1. IN the first place, the Title superscri­bed to this Discourse, and signify­ing to us the Nature and Design of it, is to be well weighed; that so, we may make a right Conceit of what we are justly to expect from Dr. St. in this occasion: 'Tis this, [The Faith of Prote­stants reduc'd to Principles.]

2. Now Principles, as we have discours'd in the Preface, must either be Evident to both Parties, or at least, held and granted by both; else no discourse can proceed for want of Agreement in that on which all Rational Process is grounded. Also, they must be [Page 2] Proper for the End intended, or Influential upon the Conclusion which the Arguer aims to evince: otherwise, if the thing in questi­on deceive not its Evidence and Truth from them, though those Propositions be never so evident in themselves, yet they cannot be to It, or in this Circumstance a Principle, what­ever they may be in others. Wherefore, to make good this Title, Dr. St. is to produce nothing for a Principle, but what is either granted at first by both Parties, or else is of so open and undeniable an Evidence, as all the World must see and acknowledge it; such as are either first Principles, or those which immediatly depend upon them, and are comprehended under them: or, if he builds on any Propositions as Principles, which are not thus evident but need Proof, he is at least to render them evident ere he builds upon them, And, lastly, he is to ap­ply them close to that which he professes to conclude from them; otherwise, he can ne­ver show them to be Principles in this occa­sion, any more than one can be a Father who has no Off-spring, or than any thing can be a Ground which has no Superstructures.

3. Next, we are to consider what Dr. St. means by the word [Faith] in this place. And, I hope, he will not think I injure him in supposing he has so good thoughts of the Faith of Protestants, as to hold 'tis more than [Page 3] a bare Opinion, whose Grounds may all be false: For if so, the Assent of Protestants as Faithful, may possibly be an Error, and all the Tenets they profess to be Truths, and hope to be sav'd by believing them, liable to be prov'd nothing, perhaps in reality but a company of Lies. If then (as in this suppo­sition he must) he hol [...]s the [...] of Prote­stants Impossible to be Fa [...]e, he is [...] to reduce it into [...] Grounds and Principles as are likew [...]e Impossible to be False; and, consequently, if it relies on Authority, he is to bring Infallible Authority for it; all that is Fallible (as Common sense teaches) ad­mitting Possibility of Falshood in whatever is grounded on it. Such Grounds then or Prin­ciples he is oblig'd to produce for the Faith of Protestants, in case he holds it may not perhaps be an Error for any thing he or his Church knows But, in case he judges this Assent or Belief of Protestants may be True Faith though the Grounds of it may be False, then he ows me an answer to Faith Vindicated, where the contrary is prov'd by multitudes of Arguments; not one of which has yet receiv'd one word of sober Reply from him or Dr. Tillotson; though, as ap­pears by the Inferences at the end of that Book, it most highly concerns them both to speak to the several Reasons it contains.

4. In the third place we are to reflect [Page 4] what may be meant by the word [reduc'd] in the said Title. And, since all Truths not self-evident, nor known by immediate im­pression on sense, are at first deriv'd or de­duc'd from Principles; this word [reduc'd] having a signification directly contrary to the other, intimates to us, that Dr. St. makes account he has begun by putting the Faith of Protestants which is the Conclusi­on, and brought it back (for so the word [reduc'd] imports) to Principles; where­as 'tis Evident to every Scholar, he pro­ceeds in a way quite contrary to what he here pretends. First, laying six Principles a­greed on, then thirty others, which, since they go before his Conclusions we are to think he meant for Principles too, and thence drawing in the Close, six Inferences or Se­quels; which is most manifestly to deduce from Principles, not to reduce to them.

5. But, however it be blameable in one who owns himself a Scholar, especially pre­tending the rigorous and learned way of proceeding by Principles, not to understand the nature of the Way himself takes; yet let us kindly suppose that Dr. St. out of an un­wariness only, made use by chance of an improper word; which being but a human lapse, is more easily pardonable; especial­ly, since the Method he here undertakes, viz. to begin with Principles, is (if rightly [Page 5] manag'd and perform'd) the most honora­ble for a Scholar, and the most satisfactory that may be, and, so, deserving to make amends for many greater faults. Let him then by [reduc'd to Principles] mean deduc'd from Principles] yet since both reducing and deducing, imply the showing a Connexion between those Principles, and what's pre­tended to be drawn from them; and this ei­ther Immediate, as to every particular Con­clusion, or Mediate: We are to expect Dr. St. should still show us this Connexion: which is best and most clearly done, by re­lating each of his six Conclusions to their re­spective Premisses or Principles: that so, by this distinct proceeding and owning particu­larly whence each Deduction follows, we may be better enabled to discover the Goodness of his Consequences, and thence discern clearly the Truth of those Conclusions; which we are to suppose, his Intention in making those Discourses.

6. In the last place we are to weigh very well what is meant by that signal and parti­cularizing word [Protestants:] for 'tis the Faith of these and these only, which he un­dertakes here to reduce to Principles. And I will have the kindness for him, as to sup­pose he so much zeals the Purity of the Pro­testant Church, as not to defile her with the mixture of Anabaptists, Independents, Qua­kers, [Page 6] and such like, much less the most abo­minable Socinians who deny the Trinity, and the Godhead of Christ. Therefore, these being secluded from the notion and name of Protestants, we are encouraged by this Title to expect such a Discourse as is not proper for Socinians, or any of those other Sects to alledge for themselves; otherwise it might and ought with as much right be entitled The Faith of Socinians, Quakers, &c. (as the Faith of Protestants) reduc'd to Principles.

The sum then of what we are by this Ti­tle to expect from Dr. St. is this; viz. to shew us such Grounds for our Assent to Points as divinely reveal'd, as are Impossible to be Erroneous; and such as are not compe­tent Allegations for Socinians, Arians, &c. but proper to Protestants only: Also, that these Grounds or Principles are such as are either self-evident or made evident. And this he is oblig'd necessarily to do, unless he will sustain either that Socinians, Fift-Monar­chists, &c. are Protestants; or, that the Faith of Protestants is but Opinion; or, that there can be any Principles which are nei­ther evident of themselves nor by means of others, that is, no ways evident, or not evi­dent at all: Or, lastly, that he can show us any Conclusion reduc'd to Principles, or de­duc'd from them, without shewing us that it is connected with them. This then is what [Page 7] Dr. St's words bid us expect from him; let us see now how he answers this expecta­tion.

1. HE begins with laying down six Principles agreed on by both sides; and they are (as to the main) all of them very True and granted by us, if rightly un­derstood: wherefore in case any ambiguous word do occur, I am to explain it, that so our perfect concurrence with him in ad­mitting them may be rightly apprehended, and the discourse more unoffensively pro­ceed, in case these Principles should come hereafter to be made use of. They are these.

1. That there is a God from whom Man and all other Creatures had their Being.

2. That the notion of God doth imply that he is a Being absolutely perfect, and therefore, Iustice, Goodness, Wisdome and Truth must be in him to the highest degree of perfection.

[Page 8] These two first are rigorously and literally true, and worded very exactly.

3. That man receiving his Being from God, is thereby bound to obey his will, and conse­quently is liable to punishment in case of Diso­bedience.

This Proposition is also most true; yet that it may more throughly be penetrated and rightly apprehended, it were not amiss to note, that though the word [obey] gene­rally amongst us signifies doing some out­ward action will'd by another, yet in this occasion 'tis to signifie also, nay principally, the exercising Interiour Acts of our soul, viz. of Faith, Hope and Charity; in which kind of Acts consists our Spiritual Life, as we are Christians. That then this Principle may be better understood, I discourse it thus; that, Because God, as far as con­cerns his own Inclination (or rather Na­ture) precisely, out of his over-flowing Goodness will all Good, and amongst the rest, the Means to Eternal Happiness to his Creatures; and the Believing in Him, Ho­ping all good from Him, and Loving him are such Virtues or Perfections of the Soul as are apt and connatural means to raise and dispose it towards the attainment of Bliss or [Page 9] Fruition of the Deity, hence he wills that man should believe on him, hope in him, and love him; whence are apt to follow the out­ward observances of his Law, and if they follow not out of these motives they are not properly virtues or truly Perfective of the soul in order to its Last end, nor available in the least to the attainment of Bliss; nor Acts of Obedience to God's will, nor in true speech the keeping his Commandments. God therefore willing us Happiness to be at­tain'd through the proper means to it, it fol­lows that those who disobey this Holy will of his, that is, those who do not cultivate their minds with the said Virtues of Faith, Hope and Charity, become liable by such their disobedience to eternal misery; as want­ing through this neglect, the Proper Means which is to elevate them to the capacity of attaining Heaven.

4. That in order to Man's obeying the Will of God, it is necessary he know what it is; for which some manifestation of the Will of God is necessary, both that Man may know what he hath to do, and that God may justly punish him, if he do it not.

5. Whatever God reveals to Man is infalli­bly true, and being intended for the Rule of Man's obedience may be certainly known to be his Will.

[Page 10] I approve very wel of these two Principles. And to this end I make it my request to the Proposer of them, that the word [manifestati­on] and [certainly known] may be understood in their proper signification for that which is True, or Absolute Certainty; and not be ta­ken abusively as Dr. T. still takes it for such a Certainty as is indeed Incertainty, as is shown at large in Reason against Raillery and Faith vindicated. Again, that we may know whe­ther this be a Principle agreed to by both sides, as Dr. St. pretends, I shall first put down our Tenet, which is; that (at least) the Pa­stors of the Church, who are to teach the Faithful, convert Unbelievers, (amongst whom are many acute wits) as also to de­fend their Faith, and make out the Truth of it, may, nay must have Infallible Grounds, and so be Infallibly or Knowingly Certain of what God revealed to Man, that is, of their Faith. If then Dr. St. grants the wisest por­tion in Gods Church to be thus Infallibly Certain of their Faith, we agree with him in this Proposition; but if he denies this kind of Certainty to them, and consequently (there being no middle between Infallible and Fallible) says they, and so, the whole Church is only Fallibly-Certain of what they believe; he both speaks non-sense, and lays for a Principle agreed on by both sides, that [Page 11] which is absolutely deny'd by us, and indeed the main point in Controversy be­tween us.

6. God cannot act contrary to those Essential Attributes of Iustice, Wisdom, Goodness and Truth in any way which he makes choice of to make known his Will unto man by.

This Principle is absolutely granted, ha­ving no Fault in it, but that it expresses not all the Truth it ought; for God not only cannot act contrary to those Essential Attri­butes, but he is oblig'd by his very Nature to act perfectly according to them, in ma­king choice of such a Way or Rule to make known his Will unto man by, as shall be (all things consider'd) most proper for Mankind; that is, most suitable to the re­spective Capacities of those who are to be led by it, that so their Acts of Faith (as far as they spring from the Provision of motives laid by God) may be pefectly rational; and also most effectual to the end for which God intended that Rule and Faith which depends on it.

These are the six Principles Dr. St. propo­ses as agreed to by both sides; which (in the main, and thus understood) are of so universal a Nature, and such sacred Truths, that if he draws any necessary consequences [Page 12] from them to the establishing the Faith of Protestants, or overthrowing that of Catho­licks (which latter seems chiefly intended) his Victory is likely to be very compleat; If he does not, but rather makes no use at all of them in concluding from them what he pretends, and his Title imports, it must needs be understood that they were only produc'd to make a plausible show, and to prepare the Readers mind to Appre­hend he must necessarily conquer all before him, having such sacred Principles engag'd in his Patronage.

One thing more I am to add on this oc­casion; which is, that no discourse at all can proceed, unless all the Principles be a­greed to by both sides; for, if the Person a­gainst whom we argue deny our Principles, 'tis a folly to hope by means of them, to force him to admit of the Conclusion depen­ding solely on those Principles for its Truth and Evidence. But we are to reflect, that an Adversary may two manner of ways grant us our Principles; either voluntarily and of his own accord; or else forcibly, that is, convinc'd by strength of Argument, if the Principles be subordinate ones, and so can admit Proof; or for fear of shame from Human Nature, if they either be First Prin­ciples, or that the Controversy by discourse be reduc'd to that most Evident Test. Since [Page 13] then Dr. St. makes account we yeild him but these six voluntarily, we are to expect from him such manifest proofs for the other thirty, as may make us by the clearness of their Evidence, or under the penalty of ha­ving Mankind our Enemy for deserting Ra­tional Nature, assent to their verity: other­wise, there is no hopes for him to conclude any thing at all, while we are at liberty to deny every thing he builds on. But alas! how far is it from such Talking Disputants, even to think of such performances; though the necessity of his duty, if he pretends to Principles, obliges him unavoidably to it.

AFter these six Principles agreed on, follow thirty other Paragraphs, or whatever else we may guess it fit to call them; and they are introduc'd by this Tran­sition.

These things being agreed on both sides, we are now to inquire into the particular ways [Page 14] which God hath made choice of for revealing his Will to mankind.

I expected that since Dr. St. had promis'd us to reduce the Faith of Protestants to Prin­ciples, he would after he had put down the Principles voluntarily agreed to by both sides, have pursu'd the Method himself had made choice of, and have produc'd next, the Principles made use of by him in this parti­cular matter which we are not voluntarily a­greed on; and either have maintain'd them to be First Principles, and so, self-evident; or else subordinate ones, and deriving their Evidence from those First, and therefore have shown us their derivation from them, or Connection with them. This had been a Method becoming a man pretending to ground himself on Principles, especially in a discourse where this, and this only was pretended; for by this means it might, as reason requires, have been examin'd first, whether those Principles had subsisted or no in themselves; which, if they had, then on­ly the Consequences had needed Examina­tion; and so the Business of Truth had been quickly decided.

2. But, instead of this candid and clear and Methodical proceeding, thirty odd kind of Sentences, Sections, Paragraphs, or I know not what, come hudling in one af­ter [Page 15] another, of such uncouth fashions, such desperate and disagreeing natures, so void of coherence with one another, that none knows well what to call them, not even Dr. St. himself, as appears by the Carriage of the matter. Some of them seem deducti­ons from the Principles agreed on. Others seem to contain Intire discourses of them­selves. The Illative particle [therefore] or its Equivalent, which necessarily Ushers in all Conclusions, is so rarely heard of here, that one would verily think they were all Premisses or Principles; but this Conceit is again thwarted, because divers of them are meerly Hypothetical Propositions, invol­ving sometimes such a condition as never was put; others are bare voluntary Asserti­ons and False into the bargain. Some few of them pretend modestly to own them­selves deductions from some other Para­graphs, but yet onely hint it afar off, as it were, not speak it out plainly, as if they fear'd some danger: Others pretend to draw a Consequence in their Close, not at all following from the part foregoing. Last­ly, the whole mass of them hang together like a rope of [...]and for want of declaring their Relation to others; and, though now and then they counterfeit a semblance of some sleight coherence, yet their whole Frame is loose and ill-built for want of an orderly and [Page 16] visible dependance of one part on another. Now, this odd variety in their Complexions puts an attentive Considerer at some loss what to name them; no Apellation fitting the thirty but that which is common to such Quantities of matter or Multitudes of lines (whether it be sense or non-sense) such as are Paragraphs, Sections, and such like: since their motly nature will neither let us call them Deductions, nor Conclusions, nor Principles, nor Propositions, nor Discourses, nor Inferences, nor Postulatums, nor Axioms, nor Maxims, nor Proofs, nor any thing of any such nature; and yet all this while the superscription is, The Faith of Protestants re­duc'd to principles.

3. It were not amiss for all that, to consi­der what Dr. St. himself calls them, and to hope thence for some better knowledge of their nature than we could attain to by our own Consideration. But he is at vari­ance with himself about the point, no one common name being capable to fit them all, where the things to be named are of so ma­ny Parishes or Families. All he does (as appears by his Transition) to make them all taken together, amount to an Inquiry into the particular ways which God had made choice of for revealing his Will to mankind. I do not by any means like this Insignificant word [Inquiry] 'Tis so very safe, that 'tis abso­lutely [Page 17] Inconfutable. Had he said candidly and plainly, [Here follow the Principles not agreed on voluntarily which therefore I will make Evident, that my Adversary's Reason may be forc'd to acknowledg their verity, and by that means my discourse pro­ceed, and way be made towards some Con­clusion] he had offer'd me some play, for then I might possibly have discover'd the weakness or Inevidence of his Principles, or the slackness of his Consequences; but now all my Attempts are defeated by this one pretty word [Inquiry] for though I should hap to confute every line in all the thirty Paragraphs, yet still after all this, none can deny but he has inquir'd into the Point in hand, whether he have produc'd one word to evince it, or no: Thus Dr. T. (in his late Preface) got rid of the hardest and mainly concerning passage in Sure-foot­ing, by vertue of two insignificant words, alledging that he had [sufficiently consider'd] it in his Rule of Faith, which words were perfectly verify'd, though (as appears in Reason against Raillery Disc. 8th) he readily granted all I contended for as to that point. Once more I desire our Learned Readers to reflect on the different manner in which I and my Adversaries bear our selves towards one another. I candidly avow my Grounds to be Evident Principles, my Consequences to [Page 18] be necessary, my Arguments to be absolutely-Conclusive or demonstrative; and by so doing I offer them all the fair play imaginable; and, (trusting to the invincible force of Truth) expose my self freely for them to lay hold of my discourse where they see it their best Advantage. They on the other side make a show indeed of bringing their Faith to Principles, because the very pretence is honorable; but when it comes to perfor­mance are so far from owning the Princi­ples they proceed on for such, that (except in those six agreed on, which, as shall be shown, are not one jot influential to the point they are aim'd to evince) they not so much as name the word [Principle] nor vouch any Argument Conclusive, or any Consequence to be Necessary, much less can­didly affirm such in particular to be thus qualifi'd; but hide and obscure all these in one dow-bak'd slippery word [Inquiry] by which means none can tell where to take any sure hold of any part of their Dis­course.

4. Notwithstanding that Dr. St. is thus shy to name these thirty Paragraphs, Prin­ciples, in regard they are so monstrously un­like those Clear and Evident Truths, which use, and ought to bear that sacred name; yet 'tis manifest by his carriage he meant them for such, and would have them [Page 19] thought such too; for they immediately follow after the six Principles voluntarily a­greed on, as if they were the other sort of Principles, not voluntarily agreed to; and all of them antecede his six Conclusions or Sequels which he puts immediately to follow out of them. Again, the Running Title super­scrib'd to them is, [The Faith of Protestants reduc'd to Principles:] All which manifests to us beyond Evasion that he makes use of and relies on them as Principles, though he be something bashful to call them so directly. Wherefore in compliance with his Intenti­on, we will for once strain a word to the highest Catachresis that may be, and by a strange Antiphrasis, call Black, White, and all these Paragraphs, Principles.

5. Yet, though there be nothing of can­did and clear and consonant to any max­ims even of Natural Logick in this Dis­course, yet I must allow that there is as much cunning and slight and Sophistry in it, as could well be stufft into so narrow a room: Wherefore, that I may not be like him, I shall openly profess before hand what I un­dertake, viz. to show plainly that he hath not spoke one efficacious word to the pur­pose he intended; that is, he has not pro­duc'd any one Principle, one Reason, one Argument, either settling in the least, the Faith of Protestants, nor unsetling that of [Page 20] Catholicks. This will be seen by our Ex­amination of each particular Principle in order, and the Answer to them. To which I now address.

1. An entire Obedience to the Will of God being agreed to be the condition of mans hap­piness, no other way of Revelation is in it self necessary to that end; than such whereby man may know what the Will of God is.

Love of God above all things, and of our Neighbour for his sake being the Fulfilling of the Law, does by consequence include in it self eminently an Intire Obedience to the Will of God, and is agreed to be the Condi­tion of mans Happiness. Yet this Love or Cha­rity presupposing Hope, and both Hope and Love presupposing Faith as their Basis; both of these do by consequence come within the compass of Obeying the Will of God, and are in their several manners and according to their several natures [Conditions of mans Happiness.] as I doubt not but all sober Protestants will grant.

Again, Faith being part of our Obedience to the Will of God, and so, commanded by him, and it being against those Attributes of God agreed on by both sides, to command Man to act contrary to the right Nature himself had given him and establish'd it Es­sential [Page 21] to him, that is, contrary to true Rea­son; Also, Faith being a Virtue, and so agree­able to right Nature, nay more, a supernatu­ral Virtue, and so, perfecting and elevating Right Nature or True Reason, not debasing or destroying it; it follows, from these and many other Reasons alledg'd in Faith Vindi­cated, that this part of our Obedience call'd [Faith] must be rationabile obsequium, a Reasonable Obedience, and that our Assent call'd [Belief] taking it as impos'd by God, is conformable to Maxims of Right Reason, and that it perfects, and not in the least perverts Human Nature. But it is direct­ly opposit to Human Nature as given us by God, or to Right Reason, to assent and profess that Points of Faith are True (as the Nature of Christianity settled by our Sa­viour enjoyns us) in case we are to rely solely on the Divine Authority for the for­mal Motive of this our believing or holding them such, and yet when we come to doubt concerning their Truth, cannot possibly ar­rive to see any Grounds absolutely Certain, that the Divine Authority is indeed engag'd for the Truth of the said Points. Also, 'tis quite opposite to Human Nature to love Heaven above all things, in case there be not Grounds absolutely certain that God has told us there is such a thing as Heaven, or such a Blissful state attai [...]ble by us in [Page 22] the sight of Him: wherefore, when Dr. St. says no other way of Revelation is in it self ne­cessary to this end, or to the Entire Obedience to Gods Will, than such whereby man may know what the Will of God is; we are to mean by the word [know] that at least the gover­ning part of Gods Church, or Ecclesia do­cens, may be absolutly-certain that the Points of Faith, (the assenting to and professing which, and grounding upon them Hope and this all-over-powering Love of Heaven, the main part of our Obedience) are True or Impossible to be False. If then Dr. St. takes the word know in this signification, this Prin­ciple is granted: if in any other, or for a great Hope only that they are True (as I fear when it comes to the point, he intends no more) I must for the Reasons here given, and many more alledg'd in Faith Vindicated, and Reason against Raillery, deny that no o­ther way of Revelation is necessary, and put him to prove it, which he neither has done, nor can do.

2. Man being fram'd a rational Creature capable of reflecting upon himself may antece­dently to any External Revelation, certainly know the Being of God and his dependance up­on him; and those things which are naturally pleasing unto him; else there could be no such thing as a Law of Nature, or any Principles of Natural Religion.

[Page 23] I suppose he means by the word [God] the True God, and then 'tis not so evident that every Man in the state of corrupt Nature may arrive to know him, however some few may, and in the State of Right Nature, All. And in case he takes the words [certainly know] in their proper signification, then he may consider how ill his Friend Dr. Tillot­son discourses, who professes not to have, even with the assistance of Christianity, that Certain Knowledge of the Being of God, which (as Dr. Still says) was attainable by the meer Light of Natural Reason.

3. All Supernatural and External Revela­tion must suppose the truth of Natural Religion; for, unless we be antecedently certain that there is a God, and that we are capable of knowing him, it is impossible to be certain that God hath reveal'd his will to us by any superna­tural means.

If he means here Priority of Nature; 'tis to be granted; for this Proposition [God has reveal'd] implies and presupposes as its basis [God is] But, if he understands it of priority of Time, as I conceive he does, then I both deny the Proposition, and the validi­ty of the Reason given for it. For, 'tis Evi­dent both by Reason and Experience, that manifest and Convictive Miracles (which [Page 24] are supernatural and external Revelations) done before the Heathens, who yet know not the true God, in Testimony of Chri­stianty, at once or at the same time made it certain that he whom we adore is the True God, and also that God reveal'd his will by supernatural means: and so 'tis not Impossible (as Dr. St. here affirms) to be certain of such a Revelation, without know­ing any time before hand that there is a God, nor must All Supernatural and External Re­velation needs suppose the Truth of Natural Religion, that is, of the Knowledge of the True God, as he pretends; since such a Revelation may cause that Knowledge, and so antecede it, not be antecedent to it.

4▪ Nothing ought to be admitted for Divine Revelation which overthrows the Certainty of those Principles which must be antecedently suppos'd to all Divine Revelation. For that were to overthrow the means whereby we are to judge concerning the Truth of any Divine Re­velation.

This Discourse seems at the first show to carry so clear an evidence with it, that no­thing appears so Irrational as to doubt or dispute it. And indeed 'tis no less, if the words in which it is couch'd be not equivo­cally taken, but still be meant in the same sence. To prevent then the growth of a wit­ty [Page 25] piece of Sophistry which I foresee creep­ing in under the disguise of an ambiguous word, I am to provide against it with a di­stinction both pertinent and necessary to the present matter.

These words [Divine Revelation] may either mean the way or Act of Revealing, or else they may mean the Thing divinely re­veal'd, that is, the Point of Faith: which differ as showing and thing shown, or as an Action and it's Effect. In the same manner as the word Tradition is sometimes taken for the Way of Delivery, sometimes for the Thing or Point delivered. When they are ta­ken for the one, when for the other, partly the circumstances and the aim of the dis­course determin, partly some annext parti­cle or variation of the word; so that, if they be taken for the Thing reveal'd or deliver'd, and be express'd singularly, 'tis call'd A Divine Revelation, or A Tradition; If plu­rally, Divine Revelations, or Traditions. Now it seems something doubtful in whe­ther sense it be taken here, for §. 1. he speaks of the Way of Revelation, which can onely mean Revealing, and in the two following ones 'tis taken in the same sense as appears by the words [God hath reveal'd] found in the Third. But this matters not much, so it be here taken in the same sense through­out; which I fear 'tis not; For, the word [Page 26] [Revelation] is here made use of thrice; and, in the first and last place it seems plainly to mean the Points revealed; in the middle the Way or Act of Revealing; yet the two fol­lowing Principles incline the doubtfulness of the Expression to mean the Points of Faith themselves; Though this be, to speak moderately, by far the more preposterous and absurd Tenet, as shall hereafter be shown. But I am to provide for both parts since I am to skirmish with such an ambi­dextrous Adversary; and therefore, apply­ing this discourse to his Proposition, I di­stinguish thus, and grant that Nothing ought to be admitted for Divine Revelation (taking those words to signifie the Act of Reveal­ing) which overthrows the Certainty of those Principles which must be antecedently supposed to the Act of Revealing: Also I grant that nothing ought to be admitted for Divine Reve­lation (taking those words to signifie Points of Faith revealed) which overthrows the Cer­tainty of those Principles which must be ante­cedently suppos'd to those Points. This is candid and clear dealing, and far from that sophi­stical and equivocating ambiguity which (contrary to the Genius of Truth) he so con­stantly and so industriously affects.

5. There can be no other means imagin'd whereby we are to judge of the Truth of Divine [Page 27] Revelation, but a Faculty in us of discerning Truth and Falshood in matters proposed to our Belief; which if we do not exercise in judging the Truth of Divine Revelation, we must be impos'd upon by every thing which pretends to be so.

Here are many quaint things to be con­sidered. For, if Dr. St. means that we can­not judge of Truth without a Faculty to judge of Truth, 'tis a [...] Principle, though very litt [...] [...] his purpose. But 'tis most [...] para [...]oxical to say that no other means can be imagin'd to judge of Divine Revelation, but such a Faculty. For, if there can be no other means imagin'd but this Fa­culty, then This is all the means; and so those Knowledges which are to inform and direct this Faculty are no means at all: whence all motives to Faith, Rule of Faith, all Teaching, nay Scripture it self are to no purpose; For none of these are our Faculty of discerning Truth and Falshood.

Again, what is meant here by [Divine Re­velation?] If it be meant of the formal Act of Revealing, then 'tis False that there can be no other means to judge of its Truth but a Fa­culty in us of discerning Truth and Falshood in matters proposed to our Belief: For these Matters are Points of Faith, and 'tis a mad­ness to think we must begin with examining [Page 28] their Truth ere we can know that God has truly or indeed reveal'd them; since the Knowledge that God has reveal'd or spoken is had ordinarily by natural means antece­dent even to the Revelation it self, much more antecedent to those Points; viz. by the Rule of Faith, which shows the Divine Authority engag'd for their Truth. But, if he means by Divine Revelation the things or Points divinely reveal'd, and (as appears by those words [matters propos'd to our belief] he bends strongly that way) then the sense is evidently this, that we must judge the truth of the Points of Faith by exercising a Faculty of judging of the Truth of those Points: And since to judge is to exercise our Faculty of judg­ing, it amounts plainly to this, that we must judge of the truth of Points of Faith by judg­ing of the truth of points of Faith; which is an Identical Proposition and perfectly true, but not at all to his purpose. Yet it is too: for 'tis creditable now and then to speak clear Evidences, however in reality they prove Impertinencies.

But if Dr. St. means nothing but that we must use our Faculty of discerning Truth and Falshood, that is indeed our Reason even in Assenting to things above Reason, or to Mysteries of Faith, he says very right: For 'tis most Rational to believe that to be True which God, who is essential Verity, has [Page 29] said; and exceedingly Rational to believe God has said it, or (which is all one in our case) that Christ and his Apostles have taught it, upon an Authority Inerrable in that affair. And thus my Faith may be most Rational without exercising my Reason in scanning and debating the Truth or Falshood of the matters propos'd to my Belief, or examin­ing the Points of Faith themselves. Nay more this Method of his is most preposte­rous and absurd; For, the Mysteries or Points of Faith being elevated above the pitch of our ordinary Natural Reason, and such, (for the most part) in which Gods Infinity most exerts (as we may say) It's utmost, but the Knowledge of the Rule of Faith which is to ascertain to us the Divine Revelation or that God has told us them, lying level to our Reason as inform'd by natural Knowledges; hence, to relinquish the method of examining the Truth of Di­vine Revelation by those Knowledges which lie within our own ken, and to begin with those which are most elevated above it (as it is to comprehend the extent of Gods Infinite Power) is both against all Art and Common sense: Both which tell us we must begin with what's more easily know­able and thence proceed to what is less Knowable. Nor is there any danger of be­ing impos'd upon by everything that pretends [Page 30] to be Divine Revelation (as the Dr. scruples,) as long as we are Certain that God cannot lie, and that God has said this; for these put, the thing is most certainly True.

6. The pretence of Infallibility in any person or Society of men must be judged in the same way that the Truth of a Divine Revelation is; for that Infallibility being challeng'd by virtue of a supernatural Assistance, and for that end to assure men what the will of God is, the same means must be us'd for the trial of that, as for any other supernatural way of God's making known his Will to men.

Here the words [A Divine Revelation] which he now first uses, give us to under­stand that Dr. St. means a Point of Faith and not Gods Revealing it or Divine Revelation; which words he us'd formerly. And this is farther confirm'd by his saying that that In­fallibility which is challeng'd by vertue of a su­pernatural Assistance must be judg'd in the same way that the Truth of a Divine Revelation is: For, such an Infallibility through supernatural Assistance of the Holy Ghost, consists in the Sanctity of the Church, which is a Point of Faith, and so the words [A Divine Reve­lation] which he joyns and parallels to it, must mean a Point of Faith also. Whence is discern'd what marvellous dexterity Dr. [Page 31] St. hath us'd to gain a notable Point against us, and how smoothly he hath slided from Gods revealing Faith to us, or the Act call'd Revelation, to the Points of Faith reveal'd: In hope by this confounding one with ano­ther to perswade his unattentive Reader; that, because 'tis the only right way of pro­cedure to begin with the using our natural Reason so to judge whether God hath Reveal­ed such a point or no; therefore 'tis fit to begin with the same Method in examining the Points of Faith themselves which pre­tend to be reveal'd, and thence conclude whether they be indeed divinely reveal'd or no: which how absurd it is hath lately been shown.

But to come closer and apply this to his present Discourse. The Pretence of Infallibility by virtue of supernatural Assistance must indeed be judged in the same way that the truth of a Divine Revelation is; for both of them being Points of Faith must be judged by the same way all other points of Faith are; viz. by the Evidence there is that the Divine Autho­rity cannot deceive, and that it stands enga­ged for those Points.

7. It being in the power of God to make choice of several ways of revealing [...] Will to us, we ought not to dispute from the Attributes of God the necessity of one particular w [...]y to the Ex­clusion [Page 32] of all others, but we ought to enquire what way God himself hath chosen; and whatever he hath done, we are sure cannot be repugnant to Infinite Iustice, Wisdome, Goodness and Truth.

I do not remember to have heard that a­ny man living ever went about to dispute from the Attributes of God alone, the neces­sity of one particular way to the Exclusion of all others, nor does it appear how 'tis possible to do it without considering also the Nature of those several ways of Revealing: in doing which if we come to discover that only one is (as things stand) of it self sufficient for that End, and all others pretended to by those against whom we dispute depend on It for their Certainty, then they can safely argue from the Attributes of God, particularly his Wisdome that none but this could have been actually chosen by him. So that Dr. St. seems here to counterfeit an imaginary Ad­versary, having never a Real one. This will better appear if we attempt to frame a Dis­course from Gods Attributes alone. In en­deavouring which it will appear that all we can argue from that single Head is this; that, Whats disagreeable to Gods infinite Iustice, Wisdome, Goodness, and Truth cannot be will'd by him, and what's agreeable can. Now who sees not that this signifies nothing either to [Page 33] the Exclusion or Admission of any particu­lar Way, unless we subsume thus, But this or that is most agreeable or disagreeable to the said Attributes; whence follows, therefore it is to be admitted, or rejected by him. Whence 'tis clearly seen that no Argument can be drawn from those Attributes alone without taking in the consideration of the nature of the Way it self, and its sufficiency or insufficiency, as Dr. St. himself confesses in common at the end of the 8th Principle, though he perpe­tually avoids to examin the particular na­ture of his Way, and its Fitness of mankind to build Faith upon its evidence. Yet let us see at least though it be so plain a point how weakly he proves that we are not to argue from those Attributes, It being (says he) in the power of God to make choice of several ways, &c. we ought not to dispute from the At­tributes of God the necessity of one particular, &c. so that the Argument stands thus, Be­cause 'tis within the extent of Gods Power, therefore it crosses not but agrees with all those other Attributes; otherwise, if it did, we could with good reason argue from them against Gods having made choice of such a way. Now this reason of his is so palpably absurd that I admire the meanest Divine li­ving could stumble upon it. For what man who holds God Omnipotent can doubt but that his Power can reach to reveal his Will [Page 34] to every single man by hourly Apparitions, the flying of Birds, nocturnal Dreams, or throwing of Dice upon a Fortune-book: yet no wise man will doubt but were we to inquire what is the way fit for God to re­veal his Will to mankind by, we should reject these as misbecoming Gods Wisdom, &c. and for the same reason all others but one, in case noneX but that one were of it self qualified to do that Effect as it ought, and so befitting Gods Wisdome to make choice of it; and yet, notwithstanding all this, it might lie within the the compass of the Pow­er of God to chuse several others.

It follows; but we ought to enquire what way God himself hath chosen; and whatever he hath done we are sure cannot be repugnant to Infinit Iustice, Wisdom, Goodness and Truth. All this is yeilded to, unless he means this to be the only way of arguing from Gods Attri­butes, as he would seem; which I must de­ny, and demand of him why 'tis not equal­ly Argumentative to say, This way of Re­vealing or Rule of Faith, as both Experi­ence and Reason shows, is evidently incom­petent to give Faith that Certainty which its Nature and the many Effects to be pro­duc'd by it, and Obligations incumbent on it, require it should have; therefore I am sure 'tis repugnant to Gods Justice, Wis­dom, Goodness and Truth, and so can ne­ver [Page 35] have been chosen by him. Or thus; God is infinitly Wise, Good, Iust and True; there­fore he hath not chosen a way so Incompetent to those Ends. In the same manner as out of the known Incapacity of a sieve to draw water, or to ferry one over the Sea to the Indies, we may conclude demonstratively that 'tis unbeseeming Gods Infinite Wis­dome, Goodness, Justice and Truth to as­sign that for a Means to attain that End: Or, if God in some extraordinary case in­tends such a Miracle, 'tis necessary all those who are to use those means be ab­solutely assur'd of this wonderful Assistance; otherwise if they compass not that End, but perish in the Sea, they may blame their own presumptuous rashness (which would needs tempt God) for their miscarriage and not God, who never bound himself by promise in frequent and ordinary transacti­ons to bring about Effects miraculously by Imcompetent Causes. How weakly Dr. St. presumes rather than proves that God has chosen Scriptures Letter to be the Rule of Faith will be seen hereafter.

8. Whatever way is capable of certainly con­veying the Will of God to us may be made choice of by him for the means of making known his Will in order to the happiness of Mankind. So that no Argument can be sufficient à priori, [Page 36] to prove that God cannot chuse any particular way to reveal his mind by, but such which evi­dently proves the Insufficiency of that means for conveying the Will of God to us.

First, Taking the words [certain convey­ing] to mean Absolute Certainty as I prov'd before in this, and in divers Treatises of mine to be requisit, I am next to distinguish the word [capable] which may either mean that the Way in common may possibly bear it, in case it shall please God to use his best Power to improve it, and make up its de­fects with all the Assistances it can need. Or it may mean that such a way or manner, as it stands now on foot in the world (for ex­ample the Scriptures Letter as 'tis now con­triv'd) is of it self capable of conveying the will of God to us with absolute Certainty, without needing any other Thing to regu­late us in the understanding it. Whatever is capable in the later sense I grant may be made choice of by God for the means of making known his will: For, this being suppos'd to have in it self actually all that is requisite for such an effect, is fitting to be made use of by God, whose Wisdome and Goodness it becomes (when he acts not miraculously) to use every thing as it is or according to its nature establish'd by the same Wis­dome. But I deny that what is capable in the [Page 37] former sense may alwaies be thus made choice of by God; For, however such a way in common may be made capable to do that effect, if it should please God to exert his Power to support its natural defective­ness, as is exemplifi'd before in Dreams, Apparitions, and those other odd methods there mention'd; yet 'tis unsuitable to Gods Wisdome, Goodness or other Attributes to show himself so extraordinarily in things which reach the Generality of Mankind, and this for a perpetuity, and so ought to be allow'd onely his ordinary Concourse; especially if other means be already plac'd in the world able to perform this with a con­stant, orderly and connatural assistance. If then we can prove the Insufficiency of any Particular means (taking it alone as 'tis now found extant) belonging to such a way in Common, for example of the Scriptures Letter as it now is, to give Mankind Abso­lute Certainty of Gods sense, or Faith; then, however the way of Writing in Common can possibly be supported by Gods Infinit Power so as to be able to work the Effect of thus Certifying us of its sense, yet not being such of its own nature, taking it as it stands now thus contriv'd, 'tis not a fitting Instrument for Gods ordinary Providence to make use of for such a general Effect as is the Certify­ing all sorts of people of their Faith.

[Page 38] 9 There are several ways conceivable by us how God may make known his will to us; either by Immediate voice from Heaven, or inward Inspiration to every particular person; or inspi­ring some to speak personally to others; or as­sisting them with an Infallible Spirit in Writing such Books which shall contain the Will of God for the benefit of distant persons and future Ages.

All this is granted and much more; for there are innumerable other ways conceiva­ble how God may make known his Will to us, besides those here recounted, in case we regard only Gods Power to do it, and set aside his Wisdome and other Attributes; namely those four ways mention'd by me above, and multitudes of other such. But, out of all these, Gods Wisdome, which has pre-establish'd the nature of all things, will make choice of That which is fittest to per­form the Effect intended, that is, to cer­tifie absolutely the first deliver'd Faith to us who live now. And, left it should be too ear­ly understood which Way is best for that End, which would forestall and render void Dr. St's future discourses, he therefore ve­ry politickly quite leaves out any peculiar mention of our Rule of Faith, which one might have thought deserv'd a place a­mongst [Page 39] the rest. Leaves out I say, for those words [or inspiring some to speak personally to others] sute better with Prophetical Messen­gers than with the Tradition of Gods Church. Wherefore, premising this Note, that it is agreed Christ and his Apostles taught and settled the whole Body of Faith at first, and therefore that there needs no more for us to know Gods Will now, but to find out what is the best means of conveying the same down to our days, I beg leave to supply Dr.St's. neglects, and to insert into the middle of this §. these words, [or else by the way of open Attestation of a world of Immediate Christian Fathers to a world of Children by living voice and constant practice of what they had learn'd by their daily sensations.] which had Dr. St. done, any considerate Reader, whom his much talking of Gods Power and what God may do, had not diverted from reflecting that his Wisdom determins his Power in ordinary and General Effects to do what ac­cor [...]ing to the establish'd natures of things is the fittest means to compass such an end, would quickly have inclin'd to judge this the most connatural and fittest way, and therefore actually to have been made choice of by God; being assisted or supported by the basis of Human Nature according to its Sensations which are naturally fram'd to re­ceive right Impressions, and according to [Page 40] his Rational Faculty, which determins him to speak Truth still in open and undisguisa­ble matters of Fact; and, if that Body of men call'd the Church had any effectual means of Goodness in practice amongst them, super-assisted also by Grace not to v [...] ­ry from right Faith, and knowingly deliver a False for a True one.

And thus ends the first Division of Dr. St's. Discourse promising to reduce the Faith of Protestants to Principles. In which I ob­serve but a few things even hinted that can make for his purpose: and not so much as any one of them prov'd, but either slightly and slily insinuated, or dexterously brought in, not by Connexion of Terms, (far be any such piece of Confidence from so Learned and profound a Jeerer at Demonstration) but by the virtue of some pretty Equivocation. I remind the Reader of the chief of them by putting some of my opposite Propositions, each of which is made good in its respective place.

1. An Entire Obedience to the Will of God is principally performed by a heartily-assenting Faith, a Lively Hope, and an Ardent Charity, and not by outward actions otherwise than as they spring from these; therefore the way of Gods revealing his Will to us, or the Rule of Faith which grounds these, must be absolutely-certain or Impossible to be False.

[Page 41] 2. The Nature of the Mysteries or Points of Faith are more remov'd from our knowledge than those Maxims which assure us that God reveal'd them; therefore 'tis not proper to be­gin with examining those Points but the Grounds for Gods revealing them.

3. This way of proceeding is perfectly secure; for, the Divine Authority being granted veraci­ous, if there be Infallible Grounds that God has said them, those Points are Infallibly True: If not, they are not Points of [...]aith; and so, not worth examining whether they be True or no.

4. Gods Power alone gives us no Light what is or is not the Rule of Faith, but his Wisdom, Goodness, &c. joyn'd with the Know­ledge of the Fitness or Vnfitness of the Thing pretended to be so.

5. Gods Wisdome makes choice of that way to reveal his Will to the Generality of Man­kind, which, according to its nature as now establish'd, is a capable or fit Instrument to such an Effect; and not by that way which is only capable to do it by an extraordinary working of his Power.

These may serve for Antidotes to the op­posite Positions, if he thinks fit to own them. For, though he is able to deliver himself as clearly as most men, if he pleases, yet he affects all over this discourse a strange perplext Intricacy and Ambiguity▪ and he [Page 42] puts down his Principles in the same man­ner as a crafty Lawyer who had a mind to bring an Estate afterwards into dispute, pens Writings. Much shifting wit there is in them, but nothing of candid, clear and down right. And this Intricacy is made greater by his unconnected way of discour­sing; no man living being able to discern in better half of his odd-natur'd Principles what influence they have, either Immediate or Mediate, upon any thing following. The rest of what is contain'd in these nine, are either Absurdities, already laid open; or else Impertinent Truths, as will be seen by their uselesness in the Process of this Dis­course.

THe right nature of the Rule of Faith being thus stated, 'tis high time to ad­dress to our Examen how Dr. St. from Principles settles us such a Rule beginning from his tenth.

10. If the Will of God cannot be sufficient­ly declar'd to men by Writing, it must either be because no Writing can be Intelligible enough for that end, or that it can never be known to be written by men Infallibly assisted. The for­mer is repugnant to common sense, for words are equally capable of being understood, spoken or written; the later overthrows the possibility of the Scriptures being known to be the word of God.

I have already said, and in divers books manifoldly prov'd, that no declaration of God's will, or (which is all one in our case) no Rule of Faith, is sufficient, con [...]dering the Nature and Ends of Faith, [...] obli­gations arising from it, but [...] [Page 54] to be false, and built on Infallible Grounds. This premised, we are to inquire, whether Writing be the best Way for thus assuring it in all Ages to the end of the world. To come then closer to our Answer.

We are first to reflect again what Dr. St. means by the Will of God, at least what he ought to mean by it: For, these words at the first sight, seem to signifie onely some External Actions commanded by God to be performed or avoided; and it is the Dr's Interest they should be taken onely in this sense; for such a will is more easie to be sig­nifi'd by Writing than some other things of a more abstruse, spiritual and dogmatical nature, which yet are of absolute Necessity to be believ'd by the Church, such as are the points of the Trinity, Incarnation and Godhead of Christ who dy'd for us: since then Gods Will extends not only to aim at Mankinds Attainment of his Last End or True Happiness, but also to provide for the best means to it, or, to give us knowledg of those Motives which are apt to create in man a hearty Love of Heaven above all things (the best Condition of Mans Happi­ness or Immediate disposition to it) it fol­lows that the holding all those Tenets which contain in themselves such Motives, do all come within the compass of the Will of God. To omit many others, I will instance in two [Page 55] Points, of main Concern and Influence to­wards Christian Life; namely the Godhead of Christ, and the Real Presence of Christs Body in the Sacrament. Now, who sees not how wonderful an Ascendent both these, if verify'd, must needs have over Christian hearts? Can any Amulet of Love be so charming, or apt to elevate to the Love of God above all things, as to be ascertain'd that he who was really GOD, Infinite in all his Attributes, and Infinitely happy in him­self, should, purely out of his overflowing Goodness toward miserable mankind, take his nature upon him, become his Brother, Friend, Physician, Master, nay suffer for his sake many hardships during his life, and at length buffeting, scourging, crowning with thorns, and a most cruel death on the Cross; and to keep the remembrance of these many Benefits warm in our hearts to give us after a wonderful manner his most precious Body and Bloud in a Sacrament instituted for that end; by this means not only reviving the memory of the former in­comparable love-motive, but also adding new Incitements to that best of virtues by our apprehending lively that he so dearly embreasts and embosoms himself with us by his uniting himself to us through his corpo­ral presence, that so our souls may by means of the Love springing from this considerati­on, [Page 56] feed on, and be united to him Spiritual­ly? On the other side, if these be not Truths, but that the Church may perhaps erre in embracing them, who sees not that the Church it self is Idolatrous (at least, mate­rially) in giving True Divine Honor which is Proper only to the Creator, to a Crea­ture? Each of these two Points then is of that High concern as to Christian Life and Practice, that it must needs be of its own nature either a most wicked and damnable Heresy to deny or else to assert it: Where­fore 'tis the highest Impiety to imagin that God has left no Way to ascertain Mankind whether these two Points (omitting many others) be True or False; since 'tis unavoi­dable they are, if True, the greatest and most efficacious helps to Christian Devotion that can be; If False, the greatest Hindrances to the same; as corrupting the best Devo­tions of those Christians into Idolatrous worship. The Knowing then the truth of these and such like, being most certainly will'd by God, we are to expect such a Rule of Faith as is declarative of these, and such as these, with Absolute Certainty.

Let us now consider whether Writing be the best means for such an end; which if it be not, it may certainly be concluded from Gods Wisdome, Goodness, &c. that it hath not been made choice of, or intended by [Page 57] God for it. But 'tis observable that Dr. St. perpetually waves any Discourse of this na­ture, and chuses rather to argue from Gods Power; which though I have already shown how Incompetent and Absurd it is, let us ex­amine at least what works he makes of it.

If (says he) the will of God cannot be suffici­ently declared to men by writing, it must either be, &c. I must distinguish the words [cannot be declared by writing] as I did formerly; and affirm that they may either mean, that the Way of Writing, as taken in the whole latitude of its nature and standing under Gods Infinite Power ordering it with all possible Advantage to the end intended, cannot suffici­ently declare Gods will, as to such Points: or, they may mean that Gods Revelation of his Will by Writing, so qualifi'd as it is now a­ctually found in the Scripture, cannot suffici­ently, or with absolute Certainty declare Gods Will as to the Points aforesaid to men of all capacities in all future Ages. Taking them in the former sense, I deny the Proposi­tion, and say that Gods will as to such Points can be sufficiently declar'd by Writing. For, 'tis absolutely within the compass of Gods Power to contrive a Book on that manner as might define exactly, or else explicate at large in what precise sense every word that expresses each point of Faith is to be taken, [Page 58] and to provide that it should never be taken in that book in more than that one sense; or, if in more, to notifie to us in which places 'tis taken in a different meaning. He could also have laid it so, that a hundred or two of Ori­ginals of these Books might be preserv'd pub­lickly in several distant Countries from the Beginning, which might by their perfect A­greement bear Testimony to one another; and, so assure us the Text was kept hitherto inviolate even to a tittle, and also remain a Standard to correct all the multitudes of Di­verse Readings which, as experience shows us, is apt otherwise to set the Copies at vari­ance with one another. He could also have so order'd it that the Original Languages might have been as well understood by the Generality of the Church as their own is, & so have avoid­ed the Uncertainty of Translations: Again, lest crafty Hereticks should at any time for the future, by wittily alluding places, or play­ing upon words, or other Sophistries, per­vert the sense; Gods Power could have caus'd a Book to be written after the manner of a large Prophecy, foretelling that in such a time [...] place, such and such a Heretick should a­rise, perverting such and such a Point, and forewarn men of his Sophisms and Errours. This and much more might have been effected by Gods Power to establish Writing such an absolutely Certain and Intelligible Way: [Page 59] which why his Wisdome should not have done, in case Faith be an Assent which, while it relies on the Ground God has left for Man­kind cannot be an error, (as it may be if none can be absolutely certain both of the Text and sense of Scriptures) I would gladly be inform­ed: Especially since Dr. St. tells us here (Princ. 15.) there is no need of an Infallible society of men, either to attest or explain them, and all that is Fallible (as common sense tells us) falls short of elevating it above possibility of being an Errour: whence follows that there being no means on foot in the world, Tradi­tion of the Church failing, or being set aside, to secure us absolutely of this; it can only be had by the Extraordinary Operation of Gods Power securing the Letter of such writings, and rendering those VVritings themselves per­fectly Intelligible in the manners assign'd, in case VVriting be indeed the RULE OF FAITH.

VVriting then can be the Rule of Faith, or able thus to ascertain Faith to us if Gods In­finit Power undertakes the framing it such as I have express'd; but, because experience tells us 'tis not so order'd, let us leave this Platonick way of considering how thing, should be in that supposition, and following the Aristotelian, consider things as they are; and accordingly examin how G [...]ds Wisdome has thought fit to order such Writings actual­ly; [Page 60] and thence gather whether (however 'tis agreed between us, they be most excellent for other uses and ends) they were ever intended by the same Wisdome for a Rule of Faith. To evince the contrary of which, (not to repeat those many Arguments I have brought else­where,) I fartner offer these Reasons.

First, If the Writings of men divinely in­spir'd were meant for a Rule of Faith, then either all such Writings, as such, are therefore to belong to that Rule, or some onely; If all, then since some Writings granted to have been written by such persons are known to be lost, it may be doubted, nay it ought to be grant­ed that the present Written Rule is defective in the nature of a Rule, unless it be well made out that those divinely-inspir'd Writings which were lost were of another Nature then these extant, and therefore that they had no part in being a Rule: The Proofs for which point ought to be very pregnant and convin­cing; otherwise it may be question'd whether any Books writ by men divinely inspir'd had in them the nature of a Rule, or were intend­ed for that end by God. And this is particu­larly inforc'd, because, Dr. S [...] here (Princ. 28.) makes Scripture the Rule and Measure of what we are to believe; and if the Measure fall short, 'tis to be fear'd the thing measur'd or Faith will fall short likewise. But, if he says onely some of those divinely-inspir'd [Page 61] Writings were sufficient, 'tis very necessary it should be made out how many are needful; that so it might be throughly understood what are the precise Grounds of Christian Faith: concerning which yet there is much difference in opinion amongst those who hold the Letter-Rule; which signifies that none of them know distinctly what themselves as­sign or hold to be that Rule. Or, if he says that onely those which Gods Providence has preserv'd are that Rule; then he must either say that Gods Providence therefore preserv'd these because they contain'd holy Doctrin and were writ by men divinely-inspir'd, or were apt to benefit future mankind; and then, by the same Reason, those which perish'd should have been preserv'd too; or else, that God preserv'd these in particular because these which remain are, besides those qualifications, Proper and Sufficient to be the Rule of Faith. And then he begs the Question, and supposes his own Tenet true, even while he is proving it so.

Nex [...], supposing the Originals of these Books now extant to have been once the Rule of Faith▪ it was requisite the Church in the be­ginning shou [...]d have look'd upon them as such; and consequently have made account for the first 300 years (till when they were not col­lected or universally propos'd) it had no Ab­solute Certainty or Entire Body of their Faith. [Page 62] But, of this we hear not that any had the least Jealousie, or that they lookt after Books of Scripture as Things without which the Church was not either absolutely Certain of its Faith, or had not all its Faith.

Again, had those Books been then the Rule of Faith as (considering that some of them were unacknowledg'd, one scatter'd here, ano­ther there accidentally) is sensless to imagin. Yet, how can we [...]ow, or, future Ages here­after have Absolute Certainty that some sub­stantial word or other is not alter'd, omitted, or inserted in those places that concern the main Points of Faith (for example, the God­head of Christ, or the Real Presence) in case there be no Infallible Authority to attest the Truth of it, which Dr. St. denies here Princ. 15. It is not evident he must say that none of these can be made out with Absolute Certain­ty, and consequently confess with Rule of Faith. p. 118.Dr. T. that all this may be o­therwise; unless he have recourse to Gods Extraordinary Assist­ance to the multitudes of Transcribers and Translators, because of the Necessity the Let­ter should be thus preserv'd still unchang'd, in regard otherwise none could say his Faith is True: which again begs the Question, and supposes it the Rule of Faith instead of proving it so.

[Page 63] Farther, Let the Letter be suppos'd exactly like the Original, how will that Letter se­cure from all possible Error all that rely on it, as the Rule of Faith ought, or, to use Dr. St's words (Princ. 15.) reveal so plainly the whole will of God, that no sober Enquirer can miss of what is necessary for salvation? Now if they cannot miss of what's necessary for salvation, they must needs hit on it, and so are in a man­ner Infallible, as to that point, while they rely thereon. To put it to the Tryal, let us consi­der what Disputes there are out of Scriptures Letter, between Socinians and their Opposers about a Trinity and the Godhead of Christ: and what between Catholicks and their Adversa­ries about the Real Presence. How many In­terpretations of [This is my Body.] How ma­ny Allusions of one place to another in both those Points to hammer out the Truth, and these agitated on both sides, by Bodies of e­minent men, excellent Scholars, Acute Scri­pturists? Must every sober Enquirer, and eve­ry private ignorant person who sincerely endea­vours needs hit on the right, and judge better of these Points than all those Learned men? Or, must we needs conclude that all those learned Enquirers found in each of those vast different parties are mad or Insincere? I wish he would prove this: 'Tis his best Interest, and would give his Argument some likelihood; which till then has none: for the Fact being [Page 64] so notorious, how earnestly they all endeavour to find out the Truth of these points by the Letter, none will judge but that if their Heads or Hearts be not strangely disorder'd by Folly or Insincerity, the Letter which shou [...]d in­form them, is strangely incompetent for that end. But 'tis remarkable how neatly Dr. St. skips aside from the Point. He undertakes not to give us any Assurance that his sober or sincere Enquirers shall by vertue of this his Rule of Faith, find out that any one point of his Faith is an Absolutely Certain Truth, but only that he shall not miss of what is necessary for salvation, that he shall not erre, or at least, not be damn'd for it. So that, for any thing appears by his discourse, let him but read the Scripture, though he holds nothing but Er­ror by so doing, yet he is still in the way to sal­vation by the very Reading and Running into Errour. But this deserves a particular reflexi­on hereafter.

Lastly, the very nature and Genius of the Scripture, as it now is, shows that, however it be excellently Vseful for perfecting the Lives of the Faithful in many regards, yet it was never intended for the Rule of Faith. For, (to omit innumerable other reasons frequently alledg'd by our Authors,) Its several parts were evidently writ on several emergent oc­casions, and have not the least semblance as if the whole had been purposely compil'd to de­liver [Page 65] an intire Body of Faith. Nor does it ob­serve any method tending to clear each seve­ral Point. For, it neither begins with define­ing or explaining every word made use of in signifying those Points, which is the best means to avoid Equivocation, the Ground of all mistake: nor does it pursue home the evi­dencing any one Point, by making us aware of the sinister senses in which each word ex­pressing that Point might seem to be taken; nor does it put objections against each Tenet, and establish us in the right Apprehension of it by solving them, nor distinguish by laying common Rules to know when the words are to be taken properly, when Metaphorically, much less tell us particularly in which places each word is to be taken thus or thus: nor can it justifie with absolute or Infallible Cer­tainty either its Text or Copy to be substan­tially like the Original, nor (if we may trust Dr. St. here Princ. 15.) can any Authority on Earth supply that necessary duty for it: nor, (it being requisite to compare one place to another so to find out the sense) does it tell us which place is to be compar'd to another as its proper Explainer, nor of the two allu­ding places which is to stand firm and be ta­ken as the Letter lies; which to bend its signi­fication in correspondency to that other; with­out fore-knowledg of which 'tis pure folly to think to avail our selves by comparing Pla­ces. [Page 66] None of these things, I say, are found in the Scriptures Letter as it lies; which not­withstanding, and perhaps many other such like, it had been agreeable to Gods Wis­dome and Goodness to have given it, in case it had been intended by him for a Rule of Faith, or such a Direction by relying on which, people of all capacities might have so well-grounded an Assent to those Points, as is impossible to be an Errour while they thus relie on it; which Assent in Christian Lan­guage we call [Faith]

On the other side 'tis evident that of some Points it gives onely accidental hints here and there without insisting upon them amply or ex­plaining them fully; and that Book which was most designedly intended to assert Christs Divinity, was yet so far from putting it out of all dispute or preserving it from being op­pos'd and call'd in question, that never yet did Heresie prevail so much against Gods Church as did the Arians, who deny'd that very Point of Faith. But what needs more to e­vince this Point than these two Arguments, one à priori, the other à posteriori. All words are either Proper or Improper and Metaphori­cal; of which Proper ones express that the Thing is indeed or in reality so: but Improper ones that 'tis not indeed or in reality so: whence it happens that in matters of so exact Truth as Points of Faith (especially when the Points [Page 67] are of main Concern) it imports a plain Here­sie either to take a Proper word for an Impro­per, or, an improper one for a Proper: For example, those Texts expressing that God has hands, feet, repents, grieves, is mov'd by our Prayers, &c. are, if taken properly wick­ed Heresies and destroy the Spiritual and un­changeable nature of the Godhead. Also, to take those words Christ is man, suffer'd, dy'd, rose again, &c. improperly, are wicked He­resies too, and take away the main supports of our salvation: This being so, it follows that the absolutely-certain Knowledg when the words of Scripture are taken properly, when not, being determinative of what's true Faith, what Heresie, it must be had from the Rule of Faith it self, and so from the Letter of Scri­pture, if that be indeed the Rule. But this Knowledge is not had from the Scriptures Letter; for this must either be done by that Letters signifying in each place expresly or e­quivalently that the words are properly or Improperly there taken, which is Impossible to be shown, nor was ever pretended; or else by signifying the contrary Point in another place; and this, as far as the bare Letter carries, or abstracting from all Interpretation, can onely signifie that the Letter in one place seems to contradict it self in another place; and this, as far as the bare Letter carries, or abstracting from all Interpretation, can onely [Page 68] signifie that the Letter in one place seems to contradict it self in another place, which is far short of giving us an unerring security which side is Truth. Or, if it be said, the Letter a­lone gives us not this security without some Interpretation, then this Interpretation per­forms what the Letter (if it be a Rule) ought, but could not, and determines with Absolute Certainty when the words are taken properly, when not; that is gives us our Faith; and consequently that Light or Knowledge, what­ever it was, which the Interpreter brought with him, and had it not from the Letter, gave us the right sense of Scripture; and, so, It, not the Scripture was the True Rule of Faith.

From the Effect, or à posteriori I argue thus: We experience that Great Bodies of men of divers sects, with equal earnestness (as far as appears to us) go about to find their Faith in the Scriptures Letter, and equally profess to rely upon Gods Assistance to that end; where­fore either we must be forced to judge that none of those several sects do sincerely desire to find True Faith in the Scriptures, and so by Dr. St's Principles no sort of men in the whole world has right Faith: which quite takes away all Christianity; or else we must think all of them truly desire to find right Faith in the Scripture, and rely on Gods help to as­sist them, In which case, since the fault is not in them taken as applying themselves to their [Page 69] Rule, and relying on it, and yet 'tis mani [...]e [...]t they differ (that is one side errs) in most Fun­damental Points, as in the Trinity, Divinity of Christ, Real Presence of Christs Body in the Sacrament, &c. it follows unavoidably that the Faul [...] is in those persons in holding it their Rule, for, in case they err'd not in holding it to be a Rule, that is in case it were indeed apt to ascertain them absolutely if they apply'd it, and that they did actually apply it, it is im­possible they should have ever err'd. Scriptures Letter then is far from securing men of all sorts, while they rely on it, from Errour; since whole Bodies of men, and, amongst those, multitudes of great Scholars and learn­ed Scripturists erre grievously and that in most Fundamental Points, even while they rely upon it: Which if it destroy not the nature of a Rule, I know not what does. This Dis­course being forelaid, we shall be able to make shorter work with his Principles, to which we now address.

Whereas then in his tenth Principle, he contend; that the will of God can be sufficient­ly declar'd to men by writing. I answer, That by Extraordinary Contrivances and Actings of Gods Wisdome and Power it may; but that this will avail him little, since 'tis evident that de facto God has not thus exerted his Wis­dome and Power in making Scriptures Letter fit for that End; whence we conclude that it [Page 70] was never meant for a Rule: and, whereas he says that words are equally capable of being un­derstood, spoken or written; I deny it absolute­ly; for nature teaches us that the countenance and Carriage of the Speaker, the Accent of the voice, the giving a due and living Empha­sis to the words, with the whole Complexi­on of Circumstances in which the Speaker is found, and which generally are not unknown to the person to whom he speaks; and, a­mongst these, principally, his applying him­self pertinently to the present exigency, Thoughts and Expectation of the Hearer: All these, I say, and many others give Living voice an incomparable Advantage over Dead Characters in point of Intelligibleness and Ex­pressiveness: And, though Dr. St. may con­tend that whatever advantage in signifying, That has over This, may possibly be put in writing and exprest by means of many large Explications writ by the person himself that was to deliver his mind, yet he can never show that those Multitudes of words in those very Explications have the same degree of Signifi­cativeness and Intelligibility as if they had been spoken vivâ voce by their Author; since they will still want all or most of the Advan­tages now spoken of, which manifestly de­termine the signification of words. To omit, that all this will little make for his purpose when he comes to apply it; since Scripture [Page 71] has no such large Explications writ upon it to supply that less clearness of expressing which the way of writing is necessarily subject to, if compar'd with that of speaking: much less if daily practise go along with living voice to declare mens minds, as is found in Tradition.

As for what he adds, and builds on, that Scripture may be known to be the word of God: If he means it may be known to be such ac­cording to the Grounds he proceeds on, he ought either to have put it amongst Principles agreed on by both sides, or else have prov'd it; which he no where attempts, but afterwards (Princ. 15.) very solidly and learnedly dis­proves and confutes: while he denies the ne­cessity of any Infallible society of men to attest or explain those VVritings; For, since in the bare Letter as it lies, there are found many passages which contradict one another, and, abstracting from all Interpretation and Atte­station of the Letter, no part of it is to be held truer than other (for if it once lose the repute of being Gods word, as in that case it must, 'tis all equally liable to be false) it follows that if there be neither any men Infallible in attesting nor in explaining those Writings, all the World may be deceiv'd in performing both those duties; and, so, all Mankind may be deceived both in judging the Scriptures which we now have to be the same book which was writ at first, since there is no INFALLI­BLE [Page 72] Attestation of it, and also may be de­ceiv'd in judging there are not Contradictions in it, since there is no Infallible Explanation of it to secure it from many such Imputations, Evident in the bare Letter taking it as un ex­plain'd or uninterpreted. Any man of reason would think that to leave Scripture in such a pickle, were but a slender provision to give it such a Certainty as will fit it to be a Rule of Faith, if he but reflects that that Rule must be the Basis of all our Knowledg that God ever reveal'd any thing at all; that is, of all Man­kinds way to salvation.

But suppose it thus granted that the will of God can be fufficienty declared to Men by wri­ting, in the manner declared above, let's see what follows.

11. It is agreed among all Christians that although God in the first Ages of the VVorld did reveal his mind to men immediately by a voice or secret inspirations, yet afterwards he did communicate his mind to some immediatly inspir'd to write his VVill in Books to be pre­serv'd for the benefit of future Ages, and par­ticularly that these Books of the New Testa­ment which we now receive were so written by the Apostles and Disciples of Iesus Christ.

This is granted: only it is not agreed among all that bear the name of Christians of what nature this benefit is which God intended men in future Ages by the Scriptures, whether of [Page 73] strengthening them in Faith, and stirring them up to good Life, or teaching them their Faith at first and assuring it to them nor how this benefit comes to be deriv'd to the Generality, whether by Immediate read­ing and penetrating it themselves: or, through the Preaching and Instruction of some others deputed by God for that end, who have Faith in their hearts already by some other Means: But we are to expect Dr. St. will in the pro­cess of his discourse clear this point solidly and throughly, for 'tis the main hinge of all this Controveesie: He goes forward thus.

12. Such Writings have been received by the Christian Church of the first Ages, as Di­vine and Infallible, and being deliver'd down as such to us by an Vniversal consent of all Ages since, they ought to be owned by us as the Cer­tain Rule of Faith; whereby we are to judge what the Will of God is in order to our salvati­on; unless it appear with an Evidence equal to that whereby we believe those Books to be the Word of God, that they were never intended for that end because of their obscurity or Imper­fection.

This whole Paragraph amounts to one Pro­position, which is this, such Writings, (viz. penn'd by men divinely inspir'd for the benefit of future Ages) receiv'd at first, and deliver'd down ever since as Divine and Infallible, are to be held the Certain Rule of Faith, unless there [Page 74] be Evidence of their Defectiveness, equal to that of their being Gods Word. Which is a bare Assertion, neither prov'd from any Principle agreed or not agreed on, and therefore per­fectly Groundless, and unprov'd; and False into the bargain, though the main stress of his whole discourse relies on it. Now that 'tis False I prove, because its Contradictory is True. For, there may be writings penn'd by men Divinely inspir'd and deliver'd down to us as Divine and Infallible, and yet we need not be bound to hold them the Rule of Faith, though we have not equal Evidence of their defect as we have that they are the VVord of God. Since to be writ by men divinely-inspir'd, to be Di­vine, Infallible, and the word of God, signifies no more but that they are perfectly Holy and True in themselves, and beneficial to mankind in some way or other; and this is the farthest these words will carry; but that they are of themselves of sufficient Clearness to give sincerely-endeavouring persons such Security of their Faith while they rely on them as can­not consist with Error (which is requisit to the Rule of Faith) these words signifie not: They may be most Holy, they may be most True in themselves, they may be exceedingly Vseful or Beneficial to mankind, and yet not be en­dow'd with this Property, which yet the RVLE OF FAITH must have. And where­as he says they are for these reasons to be own­ed [Page 75] for the Rule of Faith (that is we are for these reasons to judge and profess them such) unless it appear with an equal evidence, &c. that they are defective; sure he never under­stood what Iudging and Professing is built on, who can make such a Discourse: Our Assent or Iudgment is built on the Grounds or Rea­sons which conclude the thing to be as we judg, and not on our seeing nothing to the contrary: for, in case the reasons produc'd conclude not the thing to be so, the not appearing to be other­wise will avail nothing to conclude it so: All it can effect is to make us maintain our liberty of suspence and Indifferency that so we may be void of forestalment or prejudice and free to believe it when competent or conclusive Reasons shall appear to evince it. What then Dr. St. is to do, is to produce Conclusive Reasons to evince that the Letter of Scripture has such a perspicuity and other Perfections be­longing to such a Rule as must ground that most Firm, Vnalterable and (if rightly ground­ed) Inerrable Assent call'd CHRISTIAN FAITH, and this considering the Nature of Faith, the Effects which are to proceed from Faith, and Obligations issuing from it, and Incumbent on the Faithful, as such; But in stead of performing this necessary Duty of his, to argue as if, though the Reasons he brings conclude it not, yet it must needs be so because we have no Evidence 'tis not so, is, [Page 76] so pleasant and new invented a way of arguing, that he must find the VVorld a new Logick, and Mankind it self a new nature ere he will arrive by means of such Discourse at any Conclusion.

And, whereas he seems to build much on the word [Equal,] alledging that we must, for the reasons there given, hold the Scriptures the Rule of Faith unless it appear they are de­fective with an Evidence [Equal] to that where­by we believe those books to be the word of God: 'Tis absolutely deny'd, not only for the reason lately given in common, that, none can be bound in reason to hold or own any unprov'd Position; but particularly because of the peculiar nature of the thing we are discoursing of; For, the Rule of Faith being that which is to tell us God said such or such things, or engages the Di­vine Authority for their Verity, if we should happen to misuse Scriptures Letter, by letting loose people of all capacities to rely on it as their Rule of Faith, then, in case it should peradventure not have been intended by God for this end, but for some others, we expose our selves and others to the desperate danger of running into Endless Errors by this mis­usage of Scripture, and of adhering to those Errors as firmly as if God himself had spoke them; that is, we hazard erring irrecovera­bly in matters which ate the proper means of salvation, and blaspheming God daily in ma­king him the Patron of Lies. In this case then [Page 77] there is particular caution to be used, and so, if upon sincere and strict Examination it be but any thing dubious that Scripture was ne­ver intended by God for a Rule of Faith, we can never be obliged to hold or own it for such, especially not having any Certain Ar­gument to conclude it such; much less must we be oblig'd to hold it to be such unless we have EQVAL Evidence of its Unfitness to that whereby we believe those Books to be the word of God, unless Dr. St. will say that no­thing ought to restrain a man from hazarding the greatest mischiefs in the world but perfect Evidence, that no harm will come of it. So that still his main business, and without which he does nothing at all, remains yet to be done; which is, to bring solid convincing Proofs that God intended Scripture, or his Written Word for the Rule of Faith; that is, for such a Rule as people of all sorts relying on it should be Infallibly or absolutely-secur'd from Error by so doing. In making good which concerning Point he hath hitherto trifled ex­ceedingly. Nay himself here is afraid to own the Goodness of his own Proof; otherwise he would never have thought it fit to annex those words, Vnless it appear with an Evi­dence equal to that whereby we believe those books to be the word of God, that they were ne­ver intended for that End because of their obscu­rity or imperfection. For, the Evidence where­by [Page 78] it appears those Books are the word of God must be conclusive (else according to his Grounds, we can never conclude one word of Faith True) and so an Evidence equal to it must be Conclusive likewise: If then he had thought his reasons to prove Scripture the Rule of Faith were Good and Conclusive, Common sense would have forbid him to add these cautious words Vnless it appears with an equal evidence, &c. for Common sense tells us no Conclusive reason can possibly be brought for the Negative, if Conclusive Rea­sons be once produc'd, or be producible for the Affirmative; It appears then by this be­haviour of his on this occasion that he distrusts that either he has produc'd any Conclusive rea­son for that main Point of Scriptures being in­tended for the Rule of Faith, or that any can be produc'd.

Lastly, That we may give perfect satis­faction to this Fundamental Principle of his, though perhaps there is not Evidence Scrip­tures Letter was never intended for the Rule of Faith equal to that whereby we believe those Books to be the Word of God, in re­gard we believe this upon the Authority of Gods Church which is supported with the whole strength of Best Nature and Supernatu­rals, yet we have rigorous and Conclusive E­vidence that it is not penn'd in the very best way imaginable to avoid all ambiguity of [Page 79] words and forestall mistakes, as being imme­diately inspir'd by God, whose works are per­fect, if it had been intended by him to be our Rule of Faith, it ought to be. And I shall pre­sume I have already brought Conclusive E­vidences both à priori and also à posteriori in my answer to his 10th Principle to evince that it has not in it the nature of such a Rule, nor consequently was it intended by God to be such a Rule. How incomparably excellent soever it be for other Ends for which it was indeed and solely intended. But omitting all the rest at present, I remind him of one (which I cannot too often repeat) and enforce it upon him thus. He cannot deny but the Points of a Trinity, and Christs Godhead are most Fundamental Points of Faith, he cannot deny but both Protestants and Socinians rely on the Letter of Scripture for the sole Rule of their Faith, and sincerely endeavour to know the meaning of them, which is all he requires on the Persons side: He cannot deny but that, notwithstanding this, one party holds There is no Trinity, and that Christ is not God, the other that there is a Trinity, and that Christ is God, and so one side erres most Fundamental­ly: He cannot deny but, Error being a Defect, there must be a fault somewhere to beget this Error, that is, either in the Persons judging of what the Rule of Faith tells them, or else in judging that to be a Rule which is not the [Page 80] Rule; for in case they erre in neither of these, 'tis impossible they should erre or misconceive at all in matters of Faith. He cannot deny in any reason, but the persons on both sides be­ing such acute men and excellently well vers'd in the Letter of Scripture have both Capaci­ty enough, and apply that Capacity to their power by as great a Diligence as any; nor can he in Charity deny but they sincerely en­deavour to know the meaning of it in such points. Therefore he cannot deny but the per­sons attending to the Rule are faultless either in understanding Scripture in these points, if it be to private Understandings clearly intelli­gible, or VVill to understand it if they could; and indeed 'tis Incredible they should not will or desire this, since they use such exact dili­gence in it, and solemnly profess to rely on the Letter alone, or that did they indeed sleight the Letter or purposely decline relying on it, their byass should not manifestly appear in so long time, and they be branded for Evident Insincerity: He cannot deny then but the Per­sons are faultless as to their Capacity and Will to understand the Rule; therefore, un­less he will renounce his Reason, he cannot deny but the Fault must be in the same Per­sons, judging that to be the Rule, which is not; and consequently that the Letter of Scri­pture is not alone and of it self clear and In­telligible enough to preserve private men, both [Page 81] capable and diligent and relying solely on It from possibility of Error, no not from actu­ally Erring in most Fundamental Points of Faith, nor consequently has it in it the true nature of the Rule of Faith, and so, since God never intends any thing should do what its Nature reaches not to do, that is should do what it cannot do, 'tis manifest Scriptures Letter was never intended by God for that End, or to be such a Rule.

13. Although we cannot argue against any particular way of Revelation from the necessary Attributes of God, yet such away as writing being made choce of by him, we may justly say, that it is repugnant to the nature of the design, and the Wisdome and Goodness [...]f God, to give infallible assurance to persons in writing his Will, for the benefit of Mankind, if those Wri­tings may not be understood by all persons who sincerely endeavour to know the meaning of them in all such things as are necessary for their salvation.

It is not yet prov'd, nor ever will, that God hath made choice of the Way of writing for a Rule of Faith, nor design'd it for that end, nor that the benefit he meant Mankind by such Writings was to Ground their Faith on what appear'd to their private Judgments to be the sense of the Letter; therefore 'tis no wonder if all persons stould hap to misunderstand [Page 82] it even in such things as are necessary for their salvation, notwithstanding their sincere endea­vour to know the meaning of them, since God has never promis'd that any who takes a way never intended by him for such an End, shall infallibly arrive at that End by such a Way; nor is the Wisdome and Godness of God at all concern'd in preserving any from Error if they take such a Way, especially if we reflect upon these following Considerations.

First, That God hath no where engaged his word to secure every single or private man from Error who shall sincerely endea­vour to find his Faith in the Scripture, in case he rely on his own private Judgment & neg­lect to hear his Pastors: whence if such pri­vate persons rely on Gods promis'd Assistance to such an End, they rely on what neither is, nor ever was, and so no wonder their hopes fail them, if those Hopes be groundless.

Secondly, They cannot but know, if but meanly vers'd in the world; that whole Bo­dies of men, and amongst them divers of great learning, interpret Scripture several ways in very concerning points of Faith, and it must needs favour of a proud self-conceit in any person to think God regards his single self more than he does whole Bodies and Great Multitudes.

Again, it cannot without a strange Unrea­sonableness & Uncharitableness be imagin'd [Page 83] or judg'd that not one person of those many who adhere to the opposite Tenet as clear to them in Scripture according to their best Judgment, does sincerely endeavour to know the meaning of these Sacred Books; and, if they do, then Common sense tells this pri­vate person that the whole Foundation on which his Hope is built, is unsound; and that more is requisite than the Letter of Scripture and a sincere endeavour to understand it; and that if these suffice to direct him right, they ought for the same reason be sufficient to di­rect another; and so he ought to doubt whe­ther himself or those others proceeding on the same Grounds and having the same Means, be in the right, that is, he ought to doubt of his Faith no better grounded.

Lastly, This private man belongs to some particular Church, and so has Pastors and Governors set over him to teach and instruct him, and those too (as wee'l suppose) read and rely on the Scriptures; Also, he must judg this Church sincerely endeavours to know the meaning of Scriptures; for this being the requisit condition to find right Faith, with­out this his Church has no right Faith, and so is no Church: now for a private man who is subject to such a Church, and ought to be taught by the Pastors of that Church, not to submit to the Judgment of that Church and his Lawful Pastors, as to the Sense of Scri­ptures [Page 84] or his Faith, even though they be sin­cere endeavours as well as he, but to adhere to that for his Faith which appears to his private self to be in the Scriptures, though he con­tradict and defy all the Church he his a mem­ber of in so doing (which he ought to do, if he proceed on this Principle that Scriptures may be understood by all persons who sincerely endeavour to know the meaning of them in all things necessary for his salvatiou, for he ought not for any mans sake relinquish his Faith or its Rule.) I say, to behave himself thus, as in that supposition he ought, is such an intol­erable, ma apert Presumption, so Sensless and Unnatural and Self-condemning a Rebellion, and such a Fanatick Spiritual Pride, as I much doubt will give a man but small title to hope for Especial Assistance from Gods Wisdom and Goodness,

At present I onely remarke the Faults of this Principle which are these. First, That it supposes God has made choice of, or designd the Scriptures to be this Rule of Faith for pri­vate persons. Next, that Gods Wisdome and Goodness is Engag'd that it be thus Intelligi­ble to every sin [...]ere Eadeavourer! Neither of which is in the least prov'd or proveable. Lastly, when he comes to the close; instead of making it so intelligible as that all sincere Endeavors might therby be absolutely secur'd from erring as to the Truth of their Faith, [Page 85] (which is the Duty of the Rule of Faith) see­ing very well these slight Grounds were not able to carry so far, he substitutes in their room these waty words [in all such things as shall be necessary for their salvation] so that though they erre in all the main points of Christianity, yet for any thing we know, or these crafty common words inform us, they have still all that is needfull to save them, that is though they go wrong all their lives they are still all the while in the way to Heaven. But, I suppose Dr. St. means that no more is necessary for any ones salvation than just as much as he can understand in Scripture. Which I wish he would once begin to set him­self to prove & make out by some convin­cing argument: I am heartily weary of speak­ing still to his unprov'd and voluntary Asser­tions.

14. To suppose the Books so written to be imperfect, i. e. that any things necessary to be be­lieved, or practised are not contained in them, is either to charge the first Author of them with fraud, and not delivering his whole mind, or the Writers with Insincerity in not setting it down, and the whole Christian Church of the first Ages with folly, in believing the Fulness and Perfection of the Scriptures in order to sal­vation.

As far as I apprehend, the foregoing Prin­ciple [Page 86] was intended to shew that Scripture was sufficirntly Intelligible to be the Rule of Faith, and this under examination is to prove it to be the measure of Faith as he calls it, Princ. 28. and all he contends here is that it CON­TAINS all that is necessary TO BE BE­LIEV'D and practic'd. And, that we may not multiply disputes, I grant those Holy Books contain all he pretends, some way or o­ther either Implicitly or Explicitly; either in Exprest words, or by necessary con [...]equence. But, that those Books contain, or signifie (for they are the same) all that is to be believed and practiced, so evidently that all persons who sincerely endeavor to know their meaning, and this for all future Ages, may thence alone (as his discourse aims to evince) that is, without the Churches interpretation, arrive to know what's necessary for their salvation, with such a Certainty as is requisite for the Nature and Ends of Faith, and the Obligations annext to it, I absolutely deny, and if he means this by the word [Perfection] which he adds to [Fulness] I deny also that either the first Au­thor can be charg'd with Fraud, since he pro­mis'd no such thing; or the Writers with Insincerity, since they were not commanded, nor did intend thus to express it; nor, as far as appears, had any order from God to set down his whole mind, but only writ the several pieces of it occasionally: nor did the Christi­an [Page 87] Church in the first Ages, ever attribute to Scriptures such an Intelligibleness as that pri­vate persons should ground their Faith upon their Evidence without needing the Churches Interpretation, if we speak of all points ne­cessary to Mankinds salvation, as he seems and ought to do. And here I desire to enter this declaration to all the world, that I attri­bute not the least Imperfection to the Holy Scriptures; Every thing has all the Perfecti­on it ought to have, if it can do what it was intended to do, and in the manner it was In­tended. Treatises of deep Philosophy are not Imperfect, if they be not as plain, as plainest Narrative Histories; no not if they be ita editi ut non sint editi, in case they were meant as a matter for the Author to explain and di­late upon to his Scholars; nor are the Laws Imperfect, though they often need Learned Judges to interpret them. Nor are we to ex­pect that the Prophecy of Isaiah should be as plain as the Law of Moses. The Immediate End of writing each piece, as far as appears to us, was occasional, St. Pauls Epistles were evidently so; nor can I doubt but they were perfect in their kind, and apt to signify com­petently to those to whom he writ what he intended; so that, if they had any farther doubt, they might send to ask him, or do it viva voce; and yet we see that even in those days when the complexion of all the Circum­stances [Page 88] was fresher and neerer then now, some unlearned persons err'd damnably in mistaking and misconceiving them, that is, while they went about to frame their Faith out of them; 'Tis questionless also they rely'd upon them as Gods Word, or dictated by the Holy Ghost, else they had not so built upon them, or ad­her'd to them. They might sincerely endea­vour too to know their meaning; yet, if the Writings were disproportion'd to their pitch they migh Erre damnably for all that. What farther End God intended the H. Scriptures for, appears not by any Expresse either pro­mise or declaration of our Saviour; but out of the knowledge that they were writ by per­sons divinely inspir'd and the Experience the Church had of their Vsefulness towards In­struction and Good Life, joyn'd with the Common Knowledg we have that all Goods that come to the Church, happen through the ordering of Gods Providence, hence we just­ly conclude (as Dr. St. well says) that they were intended and writ also for the Benefit of future Ages. And from their Vsefulness and the success of their Use, we may gather how God intended them for the Church. The Learned and stable sons of the Church read them with much fruit to excite their wills to Goodness. The Pastore of the Church make ex­cellent use of them in exhorting, preaching, catchising, &c. and in many other uses of [Page 89] this sort they are excellently beneficial, which are so many that were it now seasonable for me to lay them open at large as I truly hold them, none would think I had little Reverence for Scriptures; but in deciding Controver­sies, or finally silencing Hereticks, as the Rule of Faith ought to do, by the unavoidable evi­dence of the Text to private persons no use was ever made of them (alone) with any suc­cess as the Fathers also complain; Unless the the Churches Authority, going along, animat­ed the dead Letter in dogmatical passages, and shew'd the sense of the places to have been perpetually held from the beginning, and so give It the Sense, Majesty Authority and Force of Gods VVord, elevating it thus above the repute of being some private Conceit or Production of Skill and Wit interpreting the Letter. Scripture then is perfect, or has all due to the nature God intended it; if, duly made use of as the Churches best Instrument, it be able to work those Effect [...] spoken of, though it be not so Evident or self-authoriz'd as to be the Rule of Faith. We give it absolute Pre-eminence in its kind, that is, above all other Writings that ever appear'd in the world; but we pre­fer before it Tradition or Gods Church, which is the Spouse of Christ, the Pillar and Ground of Truth, and consisting of the Living Temples of the H. Ghost, for whose sole Good, as its Final End, Scripture it self was intended and written.

[Page 90] 15. These Writings being owned as contain­ing in them the whole Will of God so plainly re­veal'd, that no sober enquirer can miss of what is necessary for salvation; there can be no ne­cessity supposed of any Infallible society of men either to attest or explain these Writings among Christians, any more than there was for some Ages before Christ of such a Body of men a­mong the Iews, to attest or explain to them the VVritings of Moses or the Prophets.

He that owns this, must own it without rea­son for any thing appears yet; for Dr. St. has afforded us hitherto nothing to prove this point but a few words craftily laid together, which, when look'd into, have not a jot of reason in them. And the like empty inside we find in this present Principle. For, if the whole will of God be plainly reveal'd in Scri­pture, then in case nothing else be requisit to understand Gods will but the disposition of soberly enquiring (as he puts no other) it must follow that no sober Enquirer can miss of knowing there the whole will of God; and since every Article of Faith is part of Gods VVill, it would follow hence that every sober Enquirer may understand all Faith in Scripture, which yet the Dr. is not dispos'd to say; as appears by his avoiding to put down what the tenour of his discourse requir'd, namely, that the [Page 91] whole will of God is so plainly reveal'd in Scri­pture that no sober Enquirer can miss [of know­ing his whole will there;] and instead of it sub­stituting, that the whole will of God is so plainly reveal'd in Scripture, that, no sober Inquirer can miss of [what is necessary for salvation] which words may be true though they fall far short of knowing the whole will of God by that means.

Next, it is very material, and it would be very requisi [...]e to know how a man must be qualify'd to be a sober Enquirer. In order to which, we may reflect that (as was said be­fore) it ought in reason be judged Gods will that we should know whether Christ be God, and whether his Body (and consequently Him­self) be really in the Sacrament; lest we ei­ther want the best Incitements to Devotion if he be, and we judge he is not; or else commit material Idolatry by judging him to be so, when he is not so. Now I would have him clearly show (clearly, I say, for all depends upon it, according to his Grounds) in what either the Roman- Catholicks or the Socini­ans fall short in point of being sober enquirers; for 'tis plain they must both fall short of be­ing such if the whole will of God be clearly re­veal'd in Scripture, since the former holds Christ is really in the Sacrament; the other, that he is not God, the contrary to both which I suppose Dr. St. holds to be the true sense of Scripture.

[Page 92] Farther, if there can be no necessity of any Infallible society of men either to attest or ex­plain those Writings, 'tis Evident there can be no need of a Fallible society of men for those Ends. For if Writings which are attested or explained by a Fallible Society of men be the Rule of Faith, or the Grounds God has left us to build our Faith on, and it be evident that a Fallible Attestation or Explication may pos­sibly lead us into nothing but Errour, it would follow that God himself may possibly have led all Christians hitherto and still leads them to the end of the world into actual Errour; since a reliance on Fallible means of knowing the Letter and Sense cannot possibly raise any Assent beyond possibility of being Erroneous. There needs therefore by Dr. St's discourse neither Infallible nor Fallible Societies; and so according to his Principles, farewell all Church, both Catholick and Protestant, as far as concerns these two main Duties, on which all else depends.

Again, though all this were true, and that the Scriptures were own'd as containing in them the whole VVill of God so plainly reveal'd that no sober Enquirer can miss of what's necessary to salvation, and that therefore there needed no Church to explain them. Yet 'tis a strange Consequence that therefore there can be no ne­cessity of any Infallible society of men to AT­TEST, them, or to witness that the Letter [Page 93] of Scripture is right. This is so far from fol­lowing out of the former part of his Disc [...]se that the contrary ought to follow; [...] prejudicing his own pretence, that [...]condu­ces exceedingly to it; for, certain [...]y, his so­ber Enquirer would less be in doubt to miss of what is necessary to salvation in case the Letter, on which all depends be well attested, than if it be not, and most certainly an Infallible so­ciety of men can better attest that Letter than a Fallible one, and those Writings can with bet­ter show of reason be owned to contain in them the VVill of God, if their Letter be attested be­yond possibility of being wrong, than if left in a possibility of being such; for if the Letter be wrong, all is wrong in this case. It might seem wonderful then what it is that thus byas­ses Dr. St. against his own Interest; And I wish I had reason to think it were not a kind of Innate Antipathy against not onely our Church but Church in Common, and a desire to attribute as little to it as he can possibly though he hazzard some prejudice to his own Cause and even all Christian Faith into the bargain. His whole way of discourse here bends strongly towards the taking away all divine Institution of Pastors (for this would oblige the people to hear them) and levelling all into a Fanatick Anarc [...]y. I would gladly interpret him otherwise; and imagine that perhaps he means that, since 'tis own'd the [Page 94] Scriptures thus contain Gods will, therefore there needs not be supposed any Infallible so­ciety of men either to attest or explain them; but I cannot conceive he should think Scrip­tures Letter must be own'd to be right without some either Fallible or Infallible Authority to attest it to be such; or that, however he may sceptically dread no Authority can be Infalli­ble, yet that he will deny but that it were good there were such an Authority to attest Scriptures Letter, nay needful too in case he heartily held that Christian Faith built (ac­cording to his Grounds) solely on that Letter may not possibly all be a Ly; which common sense tells us, it may be, in case we may all be deceiv'd in the Truth of the Letter.

Lastly, That for some Ages before Christ there was no Necessity of such a Body of men among the Iews to attest or explain to them the VVritings of Moses and the Prophets, is first not prov'd, and yet Dr. St. builds upon it as confidently as if it were evidently concluded, or else Self-evident. Next, what mean those words [for some Ages before Christ?] If the whole time of the Mo [...]ai [...]al Law; then 'tis e­vidently false, since (Deut. 17. v. 10, 11▪ &c.) God commanded upon pain of death to do ac­cording as some persons he had appointed for that end should explain the Writings belong­ing to that Law; and if these men had not some way or other been secured from Errour, [Page 95] God by commanding the subject Laity under so heavy a penalty to act as they adjudg'd, had both led them into actual Errour, and punisht them thus grievously in that case for adhering to Truth; which are too horrid blasphemies to be heard or imagin'd. But, if they mean onely, for some time of that Law, or some Ages immediately before Christ when the Sy­nagogue was most corrupt, this implies a Con­fession that such a Society was necessary in the Ages foregoing; and then Dr. St. is to show us why it was not equally necessary in the later as in the former, and not suppose it gratis. Nor was the Synagogue ever more corrupt than in our Saviour's days, and yet we see how se­verely he enjoins the Jews of that time to o­bey the Scribes and Pharisees because they sate in Moses his Chair; which it were blas­phemy to say Christ could do, if he had not secur'd their Doctrine from being Erroneous, that is, preserv'd them Inerrable in that Affair. Add, that were all granted, yet there is far more necessity of explaining the Scriptures now, than at that time: For the Law was in a manner all of it, either matters of Fact to be done, or Moral Duties and so agreeable to nature; whence both of these were far more easily expressible in proper language, and con­sequently Intelligible, than the sublime, spi­ritual and mysterious Tenets of the Law of Grace; which are more hard to be exprest in [Page 96] per words; and being more removed from our knowledg, the natures of the Things are more hard to be penetrated, and so those words more difficult to be rightly comprehended and understood without an Interpreter, than were those other.

16. There can be no more intolerable usurpa­tion upon the Faith of Christians than for any person or society of men to pretend to an Assist­ance as Infallible in what they propose as was in Christ or his Apostles without giving an equal degree of Evidence that they are so assisted as Christ and his Apostles did; viz. by miracles as great publick and convincing as theirs were; by which I mean such as are wrought by those very persons who challenge this Infallibility, and with a design for the Conviction of those who do not believe it.

Thus the Dr. makes sure work against the Infallibility of any Church; which over­thrown, his single self nay any private man or woman that has but self-conceit and confi­dence enough to proceed openly upon these Principles of his, is upon even ground with the best nay all the Churches in the World at the main point of understanding and determining what's Faith, what not: Nay more, may de­fie all the Governours of all Churches in the World, if he or she be but conscious to them­selves [Page 97] that they sincerely endeavour and soberly enquire for the true meaning of the divine wri­tings; for these being their Rule of Faith, and being assu [...]ed by Dr. St. that they cannot miss, if they soberly enquire, of what is necessary for salvation, and being inform'd by common Reason that 'tis a point very necessary to the salvation of a Christian, or one who is to fol­low and adore Christ, to know whether he be God, and so may without fear of Idolatry have Divine Honour given him or no; these things being so, in case it should seem to the best judgement of such a man (and let him be, for example, one brought up in the Church of En­gland and newly turn'd Socinian) that Christ is not God, he ought not to relinquish his Rule of Faith at any rate, nor what he judges the Scriptures sense of it (this being his Faith) but maintain it boldly against all his Pastors; talk, and quote Scripture as briskly as the best of them all; desy them to their faces, nay, dye in defence of his interpretation of it, and be a special Martyr though he take his death upon it, that all his lawful Pastors and the whole Church of which he is a member, are most hai­nons Idolaters for giving the worship proper to God, to a man. In this case 'tis plain, the Church cannot pretend to oblige him to be­lieve her interpretation of Scriptu [...]e; Alas! all such power is quite taken out of her hands by [Page 98] these new principles; not to act exteriourly as she does; for that were to oblige him to de­ny his Faith in his Actions and carriage, and this in so hainous a point as committing flat Idola­try, and which his Rule of Faith tells him is such. Nor to acquiesce so far as to hold his tongue and not contradict the Church; for 'tis both ingratitude to God who has so plainly re­veal'd it to him in Scripture, not to stand up for his honour so wickedly violated by the Church; and withall most uncharitable to his neighbour not to communicate to him the light he has receiv'd by such plain Revelation from God's word, and to endeavour his reduce­ment from so grievous an Idolatry, especially if this man be a Minister of the Church of En­gland, whose Office and Duty 'tis to hold forth or preach what he judges God's word: Nay, though it were a Lay-man or a Lay-wo­man, all's a case; why may they not with as much reason make known so concerning a truth plainly reveal'd to them, as Aquila and Priscilla did of old. As for all power of the Church to restrain them that's quite thrown out of doors. Humane commands can have no force when the best duties to God and man are neglected by obeying; and the more the Church is obstinate and opposes this private man or woman, by so much greater is the ne­cessity of his (or her) informing the Church [Page 99] right, and standing up for the Truth.

Hereafter more of this: at present let us see how he destroyes infallibility in the Church, which is his chief design, and indeed it makes very much for his purpose; for I so far con­curr with him, that if it be but fallible in atte­sting or explaining Scripture, 'tis little available to the grounding Christian Faith, so that if in­fallibility be but overthrown and these Princi­ples setled in its stead, every private man is a Church; which (our corrupt nature loving li­berty) will no doubt be very taking, and please the rabble exceedingly. He is so earnest at his work that he stumbles for hast. For, first, who did ever pretend to an infallibility equal to what was in Christ or his Apostles, as his words import? Christ was essentially infallible; the Apostles by Immediate Inspiration from God: The Church pretends indeed to be infallibly assisted, but that she pretends to have it either essentially as God has it, or by way of immediate inspiration, as the Apostles had it, is a thing I never yet learnt. 'Tis enough to justify her constant claim of infallible assistance, that she have it mediately, or by means of the ordinary working of natural and supernatural causes, so shee but have it. And to have it this way seems far more agreeable to reason than the other of immediate inspiration, as to have by way of im­mediate inspiration was far more fitting for [Page 100] the Apostles; For neither was it in their dayes accepted by a great portion of the world that Christ was God, or his Doctrine truth, that so they might receive it transmitted from the foregoing divinely assisted Church, that these and these doctrines were His, but they were the First that were to propagate this doctrine; and publish and make out the Truth of it: not could their own testimony avail to the end in­ [...]ended; for what could they testify? That Christ said thus, and did such and such miracles to testify the truth of his doctrine, or that the H. Ghost inspir'd them? The latter was latent, and the hearers had but their own words for it; the other was patent indeed, and so fully Con­victive to those who knew and convers'd with them, and were acquainted with the Circum­stances, but to remote nations, whither two or three of them were to go and Preach, it signi­fi'd little, and depended upon their bare words. Hence Miracles were at first (and shall till the end of the world in like cases be) absolutely necessary, to make such unheard of Tenets en­ter and sink into the hearts of great multi­tudes how circumstanc't soever. But, when af­terwards a World, or vast Body of men were by those Extraordinary Means settled unani­mously in a firm beleif that Christ was God, or at least that his doctrine was true, there could need no more but to know it was conti­nu'd [Page 101] down all along the same, to make deser­ters of his Church (against whom we dispute at present) accept it; and it being visible, au­dible and practical, and so subject to sense; hence Attestation of the foregoing Age to the Age succeeding was the most Proper way to continue it down; and perfectly Certain, being now grown so Ample and Vast; and the Attesters being Intelligent Persons, and having the sense of Christ's Law written in their heart, could deliver and explain themselves perti­nently to all arising difficulties, and clear all possible misunderstandings, which the dead Letter could not; and so this Living rule is perfectly Intelligible too. I omit here the Su­pernatural assistances, which those who com­prehend what most effectual means of Sancti­ty there is in the Doctrine, Sacraments, and Discipline of the Church, and consequently (as appears by divers excellent effects of it) the Product also of those means, or Holiness in great multitudes of the Faithful, will see and acknowledge, do incomparably strengthen the Authority of the Church, in delivering down right Faith.

Hence appears our D [...]s. unreasonableness in­timated to us in this principle: That though Connatural and Ordinary means be now laid in the world to continue Christ's doctrine from ou [...] time forwards, and were laid in the first [Page 102] Age to continue it along hitherto: Though Common Reason and (as I remember) St. Austin have taught him that, into the place of Miracles succeeded the consent of Countries & Nations; though Mr. Baxter, whom perhaps he holds as Holy a Father, as great a Saint, and as eminent a Scholar as St. Austin himself, have told him in his More Reasons for the Chri­stian Religion, &c. p. 32. That humane testi­mony may be so circumstanc't as amounts to a natural infallible certainty, instancing in the ex­istence of King Iames▪ and our Laws being made by King and Parliament (which how Dr. T. his Schollar will like I know not) and so the Churches infallibility in Faith to the end of the world might descend down to us by testimony to have been the doctrine of Christ and his Apostles, without needing New mira­cles done still to evince it: Nay, though him­sel [...] in correspondency to both these Doctors, does in his Rational account p. 205. make Tra­dition of the same use to us now which our Eyes and Ears had been, if we had been actually pre­sent when Christ delivered his Doctrine and wrought his miracles, and so could as well certi­fy us of the first taught doctrine, as if we had seen and heard it, and consequently of the In­fallibility of the Church in case that were a point of Doctrin taught at first; yet now, one of his principles must be, that no Argument [Page 103] though never so strong and convictive, no Tra­dition how well qualifi'd soever it be, nor any Plea in the world though never so legal and evident, shall acquit the Church from a most intolerable Usurpation if she challenge Infallibi­lity, but down right Miracles, full as great (observe his [...]igour) publick and convincing as were those of Christ and his Apostles, and wrought by those very persons that challenge this infallibi­lity, nay, and wrought with a design too for the conviction of those who do not beleeve it. How shrewdly sure this Rome [...]destroying Principle is laid! But if one should ask seriously whe­ther a Convincing reason to prove this infallibi­lity, I mean such a one as evidently concluded the point, might not do without a miracle, I know no rational man that ever would deny his assent upon such a condition; nor would Dr. St. perhaps in another occasion; but here, oh here 'tis another case! His hatred against the Church of Rome's Infallibility is so vigo­rous that he professes to desy Demonstration it self, that is, renounce Humane Nature rather than admit it; nothing but Miracle with all the nice cautions imaginable shall serve the turn. A notable resolution, and only parallel to his whom nothing would satisfy of the truth of Christianity, but the miraculous appearance of his Angel Guardian: but the Miracle not being granted him, he dy'd an Atheist.

[Page 104] In a word, if the Church ever usurpt't the pretence of Infallibility, I hope she first inva­ded it at one time or other: Now, since as long ago as St. Paul's time she we was called by that good man Columna & Firmamentum veritatis, The Pillar and Ground of Truth; which words ill consist with a Fallible proposer of such truths as belong to her sphear o [...] points of Faith, he ought to shew and make out when the Church lost that Title and preheminence; otherwise, since she is found claiming it now, and actually holding and possessing it upon the tenure of Tradition as promis'd her by Christ, we have very good reason to hold, she never usurp'd it at all, but inherited it by a continu­ed line of Succession from the beginning of Christianity to this very day: Nor has it ever seem'd Intolerable to any but to those whom nothing would content but new fan­gled Innovation, and altering the long-esta­blish'd doctrine of Christ, deliverd down per­petually from his time.

17. Nothing can be more absurd then to pre­tend the necessity of such an infallible Commission and Assistance to assure us of the truth of these writings, and to interpret them, and at the same time to prove that Commission from those writings from which we are told nothing can be certainly deduc'd such an assurance not being supposed; or to pretend that infallibility in a Body of men is not [Page 105] at liable to doubts and disputes as in those books from whence only they derive their Infalliblity.

The first part of this Principle is granted as to the Absurdity of the Position, abating the Degree of it; for, I take it to be equally or more absurd not to assent to the Infallibilty of a great body of men (which is all that is pre­tended) whatever Reason or Tradition appear for it, without an evident Miracle. The second part is likewise granted, in case it suppose (as it seems to do) the knowledge of their Infalli­bility deriv'd only from those very books which they recommend, and in passages which they are to explicate, ere they can be sure of such an infallibility. Otherwise, 'tis possible a book; obscure in multitudes of other passages may be clear in that one which relates them to the Church or that body which they are to hear and obey as to the proper interpreters of the Scriptures in Dogmatical and controverted passages which belong to Faith. But the Dr. should do well to shew us any society of men or Church, that pretends to build her Infalli­bility only on the Scriptures interpreted by that very Infallibility. Otherwise it will not touch our Church who claimes the Supernatu­ral assistance of the Holy Ghost upon her Rule of Faith, Tradition: and, as for her being natu­rally supported from errour in attesting former doctrines 'tis grounded by those who dis­course [Page 106] of that point upon Humane nature as to its infallible Sensations and on its Rationality, which renders it incapable to do any thing without a motive, as they must do, should they transmit a not-deliver'd, that is, an evidently-new doctrine for an old or deliver'd one.

18. There can be no hazard to any person in mistaking the meaning of any particular place in those books, supposing he use the best means for understanding them comparable to that which every one runs who beleeves any person or society of men to be infallible who are not; for in this la­ter he runs unavoidably into one great error, and by that may be led into a thousand; but in the former God hath promis'd either he shall not erre, or he shall not be damn'd for it.

This whole Paragraph is built on a false and unprov'd supposition, viz. that any Adversary of his beleeves any society of men to be Infallible which is not. Other faults there are in it, and that good store; as, granting in effect here what he lately deny'd, that a man using the best means for understanding Scripture may mistake the meaning of any particular place, though not with a hazard incomparable to that of the other: whereas, if Scripture be the Rule of Faith as he contended, 'tis impossible that a man relying and proceeding upon it, and using that means in the best manner he can possibly, should come to erre in his Faith; for in this [Page 107] case the man having done all that can be done by him as to the understanding the Rule, the fault must needs be in his judging that to be a Rule which is none.

But this main and fundamental error is coucht in the last words; [in the former, God hath pro­mis'd he shall not erre, or shall not be damn'd for it, what mean [in the former case, &c.] This certainly and nothing but this, if we may trust his own words; in mistaking the meaning of any particular place in th [...]se books supposing he use the best means for understanding them: Now 'tis a strange thing to me, that God should promise that a man mistaking the meaning of these books should not erre in so doing: But omit­ting this slip of Dr. St's. Reason or memo­ry; I ask what means this disjunctive promise, either of not erring or not being damn'd for it? Why it means that Dr. St. knows not well himself what to say to the point, or whether he should stand to it or no, that a man using the best means for understanding Scripture, that is, according to him, the best means lest by God for him to arrive at Faith, should not erre, and therefore he warily subjoyn'd [or he shall not be damn'd for it] and then he thinks himself secure enough from confute; it being a hard thing to conclude of any particular well [...] mea­ning man when he is damn'd, when not; whereas it might perhaps be no such hard mat­ter [Page 108] to prove whether what he held was true or not.

I could ask him whence or how he comes to this assurance of God's disjunctive promise here so confidently asserted, on the truth of which the salvation of so many souls necessari­ly depends? Not by Tradition: For this would make him rely on a society of men, or a Church, which he hates with all his heart; not by Scripture, for this would make the same thing be the proof to it self: not by Reason, for we are to suppose he has done his best in that already, and yet (as is shown) has effected nothing. But I would demand of him seriously; did God ever promise that if one takes such a way as (for want of a due intelligibleness in proportion to his capacity) is not able to se­cure him from error, he shall not erre, or that if he will needs be wiser than his Pastors and chuse a Means for such an end which God ne­ver intended for that end, he shall yet be sure to arrive at that end by that means; or that, if by relying on it and erring, he shall happen to fall short of sufficient means, he shall not­withstanding miraculously be sav'd without suffi­cient means? These are the points he is to consider well, and speak to, and not thus confi­dently call every thing a Principle which he thinks fit to say on his own head, though never so extravagant. In a word, let him prove Scrip­ture [Page 109] to have in it the nature of a Rule of Faith, or (which will fall into the same) to have been intended by God for that end, that is, to be of it self such to people of all capacities that sober­ly enquire, as secures them from erring in Faith while they rely on it, and this of it self without needing any society of Men, or Church to attest or explain it, and then I shall yeild his discourse to run as currently as his own heart can wish: but in proving this, he hitherto hath and ever must fall short most mi­serably.

He hath often, as I noted formerly, instead of saying his Rule of Faith should preserve those who endeavour to follow it from error or from missing of truth, substituted those words, cannot miss of what is necessary for their salvation, and such like: The examination of which words I have reserved till now; and, that I may do him all right imaginable, I will press his Argument (or rather indeed bare saying) in behalf of Scripture as far as my reason can carry it. None can deny but that the knowledge of a very few points are sufficient for well-mean­ing particular persons, as appears by the Iewe [...] that were sav'd, and many silly and weak Christians since; nor can it be deny'd but every one that reads Scripture or hears it read by one they dare trust, may understand some few good things, to which if they live up heartily (and [Page 110] if they do not 'tis their own fault) they shall be sure to be sav'd: And as for such points as a Trinity, Christ's Godhead, Real Presence, and such like, the knowledge of them (even in case they are truths) is not of necessity to salvation, since none doubts but tis, absolutely speaking, possible to be sav'd without knowledge of them since many have been actually sav'd who never heard of any such points.

Having impartially said in short the best I could in Dr. Sts. behalf, and much more than he has said for himself; let us see now what ought to be reply'd in behalf of Truth. To make way to it, I premise these Maxims. 1. That according to the Ordinary course of God's Providence, men are sav'd by means. 2. That All points of Faith, are to some degree Means of salvation. 3. That according to the seve­ral Circumstances and Exigencies of particular persons, one needs more Means than another. 4. That, therefore, it must be said some have miscarry'd because they had no more of those means of salvation apply'd to them, who might yet have been sav'd had they had more. This being so, how great a presumption and madness it is to affirm that every man who reads the Scripture shall be sure to understand there so much as is sufficient means for His sal­vation; or motives to work up his soul to a disposition for Heaven, considering his Exi­gencies, [Page 111] without needing the knowledge of other Points which contain other Motives ten times more forcible perhaps to move and ex­cite him to true interior goodness? Is it not manifest, that (considering mens several capa­cities, which 'tis a perfect Phrenzy to think they must needs be perfectly adjusted to their spiri­tual necessities) one may as well say that eve­ry one who throws a Die upon a Fortune book shall most certainly light on his own Lot, as that every one who reads Scripture shall, let his exigencies be what they will, find motives suf­ficient for his salvation? If Dr. St. sayes that some one or two Points have prov'd sufficient for some few, therefore they might have serv'd All if they would, and that God's goodness to­wards Christians obliges him to no more; I reply, First, That he speaks against nature, since tis evident some temptations require grea­ter Motives to overcome them than others, and no man can assure us, that those who have few­est motives shall not have the strongest tempta­tions. And if it were but rightly comprehended that tis Love of God which unites us to him, and so saves us, and that 'tis for want of this those miscarry, who do miscarry, it would be easily understood that many excellent and in­comparable motives, as the Godhead of Christ and such like are lost to weak souls, and consequently Heaven, by their not understan­ding [Page 112] them; and not only so, but by the ne­cessary connexion of truths with one another, while they misunderstand the Scripture, and so, by their holding opposite to such great truths oppose in their thoughts other points of Faith, those also lose their motive force, whence their souls become tainted with multitudes of erroneous Maxims and Practices. Secondly, this answer takes away the necessity of all other points of faith but of such a few of them only, which have hapt by the very especial assistance of God's preventing and assisting grace to have accidentally (as it were) suffic'd to have sav'd some few.

If he sayes that, proceeding on this manner, none can hold an error; for they are to hold nothing but what they see to be evidently there, and in all other things which they see not they are to suspend. I would know what should hinder them from thinking they see that to be evidently there, which is not evident­ly there; since 'tis acknowledg'd the vulgar or Generality are but bad judges and distingui­shers of a true Evidence from a Counterfeit one; besides, there are in the open Letter as it lyes, many Heresies; and if they know these to be such, how can they be sure of any thing they read there to be True, since nothing is plainer in the letter than are those Heresies; un­less it be said that natural or moral Maxims [Page 113] taught them these places are to be literally understood, and did not tell them so of the other; and then, they are beholding to those Maxims and not to Scripture for their faith, since in that case It has taught them no more than they knew before. Again, may not an acute wit make out to the generality of D. Sts. Faithfull, that to know the meaning of Scripture right, they must compare one place with another; and then, by doing so dexterously, make them beleeve a thousand Errours to be pure Scripture, and God's Word, which are not. Much more might be said on this occasion; but I only make one reflexion on this Principle, and so pro­ceed.

His intent in it is to shew which Party runs greater hazard. The Adherers to Scri­pture us'd on his fashion, or those who hear the Church; and he would run us down by vertue of an unprov'd Supposition, that the Church is not Infallible. To offer him fair play, let us grant him all the advantages he pretends to in Scripture, and let him grant us all we pretend to secure us, in the Church, and then compare the two hazards together; nay more, let us condescend as much as him­self can imagine, even so as to abate the In­fallibility of the Church, and to grant that she is Fallible; and yet the very light of Nature will stand on the side of our Faith­full [Page 114] against his. For, this teaching them that Superiours are to be obey'd, and their Teachers to be heard and believ'd in things not known to be against God's Command, and experience telling them that Scripture is oft times liable to dispute in passages that to both sides seem clear; both Humili­ty, Prudence, Obedience, and the due care of their Salvation and all Virtues that can be concern'd in this kind of action, incline them strongly rather to adhere to what Persons wiser then themselves, or their Pastors con­ceive to be the meaning of Scripture, than to what seems so to themselves, in opposition to the same Pastors and Multitudes of other Christians, who are evidently of greater knowledge, and, as far as they can be in­form'd, of equall sincerity.

19. The Assistance which God hath pro­mis't to those who sincerely desire to know his will, may give them greater assurance of the Truth of what is contain'd in the Books of Scripture, than it is possible for the greatest In­fallibility in any other Persons to do, supposing they have not such assurance of their Infallibi­lity,

God hath promis't no Assistance that those should arrive at their end who take a way disproportion'd to that end; otherwise God [Page 115] should oblige himself to work constant Mi­racles as oft as well-meaning people out of weakness should act imprudently. Next, if men desire sincerely to know Gods will and be humble (and if they be not 'tis doubtfull their desire is not sincere as is ought) they will, as God's command, the Order of the World, and common Reason obliges them, be rather willing to trust their Pastors who are better qualifi'd for such Knowledge, and whom God hath set over them to instruct them, what is the sense of Scriptures, than trust their own private shallow judgments. And, 'tis observable that Dr. St's. discourse all along concerning this point, is a plain begging the Question; For, if God have left a Church and commanded the Faithfull to hear it, and conform to it's Faith, and con­sequently to receive the sense of Scripture as to Points of Faith from it, then there is no necessity of Scripture's being intended to be plain to all Capacities of it self, nor of thinking men may sincerely desire to know God's will in Scriptures, and use due means to understand it, without making use of the Churches Judgment in that affair; upon which false supposition Dr. St. wholly builds his otherwise perfectly ruinous discourse; Wherefore, his supposition being deny'd, I must reply, that those who sincerely desire, to know Gods wisl, have a certain virtue in them [Page 116] called Humility; and this teaches them not to overween in their own opinion, but to think that their Pastors appointed by God to teach them are generally wiser then those who are to be taught, and that those who are wiser know better than those who are lesse wise. A little of this plain, honest, rational Humility would quite spoil all Dr. St's dis­course, and convince all his Principles to be a plausible piece of Sedition and licentious presumption, tending of its own nature ut­terly to destroy all Church and Church-Go­vernment; and, if applied to that Subject, Temporal too.

I should be glad to know what means the word [such] in the last line; if he means Infallible, and that the Church pretending to Infallibility must have Infallible Assurance that she is Infallible, tis asserted by us; and his supposition that she is not, is absolutely deny'd: For the Church is Infallibly cer­tain that Christ's promise to her shall not fail; and also Infallibly certain by constant Tradition and the beleef of good Christians in all Ages that Christ has promis'd her this Security or Immunity from Errour in Faith, none questioning it but those who have re­bel'd and revolted from her.

In a word, this whole Principle is Faulty, being built on a False and unprov'd Supposi­tion; and were the Supposition granted, and [Page 117] that the Church were Fallible, still it were false, that his Faithfull would have greater Assurance of their Faith than ours, as hath been partly now shown, and more amply in my Reply to the foregoing Principle.

WHoever hath perus'd the foregoing Examin, and reflected well upon what a sandy Foundation Dr. St. has built his Faith, will doubtless expect that he will assigne it such a nature as is of no exceeding great strength; for fear lest his weak Grounds' should not support his Superstructures nor his Proofs carry home to his Conclusions.

Now the Conceit which the Generality of Christians have of Faith, importing it's true Nature, is that 'tis such an Assent as is im­possible to be an Errour or False; Whence [Page 126] follows, that its Grounds are likewise such: And indeed, since all hold, That Faith is an Immoveable and Unalterable Assent which is to bide by us and we by it all our whole lives till we arrive at our future state, the Region of Light, where we shall see facie ad faciem, who sees not that it must be held; and so (since there can be no Necessity to hold a thing to be what 'tis not) must be Im­possible to be false? for, otherwise were we to hold it, that is, were it self possible to be False, it ought to be held Alterable, when ever more Light should appear discovering it to be an Errour. To evince this Truth I have produc't multitudes of Arguments in Faith vindicated, none of which has been thought fit to be reply'd to, though mine and Faith's opposers still craftily persist to in­sinuate the contrary Errour; But I will at present make use only of one, which will, I conceive, best conclude the Point between us. For, Dr. St. makes Scripture the Rule of Faith, and so speaks of Faith as standing under what he conceives the firmest and clear­est Ground, and which was left by God for Mankind to embrace Faith. I do the same when I assert the Churches Testimony or Tradition to be the Rule. So that neither of us speak of the particular odd ways by which some persons casually come to have Faith, nor of Faith as had by such means, but of the [Page 127] common road-way left by God for Mankind to attain to Faith, and of Faith as standing under such a Means or Rule. Upon this A­greement if we joyn issue, and proceed, it seems that nothing but evident Obstinacy a­gainst manifest Truth can hinder us from a­greeing in our Conclusion. For since, if we may be deceiv'd in beleeving even while we follow the direction of that Rule which God himself has appointed to light us to Faith, it would follow that there is no means imagi­nable likely to do that effect, as also that God himself had deceived us, which is both Bla­sphemous and Impossible, it must follow, That Faith built upon the Rule left by God (whether Scripture or Tradition) must be Impossible to be an Errour, and consequent­ly its Ground or Rule must be Impossible to be False or Erroneous. Wherefore Dr. St. is oblig'd as well as I am to hold heartily this double Conclusion, and, if he attempts to discourse of that point, to make it out, that the Rule he assignes is such as cannot leave us in Errour and our Infinitely-perfect God in the blame. How far short he hath fallen hitherto of making out his pretended Rule of Faith (viz. Scripture as standing under the Judgement of every private per­son) to be Impossible to suffer men to err while adhering to that way, is already shown; How heartily now he asserts Faith [Page 128] it self, built on the Means or Rule left by God, to be Impossible to be Erroneous or False, comes next to be examined.

20. No mans Faith can therefore be Infal­lible meerly because the Proponent is said to be Infallible: because the nature of Assent doth not depend upon the objective Infallibility of any thing without us; but is agreeable to the Evi­dence we have of it in our mind [...]s; for Assent is not built on the nature of things, but their E­vidence to us.

This Principle begins with a Fallacy of non causa pro causa: For what man in his Witts ever said or held, that Faith must therefore be Infallible, meerly because the Proponent is said to be Infallible; must a meer saying, that is, a saying neither self-evi­dent nor prov'd, be held a competent Ground to build the Existence of any thing upon? But let us suppose that Dr. St. by the words [is said to be] meant [is] or [prov'd to be] as is indeed our true Tenet, let's see how he confutes us.

Our Tenet is, that in case the Proposer of Faith be Infallible, all that rely on It for that particular are by so doing Infallible likewise. He argues against us from the nature of As­sent which he sayes depends not on the Object­ive Infallibility of any thing without us, but is [Page 129] agreeable to the evidence we have of it in our minds. If he means by the words [depends not] such a dependence as is Immediate, I grant it; For our Assent being an effect wrought in our Soul, and a Result of some foregoing knowledges, notions or natures of things within us, which produce that Assent if it be a Conclusion; or compound it if a First Principle; 'tis impossible any thing without us, and staying there, without evidencing it self to our minds, or breeding some Interiour discovery of it [...]elf there, should beget any Assent at all concerning it. But, if he means by those words that our Assent depends not mediately, or depends not at all on the Object without us, as his large Expression seems to signify, then 'tis absolutely deny'd; For the Evidence of the Thing in us, is an Effect of the nature of the Thing without us; nor could evidence of the Thing in us cause Assent with­out such dependence on the Object or Thing without us, for, unless by means of the Object and dependence on it, this Evidence it self could not be. The last words, [For Assent is not built on the nature of things but their e­vidence to us] is but a Tautology or short rehearsall of the reason lately given, and so needs no new Answer.

Yet, however D. St. for want of Logick ex­presses himself ill & confusedly, there is not­withstanding a kind of knot in in his dis­course, [Page 130] and I shall lend my best Assistance to loose it; but, first it will be necessary to put down his three next Principles, since they all seem to club into one Dilemma against Infallibility [...] Proponent.

21. It is therefore necessary in order to an [...] Assent, that every particular person be infallibly assisted in judging of the matters proposed to him to be beleeved; so that the Ground on which a necessity of some Externall Infallible Proponent is asserted, must rather make every particular person Infallible, if no Divin Faith can be without an Infallible Assent; and so renders any other Infallibility use­less.

22. If no particular person be Infallible in the Assent he gives to matters proposed by others to him, then no man can be Infallibly sure that the Church is Infallible: and so the Churches Infallibility can signify nothing to our Infalli­ble Assurance without an equal Infallibility in our selves in the belief of it.

23. The Infallibility of every particular person being not asserted by those who plead for the Infallibility of a Church, and the one ren­dring the other useless (for, if every person be Infallible, what need any representative Church to be so!) and the Infallibility of a Church be­ing of no effect if every person be not Infallible in the belief of it, we are farther to inquire [Page 131] what certainty men may have in matters of Faith, supposing no externall Proponent to be In­fallible.

Ere I begin my Discourse I am to note Dr. St's. shuffling way of contriving his Sen­tences here, or of penning his Principles as he call's them. His 21st contends 'tis ne­cessary to Infallible Assent that every particu­lar person be infallibly assisted in judging of the matters proposed to him to be beleev'd. And the 22d in consonancy to it, mentions the Infallibility of particular persons in the Assent they give to matters proposed by others to them, which clearly signify that Faith cannot be In­fallible unless we have Infallibility or Infalli­ble Knowledge of the Points of Faith; for what can [matters propos'd to us to be beleev'd] signify else? On the other side in the 21st Princ. he seems only to aim at proving, there must be Infallibility in us that the Proponent is Infallible. Also Princ. 22. he concludes, that to our Infallible Assurance there is required equal Infallibility in our selves in the belief of the Churches Infallibi­lity. And lastly, Princ. 23. he concludes, the Infallibility of the Church of no effect if every person be not Infallible in the beleef of it. Which expressions are of quite different sense from the former; and require not In­ [...]llibility in the in the matters propos'd to be­leeved, [Page 132] as did the other, but only in know­ing the Proponent to be Infallible. Now, be­cause I have no mind to cavill but am hearti­ly glad when he gives me occasion to handle any good point, I will not take him as his for­mer words sounded, it being perfect Non­sense to require evidence of the Points. Pro­pos'd ere we can be certain of the Authority that Proposes them (for what need can there be either of any Proposer, or of knowing him Infallible, if we be Infallible certain antece­dently of the Points themselves,) but I shall willingly pass by those expressions as effects either of a strange Unwariness, or of a crafty Preparing for future Evasion, and discourse of the Later Thesis; For in truth it hints at a very excellent difficulty, though he proposes it but ill and pursues it worse.

I will therefore clear his discourse from his contradictory expressions, and put it home and close as well as I can, and so as I hope himself will not say I at all wrong it. He seems them to argue thus. Objective In­fallibility in another (viz. the Proponent) avails nothing to make my Faith or Assent Infallible, unles I be also Infallibly certain that the Pro­ponent is Infallible, wherefore (in case Infalli­bility be requisit to Faith] every one of the Faithfull must be also Infallible. But this ren­ders both these Infallibilities useles and Insig­nific [...]nt; for the Infallibility of the Church is [Page 133] of no effect, if every person be not Infallible, and if every person be Infallible what need any Church Representative or Councill be so: Therefore, this Doctrine of an Infallible Pro­ponent is frivolous and Inconsistent.

To make way towards the clearing this considerable difficulty, I premise these few Notes.

1. That a man may be Infallible, or out of the power of being deceiv'd in some parti­cular thing two manner of wayes: Either, from his penetrating the reasons which con­clude the thing to be as he judges, that is, from his knowledge that the Thing is so, which we may fitly term Formally Infallible. Or else by adhering, not through Knowledge, but accidentally as it were, to some thing which is a reall Truth, though he penetrate not the Grounds why it is True; or by adher­ing to the Judgment of another person in some thing or Tenet whose Judgment is in­deed well grounded and Certain as to that Thing, though he see not 'tis so. And such a man may fitly be said to be materially Infalli­ble. Both of them are absolutely secur'd from Errour or Infallible Fundamentally by the Thing's being such as they judge it to be, that is, (in our case) by relying on a Propo­nent which is Infallible; and they differ only in the wayes by which they come to rely up­on that Proponent; the one being led to it [Page 134] by perfect Sight that the thing must be so, or that the Proponent must be Infallible; the other perhaps blindly, at best not out of clear discernment embracing that Judgment, yet, as long as he adheres to the Judgment of another man who cannot be deceiv'd or in an Errour as to that thing, himself is actually se­cur'd from possibility of erring; and so, In­fallible or Incapable to be in an Errour like­wise. To this difficulty I had regard in my Faith vindicated when I distinguish't be­tween Faith's being True in us, and True to us. For the blindest Assenter that is, though he stumble upon a Truth, yet if he really hold it, his Judgment is truly and really confor­mable to the Thing or Object, and conse­quently True or Impossible to False, and so himself undeceivable or uncapable to be in an Errour in holding thus: yet, if we go abut to relate that Truth which is in him, to evident reasons or Grounds in his mind, con­naturally breeding that Conformity of his Judgment to the Thing, there is no such thing perhaps to be found; whence, 'tis not True to him, or evident to him 'tis True, since he sees not or knows not that 'tis True; yet still, as I said before, he is Infallible or Im­possible to be in an Errour while he adheres to it as True, because that Judgment of his is in reality comformable to the thing.

2. 'Tis requisit and necessary that the [Page 135] Assent of Faith in every particular Belee­yer be at least materially Infallible, provided it be built (as it ought) upon the means laid by God for Mankind to embrace Faith, that is, upon the Right Rule of Faith. For (o­mitting many other mischiefs and Inonveni­encies) otherwise, as was lately prov'd, it would follow that God, who is essential Truth, did lead Mankind into Errour, in case relying sincerely on what God order'd them to rely on, their Judgment, by so doing, did become Erroneous.

3. 'Tis requisit and necessary that the As­sent of Faith in diverse particular Beleevers be formally Infallible, or that those persons be Infallibly certain by Evident Reason, that the Authority or Rule of Faith they rely on cannot herein deceive them. Else Great Witts and acute Reflecters whose piercing understandings require Convictive Grounds for their Faith, would remain for ever un­satisfy'd; nor could the wisest Christians sincerely and heartily Assent to, nor with Honesty profess the truth of their Faith, nor could any prove it True to establish Rational doubters in it, or convert men of exact knowledge to it, or convince Hereticks cal­ling the Truth of it in question. Nor could Governours and Leading Persons with any Conscience or Credit propose and Preach the Truth of Faith to the Generality: Also it's [Page 136] Truth being otherwise unmaintainable, the best vigour of Faith and it's efficacy to work through Charity, must needs be exceedingly enfeebled & deaded. 'Tis necessary then that the Grounds of Faith be both Conclusive of it's Truth, and also penetrable by those whose Proper work it is to make deep Inspection into them; whence they will become formal­ly or knowingly-Infallible that the Authority they rely on for Faith's Conveyance cannot possibly deceive them.

4. Besides these men who are to be For­mally Infallible in the Grounds of Faith, and so able to discourse of those Grounds, and make out their Absolute Certainty by way of Skill or Art, there ought to be moreover another sort of men in the Church Formally-In­fallible in discerning the True and distinct notion of each Point of Faith and this is the proper work of the Governours of the Church. For these, by reason of their State of Life, which is to meditate on God's Law day and night, their perpetual Converse with the Af­fair of Faith, by Preaching, Teaching, Ca­techizing, Exhorting; their Concern to o­verlook their Flock lest any Innovatour should infect them with Novelties; their Constant Addiction to observe exactly their Rule, Tradition, the Standard by which they govern themselves in distinguishing the true Faithfull from revolting Apostats. [Page 137] or Hereticks; their Duty to be well vers't in the Doctrine of Fathers, and Acts of for­mer Councils, and according to these soberly and gravely (not quirkingly and with witty tricks) to understand and interpret Holy Scripture: These Eminent Personages, and Chief Magistrates and M [...]sters of the Faith­full being t [...]us furnisht with all requisite en­dowments to give them a most dist [...]nct and exact knowledge of the doctrine descended to them by Tradition, and of the sense of the Church, in case any Heretick revolts openly from the formerly deliver [...]d Faith, these Men, I say, are by the Majesty and sway of their mo [...]t venerable and most ample Authority to quash and subdue his petty party newly sprung up; and either reduce him to his du­ty by wholsome advice and discipline, or, if he persists in his Obstinacy to cut him off so­lemnly from the Church by Excommunica­tion, that so the sounder Faithfull may look upon him (according to our Saviours com­mand) as on a Heathen or a Publican [...], it being thus made evident, that he stands a­gainst all his Superi [...]urs, and rebels against the most sacred Authority upon Earth. Or, in case that Heretick cloak his poisonous doctrine in a [...]biguous expressions, or goes about to pervert the words used formerly by the Church, by drawing them to a sinister sense never intended by Her; They, being [Page 138] perfectly acquainted with the language and sense of the Church, are to invent and assign proper words to express the Churches sence, and such as are pertinent and effectual for the present juncture and exigency to defeat the crafty Attempts of those quibbling Under­miners of Faith: or else, they are to clear the true sence of the former words us'd by the Church by declaring in what meaning the Church takes and ever took them; And sometimes too, beating the Heretick at his own weapon, Scripture's Letter, by avow­ing this to be the sence in which the Church ever took such and such places. Hence, they are said to define Faith, that is, to expresse in distinct words it's precise Limits and bounds, that so no leaven of Errour may possibly in­termingle it self; and, to seal and recommend their Acts by stamping on them the most Grave, most Venerable, and most Sacred Authority in the whole Christian world. Now, that this Authority of the Church Re­presentative is Infallible in knowing the Points of Faith, and that on the best manner is prov'd hence, because, if such a Learned Body, consisting of the most Eminent and Knowing Personages in the world, can be deceiv'd while they rely on the Means left by God to preserve mankinde from errour in understanding the Points of Faith, 'tis evi­dent no man in the world can be [...]cur'd [Page 139] thereby from Errour, and so the Means would be no Means to arrive at Truth, but rather a Means to leade men into Errour, since they err'd relying solely on that, which, it being supposed to have been intended by God for a Contrary end, is absolutely Im­possible.

5. Though the Substance or Essence of Faith consists in believing what is True up­on the Divine Authority certainly engag'd for those Truths, which is the Formal Mo­tive of Believing, and therefore 'tis enough for trne Faith that the [...]Generality of the Church or the Vulgar be materially Infallible in their Faith; yet it addes evidently a great perfection to Faith that they be Formally In­fallible, and that the Faithfull see with In­fallible Certainty that the Divine Authority is actually engag'd when they believe. First, because Faith is an Intellectual Virtue, and so to proceed knowingly upon it's Grounds, makes it more Agreeable to the Understand­ing and Perfective of it. 2. Because the more evident 'tis, that the Divine Authority is engag'd, the more heartily those who reve­rence it, are dispos'd to submit their Iudg­ments by believing: whence Faith in such Persons is more lively, firm and Immovea­ble, also more Efficacious and (if other Considerations be equal) more apt to work through Charity, than it is in others. More­over, [Page 140] such Faithful are incomparably more able to satisfy and convert others; being able (as is supposed) to make [...]ut evidently the Grounds of their Faith; Wherefore, every thing being then in it's perfectest state when 'tis able to produce it's like, or another of it's own kinde, 'tis a signe that Faith in such men is Ripe, Manly, and Perfect; since 'tis able to propagate it s [...]lf to others, or (as S. Paul phrases it) gignere in Evangelio. Whence, those who are to convert souls and propagate Faith, are oblig'd to labour all that may be to accomplish themselves in this particular, lest they fall short of this Perfection which seems properly and peculi­arly due to their state. For 'tis not so op­probrious to the Layity to be unable to perform this, but 'tis highly so to them, be­cause they are lame without it.

6. Notwithstanding this, 'tis God's Will that all the Faithfull should be formally In­fallible in their Faith, or know Infallibly the Grounds of Faith cannot be False, as far as they are capable. For, this being (as was lately shown) a Perfection in Faith, and God, who is Essential Goodness, not being Envious, but desirous his Creatures should have all the Good they are capable to re­ceive, especially such goods as tend to the bettering their souls and promoting them to­wards Heaven, it follows that he wills them [Page 141] this Perfection in Faith, as far as it can stand with the Universal Order of the World, or the particular natures of Things, that is, as far as they are capable to receive it.

7. He hath therefore ordain'd such a Means by which to know his Will as far as concerns our Belief, or what he would have us believe, that is, he has constituted such a Rule of Faith, that it's Certainty may be most easily penetrable by all degrees and sorts of the Faithfull. Whence follows most evi­dently that Tradition and not Scripture is that Rule. For, of all ways of Knowing and Ascertaining imaginable, nothing is more easie to be comprehended or to satisfy peo­ple of all sorts then is that of Witnessing Au­thority; as we experience in their perfect belief of K. Iames or K. H. 8ths existence, and such like. The Grounds of which Truths, not needing to be learnt at School, but be­ing either inbred or by an ordinary con­verse with the world instil'd into them, nothing is easier then for the wiser sort of them to fall into the account of it of themselves, occasion being given; as also to awaken, as it were, those dor­mant Knowledges in the Vulgar, and make them reflect and see (not with a clear and distinct sight as do the wiser portion of the Church, but) with a gr [...]sse and confu­sed, yet solid Knowledge, and suitable to [Page 142] their pitch, that a Rule of such a nature is Certain; and so, those who professedly own and proceed upon it are in the truth; they who reject it, in an Errour; Whereas yet they are utterly Incapable by any Maxims in their rude Understandings either to know that the Letter of the Scripture, on the right­ness of which all depends was preserv'd from Errour, among so many Translatious and Transcriptions; or that the Sense is ne­cessarily such as they conceive it to be, amidst such multitudes of Commentators and Sects wrangling about the meaning of that Letter; nor yet are they competent Judges of the skill of all those several Sects and sorts of men whom they see and hear differ about the sense of it. Tradition then of the Church being thus prov'd the Rule of Faith, 'tis both farther shown how Unreasonable, Unnatu­ral and Unsafe Dr. St's private-spirited Rule of Faith is, and also (even hence) demon­strated against him here that Tradition of the Church is Infallible; since being by this moans prov'd to be the Rule appointed by God to light Mankinde to their Faith, 'tis impossible that those who rely and proceed upon it, should be led into Errour, and also Impossible that Faith it self thus grounded should be False.

But I needed not have gone thus far to confute D. St's four Principles now under [Page 143] hand. The four first Notes had abundantly given them their Answer; and 'tis time we now begin to apply them to that purpose.

Whereas then he grounds them all on our Tenet, That No Divine Faith can be without an Infallible Assent, he may please to know that we only mean by those words there materially Infallible, or so as cannot possibly be an Errour: and in this sense we own the Position, and so must he too unlesse he will speak open blasphemy; For, Divine Faith being a believing upon the Divine Authority, and (as we both suppose) up­on some Means laid by God himself by which he proposes to us what we are to be­leeve, by telling us he has said it, in case an Assent thus Grounded could possibly be an Errou [...], it would follow necessarily that God himself would be the Cause of that Errour. The Substance then of Faith could be preser­ved, and the Chief End of Faith (our Sal­vation) on some fashion attained, were there no more than this, that is, though never a man in the whole world did know or could come to know that the Rule of Faith were Infallible; provided none in the Church did speculate, and so, looking into the Grounds of his Faith, and finding them (as far as he could see) Inconclusive, did begin to sus­pect the Truth of it; nor any out of the Church did oppose Faith; For the Faithfull [Page 144] would in that case be in actual possession of those Excellent Truths call'd Points of Faith, firmly assented to by their Under­standings, which were apt to produce tho [...]e Good Dispositions of their Wills, call'd Virtues; in the same sort (though not in the same degree) as they do now; and, by means of them, they might arrive at Heaven. Thus the Dr. may see that all he builds on is a pure mistake; and that all the Faithfull may be thus Infallible in their Assent, and thus Infallible in judging the Proposer does not, nay cannot deceive us; nay Infallible in judging thus of the matters propos'd to us to beleeve, and yet not one man be Infallibly sure by way of Evident Knowledge that the Church is Infallible; because all this pro­ceeds not in the least (in this supposition) from the reach of any man's Intellective Fa­culty, but purely from the Goodnesse and Conclusivenesse of the Grounds laid by God, and his good Providence which led those men to embrace them, though they neither pene­trate nor went about to discourse them, but simply to believe them; on the same man­ner as our ruder unreflecting vulgar are led now. But, in this case, were all the World no wiser, the wisest in the Church would be no wiser then the weakest and rudest vul­gar now mention'd; wherefore, both for that reason, and many others 'assign'd in my 3d [Page 153] and 4th Note, it was absolutely requisite to the Church, and so becoming God's Provi­dence to order that it should be otherwise; and that the Conclusiveness of those Infalli­ble Grounds on which God has founded our Faith should be penetrable by those who set themselves to such speculations, or fall into doubts concerning them, according as the exigencies of the Church shall be found to need such helps.

If this will not serve Dr. St. (I am sure it will serve to defeat all his Arguments) I shall farther tell him that the Generality or main Body in the Church is formally Infalli­ble in judging the Church to be such in deli­vering down the First-taught Faith, as I have prov'd in my 6th and 7th note and else­where. Besides my reasons given there and in other places, I must desire him and the rest of my Readers that in conceiving how this may be, they would take their measures from the Absolute Certainty such people are capable of in Parallell matters, and not from their Ability to explain or defend this abso­lute Certainty, or their Constancy in adhering to it if combated by plausible reasons; for he is a very mean Reflecter upon Nature, who observes not that the Vulgar have Absolute Natural evidence of many Truths, which yet they can neither give reason for, declare, de­fend, nor, perhaps (through levity in­cident [Page 154] to such weak souls) do very firmly adhere to; and no wonder, since so great a man as Sextus Empiricus speculated himself out of the Conceit of the Certainty of his Senses; of which yet none doubts but Na­ture, till he began to pervert it by wrong speculations, had given him as Infallible Cer­tainty as to any other, Also, they are to re­flect how Infallibility) or, which is all one, Certainty) may be in a thousand different de­grees according to the greater or lesser Ca­pacity of the subject; which they will best comprehend by reflecting with how differ­ent a Clearness many things appear to us now we are at Age, and how dimly when we were young, which yet we were absolutely Certain of at that time. Nor yet does one of those Infallibilities spoken of render the other Vseless; for they may either be about different Objects, as if the Church Officers were formally Infallible in knowing what particular Points came down from Christ's time, and penetrat [...]ng the distinct Limits of each point; and those other Particu­lar persons be only Infallible in judging the Church to be so; as it happens in many Controvertists, who are well instructed in the Grounds of their Faith, yet not so well verst in the nature of particular points, but believe them only by Implicit Faith; or else one of their knowledges may be more Clear [Page 155] and distinct than the others, and so serve to perfect and advance it, in the same manner as Art does Nature. Least of all can it follow that the Infallibility of the Church Represen­tative is needless; for This is not intended to teach the Faithfull their Faith at first, nor do I remember ever to have seen a Generall Council cited in a Catechism; but this is performed by the Church Diffusive by her Practise and Language, and by her Pastors in their Catechisms, and Instructions; But it's use is to secure and preserve Faith already taught and known, from receiving any taint by the Equivocating Heretick, and to re­commend it more Authoritatively to the Faithfull, when clear'd. And, whoever reads my 4th Note will see so many particularities in the Members which compound a Repre­sentative Church above others who are pure­ly Parts of Ecclesia Credens, that he cannot in any Reason judge them Vseless, though those others be in an Inferiour degree Certain of their Faith too, For all this while the word [Infallible] which seems to have so loud a sound, and is made such a monstrous peece of business by the Deniers of it, is in plain Terms no more but just barely Certain, as I have prov'd Faith Vind. p. 37. 38. and Reason against Rail. p. 113.

To come closer up then to my Adversary; His 20th Principle which speaks of Assent [Page 144] [...] [Page 153] [...] [Page 154] [...] [Page 155] [...] [Page 156] in common is wholly built upon a False sup­position, that it can only be Grounded upon Evidence; For however indeed in perfect Re­flecters that are unbyast, Evidence of the Object or of the Credibleness of the Autho­rity, is alwayes requisit to breed Assent, yet Experience teaches us that Assent, in weak and unre [...]lecting persons, is frequently built on a great Probability, sometimes a very little one, and sometimes men Assent up­on little or no reason at all, their Passion or Interest byassing their wills, and by it their Understandings, and this many times even against such reason as would be Evident to another. Again, matteriall Infallibility, which is enough to that Assent we speak of, pre­cisely and solely consider'd, depends solely, at least Principally, on the Object, contrary to what is there asserted. And, whereas he says Princ. 29. that the Infallibility of every Parti­cular person is not asserted by those who plead for the Infallibility of a Church, he sees by this discourse it both is and must be Asserted, and that we maintain that every particular per­son must be materially Infallible or incapable of erring while he relies on the Grounds laid and recommended by God; that is, while he believes the Church, which yet is far from rendring the Formal Infallibility of the Church useless; unless he will say, that because it suffices for the pitch of weak peo­ple, [Page 157] (whose duty 'tis not to maintain and make out the Truth of their Faith) that they be simply in the right, or void of Errour, and that they see after a gross manner that the thing is so, though they cannot defend it; therefore there is no need that those whose duty 'tis to do so, should be able to penetrate the Grounds of Faith, and, so, explicate, prove and maintain it to be True. Nor will it follow, that though the Generality were after a rude and gross manner formally Infal­lible in their belief that the Church is Infal­lible, and therefore that the Points she pro­poses are all likewise Infallibly-true, it will not follow, I say hence, that a greater and clearer and more penetrative degree of For­mal Infallibility is useless in Church-Gover­nours; for, as appears by my 4th Note, there are many other things to be done by them of absolute necessity for the Church, which far exceed the pitch and posture of those dull Knowers of the lowest Class, (which is the next degree above Ignorance) and are un­authoriz'd to meddle in such affairs. Unless he will say, that Art is needless because there is Nature, or that there needs no Iud­ges to decide such Cases in which the Law seems plain. And thus much for the clear­ing this concerning Point. In the rest of his Principles I shall be briefer.

But I must not pass over his Transition to [Page 158] them, which is this [We are further to en­quire what Certainty men may have in matters of Faith, supposing no External Proponent to be Infallible.] And he need not go far to sa­tisfie his Enquiry: For, it being most evi­dent by the Disputes between the Prote­stants and Socinians that Scripture needs some External Proposer of it's true meaning in such kinde of Points, as also some External Proposer or Attester that this is the true Text of it (on which all is built.) Also it being evident that Dr. St. (Princ. 15.) denies any Infallible Proposers of either of these, and that here again he pursues close the same do­ctrin; Lastly, this Proposer being such, that, however we can have Certainty without It that the Divine Authority is to be believed, yet we must depend on It for the Knowledge when and where 'tis engag'd, that is, we must depend on It for the Certainty of our Faith; It follows, that in case this Proponent be not Infallible, it can never be made out with In­fallible Certainty that the Divine Authority stands engag'd for the Truth of any one Point of Faith, and consequently that the Certainty men have in matters of Faith is not an Infalli­lible one. And if it be not an Infallible Cer­tainty which Faith has (as he no where chal­lenges, but very laboriously disproves it) he need not go far to enquire or learn what Certainty it must have; for Common Sense [Page 159] tels him and every man who has the least spark of Natural Logick, that, if Faith must have Certainty (as he grants) and have not Infallible Certainty, it must either have Fal­lible Certainty or none at all; there being no Middle between them; and so, we must make account, that because it overstrains D. St's weak Grounds to assert Faith to be Infal­libly Certain, therefore his next Attempt must be to overstrain Common Sense, and to the inestimable Honour of Christian Religi­on, maintain that all Christian Faith is Fal­libly-Certain. But he must do it smoothly and warily; and, however he nam'd the word [Infallible] loud enough and oft enough when he was confuting it, yet he must take heed how he names the word [Fallible] Cer­tainty when he is asserting it, lest it breed laughter or dislike; though it be evident out of the very Terms that he who confutes In­fallible Certainty must maintain Fallible Cer­tainty, sf he maintains any. But now he be­gins his defence of Faiths Fallible Certainty, and 'tis fit we should listen: Monstrous things use to challenge and even force Attention from the most unconcern'd.

24. There are different degrees of Certainty to be attained according to the different degrees of Evidence, and measure of Divine Assistance; but every Christian by the use of his reason and [Page 160] Common Helps of Grace may attain to so great a degree of Certainty from the Convincing Ar­guments of the Christian Religion and Autho­rity of the Scriptures; that, on the same Ground on which men doubt of the Truth of them, they may as well doubt of the Truth of those things which they judge to be most Evident to Sence & Reason.

I wish D. S. had explain'd himself here what he means by [different degrees of Evidence] whether some Glances or likely Appearances of Truth call'd greater or lesser Probabilities; or such Intelle [...]tual Sights at the least of them discovers the th [...]ng, th [...] evidenc't, to [...]e be in­deed so, or True. I suspect much he means the former, because th [...]se are the most proper Grounds for Fallible Certainty which he is now going to establish whereas the Latter sort of Evidences would hazard to carry too far and to beget Infallible Certainty, which would quite spoil his most excellent design of setling the Fallible Certainty of Faith▪ for those Evidences which show the thing to be True, show it at the same time to be Impossi­ble to be False; whence 'tis a thousand to one that such Evidences as these would utterly destroy his beloved Fallible Certainty, and endanger to introduce again by necessary and enforcing consequence that Popish Doctrine of Infallibility which he had newly discarded

[Page 161] When he adds that every Christian may by the means here assigned attain to so great a degree of Certainty &c. I had thought he had meant Certainty of the Points of his Faith; but my hopes were much defeated, when, coming to the Point, he flyes off to his Christians not doubting the Truth of the con­vincing Arguments of Christian Religion and of the Authority of the Scriptures; For this is far wide of our purpose and his Promise, which was to reduce the Faith of Protestants to Principles; whereas these words signify no more but not to doubt of Christianity be­ing the True Religion, or Scriptures being God's word; but reaches not to what are those points of Christianity or determinate sense of Scripture in particular, which con­stitutes Protestantism, and only concerns our debate. Now 'tis evident that the Roman-Catholicks profess not to doubt of the con­vincing Grounds of Christianity, nor yet of Scripture, but to hold that Christianity is the only-Tr [...]e Religion, and that the Scriptures are Holy and God's word: and yet we differ so much from Protestants that he thinks us Idolaters. What we are then in reason to expect from Dr. St. is, that he would bring us Grounds for the Certainty of his Faith as to determinate Points; viz. Christ's God-head, a Trinity, Reality or not-Reality of Christ's Body in the Eucharist and such like; and [Page 162] those so certain as that we may as well doubt of what we judge to be most evident to sense and Reason, as doubt of them, as he here pretends; and not put us off with Common words in stead of particular Satisfaction concerning his Faith and the Certainty thereof.

I would ask him then how it comes to pass that the Socinian whom he will not deny to have both use of his reason and common helps of Grace, and both the convincing Argu­ments of the Christian Religion and Authority of Scriptures to make use of, how, I say, he comes so to fall short of Evidence and conse­quently Certainty springing from that evi­dence concerning Christ's God-Head (which is a Fundamental Point of Christian Faith,) that he doubts it, nay utterly denies it, whereas yet the Protestant having the same means to work with, judges he has evidence and Cer­tainty grounded on that evidence that Christ is God; yet all this while they dissent not at all in things most evident to Sense or Reason? I much fear our Drs. big words concerning his degrees of Evidence and the Certainty of his Faith built on those degrees will, when examin'd, amount to a very obscure evidence and a Problematical kind of Assuredness; much like those comfortable lights which both parties have when they lay even wa­gers at Cock-fighting & such games; giving good hopes to both sides, but good Security to [Page 163] neither. But, so it ought to be, if the Grounds of Faith be not Infallibly but only Fallibly-Certain. which is all he is bent to prove.

25. No man who firmly Assents to any thing as True, can at the same time entertain any suspicion of the falshood of it; for that were to make him certain and uncertain of the same thing: It is therefore absurd to say that these who are Certain of what they believe, may at the same time not know but it may be False; which is an apparent Contradiction, and overthrows any Faculty in us of judging of Truth and Falshood.

This Principle and the next were, I con­ceive, intended to preserve the Dr's and his Friends Credit against the Inference at the end of Faith vindicated and diverse other Passages, shewing them either to be far from good Christians in holding that all Christian Faith may possibly be an Errour and Lying Imposture, or else very bad Discoursers of their own Thoughts whilst they equivalently exprest themselves in divers places to be possibly in an Errour in all they believe, nay more all Christians in the whole world to be in the same condition. This, if justified, can­not but reflect on them, being so concerning a Lapse, and I have at Dr. St's brisk instiga­tion charg'd it home in Reason against Rail­lery; [Page 164] though I still expres't my self to in­cline to the more Civil and more Charitable side; and rather lay the blame on their Un­derstandings then on their Wills and In­tentions. Which Book had Dr. St. seen when he writ this, he would have discern'd the triflingness of these weak excuses. But let's see what he says.

His Fir [...]t part is built on a most gross and senseless Errour, which is, that he who firm­ly assents to a thing as True is Certain of it, as appears by those words, [for this were to make him Certain and Vncertain of the same thing.] I wonder exceedingly where the Dr. [...]earn't this notion of Certainty? Not from Mankinde I am sure, at least not from those who had the use of their Reason. For all these already know it to be Evident that a man may firmly assent to a thing as True, and yet that thing be False; must that man there­fore be Certain of that Falshood, and that it is, though in reality it be not? We experi­ence, that opposite parties firmly assent to contrary Tenets as True; for example, the Socinians firmly assent, that Christ is not God, We and the Protestants that Christ is God; Catholicks assent firmly that they are not I­dolaters when they make use of Holy Ima­ges in Divine Worship: D. St. firmly assents they are; at least he would perswade his [...] by his Books he does so: Are all these [Page 165] opposite sides Certain of their several Tenets because each side firmly assents to them as True. It were an excellent world for He­reticks if this notion of Certainty would take: For these being [...]bst [...]nate in their Er­rours no men more firmly assent to Falshoods then they; and questionle [...]s the Generality of them judg'd what they held, True too: nay, they must all do so, if they once be put firmly assenting, as in our case: for to assent to a thing is to judge it to be indeed True; By which means all Hereticks in the world are Certain of their Errours; and, if they be Certain of them Common Sense tels them they ought to hold what they are Certain of. Again, [...]light Probabilities make many weak people firmly assent, so does Passion and In­terest▪ yet they are all by this new doctrin Certain of what they hold, and so all's well. 'Tis now come to light what kinde of Cer­tainty D. St. intended to pr [...]scribe for Faith after he had rejected Infallibility; namely, such a Certainty as one might have whether the Thing be True or no, meerly by vertue of firmly assenting to it as True. And in this sense I think I may say he is Certain of his Faith, and I hope he will be so civil as to requite me with maintaining that I am cer­tain of my Faith too, for we [...]oth firmly as­sent to them as Truths, and so we are both very good friends, and by the same method [Page 166] so are Turks and Jews atton'd to Christi­ans. Nothing is so proper to reconcile Con­tradictions, as a Chimaera, viz. a Fallible cer­tainty, or such a certainty as is none: Identi­cal Propositions are meer toys to them; or, as Dr. T. says, good for nothing; But Falli­ble certainty, or Certainties that are no Cer­tainties, can work wonders, and even do more then miracle. Ridiculous Folly! not to see that when any one says [I am cer­tain af such a thing] all mankind understands him to mean he has such Grounds as infer that thing is as he says, and not only that he has a Firm Assent to it as True, without intending that he has any Grounds to en­force the Truth of it. This is what I often reflected upon in Dr. T. (Reason against Railery,) that his discourse still aim'd to take the business of Certainty out of the hands of the Object, and put it constantly upon the Subject, and to make account he was sure the thing was so, because he verily judg'd it, or did not doubt it to be so; And Dr. St. is here carrying on the same wise plot to which he begun to make way in his 20th Princip. where he told us that Assent is not built on the nature of things but their Evidence to us' Indeed, if he speak of an Assent which it matters not whether it be True or False, or, rather which is or may be False 'tis meerly built on our own Fancies [Page 167] and Conceits (which I suppose he must mean there by the word Evidence) But if the Assent we speak of, and to which himself applies it, be that of Faith, which must necessarily be True; both It and the Evidence which immediately breeds it must forcibly either be built on the nature of things, or else on nothing, and so both the pretended Evidence is a False Light, and the Assent it self False and Chimerical. On the other side, in case if the Evidence and consequently the Assent be built on the Na­ture of things, which are Footsteps of Gods Infinite Wisdom in which he has imprinted all Created Truths, and establisht them un­der penalty of the highest Folly and Con­tradiction to be inerrably what they are; it follows, that; in case the Evidence had from those things be indeed a true Evidence or a right Knowledge of their natures, our un­derstanding Power will be the same within as they are without, and so Inerrable in it's As­sent and It's Certainty built on those na­tures; so that as their Metaphysical verity immediately depending on God, is fixt by that Essentially Unchangeable Being in a participated (but yet absolute) unchange­ableness in being what they are; so Formal Verity or Truth in us being an Immediate ef­fect of those Natures thus establisht, work­ing upon our Understanding transfuses into [Page 168] It, that is, into our Knowledge, and conse­quently our Assent an [...] Certainty such a pro­per effect of themselves as sutes with the Sub­ject in which 'tis received, viz. an Intelle­ctual Unchangeableness or an Unchange­ableness built on Knowledge of those Na­tures, that is an Infallibleness. No wonder then both our Drs. in their weak discourses fly off so from depending for their Assents or Faith on the Objects or Natures of things, and recurr still to the Subject, for by this means Common Sense is driven out of the world, and Non-sense and Contradiction grow in great request. And, first, Infallibility or true Cer­tainty is radically destroyed, which other­wise (according to the discourse now made) must forcibly be admitted: then Fallible Certainty comes into great Credit, or such a Certainty as is firmly assenting to a thing as True whether [...]t be true or no; that is, such Certainties as are no Certainties but Wilful Adhesions; such a Faith as is no Faith but Fancy; such a Religion as is no Religion but Folly or Interest; and such Truths as are no Truths but possible Falshoods: In a word, the Object set aside and the dependence of our As­sents upon things without us, as the Dr. would have it, the subjects are at Liberty to hold and say what best likes the spirit within them, or their voluntary Fancy; in which consists the glorious Liberty of D. St's Blessed Reforma­tion.

[Page 169] I grant him then [...]hat no man who firmly as­sents to any thing as true, can at the same time entertain any suspicion of it's Falshood. But I deny that this plea will either acquit him or Dr. T. from the imputation of making Christian Faith possible to be False which was objected; for why may not this man who firmly assents to a thing as true, now, or to day, both suspect and see it to be False to mor­row, unless he can shew that that Assent of his depends on the Object or is built on the un­changeably-fixt natures of Things, which Dr. St. denies in express terms, Princ. 20. or what can establish him in his Assent of Faith, if that do not? Is it not evident he may change if he may see true Reason may be brought a­gainst it? What would do him credit in this case is to offer to make it out that, (Assent requiring Evidence, and, so, Firm Assent Clear Evidence,) he has this Clear Evidence from the Object to ground this Firm Assent, for then we may be sure his Assent will be Unalterable and solidly-grounded, or Impos­sible to be False, as becomes Faith; not de­sultory, Inconstant and weakly-built, as is the nature of Opinion. But this my two Ad­versaries must not do: For how can they pretend to an Unalterable Assent, if Assent be not built on the nature of Things only which are Unchangeable? or how to Clear Evi­dence, if they may, notwithstanding that Evi­dence [Page 170] be still deceiv'd: as they must say all the Church may in the Grounds of their Faith if Infallibility be denied: Or lastly, how will their Evidence be Clear, if the na­ture of M [...]ral Things will not bear so clear an Evidence or afford us so much light of themselves as by it to conclude absolutely the Thing is so; as when it comes to the point I foresee both these profound Admi­rers of Morall Certainty will heartily main­tain, and Dr. T. in his Prefa [...]e to his Ser­mons p. 29. in express terms blames me for expecting in the Grounds of Faith.

And whereas he says, 'tis absurd to say that th [...]se who are Certain of what they believe, may at the same time not know but it may be False. I grant it absurd; nay more, I affirm that in case they be truly Certain, that is, in case their Certainty be taken from the Thing or Object, then not only they may not kn [...]w at the same time, but it may be False, but not at any time ever afterwards, unless the thing it self hap to be in that regard Alterable. For true Certainty is built on the thing's be­ing as it is, and nothing can ever be truly known to be otherwise than it is: But, if he takes Certainty in a wrong sense for a Firm Assent to a Thing as True, however that As­sent be grounded; then, though upon sup­position he firmly Assents, he cannot at the very same time be shaken in that Assent or [Page 171] not firmly Assent, yet he is far in that case from any Knowledge or Intellectual Certainty one way or other: because he regards not the Thing or Object, whence only true Know­ledge can be had, whatever he deems or ima­gines concerning the truth of that which he firmly assents to. La [...]tly, these Excuses are quite besides the purposex: I never accused their thoughts; They are beyond the reach of my sight; but their Discourse and Wri­tings I can see, and discover that they make Faith possible to o [...] False, as I have shown at large in Reason against Ra [...]ll [...]ry: I meddle not then with what they assent to, or whe­ther or no they can or do hold the contrary; what I objected was that their words in their books imported the possible Falshood of Faith: for which they yet owe satis [...]action to all Christians for the common Injury done to Faith, and as yet they have given none at all.

26. Whatever necessarily proves a thing to be true, does at the same time pr [...]ve it Imp [...]ssi­ble to be False; because 'tis Impossible the same thing should be True and False at the same time: Therefore they who assent firmly to the Doctrin of the Gospel as true, do thereby declare their belief of the Impossibility of the Falshood of it.

[Page 172] The first part I easily grant, and the rea­son for it to be most valid. And, for the same reason, I expect he will in counterchange grant me this Proposition, that whatever words say, prove or imply a thing possible to be False, do at the same time say, prove, or imply that 'tis not necessarily true. And then Dr. T. must consider how he will avoid the force of it, who makes Scripture the sole Rule of Faith, or the only means for Mankind to be assur'd of their Faith, and yet (Rule of Faith, p. 118.) professes that both the Letter and Sense of it are possible to be otherwise than the Protestants take them to be; which, in case they take their sense of Scripture or Faith to be True, must mean, possible to be otherwise than True, that is, possible to be False. Whe­ther his own contrary Positions hang toge­ther or no, is not my Concern.

As for his Inference, I deny that assenting (being an Interiour Act) is declaring ones belief. But I suppose he meant it thus. There­fore they who [declare they] assent firmly to the doctrin of the Gospel as True, do thereby de­clare their belief of the Impossibility of the Fals­hood of it; and thus, this is readily also grant­ed; only in requital I expect he should (for I am sure he must) grant me this counter-pro­position, that therefore they who declare their belief of the possibility of Falsh [...]od in Faith and it's Grounds, or of the Letter and Sense of the [Page 173] Gospel, do thereby declare they do not assent firmly to the doctrin of the Gospel as true. Which done, let Dr. St. and his Friend look to the Consequences of it. It lies still very heavy upon their Credit as Writers, and ever must till they retract it. No sincere Protestant who loves his Faith more then their Wri­tings, will ever be brought to endure it, if he once set himself seriously to consider it.

27. The Nature of Certainty doth receive several Names, either according to the nature of the proof or the degrees of the Assent. Thus Moral Certainty may be so called, either as it is opposed to Mathematical Evidence, but im­plying a firm Assent upon the highest Evidence that Moral things can receive; Or, as it is op­posed to higher degrees of Certainty in the same kind. So Moral Certainty implyes only grea­ter Probabilities of one side than the other; In the former sense we assert the Certainty of Christian Faith to be moral, but not only in the latter.

This Principle is pernicious to Human Nature as well as to Faith, and destructive to all Principles in the world that are true ones and not like it self.

First, it designs to give us the several Names which the nature of Certainty doth receive, but it does indeed acquaint us with some [Page 174] species or kinds of Certainty, unless he will say that the moral Certainty he assignes to Faith is of the same kind with Probability, which I perceive he is loath to own. Next, to what purpose is it to discourse of one or more sorts of Certainty or to distinguish it's Notion, unless we fir [...]t knew the Common notion of Certainty it self. The word Moral which is one of it's Differences, and chiefly intended to be explained here is hard e­nough of it self alone; but when to this shall be added a new difficulty of not knowing what [Certainty] which is the Genus means, we are like to make a wise business of it. Now, all the Knowledge we have hitherto gain'd of Certainty in a discourse purposely intended to make us under [...]tand the Certain­ty of Faith, is this, that 'tis a firm Assent to a thing as true, and that there may be a Fal­lible Certainty, both manifestly imply'd in his discourse: where, all that we can gather of the Nature of Certainty by the former, is that perhaps 'tis a fixing or resting in some Tenet without any ground; and by the later that 'tis a Chimaera or Nonsense. Thirdly, he distinguishes Certainty according to the nature of the Proof, or the degree of the Assent; but I vehemently deny it as the most absurd Position imaginable, that there can be any kind of Certainty taken from the degrees [...]f the Assent in contradistinction to the nature [Page 175] of the Proof, for this would make as if the Subject's or person's assenting more or less did constitute some Certainties without any kind of nature of Proof, that is without any regard had to the Object.

After this he acquaints us with one kind of [Mor [...]l Certainty] Watch, he says is oppos'd to Mathematical Evidence. Now I nei­ther discern how Moral and Mathema­tical come to be opposite to one another, more then Moral or Physical, and Meta­physical or Theological; less do I see how Certainty an [...] Evidence have such an Oppo­sition and A [...]tipathy; I thought they might have been both on the same side: but I con­ceive that the goodness of Natural Reason made him at unawares joyn Certainty to Moral, and Evidence to Mathematical; thereby confess [...]ng that this Moral Certainty, (as he apprehends it) is indeed the Issue of no kind of Evidence at all but of meer Ob­scurity, or at best of some conjectural glance of Likelihood. But he describes or gives us some distinct Knowledge of this Moral Cer­tainty, telling us that it implies a firm Assent upon the highest Evidence that Moral things can receive, and this he assigns to Christian Faith. Where, first I would know whether this Moral Certainty here mention'd, be an Infallible Certainty, or a Fallible one; and I presume he will answer 'tis a Fallible one, [Page 176] for Infallible and Moral Certainty are op­posite; which is a fair beginn [...]ng towards the ascertaning Faith. Next, I would desire him to speak out candidly and tell me whe­ther this Moral Certainty put Faith abso­lutely out of possibility of being False; or whether, notwithstanding this Certainty, it may with Truth be said, that still absolutely speaking all Christian Faith may be an Errour or Mistake of the world. I presume he will not say 'tis absolutely Impossible it should be all a Mistake because 'tis so protected by this Moral Certainty; for he makes this a less degree of Certainty than Mathematical Certainty is, and Dr. T. has told us there can be no degrees in Absolute Impossibilities; besides, I see not how a Fallible Certainty can establish any Tenet Impossible to be False, for an Infallible Certainty, which is incom­parably above that, can do no more. And yet, for all that, 'tis dangerous to his Cre­dit, (for 'tis indeed blasphemous) to say that all Christian Faith may possibly be a lying Imposture for any thing any man living knows; or that all the Christians in the world, though relying and proceeding to their power on the Means God has appointed to establish them in True Faith, may notwithstanding be possibly in an Errour. I suppose then he will recurr to his late excuse and tell us, that no man who firmly assents to any thing as true can at [Page 177] the same time entertain any suspicion of it's Falshood. But this is nothing to our pur­pose. 'Tis not his Iudgment but his Doctrin which stands impeach't; not his Thoughts, but his Words, and Discourses; let him clear those to the world, and I am to remit secret things to God and his own Conscience. I leave then him and his Fr [...]end to shuff [...]le a­bout for better Evasions, which I am sure can never be candid and Scholar-like, but some learned quirks and Jeers, and address my self to a farther examination of this wor­thy Principle. 3ly, then I would ask, whe­ther the Firmness of this Assent which he says here Moral Certainty implies, be taken from the Object, or from the Subject? I sup­pose he will say here from the Object, be­cause he says 'tis upon the highest Evidence Moral things can receive; but I perceive him dispos'd even while he says so to blame the Things for receiving no more. I doubt he should rather blame himself for receiving no more from those Moral Objects, who are both as able and as ready to afford him perfect Evidence as perhaps any other things in Na­ture, did he dispose himself to receive it. For, are not Moral things as firmly establisht in their respective determinate natures as Na­tural and Mathematical things, from which Establishment all our Science is taken? Is not a will as Certainly a will, and Liberty as [Page 178] necessarily Liberty as a Triangle is a Tri­angle? Again, are not Voluntary, Liberty, Virtue, Vice and such like, very Intelligible words, aud consequently the Natures of Moral things Knowable as well as others in other Sciences. I wonder then why the Evidences of Moral things cannot be as high as that of Mathematical things, since the natures of both are equally Firm, both natures can be known, and so engaged in our dis­courses of them and from them, and all science or Evidence springs from engaging the Na­tures of things.

The Sum then is, Dr. St. hath given Faith excellent good words, in telling us it's Mo­ral Certainty implys a firm Assent upon the highest Evidence Moral things can receive: but, looking to the bottom of his meaning, he intends it only a Fallible Certainty or such as may still permit it to be False; and so the right descant upon his fine words is in true construction this. He allows Faith such a Certainty as is Vncertain; such a Firmness as may both bow and break; such an Evi­dence in it's Grounds as is Obscure, and con­sequently makes it such an Assent as is Irra­tional: All which and much more must needs follow from this rejecting Infallible Certain­ty in the Gronnds of Faith. If he thinks I wrong him, let us put it to the test; Let him take the best of those Evidences or Proofs [Page 179] which ground his Moral Certainty, and put it with the help of a little Logick into a Syl­logism or two, and then tell me whether it does necessarily conclude the Truth of Faith or no. If it concludes, why does he not say Faith is absolutely Certain, but mince it with Moral? If it concludes not, how can all the world avoid but his pretended Evidence is Obscure; his pretended Certainty built on that Evidence, Vncertain; the Firmness of that Assent, Infirm; and the Assent it self to a Conclusion thus unprov'd, and no ways Evident (in a man capable to comprehend what ought in due of Right Reason cause Assent) privatively Irrational, or Faulty.

28. A Christian being thus Certain, to the highest degree of a firm Assent, that the Scri­ptures are the Word of God, his Faith is thereby resolved into the Scriptures as into the Rule and Measure of what he is to believe; as it is into tht veracity of God as the Ground of his belie­ving what is therein contained.

A Christian who is no better Certain then thus; that is by Grounds allowing only such a Certainty as is not absolutely or truly Con­clusive of the Truth of Faith (as Dr. St. in­tends no more by his Moral Certainty) is not Certain at all: As appears farther by the next words, Certain [to the highest degree [Page 180] of a firm Assent.] the meaning of which must be that this highest degree of a firm Assent ei­ther is the same with the Certainty he intends his Faith according to his former doctrin, and constitutes or explicates it; or else that at least it helps to make up this Certainty, that is perfect it within it's notion, and make it more a Certainty or a better Certainty; which makes the Conclusiveness or Evidence had from the Object needless to create a Cer­tainty, and signifies thus much in plain Terms [Think or imagine what you will, so you ima­gine it strongly, and hold it stifly, you are as Certain of it as may be.] Had he said, A Chri­stian is or may be thus Certain by such a Proof had from the Object as was truly Conclusive of the Thing, how Genuin, Coherent & Clear had his Expression been, which now is forc't; Incongruous and Obscure? how Agreeable to Reason and the nature of Certainty as all Mankind understands it; which now is most Irrational and Unsuitable to the same Na­ture? How Honourable and Creditable had it been to his Cause, and to himself too as a Writer? But men that have not Truth on their side, and consequently are quite desti­tnte of found Principles and true Grounds, must not dare to speak Sense. Himself told us (Princ. 20.) that the nature of Assent is agreea­ble to the Evidence we have of it in our Minds, let him remember then that the highest degree [Page 181] of a firm Assent requires in reason the highest gree of Clear Evidence to beget it, which yet he lately deny'd to be had from Moral things, and attributed it peculiarly to the Mathematicks. So that all is Incoherent, all is Common and big words, hollow and so of a loud and high Sound, but without any determinate Sense.

Again, how does it follow, that because a Christian is thus Certain that the Scriptures are the Word of God, that therefore his Faith is thereby resolved into the Scriptures as into the Rule and Measure of what he is to believe? There is not the least show of consequence for this, unless he had first prov'd that God had intended to speak so clear in the Scri­pture as every private Understanding should not sail of being secur'd from mistake while it rely'd upon It; as also that God had spo­ken to us no other way but by the written Word, which he has no where prov'd, nor can ever prove. And, if the former of these (as experience tels us 'tis) be wanting, 'tis not a Rule to those Persons; if the latter, 'tis not necessarily the Measure of what they are to believe.

29. No Christian can be oblig'd under any pretence of Infallibility to believe any thing as a matter of Faith, but what was revealed by God himself in that Book wherein he believes [Page 178] [...] [Page 179] [...] [Page 180] [...] [Page 181] [...] [Page 182] his Will to be contained, and consequently is bound to reject whatsoever is offer'd to be impo­sed upon his Faith which has no foundation in Scripture, or is contrary thereto; which Re­jection is no making Negative Articles of Faith, but only applying the general Grounds of Faith to particular Instances, as because I believe nothing necessary to Salvation, but what is contain'd in Scripture, therefore no such par­ticular things which neither are there nor can be deduc't thence.

If Christians were bound to hold that God had reveal'd his whole Will in that Book, and this so clearly that all or most Chri [...]tians could not miss of understanding it right so as there­by to be absolutely Certain of their Faith, then indeed the first half of his Principle here runs very currently and smoothly: but these rubs lying still in the way which Dr. St. has not in the least remov [...]d, they being also satisfy'd by the General Conceit of Christianity, and by the Nature and Genius of Christian Faith, that it cannot possibly be an Errour or Lye, and, consequently, mu [...]t have such Grounds as cannot possibly permit all the world to be in an Errour while they rely on them, that is, Grounds which are Infallibly secure, and, on the other side, observing both by expe­rience and Reason that Scripture is not such a Ground as that private Understandings ap­plying [Page 183] to it, are thereby perserv'd from possi­bility of erring (as Dr. St. also confesses in his next Principle) hence they are invited strongly to conceive that God has left some Persons on earth easily to be found who may supply what is wanting of Clearness to Scriptures Letter in the highest Points of Faith; and that God will some way or other perserve them from erring, and that while thus protected by God's signal Providence (whether this be performed Naturally, Su­pernaturally, or both wayes) they cannot Erre in that Affair, or in acquainting us with right Faith. So that, unless Dr. St. make out solidly that Scripture has in it the true nature of the Rule of Faith, of it self and without needing any Church, he must ex­pect in reason that the very nature of Faith will necessarily incline all sincere persons, who have due care of their souls and of finding out true Faith, to beleeve the Infalli­bility of the Church.

And, whereas he says that their rejection of such Points which have no Foundation in Scrip­ture or are contrary thereto is no making New Articles of Faith, but only applying the General Grounds of Faith to particu­lar Instances, he discourses therein very con­sonantly to his own Grounds were they worth any thing; Yet, I have one thing to propose to his Consideration, which is, [Page 184] that to justify his Reformers he must pro­duce Grounds full as good or rather better for the Rejection of those Points as for his Faith; or to speak more distinctly, he must have as perfect (or rather perfecter) Cer­tainty for these two Propositions [Nothing it to be beleeved which has no Foundation in Scripture] and [This or that rejected Point has no Foundation in Scripture] as he has for any point of Christian Faith For, since upon the Evidence they had of these two Propositi­ons they disobey'd and rebell'd against their then lawful Superiours and Church Pastors, and broke Church-Union, which was evi­dently forbidden by God's Law, and so the preserving Union & obeying them, is a point of Faith, and which themselves confess is such and binds them as such in case the reasons for their imposing New points be not valid, that is, if these two Propositions on whose Evidence they rely'd when they alledged they were wrongfully impos'd, and thence rejected them, be not True; it follows that they must at least have equal Evidence (nay more, for bare Equality would only Balance them in a doubtful suspence berween either side) that those Propositions on which they grounds their Rejection of those Articles, and disobedience to their Pastours aad Su­periours, are True, as they have for their Faith. And, if the Grounds of this Reje­ction [Page 185] ought to be more Certain then the Grounds of their Faith, there is either some thing wrong in the pretended Grounds of their Faith, or else their Negative Articles ought to be allow'd the honour of being Points of Faith too, since their greater Cer­tainty gives them fair and equal Title to it, if not Absolute Preemin [...]nce.

30. There can be no better way to prevent mens mistakes in the sense of Scripture (which men being Fallible are subject to) than the con­sidering the consequence of mistaking in a mat­ter wherein their salvation is concern'd: and there can be no sufficient reason why that may not serve in matters of Faith, which God him­self hath made use of as the means to keep them from Sin in their lives: Vnless any imagine that Errours in Opinion are far more dange­rous to mens souls then a vicious life is, and therefore God is bound to take more care to pre­vent the one then the other.

The Dr. being conscious to himself that he had, notwithstanding all his promises to reduce Faith to Principles, and to prove it's Certainty, left it still Vncertain, thought it his best Expedient to close his blinde Princi­ples with a speeding one, which (to the shame of all Principles) should maintain that it need not be Certain; though he couch­es [Page 186] this sense warily as it behooves him.

He seems to ground his Sceptical Dis­course on this, that Men are Fallible, and so subject to mistake the sence of the Scriptures. I wish he would speak out once in his life and tell us plainly whether all Mankinde be Fallible in every thing or only in some things, and in some Circumstances? Again, whether he means that men are naturally Fallible, or supernaturally, that is by means of God's In­finite Power, if it should set it [...]elf to deceive them. If the later, 'tis not, nor ought to be our Question; for no man who has any Re­verence for God or his Attributes, will ever think that he will do Miracles still to leade Mankind into Errour, but rather judge it be­comes his Goodness to provide, in case the Good of the world or the Church should re­quire that some extraordinary thing be done, that Mankind should have notice of it by some Certain way to prevent his Erring, as it happens in the case of the Eucharist. Taking him then to mean that man is natural­ly Fallible, we enquire further; Is all Man­kind (however one sence or another acciden­tally may be insincere in one or another par­ticular) yet is all Mankind naturally Fal­lible in their daily Sensations, or which is all one, are the Senses of all Mankind so fram'd as to convey wrong Impressions into his Knowing Power? If not, they can­not [Page 187] erre naturally: nor do I think Dr. St. will say our Senses thus and in this are Fallible; If he does, I know not what to say of him; which is, that he is a perfect Pyrrhonian and unworthy of Mankind's Conversation or Discourse with him; for, to what end should men discourse with him, if, all his Senses being Fallible, himself knows not whether they discourse or no? I ask still further, Are men naturally Fallible in some things not had immediately from sense, for example, in knowing that the world was on foot a year before we were born? or in First Principles, as Aequale est aequale sibi, An Equal equal to it self? Or in a Conclusion immediately depending on such Principles, as that there­fore three lines drawn from the Center to the Circumference are equal, and such like? I think he will not say it. We see then Men are capable of Infallibility or Certainty of their own nature: wherefore they can aim at it and desire it, especially in Faith, which is of so high a Concern to their Souls and the basis of all their Spiritual Building, therefore, both for that Reason and very ma­ny others recounted and inforced by me in Faith Vindicated and elsewhere, they ought to have this Certainty (especially since the Truth of Faith is neither Proveable, Main­tainable nor professible without it) in case such a Certainty be not in it self Impossible, [Page 188] and that 'tis not so, I have said something both in my Reason against Raillery, p. 64. to 67. and p. 112. to p. 116. as also in this pre­sent Treatise in my Answer to the 27. Prin­ciple.

But, setting this aside, we will proceed and demand still farther; Are men de­ceivable in knowing what one another means in ordinary Conversation or dome­stick affairs? Can the Ma [...]er and the Man the Mistress and her Maid understand one another? Or, in case some ambiguous Ex­pression intermingle it self, cannot the Spea­ker upon the other's signifying his dissatis­faction, absolutely clear his doubt, and make himself be throughly understood? Ex­perience tels us they can, and that they may as easily be mistaken in their Sensations as in such kinde of Expressions. We see then Men are Infallible in many things, and even in understanding words aright in same cases. If then they be Fallible in understanding Scriptures, and this in the main and Funda­mental Points of Christianity, as was shown above, 'tis evident this Fallibility is not to be refunded totally into the Subject or Man (since he is capable of Infallible Certainty in other things) but into the want of Clear­ness in the Letter of Scripture (as to such Points) in proportion to private Under­standings, and consequently that it was ne­ver [Page 189] intended by God for their Rule of Faith; since, though both sides rely on this, yet one (even while doing thus) is still in an Errour; and such an Errour as is a Heresie.

Since then what we hold is, that men are Infallible in affairs belonging to Faith, and this while they rely on the Grounds left by God for them to embrace Faith, I would ask him in a word, whether he holds all men may be deceived in that very affair even while they do this to the best of their power? If he says they can, 'tis unavoidable all the Christian world may possibly be now in an Errour, and all Christian Faith be a meer lye: As also, 'tis evident, that in that case God would have left no ordinary means to secure his Church or any man in it from Errour; & lastly, that God leads men into Errour, s [...]nce they acting to the best of their Power (as is supposed) their Errour cannot be refunded into them but into the de [...]ectiveness of those Means, that is their want of Perspicuity or sufficient Plainness to their addicted and faithfully-endeavouring Understandings, even as to those main Points.

Thus much to show how craftily Dr. St. to avoid reflexion on the Unfitness of the Rule he assigns, puts it only upon men's being Fallible, and how unreasonably he behaves himself in so doing: Let us now see how he provides against this Fallibility lest other­wise [Page 190] all Mankind should erre in their Faith. He tels us that there can be no better way to prevent men's mistakes in the sense of Scri­pture, which men being Fallible are subject to, than the considering the consequence of mistaking in a matter wherein their Salvation is concern'd. Well, put this Consideration in men, are any of them by vertue thereof yet Infallible, or secur'd from erring in under­standing Scripture? If not, all mankind may yet according to his Grounds be in an Er­rour in matters belonging to Faith, and so all Christian Faith may still possibly be False, notwithstanding all the Provision put by him to secure them and It. But if this render them absolutely secure from Erring, then we may hope God's Church too may have the grace given her by God as well as a pri­vate man, to consider the consequence of mi­staking also, I am sure it as much concerns her, and so the Church (or, as he cals it a Society of men) may also be Infallible in un­derstanding and explaining Scripture; and, by this means, we are come about again to an Infallible Proponent, which we have so zealously labour'd to avoid. In a word, af­ter he has put all Means left by God to be Certain of our Faith, and all the diligence and care possible to be used by man to lay hold on those means, let him either acknow­ledge that any particular man in the world, [Page 191] and so a fortiori God's Church or any S [...]ciety of men exactly following & relying on those Means to arrive at right Faith, is by so do­ing Infallible in that thing or in interpreting Scripture, and by consequence that Christian Faith is Infallibly Certain, or else confess that, notwithstanding all means us'd, all Christian Faith is still either not Certain at all, or else Fallibly Certain, which is a peece of most profound Nonsense; and, were it sense, signifies plain all may be False.

The later half of this Principle, is still more admirable Nonsense than the former, and shows how meanly he is verst in solid Divinity; he conterposes there the Certainty in matters of Faith, to that which God has made use of as the means to keep men from Sin in their lives; as if Faith were not intended by God to make men Virtuous and the Cer­tainty of Faith the most effectual part of those means. But because I see Dr. St. though he have a very good witt, yet by reason of his sole Application to verbal Divinity, which never reaches the Ground or Bottom of any thing it talks of, is very Ignorant of what is meant by Christian Life and it's op­posite Vice, or Sin, I will take a little pains to inform him better. He may please then to know that it suting best with God's Wisdom to govern the world by way of Causes and Effects, he carries on the course of his Ordi­nary [Page 192] Providence even in Supernaturalls by means of Dispositions The whole design then of his Goodness is to plant those dis­positions in our Soul by means of Religion as may make us most comfortable to him­self, that so Ascensiones in corde nostro dis­ponendo, asceendamus de virtute in virtutem donec videatur Deus Deorum in Sion. That is, by Ordering those rising Steps in our heart we may ascend from Virtue to Virtue till the God of Gods be seen in Sion. Hence the life of a Chri [...]tian, as such, is spiritual, and the Proper way for him to worship God is in spirit, that is by Spiritual Acts or Habits to perfect his Soul, or that part in us which is Spiritual, and dispose is for Heaven; But Errour is also spiritual, and yet is far from perfecting our Soul, therefore Truth must go along with it, and so we are to worship God in spirit and Truth; Hence, the first of virtues, in priority of Nature is true Know­ledge of God, and of the motives or means to attain him, and the only way for the Ge­nerality to arrive at these is by beleeving his Divine Authority upon some way of Reve­lation which gives his Church and by her and all others Absolute Certainty 'tis engaged; by which means we are perfectly secure that what we proceed upon is God's sense, or Truth, which is the Basis of all our Spiritual building. Out of these Knowledges are apt [Page 193] to spring Adoration, Reverence, Hope, and Love of him above all things, in Christian Language call'd Charity, the Queen of all Virtues, (major autem horuni Charitas, says St. Paul) and out of this Love of God above all things, Love of our Neighbour as our self; in the heartiness of which, or the having that Rational disposition in our hearts to do as we would be done to, consists the keeping all the Commandments of the Second Table; which is also our good; for, so, more un­disturb'd by Passion, or vexation from the Exteriour World whose order we violate in transgressing against these, we are more free to practice those other vertues which are to elevate us towards Heaven and fit us according to the measure of out pitch ap­pointed by God, for the Attainment of Bliss. Hence is seen what is meant by sin or vice; For, this, being formally a defect, is only a want of the opposit good Disposition or Vir­tue. The chief Vice then is Hatred of God, or a very sleighting and perfectly deliberate dis-regard & Posthabition of his Incompara­ble self, our Final Bliss, to a Creature; next, Despair, Irreverence, Infidelity, totally, as in Heathenism, or in some particular, as Tur [...]ism, Iudaism, Heresy: In the last place comes the want of that due Love of our Neighbour for God's sake as leaves our Will dispos'd (as far as that motive carries us) to [Page 194] do him any injury for our own temporal Convenience; in which consists the violation of the Commandments of the Second Table. Insomuch as, though a man commits not one of those Acts there forbidden, out of the mo­tive of Worldly Honour, Civility, Fear or any other such like, yet if he wants that rightly-grounded Interiour Love of his Neighbour and builds not his Avoidance of harming him on that motive, that is, if he be dispos'd to commit them all for any thing that motive would hinder him, however in the sight of man or Exteriourly he keeps those Commandments, yet is he guilty of them all Interiourly or in the sight of God.

To apply this then to our present pur­pose. 'Tis seen hence that Faith is the Basis of all virtuous Life, and consequently the want of it the ruin of all virtue and the ready way to all Vice and sin: For, external Act­ing or Avoiding are nothing to Christian virtue, unless they spring from a Christian motive: and 'tis only Faith which gives us those Motives; and the stability, well-groun­dedness or Truth of Faith, which renders those Motives effectual. Wherefore, unless the Faithful be materially Infallible while they believe God has revealed such and fuch things, that is, unless God did indeed re­veal them, and so their Faith be really True; all Gods worship and Good life is ill-built, ru­inous [Page 195] and fals to the Ground: And unless some of them, or those who are capable to un­derstand it to be True, be formally Infallible, it would work less effectually in all those who should re [...]lect that they saw not but it might be False, or be made so reflect by o­thers who were enemies to Faith; nor could the Truth of Christian Faith be defended, or made out, or be Justifiably recommended to others as True, nor with Wisdom and Ho­nesty be profest True, by those who judge themselves capable to look through it's Grounds and yet see nothing Conclusive of Truth in them. Wherefore this Fallible Cer­tainty of his destroys all Efficacy, all De­fence and even Essence of Faith, and conse­quently radically subverts and overthrows all Christian Virtue, and all true Goodness. Which, I attest the Authour and Finisher of our Faith, is the true reason why I with so much zeal and Earnestness oppose him and his Friend, for advancing Vncertainty, and consequently Scepticism in Faith, however they and their angry passionate party are pleas'd to apprehend me.

I perceive Dr. St. will hope to evade by saying that Christian virtue may be upheld by the Certainty we have of some Points of Faith, though others be Vncertain: which Points, to make his Uncertainty of Faith go down the better, he cals here Opinions. But, [Page 196] if he means by Opinions the Tenets of a Tri­nity, Christs Godhead and Presence in the B. Sacrament (all most highly concerning Christian Life one way or other) in which we discern great parties differing who all [...]dmit the Scripture and use the best means to interpret it as far as we can perceive; nay, and consider the consequence of mistaking too, which he makes the very best means of all: If, I say, these and such as these be the Opi­nions he speaks of, and counterposes them to means to keep men▪ from sin in their lives; and that the Rule of Faith he assigns leaves whol Bodies of Reliers on it in actual Errour in such Fundamental Points of Faith and of most high concernment to good life, as has been shown, even while they proceed upon it; 'tis evident 'tis not the Rule God in­tended his Church and mankinde to build their Faith on, and so none can presume of security of mistake by relying purely upon it; but all of Concern not known before by some other means, that is all which it alone holds forth, may be also liable to be a mi­stake likewise; unless some other Authori­ty more ascertainable to us then it abets it's Letter in such passages as are plain because they are either meerly Moral or Narrative; or explain it's sense in others which are more spiritual and supernatural and so more peculiar and Fundamental to Christianity.

ANY man, who had either heard of Lo­gick or reflected a little upon Na­ture, would verily have thought that such obscure Principles should necessarily have produc't more obscure Conclusions, since the Evidence of the Later, being deriv'd only from the former and participated from them, must needs be found in a lesser degree of [Page 212] Perfection in these, than is the Evidence of those former from whence 'tis borrow'd and caus'd. But herein consists Dr. St's Masterpiece; that though his Principles be never so dark, his Conclusions are yet as light as Noon-day. But I m [...]st not forestall the Reader's mirth. What I am to do is to declare in short what kind of things Conclu­sions ought to be; in doing which I will say no more than all men of Art in the world, and all who understand common reason will yeeld to be evident.

A Conclusion, then,

1. Is a Proposition which follows out of Premisses which are it's Principles.

2. The Knowledge of it's Verity depends on our knowing that the Premisses (it's Prin­ples) are True.

3. Therefore, the verity of these Premisses must be more known to him whom we intend to convince of the Truth of the Conclusion, than is the Truth of the Conclusion it self; otherwise 'tis in vain to endeavour to con­vince him of this by the other.

4. The Consequence or Following of the Conclusion out of the Premisses, or the Con­ [...]uxion between them, must be made known; for if by vertue of this Coherence it follow not thence, it may be perhaps a great Truth, but 'tis not at all a Conclusion.

5. To do this, 'tis requisite that each par­ticular [Page 213] Conclusion should either be put im­mediatly after it [...]s particular Premisses, or else be related to them; otherwise, how shall any one be able to judge whether they cohere or no, if he know not what things are to cohere.

Lastly, the Conclusion must be such as that in the granting it the victory of the Op­ponent consists; and so it must come home and close to the very point in difference between the two disputing parties. These short Notes duely reflected on, we advance to a nearer view of his pretended Conclusions.

They are introduc't with these three dry words [It follows that]. And here is our first defeat: The Consequences are Six, the Prin­ciples Thirty; and yet no light is thought fit to be given us, which Conclusion follows out of which Principles; but we are left to grope in the dark, and guess at a thing, which (as shall be seen hereafter) no Sphynx or O [...] ­dipus can ever make any probable nor even possible conjecture of. I wonder to what end he with such exact care noted all both Principles and Consequences in due Order with numbring Figures: was it only to give us a sleeveless notice that there were just Thirty Principles and just Six Conclusions? I see no such great Mystery or Remarkable­ness in that observation as should deserve such a Caution or Care. He should then ei­ther [Page 214] have omitted these, or else, to shew them usefull, have afforded us a few Figures more, relating each Conclusion to to it's respective Premisses or Principles. But the reason of this Carriage is manifest: For, had he done this, we might have examin'd what cohe­rence each Conclusion had with it's Premis­ses, and whether it follow'd from them by ne­cessary consequence or no: Also, whether the Premisses were more Evident then it self was: and all those other Properties of a Con­clusion lately noted; without which 'tis the height of Non-sense to call any saying a Conclusion. Had these considerations come to the Test, his Consequences had come off as ill or worse than his Principles. Let them­selves tell us whether I wrong them or no.

It follows that

1. There is no necessity at all or use of an Infallible Society of men, to assure men of the Truth of those things which they may be Cer­tain of without, and cannot have any greater as­surance, supposing such Infallibility to be in them.

This Proposition is so far from being a Conclusion from any Principles, much less from his, that 'tis self-known to all men of common sense, and amounts indeed to a first Principle. For, an Infallible Society of men, so [Page 215] circumstanc't as he describes, is most evi­dently needless, and to no purpose; and so this Conclusion amounts in plain Terms to this Identical Proposition, only paraphras'd a little, What's needless is needless, Or, 'tis to no purpose to put that which is of no purpose when put, or of no purpose to be put: Which are known by the Light of Nature, and so cannot admit Proof. Is not this a rare man, who first lays such obscure Principles as need Proof, and so ought to be call'd Conclusions; and then pretends to infer such Conclusions as cannot possibly need proving, being self­evident, and so ought rather to be call'd First Principles? What I desire at present is that he would please to acquaint us out of which of his [...]o Principles it follows, that what needs not, needs not. If out of none, this is no Conclusion, though it be a most Evident Truth.

2. The Infallibility of that Society of men who call themselves the Catholick Church must be examin'd by the same Faculties in man, the same Rules of triall, the same motives, by which the Infallibility of any divine Re­velation is.

This is of the same nature with the fore­going. For, the former part, which says that this Infallibility must be examin'd by [Page 216] the same Faculties in man, is as plain as 'tis that nothing can be examin'd without a Fa­culty or Power to examin; or, that nothing can examin but what can examin, which is Evident beyond all possibility of Proof: Or, was ever any man in this world so silly as to imagin that, whereas we must use our Reasoning Faculty in judging the Infallibi­lity of any Divine Revelation, yet perhaps we are to make use not of the same Fa­culty, but of our Loco-motive, expulsive or Retentive Faculty, in examining the Infalli­bility of the Church?

As for the rest of it; if he means, by Rules of Trial and Motives, the maxims and Reasons we have for holding the Truth of any thing (as he can mean no other) then 'tis manifest that, taking Divine Revelation for a point of Faith reveal'd, 'tis Infallibi­lity is to be examin'd by the same means other Points of Faith are, and so 'tis to be concluded Infallibly True, as other points of Faith also are, because the Divine Au­thority is shown to be engag'd for the Truth of it. Again, taking those words to signify the Act or way of Revealing, which goes before Faith, and so is the Ob­ject of meer natural Reason, 'tis evident its Infallibility is to be examin'd by the same Maxims as the Infallibility of other Human Authorities also are, or rather, thus taken, [Page 217] the Infallibility of the Church testifying deliver'd Faith, and the Infallibility of the Divine Revelation are one and the same thing. So that, Distinguishing his words to clear his sense, his Conclusion plainly amounts to this, that [Points of Faith are to be examin'd in the same manner as Points of Faith are to be examin'd;] or else [That Things of such a nature Subject to Human Reason, are to be examin'd in the same manner as things of that nature Subject to Human Reason are to be examin'd.] Or ra­ther, which will fit both of them, that [Things of any nature are to be examin'd as things of that nature are to be examin'd.] which is so evident to all men of common sense that it cannot need Proof, and can scarce admit any; I am sure is never prov'd by him: That is, 'tis no Conclusion drawn from any of his Principles, but putting in stead of [the same Rules of tryal and Mo­tives] these words [the same way] which includes them both equivalently, 'tis only a Repetition of his 5th and 6th Principle, and continues the same affected ambi­guity in the word Revelation as he us'd formerly; nay and is the same nonsense too, in case he takes Revelation in either place for a point of Faith reveal'd, and the Infallibility of the Church for that only which is built on Natural Assistance, that [Page 218] is, for it's Human Testimony: for so 'tis most manifest the same motives neither are nor can be common to both. For Points of Faith are receiv'd upon Authority as their proper Motive, and are Relative to That; and the Human Authority of the Church depends on Maxims of meer na­tural Reason, and not at all on Authority: which evidence they depend upon different motives, and so must be examin'd by mo­tives which are not the same.

This pretended Conclusion then is no new Proposition from his Premisses, as a Conclusion ought to be, but the self same with them; and is either self-evident, or else a meer peece of Folly and Nonsense, that is (the Terms of it being clear'd) both False and unprov'd, and so again no Conclusion, which must be made evident or Prov'd.

3. The less convincing the Miracles, the more doubtfull the marks, the more obscure the sense of either what is call'd the Catholick Church, or declar'd by it; the less reason hath any Christian to beleeve upon the account of any who call themselves by the name of the Catholick Church.

No man in his wits could any more doubt of this then of what's most Evident by the [Page 219] Light of Nature; for, Convincingness of Miracles, Evidence of the Marks, and Sense of the Church, being evidently Means or Reasons to believe, this Conclusion, putting less of [...] these Reasons, amounts in plain Terms to this Indentical Proposition [Where there is less reason to believe, there is less reason to believe] which is Dr. St. can show possible to follow out of any of his Principles as Pre­misses, as he here pretends, he will do more then Miracle. For he hath not there prov'd in the least that our Miracles are less conv [...]n­cing, our Marks doubtful, our sense obscure; nor so much as mention'd those points, much lesse gone about to confute our pretence of their Convincingnesse and Evidence: and, without doing this, to pretend this is a Con­clusion, and that it follows from his Princi­ples, whereas it is incomparably more evi­dent then the best of those he makes use of, is to abuse the common regard due to his Readers, and to declare he makes account they never knew what belong'd to ordinary Natural Logick, or the Common Light of Reason.

4. The more absurd any Opinions are and repugnant to the first Principles of Sense and Reason which any Church obtrudes upon the Faith of men, the greater reason men shill have to reject the pretence of Infallibility in that Church as a grand Imposture.

[Page 220] This is just such another as the former▪ For it being self-evident that Absurdities and Contradictions are not to be held; and self-evident likewise that that which recom­mends such things to our belief [...] to be re­jected; this pretended Conclusion amounts to this plain Truth that [What has more rea­son to be rejected, has greater (or more) rea­son to be rejected:] which is an Identical Proposition, so plain that it cannot need or admit Proof; and, if it did, or could, there is not the least semblance of any thing offer'd in his Principles to prove it by, nor any sen­tence or clause in them concerning that mat­ter, which has the tenth part of the [...]lear Evi­dence that shines in this Proposition which he pretends follows from them, as a Conclusion.

5. To disown what is so taught by such a Church, is not to question the veracity of God, but so firmly to adhere to that, in what he hath revealed in Scriptures, that men dare not out of love to their souls reject what is so taught.

The first part of this, is of the same nature with the former: For the words [such a Church] and [so taught] meaning absurdly and repugnantly to First Principles, the Truth of it is full as self-evident to all Christians who hold God the Authour of Truth, as 'tis that [The Authour of Truth is not the Au­thour of Lies.] The rest of it, which would seem to put the opposite to the foregoing [Page 221] part, and tels us that to disown what is so taught by such a Church is firmly to adhere to what's revealed in Scripture, &c. is absolute­ly False; for to disown what is so taught by such a Church, amounts to no more but to hold to the First Principles of Sense and Reason in points conrrary to those Princi­ples, obtruded by that Church; which a man may do and yet be an Athiest, for any thing Dr. St. has brought to make him ad­here to Scripture: for I much doubt that a profest Fallible Certainty, for such wonderful & extraordinary Points as he will be bound to believe if he becomes a Christian, will scarce be able to give him full satisfaction of their Truth, if he guide himself by the First Principles of Reason, as Dr. St. pretends he should. Nor is it in Dr. St's love of his Soul, as he like a Saint pretends here, but Humour and Interest, to adhere so firmly to his private Interpretation of Scripture for his Rule of Faith; which he cannot but see has not in it the nature of such a Rule, nor consequently was ever intended by God for such an end: since, renouncing Infallibility in men, he must confess that all possible means being used to finde out Truth by Interpretations of Scripture no better grounded, it still leaves all the Reliers on it in a possibility of being mistaken (as him­self also confesses Princ. 30.) that is, Inse­cure [Page 222] that their Faith is True, or only Fallibly Certain of their Faith.

Before I proceed to his sixth and last Con­clusion, it were not amiss to examine these according to the No [...]es put down formerly containing some Qualifications necessarily belonging to all Conclusions; and to show by their want of all those how utterly unlike these five last are to what they pretended to be. And first, not one of them follows out of his Principles as from their Premisses, as I show'd in each of them. 2. Their Verity is known and evident to all Mankind indepen­dently on those Principles of his. 3. Their Verity is more known than is that of those Principles. For, speaking of the main import and weight of them (abstracting from some particular words and phrasing his notions) they are all in a manner self-evident and Un­exceptionable; whereas his thirty Princi­ples are liable to multitudes of exceptions, as hath been shown in the proper Answers to each. 4ly and 5ly The Consequence, Con­nexion or Following of these pretended Conclusions out of their Premisses is not so much as attempted to be shown, nor any one of them related to any Principle or Princi­ples; but all the Figures which distinguish both the one and the others stand for Cypher [...] and are useless. Lastly, were all these Con­clusions, granted him, yet still he is never the [Page 223] nearer having prov'd or compas't what he intended. For, suppose we granted that there can be no necessity of an Infallible So­ciety of men to do that which can be done as well without them? What if the super­natural Infallibility of the Church must be examin'd by the fame Faculty and the same ways Points of Faith are, or it's Natural In­fallibility the same way it's Natural or Hu­man Authority is examin'd? What if we have less Reason to believe it, if it's Mira­cles be less convincing, it's Marks more doubtfull, and it's sence more Obscure; and greater reason to reject it, the more absurd it's opinions are, and repugnant to the first Principles of Sense and Reason? What if to disown such Doctrines be not to question God's Veracity? What, I say, if all these were granted by us (as they would have been very readily at the first, though he had never skirmish't and flourish't and kept this pother with laying so formally six Princi­ples agreed on by both sides, and then thirty o­ther of his own?) yet, he is not one jot the nearer the reducing the Faith of Protestants to Principles which was promis't us at the be­ginning, and so we ought to expect the performance of it when he had deduc't his Conclusions, which use to infer the Intent propos'd to himself by the disputant, and to come home to the very point the Arguer [Page 224] would be at. Indeed, if he could show us solidly that Infallibility in a Church were useless; that, examin'd by such ways and means as it ought, it would be overthrown and could not stand the trial; that it's Mi­racles were Unconvincing, it's Marks Doubtfull, it's Sense declar'd by it Obscure, or that it's Opinions were indeed Absurd and Repugnant to the First Principles of Sense and Reason: very great matters had indeed in that case been done against our Church and Faith, yet still nothing at all to the establishment of his own. A Catholick might in that case have indeed lost his own Faith, and be to seek for another, but never find any meerly by means of these destru­ctive Positions alone; unless Dr. St. can settle him some other Ground built on better Principles and such as are competent to set­tle Faith on, which Fallible Certainty (were it sense) will never reach. So that were all his Conclusions hitherto freely granted, he is still as far from having attain'd what he propos'd to himself and promis't others, as at the beginning, Nor can▪ it be imagined why he makes us this mock-shew of Con­sequences, but only, that as at the begin­ning he put down most undeniable and most sacred Principles agreed on both sides, so to make his Readers apprehend before-hand he must needs conquer who had such sure Cards [Page 225] to play (though by his shynesse to make use of them and apply them home it appear'd he had no Title to them.) so now he puts five undeniable Propositions for Conclusions to make weak nnattentive Readers imagine he had actually conquer'd, for nothing sounds a more compleat Victory, that to in [...]ferr evident Conclusions; But the ill luck is, not one of them is a Conclusion, not has that kind of Evidence in it which is peculiar to such Propositions, viz. Evidence-had by means of Proof, but they are all evident of themselves or self-evident, and so a good plot is unluckily spoil'd,

I have yet one thing more to say to them, that they have all of them evidently the Nature of Premisses in them, and would do extraordinary service to his Cause taken in that capacity (as far, I mean, as he ayms to overthrow the Catholick Church) if the badness of it would let him pursue them and stand by them and apply them. To show which I will put them down in a clear method, that it may be seen where the point sticks. The First Conclusion then has in it the Nature of a Major Propositi­on; and put in a Discourse, stands thus.

That Infallibility without which men may be Certain of Faith, and cannot have greater Assurance of Faith were it put, is not necessary to be put.

[Page 226] But suoh is the Infallibility of the Church of Rome.

Therefore the Infallibility of the Church of Rome is not to be put.

The second stands thus, (if it can at all con­cern the purpose.)

That Infallibility which is to be examin'd by the same Faculties, Rules of Trial and Motives by which the Infallibility of any Divine Revelation is, cannot bear the test, but must be overthrown.

But the Infallibility of the Roman Catho­lick Church is to be thus examin'd.

Therefore it cannot stand the test, but must be overthrown.

The Third stands thus.

That Church whose Miracles are less con­vincing, marks more doubtfull, sense more ob­scure, has less reason to be beleev'd.

But such is the Church of Rome.

Therefore she has less reason to be beleev'd.

The Fourth thus.

The Infallibility of that Church whose O­pinions are absurd and repugnant to the First Principles of sense and reason has great rea­son to be rejected as a Grand Imposture.

But the Infallibility of the Church of Rome is the Infallibility of such a Church whose O­pinions [Page 227] are absurd and repugnant to the First Principles of Sense and Reason.

Therefore it's Infallibility ought to be re­jected as a Grand Imposture.

The Fifth thus.

They who disown Doctrins thus absurd and repugnant to the First Principles of Sense and Reason do own and not question therein the veracity of God.

But we (in disowning the Roman Church) disown such doctrins; Therefore, We in so doing own, or do not question the Veracity of God.

By which discourses 'tis evidently seen that the natural posture and place for these five Propositions, in an attempt to over­throw the Roman Churches Infallibility, and to excuse the Protestants for not obey­ing her, as is here intended, (for they are nothing at all to the reducing the Faith of Protestants to Principles, which they were pretendedly brought for) is to make them the Major Propositions, where the Chief Principles to all Conclusions use and ought to be placed. 'Tis evident also that these Premisses or Principles stand firm in their own undeniable Verity; and the only Thing for him to do is to make good all the Mi­nor Propositions; which done, all the Con­clusions [Page 228] must necessarily follow, and so his work is done; as indeed it always ought to be when the Conclusion is inferr'd. Whereas, making these Major Propositions the Con­clusions, 'tis manife [...] he is to begin again and argue from them, when he had concluded, and so was at an end o [...] his discourse. So that 'tis most palpably Evident, that Dr. St. most absurdly, unskilfully and prepo [...]cerously made those his Principles which were ob­scure and ungranted and had hundreds of Exceptions against them, and so needed proof, that is, made those his Principles which ought to have been his Con [...]lusions; and put those for his Conclusions which were in a manner self-evident and must be granted by all Mankind, and which naturally ought to be the Majors in any discourse on this Sub­ject; that is, he mistook Principles for Con­clusions and Conclusions for Principles; which perhaps was the reason he made use of those words [reduc't to Principles] in stead of deduc't from Principles; intimating there­by, that his Conclusions were all of them in­deed Principles. Did ever Logick and Com­mon Sense go thus to wrack?

His 6th▪ Conclusion remains yet to be spoke to, and 'tis this.

6. Though nothing were to be believed as the Will of God, but what is by the Catholick [Page 229] Church declareed to be so, yet this doth not at all concern the Church of Rome, which nei­ther is the Catholick Church, nor any sound part, or member of it.

This is far from being self-evident as were the former, but of it self as obscure as may be, and in that regard is capable of being a Conclusion, had there been any Premisses to inferr it. It comes home also to the point as far as his Intent was to impugn Catholicks; for were that which it contains concluded, it would import no less than the utter over­throw of the Roman Cause. But, where are the Premisses or Principles which are to infer it? Must every bold and unprov'd saying, and which begs the whole Question, be cal'd a Conclusion whether it have any Principles or no to prove it by? If then it have none, why does he put it for a Conclusion, and so pre­tend he has concluded it? If any, why does he not show us them, and relate to them? Is there any thing more important then to be acquainted with those perillous all-over­turning Principles on which a Conclusion so desperately destructive to Rome is ground­ed? Or, may we not justly suspect that not giving us notice with which of his Insignifi­cant thirty Principles this Romantical sixth Conclusion had any Commerce, he was con­scious to himself it follow'd from none of them; and yet notwithstanding having a [Page 230] mighty mind to be thought to have concluded it, he therefore very politickly call'd his own saying a Conclusion. I know he has pretended elsewhere Idolatrous worship (forsooth) has corrupted her and made her unsound, and twenty other Flaws he findes in her; But then he ought to have made this Proposition be related to those Discourses, and not pretend they follow out of his thirty Principles where not a word to that purpose is found.

Moreover, these Churches now in Com­munion with Rome were once true Churches; how came they then, or when, to be now so rotten and unsound: Let the time be assign'd when by altering their Faith and worship they became corrupt: Let the persons, place, man­ners of beginning, proceeding and other cir­cumstances be particulariz'd, that so a matter of Fact of this manifest and concerning na­ture may be made credible: Above all, how it happen'd that matters of this notorious and important nature should remain unre­corded, and still believ'd that no such change was, and this upon the score of a testifying Authority, so great, that it must be confest e­ven by our enemies, that it was never heard since the Foundation of the world, that so many vast Nations should swallow so pro­digious an Errour so tamely in a most mani­fest and most concerning matter of Fact, and [Page 231] which, if it be indeed an Errour, none can be absolutely secure of the Existence of any former Kings or Actions done before our times, much less of the Authority or Text of any Book in the world. But, I suppose, if these things be prest, the best answer will be some Text of Scripture, as that the Ene­my sowed Tares while men slept; which, inter­preted by Dr. St's private spirit, shall san­ctifie to us this prodigious piece of non­sense, that the Roman-Catholick Church alter'd her Faith and Christian practise, and yet none observ'd it or took notice of it; that is, that those many Millions of her Subjects begun (as they must at one time or other if she indeed alter'd her Faith) to believe and practice otherwise then they did, yet none of them knew they did so: All slept, and were wrap't up (God wot) in the dark night of Ignorance, till owl-ey'd Luther even at that mid-night of Infidelity most blessedly espy'd the Light of the Gospel dawning, and show'd it to Dr. St's Predecessors.

Now, whoever reflects how considerable a Part of Christianity those Churches in Communion with Rome make, and how ma­ny abominable Corruptions or Sicknesses there are in her, if those of Dr. St's Private-spirited Church may be trusted, will with good reason conclude that the Church has as many diseases in her as an old horse, and [Page 232] very few limbs of her free; so that it will ap­pear she for whose sake whole nature was made is the greatest Monster for wretched­ness, and that her condition is more misera­ble then any other thing in nature: and con­sequently, that God's Providence has a slen­derer care of his Church then of the most tri­fling toy in the world; which ill sutes with the great wonders and extraordinary things he has done for her; as being made man, dy­ing for her, and such like.

It were good too to know how long a mem­b [...] of the Church may remain unsound ere it be time to cut it off; also, whether it can be cut off, or who are likely to cut it off: without which the Churches case must needs be most desperate, to be almost from top to to [...] as full of diseases as she can well hold, and no means extant to give her help. But alas, 'tis so evident that there are none in the world but her self and some few Sects that have manifestly gone out from her, and it sounds so unnaturally, to say the Tree can be cut off from it's branches, that whatever such Talkers may say in common, yet come once to put it in execution the Absurdity of the Practice of it bewrays the Falshood of Tenet.

But to come closer to this voluntary say­ing of his; Either the Church of Rome re­lies for the Certainty of her Faith, on, the [Page 233] right Rule of Faith appointed by God, or she does not: If not, she has no Faith at all, but only Opinion (however she may hap to be in the right in many Points she holds) for her Assent will want the Certainty requisite to Faith, as not being built on the stable Grounds God had laid to give it that Cer­tainty; and, if the Church of Rome have no Faith 'tis impossible she should be a Church, or any part of a Church, sound or unsound, as wanting what's most Essential, True Faith; and so Dr. St. has provided rarely well for the Mission of his own Church; for, if ours were no Church, she had no Church-Autho­rity; and if she had none her self, 'tis evi­dent she could give none: whence will fol­low that the Reformed Churches deriv'd no­thing which was Constitutive of a Church from any foregoing one, but were wholly erected anew; and then I would know what Authority, under that of Iesus Christ who constituted the Church at first, had power to constitute it anew. But if Dr. St. says, that the Church of Rome rely'd on the Means left by God to ascert [...] Faith, then 'tis manifest that doing so she could not erre in Faith, and so is as sound as may be, whatever our Talk­ing Disputant says. Since then there is no middle between [relying on the Means left by God to ascertain Faith] and [not relying on it] and so that Body in Communion with [Page 234] the Roman Church must necessarily do one of them; and if she does rely on it she must needs have all true Faith, and so be very healthfull or sound; if she does not, she m [...]st needs have no True Faith at all, and so not only lose her Health but her Essence too, which by consequence un-churches the Re­formers also, it were good Dr. St. would consider the point over again, and not talk thus any thing at random without proof.

As for his saying (for saying things craf­tily, and prettily is his only Talent) that the Church of Rome, by which I presume he means, as we do, those Churches in Com­munion with the Roman, is not the Catholick Church, this will be best decided by settling the Certain Rule of Faith, and then, by ap­plying of it, to consider whether any body out of her Communion have not deserted that Rule; which if they have, they will be prov'd thence to have no Faith, nor consequently to have in them the Essence of a Church; and so if this defect appear in them all, they can be in true speech no parts of the Church; in which case it must necess [...]ily follow that those in Communion with the Roman are the Catholick Church. Let us begin with Grounds and pursue them by close discoursing and things will easily be decided: but this Talk­ing Voluntaries, this countersfeiti [...]g and pre­tending to Principles and Conclusions when [Page 235] there is in reality neither the one nor the o­ther, is good for nothing but empty show.

These excellent performances having em­boldend this man of Confidence to conceit he has done wonders, he sounds the Triumph of his own Victory in these words.

This may suffice to shew the validity of the Principles on which the Faith of Protestants stands, and the weakness of those of the Church of Rome.

These words give us occasion to reflect back on his Promise and his Performances: His Promise was to reduce the Faith of Protestants to Principles; What he has per­form'd is this. He has not yet laid one Pro­position which is to him a Principle; (that is, which he makes use of to conclude what he designs) but what is both Obscure and False; He has settled no Faith at all but brought all into Opinion, by discarding Infal­lible, and maintaining only Fallible Certain­ty. And had he indeed settled any Faith, yet he has not produc't own word to settle the Faith of Protestants in particular, but all will equally fit a Socinian or a Quaker; and his way of managing his Rule will much better sute with a Quaker or any Fan­atick than with a Protestant. Also, in stead of reducing to Principles, he at first begins [Page 236] to deduce from Principles, and in the process of his discourse he puts Conclusions for Principles, and Principles for Conclusions; and so reduces and deduces, that is draws backwards and forwards, blows and sups both at once.

In a word, the Total sum of his Heroick Atchievments amounts to this. He has layd thirty Principles, which wanting either evidence or else necessary Influence upon what he pretends to prove, are no Principles: He hath so reduc't to those Principles that he makes six Conclusions follow, that is, he deduces from them; and, so, he has so reduc't to principles, that he has not reduc't to them. He has put that for a Rule, which wanting power to direct aright those who are ro rely on it, is evidently no Rule; He has attributed such a Certainty to his Faith, as is a Fallible one, that is no Certain­ty but a Chimaera: and consequently he has so Principl'd Faith as makes it no Faith, but Opinion only. He has made six Propositions so follow out the thirty, which for want of neces­sary coherence with them do not follow; Lastly, he has made those to be Conclusions which for want of Premisses, and by reason of their greater Evidence than is fonnd in his Prin [...]iples, and for many other regards, are not Conclusions but rather Principles. All which is shown in their proper places. So [Page 237] that, his perplexing Intricacy in contriving and posturing his words oddly, being once unravell'd, their affected ambiguity clear'd, and his Insignificances and Incoherences layd open, the Common Light of nature will inform any Attentive and Intelligent Reader that Dr. St. has not reduc't the Faith of Protestants to Principles, but that his whole discourse attempting it is reduc't to Contradictions. Yet in confidence of his vast performances he ventures upon this grand Conclusion that shall strike all dead.

From all which it follows that it can be no­thing but wilfull Ignorance, weakness of Iudg­ment, strength of prejudice, or some sinful passion, which makes any one forsake the Communion of the Church of England, to embrace that of the Church of Rome.

But with how much greater reason may I conclude, that (in case the Church of Eng­land owns his way of discoursing her [...], and holds not that the Tradition, Practice and Sense of Gods Church is to give us that assurance of the meaning of Scripture as to build Faith on it, but that 'tis to be left to every priv [...]te mans Fancy to be his own Iudge in that affair) no­thing but either an Invincibly-weak Igno­rance, or the wicked Sin of Spiritual Pride; [Page 238] making private men scorn to submit their Judgments to persons wiser than themselves, or to be taught by their lawfull Pastors whom God has appointed for that end, can make any man remain in the Communion of the Church of England, and not unite himself to the Communion of the Church of Rome. Especially, since they all hold that Faith cannot possibly be False, & so must hold that the means to Faith cannot possibly lead the reliers on it into errour, and yet (if but meanly verst in the world) they must needs experience that those who do rely on their own sense of Scripture differ in most Funda­mental points of Christianity, and so, oneside necessarily erre in so doing.