CHAP. I.

5. IF these are Principles to be granted, my work is done; for these are the Grounds on which I build my judgement, and these are the Touchstones by which I try it. WhatsoeverSic proponam, sic asseram, ut verita [...]i quae nec fallit, nec fallitur, semper inhaream, sem­pe [...] obediens consentiéns (que) reperiar. Ful­gent. ad Mo­nim. l. 1. sub init. I beleeve concerning Election or Reprobation, and those other Questions which are depending, I do infer from these Truths, which (as I suppose) cannot possibly deceive me. And whilest I stand to these Grounds, I am not able to quit my judgement, how little soever it shall be liked by such as are wittily unrea­sonable. So that my Principles be right, I care not whither they carry me, whilest Scripture and my best Care are both Guides in my conveyance; for where the Premises are true, the Conclusion cannot be false: all that needeth to be car'd for in the pro­gresse of my search, is the legality of the deduction; which, if it be wrong, I shall be glad to hear of it for my instruction; and if it be right, it cannot choose but be Truth which leaps natu­rally forth from the womb of Truth.

6. If by any inadvertency (either in me, or the reader) my words seem to clash with my Belief, it is by no other misfor­tuneNec inest iis quae de libero arbi­trio Patres qui­dem & Neo­terici asserue­runt, ea quam olim non nulli putant impie­tas, si haec rite modò accipian­tur, & sicut ip­si scriptores ea accipi volue­runt. then befell S. Austin, when he used such expressions against the Pelagians, as seemed to contradict what he had spoken against the Manichees; and yet he professeth it was not his judgement, but his style only that was changed. The saying of Bucer is remarkable, (and the more because it was Bucer's) That there was no such harm in what was said by the learned, both ancient and modern, concerning the freedome of the Will, if things were taken as they were meant, (that is to say) by the right handle: and that would oftner be done, if the persons of some men were not a prejudice to their cause: for I finde the same words may passe with favour from one, which would not be endured shouldApud Cassand. consult. p. 130. they be spoken by another. One short example will not be burdensome to the Reader. Doctor Twisse himself hath said expresly, That the justice of God doth not appear in the absolute or In praefat. ad Vind. Grat. p. 3. simple condemnation of his creature, but in the condemnation of it for sin. [Page 8] Thus he speaketh in his Preface, which is most of it spent against Arminius. I did but say the same words to some ad­mirers of D^r. Twisse, and yet was counted an Arminian; which makes me heartily desire, that I may meet with un­byas't and impartial Readers; that whatsoever I shall say in these following papers, may be compared with the two Princi­ples which I have just now laid: I disallowing all that dis­agreeth with those principles, as the unhappinesse of my pen, or the unsteadinesse of my brain. I desire all may go for no more then it is worth. If I seem to any man to be overtaken in a fault, he shall do well to restore me in the spirit of meeknesse, re­membring Gal. 6. 1. himself lest he also be tempted. If I am thought to be in the wrong by those that think themselves only in the [...], they can conclude no worse of me, then that I am not in­fallible: if in any thing I erre, it is for want of apprehension, not my unwillingness to apprehend; nor am I severely to be censur'd, for being every whit as dull, as those thousands of thousands who have thought as I do. I hope my Reasons will make it appear, that if I erre, I am not affectedly, but invincibly ig­norant; and so for being most unpassionately, I am most par­donably erroneous. Or if I am thought not to be so, I desire one favour from them that so think, even that all my faults (whether real or supposed) may rather be laid upon my person, then imputed to my Cause.

7. Before I come to prove any thing from the first of my Principles, I foresee a necessity to prove my Principles to be true; for though the foolishnesse of man perverteth his way, yet his heart Prov. 19. 3. fretteth against the Lord. There are men in the world of no small name, who have told the world both out of the Pulpit, and from the Presse, that all the evill of sin which is in man pro­ceedeth from God only as the Author, and from Man only as the Instrument; whether or no I am deceived, let the Reader judge by this following Catalogue of Expressions. I forbear to name the Authors in meer civility to their persons: but I have them lying by me very particularly quoted, and will pro­duce them, if I am challenged by any man's Doubt or Curiosity. The Expressions are such as these: (to begin with the mildest.)

If my hand were not weary, if my heart did not tremble, if [Page 11] both my ears did not tingle, I could reckon up many more such frightfull sayings, from mine own knowledge and inspection, which I have quoted to the very page, and can do to the very line of their several Authors: besides a cloud of blasphemies which I could name from other compilers, if I either listed or had need to take up any upon Trust. Now by all this it ap­pears, (as well as by many too literal expositions of some Texts in Scripture, which make God (blessed for ever!) to be the Tempter, the Deceiver, and the Father of Lies) there is a necessity lying upon upon me to prove my first Principle, before some Readers will dare to trust it, viz.

8. This is plain by Scripture, and by the Evidences of Rea­son: Proved by Scripture. (to which anon I shall adde Antiquity.) And first for Scripture, though the force of a Negative Praedestinare Deum homines ad pec­cata, aut poenas, in S. Scripturis non dicitur, sed eos ad vitam aeternam praedestinare dicitur, quos v [...]care de­cernit. Grot. in Riv. Ap. Disc. p. 52. Argument is not irrefragable, yet it is not unworthy to be observed, that God is no where affirmed to Predestine sin: and there­fore the word Predestination is us'd with­out any Epithet, to signifie nothing but Election in the ordinary sense: and it is set by Divines (both ancient and modern)Quatuor priores Articuli Lambethani sunt de Praedestinatione, & Reproba­tione, quarum illa significatur Rom. 11. 33. haec Psal. 36. 6. Epis. Wint. de Artic. Judi [...]. as an opposite member to Reprobation; which cannot be done from the bare na­ture of the word, but from the Use of it in Scripture: and why should that be the sole use of it (when the word it self is as fit to signifie the con­trary) but because God is the Author of all the good we do, and of all the good that we receive, whereas Man is his own Author of all the Evil which he committeth, and of the Evil which he suffereth for such commissions?

9. And though this bare negative Proof might seem suffici­ent in such a case [that God doth no where professe he wil's or decrees the sin of Man] yet (to make us inexcusable when we [Page 12] excuse our selves, like Adam, by any the least accusation of him that made us) God doth every where professe, that he wil's it not: as when he forbids it by his Lawes, when he pro­vides against it by his Discipline, when he shews us how to avoid it, when he tels us he cannot endure it, when he wins us from it by Promises, when he frights us from it by Threats, when he professeth that it is to him both a Trouble, and a Dishonour. How doth he wish that his People had walked in his Psal. 81. 13. wayes? How doth he expostulate and make his Appeal, whetherIsa. 5. 3, 4. he had omitted any thing, which might tend to the conversion Ezek. 18. of a sinful Israel? In the whole 18. chapter of Ezekiel, God is pleased to make his own Apologie and Appeal, even toVers. 2, 29. them that had accus'd him in an unworthy Proverb: [The Fa­thers have eaten sowre Grapes, and the childrens Teeth are set on edge] Are not my waies equal? and are not your waies un­equal? Sure their waies had been his, if he had absolutely con­triv'd them. The soul that sinneth it shall die, vers. 4. And why will ye die O house of Israel? vers. 31. Which was virtually to aske them, why they would sin too; which they ought to have done, if he had will'd it: for the positive will of God must and ought to be done; and can any man be punisht for doing that which he must? Must any man be punisht for doing that which he ought? 'Tis but an ill [...] (which some men use) to say that God hath a double Will, of which the one is secret, and the other revealed; the revealed will not only diverse, but even opposite to the secret one: God ordaining sin with the one, whilest he forbids it with the other; and not al­waies willing in secret what he reveals himself to be willing to, for this is a Salve ( [...]) a great deal worse then the wound which it sain would cure. Gods will indeed is [...]. [...]. in. c. 1. [...] Eph Homil. [...]. p. 1036. divided amongst orthodox Divines in respect of several Acts, and in relation to several objects, or to the very same object at se­veral Times, and in several Qualifications, into his first will, and his second will, his antecedent and consequent, his secret and re­vealed will: but to affirm two wils in simplicity it self, the one contrariant to the other about the very same act, (the one de­creeing that very act which is prohibited by the other) seemeth a greater blasphemy to me, then that which the Gnosticks, and [Page 13] the Marcionites, and the Manichees were guilty of, when theyAugustir. [...]. 6. Tertull. ad­versus Mar. l. 1. c. 1. Duos D [...]os ad­f [...]rt tanquam duas Sy [...]plega­das naufragii sui. affirmed two Gods, as the different Fountains of Good and Evil. For by what I finde in Tertullian (who was best ac­quainted with Marcion's Heresies) those two Principles of Good and Evil were found out as a Refuge for those other opinions, against which it is, that this my Scribble was first design'd. And what Tertullian speaks against Marcion, might very well be repeated against the Absolute Reprobatarians: it having been better and more reasonable (in that Father's Iudgement)Quis iste Deus tam bonus, ut ab illo malus [...]iat? ibid. c 23. Ibid. c. 26. that God should never have forbid what he determin'd should be done, then that he should determine to be done what he for­bid. And so 'tis the lesser blasphemy of the two, to ascribe Ho­linesse to one principle, and Unholinesse to another (in the Marcionite's sense) then both to him who is the Spirit of Holi­nesse; who therefore cannot so irrespectively decree the punish­ment of his Creature, as to necessitate his sin, and so be the Author of his Impenitence.

10. Let no man say then when he is tempted, I am tempted of God Jam. 1. 13, 14. (as our modern Ranters are wont to do) for every man is tempted, when he is drawn away of his own lust and enticed. So far is God from being the Author of any man's sin, that he is Faithfull (saith the Apostle) and will not suffer us to be tempted above what we are able, but will be sure to make a way 1 Cor. 10. 13. either for conquest, or for escape. I dare not say then (with him in the Comedian, who had been a great sinner) Quid si haec quispiam voluit Deus? What if some God hath so decree'd it? forTerent. in Eu­nuch. S. Iames makes me beleeve, that sin is both ingendred and con­ceived within me: when my lust hath conceived, it bringeth forth Jam. 1. 15. sin: and if my Lust is the Mother of it, sure the Father is my Will. It was David's saying of wicked Israel, that they Ps. 106. 29. provok'd God to anger (not with his will, but) with their own Inventions: there are Contrivers of mischief, (Ps. 58. 2) Devi­sers of lies, (Eccles. 7. 13.) such as weary themselves to commit iniquity (Jer. 9. 5.) Which cannot possibly be imputed unto an absolute decree. How many Volumes have been written De Vide Cornel. Agrip. de vanit. scient. arte Magica? De arte Meretricia? De arte Lenonum? with such others as would blush to be nam'd in English; and dare we say they are decreed, to be Mysteriously wicked? or that their [Page 14] destruction was irrespective, and unconditionall? I am in such disorder and discomposednesse of minde, whilest I only repeat these bold expressions, that were it not to good purpose (as I conjecture and intend) I durst not venture to repeat them. O Lord, righteousnesse belongeth unto thee, but unto us confusion of Dan 9. 7. face. For thou hast made man upright, but we have found out many Eccles. 7. 29. inventions.

After Scripture I come to Reason; by which I hope to makeProved secondly by Reason. it appear, that God Almighty is so far from being Acces­sary to sin, and does so many things to hinder it, that he doth not permit it but in an aequitable sense: and amongst ma­ny reasons which may be given, I shall (in civility to my reader, and for the love of brevity) content my self with that one, which to my seeming is the best; and I the rather think it the best, because I ground it upon a notion which I have formerly learnt from most judicious Mr. Hooker: That whichHocker Eccl. Polit. l. 1. assigns to every thing the kinde, that which moderates the power, and appoints the form and measure of working, that we properly call a Law. Hence the being of God is a kinde of Law to his working; because that perfection which God is, giveth perfection to that he doth. So that being nothing but what is good, he can work nothing that is otherwise. It is therefore an errour (saith that Man of judgement) to think there is no Reason for the works of God, besides his absolute will, (although no reason is known to us) for the Apostle tels us, he worketh all things (not simply and meerly according to his will, but) [...], according to the Eph. 1. 11. Counsel of his will: and because he doth voluntarily set him­self a Law whereby to work, it followes that that Law is no abatement to his freedome. If he is pleas'd to set him­self a Law or Rule, not to reprobate any but upon praescience of sin, (because that is most conformable to the nature of his goodnesse) can this be any praejudice to the perfection of his being? Is his nature the lesse absolute, because it pleases him that his will be conditionall in some things, as it is abso­lute in others? Does he lose any praerogative, by being unable to be the Author of sin? Or is not that rather a very great Argument of his Power? such an ability as that being meer [Page 15] Infirmity. We are God's Creatures, but sin is ours. God saw Gen▪ 1. 31▪ every thing that he had made, and behold it was very good. We see the things that are made by the Fiat of our will, and behold they are very evil. This Creative power of ours we justly reckon as the sequel of humane weaknesse, and shall we heedlesly affirm it to be a Iewel in the glorious diadem of God's Almightinesse? The Apostle indeed hath told us, that God worketh all things, (Eph. 1. 11.) but first he speaks it of God's Election which he praedestin'd in his Son, and the means conducing to such an end, which are none but good; not at all of Reprobation, the means in order to which are none but evill. Secondly, even N [...]c tamen [...] sumus stipites; ea enim nobis ut v [...]li­mus & possi­mus concedit. Beza. in Eph. 1. 11. Beza himself doth so inter­pret that place, as not to annihilate, or stupefie, but rather to strengthen and to rectifie our wils. God makes an ill will a good one, not no will at all; (as Bene volu­mus, non qui­dem naturâ, sed quia Deus ex malâ voluntate bonam fecit. Ad Philip. 2. 13. Beza elsewhere speaks, and it were heartily to be wisht that he had never spoke otherwise) according to that of Austin, Ex nolentibus facit volentes. He saies facit, not adigit, cogit, compellit. He makes us willing who were unwilling, but does not force us to be willing whilest we are unwilling; (that is to say, to be willing against our wils, or whether we will or no.)

12. But I finde that I have shot somewhat farther then I aim'd; it being only my design, and the proper businesse of this place, to shew, that the words of the Apostle, [he worketh all things] are infinitely far from being meant either of sin, or Reprobation. So far from that, that God Almighty does not permit sin, as permission signifies connivence or consent; but he permits it, as that signifies [not to hinder by main force.] If I see a man stealing and say nothing to him, I so permit as to be guilty: but if I warn and exhort, if I promise and threaten, and do all that may avert him (besides killing him) I so permit as to be innocent. In like manner, all that is done by God Almighty by way of permis­sion, is his suffering us to live, and have that nature of the will with which he made us. Whereas to destroy us for the preven­tion of sin, or to make us become stocks (as Beza phrases it) or like wooden Engines, (which are moved only by wires at the meer pleasure and discretion of the Engineer) were by inevitable con­sequence to Liberum & sui arbitrii & suae potestatis invenio homi­nem à Deo insti­tutum; nullam magis Imagi­nem & simili­tudinem Dei in illo animadver­tens, quàm e­jusmodi status formam. Ter­tull. advers. Marc. lib. 2. c. 5. see also cap. 6, 7. uncreate his Creature, which to do were repug­nant [Page 16] to his immutability, as Tertul. shewes. This is all that I am able to apprehend, or pronounce, [that God permits our sins in this sense only; and that he disposes and orders them to the best advantage.]

13. Having proved my first Principle by Scripture and Reason, it will be as easie to confirm it by the common suffrage ofProved by An­tiquity § [...]8. Antiquity; and to avoid the Repetition of so long a Ca­talogue, which I suppose will be as need­lesse, Tametsi Deus [...]reat & conservat Na­turam, tamen causa p [...]ccati est volun­tas malorum viz. Diaboli & impio­rum hominum quae avertit se à Deo ad alias re [...], con [...]ra mandata Dei. Au­gust. Confess. Artic. 9. as I am sure it will be nauseous to a considerable Reader, I refer him to the Ci­tations which will follow my first inference Sect. 18. I will content my self at present to shut up all with that Article of the Augustan Confession, (to which our 39 Ar­ticles Aliquos ad [...] divinâ potestate [...] esse, non solùm non cre­ [...], sed etiam si sint qui tantum m [...]lum cred [...]re ve [...]int, cum omni de­testatione in illis Anat [...]ema dicimus. Synod. Arausic. Can. 25. have the greatest regard and confor­mity, and which for that very reason is to me the most venerable of any Protestant Confession except our own) That though God is the Creator and Preserver of Nature, yet the only cause of sin is the will of the wicked (that is to say, of the Devil and ungodly men) turning it self from God to other things against the (will and) commandements of God. And the Orange Synod doth pronounce an Anathema upon all that think otherwise.

If any will not subscribe to this Confession, I will leave him to learn modesty both from Arrian the Heathen, and from Philo the Iew.

[...]. Arrian. in Epictet. [...]. Philo [...]. p. 325.

CHAP. II.

MY first Demand being fully granted (as in the Mathe­maticks The first Inference. [...]. Ammonius in Ioh. 8. Our selves we condemn as the only causes of our own misery. Hook. l. 5. § 72. 'tis usual to build upon certain Postulata) it doth immediately follow, that [man himself is the sole effi­cient cause of his eternal punishment] (I say the sole Cause, as excluding God, but not the Devil; whom yet I also exclude from the efficiency of the Cause; because he can only incite, and propose objects, and adde perswasions to sin, but can­not force or cause it in me without my will and consent: so that the Devil being only a Tempter and Perswader, cannot for that be justly styled an efficient. Or if he were, sure for that very Reason God himself cannot be so: but only Man and the Devil must be the Concauses of man's Destruction.) Which is the second thing I am to prove both by Scripture, and Reason, and the whole suffrage of Antiquity.

15. And sure I shall not be so solicitous as to rifle my Con­cordance, Proved by Scripture. but make use of such Scriptures as lye uppermost in my memory, and so are readiest to meet my pen. These IIn the negative. finde are of two sorts, negative on God's part, and affirma­tive Ezek. 33. 11. on man's. God gives the first under his oath. (Ezek. 33. 11.) As I live, saith the Lord, I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way and live: turn ye, turn ye from your wicked waies, for why will ye die, O house of Israel? In the 18. chapter of the same Pro­phesie, the Latine translation is more emphatical then the English: for there it is not [non cupio] but [nolo mortem mo­rientis]C. 18. v. 32. not that he doth not will the death of a sinner, but that he wils it not; he doth not only not desire it, but (which makes the proof more forcible) he desires the contrary, even that he should turn from his wickednesse and live: (chap. 33. v. 14.) not willing (saith S. Peter) that any should perish, but 2 Pet. 3. 9. (on the contrary) that all should come to Repentance. And so (1 Tim. 2. 4.) He will have all men to be saved, and to come unto the knowledge of the truth. Where it appears by the Con­text, that the Apostle does not only speak of all kindes of [Page 18] particulars, but of all particulars of the kindes too: For he first of all exhorts them, that prayers, and supplication, and giving of thanks be made for all men, (vers. 1.) Secondly, he does instance in one sort of men, for Kings and all that are in Authority, (vers. 2.) Thirdly, he addes the Cause of his exhortation, for this is good and acceptable in the sight of God our Saviour, who will have all men to be saved, (vers. 3, 4.) And if the Spanish Frier said true, that few Kings go to hell, (giving this Reason) because all Kings are but few, the Apo­stles way of arguing will be so much the stronger; for when he speaks of all men in generall, he makes his instance in Kings, in all Kings without exception, thereby intimating Nero the worst of Kings, under whom at that time the Apostle liv'd. And he uses another argument (vers. 6.) because Christ gave himself a Ransome for all. This is yet more plain from Rom. 2. 4, 5. Despisest thou the riches of his goodnesse, and for­bearance, Rom. 2. 5. and long-suffering, not knowing that the goodnesse of God leadeth thee to repentance? but after thy hardnesse and im­penitent Veteris haec Ec­clesiae sententia suit, velle Deum conversionem ad salutem omni­um, non tantùm genera singulo­rum, sed singu­los generum in­telligens. Ge­rard. Voss. in Pelag. Hist. l. 6. Thes. 2. heart treasurest up unto thy self wrath against the day of wrath? Observe who they are whom God would have to re­pent; even the hard hearted and the impenitent. But I have stronger proofs out of Scripture, and lesse liable to Cavil then any of these, which yet I thought fit to use, because I finde they are the Chief of those that Vossius relies upon, and ex­pounds to my purpose from the Authority of the Ancients. I will adde to these but three or four Texts more, of which the one will so establish and explain the other, as to leave no place of evasion to the gainsayer. First our blessed Sa­viour is call'd by the Apostle, the Saviour of all men, especi­ally of them that beleeve, (1 Tim. 4. 10.) as if the Apostle had1 Tim. 4. 10. foreseen an objection, that the word [all] might be restrained unto the houshold of Faith, he prevents it by a distinction of general and special: for if he is a special Saviour of beleevers, he is a general Saviour of those that are unbeleevers; not that unbe­leevers can be saved, whilest they are obstinate unbeleevers, but upon Condition they will repent and beleeve: else why should the Apostle affirm the Saviour to be of all, and then come off with an [especially] to them that beleeve? Certainly if it is [Page 19] every man's duty to beleeve in Christ, Christ dyed for every man. And this very argument is not easily answered in the very confession of D^r. Twisse; who yet by and by saies 'tis easi­ly answered, and yet he leaves it without an answer, he on­ly scornes it and lets it passe. Twiss. in Respon. ad Armin. Prae­fat. p. 16. col. 2. This is secondly confirm'd from the Apo­stle's way of arguing (2 Cor. 5. 14.) If one died for all, then 2 Cor. 5. 14. were all dead. This is the major Preposition of a hypothetical syllogisme; in which the thing to be proved is, that all were dead; and the Medium to prove it is, that one died for all. Now every man knows (that understands how to reason) that the argument of proof must be rather more, then lesse known, then the thing in question to be proved: so that if it be clear, that all men were dead by the fall of the first Adam, it must be clearer (as S. Paul argues) that life was offered unto all, by the death of the second Adam; and if none were died for but the Elect, then the Elect only were dead: for the word [all] must signifie as amply in the Assumption, as it does in the Se­quel; or else the Reasoning will be fallacious and imperfect: The Apostle thus argues,

Whosoever here denies the Minor, does (before he is aware) condemn the Sequel of the Major; and so gives the Lie to the very words of the Text; which I can look from none but some impure Helvidius, who would conclude the greatest falshoods from the word of Truth. This is thirdly confirmed from the saying of the Apostle, (Rom. 11. 32.)Rom. 11. 32▪ that God concluded all in unbelief (the Gentiles first, vers. 30. and afterwards the Iewes, vers. 31.) that he might have mercy upon all; from whence I inferre, that if this last [all] belong to none but the Elect, then none but the Elect were con­cluded in unbelief. But 'tis plain that all without exception were (first or last) concluded in unbelief, therefore the mer­cy was meant to all without exception. Lastly, it is confirm'd from those false Prophets and false Teachers, (2 Pet. 2. 1.)2 Pet. 2. 1. who though privily bringing in damnable heresies, even denying [Page 20] the Lord that bought them, and bringing upon themselves swift destruction, yet it seems they were such whom the Lord had bought. So far is God from being the Cause of mans de­struction, by an absolute, irrespective, unconditional Decree, that he gave himself a ransome even for them that perish. They were not left out of the bargain which was made with his Iustice, but the Apostle tels us they were actually bought▪ He whose bloud was sufficient for a thousand worlds, would not grudge its extent to the major part of but one: he was mer­ciful to all men, but the greatest part of men are unmerciful to themselves. He is the Saviour of all, but yet all are not saved; because he only offers, does not obtrude himself upon us. He Gratiam salu­tarem non exi­stimo conferri omnibus, sed tamen omnibus offerri; & praesto esse De­um ut confera­tur. Episc. Wint. de Ar­tic. Lamb. offers himself to all, but most refuse to receive him. He will have no man to perish, but repent by his Antecedent will, but by his Consequent will he will have every man perish that is impenitent. Which is sufficient to have been said for the negative part of my undertaking, [That the cause of Damnation is not on God's part] in which, if any one Text be found of power to Convince, let no man cavil at those others which seem lesse Convincing. If any one hath an objection,Omnibus offer­tur Dei miseri­cordia. Nemo illius expers est, nisi qui renui [...]. Bernard. serm. 1. in purif. Mar. let him stay for an answer till his objection is urged. It might seem too easie, to solve objections of my own choice, or confute an argument of my own making; and therefore I passe (without notice of common shifts, and subterfuges, till I am call'd to that Drudgery) to the second part of my enterprise, which is the affirmative.

16. [That man himself is the cause of his eternal punishment.] Which though supposed in the negative, must yet be provedIn the Affir­mative. to some persons, who are prevailed upon by fashions, and modes of speech; and will deny that very thing when they see it in one colour, which they will presently assent to, when they behold it in another. He who is very loth to say, that God is the Author of sin and damnation, will many times say it in other terms; and therefore, in other terms, it must be proved that he is not. O Israel thou hast destroyed thy self, but in me is thine help, (Hosea 13. 6.) They that privily bring in DamnableHos. 13. 6. 2▪ Pet. 2. 1. Prov. 19. 3. Heresies shall bring upon themselves swift destruction. The foolish­nesse of man perverteth his way: and as when lust conceiveth it [Page 21] bringeth forth sin, so when sin is finished it bringeth forth death, Jam. 1. 15. (Iam. 1. 15.) If death is that monster, of which sin is the Dam, that brings it forth, how foul a thing must be the Sire? and can there be any greater blasphemy, then to bring God's Pro­vidence into the pedegree of Death? Death (saith the Apostle) is the wages of sin, (Rom. 6. 23.) And wages is not an absolute Rom. 6. 23. but a relative word. It is but reason he should be paid it, who hath dearly earn'd it by his work. It is the will of man that is the servant of sin. Disobedience is the work▪ Death eternalVers. 20. is the wages, and the Devil is the pay-master; who as he sets men to work to the dishonour of their Creator, so he paies them their wages to the advancement of his glory. From whence I Conclude (with the Book of Wisdome) God made not death, Wisd. 1 13, 14, 15, 16. neither hath he pleasure in the destruction of the living: for he created all things that they might have their being, and the generations of the world were healthful, and there is no poyson of Destruction in them, nor the kingdome of death upon the earth. But ungodly men with their words and works call'd it to them, and made a Covenant with it; because they are unworthy to take [ [...]] part with it.

17. I will confirm this truth by no more then one Reason;Proved secondly by Reason. which, if it is not the best, doth seem to me to be the fittest; as being aptest to evince both the connexion and necessity of my first inference, from my first Principle. It is taken from the na­ture and use of Punishment; which as soon as it is nam'd, doth presuppose a Guilt; for as every sin is the [...]. transgression of some Law, so every punishment is the revenge of some sin: upon which it followes, that if a mans sin is from himself, 'tis from himself that he is punisht. And as the Law is not the Cause, but the Rom. 7. 8. Occasion only of sin; so God is not the Cause, but the inflicter only of punishment: for so saies the Apostle, Sin taking occasion by the Commandement wrought in me all manner of Concu­piscence: for without the Law sin was dead. That which is good not being made death, but sin working death by that which is good Vers. 13. God and his Law, are, each of them, the Causa-sine-qua-non▪ the Condition without which, sin and punishment could not have been, (for without Law no sin, and without God no Reprobation) but not the Energetical efficient Cause, of which sin and pu­nishment [Page 22] were the necessary effects. For if God had made a Hell by an absolute purpose, meerly because he would that some should suffer it, and not in a praevious intuition of their sins; Damnation had been a Misery, but not a Punishment: as if a P [...]tter makes a vessel on purpose that he may break it, (which yet none but a mad man can be thought to do) or if a man meerly for recreation cuts up Animals alive, (which yet none ever did that I can hear of, except a young Spanish Prince) it is an Infelicity and a torment, but no more a punishment then it is any thing else. Indeed the Common people, who do not understand the just propriety of words, make no distinction many times betwixt Pain, and Punishment; not considering that Punishment is a Relative word▪ of which the correlative is Breach of Law; and therefore is fitly exprest in Scripture by the mutual relation betwixt a Parent and a Childe: when lust hath conceived it bringeth forth sin; sin being perfected bring­eth forth death▪ Jam 1. 15. [...]. Apud Lucianum dr. (Iam. 1. 15.) which is as much as to say (ac­cording to the propriety of the Apostles words) sin is the parent, and death is the childe. Now there cannot be a Childe without a parent; (for they are relata secundum esse) much lesse can the childe be before the parent; (for sunt simul naturâ, & dicun­tur ad convertentiam) Upon which it followes, that punishment could not be ordained by God, either without sin or before it, or without respect and intuition of it, (which yet the great Ideo praesci­verit, quia de­creto suo sic or­dinavit. and for no other reason, Nisi quia Deo ita visum est. Cal vin. Instit. l. 3. cap. 23. p. 7. Mr. Calvin does plainly say.) I say it could not, because it implies a contradiction. For though God could easily make Adam out of the earth, and the earth out of nothing, yetNon percipit se dicere, ea quae vera sunt, eo ipso quòd vera sunt, falsa sint. August. contra Faustum. he could not make a sinful Cain to be the son of sinful Adam▪ before there was an Adam, much lesse before there was a sinful one: because it were to be, and not to be at the same time; Adam would be a Cause, before an entity; which God Almighty cannot do, because he is Almighty. So that when the Romanists assert their Transubstantiation, or the posterity [...]. Origen. contra Celsim. l. 4. of Marcion their Absolute decree of all the evil in the world, (both pretending a Reverence to God's omnipotence) they do as good as say, those things which are true may therefore be false, because they are true; or that God is so Almighty, as to be able not to be God: that being the Result of an Ability▪ to make [Page 23] two parts of a contradiction true: (so said Austin against S. Fau­stus, Isido [...]us Pelu­siota [...], [...], re­spondit, [...]. and Origen against Celsus.) Whensoever it is said, [God can do all things] 'tis meant of all things that become him: So Isidore the Pelusiote. But (to return to argument in the pur­suit of which I have stept somewhat too forward) if Gods prae­ordination of mans eternal misery were in order of nature be­fore his praescience of mans sin, as Mr. Calvin evidently affirms in his [Ideo Loco superi­ [...]s paulò citato. praesciverit, quia decreto suo praeordinavit,] set­ting Praeordination as the Cause, or Reason, or praevious Requisite to his Praescience) either mans Reprobation must come to passe without sin, or else he must sin to bring it orderly to passe; which is to make God the author either of misery by itself without rela­tion to sin, or else of sin in order to misery. The first cannot be, because God hath Idcirco jurat, ut si non cre­dimus promit­tenti Deo, cre­damus salum p [...]o salute juran­ [...]i. Hieron. E­pist. 46. sworn, he hath no pleasure in the death of a sinner, (Ezek. 33. 14.) much lesse in his death that never sin'd. And because, if it were so, the Scripture would not use the word Wages, and the word Punishment, and the word Retri­bution, O beatos nos, quorum causa Deus jurat! O mise [...]rimos si nec juranti credi­mus ! Tertul. l. de Poe [...]it, cap. 4. and the word Reward. Hell indeed had been a Torment, but not a Recompence; a fatal Misery, but not a Mulct; an Act of power, but not of vengeance; which yet in many places is the style that God speaks in, Vengeance is mine, and I will repay, Rom. 12. 19. Nor can the second be lesse impossible, it having formerly been proved, that God is not the Author of sin; Eccles. 15. 12. he hath no need of the sinful man, whereby to bring mans Ruine the more conveniently about; and most of them that dare say it, are fain to say it in a Disguise. Some indeed are for [ligonem ligonem] but the more modest blasphemers are glad to dresse it in cleaner phrase. A strange [...] in Divinity, to put the Jam. 1. 15. childe before the parent, the Rom. 6 23. wages before the work, the Rom. 6. 2 [...]. end before the means, the Reprobation before the sin! yet so they do who make the Decree of Reprobation most irrespective and unconditional; and after that, say, that whom God determines to the end, he determines to the means. To put the horse upon the Bridle, is a more rational Hypallage: for by this Divinity, eter­nal punishment is imputed to Gods Antecedent will (which is called the first) and sin to his consequent will, (which is the se­cond.) The first [...] and the other only [...], pu­nishment chiefly, and sin by way of Consecution. Men are [Page 24] bid not to sin ex voluntate signi, or revelata; but are deter­min'dPoterit Deus velle voluntate signi & appro­bante, ut [...]ono non [...]; interea volun­tate beneplaciti statue [...]e [...] gratiam effica­cem negare, ex quo insallibili­ter & efficaciter sequetur ut la­batur. Twiss. in vind. Grat. l. 1. de praed. § 12. p. 140. Voss. Pelag. Hist. l. 6. Thes. 2. to it ex voluntate occultâ, or beneplaciti. Distinctions very good, when at first they were invented for better uses. The former by S. Chrysostome, from whom it was borrow'd by Damascene, and from him by the Schoolmen. But I say they all were us'd to very contrary purposes, by them, and by these, who endevour'd to repel those Fathers with their own weapons, (as the elaborate Gerard Vossius does very largely make it appear.) I am sorry I must say, (what yet I must (saith Quod dicere periculosum, ad aedificationem proferendum est. Tertul. depoen. cap. 5. Tertullian) when it may tend to edification) That the Lord God merciful, and gracious, long-suffering, abundant in goodnesse and truth, who is all Bowels and no gall; who hateth nothing that he hath made, who in the midst of Iudgement re­membreth mercy, ever forgiving iniquity, transgression and sin, is exhibited to the world by the Authors and Abettors of un­conditional Reprobation, as a kinde of Platonick Lover of so ex­cellent a Creature's everlasting misery. Which if Mr. Calvin himself confessed to be a Decretum horribile qui­d [...]m fateor, in­ficiari tamen nemo poterit. Calvin. Instit. l. 3. c. 23. § 7. Horrible Decree (who yet beleev'd it) how frightful must that opinion appear to me, who did therefore leave it, because it frighted me into my wits? For to say that God is [...], a slayer of men from all eter­nity, (who is the Lamb slain, that is, a Saviour, from the foun­dation of the world, (Rev. 13. 8.) is to affirm that of him, which he affirmed of the Devil, who is called by our Saviour, A Murderer from the beginning, Ioh. 4. 44. Which the Devil could not be; if God had absolutely willed the Death of any, without respect or relation to the snares of the Devil, it being impossible to murder the Dead; or to slay those that were killed long before they were born. I know by whom it is an­swered,L. 1. part. 1. § 13. p. 140. [That God doth will sin, not as it is sin, but as it is a Medium for the setting forth of his Glory; and so Damna­tion.] But whilest men finde out Distinctions to excuse God Almighty, they do imply him to have offended. Which I am so weary even to think on, that I hasten, for some refreshment, to my third proof of this Inference, from the suffrage of An­tiquity.

18. Before I name any particular, I will take the confidence toProved thirdly by Antiquity. say in general, That all the Greek and Latine Fathers be­fore [Page 25] S. Austin, and even Austin himself before his contention against Pelagius, (and even during that contention in some places of his works) besides those many Fathers who lived after him, were unanimously of this Judgement, That God did not absolutely decree the Reprobation of any Creature, but upon prae­science and supposition of wilful rebellion and impenitence. I have not liv'd long enough to read them all, but I have dipt into the most: and by the help of such Collectors as I have gotten into my Study, (whereof Vossius hath good reason to be the Chief upon this occasion: and I the rather use him, because I find him so very punctual in every one of the quotations, which I have had means and opportunity to make trial of) I say, by the help of such credible Compilers, I shall give in a cloud of witnesses (I hope) sufficiently Authentick. I do as little love to be Voluminous as Callimachus would have me, ( [...]) and therefore shall set down only the sub­stance of what the Fathers have said, referring the Reader, byIgnatius in cp. ad Magnes. p. 53. edit. Usser. Iustin. Martyr. in Apolog. pri­ma pro Christi­anis pag. 35. e­dit. Sylburg. 1593. my Citations, to the larger fields of their Discourses.

[...].

[...].

Pluribus pereuntibus, quomodo defenditur perfecta bonitas?Tertull. contra Ma [...]cion. l. 5. c. 24 edit. Iun. A.D. 1597. ex majore parte cessatrix, paucis aliqua, pluribus nulla, cedens perditioni, partiaria exitii? Quòd si plures salvi non erunt, erit jam non bonitas, sed malitia perfectior.—magis autem non faci­ens salvos, dum paucos facit, perfectior erit in non juvando.—suae potestatis invenio hominem à Deo constitutum,—lapsúm (que) Lib. 2. cap. 5. 6. hominis non Deo, sed libero ejus Arbitrio deputandum. (I won­der Vossius did not remember Tertullian, then whom there is not any one more directly for this purpose. Iustin Martyr al­soClemens Alex. [...] p. 24. edit. [...]. vide & Clem. Rom. l. 1. [...], cap. 45. was ill omitted; and so was S. Ignatius.)

[...].

[Page 26] [...].Theophil. ad Au [...]ol. l. 3 p. 336. edit. Basil. 1555. Origen. tract. 34. in Matth. p. 194.

Ignem autem aeternum non illis, quibus dicitur [discedite à me maledicti] paratum ostendit, sicut regnum justis, sed Diabolo, & Angelis ejus: quia quantum adse, homines non ad perditionem creavit, sed ad vitam aeternam & gaudium. (Note that Chry­sostome, Theophylact, and Euthymius, interpret those words ofAthanas. orat. de incarn. v [...]rbi Dei. T. 1. p. 45. Christ, as Origen doth.)

[...]

[...] Macarius Ho­mil. 26. p. 230. Homil. 30. p. 53.

[...] Basil. Homil. in Psal. 29. p. 80.

Ideo venit Dominus Iesus ut salvum faceret quod perierat. Ambros. l. 2. de secundâ Inter­pellat. David. c. 11. Venit ergo ut peccatum mundi tolleret, ut vulnera nostra curaret. Sed [...]quia non omnes medicinam expetunt, sed pleri (que) Refugiunt,—ideo volentes curat, non adstringit invitos. Hilarius Dia­con. in epist. Pauli in Rom. c. 3. & 9 Idem ad 1 Tim 11.

Non injustè judicat, quia omnes vult salvos fieri, manente justitia.—Deus uti (que) vult omnes salvos fieri. Cur non imple­tur ejus voluntas? Sed in omni locutione, sensus est, conditio la­tet. Vult omnes salvos fieri, sed si accedant ad eum: non enim sic vult, ut nolentes salventur, sed vult illos salvari, si & ipsi velint: nam legem omnibus dedit, nullum excepit à salute.

Ch [...]ysost. in 1 Tim c. 2. p. 1556. [...] Idem ad Ephes. c. 1. Hom. 1. p. 1036.

[Page 27] Miseratur humano generi Deus, & non vult perire quod fecit. Hieronymus advers. Pelagia­nos l. 2. sub fi­nem. & ad Eph. c. 1.

Vult Deus quaecun (que) sunt plena rationis & consilii. Vult sal­vari omnes & in agnitionem veritatis venire. Sed quia nullus abs (que) propriâ voluntate servatur, (liberi enim arbitrii sumus) vult nos bonum velle, ut cum voluerimus, velit in nobis & ipse suum implere consilium.

Constat Deum omnia bona velle, sed homines suo vitio praeci­pitantur Primosius in 1 Tim. 2. in malum.

[...] Damascenus l. 2. orth. sid. c. 29. Idem contra Manichaeot p. 375 edit. Ba­sil. 1578.

[...].Oecumenius ad 1 Tim. 2.

Duae sunt voluntates in Deo. Una misericordiae, quae non est co­gens, Anselmus in Matth. c. 6. nec aliquid libero arbitrio aufert. Quâ omnes homines vult salvos fieri, quod tamen in liberâ voluntate illorum positum est. Est alia, quae est de effectibus rerum, de quâ dicitur, [om­nia quaecun (que) voluit, fecit.] huic nemo potest resistere. De quâ dicitur, Voluntati ejus quis resistit? (at (que) haec est duplex, per­mittens, respectu mali; approbans, respectu boni.) Ita (que) homi­nes resistunt voluntati misericordiae, & non resistunt voluntati justitiae. (Postea in hunc sensum.) Orat ergo, fiat voluntas tua, sicut in coelo (ubi non resistitur) sic & in terris, ubi resistitur.

Deus ex se sumit seminarium miserendi. Quod judicat & Bernardus serm. 5. in Natal. Dom. Idem serm. 1. in purif. Mar. condemnat nos, eum quodammodo cogimus, ut longè aliter de corde ipsius miseratio, quàm anivadversio procedere videatur.—om­nibus offertur, & in communi posita est Dei misericordia; nemo illius expers est, nisi qui renuit.

If after all these testimonies, I have S. Austin and Prosper to side with me in my assertion, I know not why I may not seem, [Page 28] to those who think me in an error, at least to have rationally and discreetly erred: and though Grotius gives a reason whyGrotius in Ri­vet. Apolog. Discus. p. 97, 98. S. Austin is the unfittest to be a Iudge in these matters, yet if Pro­sper (who best knew him) may be allowed for his Interpreter, I am very well content that he be one of my Iury; for of four Expositions which that Father made (in several parts of his writings) upon 1 Tim. 2. 4. [God will have all men to be saved,] I finde one very directly just such as I would have it; and it is even in those writings which he pen'd after the Heresie of Pe­lagius was on foot; which is therefore with me of very great moment and Authority.

To this Question,

De bonâ voluntate unde sit, si naturâ, cur non omnibus, cùm sit Augustin in lib. de spiritu & lite [...]â ad Mar­cellinum c. 33. idem Deus omnium Creator? si dono Dei, etiam hoc quare non om­nibus, cùm omnes homines velit salvos fieri?

He thus Answers,

Vult Deus omnes homines salvos fieri, non sic tamen ut eis adi­mat liberum arbitrium, quo vel bene vel malè utentes justissimè judicentur. Quod quum sit, Infideles quidem contra voluntatem Dei faciunt, cùm ejus Evangelio non credunt: nec ideo tamen eam vincunt, verùm seipsos fraudant magno & summo bono, malis (que) poenalibus implicant, experturi in suppliciis potestatem ejus, cujus in donis misericordiam contempserunt.

Inevitabilis illa sententia, [discedite à me maledicti] à piissimo Idem serm. 38. de Sanctis. Deo ideo multo antè praedicitur, ut à nobis totis viribus caveatur: si enim nos Deus noster vellet punire, non nos ante tot secula commone­ret. Invitus quodam modo vindicat, qui quomodo evadere possi­mus, multo antè demonstrat: non enim te vult percutere, qui tibi clamat, observa.

'Tis very true that S. Austin did sometimes let fall such ex­pressions, (transported sometimes in the heat of his dispute) as rais'd some calumnies after his death, as if he had thought that God created the greatest part of mankinde on purpose to do the will, not of God, but of the Devil. But Prosper made it appear, in his An­swers to that and the like Objections, that they who censur'd Austin's Iudgement, were seduced to it by his style: and that (notwithstanding the misfortune of his expressions) Austin's judgement and his owne, was clearly this (and so Nihil aliud accipiendum in isto Augustini sermone existi­mo, quo ad in­teritum quos­dam praedesti­natos firmat. &c. Fulgent. ad Monim. l. 1. Fulgentius doth professe to understand it.)

[Page 29]—Syncerissimè credendum at (que) profitendum est, Deum velle ut Prosper (s [...]u August) ad ob­ject. Vic [...]n▪ Ar­tic. 2. & seqq. omnes homines salvi fiant. Siquidem Apostolus, cujus ista senten­tia est, sollicitissimè praecipit, ut Deo pro omnibus hominibus sup­plicetur: ex quibus quòd multi pereunt, pereuntium est meri­tum; quòd multi salvantur, salvantis est donum.—Nemo ab eo ideo creatus est, ut periret: quia alia est causa Nascendi, alia Pereundi. Ut enim nascantur homines, conditoris est beneficium; ut autem pereant, praevaricatoris est meritum.—Insanum omnino est dicere, Voluntatem Dei ex Dei voluntate non fieri; & Damnatorem Diaboli ejús (que) famulorum, velle ut Diabolo servia­tur.—Nullo modo credendum homines—ex Dei voluntate ceci­disse, cùm potius allevet Dominus omnes qui corruunt, & erigat omnes elisos.—Dei ergo voluntas est, ut in bonâ voluntate maneatur. Qui & priusquam deseratur, neminem deserit. Et multos de­sertores saepe convertit.—Deus nec quae illuminavit, obcaecat; nec quae aedificavit, destruit; nec quae plantavit, evellit. Quia prae­sciti sunt casuri, non sunt praedestinati. Essent autem praedesti­nati, si essent reversuri, & in sanctitate ac veritate mansuri: ac per hoc praedestinatio Dei multis est Causa standi, nemini est Causa labendi.—Hi cùm à pietate deficiunt, non ex Dei opere, sed ex sua voluntate deficiunt. Casuri tamen & reces­suri ab eo, qui falli non potest, praesciuntur.—Deni (que) qui volun­tatem spreverunt invitantem, voluntatem Dei sentient vindi­cantem.

[...]. Theodor. Heracl. in Joh. 8. 44.

Anathema illi qui per Dei praescientiam in mortem hominem de­primi dixerit. Synod. Arelatensis.

Suo prorsus decipiuntur Arbitrio, suâ voluntate labuntur, & si in hac desidiâ perseverent, ipsi se his quae accepere, despoliant. Scriptor de vocat. Gent. l. 2. cap. 11.

Quos praescivit Deus homines vitam in peccato terminaturos, praedestinavit supplicio interminabili puniendos. Fulgentius ad Monimum. l. 1.

Causā Rep [...]o­bationis certum est hanc esse, viz. peccatum in hominibus. Melancthon in locis Theo­log. de prae­dest. Idem ubi (que) ait Perrus Moli­naeus in sua anatome Ar­minianismi. Lastly, that this is precisely the Judgement of the Church of England, I cannot better prove then by that sense and apprehensi­on which Bishop Overal had of it; who does professedly in­terpret the minde of her Articles in this particular, and [Page 30] was as well able to do it as any man that ever lived.

—Sub generali promissione & praecepto tutò quis (que) potest in­dubi [...] D. Overallus Theol. Cantab. professor de [...] Ecclisiae Anglic. &c. cap. 1. fide se includere: & cum certâ spe ac fiduciâ ad thronum gratiae accedere, veré (que) cognoscere, si non confidat Deo promit­tenti, & mandanti obsequatur, suam culpam esse, non Dei: id (que) per negligentiam suam, non gratiae divinae defectum acci­dere.—Ordo divinae praedestinationis nostrae in Articulo septimo iste videtur intentus; Deum praescium lapsûs generis humani ad remedium ejusdem filium mittendum decrevisse, in eó (que) salutis con­ditionem statuisse; tum ad eam in animis hominum producendam necessaria & sufficientia media & auxilia omnibus generatim secundum magis & minus ordinâsse, quae magis speciatim his quos in Christo elegit ex reliquo hominum genere pro suo beneplacito cumularet, quibus hi ad fidem, perseverantiam & aeternam salutem certissimè perducantur, & reliqui nihil habeant quod conque­rantur, &c.

De morte Christi tam plena & ubi (que) sibi constans Ecclesiae nostrae Cap. 2 de morte Christi. sententia, pro omnibus omnino hominibus, sive pro omnibus omnium hominum peccatis, Iesum Christum mortuum esse, ut mirandum sit ullos ex nostris id in controversiam vocare.

Pro omnibus actualibus hominum peccatis, non tantùm pro culpâ Artic. 2. Originis.

AEterna vita humano generi est proposita. Artic. 7.

Oblatio Christi semel facta perfecta est Redemptio, propitiatio & Artic. 31. satisfactio pro omnibus peccatis totius mundi tam originalibus quàm actualibus.

It is farther observed by that most moderate and learnedCalvin. ad Heb. 9. 28. man, that Mr. Calvin himself, however rigid he was in some places, did yet so soberly contradict himself in others, that those very texts of Scripture in which it is affirmed [Christ dyed for many] he so interprets as to say, the word [many] is put toIdem ad Rom. 5. signifie [all] as Heb. 9. 28. and that many are not saved is (saith he) for this reason, [quia eos impedit sua incredulitas] because they are hindred by their own incredulity.

19. I have not translated these Authorities, because they are principally meant for such as are able to understand them. AndThe Total sum of the Citati­ons. if any plain Reader shall desire to have them in the Grosse with­out being troubled to suffer them over in the Retail, he may [Page 31] be pleas'd to receive it in these following words: That God did not absolutely, irrespectively, unconditionally decree the ever­lasting misery of any one, but in a foresight and intuition of their refusing his proffer. That he sent his son to dye for all the sins of the whole world, inviting and commanding all men every where to repent [and be forgiven] (Act. 17. 30.) but that most, like the slave in Exodus, are in love with their bondage; and will be bored through the ear. That everlasting fire was prepared The English Reader may be pleas'd to ob­serve, that these last words are translated out of Prosper in his vindicati­on of Augu­st [...]ne his dea­rest friend, who is: he only Father (I can hear of) whom our Adversaries are willing to be tryed by in this businesse. (See the Con­fession of Dr. Twiss. in Vin­d [...]c. Grat. l. 1. Dign. 8. § 4. p. 110.) especially, (not for men, but) for the Devil and his Angels; nor for them by a peremptory irrespective Decree, but in praescience and re­spect of their pride and Apostasie. That Christ came to save that which was lost, and to call sinners to Repentance, and to have ga­ther'd them as a Hen gathereth her Chickens under her wings, but they would not. That God gave his law, his rule, his promises to all, and excepted none in the publishing of either; but so as he expected they should be willing as well as he; for he would not save any whe­ther they would or no. That God Almighty made no man on pur­pose to torment him, but that he might participate of his goodnesse. ‘That so many as perish may thank themselves; and that so many as live forever, are beholding to nothing but the grace of God. That God Decreed the fall of none, but the raising up of those were down: and that those very men who are reprobated had been predestin'd to salvation, if they would have return'd and remain'd in truth and holinesse. Gods Decrees being to many the cause of their rise, but to none of their downfal. Lastly, that they who have despis'd the will of God which did invite them to repentance, shall feel the ter­rors of his will, which is to execute vengeance upon the chil­dren of Disobedience.’

20. From all this together which hath been said from Scripture, The Result of all. from Reason, from the Authority of the An­cients [...]. Plotin. Enn. l. 2. p. 263. (who are the fittest of any to interpret Scripture) I thus conclude within my self. That God Almighty is the Author of men and [...]. Hie­rocl [...]. p. 258. Angels; That wicked Angels and wicked men are the Authors of sin; and that the sin of men and Angels is the Author of unexpressi­ble and endlesse punishment. That sin is Rebellion against the Ma­jesty of God; That hell was made to punish Rebels; and that [Page 32] God never decreed any Rebellion against himself. Upon which it followes, that as I look for the Cause of my election in the sole merits of my Redeemer, so for the cause of my Reprobation, in the obliquity of my will: because the Reason of my punishment is to be taken from my sin; and the Reason of my sin is to be taken from my self: from whence there followes (and follow it will, do what I can) A second Inference from my first, Compa­red with my first Principle, viz.

CHAP. III.

21. That every Reprobate is predetermin'd to eternal punishment, not by Gods irrespective, but conditional Decree. GodThe second Inference, doth punish no man under the notion of a Creature, but under the notion of a Malefactor: and because he does not create a malefactor, but a man, he hateth nothing that he hath created, Explain'd. but in as much as it hath wilfully (as it were) uncreated his image in it. So that no man is sinfull, because ordain'd to condemna­tion; but ordain'd to condemnation, because he is sinful. Sin is foreseen, and punishment is foreappointed; but because that sin is the cause of punishment, and that the cause is not after, but be­fore the effect (in priority of nature, though not of time) it followes that the effect is not foreappointed, until the Cause is foreseen. So that God damns no man by an absolute decree, (that is to say) without respect or intuition of sin; but the praescience of the Guilt, is the motive and inducement to the determining of the Iudgement. And yet however my second Inference is depending upon my first by an essential tye, (which gives it the force and intrinsick form of Demonstration) yet because some Readers will assent much sooner, to a plain Reason lesse convin­cing, then to a more convincing Reason lesse plain, (and that some are wrought upon, by an argument exactly proportion'd to their Capacities or Tempers, rightly level'd and adapted more by luckinesse then design, whilest another argument is displeasing they know not why, but that there is an odnesse in the look and meen, which betokens something of subtilty, [Page 33] and makes them suspect there is a serpent, though they see not the Ambush in which it lurks) I will gratifie such a Reader by a proof of this too; first from Scripture, then from Reason (groun­ded upon Scripture) and last of all by an addition to my for­mer suffrages of Antiquity: in which S. Austin more especially shall speak as plainly, and as strongly in my behalf, as any man that can be brib'd to be an Advocate, or a witnesse.

22. That my proof from Scripture may be the more effectual,Proved by Scripture. I shall first desire it may be consider'd; that since God is affir­med to have a secret and a revealed will, we must not praeposte­rously interpret what we read of his revealed will by what we conjecture of his secret one: (for that were to go into the dark to judge of those Colours which are seen only by the light) but we must either not conjecture at that which cannot be known (as Gods secret will cannot be, but by ceasing to be se­cret) or if we needs will be so busie, we must guesse at his se­cret will by what we know of his revealed one, that so at least we modestly and safely erre. Upon which it followes: that we who meekly confesse we have not been of Gods Councell, must only judge of his eternal and impervestigable Decrees by what we finde in his Word concerning his Promises and his Threats: which are fitly called the Transcripts or Copies of his Decrees. Such therefore as are his Threats, such must needs be his De­crees, (because the one cannot praevaricate or evacuate the other) but his Threats (as well as Promises) are all conditional, therefore his decrees must be so too. Thus in his Covenant Gen. 2 17. with Adam (and indeed the word Covenant doth evince what I am speaking) he threatens Death, or decrees it, (not with that peremptory Reason, which is the redoubling of the will only, I will therefore because I will, but) on supposition of his eating the forbidden fruit. Which was not therefore forbidden, that Adam might sin in the eating, (man was not so ensnared by the guide of his youth) but Adam sin'd in the eating, because it had been forbidden. Such immediately after was Gods lan­guage to Cain. [If thou do well, thou shall be accepted, andChap. 4. v. 7. if thou doest not well, sin lyeth at the door.] Again (saith God by the mouth of Moses) Behold, I set before you this Day aDeut 11. 26, 27. Blessing and a Curse. A Blessing, if ye obey; and a Curse, if ye [Page 34] will not obey. That is the form of making Covenants betwixt God and man every where throughout the Scripture: and ac­cording to the fulfilling or not fulfilling of the Condition, the Righteous Iudge of all the world proceeds to sentence. Which that we may not so much as doubt of, He (by a merciful An­thropopathia) is pleased to speak like one of us. I will go down now Gen. 18. 21. and see, whether they have done altogether according to the cry of it, and if not, I will know. There is an expression of God to Eli (1 Sam. 2. 30.) which shewes his will sometimes is either not absolute, or not immutable. I said indeed that the House of thy Father should walk before me forever. But now the Lord saith, Be it far from me. Which words do not argue any ficklenesse in his Will, but demonstrate his Promise to have been conditi­onall: there was an [If] impli'd, though not expressed, and so it appears by the very next words. This is also the style that is used in the New Testament. If thou shalt confesse with Rom. 10. 9. thy mouth the Lord Iesus, and shalt beleeve in thine heart, &c. thou shalt be saved. From whence it followes, that if thou shalt not confesse with thy mouth, nor beleeve in thine heart, &c. thou shalt be damn'd. If we forgive not men their trespasses, neither Mat. 6. 15. will your Father forgive your trespasses. If we suffer, we shall also reign; if we deny him, he also will deny us. I will cast her into a bed,2 Tim. 2. 12. and them that commit fornication with her, into great tribu­lation, except they repent (Rev. 2. 22.) If ye beleeve not that I am he, ye shal dye in your sins, Joh. 8. 24. In a word, the very end of Christs coming into the world, was to save us from our sins, (Mat. 1. 12.) to redeem us from all iniquity. (Tit. 2. 14.)Mat. 1. 12. He came to deliver us indeed out of the hand of our enemies, but Tit. 2. 14. to the end that we might serve him in holinesse and righteousnesse all the daies of our lives. (Luk. 1. 44. 45.) Now the end (we know)Luk. 1. 44, 44. is the prime condition, the greatest requisite of all: which to neglect without repentance, is the true Cause of condemnation: for so runs the sentence of our Saviour (Mat. 25. 41.) Depart Mat 25. 41, 42. from me ye cursed into everlasting fire. Why? for what Rea­son? He gives the true reason in the next verse, (not because ye were Reprobated by an absolute Decree; not because ye were ordain'd to be vessels of wrath by a meer irrespective and in­exorable will, but) because I was hungry and ye gave me no meat, [Page 35] because I was thirsty and ye gave me no drink. (Which yet they could not have given him, if it had not been given them from above to give.) From which and a thousand such Texts besides, I do thus state the matter betwixt me and my self. That no man is infinitely punisht by an unavoidable necessity, but for not doing his Duty; nor because he cannot, but will not do it. Im­possibility is not a sin, and therefore no man is punisht for not do­ing that, which it is impossible for him to do. It was the cru­eltyJudg. 1. [...]. of Adonibezek, to cut off mens Thumbs, and then to make it their task to gather up meat under the Table. A greater cruelty in Pharaoh to require a Tale of brick, where he gave no straw. Whereas the master we serve, will render to every man ac­cording Rom. 2. 6. 11. to his works. With him there is no respect of persons. But whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he reap. And therefore let usGal. 6. 7. not sin, under pretence that all we do is by an absolute Decree: (an opinion brought, amongst other Merchandise, out of Turkie into Christendome, and would be rooted out in the next Refor­mation) for every such sinner is his own worst Satan, he seeks Wisd. 1. 12. out death in the errour of his way, and puls upon himself Destructi­on with the works of his hands.

Other proofs out of Scripture, (and perhaps, to some, more convincing) will be found interweaved in my follow­lowing proofs.

23. I must next confirm this truth by Reason; and because thisProved secondly by Reason. Reason will be manifold, I will make it my endeavour to be brief in each. Whereof the first shall be taken from the na­ture of punishment, which (as before I signified) does praesup­pose a sin; sin does imply a breach of Law; and this again does imply at once, a rational and a voluntary agent. Which seems to me to be the Reason, why God is not offended with the Cruelty of the Bear, or with the Pride of the Peacock, or with the Theevery of the Fox. This is the reason, why the Earth does not sin by breeding Thornes and Thistles against its pri­mitive Gen. 3. 17, 18. Institution. For the ground cannot be punisht, and was not cursed for its own, but for Adam's sake. (Gen. 3. 17. 18.) And lastly, this is the Reason, why the Tower of Siloe was not Damn'd for committing murder. Man is an Agent very [Page 36] capable of a Law, and so of sin, and so of punishment; and is therefore punisht, not because he could not, but because he could help it, by that goodnesse of God which would have led him to Repentance, if he had not despis'd the riches of his goodnesse. Rom. 2. 4, 5. Man is punisht because he would sin, and not because he could not but sin.

24. My second Reason is taken from the nature of a Covenant; which ever implies a Condition: now when the first Covenant was broken, God immediately made a second; not with a part, but with all mankinde. And this is observable in the Title of our Gospel; [ [...]] which though we render the [New Testament] we might better render the [New Cove­nant,] which cannot be without Conditions. Heaven and Hell are set before us; the performance of Faith and Obedience, is that important condition; without which, as the former will not be had, so cannot the latter be avoided.

25. My third Reason is taken from the unlimited Generality where­by Promises and Threats, Rewards and Punishments, Exhorta­tions and Dehortations, are exhibited to all. The Gospel is com­manded to be preached to all; and it is published in writing, Mat. 28. 19. Luk. 24. 47. Joh. 20. 31. Luk. 9. 5. that all might read and beleeve; Baptisme, Repentance, and Re­mission of sins are commanded to be offered to all in general, even to them that refuse both the Word and the Preachers. Who when they are refus'd (and not before) are to shake the Dust off their feet for a Testimony against them. Now preachings would be vain, and exhortations would be deceitful, if life and death did not depend upon submitting or refusing to be amended by them.

26. My fourth Reason is taken from the Degrees of Damnation. Some shall be beaten with many stripes, and some with fewer; Luk. 12. 47. Cap. 20. v. 47. Mat. 11. 20, 21, 23, 24. Mat. 10. 15. some shall have a lesse, and some a greater Condemnation. It shall be worse for Chorazin then for Tyre, worse for Bethsaida then for Sidon, worse for Capernaum then for Sodom, worse for the Iewes then for the Ninevites; which is not because one had a greater Necessity of sinning then the other, but one was guilty of the greater Contempt. Not because God had absolute­ly Decreed a greater Punishment to the one, but because the one had means of sinning lesse then the other. For our Saviour [Page 37] sayes expresly, that if the mighty works which were done in Tyre and Sidon had been also done in Chorazin and Bethsaida, they would have repented in Sackcloth and Ashes. Which was as much as to tell them, that it was not at all for want of means and mercy on Gods part, but for want of will on theirs, that they did not do what was commanded to be done. And therefore our Saviour did upbraid them, because they repented not, (Mat. 11. 20.) which he could not have done, had it been impossible for them to have repented. Our blessed Savi­our was too pitiful, and of too sweet a disposition, to jee [...] a poor Creature for being such as God made him, or for being such as he could not but be, whether by fatal, or by natural infirmity. We esteem it an ill nature to upbraid a stammerer for not speak­ing plain; nor is any man reproached for being naturally, but wilfully blinde; nor for being born deaf, but for being like the Joh. 3 19. Psal. 58. 4. Adder that stoppeth her ears. He that bindes my feet, and then invites me to come to him, intends me nothing for entertain­ment but a salted Sarcasme, or bitter Iest; for if he were serious, he would set my feet at liberty, that I might come in good earnest; and not say to me, as we say to a Childe that is fallen down, [Come hi­ther to me and I will lift thee up.] And yet this Mr. Calvin is fainCalvinus in In­stitut. l. 3. cap. 23. § 7. to say, (having been first of all ingaged in that opinion) That so many nations of men together with their infants were involved with­out remedy in eternal punishment, by the fall of Adam, for no ima­ginable reason, but that so it seemed good in the sight of God: and being pincht with that Text (Ezek. 18. 23.) Have I any plea­sure Mortem non vul [...] Deus, in quantum vul [...] poenitentiam. Sed experientia docet, ita eam velle, ut cor peccatoris non [...]angat. Idem in Ezek. 18. at all that the wicked should die, and not that he should re­turn from his waies and live? he is fain to say, That God wils not the Death of a sinner so far forth as he wils his Repentance. Which experience teacheth us he doth so will, as not to touch his heart that he may repent. Which is all one as to say, He wils it so, as to command it; but he does not will it so, as to leave it pos­sible: (that is) he wils it in shew, but not in reality. Nor do I know any way possible for Mr. Calvin to escape those ugly sequels, but by saying [that the sinner may repent by the strength and force of Nature, without the touch of his heart by the grace of God,] which is to shelter himself un­der the Heresie of Pelagius. Solomon gives us a more ratio­nall [Page 38] accompt, why Wisdome one day will laugh at mens calami­ties, and mock when their fear cometh; even because they hated Prov. 1. 26. 29. knowledge and did not choose the fear of the Lord.

27. My fifth Reason is taken from the nature of Death, as that does signifie Privation, and as Privation supposes a former Habit. A stone is said to be not alive, because it suffers the Negation of life; but a stone cannot properly be said to be dead, because it doth not suffer the Privation of life. So that when a man is said in Scripture to be spiritually dead in Trespasses and Sins, he is im­ply'd by that expression to have been spiritually alive. And no man is damn'd for the Negation, but the Privation of Grace; be­cause the Negation of Grace would be Gods work, whereas the Pri­vation of it is his own. It having formerly been shew'd, That God doth not punish his own work in man, but man is punisht for his own work; not for Gods illiberality, but for his own be­ing a prodigal; not because no Talent was given him, but because he squander'd it away. Sin is properly the Death of Grace; Death is a privation, a privation is of a habit. So that every sin­ner had grace, for this very Reason that he hath lost it; he was alive, for this very Reason that he is dead. He came alive out of Gods hands, but he fals desperately by his own. A man may be dead born, but he cannot possibly be dead begotten; depri­ved of life he cannot be in the very Act of his conception. A man can no more be created a sinner, then he can be generated a dead man: which infers the Condition of Gods Decree.

28. My sixth Reason is taken from Christs having bought those very men (2 Pet. 2. 1.) whose damnation did not slumber. (vers. 3.) I have proved already, Christ died for all that were dead in Adam, from (2 Cor. 5. 14.) and from several other Texts. Which he could not be truly affirm'd to do, if any one had been past by, by an absolute Praeterition. For that any man doth perish for whom Christ dyed, is from his own sin, and not from Adams, if to free us from Adams it was that Christ died. Which as it hath been already proved, so it may be confirmed from other Scriptures: as from 1 Joh. 2. 2. where he is called the pro­pitiation, 1 Joh. 2. 2. not for our sins only, but also for the sins of the whole world. The Apostle foresees and confutes the Heresie of Christs dying only for the Elect, with a not only, but also. He died for Infidels and [Page 39] impenitents, as the whole stream of the Fathers conclude from those words, Destroy not him with thy meat for whom Christ died. Rom. 14. 15. 1 Cor. 8. 11. And shall thy weak brother perish for whom Christ died? That this was the Judgement of the primitive Church, I can prove by an Induction, and though I now spare my Reader, yet I shall trouble him hereafter if I am Challeng'd to it. I shall at pre­sent refer him to the 31 Article of our Church of England. ‘[The oblation of Christ once made is a perfect Redemption, propitiation, and satisfaction for all the sins of the whole world, as well Original as Actual.]’ I had almost forgot a special Testimony of S. Iohn, who cals the Messias [the true light which Joh. 1. 9. lighteth every man that cometh into the world.] So that if any man is in the Dark, it is not for want of Light, but because he will not see, (as S. Chrysostome infers) which is the very interpretation that S. Iohn himself gives it (chap. 3. vers. 9.) This (sayes he) is the Cap. 3. v. 19. Condemnation, that light is come into the world, and men loved darknesse rather then light, because their Deeds were evil. Sure that which is the Reason of their Condemnation, was the Con­dition upon which they were determin'd to be damn'd: then which I know not what can be said either more plainly, or more convincingly of any subject whatsoever.

29. My seventh Reason is taken from the conditional Decrees of temporal Death, and other temporal punishments; which are so evidently Conditional, as I cannot beleeve any Creature will de­ny it. For the Denuntiations of Destruction to Nineveh, andJonah 3. 4, 10. 2 Kin. 20. 5. of certain death to Hezekiah, do put this quite out of all scruple: for the first was not destroyed, and the second did not die, at that determinate time when God had threatned they should. Of which no reason can be given, but that Gods Purposes, and Decrees, and Threats were conditional, on supposition of their Impeni­tence he threatned to destroy, and therefore on sight of their Re­pentance he promis'd to preserve. And from hence it is na­tural to argue thus. Is God so merciful to bodies? and is he lesse merciful to souls? Does he decree temporal Iudgements conditionally, because he is pitiful? and will he decree Eternal ones absolutely, meerly because he will? Is he so unwilling to in­flict the first death, and will he shew his power, his absolute power in the second? Did he spare the Ninevites in this life, because [Page 40] they were penitents? and will he damn them in the next, be­cause they were Heathens, by his peremptory Decree? Is he milde in small things, and severe in the greatest? Is there no other way to understand those Texts in the 9. to the Romans, then by making those Texts which sound severely, to clash against those that sound compassionately? Is it not a more sober and a more reasonable Course, to interpret hard and doubtful Texts by a far greater number more clear and easie, then perversly to interpret a clear Text by a doubtful one, or an easie text by one that's difficult? which is to shew the light by the dark­nesse. Or if some Texts have two senses, if some Texts are lia­ble to many more, must we needs take them in the worst? and that in meer contradiction to the universal Church? If I had no other Argument against an absolute Reprobation, this one were sufficient to prevail with me, That that Father of mercies and God of all consolation, who spareth when we deserve punishment, did not determine us to punishment without any respect to our indeservings. He that had mercy upon wicked Ahab meerly1 Kin. 21. 29. because of his Attrition, did not absolutely damn him before he had done either good or evill, before the foundations of the world were laid. He doth not afflict willingly, nor grieve the chil­dren of men, (Lam. 3. 33.) much lesse doth he damn them for his meer will and pleasure. When God doth execute a tem­poral punishment, upon such as already have deserv'd it, he comes to it with reluctation, ( [...]) and there­fore cals it his Isa. 28 21. strange work, a work he loves not to be ac­quainted with, a work which he doth sometimes execute, be­cause he is Iust; but still Lam. 3. 33. unwillingly, because he is compassio­nate. And he therefore so expresses it, as we are wont to do a thing we are not us'd to, and know not how to set about, [How shall I give thee up, Ephraim? how shall I deliver thee, Hos. 11. 8, 9. Israel? how shall I make thee as Admah? how shall I set thee as Zeboim? Mine heart is turn'd within me, my Repentings are kindled together. I will not execute the fiercenesse of mine anger, for I am God, and not man.] Now that God doth professe toExod. 32. 14. afflict unwillingly, and many times to repent him of the evil which he thought to do unto his people, is a demonstrative argument of his Conditional decrees in things Temporal, and by a greater force of Reason in things Eternal.

[Page 41]30. My eighth Reason is taken from the little flock which be­longs to God, and the numerous herd, which belongs to Be­lial. Which would not have been, if they had both been mea­sur'd out by a most absolute Decree. For when it pleas'd the Divine goodnesse to suffer death upon the Crosse for all the sins of the world, (the every drop of whose bloud had been sufficiently precious to have purchased the Redemption of ten thousand Adams, and ten thousand worlds of his posterity) he would not yeeld the major part unto his Rival Rebel, the black prince of Darknesse; reserving to himself the far lesser portion; and all this irrespectively, meerly because he would. He would not absolutely determine such a general Harvest of Wheat and Tares, as freely to yeeld the Devil the greater crop. He would not suffer his Iustice so to triumph over his Mercy, who loves that his Mercy should rejoyce against Iudgement. It was not forJam. 2. 13. want of a new Instance to shew his Power, or his Iustice; for they were both most eminent in the great Mysterie of Redemption. Much greater Instances and Arguments then an Absolute Decree; as I could evidently shew, if I were but sure of my Readers pa­tience.

My ninth Reason is taken from the Reprobation of Angels, which was not irrespective, but in regard to their Apostasie, as is and must be confessed by all who place the object of Re­probation in massâ corruptâ. For the overthrowing of which tenent (in all the Sublapsarians) D^r. Twisse himself does thus argue. Si Deus non potuit Angelos reprobare, nisi ut contumaces, ergo nec homines nisi ut in contumaciâ perseverantes. De Prae­dest. Digres. 4. § 4. c. 2.

31. My tenth Reason is taken from the Absurdities which have, and still must follow, if Gods eternall decree of mans misery is not conditional but absolute. And those absurdities are discer­nible, by this following Dilemma.

Let Dives be suppos'd to be the man that is Damn'd. It is either because he sins, or meerly because God will have it so. If for the first Reason, [because he sins] then sin is the Cause of his Damnation, and consequently before it. From whence it fol­lowes, that Dives is not Damn'd meerly because God will have [Page 42] it so; but that God will have it so, because he sins. (Which plainly shewes the Conditional Decree.) But if it be said that it is for the [second Reason, meerly because God will have it so] then that absolute Decree to have it so, doth either necessitate him to sin damnably, or it does not. First, if it does, then how can Dives be guilty of that thing, of which Gods absolute Decree is the peremptory Cause? Or how can that be guilt, which is necessity? (Dives could as little have cherisht Lazarus, as the Tower of Siloe could have spared the Galilaeans, if his will had been no more free, then that Tower had a will.) And secondly if it does not necessitate him to sin damnably, then Dives who is Damn'd might possibly have not been damn'd. From whence it follows, That Dives is not Damn'd absolutely, but in regard to his sins. (Which had they not been his choice, they had not been his, but his that did choose them. And it is a Contradiction to say, a man chooses any thing without a free will, or by an absolute necessity, which is, whether he will or no.) Besides; if God did absolutely decree the end, which is Damnation, and consequently the means, which is final impenitence; these Absurdities would follow. First, it would be a Reprobates duty to be damn'd. And to en­devour his salvation would be a sin. Because 'twere striving against the stream of Gods absolute Will. If all men are to choose, and withall to execute the will of God, and that it is Gods will the greatest part shall be damn'd; it will then be a duty in the greatest part of men, to go industriously to Hell. And to do good will be a vice, because it tends Heaven-wards, and so to the Crossing of an absolute irreversible Decree. Which since I have considered, I have lesse wondred then I was wont, at the con­clusion of Carpocrates, that the very worst of Actions are out of duty to be performed. And that the soul shall be punisht with its imprisonment in the body, untill she hath fill'd up the number of her iniquities; according to that Text Mat. 5. 29. Which we call Iniquities, but they Duties. And so indeed they would be, if every thing in the world (the means as well as the end) were absolutely ordain'd, and by consequence effected by God (blessed forever) who can ordain nothing but good. And such sin and Hell must be [exceeding good] if they could possibly be ordain'd [Page 43] by as absolute a decree, as the Heavens and the earth, the wa­ter, and the air, of which God said, they are very good. Secondly, Gods Revealed will being that all should repent, and his Secret will being that very few shall; it followes thence, That it is his will that his will should not be done. And that God hath one will which is the same with the Devils; and that when a Reprobate saies in the Pater noster [thy will be done] he vehemently prayes for his own Damnation. Which things, as they were falsly objected in France against S. Austin, so Pro­spers way to excuse him, was to make protestations against any such Tenent, as unconditional Reprobation. He sayes the veryIneptissimae blasphemiae. Prodig [...]osa men­dacia. Diaboli­cus mendacio­ [...]um indiculus. Leguntur a­pud. Prosp. in Praesat. Re­spon. ad ob­ject. Vinc. things in his Masters vindication, which I have said in my own. And cals the sequels of that opinion which he disowns; most sottish blasphemies, and not only prodigious, but Devilish lies. But he denies not that such ill consequences will follow upon the bold assertion of irrespective reprobation, which he does therefore very distinctly and very earnestly disclaim. And he doth so much speak the very minde of S. Austin, that he seems sometimes to speak out of his mouth too: it being hard to say, whether the Answers to the Objections of Vincentius do truly belong to the Master or to the Scholar, they being in­serted in both their Works. And that which is called Prospers by Vossius, is ascribed to S. Austin by Ludovicus Lucius. If I have made any unfriendly or injurious inference, I will instantly retract it upon the least conviction that it is so. But truly the Reasons which I have given, have serv'd to confirm me in my adhaerence to my second Inference. Which I yet farther prove by the the remaining votes of Antiquity. For though my former Citations are all to this purpose, yet I will not repeat them, but adde some others, (perhaps more fully and in­disputably) to the number.

32. Proved third­ly by Antiquity. Solent veteres &c. & Scho­lastici in eâ ac­quiescunt &c. Non aliâ ratione quae futura sunt, praevideat, nis [...] quia ita ut fie­rent decrevit. Calvin. instit. l. 3. c. 23. §. 6. And first I will set down the Confession of Mr. Cal­vin, That the Schoolmen and Ancients are wont to say, [God's Reprobation of the wicked, is in praescience of their wickednesse] but he professes to beleeve (with one more modern) that God foresaw all future things, by no other means, then because he decreed they should be made, or done. [Page 44] Nor ought it (saith he) to seem absurd, That God did not Nec absurdum videri debee, Deum non modò primi hominis Casum & in co posterorum ruinam praevi­d [...]sse, sed a [...]bitrio quo (que) suo dispensasse. Idem ibid. § 7. only foresee, but by his will appoint the fall of Adam, and in him of his posterity. The Ancients, he confessed, were quite of another minde, but because he addes [dubitanter] and would have it thought that S. Austin was for his turn, I will set down some of their words, and begin with Austins.

33. No man is chosen unlesse as differing from him that is re­jected. Nor know I how it is said [that God hath chosen usNemo eligitur nisi jam distans ab illo qui reji­citur. Unde quod dictum est, [quia elegit nos Deus ante mundi Constitutionem] non video quomodo sit dictum, nisi de praescientiâ Fidei & operum pietatis. & mox—Iacobus non electus est ut fieret bonus, sed bonus factus eligi potuit. Augustia. ad. Simplicianum l. 1. quaest. 2. before the foundation of the world] unlesse it be meant of his praescience of faith and good works.—Iacob was not cho­sen that he might be made good, but having been seen to be made good was capable of being chosen.

If S. Austin was so distinctly for Conditional Election (and in those very works too, which he afterwards writ as very suffi­cient to confute Pelagius) he was infinitely rather for Conditi­onal Reprobation. As any man knows that knows any thing of him; and may be seen in the same book to Simplician.

Esau would not, and did not run. For if he had, he had at­tainedNoluit ergo E­sau, & non cu­currit. Sed et si voluisset, & cucurrisset, Dei adjutorio pervenisset, nisi vocatione contemptâ reprobus fieret. Id. in lib. ad Simpl. by the help of God; unlesse he would be made a Repro­bate by a contempt of his vocation.

It seems unjust that without the merits of good or evilNum quid ini­quitas est a­pud Deum? absit. Iniquum enim videtur, ut sine ullis bonorum malorúmve operum meritis, unum Deus eligat, odiát (que) alterum. Id. in Enchirid. cap. 98. works, God should love one, and hate another.

Wicked men had no necessity of perishing from their notNon necessita­tem percundi habue [...]unt, quia praedestinati non sunt; sed ideo praedestinati non sunt, quia tales futuri ex volunta [...]iâ pr [...]vaticatione praes [...]iti sunt. Prosper. ad Galorum cap. 3. edit. Basil. 16 [...]1. being elected; but they were therefore not elected, because they were foreseen to be wicked through their own wilful pre­varication.

[Page 45]God foresaw that they would fall by their own proper will,Illos [...] propriâ ipsorum volunta [...]e prae­scivit, & ob hoc a filiis Perditionis nullâ praedestinatione discrevit. Id. idem. ad. cap. 7. and for that very reason did not separate them by election from the sons of perdition.

God is the creator of all men, but no man was created to the end that he may perish,Omni [...]m qui­d [...]m hominum Deus Creator est, sed nemo ab eo ideo creatus est u [...] pereat. Idem. ad object. Vinc. 3.

34. I have given the more Testimonies out of Prosper, because he is known to have been the Scholar and vindicator of S. Austin. And to produce their suffrages is to imply all the rest. They ha­ving been the only Ancients whom their contentions against Pelagianism made to speak sometimes to the great disadvan­tage of their own opinion: as they do not stick to confesse themselves. And we ought in all reason to take that for their Iudgement, which we finde delivered by themselves by way of Apologie and vindication. But though I need not, I will adde some others.

He therefore brought the means of Recovery to all, thatIdeo omnibus opera sanitatis de [...]lit, ut qui­cun (que) perierit, mortis suae causas sibi ascribat, qui curari noluit, cùm remedium haberet quo posset eva­dere. Ambros. l. 2. de Cain & Abel cap. 13. whosoever perisht might impute it to himself who would not be cur'd, when he had a Remedy whereby he might.

Even they that shall be wicked have power given them of Conversion and Repentance.Etiam his qui mali sint futuri, datur potestas conversionis & poenitentiae. Hieron. l. 3. adversus Pelagianos.

God's love and hatred arises from his praescience of things to come, or from the quality of mens works.Dilectio & odi­um Dei vel ex▪ praescientiâ nascitur futurorum, vel ex operibus. Idem, ad Malach. 1.

If the day is equally born for all, how much rather is Je­susSi dies aequali­ter nascitur om­nibus, quanto magis Christus?—Cum singu­li ad donarium vocentur, quid est ut quod à Deo aqualiter distribuitur, humanâ interpretatione minua­tur? Cyprian. Epist. 76. Christ?—When every man is call'd to a participation of the gift, what is the reason, that what God hath equally distributed should by humane interpretation be any way lessen'd?

[Page 46] Patet omnibus fons vitae, ne (que) ab ju [...]e potandi qui [...]quam pro­hibetu [...], aut [...]el­li u [...]. Arnob. Adversus Nat. lib. 2. The fountain of life lies open to all. Nor is any man for­bid or hindred from the right of Drinking.

Let D. Twisse himself be heard to speak in this matter, and that against Piscator (both Antiarminians) Damnatio est Actus Iudicis, & procedere debet secundum justitiam vindicativam: at ne vestigium quidem Iustitiae apparet in Damnatione Reprobo­rum. (He speaks of absolute irrespective Reprobation which Piscator set up) Nam justitia neminem damnat nisi merentem. At esse reprobum, nequaquam significat mereri Damnationem. Sola Damnatio peccatoris splendere facit Dei Iustitiam. Twissus in vind. Gr. de Praed. l. 1. Digr. 1. §. 4. p. 57.

35. Time and paper would fail me, and sufficient Patience would fail my Reader, if I should make repetition of all I finde to my purpose. For whatsoever hath been spoken by the Fa­thers, of universal Redemption, doth Diametrically oppose the irrespective Reprobation. And to reckon up their verdicts in that behalf, were to ingage my self and my Reader in a new Ocean of employment. I hope the account that I have given of my belief in this matter is a sufficient Apologie for my belief, and may at least excuse, though not commend me. Rather then offend any man who takes me upon Trust to be unsound in my principles, I have made this excuse for being orthodox. And do humbly desire to be forgiven if I still adhaere to that Doctrine, which by Scripture, and Reason, and the Authority of my teachers, I am verily perswaded is the truest and the most safe: (to wit,)

• 1. That man himself is the Cause of his sin.
  The sum of all that hath been said.
• 2. That sin is properly the Cause of its punishment.

  And by consequence,

• 3. That man is the procurer of his own Misery.

  And by consequence,

• 4. That Reprobation is a Conditional thing.

Not decreed by God Almighty to shew his absolute power, but to shew his power in the exercise of his Iustice. Not De­termin'd before, but because of his praescience. Nor without regard or respect, but in Relation to sin, in foresight, and hatred, and requi [...]al of it, as of an injury; on which Damnation is [Page 47] praeordain'd, by way of Recompence and Revenge. And there­fore the last day is call'd a day of Iudgement, as well as of per­dition. 2 Pet. 3. 7. Jer. 51. 56. 2 Thess. 1. 8. And the Judge himself is called the Lord God of Re­compence. And when the Lord Jesus shall be revealed in flaming fire, it shall be to take vengeance on them that know not God, and that obey not the Gospel of Jesus Christ. Now that which is the motive to the taking of vengeance, was also the motive to the making of the Decree. He who therefore takes vengeance, because they obey not the Gospel of Christ, did for the very same Reason, Decree to take it. Whi [...]h to me is Demonstration that the Decree is Conditional. [...].

36. I have nothing now of Duty that lies upon me to be done,An obvious expedient to reconcile dis­senters. but that I descend to the second ground of my Belief. But for the love of Charity and Reconcilement, I will endevour to take a Course of making some Composition with my Dissenters. If they will but come up to my most Reasonable Demands, we will not strive about words and phrases; so small a thing shall never part us. I will swallow the word [Necessity,] so I mayQui non sunt praed [...]stinati ad salu [...]em, necessa­rio propter p [...]c­cata condem. nabuntur. Art. Lamb. 4. take it down with a grain of salt. I will say with Mr. Whita­ker (in his 4. Article at Lambeth) That they who are not praede­stin'd to salvation shall be necessarily Damn'd (but) for their sins. (as he himself speaks.) I allow my self to be no wiser then Bishop Andrews, (the strings of whose books I am not worthy to untie) who interprets Necessariò, not by an absolute Ne­cessity, At (que) id neces­sariò (si sic lo­qui placeat) sed necessi ate ex hypothesi, non Absolu â. Id est, ideo quia peccarunt, non autem ideo, quia non sunt praede­stinati. Epist. Wint Jud. de art Lamb. but by a Necessity which followes sin. They shall be damn'd for their sins; that is, for that very Reason, because they have sin'd, not for that only Reason, because they are not prae­destin'd. And because that Reverend, (I know not whether more learned, or Saintlike) Man, allow'd himself to be no wiser then all the Fathers and Schoolmen that went before him, he thought 'twas fit to abstain from [such [...]] such new phrases and waies of holding forth and making out the Ancient Doctrines of the Church; and therefore in stead of [necessity] to say [without doubt.] And for my own part, I desire to be no deeper, and to speak no better language, then all the Fathers of the Church (who have gone to Heaven with those opinions, for which I am Censur'd by some to Hell,) I choose to say [a Conditional, not an absolute Necessity.]

[Page 48]37. If I may guesse (without censure) at the Cause of other mens mistakes, by that which once was mine own, I shall ascribeThe probable cause of the Dissension is a mistake of Gods praesci­ence. much of it to the vulgar misconception of Gods praescience or foresight. Which being constant and infallible, seems to give a necessity to all events, which are the objects of that praesci­ence. And this must certainly be the reason, (I at least must so conjecture, who can think of no better, and did my self once stumble upon this very stone) why Mr. Calvin will have Gods praescience to succeed his praeordination. The ground of which error does so border upon Truth, as to lessen the wonder why men of good parts should so frequently mistake it for that truth it self, on which it borders. (And does unluckily verifie the Italian Proverb, Troppo confina la vertù col vitio,) Gods praescience indeed doth imply a necessity, which it is mistaken to have effected. And again necessity is not by every body di­stinguisht, as by the Admirable Boethius: (to whom I owe my greatest light in this particular.) for if it were, I beleeve ma­ny others might be converted, as I have been. But before I mention, (much lesse insist on the Distinction) I shall choose to say something in preparation to it. It is briefly this.

38. That the knowledge of the Eternal far transcending all mo­tion The mistake is endevoured to be rectified. and succession of time, does abide in the simplicity of its present being; beholding all past and future things in his simple knowledge, as just now done. And therefore Boethius will have it call'd not Praescience, but Science. Not Praevidence, but Pro­vidence: Boethius de con­sol. Philosoph. lib. 5. which doth not change the natures and proprieties of things future, but considers them as they are, in respect of him­self; which is as they shall be, in respect of Time. For as the knowledge of things present doth import no Necessity on that which is done; so the foreknowledge of things future layes no necessity on that which shall be: because whosoever either knowes or sees things, he knows and sees them as they are, and not as they are not. Gods knowledge doth not confound things, but reaches to all events, not only which come to passe, but as they come to passe: whether contingently, or necessarily. As (for illustration) when I see a man walk upon the earth, and at the very same instant, the Sun shining in the Heavens, I see the first as voluntary, and the second as natural. And [Page 49] though at the instant that I see both done, there is a necessity that they be done (or else I could not see them when I do) yet there was a necessity of one only, before they were done, (viz. the Suns shining in the Heavens) but none at all of the other, (viz. the mans walking upon the earth.) The Sun could not but shine, as being a natural agent; The man might not have walked, as being a voluntary one. Upon which it fol­lowes,

39. There is a twofold necessity. Whereof one is absolute, andBy the co [...]side­ration of a two­fold necessity in [...]. the other on Supposition. The Absolute is that, by which a thing must be moved when something moves it. The Suppo­sitive is that, by which a man shall be damn'd if he die Impe­nitent. Duae sunt ne­cessitates. Sim­plex una, ve­luti quòd necesse est omnes homi­nes esse morta­les. Altera conditionis, u [...] si aliquem am­bulare scias, cum ambulare necesse est. Boeth. de con. Phil. l. 5. The latter necessity (though not the first) does mighti­ly well consist both with the liberty of man's will, and God's Conditional Decrees. E. G. I am now writing, and God foresaw that I am writing, yet it does not follow that I must needs write; for I can choose. What God foresees must necessa­rily come to passe, but it must come to passe in the same man­ner that he foresees it. He foresees I will write; not of neces­sity but choice; so that his foresight doth not make an absolute and peremptory Necessity, but infers a Necessity upon Suppositi­on. (We must mark, in a Parenthesis, how great a difference there is betwixt the making, and the inferring of a Necessity.) Whatsoever I do, there is an Absolute Necessity that God should foresee; yet God foreseeing my voluntary Action does not make it necessary, but on supposition that it is done. If all things are present to God, (as indeed they are) his foresight must needs be all one with our sight. As therefore when I see a man daunce as he pleases, it is necessary that he do what I see he does; but yet my looking on does not make it necessary; So Gods foreseeing that man would sin, implyed a certainty that so it would be, but did not make it an absolutely necessary or involuntary thing. For that a thing may be certain (in re­spect of its event) and yet not necessary (in respect of its cause) is no newes at all to a considering person, who will but duly distinguish: Gods Omniscience from his Omnipotence, and his Foresight from his Decreè, and infallible from necessary, and spon­taneous from voluntary, and that which follow's as a Consequence [Page 50] only, from that which follow's as a consequent. If I may judge by those errors which I convince my self to have been in, when I was contrary minded to what I am, I see as many mistakes in other men arising from the misfortune of confounding those things which I just now distinguisht, as from any one unhap­pinesse that I can think of. And from all that I have spoken upon this last subject, it seems inevitably to follow, that a suppositive Necessity, and none else, is very consistent with a free and contingent Action. Whilest I see a man sitting, it is necessary that he sit, but upon supposition that I see him sitting. His posture is still a voluntary contingent thing. For he sate down when he would, and may arise when he pleaseth. (but still with a proviso of God's Permission.) I desire to be taught what is, if this is not, exact speaking, viz. That God by his prohibition under penalty makes my Disobedience become liable to punishment. AndEcclus. 15. 14. by his Decree to permit, or not hinder me, he leaves me in the hand of mine own counsel, and so in the state of peccability, that I may sin and perish if I will. So that by his praescience that I will sin he hath no manner of influence or causality upon my sin; which infers my destruction to be entirely from my self. I am a little confident, that whosoever shall but read Boethius his fifth book, and reading shall understand it, and understanding shall have the modesty to retract an error, he will not reverence the 4. Section of the 23. chapter of the 3. book of Institutions, because it is Mr. Calvins, but will suspect Mr. Calvin because of that Section. The Question there is, [Whether Reprobates were prae­destined to that corruption which is the cause of Damnation] To which he answers with a [Fateor] I confesse that all the sons of Adam, by the expresse will of God, fell down into the misery of that condition in which they are fetter'd and intangled. And a lit­tle after he professeth, that no accompt can be given, but by having recourse to the sole will of God, the cause of which lies hidden within it self. And that we may not think he speaketh only of the posterity of Adam, he telleth us plainly in the close of that Section, that no other cause can be given for the de­fection of Angels, then that God did reprobate and reject them. In this place I would aske, Was the Angels Defection or Apo­stasie their sin, or no? if not, why were they reprobated and cast [Page 51] into chaines of darknesse? and if it were, how then is God's Re­probation not only the chief, but the only Cause of such a sin? This is the sad effect of being enslaved to an opinion, and of be­ing asham'd of that liberty which looks like being conquer'd. I beleeve the love of victory hath been the cause of as many mischiefs as have been feigned to leap forth from Pandora's Box. Whereas if every one that writes, would but think it a noble and an honourable thing, to lead his own pride captive, to triumph over his own conceitednesse and opiniastrete, and to pursue the glory of a well natur'd submission; there is perhaps hardly an Author of any considerable length, but might think he had reason to write a book of Retractations. And sure it will not be immodesty for a young man to say, That many old men might have done it, with as much reason as S. Austin.

40. But as I have learnt of Boethius (that most excellent Chri­stian, And by a right. Application of a twofold Will in the Almigh­ty. as well as Senator; and profound Divine, as well as Philo­sopher; who lived a Terror to Heresie, and died a Martyr for the Truth) to distinguish of Necessity; so have I learn't from other Antients, to distinguish better of God's will, then I was wont to do before the time of my Retractation. First, I distin­guish (with S. Chrysostome) of a first and second will. GodsChrysost. in E­pist ad Eph. c. 1. Homil. 1. first will is, that the sinner should not die, but return rather from his wickednesse and live. His second will is, that he who refuseth to return receive the wages of iniquity. Secondly, I distinguishDamascen. l 2. Orth. Fid. c. 29. (with Damascene) of an antecedent and a consequent will. The antecedent is that, by which he wils that every sinner should re­pent. His consequent is that, by which he preordaineth the Dam­nation of the impenitent. Which distinction is not made in re­spect of Gods will simply (in which there cannot be either prius or posterius) but in respect of the things which are the object of his will. For every thing is will'd by God so far forth as it is good. Now a thing consider'd absolutely may be good or evill, which in a comparative consideration may be quite contra­ry. E. G. To save the life of a man, is good; and to destroy a man, is evil, in a first and absolute consideration. But if a man secondly be compared with his having been a murderer, then to save his life, is evil; and to destroy it, good. From whence it may [Page 52] be said of a just Iudge, that by his antecedent will he desires every man should live; but by a consequent will decrees the death of the Murderer. And even then, he doth so distinguish the murderer from the man, that he wisheth the man were not a murderer. Whom he condemns as murderer, and not as man. For whilest he hath a will to hang the murderer, he hath a merciful woulding to save the man. He doth not hang the man, but only because he is a murderer. And (if it lay in his power) he would destroy the murderer, to save the man. Both the one and the other is not an absolute, but a conditional will. He would save the man, (with an) [if] he were not a murderer. And doth destroy the murderer (with a) because he is a Malefactor. Just so, God's antecedent will is, that every man would repent that they may not perish. It is his consequent will, that everyProsper. in Respon. ad objec. Vincen. sub fi­nem. one may perish who will not repent. Both the one and the other is respective and conditional. Thirdly, I distinguish (with Pro­sper) of an inviting and revenging will. The inviting will is that, by which all are bidden to the Wedding Feast; his reven­ging will is that, by which he punisheth those that will not come: Or fourthly, I distinguish (with reverend Anselme) of the will Anselmus in Mat. cap. 6. of God's mercy, and of the will of his Iustice. It is the will of his Mercy, that Christ should die for the sins of all; but 'tis the will of his Iustice, that all should perish who come not in to him, when they are called, or who only so come, as not to continue and persevere unto the end.

41. All these Distinctions come to one and the same purpose, and being rightly understood, as well as dexterously used, do seem to me a Gladius Delphicus, sufficient to cut asunder the chiefest knots in this Question. For the first will of God may be repea­led, whereas the second is immutable. Which is the ground of that Distinction betwixt the Threats and Promises under God's Oath, and those other under his Word only. Of which saith the Councel of Toledo, Iurare Dei est, à seipso ordinata, nullate­nus Concil. Tolet. 8. [...]. 2. convellere. Poenitere verò, eadem ordinata, cùm voluerit, im­mutare. When he is resolv'd to execute his purpose, he is said to swear; and when it pleaseth him to alter it, he is said to repent. For there are some Decrees of God which (being conditional) do never come to passe; as he thought to have done an Evil of [Page 53] punishment unto Israel, which yet he did not. Exod. 32. 14. And the reason of this is given us from that distinction before mentioned. Which also serveth to reconcile many seeming repugnances in Scripture. For when it is said, that God repen­teth (1 Sam. 16. 35) it is meant of the first nill; and when it is said he cannot repent (1 Sam. 16. 29.) it is meant of the second. In respect of the first, we are said to grieve, to quench, to re­sist the Spirit of God, (1 Thes. 5. 19.) but when it is said, who hath resisted his will? (Rom. 9. 19.) it is meant of the se­cond. God's Mercy is above and before his Iustice, and therefore that is his first will, that all should be saved and come to the know­ledge of the Truth (1 Tim. 2. 4.) but yet so, as that his Iustice is not excluded by his Mercy, and therefore that is his second Will, that so many should be damned as hated knowledge and did not choose the fear of the Lord. (Prov. 1. 29.) The will of his Mercy, that all should live, is from nothing but his goodnesse; whereas the will of his Iustice, that some should die, depends upon something in the Creature. (So that both parties may be gratified, they that are for the dependence, and the indepen­dency of his Will.) That the Reprobate is invited, is from the mercy of God's Will; but that he is punished for not accepting, is from the obliquity of his own. In respect of the first, it is the man that refuseth God (Ier. 8. 5.) But in respect of the second, it is the God that doth reprobate man. (Rom. 1. 28.) The free Love of the Creator is the only motive to his first will; but man's ingratitude and rebellion is his impellent to the second. The first shewes him a tender and compassionate Father; the second speaks him a righteous and an impartial Iudge. Both proclaim him a powerful and a provident God. Now can any Distinction be better chosen, can any word that is aequivocable be more safely understood, can any Opinion (of God's will, or mans) be more ra­tionally, or more warily, or more religiously entertain'd, then that wherein God's Mercy doth greet his Iustice? and wherein his Love doth kisse his Power? I appeal to any man living, whether this be an Error, or if it is, whether it is not a very safe one; and if it is so, whether it is not a very small one; and if so safe, that no body can suffer by it; if so smal, that no body can see it; whether the Author of this Appeal is not [Page 54] very excusable, both for not being able to see his own Eyes, nor to see his own Error with other mens. As much as in me lies, I would live peaceably with all men. With those espe­cially,Rom. 12. 18 who when I speak unto them thereof, make them ready to battle. And in order to that Peace, I desire them to lay this one thing to heart. That as, if I were as they, I would quit my Opinion; so, if they were as I, they would not long keep their own.

CHAP. IV.

42. HAving proved hitherto, that Sin is really the cause of Punishment, that Man is really the cause of Sin, and therefore that Man is the grand cause of Punishment, (as being the cause of the cause of his Damnation) intending thereby to secure my self against the errors and blacker guilt of the Manichees, the Marcionites, the Stoicks, and the Turks, who do all affirm (some directly, some by necessary consequence) That God's absolute Will is the cause of sin, and man's only the instrument; the second part of my Task is to be an Advocate for the pleading and asserting the Cause of God too; and that against the Opiners of the other Extreme, to wit, the Pelagians and the Massilienses; who, to be liberal to Nature, do take away from Grace; and to strengthen the Handmaid, do lessen the forces of the Mistresse. And though I think the latter to be the milder Heresie of the two, it being lesse dangerous to ascribe too much goodnesse to the Power of Nature, (which very power is undoubtedly the gift of God) then the very least Evil to the God of all Grace, (and this according to the Judgement of the Synod at Orange, which pronounced an Anathema upon the first Heresie, whereas it did but civilly reject the second) yet in a perfect dislike and rejection of this latter Extremity, as well as of the former, my second Principle is this.

That all the good which I do, I do first receive; not fromThe second Principle or Ground of my Belief in this businesse. any thing in my self, but from the special Grace and Favour of Almighty God. Who freely worketh in me, both to will, and to do, of his good pleasure, Phil. 2. 13.

43. That I may not be suspected of any secret Reservation with­inExplained. my self, in the laying down of this Principle; I will ende­vour to speak out, and make my Reader my Confessor, by re­vealing the very utmost of what I think in this businesse. I be­leeve, that no man can come to Heaven any otherwise then by Christ; nor to Christ, unlesse it be given; (that is, un­lesse [Page 56] the Father draw him.) First the Father loves the Son; nextAct. 4. 12. Joh. 6. 44. 65. he loves us in the Son; then endowes us with his Spirit; so en­dow'd he elects us; so elected he praedestines us; so praedestin'd he will glorifie us; by crowning his Gifts and Graces in us. I say his Graces, because they are not acquired by us, but infus'd by him. Nor so properly given, as lent us. Lent us as Talents, not to hide, but multiply. We owe it wholly to God, not that he gives us his his Grace only, but that he gives us the grace to desire his Grace, as well as to use it to the advancement of his Glory. And we are to thank him, as for all other mercies, so for this also, even that we have the Grace to thank him. So far am I from that Pelagianism whereof I have wrongfully been accused, (I beseech God not to lay it to my Accusers charge) that I have never lain under any the least Temptation to any degree of that Heresie. No, no more, then Fulgentius, or Pro­sper, or S. Austin himself. It not only is, but ever hath been my assertion, That as we cannot spiritually be nourished unlesse the Father of Mercies doth reach out unto us the Bread of Heaven; and as we cannot take it when it is offered, unlesse he give us the hand of Faith; so cannot we possibly desire to take it, unlesse he gives us our very appetite and hunger. We cannot pant after the waters of life, unlesse he give us our very thirst. He stirs us up, when we are sleeping, that we may seek him; and shews himself, when we are seeking, that we may finde him; and gives us strength, when we have found him, that we may hold him fast unto the end. There is no good thought arising in us, unlesse suggested by his preventing Grace. No nor increa­sing, unlesse strengthned by his subsequent Grace. No nor con­summate, unlesse perfected by his Grace of perseverance. If I am1 Cor. 4. 7. Jam. 1. 17. 1 Cor. 1. 3 [...]. Psal. 115. 1. better then any man, it is God that makes me differ. Every good gift is from above, and cometh down from the father of lights. And therefore he that will glory, let him glory in the Lord, say­ing with the Psalmist, not unto us O Lord, not unto us, but un­to thy name give the praise.

44. Having thus secur'd my self from giving the Will of Man aReconciled with Choice, which is irreconcilable with Irresisti­bility. sacrilegious Liberty; I must withall provide, that I be able to answer the Objection of the Marcionites; which Tertullian could not do, but by asserting the liberty of the Will. Which Grace [Page 57] doth correct, but not destroy. Grace doth strengthen, but notObject. 1. Si Deus benus & praescius mali, & potent depellere, cur hominem lab [...] passus est? Resp. liberum & sui arbit [...]ii & suae potesta­tis invenio ho­minem. & s [...]qq. compell. Grace doth guide, but not necessitate. Grace makes able to choose good, but not unable to refuse it. Marcion objected thus. If God is good, and praescient of all the Evil which is to come, and withal able to prevent it, why did he suffer man­kinde to fall? why did he not hold him fast by irresistible Grace? Tertullian answered, That God made man in his own Image, and that in nothing more lively, then in the liberty of a Will. And to that it is to which his fall must be imputed. But (saith Marcion) Man ought to have been made of such a frame, as not to be able to fall away. Marry then (saith Tertul­lian)Object. 2. Homoita d [...]uit institui, ut non posset cadere. Resp. Ergo bo­num suum habe­ret [...] sibi à Deo. E [...] bonus aut malus necessi­tate fuisset in­ventus, non vo­luntate. Nec bo­ni nec mali merces iure pen­saretur ei. Ter­tull. advers. Marc. l. 2. c. 5▪ 6. Man had not been a voluntary, but a necessary Agent. (which is as much as to say, a Man should not have been a Man.) Nor could have been a right object of Reward and Pu­nishment.

45. Before I venture on any rational, or Scholastical way of ar­guing, I must first enlighten my self out of some clear places of Scripture. Amongst which there is none that seems more pro­per, then that of S. Paul to the Philippians. Workout your sal­vation with fear and trembling. For it is God which worketh in you, both to will, and to do, of his good pleasure. He bids them work, because God worketh, which they needed not have been bid to do, if God had workt after a physical irresistible manner. That they might not be betray'd into a yawning reliance upon their being superacted to the working out of their salvation, he bids them work it out with fear and trembling. (as our Sa­viour1. Proved by Scripture. Phil. 2. 12, 13. bids us, Strive to enter in at the strait Gate, because many shall strive, and shall not enter.) which they needed not have done, had their salvation been (not only certain, but withall) a necessary unavoidable thing, and so inconsistent with choice and option. But the Apostle tels them (in the next verse) that it is God which worketh in them, not only to do, but to will, and to do; by his preventing Grace he worketh in them to will; by assisting Grace he worketh in them to do: by neither so irre­sistibly, but that they must work it out themselves too; and that not only with expectation and hope, but with fear and trembling. God worketh in us to will (saith the Apostle) not without, or against, but according to the nature of that very will with [Page 58] which he made us. Grace doth not destroy, but establish, and strengthen, and perfect Nature. Shall we say that we do a thing without liberty and choice, because God worketh in us to will and to do? (that is) to do it by choice and option? is the liber­ty lost, because it is guided and enabled to do that which is good? If I can do all things through Christ that strengthens me, Liberi arbitrii nos condidit Deus. Nec ad virtutes [...] ad vitia necessi­tate [...]. Alioqui ubi ne­cessitas, ibi nec damnatio, nec corona est. Hie­ron. contra Jo­vinian. l. 2. Valet liberum arbitrium ad bona, si divini­tus adjuvetur; qued fit, humili­ [...]er petendo & faciendo. Au­gust. epist. 89. Psal. 119. 32. Joh. 8. 32. Tertull. loco citato. then can I (through him) both refuse the evil, and choose the Good. Which would not be choice, if it were whether I would or no. And so it would be, were I unable to resist it. (as I shall shew by and by in the open confession of D [...]. Twisse, whose Favourers cannot be angry with one that speaks his language.) I can do all things through him that strengthens me, (saith the Apostle) now to strengthen, is not to necessitate. For then to strengthen would be to weaken. Because to necessitate or compel with an irresistibility, is to vanquish, and over-master; not to give strength, but rather to take it away. Again, our Saviour is said to tread down Satan under our feet. To what end doth he tread the Serpent down, but that we may have the freedome to trample on him? and though he doth it with his own feet, yet it is under ours. This liberty and freedome of the regenerate will, is at once expressed and expounded in those words of the Psal­mist, I will run the way of thy Commandements, when thou shalt set my heart at liberty. To which is agreeable that of our Sa­viour, and the truth shall make you free. It being a great absur­dity (in the opinion of Tertullian) that a man should have his happinesse forced on him by God Almighty. So far is God from prostituting his Blessing, by such a controlling of the will, and such an ob [...]ruding of the object, as makes the object unavoidable, Deut. 30. 15, 19. that he doth not only offer and propose it to his peoples choice, but desires them also to choose it. I call heaven and earth to record this day against you (saith God by Moses) that I have set before you Life and Death, blessing and cursing. Therefore choose life, that thou and thy seed may live. But choose we cannot, if God works in us irresistibly; as I will farther prove by Reason.

46. 2. Proved by Reason. Illud propri [...] dicitur [...]resisti­bile, cui resiste­re nemo potest, quamvis vellet. Twiss. in praef. ad vin. Grat. §. [...]. p. 31. That is properly called irresistible, which is of such an over­ruling and prevailing force, that a man cannot withstand it, al­though he would. (And thus D^r. Twisse hath well defin'd it) [Page 59] Upon which it followes, that to choose irresistibly, is a contra­diction in Adjecto. For it is to will a thing whether one will or no. He that saith, God worketh in us to choose irresistibly, doth say in effect, He so worketh in us, as that we cannot choose but choose. Which is as much as to say, not only that we do, what we can­not do, but that we therefore do it, because we cannot do it. He that cannot choose but choose, doth choose because he cannot choose. Which is as bad as to say, that the thing is necessary, because it is impossible. To make this plain to my plainest Rea­der, I will shew the legality of my deduction by these degrees. First, he that is wrought upon by God (to believe, obey, or perse­vere) irresistibly, cannot possibly do otherwise (then beleeve, obey, or persevere.) Secondly▪ he that cannot possibly do otherwise then he doth, cannot possibly choose but do what he doth. Third­ly, he that cannot choose but do what he doth, doth clearly do it whether he will or no. Fourthly, he that doth beleeve, obey, or persevere, whether he will or no, doth do it by as evident unde­niable Necessity, as that by which a stone tends downward. (Which tendency of the stone, though it is spontaneous, yet is it not vo­luntary, and as it is not by violence, so it is not by choice nei­ther.) Fifthly, he that willeth to beleeve, obey, or persevere, whether he will or no, doth do it by a Necessity, by which a stone tends upwards, when it is thrown. (Which tendency of the stone is so far from voluntary, that it is not spontaneous. It is not only an irrational, but an unnatural thing.) and besides implies a contradiction in a voluntary Agent, which cannot take place in an involuntary stone. For to say, a man willeth to obey or beleeve, whether he will or no, is to say he willeth it either without his will, or against his will, or else not having a will at all. Which is as bad as to say, that he must needs will it be­cause he cannot any way possible. I know not any trick imagi­nable to escape the odium of these Absurdities, unlesse by de­nying the definition of irresistible. Which were not to escape, but to commute absurdities. And not only the authority of D^r. Twisse, but the very force of the word would cry it down. And so little is my deduction in a capacity to be blamed, thatIn act [...] vol [...] ­di locum non habet. In loco citato. Doctor Twisse saith expresly of irresistibility, it hath no place in the act of willing. And though he pleadeth for a

[Page 60] Necessity which he will have to follow Gods operation upon theEx hujusmodi autem operati­one divinâ ex­istit Necessitas offect [...]s, cum ips [...] libertate voluntatis con sen [...]iens. Ibid. Soul, yet he will have that Necessity to be no other, then what may very well agree with the liberty of the will. So that if that Doctor, in that his skirmish with Arminius, had not confounded a necessity with a certainty of event, and used that word in stead of this, his Antagonist and He (in that particular) must needs have wrangled into Friendship. For Arminius denieth the irre­sistible working of Grace upon the Will, and so doth D^r. Twisse. Again D^r. Twisse affirmeth, that the liberty of the will doth agree with the working of Grace upon the Will, and so doth Arminius. And therefore I hope for no hard usage from such as are haters of Arminius, whilest I say the same things with them that hate him.

47. Me thinks the principal Ground of my mistakes heretofore in this businesse, (if I may be allowed to passe a conjecture uponThe Ground of the opposite mi­stake removed. my self) is the misapprehension of certain Texts, the cause of whose misapprehension is the illogical confounding of two things, which though they look like one another, are yet exceedingly different. E. G. from [Ezek. 26. 27. Cant. 1. 14. 1 Ioh. 3. 9. I will cause you to walk in my Statutes, &c. Draw me, we will run after thee. Whosoever is born of God cannot sin, because he is born of God, and the like] many conclude that Gods working upon the wils of his Elect, is by such a physical immediate im­mutation of their wils, as doth not only produce a certain, but a necessary effect. And being forgetful (rather then ignorant) to distinguish necessity from certainty of events, they call that necessary which is but certain and infallible, and so (through hast or inadvertency) they swallow down the Error of irresistible Grace; using the word irresistible in stead of efficacious. And this is a second inadvertency begotten of the first; as common­ly one error loves to draw on another. Now because a fallacy undiscerned in the praemises cannot possibly be discover'd by ga­zing only on the Conclusion, (just as an error in the first Con­coction is hardly mended in the second) I must mark out the difference betwixt infallible and necessary, before I can usefully By rightly di­stinguishing be­twixt Infalli­ble and Neces­sary. distinguish betwixt effectual and irresistible.

48. Infallible properly is that, that cannot erre, or be deceived. That is properly Necessary, which cannot but be. The first re­lates [Page 61] to the perfection of the Knowledge of God, but the second to the Almightinesse of his will. The first is properly apply­ed unto the object of God's foresight, (and though 'tis other­wise used, yet 'tis by such a Catechresis, as I humbly conceive to be a stone of stumbling.) But the second more precisely unto the object of his Decree. The first is consistent with those con­tingent events, to which the second is Diametrically opposed. E. G. That I am now writing is but contingent, because I do it upon choice. Yet Gods foreknowledge of this my writing from all Eternity did infer that this my writing would infallibly come to passe. This event is contingent, for I can choose; but yet in­fallible, for God cannot erre. This contingent therefore doth infallibly come to passe, not by way of a consequent, but by way of consequence. My writing being not the effect, but the object only of God's Omniscience. Which is, in order, before the Act. God foresees a contingent will contingently come to passe, and therefore we infer it will infallibly come to passe, because he foresees it who is infallible. So that his praescience is a consequent of the thing's coming to passe; and its infallibility of coming to passe is inferr'd from his praescience only by way of consequence. It is one thing to follow as the effect of a Cause, in order of Nature; and quite another, to follow as the sequel of an Antecedent, in way of Argumentation. The short and plain upshot of all is this. The precious vessels of Election do very certainly and infallibly persevere unto the end, and that by reason of God's omniscience which cannot be deceived; but not of necessity and irresistibly, by reason of his omnipotence which cannot be frustrate nor defeated. What God foresees shall come to passe shal infallibly come to passe, and that be­cause he cannot erre who is omniscient. (On the other side) what God decrees shall come to passe must come to passe of necessity, because he cannot be resisted who is omnipotent.

49. Hence it is easie to distinguish betwixt the other two things, Betwixt suffi­cient, effectual, and unresisti­ble. which have been so often, and so unhappily confounded; I mean sufficient, effectual, and irresistible, applyed to Grace. 1 Suffi­cient Grace is that, which possibly may produce that effect for which it is given. 2 Effectual is that, which certainly will. 3 Irresistible is that, which necessarily must. That which is [Page 62] irresistible doth carry away its object to what it pleaseth, like a mighty Torrent, by indisputable force, malgre the greatest op­position that can be made, and therefore cannot take place in the elections of the will, which ceaseth to elect after the na­ture of a will, in case it be made to do any thing whether it will or no. (as hath already been shew'd from no lesse a concession then that of Doctor Twisse.) But that which is only effectual is quite another thing, and doth prevail upon the will not ineluctably, but infallibly. It doth so strongly and effectually in­cline the will, at such critical opportunities, and by such con­gruous means, as that the will doth very certainly and un­doubtedly assent. But it doth not so irresistibly and compulsive­ly necessitate, as to take away the freedome and possibility of assenting, by making it do what it doth, even whether it will or no.

50. I discern the Truth of this distinction with greater ease, by having alwaies in my prospect the very great difference be­twixtBetwixt action in general, and volition in particular. Be­twixt taking and choosing. the generical notion of acting or taking, and the specifical notion of willing or choosing. God indeed (if it please him) can by his absolute power over his Creature, make him act this thing, or take that thing, by ineluctable Necessity, and whe­ther he will or no. But then that acting is not volition, and that taking is not choice. For the very word choice cannot be apprehended but it must carry along with it a sound of free­dome. Optio must be optimorum, and so duorum at least. It is of two things or more, that we choose the best, whether in reality, or in appearance. And this liberty of the will, by which we choose, being acknowledged on all sides, (as well by Mr. Per­kins and D^r. Twisse, as by Bellarmine and Arminius, as every man knows that hath but read and compar'd them) that fa­mous [...] of a twofold Necessity, the one of coaction, and the other of infallibility, (being built upon a manifest and grosse mistake both of the word Necessity, and the word Infallibility,) seems to me to be serviceable to no other end, then to cover a wound, which 'tis impossible to cure. But admit of that di­stinction of a twofold Necessity, or admit a Necessity be twenti­fold, yet still it ceaseth not to have the nature of a Necessity. If it is absolutely Necessary that I must go to London, it doth [Page 63] not cease to be Necessity, because I am drawn rather then dri­ven. Coaction and infallibility, if they do both imply an ab­solute and peremptory Necessity, (and so by consequence an irre­sistibility, and so by consequence are opposed to the elective fa­culty of the Will,) it is no matter how they differ in their syllables and their sounds. Shall I declare my Iudgement then, (although in weaknesse, yet in sincerity) how freewill is necessa­ry to the choosing of good, to which, without Grace, it is altoge­ther insufficient? My judgement is, that it is necessary, not as a Cause, but as a Condition. Not as that, by vertue of which, we can do any thing that good is; but as that, without which, we cannot choose it. God's Grace alone is the cause of the good, but man's will is as really the instrument of the choice. We can do good, as God's Engines, without a will; and so did Ba­laams Asse without a Reason. But we cannot choose good, with­out a freewill, as that Asse could not possibly understand what she spake, without a Ratiocination. This seems to me to be as plain as the light. And now I speak of the light, (if my Reader please) by that light I will make it plain. We know the Sun is the fountain or Cause of light. And light the only means by which we see. But yet the opening of the Eye-lid is a necessary condition, because if I wink, I am dark at noon. And if my Eyelid is held open by such a power as I cannot resist, my Eye in that case cannot choose but see, and therefore can­not choose to see. My sight may be with delectation, but not properly with that which is call'd election. Thus if a man be never so much delighted in doing good, but (by reason of ne­cessity) cannot possibly but do it, it is God that chooseth that good, and the man doth only act it. I say God chooseth, by a catachrestical way of speaking, meerly the better to shew my thoughts. For though God did choose to make a world, and one world, because it was in his power to have made many worlds, or none at all; yet I conceive it absurd, to say that God did choose to be good, or that he chooseth to do good, (in oppositi­on to evil) because he is good, and doth good by an absolute ne­cessity; he cannot choose to be, or to do, any otherwise. And so he loves, but doth not choose it. For if that were true speak­ing, it would be as true speaking to say, that God doth will his [Page 64] being and doing good whether he will or no; or that he cannot choose but choose. Which is sure very childish untoward speaking. Only he chooseth to enable us to do it, because he can choose, whether he will so enable us, or not. When he giveth us his Grace, he hath the power to withhold it; when he continueth his Grace, he hath the power to withdraw it; therefore doth he choose both to give and to continue it. The goodnesse of his essence is not arbitrary and elective, but spontaneous and natu­ral. Whereas the goodnesse of his effects in all his Creatures is not naturally necessary in respect of him, but arbitrary and elective, meerly depending upon his choice and pleasure. For he gave us our goodnesse when we would, and may take it away when he pleaseth. To understand this the better, and to hold it the faster in my understanding,

51. I must carefully distinguish betwixt spontaneum (that which is of its own accord) and voluntarium, (that which is freely andBetwixt volun­tary and spon­taneous. upon choice.) The first is agreeable to inanimate creatures, the second only to rational. That is properly oppos'd to violence, but reconcilable with necessity, to which this is oppos'd. E. G. A stone tends downwards by a natural, and necessary, and sponta­neous motion. It tends downwards of necessity, because it cannot but do so. And yet spontaneously, because it doth it without violence, and of its own accord. But yet that motion is not voluntary, nor doth the stone choose that kinde of tendency; because it could not refuse it, as not being furnisht with the li­berty of a will. Thus when I made my entrance out of the womb into the world, I did not choose to go forwards, because I had not the power to stay behinde. I did it as a spontaneous, not as a voluntary Agent. But now that I am capable either of virtue, or of vice, and do pursue the one, in refusal of the other, I do it not only in a spontaneous, but in a voluntary manner. We have the perfect character of a voluntary Agent in that admira­ble [...] of the Son of Syrach. The Lord left man in the Ecclesiasticus 15 13, 14, 15, 16, 17. hand of his Counsel; if thou wilt, to keep the Commandements. He hath set fire and water before thee; stretch forth thy hand unto whether thou wilt. Before man is life and death, and whether him liketh shal be given him. I dare not (like Marcion) be more inquisitive, why God made man with such a freedome [Page 65] of willing or nilling, then why he made the hand with those two Muscles, whereof the one doth move to the taking of a thing, and the other, to the throwing of it away.

52. Having spoken all this in order to the clearing of resistibi­lity A result of the whole in two Examples▪ of the working of Grace in God's Elect, I think I cannot do better then to apply my reasoning to two examples (at least as much of it as shall be needfull) whereof one must be the Proto­plast before his Fall, and the other must be one of his posterity whom we are very well assur'd to have been one of God's Elect. Adam was made in a state of Innocence, and (God not requiring any impossibilities, as brick without straw) had grace enough to have performed a most adaequate obedi [...]nce to God's Command. Which if he had not resisted, how could he have sin'd? and if that measure of Grace was lessen'd before he sin'd, how was the taking away of Grace any punishment of his Fall? or how was he then in the state of innocence? If he was not, then was he sinful before he sin'd. God doth not take away his Grace, unlesse to punish the abuse of it. But Adam did not abuse it before he sin'd; and by our Saviour's Rule [To him Mar. 25. 2 [...]. that hath shall be given] God would rather have given him more, then have taken away any. From whence it followes, that though the working of Grace in the heart of Adam was so strong and so perfect, as to enable him to stand, and that in no lesse then [...] state of Innocence, yet was it also so resistible, as to suffer him to fall, and that into no lesse then a state of perdi­tion. And although he had the favour to be rais'd again in some measure, yet it was not to that Innocence from whence he fell. So that as to his first Covenant, and his first pitch of per­fection, his Fall was not only total, but final too. And indeed I would know, why our Saviour hath told us, that from him that hath not shall be taken away even that which he hath, if it is not for this reason, because he hath lavisht out his talent, and hath resisted that power of doing well which was offer'd him. Sure there is no better arguing then ab actu ad potentiam. Man can resist, because he doth. And I may wonder, as well as Gro­tius, why such men are not confuted by their own experience, who say that Grace in the elect is unresistible, unlesse they will deny themselves to be of the number of the elect. David hath [Page 66] Grace to have done better then he did in the double matter of Uriah, but he resisted it with a witnesse, and that for some moneths together. He was a vessel of election; how then did he resist the Grace of God, so as to fall into those damnable and killing sins, in which, if he had been snatcht away, he had perished ir­reversibly? it was not without Grace, (for he was one of the Elect) nor by its concurrence, (for God was not guilty) it was therefore against the working and means of Grace. Indeed if God did his utmost, such as David could never sin. Or if they could, it would argue God to be conquer'd either by man, or Devil. Unlesse we should say, that such omnipotent Grace doth come, and go, and come again, after the measure that God is wil­ling a man should sin and repent, and sin again. And there­fore it is evident, that God Almighty, in his Elect, doth shew the congruous efficacious Power, but not the irresistibility and Almightinesse of his Grace. Sure David (and Solomon) did fall from Grace, by resisting it, in both acceptions of the word Grace; (as it is taken for gracious living, and as it is taken for the favour of God) and this invincibly conclusible even from that very answer which is wont to be alledged for irresistibility. For they say that God had decreed the Repentance and return of Da­vid, and that therefore he could not die, until he had repented. Which is spoken by them for this reason, because if David had not repented, he must have perisht. Which yet he could not have done, if he had continued in the state of Grace.

53. If against this it is excepted, That though a vessel of Election may fall damnably from Grace, yet he cannot finally, this is un­worthyAnd that clea­red from an exception. for a Sch [...]lar to speak, or hear; for who ever was so silly, as to say or think, that the precious vessels of Election can fall away finally? this is not answering the argument, but forsaking the Question. The Question is, whether the Grace of God doth work irresistibly in the Elect? not, whether or no it brings them to a most certain and infallible degree of blisse. (For they that dispute against the first, affirm the second,) Grace is proved to be resistible in Gods Elect by such examples as David. And to that it is answer'd, he could not so resist as to fall away finally. Which is first a skipping from the first Questi­on to the second, and secondly, it is to say (what no man living [Page 67] doth gainsay) That such as persevere unto the end can never fall away finally. A grosse identical proposition, which doth not only betray the weaknesse of that opinion which it assert­eth, but doth establish the Truth of this very cause which I am pleading. For it confesseth, that Grace is resistible, and on­ly denies that it is finally resisted. David was able to resist it, but he did not resist it unto the end. And every technical Grammarian can distinguish the Act which is imply'd in the Participle, from the Aptitude which is couched in the Adje­ctive in bilis. But (to hasten towards the conclusion of my Readers sufferings) there is also a final as well as total resist­ing of such a Grace as is sufficient for the attainment of Glory. For (not to speak of those men who resisted and sinned against all the means that could be used, Isa. 5. 4. and who alwaies resisted the holy Ghost, Act. 7. 51. and who would not be ga­thered, after never so many essays, Mat. 23. 37.) how ma­ny Christian professors are now in Hell, who when they were Infants were fit and suitable for Heaven? Shall not I spare Jonah 4. 11. Nineveh, in which are above 120000 souls, which cannot di­stinguish betwixt the right hand and the left? Ion. 4. 11. God speaks there of Heathen Infants, toward whom his Bowels did yearn within him, and that upon the Impendence of but a tem­poral destruction. But I speak here of Infants born and ba­ptized into a membership of the Church. How many are there of such who in their harmlesse Nonage were babes of Grace, and yet have outlived their Innocence, so as at last to be transfor­med into vessels of wrath? I will shut up this Paragraph with the words of Tertullian. Saul was turned in­to Saulem tam Dei Spiritus vertit in Prophetam, quàm & malus spiritus po­stea in Apostatam. Iudam aliquandiu cum electis deputatum postea Diabolus intravit. Tertul. de Animâ. c. 11. a Prophet by the Spirit of holinesse, as well as into an Apostate by the spirit of unclean­nesse. And the Devil entred into Judas, who for some time together had been deputed with the elect. And with the saying of S. Au­gustine, Si regeneratus & justificatu [...] in [...]a­lam vitam suâ voluntate relabitu [...], certò is non potest dicere, Non accepi, quia acceptam gratiam Dei suo in ma­lum arbitrio libero amisit. Aug. de Grat & Correp. c. 6. &c. 9. That if the regenerate and justified shall fall away into a wicked course of living by his own will and pleasure, he cannot say, I have not received, because he hath wilfully lost that Grace of God which he had received, by that will of his [Page 68] which was at liberty to sin. And how exactly that Father doth speak my sense of this businesse, I leave it for any one to judge who shall consult him De praed. Sanct. l. 1. c. 14. De bono Persev. l. 2. c. 1. & 6. & l. 2. c. 8. & 13. And I would very fain know, whether the lost Groat, the lost Sheep, and the prodigal Son, do not signifie (in our Saviours Parables) that a true beleever may be lost, and being lost may be found, and again become a true beleever. Which is as much as I desire to prove the thing under consideration.

CHAP. V.

54. HAving evinced to my self (and that is all that I pre­tend to) First, that my will of it self is inclinable toThe Decree of Election condi­tional and re­spective. evil; and that, secondly, of it self it is not inclinable to good; and that, thirdly, it is inclined by the singular and special operation of Grace, to the refusing of evil, and to the choosing of good, and that there­foreQuá gratiâ non nova voluntas crea­tur, ne (que) invita voluntas cogitur, sed infirma sanatur, depravata cor­rigitur, & ex malâ in bonam con­vertitur, ac interiore quodam modo tra [...]itur, ut ex nol [...]nte volens effi­ [...]iatur, & Divinae vocationi liben­ter consentiat, &c. August. de grat. & lib. arb. ad Valent. c. 13. in the fourth place, that singular Grace doth not work so irresistibly as to compel an unwilling will, but yet so strongly as to heal a sick one; not so necessitating the will of God's elect, as that inevitably it must, but yet so powerfully perswading, as that it certainly will, both believe and obey, and after repentance persevere unto the end; I should in civility to my Reader conclude his Trouble, if I were sure that some menSicut praf [...]it, praedestinat, & propterea prae▪ destinat, quia quale futurum sit, praescit. Ma­la tantùm prae▪ s [...]it, & non praedestinat. Aug. in Resp. ad calum. Pe­lag. sub initi­um l▪ 6. Hypo­gnostic [...]n. would not call it Tergiversation; and if I were not obliged by those papers, which have been so frequently, s [...] falsly (that I may not say so maliciously) transcribed, and are threatned to be laid very publiquely to my charge, (and which I plead in the defence of this mine own publication, which I should never have ch [...] ­sen upon such a subject, as I have least of all studied, and am least delighted in of any other) to remonstrate the utmost of what I think in these matters. For I do stedfastly beleeve (what I also asserted in that extemporary Discourse, which was the innocent cause of this unacceptable effect) That▪ Gods Decree of Election from all eternity, was not absolute and irrespective, but in re­spect [Page 69] unto, and in praescience of some qualification, without which no man is the proper object of such Decree. And this I prove to my self from these waies of Reasoning.

55. First, I consider with my self, that there is no salvation but only to such, as are found to be in Christ Iesus, in the day of Death and of Iudgement. Which no man living can be, un­lesseProved by rea­son, from its be­ing respective of our being in Christ, and of the conditions by which we are so. he be qualified with such conditions, as without which it is impossible to be so found; (such as are Faith, and Obedience, and Repentance, after sin, bringing forth such fruits as are wor­thy of Repentance, and perseverance in weldoing unto the end.) That God will save none but such, is all men's Confession. And that he saves none but such whom he decrees to save, is every whit as plain. Therefore none but such are the object of such Decree. For if he decreed to save any without regard or re­spect to their being such, he might actually save them without regard or respect to their being such. Because whatsoever is justly decreed, may be justly executed as it is decreed. But it is granted on all sides (as I suppose) that God will save none except such as are found to be in Christ with the aforesaid qualifications; and therefore it should be agreed on all sides, that he decreed to save none but such as they. And what is that but a respective and conditional Decree? made in intuition of our being in Christ, and of our being so qualified to be in Christ? So that although our election is not of works, but of him that calleth, yet good works are required as a necessary condition, though utterly unworthy to be a cause of our election. Nor can it be without respect to the condition of the Covenant, that the Covenant is made, and the promise decreed to be fulfilled.

56. Secondly, I consider, that the Decree of the Father to send the Son to be a second Adam, was in respect and regard to the backesli­ding of the first Adam. Without which it was impossible that the Son of God should have been sent to be the Saviour of the world. And the decree of God Almighty to save the first Adam, Eph. 1. 4, 6. Rom. 8. 39. 1 Cor. 5. 15. was in regard of and respect to the meritoriousness of the second Adam. For God adopteth never a childe, nor doth acknowledge him for his own, so as to give him eternal life, unlesse it be for the sake of his only begotten Son. First God pitied a woful world, then he loved what be pitied, next he gave his own Son to save what he [Page 70] loved, and upon the condition of beleeving in his Son, he gave it a promise of eternal life. For so beleeving is interposed be­twixt love and life, in the 3. of S. Iohn vers. 26. God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whoso­ever beleeveth in him, should not perish, but have everla­sting life. From this Text it appeareth, that God loved the world before he gave his Son to it; for therefore gave he his Son, because he loved it. But it was not a love by which he loved it to life everlasting; for with such love he only loved it in his Son. And the world is not capable of such a love without the condition of beleeving. It was therefore in prae­science of our beleeving in Christ, that God elected us to life eternal. For Christ is not only the means, (as some affirm) but the meritorious cause, and the Head of our Election. Christ was foreknown, 1 Pet. 1. 2. and we in him, Rom. 8. 29. Christ was praedestin'd, and we by him, Eph. 1. 5.

57. Thirdly, I consider, that there must be a Difference be­fore there can be an Election. Love indeed is an act of fa­vour, And from the nature of Ele­ction. [...] Oecum. apud Episc. Wint. de Artic. Lam. Iud. but Election is properly an act of Iudgement; a pre­ferring of the better before the worse. They that say God Elected such a number of men without the least intuition of their qualifications by which they are differenced from the reprobated crew, do speak illogically (to say no worse.) how much safer is it to say, That because such men as are in Christ by Faith are better then such as are out of Christ by Infidelity, therefore those are taken, and these are left? Nor doth this derogate from God, or arrogate to man, to say, he chooseth his own gifts, any more then it doth, to say, he crowns them. For God doth give us the advantage of our being in Christ, as well as choose us for that advan­tage. First he giveth us his Son, next he giveth us his Grace whereby to enable us to believe in his Son, and so beleeving he doth elect us. So that here is no matter for man to boast on; he having nothing which he hath not re­ceived, no not so much as his [...] It is God that makes the difference, as well as God that chooseth. And it seems this very argument from the Nature and Use of the word Election, did prevail with S. Austin and Oecume­nius. [Page 71] S. Austin saith expresly, that Iustification precedeth Electi­on; Non ta [...]en Ele­ctio praecedit Iustificatio­nem, sed Electi­onem Iustificatio. Nemo enim eligitur, nisi jam distans ab illo qui rejicitur. Unde quod dictum est, Quia el [...]get nos Deus an [...]e mundi constitutionem, non video quomodo sit dicen­dum nisi praesc [...]entiâ. August. ad Simpl. 1. 2. and his reason is, because no man is elected unlesse he differ from him that is rejected.

58. Fourthly, I consider, that the whole Tenor of the Scri­ptures, Proved by Scripture. in the Iudgement of all the Fathers, who are best able to understand them, teacheth no other Praedestination, then in, and through Christ, which is respective and condi­tional. First the Scripture gives us none but conditional pro­mises, such as, If any man keep my saying, he shall never taste Joh. 8. 51. Gal. 6. 7, 9. Rev. 3. 20. Death. Whatsoever a man soweth that shall he reap. And we shall reap if we faint not. If any man will hear my voice, and open the doore, I will come in to him, &c. Nay even the ve­ry Texts which are wont to be urged for irrespective Ele­ction do seem very precisely to evince the contrary. For when God is said to praedestine according to his good pleasure Eph. 4. 9. which he had purposed in himself, the word [...] rendred good pleasure, doth not signifie the absolutenesse, but the re­spectivenesse of his will. For it relateth to something in which God is well pleased, and that is Christ. It being im­possible for God to please himself with mankinde, or for men to be acceptable and well pleasing to God, any otherwise then in him, of whom it was said, This is my beloved Son in whom I am well pleased. Besides, all those Scriptures which do [...] teach universal Grace, and Redemption, (which I suppose hath been proved in the prosecution of my first Principle) do seem to me most clearly to inferre a respective and conditional Election. For if it is true, that Christ did offer up himself, not only sufficiently, but intentionally for all; if he did ear­nestly desire that every one would come in, upon the preach­ing of his Word, and receive the benefit of his Death and Pas­sion; if his warnings were not in jest, and his invitations se­rious; if [depart from me ye cursed] was therefore foretold, that every one might beware and not obtrude himself upon that sentence; if he is unwilling that any one should be [Page 72] caught in the Serpents snare, who shewes to all (without ex­ception) a certain way to escape; if (as S. Austin speaks) he is desirous not to strike, who bids us look to our posture, and stand upon our Guard; if (as S. Austin speaks again) heAug. in Serm. 28. de Sanct. Idem contr [...] 2 epist. Pelag. l 3. c. 2. Idem de sp. & lit. ad Marcell. c. 33. shews his power to punish none but only those that refuse his Mercy; and would not damn any one without respect to sin, who gave his own Son to die for all; then his refusing of the Goats in respect of that which makes them differ from Sheep, infers his Election of the sheep, in respect of that which makes them differ from Goats. And I have made the more haste to make this Inference, because as the respective­nesse of Election needs not otherwise to be proved then by the respectivenesse of Reprobation; so they are both taken for granted, upon the supposition of Christ's having dyed not only sufficiently, but intentionally for all. Towards which (having discoursed so largely of it already) I will only of­fer this one consideration which meets my pen as I am wri­ting, and even obtrudes it self upon me to be delivered. It is briefly this. That since our Saviour upon the Crosse, did very heartily pray, even for those very homicides, and parri­cides, and Deicides that Kill'd him, we have no reason but to beleeve, That he laid down his life even for them that took it away; and that he dyed for all for whom he prayed. And yet we reading of their Murders, but not of their Re­pentance, I should be loth to tell my people, that those cru­cifying wretches, were precious vessels of Election, (in com­plyance with that opinion, that Christ died only for the Elect) lest they should comfort up themselves in the most [...]rimson sins that can be named (like some in the world) as well con­sisting with their pretensions to the Kingdome of Heaven. And yet in my shallow Iudgement, (which because it is shal­low, I do submit to those of deeper and profounder reach, how dogmatically soever I may seem to have spoken in many pla­ces of this Discourse) I say in my shallow Judgement, Christ dyed for all for whom he prayed; and he prayed for them that curst themselves. His bloud be upon us (said they) and yet (said he) Father forgive them. He made his Murderers Execration become his prayer. He took the poyson out of [Page 73] their Curse, and made it wholsome for them. He wished, as well as they, that his bloud might be both upon them and upon their children; but in his own most merciful, not in their barbarous and cruel sense; for they meant the guilt, He the benefit of his bloud; and would have it [...]ight on them, not to accuse, but cleanse them. And yet I dare not affirm, that they were all a portion of God's Elect.

59. Lastly, I consider, that the main stream of the Fathers And by Anti­quity, from the concessions of Anti remon­strants. doth run this way. And not to trouble my Reader with such a Catalogue of particulars, as I gave in before, for a Condi­tional Reprobation, (which yet I think were very easie upon a very smal warning) I will content my self at present toPatres hîc nullo modo audiendi, qui ad praevi­sionem hoc refe­runt. Beza in Rom. 11. 2. edit. 2. prove what I say from the confessions of Beza, and Doctor Twisse. First Beza in his Comment upon Rom. 11. 2. rejects the Judgement of the Fathers, because they are not (as he would have them) for the absolute, irrespective, unconditio­nal way. And Dr. Twisse confesseth, that all the Ancients, before S. Austin, did place the object of God's Election inTwiss. in Vin. Gr. l. 1. part. 1. Digr. 8. sect. 4. p. 110. Fide praevisâ. At which S. Austin was so far from being any way displeased, as that (with very great reverence to their Authority) he made it appear to be an innocent and harmlesse Tenent. He affirmed that all the Fathers, who li­vedAugust. de bono persever. c. 19. & 20. Twiss. loco ci­tato. before himself, agreed in this, That the Grace of God is not prevented by humane merits. Which one profession he thought sufficient for the asserting of the free Grace of the Divine prae­destination. To which saying of S. Austin, because I finde that Dr. Twisse doth very readily subscribe; I ought in rea­son to be secured from any very hard censure, because I am not an affirmer of humane merits, much lesse do I place them in a precedency to Grace.

60. I conclude with a desire of so much liberty of conscience, The Conclusion. as to beleeve with S. Paul, That God is a respecter, not of Rom. 2. 11. Persons, but of Vers. 14. Works. That my sins are perfectly and entirely mine own. And that if I do any thing that is good, it is not I that do it, but the Grace of God that is in me. Yet so, as that I can do all things through him that strengthens 1 Cor. 15. 10. me. And who doth so strengthen as that I may do them, [Page 74] but not so force me as that I must. In this, and every other thing, I have been long since taught by Vincentius Lirinen­sis, (whom I shall ever observe to the utmost of my Dis­cretion)▪ To opine with the most, and most Iudicious, rather then with the fewest, and least discerning. Opinionastrete is a fault, but Fallibility is none. If my Teachers are in the right, they have knowledge enough to make me moderately instructed; if they are any where in the wrong, they have authority enough to make me pardonably erroneous; if I have not perspicacity to comprehend them as they deserve, it seems they have Depths enough to prove, I am Invincibly ig­norant.