Epicuri de grege Porcum.

PEople would deal very unrea­sonably with Epicurus, and his affairs would be in a very ill pos­ [...]ure, if some had not been care­ful to put them to the Test, and separated 'emselves from that multitude, which has ever been [Page 68] an Enemy to all Wise Men and †Sur [opinion d'autruy. upon an alien opi­nion condemned So­crates, tho approved of by the Gods. Thus they have met with some, who have taken Information of that Wise-mans Life, and without dwelling upon the belief of the vulgar, or the face of things, have penetrated farther and in the result of their research, given Testimonies of his Probity, and the Sanctity of his Doctrine.

After due knowledge, they Proclaimed his pleasure, as severe as the Stoicks vertue; that tho its title was delicate, its precepts were difficult, and to be debauched like Epicurus, a Man must be as sober as Zeno. And certainly its incre­dible, that a Person whose Coun­trey erected him several Statues; whose Friends swayed the Citys of Greece; who loved the Worship of the Gods and his Countreys [Page 69] good; who had piety towards his Parents, Liberality towards his [...]rethren, and gentleness for his Slaves; whose modesty kept him from tampering in the State, and Temperance made him common­ly only live on Bread and Wa­ter; its incredible (I say) that this Man should write the Precepts of Lewdness, or teach his Disci­ples the practise of the vices he naturally abhorred. On the con­trary, as if this excellent Perso­nage had apprehended, that the title he bestowed upon his Disci­pline, might foster the naughty inclinations of several, and that Men might fall to caluminate his pleasure: As if he had foreseen the unjust Hatred of following Ages, and the Lewd Life of those who should abuse his Doctrine, he took care himself to make its A­pology; he explained its *Comme elle ét [...]it sobre et Si [...]ne. great [Page 70] Thirst and sobriety, and banished from the Garden, where he Philosophized with his Friends, those, who abusing the name of pleasure were its corrupters, and who considered their own vices as the soveraign good of Man and tranquillity of Life. By no means will I that in this you pin your Faith upon my Sleeve; I will make him speak in his own per­son, and Ile show you one of his Letters. Thus he Writes to Me­necans.

Notwithstanding we say (these are his words) that pleasure is the end of Man, we do not mean vile and infamous pleasure, such as proceeds from the Tast and Gluttony: this unlucky opinion is of per­sons that are ignorant of or oppose our precepts and separate themselves from their Communion, or turn 'em into an ill sense.

[Page 71]So that you see, how careful he was of having a defence ready a­gainst ignorance and ill opinion; that he believed there were only those two things capable of decry­ing him, and which indeed were, [as we have already said,] the only things, which ruined his re­pute among the greatest part of the World. His very Life tho discreet and sober, has not (how­ever) wanted to be attacqued by Invectives and detractions, but those who have written it, hav­ing recited the calumnies of his Enemies, have incontinently refut­ed them, and have not composed the History of that Philosopher, but at the same time they have made his Apology. As my de­sign is not to entertain you with his Actions, but only to defend his pleasure, Ile *And the En­ [...]lisher [pos­sibly wi [...]h more reason] t [...] the Learned Gassendus his Notes upon it, together with a la [...]ge account of Epicurus his Life, writ by the same Fa­mous French Philosopher. re­fer you to Diogenes Laertius for the re­lation [Page 72] of his Life and content my self with Philosophizing with you upon the Nature of that Plea­sure, that has so ma­ny Enemies; and we will examine whether it be such as to exclude, out of the rank of good, and wise Men, those who defend and follow it. Living ac­cording to Nature, and not having any sensation of Pain, is what Epicu­rus calls living pleasantly. Me­thinks herein there is nothing to be taxed; and such a Life has no need of censors; and there is no Government so severe in the World, as can disapprove any thing in this position. Following Nature is following Reason; the bounds nature has prescribed are those of Inno [...]ence; there is nothing in nature but what is just and equitable. [Page 73] From nature it is not, that Avarice came: she has concealed Gold in the Bowels of the vilest Element, and we have torn it thence: Nature was not the cause of Ambition which tor­ments us: It brought us into the World, and with equality sends us out thence packing. We only dif­fer from one another, in as much as we corrupt it. We eye at the same time, both Liberty and the Sun: servitude was introduc'd by violence; and the first Kings were Tyrants. Is it nature [think you] which prompts to delights? The Poets themselves, who have foisted defects into the very Hea­v'ns, to screen their own blun­ders with examples, and made Ju­piter wicked, that they might be so themselves, durst not own such a thought. They have pre­serv'd it's purity intire, and have not couch'd in the description of [Page 74] its own, that is to say, the Golden Age, the Luxury of others, that succeeded it. Do but hear 'em talk; They'le tell you, that A­corns were then Mens Food, that Rivers squench'd their thirst, that they dwelt in Caverns, that they had no Cloaths, which de­fended them against the cold, and that they follow'd Nature in all their Actions. I'le willingly own, that there was never such a constitution of things, and that Men were never reduc'd to the Villany of Brutes; the Poets have push'd on their fiction much far­ther, but at least they were wil­ling to let us understand, that our excess proceeded not from nature: that she does not advise us to them, and that it is not nature, which says,

[Page 75]And that in fine, 'tis we, who abuse the Gifts of Heav'n and the advantages, it confers upon us. How then to live according to nature, must a Man abstain from the things, that are submitted to him, and of which she has appoint­ed him Lord? This I do not say, I rather say, we ought to use 'em, provided we use 'em ac­cording to nature. We must use things in such sort, as that we may be without them, we must be their Masters, and not their Slaves; we must not grow impa­tient for 'em, nor be cast down for their loss; lets enjoy 'em peaceably, when occasion is offered, and not pursue 'em with disquiet and turmoil. There's no condition, but what's becoming the Wise Man: So as I shall never blame a Philosopher for inhabiting a Pa­lace, but in not having the power to be contented with a Cottage. I [Page 76] shall not be scandaliz'd at seeing him in the Robes, if he has not the Ambition of a King; Let Aristippus possess the Riches of Craesus, what matter? He'le throw 'em away, when they in­commode him; let Plato be at De­nis's the Tyrants Table, yet in the midst of that abundance of delicacies, he will eat sometimes only Olives: We do not damn the Possession of goods, we damn their servitude; it is not Poverty will make us wise, it may purge away, indeed, the desire of com­mitting certain faults, but there are others, which it cannot remedy. The Cynicks rags contribute not the least to tranquillity or modera­tion; Ambition follows Diogenes into his very Tub, and there it was he had the confidence to com­mand Alexander the haughtiest of all Mankind. All that comes from us, will be indifferent, if we [Page 77] have moderation of mind, that is to say, if we are wise, and follow nature. Very true it is, that there is more difficulty, in following nature in abundance, than in neces­sity, and that the Spurs, which our delights use to try our modera­tion, are much more keen than those adversity employs for that purpose: But still there is much more glory in surmounting them, and the loss of false joys secures much better the Possession of real ones. We are not sensible of the felicity which costs us nothing, and for which we are endebted to chance; it must be giv'n us by Wisdom; and trouble sometimes must usher us to pleasure ▪ A Man, who at the Olympick Games, should be in the Lists with a design to try his skill, if no body stood forth, might possibly be Crowned, but ne­vertheless, that would not render him Victorious. Storms and Tem­pests [Page 78] are what procure reputation to Pilots, and if Penelopes Chastity had not been try'd, some might have said of her, it only wanted corrupters: Wherefore, let's not fly the World, let's not fly the Court, let's not sculk in the De­sarts, from whence Philosophy fetcht the Primitive Mankind; let's possess Riches, let us not re­fuse to enter upon Publick Offices; if we are Wise, we may enjoy these things without any danger, we shall Sail happily amid those Rocks, we shall eye all this with an unconcern'd look: And if we be stript of it, we shall testify by not looking back upon't, that we despise and were not wedded to it. It is a shame in the Wise Man to fly, and to be more feeble than such desires, which being unna­tural, have no other credit but what is acquired them by opinion. This is [in part] the pleasure of [Page 79] the Epicureans, this is what they call, to live according to nature: This is their Doctrine, and these their Sentiments. Consider now whether this Opinion merits our odium, and see whether we have reason to despise it; Whether their Pleasure Pimps to Debauch­eries and Excesses, and whether than is there be any thing more sober or more Chast? Ask you me Epicurus, what is it to live volup­tuously? He will answer you, that is is not the having a fondness for Worldly concerns; that it is resist­ing evil desires, contemning Ho­nour, getting the Mastery of For­tune, and that it is (in a word) possessing absolutely Peace and Repose of Mind. Hereat are levelled all his Precepts; here you meet with pleasure, and here it is indeed, we ought to seek it, not in the satisfaction of the senses, nor in the emotion of the Appetites. It is too [Page 80] pure to depend on the body, it depends on the Intellectual part: [...]eason is its Mistress, reason is its rule, the senses are only its Minis­ters: And besides, what delights soever we may hope for in in­dulging a revelling Palate, in the Pleasures of the sight, in Perfumes and Musick, if we do not ap­proach those things with a calm mind, we shall be d [...]ceived, we shall fall under the delusion of a false joy, and take the shadow of Pleasure for its real body. We will burn [if you please] all the Wood of Arabia the happy; we will closet up our selves with Ve­nus, we will live on Nectar and Ambrosia; we will enjoy the Pleasure the Poets have imagin'd; all this will prove bitter, if we are under disquiet; and our Pec­vishness will force us to complain in the midst of these delights. Ile give you an instance of this Asser­tion, [Page 81] and shew you, how much a Man is uncapable of Pleasure, when his mind is in trouble. You have read of the Feast, which Tigellinu [...] made Nero; and you may remember that great De­bauch the Renown of whose Lux­ury has lasted to our Age. It seems to have been the last effort of sumptuousness and delicacy, and that sensuality has not been able to make any farther Progress. Agrippa's Pond was pitcht on for this extraordinary repast, it was made upon a stately Barque, which being drawn by a great many o­thers seemed of it self insensibly to move: All these Barges ap­peared enrich'd with Gold and Ivory. Many lovely Youths were the Rower [...] or rather so many Cupids. The tast knew no Fowle, but what it was furnished with at that entertainment: The Ocean provided it with Fish, and [Page 82] the Provinces of the Empire with diversity of Meats. In short, all appeared with huge daintiness and abundance. I omit speaking of the infamous Houses erected upon the Banks, which were stock'd with Women of great Quality; and I will forget the Courtizans there seen stark naked. The Night it self contributed to the Pleasure of this Debauch; its shades were combated by an infi­nity of Lights, and its silence agree­ably disturb'd by the Harmony of several consorts. Would you know, what delight Nero took in all these things, and if he de­parted satisfied from this Ban­quet? You need only imagin, that he carried with him thither the memory of his c [...]imes and the re­morses of his conscience, and you will make no difficulty of conclud­ing, that despair accompanied him to that Entertainment, that [Page 83] he there felt the Penitential Whip, and that tho his outside had the face of a triumph, he acted in his mind a Bloody Tragedy. If he had any joy, it was that of the Mena­des: He was obliged for his Plea­sure to his fury or Drunkenness, and his happiness augmented with the diminution of his reason. I sup­pose the same thing of all those of his retinue, for I imagin there neither Seneca, nor Thraseas, Poe­tus, nor Bareas Soranus, who lived according to nature amidst the corruption of their Age, to be of the number of the Guests. Doubtless, such only were present as endear'd themselves to his conversation by a con [...]ruity of man­ners: Who egg'd him on in his crimes: Who were his Minist [...]rs, in 'em, and before whom he ought not to blush at least, sin the resemblance of the wicked, hinders their shame. Cert [...]inly, such [...] [Page 84] Riff-Raff were far from being hap­py; there was no finding a sound Man in all that Assembly: Plea­sure could not get admittance in­to those Bosoms, which excesses had intirely possessed.

In short, they were assaulted with all the ill passions, which destroy the repose of mind, and by consequence, were not in a State of relishing the Pleasure, we approve. I could wish that this Philosoper had been present at this Debauch, and that in the Eyes of the universe he had told his opi­nion; I am sure he'd have de­clar'd the truth before Nero's Face: He would not have dread­ed death, which he held indiffe­rent, [Page 85] and I imagin in this manner he'd have spoken:

‘Oh Wretched Prince! How art thou mistaken in believing, that pleasure is found in thy ex­cesses! It is as far remote from 'em as thou art from Lifes true happiness. Thou dragg'st thy unhappiness along in all places, where thou go'st, and do what thou wilt, thou can'st not sculk one moment from thy consci­ence. Thou may'st cover thy Ta­ble with Meats still more preci­ous than those it abounds with; tast the most delicious Wines of Greece and Italy, Sully thy self afterwards in all abominations, that Debauchery can invent; yet nothing wilt thou find in all this to afford thee satisfaction; and tho thy body were fill'd, thy mind wou'd still be in quest of Pleasure. These are not the [Page 86] things, which render Life hap­py; tis only Prudence, which composes the soveraign good; 'tis she alone which will teach thee to regulate thy desires according to NATURE, and in this Rule it i [...] thou wilt find what thou canst not meet with in thy disorders; If any thing be wanting, turn thy Eyes to­wards that common Mother; she will give thee wherewith easily to content thee. Art thou thirsty? She has every where plac'd Rivers and Springs, where thou may'st squench thy Thirst. Hungry? Places, where thou wilt find Fruits to live on. If thou art not satisfy'd with these things, thou wilt never be satisfy'd with all thy Excesses; consult thy Hunger and thy Thirst, they will make thee find delights in the simplicity of na­ture; and Bread and Water will [Page 87] serve thee instead of the best Dish upon Earth thou canst call to mind when thou art in neces­sity. Now that thou art not so, thou dost not give thy Stomach time to disgest Meats, thy intem­perance dayly engenders crudities; it advances the hour of that death, which Hobgoblings thee with so many apprehensions. Thus thou makest Feasts without their affording thee any Pleasure, be­cause thou constrain'st thy Na­ture, forcing it to obey thy De­sires: But know, thy Desires interfere with thy Nature, and the overflowings of thy Mind darken the light of thy Reason; wherefore, do not flatter thy self with tasting the Pleasures thou imagin'st: There's nothing bounded but in nature; all that is repugnant to nature is infinite, and consequently, above us. Ambitious Subjects aspire to [Page 88] Crowns: If they became Kings, they wou'd be the sole Monarchs of the World: Being Monarchs, they'd wish for Incense and Sacrifices, and the Fable of the Gyants informs us, that the Earth has dar'd to pretend to Heavens Dominion. It is so with other bad desires, no body can be happy but he who knows how to regu­late his desires. And as it only belongs to the Wise Man to un­dertake that Province, so it only belongs to him to command the universe. Only he can extract Pleasure out of all these things, and he alone uses Delights so­berly, and despises them in their Possession. For thy part, who dishonourest the race of Au­gustus, and art the Infamy of hu­man kind, over whom the an­ger of the Gods has given thee the command, do what thou list, thou wilt ever be un­happy? [Page 89] thy grief will backney thee at all moments, and in all places: Thou wilt never steal one minute from thy conscience: And in the midst of thy good cheer, thou wilt drink no Wine, but what will represent to thee the Innocents Blood, which thy cru­elty has shed on such or such an occasion.’ This is [if I be not mis­taken] what Epicurus wou'd have said; this is what he wou'd have alledged in Justification of his Phi­losophy, and thus wou'd he have reprov'd the Emperours Enormi­ties. But forasmuch as that 'tis impossible, that the mind [the Arbi­ter of Pleasure] should enjoy per­fect pleasure, if the body its Mi­nister endures any torment; Epicu­rus or rather truth teaches, that the privation of corporal pain, is necessary to the composition of that summum bonum, which the pleasure of the Sages does produce. [Page 90] And in truth, the alliance betwixt the mind and the flesh is so close, that it's very difficult to separate their pleasures and their su [...]ferings. The mind can scarce be sove­raignly happy, while Maladies af­flict the Body: The mind can scarce think of joy, while the vio­lence of pain tears from it com­plaints, or can the mind be sen­sible of pleasure, as long as it is in all parts, that undergo the as­saults of pain? Let the Stoicks boast as high as they please, the insensibility of their Sect, and that rigorous virtue, which makes a mock of pain, they'le find their bo­dy does not colten with their opi­nion, and that tho their discourses be magnificent & sublime, yet they are neither according to truth or humane nature. I will not prop this Proposition with the example of the Mobile of those Philosophers. I will not make use of a Name, [Page 91] they may scruple to receive, nor pitch on a Man, whose virtues may seem suspected by them. Her­cules alone shall bear testimony of what I urge; that Hercules, who is plac'd among the Gods, whom so many labours have rendred Fa­mous, and the Poets made choice of, for a perfect model of the force of their Wisdom. What if we take a view a while of that He­ro dying, and consider the last Actions of his Life? That Invin­cible Mans Congee will be doubt­less like his entrance, Illustrious in performing something Heroick. Certainly he will say nothing as may dishonour his Noble Actions, or seem unworthy of his former vir­tue. The strength of his pain gets the mastery over his courage: His Constancy yields to the ardour of the Venom,. which devours him; he does not only complain, he we [...]ps, he cries, he howls:

And 'tis with the last effects of rage and despair, that he departs out of this Life to take his place among the Gods. Therefore, let the Sto­icks rank themselves in our party, let 'em tattle no longer of their insensibility, nor foist on us, that the Wise man may be happy amid Tortures, and let 'em not despise pain, to which Hercules himself was constrain'd to submit so many victories. But if it be answer'd, that the Poets were to blame for representing Hercules in this man­ner, and that in favour of that Hero, they are willing to rescue him from the Authority of Books, and the consent of Theatres: Possi­donius, formerly one of Cicero's Masters, and the greatest of all the Stoicks (for so he is stil'd by [Page 93] that disciple) will serve us for an illustrious example, we shall see a Pillar of the Porch stagger'd by a Disease. The Gout being the Malady of that Philosopher, was likewise the wrack of his constancy; he endur'd its violence as patient­ly as an ordinary Man would have done; and tho he upbraided pain, that all it's twinges pinches could not constrain him to own, that it was an evil; yet for all this it afflic­ted him, and made him complain. It seems too that Cicero was choqu'd, or at least astonisht at this wisemans weakness. I have seen, says he, Possidonius the greatest of the Sto­icks have as little power to undergo the pains of the Gout, as my Host Nicomachus, whom Tully account­ed a common sort of Fellow. And assuredly I am so far from be­lieving that true felicity can con­cur with pain, that I should esteem it the action of a Wise Man to part [Page 94] with his Life, if he could not separate it from pain. And because the Memory of Mecoenas is in great veneration with me, and in my Opinion he ought never to be mention'd but with Honour; I wi [...]h, if it were possible, that those Verses, which remain to us of him, had been stiss [...]d, and he had not informed us, that he was more wedded to Life, than became (I do not say a Philosopher, but only) a Man of Courage. You cou'd not have offer'd him any condition, so he might but live, but what he wou'd have accepted; were he deform'd? that's no matter; were he maim­ed? he'd find some consolation in living; let him endure all the Torments of the most violent Dis­tempers, he'd still be happy, if they were not mortal; and tho you shou'd have sentenc'd him to the most cruel of Deaths, he wou'd not consent to quit Life, provided he [Page 95] cou'd keep it amidst the Tortures of Executions.

Without doubt, Effeminacy dictated these Verses to him, while he tasted all the Pleasures of Life. He never had had any experience of pain, and had he fall'n into the ill condition he proposes, Death wou'd have been as welcome to him, as a Reprieve to a Criminal upon the Rack. It's easy by this to understand that M [...]caenas was voluptuous; but no Epicurean, since those Philosophers have too ge­n [...]rous a Soul to shrink to such fee­ble sentiments; they dread Death [Page 96] much less than pains, and some­times renounce Pleasure for very pain. And the reason is, that Epi­curus well judging that most Men being allured and corrupted by the fruition of pleasures, and suffering themselves without Rule, and blindly to be hurry'd away by the current of their Appetites, wou'd not be in a capacity to foresee the pains and afflictions, which wou'd fall upon 'em in conseq [...]ence of those disorders: And besides, fear­ing that the love of case and Effe­minacy of s [...]irit, joyn'd to the fear of pain and labour, might oblige them to be wanting in their Du­ties, and to render themselves useless in L [...]fe; he was of opinion, that in the time wherein a Wise man shou'd have full liberty of Election, and wherein nothing shou'd hinder him from procuring his own satisfaction, he might a­bandon himself to pleasure, and [Page 97] give a temporary Fare-well to Pain: But That then are cer­tain seasons, in which they must be Friends again, and during which the Obligation of Duties, and the Necessity of Things ought to con­strain him not to refuse Dolour, and to reject Voluptuousness.

'Twas this generous Maxim, that made Cato of Vtica his own Exe­cutioner: For, tho' he might have born himself up on the Mines of his Party, and Caesar wou'd have been mighty glad to grant him his Life; yet, the shame of surviving the Loss of the Publique Liberty, and the Infamy of Servitude, would not let that large Heart even deliberate, whether he should choose. the Pain of dying gloriously, to avoid the Pleasure of living af­ter a manner, that seem'd to him unworthy of a Roman. This Maxim it was, that made Regulus to re­put himself into the hands of his [Page 98] Enemies, where the Cruelties of his Tormentors were less s [...]nsible to him, than his Remorse would have been for having broken his word. 'Twas this Maxim, which making Fabricius to de­spise the Treasures of the King of Epeirus, made him also despise the evil desires, which fol [...]ow the possession of Riches, and preserve to himself the Repose of Mind, the sovereign and chiefest of Pleasures. Lastly, it was this Maxim, that set Cicero o' declaiming against Anthony, to devote himself for the safety of the Common-wealth at a time, when he might have stayed at home very fairly in Peace and quietly enjoy'd an easie Life, and the Delights of his own Studies.

To this Maxim there are no laudible Actions but what may be referr'd: And what Heroick Pea [...]s soever those great men have atchiev'd, you will find, that if [Page 99] they have run towards Pain, it hath been to avoid a much grea­ter, and contrariety, if they have not glanc'd upon some pleasures, it was by such an Abstinence, to ac­quire Others more satisfactory and solid. For, what other cause wou'd you have us ascribe to their Illu­strious Actions? Do you think, they would have so boldly left this Life? That they wou'd have turn'd their backs upon the posses­sion of Gold? That they would painfully hunt after very dangerous. Enmities? And, not consider at the same time, if what they did, was useful or agreeable to them? with this Censure, let us not be­spatter them: The Effects of their Wisdom let us not impute to the unruliness of their Mind, but be­lieve, that they consulted gene­rally themselves and their own Intellectuals upon their Actions: And let us not state them in a [Page 100] worse condition than the most sal­vage of Animals, which are never transported nor troubled in such a manner, but that it is easie to discover, what is the Aim of the Impetrosity of their Movements. Cato forsook that Life, which was become his Burthen; he found it less grievous to quit the World, than to obey Caesar, whom he be­lieves to be no good man, and he thought it more pleasant not to live at all, than to live in an igno­minious slavery. Regulus return'd to Carthage: If he had not done so, he had been accus'd of Perfi­diousness. Fabricius cou'd not be corrupted by Pyrrhus, in which he exerted his Integrity: He serv'd his Country, and in the single plea­sure of refusing Riches, he satisfied himself more than if he had ac­cepted all the Treasures of the Vniverse. In short, Tully gave hard words to Antonius, and de­clar'd [Page 101] himself his capital Enemy: If without any reason he did so, he is much to blame: But, if at his own peril he had a design to establish the Common-wealth, and if he un­dertook Marc Anthony's Ruine, to prevent that of Rome; as here­by he took care of the common safety of his Citizens, wherein his own was contain'd; so he, moreover, deserv'd the praise of all Mankind, and the love of the whole People of Rome. Those Great Men, indeed, were not of the Family of Epicurus, and One of 'em hath even endeavour'd by his Writings to destroy his Opi­nions: But it's sufficient, that the Authority of their Examples is found in the Doctrine of that Phi­losopher, and that the World know, That it was not Virtue alone, which was their Motive, or at least what they call'd Virtue, ought to be styled Pleasure.

[Page 102]However, out of this School there have issued Spirits com­pleatly Heroique, who in a cor­rupted Age have perform'd as vigo­rous Actions, as those Antient Romans in the flower of their Re­publique under Neroe's Reign, the World admir'd the death of Petro­nius, as much as that of Seneca. The Emperour's Tutour acquired no Glory by dying, but what was afterwards bestow'd upon the Ar­biter of his Pleasures; and the common Sentiment was, that the Stoician who had always held forth and preach'd up a contempt of Life, did not leave it more generously than Petronius, who had courted all it's Pleasures.

In this place, I am bound, for the honour and sake of Epicurus, to retrace something of the Life and Death of this great Disciple: As indeed, it wou'd be impossible for me to pass by this point with­out [Page 103] some discourse to you concern­ing it, and as you with a very wil­ling Ear listen to the performances of Illustrious Men, you will not be loath to rank Petronius in their number, and take a transitory view of the marks of his Wisdom and Generosity. This famous Epi­curean, far from resembling those Sots and Debauchees, who com­monly gormandize all their Estate away, made Profession of a Polite Luxury, making Pleasures his on­ly study. And as Toil and Industry confer Reputation on the [...]est of Mankind, he alone obtain'd it by a gentile kind of Idleness. Very free and very much neglected were his Words and Actions: And, for as much as they demonstrated the goodness and the candour of his Soul, appearing under the garb and covert of simplicity, with so much the more pleasure and satis­faction they were receiv'd. Not­withstanding [Page 104] which, this excellent Man knowing well, that there are times, wherein the Wise Man is oblig'd to lay aside the repose and tranquillity of Life, to serve the State in Publique Affairs, did wholly throw away that happy way of Living, when he was Elected Proconsul of Bithynia, and after­wards was chosen Consul: And acquitting himself worthily of those glorious Employments, he shew'd by his Application and Conduct, that no affair, how bulky soever was too unweildy for his manage­ment. At the Expiration of these Charges, he fell again to his wont­ed way of Living, and then be­ing became one of Nero's most intima [...]e Friends, when though this Prince had very bad Inclina­tions, yet he was so much en­chanted with Petronius his me­rit, that he made him the Arbiter of all his Pleasures, and [Page 105] fanci'd, that amidst the affluence of these Delights, none were to be accounted sweet and pleasant, but such as were approved by Pe­tronius. [I would be understood here to speak of honest Pleasures: since he was so far from partici­pating in the filthy Debauches of Nero, as that that Emperour was us'd to wonder, how they cou'd come to the knowledge of Petro­nius, who reproach'd him with them by his Codicils; so that he caus'd Silia to be punish'd, as su­specting, she had reveal'd them.]

From that time, Tegaltinus eyed Petronius as his Competitor; and fearing, that by the means of ho­nest Pleasure, he might do what Seneca was unable to effect with the austerity of his Sect, i. e. that he might reduce Nero from the disorders of his Life, and restore a true Emperour to Rome; he re­solv'd to under-mine him, saying, [Page 106] there was no establishing his own Fortune but by the ruin of Petro­nius. Wherefore, he straight­waies attacks the cruelty of that Prince, to which all his other Pleasures yeilded, and gave way: he accuseth Petronius of having been of the number of Scevinus his Friends, who had shared in Pisoe's conspiracy: He corrupt [...] a Slave of his, to depose against him: He deprives him of all waies to make his Defence, and causes the greater part of his Do­mestiques to be laid in Shackl [...]s, under such Circumstances, a Man, less generous, wou'd either have flatter'd himself with the hopes of Pardon, or prolong'd his Life to the utmost Extremity. But he, for his part, was of a quite con­trary Opinion; he thought it both a vile and a weak thing to support any longer the fatigues of Fear or Hope, and resolving to [Page 107] die, he contrives to do it, with the same Tranquillity, in which he had liv'd.

Thus, unwilling to part with his Life in a precipitate way, he has his Veins opened, and then bound up again, and still now and then taking off the Bands, ac­cording as his fancy mov'd him, he discours'd his Friends upon agreeable matters; not affecting to entertain them with serious Debates and search'd sentences, by which he might pretend to the glory of Constancy. The last hours of his Life, by no means would he employ, in speaking of the Souls Immortality, or of Philo­sophical Opinions, but having pitch'd upon a sort of most volup­tuous and most Natural Death, he chose rather to imitate the sweet fate of Swans, and had smooth and easy verses rehears'd to him, with miscellanies of Poe­try. [Page 108] Yet he reserv'd to himself some moments for the disposing of his Affairs: He rewarded many of his Slaves, punished some, and seeing the time draw near of shaking off Mortality, after hav­ing used a little exercise, he fell into a calm and gentle Slumber: So that his Death, which was constrain'd, might seem casual and Natural. Now, let men talk of Socrates! let them boast of the constancy and firmness of mind, wherewith he drank the Poyson! Petronius doth not yeild, to him in the least [...]unctilio. Nay, Petronius may pretend to the ad­vantage of having abandon'd a Life infinitely more Delicious than that of the Gr [...]ek Sophy, with the same serenity of mind, and the same equallity of Counte­nance.

But that you may the better know, how rich and precious is [Page 109] the Pleasure, I defend; I design to give you the Pourtraict of a man who possesses it in perfection, and by depicting his contrary after­wards, to take away all reasons of jealousy and doubt, that Epicurus his volupty is of high esteem. Ima­gin then a Man in perfect health, possessing a good Estate; enjoy­ing delights handsomly; having a mind peaceable and contented; tasting always and with abundance the most diverting pleasures of Body and Mind; not troubled with the presence, nor menaced with the fear of any Pain: What condition can you suppose more ex­cellent, or more desirable than this? For, it is necessary, that, such a Person, to be in this State, s [...]ou'd possess a force of Mind proof against [...]ain and Death it self; shou'd be absolutely undeceiv'd of the false Opinions of the Vulgar; should be insens [...]ble of impertinent [Page 110] Terrours and Scholastique Scare-Crows; not suffer the Pleasures to escape, which he enjoys; always entertaining himself in the sweet­ness of their Remembrance: And, this is to be at the high [...]st period of Felicity, and to have nothing more to pretend to for the ac­complishment of ones happiness.

On the other side, let us figure to our selves a Man oppress'd with all the evils, that can afflict hu­mane Nature; depriv'd of all hopes of ever seeing them lessn'd or abated; sensible of no present Pleasure, having never tryed any past delights; not daring to aspire to the possession of future ones: And when we have acknowledg­ed, that nothing can be imagined more miserable than this Estate, let us confess withal, that there is nothing more happy than the vo­luptuous Follower of Epicurus.

Now if you think this happy [Page 111] Man, whose Picture I now draw, is no where else to be found than in my imagination, and that so perfect a Felicity cannot be among Men; I must confess, you have but sorry Sentiments of our humane condition, and of the goodness of Heaven, and I fancy my self en­gag'd to retrieve you out of this errour, if I would pass with you for a real Man, and to keep you from maundering any more against our misery, and the Injustice of Destiny. Thus then, I find, that original done by the hand of one of the greatest Masters, plac'd in the Cabinet of the curiousest of Authors, that ever Writ: It is Felicity it self painted under the visage of Orata, for so Tully calls him; and here follows a faithful Trad [...]ction of what he relateth of his happiness. To Orata, a Man of Wealth, Pleasantry, and Niceness, nothing was wanting of all that [Page 112] can serve to live voluptuously, to procure Love, and enjoy an en­tire and a perfect Health. For he gathered very ample Revenues from his Noble Lordships: He had al­ways many Friends very useful, a­greeable, and diverting: He dex­terously made use of all these things, to maintain a sweet solacing Life: And to say all in few words, his Wills and Designs had ever a suc­cess as propitious, and an accom­plishment as favourable as he could wish. In this condition, I do not think, any thing cou'd be­found fault with, in provision no change fell out, but that Orata must be perfectly happy, if he can remain in the State, wherein we show him. And this, if I am not mistaken, is a Pourtrai [...]t, that bears assimilation enough to the first de­sign, which I shewed you, and which you might peradventure take for Crotesque and a fancy of the Painter.

[Page 113]Let us now seek for some mise­rable men in opposition to this Orata: We will compare him (if you please) to those unfortunate Wretches. whom we see upon the antient Theatre, the one of whom Judges himself too crimi­nal to manage the Grecian Scep­ter, who fears to dishonour the Race of Pelops by owning himself a Branch of that Family, and who dares not shew his Face to Mor­tals. Or let us compare him with that other, who beck'ning to his Friends, that they should not ap­proach him, esteems himself so unhappy, that he fears, his very shade may be contagious. Or ra­ther, let's not call to mind Atreus or Thyastes: Let us forget their Crimes, whose Memory creates an Abhorrence; and let our Eyes no longer dwell upon a Family, that hath forc'd the Sun to return back to the East, and has furnish'd Hell [Page 114] with one of its most famous Pu­nishments.

Occule.

Let us rather choose Heroes and People as wretched as the Progeny of Tantalus. Let Amphiareus's Son come and acq [...]aint us with his being Habgoblin'd by Vision [...], and his demanding succours a­gainst the Furies that haunt him.

After Al [...]meon has thus let us see the tortures of his Conscience, and the racks of his Mind, let Philoct [...]tes entertain us with the miseries, which he is reduc'd unto! Let him speak, and complain of his ill Fortunes; for truly, he makes no distinction of Persons, when he says:

Let him then shew us his Bodi­ly Pains, when his Vlcer becomes inflam'd: He despairs in these Verses:

Or, if these Misfortunes be not yet sufficient, let us with O­vid [Page 118] amass together all the miseries of Fables, to wish them to a Man, and then judge, whether his con­dition be more happy than that of Orata, or of that famous Vatia, who formerly merited this Excla­mation; O Vatia, you alone know, how to live: And, consequently, let us conclude with a like Excla­mation: O Epicurus, thou alone knowest how to Philosophize.

By all these vanities we may know, that Volupty is not only worthy of the Eloges of all Men, but that it is their Soveraign good and sole end. Yet in regard this first Proposition makes the princi­pal point of Epicurus his Doctrine, and that is the most true, it is al­so the most contested. Having be­gun to undeceive these Enemies of his, I must consummate my Docu­ments and their Instruction, and leave the truth of this Opinion so well established in their minds, [Page 119] that no more occasion they may have to dispute it, but with ex­tream Injustice. Therefore, that they may be of this Opinion, I will only desire them to cast their Eyes upon Nature, whose effects are rational and certain ex­periences. They will not only find, that she authorises what I say, but she gives them such clear Demon­stration [...], that, unless they pur­posely hood-wink themselves, they will be constrain'd to acquiesce therein. Let 'em, consider, what this common Mother doth in the production and Birrh of Animals, that is to say, in her intire Purity and before her Corruption: They may observe, that she inspires them with the love of Volupty, and the flight of Dolour; that she conveys 'em to what is pleasant, and dis­tanceth 'em from what is hurt­ful; that she teaches them (if a Man may say so) good and evil, [Page 120] and when they attain the former, they rejoice and rest satisfi'd in it. For which reason, when our Phi­losopher, following the Institutions of Nature, pronounces, that the voluptuous Life is the end of Man, he does not trouble his Head a­bout proving this Proposition. As he thinks, there is no need of the dint of Ratiocination to per­suade Men, that Fire is hot, Snow cold, and Honey sweet, because these are sensible things; he, like­wise, believes, that to apprehend the love of Pleasure, which may easily be known by natural effects, a Man need only make use of a mean Animadversion, and a sim­ple Advertisement upon those effects.

However, tho' we have nature on our side, that is, an infallible Decision; tho' we fully perceive in our minds a certain notion, which enclines us to hate evil and pursue [Page 121] Pleasure; tho the beginnings of our wishes, of our disgusts, and of all our actions draw their origine from Pleasure and Pain; nevertheless, because some Philosophers main­tain, that dolour ought not to be reckon'd among evils, nor Pleasure among Goods, and because to es­tablish this Opinion, they alledge many curious things, we must not so strongly confide in our own, as not to stick to the naked truth. We must argue in favour of the Epicurean pleasure: We are to shew, that Reason as well as Na­ture authorises that sect. And certainly, if the [...]hilosophers, who found fault with this pleasure, had considered it well, if they had viewed it, before they attack'd it, they would have easily disco­ver'd, that they were mistaken in their Enemy, and that their For­ces ought not to have been bent against this pleasure. That they [Page 122] were mistaken in their Invectives, and rejected it only on the score of the Pains, which follow it some­times; they might have perceiv'd; for that those pains did not proceed from it, that it is the fault of those who use it ill, and by con­sequence, they would not have decryed a pure and clean source, for having found it mudded and defil'd by dirty Beasts. For, they must confess to me, that there is no Man in the World, that de­spises Pleasure, quatenus Pleasure, that hates or eschews it; that loves Pain as Pain; that follows or endeavours to attain it. But because those who use the most moderate Pleasures ill, afterwards undergo many disquiets and tor­ments; and, on the contrary, there are certain Seasons, in which pain and labour do occasion exceed­ing great pleasures: This hath made those Philosophers (who [Page 123] had only consider'd the Sequels of a Ill-husbanded Pleasure, and of a profitable and necessary Pain) to strike the former out of the class of Goods, and then set pain among praise-worthy things. But in my Opinion, they had acted much more discreetly, if they had emulated us; and if after having accus'd the prophaneness of pleasure, as the Epicureans do in their School, they had not only discharged pleasure from the crimes, by them imputed to it, but also had bestowed upon it Encomi­ums and Crowns, and openly pro­nounc'd in favour of its Innocence. For, under what colour, could they reprove a Man, who is desi­rous to enjoy such pleasures, as from which he receives no annoy­ance, and who will endeavour to avoid the pain, that brings him no profit? Let 'em, then, quest about, as long as they please, they will [Page 124] never find the least shadow to condemn it: On the other hand, right reason will still force them to adorn it with the sublimest praises.

Now, it is time, to imploy all our forces in an enterprize, that needs them: Now are we to com­bate generously, that so we may acquire an immortal victory. The case is no longer the defending pleasure, or considering it as the chief good of Life. We must raise it upon the Throne of Vertue, which disputes with it that Title: And tho we do not chase that vertue away from it, whereof we make profession, we must constrain it to yield the first place to pleasure. And certainly, as all Philosophers agree, that the ultimate end, which Man ought to propose to himself in this World, is a calm and a pleasant Life, many of them are chous'd in situating this Life in Vertue and [Page 125] not in pleasure, and in making their applications to the Splendour of a name, that tops upon 'em, without considering an opinion, whereto nature her self compels their assent. And in truth▪ if they wou'd consult and believe her, they must own, that those vertues, which they stile great, precious and mag­nificent, only seem estimable to them, in as much as they contribute towards pleasure, and that, con­sequently not considered by them­selves, they ought not to prefer 'em before a thing, from which they receive their whole Value and Reputation. For, in the same m [...]n­ner we approve of Physi [...]k not up­on the account of the A [...]t, but upon the score of Health; and the Science of Pilots deserves com [...]e [...] ­dation only for the usefulness of Navigation; we, likewise, shou'd not wish for wisdom, which may be called the Art of Life, if it [Page 126] were of no use to us, and did not c [...]ntribute towards our obtaining the possession of v [...]lupty.

There is no necessity of repeat­ing here, what that Pleasure is, or of designing you afresh, not to de­spise that Name, which Men have corrupted. You know very well, how severe Epicurus renders it, and you must needs avow that it is no shame for wisdom to veil to it, and thence to borrow its whole consideration. Also, on our side, we will confess, that without be­ing a Philosopher, a Man cannot be happy, and that wisdom is the only means to attain Pleasure. In effect, the weakness and frailty of humane nature, being afflicted with the ignorance of good and evil, float­ing commonly betwixt those two things, without being able to dis­criminate them, and often electing with joy, what is to be avoided with care, doth fall into so mon­strous [Page 127] a blindness, that Men in­stead of meeting with the felicity, they gape after, shear oft aloof from it; so that they become miserable instead of finding satis­faction, and in exchange for the Pleasures propos'd to themselves, they plunge themselves into Pains, which vex and torment them. Wherefore, the use of wisdom ought to draw 'em out of this mi­serable condition: Its Candle is to light them in such an irksom and lonely darkness: Its power is to redeem 'em from slavery and bon­dage; from inordinate desires; from inconsiderate terrours, and from rash Opinions: In imitation of Hercules, it must make them a passage through so many Monsters, and conduct them with safety to Pleasure. Wisdom alone performs these great things, like a faith­ful and a generous Guide: She re­moves the difficulties of the way [Page 128] she points out to us. But it is not sufficient, that we do not ramble out of it, we must also in safety walk therein: And while the Winds and Seas disperse and drown the Ships, which Sail without her Steerage, others whose Rudder she hath taken in hand, pull into Harbour without running any Risque or dreading any Tempest. In this Port, it is, where the Wise Man meets with pleasure: In this Port, he reposedly contemplates the turmoil of the rest of Mankind: He discovers all the impertinent er­rours, which persecute their weak­ness: He observes, with how much busy eagerness they endeavour to satisfie their Passions: He sees em crow'd in multitudes, striving who shall advance farthest in Power, in Ric [...]es, and in Fortune.

And then, having consider'd all these things, he breaks out into this Exclamation.

For his particular, nothing dis­quiets him; nothing frets him; nothing troubles him: But, he is happy, he follows nature; he en­joys an accompli [...]ht felicity; and in this state he offers up his Thanks­givings to wisdom, the donatrix of his Pleasure. Like him, we must act, if we mean to be happy, like him: We must throw our selves [Page 130] into the arms of that wisdom, and endeavour to attain that Plea [...]ure. We must stifte those unlucky de­sires, which rob us of it: They are insatiable and dangerous: They not only minate private Persons, but destroy whole Families: They pull down States; they create Odiums, Divisions, Discords, Sedi­tions, and Civil Wars: They are the Tyrants and Enemies of those Breasts, that foster them. And if we put the Poets to a scrutiny and examination, we shall find, that by the torments of the Damned, they design to figure out those whom these internal plagues do afflict.

Since, therefore, by the sole [Page 131] aid of wisdom, we can surmount them, as she alone makes us capa­ble of resisting Fortune, and by her we learn all the means of ac­quiring tranquillity and a sedate Life; why shou'd we fear to con­clude, that it is only desirable on the account of producing Pleasure and opposing Pain? The same thing we are to say of temperance, and only not desire it for it self, but because it preserves to our Souls that Peace, without which we could not be happy. and by the Con­cord it inspires, it appeaseth our troubles, and finds even Pleasure in them. 'Tis this Vertue, which always comes to the assistance of wisdom: 'Tis that which executes what the other doth only delibe­rate: And as that shews us, what we are to shun, and what to fol­low, this stops us, when we run contrary to the their advice, and when we give more credit to our [Page 132] senses that our reason. This is a Bridle, which holds us in ▪ when we are hurried on towards evil Pleasures; a Hand, that conducts us in the road of true joy; and, in brief, a virtue, without which we can neither be happy nor wise. And truly, what avails our know­ing good, when we are too weak to practise it? What signifies our see­ing a precipice, if we suffer our selves to tumble down it, and our giving the glory of all words to [...]isdom, when we rob it of all its actions? To this pass most Men are reduced: they conclude all for [...]isdom, but they cannot keep to what they have concluded. They know, there are pleasures, whose results are dangerous, and most au­s [...]erely forbidden by Epicurus: But they make a mock of this Philoso­phers prohibition, and [...]bandon 'emselves to the empire of their bad desires. They are like to Phae­dria [Page 133] in Terence, and they speak through his Mouth on the Theatre of that excellent Comique Poet. This outrag'd Lover acknowledg­es, indeed, he should do an un­worthy action, if he came once more to a reconciliation with his Mistr [...]ss. He declares here ipso fac­to a guilt, and himself a wretched Man: He frets terribly, and grows very uneasie. What then? he does not reform; he burns still with Love, and when he most ap­parently sees, that he stands upon the very brink of ruin, yet even then he perishes with deliberation. So that Phaedria does want no wisdom, but he wants temperance. He knows, what ought to be done in order to his repose and pleasure, but he doth not practise it. He knows, what is b [...]st, and approves it, and yet he follows the worser side. These are mens ma [...]ners, ad­mirably well describ'd and expres­sed. [Page 134] This is the image of their sentiments and frailties. Thus, with­out temperance, they cannot find pleasure. In vain do you upbraid them, that what they follow, is irrational; that it is unnecessary; that its priv [...]tion produces no pain. In vain do you index the Diseases, Dammages, or Infamy, that fol­low their enjoyments. In vain, do you menace them with the punish­ment of Laws, and the severity of Magistrates: You can tell 'em nothing, but what they knew hefore, and what they'l say themselves. What of all this? Why, still they are the Slaves of what they as well as you detest and abhor, resem­bling those Grecian Philosophers, that were allow'd in an high and mighty strain to talk of such vir­tues, as they never practised.

A sort of Men there are still be­hind, who indeed are no Philoso­phers, but yet dispute with much [Page 135] acumen and vivacity. These Men (whom we may call the Propha­ners of the Epicurean Pleasure,) will upon no account allow tempe­rance to be a virtue, and loudly declare, that happiness depends up­on the fancy and imagination. There is no staying to contest with unreasonable people: And the greatest mischief, we can wish them is, that they may live according to their own desire. Our selves we may barely content with know­ing, that their opinion is false and horribly ill grounded, and that fe­licity is never but in the desires, which temperance brings along with it. For, it is not only a mi­serable thing to desire what is not honest: But also it is more ad­vantageous, not to obtain what we desire, than to obtain what we can­not without shame desire. Inso­much that we ought to be of the Opinion of that Antient Gentle­man, [Page 136] who judging of Comitty ba­nish'd from Rome, while Manlius was Master of that City, esteem'd the condition of that virtuous Exal to be better than that of that bad Citizen. But in truth, those who study temperance, and manage the possession of pleasure so well, that they feel not any pain; these Men, certainly, may be termed happy, and merit the Title of Sages. Most durable as their pleasures, as be­ing well regulated, and their whole Life being calm and eas [...]e, because it is innocent. They are far from pursuing inordinate plea­sures: Their felicity consisting in a total abstinence from them. Nay, they go to meet some pa [...]ns, that they may avoid greater: And from their only using temperance in the enjoyment of pleasure, they leave us to conclude, that tempe­rance as well as wisdom, tend on­ly to a more quiet poss [...]ssion of that [Page 137] pleasure, which temperance is in quest of: Not that it makes the pleasure, but it preserves it in us, by making us to use it rightly and with Judgment. You would per­adventure be startled (if not trou­bled) at it, if prosecuting the exa­mination of Vertues, and refer­ring them to Pleasure, I aver, that fortitude depends on it as well as wisdom & temperance; & that that Vertue, which terrasseth Lyons un­der foot, which despises dangers, and could without any dread view the ruin of the whole World, pro­duces nothing illustrious, but what bears a respect to pleasure, and pro­ceeds from it as from a source. For, first of all, it must be conceded, that neither the labours we under­take, nor the pains we support, have any thing to provoke our Sto­mach [...], if we consider them simply, and separate them from other things: And that the care and di­ligence, [Page 138] so frequently commended in Life and in Affairs, and the force (whereof we are now speak­ing) are never pracrtis'd, unless it be with some design, some cui bo­no, and for some certain cause. But we must say, that these things were introduc'd for the tranquillity of Life, and we follow them only, that we may live without care and fear; with an intent to deliver (as much as possible) our Body and Mind from the Maladies and Trou­bles which might afflict them, and safely to enjoy that indolence, which is one of the compositum's of Epi­curus his pleasure. And indeed, how would you have a Man live happy, when he fears death? How would you have that Sicilian find pleasure in the midst of Feasts and Musique, when all the while he dreads the fall of that Sword, which threatens his Head and Diadem? Is it not an extream misery to fall [Page 139] under pains, and yet support 'em basely and with weakness? Did not this debility of mind formerly make several to loose 'emselves, af­ter having lost their relatives and their Country? What was it, I won­der, that occasion'd poetry to Me­tamorphose Hecuba into a mad Bitch, unless it be, that the grief which overcame her, compell'd her to imitate the fury of that Crea­ture? Perhaps, if she had withstood her grief, or, at least, had endea­voured to forget the occasions of it, they wou'd not have made her to proceed from tears to despair, and from desperation to rage. Now, these are the complaints, they put into her mouth, and, by the repre­sentation of the wretched estate she was reduc'd to, and of that which she had lost, she fosters her mourn­ing Soul upon their Stage, and en­kindles the flames of that rage, which was ready to seize her.

Afterwards, she calls to mind the beauty of her edifices, and the Riches of Asia, to augment both her own grief, and that of the Spectators: For who can remain unmov'd with her discourses.

And, what Person can avoid be­ing seiz'd with both horrour and pitty, when she proceeds in this manner?

So that I do not at all wonder, that the People of Rome should sigh heretofore, when they heard these Verses publickly rehears'd, and that I my self in reading them gush'd out into tears. Thus their strength and beauty forced me to translate them: And, tho' perchance I have injured both: Yet as in tran­slating them, I have imitated the [Page 142] Antients with some latitude, I have likewise satisfi'd such per­sons, as do not understand them, and have in no sort robb'd others, who understand 'em in their ori­ginal. But in what language so­ever we consider them, it is easy, to perceive, they come from a mind very sorely afflicted, and tho' they were stript of their finest Or­naments, they contain sufficient seeds of sorrow to create pitty. Hecuba, indeed, hath great occa­sions to bemoan her condition. She had lost her Husband, her Son, her Empire, and her Freedom. If she beheld these misfortunes without bewailing them, she had been insensible, and we very in­humane, if after so many very lit­teral losses we shou'd go about to debar her tears. But for all that, when she has wept and be­dew'd four or five Handkerchiefs for some time, we should not be [Page 143] unjust to prescribe bounds to her affliction, by regulating her tears and sorrow, and by advising her at length to oppose the force of reason against that of despair. Now some delicate and Womanish Man, that is affected with her complaints, might perhaps start in her defence, that those who would limit her sorrow to the first motions of her mind, would allow her her laments to the last minutes of their Lives, if they shar'd the afflictions, whereof they only judge. And, by conse­quence, they would prove, that our Philosophy, which only talks of Victories, would take wing at the sight of so many calamities, when it shou'd see them coming pell-mell to overthrow it. To such a tender-hearted Man I wish a mighty deal of happiness, for, with­out dispute, if any mischance be­fall him, he would not forbear [Page 144] weeping most bitterly: Yet not unless upon this condition, that for this kind wish, he will give me a dispensation from believing, what he saies, and not exact of me, that I judge of the strength of his Phi­losophy by the feebleness of rea­son. For, not staying much to re­fute all those Men he may have corrupted [in case there be any such, and it be lawful, to hate such effeminate People Men] I shall content my self with putting him to the blush with two com­mon examples. They are Persons, whose Age and Sex might proba­bly render extreamly feeble, and yet in their infirmity have that force and strength, which our ef­feminate Blade does not desiderate in Hecuba, and does even despair to find among the Philosophers. Let him consider the deaths of Astianax and Philoxena, a Child, and a Virgin: These the Greeks [Page 145] condemned both to execution. See here Vlysses advancing himself, holding the first by the hand, and walking fiercely to tumble him down But, See! the Boy fol­lows him with no less assurance.

Consider, that among all those who accompany and lament him, he alone it is, whose Eyes are dry, and who refuseth Tears to his own Death. Observe, that whilest his Executioners are in­voking the Gods to that bloudy Sa­crifice, he Throws himself down from the Pinacle of the Tower, from whence he was doom'd to be precipitated, and voluntarily him­self [Page 146] puts a Period to a Life, which had hardly begun its Part.

But let us turn our eyes to the other side: For, Polixena is al­ready plac'd upon Achilles Sepul­chre, and only expects the Blow, which is to appease that Grecians shade, and rejoyn his Soul to those of his Fore-Fathers. Admire her Beauty, which appears so sparling and Serene; Her Mien, not at all discompos'd at the approach of Death: On the contrary, this Sun, which is going to set for ever, seems to add a new Lustre to the last Beams of its Light. There is also in her Aer some­thing more strong than her Sex & present Condition ought to bear. And indeed, she thinks it not enough to expect the Blow, with­out Shunning it: But, she sees it coming with much fierceness.

[Page 147]And, when Pyrrhus had given her the Mortal stroak, her last action seems still an action of cou­rage, and she does not let her self fall upon the Sepulchre of Achilles, but with design to make its Earth more heavy, and even in dying to revenge her self.

Tell me now, if it be not a shame in Hecuba, to see her Chil­dren more couragious than her self. Tell me, if it becomes her to pour forth such an Ocean of tears, while Astianax and Polixena dye with­out shedding one single Melancholy drop. Tell me, if you do not think those persons happy, in com­parison with that miserable Wo­man. Or, if you are so non-plust with the prospect of all these thi [...]gs, that you have nothing more to urge in her behalf, acquiesce at the long run with us, that she had too little courage in her calamities, and wanted fortitude to resent [Page 148] them less cruelly. Now if it be true, that a [...]eakness of mind is the only thing, which renders mis­fortunes insupportable to us; and which making us to leave the Helm in the sharpest Tempests and Hurricanes of Fortune, doth occasion the wrecks we suffer in places, where with safety we might plow the billows: Ought we not to seek fortitude, that so we may use it as an Anchor, op­posing it against the rage of Wind and Water, and sheltering our selves from the barbarity of the Stor [...]? Upon this Pillar we ought certainly to lean ▪ which serves for a foundation to pleasure, jo [...]n­ing this Vertue to temperance and wisdom: And for the living in re­pose and in the privation of mise­ry, we must believe, that this firm and couragious Spirit is ever above anxieties and cares, seeing it despises death it self: And it [Page 149] must be so well prepared for pain, as to bear always in mind, that death is the remedy of the most violent, that the l [...]ast have many good Intervals, and that it is Mas­ter of the middle and moderate ones. Which things standing thus, we are to infer, that we do not blame timidity and weakness, nor praise fortitude and temperance for their peculiar regard; but that we reject those and desire these, because of the former pain is the effect, and the latter skreen us from it.

So that, now, Justice remains only behind to be examined, and then we shall have done with the principal, which our Ethicks call the Cardinal Vertues. But the things, that might be said up­on this point, are almost the same with the foregoing: And it is no less conjoin'd with pleasure than Prudence, Temperance and Forti­tude, [Page 150] [...] [Page 151] [...] [Page 152] [...] [Page 153] [...] [Page 154] [...] [Page 155] [...] [Page] [...] [Page 157] [...] [Page 158] [...] [Page 159] [...] [Page 160] [...] [Page 161] [...] [Page 162] [...] [Page 163] [...] [Page 164] [...] [Page 165] [...] [Page 166] [...] [Page 167] [...] [Page 168] [...] [Page 169] [...] [Page 170] [...] [Page 171] [...] [Page 172] [...] [Page 173] [...] [Page 174] [...] [Page 175] [...] [Page 176] [...] [Page 177] [...] [Page 178] [...] [Page 179] [...] [Page 180] [...] [Page] [Page 150] which can no ways be with­drawn nor separated from it. And truly, this pleasure is so far from bringing any dammage to our minds, that it doth ever nourish therein by its influence and its nature, such thoughts and senti­ments as are sedate, and never leaves us without these hopes, that we shall never want any thing of all that nature desires, when it is uncorrupted. And just as Intemperance and Folly afflict, torment and trouble us incessant­ly: So Injustice no sooner seizes on a Mans Breast, but it instils disorder and confusion into it, ren­dering him unhappy, tho it should not render him criminal. But if an unjust Man does any sinister action, tho he commit it in such sort, that neither Men nor the Sun are privy or can bear witness of it; yet notwithstanding that he is sure of its being conceal'd, [Page 151] and what obscurity soever the shades might have, which cover­ed it, he is still under apprehen­sions of its being discuss'd by truth. Suspition, commonly, fol­lows the actions of the wicked, and then discourse, and then ru­mour, and then the accuser, and then the judge: And tho all these fail, their own Consciences will not fail to lay themselves open. Now if some Men believe, that their Riches and [...]ower forti­fie 'em sufficiently against humane justice, and set them above Laws and Punishments, yet they cannot secure their dear Persons against Divine Justice: They never lift up their Eyes towards Heaven, but their Consciences fly in their Faces, and give 'em horrible ap­prehensions; and they are still phancying, that those piercing dis­quiets, which devour them with­out abatement, are the secret [Page 152] Executioners of the punishment, which the Divinity inflicts upon them. For, what Power, or what Riches, when they are justly ac­quired, can so much diminish the irksomnesses of this Life, but that at the same time the remorses of Conscience, the fear of punishment, and the Aversion of Men do the more augment them? Are there not many Persons, who cannot set bounds to the desire of being more Rich, of getting more Ho­nours, of Lording it more absolute­ly, of shewing themselves more voluptuous, of making more stately and delicious Feasts, of still propa­gating more and more their sinis­ter Sentiments? And do we not see, that how great a prey soever they may have scrap'd together by their lewd ways, all this in­stead of pacifying their evil de­sires, helps only to enflame them still the more, and these people [Page 153] have more need of being chastis'd by the Laws, than corrupted by reprimands? Thus, reason invites Men of a sound judgment to main­tain the justice established by the Laws and Equity, which derives its origine from Nature and Faith, which may be termed the Band of Civil Society. And this very reason shews, that unjust actions ought never to be undertaken; not by the weak, who wou'd un­dertake to attempt them without success, nor by the Potent, who having compassed them, would not meet with due repose, nor the accomplishment of their desires in them: And, in short, it forces us to own, that justice is not de­sirable for it self; but because it procures us much contentment, because it makes us to be belov'd and cherish'd, which are two de­licious things: And in a word, by these two means, it renders [Page 154] our Life the more secure and our Pleasure the more compleat. Now, if the praise of those very Virtues, wherein other Philosophers did principally employ their most mag­nifick Harangues, cannot find any issue but that which leads to Pleasure, and, if that Pleasure, which is the end of all the Ver­tues, be the only thing, which calls us to it self, and attracts us by its own proper Nature, we may boldly deduce this Corollary, that it is the summum bonum, and the most perfect of all the blessings of humane Life: And we can no longer question, but that that is the truly happy Life, which Epi­curus hath taught us. O holy and severe Pleasure! O admirable Phi­losophy! By what mischance did Men come to decry thee! How hast thou been abhorr'd by many virtuous Persons, that did not un­derstand thee! What has hindred [Page 155] their Eyes from seeing through the Veil, that their Virtues are under thy Dominion! And how did they happen to treat then with op­probrious terms, when they are obliged to thee for their Felicity! But happy the Men, that have been of the Wise Man's Sect, that hath followed thee! Happy those, who have imitated him! Happy even those, who being born in an Age, wherein several believe, that the Vice and Plea­sure of Epicurus are but one and the same thing, have had sufficient light to discover the contrary, or at least sufficient, address to stand up in its defence, tho they have not had courage sufficient to put it into Practice.