THESIS: An Angel, or Pure Spirit, is natu­rally Immutable.

Prop. 1. BOdy and Spirit, which are sup­pos'd, by the Question, to be the Species, or Kinds, of Ens or Thing, do agree, (or do not differ,) precisely, in the Common Notion of Thing. This is as self-evident, as that [Every Thing is a Thing.] Which is an Identical.

Prop. 2. Therefore, they only Disagree, or Differ, by those Notions, call'd, their Differences: For, since, to have a Difference in it from another, is the Formal Reason, why one is Different, or Differs, from an­other; as, Whiteness in a Thing, is the Formal Reason which makes a Thing be white; it follows, that [to have Differences in them, is, to Differ,] is as Self-evident, as 'tis, that [to Differ, is, to Differ.] Which is an Identical.

Prop. 3. Therefore, those Things which have Greater (or more Opposite) Differences in them, do more differ; and those which have the Greatest (or most Opposite) Diffe­rences in them, do most differ: For, since, to have a Difference from another, is the same as to Differ from it, by Prop. 2. this Proposition is as Evident, as it is, that [Page 76] [These which do more Differ, do more Dif­fer;] or, [Those which do most Differ, do most Differ.] Which are Identicals.

Prop. 4. Divisible and Indivisible do Ad­equately Divide the Common Notion of Thing, as its Differences. For, since [Di­visible] means [Not-Divisible,] which is Contradictory, that is, most Opposite to, or most Different from the other; and, be­tween Contradictories, (or, is, or is not,) there can be no Third, or Middle Notion; this Proposition is as Self-evident, (by Prop. 3.) as 'tis, that (Those which do most Dif­fer, do most Differ.] Which is an Identical.

Prop. 5. Therefore, Body being evident­ly Divisible; Spirit, which differs from it, must be necessarily Indivisible: For, since Body and Spirit Differ; and they are for­mally made to differ by their Differences, by Prop. 2. and those Differences are most Opposite, or do most differ, by Prop. 4. and every thing is what it is Constituted, or made to be; this Proposition is as Self-evi­dent, as, that [A Thing is what it is;] or, that [What is Divisible, is Divisible; and, What is Indivisible, is Indivisible.] Which are, all of them, Identicals.

Prop. 6. Therefore, whatever is Affirm'd of Body, except the Generical, or Common Notion of Thing, must be Deny'd of Spirit: For, since all Predicates (except that of the Common Notion) must be taken from [Page 77] the Difference; and the Difference is that which makes one of the Species different, or distinct, from all others; that is, consti­tutes, or makes it to be no other; and, con­sequently, (since it must be something,) makes it to be it self only; it follows, that Body and Spirit are so, or, in such a man­ner, Distinct, as those Differences make them, by Prop. 3. that is, are most Diffe­rent, or most Oppos'd; that is, Contradicto­rily Distinct; or, are of Contradictory. Natures to one another, by Prop. 4. & 5. Wherefore, that whatever (besides the Common Notion of Thing) is Affirm'd of the One, must be Deny'd of the Other, is as Self-evident, as, that [Contradiction (or, saying contradictorily, by is, and is not,) is Contradiction.] Which is Identical.

Prop. 7. Wherefore, since we do truly and properly Affirm of BODY, that it is Successive, or Part after Part, in its Opera­tions; the Contradictory, viz. that 'tis Un­successive, Simultaneous, or Instantaneous, in its Operations, must, by Prop. 6. be Af­firm'd of SPIRIT. Therefore, this Pro­position is as Self-evident, as it is, that [What is not part after part, is not part af­ter part; but all at once.] Which is evi­dently Identical.

Prop. 8. Whatever is Mutable, is other­wise afterwards, than it was before; and, consequently, 'tis Successive: For, if it has [Page 78] all it had before, (neither more, nor less,) 'tis manifestly the Same, or Unchang'd; and, where there is no Successiveness, there can be no possible Ground for Before, or After: Wherefore, this is as Self-evident, as it is, that [VVhat must remain the same, or can receive no Change, is Unchangeable.] Which is Identical.

Prop. 9. Wherefore, an Angel (being, by Prop. 6. & 7. Unsuccessive) is natural­ly Unchangeable.

50. Ere I come to examine Mr. Le Grand's Solution of this Demonstration, I desire all Ingenuous Readers to reflect what Advantage it would bring to True Know­ledge, or SCIENCE, were this Con­nected Way of Discoursing from Clear Grounds brought into Fashion, and can­didly pursu'd. It would quickly make Truth appear; and discover, what Pro­ductions are the Genuine Effects of Right Reason, and what is only Loose Talk. It would put an End to all Controversies, and avoid all Occasions of Men's Catching at, and availing themselves, by those insig­nificant Methods of Wrangling, Ill Lan­guage, and Prevarication; to which Ob­stinate Opposers of Truth are forc'd to have recourse. Whence, I must sincerely declare that (as far as I am conscious to my self of my own Intentions) it was not [Page 79] any Arrogancy, or Vanity of preferring my Labours, and Thoughtful Productions, before those of some Writers, who took not this Way of Connexion but seem'd wholly to dis regard it; but, that which caus'd me to take that Way of expressing my self with that Assuredness, was, an Ear­nest Desire to invite, and (as far as I could possibly) incite others, and breed an Emu­lation in them to follow such a Method, as might set Truth in a Clear Light, ad­vance Science, and difcountenance and beat down Scepticism, and all its Incon­clusive Ways of Talking; which, in Phi­losophy, where Solid and VVell-grounded Truth is aim'd at, (let it be never so Pret­ty, and Witty,) amounts to no more, nor deserves any better Name, but that of Idle Tittle-Tattle. Nay, I express'd my self, in my Preface to Solid Philosophy Asserted, that I was aware this would be objected to me; and, therefore, I did there (from §. 8. to §. 14.) alledge many Reasons, to shew that this Carriage was necessary for a Writer who resolv'd, without Fear or Favour of any, to pursue those Good Ends; and to put it to the Test, what Doctrine, or Method, was True; what Sophisticate, and False. Which Reasons, till they an­swer, themselves must confess, that their Objecting Arrogancy can only be built on their seeing my Heart, and penetrating [Page 80] my Inward and Invisible Intentions. The plain Truth is, Mr. Le Grand would have had me speak well of his Books, (and o­ther Writers of the same Strain and Pitch;) for which Reason he complains of me sad­ly, in his Preface to his former Treatise, that I had not so much as read his Books, sive Latinè, sive Gallicè scriptos; (there is a Quod not a benè for you, now!) My Rea­sons why I neglected that Expected Duty were these: First, Because (except his Volume which is a Collection out of Des­cartes his Placita) they were so very Fa­mous, and universally taken notice of, that I never so much as heard of them. Next, I did not apprehend I had any such great Obligation to read them. Thirdly, I read as much of them as I had occasion to speak to; which did not so hugely please me, as to think it worth my while to look af­ter any more of them. Lastly, Those I had read were like Whipp'd Cream; be­ing so empty of Solid Sense and Frothy, so void of Principles or Connexion, that is, without either Head or Tail, that I was weary of them. And, as for his last Books, he has so doubly disfigur'd them with Ill Language, that the Ground-work of them is Insipid and Unconnected Talk; and the Embroidery of them is Raillery: Which are no such great Philters, to make me in love with their Brethren; nor could [Page 81] any Flattery be so fulsom from me, as to deck them with Encomiums. But, Words from an Adversary are of no VVeight; Let us, then, come to examine how pertinent­ly and punctually he has Answer'd this De­monstration, which was so highly incum­bent upon him. I earnestly beg of the Reader, to take the pains to go along with me for this once, so that we may get a full View of the Solution of it; which, if he does, I am confident he will confess, that never did a weaker Writer appear in Print; and, that he will both grant that my farther Confuting him is Needless; and, withall, will admire I have had the Pa­tience to lose my Time so long upon such an Insignificant Trifler.

51. He recites my Demonstration in his Censura, p. 44. and sets himself to answer it, p. 45. First, He says, This Demonstra­tion is none of those he brought formerly; but, that this is the first time he has produc'd it. What is this to purpose? Let it be where it will, whose it will, or whensoever first produc'd, here it is; and I have challeng'd him, and his Cartesians, to Answer it; and therefore, we are to expect their Perfor­mance. Yet, he is much out, even when he talks frivolously; for, I produc'd it for­merly, at large, (tho' not in the self-same manner,) in my Method to Science, p. 316. as any one that can read, may see. Next, [Page 82] He says, I durst not repeat here my former Argument, drawn from the Immutability of GOD. He says very right; for, I dare not commit such a Folly, as to repeat an Argument which was brought to evince Another Point, to prove This Thesis, which is so widely Different from it. The Im­mutability of GOD was my Medium, to prove, that GOD could not be the Imme­diate Cause of that which is Essentially Mu­table, as Motion is; his Nature being Con­tradictory to it. Why must this Argument be repeated here, where we are speaking of the Manner of Operating peculiar to Angels? Tho' this be nothing to purpose, and sillily Ridiculous; yet, the Words, [He durst not bring it here,] look Great; and would persuade his Readers, if they were Fools, that he has frighted me from my Argument; which, tho' he sets a good Face on it, and looks and talks Big, I dare say, poor Man! himself is far from ho­ping. Thirdly, He talks Ironically of its Formidable and Invincible Strength. Whe­ther it be Invincible, will be best seen by his Answer to it: But, it seems, 'tis For­midable to him; for he is loath to come up to it, but makes his Approaches very backwardly', and cautiously. Fourthly, He calls it Garrulity, and (afterwards) Verbo­sity. What Reader will not smile at his Humour of saying any thing, tho' never so [Page 83] manifestly False? Whoever reviews my Argument, put down by himself, in the fore going Page, and in my very Words, will see there is not one superfluous Word in it, but barely as many as suffic'd to shew the Connexion of my Discourse: And, of all the things in the World, Verbosity and Garrulity in a Demonstration is the on­ly way to blunt and spoil the Force of the Argument; since this Loosness of much Talk, bIinds the Considerer from seeing the Close Coherence of its Terms. But this acquaints us perfectly with his Genius: The very Grain of his Thoughts is laid so cross to all kind of Connexion, that he thinks all Connected Discourse is nothing: but Idle Babbling; and, that only Loose and Rambling Talk is True Demonstration.

52. But, these Avant-Guards of his, are only VVhifflers before the Show, to make way: Now comes the Answer it self. First, He excepts against the Common Notion of Ens, or Thing; which I had said, consisted in this, that It had a Power to be, or could be. Upon which, he thus descants; Quasi verò Essentia omnis Entis. Finiti, tam Creati quàm Creandi, non sit quid Positivum, sed nihil aliud quàm Poten­tia Essendi, seu id quod Quo possit Esse. More Folly, and Shifting Tricks, could not have been well crouded into five Lines! Where did I speak in the Abstract of Es­sentia, [Page 84] Potentia essendi, or Quo potest esse? Does not he see, in my Words, put down lately by himself, that I speak of Ens, or the Concrete; and, that, in my Id. Cartes. p. 244. where I demonstrate to him, what the Notion of Ens Creatum must be, (of which he takes no notice here, but only talks against, that is, denies, my Conclu­sion,) I express'd what was meant by such an Ens, p. 245. l. 2, 3, viz. Illud quod po­test existere; and, all along, I name Ens, Corpus, Spiritus, which are all Concretes. And, surely, he will not say that the Essence of Created Things includes Actual Existence; for, if he does, he makes them so many GODS; for, 'tis the Preroga­tive of the Deity only, Essentially to Exist. Let him take any Individual, Created Things, (those being most properly Things;) For Example; Michael, Peter, a Horse, a Stone, &c. and then examine his Thoughts, whether he finds either Actual Being, or Not-being, in their No­tions; and, if he cannot, but finds (as he must) they Abstract from both, that all that can be said of Ens, as to what it has of it self, or its own Nature and Essence, in order to Being, is, that it can be, or can receive Existence, if the First Cause pleases to give it. This being so, let us abstract the Notion of Ens from all Individuals; and we shall see that the Notion of Ens, or Thing, in [Page 85] Common, is That which is Capable of Be­ing, and can be no other.

33. Having thus chang'd my Words, let us see what Advantage he makes of this slippery Dealing. He objects, that this would make the Notion of Ens not to be Positive. What means he? Does he think that the Notion of Quo est Res, or the Form, or quo potest esse Res, (suppose I had said so,) is not Positive; whereas, 'tis Impos­sible a Negative Nature can exist, or ren­der a Thing Capable of Existing? Indeed, Aristotle's First Matter is defin'd Negative­ly, as having no kind of Form at all in its Notion, neither Substantial, nor Acciden­tal; but, that the Form which is part of the Essence, and constitutes the Thing, should be Negative too, would make the whole Thing to be made up of Negatives; which is such a strange Blunder in Philo­sophy, as admits no Parallel. The Form determines the Potentiality, or Indifferen­cy of the Matter, and makes it become This, or an Individual Thing, and so fits it for Existence; because a Thing in Com­mon, or that which is Indeterminats, is not Capable of Existing. Now, that the Es­sence that makes an Individual Thing, which is the most Positive Notion we have, (or rather, no Notion is perfectly Positive, but it,) should not be Positive it self, or be less Positive, because it makes the Matter [Page 86] capable of a farther, and best Perfection, to wit, the last Actuality of Existence, is a Paradox unheard of in Metaphysicks. So that Mr. Le Grand has alter'd my Words, and yet gets no Advantage by it, but blunders himself, while he went to blun­der the Demonstration. For, What is all this to the Argument? If he do but grant that Body and Spirit are Species of Thing in Common, or (which is the same) that they are both of them Things, (which 'tis a Madness to deny,) the Demonstration, which consists in the Connexion or Agree­ment of the Notions, will go on, and pro­ceed, whether he will or no. And, this he fore-sees very well; and therefore, by throwing these Flim-flams, as Rubs in the way, he endeavours to keep it off, and hin­der it from going on.

54. Next, He tells us, that De Corpore & Spiritu, rebus finitis actu existentibus, nunc sermo instituitur: This Discourse treats of Body and Spirit, actually existent. I be­seech him, who stated the Question on this fashion, or pretended we spoke of This Body, or This Spirit, which only do a­ctually exist? He knows, that, when he put my Demonstration, I acknowledg'd, that I spoke of Body and Spirit, which were the Species of Ens, in Common; and therefore, are themselves the most common Notions next to it; and, not Particulars, [Page 87] which only do exist actually. Yet, he tells us, Nunc Sermo instituitur: The Speech now, is, of Things actually existing. I beseech him, VVhose Speech? His, or Mine? Not Mine, as is now shewn: It must mean, then, that 'tis His Speech. And, by what Rule must I needs speak as he would have me? Cer­tainly, I have Right to put my own De­monstration as I please my self. It lies be­fore him; and, he is to answer it as it lies. What wriggling is here to pervert the Sense of it, instead of representing it in my own VVords, and Solving it! Again, this is a Sign he knows little what belongs to Sci­ence; for this treats of the Abstracted No­tions and Natures of the Subjects we han­dle; which, as distinctly such, exist in our Understanding, and no where else; for, there they are concise, and exact, even to an In­divisible; whereas, if we treat of them as they actually exist in Matter, or in re, they are jumbl'd confusedly with innumerable other Modes; so that there cannot possibly be any Science, nor Demonstration of them at all. I wish him to reflect upon all the particular Sciences in the Mathematicks, whether they are of Circles, Quadrates, Triangles, &c. and he will see they do all of them treat of those Formal Notions, or Natures, abstractedly, from their Actual Existence in re; where, perhaps, no Fi­gures Mathematically so exact as our [Page 88] Mind frames of them, are to be found. The same is to be said, when we treat of the Common Notions of Ens, Corpus, Spiri­tus, &c. which can no where exist, but in the Understanding: Nay, 'tis evident, I speak of Ens Formally, as its Notion is taken Generically, or of Ens in Common; and, sure, he will not say, the Thing for­mally, as in Common, can any where actu­ally exist, but in our Mind.

56. He proceeds after his old rate, and tells his Reader, that all my Verbosity, hoc solum vult, means only this, that Body has Parts, and Spirit has none; and, that there­fore, Body is Successive, and thence Mutable; and Spirit Immutable. He puts my Rea­son, after a fashion, indeed; yet, only slightly, and slubberingly: He would have more oblig'd me to have us'd my own VVords, which were more Ample, and Full, viz. That the Differences which constitute them being Contradictory, it follows, that whatever we say of the One, (except what belongs to the Common Notion of Thing,) the Contradictory to it must be said of the Other; and, therefore, if Body have Suc­cession in its Operations, Spirit must have none, but must have all its Operations in an Instant; and, consequently, be Immu­table. However, I thank him he has put the Substance of my Demonstration on any fashion, tho' not forcibly, but rawly. Here [Page 89] 'tis the Argument presses; now let us ex­pect his Solution. First, He says the An­swer is Easie; and, 'tis true; for, in his Way one may easily, without any Trou­ble, Answer all Euclid: 'tis but altering his Words, and saying something, or rais­ing some extravagant Scruple against his Conclusions, and the Deed is done. Next, He grants they may know some Things at one View, but not all. This is said; but, still the Question is, Why not All at once, if Some? His Reason? Does the Know­ledge of those Some burthen or fill the An­gel's Intellect, so, that it can hold no more? No, surely; for, we experience, even in our Souls here, that are very much Infe­riour to the Intelligences, which are Pure Acts, that the having some Knowledge, increases our Capacity to take in more; whence 'tis demonstrable, that nothing can fill or satisfie them, but the Sight of an Infinite Truth, or the Beatifical Vision of GOD. Do Angels require some Time to have more Knowledge, because slowly-mo­ving Corporeal Phantasms, must bring things leisurely into their Understanding; or, Impressions on their Nerves occasion the producing Ideas? Neither of these can be said. What hinders, then, their having at once all they naturally can have? Are not all Truths, the Objects of these Knowledges, Connected; but some of them [Page 90] stand at variance with one another? This would disgrace GOD's Workmanship, the Product of his Wisdom, if we make Truths Incoherent, Contradictory and Chimo­rical. None of these Rubs, then, being possible, which only could hinder or retard an Angel from having all his Intellectual O­perations in an Instant, it had been but a piece of Civility in Mr. Le Grand to have bestow'd upon us some Reason for his dis­senting from us in this Point; and, not to have popt us off with a bare voluntary De­nial of the Conclusion, which is the only thing in question.

57. For, we have much more Right to expect his Reason, because (as was now said) this Denial of his, instead of An­swering the Argument, is a plain Denying the Immediate Conclusion which follow'd from that Demonstration. Yet, I must say, that (however those foolish Fellows, the Logicians, would laugh at him, for such an Unpardonable Errour in Disputa­tion, yet) he behaves himself here like a Civil Gentleman; for, he compounds with us, and grants very kindly, that they do at once know some Things, but denies they have all the Operations belonging to them at once, or know all they ought to know in an Instant. Now, this being evidently the Conclusion of my Argument, (as far as I there press'd it,) 'tis a double Injury; [Page 91] first, only to hint the Argument, and then slide away from speaking to it, and deny our Conclusion; and, yet, give us no kind of Reason why. Yet, he pretends to give us something that he would have thought a Reason, tho' 'tis so slight, that he is shy to call it so: Which we will hearken to; only, let it be first remember'd, that he is Arguing against the Conclusion, which he had most learnedly Deny'd; and, not An­swering my Argument, or shewing that the Terms of it do not cohere; or, that the Conclusion does not follow out of my Pre­misses. His Reason (if it be one) is grounded on an Explication of his own Doctrine, that GOD moves Matter Im­mediately; which, unless he first establish­es, (as he never did, nor can,) his Foun­dation shakes. However, that fuppos'd, he demonstrates it after his usual sort, by bringing a Parallel. His Discourse runs thus: Bodies are Stupid Things; nor could they stir at all, if GOD did not give and conserve their Motion, and all the Modes of it: And, in like manner, GOD gives and conserves Cogitation, and the Modes of Cogitation, to Angels. Where­fore, as a Body does not therefore lose its Essence by Moving more or less, so an Angel does not lose his Essence by Thinking more or less. Where are we now? I am sure we are rambl'd quite out of the Purlue of [Page 92] our Question. My Conclusion only says, and my Argument only aims to prove, that if the Ordinary Laws of an Angel's Ope­rating be observ'd, it would know all it is naturally to know at once, and not succes­sively; but, that it would, otherwise, lose its Essence, I never said, nor thought; nor that GOD, acting Supernaturally, can­not devest them of some Property they have, tho' naturally ally'd to its Essence. So that, he first Denies my Conclusion, instead of Answering my Argument: Next, brings a Parallel for an Argument; and when he has brought it, he shoots it at Rovers, and levels it at a wrong Mark: So far he is from knowing what belongs to any one Rule belonging to Disputation. Add that his pretended Parallel is the most Unparal­lel of any he could have invented; Divi­sible and Indivisible are the Essential, or In­trinsecal Differences of Ens nor can there be any Ens, but it must be either the One, or the Other of them. Are Moving more, or Moving less, Essential Differences of Bo­dy? Or, cannot Body be, without being either of them? Could not GOD's Om­nipotence have kept their First Matter from Moving, when he had first Created it? Or, are [Moving more, and Moving less,] Contradictories; as are the Differen­ces I put, and argue from them? Or, could an Angel, which is a Pure Act, have [Page 93] been Created without Knowing at all, as a Body could without Moving at all? What a Lame Similitude then, or Parallel, is this, which has never a Leg to run on! And, yet, he will needs make it run on a Sleev­less Errand, and applies it to a Point which is Foreign to our Question. Add, far­ther, that our Question is not here of an Angel's Simultaneous Knowledge omnium rerum, of all things, as he puts it: 'Tis not the Quantity or Extension of the Angelical Knowledges, which I do here strive to e­vince; but the Unsuccessiveness of them; or, that it has them all at once, (whether they are many or fewer, large or narrow;) from whence is deduc'd immediately, that 'tis naturally Immutable.

58. Yet, of this Aukward Answer he is so fond, that he Crows over my Demon­stration most Triumphantly, in these Words, p. 45. [Quâ simplice solutione, &c. By which Simple Solution, all the Herculean Strength of his Demonstration, as Sampson's did of old, by meerly cutting off his Hairs, falls to the Ground, to his great Disgrace.] And, I must confess, 'tis (as he says) a Simple So­lution indeed. Were he but half as Power­ful in his Arguments and Solutions, as he is in his Confident Braggadochio Talk, he would be Invincible. Poor Man! He thinks the Tinkling a few fine Latin Phrases is far beyond all the strongest Reasons in the [Page 94] World: And, can any Man think I have nothing else to do, but to stand laying open the Nonsense of such a perpetual Tri­fler?

59. This may serve for a Sample of his Solutions of my Arguments, by which (since this concerns him more than all the others) we may judge of all the rest: For, I am forc'd to take the Method of pro­ceeding by Instances, in regard it would require a Volume to lay open all his Fol­lies of each kind. In the next place, I will produce an Instance or two, of his Great Talent of Aggravating and Pervert­ing my Words to a Sinister and Invidious. Sense; which is an Essential Part of this New Cartesian Method, and takes up near a quarter of his Book; and, withall, gives it a Thousand times à greater Shew of be­ing Victorious, than all his Arguments. An Honourable and Worthy Gentleman hapt to say, that the Parts of the Cartesian Do­ctrine did cum quodam lepôre sibi consenti­re, agree to one another with a certain Grace, or Prettiness; than which, I know no Ex­pression more proper. I reply'd to Mr. Le Grand, who seem'd fond of this Commen­dation, in my Id. Cart. p. 10. and grant­ed, it was not only Lepida, Graceful, or Pretty; but also, Witty. Which says the same that Noble Person said; and I added a farther Commendation to it. Upon this, [Page 95] Mr. Le Grand tells his Reader, that, No­bilissimum illum Virum spiculis suis venenatis petit; that I assault, or set upon that Noble Person with my Poyson'd Darts. His Fancy is, certainly, very fearfuly Hypochondriack: Every thing is a Spiculum, or Dart, that he dis-likes. Thus a silly Asterisk *, ca­sually left in the Context, in my ME­THOD, was interpreted as a Design, trans­figere ipsum quinque radiis tanquam tot Spicu­lis; to strike him thorow with those Five Points, as with so many Darts. Nay, he tells me, moreover, in that Preface, §. 31. that I have petulans ingenium ac Judicium pravum, for attempting to do him that Mischief with those five Darts of that A­sterisk; and is so afraid of being transfix'd, or run thorow by them, that he complains of it sadly to the Reader (it being, as we are to conceive, a Matter of much Weight) a second time there, in §. 44. Of which, see Id. Cartes. p. 30. & 72. Another In­stance of his Ranting, and shameful Ex­aggeration, shall be this: He had quoted Bellarmin, to say, that a piece of Wood was turn'd into Stone. I reply'd, That it did not appear, but Stony Particles might be interwoven with the Wooden ones, Id. Car­tes. p. 45. for which I gave my Reason. What Harm, what Incivility is in this Reply? None. Yet, let Mr. Le Grand come to represent it, (who, as Icterical [Page 96] Men see all things Yellow, dyes every Word, tho' never so Innocent, into the Colour of his own furious Choler, and ren­ders it Hideous,) it amounts to this, in his Language, (Cens. pag. 112.) Bellarmine Rationis expers es, mentiris: Bellarmin, thou hast no Sense (or Reason) in thee; Thou Lyest. Hundreds of such Ingenuous Re­presentations of my Words garnish his Censure; to which, what Credit is to be given, these few Instances may inform us: And the Reader may observe, that when­ever he is most Transported and Furious in Amplifying, he may be sure there is always the least Reason. And, so much for this Exaggerating Method, so Useful and Pro­per to our New Cartesians.

60. Another Method of theirs, is, to impose upon me False Tenets, to make me look like a Monster of Folly and Impiety. These are great Sticklers in his, and his Friend Merry-man's Pamphlets; and give the briskest Vigour to their Invectives. For example; He tells the Reader, (p. 42.) that I say, It is infinitely more Impossible that GOD should change an Angel, (if it were Changeable at all,) after the First Instant, than that it self, or another Angel, should do it. Now, What Man, reading these Words, thus industriousty singl'd out, would not verily think I made GOD in­finitely less Powerful than an Angel, or any [Page 97] other Creature; and admire at my Folly, and Impiety, both? But, read the whole Discourse there, and it is evidently quite contrary; nor could any Man more high­ly magnifie GOD's Attributes, than I do in that very place. My Discourse is this: An Indivisible Effect must be put in an Instant; therefore, it will be put in the first Instant, if all that is requisite to pro­duce that Effect be put: Those Requisites are, Power in the Cause, and Disposition to exercise that Power, and Application of the Agent to the Patient; and, that, in case the Agent be not yet Dispos'd to act, it must be Chang'd, so to be made Dispos'd. Wherefore, since 'tis Infinitely more Im­possible GOD should not have Power to do it in the First Instant, being All-power­ful, than that another Spirit should not have such a Power; or, not be Dispos'd of himself to act, he being Pure and Infinite Actuality; or, that he can be Chang'd, thus to be made Dispos'd, he being Unchange­able; or, not be Apply'd, he being Omni­present; than it is, that an Angel should not have Power to do this Effect; or, be chang'd, so to be fitted to act: Or, not be Apply'd most intimately to the Patient; therefore, 'tis infinitely more Impossible GOD should not do it in the First In­stant, (that is, not after the First Instant,) if the Effest were feisible, than that an [Page 98] Angel, which falls infinitely short in every regard, should not do it in the First In­stant; or, (which is the same,) should do it after the First Instant. See my Demon­stration, in my METHOD; from p. 307. to p. 314. particularly, p. 313. Now, 'tis evident, that, in this Discourse, I bear up to GOD's Attributes, there mention­ed; and maintain them to be infinitely a­bove those of the best Created Beings in e­very regard. What do these Men? They pick out a few Words, and purposely con­ceal the whole Tenour of my Discourse; and, by this False Dealing, endeavour to impose upon me so Wicked an Impiety, as neither any Christian, nor any Heathen, who holds a First Being, did ever assert. How he deforms this Argument, by sing­ling out a few other Words, may be seen in his Censure, p. 49. Judge then, Read­er, whether those poor spiteful Men have not renounc'd all Shame and Conscience, who dare thus wilfully defame their Neighbour, and fraudulently abuse their Reader. Would not a Lawyer that us'd such a Dishonest Trick, in Altering the Words which concern'd the Title of an Estate, be turn'd over the Bar, and hated by all Honest Men? Something worse than this as containing the same Malice, and in far worse Circumstances, is this Other Instance. He had, in the Preface of his [Page 99] former Book, §. 40. made me to say, it was Vile opus & Laboriosum, for GOD to be the Immediate Cause of Motion. He put it directly upon me, as my very Words; by introducing it with Pergit, statimque ad­dit; and, by printing the Word [Labo­riosum] in Italick Letter, and the same with the other Words, which were truly mine. This makes me Impious against GOD, with a Witness; for, it represents my Opinion to be, That GOD makes use of the Ministery of Angels, to ease himself (forsooth!) of the Fatigue and Weariness, which, otherwise, he would have felt, had he mov'd the First Matter Himself. Hereupon, I challeng'd him to have flatly falsify'd my Words, and, to have added [Laboriosum,] to put upon me such an absurd Doctrine, as never came into the Head of any Man acquainted with Christianity, or Common Sense. I had happ'd to express it to be a Drudgery mis-becoming GOD's Essence, who is Un­changeable, to be the Immediate Cause of Mo­tion, or Change. Where, 'tis manifest, I put it upon the Mis-becomingness, or Un­sutableness to GOD's Nature, which is Pure Actuality of Existence, to cause Change immediately; because, Being only was the Proper Effect of Him, whose Nature was Self-Existence. Yet, in despite of all the Concomitant Words, and the whole Te­nour [Page 100] of the Discourse, instead of Retract­ing, or Excusing his Fault, he stands to it stoutly, p. 44. And, why? Because Drudges do use to toyl and moyl, and sweat and la­bour, and lead (as we say) a weary Life: As if there were not Meanness in Drudge­ry, and Indignity for the Master of the Fa­mily to perform, it being below his Fun­ction; and, as if the Concomitant Word, [Mis-becoming,] and [Vile.] join'd with it, did not restrain it manifestly to this Sense, that it was Indignum DEO; and, not such a Toilsom Business to move Matter, which every Angel can do. Could it be possibly thought by any Man in his Wits, that he who holds that GOD Created Heaven and Earth, of Nothing, in an Instant, should think he had not Power to give Motion to Bodies, without over-straining himself? Who, but a Mad man, could hold two such Inconsistent Tenets? Or, What Man, well in his Wits, could hope to obtain Belief that I held such a piece of Extravagant Nonsense? But, what can­not Impotent Passion feign, and pretend, when Reason is Nonpluss'd? Something was to be said when he was at a Plunge; and any thing is taken up, in that Exigence, to serve a turn; and, the more Extrava­gant it is, the better it pleases his Humour; which never lets him consider whether it be Credible, or no: It serves to bespatter, [Page 101] and vent his Uneasie Anger, which is still boiling in his Breast; and, that is enough for his purpose.

61. Another piece of this New Cartesian Method, is, To cry aloud against me, and call me Proud, Self-conceited, and Arrogant, if I will not allow such Writers as himself to be most Excellent Philosophers: Or, if I hap to dissent from other Learned Men, in some Opinions, (as, Who does not?) then, presently, he complains pathetical­ly, that I damn, contemn, and trample upon those Authors: Or, if I do but say, I De­monstrate such a Point; or, that others do not demonstrate; then, presently, I am as Proud as Lucifer; and, the Lord knows what. How sincere he is in alledging this, will appear by the examining three most signal Places he makes Choice of; where he objects it, (§. 40.) In which he makes me say, [Providentiam Divi­nam, ex Aliis omnibus, me, ad Rationem Do­minio suo restituendam selegisse:] that Di­vine Providence had chosen out Me, from All Others, to restore Reason to her Dominion, or Soveraignty, over Fancy. This, certainly, thus worded, sounds proudly. But, may we not fear, after so many Trials, that Mr. Le Grand has falsify'd my Words, tho' he puts them all for mine: and, that too, in a Distinct Character? To say, I would attempt or endeavour this, is but to ex­press, [Page 102] that my Zeal for Truth had put me upon such a bold Undertaking, and, with­all, to give an Encouragement to the Reader to weigh my Argument: Or, to say, that I apprehended GOD's Provi­dence had enabi'd me to perform this, was no more than to say, I had writ a Method to Science, which the Title-Page had pro­fess'd openly; for which too, I gave GOD the Glory. But, to say GOD had chosen me, out of All others, can become no body but a Proud and Imprudent Boaster. How proves he this? that is, How shews he these Words, thus put together, in my Books? Why, he cites the very places; which, if True, must shame me; if False, must disgrace him, as a Falsifyer. The First of the Places he cites, is found in the Pre­face to my METHOD, p. 27. where I find, in the Beginning of that §, these Words; I have not enumerated these Parti­culars, to boast my Performances; but, to be-speak my Reader's Pardon, if, travelling in an Unbeaten Road, I happen now and then to stumble. Which have not the least Shew of Arrogancy, but the quite Contrary. In­deed, I say, p. 27. that It is Impossible for any Wit of Man to invent any other VVay than what I have propos'd; that is, Solid and Evident: Which, I say there, is, to build on the Nature of the Thing, and frame my Discourses by Connexion of Terms. But, do [Page 103] I pretend, that what I propos'd was my own Invention, or that I am the Author of it; as the Wondrously Modest Cartesius did; who oppos'd all the present and past World, to set up his New-fangl'd Doctrine? Do not all Aristotelians pretend to it, as well as I? And, Did not all the Learned World fol­low it, till Cartesius's Time? With what Ingenuity, then, does he tell his Reader, in the Margin, that this is Arrogantia J. S. non aliàs audita; the Unheard of Arrogance of J. S. to propose in his Books, (in Op­position to the Ideists,) what Ten Thou­sand had propos'd before him? The Second Place he cites, is, from the Epistle Dedi­catory to Solid Philosophy Asserted, §. 8. where I have these Words, [I must own, I have a high Opinion of my Principles, and of my Method, which Nature, and GOD's Good Providence, have laid, and establish'd.] Is it Arrogance to have a high Opinion of what GOD, and Nature (the Work of his Di­vine Wisdom) have done? For, it is plain, that I do not pretend I have any hand in establishing either of them. My Non Ultra has told them why I have a high Opinion of my Principles, because they are built on the Metaphysical Verity of Things, establish'd by the Ideas in the Di­vine Understanding: And of my Method, or Way of Discourse; because Nature, or (which is the same) GOD, as Author of [Page 104] Nature, has made our Soul such an Infe­riour sort of Spirit, that it works by Ab­stract or Inadequate Notions, which we compound or connect into Propositions, (in which all Truth formally consists;) and then connect those Propositions into Co­herent Discourses. These, then, being by me ascrib'd to GOD and Nature, I assume nothing to my self, but my Conclusions; and, of these I deliver'd my self thus, in the Words immediately following: [But, as for my Conclusions, and my Deductions, as I will not justifie them with the same Firmness as I did the others, so I should not think I ought to propose them to Learned Men, unless I judg'd them Demonstrative.] And, now, where is all this Unheard of Arrogancy? Where is my Bragging that GOD had Selected me so particularly, from All Others, which he most expresly puts upon me; and pre­tends to shew them, [tribus ex locis,] from three Places; of which, these are Two, where not a Word is found savouring of Arrogancy, or any thing like it; but, ra­ther, the direct Contrary? Would it be Un­civil, on this Occasion, to ask of Mr. Le Grand, whether he has not forsworn all Sin­cerity, and Common Honesty? To stander is too great a Crime for a good Christian to be Guilty of; but, to falsisie his Adversa­ry's Words, and Slander him too; or ra­ther, to pretend falsly he says thus, or thus, [Page 105] in such Determinate Places, (which Par­ticularizing makes it look Credible,) on purpose that he may slander him, is so vo­luntary and wilful a Complicated Crime, that the Tenderest, and most Indulgent Charity is at a loss to invent an Excuse for it.

62. The Third Place to which he re­fers his Reader, is taken out of the Dedi­catory to Solid Philosophy Asserted; where there are, indeed, some of those Words, but not one of those haughty ones he here expresly and distinctly fixes upon me. My Discourse in the two fore-going Pa­ges, was, concerning the Way of Ideas made use of by Cartesius, and others; which, I made account, did delude their good Reason; and, by making them dis­regard the Nature of the Thing, led them into Fancies, and Imaginary Conceits: I gave there for the Reason why I writ Philoso­phy, That I apprehended GOD's Provi­dence had fitted and enabl'd me to redress such great Mischiefs, (viz. that Fancies should beat down Reason and Truth;) and there­fore, I thought it became me to Re-instate Reason in her Sovereignty over Fancy; and, to assert to her the Rightful Dominion Nature had given her, over all our Judgments.] Which amounts to this, That I thought my self able to confute his Way of Ideas, and to shew it to be Opposite to True Reason. [Page 106] Is it such a piece of Arrogancy to pretend to be able to confute a piece of Novelry, so Opposite to the Way of all the former World, (especially, ascribing, as I did, that Ability to GOD?) Or rather, (if there be any Arrogancy at all on either side,) Is it not more like Arrogancy in them, to blame the Methods of so many Thousands of Learned Men, who writ be­fore them; and, by introducing New Ways of Philosophizing, to accuse, by Conse­quence, all the former VVorld of Ignorance? Is it not rather Arrogance in him, to be so haughtily and rudely Stiff in maintaining Ideas (as he says) Elicited, or produc'd by Himself, without even attempting to bring any one Demonstration, or Conclusive Proof for them? Can there be any Self-Conceit more Enormous, than to be thus Ravingly Earnest to maintain that he has this Invisible Gift of Producing Ideas out of his own Head, or ex se, (as he expresses it;) which he holds to be the only Ground of all True Knowledge, without bringing any one Argument that is able to evince it; and, then, because we will not believe him without Proof, to foam thus at the Mouth with the foulest Language the most Transported Rage could dictate? See his Words at the End of this §. [Quis a Luci­feri lapsu, superbiùs unquam de Seipso sense­rit! VVhat Man, since the Fall of Lucifer, [Page 107] had ever such a Proud Conceit of himself!] Then follows my never-heard-of Arrogance, my Intolerable Arrogance, my Nequissima, most VVicked Arrogance. Poor Impotent Railer! Whose Passion will neither let him reflect how he dishonours his Place, disgraces his Friends, scandalizes Good Christians, or wrongs his own Conscience. But, in the Name of Wonder! How comes it that no body but himself ever thought me thus damnably Arrogant! I do confess, I write briskly, and smartly, when I think it Evi­dent I write for Truth. It is my Duty: And, I have given my Reasons for it in my Preface to Solid Philosophy; which he, instead of Answering, tells us here only, he cannot read them without Horrour: No, nor my Arguments neither; for, he an­swers them both just alike. In what, then, consists this Arrogancy of mine? The plain Truth is this; and, his Carriage confesses it: I had challeng'd him to bring one Prin­ciple, or one Conclusive Proof, for his New VVay of Philosophy: He has none; and, therefore, I must be Intolerably Arrogant, because he is Obstinate in his Errours, and pitifully Ignorant; as also, because I follow the Way, which builds Truth on the Nature of Things, and on the Connexion of Terms; which all the Learned Men in the VVorld had so long embrac'd, and Unperverted Na­ture teaches every Man.

[Page 108] 63. But, we have lost our Third Cita­tion. I beseech my Reader to re-view it, and then to consider whether there be one Word there, that GOD had Selected me from All Others; which he here, §. 40. puts upon me, as my Express Words; and prints in a distinct Character, as mine. That I have truly represented the Three Places he relates to, will appear by the Preface to his former Book, §. 26. where he puts them down at large. This, then, being evident to Eye-sight, I charge him with Three Wilful Falsifications here, in citing Three Places in my Books for these haughty Words; viz. that I said, I was se­lected from All Others, &c. whereas, I on­ly said, that I apprehended my self Able to confute his Ideas. I demand of him, ei­ther to shew me the Words in my Books, or, to acknowledge his Errour. But, I do not expect from him the Candour to retract any of his Slanders, whatsoever he professes here, pag. 2. For, this would ob­lige him to make Satisfaction; against which, as I have sufficiently experienc'd, he is (I know not by what Case of Con­science) Church-Canon-Proof. This, then, is Another Branch of the New Cartesian Method of Arguing, and Answering; viz. to falsifie, and impose on his Adversary, what­ever VVords he pleases: And, he is very Constant, and Diligent, in pursuing that Useful Method.

[Page 109] 64. Another Branch of this New Me­thod, is, Without so much as one VVord to abet his Saying; nay, in despite of many VVords, and, even, Avow'd Demonstrations to the contrary; to impose upon me False, Invidious, Incredible, and Unchristian Tenets. Thus, p. 78, 79. he makes me deny that the Soul exists when it is separated from the Body: Nay, he is afraid I deny it is Created, but is ex Traduce; and, that it is Extinguish'd with the Body, and Rais'd a­gain at the Last Day. Nor is this all; but, (that we may see how his Suspicions con­tradict one another,) he calls into Doubt, p. 78. whether I acknowledge a Resurrection. I see, it is a great Favour he will let me hold some few of the Articles of my Creed; for, he has debarr'd me from holding most of them. His Reasons, (such as they are,) as well as I can collect them, or make them look like Aiming at any Sense, are these. First, I made her incapable of Pre­existing before the Body, of which she is the Form; (of which Opinion he seems here an Earnest Asserter:) Whence he concludes, I deny she can exist when Se­parate from the Body afterwards: And, yet, p. 78. l. 4. himself uses my Words; which affirm, that, after she is separated, ex se existere apta est, she is able to exist of her self. Next; What says he to my Dis­course: Ens is only that which is capable of [Page 110] Existing: But, as the Council of Vienna has told him, the Soul is Forma hominis; and, therefore, she cannot, of her self, exist here; but the Totum only, of which, she is a Part. Again, I argue thus; That which is Indeterminate in any kind, can­not exist; but the Soul, before she had Knowledge in the Body, was a meer Po­tentia Cognoscendi, or (as some express it) Rasa Tabula: Therefore, she could not exist before the Body. The Major is Evi­dent. The Minor must be granted by Mr. Le Grand himself; for, the Soul can have no Actual Knowledge, without I­deas; and, he denies she has any Innate Ideas, but only an Innate Power of produ­cing them; that is, she has, according to him, none at all before she had elicited them out of her self: Therefore, she was, according to some Priority, before she did elicit them, or, before she had any Know­ledge; and, consequently, she was, of her self, only a Power to have them; or, a meer Power to have Knowledge; which is, to be utterly Indeterminate, in Ratione Cognoscitivi: But, what is Indeterminate in any kind, is neither This, nor That; nor, consequently, can exist: Therefore, there can be no Pre-Existence of Souls. What answers he to these Arguments? We must excuse him; 'Tis not his Custom to do such trifling Work, as to answer any Ar­gument [Page 111] at all: 'Tis enough for him to stand stiff to his Cartesian Tenet, that the Soul and Body are Two Things; I, that they are, let Arguments say what they will. However, he will do better than Answer­ing Arguments: And, How is that? Why, he'll make them all Bad Christians, and Hereticks, that speak against Cartesius; which no sooner said, but, in his wise O­pinion, down they go to the Pit of Hell, like so many Imps of Lucifer, as they are: They deny the Immortality of the Soul, and the Resurrection; and there is an end of them. And, Is not this Confutation enough in all Conscience!

65. His Follies here were tedious to Enumerate. He yields, with much ado, what the Council of Vienna told him 'twas Heresie to deny; but he yields it very faint­ly, in these Words; Anima (says he) Ho­minis Forma aliquando dici potest: The Soul may sometimes be call'd a Form of Man. The Council is much bound to him for his Ci­vil Complement; and Cartesius is their most humble Servant, but not so Obedient to its Decrees of Faith as he ought. But, What kind of Form is the Soul then? The Council said, it was such, verè & essentiali­ter; and, if it were Truly such, why may not a Truth, that belongs to Faith, be spoke at all times? Why, only, [dici po­test, It may be said;] as if it were some [Page 112] Improper and Unusual Phrase, and not Pro­per Language, in which Declarations of Faith use to be worded? Why aliquando only? May not Truth be spoke Always, as oft as there is Occasion? Well, but, all this while, what kind of Form is it? He tells us here, p. 78. l. 18, 19, 20. Is it neither an Assistant, or Extrinsecal Form; nor an Informing, or Intrinsecal one? Now, Intrinsecal means Not-Extrinsecal: We should be glad, then, to see this Mon­ster of a Form, that is neither Extrinsecal, nor Not-Extrinsecal. What is this Mid­ling Form then? He gives us no Account of it, but that 'tis alterius Generis, Of an­other Kind; quo fit, ut Hominis Formam Hu­manitatem esse strictiùs asseramus; By which it comes to pass, that we more strictly call the Form of Man Humanity. What Gibberish is this? Is the Soul a Form at all, or no? If not, then he must say the Council errs: If it be, what is the Matter to this Form? Or, Is it neither Intrinsecal, nor Not-In­trinsecal to it? A Form that is not Intrinse­cal to the Matter, or Informs it, is a strange kind of Form. Again; What Sense is it, that Humanity is, by the Soul, more strictly made the Form of. Man! One would think, that this being the Abstract Notion of Man, its Concrete, and that which ex­presses his Total Essence, should be so more strictly ally'd to it, by the very No­tion [Page 113] of it, (as Whiteness is to that which is White,) that nothing could make a Man more strictly call'd a Man, than Manhood, or Humanity, can do of it self. So that, Insignificant Words and Contradictions are obtruded upon us, instead of Solid Rea­sons; and we must be content with them, when no better can be had.

66. As for his pretending I hold, the Soul is ex traduce, and not Created, he goes against the Light of his own Con­science: For, whoever reads my Fourth Preliminary to Solid Philosophy, § §. 8, 9. (as 'tis evident he has, since he cavils at that Book,) will see, I make the Soul come immediately from GOD, and Crea­ted; tho, indeed, the whole Man not be­ing properly Created, but, in part (viz. according to its Body) Generated, the In­fusion of the Soul is call'd by the Schools, not simply Creation, but Concreation; meaning, that the Soul is then Created, when, by Generation, the Bodily Part is brought to that Perfection, as to be fit, in some degree, to work with it. This, then, is another piece of their New Cartesian Me­thod; and would serve for Arguing and An­swering both, and do mighty Execution in Running down their Adversary, if they hap­pen to meet with Ignorant and Credulous Readers, who are so weak, as not to con­sider that Imputations of the Largest Size [Page 114] may as well proceed from Confident Calum­ny, as from Honest Ingenuity.

67. Another New Method of my Car­tesian Adversary, is, to cite Scripture, then interpret it by his own Fancy, without giving us any Rule of interpret­ing it; or, of distinguishing Metaphorical Speeches, from Literal ones; but, taking every Word that serves his purpose, or seems to chime to the Cartesian Novelty, in a Dogmatical Rigour; (which Method, follow'd home, would make mad Work with Philosophy, and Divinity too;) and then, if we will not allow his Private and Untoward Interpretations, presently to ex­claim aloud, and tell the Reader very sadly, that I oppose not only Cartesius, but Moses, St. John, and St. Paul; nay, GOD himself, and (which is a worse Fault, it seems, than to oppose GOD) the Holy Ghost too; and, p. 47. St. Jude al­so. Certainly, this Self conceited Man makes account his Private Interpretation of Scripture is the Infallible Rule of all our Faith; and, therefore, all Mankind must be Bad Christians, and Hereticks, that con­tradict such a Supernaturally-Gifted In­terpreter. What a clutter does he keep with the Word [stetisse?] And, that 'tis against all Arts and Sciences, and Com­mon Sense too, to say a Thing did not stand before it fell; as we both hold of the [Page 115] Angels, That there was some Terminus à quo, or some kind of State, whence they fell, is certain, and undeniable. The Question is, VVhat this State was? I took him to mean it was to see God; (and so did the Learned Merry-man too;) for, to say they were in Heaven, is the same, in Christian Language, as to say they en­joy'd the Beatifical Vision. Nor do I think any Man living will deny, but that our Saviour's Words, In the House of my Father are many Mansions, (one of which Man­sions he assign here, p. 47. l. 25. as a Ce­lestial Habitation to the Devils, before their Fall,) was meant of the Stations, or De­grees, of Essential Happiness, in the Sight of GOD; for, no Man will deny, but that 'tis there he told his Disciples, he went to prepare a Place for them. Now, since Mr. Le Grand calls the House which our Saviour calls here his Father's, [Heavenly,] what I want to know, is, what he means by this House, if it be not the Heaven of the Blessed Saints, who enjoy GOD. He makes it another thing; and says, that they are thence promoted, and admitted more fully to the Beatifical Vision. What means [promoted, and admitted more fully to see GOD,] but, that they saw him be­fore, tho' not so fully? If so, and, that this was really his Tenet formerly, as I suspected, then my Argument proceeds [Page 116] against it thus: If they saw GOD, they were Happy; If Happy, they had all they could wish; If they had all they could wish, they could wish no more, nor love any Created Good inordinately; nor, conse­quently, Sin, nor be Damn'd: Therefore, they did not absolutely stare; that is, they were not absolutely in Termino, or in Hea­ven. I am half afraid, that, from the Words Mansion, Domicilium, and such like, which they left, he conceits there are certain kinds of Upper-Rooms, and Low­er-Rooms, in Heaven; and, that Lucifer, and his Adherents, dwelt in some of the Lowest; and were there besieg'd, and driven thence by St. Michael and his Angels. Some may think this is too much strain'd, and looks as if I spoke in Jest: But I am very Serious; and, can see no Reason in the World that is Solid, or taken out of the Nature of our Subject, Angels; why he, who assigns to them, [Before and After,] which are the Proper Differences of Time, should not assign to them Local Habita­tions, and Places too: And, I should be much oblig'd to that Man, who would shew me, out of the Nature of the Thing, why Angels, which are Pure Acts, should not have the One, as well as the Other; or, why they should not be Contain'd in, or Commensurate to Place, which is Perma­nent Quantity; as well as their Operations, [Page 117] by being one after another, should be Com­mensurate to Time, which is Successive Quantity; both of them being equally Op­posite, nay, Contradictory to the Nature of Indivisible Beings.

68. To clear this Point, which is much blunder'd by Metaphorical Words, which are Equivocal; First, It is Certain there was some Condition, State, or Terminus à quo, from which they fell. Secondly, That Words which signifie Place, when apply'd to Spirits, are, and can only be meant, of States, or Conditions; that is, of Exalted Knowledge; Ignorance of what they long­ingly wish to know; of Extreamly Torment­ing Griefs, Blissful Joys, or Suspended Hope, which is also very Penal. Thirdly, That Aquinas (Pr. Q. 62. a. 1.) maintains, that Angels were Created by GOD Happy, Beatitudine naturali; or, in that Happiness which they could have by the Force of their Nature, (which is, in some sort, call'd Hap­piness, or Felicity;) in which Sense, Aristo­tle said, that the Utmost Happiness of Man was, to contemplate the Optimum Intelligi­bile, GOD. This Beatitude (says he) Angels have by their Creation, because they cannot acquire it by Discourse, but 'tis given them for the Dignity of their Nature. But there is an­other Beatitude plac'd in the seeing GOD's Essence, which is not within the Limits of Na­ture, but is the End of Nature; which, there­fore, [Page 119] they had not by their Creation.. Be­sides, 'tis probable they had some Grace, and some Gratuitous Knowledge, beyond what their meer Nature gave them; which Grace they resisted. These Gifts made them Candidates for Heaven; in which, the First Act of their Will would have invested them. This was their State, or Condition, from which they fell: This Hope and fair Possibility, and (as it were) Title to Heaven, they lost by their First wicked Choice: And, This, according to this Learned Saint, is all that is meant by the Domicilium, (which so much puz­zles Mr. Le Grand,) which they forfeited by their Deprav'd VVill, and Unhappy Wilfulness.

69. But, does Mr. Le Grand imagine there goes no more to the Interpretation of Scripture, than a hasty Fancy of our own? I know he is resolv'd to like no­thing that comes from me: However, I will acquaint the Readers with my Thoughts, hoping it make some of them more Cha­ritable, than to Censure highly, and Con­demn one another, because they interpret Scripture otherwise than themselves do. I conceive then, that in Passages belong­ing to Faith, Scripture is to be interpret­ed, as Mr. Thorndike (Just VVeights and Measures, p. 37.) also holds, by what the Church, from the Beginning, has receiv'd by [Page 118] their (the Pastors) Hands. In Matters that belong to Natural Subjects, True Sci­ence is the best Means to interpret it; be­cause, VVords (in a Book intended on­ly for Faith and Good Works, and not for Natural Speculation) may be Ambi­guous; but a Demonstration, if truly such, cannot deceive us. Thus, when 'tis said, that GOD made Two Great Lights, the Words would make us think that the Moon is the Greatest, next to the Sun, in the Fir­mament; but the Science of Astronomy corrects that Thought, and assures us, it is the Least within our Ken. Particular­ly, True Science of the Natures of Things enlightens us to know when Words that relate to them are to be taken in a Literal, when in a Metaphorical Sense; but, most especially, when the Speech is of Spiritual Natures; which, if we should understand Literally, it would make us entertain a thousand Frantick Conceits, unworthy GOD Almighty, or Angels either; as every one knows. This determin'd, and that 'tis once known the Words are meant Literally, then Criticism, which acquaints us in what Sense they us'd to be under­stood by those who liv'd about the same Time and Place, will give us great Light. If Metaphorically, then Logick will assist us to know in what Regard, and for what Reason, the Word is transferr'd from one [Page 120] thing to another; and, to gather by the Te­nour or Consequence of the Discourse, the Sense of the whole Passage. Nor is Gram­mar useless in what concerns the Congruity of the Words which compound the Sen­tence and Context. This, and such other Considerations, if Mr. Le Grand would please to lay to heart, he would not im­mediately pronounce, and conclude, that every Interpretation that sutes not with his Fancy, or with the Ideas of Cartesius, (the Agreeableness or Disagreeableness to which seem to be his Rule of Interpreting Scripture,) to be such heinous Sins (as he does, p. 15.) against Moses, St. John, St. Paul, St. Jude, nay, against GOD himself, and (which is an odd Addition) against the Holy Ghost too. (Had I said so, he would have objected, that 'tis a Clear Case I do not hold the Holy Ghost to be GOD.) By which Method, he assumes to himself a Prerogative to make more Decrees of Eaith in a Moment, than all the General Councils, since the Christian Church stood, have made in Sixteen Hundred Years, with all their Disquisitio Magna. But, I doubt, he will find few that will subscribe to his New Symbolum Fidei, or his New Articles of Faith, no better grounded; nor believe (however their Science, according to Malbranche, comes by Divine Revelation) that their New Faith hath such a Supernatural and Sacred Original.

[Page 121] 70. I had forgotten a very smart Con­futation of his, put down largely, p. 125. which is the more Victorious, because my own Words are brought to tell me to my Face, that I eat them. The Point was this: A Syllogism being the most Ex­act of Discourses, out of which some De­terminate Conclusion follows, from the placing of the Terms; hence, in my ME­THOD, B. 3. L. 1. where I treated of the Figure of a Syllogism, which consists in the Placing the Two Extremes with the Mid­dle, so that some Determinate Conclusion might ensue thence, I advanc'd this Pro­position, that therefore the two last Fi­gures were Unnatural, and Illogical. My Reason given there, § §. 10, 11, 12. was, because the Place of the Predicate being that which belongs to Superiour Notions, and the Place of the Subject (as the Word imports) being that which sutes best with Inferiour ones; and, it being Natural, that that which conjoins Two, should be placed in the Middle, between them; it was most Unnatural, that the Middle-Term should be plac'd so as to be Predicated, or Above them both, as 'tis in the Second Figure, where 'tis twice Predicated; or Below them both, as in the Third, where 'tis twice the Sub­ject: whence, the Middle-Term is, in neither of those Figures, in the Middle. Hence, in my §. 15. I advance this far­ther [Page 122] Consequence; [Hence, no Determi­nate Conclusion can follow in either of the last Figures, from the Disposal of the Parts in the Syllogism:] Which I repeat again, and farther explicate, in the next Page; concluding thus, (The Indeterminate Con­clusion follows not from the Artificial Form of the Syllogism, but meerly from the Material Identity of all the Terms; or from this, that their Notions were found in the same Ens.] And, in Conformity to this Do­ctrine, I put Two Propositions only in each of those Figures, (which I did no where else when I came to make Syllogisms,) be­cause no Determinate Conclusion follows thence; as I declare my self, expresly, in the last Line of that Page. By which, any Man of Common Sense may see clear­ly, that the State of the Question is this, Whether any Determinate Conclusion fol­lows in the two last Figures; and this, from the Disposal of the Parts in the Syllo­gism. Whence, (Id. Cart. p. 27.) I chal­leng'd him, and all his Cartesians, (as I do now again,) Ut ostendant, &c. That they would shew, out of the Nature of the Sub­ject we are treating of, (as they ought;) that is, out os the Artificial Frame of a Syllo­gism; which would not be such as it ought to be, (that is, Artificial,) unless all the three Terms had a Determinate Place in it; but, chiefly, out of the Placing of the Middle-Term, [Page 123] and the Laws of Predicating; why One of the Extremes ought, in the Conclu­sion, to be Subject or Predicate, rather than the Other: Or, (which is the same,) why a­ny Determinate Conclusion follows from such a Placing of the Terms. This is the Point truly stated from my Words, over and over repeated: This, then, he is to answer to, and to shew, that out of such a Placing of, the Middle-Term, any Determinate Con­clusion, that is, One of them rather than the Other, does follow. Now, let us see his Answer, and reflect upon his Method.

71. 'Tis found in his Censura, p. 125, 126. Where we may observe, First, That there is not one VVord of either a Determi­nate Conclusion following thence, nor of following out of the Placing the Extremes with the Middle-Term in the Premisses; concerning which only the whole Que­stion proceeds, as I over and over repeat­ed. Whence follows that he has not spoke one VVord to the purpose, in his whole An­swer. 2. He says, Turpiter lapsus est, He has fallen into a filthy Errour. That is to be try'd, and determin'd, by the Solidity of his Answer. In the mean time, if my Position was an Errour, he has never so much as touch'd it, much less confuted it; since, 'tis evident, he has prevaricated from the whole Question. 3. He says, I do calcare Aristotelem, trample upon Aristotle. [Page 124] Poor spiteful Trifler! Cannot I dissent from Aristotle, or any other Author, in a­ny one thing, but I must presently calcare, spernere contemnere, damnare those very Au­thors themselves? Did Cartesius calcare, damnare, spernere, &c. all the former World, when he introduc'd this New Do­ctrine of his, so Different, and, in most things, so Opposite to them all? 4. He says, I do calcare Porphyrium, trample upon Porphyrius; he means, in putting a Sixth Predicable, or Manner of Predicating: And, in case we allow Identical Propositions, without doing which, we must (as Non Ultra has demonstrated) renounce First Principles, it is Evident, that the Predica­ting the VVhole, formally and expresly, of the VVhole, is another Sort or Manner of Predicating, from his Five. Let him know then, once for all, that I am so far from standing Corrected, as to my Luciferian Pride and Arrogancy, notwithstanding his Casvigations, (as he calls them,) that I va­lue not a Pin what either Aristotle, Porphy­rius, or any other Philosopher says, when I see an Evident Reason to the contrary; Since, 'tis only the Goodness of their Rea­sons that gave them all their Credit and Authority. 5. I had alledg'd I had produ­ced no Syllogisms there at all; since a Syllo­gism consists of Three Propositions, where­as, I had manifestly put but Two; because [Page 125] no Determinate Conclusion follow'd; and, I challeng'd him that himself had added a Third. What says he to this? Does not Eye-sight, and my express Words in that place, put this out of all Doubt, or Ca­vil? He reflects on it thus, Quae haec homi­nis Impudentis Confidentia, &c. VVhat a strange Confidence is this of this Impudent Man, whose Mouth can by no other means be stopp'd, but by citing his own VVords in Eng­lish! And, immediately he puts down my very Words, in which are only Two Pro­positions, and not Three; without which last, there can be no Syllogism. His Rail­ing I pass over, and only desire the Read­er to find a Word (if he can) to express fully the Humour of this Mad-man, who strives thus to cut-face Men's Eyes; and puts down my very Words here, which evidently confute himself. 6. He cites my Words in his Censure, p. 126. that the Conclusion may either be This, or the O­ther; and, as far as I can guess, (for I am loath to fix upon him absolutely such a prodigious piece of Nonsense) he thinks that, by these Words, I signifie, some De­terminate Conclusion follows. Can any Man be so weak, as not to know that [Ei­ther the One, or the Other,] means, [Nei­ther the One, nor the other, Determinatery?] I see a thing a far off, and I say, 'Tis either a Man, or a Horse: Do I, in saying so, sig­nifie [Page 126] that it is determinately a Man, or de­terminately a Horse; when as my Words expresly speak Indifferency, or Indetermi­nation, to either? Every Conclusion that is deduc'd, is some One; and, what is One, is Determinate; and, if it be not Determi­nate, or One, 'tis None; for, None signifies No One: Whence, I told him, (Id. Cart. p. 26.) [Consultò abstinui ab ullâ Conclu­sione inferendâ, eò quòd nullam Determina­tam (seu quod tantundem est Nullam) inde deduci aut sequi tum ostendi, tum disertè pro­fessus sum.] What replies he to this, in which the Force of my Answer consists? Not one VVord, nor so much as mentions it; but rambles on, after his own fashion; that is, Concealing all that is to purpose, or else Perverting it; and, then, making a wide Mouth over it, and Railing against it. Lastly, He will needs do Feats, and put the Syllogisms, [clariùs & distinctiùs,] more clearly and distinctly than I did: Which is Ridiculous Bragging, and Nonsense to boot; for, (as Eye sight attests,) I put no no Syllogisms at all; neither Clearly, nor Obscurely; neither Distinctly, nor Confusedly. I know he will still be doing twenty things he should not do, to avoid the doing what he should do. If he will be doing. let him shew that any One or Determinate Conclu­sion follows out of Terms no better pla­ced in the Premisses; and this, from the [Page 127] Disposal of the Parts of the Syllogism; which are my very Words, §. 15. But this he has not done, nor Attempted to do, nor so much as mention'd, or taken Notice of it, tho' it be the only Point; and, therefore, he has done nothing at all but prevaricate, fool and rail, and given no kind of An­swer. To make this clearer; Let the three Terms be A B and C; of which, A is the Majus Extremum; B, the Middle Term; and C, the Minus Extremum. If A be predicated of B, that is, be Above it; and B be predicated of, or Above C; then it follows, à fortieri, out of the very Placing the Terms, that A, being the Supreme Notion, must be above C, or the Predicate in the Conclusion; and, so, a Determinate Conclusion follows, out of the Situation of the Terms: But, if A and C stand on the same Level, and be both of them ei­ther Above B, or both of them Below it; neither has any Title, by virtue of their Place, to be above, or below; that is, to be Predicate, or Subject, in the Conclusion; and, therefore, the Conclusion remains In­determinate, or No One; that is, None. The rest is Empty Vapouring, [turpissimè lapsus est,] and such like stuff; his con­stant Assistant, when he is at a Nonplus. If any one have a Mind to have a List of his Swaggering and Ranting Vapour up­on this Occasion, he may read them in [Page 128] my Ideae Cartesiauae, p. 27, 28. in these mo­dest Terms, deliver'd in his own Words; [Attend, you University men; for, he would be your Master too—This Inventor of this New Logick, or Method to Science—See here his Syllogism— (whereas, Eye-sight tells every Man, I put no Syllogism at all:) —He makes himself Ridiculous—He errs against the most known Rules of Syllogisms—His Judgment, or Opinion, is Foolish—He contemns every Man; nay, he blots out of the Catalogue of Philosophers, and makes a Mocke­ry of the most Noble Sir Kenelm Digby, and Albius: (Which is most openly and ridi­culously False, and Groundless; since the Former never writ any Logick, and the Later maintain'd the same Doctrine in this Particular.) —His Syllogisms (he means, his own; for, I brought none at all) are Er­roneous in more Respects than one—These Rules, not only Sophisters, but almost Fresh-men are well acquainted with—He errs filthi­ly—He is a Cobler, beyond his Slipper—He is an Ass, playing upon a Harp—He be­wrays his own Ignorance—He is, in Logick, more blind than a Mole—He deserves to be hiss'd at—He will be Eternally famous for a Trifler.] Now, would any Man imagin, that this Vapourer is, all this while, so utterly out, that (as has been now shewn) he has not so much as spoke one Syllable to the true Question; which is, Whether [Page 129] a Determinate Conclusion follows in the Second and Third Figures, out of the Placing of the Middle Terms with the Ex­tremes. By the way, observe, Gentlemen, with what meek and humble Spirits these Men are endow'd: They think, there is not the least Shew of Immodesty, or Inci­vility, in their Words; not, tho' they call me Impudent here, for saying what the ve­ry Words they cite shew to the Eye of every Reader. This Errour (forsooth!) was shewn me long ago, by his Friend, and Tutor, Mr. Bisset, after my Book was printed; who, out of his own won­drous Kindness to me, told me, he was sorry I had so strangely mistaken; and, as I am inform'd, he has objected it since, to some of my Friends; as a great Lapse: To rectifie whom, I have been something larger, in case he be not past Rectifying. But, of him, and all that has pass'd be­tween us, more hereafter, as Occasion presents.

72. I cannot omit another Method of Solving my Demonstrations, 'tis so very pleasant. I had demonstrated in my ME­THOD, that all Intrinsecal Differences were nothing but more or less of the Gene­rical Notion; for, if they be Intrinsecal, or keep within the Precincts of that Com­mon Notion; that is, if they be not fetch'd from another Head, (which is, to be Ex­trinsecal,) [Page 130] then, in case they did equally partake the Genus, the One of the Species (they being, both of them, constituted by their Differences) would have in it no­thing particular to it self; or, have nothing in it, but just the same the Other had; and, so, they could not differ Intrinsecally from one another: Whence follows, that the Intrinsecal Differences, by which they formally differ, can be no other but an Un­equal Participation of the Common No­tion; that is, more and less of it. What says he to this Clear Demonstration? Not a Word. 'Tis his Prerogative, never to regard the Argument. He denies my Con­clusion, as he does almost always, quite thorow his whole Answer; and, he never fails of having something or other to say against That: And, to let the Reader see here it cannot stand, he brings no less Ar­tillery than Omnipotence against it: VVhat! (says he,) Is it Impossible, then, for GOD, whose Power he is not VVilling to Obey, (that Unchristian Slander must come in of Course,) to make two Species, or Indivi­duums, that Equally participate their Supe­riour Notion? Is it Impossible for GOD to cause two Things, or Modes, or two Eggs, not to be Essentially unequal, since they all depend on GOD. Now, there is not one Word in my Argument, that relates, in the least, to GOD's Omnipotence, more than there is [Page 131] in any of Euclid's Demonstrations, or any other Argument whatsoever, brought by any other Philosopher: So that, this An­swer is equally applicable to them, as to this of mine. And, is not this a most Formida­ble Method, and, withall, very Expedite, to Answer all the Arguments in the World! viz. If they who alledge them, offer to say they conclude, he tells them, in short, that they deny GOD's Omnipotence, that they are not willing to obey his Power— on which all things depend; and, therefore, are Impious against GOD, if they will not grant, their Argument may, possibly, not Con­clude, or be Good for Nothing! What Man living dares deal with such an Ad­versary, who has Omnipotence, in all Exi­gencies, still at hand, to befriend him? This is their constant Topick; and, tho' he uses it never so oft, it will never be worn thread-bare. Certainly, that Sacred Attribute was never so Prophan'd, as by these Men, who make it perpetually an Excuse for their Ignorance, and a Cloak for their Malice. Cartesius could dare Omni­potence to do his worst, to deceive him, Med. 2. Nunquam (says he) efficiet Deceptor ille summè Potens ut nihil sim, quamdiù me aliquid esse cogitabo; and, yet, is Applaud­ed for it: But others cannot bring a Plain Demonstration, but we are presently bob­bed in the Mouth with denying Omnipotence. [Page 132] But, the Question is not, whether Omnipo­tence can solve it; but, whether Mr. Le Grand can. In the mean time, What An­swer does he himself give to my Argument, which, in short, is this, If the Species do not partake the Generical Notion Unequal­ly, One has nothing in it under that Genus, but what the Other has: If it has nothing in it, as under that Genus, but what the Other has, it does not differ from it, as un­der that Genus: If it do not differ from it under that Genus, then 'tis One and the same with it under that Consideration, and not Two; v. g. Two Yards being Equal under the Notion of Quantity, they do not Dif­fer, that is, they are the Self-same under the Notion of Quantity, precisely: Which is as certain as this Identical, into which it is refunded, viz. A Yard is a Yard. Now, would I give something to be present when Mr. Le Grand puts on his Considering. Cap, and bethinks him what to say to this De­monstration: I expect he will laugh at it, as meer Gibberish; (that we may be sure of,) for, he has a perfect Antipathy against all Connected Discourse; and, if the Con­nexion be Close, he falls into a Paroxysm of Railing; but, if the Evidence of it be dri­ven to Identical Propositions, then his Rea­son falls into a Swoon, and is perfectly En­tranc'd; nor can any thing cure him, or furnish him with any kind of Answer, but [Page 133] to have recourse to the Divine Omnipotence, for Relief; and then he is Enchanted, and Proof against all the Demonstrations in the World; and, will either pretend an Iden­tical Proposition may be False; or tell his Adversary, that GOD's Omnipotence can make his Argument not conclude; and, that he is Unwilling to acknowledge and obey GOD's Power, if he will needs stand to his Argument, Was ever Man so Nonpluss'd, and Baffl'd.

73. Another most remarkable Instance of his Exactness in Solving my Demon­strations, (and 'tis a very Compendious and Admirable one,) shall be, his Skipping over Multitudes of them, very Nimbly, at one Leap. In my Appendix, which confuted his false Pretence of holding Formal Muta­tion, (without which, all Physicks and Metaphysicks are meer Nonsense,) I had shewn how he spoke Contradictions in eve­ry Step he took; v. g. How he made [In­trinsecal] to be [Extrinsecal;] [Substan­tial,] or [Esseutial,] to be the same as [Accidental;] The Producing a new Sub­stance, or Ens, call'd [Generation,] to be meerly [Location,] or [Situation] of ma­ny things orderly together, which belong to another Head, or Predicament; and, consequently, is no Generation. How he makes [Unum, or One,] to be [Non-U­num, or Multa;] that is, Not-One, but [Page 134] Many; and Ens, or Thing, to be Entia, or Things. How he so abus'd the Notions of [Simplex] and [Compositum,] that he made them to be the Same, under the same Notion. How he made Completum, and Incompletum, to be the self-fame. How he confounds the Commonest Notions of A­ctus and Potentia, and destroys both their Natures; which contradicts all Learned, and, even, all Common Discourse. How he makes what is] Divisible,] to be no way Divisible, or, [not-Divisible.] How he puts that to be Physical, (which belongs to a Distinct Science from the Mathema­ticks,) to be Mathematical; that is, Not-Physical. How he makes [meer Matter,] which, as such, is contradistinguish'd to Form, (as the Principle of Potentiality and Indetermination is to that Principle which is Actuating, or Determinative,) to be [In­form'd;] and that too Essentially. How he makes [Suppositions] (on which Carte­sius proceeds) to be [Principles,] and re­lies on them as such; which are not only No Principles, but Contradictorily Opposite to the whole Nature and Essence of Princi­ples. All which, and much more, I ob­jected, and prov'd, against him, (at least, all but this last) by Mediums, fetch'd from Metaphysicks, which are next to Self-evident, and border upon the very First Principles of all; or, on Identical Propositions, to which [Page 135] also I did, by the way, reduce some of them. What Answers he to this large Discourse, consisting of thirty five Pages, which demonstrates how he had stumbl'd into Flat Nonsense, every Step he took? Read, Gentlemen; and admire the pro­found Learning of my Adversary, and his Dexterity in Solving my Arguments. He answers all those Demonstrations (O won­derful!) in less than a Page and a half. But, How? Does he shew they proceed upon Unevident Principles, or False and Unprov'd Suppositions; or, that the Terms I use in my Discourse, are Unconnected? No, no; all these are meer Fooleries with him: This is none of his Methods. How, then, does he Answer them? Why, First, (Censura, p. 128.) he prefaces confidently, (which is no small Part of his Method of Answering,) and says, Expectandum erat, ut Vires suas omnes in eâ (he means his Ap­pendix) confutanda eliceret: It was to be ex­pected he would have exerted his whole Force, in Answering my Appendix. Well! But, does he reply to my Answer, tho' never so negligently and carelesly written? that is to be yet examin'd. Secondly. He proceeds, At proh hominis Ignavi Imperitium! hic, cer­tè, si usquam, nugatur egregiè: Oh, the Un­skilfulness of this Slothful Man! Here, if e­ever, he trifles egregiously. These are, hi­therto, but Bold Sayings. What is his An­swer? [Page 136] Why, he says, that I bring a Physi­cal Discourse to the Ten Predicaments; to Ge­nus and Species; to Ens and Unum, Abstra­ctions, and Logical Trifles. Indeed, in one Page, (235.) where I am stating the Que­stion, I make a small Logical Discourse, to shew under what a precise Considera­tion we speak of our Subject; thus to be­get a Clear and Distinct Conception, what Forms or Modes are Intrinsecal, what Ex­trinsecal: But, my Reader will see, that all my Mediums are either taken from Phy­sicks, or from Metaphysicks. And, 'tis to these Mediums, we would have an An­swer. Does he shew that I deviate from the Nature of the Thing in hand? Do I not hold to the Notions of Ens, Unum, Matter, Form? &c. Alas! he never minds such frivolous Considerations. Thirdly, He says, I tell my Reader, my Peripateti­cal Assertions are not suppos'd gratis, but De­monstrated. Does he go about to prove the Contrary? He not so much as attempts it. To what end, then, does he bring such Stuff? Oh! 'tis a necessary Ingre­dient of his Method, to tell us at large what I say; for, that makes a Shew, as if he were about to confute me; and, when he has done, he lets it all alone, and slides away to another thing; which is his Ge­neral Trick, all over. He is true to one part of his Title, which is, Censura; for, [Page 137] he Censures very Notably: But, he never promis'd he would give a Reason, Why; and, he will not go beyond his Promise, or his Bargain. Fourthly, He says, I would have the Readers believe that the Words [Divisibility, Physical, Matter, &c.] are Abus'd by him. He mistakes; I would not have any Readers of mine believe any Tittle, upon my Word; but, see with the Eye of their own Reason, that my Argu­ments prove what I pretend, to be True. But, were it so; Does he even attempt to shew that my Arguments do not conclude; and, by doing so, to preserve my Readers from the Mischief of Assenting to my Im­pious Doctrine? Methinks, his Charity to his Neighbour should oblige him to En­deavour this, at least: But, he begs their Excuse; he must not run to New and Trou­blesome Methods, and leave his own, which never yet fail'd him, and is, withall, so Easie. By which, every one will see, that his Policy is much greater than his Charity. After this, he surceases his Impugnation of my Arguments; and ends with calling them Cavils, which, he says, he has satis­fy'd formerly; but he neither tells his Read­er, nor can tell him, Time, nor Place, when or where, he thus satisfy'd the Debt he ow'd him; and, therefore, the Obligation remains yet in Force. Then he says, I neglect his Observations, (the worthy Tran­scriptions [Page 138] of his profound Note-Book-Learn­ing,) which may sometimes (if they be Pertinent, and Authentick) be brought a­gainst a Conclusion; but can, with no Sense, be pretended fit to solve Arguments, or shew the Terms Unconnected. Besides, I have laid open, how Insignificant the Way of Observations or Experiments are, (when we are laying Grounds of Philosophy,) at the End of my Preface to my METHOD. He brings up all, with sounding his No­ble Triumph over my Demonstrations, and then concludes it with a little Pedan­tick Foolery, which are great Embelish­ments through his whole Books; and, tells his Reader, like a right Solid Phi­losopher, as he is, that the Mountains Brought forth, and were Deliver'd of a Ri­diculus Mus. Yet, tho' he has, with a won­derful Agility, skipp'd over all those De­monstrations against his Appendix, at once, without either touching or mentioning any one of them; yet, he tells us, for all that, (p. 20.) very briskly, and confidently, Ap­pendicem meam, ab omnibus ejus ictibus sar­tam tectam, tuebor: I will defend my Appen­dix, safe and sound, against all his Assaults. And, in one Sense, he says very true; for, certainly, never did Man, in the World, make such a Defence against so many De­monstrations: One would think that, to avoid them all, and run away from them all, [Page 139] is a strange Way of Defending them all. But, these Cartesian Methods of theirs can do more than Miracle. This Prevarica­tion of his from performing one jot of what he had so largely promis'd, would be enough to make any Writer, but himself, lose his Credit utterly; and so it would his too, but that he is Proof against it, having none to lose: For, he has us'd us to it so often, that none now expects it. By the same Nim­ble Method, he leaps over my whole 4th Indication, without replying one Word to those most Important Objections: See his Censura, p. 36. where he gives them their Quick Dispatch, in Ten Lines, by virtue of the same Method; which deserves to be call'd, The New Cartesian Method of EX­PEDITION.

74. In the self-same Method he answers my Demonstration, (Id. Cart. p. 127, &c.) which prov'd, the Cartesians had no Prin­ciples of Knowing; my Five Demonstra­tions, which shew'd their First Principle of Knowing (consisting in this, That the Soul had a Power to Elicit Ideas out of her self) was Contradictory to the First Princi­ples of our Understanding; and Three more against the Insignificancy of the Occasional Impression upon the Nerve, whence, as they say, those Ideas come to be Elicited; and yet Three more, against the Pretence of Annexing such and such Ideas to such [Page 140] Motions made upon the Nerve, by GOD's meer Will, as they pretended, but never yet prov'd. Now, this Expedite Way of An­swering serves them as well for These, as it did for the Former; and is equally fit to solve all the Demonstrations in the whole World: 'Tis but calling them Trifles, Ca­vils, and Ridiculous Mice; and, immediate­ly, all the Connexion of Terms in them, and all the Consequences deduc'd from them, tho' never so Strict, and Close, will fly quite asunder, and they are all shatter'd into Loose, Incoherent Talk, by the Mira­culous Virtue of this All-answering, All-confuting Method. Yet, he tells his Rea­der, in his Ad Lectorem, that Omnibus Ad­versarii Objectionibus satis abundè factum inveniet; that he will find all the Objections of his Adversary sufficiently and abundantly Answer'd. Whereas, whoever reads my Ideae Cartesianae, will discern, that he has not so much as mention'd the Tenth part of what he ought to have Reply'd to, and Con­futed. He tells him also, that Nihil inta­ctum reliquit, which was not Futile ac Ri­diculum nimis; He has left nothing Untouch­ed, but that which is very Babbling, and Ri­diculous. And, this is another Answer to all my Demonstrations; for, these are the Things he has most carefully, and most exactly left Untouch'd, (tho' he handles Wrangling Trifles very largely:) Or, if, [Page 141] by Accident, he happ'd to Touch them, he first defiles and perverts them, as he thinks fit; and then he musters, and brings up his little Army of his New Methods, to At­tack them.

75. But, What is become of these Ca­tegorical Propositions, all this while, into which I had reduc'd his Loose Ramble, as into the Principles which, I saw, lay at the bottom of his Respective Discourses, and grounded the several parts of them. I had collected them with much Exactness, and referr'd to the Places where it would appear, that they were the Foundations on which he built all his Incoherent and In­artificial Superstructures. I did this, to oblige him to aim his Random-Talk at some Certain and Determinate Mark; and, that, by seeing what he was to prove, he might, at length, be forc'd to bring some Deter­minate Arguments, to make them good. I was so far from Imposing them, that (Id. Cartes. pag. 111, 112.) I left it at his Choice, either to Grant or Deny them: If he Granted them, then he was to main­tain them; If he Deny'd them to be his Sense, then I undertook to shew that he would, by doing so, overthrow all his own Doctrine which was Grounded on them: But, he will not so much as take Notice of any one of them; only, he tells his Read­er, they are Theses Fictitiae, and Fidelitate [Page 142] nullâ collectae: Fictitious Positions, and Un­faithfully Collected. If so, I had given him the greatest Advantage against me, he could ever hope to gain. However, if none of his, and, that therefore he could not Grant them, he might have Deny'd them: But he fore-saw the Consequence, and, that I could easily fix them upon him; and, that those Positions he had made use of for his Principles, were such Shameful Nonsense, that nothing could be more Opprobrious to him, than to be Convicted to have built all his Doctrine upon such Chimerical Grounds. He fore-saw too, that these scurvy Categorical Pro­positions use to have some kind of Coherence in them, and so might hap to bring our Dispute into that abominable Way of Con­nexion; and, thence, might oblige him to bring Arguments to prove them; which would require much more Trouble, and Pains, than meer Saying would do; and, withall, would put him quite out of all his Friendly Methods, which had supported him hitherto, and were still his only Re­fuge: And, therefore, he very fairly and and prudently let them all alone; only, he tells us they are Fictitious, and Unfaith­fully Collected; and there's an end of them. For, he thinks, Good Man! that what­ever he Says, is Prov'd, as if he though he could Create and Uncreate Arguments, [Page 143] (and Answers too,) with only saying they were Naught. And, 'tis Unconscionable to expect more from a Man, who has no more to give us.

76. In the next Rank of his New Me­thods, march his Follies; and, first, for Dignity sake, come forward his Learned Ones, as those that should aim at having some Speculative Truth in them; viz. Pag. 74. he puts upon me to hold, that Creation is Essential to God; a Tenet I ever abhorr'd, and have laid Grounds to confute such a Senseless Opinion in my METHOD, B. 1. L. 7. §. 12. And, for what Reason does he impose it upon me, to hold such an Impious Tenet? Because I say there are no Different Points in Eterni­ty, or before the World was made; by the Distances from which, we may frame to our selves any Notion of Sooner, or Later; alledging, that these were Differences of Time, which could not be, till Time it self was; nor could Time be, till the World was. Which Thesis has no more Connexion with Creation's being Essential to GOD, than the Tenet of the Extension of Body is to the First Chapter in Genesis; or, that of the Four Elements is to Algebra. Whence, all his Discourse, pag. 77. by which he would seem to oppose me, is wrong level­led. Again; Since all Common Notions have their Original from our observing [Page 144] many Individuals agreeing in the same Nature; which, when All agree in it, we call it a Summum Genus; if very many only, then a Species; and so we descend to Infe­riour Kinds, or Species; which Species are Intrinsecally Constituted by partaking Un­equally the Superiour, or Common No­tion; as I have Demonstrated, and shewn by Instances, in my METHOD, B. 1. L. 3. to §. 11. Again; Since it is not e­very Indeterminate, or very small Degree of magis and minus, or of Unequal Partici­pation of the Genus, which constitutes or makes divers sorts of Mankind, or de­nominates it to be another Kind; but, the Distance between them must be Conspi­cuous, and very Notorious; and, under the Species of Man, there are found great Multitudes that do partake the Notion of Rational, (which is Essential to Man,) both in their Intellectuals, and Morals, and this from their Natural Constitution, or Ge­nius, above others; so that they seem, in a manner, Angelical, in respect of them; and the other, Comparatively, in a man­ner, Brutal. Hence, I advanc'd this Para­dox, That there may be such Degrees of more and less Rational found in Mankind, so that some of them may seem to be another Spe­cies, Sort, or Kind of Men (for those three Words are Equivalent) from the other: Nay, the Nature-taught Vulgar, follow­ing [Page 145] their Genuin Thoughts, use to call them so too: As, when they say, [He is another Kind of Man than you imagine;] meaning thereby, more Rational, or (which is the same) a Man of better Judgment, or more Vertuous. What does Mr. Le Grand? Instead of Confuting my Princi­ple, or Examining my Reason, he falls to to talk of Lunar-men, or Men in the Moon, and the other Stars; and tells me, lest (as he says) I should be ignorant of it, (How infinitely am I bound to him for Enlight­ning me!) what Authors have thought there were Men there. Then he talks al­so of Planetary-men, and tells us fine things of them too. Which done, he says, If I am too dull to understand these Astronomical Observations, (that is, which he had not made himself, but pick'd them out of Books, which he thinks to be a Work of Great Learning,) he desires I would shew my self a Divine, and answer to his Question, Whether I hold that there are any Pre-Ada­mites, or no? Why, this is pure Bedlam! What have I to do with the Men in the Moon, the Planetary Gentlemen, or the Pre-Adamites? Not a Word to this pur­pose is found in any of my Books. I spoke only of our honest Neighbours here, in our Earth; where there are many, ex ip­sâ naturâ, as Dull as Beetles; and, natural­ly, as Immoral as Brutes: Others, vel ex [Page 146] ipsa Origine, (that is, Essentially,) of a high pitch of Knowledge, and inclin'd to Vertue; and both naturally dispos'd to see Truth clearly, and to pursue it in their Practice sincerely: Whereas, Others can scarce see [...]s far as their Nose; and have such weak Eyes, that they are blear'd, and be dark­en'd, if any Evident or Connected Truth is propos'd to them; which is the great­est Depravation of Rational Nature, (as far as 'tis Intellectual,) that can be ima­gin'd, in regard all Truth consists in Con­nexion of our Notions: Which Men do therefore seem to be another Species, or (as we say) another Kind of Men, as to their Rationality, than Others are. You will say, These are only divers Qualities in those Men, which do not infer divers Spe­cies. I reply, That, if they do concern their very Power of Reasoning, or their Rationality, which is their Essence; and, that they have this from their Primordial Constitution, in the very Instant they are made Individually such; (which is always Essential, because it distinguishes them from other Individuals.) Also, if Nobilitas Ani­marum sequitur ex Nobilitate Corporum; The Nobility (or Excellency) of Souls follows out of the Nobility (or Excellency) of the Body, (as St. Thomas of Aquin says, Prim. Q. 83. q. 7.) then this Difference between such two Men is not only a Diversity in some [Page 147] Quality, but Essential; and, therefore, in case there be many of each Sort, and so vi­sibly Different, that we can abstract a Notion from those of each Sort, which is Common to all those under it, 'twill be a Sub-Species, or an Inferiour Kind of Man. But, could he have more discover'd his own Igno­rance, than to call the Knowledge of Men in the Moon, and Planetary-Men, Astrono­mical Observations? What Astronomy treats of, is, the Motion of Celestial Bodies, their Bigness, Distance, the Times of their Appearances, their Influences, and the Respects they have to one another: But, that any Astronomer did ever observe, (as he says,) Men in the Moon, or in the other Planets, I confess my self too Dull to con­ceive, or to apprehend; nor, how any Man, not better-half Craz'd, could ima­gine they should.

77. Well, But the Question is, Whe­ther there can be abstracted a Common Notion of a very notable Rationality from some Sort, or Kind of Men, which agrees to all them, and does not to another Sort, which are not, by their very Intrinsecal or Essential Constitution, near so Rational! If so, is not this all that is requisite to make a Sub-species? This being so, What says Mr. Le Grand to the Reason of it? Not a Word. Yet, he is never out, in his Way: For, as in the Preface to his former Book, [Page 148] he did, upon this Occasion, instead of re­plying to the Argument, give us a most Learned Discourse of all sorts of Dogs; of Generous Dogs, Clownish Dogs, Degenerate Dogs, Hunting Dogs, Hawking Dogs; which he says, (contrary to the Notion of all Mankind,) that they differ only in some Qualities, and not in Kind; So, he tells us here, of Lunar Men, Planetary Men, and Men before Adam. For which he had two Reasons; One is, to talk something, lest Men should think he is Nonplus'd, tho' it be not one tittle to the purpose, or, in the least concerns my Argument. The other is, Because he had laid up in Laven­der those Pretty Collections in his Note-Book; and it was a thousand pities the World should die in Ignorance of them, or himself lose the Credit due to the great Sweat of his Brain, and most profound Learning, in Reading and Transcribing them.

78. But, this premis'd, Who can do less than admire at Mr. Le Grand's Assertion, p. 130? Three Propositions were exibit­ed to two Sorbon Doctors; and so pervert­ed, and untowardly propos'd, that they seem'd plainly to say, that we must see the Connexion of Terms in those Propositions which express'd the Articles of Christian Faith; that is, that we must see the very Mysteries themselves Demonstrated, ere [Page 149] we ought to believe them; and, in this Sense they condemn'd them, as they clear­ly signify'd in their Censure. Now comes Mr. Le Grand, and tells us, p. 130. Error ab Authore isto dicitur quicquid non exhibuit damnata illa olim Parisiis Terminorum Con­nexio: J. S. calls every thing an Errour, what­ever that Connexion of Terms condemn'd for­merly at Paris, does not exhibit. Is not this Pleasant? They condemn'd not the Con­nexion of Terms, even in the Mysteries; for, then they must condemn the Truth of all the Mysteries of Christian Faith: What they condemn'd, was, most expresly, the Necessity of our seeing this Connexion of the Terms in the Mysteries themselves, ere we ought to believe them; for, this ex­cludes, or evacuates, the Divine Authority, in which only, and by relying on which, we see such Propositions to be True, or, their Terms to be Connected. Again; Does he think there is no Connexion of Terms in other things, but only in these? Does not all the Truth in all the Sciences in the World; nay, all the Truth, even, in all our Discourses, consist in this, that the Terms of the Propositions do cohere in Sense, or are Connected? Does he think that I account all these to be Er­rours? Which if I do, I must deny all my own Arguments, and all my Thoughts, which are True. No, no; that's not the [Page 150] Business. This would be a most prodigious piece of Ignorance. But, his cruel Feud against All Connexion, and, particularly, that in my Demonstrations, is so Deadly, and Implacable, that he would persuade the Reader that those Sorbon Doctors did con­demn All Connexion of Terms whatsoever; nay, the very Way of Discoursing Connect­edly; that is, all the Deduced Truths, writ by all Scientifical Men in the whole World. This, I must confess, would be (tho' Shameful to them, yet) of vast Ad­vantage to himself; for, then he need not stand Solving my Demonstrations, for, in that Case, they would be solv'd to his hand; or rather, they were never Ty'd, Knit, or Connected. And, it would be a Second Advantage to him, that, in that happy Case, his Fancy might ramble at random, without any Control, or without being fet­ter'd and shackl'd by this cruel Tyrant Con­nexion, and by the severe Laws of Logick; which improve, and, by virtue of First Principles, shew this Connexion to be real­ly such, and reducible to Self-Evidence. By which we see the Reason why his Friend Merry-man and himself are so uneasie, and Piqu't at my METHOD to Science, which advances and builds all along upon this Enemy to all these Cartesian Methods, this most abominable Proud and Arrogant U­surper over his Ideas, CONNEXION.

[Page 151] 79. It were endless to reckon up all his Loarned Follies of this kind. My Notes, which gather all his Performances into se­veral Heads, reckon them to be about two and forty: All which spring from his Ab­horrence of Connexion; which neithe permits him (or rather, render it Impos­sible for him) to bring any Arguments of his own, or to Answer mine. Whereas, I am so Arrogant, and Proud, that I am [...]o heartily contented, unless I see Self-evidens Connexion of the Terms in my Principles, and the Terms of my Conclusion to be Connected, because the Two Extremes are clearly Connected with the Middle Term, or Medium, in the Premisses. And, now we see too what is the Reason why he does still slide over the Premisses, and ne­ver looks my Argument in the Face, but comes cowardly behind it; and first denies, and then (after his fashion, or by some of his aukward Methods) sets upon their Rear, my Conclusions.

80. After his Learned Follies, march, in a long Row, his Plain Fooleries: Tho' Those may not seem worthy to be rank'd among his New Methods, yet we are mis­taken; for, they serve to set off the others, and to stop Gaps when his Reason is at a Loss: And, first, come his Profound Cri­ticisms. For example, p. 68. he takes much pains to tell us what [...], or Im­possible, [Page 152] means; and spends above a whole Page in declaring at large no less than Four several Senses, in which Lawyers take that Word. As if Philosophers could not understand the Meaning of the Words themselves Use, without having recourse to Lawyers. However, this helps to shew he is an Universal Scholar, and informs the Reader, he has peep'd into Law-Books too; at least, into their Indexes; and, that he has glean'd thence some few Notes, to enrich his Common-place-book; to do which, he thinks a high Point of Know­ledge. Which puts me in mind of the Saying of a certain Poet, concerning such Collectors:

81. The next shall be that of sentire; and of Hearing also, both in primo gradu, and secundo gradu: The Summ of which is, that the Word is Equivocal; which is no wonder, most Words being such: By which Method, he might make Refle­xions on ten Parts of twelve of the whole Dictionary. Now, in our Way of Do­ctrine, how easily are all these Speeches reconcil'd? For, Man being One Thing, all his Operations are Corporeo-Spiritual; [Page 153] whence, our Direct Knowledge of Things coming in by our Senses, it is natural to say when we hear, that we know; since both are done at the same time, and by the same Compound Operation. Thus, when we see a thing, we say, we know it; all Mankind, till Cartesius's Time, holding firmly, that we ought to trust our Eye-sight, and the other Senses, when the Power is not disabl'd from perceiving, and the Ob­ject and the Medium are well propos'd, convenient, and well circumstanc'd. He has a worse Criticism upon the Word [Conceptus,] Conception; and this, for two Reasons; One, because we rather Appre­hend, than Comprehend; as if we did not hold our Conceptions to be Inadequate; and, by doing so, declare, that we do ne­ver, by any one Conception, comprehend the whole Thing. The other Reason is, be­cause a Conception in the Womb is, Touch'd and Comprehended by it: Whence, he says, Visio sutes better with our Knowing a Thing, than Conceptio. I wish he would reflect on that Known Maxim, that the Common Use of Words gives them their Signification, whatever their Radix, or Derivation, Grammatically imports; and, that to be Conceiv'd by our Understanding, is the same as to be seen by it: So that Vi­sio and Conceptio fall into the self-same Notion. What a Coil does he keep with [Page 154] his Incoherent Criticism upon Lepidus and Lepor. Now, it signifies, Elegancy of Speech; then, Liberal Arts; then, Tri­fling and Ridiculous Sports; then, Scur­rility. Then he wonders I do not take it for Lepus, a Hare, and make the second Syllable short. And, why so? That he might bring in his Jest of corripuit Fluvium, objected to an old Poet, when he us'd the Word Euphrates so. Certainly, this be­wrays such an Emptiness of Sense, and such a Nitty Pedantick Levity, that it is below Ridiculousness. But, what is all this to me? What is all this to Philosophy? Lastly, What is all this to the Duty in­cumbent on him, and owing to his Read­ers, who desire to see Truth? Does he think it becomes him to trifle away his Time, in running thus a Wooll-gathering after petty School-Boy Criticisms, and hunting after Butter-flies; and let so ma­ny Demonstrations, which, if not solv'd, overthrow all Cartesianism from the very Foundation, lie Unanswer'd, and Untouch'd?

82. The last Criticism of which (omit­ting others) I shall take notice, is found in his Censura, p. 130. which is such a fa­mous one, that it deserves to be a Pattern to all future Generations, and to entitle him King of Criticks. I had us'd the Word [Directus,] as a Particle of the Verb [Di­rigo,] in the plain obvious Sense for [Di­rected;] [Page 155] as we use it, when we say, We direct our Prayers to GOD, or a Letter to a Friend: But, Mr. Le Grand, who is so little acquainted with any kind of Prin­ciples, that he reflects not that the First Principle, that governs the Sense and Mean­ing of all Words, is the Common and Obvious Use of them, which stamps the Significa­tion of them, and makes it Current and Proper, finds strange Mysteries in this or­dinary Word; and, as he formerly fear'd a silly Asterisk, or Star, left casually in the Context, was a Plot of mine, to run him thorow with those five Darts; so, now he ap­prehends I have some Stratagem upon him, for taking [Directus] in that plain Sense: Whereupon, he tells the Reader here, that I am Vir subdolus, a Crafty, or Subtile Man; and have some pernicious Meaning; but, let him alone, he will, in the end, turn it upon my self. Now comes his most No­ble Criticism: First, he brings in the Phrase of Plautus, the Comedian; Abi di­recte; Go your Ways, straight. Thence, he carries it on still farther, I know not how, to [Dierectè;] which Adverb comes not from Dirigo, but from an odd Obsolete Word, [Dierectus,] which his Brother-Criticks will tell him, comes from sub Dio erectus; that is, set up in the open Air, or Gib­beted. Where are we now? for, we are quite got out of the Signification of the Word [Page 156] [Directus,] which signifies [Directed.] But our Critick is not got half way to his Journey's end: For, from [Dierectus,] he carries it on to the Adverb [Dierectà;] which signifies, in English, [With a Mis­chief:] And, [Ito dierectà,] is an old Ex­pression for [Go, and be hang'd.] Having brought it to Dierectus, the next thing he does, is, to bring Dierectus, by the Altera­tion of a Letter, and putting in Another, to [Diarrectus:] whereas, no such Word is to be heard of in our Common Dictio­naries, nor in the Lexicon Latino-Barba­rum: Yet, he had a Learned End in it, we may be sure; and 'tis this; He remem­ber'd there was a Greek Word [ [...],] which signifies [Disruptus;] that is, Burst, or Broken asunder; and, this bringing it to [Diarrectus,] gives him Oc­casion to take a Leap from Italy, into Greece, that he might make the Word [Di­rected,] signifie [Broken in pieces,] as [...] does. Yet, this comes not fully home to his purpose; and, therefore, he makes [Directus,] I know not how, to signifie, amongst Criticks, (he means himself,) [Disrumpi dignus, Worthy to be broken in pie­ces.] And, now the whole Plot is come to Light: For, when once he had, by of­ten scruing the Word, and shifting the Sig­nification of it, from one Country, to an­other, got the plain Word, [Directus,] [Page 157] whither he would have it; that is, to signi­fie, [Worthy to be broken in pieces; [imme­diately he applies his Formidable Engine he had been preparing, and down goes my Preface, and my Epilogue, Directed to such and such; they, all of them, deserve to be broken, or torn in pieces. Then he brings [Broken in pieces,] to Perishing; and, then, my poor self (he says) perishes with them too; and, lastly, by virtue of a Greek Poet's saying, [If I do perish, let the Earth and Fire be mingl'd;] Let (says he) [U­niversus Terrarum Orbis,] the whole World perish too. Who could have imagin'd that such a Dite and Universal Catastrophe should befall the Whole World, from my using the Word Directus, when I expres­sed my self to design, send, intend or dedi­cate my Books, or any piece of them, to such and such Persons. Gentlemen; What can any sober Men think of such a kind of Writer? This is neither Levity, Folly, or Childishness; but, plain Downright. Madness: This is something beyond Prince Butler himself. If any one can think this Censure too harsh, let him but parallel such a Distracted Way of Writing in any other Author extant, who is well in his Wits and, I promise him, I will re-call my Censure. For my part, I can liken such a Rambling Career of Criticism, to nothing but that of a merry Sophister in Cambridge-Schools, [Page 158] who, Jokingly (as the Fashion was then, at some certain times,) would needs prove his Adversary, whose Name was Cooper, to have been Lineally Descended from King Pepin, by the like Gradation of Criti­cisms; alledging, that he was call'd [Coo­per, quasi Hooper; Hooper, quasi Haper; Haper, quasi Naper; Naper, quasi Diaper; Diaper, quasi Napkin; Napkin, quasi Pip­kin; Pipkin, quasi King Pepin. This, I say, is its only Parallel; only, this Youth did not ramble from one Language to another; nor did this, but only when Mirth and Wit were expected: But, that a Grave Man (as he would be thought) should, in a Treatise where Philosophy and Solidity were expected, let so many pretended De­monstrations lie at his Door, demanding, and calling-out to him for an Answer; and spend a considerable part of his Reply so unseasonably, in such Fooleries; and, which is worse, (as appears by his Carriage,) think himself very Learned in Criticism all the while, (which shews he does it se­riously,) makes him not reachable by that Sophister, or by any; but, to be a Phoe­nix, and only Self parallell'd. By this wor­thy Criticism, the Reader will easily see what a rare Interpreter of Scripture this Man would make, with his Acute Art of Criticizing, which can wire-draw quidli­bet è quodlibet.

[Page 159] 83. So far concerning his Criticisms: His other Fooleries, which, I believe, take up the fourth part of his Book, are Innume­rable: The best of them are so ridiculous, that it is a kind of Foolery in me to take notice of them. However, since I am to lay open all the New Cartesian Methods, I am oblig'd to give my Reader some few Instances of them, by which he may guess at the rest. A Friend of his told him, a Terrible Answer was coming out against him: This slight Occasion serves him for an Ironical Expression all over his Book; and, Terribilis Author, Terribile Responsum, Terribiles Falsificationes, Terribile Argumen­tum, comes over and over, I believe, at least, a hundred times, in his Censura: Which I can liken to nothing so well as to some little, apish, wanton School-boy, blowing a Feather up and down in the Air, to make himself Sport. Yet, this does him more Service than all his An­swers. But, give me leave to tell him, that the Way of shewing it not Terrible, is, boldly to come close up to my Demon­strations, and solve them: But, he is so far from shewing any such honest Courage, that whoever reflects how he avoids them all, or over-leaps them, will see, that, tho' my Ideae Cartesianae was not so terrible as to fright him quite out of his Wits, yet, it has put him quite beside them; and, has made [Page 160] him skip aside into twenty Bogs and Quag­mires, and Hiding-holes, to escape meeting with them. Should a Gentleman, Chal­leng'd to the Field, instead of Meeting and Grappling with his Adversary, run about, into all Companies, flouting at him for a Terrible Fighter, a Terrible Hector, a Terrible Swash-buckler; I fear, every Man would conclude, he was really, and indeed, Ter­rible to him, however he call'd him so in Mockery; and, that this Flouting him, with­out giving him the Satisfaction due, and expected, would scarce serve his Honour, or save him from the Imputation of a Coward. Then, every Errour in the Printing is charg'd upon me, as if I knew not how to write true Latin. Upon which, I am told, I break Priscian's Head, am an Ignoramus, and many such Civil Comple­ments. Did I think such Toys worth no­ting, I could requite him with enow of such Observations, in his late Scabrous, and (in some places) Unintelligible Piece. Then comes in Horace, to prove all my Wri­tings are but Ridiculous Mice. Then, Arto­trogus, an Idle Fellow in Plautus, the Mer­ry Comedian, is cited, to prove me Per­jur'd; [Perjuriorem hoc homine, &c. If ever any one saw a more perjur'd Man than this, or more full of Vanity, let him take me to him, and I will be his Bond slave if ever I eat a Sal­lad with him, tho' I were like to starve.] [Page 161] And, to clinch this Undeniable Testimo­ny that I am perjur'd; and, lest the Reader should not believe it was Artotrogus, who thus testity'd this Unchristian Immorality of mine, he assures him of it, by telling him, [Sunt IPSISSIMA Artotrogi verba apud Plautum:] They are the VERY and EX­PRESS VVords of Artotrogus, in Plautus. What an Emphatical Word is that same [IPSISSIMA;] and, how Necessary to be particularly remark'd! Then comes in Canis Aesopicus, the Dog in Aesop, and ad­monishes him, by his Example, not to follow my Shadow: And, he is so heartily ready to follow the Example Aesop's Dog had set him, that he not only not catches at my Shadow, but he lets pass what is most Substantial too, by not replying to any of my Demonstrations. Then, he talks of a Cos Gyratilis, a VVhirling VVhet-stone, to put to my Nose: Which is a Mystical Jeer, taken from some of his Pedantick Observations. Then comes in Miles Gloriosus, and his Machaera quoe gestit fartum facere ex hosti­bus; his Sword that longs to make a Pudding of his Enemy: I beseech the Reader to view the 2d and 3d Pages, and then tell me, if ever he read a Man more vainly proud of big VVords, than this Empty Man is. After that, he brings in his Friend's Pyrgopolyni­ces in campis Gurgustidoniis is ubi Bombomachi­des Cluninstaridysarchides erat Imperator sum­mus, [Page 162] N [...]ptuni filius. What Stuff is this? Can this Man do himself a greater Dispa­ragement, than to tell his Reader how fond he is of such Trash? Yet, to talk idly when he has nothing else to do, is more excusable for an Aery, Light-headed Man; but, to talk at this rate, when he has such serious Business lies upon his Hands, as Vindicating his Cartesian Doctrine from so many Arguments; and, then, instead of Answering any one of them, to stand Cut­ting Capers in the Air, and Vapouring with such High-sounding Bombast, tells every Man he is at a scurvy Loss; and, too plainly detects, how Insignificant he is in any thing belonging to Sense and So­lidity.

84. Yet, upon Second Thoughts, how­ever Mr. Le Grand makes me a Lyar, and Perjur'd; yet, I will be so civil to him, as to declare he has not, for any thing I can say, told one single Lye in any of his Books; perhaps, never since he follow'd Cartesius's Doctrine; no, nor Falsify'd neither. To understand which thorowly, and, that the Reader may see I neither flatter him, nor injure my self, upon whom he has laid so many false Aspersions; I am to give him Information of one main Point of Carte­sius's Doctrine; which is, That (no Cre­dit being to be given to our Senses, but only to the Ideas which the Soul frames in [Page 163] her self) our Judgment is not therefore True, because 'tis conformable to the Things without us; but, the Things are then to be judg'd True, or to be really thus or thus, when they are conformable to our Ideas: Whereas, the Aristotelians say, That we then judge True, when the Things are such as we judge them to be; and, that our Sen­ses, except in some odd Circumstances, do not deceive us. Wherefore, since to Lye, is not barely to say a Falshood; for, a Man may do so very innocently, and yet, since he spoke to the best of his Judgment, be an Innocent and Good Man: but, to Lye, is to go against his own Thoughts, or Judgment: This being so, hence Mr. Le Grand may think, and say, (as he does in his Preface to his Reader,) that I spoke false when I objected that he had said I was in DEUM impius, Impious against GOD; for, his Ideas might inform him so: Whereas, I, neglecting his Way of I­deas, and relying on this Fallacious Sense of mine, Eye-sight, seem'd to read those Words very plain in his former Preface, p. 38. l. 4. Thus he might read in my Books, by the Light of his Ideas, that I deny'd GOD was Primaria Causa, or the First Cause of Motion; whereas, I believing these false Senses of mine do find that I only deny'd he is the Immediate Cause of it; and, that he must therefore be the Pri­mary [Page 164] Cause, because he moves Matter by Second Causes, the Angels. Thus my Ears in­forming my Common Reason, of the Lan­guage amongst Charitable and Good Peo­ple, told me, that to call one Asinus ad Lyram, Talpa Caecior, Blasphemus, delirus, facie non satis honesta; and, that I spit at Heaven, and twenty such like Contume­lies, were Virulent Expressions; notwith­standing which, his Ideas might, for all that, tell him that they were (as he calls them here) Modest. So, my Eyes inform me, that I only put two Propositions in that place lately cited, and said expresly, No Determinate Conclusion could follow, out of them, from the Disposal of the Terms in a Syl­logism: But, his Ideas might tell him, I put three Propositions in both places, and, that there are no such Words as those now mention'd, which directly told him the true State of the Question; and, that therefore he had no reason to take notice of them. Lastly, By the same means it may come about, that his Ideas might tell him that I had said those very Words, [Providentia Divina me, ex Aliis omnibus, selegit.] And, the like may be said of all the other Falsifications I had Charg'd on him, and Multitudes of others, which (proceeding only by Instances) I had omit­ted; whereas, these False and Fallacious Eyes of mine told me, there were no such [Page 165] Words in the places he cited for them, but quite contrary. So that, he and I might both of us mean to speak Truth; but, ei­ther my Senses, or his Ideas, might delude, and deceive us: Which we ought to believe, is left to the Reader's Judgment to de­termin. Besides, perhaps, he might think, as is Malbranche's Method, (whom he so zealously defends,) that he saw all these things I object, in the Ideas which he sees in GOD, or fancies that he has a Divine Revelation of it; and therefore, it had been Impious against GOD, not to believe, and do, as he did. Whence results this Co­rollary, That 'tis hard to fix any Ill In­tention upon any High-flown, Seraphick Cartesian, lest we judge rashly of what he thinks he is assur'd of by Divine Inspira­tion.

85. But, leaving him to make out the Certainty of his Ideas, and passing over his most Useful New Method of Saying any thing, tho' never so Extravagant, and Incre­dible, provided it but tends to Disgrace or Jeer his Adversary; now comes their Last Method of Arguing and Answering, which flies a higher pitch, and aims at Blemish­ing all my Endeavours, by an Objection, which, tho' it be an Extrinsecal one, and taken from the Authority of Learned Men, of great Repute, (as the Sorbonists are;) yet, he is well aware it will do greater [Page 166] Execution, than any Intrinsecal Arguments they can hope to bring against me. Their Design (as their Managery of this Con­test shews) is not to instruct the Reader, or Confute me; but, meerly to Despite, and Disgrace me: And, a Censure of my Doctrine by the Sorbon-Doctors, especial­ly, back'd with Authority of the Chief Ec­clesiastical Governors in that place, will, (as they hope) lay such a Load upon a Single Man's Credit, that it must necessa­rily sink under it. And, tho' the pretend­ed Censure were in a Matter quite different from that of Cartesianism, (which was at first, and still ought to have been, the on­ly Question,) and therefore, is nothing at all to the Right purpose; it is, for all that, very much to their purpose; which is, to defame me; which blessed Project at­chiev'd, they hope, by this Means, to raise such a Hubbub, and Noise, that the Quiet Force of my Intrinsecal Arguments will never be heard, or regarded; but, put to Silence, and Shame, by their Clamorous Out-cry. Besides; They judg'd, nothing could make their Calumny more Authen­tick, than to relate it confidently, as Plain Matter of Fact; and, to represent it as such a Matter of Fact, as already transiit in rem judicatam: Nor are they much concern'd whether it be True, or False; that is Indif­ferent to such Resolute Men; so long as it [Page 167] serves a turn to beat down my Credit, all is as well as may be. He tells the Read­er then, pag. 7. that I did audacter asserere tam Fidem quàm Scientiam non nisi per hoc Principium, (viz. Terminorum Connexio­nem,) acquiri posse. Also, (ibid.) Autho­ritate publicâ duas Propositiones, (which he names there,) anathematizare adactus est, neanon subscribere Censurae diconti; Illas in sensu Catholico non posse explicari; that is, that I boldly affirm'd, that neither Faith nor Science could be attain'd, but by this Princi­ple, viz. Seeing the Connexion of the Terms, or seeing Faith, or, at least, the Way to it, Demonstrated: The First of which ex­cludes All; the Later, Almost all the Chri­stians in the World, from the Means to Salvation. Also, That I was fore'd, by Pub­lick Authority, to Anathematize two Proposi­tions of mine; and also, to subscribe to the Censure, That they could not be explicated in a Catholick Sense. The Sum of which is, that the Sorbon-Doctors Censur'd some Do­ctrines of mine; and Publick Authority for­ced me to retract, or (as his hot Phrase runs) to Anathematize them, and subscribe to the Censure that said, they could not be ex­plicated in a Catholick Sense. And, pag. 8. he adds farther, That it is Printed, or Re­corded, for Eternity, by an Egregious Author, in a Verissima Historia; (meaning Lominus his Libel:) And, Lastly, That this puts [Page 168] me into a Panick Fear of the Roman Inqui­sition. And, hence, he tells his Reader, p. 11. that I am abundè satis notus; he means, abominably well known, both in France, Germany, Italy, nay, to the Pope himself; which, if not True, is a Lye at large as all England, Scotland, France and Ireland. What will become of poor me! Or, where shall I hide my Head! I am, it seems, like Old Cain, Vagus & Profugus in ter­râ: Mr. Le Grand has, for my Sins against Cartesius, Excommunicated me, and all-to-be Heretick'd me, here in England: And, his Lashing Friend (according to his Obliging Temper) says, my Book against the Cartesians deserves to be burnt by the Hand of the Hang-man. So that here is no staying for me here, after such a Disgrace: And, it will be hard to find any other Country, where I can hope for Shelter; or, where my Crying Sins will not pursue, and proclaim me. And, which is worse, should I be put to death, or burnt, as such a complicated Lump of all Here­sies deserves, I must never hope for the Honour of a Christian Burial: And, what a lamentable Case am 1 in then?

86. But, to be serious: If what Mr. Le Grand says, in this Long-winded Calum­ny, be True, I am Eternally Disgrac'd: But, if I manifest, by Undeniable Testi­mony, that all this Rabble of Matters of [Page 169] Fact he charges upon me be an Arrant Fals­hood, and Calumny; and, that I make it appear, that not one tittle of my Doctrine was ever Condemn'd by any Sorbon Do­ctor; and, that I never retracted one tittle of it, nor was forc'd by Publick Authority to do so, much less to Anathematize it. Also, if I prove here, that I never held, nor said, (what he here, in express Terms, imposes upon me, viz. [Tam Fidem quàm Scientiam non nisi per Terminorum Connexio­nem acquiri posse;] but ever held the con­trary Doctrine, both as to that Proposi­tion, as also to the Ill Sense put by Tricks upon some Words taken out of my Books, which Ill and Falsly-impos'd Sense was the only Sense that was Condemn'd; then Mr. Le Grand must consult with his own Conscience, whether he has not incurr'd the Penalty of Excommunication, for Pub­lishing in Print such notoriously False Slan­ders against his Fellow-Christian; or, by what Case he will excuse, or how he will acquit himself, when it comes to be prov'd upon him, that by his thus Ca­lumniating his Neighbour so grievously, falsly and openly, he has render'd himself thus Criminal, and Obnoxious: Especial­ly, when the Circumstances that highly ag­gravate this Crime of his, shall come to be charg'd upon him.

[Page 170] 87. To understand more fully how this Business pass'd, we are to premise, that nothing is easier than to extract Words out of any Book, writ by a Christian; and then disguizing them, (by concealing the Scope and Tendency of the whole Book, the State of the Question, and the Immediate Antecedents and Consequents in those very places,) to make those Words, thus Extract­ed, and Exhibited, to speak perfect Here­sie, or worse. Take an Example: If, out of that Verse in the Psalmist, [The Fool hath said in his Heart, There is no GOD,] any one should extract those Words, [There is no GOD,] and propose them in a Paper, thus singl'd out, to any Learned Man, for his Judgment, not telling him they were found in a Book, where the Con­comitant Words, or the Circumstances, might, perhaps, give them quite another Sense; but, that it was in Theses, where every single Proposition stands alone, un­assisted by its Fellows, as to the declaring its Sense: Would any Christian, thus sur­priz'd, stick to declare, that such a Pro­position was flat Atheism, and could not be explicated in a Christian Sense? This was my very Case. A certain Great Ecclesia­stick, who was of good Parts, but (as we are not all of us of the same Temper) of a High Spirit, Turbulent, (for which Reason, 'tis thought, he had been dismiss'd [Page 171] out of his Order,) and, withall, a Great Pretender to Policy, hapt to be at Paris, when I was also there. He pretended great Friendship to me, and extoll'd my Books highly; (as another Gentleman, now my greatest Adversary, has also done formerly,) and this in Print. But, it un­fortunately happen'd, that a certain Great Person, on whose Esteem he had set a high Value, did, very imprudently, to his Face, prefer my Writings before his; with some Undeserv'd Aggravations of the One, and Reflexions on the Other. This, tho' with­out my being Accessary, in the least, to that Affront, quite Alienated his Friend­ship from me; and, he would needs make all those Books of mine, tho' of late so highly prais'd by himself, to be Heretical. At which time, some certain Gentlemen, who love to fish in Troubl'd Waters, and were not over-friendly to me, (one of whom, as I am told, had a Hand in Pen­ning Merry-man's Libel,) struck in with him; knowing, that a more fitting In­strument to make Bustles could hardly be found. To carry on this Project then, Three Propositions were pick'd out of my Books; and so politickly contriv'd, that, partly by stifling the Knowledge that they were in any Book at all, partly by Adding to, and Altering, my Words, they plainly signify'd, that None was to believe, [Page 172] unless they saw the Connexion of Terms, or (which is the same) had a Demonstra­tion, or Science, of the Mysteries of Faith themselves: And, in this Sense, two Sor­bon Doctors, thus cheated, condemn'd them; as my self, had I been thus over-reach'd, should have done; that Sense being both manifestly Heretical, and point-blank con­trary to my constantly avow'd Doctrine; as I shew'd manifestly, out of many signal and most express places, cited in my Vin­diciae. This Censure being, by Stratagem, obtain'd, he flew about the Town, shew­ing the Censure, and amplifying mightily upon my Imaginary Heresies: But, no Sollicitation could obtain of him a Copy of the Censure it self; lest it might come to my hands, and so enable me to defend my self, and detect the Falsity; so, being incapacitated to say any thing in my own Vindication, I never troubl'd my self at that which I could not help. About ten Days after, during which time his Envy took its full Swing, the two very Reve­rend Persons, Dr. Godden, and Mr. Bark­lay, Principal, or President, of the Scotch College, came to my Chamber, and thus, with some Resentment, accosted me: Sir, What do you mean? Are you stupid, that you sit studying here, Unconcern'd, when you are proclaim'd a Heretick all over the Town? I re­ply'd, When I can get the Censure, and know [Page 173] what is Objected, I am sure I can defend my self: In the mean time, 'tis Defence enough to let People know I cannot obtain the Equity of him to know my Fault. They reply'd, Tho' you dis-regard your Credit, we, that are known to be your Friends, resolve to be more careful of ours. So Mr. Barklay, taking Monsieur St. Amour, a Sorbon Doctor, with him, to make his Quality known, went to the Chamber of Monsieur de S. Beuve, the Chief of the Censurers, and thus ac­costed him; Sir, you have condemn'd Three Propositions in the Books of Mr. S. which may make as great Stirs in England, as the Five Propositions have done in France. He, all amaz'd, reply'd, That he had Censur'd no Proposition in any Book, nor could in Pru­dence, or Honesty, unless he had perus'd the Book it self; to be satisfy'd, by comparing it with the Scope of the Discourse, and the ad­joining VVords, what Sense it must clearly and necessarily have. In the Nick comes in my Adversary, with the Censure in his Poc­ket: VVell met, Mr. Barklay, says he; now your great Friend, Mr. S. is condemn'd of He­resie, by this Learned Man. My Lord, re­plies Mr. de St. Beuve, I neither Censur'd his Person, nor any Proposition of his, unless he maintain'd those Propositions thus singl'd out, and exhibited, as you propos'd them in your Paper. Then Mr. Barklay begg'd he might have a Sight of the Censure; which was [Page 174] something unwillingly granted; yet, it could not be deny'd in such a Presence. Having perus'd it; Now, my Lord, says Mr. Barclay, to let you see, I am neither a Heretick, nor a Favourer of them, I will sub­scribe this Censure: More than that, I dare swear, Mr. S. will, at first sight, subscribe it too: For, the Sense here condemn'd, is quite Different from the whole Scope of his Books; which treat only of Demonstrating Praevia ad Fidem, and not at all of Demonstrating the Mysteries, or Points of Faith; nay, 'tis di­rectly Opposite to his Doctrine, to say, they can be Demonstrated. At these Words, Monsieur de St. Beuve grew warmer with him; telling him roundly, Domine, calli­dè & artifieiosè mecum egisti, adeò ut suspicer [...]um hoc ex [...]ivore profectum: You have dealt craftily with me, and with Artifiee; so that I suspect that all this Business springs from Pique. Mr. Barclay astipulated, and told him, Domine, rem acu tetigisti: Sir, you are in the very right on't. Whereupon, my Adversary rising up in a great Heat, with a Face engrain'd in Anger, thunder'd out; Mentiris, Barclaie; mentiris impudentissime. Ego novi quis sis; nempe, Haereticus ipse, & Fautor Haereticorum: Ego tibi has vices re­pendam. You lye, Barclay; you lye most im­pudently. I know what you are; that is, a Heretick, and a Favourer of Hereticks: But, I shall be even with you. The grave Sorbon [Page 175] Doctors were astonish'd at this furious Transport; but, Mr. Barclay being a Man of great Prudence, and never in Passion, Nay, my Lord, says he, I do not love to hear my self abus'd. So he takes a short Leave, and brings away the Original of the Cen­sure with him; while the other, being in a high Passion, had forgot to re-demand it: Yet, he lingerd, unseen, not far off, till he saw my Adversary gone by; and return'd to the Doctor. and told him, he had got the Original of the Censure; desi­ring him to go to the Archbishop of [...] from me, and request of him, that I might keep the Censure, and write my [...]. He was heartily glad it was got from him, promising to go thither immediately, and to do me all the Right I could desire; and, affiaring him, the Censure should never come into his hands again. So my Re­quest was granted, and I set to write my Vindiciae. In the mean time, we sent di­vers to my Adversary; desiring to see the Censure; telling him, they would not be­lieve such a sinister Report concerning me, unless they saw it with their own Eyes. Which put him (loath to say, his Passion had made him lose it) to a great Nonplus how to answer, and gave us much Divertisement. He apply'd to the Archbishop, and complain'd to him, that Mr. Barklay had stole the Censure from him. [Page 176] But his Answer was, That he had order'd I should have it, to make my Defence. Which mortify'd him exceedingly.

88. My Vindiciae, which were now fi­nish'd, being in Latin, and my Books in English, eight Divines of the greatest Qua­lity and Worth, (who understood En­glish,) were deputed to examine the Sin­cerity of my Vindiciae; and all of them, except one, admitted by my Adversary himself; viz. Mr. Thomas Godden, Doctor of Divinity, Ex-President of Lisbo-College, Preacher to Her Majesty, and Treasurer of her Chapel: Mr. Francis Gage, Doctor of the Faculty of Paris, afterwards President of the College of Doway: Mr. Robert Barclay, Principal, or President, of the Scotch Col­lege at Paris: Mr. John Betham, and Mr. Bonaventure Gifford, then Batchelors of Divinity in the Sorbon; afterwards, Pa­risian Doctors; and the latter of them now. Bishop of Madaura: Mr. Edward Cary, and Mr. George Kempe, Canons: And Mr. Ed­ward Lutton, Confessor to the English Re­ligious: Who did, first, each of them a­part; afterwards, met in a Body, or Con­ference, give their Unanimous Attesta­tion, subscrib'd by their Names, in these Words, viz. First, That All the places, out of my Books, alledg'd by me, were faithful­ly turn'd into Latin. Secondly, That From the whole Context and Scope of the Author, [Page 177] in those placos brought by him, to prove that he does not maintain the Sense condemn'd, it is manifest, that he does not require Know­ledge of the Mysteries, in themselves, by Evi­dent Reason; but, professedly maintains, that they are Incomprehensible, and above the reach of Humane Reason. Thirdly, That the Sense assign'd by him, to the three abovesaid Propo­sitions, is Conformable to the Scope and Te­nour of his Discourse in those very places whence they are extracted; and therefore, we judge this to be his True and Genuine Sense. Also, we cannot but confess, that those Omis­sions, and Additions, which were the Reasons why the Propositions seem'd to bear another Sense, were justly charg'd by him.] After this, my Adversary would needs give them some Objections, (which, we may be sure, were the best he could make,) by way of Instruction to their Second Thoughts, how they might make a right Judgment of my Doctrine. They met all again, con­sider'd them maturely, and made a Se­cond Subscription, That they found no­thing in them, which could, in the least, make them judge otherwise than they did witness formerly. This done, the Archbishop of Pa­ris told me, that if I would subscribe to the Censure, he would order the Censurers to make me Satisfaction under their Hands, by declaring, no part of my Doctrine was Censur'd; alledging, that, as they were [Page 178] [...] [Page 179] [...] [Page 176] [...] [Page 177] [...] [Page 178] ready to clear my Credit, so it was but fit­ting I should clear them; and acknow­ledge, those Propositions, as they were exhibited to them, were justly Condemna­ble; as may be seen in my Clypeus Septem­plex, pag. 96. I, at first, begg'd his Par­don; alledging, that my Adversary was of that Humour, that he would thence take Occasion to Vapour, he had made me Retract. Subscribe then, says he, in what Form you will. Hereupon, I gave in my Subscription, in these very Words; Non Doctrinam meam Retractans; sed in ea­dem, utpōtè â Censurâ immuni, atque ab Il­lustrissimo Olivero Plunketto totius Hiber­niae Primate, atque à Superioribus meis ap­probatâ, Persistens, contrariumque ubicunque repertum fuerit condemnans. This done, the Censurers were commanded to make me Satisfaction under their Hands; which they did, in a Formal Instrument, decla­ring, That they did not, vel minimam no­tam inurere, blemish with the least Note, or Censure, either me, or my Books: Adding, That If any should pretend it, they did, from their Hearts, profess, that they made a sini­nister Interpretation of their Censure. And, there was an End of that Politick Jigg; the Issue of which was very Honourable to me, and most Shameful to my Ene­mies.

[Page 179] 89. By this Relation, every Tittle of which I can justifie by sufficient Testimo­ny, and Authentick Records, which I have now in my hands; as also, by my Vindiciae, and Clypeus Septemplex, publish'd immediately after the Contest, where all these Particulars, (and many others,) to my farther Clearing, are printed; which I durst not have publish'd, unless they had been True to a tittle, before the Face of all those Honourable and Learned Persons yet alive, who would have hated me for printing Falshoods of them; and my Chief Adversary himself, and his Com­plices, yet living, who would have desir'd no more, but to have found me tripping in the least part of my Narrative. These Things, I say, being so, Judge, I beseech you, Gentlemen, what a prodigious Fol­ly, as well as Malice, it is in Mr. Le Grand, and his Libeller, to pretend that any one tittle of my Doctrine was Condemn'd by Sorbon Doctors; that I was cited before any Tribunal; that I was forc'd to Ana­thematize any part of my Doctrine, and subscribe to the Censure of it, &c. Where­as, it is manifestly attested, I only sub­scrib'd to my own ever-avow'd Doctrine. Nor was I forc'd: No Tribunal meddl'd with me, or concern'd themselves about me; and, if I would have wav'd my own Satisfaction from the Censurers, none ob­lig'd [Page 180] me to subscribe at all. Lastly, How Base and False a Calumny is it, to say, that by Subscribing, I Retracted; when I ex­presly subscrib'd, as Not-retracting my Do­ctrine; or, that I was forc'd to Anathe­matize it, whenas I subscrib'd it as Persist­ing in it! Nor are any of those Proposi­tions, thus exhibited, and extracted, in reality, mine, (Nam malè dum recitat, in­cipit esse sua,) any more than [Non est Deus,] thus singl'd out, is the Scriptures: I have no Propositions, but in Books; where many Circumstances are found, de­termining the Sense: And, he that pre­tends this, may, by the same Reason, ac­cuse the Scripture of Atheism. How rash a Slander, then, is it in Mr. Le Grand, to lay these things to my Charge! And, how lying a Fellow is his Libelling Assistant, whose Calumnies are so notorious, and some of them so Criminal, that, were he known, he would be liable to lose his Ears.

90. The next Stratagem of our Politi­cians, (for, we expected new ones every Day,) was, to pick out of my Books no less than 37 Propositions, (with the same Honesty, we may be sure, as they did the former,) which they carry'd to the then. Nuncio at Paris, now Cardinal Spada; pretending the same Zeal for Faith, as Mr. Le Grand does; and, as those two Idle [Page 181] Knaves did, who are said to have laid their Heads together, to pen this Libel: And therefore, pressing to have them sent to the highest Tribunal, to be Condemn'd with all speed, because my Heresie (for­sooth!) spread far and near in England, and infected the whole Country. The Nuncio took them; but, being a Man of Wisdom, apply'd to my Lord Abbot Montague the next Morning, to know what strange Heresie this was, which, like a Cancer, spread so fast in England. Who, smiling, acquainted him at large with the Undeserved Feud of my Adver­sary, and my Innocency. The Nuncio sends for me the next Day, receiv'd me very kindly; told me, he understood how I was persecuted by some Adversaries of mine, and deliver'd me their Objections; desiring me to write an Answer, and he would do m the Equity to send up both together. Both which are printed in the Second Part of my Vindiciae. So this Se­cond Plot was defeated; and my Malig­ners came off as shamefully as they did in the former: For, they could never gain the least Advantage upon me, if they did not surprize Great Men with False Preten­ces, and prevent my Answering for my self.

91. But, Envy is a Restless Vice. Their Third Main Plot, (omitting many petty ones,) was, to print a Libel against me, [Page 182] under the Name of Lominus, (which, some say, N. N. and T. W. have Copy'd, and imitated, exactly;) making me guil­ty of near forty Herefies. But, this Book having neither Author, Printer, nor Ap­provet's Name put to it, (which made it highly punishable by the Laws of the Kingdom, if any did spread it,) it was glad to sneak in hugger-mugger: Which concurring Blemishes so disgrac'd it, that none regarded it; For, What Man of Common Sense will believe, that a Wri­ter for Faith, against such a manifold He­retick, should be afraid to own his Name, if his Accusations were not Calumnies? Besides, the Writer of it had counterfeited the Subscriptions against me of two Pari­sian Doctors, by name, of Mr. Peter Nu­gent, and Mr. Thaddaeus ô Brien; who, in their Letters to the Cardinal of Norfolk, (Authentick Copies of which I have in my hands,) complain'd of such Impostures, and requested they might not pass Unpunish­ed. So that, from many Heads, it was con­victed, and held to be a plain Libet. Lastly, I complain'd of it to the Sacra Con­gregatie; laid it open, and confuted it, in my Querimonia to Superiour Powers, and my Antidoti; as it is to be seen in my Cly­peus Septemplex, and the large Preface to my Vindiciae. And, so, the Third Plot of my Adversary, and of the Gentlemen be­hind [Page 183] the Curtain, his Assistants, went out in a Snuff, and lest an ill Scent behind it. And, so much for Mr. Le Grand's Egregius Author, and Verissima Historia, which does Aeternitati pingere (as he says) my Errours. Which none regarded, but those who help'd to pen it; with one of whom Mr. Le Grand and his Friend (as I am inform­ed) have struck a Holy League, to carry on their Sensless and already Baffl'd Slanders and Calumnies against me.

92. But, the Fourth Plot was so finely laid, they hop'd it would be prosperous, and make amends for all; and, that, be­ing so well levell'd, it could not but hit the Mark. They sent up all my Books to Car­dinal Barberin; and, with them, one of my Lord Chancellor Hyde's, writ against Mr. Cressy, (the Title of which they had torn out;) pretending to him, they were all writ by one and the same Author, my self. Their Friends there press'd the Con­demnation of them with such a hurry, as if the whole Church had totter'd if it were not done quickly. To expedite the Bu­siness, they earnestly sollicited him, that only that one Book (viz. Chancellor Hyde's) should be read; and then, to de­termin whether all the Books writ by such a pernicious Author, ought not to be con­demn'd. The Cardinal, without naming me, delivers them to a worthy Divine, [Page 184] who understood English; bidding him Keep the rest, till call'd for, and read only this one; (pointing to that of the Chancellors, which they had signally particulariz'd to him,) and give him an Account of it as speedily as was possible; for, by that one, they could judge of the rest. What Reme­dy now? Would not any Man swear now that all was Cock-sure? But, there is no Policy against God's Providence; which directed thither an English Divine, who had lately come out of England, and at­tended the now Earl of Derwent-water, and his Brother, in their Travels. He being of Acquaintance with this Divine, came to visit him in the very nick of Op­portunity, and finding him very busie in reading that Decretory-Book, went to his Table, and took up some Books that he saw lie there together: Finding, to his Astonishment, they were mine, he ask'd him how they came by all Mr. S's Books? The other told him, he was much mis­taken; and said, they could not be mine; telling him, they had a far other Chara­cter of me; whereas, the Book he was reading, which was (said he) writ by the same Author; could not possibly be writ by a Man of Mr. S's Principles. Mr. Mid­ford (for, that was my Friend's Name) knew the Book, and avow'd it was writ by another Author, whom he nam'd to [Page 185] him. At which, the Roman Divine held held up his Hands with Admiration, at such a Knavish Contrivance. So, they agreed that Mr. Midford should go with him the next Morning, to Cardinal Bar­berin, to inform him what a Cheat was put upon him, to hasten him to judge of all my Books, by the Book of another, who was of another Judgment, and went upon different Principles. This was so Shameful, and Horrid, that, after this, not an Enemy of mine durst appear. Besides my Clypeus Septemplex, and Vindiciae, I had sent divers Apologeticks thither, explaining my Doctrine; which the Roman Divines examining, desir'd Mr. Midford to know of me, if my Occasions would let me come thither, to teach the same Doctrine there, I had printed in England. If I would, they would petition for a good Pension to maintain me. But, I was a greater Lover of my Studies in my Priva­cy, than I was of Courts. However, Mr. Le Grand, and my then Opposers, may see by this, how I am Notus in Gallia, and in Ita­lia. The Malice of my Enemies (as GOD had order'd it) having done me more Kindness, and gain'd me more Honour, than all my Friends could ever have done. All this was writ by Mr. Midford, to my Friends, and my self, then at Paris; di­vers of whom are yet alive, to witness it.

[Page 186] 63. I am heartily sorry to lay open such Fraudulent and Unconscionable Carriages in any Christians much more in those of my own Persuasion it being so perfectly con­trary to Common Honesty, than a Turk would blush at it, and a good Moral Heathen de­test it. But, when my Christian Credit is thus assaulted, I am oblig'd in Conscience to vindicate my self: Nor, can any Man blame me, for doing that Just and Neces­sary Duty to my own Reputation. Per­haps, to revive this Quarrel, which the Chief Church Governors have Exami­ned, Determin'd, and Compos'd, Mr. [...]. Grand exerts himself in this Consure of his, to gratifie the Contrivers of it then, hoping it would oblige them to put them in a Capacity to play a Book-Game. And, for the same Reason, he goes about to gratifie some Protestants too, by ha­zarding his Credit, to do them a Kindness. But, as I believe, the former are too pru­dent to begin Squabbles with one, who meddles not with them; so, I am very confident, the Later have too much Ho­nour and Candour in them, to be offended at a Man who writes for his Conscience; and in such a Cause, as is the Settling Christian Faith upon such Grounds as are Absolutely Certain; which is the Interest of all Christians: And, that they will never be favourable to a Writer, that wrongs [Page 187] the Common Cause, and, consequently, his own Conscience, to please his Passion; much less, to such a Man, who, in his Cen­sura, as appears by the Words, [ut sint,] calls the Protestants In England, INFI­DELS.

94. That the World may know of how different a Temper I was, from that of Mr. Le Grand, (whether Natural to him, or Inspir'd by another, I wave at present,) after his Censura Injustissima came out, not­withstanding his Unoccasion'd Provoca­tions at first, which was the Origin of all his Warmth of Opposition, so little Edi­fying to Sober Christians, or Beneficial to Learned Readers; tho' I saw also, there was a Pound of Gall in that Book, for a Grain of Reason; yet, I did charitably resolve to try if I could calm his Passion, and sweeten his Bitter Humour. To compass this, I put my self upon some great Disadvantages; and blam'd my self as much as I could with any Degree of Truth; that so I might in­vite him, by my Example, to some Civil Acknowledgment of his Peevish Errours, I had resolv'd to pass over all his Unsavou­ly Taunts, his Railing, Falsifications, and Un­true Imputations, under the Name of Mis­takes; nor to take notice of his manifold O­missions; but, to put down barely, and clear­ly, my yet Unanswer'd Arguments; tho' it was tedious to me, without any Occasion, [Page 188] to repeat them. Nay, I fully purpos'd to give his Pretended Answers a fairer Chara­cter than they could deserve; and, while I rectify'd his Errours, to excuse, as well as I could, what was Amiss, or Defective. I had fram'd my Thoughts to pen my Book in a Gay, Familiar Style, to put him in a good Humour. And, in a Word, I was resolv'd to omit nothing that could become a Kind Friend, and a Charitable Christian. Whence, I had begun my Reply on this manner; by which, the Reader may make an Estimate, how Condescending and Obli­ging the Whole had been, had they let it go forward.

[Page 196] 95. I do not believe there is any Man in the World, who reads this Charitable Overture of mine, and considers all the Circumstances, but will both commend, and admire at, such an Unexpected, and Extravagant Condescension, and Modera­tion, on my part. Mr. Le Grand had been the Unprovok'd Aggressor; for, I had not gi­ven him one Unhandsome Word, but only oppos'd some Cartesian Tenets, by way of Argument; when he, in requital of my Civility, fell upon me with the the most Virulent Language that ever was heard gi­ven by (I will not say any Christian, but) even by any one Heathen, to another Tho' my Defence was Smart, yet I confin'd my Resentments, to oppose him only as an In­jurious and Weak Writer; without imita­ting him, by blackening him as Impious against God, or Unsound in Faith; but still excus'd him in such Occasions. He had printed Infamous Slanders against my Books, writ for the Absolute Certainty of Faith; making my Doctrine in them Con­demn'd by Scrbonists, Retracted and Anathe­matiz'd by my self; and, what not? He abetted a Known Libel, as a most True Hi­story; which makes me guilty of Twenty Heresies at least. Lastly, He had given me more Advantages against him, as a Scholar, in his Censura, than even my self could have wish'd. Yet, I was willing to pass by [Page 197] all these Highest Provocations, and lose all these Advantages, and (Unconstrain'd) to make the First Charitable Step to a Friend­ly Accommodation; Requiring only, that he would make some Publick Satisfaction, not for any Reviling Words, or Slanders, against my Particular Person, (all which I was ready to pardon;) but, to wipe off the False Aspersions he had laid upon my Books writ for Faith, which reflected upon the Common Cause of Religion; to do which is the precise Duty of every Good Man: To promise which, notwithstanding, (by the way,) I could never learn he was Willing, or Inclin'd; Nor could I ever get any certain Light what he would do, or how far he would comply on his part. I had now finish'd about a Third Part of this Healing Reply, and had communica­ted this Exordium of it to some Friends of his; who, I dare say, had acquainted him with my Peaceful and Friendly Intentions; when, as if done on purpose to prevent it, out comes Merry-man's LIBEL, contriv'd and fram'd by some Achitophel, (I leave it to the Reader to guess whom,) to render all Reconciliation Impossible; and, Tim'd so, as to be Publish'd just in the Nick, when I was expecting that Half-Sheet, which (as I had requested in my Non UL­TRA) was to decide the whole Controver­sie, by way of PRINCIPLES. This made [Page 198] me see, that my Charity was requited with such a Rude Affront, that all the Malice in the World, put together, could scarce have invented any thing more Rancorous; and, that I was to content my self with my own good Intentions, and prepare for a Vigorous Defence. Which, also, was the reason why (putting a Stop to my Latin Treatise) I became oblig'd to reply in Eng­lish, into which their Slanders were now brought; that so my Answer might be as Universally Read, and Understood, as Order had been taken their Calumnies should be: And, indeed, both Mr. Le Grand, and the Libeller, very Brotherly conspire to slan­der my Doctrine, as Condemn'd; or, which is the Word they do both of them affect, [Damn'd;] Whence, I saw plainly, that this Writing in English was Absolute­ly Necessary, and most proper to spread my Vindication, and make it more taken notice of.

96. I am to expect, that Mr. Le Grand, and his Inspirer, will stoutly deny that they are Accessary to this Libel, or knew of it: 'Tis their Interest, as well as their Credit, to do so. That they did not pen it, I am apt to believe: Nor, is it Pru­dence to charge them positively with their Knowing it, Liking it, or (in their Way) Abetting it; unless I had Positive Testimo­ny for it. But, yet, I must beg the Fa­vour [Page 199] of them, to leave Thought Free: 'Tis best, in such Cases, to give my Reasons, and remit the Decision to the Judgment of Prudent Readers: For, First, I could ne­ver learn, that any one Man in England spoke the least Word against those two Books of mine, till Mr. Le Grand and his Governor did so; and, this Libel visibly abets them, and carries on the same Cause, viz. the Defaming of me: And, 'tis very hard to conceive, that one who assists an­other, should not let him know what Kind­ness he is doing him; or, that the Assisted Person should not contribute to his Power, and help those who were so kindly helping him; or, that a Journey-man should go to work without the Knowledge of his Prin­cipal; especially, when he uses his Tools all the while, as Merry-man does Mr. Le Grand's Censura; out of which, the whole Libel is Extracted. Secondly, I was in­form'd, ere the Libel came out, by a wor­thy Gentleman (Mr. F. H.) that Mr. Le Grand had struck in with a certain Eccle­siastick, who would joyn with him, in op­posing me; which, all things consider'd, especially, their sympathizing in their be­ing, both of them, of a Light, Inconside­rate Genius, and, in their Aversion against me; makes it very Wonderful, and Un­heard of, that Confederates should not com­municate their Designs, or confer their [Page 200] Notes, how to carry on their Common Cause. Thirdly, That Ecclesiastick spoke of, as siding with Mr. Le Grand, is the ve­ry Person who is universally said to be, at least, the Parcel-Author (if not the only one) of that Libel. Now, that a Con­currence in Affections (that is, in Disaffe­ction to the same Person) should not pro­duce a Concurrence in Action, when that Person is upon the Anvil, when they are both striking at him, and when the Resolu­tion to run him down is already evident­ly, Taken by both; let any Man believe that can. Fourthly, 'Tis evident, that they do Mutuas operas tradere, or friendly assist one another. Mr. Le Grand (I fear, in this, made Foot-of-Whelp) hazards his Credit, in defaming my Books, as Con­demn'd; and crying up Lominus's Libel; so, to retrieve the Credit which was lost by a former Defeat: And, the Libeller, by ta­king his Matter out of his Censura, and ec­choing aloud all those Slanders in English, manifestly abets him, and requites his Kindness; and yet, we must believe (to the Forfeiture of Common Sense) that all this lights by Chance, and not by Design, or Agreement. Sure, they think all Men are Fools, but themselves; or else, they Child­ishly imagin, that while they hood-wink themselves, none can see them. Fifthly, The Opposing Cartesius would not bear [Page 201] the weight of an Accusation in the High Court; whereas, the Magnifying Albius, who had given Disgust to them above, would easily, as they hop'd, if well im­prov'd, and manag'd, be made Criminal, if they could but catch me in that Snare: But, it light unluckily to their Project, that (resolving to live quietly with my Neighbours, if I could; and, to carry on Truth, without giving Offence to any) I had not, so much as once, nam'd Mr. White in either of those two Books the Libeller is is so angry at; nor have I any Position there, peculiar to him alone; as I can easi­ly shew, when put to it. Wherefore, it was plotted to bring me, by Stratagem, to name Mr. White, with some handsome Character. To this End, Mr. Le-Grand, in his Railing Preface, p. 39. (by which we may see 'tis an Old Project,) challeng'd me, that I did [eradere Albium-ex albo Phi­losophorum, & in ludibria vertere;] that is, that I did blot Mr. White out of the Roll of Philosophers, and make a Mockery of him: And, I was blam'd by them, as proudly dis-regarding all others, and assuming all to my self. I might have smelt a Design in it, it being such Nonsense, that I should make a Mockery of a Man I had not so much as spoke of: But, I was too Candid, to give easie way to Suspicions. Upon which, hating to be held Guilty of such [Page 202] an Ungentileness, I made mention of him in my following Books, tho' under no other Character, but only that of a Great Philo­sopher, which his worst Enemies cannot refuse him. No sooner had I done so, and that he had drawn me into the Noose, but the Cloak was immediately pull'd off; and, the same Man who had lately seem'd so zealous for the Honour of Albius, presently profess'd himself his greatest Enemy: He sets up, and abets Lominu's Libel, which makes him Guilty of half the Heresies that have pester'd the World, from the Be­ginning of the Church; and, a Mark is set on every Man who has any Esteem for him, as a Scholar: And, I was told by a Right Reverend Bishop, that I had done my self a greater Injury, by speaking well of Albius, than I could imagin; as fore-seeing the Malicious Use they intended to make of this Fraudulent Trappan. All which, laid together, shews the Intimate Corre­spondence between Mr. Le Grand, and the Libeller; and, to think that his Old Friend, who began all this Stir, would not joyn with him in this, and gather a few Twigs to help to lash me, were, to break the Sacred Bond of Friendship between them, and disoblige them both. Add, that Mr. Le Grand, according to his small Politicks, to gratifie his New Friend, picks Quarrels with me, in his behalf, by [Page 203] making me say of Bellarmin, (an Author he much esteems,) Bellarmine, Rationis ex­peris, mentiris. Which, and divers such Passages, are too plain Evidences of their strict Confederacy; and, consequently, that he could not be ignorant of this Prop of his Cause, this Libel. His Hopes were, that the Libeller would bring in divers. Friends of his, to increase the Cry, and assist him with their Interest: But, I will not think them to have so little Charity, or so little Regard to Religion; or, to be so Imprudent, as to oppose a Veteran Wri­ter for Faith, who meddles not with them; against whom they have nothing to say, Justly; and, who has already given good Proof, that, in case he be attack'd Unjust­ly, he is able to defend himself; nay, who is before-hand with them too, should they attempt it.

97. Against all these strong Proofs of their being Conscious of, and (in what they could) Abetting to this Libel, what can they bring for themselves? Oh! they De­ny it: As if, either Affirming, or Denying, were such most Valid Arguments for Per­sons speaking in their own Cause! Or, as if I (who was the Person concern'd) ought, in Prudence, to give any Credit to to the Words of those Men; one of which smil'd in my Face, and pretended great Friendship, when he was doing me all the [Page 204] Mischief he could: The Other so falsifies my Words, and publishes such False and and Scandalous Slanders against my Do­ctrine. Whence, that Objection is Ground­less, which (for want of something else to say) is lately given about, that Things were about Composing, and I, upon Occa­sion unjustly taken at this Libel, flew off; and, so continu'd the Difference, when it might have been heal'd. These Gentle­men are either Ill-inform'd, or very Partial; For, 1. He never offer'd Peace at all: 2. I offer'd it (as a Judicious Friend, meet­ing with my Thoughts, had advis'd me) on these Terms; viz. Heartily to pardon and pass over all his Causless Revilings a­gainst my Particular; only desiring, that the Injury done to the Common Cause should be Repair'd; to which I could ne­ver hear he would yield. Some cry [Pax, Pax; ubi non est Pax.] I had never ob­serv'd the least Ingenuity on their side; and, I had been false to my self, to print my Condescending Treatise, and be laugh­ed at for my Foolish Charity; and, Advan­tages be made of it, against my self. Nay, I ever reply'd, to those Good Men who de­sir'd it of me, that I would do any thing that could be thought reasonable; but, that I much fear'd, all our Charity would be lost, thro' Mr. Le Grand's being ty'd up by this New Engagement, and govern'd [Page 205] by a Man who was an Enemy to all Mo­deration.

98. I expect, Gentlemen, you will complain you have lost your Time in Reading this Treatise; and ask, What Benefit accrues to the Reader, by seeing the Faults of others laid open? But, I must beg your Pardon; and maintain, that this Procedure, tho' most Unpleasant to me, is, notwithstanding, most Benefi­cial to the World. [Virtus est Vitium fu­gare, & Sapientia Prima Stultitià caruisse—] And, these Idle Methods of Railing, Flout­ing, Prevaricating, Bantering, Fooling, Slan­dering, Falsifying and Libelling, (to which Nonplus'd Writers are forc'd to have re­course,) being thus Expos'd; and, by your declaring against them, Disgrac'd; they must either be driven to take the Way of Discoursing Connectedly, or leave of Wri­ting at all. To return then to my Adver­saries: I Request, or (it being my Right) De­mand of them, that they would make choice of some one Principle for the Cartesian Do­ctrine, which they will maintain to be such; or, some one Argument of theirs, which they will undertake to be Demon­strative; or, pitch upon some one Solution of theirs, to any one Argument of mine, where I pretend to Demonstrate; and, that Principle shall be Examin'd, by looking into the Self-Conexion of its Terms, or [Page 206] the Reducibleness of them to Self-Connexion, or Self-Evidence; that Argument shall be try'd by the Necessary Connexion of its Terms, with the Medium; and, lastly, that Solution shall be judg'd of, by putting my Argument home, shewing on what the Connexion of the Two Terms with a Third, was built; and, then, considering upon what Grounds it it is pretended they are Unconnected, the Consequence of it Slack, and the Reason of it Solv'd. And, let him who uses the least Disrespectful Word to his Adversary, be held Nonplus'd, and to deserve no Answer. By this means, in a Reply or two, Truth will be made appear, much precious Time sav'd, all Wrangling avoided, the Rules of Decen­cy and Civility preserv'd Inviolate, and the Controversie decided.

99. Only, this Condition I would re­quest, That if any Principle, Axiom, Po­stulatum, or Argument, be produc'd, which has been solidly Refuted already; that, then, to save Unnecessary Labour, it may be sufficient to relate to it, unless it has been Reply'd to formerly: Which I de­sire, because I have very lately seen and perus'd a Book, written by a Professor of Philosophy in Paris, and Dedicated to the Dean and Faculty of Sorbon; in which, many of the Principal Positions of the Cartesians are solidly Confuted. It bears [Page 207] for Title, [De Existentiâ Dei, & Humanae Mentis Immortalitate, secundum Cartesii & A­ristotelis Doctrinam, Disputatio.] This A­cute and Learned Author is thorowly ver­sed in Cartesius; and has so perfectly di­gested Aristotle; that he seems to have tur­ned him in Succum & Sanguinem. He tells us, Cartesius attempted to Demonstrate these two Points, because he was (I believe, Unjustly) suspected to hold neither of them. He refutes his Definitions of [Cogitatio, Idea, Sustantia, & Mens:] As also, his Notion of [Corpus, Materia, Extensio, Phy­sica, &c.] He shews his Definition of GOD, to be Faulty; and, his Notion of Real Di­stinction, to be Groundless. He sifts all his Seven Postulatums, his Ten Axioms, and all his pretended Demonstrations of those Two most Important Theses; and, shews them to be Shallow, and Spurious. Lastly, In his Second Part, he Domonstrates those main Points, by the Principles of Aristotle. Tho' a School-man, (indeed, the Best of our Modern ones, I have seen,) and, for being such, ought to have some Grains of Allowance granted him; yet, he avoids School-Terms as much as is possible. His Style is Concise, and yet Clear. His Oppositions and Solutions (generally) Forcible, and Full. He lights, frequently, into the same Arguments I do; and, very often falls into my Abominable [Page 208] Sin, (which so mads my two Cartesians,) of telling his Reader, and shewing, that the Cartesian Doctrine is strangely FA­NATICAL. I thought fit to acquaint our Country-men with the Just Character of that Learned Book; than which, I know none more Proper for those of our Universities, after they have pass'd their First Studies; as well for the Excellency of the two Noble Truths it demonstrates, as for giving them great Light to look in­to the Nature of True Demonstration, and and into the Right Understanding of Ari­stotle's Genuin Doctrine; so much mista­ken by most of our Unskilful Modern Commentators.

100. I hear, my Adversaries contend, that (Id. Cart. p. 64.) I deny Annihila­tion to be Possible, even to GOD's Ex­traordinary or Miraculous Power. I an­swer, 1. That I speak there, (§. 43.) not of Annihilation it self, but of a parti­cular Way I was inventing, how it might be done; which Way, whether it holds, or no, I neither know, nor care. 2. I did not seem to deny even This, but upon Supposition that it would put an Attri­bute in GOD, which was unworthy of Him. 3. That, in my whole Discourse there, 'tis most Evident that I only spoke tentativè, not assertivè. I will not re­count how many Authors have held the [Page 209] same, as to this Point, which my self (if truly represented) have done: One will suffice, ad hominem, against my Cartesian Adversaries; viz. Du Hamel; the Best Philosopher of the Cartesian School, tho' he be none of the Fierce, or Furious ones; who, in Tom 5. p. 8. says, Substantiae An­nibilatio aliquid Inconstantiae in ipso rei Con­ditore testari videtur: The Annibilation of a Substance (or Thing) seems to testifie some Inconstancy in the Maker of the Thing, Himself: Which, certainly, is a Dishonour, and Im­perfection; and, cannot be attributed to GOD. The Sense of that Position, as far as concerns the Generality of Christians, who are no Speculators, is, that Crea­tures should not be held, to subsist of themselves; but, to depend entirely, eve­ry Moment, on GOD, for their Being. Now, let us consider how I had exceed­ed all other Writers, in Asserting that Substantial Truth. Others use to say, that the Nature of Creatures is Indifferont to Being, and Not-Being: Whereas, (Me­thod to Science, p. 304.) I maintain, that, [Were there any Inclination in Creatures, rather to One, than the Other, it seems to be, rather to Not-Being, than to Being;] And, that [the Nothingness of Creatures is so radicated in their Natures, and sticks to them, that it inclines them to Not-Being, [Page 210] even while they are.]. Whether this Do­ctrine of mine be more for the Honour of our Great Creator, and for our Con­tinual Dependence on Him; or Mr. Le Grand's, in his Censura, p. 71. who de­nies that Creatures would, out of their own Defectiveness, or Indigent Condition, fall to Nothing, or be Annihilated; and says, that every thing, as far as is of it self, would remain in the same State; let In­different Divines judge. Nay, he says this, in Opposition to me, when I affirm, that all Creatures depend on GOD, for their Continuance in Being. Certain­ly, there needs many Grains of Salt, to make such Doctrine as this sound well to a Christian's Ear: For, this destroys the Doctrine of Suspension's being the Cause of Annihilation; in regard he makes the Creature still, of its own Nature, able to Exist alone, after it is once put to be; which, I am sure, takes away its Conti­nual Dependence on GOD, for its Being; which is both against the Language and Sense of Christianity. Yet, I doubt not, but his Intention is very Orthodox, what­ever his Ideas are.

By this time, Gentlemen, I fear I have over-weary'd you; I am sure I have my [Page 211] self, with Replying, by Snatches, to Un­connected Talk. I hope, my next Present will be more worthy of your Perusal. In the mean time, I am, with all Re­spect,