1. AMbiguity of Words being one great occasion of Con­fusion of Thoughts; whoever will Discourse clearly and distinctly of any Subject, must in the first place fix and settle the signification of his Terms, in case they are Ambiguous; that is, if one and the same Term be applyed to different Ideas. In this case, Definition of the Name is to go before the Definition of the Thing; between which two I conceive the difference to be this, That in a No­minal Definition the word is only determin'd to such a certain Idea, whereas in a Real one, the Idea it self is opened and explained by some other Ideas that are supposed to be contain'd and involv'd in it. Upon which account it is that Nominal Definitions are Arbitrary, and there­fore incontestable, and therefore may [Page 19] be used as Principles in Discourse, as they are in Geometry; whereas Real Definitions are not Arbitrary, but must be conform'd to the Nature of things, and so are not to be taken for Principles, whose Truth is to be supposed, but for disputable Proposi­tions, whose Truth is to be proved.

2. Reason therefore being an am­biguous word, and of various accep­tation, before I proceed to give an account of the Nature of the thing it will be necessary that I define the Name; which will also be the bet­ter defined, if it be first distinguisht. Now all Distinction being a sort of Division, in which, according to the Rules of Logick, the Distribution ought to be into the most general, and most immediate Members, I shall accordingly distinguish of the several meanings of this word, Rea­son, by the same measure as I would divide any whole into its parts.

3. I consider therefore that the most general distribution of Reason is into that of the Object and that of the Subject; or, to word it more Intelligibly, though perhaps not al­together so Scholastically, into that [Page 20] of the Thing, and that of the Un­derstanding. Reason objective, or of the Thing, is again very various: Sometimes it is taken for Truth, and that both for Truth of the Thing, namely the Essential relations that are between Ideas, and for Truth of the Proposition which is its confor­mity to those Ideal Relations. Thus it is taken the first way for the Ideal Relations themselves, when we in­quire whether the Reasons of Good and Evil are ab Eterno, meaning by Reasons the Essential Relations or Differences. Thus again it is taken the second way, for the agreement or conformity of a Proposition with those Essential Relations; as when we say, This is Sense and Reason; meaning that the Proposition is true, and conformable to the Nature of things. Sometimes again it is taken for the Medium, Argument, or Prin­ciple whereby as Truth is proved; as when we say, Do you prove this by Reason or by Authority? Sometimes again for the Rules and Measures of Reasoning; as suppose I should say, That Reason is the [...]ittest Study for a Rational Creature, I should be sup­posed [Page 21] to mean those Rules and Mea­sures whereby we ought to reason, and so to intend a commendation of Logick. Sometimes again it is taken for Moderation; as when we say, There is Reason in all things. Some­times for Right, Equity or Justice; the observation of which is com­monly call'd. Doing a Man Reason. It is also taken for the End or Mo­tive of an Action; as when we say, For what Reason do you this or that; in which sense it is used by the Poet; ‘—stat pro Ratione voluntas.’

4. Come we now to the Conside­ration of Reason, as 'tis taken sub­jectively, the other general part of its distinction, in which also there is some variety of Acceptation. For it is sometimes taken for the Act, sometimes for the Habit, and some­times for the Natural Power or Fa­culty of Reasoning. For the Act; as when we say of a Man asleep, that he is deprived of his Reason. For the Habit; as when we say of a Man, that he has lost his Reason, when his Intellectuals are mightily [Page 22] disorder'd and impair'd by a Disease. For the Natural Power or Faculty of Reasoning; as when we say▪ That Man is a Creature indued with Reason. Which being a Proposition of Universal Truth, and that pro­ceeds of Man as Man, must neces­sarily be verified of every Man, and consequently must not be meant of the Act or Habit of Reason, (for these are not at all times in every Man) but of the Natural Power or Faculty of it, which is not lyable to be suspended as the Act, nor lost as the Habit, but is Essential to the Na­ture of Man, that which constitutes him what he is, and distinguishes him from other Creatures, and con­sequently is inseparable from him, whether asleep or awake, whether sick or well.

5. Reason thus consider'd as it stands for a Power or Faculty in Hu­man Nature, may be taken again ei­ther largely or strictly. Largely, for the Power of Thinking or Percep­tion in general, whereby a Man is capable of knowing or understand­ing any Truth, let it be by what means, or in what order or method [Page 23] soever. Strictly, for the same Power proceeding after a certain special manner, and according to a peculiar order and method, namely, from the knowledge of one thing to that of another, or to the knowledge of what is, as yet, obscure and unknown, by the knowledge of what is more clear and better known; concerning which a fuller account by and by.

6. After having thus distinguisht, with what exactness of order I could, the several Acceptations of the word Reason, I shall in the next place define in which of these Senses I now use it. By Reason then in this place, I intend not Reason of the Object, but that of the Subject; and that not as to the Act or Habit, but as to the Natural Power or Faculty of Reasoning. And that again not as it is taken strictly, as it uses a cer­tain particular process in its opera­tion, but as it is taken more at large for the power of perceiving or know­ing in general. According to which Sense Reason is here the same with Vnderstanding. And so it is often used; as when we say, The Reason of a Man teaches him this or that; [Page 24] meaning his Understanding at large, or the general Power whereby he understands. For if Science, which strictly taken is that particular kind of Knowledge which is acquired by Demonstration, be yet often used more largely for Knowledge in gene­ral, why may not Reason, the great Principle and Faculty of Science, which strictly taken signifies a Power of Knowing by such a certain way and in such a certain manner of pro­ceeding, be taken as well in a greater latitude, for the Power of Knowing or Understanding in general?

7. And the Nature of the Subject and Question now under Considera­tion requires that it should be thus used here. For when 'tis inquired whether there be any thing in Reli­gion above Reason, the meaning cer­tainly can be no other than whether there be any thing which surpasses the Power and Capacity of a Mans Understanding to comprehend or ac­count for? And he that says there is nothing in Religion above Reason, is supposed to mean, that there is nothing in it beyond the comprehen­sion of a Mans Natural Understand­ing, [Page 25] nothing but what he can pro­found and fathom. And so also he that says, that there are Mysteries in Christianity, or things above our Reason, must be presumed to mean, that there are Reveal'd Truths that so far exceed the measure of our In­tellectual Faculties and are of a size so disproportionate to our Minds, that with all the force and penetration of Spirit, and the utmost application of Thought, we cannot possibly com­prehend them, be our method of proceeding what it will. I do not intend by this to state the Question (which shall be done more fully in its due place) but only to give an ac­count of one of its Terms, and to shew that by Reason I both do and should here mean, A Mans Natural Power of Knowing or Understand­ing in general. In which use of the word, 'tis no [...] Authority to me that the Excellent and most Accurate Author of L' Art de Penser, defines Log [...]ck to be an Art of well conduct­ing ones Reason in the knowledge of things: Where by Reason 'tis plain he must mean the same as Vnder­standing,

[Page 26]8. What this Power or Principle of Understanding is in its self, or in its own Nature and Essence, I do not pretend to know, as not having any clear Idea of my own Soul, and in­deed as not knowing my self at all by Idea, but only by a confuse Sen­timent of internal Consciousness. And therefore I shall not go about to examine what it is. For the same reason also I shall not set my self to consider whether the Understanding be any Power or Faculty really di­stinct from the Soul, or only the Soul it self acting after a certain manner, this being almost as obscure as the other; and I care not to employ ei­ther my own Thoughts, or my Rea­ders, upon things whereof I have not any clear Conception. All that I shall therefore further treat of con­cerning the Understanding (for so I now call our Reason) shall be with respect to its Operations, by which the Nature of it is best known, and whereof we are not only Conscious by way of Sentiment, but have also, or at least by self-reflexion may have, some Notion and Conception by way of Idea.

[Page 27]9. Now these are ordinarily sup­posed to be three, Apprehension, Iudg­ment and Discourse: By Apprehension, meaning the simple view or percep­tion of a thing; by Iudgment, the joining or separating of Ideas by Af­firmation or Negation; by Discourse, the collecting of one thing from ano­ther. And upon this threefold ground our Systems of Logick have for a great while proceeded with great Agreement. But as Authentick as Time and Consent have made this Division, I cannot think it right, when I compare it with what by self-reflexion I find to pass within my own Mind. For supposing it were true as to the matter of it; that is, I mean, that Judgment and Dis­course did really belong to the Un­derstanding (which yet the Philoso­phers of the Carcesian way will by no means allow) yet the Form of it must needs be very unartificial and inaccurate. For Truth being the general Object of the Understanding, and there being nothing in Truth but Ideas and the Relation that is between them, 'tis impossible there should be any more operations of the [Page 28] Understanding than Perception and Iudgment; Perception as to the Ideas themselves, and Judgment as to their Relation. Which Judgment 'tis true may be either Immediate or Medi­ate; Immediate when the Relations of Ideas are judg'd of by the very Ideas themselves, or Mediate when they are judg'd of by the help and means of some other Idea, but then all this is but Judgment still, though in two different ways, the difference between them being the same as be­tween judging of a thing under the Formality of a Proposition, and judging of the same thing under the Formality of a Conclusion. These indeed are different ways of judging, but still they are both but Judgments, and one as much as the other. So that in reality that which these Men call Discourse is but a species of Iudg­ment; and if for that reason they will consider it as distinct from Judg­ment and make it a third Operation, they might as well have put in the other species too (Judgment imme­diate) and so made a fourth. But then this is against the great Funda­mental Law of Division which re­quires [Page 29] that one of the Members ought not to be so included in the other, as that the other may be af­firm'd of it. Which is plainly the Case here, this being such a kind of Division, as if one should divide a Living Creature into a Plant, an Animal and a Man, and that because Discourse is as much a Species of Judgment as Man is of Animal. And herein (though the matter be so clear that I need it not) yet I happen to have the Authority of a conside­rable PhilosopherPhiloso. contract. p. 242. on my side, Mon­sieur Derodon, who in these few words expresses his Sense full and home to this purpose; The third Operation of the Mind, says he, is commonly call'd Discourse, but is pro­perly the Iudgment of the Consequent, as inferr'd from the Iudgment of the Antecedent.

10. By this it is evident, that supposing the matter of this Divi­sion never so true, that is, that Judg­ment and Discourse do appertain to the Understanding, yet the Form of it is wrong; Discourse, which is here made a third member of the Division, being contain'd under Judg­ment, [Page 30] which is the second, as the Species of it. But neither is the matter of it true. For Judgment and Discourse, or to speak more ac­curately, Iudgment, whether imme­diate or mediate, does indeed not belong to the Understanding, but (as will by and by appear) to the Will. There is but one general Ope­ration that belongs to the Under­standing, and that is Perception. For as I said before, Truth being the general Object of the Understand­ing, and there being nothing in Truth but Ideas and their Relations, all that the Understanding can here have to do will be only to perceive these Ideas, and the several Relations that are between them. For when this is done, then is a thing sufficiently understood, to understand a thing being no more than to perceive its Ideas, and how they stand related to one another. Here is the whole compass and full extent of the Un­derstanding, and all that we can pos­sibly conceive by it; and he that perceives Ideas and their Relations understands as much of them as is to be understood. Whereby it is [Page 31] evident, that Perception is the only operation of the Understanding, and that it can have no other. 'Tis true indeed there is variety in this Per­ception, it being either Simple or Complex; Simple of the Ideas them­selves, and Complex of their Rela­tions; which latter again is either Immediate or Mediate, (as was said before of Iudgment) but still 'tis all but Perception, though differently modified; which therefore I con­clude to be the only Operation that properly belongs to the Understand­ing.

11. But now if all that of right belongs to the Understanding be Per­ception, then 'tis most certain that Judgment cannot belong to the Un­derstanding, and that because Judg­ment is not Perception. For we are said to judge as we perceive, and some are so much in haste that they will judge before they perceive, which plainly shews them to be two dif­ferent things. And that they are so this one Argument well considered is a Demonstration, that Judgment is a Fallible thing, that may be true or false as it happens; whereas Per­ception [Page 32] is always true, it being a Contradiction that it should be other­wise: For what a Man does not truly perceive he does not perceive at all. I conclude therefore that Judgment is not Perception; and since Perception is (as has been shewn) the only opera [...]ion of the Understanding, I conclude again that Judgment does not belong to the Understanding. It must therefore belong to the Will, which is the proper seat both of Judgment and of Errour too. And it is nothing else but the Will's consenting to and acquiescing in the Representations that are made by the Understanding. Which agrees well with those weigh­ty and very fruitful Maxims, ‘That the Will is the Subject and Prin­ciple of all Errour as well as Sin (which indeed ought to be volun­tary to make it culpable). That 'tis in our Power to avoid Errour by suspending our Judgment till the Evidence be clear, though 'tis not in our Power to avoid Igno­rance or Non-Perception of many things by reason of the limitedness of our Faculties. That the fault [Page 33] of those that err is, that their Wills run before their Under­standings, that they judge and pronounce before they perceive, or of things whereof they have really no Perception, which in­deed is a great fault, and the cause of all our disorders. That we are accountable for our Judgments as well as for any of our other Acti­ons. And lastly, That God is not the Cause of any of our Errours, which with respect to him are on­ly Negations, occasioned only by his not having given us larger Ca­pacities; but with respect to our selves are Privations, proceeding from the ill use we make of those Natural Capacities he has indued us with.’ All which great and mo­mentous Truths are grounded upon the very Principle now laid down, (which by this may appear to be something more than a Curiosity) That Judgment however commonly ascribed to the Understanding, does yet really belong to the Will, and not to the Understanding, whose operations are all terminated within the limits of Perception. So well do [Page 34] these things cohere together, and so aptly does one Truth hang and de­pend upon another.

12. But as right as I think this Account of the matter to be, yet considering what an innovation it is from the Scholastic Measures, and how like a Paradox it looks, I think a little Countenance from Authority may do well to counterpoise the Pre­judice of Singularity. And because this is a greater Innovation than the precedent one, I shall back it with an Authority proportionably greater than what was used upon the other occasion.Recher­che de la Veritè. Liv. 1. p. 10. It may be well concluded from what has been said (says a Mo­dern Writer, and whom I think I may venture to call a Philosopher) that the Vnderstanding never judges, since it only perceives, or since Iudg­ments and even Reasonings, with re­spect to the Vnderstanding, are only pure Perceptions. That 'tis the Will alone which truly judges in acquiescing in that which the Vnderstanding repre­sents to it, and in voluntarily reposing it self therein. And that also 'tis that alone which leads us into Errour. Again; I say then that there is no [Page 35] other difference on the part of the Vn­derstanding between a simple Perception, Iudgment and Discourse, but that the Vnderstanding perceives a simple thing without any relation to any thing what­soever, by a simple Perception. That it perceives the Relations between two or more things in Iudgment. And that in fine, it perceives the Relations that are between the Relations of things in Discourse. So that all the Opera­tions of the Vnderstanding are no other than pure Perceptions. All which he further explains and con­firms by an Illustration taken from Numbers, with some other very considerable Reflections upon it; which for brevity's sake I leave the curious Reader to consult in order to his better satisfaction.

13. To this Account of this most excellent Person I fully agree as to the substance and matter of it, only would by his leave make some little Alteration in the Form of it; con­cerning which he had no occasion to be sollicitous, as not designing a for­mal and exact division of the Ope­rations of the Understanding; but only to shew that they were all no [Page 36] other than pure Perceptions. And so far his representation of the Mat­ter is right, and so, I suppose, will the Form of it be too if it run thus. The only operation of the Under­standing is Perception: Which Per­ception is either Simple or Complex. Simple of the Ideas themselves, and Complex of their Relations. Which Complex Perception is again two­fold, Immediate or Mediate. Im­mediate when the Relations of Ideas are perceiv'd by the perception and collation of the very Ideas them­selves whose Relations they are; Mediate when those Relations are perceiv'd by the help or mediation of some third Idea, made use of as a common measure of comparing those Ideas which could not be so collated together as to have their Relations perceiv'd by themselves. And in this, I think, we have a right Account of the Operations of the Understanding, both as to Matter and Form; the knowledge of which, considering how much Spirit is a­bove Body, though it were only a piece of Speculation and Curiosity, I should think of greater worth and [Page 37] consideration than that of the Pro­perties of Lines and Figures, or any of the Phenomena's of Nature.

14. This Complex Perception, or the Perception of the Relations that are between Ideas, I take to be the same with what we commonly call Knowledge: Which is usually defi­ned by an evident Assent, but I think not rightly. For an evident Assent is the same as an Assent upon Evi­dence; that is, an Assent to an evi­dent thing, or to a thing whereof we have an evident Perception. But now Perception and Assent are two things, (the former being the ground of the latter) and 'tis in the Percep­tion, not in the Assent, that Know­ledge properly consists. For Know­ledge is most certainly an Act of the Understanding; and it was shewn before, that the only Operation of that is Perception. As for Assent, that will be found to belong to ano­ther Principle. For Assent is no o­ther than an Affirmative Iudgment; (for then a Man is said to assent to a thing when he judges it to be so or so, and then to dissent when he judges it not to be so); and Judg­ment, [Page 38] as was shewn before, belongs to the Will. Nor is it any thing to the contrary that we necessarily as­sent to whatsoever we clearly per­ceive. This neither proves Assent and Perception to be one and the same, nor that Assent does not be­long to the Will, but only that the Will necessarily follows, and cannot possibly resist the clear Light of the Understanding; which is a great Truth, but no Objection. Assent therefore is always voluntary, tho' not always free; and whether vo­luntary or free is a plain Act of the Will imbracing and acquiescing in what is represented to it by the Un­derstanding. And therefore though we do always assent to what we evidently perceive, yet Knowledge does not consist in the Assent, but in the Perception, which is the ground of that Assent.

15. For, to push the matter a little further, though Assent neces­sarily follows upon clear Perception, and cannot be separated from it, yet sure we may use Abstraction here, and consider Perception without con­sidering Assent, the Idea of the one [Page 39] not including the Idea of the other. But now I would fain know whe­ther he that clearly perceives the Relations of things one to another, may not be truly said to understand or know those things? Or whether there be any thing further requisite to the understanding or knowledge of a thing after a full and clear per­ception of it? If not, (as I think no Man that considers what he speaks will say that there is) then Know­ledge is supposed to be in its com­pleat and perfect act of being by Perception alone, and that before any Assent be given; which Assent therefore cannot go to the making up of its Nature, since it was sup­posed to be compleat without it. To which I add, That let our Assent be join'd with never so much Evidence, still we are said to assent because we know, and to what we know. So that our Knowledge is here presup­posed to our Assent, and consequent­ly is in order of Nature at least be­fore it, and therefore cannot consist in it. I conclude therefore that Knowledge is not evident Assent, but Perception, particularly that Per­ception [Page 40] which I call Complex, the perception of the Relations that are between Ideas, whether as to Agree­ment or Disagreement. Which, I think, till we can meet with a bet­ter, may serve for a tolerable Defini­tion of Knowledge.

16. But now whereas this Com­plex Perception (as was noted above) is either Immediate or Mediate; hence it is that our Knowledge also admits of the same division, being either Immediate or Mediate, or if you please, Intuitive or Demonstra­tive. Between which two the dif­ference usually made is, that in In­tuitive Knowledge we have an in­tire and simultaneous view of things, and see all at once; whereas in De­monstrative Knowledge our pros­pect opens by degrees and we pro­ceed step by step, advancing from the knowledge of one thing to that of another. This account indeed is true, but not explicit enough to make it clear: For 'tis Characteri­sing from the effect only, and does not explain how our view in Intui­tive Knowledge comes to be so in­tire, and in Demonstrative so gra­dual [Page 41] and progressive. This there­fore must be deduced higher, and explained by a more distinct Princi­ple. And I think we shall distin­guish them more clearly and exactly by saying, That Intuitive Know­ledge is when we perceive the agree­ment or disagreement of one Idea with another immediately and by themselves, without the mediation or intervention of any other Idea. Demonstrative, when this agreement or disagreement is perceiv'd not im­mediately, by comparing the Ideas with themselves, but mediately, by comparing them with a third; that is, when we perceive them to agree or disagree with themselves, as we find them to do so with some third Idea, which we are oftentimes for­ced to make use of as a common measure, because we cannot always, by reason of the narrowness of our Faculties, so collate and confront our other Ideas together, as to see whe­ther they agree or no by their mere comparison.

17. This Demonstrative Know­ledge is what in the Schools is call'd Science, concerning which great stir [Page 42] is made, and variety of Definitions given, but which by the measures already laid down, appears to be no­thing else but a Mediate Perception, or the perception of the Relations of Ideas by the mediation of some other Idea. This other Idea is what we usually call a Medium or Proof, because it is the common measure whereby our Ideas are compared, and the Relations between them per­ceiv'd. And 'tis the form and pro­cess of the Understanding using this middle Idea as a measure whereby to perceive the agreement or disa­greement of the others, according as they agree or disagree with this, that I would call Reasoning, which is not the very same with Science, but the way and method to it. For we are said to reason in order to know, and Science is the effect of Demonstration, according to that known saying in Logic, Demonstra­tio est Syllogismus scientiam pariens.

18. If this Account of Reasoning be not clear enough to make it in­telligible in it self, or to distinguish it from Science, I would further ex­plain it thus, by saying that Reason­ing [Page 43] (as I here consider it with respect to the Understanding) is nothing else but the successive Perception of each of the extream Ideas with the middle one, in order to perceive the union that is between them by the union that they have with the mid­dle Idea. As for Example: I am to perceive that Space is Body; and not being able to perceive this by the immediate inspection of these two Ideas, I call in a third to my assistance, and proceed to the per­ception of it thus: Whatever is ex­tended is Body; Space is extended, therefore Space is Body. Here 'tis plain that I perceive the union of the two extream Ideas Space and Body, by the successive Perception of the union that each of them have with the middle Idea, extended. Now the very Perception it self of the union of the two extream Ideas, Space and Body, by the mediation of the third and middle one, is what I would call Science: For 'tis in the Formality of this Mediate Percep­tion that I am said to know that Space is Body. But the successive Perception that I have of the union [Page 44] of each of these two extream Ideas with the middle Idea in order to per­ceive the union they have among themselves, is what I would call Reasoning. Which certainly cannot be the very Perception of the con­clusion it self (for that would con­found it with Science) and [...]et must be Perception too, (or else it would not belong to the Understanding) and therefore can be no other than this successive Perception that I speak of. Whereby it may appear that the Reasoning here specified is not only distinct from Science, but also from that Reasoning which consists in illative Affirmations and Nega­tions, and so is a Species of Judg­ment, and accordingly belongs to the Will, not to the Understanding; as was both remark'd and accounted for before.

19. Those things which are known or perceiv'd by Intuitive Knowledge we call Principles, and those things which are perceiv'd by Demonstra­tive Knowledge we call Conclusions: Which though equally certain (be­cause the Objects of Knowledge) are yet not so clear as Principles, [Page 45] which serve indeed to the demon­stration of other things, but need none themselves, as being visible by their own Light, and sometimes are so evident that they are not so much as capable of any, but are strictly indemonstrable, there being nothing more clear than themselves whereby they may receive further Evidence. We say of such Propositions, That they are as clear as the Light; and there is more aptness in the compa­rison than all that use it, I believe, are aware of. For Light is seen im­mediately and by it self, and not by the mediation of any thing else; whereas all other things are seen by Light. The Light that is thus seen by it self answers to Principles, and those other things which are seen by Light answer to Conclusions. And the resemblance holds as well on the part of the Act as of the Object: For the first of these ways of seeing answers to Intuition, and the last to Demonstration. So surprising is the agreement between Vision and Knowledge, and so strange and won­derful the proportion in this as well as in some other things between the [Page 46] Sensible and the Intellectual World.

20. Intuition is by far the most perfect and excellent way of Know­ledge, as being more clear, more simple, and more intire. More clear, for here we have all Light without any mixture of Darkness, whereas in the other there is one dark side. More simple, for here the Mind per­ceives the Truth by one single View, whereas in the other it is fain to mul­tiply its Perception. More intire, for here again we have the prospect lying altogether before us in its full and whole extent, whereas in the other it opens gradually and succes­sively, the Light stealing in upon us more and more as we go further and further, as it does upon. Men that travel toward the East. To which may be further added, that Intuitive Knowledge supposes and proceeds from perfection of the Understand­ing, whose Perceptive Faculty is hereby argued to be very bright and clear. For it must be a very clear Perception to perceive the Relations of Ideas by the very Ideas them­selves. Whereas Demonstrative Knowledge, and the necesslty of [Page 47] Reasoning in order to it, is founded upon the narrowness of our Intelle­ctual Capacities, which not being able to perceive the Truth or Fals­hood of a Proposition by the single collation of the two Ideas that com­pose it, are fain to make use of a third as a common measure between them; and so from the consideration of something more clear and better known, to proceed in the search of what is more obscure and less known. Accordingly we attribute the way of Intuition to the most Perfect Be­ings, God and Angels. Though as to Angels, I make no great doubt but that in the Consideration of ve­ry compounded Questions, and such as include a multiplicity of Relations they are fain to use Reasoning as well as we (as in the more simple ones we use Intuition as well as they) though perhaps after a much more perfect manner, and by such com­pendious and facilitating Rules as we know nothing of. And as they may be supposed when they do reason, to reason better and more expeditely than we, so with equal probability it may be presumed, considering the [Page 48] great disproportion of Natures and States between us, that they use In­tuition in very many things wherein we are forc'd to have recourse to Reasoning.

21. Hereafter indeed when, as the Scripture tells us, all that is imper­fect about us shall be done away, and we shall be [...], not only like but equal to the Angels, we shall be able to see ('tis to be hoped) by Intuition too; and that many things which we here not only were ignorant of, but thought impossible; things that were not only above our Reason, but, as we thought, con­trary to it. We shall not only be able to reason better than we do now, but shall in most things not stand in need of any Reasoning at all, but shall with one simple View glance over and through the Rela­tions of Ideas, and so have an intire prospect of the fair Field of Truth. But at present we must travel it over, and that with many a weary step, there being but very few things that we know by Intuition, no more than just to give us a taste of the great Priviledge of Heaven; and to incou­rage [Page 49] both our Desires and our Hopes of that perfect State, when we shall be so far from needing any Logic to direct us in our reasoning, that we shall have (in comparison) but little need or use even of Reason it self. But in this present state of our Non­age and Infirmity our Necessity of it is very great. For our Intuition is so short-sighted, and reaches so very little a way, that, as, if we knew no more than what we can by this Means attain to, the Compass of our Knowledge would be so very Scanty that we should not have near light enough to direct us in our journey through the World. So if we would Know more, and see to a further di­stance from us, we must assist our Feeble Eye by the Advantage of a Glass. Now Reason is this Glass, Naturally indeed a very good Prospe­ctive, but which Logic, and especi­ally Algebra, has improved into a Telescope. But yet still 'tis but an Artificial way of seeing, and all Art supposes and argues a Defect in Na­ture. And though it be a great help, yet we know 'tis no very great Com­mendation [Page 50] to a man's eye-sight to see with Spectacles.

22. And why then are we Proud? And why proud of that which should rather deject us, and make us Humble, of our Imperfections and our Defects? Our Natural Reason is a Mark of our Limitation as Creatures, and our Artificial one of our Infirmity as Men, and both together give us but little Light, and help us to see but a very little way off, and that after the most imperfect and defective Man­ner, such as upbraids our Ignorance at the very same time that it increases our Knowledge, our Reason not so much inlightning, as betraying the Darkness of our Understandings. Some few things indeed we know as Angels do, by Intuition (or else we could not so much as reason like Men) but still the main Fund of our Knowledge lies in the Rational and Demonstrative kind, and we are fain to use Clues and Chains to Conduct our Thoughts through the infinite Mazes and Labyrinths of Truth, to proceed in a Train from one thing to another, to walk step by step, and [Page 51] feel out our way with wariness and Caution like Men that go in the Dark. And such indeed is our state in this Body and in this World. 'Tis now a kind of Night with us, as having for the Most part only the Lesser Light, Reason, for our Di­fection. As for the Greater, Int [...] ­ition, we have little more of that than of the refracted Beams of the Sun a little before its rising, and after its setting, enough to make a Twi­light, a Mixture of Light and Dark­ness, but such a Mixture as is very unequal, Darkness making the far greater part of the Composition. And is not this Consideration suffi­cient (if there were nothing else) to take down our Pride, and inspire us with a Sentiment of the profoundest Humility and Self-dejection. If not, let us Consider that even this Lesser Light that is to govern our present Night and Darkness, does often­times fail us, and suffer an Eclipse. Let us Consider that we have a dar­ker side yet, and are subject to a Much lower Dispensation. There being many things, and those of the [Page 52] highest Nature, and greatest impor­tance, wherein our Reason is utter­ly at a loss, and cannot help us out, and with respect to which being de­stitute of Sight, we must be Content to walk altogether by Faith. Con­cerning which in the following Chap­ter.

1. FAith is a Term of great Am­biguity as well as Reason, but not to insist upon the several Acceptations of it as it is used either in Divine or in Humane Writings, I shall only define in what sense I here take it, and then proceed to such Considerations upon it as may serve to lay open its Nature so far as is re­quisite to the Present Design.

2. I do not take Faith here for the Object of Faith, but for the Act or Habit of Faith, and that not E­thically consider'd, as it denotes the Moral Vertues of Veracity, Fidelity, Honesty and the like, but Logically, as it signifies a certain Assent, Judge­ment or Perswasion of the Mind, particularly that which is founded upon Testimony or Authority. So that the Generical and Common Part of Faith is Assent, wherein it [Page 54] agrees with some other Acts of the Mind, and the more special and pe­culiar part that limits and Contracts the General, and whereby the whole is differenc'd and distinguish'd, is the Motive and ground of this Assent. 'Tis it seems an Assent grounded not upon the internal Reason and Evi­dence of the thing, but upon the bare Testimony and Authority of the Speaker.

3. For I consider that there are two general grounds of Assent, Rea­son and Authority. That is, we assent to a thing either because we have some Perception or Knowledge of it our selves, or because its Truth is declared to us by another upon whose Knowledge and Veracity we think we may safely depend. If the Reason or evidence of the thing be imperfect and incomplete, that is, if we perceive only in part, then we yeild a partial and imperfect Assent, mix'd with some Fear or Suspicion of the Contrary, which is what we call Opinion. But if the Evidence be full and perfect, then we yield a firm and most assured Assent, which is generally distinguish'd from the o­ther [Page 55] by the Name of Knowledge, which according to the common Notion and Definition of it is an Evident Assent. But it was shewn before that Knowledge does not For­mally Consist in the Assent, but in the Perception which is the Ground of the Assent. And indeed how is it possible it should consist in any thing else? For (to give yet a further Con­firmation to what has been already offer'd upon this Occasion) let Assent be never so evident, the evidence lies in the Perception, not in the Assent, which of it self is a blind dark Act of the Mind, and can be said no o­therwise to be Evident, than as 'tis an Assent to an Evident thing, that is, to what we perceive. But now Perception and Assent are not only two things, but such as belong also to two different and distinct Faculties, and therefore can never joyn together to make up Knowledge, which is an Act only of one. And indeed to speak the truth, Evident Assent (as 'tis here applied) seems to me a mere jum­ble of Words confusely uniting to­gether in one Idea Operations that belong to distinct Faculties, one be­longing [Page 56] to the Will and the other to the Understanding. And how the result of this heterogeneous Compo­sition should be Knowledge, I must confess to be indeed a Mystery above my Comprehension. And besides, after all, an Evident Assent when re­solv'd into more words will amount to the same as an Assent to what we know, and would it not be a Nota­ble Definition of Knowledge, to say, that it is an Assent to what we know?

4. If then Knowledge be not an Evident Assent, and indeed as to the Formality of it has nothing of Assent in it, as consisting purely and whole­ly in Perception, 'tis plain that this Assent to an evident thing ought not to be call'd Knowledge. For 'tis necessa­ry that the several Species of Assent should all have the general Nature of Assent in them, and consequently this being a certain Species of Assent must partake of the nature of Assent in ge­neral, which it cannot do if it be Know­ledge, for that were to pass over into another Kind, Knowledge not being Assent, but Perception. 'Tis there­fore most clear and evident that our Common Systemes have here also [Page 57] gone upon a wrong ground, and that Knowledge ought not to be put into the Number of the Three Assents (which are usually reckon'd to be Faith, Opinion and Science) since the Assent whose ground is full Evidence, and which is the only one that may pretend and is commonly presumed to be Knowledge, is most apparently not so, as differing from it no less than in the whole kind.

5. If then it be demanded by what Name I would distinguish this Se­cond Assent to a thing when the E­vidence is full and complete from the former wherein the Evidence is sup­posed not to be so perfect, I answer that indeed (so little have these things been Consider'd as they ought) there is no proper Name, that I know of, for it. When we assent to a thing of incomplete Evidence we call it Opinion, and when we assent to a thing whose Evidence is com­plete this has been usually call'd Knowledge, but certainly with the utmost impropriety, knowledge, as appears, being quite another thing. But by what name to call it, or how to distinguish it, I pro [...]ess I know [Page 58] not. Not for want of real difference and distinction in the thing (for my Thought of it is very distinct) but merely because we want a word for it. As we do in like manner for Assent upon Reason in general to di­stinguish it from Assent upon Autho­rity in general. For as Assent upon Authority in general Abstracting from Humane or Divine is call'd Faith, so also Assent upon Reason in general abstracting from complete or incomplete should be call'd some­what, if one could tell what, as eve­ry generical Idea ought to be distin­guish'd by a generical Name. But since our Language affords not any one word that will serve to either of these purposes we must be content with the De [...]initio instead of the De­finitum, and express the things at large, by saying Assent upon Reason or Evidence, and Assent upon such Evidence as is full and complete, which is sufficient to distinguish it from Assent upon evidence incom­plete, though we have no one proper word for this as we have for the o­ther, which is fitly call'd Opinion, whereby we denote the imperfection [Page 59] both of the Evidence and of the As­sent.

6. But now if the Assent he not grounded upon any internal Reason or Evidence of the thing at all, but only upon Testimony or Authority, then we call it Faith. Which ap­pears to be an Assent of a quite diffe­rent Nature from the other two. For they both agree in the general Nature of Assent upon Evidence, and differ only as the Evidence dif­fers, and that is gradually, as com­plete differs from incomplet [...]. But Faith differs from them both in the whole Kind, as having no Evidence at all, but only Authority for its Ground. And thus we have here a Threefold Assent, (though not such as is taught us in the Schools) the Account of which in short proceeds thus. All Assent in general is either upon Reason or Authority. If the Reason be incomplete then 'tis Opi­nion. If complete, then 'tis another kind of Assent for which as yet there wants a Name, as also there does for Assent upon Reason in General. But if the Assent be upon Authority only, then 'tis Faith.

[Page 60]7. Now this Authority may be either of God or of Man. If the Authority whereupon our Assent is grounded be of Man, then the As­sent that is so grounded is Human Faith. If of God, then 'tis Divine Faith. Between which two there is this in Common, that they both proceed not upon the internal Light and Evidence of the thing but upon Authority, and so agree in the gene­ral Nature of [...] ▪ only as the Au­thority differ [...] Faith also va­ries, and Human Authority differing from Divine just as much as Fallible differs from Infallible▪ the same in proportion will also [...] between Human and Divine [...]aith. That is, the former will always be a Fallible, and the latter an Infallible Assent.

8. Human Faith (though some­times as actually undeceiv'd as Di­vine) is yet always liable to Error and Deception, and so doubtful, ha­zardous and uncertain even when actually true, like a Conclusion drawn from uncertain Premisses; in which respect it resembles Opinion, and that so much that some have confounded [Page 61] it with it, though I think illogically enough, since though there be a like uncertainty in both Assents, yet they differ extremely in their Formal Motives, one being grounded upon Reason, and the other upon Autho­rity. And the Distinction of these Assents is not taken from the degree of Certainty wherein they agree, but from the Quality of the Motive wherein they differ. However tho' this makes a great difference in No­tion, it makes None in the Affairs of Civil Life, and the Faith of him that believes the Testimony of a Man will as to all real intents and purposes go for no more than his O­pinion. And that because though different Assents as to the Formality of their Motives, they are yet Much at one rate for Certainty, being both Fallible in their Grounds, and so subject to Error and Deception.

9. But the Case is quite other­wise as to Divine Faith whose Foun­dation stands too sure not only to be overturn'd, but even so much as shaken. This Faith is strictly and Absolutely infallible, not subject to the least Error, or Possibility of Er­ring, [Page 62] as having the very Ground and Pillar of Truth it self, the Omnisci­ence and Veracity of God for its Se­curity, than which there neither Needs, nor Can be Greater. 'Tis Most Certain that God is both Actively and Passively Infallible, his Omniscience will not suffer him to be deceiv'd himself, and his infi­nite Veracity and Truth will not suffer him to deceive us. And there­fore he that builds his Faith upon his Authority, goes upon the Most sure Grounds, and cannot possibly Err in his Assent. And as he is se­cure from Error, so he is also from all just reason of Scruple or Fear, and leaning upon a firm and inde­fectible Support, may stay and re­pose himself upon it with full Ac­quiescence. So that there is all the Certainty that can be in this Faith, both Objective and Subjective, that of the Thing, and that of the Per­son. The thing assented to is most undoubtedly true in it self, and he that assents to it may be most firmly assured and perswaded of the Truth of it in his own Mind, and among all Temptations to Doubt and Di­strust [Page 63] may with great Triumph and Confidence say with the Apostle,2 Tim. 1. 12. I know whom I have believ'd.

10. It was observ'd a little before of Humane Faith that it resembles Opinion, in as much as they are both dubious and uncertain Assents, as proceeding upon grounds of like un­certainty, though otherwise of diffe­rent Natures. Now as this Faith resembles Opinion, so in like manner it may be observ'd of Divine Faith that it resembles Science, or rather that Second Assent (for so I am forc'd to call it for want of a better Name) which we lately discours'd of, and plac'd between Opinion and Faith. The Comparison here bears the same proportion as to Certainty, as it did in the other Case as to un­certainty. Divine Faith has all the Certainty that is possible, and there­fore to be sure as much as Science or that Second Assent can have. There is as much Certainty in the thing as­sented to, and there may be as much Assurance and firmness of Perswasion in the Assent it self, or in other words what a man believes upon the Au­thority of God is in it self as certain as [Page 64] what he knows, and he may also be as Certain of it. For he that assents to a thing upon full evidence can but assent fully and perfectly without suspense or hesitation, and so also can he that assents to a thing upon Divine Au­thority only. His Ground is every whit as Firm and Sure as the others, and why then should the Measure of his Assurance be less? It cannot possibly be if he Knows and Consi­ders upon what Ground he stands. So that thus far, both in regard of the Certainty of the Object, and the Firmness of the Perswasion, Divine Faith may be justly placed upon a level with the Most Evident Assent whatever.

11. Nor I suppose will this be thought an undue Elevation of Di­vine Faith. On the Contrary I ex­pect to be Complain'd of for setting the Dignity of it at too low a Pitch by those who say that Divine Faith is Firmer than Science. But 'tis for want of the Latter that these Men so excessively ex [...]ol the Former. I call it excessively, because 'tis what strictly and exactly speaking cannot be. For what I Perceive or Know [Page 65] is even by that very supposition un­questionably true, (or else I cannot be said to Know it) and what I be­lieve upon the highest Authority can be no more. To say therefore that Faith is Firmer than Science, is like saying that one streight Line is streighter than another. But per­haps their Meaning only is, that 'tis safer relying upon the Aut [...]ority of God than upon our own Rational Faculties, which indeed is right, and I heartily wish all Men were convinc'd of it. For though what I do actually and really Know be to the full as true and certain as what I Believe, and I can no more be out in one than in the other, yet it is More Certain in the general that God cannot deceive me, than that my Reason cannot be deceiv'd. Not that what I assent to by Divine Faith can have a greater Objective Cer­tainty than what I clearly and di­stinctly Perceive or Know, but only that there is a Possibility, not to say Danger, of my taking that for a clear and distinct Perception which [...]ndeed is Not so, and so though I [Page 66] cannot be deceiv'd in what I do tru­ly know, yet I may be deceiv'd in thinking that I know when I do not. So that Divine Faith though not more Certain than Knowledge it self, is yet of greater Certainty than our Knowing Faculties, and ge­nerally speaking the Believer goes upon surer grounds than the Man of Reason and Demonstration. Because his Reason may possibly lead him into Error, whereas the Other's Au­thority cannot. And when they are both in the right, yet still there will be this difference between them, that his Reason is only not Deceiv'd, whereas the Other's Faith is Infal­lible.

12. And thus far we have taken a view of the more bright and per­fect side of Divine Faith, I mean that of its Firmness and Certainty, in respect of which it stands upon a just level with Science. But it has also a more dark side, in which re­spect it comes short of it, and must give it the Precedency. And I think it may be very properly call'd a Dark side, because it consists in Dark­ness [Page 67] and Obscurity, and which is still so much the darker, because 'tis so pe­culiar to Faith, and makes so great a part of its Character, being the Main Difference that distinguishes it from Science, or that Second Assent before spoken of. For as to Firm­ness and Certainty, therein they a­gree. For Faith may be Firm, be­cause he that believes in God may be supposed not in the least to hesitate or doubt of the truth of what he reveals. And 'tis also certain, be­cause it relies upon the most certain Foundation, the Testimony of God, who is Infallible himself, and can­not deceive. And hitherto they run parallel one to the other. But here begins both the difference and the disproportion, that there is Clearness and Evidence on the side of Science, and that Second Assent, whereas there is none on the side of Faith, which walks indeed upon firm Ground, but altogether in the dark. For he that Believes does not give his Assent because either by Sense or Reason he perceives the Object of his Faith to be thus or thus, but merely because he has the [Page 68] Word and Authority of God for it. Which though it be sufficient to found a Firm and Certain, is yet however not enough to beget a Clear and Evident Assent. So that the great and distinguishing Character of Science and the Second Assent, is Light and Evidence, and that of Faith inevidence and Obscurity, which accordingly is commonly said to be an inevident Assent. But how and in what sense it is so seems not commonly to be so well understood, and for the Consequence of what depends upon the right stating of it, deserves to be explain'd with all pos­sible exactness.

13. In order to which we are carefully to distinguish between the thing believ'd, and the Reason or Motive that induces us, to believe it; even as in Knowledge we distin­guish between the thing Known, and the Argument or Medium by which it is Known, the Scitum and the Formalis ratio Sciendi. The thing Believ'd I would call the Mat­ter or the Object of Faith, and the Motive that induces me to believe it I would call the Formal Reason [Page 69] of Faith. Aquinas I know calls them both Objects,22 [...]. Q. 1. Art. 1. and then after distinguishes them by calling the Former the Material Object, and the latter the Formal Object of Faith. Accordingly he says that the For­mal Object of Faith is the First Truth, meaning (as he afterward explains himself) that Faith relies upon the Truth of God as its Medium, or Argument. Which Medium I chuse rather to call (and I think more in­telligibly) the formal Reason, than the formal Object of Faith. Since the Term (Object) seems more properly to design the Matter of Faith, or the thing Believ'd, and is hardly applicable to the Motive or Reason of Believing. However since we both mean one and the same thing, there need be no debate upon the different manner of expressing it, especially since if any one think his Term more intelligible and expres­sive of the Notion intended by it, or has any reverence for it upon any other Consideration, he is at liberty to substitute it in the room of the other.

[Page 70] 14. This necessary Distinction be­ing premised, 'tis in the first place to be well heeded that when Faith is said to be an obscure and inevi­dent Assent, this Obscurity or ine­vidence is not to be applied to the formal Reason or Motive of Faith, but only to the Matter or Object of it. I say not to the formal Reason of it. For as there may be in gene­ral a clear Reason why a Man should believe an Obscure thing, so 'tis most Certain that the formal Reason for which we assent to the things of Faith is very clear. For this for­mal Reason is no other than the Authority of God, Or rather, since this includes the Truth of the Re­vealer as well as the Revelation it self (for otherwise of what Autho­rity would be the Revelation:) I would chuse to say that the Truth and Revelation of God do jointly make up the formal Reason of Di­vine Faith, which accordingly pro­ceeds upon this double Principle, 1. That whatever God reveals is true, 2. That this or that thing in particular is reveal'd by God. For Faith has its Reasons as well as [Page 71] Science (though of another Nature) and its Reasons are these two, as will more distinctly, appear by dis­posing the Process of Faith into a Syllogistical Form, which will be this.

The Conclusion of this Syllogism contains both the Matter and the Act of Faith, as it is an Assent to such a thing upon such a ground, which is implied by the Illative Particle, Therefore. The two other Propositions contain the Ground it self or the formal Reason of Faith, which you see consists of the double Prin­ciple before-mention'd. Now 'tis most apparent that these two Princi­ples are both of them sufficiently clear, or at least may be so. 'Tis clear in the first place that whatever is reveal'd by God is true. This is either self-evident, or may be proved from the Idea of God, and so has either the Light of a Principle, or of a Conclusion, either an imme­diate [Page 72] or a Mediate Evidence. And it may be also clear (and to be sure is so whenever our Faith is well-grounded) that such a thing in Par­ticular is reveal'd by God. And in both these respects it is true (what is commonly said) that Faith is the Highest Reason. For you see it is perfectly reasonable in its Fund and Principle, and does at last resolve, as much as any Mathematical Con­clusion, into a rational ground of un­questionable Light and Evidence. With this only difference that a Con­clusion in Geometry is founded upon a Ground taken from within, from the intrinsic Nature of the thing, whereas our Conclusion of Faith proceeds upon a ground taken from without, viz. from the Authority of God, but such as however in Light and Evidence is no way inferiour to the other.

15. This by the way may serve to shew the vanity and impertinence of those who when they are to prove that there is nothing in Christianity above Reason, run out into a Popu­lar Ve [...] of Harangue about the Rea­sonables of the Christian Reli­gion [Page 73] and its great Accommodation to Human Nature, crying out with repeated importunity that Man is a Reasonable Creature, Christianity a reasonable Service, and Faith a Ra­tional Act, nay even the Highest Reason, and the like. As if we were for a Blind and unaccountable Faith, and denied the use of Reason in Re­ligion, or that Faith was founded upon Reason. Or as if because there is a Reason from without for Believ­ing, therefore the thing Believ'd might not from within, and as to the inward Matter of it be above Rea­son, so as not to be comprehended or accounted for by it. But this will cross my way again in another place,Chap. 7. Artic. 9. and therefore I shall not anticipate here what further Considerations I may have occasion to bestow upon it there.

16. To return therefore, I say that this Obscurity and inevidence that is in Faith, and upon whose account it is commonly said to be an inevident Assent, does not belong to its formal Reason (which you see may be clear enough, as clear as any Principle of Natural Science) but [Page 74] only to the Matter or Object of it. That is, in other words the inevi­dence does not lie in the Reason of Believing, but in the Nature of the thing Believ'd. Not that the mat­ter of Faith again is wholy and all over without Evidence (for then there would be no reason to believe it) but only that it has no evidence from within, and from the Nature of the thing it self, as was remarqu'd before. Not that this again is so to be understood neither as if the Pro­position to be believ'd were not so much as simply intelligible as to the very litteral sense and direct signifi­cation of its Terms. No, we are no more to believe we Know not what, than to believe we Know not why, and whatever Darkness there may be in Faith, it is still so much a Luminous Assent, and an Act of Reason, as to require that we un­derstand the simple Meaning of the Proposition we are to believe, as well as the Grounds of Credibility upon which it Challenges our Assent. For the general Object of Faith is Truth, and Truth is the relation of Con­nexion between Ideas, I say Ideas, [Page 75] for Truth does not lie in Sounds or Words but in Things. Therefore to believe such a Thing to be True is the same as to believe that there is a Connexion between such Ideas. But then a Man must know what those Ideas are, or else how can he believe they are connected. There­fore he must understand something more than the Terms themselves, he must also have the Ideas of those Terms, which is the same as to under stand the Meaning and Signification of them. And indeed he that has no Idea or Conception of what he believes, believes he knows not what, and he that believes he knows not what cannot be properly said to be­lieve any thing. In all Faith there­fore the Proposition Must be simply intelligible, and though the Truth of it be to be Believ'd, yet the Meaning of it must be understood.

17. For we are again Carefully to distinguish between the Meaning of a Proposition, and the Truth of a Proposition. The meaning of a Proposition is only the Determina­tion of the Ideas that are signified by such Terms; the Truth of it is the [Page 76] Union or Connexion that is between those Ideas. Now though a Man does not see the Connexion that is between the Ideas of that Proposi­tion he is said to Believe, yet he must in some measure perceive the Ideas themselves, because in believing the Proposition he is supposed to believe that such Ideas are so related and Connected together. When there­fore 'tis said that the Matter of Faith is inevident as to the intrinsic Na­ture of the thing, the inevidence must not be thought to lie in the Ideas whereof the Proposition to be Believ'd Consists, but in the Con­nexion of those Ideas, that is, not in the Meaning of the Proposition, but in the Truth of it, which is pro­perly the Object of Faith, as the I­deas themselves are of Perception. Which again by the way may serve to discover another Instance of Im­pertinency in the Reasoning of those, who when they are Maintaining that there can be no Article of Faith above Reason, divert into pompous Flourishes and Declamati­ons about the Intelligibility of the Objects of Faith, and the utter im­possibility [Page 77] of Believing what is not intelligible. As if we denied the simple intelligibility of the Proposi­tion, or would have Men believe they know not what (which cer­tainly would be a strange degree of Implicit Faith, and more Non­sensical than that of the Collier) or, as if that Proposition which is clear enough as to its simple Meaning might not be inevident, and so a­bove Reason, as to its Truth, or in other words, as if Clearness of Ideas might not consist with Obscurity of their Connexion.

18. But then it must be observ'd again that when we say that the In­evidence that is in the Matter of Faith respects the Truth of the Pro­position not the Meaning of it, or the Connexion of the Ideas, and not the very Ideas themselves, this is not so to be understood neither as if the Matter of Faith even thus consider'd, were Absolutely, and in its self ne­cessarily inevident, and such as could not possibly be known without alter­ing its Nature, and ceasing to be any longer the Object of Faith. I know the contrary Supposition has [Page 78] prevail'd in some Schools, where it passes almost for Principle and Maxim that Knowledge and Faith are mu­tually Exclusive of each other, that the same thing cannot be at once the Object of both, and that therefore if a thing be believ'd it cannot be known, and if known that it cannot be believ'd. St. Austin was of this Opinion, and has in many places de­clared his mind to this purpose, par­ticularly in his XL Treatise of his Exposition upon St. Iohn's Gospel.Tom. 9. p. 107. And his Authority has recommend­ed it (as it did most other things) to several of the Schoolmen, particu­larly Aquinas, whence it has been transmitted down among many Mo­dern Writers of the Systematical way, both Philosophers and Divines. But we must follow Reason before Authority, and whoever can be pre­vail'd with to lay the latter quite a­side, and to use the other as he ought, will I believe clearly perceive that nothing hinders but that the same Proposition may be at once the Ob­ject of both Faith and Science, or that the Same thing may be at the same time both Known and Believ'd, [Page 79] provided it be by different Mediums, according to the diversity of the re­spective Acts.

19. For, not to enter into the wrangle and Dust of the Schools up­on this Occasion, it may be sufficient to consider that there is no manner of Opposition between Faith and Knowledge, or the Most evident Assent as to the Essence of the Pro­position (that being not supposed to be denied in the one which is Af­firm'd in the other, or the contrary) but only as to the Medium of the Act. And that 'tis not the Absolute Nature of the thing Believ'd, but the Quality of the Motive that spe­cifies Faith, and distinguishes it from other Assents. So that 'tis no matter what the Absolute Nature of the thing be in it self, whether it be evi­dent or not evident, Knowable or not Knowable, provided it be assent­ed to upon the proper Medium and Motive of Faith, that is upon Au­thority, without any respect had to the Natural evidence of the thing, though otherwise never so evident in its own Absolute Nature, so as to be the Object of Science (though [Page 80] upon a different Medium) at the same time. For as I said before, 'tis not the Nature of the thing, but the Quality of the Medium that speci­fies Faith, and tho' the same thing cannot have two Natures, or be in it self at once evident and not evi­dent, yet why may it not sustain two different Relations, or be consi­der'd in two different Mediums, so as to be said to be known when per­ceiv'd by its Evidence, and to be believ'd when assented to upon Au­thority? Which certainly may be done as fully, and with as little re­gard to its evidence, as if there were no evidence in the thing at all. So that the Evidence of the thing does not hinder the Belief of it, suppo­sing the Belief not to proceed upon that Evidence, but upon its own pro­per Medium, Authority.

20. But to use a way of Arguing less Abstract, though it may be with some more pressing and convincing. Suppose God should reveal to me a Geometrical Truth, as that two Tri­angles having the same Base, and being within the same Parallels, are equal, and I who at first receiv'd [Page 81] it upon his bare Authority should come afterwards to be able to de­monstrate it my self upon the known Principles of Art, who that well considers the Natures of these things would say that my Science evac [...] ­ted my Faith, and that I ceas'd to be a Believer assoon as I became a Mathematician? For though I am now supposed to Know what before I only Believ'd, yet why should this Knowledge destroy my Faith, since I may still have as much regard for the Authority of God, and as little to the Evidence of the thing as I had before the Demonstration, and would still be ready to assent to it though there were no evidence to be produced for it, only upon the Ground of Divine Authority. And, to use another Sensible though not so Artificial way of arguing, I would fain know whether any one of those who are of the Contrary Sentiment would refuse a Demonstrative Ac­count of a Reveal'd Truth, suppose the Creation of the World, merely for fear of injuring or destroying his Faith, which yet he were bound in Conscience to do, if Knowledge and [Page 82] Faith were so exclusive of each o­ther, and inevidence and Obscurity were so absolutely of the Essence of Faith as some pretend. For then it would not be lawful to acquire the Natural Knowledge of any reveal'd Truth, because 'tis unlawful to de­stroy one's Faith, and every Belie­ver would have just reason to fear all further Light and Information about what he believes, which yet I think would be acknowledg'd by all an extravagant Scruple, such as can hardly enter, much less stay long in any Considering head; And is withal Contrary to a plain Exhorta­tion of the Apostle, who bids us add to our Faith Knowledge 2 Pet. 5..

21. When therefore the Matter of Faith, as it is taken for the Truth of the Proposition Believ'd, is char­ged with Obscurity, and Faith it self upon that account is said (as it commonly is) to be of inevident things, the Meaning ought not to be of an Absolute, but of a Relative inevidence. Not that what is Be­liev'd is so all over dark and obscure that it cannot (while Believ'd) ab­solutely be known, but only that it [Page 83] cannot under that Formality, and so far as it is Believ'd, being neces­sarily in that respect inevident, how bright or clear soever it may be in other respects. That is in other words, though the thing Believ'd absolutely consider'd may be Evi­dent, yet it is not so as Believ'd, or in relation to Faith, because that has no regard to the Evidence how bright soever it may shine, but proceeds wholy upon another Argument, be­tween which and the Evidence of the thing there is not the least Af­finity or Communication. The short is, the Object of Faith simply and absolutely speaking may admit of Evidence, but then though it be never so evident and demonstrable in it self, yet as Believ'd it is always Obscure, Faith having no regard to the proper light and Evidence of the thing, but only to the Testimony of the Revealer, whose bare Autho­rity is the only Motive that deter­mines her Assent, and the only Ground upon which she lays the whole weight of it, though the Truth of the thing in it self abso­lutely Consider'd, may also stand [Page 84] upon other Foundations, be ratio­nally accounted for by Arguments from within, and so be seen by its own Light. But let the Light shine never so bright upon the Object from other sides, Faith lets in none, nor has any regard to that which she finds there, but connives at it, and walks (as I may say) with her eyes shut, contenting her self with the certainty of Revelation, and leaving to Science (if there be any) the E­vidence of the thing. So that the Object is always dark to her, how clear and bright soever it may be in it self, or appear, when absolutely consider'd, to a Philosophic Eye. In which respect it falls very short of the Perfection of Science, though in respect of Firmness and Certain­ty it be equal to it, as was said be­fore. All which is briefly couch'd in that excellent Account of Faith given by the Author to the Hebrews, Heb. 11. 1. when he says, that it is the Substance of things hoped for, and the Argument of things not seen. Where by Sub­stance and Argument he equals it with Science in regard of the Firmness and Certainty of the Assent, but by [Page 85] saying that 'tis of things not seen he makes it vail and stoop to it in point of Evidence, in which respect indeed Faith, as Firm and as Certain as it is, is as much inferiour to Science, as Darkness is to Light.

22. To gather up then what has been here discours'd at large con­cerning the inevidence of Faith into one view. When we say that Faith is an inevident Assent we are not to understand this inevidence of the formal Reason of Faith, but of the Matter of it. And when we say that the Matter of it is inevident, we should not intend by it that it is wholy and all over without Evi­dence, but only that it has none from within or from the intrinsic Nature of the thing. And when we say that the Matter of Faith is inevident from within, this again is not to be intended of the simple Meaning of the Proposition, but of the Truth of it. And when we say that the Truth of it is inevident, this again lastly is not to be understood, as if it were always and necessarily so in its own Absolute Nature, but only so far forth as it is Believ'd, or [Page 86] as 'tis consider'd under the forma­lity of an Object of Faith. Or in other words, the inevidence of the Matter of Faith in respect of the Truth of the Article is not an Ab­solute but a Relative inevidence. Not that the Matter of Faith is Never Absolutely and in the Nature of the thing inevident (for it may be so too as will be seen afterwards) but only that it is not necessarily so, there being no reason from the Nature of Faith that requires it should, which may consist with Evidence, though it proceeds not upon it, and has no regard to it as a Motive. So then the formal Reason of Faith is always Clear, the Matter of it Absolutely consider'd may be clear or not clear, as it happens, according as the Na­ture of the thing is, but as Believ'd, or as Consider'd under the formality of being the Object of Faith so it is always inevident and Obscure, as being not supposed to be assented to for the sake of its Evidence (even when it has any) but wholy upon another Account, already sufficiently represented.

[Page 87] 23. And thus having struck some Light into the Darkness of Faith, by stating and explaining with what exactness I could in what Sense it is an inevident Assent, I cannot forbear Observing by the way (though a little of the soonest) of what Ser­vice this Account may be towards the grand Question of Believing things above Reason. For if Faith be an inevident Assent so far at least as not to respect the Evidence of its Object, why may not a thing be believ'd though it be above Reason? For what though it be above Rea­son, is it therefore above Faith? Has Faith any regard to Evidence? Or is it determin'd by any Rational Mo­tive, I mean that is taken from the Nature of the Object? Even when a thing is evident, Faith is not sup­posed to assent to it because of its Evidence, and why then may not a thing be believ'd though it be not evident? Some Contend that Faith and Evidence cannot possibly con­sist together, and according to them Not only what is inevident may be believ'd, but whatever is believ'd must be inevident. But this I look [Page 88] upon, and have already shewn to be a Mistake. And 'tis a Mistake in the Extremity too. For I take it to be every whit as much an Ex­treme to say that the Object of Faith is always inevident, as to say that it is always evident. However, it is always inevident so far as Believ'd, which is the Middle Point between the two extremes. The Nature of Faith requires at least this Relative inevidence of the Object, whatever it be in its own Nature, and we need no More. For if the Object of Faith be alwayes inevident so far as Believ'd, then will it not follow that it May be believ'd though inevi­dent? For my part I see nothing that should hinder this Consequence, if the Principle it proceeds upon be right. The Principle is (and a very moderate one sure, the generality of Writers straining the Matter a great deal higher) that the Object of Faith is inevident as far as Believ'd. The Consequence is, that therefore a thing may be believ'd, though inevident. 'Tis true indeed one of these is an Absolute, and the other only a Re­lative inevidence. But this signifies [Page 89] Nothing to the Argument. For why may not a thing really and in it self inevident be believ'd, when even that which is Evident is Consi­der'd by Faith as inevident? Why, then 'tis all one (as to Faith) as if it were so indeed; For what does the Evidence signify, or what real alte­ration does it make, if Faith has no regard to it, nor Consideration of it? And what should hinder then but that a thing really inevident may be believ'd, especially if reveal'd by God himself, and concerning him­self. The short is, Faith as Faith has no regard to Evidence (I mean that of the thing) and Faith as Di­vine has no need of it, and therefore why an inevident thing may not be believ'd is what I do not under­stand, and would be glad to Learn.

24. But to return (for I look upon this as too much a digression from the present, and too much a Prevention of what is to follow to be further pur­sued) after having thus discours'd of the Nature of Faith in General, and the double Distribution of it into Humane and Divine, with proper Considerations upon each of them, [Page 90] it remains that it be now further consider'd that each of these may be either Explicit or Implicit. Then we are said to believe Explicitly, when we believe determinately such or such a thing in particular, di­stinctly knowing what that Parti­cular thing is. And then Implicitly, when we believe indeterminately and at large whatever is proposed to us by such an Authority, not know­ing what in particular is proposed, or what it is we Believe. Which though it seems to carry the Ap­pearance of an Assent too blind and hood-winkt to be the act of a Rea­sonable Creature, may yet in its pro­per place become him as much as the other, and indeed is every whit as rational an Assent in its Ground and Principle. For all Explicit Faith is founded upon Implicit, and has Implicit Faith in it.

25. To understand both this and the Nature of Implicit Faith the better we are to Consider (what has been already intimated) that Faith proceeds upon Premisses, as well as Science, and is the Conclusion of a Syllogism. And I further Note [Page 91] (what perhaps may not be unwor­thy the Observation of the Curious) that the Major Proposition in Faith Explicit is the Conclusion in Faith Implicit, as may be seen in the Syl­logism before set down.

The Major Proposition here (what­ever is reveal'd by God is true) is the Conclusion of Implicit Faith, whose act is as much to believe to be true whatever God reveals, as the act of Explicit Faith is to believe that this or that in particular is so. So that Explicit Faith proceeds upon Implicit, borrows from it its Con­clusion for its Principle, and begins where the other leaves off. Just as in the Subalternation of Sciences, that which is a Conclusion in one is a Principle in the other, so 'tis here in the Subalternation of these two Faiths, whereof that which is Expli­cit may be said to be Subalternated to that which is Implicit. Let not any therefore vilify or disparage Im­plicit [Page 92] Faith as a blind and irrational Assent, since it lays a ground for Explicit, which serves it self of it, using its Conclusion as a Principle, even as what is a Conclusion in Geo­metry is a Principle in Perspective. And as Geometry is therefore ac­counted the Superiour Science, so ought implicit Faith to be reckon'd as the Superiour Faith, upon whose Conclusion the other proceeds, and which it self proceeds thus,

Here besides that 'tis plain to be seen that the Conclusion of this last Syl­logism is the Principle of the prece­dent One, and that Explicit Faith supposes what is proved in Implicit, it may be further noted that Implicit Faith (as being the highest degree of Faith) is due only to the highest, that is, to an Infallible Authority, the reason why whatever is reveal'd [Page 93] by God is here Concluded to be true, being, because he is infallible. In­fallibility then is the proper ground of Implicit Faith, and accordingly the Church of Rome assuming to her self the Character of Infallible, does upon that Supposition rightly require it. I say upon that sup­position, for she is right enough in her Consequence, supposing her Principle to be true. But the truth of it is, that is Most Ex­travagant, and such as carries in it such matchless Arrogance and Pre­sumption as befits only him who as God sitteth in the temple of God, 2 Thes. 2. 4. shew­ing himself that he is God. For God only is Infallible, and therefore he only has right to require Implicit Faith. And to him indeed it is due from every one of his Creatures in the highest Measure imaginable, as is also Implicit Obedience upon the same Ground. Of both which we have a signal Example in Abraham, Heb. 11. 8. who when he was call'd by God to go out into a place which he should after receive for an Inheritance, is said by Faith to have Obey'd, and to [Page 94] have gone out, not knowing whither he went.

26. But now what can be more dark and inevident than this Im­plicit Faith? Its Formal Reason in­deed is sufficiently clear, and it re­solves at last into a Ground highly Rational, and so may be said in that respect to be the highest Reason. For certainly nothing can be more Reasonable than to believe whatever God (who is Infallible) reveals. There is therefore no Darkness on this Side. Nay even the Light it self does not shine more Clear. But as for the Matter of it (if I may call it so where nothing distinctly is be­liev'd) that is sure as dark and ob­scure as can well be conceiv'd, so dark as even to be Invisible. For a Man to believe at large without any restriction or limitation what­ever God shall propose to him, let it be what it will, not Knowing what that is (like Abraham's going, not knowing whither he went) is such a dark and obscure act of Faith as has nothing clear in it but the Hu­mility and Devotion of him who [Page 95] so believes. This is a Faith Wor­thy of God, as well as peculiar to him, and 'tis the great inevidence and obscurity of it that makes it so. For so far is the Matter of it from having any Evidence in it, that it is not so much as Evident what the Matter of it is. Here then is the very Blackness of Darkness, and he that has this infolded Faith (as every true Believer has) and can thus trust God in the Dark, where he sees nothing but only the gene­ral Reason of his so doing, is not likely in any of the more explicit instances of it to plead the inevi­dence of the Article to excuse his Infidelity, or to deny his Faith to an otherwise sufficiently clear Re­velation, merely because it is above his shallow Reason.

27. Upon what has been hither­to discours'd it will not be difficult to give in few words a Satisfactory Resolution of a Celebrated Question which among the Schoolmen has made a great many, and that is, whether Faith belongs to the Vn­derstanding or to the Will: It is [Page 96] plain by the Measures already laid down that it belongs to the Latter. For Faith (as all acknowledge) is an Assent, and Assent is a Species of Judgement, and Judgement (as has been shewn already) is an act of the Will, not of the Understand­ing, whose only Operation is Per­ception, and consequently Faith is an act of the Will consenting to, imbracing, acquiescing and reposing it self in what the Understanding represents as proposed and reveal'd by God. And indeed unless Judg­ment and consequently Faith did belong to the Will as their proper and immediate Principle, 'tis im­possible to Conceive how a Man should be blame-worthy for any of his Opinions, or how he should stand accountable either for Er­ror on the one hand, or for Infi­delity and Heresy on the other. For if Faith be an act of the Un­derstanding then since the only O­peration of the Understanding is Perception, the greatest Fault of an Infidel or a Heretic will be Non-Perception, which indeed is not [Page 97] Error but Ignorance, whereas Infi­delity and Heresie are always sup­posed to include Error, and to be also the worst of Errors. And this Non-perception is only a Ne­gation, and such as resolves into want of Parts, which is not a Mo­ral but a Natural defect, whereas Infidelity and Heresie (as indeed all that is Faulty) are understood to be Privations, and Defects of a Moral Nature. But then to make them so they must be voluntary (nothing being faulty but what is so) that is again they must be Wil­ful, that is, they must be acts of the Will, and Consequently Faith which is the Habit whereof those Sins are Privations, must also be­long to the same Principle, or else in short there would be neither Vertue in having it, nor Vice in being without it. And according­ly our Saviour in upbraiding the Iews with Infidelity does all along not only by Confequence, but di­rectly and expresly, Charge it up­on their Wills:Joh. [...] 40. Ye will not come to me, that ye may have Life.

[Page 98] 28. And thus I have gone tho­rough what I intended, and what indeed is of greatest Considerati­on, upon this Subject of Faith. In the account of which if I dif­fer from any Authors of the bet­ter Character that have either professedly or occasionally writ­ten upon it, particularly Baronius and Dr. Pearson, 'tis not that I love to lay aside great Authori­ties, or affect to be by my self, but because I follow the best Light of my Understanding, write with Freedom and Ingenuity what I think, and endeavour to repre­sent things as they are, without having regard to Authority any further than I think it joyn'd with Truth and Reason. Which shall also be my Rule in what remains of this Treatise. In the Mean time what has been hither­to discours'd concerning Reason and Faith may serve as a good Preparation in order to an Ac­count of the Great Question Con­cerning the Belief of things above Reason. But before we enter up­on [Page 99] any thing of that Nature, 'tis fit the Distinction of Above Rea­son, and Contrary to Reason be Consider'd and rightly Stated, which is the task allotted for the next Chapter.

1. THere are some Distinctions in the World that are with­out a Difference, though Difference be the Ground of all Distinction, and this by some is pretended to be of that Number, who will have the Parts of it to be Coincident, and that Contrary to Reason and above Reason signifie in reality alike, and are but different Expressions for one and the same thing. And though they may be reasonably suspected to do this to serve the interest of a Cause for whose advantage it would be to have this Distinction taken away, yet they have the Confidence to Charge the same upon those that hold it, pretending that it is only a dextrous Shift and Evasion invented [Page 101] by Subtile Men as an Expedient to relieve the Distress of a desperate Argument, when there is nothing else to be said for it.

2. Which of these is the Evasion, either the denying or the allowing this Distinction, will best appear by the Examination of it, which, be­sides its Serviceableness to our Clea­rer proceeding in what we are now upon, I am the rather induced to undertake, because (as Mr. Boyle Observes in a little Treatise upon this Subject) there are divers that employ this Distinction, few that have attempted to explain it, and none that has taken care to justifie it. Indeed He himself is the only Person that I know of that has written pro­fessedly about it (and I cannot but wonder that a thing of such Curi­osity and Importance should be so little Consider'd) though I think he has not gone to the Bottom of the Subject, nor is sufficiently clear even as far as he goes. However because he has some Considerable Observations upon it (as indeed his Thoughts are generally very good) and there is no reason why we [Page 102] should refuse any additional Light in so dark and untrodden a way, I shall for the further advantage and illustration of the Matter first draw up into a short view what that Ex­cellent Person has Meditated con­cerning it, with such Occasional Remarques as I shall think neces­sary, and then proceed to state the thing according to my own Con­ceptions, hoping that between us both it will be sufficiently clear'd, and that nothing of any Conse­quence will be overlook'd that be­longs to the Consideration of this so little consider'd, and almost Virgin Subject.

3. To give you then in the first place the Sum of Mr. Boyle's Ac­count, He proposes in general two things. 1. To declare in what sense the Distinction is to be under­stood. 2. To prove that it is not an Arbitrary or illusory Distinction, but grounded upon the Nature of things. As to the first he tells you that by things Above Reason he Conceives such Notions and Propo­sitions as Mere Reason, that is, un­assisted by Revelation would never [Page 103] have discover'd to us, whether those things be to our Finite Capacities clearly comprehensible or not. And that by things Contrary to Reason he understands such Conceptions and Propositions as are not only undis­coverable by mere Reason, but such as when we do understand them do evidently appear repugnant to some Principle, or to some Conclusion of right Reason.

4. Now before I go any further I would here by this great Man's leave, and with due deference to his high Character, remarque, that though things undiscoverable by mere Reason without Revelation may in a Certain sense be said to be above Reason, in as much as they surpass the Natural ability of the Understanding to make the first Discovery of them, yet this is not what Divines mean by Above Rea­son as they use the Phrase in this Distinction, opposing it to Contrary to Reason. For this Distinction was intended against the Socinians, who generally reject the Mysteries of Faith as contrary to Sense and Rea­son, to which we reply that they [Page 104] are not Contrary to Reason but on­ly Above it. They cry out that this is no Distinction, but a mere Shift and Evasion, pretending that the I arts of it fall in together, and that what is above Reason is also contrary to it, and therefore not to be believ'd. Now 'tis most plain that both they that use this Distin­ction, and they against whom it is used do not. Mean by things Above Reason such as are beyond the first invention or Discovery of it. For besides that to mean that our My­steries are only undiscoverable when we say they are above Reason, would be too little a thing to oppose to Contrary to Reason, it is also too lit­tle a thing to intend by Mystery, since though the undiscoverableness of them by Reason might be a suf­ficient ground of their being so call'd before their Revelation, it can be none now after they are reveal'd. And therefore if we say of these My­steries now that they are above Reason, we cannot be presumed to intend it in respect of their undisco­verableness. And 'tis as plain that that our Adversaries do not so un­derstand [Page 105] us. For they deny that things above Reason are to be be­liev'd, and that because (according to them) above Reason and contra­ry to Reason are all one. But now no Socinian that understands his own Principle would deny the Credibi­lity of things above Reason, as that signifies only undiscoverable by Rea­son alone, much less would he say that what is above Reason (in that Sense) is also contrary to it. No, without doubt they will in this sense both allow us the Distinction, and the Mysteries (if they may be so call'd) that are built upon it. But then this plainly shews that they do not understand it in this Sense, any more than we.

5. Instead therefore of saying un­discoverable, he should have said in­comprehensible by Reason. Into which he slips unawares in the account of the other part of the Distinction, things Contrary to Reason, by saying that they are such as when we do understand them do appear repug­nant, &c. which plainly implies that the former things that were said to be above Reason are such as we do [Page 106] not understand, even when disco­ver'd, and not such as we are not able only to Discover, since other­wise there will be no Antithesis in the Second part, in which there is nothing amiss except those words as are not only undiscoverable, which in my judgment ought to be ex­pung'd as the Production of the first Mistake.

6. Mr. Boyle proceeds to illustrate his Explanation of this Distinction by a Comparison drawn from Sight. He supposes a Man to be askt by a Diver what he could see in a deep Sea. To which the Man is suppo­sed to reply that he could see into a Sea-green Liquor to the depth of some yards and no further. So that if further ask't if he could see what lies at the Bottom of the Sea, his Answer no doubt would be in the Negative. But then if the Diver should let himself down to the Bot­tom and bring up thence and shew him Oysters or Muscles with Pearls in them, he would easily acknow­ledge both that they lay beyond the reach of his Sight, and that the Pearls were Genuin and Good. But [Page 107] if the Diver should further pretend that each of these Pearls was bigger than the Shells they were contain'd in, this would be thought not only undiscernible by the Eyes, but con­trary to their Informations, and to admit this would argue the Sight not only to be imperfect, but false and delusory, and accordingly 'tis presum'd that this he would not admit.

7. Now I not only allow this Com­parison, but even admire it for the singular Aptness and Pertinency of it to illustrate, even to the Sense, the difference between things above and things contrary to Reason, only I think it seems to proceed upon the supposition that by things above Reason are meant such only as are incomprehensible by it, which cer­tainly would make the Comparison much more Apposite and Exact. Whereof he himself appears sensible at the end of it, where offering to consider the Matter more distinctly, he tells you that the things above Reason are not all of one sort, but may be distinguish'd into two kinds sufficiently differing from each other. [Page 108] which he makes to be these, that there are some things that Reason by its own Light cannot Discover. And others, that, when proposed it cannot Comprehend. This indeed is true, but then he should have said so sooner, and have told us withal that by things above Reason (as the Phrase is used in this Distincti­on) he meant the Latter Sort only, the Former not being to the Pur­pose.

8. However he proceeds upon that part First, that is, to shew that there are divers Truths in the Chri­stian Religion that Reason left to it self would never have been able to find out. Of which he gives seve­ral Instances, which as not being to the Point, I pass over, and come to his other Consideration of things a­bove Reason, meaning such as when proposed do surpass our Compre­hension, and that (as he well ob­serves) upon one or other of these three Accounts, either as not clearly Conceivable by our understanding, such as the Infiniteness of the Di­vine Nature, or as inexplicable by us, such as the Manner how God can [Page 109] Create a Rational Soul, or how this being an Immaterial Substance can act upon a Human Body, or be act­ed upon by it, &c. Or else lastly as Asymmetrical or unsociable, that is, such, as we see not how to recon­cile with other things evidently and confessedly true, whereof he gives an instance in the Case of Prescience and Contingency.

9. He further observes (and I think rightly) that there may be difference of degree in things above Reason, as to their Abstruseness. That some things appear to surpass our understandings immediately, e­ven before attentively lookt into. And other things only when a nar­row inspection is made into them, being intelligible enough in the [...] ▪ and as imploy'd in common Discourse. Whereof he gives in­stances in Place, Time, and Motion. And he makes use of this Observa­tion to solve a Difficulty wherein it is pretended that we cannot profess to believe things which we acknow­ledge to be above our Reason, with­out discovering that we do not well consider what we say, and that we [Page 110] then talk like Parrots. To which the substance of his Answer is, that we may talk of those things accord­ing to that Notion of them which is more Obvious and Superficial, though not according to that which is Philosophical and Accurate.

10. After this Explanation of what is meant by Above Reason and contrary to Reason he comes in the Second place to justify the Distin­ction by shewing that it is ground­ed upon the Nature of things. And that he does by shewing that there is no Necessity that things above Reason should be also Contrary to Reason. This he shews first of things above Reason in the first Sense, viz. those that are undisco­verable by Reason alone, but this being not the sense of Above Rea­son as it is used in this Distinction, and since things according to this sense above Reason are not affirm'd by our Adversaries to be contrary to it, I pass over all that he says upon this part, and strike in with him again where he shews the same of things above Reason in the Se­cond sense. I cannot meet with any [Page 111] thing directly under that Head, but only a few Passages here and there scatter'd up and down. As when he says of Galileo, that when he first made his Discoveries with the Telescope and said that there were Planets that mov'd about Iupiter, He said something that other A­stronomers could not discern to be true, but nothing that they could prove to be false. And again when he says that for a thing to be above Reason is Extrinsecal and Acciden­tal to its being true or false. Be­cause to be above our Reason is not an Absolute thing, but a Respec­tive One, importing a Relation to the Measure of Knowledge that be­longs to Human understanding. And therefore it may not be above Reason in reference to a more in­lightned Intellect &c. which indeed is rightly and very judiciously re­marqu'd in it self, and no less per­tinently to the present business. And again when he says that there are some things true which yet are li­able to Objections not directly an­swerable, and so above Reason. He instances in the Controversie of the [Page 112] Divisibility of Quantity, where each side of the Contradiction is press'd with unanswerable Objections, and yet as parts of a Contradiction, one of them must necessarily be true. And yet take which you will you run into invincible Difficulties. Which indeed well concludes that a thing that is above Reason may yet be true, and if true then not contrary to Reason, it being impos­sible that what is so should be true. Which one Consideration is indeed enough to justifie the Distinction be­yond all exception.

11. Mr. Boyle has yet a further Observation concerning this Distin­ction too Considerable to be pass'd over, and that is, that he looks up­on it to be of Importance not only to the defence of some Mysteries of the Christian Religion, but even of some important Articles of Natural Theology, in which (as he shews by several Instances) there are ma­ny Doctrins which must be acknow­ledg [...]d to be true, and yet whose Mo­dus is not explainable.

[Page 113]12. After this he Considers an Objection wherein it is pretended that the granting this Distinction would be of bad Consequence, as affording shelter to any unintelligible stuff that a bold Enthusiast may ob­trude under the venerable Title of a Mystery, that is above Reason. To which he answers very judiciously, that he does not deny but that the Distinction is liable to be ill imploy'd, but that this is no other than what is common to it with divers other Distinctions, which are without Scruple Admitted because useful, and not rejected because they have not the Priviledge that they can never be Misapplied. And that therefore both in reference to those other Di­stinctions, and that he had been treating of, it becomes Men to stand upon their Guard, and strictly exa­mine how far the Doctrine proposed as a Mystery, is intitled to the bene­fit of this Distinction. Which if it should be employ'd to justifie any thing, that, though styl'd a My­stery, is but a pretended one, the Errour (as he well observes in the Close of all) will lye, Not [Page 114] in the Groundlesness of the Distin­ction, but in the Erroneousness of the Application.

13. In this you have the Sum and Substance, as briefly and as clearly as I could represent it, of Mr. Boyle's Thoughts concerning things above Reason and contrary to Reason, which, like all his, are great and strong, and (allowing only for those inaccuracies taken Notice of) just and true. And now though what this Excellent Person has offer'd may serve to let in a great deal of Light into the Distinction, yet since a thing of such Consequence if true, and so much Contested whether true or no, can never be made too Clear, and sometimes a different, though not better, Representation of a thing may contribute to its further Illustra­tion, every Reader having his parti­cular Point of View, so as that the very [...]ame Notion or Truth that does not Meet with him in one Posture, may shine full in his Face and strike him with success in ano­ther, I shall therefore under the Shelter of Mr. Boyle's Authority, and by the advantage of his Light, [Page 115] venture to set down my own Thoughts concerning this weighty Point, applying my self chiefly to that part of it, wherein I think the other Account Most defective.

14. And first though it should be true that to be above Reason is to be Incomprehensible, and to be Con­trary to Reason is to appear repug­nant to some Principle or Conclu­sion of Right Reason, yet I do not think this of it self sufficient either to Clear or to Justifie the Distincti­on, since it may be both again de­manded what it is to be incompre­hensible, and what repugnant, and again disputed whether incomprehen­sible and repugnant be not the same, as well as whether that which is a­bove Reason be not also Contrary to it. And then we are but where we were before. This Account of the Matter is then too Gross and Ge­neral to be rested in, and we must be therefore more minute and par­ticular in our Explanation of it, if we would be more Clear.

15. However since Generals are to go before, and do also prepare the way for Particulars, I shall first pro­pose [Page 116] the general Idea of things a­bove Reason and contrary to Rea­son, and then particularize upon that Idea, by opening and unfolding more distinctly and explicitly what is con­tain'd in it, and by so comparing and collating together the two parts of the Notion as to shew the real Difference that is between them. So that I shall make but one work of the Explanatory and Iustificatory parts, supposing that there needs no more to the Justification of the Di­stinction, than only to have the Members of it well explain'd. For if the Idea of Above Reason be di­stinct from the Idea of Contrary to Reason (as the Explanation of them will shew that it is) then the Distin­ction proceeds upon a real Difference, is grounded upon the Nature of things, and has all that is necessary to a true and good Distinction.

16. By things above Reason then (as the Expression is used in this Distinction) I conceive to be Meant, Not such as Reason of it self cannot Discover, but such as when proposed it cannot Comprehend. And by things Contrary to Reason I conceive [Page 117] such as it can and does actually com­prehend, and that to be absolutely Impossible. Or in other words, a thing is then above Reason when we do not comprehend how it can be, and then Contrary to Reason when we do positively comprehend that it cannot be. Thus in the General.

17. But to be a little more Par­ticular, we are to Consider upon the first Part, that when we speak of things above Reason, the word Rea­son here (as was shewn in the first Chapter) signifies the same as Vn­derstanding, and there being but one only Operation of that, namely Per­ception, by Comprehend here must be meant the same as by Perceive. So that when we say of things above Reason that they are such as Reason cannot Comprehend, 'tis the same as to say they are such as the Under­standing cannot Perceive. But then when we say, Cannot Perceive, 'tis to be carefully noted that this is not to be understood of the literal and Grammatical Meaning of the Propo­sition, as if the thing said to be A­bove Reason were perfectly unintelli­gible, but only of the Truth of it, [Page 118] as was observ'd before concerning Faith. And then again when we say that Above Reason is when we do not Comprehend or Perceive the Truth of a thing, this must not be meant of not Comprehending the Truth in its whole Latitude and Ex­tent, so that as many Truths should be said to be above Reason as we cannot thus thorougly comprehend and pursue throughout all their Conse­quences and Relations to other Truths (for then almost every thing would be Above Reason) but only of not comprehending the Union or Con­nexion of those immediate Ideas of which the Proposition supposed to be above Reason consists. And which is therefore said to be above Reason not because the simple and direct Meaning of its Terms is unintelligi­ble, or because the Truth of it is not comprehensible in its remotest and utmost Extent, but purely because the Connexion of its Ideas, or the manner of it, is not discernible, and that partly for want of sufficient clearness of the Ideas themselves so as to be able to perceive their Uni­on Intuitively, and partly for want [Page 119] of a due and proper Medium where­by to compare them, so as to dis­cern their Union in the way of Sci­ence and Demonstration.

18. 'Tis also to be Observ'd upon the Second part of the Explanation, that I chuse rather to say that things contrary to Reason are such as we Perceive to be Impossible, than such as appear contrary to some Principle, or some Conclusion of Right Reason. This being the more General and Absolute Idea, whereof the two o­ther are but Instances and Specifica­tions. For then is a thing said to be Impossible when its Ideas cannot stand together or be united. Which may be either because of the imme­diate Opposition and Inconsistency of the Ideas themselves with them­sel [...]s so as Mutually to Exclude each other (as in a Contradiction) or be­cause of their inconsistency with some other Truth, with which it cannot Comport. Or in other words, either because one of the Ideas can­not consist with the other, by rea­son of the immediate opposition that is between them, or because the U­nion of both is inconsistent with some [Page 120] Truth or other, which therefore will not suffer them to be United. Which Truth will be indeed either a Principle or a Conclusion of right Reason. And then we are said to Perceive a thing to be Impossible when we perceive that its Ideas can­not stand together, and that either immediately by the very inconsisten­cy of the Ideas themselves, or me­diately by the Repugnance that they carry to some other Truth, whether Principle or Conclusion. Which Repugnance I take to consist in this, that the supposed Principle or Con­clusion cannot stand with the Union of such Ideas, and that therefore if such a Principle or such a Conclusi­on be true (as is supposed) then such Ideas are not United, and indeed are as uncapable of Union, that is as impossible, as if there were an imme­diate inconsistency between the Ideas themselves. So that for a thing to be Contrary to Reason, is, in short, for the Understanding to perceive the Absolute impossibility of it, or that its Ideas cannot stand together, which it does either Immediately by perceiving the direct inconsistency of [Page 121] those Ideas, or Mediately by per­ceiving their inconsistency with some evident and incontestable Truth or other, whether Principle or Con­clusion. For the way and method is the same in knowing a thing to be False or impossible as in knowing it to be True, and accordingly as the Process of the Understanding is either Immediate or Mediate in the latter, so is it also in the Former. But though there are these different ways of perceiving the impossiblity of a thing, 'tis in the General Percep­tion of its Impossibility and not in the several ways of it that its con­trariety to Reason must be made Formally to consist; Even as it was shewn before of Knowledge, which is made to consist in the Perception of the Relation of Ideas, and not in this or that determinate manner of perceiving it, which indeed serve afterwards to distinguish Knowledge into its kinds (as suppose Intuitive and Demonstrative) but do not en­ter into its First and General Idea. For which Consideration I think the Perception of a things impossi­bility does better express its Con­trariety [Page 122] to Reason than the Re­pugnance it appears to have to some Principle or Conclusion of it, that being only (as I said before) an in­stance and specification (and but one single one too) of its Impossibi­lity.

19. So Now we are arrived to a Clear and Distinct Conception of things Above Reason and things Contrary to Reason. A thing is then above Reason when we do not Perceive or Comprehend how it can be. And then Contrary to Reason when we do Perceive that it Cannot be, or is Impossible. As to give a plain and sensible Instance of each of these. That the sides of an Hy­perbola should be always approach­ing to each other and yet never meet, though continued to infinity; is a Proposition of unquestion'd Cer­tainty in Geometry, and yet such as passes the Reason of a Man to Com­prehend how it can be, and there­fore may properly be said to be one of those things that are above Rea­son. But now that a Triangle should have Parallel Sides, is not only above Reason, but directly Contrary to it. [Page 123] For here the Understanding is not only at a loss to Comprehend how it may be, but does positively and evi­dently perceive that it cannot be, it being utterly impossible that a Fi­gure of Three Lines should have its sides Parallel to each other.

20. Now though by this Expla­nation of things above Reason and contrary to Reason the Difference between them is already obvious e­ven to the eye, and stares a Man in the very Face, like things of great inequality whose Disproportion ap­pears at View, without Measuring them, yet for further Satisfaction's sake, and to make the matter as plain as any thing in Nature to all but those who either have not, or will not use their Understandings, let us a little Compare these Ideas toge­ther, thereby the better to illustrate their Difference.

21. It is most Evident that the Idea of things above Reason and the Idea of things contrary to Reason are two really distinct Ideas, and that One is Not the Other. This immediately appears from the very direct View of the Ideas themselves. [Page 124] For what can be More plain than that Not to Comprehend how a thing may be, and to Comprehend that it cannot be, are two different things? And what better way have we to know the Distinction of things, but only that the Idea of one is not the Idea of another? But then be­sides, the Ideas of these things are not only Formally different from each other, but have also different Properties and Characters belonging to them, and such too as are exclu­sive of each other, and which there­fore do manifestly shew the Ideas to which they belong to be distinct. For, for a thing to be above Reason implies only a Negation, the Not Comprehending how a thing can be, but for a thing to be Contrary to Reason implies the Position of an In­tellectual act, the Comprehending that it cannot be. Again, in things above Reason the Proposition is sup­posed not to be understood, whereas in things Contrary to Reason, it is supposed to be well understood, and that to be false and impossible. A­gain, in things above Reason the Mind determines nothing concern­ing [Page 125] the Object proposed, whether it be true or whether it be false, whe­ther it be Possible, or whether it be Impossible. All that she determines is concerning her own Act, that she does not Comprehend how it can be. But whether it be or not, that she does not affirm, but holds herself in a perfect Suspence. But now in things Contrary to Reason the Mind is every whit as positive and deci­sive, and does determine as boldly and freely as in those things that are most according to it. Whereby it plainly appears that to be Contrary to Reason is something more than to be above it, and that the Mind proceeds a great deal further in the former than in the latter, the Lan­guage of the Soul in things above Reason being only, How can these things be! But in things Contrary to Reason she is Positive and Dogma­tical, roundly pronouncing, This cannot be. So that unless there be no difference between a Negation and a Positive Act, between the Igno­rance or Non-Perception of a thing, and the knowing it to be False, be­tween Suspension and a peremptory [Page 126] Determination, between a greater and a less, 'tis most undeniably evi­dent that the Parts of this Distinction are not only really but widely diffe­rent, and that to be above Reason is one thing, and to be contrary to Reason is another.

22. If it be pretended (as some perhaps may be likely to Object) that to be Contrary to Reason im­plies a Negation, as well as to be above Reason, because it is there supposed to be Comprehended that the thing is False and cannot be, and that therefore they agree in one of the Main instances of their Diffe­rence, to this the Answer is Clear and Full. I grant there is a Nega­tion in one as well as the other, but then I distinguish of Negation. There is a Negation of the Act, and a Negation of the Object. Contrary to Reason does indeed imply a Ne­gation of the Object, that is, it im­plies a Separation and dis-union of certain Ideas, as inconsistent and in­compatible one with another. But it does not imply a Negation of the Act, but the quite Contrary, be­cause the understanding is here [Page 127] supposed positively to comprehend the thing, and withal the Impossi­bility of it, which is not done in things Above Reason, wherein the Negation is that of the Act. So that this first and great difference between them stands firm and good.

23. And now having thus far justified the reality of this distincti­on of things Above Reason and Contrary to Reason both by the Explanation and Collation of the Parts of it, which thereby appear to consist of Ideas as different as can well be conceiv'd, I might further proceed to do the same by producing some Instances of things confessed­ly Above Reason that are also not­withstanding as confessedly True. For if any one thing that is Above Reason be yet found to be true, this plainly demonstrates the thing in Question (if there can be yet any Question about it) most evidently shewing that what is Above Rea­son is not as such Contrary to Rea­son, it being impossible that what is Contrary to Reason should be true, whatever is Contrary to Rea­son being also as Contrary to Truth. [Page 128] I might also further alledge that to be Above Reason does equally ab­stract from True and False (which Contrary to Reason does not) and that not only because, as I observed before, it determines nothing con­cerning its Object, but also because 'tis a thing not of an Absolute, but of a Relative Importance, as being an extrinsecal Denomination taken not from the Nature of the Object as it is in it self, but only as it is to us, and in relation to our not only Finite, but very Limited Capacities. For to be Above Reason is not to be Above Reason in general or all Rea­son, so as to be absolutely incom­prehensible, but only Human Rea­son. But then that which is Above the Reason of a Man may not be Above the Reason of an Angel (as indeed what is Above the Reason of one Man may not transcend that of another) and what is above the Rea­son of an Angel may yet be perfect­ly comprehended by God, the Su­pream and Soveraign Reason. So that to be Above Reason here is of a respective signification, such as does not express the quality of the Object [Page 129] as it is in its own Nature, but only as it is in reference to such a particu­lar Faculty, whereas to be Contrary to Reason is not a Relative but an Absolute thing, and whatever is Con­trary to Reason, is Contrary to all Reason, and so consequently to Truth. I say I might further insist on these and some other Considera­tions, but being partly prevented here by Mr. Boyle (whose Account I would have used to supply the de­fects of Mine, as Mine is intended to supply some of his) and having so abundantly clear'd the difference of these things already, I shall not so far distrust either the Strength of the Argument, or that of my Rea­der's Understanding, as to prosecute this Matter any further than only to shape an Answer out of what has been laid down, to an Objection which I meet with in a Modern Writer against Monsieur Iurieu, and which, to do it the utmost Justice, I will set down in his own words.

24. I have Consider'd (says he) the Distinction which they use between be­ing Contrary to Reason,Avis Stir le Table [...] du Socini­anisme. Traité 1. pag. 14▪ and being a­bove Reason. 'Tis agreed that 'tis not [Page 130] possible to believe what is Contrary to Reason. But 'tis said that we can well believe what is above Reason. This Distinction seems to me of no use, or else I do not comprehend it. For if by being above Reason it be meant that we do not comprehend a Truth in its whole Extent, though what we con­ceive of it be clear and certain, I own that in this sense one ought to believe what is above Reason. But if by being above Reason be meant a Doctrine, wherein we see nothing Clear, a Do­ctrine which our Reason loses the sight of on all its sides, I mean that all the Propositions which may be extracted from it appear incomprehensible, such a one as this for example, that the three Divine Persons make but one God, &c. It seems that to be above Rea­son in this sense, is the same as to be intirely inaccessible to Reason, which differs nothing, but in words, from be­ing Contrary to Reason.

25. I suppose whoever has duely consider'd and well comprehended the Tenour of the foregoing Dis­course, can neither be insensible of the Deficiency of this Allegation, nor be long at a loss what Answer [Page 131] to return to it. But to spare my Reader this Trouble, My Reply is, that this Author's Argument pro­ceeds upon a wrong Supposition. He supposes here that to be Above Reason must be either the Not Com­prehending a thing in its whole La­titude and extent, or the Compre­hending Nothing at all of it. Where­as I have shewn before that 'tis nei­ther of them; That we do not mean by Above Reason what is all over unintelligible, even as to the very Meaning of the Proposition, nor what is not to be Comprehended in its utmost extent, but only what is in­comprehensible to us as to the Truth of the thing, or the Manner of it. 'Tis true indeed if the Proposition were perfectly unintelligible, so that (as he says) we could see nothing clear in it, even as to the very Sense and Meaning of it, we could no more believe it than what is Contrary to Reason, though even then it would not (as this Author confusely e­nough pretends) be the same with it, because what is Contrary to Reason is supposed to be well un­derstood. But 'tis much otherwise [Page 132] if it be incomprehensible only as to the Truth or Manner of the thing. This as I shall shew hereafter may very well be Beleiv'd, though what is Contrary to Reason cannot, and what is utterly unintelligible can­not. And I have sufficiently shewn already that what is thus only in­accessible to Reason differs, a little more than in words, from being contrary to it.

26. And now if Humane Nature were not a very unaccountable thing, I should stand greatly amazed at either the Natural or wilful Blind­ness of those who are for confound­ing things so vastly different as the parts of this Distinction, of things above Reason and contrary to it, most apparently are. There are in­deed some things which we are or­dinarily taught to distinguish, and yet when strictly examin'd and com­pared, will be found to have no real ground of Distinction in them. And 'tis every whit as great (and almost as Common) a Fault to distinguish things that do not differ, as to con­found those that do. And there are [Page 133] also other things of such near Re­semblance and Cognation to each other that there needs a great deal of Art, Subtlety and nice Inspe­ction to discern their Difference. So Fine and Minute and almost im­perceptible are the Lines that ter­minate their Natures, and divide them from one another. But the Ideas of these things are as different as those of a Man and a Tree, a Triangle and a Square, so that a Man must wink hard not to per­ceive it, or be very insincere not to acknowledge it. And I cannot ima­gine why those especially who are known to serve themselves upon occasion of Distinctions which have no other Foundation than the mere Will and Pleasure (unless you will say Interest) of those that use them, should yet reject such a Solid and well-grounded, as well as well Au­thorized, one as this, but only be­cause it is not for their turn, and, if admitted, would like a Bomb thrown into their Garrison, blow up and lay wast their Main Strength, and force them to desert and give [Page 134] up a Cause which they are (now especially) most Zealously Fond of, and seem resolv'd even against Reason to Maintain.

27. For I must further remarqu [...] (and 'tis an Observation not lightly to be pass'd over) that if this One Distinction of things above Reason, and things contrary to Reason be once admitted, or shewn to be real, Solid and well-grounded, the main part of the Socinian Controversie is immediately, or at least in the very next Consequence, at an end. For the Reason why they will not be­lieve things above Reason is because (as they pretend) Above Reason differs nothing in reality from Con­trary to Reason, and so those things that are above Reason are also as much contrary to it as above it, and what is Contrary to Reason is on both sides acknowledg'd impossible to be believ'd. Well, but then if it be made appear (as I think by this time is sufficiently done) that these two are quite different things, and that to be above Reason is not the same as to be contrary to it, [Page 135] then even by their own Confession there can be no pretence why what is above Reason may not be Be­liev'd. Which I take to be the true inducement that makes these Men stand out so fiercely and obstinately against this Distinction (for they are aware what mischief it will do 'em) as it is also the reason why I have bestow'd so much care and pains to clear and justifie it.

28. And thus having given an Account of these great and Funda­mental things, what Reason is, what Faith is, and what it is to be Above, and what Contrary to Rea­son, we have now prepared the way to the more full and direct Consi­deration of the Belief of things a­bove Reason, the true state of which Question by what has been hitherto discours'd appears to be this, Whe­ther we may not Assent upon the Authority of Divine Revelation to such things as our Understanding or Reason cannot perceive or Com­prehend as to the Truth or Manner of them. Or, whether our not being able thus to Comprehend them, be a [Page 136] sufficient Reason why we should not believe them. For the Resolution of which we have already laid the Grounds, and shall now proceed more directly to build upon them in the following Chapter.

1. WE have gain'd a most wonderful Point in the foregoing Chapter, by proving the Distinction between things Above and things Contrary to Reason, and such as of it self alone is suffici­ent Not only immediately to de­cide, but even forever to Silence the Controversie between us and our Socinian Adversaries concerning the Belief of things above Reason. For the only Objection that is or can pos­sibly be pretended against the Belief of things above Reason being the supposed Contrariety of the same things to Reason, if it be shewn that to be above Reason involves no such Contrariety, then the Ob­jection against the belief of such things is fairly and wholly remov­ed, [Page 138] and consequently there remains no Reason why they may not be Believ'd. So that I cannot but look upon the Substance of my Work as most effectually done already, and those of our Adversaries that have any reasonable Measure of Pene­tration and Sincerity must needs be sensible of it. And I dare appeal even to their own Consciences whe­ther they are not. However con­sidering the importunity of those I have to deal with, as well as the weight of the Cause it self, I shall endeavour the further establishment of it upon some other Considerati­ons, whereby I shall also give fur­ther Confirmation, and so repay what I am endebted to the Point contended for in the preceding Chap­ter, since we may as well argue backwards from the Believableness of things above Reason to their not Contrariety, as forwards from their not Contrariety to their Believable­ness, the Consequence being full as good, thus, Above Reason Believa­ble, therefore not Contrary, as thus, Above Reason not Contrary, therefore Believable. Now in order to the [Page 139] fuller Conviction and demonstration of the Believableness of things a­bove Reason I set out upon this Ground, that Humane Reason is not the Measure of Truth.

2. 'Tis agreed among the Masters of Reason that as all Proof ought to be only of such things as need it, so there are Propositions so Clear and Evident of themselves that they have no need of being demonstra­ted, and that there are some again that are not capable of Demonstra­tion, the Fulness and immediateness of their Evidence rendring them strictly indemonstrable. And it has been charged by one of the most Considerable of them as a Fault in the Method of the Geometricians that they set themselves to prove things that have no need of Proof,L' Art de Penser. p. 432. where­of he gives an Instance in Euclid, who goes formally to work to prove that two sides of a Triangle taken together are greater than one, al­though this be most Evident even from the Notion only of a Right Line, which is the shortest that can possibly be between two Points, and the Natural Measure of Distance [Page 140] from one Point to another, which it could not be if it were not also the shortest of all Lines that can be drawn from Point to Point.

3. Now though I cannot say that the Proposition of this Chapter is so Evident of it self as not to be ca­pable of Demonstration, yet I must Confess I cannot but think it of the Number of those that do not need any, that is I mean, to those who will but take the Pains to consider it with Attention, and are withal so sincere as to say ingenuously what they inwardly think. For to un­attentive or Captious Persons no­thing is plain (since there is No­thing but what some will contradict, and there are those who profess to doubt of every thing) and even the Sun it self can't make a Man see, if either he want eyes, or will shut 'em. I cannot therefore say that to such men either this or any other Proposition is plain, but I would venture to be tried by any compe­tent and indifferent Considerer whe­ther this be not indeed a very plain and certain Proposition, as plain as most of those which pass for Prin­ciples [Page 141] and Maximes in Discourse, that Human Reason is not the Mea­sure of Truth. And accordingly I should justly fear incurring the same Censure that is charged upon the Geometricians, of going to prove what is evident, were there not something peculiar in the present Case that makes it very different from theirs. For they dealing in Mat­ters of an Abstract and indifferent Nature, and such wherein the Lusts and Passions of men are altogether uninteressed, have no real need to prove evident things, because for that very reason their Evidence is never Contested; whereas the Point I have now in hand being of a Mo­ral Concernment and such as in­counters the Partialities and false Biasses of Humane Nature, parti­cularly that great and governing one of Self-Love, though it should be of equal evidence with some of their Maxims, will yet not be e­qually secure from Opposition, and pass alike uncontested. And so there may be need of proving it, if not to do any necessary Service to the Pro­position it self, yet to satisfie the [Page 142] importunity of the Men I argue with. Which indeed is the present Case, since (as was intimated in the Beginning) the Sentiment of these Men concerning the disbelief of things above Reason resolves at last into this Principle, that Human Reason is the Measure of Truth. Which therefore both for their Sa­tisfaction and Refutation must be shewn to be False.

4. Now when I say that Human Reason is not the Measure of Truth, my meaning is, that it is not that Common Standard whereby Truth in the General is to be Measured, so that of every thing it may be safe­ly Concluded that it is either true or not true according as it accords with this Measure, as 'tis comprehensi­ble or not Comprehensible by Hu­man Reason. 'Tis true indeed there is a certain Sense in which Human Reason sometimes is, and may be truely said to be the Measure of Truth, in as much as whatever the Understanding does clearly and di­stinctly Perceive may be concluded as most certainly true, it being im­possible that a thing should be other­wise [Page 143] than as we clearly perceive it to be, without supposing our Per­ceptive Faculties to be in themselves Naturally False, and without sup­posing it also necessary that we should fall into Errour even in the right use of these Faculties (it being impossible to conceive a More right use of them than to Assent only to what we clearly Perceive) which are not only in themselves manifest Absurdities, but such also as would necessarily infer the Authour of our Natures to be also the Authour of our Errours and Deceptions. It must therefore be admitted by all what the Philosophers of the Car­tesian way so earnestly stand and Contend for, that Clearness of Per­ception is the great Rule and Crite­rion of Truth, so far that whatever we do clearly and distinctly perceive to be true is really in it self True. But then this is only to be a Partial and inadequate Rule, and in some certain limited respect only, not ab­solutely and in general. For though I grant that whatever we clearly perceive is true, yet I deny that it follows likewise Backwards, that [Page 144] whatever is true we do also clearly Perceive, and so consequently that whatever we do not clearly Perceive is therefore not True. By which it is plain that this Cartesian Maxim must be very much abused to prove that Human Reason is the Common and General Measure of Truth, and I dare say the Great Authors of it never intended it to that purpose.

5. Reason or Understanding in general may be safely said, and must necessarily be allow'd to be the Measure of Truth. For Truth in general carries a necessary Relation to understanding in general, as fully adequate and commensurate to it. So that all Truth is simply and ab­solutely intelligible, the greatest and sublimest Truths as much as the least and meanest, those which the Angels study and desire to look in­to, as much as those which employ the narrow Thoughts of the poorest Rustic. The Former are in them­selves as intelligible as the latter, and if not actually so well under­stood 'tis not because of any incapa­city in the Objects, but by reason of the Disproportion of the Faculties [Page 145] that are Conversant about them. But this disproportion must not be Universal, nor extend throughout the whole Order of Being. For what is intelligible must be so to some Understanding (since what no Understanding can Comprehend is the same as not to be intelligible) and consequently there must be an Understanding that Comprehends all that is truly intelligible, that is, all Truth. And accordingly it may be truly said of this All-Compre­hensive Understanding, that it is the Measure of Truth, so that whatever this perfect Understand­ing does not understand is not intelli­gible, and if not intelligible, then also not True. Besides that it might be further Consider'd (were this a proper place for so Abstract and Metaphysical a Speculation) that Truth it Self, as to the real Nature and Essence of it, is one and the same with the Divine Ideas as they are related to one another, and does therefore exist Originally and intirely in the Mind of God, who is Substantial Truth, and accord­ingly does Comprehend all Truth, [Page 146] and so consequently is the Measure of it. And because this All-com­prehensive Understanding is con­tain'd within the Extent of Reason or Understanding in General, there­fore it may be truly said also of Reason or Understanding in Gene­ral that it is the Measure of Truth, it being most certain that what is above all Reason, or what no Rea­son whatsoever can Comprehend is as much above Truth too, and can­not possibly be true.

6. But though it be thus neces­sary to allow this of Reason in Ge­neral, the same cannot be allow'd of Human Reason. For whatever is the Measure of Truth must be fully adequate and Commensurate to Truth. That's Certain. And therefore if Human Reason be the Measure of Truth it must have the same compass and extent with Truth, and possess it whole and in­tire, if not Essentially and Substan­tially as God does, yet at least Noe­tically and by way of Theory, so as to be able thoroughly to Per­ceive and Comprehend all Truth. But now that this Qualification can­not [Page 147] possibly agree to Human Rea­son (though it be somewhat un­reasonable that I should be put to prove such a Proposition as this) I hope fully to demonstrate upon a Double Consideration, one taken from the Nature of Human Rea­son, and the other from the Nature of Truth.

7. And first to begin with Truth. This, as the Most thinking and Metaphysical Persons Conceive of it, is supposed to consist in the Relations of equality or inequality, or Agreement or Disagreement. Now we are to Consider that these Relations may be of Three Sorts, either such as are between Created Beings, or such as are between In­telligible Ideas, or such as are be­tween Created Beings and their Ideas. And we are also to Consi­der that there are two General Sorts of Truths extremely different one from another, and therefore care­fully to be distinguish'd. Those that regard only the Abstract Na­tures of things, and their immuta­ble Essences, independently on their actual Existence. And others a­gain [Page 148] that do regard things that do actually Exist. The former of these Constitute that Order of Truths which we call Necessary, the latter that which we call Contingent. And this double order of Truths results from that threefold Relation be­fore-mention'd. From the first and third Relations arise Contingent Truths, which are nothing else but the Relations of agreement of dis­agreement that are either between Created Beings themselves, or be­tween Created Beings and their I­deas. And these I call Contingent Truths in opposition to those that are Necessary and Eternal, partly because these Relations could not begin to exist before those Beings were produced (it being impossible that there should be Relations be­tween things that are not) and partly because these Relations might not have existed, because those Be­ings might not have been produ­ced. And as Contingent Truths arise from the first and third, so from the second and middle Rela­tions result those Truths which are Necessary, Eternal, and Immutable, [Page 149] and which I understand to be no­thing else but the Relations of Agree­ment or Disagreement that are be­tween Ideas.

8. I go here upon the common and allow'd Distinction between Necessary and Contingent Truths, and upon the as much allow'd Sup­position that there is such an Order of Truths as are Necessary and Eter­nal, which therefore I take for granted as a Principle, not to de­cline the trouble of proving it, but because it is a Confess'd as well as Evident thing, and I care not for proving any more evident things than I needs must. And that these Necessary and Eternal Truths are in this precisely distinguish'd from those that are Contingent, that they are the Relations that are between I­deas, I think is plain from the very Notion and Nature of them, be­cause they are supposed to be such Truths as regard the Abstract Na­tures and Essences of things as they are in Idea, and not as they have an actual Existence in rerum Naturâ, since then they would not be ne­cessary, but Contingent Truths, [Page 148] [...] [Page 149] [...] [Page 150] which would be contrary to the Supposition. And Because these Ne­cessary Truths are the most consi­derable and principal sort of Truths, as being the Ground and Founda­tion of all Science, and the true and proper Objects of our Theory and Contemplation, and because for the same Reason whenever we speak of Truth Absolutely and in General we are presumed to mean necessa­ry and immutable Truth, hence it is that Truth is commonly said by Metaphysical Writers to consist in the Relations that are between Ideas, though indeed this be strictly true only of Necessary Truth. But it is sufficient to the present purpose that it is true of this. And so much I suppose will readily be granted me at least, that the general Nature and Reason of Necessary and Eternal Truths consists in the Relations that are between Ideas.

9. I further add that these Ideas must be the same with the Divine Ideas. 'Tis true indeed that exact­ly speaking all Ideas are Divine I­deas, even those which we use to call our own, it being most Cer­tain [Page 151] (as might easily and with the greatest Evidence be shewn) that the immediate Objects of our Un­derstandings are no other than the Ideas of the Divine Intellect, in which we see and contemplate all things. But not to enter into this sublime Speculation at present, it will be sufficient to consider that unless the Ideas whose Relations Constitute those Truths which are Necessary and Eternal be the Di­vine Ideas, it will be impossible that Necessary and Eternal Truths should be what we suppose they are, that is Necessary and Eternal. For Ne­cessary and Eternal Truths must be Necessary and Eternal Relations, and it being impossible that Rela­tions should be more Necessary or Eternal than the Subjects from which they result, unless these Ideas the Subjects of these Relations be Ne­cessary and Eternal, how can their Relations be so? 'Tis plain there­fore that these Ideas must be Ne­cessary and Eternal. But now I pray what Ideas are so but the Di­vine? What is there in the whole Compass of Being that is Necessary, [Page 152] Eternal and Immutable but God and his Divine Perfections? As there­fore we say that these Necessary and Eternal Truths are Relations between Ideas, and not such as are between either Created Entities themselves, or between them and their Ideas, because then they would be of the Order of Contingent, not of Necessary Truths, For the same reason we must say that they are the Relations that are between the Divine Ideas, those only being suf­ficiently steddy and Permanent Sub­jects to sustain such Stable and Im­mutable Relations. And indeed were it not for those Representa­tive Perfections of the Divine Na­ture which we call Ideas, there would be no Necessary and Eternal Essences to support these Necessary and Eternal Relations, and then there could be no such Relations, and if no such Relations, then there could be no Necessary Truths, and is no Necessary Truths then no Science Which by the way would most Convineingly prove to any Ca­pable and Attentive Understanding the absolute Necessity and Certainty [Page 153] of a God, as the most inmost Ground and Central Support of the whole Intellectual World.

10. Well then it can no longer be doubted but that these Necessary and Eternal Truths are the Relati­ons that are between the Divine Ideas. But now as these Ideas are Infinite as being the Essential Per­fections of God, and really identi­fy'd with his Divine Nature and Substance, so it must necessarily fol­low that the Relations that result from them, and subsist between them must also be Infinite. And then since these Truths do essen­tially Consist in, and in their Rea­son and Formality are no other than these Ideal Relations, it no less evi­dently follows that Truth also must be Infinite too.

11. Which also will be necessary to Conclude upon another Account. For I confider again that since Re­lations do not in reality differ as di­stinct Entities from their Subjects and Terms (as the Relations of two Circles supposed to be equal to each other do not really differ from the Circles themselves so related) these [Page 154] Ideal Relations must in the reality of the thing be one and the same with the Divine Ideas themselves, and consequently with the Divine Na­ture with which these Ideas are i­dentified. And accordingly Truth which is the same with these Ideal Relations must also as to the real Essence and Substance of it be one and the same with the Divine Na­ture.

12. And that indeed it is so may be further, and somewhat more di­rectly, demonstrated thus. That God is the Cause of whatever is be­sides himself, or, that whatever is, is either God or the Effect of God is a clear and acknowledg'd Princi­ple. Necessary Truth then is either God or the Effect of God. But it is not the Effect of God, and there­fore it can be no other than God himself. Now that it is not the Effect of God, the many gross Ab­surdities which that supposition draws after it I think will oblige him that Considers them to acknow­ledge. For First, if Necessary Truth be the effect of God either it would not be necessary, which is against [Page 155] the Supposition; or if it be, then as being a necessary Effect it must have a necessary Cause, that is a Cause necessarily determin'd to act, and so God would be a necessary Agent, even ad extra. He would also be an unintelligent Agent. The Conse­quence is not to be avoided. For if Truth be the effect of God then an­tecedently to the effecting of it, there was no Truth, and consequently no Knowledge, because there could be nothing known; and so God in the production of Truth (if indeed he did produce it) must be supposed to act altogether in the dark, and with­out any Intelligence. Again, if Truth be the Effect of God, then the Perfection of the Divine Under­standing must be supposed to depend upon something that is not God, nay upon something created by God, whereas God is the true perfective Object of all his Creatures, and is himself completely Happy in the sole Contemplation of himself. 'T [...]will follow again that God has constitu­ted an Order of Realities which he has not [...]ower to abolish; that he has made some things which he can­not [Page 156] unmake again. And lastly to add no more, If Truth be the Ef­fect of God then it cannot be God, (because God cannot produce what is Himself) and if it be not God, then by the Supposition there will be something Necessary, Immuta­ble, Eternal and Independent, &c. that is not God. Which last Con­sequence as it contradicts the Com­mon and Natural Sentiment of Man­kind, so it struck so hard against a certain very Thoughtful and Meta­physical Head,Cogit. Rational. de Deo, p. 296. that he could not forbear urging this as One Argu­ment against the very Being of Ne­cessary Truth; because then (as he pretends) there would be something Necessary besides God, not consider­ing that this Necessary Truth is re­ally one and the same with the Di­vine Substance. Which one Con­sideration puts by the whole force of his Argument against the Being of Necessary Truth, though however it be sufficiently conclusive of the Point we now contend for, that this Truth is not the Effect of God. For if it were then his Allegation would take place; that is, there would in­deed [Page 157] be something Necessary besides God, which though it does not fol­low from the Supposition of the Being of Necessary Truth, is yet plainly inseparable from the other Supposition, that of its being the Effect of God. For then the very next Consequence is, that there would be something Necessary be­sides God, which no Religious, nor indeed Rational Ear can bear. 'Tis plain therefore that Truth is not the Effect of God; and since it is not, it remains by vertue of the premised Disjunction that it can be no other than the very Substance and Essence of the Deity.

13. And to this purpose I further consider, That the whole Perfection of the Mind does consist in its union with God, who is her only true Good. This seems to me a Propo­sition of a very shining Evidence. For the good of the Mind must of necessity be something Spiritual, o­therwise it would be of a Nature inferiour to herself, and so not capa­ble of being her Perfection. But neither is that enough Whatever is the good of the Mind must not [Page 158] be only of a like Nature with the Mind, that is, of a Spiritual, but of a superiour Nature too. It must be something above the Mind that can be its Perfection, and that can act upon it, and inlighten it, and affect it with pleasing Sensations, otherwise how can it be able to add any thing to its better Being or Per­fection? And in order to all this it must also be intimately present to it, and united with it, otherwise how can it so act upon it? But now God is the only Spiritual Being whom we can possibly conceive thus qualified to be the good or perfective Object of our Minds. Whence it follows that he only is so, and that we can­not become either more Perfect or more Happy in any Kind or Degree but by our Union with, and Posses­sion of God. And hence it further follows, that Truth could not be any Perfection of our Understandings if it were not the same with the Divine Essence (since that is our only per­fective and beatifying Object) and that therefore since it really is per­fective of our Understandings, and that in the very highest measure [Page 159] (the Understanding being then most Perfect when it has the clearest and the largest view of Truth) it can be no other than the very Essence of that Infinite Mind who is the only true Good and Objective Perfection of all Spirits.

14. 'Tis true indeed Des Cartes makes all Truth, even that which is Eternal to have been positively instituted and establish'd by God, to depend upon him as the Summus Legislator, to be the effect of his Will and Pleasure, and by Consequence to be Absolutely and Originally Ar­bitrary and Contingent. So that ac­cording to him 2 and 2 might not have been 4, or 3 Angles of a Tri­angle might not have been equal to 2 Right ones if God had pleas'd so to Order it. But this Notion of this Great Man does so rudely Shock the Natural Sense of Mankind that it cannot find Admission even where the rest of his Philosophy does, but is generally exploded notwithstand­ing the eminency of its Author, and that even by one of his greatest Ad­mirers,Mr. Male­branche. and (as I think) by far the Most Considerable of his Disciples. [Page 160] And truly I think this Opinion is treated no worse than it deserves, since besides the Absurdities already Mention'd, it shakes the Foundati­ons of Science, yea and of Mora­lity too, by supposing the Natures not only of Metaphysical and Ma­thematical Truth, but even of Mo­ral Good and Evil to be of a Posi­tive and Arbitrary, and Consequent­ly of a Contingent Ordination. It is therefore deservedly as well as generally rejected, but then let those that reject it have a Care that they fall not into a worse Absurdity. As they would not suppose Truth to be of a Positive and Alterable Na­ture and that the Relations of Ideas might have been otherwise than they are, so let them have a Care how they make any thing Neces­sary and Immutable that is Not God. Let them be Consistent with themselves, and as they justly re­ject the Opinion that makes Truth the Effect of God's Free and Arbi­trarious Constitution, and conse­quently of a Mutable and Variable Nature, so let them own and Con­fess (as they are Obliged to do) that [Page 161] it is no other than God himself. For there is no other way of avoid­ing Des Cartes's Absurdity. For if Truth be not God then 'tis the Ef­fect of God, and if the Effect of God then since the Constitutions of God are Free and Arbitrary, the Natures and Relations of things might have been quite otherwise than they are, the whole Science of Geometry might be transposed, a Circle might have the Properties of a Square, and a Square the Properties of a Circle, 2 and 2 might not have been 4, or what else you will instance in. And so in Morality too (which is of far worse Consequence) there might have been the like transposition, what is Vertue might have been Vice, and what is Vice might have been Vertue. These are the Na­tural Consequences of Truth's being the Effect of Divine Constitution, and they are intolerable ones too, and therefore the Principle from which they flow is by the general Current of Writers well denied. But then unless they proceed, and acknowledge Truth to be one with the Divine Essence they cannot help [Page 162] relapsing into the same or worse Absurdities. For whoever says that Truth is not God must say that it is the Effect of God, and whoever says that, must either say that 'tis Arbitrary and Contingent, or if he says it is Necessary and Immutable, he must allow of something Neces­sary and Immutable that is not God. But now it being most Evident that there is nothing Necessary that is not God, if Truth be not God then 'tis plain that it cannot be Necessary (which presently runs us into the Cartesian Absurdity of the Arbitra­ry Position of Truth) or if it be Necessary then 'tis as plain that it must be God. The short is, Truth is either God or the Effect of God. If it be not God, then 'tis the Effect of God as Des Cartes says. But if not the Effect of God (as the Con­sequent Absurdities from that Prin­ciple demonstrate, and as is gene­rally granted) then 'tis God him­self as we say. It must be one or the other, there is no Medium. To say that Truth is God, or to say that 'tis the Effect of God are each of them Consistent Propositions, [Page 163] though from the gross Absurdities of the Latter the Former only ap­pears to be the right, but to deny that 'tis the effect of God and yet not to say that it is God, that is to affirm that 'tis neither the Effect of God nor yet God, is all over un­maintainable and inconsistent. If it be not the Effect of God (as is both generally and justly acknow­ledg'd) then it must of Necessity be God, since whatever is, is either God or the Effect of God.

15. And indeed if Truth be not God how comes it to be Cloath'd with the Glorious Ensigns of his Majesty, to wear the Characters of his Divinity, and to have so many of his peculiar and incommunicable Attributes? How comes it to be Necessary, Immutable, Eternal, Self-existent, Increated, Immense, Omni-present and Independent, and that not only upon the Conceptions of any Minds whether Human or Angelical, but even all things what­soever, which might never have been made, or might now be anni­hilated without any Prejudice to the being of Truth, which does not [Page 164] respect the natural and actual Exi­stencies but only the Abstract Es­sences of things. For were there no such thing as any real Circle or Triangle in Nature it would still be never the less true that their Ab­stract Essences would be determi­nate and invariable, and that such and such distinct Properties would belong to them. Which by the way plainly Convinces that Truth is none of the Effects, Works, or Creatures of God, since it did exist before them, does not now depend on them, and would remain the self-same Immutable thing without them. But then I demand whence has it this Self-subsistence and Inde­pendency of Being? Whence again has it its fix'd and unalterable Na­ture, such as we can neither add any thing to, nor diminish ought from? How is it that it is Present in all Places, and to all Minds, so as to be Contemplated by them all at the same time, and after the same Manner? How comes it to pass that we cannot so much as dis-imagine it, or by way of Fiction and Supposi­tion remove it out of Being; but [Page 165] it still returns upon us with a strong and invincible Spring, since even the very Supposition that there is no Truth carries a Formal Proposi­tion in it whose Ideas have a cer­tain Habitude to each other, and so Contradicts it self. Besides how comes it to be a Perfection of the Divine Understanding? Is any thing a Perfection to God but himself? How comes it also to be the Rule and Measure of his Will, which can be determin'd by nothing but what is just Reasonable and True? Can any thing be a Rule to God that is not himself? Does he Consult or Follow any thing but what is One with his own Divine Nature and Essence? And yet God consults and follows Truth, and cannot act but according to its Immutable Laws and Measures. It is not therefore really distinguish'd from him, but Coeternal and Consub­stantial with him, and so in Consulting Truth he Consults his own EssenceVeritas immortalis est, veritas incommutabilis est, veritas illud verbum est de quo dicitur in principio erat verbum, & verbum erat ap­ud Deum & Deus erat verbum. S. Austin in Psal. 123., even the Divine [...], the E­ternal and Increated [Page 166] Wisdom, the true intelligible Light, in whom are all the Ideas and Essences of things, the Fulness of Being and Truth, who in the Be­ginning was with God, and was God, who is Eternally Contem­plated by him with Infinite Joy and Complacency, and who said of himself Incarnate, I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life. I would fain know how all these incom­municable Attributes of God should agree to Truth if it be any thing less than a Divine Nature. Par­ticularly I demand, whence has it that unshakeable Firmness and Sta­bility, that invincible Permanency and Sted [...]astness, that Necessity of Existence, that utter repugnance to Not Being, but only because it is really Coessential and Consubstan­tial with him whose Name is Ie­hovah, and who is Being it self, to whom it is Essential to Exist, or rather, whose very Essence is Exi­stence.

16. But now from this Coessen­tiality and Consubstantiality of Truth with the Divine Nature (a Noble and Sublime Theory, but which I [Page 167] do but lightly touch over, having not room here to pursue it at large) it evidently and necessarily follows again that Truth is Infinite. There cannot be a more immediate, nor a more necessary, nor a more insepa­rable Connexion between any two things than between this Conse­quence and that Principle. And indeed if Truth were not Infinite how can the Knowledge of God be so? Not sure as Concretely and Objectively Consider'd, for that ma­nifestly implies the Infinity of its Object. And what is the Object of the Divine, or of any other Under­standing, but Truth? And should Knowledge here be taken for the Power or Faculty of Knowing, to what purpose is an Infinite Power of Knowing unless there be an In­finite to be Known? And would not such a Power be uneasie and afflictive, as well as useless, to him that had it, unless the Object be supposed to carry due Proportion to it: For if it be so uneasie a Re­flexion to some of us to have such short and narrow Faculties when the Compass of Truth has so large [Page 168] and spatious an extent, to be able to know so little when there is so much to be known, how much more troublesom and painful would it be to the Supreme Intelligence to have an Infinite Understanding when all that is intelligible is but Finite? Would not that Infinity of his Ca­pacity serve to vex and disquiet him more than the Narrowness of ours does us, the difference being as much as between having a great Stomach and but little Meat, and a little Sto­mach when there is a great deal of Meat, whereof which is the greatest Punishment is Obvious to imagine. And we may judge of this in some measure by our selves. We have in us a Capacity boundless and unlimited. For tho' our Understandings be Finite, our Wills know no Measure, and are in a manner Infinite. As God has made us capable of enjoying an In­finite Good, so Nothing less than that can satisfie our Desires. For we desire Good as Good, and con­sequently all possible Good. Now we find this to be a great Pain to us at present to desire an Infinite Good when all that we can enjoy [Page 169] here is Finite. The greatest part of the Uneasiness, the Melancholy, the Disconsolateness, the Aridity that accompanies Human Life will be found, if traced to the Original, to proceed from hence, viz. from the little proportion that is between our Capacities and our Gratificati­ons, between what is desired and what is enjoy'd. And this Desire of an Infinite Good will be a far greater Punishment to us Hereafter when the Activity of our Faculties shall be more invigorated and in­larg'd, if we have not then an Infi­nite Good to enjoy. [...]Twill be at least the worst ingredient of Hell and Damnation, if not all that is to be understood by it. And yet we are still to Consider that our Will is In [...]nite only Ex parte Objecti, be­cause it desires an Infinite Good, and not Ex parte Actûs because it desires it infinitely or with an unlimited Force and Activity. For 'tis im­possible that a Finite Nature should have any Power or Force in it that is strictly infinite, or that any such Act or Operation should pro­ceed from it. But then what would [Page 170] the Affliction be if the Act were Infinite as well as the Object, and we were to aspire after an Infinite Good with an Infinite Desire! What Conception can Frame a just Idea of the Misery of such a State! And can it be much less for an Infinite Intelligence to have only a Finite Intelligible for its Object? But there is Nothing Painful or Afflictive in the Condition of the Supremely and Completely Blessed. And therefore we must Conclude that as the In­finite Will of God has a Good fully Commensurate and Adequate to its unlimited Activity, whereon it may Center and Repose its Weight, so the Infinite Understanding of God has also an Infinite Intelligible for its Object. And since the Formal Object of Understanding in General, and Consequently of the Divine, is Truth (as that of the Will is Good) hence it follows again that Truth must needs be of an Infinite Nature.

17. And do we not find it so when we Convert our selves to it by Study and Meditation? When we apply our Minds to the Con­templation of Truth, and set our [Page 171] selves to muse and think, do we not find that we launch forth into a vast intelligible Sea, that has neither Bottom nor Shore? And the more we think and the more we Meditate are we not still more and more con­vinc'd of this, and do we not disco­ver the further we go in our Intel­lectual Progress, that there still lies more and more beyond us, so that the more we advance in the Know­ledge of Truth the more we inlarge Our Idea of it, as the greatest Tra­vellers think most Magnificently of the World? Do we not find as in a Spatious Campaigne, so in the im­mense Field of Truth, that our Eye wearies, and our Sight loses it self in the boundless Prospect, and that besides the clear view which we have of a few things at a little di­stance from us, there lie all round us vast Tracts unmeasurably diffused, whereof we have only Confuse and indistinct Images, like the Faint Blew of the far distant Hills? Are not the Relations and Combinations of things with one another Infinite, and should but one link in this End­less Chain be alter'd would not in­numerable [Page 172] Alterations ensue upon it? Should but One Proposition that is False be supposed True, or One that is True be supposed False, what Understanding but the Divine could go on with the Train of New Con­sequences that would result from such a Supposition? I say New Con­sequences, For we are to consider that besides the Absolute Systeme of Truth which contains the Relations of Ideas with their settled Coheren­cies and Dependencies one upon a­nother according as they really stand in their Natural Order, there is a Secondary Systeme of Truth which I may call Hypothetical, that results from any supposed Change made in the Absolute Systeme, whence will still arise new and new Consequences even to Infinity. But not to consi­der Hypothetical Truth, can the Bounds of that which is Absolute be ever fix'd, or its Stock ever Ex­hausted? Does it not after all the Study that has been employ'd about it, and the Numberless Number of Volumns that have been written up­on it furnish perpetual matter for our Contemplation, and is it not a [Page 173] Subject for everlasting Thoughts and Considerations? Has it not been the great Research of the Thoughtful and Inquisitive for many Ages, and yet does not every Age refine upon its Predecessour, and produce New Discoveries? Are not the Sciences continually improved, and yet are there not still Depths in every Sci­ence which no Line of Thought can ever Fathom? What a vast Fe­cundity is there in some plain simple Propositions, nay who can number the Conclusions that may be drawn from any one Principle! Take the most simple Figure in Geometry, and where is the Mathematician who after a Thousand Years Study can reckon up all the Properties that may be affirm'd of it, both as Ab­solutely Consider'd, and as it stands in relation to other Figures? And what then shall we think of the whole Science in all its Branches and Dependencies, Particularly of Al­gebra, the Main Ocean of this Bot­tomless Sea? And what shall we say of Metaphysick's, another un­measurable Abysse, and what of the endless Circle of Truth, if not the [Page 174] same which one of Iob's Friends says of God,Iob 11. 7. Canst thou by searching [...]ind out Truth, Canst thou find her out unto Perfection? It is as high as Heaven, what canst thou do? deeper than Hell, what canst thou know? The Measure thereof is longer than the Earth, and broader than the Sea. And that because they after all are Fi­nite, whereas this is truly and strict­ly Infinite. Which by the way suf­ficiently proves a God, and that this God is Truth, whose Eternal and Glorious Majesty be Blessed for Ever.

18. But then let us Consider, if Truth be indeed (as you see) of an Infinite Nature, then to prove that Human Reason is not fully adequate to it, does not intirely possess it, nor all over and wholly comprehend it, and consequently cannot be the Measure of it, there will be no need of laying open the great Weakness and Deficiency of our Understand­ing: I need not represent the Im­perfection of its Light, nor the Shortness of its Views, nor the Slen­derness of its Attainments, nor the very Narrow Extent of its Know­ledge, [Page 175] nor the very little Progress it is able to make in the Contempla­tion and Comprehension of Truth; That there are a great many things whereof we have no Ideas (for which we need go no further for an Instance than our own Souls) and that even where we have Ideas of things we cannot always discern the Relations and Connexions that are between them, and that either for want of sufficient Clearness in the Ideas themselves to have their Re­lations perceived immediately with­out comparing them with other mediate Ideas, or else for want of such due and proper Mediums wherewith to compare them, and that therefore the extent of our Knowledge is not only vastly ex­ceeded by the Natures of things, but also very Considerably even by our own Ideas, there being many things whereof we have Ideas, and sometimes very clear ones too, and yet which we know no more how to reason upon or discourse of intel­ligibly, or with any Certainty, than we do of those things whereof we have no Ideas at all, being, for Ex­ample, [Page 176] no more able to tell what proportion such a Circle bears to such a Square though we have clear Ideas of both, than we are to tell what proportion there is between Angels and our own Souls, things whereof we have no Ideas. A very remarkable Instance of the Shortness and Contractedness of our Under­standings, which it seems are not only destitute of the Ideas of many things, and Consequently of the knowledge of them (it being im­possible that the extent of our know­ledge should exceed that of our I­deas) but are also Blind to those ve­ry Ideas which they have, and can­not see even when they have the advantage of the Light. But I say I need not present my Reader with a Night-piece of Human Reason, de­scribe great Blindness and gross Darkness, how ignorant she is when she does not adventure to judge, and how Erroneous when she does, stumbling and falling (as is usual in the dark) out of one mistake in­to another, out of one Errour into another, either by im [...]racing false Principles, or by drawing wrong [Page 177] Conclusions from true ones, so that Ignorance seems her safest Retreat, and to suspend her best Wisdom; These I say and such other of our intellectual Infirmities I need not in­sist upon or make any advantage of, it being sufficient to conclude the Point in hand that Human Reason in its largest Capacity and Extent and with all the advantages of both Nature and Artificial improvement is after all but a Finite thing (and that to be sure the most Zealous of its Votaries and Advocates must confess that it is) since 'tis impos­sible that what has Bounds should be able totally and adequately to Comprehend what has None, or that Finite should be the Measure of Infinite.

19. I know but of one thing that can with any Pertinency be replied to this Argument, and that is, that though Human Reason (as Finite) be not able to comprehend all Truth (as being Infinite) yet however there may perhaps be no one Truth in Parti­cular but what, when presented to it, may be comprehended by it, and so Human Reason may be rightly said to [Page 178] be Adequate and Commensurate to Truth as Distributively, though not as Collectively consider'd. But to this I have several things to return. First of all I say that such is the re­ciprocal dependence and concate­nation of Truth that the want of a thorough and intire Comprehension of all Truth in its widest and most diffused Extent must needs very much Eclipse the view and darken the Perception of any one Solitary Truth in particular, so that how­ever we may have some tolerable Perception of it, and such as we may call Clear in Comparison of some other Truths which we do not see so clearly, yet it cannot be near so clear and Distinct a Perception, as that Infinite Being has of it who sees not only the Truth it self, but also the Manifold Relation, Con­nexion, and Combination that it has with all other Truths. The diffe­rence between these two ways of Perception being of a like Nature with that which is between seeing a Proposition as it stands singly by it self, and seeing the same Propo­sition with all its Relations and [Page 179] Dependencies, and in conjunction with the whole Context and Cohe­rence of the Discourse whereof it is a Part. I say again Secondly, that though we may have a competent Perception of some plain and simple Truths without pursuing them tho­rough all the Relations and Depen­dencies that they have with other Truths (since otherwise, as I have hinted already, we should be able to understand nothing, and every thing would be above Reason) yet how­ever we do not know but that there may be some Truths of such a Na­ture as not to be understood without the adequate Comprehension of those Relations and Dependencies; which since we have not, we do not nor can ever know but that there may be some Truths that are so a­bove us as to be out of our Reach, and to lie beyond all possibility of Comprehension, and consequently that Human Reason is not adequate and commensurate to Truth even Distributively consider'd. I say we do not know, and 'tis impossible we should ever know but that thus it may be. For how should we be [Page 180] able to know it, or upon what shall we ground this our Knowledge? It must be either upon the Natural Force and Penetration of our Under­standings, or upon our Actual Views and Perceptions, or upon the Nature of Truth it self. As for the Capacity of our Understandings though we do not know the pre­cise and exact Bounds and Limits of it, yet we know in the general that it is Finite, and has its fix'd and de­terminate Measure, which it would strive in vain to exceed. As for the Nature of Truth, that we both ex­periment, and from the foregoing Considerations must of necessity con­clude to be Infinite. And what Ground of Assurance can we have from either or both of these, which are apt rather to lay a Foundation of Diffidence and Distrust? And then as for our actual Views and Perceptions, though we should sup­pose them to have been hitherto ne­ver so clear and distinct, never so numerous and extensive, and never so fortunate and successful, so that our Victorious Understandings never yet met with a Baffle, nor sounded a [Page 181] retreat from a too difficult and im­pregnable Theory, suppose in one word, that we never yet applied our minds to the consideration of a­ny one Truth but what we fully comprehended and were perfect Ma­sters of (which yet he must be a ve­ry Presumptuous, or a very little experienc'd Thinker that shall affirm of himself) how notwithstanding do we know, considering the Finiteness of our Intellect, and the Infiniteness of Truth, but that there may be O­ther Truths of a Nature so far above us, and so disproportionate to us, as not possibly to be Comprehended by us. For we cannot argue here from the past Successes and Atchievements of our Understandings to the Fu­ture, or because there has been no­thing hitherto proposed to us but what we Comprehended, that there­fore there can be nothing proposed but what we can Comprehend. If we conclude thus, we forget the vast disproportion between Truth and Human Reason, that the one is Finite and the other Infinite, the due and attentive Consideration of which would convince us that tho' [Page 182] we have thought never so much, and never so well, and comprehend­ed never so many Truths, yet for ought we know there may be Truths which our intellectual Sight though aided with all the advantages of Art, that may help the Mind as much as a Telescope does the Eye, can yet never penetrate, and which (by the way) it may be Worthy of God to reveal to us if 'twere only to Check and Controle the daring Progress of our Understanding, to make us un­derstand our Measure and remember that we are but Men, to be sensible of the defects of that part upon which we most value our selves and despite others, and that even the Light that is in us is but Darkness. Whether there be any such Truths I do not now say, but only that upon the Supposition of the Infinity of Truth 'tis impossible for us to be sure but that there may be such, which is enough to hinder Our Reason from being (at least as to us) the Measure of Truth, since if it be so 'tis more than we know, or can possibly be assured of, which makes it all one (to us) as if it were not. For we [Page 183] cannot make use of it as a Measure, or draw any Consequence from it to the Falsehood, Impossibility, or In­credibility of things Incomprehen­sible, since for ought we know or can know to the Contrary, there may be Truths which we cannot Comprehend.

20. But then I say further Third­ly, that the Infinite Nature of Truth will Oblige us to acknowledge that there actually are and must be such. For if Truth be Infinite then 'tis plain that we cannot Comprehend it in its full and intire Extent, and so much the very Objection sup­poses. But then I say that as the want of a perfect Comprehension of all Truth does very much shade and darken the perception of any one single Truth in particular, and that because of the mutual connexion and dependence of things one upon ano­ther (as was before observ'd) so it must needs quite Eclipse and totally Abscond some Truths from our View. For there are some Truths so very Complex and Abstruse, and that lie so deep, and, as I may say, so far within the Bowels of the In­tellectual [Page 184] Systeme, that include such a Multitude of Relations, depend up­on so many Suppositions, are the Conclusions of so many Premisses, presuppose and require the know­ledge of so many things (of some of which it may be we have not so much as the simple Ideas) have such a Train of Principles Planted and Intrench'd as a Guard before 'em, and draw such an immense Retinue of Consequences after them, and are every way so mingled, involv'd and combined with other Truths that they cannot possibly be under­stood without an intire and all-com­prehensive view of the whole Ratio­nal Systeme. Instances of such Truths abound in every Science. But there is nothing that may furnish us with so sensible and palpable an Illustration of this Matter as th [...] Order and Measure of Divine Pro­vidence. We are all fully assured from the very Notion and Idea of God as involving all possible Excellency and Perfection in it, that he is a Being infinitely Wise, Good, Just and Holy, and Consequently that his whole Conduct in the Go­vernment [Page 185] of the World must neces­sarily carry the Character of all these Attributes, and that he cannot pos­sibly do any thing contrary or repug­nant to any of them any more than he can deny himself, or depart from the Essential Perfections of his In­finite Nature. And upon this Con­sideration is founded the best Argu­ment we have for Submission and Resignation to the Will of God, and Acquiescence in his Providen­tial Dispensations. Thus far then we are all satisfied and agreed. And yet it cannot be denied when we come to Particulars, but that there are Phenomena in the Moral as well as in the Natural World which are utterly insolvible, and that a great many of these Dispen­sations of Providence are accompa­nied with desperate and invincible Difficulties, such as have at once exercised and puzzled the thoughts of the most inquisitive in all Ages, and still remain Obstinate and Un­moveable Objections not only to the Atheists and Libertines, but even to the most sober and intelligent of both Philosophers and Divines, Men [Page 186] of the greatest Light and Piety, those who best understand, and do most reverence and adore the ways of God. And adore them after all they must, for so intricate and in­tangling are the Difficulties, or (by the leave of some) I would say My­steries of Providence, especially in those dark Scenes of it that relate to the Divine Concourse and Co­operation with the Will of Man, the Ordination of his Final State, the Order and Distribution of Grace, the Permission, Direction and Nice Conduct of Sin, &c. that the Capacity of our Understanding will not serve us to give a clear and unobnoxious account of them. In­deed the diligent and curious Wit of Man has gone a great way in this as well as in Other Matters, and several Systemes and Hypo­theses have been invented about these things by Contemplative Spi­rits, among whom the two very particular Authors of the Treatise of Nature and Grace, and of L'Oecono­mie Divine have I think gone the furthest of any. But though some of these Accounts bid fairer for re­ception [Page 187] than others, by striking some glimmering Light into these Abstrusities, yet still they all agree in this, that they leave a great deal more in the Dark, and labour with Difficulties even where they do Ex­plain: So that after all they discover nothing so much as their own Short­ness and Deficiency. In the mean while we know and are most cer­tain in the General, that all is right and as it should be in the Conduct of God towards his Creatures, and that he cannot make one false Step in the Government of the World. So much we understand without Systemes, and truly not much more with them. For as for the Particu­lar Scenes of Providence we know not what to make of them; and when we have consider'd the Dis­pensations of God as much as we can or dare, we find our selves after all obliged to confess, that though Righteousness and Iudgment are the Habitation of his Seat, Psal. 97. 2. yet Clouds and Darkness are round about him.

21. But now how comes it to be so Dark and Cloudy? How come we to be so little able to see the par­ticular [Page 188] Wisdom, Goodness, Justice and Holiness of those ways of God, which in the general we are con­vinc'd to be so Wise, Good, Just and Holy? Why can we not enter into the Detail of Providence? Why even because we do not see it throughout, and have not a Com­prehension of its Universal Systeme. For the Passages of Providence [...] of such a Relative and Complicated Nature, there is such a kind of [...] or mutual in-being or in­dwelling in them, (if I may transfer an Expression hither, commonly ap­plyed to a higher Mystery) they are so interwoven with, and have so common a dependance upon one another, that without a Compre­hensive View of the whole Drama, we can hardly make any thing of any one Particular Scene. Indeed if we could have such a View as that, a View that went round and through, and grasp'd the whole Area of that immense Circle, we should quickly see the Regularity of the most uneven and odd-figured Parts, and how wonderfully they conspired (like the Flats and Sharps [Page 189] of Musick) to the Order and Har­mony of that excellent and surpri­zing Beauty that results from them. But being not able to reach this, we are not competent Judges of the rest, (which by the way should re­press our forwardness to fit in Judg­ment upon things so far above the Cognizance of our Court); and though we know the Measures of God to be all Wise, Good, Just and Holy, yet this is only an implicit Knowledge, founded upon an Ex­ternal Evidence only (much after the same manner as it is in Faith) even the general Conception we have of the Divine Perfection, without any clear and immediate discernment of the Internal Connexion that is be­tween the things themselves. We believe 'tis all well and right because the Infinitely Wise God sits at the Helm; but then again, because he is so Infinitely Wise we cannot found the Depths of his Wisdom, (as in­deed it would be very strange if an Infinitely Wise Agent should not be able to do things Wisely, and yet beyond our Understanding) nor re­concile all his particular proceedings [Page 190] to the Laws of Reason and Equity; but the more we study about these things the more we are at a loss, the further we wade into this Sea the deeper we find it, till at last we find our selves obliged to cry out with the most inspired Apostle, O the Depth of the Riches both of the Wis­dom and Knowledge of God, Rom. 11. 33. how un­searchable are his Iudgments, and his Ways past finding out! And all for want of an Intire and Comprehen­sive View of them. For if the Knowledge of some very Com­pounded Truths be impossible with­out the Clear Perception of the Sim­ple Principles upon which they de­pend; and a Man would to no pur­pose beat his Brains about the Con­sideration of Conical Sections, till he has first well possessed himself of Ordinary Geometry; how much less then (may we conclude) are the In­tricate and very Complicated Events of Divine Providence to be unravel'd without a Collected and Simulta­neous Idea of the Universal Systeme whereof they are parts, to which they relate, and from their Concen­tricity with which they receive all [Page 191] their Order and Beauty, but which is in a manner lost to us for want of Compass enough in our Prospect. By which single Instance it appears (among many others that might have been given) how the Incapacity of Comprehending Truth in its whole Extent may disable us from Com­prehending many Particular Truths; and consequently, that the same In­finity of Truth which hinders us from Comprehending it according to that Extent, must also hinder us as much from being able to compre­hend every Particular Truth. So then there will be Particular Truths which are Incomprehensible by us, and consequently Human Reason is not Commensurate to all Truth, not only as Collectively, but even as Distributively Consider'd. And there­fore not as Distributively, because not as Collectively.

22. But then to raise our Specu­lation a little higher, I consider yet further, that the Infinity of Truth is not only an Infinity of Extent, but also an Infinity of Nature, that is, that the Compass of Truth is not only Boundless and illimited, and [Page 192] that it has in it an inexhaustible Spring, which like the Source of Light, is never to be drawn dry by the most thirsty draught of the whole Intellectual World, but also that there are Particular Truths of a Na­ture truely infinite, and by conse­quence incomprehensible to any Understanding that is not so. For we are here to recollect, what has been already shewn, that Truth is Consubstantial and Coessential with God and with the Divine Ideas. Now though these Ideas are all equally of the Essence and Nature of God, and so far equally Divine (it being impossible that there should be any thing in God that is not God) yet there is this general and very remarkable Difference between them, that some of these Divine Ideas are Absolute, and some Relative. That is, some are of the Essence of God Simply and Absolutely as He is in Himself, without any Relation to any thing out of Himself. And o­thers again are of the Essence of God consider'd purely in Relation to things without Him either in Act or in Possibility, and only so far forth [Page 193] as the Divine Essence is representa­tive of Creatures. Or if you will, thus: We may consider a twofold Being in Ideas, Esse Reale, and Esse Ideale or Repraesentativum. Some Ideas are Divine, not only accord­ing to their Esse Reale (for so they are all) but also according to their Esse Repraesentativum, as representing God to the Mind that Contemplates them. Others again are Divine only according to their Esse Reale, being indeed of the Substance of God, but not representing him, but his Crea­tures, and so are Divine in the same sense as the Idea of a Body is Spiri­tual, viz. Essentially only, not Re­presentatively. Which Diversity in­deed resolves into the former, be­cause they are of the Essence of God, not as it is absolutely in itself, but only as it is representative of Crea­tures, according to such a certain Modality and Limitation of Perfe­ction. And accordingly though they are truly Divine Ideas as well as the other, yet they are not said to be Ideas of God, as not representing him, but his Creatures. The short is, The Essence of God may be con­sider'd [Page 194] either as it is absolutely in it self according to its Infinite Simpli­city, or as it is in relation to, and representative of things without, ei­ther of an Actual, or of a Possible Existence. And so the Ideas or Es­sential Perfections of God are of two sorts: Either such as are of the Es­sence of God consider'd in the first sense, as it is in it self, or else such as are of the same Divine Essence only in the second sense, as far forth as that Essence is representative of things out of it self; upon which by the way, I suppose, must be grounded (if we will resolve things into their last Principle) the common distinction of the Attributes of God into Communicable and Incommunica­ble. The Incommunicable Attributes of God being those Perfections that are of the Divine Essence Simply and Absolutely consider'd as it is in it self; and the Communicable those that belong to the Divine Essence Relatively consider'd, and as repre­sentative of Creatures, to whom accordingly they are in their Mea­sure truly applicable; whereas the former are not, but are peculiar to [Page 195] God alone; which sufficiently shews the difference between this double order of Divine Ideas. But to make it yet more intelligible by an Instance. The Idea of the Divine Immensity, or that Perfection in God which we call his Immensity, is of the Essence of God according to the first sense, as it is simply and absolutely in it self; being no other than the Sub­stance of God as it is universally dif­fused, intirely present in, and filling all places without being circumscri­bed by any, yet without any Local Extension. But now the Idea of Extension, or that Perfection in God which vertually, eminently, and modo intelligibili, answers to Exten­sion (and is therefore frequently cal­led by Mr. Malebranch, L' ètendue intelligibl [...]) is of the Substance of God, not as it is in it self simply and absolutely, but only as far forth as it is representative of Matter, or Body, and imitable or participable by it, according to those Limitations and Imperfections which belong to that kind of Being, and which are represented by this its Idea. I know not whether I express my self to [Page 196] the Conception of every Reader, but I am sufficiently Clear and Intelligi­ble to my self; and whoever is not much wanting either in Metaphysics, or in Attention, cannot I think well miss my Meaning.

23 Now the use that I make of this Speculation to the present pur­pose is this: Those Ideas which are of the Essence of God only as that Divine Essence, according to some certain Limitations and inadequate Considerations of it, is representa­tive of Creatures, must be consider'd by us as of a Finite Nature. Be­cause however truly Divine and of the Essence of God, yet not as it is absolutely and simply in it self, but only as it is in relation to Creatures; that is, as partially and inadequately consider'd, according to certain Ab­stractions and Limitations of Entity and Perfection, such as the things whereof they are Ideas do require. And accordingly such Ideas are or­dinarily said, not to be the Ideas of God who is Infinite (for they do not represent him, though Essential to him) but to be the Ideas of Crea­tures, who are Finite. They are [Page 197] indeed Divine Ideas, because Essen­tial to God; but they are not Ideas of God, because they are of the Di­vine Essence only as it relates to Creatures, and is representative of them. Of Creatures therefore they are the Ideas, and God in seeing them is not properly said to see him­self, (though they are of himself) but to see Creatures; because though they are of his Divine Essence, yet 'tis only according to such Precisions, Limitations and Inadequations of it as to be expressive and representa­tive of their Finite Perfections. As therefore the Realities which these Ideas represent are Finite, so these Ideas must be conceiv'd by us as Fi­nite too; it being impossible that Infinite consider'd as Infinite, should be representative of what is Finite. And as these Ideas are Finite, so are they also by Consequence so Pro­portionate, and of a Measure so ad­justed to Finite Understandings, as to be Intelligible by them, and with­in the Possibility of their Compre­hension; which must also in like manner be concluded of all those Truths which are Consubstantial to [Page 198] them. And accordingly the Expe­riment answers the Theory. We find that not only contingent Truths that regard only the Actualities and Existencies of Things, such as mat­ters of Fact, Human Events, &c. but even a great many of those which are Ideal and Necessary, and concern only the Abstract Reasons and Essences of Things independent­ly on their Actual Existence, are Comprehensible by us, as in Meta­physics and Geometry, in the Con­templation of which Sciences we meet with a great many things which we well understand, and whereof we have Clear Ideas and Conceptions.

24. But now it is not thus with the Ideas of the first Order, nor with their Truths, Though those Divine Ideas which appertain to the Essence of God only as representa­tive of Creatures, be both Finite and Comprehensible by limited Un­derstandings, (which indeed other­wise would not be capable of any Science) yet these Absolute Ideas which I now speak of, are neither Finite nor Comprehensible. For [Page 199] these Ideas are of the very Essence and Substance of God as it is in it self purely and separately consider'd according to its simple and absolute Nature, and not as it is in relation to Creatures, or as representative of any Reality out of it self. And accordingly God in contemplating these Ideas of his may be truly and strictly said to contemplate himself; and we also in the Contemplation of them do as really contemplate God, and that because they are of his Di­vine Essence simply and absolutely consider'd as it is in it self, and not as it is in reference to any thing be­sides, or out of it self. These Ideas therefore are strictly Infinite (be­cause the Divine Essence, as it is in it self simply and absolutely consi­der'd is so) and consequently Incom­prehensible by any Finite, and con­sequently by Human Understanding. God only can Comprehend these Ideas, and that because he only can Comprehend himself. Human Rea­son indeed has Light enough to dis­cover that there are such Ideas and Perfections in God, and is withal able to discern enough of them to [Page 200] raise her greatest Wonder and Devo­tion, and to make her despise all o­ther Intelligible Objects in compari­son of these Infinite Grandeurs; and the Angelic Spirits that wait about the Throne of his Majesty, and stand in a better Light, are able to see yet more of them; but neither the one nor the other can Compre­hend them fully any more than they can God himself, and that because they are God. So that though the other Ideas are Finite and Compre­hensible, these are truly Infinite and Incomprehensible. And of this we have sufficient Evidence in the In­stances above proposed of each. The Idea of Extension is very Clear and Intelligible to our Minds, as Finite and as Narrowly bounded as they are. We have a very distinct View of it, we Perceive it, we Compre­hend it. Among all Intelligible Ob­jects there is none that is more clear, nor whereof we have a more ade­quate and exact Notion. And upon this is founded all that peculiar Clearness, Evidence and Certainty that is in the Geometric Sciences, which alone have the happiness to [Page 201] be free from Disputes, and without Contestation to find that Truth which the others seek after, and that for no other Reason but because we have so clear and distinct a Notion of its general Subject, Extension. But now as to the I the rather Instance in the Divine Immensity, be­cause the D [...]vout Psalmist does herein parti [...]ularize his Igno­rance, making it the Subject of his Astonishment rather than his Curiosity. Such Know­ledge is too wonderful for me, it is high, I cannot at­tain unto it, Psal. 139. Divine Immensity, so far are we from ha­ving a Clear Concep­tion of that, that no sooner do we set our selves to contemplate this vast Idea, but we enter into Clouds and Darkness, or rather into such an over-shining and insupportable Light as dazzles and blinds our Eyes, yea hurts and pains them, till they can no longer indure to gaze, but are forc'd to refresh themselves either by letting down their wearied Lids (suspense of Thought) or by turn­ing their view upon less glorious Ob­jects. In the Meditation of the other Idea we are like Men that wade in a River where we both see and feel the Bottom, and go on for a pretty way together smoothly and without much difficulty, only now and then [Page 202] meeting with an intangling Weed that lets and incumbers our pro­gress. But in the Contemplation of the Infinite Idea of the Divine Im­mensity we are like men that com­mit themselves to the Main Sea, at the very first Plunge out of our depth, and ready to be overwhelm'd, swallow'd up and lost in an Abyss that knows no bottom.

25. I use a little Figure and Ima­gery here the better to impress this upon the Imagination of those who are not so well habituated to the Conception of things by Pure In­tellection, but the thing it self needs none of the advantages of the Me­taphorical way, being strictly and severely true. And by these two Instances it may appear what a vast difference there is between these two sorts of the Divine Ideas, the Ab­solute and the Relative, those that are of the Essence of God as in him­self, and those that are of the same Divine Essence as it is in relation to Creatures. The First, Infinite and Incomprehensible, the Second, Fi­nite and Comprehensible. For you see here the Idea of Extension is [Page 203] clear and distinct, and such as we can fully and adequately Conceive, but the Idea of the Divine Immen­sity, has nothing clear and distinct in it, but is all over Darkness and Obscurity, and such as quite asto­nishes and confounds us with a Thousand difficulties upon the first application of our Thoughts to it, as indeed do all the Absolute Attri­butes and Perfections of God, which are all equally Infinite, and equally incomprehensible to Finite Spirits, however they may be able to Com­prehend that which in the Essence of God is representative of, and car­ries a Relation to those Realities which either actually do, or possibly may exist out of it. And in this I say no more (setting aside only the Rationale of the thing) than those who tell us that the Incommunicable Attributes of God are Infinite and Incomprehensible. They are so. But what is it that makes them In­finite and Incomprehensible? Even the same that makes them Incommu­nicable, viz. their being of the Es­sence of God as it is in it self ac­cording to its Absolute Simplicity, [Page 204] and not as it is in Relation to Crea­tures. For 'tis most evident that the Essence of God as it is simply and Absolutely in it self is every way Infinite and Incomprehensible, and therefore all those Ideas and Perfections of his which are in this Absolute Sense Essential to him must be also of an alike Infinite and Incomprehensible Nature. Which by the way may serve to Silence the presumptuous Cavils of those who draw Objections against the Existence of God from the incom­prehensibility of his Attributes, since if there be a God he must have in­comprehensible Attributes, which unless we ascribe to him we do not think either rightly or worthily of him.

26. But to resume our Point, we see then here what a large Field is now open'd to our Prospect of In­finite and Incomprehensible Truths, even of a Compass as large as the Absolute Ideas and Perfections of the Divine Essence. For though all Created things are of a Finite Na­ture, and though even the Divine Ideas that represent them, as far as [Page 205] representative of them, must fall under the same limited Considerati­on, yet those Absolute Ideas and Perfections of God that have no such external Reference, but are of the Divine Essence as it is in its pure, simple, abstracted Self, must ne­cessarily partake of the Divine In­finity, and be as unbounded as God himself. And since Truth (as was before observ'd) is Coessential and Consubstantial with the Divine Ideas, I further Conclude, that though those Truths which regard the Ac­tualities and Existencies of things, or if you please, things that do actu­ally exist, be Finite, because the things themselves are so, and though even those that regard the Divine Ideas themselves are also Finite sup­posing the Ideas to be of the inferi­our Order, such as are of the Di­vine Essence only as it is represen­tative of, and in relation to Crea­tures, yet those Truths which re­spect those Divine Ideas of the Su­periour Order, that are of the Ab­solute Essence of God as it is in it self purely and simply Consider'd, and so are not only Essentially, but [Page 206] even Representatively Divine, as tru­ly representing God, and being in a strict and proper sense his Ideas, I say the Truths of this Order and Character must necessarily be of a Nature far exalted above all Crea­tures, yea above all other Ideal Truths, even as far as what is of the Simple and Absolute Essence of God transcends that which in the same Es­sence is only Relative to things with­out, and can therefore be no less than Infinite. We have here then an Order of Infinite Truths, even allthose which regard the Absolute Ideas and Per­fections of God. These Divine Ideas and Perfections are all Infinite, as that Glorious Essence whose Ideas they are and whom they represent, and so also are the Sublime Truths which result from them. They are of a Nature strictly Infinite, and if Infinite then by Consequence Incomprehensible, I mean to all understandings that are not so. For as Nothing Finite has Reality enough to represent Infi­nite, so neither can any thing Finite have Capacity enough to Compre­hend it. For as the actual know­ledge of any intelligent Being can [Page 207] never exceed its intellectual Power, so neither can its Power exceed the measure of its Essence. A Finite Being therefore must have a Finite Understanding, and a Finite Under­standing must have a Finite Percep­tion. Since then our Understand­ings are Finite, 'tis plain that our Perception of Infinite must also be Finite. 'Tis true indeed that Objective Reality which we contemplate when we think upon Infinite has no Limits, and so we may be said in some respect to have an Infinite Thought, as far as the Operation of the Mind may be de­nominated from the quality of the Object, but yet still we think ac­cording to the Measure of our Na­ture, and our Perception of Infinite can be no more at the most than Finite. But now a Finite Percep­tion bears no proportion to an In­finite Intelligible, besides that to per­ceive such an Object after a Finite manner is not to perceive it as it is, but only Partially and inadequately. But now a Partial and inadequate Perception of a thing can never be said to be a Comprehension of that [Page 208] thing, even though the thing be Finite, much less then when it is Infinite. Whereby it plainly ap­pears that if there be an Order of Infinite Truths the same will also be Incomprehensible Ones, and since again as I have shewn there is an Order of such Truths, even all those that regard the Absolute Ideas and Perfections of the Divine Essence, it clearly follows that there is an Or­der of Incomprehensible Truths, and Consequently that Human Rea­son is not the Measure of Truth, even Distributively consider'd, since there are Particular Truths which it cannot Comprehend; which was the thing to be proved.

27. And of all this we may have a plain and visible illustration in the foremention'd Instance of the Di­vine Immensity. This is an Idea or Perfection of God that is truely In­sinite, as being of his Divine Essence as it is Absolutely in it self, and not as in Order to, or representative of Creatures; And as Infinite 'tis also Incomprehensible by any but God himself. Accordingly the Complex Truth that regards this Absolute [Page 209] Idea of God is also Infinite, and as such Incomprehensible. As appears in this Proposition, God is Immense; which is an Infinite and Incompre­hensible Truth. We find it is so a Posteriori by casting the view of our Understandings upon it. And we find it must be so a Priori by reason­ing upon the Principles already laid down and establish'd. And to pre­vent all vain cavilling in this matter I further add, that though we could suppose the Truths that result from Infinite Ideas not to be Infinite (which yet we cannot by reason of their real Identity and Coessentiali­ty with those Ideas) yet however they must upon another account be incomprehensible, even upon the Incomprehensibility of those Ideas. For if the Ideas whereof a Truth consists be incomprehensible, as they must be if they are Infinite, that alone would be enough to hinder us from being able to Comprehend such a Truth, it being impossible we should thoroughly understand the Relations or Habitudes between those Ideas whose Simple Natures (the Foundation of those Habitudes) [Page 210] we do not Comprehend. For if in Finite things the not having a clear and adequate Idea of a thing makes us unable to judge of the Truth or Falshood of many Propositions con­cerning that thing (whereof there are a multitude of Instances in Mo­rality, especially in Questions relating to the Soul of Man, which must for ever lie undetermin'd merely for want of our having a clear Idea of that Noble Essence) much more then in things Infinite will the not having a Comprehension of the Ideas incapacitate us from Comprehending the Truths that Result from them, which will therefore be as incompre­hensible as if they were (what in­deed they are) in themselves Infi­nite.

28. I have hitherto shewn the In­comprehensibility of Truth by Hu­man Reason, and consequently that Human Reason, is not the Measure of Truth, from the joynt Conside­ration of each. Only with this diffe­rence. I have consider'd and re­presented Truth Absolutely as it is in it self, according to its own Infi­nite and unmeasurable Nature. But [Page 211] as for Human Reason I have consi­der'd that only as Finite, as suppo­sing that sufficient to my present Purpose, and that there was no need of placing it in any other Light. For after it hath been shewn that Truth is Infinite, to prove that Hu­man Reason cannot be the Measure of it, it is certainly enough to Consider it as a Bounded Power, without re­presenting how very strait and nar­row its Bounds are, since whatever is Finite can never measurer Infinite. But then it so, what if we add the other Consideration to it? If the bare Finiteness of Human Under­standing (a defect common to it with all Created Intelligencies) ren­ders it uncapable of Comprehend­ing Truth, and Consequently of be­ing the Measure of it, how much more then does the littleness and narrowness of its Bounds contribute to heighten that incapacity? If the having any limits does so unquali­fie it for the adequate Comprehen­sion of Truth, how then does the having so very short and strait ones? Strait indeed by Natural and Origi­nal Constitution, but much more [Page 212] yet retrench'd by Sin, and by all those Passions, Prejudices, deordi­nate Affections and Evil Customs which are the Effects and Conse­quences of Sin, and which have now so darken'd our Minds, and drawn such a gross Film over our Intel­lectual Sight that we can hardly distinguish Day from Night, Clear­ness from Obscurity, Truth from Falshood, and are able to see but so very little a way into the Works of God (much less into the Nature of God himself) that we need nothing else to depress and humble our Pride and Vanity than that very Know­ledge of ours which puffs us up. So very narrow in its Compass and Extent, so very Shallow and Super­ficial in its Depth, so very Confuse and Obscure in its Light, so very uncertain and conjectural in its Ground, and so every way defective and imprerfect is it. But how then can we found the Depth of Truth with so short a Line? A Bottomless Depth with (I will not say a Finite, but) so very scanty a Measuer? And what an extravagant Folly and Weakness, not to say Pride and [Page 213] Vanity is it to fancy that we can? It would be a Vain Presumption in an Angel, but sure the very Mad­ness and Distraction of Impudence in Man, who may with less defi­ance to Sence and Reason think to grasp the Ocean within the hollow of his hand, than to Comprehend and Measure Truth, Infinite Bound­less Truth, not only with Finite, but so very limited Capacities.

29. But suppose Truth were not (what we have shewn it to be) In­finite, but had Bounds as well as our Reason, yet unless it had the Same, our Reason cannot be Com­mensurate to it, or the Measure of it. But does the supposition of its having Limits infer that it has the same? No, For though Finite, its Bounds may possibly be extended further than those of our Under­standings, and how can we be sure that they are not? We cannot then even upon this supposition be sure that our Reason is the Measure of Truth, and therefore it is all one as to us (as I said before) as if it were not so, forasmuch as we can­not use it as a Measure by drawing [Page 214] any Consequences from it concern­ing the Falshood or impossibility of things upon the account of our ina­bility to Comprehend them, since for ought we know the Limits of Truth though we should suppose it Finite, may yet exceed, and that very greatly too, those of our Ra­tional Faculties. And Considering both the Natural and the Super­accessory defects of them it is very reasonable to think that they do.

30. Some Essences perhaps there may be (though even this again is more than we know) that sit so high in the Intellectual Form as to be able to Comprehend all that is Finite, so that the only reason why they have not an adequate Compre­hension of Truth at large is because it is indeed Infinite. But there is no Necessity, nor so much as Probabi­lity that Human Reason should be of so rais'd an Order that nothing but Infinity should transcend its Comprehension. And it must be a strange Composition of Pride and Self-love that can make us fancy that it is; something like that, only much more extravagant, which [Page 215] possesses the disturb'd Heads of some in Bedlam, and makes them Conceit themselves Kings and Emperours in the midst of their Irons, Rags, and Straw. What though Truth were Finite, and some Understandings too that are so were able to measure it, why must this needs be concluded of Human Understanding? If a Finite Being were able to Compre­hend Truth, why must Man be that Being? The Scripture tells us he is made lower than the Angels, and how many Orders and Degrees there may be among them we know not, nor indeed how many Ranks of Spiritual Beings there may be in the Universe whose Understandings go beyond ours. For who can define the Out-flowings of the Divine Fe­cundity, or Number the Rounds of the Intellectual Scale? In the mean while though man knows not how many Orders of Intelligent Crea­tures there are above him, yet 'tis with great Reason and Consent pre­sumed that there are none below him, so that he is placed even by his own Confession in the lowest Form of the Intellectual Order. [Page 216] And why then may not his Under­standing (as much as he values him­self upon it) be of so Shallow a Depth, and so low a Size that e­ven Finite Objects may be dispro­portionate to him? Especially since we find him so often puzzl'd and gravell'd in Natural things, as also in those Ideal Truths that have re­lation to the Natural and Ectypal World, such as Philosophical and Mathematical Problems. Or if the Reason of any Creature could be the Measure of Truth, why should he be that Creature, who is seated in the very Confines of the Mate­rial and Immaterial World, and is as it were the Common-Point where Matter ends and Spirit begins, who brings up the rear of the Intellec­tual kind, and is both the youngest and the least indow'd among the Sons of God.

31. These Considerations suffici­ently shew that there is no Necessi­ty, nor so much as Probability, that Human Reason should be the Mea­sure of Truth even upon the Sup­position of its being Finite. Which indeed is enough of it self to carry [Page 217] the Point Contended for as far as the Design of the present Argument is Concern'd. For if it be not necessary that Human Reason should be the Measure of Truth, then it is Possible that it may not be, and if it is Pos­sible that it may not, then we can be never Sure that it is, and if we cannot be Sure that it is, then we cannot Use it as a Measure, which (as I have remarqu'd already and for the Moment of it do here reincul­cate) makes it the same to all intents and purposes as if it were not such at all. But yet to carry our Plea a little highter I further Contend that as the foregoing Considerations suf­fice to shew that Human Reason may not, so there is One behind that very positively Demonstrates that it Cannot be the Measure of Truth, even tho' we should allow it to be of a Finite and bounded Nature as well as our own understandings.

32. As there are many things whereof our Ideas are very Confuse and Obscure, so 'tis most [...] that there are some things [...] we have no Ideas at all, it [...] not pleas'd the Eternal and [...] [Page 218] Intelligence to Exhibit that in Him­self which is Representative of those things to our Understandings. But now besides the Difficultys and disad­vantages we shall always ly under in the Comprehension of things from the Confuseness and Obscurity of our Ideas, which of it Self will many times render those things, and also whatever nearly relates to those things incomprehensible by us, and besides that our not having any Ideas of Certain things, is an invincible Bar to all Knowledge and Compre­hension of those things (unless we could be supposed to be able to see without Light) 'tis also further Considerable that possibly the Know­ledge of that Truth which we set our Selves to Comprehend, and whereof we have the Ideas, may depend upon the truth of another thing whereof we have no Idea. If it should be so tho Truth in gene­ral be never so Finite, or the Parti­cular Truth we would Contemplate be never so Finite, 'tis plain we shall be no more able to Compre­hend it than if it were Infinite. Now I say that 'tis not only Possible that [Page 219] this may be the Case (which yet of it Self as I have again and again Noted is sufficient to debar us from using our Reason as the Measure of Truth) but there are also some In­stances wherein it appears actually to be so. We know well enough what we mean by Liberty and Con­tingency, and are withal well assured that we are Free Agents. We have also a Sufficient Notion of Prescience, and are also no less assured of the Reality of it, And because both these are true, and there can be no real re­pugnance between one Truth and another we are also by Consequence assured that there is a good Harmony and Agreement between them, and that they are Consistent with each other. But now how to adjust their apparent Opposition, or re­concile those Instances of seeming Contradiction and inconsistency wherewith they press us, this we nei­ther Know nor are able with all our Meditation to Comprehend, and that because we have not an Idea of the Human Soul, without which there is no possibility of Compre­hending how its Free Workings [Page 220] may be the Objects of Prescience, tho our Ideas of Prescience and Li­berty were never so Clear. Or if this Instance shall not be thought so proper because the Men with whom our present Concern lies are pleas'd to disown the Doctrine of Prescience, let me desire them to Consider whe­ther there be not many other Difficul­ties concerning Human Liberty, be­sides that taken from, Prescience, which they are no more able to get over then they are that. And that for the very same Reason, even be­cause they ahve not an Idea of the Soul, upon the Knowledge of which the Solution of those, as well as some other Difficulties in Morality, does Necessarily depend. Or if they please let them take an Instance of a Physical Nature. We know well enough what it is to be in a Place, and we know also as well what it is to be Coextended to a Place. But now how Being in a Place may be without Coextension to a Place, this is what we cannot Comprehend (tho as to the thing it Self, upon other Considerations constrain'd to grant it) and that because we are [Page 221] ignorant of the general Nature of Spirit, upon the clear Conception of which the Comprehension of the other does so depend that it cannot be had without it. And indeed we may concluded in general that when ever we have clear Ideas of things, and yet are not able to Comprehend the Truth of them, 'tis because the Know­ledge of those things depends upon the Truth of something else where­of we have either no Idea, or not such as is sufficiently Clear. Which must be the true Reason of the hither­to presumed impossibility of finding out the exact Proportion between a Circle and a Square. Why, Circle and Square are very Intelligible things, and how come we then not to be able to determin the precise and just Proportion that is between them: It cannot be from any Ob­scurity in the things themselves, much less from our want of having Ideas of them, for we have as clear and exact Ideas of these Figures as we can have of any thing in the World. It must be therefore be­cause the Knowledge of their Pro­portion depends upon the Knowledge [Page 222] of some other thing whereof the Idea fails us, which till we are pos­ses'd of we shall in vain endeavour to discover the other. Whereby it plainly appears that we are not only uncapable of Comprehending those Truths that relate to things whereof we have no Ideas, but that even where we have Ideas, and those very Clear ones too we may be as far from Comprehending a Truth as if we had none merely upon the account of the Dependence which that Truth has upon some other thing whereof we have not, at least a just, Idea. Which single Consideration is e­nough for ever to spoil Human Rea­son for setting up for the Measure of Truth, even upon the Supposition of its being Finit. So very False is that arrogant Assertion of a Modern Philosopher, [...]erardi de Vries Prasessor­is V [...]tra­ [...] [...], exercita­tiones rationales de Deo, Divinis (que) Perfecto­inibus Pag. 248.. Quaecunque existunt hu­manae Menti pervestigabilia, praeter­quam In [...]initum. Whatever is may be thoroughly Comprehended by the Mind of Man, except Infinite. And again. Vnum duntaxat est quod om­nem mentis nostrae vim longissime ex­cedit, ipsâ (que) suâ Naturâ, ut in se est, ab eâ Cognosci nequit, In [...]initum puta. [Page 223] There is but one only thing that far exceeds the Force and reach of our Mind, and that cannot of its own very Nature be known by it as it is in it self, namely Infinite. What but One thing excepted from the Verge, and placed beyond the reach of Human Knowledge? 'Tis well that One thing is a pretty large one, but sure the Authour was ignorant of something else, that is Himself, or else he could never have advanc'd such a Crude and ill-consider'd a Pro­position.

33. And thus I have shewn at large in a rational way by arguing a Priori, and from the Nature of things, that Human Reason is not the Measure of Truth, and that even upon the most Liberal Sup­position of its being Finite; And if it be not so supposing Truth to be Finite, much less is it supposing it (what it has been prov'd to be) of an Infinite Nature. If upon the Former Supposition it exceeds the Proportion of our Reason, certainly upon the latter there will be no Proportion between them. But whether our Reason bears no Pro­portion [Page 224] to Truth, or whether it be only Disproportionate to it, either way it follows that it cannot be the Measure of it, which I cannot but now look upon as a Proposition sufficiently demonstrated. And in all this I contend for no more than what is implied in that Common and universally approv'd Maxim even among those of the Rational way, that we ought not to deny what is Evident for the sake of what is Obscure, or de­part from a Truth which we see a Necessity to admit because of some Difficulties attending it which we cannot solve; which they say is an Argument only of our Igno­rance, and not of the Falshood of the thing. This indeed is a true Rule, and such as must be allow'd to hold good in all our Reasonings, let the Matter of them be what it will. Only I wish that the Impli­cation of the Rule were as much minded, as the Rule it self is gene­rally receiv'd. For it plainly im­plies that there are some things which though plain and certain as to their Existence, are yet incom­prehensible [Page 225] and inexplicable as to their Manner. But then as the In­comprehensibility of the Manner should not make us reject the Truth of the thing when otherwise Evi­dent, so neither should the Evidence we have of the Truth of the thing make us disown the Incomprehen­sibility of the Manner, since it is so far from being against the Nature of Truth that it should be incom­prehensible, that you see we have discover'd even from the Contem­plation of its Nature that there are incomprehensible Truths. Of which I might now subjoyn some parti­cular Examples, but that I should fall very deep into a Common Place, being herein prevented by many o­ther Writers, particularly by the admirable one of L' Art de Penser, to the First Chapter of whose Fourth Book I refer my Reader; where he shews by several, and some of them uncommon Instances that there are things which the Mind of Man is not capable of Comprehending. Af­ter which he Concludes with a very grave and useful Reflection, which for the great advantage and Perti­nency [Page 226] of it to the present Affair, though I refer my Reader to the rest of the Chapter, I shall here set down. The Pro [...]it (says he) that one may draw from these Speculations is not barely to acquire the knowledge of them, which of it self is barren enough, but it is to learn to know the Bounds of our understanding, and to force it to confess that there are things which it cannot Comprehend. And therefore it is good to fatigue the mind with these kind of Subtilties, the better to tame its Presumption, and abate its confi­dence and daringness in opposing its Feeble Lights against the Mysteries of Religion, under the Pretence that it cannot comprehend them. For since all the Force of Human Vnderstand­ing is constrain'd to yield to the least Atom of Matter, and to own that it sees Clearly that it is infinitely divi­sible without being able to Comprehend how this may be. Is it not apparent­ly to transgress against Reason to refuse to believe the wonderful effects of the Divine Onnipotence, Merely for this Reason, that our Vnderstanding can­not Comprehend them? Yes without [Page 227] doubt it is, as will better appear in the sequel of this Discourse. In the mean while before I take leave of the Subject of this Chapter, I have a double Remarque to make upon it.

34. The First is, that since Truth in its full extent is Incomprehensi­ble, we should not vainly go about to Comprehend it, but be contented to be ignorant in many things. And since there are some special Truths in particular that are in­comprehensible we should not ap­ply our Thoughts to the Compre­hension of all things at a Ven­ture, as some who are for under­standing every thing, but sit down first and Consider whether they are proportionate to our Ca­pacities or No, and, as far as we can learn to distinguish what Truths may, and what may not be Comprehended by us, that so we may not lose that Time and Pains in the Contemplation of them, which might be profitably imploy'd in the Consideration of other things, better suted to our [Page 228] Capacity. As a great many do, who busie themselves all their Lives long about such things which if they should study to E­ternity they would not Compre­hend, and that indeed because they require an Infinite Capacity to Comprehend them. Whereas the shortest Compendium of Study, and the best way to abridge the Sciences is to study only what we can Master, and what is within the Sphere of our Faculties, and never so much as to apply our selves to what we can never Com­prehend.

35. The other Remarque is that the Conclusion prov'd in this Chapter does very much Fortifie and Confirm that which was un­dertaken to be made out in the last Concerning the Distinction of Things Above, and Things Con­trary to Reason. For if there are Truths which we cannot Compre­hend, then it seems what is above our Comprehension may yet be True, and if True then to be sure not Contrary to Reason, [Page 229] since whatever is Contrary to Rea­son is no less Contrary to Truth, which though sometimes above Reason is yet never Contrary to it.

1. AS there is nothing in Man that deserves his Conside­ration so Much, and Few things without him that deserve it More than that part of him wherein he resembles his Maker, so there is Nothing more worthy of his Con­sideration in that part, or that is at least more necessary to be Consi­der'd by him, than the Defects of it, without a due regard to which it would not be very safe for him to dwell much upon the Considerati­on of the other, as being apt to se­duce him into [...] ride and Vanity, to blow him up with Self-Conceit, [Page 231] and so by an imaginary Greatness to spoil and corrupt that which is Genuine and Natural.

2. Now the Defects of our In­tellectual part Consider'd in their general Heads are I suppose Sin, Ignorance, and Errour. And though Sin in it self must be allow'd to be of a worse Nature and Consequence than either Ignorance or Errour (however some may fancy it a grea­ter Reproach to 'em to have their Intellectuals question'd than their Morals) and so upon that score may require more of our Consideration, yet upon another account the De­fects of the Understanding seem to need it more than those of the Will, since we are not only apt to be more proud of our Intellectuals than of our Morals, but also to Conceit our selves more Free and Secure from Errour than we are from Sin, though Sin in the very Nature and Principle of it implies and supposes Errour.

3. Pride the presumed Sin of the Angels is also the most Natural and Hereditary one of Man, his dominant [Page 232] and most cleaving Corruption, the Vice as I may call it of his Planet and Complexion. And that which we are most apt to be proud of is our Vnderstandings, the only Facul­ty in us whose limits we forget. In other things we are Sensible not on­ly of the general Bounds of our Nature, but also of the particular narrowness of them, and according­ly do not attempt any thing very much beyond our Measure, but con­tain our Selves pretty reasonably within Our Line, at least are not such Fools as to apply our Strength to Move the Earth out of its place, or to set our Mouths to drink up the Sea, or to try with our Eyes to look into the Regions beyond the Stars. But there is hardly any Distance but to which we fancy our Intel­lectual Sight will reach, scarce any Object too bright, too large, or too far remov'd for it. Strange that when we Consider that in us which makes us Men, we should forget that we are so. And yet thus it is; when we look upon our Understand­ings 'tis with such a Magnifying Glass that it appears in a manner bound­less [Page 233] and unlimited to us, and we are dazzled with our own Light.

4. Not that it is to be presumed that there are any who upon a delibe­rate Consideration of the Matter have this Form'd and express Thought that their Understandings are Infinite Human Nature seems hardly ca­pable of such Excess. But only as the Psalmist says in another Case of some Worldly Men, that their In­ward Thought is that their houses shall continue for ever, Psal. 4. Not meaning that any could be so grossely absurd as positively and explicitly to Con­ceive that their Houses any more than their own Bodies, should last always, and never decay, but only that they had such a kind of a wandring and Confuse Imagination secretly lurking in their Minds, and loosely hovering about them; so in like manner there are a sort of Peo­ple who are Parturient and teeming with a kind of Confuse and unform'd Imagination tho' perhaps they never bring it to an express and distinct Thought, that their Understand­ings have no bounds or limits be­longing to them, tho' they cannot [Page 234] deny but that they have, if directly put to the Question.

5. Accordingly you shall find those whose Conduct betrays this inward Sentiment, who venture at all in their Studies, stick at nothing, but will undertake to give a Reason for every thing, and positively decide whatever Comes in their way with­out Suspense or Reserve, imagining (confusely at least) they have a Comprehension of all things, and that there is nothing too hard or knotty for them, nothing but what they either actually do, or are capable of Comprehending, if they once set themselves to it. And from hence they roundly Conclude that what­ever they are not able to Compre­hend is not true, and accordingly deny their Belief to whatever trans­cends their Comprehension.

6. Now I confess there is no fault to be found with the Conse­quence of these Men, nor with their Practice as it relates to that Conse­quence, which are both (as far as I can see) exceeding right if their Principle be once admitted: For if indeed it be really so that Human [Page 235] Reason is adequate and Commen­surate to Truth, so that there is no Truth but what it is able to Comprehend, then it will certainly follow that whatever it cannot Comprehend is not True, and there will need no other, nor better Ar­gument of the falshood of any thing than the Incomprehensibility of it. For their Reasoning resolves into this Form.

Or thus,

Where 'tis plain that if the Major of the First, or the Minor of the Second Syllogisin (wherein the Prin­ciple of these Men is Contain'd) be allow'd, there will be no avoiding [Page 236] the Conclusions of them. So that if we admit that Human Reason is Comprehensive of all Truth we are not Consistent with our Selves if we do not also grant that the Incompre­hensibility of a thing is a just War­rant to Conclude it not True.

7. But then on the other side if this Mighty Principle upon which such a Weight is laid, and such great things built be false, if Human Rea­son be not the Measure of Truth (as I think is with great Evidence Demonstrated in the last Chapter) then is not the Consequence as good this way, that therefore a thing's be­ing Incomprehensible by Reason is no Concluding Argument of it's not being True? For how are we in­consistent with our Selves, if grant­ing Human Reason to be Commen­surate to Truth we deny that the Incomprehensibility of a thing argues it not to be True, but only because in denying that we Contradict our Principle; or, which is all one, Sup­pose the Contradictory Proposition to it to be true, viz. that Human Reason is not Commensurate to Truth. But now if in saying that [Page 237] the Incomprehensibility of a thing does not argue it not to be true we in the Consequence of what we affirm Suppose that Human Reason is not the Measure of Truth, then 'tis as plain that the Supposition of Reason's not being the Measure of Truth will also Oblige us to say that the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no Argument of it's not being True. Whereby it is plain that the Consequence is every whit as good thus, Human Reason is not the Measure of Truth, therefore the In­comprehensibility of a thing is no Ar­gument that it is not True; as thus, Human Reason is the Measure of Truth, therefore the Incomprehensibili­ty of a thing is an Argument that it is not True. The only Reason why he that denies this latter Conse­quence upon the Supposition or Con­cession of this latter Principle is inconsistent with himself, being this, because in denying the latter Con­sequence he Supposes the Former Principle, which Principle therefore must as much inter the Consequence that Supposed it, viz. That a things being Incomprehensible by Reason [Page 238] is no Warrant to Conclude that it is not true.

8. And because this Principle that Human Reason is not the Measure of Truth has been already proved at large, I look upon the grounds of this Consequence as already laid, and therefore to shew the Connexion that is between the one and the other (besides what I have even now said to that purpose) need only add this further Remarque. That since Human Reason is not the Measure of Truth, or since there are Incomprehensible Truths, then it seems the Incomprehensibi­lity of a thing and the Truth of a thing may Consist together; or in other words, the same thing may be at once True and Incomprehensible. But now there cannot be in the whole Compass of Reasoning a more certain, or more evident Maxim than this, That that which is when a thing is, or would be supposing it were, is no Argument that it is not. As for Instance, Suppose it should be Objected against the Coper­nican Hypothesis of the Motion of the Earth that it is repugnant to [Page 239] Sense, since we see the Sun and the Stars Rise and Set, and Move round about us. It is thought a sufficient Answer to this to say, That sup­posing the Earth and not the Sun did really Move these Appearances would yet be the same as they are now, since Sailing,Le Clerks Physics. Pag. 14. as we do, between the Sun and the Stars (as a late Writer expresses it) not the Ship in which we are, but the Bodies which surround us would seem to Move. And 'tis most Certain that if supposing the Earth did) really Move the Motion would yet seem to be in the Sun and Stars; then the seeming Motion of those Bodies is no Argument that the Earth does not Move.

9. Why just so it is in the present Case, when 'tis Objected against the Truth of a thing that 'tis Incom­prehensible by Human Reason, 'tis a sufficient Answer to say that this argues nothing, since if the thing were true it might yet be Incom­prehensible. And 'tis most certain that if supposing a thing to be True it might yet be Incomprehensible, then the Incomprehensibility of a [Page 240] thing is no good Objection against the Truth of it. And therefore since we have proved that there are In­comprehensible Truths, and Con­sequently that the Truth of a thing and the Incomprehensibility of the same thing may Consist to­gether, we may now with all Rati­onal assurance Conclude that the In­comprehensibility of a thing is no Argument that it is not True, any more than the seeming Motion of the Sun is an Argument against the real one of the Earth, since the For­mer would be even Supposing the Truth of the Latter. And both by Vertue of this most Evident and in­contestable Principle, That what may Consist with the Truth of any thing, can be no good Argument that it is not True.

10. And indeed when it shall be Consider'd how many things sur­pass our Conception when we are Children which yet we are able well to Comprehend when we are Men, how many things again are beyond the Ken of Ignorant and Illiterate Men which yet are very Intelligible and Shine forth with full [Page 241] Light to the Men of Art and Learn­ing, and how many things again even among the Learned are now discover'd and well understood by the help of Algebra which were Mysteries to former Ages, and are still beyond even the Imagination of those who have not that Noble and Wonderful Key of Knowledge. When again it shall be further Consider'd how many of those things which we cannot even with the Assistance of that Commanding Key unlock in this state of Mortality, we may yet have a clear view of in that of Separation, when deliver'd from the Burthen of our Flesh, and that many of those things which are too high for us then may yet be of a level with the Understanding of Angels, and that what is above their Capacity may yet be most clearly and distinctly perceiv'd by the Infinitely penetrating and All-Comprehensive Intellect of God, I say he that shall but seriously enter into this single Reflection must needs discover himself much wanting in that Stock of Sense and Reason he [Page 242] pretends to, if he still continue to Measure the Possibilities of things by their Proportionableness to his Un­derstanding, or Conclude any thing False or Impossible, when he has no better Reason for it but only be­cause he cannot Comprehend it.

1. AS there is Nothing more Common than for people to hold Certain Principles that have an inseparable Connexion with ve­ry bad Consequences, and yet not professedly to hold those Conse­quences, because either they do not attend to them, or are not sensible that they do indeed follow from such Principles, whereof we have two very pregnant Instances in the Maintainers of the Predestinarian and Soli [...]idian Systemes, so on the other hand, and for the same Rea­son there are those who take up, and with great Fixedness adhere to certain Consequences without Pro­fessedly [Page 244] holding those Principles from which they truly flow, and to which (if traced to the Head) they will infallibly lead them.

2. Of this we have a very par­ticular Instance (where I confess one would not expect to find it) in those of the Socinian Perswasion. The Reason these Men of Reason give why they will not believe the Mysteries of the Christian Faith, is because they are above their Rea­son, they cannot Comprehend them. Whereby they plainly imply, that they will believe Nothing but what they can Comprehend, or that No­thing is to be believ'd that is In­comprehensible, which is also a common Maxim among them, who accordingly make Above Reason and Contrary to Reason to be one and the same thing. And whereas 'tis only the untruth of a thing that can make it unfit to be the Object of Faith, in saying they will not believe what they cannot Compre­hend, they do as good as say that what they cannot Comprehend is not True, and so that the Incom­prehensibility of a thing is a just [Page 245] warrant to conclude it False. And all this they own and expresly de­clare, if not in these very terms, yet at least in such as are equiva­lent to them as is too Notorious and well known to need any Ci­tations for the proof of it. But now though they do thus profess [...]d­ly own that the Incomprehensibi­lity of a thing by Reason is an Ar­gument of its not being true, yet that Human Reason is the Measure of Truth, or that all Truth is Com­prehensible by it, are (as I take it) Propositions which they do not o­penly and professedly avow. For as I noted in the Introduction 'tis such an Odious and Arrogant Asser­tion that they cannot with any Face of Modesty or common Decency make a plain and direct Profession of it, though at the same time 'tis most Certain, that this is the true Principle of that Consequence which they do professedly hold, viz. that the Incomprehensibility of a thing ar­gues it not to be true, and that this Consequence does as necessarily lead back to that Principle.

[Page 246] 3. For as if Human Reason be the Measure of Truth it follows in the descendintg line as a direct Con­sequence that the Incomprehensibi­lity of a thing argues it not to be true, so it follows as well Back­wards & per viam ascensûs, that if the Incomprehensibility of a thing argues it not to be True, then Hu­man Reason is the Measure of Truth. Since if it were not, the Incom­prehensibility of a thing (as is shewn in the Preceding Chapter) would then not argue it not to be True. If therefore it does, 'tis plain that Hu­man Reason is the Measure of Truth. Which Principle whoever disowns ought also to renounce the other Proposition, viz. That the Incompre­hensibility of a thing is an Argu­ment of its untruth, which if yet he will imbrace notwithstanding, 'tis plain he holds the Consequence without its Principle, and has in­deed no Reason for what he Af­firms.

4. For as he who granting Human Reason to be the Measure of Truth, denies yet that the Incomprehensi­bility of a thing is an Argument of [Page 247] its not being true is therefore incon­sistent with himself, because in so doing he supposes the Contradictory to what he had before granted, viz. that Human Reason is not the Measure of Truth. So he that Af­firms that the Incomprehensibility of a thing is an Argument of its not being True, and yet denies that Human Reason is the Measure of Truth, is also as inconsistent with himself, because in so doing the sup­poses the Contradictory to his own Assertion, and does in effect say that the Incomprehensibility of a thing is not an Argument of its not being True, as most Certainly it would not be in case Human Reason be not the Measure of Truth, as the foregoing Chapter has sufficiently shewn. The short is, if the Not being of A proves that C is not, then the being of C proves that A is, since if it were not, according to the First Suppo­sition C could not be. And so here if Reason's not being the Measure of Truth proves that the Incom­prehensibility of a thing is not an Argument of its not being True, [Page 248] then if the Incomprehensibility of a thing be an Argument of it's not being True 'tis plain that Reason is the Measure of Truth, since if it were not then according to the first Supposition the Incomprehensibility of a thing would not be an Argu­ment of its not being True.

5. For how I pray comes the In­comprehensibility of a thing to con­clude the untruth of it? I cannot Comprehend such a thing, therefore it is not True, where's the Conse­quence? By what Logic does this Latter Proposition follow from the Former? why we have here the Minor Proposition and the Conclusi­on, and to make a Complete Argu­ment of it we must add another, thus; If it were true I should Com­prehend it, but I do not Comprehend it, therefore it is not true. Where­by it appears to the eye that my not being able to Comprehend a thing is no otherwise an Argument of the [...]truth of it, than as it is first pre­ [...]pposed that if it were true I should [...] [...]ble to Comprehend it. Which again resolving into this Absolute [...]osition, that I am able to Com­prehend [Page 249] all Truth, it plainly follows that if my inability to Comprehend a thing be an Argument that it is not true, then I am able to Compre­hend all Truth, and that my Reason is the Measure and Final Standard of it.

6. I Conclude therefore that if the Incomprehensibility of a thing were an Argument of it's not being true then Human Reason will be the Measure of Truth, and that they that hold the Former ought also if they will be Consistent with them­selves to admit the Latter. But be­cause this is a False Principle, that Human Reason is the Measure of Truth, therefore, I Conclude again that the Consequence that Resolves into this Principle is also False, since we may as well Conclude a Con­sequence to be False because it leads back to a False Principle, as a Principle to be False because it is productive of a bad Con­sequence. Which still further Con­firms and Establishes the Conclusion of the last Chapter, viz. That the In­comprehensibility of a thing is no Ar­gument of its untruth, which you [Page 250] see is now proved both Backwards and Forwards, and so made impreg­nable on all sides. We have proved it Forwards by shewing the False­ness of that Principle that Human Reason is the Measure of Truth, and by thence arguing the said Con­clusion; and we have also proved it Backwards by shewing that the Contrary Supposition Resolves into that False and already Confused Principle. And I do not see how any Conclusion can be better prov­ed.

1. TIs a Wonderful thing to Consider the Caprice of Hu­man Nature, by what unaccount­able Springs it's Movements are ordered, and how odly and unsted­dily Men act and manage themselves even in the same Circumstances, and in Relation to the same Objects. Sometimes the Obscurity and Myste­riousness of a thing shall be a Mo­tive of Credibility, and recommend it the rather to their Belief. Thus you shall have a great many reject that Philosophy as idle and Chime­rical which undertakes to explain the Effects of Nature by insensible [Page 252] Particles, their different Bigness, Figure, Contexture, Local Motion, Rest, &c. Merely because this is a plain Simple and Intelligible Account, such as they can easily and well Con­ceive. The very easiness and clear­ness wherewith they Conceive these Principles is Made an Ob­jection against them (though indeed it be a good Presumption for them) and for that very Reason they will not believe them to be the true Prin­ciples of Nature, whose Effects they fancy must be Resovled into Causes more hidden and Abstruse. And accordingly they find in themselves a greater inclination to lend attenti­on to those that shall undertake the Solution of them by the real Chi­meras of Substantial Forms, Quali­ties, Sympathys, Antipathys, &c. or that shall go to account for them by the yet more Obscure Principles of the Chymists, striking and filling their Ears with those great but emp­ty Sounds, Archeus, Seminal Spirit, A­stral Beings, Gas, Blas, &c. which they receive with great satisfaction not for their Scientific Light (for they are dark as may be, mere Philosophic [Page 253] Cant) but only because they are Mysterious and Abstruse, and there­fore they fancy there must be some­what more than Ordinary in them, tho they know not, nor, it may be, never Consider'd, what. And here­in, as in some other Instances, Men love Darkness better than Light.

2. But then at another time you shall have them inquiring after Truth as Diogenes did after an Hon­est Man, with a Candle in their hands, and not caring to go a step any further than they can see their way. Now upon a sudden they are all for Clear and distinct Ideas, Full and adequate Perceptions, Demon­strative Proofs and Arguments, and nothing will serve or Content them but Light and Evidence, and they will believe nothing but what they can Comprehend. Strange diversi­ty of Conduct! Who would think two such vastly distant extreams should meet together, I will not say in the same Man, but in the same Human Nature, and that the very same Creature (and such a One as Stiles it self Rational too) should proceed by such uncertain Measures, [Page 254] and act so inconsistently with it Self; sometimes embracing a thing for the sake of it's Obscurity, and some­times again in another Fit making that alone an Invincible Objection against the Belief of it.

3. But it is plain by the foregoing Measures that it is not. For since Truth is the general Object of Faith, 'tis evident that nothing can argue a thing to be absolutely incredible, or not reasonable to be beleiv'd, but that which at the same time argues it not to be True. For if true, then 'tis still within the Compass of the general Object of Faith. But now we have shewn already that the In­comprehensibility of a thing is no Argument of it's not being true, whence it clearly and closely follows that 'tis no Argument neither a­gainst it's Credibility. And if so, then we may believe it Notwith­standing it's Incomprehensibility, because we may believe whatever is not Absolutely incredible. So that there is no Necessity that we should discard every thing we cannot Conceive as unworthy of a Ratio­nal Belief, or that what is Above [Page 255] our Reason should be therefore a­bove our Faith too.

4. It is true indeed that the In­comprehensibility of a thing is in it Self no proper and direct Argument why it should be believ'd, and he would be thought to give but an or­dinary account of his Faith, who be­ing ask [...]d why he believ'd, such an Incomprehensible thing, should an­swer because it is Incomprehensible. which at best could pass only for a Religious Flourish, much such another as, Credo quia impossibile. And that because the Incomprehen­sibility of a thing is not directly and per se a Criterion of Truth (whe­ther it may be per Accidens, may be Consider'd afterwards) whose Na­tural and genuin Character is not Obsecurity, but Light and Evidence. Not that nothing is True but what has this Character (for we have al­ready shewn the Contrary in prov­ing Incomprehensible Truths) but that as whatever we clearly per­ceive is True, so our Clear perceiving of a thing is the only sign from the Intrinsic Nature of the thing it Self of the Truth of it. Incomprehensi­bility [Page 256] therefore is none, but as such abstracts from true and not true, and is equally Common to both. But now that which may Consist with a thing supposing it false, can no more prove it True, than that which may Consist with a thing sup­posing it True, can prove it false, according to the Tenour of the Fifth Chapter. The Incomprehen­sibility therefore of a thing is no pro­per Argument of the Truth of it, and Consequently no Reason of it Self, why it should be believ'd, and that because it abstracts as such from True and False, and is too Common to Both to prove either.

5. And because it is so, it is also further granted that the Incompre­hensibility of a thing is not only in it Self no proper Reason why it should be believ'd, but has also so far the Nature of a Disswasive from believing, as to be a Caution against a too hasty Belief, till there appear some other Motive from without either from Reason or Authority that shall deter­min the Assent. In the mean while it advises to Suspend. For the [Page 257] Incomprehensibility of a thing being as such No Reason why a Man should believe it, 'tis plain that if he did believe it Consider'd only as in that State he would believe it. with­out Reason. That therefore is a Reason why he should suspend, a Negation of Reason being enough to with-hold ones Assent, though to give it one had need have a posi­tive Reason. When therefore a thing appears Incomprehensible, that indeed is sufficient Reason to suspend our Belief, till some prevailing Con­sideration from without shall over­rule that Suspension, by requiring our Assent. But when it does so, then the Incomprehensibility ought to be No Argument to the Contra­ry, and it would be every whit as absurd to reject a thing now because of its Incomprehensibility, as to be­lieve it before for that Reason. And that because as the Incomprehensi­bility of a thing is no reason for Be­lieving it, so it is no Absolute Reason against it.

6. If it were so it would be in Natural things, the objects of Hu­man and Philosophic Science, such as [Page 258] belong properly and immediately to the Province and Jurisdiction of Rea­son. Here, if any where, the In­comprehensibility of a thing would forbid all Assent to it. And so it is supposed to do by some who though far from denying the Belief of In­comprehensible things in Religion, will yet tell you that in Physical Contemplations, Clearness and Evi­dence is to lead the way, and we are to proceed with our Light be­fore us, assenting to nothing but what we well Comprehend. In Matters of Faith indeed they will allow that Reason is to be submitted to Revelation, and that we are to believe many things which pass our Comprehension; but in Matters of pure Reason they will have us go no further than Reason can carry us. Which indeed is right enough it their Meaning be that we are to Assent to Nothing but what upon the whole Matter all things Consider'd from without as well as from within, we have reason to believe true, and that we are never to proceed to judge or determin without some Evidence or other, but then this will equally hold [Page 259] in Matters of Faith too, which is too rational an Assent to be given at a Venture, and we know not why, and whose Formal Reason (as has been already discours'd) is always Clear. But if their Meaning be that in Matters of Reason we must As­sent to nothing but what has an in­ternal Evidence, and what in its self, and by its own Lights is Comprehen­sible by us (as they seem to mean, or else their distinction of the Case of Reason and the Case of Revelation is here impertinent) then I conceive that they set too narrow limits to our Assent in Matters of Reason when they allow it to be given only to things which in this sense are Evi­dent to us. For 'tis plain that there are many things in Nature which we fee are True, and must be True, and so not only may, but cannot help Assenting to them, though at the same time we are not able to Com­prehend how they are, or can possi­bly be.

7. Not that our Assent is then Blind and wholly without Evidence, (for then we might as well Assent to the contrary as to what we do, and [Page 260] would do better not to Assent at all) but only that it has none from within, and from the intrinsic Nature of the Object, but only from some Exter­nal Consideration, much after the same manner as it is in [...]atch. In both which there may be a Clear Reason, why we should Assent to an Obscure thing. But then as the internal Obscurity does not destroy the External Evidence, so neither does the External Evidence strike a­ny Light into the internal Obscurity; or in other words, as the Reason for Assenting is never the less Clear be­cause the Matter assented to is Ob­scure, so neither is the Matter as­sented to ever the less Obscure be­cause the Reason for assen [...]ing to it is Clear. And yet notwithstand­ing this internal Obscurity of the Matter we assent to it because of the prevailing Light of the External E­vidence. And this we do, not only in Matters of Faith (according to the Restriction of some) but in the things of Nature and Reason too, where we are oftentimes forced by the pressing urgency of certain Ex­ternal and Collateral Considerations [Page 261] to assent to things internally obscure and whose very possibility we can­not Comprehend, as is plain in the great Question of the Divisibility of Quantity, and other Instances, whereof every Thinking Man's Ob­se [...]ation cannot but have already furnish'd him with variety. The Incomprehensibility then of a thing is non just Objection against our As­sent to it even in Matters of a Ra­tional Nature, much less then is it in Matters of Faith For if not in Matters that belong to the Court of Reason, and where she sits as Judge, then much less in things that are not of her proper Jurisdiction, and if notwithstanding the internal inevi­dence of an Object we think fit to assent to it upon Rational Conside­rations, much more may we, and ought we upon the Authority of the Infallible God.

8. Indeed if whatsoever is Above our Reason were also (as some pre­tend) as Contrary to it, and there were nothing true but what was also Comprehensible, and so the In­comprehensibility of a thing were an Argument of its not being true, [Page 262] then I con [...]ess we could not as Ra­tional Creatures assent to an incom­prehensible Proposition upon any Consideration whatsoever, No not even that of Divine Authority. 'Tis true indeed there could then be no such Authority for Incomprehensible things. But if there were, 'tis im­possible we should regard it, because we could not have greater assurance either of the Existence or of the Truth of it, than we have already (upon this Supposition) that the things reveal'd are not true. But now if this Supposition be no more than a Supposition, if to be above Reason does not involve any Con­trariety to it, if there are incom­prehensible Truths, and Consequent­ly the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no Argument o [...] its not being true (all which has been already proved) then 'tis plain that what is an in­comprehensible may yet be a Be­lievable Object (because within the Possibility of Truth) and then to render it actually believ'd there needs only some External Evidence either from Reason or Authority. For what should hinder our Assent to an [Page 263] Incomprehensible thing when we have plain Evidence from without for it, and its own internal Obscu­rity is no Argument against it! 'Tis plain therefore that we ought to give our Assent. And since we do so oftentimes upon a Ground of Rea­son, much more ought we upon that more Firm and Immoveable ground of Revelation. The short is, whatever is no Objection against the Truth of a thing is none against the Credibility of it, since Truth is the General Object of Faith (un­less you will say that a thing is un­fit to be believ'd upon any other ac­count besides want of Truth) and therefore since we have already shewn that the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no Argument against the Truth of it, it visibly follows that it is no Argument against the Belief of it neither. Therefore an Incomprehensible thing may be be­liev'd, and accordingly he that refuses to believe any thing is bound to give a better Reason for it than because it is Incomprehen­sible.

[Page 264]9. If it be said that this is rea­son enough, because Faith is a Ra­tional Act, and therefore what is a­bove the Comprehension of Reason is as much above a Rational Belief, to this, besides what I have already remarqu'd upon this Occasion in the Chapter of Faith, [...] I here further reply, that it is true indeed and on both sides agreed that Faith is a Rational Act, but in what Sense is the Question. There are two very different Senses according to which it may be said to be so either in re­gard of the Clearness of its Formal Reason, or in regard of the Clear­ness of its Object. Either because it is founded upon an External Evi­dence, or Argument for believing, or because it proceeds upon an In­ternal Evidence, that appears in the very Nature of the thing Be­liev'd. I [...] Faith be said to be a Ra­tional Act in the latter Sense, the Assertion is then False, for so (that [...]s in respect of the Object) we have sh [...]wn it to be an inevident Assent. But i [...] [...] be said to be a Rational Act in the former Sense, then indeed it is true, but nothing to the purpose, [Page 265] since nothing hinders but that this External Evidence may well consist with an Internal Inevidence, or in other words, that the Clearness of the Reason for Believing may stand with the Obscurity of the Object Believ'd. And therefore though Faith be a Rational Act yet it does not hence [...]ollow that what is Above Reason is also above Faith and can­not rationally be believ'd, because the Act of Faith is said to be Rational, Not in respect of the Evidence of the Object, but only that of its For­mal Reason or Motive. And there­fore though there be no Evidence in the Object, yet it is not thereby ren­der'd uncapable of being the Matter of Faith, because the Evidence which Faith as a Rational Act supposes, is wholly of another kind. There seems indeed a kind of opposition as to the Sound between Faith's be­ing an Act of Reason, and the be­lieving what is Above Reason. And this it may be is that which imposes upon the Minds, or the Ears shall I say, of them that urge it as an Objection. I cannot imagine what else should, for I'm sure there is no [Page 266] Contradiction in the Sense. 'Tis true indeed Evidence in the Act and not Evidence in the Act are Contra­dictories, because ad Idem, and so are Not Evidence in the Object and Evidence in the Object, for the same reason. But there is no Con­tradiction between Evidence in the Act and No Evidence in the Object, and therefore these may stand toge­ther, though the other cannot

10. But to lay open the Fallacy of this great and very popular Objection yet a little more to the Eye (though it must be a very blind one that does not see it already) I will put it into Form, and give it a Formal Answer.

For Answer to this I distinguish. If by Rational Act be meant an Act founded upon Internal Evidence, or the Evidence of the Object, then I deny the Minor, Faith is not so a Rational Act. But if by Rational [Page 267] Act be meant an Act founded upon External Evidence or the Evidence of its Formal Reason or Motive, then indeed I grant the Minor, but deny the Consequence, which is none at all, for it does not at all fol­low because Faith is a Rational Act, meaning by it that it proceeds upon External Evidence, and that there is a clear Reason for Believing, that therefore the thing Believ [...]d may not from within and in its own Nature be altogether inevident and so above the Comprehension of Reason. For though Evidence be Contradictory to Not Evidence in the [...]ame, yet Evidence in the Act is no way Con­tradictory to inevidence in the Object, and Consequently does not at all exclude it. They may there­fore both stand together, and Con­sequently what is above Reason may be believ'd for any thing that this Celebrated Objection from Faith's being a Rational Act makes to the Contrary; which truly is so gross and palpable a Sophism, that I cannot but wonder how it could ever impose upon so many Learned Men as it has done, and some of [Page 268] them very acute and nice Consider­ers of things. But I hope the Falla­ciousness of it is by this so plainly and fully detected, that I shall not think those Heads worth much inform­ing that shall be further imposed on by it.

11. But what then shall we say to that Great and Fundamental Maxim so pressingly inculcated by Des Castes and his Followers, and not disal­low'd of by others, that we are to assent to not [...]ing but what is Clear and Evident? If to nothing but what is Clear and Evident, how then to what is Obscure and Inevident? Or if to what is Obscure and Inevident, how then to nothing but what is Clear and Evident? Do not these seem flat Contradictions one to the other, and how then shall we adjust the Matter between them? It must be either by denying that Cartesian Maxim to be true, or by shewing that though it be true it does not Contradict the Assertion here main­tain'd, but is Consistent with it. The First way I shall not take. I allow the Maxim to be true, and not only so, but to be withal of the [Page 269] greatest importance of any that can be given for the direction of the Mind of Man in order to the avoid­ing of Errour. The only Remedy and Caution against which is never to let our Judgments prevent our Conceptions, or to Assent to any thing that we have only a Confuse Notion of, and where we see only by halves and with an imperfect Light, or perhaps do not see at all, but to have a Clear Understanding of the Matter before we adventure to judge of it, and to Maintain an Evidence in all our Reasonings. Which accordingly is made by M. Malebranche the First of those Rules which in his Treatise of Method he lays down to be observ'd in the inquiry after Truth. And indeed to do otherwise is to make a wrong use of our Intellectual Powers, particu­larly of that Liberty we have to sus­pend Judgment till the fulness of E­vidence requires it, and the want of Observing this Rule is also the Occasion of most of our Errours and Wrong Assents,Recherche de la Ve­rité. Tom. 2. p. 165. as the same Excellent Person shews it to have [Page 270] been in particular to the Authors of the Scholastic Philosophy.

12. I shall not therefore go about to salve my own Assertion by deny­ing Des Cartes's Maxim, but rather by shewing that according to the true Sense and intendment of it, it does not Contradict it. But first we must see what the true Sense of it is, or rather in what Sense it is true, though this may be without much difficulty Collected by any attentive Reader from what has been already said in several places of this Chapter, wherein I have in great Measure prevented this Objection. But to Consider it more directly; To verifie this Maxim that we are to Assent to nothing but what is Clear and Evident, the usual way has been to distinguish between Matters of Faith, and Matters of Reason. In Matters of Faith, say they, we are to believe many things which we cannot Comprehend. And here then it seems this Rule must be laid a­side. But in Matters of Reason we must Assent to nothing but what is Clear and Evident. And here then it seems it holds. Accordingly when [Page 271] 'tis Objected against certain Articles of Faith that they are not to be com­prehended by Reason, 'tis usual to reply that these things do not belong to Reason &c. implying that if they did, then indeed the Objection would be good, and the incomprehensibility of such things would be an Argu­ment against assenting to them, which implies again that in Matters of Reason we must not Assent to any thing but what is Clear and E­vident, though in Matters of Faith we may. But we have remarqu'd already that even in Matters of Pure Reason we are forc'd to Assent to many things which we cannot com­prehend, and that even in Matters of Faith we do in a Certain Sense Assent upon Clear Evidence. This Distinction therefore will not do.

13. In stead therefore of distin­guishing between Matters of Faith and Matters of Reason, I think it will be better to distinguish of Evi­dence. We are to Assent to Nothing save what is Clear and Evident, says our Maxim. Very Good. Now if by Evidence here be meant inter­nal Evidence, and the Sense be that [Page 272] are to assent to nothing but what in its own Nature, and by a Light in­trinsic to it, is Evident, then the Maxim is False; and that not only in Matters of Faith, but also in Mat­ters of Reason too, wherein we find our selves often Constrain'd to assent to things that have not this inter­nal Evidence, but are (as to what respects the Nature of the things themselves) altogether Obscure and Incomprehensible. But if by Evi­dence here be Meant Evidence at large, abstracting from Internal or External, and the Sense be that we are to assent to nothing but what has some Evidence or other, either In­ternal or External, or what is some way or other evident to us, and what we see plainly to be true by a Light shining from within or from without, in short, what we have one way or other sufficient ground or Reason to assent to, then the Maxim is undoubtedly true, and will hold Universally, not only in Matters of Reason, but also in Matters of Faith too, which (as was shewn in the Chapter of Faith) is the Conclusion of a Syllogism, and so a Rational [Page 273] Act, and proceedt upon as Much, though not the Same kind of Evi­dence, as any other Conclusion does, And that even in the Belief of In­comprehensible things, which it would be absurd, nay impossible to believe, if there were no Reason to believe things above Reason. Ac­cording to a saying, as I take it of St. Austin, in one of his Letters to this purpose, That we could not bring our selves to believe what is Above our Reason, if Reason it self did not per­swade us that there are things which we should do well to believe, although we are not capable of Comprehending them. So then in [...]hort, if this Maxim that we are to assent to nothing but what is Evident, be understood of Internal Evidence, then 'tis False, not only in Matters of Faith but also in Matters of Reason, wherein things intrinsecally inevident are assented to. But if it be understood of Evidence at large then [...]tis true, not only in Matters of Reason, but also in Matters of Faith, which (as has been often noted) is reasonable in its Fund and Principle, and whose Evidence [Page 274] must be Clear, though its Object may be Obscure.

14. In this large therefore and indefinite Sense of the Word Evi­dence the Maxim is to be under­stood. We are to assent to nothing but what is Clear and Evident, that is, we ought to make use of our liberty of Suspension so far as not to give our Assent to any thing but what all things Consider'd and upon the whole appears Evident to us, what by some Light or other we see and plainly perceive to be true, and what in one word we find sufficient Reason either from with­in or from without to Assent to. According to that well known Sen­tence wherewith Des Cartes Con­cludes his wonderful System, Ni­hil (que) ab ullo Credi velim, nisi quod ipsi Evidens & invicta ratio persua­debit. I would have nothing be­liev'd by any one but what by evi­dent and irresistible reason he shall be Convinc'd of. And certainly he would be very unreasonable that should desire more. For to assent without Evidence of one sort or o­ther that the thing assented to is [Page 275] true, is to assent without a why or wherefore, and to assent so is to as­sent without Reason, which again is to assent not as a Rational Crea­ture; and as Man ought not, so to be sure God cannot require such an Assent. To assent therefore to no­thing but what upon some Consi­deration or other is Clear and Evi­dent to us, and what we have good reason to imbrace, as true, is cer­tainly a Maxim of unquestionable Truth, and of universal Extent, that holds in all Matters whatso­ever, whether of Reason or of Faith, in the former of which an Assent without Evidence would be the Act, and in the latter the Sacri­fice of a Fool.

15. And that this is the true Sense wherein Des Cartes intended his Maxim, as well as the true Sense of the Maxim it self, is plain from the Occasion of it which as all know who are not utter Strangers to, or very Negligent Readers of his Books, was the bringing in and obtruding so many things in the Vulgar Philo­sophy whereof the Introducers of them had such Confuse Notions [Page 276] and of whose reality and Existence they had no Firm and Solid Reasons to assure them, such as Substantial Forms, really inhering Accidents and Qualities and the like, which served rather to darken than clear up the Science of Nature, and were the Occasions of a thousand Errours in the Superstructures that were rais'd upon those Imaginary and Chimerical Principles. In Opposi­tion to, and as a Remedy for which, he lays down this Fundamental Maxim, to be Carefully observ'd by all the Disciples of Truth in their whole Intellectual Progress, never to assent to any thing but what is Clear and Evident, that is, to no­thing but of Whose Truth and Rea­lity they are fully assured, and have sufficient Reason to assent to. This is the true Sense of the Maxim, this is the Sense of its Author, and in this Sense it is undeniably true. And that without any prejudice to our present Conclusion, with which (as thus explain'd) it is very Consistent. For 'tis now very easie to discern that we may believe an Incompre­hensible thing, and yet at the same [Page 277] time according to this Cartesian Maxim assent to nothing but what is Clear and Evident, because the Evidence of Faith is External, and that there may be an External Evi­dence to assent to a thing Internally Inevident is no Contradiction.

16. Which by the way may serve to discover as well the Injustice as the Impertinence, 1. Of those who make use of this Maxim as an Ob­jection against the Belief of things above Reason. 2. Of those who take occasion from hence to traduce the Cartesian Philosophy as favoura­ble to, and looking with a very pro­pitious Aspect upon Sociniani [...], and indeed as little better than an Intro­duction to it, only because it talks so much of clear and distinct Ideas and Conceptions, and of assenting to nothing but what is Clear and Evi­dent. But Most of all 3dly. Of those who proceed even to traduce the Author himself as a secret Friend to the Cause, and no better than a Socinian in Disguise. It would have been indeed a Considerable Glory and Advantage to that, (or any o­ther Interest) to have had so great [Page 278] a Master of Reason a Friend to it. But he Certainly was not, if with his Words he has transmitted to us his real Thoughts, which would be great uncharity to question, and, with a witness, to Assent to what is not Evident.

17. He was indeed a great Master in the Rational way, but no Mag­nifier or Exalter of Human Rea­son. So far from that, that he seems to have had the most inward and feeling Sense of its Infirmities and Defects, and the best to have under­stood what a poor little thing 'tis to be a Man, of any one in the World. As may be abundantly Collected from several passages in his Writings (besides that the whole vein of them runs that way) particularly those two final Sentences wherewith he shuts up his Principles and his Meta­physics, At Nihilominus memor meae­tenuitatis, nihil affirmo &c. and, Naturae nostrae infirmitas est agnoscenda. Which plainly shew what a low de­basing Sense he had both of Him­self and of Human Nature in ge­neral, as [...]tis Natural for every man to have more and more, the wiser [Page 279] he grows, and the further he ad­vances in Knowledge, which when all's done (provided you take a good Dose of it) is the best Cure of Pride and Vanity.

18. And as he had thus slender an Opinion both of Human Reason and his Own, so he appears to have had also at the same such an high-raised and elevated Sense of the im­mense Grandeur of God, and of the Magnificence of his Works, and how inscrutable the Profundities of both are to such Finite and Con­tracted Minds as ours, as can scarce any where be parallel'd. Two Characters certainly of Spirit, that are none of the aptest to dispose a Man to Socinianism. But not to dwell any longer upon Rational Presumptions, there is a certain plain and deciding place in the Writings of this Great Man (which one would think had escaped the Eyes of some) that is enough for­ever to silence the Calumny of his being even in the least Socinianiz'd, and to shame those that have so little Conscience or Judgment as to [Page 280] stain his Memory with it. For who can suspect him in the least in­fected with that Head-seizing Dis­ease, which is now become so Po­pular and Epidemic, when he shall hear him still Purging and Apolo­gizing for himself in these Vindica­tory words, [...]. Credenda esse Omnia quae a Deo revelata sunt, quamvis Captum Nostrum Excedant. And again, Ita si soriè nobis Deus de seipso, vel aliis aliquid revelet, quod Naturales inge­nii Nostri vires excedat, qualia jam sunt Mysteria Incarnationis & Trini­tatis, non recasabimus illa Credere, quamvis non Clare intelligamus. Nec ullo modo mirabimur multa esse, tum in immensâ ejus Naturâ, tum etiam in r [...] bus ab [...]o Creatis, quae Captum No­strum excedant. Now how glad should I be to see all the Socinians in Christendom Subscribe to this Form of Words, and is it not strange then that he whose Originally they are should be suspected of Socinianism, and that his Philosophy too should be thought to lead to it. But the Truth is, the Cartesian Philosophy leads just as much to Socinianism, as [Page 281] Philosophy in general does to A­theism, and I will venture to say, and be bound to make it good, that as no good Philosopher can be an Atheis [...], so no good Cartesian can be a Socinian.

1. REason being the great Cha­racter and Principle of Man, that makes him like to the Angels above him, and distinguishes him from the Beasts that are below him, and which therefore only are below him for want of the Rational Power (being many of them in regard of their Bodily Endowments upon a level with him, and some beyond him) 'tis but Just and Natural it should appear in all that he does, and pre [...]ide and govern in all his Actions. For as the Conduct of the Infinitely Wise and All-knowing God does always carry in it the Characters of his Essential and Con­substantial Reason, even of him who is the Wisdom of the Father, the [Page 283] true intelligible Light, so should also the Conduct of Man express in Proportion the Signatures of his Reason, and though he cannot act by such exact and unerring Mea­sures as his Glorious Maker, nor yet with all that Perfection of Wis­dom that even some Created In­telligences express, yet at least he should act like Himself, and not by doing any thing absurd or unac­countable deny his Reasonable Na­ture.

2. This has serv'd for a Princi­ple to some Scholastic and Moral Writers whereon to build a very high, and (as some think) very Severe Conclusion, viz. that there is no individual Action of Man pure­ly indifferent. Which I suppose may be true enough of those Acti­ons of his which are properly Hu­mane, I mean that are done delibe­rately, with fore-thought and Con­sideration, every one of which must, as far as I can see, be either good or Bad according to the Circum­stances wherewith they are Cloath'd, however specifically Consider'd in [Page 284] relation to their Objects only, and as abstracted from those Circum­stances, some of them may be In­different. And certainly we cannot suppose any Action of a more Neu­tral and adiaphorous Nature than an unprofitable Word, and yet of such He that is to be our Judge tells us we shall render an Account in the Day of Judgment. Which plainly shews that there is no such thing as Indifferency in the Actions of Man as Individually and Concretely Con­sider'd, but that all of them are either good or bad according as the Principle, Manner, End, and other Circumstances are that attend the doing of them. And that because Man being a Rational Creature the Order of Reason is due at least to all his deliberate Actions, which ac­cordingly ought to carry the Cha­racters of a Rational Nature in them, the want of which will be enough to render any of them evil and imperfect.

3. But then if Reason ought to pre [...]ide and direct in all the deliberate Actions of Man much more ought [Page 285] it in things of the greatest Moment and Consequence, wherein his In­terest and Welfare is more nearly Concern'd, and which accordingly require his greatest Consideration, and the use of the best Light that he has. And because there cannot be a thing of greater Consequence and Concernment to him than Reli­gion, upon which both his Present and his Future, his Temporal and his Eternal Happiness does intirely depend, hence it follows that the Principal Use he ought to make of his Rational Faculty is in Religion, that here if any where he ought to Think, Consider, Advise, Delibe­rate, Reason and Argue, Consult both his own Light and that of o­thers, neglect no advantage that may be had from Nature or Art, from Books or Men, from the Liv­ing or the Dead, but imploy all possible Means for his direction and Information,Psal. 32. 10. and not be as the Horse and Mule which have no Vnderstand­ing. For 'twas for this great End and Purpose that his Reason was given him, and this is the best Use [Page 286] he can make of it. As for the Study of Nature, that turns to too little an Account, and as for the Affairs of Civil Life they in themselves and without relation to another World, are too little and inconsiderable for us to suppose that our Reason was given us for the Management of them. Religion only bears propor­tion to so Noble a Faculty, is most worthy of its Application, and can also best reward the due Exercise and Use of it, and accordingly 'tis up­on Religion that it will be best be­stow'd.

4. Nor is there any thing in Re­ligion that may justly fear to be brought before the Bar of Human Reason, or to undergo the Test of its severest Discussion. The Hea­then Religion indeed Might, for which Cause those that drew its Picture cast a Shade upon a great part of it, and would not Venture to expose it to Common View. And the too much Heathenized Re­ligion of some Christians may also very deservedly retire behind the Curtain, and decline coming to the [Page 287] Light, for fear the Absurdities and Monstrous Inconsistencies of it should be laid open. But certainly there is not any thing, neither Doctrine nor Precept in that true Religion that is reveal'd by God, in Evangelical Christianity, that need fly the Light of Reason, or refuse to be tried by it. Christian Religion is all over a Reasonable Service, and the Author of it is too reasonable a Master to impose any other, or to require (as his Vicar does) that Men should follow him blindfold, and pull out their eyes to become his Disciples. No, he that Miraculously gave Sight to so many has no need of, nor pleasure in the Blind, nor has his Divine Religion any occasion for such Judges or Professors. For it is the Religion of the Eternal and un­created Wisdom, the Divine Word, the true Light of the World, and the Universal Reason of all Spirits, and 'tis impossible that he should re­veal any thing that Contradicts the Measures of sound Discourse, or the immutable Laws of Truth, as in­deed it is that any Divine Revela­tion [Page 288] should be truly Opposite to Right Reason (hower it may some­times be Above it) or that any thing should be Theologically true, which is Philosophically False, as some with great profoundness are pleas'd to di­stinguish. For the Light of Rea­son is as truly from God as the Light of Revelation is, and there­fore though the latter of these Lights may exceed and out-shine the for­mer, it can never be Contrary to it. God as the Soveraign Truth cannot reveal any thing against Rea­son, and as the Soveraign Goodness he cannot require us to believe any such thing. Nay to descend some degrees below this, he cannot re­quire us to believe, not only what is against Reason, but even what is without it. For to believe any thing without Reason is an un­reasonable Act, and 'tis impossi­ble that God should ever require an unreasonable act, especially from a Reasonable Creature.

5. We therefore not only ac­knowledge the use of Reason in Religion, but also that 'tis in Re­ligion [Page 289] that 'tis chiefly to be used; so far are we from denying the Use of it there. And it is a little unfairly done of our Adversaries so much to insinuate the Contrary as they do. For I cannot take it for less than such an Insinuation, when they are arguing with us against the Belief of the Christian Mysteries to run out as they usually do into Harangues and Flourishes (where­of, by the way, I know none more guilty than the Author of Christi­anity not Mysterious) about the Rea­sonableness of the Christian Reli­gion, and the Rational Nature of Faith, what a Reasonable Act the One is, and what a Reasonable Service the Other is, &c. as if we were against the Use of Rea­son in Religion, or were for a Blind, Groundless, and Unac­countable Faith, or if because we hold the Belief of things above Rea­son, therefore we are for having no Reason for our Belief. This I say is an unfair Insinuation, and such as argues some want either of Judgment or Sincerity (I don't [Page 290] know which) in those that sug­gest it. For they seem plainly by running so much upon this Vein to imply as if it were part of the Question between us, whether there be any Use of Reason in Religion, or whether Faith is to be Founded upon Reason or No. But Now this is no part of the Controversie that lies between us, we acknowledge the Use of Rea­son in Religion as well as they, and are as little for a Senseless and Irrational Faith as they can be. This therefore being Common to us both is no part of the Que­stion, and they do ill to insinuate that it is by so many Popular De­clamatory Strains upon the Rea­sonableness of Religion, and in particular of Faith, whereas they do, or should know, that the thing in Question between us is not whether there be any Use of Reason to be made in Believing, but only what it is, or where­in the true Use of it does Con­sist.

[Page 291]6. Now this we may determine in a few words, having already laid the grounds of it. For since the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no Concluding Argument against the Truth of it, nor Consequent­ly against the Belief of it (as is shewn in the three foregoing Chap­ters) it is plain that the proper Office and Business of a Believers Reason is to Examin and Inquire▪ Not whether the thing proposed be Comprehensible or not, but only whether it be Reveal'd by God or No, since if it be, the Incom­prehensibleness of it will be no Ob­jection against it. That therefore ought to be no part of its Questi­stion or Deliberation, because in­deed it is not to the purpose to Consider whether such a thing be, when if it were it would be no just Objection. The only Consi­derable thing then here is whether such a Proposition be indeed from God, and has him for its Author or no. And here Reason is to clear her Eyes, put the Matter in the best Light, call in all the Assistance [Page 292] that may be had both from the Heart and the Head, and determine of the thing with all the Judge­ment, and all the Sincerity that she can. But as to the Compre­hensibility or Incomprehensibility of the Article, this is quite besides the Question, and ought therefore to be no part of her scruting or debate, since if it were never so much a­bove her Comprehension it would be never the less proper Object for her Belief.

7. The Sum is, the Incompre­hensibility of a thing is no Argument against the Belief of it, therefore in the believing of a thing, the pro­per work of my Reason is not to Consider whether it be incompre­hensible. But when a thing is pro­posed to me as from God, all that my Reason has to do in this Case is Seriously, Soberly, Diligently, Impartially, and (I add) Humbly to Examine whether it comes with the true Credentials of his Autho­rity, and has him for its real Au­thor or no. This is all that Reason has to do in this Matter, and when [Page 293] she has done this, she is to rise from the Seat of Judgement, and resign it to Faith, which either gives or refuses her Assent, Not as the thing proposed is Comprehensible or not Comprehensible, but as 'tis either Re­veal [...]d or not Reveal'd.

1. HAving thus raised the Shell of our Building to its due [...]itch, we have now only to Roof it by making a Short Application of the Principles laid down and set­ [...]led in the Former Chapters to the Mysteries of the Christian Religi­on, against the Truth and Belief of which it plainly appears from the Preceding Considerations that there lies now no Reasonable Objection. For if Human Reason be not the Measure of Truth, and if there­fore the Incomprehensibility of a [...]hing to Human Reason be no Ar­gument of its [...] being True, nor Consequently against its being Be­liev'd, and if the only Use and Im­ployment [Page 295] of Reason in Believing be to Consider, not the Internal Evidence of the thing, whether the Article be Comprehensible or no, but whether it be truly reveal'd by God, I say if these things are so, as we have abundantly prov'd them to be, then from these Premises the Clear and undeniable Consequence is that the Incomprehensibility of the Christian Mysteries is no just reason why they should not be Believ'd, and so tha [...] we may Be­lieve them though we should sup­pose them (what yet some deny) to be Incomprehensible.

2. Nay so far is the Incompre­hensible Sublimity of these Myste­ries from being a sufficient Ob­jection against the Belief of them, that Accidentally and indirectly it may be improved into a Consider­able Argument for them, and such as may serve to recommend them to our Faith, inasmuch as it is a very strong Presumption that they are of no Human Origin, but have God for their Authour, it being reasonable to suppose that what does so very much transcend the Capa­city [Page 296] of Man to Comprehend, does no less exceed his Ability to invent. And accordingly the Incomprehen­sibility of our Mysteries for which some will have them to be false, is made use of by a very Rational Authour as an Argument of their Truth. And it may be worth while to let the Reader see how he Manages it in relation to One of the Most Sublime of them. [...]. The more Obscure are our Mysteries. Strange Paradox! the more Credible they now appear to me. Yes, I find even in the Obscurity of our Mysteries, re­ceiv'd as they are by so many different Nations, an invincible Proof of their Truth. How, for instance, shall we accord the Vnity with the Trinity, the Society of three different Persons in the perfect Simplicity of the Divine Nature? This without doubt is Incom­prehensibl [...], but not Incredible. It is indeed above us, but let us Consider a lit­tle and we shall believe it, at least if we w [...]ll be of the same Religion with the Apostles. For supposing they had not known this ineffable Mystery, or that they had not taught it to their Successours, I maintain that it is not [Page 297] Possible that a Sentiment so extraor­dinary should find in the Minds of Men such an Vniversal Belief as is given to it in the whole Church, and among so many different Nations. The More this Adorable Mystery appears Monstrous (suffer the Expression of the Enemies of our Faith) the More it Shocks Human Reason, the More the Imagination Mutinies against it, the more Obscure, Incomprehensib [...] and Impenetrable it is, the less Credible is it that it should Naturally insi [...]ate it self into the Minds and [...] of all Christians of so many and so di­stant Countries. Never do the same Errours spread universally, especially such sort of Errours which so strangely offend the Imagination, which have nothing sensible in them, and which seem to Contradict the most Simple and Common Notions. If Iesus [...]hrist did not Watch over his Church, the Number of the [...] would quick­ly exceed that of [...] [...]hodox Chri­stians▪ For [...] in the Sentimen [...] [...] that does not [...] the Mind. And [...] that [...] to our Vn­derstandings [Page 298] may establish themselves in time. But that a Truth so Sub­lime, so far removed from Sense, so Cross to Human Reason, so Contrary in short to all Nature as is this great Mystery of our Faith, that a Truth I say of this Character should spread it self Vniversally, and Triumph over all Nations where the Apostles had Preach'd the Gospel, supposing that these First Preachers of our Faith had neither known any thing, nor [...]aid any thing of this Mystery, this Cer­tainly is what cannot be Conceiv'd by any one that has never so little know­ledge of Human Nature. That there should be Heretics that should oppose a Doctrine so Sublime is nothing strange, nor am I surprized at it. On the Contrary I should be very much if ne­ver any body had opposed it. This Truth wanted but little of being quite oppress'd. 'Tis very possible. For 'twill be always reckon'd a Commend­able Vndertaking to attaque that which seems to Clash with Reason. But that at length the Mystery of the Trinity should prevail, and should establish it self Vniversally wherever the Religion of Iesus Christ was receiv'd, without [Page 299] its being known and taught by the A­postles, without an Authority and a Force Divine, there needs methinks but an Ordinary Measure of good Sense to acknowledge that nothing in the World is less Probable. For it is not in the least likely that a Doctrine so Divine, so above Reason, so remov'd from whatever may strike the Imagi­nation and the Senses, should Na­turally Come into the Thought of Man.

3. You see here how this Excel­lent Person strikes Light out of Darkness, by improving even the Incomprehensibility of the Christian Mysteries into an Argument for the Truth and Credibility of them, and so turning the Artillery of our Ad­versaries against themselves. This indeed is a bold Atchievement, an [...] as Fortunate a one too, for I think there is a great deal of Force and Weight in his Reasoning. But I need not push the Matter so far, nor follow so home into the Ene­mies Camp, as to plant their own Cannon against them. 'Tis suffi­cient to the design of the present undertaking, and as much as I am [Page 300] led to by the Principles before E­stablish'd, to Conclude that the In­comprehensibility of the Christian Mysteries is no Argument against them. This therefore I insist upon, and (if my Reason mightily de­ceive me not) dare ingage finally to stand to. For if (as it has been shewn) the Incomprehensibility of a thing in general be no Conclusive Argument against either the Truth or the Credibility of it, then since Negative Propositions do separate the Attribut from the Subject ac­cording to all the Extent which the Subject has in the Proposition, what Consequence can be more Clear than that the Incomprehensibility of our Mysteries is no Argument a­gainst the Belief of them? I Con­clude therefore that it is None, and that they ought never the less to be believ'd for their being Incompre­hensible, supposing them otherwise sufficiently Reveal'd.

4. Whether they are so or no is besides my Undertaking at present to examin, nor need I ingage my Pen in this Question, since the Af­firmative side of it is so Obvious [Page 301] to every Eye that can but read the Bible, and has been withal so abun­dantly and convincingly made good by those abler hands which have gone into the Detail of the Contro­versie, and undertaken the particu­lar defence of the Christian Myste­ries. This part of the Argument therefore being so well discharged already, I shall Concern my self no further with it than only in Conse­quence and Pursuance of the For­mer Principles to bestow upon it this one single Necessary Remarque, viz. That as the Incomprehensibi­lity of the Christian Mysteries is no just Objection against the Belief of them supposing them otherwise suf­ficiently Reveal'd, so neither is it a just Objection against their being so Reveal'd, supposing the plain, ob­vious and literal Construction of the Words does naturally and directly lead to such a Sense. And that it does so is not I think offer'd to be denied, and the thing it self is plain enough to extort an acknowledge­ment, but then 'tis pretended that there is a Necessity of having re­course to a different Construction, [Page 302] and to understand the words in ano­ther Sense, because of the uncon­ceivableness and incomprehensible­ness of that which their proper and Grammatical Scheme does Exhibit. But by the Tenour of this whole Discourse it evidently appears that there is no such Necessity, since to admit an incomprehensible Sense has nothing absurd or inconvenient in it, and that because the Incomprehensi­bility of a thing is no Argument of the Untruth of it. From whence it plainly follows that 'tis no more an Objection against its being Reveal'd than 'tis an Objection against the Belief of it supposing it were Re­veal'd, there being nothing but the untruth of a thing that can be a reasonable Obstruction against ei­ther.

5. We are therefore to take the Words of Scripture according to their proper and most Natural Sense, and not seek out for Forc'd and Strain'd Interpretations upon the account of the Incomprehensibility of that which is apparently Genuin and Natural. And if the Revela­tion be otherwise plain, and such as [Page 303] we would accept of in another Case, and about matters which we can well Comprehend, we ought not to think it the less so because the Sense of it so understood is such as we cannot reconcile to our Apprehen­sions and Conceptions of things. For notwithstanding that it may be true, since by this time we may be sufficiently satisfied that there are many Incomprehensible Truths. The Incomprehensibility of a thing is therefore no Argument against its being Reveal'd, any more than 'tis against the Belief of it supposing it were. Which opens an immediate Entrance to the Christians Myste­ries, which I doubt not would be thought sufficiently Reveal'd were it not for the incomprehensibility of them, the only Objection that can be pretended against their Reve­lation.

6. I have hitherto argued upon the Supposition that the Mysteries of Christianity (those Doctrines I mean that are so call'd) are above Reason, and such as do transcend our Comprehension, and have shewn that even upon that Supposition [Page 304] there is no reasonable Objection a­gainst the Belief of them, that they are never the less Believable for their being Incomprehensible. But what if I should recall this Concession, and put our Adversaries to the proof that they are indeed above Human Reason and Comprehension. They cannot be ignorant that there are those that Contend they are not, and with great shew of reason offer to prove it, by endeavouring to render a Conceivable and Intelligible Account of them. If these Men should be in the right (which I do not think necessary at present to in­quire into) it would be a further Advantage to our Cause, and such as though I do not now insist upon it, I need not lose the Benefit of. But if it should prove that they are not in the right, the Cause of our Christian Mysteries is not much Concern'd in the loss of that Pillar, but can support it self well enough without it, as having another that is sufficient to bear its weight, since though we should suppose these Sa­cred Doctrines to be never so Incom­prehensible to our Reason, it does [Page 305] by no Consequence follow (as from the Argument of this whole Dis­course is apparent) that therefore they may not be due Objects of our Faith.

7. Should any one now be so fond of Objection as to draw one against the Mysteries of Christianity from the use of the Word Mystery in Scripture, which knows no other Mysteries but such as before the Re­velation of them were undiscover'd, not Considering whether they were in themselves Conceivable or no, I must tell him that I do not know that ever I met in any Controversie with a less pertinent Objection, as much as it is made of by a late Bold Writer,Christia­nity not My [...]ter▪ p. 90. who heaps together a great many Texts to shew the signification of the Word Mystery in the New Testament, that it signifies not things in themselves inconceivable, but only such as were not known before they were Reveal'd. Well, be it so as this Gentleman pretends (though I believe upon Examination it would appear otherwise) yet what is this to the purpose? For do we Dispute about Names or Things? [Page 306] The Question is not whether the Scripture expresses inconceivable things by the Name of Mysteries, but whether there be not things in Scripture above our Conception (call them by what Name you will) and if there be, whether their being so above our Conception be an Argu­ment why they should not be Be­liev'd. Now to these inconceivable things it has been the Common Use of Church-Writers to apply the Name of Mysteries, which, if the thing be granted, he must be a great Lover of Cavil and Wrangle that will Contend about it. But the Lear­ned Bishop of Worcester has already prevented me in the Consideration of this Objection,Serm. of the My­steries of the Chri­stian Faith. for which reason, together with the Frivolousness of it, I shall pursue it no further.

1. AND thus I have led my Rea­der through a long Course of Various Reasoning, and perhaps as far as he is willing to follow me, though I hope his Journey has not been without some Pleasure that may deceive, and some Profit that may in part reward the Labour of it. I have shewn him what Reason is, and what Faith is, that so he may see from the Absolute Natures of each what Habitude and Relation they have to one another, and how the Darkness and Obscurity of the Lat­ter may Consist with the Light and Evidence of the Former. I have also Consider'd the Distinction of things Above Reason and things Contrary to Reason, and shewn it to be real and well-grounded, and to have all that is requisite to a good Distincti­on. [Page 308] And for the further Confir­mation of it, I have also shewn that Human Reason is not the Measure of Truth. From which Great Prin­ciple (which I was the more willing to discourse at large and thoroughly to settle and establish because of its Moment and Consequence to the Concern in hand) I have deduced that weighty Inference, that there­fore the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no Concluding Argument of its not being true, which Consequence for the greater Security of it, be­cause it is so Considerable in the pre­sent Controversie, I have also prov­ed Backwards, by shewing that if the Incomprehensibility of a thing were an Argument of its not being true, then Human Reason (contrary to what was before demonstrated) would be the Measure of Truth. Whence I infer again ex Absurdo, that therefore the Incomprehensi­bility of a thing is no Argument of its not being true. From this last Consequence I infer another of no less Moment and Consideration, viz. That therefore the Incomprehensi­bility of a thing is no Argument [Page 309] against the Belief of it neither, where also I Consider that seeming­ly Opposite Maxim of Des Cartes, that we are to Assent to nothing but what is Clear and Evident, and re­concile it to the other Position. Whence my next step was to state the true use of Reason in Believing, which I shew'd to Consist not in ex­amining the Credibility of the Ob­ject, but in taking account of the Certainty of the Revelation, which when once resolv'd of we are no longer to Dispute, but Believe. In fine, I have made an Application of these Considerations to the Myste­ries of the Christian Faith, by shew­ing that they are never the less to be Believ'd for being Mysteries, sup­posing [...] them otherwise sufficiently Reveal'd, against which also I have shewn their Incomprehensibility to be no Objection. So that every way the Great Argument against the My­steries of the Christian Faith taken from the Incomprehensibility of them vanishes and sinks into nothing. In all which I think I have effectu­ally overthrown the General and Fundamental Ground of Socinianism, [Page 310] and truely in great Measure that of Deism too, whose best Argument against Reveal'd Religion in gene­ral, is, because the Christian, upon all Accounts the most preferable of those that pretend to be Reveal'd, Contains so many things in it which transcend the Comprehension of Human Understanding. But whe­ther this Best Argument be really a good one or no, the whole Proce­dure of this Discourse may suffici­ently shew, and whoever knows how to distinguish Sophistry from good Reasoning, may easily judge.

2. And now you Gentlemen for whose sakes I have been at the pains to write this Treatise, give me leave in a few words to Address my self a little more particularly to you, and to Expostulate with you. Whether it be the good opinion you have of your Cause, or the present Oppor­tunity you have to appear in the behalf of it that invites you so freely to Come abroad as you have done of late, you have certainly (to give your Courage its due) taken a very rational and Polite Age for it, and I hope the Wise Conduct of [Page 311] Providence may turn this juncture to the Advantage of the Truth, and that the Light to which you have adventur'd to expose your Novel Opinions may serve to make you see their Absurdities, if you do not too Obstinately shut your Eyes against it. Some of you are Considerable Masters of Reason (otherwise truly I should not think it worth while to argue with you) and you all pro­fess great Devotion to it (I wish you do not make it an Idol) and to be very Zealous and Affectionate Disciples of it. Reason is the great Measure by which you pretend to go, and the Judge to whom in all things you appeal. Now I accept of your Measure, and do not refuse to be tried in the Court of your own Chusing. Accordingly you see I have dealt with you all along upon the Ground of Logic, and in a Ra­tional way, being very Confident that Reason alone will discover to you your undue Elevations of it, and the Errours you have been mis­led into by that Occasion, if you do but Consult even this Oracle of yours [Page 312] as you ought, and make a right use of its Sacred Light.

3. But I am afraid you do not. Instead of imploying your Reason in the first place to examin the Cer­tainty of the Revelation, whether such a thing be truly Reveal'd, and if so, to believe it notwithstanding its being incomprehensible, your Method is to begin with the Quality of the Object, to Consider whether it be Comprehensible or no, and ac­cordingly to proceed in your Belief or Disbelief of its being Reveal'd. 'Tis true indeed you are not so gross as to argue thus, this is Comprehen­sible therefore 'tis Reveal'd. But you cannot deny but that you ar­gue thus, this is Incomprehensible, therefore 'tis not Reveal'd, proceed­ing upon this general Principle that though whatever is Comprehensible is not therefore presently Reveal'd, yet whatever is Reveal'd must be Comprehensible. But now judge you whether this be not to make your Reason the Rule and Measure of Divine Revelation, that is, that God can reveal nothing to you but what you can Comprehend, or, that [Page 313] you are able to Comprehend all that God can possibly Reveal (for other­wise how is your not being able to Comprehend any thing an Argu­ment of its not being Reveal [...]d) I say Consider whether this be not to set up your Reason as the Rule of Revelation, and Consider again whe­ther this does not resolve either into a very low Opinion you have of God and his Infinite Perfections, or an extravagantly high one you have of your selves and your own Rational indowments.

4. And yet as if this were not Presumption enough, do you not also make your Reason the Rule of Faith, as well as of Revelation? To be the Rule of Faith is a very Great thing, and yet so far 'tis plain that you make your Reason the Rule of Faith that you will allow nothing to be believ'd but whose Bottom you can Sound by that Line, this being an avow'd Principle with you that you are to believe nothing but what you can Comprehend. But hold a little, before your Reason can be the Measure of Faith, must it not be the Measure of Truth? And I [Page 314] pray Consider seriously, and tell me truly, do you verily think in your Consciences that your Reason is the Measure of Truth? Do you think your Rational Faculties proportion'd to every intelligible Object, and that you are able to Comprehend all the things that are, and that there is no­thing in the whole extent of Science too high, too difficult, or too ab­struse for you, no one part of this vast Intellectual Sea but what you can wade through? If you say yes, besides the Blasphemous Presump­tions and Luciferian Arrogance of the Assertion, and how little it falls on this side of Similis ero Altissimo, which banish'd the vain-glorious Angel from the Court of Heaven, because nothing less would Content his Aspiring Ambition than to be as God there (though by the way there is more Sense and Congruity of Rea­son in pretending to be a God in Heaven, than to be a God upon Earth) I say besides this, I would put it to your more sober thought to Consider whether it be not every whit as great an Extremity in the way of Rational Speculation to Dog­matize [Page 315] so far as to pretend to Com­prehend every thing, as to say with the Sceptics and Pyrrhonians that we know nothing: The latter of which however in regard of its Moral Consequences may be more inno­cently and safely affirm'd than the Former, since in that we only hum­bly degrade our selves, and are Con­tent to sink down into the Level of Brutes, whereas in this we aspire to what is infinitely above us, and ad­vance our selves into the Seat of God. And you know an Excess of Self-dejection is of the two the more tolerable Extreme. But if you say that your Reason is not the Measure of Truth (as upon this, and the o­ther Considerations there lies a Ne­cessity upon you to Confess) how then I pray comes it to be the Mea­sure of your Faith, and how come you to lay down this for a Maxim that you will believe Nothing but what you can Comprehend? Why, if your Reason be not the Measure of Truth (and you your selves Care not, and I believe are asham'd in terms to say that it is) then do you not evidently discern that there is no Consequence from the Incom­prehensibility [Page 316] of a thing to the in­credibility of it, and that you have no reason to deny your Belief to a thing as true merely upon the ac­count of its incomprehensibility. And do you not then plainly see that your great Maxim falls to the ground, that you are to believe no­thing but what you can Compre­hend? But if yet notwithstanding this you will still adhere to your beloved Maxim, and resolve to be­lieve Nothing but what you can ad­just and clear up to your Reason, then I pray Consider whether this will not necessarily lead you back to that Absurd, and withal Odious and Invidious Principle, and which there­fore you your selves care not to own, viz. That your Reason is the Measure of Truth.

5. But why do you not care to own it? Do you not see at the first cast of your Eye that you are unavoidably driven upon it by your profess'd Maxim? Or if you do not think fit to own it (as indeed it is a good handsom Morsel to swallow) why do you not then renounce that Maxim of yours which is the im­mediate [Page 317] Consequence of it, and ne­cessarily resolves into it? Why will you whose Pretensions are so high to Reason act so directly against the Laws of it, as to own that implicit­ly and by Consequence which nei­ther your Head nor your Heart will serve you to acknowledge in broad and express Terms? Be a little more Consistent with your own Sentiments at least, if not with Truth, and be not your selves a Mystery, while you pretend not to believe any. If you do not care to own the Principle, then deny the Consequence, or if you will not let go the Consequence, then stand by and own the Principle. Either speak out boldly and roundly that your Rea­son is the Measure of Truth, or if you think that too gross a defiance to Sense, Experience, Religion and Reason too to be professedly main­tain'd, then be so ingenuous to us, and so Consistent with your selves as to renounce your Maxim of Believ­ing Nothing but what you can Com­prehend, since you cannot hold it but with that Absurd Principle; And which is therefore a Certain Argu­ment [Page 318] that you ought not to hold it.

6. And are you sure that you al­ways do, I mean so as to act by it, that you hold it in Hypothesi as well as in Thesi? Do you never assent to any thing but what you can Com­prehend? Are there not many things in the Sciences which you find a pressing Necessity to Subscribe to, though at the same time you cannot conceive their Modus, or account for their Possibility? But you'l say per­haps these are things of a Physical and Philosophical Consideration, and such as have no relation to Religion. True, they are so, but then besides that this visibly betrays the weak­ness of your ground, since if the incomprehensibility of a thing were a good Argument against assenting to the Truth of it, it would be so throughout, in the things of Nature, as well as in the things of Religion, I would here further demand of you why you are so particularly shy of admitting incomprehensible things in Religion, why is it there only that you seem so stiffly and zealously to adhere to your Maxim of Believing [Page 319] nothing but what you can Compre­hend? Since there are so many in­conceivable things, or if you please, Mysteries, in the Works of Nature and of Providence, why not in Re­ligion? Nay where should one ex­pect to find Mysteries if not there, where all the things that are Re­veal'd are Reveal'd by God him­self, and many of them concerning Him­self and his own Infinite Perfecti­ons? And what deference do we pay to God more than Man, if either we suppose that he cannot reveal Truths to us which we cannot Comprehend, or if we will not be­lieve them if he does? Nay may it not be rather said that we do not pay him so much, since we think it adviseable to receive many things from our Tutours and Masters upon their Authority only though we do not Comprehend them our selves, and justifie our doing so by that well known and in many Cases very rea­sonable Maxim, Discentem oportet Credere. But as there is no Autho­rity like the Divine, so if that Motto become any School, 'tis that of Christ.

[Page 320]7. Now 'tis in this School that you profess to be Scholars, and why then will you be such Opiniative and uncompliant Disciples as to refuse to receive the Sublime Lectures read to you by your Divine and In­fallible Master, merely because they are too high for you, and you can­not Conceive them, when at the same time any one of your that is not a Mathematician (pardon the Supposition) would I doubt not take it upon the word of him that is so that the Diameter of a Square is in­commensurable to the Side, though he did not know how to demonstrate, or so much as Conceive it himself. Since then you would express such implicit regard to the Authority of a fallible, though Learned, Man, shall not the Divine weigh infinitely heavier with you, and since you would not stick to assent to things above your Conception in Human and Natural Sciences, why are you so violently set against Mysteries in Religion, whereof God is not only the Authour, but in great Measure the Object too.

[Page 321]8. You know very well that in the great Problem of the Divisibi­lity of Quantity there are Incom­prehensibilities on both sides, it be­ing inconceivable that Quantity should, and it being also inconcei­vable that it should not be divided infinitely. And yet you know again that as being parts of a Contradi­ction one of them must necessarily be true. Possibly you may not be able with the utmost Certainty and without all hesitation to determine which that is, but however you know in the general that One of them, indeterminately, must be true (which by the way is enough to Convince you that the Incomprehen­sibility of a thing is no Argument against the truth of it) and you must also further grant that God whose Understanding is infinite does precisely and determinately know which of them is so. Now suppose God should Reveal this, and make it an Article of Faith. 'Tis not in­deed likely that he will, it being so much beneath the Majesty, and be­sides the End and Intention of Reve­lation, whose great Design is the [Page 322] direction of our Life and Manners, and not the improvement of our Speculation. But suppose I say he should, would you not believe it? If not, then you must suppose either that there is no Necessity that either of the two parts (which yet are Contradictory) should be true, or that though one of them be true yet that God does not known which is so, or that though he does know which is so, yet he does not deal faithfully in revealing that which is the Right, all which are extravagant Suppositions, and such as Men of your Sense and Reason can never allow. But then if you say (as you must) that you would believe it, then I pray what becomes of your Maxim of believing nothing but what you can Comprehend, and why do you so stiffly plead the in­comprehensibility of an Article of Faith against the Belief of it, and why must there be no Mysteries in Religion? I say in Religion, where if any where our Reason might ex­pect to find things above its Mea­sure, unreachable Heights, and un­fathomable Depths, and where God [Page 323] is not only the Revealer (as in the Case now supposed) but also the Object Reveal'd. For is it not rea­sonable to suppose that there are things more incomprehensible in God than in Nature, and if you would receive an Incomprehensible Revelation of his concerning his Works, how much rather ought you to admit the same concerning Himself?

9. And this gives me occasion to say something to you concerning the Doctrine of the Holy Trinity. This great Article of the Christian Faith you have a particular Pre­judice against and will not believe, and that because it so utterly tran­scends the Force of Reason to Con­ceive how the same undivided and Numerically One Simple Essence of God should be Communicated to Three really distinct Persons, so as that there should be both a Unity in Trinity, and a Trinity in Unity. This however, as inconceivable as it seems, some will not yield to be so far Above Reason but that a Rati­onal and Intelligible Account may be given of it, which accordingly [Page 324] they have essay'd to do by several Hypotheses. But I decline at present all advantage that may be had from them, or any other that may be in­vented to render this an intelligible Article. You know I Reason all along upon the Contrary Supposi­tion, that those Articles of the Christian Faith which we call My­steries are really incomprehensible, and only go to invalidate the Con­sequence that is drawn from thence in prejudice of their Belief. Well then for once we will give you what you stand for, that the Doctrine of the Trinity is indeed utterly above Reason. You have our leave to suppose it as incomprehensible as you please. But then you are to Consider (besides what has hither­to been discours'd concerning the Nullity of the Consequence from the incomprehensibility of a thing to its incredibility) that this is a Revelation of God concerning Him­self, and do you pretend to Com­prehend the Nature and Essence of God? If you do, then your Un­derstanding is as infinite as the Di­vine. But if you do not, then the [Page 325] incomprehensibility of this Myste­rious Article ought to be no Objecti­on with you against the Belief of it, since if it be, you must be driven to say that you Comprehend the Na­ture of God, which I hope you have too much Religion as well as Reason to affirm.

10. And indeed if we meet with so many insuperable Difficulties in the Search of Nature, much more may we in the Contemplation of its Author, if the Works of God do so puzzle and baffle our Under­standings, much more may they Confess their Deficiency when God himself is their Object, and if we are not able to explain Creation, or give an Account how the Material World issued in time from the great Fountain of Being, much less may we be supposed able to explain the Eternal and ineffable Generation of his Divine and Consubstantial World. But what then, shall we not Believe it? Or rather shall we not say upon this Occasion with the Pious and Ingenious Mr. Wesley, Life of Christ, p. 184.

Nay to go lower yet, if there be so many things relating to Extension, Motion and Figure (of all which we have Clear Ideas) which we cannot Comprehend, and there re­sult from them Propositions which we know not what to make of, with how much greater reason may we expect to find what we cannot Understand in the Nature of an In­finite Being, whereof we have no adequate Idea. And indeed we meet with so many Incomprehen­sibles in the School of Nature that one would think we should be too much familiarized to 'em to think them strange in that of Religion, and God seems on purpose to ex­ercise and discipline our Understand­ings with what is above them in Natural things, that so we might be the less surprized to find what passes our Conception in his own [Page 327] Infinite Essence. Here then at least you may Confess your Ignorance, and that without any reproach to your Understandings, which were indeed intended for the Contempla­tion, but not for the Comprehension of an Infinite Object. You need not therefore here be backward to own that you meet with what you cannot Comprehend (it would in­deed be a Mistery if you should not) nor think it any disgrace to have your Eyes dazzl'd with that Light at the insupportable Glory of which even the Seraphin Veil and Cover theirs.

11. You may perceive by this that your Denial of the Doctrine of the Trinity because of the Incompre­hensibility of it proceeds upon no good Consequence, but you are also further desired to Consider the very Bad one that it Naturally leads to. You refuse to receive this Article because you cannot Comprehend it, but besides that your Reason for this your refusal is not good unless you could be supposed to Compre­hend every thing, even the Deep things of God. Pray Consider what [Page 328] the Consequence will be if you pursue your Principle to the ut­most, and Conduct your selves in­tirely by its Measures. Will it not inevitably lead you to the denial of all Religion? This perhaps may startle you, but think again. Will not this necessarily lead you to the denial of God the Foundation of all Religion? For if you will not be­lieve the Trinal Distinction of Per­sons in the Divine Essence because you cannot conceive how such a thing can be, then may you not for the same reason refuse as well to believe the Divine Essence it self, some of whose incommunicable At­tributes, such as his Self Existence, Eternity, Immensity, &c. are as In­comprehensible as any thing in the Notion of the Trinity can be. So that if you will but follow your Measure from the denial of Three you may be quickly brought to deny even One. So directly does your Principle of Believing nothing but what you can Comprehend lead to Atheism, and that with such swift and wide strides, that were it not for the assistance of the same expe­dient, [Page 329] your Friends the Deists would hardly be able to follow you.

12. And now Sirs what do you think of your Principle? Is it not a goodly one, and richly worth all the Passion and Zeal you have ex­press'd for it? You know very well that M. Abbadie in his Excellent Treatise of the Divinity of Christ has shewn you that upon one of your grounds (viz. the denial of that Article) the Mahumetan Reli­gion is preferable to the Christian, and indeed that you are Obliged by it to renounce Christianity and turn Mahumetans. This truly was a home-thrust. But yet you see the Consequence of your general Prin­ciple reaches further, as leading your not only out of Christianity, but out of all Religion whether Natural or Reveal'd, even beyond Deism, even into Atheism it self. If it does not actually lead you thither the fault is not in the Principle, whose Connexion with that Consequence is natural enough, but 'tis because you are not so Consistent with your selves as to follow it. And indeed 'tis a great Happiness that you do [Page 330] not, (since if you were here better Logicians you would be worse Men) though it would be a much greater, if for the danger of being more Con­sistent with it you would be perswa­ded to lay it down.

13. And that you may be so be pleased further to Consider, that though this Principle of yours does not eventually carry you as far as Atheism, because perhaps the Hor­ridness of the Conclusion may be a Counterweight against the Force of the Premises (though you see it Naturally tends that way) yet there is very great danger of its leading you Effectually into Deism, that not being not accounted now-a-days such a very frightful thing. For as long as you hold that what is above Human Reason is not to be Believ'd, and upon that Account reject the Christian Mysteries, because they are above Reason, you lie at the Mercy of that Argument that shall prove to you that these Mysteries are indeed Reveal'd, and that the Genuin and Natural Sense of the Sacred Text declares for them. For if you once come to be convinc'd of that, [Page 331] you will then be Obliged in Conse­quence of your Principle to renounce that Religion which reveals such in­credible things, that is the Christian, which will be a shrew'd (indeed an invincible) Temptation to you to throw up all Reveal'd Religion, and so to turn perfect Deists. And I pray God it may not have that Effect up­on you.

14. But as to the parting with Christianity that you will be further tempted to do upon another account. For when you have by your Princi­ple stript it, or I may say rather un­bowell'd it of its great and adorable Mysteries, it will appear such a poor, lank, slender thing to you that you will hardly think it Considerable e­nough to be reveal'd as a New and more perfect, Institution by God, or to be receiv'd as such by thinking and Considering Men. For what will such find so considerable in Chri­stianity (especially as a new Institu­tion) what so visibly peculiar and assu­redly distinguishing, what that may infallibly set it above an Humane Institution, if it be once robb'd of its Mysteries? They may indeed think [Page 332] it a good plain piece of Morals, and such as exceeds any other of a known Humane Composure, but how are they sure but that the Invention of Man may be able to rise so high, as to Compose such a System as this, if you set aside its Mysteries? Which therefore I can­not but look upon of all the things that are intrinsic to it (for I do not here Consider Miracles) as the greatest Characters of its Divinity. And some perhaps would be apt to think them such as without which it would hardly be thought worthy of reception (especially as a New Institution) even with the help of Miracles, which Men are always ready, and not without reason, to suspect, when the Matters for whose sake they are wrought bear not suf­ficient Proportion to them. Which they would also perhaps be inclined to think to be the present Case. For what (would they say) is there in the Christian Religion that deserves so great ado, what that should ingage an Omnipotent Arm to introduce it into the World, by such mighty Signs and Won­ders, [Page 333] if there be indeed nothing Won­derful in it, that is, if you take a­way its Mysteries. What cannot a good System of Morality (especi­ally if only a Second, and a little more Correct Edition of a For­mer) be Communicated to the World without Alarming Heaven and Earth, and giving disturbance to the Course of Nature? And if Christianity be no More, what Proportion (say they) will it bear to its Miraculous Introduction? And what will it be found to have so very Considerable as either to deserve or justifie such an Appara­tus? It must indeed be allow'd by all to be a good wholsom In­stitution for the Direction of Man­ners, but what is there so very Great and Admirable in it, what that ei­ther deserves or answers to so ma­ny Types and Figures and Prophe­tical Predictions, what that so Co­piously sets forth the Manifold Wis­dom of God, and the Glory of his Attributes, and the Nothingness of the Creature, and where are those Deep things of God, that Eye hath not seen nor Ear heard, nor have [Page 334] enter'd into the Heart of Man (a place which the Apostle applies out of the Prophet Isaiah to the Reve­lations of the Gospel) where I say are those profound things which the Spirit of God only that Sear­ches all things could reveal,1 Cor. 2. 9, 10. and which even now they are Reveal'd the Angels desire to look into. 1 Pet. 1. 12. You'l hardly find any thing of so rais'd a Character in Christianity if you devest it of its Mysteries, which therefore may justly be reckon'd as the Main Pillars of it, without which it will have much ado to support it self. So that in short Christianity Not Mysterious (how fond soever a Certain Author is of such a Religion) will make but a very little Figure in Proportion to its Pomp and External Splendor, and indeed will almost dwindle down into Nothing.

15. It may indeed even without the Mysteries make a shift to sub­sist as a mere System of Precepts, and Rule of Life, though even thus Consider'd it will be greatly im­pair'd and suffer much disadvan­tage [Page 335] (as wanting those Convincing Demonstrations of God's hatred of Sin, and of his Love towards Man­kind, and withal those indearing and perswasive Arguments for their returns of Love, Gratitude and Obedience towards him, which can only be deriv'd from the Re­demption of the World by the Death and Satisfaction of its Divine Un­dertaker) but as a Covenant of Grace establish'd betwixt God and his Offending and Estranged Crea­ture it cannot possibly stand, but must fall to the ground. So that though the Moral or Legal part (as I may call it) of Christianity may at a hard rate Continue after the downfall of its Mysteries, yet its Federal part, and all that is pro­perly Gospel in it must needs be involv'd in the Ruin and Fall with them, that being all built upon the Satisfaction of Christ, as that again upon his Divinity, which is there­fore the very Foundation of the Christian Religion, as M. Abbadie has by Variety of Demonstration proved it to be. If then you would [Page 336] have that Divine Institution stand, and if you would stand fast in it (both which I am willing to sup­pose) have a care how you remove its Mysteries, Considering how Fun­damental they are to the Building, and how great a share of its Sacred Weight rests upon them. But en­deavour rather to remove your own Prejudices, to Mortifie your Under­standings, to study Humility, and to restrain the too free Sallies of your too curious and over venturous Reason by still and silent Reflecti­ons upon God's Infinite Greatness, and your own almost as great In­firmities, by which one Thought well pursued you will (by the Grace of God) come to a bet­ter Understanding of your selves than to reject any of his plain Revelations merely because you cannot Conceive them, and so leaving Light and Vision to the other Life, will be Content with other good Christians humbly to Believe and Adore in this.

[Page 337]16. Gentlemen, I beseech you se­riously to Consider what with Chri­stian Charity and all due Civil Re­spect I have here laid before you, and if upon Consideration of it you find any weight in it, to let it have its full Force and Effect upon you. Which if you do I hope it may serve by the Blessing of God (to whom for that end I humbly de­vote this Labour) to Convince you, or at least to put you upon such better Considerations of your own as May. For I pretend not here to have said all, but to have left many things to the inlargement and improvement of your own Medi­tation, Considering the impropriety of doing otherwise to Persons of your Parts and Learning, which I pray God to Sanctifie and Increase to you. Whereby you may per­ceive that I am not against your making use of your Reason. No, I would only have you reason right­ly, and that you may do so would have you by all Human Methods to improve and Cultivate your Reason as much as you can, being well per­swaded that as a half-view of things [Page 338] makes men Opiniative, Disputatious and Dogmatical, so a Clear and thorough Light makes them Hum­ble and distrustful of themselves, and that the more Cultivated and Improved any Man's Natural Rea­son is, the easier it will be for him to Captivate it to the Obedience of Faith.