Of Policy.

POlicy is an Art of Government of a Common-wealth, and some part of it according to that State, or form • of Government wherein it is setled for the publique good.

State, is the frame or set order of a Common-wealth, or of the Governours that rule the same, specially of the chiefe and Soveraigne Governour that commands the rest.

The State or Soveraignty consisteth in 5. points.

1. Making or annulling of Lawes. 2. Creating and disposing of Magistrates. 3. Power over life and death. 4. Making of Warre, or Peace. 5. Highest or last appeale. Where these 5. a • e, either in one or in more, there is the State.

These 5. points of State rest either in; 1. One Monarchy or Kingdome. 2. Some few chiefe of men for vertue and wisedome, called an Aristocra • y. 3. Many, called a Free State or a Popular State. These three sorts of Government have respect to the Common good, and therefore are Iust and Lawfull States.

These 3. degenerate into 3. other Governements. 1. Monarchy. 2. Aristocraty. 3. Popular Estate. Into 1. Tyrany. 2. Oligarchy, or Government of a few, rich or able. 3. Common-wealth or Government of all the common & baser sort, and therefore called a Common wealth, by an vsurped Nickname.

These all respect there owne, and not the publique good, and therefore are called Bastard Governements.

1. Monarchy.

A Monarchy, or Kingdome, is the Governement of a State by one head, or Chiefe, tending to the Common benefit of all.

Monarchies or Kingdomes are of 3. sorts touching the right or possession of them; viz.

1. Hereditary, by discent, as the English, French, &c. 2. Elective, by suffrage of the other Orders, or some of them, as the P • l • nian. 3. Mixt, or of both kinds; viz, by Discent yet not tyed to the next of bloud, as the ancient Jewish State.

Monarchies are of 2. sorts touching their power or • uthority: viz.

1. Intier. Where the whole power of ordering all State matters, both in peace and warre, doth by law and custome appertaine to the Prince, as in the English Kingdome, where the Prince hath power to make Lawes, League and Warre, to create Magistrates; To pardon life: Of appeale, &c. Though to give a contentment to the other degrees, they have a sufferage in making Lawes; yet ever subject to the Princes pleasure, nor negative will.

2. Limited, or restrained that hath no full power in all the points or matters of State, as the Military King that hath not the Soveraignty in time of peace, as the making of Lawes &c. But in Warre onely as the Poloni •• Kings.

2. Aristocraty or Senatory State.

AN Aristocraty is the Government of a Common-wealth by some competent number of the better sort, preferred for wisedome and other vertues for the publique good.

Aristocraties are of 3. sorts, viz, where the Senators are chosen, for 1. Vertue, Riches, and the Common good, as the Venetian.

2. Vertue and the publique good without respect of wealth, as sometimes the Roman when some of the Senatours, were fetched from the plough, and some from the Schooles.

3. Vertue and Wealth, more respecting their private, then the publique good which inclineth towards an Oligarchy, or the Government of the Richer or Nobler sort, as in Rome towards the end.

3. Free State or Popular State.

THe Popular State is the Government of a State by the Choiser sort of people, tending to the publique good of all sorts; viz. with due respect of the better, nobler, and richer sort.

In every Iust State, some part of the Government is, or ought to bee imparted to the people; As in a Kingdome, a voice or sufferage in making Lawes; and sometimes also, in levying of Armes (if the charge bee great, and the Prince forced to borrow helpe of his Subjects) the matter rightly may bee propounded to a Parliament, that the taxe may seeme to have proceeded from themselves. So consultations, and some proceedings in Judiciall matters may in part bee referred to them. The reason, least seeing themselves to be in no number, nor of reckoning, they mislike the state or kind of Government: And where the Multitude is discontented, there must needs bee many Enemies to the present state. For which cause, Tyrants (which allow the people, no manner of dealing in State matters) are forced to bereave them of their wits and weapons, and all other meanes, whereby they may resist, or amend themselves, as in Rusheland, Turkey, &c.

4. Tyranny.

A Tyranny is the swarving, or distorting of a Monarchy, or the Government of one tending not to the publique good, but the private benefit of himselfe, and his followers. As in the Russe and Turkish Government, where the State and Wealth of other orders are employed onely to the uphoulding of the greatnesse of the King, or Emperour. This is the worst of all the Bastard States, because it is the perverting of the best Regiment, to wit, of a Monarchy, which resembleth the Soveraigne Government of God himselfe.

5. Obligarchy, or the Government of a few.

AN Oligarchy is the swarving, or the corruption of an Aristocraty; or the Government of some few that are of the Wealthier or Nobler sort, without any respect of the publique good. The chiefe end of these Governours is their owne greatnesse and enriching. And therefore there manner is to prepare fit meanes to uphold their Estates. This State is not wholly so bad, as is the Tyra • nny, and yet worse then the Common-wealth, because it respecteth the good of a few.

6. Common-wealth.

A Common-wealth is the swarving or depravation of a Free or Popular State, or the Government of the whole Multitude of the base and poorer sort, without respect of the other orders.

These two States, to wit; The Oligarchy and Common-wealth, are very adverse the one to the other, and have many bickerings and dissentions betweene them. For that the Richer or Nober sort suppose a right of superiority to appertaine unto them in every respect, because they are superiour, but in some respects onely, to wit, in riches, birth, parentage, &c. On the other side, the Common people suppose, there ought to bee an equality in all other things, and some State matters; because they are equall with the rich or noble, touching their Liberty, whereas indeed neither the one nor the other are simply equall or superiour as touching Government and fitnes thereunto, because they are such, to wit, because they are Rich • Noble, Free, &c. But because they are wise, vertuous valiant &c. and so have fit parts to governe a State.

These severall States are sometimes mixed and interwrought one with the other, yet ever so, as that the one hath the preheminent predomination over the other, as in the humours and complections of the body. So in the Roman State, the people had their Plaebiscita, and gave the sufferage in the election of Magistrates: Yet the Senate (as the State stood) for the most part swayed the State, and bare the chiefe rule. So in the Venetian State, the Duke seemeth to represent a Monarch, and, the Senate to bee his Councell: Yet the Duke hath no power in State matters, but is like a head set on by art that beareth no braine. And so that State is Senatoricall or, Aristocraticall.

Causes of States and Common-wealths in generall.

Causes of States or of Common-wealths are of 3. sorts, viz. 1. Founding or setling a State where to bee considered. 2. Preserving a State. 3. Changing and alltering a State. 1. Measure. 2. Parts and their Qualities.

Founding a State. In founding a State are to bee considered 2. things. 1. Proportion. 2. Parts.

PRoportion is a Just Measure or Mediocrity of the State, whereby it is framed and kept in that order, as that neither it exceed nor bee defective in his kind; to wit, so that a Monarch bee not to Monarchicall, nor strict, or absolute, as the Russe Kings; nor Aristocraticall, that is overmated; or ecclipsed by the Nobility, as the Scottish Kingdome; but ever respective to the other degrees. That an Aristocraty bee not to magnificent nor intier to it selfe, but communicate with the people some commodities of State or Government as the Venetian, and sometimes the Roman allowed the people to elect certaine Magistrates out of themselves, to have a Tribune, to make Plaebiscita &c. So a free State or Common-wealth that it bee not over popular, viz. That it depresse not to much the richer, wiser, nor learneder sort; but admit them to offices with a Caution out of the rules and misteries of that State. That they seeke no alteration of the present State. The reason, because the moderate States in their severall kindes (as all other things that observe the meane) are best framed for their continuance, because they give lesse cause of grudge, envy, and affecting the wealth, honour, and liberty which they see in others, that governe the State; And so are lesse subject to stirres, and commotions, and easiest kept in their present State wherein they are set.

Parts.

THe Parts of the State, or those Magistrates that beare place or sway in the publique Government.

Parts or Partakers of publique Government, are 1. Counsell or Senate, which consulteth of all matters pertaining to Warre and Peace, Magistrates, &c. in admitting of whom there ought to bee a more speciall care that they bee men expect in matter of Policy, because it is their trade and vocation, as men use to choose Pilots and Masters of shippes such as know the Art of Navigation, and not Husbandmen &c. And so the contrary.

2. Magistrates and Officers which are to bee executioners of that which is consulted and found to bee expedient for the Common-wealth, wherein are to bee observed the kinds of Magistrates, that they bee such as fit that kind of Government; The time of their continuance, and the manner of their election or appointing, by whom, out of whom, and in what manner they be choosen.

3. Iudges; To determine in civill and criminall matters, where are to bee observed, out of whom they are to bee chosen; what kinds are necessary, and the manner of Judgement and Judiciall proceeding.

I • Magistrates are to be observed, 1. Kindes of Magistrates, as 1. Civill. 2. Ecclesiasticall.

1. Superiour, which are to bee such and of that kind as agree with the State; as Consuls for a yeare, and not Perpetuall Dictatours in a Senatory State. Preators and Censors that oversee manners and orders of the people.

For a Kingdome Lieutenants of Shires, Marshals, Masters of Horse, Admirals, &c.

Inferiour, as Conservatours of Peace, Constables, &c.

Overseers of Youth, that take care of their education for civill and warlike exercise.

Clarkes of the Market that provide for the quantity and prize of victuall.

Ediles for Buildings, Streets, Bounds.

Quaestours or Treasurours to keepe and despence the publique treasury.

Actuaries or Recorders, which keepe the publique records.

Gaolers, to keepe Prisons, and Prisoners.

Surveyours of Woods and Fields, &c.

As Bishops, or Pastours, Elders, Wardens.

2. Time of Magistrates, whereof some are perpetuall, some for a time, viz., for more yeares; a yeare, halfe a yeare, according to the necessity of the Common-wealth, and not perpetuall; or at least not hereditary in a Kingdome. Yearely in an Aristocracy, or halfe yearely in a free State. 3. Manner of choise, by whom and how to bee chosen, where especially they are to bee chosen by sufferage, and not by Lot.

Causes preserving a State or Common-wealth. In preserving of States, two things required. 1. Misteries or Sophis • es. 1. Generall to all States. 2. Particular for every severall State. 2. Rules or Actioms. 1. Generall for all States. 2. Particular for every State.

Mysteries or Sophismes.

MYsteries or Sophismes of State, are certain • secret practizes, either for the avoiding of danger; or averting such effects as tend to the preservation of the present State, as it is set or founded.

State Mysteries are of 2. sorts. 1. Generall: That pertaine to all States; as first, to provide by all meanes, that the same degree or part of the Common-wealth doe not exceed both in quantity and quality. In quantity as that the number of the Nobility, or of great persons, be not more then the State or Common-wealth can-beare. In quality, as that none grow in wealth, liberty, honours, &c. more then that is meet for that degree; For as in weights, the heavier weights beare downe the Skale; So in Common-wealths, that part or degree that excelleth the rest in Qu • lity and Quantity, overswayeth the rest after it, whereof follow alterations and conversions of State. Secondly, to provide by all meanes, that the middle sort of people exceed both the extreames (viz.) of Nobility and Gentry, and the Base, Rascall and beggerly sort. For this maketh the State constant and firme, when both the Extreames are tied together by a middle sort, as it were with a band, as for any conspiracy of the rich and beggerly sort together, it is not to bee feared. To these two points, the Particular Rules or Sophismes of every Common-wealth are to bee applied.

2. Particular: That serve for preservation of every Common-wealth in that forme of State, wherein it is setled as in a Kingdome. That the Nobility may bee accustomed to beare the Government of the Prince, especially such as have their dwelling in remote places from the Princes eye, it is expedient to call them up at certaine times to the Princes Court under pretence of doing them honour, or being desirous to see and enjoy their presence; and to have their children, especially their eldest, to bee attendant upon the Prince, as of speciall favour towards them and theirs, that so they may bee trained up in duty and obedience towards the Prince, and bee as Hostages for the good behaviour and faithfull dealing of their Parents, especially if they bee of any suspected note. To that end, serves the Persian practize in having a band or traine of the Satrapaes children; and other Nobles to attend the Court which was well imited by our traine of Henchm • n, if they were of the Nobler sort. Againe, sometimes to borrow smale summes of his Subjects, and to pay them againe, that hee may after borrow greater summes and never pay: So in an Oligarchy, least it decline to a Popular State, they deceive the people with this and the like Sophismes (viz.) They compell their owne sort, to wit, the rich men by great penalties to frequent their assemblies for choosing of Magistrates, for provision of Armour, warlike Exercise, making an Execution of lawes, &c. By that meanes seeming to beare a hard hand over the richer; but to suffer the poorer and meaner sort to bee absent, and to neglect those assemblies under pretence, that they will no • draw them from their businesse and private earnings: Yet withall to cite thither some few of them (viz.) so many as are easily over-matched by the richer sort, to make a shew, that they would have the people, or poorer sort partakers likewise of those matters, yet terrifying those that come to their Assemblies with the tediousnesse of consultations, greatnesse of fines, if they should mi • doc. To the end to make them unwilling to come againe, or to have to doe with those consultations; by which meanes the Richer sort doe still governe the State with the people • liking and good contentment.

Axioms. Axioms or Rules of preserving the State, are 1. Generall, that serve for all Common-wealths. 2. Particular, that serve for every severall State.

Generall Rules.

1. THe first and principall Rule of Policy to bee observed in all States is to professe, and practize, and maintaine the true worship and religion of Almighty God, prescribed unto us in his word, which is the chiefe end of all Government. The Axiom, that God bee obeyed simply without exception, though hee command that which seemeth unreasonable, and absurd to humane Policy, as in the Iewes Common-wealth, That all the men should repaire yearely to one place to worship God foure times, leaving none to defend their coast; though being beset with many Enemies. Not to sow the seventh yeare, but to suffer the ground to rest untilled without respect or feare of famine, &c.

2. To avoid the causes of conversions, whereby States are overthrowne that are set downe in the title of conversions; For that Common-wealths (as naturall bodies) are preserved by avoiding that which hurteth the health and State thereof, and are so cured by contrary Medicines.

3. To take heed, that no Magistrate bee created or continued contrary to the Lawes and Policy of that State. As that in a Senate, there bee not created a perpetuall Dictator, as Caesar in Rome. In a Kingdome, that there bee no Senate or convention of equall power with the Prince, in State matters; as in Poland.

4. To create such Magistrates as love the State as it is setled, and take heed of the contrary practize, as to advance Popular persons in a Kingdome, or Aristocraty. And secondly, to advance such as have skill to discerne what doth preserve, and what hurteth or altereth the present State.

5. To that end to have certaine Officers to pry abroad, and to observe such as doe not live and behave • hemselves in fit sort, agreeable to the present State; but desire rather to bee under some other forme or kind of Government.

6. To take heed that Magistracies bee not sold for money, nor bribe in their Offices, which is specially to bee observed in that Common-wealth which is governed by a few of the Richer sort: For if the Magistrate gaine nothing but his Common Fees, the Common sort and such as want honour take in good part, that they bee not preferred, and are glad rather that themselves are suffered to intend private businesse. But if the Magistrate • uy and sell matters, the Common people are do • bly grieved, both because they are debarred of those preferments and of that gaine which they see to grow by them, which is the cause that the Germaine Olygarchies continue • o firme, for both they suffer the poorer sort to grow into wealth, and the Richer sort are by that meanes freed, and secured from being under the poore.

7. To take heed that the State as it is setled and maintained bee not over strict, nor exceed in his kind; (viz.) That a Kingdome be not too Monarchicall; Nor a Popular State bee too Popular: For which cause it is good, that the Magistrates sometimes yeeld of his right touching honour, and behave themselves familiarly with those that are equall unto them in other parts, though inferiour for place and office; And sometimes popularly with the Common people, which is the cause that some Common-wealths, though they bee very simply and unskilfully set; yet continue firme, because the Magistrates behave themselves wisely, and with due respect towards the rest that are without honour; And therefore, some kind of Moderate popularity, is to bee used in every Common-wealth.

8. To take heed of small beginnings, and to meet with them even at the first, as well touching the breaking and altering of Lawes, as of other Rules which concerne the continuance of every severall State. For the disease and alteration of a Common-wealth doth not happen all at once but growes by degrees, which every Common wit cannot discerne, but men expert in Policy.

9. To provide, that that part bee ever the greater in number and power which favours the State, as now it stands. This is to bee observed as a very Oracle in all Common-wealths.

10. To observe a meane in all the degrees, and to suffer no part to exceed; or decay overmuch. As first for pre • erments, to provide that they bee rather small and short, then great and long; And if any bee growne to overmuch greatnesse, to withdraw or diminish some part of his honour. Where the Sophismes are to bee practized (viz.) to doc it by parts and degrees; to doe it by occasion or colour of Law, and not all at once. And if that way serve not, to advance some other, of whose vertue and faithfulnesse, wee are fully assured, to as high a degree, or to greater honour: and to bee the friends and followers of him that excelleth, above that which is meet. As touching wealth, to provide, that tho • e of the middle sort (as before was said) bee more in number; and if any grow high, and overcharged with wealth, to use the Sophismes of a Popular State; (viz.) to send him on Embās • ages, and forram • Negotiations, or employ him in some office that hath great charges and litle honour, &c. To which end the Edelishi • served in some Common-wealths.

11. To suppresse the factions and quarrels of the Nobles, and to keepe other that are yet free from joyning with them in their partakings and factions.

12. To encrease or remit the Common taxes and contributions, according to the wealth, or want of the people and Common-wealth. If the people bee increased in wealth, the taxes and subsidies may bee increased. If they bee poore, and their wealth diminish, specially by dearth, want of traffique, &c. to forbeare taxes and impositions, or to take litle. Otherwise grudge and discontentments must needs follow. The Sophismes that serve for impositions are these, and other of like sort, to pretend businesse of great charge, as Warre, building of Ships, making of Havens, Castles, Fortifications, &c. for the Common defence; sometimes by Lotteries and like devises, wherein some part may bee bestowed, the rest reserved for other expences; but Princely dealing needs no pretences.

13. To provide that the Discipline and training of Youth of the better sort bee such as agreeth with that Common-wealth: As that in a Kingdome, the Sonnes of Noble-men to bee attendant at the Court, that they may bee accustomed to obedience towards the Prince: In the Senatory State, that the Sonnes of the Senatours bee not idly, no • over daintily brought up, but well instructed and trained up in learning tongues and Martiall exercise; that they may bee able to beare that place in the Common-wealth, which their Father held, and contrary wise in a Popular State.

14. To take heed, least their Sophismes, or secret practizes for the continuance and maintenance of that State bee not discovered, least by that means they refuse and disappoint themselves, but wisely used and with great secreflie.

Particuler Rules. Rules and Axiomes for preserving of a Kingdome; Hereditary. Conquered.

Kingdomes Hereditary are preserved at home by the ordering.

1. HImselfe; (viz.) By the tempering and moderation of the Princes power, and prerogative. For the lesse and more temperate, their power and state is; the more firme, and stable is their Kingdome and Government, because they seeme to be further off from a Master-like and Tyrannicall Empire; and lesse unequall in condition to the next degree; to wit, the Nobility, and so lesse subject to grudge and envy.

2. Nobility; (viz.) By keeping that degree and due proportion, that neither they exceed not in number more then the Realme or State can beare, as the Scottish Kingdome, and sometime the English, when the Realme was overcharged with the numbers of Dukes, Earles, and other Nobles; whereby the Authority of the Prince was ecclipsed, and the Realme troubled with their factions and ambitions. Nor that any one excell in honour, power or wealth, as that hee resemble another King within the Kingdome; as the House of Lancaster within this Realme. To that end not to load any with too much honour or preferrement, because it is hard even for the best and worthiest Men to beare their greatnesse and high fortune temperately, as appeareth by infinite examples in all States. The Sophismes for preventing or reforming this inconvenience, are to bee used with great caution and wisedome. If any great person bee to bee abated, not to deale with him by calumniation, or forged matter, and so to cut him off without desert, especially if hee bee gratious among the people after the Machivilian policy, which besides the Injustice, is an occasion many times of greater danger towards the Prince. Nor to withdraw their honour all at once, which maketh a desperate discontentment in the party, and a commiseration in the people, and so greater love, if hee bee gratious for his vertue and publique service. Nor to banish him into forraine Countries, where hee may have oportunity of practizing with forraine States, whereof great danger may ensue, as in the Examples of Coriolanus, Henry the fourth, and such like. But to use these, and the like Sophismes: (viz.) To abate their greatnesse by degrees, as David, Ioabs, Iustinian, Bellisarius, &c. To advance some other Men to as great or greater honour, to shadow or over-mate the greatnesse of the other. To draw from him by degrees his friends and followers, by preferrements, rewards, and other good and lawfull meanes; especially, to bee provided that these great men bee not employed in great or powerfull affaires of the Common-wealth, whereby they may have more oportunity, to sway the State.

3. People: (viz.) so to order and behave himselfe, that hee bee loved and reverenced of the people. For that the Prince need not greatly feare home-conspiracies, or forraine invasion, if hee bee firmely loved of his owne people. The reason, for that the Rebell can neither hope for any forces for so great enterprise; no • any refuge being discovered and put to flight, if the multitude affect their Prince: But the Common people being once offended hath cause to feare every moving, both at home and abroad. This may bee effected by the Prince, if hee use meanes and art of getting the favour of the people, and avoid those things that breed hatred and contempt: (viz.) if hee s •• me as a • utor, or a Father to love the people and to protect them, if hee maintaine the Peace of his Kingdome; For that nothing is more Popular, nor more pleasing to the people then is peace.

4. If hee shew himselfe oftentimes gratiously, yet with State, and Majesty to his people, and receive complaints of his suppliants, and such like.

5. If hee sit himselfe sometimes in open Courts and place of Justice, that hee may seeme to have a 〈◊〉 of Justice among his people. If hee bestow many benefits and graces upon that City which hee maketh the seat of his Empire, and so make it sure and faithfull unto him, which is fit to bee in the middle of his Kingdome, as the heart in the middle of the body, or the Sunne in the middle of Heaven, both to divide himselfe more easily into all the parts of his Dominions; and least the furthest parts at one end move, whilest the Prince is in the other. If hee goe in progresse many times to see his Provinces, especially those that are remote.

6. If hee gratifie his Courtiers and Attendants in that sort, and by such meanes as that hee may seeme not to pleasure them with the hurt and injury of his people, as with Monopolies, and such like.

7. If hee commit the handling of such thing • as procure envy, or seeme grievous to his Ministers, but reserve those things which are gratefull and well pleasing to himselfe, as the French Kings, who for that purpose • as may seeme, have erected their Court at Paris, which 〈◊〉 the Prince from grudge and envy, both with the Nobles and the people.

8. If hee borrowes sometimes summes of money of his people, though hee have no need, and pay the same 〈◊〉 without defalcation of any part by his Exchequer or other Officers.

9. If hee avoid all such things as may breed hatred or contempt of his person, which may bee done, if hee shew himselfe not too light, inconstant, hard, cruell, e •• eminate, fearefull, and dastardly, &c. But contrariwise, Religious grave, just, valiant, &c. Whereby appeareth the false Doctrine of the Machivilian Policy; with feare, the better meanes, to keepe the people in obedience, then love, and reverence of the people towards the Prince.

9. If the Prince bee well furnished with Warlike Provision, which is to bee rumored and made knowne abroad: If it bee knowne, that hee is revereneed and obeyed by his people at home.

10. If hee provide so much as lieth in him, that his Neighbour Kingdomes grow not overmuch in power and Dominion; which if it happen, hee is to joyne speedily with other Princes, which are in like danger to abare that greatnesse, and to strengthen himselfe and the rest against it. An overfight of the Christian Princes towards the King of Spaine.

11. If hee get him Intelligencers by Reward, or other meanes, to detect or hinder the de • ignes of that Prince, with whom hee hath differences, if any thing bee intent • ed against his State. Or at least have some of his owne Lydging abroad about that Princes Court, under colour of Embassage, or some other pretence; which must bee Men of skill and Dexterity to serve for that turne.

12. To observe the Lawes of his Conntrey and not to encounter them with his Prerogative, nor to use it at all where there is a Law, for that it maketh a secret and just grudge in the peoples hearts, especially if it tender to take from them their commodities, and to bestow them upon other of his Courtiers and Ministers.

13. To provide especially that that part which favoureth the State as it standeth • bee more potent, then the other that favoureth it not, or desireth a change.

14. To make specially choyce of good and sound men to beare the place of Magistrates, especiall of such as assist the Prince in his Councels, and Policies, and not to leane overmuch to his owne advise, contrary to the rule of Machivill, who teacheth that a Prince can have no good Councell except it bee in himselfe; his reason, because if hee use the Councell of some one; hee is in danger to bee overwrought and supplanted by him: And if hee Councell with more, then hee shall bee distracted with the differences in opinion. As if a Prince of great, or meane wisedome could not take the judgement of all his Counsellours in any point of Policy, or of so many as himselfe thinketh good, and to take it either by word or in wr • ting; and himselfe then in private peruse them all, and so after good 〈◊〉 mature deliberation make choice of the best, without any destraction or binding himselfe to the direction of one. For the Proverbe is true, that two eyes see more then one; and therefore, the advises and consultations of a Senatory State is compared by some to a feast, or dinner, where many contribute towards the Shot, by which meanes they have more variety of dishes, and so better fare: And yet every man may make choice of that dish that serveth him best for his health and appetite.

15. The Prince himselfe is to sit sometimes in place of publique justice, and to give an experiment of his wisedome and equity, whereby great reverence and estimation is gotten, as in the example of Solomen; which may seeme the reason, why our Kings of England had their Kings bench in place of publique Iustice, after the manner of the ancient Kings that sate in the Gate; where for better performing of this Princely duty, some speciall causes may bee selected, which may throughly bee debated and considered upon by the Prince in private, with the helpe and advise of his learned Counsell, and so bee decided publiquely, as before is said, by the Prince himselfe; At least the Prince is to take accompt of every Minister of publique Iustice, that it may bee knowne, that hee hath a care of Iustice, and doing right to his people, which makes the Iusticers also to bee more carefull in performing of their d • ties.

16. To bee moderate in his taxes, and impositions; and when need doth require to use the Subjects purse, to doe it by Parliaments, and with their consents, making the cause apparant unto them, and shewing his unwillingnesse in charging them. Finally, • o to use it, that it may seeme rather an offer from his Subjects, then an exaction by him.

17. To stop small beginnings, unto this end to compound the dissentious that arise amongst the Nobles, with Caution that such as are free, bee not drawne into parts, whereby many times the Prince is endangered, and the whole Common-wealth set in a combustion; as in the example of the Barons Warres, and the late Warres of France, which grew from a quarrell betwixt the Guision faction and the other Nobility.

18. To stirre up the people, if they grow secure and negligent of armour and other provision for the Common-wealth, by some rumour or feare of danger at-home, to make them more ready when occasion requireth. But this seldome to bee used least it bee supposed a false Alarme, when there is need indeed.

19. To have speciall care, that his children, especially the heire apparent, have such bringing up as is meet for a King (viz.) in learning, specially of matters pertaining to State, and in Marshall exercise, contrary to the practize of many Princes, who suffer their children to bee brought up in pleasure, and to spend their time in hunting &c. which by reason o • their defects afterwards is a cause of mis-government and alteration of State.

2. Kingdomes new gotten, or purchased by force, are preserved by these meanes.

1. FIrst, if they have beene Subjects before to his Ancestours, or have the same tongue, manners, or fashions as have his owne Countrey, it is an easie matter to retaine such Countries within their obedience, in case the Princes bloud of the said Countrey bee wholly extinct. For men of the same quality, tongue, and condition, doe easily shole and combine themselves together, so much the rather if the people of that Countrey have served before and were not accustomed to their owne liberty, wherein specially is to bee observed, that the lawes and customes of that purchased Countrey bee not altered nor innovated, or at least it bee done by litle and litle. So the Burgundians and Acquitaines were annexed to France. The rea • on • because partly they have bin accustomed to serve; and partly, for that they will not easily agree about any other to bee their Prince, if the blo • d Royall bee once extinguished. As for the invasion of a forraine Countrey, whereunto the Prince hath no right, or whereof the right heir is living; It is not the part of a ju • t Civill Prince, much lesse a Prince Christian to enforce such a Countrey; and therefore, the Machivilian practizes in this case to make sure worke by extinguishing wholly the bloud Royall i • le • d, and impertinent: The like is to bee said, of murthering the natives, or the greatest part of them, to the end hee may hold the rest in sure possession. A thing not onely against Christian Religion: but inhumane Iustice, cruell, and barbarous.

2. The safest way is, (supposing a right) that some good part of the Natives bee transplanted into some other place, and our Colonies consisting of so many as shall bee thought meet be planted there in some part of the Province, Castles, Forts, and Havens, seised upon, and more provided in fit places, as the manner was of the Babylonian Monarch which transplanted 10. tribes of the Iewes: And of the Romans in France, Germany, Britany, and other places. The reason: 1. For that otherwise forces of horse and foote, are to bee maintained within the Province which cannot bee done without great charge. 2. For that the whole Province is troubled and grieved, with removing and supplying the Army with victuals, carriages, &c. 3. For that Collonies are more sure and faithfull then the rest. As for the Natives that are removed from their former seates, they have no meanes to hurt, and the rest of the Natives being free from the inconvenience, and fearing that themselves may bee so served, if they attempt any thing rashly, are content to bee quiet. The Turkes practize in Asia, where the chiefe grounds and dwellings are possessed by the Souldiours, whom they call Timariotae. That the Prince have his seat and his residence in his new purchase, especially for a time, till things bee well setled; especially if the Province bee great and large, as the Turke in Greece. The reasons: 1. Because the presence of the Prince availeth much to keepe things in order, and get the good will of his new Subjects. 2. They conceive that they have ref • ge by the Princes presence, if they bee oppressed by the Lieutenants and inferiour Governours: Where it will bee convenient for the winning the peoples hearts, that some examples bee made of punishing of such as have committed any violence or oppression. 3. Because being present hee seeth and heareth what is thought and attempted; and so may quickly give remedy to it, which being absent, hee cannot doe, or not doe in time.

3. If the Prince himselfe cannot bee present to reside, then, to take heed that the charge of Governing, on new purchases bee committed to such as bee sure men, and of other meet quality, that depend wholly upon the Princes favour; And not to Natives, or other of their owne Subjects, that are gratious there for their Nobility, or vertue; especially if the Province bee great, and somewhat farre distant, which may soone seduce the unsetled affections of those new Subjects. As for such Governours as depend wholly upon the Princes favour being not bor •• , but created Noble, they will not so easily suffer themselves to bee wonne from their du • y; and in case they would revolt, yet they are not able to make any great strength, for that the people obey them but as Instruments and Ministers to keepe them in subjection, and not for any good will.

4. To have the children of the chiefe Noble men, and of greatest authority, Hostages with them in safe keeping; the more the better: For that no Bound is stronger, then that of Nature to containe the Parents and Allies in obedience, and they the rest.

5. To alter the Lawes, but by degrees one after another, and to make other that are more behovefull for the establishing of the present Government.

6. To keepe the people quiet and peaceable and well affected so much as may bee, that they may seeme, by being conquered, to have gotten a Protectour, rather then a Tyrant; For the Common-people if they enjoy peace, and bee not distracted, nor drawne from their businesse, nor exacted upon beyond measure are easily contained under obedience • Yet notwithstanding, they are to bee dis-used from the practise of Armes, and other Exercises which encrease conrage, and bee weakened of Armour, that they have neither Spirit nor will to rebell.

7. If there bee any faction in the Countrey, to take to him the defence of the better, and stronger part, and to combine with it, as Caesar in France.

8. To looke well to the Borders and confining Provinces, and if any rule there of great, or equall power to himselfe, to joyne league with some other Borderers, though of lesse strength to hinder the attempts (if any should bee) by such Neighbour Prince. For it happeneth often, that a Countrey insested by one Neighbour Prince calleth in another of as great or greater power to assist, and rescue it from the other that invadeth it; So the Romans were called into Greece by the AEt • lians; The Saxons by the Britaines, the Danes by the Saxons.

9. To leave their Titles and Dignities to the Natives, but the command and authority wholly to his owne.

10. Not to put much trust, nor to practise to often the Sophisimes of Policy, especially those that appertaine to a Tyrannicall State, which are soone detected by m • n of Judgement, and so bring discredit to the Prince, and his Policy among the wiser and better sort of his Subjects, whereof must needs follow very evill effects.

The Sophisimes of Tyrants, are rather to bee knowne, then practized, (which are for the supporting of their Tyrannicall States,) by wise and good Princes, and are these, and such like as follow.

Rules Politique of Tyrants.

RVles practised by Tyrants are of 2. sorts: viz. 1. Barbarous and Professed, which is proper to those that have got head, and have power sufficient of themselves without others helpes, as in the Turkish and Russe Government.

2. Sophisticall and Dissembled; As in some S • tes, that are reputed for good and lawfull Monarchies, but inclining to Tyrannies, proper to those which are not yet setled nor have power sufficient of themselves; but must use the power and helpe of others, and so are forced to bee Politique Sophisters.

1. Sophisimes of a Barbarous and Professed Tyranny.

1. TO expell and banish out of his Countrey all honest meanes, whereby his people may attaine to learning, wisedome, valour, and other vertues, that they might bee fit for that estate and servile condition. For that in these two, learning, and Martiall exer • ise, effect two things most dangerous to a Tyranny: (viz.) Wisedome and Valour. For that men of Spirit and understanding can hardly endure a servile State. To this end to forbid learning of liberall Arts, and Martiall exercise; As in the Russe Governement, so Iulian the Apostata dealt with the Christians. Contrarywise, to use his people to base occupations, and Mechanicall Arts, to keepe them from Idlenesse, and to put away from them all high thoughts, and manly conceits, and to give them a liberty of drinking drunke, and of other base and lewd conditions that they may bee sotted, and so made unfit for great enterprizes. So the AEgyptian Kings dealt with the Hebrewes; So the Russe Emperour with his Russe people • And Charles the fifth with the Netherlanders, when hee purposed to enclose their Priviledges, and to bring them under his absolute Government.

2. To make sure to him and his State, his Military men by reward, liberty, and other meanes, especially his Guard, or Praetorian band; That being Partakers of the spoile and benefit, they make like that State, and continue firme to it; as the Turke his Ianizaries, the Russe his Boyarent, &c.

3. To unarme his people of weapons, money, and all meanes, whereby they may resist his power; And to end, to have his set & ordinary exactions, viz. once in two, three, or foure yeares; and sometimes yearely, as the Turke, and Russe; who is wont to say, that his people must bee used as his flock of sheep: viz. Their fleece taken from them, least it overlade them, and grow too heavy; that they are like to his Beard, that the more it was shaven, the thicker it would grow. And if there bee any of Extraordinary-wealth to borrow of them in the meane while, till the taxe come about, or upon some devised matter to con • iscate their goods, as the Common practise is of the Russe and Turke.

4. To bee still in Warres, to the end, his people may need a Captaine; and that his forces may be kept in practise, as the Russe doth yearely against the Tartar, Polonian, and Sweden, &c.

5. To cut off such as excell the rest in wealth, favour, or nobility, or bee of a pregnant, or spiring wit, and so are fearefull to a Tyrant, and to suffer none to hold office, or any honour, but onely of him; as the Turke his Bashaes, and the Russe his R • ezzes.

6. To forbid Guilds, Brotherhoods, Feastings, and other Assemblies among the people, that they have no meanes or oportunity to conspire or conferre together of publique ma • ters, or to maintaine love amongst themselves, which is very dangerous to a Tyrant, the Russes practise.

7. To have their Beagl • s, or Listners in every corner, and parts of the Realme, especially in places that are more suspect, to learne what every man saith, or thinketh, that they may prevent all attempts, and take away such as mislike their State.

8. To make Schisme and Division among his Subjects, (viz.) To set one Noble man against another, and one Rich man against another, that through faction and disagreement among themselves, they may bee weakened, and attempt nothing against him; and by this meanes entertaining whisperings and complaints, hee may know the secrets of both parts, and have matter against them both, when need requireth. So the Russe made the faction of the Zemsky and the Oppress • ie.

9. To have Strangers for his Guard, and to entertaine Parasites, and other base and servile fellowes, not too wise, but yet subtill, that will bee ready for reward to doe and execute what hee commandeth, though never so wicked and unjust. For that good men cannot flatter, and wise men cannot serve a Tyrant.

All these practises and such like, may bee contracted into one or two, (viz.) To bereave his Subjects of will and power to doe him hurt, or to alter the present State. The use is Caution, not Imitation.

2. Sophismes of the Sophisticall, or subtill Tyrant to h • ld up his State.

1. TO make a shew of a good King by observing a temper and mediocrity in his Government, and whole course of life; to which end it is necessary, that this subtill Tyrant bee a cunning Polititian, or a Machivilian at the least, and that hee bee taken so to bee, for that it maketh him more to bee feared and regarded, and is thought thereby not not unworthy for to governe others.

2. To make shew not of severity, but of gravity, by seeming reverent, and not terrible in his speech, and gesture, habite, and other demeanour.

3. To pretend care of the Common-wealth; and to that end to seeme loath to exact Tributes and other charges; and yet to make necessity of it, where none is, To that end to procure such Warre as can bring no danger towards his State, and that might easily bee compounded, or some other chargeable businesse; and to continue it on, that hee may continue his exaction and contribution so long as hee list. And thereof to employ some part in his publique service, the rest to hoord up in his Treasury, which is sometimes practised even by lawfull Princes; as Edward the fourth in his Warres against. France, when having levied a great summe of money throughout his Realme, especially of the Londoners, hee went over Seas, and returned without any thing doing.

4. Sometimes to give an accompt by open speech and publique writing of the expense of such taxes and impositions as hee hath received of his Subjects, that hee may so seeme to bee a good Husband, and frugall, and not a Robber of the Common-wealth.

5. To that end, to bestow some cost upon publique Buildings; or some other worke for the common good, especially upon the Ports, Forts, and chiefe Cities of his Realme, that so hee may seeme a Benefactour, and to have a delight in the adorning of his Countrey, or doing some good for it.

6. To forbid Feastings and other meetings, which increase love, and give oportunity to conferre together of publique matters, under pretence of sparing cost for better uses. To that end, the Curfieu bell was first ordained by William the Conquerour to give men warning to repaire home at a certaine houre.

7. To take heed, that no one grow to bee over great, but rather many-equall great, that they may envy and contend one with another; and if hee resolve to weaken any of this sort, to doe it warily and by degrees, If quite to wrack him and to have his life, yet to give him a Lawfull triall after the manner of his Countrey; And if hee proceed so farre with any of great power and estimation as to doe him contumely or disgrace, not to suffer him to escape, because contumely and disgrace are things contrary unto Honour, which great Spirits doe most desire, and so are moved rather to a revenge for their disgrace, then to any thankfulnesse, or acknowledging the Princes favour for their pardon or dismission; True in Athiests, but not in true Christian Nobility.

8. To unarme his people, and store up their weapons under pretence of keeping them safe, and having them ready when service requireth, and then to arme with them, such and so many as hee shall thinke meet, and to commit them to such as are sure men.

9. To make scisme or division under hand among his Nobility, and betwixt the Nobility and the People, and to set one Rich man against another, that they combine not together, and that himselfe by hearing the griefes and complaints may know the secrets of both parts, and so have matter against them both, when it listeth him to call them to an accompt.

10. To offer no man any contumely or wrong, specially about Womens matters, by attempting the chastity of their Wives or Daughters, which hath beene the ••• e of many Tyrants, and conversion of their States. As of Tarquinius, by Brutus, Appius, by Virginius, Pisistratus, by Harmodius, Alexander Medices Duke of Florence, Aloisus of Placentia, Rode • icus King of Spaine, &c.

11. To that end to bee moderate in his pleasures, or to use them closely that hee bee not seene; For that men sober or watchfull, or such as seeme so, are not lightly Subject to contempt, or conspiracies • of their owne.

12. To reward such as achieve some great or commendable enterprize, or doe any speciall action for the Common-wealth in that manner as it may seeme, they could not bee better regarded, in case they lived in a free State.

13. All Rewards and things gratefull to come from himselfe but all punishments, exaction • and 〈…〉 gs; ungratefull to come from his Officers and publique Ministers; And when hee hath effected what hee would by them, if hee see his people discontented withall, to make them a Sacrifice to pacifie his Subjects.

14. To pretend great cure of Religion and of serving of God, (which hath beene the manner of the wickedest Tyrants) for that people doe lesse feare any hurt from those, whom they thinke vertuous and religious, nor attempt lightely to doe them hurt, for that they thinke that God protects them.

15. To have a strong and sure Guard of forraine Souldiours, and to bind them by good turnes, that they having at least, profit, may depend upon him, and the present State; As Caligula, the German Guard, where the Nobility are many and mighty. The like is practifed by lawfuls Kings, as by the French King.

16. To procure that other great persons bee in the same fault, or case with them, that for that cause • they bee forced to desend the Tyrant, for their owne safety.

17. To take part, and to joyne himselfe with the stronger part; if the Common people, and meane degree bee the stronger to joyne with them; if the Rich and Noble, to joyne with them. For so that part with his owne strength will bee ever able to over match the other.

18. So to frame his manners and whole behaviour, as that hee may seeme, if not perfectly good, yet tollerably evill, or somewhat good, somewhat bad.

These Rules of Hipocriticall Tyrants are to be known, that they may bee avoided and meet withall, and no drawne into imitation.

Preservation of an Aristocraty.

RVles to preserve a Se • atory State, are partly taken from the Common Axioms, and partly from those that 〈◊〉 a Kingdome.

Preservation of an Olygarchy; by Sophisimes. Rules.

1. IN Consultations and Assemblies abo •• publique affaires so to order the matter, that all may have liberty to frequent their Common Assemblies and Councels: But to impose a fine upon the richer sort if they omit that duty. On the other side to pardon the people, if they absent themselves, and to beare with them under pretence, that they may the better intend their occupations, and not bee hindred in their trades and earnings.

2. In election of Magistrates and Officers: To suffer the po •• er sort to vow and abjure the bearing of office under colour of sparing them; or to enjoyne some great charge as incident to the office, which the poore cannot beare. But to impose some great fine upon those that bee rich, if they refuse to beare office, being elect unto it.

3. In Judiciall matters: In like manner to order that the people may be absent from publique Trials, under pretence of following their, businesse. But the richer to bee present, and to compell them by fines to frequent the Court.

4. In Warlike Exercise and Armes, that the poore bee not forced to have Armour, Horse, &c. under pretence of sparing their cost, nor to bee drawne from their trades by Ma • tiall Exercises; but to compell the richer sort to ke • pe their proportion of Armour, Horse, &c. By excessive fines, and to exercise themselves in Warlike matters, &c.

5. To have speciall care of instructing their Children in liberall Arts, Policy, and Warlike Exercise, and to observe good order and discipline. For as Popular States are preserved by the frequency and liberty of the people, so this Government of the richer is preserved by discipline and good order of Governours.

6. To provide good store of Warlike furniture, especially of Horse, and Horsemen; and of Armed men, viz. •• ke, &c. which are proper to the Gentry; as shot and light furniture are for a popular Company.

6. To put in practise some points of a Popular State, viz. To lade no one man with too much preferrement; to make yearely or halfe yeares Magistrates, &c. For that the people are pleased with such things, and they are better secured by this meanes from the rule of one. And if any grow to too much greatnesse, to abate him by the Sophis ••• fit for this state.

7. To commit the Offices and Magistracies, to those that are best able to beare the greatest charges for publique matters, which both tendeth to the conservation of this State, and pleaseth the people, for that they •• ape some releife and benefit by it.

8. To the same end to contract marriages among themselves, the rich with the rich, &c.

9. In some things which concerne not the points and matters of State as electing Magistrates making Lawes, &c. to give an equality, or sometimes a preferment to the Common-people, and not to doe, as in some Olygarchies they were wont, viz. To sweare against the people, to su • presse and bridle them; but rather contrary, to minister an oath at their admission, that they shall doe no wrong to any of the people; and if any of the richer offer wrong to any of the Commons, to shew some example of servere punishment.

For other Axioms that preserve this State, they are to bee borrowed, from those other Rules that tend to the preserving of a Popular and Tyrannicall State; for the strict kind of Olygarchy is kinne to a Tyranny.

Preservation of a Popular State; Sophismes. Rules or Axioms.

1. IN publique Assemblies and consultations, about matters of State, creating of Magistrates, publique Justice, and Exercise of armes, to practise the contrary to the former kind of Government, to wit, an Olygarchy. For in Popular States, the Commons and meaner sort are to bee drawne to those Assemblies, Magistracies, Offices, Warlike Exercises, &c. By mulcts and rewards, and the richer sort are to bee spared, and not to be forced, by fine, or otherwise, to frequent these Exercises.

2. To make shew honouring and reverencing the richer men, and not to sweare against them, as the manner hath beene in some Popular States; but rather to preferre them in all other matters, that concerne not the State and publique Government.

3. To elect Magistrates from among the Commons, by Lot, or Ballating, and not to choose any for their wealths sake.

4. To take heed, that no man beare office twice, except it bee Military, where the pay, and salery, &c. is to bee reserved in their owne hands, to bee disposed of by a Common Councell, &c. And to see that do man bee to highly preferred.

5. That no Magistracy bee perpetuall, but as short, as may bee, to wit, for a yeare, halfe yeare, &c.

6. To compell Magistrates, when their time expireth to give an accompt of their behaviour and Government, and that publiquely before the Commons.

7. To have publique Saleries and allowance for their Magistrates, Judges, &c. And yearely dividence for the Common-people, and such as have most need among them.

8. To make Iudges of all matters, out of all sorts, so they have some aptnes to performe that duty.

9. To provide that publique Iudgements and Trials, bee not frequent; and to that end to inflict great fines and other punishments upon Pettifoggers and Dilatours, as the law of requitall; &c. Because for the most part the richer and nobler, and not the Commons are indited and accused in this Common-wealth, which causeth the rich to conspire against the State; whereby, many times, the Popular State is turned into an Olygarchy, or some other Government. Hereto tendeth that Art of Civill law, made against Accusers and Calumniatours: Ad Senatos Consultum Turpilianu • , lib. 1. di Calumniatoribus.

10. In such free States as are Popular, and have no revenue, to provide that publique Assemblies bee not after: because they want salery for Pleaders and Oratours; And if they bee rich; yet to bee wa • y. that all the revenew bee not divided amongst the Commons. For, that this distribution of the Common revenue among the Multitude is like a purse or barrell without a bottom. But to provide, that a sufficient part of the revenue bee stored up for the publique affaires.

11. If the number of the poore encrease too much in this kind of State, to send some abroad out of the Cities into the next Country places, and to provide, above all, that none doe live idly, but bee set to their trades. To this end, to provide that the richer men place in their Farmes and Coppiholds, such decayed Citizens.

12. To bee well advised what is good for this State, and not to suppose that to bee fit for a Popular State, that seemeth most popular; but that which is best for the continuance thereof. And to that end, not to lay into the Exchequer, or Common Treasury, such goods as are confiscate, but to store them up as holy and consecrate things, which except it bee practised, confiscations, and fines of the Common people would bee frequent, and so this State would decay by weakening the people.

Conversion of States in Generall.

COnversion of a State, is the declining of the Common-wealth, either to some other forme of Government, or to his full and last period appointed by God.

Causes of Conversions of States, are of two sorts: Generall and Particular.

GEnerall, (viz.) 1. Want of Religion • viz. of the true knowledge, and worship of God, prescribed in his word; and notable sinnes that proceed from thence in Prince and people, as in the examples of Saul, Vzziah, the Iewish 〈◊〉 ; the foure Monarchies, and all other.

2. Want of wisedome, and good Councell, to keepe the State, the Prince, Nobles and People in good temper, and d •• proportion, according to their severall orders and degrees.

3. Want of Iustice, either in administration (as ill Lawes, o • ill Magistrates) or in the execution, as rewards not given where they should bee, or there bestowed where they should not be, or punishments not inflicted where they should be.

4. Want of power and sufficiency 〈◊〉 maintaine and defend it selfe; viz Of provision, as Armour, Money, Captaines, Souldiours, &c. Execution when the mea • es or provision is not used, or ill used.

2. Particular: To bee noted and collected 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the contraries of those rules that are prescribed for the preservation of the Common-wealths.

Particular causes of Conversion of State, are of two sorts.

1. FOrraine: By the overgreatnesse of invasion of some forraine Kingdome, or other State of meane power, having a part within our owne, which are to bee prevented by the providence of the chiefe, and rules of policy for the preserving of every State. This falleth out very seldome for the great difficulty to overthrow a forraine State.

2. Domestique: Sedition or open violence by the stronger part. Alteration without violence.

Sedition.

SEdition is a power of inferiours opposing it selfe with, force of Armes against the superiour power, Quasi diti • secedens.

Causes of Sedition are of two sorts.

1. Generall. Liberty.   Riches. VVHen they, that are of equall quality in a Common-wealth, or doe take themselves so to bee, are not regarded equally in all, or in any of these 3. Or when they are so unequall in quality, or take themselves so to be, are regarded but equally, or with lesse respect, then those that bee of lesse defect in these 3. things, or in any of them. Honour.  

1. IN the Chiefe: Covetuousnesse or oppression, by the Magistrate or higher Power, (viz.) when the Magistrates, especially the Chiefe encreaseth his substance and revenue beyond measure, either with the publique or (private calamity, whereby the Governours grow to quarrell among themselves as in Olygarchies) or the other degrees conspire together, and make quarrell against the chiefe, as in Kingdomes: The examples of Wat Tyler, Iarke Straw, &c.

2. In the Chiefe: Injury, when great Spirits, and of great power are greatly wronged and dishonoured, or take themselves so to bee, as Coriolanus, Cyrus minor, Earle of Warwick. In which cases the best way is to decide the wrong.

3. Preferment, or want of preferment; wherein some have overmuch, and so wax proud and aspire higher: or have more or lesse, they deserve as they suppose; and so in envy, and disdaine seeke Innovation by open faction, so Caesar; &c.

4. Some great necessity or calamity; So Xerxes after the foile of his great Army. And Senacheris after th • losse of 185. in one night. 2. P • rticular. 1. ENvy, when the chiefe exceed the medio •• ity before mentioned, and so provoketh the Nobility, and other degrees, to conspire against him; as Brutus Cassius, &c. against Caesar. 2. Feare, viz. Of danger, when one or more dispatch the Prince, by secret practise or force to prevent his owne danger, as Artabanus did Xerxes. 3. Lust or Lec • ery, as Tarquinius Superbus, by Brutus; Pisistratinde, by Armodius, Appius by Virginius. Chiefe. 4. Contempt; For vile quality and base behaviour, as Sardanapalus, by Arbaces; Dionisiu • the younger by Dion. Other degrees. 5. Contumely; When some great disgrace is done to some of great Spirit who standeth upon his honour and reputation, as Caligula, by Chaereas. Other degrees. 6. Hope of Advancement, or some great profit, as Mithidrates, An • barsanes.

Alteration without violence.

CAuses of alteration without violence are; 1. Excesse of the State; when by degrees, the State groweth from that temper and mediocrity, wherein it was, or should have bee setled, and exceedeth in power, riches and absolutnes in his kind, by the ambition & covetousnesse of the Chiefes, immoderate taxes, and impositions, &c. applying all to his owne benefit without respect of other degrees, and so in the end changeth it selfe into another State or forme of Government, as a Kingdome into a Tyranny, an Olygarchy into an Aristocraty.

2. Excesse, of some one or more in the Common-wealth; viz. When some one, or more, in a Common-wealth grow to an excellency or excesse above the rest, either in honour, wealth, or vertue; and so by permission and popular favour, are advanced to the Soveraignty: By which meanes, Popular States grow into Olygarchies; and Olygarchies, and Aristocraties into Monarchies. For which cause, the Athenians and some other free States made their Lawes of Ostrocismos to banish any for a time that should excell, though it were in vertue, to prevent the alteration of their State; which because it is an unjust law, t'is better to take heed at the beginning to prevent the meanes, that none should grow to that hight and excellency, then to use so sharp and unjust a remedy.

FINIS.

Old age is not ever unfit for publique Government.

DAvid being of great yeares, and so having • cold, dry, and impotent body, married with Abishag a faire Maide of the best complection through his whole Realme, to revive his body and prolong his life • 1. Reg. Chap. 1. Verse 3.

Example of the like practise in Charles the fifth.

DAvid being old and impotent of body by the 〈◊〉 of his Nobles and Phisitions, married a young Maide called Abishag, to warme and preserve, his old body.

Observation.

VVHether David did well in marrying a Maide; and whether it bee lawfull for an old decayed and impotent man to marry a young woman; or on the other side, for an old-worne, and decrepite woman to marry a young and lusty man.

For the Affirmative.

ARG. The end of marriage is Society and mutuall comfort; but there may bee Society and mutuall comfort in a marriage betwixt an old, and young party. Ergo 'tis lawfull.

Answ. Society and comfort is an use and effect of marriage; but none of the principall end is of marriage, which are: 1. Procreation of Children, and so, the continuance of mankind. 2. The Avoiding of • ornication.

As for comfort and society, they may bee betwixt man and man, women and women where no marriage is • And therefore no proper ends of marriage.

The Negative.

ARG. 1. That conjunction which hath no respect to the right and proper ends, for which marriage was ordained by God, is no lawfull marriage. But the conjunction betwixt an old impotent, and young party hath no respect to the right end, for which marriage, was ordained by God. Therefore it is no lawfull marriage.

2. No contract, wherein the party contracting, bindeth himselfe to an impossible condition, or to doe that which hee cannot doe, is good, or lawfull. But the contract of marriage by an impotent person with a young party bindeth him to an impossible condition to doe, that which hee cannot doe (viz.) to performe the duties of marriage; Therefore it is unlawfull.

For the same ca • se, the civill law determineth a nullity in these marriages, except the woman know before the infirmity of the man, in which case she can have no wrong, being a thing done with her owne knowledge and consent, because Volenti ne fit injuria:—In legem Iulian. de adulteriis leg. Si uxor &c.

It provideth further for the more certainty of the infirmity, that three yeares bee expired before the dissolution of the marriage, because that men, that have beene infirme at the first, by reason of sicknesse, or some other accident, afterwards proved to bee sufficient: De repudiis leg. in causis.

Defence for David in marrying Abishag.

1. IT was rather a Medicine then a marriage, without any evill or disordered affection.

2. It was by the perswasion of his Nobles and Phisitians.

3. It was for the publique good to prolong the life of a worthy Prince.

4. It was with the knowledge and consent of the young Maid, who was made acquainted with the Kings infirmity, and to what end shee was married unto him; who if shee did it for the Common good, and for duties sake, having withall the guift of continency, shee is to bee commended; if for ambition, or some vaine respect, it is her owne, and not Davids fault.

Politicall Nobility. Adoniah aspiring to the Kingdome.

FIrst, tooke the advantage of Davids affection and kindnesse towards him, and made him secure of any ill dealing.

Secondly, of his age and infirmities, disabling his father as unfit for Government.

Thirdly, blazed his title, and right to the Crowne.

Fourthly, got him Chariots, Horsemen, and Footemen, and a guard to make shew of State.

Fiftly, being a comly and goodly person, made a Popular shew of himselfe, and his qualities.

Sixtly, joyned to himselfe in faction Ioab, the Generall of the army, who was in displeasure for murdering of Abner and Amasa, and feared that David would supply Benajah into his place, and so was discontented. And Abiather the high Priest, that was likewise discontented with David, for the preferrement of Zadoch.

Seventhly, had meetings with them, and other his confederates, under a pretence of a vow and offering at the Fountaine of Raguell, in the confines of Iudaea.

Eightly, made a shew of Religion by Sacrificing; &c.

Ninthly, made himselfe familiar with the Nobles and people, and entertained them with feasting.

Tenthly, drew into his part the chiefe officers of the Court, and Servants to the King, by Rewards, Familiarity, &c.

Elevently, disgraced and abased the Competitour, and such as hee knew, would take part with him, and concealeth his ambition, and purpose from them.

Twelftly, had Ionathan a favorite of the Court, and neere about the King to give him intelligence, if any thing were discovered, and moved at the Court, whilest himselfe was in hand about his practize.

Observations. Wayes of such as aspire to the Kingdome, and Markes to discerne them.

FIrst, they wind into the Princes favour, by service, officiousnesse, flattery, &c. to plant him in a good opinion of their loyalty and faithfulnesse, thereby to make him secure of their practises.

2. They take advantage of the Princes infirmities, age, impotency, negligence, sexe, &c. And worke upon that by disabling the Prince, and secret detracting of his person and Government.

3. They blaze their Title, and claime to the Crowne, (if they have any) with their friends, and favourers.

4. They provide them in secret of extraordinary forces and furniture for the warres, make much of good souldiours, and have a pretence (if it bee espied) of some other end, as for the Kings honour, or service, and to bee in readines against forraine enemies, &c.

5. They make open shew of their best qualities and comlines of their person (which though it bee vaine as a dumbe shew, it is very effectuall to winne the liking of the popular sort, which according to the rule of the election of Kings, in the Bees Common-wealth; thinke that Fo • ma est digna imperare) Activity, Nobility, Ancestry; &c.

6. To have th • ir blazers abroad to set out their vertues, and to prepare th • ir friends in every Province.

7. To draw into their part, and make sure unto them, of the chiefe Peeres, & men of best quality, such as are mightiest, and most gratious with the Souldiours, and the Military men, and most subtill and politique, especially such as bee ambitious, and discontent with the State.

8. To have meetings f • r conference under some pretence of some ordinary • a •• er in some convenient place, not to • neere, nor too farre of, but where friends may best resort and assemble unto them without suspition.

9. To take up a shew and pretence of Religion more then before, and beyond the practise of their former life.

10. They use popular curtesie (which in a great person is very effectuall) feasting, liberality, gaming, &c.

11. To bee over liberall, and winne to them by guifts, familiarity, &c. the chiefe Officers of the Court, and Governours of Shires.

12. To have some neere about the Prince, to keepe them in credite, and remove suspition, if any rise.

13. To disgrace such as they know to bee sure and faithfull to the Prince, and present State, or to the Competitour, and to bring them into contempt by slander, detraction, and all meanes they can, and to conceal • the designes from them, least they bee discovered before they bee ripe.

14. To have some spie neere about the Prince, to advertise them if any inckling of suspition arise whilest themselves are practising.

Note the practises of Absolon: 2. Sam. Chap. 16. and of Cyrus minor, in Xenophon: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 cap. 1.

Politicall Prince.

David being a most worthy and excellent Prince for wisedome, valour, religion, and justice, and so highly deserving of the Common-wealth, yet growne into age, grew withall into contempt, • nd had many, both of his Nobles and Common-people, that fell from him; first with Absolon, then with Adoniah, who affected the Kingdome and rebelled against him: For remedy whereof, hee stirred up himselfe to publique actions which might shew his vigour and sufficiency to mannage the affaires of his Kingdome.

1. AFter the victory against Absolon, hee forced himselfe to forbeare mourning, and shewed himselfe to his discontented Army, when all were like to fall from him, for his unreasonable sorrow and lamentation for his Sonne.

2. After the victory, hee caused a generall convention to bee assembled of the whole nation, to bring him home with honour to Ierusalem, which was a renewing and reestablishing of him; 2. Sam. 19. 12.

3. Hee gave an experiment of his power and authority, by deposing a person of great authority and estimation, to wit, Ioab, Generall Captaine of the Army, and advancing Amasa to his place.

4. Hee sent kind Messengers to Ierusalem, and to other chiefe and head Townes, and speciall men of Iude • , his contributes, putting them of their alliance with him, with these words, that they were of his owne flesh and bloud, with protestation of his speciall love and affection towards them, to provoke them with like kindnesse and affection towards him.

5. Hee assembled a Parliament of his whole Realme, and tooke occasion upon the designing of his Successour, to commend unto them the succession of his House, and the continuance and maintenance of Gods true worship and religion, then established, and gave a grave and publique charge to his Successour, now designed, touching the manner of his government, and maintaining o • Religion, 1. Chron. 12. 13.

6. Hee shewed his bounty and magnificence in congesting matter for the building of the Temple, as gold, silver, brasse, &c. And caused it to bee published and made known to the Parliament and whole Nation, 1. Chron. 22. 13.

7. Hee revived the Church Government, and set it in a right order, assigning to every Church Officers his place and function.

8. Hee suppressed the faction of Adoniah, and ordained Solomon his Successour; 1. Reg. 1. 22. By these meanes. hee retained his Majesty and authority in his old age, as appeareth by th'effect; for that being bedred, hee suppressed the faction of Adoniah, (which was growne mighty, and was set on foote) with his bare commandement, and signification of his pleasure, and so hee died in peace.

FINIS.