A LETTER from The Authour of Sure-footing, to his Answerer.

SIR,

I Am certainly inform'd there is an Answer to my Book intended, and a Person chosen out for that Employment; whose Name I am unconcern'd to know, it being only his Qua­lity as a Writer I have to do with. I receive the Alarum with great chearfulness; knowing that, if my Adversary behaves himself well, it will exceedingly conduce to the clearing and settling the main point there controverted. But, be­cause there is difference between being call'd an Answer and being an Answer, and that 'tis ex­tremely opposit to my Genius, to be task't in lay­ing open mens Faults even as Writers, (though it has been my unhappiness formerly to meet with Adversaries, whose way of writing made that carriage my only duty) wherefore to prevent, as much as I am able, all occasion of such un­savory oppositions, and to make way to the clearing the point, that so our Discourse may redound to the profit and satisfaction of our Readers, I make bold to offer you these few Re­flexions; which in effect contain no more but a Request you would speak to the point, and in such a way as is apt to bring the matter nearer a clearing. This if you please to do, you will [Page 2] very much credit your self and your endeavours in the opinion of all ingenuous persons. If you refuse, and rather chuse to run into Rhetorical Excursions, and such Discourses as are apt to breed new Controversies not pertinent to the present one under hand, you will extreamly dis­parage both your self, your party and your Cause, and give me an exceeding advantage against them all; I shall also have the Satisfacti­on to have manifested before-hand by means of this Letter, that I have contributed as much as in me lies to make you avoid those Faults, which I must then be forc't to lay open and severely press upon you, little to your Credit nor your Causes neither; You being (as I am inform [...]d and Reason gives it) signally chosen out as held most able to maintain it.

2. That there may be no more distance be­tween us than what our Cause enforces, I hearti­ly assure you that though I highly dislike your Tenets negatively opposit to what we hold Faith, and the Way of Writing I foresee you must take (unless you resolve to love Candour better than your Cause) as being Inconclusive and so apt to continue not finish debates, yet I have not the least pique against yours or any mans Person. Nor have I any particular aversion against the Prote­stant party; rather I look upon it with a better eye than on any other Company whatever which has broke Communion with the Catholick Church: It preserves still unrenounc't the form of Episco­pacy, [Page 3] the Church-Government instituted by Christ; and many grave Solemnities and Cere­monies, which make our Union less difficult: Many of their soberest Writers acknowledge di­vers of the renounc't Tenets to be Truths: some of them also profess to hold Tradition, especially for Scripture's Letter; and even for those Points or Faith-Tenets in which they and we agree; that is, where their Interest is not touch't. I wish they would as heartily hold to it in all other Points which descended by it, and look into the Virtue it has of ascertaining, and declare in what that Virtue consists; I am confident, a little can­dour of confessing truly what they finde, joyn'd with an endeavour of looking into Things rather than Words, would easily make way to a fair Correspondence. I esteem, and even honour the Protestants from my heart for their firm Allegi­ance to his Sacred Majesty and his Royal Father; This uniting them already with all sober Catho­liks under that excellent notion of good Subjects, and in the same point of Faith, the Indispensa­bleness of the duty of Allegiance we owe our Prince by Divine Law. Lastly I declare, that for this as well as for Charitable Considerations, I have a very particular zeal for their reconcile­ment to their Mother-Church; and that 'tis out of this love of Union I endeavour so earnestly to beat down the wordish and dissatisfactory way of Writing, and go about to Evidence the Ground of all our Faith; knowing, that, as wounds are [Page 4] never connaturally and solidly cur'd, by uniting the distant sides at the surface, and leaving them disunited and unheal'd at the bottom, but the cure must begin there first; so, the onely Way to heal the Wounds of the Church, is to begin first to win some to acknowledge the most radical and bottom-Principle of all Faith, as controverted between us; without which all agreement in par­ticular points must needs be unsound and hollow-hearted. This is my onely aym in Sure-Footing. That therefore you may not obstruct so good a work, and withall perform the duty of a solid and candid Writer, I offer to your self and all ingenuous Readers these few Reflexions: not sprung from my Will (for what Authority have I to prescribe you your method) but from true Reason working upon the Thing; which makes it just duty in you, and so ought oblige you to follow it.

3. In the first place, since the scope of my whole Book is about the First Principle in Con­troversy, or the Ground of all Faith, as to our Knowledge; that is, about a Point antecedent to all particular Points; I conceive it reasonable you should let your Discourse stand firm to the mat­ter in hand, and not permit it to slide into Con­troversies about Particulars. For so, 'tis evident, we shall be apt to multiply many words little to our present purpose. On what conditions you may have right to alledge Particulars as pretend­ed Instances of Traditions failing, shall be seen hereafter.

[Page 5]4. Next, I desire you would please to speak out Categorically, and declare whether you hold Faith absolutely Certain to us, or else Possible to be false for any thing we know. To explicate my self better, that so I may void some common and frivolous Distinctions, my intent is to de­mand of you in behalf of the Christian Reader and his due satisfaction, whether you hold Gods Providence has laid in the whole Creation any Certain means, by way of Proper Causes to such an Effect, to bring down Faith truly to us, and whether we can arrive at Certain Knowledge of those means, that is, come to see or know the Connexion between such Causes and their Effect spoken of. I make bold to press you earnestly to this declaration; and my reason is, because no­thing will more conduce to the Conclusion of our present Debate: For, in case such Causes be laid and can be seen by us, then they are Evident or Demonstrative Reasons for the Ground of our Faith's Certainty: But, if no such Causes be laid, or being laid, cannot be seen by us, then all the Wit of man can never avoid the conse­quence, but that we can have onely Probability for all our Faith; that is, for any thing we abso­lutely know, 'tis all as false as an old wife's tale; since there are no degrees in Truths and Fals­hoods. If you advance this Civil piece of Athei­stry, you must pardon me if I be smart with you in opposition to so damnable and Fundamental an Errour: I love Christianity and Mankinde too [Page 6] well to suffer that Position which destroyes effe­ctually the Root of all their Eternal Happiness, and the Substance of all their Hope, to pass un­stigmatiz'd, as it deserves. Nor think to avail your self by some Discoursers in our Schools, It will be shown, when prest, that they are still pre­serv'd good Christians through the virtue of Tra­dition which they all hold to, notwithstanding their private speculations: but you not, because of your want of Certain Grounds, to make you rationally hold Christs Faith. They onely mistook a Word, whereas you will be found to erre in the whole Thing, or the ordinary Means to true Chri­stianity.

Again, if such Causes be fitting to be laid by God's Providence, 'tis impossible to avoid the Doctrin propos'd in Sure-Footing, because 'tis absolutely Impossible to invent any thing that looks like such Causes, but those which are de­liver'd there; nor did any other Way ever at­tempt to show any such. Whence I foresee your Cause will force you to fly for refuge to the actu­al Uncertainty, or possible Falshood of all our Faith for any thing any man living knows by ordinary means. A sad consequence of an erro­neous tenet! But 'tis connatural, and, so to be expected, such Effects should follow the renoun­cing the Rule of Faith.

5. Thirdly, I conceive it very reasonable that you would please to declare whether Controversy ought to have any First Principle or no; If none [Page 7] then to speak candidly out, and confess that Con­trovertists are Certain of nothing they say, since their discourse has no Ground or First Principle to rely on. If any, whether Tradition be It; or, if it be not, what else is; and then vouch (as plain reason tells us you ought) that what you assigne has truly in it the nature of a First Prin­ciple, which common Reason gives to be self-evidence. Or, lastly, to profess (if you judge it your best play) that, what you substitute in stead of Tradition, though it be a First Principle, yet it need not be at all self-evident. Any thing shall content me, so you will but please to speak out, and to the point.

6. Again, since it is evidently your task to argue against Tradition's Certainty, 'tis as Evi­dent that while you argue against it, you must bear your self as holding It uncertain; I conceive then plain Reason obliges you not to produce any thing against Tradition which depends upon Tradition for its Certainty; for, in doing so you would invalidate and even nullify all your own proofs: Since, if Tradition be held by you un­certain, and they have no certainty but by means of It, they must be confest Uncertain too; and so they would be incompetent to be produc't as proofs, and your self very dis-ingenuous to pro­duce them: I add self-contradicting too, and Vnskilful; Nature and Aristotle teaching us, that a Discourser ought not sustain contrary to himself. Hence plainest Reason excludes you [Page 8] from alledging any kind of Testimony, either from Scripture, Councils, Fathers, or History, till you answer my Corollaries 12, 15, 16. which pretend to demonstrate the Certainty of all these depen­dent on Tradition's; and the onely way to show my discourses there to be weak, is to manifest my mistake by declaring into what other thing your Certainty of those Testimonies is finally re­solvable, which is not coincident with Tradition▪ When you produce such a Principle, and prove it such, you have right to alledge the foresaid Te­stimonies, for then you can make good their Authority: Till then, you can have no right in true reason to do it. Not onely, because till then you are to be held a Renouncer of that Thing's Certainty upon which there are pretended de­monstratious against you Theirs is built; and those presum'd true ones, because you let such strongest Attempts pass unanswer'd; but very particularly for this Consideration that our pre­sent matter restrains you from it: For, our dis­course is about the Ground of that Authority which ascertains to us Faith; which therefore is antecedent to the notions of Faith, Faithful, Church, Councils, Fathers, nay and creditable History-books too; since those rely on Tradition (taken at large) for their Certainty, as is evident by plain reason, Coroll. 16, 24. which devolves into this, that Tradition is FIRST AUTHO­RITY, and so not proovable or disproovable by any other secondary Authorities, but ought to [Page 9] be impugn'd by pure Reason. But, if you think fit to grant this Certainty to Tradition taken at large, yet deny it to Christian Tradition, which hath, besides its Human force, most powerful Di­vine Motives also to strengthen it; please to speak it out, and the strange unreasonableness of the position will quickly be made appear. Or, if you grant Christian Tradition Certain in bringing down those common Points in which we agree, yet Fallible, nay actually erring, in bringing down to us those other points which we were found holding upon Tradition when you left us, and for which, as grievous Errors, you pretended to leave us; please to declare in what you hold the virtue of Tradition consists, ascertaining to us both those common points, and how we come to know Tradition is engag'd for them; which done, it will quickly appear whether its ascertaining vir­tue has its Effect upon some, and not others; or on all. Unless you do this, your very admittance of Tradition's Certainty in some, overthrows you without more ado: for, to acknowledge it argumentative for the Certainty of some, grants it a virtue of Ascertaining, which therefore you are oblig'd to grant in all, unless you give the reason of your Exception: otherwise to admit it when your Interest is not toucht, and reject it when it opposes you, is plainly to confess that Tradition is able to certify, yet that you admit it when you list, and reject it when you list.

7. Being inform'd then by Evident Reason, [Page 10] that no kind of Authority but only the way of Reason is a competent Weapon to fight against Tradition with; I have three things to propose to your Thoughts on this occasion, which I hope will sound reasonable to any intelligent man by the very mentioning. First, that you would not alledge such Argumments as strike as well at the Constancy of every Species in Nature, especial­ly Rational Nature; that is, such natural Medi­ums as tend to destroy all Natural Certainty. Secondly, that your objections be not forrain, or fetch't from afar of; for these are multiplia­ble without End, and apt to be suggested by Fancy upon every not-seeing the coherence of some other remote (whether real or conceited) Truth, with the Tenet we aim to impugn; but that they be immediate and close, that is, taken out of the Intrinsecal Nature of the Thing; For so, they will be more forcible and by conse­quence be apt to do your Cause much service; and unless they be such, they will do it none: For, in regard my whole process is grounded on the nature of the Thing, as appears by my Tran­sition, and every Logician knows that remote and common considerations are liable, for any thing we know, to be connected or not-connect­ed with the point we would apply them to, be­cause we see no Connexion but what's Immedi­ate; it follows that 'tis a very incompetent and dissatisfactory way to impugn an Adversary who endeavours all along to frame his discourse out of [Page 11] the Intrinsecal Nature of the Thing, by re­mote, or unimmediate, that is, indeed, Uncon­nected Mediums. The third thing I request is, that you either grant that no Argument or Rea­son is Conclusive, Obliging-to-Assent, or Satis­factory, but what is either Proper (at least Ne­cessary) Cause or Effect; or else show us out of Logick that other Mediums have this virtue, and how they come to have it. This way of proce­dure will give me a great respect for you as ta­king honestly the Way which is apt to clear Truth; and you will have this Satisfaction to your Conscience that you have endeavour'd it to your power by following the best method you could imagin to give your Cause its due advan­tage, in case it can bear that Test; that is, in case it be Truth. And, if it cannot bear it, that is, if it be no Truth, 'tis your own best Advan­tage by this strict procedure to have discover'd it. Your Judicious Readers also that look seri­ously for satisfaction, will rest much edify'd and thankfull for your pursuing that Method which is likely to save them a great deal of fruitless pains in reading multitudes of books writ in a loose way, whence no Conclusion or Satisfaction is likely to result.

8. My fifth request, and I hope 'tis just and reasonable, is this; that, if you conceive your Discourse has made good the Certainty of Writ­ten Authorities or quoted Testimonies, without Tradition, (which I see is impossible,) and hence [Page 12] you make account you have title to produce them against Tradition's Certainty, (That being the matter in hand) and therefore you resolve to pursue the way of Citing Authours; you would then be pleas [...]d to vouch your Citations to have truly in them the nature of Testimonies; that is, to be built on Sensible Knowledge, and not on Speculative, or Opinion in the Authour alledg'd, and that they fall under none of Dr. Pierce's faulty or Inconclusive Heads; or else show they are Conclusive though thus Faul­ty, which is done by confuting my Grounds laid in my First Appendix. §. 6, 7, 8. Or, lastly, to declare, that though thus Faulty and Inconclusive they ought still to be alledg [...]d; and to give your reason for it; which, candidly spoken out, I am sure will be this, that you must either produce such, or none. I hope all our ingenuous Rea­ders will think me very reasonable, who am well contented with any thing which is spoke out expressly and declaratively of what method or way of Satisfying you take; and onely desire you would not quote and speak confusedly and in common, as if you meant to persuade your Readers that your discourse has in it some strange force taken in the bulk, though you will vouch no one particular piece of it to be Certain; or, as if you suppos'd their reasons were to be amaz'd and stupify'd meerly at the vene­rable Names of Authors and the solemnity of a diverse-letter'd, or diverse-languag'd quotation, [Page 13] without clearing to their Judgements the virtue by which such Citations can pretend to have force able to subdue their understandings to As­sent, or (which is all one) satisfy them. If you re­fuse to do me reason in this point, and still resolve to pursue the huddling together Testimonies without warranting their Certainty by showing upon rational grounds they must be such, I shall declare beforehand to my Readers, that I must be forc't to do right to my self; which is, to rank all your Testimonies under Dr. Pierce's Faulty Heads, and so let them go as they are.

9. Particularly, I beg the Justice of you not to think to over-bear me with the conceiv'd Au­thority of other Divines resolving Faith in their Speculative Thoughts after another manner than I do: since this can onely tend to stir up Invidi­ousness against my person (which yet their charity secures me from) and not any wayes to invali­date my discourse. For, every one knows tis no news Divines should differ in their way of ex­plicating their Tenet, which they both notwith­standing hold never the less firmly; and every learned man understands that the word Divine, importing a man of Skill or Knowledge in such a matter, no Divine has any Authority but from the Goodness of the Proofs or Reasons he brings and on which he builds that Skill. Please then to bring, not the empty pretence of a Divines Authority or Name to oppose me with, and I shall freely give you leave to make use of the Vir­tue [Page 14] of their Authorities, that is their Reasons a­gainst me as much as you will. I easily yeeld to those great discoursers, whoever they be, a pre­cedency in other Speculations and Knowledges, to which they have been more addicted, and for which they have been better circumstanc't; In this one of the Ground of Faith, both my much Practice, my particular Application, my Dis­courses with our nations best Wits of all sorts, my perusing our late acute Adversaries and the An­swers to them, with other Circumstances; and lastly, my serious and industrious studying the Point, join'd with the clearing Method God's Providence has led me to, have left me (as far as I know) in no disadvantage. What would avail you against me and our Church too (for my Interest as defending Tradition is indissolubly linkt with Hers) is, to show that our Church proceeds not on Tradition, or that in Her Definitions She professes to resolve Faith an­other way rather than mine, or (which is equivalent) to rely on somthing else more firm­ly and fundamentally than on Tradition. But the most express and manifold Profession of the Council of Trent to rely constantly on Tradi­tion, has so put this beyond all possible Cavil on my side, that I neither fear your Skill can show my Grounds in the least subcontrary to hers, nor the Goodness of any Learned and considering Catholik (however some may conceive the In­fallibility of the Church plac't ad abundantiam [Page 15] in somthing else) will or can ever dislike it. I ex­pect you may go about to disgrace my Way as new: But I must ask, whether you mean the sub­stance of it is new, or onely that 'tis now deeper look't into and farther explicated than formerly: If you say the former, my Consent of Authorities (p. 126, 127, &c.) has clearly shown the contra­ry; and common sense tells us no other way was or could be possibly taken (for the Generality of the Church at least) in Primitive times till Scrip­ture was publisht universally and collected: If the later, please to reflect, that every farther Ex­plication or Declaration, as far as 'tis farther, must needs be new; and so, instead of disgracing us, you most highly commend our reasons for draw­ing consequences farther than others had done before us. Again, if it be onely a farther Expli­cation, 'tis for that very reason not-new; since the Sence of the Explication is the same with the thing explicated; As 'tis onely an Explication, then 'tis not-new; as farther, 'tis indeed new, but withal innocent, nay commendable. But there are three things more to be said on occasion of this object­ing Catholik Divines; One is, that, taking Tra­dition for the living voice of the present Church as I constantly declare my self to do, not one Catholick does or can deny it; for he would eo ipso become no-Catholick but an Arch-heretick; and this all acknowledge. In the thing explica­ted then, that is, in the notion of Tradition all agree with me (and consequently in the Substance [Page 16] of my Explication) nor can any do otherwise, ex­cept they be equivocated in the Word Tradition and mistake my meaning, which I conceive none will do wilfully after they have read here my declaration of it so unmistakably laid down. The second thing is, that an Alledger of those Divines will onely quote their Words as Speculaters, not those in which they deliver themselves naturally as Christians or Believers; which Sayings were they collected, we should finde them unanimous­ly sounding to my advantage, and not one of them oppositely. And, lastly, speaking of our Explica­tion as to its manner, Divines contradict one ano­ther in other kinds of Explications, but not one Author can be alledged that expresly contradict [...] this which I follow.

10. My sixth request is, that you would speak to the main of my Book, and not catch at some odd words, on the by as it were: Otherwise, un­derstanding Readers will see this is not to answer▪ but to cavil.

11. And, because we are (I hope) both of u [...] endeavouring to clear Truth (I am sure we ough [...] to be so) therefore, to acquit your self to you [...] Readers that you ingenuously aim at it, I con­ceive you will do your self a great deal of right and me but reason, nay (which is yet weightier) do the common Cause best service, if you wil [...] joyn with me to retrench our Controversie a [...] much as we can. Let us then avoid all Rheto­rical Digressions and Affectations of Witty and [Page 17] fine Language; which I have declin'd in my whole Book, and chosen a plain downright man­ner of Expression, as most sutable and connatu­tural to express Truth. Likewise all Repetitions of what particulars others have said or answer'd before us, such as are the Objections made by that ingenious person, the L. Faukland, and the Answers given them in the Apology for Traditi­on; unless it be conceiv'd those Solutions are in­sufficient, and Reasons be offer'd why they are judg'd so. For I conceive it an endless folly to transcribe and reprint any thing others have done before us, except it be Grounds which ought to be oft inculcated and stuck to; and those parti­culars which we show to be not yet invalidated, but to preserve still their strength. Much less do I suspect it can fall under the thought of one who aims to discourse rationally (such my An­swerer ought to be) to rake together all the filth and froth of the unwarrantable Actions or Opi­nions of some in the Church, or to run on end­lesly with multitudes of invective & invidious say­ings on his own head without proof; & then apply them to the Church, as does the Disswader. It would also very much conduce to the bringing our differences to a narrower compass if you would candidly take my Book endwayes, and declare what in it is evident, and so to be allow­ed, what not: What Principles are well laid or Consequences right drawn; and what are other­wise: To requite which favours, I promise the [Page 18] same Carriage in my Reply to you. By this means it will be quickly discover'd whether or no you have overthrown my Discourse by show­ing it ill coherent, and how far 'tis faulty; that, if I cannot clear it to be connected, I may con­fess my fault and endeavour to amend it. For, however I see my Grounds Evident, yet I am far from judging my self Infallible in drawing my Consequences; though I see withal the method I take, will not let me err much; Or, if I do, my Errour will be easily discoverable; because I go not about to cloud my self in words, but to speak out as plain as I can from the nature of the Thing.

12. In the next place I earnestly request you, as you love Truth, not to shuffle of the giving me a full Answer, nor to desist from your Enterprise (as I hear a Certain person of great esteem for his learning and prudence has already done) though you find some difficulty where to fasten upon the Substantial part of my discourse. There are perhaps many difficult passages which my Short­ness forc't me to leave Obscure; These will natu­rally occasion mistake, and Mistake will breed Objections to impugn me with. Please, if o­thers fail, to make use of those at least. 'Tis no discredit in you to mistake what's obscure; rather it argues a fault in me (did not my circum­stance of writing Grounds, & onely to Schollers, excuse me) that I left it so; To make amends for which I promise you to render it clear when [Page 19] I see where it pinches you or others. And on this score, I owe very particular thanks to Mr Stilling-fleet, that by speaking clearly out his thoughts, he gave me a fair occasion to open that point he impugn'd, I think, upon mistake of our Tenet.

13. If you think fit somtimes to argue ad hominem, be sure what you build on be either our Churches Tenet or mine; for I am bound to defend nothing else. If then you quote Fathers, first, see they speak as Fathers, that is as Believers and Wit­nessers; for so 'tis evident our Church means them by her Expressions in the Council of Trent; as also did Antiquity. For both of them con­stantly alledge and stand upon Traditio Patrum, not Opinio Patrum: Next, see you bring Consensus Patrum, or an agreement at least of very many of them speaking as Witnesses, otherwise you will not touch me nor our Church; for she never abetted them further. In case you bring Coun­cils, it would be very efficacious you would chuse such Testimonies (if you can finde them) as I brought from the Council of Trent; that is, such in which they declare themselves (or the Cir­cumstances give it) they proceed upon their Rule of Faith: For, otherwise, every one knows that Bishops in a Council have in them, be­sides the Quality of Faith Definers, those also of Governours, and of the most Eminent and solid Divines in God's Church. If Scripture, you must make Evident the Certainty of your way of arguing from it, ere I or our Church shall allow [Page 20] it argumenative. Thus much for Authority. If you oppose me by my own Principles or Discour­ses of my Reason, I must defend my self as well as I can. One thing on this occasion, I must mind you of; 'tis this, that though you should conquer in this way of arguing ad hominem, you onely conquer me as a Discourser, by showing that I contradict my self; not my Tenet: for to prove that false, you must fix your foot and build your discourse on some Certain Ground; which bare­ly my holding it (on which your discourse ad hominem relies) cannot make it. You must build then on some Grounded Truth if you will go about to overthrow a pretended one. Indeed, if you can show Tradition contradicts her self, you will do more than miracle, and so must con­quer. But I fear not the Gates of Hell, much less Man's wit can prevail against that impregnable Rock. Onely, I beseech you bring not as Parallels against our Tradition in hand, which is a vast and strong stream, other little petty rivulets sprung originally from the Sensations of two or three: For, then, as one side was liable, in a thing not known publikly, to bely their Senses; so the con­veyance down of such sleight built Attestations may easily be self-contradictory. In a word, if you will argue, take first into your Thoughts the nature of the Thing you argue against, and then fall to work assoon as you will. Now, if you should chance to say you hold the Sayings of Fa­thers and Councils (some at least, to be Certain, [Page 21] my Reason tells me from Principles, that, having renounc't Tradition which onely could ascertain them, rational nature in you will not let you have any hearty conceit of their Convictiveness, what­ever you pretend; but that you rawly alledge them, and so let them go with a valeant quantum valere possunt. That therefore we may have some security more than your bare word (which Experience tells us is now affirmative now nega­tive in this point, as it best sutes your Interest, or, after a pretty Indifferent manner, half-one-half-tother) that your profession of holding to such Authorities is not hollow-hearted but rooted in your Reason, 'tis just your Readers should ex­pect you would declare in what the virtue of Cer­tifying consists, and that They have this virtue. This if you do, you acquit your self to go to work solidly, and you offer us fair play in giving us some hold of your Reason, whereas a com­mon Expression gives none. This Procedure also will show, when apply'd, whether you are Justi­fiable or no for admitting some Authorities of that nature and rejecting others.

14. My last request is, that, if in the course of your Answer you think fit to complain of me for bring­ing History and other Proofs heretofore common­ly without more ado admitted, into Incertainty: please to amend the fault you finde, and settle their Certainty on some better Principles than I have endeavour'd. In the mean time 'tis Evident my whole Book ayms at settling the Certainty of [Page 22] all Authority, by evidencing the Certainty of First Authority; upon which the Assuredness of History, Fathers, Councils, Church, Faith, nay Virtue or Christian Life must all be built. This is my way; if you judge it incompetent to do the Effect spoken of, be pleas'd to manifest it Un­fit and show us a Better.

15. Perhaps I may have demanded more of you in some particulars than is due from the strict duty of meerly answering: in the Schools, a bare denial, or distinction is enough for a Respondent. But I conceive we are not on these terms: in regard we are not met face to face, where the returns of the one to the other can be quick on every occasion. This obliges us, for the Readers satis­faction, to enlarge our selves and bring reason for every thing we affirm or deny, lest we should be thought to do it gratis. And, your case here, is particularly disadvantageous: For, if you go about to overthrow that on which I aym to show the Certainty of all Authority built, and yet de­clare not on what your self hold them built, and, by your faithful promise to show it shortly, give them strong hopes you will perform it; you send them away very much dissatisfy'd either with you or with all the Authority in the world, though built on Sensitive Knowledge: Of which it being impossible Rational Nature should per­mit them to doubt, they must needs dislike your attempt, and have an ill conceit of your per­formance.

SIR, I understand, to my exceeding Satisfacti­on, that multitudes of the most Eminent, Solid and Ingenuous Wits of our Nation have been diligent perusers of my Book. Consider, their eyes are upon you while you Answer; I am confident they will judge I have requested no more of you in this Letter, but what's reasonably due to their and my satis­faction; and so, will look your Answer should be correspondent. They are weary of endless Contests about Faith; and, seeing we are not now contro­verting the signification of some ambiguous Testi­mony, but penetrating deep into the very bowels of a point which is of the greatest concern in the whole world; and pursuing (in a method likely to decide) the clearing of it, their expectations are very much erected and attentively observing what will be the issue of this rational combat. Frustrate not their desires to see Truth manifested by bringing the Que­stion back from the plain open field of Evidence-in-our-method, to a Logomachy or word-skirmish in a Wilderness of Talk, out of which the Thread of Grounds or Principles had disentangled it. To them therefore as well as your self I address this; requesting those of them who are acquainted with my Answerer, to press him to do himself, me, the world (his Cause too, if it can bear it) the right due in Reason, and here demanded, This Sir, if you will perform, I shall lay aside the remembrance of the Justice I have to it, and look upon it purely as a Favour and most obliging Civility to him who is, next to Truth's,

Your Friend and well-wisher, J. S.

POSTSCRIPT.

IF you complain of this Fore-stalling as Vn­usual; as long as 'tis rational you can have no reason to do so: and it will appear such to him that considers it was an unusual Circumstance occasion'd it. 'Tis this: I had endeavour'd to bring Controversie from an Endless to a Conclu­sive Way: and both my Reason and Experience made me apprehend my Protestant Answerer would have such strong Inclinations to bring it bac [...] into the way of quoting and glossing Testi­monies (that is, into a wordish scanning a great part of all the Libraries in the World) that a slender touch at it in my Book was not forcible and express enough to oblige him to take notice of it. Having communicated therefore my thoughts with intelligent and ingenuous persons, both Catholiks and Protestants, and receiv'd their approbation, I resolv'd, and pursu'd it as you see; And I hope the manifold Usefulness of it (as shall be seen what way soever now you take upon you of answering) will sufficiently justify my Action.

FINIS.

This keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the Text Creation Partnership. This Phase I text is available for reuse, according to the terms of Creative Commons 0 1.0 Universal. The text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission.