CHAP. I. The Authours Designe, and the occasion of it.

AS bodies that are foule and doe abound with pec­cant humours be subject to contagion and apt to be infected by each weake venome, from the danger whereof cleaner and better tempered bo­dies live secure, so, in like manner, mindes that be corrupted and all such understandings as have lost the stayes and principles of truth are easily entrapped by every poore and childish sophistication; and having once left their anchour-hold floate afterwards up and downe upon the waves of humane opinations, are dasht against every rocke of er­rour, be it never so low, or contemptible, and, like unto small weake flyes, be caught and entangled, not alwaies by the strongest and most artificially woven cobweb, but by the very next, though never so rude and slender. This poore and sorrowfull manner of failing must needs be of all other the most hatefull, not for the deadlinesse of it, but rather for the reproach which followes; for by it a man looseth not truth a­lone, but withall his reputation and esteeme, it being a judgement ve­ry slenderly armed that with a wooden dart can be peirced through. Experience verifies what I affirme; for of late a sorry Animal, better I cannot call him, whose soule be himselfe thinkes to be mortall, and whose learning and capacity is so small, as if indeed it were so as he imagineth it to be, a sorry Animal I say, having stept into the crowde [Page 2] of Scriblers in the defence of an old rotten heresy condemned and suf­focated by consent of the wise, almost at the houre of the birth, hath met with some soules so unhappy as to be perswaded by him, and to thinke as meanely of themselves as the wisest of all ages did of beasts; and to the dishonour and debasing of their owne kind, not elevating Beasts to the degree of reason, as sometimes Plutarch, Sextus Empiri­cus, and some others have sought to doe, though vainely, and perad­venture more for ostentation and argumentation sake, then in any ear­nest; but contrariwise reproachfully depressing man even as low as bruite beasts, and ascribing to them both a mortality alike.

The old and despicable heresy which this obscure authour now la­bours to resuscitate and to conjure up, was raised in Arabia about the time of Origen, and extinguished by his dispute, immediately after the birth, as Eusebius witnesseth l. 6. Hist. c. 30. and according to the di­vision of Rufinus, 27. such as were infected with this errour were ter­med by Saint Augustine de Haeres. c. 83. Arabici, by reason of the Pro­vince from whence the errour first arose: so that such as now submit unto it may well be termed wilde Arabians, which kinde of people by reason of their rude condition and volatile natures, were ever as rea­dy to be cosened, first, by this heresy, and after, by the grand Impo­stour Mahomet, as the Romanes prepared to betray their owne liber­ty, then when Tiberius cried shame upon them for it, saying, O homi­nes ad servitutem paratos! O men prepared for servitude! who if he had lived in this age, and noted the pronity of men now adaies, to em­brace every groundlesse fancy and to forgoe any antient and well grounded truth, would have changed a word or two and said, O men­tes ad errorem paratas! O mindes prepared for errour! O mindes cor­rupt enough for the receiving and applause of any folly, of any errour, be it never so absurde, disadvantageous unto them, or derogating from the dignity of humane nature! O curvae in terris animae! About the time of these Arabici, Tatianus in an Oration of his yet extant seemes to have held with them, and afterwards some later Sectaries termed by reason of this their foolish errour Thnetopsychitae, as Damascene rela­teth l. de Haeres.

Upon the consideration of those errours that have of late infected us and betrayed humane nature, I cannot thinke it a thing improbable, but that the infernall spirit which hath suggested them and governed the hearts of men as a predominant planet, in these Northerne Provinces of Europe, is that martiall Devill called Apocal. 9. 11. Abaddon, or Apol­lyon, that is to say, a Destroyer; for as much as the designes of all such [Page 3] as have disturbed our peace of late daies, are all generally for ruine and destruction; the former acts were for destruction of Prelacy, or power Ecclesiasticall; the latter for subversion of regality, or sacred rights of Princes: they began with the destruction and prophanation of sacred and religious edifices, now they take the same licence for ruinating of of Cathredrall and Collegiate Churches, and like true Barbarians, what time and leasure doe not yet give them leave to demolish, that they at least deface and contaminate, leaving behind them nothing but de­solation; neither sufficed it to have beene contumelious to their owne ancestours, unlesse besides they should prove treacherous and false e­ven unto their owne nature, by their divesting and disrobing it of all the cheifest ornaments, which, according to the judgement of the wi­sest, doe appertaine unto it.

For first, what is the wealth and treasure of man, but the dignity and value of his actions? of this he hath long since beene plundered. His eyesight whereby his steps were to be gui­ded, was his knowledge; but this divers have laboured to extinguish, by denying, with the old Academickes and late Socinians, that there is any certainty in it, and by becoming so witty as to know nothing. His crowne and life was the immortality of his better part, as therein cheife­ly being superiour to beasts and all other living things irrationall; but behold here a privy but a dangerous traitor endeavours to despoile him of it; so that in fine, if all these treacherous assailants might have their wills, he shall be wholly mortall, poore, feeble, blinde and miserable, dethroned from his wonted dignity, and cast downe unto the lower classe of Beasts. Profectò plurima homini ex homine mala, as Pliny just­ly complaineth, though he himselfe be one of the Authors of these e­evills. Was it not enough that all inferiour creatures doe rebell against us, but we must basely and treacherously conspire against our selves? The man that going from Jerusalem to Jericho fell amongst theeves, had hard measure offered him, for he was despoiled and wounded by them, and left onely halfe alive; but those theeves amongst whom we are now fallen be farre more cruell, for they would kill us outright both in soule and body, and with lesse then this will not be contented. But now it is time we examine what urgent reasons, what killing arguments there were that moved this new author unto so extravagant a course of rigour against all mankinde; for if these be not very urgent and invin­cible, we must conclude this man guilty not onely of much folly but al­so of heinous malice and temerity against the rights and prerogatives of man.

CHAP. II. His first Classe of arguments examined and refuted.

HIs first arguments be drawen from mans creation, fall, restitution and resurrection: the principall is this,

That what of Adam was immortall through Innocency, was to be mortalized by transgression.

But whole Adam (quatenus animal rationale) was in Innocency immortall.

Ergo all and every part even whole man liable to death by sinne.

Upon this bungling argument or syllogisme the weight of all his cause must leane, which as I perceive by the posture it should have been a syllogisme, if the Author could have cast it into that forme, but since that might not be, we will be contented to take it in grosse as it lies, rather then passe it over without an answer. We grant then that indeed all Adam for example, by sinning became mortall, and all and every part of him, that is to say, he was after so much of his age expired, to yeild up to death and be totally corrupted; or, which is all one, he was to have his two essentiall parts disunited, and after that untill the resurrection, neither he nor any of his parts thus dissevered & disunited to be Adam or a man any longer. All which might be without that, either the matter of his body, or substance of his soule should perish, or be destroyed. And forasmuch as concernes the matter of his body, it is an evident case because matter is a thing both ingenerable and incorruptible, and so neither produced by his generation, nor destroyed by his corruption; and as by generation onely fashioned and united, so againe by corrup­tion or death, onely defaced and disunited or dissolved. And as for the soule the other part, there is no more necessity death should destroy it, then there was it should destroy the matter, there being no more rea­son for the one then for the other. Wherefore Saint Paul wishing death that so he might be with Christ, did not desire to be destroyed, as this silly authours doctrine would inferre, but to be dissolved; for surely if his soule by act of mortality was to have beene destroyed, he could not thinke to be with Christ, during the time of that destruction, or dissolution which he wished, and so his words and wishing would have beene very vaine, seeing according to this Author he should by his being dissolved, come never the sooner to be with Christ; because according to this Author, neither alive, nor dead, he was to come unto [Page 5] him before the Generall resurrection; nay further, his wish would have made against himselfe and his owne ends, because he knowing Christ a little in this life, might in some small measure injoy him in it; but if by death his soule be killed as well as his body, he should have no knowledge at all nor comfort of Christ, but be cast farther off then he was before.

Now, as all agree, that matter throughout all mutations, remaineth incorrupted; so also according to the judgement of sundry knowing men and diligent inquirers into the workes of nature and transmuta­tion of naturall compounds, naturall and materiall formes themselves also doe not perish at their parting from their matters, but onely are dissolved and dissipated, lying after that, in their scattered atomes within the bosome of nature, from whence they were before, by force of the seed, extracted, the result of whose union was the forme. So that the entity of the forme remaines after corruption, though not in the essence and formality of a forme, or totally and compleatly. Thus teacheth the learned author of Religio medici, and exactly declares him­selfe; of the same minde is the famous late Physitian Daniel Sennertus in his Hypomnemata, though sometimes not so fully; as for example, when he ascribes to formes precedent the full production of the sub­sequent; assigning a vis prolifica in every forme for multiplying of it selfe: by which doctrine he seemes to recede from his former princi­ples of Atomes and not to sticke constantly to them, yea and besides to deliver a conceit which is hardly understood, and which moreo­ver seemes to be improbable; for, who can explicate what one forme does when it multiplies another, or what kinde of causality it doth then exercise, or by what strange influence that effect is wrought and the forme made up of nothing. This same doctrine of Religio Medi­ci; and that also which we deliver here touching the Origination of formes was the doctrine of old Democritus expressed by him in his constitution of Atomes, or minima naturalia, not that every Atome did conteine a forme, as Sennertus seemes to thinke, but rather severall pee­ces for the composition of it; as every simple, or ingredient of Dia­catholicon, for example, is not Diacatholicon, but conteines some­thing in it of which it is to be made up, and from which as from differ­ing heterogeneall parcells, collected and united by an artificiall mixtion it results; and for want of putting this difference or restraint, Sennertus his owne doctrine and explication of Democritus may seeme defe­ctive. This also was taught by Anaxagoras, when he affirmed all to be in all, or every thing, and to have a preexistence in the bosome of [Page 6] nature before such time as by the operation of seminall causes, formes be accomplished and made to appeare in their owne likenesse upon this theater. This is also the judgement of Athanas. Kircherius a late learned writer l. 3. de magnete, part. 3. c. 1. where he shewes how rich compounds earth and water be, as Chymique industries for seperation, have discovered, insomuch as in them, as he noteth, is con­teined a [...] or generall magazine; the common matter be­ing from the first creation, not leane and hungry, but faeta and prae­seminata with formes partiall and incompleate. This also is the in­choations of formes and the rationes seminales praeëxistent, which ma­ny learned men have often favoured, and which, being thus explained, and in which this sence of ours can suffer nothing from the objections of Gandavensis, or Durandus. This lastly, is nothing else, but in a good sence, an eduction of formes ex potentia materiae, which is A­ristotles and his Disciples Doctrine; for, it cannot be thought, that A­ristotle ever intended to presse, or squeeze any formes out of the dry skeleton of materia prima, which matter is a principle onely receptive, and no promptuary out of which to educe a forme by virtue of any naturall agent whatsoever; for in such a spare entity as that what fe­cundity is imaginable? And so much touching the originall of formes, which is one of the abstrusest and nicest points in all philosophy, and that which by vulgar authors is meanliest handled, and by the wisest is knowne but by conjecture.

Thus his maine argument is answered, after which all the rest will fall downe headlong with any light touch, though but of a finger.

Immediately after this he argueth out of Gen. 3. 19. where Adam is told, that for his disobedience, he must turne into that dust of which he was made; out of which he concludes, that all and every part of A­dam must be converted into dust: which, if it be so, as he sayeth, then not only his earthly particles, but his aiery, watry and fiery partes must to dust also, and not only his body, but his soule, if he have any, must be turned into the same matter. See what fine conclusions follow out of this mortall soules philosophy. It sufficed then, that so much of his body, or of the whole man was to returne to dust as had beene made up of it. And by this alone, the commination of God is fullfill­ed without any more adoe.

After this he comes upon us with his false Latin, saying as follow­eth. ‘Death reduceth this productio entis ex non ente ad Non-entem, returnes man to what he was before he was: that is, not to be, &c. and by and by, citing impertinently two or three places of Scripture, [Page 7] falls to another argument drawen from the resurrection.’

As for the Latine word Non-entem whether it be right, or no, we will not examine, but apply our selves to the consideration of the sense which is as faulty as the Latine can be: know therefore in breife, that death did not reduce Adam to non ens, but to non Adam; it did not cause him absolutely not to be, but onely not to be man, or Adam any longer. And forasmuch as concernes his body, it is confest and certaine, that it was not turned by death or mortality into nothing, or non ens, but into dust which is an ens, or something; that is to say, his body was not annihilated, but corrupted; and to dye, is not wholly to be destroyed, but partially only, which act is all one with dissolution. Now, if to the totall mortalizing of man, it be not necessary that his body be destroyed, then can it not be needfull that his soule should be so, and thus our adversaries stout argument is more then mortalized, for it comes to nothing, which man by dying does not.

We will not deny him, but that the soule of man did die and die a­gaine, as much as it was capable of death; for first it dyed by the being seperated from the body; secondly, by being subjected unto damna­tion, which, as we know, is called in scripture a second death. But as for the annihilation of it, or of the body, that is it which we deny; and so to doe we have just reason. In fine, as generation is nothing but the union of the parts, and not the creation or absolute production of them; so againe, Death and Corruption is nothing but the disunion, or dissolution of them, and in no wise the annihilation, according as this wise Author would perswade us.

As for the article of the Resurrection, it proves nothing against the perpetuity of the soule; for we never read of any resurrection besides that of the body: wherefore, to averre a resurrection of soules were a grand foolery, and a doctrine never debateable or heard of amongst Christians, till this silly Author came to teach it. And so much for his first chapter.

CHAP. III. Scripture no way a favourer of the soules mortality?

HIs places cited out of scripture in favour of his errour are so imperti­nent, as that it were no small peice of folly to examine them one by one; They all of them signifie that man shall dye, or sometimes, that Joseph or Simeon is not, as Gen. 42. 36. all which how they are to [Page 8] be expounded and understood, may sufficiently appeare by that which hath beene said in the precedent chapter, and how againe they make nothing at all against the soules immortality.

Touching the words of Ecclesiastes c. 3. the answer is, that they were no determinations, or resolves, but a history, or an account gi­ven of what sometimes came into his thoughts, and what obscurities and desolations of soule he had, and what lastly was one of the first difficulties that troubled him and stirred him up unto a sollicitous en­quiry; for certainely this one verity of the mortality of mans soule is that which is to order his designes, to regulate his actions, and to put life and vigour into them, this being a truth most fundamentall. We see this one was it which moved Clemens Rom. (if he be the true Author of that which passeth under his name) to a serious inquiry and care Clem. l. 1. re­cogn. for the finding out what he was to do, whom to consult, what to e­steeme most, and in fine what to feare, or hope most, and how to or­der all the passages of his life. This is the question that usually trou­bles men first of all, and till a resolution be had, suffereth their hearts not to be at quiet, every man at first suspiciously, as Solomon did, asking of himselfe, as Seneca gallantly expresseth, saying. Senec. in Troade

After this sort do anxious and afflicted spirits often times argue and dispute within themselves, laying before their eyes all the doubts and difficulties immaginable before they descend to the making of any conclusion at all, or to the determining of any settled doctrine. Thus, and no otherwise did Solomon, when first revolving in his thoughts the matter of the soules condition, and touching upon the various sus­picious of men concerning it with no small sense and anguish of mind, at length c. 12. drawing to a conclusion, determines saying, let the Eccle: 12. dust returne unto the earth from whence it came, and the spirit unto God who gave it. And this text alone is sufficient to confound the Adversary, and to confute whatsoever he hath endeavoured to draw out of scripture for mans totall corruption and mortality.

CHAP. 4. His argument out of reason viewed and examined.

WHat the severall fancies were of heathen Philosophers touch­ing the nature and definition of the soule is not much regard­able, sundry of them being so monstrous and absurd. But it is a thing very considerable, that amongst so many stragling and wilde conceits all, or most of all at least of the noblest and the best Philosophers have taught the immortality of the soule it selfe. Howsoever, in other businesses concerning it, they might sometimes disagree. Permanere animos arbitramur, saith Cecero, consensu nationum omnium: qua in Cicero Tuscul. l. 1. sede maneant qualesque sint ratione discendum est, * and againe in his Hortensius, as witnesseth Saint Augustine l. 14. de Trinitate. Antiquis Philosophis hisque maximis [...]ngèque clarissimis placuit quod aeternos animos divinosque habeamus. We are perswaded by the consent of all nations that soules remaine, but must learne of reason of what qua­lity they are, and in what places they remaine. This assertion of Cice­ro, [Page 10] for consent of nations and Philosophers in this truth, hath beene shewed to the eye by the great diligence and learning of Augustinus Steuchus, commonly called Eugubinus, in the 9 booke of his excellent [...]ugubinus l 9. [...]e Peren. Philo­soph. worke de perenni Philosophia, in which he voucheth to this purpose the authorities of Pherecides Syrus, who, as Cicero witnesseth, was the first that delivered this verity in writing, also of Trismegistus and the Chaldean monuments of Plato, likewise Pythagoras, Aratus, Philo, Cicero, Plotinus, Jamblichus, Hierocles, and sundry others, as also of Aristotle the Prince of the Peripatetiques, who is judged by the greatest searchers into his doctrine to have directly taught the immortality, although he hath not declared himselfe in that point, as in many others, nor as others have done, peradventure concealing himselfe on set purpose, because he for want of light from divine re­velation was not able to tell what to do with them after death, nor was he willing to make up his matter with fictions poeticall, as his master Plato had done. The same Philosophers also are diligently al­leadged [...]less. c. 15. de [...]erit. Christ. Rel. by Monsieur Plessy, in his booke de veritate Relig. Christia­nae, which is every where extant. Besides, the same doctrine of immortality hath beene constantly taught by the learned Aben Sina, or Avicen in the last booke of his Metaphysiques, and also in his Al­mabad, in which treatise he maintaineth constantly the immor­tality of the soule, but earnestly impugneth the bodies resurrect ion, and withall which is most false and improbable, defends that Mahomet in his law never taught it, but only parabolically and for fashion sake, complying with the peoples rudenesse, whereby they were not sen­sible of any doctrine teaching a felicity that was spirituall. ‘Another Arabique author who goes under the name of Aristotle is of the same minde with Avicen: seeing, saith he, it is manifest out of the bookes of Author secret. sap. secundum AEgyptios. p. 1, & 12. the ancient, and already proved that the soule or minde, is not a bo­dy, nor doth perish, but remaine &c.’ Thus he l. 1. de divin. sap. secundum Aegyptios, c. 2. consonantly to other Philosophers, though afterwards, in the very next chapter, most absurdly he af­firmes as much of the soules of Beasts. ‘Afterwards c. 4. he addeth, saying. If our foreelders had beene doubtfull of the soules im­mortality, they had never, for the confirmation thereof by natures dictamen, made a law against which no man is, but he who is en­tangled in vice. And a little after. The soule therefore passing out of this life, and gotten into the other world, doth not at all perish. Lastly l. 12 a c. 10. ad 17. he, by many arguments assayeth to prove that the soule is void of corporeity.’ Thus he, of whose credit and excellency see the judicious censure of Doctor Guiliel. Dunal in Synopsi doctrinae Peripateticae cap. ultimo.

[Page 11] Next unto this Author I produce Manilius, yet, not as a light Poet, but as a sage Philosopher, he flourished in the time of Cesa Julius. This same same Author l. 1. Astronomicωn, speaking of the Galaxia and indeavouring to give a reason of it, writeth on the manner fol­lowing.

[Page 12] Lo here how he doth signifie, not onely the soules of men be di­vine and immortall, but besides, that they had not their originall from the earth, or from any earthly agent, with whom consenteth a Greeke Philosopher Sallustius Emescenus in his booke de Diis & mundo late­ly published and vindicated from the moathes by Leo Allatius; This Philosopher c. 8. teacheth on this sort. ‘First saith he, let us know Sallustius Emasenc. 8. what the soule is. The soule is that which makes things living or animated, differ from the livelesse, or inanimate. Their difference consists in motion, sense, phantasie, and intelligence. The soule de­voyd of reason is a life that serves apparences and the senses, but the rationall, using reason, beares rule over the sense and Phantasie. In­deed, a soule destitute of reason followes the affections of the body, for it desires and is angry without reason; but a rationall, according to the rule of reason, contemnes the body, and entring into combate with the soule irrationall, if it get the better doth follow virtue, if vanquisht declines to vice. This of necessity must be immortall be­cause it knowes the Goddesse, and no mortall thing can know that which is immortall; besides, it contemnes humane things, as if they were belonging to some other person, and being it selfe incorporeall, is a verse from things corporeall, which bodies, if they be faire and fresh, it languisheth, if old, it begins to flourish. Also every diligent soule makes use of the mind. [...]. the soule is not generated by the body, for how should any thing that wanteth reason generate that which hath? Thus Sallu­stius, out of whose words we have, first, that the soule differs from the body. 2. That the rationall from the irrationall, or the sence;’ 3. That the rationall is immortall and the reason why. 4. That it is ingenerable and for what cause. With this greeke Sallustius agrees the Roman, who l. de bello, Jugurth saying, Ingeniiegregia facinora, si­cut anima immortalia sunt. The egregious atcheivments of the wit are like the soule immortall, and, by and by, Omnia orta occidunt, aucta senescunt, animus incorruptus, aeternus, rector humani generis. All things which rife do fall, and being ever eased doe wax old, the minde is in­corrupt and eternall &c.

Our next authority is that of Apollonius Tyanaeus that famous Py­thagorean Phylosopher whose life Philostratus Lemnius hath writ at Apollonius a­pud Philostrat. l. 8. de vita e­jus. large, and amongst other accidents, relates of him how, after his de­cease, he appeared to a young man a student in philosophy resolving him as followeth. ‘The soule is immortall and no humane thing but proceedeth from the providence divine. This, therefore, after the [Page 13] body is corrupted, as a swift courser released from his bonds and delivered from a troublesone servitude, removeth up and downe and intermingles with the gentle aire.’ Thus he, to whom consent­eth most expressely Hierocles in his commentary upon the golden verses of Pythagoras in sundry places, telling us that the soule is not only incorruptible, but also made immediately, not by procreation but the hand of God. See him of the Greeke and Latine edition of Paris pag. 101. 103, 132.

‘I will adde to these the words of the Emperour Marcus Antoninus, commonly called Aurelius, l. 4. n. 13. according to Merick Casa [...] ­bon's division, If soules, saith he, remaine how from all aeternity Marc. Antonin. l. 4. de vitasu [...]. n. 13. could the aire hold them, or how the earth retaine their bodies? As here the bodies after they have lyen a while within the earth are changed, and being dissipated, leave space for other carkasses; so soules carried up into the aire, after they have beene there sometime, whi­ther kindled, or liquefied, are conjoined to the common [...], that is unto the originall mind, or great soule of the world.’ Thus he as if he had said with Solomon the spirit returnes to God that made it, for the great soule of the universe, or the originall minde of all, is nothing else. Horace consenteth, saying, Melior pars nostri vi­tabit lebitinam. and Tacitus in vit. Jul. Agric. Siquis piorum manib. locus: sive sapientib. placet, non cum corpore extinguuntur magnae ani­mae, placide quiescas. If to the spirits of the pious there be any place remaining, if great soules be not together with their bodies extin­guished, mayest thou rest in peace. To these Ovid subscribeth Meta­mor. l. ult.

The same doctrine is constantly taught by Pythagoras as appeares by his doctrine of Metempsycosis and also both Jamblichus & Porphy­ry in their severall histories of his life do witnesse of him, as also Dio­genes Laërtius.

I conclude this Jury with the judgement of Macrobius, who c. 14. Macrob. in som. scipio. c. 14. in somnium Scipionis after he had recited sundry and differing fancies of severall Philosophers touching the nature of the soule, concludes, [Page 14] as followeth. ‘Obtinuit tamen, non minus de incorporalitate ejus, quàm de immortalitate sententia. Neverthelesse, the opinion touch­ing the incorporeity of the soule, as well as touching the immortali­ty of it hath beene prevalent.’ Against all these, therefore it im­portes little that Dicaearchus Messenius a Peripatetique Philosopher & Scholler to Aristotle, or as Aristoxenus should, as Cicero relateth in the first of his Tusculanes and in his second of his Academiques, hold and defend it to be mortall, or that both he, and as Cicero reporteth out of him, another more ancient Philosopher, by name Pherecrates, one of the linage of Deucalion, did thinke there was no soule at all, neither in man, nor beast, and forasmuch as concerneth the same Dicaearchus, Sextus Emp. l. 2. Hypotyp. c. 5. Fr. Picus l. 1. de Doctrin. vanit. Gentium▪ c. 14. we read in Sextus Empericus and Tertullian, as also in Joh. Fr. Picus of Mirandula, he was of the same opinion: for there is nothing so ab­surde which some one Philosopher, or other hath not maintained. Sextus Empericus was of the same minde also as he l. adv. Mathema­ticos acknowledgeth.

But now by the way, I note how sublimely most of these heathen wise men did Philosophize, when as they conclude the soules originall to be from heaven, and how much above the low pitch of certaine depressed spirits of this age, who after their continuall poring into objects materiall, and raking in the mudde of corruptible things, will needs draw out of that dirte the nobler substances of our soules and natures intellectuall by assigning for them no more perfect principle then generation, of which number this sorry author against whom we now deale, is one, yea and one also of the grossest that ever medled a­bout this businesse, as by his demeanour in it doth appeare. Hiero­cles in expresse termes determines saying, It seemes saith he, that God himselfe produced the severall soules of every particular man and left the soules of Beasts to be produced by the hand of nature, according to the judgements of Plato and of Timaeus the Pythagorean; so he com. in carm. aurea Pythagoreae pag. 133. of the Greek and Latine edition of Paris Anni 1583.

I know well, that amongst these ancients the word Anima, or [...], is aequivocall, because sometimes it is taken only for an exhalation of purer bloud, sometimes againe for [...], Mens, or Animus, [...] by which words the ruling, the spirituall, and intellective, and lastly the immortall part of man is signified; and not any materiall or fading ex­halation, which here by the way I note for the avoyding of excepti­ons and mistakings.

Let us come now unto our Author who would gladly father upon Aristotle, Nemesius, and Ambrosius Paraeus, that the soule is all the [Page 15] externall and internall faculties of man jointly considered. Which charge is strange, seeing it is well knowne that Aristotle defines the soule after no such way, but saith it is Actus corporis Organici, and a substance by which we live, have sence, and do understand; and if a substance then can it not receive intension, and remission, as every young Logician hath learned. But let us heare further.

All the faculties of man are mortall, as well those peculiar to man, as those other which are common to him with beasts, and if all those with his corpulent matter compleating man be proved mortall, then the invention of the soule upon that ground vanisheth, which thus I prove.

All elementary compositions or temperatures are mortall. But mans faculties, a minore ad majus, are temperatures. Ergo mortall.

The minor is denyed, namely that all mans faculties be temperatures; for, to instance, neither the understanding nor the will be temperatures, and yet are principall faculties of man.

He proves the minor. That which is subject to intension and re­mission is a temperature.

But such are all mans faculties, yea those of reason, consideration, science &c. All that distinguisheth man from beast are augmented by learning, education &c. lessened by negligence, idlenesse, and quite nullified by madnesse. Ergo.

Of this gallant argument there be but two propositions false, that is to say, both the major and the minor of it, and then what kinde a conclusion it hath, we may easily judge. For first, it is false that e­very thing is a temperature, universally speaking, which is subject to intension and remission, but such things only as be subject unto them per se and by their owne nature, and not by accident onely, and this ap­peares in the very businesse now in agitation betweene us; for a great­er clerke then this man is will hardly ever prove that the augment, or diminution, which is, found in the acts of knowledge, do arise from a­ny internall alteration in the intellective faculty, and not contrary wise from the difference, advantage, and alteration in the organ, or the species and formes intentionall: for this reason a man may understand better then a childe, not because his faculty intellective is better then a childes, namely for betternesse in the organe; also a learned man bet­ter then an illiterate, and a diligent then a negligent, because those may have acquired more species, or formes intentionall, or else have kept them better then these other that be illiterate and negligent, and not for any intension, or remission in the faculty▪ This I say may be reason of the difference and is likely so to be, and not any variation in the [Page 26] doe usually fetch them, which how more or lesse valid or perspicuous they may seeme, yet have they beene held for good by the wisest Phi­losophers both Heathen and Christian, and to be concluding. But how­soever that be, the verity it selfe hath beene counted certaine and evi­dent, insomuch as Aureolus himselfe although he found difficulty in sundry of the arguments, yet did he not doubt to say, speaking of the soules immortality, in 2 Sent. dist. 19. ‘This doctrine of faith is to be held undoubtedly, and it is the common conception of the minde, [...]ureols in 2 [...]ent. Dist. 19. and a verity evident of it selfe, though to give a reason for it it is not so easie.’ So Aureolus, with whom consenteth Cicero when as he said, as hath beene before alleadged out of him, that it is the consent of all Nations. ‘Now, saith he, if the consent of all be the voice and ver­dict of Nature, then are we to thinke the same.’ Besides how could so many Heathen Philosophers have acknowledged unanimous­ly this doctrine of immortality otherwise then by the light of nature and common reason? out of which it is plaine, that naturall reason doth teach us this verity. It followeth then, that by Ciceroes judgement whatsoever the arguments be, the doctrine it selfe is not onely true but also certaine and evident; which thing may very well be, for there be many truths which are not proved easily or evidently, yea perad­venture are not to be proved at all, but be things most evident and in­demonstrable; nature and the understanding acknowledging and em­bracing them as legitimate, without any further argument then her owne light; and againe, many things be knownely false which na­ture rejecteth as spurious and false, although she be not able to demon­strate that they involve any repugnancy or contradiction; so that in divers verities we are to rely lastly upon Tertullian's Testimonium ani­mae.

CHAP. VII. Mans being by Procreation no argument of his soules mortality.

THat mans soule must have the being by generation, because the man himselfe hath his being by it, is no good consequence; and the reason why some have beene deceived in judging it to be a good one or that of due his soule ought to be generated as well as the soules of Beasts, hath beene partly a false apprehension what the true nature and essence of generation was, and partly also what was the perfection and essence of man.

As for the first misprision, it was that generation was not onely to [Page 27] make the compositum or whole to be, but also the parts, by the confer­ring unto them not onely the being parts but also the simple being, or the being Entities, that is to say, not onely the formality of them, but even the naturality; which conceipt of theirs is a false conception & a­gainst all reason and principles of Philosophy. Which clearely teacheth us that it is man which is procreated or made by generation, and not his soule, his body is made or framed by it, and not the matter of which it is composed. For it is a received maxime and most true, touching the power of naturall causes, and no farther. Quòd ex nihilo nihil fit; Of nothing there is nothing to be made: out of which it followes, that before generation both matter and formes of all corporeall things must have before hand a being in rerum natura, at least an incompleate one, and cannot possibly have it from generation; wherefore by the worke of generation they are not made, or receive any new absolute entity, but onely are collected, ordered, and at last substantially linked and u­nited one with another, which union is not by a sole approximation, contiguity, or juxta position, that I may so speake of one of them with another, as it falls out in artificiall compounds, where colours for ex­ample, though they be not pictures, yet being thus or thus chosen, for­med and united, make up such or such a picture; but it is by a continui­ty or an inward and substantiall knot which is in our power better to conceive then explicate, and yet not to conceive fully neither, for these principles of generation are natures arcana, her darkest and most secret misteries, which like the springs of Nilus she hath hidden from our eyes, as if our seeing of them were a prophanation, and to let us know that she is our mother, and we but ignorant children and such who must not be made much acquainted with our originall.

Againe, if the parts also must be generated, I aske whether these parts be simple or compound entities? If simple, they cannot be gene­rated, but must have their being by creation; if compound, then if they must be generated, the parts also of which those parts are made must in like sort be generated; and so either in infinitum, or else at least, till we come to some parts which are simple and ingenerable; by which discourse it followes that no parts at all, neither corporeall nor spiritu­all, neither in man nor beasts, doe receive their being by generati­on.

Touching the second misprision or originall of errour and mistak­ing, note, that although it belong to the perfection of an Animal to generate another like it selfe, yet is it a perfection onely to Animals and Vegetables, and to them also not simply but onely quatenus corrup­tibilia, so farre forth as they are corruptible, generation being institu­ted [Page 28] onely for reparation of decayes, and to reëdify the ruines of cor­ruption; so that wheresoever there be more ruines, in that place more reedification is needfull. In creatures therefore irrationall where there is a corruption more large then in the rationall, a fuller manner of ge­neration is necessary, because there is a greater decay in the forme in the one then in the other, forasmuch as the formes of irrationall crea­tures be by corruption disformalized and dissipated into their atomes, which dissipation if the formes were spirituall needed not; and againe, if indivisible were a thing impossible. Therefore generation is to per­forme more in one then in the other, and yet sufficiently in both, accor­ding to their severall exigences. Seeing then generation is nothing but productio viventis a vivente in similitudinem naturae; a production of one living thing by another in a similitude of nature; according to the definition thereof, whatsoever agent shall doe this that same is tru­ly and univocally said to generate, how much more or lesse soever it doe besides this. A man therefore producing another man by the one­ly composing and uniting his two essentiall parts, body and soule, ma­keth that to be a man which before was none, and doth truly generate a man, although he no more produce his soule, then he does the matter of which his body is formed and made; for there can be no more neces­sity for the production of the one then of the other. And this one in­stance of matter will evidently destroy our adversaries argument taken from procreation.

Neither is it, as Argenterius well declareth, any imperfection in man not to generate so fully as other Animals doe, but rather a great perfe­ction in him; for as it is a perfection in beasts to generate totally as much as generation can doe, because they are toally corruptible as much as in nature it is possible, and as in Angels it were an imperfecti­on to generate, because they by their nature are totally incorruptible; so in man it is a perfection to generate as Angels doe not doe, and also not to generate so totally and fully as brute beasts doe generate, be­cause he is as the Philosopers rightly and aptly terme him, Horizon mundi & nexus naturae utrius (que); as it were, the Horizon of the world and that which knits corporeall and spirituall natures together by his participating with them both, and not fully agreeing with either: not being so corruptible as beasts, nor so incorruptible as Angels or pure In­telligences. By which it followes, that his manner of generation is in something to agree with the non generation of Angels; and againe, something with the totall generation of creatures irrationall, that same generation of his being truly and univocally a generation, because he is univocally and truly an Animal, and yet not totally so, because in his [Page 29] immortall soule, he resembles the incorruptibility of Angels or Intelli­gences. For Modus generandi sequitur modum essendi: & ideo quod partim est immortale & partim non, partim etiam gener are debet & par­tim non. That which is not wholly mortall doth not wholly generate, and therefore neither man nor beast doth generate wholly, yet a beast more wholly then a man.

Wherefore if some of him after corruption doe remaine, there can be no necessity that all of him should be made by generation; nay seeing something more of him, namely the forme after corruption, doth re­maine incorrupted then there doth of Beasts, for of beasts the matter onely remaines, something lesse of him is to be produced by generati­on then there is of them, though all of neither. Whosoever therefore shall affirme that a creature intelligent like man should generate ano­ther of his owne kind as totally and adequatly as one beast does gene­rate another, doth not speake like a Philosopher, and besides doth un­justly disparage and disgrace his, owne linage, and violates the rights of his creation.

CHAP. VIII. A solution of the Adversaries objections, together with some others of Doctor Daniel Sennertus.

THese former notandums having beene premised, we need not dwell long upon answering of objection, for by them the way is opened already, and that which before hath beene delive­red will not need any more then application.

Object. 1. Whole man is generated by man, therefore all his parts, both soule and body, and if both be generated then both are mortall.

Answ. Whole man is generated by man, I grant it. Therefore both soule and body are generated. I distinguish. That both soule and body are made parts of man by generation, and a creature produced like in nature to him that generates; I also grant and doe affirme that by do­ing of this onely the compleat act of generation or procreation is per­formed according to the received definition of generation before ex­hibited in the Chapter precedent. But that both soule and body must [Page 36] be, therefore made and have their Entities or beings given them by procreation; that consequence I deny as false and absurde, yea so ab­surde as it suffers a thousand instances to the contrary in all sorts of A­nimals. For example, a whole horse is generated both matter and forme; and yet his matter did not receive any being by generation, and so it falls out in other creatures. If then it be not necessary that the matter receive the being by procreation, though the whole Animal consisting of matter and forme be truly generated, what reason can there be why to the generation of the whole Animal, a new being of the forme, by vertue of procreation should be necessary? or why can one be necessary to generation, when as we see evidently the other is not? or why againe should we exact the new production of either of them by generation, when without any such act the definition of ge­neration See Argenter. com. in Aphor. 1. Hippocr. is fulfilled, and agrees both unto the generation of beasts, whose matter is not generated, and to the generation of man, whose forme is not generated, any more then his matter is? By force of this solution all his imaginary absurdities which he labours to fasten upon the non procreation of the soule, doe of themselves dissolve.

If the soule, saith he, be infused, then Christ did not take whole hu­manity from the seed of the woman.

Answ. He received from the seed of the woman as much of the humanity as was to be received thence, and that which he tooke did not come unto him by procreation, nor was it so to doe. As for the fourteenth to the Hebrewes which he cites for his purpose, our answer to it is, that it is not found in our bookes, neither Greeke nor Latine, neither do the Editions of Raphelengius or Elzevir contain any more Chapters than thirteen.

If saith he, we consist of soule and body, and are not men without both, and receive not our soules from him, (he meanes the Generatour as I suppose) then Adam is the father of no man, nor Christ the Son of man, because his manhood's constitutive part, even that which should make him a man, could not be by the seed of the woman, and a man is as much a father of fleas and lice, which receive their matter from him, as of his children.

Answ. Surely fleas and lice, whence soever they receive their matter, do not proceed from him in likenesse of Nature; as by the defini­tion, they if they were generated by man, ought to do. Moreover, they are not generated by man, but of him, neither is he the agent but the patient, and so is of these vermin no generatour at all proper, or impro­per. Secondly, men do receive their soules by force of generation, al­though they be not generated, and so, notwithstanding this non-gene­ration [Page 37] of the soule, Adam might truly and univocally be the father of all men; and also the soule of Christ might come by the seed of the woman, although it were not made or procreated by it.

If the soule (addes he) be infused after the conception, then there is growth before there is life, which is impossible, for the soule is made, the vegetative as well as the motive, sensitive, or rationall part.

Answ. I grant, that before the infusion of the soule there may be vegetation, and this by the sole virtue of the sperme; but I deny that therefore there be in man more soules than one, that is, than the ratio­nall: for this same force of vegetation which is in the seed holdeth it selfe upon the part of the matter onely, and doth not performe the of­fice of a soule, or forme, the substance and operation thereof, being no more than to fashion an organicall body and to make it fit for the re­ception of the soule and the union with it, after whose infusion both the vitall and animal spirits do but serve as instruments to it, and to accomplish the body in making it, to be so perfectly organicall as the eminency of a rationall spirit, above other formes, doth require to have it.

If the soule be not generated but infused into a dead body, then, saith he, it is lawfull to be Nigromancer; for Nigromancy is nothing but putting a spirit into a dead body, and so it is imitation of God, and God the onely Nigromancer, and all the men in the world but Nigromanticke apparitions, whose spirits when they have done the worke for which they were put into the bodies, desert them as other conjured Ghosts do.

Answ. See the shallownesse of this man who can neither speak right, nor reason with common sense and probability. He calls Necro­mancy constantly Nigromancy, and he supposes that a soule in a dead body makes a living man, and can exercise vitall actions in it, or acti­ons of life, and so, according to his grosse capacity, if the soule be in­fused God must be a Necromancer and men but Necromantique appa­ritions; for this Ignoramus, it seemes, knowes no difference between a soule and body that are united and those that are not united, but to­gether onely, nor between a body living by the virtue of the spirit, and by virtue thereof doing vitall actions, and another which is onely moved and inhabited by a spirit, without any union with it or partici­pation of life. But, supposing all were one, yet were it not lawfull to be a Necromancer, because nothing at all be it never so good, is to be done by superstitious actions, or by making any recourse unto the De­vill, and acknowledgement of his power by any dependency of him whatsoever, more or lesse.

[Page 38] It is granted, saith he, that the body considered meerly sensitive cannot sin and is but an instrument, or as the pen in the hand of the writer. Therefore if the soule be infused, then of necessity, the im­mortall thing and not our mortall flesh is the authour of all sin, and so God's immediate hand the cause of all sin.

That the body is onely an instrument of the soule, is false, for it is a See Solo of this in 4. d. 43. q. 1. a. 2. Rat. 3. living co-agent with it, and a partaker both in the good and evill acti­ons, and so is both rewardable and punishable with it; whether in the mean time it be created or generated, for this variation makes no difference in this matter of merit or demerit; neither doth the creati­on of the soule make God the authour of sin, more than the generati­on of it, that is to say, not at all, for still the soule and body are au­thours of their own actions, and the deformity ariseth from their mis­demeanour, and not from God's creation or concurrence.

Doctour Sennertus, although he admit not of any mortality in the soule, yet he holds it probable, that it comes by procreation, and that from the first instance of conception, the seed is animated with the ra­tionall soule: which Doctrine of his, by his leave, inferres mortality: for whatsoever is generated, is corruptible, and is to go out, according to the ordinary Lawes of Nature, at the same gate of according to the ordinary Lawes of Nature, at the same gate of corruption at which it entred in. Neither is it true, or likely, or lastly, any way phi­losophicall, to say as he doth Hypomn. 4. c. 10. that nothing created is immortall by the principle of Nature, but onely by the free will or gift of God; because as it is amongst bodies, some are very durable, as Marble and Cedar, some by and by corrupted, as flowers and fruits, even out of the severall natures of their composition which God hath appointed for them, and not out of the free will of God immediate­ly, without any further relation; so in like sort, some substances are perpetuall out of the nature of their being, as spirituall substances and bodies that are simple and unmixt, other some, out of their own Na­tures, corruptible, as those that are mixt and made up of Elements, which as by some naturall agents they were knit up together, so by the operation of other some they are dissolvable. Soules then if genera­ted are compounds, and if so, may be uncompounded by the agen­cy and operation of causes naturall; wherefore to seek an immortali­ty onely from a decree extrinsecall, without any foundation in their naturall beings, seemes neither to be philosophicall, nor true; where­fore the immortality of Soules and Angels is not to be reared upon this weak foundation, according to which a Flye may be as much immor­tall as an Angel, one by Nature, according to Sennertus, having no preheminence over the other the free determination of God for [Page 39] their perpetuall conservation being equally applicable to either of them.

Conformably to this position of his he will needs have the sperme alwaies animated with a reasonable soule; but then consider how ma­ny Sennertus Hy­pomn. 4. ca. 10. & lib. de con­sens. Chymic▪ cum Arist. & Galeno c. 9. more soules are cast away without any bodies organicall and hu­mane, then are actuated and preserved by bodies. I aske what must become of these innumerable soules? must they perish, or have bodies made them at the Resurreection? neither of these two can be admit­ted without great temerity and absurdities.

Besides this, we know God did not inspire Adam with a living spirit while he was a lumpe of clay, but when he had a face and a body that was organicall, and not before. Againe, why does the soule depart from the body, but onely because it leaves to be organicall? why then, or with what probability can we imagine the soule is in the in­organicall sperme? certainly, with none at all.

The winde that did drive Sennertus upon this inhospitall shoare was the necessity of assigning a vis formatrix, or a [...], that is to say, an able architect, or former of humane body, which though most acknowledge to be the seed, yet Sennertus sees not how this can be, unlesse it should be animated with the soule; his reason is, because the soule onely is to build an house fit for it selfe to inhabit. But this reason of his is not urgent; nay more, it is not likely; for egges and young birds do not build their own nests, but the old ones for them; so that it must, by this account, be the fathers office to erect this new building and not the childes. But, how, sayes he, can the father do this? easily and well, by sending his sperme as his deputy and officer, Argent. com in 1, Aphor. Hipp. to performe that duty, as Argenterius also teacheth; which entity hath derived to it from the generatour so much naturall strength and cunning as to make a sufficient architect for the effecting of this work, and all this may be done with the only forme of seed, without any animation of it with a soule. Thus, it is likely, that the Acorne, for example, without any more forme than of an Acorne, collects fit par­ticles out of the elements and materials about it, and by a virtue deri­ved from the tree on which it grew, formes out and fashions the body of an Oake: and for the effecting of this worke the seed participates tmch of the nature of the tree or plant, and hath ordinarily much of [...]he same virtue: wherefore in this abstruse question or quere that we may say something which is likely, and hath for the truth thereof pro­bable examples and instances in Nature, we do conceive that [...], or forming virtue, is the seeds own forme excited and assisted by the breeding, cherishing, and connaturall warmth of the maternall body, [Page 40] which doth environ it; as in the procreation of birds it seemes to be, where the semen of the Cocke being cherished and stirred up by the ambient and incumbent warmth of the Hen, is that which changes the egge, and formes it into the shape of the bird from whence it came. Neither is it probable, that in so small a coagulum or seed, which came from the Cocke the soule or essence of a Cocke is re­sident.

Now, whereas he tels us, that by the blessing granted to all Creatures by the Creatour of them in these words, Increase and multiply, force was given to every soule to multiply another: we confesse it to be true; yet this not to be done by creating of the younger by the elder soules, or by the giving of them new entities; but rather by doing some other act out of which these formes should connaturally follow, as materiall formes they do by a resultancy, and immateriall by crea­tion from a higher cause, which creation is to follow, and is due by a regular ordination & exigence of Nature; and so they may truly be said to be given and communicated, though not made, by the force of ge­neration. And this is the true vis prolifica, and not that other which Sen­nertus feignes unto himselfe, by which he will have one humane soule to beget another, and on the instant to become with childe of it, no bodie knowes how; neither by what particular operation, nor from what Mine it should be digged. For this manner of speaking makes shew rather of some empty Magicke, than of sound Philosophy, and seemes altogether as hard and impossible as the eduction of them out of the potentiality of the materia prima, when understood in that sense in which he himselfe impugnes it.

If the Parents (objecteth Sennertus) do not give the soule which is the forme of man, they do not generate the man; but for certaine, they do generate the man, therefore they give the soule also; unlesse they communicate the soule, like should not generate his like. So he Hypomn. 4. cap. 11. In briefe, I answer, that the Parents do give and communicate both Forme and Matter, but that worke they may well do without the making or the producing either of them. It is certain they give the Matter, and it is as certain they do not produce it, where­fore the same may be said of the Forme without prejudice to the es­sence of generation, or which is all one, of one like or simile produ­cing of another. And that there is true generation, without produ­cing either part, appeareth plainly; for Death which is the opposite to generation, and destroyes what the other made, will shew us what generation is; but Deach is onely a dissolution of parts united, and not a destruction of them; it is destructive, not of the matter or forme, [Page 41] but of the man: for do but divide a mans soule and body and he is de­stroyed, and remaines not a man any longer, but loseth what he had got by generation, that is to say, by generation he got to be a man, and by dying he loses it. In fine, as Argenterius rightly answereth, Generation is not of the parts, but of the compositum.

He addes, if the sperme, from the first instant, be not animated, and See him in 1. Aphor. Hip. the generatour dye in the interim before the animation, it might be said, that a dead man did generate. I deny the consequence, because that Parent while he was living did that act, by virtue of which all the rest (as their turnes came) did follow, and that one and first act was generation, and not the subsequent. As for example, he is said to make a fire who first puts the fire to the fewell and kindles it, though all do not burne of a great while after, because all the rest did follow in virtue of the first act.

Thus we see that the arguments of Sennertus were not so urgent and weighty as to be able to hinder a wise Christian Philosopher, as he was, from relinquishing this tenet of his, and from piously subscri­bing his Pareamus, by which act he left behinde him an example wor­thy of great praise, and of all true students to be imitated. I have ad­ded to the Authour's Objections, whom I undertook to impugne, these out of Sennertus who is a Writer of great worth and substance, to the end that by occasion of his difficulties, the matter in hand might be explicated with more satisfaction, and for mine own satis­faction also, who was weary with fighting with a shadow.

CHAP. IX. The Adversaries resurrection of Beasts exploded, together with a Conclusion of the Worke.

IT is usually said, that one folly brings on another, and ordinarily one worse than it selfe, and so it fals out with this wretched man against whom we deale at this present, who after his grosse errour of mans totall mortality, fals into one which is much grosser, yea, so absurd, as it is to be numbred amongst the most ridiculous that ever were main­tain'd even by Mahomet the father of absurdities, and who was bet­ter at that worke, than any man that went before him. But at the length what may this errour be? I will give it in his own words, and it is this:

All other Creatures (saith he) shall be raised and delivered from Death at the Resurrection, my reasons and ground for it, be these. First, that otherwise the curse in Adam would extend further than [Page 42] the blessing in Christ, contrary to the Scriptures, For as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive, 1 Cor. 15. 22. Thus he, abusing Scripture, as we see, for the upholding of this his prodigious folly. Surely, the man when he resolved upon these things was given over into reprobate sense, and permitted (for his greater confusion) in sight both of God and the world to fall into such an Abyssus of ab­surdity as that no man might take harme, or be seduced by him but such onely who had a minde to be deceived.

It seemes then by this bestiall Doctrine, that at the Resurrection all the Gnats and Fleas that ever were shall be revived, all the Toads and Frogs and poysonous Serpents and other vermin. Certainly, those who are to live amongst all these are likely to have gallant time of it. His places of Scripture which he profanes in alleadging to prove this need no expositor nor answer to them, for I thinke no reader is so sim­ple as cannot do it by himselfe. Doubtlesse both according to the common principles of Christianity, and also those particulars of this Authour, Christ is the cause of our Resurrection, and none are to rise but those onely for whom he died, and therefore since he died not for beasts, they are not to have any Resurrection.

As for the Assertion, it is grosser and more inexcusable in this Au­thour, than it was in Mahomet, because this Mahomet made a Paradise and felicity agreeing most of all to beasts and men of bestiall dispositi­ons, for as it is well knowne out of the Alfurcan or Alchoran, and as Theophanes an ancient and faithfull Historian relateth. ‘His Paradise Theophan. apud Porphyr. c. 17. & Jacob. de Vitriaco l. Hist. Orient. c. 6. was a place of corporall eating and drinking, of wantonnesse with women, where there was a River flowing with wine and hony and milke, together with an incomparable deholding of women, not not these we have now, but of others. Also long lasting plea­sures of obscenity, and other such things full of luxury and folly.’ So writeth Theophanes. But this man who will seem a Christian might have learned out of the Gospell a felicity of an higher straine, one purely refined from all dregs of basenesse and carnality, and that the blessed shall neither marry nor be married, but live like the Angels in Heaven, not enjoying the felicity of a swine, but a celestiall. Where­fore leaving Mahomet and other beasts with him to enjoy such a fe­licity as they deserve and feigne unto themselves; I passe unto our Authour's last folly, which is his calling it a Riddle, that the soule im­mortall is all of it in all, and again, all in every part, wondring how this should be, and holding it a meer fiction and thing impossible: but I for my part do not wonder, that a man of so grosse a wit and nar­row a capacity, as he in this book hath shewed himselfe, should not [Page 43] understand this Doctrine or saying, especially if he will judge of the nature of indivisible presences by those that are divisible, as it seemes he does. Yet I have cause to wonder why so stupid and so sorry a fellow as this is, should dare to hold it to be a Riddle or impossible, onely because he with his small wit is not able to understand it; as if forsooth, nothing were possible to Nature or to God the Authour of Nature, saving that alone which he understands how it can be done. I am now quite weary of this man, and sicke with raking so long in such a heap of dirt, and therefore at this instant I leave him to be­thinke himselfe about making a timely recantation.

Now, turning with delight unto my Reader, to solace and refresh my selfe after all this travaile, I desire him to look into Hierocles Commentary upon the Golden Verses ascribed to Pythagoras, in Hierocles in Carm. Pyth. which he seemeth to have discovered the originall of this pernicious errour, touching the soules mortality. ‘What availes it, faith he, with perjuries and murders and other wicked wayes to gather wealth and to seem rich unto the world, and to want those good things which are conducible unto the minde? But besides, to be stu­pid and insensible of them, and thereby to augment the evill, or if they have any remorse of conscience for their offences, to be tor­mented in their soules, and affraid of the punishments of Hell, com­forting themselves with this alone, that there is no way of escaping them, and from hence are ready to cure one evill with another, and by a perswasion that the soule is mortall, to sooth up themselves in wickednesse, judging they are not worthy to have any thing of theirs remaining after death, that so they might avoid those punish­ments, which by judgement should be inflicted on them; for a wicked man is loath to thinke his soule to be immortall, for feare of the revenges that are to follow his misdeeds. Wherefore pre­venting the Judge who is below, he pronounceth the sentence of death against himselfe, as holding it fit that such a wicked soule should have no longer a being nor subsistence. Behold here the foun­tain head of this errour opened and purged by Hierocles.’

In fine, from whatsoever puddle this errour sprung, let us remem­ber what Socrates (being to die) delivered touching the various con­dition of soules after this life. ‘He said, as Cicero relateth, there were two different pathes or voyages of soules at their departure Cic. l. 1. Tuscul. from the bodies, for all such as with humane vices had contaminated themselves, and were delivered wholly up to lust, with which as with domesticke vices being blinded, they had by lewd actions de­filed themselves, or had attempted against the Common-wealth any [Page 44] crime, or fraud inexpiable, that these had a wandring way assigned for them, sequestred from the assemblies of the Gods; but such againe as had preserved themselves entire and chaste, contracting little or no contagion from the body, having alwayes retired and withdrawn themselves from it, and had in humane bodies imitated the conversation of the Gods, these found opened for them an easie way of returne to them from whom they proceeded at the first.’

This is the Doctrine both of Cicero and of Socrates, what then re­maines to do but to hearken attentively to the wise Counsell of the Prince of Philosophers Aristotle, and to suffer it to have a powerfull influence into all the passages of our life? His words l. 10. Ethic. c. 9. ac­cording to the division of Andronicus Rhodius be as follow. ‘If then, saith he, our understanding, in respect of man, be a thing divine, so Arist. l. 10. Ethic. c. 9. that life which is lead according unto the understanding, if compa­red with life humane, is divine also; neither, as some perswade, is it lawfull for a man to relish and follow onely that which is humane, and being mortall, those things onely which are mortall, but as much as in him lieth, he ought to vindicate himselfe from all mortality, and to take speciall care that he live according to that part which is most excellent within him. Now that which is best within us is our minde, which though it be small in bulke and weight, yet in power and excellency doth surpasse the rest.’ And with this wise counsell of the Philosopher I conclude this whole Question, which though the day of every mans departure will decide and give a finall resolution to it, yet in the mean season, are not disputes of this nature fruitlesse or superfluous, because if they be well performed, they are like burning torches, which in the darke gallery of this life teach us how to direct our steppes, and before that blacke day come, to helpe us for the making our preparations before-hand, that so with better hopes of safety we may meet our deadly enemies in the gate. With­out all doubting for the repressing of brutish, bestiall and unworthy affections; and again for our encouragement to noble and generous de­signements, the best preparatives against Death, there is no considera­tion so powerfull and efficacious as that one of the high perfection of mans soule, and the immortall nature and condition of it, for, as Cicero observeth l. 1. de legib. Qui se ipsum nôrit primùm aliquid sentiet se ha­bere divinum, ingenium (que) in se suum sicut symulachrum aliquod dedica­tum Cicero l. 1. de legib. putabit, tanto (que) munere Deorum semper aliquid dignum faciet & sentiet. ‘He that doth know himselfe will forthwith finde within him something that is divine, and will hold his understanding as a statue dedicated, and be alwayes thinking or doing something an­swerable [Page 45] to so great munificence of the Gods.’ That is to say, he will be mindfull, that as in upright shape of body and the perfection of his spirit, he excelleth beasts and all creatures irrationall, so he will endeavour to do in the condition of his living, by disdaining to stoop to any thing which is base, or to defile the house in which his soule inhabits with any unworthy or ignoble actions.

I will seale and signe this whole dispute with the determination and censure of the book of Wisedome, which book whether it be re­ceived into the Canon, or no, yet is it confessedly very ancient, and therefore by consent of all may claime a just precedence of authority before any Heathen Philosopher whatsoever, the words are these, Justorum animae in manu Dei sunt, & non tanget illos tormentum mortis, visi sunt oculis insipientium mori, illi autem sunt in pace. The soules of Sap. 3. the just be in the hands of God, and the torment of Death shall not touch them. To the eyes of the foolish they seemed to die, but they remain in peace. Behold here in the judgement of this venerable Au­thour, what kinde of people they are who hold the soules mortality, namely, [...], such as be destitute of true judgement and understand­ing. This is not my censure, neither is this character of my making; for who am I that should presume so farre? but it is the judgement of the ancient Authour of the Book of Wisedome, whose yeares and credit may deserve regard, even amongst those spirits that be most confident of their own conceptions, and be the greatest admirers and idolaters of themselves. In fine, this ancient Sage brands all deniers of our soules immortality with the selfe same note of ignominy, that David the kingly Prophet did marke that wretched mortall who Psalm. 13. closely and in his heart had said, There is no God. Yet there is this ods between them two, and worthy to be observed, for though both of them be impious and absurd, yet one of them had some shame in him and said it onely in his heart. But this Adversary of ours goes further, and had the face to publish his impiety in Print, or at least the heart so to do it, as he himselfe might lie concealed, and his name unknowne; which covert way of his though it appeare not altogether so bold and bad, as if he had put his name unto his worke, yet was it an act too bold for any Christian man or true Philosopher to exercise, or to be an Authour of in Print; for alas, after so many great Divines and deep Philosophers, whose uniforme suffrages we have for the dignity of man, that is to say, for the soules immortall nature and incorruptibi­lity, how could the cogitations unto the contrary of this poore worme be a matter any way considerable with men of understanding and ability?