SURE-FOOTING In Chri …

SURE-FOOTING In Christianity, Or Rational Discourses On The Rule of FAITH. With Short Animadversions on Dr Pierce's Ser­mon; Also on some passages in Mr Whitby and M Stillingfleet, which concern That RULE.

Ecce nos ex Patribus ad Patres per manus tra­ditam fuisse hanc sententiam demonstravimus. Athanasius.

By I. S.

LONDON, Printed in the Year 1665.

To the QUEEN:

Madam,

THough the Faith I write for be far more firmly esta­blish't then Heaven and Earth themselves, (as the Worlds great Master has by his own word assur'd us) and so needs no Sup­port but its own Invincible Strength: Yet, I am told by my reason, that nothing so clears and recommends Religion to the Ge­nerality, as the vertuous Life and eminent Devotion of Them that profess it. But, where shall I seek those happiest Effects and noblest Arguments of Truth? If I consider [Page] them in their abstracted Idea's they are Invisible as Angels; too sub­tle and delicate for vulgar eyes. Where then may I hope to meet those excellent Forms vested with Bodies? if I consult the com­mon Judgment; I expect to be sent to some Hermit's Cell, or the private Oratory of some holy Vo­taress; where I may find them, in­deed, embody'd; but withal, half-bury'd: Incomparable Lights, but, shut up in a kind of dark Lanthorn; where they burn safely I confess, but shine to few: while Those I seek, must be high and conspicuous, to send forth their Beams and Influ­ences over all the VVorld; and in that regard, Courts are the properest Firmament for such Illustrious [Page] Stars; and Courts are easily seen, but where's the Star?

In this perplexity, Madam, it pleas'd the Goodness of Heaven to relieve me; for, as the mention of Courts brought immediately into my memory the happiness our Nation is blest with by Your Majesty's Resi­dence among us; so the Contempla­tion of Your Exemplar Life fill'd my soul with joy to have found, at last, those sublime and heroick Virtues; whose perfect Conformity to the Rules of Catholick Religion is, alone, capable to convince the Certainty of its Truth. Such an unwearied Constancy in Devo­tion, such a degree of Fervor in that Constancy, cannot possibly pro­ceed from a luke-warm Probability [Page] in Faith: such frequent Retire­ments to intimate Conversations with Heaven, such Mortifications, and contempt of Court-Entertain­ments, and (which is yet harder) such Innocence and Purity amidst the necessary Admittances of them, as they all conspire to speak Your Soul Angelical, so they clearly prove the vigorous Activity of the Faith that breeds them, far beyond the drowsy Indifferency of a pro­bable Opinion. Thus, Madam, while Schollars but discourse, YOV live Demonstrations. Permit me then to use, not Your bare Name, but Your Vertues as a Patronage to my Endeavours; since the Motive of this my Dedicatory meant These for its Substance, and Your Tem­poral [Page] Supremeness onely for a Cir­cumstance. Others Complement while they dedicate, I Argue all the while: nor intend I this for a farther Display of Your Excellent Vertues (which already are suffici­ently manifest to all the VVorld) but to breed a more serious reflexi­on on Them in the minds of those against whom I write; and other well-meaning, but mis-led per­sons.

This advantage Your Majesty and the Practical Provers of Ca­tholick Faith have above us Specu­laters, that Your whole Life is a Continual Argument for It; while we are bound to expect Seasons and wait Opportunities: Nor should I at this time have of­fer'd [Page] to appear, had not the Mul­titude of Books lately Printed a­gainst Catholick Religion made it my plain and necessary Duty with all my little power to defend It, VVhat I have endeavour'd, I most humbly lay at Your Maje­sties feet, and remain,

MADAM,
Your Majesties most dutiful Subject and most obedient Servant I. S.

PREFACE
To the Intelligent READER.

1. He is little acquainted with the paths which lead to Science who knows not that the settling the First Principle in any Affair, is of mainest Import towards Satisfaction in that par­ticular; because if such a Principle be not first settled, the whole Discourse, as relying on that Principle for its Certainty, must needs waver and stagger. Reflecting on this plainest Truth and withal on the manner how very many (I wish I might not say most) Controversies are manag'd; that is, by debating much about diverse Conclusi­ons, but very little about the first Principle in Controversie, I cannot wonder if Disputes come slowly to an End when few of them were ever rightly begun. Another mischief and even de­spair of entire Satisfaction springs from hence; that, seeing all Dispute Supposes an Agreement between the Disputers in some acknowledg'd Prin­ciple, I much fear, while things are carry'd on this fashion, this Requisit is wanting to the Catho­lick and Protestant Controvertists; For, neither doth the Protestant from his heart hold (witness the Books of their most extold Champions, and even the 39. Articles, to the contrary) the Testi­monies of Fathers and Councils, Certain and Convictive; nor even Scripture alwayes as to its [Page] Letter and the Sence they give it, (for they pre­tend Infallible Certainty of none of these;) much less does the Catholick agree that private Interpretations of Scripture, or Citations from Fathers (not speaking as Witnesses of the Churches Belief) are of sufficient Authority to settle the True, or overthrow a False or pretended Faith. Yet, notwithstanding all this, each Antagonist permits the other to frame his Discourses upon these Grounds as if he held the Method were good and allowable; which not being heartily granted by either, what satisfaction can we expect but end­less and fruitless contests, for want of Agreement in some acknowledg'd Principle, while this Me­thod is follow'd. Nay more, were it suppos'd that both sides had agreed not to reject in their Disputes such a Principle; yet still, however one side might happen to foil the other so far as to make him contradict himself, yet never so as to convince his Tenet of falshood, unless the process were grounded upon some First, that is, Self-evident Principle, by virtue of whose undoubta­ble Certainty the Discourse built on it might gain an establishment. Whence also, the result of this way of Discourse can be onely the Credit or Dis­credit of the Authours; and touches not at all the Thing; Which, without some Evident Princi­ple to establish or overthrow it, hovers in its pure neutral condition of being (as to Assent or Dis­sent) just a bare saying and no more.

2. The reason why the First Principle of Con­troversie [Page] is not more lookt into and clear'd ap­pears to me evidently this, that our modern Dis­senters from the Church and her Faith seeing (which is common to Them with all other main­tainers of Errours) that to begin with First or self-Evident Principles is the direct road to Science, and therefore absolutely destructive of their In­terest, avoid as much as in them lies, the laying any such Principles: and instead of this apply their whole endeavours to aiery Descants upon Words, by such means and Arts as are never likely to give them any determinate Sence; by which craft (the way of Science, being to proceed from one piece of Sence to another) they carry the war out of the bounds of Science where solid ground is to be found to fix ones fool upon, so to overthrow or be overthrown, and transfer it to a kind of Spatium Imaginarium of Fancy and un­signifying Sounds, the proper sphere for Chimeri­cal Discoursers to buz confusedly and make a noise in; Where the Catholick must either let them alone, and then they cry Victory; or follow them thither, and so hazard to prejudice his own cause by seeming to allow their method of discoursing. Whereas indeed the Catholick is forc't by their Importunity exciting his Charity towards the unskilfull, to show how weakly they discourse in their own shallow way.

3. How little faulty the Catholick is in this will be quickly manifest, if we consider that [...]tis against his Principles and Involuntary in him to [Page] take this Method: for, he builds not upon those aiery Skirmishes for his Faith; nor, consequently, esteems he it conquerable by such attempts: he recei­ved his Faith from the present Church witnessing it's delivery from the former Age; to this ancho­rage he sticks; he stands on immemorial Possession, nor doubts he that Christ's Doctrin is his true and proper inheritance, while brought down by the test­imony of so many Christian Nations. As long as this foundation stands firm, quirks hurt not him; Shake this, that is, show the Church Essential is Mistress of falshood, and he must doubt all his Faith; but yet cannot hold the Protestants, for he must hold nothing. No Book can secure him, when that Prin­ciple which onely can secure to us Books written long ago, is insecure it self. Now, on the contrary, the Protestant builds his Faith by thus hammering it out of unsenc't Characters, and is quite over­thrown (would his will give his reason leave to follow his principles) if another more dexterously fit the words to a sence inconsistent with his. And his hopes of standing are not built (as are the Ca­tholicks) on the self evidence of ony Thing or Prin­ciple, but indeed on the Inevidence or Ambiguity of Words and his Way to manage them; which is, to let no Living Authority sence thew, and so they will more easily change their shape as the ingenious contrivances of Fancy molds them; and then, if the discourse seem but a little plausible, Education and Interest make the Vnderstanding content with very easiy satisfaction.

[Page] 4. I am far from blaming the Catholicks prudence for engaging on this manner; I rather admire their Charity towards their weaker Brethren, that at the expence of so much patience and pains, such excellent Wits will condescend to so laborious a talk; less sutable both to their own Genius as Ca­tholick, and to the nature of their Cause. How easi­ly might they rest secure upon Immovable Possession, and demand Evidence and Demonstration from the Protestant, who denies his right to Christs Doctrin? How easily might he show their reasons inconclusive (which method was observ'd by a late Learned Writer Mr. J. S. against that Pulpit-vapour of Dr. Pierce) especially by discovering the unsatisfactoriness of the Method they take? How most easily, that they have never a Principle or self evident Ground to begin with; That till they settle such a First Principle all their Discourse is frivolous; That their rejecting the Churches Living Voice or Tradition brings all into doubt▪ both Sayings of Fathers and Texts of Scripture; And hence, not to allow them the favour of dispu­ting ad hominem from Scripture or Fathers, by granting them any thing Certain, but putting them to prove all; For since they are to object and bring Evident Reason for changing, it lies on them to make their reasons Evident; nor has any Dispu­tant right to have any thing allow'd him Certain, who renounces that Principle, which if renounct [...] ▪ all is Vncertain: And, lastly, that he who denies the First Principle in any Science, deserves not, [...]ay [Page] cannot in reason (abstracted from circumstances) be discourst with at all in that Science, nor They in Controversy. This will force them to lay some First or self-evident Principle; which cannot fail to produce these two Advantages; One to the World, that it shall get into a method of concluding something with evidence: The other to Catholick Religion; For, [...]twill be found Impossible their Reason strain'd to its utmost, can invent any other in this matter, but that of Tradition.

5. This will clearly shorten our debates, and save the laborious transcribing and Printing Vo­lumes of Testimonies, by bringing Conrroversy to the way of Reason; for the Certainty of First Au­thority must needs be manifested by pure Reason. But who am I that I should attempt such a change in the method of Controversy, or think my self a fit proposer or presser of it? Far be it from me. Yet, if I mistake not, Nature her self (whom I second in this design) is about doing that work. For, I hear Catholick Writers complain of the Pro­testant (and justly too) that he puts him to answer what h [...] been an hundred times said before; and I am inform'd an Eminent Protestant now writing in behalf of Dr Pierce, makes the same counter-complaint of the Catholick, and the Dissuader be­gins his book with the same resentment: Besides, I am sure the Best Wits of our Nation are weary of this Method, seeing tis no more but reciprocating a Saw, or transcribing and re-printing what has been done before, onely in another Frame; or, if [Page] any new production be made, generally tis nothing but some note collected from some Historical book unobserved by others; which, what satisfactory Evi­dence tis like to bring with it, is easy to be ghest.

6. Now all this happens through not first settling and agreeing in some First Principle. Not onely for the reasons given in the beginning of this Pre­face; but also, because (as will be shown hereafter) without thi [...] the validity of any Testimony from Father or Council cannot be weigh'd, understood, or prest with force upon the Adversary. For, if These be but parts of the Living Voice of the Church Essentiall of their time, that is, of Christian Tra­dition, it will follow that till the force of Tradi­tion be evidenc't, Theirs will not be clearly known. Again, Tradition once evidenc't wil give principles to distinguish those Citations by, and to secure (as far as is needful) and interpret Scriptures Letter: Whence clear Victory will accrue to Truth, and full Satisfaction to her ingenuous Seekers Not that I at all doubt, but that many things in Catholick Writers of the Testimonial strain, carry 4 strong force of Conviction with them; but I see th [...] while the solid Testimonies are not distinguisht and solely insisted on, but run mixt with others of less force, by such a mixture they weaken their own; I see also that they want their effect upon the Prote­stant, by reason he is not first prest to admit that Evident Principle on which their strength is built; and, which once settled, they are irresistable.

7. The settling then the First Principle in Contro­versy [Page] being so supremely important, I have attemp­ted it. Putting this Dilemma to the Protestant. Either Controversy (or the skill which enables us to conclude certainly what's Faith,) is a Science, or not; if not, why do we meddle with it; since without Science or Knowledge, all is meer beating the ayr and empty ignorant talking. If it be, com­mon seuse tells us it must be grounded on some first and self-evident Principle. Let's to work then, and settle this Principle, that so we may have something to agree in and proceed upon; that is, be able to di­scourse together. I have endeavoured to show the First Principle we Catholicks proceed on establisht on rational Grounds, and self-evident: Let the Pro­testant either agree with us in it, or settle some other able to render his Citations certain, without which they ought alledge nothing. Nor is it enough for them to catch at single words, or little parcels of my Discourse, (as their way is) but, it being connected, they must overthrow the main of it: nor that; but they must lay some First Principle of their own, else they ought affirm nothing, nor speak; for why should any one say what he knows not, or how can he know without Principles? Especially the Protestant is ob­lig'd to do this, who cannot stand on Possession, but on his Reasons why he mov'd what he found settled. This Principle then they are ty'd by all ho­nest Considerations to produce, and till they do so, I must frankly declare what reason tells ever in­telligent man, that those many flashy books of late against Catholicks, by whomsoever written, deserve not a word in Answer.

FIRST DISCOURSE,
Showing, from the nature of Rule and Faith, what Properties belong to the Rule of Faith.

1. As common Reason gives it evident, that no satisfaction at all can be had in any point whatever without knowing first the Meaning of those Words which express the Thing under debate, since without this the discoursers must talk of they know not what; so the Art of Logick assures us that, the Meaning of those Words exactly known, a ready way is open'd to a clear decision of the most perplexing difficulties. For, seeing the Meaning of a Word includes in it self the Na­ture of the Thing as signified by that Word, in re­gard it could not mean That Thing, unless it al­so meant it of such a Nature which constitutes that Thing, so tis plain that, the Meaning of the Word once known perfectly, the Nature of the Thing, as signify'd by that word, must be known likewise. Wherefore, since the Nature of the Thing bears along with it all those Considerati­ons and Attributes which intrinsecally belong to such a Nature, and excludes all those which are incompetent to the same Nature, it acquaints us with what can be both said and deny'd of the Thing, as far as exprest by that word. The per­fect knowledge then of the Meaning of the Words [Page 2] affords us the certain solution of all questions whether Affirmative or Negative, and is the most compendious way to settle all Controver­sies. Let us therefore apply this method to our present purpose, and examin well what is meant by those Words which express the thing we are discussing, namely THE RULE OF FAITH; and we may with good grounds expect a solid, clear, and brief satisfaction both of what is not that Rule, and what is It.

2. To begin then with what is most evident; Seeing a Rule signifies a thing which is able to regulate or guide him who uses it, it must con­sequently have in it all those Qualities by which it is able to do that it's proper Effect; otherwise 'tis no Rule, that is, 'tis not apt or able to do what a Rule should do.

3. It must then in the first place be Evident as to its Existence; unto the Sense, if it be to guide it; or to the Vnderstanding if it be an Intelle­ctual Rule. For, how should either of these be guided by what they neither see nor know?

4. Whence follows that it must be Evident to all those who are to be regulated by it, that there is such a Thing; otherwise it can be to them no Rule; since, being unknown, it reaches not, or affects not those persons who are to be ruled by it; that is, reaches not those things upon which it is to do its Effect; and so, cannot rule them, or be a Rule to them.

5. Moreover, to those who can raise doubts or [Page 3] can have doubts raisd in them, (that is in a man­ner all Mankind, even the Rudest Vulgar) it must be knowable that the Intellectual Rule they are to be regulated by, has in it self a virtue to rule or guid their understandings right; That is, they must be capable to know that it de­serves to be reli'd on as a Rule. Wherefore, this must either be evident by its own light, or at least easily evidenceable by other knowledges or skills presupposed in those users of Reason, who are to be guided by that Rule. Otherwise, 'tis against Sense and Reason to yield over ones un­derstanding to be guided by that which he can never come to understand that it has in it any ability or power to guide him.

6. And, because nothing can be evident to be what in reality it is not, it follows that this Thing pretending to be a Rule, must also be cer­tain in it's self, or establisht on secure Grounds: For otherwise, 'tis not possible that can in true sence be call'd a Rule, which one may follow and yet go wrong, or be missed. The Directive Power then which it has must not be wavering; Wherefore also the causes which conserve it so constantly able to perform that Effect must be established too to that degree as to keep it fitting to do the effect proper to its Nature; which is, to be certain in its self.

7. Thus much is evidently gathered out of the common Notion or Nature of a Rule; That is, out of the genuin and proper meaning of that [Page 4] single word. We are next to consider the mean­ing of the word FAITH. By which we in­tend not to give rigorous School-definitions of either this or the former word; but only to re­flect on and make use of some Attributes, Predi­cates or Properties; which in the sence of such who intelligently use those words are apprehend­ed to be involved in or truly appertaining to their signification. This caution given to avoid mistake or cavil, let's enquire of what kind of Nature that thing is which is meant by this word FAITH, and then reflect what further qualifications it requires in it's Rule, that is, in the Certain Means which is to guide us to that Knowledge called Faith.

8. FAITH then in the common sence of Man­kind is the same with Believing; and Divine Faith in the sence of the generality of Christians (from whom, as being the intelligent users of that word, the true sence of it is taken) the Believing God in reveal'd Truths, which necessarily imports some kind of Knowledge of super [...]atural Things. Again, it being evident and held by those Christians that none can come to Heaven without knowing there is such a thing, or some very great Good re­serv'd for the next life; nor yet without loving it, (for none is thought to go to Heaven whether he will or no) which Love, besides the Knowledge that Heaven is, cannot be had without know­ing likewise that 'tis a Good incomparably great­er than any in this life; nor can these Know­ledges [Page 5] be had by Mankind but by Believing; hence, Belief of Supernatural things, or Faith is conceived necessary for the salvation of Mankind. Nor is this found only in the Judgements the learneder Faithful make concerning it by their Discourse, but in the very Meaning of the word Faith as it imports Knowledge of super [...]atural things. It being then granted by all and in it self most rational that some at least of the vulgar are to be saved, that is, are to have Faith or Knowledge of God, it follows that the Rule of Faith or certain means to arrive at Faith must be appliable to them.

9. Moreover, since the ruder or unskilfuller people are, the lesse capable they are of Science, and none doubts but some, amongst even the rudest, may come to be saved, since we expe­rience they have oftentimes well-meaning, vir­tuous and devout hearts; the Rule or Means to come to Faith must also be appliable to these; that is, must be such as even the rudest may be capable to know there is such a thing.

10. The Rule of Faith therefore must be Knowable as to it's Existence by natural impres­sions upon mens Senses, affecting their Souls ac­cording to the common light of understanding. For, seeing the rudest are very shallow Reflecters and Discoursers, and suppos'd to be utterly unac­quainted with any kind of Skill got by Specula­tion or Study, the Knowledge of the Rule of [Page 6] Faith's Existence must not need any skill or Sci­ence acquir'd by Study, intervening between the natural power of their Understanding and It [...] otherwise it could not be Knowable by them, [...] be to them a Rule, by parag. 4th.

11. Again, seeing those who are very rude are yet capable of being put into Doubts concerning their Faith, either by Sophistry or fai [...] Language, and at length deserting it; and 'tis most unrea­sonable there should be no means lest by God sufficient to settle them; nor can any Means be sufficient if the Rule of Faith (which is the best if not only Means to come to the Knowledge of Faith) be dissatisfactory, or impossible to be shown worthy to be rely'd on; it follows that the Rule of Faith must be of such a nature as i [...] either by its own light evidently secure and wor­thy to be held a Rule, and this even to the rudest who can doubt; or else easily evidenceable to them to be such by intelligent persons who art vers'd in such reflexions, and this out of Princi­ples they are capable of, (as was prov'd parag [...] the 5th.) that is, requiring onely common and obvious Reason not scientifical speculation to in­still them. Otherwise those rude persons would be left unfurnish't of due Means to be sted [...]ast in their Faith.

12. Also, since the Notion of the word Faith bears, that 'tis a perfection of the Soul, or a Virtue, and so no act of it irrational, but on the contrary, all its Acts rational, and the submis­sion [Page 7] of onr Understandings exercisd in it ratio­nabile obsequium, 'tis evinc't that the Satisfacto­rines of its Rule, ought not onely to be evident or easily evidenceable to the rudest Doubters, as we now prov'd, but also it ought to be so qua­lify'd, that the Faithful who yet have no doubts should do rationally even while they simply or unreflectingly adhere to it, and that it should sup­ply to their common and uncultivated Reason by a natural way what it wants of reflexion: I mean, so that the common light of Reason may tell them, upon solid and true Principles taught them by the ordinary course of things in the World, this is to be held or followed, thongh they dive not into the Grounds or particular Rea­sons of their tenets or actions, nor can give ac­count of them.

13. And, since our Saviour intended those out of the Church should embrace Faith, and those who are to be converted are Heterodox, that is, hold contradictorily to the Church, in what they dissent from her; so that if they change, they must now hold is, indead of is not, or is not in­stead of is (there being no middle to hold to) in those points in which they differ from her, and no change ought to be in reason or in a rational Nature (of which Nature those Heterodox are) without true reason to change, and the change in our case is to be made not to a meer Suspensi­on, which is believing nothing, nor to a middle between is, and is not, but to a contrary or ra­ther [Page 8] contradictory Assent, and no Assent can be [...] without sufficient Cause of Assent, nor is any suf­ficient in reason to put that Effect or cause Assent [...] in a thing antecedent to Faith, as is the Rule [...] of Faith, but Evidence; (for while 'tis but pro­bable, that is, while the Understanding must a [...] yet say I know not it is so, it cannot say I know i [...] is so, which is no more but to say understanding­ly or to assent that it is so) now the Cause of our actuall assenting to the Churches Faith, is the Rule of Faith; It follows out of the notion of Rational included in the word Faith, as apply'd to convettible persons, that the Rule of Faith must be beyond all Peradventures, how high and presumed soever they be; that is, absolutely Evident to us, and consequently CERTAIN.

14. Moreover, there being many Eminent Wits in the Chutch vers'd in true Logick & enu­red to Sciences, and true Logick and the course of Science necessarily telling them that nothing can in perfect reason be held by one who penetrates difficulties, but either Self-evident Principles, or Conclusions necessarily deduced by intrinse­cal mediums from those Principles, nor can they be necessarily deduced without immediate con­nexion or Identification of the Terms with the Medium which infers the Identity between themselves in the Conclusion, and that what is not seen to be thus connected is unknown, and so, for any thing appears, may be false; and to see a thing may be false, must needs breed some Fear [Page 9] of being so, or Doubt, if we be concerned in the Truth or Falsitie of that thing, and none can ra­tionally assent or fix their judgment where there is left some Doubt or wavering of Judgment, and the Judgement or Assent of Faith must be rotional; It follows that the Rule of Faith, (which is the immediate Producer and Cause of the Assent of Faith) ought to be of that Nature that it must not onely be plain to the ruder sort, but also contain in it self Seeds of perfect evidence to satisfy those learned Persons who shall more narrowly examin it: Otherwise the best and wisest portion, and as it were the flower of Man­kind, which guide themselves by perfect reason, could hold nothing or have no Faith; That is the Church must onely be made up of ignorant and undiscerning persons; which would make her little better than a Congregation of Phanaticks.

15. Especially the Church having many Ad­versaries skild in natural Sciences, who will not stick to oppose her all they can, and conquer her too, could they take any just advantage against her; and no greater advantage being possible to be gained or more deadly wound to be given her than to prove her Faith uncertain, which is done by showing the Ground of it as far as concerns our Knowledge, that is the Rule and Means to come to Faith, possible to be false; For this at once enervates her Government▪ vilifies her Sacra­ments, weakens all the motives to the love of Heaven, which she proposes, and by consequence [Page 10] quite enfeebles the vigour of Christian Life; or rather, this made manifest, by reason of temptations to the Love of Creatures perpetual­ly and on all sides besieging us, endangers to ex­tinguish it utterly; and, lastly, makes Christians the most ridiculous people in the world to be­lieve such high mysteries above their reasons upon uncertain Grounds: Tis manifest therefore that the only safeguard and all the strength of the Church and Christian Religion is placed in the absolute Certainty of the Rule of Faith: Tis made therefore and ordained to ascertain Faith; that it, it has in it what is fit for this end; that is, it is of its own nature absolutely certain; that is, absolute Certainty is found in the nature and no­tion of the Rule of Faith; or, which is all one, is signified or meant by those words thoroughly un­derstood.

16. And lastly, Faith being a Virtue mainly conducing to Bliss (as is seen▪ §. 8.) and its In­fluence towards Bliss (which we call its Merit) consisting in this that it makes us submit our Un­derstanding to the Divine Veracity and by that means adhere unwaveringly to such Truths as raise us to Heaven, so that the Divine Authority apply'd is the Principal Cause or Motive of this submission, assent or adhesion; and every Cause producing its effect better and stronglier by how much the nearer and closer 'tis apply'd, and all the application of it to us consisting in the Rule of Faith, whose office it is to derive down to us [Page 11] those doctrines Christ taught and to assure us that Christ said them; and the application of a thing closely to a Judging Power being per­formed by Certifying it, which makes it sink into it & become an intimate Act of that Power, whereas Uncertainty can only admit it to swim as it were upon the surface of the Soul, much after the manner of a bare Proposal or simple apprehen­sion, or at best as a Probability, not having weight enough of motive to settle deep into its solid substance which is Cognoscitive and so be­come there a fixt Judgement; it follows that the Virtue of Faith and its Merit are incomparably advantaged by the absolute Certainty of the Rule of Faith and very feeble and inefficacious without it. This Rule then must be absolutely-Certain of its own nature, that is, the notion of absolutely-Certain is involv'd in the Rule of Faith.

17. Summing up then the full account of our Discourse hitherto it amounts to this that out of the genuine meaning of the word Rule which as used by us denotes an Intellectual Rule, & much more out of the meaning of the word Faith it is clearly evinced that the Rule of Faith must have these several conditions; namely, it must be plain and self-evident as to its Existence to all (§. 3, 4, 9, & 10.) & Evidenceable as to its Ruling Power to enquirers even the rude vulgar (§. 5. & 11.) apt to settle & justify undoubting persons (§. 12.) to satisfy fully the most Sceptical Dis­senters [Page 12] (§. 13.) and rational Doubters (§. 14.) and to convince the most obstinate and acute Adversaries, (§. 15.) built upon unmoveable Grounds, that is Certain in it self, (§. 6. 15, 16.) and absolutely ascertainable to us (§. 5, 11, 13, 14.)

SECOND DISCOURSE.
Showing the two first Properties of the Rule of Faith utterly incompetent to Scripture.

1. HAving attained so clear a Description of the Rule of Faith and acquaintance with it by particular marks, we may with reason con­ceive good hopes of knowing it when we meet it: Especially, not having a great croud from which we are to single it out, the pretenders to that title being very few; and, indeed, but two are owned, namely Tradition and Scripture; though if we look narrowly into it, the Private Spirit, Private Reason, Testimonies of Fathers, or whatsoever else is held the ascertainer of Scri­ptures sence ought to have a place among the pretenders to be the Rule of Faith; since tis those which are thought to give the reliers on them all the security they have of Gods sence, that is, of Points of Faith, and so are or ought to be to them a Rule of Faith.

[Page 13] 2. But, to speak to them in their own Lan­guage who say Scripture is their Rule, we must premise this Note, that they cannot mean by Scripture the Sence of it, that is, the things to be known, for those they confess are the very Points of Faith, of which the Rule of Faith is to ascertain us: When they say then that Scripture is the Rule of Faith, they can onely mean by the word SCRIPTURE, that Book not yet senc't or interpreted, but as yet to be senc't; that is, such and such Characters in a Book with their Aptness to signifie to them assuredly Gods Mind, or ascer­tain them of their Faith: For, abstracting from the sence or actual signification of those words, there is nothing imaginable left but those Chara­cters with their Aptness to signifie it.

This understood, let us apply now the Pro­perties of the Rule of Faith to Scriptures Letter, that we may see how they will fit.

3. And the first thing that occurrs is its Exi­stence or An est; that is, whether those Books pre­tended to be Gods Word bee indeed Scripture, that is, written by men divinely inspired; Of which 'tis most manifest the very rudest sort cannot be Certain by Self-evidence, nor can it be easily evidenceable to those Doubters that are the ordinary sort of the Vulgar by any skill they are capable of; nor even to more curious and speculative Scarchers but by so deep an inspecti­on into the sence of it as shall discover such se­crets that Philosophy and Human Industry [Page 14] could never have arrived to. Besides, all the seeming Contradictions must be solved ere they can out of the bare nature of the Letter conclude the Scripture to be of Gods enditing, and so wor­thy to be a Rule; to solve which literally, plain­ly and satisfactorily, the memories of so many par­ticulars, which made them clearer to those of the Age in which they were written and the matter known, must needs be so worn out by tract of time, that tis one of the most difficult tasks in the World. The Scriptures Letter then is not the Rule of Faith (by § 3, 4, 5, 10, 11. of our former Discourse) as wanting Self-evidence of its Exi­stence, Easie Evidenceableness of its Ruling Vir­tue, and Power to establish and satisfie at least unlearned Doubters.

4. Secondly, were it known that there are some Books left written by men divinely inspired, yet it is unknown how many those Books ought to be, and which of the many controverted ones may securely be put in that Catalogue, which not: Which 'tis most palpable that either few or at least the rude vulgar and common sort of Mankind, (especially those who are not yet Faithful, but looking to come to Faith, which is done by knowing the Rule of Faith) can never be assured of, either by Self-evidence of the things themselves, or by other skills they are al­ready possest of. The Scripture's Letter then is from this Head concluded defective in the fore­mentioned Properties necessarily belonging to the Rule of Faith.

[Page 15] 5. Thirdly, Were the Catalogue of the true Books known, yet how is it self-evident or easily evidenceable to the capacities above named (if to any) that the very Original or a perfectly true Copy of these Books was preserved indeficient­ly entire, out of which our Translations were made? Can the ruder sort either know this or be assured of the skill of others by which they know it? The former being manifestly impossi­ble; the later equally such; since they have no knowledges in their heads enabling them to judge unerringly of the competency of others skill in such a particular. Wherefore, Scrip­tures Letter faulters still in the primary, most necessary and essential conditions of a Rule of Faith.

6. Fourthly, Were it evident that the right Original or true Copy of it is preserved indefe­ctive, yet very few, that is, onely those who are perfect in those ancient Languages, can arrive to the understanding so much; The rest, which are in a manner all Mankind, must come to the knowledge of it by Translations; and, ere they can think it is fit to be a Rule, they must know it is rightly translated; For which, because they have no skill in those Languages themselves, they must rely on the Translators skill: Concerning whose sufficiency of understanding to be able to translate unerringly right, and honesty of Will or true intention to do it, themselves, at least the rudest vulgar, are not qualified enough to [Page 16] jndge assuredly, that they are worthy to be se­curely relied on. So that we are still at a loss in this pretended Rule of Faith for our first and fundamental conditions.

7. Fifthly, Let us pass by all these defects, and grant it most truly translated to a tittle (and indeed to a tittle it should be, else an errour may slip in instead of a Point of Faith, for any thing the bare Letter can assure us) yet the innumerable Copiers before Printing, and since Printers and Correcters of the Press are still ro be relyed on: and they onely can have evidence of the right Letter of Scripture, who stood at their elbows attentively watching they should not erre in making it perfectly like a former Copy; And even then why might they not mistrust their own eyes and aptness to oversee? Or, were it granted these men err'd not, nor themselves in o­verlooking them, yet the same difficulty occurrs concerning the former Printer's care if the for­mer Copy were printed, or the Scriveners if Manuscript, which scapes the view of our now-livers, except we will examin them again from Impression to Impression, or from Copy to Copy by others more ancient; and still let us run as high as we will the same difficulty pursues us. To which if we add that the Printers, Cor­recters or Transcribers might hap to be Knaves; and either be Hereticks themselves or brib'd by Hereticks, whose manner it being ever to make the Letter of the Scripture their weapon, they [Page 17] could wish no greater advantage than to have it fram'd commodious to their hand, and so would questionless endeavour it, and History assures us they did. So that we are still at the same or a greater loss in our pretended Rule of Faith.

8. Lastly, were all this multitude of Excepti­ons pardon [...]d, still we are as far to seek, unless those who are to be rul'd and guided by the Scriptures Letter to Faith were Certain of the true sence of it, which is found out by right In­terpretation. Now the numerous Commenta­tors upon it and infinite disputes about the sence of it even in most concerning points, as in that of Christ's Divinity, beat it out so plain to us that this is not the task of the vulgar (who yet are capable of salvation, and so of Faith, and so of the Rule of Faith) that 'tis perfect phrenzy to deny it.

9, It may be alledg'd that some of these de­fects may be provided against by skill in History. But 'tis quickly reply'd, that then none can be se­cure of their Rule of Faith, nor consequently have Faith, unless skill'd in Histories or knowing [...]hose men to be so, and withall unbyast, whom [...]hey converse with; nay, without knowing that those men knew certainly the Historians whom they rely'd on had secure Grounds, and not bare hearsay for what they writ, and that they were not contradicted by others either extant or pe­ [...]ish't: now, how few of the unlearned vulgar, [...]ay even of the middle sort of prudent men [Page 18] which make up the generality of the world, I may say, of very good Scholars, can judge of these points? And, if they cannot, how then is their Faith rational or virtuous and not rather an hair-brain'd opinionative rashness to build their Assent, Faith and Salvation upon Principles they can make no Judgement of?

10. If necessity make some willing to reply what their Judgments naturally flowing from their Principles would not, that God assists his Church, and therefore his Providence will take care the contingencies their Rule of Faith, the Scripture's Letter, is subject to, shall be avoid­ed; 'tis ask't, how they are certain, in their way, of such an Assistance, but by the Letter of the Scripture? They must first then prove that Certain, ere they mention the Church or God's Assistance to her; since this Assistance is, in their Grounds, founded upon the Truth and Certainty of that Letter. Besides, a Church is a Congregation of the Faithful, that is, of such as have Faith; which not being possible to be had without Cer­tain means to come unto it, or the Rule of Faith; it follows that the first thing that must be clear'd is the Certainty of the Rule of Faith; antece­dently to the Notions of Faith, Faithful or Church.

11. If Testimonies out of Councils or Fathers be alledg'd by them sufficient Interpreters of Scripture, tis reply'd that if those be needful to make a Certain Interpretation of Scripture, or [Page 19] (which is all one) the Letter of Scripture certain­ly significative of God [...]s sence; then, First, none can be capable of the Rule of Faith, nor conse­quently of Faith, but those who are read in Councils and Fathers: nor yet, unless those Au­thorities be held Infallible in such an office; which none but Catholiks will say; for if they can erre in such a performance, how shall we be certain they do not erre in each particular Inter­pretation, without some other Guide to establish them and secure us; which Guide must be infal­lible in such an affair, else the same question and doubt returns concerning It: And, if there be some other infallible Guide whose constant direction secures them from erring in every par­ticular Interpretation and ascertains us of the same, let them name It, not Fathers and Coun­cils to interpret Scripture by. But the third and most Fundamental fault is that a Father, as the word is commonly us [...]d, and now taken by us, signifies not a Doctor or learned Deducer of Con­sequences by human learning, nor a Commen­tator upon Scripture, nor a Preacher or Homily­maker (for so every Doctor, Commentator and Preacher would be a Father) but an Eminent and Knowing Witnesser to Posterity of the sence and Faith of the Church which he received: The no­tion then of CHURCH is presupposd to the knowledge of what is meant by the word Father, or to the notion of a Father. Again, a Council signifies a Representative of the Church, whence, [Page 20] 'tis Relative to what it represents, and so its meaning cannot be known unless that others to which it relates be first understood; nor can it be a true and right Council unless what it re­presents be a true Church. Both Council there­fore and Father presuppose the notion of Church; Church presupposes the notion of Faithful; Faithful the notion of Faith; Faith, of the Rule of Faith; 'Tis most evident then that, in the way of generating Faith, the knowledge of the Rule of Faith is antecedent to the knowledge of all these; and so none of these cau help one, who discourses orderly and rationally, to the Knowledge of the Rule of Faith, unless acci­dentally; as it may happen a Father may be a Doctor or great Schollar; and so by a rational discours opening the meanings of the words (or, which is all one, the notion or nature of the Things) give us insight to know what it is which has the properties of such a Rule. In vain therefore do they strive to piece out the sufficiency of Scripture's Letter to be the Rule of Faith by those helps; since the being of that Rule is presuppos'd entire in it self before their existence, and indeed is that which gives them all the Being they have.

12. Some may reply that Fundamentals are clear in Scripture. But, first, a certain Cata­logue of Fundamentals was never given and agreed to by sufficient Authority; and yet without this all goes to wrack; since the neg­lecting [Page 21] or not-knowing which be Fundamental hazards to ruine all: For the discourse grows ticklish when we talk of Fundamentals; this ve­ry word importing that any one left out or mista­ken overthrows the whole End of Faith to those which miscarry in it. Secondly, is it a Funda­mental that Christ is God? If so, I ask whether this be clearer in Scripture than that God has hands, feet, nostrils and passions like ours? Seeing then the appearing clearness of the Scrip­ture's letter in this later point is certain to lead vulgar heads into exceeding great Errours, and that Heresies are as seemingly clear in the out­ward face of it as Fundamental Truths, how mistaken a Principle do they relie upon for the main hinge of their salvation, who say that Fun­damentals are so clear in Scripture's Letter to e­very capacity.

THIRD DISCOURSE.
That the Three next Properties of the Rule of Faith are utterly Incompetent to Scripture.

1. THus much to show that the Letter of Scripture wants the two first and most Fundamental Conditions of a Rule of Faith; being neither Evident as to it's Existence to all, nor Evidenceable as to its Ruling Power to un­learned Enquirers. Let us proceed to the third Property, namely, its Aptness to settle and justify those unlearned persons who rely undoubtingly upon it, such as are the meaner sort of the Vul­gar, who take things by course as they fall, in a natural kind of way without reflecting upon them and their reasons.

2. Since then no Man or rational Creature can be justifiable either for Assent or Practice but by proceeding upon some Principles, and such as, to his best judgment, he takes to be true ones and those Principles can be but of two sorts viz. either inbred in him by the ordinary Light of Nature, call'd Common Sence, or got by some reflexion; and that the persons we speak of are such as proceed undoubtingly, that is, without occasion to reflect; 'tis left that what can justify them must be Principles of Common Sence. Seeing then 'tis both against all Principles of Common Sence to judge that themselves have [Page 23] any self-assurance of the Scripture's Letter, knowing themselves utterly ignorant when 'twas writ, by whom, how brought down, &c. and equally senceless to believe a multitude which sayes it may possibly erre in what it tells them, it follows that they are left unjustify [...]d, nay con­demn'd by Common Sence in absolutely believ­ing such a Rule; That is, condemn'd by the best judgments they are Masters and capable of. This, I say, follows in case this multitude be truly dealt with, and that the Teachers give them a sincere account of their own Tenet. Nay, should these men say they cannot erre in such a matter, by reason of their great Schol­lership, as skill in History, Languages, reading of Fathers, Councils, and such like, yet even then they could not afford them credit to such a degree as to build their hopes of salvation on their word, in regard those learned mens Pro­fession is not of plain Sensations by their Eyes and Ears which the vulgars experience capaci­tates them to judge of, but of such high skills as unlearned men know not what to make of, and even understand not what the very words which express them mean. The best then they can do is to hope that perhaps those men may have some such strange skill, in the same man­ner as they trust to other Tradesmen and Artist [...]s they have heard well of or seen some of their work; or rather not near so much; seeing their Senses give them a far better know­ledge [Page 24] of these Handycraftsmen's skill by the Ef­fects and their fitness for the use intended, than their uncultivated Reason can give them of the goodness of Christian Doctrin and its proporti­on to Bliss. But the main is, when they shall hear and see many several Professions all pretending to Scripture, yet all differ, damn and condemn one another, perhaps persecute one another and fight about Religion, and themselves unable to judge which is most to be trusted; what can common Sense dictate to them but an inextri­cable blunder, and onely clear to them thus much that that can never be the way which ma­ny follow and yet many must needs be misled: Their most vulgar reason easily telling them that there can be but one Truth, that is, that all the other Professors to follow Scripture do notwith­standing believe and speak false. Now these ho­nest Scholars of plain down right Nature, & that of her lowest form too, being unable to judge which truly follow the Scripture's Letter; and onely capable to know they all profess it with Words and Actions expressing the greatest seri­ousness in the world; are to think that all equal­ly mean to follow it to their power. Whence, their common reason will tell them (though they cannot express it in our terms, or defend it) that meerly for want of Light, that is Evidence in the Directive Power of that Rule, they all but one party (and perhaps that too as well as the rest) go most miserably astray. This third Property [Page 25] then of the Rule of Faith, namely, to justify the undoubting vulgar, is wanting to Scriptures Letter.

3. There follows the fourth Property of the Rule of Faith, which is that it must be able of its own nature to satisfy the most Sceptical dissen­ters and rational doubters that the Doctrin it holds forth came from Christ. To make a true conceit of what may be judg'd sufficient for this End, let us reflect on the nature and temper of such Dissenters and Doubters, and we shall quickly discover that they are men given to stir their thoughts by much reflexion and to call them to a strict account ere they yield them o­ver to Assent: Wherefore, if we suppose them true to their own thoughts and not to betray the Light of their Reason to some Passion (in which case their Faith it self were in them a Vice) we cannot imagin that any thing under Demonstra­tion can bind and restrain those active and vola­til Souls from fluttering still in Objections and hovering in doubts when their Eternal Good is concern'd: Especially, when an Authority is a­bout scanning, upon whose word they are bound, after they have approv'd it, to believe uncon­cievable and unheard of things, above the reach of human Reason & Apprehension. Let now any man go about to demonstrate to those great wits these points, That the Scripture's Letter was writ by men divinely inspir'd, That there is ne­ver a real one however there may be many seem­ing [Page 26] Contradictions in it, and this to be shown out of the very Letter it self; That just this Ca­talogue or number of Books is enough for the Rule of Faith, and no one Necessary that was lost, none be abated; or, if so, how ma­ny; That the Originals out of which the Tran­slations were made, were entire and uncorrupted; That the first Translations were skilfully & right­ly made, and afterwards deriv'd down sincere, notwithstanding the errableness of thousands of Transcribers, Printers, Correcters, &c. and the malice of antient Hereticks and Jews who had it in their hands: And, lastly, That this, and this onely is the true sence of it; to which is requisite great skill in Languages to under­stand the meaning of words; in Grammar, to know what meaning they should generally beat according to its Rules as thus construed or put together; Criticism, to know what a word doe most commonly or may possibly signify by rules [...] nicer Etymologies or acception of Authours an­cient or modern, by dialects of several Coun­tries, &c. History, to make known the true scope of the Authour, the best Interpreter of his meaning; Logick, to draw consequence [...] aright, and so find out the thread of the dis­course, to avoid equivocation in words, by dis­covering which are to be taken properly, which Metaphorically; And, to apply this right, fome skill in the things themselves, that is, in Nature and Metaphysicks, especially that which treats [Page 27] of the nature of Spirits, as the Soul, Angels, God and his Attributes; but especially in Di­vinity both Speculative and Moral; which (by the way) supposes Faith and comes after it, and so cannot be presuppos'd to the Rule of Faith which precedes it. Let any man, I say, go a­bout to demonstrate all these difficult Points ro those acute men and will they not smile at his endeavors? since most of them that concern the truth of the Letter are such that we want Prin­ciples to go about to evidence them; and the rest so obscure that a searching and sincere wit would still find something to reply to rationally, or at least maintain his ground of Suspence with a Might it not be otherwise? And, were some one or two of these points demonstrable, yet who sees not it is a task of so long study that a great part of a man's life would be spent in a wea [...]i­some and hopeless endeavour to come to Faith by this tedious method; which would both dis­invite to a pursuit; and even a diligent man may in likelihood die ere he could rationally embrace any Faith at all. Faith then being intended for a man to lead his life by, 'tis necessary it's Rule and the means to come to it should be easily vi­ctorious, by reason of it's Certainty and Evi­dence, over the shock of Doubts or the assaults of Intellectual Fears. In which the Scripture's Let­ter being defective, 'tis plain that 'tis far from the Nature of a Rule of Faith.

4. The same discourse holds to prove that the [Page 28] Scripture's Letter is not convictive of the most ob­stinate and acute Adversaries, which is the fifth Property of the Rule of Faith. Yet, to appre­hend this more lively, let us imagin it apply'd to practice, and that some Text of Scripture were quoted to convince a Deist in some point. He asks how you are certain that Book is God's word? You alledge the Excellencies of it; which indeed are such that eyes already enlighten'd by true Faith may discern something in it above nature, and cry, Digitus D [...]i est hîc, though not his dim sight: He answers that many parts of it are indeed very excellently good, but that the Devil can transform himself into an Angel of Light. On the other side he requites your Excel­lencies with many strange Absurdities and He­resies even by your own confession in the open Letter as it lies, and most unworthy God; as that he has hands feet and passions like ours ac­cording to which he is variable. He finds you direct Text against acknowledg'd Science in di­vers particulars, and reckons up a multitude of Contradictions to his Judgment. You answer that those places are understood according to hu­man apprehension, and are indeed incompetent to God, but that there are mystical and spiritual meanings couch't in those sacred Oracles, which with the help of History would reconcile those seeming Contradictions. He cries, you quite abandon your pretended Rule, that since you confess Heresies are in the open Letter taken as it [Page 29] lies, you must have some Knowledge in your Head concerning God which makes you decline the sence of the words as they lie and run to gloss them; and demands whence you came by those tenets which oblige you to correct the plain Let­ter; challenging your thoughts and carriage as witnesses that that which imbu'd you antece­dently with those contrary Tenets, not the Scri­pture's Letter, was your true Rule of Faith; in regard you frame It according to the Interest of those foreheld Tenets. He pressingly therefore de­mands whence you had those Tenets or Points of Faith by which you guide your self in adhering or not adhering to the Scripture's Letter as it lies?

5. If you say, from other places of Scripture controlling plainly the others; he replies, this can onely make you acknowledge Scripture's Letter plainly contradicts it self, and so leaves you doubtful which side to hold, as far as the bare Letter carries you; or, if it invites you to any thing, 'tis to hold both sides of the contradi­ction. What therefore he still demands is, what it is which forelaid those Judgements in you by which you were byast beyond the power of the Letters Indifferency to hold one side rather than [...]he other? Here you are at a loss with your [...]retence of the Letter's Authority, being gone beyond it. If then you recurr to Reason and Science, teaching you that God is immuta­ble, a Spirit, &c. he straight replies, Then that Science taught you that Point whether Scripture [Page 30] had been or no. It therefore was your Rule in this, (and the same may be said of what-ever you avail your self to interpret Scriptute by) not the Letter. If you say you rely on the Sci­ence or Skill of your Parents, Forefathers, and Pastours, then their skill which ascertaind them of Gods sence (not Scripture's Letter) was their Rule, and so is likewise yours; for whoever re­lies on any precisely as skilful, relies in very deed and properly on their skill, and not on the Letter their skill works upon. Besides, oue not skilful himself, is a bad Judge how far anothers skill ex­tends. If you say you rely not on their skill, (fallible perhaps in them, and obscure to you) but on their Senses enabling them to be knowing Witnesses of what was delivered them, and free from the former exceptions, you are driven for your last refuge to Tradition, and still desert your Letter-Rule. In a word, he challenges the con­sciousness of your most inward thoughts, whe­ther (however in Controversies against others you quote Scripture, yet) in reading the Letter for your own Faith, you bring not along with you some thoughts to interpret it by, which you are resolved to hold to; and so the Scriptures Letter lies before you as matter to work on, so as to preserve it significative of what you judge sound, and not to frame your Judgements by; that is, you use it as a thing ruled, not as a Bule. Nay more, if you look narrowly into the bottome of those Thoughts, you shall discover the natu­ral [Page 31] method of Tradition to have at unawares set­led your Judgements concerning Faith, and actu­ally guiding you in the Interpretation, however when your other Concerns awake design in you, you protest against it, and seem perhaps to your unreflecting self to embrace and hold to the meer guidance of the Letter.

6. Again, Waving the insufficiency of the Scriptures Letter to declare its own sence, he asks this smart question, how you are certain of the Truth of the Letter in this very Text; and de­mands your certain proof or demonstration either either for the Thing, or for the Certainty of the Authority upon which you hold that any parti­cular Text you alledge is truly a part of the Scri­ptures Letter, and not foisted in, or some way altered in its significativeness: or, how you know by the diligence of the Letter-examiners, if it be a negative Proposition, that the particle not was not inserted; if affirmative, not left out. You alledge Consent of all our Copies: He replies, first, that this onely argues that those ancient Co­pies whence ours came were alike (perhaps not so much) but who knows or can undertake that they were not alike faulty, or alike Unlike the true Original? or, that there were not some in those dayes which never came to our knowledge, different from ours in the very point between us? In a word, that all depends on the Truth of the Copies immediately taken from the Original, or the very next to them; which, what they were, [Page 32] by whom taken, where and how preserved from time to time, how narrowly examined when they were first transcribed, and such like, is so buried in obscurity and oblivion, and so far from Evi­dence apt to beget Certain Knowledge, that we must have recourse to Charity to allow it our Hopes, had we no other Rule of Faith than that bare Letter. Again, though human diligence did play its part, yet it is acknowledg'd (sayes your Deist) that there are almost innumerable Variae Lectiones in it still controverted; nay so many in the new Testament alone observed by one man (my Lord Vsher) that he durst not print them for fear of bringing the whole Book into doubt; and, why may not there have been such formerly and now blindly determined and swal­lowed in each Text that concerns our mainest Points of Faith. If you reply (as Nature will lead you) that the Faith of Christ believed and taught from Father to Son was writ in the hearts of the Faithful; and this made them both able and willing to (that is, actually did) preserve the Letter from Errour in any passage that concerned the Body of Christian Doctrine; he challenges you to fly your Colours, to desert your own Rule, and embrace Tradition, the Rule of Roman-Catholikes; and lastly, that you make Scrip­tures Letter the thing Ruled, not the Rule: Yet without this recourse, no satisfactory account can possibly be render'd to a strict Examiner why Errour might not creep into the Text in substan­tial [Page 33] points of Faith as well as in less concerning passages: which devolves to this, that the Scrip­ture's Letter held forth as a Rule of Faith can never convince an obstinate and acute Adversary.

FOURTH DISCOURSE,
That the Two last Properties of the Rule of Faith are clearly incompetent to Scripture.

1. THere remain the two last conditions; Certainty in its self, and Ascertainable­ness to us. That the later is incompetent to Scripture alone or unassisted by another certain Rule, that is, incompetent to it as a Rule, how­ever it may agree to it as a thing regulated or ruled, is the Subject in a manner of all our fore­going Discourse; and it so depends upon the former Property of the two last named, Cer­tainty in it self, that if it fails, that later is im­possible. Now, as for its Certainty in its self or its being establish't on secure Grounds, we may consider Scripture's Letter either Materially as such and such Characters, or Formally as Sig­nificative of a determinate sence suppos'd to be Christ's; and both of these either in its single self, or as dependent on other helps or Causes on foot now in the world according to the course of things.

[Page 34] 2. And, as for the meer material Characters in Books, 'tis evident that they are of them­selves as liable to be destroy'd as any thing else in Nature, as burnt, torn, blotted, worn out, &c. Which though it seems a remote and im­pertinent Exception, yet to one who considers the wise Dispositions of Divine Providence it will deserve a deep Consideration. For, seeing the Salvation of Mankind is the End of God's ma­king Nature, the means to it should be more settled, strong and unalterable than any other piece of Nature whatever; Putting then Scrip­ture's Letter to be this Rule, and that all its Sig­nificativeness of God's Sence, that is all its vir­tue of a Rule, is lost if the material Characters, its Basis, be destroy'd or alter'd; who sees not a very disorderly proceeding in laying so weak means in such immediateness to so main an end; and concludes not thence that Faith's Rule ought in right reason have a better Basis than such perishable and alterable Elements?

3. Reflecting next on those material Chara­cters in complexion with the Causes actually laid in the world to preserve them entire, we shall find that either those Causes are Material, and then themselves are also liable to continual alterations and innumerable Contingencies; or Spiritual, that is, men's Minds. Now, these being the noblest pieces in Nature, and freed in part from Physical mutability by their Immate­riality, we may with good reason hope for a [Page 35] greater degree of constancy from them than from any other; and indeed, for a perfect unaltera­bleness from their Nature, and (this being to conceive Truth) an Inerrableness, if due cir­cumstances be observ'd; that is, if due propo­sals be made to beget Certain Knowledge, and due care us'd to attend to such Proposals: O­therwise their very Createdness and Finitness en­title them to defectibility, besides their obnoxi­ousness to mutation and perpetual alteration through the alloy of their material Compart. I call it due proposal when it must necessarily affect the Sense, and so beget natural Know­ledge; or when unequivocal terms are so imme­diately and orderly laid, that the Conclusion must as necessarily be seen in the Premises as that the same thing cannot both be and not-be at once, by a mind inur'd to reflexion and specula­tion; and I call that due care, which preserves the Soul in such temper as permits the objects impression to be heeded and the Mind to be af­fected by it.

4. This premised we may reflect that the Rule of Faith as was provd (Disc. 1. §. 4, 5, 10, 11.) must be obvious to men of ordinary Sence, and not onely to Speculators; as also, that Ob­jects of the Senses may be of two sorts; Of the the first are things in Nature, or else simple vul­gar actions and plain matters of Fact; which, if oft repeated and familiariz'd, are unmistakable; and consequently the perceiver inerrable in such [Page 36] a matter; Of the second are such actions as are compounded and made up of an innumerable multitude of several particularities to be obser­ved, every of which may be mistaken apart, each being a distinct little action in its single self; Such as is the transcribing a whole book, consist­ing of such myriads of words, single Letters, and Tittles, or Stops, and the several actions of writing over each of these so short and curso­ry, that it prevents diligence and exceeds hu­man care to keep awake and apply distinct at­tentions to every of these distinct actions. And yet, to do our Opposers right, I doubt not but each of these failings may possibly be provided against by oft-repeated Corrections of many se­dulous and sober examiners set apart for that business, and that the truth of the Letter of an whole Book might to a very great degree, if not altogether be ascertain'd to us, were the Exa­miners of each Copy known to be very nume­rous, prudent and honest, and each of them testifying his single examination of it word by word; For then the difficulty, consisting in the multiplicity and the variety, is provided against by the multitude of the preserving Causes; and their multifariousness made convictive to us by their well-testify'd consent.

5. To apply this discourse to the matter in hand. If we were Certain there had been an­ciently a multitude of Examiners of the Scrip­ture's Letter in each Copy taken from the first [Page 37] Original or the next Copies from these and so forwards, with the exact care we have defin'd, the single Examinations of each and the amend­ment of the Copy according to their Examina­tions convincingly testify'd, and that by Excom­munication or heavy Ecclesiastical Prohibitions and Mulcts it had been provided for from the be­ginning that none should presume to take a Co­py of it, and that Copy be permitted to be read or seen till it were thus examined; much might have been said for the Certainty of the Scrip­ture's Letter upon these men's Principles: But, if no such Orders or Exactness was ever heard of, especially of the New Testament upon the Truth of whose Letter they build Christian Faith; If the multitudes of Letters, Commaes, blottings or illegibleness of the Originals, like-appearance of Letters and even whole Words in in the Book, like-sounding in the ear or fancy of the Transcriber, possibility of misplacing, omit­ting, inserting, &c. did administer very fruit­ful occasions to human over [...]ight; If, the more Copies were taken, the more the errours were like to grow, and the farther from correcting; If Experience testifies no such exact diligence has been formerly us'd, by the diverse Readings of several Copies now extant, and thousands of Corrections which have lately been made of the Vulgar Edition, the most universally currant perhaps of any other; what can we say but that (for any thing these Principles afford) Scriptures [Page 38] Letter may be uncertain in every tittle, not with­standing the diligence which has de facto been used to preserve it uncorrupted in the way of those who hold it the onely Rule of Faith? In their way, I say, who will not have the Sence of Christ's Doctrine writ in Christians hearts the Rule for the Correcters of the Letter to guide themselves by, but the meer Letter of a forme [...] (and God knows, controvertible) Copy, out of which the Transcription and by which onely the Examination is made. What Certainty accrues to Scripture's Letter by the means of Tradition, or the living voice of the present Church in each Age, is the Subject of another enquiry.

6. Now, as for the Certainty of the Scripture's Significativeness, which is the other Branch, no­thing is more evident than that this is quite lost to all in the Uncertainty of the Letter; and [...] evident that 'tis unattainable by the vulgar, that is the better half of mankind, since they are un­furnisht of those Arts and Skills, as Languages, Grammar, Logick, History, Metaphysicks, Di­vinity &c. requisit to establish and render certain the sence they conceive the Letter ought to bear; without which they can never make such an Interpretation of it but an acute Scholler skill'd in those means will be able to blunder theirs, and make a seeming clearer one of his own. In a word, if we see eminent Wits of the Protestants and the Socinians, making use of the self-same, and, as they conceive, the best advan­tages [Page 39] the Letter gives them, as comparing places and such like, and availing themselves the best they can by acquir'd skills, yet differ in so main points as those of the B. Trinity and Christ's Di­vinity; what Certainty can we undertakingly promise to weaker heads, that is, to the Gene­rality of Mankind, less able to make such fit al­lusions of places to one another; incapable of such means as should help them, which the o­ther had and are very pertinent and proper to work upon the Letter; And, lastly, who are, for want of those, unfurnish't of any steady Principles to settle their Judgements and ratio­nally determin their own Interpretation Certain. Scripture's Letter therefore is not Certain in it's self, that is, has no immovably secure Grounds enabling it to perform the Office of the Rule of Faith, or to guide Mankind in their way to Faith with a rational assuredness.

Our Conclusion then is this, that SCRIPTURE'S LETTER WANTS ALL THE FORE­MENTIONED PROPERTIES BE­LONGING TO THE RULE OF FAITH.

7. Lest any should misconstrue my former Discourse, I declare here once more that, in a great part of it, I argue ad hominem; that is, I manifest what must follow out of the Princi­ples [Page 40] of those who hold the Scripture's Letter the Rule of Faith, not out of my own or Catholick ones. I declare likewise that I with all reverence acknowledge such Excellencies in those Sacred Oracles as would task the tongues both of Men and Angels to lay them forth. I onely contest that the Scripture's Letter is most improper and never intended for the Rule of Faith; as is easy to be evinc't against an unobstinate Adversary by this, that 'tis known the Apostles and their Suc­cessors went not with Books in their hands to preach and deliver Christ's Doctrin, but Words in their mouths; and that Primitive Antiquity learn't their Faith by another Method a long time before many of those Books were universal­ly spread amongst the vulgar, much less the Catalogue collected and acknowledg'd; till the Revolters from that Method and Rule, being manifestly convinc't of Novelty by it, were for [...]t to invent some other, and chose this of the Scri­pture's Letter for most plausible, as being held very Sacred: untill, by straining it to an undue use, and, to please the people, putting it with­out any distinction of the person, into their hands, and leaving it to their Interpretation, they have brought it (as 'tis made use of for a Rule of Faith) to the vilest degree of contempt; every silly up­start Heresy fathering it self upon It. Of which no Nation in the world is so evident an Instance as our miserable Country, distracted into so ma­ny Sects (all issuing from that Principle,) so im­possible [Page 41] to be brought under Ecclesiastical Go­vernment (and even with much ado under Tem­poral) that 'tis wonderful such proper Effects, especially so sensible, burthensome, so univer­sally spred, and so continual, should not long ago have abundantly demonstrated their Proper Cause, and oblig'd them to renounce that Prin­ciple which is the necessary Parent of such rui­nous and unredressable disorders

FIFTH DISCOURSE.
Showing the Notion of TRADITION, and that all the Properties of the Rule of Faith do clearly agree to It.

1. HAving then quite lost our labour in our last search, let us see whether we shall have better success in this second Enquiry; which is, whether we may hope to find the Properties of the Rule of Faith meet in that which we call or all or Practical Tradition. By which we mean a Delivery down from hand to hand (by words, and a constant course of frequent and visible A­ctions conformable to those Words) of the Sence and Faith of Forefathers.

2. But, to make a more express conceit of Tradition, that so we may more perfectly un­derstand [Page 42] the Nature of that which we treat of let us first soberly reflect on the manner how Children learn their own and others names with whom they live, as also of the rooms and thing [...] they converse with; afterwards, growing up, to exercise their trades, to write, read, or use civil or legal carriage to every one in their kinds [...] And, looking into the Thing we shall observe that they first glean'd notions of those several Ob­jects, either meerly through Impressions on their Senses by the Thing it self alone, or by the help of having them pointed at, or something practic' [...] about them at the same time they were nam'd [...] and afterwards learnt to repeat the same Word after others, more and more intelligently by de­grees, and to practice the same Actions; till a [...] length the former Generation of Teachers de­caying by the course of Nature, a new one i [...] sprung up to Perfection, furnish't with all the accomplishments of the former, and continuing the same natural and Civil Knowledges, Action [...] and Conveniences to this Age which the forme [...] enjoy'd; and so forwards to succeeding Generati­ons by a natural kind of method, without needing Books or new Skills meerly to perform this Effect of continuing and preserving the former Age, as it were, alive in this. Add now to this that this Continuation goes not by long leaps from Age to Age, or from twenty years to twenty, but from year to year, nay moneth to moneth, & even less; according as the new Off-spring grows up by de­grees [Page 43] to a Capacity of understanding and practi­cing; and then reflect on this whole Course, and we shall see the true nature of Tradition or im­mediate Delivery, as exercis'd in Civil matters and Human Conveniences.

3. We want nothing now but to apply this self-same Method to Spiritual or Ecclesiastical affairs, and to reflect how it brings down Faith by Doctrin couch't in Words and exprest in conformable Practices; and then we shall have gain'd a compleat and proper notion of Faith-Tradition, which is the Tradition we speak of.

4. We may observe then that the Children of Christians first hear the Sounds, afterwards by degrees get dim notions of God, Christ, Sa­viour, Heaven, Hell, Virtue, Vice, and such like; and, according as their capacity increases, are put on to practice what they have heard, and made to do some external Actions by pre­cept and Example; which Actions by their more particularizing nature ripen to a more ex­press and familiar conceit those raw Apprehensi­ons or Judgments which while they stood under bare words look't as if they hover'd in the Ayr, and afar off. They are deterr'd from sins, first from lying and disobeying their Pa­rents, afterwards others, by reproaches and pu­nishments and encourag'd to virtuous actions by rewards such as their Age bears, to breed in them a conceit of the badness of sin and good­ness of Virtue: They are shown how to say [Page 44] Grace, say their Prayers, and made do it when they are able; and to gain them some abstracted conceit of those Actions, they are inur'd even while very Infants by certain carriages unusual at other times, as holding up their hands or per­haps eyes, kneeling, keeping silence and other sober postures, to look upon such actions as ex­traordinary ones, when as yet they know no more of them; which breeds a certain awe in them before-hand, preparing their minds to more re­verence for the future. Afterwards, growing up, they come acquainted with the Creed, the ten Commandments, the Sacraments, some common forms of Prayer and other Practices of Christianity, and are directed to order their lives accordingly; the Actions or Carriage of the cir­cumstant Church and Elder Faithful guiding the Younger (notwithstanding the difficulty of the yet-undigested Metaphor, in which dialect Faith is delivered) to frame their lives to several sorts of Virtues by the doctrine deliver'd in words; as Faith, Hope, Charity, Prayer, Adoration, &c. and the concomitant or subservient Vir­tues to these; and the more intelligent, whose Understandings are clear'd by Study and the cir­cumstance of conversing with the learneder sort of Fore-fathers, to do out of Knowledge and Reflexion, what others do (as it were) natu­rally, and by meer Belief or guidance of o­thers. And this goes on by insensible degrees, till at last the Teachers die, and leave in their [Page 45] room a new Swarm of the same nature with themselves as to Christian Life; that is, practi­sing the same external Actions which determin to a certain degree the sence of the Words they have been inur'd to; and (since the practice of those Actions was instill'd from their Infancy, and serious) holding consequently the Principles of those Actions; that is, the same Points of Faith with the former Age. And this goes on not by leaps from an hundred years to an hun­dred, or from twenty to twenty, but by half-years to half-years, nay moneths to moneths, and even less; according as the young brood of Eaglets, made to see the Sun in his full Glory, grow up to a capacity of having their tender eyes acquainted first with the dawning, after­wards with the common day-light of Christian Doctrin.

5. If any should be so dull as to think this looks like a Speculation onely, and not to see plainly that 'tis confirm'd by ten thousand Expe­rements every day; I desire them to consider how the Primitive Faithful were inur'd to Chri­stianity ere the Books of Scripture were writ or communicated; or how themselves (though Protestants or Presbyterians) were first imbu'd with Christian Principles ere they could read, and they shall finde it was meerly by this way of Tradition: Nay more, I dare affirm that the very Presbyterians, much more the Protestants, still adhere to their Faith, because their Parents [Page 46] & Pastors taught them it when they were young, and not upon the Evidence of Scripture's Letter to their own private Judgement: which is mani­fest by this, that those who are brought up un­der Mr. Baxter are apt to follow him, others Mr. Pierce, and all in general hold fixedly to the do­ctrin of others, especially if their Parents be of the same persuasion. So hard it is to beat down Na­ture by Designe, or not to follow Tradition in pra­ctice, though at the same time they write and talk never so vehemently and loud against it. Nay 'tis easie to remark that those who were brought up Protestants, while they follow'd their Teach­ers and Forefathers in the Traditionary way, continu'd firmly such; and that none declin'd from that Profession until they began to use their own private Judgments in interpreting Scripture; and that then they ran by whole shoals into innu­merable other Sects. However then they exclaim against Tradition, yet 'tis evident they owe to It all the Union and Strength they have, and to the renouncing It all their Distractions and Weak­ness.

6. What is said hitherto, is onely to explain the Nature of Tradition perfectly, and to settle a right conceit of it: which done, many Obje­ctions will be render'd unnecessary either to be answerd or mention'd, as those that proceed against a kind of Prophetical Afflatus, which can have no force against our way, building upon perfect Evidence of our best Senses: but [Page 47] especially those which take so wrong an aym, that they dispute against res traditae, or the things de­liver'd, instead of Tradition it self, and there­upon accuse us for holding Human Traditions, or things invented by men for Faith. Whereas, when we speak of the Rule of Faith, we mean by the word Tradition onely the Method of publickly delivering and conveying down Tenets, held to have come from Christ, in the manner before de­clared. This note premised to avoid mistake and keep the Reader's mind more steady to the mat­ter in hand, let us see now whether Tradition have in it the nature of a Rule of Faith; which is done by examining whether the fore-named Pro­perties belong to it or no.

7. And first, 'tis already manifest from what is said, that the First Property of the Rule of Faith, namely, that it must be Evident to all as to its Existence, absolutely agrees with Traditi­on. For, Tradition being the open conveyance down of Practical Doctrines by our best senses of Discipline, that is, our Eyes and Ears; and this by Sounds daily heard and Actions daily seen and even felt; 'tis as easily appliable to all sorts, or Evident to them as to its Existence, as it is to see and hear: So that it can be insinuated into or affect not onely the rudest vulgar and little. Chil­dren, but in some degree even very Babes, as was shown.

8. The second Condition, which is that its Ruling Power should be easily Evidenceable to [Page 48] any Enquirer is thus shown to agree to Tradition, Let the rudest Doubter come and desire to be certify'd that Tradition is a Rule able if fol­low'd, to convey down Christ's doctrin to our very daies; or to the world's end, and let these plain Interrogatories be put to him. Suppose all Protestants in England were settled in an u­nanimous Profession of their Faith, and that their Children without looking farther should believe and practice as their Fathers had brought them up, would it not follow in self-evident terms that those Children while they followed this method would be Protestants too? Suppose these, now grown men under those Parents, should have children too of their own who should behave themselves in the same manner to­wards their Fathers by believing and practising as they taught them, without looking any farther, would it not be equally evident they would still be Protestants also? Since to believe and pra­ctice thus is to be a Protestant; and, would not this method if followed carry on that doctrin still forwards from Generation to Generation to the very end of the world? 'Tis then most easily evidenceable to the rudest capacity that this immediate delivery of Tradition, as above ex­plicated, is a certain way of deriving down Christs Doctrin while the world shall last. This Property therefore of the Rule of Faith is found evidently to agree to Tradition.

9. The third Condition, which is that the [Page 49] Rule of Faith must be apt to justify unreflecting and unredoubting persons that they proceed ra­tionally while they rely on it, is found most exact­ly in Tradition. For the common course of hu­man conversation makes it a madness not to be­lieve great multitudes of Knowers, if no possible consideration can awaken in our reason a doubt that they conspire to deceive us. Now in the way of Tradition all deliverers or immediate Forefathers are Knowers, as appears in those who immediately heard the Apostles; all the Know­ledge requisit being of what they were taught, and practic't accordingly all their lives; of which 'tis impossible the rudest person should be igno­rant, who ever had any Effect of such a Teaching wrought upon him. Nor can any, unless their brains rove wildly or be unsettled even to the de­gree of madness, suspect deceit where such mul­titudes unanimously agree in a matter of fact, look seriously when they speak, act themselves and practice accordingly, and show in the whole course of their carriage that they hope to be sav'd themselves, and to save others whom they thus instruct, by relying on this Truth that their Forefathers thus taught them; which amounts to this, that Nature or common Reason at una­wares steals into them a solid apprehension that Tradition is of a certain kind of Nature; and so, that, while Fathers thus taught Children, it was ever such, that is, that Tradition is a certain Rule of conveying down Faith, which is all we [Page 50] study to evince at present. I may add that, Na­ture telling them by their own experiences, that Parents generally would be apt to teach their Children what themselves had been taught and believ'd to be good, and true, & needfull to their eternal Salvation, their natural thoughts would lead them by a downright procedure, to judge that Tradition was ever in some considerable Body of Deliverers who stuck to it and own'd it; and that those had true Faith, or truly that doctrin which Christ and the first Planters of Christia­nity taught. But of this point more hereafter.

10. If it be objected that this multitude of plain honest-meaning Souls are as much justify'd for believing Scripture. I answer, that if you mean their Faith conceiv'd to be found in Scri­pture, or a determinate Sence of Scripture's Letter, it cannot with any show of reason be pretended that they are as much justifiable for believing any, setting aside Tradition's help; for, without this it totally depends on the inward Judgments, Fancies or Skills of men which they are unqualify'd to judge of; not on open verdict of Senses, to wield the Certainty or Uncertainty of which lies clearly within the reach of their common reason. And as for Scripture's Letter they cannot possibly be justify'd in reason for be­lieving even the Substantial Truth of it without Tradition's assisting hand and preserving care. And the reason is the same; because the com­mon course of human Experience tells them that [Page 51] Judgments or Opinions often disagree, but their plain Sensations (especially if frequently re­peated) never; Whence a Jury of the plainest High-shoes would, upon the Evidence of the sight of six Witnesses, without more ado con­demn a Malefactor; but not upon the Judgments of a thousand men, if a Testimony grounded on Sense were not brought. Now take away Tradition and all ground from Certain Sence fails us, either for the meaning or even Letter of Scripture; and all is left to men's Judgments built on latent Skills or Fancy, or at least on Sense liable to great and numerous mistakes, as hath been shown, (Disc. 4. §. 3.) Again, seeing every one apprehends the most vulgar have reason enough to believe there was such a one as K. Iames and Q. Elizabeth, of which they are no otherwise ascertain'd but by Tradi­tion; why are not they as much or more justi­fy'd for believing points of Faith received down by the same tenour? whereas if you go about to pump their common Reason about the Au­thority of the Statute-Book or the Truth of its Letter, you shall find them blunder and at a [...]oss, being pos'd beyond their sphere of [...] Nature by a question entrenching upon skill, to which they can never answer with a steady as­suredness inwardly; and, if they do so out­wardly, 'tis manifest that some Passion and not their Reason breeds that irrational Profession. The third Condition then of the Rule of Faith, [Page 52] which was to be apt to settle and justify unreflect­ing and undoubting vulgar, is manifestly found agreeing to Tradition.

11. I put next the 6th. Condition, because the proof of it evidently proves the fourth, fifth and seventh; For, what is built on immovable Grounds or Certain in its self, has in it where­with to settle and satisfy the most piercing Wit [...] convince the most obstinate Adversaries, and to ascertain us absolutely. To prove that Tradition has Certain and Infallible Grounds it may suffi [...] to note, that, (Disc. 1. §. 13, 14, 15.) it being evi­dently proved Faith must be Infallible to us, an [...] no less evident that it cannot be such without ha­ving Infallibly-c [...]tain Grounds, (since nothin [...] can be firmer to us than the ground it stands on now the Rule of Faith is its Ground; It follow evidently that This must likewise be Infallib [...] certain. There being then onely two Ground or Rules of Faith owned; namely, Deliver of it down by Writing, and by Words an [...] Practice, which we call Oral and Practical Tra­dition, 'tis left unavoydably, out of the impo­sibility that Scripture should be Infallible as Rule, that Tradition must be such.

12. Though this Conclusion, supposing th [...] Truth of the Propositions I assume as alread [...] prov'd, be sufficiently consequent to those Ad­versaries against whom I contest at present th [...] Certainty of Tradition, in regard they do [...] stick to grant that either Scripture or Tradition [Page 53] must be the Rule of Faith; Yet I foresee more will be expected from a pretender to demon­strate its Certainty, and that he should frame his Discourse from intrinsecal Mediums. Re­flecting then on the nature of Tradition as be­fore explicated, we shall observe that it hath for its Basis the best Nature in the Universe, that is, Man's, the Flower and End of all the rest; and this, not according to his Moral part, de­fectible by reason of Original Corruption; nor yet his Intellectuals, darkly groping in the pur­suit of Science by reflected thoughts or Specula­tion, amidst the misty vapours exhal'd by his Passion predominant over his rational Will; but according to those faculties in him perfectly and necessarily subject to the operations and stroaks of Nature; that is, his Eyes, Ears, handling, and the direct Impressions of Know­ledge, as naturally and necessarily issuing from the affecting those Senses, as it is to feel he [...], cold, Pain, Pleasure, or any other material Quality. Again, those Impressions upon the Sense are not made once but frequently; and, in most, many times every day. Moreover, to make these more express and apt to be taken no­tice of, their lives are to be fram'd by the Pre­cepts they hear and conformable Examples they see; so that Faith (I mean the substance of it, or that solid plain Knowledge as far as 'tis apt to cause downright Christian [...]) comes clad in such plain matters of Fact that the most [Page 54] stupid man living cannot possibly be ignorant of it. Compare next the certainty each Christian Forefather has of what he has practic't all his life with that which a sworn Witness in a Court has of what he saw or heard but once; which done, multiply these thus-qualify'd Witnesses till you equal the vast total of Christianity, and then invent what force in Nature's Universe is comparable to this Inerrability of Tradition. And, if clear Reason evinces to you that 'tis far more possible to make a man not be than not to know what is rivetted into his Soul by so-oft-re­peated Sensations; nay if it exceed all the po­wer of Nature (abstracting from the cases of Madness and violent disease) to blot Knowledges thus fixt out of the Soul of one single Believer; then 'tis as clearly evinc't that sooner may all Mankind perish than the regulative virtue of Tradition miscarry: Nay, sooner may the si­nows of entire Nature by overstraining crack, and she lose all her activity and motion, that is, her self, than one single part of that innumerable multitude which integrate that vast Testification we call Tradition can possibly be violated. The virtue then, by which Tradition regulates her followers to bring down Faith unerringly, is grounded on a far stronger Basis than all materi­al Nature; that is, on such a one as was fitting for Supream Wisdom to lay for Faith, being so neer and necessary a means to bring Mankind to his Beatitude, which was the end of all this [Page 55] corporeal Architecture. Its Followers, I say; for I onely contest in this present part of my Dis­course that Tradition, if follow'd, is of such a Nature: whether it was alwayes thus follow'd or no belongs to another Enquiry.

13. Nor must I neglect the reminding in this place what was produc [...]t before (§. 8.) to show the Evidenceableness of Tradition's Ruling Po­wer to the rudest Enquirers; It being as Evi­dent that while the next Age believes and pra­ctices as the former Age held and practic't (that is, while the Rule of Tradition is follow'd) those of the later Age are still of the same Faith with the former, as it is that to believe the same is to believe the same. Onely I am forbidden by my Reason and Logick to call this a Proof or Argument, because 'tis of the Nature of that first Principle Idem est idem sibijpsi, and onely an Instance or Particular of it, as these Proposi­tions are, a stone is a stone, a man is a man; in which the two Terms are as neerly laid and as fast connected as perfect Identity can ciment them; that is, so close that no medium can come between to make them capable of being argud or prov'd; that is, 'tis self-evident: and so I had no more to do but by opening the Terms to explicate the Proposition; which done it was evi­dent beyond proof.

14. Let now the most rational Doubter or most Sceptical Dissenter muster all the Capri­choes of Fancy Invention can suggest, and the [Page 56] subtlest quirks ingeniously misus'd Logick and abus'd-into-Sophistry can furnish them with; Let the most obstinate and acute Adversaries of Faith whet their wits to that degree of sharpness as to be able to penetrate with nice distinctions between the sides of two notions, if in the least disagreeing, (that is, onely metaphysically divi­sible,) and lay open their difference; what can they say in this case? If they will argue against Tradition, it must be out of some Knowledges; but Knowledge is taken from Things, and the best Thing in this universe, to wit, Man's Na­ture in what he is unalterable, is engag'd for the Certainty of Tradition. But indeed, their proper task will be to find a solution for; or to loose those two notions which perfect Identity binds, and to blunder that Truth which the noon-day-Sun of Self evidence discovers, and (as it were) writes with its most lightsome and most conspi­cous rayes.

15. These four last Conditions then of the Rule of Faith most fully agree with Tradition as well as the three first, that is, 'tis Self-evident to all as to it's Existence, §. 7. and Evidenceable as to it's Ruling Power to a­ny vulgar Enquirer, §. 8. apt to settle and justify undoubting persons, §. 9, 10. to satisfy fully the most Sceptical dissenters and most rational doubters, and to convince the most obstinate and acute Adversaries, built upon unmoveable Grounds, that is, Certain in it's self and abso­lutely [Page 57] ascertainable to us, §. 11, 12, 13, 14. And these Properties springing out of the very nature of the Rule of Faith, and being incompetent to any Competitor or pretended Rule, as has been shown, this main Conclusion is made good, that TRADITION IS THE RULE OF FAITH.

SIXTH DISCOURSE.
Endeavouring to demonstrate à priori the In­defectibleness of Tradition.

1. ALl this is well, may some say, in case Tra­dition had been ever held to; for then in­deed Faith had come down by such an incom­parable Testification that the like was never heard of. But how know we who began to de­sert that Rule, and who ever held to it; or that it was ever held to by any?

2. Now, though the carriage of Protestants makes this labour needless, while I write against them; yet I owe to my former discourse a clear­ing of this likewise. Their Carriage, I say; For, when it is prov'd evidently that Tradition is a certain Rule and Scripture's Letter not such, they who reject the former to adhere to the later are clearly cast in their Cause and condemn'd with­out [Page 58] more ado. Indeed, If Protestants faulted not the Rule but onely pretended that men had fail'd it, they might yet delude the world with some colour that they had ever held to the do­ctrin of Ancestours, and onely deserted us be­cause we had deserted Ancestours formerly; but if they put the fault in the Rule it self, write a­gainst it, disgrace it and recurr to another, 'tis a certain sign of self-condemnation, and that they judge in their inmost thoughts that Tradi­tion or immediate delivery ever stood our Friend and would overthrow them. Nay, did they think they could manifest satisfactorily that we had deserted formerly the Faith of our Forefa­thers as they pretend, they had no more effica­cious way to ruine us than to oppose us upon those Principles laid in this former Discourse; since Tradition, a little after the Primitive times, at which time they pretend we fell, had not gone down many steps, and so the Renouncers of it would in reason seem to them more easily dis­coverable by its vicinity to the Apostles. Besides, this Rule being so own'd and stuck to by us it had been the most efficacious way ad hominem to confute and shame us even by our own Prin­ciples. Wherefore it is most evident they think it not their best play to offer to avail themselves by Tradition, knowing 'twill be their disadvan­tage and our gain; that is, they in effect tacitly yield that (if Tradition be a Certain Rule, which we have shown self-evident) the doctrin [Page 59] held by our Church to be of Faith came down uninterruptedly from the Apostles, that is, was ever, or is Christ's doctrin, however, they blind their own Consciences with glances of Fancy from private Interpretations of God's word, and deaf their own and others ears with empty sounds rebounding witth false Ecchoes from those Sa­cred Oracles.

3. Now, though it seem an unreasonable ex­pectation to require that a Rule should not onely be able to rule those who would follow it, but al­so should have power to oblige the generality of those who actually do follow it not to desert it; yet, such is the Goodness of our Saviour towards his Church to order that the Rule which brings down Faith to us should, both out of the Nature of Man in which it is grafted, and much more by means of the doctrin it recommends, be of so wonderful an Efficacy.

4. This point therefore of the actual Indefe­ctiveness of Tradition I shall endeavour to de­monstrate both à priori from proper Causes, and à posteriori from a now-adayes experienc't Ef­fect.

5. To do the former, I say for my Grounds, First, that Christian doctrin was at first unani­mously settled by the Apostles in the hearts of the Faithful disperst in great multitudes over se­veral parts of the world. Secondly, that this doctrin was firmly believed by all those Faith­ful to be the way to Heaven, and the contra­dicting [Page 60] or deserting it the way to damnation; so that the greatest Hopes and Fears imaginable were by engaging the Divine Authority strongly apply'd to the Minds of the First Believers, en­couraging them to the adhering to that doctrin, and deterring them from relinquishing it; and indeed infinitly greater than any other whate­ver springing from any temporal consideration; and that this was in all Ages the perswasion of the Faithful. Thirdly, that Hopes of Goods and Fears of Harms strongly apply'd are the Causes of Actual Will. Lastly, that the thing was feisi­ble or within their power, that is, that what they were bred to was Knowable by them. This put, it follows as certainly that a great num­ber or Body of the first Believers and after-Faith­ful in each Age, that is from Age to Age, would continue to hold themselves and teach their Children as themselves had been taught, that is, would follow and stick to Tradition, as it does that a Cause put actually causing produ­ces it's Effect. Actually, I say; For, since the Cause is put, the Application put, and the Pa­tient dispos'd (for our Argument puts this to be the Minds of true Believers, in regard the first Renouncers of Tradition must have been True Believers or Holders of it ere they renounc't it) it follows inevitably that the Cause is put still actually causing.

6. I foresee some will object the Indispositi­on of the Wills of the Believing Parents by rea­son [Page 61] of original Corruption. But, supposing I dispute against those Christians who hold that Christ's Doctrin was intended to be an Antidote for that Original malice, and to keep Men's Wills (already possest with it) right, notwith­standing the poize of their corrupted Nature and the temptations of their circumstances; to say 'tis apply'd universally to all several sorts and tempers, and preserves none good, is to questi­on Christ's Wisdom, and to doubt whether it be fit to do the Effect it was meant for. Not to mind the Objecter how many thousands of Mar­tyrs and Holy Confessors, by the Power of this Doctrin, overcame this inbred declivity of their Wills and its disorderly inclinations to the dearest Goods Life or Nature could bestow. A great part therefore would be virtuous, and so (it being easie and obvious, as our former Dis­course proved) would teach their Children what themselves believ'd in their Consciences to be Christ's Doctrine, or the doctrine they had been taught; and so a Body of Traditionary Christians would still be continu'd to the very End of the World; nor could that Rule be to­tally relinquisht by any Stratagem of the Devil or prevail'd against by the gates of Hell. Again, though Nat [...]re incline men to sin or vicious Ap­petites, yet can it incline them all to this sort of sin, that is, to teach their Children what they think will damn them? Or rather does not Na­ture most strongly carry them to the contrary? [Page 62] Their Original corruption then is no particular inviter to this kind of sin, to teach their Chil­dren pernicious falshoods, and which themselves hold such; though themselves be otherwise lia­ble to several sort of particular failings.

7. If any object the fickle nature of the Will, and imagin that this exempts her from the Laws of Causes; I ask them (without engaging far­ther into School-disputes, which I industriously avoid) whether Good be not the proper Object of the Will, and so is to affect it when sufficient­ly apply'd or propos'd? If so, then, since an Object to affect a Power is to put it in act, and the Act of the Power we call the Will is actual Volition or Willing, Good propos'd makes the Will to will or desire that Good, and consequent­ly the known means to obtain it; Now, Infinit Goods and Harms sufficiently propos'd are of their own nature incomparably more powerful Causes to carry the Will, than Temporal ones. Since then, when two Causes are counterpos'd, the lesser, when it comes to execution, is no Cause, as to the substance of that Effect (as a heavy weight, which were otherwise a cause of de­scending, is no such Cause when overweigh [...]d by an heavier, as not making its scale descend at all) it follows that there is no Cause to move the Wills of a World of Believers to be willing to do that which they judge would lose them­selves and their Posterity Infinit Goods and bring them Infinit Harms, such strong and main [Page 63] Hopes and Fears being put in the counter-bal­lance, in case a sufficient Proposal or Application be not wanting.

8. The last Attempt then of an Objectour is to fault the Application of Spiritual and Hea­venly Goods, and to enhance the Proposals of sensible and Temporal Objects. But, if we re­flect with how steady a pursuit and even equal to that of eye-sight or any other Sense, we gene­rally work for Ends no otherwise propos'd than by undoubted Authority; as when a King pre­pares for an Expedition against a forrain Country he never saw, or a Gentleman for a journey to Rome and such like; If we but call to mind how the greatest Testimony in the world engages God's supremely-Infallible Veracity for the truth of the Doctrin, it proposes, which ascer­tains us of those Infinit Goods and Harms spo­ken of; the best Application of a motive to a truly rational power which can possibly be ima­gin'd; If we but consider how those spiritual and unseen Goods are made Intelligible to all, in a fair measure, by most fit and obvious Meta­phors; Familiar and Sensible, by daily practice and as it were Experience of them in Christian Language and Actions, by the venerable Sacra­ments, by the spectable Majesty of outward Ceremonies, all including our spiritual last End or intimating it by their order to it; nay, if we but contemplate even Essential Heaven it self made the Object of our Senses, to comply with [Page 64] our weakness, by the Word's being made Flesh and dwelling amongst us, his being born, his suf­fering cold, hunger, persecution, banishment and other inconveniencies in his Life; his curing our diseased, comforting our afflicted, rais­ing our dead, and other miraculous actions; his being bound, buffetted, scourged, crown'd with thorns, and lastly crucify'd; and all this believed to be for our sakes; all of them Ob­jects most sensibly and palpably affecting our Un­derstandings and thence sliding movingly (and this by their sensible nature) into our very Wills; we shall discover that the Infinit Spiritual Good we spoke of is become through the Provident Goodness of our God, both as easily appliable as the most visible and concerning civil Actions working on the best Sensations of our Forefa­thers, the best and amplest Authority in the world to make their Sensations ours, and the whole course of our Life, Actions, Sacraments, and all other outward shows which could be in­vented to make such mysteries maniable, can possibly render them; and that, if after all this they can be conceiv'd to want any thing of the Sensibleness, 'tis abundantly supply'd by that deep Impression which the Sacred Horrour of the Reverence given to them makes, and the effica­cious wayes to excite and and preserve that Re­verence. All which wayes and objects, thus easi­ly and strongly appliable were frequently and ef­ficaciously apply'd by the education of Parents [Page 65] and by the Discipline and Oeconomy of the Church, which brings those speculations to pra­ctice, was ever, and must needs reach the Genera­lity. In a word, Christianity, urg'd to execution, gives its Followers a new Life and a new Nature; than which a nearer Application cannot be imagin'd. No Application therefore is wanting; Wherefore, the Efficient and the Matter being proper and fitted to one another, the Effect must still be or continue; that is the delivering down sincerely and carefully Christian Doctrin first re­ceived must still continue in some great multi­tude at least, and this to the end of the world.

SEVENTH DISCOURSE,
An Objection clear'd, and the Beginning and Progress of an HERESY connaturally laid open.

1. WHat onely and mainly seems to preju­dice our Argument is, that there have actually been many Hereticks or Deserters of Tra­dition. To which I answer that 'tis not to be expected but some Contingency should have place where an whole Species in a manner is to be wrought upon. It sufficeth us that the Causes to preserve Faith indeficiently entire are as effi­cacious [Page 66] as those which are lay'd for the propaga­gation of Mankind; The Virtue of Faith not being to continue longer than Mankind, its one­ly Subject, does: And they will easily appear as efficacious as the other if we consider the strength of those Causes before explicated, and reflect that they are effectively powerful to make multitudes daily debar themselves of those plea­sures which are the Causes of Mankind's Propa­gation. And, if we look into History for Expe­rience of what has past in the world since the first planting of Christianity, we shall find fa [...] more particulars failing in propagating their Kind than their Faith.

2. I know the multitudes of Hereticks which have from time to time risen makes this position seem incredible; wherefore, that we may [...] once both open Tradition and make good ou [...] Tenet, we will reflect how an Heresy is first bred To inforce then our former Argument, we mus [...] look on Christ's Church not onely as on a Con­gregation having in their hearts those most pow­erful motives already spoken of, able of their own nature to carry each single heart possest by them, though left at its own liberty; but as o [...] the perfectest form of a Commonwealth, ha­ving within her self Government and Officers ap­pointed by Christ himself, and so look't upon by the Faithful, to take care all those motives b [...] actually apply'd as much as may be to the sub­ject Layity; and that all the Sons of the Church [Page 67] be aw'd by wholsom disciplin to conform their lives according to the Doctrin they profess. Yet notwithstanding, as in the Civil State, maugre the Laws and care of Governours, it happens sometimes that some particular Person turns Rebel or Outlaw, and associates to himself others; so it happens sometimes in the Church, that, because 'tis impossible the perfection of Disciplin should extend it self in so vast a multi­titude to every particular, some one or few per­sons, by neglect of applying Christian motives to their Souls, fall into extravagancies of spiritual Pride, Ambition, Lust, or other vices; and itching with desire of followers to honour and support them, they first lay hold on some accidental mis­carriages, as foolish opinions or ill lives of some in the Church, which they aggravate beyond all reason to justify their Rebellion, and [...] invent and propose new Tenets to others; which partly by their plausibleness, partly licentious­ness, suting with the curious or passionate hu­mour of diverse, if Governours be not vigilant and prudent, draw them into the same faction with themselves; especially, if they get the State on their sides, secure indemnity and hopes of reward draw the corrupt hearts of many to bandy with their fellow-revolters against the former Church. Thus a Body is made; incon­siderable in respect of the whole, which yet is engag'd by the natural care of self-preservation to make Head against it. The Church stands [Page 68] upon the uninterrupted Succession of her Do­ctrin from Christ, grounded on the noon-day manifestation of the most universal and clear Attestation in the world: The other's known newness makes it impossible to human nature (though most deprau'd) to pretend this recep­tion from immediate Forefathers; the contrary being so evident to the whole world's eye-sight that this were to tell an openly to no imaginable purpose. They must cry therefore the Church has err'd in Faith, else they condemn them­selves; whence they are oblig'd at next to re­nounce and disgrace Tradition or the living voice of the Church as unfit to be a Rule, which left in force would presently quash and strangle all their Attempts. After this a new Rule must be sought for; either some private Inspiration, or some waxen-natur [...]d words not yet senc't not having any certain Interpreter, but fit to be plaid upon diversly by quirks of wit; that is, apt to blunder and confound, but to clear little or nothing. Their Policy must be to study va­pour in wordish learning, to be dextrous in Cri­ticisms and all that can conduce to the various acception of words; and then to hook Catho­licks from their Infallible and Evident way of Tradition, to combat with them at their own weapon and in their own way: In which if the Catholick be so unwary or good-natur [...]d as to engage, and having been inur [...]d to more so­lid and sober Grounds for his Faith, be not per­haps [Page 69] so skilful in beating the air as his bird-witted Opponent, presently a Victory is pro­claimed with the loudest Trumpet of Fame, and (vanity being generally their God who place their honour in such aiery sorts of learning) blaz'd up and down to the commendation of themselves and perversion of others. But a company which makes such a bustle cannot long want a Name; Wherefore, the Traditionary Christian having ever enjoyd the Appellation of Catholick, and it being impossible their Adver­saries should by any design or craft after the common Language of Mankind, hopeless to attain the name of Catholick, they are forced to content themselves (though unwilling) with some other new one; which, Nature, working upon their own comportment, determines to be either from their Authour, as Lutherans, Zuin­gliaus; or their new Tenet, as Tritheits, Sa­cramentarians; or some combination amongst themselves, as Protestants; or, lastly, some particular carriage, as Quakers, Dippers, &c.

3. These first Adherents to the upstart Novel­list being clung into a Body, after a while young understandings ripening to a capacity of Faith, things are presently alterd; The pretended Rule of Scripture's Letter's self-sufficiency is immedi­ately thrown by as useless any farther; Design hath got its end already, and the natural way of of Tradition begins to take place again and re­cover [Page 70] its self; nay the Reformers themselves are forc't to crave help of it to keep their company together. Children are taught that they are to believe their Pastours and Fathers; and, though they are permitted to read the Scripture when they come at age, yet they are told they are to guide themselves by the sence their Pa­stours and Fathers give it, which is that they ought to guide themselves by the Faith of their Parents and Teachers in interpreting Scripture; the very way Catholicks ever took in that par­ticular: And, if any company of men though now mature to judge, presume to follow their own Judgement in interpreting it, and differ from those first Reformers, these if they get the power in their hands will presently fall to oblige them by force to act, that is (if they would have them do it conscientiously, which else were to force them to sin) to hold as they do, and per­secute or punish them if they do not; whereas they guide themselves to their best capacity by the Scripture's Letter which is the very Rule of Faith their Persecutors taught them and made use of themselves when they broke from the Church. Which evidently shows that a new Rule is introduc't; and that it is not indeed the Letter of God's word which is now thought fit to guide the Readers of it to Faith, but those men's In­terpretations of it. So that the breaking from Tradition and consequently the Church casts them most inevitably upon these self-contradi­ctions. [Page 71] First, to reform npon pretence of the Scripture's Letter being the Rule of Faith, yet afterwards in practice to desert that Rule in their carriage towards others. Secondly, to disallow to others those Grounds themselves proceed upon. Thirdly, to pretend first the Scripture's Letter clear of it self without needing the Church to in­terpret it, so to avoid condemnation from the for­mer Church; yet afterwards, to judge the Follow­ers of it to their best power to go wrong; that is, to confess it obscure, and to need their new Churches Interpretation. 4ly. To persecute others for taking that way, which they held (at least pretended) meritorious in themselves. 5ly. To oblige others to relinquish the sole guidance of the Scriptures Letter and to rule themselves by their Tradition; and yet at the same time when they write and dispute against Catholicks, to impugn Tradition or the doctrin of Forefathers as unfitting to sence it, and abet onely the self-sufficiency of Scri­ptures Letter. And, lastly, to impute that carriage to our Church as a fault which themselves pra­ctice upon their own Subjects: And, which is most material, our Church punishes none but such as desert the Rule she recommends; where­as they punish those under them for following too close that Rule which themselves recom­mended and applauded, as the whole and sole Bafis of their Reformation.

4. Now, what can follow hence but that their Ecclesiastical Subjects whom Common Sence [Page 72] cannot but make exceeding sensible of such their unreasonable carriage, in persecuting them pure­ly for following God's word or the Scripture's Letter to their best power, which themselves had taught them might securely, nay ought in conscience be follow'd, let the Consent of Fore­fathers and the present Church made up of mee [...] men say what they would, what follow's, I say, but that exasperated beyond patience by this pro­cedure which they will be apt to conceive to be a most senceless and self-condemning tyranny o­ver their Consciences, they will (unless Gover­nours be vigilant,) strive to wreak their malice against their Persecutors; and if they be nume­rous and powerful, endeavour to involve whole Nations in war and blood; which God of his mercy avert from our distracted Country. Of so main consequence it is both for Church and State that men's Minds be right set in the Fundamen­tal Grounds of Christianity; and that the Prin­ciple they build Religion on be Evident, that is, apt to unite their Understa [...]dings and by it their Affections; not uncertain and vertible, which must needs lead (if pursu'd by an earnest zeal) to nothing but diversities in Opinions about Faith, thence to dissensions and Feuds in the Will, which upon any great pressure will be apt to break forth into actions of highest enmity; and by the irreconcileableness of such Interests, (neither side being able to yeeld to the other in what each of rhem holds Sacred, Religious and [Page 73] Conscientious) endless and fiercest bickerings are apt to succeed, even to utter desolation; as frequent Histories too lamentably record. Not that I intend the Justification of those revolting Sects, who having no certain Grounds of Con­troversy are both self-condemn'd by the com­mon Light of Reason for disobeying a Certain and Known Legal Authority (which God's Law and plain Reason commands them to submit to) to maintain an Uncertainty, that is for any thing they know an Error; and, were it a known Truth they held, would be no less condemn'd by the Law of God and common Reason, nay out the nature of Religion it self, for making Rebellion and an unimpower'd Sword the Defence of Truth which stands firm on a surer Basis. I one­ly mind prudent Considerers on the by how much it conduces to State-Unity and Peace that the Principle of conveying Faith to us be built on Sensible Evidence acknowledgable by all Man­kind, when rightly understood; and not left to giddy Interpretations of Private Fancies, which are apt to run so eccentrically to one another, that we can never expect they shall have any common point, where to fix and unite men's Minds and Afflections.

5. The usefulness of this Parergon serves to elucidate as it were ptactically and experimen­tally the Certainty of Tradition. The particu­lar use we make of it in this present Discourse, whence we digrest into it, is to conclude (as well [Page 74] as we can of things at a common view, which yet is no less certain) that the number of the actual Deserters of the natural way of Tradition have been but few, to wit the first Revolters, a small handfull compar'd to all Christianity besides, and onely occasionally not constantly happening; that the Descendents of these Revolters were taught by them to believe Them in the right, in interpreting Scripture, and not their own Judg­ments; that is, follow'd the way of Tradition, however misplac't: To which if we compare the numerous contingencies both in man's Na­ture and other circumstances, hindring Propa­gation, every day happening, we shall find much reason to prefer the multitudes of the o­ther before this: But if we add to this Conside­ration the daily decay of innumerable particu­lars, upon whom the Continuation of Mankind depends, by natural or accidental deaths, and reflect on the innumerable new Subjects and even whole Nations into which Tradition hath and does daily propagate it self, and those unin­fected by new Heresies for whole Ages, that is without any one Deserter of Tradition among them; and none of those beholding to Proge­nitors for their Faith but to Externs who con­verted them, whereas Propagating their Kind can onely be by those of the same race; We shall find that the Causes laid to propagate & preserve a Body of Traditionary Christians look far more steadily and less needing a recourse to any parti­cular [Page 75] Providence than those which we can disco­ver laid for the keeping on Foot a Body of Men. Whence, if any (as the common fashion is) bring against the perpetuation of Tradition such wild­roving Arguments as would equally strike at the Certainty of perpetuating Mankind, or conti­nuing any Species in Nature, the readiest answer is to show they do so; and then to tell them we intend not Tradition should last longer than the onely Species capable of Faith will; that is, longer than Mankind is to stand, who onely can have it or need it.

EIGHTH DISCOURSE.
Endeavouring to demonstrate à Posteriori the Vninterruptedness of Tradition hitherto.

1. HAving seen and weigh'd the strength of those Causes which preserve and continue Tradition on Foot, and thence endeavour'd to demonstrate its Indefectibleness as the proper and necessary Effects of those Causes; we will now begin our Discourse at the other end, and try if we can conclude the same from some Pro­per Effect; that is, from such an Effect as could onely have sprung from the actual Indeficiency of Tradition as its Cause: That so we may show [Page 76] the Certainty of Faith's Conveyance to us do [...] ­bly guarded, and on all sides Evident.

2 Though indeed this seems a needless endea­vour against the Protestant who yeilds that those points of Faith in which we agree came dow [...] by this way of Tradition. Whence, he is to be prest to answer candidly these Queres. W [...] not the Trinity, Incarnation and other points [...] which we agree held in all Ages since Christ by Gods Church? He must yeild it, no Protesta [...] ever denying it; besides that we both agree to call that God's Church which held those mai [...] points of Faith. Next, he is to be askt, whether seeing those points were held ever of Faith, Fa­thers did not actually teach Children so, or the former Age the later. Common reason will teach him they did; which devolves into this that a Protestant must confess those points came down by Tradition, and that Tradition hath not faild to bring them down to us. Ask him next by what virtue Tradition perform'd this and whether the same virtue were not powerful to bring down others as well as these had any such been? And, when he assignes this virtue, I cannot suspect him negative in so plain a point. Ask him farther; Is there not a necessary Con­nexion and Relation between such a constant Cause and its formal Effect? So that, if its for­mal Effect be Those Points received as delivered ever, the Proper Cause must be an ever-delivery, whence, we can argue from such an Effect to its [Page 77] Cause for any particular Point, and consequen­ly for any Point that is in Controversie between Them and Us, in case it be a Point we held ever deliver'd: And if so, as manifest Reason evinces it, our now-held Faith was taught by Christ and his Apostles, and our dispute is at an end. But, because I rather suspect the Protestant see­ing his Cause and Interest too deep engag'd and himself streightned by such strict Connexion of Terms, will fly of and deny Tradition to be a necessary Cause, notwithstanding its constant te­nour of having wrought this its Effect millions of times, or from step to step during so many Ages, and will not care to alledge that all this is pure Chance and contingency, I shall pursue the De­signe and Method I at first intended.

3. The Effect then we will pitch upon and avow to be the proper one of such a Cause, is The present perswasion of Traditionary-Christi­ans (or Catholicks,) that their Faith hath de­scended from Christ and his Apostles uninterrupt­edly, which we find most firmly rooted in their hearts. And the Existence of this Perswasion we affirm to be Impossible without the Existence of Traditions ever-Indeficiency to beget it.

4. To prove this, I lay this first Principle. That Age which holds her Faith deliver'd thus from the Apostles neither can it self have chang'd any thing in it, nor know or doubt that any Age since the Apostles had chang'd or innovated any thing therein. This Proposition needs no proof to [Page 78] evidence it, but onely an Explication; For, since no man can hold contrary to his Know­ledge, or doubt of what he holds, nor change or innovate in the case propos'd without knowing he did so; 'tis a manifest Impossibility an whole Age should fall into an Absurdity so inconsistent with the Nature of one single man.

5. The second Principle shall be this, No Age could innovate any thing, and withal deliver that very thing to Posterity as receiv [...]d from Christ by continual succession. For, since Man is a rational Creature, he must have some reason or motive, good or bad, which he proposes to himself as an Eud to be atchiev'd by his action; and (what­ever his remote end is) his immediate End in telling Posterity a late invented thing was held immediately before, is to make them believe it; Wherefore, since a seen Impossibility can­not be a motive to one not frantick, and that 'tis evidently Impossible they should make Poste­rity believe a thing so universally known to be false as this must needs be; because were it possi­ble the whole Age should conspire to tell such a lye, (the whole, I say, otherwise the Refusers would easily discover the cheat) yet 'tis mani­festly Impossible all at age to know the truth should conspire from so many several and so far distant places, in the precise time to deceive the new Off-spring every moneth ripening to a ca­pacity of such knowledges, or blot out all the Monuments which would evidently undeceive [Page 79] their abused Posterity: 'Tis then as impossible this Principle should falter as that the foregoing Age should conspire to act without a motive or that the succeeding Age should believe what they know to be otherwise; that is, should hold both sides of a Contradiction in a clear matter of Fact, which is utterly inconsistent with a judg­ing or congnoscitive nature.

6. These Principles lay'd, we we will advance to the proof of our main Conclusion on this man­ner; that since neither any Age (by our first Principle) could hold a new introduc't point for not-new but immediately deliver'd; nor yet any foregoing Age (by our second) make it be re­ceiv'd as not-new by Posterity, it follows that in no Age could any doctrin changing the imme­diate Faith of Fore-fathers or new at that time, come in or be received under the notion of im­mediately deliver'd or not-new at that time. Wherefore, since nothing can descend or come down under the notion of not-new, or deliver'd uninterruptedly, unless it first come in or be re­ceiv'd under the notion of not-new or deliver'd uninterruptedly, nor be held by us as descended under such a notion unless it did actually descend to us under such a notion (by the second) it fol­lows manifestly that, if we now hold it descended as such, it did descend as such, and consequently was received by the deliverers as such; and (the same reason holding equally in each Age from Christ,) came down consequently from Christ [Page 80] and his Apostles. No power then or wit of man could make our Faith now held to be so descended, but its having been actually so descended: that is, onely the Existence of Tradition's Indeficiency could have effected this present persuasion of Traditionary Christians (or Catholicks) that their Faith descended uninterruptedly from the Apostles. It being then manifest by Experience that this Effect or present Persuasion is, (for all Catholiks hold the Church never fail'd in Faith,) 'tis demonstratively Evident that its proper and onely Cause has been put; that is, that Chri­stian Tradition has ever been held to by a Body of Men consisting of the Predecessors to those whom we find actually thus perswaded.

NINTH DISCOURSE.
Opening the incomparable strength of the Churches Human Authority, and the Infinit ad­vantages accrue to It by the Supernatu­al Assistances of the Holy Ghost.

1. BUt all this is Nature may some say, and by this Method an Heathen may by his natu­ral wit become a good Christian. By which word Nature, if the Objecter means Reason wrought upon by motives laid by God's special goodness to bring Souls to Bliss, I wonder what else is Supernaturality but this which he miscalls Nature; and why Reason, rectify'd by such Lights and Proposals as the force of Nature could not have aym'd at much less effected, ought not to be said to be affected supernaturally, however those very motives be connatural to our Souls: It being evident that we use even the na­tural power of our Reason in discoursing of things above our reason; and, on the other side to ex­pect no constant way or common path of motives laid for the Salvation of Mankind, but extraor­dinary inspirations for each particular man, unra­vell's the Order of God's best Providence, and is the very notion of Fanatickness. But to med­dle with this point is out of my road otherwise than to take my rise hence to show how far Christian Tradition is strengthen [...]d above the [Page 82] greatest meerly-human Testimony whatever: And that the Church owes this strength to those Motives supervening to meer Nature, which we rightly call Assistances of the Holy Ghost; in re­gard they are built on Perfections of Will in the Faithful, or on Virtues, the Effects properly at­tributed to that Divine Person.

2. Ere we come to explain what advantage the Church as thus divinely assisted has over her self as meerly wrought upon by human motives, we will compare first her human Authority with some other vast Body of Testifiers which may most seem to stand in competition with her. And an eminent and acute opposer of Tradition has already pointed us out a choice one; namely, that of the Mahometans for Mahomet's Existence: which we doubt not to have the power to con­vey down the Truth thereof with Infallible Cer­tainty to the end of the world, if follow'd; not do we think the most Sceptical Protestant doubts but it has had the force to make it self be follow'd hitherto; however at unawares their calm Rea­son grants that to a Body of Turks which their Passion makes them question and even deny to a Church of Christians. Yet, I averr that the hu­man force of Tradition in the Church for the de­scent of the main Body of Christs doctrin far ex­ceeds that of the Turks for Mahomet's Exi­stence.

3. To shew this in brief I note in the first place and chiefly; that howsoever a report may [Page 83] spread universally from a small beginning in the quality of a rumour, yet the force of its Cre­dibility, if it be a matter of Fact, is founded on the Quantity and Quality of those who first saw or perceiv'd it. Putting then the Quality of the Testifiers in both cases to be equal, so to bring our Controversy to a smaller compass, and comparing onely the Quantity or Number of the original Testifiers on both sides; what propor­tion is there between that handful of men about Mecha and some few other places where Mahomet conquer'd and planted his doctrin, and those vast multitudes whom all the Apostles, Disci­ples, and Apostolical men converted by most powerful miracles in so many distant Nations in the World? If we lay them together we shall find that few saw or felt (that is, were witnesses of) Mahomets Existence so much as once, in comparison of those who were every day imbu'd with and practic [...]t Christian Doctrine. A new Consideration springs hence that 'tis a thousand times easier for that single company of Arabians and Syrians to conspire to a ly and so deliver down to us a false Mahomet, than it is for such a multitude of people in so remote Countries as first suck't in Christianity to conspire in the very thought of having such a Conspiracy. And, lastly, it was as easie by oft repeated Sensatio [...]s to know Christian Doctrin at first to that degree as to govern their actions by it (which is all that is requisit for the generality) it giving the Prin­ciples [Page 84] to the daily practice of their new Life as they were Christians, as it was for these other witnesses to be certain of Mahomet's Existence; and much easier, in regard the greater part by far of those whom we allow Witnesses of Maho­mets Existence perhaps scarce knew him by sight; not conversing him daily or very often, as each of the Primitive Christians did with those points of Faith they guided their lives by.

4. The human Authority then of the Church being such as exceeds she Evidence of other Te­stimonies, which yet are such that amongst all the most extravagant Opiniastres none was ever found so frantick as to doubt them; and should any do so, all sober Mankind would esteem them stark mad; which could not be done in reason unless they renounc't perfect evidence, that is, unless those Testimonies were perfectly Evident: This, I say, being so, some may think it superfluous and a quirk of an over­straining Fancy to contend there is any greater Evidence to ascertain the conveyance of our Faith from Christ's time to us. But, whoever re­flects on the reason of those words, Sic Deus di­lexit Mundum ut Filium suum Vnigenitum daret, John 3. 16. Or for those, Nunquid de bobus cura est Deo? 1 Cor. 9. 9. Nonne vos magis pluris estis volatilibus caeli? Mat. 6. 26. and such like; or, on what Metaphysicks demonstrate concerning the perfect methods and wayes of [Page 85] Essential Wisdome, will easily be convinc't that, if the Salvation of Mankind be the End of this material world's Creation, the Providences to bring about this End ought in true wisdome be so particular and so sublimely efficacious that the means laid for the preservation of any other species in Nature would scarce deserve the name of a Providence in comparison of the other. Whence follows, that the means which are mainly influential to promote Man towards Bliss (such as is Faith, the Rule of that Life by which he tends to Heaven, and the Substance of his Hope which gives the vigour to that Life) must be Certain (its Efficacy depending on this Certainty) beyond any Evidence meer Nature could compass. Which that great Mèditater on God's Law day and night well comprehended, when out of the full sight of this Truth he burst out into that expression of wonderment, Testi­monia tua, Domine, credibilia, facta suut ni­mis.

5. We will briefly touch at some of the Ad­vantages which those Assistances superadded to Nature give the Church, and leave them to be scann'd by the leasurely thoughts of attentive Considerers.

6. First then, we find that 'tis natural to every Man that his Phantasms should be such as the Impressions of the Objects are apt to make them, his Thoughts appropriated to his Phantasms, and his outward expressions concerning the thing, [Page 86] and amongst them his Words, conformable to his Thoughts: So that true Words and sincere Acti­ons are the proper Effects of the other Causes, and necessarily produc't by them if Designe hin­der not: Which amounts to this, that 'tis Natu­ral for every man to speak Truth; and that, whenever one speaks False wittingly, Artifice makes him cast about to contrive a ly fittingly to the end he aims at; whence it is that Fools and drunken men, who are incapable of such Artifice, use to tell the plain Truth. If this be so in Nature, and that Grace is to perfect Na­ture in whatever is good in it, it follows that one truly Christian heart is far more fixt to Vera­city than others not imbu'd with those heavenly Tenets; and consequently that a Multitude of such incomparably exceed, in point of testify­ing, the same number of others unfortify'd by Christ's Doctrin.

7. This will be clearer if we reflect upon the way by which Original Corruption violates fre­quently in execution this natural Veracity; and 'tis this; that inclining and transporting them to the undue love of Creatures even to the injuring known rational Orders laid in the world and most necessary for the subsistence or Universal well-being of Mankind (which we call the Commandments) hence, afraid to own such an enormous procedure, they cast about to cloak it with sought pretences. The sum therefore of Christianity tending to implant in the hearts [Page 87] of the Faithful an over-powering Love of Supreme spiritual Goods attainable in the next Life, and by consequence to take off their ex­travagant affection to earthly things, it leaves Man's natural disposition to Truth free to do its Effect, and renders needless that crafty way of design, onely which could byass and pervert the Will from pursuing the way of Nature.

8. Compare we now the positive Motives, Natural and Supernatural, obliging to Veracity, and we find the Hopes and Fears which Christi­anity proposes to make and keep men Good as infinitly exceeding the Natural ones as Eternity does a moment, abating the intenseness of the Goods and Harms hop't for and fear'd, nay held firmly by all and conceited lively by many to be beyond all imaginable comparison greater than the other. Yet experience tells us and none doubts but that these transitory and incompara­bly-less Goods and Harms are sufficient Motives to oblige Bodies of Men to deliver down Poli­tick or Natural matters of Fact, as the Existence of such former Kings (to blunder which truth there wanted not highest Interests were it con­ceiv'd feisible) such Eclipses, Wars, &c. In­concievably more powerful then must the other motives be to oblige them to Veracity in such narrations on which the destroying or preserving those highest concerns depend. And what pre­valency Eternal motives had over Temporal ones when they came to clash so neer as one [Page 88] must forego one Hope or the other is seen by the perpetual and constant sufferings of the Martyrs in all Ages, and the many Persecutions daily and gladly undergone every day in many places for Conscience-sake.

9. In the Natural Commonwealth there are multitudes of men deputed particularly to great Trusts, and some Extraordinary Ceremony done upon them to make them true to such Trusts, nay Oaths by things they highly reverence taken, not onely by those Officers, but sometimes (though rarely) by the Generality to secure their Fidelity. But what proportion can those Ceremonies bear being but of human Institution to the Sacraments of the Church held to have been instituted by Christ himself; many of which are common to all Christians; some to initiate them most solemnly at first, or to rivet that Initiation with a new military Tessera; some to strengthen and cure the languishing; some to win to Love by Acts of greatest Bounty; Others are proper to impower some as Officers to over­see the common affairs of Faith; all tending to strengthen powerfully the Generality not to pre­varicate from the Faith held ever truly received down, and particularly to oblige Governours not to bely themselves or connive at others gros­ly belying their Forefathers and betraying their Depositum.

10. Though Nature teaches the rudest that they should not do to another what they would [Page 89] [...]ot have done to themselves, yet Original Cor­ [...]ption too often makes us prevaricate in pra­ [...]ice from that evident Rule: and the Reason because while men's Affections are chiefly [...]tch't on Temporal Goods, hence, in regard [...]hey are finite, that is such that if one have [...]ore another has less of them, such men are [...]t enviously to deprive their partaking Neigh­ [...]ours of them, that so the greatest part may [...]ll to their own share: But, such an action can ever proceed from, nor thought enter into the [...]ost deprau'd nature as to harm another without [...]y good to himself. Now, this in our Case [...]ust be put, if we put Christian Fathers mis­ [...]aching their Children unreceived doctrins for [...]ceived contrary to their own knowledge. For, [...]pposing Sanctity in the Church, that is, that [...]ultitudes in it make Heaven their first Love, [...]nd look on Spiritual Goods as their main con­ [...]ern, which are of such a Nature that none has [...]ess for another's having more, but on the con­ [...]ary the Multitudes of virtuous persons would [...]elp to encrease both Virtue and Glory too in [...]heir fellowes and relations; It follows, that [...]ad those Fathers in any Age consented to mis­ [...]ad their Posterity from what themselves con­ [...]eit to be true, they should do the most Extream [...]arm imaginable to others, without any the [...]east Good to themselves; which is perhaps im­ [...]ossible in one single man, more in a few, but [...]nfinitly in a multitude, especially of good men [Page 90] Moreover, Christ's Law being the Law of Ch [...] ­rity, which includes Love of our Neighbou [...] 'tis directly opposit to the Principles of Christi [...] ­nity to do them an injury of so high a nature [...] to debar them Heaven and send them to Hel [...] and all this gratis.

11. Again, the greater the Recommends any Truth is, the greater is the obligation not bely our selves and it. Let us weigh then [...] Recommends which Christian doctrin receive from Forefathers had; either as to its serious [...] port, that it be faithfully transmitted to other [...] or the Universality, conceited wisdom, goo [...] ­ness, &c. of the Recommenders; and then [...] lance it with the Recommendation of any nat [...] ­ral or civil Truth whatsoever, and we shall [...] it levitate like an inconsiderable feather or [...] in comparison of the vast poize and weig [...] sway with which the other descended.

12. Nothing is by Nature more deeply [...] more universally rooted in the hearts of manki [...] than a dear and tender love of their off-sprin [...] and a careful provision for their passing their [...] well, that is free from miseries, with a com [...] ­tency of such Goods as are held fitting for th [...] Nature. But how much more care must Cha [...]ty oblige Parents to have of their Children, [...] to use the means they conceive proper to bri [...] them Everlasting and Infinit Bliss in Heave [...] and to avoid them Intolerable and Endless Mis [...] ­ries in Hell? Especially, since the performing [Page 91] [...]evaricating from that Duty is of equal concern [...] Themselves? How strange an advantage [...]peradds Christianity in this particular to the [...]earest natural love of our selves, or of our near­ [...]t Relations who are next our selves!

13. Consider we next the Natural care of not [...]sing one's Credit, and we shall find in com­ [...]on that, the good Opinion of others we call [...]redit or Repute is look't upon as a most necessa­ [...] means to make men fit for human Society or [...]ommerce, and without which none can expect [...] thrive in his Vocation or live with comfort. [...]eflecting next on the degrees of Discredit, we [...]nd that he who tells a lye for his own ad­ [...]antage though without any harm to others, with [...]uch ado escapes some disrepute; but if his [...]yes be pernicious, he is held an arrant villain; [...]f to nearest Friends and Relations, still greater: [...]f the mischiefs he does by his salse words or [...]ealings be exceeding great ones, he is yet more [...]bominable, and proportionally still as the harms, [...]e induces, grow. If the motives he had to keep [...]im good were very strong and efficacious, he [...]s still more enormous; and, as the strength of [...]hose preservative motives encrease so is his Ma­ [...]ice still enhanc't. But, if he go about all this wickedness boldly and confidently without ca­ [...]ing who knows it, especially if he back his most notorious and most pernicious Lye with deepest Oaths and Perjuries by things most Sacred, he is now conceiv'd to be arriv'd at such a pitch of [Page 92] wickedness, that he is no longer to be held a Man, but a Divel Incarnate. But, how in­comparably more wicked and consequently disgraceful must that man be, who believ­ing Christ's doctrin to be thus received and the means to salvation, should teach his Chil­dren otherwise! The believed mischiefs he does his nearest relations, no less than the loss of Heaven and the sad Gain of Hell-fire for all E­ternity; the motives he had not to do it, as to his own concerns, full as Infinit; his lye most Notorious to all about him, and even the whole World. And, if he be a Pastor, who (besides other Sacraments implying most obliging vows not to renounce his Faith) is consecrated by a par­ticular one to preach Christ's doctrin truly and to preserve his Flock sound in Faith to his power, then to prevaricate from this Duty renders him a sacrilegious abuser of the most holy state of life, and most inviolable tye this world, as Sanctify'd by our Saviour, has in it. What inconcieva­ble villany then and consequently discredit must that man seeingly undergo, who shall misteach his own Fancies for doctrins deliver'd; and how impossible is it a World of Forefathers should all conspire to make so desperate and absolute a forfeit of their reputation and honesty! 'Tis not possible to be summ'd up or even ghest at, be­ing beyond all proportion. The Advantage then with which Christian Doctrin in the mind of each, and the Holy Ghost in the hearts [Page 93] of most of the Faithful, rivet and confirm this natural care of Credit to the preserving Tradi­tion inviolable, is incomparable and in a man­ner Infinit.

14. It would require a large volum, to unfold particularly how each virtue contributes to show the inerrable Indeficiency of Tradition, and how the Principles of almost each Science are con­cern'd in demonstrating its Certainty: Arith­metick lends her Numbring and Multiplying Fa­culty to scan the vast number of Testifiers; Geo­metry her Proportions to show a kind of Infinit Strength of Certitude in Christian Tradition a­bove those Attestations which breed Certainty in Human affairs; Logick her skill to frame and make us see the Connexions it has with the Prin­ciples of our Understanding; Nature her Laws of Motion and Action; Morality, her first Prin­ciple that nothing is done gratis by a Cognosci­tive Nature, and that the Body of Traditionary Doctrin is most conformable to Practical Reason: Historical Prudence clears the Impossibility of an undiscernible revolt from points to descended & held so Sacred; Politicks show this to be the best way imaginable to convey down such a Law as it concerns every man to be skilful in: Metaphysicks engage the Essences of Things, and the very no­tion of Being which fixes every Truth; so esta­blishing the scientifical Knowledges which spring from each particular nature by their first Causes or Reasons exempt from change or motion: Di­vinity [Page 94] demonstrates it most worthy God and most conducive to bring Mankind to Bliss. Last­ly, Controversy evidences the total Uncertainty of any thing concerning Faith if this can be un­certain, and makes use of all the rest to establish the Certainty of this first Principle; and, which settled, secures Scripture as far as is requisit, and all things else that can mainly concern Salvation. To pursue these and many other Testimonies of Tradition's Infallibleness is not my task at pre­sent: I shall content my self with concluding, that, as we have prov'd it self-evident that Tra­dition if ever held to is an inerrable Rule, so our four last Discourses have shown its ever-In­deficiency or rather Indefectibleness, scientifi­cally Evident; and as strong as Nature and Grace strain'd (as we may say) to their utmost can make it.

COROLLARIES From The former Discourses.

1. NOne can pretend to have Faith (by the or­dinary course of God's Providence) but the holders to Tradition. 'Tis prov'd by our Conclu­sion formerly deduc't, (Disc. 5. §. 15.) that Tradition is the Rule of Faith, that is, the Or­dinary Way to arrive at Faith.

2. None can with right pretend to be a Church but the Followers of Tradition. For, since (Corol. 1.) none can have Faith by the ordinary course of God's Providence but the holders to Tradition, and a Church must be a Congrega­tion of persons truly Faithful, or who have true Faith coming to them by ordinary means, (as we daily experience,) 'tis manifest that none but the Followers of Tradition can pretend to be a true Church.

3. None can be of the Church or any Church but Followers of Tradition. For, seeing a Church is a Congregation of persons who have true Faith coming to them by ordinary means, and (Disc. 5. §. 15.) Tradition is this means, it follows that none are of the Church or any Church but they who have true Faith by this means, that is, who fol­low the means of Tradition.

Those who renounce Tradition or Immediate Delivery, are ipso facto cut off from the Root of Faith, and cease to be truly called Faithful. For [Page 96] seeing that is to us, or in the way of reasoning, the Root of any Knowledge whence that Know­ledge springs, and Faith is no Knowledge in us, (Disc. 1. 15. and Corol. 1.) but by relying on the Rule of Faith or Tradition as on its Princi­ple, 'tis manifest that they who renounce Tra­dition want the Root of Faith, nor consequent­ly are Faithful nor of the Church, but are Dead branches or Opiners onely.

5. That company of men who follow such Ance­stours as formerly renounc't Tradition or Imme­diate Delivery are no less cut off from the Root of Faith. For, since (Corol. 4.) those Ancestours renouncing Tradition formerly were by so doing cut off from the Root of Faith, their Followers (for how many Generations soever they conti­nue) must be so likewise, as wanting and not daring even to pretend to that Faith [...]causing Principle of Tradition or uninterrupted Delivery which their Forefathers had renounc't.

6. They who follow such Ancestors as formerly had manifestly renounc't Tradition (how nume­rous soever) can never claim to be a part of Chri­stian Tradition or deliverers of Faith. First, be­cause (Corol. 5.) they are cut off from Tradition and so can be no part of it. Next, because Chri­stian Tradition is Indeficient or Uninterrupted, (Disc. 6, 8, and 9.) and so none can lay claim to it who cannot lay claim to Uninterruptedness; which those we speak of cannot. The saying then of Vincentius Lirinensis, Id teneamus quod ubi­que, [Page 97] quod semper, quod ab omnibus creditum est, and that we must follow Vniuersality, Antiqui­ty, and Consent, can onely be meant within the verge of those who adhere to Tradition, or fol­low the Doctrin formerly deliver'd, not of those who have broke from it; otherwise all Here­ticks in the world, especially the Primitive ones might claim to be part of the Church.

7. They who pretend themselves Reformers in Faith, do ipso facto, manifest themselves cut off from the Root of Faith and the Church. For since Points of Faith are Truths, and so have no Degrees in them, but are Indivisible; Reforma­tion in Faith cannot mean mending Faith, but putting it anew. But this presupposes Tradition Interrupted, wherefore Reformers in Faith must renounce Uninterruptedness of Delivery, that is, they must renounce Tradition; (Disc. 6. 8, 9.) and consequently they are cut off from the Root of Faith. (Coroll. 4.)

8. That Body of men who adhere to Tradition can evidence clearly and plainly who are truly Faithful, who not. For, since (Coroll. 4. & 5.) to those men 'tis all one to renounce Immediate or Uninterrupt­ed Delivery, or follow those who renounc't it, as to be cut off from the Root of Faith; and all one to be Faithful and to rely on that Principle: Again, seeing 'tis evident by clear matter of Fact who rely and proceed upon it, who not; That Body of men who adhere to Tradition can evidence clearly and plainly who are truly [Page 98] Faithful, who not; and (if Church-Govern­ment be instituted by our Saviour and so a Point of Faith, and so descended to us by the Rule of Faith) who are of the Church, who not.

9. None else can give any certain account who are to be held truly Faithful and of the Church, who not. For since without Tradition both Let­ter and Sence of Scripture is Uncertain (Disc. 4.) and subject to dispute (as we also daily experi­ence) it follows that all the deniers of Traditi­on are uncertain who have the right Letter or Sence of Scripture; that is, whom they are to esteem Faithful (or sit to be of the Church) whom not. Again, Tradition being the onely certain Rule of Faith, if one Revolter from it may be admitted, all may, so they prosess Chri­stianity in outward talk which they will easily do: Wherefore, since the Denier of Tradition deems some one Revolter from it to be of the Church, that is, himself; he may, nay ought judge so of all the rest, provided they talk a few fine pious words of God and Christ, which what Hereticks but did?

10. None can rationally punish the Revolters from their Faith but that Body which adheres to radition. For since, setting aside Tradition, both Letter and Sence of Scripture is Uncertain, (Disc. 4.) the Guilt of those Revolters is also Uncertain: seeing then none can even pretend to correct a fault much less punish it upon uncer­tain Grounds, none can rationally go about to [Page 99] punish their Revolters from Faith unless it be that body which adheres to Tradition; and They can. For, in regard Tradition's Certainty is evi­dent to the rudest by common sence, (Disc. 5. §. 8.) and likewise 'tis as evident to Governours who revolt from it as it is to know when one dis­acknowledges and rises against a settled civil Au­thority and the Laws of the Land; 'Tis most manifest that the Revolter hath both Passion or Guilt enough to be held punishable, and the Christian Magistrate evidence enough of his Fact to go about to punish it. To avoid mistake, I declare that in this Corollary I onely discourse what may or may not be done upon a Church-account, what may be fit to be done upon a State-account, I am neither able to judge, nor do I meddle with it.

11. No Company of men hang together like a Body of a Christian Common-wealth or CHURCH but that which adheres to Tradition. For, since 'tis manifest that every external Commonwealth or Body of men hath some Outward Marks proper to it, by which the members of it have their coherence, or consistency and that those are cer­tain tokens to distinguish it from any other; and as manifest that all the marks proper to a Church as such depend upon the Rule of Faith, (Disc. 1. §. 15.) and their Certainty on its; and lastly, that none of the pretended Rules of Faith (all of them building on Scripture's Letter) are Certain, (Disc. 2. 3, 4.) without Tradition; it [Page 100] follows that no other company have any Princi­ple of Distinction from others, that is either of Constitution or self-preservation under the no­tion of Church, but that which adheres to Tradi­tion. All the loud out-cry then made common­ly against that Body which adheres to Tradition, call [...]d Roman-Catholick, for accounting it self onely the Vniversal Church and excluding all o­thers is but empty noise, and her claim rational and well-grounded, till it be shown by evident Discourse that the other Pretenders have some other more Evident and Certain Rule to know who are of the Church who not, than this of Tra­dition now produc't and explicated; upon which she proceeds and by which she consists.

12. There is no arguing against Tradition out of Scripture. For, since (as we have prov'd Disc. 4.) there can be no absolute Certainty of Scripture's Letter without Tradition, this must first be suppos'd Certain ere the Scripture's Letter can be rationally held such; and consequently ought in reason to be held Vncertain while Tra­dition is thought [...]it to be argu'd against, that is, while it's Certainty is doubted of. Wherefore since none can argue solidly upon uncertain Grounds, none ought to argue against Tradition out of the Letter of Scripture.

13. None can in reason oppose the Authority of the Church or any Church against Tradition. First because in reality Tradition (rightly understood) is the same thing materially with the living Voic [...] [Page 101] and Practice of the whole Church Essential, consist­ing of Pastors and Layity; which is so ample that it includes all imaginable Authority which can be conceiv'd to be in a Church. Secondly, be­cause in the way of generating Faith Tradition formally taken is antecedent to, (Disc. 2. §. 11.) and so in the way of Discourse working by for­mal and abstracted notions its notion must be presuppos'd and its Certainty establish't before the notion and Certainty of Faith, consequently of Faithful, and consequently of Church, which must necessarily be a congregation of Faithful. Whence they would argue very preposterously who should go about to oppose Church against Tradition; this being the same as to think to esta­blish the House by overthrowing the Foundation.

14. None can in reason oppose the Authority of Fathers or Councils against Tradition. This is evident by the former, (Corol. 13.) in regard nei­ther of these have any Authority but as Repre­sentatives of the Church, or Eminent Members of the Church: Nor can any determin certainly what is a Father or Council (Disc. 2. §. 11.) till the notion of Church, that is of Faithful, that is of Faith, that is of Rule of Faith, that is of Tra­dition be certainly establish't.

15. No Disacknowledgers of Tradition are in Due of reason but in Courtesy onely to be allow'd to argue out of Scripture's Letter, Father or Council. For, since, wanting Tradition they have Certain­ty of none of those (as was prov'd, Disc. 2. §. 11.) [Page 102] 'tis manifest that, disacknowledging Tradition, while they alledge and talk of these they alledge and talk of things themselves do not know to be Certain. Wherefore, 'tis too great a Condescen­dence and courtesy in Catholiks to let them run forwards descanting with wordish Discourses on those Testimonies after their raw manner, since they might justly take their advantage against them and show they have no right to make use of Principles, which their own Grounds can never make good to them; as was Tertullian's smart and solid way, de Praescr. Haeret. c. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21. denying them the use of Scrip­ture who deny'd the Church; which would save many an aiery confus'd discourse about words, unapt to evidence any thing satisfactorily. Nor can the right of an Opponent to argue ad homi­nem licence them to claim this favour from our Controvertists; in regard we never held that Scri­ptures Letter hammer'd upon by Criticisms and such pretty knacks of human Learning was the Ground of our Faith nor the way to establish it, but onely as interpreted by the Language and Practice of the Church; nor consequently can we hold it capable to be prejudic't by such endea­vours of private Wits. Though then we should al­low them a Copy of the Letter, and consequent­ly so far a liberty to argue ad hominem against us; yet we never allow'd their method of arguing from it, as efficacious, either to build or evert Fai [...]h, but our learned Controvertists ever held [Page 103] direct contrary. Whence, in case they clamour that in not following their wild method we de­sert Scripture (to avoid which calumny with the vulgar I conceive one reason our Controvertists generally were so civil to them as to cope with them in their fleight way) the unreasonableness of the Calumny is to be made appear, which is quicklier done, not their unreasonable expecta­tion to be satisfy'd.

16. No Authority from any History or Testi­monial Writing is valid against the force of Tra­dition. For, since Falshood is as easy to be writ or printed as Truth, 'tis evident those Books can give no Testimony to themselves that what they express is certainly true; and, if we say they are abetted by the Testimony of other Books, the same question recurrs concerning them, in what Age soever they were writ. It remains then that 'tis onely the Acceptation of Men or Sence writ in their Hearts and so convey'd down from Fa­ther to Son that these Books are true Histories and not Fables, which gives them any Autho­rity: But this has plainly the nature of Tradi­tion; They have therefore no Authority but by force of Tradition: Therefore they can have no possible force against Tradition; since, if Tradition, or the conveying down from hand to hand sence writ thus universally in men's hearts, can deceive us, no such Books can have any Authority at all: Wherefore, not the Books, but the Sence writ in men's hearts of the Goodness [Page 104] and skill of the Authours of those Books (upon which qualifications the Truth of each passage contain'd in those Books is built) is to be al­ledg'd against Christian Tradition, since 'tis that Sence which authorizes those Books and gives Credibility to those passages, and so is stronger than any dead Testimony from the Books them­selves. Which devolves into this, that onely some great Tradition or living Testimony for things past, can, in point of Authority, be pretended an equal match to Christian Tradition or competent to be alledg [...]d against it.

17. No Tradition is alledg'd or alledgeable in reason against Christian Tradition. That none is alledg [...]d is Evident from matter of Fact: For, the Adversaries of Catholick Tradition never pretend the Consent or constant Sence of great multitudes deriv'd from age to age by living voice that at such a time former Tradition was relinquish't, new Faith introduc't, or the old Faith chang'd or abolisht; but onely odd ends or scraps of Histories or other dead Testimonies, according as they light on some passage which seems favourable to them, or may be rendred interpretable that way. Whence, there are al­most as many minds as men about the time when any change was made; nay, some of their best Champions, Dr Whitaker, and Mr Powel, profess the time of the Romish Churches change cannot easi­ly be told, and that they cannot tell by whom or at what time the Enemy did sow the Papists Doctrin: [Page 105] This, I say, being so, 'tis most Evident they decline the pretence of any Tradition against ours, and the very way of deriving down orally and practically Sence writ in mens Hearts by matter of Fact working on their Senses; and, in­stead of that, recurr to pittiful shreds and frag­ments o [...] words, utterly unauthoriz'd if the Tra­dition for that Books Goodness can fail: And, if Catholick Tradition, which in its source was so largely extended, visible and practicable by all can faulter, ten thousand times more easily may the Tradition for any particular Book, which in comparison of the other can be but of a very obscure Original, fail and deceive us.

Now, that no Tradition is alledgeable against us by Protestants appears hence, that their im­mediate Forefathers little more than an 100. Years ago being Catholicks; that is, holders of their Faith no Novelty but uninterruptedly de­scended, could never conspire to deliver to them any such sence that the Roman Church had alter'd her Faith, since they had the con­trary sence writ in the Tables of their hearts. Nor can they have recourse to the Greek Church for a Tradition opposit to ours for any points of Faith in which they differ from us, for they will find none such. Nor is the Greek Church Pro­genitours to them here in England, nor by con­sequence can they derive traditionarily from them.

18. No solid Argument from Reason or intrin­secal [Page 106] Principles is producible against Christian Tradition. For, since Arguments, if solid, are taken from Things or Nature, and the Certainty of Christian Tradition is built on the best Na­ture, that is, Man's; not according to what is alterable in it, but what is (abstracting from dis­ease) absolutely unalterable; that is, on Know­ledge imprinted by natural Sensations; and this Knowledge strengthen'd and made most lively by the oft-repeatedness of those Sensations, and the import of the Things known: Also, since most efficacious Causes actually appli'd, that is, impossible not to do the Effect, and Effects impossible to be without such a Cause's Exi­stence are engag'd for the ever-continuance or Uninterruptedness of Tradition (as hath been shown, Disc. 6. & 8.) and the force of those preserving Causes strengthen'd by the most po­werful assistances of the Holy Ghost, (Disc. 9.) or by best Graces superadded to best Nature; 'Tis impossible any solid Argument from Rea­son should be brought against Tradition.

19. The arguing by way of some few Instances (as the manner is) can have no force against Tra­dition's Certainty and Indefectiveness. For, seeing a pretended Instance of Tradition's failing is a particular action presumed to be long ago past, and particulars out of the very nature of being particulars are surrounded by a thousand indivi­duating circumstances or rather constituted by them, that is, are plac't in the proper sphere of [Page 107] Contingency: and that particular Action is put to be long ago past, and [...]o affects not our Senses by Experience (in which is founded the force of Instances, in regard Experimental Knowledge is a necessary Effect of the Things being such as it is known) Nor have we, or can we have with­out Tradition, any certain knowledge (Coroll. 16.) that the Points of Faith pretended to have miscarried or to have been alter'd then, or else the manner of expressing them, were not mis­taken then or misrepresented to us now; nor that Interest (for example) of one party pas­sion between both, ambiguity of words, slight­ness or confusedness of report grounding the Historians narration, rashness of belief in him, corruption of his Books since they were writ, and innumerable other chances apt to occasion mis­take did not intervene; any of which would render the Instance uncertain, and the Argu­ment from it Inconclusive. Again, seeing we can have certainty of our own meaning of our words when we demonstrate, and also of our consequence, it follows that the way for a solid man to answer Traditions pretended demonstra­bleness must be to show the incoherence of the Terms, and not to bring some old story against it; which were to produce Uncertainty known to be such, against pretended Certainty and not yet known to be other than such; nay whose Evidence we cannot in reason deny till we can solve the connexion of Terms drawn from [Page 108] intrinsecal Mediums, on which 'tis built.

20. The denying Tradition is a proper and necessary disposition to Fanatickness. For, since no Argument taken from any dead or written Testimony, (Coroll. 12. 14. 16.) nor living Testimony of Tradition, (Coroll. 13. 17.) nor from any thing in Nature, Coroll. 18.) that is, from any thing without us which is a second Cause, is valid against Tradition: It follows that Tradition cannot be denied but by pretending some Light or Knowledge within us deriv'd from the immediate Influence of the First Cause. To which pretence helps its difficulty to be confu­ted; in regard 'tis easie to stand stiff in this Te­net that they see clearly such Truths by an in­ward Light, and that therefore it were a mad­ness to go about to confute their own manifest Experience; whereas, were Arguments pro­duc-t openly, they and their confutations might be publisht together, and the Truth would lie expos'd to the scanning and decision of the In­different part of the world, and be clear'd by a few Replies if a right method of discourse be taken. Wherefore, since Nature will easily teach the obstinate deniers of any Principle to avail themselves by the best plea they can to escape confuting, 'tis manifest that Nature will connaturally carry the deniers of Tradition to Fanatick Pranciples, and that men are so long and no longer preserv'd from Fanatickness than they follow Tradition or the openly declar'd [Page 109] Sence of Forefathers either in our Church or some other Congregation.

Again, Tradition being the way of coming to Faith by the open use of our Senses, the denying it must drive the deniers to deny that way, and to recurr to Knowledge had some other way; Not to Knowledge acquir'd by human skill, (the Knowledge of such high mysteries being confes­sedly more than human) therefore to infus'd Knowledge; and this not infus'd by ordinary wayes, as preaching, teaching of Forefathers and such like (as we experience such Knowledges to be infus'd into us) for this again falls into the way of Tradition; therefore they can onely have refuge to inward Light or Knowledge infus'd extraor­dinarily or without connatural means; to make which the common road of receiving Heaven's Influences is the very definition of Fanatickness.

21. Fanatick Principles can have no force against Tradition, though unconfutable but by it. For, since they pretend for their ground a Light with­in imprinted on such a manner as manifests God the Authour, that is, an Effect which onely themselves know and are conscious of, and on the other side nothing appears why such a kind of Impression is impossible, nay 'tis granted possi­ble, 'tis clear none can argue against that in­ward Light's existence out of the nature of that inward perswasion Fanaticks have, in regard 'tis latent and unknown. It follows then that the way to conclude against it is to show out of evi­dent [Page 110] Principles the contrary to these Inspiration to be Truth: None therefore (as plain matter of Fact testifies) taking the way of arguing from Principles absolutely evident, or demonstrating, but Catholiks or the followers of Tradition, and they effecting this by virtue of Tradition, Disc. 5, 6, 8.) it follows that they and onely they are able to confute Fanaticks and conclude their inward Light delusive. Again, since a Fanatick builds on conceited experience of Divine Inspiration, there is no hopes to convince his Judgment without producing Demonstration for the con­trary; a task onely performable in the way of Tradition. Which is enforc't and strengthen'd by this Consideration, that the Basis of Tradi­dition is natural Knowledge directly imprinted by his Senses, in which Knowledges he is unde­ceivable; and these Sensations or Knowledges are daily repeated, not on one private temper but on innumerable millions conspiring in the same, that is, Tradition is built on almost Infi­nit, daily and most manifest Experiences; where­as the conceited Effect of Inspiration, or his strong persuasion that God speaks thus inwardly is found with consent of tenets in a few onely; and liable to deceit by depending upon Fancy, not Sense; as appears in diseased or mad persons, and the Fanaticks contradicting one another though both proceeding on the same Principle. With­out Tradition's help then 'tis very hard (if not impossible) to confute Fanaticks, (as Experi­ence [Page 111] also testifies by Protestants being forc't to recurr to Tradidion in disputes with them) though very easy with it, or by means of it.

22. There is no arguing against Tradition with­out questioning the Constancy of every species in Nature, that is the Certainty of whole Na­ture. For, seeing Man's Nature is as necessarily fit to receive the direct Impressions of Objects on his Soul, that is Natural Knowledges, and as necessarily determin'd to work for a motive or reason good or bad, as Fire is to heat or water to wet, and this absolutely and alwayes abstracting from disease incapacitating him to use his senses or his Fancy, and both these spring out of the very Substance of his Nature as Rational or of such a species, which Original Corruption hin­ders not; it follows that he is as fit for those O­perations, and consequently will as frequently perform them as Fire burn, water wet, fruit-trees bear fruit, or any other species in Nature do its ptoper Effect; that is generally, and onely rarely and contingently fail, unless the Au­thour of Nature order the whole course of it worse for Man than for other things, which were blasphemy to say, and contrary to Experience; since we find a course of Super­naturals on foot, and that they comfort and strengthen man's true nature as hath been for­merly declared. Less liable then is the human Species to contingency in those its natural ope­rations than any other kind is. Wherefore, [Page 112] seeing Traditions Certainty is grounded upon direct natural Knowledges, and its Indefective­ness on Mankind's Incapableness to act without some motive; to argue against It were to questi­on These, that is, the constancy of the best and best-supported Species in Nature, and a fortiori the Constancy of the rest.

Note here, that all the Arguments brought by witty Reasoners against Tradition are fetcht from the Contingency of some one or some few Particulars, whence by a wild kind of roving way they would conclude the defectibleness of the Generality or of the entire Species: But, because it looks too palpably inconsequent in Logicall form to say, a few can err, ergo all, therefore they use to bring it in with a why not. So that all the arguers against Tradition from natural reason oppose directly any Constancy in the Species or Generality, and so are destroyers of natural Certainty and of their own Argu­ments to boot.

23. There is no possibility of arguing at all a­gainst Tradition rightly understood, or the living voice of the Catholick Church with any show of reason. For, since 'tis evident that Scripture's Copy or Letter is in the whole and every tittle Uncertain (Disc. 2, and 4.) without Tradition; as also that the writings of Fathers, Councils, History, and of any written or dead Testimony whatever, (Corol. 14, and 16.) are utterly unauthoriz'd otherwise than by means of [Page 113] Tradition, and that no living Testimony or Tra­dition is alledgable against the Tradition we speak of or Catholick Tradition, (Corol. 13. and 17.) Nor any pretended Instance of Tradition [...]s failing has force but by its being faithfully convey'd down by Tradition and depending on Tradition for its Certainty, (Corol. 19.) and all Arguments from Natural Reason are so weak that they destroy all Certainty in that mat­ter while levell'd against Tradition, (Corol. 18. & 22.) It follows, that no Argument from any Au­thority publickly appearing in the world, nor yet from intrinsecal mediums fetcht from second Causes in Nature can bear any show against Tra­dition. Nor yet from private Effects pretended from the first Cause, call'd Inspiration or Light of the Private Spirit (Corol. 21.) For, (be­sides what has been concluded for this point) however this preten [...]e may make the first Syll [...] ­gism, yet when it comes to be prov'd, that is made appear outwardly, that the first Cause in­spir'd thus or thus, no extraordinary Effects pro­per to that Cause (as miracles) being produci­ble, their arguing or Proof is at an end, how­ever their Inward Adhesion stands. There be­ing then no other Argument imaginable, but what is fetcht from Authority living or dead, or else from Effects or Experience testifiable by those Authorities, or from proper Effects or Causes in the ordinary course of natural things, or from extraordinary private and unseen pre­tended [Page 114] Effects of the first Cause; and none of these bearing any show against Tradition; 'Tis evident There is no possibility of arguing against Tradition rightly understood, or the living voice of the Catholick Church, with any show of Rea­son.

24. Tradition is the First Principle in the way of Authority as it engages for matter of Fact long ago past. For, seeing that is the first Principle in any Knowledge into which all Knowledges in that kind are resolv'd to establish their Cer­tainty, and all ptetended Authorities for any matter of Fact long ago past (Corol. 16.) and consequently all Knowledges caus'd by the means of them, are resolv'd finally into Tradi­tion and depend on it for their Certainty; it fol­lows that Tradition is the very first Principle in the way of Authority as it undertakes for the truth of matters of Fact long ago past.

25. Tradition, in the matter of Tradition (that is, in matter of Fact before our time) is Self-evident to all those who can need the Knowledge of such things, that is, to all Mankind who use common Reason. This is evident from the for­mer; For, first Principles are to be Self-evident to all those who are to use them and proceed upon them, which in our case is the most ordina­ry vulgar.

26. The Certainty of Tradition being establisht the whole Body of the Faithful (by which I mean Catholicks) or the Church Essential, is, by rely­ing [Page 115] on it, infallibly certain that it is in possession of Christ's true doctrin. For, since Tradition is Self-evidently a Certain way if followd (Disc. 5. §. 8. & 13.) and both best Nature and best Grace in this world are engaged that it hath been and shall be ever followed. (Disc. 6. and 9.) Again, since the Certainty of what Faith was formerly taught must needs descend to us as matter of Fact formerly past, that is whose Certainty depends on Authority, and Tradition is the first Princi­ple in way of Authority as it engages for matters of Fact formerly past (Corol. 24.) and Self-evi­dent to the proceeders on it (Corol. 25.) that is to the Body of Catholicks: Lastly, since Chri­stian Tradition rightly understood is nothing but the living voice of the Catholick Church Essen­tial as delivering, 'tis manifestly and manifoldly evident that that Body which relies on It, that is the Catholick Church or (Corol. 6. & 11.) the whole Church Essential, is infallibly Certain that she is in secure possession of Christs true Doctrin.

27. Tradition once establisht, General Coun­cils and even Provincial ones, nay particular Churches are Infallible by proceeding upon It. For the same reason; in regard that proceeding on it they proceed upon a Certain and Self-evi­dent Principle; (Corol. 24. & 25.) that is such a one as neither they can mistake nor it mislead them.

28. The Roman See with its Head are particu­larly [Page 116] Infallible by the same means. For, in re­gard a more vigorous Cause put at first is apt to produce a greater Effect, and the Coresidence, Joynt-endeavours, Preaching, Miracles, and lastly Martyrdome of the two Chief Apostles working upon that City which commanded the greatest part of the world were more vigorous Causes to imprint Christs Doctrin at first and re­commend it to the next age than was found any where else; it follows that the stream of Tradi­tion in its source and first putting into motion was more particularly vigorous here than in any other See. Again, since uninterrupted publi­city of professing Faith makes a greater visibili­ty of Faith, which is a manifest advantage to Tradition, and no Patriarchal See but the Ro­man hath continued ever from the Primitive times in a publick Profession of Christs Faith, being held under by Barbarians; hence the Ro­man See (and inclusively their Pastours and most their chief Pastour) have a particular title to Infallibility built on Tradition above any other See or Pastour whatsoever. Not to mention and dilate on the particular Assistances to the Clergy of that See, and most particular to its Bishop, springing out of their divinely consti­tuted office, in regard 'tis a position unac­knowledged by Adversaries against whom I am discoursing.

29. Tradition establisht, the Church is provi­ded of a certain and Infallible Rule to preserve a [Page 117] Copy of the Scripture's Letter truly significative of Christs sence, as far as it is coincident with the main Body of Christian doctrin preacht at first. For, since [...]tis certain the Apostles taught the same Doctrin they writ, [...]tis manifest the Scripture [...]s Letter was at first (for what of it was intended to signify Points of Faith) significative of Faith or Sence writ by miracles, preaching and pra­ctice in the hearts of the first Faithful: Where­fore, since the same sence that was preacht at first was preserv'd all along unalterably by Tra­dition, (Disc. 6. & 8.) and the same sence in mens hearts can easily guide them to correct the alteration of the outward Letter, so as to pre­serve it significative of the sence first delivered; Therefore Tradition establisht the Church is provided of a certain and Infallible Rule to pre­serve a Copy of the Scripture's Letter truly sig­nificative of Christ's sence, as far as Scripture is coincident with the main body of Christian Do­ctrin preacht at first.

30. Tradition establisht the Church is provided of a certain and Infallible Rule to interpret Scri­pture's Letter by, so as to arrive certainly at Christ's Sence, as far as that Letter concerns the Body of Christian Doctrin preacht at first or points requisit to Salvation. For, since (Disc. 6. & 8.) Tra­dition preserves the first deliver'd sence alive in mens hearts sent down by way of living voice and Christian practice; and these were in the beginning evidently a most certain way of know­ing [Page 118] the Sence of the Letter, [...]tis evident that they are still such. Wherefore Tradition esta­blisht the Church is provided, &c.

31. Tradition establish't nothing can be recei­ved by the Church as h [...]ld from the first or ever, un­less held ever. For, since (Disc. 5. §. 13. & Disc. 6. & 8. & Corol. 24, & 25.) Tradition is self-evi­dently a certain method of conveying down matters of Fact as they were found, it follows that, Tradition establish't, points not held ever must be convey'd down such as they were found, that is as not held ever and consequently not as held from the first or ever.

32. Tradition establish't 'tis impossible any Er­rour against Christ [...] s Faith should bee received by the Church; that is no Errour contradicting Faith can be received as of Faith. For, since to be re­ceived as of Faith is (Disc. 6. & 8.) to Traditio­nary Christians the same as to be received as held ever or from Christs time, and (Corol. 31.) no point at all, though disparate or indifferent, not-held-ever can be received as held-ever, 'tis evident that much less can an erroneous point contradicting what was held ever be received as held-ever.

33. Notwithstanding Tradition, Erroneous O­pinions and (their proper Effects) absurd Practi­ces may creep into the Church and spread there for a while. For, since, notwithstanding the Certainty of Tradition, the Church is still, ac­cording to our Saviour, a Congregation made [Page 119] up of good and bad, and the Bad will do like themselves, that is be glad to invent and propa­gate such Principles as shall make for their own Ends or for Vices, that is, Erroneous ones; A­gain, since it cannot be expected but that mul­titudes even of good men in the Church should in using their private reasons be liable to Errour in divers particular points or Cases, and that the remoteness of Christian Principles or Points of Faith from the Principles of particular Actions or Cases is apt to make the opposition between them not easily nor clearly discoverable at first, nay the ambiguity in wording them may make them appear at first sight fairly reconcilable till the Terms be distinguisht and clear'd from equi­vocation; 'tis very evident that Tradition's Cer­tainty hinders not but Erroneous Opinions, and (their proper Effects) absurd Practices may creep into the Church and spread there for a while.

34. Erroneous Opinions can never gain any solid footing in the Church. For, since (Disc. 5. §. 15. Corol. 11.) the Church is a Body of men relying on Tradition or the Authority of attest­ing Forefathers, not on the Authority of Opina­tors, these Opinions can never have any firmness in her by means of Authority; and, on the other side, being Erroneous, they can never gain any depth of adhesion by being demonstrably true; nor (Errour being necessarily opposit to Truth) can they even maintain their quiet posture by [Page 120] being evidently not opposit to Faith; It follows that neither upon the score of Reason nor Authority can they sink deep into the minds of the Faithful (at least the intelligent party of them) or gain any solid footing in the Church; but are subject to be contradicted or have their verity disputed by the searching and unsatisfy'd wits of Opposers.

35. The Prudence requisit in Church-Govern­ment is one Cause why Erroneous Opinions are not immediately but after some long time perhaps to be declared against by the Authority of the whole Church. For, since a Church is a most vast and sacred Common-wealth, and so of the greatest gravity and Authority imaginable, she is not in prudence to engage it trivially in sleight occa­sions, nor rashly when the point is unevident. Wherefore, seeing an Erroneous Opinion, while held but by few, is of sleight concern, and so onely fit to be taken notice of by inferiour Of­ficers; when universally held is of great Autho­rity amongst the multitude; she is in Prudence to suspend till its Opposition to Faith be clear'd by the Science of Divinity, and this satisfacto­rily to a great part of the Opinatours; lest ei­ther she should in stead of tares pluck up wheat, or use her Authority more to destruction than edification by a too hasty decision.

36. No Erroneous Opinion in Divinity, if Vniversal and Practical, can be very long per­mitted in the Church. For since (Corol. 31.) a [Page 121] meer Opinion can never gain the Authority of a Traditionary point, 'tis manifest it can never subsist when it is shown to clash with any of the said Points: Wherefore, since it is liable to dis­cussion, and men are naturally of different Judg­ments and Interests, and the variety and Nature of worldly Interest is such that if any thing makes for the Interest of some 'tis for that very reason against the Interest of another, it will excite them to discussion and sifting its Confor­mity or Disconformity to Christian Principles, which is the way to clear the Terms and make it appear. But, especially, seeing absurd or irrational Practices are the proper Effects of Er­roneous Principles, and that our natural Cor­ruption inclines men to follow such Practices till they be checkt by regard to something held Sacred, that is by being shown opposit to Faith; it follows that, till this opposition be shown, they will infallibly grow on still more and more, till they come to such an height of absurdity that they need now no skill to discover them: Expe­rience teaching us that the most palpable and evident method to try the Truth of any Specu­lation is to put it into matter and bring it into Practice. Those irrational Practices therefore must needs after some time discover themselves opposit to Christian behaviour, and consequently confess the Principle which begot them opposit to Christian Faith; which done, it presently loses its credit, and is quasht by the incompa­rably [Page 122] more powerful force and all over-bearing Authority of Tradition.

37. Erroneous Opinions and the irrational Practices issuing from them (though suppos'd Vni­versal and of long continuance) can never cor­rupt substantially the Iudgments or Wills of the Faithful. For, since (Corol. 31.) nothing not held ever or not coming from Christ can possibly be accepted as held ever or coming from Christ, 'tis evident no Erroneous Opinion can come to gain the sacredness and repute of a Traditionary point, nor their proper practices the Esteem of Christian Practice; Wherefore, Traditionary Points being the Principles which absolutely possess the Judgmenrs and govern the lives of the Faithful as Christians, it follows that no Opini­on can ever be held by them but in a conciev'd subordination to Traditionary points or points of Faith, nor practic [...]t by them but with a con­ceivd subordination and conformity to those Practices which spring from undoubtedly-known Christian Tenets or Traditionary points. See­ing then what is not held and practic [...]t but as conceivd subordinate to other Tenets and Pra­ctices must needs be less held than those others, nay not held at all otherwise than conditionally or upon supposal of such a subordination, [...]tis clearly consequent that Traditions Certainty is so powerful an Antidote that bad Opinions and Practices can never corrupt substantially and [Page 123] absolutely the Judgments or wills of the Faith­full.

38. No Erroneous Opinion or its proper Practice is imputable to the Church properly and formally ta­ken. For, since the Church, formally as such, pro­ceeds on Christian Tradition, no such Opinion nor consequently Practice is imputable to the Church properly and formally taken, but onely to some men in the Church (materially consi­der'd) as left to the contingent force of their pri­vate Discourses: that is, indeed, to the Schools not the Church.

39. 'Tis exceedingly weak and senceless to think to impugn the Church by objecting to her such Opinions and Practices. For, since they concern her not, nor are imputable to her as Church, or to her Members as Faithful, the wise Objection can onely signify thus much, that the Church has men in her who are fallible in their private Discourses or School-disputes; that is, she has men in her who are men. A heavy imputation!

40. The Knowledge of Tradition's Certainty is the first Knowledge or Principle in Controversial Divi­nity, that is, without which nothing is known or knowable in that Science. For, since Controversy or the Science which establishes the Certainty of Faith depends on these two Propositions, Whate­ver God said is true, and God said this, the former of which is out of Controversy as we now handle it with our modern Dissenters, and onely the [Page 124] later is the subject of our debate: Seeing also (as hath been largely and manifoldly evident) nothing can ascertain us of this but Tradition, nor It unless its Certainty be known, it follows that the Knowledge of Tradition's Certainty is the first Knowledge or Principle in Controversial Di­vinity.

41. Christ's promise to his Church (however com­fortable to the Faithful) can bear no part in the notion of the Rule of Faith, nor be the first Prin­ciple of a Controversial Divine. For, since Christ's promise to his Church is held as a point of Faith, that is, receiv'd upon the Rule of Faith, that is, subsequent to that Rule, 'tis manifest that it can be no part of that Rule nor first Principle in Con­troversy. Again, the Rule of Faith (Disc. 1. §. 4, and 9.) must be so evident as to its Existence that no other Knowledge must intervene between the natural power of Understanding and It, and this in the meanest vulgar; but, that Christ promist his Church Infallibility is not thus self-evident but needs other Knowledges to evidence it, un­less we will make all come by Inspiration. Besides, if God's Providence laid in second Causes for Tradition's Indeficiency be not Certain in its self, (abstracting from Christ's promise to his Faithful) Tradition can never convey certainly that Pro­mise to us; It must then be assur'd to us by Scripture's Letter ascertain'd onely by imagin'd diligence from Copy to Copy, not by Tradi­tion; [Page 125] that is, that Letter could not be certain its self, and so fit to ascertain others, till Tradi­tion's Certainty be establish't antecedently: And, were it suppos'd a true Letter, this Letter (Tra­dition being as yet suppos'd unknown to be able to convey down certainly Christs sence) must be interpreted onely by private skills; and so, all the Churches Veracity, that is, all Mankinds Sal­vation must be built on that private Interpreta­tion. Private, I say; for in that supposition, till the Scripture's Letter for that point be Interpret­ed certainly truly, the Churches veracity or power to interpret it truly is not yet known: which, besides the common Rule that no Scrip­ture is of private Interpretation, is particularly and highly faulty in this case, that it would make our Fundamental of Fundamentals, the Certainty of our Rule of Faith, rely on such a private Interpretation. Moreover, to say Tradi­tion of the Church is Certain because Christ pro­mist it, puts it to be believ'd not seen; and is the same in Controversy as it is in Nature to say in common, such an Effect is wrought because 'tis God's will; which gives no account of that par­ticular Effect, but onely sayes something in com­mon: Wherefore, since the Certainty of the Rule of Faith (it being antecedent to Faith) must be seen not believ'd, a Controversial Di­vine ought to make it seen; that is, ought to de­monstrate its Certainty and Indeficiency by in­trinsecal [Page 126] mediums or dependence on proper Causes. It signisies therefore no more in the Sci­ence of Controversy to say Christ promist, than in Natural Science to answer to every Question, in stead of showing a proper Cause, that God wills it; which is a good saying for a Christian, as is also the other; but neither of them a competent Prin­ciple either for Philosopher or Controvertist.

ANIMADVERSIONS On Dr …

ANIMADVERSIONS On Dr. Pierce's Sermon: Also, on Mr. Whitby and Mr. Stillingfleet, where they touch the Way lay'd in the fore­going Discourses.

In Three Appendixes.

Psalm. 63.
Sagittae parvulorum factae sunt Plagae eorum.

Anno Dom. 1665.

TRANSITION To The following APPENDIXES.

I Have finisht my Discourse: how dexterously must be determin'd by the Iudgment of my Readers, and Confutation from m [...]e Adver­saries. But I account those onely my proper Iudges & competent Adversaries who lay their Principles ere they discourse, and weigh the efficaciousness of their Testimonies in the Scales of Reason ere they alledge them. If I find a man laying no Princi­ples of his own, but supposing them, and making account all men must admit them out of respect to him or his party, and yet bend all his endeavours to cavil at Principles laid by others to ascertain and establish the Groundwork of Christianity; If I find one ignorant of or resolv'd against the onely-Certain method and Rule of Discourse, which is, that No Position deserves Assent unless the Con­nexion of its Terms be Evident, which must either be when they are Evidently connected of them­selves (of which nature ought to be all First Prin­ciples) or made evidently-connected by the inter­position of some other, which we call Evident-by-consequence or Deduction: Lastly, if I find a man [Page 158] wedded to Parrat-talk of Ayr and Sounds that he thinks it a rare thing to load margents with Citations, without first distinguishing them and con­sidering what strength each ought to have accor­ding to rational Principles; I decline such an empty Soul for my Iudge, and sleight him as mine Adversary. And lest any should impute this carriage to me for fastidiousness I offer my Reason for it. For, to cavil at Principles and yet go about to lay none himself, is the method of a Sceptick; and from him indeed I must suffer it, if I can­not forc [...] him to hold his tongue: But, that one who pretends himself a Christian, that is an Holder of Christ's Law, that is (if he goes con­sequently) a Relier upon some First or Self-evi­dent Principle for holding that Christ said thus or thus, should be permitted to impugn Principles brought to ascertain fundamentally that point, and yet himself lay none to do that Effect (as is the Custome of the Impugners of Tradition) is to let him behave himself like a Renouncer of Christianity, and to fight against any assu­redness of Christianity; that is, to contradict himself and all his own positions as he is Christi­an; which permission is unreasonable according to Maxims of Common Sence, and illegal by the Rules of true Logick. Again, if the clear light of Vnderstanding gives it manifest, that no­thing can be seen intellectually but what is either Evident by its own Light or by Deduction in the manner declared, tis as Evident that to frame [Page 159] Discourses in another method than this, or at least loose Discourses that have no Connexion in­volu'd in them, enabling them to bear the Test of this Method, can be onely to talk Vncertainties, that is, of we know not what: Which is unwor­thy a Man, much more a Scholler. And, lastly, Since it is evident by Reason that every sleight Authority is not comparable to that of God's Church, 'tis Evident likewise that Reason is to weigh what is due to Authorities; and that, No Authority deserves any Assent further than Rea­son gives it to deserve. Now, this being so, to alledge Authorities undistinguishingly, whereas there is such diversity of degrees in them that perhaps there are no two to be found perfectly alike in merit, is such a wild proceeding hand over head, such a careless saying any thing to no imaginable purpose but purely to talk, that no sober Discourser can think it fit to spend time in combating such an aiery Adversary.

2. I make it my request to my intelligent Rea­der (for I write to none but such) that he would reflect back on the Method I have taken in my short Discouse; and he will see that (however my Performance speeds) I pursue the Way of Evi­dence, and aim at least at perfect Science of the point in hand. He will see I take my rise at the meaning of the words Rule and Faith; this known, I establish my first Principles in this present mat­ter to be these, a Rule is a Rule, Faith is Faith; hence I proceed to discover diverse Attributes ne­cessarily [Page 160] connext with what is meant by those two words; and if, to avoid witty cavil, I decline the pretence of rigorous Definitions of either word, without pressing the Essentialness of any of those Attributes to the Natures of Rule and Faith, I hope I shall merit both pardon and thanks from those who look for satisfaction; For, as long as those Attributes must necessarily accompany the Rule of Faith, I do my work without engaging into nicer disquisitions. Those Attributes being shown necessarily connected with the notion of Rule of Faith, I apply'd them to my matter in hand by means of these two Propositions, bearing a necessity of Truth in their very Terms; That is not the Rule of Faith to which Attributes necessari­ly belonging to the Rule of Faith belong not; and, That is the Rule of Faith to which Proper­ties belonging onely to such a Rule do belong. Hence I reject Scripture's Letter from being that Rule, and assert Tradition to be it. And this was enough perhaps for me to do if I onely minded opposition to those who adhere to Scripture's Let­ter for their Rule, in contradistinction and oppo­sition to Traditions being such.

3. But, intending to avail my self and my Cause by the strength of Truth and Reason not the Weakness and Passion of others, I went forwards (having first shown it clearly Self-evident that Tradition was a most Certain Rule, if follow'd) endeavouring to demonstrate the Indefectiveness of Tradition, or that it was ever follow'd; and [Page 161] this I attempted by those means. I took the al­low'd Definition of Man (the Subject of the Effect I was to show,) which was to be a Rational Crea­ture. I found the proper Agent or Efficient to work upon him as such to be Motives or Reasons; and, from the impossibility of any such Motives to make him prevaricate from openly-deliver'd Faith, nay the necessity of seeing he must destroy his Credit without any possibility of compassing his End, I endeavour'd to conclude that Faith thus descended was never prevaricated from. Then, ta­king the way of demonstrating the same a poste­ [...]iori, I took an Effect I conceiv'd Impossible to be introduc't into a Knowing Nature without the Existence of Tradition's ever-Indeficiency to in­graft it there, or rather to imbue Souls with it na­turally, and, as it were, ex traduce.

4. Seeing by this time that my Discourse, by stooping from my First Principles while I apply [...]d them to my business, seem'd immerst in matter; and, by the blunder of many more and more particular Terms than were in the meer Principle forci [...]ly ta­ken in, began to look with a contingent Face (though indeed I still perch't upon the specifical natures of Things, and so never flaggd below the Sphere of Science) therefore to comfort the Readers under­standing apt to grow turbid by my approach to­wards Practice, I consider'd Tradition practi­cally and open'd the nature of it, by reflecting con­naturally how the Revolt from it which we call Heresy comes to be originiz'd. For the same rea­son [Page 162] I compar'd the Human force of Christian Tra­dition with another vast Tradition meerly human; & then touching at some Divine Assistances, show'd how the Author of Nature had establish't the best piece of it, Man's Nature, by particular means ex­ceeding her own native strength, to this Effect of preserving the descent of Christ's doctrin unaltera­ble and uninterrupted; that is, I show'd Tradi­tion most Certain and most Indefective, and far beyond the establishment of any other piece of Na­tural Science whatsoever.

5. Lastly, observing that my Discourse by process (as the custom is in all Discourses, however evident, if not bound to Syllogistical form) began to look dishevel'd, I added diverse Corollaries; In some of which I made many several ends of it meet in a closer frame; in others I advanc't forwards to show that the Churches Vnity, power to oblige and govern her Subjects as Faithful, and her Infalli­bility in the whole and several parts of her was founded in Tradition; nay that by means of Tra­dition She enjoyes a wonderful Sacredness of Au­thority, being not onely unexpugnable but also unimpugnable without destroying all kinds of Certainty; that is, without highest nonsence in the Opposer. And hence I seat TRADITION on her Throne; demonstrating her they the First, and consequently self-evident, Principle in affairs of this Nature; and therefore that the Knowledge of her Certainty is the First Principle in the Sci­ence of Controversy.

[Page 163] 6. This tenour of my Discourse briefly reflected on, I beg of my intelligent Reader to regard it once more in the bulk, and he will see that I begin with Self-evident Principles; That my Principles are antecedent to Authorities, and so are compe­tent means to judge Authorities by; that I studi­ously avoid wordish ambiguity, which Rhetorical Discoursers ly open to, holding rigorously to the notion or meaning of the words; that I lay but the meaning of two familiar words, Rule and Faith, for the basis of all my Discourse; that I endeavour to pursue my Principles by very obvious and immediate connexions; that all the way I attend heedfully to and build upon the Natures of the Things; which, in short, devolves to this, that it may be hop't (at least by my method) that there needs nothing but Time and Industry to frame and make up in rigorous demonstrative form, that sence which I have here deliver'd in a way more sutable to the temper of the World and ease of my Readers; who may see Evidence in my Dis­course, without being oblig'd to bend their brains to study my Book with that severity as they would do an Euclid.

7. When this is done, let my Reader reflect on all the Discourses concerning Faith made by any Protestant, and see how far they are short from (I will not say any such performance, but) even an Attempt of Evidence. First Principles they lay none; and consequently Evidence of Deduction can­not be expected from them: for, wanting First Prin­ciples, [Page 164] 'tis nonsence and folly to talk of deducing. Again, For want of such Principles, they want Certainty of any Text of Scripture to justify it against an Atheist or Deist. They want Self-evident Principles to guide them in interpreting their Vn­certain Letter, and so confute other Sects which differ from their Church; and the method they take to do it is evidently quite of another nature than Scientifical. They have nothing upon account of Living Teachers which ascertain Sence; so that you must to find your Faith not build upon the sence of two or a few familiar words, but of an whole large Book; that is, on millions of words, and those too not onely unsenc't, but also very abstruse and mysterious. They suppose all which is antecedent to Faith, that is all Principles which are to induce Faith and so make no Pro­vision for the Grounds of Christianity against Hea­thens and Atheists: The Natures of Things they are so far from proceeding upon, that they not so much as mind or think of them, nor I doubt fancy or value that method when set before their eyes. Principles to weigh each Testimony by they lay none, and so quote at randome. Certainty they seek not, nor care for; for they quote the Fathers and Scripture as by themselves interpreted, and yet neither hold the Testimony of Fathers Infalli­ble nor yet themselves in interpreting Scripture; yet plainest reason tells us, that unless the Fa­thers or themselves were Infallible hic & nunc in this saying or interpretation, they were hic & [Page 165] nunc Fallible; that is, all built on that Testimo­ny or Interpretation is contingent and Vncertain: yet of such Citations no better authoriz'd, cl [...]d perhaps in some fine words, the Books of their best Champions are made up. So that they are con­vinc't not to study Things, but Words; that is, not to be Scholars or Knowers, but Empty Talkers; and so the effect of their endeavours can never be satisfaction to an intelligent soul, but onely tick­ling the Ear or pleasing the Fancy.

9. As I have shown this Vngrounded proceed­ing of the Protestants by Principles, so I intend to do the same by Instances: but ere I go about this undertaking, I think fit to meet with an Ob­jection obvious to many Readers. 'Tis this; that, 'Tis strange all Catholicks do not take this way, it being so conclusive, as well as I.

10. I answer, that all Truths being connected, 'tis evident each Truth, even for being such, is main­tainable several wayes; especially Supreme [...]nd ve­ry concerning ones: Amongst which wayes, some are sutable to some capacities, others to others. Wherefore Catholick Controvertists esteeming themselves Debtors both Sapientibus, or to those who judg of things per altissimas causas; and Insi­pientibus, or those who do not so nor fly higher than a prudential pitch: and the later of these being the Generality; hereupon the Charity and Pru­dence of those learned Opposers of Dr. Pierce (and very many others) have thought fit to address to These by answering his Testimonies particularly; [Page 166] leaving me the way of Reason and Principles; though in danger to receive much disadvantage by my imperfect delivery, and securer under the ma­nagery of their abler heads and pens. I declare therefore that I intend no confutation of any of those Authours, nor to share in the victory of those excellent Champions of Truth: It being per­haps needless to the Generality (however very sa­tisfactory to examining Wits) to confute that in Common which is already confuted by Retail. I write more against their Way than their Books. Yet, if any will be so charitable as to judge my short hints to bear the force of a solid Confutation, be­cause they radically and fundamentally overthrow all their Arguments and very Method of arguing, if it be Truth's advantage, I shall give God thanks for it and be glad of it. But the main is, it imports not in maintaining Truth what others do or do not; but, if it be shown that Catholick Principles (I mean the living voice of the Catholick Church, or Tradition, our Rule of Faith) can bear such a rigorous test of Reason, and appear more lustrous and bright by so severe a trial; and, on the con­trary, that the Principles of the Revolters from her are so little solid, so volatil and meerly made up of Fancy, that they evaporate into ayr and even shrink into nothing when set in the mid-da [...] beams of Truth, the Rules of Evidence; I desire no higher an honour to the Catholick Church, nor deeper dis­credit to her Adversaries.

FIRST APPENDIX.
Animadversions on the Groundlesness of Dr Pierce's Sermon.

1. LOoking about for Instances of Protestants Books most proper to be confuted by my former Doctrin, my thoughts pitcht naturally on Mr Whitby's, where he goes about to settle rationally his Rule of Faith, and on Mr Stilling­fleet's, where he opposes the way of Reason, and the Certainty of Tradition. But it seem'd con­venient to take to task also some Adversary who insisted on Testimonies, and bring him to Grounds; because, in the way of Reason which brings Testimonies to Grounds, to confute one is in a manner to confute all. Dr Hamond seem'd proper; but his Book is now out of vogue, if it were ever in it; for I never heard past two or three persons speak of it: and, I am sure, the best Protestant Wits of our Nation never valued him as a smart and efficacious Writer. Besides, the Notes I have lately given upon the Fathers Testi­monies, leave little in him to be reply'd to, and my Discourses have left nothing at all. Amongst late Adversaries then, Dr Dentons folly seem'd so ultra crepidam, that it was not worth a serious thought; and 'tis wholly answer'd by declaring that he begins and grounds his whole Book on so knavish a Calumny, that, could the Universality [Page 168] of Catholicks have the same Law against him, that a private Protestant, though the meanest in the Kingdome, might freely have, he would lose his Ears for Libelling. The Dissuader for his plausibleness (not for his strength of sence) seem'd to require a larger Answer than was sutable to the design of an Appendix. Dr Pierce was of highest vogue, and short; but he was al­ready so doubly overthrown by two Learned Opposers, that it seem [...]d unhandsome and igno­ble to strike a man when he was down; his Cir­cumstances making him rather an Object of Pity than Victory. Yet his Pulpit-alarum to excite all England to persecute Catholicks was so full of malice, and so monstrously cry'd up, that I judg'd it above all others deserving to be made an Example of ungrounded Talk. Though I shall do it with that compassion as not so much to confute him, as by laying a few Notes as Ad­monitions to him, to open his Understanding and enable him to look into the force of his own Ci­tations, and so to guide himself better the next time he goes about to quote Authors; a point I doubt he as yet never thinks on. They may also give his Defender (now, as I hear, writing) some light to strengthen his Testimonies against us. I am sure they will tend to clear Truth, not to blunder it; and so all ingenuous seekers of satis­faction will thank me for them. To begin then,

2. The whole scope of his Sermon exprest in the Title of it, The Primitive Rule of Reforma­tion, [Page 169] causes my first Admonition. For, since we both agree that the Primitive Faith is to be held to, and only differ about the Certain means to come to know what that Faith was; we holding to Tradition and to Fathers and Councils (which are, taken properly, parts of Tradition) as Cer­tain means to know that Faith; The Protestants to private Interpretations of Scripture, and to Citations quoted on any fashion; The way to confute us Catholicks is to demonstrate the Cer­tainty of the way they take to prove their Faith the same with the Primitive; otherwise, let them talk and write as long as they will, they are ne­ver the neerer their Conclusion. Now, if plain Experience tells us the Sm [...]ctymnuans too preacht and writ against Episcopacy by quoting Fathers and Scripture, let Dr Pierce show us what his way of Talking has above theirs which gives it a virtue of ascertaining or perfectly settling the un­derstanding; or confess theirs (and so his too) is fallible and frivolous. To demonstrate then against us, and so confute us, he ought rather have insisted on a derivative Rule, or a Rule able to derive down to them Christ's Faith with Certainty; so to make out their present know­ledge, which alone can justifie their present or late Action of Reforming; and not run afar off to a Primitive Rule or Faith, which is nothing to the Protestants, unless they can prove Cer­tainly they follow it. When D. Pierce makes a Sermon at Court upon the Certainty of such a [Page 170] Rule, we will all become Auditours, so he will promise to begin with first Principles, and bring Evidence of what he sayes: Till then let him take heed of bragging in print of Demonstrati­ons, until he knows what the word means: that is, till he reflects how a Demonstration is a Proof which obliges the Uudersta [...]ding, and considers or studies wherein the virtue by which it performs this, consists. Such bold and careless talk has cost his Credit dear already; and when it comes to be scann'd by Principles and Science, will leave it quite bankrupt.

3. We have seen the End and Scope of D. Pierce's Performance, which is, to over-leap all that concern'd him to prove, if he would con­clude with Certainty against us: Now, the use­fullest part of his whole performance, as he sayes in his Dedication, are his Citations, as being the Evide [...]ce and Warrant of all the rest; which therefore (if any thing) deserve to be consider'd.

Their faults distinguish them into so many forts.

Of the first sort are those which are imperti­nent to our (or indeed to any) purpose, but to make a noise or vaporing show.

Of the second, those which are raw or unap­ply'd, and onely say somthing in common which never comes home to the point.

Of the third, those which are levell'd blindly at none knows what, or at a question unstated; and so are shot at rovers.

[Page 171] Of the fourth, Those which impugn a Word for a Thing; or some Circumstance or Manner for the Substance.

Of the fifth, Negative Testimonies.

Of the sixth, A private Authours saying against the torrent of a contrary consent; which, of it self, is liable to innumerable contingencies of passion, mistake or ignorance; but, thus com­par'd, signifies less than nothing. The like is to quote a Schoolman or two for a point which others freely contradict.

Of the seventh, those which are false, and sig­nifie not the thing they are expresly quoted for.

Of the eighth, those which labour of obscuri­ty by an evidently ambiguous word.

Of the ninth, Sayings of those on his own side.

Of the tenth, a few fragments of Scripture, senc't by Fancy.

4. I intend not to muster up one by one all his Citations and then rank them under their respective Heads, the brevity of an Appendix not permitting it: But, I make this fair proffer to his Vindicater or himself, that if they please to pitch upon any Testimonie of his which falls not under some one (perhaps many) of these Faulty Common-places, I will yeild them all valid and conclusive, and make him publick satisfaction for the Injurie.

Having thus given my bond for the Truth y charge, and under so great a penaltie [Page 172] upon failure of being so, I have Title to free li­cence to suppose my charge good, (which will also appear shortly in common by my §. 9.) and accordingly to apply my reason to consider his Citations. I discourse then thus, and Note.

6. First, That Citations are of two sorts; the one alledges the Testifiers Knowledge by Eye-sight or Infallible Sense; the other his Judgment or Opinion. Now this later, in re­gard mens Judgments or Opinions depend on Reasons, is not properly that Authours Testi­monie, nor he a Witness (who ought to proceed upon Evidence had by Senses) but a Schollar or Relier on his Reasons; and, so, his expres­sing himself in the words found in such a Cita­tion has no Authority further than his Reason gives him; which Reason therefore and not his Saying ought to be alledg'd: in regard it was meerly by vertue of his Reason he knew this; and so the whole vertue of his Authority (which follows and goes paralel to Knowledge) consists in that Reason. None therefore are properly Testimonies, but those which relie on Sensitive Knowledge: and those are of Certain Authori­ty, if the sincerity of the Testator be unquesti­onable, and the conveyance of his sincerely­meant Knowledge to us be Evident; not otherwise.

2ly. Note secondly, that, for the reason given, Citations from Adversaries, and Opinators sig­nifie nothing; also those whose words presumed [Page 173] to express the Witnessers sence are Ambiguous, or otherwise-interpretable; or else their very Let­ter Uncertain; as all are, if the way of Tradition be held fallible.

Thus much in common of Citations as in them­selves. Considering them next as made use of by D. Pierce, we finde he relies on them as on his Principles to conclude against us, or as he (good man) unfortunately calls it, Demonstrate. Hence.

3ly, They must not be Negative; for such can conclude nothing.

4ly, They must not be false or evidently sig­nifying another thing than they are produc't for, nor impertinent; for then they are in both cases quite besides the purpose.

5ly, They must be express and home to the point; for, Principles must need nothing but themselves (besides the Application) to infer the Conclusion pretended to spring from them.

9ly, They must be void of ambiguity. For, Principles must be either self-evident, or at least made evident, ere they can deserve to be pro­duc't or admitted as such.

Lastly, Principles are Sence, not Sounds or Characters; and so their Sence ought to be In­disputable.

7. The first Note evacuates at once all his Ci­tations from Authours that concern any point between us. For he brings no Certainty of any knowledge exprest to be built on Sense; that is [Page 174] no Citation against us, which, in proper speech, deserves to be call'd a Testimony.

The second Note particularly invalidates those of the eighth and ninth sorth.

The third, those of the fifth sort.

The fourth, those of the first and seventh.

The fifth, those of the five first sorts, and also those of the seventh.

The sixth, those of the second, third, and par­ticularly the eighth.

The last Note enervates the tenth, and indeed almost all the rest. It being evident that our learned Controvertists give other Sences to those Citations than what Protestants assigne them, and maintain still those sences to be better than theirs.

8. In a word, seeing all Testimonial Authority supposes Knowledge in the Authour, and all Knowledge is either from Sense (call'd Expe­rience) or else from evident connexion of Terms (or Reason) and that this later knowledge is apt to make a Master, that is, one fit to convince and teach another rationally by Intrinsecal Me­diums or to cause Science in him, and so is un­fit for Testifying: And the former kind of Know­ledge onely is fit to be an Extrinsecal Medium or apt to beget Belief of the Witnesses word (in regard any person, unacquainted otherwise with the Truth of the Point, knows by ordinary Experience and common reason that mens Un­derstandings may err, but their Sences rightly [Page 175] circumstanc't, cannot;) it follows that no Cita­tion in proper speech deserves the name nor has the force or virtue of a Testimony but those which are built on Sence or Experience. This weigh'd, reflecting on the main, I find not one [...]ress Testimony against any point of our [...]aith, engaging Sense; that is, not one which merits the name of a Testimony or to be esteem'd a part of Tradition. That of S. Austin for com­municating Infants has the true nature of a Te­stimony in it, and deserv'd a more elaborate Answer, had its Sence been unquestionable and the Words cited from the Father himself; but the Sence of it being Disputable (his Expositors explicating S. Austin by himself in another place no [...] to mean oral Manducation, but virtual [...]ly which is done by Baptism) and withall cited as a private Authours Sence concerning S. Austin, it falls under the 6th, and 8th. Head of faulty or inconclusive Citations, and so is al­ready answer'd.

9. This is the upshot of that famous Sermon: And now I would gladly know what, in the Judg­ment of an intelligent person who examins things by Grounds, Dr. Pierce hath perform'd in this so highly extoll'd piece of his more than his dear Brother and fellow-champion against the Pope, Mr. HENRY WHISTLER? Onely he hath clad his little Nothings in some kind of mock-Rheto­rick; which, like Fig-leaves, cover after a piti­ful manner the Nakedness of his empty Dis­course. [Page 176] Yet, were even his Rhetorick examin'd by the substantial Rules of that Art, I doubt it would come of as ill as his Proofs. For 'tis ob­vious to observe that the beginning of his Sermon is a-la-mode a School-boy's Theme, and that his Style is far from even or spun on one thread; In­stead of the Thunder & Lightning of strong and sententious Sence astonishing and moving the Auditors reason by the advantageous smartness and Majesty of the Expression; he gives us a peal of Ordinance charg'd with ayr, a volly of thunder-thumping bombast, able to make a solid man's Reason nauseate; and this most in­artificially plac't at the very entrance of his Ser­mon, §. 2. Or else loud Pulpit-beating invectives▪ and railings. He makes huge account of little quirking Observations out of Human Authours; which have no imaginable force or purpose but to make an ostentation of the uncouthness of his reading; the Gallantry of his third para­graph. For ingenious surprizes of Reason, erecting and taking the Understanding, we have wordish Quibbles, Quirks, and Paranomasias: and those most evidently (contrary to Art) studiously and industriously affected. His con­ [...]ident sayings without Proof make up half his Sermon; and his Ironies and Sarcasms are the sauce to make all this windy meat go down.

10. I will close with noting his excellent Facul­ty in quoting Scripture: To do which when the place is worth looking, as being brought to ju­stify [Page 177] some passage we are about, is grave and to some purpose; but, when no occasion or need invites, upon the naming any two or three words which hap to be in Scripture, to be still quoting and tricking the Margent with Book, Chapter and Verse and relating Stars or little Letters, is a very empty piece of Pageantrie, and most sil­lily Pedantical. Now, our Dr. cannot talk of Faith, but he must add (though most unsutably to his Reformers in England, to whom 'tis most notorious no body deliver'd it) which was once deliver'd to the Saints, and Iude 3. shall ascer­tain it. He cannot name the words, which was from the beginning, but the margent shall direct you to Mat. 19. 8. The two words Spending and being Spent oblige him to let you know where to find them, 2 Cor. 12. 15. At the very naming Help and All sufficient, (two good ho­nest words, which might have been spoke whe­ther Scripture had been or not) he cannot for his heart hold, but alledges you for it, 1. Cor. 1. 27. And will needs (though indeed very needlesly to us) prove himself a weak Instru­ment by a plain Text, 2 Cor. 10. 4. The obvi­ous and common words condemn'd out of their mouths, must have a Star of the First magnitude to light you to a lesser one in the margent, and that to Luke 19. 22. And David's cutting of Goliah's Head with his own Sword, a story known undoubtedly by all that were like to read his Sermon, shall be secured from being [Page 178] thought a piece of a Romance or Knight-erran­try by a punctual Citation in the open margent, 1 Sam. 17. 51. And, to omit diverse of the like pleasant strain, lest any Unbeliever should be so impious as to doubt that his THEOPNEVST AHOLIAB was an Embroiderer, you shall see it as plain as the nose on a man's face in an ex­press Text, Exod. 35. 30. 34.

11. But why insist I thus on so poor a foolery in a Book I design'd for solid? or what advantage can I gain to my cause by so sleight an Animad­version? I'answer, [...]Tis my temper when I see an odd action done without reason, to trace it to its Original, and to search after its proper Cause: And, upon consideration, I finde none so proper for this Effect, as a certain kinde of humour of quoting in D. Pierce and others of his Brethren, so strongly possessing them, and even naturaliz'd into them, that, so they be quoting, they matter not much whether it be to purpose or not: This I have shown in the whole bead-roll of his Cita­tions (the usefullest part (as he sayes) of his whole performance) and that not one of those which he call Evidences, is conclusive; that is, worth a straw, or to purpose: But, because every one will not be capable to see it in those Citations he brings for Proofs, I let them see it in those his late quotations of Scriptures: In which he so pittifully betraies his silly and vain humour of quoting to no imaginable end but to satisfy his customary habit or Fancy; and, as in his [Page 179] Citations, so in these, imagins the Applicati­on of them to his Cause in stead of showing it, that I conceive no Universitie-wit but will see in this carriage of his, that Dr. Pierce's head is not too Scienti [...]ical, nor himself a fit man to to demonstrate against the Papists.

SECOND APPENDIX.
Animadversions, On Some Passages in Mr. Whitby.

1. I Beg pardon of my Reader for my late Mer­riment and Children's play with aiery bub­bles and Feathers. Both D. Pierce's manner of writing and his Carriage towards Catholicks merited this kind of return. I hope the passa­ges in Mr. Whitby I have design'd to answer, will give me occasion to speak more solidly: And, that they may do so, I will pick out those which aim at some point of Concernment. I have a particular respect for the person, and am sorry his growing hopefulness receiv'd a foil by his Book against Mr. S. C. and this though a threefold disadvantage; the badness of his Cause, the Patronage of Dr. Pierce's malice, [Page 180] and his impar congressus with so learned an Antagonist.

2. My Designe leads me to take notice espe­cially of that passage, p. 93. Sect. 4. where he begins a discourse about the Soveraignty of Reason, and explicates (rather than proves it ought to be so) what is his Rule and Guide to Faith. Which, because it look't plausibly, yet was prudently neglected by Mr. S C. who hearing of more Eminent Antagonists writing against him, judg'd it wisest to reserve himself to answer the Protestanrs second and best Thoughts in Them, in case they were found to deserve it; and, because on the other side the Challenge was made to all the Romanists in the World, and many passages in it light cross to the Grounds I had laid, I took leave to consider and examin it my way. In a great part of it, especially at the beginning the discourse is right­ly made; but in other places he confounds Guide with Rule, Power with Motive, and, by straining a word in Mr. S. C. beyond its necessa­ry signification, imposes on us a false Tenet which he mainly builds upon. So that I am forc't to begin my answer by putting down our true one, which gives Faith and Reason both their due. This done, his Superstructutes on that Supposition will fall of themselves.

3. Our Tenet then is that Faith is the same with Belief, that Belief relies on Authority, and Divine Faith or Belief on the Divine Authority [Page 181] as its Motive, and on the Churche's as on the Applier of the other to my Understanding. At next, I hold that no Authority deserves Assent further than true Reason gives it to deserve; and, hence, the Divine Authority, being Essential Truth deserves in true Reason, if possible, Infi­nitely intense Assent or adhesion to its sayings from me; and the Churches Authority being found by my Reason to be Certain, it applies with Certainty (that is closely) the Divine Au­thority to my Understanding; and so obliges it absolutely to believe the Truths God has told, and to submit whatever reasons I may have a­gainst the Object reveal'd to this all-overpower­ing Authority of Essential Truth; This being the First Cause of all those things, whence my particular Reasons are taken. Nay, farther, hence it is that I adhere more heartily and firmly to a point of Faith than to any Conclusion of any Science whatever; because a more efficacious Cause equally closely apply'd is apt to produce a greater Effect, and no Cause is or can be in [...] reason comparable to that of the Divine Ver [...]city in the point of causing Assent; which is closely apply'd by me to the Churches assurance. Hence my Faith is ever most Rational; because [...]is [...] rational to believe a point for which the Divine Veracity is engag'd, and highly rational to be­lieve the Church assuring me that it is engag [...]d for such and such points: Nor yet is the Divine Authority or the Church (as Mr. Whitby p. 96. very [Page 182] mistakingly argues) beholden to the judgment of my private reason for my belief of her Infallibility, but on, the contrary, my private reason is behol­den to them for that Judgment; seeing I there­fore come to have that Judgment because Those, as Objects, wrought upon my Apprehension and imprinted a conceit of them there as they were in themselves, and so oblig'd my Reason to con­clude and my Judgment to hold them such as they were. This Rational Assent establishes my Faith against the assaulds of any doubts from Hu­man Reasons; resting assur'd th [...] the same God who told me this, is the Maker of all things else, and hath writ all Created Truths in the Things he hath made; whence no created [...]ruth can thwart my Faith unless He can contradict him­self, which is impossible. Hence, if I have true Science I am certain to find no part of it opposit to my Faith; but, on the contrary, conformable to It, as being a Child of the same Parent, Es­sential Truth: If I have not true Science, I ought not to think so; nothing therefore but mine own overweening can make me mis­carry.

4. Reason having thus play [...]d her part in bringing me to Faith, deserts me not yet while I act in it, nor I her: my Acts of Belief are still rational, because it was rational to believe at first, and my Grounds why I then believ'd rest still unchang'd, nay are unchangeable. But yet, Reason acts much differently now then [Page 183] [...]ormerly; Before I came at Faith she acted about her own Objects, Motives or Maxims, by which she scand the Authorities we spoke of: But, in Acts of Faith she hath nothing to do with the Objects of those Acts or Points of Faith; She is like a dimsighted man who us'd his Reason to find a trusty Friend to lead him in the twi-light, and then reli'd on his guidance rationally with­out using his own Reason at all about the Way it self. To make this clearer we may distinguish two sences in the word Reason; one, as 'tis ta­ken for that natural Faculty which constitutes Man; which Faculty never deserts or ought to desert us in any action that is Manly or virtuous, The other as 'tis taken for that Power wrought upon by motives under its own ken; in the same sence we call it human Reason; by which is not meant the natural Power unactuated or abstra­ctedly, for then the word human were a Ta [...]to­logy; but Reason as conversant with such ob­jects or inform'd by such knowledges as are com­monly found within the sphere of our natural condition as Men, such as are those which beget Science: And this leaves us when we have once found the Authority now spoken of; the Objects of Faith, formally speaking, being out of her reach; nor is she (thus understood) the motive of our Assent to the verity of the Point of Faith, but AVTHORITY onely. Wherefore into Authority onely, Faith (as such) is resolvd fi­nally; though, if you go about to resolve the [Page 184] Rationalness of assenting to the Authority it self, it will light into those Evident Reasons, which your naturall power of reason, as yet uninform'd by Faith but by motives or maxims within its own sphere, was capable to wield.

5. Reason therefore taken for my natural Power is my Eye or interiour sight; as inform'd by com­mon Principles or Maxims antecedent to Faith, my Guid to bring me to believe Authority; and those motives or Maxims are the Rules to my Reason, by attending to which, she hath virtue or skill to set her own thoughts right, that is to guid me in my way to Faith: but, when I have once come to beleeve Authority, that is, come to Faith, not Reason but Authority is my Guid; for I follow Authority and not my Reason in judging what is Faith, what not; and, though the Light of that naturall power never deserts me, yet Reason, as rul'd by her own natural maxims, is useless to me as a Guid, or those Maxims as a Rule; for I apply neither of these to the mysteries of Faith to scan their verity or falsity by, but purely rely upon Authority, and beleeve them. Authority then is my Guid; and in the Infallibility of that Authority, consists the power or virtue it has to guide me right, that is to regulate or rule me, as one of the Faithfull, or as one who must have such Certain Grounds of my Assent, as I may securely build my Salvation on. This Authority then, as it is In [...]allible, is also my Rule in my beleeving, or the Rule of my Faith. This of my [Page 185] Rule of Faith in Common, against Adversaries of Faith in common. But, with Protestants, who grant Christ to be God, and consequently his words or doctrine true, the onely Rule and Guid we need, is to lead us into the Knowledge of what he said and assure it to us. We affirm then, that the Catholick Church is the Guid we follow, and her Infallibility (consisting in Tradition) our Rule of Faith. Hence all Catholicks profess her doctrin uninterruptedly succeeding from the Apostles time, and so to continue to the end of the World; hence with one voice they lay claim to Christs gracious Assistance to her, in defending her from over-growing Errors against Faith, or Heresies; hence all profess to hear and follow her, and pledge undoubtingly even the security of their salvation, by relying on the Certainty of her Living Voice for their Tenets, and on her Disciplin for the Practice of their Faith. And though some Schoolmen make Scripture a partial Rule of Faith, yet they can mean onely materi­ally not formally, that is, that some part of Faith is signifi'd by Scripture's Letter, not that Scrip­ture's Letter alone is sufficient securely to signify it to private understandings so as to beget that most strong & firm Assent found in Divine Faith; as is evident by this, that all hold no Scripture is of private Interpretation; all hold the living voice of the Church and her constant Practice are the best Interpreters of Scripture. Now, Faith being Tenets and Sence, that must be [...] [Page 186] the Rule of Faith, which ascertains us of Christs Sence; not the materiall Characters which that Certain Interpreter we call the Church works upon, and by her Practicall Tradition inter­prets.

6. 'Tis high time now to look back upon Dr. Pierce and his party, how justly they deal with us, and how mistakingly they discourse when they come to the Grounds of their Faith.

7. First, by the tenour of his discourse he would seem to obtrude upon us a Tenet, which none but perfect mad-men could hold; name­ly that we profess we have no reason why we believe the Church; which devolves to this that we must profess we have as much reason to believe an old wife's dream as our Faith, since there can be no less reason than none at all. And hence he will needs assure the Reader, that therefore, the Enthusiastick Sectaries are in part Romish Proselytes, &c. And indeed upon so gross a calumny layd down for his principle and a so­ber Truth, what might he not conclude? with equal reason he might have inferr'd that all Bed­lam were Catholicks, and that to turn mad were to turn a Romanist. But his carriage to put this upon Mr. S. C. is strangely unjust; since he knows and hints it, that he writ a Book upon his declaring himself Catholick, entitled, Mo­tives of his Conversion; does he think the word Motives does not signify Reasons, or, that to write an whole Book of Reasons why he adhea'd [Page 187] to the Catholick Church signifies that he re­nounc't all reason why he believ'd her?

8. Next, as for his own tenet, he layes this for his Ground, that, Reason alone is Iudge in all cases. I will propose him one case, and 'tis the Existence of a Trinity. To work now with your Reason about this object, and see how you evince it. I doubt your best reasons will crack ere you make all ends meet. But, you mean you must have Reason to believe it; I conceive (speaking properly) you should rather say you must have Reason to believe the Authority, and Authority to believe It; for Belief is as properly relative to Authority as Science is to an Act of true Reason or Evidence. Whence 'tis as incongruous to say I must have Reason to believe such a Point, as to say I know such a point Scientifically by Authority. Again, for God's love who ever deny'd they ought to have reason to believe the Churches Authority; Is any thing more frequent in our Controvertists and Divines treating of the Ground of Faith than large Discourses concerning Motives of Credibility?

9. Thirdly, he saies that disputing with Ro­manists whether Scripture be the sole Rule, he means tis so limitedly, that is between Christians, who have already acknowledged Scripture a Rule of Faith. By which I see Mr Whitby guides him self by sounds, though he must need; know (if he knows any thing of Catholick Ten [...]) our [Page 188] sence is quite different. I beseech you, Sir, deal fairly with us: Is not that, speaking formally and properly, the Rule of Faith which gives us Christs sence; and does not that give us the Sence of Scripture which regulates us in the Interpreta­tion of it? Did ever Catholick then hold that Scripture interpreted on any fashion, much less on your fashion by private Judgments or reasons regulated by Grammatical skill, Criti­cisms and such like verbal knowledges, is a Rule of Faith; nay do not we constantly abhor this way as the Source of Heresy? Take us right then we hold not Scripture's Letter alone a Rule, but Scripture interpreted by the Church; that is, indeed, the Church formally speaking; and so you see you mistake our Principle. Yet upon our joint-agreement in this your Discourse against us proceeds. Retrive it then, you see your Errour. Again, you tell us Scripture is your new Rule, but forget quite in your discourse to tell us that your Reason assures you Scripture is to be the onely Rule, or why it should be so; since (besides what I have demonstrated to the Contrary in my former Discourses) 'tis evident Christian Religion had descended many steps ere the Scripture's parts were much scatter'd, much less the Whole collected; and no less clear that, that can never be a Rule or Way to Faith, which many follow yet their thoughts straggle into many several Judgments; not in indifferent points, but in that of the Trinity [Page 189] amongst the rest, as your self profess of the Soci­nian, that he rejects not the Trinity in the first place, because it seems a contradiction, but because 'tis not clearly discover'd in Scripture; by which you see he adheres firm to your Rule, and so ought to be acknowledg'd one of your Church; since, though he hap to differ in some points, yet he holds fast the Rule common to both; which is the substantiallest Principle of a Church as such, being the Ground of all Faith. And, indeed, your Kindness to him here, and your tender care not to displease him, shows you have a true brotherly affection for him. Though I fear he he will con you small thanks for making his Principle run thus, That which is not clearly re­veal [...]d in Scripture and is coniradictory ti reason is not to be believ'd; which seems to imply, that were it clear in Scripture, yet contradictory to Reason, then he would notwithstanding be­live it. An over-strain of Piety no Socinian was ever guilty of, and I can assure you no learned Catholick Divine I ever heard of ever made such an Act of Faith. But 'tis another case if it onely seems contradictory, and is not judg'd by him to be evidently such; for then there is room left in his mind for the contrary Assent of Faith to settle there.

10. You say you prescribe not the doctrin im­puted to the Socinians, because it makes Reason the Iudge of Faith, but the Rule of Faith. Pray take pains to consider what you say. He that [Page 190] judges must have some Principles in his head by which he is regulated in making such a Judgment; those Principles then must be his Rule in that Action; and, if that Judgment be an adhesion to a point of Faith, those Principles are his RULE OF FAITH. Examin now well your own thoughts, whether your Principles, by which you find out certainly by interpreting Scripture this is God's sence or a point of Faith, be not Maxims of your human Rea­son. I am sure in disputes against us you prove and defend your Faith by such skills; as Languages, History and other Knowledges got by Human Learning; and consequently hold It your selves upon the tenour of those skills, which therefore are your Rule of Faith, and not upon the bare Letter. You, I know, will deny it. But I beg your second thoughts to reflect that a Rule to such an Effect is the immediate Know­ledge to the Power as conversant about that Effect; and that, if another intervene, it regulates the former; which thereupon becomes the thing ruled, not the Rule. Do then these skills clear the Letter of Scripture, that is, make known Gods Sence to you? If so, since their Immedi­ate effect is to clear it, 'tis impossible to deny but they are at least part of the Revelation; for re­vealing is clearing, and God's Sence was not clear­ly revealed but by those means, that is by human maxims; and so they are at least the more for­mal part of your Rule of Faith. Again, I ask [Page 191] might you not have mistaken the true Sence without those Human Maxims? If so, then They, and not Scripture's Letter, were your Rule. If not, then onely common Sence is re­quisit to understand clearly what's reveal'd in Scripture; and then, either your Brother Socini­an or you want Common Sence, which I think you'l scarce say.

11. But, will you see you still hold Reason your Rule, notwithstanding you cry up the Written word? Find you not there expresly that God has hands, feet, nostrils and passions like ours, and this in clear terms? Why is it not then a point of Faith? You will not answer sure it is against Maxims of Reason; you renounc't them for­merly (p. 94.) when you had found out your new Rule and onely allow'd your Reason power to judge, if a point were sufficientlie reveal'd, that it is most rational to [...] it self, though it seem to contradict or thw [...] Reason. Now this is sufficiently reveal'd being plainly writ in your Rule of Faith, and the direct Letter of Scrip­ture; why will you not then captivate your Rea­son and believe it? I see you do but complement with God's incomprehensible Knowledge in speak­ing so highly of it and so humbly of your own shallow Intell [...]ct: Will you deny a point of Faith so plainly reveald for your own capricho or conceit? Perhaps you'l say 'tis not clearly reveal'd because the contrary is plain in Scrip­ture too. I ask, is it as plain? if not, it cannot [Page 192] overthrow the title of This to be a point of Faith: If as plain, why should you not believe both? Be valiant, Sir, and believe a contradi­ction it being clearly reveal'd. Perhaps it seems but such, and then your own profession. p. 94. obliges you to admit it: You that can acknow­ledge an Infinit extension of space (when you say all the world besides does so too, sure you thought all the World was in your Fancy) may also hold Materia ab aeterno, and that it is onely a part of Gods Nature, as (if I mistake not) Ia­cob Bemen does; and then secundum hanc par­tum of illam will do the work, and gives a true sence to both sides of the contradiction. You should do any thing which could by any means make it seem possible, rather than question a plain Divine Revelation: Nay, perhaps you do not think you can demonstrate the contrary to the solution I have helpt you out with, at least that your Demonstration is but a seeming one; and then I challenge your candour to own your sayings, and demand why you are not bound to use this shift and a thousand others rather than violate your avow'd Rule of Faith, and deny and hold against the clear Letter of Scripture. If you alledge you have perfect Science of the contrary by Metaphysicks; then, though I ex­pect not this from you, your Science rules your Rule of Faith; glossing or rather violently wrest­ing the plain Letter, and so is so absolutely your Rule of Faith that it controls and even baffles [Page 193] the other though clearly revealing: Or, if to be in express terms in Scripture be not to be clearly revealed, I would fain know what those words clearly revealed in Scripture signifie.

12. Perhaps you I say, that notwithstanding your new Rule, Reason must be your GVID still even in Faith, though not your Rule. But I ask, if your Reason must guide you sometimes so as to deny the clear Letter of Scripture, since a Guid in any thing must be regulated by some Know­ledges in that Affair, by what Principles or Knowledges Reason is to regulate it self while it guides you in that particular now in question? By Principles of Faith? How can that be in your Grounds antecedently to the known Sence of the Scripture? By Principles of Human Sci­ence? Then those Principles of Human Science give you the certain Sence of the Written Word when it self is insufficient, and therefore are still truly your Rule of Faith; and so you are forc't to fly back for refuge to the old Rule, Human Reason, which you seemingly renounc't when you had found your new Rule of the Scripture. 'Tis Evident then that some Maxims of your Reason are your Rule and not Scripture's Let­ter. And this is what we reprehend in the So­cinian and you too; that, chusing a wrong Rule of Faith so to avoid the Church, you both gloss it as seems best to your Reason regulating her self by her own, and those fallible, Maxims. They by certain acute and ingenious Sophistries proper [Page 194] to themselves, you by the more school-boy way of Grammar and Dictionary Learning; and so both of you make your Rule the thing Ruled. Nor think to retort any part of this Discourse upon our Rule of Faith; For, this being the living voice of the Church, delivers us a Determinate Sence of the Points we are to profess, whereas Yours needs skils and helps of studious Reason to tell you what it would say; Ours is alive, and in the Breast and Actions of the Faithful; yours is dead characters, waxen-natur'd, and pliable to, the Dedalean fancies of the ingenious molders of new Opinions; and so, alone, can satisfie no man as you handle it.

13. No wonder now, if, having no certainer a Ground or Rule of Faith for her self, your Church is shamefast of obliging others to believe her: Man's nature could scarce own or permit so irrational a tyrannie. Yet whether she does or does not, we must not know from your words; which run so backwards and forwards, that none can tell which is the true face of the Ianus. First p. 99. you seem to deny it stoutly from the carri­age of your Convocations and Bishops, and from your own Tenets: Yet afterwards you seem to grant they do require a positive assent somtimes, and justifie them as not doing it upon pretence of any Infallibility, but because the thing determin'd is so Evident in Scripture, that all denying it must be wilful. A rare Discourse, and worthy a deep consideration! Pray who must be Judge it is so [Page 195] Evident in Scripture as to render the Dissenters guilty of flat Wilfulness? The Bishops, or your Church? Nothing less: In the beginning of this Discourse (p. 93.) you plainly deny'd them to be Judges of Faith. Now in your sence to be clearly reveal'd or evident in Scripture, and to be of Faith is all one; so that they must not be Judges of what is evident in Scripture, lest by necessary consequence they become Judges of Faith; and yet without having power to judge what is evi­dent in Scripture, they must have power to re­quire assent to Points as evident in Scripture; nay and punish the dissenters too: For 'tis a madness for Governours to require any thing of their Sub­jects, without having Rewards and Punishments in their hands to make what they require to be duely observ [...]d. Nay p. 93. you absolutely re­fus'd to admit them as Guides of your Faith. A mo­derate word and less than to be a Iudge! Which signifies they may have power to require our Assents in matters in which they have no power to guide us; that is, they may have power to require us to go wrong for any thing we or they know. An ex­cellent honour for the Church of England, that her Champions profess in Print her Supreme Pa­stors have no power at all to guide their Flock in their Faith, or to it when they are out of it! A­gain, I would ask whether the Trinity be not Evident in Scripture, and the Socinians wilful for denying it? Why are they then so kindly dealt with? Or what could be reply'd to a Socinian, [Page 196] answering, when his Assent to the Trinity were required, that he humbly submitted to Scripture, that he us'd all the means he could, but disco­ver'd it not so evident there; and thereupon com­plain'd that you obtruded upon his equally-learn­ed party your own conceit or opinion for Scrip­ture-Evidences? What therefore you alledge here, as in your Churches behalf, that she requires not a positive assent upon pretence of any Infallibi­lity, more condemns Her; seeing tis most absurd and irrational that one should require any man to assent to any point or proposition whatever, as evident in Scripture, without Infallible Certainty (at least imagin'd and pretended) that it is thus evident there; for, should it happen to be other­wise, how ridiculous were his Authority, how damnable and diabolical his Tyrannie to oblige men to the hazard of falshoods in matters of Faith, that is in matters belonging to his eternal Salvation; and in the mean time profess himself Ignorant whether they be false or no.

14. Now our Church goes another way; which ere I declare, I would let your party see, that In­teriour Assent may be required by Governours lawfully and rationally, which your Principles can never make sence of. Suppose a thousand witnesses from several places each of them held alwayes men of good consciences should swear in open Court that they had seen such and such acti­ons done by such a man, or that they had seen, spoken or converst with such a person, were not [Page 197] he mad that is a renouncor of Reason or Man's Nature who should not believe them. You see then these Witnesses have power to propose such an Object as can oblige to Belief? You see the Dissenters are Irrational, that their act of dissenting springs from some Passion or Vice, and Vice is punishable; and so is the Effects of that Dissent, if it be in such a matter as is highly pernicious to Mankind's best concerns. Now our Church makes account she is able to propose an Authority incomparably more ample than the Attestation now spoken of, for the true Descent of her Faith; and judges such a pro­posal, founded on the eye-sight of all those Wit­nesses, to be able to oblige to interiour Assent in such a degree as to render them most highly wil­ful vicious and irrational who should disbelieve it; hence (the crime intrenching upon the or­der to mankind's Salvation▪ the highest concern imaginable,) both to edify those dissenters by correcting their vice, and the circumstant Faith­ful, by breeding a conceit in them, through the punishment of the others, of the sacredness of Faith and its Rule, and the hainousness of Pride of understanding the ready way to all Heresies, they may nay ought punish their Interiour Dis­sent: Not out of an height of Authority with­out motives, as Mr. Whitby conceits, but be­cause that Authority is her self such a motive to Belief, that onely irrational vicious and wil­fully-blind persons can recede from it by disbelief: [Page 198] And hence our Churches procedure is rational, natural, sweet and charitable, tending to amend an enormity of Will not bred from a rationally but passionate dissatisfy'd Understanding. Nay, Mr. Whitby's discourse justifies Our Churches procedure; who seems to allow his Church a power to require a positive Assent, when the case comes to be such that the denier of it must needs be held wilfull; and our Church neither sayes nor acts otherwise.

15. By this Discourse I would not have Mr Whit­by imagin that I am about proving our Churches Infallibility in this place; but onely showing that, holding She can evidence her Authority, She goes rationally to work and consonantly to her self in requiring Assent to her Proposals; whereas Theirs, confessing her self fallible even in interpreting Scripture, upon which all, both her Faith, and Authority as a Church, depends, were self-condemn'd, irrational and tyrannical if She should go about to require any such Inte­riour Assent. Now, though he in big words de­nies this to be her carriage, asking when did they (meaning Bishops, Convocations or Parliaments) challenge any power over our minds and Consci­ences, and alledges the consent of their Divines for it, yet I wonder what he thinks of the Oaths of Allegiance and Supremacy, made by a Pro­testant Parliament; is there no obligation there to hold any thing? Yes, as strong as Oath can tye it. And, which is worse, 'tis more Irratio­nal [Page 199] to go about to bind Our Assents who are not of their Church, than to bind their own Sub­jects. This in practice is perform'd towards all; but so imprincipled a procedure that their Church waves it when it comes to a rational scanning in a Dispute and Controversy, ac­knowledging so their want of Grounds to make it good. Which shows that the Authority of their Church sprang from the Parliament or Se­cular State, in regard She professes her self very heartily content with external Obedience, let the Interiour Assent goes where it will; most un­like the Church settled by the Wisdome of the Eternal Father, and constituted the Pillar and Ground of Truth; who provided in the first place for the Churches Power to hold us to the same Tenets (which are the Principles of our Actions) knowing that, unless the Root of Faith be sound, the Actions, its branches, must needs be rotten and unconscientious; and, that no Congregation could long hold together, nor in­deed longer than the plain force of the Secular Sword aw'd them, unless by power to evidence its Authority it had power to oblige men's Un­derstandings connaturally to an Unity in the same Faith; which done, all else would follow, And hence we may see confessedly in the Prote­stant Principles the reason of their present and past distractions, and divine of the future; for, men's Fancies being naturally various, and no power in her to keep them in an Union, they [Page 200] must needs ramble into multitudes of dissenting Sects; which to strive to unite into one were to force both Nature and Conscience too. Nature, in striving to unite their Understandings in Faith, without offering them Evidence of Authority; Conscience, in binding them to Act as Protestants do, whereas they are ready to stake their Sal­vation upon it that their best reasons working upon the very Rule of Faith Protestants recom­mend, obliges them to the contrary, and that to force them to act with Them is to force them to sin; So that the Protestants at once profess they will not or cannot oblige their Vnderstand­ings, and yet at the same time contend by force to oblige their Wills, without, nay against their Understandings.

16. In a word, let Protestants write, talk & quote words as long as they will, Plainest Common Sence tells them and every man who considers it, that unless they settle some undisputable Method of arriving at Christ's Sence or Faith, that is, some self-evident (and so all-obliging) Rule of Faith, the Protestant Church can never hope for Power to reduce their Dissenters, nor to hold together or govern efficaciously their own Subjects; that is, they can never hope for Unity within themselves; nor, lastly, Union with them that have it, and charitably endeavour they may have it too.

THIRD APPENDIX.
Animadversions On Some Passages in Mr. Stillingfleet.

1. THe loud Fame of Mr. Stillingfleet's Book preventing its Publication, and withall the report of his good parts coming from di­verse Judicious Persons, bred in me a great Im­patience to see something of his other Writings, that so I might have more solid Ground to build my Expectation on than common rumour or commendation of acquaintances. A Protestant Friend show'd me a little Treatise of his con­cerning Excommunication. I perus'd the be­ginning of it, and immediately told him Mr. Stil­lingfleet was a very ingenious person, and writ the best I ever yet saw any Protestant: For he settled first his notion or the true nature of the Thing, and thence attempted by intrinsecal mediums to draw immediate Consequences, which show'd that his head lay right for Science. But, withal, I assur'd my Friend 'twas impossible he could write against us, and take that method; the nature of his Cause not enduring so severe a Test. His Book coming forth, and bearing in its Title a Rational Account of the Grounds of [Page 202] Protestant Religion, my Expectation was more erected; and, till my self could get leasure to peruse it, I told diverse both Catholicks and Protestants that they might expect from Mr. Stil­lingfleet's Wit the most that could be said ei­ther for the later or against the former. But, coming to over-look cursorily his Infallibility of Tradition, Part 1. Cap. 6. and The. Protestants Way of resolving Faith, Cap. 7. I had quite lost Mr. Stillingfleet; and, instead of him, had found a Dr. Hammond, Dr. Pierce, or a Dissuader; who talk not out of Nature or Things, but Words & Imagination. I plainly discover'd there was not one proposition in those two Discourses which could be a solid Ground for a rational under­standing (that would be true to it self) to set­tle and rely on; and was desirous to show it, had it not been uncivil to put my sickle into another man's harvest, and crop the victory due to another's Learning and Industry: Victory, I say; For he that defends his Cause no better, in effect yields it lost. Yet I beg leave of the judicious Authour of Labyrinthus Cantuariensis to maintain one Breach where I find my self more directly assaulted; Oral Tradition being the Post I have taken upon me to explicate further & defend, because I conceive it the solid Ground on which the Church, or all Catholicks both Learned and Unlearned, rely as Faithful: however some School-men, abounding in their own Sence, ground also their Explication of [Page 203] the Churches Infallibility on somthing besides.

2. Mr Stillingfleet then Part 3. Chap. 5. § 4, & 5. sets himself to oppose Oral Tradition, whose Infallibility he opposes to Doctrinal Infallibility in Pope or Councils. Where, if by Doctrinal Infalli­bility, he means that which they have as Doctors or Schollers, he may reflect that no Catholick makes such an Infallibility proper to the Church or Church-Governours, as such; however it may be somtimes necessary to proceed upon it in some signal occasions. Now, take away this Infallibi­lity, there is none left but the Infallibility of Tra­dition, perform'd by Testifying: It being Evident that we have but two wayes of ordinary Know­ledge; by Acts of our Soul, or Operations on our Body; that is, by Reason and Experience; the former of which belongs to Speculaters or Doctors; the second to Deliverers of what was receiv'd, or, to Testifiers. Whence M. Stilling­fleet may see he stumbles at the very threshold by counterposing Doctrinal Infallibility to Tra­ditionary; since that which we call Ecclesia docens professes constantly to ground her self on Tradi­tion; witness the Council of Trent in every Session where she defines Faith.

3. No wonder then, if grounding on this mi­stake, Mr Stillingfleet declares himself unsatisfi'd. He asks therefore whether he is bound to believe what the present Church delivers to be Infallible? I understand him not: Had he instead of the word Infallible, put receiv'd as deliver'd ever, or Infal­libly [Page 204] true, I had; for Fallibility and Infallibility belong to the Knowing Power or the Persons that have it, not to the Object; The Object being neither deceiv'd nor not deceiv'd, but we: Well, but suppose he means by it deliver'd ever, or (which is equivalent) certainly true, for what came from Christ must be so; In that case we answer Affirmatively: He asks again, on what ac­count is he bound to believe it? And he makes our Answer to be, Because the present Church cannot be deceiv'd in what the Church of the former Age believ'd, nor That in the precedent, and so up till Christ. This is indeed part of our Answer: The other part is, that the Church in no Age could con­spire against her Knowledge to deceive that Age immediately following in matter of Fact evident in a manner to the whole World. Upon this, he falls into two new Demands which take up this whole paragraph.

4. The first is, how we can assure him the pre­sent Church obliges him to believe nothing but onely what and so far as it receiv'd from the former Church? I answer, by her manifest Practice; ne­ver refusing Communion to any man that could approve himself to believe all the former Age did. I could here distinguish the word Believe, but I refer it till I come to speak of de fide. He pro­ceeds. What Evidence can you bring to convince me both that the Church alwayes observ'd this Rule, and could never be deceiv'd in it? For the later, I hope I need bring no greater Evidence than this, [Page 205] that men in all Ages had Eyes, Ears, and other Senses, also common Reason, and as much memo­ry as to remember their own names and frequent­ly-inculcated Actions. If you disprove this, I doubt we have lost mankind, the subject we are speaking of. And, till you disprove it, neither I nor any man in his wits can doubt that this Rule depending on Testifying, that is Sence or Experi­ence, can possibly permit men to be deceivable. The former part I shall speak to when I come to show the Obligation not to vary from Faith. His Scruple springs hence, that he sees the Roman Church asserts things to be de fide in one age which were not in another, &c. that this is the common Doctrin and the deniers ill-look't on. I beg leave to distinguish the words de fide; which may ei­ther mean Christian Faith or Points of Faith taught by Christ; and then you see 'tis nonsence to say they can be in one Age and not in another; for what Christ has taught he has taught, and the preteritness of the Thing has so fixt its Exi­stence to its proper time, that 'tis not now obno­xious to variation; Quod factum est infectum fieri non potest. Or, de fide may mean obligatory to be believ'd. In this later sence none (I think) de­nies things may be de fide in one Age, and not in another; in the former sence none holds it. What's now become of your difficulty? I believe you are in some wonderment, and think I elude it rather then answer it: I shall endeavour to un­perplex you.

[Page 206] 5. Christianity ayms not to make us Beasts but more perfectly Men; and the perfection of our Manhood consists in using our Reasons. Since then natural Consequences are apt to spring from natural Principles by the operation of Reason, and we cannot but think that the Consequences apt to flow from Supernatural Principles or Points of Faith deliver'd down from Christ (onely which are de fide in the former Sence) are of incomparably greater Excellency than Natural Truths, it follows that Christianity or Christian Faith is so far from hindring the Faith­ful from deducing out of them, that both out of their nature as Supream Truths or Principles, and out of their high Excellency they invite and prompt most strongly to it. Now these Points deduct out of Principles of Faith are of two sorts; The former those which need no more but Common Sence or the ordinary natural Light of Reason to discover their arising thence, nor any piece of Skill or Science to infer them, but are seen by the bare Principle of Faith, or rather in it; being indeed but a Branch or Part of that Principle. The later are those which need, besides, the Maxims of some Science got by Speculation to infer them. An Example of the former sort is that against the Monothe­lites of Christ's having an Human Will; for, com­mon Experience tells the most vulgar that eve­ry Man has a Principle in him impelling him to Act, which we agree to call a Will. Such like­wise [Page 207] are all Propositions of this Nature which the Church uses upon occasion of some emergent Heresie to explain her self and put the point of Faith out of danger of being equivocated. Ex­amples of the later sort are Theological Conclu­sions; in which a Natural Truth is one of the Premises, joyning with the Supernatural one to infer them. To omit this, as little to our pur­pose at present; Of the former sort the Church is necessitated to make use upon occasion; that is, when any Heretick questions Those, and eâdem operâ the whole point of Faith it self of which they were a part. Upon occasion I say; For what concern'd its the Faithful or who ever heard much noise of this Proposition, Christ has two Wills, thus singled out and exprest apart, till the Monothelite granting him but one, forc't the Church, that she might preserve the main Tenet of Christ's having two Natures, or being God and Man, to maintain, publish and define that other.

6. To apply this then; since none can have Obligation to believe what they have not obli­gation to think of, and, that in some Age the Generality of the Faithful have no Occasion nor consequently Obligation to minde, reflect or think on those Propositions involvd in the main stock of Faith, and truly parts of it, that is indeed It; It follows that a Thing may be de fide or obligatory to be believ'd in one Age and not in another. Perhaps Mr. Stillingfleet may [Page 208] ask how the Church can have Power to oblige the Generality to Belief of such a point. I answer, she obliges them to believe the main Point of Faith by virtue of Tradition's being a Self-evi­dent Rule, and these Imply'd Points by virtue of their being self-evidently-connected with those main and perpetually-us'd Points, so that the vulgar can be rationally and connaturally made capable of this their Obligation. Whence the Government of our Church is still justify'd to be sweet and according to right Nature, and yet forcible and Efficacious to hold her Sub­jects in a strict Union. Not to mention how these Points also descended by a kind of Tradi­tion; for I doubt not but the Apostles had oc­casion in explaining Faith to speak of These; however the no Necessity brought them not so much into play, but left them unreflected on by the Generality.

7. But to return to Mr. Stillingfleet, who acts here like a Politician and would conquer us by first dividing us, and making odious Compari­sons between two parties of Divines. But he may please to reflect how we all hold firmly the same divinely-constituted Church-Government, and the same self-evident Rule of Faith to give our understandings the same principles as Chri­stians, and so our wills the same Actions: And those are firmly rooted in all our hearts to have been recommended to us by the wisdom of the Eternal Father: Whence 'tis Impossible for all [Page 209] the Wit of Man or even Malice of Hell to disunite us as we are Faithful: As private Discoursers, our different Natures and Circumstances must needs distinguish us. Every one believes the same; but, coming to explicate this Belief, they vary accord­ing to the several degrees of perfection in their understanding Powers. And yet M. Stillingfleet is not aware how little we differ even as Divines: For, though some Speculaters attribute to the Church a power of defining things not held before, yet few will say she has New Revelations, or New Articles of Faith, & those only some Lawyers who talk ultra crepidam, no Divines that I know of; and none, that Christ was not a perfect Law-giver; which are necessary Consequents (or rather in a manner Identical) to the other. And, when it comes to the point, those men explain themselves that all was deliver'd Faith, either Explicitly or Implicitly; which I have shown to bear a very good Sence, in my Explication of de fide. He tells us Popes and Councils challenge a power to make things de fide in one Age which was not in another: he speaks onely in common and proves it not: Had he brought Instances, it might have been better clear'd. In the mean time I have shown him how, take them right, this is both perfectly innocent and unavoidably necessa­ry to a Church. What would avail him is, if a Pope and Council should define a new Thing, and declare they ground themselves on new Lights, as did their first Reformers in England. But he will [Page 210] finde no such fopperies in Faith-definitions made by the Catholick Church. He tells us that this is the common Doctrin maintain'd; By which I per­ceive he is at an end of his Argument against our Church; there being no evidenter signe of it, than to leave off assaulting Her; confound her with the Schools, or some private Opinaters, and then carp at these mens Tenets. Whereas M. Stil­lingfleet wants not Wit to know, that no sober Catholick holds Human deductions the Rule of our Faith, Schoolmen Definers of it, nor the Schools the Tribunal whence to propose it autho­ritatively and obligingly to the Generality of the Faithful; much less a few Divines, which are far from reaching the Authority of the Schools. Yet how much of his Book would need no Answer, were this Impertinent Topick laid aside? But well; Let Schools and Church be all one, that is, let every master of divinity be a Bishop, what means he to conclude from the words common Do­ctrin? Does he make account every School-Doctrin must be equally in vogue, or that an Opi­nion's being Common defines it Faith and con­demns the other for Heretical. Where's his Rea­son? The direct contrary follows from its being Common; and, that 'tis not Faith which others, though not so many, may contradict; and he is but meanly vers't in our Schools if he sees not very many publikely maintain that there are no new Revelations without dreading Excommunica­tion, or being held Heretical and seditious: So [Page 211] they grant the Church power (as they ought) by new Propositions and new but expressive Words, (yet, both the same in sence and so not new in sub­stance) to meet with the new blundering Cavils of Innovators.

8. Yet all this while M. Stillingfleet cannot see how to satisfie himself of the Sence of our Church as to this particular. Nor ever will, while he wil­fully looks the wrong way, that is, towards some particular Schoolmen or Divines, not towards the Universality of the Faithful or Church. What need he counterfeit this puzzle? Did he never hear of such a thing as the Council of Trent? Or is it so hard to finde it? Again, does not he know all the Catholick Church allow more a thousand times to It than to all the Schoolmen in the World? Yes very well; How comes it then that he runs to some Schoolmen, and neglects the Church speaking in her Representative? Because he may finde there a clear Solution of his doubt, by the constant procedure of that most grave Sy­nod in its definitions: where he will hear of no such Toyes as New Revelations, but directly the contrary; Every Session where Faith was de­fin'd professing to build on Tradition, Teaching and Preaching, that is, Oral Tradition; ever, al­wayes, from the beginning, &c. that is not-new, but the old-and-ever-Faith. If you would com­bat our Church, here you have her; fall to work: But you find some Schoolmen opining also Infalli­bility in some other means besides Tradition, and [Page 212] judging this Tenet easilier confuted, you level your blowes at it, because the other is out of your reach; and would make this Tenet the Sence of the Catholick Church, and so seem to oppose the Church her self. You would disgrace this Way of Tradition as maintain'd but by a few, and those blemisht persons. How far are you wide of the Truth? 'Tis the way every Catholick in the whole Church, none excepted, holds and follows. For my part, I disavow the main­taining any Point or affecting any way which is not assented to by all; and this, not as Opinion, but deeply rooted in their hearts as Infallibly Certain. Schoolmen at Liberty question Personal Infallibility of the Pope, some grant it not to him and his Roman Clergy, some question that of a Provincial Synod; nay some, whose Books are extant and yet uncensur'd, maintain even a General Council may possibly err; but not one I have heard or read of affirms that Tradition, or the Living voice of the Church Essential, could err; For in doing so, he call'd all his Faith in question, and so ceast to be a Christian.

9. This then being held by all; held firmly; and that it is absolutely Infallible so that in no case it can err, the others only by some, & faintly in com­parison (as appears by the Faithful's permitting them [...]o be question'd) nay, not held at all Infal­lible but upon Supposal of certain Conditions to be observ'd, in which also Divines differ, Mr. Stil­lingfleet and other Protestant Writers may see [Page 213] what they have to do if they will candidly im­pugn the Catholick Church, and not trifle away time in wrangling with some private Opinators. I have set them a fair mark in my Discourses, if they will speak to the Point; and the end of my Preface has told them how to do it. If they overthrow this, all the other Infallibilities now spoken of will fall with It; If not, not onely This of Universal Tradition will stand, but also all the other Infallibilities will in Virtue of it be establisht on a firmer basis, than any who be­gins not with and settles the First Principle in Controversy could ever give them. This Foun­dation then they must either subvert, or they may fear the Papists will build such super­structures on it as will reach to Heaven. It rises apace, and has advanc't many Stories in a small time.

10. By this Discourse all Mr. Stillingfleet's If's which follow, have their Answer; and he will see the knot easily loos'd in distinguishing the word other; by which if he means disparate, un­connected or unimply'd Points of Faith: No Di­vines of any number or account hold they can be de novo, much less our Church; If involv'd or imply'd in the main Point, he must show 'tis absolutely Another, and not rather a piece or part of the Implying one; as, Homo est Animal, is a part of Homo est Animal rationale. In the mean time let him consider what Logick tells us, that The Conclusion is in the Premises, which re­flexion [Page 214] will much unblunder his Thoughts; and withall, that 'tis most unreasonable to deny the Church the Liberty to take asunder her own Thoughts, and clear them, upon occasion; by representing their Parts distinctly or in many Propositions, which were invol'd before in some one. A priviledge Nature grants all Mankind as a necessary Conseqent to their working by abstra­cted Notions; this being no more than to regard or view the same thing`now on one side, then on the other.

11. His Second Chief Demand is, What security is there that in no Age of the Church any Practices should come in which were not in the Precedent. I answer, Our Practices spring from our Tenets; If then he means Ecclesiastical Practices, that is, such as spring from Ecclesiastical Constitutions, there is no security at all; for these are to come in anew as oft as the necessity of Disciplin or Go­vernment requires it: If he mean such Practices, as spring from Points of Faith taught by Christ, there is the same security no such new Practices can be introduct as there is that no new Christian Tenets can come in. Now these later Practices are those we make use of in Tradition, as making Faith visible, being as it were its Body: He must mean then of These Practices to do his Discourse any service; and, so, of these he questions whe­ther the Descendents held themselves bound un­alterably to observe what their Forefathers did; otherwise to know barely what they did, was not [Page 215] enough to make them follow it. He argues well. To smooth as many rubs as I can, that so we may have no difficulty but our main one, I would reflect on the signification of the word unalterably. For to introduce new Practices consequent to the former is to propagate, enlarge, extend and so strengthen them, not to alter them; in the same manner as to discourse con­sequently to a Principle or Tenet, is so far from altering it, that by the contexture of other Truths with it, it corroborates and establishes it more unalterably its self. They must then be Practices not of a subordinate but an opposit Na­ture to Christian ones which can be fear'd to alter Christian Practices. The Question then is whether Children or the Succeeding Age held themselves still bound not to bring in Practices and Tenets contrary to the Doctrin and Practice of the Precedent Age. And, the Affirmative is most Evident, in case they held those Tenets which Principled those Actions, True, taught by Christ, and commanded by him as the Way to bring them to Heaven; and those Practices Consequent. If then they held the deliver [...]d Do­ctrin Christ's, they could not but hold themselves oblig'd not to alter it, nor consequently its Practices. So that our Question is restrain'd to to a narrower compass, and the onely Difficulty now is whether they held the Doctrin of Forefa­thers to be the Doctrin of Christ, or no.

12. I am heartily glad so acute an Adversary [Page 216] as Mr. Stillingfleet and one chosen out (if I am inform'd right) as a person conceiv'd the ablest to write against Catholicks, has so candidly confest here, p. 629. That the onely thing to be prov'd in this case, is, That every Age in the Church and all persons in it looked upon them­selves as oblig'd not to vary in any thing from the Doctrin and Practice of the Precedent Age. He of­fers me my choice of three wayes to prove it: I accept of the way of Reason. He presses for a demonstrative medium to prove it; yet seems to dislike our pretence to Demonstrations for the Ground of our Faith. Not to note the uncon­sonancy of this carriage, I shall yeild him the honour of professing he has no Demonstration but onely Probability for the Ground of his; and to make this serious protestation for my self, that I should esteem my self very dishonest did I assert and press on others any Argument for the Ground of my Faith which I judge not Evi­dent, that is, Demonstrative. This, I hope, will secure the Honesty of my Intentions, how­ever my Weakness may permit me to fail in my performance. After this he endeavours to forestal my Reason for the Point in these words; They have understandings of another mould from others, who can conceive it Impossible that men should not think themselves oblig'd to believe and do all just as their Predecessours did. Which words I desire the Reader to review and note, for thence my Discourse takes its rise.

[Page 217] 13. What is it then that we affirm the later Ages oblig'd to hold and act as their Forefathers held and acted? Wearing their clothes, or building their houses? No; For, both, those matters of their own nature are of trivial con­cern, and the fashion of both depend on Fancy which is too sleight a Principle to oblige to a Constancy. What is it then? To manage their Estates thus or thus; no, for the Inconvenience or Convenience of the different wayes were per­haps held not very material, and the judging which was best depended upon Prudential Prin­ciples which are of their own nature variable and accommodable to circumstances, and there­fore not obliging them to think and Act as their Forefathers did. Let us proceed? Was it some piece of Skill or a Speculative Opinion depend­ing on the Goodness or Badness of the Ance­stors knowledge? No: For, experience teaching that men differ in such Judgments and are erra­ble, it could never oblige posterity to believe Unalterably as They did. Is it then some Hi­storical passage or matter of Fact, of great note, and as such apt to strike their Fancy strongly, yet still such as the succeeding Age was not highly concern'd whether it were true or no; for example, that of Alexander's Conquest of Asia to the Asian and Grecian off-spring of the next age after. No; Yet Experience tells us the me­mory of this is fresh and lively (even amongst Us who are not the immediate descendents of those [Page 218] where he conquer'd) though some thousands of years since.

14. Before we go any further, let's examin how this History comes to obtain so firm and un­shaken a Beleef from the whole World to this very day. And, first, he must be a very weak Speculater that can think the universal and strong Perswasion of this matter of Fact was caus'd by Books, Curtius his History for Example; For, since all Mankind knows naturally that Falshoods may as easily be charactered in Letters as Truths; 'tis evidently the continu'd Beleef of the Thing or Sence in mens hearts of it's Truth, that is Hu­man Tradition, which gives that Book all its Au­thority, and secures its strange Contents from being held Romanical; which the very being-writ could never have done. Let's see next whence this Human Tradition had its force to continue hitherto so settled and unalterable a Persuasion of Alexanders Conquests. And, look­ing into the Thing for Proper Causes, that is, the best demonstrative mediums, we shall find the Object it self was very Universall, strange, no­torious, and held of concern to the then livers; which made their Hearts and Fancies full of it, and so oblig'd them to burst out into Expressions of it, and relate it to their Off-spring of the next Age. I but, what oblig'd the Off-spring to be­leeve their Forefathers telling it, and to act (or talk of it again to their Children) as the Fathers did; without which obligation it could not have [Page 219] descended to us. Regarding once more the Thing, we shall discover that it was imprinted into the Off-spring by the Forefathers Testifying what their senses had told them; which put, Common Sense inform'd them the thing was Infallibly-true, and as Certain as if they had seen it with their own eyes. For, no reach of Reason but onely Extravagance of Madness could have furnish't them with any imaginable motive, why the whole world should conspire to deceive them, or be decievable in their Sensations. By this means the Conceit of the Thing or matter of Fact (as to the main, for circumstantial Consi­derations were not so evident to all at first, and so could not be universally deliver'd as ascer­tain'd by Sence) was in the same degree of firm­ness and Certainty rivetted into the Hearts of next Age; and, so, there being necessarily in the Rational part of the World some curious persons, whom Nature her self could not but incline to an Inquisitiveness of what was done formerly, and others too naturally inclin'd to tell it Chil­dren who were capable of it and delighted with hearing such strange-true Stories; It went down continuing by the way of Tradition to our very dayes.

15. But we have over-shot our mark. The que­stion is of the Obligation not to believe contrary to Forefathers from Age to Age. And, tis already evident, that the second Age after Alexander was oblig'd to beleeve the First, because They [Page 220] saw with their eyes what was done; But how could those in the Third Age be oblig'd to be­leeve the Second who saw it not? To answer this, we must ask whether the third Age could be Certain that the second could not be deceiv'd in what the first Age told them (and the notori­ousness of the Thing, being no speculation but a plain matter of Fact, secures that:) or conspire to bely the second Ages Authority; and, common reason satisfying them, by the circumstances, of the honesty of the persons, their Consent and the disinteressedness of the position, that they could not thus conspire, even the rudest have a Demon­stration the second Age truly testifi'd what the First said; and so those of the third Age have the first Ages Authority certainly apply'd to them; and, by means of its Authority, its Sensa­tions too, and perfect knowledge of the Thing springing from that Experimential Perception; which therefore must needs work the same Effect upon the third Age, as it did upon the second. And by virtue of the same Argument upon the the fourth, fifth, and five hundredth, while it is known to have come down by the way of Testi­fication, and this is known by its being receiv'd in the five-hundredth Age as testify'd; For, if the second Age could not tell the third it was te­stify'd by the first unless it had been so testify'd, the same reason I have assign'd for the Impossi­bility of that will hold for each Age to the End of the world, that is, 'twill follow no Age could [Page 221] say a former Age testifyd so, unless they did so; whence nothing can come in as Testify'd by a former Age, unless thus Testifyd. If therefore the five-hundredth Age receiv'd a thing as testi­fy'd (supposing the notoreity of it secur'd the thing from mistakableness) it follow'd, demon­stratively it was testify'd; and, (to come close to our purpose) that the descendents in each age, to the very end of the world, had the same Obligation to believe their immediate Fore­fathers saying it was testify'd by the former, as those of the third Age to believe the second, or the second the first.

16. Who ever looks into Rational Nature, with even that ordinary Knowledge with which the rudest person almost that lives does upon mate­riall natures, would discern the same Necessity or Obligation of continuing down by the way of Testifying notorious and Important matters of Fact, fixt at first in the minds and fancies of an Universality by the Existence of the Thing working on their Senses, as that in a long chain of Iron, one link drawn should draw all the rest; or, that the turning the First wheel, should move a thousand distant ones depending on its motion. Nor doubt I but it will be made full as Evident, when rational Souls come to set themselves to reflect seriously on their own nature and proce­dure to Action; a speculation few Protestants are acquainted with; Bookishness and much reading being onely in Vogue with the talking [Page 222] Tribe amongst them. In the mean time Mr. Stillingfleet may see in the Instance now put, that is, in the strong Persuasion of Alexander's Victories yet continuing by Tradition, that there is an Obligation in one Age to believe another when they proceed as Witnesses; and this, not onely of what they saw, but of what others told them They saw, and of what some affirm'd they were told by others that the Age before Them saw; and so downwards; and that, as the Impulsive force is communicated from the Mo­vers hand to the farthest-distant-wheel by the Application of the intermediate ones, the solid or Inflexible nature of the matter obliging the next wheel to propagate its motion; So the Exi­stence of the Thing mov'd the First Experimen­tal Percievers of it; and That solid Notion, which fixes every Truth, was the virtue which run thorough and gave force to all the rest; being apply'd by Universal Witnessing a plain matter of Fact (or others Testimonies) from each Age to the other; as great a Ty to Assent as Human Nature was capable of by natural means. For, that Existence of the Thing was the virtue which made this Persuasion so solid and firm, besides what's said, is seen by this; that, were it deliver'd onely as an Opinion of the Things being so, its strong conveyance had not been able to elevate it beyond Opinion; for, the stronger That had been, the more perfectly it had been held Opinion still. The Existence [Page 123] then of the Thing had virtue to oblige to a full persuasion the thing was so, when Apply'd with Certainty; The Testification of the precedent Age is a Certain Applier of it, and Undoubtable, that is Obliging to Belief; therefore the next Age is (in such matters convey'd down this way) as strongly oblig'd to believe the foregoing as Reason can oblige it; that is, by seen Effects impossi­ble to be without the Existence of foregoing Testifications, nor they, finally, without the Ex­istence of the Thing.

17. I expect now what Mr Stillingfleet will reply to this discourse. Will he say there were no Causes layd to oblige the After-comers to be­lieve the Fore-goer, that Alexander conquer'd Asia, but that it happen'd so by Chance? What will he say then to thousand other such matters of Fact, and indeed all that were done long ago; all which must either be held obligingly this way or none; (see Cowll. 24.) Besides, the Cau­ses proper to work on a rationall Nature are Reasons: To say then there are no Causes able to make us believe Alexander thus conquer'd, is to say there is no Reason for it; and (Chance being nothing but a Cause unforeseen by us) to say all believe it by Chance, signifies none s [...]e any reason why they believe it; which makes [...] the world Asses; Or have I not hit on the right Causes? I shall thank Mr Stillingfleet to help me out; and in the mean time assure him that whatever Causes he assignes, obliging po­posterity, [Page 224] to believe Ancestours in this, shall strengthen Tradition. Perhaps he will say, they may be oblig'd to believe such Histories deli­ver'd, yet not deliver'd Points of Faith. I shall wonder at the position; but, because I foresee he is like to recurr to this (for he must be forc't to say either this or what's worse) I shall prepare against it, by parallelling the Obligation to believe this deliver'd History to the Obligation to believe Christian Faith deliver'd.

18. To do this more amply we will consider Christ's Doctrin according to the whole com­plexion of Circumstances exprest in that com­mon Verse, ‘Quis, quid, ubi, quibus auxiliis, cur, quo­modo, quando.’

Quis? Who was the Authour and Subject of this Faith thus to be deliver'd; Not a poor mortal, but the Wisdome of the Eternal Father; not an ambitious self-extolling Man, but a self-humbled God, come down from his Heaven to be the World's Saviour and Master; every of whose Words and Actions were infinitely to be admir'd; and, consequently, requiring to be had in perpetual remembrance.

Quid? What thing was it which was deli­ver'd or Testify'd? A Doctrin containing Prin­ciples of the new Life they were to lead as Chri­stians, and so Practical, notwithstanding the [Page 225] Majesty of its abstruseness; a Doctrin Conna­tural and sutable to Reason, Man's true Nature, and so apt to sink into him & not be easily relin­quishable; A Doctrin which bears in its very no­tion to be a Guid towards Eternal Bliss, and consequently that to forsake it is the way to Eter­nal misery, which therefore oblig'd Fathers to teach it, and Children to esteem themselves bound to learn it and hold to it. Lastly, a Do­ctrin all made up of most astonishing miracle and wonder; and, so, apt to strike a deep sence of reverence into hearts already imbu'd with it. Such was the nature of the Thing we call Christ's Doctrin, imprinted on the Sensarions of the [...] Age of Christians; not a pittifull story of an A­lexander or Caesar; of Sleight concern, wonder­ment or practical Usefulness; but, in compari­son of the other, like a Tale of a Tub; which, no hurt is done if it go in at one ear and out a [...] the other.

19. Vbi? When was this matter of Fact or Preach­ing this doctrin performed? In all, even the remo­test parts of the world, and not onely in a peece of Europe and in Asia; and this openly: Especi­ally in Rome the world's Metropolis, whence it could easily and effectually spread into the rest. Nay in the very face of Tyrants; which things gave it a perfect Visibility; and, lastly, in every private Family it was taught and put in practice; which made it beyond dispute Sensible and Ma­niable as far as it conduces to Christian Life.

[Page 226] Quibus auxiliis? By what helps or means? By most stupendious miracles, powerful preaching and heavenly Living conformably to those Prin­ciples; which made those Principles or Faith vi­sible and evident. Not by three or four Victo­ries, imputable perhaps to Chance; at least in which nothing Divine discovered it self engaged.

Cur? Why was this doctrin of Christs taught and practic't? not to satisfy the vain humour of impotent Ambition, but to deliver mankind from the Devils slavery and-hell fire its reward, and to bring him to everlasting Salvation.

Quomodo? By what manner? By writing it in the fleshy Tables of the hearts of the First Chri­stians; and, afterwards, continuing it by the way of Testifying; the most connatural way to oblige the Generality to Beleef of matters of Fact, that Nature knows.

Quando? When? In the First Christians when they were now at Age to judge of the miracles, and multitudes of Motives spoken of; which aw'd, overpower'd and subdu'd their Understan­dings to a firm Beleef and an high Reverence to the doctrin thus attested to be Gods: In the after-Christians when they were yet scarce able to speak much less to judge; and taught by nature to be­lieve their Parents. Hence a lively and reverential conceit was bred in their Hearts, by others seri­ous teaching and their own practising, of the Sa­credness and consequently Unalterableness, of that doctrin; ere they came to that Ripeness as [Page 227] to use their own Judgment; Nay, that doctrin was so deeply naturaliz'd into them by Christian Life ere they came to maturity of Understanding that it became Unnatural and exceedingly vio­lent for them to act and beleeve contrary to what Fathers had taught. Whereas the story of A­lexander was not proper to be told Children till they were at Age and fit for some kind of Schol­lership; and then, it was so little practical that nothing was to be acted about it, but talking of it again; so that it lookt like a meer piece of Spe­culation and totally unconcerning them. I add, that this delivery by attestation or teaching went on linking the former Age to the later, by propa­gating it into new Subjects, not all at one time, but from year to year, moneth to moneth, and even less; according as the Understandings and even Bodies of Children budded into a Capacity of knowing saying or doing something which be­long'd to Christianity; which still-continu'd In­terweaving the former Age with the later, after a wonderful manner strengthens the sway of Tra­dition, and secures it both against Mistake and Deceit; neither of them having any possible place where the whole business is carry'd on by such immediate Steps.

20. I will not repeat over again [...] [...]concei­vable Advantages, but leave it to M [...]o Stillingfleet's reflexion; and so, proceed [...] discourse thus. If the conceited Sacredness, Concern, Necessity, Unalterableness, miraculously-attest­edness, [Page 228] also if the Visibleness, Practicalness with extent to every particular, connaturalness &c. found in the notion and nature of Christs doctrin or manifestly connected with it, render'd it in­comparably recommendable in every respect above the Story of Alexander's Conquests, and that plainest nature or Common Sense and daily Experience teaches us that, by how much more a thing is recommendable or deserving to be be­leev'd and practic't, by so much more 'tis obliga­tory to be believ'd and practic't; and that we find in unconcerning Stories a continu'd Obliga­tion layd in Nature for the Children to believe Parents (else such stories could never have de­scended with an hearty perswasion of their Truth hitherto) it follows that incomparably and in a manner infinitely greater must the Obligation be to believe Christ's Doctrin than Alexander's or William the Conquerors Victories; or any Hi­story of the like nature whatever.

21. I have been much longer in such a point than the matter requir'd; it needed no more but to manifest that Common Sense tells us Na­ture obliges every man to believe those he takes to be honest; much more children Fathers: (or the next Age those of the former;) still more, if what they tell them be no Speculation depending on Fancy or private Judgment, but matter of Fact depending onely on Sense; that is, if they tell it them as Witnesses: But most of all, if they see we conspire in the same; For then the Obli­gation [Page 229] is so necessary, that I cannot conceive that from the beginning of the world there was ever found one single person so unreasonable as not to yeild to it. Whence also we can show eve­ry first Beginner of an Heresie is [...], or self-condemn'd; that is, conscious to himself that out of Pride or some Passion he goes against Evi­dence of Authority. Now, in Tradition all is carry'd on this manner. So that, if the Explain­ers of Tradition have not made provision for this point, 'tis because they thought there could not be found a Considerer so unreasonable as to que­stion it. Yet, because Mr Stillingfleet puts the whole stress of his Objection against. Tradition in this, I shall (to give him further satisfaction) consider it practically.

22. Let us conceive then that the Apostles, Disci­ples, and Apostolical men, taught the first Age Christ's Doctrin (qualifi'd in the manner before declar'd) and recommended it as such (that is as Sacred, Unalterable, the way to Bliss. Taught by Christ &c.) by Miracles and other Supernatural means; 'tis plain They had Obligation to believe Christ taught it. Well, they receiving it as such, that is, as Christ's, and, so, Unalterable; were bound to recommend it for such to the next Age. Nor does Mr. Stillingfleet question this: But, were their Children oblig'd to believe them? While they were young tis plain they could do no other neither out of Reason nor Passion. But what were they oblig'd to when they were grown up to [Page 230] ripeness of Judgement? 'Tis plain, that, were that Doctrin deliver'd as an Invention of then Forefathers, or some Collection of their Reason that it was Christ's, it was obvious for them to make this Discourse; We have natural Wit as well as our Parents had, and perhaps as good Circumstances to apply that wit, and why then should not we cast about and consider whether that be indeed Christ's Doctrin, and taught by the Apostles, which they would persuade us is so? But, in case it were deliver'd as ascertain'd by their Senses, to have been taught by the Apostles, what imaginable reason can they have of doubt? Can they think all their Fathers and Neighbours a pack of impudent Knaves, that conspire to abuse their posterity purposely to damn them, or that they could be mistaken in a Doctrin they were so highly concern'd to learn right, and had led their lives by ever since they were Christian? The third Age succeeds, whose Immediate Ancestours the Second Age told them they had been taught and brought up thus by the First. Nor have they more reason to doubt the Second Ages Attestati­on of the First Ages Doctrin and Life (it being an unmistakable matter of Fact) than the Second had the First's; that is, they were oblig'd to be­lieve it. And, since each foregoing Ages Atte­station is a plain matter of Fact, it follows that each succeeding Age has still equal obligation to believe the foregoing: Especially in a matter car­rying along with it such powerful Recommends, [Page 231] and this out of its very Nature, as that the pre­serving and holding to it would bring them Infi­nit Goods, and the altering it Infinit Harms. Thus it goes on; and while it goes on thus, that is, while this Rule is follow'd, 'tis self-evident no Heresie could ever be. (Disc. 5. § 8.) Whence by the way, if this be the onely difficulty in Tra­dition; (that is, in case the next Age were oblig'd to believe the former, Tradition would still be fol­low'd, and so it would be self-evident no Heretick could be) then it needs no proof they have such an Obligation; for 'tis questionless there is an Obli­gation for men not to be Hereticks.

23. Well, but an acute Wit or great Scholar ari­ses who begins to question this way. Let's see if he have a good reason, if not he is still oblig'd. Can he bring an ampler or Certainer living Au­thority for the contrary? Where shall he have it? For all the Christian world is against him, if he be the first (and so onely) denier of this way of Tradition. Will he bring Demonstration against the Point? How can he against a Truth; for our case puts the point truly deliver'd, and onely en­quires into the obligation of believing Ance­stours in such a Delivery; and he must not hope a seeming Demonstration can free him from his Obligation of believing Ancestours. For, whence hapned it that it seem'd so to him when it was not such? From Perfection in Science in that particular? No surely; for then he had not miscarry'd: From the Imperfectness of his Sci­ence? [Page 232] Then he ought the more to have be­liev'd: From Precipitancy? Then he ought not have been passionate. But, perhaps he will build on Dead Testimony, or some Book granted to be Sacred. In that case I ask, how knows he with such a Certainty as to build Faith and his opposi­tion to the whole Church upon it (which ought be no less than a Demonstration) that he has the right Letter and Sence of that Book. Can he Demonstrate the exact conformity of its Letter from Copy to Copy, and Translation to Tran­slation, and this up to the very Original? He may as well measure the back-side of Heaven. Will he recur to Traditions help? Tradition could onely perform this either by the way of diligent Examiners continu'd along and securely testifi'd, which (as was said) is impossible to show; Or by continu'd Sence in Christian Hearts, and then 'tis plain if their Sence preserv'd the Letter right­ly significative, he ought to take the Sence of the Letter from them too, as the Fathers use to press upon ancient Hereticks. 'Tis left then that he must pretend he will demonstrate some former Age has err'd; How I wonder? We have exclu­ded him Scripture, the nature of the Points, and Authority of living men. It may be he will al­ledge Testimonies of Historians, or Fathers. But, first, Fathers, taken as such, are not meerly great Scholars, but Eminent Parts of Ecclesia docens or Witnessers of the Doctrin deliver'd; Take away then the Certainty of Delivery or Traditi­on, [Page 233] there's no Certainty of Doctrin deliver'd, nor consequently of Fathers. 2ly, An Histori­ans Testimony signifies but his own private saying, unless authoriz'd by Sence writ in mens hearts or Tradition. 3ly, Are those Testimonies (and the like may be said of Scripture-proofs) evi­dently against the present Church, or no? If not, 'tis a madness to talk of seeming Testimonies against so vast and evident a one as that of the whole foregoing Church. If Evident, 'tis in­consistent with mans Nature the Christian Church should recommend down for true Fa­thers and creditable Historians those Authours which so evidently oppose her Doctrin: Or, if so great an Authority as the Churches delivers them down for fabulous or spurious, how can their Au­thority ever come to be undoubtable or Certain? The last refuge then of a passion-misled Reason is, asham'd of her want of Principles and loth to show her head, to pretend private Inspirations: which therefore is the last non ultra of all Here­sies and the flower or most refin'd quitessence of all Faith-Reformation. But, miracles failing these poor Creatures to shew forth the hidden divinity which they pretend possesses them, they quickly fade away; or, if they make any further pro­gress, 'tis into phrenzy or perfect Madness, as we experience in our most miserably-distracted Country; which disposition is therefore the Ca­put mortuum, or Terra damnata of Heresie, and the last and most natural effect of relinquishing Tradition.

[Page 234] 24. By this Discourse is seen that 'tis impossible the following Age and every person in it, unlearn­ed and learned, should not be oblig'd to believe the foregoing delivering to them Christs Doctrin as receiv'd from hand to hand by way of Testi­fying: and that this Universal Obligation springs out of the Nature of that Heavenly Doctrin, and the Nature of the Way of conveying it down­wards. 'Tis time now to review Mr Stillingfleets words against the possibility of proving this by Reason, and see how lank they look: They are these, neither more nor fewer: It is hard to con­ceive what Reason should inforce it but such as proves the Impossibility of the contrary: And they have Vnderstandings of another mould from others who can conceive it impossible men should not think themselves oblig'd to believe and do all just as their Predecessors did. Is this Mr Stillingfleet who in the Appendix to his Irenicum § 6. so rati­onally characters those for more zealous than Iu­dicious discoursers who argue not out the very Nature and Constitution of a Thing; and here, in a discourse concerning the Rational way of looking into a point, quite overleaps all that con­cerns either the Nature or necessary circumstan­ces of that Thing, and talks so rawly in common, that is, not one word to that particular purpose? Observe the words, Oblig'd to believe and do ALL IVST as their Predecessors have done. What means the word ALL? Does he mean we hold them oblig'd to cut their Beards, or wear [Page 235] such Garters and Hatbands as their Fore-fathers did? His raw words reach no farther: What means the word JUST? Does he think Faith being planted in Human, that is Rational, Na­ture will not propagate it self into consequent and subordinate Tenets and Practices? All the wonder then of the Impossibility of the no-obli­gation lies in his crafty and sophistical expressing it, which includes a fallacy of non-causa pro causa; for, not any thing convey'd down on any fashion is held by us thus obliging to believe and act ac­cordingly, but such a Doctrin, and so convey'd as was before declared. Had he put our Position thus, as indeed he ought, it being the true case, Children or Immediate Posterity taught by Fathers or immediate Ancestors relying on the way of Sen­sation, that such a Doctrin was taught or deliverd to be taught by God himself, as most Sacred, Neces­sary to be believ'd and practic [...]t by all, being the way to salvation, so that to vary from it, or hold or practise the contrary, is the way to eternal mi­sery, are all oblig'd to believe and act as their Forefathers did, and not introduce Contrary Do­ctrins and practices to those they had receiv'd▪ Had it been, I say, thus propos'd, there had been no such cause of wonderment: But all these, that is indeed all of weight in the point is quite left out. Such poor shifts even the best Wits must be dri­ven to, when they would maintain a false Cause.

25. One word to M. Stillingfleet. He hath chal­leng'd us to make out this Obligation to Belief as [Page 236] the onely Thing we are to prove in the Traditio­nary way; he hath offer'd us the choice of our Weapon, either Reason, particular Testimony, or Vniversal Tradition: I have accepted his offer, chosen my weapon, and given here the first blow; I hope he will not now run the Field, but return an Answer to my Discourse in the way of Rea­son, which I have chosen by his Offer. I am sorry for his sake my reflexions here are not more ela­borate, being sent to the Press in loose quarters of sheets as soon as writ, more time not being allow'd me, nor I hope needful to answer such mi­stakes. Onely I request him when he replies, to take along with him the nature of the subjecta materia, the Doctrins and Practises we speak of; the Nature of the Manner of delivering it, and the necessary Circumstances which give weight to both, as I have declar'd above; and I pro­mise him (God assisting me) a very serious Reply.

26. Ere I quite leave this matter, I desire to take the Reader along with me in my quest for a Rea­son or proper Cause why so judicious a person as Mr. Stillingfleet could come to doubt of such an Obligation in posterity to beleeve their Ancest­ours in a matter of fact, or a matter deliver'd to have been (not deem'd or thought, but) done; or (which is equivalent being it's necessary effect) seen or known by Sense. For, I make account there is not a man in the world or ever was (such is the Goodness of rational Nature given us by [Page 237] God) who in his natural thoughts could ever raise such a doubt, or think he could possibly frame his thoughts to a disbelief of the contrary; no more than any man in England (whom Spe­culative Scepticism has not besotted and un­mann'd) can doubt of William the Conquerors, Harry the Eighths, or Mahomets Existence; much less judge the contrary; And, it appears at first sight to be a strange distorsion or rather destruct­ion of human Nature, which can so alter it. Now, looking into Things, I find it to be a proper and natural Effect of the Protestant's temper, and in­deed of all who have left the Church. For their humour being to chuse every one his Faith by his private Judgment or Wit working upon disputa­ble words; They wonder, and judge it very un­reasonable their Posterity, thus imbu'd, should be oblig'd to beleeve and act as Ancestours do; and so should I too. For, while they can never deli­ver it to their Children as received ever, by the way of Infallible Sense or Witnessing, but must say the former Church de facto err'd and conse­quently that themselves might do so too, so that they can only deliver it as depending or built on their own fallible Opinion in interpreting Scrip­ture (all which is imply'd in their making Scri­ptur's Letter the Rule of Faith, and allowing no Living Interpreter able to give infallibly the Sence of it) 'tis natural their posterity should [...] hold themselves oblig'd to beleeve Immediate Ancestors, but use their own Judgments and [Page 238] chuse their own Faith when they come at Age as well as They did; and Experience tells us they have done so in England till they have cho­sen fairly. And this horrid Unreasonableness is the venomous source, the First defective Prin­ciple, or indeed the very nature of all Heresie; im­ported also in the very word, which signifies Choice, or chusing one's Religion; mention'd by Clemens Alexandrinus (cited above p. 135.) and counterpos'd by him to Tradition as also by S. Athanasius (cited p. 133. 134.) where 'tis most excellently describ'd, and homely apply'd to the Protestants and such others, as the Reader may see. I am a bad Transcriber.

27. I have done my main task, and so shall only touch at his next paragraph. It begins thus; It is to no purpose to prove the Impossibility of motion when I see men move, no more it is to prove no Age of the Church could vary from the foregoing when we can evidently prove they have done it. You argue well. But two things are requir'd ere you can see our Faith varies from the former. First, To see what our Church holds now, and then to see what the former Church held before; and if I see any thing you see neither well. For, while you cannot distinguish between Faith and its Explication, some School-men and Church, I have no hopes you should see candidly what our Church holds now: and, if you cannot at present see what our Church holds now, how and by what method will you assure us you see [Page 239] what She held formerly? The thing to be prov'd is a plain matter of Fact, and you have renounc't all living Attestation the common and secure way to bring it down; and consequently Fa­thers too; For Fathers (speaking of them as such) being Evident Witnessers, Transmitters or Propagates of the Faith received to Immediate Posterity, if you question Delivery or Tradition (which you do while you doubt Obligation in Posterity to believe Ancestours) you question whether there be any Doctrin deliver'd and so any Fathers: and I wonder how you can ima­gin any man oblig'd to believe Fathers, Histo­rians or any that writ or testify'd things long ago, and yet think the next age not oblig'd to believe the former in a matter of Fact done in their own dayes. How far short then are your Evidences of the former Churches Doctrin, like to prove of being parallell to our seeing a man move with our corporeal Eyes! But you may say any thing; or rather indeed, forc't by your bad Cause, you must do so.

28. You call this Way of ours a Superficial Sub­tilty; I beseech you consider what you say; Is that which is wholly builds on the Nature of the Things (as you see ours does) Superficial; or Yours which is meerly an aiery Descant upon dead Words? What do you think Controversy is? I deal plainly with you, you may take it to be an Art of Talking, and I think you do so though you will not profess it; but I take it to [Page 240] be a noble Science; I hold its Object to be ra­tionem reddere fidei, or to maintain question'd Faith, which is chiefly done by showing the Au­thority on which Faith depends quoad nos Cer­tain. Hence, all other Authority depending on Tradition's, I hold Knowledge of its Certainty the First Principle in Controversy; And this be­ing quoad nos necessarily antecedent to Autho­rity, it can onely be manifested by Reasons taken from Things or men's Minds, naturally; and (if we discourse against those who grant the ex­cellency of the first-preached Doctrin) Supernatu­rally affected or qualify'd; as he sees I have en­deavour'd in my Discourses.

29. So much for our Way. Now for yours: Who sees not first how Words as interpretable are its subject; and if in the method you take to work upon them you lay one Principle which deserves the name of a Principle, I dare undertake to be of Mr. Stillingfleet's persuasion. He sees in my TRANSITION our Way laid open; Either let him acknowledge it solid, or remember, having provok't us, he is challeng'd to produce some­thing for his Rule of Faith, which begins with the natures of the Things in hand, that is of Rule and Faith, and approves it self solider than ours. But 'tis so impossible their Cause can endure the Trial of that clearing Method, that I fear not either Mr. Stillingfleet or any Pro­testant Writer of the least prudence will dare to attempt it.

[Page 241] 30. Will you see one Example of our Superfici­alness and Mr. Stillingfleet's Solidness? He gives you both in his next words, p. 620. and assures the Reader we would prove no alteration in the Faith of the Church by such an Argument as would prove the world ab aeterno. How strangely wide he roves from the mark? Our Argument runs thus, beginning à priori; Causes were laid in the nature of Christs heavenly Doctrin, and the nature of its Conveyance down by Testifying to make its Delivery continu'd hitherto; à posteri­ori thus; we find a present Effect (the present Persuasion of Christians their Faith descended uninterruptedly from Christ) impossible to be without such a Cause's Existence or its having been at first taught by Christ; whence we con­clude that Faith came from Christ: Let us paral­lel it then to his. Finds he any such Effect in the world at present apt to spring onely from the Worlds Eternity as its Cause; or Causes laid ab aeterno in the nature of the world apt to continue it hitherto? If he does, he must hold it was Eter­nal; If not, how unconsonant is his parallel? He makes our Argument run thus; The present Age sees no alteration in it, and they could not be de­ceiv'd in what their Forefathers believ'd, nor they in theirs, and so on in infinitum; for no men did ever see the World made, and therefore it was ne­ver made, and so Eternal. In return, I must first profess there is not a tittle in it parallel to our medium; and, at next, that I never saw in my [Page 242] life more absurdities coucht in so few words. For,

First, he should have begun, the present Age has a firm perswasion it was ever, or have alledg'd some other Effect, without which 'tis impossible to argue to the Existence of a thing before, or a Cause.

2ly, He wrongly supposes a Belief in the for­mer Age of the Worlds ever-Existence, saying, They could not be deceiv'd in what their Forefathers believ'd.

4ly, The words, Nor they in theirs, falsely sup­pose a Continuance of belief upwards of the worlds Eternity.

5ly, He sayes not whether this Belief was foun­ded on Ey-sight at first, or Opinion. If the later, 'tis contrary, and not parallel to our case. If the former, then he must suppose some man saw the world made ab aeterno.

6ly, The words, and so on in Infinitum, sup­pose this belief did go on in Infinitum; which put, 'tis beyond question, and plac't in the very Terms, that the world was Eternal.

7ly, His reason for the last words, thus, For no man did ever see the World made, is manifoldly faulty: for 'tis a negative argument, and, as such, inconsequent; since the world might have been made, whether any had seen it or not. Again, the first men might have known it certainly to have been made, whether they had seen it making or no. And lastly, 'tis directly contradictory to [Page 243] what it should parallel; For, we agreeing with them that Christ and his Apostles did teach a Doctrin thus qualify'd, first put its Existence seen, and thence conclude the contrary could never come to be held universally; or else, we take a present-Belief of its then-Existence as ever re­ceiv'd by Testifying: neither of which have any correspondence with his rambling chimerical Argument; no two pieces of which hang toge­ther with themselves or any thing else.

31. He sayes, he can evidence the Alteration of Faith. I wish he would tell us first what an evidence means; whether a strong Fancy of his own, or a Demonstration, onely which can ex­cuse him or not believing the former Age Attest­ing. His first proof is, Because the Scripture supposes a degeneracy in the Christian Church: Incomparably argu'd! why see we not the place! Does it evidently speak of Faith or Manners; the universal Church, or particular persons; that is, some Hereticks? But be it in Faith; Be it Universal. Does it suppose this Degeneracy already past (which is onely proper to your purpose) or yet to come? That is, does it say there must be a Total Apostasie in Faith be­fore the Year 1664? Alas, he had forgot this: Yet for such wretched proofs as these, baptiz'd God's Word, have they left the evidently-attest­ed Doctrin and the Union of the former Church. His next Evidences are his own Performances in [Page 244] some other parts of his Book. Truly the mi­serableness of these Evidences disinvite me from thinking the other worth a serious thought: But, if perhaps there be ever a Testimony among them that is not coincident with some of Dr. Pierce's faulty ones; Let him single it out and Print it at the End of his Rejoynder to this, it shall have a fair Answer from me, or some other more proper.

FINIS.

THE HEADS.

  • First Discourse. SHowing from the nature of Rule and Faith, what Properties belong to the Rule of Faith. p. 1.
  • Second Discourse. Showing the two first Properties of the Rule of Faith utterly incompetent to Scripture. p. 12.
  • Third Discourse. That the three next Properties of the Rule of Faith are utterly incompetent to Scripture. p. 22.
  • Fourth Discourse. That the two last Properties of the Rule of Faith are clearly incompetent to Scripture. p. 33.
  • Fifth Discourse. Showing the notion of TRADITION, and that all the Properties of the Rule of Faith do clearly agree to It. p. 41.
  • Sixth Discourse. Endeavouring to demonstrate à priori the Indefe­ctibleness of Tradition. p. 57.
  • Seventh Discourse. An Objection clear'd, and the Beginning and Pro­gress of an Heresy connaturally laid open. p. 65.
  • Eighth Discourse. Endeavouring to demonstrate à posteriori the Vn­interruptedness of Tradition hitherto. p. 75.
  • [Page] Ninth Discourse. Opening the Incomparable Strength of the Churches Human Authority, and the Infinit Advantages accrue to it by the Supernatural Assistances of the Holy Ghost. p. 81.
  • Corollaries from the former Discourses. p. 95.
  • Consent of Authority to the Substance of the fore­going Discourses. p. 126.
  • Transition to the Appendixes: p. 157.
  • First Appendix. Animadversions on the ground­lesness of Dr. Pierce's Sermon. p. 167
  • Second Appendix. Animadversions on some passages in Mr. Whitby. p. 179.
  • Third Appendix. Animadversions on some pas­sages in Mr. Stillingfleet. p. 201.

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