WHEN I remember to have ſeen Gentlemen and other Lay Perſons, in my Youth, who held not only the major part of Priories and Abbies, but alſo of Cures and Biſhoprick in Commendam; and when I conſider that in my firſt Years there was ſuch a Licentiouſneſs in Monaſteries of both Sexes, that nothing but Scandals and ill Examples were met with in places where Edification was to be look'd for, I own that it is no ſmall Satisfaction to me, to ſee thoſe Diſorders abſolutely baniſh'd under your Majeſty's Reign; and that the ſaid Tenures and the Diſorders of Monaſteries are ſcarcer than lawful Poſſeſſions and Orderly Communities were at that time.

The beſt Method, in my Opinion, for your Majeſty to continue and to increaſe that Bleſſing, is to take a particular Care to place Perſons of Merit and of exemplary Lives, in Biſhopricks; to beſtow Abbies and other ſimple Benefices of your Nomination on Perſons of Probity; to deprive thoſe who lead Licentious Lives in ſo holy a Station, as that is which unites men particularly to God; of your Sight and Favours, and to make an exemplary puniſhment of the Scandalous.

I might propoſe many other Expedients for the Reformation of the Clergy; but provided your Majeſty will be pleas'd to obſerve theſe Four Conditions, and to uſe virtuous Men of that Profeſſion favourably, you will diſcharge your Duty, and will render the Eccleſiaſticks of your State either ſuch as they ought to be, or at leaſt ſo prudent, as to endeavour to become ſo.

To that end it is my Duty to repreſent to your Majeſty, that it is very neceſſary to take Care not to be miſtaken in your Judgment of the Capacity of Biſhops.

A Man may be Learned, may be Capable, and yet not fit for that Function; which beſides Science, requires Zeal, Courage, Vigilancy, Piety, Charity and Activity together.

It is not ſufficient to be an honeſt Man, to make a good Biſhop; for he muſt be good for others as well as for himſelf.

I have often had a Dread that Men of Quality would hardly contain themſelves within the bounds of their Duty, and that they are leſs regular in their Lives than others: Many others being mov'd with that Fear, are of Opinion, that Doctors of a good Life, and low Birth, are fitter for thoſe Employments, than thoſe who are of higher Extraction: But there are many things to be conſider'd on that Subject.

A Biſhop ought to be Learned, full of Piety, Zeal, well Born; by reaſon that the Authority requir'd in ſuch Places is only to be found in Perſons of Quality. But as it is difficult to meet all thoſe Qualifications in one and the ſame Perſon, I will be bold to ſay, that good Manners, which muſt be conſider'd above all things, being ſuppos'd, Quality and Authority, which are commonly Companions, are to be preferr'd before great Science; having often ſeen very Learned Men who made very ill Biſhops, either for not being able to Govern, upon the account of their low Extraction, or for living too near, according to their Birth, which borders upon Avarice; whereas Nobility, which is attended by Virtue, commonly has a particular Deſire of Honour and of Glory, which produces the ſame Effects as Zeal, occaſion'd by the pure Love of God; that they generally live with a Splendour and Liberality conformable to that Dignity; and better underſtand the manner of behaving themſelves in, and converſing with the World.

Above all things, a Biſhop muſt be humble and Charitable, have Learning and Piety, a ſteady Courage, and a great Zeal for the Church, and for the Salvation of Souls.

Thoſe who aim at Biſhopricks out of Ambition and Intereſt, are commonly thoſe who make their Court beſt to obtain that by Importunity, which they cannot pretend to by Merit; and therefore ſuch muſt not be choſen, but thoſe whom God calls to that Vocation; which is eaſily known by their different way of living; theſe applying themſelves to the Eccleſiaſtical Functions, that are practis'd in Seminaries. And it would be very proper for your Majeſty to declare, That you will chuſe none but ſuch as have ſpent a conſiderable time after their Studies, in applying themſelves to the ſaid Functions in Seminaries, which are places appointed in order thereunto; ſince it is not reaſonable, that the moſt difficult and moſt important Profeſſion in the World ſhould be undertaken without having firſt ſtudied it; ſince no Man is allow'd to exert the meaneſt and the moſt vile, without a Prentiſhip of many Years.

After all, the beſt Rule in that Choice is, to have no general one; but to chuſe ſometimes Learned Men, ſometimes Men that have not ſo much Learnig, and are better Born; young Men on ſome occaſions, old ones on others; according as Men of divers Conditions may be thought moſt fit to Govern.

I have always had this Conſideration; but yet whatever Care I have taken to make a good uſe of it, I own I have been ſometimes miſtaken; and indeed it is very difficult not to be miſtaken in Judgments, which are the leſs eaſie, in that it is almoſt impoſſible to penetrate into the Hearts of Men, or to fix their Inconſtancy.

They change their Humour with their Condition; or rather, they diſcover what they diſſembled till then, to obtain their ends.

While ſuch Men live in Miſery, they make it their buſineſs to be thought much better than they are; and when they have obtain'd their ends, they no longer conſtrain themſelves to conceal the ill Qualifications they have had all along.

Nevertheleſs, in uſing the Precautions I propoſe in the ſaid Choice, you will diſcharge your Conſcience before God: And I maintain boldly, That your Majeſty will have nothing to fear, provided, that obliging thoſe who ſhall be choſen with the ſaid Caution, to reſide in their Dioceſes, to eſtabliſh Seminaries there for the Inſtruction of their Eccleſiaſticks, to viſit their Flock, as they are oblig'd to do by the Canons, you put them in a way to perform that Duty effectually.

I ſay this, Sir, becauſe it is abſolutely impoſſible for them to do it at preſent, by reaſon of the daily Encroachments your Majeſty's Officers make upon their Juriſdiction.

Six things are likewiſe to be wiſh'd, that the Souls which are committed to their Care may receive all the Aſſiſtance they can expect from them.

Three of them depend on your own Authority; one on Rome only; and the other two on Rome and your Authority together.

The three firſt are, the Regulations of Appeals, that of Priviledg'd Caſes, and the Suppreſſion of the Regalia, pretended by the holy Chappel of Paris, over the major part of the Biſhopricks of this Kingdom, until thoſe who are nominated for the ſame by your Majeſty have taken the Oath of Allegiance.

The fourth is, a Regulation of the Plurality of the Sentences requir'd by the Canons, for the Puniſhment of a Crime committed by an Eccleſiaſtick; to the end, that the Guilty may not be able to avoid the Puniſhment they deſerve, by the Delays of the Formalities that are practis'd.

And the other two, which relate to the Authority of the Church and yours together, are the Exemptions of the Chapters, and the Right of Preſenting to Cures, which belongs to divers Abbots and Seculars.

We muſt diſtinctly examine theſe Caſes one after another.

THoſe who Conſecrate themſelves to God, by devoting their Lives to his Church, are ſo abſolutely exempted of the Temporal Juriſdiction of Princes, that they can only be try'd by their Eccleſiaſtical Superiours.

Divine Right, and the Law of Nations, eſtabliſh the ſaid Immunity clearly. The Law of Nations, in that it has been acknowledg'd by all Nations. Divine Right, by the Confeſſion of all Authors who have treated of it, before the Modern Juriſprudence of the laſt Age.

The Church has enjoy'd it until the Male-Adminiſtration of Eccleſiaſtical Juſtice has open'd a way to the Ambition of the Officers of Temporal Princes to take Cognizance of the ſame.

The Church alſo being ſenſible, that the Misfortunes of the Times hindred them from being able to redreſs by their own Power, many Diſorders, which thoſe who were under her Juriſdiction were fallen into, reſolv'd in order to remove all Cauſe of Complaint, upon the account of the Impunity of the Crimes, which were committed under the Protection of her Authority, to give Secular Judges the Power to take Cognizance of thm in certain priviledg'd Caſes; Fifty Years ago this diſtinction of Priviledg'd Caſes and of Common Treſpaſſes was unknown to the Church: Common Treſpaſſes are all the Faults, the Cognizance whereof belongs to the Eccleſiaſtical Tribunal. becauſe they could not do it otherwiſe, than by virtue of the Priviledge that was particularly granted them to that effect.

It muſt be noted, that there is a difference between the Caſes that are ſtyl'd Priviledg'd in all States, and thoſe that are particularly pretended ſuch in France.

The Firſt may be reduc'd to Two, which are Voluntary Homicide with Premeditation, and manifeſt Apoſtacy, as to perſwade Clerks to deſpiſe, and to forſake an Eccleſiaſtical Life, to quit the Habit of it, and to live with Scandal in the World, either in bearing Arms, or in doing any other Action directly contrary to their Profeſſion.

The number of the Second were inconſiderable at firſt. When the Pragmatical Sanction was eſtabliſh'd, there were but two; the bearing of Arms, and the Infraction of the King's Safeguard; but by degrees they have been extended farther.

All Treſpaſſes againſt the Pragmatical Sanction have been deem'd Criminal Caſes.

That of the Agreement made between King Francis t •• 1. and Pope Leo the 10. about Benefices. Concordats has been put in the ſame Rank.

The Verification of Cedules before the Judge Royal is alſo deem'd of the ſame kind.

Raviſhments, Robberies upon the High Ways, Falſe Witneſſes, Coining, High Treaſon, and all enormous Crimes are deem'd to be of the ſame nature by the Parliaments.

In fine, if we believe them all the Faults of Eccleſiaſticks, even common Injuries are priviledg'd Caſes, there are no longer common Treſpaſſes.

Such Crimes as are granted to be priviledg'd Caſes, in all States, are own'd as ſuch by the unanimous Opinion of the whole Church; and many of thoſe that are deem'd ſuch in this Kingdom, are ſo by Abuſe, and by the Incroachments of the Officers Royal.

They have been the bolder in aſſuming the Cognizance of all the Deportments of Clerks, by reaſon that, according to the Order of the Canons, which requires three conformable Sentences for the Condemnation of their Faults, it is very difficult to puniſh even the moſt notable, and impoſſible to do it in a ſhort time.

Altho' this Pretence is plauſible, and that it requires a Reformation of the Formalities obſerv'd in the adminiſtration of the Juſtice of the Church; nevertheleſs, the ancient Lawyers could not forbear blaming the ſaid Incroachment publickly. And it is no Argument to urge, that thoſe Crimes which render Eccleſiaſticks unworthy of their Character, deprive them at the ſame time of their Immunities; ſince by ſuch Arguments many Concluſions would be inferr'd as falſe as prejudicial, even to thoſe▪ who draw ſuch Conſequences.

The only Conſequence that can be inferr'd of the Delays and Irregularities obſerv'd in the Adminiſtration of the Juſtice of the Church, is, that it is neceſſary to remedy the ſame; and that as the Eccleſiaſticks are oblig'd ſo to do, ſo Kings are oblig'd to maintain them in the Immunities which God has been pleas'd to confer on his Church.

In order to diſcharge theſe Obligations, the Church is oblig'd to remedy, by the means we ſhall propoſe hereafter, the intolerable Delays of theſe Sentences, requir'd by the ancient Canons; and in the next place, to become ſo exact in the puniſhment of the Crimes committed by thoſe that are under her Juriſdiction, that as ſoon as a Scandal is diſcover'd, the exemplary Puniſhment of the ſame may be known as ſoon as the Offence.

And the King making a Declaration to expreſs all the priviledg'd Caſes, which may be reduc'd to thoſe which may be committed by ſuch, and in all States, and in all Orders; and beſides, in the bearing of Arms, the Infraction of the King's Safeguard, the Verification of Cedules, manifeſt Apoſtacy, as it is above explain'd, Robberies on the High Way, Coining, and all Crimes of Leze-Majeſty, muſt abſolutely forbid his Officers to take Cognizance of any other Caſes, until the Accus'd be ſent to them by the Judges of the Church; and that in caſe they infringe the ſaid Order, their Puniſhment may be known almoſt as ſoon as their Treſpaſs.

Now ſince Juſtice requires an exact knowledge of a Fault before it can be puniſh'd; and that Kings cannot adminiſter Juſtice themſelves to all their Subjects: His Majeſty will diſcharge his Obligation, in ordering his Privy Council to receive the Complaints of the Infractions made by his Officers of what Quality ſoever, to ſuch a Regulation, and to puniſh their Incroachments ſeverely: In which caſe the Church being ſatisfy'd with ſuch an Order, will be the more careful to adminiſter Juſtice, when they do receive it from their Prince.

ALtho' the Canons of the Holy Chappel By Letters Patent of 1453. Charles the 7th granted that favour to the Holy Chappel, inj •• ad of the Gift Charles the ••• had made to them of the remainder of all the • ccounts deliver'd in the Chamber, which he deſir'd to be employ'd for the Reparation both of the Palace and of the Holy Chappel. of Paris maintain, that the Regalia was given them by St. Lewis their Founder: Yet it is moſt certain, that the firſt Grant we find of it is of Charles the 7th, which allows them for three years only the right of enjoying the Temporal Revenue of the vacant Biſhopricks, over which the Regalia ſhould be found to have a Right. The time of the ſaid Grant being expir'd, he continu'd the ſame for three years longer, and for the four following; the whole on condition, that one half of the Money ariſing thereby ſhould be imploy'd for the maintenance of the Chanters who were to perform the Service; and the other, for the Reparation of the Glaſs Windows and Ornaments, and for the maintenance of the Choiriſters, according as it ſhould be ordain'd by the Chamber of Accounts of Paris.

Charles the 7th being dead, his Son Lewis the 11th continu'd the ſame Favour to the Holy Chappel, during his Life, which was look'd upon to be ſo extraordinary, that the Chamber of Accounts would only verifie the Letters Patents thereof for Nine Years.

After the Reign of Lewis the 11th, his Succeſſors Charles the 8th, Francis the 1ſt, and Henry the 2d continu'd the ſame Favour during their Lives.

Charles the 9th went farther, By the Edict of • ebr. 1569. and granted to Perpetuity to the Holy Chappel, what his Predeceſſors had only granted them for a time.

The Intention thoſe Princes had is praiſe-worthy, ſince they gave a Right which did belong to them to a good end. But the Uſe thoſe of the Holy Chappel have made of it can never be ſufficiently blam'd, ſince that inſtead of being ſatisfy'd with what was given them, they have endeavour'd under that pretence, to make all the Biſhopricks of France ſubject to the Regalia.

The Parliament of Paris, which pretend to be the only Judges of the Regalia, have been blinded to that degree by Self-intereſt, as to make no Scruple to declare even all thoſe Biſhopricks, The Biſhop du Bellay. which in our days have been united to the Crown, liable to that Servitude; and to order the Advocates in proper terms no longer to queſtion, but that the extent of the Regalia was as large as that of the Kingdom.

This Incroachment being too viſible to produce any Effect, induc'd the Churches which were not liable to that Right no longer to acknowledge that Tribunal for Judges, and the Kings to refer all ſuch Cauſes to their Council.

The extent of that Right over all the Biſhopricks of the Kingdom, is a Pretenſion ſo ill grounded, that in order to diſcover the Injuſtice thereof, it will be ſufficient to read a Deed The Deed begins with theſe words, Dominus Rex. , the Original of which is in the Chamber of Accounts, which the Preſident Le Maitre caus'd to be printed, which gave an Account of the Biſhopricks that are ſubject to the Regalia, and of thoſe that are free from it.

Formerly the common Opinion was, that there was no Regalia beyond the River Loire The Ordinance. Dom Epiſcopus a • cujus Epiſcopa ••• , ubi Rex habet Rega •••• . Philip the 4th in his Philippines of the Year 130 • . uſes theſe words. Io •• quibus Eccleſ •• Reg •• . Philip the 6th in his Ordinance of the Year 1334. ſpeaks thus, In the Biſhopricks in which we have a Regalia. Lewis the 12th in his Ordinance of 1499. cited by the firſt Preſident Le Maitre, We have and do forbid all our Officers in the Archbiſhopricks, Biſhopricks, Abbies, and other Benefices, in which we have no Right of Regalia, or of Guard, to eſtabliſh any there, on pain of being puniſh'd as guilty of Sacrilege. Paſquier in the 3d Book of Enquiries, chap. 13. The late King Henry the 4th, by his Edict of the Year 1606. Art. 17. We only deſign to enjoy the Rights of the Regalia, as our Predeceſſors and our ſelves have done heretofore, without extending the ſame to the Prejudice of the Churches, that are exempted from it. And that good Prince believing that the Parliament of Paris would judge to the contrary, ſuſpended all the Cauſes about the Regalia for a year by his Letters Patent of the 6th of Octob. 1609. The King now Reigning having inherited his Piety as well as his Kingdom, declares by the Ordinance of 1629. Art. 16. That he only deſigns to enjoy the Regalia as it has been done for the time paſt. And the Clergy having complain'd, that thoſe Terms were not expreſs enough. H. M. order'd his Commiſſioners to make this Anſwer. That the Ordinance being refer'd to that, of 1606. thoſe Terms were ſufficient to ſatisfie the World, that he did not deſire to enjoy the Regalia in thoſe places where it has not been enjoy'd for the time paſt. The Ordinance, Dominus Rex, makes uſe of theſe Words, Conſuevit capare Regaliam. Philip the 4th, in his Ordinen •• of 1302. ſays, Regalias, quas Nos & Praedeceſſores noſtri conſuevimus precipere. And the Philippine of the Year 1334. Our Predeceſſors Kings upon the Account of the Regalia, and the Nobility of the Crown of France have us'd and have been accuſtom'd to be in Poſſeſſion and Seiſio. And ſince all the Kings in their Ordinances have only ſpoken of the Cuſtom and of their Poſſeſſions. , the Kings Lewis le Groſs and Lewis the Young exempted the Archbiſhoprick of Bourdeaux, and the Suffragan • thereof, of the ſame. Raymond Count of Tholouſe granted the ſame Favour to the Biſhops of Provence and of Languedoc, which was afterwards confirmed to them by Philip le Bell; and St. Lewis yielded the Regalia of all Brittany to the Dukes of the Country, by the Treaty he made with Peter Ma • -clerc; which ſhews, that he did not give it to the Holy Chappel when he founded it.

Several other Biſhopricks, as Lyons, Autun, Auxerre, and divers others, are ſo undoubtedly free from that Subjection, that no body calls it into queſtion.

The Ordinances made at divers times ſhew clearly, that the Kings of France never did pretend to have a Regalia over all the Biſhopricks; and that Truth is ſo evident, that Paſquier the King's Advocate in the Chamber of Accounts, is forc'd to confeſs, that he who maintains that Doctrine, is rather a Court Flatterer than a French Lawyer. Theſe are his very Words.

The Ignorance, or rather the want of Spirit, and Intereſt of ſome Biſhops, has contributed very much towards the Vexation the Prelates of this Kingdom ſuffer at this time, who, to free themſelves of the Preſecution they did receive in their own particular, have made no ſcruple to receive Acquittances from the Holy Chappel for Sums they never paid.

The Opinion they had, that in diſputing their Right before Judges who were their Parties, they would be condemn'd, has perſwaded them that they might innocently commit ſuch a Fault, the Conſequence of which would be very dangerous, if your Majeſty's Goodneſs did not repair the harm done by their Weakneſs.

Common Right requiring the Diſpoſition of the Fruits of a vacant Benefice, to be reſerv'd for the future Succeſſor; the contrary cannot be done without an Authentick Title to impower one ſo to do.

Yet we find none of that kind to juſtifie the Pretenſions of Kings, to diſpoſe of them according to their Pleaſure; for want of which they are forc'd to have recoutſe to Cuſtom.

This Truth is ſo certain, that all the Ordinances made upon that Subject only maintain their ancient Poſſeſſion.

As it is very eaſie for Soveraign Princes, by divers Pretences, to attribute that to themſelves which does not belong to them; and that thereby an unjuſt Uſurpation in the beginning, may in proceſs of time be deem'd Lawful, by virtue of Poſſeſſion: There may be a great deal of Reaſon to queſtion, Whether Cuſtom can have the force of an authentick Title in the caſe of Soveraigns.

But not deſigning to diſpute your Majeſty's Rights, but only to perſuade you to regulate them, inſomuch that they may not endanger the Salvation of Souls; without endeavouring any farther to examine the Source and the Foundation of the Regalia's, which I ſuppoſe valid; I only deſign to examine what the Holy Chappel can pretend by virtue of thoſe Conceſſions of your Predeceſſors, and to propoſe the Remedy of the Abuſe which is committed in the enjoyment of ſuch a Grant.

It often happens, that a Biſhop who is Rich in all the Qualifications requir'd by the Canons, and which the Piety of Good Men can deſire in him, but Poor by his Birth, remains two or three Years incapable of performing the Duty of his Office, both by the Payment of the Bulls, to which he is oblig'd by the Concordates, which often ſweep away a whole Year's Revenue, and upon the account of this new Right, which takes away another. So that adding to theſe two Expences the Charge he muſt be at to buy the Ornaments he ſtands in need of, and to furniſh his Houſe according to his Dignity; it will often be found, that three Years are paſs'd, before he can receive any thing for his Maintenance: For which reaſon, many of them do not go to their Biſhopricks, excuſing themſelves upon neceſſity; or laying aſide Houſe-keeping, deprive themſelves of the Reputation they ought to have to feed their Flock, as well by Acts of Charity, as by Words.

It alſo often comes to paſs, that to avoid theſe Inconveniencies, they engage themſelves ſo far, that ſome are prevail'd with to practſie illegal means to acquit their Debts: And thoſe who do not fall into that Extremity, live in perpetual Miſery, and finally fruſtrate their Creditors of what they owe them, for want of Power to pay them.

The Remedy to that Evil, is as eaſie as neceſſary, ſince it only requires the annexing to the Holy Chappel, an Abbey of equal Revenue with that which they can receive by that Settlement.

Some perhaps will ſay, That it will not be eaſie to clear this Point as it ſhould be, by reaſon of the difficulty the ſaid Society will make of diſcloſing that which they deſign to conceal: But if your Majeſty orders them to juſtifie in two Months time, by the Acts of their Regiſters, what they did enjoy before the perpetual Conceſſion made to them by Charles IX. and that on pain of forfeiting the ſaid Right; this lawful Proceeding will ſoon diſcover what is neceſſary to be done, to recompence the Grant they have receiv'd from your Predeceſſors.

I am ſenſible, that the ſaid Chapter will pretend, that the Revenue they receive by the Regalia, ought to be conſider'd, according to what they enjoy by it at preſent; but whereas it is certain, that they were no ſooner certain of the perpetuity of that Grant, but they extended it on divers Biſhopricks that were not liable to it, it is evident, that the Fine I propoſe is that on which you may juſtly take your Meaſures.

If your Majeſty will be pleas'd to do this, you will eaſily procure an incredible advantage to your Church, by which means the Souls will more eaſily receive the Food that is ſo ineceſſary for them, and which they ought to expect from their Paſtors.

If, in the next place, you continue the Reſolution you have taken and which you have practis'd for a conſiderable time, Not to grant any Penſion on Biſhopricks, which is abſolutely neceſſary, you will admit nothing in your Power, to put Biſhops out of danger of not being able to perform their Duty for Want.

EVery body knows, that the Orders which me meerly Political in the Church, may and ought often to be chang'd, according to the Altaration of Times. In the Purity of the firſt Age of Chriſtianity, ſome Eſtabliſhments of that kind were good, which at preſent would be very prejudical.

Time, which is the Father of all Corruption, having render'd the Manners of Eccleſiaſticks different from what they were in the Fervor of their firſt Zeal; it is certain, that whereas during the courſe of ſeveral innocent Years, the Church, in which the Zeal of the Prelates made them as ſevere in the Puniſhment of Crimes, as they are ſlack and negligent in that Performance at preſent. It is certain, I ſay, that whereas in thoſe Days the Delays of the Formalities, obſerv'd in the Eccleſiaſtical Juriſdiction, were of no ill Conſequence, they are very prejudicial at preſent; and Reaſou does not permit the continuanco of the ſame.

This Conſideration makes it very neceſſary to aboliſh the ancient Order preſcribed by the Canons, which requires three conformable Sentences for the Conviction of Clerks.

The ill uſe that has been made, for a long while, of the ſaid Order, Author of all Impiety, and conſequently of the Diſorders of the Church, obliges it to do it ſelf Juſtice in that point, to remove all Pretence from Temporal Judges, to follow the Opinion of certain Theologians, who have made no ſcruple to ſay, That it were better the Order ſhould be revers'd by an Incompetent Judge, than to ſee Diſorder reign.

It is impoſſible to take away the Right of Juriſdiction of the Archbiſhopricks, of the Primates of the Holy See; but whereas it often comes to paſs, that Six or Seven Sentences are given, before Three of them happen to be conformable to one another, the ſaid Inconvenience may be remov'd, by ordering the Sentence of the Judges Delegated by the Pope, upon the Appeal of the Primate, or Archbiſhop, to be definitive and abſolute; and to the end this laſt Judgment may be obtained ſpeedily, and that the Zeal of the Church may appear in the good Adminiſtration of their Juſtice, it will be fit his Majeſty would be pleas'd to joyn with his Clergy, to obtain from the Holy See, that inſtead of having recourſe to Rome, in all the particular Caſes that are to be Tried, his Holineſs would be pleas'd to Delegate, in all the Provinces of the Kingdom, Perſons of Capacity and Probity, with a Power to Judge Soveraignly of all Appeals made in his Tribunal, without any new Reſcripts.

This Propoſition cannot be odious at Rome, ſince the Concordate obliges the Pope to Delegate in partibus, for the Deciſion of the Cauſes that are depending there; this difference will only be found, That whereas at preſent there is a neceſſity of having recourſe to Rome in every Cauſe, for the Delegation of thoſe Judges, they will then be all ready Nominated for the Deciſion of all the Cauſes of the Kingdom; which facilitating the Puniſhment of the Crimes of the Eccleſiaſticks, will remove all pretences of the Parliament's Incroaching, as they do, upon the Juſtice of the Church, and all Subjects of Complaints from the Eccleſiaſticks againſt them.

And thereby the Mouths of thoſe that are open Enemies of the Church, or envious of her Immunities, will be ſhut; and her beſt Children who have been ſilent hitherto upon that Subject, will maintain her Cauſe, and ſpeak boldly and freely to defend her Liberty, againſt thoſe who would oppreſs it without Reaſon.

I am ſenſible, that the Holy See will fear, left thoſe Delegates ſhould become perpetual Dictators in time; but the changing of them from time to time, which I think to be fit and neceſſary, will remove the fear of that Inconvenience; and continuing. to ſue out the Appeals at Rome in every Cauſe which may be ſuffered, the Rights of the Holy See will remain entire, without any diminution.

It may be urg'd, That it will require no more time to obtain a new Delegation of Judges from Rome, for every Crime that ſhall be committed, than to ſue out an Appeal to remove the Cauſe, before thoſe that are already Delegated; but the thing is very different, ſince it is certain, that one of the principal Abuſes which hinders the Puniſhment of the Crimes of the Clerks, conſiſts in that the Appellant commonly obtains at Rome his Removal, before ſuch a Judge as he thinks fit in France, by Colluſion with the Benchers, who for Money ſerve their Clients as they pleaſe.

EXemption, is a Diſpenſation, or Relaxation of the Obligation we lay under to Obey our Superiours: They are of different kinds; ſome are of Right, others of Fact.

The Exemptions of Right, are thoſe we enjoy by the Conceſſion of a lawful Superiour, who grants them upon mature Deliberation, and for certain Reaſons.

The Exemptions of Fact, are thoſe we are in poſſeſſion of without a Title, Quo'd enim, qua ſine Privilegio poteſt acquiri. Conſuctudine immemoriali, ſay the Canons. but only by the uſe thereof Time out of Mind.

The Exemptions of Right are approv'd of by all Caſuiſts, as granted by a Lawful Authority.

Thoſe of Fact, though not lawful in themſelves, are not always condemn'd by them; becauſe thoſe that have enjoy'd a Priviledge Time out of Mind, had formerly Bulls for the ſame, though they cannot produce them.

There are Three different Exemptions of Places; The Firſt is that of Mendicant Monaſteries, which the Biſhop does not viſit, though he is receiv'd ſolemnly there, whenever he goes thither, may hold his Orders there, and perform all the Epiſcopal Functions, whenever he thinks fit.

The Second is of many other Places, in which they are not receiv'd, and can perform no Epiſcopal Function, unleſs they make a Declaration, That it is without prejudice to the Rights and Privileges of the ſaid Places. The Abbeys of Marmoutier, and of Vendoſme, and many others, are of this kind.

The Third is of certain Territories, in the extent of which, the Biſhop exerts no Juriſdiction, not even over the Laity; over which, thoſe who enjoy ſuch Exemptions, have the ſole Juriſdiction, and the Power commonly call'd, Lex Diocoeſana: The Abbeys of S. Germans des Prez, or of the Fields, of Corbie, of S. Florent le Vieil, of Feſcamp, and many others are of this kind within the whole extent of their Territories, the Monks themſelves exert all the Epiſcopal Juriſdiction.

They give Diſpenſations of Banes; they appoint Monitories; they publiſh Jubilees, aſſign the Stations after the Orders are come from Rome; the Viſa's are expedited in their Names. Moreover, they pretend a Right to chuſe whatever Biſhops they think fit to give Orders, without Leave from their Dioceſan Biſhop.

Finally, they give Demiſſories to receive Orders from any Biſhop.

The Chapter of Chartres enjoys this Exemption; by virtue of which, the Biſhop cannot make his Entry into the Church, without giving an Act, by which he promiſes to preſerve the Priviledges of the Church, nor make any Viſitation, either of the Holy Sacrament, or of the Holy Oyls.

Thoſe Perſons are ſo far exempted from the Juriſdiction of the Biſhops, that when a Canon becomes a Delinquent, the Chapter nominates the Judges that are to Try him; and if there be an Appeal of Judgment, they apply themſelves to Rome, to have Judges in Partibus, becauſe that Church ad Sanitam Romanam Eccleſiam, admiſſo nullo • edio, pertinet.

They publiſh Indulgences; they have a hundred and odd Pariſhes; they exert all the Dioceſan Juriſdiction, and the Appeal of all their Sentences is carried to Rome: They ordain all General Proceſſions.

St. Martin of Tours enjoys the ſame Priviledges.

Four ſorts of Perſons are particularly exempted in the Church; the Archbiſhops of the Primates; the Biſhops of the Archbiſhops; the Monks, and the Religious of the Biſhops; and the Canons of the Biſhops and Archbiſhops.

Thoſe Exemptions differ in many Circumſtances; ſome only exempt Perſons, and others alſo exempt the Place of their Abode, and that differently.

Anciently the Archbiſhops were ſubject to the Primates 'Tis but 60 Years age, ſince the Archbiſhop of R • üen has been freed of the Yoke of the Primate of Lyons, and has made himſelf Primate of Normandy. , to whom the Pope ſent the Pallium to exert Power and Authority over the Metropolitans. But ſince thoſe of France, excepting thoſe of Tours, of Sens, and of Paris, have obtain'd, either by Bulls, or by Preſcription, leave to have no Dependance on the Primates.

Some Biſhops The Biſhop du P • y is exempted from the Juriſdiction of the Archbiſhepr •• k of Bourges, and ſo are many others in Italy; yet they are oblig'd to appear in the Provincial Councils that are held by the Archbiſhops. St. Gregory of Tours exempted an Hoſpital, a Church, and a Monaſtery from the Juriſdiction of the Biſhops of Autun, at the Requeſt of Queen Brun • halt▪ and of her Grandſon King Thierry. Cro • bert Archbiſhop of Tours exempted the Monaſtery of St. Martin from his Juriſdiction. have alſo obtain'd the Exemption of their Subjection to their Archbiſhops from the Pope.

The Monks are almoſt all exempted from the Common Juriſdiction, and their Right is grounded on the free Conceſſion of their Biſhops, or of the Popes; their moſt ancient Exemptions, are thoſe that were granted them 7 or 8 old, ears ago, by the Biſhops and Archbiſhops; bu •… thoſe they have obtain'd ſince, have been granted by the Popes, to one of theſe ends, either leaſt the Preſence and Court of the Biſhops ſhould diſturb their Solitude, or to free them from the Rigour of ſome, by which they were, or pretended to be ſeverely us'd.

The laſt that have been exempted from the Juriſdiction of their Superiours, are the Canons. In their firſt Inſtitution they were ſo ſtrictly bound and united to their Biſhops, that they could do nothing without their leave; and to endeavour to free themſelves of their Obedience to them, would have been look'd upon as the greateſt Crime they commit in thoſe days

Many have been of Opinion, that they have obtain'd all their Exemptions from the Anti-Popes, or that they are evidently ſurreptitious, or barely grounded on the Poſſeſſion of a Time out of Mind; but it is moſt certain, that ſome of them are more ancient than the Schiſms, and more authoriz'd than thoſe which draw their Force and Virtue from the Anti Popes.

The moſt lawful have granted ſome; A Letter of Alexander the 3d to the Chapter of Pa •• s, ſhews, that the Popes have granted Exemptions. either in Confirmation of the Conceſſions of the Biſhops, or of the Agreements made with them; or of their own accord, under pretence to ſecure the Canons againſt the ill Uſages they did receive from them.

In order to penetrate into the bottom of this matter, and clearly to diſtinguiſh the good Exemptions from Rome▪, • ad, we muſt conſider the Bulls • y which th •… Authoriz'd differently.

Thoſe▪ that were granted by the Popes before the Misfortune of the Schiſms are different from thoſe which were granted ſince the Extinction of the ſame.

The firſt ſort muſt be look'd upon as good and valid; but yet ſuch Bulls being an Exemption from the common Right, which is always odious, muſt be carefully examin'd, for fear of being miſtaken in the Tenor of them; ſince it is certain, that many are produc'd as Bulls of Exemption, which are only Bulls of Protection, which were obtain'd anciently; and Bulls, which grant ſome particular Priviledges, but not an Exemption from the uſual Juriſdiction; or Bulls, which only authorize Chapters to erect a Juriſdiction inferiour to that of the Biſhops; like unto thoſe of the Arch-Deacons, who in ſome Churches have a right to Exeommunicate, to Interdict, and to injoin publick Penances, tho' they are ſtill ſubordinate to the Biſhop's Juriſdiction.

As for the ſecond ſort, as they are void in themſelves, for want of a Lawful Authority in thoſe who did grant them, particularly by the Conſtitution of Pope Martin the 5th, The Exemptions of Sens, Paris, Bourges, Bourdeaux, Limoges, Meaux, Auxerre, and the Country of Mans, have been obtain'd by the Anti-Popes. which annihilates all Bulls obtain'd during the Schiſms, no body can▪ pretend, without Malice or Ignorance, to make uſe of them to the Prejudice of the Common Right.

The third ſort have been granted, either to ſerve for new Exemptions, or to confirm preceding ones.

The firſt muſt be reputed void, either becauſe they are directly oppoſite to the Decree mention'd by Martin the 5th; or becauſe they have been ſurreptitiouſly obtain'd, as the Parliament of Paris and Tholouſe have adjudg'd it, againſt the Chapters of Angers and Cahors.

The ſecond being only granted to confirm an ancient Right, which is never found to be lawfully eſtabliſh'd, muſt, in the Judgment of all Impartial Perſons, be look'd upon as of no Effect.

It now remains to ſee whether the Exemptions The Exemption of Auxerre, N • y •• . O ••• ns, Bea • vai • , Chalo •• ▪ Ang is P • irie • s and Ly •• s are grounded on the Conceſſions of the Biſhops, and the Agreement made among them. grounded on the bare Conceſſions made by the Biſhops, or on the Agreements and Arbitral Sentences interpos'd upon that Subject againſt them and their Chapters, are good and valid.

If it be never lawful for Biſhops to alienate their Temporal without an evident Advantage and Profit, much leſs can they renounce their Spiritual Authority, to the great prejudice of the Church, which thereby ſees her Members divided from the Head, and the Rule whereby it ſubſiſts chang'd into a Confuſion, which deſtroys it.

The Nullity of Agreements, mutual Promiſes, or Arbitral Sentences is very viſible by that Principle: No Man can compromiſe or transfer a thing, the Diſpoſition whereof is not in his Power; and if there be any Authors who are of Opinion, that Spiritual things may be transferr'd, all in general except ſome, among which the Subjection of this nature is the firſt: And indeed thoſe ſort of Titles are ſo invalid in the Caſe in queſtion, that tho' they were confirm'd by the Popes, they would not be ſufficient to deprive of their Right the Succeſſors of the Biſhops, who have parted with their Superiority in one of the three ways above ſpecify'd.

As Reaſon ſhews that none of theſe ways can be of force againſt common Right; it alſo ſhews, that Bulls barely confirming the ſaid Conceſſions, Agreements, or Arbitral Sentences, give no Right to thoſe who would make uſe of them, becauſe they can have no more Force than the Foundation they ſuppoſe.

One Point only remains liable to Examination, viz. Whether the Cuſtom and ancient Poſſeſſion which Chapters claim againſt the Authority of their Biſhops, is a Title ſufficiently valid to make the Church undergo the Prejudice it ſuffers by Exemptions.

Cypr'anus. Fruſtra quidam qui ratione vincuntur conſuetudinem nobis opponunt, quoſi conſuetudo major ſit veritate, aut non fuerit in ſpiritualibus ſequendum; ſi. melius fuerit à ſpiritu ſancto revelatum. Cuſtom is a very deceitful Rule; the ill ones, tho' nenever ſo ancient, are univerſally condemn'd; and all thoſe that are againſt common right, and deſtroy an Order eſtabliſh'd by Eccleſiaſtical Conſtitutions, muſt be reputed ſo, and can be no juſt ground of Preſcription, much leſs in what relates to Eccleſiaſtical than to Civil Laws, ſince the Settlements of the Church are grounded on a more certain Principle; and the Difficulty propos'd muſt be decided every where, by ſaying, That Cuſtom may ſerve as a Title in thoſe things which may be poſſeſs'd by common Right, but never in thoſe in which Poſſeſſion violates it; in which Caſe it is abſolutely void, unleſs it be accompany'd with a Title ſo Authentick, that it may be liable to no manner of Suſpicion: Whence it reſults, That Common Right ſubmitting all Canons to their Biſhops, there is no Cuſtom ſufficiently powerful to exempt them from that Subjection.

It is impoſſible to imagine the many Evils Exemptions are the Source of. They overthrow the Order the Church has eſtabliſh'd conſonant to Reaſon, which requires Inferiours to be ſubject to their Superiours. They ruine the Concord which ought to be between the Head and the Members; they authorize all ſorts of Violences, and leave many Crimes unpuniſh'd, as well in the Perſon of the Priviledg'd; as in that of many Libertines, who take the Advantage of them to ſecure themſelves:

There are two ways to redreſs that Evil, either by annihilating the Exemptions abſolutely, or by regulating them.

I am very ſenſible that the firſt Expedient, as the moſt abſolute, is the moſt difficult: But ſince it is not impoſſible, I will nevertheleſs propoſe it to your Majeſty, who has ever delighted in doing that which your Predeceſſors durſt not attempt.

However, I do not think it proper in relation to the Exemptions which Monks and their Monaſteries enjoy. As they are diſpers'd in divers Dioceſes, the Uniformity of Mind, which ought to reign among them, requires, that inſtead of their being govern'd by divers Biſhops, whoſe Minds are different, they ſhould be under the Government of one Regular Chief; upon which Foundation I affirm boldly, That it is as neceſſary to allow them the Poſſeſſion of the lawful Exemptions they enjoy, as it is juſt to know the Validity of them, by the Examination of their Bulls, which they extend ſometimes farther than Reaſon requires.

But I ſay moreover, that the other Exemptions may be aboliſh'd with ſo much Advantage for the Church, that that Univerſal Motive is ſufficient to make one deſpiſe particular Intereſts on that occaſion.

When a thing is juſt, it is a ſufficient Inducement for us to undertake it; and we are abſolutely oblig'd to do it when it is altogether neceſſary.

The Church having ſubſiſted hitherto without the Alteration I propoſe, I do not ſuppoſe it has this laſt Quality; but I ſay, that it would be very uſeful, in that it would leave no ſubject of Excuſe to the Biſhops, in caſe they were wanting in their Duty.

To make uſe of this firſt Expedient would only require a Revocation made by his Holineſs of the Exemptions and Priviledges in queſtion, and a Power given to the Biſhops to exert their Juriſdiction over their Chapters, and all other priviledg'd Perſons, except thoſe above mention'd.

Such a Bull, accompany'd by a Declaration from your Majeſty, verify'd in your Parliaments and in your Council, would break the Fetters which tie the Hands of the Prelates of your Kingdom, and would make them anſwerable for the Diſorders of their Dioceſes, which it is almoſt impoſſible for them to do at preſent.

The obtaining of the Pope's Bull would prove the eaſier in my Opinion, in that it is conſonant to the overtures of the Council of Trent, which declares particularly Seſſ. 14. Cha. of Ref. 1. Capitula & Cathedralium & aliarum majerum Eccleſiarum illorum Perſona Exemptionibus, Conſuctedinibus, Sententiis. Juramentis, Concordatis, feri ſi poſſint, quo min • s à ſuis Epiſcopis, & aliis majoribus Prelatis per ſe ipſes ſoles, vel illis quibus ſine videtur adjunctis, juxta Canonicas ſanctiones, toties quoties opus fucrit viſitari, corrigi, & emendari, etiam authoritate Apoſtolica peſſint & val • ant., That the Chapters and Canons cannot by virtue of any Exemption, Cuſtom, Poſſeſſion, Sentence, Oath and Concordat whatever, be excus'd of being viſited, corrected, and chaſtis'd by their Biſhops, or other Perſons deputed by them: And tho' this Expedient were not reliſh'd at Rome, where Novelties, tho' uſeful, are commonly odious, and where the leaſt Oppoſition generally obſtructs great Advantages; your Majeſty cauſing the Decree of the Council to be obſerv'd on this Subject, will have no need of any new Expedition.

I am ſenſible that this Remedy will be diſlik'd by the Parliaments, with whom Uſe and Practice is far more prevailing, than whatever Reaſons can be urg'd; but after having foreſeen that good, and conſider'd all the Obſtacles which may be met in it, I declare boldy, that it would be much better to paſs over all of them, than to ſtop at any oppoſition whatever: And your Majeſty may undertake the ſaid Alteration the better, and with more Reaſon, becauſe that in reſtoring things upon the foot of common Right, you will reſtore them in their own Nature; and that it ſometimes becomes Sovereigns to be bold on certain occaſions, which are not only juſt, but of which the Importance cannot be queſtion'd I •• dorus. Sape per Regnum Terrenum, Coele • te Regnum profecit, ut •… Eccleſiam poſiti contra •• dem & Diſciplinam Eccleſia agunt, vigore Principium conte • antur..

The Canons keep their Titles ſo conceal'd, that it is impoſſible to come to the knowledge of them, unleſs by the King's Authority: Moreover, they often ſuppoſe them, when they have none; which Peter de Blois and Peter le Venerable openly complain of.

Tho' the Advantage of theſe two Expedients, which indeed are but one and the ſame, ought to prevail with the World to approve them; yet the Fear I am in, that the Difficulties which would be met with, to put them in Execution, would make them ineffectual, makes me paſs to the ſecond, which conſiſts in the Nomination of Commiſſioners, Biſhops, Canons and Monks, which being joyn'd to Deputies of the Council and of the Parliaments, ſhall take an Account of all the Exemptions and Priviledges of the Church; to the end, that being repreſented to your Majeſty, thoſe that will be found good and valid may be regulated; and thoſe that have no lawful Foundation, retrench'd and aboliſh'd: And the ſaid Expedient is the more practicable, in that the Ordinances of Orleans Ordinance of Orleans, Art. 11. All Canons and Chapters, whether Seculars or Regulars, and if Cathedral or Collegiat • Churches, ſhall be equally ſubject to the Archbiſhop, or Dioceſan Biſhop, without being allow'd to plead any Priviledge or Exemption, in relation to the Viſitation and Puniſhment of Crimes, all Oppoſition or Appeals whatever notwithſtanding, without Prejudice to the ſame, of which we have transferr'd the Cognizance and retain'd the ſame to our Privy-Council., made under Francis the 2d, have a particular Article for the Regulations of Exemptions.

If, in the next place, the Pope would be pleas'd to impower in every Metropolis the Delegated Judges we have above propos'd, to regulate by the Authority of the Holy See, what the Biſhops will not be able to do of themſelves, by reaſon of the Exemptions, which will remain in their Force and Vigour, and your Majeſty to command your Council to take Cognizance of the Differences which will ariſe upon ſuch a Subject, you will abſolutely remedy all the Evils the ſaid Priviledges occaſion.

IT now remains to ſpeak of the Evil which proceeds from, that the Biſhops do not diſpoſe of the major part of their Cures of their Dioceſes, to which the Eccleſiaſtical or Lay-Patrons have a Right of Preſentation.

The Eccleſiaſticks began to enjoy the right of Patronage The Year 441. in the Council of Orange, where it was ordain'd, That the Biſhops, who ſhould build Churches in another Dioceſe, ſhould have a Right to put ſuch Prieſts there as they ſhould think fit, provided their Capacity was approv'd of by the Dioceſan Biſhop.

Nouvell. 123. Ch. 18. the Year 541. The ſame Right was alſo given by Juſtinian to the Laymen, who ſhould be Founders of Chappels, which they obtain'd afterwards even in reſpect of Monaſteries, which they ſhould be Founders of.

St. Gregory's Epiſtle to Secundinus,▪ in the Year 598. juſtifies that Point. The Ninth Council of Toledo moreover extended the Right of Laick Patronage to Parochial Churches, allowing the Founders to nominate Curates, leſt the Negligence wherewith Biſhops would ſerve their Foundations ſhould diſcourage them from making any new ones.

In the beginning this Right was of no longer continuance than the Founders Life, Gregory and Pellagius extended it to their Children; and finally, under Charlemayne it paſs'd to the Heirs, whoever they were, which has continu'd ever ſince.

This Right, which is approv'd of by ſeveral Fathers of the Church, being confirm'd by divers Councils, particularly that of Trent, muſt be look'd upon as holy and inviolable, by reaſon of its Ancientneſs, for its Authority founded on the Canons of the Fathers and of the Councils, and for the Advantage which accrues to the Church by the ſame, in favour of which many Foundations are made, thereby to acquire the Power to nominate thoſe that are to enjoy them.

But when I conſider, that Neceſſity has no Law, and that the Uſe of a Priviledge, which was good during the fervour of the Founders, is at preſent ſo prejudicial by the Corruption of thoſe who are Heirs of their Eſtate, but not of their Zeal and of their Virtue, nor even ſometimes of their Religion, that it is impoſſible to continue it, without expoſing many Souls to their Ruine: I dare affirm boldly, that a Diſorder of that Conſequence can no longer be conniv'd at, without being anſwerable for the ſame before God.

Many are of Opinion, That the beſt Remedy for this Evil, is wholly to aboliſh the Cauſe of it; but when I conſider, that a Legacy of this nature cannot be poſſeſs'd with Juſtice, without performing the Conditions on which it has been given; and that the Fathers of the Council of Trent, who were ſenſible of the Abuſes of the ſame, durſt not alter them, I am at a ſtand; and I do not think that a private Man can, without Temerity, propoſe ſuch a Remedy: It will be better to have recourſe to a milder way, in ſome meaſure propos'd by the Council of Trent Seſſ. 2. Ch. 18. of Reff. though not directly.

That way is, Idem Seſſ. 24. of the ſame Chapter. That the Synod ſhould Elect Examiners, by which all the Pretenders to Benefices, which have the Cure of Souls, ſhall be carefully examin'd, to the end that their Capacity and Probity being known, they may afterwards propoſe two or three of the moſt Capable, to the Patrons of the Cures which ſhall be vacant, for them to chuſe, and preſent to the Biſhop the Perſon which ſhall be moſt agreeable to them.

I am ſenſible that this Expedient takes off ſomething of the Liberty Patrons enjoy in France at preſent; but ſince in reſtraining it, it nevertheleſs leaves it them, and hinders incapable Perſons from being put into Cures, it ought to be receiv'd; and that the more willingly, in my Opinion, ſince that in redreſſing the Evil which ariſes from the Preſentations to Cures, if the Order of the Council be obſerv'd, it will alſo redreſs thoſe that are caus'd by the facility wherewith the Archbiſhops often receives the Prieſts, whom their Suffragans have refus'd; in that as the Council's Orders, that the Examiners, propos'd by it, to be the Judges of the Capacity of thoſe that are to be nam'd for Cures, ſhall be oblig'd to give an account of their Proceedings to the Provincial Councils; ſo it will not allow the Archbiſhops to paſs by their Judgment, without ſo juſt a Cauſe, that no body may diſapprove it.

AFter ſuch juſt Regulations, as are above mentioned, it will ſuit with your Majeſty's Piety to Authorize the Reformation of Monaſteries as much as is poſſible.

I am very ſenſible, that many Conſiderations may give cauſe to fear, that thoſe which have been made in our Days, are not ſo auſtere in their Progreſs, as in their Beginning; but yet it is very neceſſary to mind, and to favour them; ſince Good does not change its Nature in not being laſting, but ſtill remains good; and that he who does what he can with Prudence for a good End, performs his Duty, and anſwers what God expects from his Care.

It is true, that I ever was of Opinion, and am ſo ſtill, That it were better to eſtabliſh moderate Reformations, in the Obſervation of which, both Bodies and Minds may ſubſiſt with ſome eaſe, than to undertake ſuch auſtere ones, that the ſtrongeſt Bodies will hardly be able to bear the Rigour of them. Temperate things are commonly conſtant and laſting; but it requires an extraordinary Grace to make that ſubſiſt, which ſeems to force Nature.

It is alſo obſervable, That the Reformations of Religious Houſes in this Kingdom, muſt be different from thoſe of other States, which being free of Hereſies, require rather a profound Humility, and an exemplary Simplicity in the Members thereof, than Doctrine, which is altogether neceſſary in this Kingdom, in which the Ignorance of the moſt Vertuous Monks in the World may prove as prejudicial to ſome Souls who ſtand in need of their Learning, as their Zeal and Vertue are uſeful to others, and to themſelves.

I muſt needs ſay by the bye on this Subject, That as to what relates particularly to the Reformation of the Monaſteries of Women, to reſtore the Elections, and particularly the Triennial, inſtead of the King's Nomination, is not always an infallible Expedient.

The Brigues and Factions which reign ſometimes amidſt the Weakneſs of that Sex, often riſe to that degree, that they are not ſupportable, and I have ſeen your Majeſty oblig'd twice to alter it, in places where you had ſetled it, to reſtore Things to their former ſtate.

As it behoves your Majeſty's Piety to labour about the Regulation of ancient Monaſteries, ſo it behoves your Prudence to put a ſtop to the progreſs of the over-great number of new Monaſteries which are daily eſtabliſh'd.

In order whereunto, it is neceſſary to deſpiſe the Opinion of certain Perſons, as Weak as Devout, and more Zealous than Prudent; who often fanſie, that the Salvation of Souls, and the Safety of the State, depends on that which is prejudicial to both.

As none but ſuch as are wicked or blind, can be inſenſible or diſown, that Religious Houſes are not only very uſeful, but alſo neceſſary; ſo none but thoſe who have an indiſcreet Zeal can be ignorant, that the exceſs of them is inconvenient, and that it might come to ſuch a point as would be ruinous.

That which is done for the State being done for God, who is the Baſis and Foundation of it; to Reform the Houſes that are already eſtabliſh'd, and to put a ſtop to the exceſs of new Eſtabliſhments, are two Works very agreeable to GOD, who loves Rule in all things.

THe Order which God requires in all things, gives me an occaſion to repreſent to your Majeſty, in this place, That as Princes are oblig'd to acknowledge the Authority of the Church, to ſubmit to their Holy Decrees, and to pay an entire Obedience to the ſame, in what relates to the Spiritual Power which God hath placed in her hands for the Salvation of Mankind; and that as it is their Duty to maintain the Honour of the Popes, as Succeſſors of St. Peter, and Vicars of Jeſus Chriſt; ſo they ought not to yield to their Attempts, when they endeavour to extend their Power beyond its Bounds.

As Kings are oblig'd to reſpect the Thiara of the Soveraign Pontifs, the ſame Obligation lies upon them to preſerve the Power of their Crown.

This Truth is acknowledged by all Theologians; but it is very difficult to diſtinguiſh the Extent and Subordination of theſe two Powers aright.

In ſuch a matter, Princes are neither to credit the Gentlemen of the Long Robe, who commonly meaſure the King's by the Form of his Crown, which being round, has no end; nor thoſe who by the exceſs of an indiſcreet Zeal, declare themſelves openly in favour of Rome.

Reaſon adviſes us to hear both the one and the other, in order afterwards to reſolve the Difficulty by Perſons of ſo much Learning, that they may not be liable to miſtake through Ignorance; and ſo ſincere, that neither the Intereſts of the State, nor thoſe of Rome, may prevail with them againſt Reaſon.

I may declare with Truth, That I have ever found the Doctors of the Univerſity of Paris, and the moſt Learned Monks of all Orders, ſo reaſonable on this Subject, that I have never obſerv'd the leaſt Weakneſs in them, that could hinder them from defending the juſt Rights of this Kingdom; neither have I ever obſerv'd any exceſs of Affection in them for their Native Country, which could induce them, contrary to the true Sentiments of Religion, to diminiſh thoſe of the Church to augment the others.

In ſuch Caſes, the Opinion of our Fathers muſt be of great Weight; the moſt famous and moſt impartial Hiſtorians and Authors, who have written in all Ages, muſt be carefully conſulted on thoſe Occaſions, in which nothing can be more dangerous than Weakneſs or Ignorance.

HAving repreſented, that Ignorance is ſometimes prejudicial to the State; I am now to ſpeak of the Neceſſity of Learning, one of the greateſt Ornaments of States, this being the moſt proper place for it, ſince the Empire of it is juſtly due to the Church, by reaſon that all ſorts of Truths have a natural Relation to the firſt, the Sacred Myſteries of which, Eternal Wiſdom has been pleas'd to make the Eccleſiaſtical Order Depoſitories of.

As the Knowledge of Letters is abſolutely neceſſary in a Commonwealth, it is certain, that they ought not to be taught without diſtinction to every body.

As a Body having Eyes in all its Parts, would be monſtrous; a State would be the ſame, if all the Inhabitants thereof were Learned; we ſhould find as little Obedience in it, as Pride and Preſumption would be common.

The Commerce of Letters would abſolutely baniſh that of Trade, which enriches Nations; would ruine Husbandry, the true Mother of the People; and would ſoon deſtroy the Nurſery of Souldiers, which encreaſes more in the Rudeneſs of Ignorance, than in the Politeneſs of Sciences: Finally, it would fill France with Litigious Perſons, more proper to ruine private Families, and to diſturb publick Peace, than to do the State any good.

If Learning were prophan'd to all ſorts of Minds, we ſhould ſee more Perſons capable to form Doubts, than to reſolve them; and many would be fitter to oppoſe Truths, than to defend them.

'Tis this Conſideration which induces Politicians to ſay, that a well regulated State requires more Maſters of Mechanick Arts, than Maſters of Liberal Arts to teach Letters.

I have often heard Cardinal du Perron, for the ſame Reaſon, earneſtly wiſh the Suppreſſion of part of the Colledges of this Kingdom; he was deſirous to have four or five famous ones eſtabliſh'd in Paris, and two in every Metropolitan City of the Provinces.

He added to all the Conſiderations I have urg'd, that it was impoſſible to find a ſufficient number of Learned Men in every Age to ſupply a great number of Colledges; whereas being contented with a moderate number, they might be fill'd with worthy Perſons, who would preſerve the Fire of the Temple in its Purity, and would tranſmit by an uninterrupted Succeſſion the Sciences in their Perfection.

I cannot forbear thinking, when I conſider the great number of Men who profeſs the Teaching of Letters, and the multitude of Children that are inſtructed, that I ſee an infinite number of Sick People, who only aiming to drink pure and clear Water for their Cure, are preſs'd with ſuch a diſorderly Drought, that receiving without diſtinction all thoſe that are preſented to them, the major part drink ſuch as are impure, and often out of payſon'd Cups; which encreaſes their Drought and their Diſtemper, inſtead of eaſing either.

In fine, this great number of Colledges, indifferently eſtabliſh'd in all places, produces two Evils; the one, by the mean Capacity of thoſe that are oblig'd to Teach, there not being a ſufficient number of eminent Perſons to fill the Pulpits; the other, by the want of natural Diſpoſition in thoſe whoſe Fathers oblige them to ſtudy, by reaſon of the Conveniences of it, without examining their Capacity; which is the reaſon, that moſt of thoſe that ſtudy have only a mean Tincture of Learning; ſome for want of more Capacity, others for not being well inſtructed.

Tho' this Evil is of great conſequence, the Remedy is eaſie, ſince it only requires to reduce all the Colledges of ſuch places as are no Metropolitans to two or three Claſſis, ſufficient to free the Youth from groſs Ignorance, prejudicial even to thoſe who deſign to follow Arms, or to ſpend their Lives in Trading.

By that means, before Children are determin'd to any Condition, two or three Years will diſcover the Capacity of their Minds▪ after which, thoſe that have a good Genius, being ſent to great Cities, will ſucceed the better in their Learning, both upon that account, and by their being inſtructed by ab • er Maſters.

Having thus provided againſt this Evil, which is much greater than it ſeems to be, we muſt alſo provide againſt another into which France would infallibly fall, if all the Colledges that are eſtabliſh'd were in one Hand.

The Univerſities pretend, that a great deal of wrong is done them, in not leaving them excluſively from all others the faculty of Teaching Youth.

The Jeſuits on the other hand would not be diſpleas'd, perhaps, of being the only Perſons imploy'd in that Function.

Reaſon, which ought to decide all ſorts of Differences, does not permit the fruſtrating of an ancient Poſſeſſor, of what he poſſeſſes with a juſt Title: And Publick Intereſt cannot ſuffer a Society, not only recommendable by their Piety, but famous for their Learning, as the Jeſuits are, to be depriv'd of a Function, which they are able to perform with great Advantage for the Publick.

If the Univerſities ſhould teach alone, there would be cauſe to fear they would in time reſume their former Pride, which might prove as prejudicial for the future as it has been heretofore.

If on the other hand the Jeſuits had no Companions in the inſtructing of Youth, beſides that the like Inconvenience might be fear'd, there would be moreover a juſt ſubject to fear many others.

A Society which is govern'd, more than any ever was, by the Laws of Prudence; and which, devoting it ſelf to God, without depriving themſelves of the knowledge of the things of this World, lives in ſo perfect a Correſpondence, that the ſame Spirit ſeems to animate the whole Body: A Society, which by a blind Vow of Obedience is ſubmitted to a perpetual Chief, cannot, according to the Laws of Sound Policy, be much Authoriz'd in a State, in which a powerful Community muſt be formidable.

If it be true, as it is moſt certain, that Men have a natural Inclination to advance thoſe they have receiv'd their firſt Inſtructions from; and that Parents have always a particular Affection for thoſe who have educated their Children. It is alſo true, that the abſolute Education of Youth cannot be committed to the Jeſuits, without being expos'd to give them a Power, which would be the more obnoxius to States, in that all the Places and Honours which give the management thereof, would be fill'd by their Diſciples; and that thoſe who take an Aſcendant early over the Mind ſometimes retain it during their whole Life.

If we add, that the Adminiſtration of the Sacrament of Penance gives that Society a ſecond Authority over all ſorts of Perſons, which is of no leſs weight than the firſt: If we conſider, that by thoſe two ways they penetrate into the moſt ſecret Motions of Hearts and Families, it will be impoſſible not to conclude, that it is not fit to leave them the ſaid Miniſtry alone, without Competitors.

Thoſe Reaſons have been ſo powerful in all States, that we have no Example of any hitherto, who have been willing to yield the Empire of Letters, and the abſolute Education of their Youth to that Society alone.

If that Society, good and harmleſs in it ſelf, created ſo much Jealouſie in the Arch-Duke Albert, one of the moſt pious Princes of the Houſe of Auſtria, who only acted according to the Motions of the Council of Spain, that he thought fit to exclude them out of certain Univerſities, in which they were actually ſettled, and to oppoſe the new Settlements they deſign'd in Flanders.

If they have behav'd themſelves ſo, as to induce ſome Republicks to remove them abſolutely out of their Dominions, tho' with too much Rigour, it is the leaſt that can be done in this Kingdom, to give them ſome Check, ſeeing not only that they are ſubmitted to a Foreign and Perpetual Chief, but moreover, ſubject and at the Devotion of Princes, who ſeem to deſire nothing more, than to humble and ruine this Crown.

As in point of Faith all the Catholick States of the World have but one Doctrine; in that which does not relate to it, there are many who differ, from whence the Source of their Fundamental Maxims is often deriv'd; for which reaſon, ſtanding in need of ſome Theologians, who may on certain occaſions couragiouſly defend the Opinions, which have been always receiv'd there; and preſerv'd by an uninterrupted Tranſmiſſion, they require ſome free from any Ingagement with any ſuſpected Powers, having no dependance to deprive them of Liberty in things, in which Faith allows it to all the World.

Hiſtory informs us, that the Order of St. Benedict was formerly ſo abſolutely Maſter of the Schools, that no body was taught in any other places, and that it decay'd ſo abſolutely in point of Science and of Piety together in the Tenth Century of the Church, that it was call'd Unhappy upon that account. It alſo informs us, that the Dominicans have afterwards enjoy'd the ſame Advantages which thoſe good Fathers were firſt poſſeſs'd of; and that Time has depriv'd them of it like the others, to the great prejudice of the Church, which happen'd to be infected at that time with many Hereſies: It alſo informs us by the ſame means, that Letters are like paſſing Birds, which do not always remain in the ſame Country. And therefore Policy requires the preventing of the ſaid Inconvenience, which being come to paſs twice, is with Reaſon to be fear'd a third time; and which probably will not happen, if that Society has Companions in the Poſſeſſion of Letters.

All Parties are dangerous in point of Doctrine; and nothing can be more eaſie, than to form one under pretence of Piety, when a Society thinks it ſelf oblig'd to it by the Intereſt of their Subſiſtance.

The Hiſtory of Pope Benedict the 11th, againſt whom the Cordeliers, nettled upon the account of the Perfection of Poverty, viz. of the Revenue of St. Francis, were animated to that degree, that they did not only declare open War againſt him by their Books, but moreover by the Emperour's Arms; by favour of which an Anti-pope aroſe, to the great prejudice of the Church, is too great an Example to require any thing more to be ſaid upon that ſubject.

The more Societies adhere to their Chief or Superiour, the more they are to be fear'd, particularly by thoſe to whom they are not favourable.

Since then Prudence obliges not only to oppoſe whatever may be prejudicial to the State, but alſo to prevent whatever might contribute thereunto; ſince the Power of ſo doing often creates a Deſire ſo to do.

Since alſo the Weakneſs of Humane Nature requires a Counterpoiſe in all things, and that it is the Foundation of Juſtice; it is more reaſonable, that the Univerſities and the Jeſuits ſhould Teach in Emulation of one another, to the end that the ſaid Emulation may whet their Vertue, and that Sciences may the better flouriſh, and be certain in the State, in that being depoſited into the Hands of Two Guardians, if the one ſhould chance to loſe this ſacred Pledge, it may be found among the others.

WHereas it would be prejudicial to a State, if Men of all Capacities ſhould apply themſelves to the Sudy of Letters, it is to be wiſh'd that Men of Senſe may be encourag'd in it. Your Majeſty cannot do a more uſeful thing to that end, than to put a ſtop to the Abuſes which are committed in the Diſtribution of Benefices, which ought to be reſerv'd for thoſe to whom they are due, as a Reward of their Labours.

None but ſuch as are Enemies to Learning and Vertue can queſtion that Right. The Council of Baſle

Seſſ. 31. The Council of Baſle ordained, that one third Part of the Benefices ſhould be conferr'd on Maſters of Arts, Batch • lor • . Licenciates. and Doctors of Phyſick, Law, and Theclogy, which have ſtudied a certain time in a Priviledg'd Ʋniverſity.

By the Concordate, which was made ſince at the Council of Lateran, between Leo X. and Francis I. it was agreed, that Graduates ſhould enjoy vacant Benefices the 3d: pa • s of the Year, viz. in the Months of January, April, July, and October.

THE Right of Indult being deriv'd from a Bull of Pope Eugene Bull of Pope Eugene, granted to King Charles 8th., which is not to be found; if it ſhould be examin'd with rigour, we would find that the Foundation of it is not ſolid; ſince, according to Reaſon, ſuch things as cannot be prov'd, ought to be put in the ſame Claſſis with thoſe that are not.

I am ſenſible, that Paul III. being willing to oblige the Preſidents and Counſellors of the Parliament of Paris The Bull was ſent to King Francis I. in 1538., who did oppoſe the Concordates, gave them a Power of Nomination to Regular and Secular Benefices. I am alſo ſenſible, that the Chancellor of France, as Preſident of the ſaid Parliament, receiv'd the ſame Privilege by the ſame Bull: But if we conſider that the ſaid Bull is grounded on that of his Predeceſſor, which is not to be found; that Conſideration will have no force, ſince Lawyers inform us clearly, That a Reference can have no force, unleſs the thing referr'd unto, is clear and evident Non creditur referenti, niſi conſtet de relato..

The leſs the Foundation of that Privilege is certain, the more the Abuſes which are committed in it, are inſupportable.

Notwithſtanding the ſaid Right is Perſonal; that is, Though it was only granted to the Perſon of the Officers, ſpecified by the Bull of Pope Paul. III. it paſſes now to the Widow, and to the Heirs, as a Temporal Heritage: And tho' the ſaid Favour was only granted them, in order lawfully to gratifie either their Children, or ſome of their Relations or Friends, capable of the Benefices to which they ſhould be Nominated; they often, contrary to Divine and Human Laws, conſtrain thoſe who obtain Benefices by virtue of their Indults, to reſign them to whomſoever they think fit; abuſing the ſaid Priviledge to that degree, that often thoſe who will not hold them in Commendam, can only avoid that Crime, by committing another, which makes them guilty of Simony before God.

The Weakneſs of the Foundation of the ſaid Grant, and the Number Aug. Ipſa mutati • conſu • t • di ••• etiam quae adjuvant uti •• tate no • ita • perturbat. of Abuſes committed by virtue thereof, might lawfully induce your Majeſty to aboliſh it; which would be the eaſier, in that it would be ſufficient in order thereunto, to refuſe the Indultaries their Letters of Nomination, without which, they can pretend to no Benefices: But Experience teaching us, That an accuſtom'd Evil is often more ſupportable than a Good, the novelty of which is vexatious; it will be ſufficient for your Majeſty to make ſo good a Regulation, that thoſe who are to enjoy the Benefit of the ſaid Grants, may not be able to make an ill Uſe of the ſame, as they have done heretofore.

If you hinder the ſame Officer from having his Nomination upon ſeveral Benefices: If you order thoſe that ſhall be preſented by him to be Nominated, not to be admitted before a good Examination, according to the Ordinances, without Favour.

If you make an Order, that the Letters of their Nomination ſhall expreſs poſitively, That the Benefices to which they are Nominated, ſhall be really for them: That it ſhall not be allow'd for them to be conſtrain'd to reſign them to any body; and that if it be diſcover'd that if they lend their Names to any to poſſeſs the ſaid Benefices in Commendam, they ſhall not only be made incapable of ever poſſeſſing any Benefices for ſuch a Crime, but moreover be liable to Puniſhment.

If, in the next place, you are pleas'd to order the ſaid Right, which is only Perſonal, from being tranſmitted to Heirs; the Obſervation of ſuch a Regulation, will produce this effect, That your Officers not being depriv'd of the Favour your Predeceſſors have obtain'd for them, Learned Men will receive a great Advantage under your Reign, and will be deliver'd of the great Vexation they receive from them.

You might alſo refuſe to allow your Officers, after having Nominated a Man to an Indult, to ſubſtitute another in his room, in caſe he ſhould die before it be fill'd.

IT is much eaſier to diſcover the Defects of the Courts of Juſtice, than to preſcribe Remedies for the ſame: Every body is ſenſible, that thoſe who are appointed to hold the Scale even in all things, have inclin'd it ſo much themſelves on one ſide to their own Advantage, that there is no longer any Counterpoiſe.

The Diſorders of the Courts of Juſtice are come to that paſs, that they can go no farther: I would enter into the Particulars of the ſaid Diſorders, and of the Remedies which may be applied to the ſame, if the Knowledge I have both of the Perſon of him who has the Firſt Office of Juſtice at preſent, and of his Deſign to render it as pure, as the Corruption of the World will allow it, did not oblige me barely to propoſe certain general Remedies to your Majeſty, to ſtop the progreſs of the principal Diſorders.

In the Opinion of the Generality of the World, the Chief conſiſts in ſuppreſſing the Sale of Offices, in extinguiſhing the Inheritance of the ſame; and in giving them gratis to Perſons of ſuch known Capacity and Integrity, that even Envy it ſelf may not be able to conteſt their Merit.

But whereas it is a thing which cannot be done at this time; and that it will be difficult to practice this Expedient at any other, it would be uſeleſs at preſent to propoſe Means to that End.

Whenever the ſaid Deſign is undertaken, ſome will certainly be found, which cannot be foreſeen at preſent; and thoſe one might preſcribe, would be no longer in ſeaſon, when the thing might be attempted.

In the mean time, though it is commonly dangerous to be ſingular in Adviſing, I cannot forbear ſaying boldly, That conſidering the preſent State of Affairs, and that which may be foreſeen for the future, it is better, in my Opinion, to continue the ſaid Sale and Inheritance of Offices, than abſolutely to alter the Settlement thereof.

So many Inconveniences are to be fear'd in ſuch an Alteration, that as though the Elections for Benefices are more ancient, and more Canonical than the Nomination of Kings; nevertheleſs the great Abuſes which have been committed in the ſame, and which it would be impoſſible to prevent, render the Nominations more ſupportable, as leſs ſubject to ill Conſequences.

So, notwithſtanding the ſuppreſſion of the Sale, and Inheritance of Offices, is conſonant to Reaſon, and to all the Conſtitutions of Right; yet the inevitable Abuſes which would be committed in the diſtribution of Offices, depending ſo much on the bare Will of Kings, and conſequently on the Favour and Craft of thoſe who ſhould have moſt Power with them; would render the preſent proceeding in the ſame, more tolerable than that which has been us'd heretofore, by reaſon of the great Inconveniences which alway attended it.

All reaſonable Men muſt needs ſee the difference between theſe two Parties, and heartily deſire the ſuppreſſion of the Sale and Inheritance of Offices, ſuppoſing that in this caſe Places would be diſtributed by the pure Conſideration of Vertue.

Neither can they be ignorant, that in ſuch a Caſe, the Artifices of the Court would prevail before Reaſon, and Favour before Merit.

Nothing contributed more to make the Duke of Guiſe ſo Powerful, in the League againſt his King and Country, as the great Number of Officers his Credit had introduc'd in the greateſt Employments of the Kingdom. And I have been told by the Duke of Sully, That the ſaid Conſideration was the moſt powerful Motive which induc'd the late King to the Eſtabliſhment of Duty yearly paid by the Judges and other Officers, &c. the Annual Duty: That that great Prince had not ſo much regard to the Revenue which accru'd to him by it, as to the Means to ſecure himſelf for the future againſt ſuch Inconveniences: And that notwithſtanding Treaſure had a great Influence over him, Reaſons of State were more prevailing on that occaſion.

In the new Eſtabliſhment of a Commonwealth, it were a Crime not to baniſh the Sale of Offices, becauſe in ſuch Caſes, Reaſon obliges to eſtabliſh the moſt perfect Laws Human Society can permit: But Prudence does not allow it in ancient Monarchies; the Imperfections of which are turn'd to uſe, and the Diſorder of which (not without Advantage) compoſes part of the Orders of the State.

In ſuch Caſes, Men muſt ſubmit to Weakneſs, and prefer a moderate Regulation, to a more auſtere Settlement, which perhaps would be leſs proper, the Rigour of it being capable to ſhake the Fabrick which one would ſtrengthen.

I am ſenſible that it is a common Saying, That he who buys Juſtice by the Lump, may ſell it by Retail; but yet it is certain, that an Officer who lays out the beſt part of his Eſtate upon a Place, will be kept from doing ill in a great meaſure, for fear of loling all that he is worth; and that in ſuch a caſe, the Price of Offices is not an ill Pledge of the Fidelity of the Officers.

The Complaints which are made againſt the Sale of Offices, have been the ſame in all the Ages of the Monarchy; but though they have ever been look'd upon as reaſonable in themſelves; yet the Diſorders, upon which they are grounded, have been tolerated, ſuppoſing that we are not capable of the auſtere Perfection which is the ſcope of them.

Thoſe who are not ignorant of Hiſtory, muſt needs know, that ſome Writers, not even ſparing the King St. Lewis, have upbraided his Reign, becauſe Places were not beſtow'd gratis in his Time: That they condemn others after him, becauſe the Traffick of Offices was already ſo publick, that the Money ariſing by the ſame was Farm'd; and that they caſt an Odium upon the Memory of the great King Francis, becauſe he was the firſt, who upon the account of the neceſſity of the Age he liv'd in, made a Regulated Commerce of them, which has laſted ever ſince.

I own that it is a Misfortune for that great Prince, to have been the firſt Author of that evil Eſtabliſhment; but perhaps he would not be blamable, if the Reaſons which conſtrain'd him to do it were known. The Knowledge he had that his Favours were ſold by private Perſons without his Leave, and the Importance: of the Affairs which overwhelm'd him, perſuaded him that there was no better nor more ready way to get the Eſtates of his Subjects voluntarily, than to give them Honour for Money.

The late King, aſſiſted by a very good Council, in a profound Peace, and in a Reign free from Neceſſity, added the Eſtabliſhment of the Annual Duty, to the Sale of Offices, introduc'd by that great Prince:

It is not to be preſum'd that he did it unadviſedly, and without having foreſeen, as much as Humane Prudence could permit, the Conſequences of the ſame; and it is moſt certain, that thoſe things which have been done by Princes, whoſe Conduct has been Judicious, cannot be chang'd without a Reaſon; unleſs Experience diſcovers the Prejudice of them, and that it is evident that one might do better.

The Diſorders which have been Eſtabliſh'd by Publick Neceſſities, and ſtrengthned by Reaſons of State, cannot be reform'd without Time: It muſt be done by degrees, without paſſing from one Extream into another.

An Architect, who by the Excellence of his Art corrects the Defects of an ancient Building, and who without pulling of it down, reduces it to ſome ſupportable ſymetry, deſerves more Praiſe, than he who ruines it abſolutely, to erect a new Edifice perfect and accompliſh'd.

It would be very difficult to change the Order eſtabliſh'd for the diſpoſition of Offices, without altering the Hearts of thoſe that are in poſſeſſion of them; in which caſe, there would be reaſon to fear, That whereas in Times paſt they have been ſerviceable to keep the People within the Bounds of their Duty, they would contribute more towards their Debauches for the future, than any others. Prudence obliges ſometimes to weaken Remedies, to make them the more effectual; and thoſe Orders which are moſt conſonant to Reaſon, are not always the beſt, becauſe they are not always proportion'd to the Capacity of thoſe that are to put them in practice.

Whereas the ſuppreſſion of the Sale and Inheritance of Offices, ought to make way for Vertue, it would only make way for Brigues and Factions, and would fill Places with Officers of low Extraction, often more loaden with Latin than Eſtates; which would produce many Inconveniencies. If Men could obtain Places without Money, Merchandiſe would be forſaken by many, who being dazled with the Splendor of Offices, would ſooner embrace Offices and their Ruin together, than addict themſelves to Merchandiſe, which inriches Families.

Moreover, it is very well known, that the Weakneſs of this Age is ſuch, that Men yield more to Importunities, than they are guided by Reaſon; and that inſtead of being rul'd by Juſtice, Favour oftentimes ſways us.

The Experience of what is paſt, ſhould make us fear the future; both becauſe it has ever ſhewn us, That the moſt powerful in Credit often gain their Cauſe, to the prejudice of Vertue; and that as the Prince and his Confidents can only know the Merit of Men, by the Judgment of others, they are often liable to take the Shadow for the Body.

A low Birth ſeldom produces the Parts which are neceſſary in a Magiſtrate; and it is certain, that the Vertue of a Man that is well-born, has ſomething more noble in it, than that which is found in Men of meaner Extraction. The Minds of ſuch Men are difficult to manage; and many of them have ſuch a nice Authority, that it is not only troubleſome, but alſo prejudicial.

It is with the firſt, in reſpect to the ſecond, as with Trees, which being planted in a good Ground, produce better Fruit, and finer, than thoſe which are in an ill one: And therefore the Sale of Offices ought not to be condemn'd, becauſe it excludes many Perſons of low Extraction from Places and Offices; ſince, on the contrary, 'tis one of the Reaſons which rather makes it tolerable.

A good Eſtate is a great Ornament to Dignities; which are ſo much heightned by exteriour Luſture, that one may boldly affirm, That of two Perſons of equal Merit, he whoſe Circumſtances are the moſt eaſie, is preferrable to the other; ſince it is moſt certain, That a poor Magiſtrate muſt have a world of Vertue to withſtand the Temptations of Intereſt. Experience alſo informs us, That the Rich are leſs liable to Extortion and Bribes, than the others; and that Poverty conſtrains an Officer to be very careful of the Revenue of the Bag.

It may perhaps be urg'd, That though theſe Inconveniences may induce to ſuffer the Sale of Offices; yet it is moſt certain, that the Annual Duty ought to be ſuppreſs'd, becauſe it puts Offices out of Price, and hinders vertuous Men from obtaining them even for Money.

The late King foreſeeing that Evil, had incerted, in the Edict he made upon that Subject, Precautions capable to prevent it; excepting not only from the Annual Right the Offices of firſt Preſidents, Attorneys, and Advocates General, but moreover reſerving to himſelf the diſpoſal of the Offices that are compris'd in the ſame, when they were vacant, paying in lieu thereof, to the Heirs of thoſe who were in poſſeſſion of them, the Price they ſhould be valued at.

Thoſe Precautions were as equitable as neceſſary; and to ſay the truth, the Evils which the Annual Duty cauſes at preſent in the State, do not proceed ſo much from the Defect of its Nature, as from the Imprudence of thoſe who have remov'd the Clauſes which that great Prince had included in it. Had the Edict been kept in its firſt Purity, Offices had never come to the exceſs of Price they are at preſent. The Alterations that have been made in it, have made the uſe of it as prejudicial, as it would have been innocent, had it been left in the firſt from in which it was made; and therefore it is fitter to correct the Abuſes of it, than to reverſe it.

The Revocation of the Annual Duty, would oblige the old Officers to quit their Offices, when the Experience and Maturity of their Age would render them moſt capable to ſerve the Publick. Yet it is neceſſary to have both old and young ones, by reaſon, that as the Prudence of the firſt may be of great uſe to direct the others, the Vigour of the younger ſort is neceſſary to revive and animate the old ones.

If I had a mind, by this Work, to acquire the Inclination of the People, rather than to deſerve their Good-will, by making my ſelf uſeful to the State, I would maintain, That it is neceſſary to ſuppreſs the Sale of Offices and the Annual Duty at once; all Men are ſo prepoſſeſs'd that they are the two Sources of the Diſorders of the Kingdom, that the Publick Voice would decree Crowns for me, without examining whether I deſerve them or no.

But being ſenſible, that thoſe who endeavour to gain Reputation, by the Overture of a Reformation, more conformable to the Rigour of the Laws, than proportion'd to the Strength of the State, only ſeek their own Intereſt, and can never excuſe a Vanity, which is not only blamable, but criminal alſo; and that in ſuch a caſe, their Cares, though ſpecious, are as prejudicial to the Publick, as the Negligence and Malice of others.

I will take ſpecial care not to commit ſuch a Fault; the ſuppreſſion of thoſe two Edicts is attended with too many Inconveniences, to conclude it neceſſary to be done.

If they did really contribute towards Negligence and Vice, as it is commonly ſuppos'd, I would give my Vote immediately for the revocation of them: But when I conſider, that if any Perſons are admitted into Offices, not being qualified for the ſame, it is only the fault of the Attornies General, who are to enquire into their Lives and Converſation, and of the Courts; which being Judges of their Capacity and Vertue, ought to refuſe them when they want the Qualifications requir'd. I cannot forbear ſaying, That the Remedy of the Evil conſiſts more in the obſervation of the Ordinances, than in the ſuppreſſion of the Sale of Offices and Annual Duty, which are not the Cauſes thereof.

Perhaps it may be urg'd, That if Places of Judicature were not ſold, Juſtice might be adminiſtred gratis; but provided the Charges of it be regulated, they cannot be conſider'd as a great Grievance.

I am ſenſible, that examining the thing with rigour, that very Price which is due for the Adminiſtration of Juſtice, is paid for the loſs of the Liberty of thoſe who have voluntarily ſubmitted themſelves to the Obſervation of Laws; and therefore, that to oblige thoſe who go to Law, to give Money, is obliging them to buy that a ſecond time, which they have already dearly purchas'd by their Subjection. Nevertheleſs, the ſaid Cuſtom has prevail'd ſo far, that though the Spice is ſharp by its Nature, yet no body dares complain of that which is paid in the The place where the Courts of Judicature are held. Palace; and ſhould any body propoſe to aboliſh the uſe of it, they would expoſe themſelves to the Laughter of all the World.

There are Abuſes which muſt be tolerated, for fear of falling into Inconveniences of worſe Conſequence: Time and Occaſion will open the Eyes of thoſe who will ſucceed in other Ages, to perform that uſefully, which we dare not undertake in this, without expoſing the State imprudently to a great deal of danger.

All the Reaſons aboveſaid, and many others being maturely conſider'd, though the Sale and Inheritance of Offices are not Canonical; though it were to be wiſh'd that Merit were the only Price of Offices, and Vertue the only Title to tranſmit the ſucceſſion of them to the Heirs of the Officers, inſtead of concluding for the alteration of thoſe two Settlements, the preſent Conſtitution of the State obliges me to ſay three things determinately.

The Firſt is, That by the Reverſion of the Act for the Sale of Offices, the Diſorders which would proceed from the Brigues, and the Sollicitations which would be made for the obtaining of Offices, would be greater than that which ariſes by the liberty of Selling, or Buying of them.

The Second, That if the Inheritance of the ſame were only aboliſh'd, beſides that the abatement it would daily occaſion in the Price of the Offices which would become vacant, would render the Revenue, which accrues to the King by the Sale of the ſame, wholly inſignificant; and that thereby a baſe Commerce would be introduced, which would enable many Men of little Merit, ſecretly to ſhare the Favours, which Kings only deſign for their Officers, we would relapſe into the Evil the late King endeavour'd to free the State from, when by the Eſtabliſhment of the A yearly Revenue which the King receives from all Officers of Judicature, &c. Paulette, he depriv'd the Grandees of the Kingdom of the means to make many Creatures at his Coſt, to ſerve them on all Occaſions, to the prejudice of the Publick Good.

The Third is, That ſince the Virtue of Men is not always ſtrong enough to induce them to prefer Merit before Favour; it is better to leave the Sale of Offices and the Annual Duty, than to aboliſh thoſe two Settlements, which are very difficult to alter all of a ſudden, without endangering the State.

But, I add, That it is abſolutely neceſſary to moderate the Price of Offices; which is riſen to that degree, that the exceſs of it is intolerable.

If the Excellence of a Council conſiſts in its being uſeful and eaſie to put into practice, this ought to be receiv'd, ſince the Benefit of it is evident, and the Practice eaſie; ſince the execution of it only requires to reſtore the Edict of the Annual Duty to the firſt terms of its Settlement.

In ſo doing, Offices being reduc'd to a reaſonable Price, which will not exceed one half of that, to which the Extravagance of the Age has brought it at preſent; and the King having the liberty to pay it to the Heirs, to diſpoſe of the ſaid Places according to his Pleaſure, the State would be ſo far from receiving any prejudice by it, that, on the contrary, I dare repeat, that a conſiderable Advantage would accrue by it.

Moreover, things may be reduc'd to that point, without affording the leaſt cauſe of Complaint to the Parties concern'd; ſince it is eaſie to make them amends for the Prejudice they have done themſelves by divers means I do not ſpecifie at preſent, by reaſon that if they were diſcover'd, they would loſe their Force, before they could be put in practice.

AFter what is aboveſaid, I have nothing to add before I eonclude this Chapter, but what I have repreſented to your Majeſty, upon the Subject of the Firſt Order of your Kingdom.

If you encourage thoſe Officers of Juſtice, who are Men of an unſpotted Reputation; if you diſcourage thoſe, who being deſtitute of all Merit, have nothing but Money to obtain the Magiſtracy; if you deprive all thoſe of your Favour, and cauſe them to be puniſh'd who do not perform their Duty, and do ſell Juſtice to the prejudice of your Subjects, you will abſolutely do whatever can be uſefully done for the Reformation of that Body, which, as well as that of the Eccleſiaſtical Order▪ depends more on thoſe who have the Adminiſtration of them, than on Laws and Regulations; which remain uſeleſs, unleſs thoſe who are employ'd to ſee them obſerv'd, are willing to perform it.

Although the Laws were defective, if the Officers are Men of Honour, their Integrity will be capable to ſupply that Defect and let them be never ſo good, they prove ineffectual, when the Magiſtrates neglect the putting them in execution; much more when they are ſo wicked as to pervert the uſe of them, according to their Paſſions: Since it is difficult to be a Judge, and young at the ſame time, I cannot forbear obſerving, after what I have ſaid, That it is a thing of no ſmall Conſequence, in order to reform the Courts of Juſtice, to put the Ordinances in execution, in what relates to the Age of Officers.

In my Opinion, it is impoſſible to be too exact in it, nor conſequently too ſevere towards the Attornies General who ſhall be wanting in their Duty, in taking care that the Parties concern'd may not be able to ſurpriſe the Judges on that Subject, nor to elude the good Intentions of the Prince, by Suppoſitions or Concealments.

Thereby the Evil of Youth, which is conſiderable, will be avoided, as well as that of Ignorance, which is the Source of many others.

Officers not being able to precipitate themſelves, as they do at preſent, in their Reception, will ſtudy more; ſince otherwiſe they would remain idle, which ſeldom happens to thoſe who have ſtudy'd until they have obtain'd the End they propoſe.

I muſt not omit ſaying on this Subject, That it would be fit abſolutely to retrench the Practice of certain Doctors, who, prompting the Young ones like Parrots, often teach them to ſay things they do not underſtand, and only make them Learned in cheating the Publick, and themſelves alſo.

Such Men may be compar'd to Fencing-Maſters, who are only good to inſtruct Men to their own ruin, and to hinder them from Learning the true Exerciſes of Soldiers, which are only learn'd in Armies, with a great deal of time and fatigue.

The baniſhment of ſuch, would be of great uſe; which in the Practice would be found as difficult, as it is eaſie in the Propoſition. Therefore I rather chuſe to condemn the Fathers in this place, who ſuffer their Children to be inſtructed thus, and to adviſe them no longer to commit any ſuch Faults againſt their own Blood, than to intreat your Majeſty to preſcribe new Laws upon that Subject; which would be no ſooner made, but a thouſand ways would be found out to elude the Effect of the ſame, and to avoid the putting of them in practice.

The Experience which Twenty Years of continual Occupation I have had, in the Adminiſtration of Publick Affairs, has given me, obliges me to obſerve, That though it were to be wiſh'd, that the Sedentary Courts, which are abſolutely eſtabliſh'd to adminiſter Juſtice to every one, and to prevent and regulate all the Diſorders of the Kingdom, ſhould acquit themſelves ſo well of their Duty, that there might be no neceſſity to have recourſe to extraordinary Commiſſions to maintain them in the ſame. It is nevertheleſs ſo difficult to hope for that, which is to be wiſh'd on that Subject, that I dare be bold to ſay, That in order to maintain this great State in the Policy and Diſcipline, without which it can never flouriſh, nothing can be of greater uſe, than to ſend from time to time in the Provinces Chambers of Juſtice, compos'd of Counſellors of State, and Maſters of Requeſts, well ſelected, to avoid the Thorns of Parliaments, which foment Difficulties upon every thing; to the end that the ſaid Court receiving the Complaints which may be made againſt all ſorts of Perſons, without any exception of Quality, may remedy the ſame immediately.

I am ſenſible, that the Soveraign Courts will be loth to ſuffer any ſuch Eſtabliſhments to be made: But as they muſt needs know, that a Soveraign is not oblig'd to ſuffer their Negligence, and that Reaſon obliges him to remedy thoſe Defects; I am not afraid of ſaying, That it is ſafer on that occaſion to acquire their Eſteem in performing one's Duty, than to preſerve their Good-will, in being wanting in what is due to Publick Good. But whereas it is impoſſible to ſend ſuch Commiſſions at one and the ſame time in all the Provinces, and that it will ſuffice, for one of that Nature, compos'd of the ſame Officers, or different, to make the Circuit of France in ſix Years time; I am of Opinion, that it will be neceſſary to ſend often Counſellors of State into the Provinces, or Maſters of Requeſts well ſelected, not only to perform the Function of Intendants of Juſtice in Capital Cities, which may ſerve more toward their Vanity, than be of any uſe to the Publick; but to go into all the Parts of Provinces, to enquire into the Behaviour of the Officers of Juſtice, and of the Finances; to ſee whether the Impoſitions are rais'd according to the Ordinances; whether the Collectors commit no Injuſtices in vexing of the People; to diſcover how they perform their Offices; to know how the Nobility behaves it ſelf; and to put a ſtop to all Diſorders, eſpecially to the Violences of thoſe who, being Powerful and Rich, • ppreſs the Weak, and the King's poor Subjects.

THe Officers of the Finances and the Thoſe who Farm the King's Revenue. Partiſans, are a ſeparate Claſſis, prejudicial to the State, but nevertheleſs neceſſary.

Theſeſort of Officers are an unavoidable Evil; but they muſt be reduc'd to ſupportable Terms.

Their Exceſſes, and the Diſorders which have been introduc'd among them, are come to that heighth, that it is impoſſible to ſuffer them any longer. They cannot raiſe their Fortunes higher, without ruining the State; and without undoing themſelves, by giving the Prince a juſt Pretence of ſeizing their Eſtates, upon the bare knowledge of the exceſſive Riches they have heap'd up in a ſhort time, upon the difference which will be verified between what they had when they were firſt employ'd, and what they are found to be in poſſeſſion of.

I am ſenſible, that ſuch a Proceeding may be liable to great Miſtakes, and that it may ſerve as a Pretence for very unjuſt Violences: Neither do I mention this, by the bye, to adviſe the putting it in practice, which would occaſion great Abuſes; but I maintain, that no body could juſtly complain of it, if it were manag'd with ſo much caution, that in puniſhing thoſe who do inrich themſelves of a ſudden, by the ſole Induſtry of their Fingers, no prejudice were done under that Pretence, to the Eſtates of thoſe who are grown Rich and Powerful, either by their Patrimony, one of the moſt lawful means to riſe; or by the Gratifications receiv'd from the Favour of their Maſter, which exempts them from Crime; or by the Rewards which have been given to their Services; which is alſo one of the moſt lawful, ſince that in being uſeful to private Perſons, it is alſo advantageous to the State; which will be the better ſerv'd, when thoſe who ſerve it uſefully are well rewarded.

It is abſolutely neceſſary to remedy the Incroachments of the Financiers, otherwiſe they will finally occaſion the ruine of the Kingdom; which is ſo much impair'd by their Robberies, that unleſs a ſtop be put to the ſame, it will be quite undone in a ſhort time.

The Gold and Silver they abound in, affords them the Alliance of the beſt Families in the Kingdom; which are ſo much Baſtardiz'd by that means, that their Iſſue proves as different from the Generoſity of their Anceſtors, as they often differ in the Reſemblance of their Faces. I may affirm, as having been an Eye-witneſs of it, in many occaſions, that their Negligence, or Malice, has been very prejudicial to Publick Affairs.

After a ſerious Conſideration, on all the Remedies of the Evils they occaſion, I dare ſay, that the beſt is to reduce them to as ſmall a Number as is poſſible; and to employ, by way of Commiſſion on important Occaſions, Men of Probity and Capacity, inſtead of Perſons whoſe Places being for Life, or Hereditary, think it a ſufficient Title to Rob, without the leaſt fear of Puniſhment.

It will be very eaſie, in time of Peace, to ſuppreſs many Officers of this kind, and thereby to free the State of thoſe who, without doing it any Service, ſuck up all its Subſtance in a very ſhort time.

I am ſenſible that it may be urg'd, That they are commonly us'd like Leeches, who with a Grain of Salt, are often made to diſgorge all the Blood they have ſuck'd up, and, like Spunges, which are eaſily ſqueez'd dry again, though never ſo full before. But, in my Opinion, it is an ill Expedient; and I look upon the Agreements and Compoſitions which are ſometimes made with the Officers, as a Remedy which is worſe than the Diſeaſe; ſince, proproperly ſpeaking, it gives them a Title to Rob anew, in hopes of a freſh Pardon; and that if any thing be got out of their Purſe that way, they do not only recover the Principal they have given, but alſo the Intereſt at a much higher rate than is allow'd of by the Law. Wherefore I conclude, That beſides certain neceſſary Officers, as a Treaſurer of the Exchequer, a Receiver General, Two or Three Treaſurers of France in every Generality, and ſuch others as are abſolutely neceſſary, it will be no ſmall piece of Service to the State, if in ſatisfying thoſe who have, bona • fide, given their Money in hopes to advance themſelves by ſuch Employments, according to the courſe of the times, all the reſt are ſuppreſs'd. Without this Remedy, whatever Regulation may be made, it will be impoſſible to preſerve the King's Money, ſince all Puniſhments, tho' never ſo great, are not capable to hinder many Officers of that kind from converting part of the Money, which will paſs through their hands, to their own uſe.

AFter having ſpoken ſeparately of the divers Orders the State is compos'd of, I have but little to ſay in the main; but that as the Whole only ſubſiſts by the Union of its Parts in their Order and natural Situation; ſo this great Kingdom can never flouriſh, unleſs your Majeſty takes care to keep the Bodies which compoſe it, in their Order; the Church having the Firſt Rank, the Nobility the Second, and the Officers, which are at the head of the People, the Third.

I ſpeak this boldly, becauſe it is as neceſſary as juſt, to put a ſtop to the Incroachments of ſome Officers, who being puf • 'd up with Pride, either upon the account of the great Eſtates they are poſſeſs'd of, or by the Authority they derive from their Places, are ſo preſumptuous as to challenge the Firſt Rank, whereas they can only pretend to the Third▪ Which is ſo contrary to Reaſon, and to the Good of your Service, that it is abſolutely neceſſary to put a ſtop to the Progreſs of ſuch Enterpriſes; ſince otherwiſe France would no longer be what it has been, and what it ought to be, but a monſtrous Body, which as ſuch, could never ſubſiſt or be laſting.

As it is moſt certain, that the Elements which are capable of weight, have none when they are in their Place; ſo it is certain, that none of the Orders of your State will prove burthenſome to the other, while each do remain in the Place which their Birth has aſſign'd them.

And as neither Fire, Air, nor Water, can ſuſtain a Terreſtrial Body, becauſe it is heavy out of its place; ſo it is certain, that neither the Church, nor the Nobility, can ſupport the Burthen of the Officers, when they endeavour to move out of their Sphere.

As I am very ſenſible that your Majeſty knows how to keep all Orders within their Bounds, without enlarging any farther upon this Subject, I will proceed to two Queſtions, which I incert in this Chapter, becauſe they have an equal Relation to the Threedifferent Orders of the State.

EVery body will fancy at firſt, that it will be better to make them Triennial; but after having compar'd the Advantages which may thereby accrue, to the Inconveniences that are to be fear'd; perhaps it will be thought, as I have already obſerv'd it, that though the Nomination to Benefices is not ſo Canonical as the Elections, the Uſe of it is nevertheleſs more advantagious at this time, for ſeveral Reaſons; as alſo that notwithſtanding the ſuppreſſion of the Sale of Offices is to be deſired for ſeveral Reaſons, yet the not tolerating the Uſe of it would occaſion many Inconveniences expreſs'd in their proper places.

So it is impoſſible to render the Governments of Provinces and of Towns Triennial, without being expos'd to far greater Inconveniences, than thoſe which may be fear'd by the perpetual Settlement of Governours.

I am ſenſible, that ſome may urge, That a Man having a Government only for Three Years, will, in all probability, endeavour to quit it with Reputation, and to behave himſelf with ſo much Prudence, that his Adminiſtration may be preferr'd before his Predeceſſor's; whereas having it for Life, the certainty of it gives him more Licence.

But it is much more likely, that he who knows he is not long to continue in his Office, will endeavour to draw as much Profit out of it, as he might expect during his Life, if he were to enjoy it to his Death. Moreover, conſidering the Inconſtancy of our Nation, there might be ſome reaſon to fear the employing of ſome, who foreſeeing the End of an agreeable Adminiſtration, might reſolve to perpetuate it, by receiving thoſe as Maſters, whom they ought to look upon as Enemies.

If the Practice of Spain be urg'd, which often changes Governours, after having anſwer'd, that Example ſhews us, that nothing can be more dangerous than that Government; I will add, That as there are Fruits, the Uſe of which is excellent in one Country, and a Poiſon in another; ſo there are Settlements, the Practice whereof is good in one State, but yet would prove pernicious in another.

Some may ſay, to prevent the Objections which may be made againſt the Practice of the Order of Spain in this Kingdom, That thoſe who will lay down an Office, after the expiration of the term of their Adminiſtration, will have no reaſon to be diſſatisfied, ſince they will be employ'd in others which will prove better; but ſuch great difficulties will be met with in the Practice of ſuch an Order, that it will be impoſſible to overcome them.

A Man may be fit to Govern in Piccardy, by reaſon of his being born there, who will not be fit to be employ'd in Brittany, where he has no Acquaintance, and where the Place which will be given him, will hardly be able to maintain him.

The Governments of France are, for the moſt part of ſo little Profit, that unleſs they are given to Perſons who are more deſirous of them upon the account of Honour, and for the Convenience of their Neighbourhood, than out of any other Conſideration; there are few who are able to bear the Expence of them: Beſides, there are not Men enough in the Provinces, for the Alterations which muſt needs be made, if Employments are made Triennial.

Thoſe Mutations are not only practicable, but abſolutely neceſſary in the great Employments of Spain; as thoſe of the Viceroys of Naples, of Sicily, of Sardinia, the Government of Mi • an, and other Employments of the like Conſequence: And all of them are ſo profitable to thoſe that poſſeſs them, that in quitting the Abundance of the one, they enter into the Wealth of the other.

Places which are diſtant from the abode of Princes, require a Change of Governours in Places of the Conſequence of thoſe I have mention'd, by reaſon that a longer Reſidence than that of Three Years, might enable them to form Projects to ſettle themſelves there for ever; ſeeing particularly that the Ambition of Men is ſo prevailing, that they are eaſily inclin'd to change the Condition of Subject into that of Maſter.

But the caſe is different in France, where the Governments are not ſo diſtant from the abode of the Kings, as to fear ſuch Inconveniences; nor the ſaid Employments ſo great, as to give the Poſſeſſors a ſufficient Authority to make themſelves Maſters of the ſame.

Therefore provided your Majeſty, and your Succeſſors, keep the Power of Changing the Governments as you ſhall think ſit, upon real Cauſe given ſo to do, which you may always do with Juſtice, provided they are given gratis, and not ſold; I dare be bold to ſay, That it is better in that point to follow the ancient Cuſtom of France, than to imitate that of Spain; which is nevertheleſs ſo politick and ſo reaſonable, conſidering the extent of its Dominion, that though it cannot be uſefully practic'd in this Kingdom; yet it will be proper, in my Opinion, to make uſe of it in thoſe Places, of which France will preſerve the Poſſeſſion in Lorrain and in Italy.

THe Survivorſhips in queſtion in this Place, are granted either againſt the Will of the Poſſeſſors of Places, or by their Conſent.

All Men are ſenſible, that it is very unjuſt to nominate the Succeſſors of a Man, while he is alive, againſt his Will; ſince it expoſes his Life to the Artifices of the Perſon that is to profit by his Death, and that the Dread which may juſtly ſeize his Mind, is a kind of Death to him.

That Practice which was formerly very much in vogue in this Kingdom, is at preſent baniſh'd from thence. It is ſo dangerous, that the Councils, and the beſt Conſtitutions of Temporal Princes, do condemn it, as well as Reaſon.

Neither can the Conſent of the Poſſeſſors any ways juſtifie that Proceeding, ſince that whatever Confidence they may repoſe in thoſe who are appointed to ſucceed them, they are often miſtaken: Though it is impoſſible to ſatisfie every body in a State by Grants, yet it is neceſſary at leaſt to afford hopes to thoſe to whom nothing better can be given: Which can never be done, if Places, Offices, and Benefices are given to Children, who in the height of their Merit, and of their Age, would perhaps hardly dare to expect thoſe Honours and Dignities which are granted them in the Cradle.

Such Favours, in which the State is greatly concern'd, hardly oblige any body. A Man does not think that that is given him, which his Father, or another Relation is in poſſeſſion of, he looks upon the Survivorſhip of it as a Right of Inheritance, rather than as an effect of the Prince's Goodneſs.

Notwithſtanding that the Good of the State requires, that in the Promotion of Offices, Merit ſhould be preferr'd to all other things; in what relates to Survivorſhip, a greater regard is had to the Service of him who demands a Succeſſor, than to the perſons that is to ſucceedhim can do. The Favour of the one on ſuch occaſions, often ſerves in lieu of Merit in the others, who have nothing but their Importunity to recommend them.

Therefore I conclude, that the leſs Favours of that kind are granted, is certainly the beſt; and that it would be better yet never to grant any; ſeeing that whatever particular Conſiderations can be alledg'd, the Conſequence of them is dangerous in States, where Examples have often more Force than Reaſon.

If any one obſerves that I condemn a thing in this Article, the practice whereof I have ſuffer'd even in reſpect to my own Relations When the Command of the Sea was given to the Cardinal, Trade was almoſt totally ruin'd, and the King had not one Ship., I am ſure that he will remain very well ſatiſfied, if he conſiders, that while a Diſorder is in vogue, without any poſſibility of a Remedy, Reaſon requires that Order ſhould be extracted out of it: Which was my Intention in preſerving Places, which had been eſtabliſh'd by my Cares, to Perſons whom I could more ſtrictly oblige to follow my Intentions and my Steps. If it had been poſſible, during the Troubles of a Reign agitated by divers Storms, to ſettle the Regulation I propoſe, I would have been a very Religious Obſerver of it.

IT is no ſmall queſtion among Politicians, to know, Whether a Prince who Governs a State by his own Head, is more deſirable than he who not confiding ſo much in his own Abilities, relies much on his Council, and does nothing without their Advice?

Whole Volumes might be compil'd of the Reaſons which might be alledg'd for and againſt it: But referring this Queſtion to the particular Fact which obliges me to introduce it in this place; after having preferr'd the Prince who acts more by his Council, than by his own Opinion, to him who prefers his own Head to all thoſe of his Counſellors; I cannot forbear ſaying, That as the worſe Government is that, which has no other Spring than the Head of a Prince, who being incapable▪ is ſo preſumptuous as to ſlight all Counſel; the beſt of all is that of which the main Spring is in the Senſe of the Soveraign, who, though capable to Act by Himſelf, has ſo much Modeſty and Judgment, that he does nothing without Advice, upon this principle, That one Eye does not ſee ſo well as many.

Beſides that Reaſon diſcovers the Solidity of this Deciſion, Truth obliges me to ſay, That Experience has convinc'd me ſo much of it, that I cannot forbear affirming it, without doing my ſelf a Violence.

A Capable Prince is a great Treaſure in a State; a Skilful Council, and ſuch as it ought to be, is no leſs conſiderable: But the Concert of Both together, is of an ineſtimable Value, ſince thereon depends the Felicity of States.

It is certain, that the moſt happy States are thoſe, in which Princes and Counſellors are the Wiſeſt.

It is alſo certain, That there are few Princes capable to Govern States alone; and, moreover, though there were many, they ought not to do it.

The Almighty Power of GOD, his infinite Wiſdom, and his Providence, do not hinder Him from making uſe, in things which he might do by his bare Will, of the Miniſtry of Second Cauſes; and conſequently Kings, whoſe Perfections are limitted, inſtead of being infinite, would commit a notable Fault▪ in not following his Example.

But whereas it is not in their power, as in GOD's, to ſupply the Defects of thoſe they employ, they muſt be very careful to chuſe them as perfect and as accompliſh'd as poſſible can be.

Many Qualifications are requir'd to make a perfect Counſellor; nevertheleſs they may be reduc'd to Four, viz. Capacity, Fidelity, Courage, and Application, which includes many others.

IT is a different thing to be an honeſt Man in what relates to GOD, and in relation to Men.

He who takes a particular care to obſerve the Law of his Creator, performs his Duty in the firſt; but to do it in the ſecond, he muſt obſerve that which is preſcrib'd by the Honour of Men.

Thoſe different Integrities are neceſſary in a Counſellor of State; but it is uncertain yet, whether he who poſſeſſes all the Qualifications which are requir'd in order thereunto, as to thoſe of the World, alſo commonly has thoſe which make him an honeſt Man before GOD. A Man might be very careful to regulate his Conſcience according to the Will of his Creator, who being depriv'd of ſome of the Conditions of that Integrity, will be leſs fit to be employ'd in the Miniſtry of publick Affairs, than he who having them all, may be ſubject to ſome particular Defects, in relation to the firſt.

However, as the Diſorder of Conſcience is the true Source of all the Imperfections of Man; I declare boldly, That the Two Integrities I am ſpeaking of, are equally neceſſary for the Perfection of a Counſellor of State, and that he cannot have the ſecond, if he be deſtitute of the firſt.

In a word, A States-man muſt be Faithful to GOD, to the State, to all Men, and to himſelf; which he will be, if, beſides the Qualities abovemention'd, he has an Affection for the Publick, and has no private Ends in his Counſels.

The Integrity of a publick Miniſter, does not ſuppoſe a fearful ſcrupulous Conſcience; on the contrary, nothing can be more dangerous in the Government of a State; ſince that as the want of Conſcience may occaſion many Injuſtices and Cruelties, Scruples may introduce many Emotions and Indulgences, very prejudicial to the Publick: For it is moſt certain, that thoſe who tremble in the moſt certain things, out of fear to ruin themſelves, often ruin States, when they might ſave themſelves with them.

As the Integrity of a Counſellor of State can never agree with a certain Rigour, which is accompanied with Injuſtice, it is not contrary to the Severity which muſt be us'd of neceſſity in many occaſions; on the contrary, it adviſes and preſcribes it ſometimes, and often obliges to be Pitileſs.

It does not hinder a Man from minding his own Buſineſs, in ſerving the State; but it only forbids him to think on it, to the prujudice of publick Intereſt, which ought to be dearer to him than his own Life.

That Integrity does not allow a certain Good-neſs, in thoſe who are employ'd in publick Affairs, to hinder them from boldly refuſing thoſe who have unjuſt Pretenſions; on the contrary, it requires, that in granting that which is reaſonable, they ſhould be ſteady in denying what is not ſo.

I cannot proceed on this Subject, without ſaying what Ferdinand Great Duke of Florence, who liv'd in our time, was us'd to ſay on the ſaid Subject, That he would prefer a corrupted Man, before one whoſe Facility was extraordinary; becauſe, added he, a corrupted Perſon cannot always be wrought upon by his Intereſt, which does not always come in play; whereas he who is of an eaſie Temper, is eaſily ſway'd by all thoſe who preſs him; which happens the oftner, by reaſon that it is known, that he is not capable to reſiſt thoſe who preſs him.

The ſaid Integrity requires that all thoſe who are employ'd in the Government of a State, ſhould walk an even pace; and that as they act to the ſame End, they ſhould hold the ſame Language; otherwiſe, if any one be found, who, though he behaves himſelf well in effect, ſpeaks leſs reſolutely than the reſt to decline Envy; beſides, that he will be wanting in the Integrity requir'd in a Miniſter of State, he will load thoſe with Hatred whoſe freeneſs of Speech is conſonant to the Steadineſs of their Actions.

There are Men, whoſe Vertue conſiſts more in Bewailing Diſorders, than in applying a Remedy to the ſame, by the eſtabliſhment of a good Diſcipline.

Thoſe are not the Men we ſeek for; their Vertue is only in appearance; and as it has no Action which can be of uſe, it differs but little from Vice, which has none but what may be hurtful.

The Integrity of a Counſellor of State muſt be active; it diſdains Complaints, and fixes on ſolid Effects, which may be uſeful to the Publick.

There are others, who having nothing but the good of the State in their Mouth, have ſo extravagant an Ambition in their Heart, that no End can ſtop their Deſires, and nothing can ſatisfie or content them.

Others proceeding farther, not contented with never being ſo, convert, under ſpecious Pretences, Publick Intereſts to their own; and inſtead of guiding Particular Intereſt by that which is Publick, they do the contrary, with as much Injuſtice as Boldneſs.

Such Men are not only deſtitute of the Integrity which is neceſſary in the Employment of Publick Affairs, but they are moreover true Plagues to a State; they are the wild Boars of the Scripture, in the Vineyard, in a full Vintage, who do not only fill their Bellies with it, but ſpoil and deſtroy all the reſt.

Thoſe who are of a wilful Temper, and follow their Paſſions more than Reaſon, and who, inſtead of chuſing Men barely upon the account of their Capacity, in thoſe things in which they are to be employ'd, chuſe them only becauſe they are ſenſible that they have an Affection for them, and that they are link'd to their Intereſt, cannot neither be reckon'd Men of the Integrity which is requir'd in the Adminiſtration of States.

If a Man be Revengeful, to put him in Authority, is to put a Sword in the hand of a Fury: if he follows his Appetite, and not Reaſon in his Elections, it is expoſing the State to be ſerv'd by Men of Favour, rather than of Merit; which will occaſion many Inconveniences.

A Man of true Integrity muſt never revenge his own Injuries, unleſs when he rights thoſe of the State: Moreover, he muſt not be induc'd to publick Vengeance, upon the account of his particular Intereſt; and when he does it, as thoſe who have a ſcrupulous Integrity, often injure themſelves by a good Principle, it may be ſaid with truth, that he does good by an ill one.

As the Integrity of a Counſellor of State requires his being proof againſt all ſorts of Intereſts and of Paſſions, it alſo requires his being ſo againſt Calumnies; and that all the Croſſes he may meet with, may never diſcourage him from doing well.

He muſt know, that the Labour Men undergo for the Publick, is ſeldom acknowledg'd by private Perſons; and that no other Reward is to be expected for it on Earth, than that of Fame, which is the true Reward of great Souls.

He muſt alſo know, That the great Men who are employ'd in the Government of States, are like thoſe who are condemn'd to ſuffer; with this difference only, That thoſe receive the Reward of their Faults, and the others of their Merit.

Moreover, he muſt know, That none but great Souls are capable to ſerve Kings faithfully, and to ſupport the Calumnies which the Wicked and Ignorant impute to Men of Honour, without diſquiet, and without ſlackning in the Service they are oblig'd to do them.

He muſt likewiſe know, That the Condition of thoſe who are call'd to the Adminiſtration of publick Affairs, is much to be pity'd; by reaſon that if they do well, the Malice of the World leſſens the Glory of it, pretending that one might do better, though it were abſolutely impoſſible.

Finally, he muſt know, That thoſe who are employ'd in the Miniſtry of the State, are oblig'd to imitate the Stars, which notwithſtanding the Barking of Dogs, lighten them, and follow their Courſe; which ought to oblige him ſo far to contemn ſuch Injuries, that his Integrity may not be ſhaken by it in the leaſt, nor he hinder'd from proſecuting thoſe Ends ſteadily, which he has propos'd to himſelf for the Advantage of the State.

YOur Majeſty having thus choſen your Counſellors, it is your Buſineſs to put them in ſuch a ſtate, that they may be able to labour towards the Grandeur and Felicity of your Kingdom.

Four things are particularly neceſſary to that end:

The Firſt, that your Majeſty muſt confide in them, and that they ſhould know it, which is abſolutely neceſſary, becauſe that otherwiſe the beſt Counſellors might be ſuſpected by Princes; and that the Miniſters not being certain that their Sincerity is known, would reſtrain themſelves in many occaſions, in which their ſilence might prove very prejudicial.

'Tis a common Saying, That a Phyſician who is lik'd by his Patient, and is belov'd by him, will be able to do him more good than another: And 'tis alſo certain, that there is none who could apply himſelf boldly to the Cure of his Patient, if he were perſuaded that he was diffident of him.

The Second is, To command them to ſpeak freely to him, and to aſſure them that they may do it without Peril.

That Condition is abſolutely neceſſary, not only for ſome weak and timorous Minds, who want to be encourag'd, but alſo for thoſe who not being naturally timerous, employ their Zeal the more uſefully for the Advantage of the Publick; in being certain that their Boldneſs cannot be prejudicial to them.

The Soldier who fires behind a Breaſt-work, is more confident than he who knows that in ſhooting he may be ſhot; and indeed, few Men would expoſe themſelves to Ruin to ſerve the Publick.

It is true, that an honeſt Man muſt never conſider his own Intereſt, when the Publick is concern'd; and that the higheſt Point of Fidelity that can be deſir'd in a Servant, is, to ſpeak that ingenuouſly which he knows to be for his Maſter's Intereſt, without the leaſt fear of incurring the Hatred of thoſe who have moſt intereſt with him, nor even of diſpleaſing him: But there are but few who have ſo much Zeal as to run ſuch a Riſque.

The Third, To be liberal towards them, and to give them reaſon to think, that their Services will not be unrewarded.

Which is the more neceſſary, becauſe there are but few Men who love Vertue naked; and that the only way to hinder a Servant from thinking too much on his own Intereſt, is to practice the Advice of that Emperour, who recommends to his Son, to have a great care of the Affairs of thoſe who are very mindful of his.

No honeſt Man ever endeavours to enrich himſelf at the coſt of the Publick, in ſerving it; but as it would be a Crime to have ſuch a Thought, nothing can be more ſhameful in a Prince, than to ſee thoſe who are grown old in his Service, loaden with Years, with Merit, and with Poverty together.

The Fourth is, To authoriſe and maintain them ſo openly, that they may be certain, that they need neither fear the Artifices, nor the Power of thoſe who would ruin them.

The Intereſt of the Prince obliges him to behave himſelf thus, ſince no Man can ſerve the Publick effectually, without incurring the Hatred and Envy of every body; and that few would be found ſo vertuous as to do well, if they thought it would prove prejudicial to them.

There is no Town in the World, though never ſo ſtrong in it ſelf, but will be taken in proceſs of time, unleſs a particular Care be taken to defend her Out-works.

It is the Caſe of the Greateſt Kings, who can never preſerve their Authority entire, unleſs they take a ſingular care to maintain it in the leaſt of their Officers, near or diſtant from their Perſons, which are Outworks that are attack'd firſt; the taking of which, imboldens Men to make Efforts againſt thoſe within, though they ſeem to be impregnable, as ſacred and fix'd to the very Perſon of Kings.

Few Men will be ſo preſumptuous as to attack thoſe by open force, whom the Prince will make choice of to ſerve him; becauſe all are ſenſible that their Power cannot cope with their Soveraign, who is too much concern'd to protect his Servants, to neglect it to his prejudice; but there are always ſome who endeavour to ruin them by Artifices and indirect Means, difficult to be diſcover'd.

Men behave themſelves commonly with ſo much Cunning in thoſe occaſions, that when the leaſt proſpect is obſerv'd in ſuch Deſigns, they muſt be look'd upon as certain; not to harm thoſe who are ſuppos'd guilty before they are convicted, but toprevent them with Prudence.

The Artifice of Men makes them diſguiſe themſelves a hundred different ways to compaſs their Ends: Some ſpeak openly, under pretence that their Silence would be criminal; but there are few of that kind: Others feign to be Friends to thoſe they deſign to ruin: Others employ a Third Perſon to ſpeak, and reſerve themſelves to ſecond the ill Offices they have begun. Finally, there are ſo many ways to do harm in that kind, that a Prince can never be too much upon his Guard, to ſecure himſelf againſt ſurpriſes, in a thing of that importance.

Whenever any body ſpeaks to him in private againſt the Government of the State, under any pretence whatever, he may aſſure himſelf that it is to ruin and to undo him.

We may compare thoſe who behave themſelves ſo, to thoſe who have Fevers, which are the more malignant, in that the external Fire ſeems little, when they are almoſt parch'd up within.

Such Diſtempers muſt be prevented in time, without ſtaying for a perfect Knowledge of them, becauſe it often happens that we can only have it by the Event, and the Effect of the ill Deſign which is projected.

Thoſe who make ſuch Enterpriſes, are too ſenſible of the Danger to which they expoſe themſelves to begin them, without a Reſolution to go thro' with them. On ſuch occaſions, Men begin ſlowly and fairly; but afterwards, the nature of ſuch Affairs obliges them to double their pace, and to run for fear of being ſurpris'd by the way.

In that, they imitate the Stone which is flung from the top of a Mountain; its firſt motion is ſlow, and the more it deſcends, the more weight it receives, and redoubles the ſwiftneſs of its fall: And as it requires more force to ſtop it in the midſt of its fall, than in the beginnig; ſo it is very difficult to ſtop a Conſpiracy, which not being ſtifled in its Birth, has already made a great Progreſs.

The more conſiderable a Place is, the more the Enemy endeavours to ſeduce the Governour of it; the more a Woman is beautiful, the more Men endeavour to engage her Affections: So likewiſe the more a Miniſter is uſeful to his Maſter, powerful in his Mind and Favour, the more Men envy him, and are deſirous of his Place, and endeavour to ſupplant him to come in his room.

Among faithful Governours, thoſe are moſt eſteem'd, who do not only reſiſt the Propoſitions which are made to them againſt their Duty, but alſo refuſe to hear them, and who immediately ſtop the mouths of thoſe who will tempt them by ſuch means.

Among chaſt Women, thoſe who have no Ears to hearken to the ill Diſcourſes which Men would make to them to ſeduce their Purity, are, by the Judgment of the Wiſeſt, preferr'd to thoſe who open them, even when they ſhut their Hearts.

So among Maſters who have Servants, whoſe Fidelity has been tried on ſo many occaſions, that they cannot queſtion it with Reaſon, thoſe are the Wiſeſt who ſtop the Mouths of thoſe would ſpeak ill of them.

Whatever Virtue there may be in reſiſting Temptation; Princes and Husbands are eſteem'd too Indulgent, when they allow their Governors and their Wives, to give Ear to thoſe things which they would not have them adhere to, and to which they cannot conſent without a Crime; and Ma •• ers muſt condemn themſelves, when they give Ear to what Men would tell them againſt thoſe, whoſe Fidelity is unreproachable. The Primitive Reaſon of this deciſion conſiſts in that, as to expoſe ones ſelf boldly to danger in a juſt and uſeful occaſion, is an Act of Valour; ſo to do the ſame without Cauſe or Reaſon, is an Act of Temerity; and it is in that Sence, it has been ſaid with great Reaſon, that whoever gives Ear to Calumnies deſerves to be deceiv'd.

Perhaps ſome will ſay, that there is a great deal of difference, between the Duty of the Governor, of the Woman, and of the Prince, in the caſe which is repreſented: That it is true, that the Governor and the Woman, do a great deal better not to hearken, becauſe they can in no wiſe conſent to what is to be propos'd to them; but that the caſe is different in relation to the Prince, who muſt keep his Ears open, ſince he may be told Truths of that conſequence, that he will be oblig'd to provide againſt them.

To that I anſwer in the firſt place, That in ſpeaking only of ſuch Servants whoſe Fidelity is unreproachable, and whoſe Conduct has heen try'd on many occaſions of that importance, that it is impoſſible to meet with greater; the difference will be ſo inconſiderable in the Compariſon aforeſaid, that in Reaſon it muſt be look'd upon as none; the Rule of Moral Things, obliges to look upon thoſe things as nothing, which are of ſlight conſequence.

I add in the ſecond place, That the ſome inconvenience might attend the cloſing of ones Ears againſt what any body would ſay againſt a Servant of approv'd Fidelity; It is ſo inconſiderable in reſpect to thoſe which are inevitable, in opening them to the prejudice of Perſons thus qualifi'd, that I may ſay abſolutely, that the Governor, the Woman, and the Prince muſt equally ſhut them in the occaſions above-mention'd.

There is no ground to preſume, that he who has been faithful all his Life, would become unfaithful in a moment, without Cauſe or Reaſon, principally when the Intereſt of his Fortune is joyn'd to his Maſter's.

An Evil which can happen but ſeldom, muſt be preſum'd not to happen at all; particularly, when to avoid it, we muſt expoſe our ſelves to others which are inevitable, and of greater Conſequence, which is the Caſe in queſtion: It being certain, that it is almoſt impoſſible for a Prince to preſerve his moſt faithful and moſt aſſured Servants, if under pretence of not ſhutting his Ears againſt Truth, he opens them to the Malice of Men; beſides, that it is certain that he will loſe more, in loſing one thus Qualify'd; than if for want of giving Ear, he ſhould tolerate in any one, Faults which cannot be of great conſequence, if he finds him faithful in the moſt important Occaſions.

If he who gives a free entrance to the Murtherers who kill a Man, is guilty of his Death, he who receives all ſorts of Suſpicions, and of Calumnies, againſt the Fidelity of one of his Servants, without examining the Caſe to the bottom, is anſwerable before GOD for ſuch a proceeding.

The beſt of Actions are deem'd ill by two ſorts of Men; by the Malicious, who impute every thing to Ill by the exceſs of their Malice, and by thoſe who are naturally ſuſpicious, who explain every thing ill by their Weakneſs.

There is no Man on Earth, though never ſo vertuous, that can paſs for innocent in a Maſter's Mind, who not examining things himſelf, gives ear to Calumny.

As there are but two ways to reſiſt Vice, either by Flight, or by Combat; ſo there are alſo but two to reſiſt the Impreſſions which are made by Calumnies; the one conſiſts in rejecting them abſolutely, without hearkning to them; the other in being ſo careful in the Examination of what is told, that the Truth or Falſhood thereof may be averr'd.

To avoid all Inconveniences, to ſecure one's ſelf againſt the Artifices and Snares that are laid by the Wicked, to ruin honeſt Men, and not to be depriv'd of the means to diſcover the ill Behaviour of thoſe who ſerve ill; the Prince muſt look upon all thoſe things as Calumnies which are only whiſper'd to him; and upon that account, refuſe to hear them: And if any Man will maintain what he has to ſay in the preſence of thoſe he accuſes, then he may give ear to them thus, on condition of a good Recompence, if he ſays any thing material to the Publick which proves to be true; and of a great Puniſhment, if his Accuſation prove falſe, or not conſiderable and important, though it ſhould prove true.

I have always begg'd of your Majeſty to follow this Method in relation to my ſelf, in order to give thoſe who would cenſure my Actions an opportunity to do it, and me means to defend my ſelf.

I may ſay with truth, That your Majeſty never had the leaſt Diſguſt againſt my Conduct, but when you have not practis'd this Council, which is the more to be receiv'd, in that it is altogether innocent.