1. I Give you many Thanks for your kind Visit. Had you known how welcome it was, I am confident you would have accepted my kind Invitation, and have gratify'd my Request that you would repeat it often. But your exceeding Modesty and Civility, did, it seems, fear that might be a Trouble, which, I do heartily assure you, was esteem'd by me as a high Favour. Of which I thought I could give you no better Testimony, than by letting you see that I am not willing that small Scantling of your Conversation you then allow'd me, should be lost. Wherefore, I thought it not amiss to give you a Rehearsal of it, as far as my Memory reaches at such a Di­stance; and withal, my Sentiments of the several Particulars then touch'd upon; what my First Thoughts of them [Page 4] were then, and my Second Thoughts since: Not debarring myself the Liber­ty of adding some farther Reflexions that occurr'd to me, while I was wri­ting this Paper; because the Treating of many Things confusedly, ere any one was concluded, made the Tenour of our Conference Uneven, and Shatter'd▪ For, in Discoursing of Principles, a Slow Pace is the Surest; and, when Wit is too Nimble, it hazards to lame Reason and Iudgment, to keep pace with it.

2. I must confess, Dear Sir, That when I heard you discourse, you did it so ingeniously in the Cartesian Way of Wit, which consists in Explicating and Doubting, and seems to exclude Proving, that I did not see how the Great Cartesius himself could have de­fended his Doctrine better: For, he could not have Doubted more scrupu­lously than you did; nor, I think, have Explicated himself more inge­niously. You guarded his Doctrine so warily, that it was scarce possible to attack it. Tho', that I may not flat­ter you, I cannot say you did this by the Evidence of any Proposition you [Page 5] Advanc'd, but by your Ready Excepti­ons against any thing that Art or Na­ture could oppose; at least, taking them as manag'd by one no better skill'd than I am. Your Cause seem'd to me, as if it had been secur'd in some Ca­stle; made Impregnable, not by means of the Ordinary Methods of Fortifica­tion, us'd in Lawful War; but, (which is against the Old Laws of Arms,) by a kind of Enchantment. Your Bul­warks, Entrenchments and Redoubts lay so cunningly hid in your Way of Ideas, that they were altogether Invi­sible; so that the most quick-sighted Engineer living could not discern them, or take any sure Aim at them: Much less such a Dull Eye as mine; who, tho' I bend my Sight as strong­ly and steadily as I am able, yet I can­not, for my Heart, see what kind of Things those Spiritual Ideas are. And, which leaves me in a helpless Condi­tion as to that Particular, such very Ingenious Cartesians as Mr. Le Grand, who, having por'd so long upon them, should be best acquainted with them, and therefore best qualified to inform me what they are, gives me no Account [Page 6] of them; unless we can think there may be such Things as are made up of Contradictions, and altogether Chimeri­cal. As you may see in the 2d Exa­men of my Ideae Cartesianae Expensae, §§. 26, 27, 28, 29, 30.

3. Now, Sir, This looks like a kind of Rosycrucianism in Philosophy, to build all your Doctrine on Ideas, and yet keep the Secret among your selves, and conceal from us what those same Ideas are. Indeed, our Doctrine, which makes our Notions, Conceptions, or Simple Apprehensions, to be the very Things objectively in our Understanding, seems very Abstruse to those who guide themselves by Fancy, and not by Connexion of Terms; in regard it depends on the Manner of Operating proper to Spiritual Natures; which is above our Common Speculation con­cerning Natural Subjects, and is only reachable by those who are well vers'd in Metaphysicks: Yet, notwithstand­ing, I tell you plainly (Preliminary 2d.) what these Notions are: I explicate them fully, so that none can doubt what I mean by them: Nay, more; I bring there many (at least pretended) [Page 7] Demonstrations, to prove they must be such; none of which Mr. Le Grand (if he do, indeed, differ from me in that Point) has thought fit to solve. This being so, you would very much ob­lige me, if you would help me to the sight of any Cartesian Author, who has so clearly and candidly given us his Thoughts concerning your Ideas; who has fully explain'd their Nature, defin'd them, and attempted to demon­strate they must be such. Which if it be not done, all other Sorts of Phi­losophers in the World have reason to complain that they are very hard­ly dealt with. For your Method calls into Doubt, in a manner, all the Ways of Knowing held by Mankind, till Cartesius's Time: And you would have us renounce all our former Judgments, and accept nothing for Certain, but what appears to us by your Way of IDEAS; and yet you will not give us a Clear and Distinct Knowledge, what your Ideas are, nor demonstrate them to be such as you would have us believe them to be: Without which, perhaps there are no such Things as those Ideas of yours; nor, consequently, is your [Page 8] Way of Philosophy, building all our Science upon such Ideas, any Way at all. But, to return to our Confe­rence.

4. Foreseeing I should not be able to give Satisfaction to your Acute Wit, without beginning from the very Bot­tom-Ground of all Truth, (to do which my own Genius also inclin'd me,) I alledg'd, That it was manifest we could neither speak True nor False, without Affirming, or Denying, (which we use to call Formal Truth;) and therefore, that Truth was no where to be found, but in such Speeches as were Affirmative, or Negative: Which kind of Speeches Logicians call Propo­sitions. Also, That all Truth, if Affir­matively express'd, consists in the Con­nexion of the two main Parts of a Pro­position; which Logicians call, its Terms, or Extremes; and that, for the same reason, if those Terms were Un­connected, the Proposition was False. I flatter'd my self, you would become Convinc'd thus far; the Ground I built on being Unavoidable, my Deductions thence Immediate, and the Consequence Clear and Undeniable. But you were [Page 9] too hard for me in your Doubting Way: For, you gave some small Stop to my Proceeding, by your Dis-like of the Word [Proposition] as savouring of the Way of the Schools. This a little surpriz'd me: For, I conceiv'd, that since Words were only intended to signifie our Meanings, there could be no Reason why the Word should dis­like any, so it was declar'd what was meant by it; which, the Common U­sage of it by Philosophers, for so ma­ny Centuries, had, I thought, suffi­ciently manifested, and warranted. This gave me Occasion to explain my self; and to declare, that I meant no more by the Word [Proposition,] but A Speech that Affirms, or Denies. I ad­ded, That therefore, such Speeches, if Affirmative, (and the same, mutatis mutandis, is to be said of Negative ones,) must consist of something that is Affirm'd, something of which, is Af­firm'd, and some Word which Affirms or expresses the Affirmation. Which three Parts of a Proposition, Logi­cians agree to call Predicate, Subject, and Copula. These plainest. First Ru­diments I was forcd to begin with; [Page 10] not out of any Apprehension you did not know them; but, out of my De­sire you would admit the Words, after such an Explanation of them; fear­ing, otherwise, I should want Lan­guage to discourse with you, in a Subject of this nature.

5. What follow'd immediately, I do not certainly remember; but I think it was, That you excepted a­gainst that whole Artificial Way of Discoursing; and made account there was a more Compendious Method, or Shorter Cut to Science: Which, I con­ceive, was, by Contemplating your Ideas; by which you hop'd to arrive at Truth, by the Clear and Distinct Appearance of it to your Mind. To defend our Method, I alledg'd, That it was the Way of Nature, tho' per­fected by Art; as all our other Na­tural Faculties and Operations are. That all Art, if it be Solid, and not Fantastick, is nothing but a Deeper In­spection into Plain, Honest Nature, made by the Reflexion of our Mind. That such Mental Speeches and Pro­positions, and each Part of them, (as was shewn lately,) were in the Un­derstandings [Page 11] of all Mankind, when they do conceive, or intend to speak any Truth, or Falshood. That all the Discourses about a Syllogism, made by True Logick, (which is nothing but Exact Reflexion upon what passes in every Man's Mind, naturally,) is nothing but the Dissecting an Evident or Conclusive Discourse, made by our Natural Faculty of Reasoning, into all its Parts; the Placing those Parts best, in order to Clearness; and the Shew­ing those Nerves and Wires, (the First Principles of our Understanding,) which are, as it were, th [...] Main Springs of our Reason, an [...] give Strength and Vigour to such a Dis­course. And the same may be said of a Proposition, both as to its P [...]s, and the Connexion or Identity of its two Terms, (the Subject, and Pr [...]icate,) in which consists its Truth: A [...] which, I hope, I have shewn very par [...]cularly, in the Second and Third Books of my METHOD to SCIENCE. More­over, Because I saw, your Prejudice against our Way was taken from the Insignificant Iargon of some of our School-men, I take leave to add, that, [Page 12] let others talk as superficially of those Matters as they please, and disparage the true Way of Art, by mis-mana­ging it, and making it look Phanta­stick; yet I am not conscious to my self, that I have any thing in my Me­thod, but what is entirely built on the Nature of the Thing in hand; I mean, Notions, Propositions, and Rational Dis­courses, found in the Minds of all Man­kind: Which Way of Building on the Nature of the Subject of which we are speaking, is the only Ground that can give Solidity to any Discourse: At least, I am sure, that, if I have any Argu­ment there, which has any other Foun­tion, I shall renounce it, as swerving from my Method, and my Intention: And I do candidly here declare, that I am oblig'd, either to bring a more Solid Proof for that Point, or I ought not to expect it should be well receiv'd by any Man of Learning. Which be­ing so, I have that good Opinion of your Equity, that you will not there­fore discard a Way which is thus wil­ling to approve it self to be Solid, and to subsist by Arguments built on the Firm Ground of the Nature of the [Page 13] Thing, because some slight Under­standers of it have us'd it triflingly. Nor would you think it reasonable, that the Cartesian Hypothesis should be quite rejected, upon no other Reason, but because you think some late Wri­ters have not done it the Right they ought.

6. In order to your Clear and Di­stinct Perception, which you therefore judg'd to be the Rule or Test of all Truth, because we cannot but Assent to that, as True, which we Clearly and Distinctly see to be so, I make these Preliminary Remarks. 1. That this is the main Hinge of all the Cartesian Hypothesis, which persuades them to place the Ground of Truth within their own Minds, and its Productions; and not in the Things themselves. 2. That this is the most Ingenious and Plausible Conception, which the Great Wit of Cartesius ever advanc'd; and therefore it most deserves Clearing: Which is, indeed, one main Reason why I strain'd Courtesie a little, in publishing this Pa­per. 3. That the Plausibility of it lies chiefly in this, That every Man must grant the Truth of that Proposition, as [Page 14] it lies: For, Who can deny, but that what I see to be True, is True? This being full as Evident, as that I cannot see what is not. This, then, is a plain Truth, and might deserve the Name of a Subordinate Rule; were it Certain, or prov'd first, that we could not pos­sibly be Mistaken in thinking we have a Clear and Distinct Perception of a Thing, when we have it not. Mr. Le Grand confesses, this may happen when the Will is Byass'd, or Men are Un­skilful; (and how frequent is that?) And we shall give many Instances af­terwards, how we are deceiv'd in ma­ny other Occasions. 4. That this Clear and Distinct Perception, the Cartesians so much speak of, and value them­selves upon, tho' the Expression be New, is no more in reality, but Perfect Evi­dence of an Object: For, the seeing any Object Clearly, is the seeing it Evi­dently; nor can we see It evidently, if that Object, or It, be Confounded with others, and not seen to be Distinct from them. Wherefore, this Phrase, of Clear and Distinct Perception is a meer Amuzement; and, being New, makes the Readers apt to conceit that it is a [Page 15] lately-found-out Discovery of some un­heard of Thing, or some New Method, of which all former Philosophers were hi­therto ignorant; whereas, 'tis the self-same with Perfect Evidence of some Par­ticular Object; which all the Learned Part of Mankind have ever us'd, be­fore Cartesius was born; nay, have allow'd, and held also, That no Man could refrain from Assenting that the Thing, or Mental Proposition, is True, when with Perfect Evidence It is seen to be so. Wherefore, this last Point will not, I hope, break Squares be­tween the Cartesians and me; for, thus far we agree in our Meanings; however, I except against the Novel­ty of the Expression, which would seem to intimate something Extraordinary in the Method you pretend to have first found out, and introduced; and which, by your Carriage, you seem to appropriate to your selves, as singu­larly yours. 5. These Things being so, it follows, that the First Rule of our Knowledge of all Truths whatever must be Common to all Knowing Na­tures in the World: It must also be the most Evident that can be, or Self-evident; [Page 16] so that none can disagree, dis­sent, or be Deceiv'd in it, but must See and Assent to it, in despite of any Weakness of the Understanding, or any Byass or Obliquity of the Will; as we shall see hereafter our Rule is, and must be. And the Reason is, be­cause this Rule being that, by means of which, a Creature made for Know­ledge is capable of knowing any thing; it follows, that, if it lay in any Man's power to be Ignorant of this Rule, or to dissent from it, or be deceiv'd in it, it would be in his power, not meerly to pervert, but utterly to destroy and unmake the Nature given him by God; and, of Cognoscitive or Capable of Knowledge, make it Uncognoscitive or Incapable of Knowing any thing; which, the Natures of Things being fix'd by God's Wisdom, to be what they are, 'tis as impossible for any Man to do, as it is for him to put off his own Individuality, and not be the same Person he is.

7. These Notes premis'd, I come closer to examine your Rule of Truth. You say, If you Clearly and Distinctly see that a Thing is True, you do thence [Page 17] certainly know it to be so. I allow the Conditional Proposition; for, 'tis Im­possible to see that which is not to be seen; or [...]o know that to be True, which is not-True. The only Que­stion, then, is, Whether this be a Rule of Truth; Mr. Le Grand very rational­ly granting, p. 92. there goes more to constitute a Rule of Truth, than to be True? In order to the Clearing of which, I ask: Was it True before you saw Clearly and Distinctly it was True? Or, Did it become True by your seeing it (as you phrase it) Clearly and Di­stinctly to be True? If it were True before you thus saw it to be True; then, 'tis unavoidable, there was An­other Rule, or Reason, for that Truth which anteceded your Seeing it to be such; and therefore, your Clear and Distinct Perception could not be the Rule of Knowing that Truth, being Subsequent to it. And, if you say, it became True by your Seeing it Clearly and Distinctly, then it was not True before; and then, you saw that to be True, which was not True; that is, you saw it to be otherwise, than, in Effect and Reality, it was. And, con­sequently, [Page 18] that pretended Sight or Per­ception is so far from being A Rule of Truth, that it is a palpable Errour and Mistake; and therefore, all the Judg­ments issuing from it must be False. Which, instead of Constituting it A Rule of Truth, would make it, indeed, A Rule of Falshood.

8. To make this yet plainer, please to reflect, that this Clear and Distinct Perception is such an Act of your Un­derstanding; and that all Acts have their being such, from the Object of those Acts. For, the Faculty or Power of Understanding was, of it self, In­different and Indetermin'd to All and Every Particular Act: And, since no­thing that is Indetermin'd, nor any Act in Common, can Be; it follows, that the Being, and being such, of each Act, depends formally on the Object, and is such in particular, as that Object, which informs the Power, is. Wherefore, when you see a Thing to be True, that which you saw thus Clearly and Di­stinctly True, must have been thus True before you saw it to be so. Whence, we ask, What was that which made the Object you perceiv'd-to-be-true, to [Page 19] be True? Or, What was the Rule of Truth to that Object that was True, ere you saw it to be such? Must not the Object be such, ere you can know it to be such? Or Clearly and Distinctly Perceptible to be such, before you can Clearly and Distinctly Perceive it to be such? If not, then you must say, you can know what is not to be known, or Clearly and Distinctly perceive what is not Clearly and Distinctly to be per­ceiv'd: Which is a perfect Contradi­ction.

9. For Instance; Since Truth is no where to be found, but in such Speeches as Affirm, or Deny, that is, in Propositions; let us put some Propo­sition which you thus Clearly and Di­stinctly perceive to be True, and there­fore (as was lately demonstrated) must have been True before you saw it to be so. Does it not clearly follow, that, Either that Truth must have been made Evident by Another, and that again by Another, and so in infinitum; (by which means, nothing at all could ever be seen to be True;) or else there must have been some First kind of Truths, whose Noon-day Evidence [Page 20] imparts Evidence to others, and is it self Visible, or (if you please) Clear­ly and Distinctly Perceptible to all Mankind; and forces them, at first sight, to Assent to its Verity? Now, if some such First kind of Truths can be found, which, by their Absolute Self-Evidence, do, as Objects of our Understanding Power, necessarily de­termin the Understandings of all Mankind, to Assent; and do withall influence All our other Truths, and our Knowledge of them; then (our Act of Perception being clearly Excluded from being the Rule of Truth) these First Truths have all the Requisites that can be imagin'd for a Ratio cognoscendi Ve­ritatem, or a Rule of Truth; since they self-evidently manifest to us their own Truth; and by it, give us Light to know all others. Let us pursue then the Quest of these First Truths. Our Discourse, because it concerns and antecedes all other Knowledges, and all particular Truths, must necessarily be fetch'd from the Deepest Grounds, and therefore▪ must needs be very Spe­culative. But, I know I speak to him whose Piercing Wit will easily com­prehend [Page 21] it. Only, I beseech you, so far to bend your Byass, which you must needs have contracted by your Long and Steady Meditating on your Way of Ideas, till you reduce any Ob­liquity that may have prepossess'd your good Judgment, to a Rectitude, or In­differency; and then I cannot doubt, but I may do you some Service, even, perhaps, against your Will: For, E­vidence, if Clear, and well penetra­ted, does oft-times force Assent, whe­ther the Will repugns, or no.

10. The Ideas, or Essences, of each Piece of the World's Fabrick were in the Mind of the Divine Architect, ere they were made. Again; Since he did not make them by the Hand of some Bungling Journey-man, who might, perhaps, deviate from his Pat­tern, or Model; but immediately, by his own Infinite Wisdom and Power; it cannot be doubted, but that each Part of the Creation was fram'd ex­actly according to the Archetypes of those Unchangeable Ideas; and there­fore, was perfectly Establish'd in its re­spective Essence, or Nature, as those Original Ideas were; that is, they [Page 12] were fix'd to be what they are, by an Inerrable Hand; in which consists that which we call their Metaphysical Veri­ty. Wherefore, since all Truth, Ori­ginally, Primarily and most Fundamen­tally consists in this Metaphysical Verity of Things, it being the Immediate Ef­fect of the Divine Wisdom; it follows, that the First Formal Truths that can be in our Minds, (which, consequent­ly, are the Rules, or Principles, to all others,) must be those which speak, express, or Affirm this Metaphysical Ve­rity, or, that the Things are what they are. Which kind of Self-evident Propo­sitions, can therefore, be no other than those we call Identical. This is most Evident, and Incontestable: For, since this Metaphysical Verity, which (next to the Divine Maker of all Things, from whom it immediately proceeded) is the Ground and Cause of all Truth, does consist in this, That Things are Fix'd in their Essences, or are what they are; 'tis Impossible to speak this Truth, or make it a Formal Truth, by affirm­ing, or Denying, (that is, by putting it into a Proposition;) but by Affirm­ing, that they are what they are; which [Page 23] is most evidently an Identical Propo­sition.

11. Hitherto, then, it is undiscern­able, how it can, with any Shew of Reason, be deny'd, that the Self-Evi­dence that so visibly shines in Identical Propositions, bids fair towards their be­ing the First Rule of Knowing all Truths; or, which is the same, the First Principle to all other Know­ledges. For, 1. There cannot be any so great Clearness, or Evidence, as is Self-Evidence; nor so Close Connexion of the Terms in any Proposition, or Speech, that expresses Truth, as is Per­fect Identity, or Self-Connexion; con­sisting in this, That the Thing, or Mode of Thing spoken of, is what it is, or, is its self. 2. 'Tis Impossible any thing else can be so Solid, or so Firmly Establish'd; being immediately built on the Unchangeable Metaphysical Ve­rity it self; or rather, being It, spo­ken, and express'd: Which Verity (as was shewn) is imprinted in the Essen­ces of every Created Thing, by the Immediate Hand of Essential Truth. Whence it is so nearly ally'd to that In­finite Truth it self, that it is remov'd but [Page 24] one Degree from it. 3. By reason of this Connatural and Immediate De­scent from that Brightest and most Glorious Luminary of all Knowledge, the Father of Lights, who is Candor Aeternae Lucis, and Infinitely Intelli­gible; it forces the Assent of all Man­kind to its Verity. Insomuch, that no Disease can so pervert a Rational Be­ing, which has the least Use of Rea­son, as to deny it, or doubt of it; nor suspend their Judgment concerning it: Nor can the highest Passion of the most Profligate Wretch living, hurry his Un­derstanding into the Admittance of such a Folly. No Scepticalness can call the Truth and Certainty of it into Question. No Whimsical Speculation can inveigle any Man into a Conceit, that it can be False. No Opposition can make head against it; since, whatever can be alledg'd to overthrow it, must needs appear to be less Evident than It; and, therefore, Unable to shock it. No subtil Distinction can impair its Truth; or pretend it is True in One Respect, but not in Another; since it is Impos­sible to distinguish the Copula [is;] the Notion of Existence being so per­fectly [Page 25] Simple, and most Formal, or In­divisible, that it can admit of no Di­stinction into Divers Formalities; ac­cording to One of which, it may be True; according to Another, False. Nor can it prejudice any such Propo­sition, to Distinguish its Subject, or Predicate; since whatever Distinction can fall here upon the Subject, must fall upon the Predicate too; both of them being the self-same Notion. By which means, the Identicalness and Self-evidence of the Proposition will be still the same after the Distinction is given, as it was before. So that 'tis Impossible to imagin, that any thing can be pro­pos'd, which can, in any Regard, or in any Degree, vye with Identical Pro­positions; either in being so Solidly Grounded, or so perfectly Clear, Unde­niable, Unmistakable, and plac'd above the reach of any possible Attack. Nor did Cartesius himself, amongst all the Evident Things he call'd into Doubt, in the least Question the Evidence and Truth of such Propositions, formally ex­press'd: Nor could he have done it, without utterly Destroying, at the same time, the Certainty of all he could [Page 26] have said; nay, even of his own First Principle too; as will be seen here­after. From all which Considerations, (any One of which might suffice,) I may Safely and Evidently conclude, that, in point of Evidence of its Truth, and Stability of its Grounds, nothing can be any way comparable to the Light which strikes the Eye of our Understanding, by its steady Rays e­mitted from these Self-evident, or Iden­tical Propositions: Which goes very far to the Entitling These, and These only, to be the Rule of Knowing all Truths, or the First Principles to all Science, in whatever particular Sub­ject; not excepting even Metaphysicks it self.

12. Notwithstanding all that has been so fully evinc'd hitherto, I have, as yet, done but half my Business; or rather, the better half is still left be­hind. For, a First Rule, or First Prin­ciple, requires Another Quality, pecu­liar to it self, to compleat its Notion, besides its being thus Solidly Grounded, and thus Supreamly Evident; which is, That All other Truths, or Knowledges, must be Rul'd, or Principl'd by It: It [Page 27] must have an Universal Influence over all other Knowledges, and impart its Light to them. The former Qualities will, I believe, be granted to Identical Propositions, by every Attentive Consi­derer, who knows what belongs to Logick, or Reason reflecting on it self; and is, withall, but meanly vers'd in Metaphysicks. This later Qualifi­cation will be deny'd by many, per­haps by most; nay, will be fancy'd, and abetted by very Few. For, every one's Genius does not lead him to spe­culate so deep; and there are scarce any who have propos'd this highest and nicest Point, much less handl'd it at large; tho' divers have given the Grounds whence it must follow. The Reason of this General Dis-like of Identical Propositions, is, because they have such a Dry Meen, and Contemptible Aspect; so unlikely to give us the least kind of Instruction, or Light, to know any thing but their own Insig­nificant Selves, that nothing seems more Ridiculous, than for any Man, who is to teach others, even to propose such Insipid Sayings as a Means, much less as a Rule, to gain the Knowledge [Page 28] of any Truth whatever; nor is it Dis­cernable how we can come to know any thing, or work out▪ any new Knowledges, by making use of such Blunt Tools.

I think I have said the worst against them, that the keenest Adversary can alledge. It remains, then, to shew how I can clear them of this Dis­graceful Character; or make out that they have such a General Influ­ence over all other Truths, as is pre­tended.

13. I demand, then, of my Oppo­sers, whether it be not Fundamentally necessary in all Discourses about what­ever Truth, to attend still, and keep an Eye directed to the Nature of the Thing or Subject about which we are Discoursing, and to take special Care we do not deviate from it? I do not think any Scholar living, attending to his Natural Thoughts, or Common Sense, will deny this. For, if any Discourse makes the Thing be other­wise than it is, it must necessarily be False; and expose the Author of it to speak manifest Contradictions. Now, I do no more but this, while I make [Page 29] Self-evident or Identical Propositions to be the First Rules, or First Princi­ples of all other Knowledges: All I do, is, to keep a heedful Eye to the Nature of the Thing, and its Metaphy­sical Verity. Only, because it is ma­nifest to every Reflecter, that all our Discourses are made up of Propositions; nor can a Rule or Principle be express'd, but by such Forms of Speech; nor is the Comparative, or (as I may say) the Compositive Nature of our Soul sa­tisfy'd, till it has brought the Object it would Discourse about, into some Formal Truth, (her only Perfection in this State,) which is express'd by a Proposition: Hence, we become forc'd to put the Nature of the Thing, or its Metaphysical Verity, into such a Frame of Speaking; so to fit it for Discourse: which 'tis Impossible to do, but that Speech, or Proposition, whether we will or no, must be an Identical one.

14. As for their seeming so Ridicu­lous, and Dry, this happens because of their most perfect Simplicity, ha­ving as little Composition in them as is possible; or rather, none at all, but what is in the Form of Expression; I [Page 30] doubt not but your Acute Judgment is well aware, that the first Stamina, in what kind soever, are, and must be, the most Simple; and, therefore, such, that, should Nature stop her Course there, and proceed no farther, they would be the most Insipid, and Useless Things in Nature. And yet, from such Simple Beginnings, or (to use Virgil's Expression) tenues orsus, all the most Perfect Productions in Whole Na­ture have their Rise: Nor could any Work of hers ever arrive at Maturity, or attain to that Admirable Frame it afterwards grows up to, unless it had had at first such a Simple and Shapeless Origin. The same happens in the First Stamina of all our Succeeding Know­ledges: They are so Simple, and have such an Odd, Bald and Unfledg'd Ap­pearance, that we know not what to make of them, when we regard them only in themselves; or, what Use they are of in the Acquisition of Science; yet, without such Simple Beginnings, fore-laid in our Knowing Power, no Distinct Knowledge at all could be had of any other Thing; as will most Clearly appear shortly.

[Page 31] 15. We may observe, that, gene­rally, we are not so Sensible of Goods, as of Harms; because the Former, thro' the Generous Bounty of GOD's Good Providence, are of so many kinds, surrounding us on all sides, that they are Common, and Quotidian; whereas, the Later are Seldom, and (as it were) Casual: Whence, These are Remark­able, and apt to strike our Apprehen­sions smartly, and f [...]rce us to take notice of them; which Those, being Ordina­ry, and Customary, do not. To breed then a due Reflexion, what Good those First Truths now spoken of, laid up in our Minds, do us, we will consider what Universal Mischiefs their proper Opposites, [Contradictions,] would do to all our Knowledge; and what a Malignant Influence they would have, not only to pervert all our Actual Knowledge, but to destroy our very Power of knowing any thing. Let us suppose then, that those two Proposi­tions, [What is, is not;] and [A Thing is not what it is,] which are the proper Contradictories to those Chief Identi­cals, [What is, is;] and, [A Thing is what it is;] to be, both of them, True: [Page 32] Would it be possible, in that Case, to speak a Word of Truth; or, to Dis­course at all; but, instead of speaking consequently, to talk a Hotch-potch of Incoherent Nonsense? For, we can­not Affirm any thing to be True, but by means of the Copula [is,] in whose Connecting or Identifying Sense, all Truth most Formally consists: Wherefore, if that Word, or the Notion it signifies, were Chimerical, and might be the same with [is not,] then, since there can be no Middle between them, all we affirm might be False. And, since the Subject we speak of, must either be some Thing, or some Mode of Thing; all that we speak of that Thing would go to wrack, and be False, in case the Subject of our Discourse, or Speech, were not Distinguish'd from all other Things or Modes; that is, if it were not it self only, but Another, all the while. Since then, the Contradictories to these two Identicals now spoken of, have such an Universal Influence, that they constantly set up Errour, and de­stroy Truth; 'tis manifest, that Identi­cal Propositions (their Contradictory Opposites) do, for the same reason, [Page 33] of their own nature, tend to abet Truth' and destroy Errour; and therefore they are deservedly entitled to be the Rule of Truth; the Influence they have over all Truths being full as Universal, as Contradictions, their Opposites, have, to induce Errour.

16. But nothing can more victo­riously confute, or more unanswerably convince an Adversary, than to shew that he must be forc'd, for his own Interest, to admit the Truth of that Tenet which he opposes. Ask, then, a Cartesian, how he knows any Particu­lar Truths; or (which is the same) how he knows that such Predicates, or Attributes, do belong to such a Subject? He will answer, Because he finds those Predicates in the Idea he has of such a Thing, or such a Na­ture. Very good, replies the other: But, how shall we know that the Idea you have of that Thing is not Chime­rical, and involves in it many other Things, as well as That? Which, if it does, your Discourse, applying it to That Thing only, must needs be Inco­herent, and False. Your only Answer, in this Case, can be This, That each [Page 34] Idea you have is Distinct from all other Ideas, and has its Metaphysical Verity and Unity peculiar to it self, or (which is the same) is its self only; which is an Identical Proposition, and speaks, or expresses the Metaphysical Verity of each Idea you have. Now, say I, hence appears evidently, that this Truth, viz. [Every Idea is it self only, or no other;] which is an Identical Proposition, is the very First Truth you can have; and, that on it depends, Fundamentally, your whole Doctrine by way of Ideas: For, if this be False, 'tis most Evident that your Ideas can give you no Di­stinct Knowledge of any Thing, or Mode of Thing; that is, they could enable you to know Nothing at all.

17. You will say, perhaps, it is not Needful to put, lay or propose so ex­presly those Identicals, they being so very Clear, of themselves, to all Man­kind. I reply, 1. That this comes over to me, as to what relates to their Clearness, and Self-Evidence, and abets my Position. 2. That, certainly, That is most needful, on which, as was now shewn, all depends. You must, then, have those Identicals in your Mind, at [Page 35] least Understood, and Presuppos'd, tho' you express them not. 3. You must be forc'd to express them if you come to discourse rigorously, and reduce your Thesis to the First, and Self-evi­dent Truths; without doing which, (especially, if you hap to encounter with a Sceptick,) nothing can be fi­nally Decided, or Concluded. 4. The Point is, That 'tis most Needful to ex­press them, nay, Unavoidable, when the Question, [Which is the First Truth that can be, which gives Light to all others,] is in Agitation; as is our Case at present: You must be forc'd to con­fess, that the Truth of these Identicals is Antecedent to all the following Knowledges you can have by your Ideas; that, thence, you can know No­thing, unless this be Presuppos'd, and Foreknown; and that, therefore, it in­fluences all your Future and Dependent Knowledges, after its Fashion; and gives and secures to them all the Strength, Distinction and Evidence they have. Whence is clearly inferr'd, that the Self-evident Light which ap­pears in such First Truths, ought to be made, by the Cartesians themselves, the [Page 36] Rule of Knowing whatever other Truths they can pretend to know by their Ideas; that is, the very First Rule of all others; that is, the Only one: For, none can be, in Proper Speech, a Rule, unless it be the First; all others being regulated by that which is the First: So that It, and only It, is the Rule; all the rest, Ruled. And, certainly, it will appear Evident to all Mankind, that what is most Self-evident, as all Identi­cals are, were there nothing else, should be the Rule of Knowing all other Truths which are not so Evident as They. Be pleas'd, Sir, to reflect upon that Pro­position, by which you notifie, or ex­press to us your Rule of Knowing, viz. [That which I clearly and distinctly see to be True, is True.] Consider, how ma­ny Words are in this Proposition; and that each Word has its Proper, or Pe­culiar Idea, each of which Ideas must be Distinct from all other Ideas, that is, each of them must be the same with its self only, (which make so many Identical Propositions;) or else, none of those Ideas can be possibly able to do you any Service. So that, 'tis ma­nifest, your Rule of Knowing depends [Page 37] on the Self-evident Light suppos'd to be in ours. Whence 'tis Concluded, that yours is not the First Ratio Cogno­scendi, the First Rule, or First Truth; but, Ruled by ours, Grounded on ours, and Subsequent, in the Order of Know­ing, to ours.

18. I do not expect, that such high Speculations will please every Body: But, I hope, it will plead my Pardon, that I could not avoid it. In so Nice a Point, as is the Settling the First Rule of all Knowledge; or, what is the very First, Self-evident, and most Firm­ly-Grounded Truth; no Speculation, resolving all Dependent Truths into that which is Absolutely-Independent, (as the Rule of all Truth must be) can be too Accurate, or laid too Deep. 'Tis not, then, any Humour of mine, or a kind of Trial of Skill, which mov'd me to this very Abstracted, and Meta­physical Way of Discoursing▪ but, it was the very Nature of the present Sub­ject, that forc'd me upon it.

19. Nor was it any Care of over­reaching your Acuteness, nor the De­sire of Opposing the Rule of Knowing Truth introduc'd by the Great Carte­sius, [Page 38] which put me upon this Unusual piece of Doctrine. I had, above twen­ty Years ago, upon some Hints given me by that Second Aristotle, the pro­foundly-Learned Albius, apply'd my Speculative Thoughts to dig very deep into this Subject, to find out the Im­moveable Center of all Truth; and I had begun to write a very Speculative Treatise, shewing how to reduce every Truth into an Identical Proposition; and every Errour, to a Contradiction; which, I saw, lay hid at the Bottom of every Truth, and Falshood. This, I say, was an Old Design of mine, be­fore I thought of Opposing any, or of being Oppos'd by any. I foresaw also, while I was writing my Method, that (it being more easie to be Witty, than to be Solid) Identical Proposi­tions would be look'd upon by very Ingenious Men, who were not thorow-Speculators, as Sapless, Useless, and In­significant. Wherefore, I did there take some Occasions, which lay in the Track of my Thoughts, while I was settling the Grounds to True Science, to clear those First Truths from such Unworthy Mis­apprehensions. To this End, I de­monstrated [Page 39] there, B. 3. Less. 1. §. 3. That all the Force of Consequence, in which consists our Rationality, can on­ly be built upon such Propositions. I shew, B. 2. L. 2. in what their Self-evidence consists: What is the First of them, and their several Sorts and De­grees. I set my self to Demonstrate, by many Arguments, from §. 11. to the End of that Lesson, that all First Principles must be Identical Propositions; and (§. 19.) that plain Reason teaches us it must be so: Which evinced, it follows, that whoever denies these to be Useful, must, with the same Breath, affirm, that all First Principles are Use­less, and good for nothing; which is a strange Position. Nay, since there is an Order in Truths, and therefore all Second Principles have their Force from the First, it follows, that we can have no Use of Second Principles, if the First be Useless; and so, we must talk ramblingly, and at random, all our Lives, without any Principles at all. I manifest the same, (L. 3.) by In­stances, fetch'd from the Mathema­ticks, and other Sciences; and shew what Use is to be made of them; [Page 40] which is not to make them either of the Premisses in a Syllogism; but to a­vail our selves of them in a higher na­ture. I shew (B. 2. L. 2. §. 18.) that even plain, Uncultivated Nature makes the Vulgar recurr to them, as their First Principles, when they would ex­press that which is decisive of the Dis­pute, and Undeniable. I prove, that all Middle Terms which are Proper, are built upon the same Ground with them. I endeavour (B. 3. L. 3. §§. 16, 17, 18.) to evince clearly, that All Truths have, at the bottom, Identical Propositions, and are Reducible to them; and I attempt to shew, (Less. 4.) the Way how to reduce Inferiour Truths to those Highest ones. All which, if I have fully prov'd, especially, that All First Principles are Identical Proposi­tions, which bears all along with it, and is concluded there by divers De­monstrations, on which I dare ven­ture my whole Cause, that they are impossible to be solv'd; then, I may safely presume, I have evinc'd, that the Intelligibility and Light of Identical Propositions is most Self-evident; the Ground on which they are built, most [Page 41] Solid; and the Usefulness or Influence of them upon all other Truths, most Universal: And, therefore, that they are every way qualify'd to be the First and Only Rule of Knowing all Truths whatever.

20. To comprehend better the Evi­dence of this Discourse, let us imagine a Man devested of the Knowledge of Identical Propositions; and then let us consider whether he could know any thing at all, or what he is good for. To instance in one of them; Let us suppose him Ignorant that A Thing is what it is; or a Cartesian, that Each Idea is it self, and no other; and Com­mon Sense will tell every one, that such a Man could know nothing, nor make any Judgment or Discourse con­cerning any Thing, or Idea either; since that Thing, or Idea, he would Judge, or Discourse of, is, perhaps, all the while, for ought he knows, Another. Whoever would see farther the Use of Identical Propositions brought to Practice, may please to ob­serve how they are serviceable in ma­ny places of my three Treatises here mention'd: Not by proposing them first, [Page 42] and then Deducing and Arguing from them, as some may mistake; but by Reducing the Truth of my Discourses up to those Standards of all Truth; and by shewing these to be engag'd in the Patronage and Support of my Thesis; by which means, they smartly clinch the Force and Evidence of my Arguments, by bearing up to them, and relying on them.

21. It was a well-aim'd Reach of Speculation in Mr. Locke, [Essay con­cerning Humane Understanding, B. 2. Ch. 32. §. 2.] where he says, that the Metaphysical Verity of Things contains in them a Tacit Proposition: Which I would understand, not to be meant of that Verity, as it is in the Thing it self; but as it is in our Understanding, where only Propositions are, or can be. For, since this Metaphysical Verity is not a Natural Notion, imprinted directly by our Senses, it can only be known by Reflexion. The Mind, then, careful to be well assur'd of the Subject of which it is to Judge, or Discourse, (without which Pre-assurance, it could do nei­ther,) reviews it heedfully, and steadi­ly; and then says of it, within it self; [Page 43] ['Tis this, and no other.] Which is an Identical Proposition, in Substance; tho', for a Reason we shall give short­ly, we put it afterwards into an Ex­pression more formally Identical. Why the Soul does this, springs hence; be­cause, being naturally made to see Truth; and no Truth (in the First and Proper Signification of that Word) being possible to be had, without Af­firming, or Denying; hence 'tis Natu­ral, and Necessary, that, when it comes to review the Object, in order to see its Truth or Falshood, it should put it into the Frame of an Identical Proposi­tion; only which kind of Speeches are capable to Affirm, or Deny. And this is that I mean, when I use to say, (as I do frequently,) that the Nature of the Soul is Comparative, or Relative: For, when a Proposition is molded in the Mind, the Predicate of it is Com­par'd or Related to the Subject, in or­der to see their Agreement, or Disagree­ment; without which, nothing can be known to be, in proper Speech, True, or False: In which Position, Mr. Locke perfectly agrees with me. Now, set­ting aside Extrinsecal Denominations, [Page 44] which are not at all found in the Thing, but meerly tack'd to it by our Consideration; this Comparing is, ei­ther of the Mode, to the Thing; and, seeing, in general, how it affects it, as is seen in the two last Predicables of Porphyrius; which, because Modes are not Distinct Things, and yet differ vast­ly from the Formal Notion of the Thing it self, of which they are Modes, can only be Connected with it Mate­rially; or, as Belonging to the Thing, as their Subject: Or else, the Mind compares the Thing to what's Formal, or Essential to it. And this, either in the Whole, as is found in our Identical Propositions; for which reason, I am forc'd to make a Sixth Predicable, in which the Whole is predicated, entirely and formally, of the Whole: Or else, in Part; when some Part of the Essence or Nature of the Whole Thing is Pre­dicated, or Compar'd to it diversly; as is seen in Porphyrius's Three First Predi­cables, call'd Genus, Species, and Diffe­rence; which do, all of them, in part, belong to the Essence. These Notes borrow'd from Logick, and premis'd, 'tis here farther to be Noted, that all [Page 45] those Comparisons, or Relations the Soul makes in whatever Proposition, is done by that Relation, call'd Identi­ty; as is manifest from the Copula [Est.] Wherefore, to review what we said lately; the Predicates belong­ing to the two last Predicables of Por­phyrius, are Referr'd only according to Material Identity; or, only as found to belong to the same Thing, and not as Essential to it. The three former are related, or Compar'd, as Identify'd Formally to the Thing; yet, still so, as but several Parts of its Essence. The 6th is, when the Whole Thing is Com­par'd, Related to, or Identify'd with the Whole Thing; and this Entirely, or according to all that is in the Thing. And, this Way of Comparing or Rela­ting the Whole Thing to its Self, is that Relation of Identity, which is the most Essential, most Formal, and most Expresly such, of all other; and, is only found in those Propositions we call First Principles. Which Proposi­tions being, for the Reasons given, most Fully and Properly such, we do therefore, [...], call Identical.

[Page 46] 22. Whence may be seen, that the Virtue of Identical Propositions threads, or runs thorow all those Propositions that are Essential; and, collaterally, those also whose Predicates are imme­diately and necessarily Connected with the Essence. For, since the Parts are found in the Whole, and all Identifica­tion in part, is a Part of the Identifi­cation of the Whole Thing with its self; it follows, that Propositions, or Truths, in which the Predicate is but Part of the Whole, are, in Reality, but Parts of our Identicals. Nor is this all; but the Force of every Consequence too is Grounded on them, in which consists all our Rationality; as was shewn above. Whence Mr. Locke, in his Essay, B. 4. Ch. 2. §. 7. shews, ve­ry Judiciously, that every Step we take in true Demonstrations, is made by Intuitive, or Self-evident Know­ledges.

23. Whence, 'tis Evident, that even your Rule will force you, tho' contra­ry to your Intention, to come over to us; and, will oblige you to guide your selves by Connexion of Terms, (which is our Way,) however you [Page 47] strive to avoid it. You say, that when you Clearly and Distinctly see a Proposi­tion to be True, it must be so: And we say, you can never see a Proposition to be True, but when you see its two Extremes, (or, the Subject and Predi­cate,) Connected. You will alledge, you see it in your Idea: But, (as is shewn above,) there are three Parts in a Proposition, which have, each of them, a Distinct Idea; in regard, the self-same Idea which is of the Subject, cannot be the Idea of the Predicate; for, this would throw you upon Iden­tical Propositions, which is our Rule: And, the Idea of the Copula is, most evidently, quite Different from the other Two; being, precisely, That which Affirms, or Denies; which nei­ther of the other does. This being so, I beseech you to reflect, that Truth (which is the Thing in question) can­not consist in these Ideas, singly consi­der'd; for, taken thus, they are, all of them, Simple Apprehensions▪ which can neither be True, nor False. It remains, then, that you must confess, Truth can be only in those Ideas, put together, or Connected; nor, can they be Con­nected, [Page 48] but by that which only is apt to Connect or Identifie them; viz. by the Copula [Est;] for, these three Parts cannot be fram'd into one Speech, by any other manner, but by putting the Word [Est] between them. Wherefore, 'tis Evident, that you can­not pretend to see clearly and distinctly, that any Proposition is True, (which is your Rule to know Truth,) but by seeing its said Terms Connected, or Iden­tify'd. I see not how you can, even in your Way of Ideas, deny this Clear Discourse: And, if you grant it, we are thus far Friends. Only, we add, that, to make such Connexions the RULE to all others, you must allow them to be Self-Connexions, or Identi­cal; which is our Position. So that, which way soever you wriggle, to avoid our Rule, the Light of Com­mon Reason, or Natural Logick, will force you into it, whether you will or no.

24. As for the Dryness of Identical Propositions, which goes not down with some Men of Fancy, I have this to add; that That which is objected to them, as Scandalous, and Opprobrious, [Page 49] is, in reality, a Great Commendation to them. For, this Conceit of their Dry­ness springs from their seeming too Ob­vious. Whereas, were not the very First Principles, and the Rule of Know­ing all Truths, thus most Plain, Easie and Obvious, but needed the least Re­flexion, or Consideration, they would be utterly unfit to be what they ought to be; First Principles, and Self-evi­dent. Nothing pleases the Palate of such Gentlemen, which is not New, or such as they knew not before. Not Reflecting, in the mean time, that nothing is New, but Conclusions lately Deduced; and that all First Principles must be as Old as Nature, or Mankind it self: Nor could they be the Rule of Truth, which must oblige all Mankind to see their Evidence, and Assent to their Verity, were they otherwise.

25. How pretty a Delusive Faculty is this Fancy of ours! and, how apt, if we be not aware, to decoy us, eve­ry Step, into Errour, by Customary Appearances; which, by striking of­ten upon it, would fool our Reason! Our own Thoughts, and those of others, do, in all our Conversations, [Page 50] use to come to us, clad in Words: Whence it happens, that 'tis very hard, liquidly and clearly to strip the Sense from those Words; and to consi­der It, and nothing but It. If a Man says, [Every Thing is Distinct from all other Things,] none is apt to smile at him, or impute it as Ridiculous, or Foolish: But, if he says, [A Thing is its self,] Witty Men can scarce con­tain their Iest at such an Idle Proposi­tion: And yet they are, most evident­ly, the self-same in Sense; for, that which is Distinct from all others, must either be its Self, or Nothing; and, the taking away all Distinction, does, almost in Terms, at least, most for­mally, and necessarily, put Identity. Let us take another Instance: If one says, [A Whole is more than a Part,] it ap­pears to such Men, wondrous Wise; and, none blames him, in the least, that says it, or lays it for a Principle. But, if he says, and puts for a Prin­ciple, [What's more than a Part, is more than a Part,] it is good Luck if they do not think he deserves Midas's Ears. Yet, both of these Propositions are the self-same, and both of them equally, [Page 51] and most perfectly Identical in Sense; and only differ in the Manner of Ex­pression. Which I thus shew: A Whole consists of its Parts; and, since every Thing is that of which it consists, A Whole is its Parts. But, the Word [Parts,] being Plural, signifies more than One Part; Wherefore, [A Whole is more than a Part,] is the same as to say, [What's more than a Part, is more than a Part;] which is as perfectly Identical, as can be imagin'd. Nay, more; If we regard it well, we shall find, that the former Proposition had not been known, Speculatively, to be Self-evident, nor could have been made out to be such, but because it is the same with this later, whose Terms are most formally Identical; to which, the other is easily reduc'd.

26. It will be ask'd, why we could not let the Sense alone in its former Dress, (which became it much better than this other,) since it was Self-evi­dent enough before? I answer; Because the Self-evidence better appears, when it is also brought to Terms most perfect­ly Identical; as any one may discern, who compares the two Propositions [Page 52] now mention'd: And, hence also the Sceptical Dissenter, or Denier, is most forcibly, and unavoidably thrown up­on a Direct and Open Contraction; for, to Deny those Identicals, which are such, not only in the Sense, but in the manner of Expression too, is, to avow a Contradiction propos'd bare-fac'd, and in the plainest Terms; which could not have appear'd so clearly from the Terms of the former Proposition. Lastly, A Brabbling Pyrrhonian might have drawn the Words, [Whole,] and [Part,] into some sinister Constru­ction; and have wrangl'd and quib­bled about them, by putting upon them divers Senses; which he is quite debarr'd of, when the Terms are thus Identical: For, when the Words of both the Terms are the very self-same, what­ever Sense he gives the Words of the Subject, must be allow'd to the Words of the Predicate too; so that he will be put quite past his Shifts, and the Proposition will still remain equally Identical as it was before, maugre all his Cavils, and Evasions.

27. By this time I have, as I con­ceive, good reason to presume enough [Page 53] has been alledg'd by us, to prove that our Rule of Truth is, in every Re­gard, qualify'd for such an Employ. We will therefore, if you please, now turn the Tables, and examine what your Rule can pretend to; or, what it it has in it, which can entitle it to be such a Rule; or, in any respect, coun­ter-ballance what has been produc'd for ours. To do which, we will con­sider it, both as to the Act of your Clear and Distinct Perception, the Im­mediate Object of that Act; and, at the same time, as to the Stability which each of these may be conceiv'd to have from its Ground. We will begin with the Object, that determines your Fa­culty of Understanding to this or that Particular Act. If I rightly conceive the Cartesian Doctrine, the Immediate Objects of your Clear and Distinct Perception, are your Ideas, in which appears this Truth which, you say, you Clearly and Distinctly see. Now, these Ideas of yours are, confessedly, Ef­fects produc'd by a Second Cause, the Mind it self; and not the Immediate Work of the First Cause, on which (as has been sh [...]wn) our Rule is built: [Page 54] Which gives ours an Infinite Advan­tage, above yours, as to the Stability of its Ground: Ours having, for its Solid Foundation, the Ideas in the Di­vine Understanding; whence are un­questionably Deriv'd, and by which are Establish'd, the Essences of Things, on which ours is Immediately Ground­ed: Whereas, your Ideas are held by your selves, to be the Creatures, or Productions of your own Mind; which (were it granted it could produce any such Ideas) is a Defective Agent of its own Nature; and, therefore, its Pro­ductions so Uncertain, that it seems a most strange piece of Doctrine, to build all the Certain Truth and Know­ledge Mankind can possibly have on such an Unsteady Foundation. How many Thousands, even of a fair Pitch of Understanding, have mistaken Live­ly Fancies, for Evident Knowledge? Must, therefore, all Truth be built on a Mistakable Principle? Nay, more; such Men, judging thus, by Mistake, the Thing was Evident, taking them as possess'd with such a Mistake, can­not but Assent to it, as True, tho' it be never so False: Must we therefore con­secrate [Page 55] this Erroneous Ground of theirs, into a Rule of Truth? Oh, but it be­longs to God's Goodness, to take care, that, since we cannot but Assent upon such a Clear and Distinct Appearance, we should not be forced upon Errour. Why so? If you will needs leave the Things his Wisdom has made, take your own Way, and over-conceit the In­fallibility of your own Faculty, in judging you Clearly and Distinctly know a Thing, when you do but fancy it; is God's Providence answerable to sup­port every over-weening Rashness of ours? Doubtless, his Goodness is ne­ver wanting to such a considerable Species, as is Mankind, in N [...] to their Knowledge, for which th [...] Nature was made: But, if there [...] Another Way, more Solidly Ground [...] and Evident than yours; nay, aga [...] which (as has been prov'd) ther [...] can lie no Exception, and Men will not take it; his Providence is acquitt [...]d, and, 'tis just to let them delude them­selves. At least, it will be said, that this Clear and Distinct Perception is a Rule of Truth to us, tho' not to Truth, consider'd in it self. But, if [Page 56] what we assent to upon that Imaginary Ground, may still be false, for any thing that Ground can assure us, how can it be a Rule of Truth to any? To return to our Ideas; The main Point is, that it is so far from Evi­dent that there can be any such Ideas Elicited, or Produced, by our Minds, that there are many pretended De­monstrations against it; as may be seen in Ideae Cartesianae Expensae, Exam. 2. from § 31. to §. 49. Nay, there are very many others in my Second Preliminary, proving there can need none; the Thing it self being objective­ly in our Understanding. To none of which Demonstrations, I do expect any Full and Solid Answer; but only, perhaps, some slight Touches. I add, that the Ideists themselves cannot a­gree amongst themselves, what kind of Things these Spiritual Ideas should be. Mr. Locke makes them to be Si­militudes; Which Mr. Le Grand denies; and, is so at variance with himself, that he puts them to be many several sorts of Things, and those Inconsistent with one another; and so makes them to be Chimeras. This Inconsonancy [Page 57] of those Writers with one another, and with their own selves, makes it very Dubious that there are any such Things as these Ideas, at all; at least, 'tis Evident, that they who ground all their Doctrine upon them, do not know what they are; and, therefore, they build all their Hypothesis on they know not what. And, if this be so, then the Immediate Object of their Clear and Distinct Perception is, perhaps, a Non-Entity; or, at least, such an Enti­ty, as no Man living (nor themselves neither) knows what to make of it.

28. Again; This Object, which you Clearly and Distinctly see to be True, must be some Mental Proposition; for, nothing can be Formally True, but some Speech that Affirms, or Denies. Now, say we, 'tis most incontestable, that the First Proposition we can make of a Thing, is, to affirm its Metaphysi­cal Verity; or, to say, 'Tis this, (or its self,) and no other: For, the Subject being the Basis of all our Thoughts, we must fix it certainly, Clearly and Distinctly, ere we can, with Certainty, say any thing else of it. This Propo­sition, then, say we, is such, that our [Page 58] Understanding no sooner opens its Eye, to take a View of it, but it must assent to it, because of the Self-evident Identification of its Terms; whose Self-Evidence we do therefore make our Rule. It remains then, that you shew us some Truth, or Proposition, which is before this, (which we think to be the First,) and which both makes it self thus Visible; and also, by its Self­evident Light, gives Clearness and In­telligibility to all other Truths; and, lastly, which is so Firmly Grounded, that it may be a Solid First Principle, and not an Aery and Phantastick Con­ceit. You must then, (we say,) pro­duce, and shew us some other Proposi­tion than that you have brought hi­therto, which tells us your Clear and Distinct Perception is your Rule; for, this, you see, is already, by many Un­answerable Arguments, thrown out of doors, and shewn Unfit to be a Rule. And, till you do this, you ought not to be offended, if we tell you friendly, and plainly, that you have no Rule of Truth at all.

29. Thus much for the Immediate Object of your Clear and Distinct Per­ception. [Page 59] As for the Act it self, I be­seech you, Sir, consider on what a Sandy Foundation you would build all Truth. What signifies yours, or mine, or any Man's Iudgment, that he Clear­ly and Distinctly sees a Truth; or, that he must Assent, or may not Assent to it? What signifie these, I say, to the Truth of the Thing? Must Truth be built on Men's Iudgments, or their Manner of Conceiving? What's True, is Infallibly such; and this, by virtue of its Grounds. Is our Iudgment, or Manner of Conceiving, such a Certain Ground, or Infallible? How many In­stances is the World full of, to prove those Perceptions of ours, tho' judg'd by us most Evident, to be Fallacious? A Passionate Man, highly Injur'd, and bent upon Revenge, judges it most E­vident that he ought to take his Pri­vate Satisfaction: And, you can do no more, but verily Iudge you have this Clear and Distinct Perception, that such or such a Proposition is True. I am to presume, that those Cartesians who stigmatiz'd me with the Ignomi­nious Note of being Impious against God, &c. judg'd they did Clearly see, [Page 60] I was thus wicked; for, otherwise, they left their own beloved Rule, to blacken me; which is too high a Ma­lice for any Man to charge them with: And yet, no Man living, as far as my self, or my Friends, can discern, did think so, but themselves; for, 'tis hard to conceive, that, if others had thought so, none of them should have that Zeal for God's Honour, as to ob­ject it, or reprehend me for it: Nor am I to doubt but they thought they clearly and distinctly saw, that when I said, Annihilation was Impossible, I did, by that Doctrine, set upon God himself: And, yet, tho' the Learned Albius maintain'd the same, in his Metaphy­sicks, 50 Years before, no Friend ever admonish'd him, that by saying so, he had fallen into a Wicked Errour: Nor any of his Opposers, who were very Learned Men, tho' they gather'd ma­ny Propositions out of his Books, which seem'd to sound ill, did ever object This; whereas, had they judg'd it Impious, they would not have spar'd him, but have laid load upon him for it. But, it seem'd, they all wanted this Gift of Clear and Distinct Per­ception, [Page 61] which is peculiar to the Carte­sians. To come to other Instances; How frequently are People mistaken, in thinking they have a Clear and Di­stinct Perception, or Perfect Evidence! Prejudice, Faction and Education work this ill Effect, and make Men abso­lutely judge they see most Evidently, they are in the right. People far gone in the Spleen, or a deep Melancholy, do Assent, and Judge, perhaps, more Firmly than you do, that they see Clearly twenty Ridiculous Fooleries to be True. High-flown Enthusiasts judge the same. Pious Women, and Pru­dent in other Things, if much given to Introversion, judge, they see clearly and distinctly (nay, far more lively than we do) many strange Things in their Imaginary Visions and Revelations; in­somuch, that they would pawn their very Souls for their Truth; which, yet, are oft known, by their Effects, to be meer Illusions of Fancy. From all which Errours and Inconveniences, our Rule is Free: For, who can, out of Humour, Precipitancy, Fancy, Disease, or any other Casualty whatever, be deceiv'd, in Judging, that Identical Propositions [Page 62] are True? This, then, unanswerably con­cludes ours to be the Genuin Rule of Truth; in regard, this must be such as all Men must be forc'd to Assent to, una­nimously Agree in it, nor can ever hap to be Deceiv'd in it by any Chance whatever: Since, otherwise, the whole Nature of those Men would be Depra­ved, and good for nothing, as having no Rule by which to know any Truth whatever. Nay, it must be such as may be produc'd openly, by the Asserters of any Truth; that, by alledging It, they may be able to convince others, that what they maintain is a Real Truth, and not some Phantastick Con­ceit of their own; without which, their Clear and Distinct Perception is Invisible, and so can satisfie no Man; nor clear themselves from being Self-conceited; but, to argue like Phana­ticks, who pretend they discern Things by an Inward Light, which none can see but themselves, nor they themselves make it visible to others. Of which, more hereafter.

30. I beg of you, once more, (the Point being of great Importance,) that this Question, concerning your Rule, [Page 63] may be rightly stated, and understood. None doubts, but that, if we clearly know a Thing to be True, it is True; otherwise, it would follow, that we may know what is not; or, (which is the same,) may know that which is not to be known. The only Question, then, is, Whether we may not be Mis­taken in Iudging we know it, when, indeed, we do not know it, but only fancy it: Which is a Thing so Com­mon amongst all Mankind, that not very many escape this Fault of Over­weening. Wherefore, ere you can pre­tend that this Rule of yours is Useful, and a Certain Means to know Truth, you should first prescribe us some Self-evident Rule, how we may know assu­redly, that our Iudgment that we do Clearly and Distinctly know a Thing, is not a Mistake: For, otherwise, we are often apt to think we do most cer­tainly know a Thing, when we have only a Lively Apprehension, or Fancy of it. Besides which, this Rule must have Force upon all Mankind, that we may easily make it out to others, that we do indeed and really know, and not meer­ly presume we know, when, perhaps, [Page 64] we do not: Otherwise, it will neither give others, nor our selves, any Cer­tainty that what we imagin we know, is True. This is the true Difficulty; and against this, I do not discern any effectual Provision made by you; nor how you can make any, without ha­ving recourse to the Self-evident Con­nexion of the Terms in an Identical Proposition. This Self-evident Con­nexion we can produce openly, to every Man's Eye; whereas, you cannot pro­duce your pretended Clear and Distinct Perception to any Man: And, it be­ing, when thus produced by us, impos­sible not to be seen and acknowledg'd by any Man, who has any Use of his Intellectual Faculty, 'tis able to give perfect Satisfaction to our selves, and to others also, that we neither are, nor can be Mistaken in our Judgment, that we do really and indeed Know it; and, not only Deem it. You see, Sir, where the Difficulty pinches. That can never be a Certain Rule to me, or to any Man, which I can never be sure I make use of: Now, 'tis evident by what is said here, I cannot be assur'd I do clearly and distinctly know, unless my Judg­ment [Page 65] that I do so be secur'd from Mis­take: For, if I be mistaken in that Judgment, and do not clearly and di­stinctly know, your Rule affects not me at all; nor am I a jot the better for it, or nearer the Knowing any Truth by it: But, which is yet worse; 'tis Evident from this Discourse, that there needs another Rule of Knowing, Ante­cedent to yours, to guide my Iudgment that I do clearly and distinctly know, and do not mistake, or rashly presume I know; as we experience, the Gene­rality of Mankind does. Which evi­dently concludes, that the Proposition by which you express your pretended Rule of Knowing, may, indeed, be a Truth, (in case you do really know,) but can never be a Rule of Truth to you, me, or any Man: For, this must be First known, or Self-known, to all Man­kind; or otherwise, it needs another Antecedent Rule, to make it Useful; and, so it is Ruled, and no Rule. Here it is, then, that the Point sticks; and, here 'tis like to stick, for any thing I can imagin, in behalf of the Cartesians.

31. I am apt to apprehend, that your Acute Wit will object, that some [Page 66] few of those Instances I alledg'd former­ly, of Men who verily judg'd they clearly and distinctly knew such and such Things to be True, and yet were mis­taken in thus Judging, do fall short of Concluding; I mean, those that con­cern'd People in Diseases; which you may, with some reason, think, are known to be plain Deviations from Nature, by an easie Criterion; viz. by the Standard of Mankind, who have the right Use of their Reason. Which I shall not contest with you; nor had I brought such as these, but that I see your Writers bring the same against the Certainty of our Senses; as, that Icterical People see all Things Yellow, and such like; which are solv'd by the same Criterion. But, what are these to many others which I there alledg'd; and could press farther, were it suta­ble to the Brevity I had intended. To force that Objection home, what shall we think of Speculative Men, and Great Philosophers; nay, of many Great Ma­thematicians, who thought they had most certainly Squar'd the Circle? They are held to be Men in their perfect Wits; nay, they are held to be Can­did [Page 67] too; and, moreover, Learned; and, which is more, both Sides offer De­monstrations for their Tenet; and have, oft-times, great Multitudes that follow them, and embrace their Doctrine. Can it be deny'd, but that such very Learned, Acute and Ingenious Men do verily Judge that they clearly and di­stinctly see their Doctrine to be True? And yet, we are certain that, since they contradict one another, one Side must needs be in an Errour in that Judgment. We will bring it yet near­er home, and lay it even at our own Doors.

32. I do not doubt, but your self (for, I cannot suspect your Candour) does verily judge that you clearly and distinctly perceive, or (which is the same) have Perfect Evidence, that your Way of Ideas is the True Way to Sci­ence: And I, on the other side, am as fully persuaded, as that I live, that I do clearly and distinctly see, it is so far from being the Way to Science, that it is per­fectly Groundless, and leads to Innumera­ble Errours. That you are thus persua­ded, seems very Evident to you; for which, I am very willing to take your [Page 68] Word. And, that I am thus fully per­suaded I do Clearly and Distinctly see the Contrary, besides my faithful Asse­veration, I believe Indifferent Men will think I have given sufficient Testi­mony, by bringing so many pretended Demonstrations against your Way; and hazarding my Credit, by vouching them to be Conclusive; which, therefore, are so many Sure Gages for my Sincerity, when I declare this to be my Senti­ment. Add, that these Demonstra­tions are not like Flashes of Wit, coin'd by my own Brain; for, then, perhaps, I might, for some by-end of Applause, or some such Foolery, have falsly pre­tended they were my true Thoughts: But, they are all built upon the Nature of the Thing, or Subject in hand; which being Establish'd to be what it is, 'tis beyond the Wit or Power of Man, to make, marr, alter, or deface it; and, should I go about to disguize or mis-re­present it, 'tis easie for any Adversary to shew, I speak Contradictions, and ex­pose me to open Shame for my Confi­dent Ignorance: For, what is against the Nature of the Thing, makes that Thing to be what it is not; which is a [Page 69] plain Contradiction. This, then, be­ing so manifest, that I may convince you by your own Method, Why ought not you, by your Way of Doubting of every thing that has any Shew or Pos­sibility of Falshood, or any Uncertainty, to lay aside, and renounce your Rule of Truth, as Uncertain and Fallacious; since we do both of us follow it to our power; and, yet, since we contradict one another so Diametrically, one of us is, notwithstanding, in a vast Er­rour! Here is Matter of Fact, then, against the Usefulness of your Rule; and that too, as Certain, and Evident, as that one (or both of us) is not the worst sort of Hypocrites; that is, be­lies himself, and his own Thoughts: Whereas, I believe, no Man that knows either of us, had ever such a bad Opi­nion of us. I could press this Topick much farther; but I had rather leave it to your Sincere and Deliberate Con­sideration.

33. The Rule by which we are to know Truth, ought therefore, (as was said,) in such a manner oblige all Man­kind to Assent, that it should be apt, of it self, to compose all Differences in [Page 70] Opinion, by Applying, and Bearing up to it: Whereas, yours can com­pose none at all; but, contrariwise, en­gages Learned Men in an Endless Wran­gle. We both grant, That if we see a Thing clearly to be True, it is True; since Common Sense tells every Man, that none can see what is not to be seen: Nor is there any such Mystery, or Ma­stership, in advancing this obvious Position; or, for magnifying Carte­sius so highly, for inventing it; since, I think, no Man living ever deny'd it. The Question is, Which of us has this True Evidence, which you call Clear and Distinct Perception? You will say, you have it, and I want it: I shall re­ply, that I have it, and you want it. You will blame some Defect in my Un­derstanding, or some untoward Byass or Propension of my Will, both which, ac­cording to Mr. Le Grand, (p. 93.) can make one deceiv'd in thinking that he evidently perceives: And I, on the o­ther side, think I may, with equal Ju­stice, blame yours: And, so, we may come to lay the Fault, either on the Weakness of one another's Understand­ing, or the Depravedness of his Will; [Page 71] which naturally leads Men to pelt one another with Rash Iudgments, and hard Words: But, since we can, neither of us, see one another's Thoughts, or dis­cover to others, how Clear they are, which is your Way; both sides will still remain as far from Conviction, and the Point from Decision, as at first, for any thing your Rule helps either of us. And, if we set aside Propositions and Discourses, and the shewing that their Terms are Undeniably Connected, and therefore, Themselves certainly True; (which is not yo [...] Way;) how, I be­seech you, shall Men ever come to a Final Conclusion by dint of Reason, with­out being put to it to avail themselves by Ill Words, and Passion; which (I fear, by proceeding upon your Rule; for, you pretend not to have produced any Connexion of Terms) has been such a Stickler, of late, to uphold the Car­tesian Cause?

34. This seem'd to me so Odd a Procedure, that I begg'd the Favour of you, to acquaint me, how, or by what Means, you would make others know you had, indeed, this Clear and Di­stinct Perception; or, how you could [Page 72] prove you had it, but by making use of Propositions and Discourses; the Force of which consists only in Affirming, De­nying, or Inferring; that is, in the Con­nexion, or Inconnexion of the Terms. As I remember, your Answer was, by Explicating to them clearly the Point, and desiring them to Meditate upon it: Which Way you seem'd to magnifie very much. I could have alledg'd, that you could not have propos'd, or us'd, even this Way, without making use of Propositions, and Discourses: But, letting you proceed, I barr'd Explica­tions, if they were brought (as it here seem'd) to evacuate any Need of Proof: For, Explicating, as contradistinguish'd to Proving, amounts to no more but a kind of Rhetorical Persuasive, made up of Similitudes, Parallels, Allusions, and such little sorts of light, Witty Fan­cies, which may serve, and are made use of, in a manner, equally, to abet Er­rour, as well as Truth. Indeed, if the Terms of the Question be Dubious, Ex­plications are needful, and very requi­site; lest, otherwise, we level our Ar­gument at a wrong Thesis: But, if the Point in question be rightly under­stood [Page 73] by both Parties, it must either be Prov'd, if it be not Self-evident and needs no Proof; or, it must remain for ever Uncertain, and Undecided. I should be glad to know whether, or no, you would go about to convince such a Man by Grounds and Principles? If you say, you would, and that you think you can do this: then you wrong your Cause exceedingly, by waving the Mention of such Strong Supports as Principles and Grounds; and Recurring to, and Rely­ing on such Unsteady, Feeble Reeds as Explications. If you say, you cannot evince your Thesis by Principles; then all your Explications, tho' never so Witty, are, confessedly, Unprincipl'd, and Groundless. If you pretend, your Explications do involve Proofs in them; 'tis clearly for the Interest of your Cause, to make use of the Argumenta­tive part of such Discourses, and leave out the Explicative: For, 'tis certain, that the Argument, if a good one, sub­sists upon some Solid Principle; where­as, an Explication may be without any at all. It will therefore, to any consi­dering Man, be a strong Prejudice a­gainst the Cartesians, and make Men [Page 74] apt to think they have no Grounds or Principles at all, that they do not much pretend to them, much less build their Discourses on them, or reduce them to them; but seem to abdicate them, while they place their chief Support in Explications. In a Word; Let the Po­sition be first Prov'd to be True, or all Explications are Frivolous: For, to what purpose is it to stand Explicating a Falshood? The nature of all Explica­tions, is, to give us the Sense of the The­sis propos'd; but, let it be first Prov'd, and Seen that it bears good Sense; for, 'tis a very sleevless Task, to stand Ex­plicating Nonsense.

35. On this Occasion, it were not amiss to note here a certain manner of Writing, very frequent amongst some Modern Philosophers; which is apt to lead the Generality of Learners into very great Errours. We do, all of us, naturally affect Knowledge; and there­fore, we love to read Authors that are Clear, or write clearly; as being very Knowable, or Intelligible. But, now, Clearness is of Two sorts: The one makes Clear the Thoughts of the Writer; The Other makes Clear the Truth of the Point [Page 75] he writes of. The One expresses clear­ly his own Meaning, when he says thus: The Other manifests clearly, that he says True when he says thus. The Former is perform'd by means of Rhetorick, and Witty Expressions: The Other can only be done by Solid Principles, and by True Logick. But, it too often happens, that those Readers who have not a Strong Bent to see Truth, and, with a steady Aim, pursue it, and It only, are so well appay'd with the Clear Expres­sion of an Author, in delivering his own Mind; which cannot but be very Pretty, and Taking, being, generally, neatly clad; that they are, at unawares, Decoy'd to think the Thing it self is Clear, when 'tis only the Sentiment of the Author which is render'd so Evi­dent; especially, if there be also some slight Shew of Coherence; which sel­dom wants, if the Writer be a Man of Parts. And, yet, perhaps, all this while, were that Discourse strip'd of its Su­perficial Gayity, and sounded to the bottom, nothing will be found to sup­port its Truth; but it will appear Plain Bald Nonsense en cuerpo. On the o­ther side, it lights so, that Discourses [Page 76] that are Solid, and built all along on Evident Principles, (only which can clear the Truth of the Point,) do want the other sort of Clearness, which con­sists in Explicating, to recommend them to the Liking of the Reader. And this happens for Two Reasons: One, be­cause Principles do consist of Few Words, or Notions; and those too, such as are General, or Universal ones; which do not admit such varying the Phrase, or Smooth Explications, to make them more Knowable; their Clear­ness consisting only in the greater Sim­plicity of those General Terms, and their Close Connexion. The Second Rea­son is, that those Writers who endea­vour to look deep into the Foundation and Principles on which Truth is Groun­ded, and are not satisfy'd with Skim­ming over Questions superficially, do not care to avail themselves by Explica­tions, and the Way of Smooth Expres­sions; but quite dis-regard them, and judge them only Luke-warm Words in their present Circumstances; because they neither conduce to the Attain­ment of Science, nor to Settle and Clear the Truth of the Thesis; which [Page 77] such Men see can only be done by the Strict and Evident Connexion of their Notions. To apply this Dis­course; I intreat you, Sir, to consider whether the Former Sort of Clearness be not that which the Cartesians affect; the Second, that which we take, and pursue. I shall hope, that whoever peruses my METHOD to SCIENCE, with an Attentive and Indifferent Eye, will easily observe, that I first put my Thesis, and then endeavour to establish it by rigorous Proofs, drawn from the Nature of the Thing or Subject treated of in those respective Places: And that the Cartesians do not use to take any such Method, but place their Hopes of recommending their Tenets to the Reader's Approbation, in their Expli­cations. Which makes it so difficult for a Logician to find where their Ar­guments lie hid, or where they press; of which, with just Reason, I so often complain.

36. Thus much concerning your Method of Proving by Explicating; or rather, of substituting Explications in the place of Proofs. As for the other part of your Method, which is, your [Page 78] putting Learners to Meditate long and seriously, upon what you have pro­pos'd to them, I lik'd that as ill as I did that of Explicating: And, my Rea­son is, because, unless Men take Prin­ciples along with them, to guide their Thoughts right, and keep an Attentive Eye to them, while they thus Medi­tate; 'tis to be fear'd, their long Me­ditating will, by its frequent Dints, so imprint and fix what you have told them, in their Brain; and, at length, make it sink so deep into their Minds, that, whether it be Right or Wrong, it will stick there, as daily Experience shews us; Custom, a Second Nature, having a very powerful Ascendent over the Understanding, to imbue us with False Impressions, by the oft-rei­terated Thinking upon any Point that is Disputable; especially, Ingenious Explications (as was shewn lately) too often serving for Reasons, to those who are not well vers'd in True Lo­gick.

37. But, the main Objection I make, is, That this Method of yours quite overthrows the Rule of Truth, which you intended to establish by it. For, [Page 79] this Rule being that, upon which all all our Knowledge of Truth depends, must be so very Clear of it self, above any thing we can add to its Highest Evidence, that it cannot possibly need any Explication, nor Meditation nei­ther. Nor, consequently, can any stronger Argument be brought, to De­monstrate that this Rule of yours is not the Right one, than 'tis to confess or pretend that it stands in need of, or, even, can admit Assistance, or Light, either from the one, or the other. For, if it can need any Explication, it follows, that it must be something Ob­scure: And, if it can need Poring and Meditating upon it, ere it be admitted, or can be known, then 'tis far from be­ing most Self-evident: Both which ut­terly destroy the Nature of such a Rule. For, since we must know all other Truths by It, its Evidence must be the First Thing to be known; and there­fore, the Knowledge of its Truth must antecede the Knowlege of all other Truths whatsoever, and be Clearer than They. Which being so manifest, I wonder what Thoughts or Considera­tions our Explicating or Meditating can [Page 80] suggest, that can do this First Rule of Truth any Service, or give it any Advan­tage; since, all others being more Obscure than It, they may, indeed, (could they affect it,) impart to it their own great­er Obscurity, and make it less Clear and Intelligible than it was; but, can ne­ver make it Clearer, as having no great­er, but far less Clearness themselves. Lastly, As this pretended Necessity of Explicating, and Meditating, quite de­grades yours from being the Genuin, First, and, consequently, the Right Rule of Knowing Truth; so it abets ours, and gives it a Clear Title to be such a Rule, since the Self-evidence of those First Truths, express'd by Iden­tical Propositions, (which is our Rule,) is such, as is both Impossible to be Ex­plicated, and Impossible to need Medi­tating, to clear it to us; but, at the first Instant we open the Eye of our Mind, it discovers it self fully to all Mankind, to be most True; and, with­all, begets, forces and fixes us in a Full and Firm Assent to its Verity.

38. Perhaps it will be alledg'd, not­withstanding what I have said above, That this Clear and Distinct Perception [Page 81] is not pretended to be a Rule of Truth in it self, so that it establishes Truth Fundamentally; but of Truth to us, or, (as the Schools phrase it,) quoad nos; that is, a Rule whereby we may know what's Truth, what not: And, it seems, that it cannot be deny'd to be such a Rule, in regard 'tis Evident that we must Assent, or hold a Thing True, when we see clearly and distinct­ly it is so; nor ought we to Assent, or hold it to be True, unless we do clearly and distinctly see it to be so. I answer, That this Pretence is already fore-stal­led, in divers places of my former Dis­course; where it was shewn, by many Instances, that, even in the Opinions Learned Men held, this Guiding our Thoughts and Judgments by what ap­pears to us a Clear and Distinct Per­ception, is Uncertain, and Fallacious. Whence, in the Thesis constituting this to be your Rule, there is tacitly in­volv'd a False Supposition; v [...]z. That that Perception, on which we solely rely, is Unmistakable by us: For, if we may mistake it to be really a Perception thus qualify'd, when it is not, then our As­sent may be Erroneous; and, how can [Page 82] an Erroneous Judgment, in any Sense, be True to us, or make us know a Thing to be True? If I am to draw a straight Line, and the Rule by which I guide my self be sometimes Straight, and sometimes Crooked, how is it a RULE to me, in that Action, or Draught? 2. In constituting this Perception to be your Rule, you begin at the wrong End: For, seeing this Perception is an Act, and that the Object specifies every Act, and makes it such as it is; the Object, or Thing, must be True in it self; and, by being in it self True, it thence makes our Judgment (when we rightly conceive it) to be True al­so. This Distinction, then, in our present Case, is altogether Frivolous; and the alledging it, Preposterous. 3. To Perceive, is an Act of the Understand­ing, and the same as To Know; and, to Perceive Clearly and Distinctly, is the same as to know perfectly. Whence follows, that to say, [I know that to be True, which I clearly and distinct­ly Perceive to be so,] is the very self­same Sense, as to say, [What I know to be True, I know to be True;] or, [I know what I know:] Which is a [Page 83] good Confident Saying; and, more­over, True too. But, nothing can be more ridiculous, than to make Know­ing the Rule of Knowing, or a Rule to make a Thing True to us. To say, [A Thing is, because it is;] or, [I know it, because I Know it;] is more like a Woman's Reason, when she is Fix'd, and Wilful; than a Rational Man's, or a Philosopher's.

39. The Ingenious Mr. Le Grand seems to go more charily to work, by putting his Rule of Truth, (Dissert. pag. 86) in these Terms, [Illud omne Verum est quod clarè & distinctè percipi­tur.] He does not say, [quod percipi­tur esse Verum;] but barely, [quod per­cipitur.] Which Words do not tell us, whether he speaks of our Perception by the First Operation of our Under­standing, simply Apprehending a Thing; or of the Second, which is express'd by a Proposition. But, this still falls into the same: For, if he means the For­mer, then, since Simple Apprehensions have neither Truth nor Falsity in them, being no more but, barely, what's meant, or signify'd, by the Words; it cannot follow, that what I clearly and [Page 84] distinctly thus perceive, is therefore True: For, I simply apprehend, and this clear­ly and distinctly too, the Meaning of these Words, [A Triangle has four Corners;] yet tis far from being True, being a plain Contradiction. He must mean then, that I am to perceive the Sense or Meaning of those Words to be Connected, which is done by putting them into a Proposition; and then his Rule must run thus, [Whatever Sim­ple Apprehensions I see clearly and di­stinctly to be Connected in a Proposi­tion, that Proposition is True:] Which is that very Rule which we advance, and the Cartesians would avoid. On­ly, we say, That to make this a Rule, we must see the Parts of it Self-connect­ed, or Self-evident; for, all other Con­nexions are made, by the Terms being Connected by means of a Third; which is the same as to be Deduced, or Prov'd. But, these Connexions being, all of them, Conclusions, they cannot pretend to be Rules, or Principles, since they must depend on such Rules, as shew those Conclusions must follow. Again, If he means, (as he must, if he means any thing,) that his Rule is, That we [Page 85] must see those Simple Apprehensions, which we call the Terms, Connected in a Proposition; then we must see, or clearly perceive, that that Proposition is True: And then, his Principle must run thus; [Whatever Proposition I clearly and distinctly perceive to be True, is known by me to be True:] Wherefore, since to per­ceive thus, is, to know; and that, as ap­pears by Cartesius's Words, there cited, he speaks of what's Verum mihi, as the Effect of his Principle; that is, of what I know to be True; join these two to­gether, and this Principle, or Rule, does manifestly amount to this; [That which I know to be True, I know to be True;] which is a most prodigious Rule of Knowledge; and yet, this is most evidently the Sense of it, in case to Perceive means, to know; and Ve­rum mihi means that which I know to be True: which, I think, is Un­deniable by any Man of Common Sense. And, I wonder how the Great Wit of Cartesius could imagin that any thing could be True to Him, unless he first saw it to be True in it self, which it has from its Grounds; unless he makes account, that a Thing may be [Page 86] True to him, which, in it self, is False: Which makes those two Truths fall out, and contradict one another, which I ever took to be very good Friends. This makes me wish that the Inge­nious Mr. Le Grand, who tells us here, p. 92. that there goes more to a Rule, than to a Truth, had told us, in what a Truth, and in what the Nature of a Rule consists; which we plainly deliver, by affirming that a Truth consists in the Connexion of the main Parts (or Terms) of any Thesis; and a Rule in the Self-Connexion of them, by Formal I­dentity; whence, such Rules become Self-evident to all Mankind, and able to impart their Light to all other Truths whatever. But, this shews the Genius of the Cartesian Writers: They take what's uppermost, and descant very prettily and gentilely upon it; which, being Obvious, and Facil, does migh­tily please the Fancy of the Readers: But, they go not to the Bottom of any Question. They rake the Surface of the most Difficult Points; but they ne­ver dig deep into it, to find out the Ground and Foundation on which Truth is built. And, I hope, the Reasons I [Page 87] have alledg'd, both here, and else­where, will satisfie my Readers, that it is not the ridiculous Motive of Pique, or Humour, which makes me give this Character of their Way of Writing; but, meerly, the Duty I owe to Truth, which obliges me to do it.

Thus, worthy Sir, I have us'd the best Reason I was Master of, in exa­mining exactly, and understanding rightly, your Rule of Truth; and I have endeavour'd to stop all the Starting­holes, by which the Cartesians may think to evade the Force of my Ar­guments. Which done, I presume I may take my leave of this Point, and apply my Discourse to what follow'd next at our Interview.

40. My Design, at the beginning of our Conference, was to convince you, that Truth consisted in the Connexion of the Terms, in those Speeches we call'd Propositions; which evinc'd, I made account I could easily prove, that the very First Truths, which were to give Light to all others, or be the Rule of Truth, were such Propositi­ons as were Self-connected, and there­fore [Page 88] Self-evident. How your over-a­cute way of Doubting defeated my In­tentions, and stop'd my Progress, is seen above. Sorry to have been put out of that Direct Road, which I saw was the only Right one, and without settling which, all our Discourse would be Unconnected Talk to no purpose, I was casting about how to get into it again. But a Learned and Judicious Friend of ours, who was present, sug­gested, that [Cogito ergo sum] was pre­tended by you to be a First Principle; and, he prest earnestly it might be thorowly examin'd, that we might see whether it had in it the nature of a First Principle, or no. I was some­thing troubled to relinquish the Me­thod I had prefix'd to my self; without which, I saw, the Nature of a First Principle could not be settled, nor shewn: However, I yielded to his Re­quest. I allow'd then, that [Cogito er­go sum] was a True and Evident Conse­quence, as are a thousand such others, viz. Dabito ergo sum; Scribo, ambulo, dormio; nay, Somnio ergo sum, &c.) which is what, with Unattentive Con­siderers, give it all its Credit, and [Page 89] makes them look upon us, as Unrea­sonable Men, who, as they apprehend, do question this Consequence, or call it into Doubt. But they are quite mistaken; there is no Body that doubts it is an Evident Consequence; but, there is a very wide Difference between a Consequence and a Principle; or rather, if it be a Consequence, tho' ne­ver so good, it can never be a First Principle, because, the Premisses, which induced that Consequence, were before it; and that Truth, on which all force of Consequence is grounded,, (as was no­ted above,) is before either of them. What we affirm then is, that it is not a First Principle, nor could be so to Car­tesius, when he propos'd, and made use of it as such: And I addrest my self, to show it had not in it, the nature of such a Principle, nor could, with Rea­son, be pretended such by Cartesius himself.

41. To prove this, I alledg'd, that it is an Inseparable Property, or rather, Essential to First Principles, that they must manifest themselves, to be such by their own most perfect Self-Evidence; whereas Cartesius was forc'd to use [Page 90] very many prolix Antecedent Discourses, to prove all else to be Dubitable; and, be­cause they were so, he went on, Enqui­ring farther, till he could find some­thing that could not be Doubted; which, he conceiv'd, was [Cogito ergo sum,] from which he came to Conclude, that this was the First Principle. Whence I alledg'd, that therefore, those Ante­cedent Discourses of his, which prov'd all else to be Doubtful, were the Rea­sons or Arguments whence he drew his Conclusion, that this was the First Prin­ciple. Now, I think this as Plain Rea­son as plain can be, that No Man can evince a thing to be the First in any kind whatever, but, because, there is nothing before it in that kind. And, from this consideration, I prove my Allegation clearly; because, had not those many and large Antecedent Dis­courses, to prove all else to be Doubtful, been True; his Conclusion, viz. that [This is the First Principle,] could not have follow'd, or been True neither. For, in case the Senses had not been thus Fallacious as still to deceive us, perhaps, Science might have been had from the Things without us affecting [Page 91] those Senses; nor had there been any need to recur to the Operations of our own Mind, to seek for the Ground of all Truth there, because, we might have had it from the Things in Nature. This being so, how many Propositions did he use all along, to prove that our Senses might all decieve us; that we know not certainly whether we sleep or wake; that Mathematical Demon­strations might be all Erroneous, &c. All which Antecedent Propositions, by the plain Rules of Logick, ought to be more Evident, and more Certain, than the Conclusion he gather'd, or in­ferr'd thence, viz. that Therefore This, and only This, being Indubitable, and Certainly Known, is the First Princi­ple. Add, that this being Plain Sense, his own Discourse overthrows the E­stablishment of his First Principle. For, since he had not this First Principle of his till he had found it, nor did he find it, till he found all else to be Doubtful; it will be ask'd How, and in virtue of What First Principle he be­came, while he was in quest of it, more Certain, that all other things were Doubtful, than he was of the Conclu­sion [Page 92] he inferr'd thence, viz. that [Cogito, ergo sum] being impossible to be Doubt­ed of, was his First Principle. Where­fore, if he guided himself by no Indu­bitable, or First Principle all along, in those Antecedent Discourses, which were in reality his Premisses; that Con­clusion of his, cannot in any Logick follow, nor be Certainly True, nor ought to be Embrac'd; especially, by such a Philosopher as he was, who pro­fesses Doubting of ever thing, till he came at his First Principle, that can be in the least Dubitable.

42. In Reply to this Discourse of mine, which is grounded on the Sup­position, that Cartesius guided himself by Reason, in settling his First Principle; and on the plainest Rules of Logick that the Premisses must be Clearer than the Conclusion; the former of which, I suppose you will grant, the latter is obvious to Common Sense; you brought an Ingenious Explication, by way of Similitude, or Parallel; which, I see, are to supply the place of Ar­guments, and Answers too, in the Car­tesian way. It was this. ‘Suppose I see a Man making great Holes [Page 93] in the Ground, or throwing aside Rubbish; and that I ask him what he is doing? He tells me, he has an In­tention to Build, and to lay Founda­tions for that End, and is making Way for it. Now this Action of his looks like an idle business, if we con­sider it alone; but, if we regard his farther Intention of Building, it is a Wise and Necessary Preparative. And yet this Antecedent Action, of pre­paring to lay a Foundation, does not give strength to the Building, which is an Action quite different from it; but the Building depends on the Foundation it self, and on no­thing else. And, therefore, it fol­lows, by way of Parallel, that the Antecedent Discourses of Cartesius, need not be Connected with that First Principle, as Premisses, to inferr it must be such; since they serv'd on­ly to remove the Rubbish, or the Pretended Knowledge of Things by means of the Senses, which en­cumber'd the Mind with Preposses­sions; and, so to make way to lay that First Foundation of Science.’ I think I have done your Parallel all the [Page 94] Right you can expect: Wherefore, I come now to examine what Force it bears, and what Strength such a way of Discoursing has in it; which, I the ra­ther do, that I may inform those Rea­ders, who take such kind of Simili­tudes for Reasons, how easily, and how frequently they are deluded, by such Unsteady, Inconclusive, and Illogical Me­thods.

43 First then, 'tis so certainly known, that Similitudes do not use quadrare per omnia, or, (as they say,) run on four Feet, that it is grown Proverbi­al; which lays a great prejudice upon that Way in common. 2. Similitudes drawn from Material Things, to Im­material, are particularly liable to this Defect. They may, indeed, oft times, serve to illustrate some Truth, as fit Metaphors to sute with our Fancy; but then they presuppose the Truth, which they are to illustrate, to be known some other Way. Whence, unless this be done first, all they can do is to expli­cate we know not what, which destroys the nature of an Explication; for, Ex­plications are not intended to put the Truth of the Point, but suppose it. 3. All [Page 95] the Actions of our Soul are, or ought to be Rational; and have a Dependence on one another, by the way of Rea­son gathering Subsequent Truths from those which preceded. Now, I think, 'tis impossible to be contested by any Man who has read Cartesius's Medita­tions, but that his Discourses which anteceded his finding out this First Principle of his, are reducible to this Enthymem; [For these and these Rea­sons, there can no Certainty be had, as to Speculative Knowledges, by any In­formation had from Outward Objects affecting the Senses; therefore, it ought to be sought for in some Interiour Act of our Mind, which is most Com­prehensive and Peculiar to it,] which he concieved was Cogitation; and thence he laid this First Principle: [Cogito ergo sum] Which being so, it follows ne­cessarily, that the Laying this for his First Principle, depended on the Good­ness of the Reasons he had, why our Senses were not to be trusted, nor could give us our First Notions; whence, by reflecting on their Metaphysical Verity, we might have those Self-evi­dent, and First Truths, of ours. This, [Page 96] I say, was evidently the Tenour of his Discourse; because, did not those Reasons of his, against the Sufficiency of our Senses to give us this Informa­tion, conclude; but that, notwith­standing all those Reasons could prove, the Senses might still imprint on our Mind those First Notions, his Consequent would not have follow'd: Nor, could he have had any Ground for recur­ring to the Interiour Act of Cogitation, for his First Principle, in regard it had been given to his Hand by means of the Senses, as was now declar'd. 4. It being then evident, that the Substance of those antecedent Discourses was summ'd up in the Enthymem now men­tion'd, 'tis manifest, that this Ex­plication of yours falters in the main Particular, in which it ought to sute, and resemble. For, in case those Im­pressions on our Mind could have been made by means of the Senses, as afore­said; then those Impressions, or No­tions, being the Immediate Foundation, on which is built all our Knowledge, could not be call'd, or resembl'd to Rubbish; nor compar'd to a Hole, to lay the Foundation; for, the Holes were [Page 97] already made in those Inlets, our Sen­ses; which were Pervious to the Efflu­viums affecting the Seat of Knowledge; and thence, the Soul. So that your Similitude is, in effect, the Begging the whole Question; and can have no Force at all, but by our Granting it; which, I see plainly, we shall never have Rea­son to do. Rather, unless this Petitio Principii (which is tacitly involv'd in this Parallel) be yielded by us, or prov'd by you, it makes against your selves. For, by Denying all such certain Infor­mation from the Senses, you will be found, not to remove the Rubbish, in order to lay the Foundation; but, to stop up the Way to the laying any; and, to damm up all the Holes, by which the Materials could come into our Minds, where only such a Foundation could have been laid. At least, you see, your Explication amounts to nothing; and, that your Similitude is lame in all its Legs, and has not one Sure Foot to stand on. Which will, I hope, suffi­ciently inform others, that this Way of Explicating, so mightily affected by Cartesius, and his Followers, is ut­terly Insignificant. I shall hope too, [Page 98] that this Paper will light into the hands of some Readers, who are so Intelli­gent, as to discern, that this Explica­tive Way is taken up, to avoid the Way of Rigorous Proof; which is so Unfriendly to a Doctrine that wants Principles.

44. Whence I should give this Ad­vice to all Aristotelians, that whenever the Cartesians would obtrude upon them their Ingenious Explications, they would demand of them smartly, by what Grounds they know, or will prove to others, that what they explicate, is True; without doing which in the first place, no Explication ought to be admitted. It may serve for a kind of Currying Favour with weaker Under­standings; but it can never improve any Intelligent Man in Solid Knowledge, nor make him one Jot the Wiser.

45. After this, we came to argue that other Objection of mine, That First Principles, of all others, must be most Clearly and Distinctly Known; because they ought to be, of all others, most Knowable; there being no others before them, by means of which they might come to be better Known. Now, [Page 99] Cartesius himself expresly confesses, that, when he had found this First Principle, he did not yet sufficiently understand what [Ego,] the Subject in that Principle, meant: Whence I inferr'd, that there­fore, [Cogito ergo sum,] could not be to him a First Principle. This is en­forc'd, because the Subject is the Prin­cipal, and most Substantial Part in eve­ry Proposition: And, since, in ordina­ry Things, when we do not well know what we talk of, plain S [...]nse tells us, 'tis a Folly to talk at all; much more is it Disallowable in Philosophical Mat­ters, where Exact Truth is aim'd at; and most of all in First Principles, which must be most Self-evident. You seem'd to think an Obscure Knowledge of the Subject was sufficient. But, how an Obscure Knowledge can be either Clear, or Distinct; much less, superlatively such: Or, how a Proposition, whose Principal Part is neither Clear, nor Di­stinct, should, notwithstanding, it self, (as here it must,) be most Clear and Distinct, is, I believe, past any Man's Comprehension.

46. However, I let your smooth Explication slide, without pressing my [Page 100] Discourse too forcibly: For, it had been something Rude, at so Civil a Visit in my own Chamber, to push Things forward too rigorously; or, to seem to affect the Victory of a Con­futation. But our Friend urg'd me to bring some one Argument, that might decisively conclude the Point. It came into my Mind, (waving what I had objected elsewhere,) to alledge against it, that A First Principle must be some One Determinate Proposition; where­as it was Evident that this Principle of yours had in it Two, and those ve­ry Different ones. For, [Cogito] is a Speech that Affirms, which Logicians call a Proposition; and involves in it all the Three Parts that compleat such a Speech, being clearly the same as [Ego sum Cogitans;] as [Sum,] for the same Reason, implies, [Ego sum Existens;] which is evidently a Proposition too, and Distinct from the other. Your An­swer was, That, notwithstanding the manner of Expression, they made, or amounted to but One Proposition; and signify'd no more but [Ego sum re Co­gitans.] But I reply'd, That this was the First Proposition; and hence I a [...]k, [Page 101] What becomes of the Later, [Ego sum Existens,] since the Predicate [Exi­stens,] is a quite different Notion from the Predicate [Res Cogitans.] Add, that to prove himself Existent, was the sole Scope Cartesius aim'd at in laying this Principle; as appears by his Words immediately following; viz. [Non­dum tamen satis intelligo quisnam sim Ego ille qui jam necessario sum.] He does not pretend to have evinc'd that he was Res Cogitans, but only necessarily Exi­stent. To enforce this the more, I al­ledg'd, that the Illative Particle [Ergo] did shew plainly, that there were Two Propositions; of which, the One was an Antecedent; the Other, a Consequent. But you would not allow that [Ergo,] in that place, had an Illative Significa­tion; nor, as far as I could discern, any at all; for, I am sure, if it has any, it can have no Other. I remember, you bestirr'd your Wit as dexterously as any Man could in such a Cause, to bring off Cartesius; but 'tis beyond the Power of Wit, or Art, to do it, un­less the most pregnant and significant Words which Rational Creatures can use, must, for his sake, lose their Sig­nification. [Page 102] Which is such an Injury to the rest of Mankind, who would be at a strange Loss to discourse or under­stand one another, were this admitted, that it will never be allow'd by other Philosophers, who are Dis-interessed, and have not that Passionate Concern for Cartesius, as some others seem to have. I remember, Mr. Le Grand tells us, he has spoke to some Exceptions made against this Principle formerly, and, perhaps, this may be one of them. But, as I could not light on that Book of his, so I clearly see, this Particular is so manifest, that 'tis impossible for any Man, in such a Case as this, to answer to the purpose.

47. And thus ended our Discourse; In which, if you had any Disadvan­tage, it proceeded hence, that you would needs undertake to defend Car­tesius's Logick: Whereas, nothing is more Evident, than that, in the far greatest part of his Meditations, (not to speak of some other pieces of his,) he regarded no Rules of Logick at all; but meerly follow'd the Current of his own Ingenious Thoughts, in gliding smoothly and gentilely, from one Thing, [Page 103] to another, as his First Design led him, and in putting his Conceptions Clear­ly; I mean, according to the First sort of Clearness, mention'd above, §. 35. The Summ is this; Without Proposi­tions, we cannot speak; and, without Illative Particles, we cannot make use of our Rationality; both which, not­withstanding, you do not seem very willingly and heartily to admit. Had I been of your Party, I should have advis'd you to have flatly deny'd all Syllogisms, Inferences, Antecedents, Con­sequents; and, in a Word, all Logick, and all kind of Connexion, and then it had been impossible for any Man to Attack you, or bring any Argument against you; I add, nor you any for your selves.

48. The Generality of Mankind (I wish I might not say, of Philosophers too) being much govern'd by Fancy, I am to expect, such a High Specula­tion as is the foregoing Discourse, will scarce find a Civil Entertainment amongst such Gentlemen. However, I hope it will not displease them, if, on this Occasion, I ask them some few pertinent Questions; leaving the Re­solving [Page 104] them to themselves. 1. Whe­ther there be not such Propositions; as those I call Identical? 2. Whether Mathematicians, and some others, who treat of Philosophy in a Mathe­matical Method, have not propos'd such before me, and made use of them? 3. Whether such Propositions are not the most-firmly-Grounded, and the First of all others? 4. Whether they are not Self-evident, and force the Assent of all Mankind? 5. Whether we can be Deceiv'd in Iudging them Self-evi­dent; as we may, and often are, in Judging that we Clearly and Distinct­ly know a thing to be True? 6. Whe­ther they have not an Universal In­fluence, in their Way, over all Truths, especially all Deduced Truths; since 'tis Demonstrable, that all the Force of Consequence is Grounded on them? 7. Whether, all these Qualifications being shewn to be found in the Self-evident Knowableness of Identical Pro­positions, this Clearest Light, or Intel­ligibility, which so necessarily appears in them, ought not, with just Right, entitle Them to be held the RULE by which to know all other Truths? [Page 105] Lastly, Whether this Self-evident Con­nexion of the Terms of a Proposition, found in them, which is Producible open­ly, be not a Clear Means to shew to others, that we do not mistake when we judge them Self evident, and True; since all Mankind that sees them Pro­duc'd, must think the same of them we do? And, whether, on the other side, it can possibly be shewn to others, that our selves do Clearly and Distinctly know a Thing to be True, without pro­ducing finally some Proposition that is Unmistakable and Self-evident to E­very Man? When they have duly weigh'd each of these Particulars, and the Proofs brought for them, I appeal from their Fancy, to their Reason, whe­ther I have not done a Just and Neces­sary Duty to Philosophy, in endea­vouring to settle the Rule of Truth up­on so Solid and Evident a Basis; and, whether I could have been less Specu­lative in such a High Subject, as re­quires a Deep Inspection into the very Center of all Truth whatever, even to the Resolving it Finally and Connatural­ly, into Essential Truth it self? If these Considerations do not acquit me upon [Page 106] either Account, I cannot but think my self Unjustly Condemn'd; and, I hope, the whole Court of Philosophers, who are Impartial, and Sincere, will judge the same.

49. To clear me from Singularity in this Uncommon Method of Philoso­phizing, I could farther alledge, that Mr. Locke, in his Essay, B. 4. ch. 1. §. 4. gives us this Doctrine; that The First Act of the Mind, is, to perceive its own Ideas; and, that One of them is not Another; that is, that each of them is its self only; which is an Identical Pro­position.—That this is so Absolutely Ne­cessary, that, without it, there could be no Knowledge, no Reasoning,—no Distinct Thoughts at all. Which sufficiently ex­presses it to be the First Truth, or RULE of TRUTH, which influen­ces all other Truths; since, without it, nothing at all could be known.—That a Man infallibly knows that the Ideas of White, and Round, are the very Ideas they are.—That this is the First Agree­ment, or Disagreement, (that is, the First Truth,) the Mind perceives in its Ideas.—That Men of Art have, for ready Ap­plication in all Cases, reduc'd this into [Page 107] those General Rules, [What is, is,] &c. In all which, (as he does in divers other main Speculative Points,) he so perfectly agrees with me, that, tho' I did not proceed on my own Grounds, I need no more but these of his, to draw such Immediate Consequences thence, as would establish and abet my Thesis. Indeed, it did not lie in the Way of that very Learned Man's Spe­culation, to reflect on the Universal Influence Identical Propositions have over all Truths, and all Knowledges, whatever; and therefore, his Dis-like of them afterwards, (chap. 8.) can be thought to relate only to their appre­hended Uselesness: Tho', even there, (§. 2.) he acknowledges an Excellent Use of them too; where he says, that [What is, is,] may serve sometimes, (he might have said, Always when it need­ed,) to shew a Man the Absurdity he is Guilty of, when, by Circumlocution, or Ambiguous Terms, he would, in particu­lar Instances, deny the same Thing of it self; because no body will so openly bid Defiance to Common Sense, as to affirm Visible and Direct Contradictions, in plain Words. To which Reflexion of his, if [Page 108] this Learned Gentleman pleases to add, That whoever discourses False on any Subject, does, at the same time, make that Subject not to be what it is, or (if the Question be of some Mode) as it is; his Penetrative Judgment cannot but discern, that Identical Propositions are Equally Useful in all Questions, all Disputes, nay, all Discourses whatso­ever, if the Way of Reducing Inferiour Truths to Them, were but well im­prov'd, and cultivated.

50. I much value your good Opi­nion; and, I perceiv'd, I was in dan­ger of losing it, by a hint you gave me, with a Dis-relishing Air, that I call'd Cartesius a Fanatick; which you thought very harsh. In Answer, I de­ny the Charge. 'Tis one Thing to say, that, when Cartesius was laying his Me­thod to Science, by denying his Senses, and devesting himself of all his former Knowledges, which (as my Author expresses it) was no less than to Un­man himself, he fell, for some few Days, into a Spice of Enthusiasm; nay, was brim-full of it; and fancy'd he had Vi­sions and Revelations; so that he seem'd Crack-brain'd, or to have drunk a Cup [Page 109] too much; which are the very Words a Cartesian, who wrote his Life, has given us, (p. 34, 35, 36.) And, 'tis another Thing to say, he was habitual­ly a Fanatick, or Enthusiast, all his Life, and in every Action he did, or Book he writ; the Former of which can neither be deny'd with Truth, nor the Later objected with any Degree of Mo­desty: Nor does it sute with the high Character I have given of him, in the Preface to my Method, and the Enco­miums I have, upon Occasion, bestow­ed on divers of his Books. I beseech you, Sir, be so Just, as to stare my Case right. I was writing a ME­THOD to SCIENCE, and two other Methods, (if, indeed, they do not fall into the same,) which look'd ve­ry Extravagant, did lie cross my Way; which, unless I remov'd, my whole Design had been spoil'd, and of no Ef­fect. I mean, that of Malbranche, which makes all Humane Science come by Di­vine Revelation: And, that of Cartesius, that we must deny all our Knowledge of Natural Truths, had by our Senses. The settling this Later Method, had, confessedly, lost Cartesius his Wits, for [Page 110] some time; and therefore, I had good reason to fear, that the following the same Method might do a greater Mis­chief to others, who had not such Strong Brains as that Great Man had; of which too, there do not want In­stances. The former Method, advan­ced by Malbranche, I saw evidently, brought a kind of Fanaticism into Phi­losophy. For, I believe, no Man doubts, but that the Genius of Fana­ticks is, to over-leap all Humane Means, and to pretend that their Light of Knowledge comes to them immediate­ly from GOD. My Fault, then, on­ly consisted in this, that I was such a Friend to Truth, and to Mankind, as to endeavour (to my Power) to avert such Mischiefs from young Students, by fore-warning them of what had prejudic'd others, and therefore might highly prejudice them; and, to con­fute those Ways to Science, that so di­rectly thwarted mine, which, my best Judgment told me, was the True one. Now, this being a Task so Unavoid­able to one in my Circumstances; and the Confuting such strange Methods being, with good Reason, judg'd by [Page 111] me to be so Beneficial to others, it can­not, without Rashness, be thought, I did this out of a Desire of Opposing other Learned Men; but, purely out of Duty to my Reader, and a just Re­gard to my self. Yet, for pursuing this Laudable and (in my Case) Ne­cessary Intention, I am persecuted with the highest Malice, by two over-zea­lous Cartesians; who, to uphold these Aukward and Pernicious Methods, make no Scruple to break in upon the most Sacred Methods of Christianity; tho' I have done no more but cite the Words of their own Authors. Be­sides, every Candid Reader will, hence, easily discern, that it is not out of Pique against their Persons; but, purely, out of my Dis-like of their Unprincipl'd and Dangerous Methods, that I have oppos'd them at all. Nor have I any Personal Reflexions upon their Mora­lity: Nor do I charge them with Im­piety, but of Folly; which every An­tagonist in Philosophical Debates is forc'd to object to his Adversary.

51. But, am I the only Man, of our Moderns here in England, who have thought it the Interest of Philosophy, [Page 112] and of Truth, to oppose Malbranche and Cartesius? Mr. Iohn Keyll, of Ox­ford; a Person of Great Wit, and Greater Hopes, being (as I am infor­med) scarce arriv'd yet at the Summer of his Age, has lately put forth An Examination of Dr. Burnet's Theory of the Earth; where, after he had, in his Introduction, discover'd the Fopperies of divers of the Antient Philosophers; and of three of our Moderns, Spinoza, Dr. More, and Mr. Hobbs, not much less Ridiculous than the former; he lays open that superlatively absurd O­pinion of Malbranche, which I noted above. He gives us a Summary, and Parallel Consequences, of his Doctrine in that particular; which is, That We see not the Things themselves, but only their Ideas, which the Soul sees in GOD:—And, that there is no possibility of see­ing any Bodies, except in that Being, (GOD;) which contains them after an Intelligible manner.—Bodies, therefore, and their Properties, are (only) seen in GOD; so that (says he) a Man who reads this Book, does not really see the Book it self, but the Idea of it, which is in GOD. Which he deservedly cha­racters, [Page 113] to be Unintelligible Iargon, and a Solid piece of Nonsense. He exposes that equally-senseless Opinion, That Bodies, of their own Nature, are neither heard, seen, smelt, nor tasted; and, that when, for Example, we Taste any thing, the Body Tasted cannot produce any Sa­vour in us; but GOD Almighty takes that Occasion, to stir up that Sensa­tion in us, to which the Body does not really concurr. So that Mankind has, it seems, quite lost its Animality; at least, that we are not Naturally Sensi­tive Creatures, but only Supernaturally; or, by GOD's Immediate Power ma­king us such, every time we are to use our Senses. He proceeds: According to him, it is impossible for any Man to move his own Arm; but, when he is Willing to move it, GOD takes it, and moves it up and down, as the Man Wills. If a Rebellious Son, or Subject, murther his Father, or his Prince, by stabbing him, the Man himself does not thrust the Pon­yard into his Father's or Prince's Breast, But GOD Almighty does it, without any other Concurrence of the Man, but his Will. It seems, our Laws are very Unjust; which do not Hang Men for [Page 114] meerly Intending, or Willing; but for Ouvert-Acts; in which the Man himself has no hand at all; they being, all of them, entirely of GOD's doing. Whence we see, that, with the Cartesians, such Doctrine as this has no Impiety in it at all against GOD: It comes from Them, and so 'tis all Sacred. He proceeds, and affirms that no Second Causes act: So that no Body, tho' mov'd with never so great a Velocity against another, can be able to drive that other before it, or move it in the least; but GOD takes that Oc­casion, to put it into Motion. At this rate, one need not fear his Head-piece, tho' a Bomb were falling upon it, with all the Force that Powder can give it; for, it would not so much as break his Skull, or singe his Hair, of GOD did not take that Occasion to do it.—The most Natural Agents, with him, are not so much as Instruments, but only Occa­sions of what is produc'd by them: So that a Man might freely pass through the Fire, or jump down a Precipice, without any Harm, if GOD Almighty did not take that Occasion to burn him, or dash out his Brains.

[Page 115] 52. Coming to Cartesius, whom he calls the Great Master and Deliverer of the Philosophers, from the Tyranny of A­ristotle; —and the First World-Maker of our Century, he lays the Blame at his door, of all this presumptuous Pride of his Followers, and their Fantastick Philosophy; and animadverts severe­ly upon divers of his odd Placita: As, that there is always the same Quantity of Motion in the World. So that, if all the Men and Animals in the World were Moving, which most part of them can do when they please; yet, still there would be no more Motion in the World, than there is in the Night-time, when they are at Rest; and, what Motion they had when they were Moving, must be commu­nicated to the Aether, when they are at Rest. And, whereas Cartesius's Skill in Geometry gave those Contrivances of his Witty Fancy all their Credit, this Author assures us, p. 15. that, from the beginning to the end of his Principles, there is not one Demonstration drawn from Geometry; or, indeed, any Demonstration at all, except every Thing illustrated by a Figure be a Demonstration; for, then, in­deed, there may be enow of such Demon­strations [Page 116] produc'd in his Philosophi­cal Works. Now, in case this be so, then, it seems, Explications by Figures do serve Cartesius, and his Followers, for Demonstrations in Geometry, as well as Explications by Words serve them for Demonstrations, or Proofs, in other Scien­ces. —He adds, that, His great Fault was, that he made no Use at all of Geo­metry in Philosophy.—Nay, that His whole System was but one continual Blun­der, upon account of his Negligence in that Point.—That Galileo and Kepler have by the Help of Geometry, discover'd Phy­sical Truths, more worth than all Carte­sius's Volumes of Philosophy. He con­futes his Vortices, by Mr. Newton's Principles; who shews it impossible, up­on many Accounts; that the Earth, and other Planets, should move in a Vortex. With which most Consummate Geo­metrician, I believe, none of the Car­tesians will be willing, or able, to grap­ple, or contend. And, were Cartesius now alive, perhaps he would have as much admir'd Him, as Himself, in his Life-time, was admir'd by others.—He subjoins, that, His Notion of a Vortex being ruin'd, the whole Cartesian System must [Page 117] of necessity fall to the Ground: And, that World, whose Origination he pretended to have deduced from Mechanical Principles, must be a wild Chimera of his own Ima­gination. He affirms, that Cartesius's Discourse about the Motion of the Moon, is so notoriously False, that there is no Al­manack-maker, but can demonstrate the contrary. Farther, That the Cartesians pretend to give a true Account of all the Phaenomena in Nature; whilst they un­derstand so very little, that they have not given us an Explication of any one Thing:—And, that Cartesius has blunder'd so much in the easiest, and most abstract Things in Nature, that of the Seven Rules he has given of the Laws of Motion, there is but One of them True. Lastly, He af­firms, that Cartesius's Fancy of Making a World by Mechanical Principles,—has given the Ignorant Atheists (for, so are, says he, most of that Persuasion) some plausible Pretences for their Incredulity, without any Real Ground. Where the the Parenthesis lays such a Blemish on the greater Part of the Followers of Cartesius, and on his Doctrine, as oc­casioning it, that, as I have charitably endeavour'd, in divers places, to wipe [Page 118] off that Aspersion, and have taken their part; so, I am sorry to see now, that 'tis beyond my Power to do it. I must own, that there have been many Vertuous Persons, Cartesians; but I am not so well vers'd in their Catalogue, as to to know, whether they, or the Athèists of that Persuasion, do make the Major Part. These are his present Objections against Des Cartes; and, by what I have read of this Learned Author, I know no Man more likely to make good what he has charged upon him, than He is.

53. You see, Sir, how much it be­hoves the Cartesians to look to their Hits, if they have any; and, to arm themselves against such brisk Attacks, tending to the Overthrow of all their Hypothesis by way of Geometry; which I have attempted to do by way of Lo­gical, Physical, and Metaphysical Prin­ciples. For, if this Opposition to Carte­sius, by Geometrical Arguments, should come to be a Confutation; then, since Mr. Le Grand tells us, his Physicks is but a Part of the Mathematicks, his Credit, as a Philosopher, will sink utterly; as I am inform'd, the Esteem of his Do­ctrine [Page 119] does, by large degrees, in both the Universities; or rather, it is quite vanish'd out of one of them already.

54. For my part, let them come off with the Geometricians as well as they can, I will not give them much Trou­ble; but, do sincerely declare, that if they can bring any one Evident Princi­ple, either in Logick, Physicks or Me­taphysicks, which they will vouch to have the Nature of a Principle in it; and prove that it abets any Point of their Doctrine, as 'tis distinguish'd from ours, I will cross the Cudgels for the next Comer, and promise, never to oppose them more. Fairer Offer was never made; nor any Method ever propos'd, that shews a greater Sinceri­ty of the Proposer in pursuing Truth, nor that can be more Decisive of a Phi­losophical Contest; in which, half a Sheet of Paper will do the Business, as well as whole Volumes. You see, Sir, I allow my Adversaries a large Field; out of which they may please to pick and cull what they like best, or judge they can best prove. If they know of any thing that grows there, which will bear the Test, and can approve it self by [Page 120] Principles, to be an Evident Truth, they have Free Liberty, and a fair Occasion to do Right to themselves, and oblige the World; and, withall, they will do Me an Especial Favour, (for which I shall not be Ungrateful,) in making me, by their Confutation, see a Truth I never knew before. This very Com­pendious Method, I say, will shorten Disputes, avoid all shew of Wrangling, which is grateful to no Man; and, fi­nally conclude the whole Cause. Or, if this does not please them; and, that it agrees not with their Genius to stand bringing Evident Proofs; then, let them but meerly name, or put down Categorically, any one Principle of theirs, which they judge to be the Strongest, and most Evident, of any they have; and, which they will vouch to be Influential upon the Cartesian Do­ctrine; and I will undertake to De­monstrate, that either it is no Principle, or, that it has no Force to prove any Point of their Doctrine, nor has any Influence upon it at all. In case this Rational Proposal (which, if both Par­ties do candidly seek Truth, ought ra­ther to be call'd an Overture of Peace, [Page 121] than a Challenge) be as friendly Accept­ed as it is meant, it must needs draw upon us both the Eyes of all Learned Men who are Lovers of Truth, and are Weary of Long Disputes; especially, if they be concern'd to know whether the so much fam'd Philosophy of Car­tesius be Solidly Principl'd, or only Ex­travagantly Witty: And, their Expecta­tion will be strangely rais'd, to see what will be the Issue of a Controver­sie thus closely manag'd; our Philo­sophical Combat being, by this means, brought to the Last Trial, and a Final Decision by Principles, which are the Arma Decretoria or Truth. For, if it shall hap to appear that Cartesius's Doctrine has not so much as any One Principle, which is truly such, their Cause will be quite lost, past hopes of Recovery: But, if it subsists by Prin­ciples, then I must make them Satisfa­ction, by acknowledging publickly, that I have foolishly over-ween'd▪ and take the Shame to my self, for my Rash Presumption. We may confine our selves (as I said) to half a Sheet of Paper: All shall be transacted by pure Dint of Reason; and, he that uses the [Page 122] least Uncivil Word to his Adversary, and falls into Passion, shall be held to have lost his Cause, and to be reduc'd to a Nonplus. Every Man, acquainted with Humane Affairs, knows that, in some Cases, [Responsum non dictum,] may be a sufficient Plea to justifie one who is to vindicate his Christian Cre­dit, unjustly attack'd, without any Provocation given to his Opposer. It happens too, often times, that a Man cannot clear himself fully of those Ble­mishes with which he is aspers'd, but by laying them at the Door of the In­jurious Affronter; whose Faults, if they be Great ones, cannot be so much as Nam'd, but the Words which ex­press them must needs sound harshly. Retorted Language, in such a Case, is only the Rebound of the Aggressor's Violent Strokes, upon Himself; and are not thrown at him, but only Rever­berated from an Object incapable to re­ceive their Impression. But, especial­ly, such a Replier is excusable, when he observes such a Temper and Mea­sure, that he imputes no Impiety or Ir­religion to his Adversary; but rather, charitably excuses him from any such [Page 123] high Crimes, even tho' he had causles­ly, and uncharitably, imputed the same to himself; which (as I hope every Man will observe) is the distinguish­ing Character between Mr. Le Grand's Aggressive, and my Defensive. Not­withstanding, however such a Car­riage against an Assaulter may, in Prudence, seem sometimes unavoid­able; yet, certainly, it is, in it self, neither Edifying to good Christians, In­structive to the Learned, nor Profitable to the Readers. Therefore, to avoid it for the future, and to clear Truth, which ought to be our only Care, I have thought fit to make this Fairest and Civillest Overture. If it be ac­cepted, neither Party, in case they do seek Truth, can be justly displeas'd. But if it be refus'd, and that my Op­posers resolve to pursue their former Rude Method, I shall hope that all Wise and Good Men will hold me Excus'd, (I dare say, your self will,) if I de­cline the Ungrateful Task of Recipro­cating the Saw of Contention; but let them still wrangle on contentedly to themselves, and apply my Thoughts to better Things.

[Page 124] 55. It remains, Worthy Sir, that I beg your Pardon for Publishing this Paper, without acquainting you first with my Design. But, since you are not nam'd in it, it need not concern you in the least, unless you please your self. Besides, I have discours'd with other Cartesians, of your Profession, upon the same Subject; and, added, for their sakes, some Passages, which, otherwise, had not needed: So that it cannot particularize you, in the least. And, since this Paper has no other Tendency, but to clear Truth, I have reason to presume, that your Candour would not have been displeas'd at it. I intreat you to do me that Justice in your Thoughts, as not to interpret this Address, by way of Letter, to be a kind of Challenge, or Provocation. I am too well acquainted with the Study and Practise, in which you are so Lau­dably and Successfully. employ'd, to think it can allow you any Leasure for an Avocation so Impertinent to your Proper and Precise Business. I hope my [Ideae Cartesianae Expensae] may give you Satisfaction in divers other [Page 125] Points. But, I must bespeak your Pardon, while you peruse it, for the many Errata. It happen'd, that the Compositor understood no Latin; and (besides other Faults,) in two or three places, he hapt to put in what I had blotted out in amending my Copy; and, my Circumstances were such, that I could not always be in Town, to correct the Press. I am,