The case of the Common-wealth of England stated, or, The equity, utility, and necessity of a submission to the present government cleared out of monuments both sacred and civill, against all the scruples and pretences of the opposite parties, viz. royallists, Scots, Presbyterians, Levellers : wherein is discovered severally the vanity of their designes, together with the improbability of their successe and inconveniences which must follow (should either of them take effect) to the extreme prejudice of the nation : two parts : with a discourse of the excellencie of a free-state above a kingly-government / by Marchamont Nedham, Gent.

The Caſe of the COMMON-WEALTH, STATED.

Part I.

CHAP. I. That Governments have their Revolutions and fatall Periods.

THe beſt of Preachers, Eccleſiaſtes cap. 1. SOLOMON, taking the World for his Text, found no other Application could be made of it then this, That All under the Sun is vanity; and this he proveth (as did the wiſeſt of Philoſophers) by the perpetuall rotation of all things in a circle, fromContinua est rebus generatio & corruptio. Ariſt. de gen. & corr. lib. 12. cap 10. Generation to Corruption. Ineſt rebus cunctis quidam velut orbis, 3 Annal. &c. There is (ſaith Tacitus) as it were a wheeling of all things,Certis eunt cuncta Temporibus. Naſci debent, creſcere, & extingui. Senec. conſol. ad Hel. and a Revolution of Manners as well as Times. Nor are the huge Bodies of Common-wealths exempted from the ſame Fate with Plants, Brutes, Men, and other petty Individuals; and this by a certain deſtiny, or decree of nature, who in all her Productions, makes the ſecond moment of their perfection, the firſt toward their diſſolution.—Numina rebus Creſcendi poſucre modum. Lucan. This was obſerved to our purpoſe in the preſent caſe, by the Maſter of Roman Eloquence, Idipſum à Platone, Cic. de divin. Num • ri fatales, vel periodi. Plat. Philoſophiâ que didici, naturales eſſe converſiones Rerumpub. ut eae tum à Principibus teneantur, tum à populo, tum à ſingulis. I have learned (ſaith he) out of Plato's Philoſophy, that Commonweals are altered by Turnes into the ſeverall Formes of Government, Aristocracy, Democracy, and Monarchy. Nor can any reaſon be given For it, beſides thoſe rapid Hurricanoes of fatall neceſſity, which blow upon our Affaires from all points of the Compaſſe, —Sicut variae naſcentibus— Contingunt pueris animae,Prudent. lib. poſt. in Sym. ſic urbibus affert Hora, diéſ que , ſuum, cum primùm maenia ſurgunt, Aut genium, aut fatum.— —Certum eſt & inevitabile fatum. Quod—ratio vincere nulla poteſt;Ovid. quod que —Omnia certo fine gubernat. —Sic omnia verti Cernimus,Ovid. Metam. at que , alias aſſumere pondera gentes; Concidere has.—

The Engliſh of all is, That as men are borne into the world with ſoules;De Fato vide Lipſ. polit. l. 1. c. 4. & l. 6. c. 2. & in uotis ad lib. 1. polit. cap. 4. ſo Cities have a Fate or Genius given them, at the firſt founding of their Walls; and this Fate is ſo ſure and inevitable, that no reaſon or wit of man can conquer it, but it directs all things to the appointed end. Now that you may underſtand what Fate is, Minucius Felix calls it, Quod de unoquo que , nostrum fatus eſt Deus, • lapmar. 124. that which God hath ſpoken or determined concerning every man. Vide Richter ax • om. pol. à pag. 1. uſque ad 50. It is (ſaith Seneca) that Providence which pulls downe one Kingdome or Government, and ſets up another; nor is this done leiſurely, and by degrees, but it hurles the powers of the world on a ſudden, Sence 2. Nat. quae • . from the higheſt pinnacle of glory, to nothing. Hence it is, ſaith the ſame Author, (almoſt in the language of Scripture) that a Kingdom is tranſlated from one family to another, Epiſt. 92. the Cauſes whereof are lockt up in the Cabinet of the Deity, though Holy Writ hath left the main cauſe of ſuch Changes upon record, viz. the wickedneſſe and injuſtice of Rulers. It is the weight of Sinne, which cauſeth thoſe fatall Circumvolutions in the vaſt frame of the world; all things being as changeable as the Moon, and in a perpetuall Flux, and Reflux, like the Tides that follow her Motion; ſo that what hath been is that which ſhall be, and there is no new thing under the Sun.

It was the weight of Sin which ſunk the old world in a Deluge, and hath been the occaſion (no doubt) of all ſucceeding alterations,Beſold. 309. by permiſſion of Divine Providence, who leaves the men of the world to the fulfilling of their luſts, that he may accompliſh his own Fatalities or Degrees by an execution of vengeance. Hence it comes to paſſe, that the beſt eſtabliſhed and mightieſt Governments of the world have been but temporary; witneſſe the foure great Monarchies, the Aſſyrian, the Perſian, the Grecian, and the Roman; and the time or age of a Government hath by ſome been reputed Peucerus de divinat. gen. fol. m. 30. & Gregor. Richter, ax • om polit. 1 & Occonom. 5. • cum • multis aliis. Herod. for the moſt part 500. years. As for example, the Aſſyrian Empire laſted 520. years, till it was ruined by the Medos and Perſians.

The Athenian, Iſocr. Symm. from their firſt King Cecrops to Codrus the laſt, continued 490. years, and then it was tranſlated to a populan Government.

The Lacedemonian Common-wealth flouriſhed much about the ſame number of yeares,Idem? from the time of their Founder Ly • urgus, to the dayes of Alexander the Great, under whom it fell.

The Roman was governed by Conſuls about 500.Numerus quingenteſimus eſt fatalis. Ultra quingentos annos non durant Regna, ut eſtē dunt hiſtoriae omnium Temporum. Peucer. in lect. Chron. years too, from the expulſion of their Kings, till it was reduced again into a Monarchy by Auguſtus.

After Auguſtus it ſtood in this Form, about 500. years more, under Emperors, till Valentinian, the laſt Emperor of the Weſt, was ſlain at Rome, at which time the Empire was rent in pieces. The Vandals, under the conduct of Genſericus, poſſeſſed Themſelves firſt of France, then of Spain, at length of Africk, and in Italy of Rome it ſelf.Ann. 70. & 1569. The Scots and Engliſh ſhook off the imperiall yoke in Britain. The Burgundians and Franks ſeized part of France. Illud est abantiquiſſimâ memoriâ proditum; Civitates omnes Anno quingenteſimo converti, aut everti. Bodin. l. 4. de Repub. c. 2. The Gothes another part of it, and part of Italy, the Country of Aquitain, with the ſeats of the ancient Cantabrians and Celliberians in Spain, whilſt the Lombards laid hold on Gallia Ciſalpina. By which means, the Emperors had no certain power in the Weſt, after the time of Valentinian; ſo that relinquiſhing Rome, the old Imperiall City, they erected an Exarchate at Ravenna, which was ſoon deſtroyed likewiſe by the Lombards.

Now,Eaſt periodus fatalis regnorum & Rerumpublicarum, plerum que congruat, ad Annos quingentos; tamen multa regna circa medium b • ſas • Periodi defecerunt: Strigel. u Reg. 1 • . Peucer. de Devin. p. 20. though 500. years be reputed the uſuall period of Governments; yet ſome have not atteined above half the number: As the Perſian Monarchy, which from Cyrus the firſt to Darius the laſt, floriſhed no longer then about 230. years.

The Grecian having completed 250. after many ſtruglings and bloudy bickerings betwixt the Competitors, was divided into the ſeverall Kindomes of Macedonia, Syria, Pontus and Egypt.

TheHoc eſt, anno ab V. C. 244. Kingly government of the Romans was aboliſhed, near the one hundred and fiftieth year after its Inſtitution.

The Lombards domineered in Italy 240. years, till they were ſubdued by Charlemain, and their laſt King Deſiderius baniſhed with his wife and children.

But this is not all; I can tell you of many Royall Families and famous Governments,V. P. Greg. that have had their fatall periods in a very ſhort revolution of time,Lib. 21. de repub. cap. 5. & Greg. not exceeding 100. years. Richt. in Axiom. pol. As, in the one hundreth year after the Empire of Auguſtus, the Roman government came into the hands of Princes that were ſtrangers,Annus 100. est fatalis principibus Familiis. as Nerva, Trajan, Adrian, by nation Spaniards.

In the yeer of our Lord, Matthias Chriſtianus in ſpecul. 171. vide Mich. in Axio. Occ. 23. 280. Artaxerxes erected a new Kingdom of the Perſians out of the ruines of the Parthians.

In the year 300. the Roman Empire was committed to the tutelage of Princes Chriſtian, as Conſtantius and Conſtantine the Great.

Anno Domini 400.The Empire hath been uſually tranſlated from Family to Family, at the end of the one hundreth year. divers new Kingdoms were raiſed out of the Aſhes of the Empire, inflamed by Diviſions, viz. in Italy, France, Spain, Africk, Aſla and England.

Anno 500. the Weſtern part of the Roman Empire was extinct, untill the time of Charlemain, and ſwallowed up at Conſtantinople in the Grecian. Ibid.

I could reckon up many more of theſe ſhort-liv'd Governments.Centeſimas periodos fatales eſſe regnis, & regiis Stirpibus, oſtendunt historiarum monumenta. But this may ſuffice to ſhew, that (ſooner or later) they all have their fatall Periods; their Crownes are laid in the duſt, and their Glories buried in the Grave of Oblivion. No wonder then, if our Engliſh Monarchy, having arrived to almoſt 600. years ſince the Conquest, ſhould now (according to the common Fate of all other Governments) reſigne up her Interest to ſome other Power, Peu. in orat. de miraculoſa 〈◊〉 . Family, or Form. The late Commotions and Conteſts betwixt King and Parliament, were as ſo many ſharp Fits and feaveriſh diſtempers (which by a kind of Antiperiſtaſis are ever moſt violent in old age) upon the approaching Inſtants of diſſolution. The Corruption of the old Form hath proved the generation of another, which is already ſetled in a way viſible and moſt ſubſtantiall before all the world; ſo that 'tis not to be doubted but (in deſpight ofIrriti ſun • conatus humani. Vide Richter. 684. oppoſition) it will have a reaſon of continuance (as others have had) according to the proportion of time allotted by Divine Providence. And this I am the more apt to believe, in regard of its confirmation by a continued Series of many ſignal Victories and Succeſſes, to the envie of all oppoſers, and amazement of the world: Beſides, I ſuppoſe it cannot be exemplified in Hiſtory, that ever Kings were ſuddenly re-admitted, after they had been once expelled out of a Nation. If any one caſe of this kind may be produced, there are a hundred to the contrary: So that if it be conſidered likewiſe, how the Worm works in many parts of Europe, to caſt off the Regall yoke (eſpecially in France, Scotland, Ireland, and other places) it muſt needs be as much madneſſe to ſtrive againſt the ſtream for the upholding of a power caſt down by the Almighty, as it were for the old Sons of Earth to heap up Mountains againſt heaven. And when all is done,Nulla vis bumana vel virtus, incruiſſe unquam potuit, ut quod praeſcripſit fatalis ordo, non fiat. we ſhall find it but labour in vain; that we have but fortified Caſtles in the aire againſt fatall Neceſſity, to maintain a phant'ſie of pretended Loyalty; the conſequence whereof will be, that at length in coole Blood we may have leiſure to conſider, how fooliſhly we have hazarded our lives and fortunes, and ſacrificed the lives of others,Ammian. lib. 23. with the common good and peace of the Nation, for the ſatisfying of an opinionated humor.

CAP. II. That the Power of the Sword is, and ever hath been the Foundation of all Titles to Government.

TO cleare this, we need do no more but take a review of thoſe Governments mentioned in the former Chapter, in their Riſe and Revolutions. The World, after the Flood, in time grew more populous; & more exceeding vitious, being inclined to rapine, ambition, &c. ſo that the Pater familiar way of Government being inſufficient to correct thoſe grand enormities, there was need of ſome one more potent then the reſt, that might reſtraine them by force.Vide Peterium ſupra Geneſin. Upon which Ground it was, that Nimrod, firſt of all men, complotted a new and arbitrary way of Government, backing it with Power by a party of his owne, that thoſe Crimes which could not be cured by Perſwaſion, might be cut off by Compulſion; and that by a power ſeated in his own Sword and Will, he might oppoſe the wilfulneſſe of others: But he, afterwards abuſing this power, by ſtretching his own will too far over other men's wills, to the prejudice of their wel-being, and oppreſſion of the Church, became the firſt Tyrant in the world;Gen cap. 10. and therefore was called a mighty hunter, as having uſed his power to no other end, but to lay the Foundations of Idolatry, and Tyranny.

Thus you ſee the power of the Sword to be the original of the firſt Monarchy, and indeed the firſt Politicall Form of Government that ever was; for the maintenance whereof he fortified himſelf in the lofty Tower of Babel, the beginning of the Babylonian or Aſſyrian Government, which laſt name it took under Ninus, and from him continued in a Succeſſion of 36. Kings, down to Sardanapalus; who was overcome in Battel by a conſpiracy of his Capta • ns; among whom Arbaces the Governor of Media being chief,Vide Juſtinum, & alios. reigned in his ſtead, & by his Sword tranſlated the Title into his own Family, from the Aſſyrians to the Medes; with whom it continued in a Succeſſion of 9. Princes, till the Sword made King Astyages give a Surrender to Cyrus the Perſian, the laſt of whoſe Succeſſors, Darius, yeelded it up upon the ſame Termes to Alexander the Great, who erected the grand Monarchy of the Gr • cians. Veluti, è ſpecula quadam, libertati omnium inſidiatus, dum contentiones civitatum alit, auxilium inferioribus ferendo, victos pariter, victoréſque ſubire regiam ſcrvitutem coegit. King Philip, the Father of this Alexander, was confined at firſt within the narrow compaſſe of Macedonia, too narrow for his ambition; and therefore by fomenting quarrels betwixt the Thebans, Phocians, Lacedemonians and Athenians, he found means to undermine them one after another, and by his Sword made way for a Title, through thoſe petty Common-weals, to the Monarchy of Greece; which being improved the ſame way by his Son to the Dominion of the whole World, was loſt again to the Romans by King Perſeus, the laſt of the Macedonians; all whoſe Glories, with thoſe of his Predeceſſors, ſerved in the end only to aggravate his misfortunes,Juſt. l. 8. and magnifie the triumphs of a Roman Conſul. But the Title to that of Macedonia and the other Provinces had been loſt from the Family of Alexander above 150. years before, it being immediately upon his death bandied by the great men of his Army, and his Mother, Wives, and Children ſlain by Caſſander; who, with Antigonus, Seleucus, and Ptolomie, having by Conqueſt rid their hands of all other Competitors, ſhared the Empire between themſelves, Caſſander reigning in Macedonia, Antigonus in Aſia, Seleucus in Syria, and Ptolomie in Egypt; all whoſe Succeſſors ſucceſſively reſigned their Titles (as did Perſeus the laſt Succeſſor of Caſſander) to the Sword of the Romans.

If we look to the Originall of the Romans, we find Romulus and his Succeſſors, founding a Kingdom upon the ruins of their Kindred, Friends and Neighbors. Next, the Kingly Title gained by the Sword and Subtilty, was the ſame way derived to divers of the 7 Kings, and at length extinguiſh'd in Tarquin by the Sword of the Senate; wherewith they drave, and kept him out of his Dominions, and made a Title to thoſe alſo of other Nations, ſo far, that in the end they entituled themſelves Lords of the whole Earth, and ſo continued, till Caeſar wreſting the ſword out of their hands, became Maſter both of it and them: Moſt of the Succeſſors of Caeſar likewiſe made way by the ſword to the Imperiall Chaire; as Auguſtus by the ruine of Lepidus and Conqueſt of Anthony; Claudius, Nero, and moſt of the reſt, by policy, murther, and the Favor of the Soldiery. At length the Sword divided the Empire into Eaſt and Weſt, and in the ſame manner likewiſe each of them ſuffered many titular ſubdiviſions, till new Titles were raiſed in the Weſt, by the Sword of the Gothes and Vandals; in the Eaſt, by the Turks and Saracens.

If this be not obvious enough out of profane Hiſtories, take a view of thoſe in Holy Writ, where you ſhall find the ſword the onely diſpoſer, and diſpenſer of Titles to Common-weals and Kingdomes. We find Jacob on his death-bed, bequeathing one Portion to Joſeph, above the reſt of his brethren; and that was a Parcell which he took out of the hand of the Amorite with his Sword, Gen. 48. v. 22. and with his Bow; unto which Parcell the Scripture mentions not any Title that Jacob had, but by his Sword. And as for the Title which his poſterity had unto the Land of Canaan, though it were allotted them by divine promiſe and diſpenſation; yet (as to the eye of the world) they were to lay claime and take poſſeſſion by the Power of the Sword, and ſo accordingly they received commiſſion to ratifie their Title, by a Conqueſt of the Canaanites; after which, Jure gentium, it became for ever unquestionable.

In the Hiſtory of the Kings of Iſrael, we read, that moſt of their Titles have been founded upon powerfull uſurpation: ſuch was that of Ieroboam; who though the Kingdome were deſigned to him by a Declaration from heaven in the mouth of the Prophet, erred notwithſtanding in his over-ſpeedy invading the Soveraignty by force; and that Act of his is branded with the black Character of Rebellion. Yet being thus gotten into the Throne, God would not ſuffer him to be diſturbed, ſaying,1 Kings 12. 24 the Thing was from him; that is, by his permiſſion; And ſo he that was a Traytor in rebellion, being once inveſted by a meer permiſſive Act of Providence, came to have a poſitive Right, to the prejudice of him that was his Soveraigne, and to the exerciſe of Juriſdiction over thoſe, that had been of late his Fellow-Subjects.

After Jeroboam reigned his Son Nadab, who was conquered and ſlaine in Battell at Gibbethon, 1 Kings 15. 27 by Baaſha, who with his Sword ſetled the Crown upon his owne head, which was worn afterward by his Sonne Elab, till he likewiſe was ſlain, and the Crown by force of Arms uſurped by Zimri; Cap. 16. from whom alſo it was ſnatched in the ſame manner by Omri; who died peaceably, and left the Succeſſion to his ſon Ahab, without the leaſt ſcruple all this while on the Peoples part, in point of ſubmiſſion and obedience to theſe uſurped Powers. Adde to theſe Uſurpations that of Nebuchadnezzar over the holy City, which he took by force of Armes, and carried away many of the Jewes, 2 Chron. • . 36. with their King Jehoiakim into Captivity to Babylon; an Action as full of Injuſtice and Cruelty as moſt that we read of: yet Nebuchadnezzar being once in poſſeſſion by Conqueſt, his Title became right and good; as may appear by the Report given concerning Zedekiah the Succeſſor of Jehoiakim, of whom it is ſaid,Ver. 13. that he rebelled againſt Nebuchadnezzar; which implies an inveſtiture of right in Nebuchadnezzar by the Sword, or els that Reſiſtance of Zedekiah could not be called Rebellion.

To come a little nearer, and give you a ſight of this Truth in Moderne practiſes, it will be very convenient a little to examine the Rights and Titles of preſent Princes to their ſeverall Principalities within Chriſtendome; whom if we trace up to their Originalls, we ſhall find▪ to have no other dependance then upon the ſword. What pretence had Ferdinand the Spaniard to ſeize upon the Kingdome of Navarre, but onely to ſatisfie the ſpleen of Pope Julius 2d. Vide Anto. and his owne Ambition againſt the French? Nebriſſenſem de bello Navarrienſi. for which cauſe to make his way the eaſier, he ſet upon John Albret unawares, and forced him with his Queen and Children quite out of his Dominions; which he afterward held in poſſeſſion, and brought the people under his Allegance.

In the ſame manner, Philip the ſecond, with an Army under the Command of the Duke of Alva, ſet upon Don Antonio King of Portugall, and after he had ſubdued the Kingdome, laid claime to the Crown as his owne by Right; which he and his Succeſſors held, till that now of late, in the Reigne of Philip the fourth it was recovered againe by the Sword of Don John of Braganz •• . Fair Titles to the Succeſſion were pretended on both ſides; but if either have the better this way, it muſt be Don John, as being deſcended from Edward, a third Sonne, whereas the Spaniard deſcends from Elizabeth, the youngeſt Daughter, of Emanuel King of Portugall. Yet it ſeems poſſeſſion hath hitherto been held the beſt Title, and the Portugalls having of late outed the Spaniard, made bold to ſtop his mouth with this Anſwer:Vide Autorem Luſitaniae liberatae. That his Predeceſſor Philip 2d. had no Right to the Crowne, it being contrary to their fundamentall Lawes, that any Foreiner ſhould ſucceed in the Kingdome: And that it was lawfull for a Kingdome oppreſſed by Armes, by Armes againe to recover its ancient liberty: which is enough to ſhew, that the Spaniard neither had, nor hath any Title, beſide his Sword, to lay claim to the Kingdom of Portugall.

That Arragon was fairly annexed to the Crown of Caſtile, by the marriage of Ferdinand and Iſabella, cannot be denied; yet it is notorious to all the world, that the Spaniard hath ſince this union, uſurped much more in Arragon by Force, then his Predeceſſors injoyed before by Right, and dealt no otherwiſe with that Kingdome, then if it were his by Conquest, exerciſing an abſolute Tyranny therein, as well as other his Dominions. To this end he aboliſhed the ancient and moſt excellent Conſtitution of that eminent Office, Covaruv. pr. Quae • t. 1. called, the Juſtice of Arragon; whereto ſome one perſon was choſen by the Vote of the People, who in moſt Caſes had a Power to controll the King. This was ſo great an Eye-ſore to Philip the ſecond, that (as Petrus Matthaeus ſaith) he number'd theſe among the moſt glorious of his Actions, That he had leſſened the power of the Arragonians, deprived them of their greateſt Priviledges, and demoliſhed that grand Office, called, the Juſtice, the Bulwark of their Liberty: So that what Title the Spaniard now hath to tyrannize in Arragon, is founded onely upon force and uſurpation. If we turne our eyes likewiſe upon his other Dominions, in America, and thoſe here in Europe, as Sicily, Naples, Milain, Flanders, &c. his Title ſtands in all upon the ſame Termes, viz. a poſſeſſion by the power of the ſword.

And this is juſt as much Right as his Kinſman the Emperour had to lay claim to the Kingdome of Bohemia, and afterward to ſeize upon the Palatinate; Ut pat •• ex aurea Bullá C • roli IV. c. 17. Bohemia being an Elective Kingdome that had power of themſelves to chooſe whom they pleaſed for King, and ſo made choice of the Prince Elector Frederick, whom the Emperor made bold to drive out of that and his own Countrey by Force of Arms, See Inſtrumentum Pacis. becauſe he accepted of the Election; And not onely ſo, but after Frederick was dead, proſecuted the warre,Feuda Germanica, praecipuè dignitatum illuſtrium, ex proviſione Legis fundamentalis, & conſuctudine perpetuae obſervantia, ita ad Liberos & Agnatos pertinent, ut nec crimine laſae Majeſtatis confiſcari, nec bollo juſto, in praejudicium Liberorum amitti poſsi • t. Ut aiunt J. C. Germani. to the prejudice of his Heire, the preſent Pr. Elector, whom he hath conſtrained to quit his dignity of the firſt Electorſhip, and reſigne it, with the beſt part of his Dominions, upon hard Termes, to the Duke of Bavaria; ſo that what Title the Emperour hath to Bohemia, and the Duke to the reſt, is derived rather from the Sword of Mars, than the Scepter of Iove by right of Succeſſion.

This Act of violence againſt the Prince Elector gave an Alarm to the other Proteſtant Princes of Germany, to defend their Eſtates by Armes from the Incroachments of the Emperour; and therefore to avoid the inconveniences of emulation between themſelves, they made choice of the Swede to be their Chief; who, moved partly by the Common Intereſt of Religion, but eſpecially for ſeverall injuries done him by the Emperour, (as may be read in that King's Manifeſto) undertook the warre, and with his Sword hath carved out a Title to many fair Countries and Priviledges within the Empire. See Inſtrument. Pacis.

What Title have the Swiſſes, the Hollanders, Geneva, &c. to their Liberty,Plenum Regnum est in Florentino Ducatu; quale plerumqne ſubſequitur Armis oppreſſam Libertatem. Beſold. in Synopſi. c. 4. but the ſword? On the other ſide, what Title have the Medices to domineer over the free States of Florence, and Siena, to the utter ruine of their Liberties, but only force? whereby Coſmus introducing an abſolute Tyranny, under the name of Duke made himſelfe more than a King, and (in emulation of the Muſcovite) glorified his Succeſſors with the Stile of Great Dukes of Tuſcany.

How the Pope's Temporal power (which was once ſo ſmall) in Italy, came to be thus conſiderable, is eaſily known, if we take an Accompt of the Actions of Alexander the ſixth, who, of all the Popes that ever were,Nic. Mach. de Principe. c. 11. ſhewed what a Pope was able to doe with Money and Armes, and having a mind to make his Sonne Caeſar Borgia, a Prince in Italy, he taught him how to make uſe of the French Forces to build himſelfe a Fortune in Romania, upon the ruine of the Barons of that Country. And though the Pope's intent thereby was not to inlarge the Church-Dominions, but to make his Son great; yet after his Sons death, it turned to the Churches advantage, the ſucceeding Pope ſeizing upon all, as Heire of Borgia's Uſurpations, founded upon blood and treachery. After this Pope ſucceeded Iulius, who finding the Church thus made great, the Barons of • ome quite extinct, and their Parties worn out by Alexanders perſecutions, found alſo the way open for heaping up moneyes, never practiſed before Alexanders time; wherewith acquiring Forces, he endeavoured to make himſelfe Maſter alſo of Bolonia, to extinguiſh the Venetians, and chaſe the French out of Italy; in moſt of which Deſignes he gained happy ſucceſſe. And thus you ſee, how his Holineſſe himſelfe came by a Title to his Temporall poſſeſſions; yet as among the Iewes, none but the high Prieſt might enter the Sanctum Sanctorum, ſo the Roman high Prieſt, that none might preſume to enter upon his Territories, hath ever ſince gilded theſe magna latrocinia, theſe great Robberies, with the faire Title of Saint Peters Patrimony; ſo that having intailed it on himſelfe firſt by the ſword of Peter, it hath been the eaſier ever ſince by vertue of the Keyes, to lock the right Owners out of poſſeſſion.

Out of Italy let us paſſe into France, and there we finde Charles the ſeventh, who, when his Title to the Crowne was adjudged in Parliament leſſe valid, than that of the Queen of England, appealed to hisAd mucronem gladii ſui appellavit. Girard. l. 21. Paſquier. 5. c. 7. ſword, as the only Protector and Patron of Titles. Of this Truth the Realme of France is a moſt ſad example at this day, where the Tyranny of their Kings is founded and preſerved by force, not only upon the ſhoulders of the Peaſant, but on the deſtruction of their ancient Princes, and the majeſty of Parliament; which retaines not ſo much as a ſhadow of their old Liberty. What is become of the Dutchies of Normandy, Britany, Aquitaine, Burgundy, &c.? what Title had the French Kings to thoſe Countries, til. they worm'd and worried out the right Owners by Force of Armes? What Claim had they to this abſolute Domination over Parliaments, but Tyrannicall uſurpation? yet Lewis theJactitare ſo • ebat, ſuâ potiſſimùm operâ effectum fuiſſe, ut Regnum Gallicanum quaſi ex Tutelâ, ad plenam Pubertatem fuerit redactum. Beſold. in Synopſ. c. 4. eleventh gloried in the Action, Lehmann. 2. cap. 4. as if the Fleurs de Lys never flouriſhed ſo well, as when they were watered with the blood and tears of the People. For, according to the antient Conſtitution, that Kingdome retained a mixture of Aristocratical power; ſo that the then ſupreme Court of Parliament at Paris had a principall ſhare in the Government, and nothing was impoſed on the People, but by the Conſent of their Deputies: But now, having been mined out of their Authority by the powerfull Incroachments of their Kings, and being overawed by armed Powers held continually in pay for the purpoſe, their Authority is defunct, and their common Intereſt in the Affairs of the Publique tranſlated into a private Councell d' Eſtat, which depends upon the meer will of the King: And ſo the Parliament of Paris, which was once the Supreme Councel, Senatus Pariſienſis in Judicum curiam tranſmutatus. Beſold. having ſurrendred its Title to the Sword of the King, ſerves now onely for a petty Court of Judicature, and a meer Mock-ſhow of Majeſty—Thus we ſee the French King's Title to what he holds at home; and if we look abroad, he hath but the ſame Right to what he got in Catalonia and Flanders: And yet we muſt needs ſay, it is as good every jot as that of the Spaniard, See Malvezzi, in the Events of the Spaniſh Monarchy. whoſe beſt Plea is, that his Theeveries there have been of a longer Preſcription: And upon the ſame Termes, of late years, They have both laine at Catch for the Dutchy of Savoy, and ſeverall parcells of Germany.

Here likewiſe I might ſift the Title of the Family of Oldenburgh (the ſtock of the late King) to the Crown of Denmark, and of Denmark it ſelf to the Dutchy of Holſtein, but to bring this diſcourſe to a Period, I ſhall draw nearer home, and make it as clearly appear likewiſe; that the Power of the Sword ever hath been the Foundation of all Titles to Government in England, both before, and ſince the Norman Conquest. Firſt, the Sword of Caeſar triumphed over the Liberties of the poor Britaines, Caeſar in Comment. and gave the Romans here a Title to their Dominion. Afterwards, their Liberty returning again, when the Roman Empire fell to pieces, a new Title was ſetled by the Sword of our Progenitors the Saxons, See the Engliſh Chron. who ſubmitted for a Time, upon the ſame Terms alſo, to the Danes, till the Saxons, impatient of the yoke, out-acted (by way of Precedent) the Pariſian Maſſacre, or Sicilian Veſpers, and made uſe of their Knives, inſtead of their Swords, to recover their own Title againſt the Daniſh Tyranny. Now, if in theſe nationall revolutions of Government, I ſhould examine thoſe alſo of the Regall Families, we cannot from any examples produce more pregnant Inſtances, concerning the Tranſitions of Title from Family to Family, meerly upon the accompt of the Sword: But I wave thoſe, and will take a view of our own Affairs at a leſſe remote diſtance, and ſee whether William the Conquerour tranſlated the Government, upon any better Terms into the hands of the Normans.

And upon examination it appears, he had no better Title to England, then the reſt before mentioned had at firſt to their ſeverall Countries, or than his Predeceſſor Rollo had to Normandy it ſelf.Hiſtor. Norman. For, about 120. years before, it hapned that this Rollo iſſued in the head of a barbarous Rout, out of Denmark and Norway; firſt, into the Dutchies of Frize and Henault; afterward he ſeated himſelf by force in the poſſeſſion of Rohan; in a ſhort time of all Normandy, and miſſed but a little of the Conqueſt of Paris.

From him, this William was the ſixth Duke of Normandy; who, though a Baſtard, legitimated his Title, by the ſucceſſe of ſeverall Battels, againſt ſix or ſeven of his Competitors, more clear in Bloud than himſelf; by which means having ſecured his Claim at home, he became the more confident to tempt his Fortune with a deſign upon England. As for any Right to the Crown, he had none, ſave a frivolous Teſtamentary Title, pretending that it was bequeathed to him by the laſt Will of his Kinſman, K. Edward the Confeſſor, upon which pretence he betook himſelf to Armes, and with a Collection of Forces out of Normandy, France, Flanders, and other Countries, landing in Suſſex, he gave Battel at Haſtings, and eſtabliſhed himſelf a Title by Conqueſt upon the deſtruction of King Harold, and of the Norman. ille Spurius, Guil •• lmus. dictus, Anglicanum Regnum vi occupavit; Legeſ que tulit, nullas accepit. Laws and Liberties of the Nation, as may be ſeen in all our Chronicles.

After him, his Sonnes, the two ſucceding Kings, William Rufus, and Henry the firſt, made good their ſucceſſion by the Sword, againſt Robert, their elder Brother, as did King Stephen a ſtranger againſt Maud the Empreſſe, Beſoldus in Synopſi. l. 1. c. 4. the right Heire of that Henry. Next to Stephen ſucceeded Henry the ſecond, the Son of Maud, who, as Heir of his Predeceſſors way of Uſurpation, Quarter'd the Armes of England with the Lordſhip of Ireland, by the Sword; as his Succeſſor Edward the firſt, by the ſame means, cemented the Principality of Wales to the Kingdome of England, with the Blood of Leoline and his Brother David, the laſt of the Welch Princes.See the Chronicles. Next, Edward the ſecond was forced by Armes to ſurrender his Right to his Sonne Edward the third, whoſe Grand-child Richard the ſecond was in like manner by force of Armes deprived by Henry of Lancaster, whoſe Sonne Henry the fifth made good not onely that Title, but craved out a new one with his Sword to the Crown of France, in defiance of the Salick Conſtitution; and left it ſo confirmed unto his Sonne Henry the ſixth, that he was Crowned King of France at Paris, and ſo continued, till (Fortune turning) his Title was Cancell'd there by the Sword of the French, as it was likewiſe in England by that of Edward the fourth; whoſe Sonne Edward the fifth left the Crown in the bloody hands of Richard the third, from whence it was wreſted by Henry the ſeventh. This Henry (from whom the late King derived his Claime) came in with an Army, and (as one hath well obſerved) by meer Power was made King in the Army, and by the Army; ſo that in the very Field where he got the Victory, the Crown was ſet upon his Head, and there he gave Knighthood to many of his Commanders. Upon this Foundation of Military Power, he got himſelf afterwards ſolemnly Crowned at Weſtminſter. And ſoon after, upon Authority thus gotten, he called a Parliament, and in that Parliament was the Crown entailed upon him and his Heirs. Thus both his Crown and his Parliament were founded upon Power: As for any just Title, he could have none; for, he deſcended from a Baſtard of John of Gaunt, which (though legitimated for common Inheritances, yet) expreſly was excluded from Succeſſion to the Crown. And for his Wives Title, that came in after his Kingſhip, and his Parliament, which had ſetled the Crown before upon him and his Heirs. And he was ſo far from exerciſing authority in her Right, that her Name is not uſed in any Laws, as Queen Mary's was, both before and after her Marriage with the Spaniſh King.

Now, having made it evident out of the Hiſtories of all Times, our own, and other Nations, that the Power of the Sword ever hath been the Foundation of Titles to Government, it is as clear likewiſe out of the ſame Hiſtories, that the People never preſumed to ſpurne at thoſe Powers, but (for publique Peace and quiet) paid a patient ſubmiſſion to them, under their various Revolutions. But it were vain to raiſe more duſt out of the Cobwebs of Antiquity in ſo limpid a Caſe, confirmed by the Practiſes of all Nations: Look nearer our own Times into the warres of Germany, and thoſe betwixt the French and Spaniſh of late Time in Catalonia and Flanders; one while you might have ſeen the ſame Town uuder the Power of the Emperour, another while under the Swede; th • s year under the French, the next under the Spaniard, and upon every new alteration, without ſcruple, paying a new Allegiance and Submiſſion, and never ſo much as blamed for it by the Divines of their own, or any other Nation. Moreover, none can deny, but that as Henry the ſeventh, and the reſt before mentioned, came into this Kingdome by meer Power, without Title of inheritance; ſo the whole Body of this Nation (as one obſerves) ſwore Fealty and Allegiance to them, and obeyed them whilſt they ruled; yea, doth yeeld ſubjection to thoſe Laws until this very day. And the learned in the Laws do continually plead, judge, juſtifie, and condemn, according to thoſe Laws; So that herein the very voice of the Nation, with one conſent, ſeems to ſpeak aloud: That thoſe whoſe Title is ſuppoſed unlawfull, and founded meerly upon Force, yet being poſſeſſed of Authority, may lawfully be obeyed. Nor may they onely, but they muſt, elſe by the Judgement of Civilians, ſuch as refuſe may be puniſhed as ſeditious and Trayterous;Vide Grotium, de jure B • lli, l. 3. c. • 5. Bello ut alia acquiri peſſunt, ita & jue Imperantis, &c. the Victors being ever allowed (Jure gentium) to uſe all means for ſecuring what they have gotten, and to exerciſe a right of Dominion over the Conquer'd Party. Whoſoever therefore ſhall refuſe Submiſſion to an eſtabliſhed Government, upon pretence of Conſcience, in regard of former Allegiances. Oaths and Covenants; or upon ſu • poſition that it is by the Sword unlawfully erected, deſerves none but the Character of peeviſh, and a man obſtinate againſt the Reaſon and Cuſtome of the whole world. Let his pretence be what it will, Reſiſtance, in the eye of the Law of Nations, is Treaſon; and if he will needs periſh in the Flames of his own phren'tick Zeal, he can at the beſt be reckoned but the Mad-mans Saint, and the Fool's Martyr. Neſcio an Anticyram ratio illi deſtinet omnem.Horat.

CHAP. III. That Non-ſubmiſſion to Government juſtly deprives Men of the benefit of its Protection.

IF at any time it ſeem good to the wiſe diſpoſer of States and Kingdoms (who puts down one, and ſets up another) to permit the expulſion of ſuch as were formerly in poſſeſſion, and admit others in their places, it cannot in reaſon be expected, that thoſe which refuſe obedience to their Authority ſhall receive the Benefit of Protection; and that for ſeverall conſiderations.

Firſt, becauſe Protection implyes a Return of obedience and Friendſhip, from the perſons protected, to thoſe that protect them; otherwiſe they put themſelves into the condition of Enemies, and by the Law of Nations, which indulges a liberty unto all that are in power to provide for their own ſecurity, they may be handled as Publique Enemies, and Out-lawes; wherefore in this Caſe, ſo little of protection is due to them, that they may be puniſhed as Traitors, by ſome ſhamefull Execution. And it appears out of Grotius, De Iure Belli. lib. 3. cap. 20. in caſe of Non-ſubmiſſion, to new Lords after a Victory, the Throats of every Re • uſer are wholly at their mercy; and all this, De Jure.

Secondly▪ there being a neceſſity of ſome Government at all times, for the maintenance of Civill converſation, and to avoid Confuſion, therefore ſuch as will not ſubmit, becauſe they cannot have ſuch a Governour as themſelves like, are in ſome ſenſe meer Anarchiſts, and deſtroy the two main ends of all Civill Communion:3 Polit. cap. 4. 1 Polit. c. 2. & l. 2. c. 4. & 6. The firſt whereof Ariſtotle ſets down to be Publique Safety, in relation whereunto each Member of the Commonwealth is concerned to have a care of the whole: The ſecond is Publique Equity, for the Adminiſtration of Juſtice, encouragement of Vertue, and puniſhment of Vice, without which it's impoſſible to enjoy Peace or Happineſſe. Where this humour reignes, there thoſe two can never be ſecured, nor any politicall •• taxi • , good Order, or Tranquillity maintained, which is the very Soul of Government; foraſmuch as (ſay the Civilians) the eſſence of a Common-weal conſiſts,A • iſt. 1. Polit. cap. 5. Bellarm de Laicis, c. 5. Ratione Imperandi & parendi; in Imperii & Subjectionis rectâ ordinatione, in a due courſe of Commanding and Obeying, Rule and Subjection: From whence (ſay they) we may conclude. Molina. de Jure & Just. Tract. 2. diſt. 26. Regere & Subjici; that Rule and Su • bjection are founded upon the Law both of God and Nature, and they muſt needs be Tranſgreſſors againſt both, that upon any pretence whatſoever ſhall refuſe to obey thoſe Powers that are ſet over them, and open a Gap to Confuſion, ipſa Tyrannide deteriorem, of far worſe conſequence than any Tyrannicall uſurpation.

Thirdly, private and particular perſons have no Right to queſtion how thoſe came by their Power that are in Authority over Them; for, if that were once admitted, there would be no end of diſputes in the world touching Titles. It is ground enough for the ſubmiſſion of particular Perſons in things of politicall equity, that thoſe which have gotten the Power are irreſiſtable, and able to force it if they refuſe:Judicium ſibi privatus ſumere non debet, ſed poſſeſſioenem ſequi. lib. 1. c. 4. For, as touching this Caſe (ſaith the moſt excellent Grotius) Private perſons ought not to take upon them to meddle with theſe Controverſies in point of Title, but rather to follow them that are in poſſeſſion. For, all Power is from God; and, our Saviour told Pilate, the Power that he had was given him from above, though all the world knows that Pilate was but a Deputy-governour, and (in a civill acceptation) received his Power from Caeſar, who was an Uſurper. To this accords that of Bodinus 1.Reſpectu prima • auſa • muia Imperia legitima eſſe concedo; ſed ſi quaeras de cauſis intermediis, &c. de repub. cap. 6. who ſaith, that all Governments are lawfull in respect of the firſt Cauſe, viz. God; but on the othor ſide, if we regard ſecondary Cauſes, all Governments have had their Beginning and Foundation upon Force and Violence. Now, ſince all commanding Powers hold their Supremacy from God, and that by the Law of Nations, They have a Right to exerciſe their Power over thoſe whom they hold in poſſeſſion;Rom. 13. Therefore by the Law of God (which damnes reſiſtance againſt thoſe Powers) and by the ſame Law of Nations, they which refuſe ſubmiſſion to thoſe Powers, (be They juſt or unjuſt by way of Acquiſition) may be juſtly deprived of their Poſſeſſions and Protection.

To thoſe Teſtimonies before Cited, Tract. de Majeſt cap. 1. let me adde one more, to conclude out of Bocerus: Contra Rempublicam quamcun que , ſuperiorem non rccognoſcentem, ſi quis aliquid moliatur; is, ut Criminis Majestatis reus puniatur: Non quidem ex l • ge Julia; ſed Jure gentibus communi, quod cujuſlibet Imperantis tuctur Majestatem. If any man attempt ought againſt any Common-wealth whatſoever, that acknowledges no Superiour, he may be puniſhed as guilty of Treaſon: And this, by the Cuſtome and Law of Nations, which provides for the Authority and ſafety of all that are in Power.De Regalibus, c. 3. num. 307. Now (ſaith the ſame Author) If any perſon will not acknowledge, nor ſubmit to thoſe that rule the Common-wealth, it is to be preſumed that he hath ſome deſigne in hand to their Prejudice, and he may be puniſhed accordingly; which puniſhment (the Crime being Treaſon) amounts to loſſe of Life, as well as Poſſeſſion and Protection.

CHAP. IV. That a Government erected by a prevailing part of the People is as valid de Jure, us if it had the ratifying conſent of the whole.

SInce after the miſerable Confuſions of a Civill War, there is in the end a neceſſity of ſome Settlement, it cannot in Reaſon be imagined (when the Controverſie is decided by the Sword) that the Conquerours ſhould, as to the manner of ſettlement, ſubmit to the will of the Conquered Party, though more in number than Themſelves; nor are they obliged to ſettle the Government again, according to the former Lawes and Conſtitutions, but may, in this caſe, uſe ſuch means asNeceſſitas ſumma reducitres ad merum Ius naturae. nature inſtructs them in, and erect ſuch a Form as they thewſelves conceive moſt convenient for their own Preſervation. Grotius de Jure belli. l. 2 c. 6 Grotius inter Pr • legomena de Jure Belli: To this truth we have the Teſtimony of the moſt Learned Grotius, which I wil ſet down at large. In bello Civili, ſcripta quidem Jura, id eſt civilia, non valent; at valent non ſcripta, id eſt, quae natura dictat, aut gentium conſenſus conſtituit. In a Civil war, (ſaith he) written Laws, that is, the eſtabliſhed Laws of a Nation, are of no Force, but thoſe only which are not written, that is, which are agreeable to the dictates of Nature, or the Law and cuſtom of Nations. And then that only is Law (ſaith he) which ſhall be declared by the prevailing Party. Grotius ibid. Jus dicitur eſſe id quod validiori placuit, ut intelligamus fine ſuo carere Jus, niſi vires miniſtras habeat. That onely which it pleaſeth the ſtronger Party to enact is ſaid to be Law, ſince it cannot accompliſh the outward end of a Law, Nic. Mach. de Principe, c. 6. except it be attended by Force to conſtrain obedience. Hence came it (ſaith the Florentine Secretary.) that all the Prophets that were arm'd, prevailed; but thoſe that were unarm'd were too weak. And therefore it behaves all Legiſlators to be ſo provided, that if the People will not be ruled, they may compell them by Force. Moſes, Cyrus, Theſeus, and Romulus, would never have been able long to continue the Authority of their Laws, had they been without Arms at Command. And Solon himſelf, the great Athenian Law-giver,See Grotius ib. declares, he could never have eſtabliſhed his Laws at Athens, had he not had Power to ſecond Them; and that all thoſe great matters which he effected in founding a Common-wealth, he did, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 .Vim Iuſ que parilis copulans vin • li Iugo. by coupling Law and Force, making Authority and Power walk hand in hand together.

Moreover, as to the late Conteſt betwixt King and Parliament, Grotius ſpeaks very home to juſtifie the Parliaments late Proceedings in poſitive Terms: Grot. lib. 1. c. 4. Si Rex partem habeat ſummi Imperii, partem alteram populus aut Senatus, Regi in partem non ſuam involanti, vis justa opponi poterit, quia eatenus Imperium non habet: Quod ubi fit, poteſt Rex etiam ſuam Imperii partem belli Jure amittere; that is in Engliſh, if the Authority be divided betwixt a King and his People in Parliament, ſo that the King hath one part, the People another; the King offering to incroach upon that part which is none of his, may lawfully be oppoſed by force of Arms, becauſe he exceeds the bounds of his Authority. And not only ſo, but he may loſe his own part likewiſe, by theIure Belli. Law of Arms. From whence I plainly infer; that if a King may thus,Eventus belli, velut aequus judex unde Ius ſtabat, victoriam dedit, Livius 21. by Right of war, loſe his ſhare and Intereſt in Authority and Power, being conquered; then on the other ſide, by Right of war, the whole muſt needs reſide in that part of the People which prevailed over him, there being no middle Power to make any claim: And ſo the conſequence is clear likewiſe. That the whole Right of Kingly Authority being by military deciſion reſolved into the prevailing Party, what Government ſo ever it pleaſes them next to erect, is as valid de Jure, as if it had the Conſent of the whole body of the People.

Theſe Premiſes thus laid upon a ſure Ground, ſhew the weakneſſe of his, who wrote that ſo much magnified Pamphlet, entituled, [An Exercitation concerning Ʋſurped Powers, &c.] For the Deſigne of that gilded Structure, raiſed upon the ſandy Foundation of a falſe Hypotheſis, is, obliquely to charge the preſent Powers in England as Ʋſurpers, though he have laid the Scene in America. To this purpoſe, he ſpends his firſt Chapter; where telling what Ʋſurpation is, he defines it an Intruſion into the Seat of Authority, without any lawfull Right, Title, or calling; and inſinuates it to the prejudice of the preſent Governers, as if they were guilty of this Intruſion, without right or Title. In applying this, he firſt alledgeth, that the Right and Title to Government is in a King, Lords, and Commons, co-ordinate in power, not in the Commons alone. This indeed was true, til the King (as I ſhewed before) loſt his Title by Right of war, and until the Lords likewiſe loſt theirs, by compliance with the Enemies and Invaders of the Nation; for which cauſe they Themſelves alſo, by Right of War, forfeited all their Intereſts and Priviledges, as Enemies; and ſo the whoſe Authority devolved naturally into the hands of the Commons.

But here the Exercitator objects alſo, that the preſent Governers have uſurped over the majority of the Houſe of Commons, in that they were thruſt out of the Houſe by Force. But (for Anſwer) ſince by the equity of all Laws, Acceſſaries are puniſhable as well as thoſe that are principall in the Crime, therefore by the ſame Right of war, the ſecluded Members alſo, in adhering to the conquered Party; even after the Victory, and favouring the Invaders, were juſtly deprived of their Intereſt, and the ſupreme Si qui jure ſuo uti non poſſunt, coru • jus accreſcit praeſentibus: Grotius de Iure Belli, l, • ., c. 5. Authority deſcended lawfully to thoſe Members, that had the courage to aſſert their Freedoms, ſecure their own Intereſt, themſelves and their Adherents, from future Inconveniencies, and take the Forfeiture of thoſe Prerogatives and Priviledges of the King Lords, and ſecluded Commons, as Heirs apparent, by the Law of Arms, and Cuſtom of Nations, to an Inveſtiture in the whole Supremacy.

One Objection more he hath; how that a Calling from the People, being neceſſary and eſſentiall, to a humanely conſtituted Magiſtracy, our preſent Governors ought to have ſuch a Call; but not having it, they are therefore concluded guilty of Ʋ ſurpation. This is the ſumm of the Objection, though not Syllogiſtically deciphered. To which I anſwer: 1. That if only a Call from the People conſtitute a lawfull Magiſtracy, then there hath very rarely ever been any lawfull Magiſtracy in the world, nor among us long before and ſince the Conqueſt. The proofe of this may be confirmed by a Review of thoſe Inſtances ſet down before in the ſecond Chapter; where it is evident, that all the world over, moſt Princes came into the Seat of Authority not only without a Call, but abſolutely againſt the wills of the People, and ſo, many of them exerciſe the Soveraignty to this very day: And particularly, here in England, moſt of our own Kings reigned without any Call, but made way by their Swords; there being of thoſe 25 Princes that have King'd it among us, not above half a dozen that came to the Crowne in an orderly Succeſſion, either by lineall or collaterall Title: And not any one of thoſe halfe dozen but laid claime to it, by vertue of their Predeceſſors Uſurpations, without any Call from the People; onely in the Inveſtiture they had their conſent, becauſe out of a love of publike Peace, none would, or out of Feare, none durſt offer to queſtion their Titles. Now, if the former part of this Objection were true, that a Call were the only Eſſentiall, conſtituting a lawfull Government, then it would follow, that as all the world, ſo we and our Anceſtors have lived and paid obedience for the moſt part, under an unlawfull Magiſtracie; which ſure no ſober man will affirm. But if any will be ſo mad as to ſay it, I only propound to him this ſober Quaere, Why we may not now as lawfully ſubmit to the preſent Magiſtracy, in caſe it were unlawfull, as our Anceſtors did heretofore to theirs, for the publike Peace of the Nation?

2. As to the Aſſumptive part part of this Objection, which inſinuates, that our preſent Governors have no Call or Conſent of the People, I anſwer, That if by the conſent be meant the Conſent of the Body of the People, or of the major part of their Repreſentatives, this may hold requiſite in a State not divided by Civill War, but at Peace within it ſelf; where it is moſt conſonant to reaſon, that in caſe there be occaſion to elect a ſupreme Magiſtrate, or Magiſtrates, the election ſhould be carried by the greater number of Voices, in ſuch manner as Voices are uſually given in that State; But now in a Civil War the caſe is altered, when the controverſie touching Government is decided by the Sword: For, ipſo facto the Sword creates a Title for him, or thoſe that bear it,Majeſtatem realem durare conſtat, quamdiu, vel vi maj • re, vel omnium quorum intereſt conſenſunon mutatur. and inſtalls them with a new Majeſty of Empire, aboliſhing the old; Becauſe, as the Civilians ſay, The ancient Majeſty of a State or Common-weal continues no longer, if it be changed either by a greater power, or by conſent of the People; where (you ſee) force and power is put in equall Balance with popular conſent, in relation to change of Government. And as if it were the beſt pedegree of ſupremacy, they define the Supreme Authority to be that which holds claim from God and the Sword; Beſold. de Majeſt. cap. 1. Dicitur verò ſumma, qui • non alium niſi Deum & gladium recognoſcit; at que ideò ſuae Origini • quaſi Author exiſtit, &c. and therefore is alſo as it were the Author of it's owne Originall, without dependance on any other; ſo that (ſay they) every Common-wealth, be it never ſo ſmall, which acknowledgeth no Superior but God and the Sword, hath a Right of Majeſty, or politicall Supremacy. Camman. diſput. de Iuribus Majeſt. 1. Theſ. 70. 75. &c. To this accords that of Grotius before-recited; That as in War all other things fall to the Conquerors, by way of Acquiſition; ſo likewiſe a Right to govern the People, and even that Right alſo which the people themſelves have to Government; Arniſaeus de Majeſt. c. 1. ſo that what Government ſoever it pleaſes them to erect,Bello ut alia acquiripoſſunt, it a & Jus imperantis in Populum, & Ju • quod in Imperio habet ipſe Populus Grot. de Jure belli. l. 3. c. 15. the People having loſt their Right of Election to them, muſt be as valid de Iure, as if it had the Peoples Conſent. But as in this caſe, there is no need of their expreſſe poſitive conſent to juſtifie a new Goverument; ſo a tacit or implied conſent is ſufficient; which Conſent (as one ſaith well) is the very dictate of Nature or common Reaſon, becauſe it is better to have ſome Iuſtice than none at all; and there is a neceſſity of ſome coercive power or government, left all be left to Diſorder, Violence, and Confuſion, which none (even of the conquered Party) can be ſo unnaturall as to deſire; and therefore (ſaithLib. de legib. 3. cap. 10. Suarez) They do tacitly conſent, that Juſtice be adminiſtred by the Conquerors, becauſe it is a leſſe evill to be governed, by them, than altogether to want due coaction and direction.

Object. Now, ere I conclude this Chapter, I muſt needs wipe away one Objection very frequent in the mouthes of many: That this tranſmiſſion of Title by Right of war holds good, when Nation is ingaged againſt Nation; but in one ſingle Nation within its ſelf it cannot; becauſe (ſay they) it ſeems unreaſonable that a Nation ſhould challenge a Conqueſt over it ſelf.

Anſw. To this I anſwer,that warlick Acquiſitions hold as good in civill Diviſions within the ſame Nation, as in war betwixt Nation and Nation: For, where a Nation is ingaged in a Civill war, and divided into parties, the eye of the Law of Nations looks not on them as one Nation,In Tract at. de Legatis. but as two, according to that of Grotius: In Regno diviſo, gens una, pro tempore, quaſi duae gentes habentur: In a divided State, one Nation, during the time of its Nationall Diviſions, is eſteemed as two Nations; ſo that what preeminence Nation may gaine over Nation by right of forein war, the ſame may be obtained likewiſe by one part of a Nation againſt the other, by Right of civill war: And what the forein Conqueror may doe in changing the Government, aboliſhing old Laws, and eſtabliſhing new, the ſame may be done alſo by the Civill Victor for his own ſecurity.

Thus by all the Premiſes it is undeniably evident, in a way of application; That the preſent prevailing Party in England have a Right and juſt Title to be our Governours; and that this new Government erected by them, to the ſubverſion of the old, is as valid de Jure, as if it had the ratifying Conſent of the whole Body of the People; Nor can they in any ſence, be counted Uſurpers, as is moſt irrationally intimated by the ſlight Exercitator.

CHAP. V. That the Oath of Allegiance, and Covenant, are no juſtifiable grounds to raiſe a new War, in, or againſt the Common-wealth of England.

HAving in the former Chapters cleared the Right and equity of the preſent Government, in point of Title, from the ſlanderous Character of Ʋſurpation, I ſhall in the next place deſcend to examine the vain Phanſees of ſuch as refuſe a Submiſſion thereto, upon pretence of Conſcience, in regard of former Obligations. Theſe people are repreſented unto us under the ordinary Notions of Royaliſts and Presbyterians; the the former pleading the Oath of Allegiance; the later, the ſolemn League and Covenant, as a Ground for their Refuſall.

As for the Oath of Allegiance; In a word, Allegiance is but a politicall Tie, for politick ends, grounded upon politicall Conſiderations, and therefore being politically determined, when thoſe Conſiderations are altered by new Circumſtances, (be it in relation to Caeſar, or the Senate) the old Allegeance is extinct, and muſt give place to a new. The ſame deſcription may ſerve likewiſe for the Covenant; For, even that part of it which relates moſt to Religion, will be found wrap't up altogether in matters of Diſcipline and Church-politie, to ſerve politick ends and Intereſts, if the Actions of our Engliſh and Scot • ch Preſbyters, may be admitted as a Comment upon the Text, I grant, both thoſe Oaths are Religious Acts, as they are ſolemnized with the Invocation of God, as a Witneſſe; but as all Actions are qualified from their principall End; ſo the maine end of thoſe Oaths being Obedience to the Prince in order to the good of the Publique, they are of a politicall Nature; and when ſuch an alteration of Affairs ſhall happen as extinguiſhes his Title, I conceive we are not obliged, in this Caſe, to pay him that Submiſſion which by Oath we promiſed, but ought rather to ſwear a new one, to thoſe that ſucceed him in the Government.

For, in promiſſory State-Oaths (as theſe two are) it is granted by all, that there lurk ſeverall tacit Conditions, inſeparable from the nature of all Oaths and Engagements; and which are as it were the life and ſoul of the Obligation: Theſe tacit Conditions, or (as Dr. Sanderſon calls them) Suppoſitions, are ſet downe by divers Authors, Sanderſ. de Jura. Praelect. 2. ſect. 1. which I ſhall orderly apply to the matter in Queſtion: One tacit Condition annexed to every Oath, is, That the words of it be duly interpreted, Idem. in ſect. 8. in a fair and equitable conſtruction, not wreſting it out of hatred or affection to any Party. This Condition hath been but ill obſerved by the Scots, and others, in relation to their Covenant, who will not admit any conſtruction, but what may ſerve to advance their own owne Deſignes, and heap hatred upon others: witneſs their pleading for it in an abſolute ſence, or their own ſence, when as the principall parts of it are limited by expreſſe Conditions; viz. that part which concerns the maintenance of the King, and the Priviledges of Parliament, is circumſcribed with this Clauſe [In (or no otherwiſe than in order to) the preſervation of Religion and Liberty] And the other which relates to Religion, is as to manner of Reformation, qualified with another Clauſe, [viz. According to the word of God,] ſo that the old ſtatu quo of King and Parliament was ſworn to in a ſence but ſecondary, and ſubordinate, to ſhew that the uſuall Priviledges of both might be quitted, if they proved inconſiſtent with Religion and Liberty; as alſo that any Reformation might be exploded, to make way for one more conſonant to the word. And certainly, if the preſent Preſbyterian Whipſ • ers knew any other way more probable to advance their Kirk Dominion, than by making a pretended Plea for Prerogative, a Stalking-horſe to the Deſign, I believe both King and Lords, had been left long ſince to God's bleſſing and the warne Sun (as they ſay) in deſpair of any Comfort from the Kirk's Benediction. It ſeems now to me likewiſe, That they added this Clauſe [according to the word] not out of any love to a reall Reforming, but onely that they might have a Plea for the pulling down of Epiſcopacy, to introduce another Form more ſuitable to their own ambitious ends, ſince that Form that they contend for is as little conſonant to the word as the other, becauſe they take little thence beſides the bare name of Preſbyterie, to patch up a Reformation. Theſe things the world muſt needs believe of them, till they lay aſide their Self-deſignings, and admit of an equitable interpretation of the Covenant in the limitations expreſſed, or according to that Sanderſ. ibid neve ſenſum aliquem juramento à nobis praeſtito, aut ejus alicui parti aſſingamus proprit commodi aut utilitatis cauſâ, quem non quivis vir alius pius & prudens (qui eſt liberioris Iudicii, utpote cujà nihil intereſt) ex ipſis verbis facilè eliccret. Latitudo prudentialis, the prudential latitude, ſpoken of by Dr. Sanderſon, which ought to be conſidered in all Oaths, when the Sence and meaning of them is in queſtion. For, as we ought by all means to beware, that we give not our ſelves too great a liberty of Interpretation, to the end that we may ſhake off the obligation of an Oath; ſo none ought to faſten ſuch a ſence upon an Oath, or any part of it, for their own profit or commodity, which any other pious and prudent man (indifferent and un-intereſted in the buſineſſe) would not collect and conclude out of the words of the Oath.

Moreover, if we did grant the Scots their own Interpretation; yet it can be of ſmall Conſequence to their ends, ſince the Covenant it ſelf is extinct, by reaſon of the Breach firſt made by themſelves: Let Grotius determin this truth, who lib. 2. cap. 15. ſaith, Si pars una Foedus violaverit, poterit altera à Foedere diſcedere: nam Capita Foederis ſingula conditionis vim habent. If one Party break a Covenant, the other is no longer bound to it: For, each particular head of a Covenant, carries with it the force of a Condition; which Condition in relation to the Covenanters is, that either of them obſerve it with Fidelity to each other. But the Scots have been ſo far from obſerving, that the whole Nation have been involved in the Breach of it, by dividing the King from the People, the People from each other, and at length by a perfidious Nationall Invaſion: ſo that except they can ſhew us ſome new Foundation whereon that Breach is repaired, the Covenant muſt needs be defunct in point of obligation. For, Grotius ubi ſuprà. (aith the ſame Author) Foedus tacitè renovatum intelligi non debet: Non enim facilè praeſumitur nova obligatio, niſi ex actibus qui nullam aliam interpretationem recipiunt. A Covenant being once at an end, cannot be ſuppoſed to be renewed ta • itly: For, a new Obligation is not eaſily to be preſumed, but by ſuch Acts as declare it, and admit no other Conſtruction. Therefore, till the Scots and their Partiſans can produce evidences of a renovation of the Covenant, by poſitive Acts of State, they muſt of neceſſity grant, that all Covenant-obligations and Relations are expired, between the two Nations of England and Scotland.

A ſecond tacit Condition latent in Oaths promiſſory, is expreſſed in theſe words, out of the Divinity of the Stoicks, by Seneca: Tun • fidem fallam, Seneca l. 4. De Beneficiis, c. 36. & conſtantiae crimen audiam, ſi cum omnia cadem ſint, quae erant promittente me, non praestitero Promiſſum: Alioqui, quicquid mutatur libertatem facit de integro conſulendi; & fidem meam liberat. Then (ſaith he) let me be accuſed of falſhood and Inconſtancy, if when all things remain the ſame as they were at the time that I promi • ed, I ſhall not then perform my Promiſe: Otherwiſe, any alteration whatſoever leaves me wholly at liberty, and freeth me from my Enagement. And a little after (ſaith he)Omnia debent eſſe cadem quae ſuerint cum promitteres, ut promittentis ſidem teneas. Affairs ought to be in the ſame condition they were, when thou didſt promiſe, to bind thee to the performance. And in his 39 Chapter he becomes more particular, and ſaith, In all promiſes do lurk theſe tacit Conditions or Exceptions, Si potero, if I am able, Si debeo, if I ought, Si haec ita erunt, if Things continue as now they are. If you require the performance of my Promiſe, Si aliquid intervenit novi, quid miraris cum conditio promittentis mutata ſit, mutatum eſſe Conſilium? bring Affairs into the ſame poſture that they were in when I made it: But if any new alterations happen, why dost thou wonder, my condition being otherwiſe than it was when I promiſed, that I am changed in my intentions? Render things the ſame, and I am ſtill the ſame.

And that this holds good in Chriſtian Divinity, as well as Stoical, appears out of the afore-mentioned Doctor, whoſe Doctrine is equivalent, Sanderſ Praelect. 2, ſect. 10. and his Terms convertible with thoſe of Seneca, declaring that all Promiſes have theſe tacit Conditions, Suppoſitions, or Exceptions; Si Deus permiſer it; if God permit, which anſwers to Seneca's Si potero; Quoad licet, as far as lawfully I may, which anſwers to his Si debeo; Rebus ſic ſtantibus, as long as things thus ſtand, which anſwers to his Si haec itaerunt; According to which ſeverall Suppoſitions in order, I ſhall examine both the Oaths of Allegiance and Covenant, and prove their Non-obligation.

Firſt, • . S • Deus • ermiſcrit. No man that enters into an Otah or Covenant, can be ſo ſtupid, as to promiſe the performance of any thing, without this tacit Reſervation within his own Soul, that he will do it if God permit, conſidering we can do nothing without him, who exerciſeth his Wiſdom and Soveraignty in the diſpoſition of all human Affaires, according to that of the Apoſtle James, who bid us ſay,James 4. If the Lord will, we will do this or that. If ſo, then having ſworn in the Oaths before-mentioned, to continue true and faithfull to the King, and his Heirs, &c. it cannot be meant otherwiſe, then with this Clauſe, If God pleaſe to permit their continuance in the Government: But we plainly ſee God is not pleaſed to permit their continuance, ſince all men will confeſſe, that (at leaſt) by a permiſſive Act of Providence, another Form of Government is erected quite contrary to the Old. Therefore if we conſider the Oath of Allegiance and Covenant, according to this firſt Suppoſition, they are now of no force and obligation; but it may ſerve to ſatisfie a private mans Conſcience, if in times paſt he have done his utmoſt to perform the duties required by thoſe Oaths, during the former eſtabliſhment. The Reaſon is (ſaith the ſameQuia cum omnia divina Providenti • & voluntati ſubſint, nec ſit in cujuſvis hominis poteſtate omnes ſuturos Caſus praestare; qui fecit quod in ſe fuit ut adimpleret quod promiſerat, Juramenti fidem exolvit. Rei Impoſſibilis nulla est obligatio. Sanderſ. Ibid. Doctor) Becauſe ſeeing all things are ſubjected to Divine Providence and Pleaſure, and that it is not in the power of any man to regulate all accidents which happen in the future; therefore he that hath uſed his whole endeavour to perform what he promiſed, hath paid his Allegiance, and fulfilled the intent of his Oath; the Obligation ceaſing when things cannot poſſibly be effected (as the Doctor ſaith) ex Impoſſibilitate Facti. Praelect. 2. Sect. 12.

Quoadlicet As concerning the Dr's Quoadlicet, the ſecond tacit Condition or Excption, it is to be preſumed no man ſwears to any thing, but with this Reſervation, as far as lawfully he may. If ſo, then in caſe it ſo happen, that we cannot lawfully act in proſecution of thoſe things which we have ſworn to, our obligation ceaſeth ex Impoſſibilitate Juris; as in the former, by an Impoſsibility of Power in us to effect what we were obliged unto, ſo in this, by an Impoſsibility of Right in us to act in order thereunto: For, ſaith he, that is ſaid to be impoſſible by an Impoſsibility of Right, which a man hath no lawful power to endeavour. But as to the reſtauration of Kingly Government, now that another is eſtabliſhed (by as good a Title (I have proved) as ever the Kingly was) I would fain know what right or lawfull Power, any private man hath, and which way he can ground it upon the Oath of Allegiance and Covenant, to indeavour the deſtruction of the New Form of Government, and a reſtitution of the Old. For, private perſons have no right to queſtion thoſe that are in Power, Grot. de Jure Belli l. 1. c. 4. and are no competent Judges in Controverſies of that nature, nor ought they to meddle with them, but (as Grotius ſaith) rather to follow Poſſeſſion. Yea, put caſe they were unlawfully poſſeſt,Ibid. Ʋſurpers, Invaders, and Tyrants, yet the ſame Author ſaith, Privato vi dejicere ſummi Imperii Invaſorem non licet, It is not lawfull for any private Perſon to indeavour the thruſting them out by Force.

Nor is this founded only upon humane Reaſon, but alſo upon Scripture. That place in the 13. to the Romanes [There is no power but of God, The Powers that be are ordained of God] is ſufficient to convince every private conſcience of the neceſſity of Submiſſion; that is, to ſubmit to them ſo far, as not to preſume to diſpute how they came by their Power; and this courſe is moſt agreeable to the ſenſe of all Expoſitors, the practice of all Times, and the voice even of naturall reaſon, ſince the opening of a gap to queſtion Supreme Powers, and touch the tender eye of their Authority, would let out all into Confuſion; Tumult following Tumult, like Billow upon Billow, till the world were over-whelm'd with a Sea of Miſeries and Diſtractions.

Object. But ſome may object;If there be ſuch a neceſſity of ſubmiſſion to Supreme Powers without queſtioning them, how then can this Parliament be juſtified in having queſtioned the King, at their firſt ſitting, for divers of his Actions? Anſw. I anſwer, there is a difference betwixt Supreme Power, and the Exerciſe of it. The controverſie was not at firſt concerning his Right of Government, but the abuſe of it by way of male-adminiſtration; in defence of which abuſes he took Arms, and ſo by the Law of Arms loſing his Right, (as is proved before) the Power deſcended to thoſe that are now in poſſeſſion, whoſe Right we ought no more to queſtion, than at firſt we did his; their power deriving as naturall a pedegree from Heaven as his did, and being as legally confirmed by the Law of Arms and Nations, as ever that was which he held from his Predeceſſors. Now, in that the 13. to the Romans commands a ſubmiſſion and obedience in general Termes, it is not meant to all Powers in the arbitrary exerciſe of their Power in time of Peace, but to all Supreme Powers in point of Title, be it ſetled upon them byPotestates apud Ammianum alióſque dicuntur, penes quos ſunt Jurae militaria. Arnold. Clapmar. de Jure Imperii. l. 1. c. 10. Right of War, Inheritance, or any other way. And to ſupport this expoſition, give me leave here to introduce two of the main Pillars of Reformation Bucer, and Calvin, men famous in their generations; whoſe Teſtimonies may ſerve once for all, touching that ſo much controverted Chapter to the Romans. The Apoſtle (ſaith Calvin upon the place) ſeemes here to go about to take away the frivolous cu • ioſity of men, Videtur Apoſtolus voluiſſe tollere ſrivolam hominum curioſitatem, &c. Calv. in Rom. c. 13. who uſe often to inquire by what Right thoſe which have Command did get their Authority; But it ought to ſuffice us, that they are in preeminence; For, they did not get up to this height by their owne ſtrength, but are ſet over us by the hand of God. And ſaith Bucer alſo, on the ſame place, When a Queſtion is made whom we ſhould obey, it muſt not be regarded what he is that exerciſeth the Power, Quum quaeritur cui parendum, non est ſpectandum qualis ſit qu • poteſtatem exercet, nec • que Jure, vel injuriâ, quis poteſtatem invaſerit. Bucer. in Rom. 13. or by what Right or wrong he hath invaded the Power, or in what Form he dispence it, but onely if he have Power. For, if any man doth excell in power, it is now out of doubt, that he hath received that power from God; wherefore, without all exception thou must yeild thy ſelf up to him, and heartily obey him.

Seeing now all Supreme Powers are of God, and that the Apoſtle commands ſubjection to them, but damns Reſiſtance, it is clear then, as to our caſe here in England, that we owe Submiſſion to the preſent Governors; and that no private man hath any warrant out of the Word to ſatisfie his Conſcience in the lawfulneſſe of ſuch Actions, as tend to diſturb or thruſt them out of poſſeſſion; therefore according to this ſecond Suppoſition of the Doctor, no Oath being of Force to bind the Conſcience, further then a man may lawfully Act, it followes, evidently (the caſe thus ſtanding) that the Old Allegiance is cancell'd, and we bound to admit a New; and that both it, and the Covenant have now no influence at all over us, but are utterly void, and of none effect.

Rebus ſic Stantibus▪ The third tacit condition or Suppoſition implied in all Oaths is (ſaith the Doctor) Rebus ſic Stantibus, as long as things continue thus; it being to be preſumed, that when I ſwear to performe any thing, I do it with this tacit Reſervation, if I be not hindred by an alteration of Affairs: But if ſuch an alteration happen, that neither the ſame perſons nor things are in being which I ſwore to maintaine my Oath is at an end, and the obligation ceaſeth; which now is our very Caſe here in England, the Government being changed, and new Governors ſet over us. For this the learned Grotius hath one inſtance very pertinent to our purpoſe.Non tenebitur, ſi ceſſet qualitas ſub quâ alicui juravit; ut ſi Magiſtratus deſinat eſſe Magiſtratus. An Oath (ſaith he) binds a man no longer, if the quality or condition of the perſon to whom he ſwore, be altered: As for example, if he that was a Magistrate ceaſe to be a Magiſtrate. In evidence whereof, the ſame Author alledgeth a ſaying of Caeſar's to the Souldiers of Domitius, when Domitius was a Priſoner. They were unwilling to ſerve Caeſar, becauſe of the military Oath they had taken for the other: But to take away this ſcruple,Grot. lib. 2. ſaith Caeſar to them, Sacramento quidem vos tenère quî potuit, cap. 13. de Jure belli. quum projectis faſcibus & depoſito Imperio, privatus & captus ipſe in alienam veniſſet poteſtatem? How can he hold you bound by Oath any longer, being outed of his Authority and Command, remaining a private man, and a priſoner under the power of another? Alas,Sacramentum capitis dimunitione ſublatum. your Oath ended together with his Authority.

Thus alſo, according to this third Suppoſition of the Doctor's, it is plainly to be inferred; that ſince Affairs of State ſtand not now in England, Ibid. as they were when we took the Oath of Allegiance, or the Covenant, but a new Government is erected; therefore our obligation to the former is totally extinguiſhed. And if the obligation be extinct (as I have proved in the ſeveral particulars before-mentioned) then the conſequence is as plain; that neither of thoſe Oaths can be a ground ſufficient to juſtifie any Royaliſt or Preſbyterian, in denying a ſubmiſſion to the preſent Government, or to raiſe a new war within the Nation.

Part II.

HAving in the former Part (as I think) fully manifeſted the neceſſity and equity, my deſigne in the next is, to ſhew the utility and Benefit of a Submiſſion: This I ſhall doe, by ſtating the nature of the Deſignes of the ſeverall Parties claiming an Intereſt in this Nation; Viz: ROYALISTS. SCOTS. PRESBYTERIANS. LEVELLERS; as they ſtand in oppoſition to the preſent Government, and would each of Them introduce a New Form of their owne. And that you may the better underſtand Them and their Affaires, I ſhall in plain Method (for the more eaſie Conviction) proceed upon theſe Particulars:

Firſt, The great Improbability of effecting their Deſignes.

Secondly, The grand Inconveniences which muſt needs follow, in caſe either of Them be effected, to the prejudice of the whole Nation.

Thirdly, The Excellency of a free State or Common-wealth, as it is now eſtabliſhed in England, and what happineſſe we may reap thereby.

After I have handled the 2 former, as they hold relation to the ſeverall Parties, I ſhall bring up the Rear with the Third, by way of Concluſion.

CHAP. I. Concerning the Royall Party.

THE Royalliſts are of two Sorts. Firſt, ſuch as adhere to the Prince out of neceſſity; Secondly, ſuch as adhere to him out of humor. The former are Thoſe, who being hopeleſſe of a Return, or of the recovery of their Fortunes, by way of Reconcilement, are conſtrained to run any hazard abroad with the head of their Party, and turne every ſtone to over-turn the preſent Powers here in England, that they may ſet up Themſelves. The latter Sort of Royalliſts, are ſuch, as though they ſerved heretofore under the Royall Standard, yet, through the Favour of the Parliament, have re-gained poſſeſſion of their Eſtates: And therefore being re-inveſted with their Fortunes, They are loth as yet to attend the Prince in perſon, though they follow him with their wiſhes, and would be glad to imbrace any Deſigne underhand, or perhaps (when time ſerves) appear here again in the Field, to make way for his Advancement. Theſe may (not improperly) be called humorous Royalliſts, becauſe they have only an obſtinate and vain-glorious humor for the ground of their behaviour, without any reſpect of Advantage to Themſelves, but are ridden by the other to carry on the highRoyall deſigne of Particular perſons, and run a new hazard of their own. To reſtore the ſingle Family of a Prince, ſuppreſſed by the Almighty, they ſeeme willing to Venture the deſtruction of all their own Families; and to ſerve the ends of certain Perſons about him, men whoſe Fortunes are deſperate, they are apt to foole themſelves into the loſſe of their owne; as they muſt needs doe, if the Prince miſ-carry in his Enterprize, whereas if he ſhould carry it with Succeſſe, They will be then but where they were, They can be but Maſters of what they have already. The high Ranters and Fugitives are they that will be look't on at Court; Thoſe Bell-weathers of Royalty will bear away the Bell of Preferment, whilſt the poore Countrey-Royalliſts (both Gentry and Yeomen) ſhall be glad to drudge and plow, to pay thoſe yet unknown Taxations, which muſt needs be collected, to ſatiſfie the forlorn Brethren of the Sword, the many yonger Brothers, and Strangers, which will come in with the Grandees, in hope to purchaſe a Fortune by ſqueezing the Publique.

All which being conſidered, it is awonder to ſee, how They feed Themſelves with Phant'ſies, who pretend in this Nation to the reſtitution of Royality; how their eyes are dazled with that Sun which ſeems to riſe upon their Party, ſuppoſing the golden Ag • muſt needs return again with him, and that he will climb up to the Meridian, in ſpight of all oppoſition! But to give them a Cooler for theſe Conceits, I ſhall more particularly, according to the Method before propounded, ſhew firſt the Improbability of Succeſſe in the new Royall Deſignes; and then, the grand Inconveniences that would follow ſuch a Succeſſe, that all miſtaken Perſons may ſee, how far they wander (to the hazard of themſelves) out of that way, which leads to the future happineſſe of this Nation.

As to the Improbability of the Prince's Succeſſe in his Deſigne, Firſt, he is like to have but a ſlender Supply of forein Aids: For, the Affairs of Chriſtendom are at this time ſo diſpoſed, that ſome Princes want leiſure; others ability to aſſiſt Him: And divers there are which refrain, for particular Reaſons of State. The Spaniard hath other Fiſh to frie, keeping a ſerious eie upon France, and lying at Catch againſt Portugal. Beſides, there are ſeverall Reaſons (not fit here to mention) which may diſpoſe him rather to imbrace the Amity of this Common-wealth, as it is now eſtabliſhed; and whereof there is ſome hope (were there no other ground) in that he hath given our Agent a friendly reception.

So likewiſe hath the King of Portugall too another Agent; and how far he is from neglecting our Friendſhip, may appear by his Demeanour toward our Fleet, in the Port of Lisbon, where he hath given them the like Freedom and entertainment as he doth to Rupert, carrying himſelfe indifferently between both, though he ſeem a little to incline ſomewhat more toward Rupert; not out of any good will, but only in regard of his Preengagement to that Party.

The King of France hath his hands full enough at home, ſo that he hath little liſt or leiſure to mind Affairs abroad; being jealous not only of the Spaniard, but even of his owne Subjects, by reaſon of their regret at the inſupporrtable Taxes, the Diſcontents and Bandyings of his Parliaments in the ſeverall Provinces, and the Partiſans of the Impriſoned Princes; all which ſeem to threaten (if not the Monarchy it Self, yet) the Family of the Monarch.

Denmark hath hitherto given but a coole Acknowledgment of ſo neare an alliance, having been (at the beſt) but a Retiringplace for Montroſe, ſeconding this with ſome other ſlight ſuperficiall courteſies; one of the beſt of which was (to rid their hands of their Gueſt) by lending him a few Bottoms, firſt, to ſeek his better Fortune in Swethland, and then to waft him and his Forlorn hope toward their long homes, into Scotland.

Some ſuch triviall Supplies likewiſe may be expected from the Swede, with a few Complements from the Emperour and German Princes, their jealouſies of each other not permitting them to ſpare their Forces: For, whoſoever conſiders the Delayes and Shifts made by the Emperour and his party, in performing the Articles of Peace; and on the other ſide, the reſolution of the Swede and that Party to have them fully performed (together with thoſe heart-burnings among them, which break out often into Flames in every Corner) may eaſily imagine the peace of Germany is not long-liv'd, and therefore that neither of thoſe Princes will part with many of their Soldiery.

The Hollanders eſteem it a ſafe way to conform themſelves ever to the Prevailing Party in England, having Reaſon, above all others, to prize the Friendſhip and Amity of the Engliſh Nation. And though ſome common Courteſies are expreſſed there to the Prince by way of entertainment; yet theſe are done rather to comply with the deſires of the Prince of Orange, than out of any inclination or affection to the Royall Party; whereas the Sence of the States Provinciall (and in them the meaning of the whole People) is, to preſerve a ſtrict Correſpondence with the Common-wealth of England. Nor do they reliſh thoſe cloſe Combinations between the Prince of Orange and his Brother; fearing ſo great an Alliance may diſpoſe Orange to aſpire, and eſtabliſh a greater Intereſt of his own than is meet for a Member of a Republique, if Monarchy come to its height again in England; which they ought by no means to deſire, but rather that England ſhould continue as it is; not onely for the former Reaſon, but alſo, for that ſuch a Neighbourhood would be concerned in Reaſon, to admit Them into a nearer Friendſhip and Complication of Intereſts, than ever they can hope from a Monarchy.—

Theſe things being conſidered, the Prince hath ſmall hope of Succeſſe, in regard of any conſiderable Supplies from Forein Princes.

Secondly, Put caſe he can, by the help of the many fugitive Engliſh, the Scots, and Supplies drain'd out of the Dregs of ſeverall Countries, make ſhift to patch up an Army, or two, to trie his Fortune, yet 'tis ten to one but They ruine his Deſigne. For, firſt, the introducing of Forrainers will ſoone alienate the Affections of the Engliſh, as experience hath proved in all times. Secondly, Auxiliatores conducti ex diverſis locis, nec diſciplinâ inter ſe, nec affectione conſentiunt. Petr. Greg. Toloſ. lib. 11. de Repub. cap. 3. pag. 656. Mercenary Auxiliaries that are collected out of ſeverall Nations, ſeldome agree either in diſciplin, or Affection. The reaſon of this is given by the ſame Author: For (ſaith he) ſince the Cuſtomes of Nations are diverſe, therefore men of ſeverall Countries, differing both in habit and manners, cannot long continue together, without diſcovering an Antipathy or Contrariety in their natures, even to the ruine of that Party with whom they are ingaged.

To paſſe by the Teſtimonies of many other States men, we have two very pertinent ones afforded us out of our own Affaires: witnes that emulation diſcovered between the Scots and Engliſh in the Hamiltonian Invaſion; and alſo of late, between the Engliſh and Iriſh under Ormond in Ireland, whereupon the Engliſh choſe rather to joyn with the Parliament-Party, than continue any longer ingaged with the Iriſh. Laſtly, Thoſe Forrain Mercenaries will, upon the leaſt misfortune of War, deſert the Prince, and take up Arms under the Parliament. For (as ſaith Patritius) TheMercenarii militis ſides ex fortuna pendet: quá inclivant • ad hoſtes, ipſi etiam ſpem at que animum cò incli •• nt. Franciſc. Patrit. lib. 9. de Reg. Tit. 15. Faith of Mercenaries depends upon Fortune, and if ſhe turn to the Adverſe Party, thither They follow, and incline their hopes and affections. Yea, ſo little truſt is to be given to theſe Mercenaries, that notwithſtanding their Condition be good, yet (ſaith another)Solent plus lucrum quàm cauſam ſcqui bellandi: Et it â facilè ab boſtibus, vel majore ſtipendio, vel donis, corrumpi poſſunt. Pet. Greg. Toloſ. ubi ſupra. They are eaſily corrupted with Money, and with rewards and promiſes of better Pay, bought over to any other Party; reſpecting gaine much more than the Cauſe of their Engagement. Judge then, how the Prince is like to thrive with his Forrain Auxiliaries, if he ſhall have any, either in England or Scotland; for, the Reaſon of theſe Things holds good in one Nation, as well as another.

Thirdly, ſince it appeares how ſmall Succeſſe he is like to have by the Aides of other Princes, let us ſee whether he have any better hopes by Forrain Aid out of Scotland or Ireland, to make a Conqueſt of England. As for Ireland, he hath but poore expectations thence, ſince the Lord Lieuten • nt hath ſwept away thoſe Adverſaries with the Beſome of Vengeance, and made way by a continued chain of miraculous Succeſſes, to Shackle that Rebellious Nation; and doubts not ere long, to bind their Princes with Chaines, and their Nobles with links of Iron, ſince every month brings in freſh Laurels of Victory, to their Terror and amazement. But Ireland being given for loſt, let us ſee next, whether the Royalliſts are like to receive any more comfort from Scotland: Its an old ſaying, Nullum bonum ex Aquilone, No good comes out of the North; and of all others, Royalliſts ſhould be the leaſt apt to beleeve any benefit to come out of that Nation, from whence proceeded the Ruine and Deſtruction of the late King, and all their Party; nor can they hope much better of them in time to come. For, firſt, They adhere to the Prince, not out of any love to his Intereſt, but onely in hope to ſettle their own upon his Shoulders; and therefore if they can make a better Bargain elſewhere, they wil caſt him off, or (if he be in their power) ſell him off (as they did his Father) upon the firſt occaſion. What elſe can he expect from a Party, whoſe Intereſt was firſt founded upon the ruine of his Great Grand-mother, continued and augmented to the perpetuall vexation of his Grand father, and at length proſecuted to the deſtruction of his Father? Secondly, it is impoſſible to reconcile the two Parties, Royall and Presbyterian, even as impoſſible (King James was wont to ſay) as to reconcile God and the Devill. Thirdly, if They cannot be reconciled or ſtand together, then whatſoever Agreemens may be made, it will be but from the Teeth outward; nor can there be an union betwixt them upon any deſigne, but in the proſecution thereof they will mind the advancement of their ſeverall Intereſts, which muſt make them jealous of each other, divided and partiall in their Counſels, and cauſe the inward rancor to break out, to the prejudice and utter ruine of the whole Engagement. Fourthly, let the Scots invade us again upon the Royall, or what ſcore elſe they pleaſe, They will never be endured (eſpecially in the Northern Parts) having heretofore by their perfidious and Tyrannical behaviour, fixed an odious Impreſſion upon the Spirits of the People, and quickned the old Antipathy betwixt the two Nations: So that, if the Prince come in with them, or by them, he will fare never the better (but much worſe) for their Sakes, or their Company. Laſtly, they come (if they dare come) a moſt naſty, lowzie, beaten Generation, againſt one of the moſt generous, beſt accompliſhed, and moſt Victorious Armies in Chriſtendome; an Army that muſt needs be diſhonoured by ſuch an Enemy, from whom neither Credit nor Advantage is to be gotten; yet it is meet they ſhould be chaſtized, ſince the Almighty, out of love to the future Peace of our Nation, ſeemes to decree, that Belial and Dagon, Montroſe, and the Kirk, with her Worthies ſhould be ſent after Hamilton. This indeed, would be a fair ſtep to Reformation, by letting out the Corruption of that Country, which ſticks like a Scab, upon the faire Body of this Fortunate Iſland.

Now, in the laſt place, to conclude this particular touching the Improbability of the Prince's Succeſſe, ſince he hath little ground to hope for any by the aſſiſtance of other Nations, let us examine what hope he hath from our own. Severall Reaſons may be given to the contrary; As firſt, the People's hatred of Foreiners, and their feare of that Plague, univerſall Free-quarter, with their averſneſſe to War, having taſted ſome time of the Sweets of Peace; And though they are ſenſible of ſome neceſſary Burthens, yet conſidering another War will increaſe new ones, more exorbitant, every man would be content with things as they are; for, the Common people (as the Poet ſaith) —Duas tantùm res anxius optat,Juvenal. Panem, & Circenſes.— will be ſatisfied with Bread and Quietneſſe, rather than hazard their Eaſe and Security, to ſerve the Ambition of others.

Secondly, They will be the leſſe apt to engage in any new Inſurrections and Parties, ſince the laſt thrived ſo ill, to the Prejudice and ſhame of all the Undertakers: Examples make Men wiſe; and though many of them eſcaped without puniſhment, in regard thisSee the new Acts of Treaſon, and the Act for eſtabliſhing an High Court of Juſtice. Government was not then declared; yet now that it is eſtabliſhed, and Laws are made to defend it againſt all that offend in time to come, men will beware (I ſuppoſe) how they meddle, ſince they can expect nothing leſſe after another War, than the puniſhment of Traitors.

Thirdly, Put caſe the Counties were reſolv'd upon New Inſurrections, yet what can be done by unweildy Bodies of raw Men, taken from the Streets, the Plow, or the Harrow; rude, and unacquainted with Military Diſciplin, againſt a well-diſciplin'd Army of Old Soldiers? Conſider what became of thoſe vaſt numbers in Kent, Eſſex, &c. with what eaſe they were diſperſed, and how ſoon they vaniſhed into nothing!

Fourthly, It is not like, that the Gentry, men of Eſtates, will ſtir in any conſiderable number, to hazard their Poſſeſſions, being yet ſcarce warm in them, after a Purchaſe made upon dear rates of Compoſition; But if any are ſo mad as to venture on new Deſignes, they might do well to conſider how hard a matter it is to carry them on without diſcovery, ſeeing the State hath a Party and Friends, in all Countries and Corporations. Beſides, if They could carry it ſo cloſe, as to bring any petty deſigne into Action, yet they cannot but be ſnap't, and nip't in the Bud, the Militia being ſo well ſetled, and a Party ready in Armes in every County—Now, all theſe parcells of diſcourſe being well weighed together, I leave every mans Intellect to make the Concluſion; what ſlender probability of Succeſſe there is, by the aſſiſtance of Foreiners or Natives in the preſent Royall Deſigne againſt England.

Having thus, in the former part of this Chapter, ſhewn the Improbability of Succeſſe in the new Royall enterprrize, which were enough to wean Wiſe men from engaging upon that Score, I ſhall (according to the Method propounded) in the next place ſtate thoſe Grand Inconveniences, which would unavoidably follow to the prejudice of the whole Nation, in caſe the Royalliſts ſhould proceed with Succeſſe, to the ruine of this Government: The very conſideration whereof ſhould (me thinks) be ſufficient to ſtartle all underſtanding men, from wiſhing well to that Party.

Firſt, ſince there can be no Medium of Reconcilement betwixt our preſent Governours and the Son of the late King, it is granted by all, that if ever he come into poſſeſſion, it muſt be by Conqueſt, and the Power of the Sword: If ſo, then he will be as abſolute as was William the Conqueror, and we all muſt be in the ſame ſlaviſh Condition, as our Fore-fathers were, under the Tyranny of that Norman Baſtard. That Government which heretofore was called Monarchicall will then be exactly Tyrannycall, Cic. ad Art. 7. Epiſt. 5. according to that ſaying of prudent Cicero in one of his Epiſtles; Ex victoriâ cùm multa mala, tum certè Tyrannis exiſtit. As many other miſchiefs, ſo certainly, a Tyranny ever followes a Conqueſt. And therefore it was that whenHe was afterwards King, by the name of Henry. 2. Henry, the Son of Maud the Empreſſe, contended for the Crown by Arms againſt King Stephen, and was like to prevaile, the Eſtates of the Realm wrought an Accommodation betwixt them,See Daniel. in the life of King Stephen. upon this Ground, becauſe they conceived it dangerous for them, and the whole State, to have a young Prince get the Maſtery by his Sword: For, Princes ever improve ſuch kinds of Victory to an Advantage over the People, and Succeſſe makes them cruell; withneſſe the ſavage Proceedings of Edward the Second, Daniel. in Edw. the Second. againſt his Lords, after he had overthrown them in Battell, in the Northern Parts; executing their Perſons, and confiſcating their Eſtates, as Traitors, ſo that he is noted in our Chronicles, to be the firſt of all our Kings, after the Conqueſt, who to proſecute his Revenge gave a Precedent of Butchering the Bodies of the Engliſh by Beheading and Quartering. This may be enough to ſhew, that to bring any Prince into poſſeſſion by the Sword, is to inſtate him in a Tyranny.

Secondly, Though the Prince of himſelf ſhould not be inclined to Tyranny, yet his followers having a Power over him, will ſoone perſwade him to it. Beſold. in Cap. Nam Legitimum Regnum convertitur in Tyrannidem, aut Dominatum,de morble rerumpub. p. 3. 12. cum Aulo-politicis (qui plerún que odio proſequuntur libertatem) facilè aurem prabet Princeps. For (ſaith one) a well-regulated Government is ſoon changed into a Tyrannycall domination, when a Prince gives ear to Court-politicians, who (for the moſt part) are enemies to Liberty. And as to our preſent caſe Machiavel ſpeaks very aptly; Mach. de Repub. l. 1. c. 16. that a Nation which hath caſt off the yoke of Tyranny or Kingſhip, (for in his language they are both the ſame thing) and newly obtained their Liberty, muſt look to have all thoſe for Enemies, that were Familiars and Retainers to the King or Tyrant, who having loſt their Preferments, will never reſt, but ſeek all occaſions to re-eſtabliſh themſelves upon the ruines of Liberty, and to aſpire again unto a Tyranny; that exerciſing an arbitrary Power, they may take the more ſharp Revenge, againſt all thoſe that dare but pretend unto Liberty.

Thirdly, ſeeing that (as things thus ſtand) to have a King again inveſted by the power of his own Sword, were all one as to have a Tyrant erected, with an Arbitrary Power, to doe what he liſt, it will not be amiſſe to take a view of the effects and Conſequences of Tyranny, As firſt, a Leges opprimit Timor. Sen. Herc. Fur. trampling of all Lawes under Foot. Secondly, uſing all ſorts ofAnſ • rre, trucidare, rapere. T •• . in Agric. Cruelties and Rapine. Hence it is, that Cato called a KingPlutarch in vitâ Catonis. Carnivorum Animal, a Ravenous Creature; and by Homer in the firſt of his Iliads, a King is called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , a Devourer of the People, ſo that no mans Life or Eſtate is in ſafety, if they have a mind to bereave them of either; and for this purpoſe, Tacitus ſaith, they alwayes D • latores per praemia cliciu •• . Tacit. Annal. 4. keep falſe Accuſations and Witneſſes in Lavender. Thirdly, noBoni quàm mali ſuſpectiores ſu • , ſemperque allena virtus formidoloſa eſt. Saluſt. Nec minus periculum ex unagnâ famâ, quam ex malâ. Tacit. Agric. good man can live ſafe by them, nor any man that is eminent for Valour or Vertue; according to that of the Tragedian Seneca. Se • vare Cives Principi & patriae graves, Claro tumentes genere, quae dementia eſt? Who acting the Part of a Tyrant, ſaith, It is a madneſſe to preſerve great Perſons, when they once grow burdenſome to their Prince and Country. Thus Tarquin taught his Son Lucius to ſecure his Tyranny, by ſtriking off the Heads of thoſe Poppies in his Garden, which grew higher than thir Fellowes; whereupon, his ingenious ſon gave the world to underſtand, as well as himſelfe, what his Fathers meaning was, when afterward he deſtroyed all the principall men among the Gabians, by Force, Treachery, and falſe Accuſations. No matter whether things be juſtly done, or not; for, a Tyrants Maxims are ſuch as this, out of Lucian, Scoptrorum vls tota perit, ſi pe •• ere juſta Incipit.—

That Prince's Scepter is not worth a Ruſh, who ſtands upon Juſtice and honeſty. Caeſar hath left it upon Record of himſelfe, as Th •• cydides hath of Euphemus, and Euripidei of E • eocles:Regni cauſâ jus violandum eſſe. That all Lawes may be violated, to make way to a Domination: That Regni cauſa ſecleratum eſſe. a man may be wicked to obtain, or maintain, an abſolute Soveraignty; That a PrincePrincipi nihil eſt injuſt • quod fructuoſ • m. ought to account nothing unjuſt which is profitable. To which may be added one more out of Ubi honeſta tantùm dominanti licent, precariò regnatur. Seneca, That where a Prince hath no power to doe ought but what is juſt, he reignes but by Courteſie. Theſe are the uſuall Rules by which Tyrants ſteer their Courſes; and therefore it concernes all men to forbeare their aſſiſtance, to any that endevour to re-ſettle a King by the power of the Sword, leſt he ſeat himſelfe as a Conqueror, and ſo ſlip into an abſolute Tyranny. For,

It is ſeldom, that Kings forbear an arbitrary Power, if they can by any means uſurp it, over the People: and though there may ſometimes happen a good King that will not make uſe of it to their Prejudice; yet even then the People are not ſafe,Quamvis bonus at que clemens fit, qui plus poteſt tamen quia malo eſſe licet, formidatur. Saluſt. ad Caeſ. becauſe (ſaith Saluſt) it is in his power to be wicked if he pleaſe.

Fourthly, If he come in by the Sword, there will be no Act of Oblivion paſſed before hand; and if he gaine poſſeſſion, it is a Queſtion then, whether he will grant any afterward; or if (for faſhion ſake) he doe grant one, how farre it ſhall extend, and whether it may not be eluded, to make way for revenge againſt particular Perſons, who (perhaps) little dream of an Inquiſition for paſt Offences, as being of the moderate Sort of Offenders againſt the regall Perſon and Prerogative. All theſe Quaeres are well worthy every mans Conſideration, ſince revenge is eſteemed inter Areana Imperii one of the ſpeciall myſteries in the Cabinet-Counſells of Royalty: For, with them, as Tacitus ſaith, Ʋltio in Queſtu habetur, Revenge is counted great gaine, and prized as the prime Jeweli of a Crowne. It is ſoD • lc • malum vindicta. ſweet a Morſell, that even the beſt of Kings could not refraine it; as may be ſeen in the practices of David and Solomon. 2 Sam. 19. 18. We read how David pardoned Shimei for a time; and he ſeemed ſo earneſt in the doing it, that one would have thought, the Offence ſhould never have been remembred; Alſo, how he forbore to revenge himſelf upon Joab all his owne daies; yet being to die, he gives charge to his Son Solomon, not to let them eſcape unpuniſhed, but that he ſhould bring their hoar heads unto the grave with blood, 1 Kings 2. which afterward (upon ſlight occaſions) were executed accordingly. So Solomon himſelf likewiſe, though he forgave his Competitor and Brother Adonijah, Ibid. and bad him go to his houſe in peace; yet he lay at catch ſtill for ſome new occaſion to be revenged: And therefore for a petty paſſion of love toward the Shunamite Lady, in demanding her to be his Wife, poor Adonijah was laid to ſleep with his Fathers.Daniel. In our owne Chronicles we find alſo, how that when Henry the third had in the end gained the better by his Sword, over the Earl of Leiceſter and the People, he meditated nothing but revenge againſt all that had oppoſed him, razing the Caſtles of his Barons, confiſcating their Eſtates, and taking forfeiture of the Charters of many Corporations; eſpecially of the Londoners whom he ſpightfully vexed ever after in body and purſe, upon every opportunity. So likewiſe Richard the ſecond, becauſe the Londoners were not willing to back him in his Irregularities, but had appeared croſſe to his Deſigns, watched every way to be revenged on them;Ibidem. and upon a ſlight occaſion of a Tumult in the City (which nevertheleſſe the Mayor ſoon ſuppreſſed) he deprived them of the beſt part of their Priviledges, and put them to the expence of no leſſe than Twenty thouſand pounds; a fine conſiderable ſumme in thoſe daies of Antiquity, to be added to that invaluable loſſe of their Liberties, for ſo poor a matter as a petty Tumult about a Quarrel with a Biſhop's Servant. But when Kings have been diſ-obliged by any City or perſons (by hook or by crook, ſooner or later) they ſhall feel their diſpleaſure: And therefore Machiavel adviſeth never to truſt them;Mach. de Prin. For, whoſoever (ſaith he) thinks by new Courteſies to take out of their minds the remembrance of old Injuries, is extremely deceived.

Fifthly, If Kings are thus revengfull, then what may we expect but the fatall Conſequences of that humor? It is an old Saying; —Regnabit ſanguine multo, Ad Regnum quiſquis venit ab exilio; that is, His Reigne will be very bloody, that comes from baniſhment to a Kingdome; whereof they ſhall be firſt ſenſible that have oppoſed his Intereſt; and ſuch are all thoſe in this Nation that have appear'd for the Parliament, againſt the Encroachments of the Prerogative. Nor let them flatter themſelves, that they ſhall ſcape better than others, becauſe they never oppoſed this Princes perſon; It will be ground ſufficient for his hatred, that They bandied againſt his Father, and the Prerogative, to which he is heire. Nor is it likely he will forget the obſervation made by one of his Chaplains, in a Sermon before him at the Hague; how that the Presbyterians held his Father by the haire, Dr. Crighton. and the Independents out off his head; Nor is it to be ſuppoſed that we ſhould have many Parliaments hereafter; For, beſides the Provocations given by Parliament, it is againſt the nature of King's to loveMonarchae nois amant Ordinum Conventus crebriores. Beſold. de Simulachris Reri • npub. Parliaments or Aſſemblies of their People; and it was left as a Legacie by King James to his Family, in his Baſilicon Doron; That his Succeſſors ſhould neglect Parliaments as much as might be: So that conſider how this Prince is engaged, not only by the Intereſt of the Crowne, his particular perſonall Intereſt of Revenge, but alſo by the Praecepts of his Grand-father, and the common Inclination of all Monarchs, and we may eaſily imagin what will become of Parliaments, and Parliament-Patriots, if ever he get poſſeſſion.

Sixthly, Whereas many now adhere to him in their hearts, in hope they ſhall be eaſed of Exciſe and Taxes, &c. if he be reſtored, they are exceedingly miſtaken. I remember a Paſſage out of the Stories of France; Du Serres. that the Duke of Orleans having, upon a difference betwixt him and the King, laid a Tax upon ſome of the Provinces, by their owne conſent, to maintein his Army; afterward, allured with fair promiſes, they inclined the Duke to accord with the King, hoping to be eaſed of the Impoſition; but they fell ſhort of their deſires; for, that which they had voluntarily impoſed upon Themſelves, was ſetled upon Them perforce by the King, when he once had them in poſſeſſion: And ſo that Tax, which was called the Gabel, continues upon them to this very day, as a Token of their folly. Now, let not us flatter our ſelves here in England, that we ſhall fare any better (in point of Exciſe, or other payments) upon the Prince's reſtitution. If now we have Burthens, we muſt then look to have Furrows, made upon our backs: If now we are (through neceſſity) put to endure a few whips, we ſhall then (of ſet purpoſe) be chaſtiſed with Scorpions. It is not an Exciſe, or an Army that we ſhall ſcape, but be viſited with whole Legions of forein Deſperadoes, which muſt be fed with greater Payments than ever, and (God knowes) when we ſhall be rid of them, if the Prince ſettle upon their ſhoulders. Conſider, how many hungry Scots gape after this gude Land, who, with thoſe of other Nations, muſt be Satisfied out of the Purſes of our own, whilſt thoſe that are their Leaders will be gratified, with this, that, and the other Mans Lands and poſſeſſions. And that this Inſinuation is no Fiction, but well grounded upon Precedents out of our owne Hiſtories, in the Practices of our Kings, may appear by the Proceedings of the Conquerer; who being forced to extraordinary Courſes to ſatisfie his forein Soldiery, made bold ſo frequently with the Eſtates of his Subjects, that the great Lords of the Kingdom, fearing it would come to their Turns at laſt to part with their Poſſeſions, by way of prevention, ſled out of the Land, ſome into Scotland, ſome into Denmarke, and other Parts, to trie if by aide from abroad, they might recover Themſelves and their Fortunes again at home: But by this means they hapned to loſe all ſo much the ſooner; for, miſcarrying in the Deſigne, their Eſtates were poſſeſs'd, and their Offices ſupplied by the Norman Favorites. Thus alſo, King Stephen, himſelf being a Foreiner. and relying moſt upon forein Arms to preſerve him in poſſeſſion, was conſtrained to take the ſame Courſe, for the ſatisfaction of his forein Auxiliaries, which conſiſted moſt of Flemings and Picards, whom he eſpecially truſted in his greateſt Actions, neglecting and oppreſſing the Engliſh. Thus did Henry the third alſo in his wars with the Barons; againſt whom bringing in Foreiners, He, for reward, inveſted them with others Lands and Honors, and laid heavy Impoſitions beſides upon the whole Kingdom, to make Them Satisfaction. And in thoſe variations of Fortune between the two Houſes of Yorke and Lancaſter, as often as either of Them had occaſion to make uſe of forein Arms to aſſert their Titles, the Eſtates of the Adverſe Party, and the Purſes of the People, were ſure to goe to wrack for the Pay of the Soldiery. From hence then it appears, that if the Prince put himſelfe in poſſeſſion by Arms, we ſhall be ſo far that way from any eaſe of our burthens, that they will be doubled, and trebled, yea, and tenfolded upon us.

Laſtly, The Prince's Confederation with the Scots, and our Engliſh Presbyters, (were there no other Reaſon) might be enough to terrifie any ingeniouſly minded People from giving their aſſiſtance, be they Royaliſts, or not: For, if the Kirke be able to bind the Prince to hard Conditions, and prove (like the Sons of Zeruiah) too ſtrong for him, ſo that his Intereſt bow to theirs, then in ſtead of a Regall (which is more tolerable) we muſt all ſtoop to the intolerable yoke of a Presbyterian Tyranny, that will prove a plague upon the Conſciences, Bodies, and Purſes of this free Nation. The Scots by this means will effect their Deſigne upon us, by ſtretching their Covenant-union to an equality of Intereſt with us in our owne Affairs: And the Engliſh-Grandees of that Party will ſeat themſelves again in the Houſe, and exclude all others, or elſe a New Parliament ſhall be called of Perſons of their owne Faction; ſo that if they ſhould carry the day, all the Comfort we ſhall have by caſting off the preſent Governers, will be only that we ſhall have theſe furious Jockies for our Riders: Things (perhaps) ſhall be in the old Statu quo, as they were when the late King was at Holdenby, whoſe Son muſt then lay his Scepter at the Foot-ſtole of the Kirke, or elſe they will reſtore him by leiſure (as they did his Father) into the exerciſe of Royalty: By which means we ſhould be brought again, as far as ever we were, from a condition of Settlement, and the Common-wealth reduced to Aſhes by endleſſe Cumbuſtions. On the other Side, put caſe the Prince have the better end of the Staffe of the Presbyters, (they relying upon his Courteſie, as well as the reſt of the People) then, in caſe he carry the day, They, and All, are at his mercy, and no Bar will be in the way to hinder him from an Aſcent unto an unlimited Power: So that you plainly ſee, this preſent Combination of Royalliſts and Presbyters (which ſoever of them be moſt prevalent) muſt of neceſſity put the Nation in hazard between Scylla and Charybdis, that we cannot chuſe but fall into one of the pernicious Gulphs, either of Presbyterian, or Monarchicall Tyranny.

All theſe Particulars being ſeriouſly conſidered; how Improbable it is in the firſt place that the Prince ſhould goe on with Succeſſe in his Deſigne; and then, what miſerable Inconveniences muſt needs follow ſuch a Succeſſe (in caſe he prevaile) not only to the Prejudice of any one Party, but of All, I may undeniably conclude, that all miſtaken Royalliſts, as well as others, who live now under the Protection of the preſent Government, are concerned out of neceſſity, and in reſpect to their owne well-being and benefit, to wiſh well thereunto, rather than proſecute the private Intereſt, of a ſingle Family, and of a few Fugitives its Dependants, to the hazard of their owne Families, with the Peace and happineſſe of their native Country.

CHAP. II. Concerning the Scots.

I Am ſorry I muſt waſte Paper upon this Nation; but ſeeing They make Themſelves Conſiderable by being troubleſome, it will not be amiſſe to ſound the Depth of their preſent Deſign; which that I may the better doe, give me leave to trace them in their Encroachments, from the firſt to the laſt, upon the Engliſh Nation. Not to mention thoſe of elder date, let us begin with King James who being a native Scot, out of love to his Countrymen (or rather to himſelfe, that he might keep them quiet, by ſtopping their mouths with the ſweet morſels of England) was pleaſed to admit many of them into his Court, then into his Councell, and to be partakers of Honours and Offices, equall to the beſt of our Engliſh. His Son, the late King. knowing danger might come of diſcontent out of the Northern Corner, followed the ſame Courſe that his Father tooke, to oblige Them; holding them in Penſion, giving acceſſe to all Beggars, with ſuch faire Entertainment, that moſt of Them ſtaid here, and none returned empty. This heaping of Favors upon Some, ſtirred up the Appetites and Emulation of others; who ſeeing themſelves neglected, and not like to ſhare in any of theſe Enjoyments by the Favor of the King, bethought them of an other way, to make Themſelves as conſiderable as the reſt of their Country-men, and gain an Intereſt with the Engliſh. Seeing they could not thrive with the Court, They would trie what They could doe without it.

Hereupon, being men of Power in their owne Country, They became moſt Zealous Aſſertors of the Presbyterian Diſcipline againſt the Epiſcopall, by which means they gained the Friendſhip of all the Religious Party in England, then perſecuted by the Biſhops, who were at Court the only Favourites: Hereupon, theſe Leaders of the Scotiſh Presbyterians, beginning to grow active and forward in eſtabliſhing their own Form at home, and alſo to propagate it abroad by encouraging their Friends, gave ſuch an Alarm to the Biſhops, that they (to croſſe the Deſigne) fell foule upon all of the Opinion here in England; and not onely ſo, but preſſed the King to eſtabliſh an Epiſcopall Ʋniformity in both Kingdoms, even in Scotland as well as England. The forcing of this upon the Scots was a Cauſe of the Commotions in that Kingdom; whereupon a war enſued betwixt the King and Them through the inſtigation of the Biſhops; which was ſoon ended, to the Advantage of the Scots in Money and Credit, and to the diſhonor of the King and the Epiſcopall Party.

This happy Succeſſe wrought a very reverend opinion of them, in the hearts of the well-affected Party in England, who ſtood for the purity of Religion, and a liberty of Conſcience, againſt Epiſcopall power and Innovations; as alſo for the Lawes and Liberties of the Nation, invaded by the Prerogative. And for redreſſe of theſe things the King was neceſſitated to call a Parliament; who not obtaining ſuch Reliefe of Grievances as they expected by reaſon of a Corrupt Councell of Biſhops and others about the King, which alienated him from his great Councell the Parliament, and afterward cauſed Him to breake out into a warre againſt Them, were conſtrained likewiſe to take Armes, in defence of our Liberties. Hereupon, recourſe was had to the Scots for their aſſiſtance; who, having the ſame Enemies at Court, and being equally involved in the ſame common Danger, it was ſuppoſed they were concerned in Reaſon to joyn with the Parliament, without any Diſpute or Scruple. But They, conſidering now was the Time to make their Markets (if ever) and their owne intereſt as much Engliſh as might be, came not off ſo roundly as was hoped, but fell to bartering like Hucksters, and no Bargaine would be (forſooth) without a Covenant. They would not joyn, except They might be (in a manner) all one with us, and this Ʋnion muſt be ſealed with that ſolemn League and Covenant. What their meaning was therein, we ſhall know by and by, by taking a view of their Actions ever ſince, which are the moſt ſure Interpreters: Yet even at that time,See the grand Caſe of Conſcience concerning the Engagement, ſtated, &c. ſome men had their eyes in their heads, and many Objections were made at divers Expreſſions in the Covenant, and many Deſires for explanation of ſome Articles more fully. But the Scots ſtanding ſtiffe upon their owne Terms, and no Conjunction like to be obtained without the Covenant, and the neceſſity of the Parliaments Affairs admitting no delay, we were glad to take it as it was offered, without further queſtion or Demurrer.

It was no ſooner taken here at London, but immediately every one began to make his Advantage (through the multitude and ambiguity of Expreſſions) and by it to promote his ſeverall Intereſt; as if it had been made to engage unto a particular Party, not to unite two Nations in a common Intereſt. But above all the Scots, having had the honor of this Invention, conceived themſelves much injured by any, that denyed them the Prerogative of making an Interpretation; and in matter of Religion, urged their owne Diſcipline as the only Patern to Reform the Church by; and their Plea had been fair enough out of the Covenant, could they have proved it to be [according to the word of God;] which Clauſe was moſt luckily inſerted. Notwithſtanding all the Reaſons to the Contrary, the Scotiſh Module was ſtill preſſed: The Scot was willing to ride, and having (as he thought) the Engliſh-man faſt bridled with a Covenant, he began to ſwitch and ſpur. The Throne of the Kirke was the Stalking-horſe to catch geeſe; and if that could have been ſetled, then there had been no denying Them whatſoever they would ask; They would have ſeated themſelves ſurely in this fat Soile; There would have been no removing them out of our Councels, whereof the neceſſity of our Affaires had made them Members and Partakers. For, had the Kirk-Intereſt been once confirmed among us, then by vertue of that Authority which they uſe to controll the Civill power, the Parliament muſt have been ſubſervient to all their ends. And ſince it would have concerned the Engliſh Clergy (to make their Party ſtrong, and maintein Correſpondencies for their owne preſervation) to have gratified their Scotiſh Founders in all their Deſires, the Scots might eaſily have tranſlated the Covenant-union to as good as an abſolute Nationall union, by gaining a Joynt-Intereſt with us in our Affairs for ever, and conſequently, in all the Profits, great Offices, Councels and Concernments of this Nation.

Now, whether this were their Deſigne or not in the Covenant ab origine, I ſhall not determine; but let it be judged by their inſolent behaviour here among us, after they were admitted to our Counſells: and therefore in the next place I ſhall examine their Proceedings, which moſt evidently repreſent them in their Intentions. —It ſufficed them not; after they were come in, that they had an equall Power with us in publique Affairs, in the Committee of both Kingdoms at Derby-houſe (which was willingly allowed them for a time, ſo far as concerned the Common cauſe of both Nations, in proſecuting the war) but driving a Powerfull Party in both Houſes, They tooke upon them to meddle with matters relating to the future Peace and Settlement of this Nation, diſtinct from their owne, and to provide for an equall Intereſt with us therein. The firſt moſt notable Evidence of this (though there had been many before) was diſcovered at the Ʋxbridge-Treaty, where Propoſitions of both Houſes for Peace being preſented to the King, it was found the Scots had ſo far Provided for Themſelves by their Party in the Houſes, That in time to come, the ordering of the Engliſh Militia, the Power of making War and Peace, and all other Prerogatives of Government, were to be adminiſtred by a proportionable number of Scots, as well as Engliſh: A thing ſo ridiculous, and an Encroachment ſo palpable, that the King Himſelf, in one of His Anſwers, took notice of it, and ſaid, He was not ſo much an Enemy to the Engliſh Nation, as to ſigne thoſe Propoſitions; or ſomewhat (I am ſure) to this Purpoſe.

A ſecond evidence or diſcovery of their Encroachments was made, upon their delivering in divers Papers to the Parliament, at ſeverall times, wherein they diſputed their Claim, and ventured their Logick upon the Letter of the Covenant, to prove an Intereſt in diſpoſall of matters meerly relating to our welfare; which they re-inforced afterwards with new Recruits of Argument, when the King came into their Army.

But not knowing well how to maintaine their Arguments, They were contented for that time, to quit Them and their King too, upon ſuch Terms, as are notorious to all the world; who being at length reduced under the Power of the Parliament and Army, Propoſitions of Peace were ſent to him at Hampton-Court, wherein no ſuch Proviſion being made for the Scotiſh Intereſt, as was in thoſe at Ʋxbridge, their Commiſſioners here proteſted againſt them▪ accuſed the Parliament of Breach of Covenant, and complained highly in one of their Declarations that they ſhould be ſo neglected. This may ſerve as a third evidence of their Covenant-deſigne of Encroachment; whereto may be added one more, when the King was at Carisbrooke Caſtle, whither the Commiſſioners of Parliament were no ſooner arived with Propoſitions againe, but the Scots Commiſſioners were at hand, and for the ſame reaſon proteſted furiouſly againſt Them. By which inſolent demeanors and expreſſions, from time to time, and crying up the Covenant for their defence, it is clear enough what their Intentions were when they urged it upon us, and that notwithſtanding all the ſpecious Pretences of brotherly Love, their Deſigne in it hitherto hath beene, onely to ſcrue themſelves into an equall Intereſt with us in this Nation.

Having ſmelt out their Project thus farre, give me leave to trace them on to the end, as briefly as may be. The Royall Party being totally ſuppreſſed, and ſo no further occaſion to make uſe of the Scotiſh Army, the Parliament, with ſome difficulty, made ſhift to ſend them home into their own Kingdome: But being defeated of their Aims and expectations, they could not ſo reſt; having failed of their ends by pretending for Parliament, they reſolved next to try what they could do upon the Kings Score, and ſo the Grandees turn'd the Tables, in hope of an After-game, by cloſing with Hamilton upon the Royall Accompt; not doubting but if they gained the day this way, to recompence their Travels with much more Advantage. The Covenant, like a noſe of wax, apt to be turned any way, ſerved this enterprize every jot as well as the former, though the Deſigne were different from what it was, the great ones not caring much what became of the Kirk Intereſt, ſince they had agreed for the ſecurity of their owne; which muſt needs have been very conſiderable, if they could have redeemed the King, and reſtored him into the condition of an abſolute Monarch. Therefore the Kirk ſeeing themſelves left thus in the Lurch, thundered out their Curſes amaine upon that Hypocriticall Engagement, as deſtructive to the Covenant.

But the Grandees being at a loſſe in this likewiſe upon Hamilton's Defeat, and followed home to their owne dores by the brave Engliſh Army, were glad to cry Peccavi to the Kirk, and alſo to our Engliſh Commanders, whom they diſmiſſed with many promiſes of fair Carriage for the future. Within a while after, a new dore of hope being opened to them by the ſuppoſed Succeſſion of the late Kings Son, They to ingratiate with him, proclaime him their King; and here the Grandees and the Kirk joyning hands againe, become friends, and offer their Service for his reſtitution, upon Terms of the Covenant; which is their Plea now at this very day: So that the Covenant, which was pretended to be framed at firſt, for the preſervation of this Parliament and the Liberties of the People, againſt the uſurpations of regall Power, is; now that the Scots can ſerve their deſigne no longer that way, become the Ground of their preſent Combination with the Prince, and their Presbyterian Brethren in England, for the deſtruction of our Liberties; being reſolved this way, ſince they have failed in all the reſt, to trie whether they can accompliſh their profane Projects through the Covenant, by inſinuating themſelves into places of Honour, Profit, and Power, that they may domineere in the poſſeſſions, as their Phariſaicall Prieſts would over the Conſciences of the Engliſh.

Thus having made way, in diſcovering what the deſigne of the Scots ever hath beene, and is at this Inſtant, under the faire Covert of the Covenant, certainly, no man that is maſter of an Engliſh ſpirit, but will abhorre the Hypocriticall pretences and Encroachments of that perfideous Nation. And therefore now that all men may beware how they be drawne into an Engagement with them, I ſhall (according to my way) manifeſt firſt, the Improbability of their Succeſſe, and then the Inconveniences which muſt neceſſarily follow, in caſe their deſigne be ſucceſſefully effected.

Firſt, As to the Improbability of Succeſſe, conſider by way of Compariſon, the great difference between the Engliſh and Scotiſh Soldiery. Ours are heightned with extraordinary Pay, bravely accompliſhed, ſtrong Horſe, well diſciplin'd, veterane Soldiers, better Spirited by reaſon of a more generous education; and to all theſe add the advantage of being Engliſhmen, and the Reputation of having been ſo long victorious; let theſe conſiderations be laid in the balance againſt the Scots; freſh men (for the main) newly raiſed, a People of farre leſſe generous Soules, poor in Body, Pay, and other Accommodations, ſave what they have purchaſed by proguing here in England. Judge then in reaſon what theſe are able to doe againſt ſo brave an Army that contemns and ſcorns Them, as having beaten them with a handfull (in compariſon of their numbers) home to their owne dores; an Army, that to all worldly Advantages, hath hitherto had a ſpeciall Protection from Heaven, God having Sealed them for his owne by many miraculous victories and Succeſſes, to the wonder of the whole world.

Secondly, conſider that our Engliſh Army are all of a Nation, Natives, and unanimous eſpecially upon the appearance of any Invaders; whereas the Scotiſh will be made up of divers Factions, Royaliſts and Presbyterians, that com in purſuance of different ends; which (for the time that they continue together) muſt needs be a cauſe of many Confuſions and partialities of Counſells, to the prejudice of their Enterpriſes and Proceedings; a ſpring of perpetuall Emulations, that will ſoone untwiſt the Confederacy; ſo that in ſhort time they muſt fall aſunder like a Rope of Sand, and the private Soldiery be diſpoſed to entertaine thoughts of ſome new Engagement, to the ruine of the firſt.

Thirdly, We ſhall not only be provided for them here, if they dare be ſo unworthy as to invade us; but 'tis like this Common-wealth may find work for them at home, and (to cure their madneſſe) divert the humour with Phlebotomie, by way of Revulſion.

Fourthly, It is like they will be farre from running much hazard to gain Succeſſe unto the Deſigne. For, if they provr a little unfortunate, the humour will alter; one good beating will make them underſtand, there is another way of Intereſt and Thriving, than under the wings of Royalty. It may chance to make them remember (becauſe they cannot forget) how long they have lived without a King in Scotland, while the Grandees and the Kirk did all; and that the Engliſh have dealt more ingenuouſly to have no King, than a Presbyterian Mock-King. One Rout (with this conſideration) puts them preſently into the humour of a Republique, as well as England. And then they will have no more work to doe, but to raiſe the Market, and get Chap men for their King to put him off handſomly, that they may pay their Army, and goe home again like Scots.

Laſtly, the Scots having no juſt Ground of a Warre againſt England, can hardly be proſperous in the Attempt. The Covenant can be none, being extinct, as I have proved in the former part of this Treatiſe; beſides I ſhall adde one Reaſon more: It cannot in common ſenſe be ſuppoſed to have been intended as an eternall obligation, binding both Nations for ever, or to bind the Engliſh Nation with an implicite Faith, to whatſoever the Scots ſhould expound to be righteous and neceſſary, to be done here for ever by way of Government. But it appeares intended onely for a certain time, for the proſecution of certaine Ends which were common to both Nations as Affaires then ſtood; and therefore being of a tranſient nature, becauſe thoſe Ends (by the alteration of Time, and other Circumſtances) are found either not poſſible or inconvenient, the obligation expires of it ſelf. This being the ſtate of the Covenant, neither the Scots, nor any other Party can found a Warre upon it in Reaſon or Juſtice. If ſo, then having no other Ground for a Warre▪ but Covetuouſneſſe, Emulation and Ambition, which (as I ſhewed in the Preamble of this Chapter) have been cloaked under the Covenant, in all their Ingagements, the hand of Heaven will aſſuredly be againſt them for their unchriſtian Practices, as may appeare by theſe examples following.

Firſt, Strig. in Chron. part. 2. p. 186. The Athenians, carried on with Covetouſneſſe, Emulation, and a deſire to poſſeſſe themſelves of the Riches, of the Lacedemonians, were the Author of the Peloponeſian Warre; the conſequence whereof was, that it ended with the ſubverſion of their City walls, P • ucer. in lect. and the miſerable ſlavery of their People. The ſame end likewiſe had the Carthaginians, Chron. d. 18. for moving an ambitious War againſt the Romans by the Inſtigation of Hannibal; Iul. An. 73. as alſo had the Thebans for their unjuſt invading the Macedonians.

It is obſervable likewiſe how thatSemiramis. Babilonian Queen and Virago (as Diodorus Siculus tels us) being gre • dy after the Wealth of the Indians, Diod. Sic. rerii antiq. l. 2. c. 5. invaded them by an unjuſt Warre, in hope to make a Conqueſt▪ Bella injuſta infelices Su • c • ſſus, tri •• es, & Tragi • os exitus ſemper habent. but th • Iſſue was, that ſhe was forced to flie home again moſt ſh • m • fnlly for the ſafety of her life. Thus Xerxes, invading Greece with a world of Men, and Ships, was in the end glad of a poor Fiſhing-boat to get home out of Europe, to a worſe deſtiny in Aſia; Strig. • . Reg. 14. p. 187. being ſlaine immediately after his Return, by his Uncle A • ta • an • s. Upon the like occaſion, Cyrus loſt his Army, and his life; and to quench his B • oud-thirſty humour, his Head was cut off, and caſt into a Hogs head fill'd with Bloud, by the Scythian Queen. Thus likewiſe, Mark Anthony, not content with half the Empire of the World, invading his Partner Octavius for the whole, loſt all, & being taken alive at mercy, laid violent hands on himſelf to prevent the Fury of the Conquerour. Thus Craſſus another Roman, Philip. Chron. being of the Scotch Religion, a ſacred hunger after Gold,Tom. 1. Epiſt. per Pe • c. edit. pag. 248. invaded the Parthians without cauſe, againſt the advice of the Senate; in which expedition he loſt his Army and Life, and the Parthians conſidering what he came for, poured Molten Gold into his Mouth, in Triumph and Mockery.

To theſe Examples out of profane Hiſtory, let me adde a few out of the Sacred. You may read 2 Kings 15. how Senacherib, the King of Aſſyria, mad an impious invaſive War againſt Hezekiah King of Judah; the conſequence whereof was the Confuſion of his Army, and Revenge followed him to his own home ſo cloſe at the heels, that it was executed upon him by his owne Sons, while he was at his ſuperſtitious devotion, in the midſt of his Idols. Nor have wicked Princes onely beene puniſhed for invading the good, but you may read alſo that the good have had ill Succeſſe in invading the bad.2 Chron. 35. Thus good Joſiah, a moſt religious Prince, warring without cauſe againſt Pharaoh Nicho King of Aegypt, received his deaths wound at Megiddo, and after his death, the ſame King Pharaoh, to right himſelf of the Injury done him by Joſiah waged Warre, and by Gods permiſſion ſubduing the Land, made the whole Nation Tributary, and took King Jehoahaz, the Sonne of Joſiah, and carryed him Priſoner into Aegypt.

Alſo, another good King of Judah, by name, Amaziah, provoking Jehoaſh, 2 Kings 14. a wicked King of Iſrael, without cauſe, to Battel, was utterly Routed, the City of Hieruſalem taken, the Walls demoliſhed, the Temple ſpoiled, and Amaziah himſelf carried away Priſoner, to ſhew how much the Lord of Hoſts, and God of Battell, it displeaſed with unjuſt Wars, that he will not proſper them, though made by his own People againſt the wicked that are his Enemies.

But there is one example more, which (me thinks) is very pertinent to our purpoſe;2 Sam. Chap. 2, 3, & 4. and that is of Iſhboſheth, the Son of King Saul, who laying claim to the Kingdome after his Father, by prerogative of Succeſſion, made War againſt David, who was choſen King by Gods owne appointment: But to ſhew that Hereditary Succeſſion is no Plea to juſtifie a Warre againſt the Powers that are ordained by him, he placed marks of diſpleaſure againſt all that took part with Iſhboſheth, ſo that in the end Iſhboſheth had his Head ſtrook off by ſome Commanders of his own Party, and brought to David. Now, I leave this unto thoſe that liſt, to make the Application: And withall, they may doe well to conſider how the Spaniard proſpered in 88. in his Invaſion againſt England; how ill he hath thrived ever in his Attempts againſt the Hollander: And as for the Scots, I ſuppoſe, that as it concerns them to conſider the ſad example of the late Hamiltonian Invaſion; ſo they and their Adherents may learn from all theſe together, That God will never proſper them, if they proceed in their unrighteous Combination.

Having ſhewn the Improbability of the Scots ſucceſſe, I ſhall in the next place diſcover the great Inconveniences and hazards that our Nation muſt needs undergoe, in caſe it ſhould happen.

Firſt, It being evident, that their deſigne in urging the Covenant upon us, hath been to inſinuate themſelves into an equall Intereſt with us in our own Nation, it is to be ſuppoſed, that having hitherto been defeated of their long-expected Prey, they come now to proſecute it with the greater appetite: And it is to be preſumed they will not ſerve the King with the Covenant, at an eaſier rate than they intended it ſhould have coſt the Parliament.

Secondly, It is to be feared, this ſo much deſired Intereſt of theirs may (if opportunities fall out right for their Turns) be driven on farther by the Sword, than yet we are aware of. A Nationall Ʋnion hath been whiſper'd often among them heretofore; and there's no doubt but they will bid high for it, if ever they have occaſion; And then it muſt needs be a very fine world, when we are confounded with a Miſcelany of Scotiſh and Engliſh; when Scots ſhall be Competitors with us in point of Priviledge, vie wealth with us in our own Poſſeſſions, Honours, and Dignities; and either impoſe new Lawes upon us, or alter the Old, as may make moſt for their Advantage.

Thirdly, That theſe things may be, is probable enough, ſince their King having no other rewards to give them, it is impoſſible he ſhould ſatisfie the Grandees and Leaders any other way, than by promiſing large acceſſions of Intereſt, with other mens Honours and Poſſeſſions; even thoſe men's (perhaps) that are the Moderate Sort of Tranſgreſſors; For, in ſuch Caſes it is uſuall to ſtretch all Offences upon the Wrack, to ſupply the neceſſities of the Conquerour; and then if this happen, 'tis like a Scotch Covenanters ſtomack, will allow no diſtinction, betwixt Presbyter and Independent, but may digeſt the eſtate of an Engliſh Covenanter without ſo much as a Scruple of Regret, or Compaſſion.

Laſtly, it is a very great wonder, ſince the preſent Stage-play of the Covenant, and the Actors are brought on this ſide the Curtain, and we know what they are through all their diſguiſe, and what they aime at, That yet many of our Engliſh ſhould be ſo ſtupid, as to be led away with their Cheates and Pretences for a King and Reformation: Alſo, ſince it is evident, that their chief Leaders and Sticklers gape onely after Profit and Preferment, and (according to the Cuſtome of all Forreiners in Arms) will make no difference between Friend and Foe, ſo they may ſatisfie their covetous and ambitious Ends; ſince the whole People likewiſe muſt of neceſſity be haraſed with innumerable Taxes, to pay the rabble of their Souldiery; certainly, no true Engliſh heart can be ſo degenerous, as to forward or countenance them, in their invading this Nation.

Now, for a Concluſion to the whole; that theſe Particulars may appeare more ſolid then mere Inſinuations, give me leave to confirme them by many Authentick examples; it being an ordinary Caſe in the world, ThatAb iſtis exercitibus, quos defendendi ſui causâ attraxerunt, evertuntur. Commonwealths and Kingdomes have been oppreſſed often by thoſe Foreiners, that came or were invited in as Friends, to give their aſſiſtance. Here before I proceed, let me call to minde a Story of the Hedghog, in the Fable; Peucer. Auxiliatores, ut ſolet fieri, poſtea ſiunt domini. Strigel. 2. Paralip. 28. who being almoſt dead with Cold, chanced to light upon a Foxes Kennel; where asking for entertainment, the Fox more compaſſionate than wiſe grants his Requeſt. But the Hedghog, as ſoone as he recovered warmth, began to briſtle and prick the Fox, who complaining of his unworthy carriage, the Hedghog made Anſwer, that if he found him troubleſome, he might leave him, and ſeek a new Lodging. I ſhall make no application, but leave thoſe that would entertaine the Scots as their Friends, to conſider whether they ſhould finde more Courteſie from them, if They had power here then the Fox did from the Hedghog, or than other Nations have had from the friendly Pretences of Forain Auxiliaries.

Concerning this,Juſtin. there are ſeverall Precedents. Tht Mac • donians being invited by the Thebans, to aſſiſt them againſt the Phocians, made a ſhift not onely to ſeat themſelves among the Thebans, but under the conduct of King Philip, made way to the Conqueſt of all Greece: Xenoph. lib. 7. So the Perſians comming as Friends to aid one party in a civill diviſion in Caria, ſuppreſſed both, and deprived that Common-wealth of its liberty. And the Carthaginians, in the firſt Punick Warre, received more prejudice from the Cel • ae, their Confederates and Brethren in Covenant, than from the Romans their Enemies.

The Goths and Vandals being invited by the Emperour Theodoſius, Pezel. part 4. pag. 613. for his aſſiſtance, deprived him of Italy and Spain. Afterward, the Longbeards or Lombards being called in by Narſes againſt the Goths, ſeated themſelves for above 200 years in that part of Italy, which from them was called Lombardy.

A Quarrel hapning between the two Saracen Sultans of Perſia and Babylon, Circa Annum Chriſti▪ 870. the Perſian called in the Turks, under the Conduct of their Captain Tangrolipix out of Scythia, Chytraeus in Apoc. cap. 9. who ſeated Themſelves firſt in a part of his Dominions.

In the Chronicles of Judah, 2 Chron. 28. we read how King Ahaz invited Tilglath-pilneſer King of Aſſyria to his Aſſiſtance, againſt the Edomites; who comming as a Friend, did him exceeding prejudice, and laid a Deſigne then for the Conqueſt of Hieruſalem, which was afterwa • d effected. Joſephus tels us likewiſe, how that Pompey being called to aſſiſt Hircanus, in the recovery of the Kingdome of Judaea, Joſephus de bello Jud. lib. 1. c. 12. out of the Hands of his yonger brother Ariſtobulus, took occaſion hereby to reduce it under the Roman obedience.

In the time of the Emperour Fredrick the 3. the Princes of Italy being in contention, the Pope called in the Spaniard and ſeverall other Princes, to compoſe the Quarrel;In Chron. Phil. lib. 5. which being done, a new one aroſe betwixt the Auxiliary Princes for the Lordſhip of Italy; but the Spaniard drave away the reſt, and made bold to keep poſſeſſion for himſelfe. Thus likewiſe, the Spaniards being invited into Sicily and Naples, to free them from the French, did indeed expell the French, but poſſeſſed both Kingdomes themſelves. On the other ſide; a Controverſie ariſing between Lewis and John Sforza for the Dutchie of Milain, John called in the Spaniards to his Party, and Lewis the French: But the French driving out John and the Spaniards, made themſelves at that time Maſters of the Duke-dome, and carried their Friend Lewis away Priſoner into France.

Thus in old time our Anceſtors the Saxons, Sam. Daniel. being called in by Vortigern the Britiſh King, to aſſiſt him againſt the Invaſions of the Picts and Scots, turned their Arms againſt the Britans, and driving them into Wales, tranſmitted the poſſeſſion of this Iſland to us,Joh. Bodinus lib. 5. cap. 5. their Poſterity. So the Scots likewiſe (as Bodin ſaith) being called in to the aſſiſtance of the Picts againſt the Britains, poſſeſt themſelves of the beſt part of that Kingdome, which they hold at this day.

And now I would faine know of the Admirers of the Scotiſh Nation, that if The Scots come in hither with their King upon their Shoulders, and their fine Flouriſhes of pretended Friendſhip, what aſſurance they can have, that they ſhall not ſerve us the ſame ſauce, as their Anceſtors did the Picts, and as ours did the Britans, or as others did other Nations, whom they oppreſſed under as glorious Pretences, in caſe They ſhould get the power in their hands: Eſpecially ſince of late time, They have made ſo many pelpable Diſcoveries of Encroachment upon the Engliſh Nation.

Seeing therefore that their Covenant-Cauſe appears a Cauſe for intrenchment upon our Nationall Intereſt, rather than for Religion or Monarchy▪ I may reaſonably conclude, that it concerns all Parties whatſoever (if not for the Improbability of their Succeſſe, and the Miſeries that would follow it, yet) out of a deteſtation of their Deſigne, to abhor Them in their Invaſion.

CHAP. III. Concerning the Engliſh Presbyterians.

WHence it was, and for what ends, Presbytery was firſt brought into this Nation, is not here to be diſputed: But if we grant the Intentions of its firſt Fautors to be pure in the Fountain; yet it appears polluted in the Streams, by the Corruption of their Succeſſors: For, as the primitive Pretences of it were high and glorious, in the innocence of its Cradle; ſo being grown up to a full Stature, it hath (after the manner of all other things that participate of worldly mixtures) in time contracted ſo many adulterations of worldly Intereſt, that it hath loſt the Beauty which it once appeared to have, and ſerves every Sophiſter, as a Cloake, to cover his ambitious Deſigne.

But ſince it is arived, notwithſtanding, to ſuch a hight in the opinions of many, as to be cried up for the only patern of Government under the Goſpel, this is to be imputed to the blind Zeal of thoſe that are led, and the deceitfulneſſe of the Leaders, rather than to the Intention of its learned Founder, Mr. Calvin. For, it doth not appear that ever he ſtretch't his Module ſo far, as the neceſſity and univerſality of a Divine Right, but ſeems only to have hewn part of the Building out of the rock of the Scriptures, and peeced up the reſidue by politique and prudentiall Rules, ſuch as he conceived might ſound neareſt the Text, and ſerve moſt conveniently to cement the diſ-joynted Members of the then broken and tumultuous Common-wealth of Geneva, into an entire and well-compacted Body.

It was no ſooner lick't into Form there; but (as it is the Fate of all things new) it began to be much extoll'd and admired; and the Fame thereof ſpreading in England, as well as other Parts, wrought in many of our Country-men an Itching deſire to goe thither, and inſtruct Themſelves in the Nature and Cuſtoms of the Government; where, of Spectators they ſoon became Proſelytes, and returning home with new Affections, looked with an eye of diſdain upon the Biſhops; as if Themſelves had indeen found out the Patern in the Mount, becauſe (forſooth) the words, Presbytery, Elder, Deacon, and Aſſembly, &c. ſound more Goſpel like than Dioceſſe, Church-Warden, Arch-deacon, and high-Commiſſion, &c. With theſe Terms,Maxima pars vulgi capitur Amba • gibus. the ordinary Sort of Religious perſons, not able to ſee through this Shell of words, into the Kernell or Subſtance of the buſineſſe, were eaſily led to a belief of high matters; whereas this new Forme, like the Trojan Horſe, brought an Army of miſchiefs in the belly of it; which were never ſo fully diſcovered, as till this Parliament. For, immediatly after that the Epiſcopall Form was aboliſhed here, as corrupt and Antichriſtian, the chief Sticklers of the Preſbyterian Clergy began to ſhew their Teeth; and ſitting in an Aſſembly Cheek by Jo • e with the Parliament, intermedled with their Affairs, labored to twiſt their Church diſcipline with the Intereſt of State, claimed in their open Pleas, Diſcourſes, and their Confeſſion of Faith, a Power in themſelves diſtinct from the Civill, and demanded the Voting of this in both Houſes, as Jure Divino, that ſo the Parliament might for ever cut the throat of their own Authority, and Magiſtracy.

Theſe, and many other Pranks they played, in hope to erect their intended Domination: And though (being often required) they were as little able as the Biſhops to ſhew their Pedegree from the Apoſtles, or to derive the lineaments of their form from the Body of the Scripture; yet they preſſed it on ſtil, and wanted not their Party in Parliament, with the aſſiſtance of the Scots, (whoſe Intereſt it was) to ſecond them. And here it might be wondred, that ſo many knowing men, and of able Parts, ſhould prove ſo degenerous, as to proſtitute Themſelves, and the Majeſty of the Nation, to ſerve the ambitious ends of a few Prieſts; but that they had their Ends in it too, and were willing to follow the Example of the Scotiſh Grandees, by gratifying the new Clergy in the form of a Nationall Church, with Accruments of worldly pomp and Power, the better to ſupport their Owne in the State.

For this Cauſe it was, that They ſtooped ſo unworthily to the Deſigne of the Scots and the Clergy; and being all of them combined in Intereſt, they were in a manner neceſſitated, to countenance and comply with each other in their mutuall Encroachments, to the diſhonour of our Nation, the debaſing of Parliaments, and the extreme hazard of the Libery of our Soules and Bodies. All which being conſidered, you may ſee, how exceedingly we are obliged to our preſent Governers, that they ſtrove ſo mightily againſt the ſtream to prevent Them all in their ſeverall Deſignings; and what neceſſity lay upon them to expell that corrupt Intereſt out of Parliament, and to follow the Counſell of the Poet, in cuttingImmedicabile vulnus Enſe recidendum eſt. Ovid. off a rotten Part for the Preſervation of the whole, by the Power of the Sword. By reaſon of this neceſſary and magnanimous Act, it is, that they have made Themſelves ſo many Enemies to the Presbyterian Party: For, the Scots, being defeated of their Engliſh Intereſt, the Secluded Members of their Hopes and Priviledges, and the Clergie of their Kirk-domination, incline all immediately to face about to the Prince, and to hedge in him and his Intereſt with their owne, as well as they can, in hope of private Revenge and a Recovery, without any regard at all to the good and peace of the Publique. Then Gentlemen, if they prevaile, ye will be but in the old poſture again, As You WERE; yea, and far worſe than you were, ſince all thoſe Church-uſurpations which were then but in deſigne, muſt needs be confirm'd by a new alteration.

For this Cauſe it is, there are ſo many Presbyterian Juglings in private, ſuch Murmurings abroad, and ſo many Mutinies in the Pulpit; ſuch wel-acted Lamentations for the glory of the Kirke, and the loſſe of their Diana, that every Prayer is a Stratagem, moſt Sermons meer Plots againſt the State, and upon their Hearers. Thus the Nature of their Deſigne being diſcovered, give me leave in the next place to manifeſt the Vanity of their Hopes, that if men will not forbeare for ſhame of its hypocriſie, they may yet, in conſideration of the many ſad Conſequents which may follow.

As to the Improbability of their Succeſſe,

Firſt, our Engliſh Presbyterians are very inconſiderable now in England, becauſe above three Parts in four are fallen off, ſince they were able to ſee through the Pretences of the Grandees of their Party, ſo that the ſmall Remainder can doe little of Themſelves, and all their hope leans upon Scotland, that bruiſed Reed.

Secondly, As their Party is but ſmall of its Self; ſo there is ſmall likelyhood of an Increaſe, becauſe all the Reſt of this Nation are Oppoſite to them and their waies, being either Common-wealths-men, or Royalliſts. And though they uſe all Indeavours to draw in the Royall Party to their own, yet it can never be effected, by reaſon that the old Antipathie will revive upon every little occaſion. For, the Royalliſts looke upon them ſtill, as the Authors of their Miſery; and the Prince (who is Head of that Party) though He may feed Them with fair Promiſes, can never cordially imbrace them, being the old Enemies of his Family: Nor will he count them any whit the leſſe guilty for their hypocriticall proteſting againſt the Death of his Father; For, They reduced him Diminutione Capitis, into the condition of a Captive; They ſpoil'd him as a King, before others executed him as a private man; They deprived him of his earthly Crowne, and kept him languiſhing, whereas his owneSee the Iriſh Biſhop's Sermon at the Hague, in print. Party ſay, others were more courteous in ſending him to an heavenly. In ſhort, I affirm, that the preſent Powers have done nothing now in altering the Government, but what was done in effect before, or muſt have been done by the Presbyterian Party.

Thirdly, But ſuppoſe (what in reaſon cannot be ſuppoſed) that the Prince could forget old Injuries, and that the neceſſities of the chiefe of his Party ſhould bring down their Stomacks to a compliance with Presbyterie; yet the main Body of that Party will never comply, in a courſe ſo deſtructive to every mans Intereſt of Conſcience and Liberty; nor venture their Lives and Eſtates to eſtabliſh a Faction, which they beleeve to aſpire toward an intolerable Tyranny, over Magiſtrates and People.

Laſtly, the Presbyterians Themſelves may doe well to conſider, what Succeſſe they are like to have in their union with a Prince, whoſe Intereſt is already declared to be Revenge for the ruine of his Father. Though They laid him not down upon the Block, yet They brought him to the Scaffold; and when time ſerves, the Philoſopher's Maxime will prove good Logick at Court,Bed a. Axiom. ex. Ariſtotele. Qui vult media ad finem, vult etiam & ipſum finem; He that wills the meanes conducing to the end, wills alſo the end it ſelfe: Ergo (will the Courtiers ſay) ſince the Presbyterians put ſuch Courſes in practiſe, as tended to the Kings Ruine, they certainly intended it, and are as guilty as others.

But to illuſtrate this a little, give me leave to cloſe up this particular with a notable example—It hapned that Clearchus, This Story is recorded by Machiavel, in his firſt book de Repub. the Tyrant of Heraclea, was by a Conſpiracy of the Grandees driven out of his Dominions, they hoping when he was gone to have all power in their owne hands; but there ſtarted up a Party of the People, which prevented them, and ſetled the State in a condition of Liberty and Freedome. Hereupon, the Grandees, in diſdain and revenge againſt this new Party, conſpired againſt the Common-wealth, and brought back Clearchus into poſſeſſion. The Tyrant being thus reſtored, inſtead of gratifying them that had a hand in his reſtitution, conſulted to ſatisfie both his owne Revenge upon them, for having oppoſed him at firſt, and alſo the diſcontents of the People againſt them, for their having deprived them of their late Liberty: and therefore all the reward they received for bringing him back was, that he Sentenced them all to a moſt ſhamefull Execution. This is the Story, and now I leave thoſe Presbyterians, that dreame of high Succeſſe in bringing back the Prince, to make application.

As for the Inconveniences which the Presbyterian Deſigne would bring upon the whole Nation, gueſſe at them by theſe Particulars following.

I ſhall paſſe by thoſe Inconveniences which muſt enſue their Combination with the Scots, having ſufficiently mentioned them in the former Chapter, and conſider thoſe only that would follow the eſtabliſhment of their Presbyteriall Diſcipline; Firſt, Beſides the many miſchiefs it would bring upon the Nation in generall, the Royaliſt • (of all others) can receive no content in it, being abſolutely deſtructive to Regall Dignity. It never was embraced yet by any one Nation, in a Nationall Form, but by Scotland. This (as one See the Caſe of the Kingdome Stated. Anno 1647. hath obſerved) was done, during the minority of King James, when the Lords and Clergy ruling all as they liſted at length parted Stakes (though the Clergy then got, and ſtill hold the better) that when he came to Age, he found the Fable of Ixion's Juno moraliſed upon himſelf: For, as he imbraced a Cloud in ſtead of a Goddeſſe; ſo the King, when he thought to graſp his Scepter, laid hold on a Manacle, which kept his hands ſo faſt, during his abode there, that he could never Act but what they pleaſed to let him, according to their owne Directory of Kirk and State. And in proceſſe of time, this heat of Presbytery proved ſuch an Hectick in the body Politick of Scotland, that the ſubſtance of Kingly Power was utterly conſumed, and nothing left (as we ſee at this day) but the bare Bones, the very skeleto • of a Monarchy: witneſſe the abſolute Power now exerciſed by their Parliament, and the Generall Aſſembly of the Kirk-men; but eſpecially of this latter, which, like to the Rod of Aaron, is in ſuch a budding thriving condition, that it hath devoured the Rod of Moſes, as his did thoſe of the Magicians of Aegypt, and proves a Scourge to the Magiſtracy and People.

Secondly, the difference betwixt the preſent Powers, and Them, is only this; That they would not have a King ſo much as in Name; the Presbyterians would have no more but the Name of King, a Scar-crow of Royalty: The State in down-right terms have declared themſelves Free; the other pretend to maintain the Monarchicall Form, yet actually deſtroy the very Fundamentalls of Monarchy: And now I would faine know of the deluded Royaliſt, which of the two deals moſt ingenuouſly; and if the Presbyters take place, wherein he can conceive his Party will receive any Advance or Advantage: For, beſides that this mad Diſcipline deſtroyes Biſhops, and clips the wings of Regality, it will intrench alſo upon the Lawyers, curb the Gentry in their own Lordſhips, by a ſtrange way of parochiall Tyranny, and bring all People into the condition of mere Gally-ſlaves, while the blind Prieſts ſit at the Stern, and their Hackney-dependants, the Elders, hold an Oar in every Boat. For,—

Thirdly, were thoſe Prieſts ſeated here (as they are in Scotland) in a ſure Succeſſion, then (as it hath been long ſince See the Caſe of the Kingdome, ut ſupra. obſerved in Print) a Correſpondence being cheriſhed between a Clergy of the ſame garb and humour, in both Countries, They might finely loſſe Thunderbolts of excommunication on both ſides, to gratifie each other, and ſo be able to terrifie all Perſons, that dare be averſe in either Nation, and promote ſuch onely to places of Honour and Profit, whoſe poorer Spirits will vaſſalize their Genius to ſerve the ends of their Kirk-domination. In hope of this it is, that we have ſo much bauling about the Covenant; and rather than faile of it, Oh, how they pant after the Scots, who cannot chuſe but laugh in their ſleeves at them, to ſee them drive on the work, at the perill of their Necks; the new Scotiſh Combination being (as I have ſhewn) but a freſh On-ſet to the firſt Deſigne of encroaching upon Engliſh Intereſt, and the mainteining of a Faction here to ſerve the Aims of Scotland, and the Ambition of a few Scotified Engliſh, (ſome particular Grandees among the Laity, and obſcure Rabbies of the Clergy) who are content to ſhare dominion with the Scots; and ſo they may do that, care not though they betray the whole Common-wealth and State of the Nation.

Fourthly, it being cleare, that the Plot of Presbytery is carryed on meerly for theſe unworthy ends, what madneſſe is it for any men that pretend wiſdome, to hazard Themſelves and their Fortunes to draw on the guilt of innocent bloud by embroyling their Countrimen, only to ſerve a Faction, whoſe practiſes (when they are inveſted with power) will be (as they ever have been) to make them ſhare with others in the Common calamity at preſent, and entaile Slavery upon their poſterity for ever.

Fifthly, that I may give you a little more light in theſe Things, conſider, that the Reaſon why the Presbytery contended for is ſo deſtructive of Liberty, is, becauſe of theIn ordiue ad Spiritualia. Popiſh Trick taken up by the Presbyterian Prieſts, in drawing all Secular Affairs, within the compaſſe of their ſpirituall Jurisdiction: And this they doe by meanes of that awe, wherein they pretend to hold the Conſciences of the Magiſtrate and People; the one being lyable as well as the other, by Suſpenſions and Excommunications, to be exploded at pleaſure as Scandalous Sinners. This appears by that large extent of their Authority in judging of ſcandalous Sins, which reaches almoſt to every action of humane life; So that all the people beſides their Favourites (from the Counſellor to the Beggar) muſt at every Turn ſtoop like Aſſes, to be ridden by them and their Arbitrary Aſſemblies.

Laſtly, the Setling of Presbyterie, in ſuch a mode, would erect a Power Eccleſiaſticall diſtinct from that of the Civill: For, it is a Maxim among all Presbyters, and we find it pleaded for at large, in the Confeſſion of Faith ſet forth by the Aſſembly of Divines [That there ought to be a Juriſdiction in the Church (that is, in their way of Diſcipline) diſtinct from the Civill:] which Tenet of diſtinction muſt needs be the ſame, in effect, with that of the Church of Rome's Supremacie; ſeeing, thoſe which plead now for a Power without the Civill, will not be long before they arive to ſuch a height of Preſumption, as to act above it or againſt it, in perſuance of their owne Deſignes. It will be impoſſible to keep ſuch a Church-Diſcipline, within its limits in any Common-wealth, which makes the ſame Perſons Civill Subjects, and Eccleſiaſticall Superiors.—To paſſe by many other Examples of the ſtrange Inconvenience of that Diſciplin, in this one Particular, I ſhall only produce one of late memory, about the Ingagement of Hamilton: who (as I ſignified in the Preamble of the former Chapter) preparing to invade this Nation without the Kirke's approbation, was by Them oppoſed, and all his Party alſo in Parliament (which were the Major Vote:) And after he had gotten as Authentick an Authority, as that Nation was conceived able to give him for his Deſigne; yet notwithſtanding, the Aſſembly (becauſe they ſaw the Grandees had deſerted Them, and left the Kirk-Intereſt in the Lurch) Not out of any good will toward England, but becauſe their diſcipline was not like to be ſet up here, if Hamilton had prevailed. proteſted againſt Hamilton's Proceedings, and in him, againſt the Authority of Parliament whereby he was inabled, curſing Him and his Adherents.

Now therefore, conſidering what the Nature and Deſigne of their Presbyterie is, what ſmall Succeſſe its Abettors are like to find, and what miſchievous Inconveniences muſt unavoidably follow it, I leave every reaſonable man, within the Cloſet of his owne Soule and Conſcience, to make a Concluſion; whether he ought not rather to Engage with the Common-wealth, than with this unreaſonable Party.

CHAP. IV. Concerning the Levellers.

WHat theſe People aime at, and how they would ſettle, is as hard for me to determine, as in what point of the Compaſſe the wind will • it next, ſince they are every jot as giddy and rapid in their Motions. Yea, the very Settlement which they pretend to, would, were their Deſires granted, put the Common-wealth into an utter Impoſſibility of Setling, as I ſhall prove by and by, when I come to Particulars.

In the mean time, that you may know what They are, and how they came to be diſtinguiſhed by this Title, give me leave to trace Them from their Originall, and manifeſt how they were divided in Affection from the Parliament; which appears to be occaſioned only by a meer misinterpretation or miſtake of ſome Paſſages in divers Declarations of the Parliament and Army touching the Liberties of the People; wherein they profeſſed, That the compleat Settlement of the Liberties and Peace of the Nation is that bleſſing of God, than which, of all worldly things, nothing is more dear and precious in their Thoughts. From this, and the like Expreſſions, a certain Sort of men, of buſie parts, and that have a mind to ſeem Sombody, immediatly tooke upon them to frame ſuch Comments, and Chimaera's of Liberty, as might fit their own Ends and Phantſies; And in time, diſſeminated ſuch ſtrange Principles of pretended Freedome, among the common Sort of Soldiery and People; that it became evident to all the world, they ſought not Liberty but Licentiouſneſſe.

And the firſt time that they began to appear conſiderable in view, was in the year 1647, when that memorable conteſt hapned betwixt the Army, and the corrupt Party then prevalent, in both Houſes and the City: At which time, though they did good Service in helping to reduce the one, and purge the other; yet no ſooner had the Parliament recovered it Self into a State of Innocence and Freedom, and begun to act in ſuch a way, as they conceived neceſſary to eſtabliſh the liberties of the Nation, but theſe men made bold to carp at their Proceedings, and crie out againſt them and the ſuperior Officers of the Army, as perfidious, and betrayers of the publique Intereſt; becauſe Themſelves (a hot headed Rabble, and the meaneſt of the People) might not have it ſetled after their own humor.

From whence it appears, the firſt Cauſe of the Difference between the Parliament and Them, was their bold and impudent behaviour, in preſuming to direct their wiſdome what to doe, and taking upon them, Dictator-like, to define what is Liberty, and what not, and how it ought to be eſtabliſhed; as if Themſelves alone were infallible, and the only Champions of Ʋniverſall Freedom, and the Parliament ſuch, as either regarded it not, or ſought it's deſtruction. And, notwithſtanding that they have manifeſted their great wiſdom, courage, and care ever ſince, in carrying on the work of Freedom to this height, wherein we now ſee it, to the abſolute confutation of theſe mens Calumnies; yet their reſtleſſe Spirits proceed ſtill in the ſame violent Courſe, having of late, in a preſumptuous manner, preſented a mutinous ſcandalous Remonſtrance, which (nevertheleſſe) they call an humble Petition, to the Parliment; wherein they take advantage, by the preſent Neceſſities of the Common-wealth, to ſlander Them in their Proceedings, as Oppreſſors of that Liberty which they ſo Zealouſly mainteine; and for the neceſſary Defence whereof, they are conſtrained to continue divers payments upon the People at preſent, to purchaſe • aſe in the future.

Having thus diſcovered the vanity of their Quarrell, in the next place give me leave to ſhew what their Deſigne is: And this They profeſſe, in that Pamphlet, called the Agreement of the People, See the Agreement of the People. (ſet forth May 1. 1649.) to be a Popular Form, or a Government by the People, as the only Preſervative of Peace and Liberty; wherein it is required, That the Supreme Authority of England, and the Territories therewith incorporate, may reſide henceforward in a Repreſentative of the People conſiſting of 400 perſons, and no more; whereto all of 21 yeares and upwards, are allowed a Right to chuſe, and be choſen Members, except Servants and Vagabonds. And becauſe all perſons have an equality of Right to chuſe and be choſen, without reſpect of Birth, quality, or wealth, all Orders of men being Levell'd in this Particular, therefore the Promoters of this way, are not improperly called Levellers; ſo that this Term of Levelling is equivalent with Ariſtotle's 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 ,6. Polit. cap. 2. which is tranſlated aequalitas Juris, the Equality of Right before-mentioned; And the ſame Author ſaith, this Plea for Equality of Right in Government, at length introduceth a Claim for Equality of Eſtates, and the making of ſuch Lawes as theIndeque frequentantur Agrariae Leges▪ quae prohibent, ne quis nimis dives efficiatur. Beſold, in Synopſ. de Democr. Agrarian Lawes enacted by the popular Boutefeus in Rome, whereby it was made criminall for any man to grow Richer than ordinary. But of this, more anon.

Now therefore, ſince it appears, how injurious their Calumnies are, and how perilous their deſigne is, to the Parliament and Common-wealth, I ſuppoſe it were time loſt to ſtand to prove the Improbability of their Succeſſe, ſeeing all Perſons of Credit and Fortune, are concerned, to abhorre and deteſt this Wild Project: And though the four Champions made proclamation in the head of their Agreement; See the Preamble of the Agreement. That according to the nature of Truth, it hath made its own way into the underſtanding, and taken root in the hearts and Affections of moſt Men; yet you muſt know theſe men they ſpeak of, are only the rude multitude, who underſtand no more of the buſineſſe, than that it may prove a hopefull way, to mend their own out of other men's Fortunes, and ſatisfie their naturall Appetites of Covetouſneſſe and Revenge, upon the Honourable and Wealthy. In conſideration whereof, I come next to give you a more exact and lively Draught, of the manifold miſerable Inconveniences of that Government, (or rather, Confuſion) ſo earneſtly contended for by the Levelling Party.

Firſt, Such a Democratick, or Popular Forme, that puts the whole multitude into an equall exerciſe of the Supreme Authority, under pretence of maintaining Liberty, is, in the Judgment of all States-men, the greateſt enemy of Liberty; For, the multitude is ſo Brutiſh, that (as the Emperour Claudius ſaid) they arePlebs ut prona in miſer • cordiā, ita immodica in ſaevit • am. ever in the extreames of kindneſſe or Cruelty; being void of Reaſon, and hurried on with an unbridled violence in all their Actions, trampling down all reſpects of things Sacred and Civill, to make way for that their Liberty, which Clapmarius calls Clap. de Arcau. dom. pop. a moſt diſſolute licentiouſneſſe, or a licence to doe even what they liſt; according to that of the Lyrick, —In vitium Libertas excidit. & vim Dignam lege regi— when Liberty becomes the greateſt Vice, and degenerates into Violence. Such a Liberty as this is recorded by Tacitus, to have been among the Parthians, an uncertaine looſe kind of People, Incerti nimirum, ſolati que & magis ſine dominio, quàm in Libertate. living rather without government, than in Liberty; or as Saluſt ſpeaks of the Abrogines,2. Annal. Genus hominum agreſte, ſine legibus, ſine Imperio, liberii, atque ſol • tum. Saluſt. a rude ſort of men, without Lawes, without Government, free, and diſſolute. And Livy Quoniā ea demum Libertas Romae eſt, non Senatii, non Magiſtratus, non Leges, non mores majorum non Inſtituta patrii, non Diſciplinam vereri Militiae. Liv. l. 5. tells you, how things were come to that paſſe in the popular State of Rome, that no regard was had either to the Senate, or Magiſtracy, or Military Diſcipline, or to the Lawes and Cuſtoms of their Anceſtors. When affaires are in this condition, then (as Ariſtotle ſaith) Mera 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 eſt extrema tyrannis, meer Democracy (or liberty) is extreme Tyranny; and (as Beſoldus) Plebs pernicioſiſſimus fit Tyrannus, the People becomes a moſt pernicious Tyrant. Hence it is, ſaith Quicciardin, Histor. lib. 2. very pertinently to our purpoſe, That many times, when a People have got looſe from the yoke of a Tyranny or Kingly Government, out of a deſire of Liberty, they proceed from one Extreme to another, & ſeſe, niſi retineantur, in effraenatam licentiam praecipitant; quae quidem & ipſa, Jure Tyrannis, poteſt appellari, and except they be reſtrained, run headlong to Licentiouſneſſe; which alſo may be rightly called a Tyranny. To which accords that of Peucerus, who moſt excellently deſcribes the Effects of it in theſe words:Tales longè ſunt crudeliores, et longè plus nocent quàm ſoli Tyranny, &c. The ſtudy of popular Air, applauſe, and humor, is a madneſſe no whit inferior to Tyranny it Self. Thoſe which ſeek after it, as Leaders of the People, become far more cruell and miſchievous than ſingle Tyrants can be: For, ſingle Tyrants are the leſſe able to doe miſchief, becauſe, they are conſtrained to ſtand in fear of others; but the furious Multitude fearing no colours, are hurried on like a Torrent, and beare downe all the Bankes of oppoſition. So that (as Clapmarius ſaith) reckon up thoſe flagitious Enormities of Kingly Government together▪ Clapm. de Flag. as breach of Faith, violation of things Sacred, depriving men of their Poſſeſſions, Dom. cap. 19. with all the Acts of Injuſtice and cruelty, and they abound much more in a meer Popular State (or Levelling popularity) than any other. And therefore, (Omnium prope Judicio vapulat; eò quòd imbi li • o • tia pro libertate habeatur. Bodin concludes) ſince it is the high Road to Licentiouſneſſe and Tyranny, it is juſtly condemned by all wiſe men of the world. Bodin. 6. cap. 4.

Secondly, Petr. Gregor. 5. de Repub. cap. 3. Nor is is only a meer Tyranny in it Self; but ſo far deſtructive of a Free State (eſpecially a Free State newly erected) that it ſoon cauſes a change of it into the form of a regall Tyrannie; according to that Maxim of Politicians, Facilis eſt tranſitus à regimine Democratico ad Monarchicum, The paſſage is quick and eaſie from a meere Popularity to Monarchy; And that, becauſe of thoſe Diſcontents, Emulations, and Tumults, which ariſe continually among them, and whereby their Leaders ſo tire them out, that in a little time, theyComponi non poſſunt, niſi Imperio ad unum devoluso. willingly yeeld themſelves under the yoke of any one Perſon, who ſeems willing and able to deliver and eaſe them by a ſettlement. Thus Rome, that ſtately Miſtreſſe of the World,Clap. de Arc. who diſdained to ſtoop under Victorious Caeſar, Imp. l. 2. c. 14. falling afterward into Popular Diviſions, and Diſcords, more fierce than ever, ſoon grew weary, and willing to bow her neck underEam Republicam diſcordiis civilibus feſſam, nomine principis, ſub Imperiū accepit. Tacit. Auguſtus. Plutarch compares thoſe popular tumults to the pangs of a Woman in travell, calling them 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Reipub: the Pains of a Common-wealth, thatTumultus populares parturiu • Regnum. muſt needs bring forth into the world ſome great Kingdom or Tyranny. Now the Perſon inveſted after this manner, is uſually ſome one of their Leaders; Ann. 1. who by ſoothing and carrying them on upon high and glorious pretences of Liberty, gaines ſo much confidence and Power among them, that in the end he bereaves them of liberty to diſturb him, or themſelves any further. Thus, and by ſuch Arts as theſe, Julius Caeſar firſt erected the Imperiall Tyranny at Rome, as Piſiſtratus likewiſe made himſelf abſolute at Athens, and Dionyſius the Tyrant at Syracuſa; who pretending Themſelves great Patrons of Liberty, ſtirred the people up againſt the Senate and Counſellers of State, as Enemies to that Liberty, whereof they were ineed the onely Keepers. And it is not to their Leaders alone, that they expoſe the publique Liberty, but oftentimes to thoſe out of whoſe hands it was firſt recovered: Thus, Agathocles the Tyrant of Sicily, Periander, and ſeverall others, have by this means, after they had been expelled, regained a poſſeſſion: And therefore it cannot be improper here, to return the Language of our Levellers in their late Petition, home to themſelves; that ſince They, and divers others diſ-affected perſons▪ are ſo unwilling to imbrace the Common-wealth, in its preſent ſtate and true condition of Liberty, They are to be reckoned the only Cauſers of thoſe Taxes and other Inconveniences now lying upon us, whereas if they would unite (as they ought) our Burthens would be inconſiderable, becauſe the Royall and forein Confederates would have the leſſe Confidence to aſſail us, and force theſe Neceſſities upon us, were we once free from thoſe Diviſions, diſtractions, and diſ-ſatisfactions, which Presbyters and Levellers occaſion here among us.

Thirdly—It cannot but be ſad to conſider, what Tumults and Combuſtions muſt needs happen every year, by reaſon of thoſe prodigious multitudes, that are admitted to make choice of the Perſons to be intruſted in the Repreſentative: And though there be one Clauſe in the Agreement, which ſeems to provide againſt Riots at every chuſing of the Members, yet it is impoſſible to deviſe any meanes to prevent thoſe Inconveniences which will ariſe in a ſelf-opinionated Multitude upon ſuch an occaſion,S • inditur incertum ſtudia in cōtraria vulgus. wherein they all conceive themſelves to have an equall Intereſt and power, and touching which it can hardly be expected any Concluſion can be made, till from Arguments they proceed to Cuffs, and ſo in the end, the Club carry the Election.

Fourthly, It hath ever been the Cuſtom in theſe meer Popular Forms, Contzen. 1. polit. cap. 20. for the moſt part to make choice of the loweſt of the People, ſuch whoſe Perſons are held in Admiration by the reſt of their Fellowes, and like to ſatisfie them in all their phren'tick humours; a lively ſad example whereof we have in the popular State of Athens, where they choſe ſuch Perſons to participate of the ſupreme Authority, Greg. Toloſ. l. 4. de Repub. cap. 3. as would countenance them, and ſhare with them, in ſlaying or condemning the richer Sort, and then ſeizing upon their Poſſeſſions, plundring their Houſes, and many more ſuch fine effects of Levelling Liberty. Hence it is, they ſhift and change their Governers ſo often,Plebs Rectores meliores vocat eos, qui magis • i indulgeat. Idē. rejecting, at every new Election, ſuch as they have found averſe to their licentious waies, as Enemies of Liberty, under pretence of putting Better in their places; that is, ſuch as indulge them in theſe and the like Courſes.

Fifthly, by this meanes, unlearned, ignorant Perſons, neither of Learning nor Fortune, being put in Authority, the Common-wealth cannot remain ſafe either in peace or war; for, though covetouſneſſe and private neceſſity, they will exerciſe rapin and Injuſtice in time of Peace, and by reaſon of their Ignorance in the Affaries of Government, the State muſt needs run a hazard in time of War, or any other publique extremity. Here, let me call to mind a paſſage of the Romans, mentioned by Aquinas Aquin. de Regim. Princ. l. 4. cap. 15.; among whom it hapned, that two Perſons being choſen by the Conſuls, for the Government of Spaine, they were after the Election found fault with, the one being very Poore, the other accuſed of being Covetous: And when it had been long debated, which of Them ſhould be intruſted, at length Scipio, to end the controverſie, ſtood up, and concluded neither, becauſe Perſons ſo qualified muſt needs be corrupt in their Government, and ever ſucking the Body Politick, like Leeches, whereſoever they can lay hold: yet ſuch Perſons as theſe, poor, and unexpert in Affairs, if they are Buſie-bodies, and have a nimble Faculty of prating, are uſually adored by the Vulgar, as the onely Statesmen.

Sixthly, It is ordinary with the grand Demagogues, or Leaders of the People, to make Sale of Elections, and all Offices of Judicature, Honour and Authority: and upon theſe Terms they many times admit the better Sort into Places of power, and turn them out again at pleaſure: So that ( 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . as Plato and Plutarch ſay) meer Popularity is no Government, but is as it were a Market, wherein all Offices of Government are expoſed to ſale; and He ordinarily gains the beſt bargain of Authority, that hath the longeſt Purſe, and moſt powerfull Tongue, to perſwade theEx Favore, & pretio, populus diſtribuebat Magiſtratus. Clerks of the Market;Plato. whereby it is to be ſuppoſed on the other ſide, that the Purchaſers will ſee Themſelves no Loſers; it being a matter of Courſe, that ſuch as buy Authority ſhould ſell Juſtice.

Seventhly, Polyb. 6. hiſtor. à pr. paratu. 1. diſc. The Plea of our Levellers for yearly Repreſentatives, with this Caution, That no man ſhall be choſen a Member of two Repreſentatives together, and that in the Intervalls we may be governed by a Committee of their own Members, without a ſtanding Councell of State, is very irrationall. For, what underſtanding can a Succeſſion of mean and new elected Perſons have of the publique Affairs, ſo as to manage them with Skill and Advantage, in ſo ſhort a Time, ſeeing it is uſe and experience that fits a man for the carriage of Grand Concernments of State. We find in the Roman State (when it was moſt Popular) that the Multitude were never ſo mad as to caſt off, though they took upon them now and then to controll, the Senate, which was their ſtanding Councell; and without which no Common-wealth can continue of any long ſtanding: And thherefore it is that rather than ſuch a Councell of State ſhould be wanting,Summa-Rerū ſit penes paucos, qui antecellunt reliquos virtute & Sapientiâ. Ariſtotle adviſeth us to intruſt them with Affaires altogether, they having all thoſe Advantages of Obſervation, Cuſtom, and Experience which cannot be expected from a tumultuary Succeſſion, of raw and unexpert Statiſts. Polit. 1. As for example, we read, in what a flouriſhing condition the Common-wealth of Athens continued, as long as Affairs were ordered by that Famous Councell, Thucy • ides l. 2. pag. 63. the Areopagites; and no ſooner did the power come into the hands of the People, but afterwards all turned to confuſion. It were much to be wonder'd, that the State of Rome ſtood ſo long in a Popular Form, but that we know it was alſo underpropp'd by the Wiſdome and Authority of the Senate, and had many eminent Pillars to ſupport it; as Menenius Agrippa, Furius Camillus, Papirius Curſor, Fabius Maximus, Ca • o Cenſor, Marcus Scaurus, and Pompey, upon whoſe Vertues its ſubſiſtence depended, and not upon thoſe Tumultuary Sots, the Many. Thus likewiſe, the popular State of theBodinus 6. 〈◊〉 Repub. cap. 4 Thebans ſubſiſted a while, by the ſingular Wiſdome and Valour of Pelopidas and Epaminondas; who were no ſooner gone, but the Popularity ſunk of it ſelf, and came to nothing. How much ſafer then muſt it needs be for the People of this Nation, to leave the Succeſſion of Repreſentatives, and the Form of a Councell in the fu • ure, with the time and manner of their Conſtitution, and Rules for Election, to be ordered by the wiſdome and diſcretion of Parliament, than after the humour of ſome obſcure p • rſons, whoſe Knowledge and Intereſt in the Publique matters, is no whit comparable to theirs, and therefore not to be valued in competition with them, for the ordering of ſuch Affaires, as ſo highly concern the Good and Peace of the Publique.

Eighthly, this Pop • lar Form is the only enemy of true generoſity and vertue: For, how much the more excellent any man hath approved himſ • lfe, either in Conduct or Councell, ſo much the more he is ſuſpected, hated and calumniated, by the ungratefull multitude.Lez Repetundarum. In the popular ſtate of Rome They had Lex Repetundarum, a Law whereby the multitude were inabled to call all publique Magiſtrates and Officers to Accompt; a courſe ſeeming plauſible enough in it ſelfe: But hence proceeded thoſe Liberae Accuſationes, whereby the People having liberty to accuſe Magiſtrates,Libera accuſationes, & Calumniationes. proceeded to Calumniations, and continually vexed with falſe and unreaſonall Charges, even thoſe who had been moſt faithfull, and done very famous Services for the Common-wealth; juſt as our Levellers now exclaim againſt the Parliament, and would (if they might) rage againſt them about publique Accompts, as appeares by their old Agreement, and their late Petition; the conſequence whereof would be, that in the end they ſhould be Oſtraciſed, and receive an Oſtraciſmus uſed at Athens as Petaliſmus elſe-where; when the People baniſhed any eminent man, the Sentence was written either upon the Shell of a Fiſh, or an Olive leafe. OYSTERSHELL, or an OLLIVE-LEAF, in recompence of all their Labours.

Thus, the moſt famous Captain Alcibiades, having done many Services for the Athenian Populacy, was, only for a petty miſfortune (and no other Cauſe) in mannaging the Warre of Sicily, called h • me, and baniſhed both from his Command and Country. At length, being ſent for home again, he made them Victorious over their Enemies the Lacedemonians; yet notwithſtanding ſo great merits, he was, upon another Turn of popular Air for a misfortune in Aſia, A • . 3. polit. c. 13. ſent the ſecond time into baniſhment by thoſe Levellers.

So likew • ſe,Phil. Camera • . Cent. 2. oper. Succiſ. cap. 51. another famous Athenian Captain, Themiſtocles, received no other reward than Baniſhment, for all his meritorious Archievements. And Miltiades, who erected the Grecian Trophies in Perſia, and aſſerted the Liberties of Greece againſt all their Enemies, was uſed farre worſe, being kept a Priſoner all his life, and after his death, they not onely neglected to give him Buriall, but (to ſtretch their ingratitude yet further) condemned his Sonne Cimon to perpetuall Impriſonment. In like manner, they uſed Phocion, the moſt deſerving of all the Athenian Commanders, but with much more cruelty; for, they murther'd him with their own hands, and afterward denyed him Buriall: Whereupon, Bodinus relating the Story out of Plutarch, makes this obſervation; That when the Multitude begin to inſult againſt the moſt deſerving Men, they run beyond all Shame and Reaſon.

Nor was it thus only in Greece, but we finde the ſame humour alſo among the Roman Levellers whereof that illuſtrious Family of the Scipio's was a ſad Example. For, Scipio Major, he that for his Famous exploits againſt Carthage, was Sirnamed Africanus, having reſcued Rome from the Brink of Deſtruction, and freed her from the fear of that pernicious Rivall, was, at his return home, ſo afflicted and vexed with injurious Calumnies of the unthankfull Rabble, that for quitneſſe ſake he ſpent his dayes in a voluntary exile, and at his death, commanded ſuch an Ingrata patria n • oſſa quidem mea habes. Epitaph to be fixed upon his Monument, as might teſtifie to After-times the great ingratitude of his Peeple. They accuſed his Brother alſo, Sirnamed Aſiaticus, of defrauding the Common-wealth, and kept him a Priſoner. In the ſame manner, they calumniated likewiſe the moſt meritorious Scipio Naſica; ſo that to decline the popular Fury, he departed with the good will and conſent of the Senate, as employed by them upon an Embaſſy to Pergamus, from whence he never returned. By this it appears then, that all generous Spirits are concerued in reaſon, to abhor the Levelling way of Government.

Ninthly, Ubi Imperium plebis eſt, ibi Patricios ac nobiles, multis magniſque Injuriis, affici neceſſe eſt. Ariſt. 3. pol. cap. 7. Ariſtotle ſaith, where this Levelling popular Form is erected, there is a neceſſity that all perſons who are become eminent or potent, either by fortune, or vertue, ſhould receive many high and heinous injuries from the Vulgar. And Tacitus gives the reaſon why it was thus in the Roman State; Becauſe (ſaith he) the Common Rabble have a kind of inveterate hereditary hatred againſt the more noble, and worthy perſons, eſpecially ſuch as are Councellours of State;Inveratiſſimum fuit in Rep. Romana odium plebis adverſus Patricios. Tac. as appears by their frequent calumniating the Senators, puniſhing them ſometimes with Baniſhment, as they did Furius, and many others, and often with unreaſonable Fines, as they didLiv. li. 4. & 5. C. Sempronius, Q. Pomponius, and Virginius, &c. And all this, for the moſt part without any cauſe, but meerly to exerciſe their Spleen, which takes the ſame courſe of enmity likewiſe againſt all that are Wealthy, be they High or Low. For, it is reckoned Clapm. de Arcan. l. 2. c. 13 inter Arcana, a prime myſterie of Popular Government, to uſe all private tricks and waies of Milking and Gelding the Purſes of the Rich. Nor is that alone ſufficient, but they fly out ever and anon into violence, and from Plandering they proceed to • lat Levelling of Eſtates, as is evident by thoſe Licinian and Agrarian Lawes made by the Populacy of Rome, whereby it was provided, that no man ſhould grow too rich, nor be Maſter of above fifty Acres of Land. And touching this, there is an inſolent Paſſage recorded by Livy, how that when the Senate ſeemed unwilling to permit the Diviſion of certain Lands among the common ſort, the Tribunes, or Ringleaders of the People, asked the Senators, Auderen • ne poſtulare, ut cùm bina Jugera agri plebi dividerentur, iſis plus quàm quinquaginta jugera habere liceret? how they durſt poſſeſſe more than fifty Acres apeice, yet find fault with a diviſion made of two apeece to the People! And the ſame Author tells us, ſo many Quarrells and Tumults aroſe about diviſion of Lands, that the Senate knew not which way to prevent them, till they disburdened the Common-wealth, by ſending forth Colonies, and ſatisfying them with Lands, in the remote Parts of Italy, Liv. l. 10. and other Places.

Laſtly, from Levelling they proceed to introduce an abſolute Community. And though neither the Athenian nor Roman Levellers, ever arived to this high pitch of madneſſe; yet we ſee there is a new Faction ſtarted up out of ours, known by the name of Diggers; who, upon this ground, That God is our common-Father, the Earth our Common-Mother, and that the Originall of Propriety was mens pride and Covetouſneſſe, have framed a new plea for a Returne of all men ad Tuguria, that like the old Parthians, Scythian Nomades, and other wild Barbarians, we might renounce Towns and Cities, live at Rovers, and enjoy all in common.

Now for a concluſion, all theſe Conſiderations being put together, you may eaſily ſpell what Leveller is, what the meaning is of thoſe Zealous Pretenders to Liberty and Freedome, and what their Pretence may come to, it being the ready Road to all licentiouſneſſe, miſchief, mere Anarchy and Confuſion; which whoſoever followes, may ſtay long enough, ere he ſee the performance of thoſe glorious promiſes, ſet forth in their late Petition, wherein the People are made to believe fine things; but I leave them to judge, whether this be the way, [to ſit down ſecurely under their own Vines, under the glorious adminiſtration of Juſtice and Righteouſneſſe.] Odi profanum vulgus, & arceo. Horat.

CHAP. V. A diſcourſe of the excellency of a Free-State, above a Kingly Government.

HAving in the former Chapters Stated the Deſignes, and given an Accompt of thoſe grand Inconveniences, which of neceſſity will enſue a Succeſſe of the oppoſite Parties, this next diſcourſe muſt needs be very pertinent, by way of concluſion, to manifeſt the excellency of the preſent Government, which They all endeavour to deſtroy. And though there needed no other Argument to prove it, and recommend it to the world, than this; That it is the only Bank, which preſerves us from the Inundations ofIf this Government be deſtroyed, we muſt expect a Regall, or a Presbyterian, or a popular Tyrannie. Tyranny on the one ſide, and Confuſion on the other; yet it wants not (of it ſelfe) thoſe many Advantages, above all other Forms, which render it moſt convenient to promote the Peace, wealth, and honour of the Engliſh Nation.

Yet it is a wonder to ſee, how lightly men prize this invaluable Jewell of Liberty, which hath coſt the Common-wealth ſo much Blood and Treaſure, trampling the precious Pearl under their Feet, like Swine; ſo that the Parliament meet now with as many difficulties to preſerve, as ever they had to purchaſe it. But for this, there are two ſpeciall Reaſons, which may be collected out of theMach. de Rep. l. 1. c. 16, 17, & 18. Florentine's ſubtile diſcourſes upon Livy; who compares ſuch as have been educated under a Monarchy or Tyranny, to thoſe Beaſts which have been caged or coop't up alll their lives in a Den, where they ſeem to live in as much pleaſure, as other Beaſts that are abroad; and if they be let looſe, yet they will returne in againe, becauſe they know not how to value or uſe their Liberty: So ſtrong an Impreſſion is made likewiſe, by education and Cuſtome from the Cradle, even upon men that are endued with reaſonable Souls, that they chuſe to live in thoſe Places and Cuſtomes of government, under which they have been bred, rather than ſubmit to better, which might make more for their Content and Advantage. Hence it is, that thoſe poore Slaves under the Turk, Perſian, Tartar, Muſcovite, Ruſſian, French, and Spaniard, with other Eaſtern, Northern, and Weſtern Tyrants, are ſo enamoured of their Chains, that they admire their own condition above all others, and (like the Indians) adore the Devill which torments them, becauſe they are ignorant of a better Deity to protect Them.

But beſides education and cuſtom, under another Form, there is a ſecond Reaſon why men are ſo degenerous in Spirit, as to vaſſalize Themſelves, and neglect the maintenance of their Liberty; and that is, a generall Corruption and Depravation of manners, by luxurious Courſes, when a Nation is even ſwallowed up with Riot and Luxury; ſo that being Slaves to their owne Luſts, they become the more eaſily inſlaved unto the Luſts of another. The Truth of this may be obſerved in the variation of the Roman State; which in its primitive innocence, was ſo ſenſible of Liberty, that when Brutus and Colatinus had once expell'd the Tarquins, the People all moſt readily joyned with then as one man, in defence of their Freedom; Florus. yea, they were ſo zealous of it for a long time, that no Relations or Conſiderations whatſoever of former merits, could availe with them to ſpare thoſe that attempted ought againſt it: For, when the Sons of Brutus were found guilty of a conſpiracy, to bring back the Tarquinian Family, They condemned them to death, and their own Father was as forward as any, to bring them to Execution: So the famous Manlius likewiſe, to whom Rome owed both her ſelfe and Liberty, being by him preſerved againſt the Galls, in the greateſt extremity, was notwithſtanding, upon a diſcovery of his after-Intent to ſurprize their Liberty, thrown headlong down the Tarpeian Rock, within view of the Capitoll which he had ſo nobly defended. By which Actions you may perceive, that when Rome was in its pure eſtate, vertue begat a deſire of Liberty, and this deſire begat in them an extraordinary Courage and Reſolution to defend it; which three walked a long time hand in hand together, and were the Cauſes, that the firſt Foundders of their Freedome had ſo little difficulty, in maintaining themſelves, againſt thoſe Invaſions which hapned afterward, by the Tarquins and their Royall Confederates. But in proceſſe of Time, when the Romans had loſt that ancient vertue, which purchaſed their Liberty, and an Empire over the world; being ſoftned in their manners, and conquered by their vices whoſe Dominions they had conquered, they ſoon bowed under the yoke of Imperiall Tyranny; And though there appeared afterward ſome ſparks of ancient courage and love of liberty among Them, when They took off Caeſar himſelfe, Caligula, Nero, and in the end rid Themſelves quite of that Tyrannicall Stock of the Caeſars yet (I ſay) becauſe thoſe Sparks were kindled only in a few of the more noble Soules, and the generallity corrupt and degenerate from their old vertue, therefore ſuch heroick minds as endevoured, could by no means engage Them to aſſert their Liberty.

It is obſervable alſo in all times, the Northern and more manly People, that have no Acquaintance with luxurious Diets and Apparrell, nor care much to obtain Them, nor to taſte of thoſe melting Enchantments of more wanton Nations, are endued with a greater courage and Sence of Liberty; whereas thoſe People that inhabit the delicate parts of the world (as in Aſia, and other Countries, where civility hath degenerated into effeminacy) They ever have lived, and do (for the moſt part) continue in miſerable Slavery, at the will of imperious Tyrants: And if at any time there have happen'd worthy Reſolutions in vertuous Spirits, to recover their Freedom, They have (for the moſt part) failed in the Enterpriſe, by reaſon of the Corruption of their Party, which cauſeth men at length to decline the common Cauſe, through puſillanimity, Faction, Treachery, or Apoſtacie; being more ſuperſtitiouſly inclinable to adore the greatneſſe of a Tyrant, Mach. l. 1. c. 17 de Repub. than really affectionate to the worth of Liberty. For this Cauſe it was, that in elder time, the People of Naples, Milain and Florence, loſt their Freedoms, as ſoon as they had gotten it; and of late alſo the Neapolitans failed in their Attempt, being a ſoft effeminate people, eaſily bribed and courted out of their Deſigne, with Spaniſh Gold and Complement; whereas the Swiſſes, Hollanders, and divers other hardy People, ſtuck cloſe to their Leaders, and by their conſtancy, Induſtry, and Zeal of Liberty, accompliſhed the work.

By which parcell of diſcourſe we may collect, whence it is, that our preſent Governers meet with ſo many difficulties and oppoſitions from their owne Country men here in England, viz: by reaſon of our former education under a Monarchy, with the generall debaucheries of all ſorts of People, which render them Admirers of the Pomp of Tyranny, and Enemies to that Freedom which hath been ſo dearly purchaſed. They are Lovers of Vanity more than of Themſelves or their Country, humorous, and led with an admiration of old Cuſtoms to their owne hazard, rather than they will ſteer a new and reaſonable Courſe of farre more Convenience and Commodity; ſo that if the Common-wealth had not a Party of its owne throughout the Nation, men of valour and vertue, free from thoſe Corruptions of Exceſſe and Riot, and ſenſible of Liberty, it were then in reaſon to be expected, they could not long maintain their Station: But being ſupported by Counſellers, grave, ſerious, abſtemious, and vigilant, and by a Soldiery, whoſe valiant Commanders are ſevere and ſtrict in Diſcipline, both Morall and Military, when I conſider this, with the many other Advantages which their Enemies have not, their Foundation ſeems to me impregnable, and prompts me to this Omen; That being every way qualified likeEis fuit domi Induſtria, foris juſtum Imperiū, animus in conſulendo lib • r; ne que libidini, neque delicto obnoxius. Saluſtius; de Catone in ſuâ Concione ad Romanos Conſules. thoſe Roman Spirits of old, they will be Courted and confirm'd by the Roman Fortune.

For ſhame or feare then (if not for love) let men forbear an oppoſition, and conſider what an honor it is to be in the Liſt of that Party, which have ennobled Themſelves by their owne vertue and the love of Liberty; For, as Cato ſaith in Plutarch, even the greateſt Kings or Tyrants are much ihferior to thoſe that are eminent in Free-States and Common-weales; nor were thoſe mighty Monarchs of old worthy to be compared with Epaminondas, Pericles, Themistocles, Marcus Curius, Amilcar, Barca, &c. and other excellent Captains in Free-States, which purchaſed Themſelves a Fame in defence of their Liberties. And though now the very name of Liberty is grown odious or ridiculous among us, it having been a Stranger a long time in theſe parts; yet in ancient time, Nations were wont to reckon themſelves ſo much the more noble, if they were free from the yoke of Regall Tyranny; which was the cauſe why there were then ſo many Free-States in all parts of the world. In our Country here, before the time that Caeſar's Tyranny tooke place, there was no ſuch thing as Monarchy: Caeſar. Cōment. lib. 5. For, the ſame Caeſar tells us, how the Britains were divided into ſo many ſeverall States; relates how Caſſevellanus was, by the Common Councell of the Nation, elect in this their publique danger, to have the principall adminiſtration of the State, with the buſineſſe of Warre: and afterward how the ſeverall Cities ſent their Hoſtages unto him. Whereby we perceive it was of old no Monarchy, but like to the Gaules, with whom it was then one alſo in Religion, divided into provincall Regiments; Sam. Daniel. of the State of Britain. withont any entire rule or Combination; onely in caſe of common perill, by Invaſion, &c. they were wont to chuſe a Commander in Chief, much like the Dictator choſen by the Romans upon the like occaſion. And now we ſee all the Weſtern world (lately diſcovered) to be, and generally all other Countries are, in puris naturalibus, in their firſt and moſt innocent condition, ſetled in the ſame Form, before they come to be inſlaved, either by ſome predominant power from abroad, or ſome one among Themſelves more potent and ambitious than h • s Neighbors. And ſuch was the State heretofore, not on • ly of our Nation, but of Gaule, Spaine, Germany, and all the Weſt parts of Europe, before the Romans did by ſtrength and cunning unlock their Liberties. And ſuch as were then termed Kings, were but as their Generalls in War, without any other great Juriſ • iction.

If we reflect likewiſe upon the ancient State of Italy, we find no other Forms of Government but thoſe of Free-ſtates and Common-weals;Mach. lib. 2. Cap. 2. as the Tuſcans, Romans, Samnits, and many others; nor is there mention made of any Kings in Italy beſides thoſe of the Romans, and Porſenna. Concerning the ruine of whoſe Family, though Hiſtories are ſilent; yet we reade, that Tuſcany (whereof Porſenna was King) became afterwards a Free-State, and continued ſo Zealous of Liberty ever after, and ſuch haters of Monarchy; that they denyed the Veians their aſſiſtance againſt the Romans, for no other reaſon, but becauſe thoſe Veians had made choice of a King to protect them in their neceſſity; ſaying, that they ſcorn'd to joyne with thoſe men who had ſubjected themſelves to the Government of a ſingle Perſon.

Nor is it onely a mere gallantry of Spirit which invites men to the love of Freedome; but experience tells us it is the moſt commodious and profitable way of Government, conducing to the enlargement of a Nation every way in Wealth and Dominion. Incredibile eſt memoratu; quantùm adepta libertate, in bre • i Romana Civitas creverit. Saluſt. It is incredible to be told (ſaith Saluſt.) how exceedingly the Roman Common-wealth increaſed in a ſhort time, after they had obtained their Liberty. And Guicciardin affirmes, thatDeo ſummoperè placent; eò quòd in iis, magis quàm in alio g • n • re Rerumpublicarum, commune bonum conſervetur, Jus ſuum cuique aequaliter diſtribuatur, Civium animi vehementius ad virtutem, &c. Fr. Guicciard. lib. 10. Hiſt. Free States are moſt pleaſing to God; becauſe that in them more regard is had to the common good, more care for impartiall diſtribution of Juſtice to every man, and the minds of men are more inflamed with the love of Glory and Vertue, and become much more zealous in the love of Religion, than in any other Form of Government whatſoever. It is wonderfull to conſider how mightily the Athenians were augmented both in Wealth and Power, in the ſpace of one hundred years, after they had freed themſelves from the Tyranny of Piſiſtratus; but the Romans arrived to ſuch a height as was beyond all imagination▪ after the expulſion of their Kings. Nor doe theſe things happen without ſpeciall reaſon, foraſmuch as it is uſuall in Free States to be more tender of the Publique, in all their Decrees, than of Particulars, whereas the caſe is otherwiſe in a Monarchy; becauſe in this Forme the Princes pleaſure uſually weighs down all Conſiderations of the Common Good. And hence it is, that a Nation hath no ſooner loſt its Liberty, and ſtoopt under the yoke of an Ʋſurper, but it immediately loſeth its former Luſtre; the Body fills with ill humours, and may ſwell in Title, but cannot thrive either in Dominion or Riches, according to that proportion which it formerly enjoyed; becauſe all new Acquiſitions are appropriated as the Princes Peculiar, and in no wiſe conduce to the eaſe and benefit of the Publique.

—It is obſervable likewiſe in the courſe of Hereditary Monarchies; that though a Nation may have ſome reſpit and recruit now and then, by the Vertue and Valour of a Prince, yet this is very rare; and when it doth happen, it uſually laſts no longer than his life, becauſe his Succeſſor (for the moſt part) proves more Weake, or Vicious, than himſelf was vertuous. For, as Dantes the Italian Poet ſaith, Non ſicut in ramos ex imo Stipite ſuccus Influit, in liberos ſic orta parentibus ipſis Deſcendit virtus.— Vertue is not tranſmitted from Father to Sonne, as the Sap of a Tree is from the Root to the Branches. Vertue is loſt in the deſcent,Lib de Repub. 2. cap. 11. and comes not by Traduction: Therefore (Machiavel ſaith) Not he that placeth a vertuous Government in his owne Hands or Family, and Governs well during his naturall life, but he that eſtabliſheth a laſting Form for the Peoples conſtant Security, is moſt to be commended. It is recorded inTam obſtinatè Jus ſuum urſ • rum, ut Turcicae perfidiae ſe • ommittere malucrint, quàm Sceptris haereditariis cum potiri. Beſold. de Succeſſione regia, • ap. 5. Hiſtory, that the Hereditary courſe of Government was ſo odious to the Hungarians, that when Ferdinand the firſt, King of the Romans, laid claim to that Crown, as Heir in his Wives Right, They choſe rather to make a League with the Turk, than ſubject their State to the Inconveniences of an Hereditary Succeſſion. Regibus eſt aliis, potiundi jure paterno Certa fides, ſceptrum que patris novus accipit hares. Nos,Gunt. li. 1. quibus eſt melior libertas, jure vetuſto, Orba ſuo quoties vacat inclyta principe Sedes, Quodlibet arbitrium ſtatuendi Regis habemus.

The German Poet Gunther (who reduced much of Policy into Poetry) in theſe Verſes commends the faſhion of his own Country, that ſince they had accepted the Regall or Imperiall Form of Government, they were accuſtomed to truſt their own Judgments in making choice of their Emperour, rather than receive him blindly from the hand of Chance or Fortune: Nor doe I find any that think a Monarchy tolerable otherwiſe than upon Terms of Election, except it be Lipſius, and ſuch partiall Pen-men as Himſelf, who were held in penſion or relation by Hereditary Tyrants. For, beſides that common Reaſon diſſwades men from taking Governers at Adventure, without reſpect of wiſdome or vertue; ſo if we take a view of the miſerable events of it in all Hiſtories, it muſt needs deterre men from the love of ſuch a Succeſſion: And therefore the Argument uſually brought in defence of it, that it is the only way to prevent the Inconveniences of an Interregnum where the Heire is uncertaine, is of no validity; ſince it hath cauſed ten thouſand times more bloody Diſputes between Pretenders in point of Title, than ever happened in thoſe Inter-regnall Controverſies, whith have riſen betwixt Competitors by way of Election; witneſs the tedious fatall Bickerings which happened in France and other Nations among Princes of the Blood, and here in England, between the two Houſes of Yorke and Lancaſter. It is obſerved alſo, out of the antient Roman Hiſtory, that all thoſe Emperors which ruled by right of Inheritance, Mach. de Rcpub▪ cap. x. proved moſt of them no better than ſavage Beaſts, and all of Them wicked, except Titus; but ſuch as were advanced by Election approved Themſelves noble and vertuous, as you may ſee in thoſe five that ſucceeded Nerva to Marcus: And no ſooner did the Empire return again into a Courſe of Inheritance, but it ran to a loſſe, and at length to the ruine of its glory and greatneſſe.

But, to wave this digreſſion touching Hereditary and elective Monarchies, I affirm, that neither of Them are to be compared with a Free-ſtate, nor to be admitted, unleſſe it be the latter by way of Election; and then only in caſe of extreme neceſſity, as the Roman Common-wealth was wont now and then to create their temporary Dictators, Dictator was a King pro Tempore. into whoſe ſingle Hands they tranſmitted the whole Power of ordering Affairs, in time of urgent and imminent danger, to avoid the Inconvenience of delay which might be occaſioned through the variety of Opinions, and multiplicity of Counſels: Howſoever elective Kings are found fault with, becauſe They uſually practiſe ſuch Sleights, that in a ſhort time, the Government which They received for their own Lives, becomes entailed upon their Families.

It is to be conſidered alſo, That the Kingly are not much leſſe deſtructive, than the Levelling popular Tyrannies to gallant and worthy men. —Sors iſta Tyrannis Convenit;Claud. 6. Conſol. Honor. invideant claris, forteſque trucident. Nor is it the worſe ſort of Kings or Tyrants only, that hate brave and deſerving Perſons; but even the moſt moderate, and thoſe that ſeem to be the beſt▪ conditioned become jealous and diſtaſtfull, ſuppoſing the Fame and gallantry of their Subjects, detracts from their own eſtimation: And therefore They uſually conſult which way to diſhonor or deſtroy Them; by which means men are terrified from the Love of glory and vertue.Orat. id. Epiſt. Philippi. Demoſthenes tells us, Philip the Macedonian was ſo full of vain-glory, that he would arrogate the worthy Deeds of his Friends, and other men, to himſelf, and make them ſeeme to be his owne: And he ever hated thoſe Commanders and Governors which were victorious and ſucceſsfull, more than ſuch as were either careleſſe or unfortunate. His Son Alexander was of the ſame humour too: For, when Curtius. l. 6. ſuae exiſtimans quicquid ceſſiſſet alienae. Antipater had gained a victory, which he intended himſelf to have had the honor of, he could not forbear to utter his Indignation, reckoning himſelf injured by the merits of his Subject and Servant. And at another time, he cauſed Parmenio to be put to death, for no other cauſe, but becauſe he hated him, being ſuſpitious of his extraordinary merits. Thus the Emperour Veſpaſian likewiſe behaved himſelf toward the Generall Antonius, by whoſe means Rome was ſecured from him againſt Vitellius, and the Imperiall Diadem placed on his head, which was no ſooner done, but Veſpaſian, in ſtead of a Reward, caſheered him of his Command, and all other Imployment whatſoever; ſo that ſinking under the Burthen of his owne deſpaire, and the others Ingratitude, he lived not long after. In like manner, Alphonſus Albuquerquius, after he had brought moſt part of the Eaſt Indies under the obedience of his Maſter the King of Portugall, was ſent for home; and outed of his Command, died for meer grief and ſorrow. Nor did Conſaluus the great or Ferdinando Corteſe, fare any better for all their Services:Sepulveda. Comma ad Ariſt. polit. 3. c. 9. Conſaluus, after he had driven the French out of the Kingdom of Naples, and ſubdued it to Ferdinand of Arragon, was by him, at his coming to Naples put out of his Command, and carried into Spaine in little better condition than a Priſoner, where his heart broke for griefe immediately. How miſerable then is the condition of the moſt generous Spirits under Tyrannous Royalty, wherein Princes count themſelves diſ-obliged by the braveſt Actions of their Subjects! And Tacitus tells of one of the Caeſars upon the like occaſion,Deſirui per haec fortunam ſuam Caeſar, imparem que tan o merito rebatur. That he conceived it prejudiciall to his own honor and Fortune, and ſuppoſed himſelfe inſufficient to recompence extraordinary merits. For, good Turns ſeem then only acceptable to Princes, when they may be eaſily requited; Nam beneficia uſ que eò laeta ſunt, dam videntur poſſe exolui: otherwiſe, they return Hatred in ſtead of Thanks. Cominaeus alſo reports it from Lewis of France his own mouth; That he much more loved thoſe whom himſelfe had obliged by bounty and courteſie, than ſuch as had obliged him by their deſerts.

Yea,Ubi multùm ante 〈◊〉 , pro gratiá o • i • i redditur. Tacit. ſo dangerous a Thing is Vertue in Prince's Courts, that it is as much as a man's life is worth to be commended for it. And to this purpoſe we have a ſtory in Polybius lib. 6. how that one Apelles being Enemy to Aratus, Annal. 4. a Favorite of King Philip the Macedonian, took occaſion to extoll him moſt highly to the King, as a Perſon admired by all for his many rare and incomparable Vertues, knowing this was the way to bring him out of the King's Favor; which was (ſaith one) a new way of revenge, and it took effect to the deſtruction of Aratus: For, after a while, he became ſo much diſreliſhed, that the King gave him a Doſe in convenient Seaſon, which rid him away by a lingring Sickneſſe. And Aratus ſo well underſtood how the Caſe was with him, that when his Friend Cephalon came to viſit him in his Chamber, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and asked how it came to paſſe that he ſpit blood? O Cephalon (ſaid he) theſe are the rewards of Kingly Friendſhip and Acquaintance. Our own Hiſtories, and our Neighbours of France, might furniſh us with Inſtances enough of the ſame nature; but at home here look no further than Harry the 8th. and we find him ever and anon be-dabled with the Blood of the moſt deſerving Perſons,Plutarch. in Atato. as well as moſt of his Predeceſſors. What perſecution hath hapned ſince, is notorious to all of the meaneſt Reading and obſervation; ſo that ſeeing it appears there is as little Security for the braveſt Spirits, in a Regal, as in a popular Tyranny, certainly, all Perſons of generous Thoughts and Reſolutions are much more concerned to diſlike it, and apply Themſelves to the love of a Free-State; it being concluded by Ariſtotle the beſt of Governments, and is by experience known to be moſt conducing to the Advancement of a Nation every way in Honor, Profit, and Dominion; having ever produced many more excellent Heroes, than any other Form, upon the Stage of Action; as is evident in the Grecian, Roman, and modern Stories.

But one great Argument of exception (I perceive among ſome) againſt this Government is; becauſe men are permitted the Freedom of their Souls and Conſciences in the profeſſion of Religion. This they conceive inconſiſtent with the publique Peace; that no State can be of continuance with ſuch a Toleration; and that it is not agreeable to the Word of God. To the latter part of this Aſſertion, I anſwer, That prudent Toleration of opinions in matter of Religion could never be proved yet, by any of our Epiſcoparians and Presbyterians, in all their VVritings, to be repugnant to the VVord; being as farre to ſeek this way, as they are to convince us of the ſacred neceſſity of a Nationall Ʋniformity. Severall Inſtances there are to ſhew, how this Common-wealth hath puniſhed thoſe wild Pretenders, that profeſſe manifeſt Libertiniſm and Blaſphemy; many of whom at this day are in Cuſtody: And as long as theſe Ill Weeds are rooted out of the Garden of the Church, the wholeſome tender Plants will thrive in Beauty and Vertue, under their ſeverall meaſures, and diſpenſations.

And that variety of Opinions can be no way deſtructive of Publique Peace (as is pretended) is evident by the Cuſtoms of other Nations, both Heathen and Chriſtian. TheJoh. Leo. l. 8. Egyptians have now among them no leſſe than four ſeverall Sects, differing in Doctrine and Diſcipline, and all derived from the Superſtition of Mahomet. Yet their great Pontifes and Prieſts, live in amity together, void of hatred and ſtrife; and the common People alſo behave themſelves accordingly, without brauling or enmity. And it is uſuall for the more learned ſort of Them, to Diſpute with each other, and defend the Opinions of their Party, which they are allowed to do with all Liberty, ſo long as they flie not out into language againſt any of the four Doctors, who were the firſt Patrons of thoſe Opinions. Wherein if any chance to Offend, they are puniſhed by Fine and Impriſonment.

Lipſius tells us,Lipſ. l. adverſus Dialogiſt. that in the Iſle of Japan, there are no leſſe than nine Religions, every man being at liberty to profeſſe which he pleaſe: So that in the ſame Houſe you might ſee the Husband of one Religion, the Wife of another, the Son of a third; and yet no heart-burning nor difference among them, to the diſturbance of the Family. The Turk (we ſee) alſo allows an equal Liberty to Chriſtians and Jews, yet his Empire hath long continued firme and Peaceable, notwithſtanding the variety of Opinions tolerated among thoſe of his own Sect, and others. The caſe is the ſame likewiſe in ſeverall Chriſtian dominions; as Poland, Tranſylvania, Hungary, and even in the Proteſtant Dominions in Germany. Yet the experiment is brought nearer home to us by our neighbours the States of Holland, who by a prudent toleration of ſeverall Profeſſions, have eſtabliſhed themſelves in ſuch a meaſure of Peace, Plently, and Liberty, as is not to be equalled by any of the Nations round about them. And the Reaſons why thoſe Nations continue in Peace, notwithſtanding their difference in Religious Opinions, are confeſſed by the ſame Lipſius (a great Roman Catholick) to be theſe: Firſt, becauſe the Prince, and he that is the High Prieſt, among them, carry themſelves with the ſame Aſpect upon all, giving no Countenance to one more than another. Secondly, becauſe they ſeverely puniſh ſuch as offer to diſturb their Neighbours about any matter relating to Religion. Thirdly, becauſe they ſuffer not that Religion to be evill ſpoken of, which is publiquely profeſſed by the Prince or State: whereby it is implyed, that a Toleration of different opinions in Religion, can be no prejudice to the Peace of a Nation, ſo long as theſe Rules are obſerved; but rather a grand Preſervative of publique Quiet; whereas perſecutions for matter of Religion have ever been all the world over the great Incentives of Sedition. And ſince it is of unavoidable neceſſity, that (while the world ſtands) there will be diviſions of Opinion, certainly ſuch a courſe muſt needs be moſt rationall, which ſhall provide waies of remedy againſt ſuch Inconveniences as may follow them, rather than Inventions of Torture and Torment to thwart and ſtifle Them; becauſe the understandings of men can no more be compelled than their Wills, to approve what they like not. So that from hence it appears plainly, the great pretenders of Nationall Ʋniformity in Religion, thoſe high imperious Ʋniformity-mongers, that would have men take meaſure of all Opinions by their own, are the greateſt diſturbers of States and Kingdomes; and ſeem of the ſame ſtraine with the Tyrant Mezentius, who, if his Gueſts were too long for his Bed, cut them ſhorter, and if they hapned to be too ſhort, he had Engines of Torture to ſtretch them longer; being reſolved to fit them all to his own meaſure and humour.

Severall other Objections there are againſt this new Government, in the mouths of many People; but they are founded upon outward Sence, more than inward Reaſon; they raiſe Arguments from thoſe Things which are the effects of preſent neceſſity, and not of the nature of the Government it ſelf, whereas if men would unanimouſly joyn in an eſtabliſhment, no ſuch neceſſity would be: But as now, ſo alwaies all alterations of Government (though for the better) have been declaimed againſt by the more ignorant ſort of People, ſuppoſing thoſe Burthens will remain for ever, which Governors are conſtrained to lay upon Them for preſent ſubſiſtence and ſecurity: yet it hath been ever obſerved likewiſe, that the more willing and forward People have been to ſettle in Peace under a new Government, the ſooner they have been eaſed of all their Grievances and Preſſures; according to that ſaying ofCurt. apud Alex: lib. 8. Curtius, Obſequio mitigantur Imperia. And therefore in this caſe, Omnes intelligant, ſi ſalvi eſſe velint, neceſſitati eſſe parendum. Cicero adviſeth all men that would be ſafe, to ſubmit unto neceſſity.

Whence is it that Taxes continue, but from abſolute neceſſity? and this neceſſity is much augmented by the peeviſh humours of People;Cic. de offic. lib. 2. who remaining unſetled, give cauſe of Jealouſie to the State, and of hope to their Enemies; ſo that they are forced to keep up an Army for ſecurity. When things ſtand thus, Tac. Hiſt. 4. Diſſolutionem Imperii docent, ſi fructus ſuſtinetur, diminuantur. Tacitus affirms there can be neither Peace nor Security without Armies, nor Armies without Pay, nor Pay without Taxes. And therefore (ſaith he) they aim at a deſtruction of the Government, that would take away thoſe Profits whereby the Common-wealth is ſupported; From whence (by the way) may be collected, what the meaning of our Levellers is, in demanding a preſent Releaſe of all Taxes and Payments. And whereas great Complaint is made againſt the impriſoning men in unlawfull waies, and trying them by extraordinary Courts and Commiſſions of Justice, know that of Tacitus takes place ever upon extraordinary occaſions:Tac. Annal. • 4. Magna exempla ſemper habent aliquid ex iniquo, quod tamen adverſus ſingulos utilitate publicâ rependitur. Great examples are not tyed ſtrictly to the Rule; and though ſome particulars ſuffer by ſwerving from it; yet recompence is made in that Profit, which redounds to the good and ſafety of the Publique: For, it cannot in Reaſon be preſumed, that ſuch ordinary Proceedings as are uſed in times of Peace, can be ſufficient to ſecure a Common-wealth, during the neceſſities of Warre, at which time Inter Arme ſilent Leges. Laws uſe to be ſilent, and thoſe Courſes are judged moſt juſt and equitable, and have ever been allowed ſo by all States and States-men, which are dictated by common reaſon and prudence, for their neceſſary preſervation, To this accords that of Queen Dido in Virgil, Aeneid. 2. Res durae, & Regni novitas, me talia cogunt moliri.Seneca▪ — And that of Hercules in the Tragedian; Quod civibus tenere te invitis ſcias, Strictus tuetur Enſis.—

Therefore if men will not ſubmit and ſettle, but keep the State by their obſtinacy, under the neceſſities of warre, they muſt (if they plot or attempt any thing againſt them) expect ſuch proceedings and conſequences as attend the Sword when it is drawne: But would they cloſe cordially in affection, and be reſolved once to ſettle, in oppoſition to all Invaders, and Intruders, and let the Common-wealth have leave to take breath a little, in the poſſeſſion of a firme peace, then they would ſoon find the Rivulets of a Free-State, much more pleaſing than the troubled Ocean of Kingly Tyranny; begetting Fertility and verdure (as they run along) in all the Medowes, and reviving thoſe Paſtures which Royalty was wont to drown and ſwallow. Had they but once taſted the ſweets of Peace and Liberty both together, they would ſoon be of the opinion ofSee Axiom. polit. Rich. p. 152. Herodotus and Demoſthenes, that there is no difference between King and Tyrant, and become as zealous as the antient Romans were in defence of their Freedom. And though this diſcourſe may ſound like that concerning the Joyes of Heaven in the ears of ordinary people, as of Bleſſings afarre off; yet ſince it is in your power to haſten them, why ſtand ye off, and delay? ye may (if you pleaſe) by an unanimous obedience, quickly open the Fountains of future happineſſe, that Juſtice may run downe as a mighty ſtreame, in the Channell of the Lawes and righteouſneſſe and Peace imbrace each other.

Seneca in Here▪ Fur. Si aeterna ſemper Odia mortales gerant, Nec caeptus unquam cedat ex animis furor, Sed Arma faelix teneat, infaelix paret; Nihil relinquent bella. Tum vaſtis ager Squallebit Arvis, ſubdita tectis face Altus ſepultas obruet gentes cinis. Pacem reduci velle, Victori expedit, Victo neceſſe est.— FINIS.