Now to acquaint us what a Faction in a State is, The ſaid worthy Author thus Diſcourſeth. By a Faction in a Common-wealth I do not mean that Government, which is by Law or Cuſtom ſettled; and therefore, where the ſettled Government is Monarchical, I do not take the Adhearing to the King a Faction, or where the Government is Ariſtocratical or by a Senate, as was ſometime in Rome, or mix'd, partly Ariſtocratical, and partly Popular, &c. that Eſtabliſh'd Government,☜ or the Adherance to it was no Faction; but it is ſo far from it, that the Adhearance to the Government Legally Eſtabliſh'd, is the Duty of every Subject and Citizen.

But this I call a Faction; When a party of Men ſhall Conſpire, and Unite themſelves againſt the Eſtabliſh'd Government to ſubvert or alter it; and this is the greateſt Faction, Crimen laeſae Majeſtatis.

Secondly, When a party of Men ſhall Unite and Confederate themſelves together to gain either Something to themſelves, or to others by Force or Fraud, againſt the Will and Conſent of that Power, that by Law is intruſted with the Conceſſion or Denial thereof.

Thirdly, When any Perſon intruſted by the Sovereign Power, with a Particular Power or Authority ſhall endeavour by Force or Fraud to extend that Power, wherewith he is intruſed, beyond the bounds of it: As if the Tribunes of the People in the State of Rome ſhould, by ſtirring up the People, or by Force or by Secret Confederacy incroach upon the Power of the Senate, &c. And therefore in ſuch an enterpriſe they are no more Excuſed from being a Faction by their Authority, than if they were without any ſuch Authority; for herein they Act as Private Perſons.

Fourthly, When Two or more Great and Eminent Perſons or Parties, and it may be of a conſiderable Intereſt in a State or Government, engage one againſt another; at firſt it may be privately, and then after more openly and viſibly croſſing each other, and at laſt to Affronts and Rencounters, and all this while the True real Government ſit ſtill and look on, either out of Fear or in Policy; and many times look on contenting themſelves with the Complement and Profeſſion of Subjection, till at laſt one Party get the better, and at laſt pull off the Diſguiſe and gives Laws to his Lawful Governors.

Fifthly, When ſome particular Perſons, that are or are not in any Authority, in a State or Common-wealth, deſign ſome Matter either for themſelves or againſt any other, and to effect that Deſign, do by Secret Means or Power, or Fraud, or otherwiſe, draw over the Power of that State, wherein they live, to be their Engins and Inſtruments under the Countenance and Signature of their Authority to effect their Deſign. For though☞ the Authority of the State is engaged therein, yet that being obtained by Force, Fraud or other Engine, and to ſerve the particular Intereſt and End of a Party, and not acting according to the True and Native Freedom and Integrity of their Inſtitution, excuſeth not this from being really a Faction, though ſometimes it be ſpeciouſly Guilded over with the Countenance of Publick Authority. And for the moſt part the Factions of Rome, before mentioned, were of this latter Sort or Kind, and managed under the ſhadow and umbrage of the Civil Authority, though in their Original they aroſe from the Pride and Ambition, Envy and Emulations, Jealouſies, Deſigns, Diſguſts and Animoſities, of particular Perſons, who could not brook any whom they ſuſpected might be Rivals of their Greatneſs, Honour, or Power; and theſe prevailing, bore down the Magiſtracy of Rome before them.

Now though it may be true, That thoſe Decrees of the Authority☞ Eſtabliſh'd by Law, though by theſe means obtained, are binding while they ſtand in Force, yet the manner of obtaining ſuch Decrees by theſe, and the like means, are Unjuſt and Factious; and in true Intrinſick Juſtice, do not Excuſe or Juſtify the Obtainers thereof from Oppreſſion and Injuſtice, &c.

And as theſe ſeveral Factions were extreamly Cruel and Severe unto one another (as is before mentioned) ſo they were all infinitely pernicious to the Common-wealth; which by the Competitions of theſe Turbulent Spirits was torn in pieces. For☞ theſe Factions were, in Truth, no other than certain Excreſcences, Tumors and Diſeaſes, ariſing in the Roman State, by the Power, Ambition and Unquiet Spirits, of certain buſy Men in Rome, that either thought their Worth neglected, or not ſufficiently rewarded, or were provoked to Animoſities by mutual Jealouſies and Emulations one of another. And although it is true in the ſeveral Viciſſitudes, and the prevalency of any Faction, they did ſo handle the Senate and People, by Artifices and Tricks, Threats and Affrights, that they minted their Factions oftentimes with the Stamp and Face of the☞ Senate and Publick Authority, yet the Truth was, They were really ſtill no other than Factions and Parties, which like Prevalent and Noxious Humors, or Putrid Diſtempers in the Body, over-powered the true State and Genius of the Civil Government, and rendred the whole Body in Diſorder; and it could no more be eſteemed the true Complection of the Roman Government, than a Fever or a Calenture, though it overſpread the whole Man. And although the Paroxyſms or Fits of the Roman State, which it was put into hereby, were various and contrary each to other, according as one or the other prevailed. like the hot Fit and cold Fit of an Ague, yet ſtill the Common-wealth of Rome was Sick, and laboured under the Diſtemper☜ of either Faction whichſoever of them prevailed.

I do confeſs (faith my Author) that commonly all Factions, to gain to themſelves Credit, at leaſt make ſome pretence for the good of their Country, ſomething that they would pretend to reform; and it may be really, there was ſomething in the State of Rome that was neceſſary to be reformed, and the Diſorder might be ſo Powerful, Stubborn and Obſtinate, that they thought it could not be done by ordinary means, and that at the firſt attempt might be the Thing that they, or at leaſt many of them, really, and it may be only, or at leaſt principally, aimed to ſet right. But Wiſe Men ſee, That many☜ times Reformation was pretended, but the great Deſign was private Intereſt or Revenge; or if ſome Men in the ſimplicity of their Hearts meant well to the State of Rome, that were engaged in thoſe Factions; yet when once a Faction is ſet on foot, Men that have other Deſigns, either of Ambition or Covetouſneſs, mingle in it, and commonly in a little time become prevalent, and diſtort all to their private Ends and Advantages, and engage others in the like, who are fed, or do feed themſelves with the like hopes. They well know that in a very little proceſs of time variety of Succeſs, and Occurrences, and New Emergencies and Counſels, carry Factions quite beyond their firſt Deſigns, into greater Rapine, Fury, and Cruelty, and Revenge, then ever they themſelves (it may be at firſt) thought they ſhould have been guilty of.

And as my Author goes on, In the firſt motion of Enterprizes of this nature (as he touch'd upon before) the Pretences are commonly Fair, Modeſt; nothing pretended but Reformation of Abuſes, and great Moderation profeſſed; and this to cover partly their Deſigns, partly to gain to themſelves Credit and good Eſteem with good Men, or at leaſt with the Vulgar.

Therefore this Wiſe Man Pomponius Atticus, (as ſaith my Author) would never be drawn into any of thoſe Factions in the State of Rome; for he knew well, that if he were once engaged, he muſt follow not only the Fortune, but alſo the Commands and Counſels of the Party and their Governors, and ſo be engaged in all the Villanies and Injuſtice that attended their Succeſs; and (the motions of a Powerful prevailing Succeſsful Faction, being ordinarily very Ungovernable) he knew beſides, that very often a Faction grows utterly unlike to what it was at firſt; ſo that if he could have perſwaded himſelf to have engaged in any Faction, he muſt have reſolved to have kept thoſe plauſible Principles, which firſt led him to that Engagement, and then he had been quite out-run by his own Party, or elſe he muſt have reſolved to hold pace with his Party in all their Changes and Practices, and then he muſt out-run his Innocence, his conſtant Integrity himſelf.

Thus not only in Prudence, but from the very Habit, Complection and Conſtitution of his Mind was this Wiſe Man, Pomponius Atticus, admirably ſecured againſt all Temptations to Factions: For (as my Author obſerves) there is in moſt Men☞ a certain Intemperance of Paſſions, that render them very obnoxious to fall into Factions; but among them there are Three ſorts of Paſſions, or rather indeed Putrifactions of Paſſions, and Diſeaſes of the Soul, namely, Ambition, or the Deſire of Honour, Power, Place, or Preferment; next, Covetouſnes, or the Deſire of Riches; or Vindictiveneſs, or the Deſire of Revenge; and of which the crafty Heads of Factions make great uſe, that where they find a Man that is under the Regiment of any of theſe Diſtempers, 'tis a thouſand to one but they win him over; yea the Magick and Enchantment that ariſeth from thoſe Intemperances of the Mind, that without any Solicitation from without, they carry Men headlong that way they think ſhorteſt to ſatisfy themſelves; and therefore are eaſily caught and entangled in a Faction, as that which promiſeth the moſt compendious Method for the Attainment of their Deſires. But the Complection or Conſtitution of the very Soul of Atticus (ſaith my Author) was ſuch, that thoſe Diſtempers of Ambition,☞ Covetouſneſs or Revenge, dwelt not there: And by this means he was Proof againſt Temptations from within or from without, to ſide with a Faction; which he avoided as a Peſt or a Plague Sore, wherein he was ſure, if he were once engaged, he ſhould looſe either his Safety or his Innocence, or both. And as he was ſo happy as never to have received any ſuch Injury as might provoke Revenge, ſo he had ſuch a Calm, Serene, Even frame of Mind, that that Paſſion could get no hold upon him; and he had abundantly well learned the beſt Leſſon of the Stoical Philoſophers, Not to injure himſelf by Paſſion or Perturbation,☞ becauſe another did him Wrong.

Beſides (ſaith my Author) Atticus did it upon an Account of greateſt Prudence; For it was evident to him, by great Experience, and by a wiſe Proſpect of Things, That theſe Factions and their Succeſſes were ſtrangely mutable and uncertain: Tanta varietas iis temporibus fuit fortunae, ut modo hi, modo illi in ſummo eſſent faſtigio, aut periculo; (i. e.) Though Succeſſes of Factions☞ were ſo uncertain, and the Viciſſitude ſo ſtrange and various, that thoſe that now prevailed, and ſeemed in an impregnable Condition, were ſuddenly tumbled down: And again thoſe that ſeemed in an irrevocable and deſperate Ruin, regained the Government even to a Miracle; therefore by engaging in any Faction, he was ſure to undergo the common Fate which that Faction had, which was either wholly to be ruined, if the adverſe Party prevailed, or at beſt in caſe the Party wherein he ſhould be engaged prevailed; yet they were but in a tottering, uncertain, unquiet, reſtleſs Condition, and were not like to hold that Power or Intereſt which they had ſo difficultly gotten.

Secondly, He did it (ſaith my Author) on the account of common Juſtice and Honeſty, For theſe Factions in the State☜ of Rome were not the True, Lawful, Settled Government thereof, for therein Atticus and all good Men ought to have been engaged, for it had been their Duty and Glory to have aſſiſted it; and a certain Baſeneſs and Puſillanimity of Mind to have deſerted it: But thoſe Factions were certain Excreſcences, Tumors and Diſeaſes (as is mentioned before) ariſing to the Roman State, by the Power, Ambition and Unquiet Spirits of certain buſy Men.

And as a Third Expedient he uſed for his ſafety it was this; That although he was always ready to oblige all Men by all Offices and Kindneſſes, Yet he never would receive over-great☜ Kindneſſes from great Perſons, as alſo avoyding publick Offices, Atticus was ſo far from ſeeking that, (ſaith my Author) that he would not take them when offered; this being his Principle, that he would do all the good Offices he could, either for particular Perſons, or for the Common-wealth in the ſtate and capacity of a private Perſon. And it ſeems a Wonder to me (ſaith the Author of this Diſcourſe) to ſee the Folly and Vanity of Men ſo fondly to hunt after publick Offices, and that they ſhould be ſo much miſtaken, and no better to underſtand themſelves, for thoſe even that are more Honourable and more Profitable, yet are more Dangerous and Hazardous. And the Truth is, (ſaith he) That it hath been the Skill and Art of the Wiſer ſort of Mankind to annex to ſuch great Employments, thoſe Blandiſhments of Honour, Eſteem and Profit to invite Men to the undertaking them; as Phyſitians guild their Pills, that they may be the eaſier ſwallowed; it is true, theſe are indeed Neceſſary for the good of others. But it is moſt certain that any Man that Ambitiouſly hunts after them, nay that Man that doth not Induſtriouſly decline them (if poſſible he may)☜ underſtands not himſelf nor his own Peace and Happineſs, or Contentment. For, firſt, he draws neceſſarily Envy upon himſelf; and Envy is a buſy active Humour, and reſtleſs until it unhorſes thoſe upon whom it faſtens, or break it ſelf in the attempt, whoſoever Poſſeſſeth that which many Deſire, hath as many Enemies and Enviers, as he hath Rivals and Competiotrs, and as many Competitors as there are Ambitious or Covetous Men in the World. And as all great Offices have commonly ſomewhat of Power annexed to them, and although Societies of Men can never ſubſiſt in Order without ſome Power be over them, yet particular Perſons commonly hate and envy any Power in any but themſelves. Further alſo, a Man that undertakes a publick Employment yields up, and loſes his own Tranquillity, and Reſt, and Quiet, that his private Station yields, and even diveſts himſelf of himſelf: And as his Faults and Defects in that Condition are more eaſily obſerved and ſeen, ſo they are very diligently watched and obſerved, yea he wants not ſuch Spectators as make it their Buſineſs to be diligent Searchers and Obſervers of them; and then they are ſure to be the Objects of moſt ſevere Cenſure and Animadverſion. And further the Miſchiefs of his Miſtakes are of a vaſt and comprehenſive Concern, and the ill Conſequences irreparable; yea let a Man manage his publick Employments with all the Integrity and Wiſdom imaginable, yet the Race is not to the Swift, nor the Battel to the Strong; ſo that ill Succeſs will attend the beſt and wiſeſt Endeavours ſometimes. Again there is no publick Office in the World, but muſt neceſſarily make a conſiderable part of Mankind his Enemy, for he cannot ſatisfy and pleaſe all; he that is diſappointed in his Expectation, or that finds leſs than he Expected, hates him; and it will not be material to the ſafety of him that is hated, whether there be Cauſe or not, for his Enemy's Indignation is as high, as if it were juſt. And though it may be objected that he makes as many Friends as he doth Enemies, this mends not the matter; for ſuppoſed Injuries are longer remembered than real Benefits.

But ſuppoſing (ſaith my Author) that in a calm and ſedate Time this wiſe and good Man might have been perſwaded to take an honourable publick Employment, yet conſidering the☞ Time wherein he lived, his declining of publick Employments was not only Excuſable and Juſtiſiable but alſo very Commendable, and an Abſtinence full of Prudence and great Diſcretion: For he that takes a publick Employment in a troubled State, is (without the intervention of a marvellous Providence) firſt, and before any other, expoſed to the Shock of all publick Commotions; if he oppoſe the Faction, he is in danger of Ruin for oppoſing their Deſigns; if he take their part, he is under an Engagement not only in the hazard of their Fortune, but alſo in purſuit of all thoſe deſperate Enterpriſes that ſuch a Faction thinks Neceſſary or Convenient for their Eſtabliſhment, and then, he will loſe his Reputation and his Innocence, and be entangled in a moſt baſe Servirude, &c. And if ever there come a turn of Affairs, he ſhall be ſure to be one of the firſt that is cruſhed by the prevailing Party, and this Cicero found to be true to his coſt. And therefore Cato Ʋticenſis, who the greateſt part of his Life had been concerned in publick Offices; yet when he found himſelf over-born by the Ceſarian Party, learned (though too late) Atticus his Wiſdom, and left this Legacy to his Son; That he ſhould never engage himſelf in the publick Adminiſtration of Offices or Employments of the Common-wealth.

Now in further tendency to our Safety in troubleſome Times, my Author thus Diſcourſeth. Things (ſaith he) that create a Man many Enemies, are theſe that follow. Firſt, When a Man is an Accuſer and Informer againſt any Man, for Matters of Crime or Miſdemeanour, which makes the Party and all his Relations his Enemies. Secondly, When a Man is Litigious and Contentious, going to Law for every Trifle. Thirdly, For a Man to be a Publican, or Farmer of Cuſtom, &c. Fourthly, When a Man deals much in Goods or Lands that are Confiſcate. Fifthly, That which create Men trouble, eſpecially in a troubled State, is too much Prodigality of Speech, as an overfree☜ inconſiderate Commendation of ſome Perſons of one Party, or too liberal Invectives or Cenſures of Perſons engaged in an other. Sixthly, Pride, and Haughtineſs of Deportment alſo doth Infallibly create a Man more Enemies, than any one Diſtemper beſides, and is commonly the Root of all Contentions and Animoſities both in publick and private Perſons; therefore Atticus always kept an humble Mind, and an humble Deportment. An humble Man in all States and Conditions ſtands ſquare upon his own Baſis, without any great Diſorder or Trouble, ſo that (as my Author tells us) it was a hard thing to tell whether the ſame Men did more Love, or Fear him. It is (ſaith he) the common Folly of great Men in Place, Power, or Wealth, to think themſelves above the reach of Enemies, eſpecially of the meaner Sort. But this is certain, there is no Man, though never☜ ſo mean, but once in Seven Years will have an opportunity to do the greateſt Man much Good or much Harm. As in the Fable; When the Mouſe troubled the ſleepy Lion, and hapned to fall under his Paw, he deſired the Lion to ſpare him, he was but a Mouſe, and yet might live poſſibly to do him a Kindneſs; but however he was not worth his Indignation: The Mouſe afterwards ſerved to eat in ſunder that Net that entangled the Lion, and ſo delivered him, that for all his Greatneſs could not deliver himſelf.

Now my Author conſiders and repreſents to us theſe Things, which were in this Good Man that were honourable, and had a great tendency to his Safety, viz. his Beneficence, the Principle of which was higher and nobler than his own Intereſt and Safety. For (ſaith he) it aroſe from the Nobleneſs of his Diſpoſition, it was a certain native Generoſity and Beneficence to Mankind, and this appeared by his extending it towards ſuch who were in greateſt Diſtreſs, and below the expectation of ever making a Retribution. And as his Beneficence was full of Sincerity and Integrity, ſo it was full of Equality and Impartiality; and alſo attended with ſingular Prudence; and laſtly he was very conſtant to his Friends in all Conditions.

And my Author concludes his Diſcourſe upon this Great, Excellent, Prudent and Good Man, Pomponius Atticus, thus. Firſt, That moſt certainly Vertue, Goodneſs and Integrity, is the beſt Policy and the greateſt Means of Safety in the moſt dangerous Times and Places. Secondly, That moſt certainly Vertue and Goodneſs, and Integrity, is the trueſt way for any Man to gain true Honour, Veneration and Eſteem among Men; yea it is more conducible to it than Riches and Armies, than Victories and Triumphs. Thirdly, That as it is the trueſt way to get Honour ſo it is the beſt means to keep it, becauſe ſuch an Honour hath not its Dependance on any thing without a Man; his Fortune, Wealth, Power, or Succeſs, theſe are changeable and variable; but a Good, Wiſe and Vertuous Man carries the Root and Spring of his Honour in himſelf, he ſhall never ceaſe to be Honoured till he ceaſe to be Good. Fourthly, There is a ſecret Veneration of Goodneſs and Vertue in all Men, even in the Worſt and Vileſt; a Man cannot ſo far put off Humanity, but that Goodneſs, Wiſdom and Vertue, will have ſo much of Party and Intereſt in his Nature, that he cannot chooſe put pay a ſecret Approbation and Eſteem towards thoſe that have them. Fifthly, That conſequently Wiſdom, Beneſicence, Vertue and Goodneſs, have a great Connaturality to Human Nature, and are the true genuin Spirit, or genius of it; and that it is ſo, is evident. Firſt, By the great Good it procures to human Nature, Honour and Safety. Secondly, By the great Eſteem Mankind hath of it, and the common Intereſt it obtains in the common Nature of Mankind.