CHAP. I.
Of the Art of Rhetorick in the Generall.

RHETORICR is the Art or fa­culty of eloquent and delightfull speaking.

And this eloquent and delightfull speak­ [...]g, is that which we usually call Oratory: [Page 2] The difference therefore between a Rheto­rician and an Oratour is this; the Rhe­torician delivers precepts and directions for this eloquent speaking, and the Ora­tour doth put these precepts and directions into practice.

In this Art of Rhetorick then or in these precepts and directions for Oratory, three things must be considered.

• 1. The Matter about which it is conversant.
• 2. The End for which it serveth.
• 3. The Meanes by which that end may be attained.

The Matter or Subject of this Art or facultie is any thing whatsoever which may be discoursed or questioned; any Theam or Case.

A Theam is an infinite Question in which an inquiry is made in the general concern­ing the Thesis or Position; as, whether it be fit to wage War.

A Case is a Question confined to persons and times, in which a particular inquiry is made concerning the Hypothesis or matter in dispute; as, whether it be fit for England to wage War with the Dutch.

2. The End or Ends for which Rheto­rich serveth are these.

1. To tickle and delight the eares o [...] [Page 3] [...]he Auditors that they may be willing to [...]ear that which is intended to be deli­ [...]ered.

2. To inform their judgments, and by [...]trength of argument to beget a beliefe of [...]hat which is spoken.

3. To move the affections and beget [...] willingness either to do themselves, or to [...]ssist in the actions of others, or to justifie [...]hat which is said or done.

Lastly, The wayes and meanes by which [...]hese ends may be attained, are three, Nature, Art, and Practice.

Natural abilities do much conduce to [...]he attaining of this excellent faculty; for [...]hey that are naturally ingenious, and have [...] good memory will easily attain to this Art of eloquent and delightfull speaking; [...]ut where Nature is defective, more care [...]nd diligence must be used, that the de­ [...]ects of Nature may be in part at least [...]upplied by Art, whose best companion is [...] general knowledge of things, which i [...] a [...]oung Student have not as yet attained [...]nto, it is at least necessary, that he should [...]erfectly understand the Theam or case [...]ropounded, or else the Rules of Art will [...]and him but in little stead; for how [...]hould he dispose of Matter before he hath [Page 4] it? And in vain do we speak of Use and Practice, where Knowledge which must fur­nish us with Matter, and Art which must teach us to dispose of it, are both want­ing. But naturall abilities being presup­posed, and matter acquired by diligent reading and observation; I shall here shew how those naturall endowments may be by art improved, and the prepared mat­ter so disposed and ordered, as that they may make way for Use and Practice.

CHAP. II.
Of Invention.

THE Rules of this Art or Faculty of Rhetoricall and delightfull speaking are commonly reduced unto five heads, Invention, Disposition, Elocution, Memory and Pronunciation.

The first of these is Invention, in which we must consider three things; First, what we are to invent; Secondly by wha [...] Arguments we may confirm the matter in­vented: Thirdly, from what Topickes o [...] generall heads, those Arguments may b [...] raised.

[Page 5] And First, we are to consider what it is that we are to invent; and the thing or matter which we are to invent or find out, is the scope and purpose, of the intended Oration; that is, we must pro­pound some certain proposition, to which we mean to direct our speech; and of those several propositions which may be raised from the Subject propound­ed, we should still make choice of that, which is most agreeable to the sen­tence given, most suteable to the present occasion, most profitable, and that which the Auditors may probably best appre­hend. But now a dayes our Oratours do much labour to find out some acute proposition, and that proposition is so stilled, which under some Allegory doth express a simple and a received truth: as in this expression; I would advise you to set the Campe in order: the meaning is, I would advise you to prepare for War: such propositions are not to be found fault with; but yet we must take heed of affectation, yea and of lightness too, because gravity doth become an Ora­tour; though young students may do well to pitch upon the most plain and obvious propositions; and such easie ar­guments [Page 6] as are most pertinent to the matter in hand; and after they can do this tollerably well, they may be degrees aspire higher.

Secondly, When you have resolved up­on your proposition, then you are to be­think your self of some Arguments by which that proposition may be confirmed: for an argument is a probable reason brought, to perswade the Auditours of the truth of the Proposition.

I call it a probable reason, because argu­ments are of two sorts; some are certain, evident and necessary, and these are con­vincing: as, that Peter is not a beast, because he is induced with reason; others are probable carrying with them some shew of truth; that is, they seem to be true either from the general received opinion, or for the similitude that they have with the truth, or from the event; and these are the Arguments, which an O­ratour should chiefly enquire after; not but that he may also use such are Demon­strable and undeniably true: but because he many times hath to doe with such pro­positions as cannot be demonstrated, or if they can, yet he useth probable argu­ments for the most part, because he is to [Page 7] [...]peake to such, as will be more easily per­ [...]waded by such arguments, as come within [...]heir own sphere, which they can easily [...]athom, than by such as are Demonstrative and beyond their apprehension.

Thirdly, in Invention, we are to consi­der the several Topicks or common places, from whence these probable Arguments may be invented or raised; and these are of two sorts; Intrinsecal, and Extrinsecal: those are called Intrinsecal, which are comprised in the matter which is pro­pounded of what kind soever it be; and all matter is comprised in one of these three kinds of Cases or Causes, Demonstrative, De­liberative, and Judicial.

The Demonstrative Case so called, be­cause it doth Demonstrate the Nature of the Subject propounded. And is used either in the Commendation, or Condemnati­on or persons, actions, or things. When it is used by way of commendation, it is cal­led an Encomium or a Penegyrick: and when it is used by way of condemnati­on, it is called an Invective, if against some eminent Person, it is called Philip­pick.

The [...]eliberative Case is so called, from the deliberation or consider [...]n that [Page 8] should be taken before advice be given.

The subject matter in this case, is every contingent thing; every thing which is in our own power.

More particularly, if it be a publick [...]ase there are five things in which ac­cording to Aristotle, deliberation is requi­red.

1. In publick taxations. 2. In ma­king of War and Peace. 3. In the guard­ing of Countries. 4. In importation and exportation of goods. 5. In the dispens­ing or not dispensing with Laws.

But in private cases the particular mat­ters in which we should deliberate, can­not be assigned, beacuse of the great va­riety; there being nothing concerning our selves or families, in which deli­beration is not convenient, if not neces­sary.

The Judicial case may be so called, from the delivering of our Judgment or opinion of the matter propounded, whether for or against, whether by way of Accusation, or by way of Defence. And the heads from whence Arguments may be raised in these seve­rall kinds of cases are ei [...]her such as are common to them all; or such as [...]e peculiar to each kind: I will here speak of such [Page 9] general wayes of inventing Arguments from the very matter propounded, as are common to all three cases or causes; and they being well understood, the Ingeni­ous and Judicious Oratour will need no direction for each severall kind of causes in particular.

The Topicks or Heads for invention in the General are these following.

1. Definition. 2. Division. 3. Notati­on. 4. Conjugation. 5. Genus. 6. Spe­cies. 7. Similitude. 8. Dissimilitude. 9. Con­traries. 10. Opposites. 11. Comparison. 12. Causes. 13. Effects. 14. Adjuncts. 15. Antecedents. 16. Consequents. All o­ther Topicks from whence Intrinsical or Artificial arguments may be raised, are contained in these or may be derived from them.

The first of these Topicks I call Defini­tion. And, Definition is a speech explaining or declaring what a thing is. The parts of a Definition according to the Logicians are these two 1. The Genus or general name; that is, a name that doth agree with the thing defined, and also with several other things besides. 2. The Diffe­rence or [...]ticular name, that is, a name which doth only agree with that which [Page 10] is defined; for example, Man is a living Creature endued with Reason. But such Definitions are seldome used by Orators, because they afford but little matter for an Oration; but other wayes of Defining things, which may be called Descripti­ons rather, and such are these that fol­low.

One way of Defining things, much used by Oratours, is, to describe it by the parts thereof, which may be sometimes large and yet elegant: of this way we have an [...]xample in Causinus, who doth describe a Butterflie in this manner. ‘A Butterflie, saith he, is a small Animal, seldome seen in Cities but very frequently in the fields; it is of a full, tender, soft, and flexible body, growing smaller and smaller to a little length, on which a dispersed gentle down doth neatly shine; there stand out as it were extended Horns, small as thrids, between which a pleasant light of his shining eyes doth sparkle; but a special wonder is in his Wings, far beyond the bulk of his little body, they are bedecked with flowers, adorned with Purple, shine like Gold, and glitter with stars; being poysed with these, he [...]ies as it were with Oares into the air, disport­ing [Page 11] himself, and cleaving almost to every stalke: sometimes he sucks the juice of leaves with his most delicate trunk, some­times he sweetly reposeth amongstdelight­full odors, other while with a renewed flight he soars aloft and escapes the hands of insulting boyes, drawing in the air six hundred Meanders.’

A Second way by which Oratours do define or rather describe things, is by such effects, as do proceed from the four causes, and this way doth as it were open a gate to a large field; only you must take heed, that you reckon not every minute or small matter for an effect; according to this way Saint Ambrose doth describe drunkenness to be an incentive of madness, the fomenter of lust, and the poyson to wisdome.

A Third way is by similitude; but not according to the usual way of expressing them, by the particle, As: but by bare affirmation omitting the usual way of comparison: for example: What is our life? It is a market in which we buy and sell; in which one deceiveth another, and in which every one doth mind his own business; and hath a care of his own wealth: it is a Co­medie, in which every one doth act his own part, this man the part of a King, and that of a peasant.

[Page 12] A Fourth way is by Synonomie, as thus▪ What else is a Lilly, but an ornament to th [...] Earth, the glory of Plants, the very eye of Flowers, the Jewel of the meadowes and Star of the Fields, adorning the Earth, a [...] the Stars do Heaven; giving as great a luster to other flowers, as the Jasper stone doth to Gold, and as much delighting the eye as the Sun the world.

A Fifth way is by those causes by which effects are produced; as the Material, formal, efficient and finall causes. For example, the Edifice which Daedalus hath raised with his own hand, of strong and hewed stone, in a round form, is not only fortified a­gainst the injury of weather; but hath also so much gracefullness in it, that it easeth the mind of all care, yea and filleth it with delight; it is so neatly built, that you would think it Heaven up­on Earth.

A Sixth way is by negation; when we first shew what a thing is not, and then what it is: Thus Babusius L [...]b. 3. Epigr. doth describe a Friend.

A Friend is not a bare voice, or empty nut­shel, but a Friend is known by his affecti­on and behaviour, by his words and acti­ons.

[Page 13] A Seventh way is by adjuncts and pro­prieties; Thus our blessed Saviour is called, The Assertor of humane liberty, the master of Sanctitie, and absolute perfection, the ever­lasting fountain of all vertues. Thus Solo­mon is described: Solomon that great mi­racle and Oracle of humane Wisdome, the Master or Tutor of the World.

An Eighth way, is first to describe the thing Ironically according to the opini­on of some, and then to explain the same, as in truth it is, or at least according to your own thoughts and apprehensions of it.

The Second Topick for Invention is Divi­sion, or Distribution of the matter propounded into its parts; thus the life of Man may be divided, into Infancy, Childhood, Youth, middle age, old-age.

Arguments may be raised from the parts unto the whole, three wayes. 1. By affirming that of the whole, which may be af­firmed of all the parts; as if you would prove the whole Fabrick of a Huse to be defective; you may divide the house, into the walls, the roofe, and floores; and shew the defects in each of these.

2. By denying that of the whole, wh [...] may be denied of all the parts; as if you [Page 14] were to shew the inconvenience of send­ing Children to travell: you may enum [...] rate the several places adjoyning, and shew the inconveniencies that may be i [...] sending them to any of those places; a [...] suppose to France, Spain, or Italy, and by consequence any whither else.

3. By making an affirmation of one par­ticular part, omitting or rejecting the rest; as thus, either he loves me or hates me, for there is no third or mean; but he doth not love me, therefore he hates me.

This Topick may be elegantly used by way of Interrogation, Repetition, Subjection, Preterition, and Apostrophe. An example whereof, may be this excellent description of a Garden, as it is set forth by Drexelius in his Nicetas. ‘There was, saith he, a most pleasant Garden as it were a Para­dise, the smiling Trees stood with their leaves budded, which with a delightfull odour made the shadows gracefull, the gentle motion of whose boughs made a sweet whistling noyse, amongst these a murmuring Rivulet, clearer than any Chrystal, with running streams which did smoothly glide, disturbing the pible stones with its singing waters: so that the mo­tion thereof was almost a Musicall har­mony. [Page 15] On either side were flowers, with Zephyrus's copious family; on the one hand the silver Lillies from the green bank did smile (upon you) on the other the purple Roses did glitter, from an o­ther part the Daffidillies white as Snow or Ivory, were set off with the Hyacinths red as blood, yellow as gold; most plea­sant gales of wind breathing from every part.’

The Third Topick is Notation, or Etymo­logie, which is the interpretation of the word, shewing as well the original thereof, as the signification: as a Senate is so called be­cause of convention of the Seniors, that is of old men. Etymology is more frequent amongst Grammarians, than Orators, yet sometimes there may be an occasion for it amongst them, even for ornament and sweetness sake.

The Fourth Topick is Conjugation: and Conjugation is either when one word [...]ath various endings, as Knife, knives; or when several words do come from, or are derived from one primitive; thus beautifull and beauti­fullness are both derived from beauty. From this Topick we argue thus, If piety be a commendable quality, then he that is pious is worthy of commendation.

[Page 16] Conjugation and Notation differ in this; Notation explains the word; Conjugation shewes its derivation and various termina­tion.

The Fifth and Sixth Topicks are Genus and Species: now that is called Genus, which doth comprehend several things under it which are really different from one ano­ther. And that is called Form or Species, which may with other things be referred to one common Genus: And thus this word (Art) is a Genus in respect of the seven liberal sciences, as Grammar, Rhetorick, &c. And these sciences Grammar, Rheto­rick, &c. are the forms and Species which are contained under this Genus or gene­ral term (Art.)

The first of these Topicks namely that which is called Genus, doth many times afford the Oratour plenty of matter; for by this meanes a finite proposition, that is a proposition that is confined to the cir­cumstances of time, place and such like, is reduced to an infinite, and hath all those restrictions taken from it. From these To­picks we may argue two ways.

1. That which is spoken of the Genus may sometimes be also spoken of the Form or Species; as thus, if vertue be to be im­braced, [Page 17] then Temperance ought to be imbra­ced also.

2. That which is denied of the Genus, may be also denied of the Species; as thus, if no liberal Art be necessary for a Soul­dier; then Rhetorick is not necessary for him.

The seventh Topick is Similitude; and si­militude is the comparing of two or more things together, which are in themselves diverse, but do agree in some particular. For Example, a shadow and Glory are in themselves very dif­ferent things: but yet they agree in this, that the shadow doth accompany the body, and glory vertue. And hence Tully saith, that Glory is the shadow of vertue. Similitude may be collected, either from words, acti­ons or fable [...]; nay there is scarce any thing which may not in some particular be compa­red with another, sometimes it is used for to prove, but most commonly for illustrati­on.

The eighth Topick is Dissimilitude; and Dissimilitude is the disagreeing of two or more things in some particular; from this Topick we argue thus: that which agreeth with one thing that is unlike, doth not necessarily a­gree with another; & that which doth not agree with some one thing, may yet agree [Page 18] with some other particular: For Exampl [...] Idle Citizens care not what mischief doth befa [...] the Commonwealth; therefore the more gene­rous and publick spirited men, must endeavour to keep the Republick from danger.

The ninth Topick is from Contraries; and those things are said to be contraries, which cannot both at the same time agree with one and the same thing: thus no man can be said to be wise in that thing, in which he is a fool.

Contraries are distinguished into four ranks or kinds: Adverse, Privitive, Rela­tive and Contradictory; in these severall kinds of contraries we are wont to argue either by way of affirmation or by way of negation.

In those Contraries which we call ad­verse, we argue rightly, if we deny that of one thing or person, which we af­firm of another, as thus; there is no safe­ty in Warre, all men doe therefore desire peace.

In those Contraries, which are Privative, we argue rightly, when one privative is denied of that person, of which another is affirmed, as thus: you wish me poverty, be­cause you envy my prosperous and wealthy con­dition.

[Page 19] In Relative contraries, we argue rightly, when one is inferred from the relation which it hath unto the other; for example, [...]f you be a Schollar, pray tell me who is your Master.

In Contradictory contraries, we argue rightly, when one being denied, the other is affirmed, or the contrary; as thus, He is just, he is not just.

The tenth Topick is from such things as are opposite to one another: And they are said to be opposites to one another, which can never agree together: as wrath and friendship; from which sort of Topicks, the way of arguing is, to deny that of one op­posite which is affirmed of the other; as thus, If Peter have a mind to kill Paul, sure­ly he can have no love for him.

In the use of these Topicks we must con­sider how things that are contraries, unlike or opposite, do differ from one another. Those things are said to be contrary, which cannot agree with one another; things that are unlike doe not disagree, but are diverse; but in things that are opposite, when one of the contraries is expressed, we are to answer it by the effect of the other; as thus, to love and to hurt; for to hurt doth pro­ceed from hatred, and hatred is contrary unto love.

[Page 20] The eleventh Topick is Comparison, and Comparison is the comparing of one thing with another. This is either equall or unequall.

Equall comparison is; when two equal [...] things ar compared together. As thus; he hath deceived thee, therefore he will deceive me also▪

Unequall comparison is two waies, first when we argue from the greater to th [...] less: As, God spared not the Angels tha [...] sinned, how then shall he spare man?

Secondly, when we argue from the less to the greater: As, he will not let one sin go un­punished: much more will he therefore punish [...] multitude of sins.

Comparison doth differ from Similitude; in that two things are compared together in respect of some third; but in Simili­tude there is no respect unto a third, bu [...] to one another only: as thus, It is lawful [...] for M. Antony to defend Clodius; why may not Tully then defend Milo? Here the com­parison is between Tully and Anthony, but it is in respect of a third, that is, in re­spect of Defence. But in this, As they that are sick, thinke all things loathsome, though ne­ver so sweet; so they that are wicked cannot relish the best Societies: Here the sick in bo­dy are compared to the sick in mind, that is to the wicked, but not in respect of a [Page 21] [...]hird, but in respect of their own corrup­ted tastes.

The twelvth Topick is from the caus­ [...]s of things: And that is said to be a cause, from whence a thing may in any sort be said to be produced.

We commonly reckon four sorts of causes, Efficient, Material, Formal and Fi­ [...]all.

The efficient cause is that which maketh a thing: Thus the Sun causeth or maketh the Day; to this may instruments and all other things be referred, which do only assist in the making as well as those which make the thing: as a Pen is an assistant in writ­ing. From this cause we argue thus: If the cause be denied, we deny the effect; if the cause be granted, we grant the effect al­so: if it be praised or dispraised, we praise or dispraise the effect also.

The Material cause is that of which a thing is made, or is imployed in; as money of Gold, and an Oratour about every matter or thing. From this cause we argue thus; If matter be afforded, there may be such an effect, and the goodness or the badness of the effect depends upon the goodness or the badness of the matter.

[Page 22] The formal Cause is that by which the thing is what it is, or that by which it is distingui­shed from other things. Thus a Ship and a Timber house do differ by the diverse disposing of the parts. In this cause we argue from the excellence or the meaness of the form; the more excellent the form is, the better is the thing, and any defici­ency in the form doth make it the worse: and every thing should be proportionable to his sorm: and hence a man should aim at immortal things, because his soul (which is his form) is made immor­tal.

The final cause is that for which a thing is made: and the end for which we do any thing, is generally one of these three, because it is either honest, profitable or de­lightfull. From this cause we argue accord­ing to these Axiomes. Such as the end is, such are the things that are done to that end. If the end be good or bad, the things referred to that end are good or bad also.

The thirteenth Topick is from the Ef­fects, and those are said to be Effects which are produced by their causes. From these we argue either by inferring the cause, the effect being granted, or by denying the cause, the effect being denied; or by com­mending [Page 23] the cause, if the effects be good, [...]r by condemning it, if the effects be bad: [...]nd these heads drawn from the causes and [...]ffects, do afford great plenty of matter [...]or discourse.

The fourteenth Topick is from the Adjuncts, and those are said to be adjuncts, which are joyned with the thing, but not of necessity; to wit, such as are joyned to per­sons or things. Tully reckons up twelve of the first sort, viz. Of the Person, as the Name, the Nature, the Habit, the Fortune, the Life, the Affection, the studies, Councells, Actions, Chances, and Speeches. The Adjuncts of a thing are commonly six. Place, Time, Occasion, Manner, Faculty, and In­strument; but some there are which do reduce them to these seven.

In English thus,

Quis, who, doth signifie the quality of the Person, in which there must be considered [Page 24] his nature, sex, age, nation, kindred and estate, in respect of his body, mind and fortune.

Quid, what, importeth an enquiry after the nature of the thing, as whether it be of importance or not; whether great or small; noble or ignoble.

Ubi, where, denotes the place.

Quibus auxiliis, with what aide, notes an enquiry concerning the person, that joyned with him in that action, or o­ther instruments by which it was effect­ed.

Cur, why, denotes the finall cause, with what intent or to what end it was done.

Quomodo, how, shewes the manner of doing it, as namely with what ease, or how hardly.

Quando, when, notes the time in which it was done, and this head doth many times afford great plenty of matter.

The fifteenth and the sixteenth Topicks are the Antecedents and the Consequents. Those are called Antecedents, which go before the thing; as, you made him tremble, therefore he is sensible.

They are called consequents, which do ne­cessarily follow the thing; as, he that is thrust [Page 25] through the heart must needs dye. From the Antecedents we argue thus. The Antecedent being granted, the consequent must needs fol­low; as, he is wounded in the heart, there­fore he will dye. But from the Consequents we argue thus: If the consequent be affirm­ed, the antecedent is affirmed; as, It is a great gash, therefore it was a great blow that made it; if the Consequent be denied, the antecedent is denied also; as, he is not dead, therefore he is not wounded in the heart. And these are the Intrinsecal or Artificial Topicks from whence arguments may be raised on any Theam or matter propounded. For il­lustration sake, I will shew you, how, from these Topicks, a matter for an Oration may be raised from this Theam or propo­sition, Clodius laid snares for Milo.

CHAP. III.
Of the Sharpness and ingenuity be­coming an Oration.

SUch is the Curiosity of this age in which we live, as that it is grown weary of these plain and ordinary waies, and requi­reth or expecteth in the very style some­thing more than ordinary; insomuch that now a daies he is not worthy the name of an Orator, that knowes not how to bran­dish an Oration, by some sharp and witty flourishes. And therefore, that we may com­ply with the present times, we will also speak something of that sharpness or in­genuity, with which an oration should be adorned.

And first I will shew you what is meant by sharpness or ingenuity: as Material sharp­ness then, is the meeting of two lines or sides in one point: so Metaphorical sharpness is the concourse, or disagreeing concord, of the subject and the predicate in an Oration. Or thus, Sharpness is an agreeing discord, or a disa­greeing concord, that is, we are then [Page 29] said to speake smartly or wittily, when the predicate and subject of an oration, do agree with one another in one part, and disagree in another.

This sharpness or acuteness is threefold, unnatural, praeternatural, or natural.

Unnatural sharpness is, when two things agree that are in themselves unlike, oppo­site and contrary, or any way differing; or when there is a different application of the subject and predicate; as thus:

It is against nature that cold should pro­ceed from fire. Yet seeing that many by that meanes have defended their chastitie, and restrained the heat of lust, it is fitly said, that cold proceeds from fire.

Praeternatural sharpness is that, which is not indeed against nature, but yet is very unusual: as, Martial:

Natural sharpness is that which doth a­agree [Page 30] with the nature of the thing; as Martial:

It is the Kings grace that you are alive. As if he had said thus, You are beholding to the King for your life; whereas naturally, it becomes a King to preserve the lives of his subjects.

The best of these three is that which is called unnatural, because it begetteth great admiration.

The wayes by which this disagreeing concord between the subject and the pre­dicate may be made, are chiefly four:

1. By annexing to the subject a disa­greeing Epithite; as, an innocent ruin: a confused order.

2. By annexing to the subject another disagreeing substantive. as, The Sun is a fountain of light.

3. By a Catacresis either in the Adjective, in the Substantive, or in the Verb. First in the Adjective; as, a brazen forehead, mean­ing shameless.

In the Sustantive, as if you call Almes, an holy rain, or a golden shower of piety.

In the Verb, as thus; the waters made [Page 31] the Souldiers valiant and compelled them to fight: that is they were the more couragi­ous, because being near the Sea it was im­possible to fly.

4. When the predicate is both affirmed and denied of the subject in a different sence; as the Poet speaking of a Virgin that lost her beauty to preserve her chasti­ty said: And then she thought her self most beautifull, when she had lost her beauty.

Matter in which to exemplifie these se­verall wayes of making an agreeing dis­cord between the subject and the pre­dicate in a proposition may be had first from the Logicall Topicks of Definition, Division, &c. for there is none of them so barren from whence with a little con­sideration you may not collect something that is smart and ingenious. Biderm.

Where he sheweth that tears are the waters [Page 32] proper for or becoming funerals. To run through all the Topicks would be tedious, only observe, that the chiefe for this mat­ter, are these, Final causes, effects, adjuncts, contraries and opposites: for hence it will be easie to find something consentaneous and dissentaneous to the subject.

Secondly, Matter may be had from some Paradox, or some unusual speech.

And unto this head may those be redu­ced, which are drawn from pleasant jests: as,

First from Metaphors; as if one seeing a horse with an ill favoured mouth should say, the Horse laughs.

2. From a Paronomasia: as, Eminent men of great note, are now adaies most subject to imminent dangers.

3. From the Etymologie of the name:

4. From some rare and pleasant sto­ry.

Thirdly, From some lesson of Morali­ty.

Fourthly, From some Ambiguous word.

Fifthly, From some Trope and Figure in Rhetorick, especially from some Metaphor, Allegory, Catachresis, Metonymie, Prosopo­poea, &c.

And now though these directions, for the finding out of something in a propo­sition [Page 33] that is smart and ingenious are in themselves good, yet methinks they are not clear and perspicuous enough; here there­fore I will set down what Horatius P. Mat­thias Sarbievius hath more plainly exprest by way of Praxis, though much to the same purpose.

The first Praxis is, when some magni­tude, bulk, majesty, authority, largness, or destruction is fitly applied to any thing, in a doubtful sence; and is indifferent whe­ther it be taken really or Morally. Thus Se­neca, Epist. 66. saith, that Scaevola being-lame and unarmed, made war, and with that lame hand he overcame two Kings.

The second Praxis is the contrary unto this, when a thing is diminished either in quantity, or estimation, and in a doubtfull sence.

The third Praxis is when this Sharp­ness doth actually contain the cause, or doubtfully insinuate some truth of a con­trary effect.

The fourth Praxis is from the ambigui­ty of some word or sentence, as when it doth in truth signifie one thing, but it is intended to signifie another. Thus when Julius Montanus was repeating his verses, [Page 34] and having described the rising of the Sun, and began to describe the manner of his set­ting, one of the company would have gone his way; and being asked the reason, said, Could I heare him any longer than from Sunrise, to Sunset?

The fifth Praxis is, when that is applied to an inanimate thing, which is proper to a thing that hath life, yet so, as that the sence and meaning is understood, by some action of the thing of which we speak, be­ing applied to something of a contrary nature. Thus Pliny speaking to one, that went to plough, after he had gotten the victory in battaile, saith: The earth rejoyceth to shew it self to one that is victorious, and being tilled by a conquerour, she waxeth proud with her early fullness of princely fruites. And thus Saint Augustin upon these words of Christ, I am the true light, saith, Rise then thou sluggard, the way it self doth come unto thee, and rouzeth thee from sleep, rise and walk.

He also speaketh acutely, who appli­eth naturall things to things artificial.

Thus the Poet, of one that had a long nose, saith,

The Sixt Praxis is, when that which doth agree with real persons, is applied to those that are not real. So he in Plautus, Our hands have eyes, and think they see. But this way is most pleasing, when in one and the same thing, the application is both true and false: such is that of Augustus Caesar, when he said, that he had two nice daughters, which he was compelled to beare with; the one was his daughter Julia; and the other the common wealth.

There is yet another way of Inventing that which is sharp and witty; that is by comparing the matter with the Oratorical heads and Topicks: this may be done three wayes.

First, by comparing the matter in hand with every topick severally; by consider­ing what the thing is which we are to speak, what the Parts, the Genus, Species, adjuncts [Page 36] and the rest. Thus doth that Prince of Roman Eloquence, deride the consulship of Vati­nius, by reckoning up the parts of the year in which he was not Consul: There hap­pened, saith he, a wonderfull thing in the year of Vatinius, for while he was Consul, there was neither Spring, nor Autumn, neither Sum­mer nor Winter.

Secondly, by comparing one head of the matter in hand, with another different head of the same thing: as the definition of the thing with its adjuncts, or of the effects with the Causes. Thus Valerius Maximus by com­paring the Material cause with the Formal, that is by comparing the body with the soul, finds out this smart commendation of Lu­cretia: Lucretia, saith he, that mirrour of Ro­man chastitie, whose manlike courage was by an evil mistake of fortune, confined to a female body.

Thirdly, by comparing the Topicks of one order, with other Topicks of the same order, as definition with definition, cause with cause &c. as for example, The King whom Mutius Scaevola could not conquer by his [...]rmed hand, he made to fly, by setting his hand on fire. Here the acuteness lies, in com­paring of one cause with another, that is his armed hand, with his hand in the flames. And thus much concerning Invention.

CHAP. IV.
Of Disposition.

DIsposition is the orderly placing of those things which are Invented. It is two fold.

First, Natural, in which things are dis­coursed in that order in which they were done, or in which according to nature, they should be done: as if you were to com­mend a person, you should first begin with his childhood, next his youth, and so to the other degrees of his age.

The second way is Artificial, which doth either for delight, or profit diversly mingle and confound the matter, putting that in the end which should be in the beginning, and the beginning in the end, that so he may both delight the Auditours and hold them in suspence; which in an unexpected event doth not a little please and delight the hearers. Thus doth Virgil do in his Aeneades, in which he speaketh of Aeneas his voyage into Italy, but not in the same order in which he began: thus doth Bar­clay [Page 38] in his Argenes, and thus do all that write either Comedies or Tragedies.

The Orator then having resolved of his proposition, must first consider of what Na­ture it is, whether single or consisting of several parts, and which of the parts should be first handled, which next.

Secondly, He must choose some few of the best arguments he hath invented, and place some solid argument in the beginning, those that are less forcible in the midst, reserving still the best and most convincing argument for the conclusion; because the Auditor at the first being greedy of knowing must be prepossessed and convinced, but in the end he must be strongly confirmed and forced.

And the most perswasive arguments are those, which proceed from the Definition, Distrubution, Genus, Causes, and Effects of the thing discoursed of, for these explain the nature thereof: The less forcible argu­ments are such as are collected from some trivial adjuncts and conjectures.

Thirdly, He must Logically dispose of these reasons and arguments, first into Syllogisms, and then consider how to en­large them in an Oratorical manner.

[Page 39] Fourthly, He must consider into what parts his Oration should be divided. Con­cerning the two last, I will a little en­large my self: And

First, of the Logical Disposition of those reasons and arguments which are invented, by way of Syllogisms, and the enlarging of those Syllogisms in an Oratorical man­ner.

A logical argumentation is the disposition or explication of the argument, which when it is perfect doth consist of three parts, of which that which is put in the first place, Logicians call the Major, Rhetoricians the Proposition: That which is put in the second place, philo­sophers call the Minor, Orators the Assumpti­on: That which is put in the third place, is by Logicians called the conclusion, by Rhetori­cians the complexion or inference. And these three propositions, when they are regular­ly placed, are called a Syllogism, which must be framed from that proposition, and cause or reason, which was before invented.

For example, the proposition was, That Clodius is justly put to death: the Argument or reason given for it is, because he was a trea­cherous person. Now then form your Syl­logism thus: Take this cause and joyn it with the predicate of your proposition, say­ing, [Page 40] Every treacherous person doth deserve to be put to death: and this is your Major. Then take the subject of your proposition, and joyn that with the given cause and say, Clodius was a treacherous person; and that is your Minor: then bring in the pro­position it self, saying, therefore Clodius de­serveth death, which is the conclusion, and maketh up the whole Syllogism. The like may be done in any other; but alwayes, con­sider, with what reasons, examples, sen­tences or similitudes your Major or Minor may be again confirmed, especially if they be in themselves weak & but probably true; for if they be certain, they are not then to be proved, but handsomely expressed. This done, consider how these Syllogisms may be handled Oratorically; the which besides many others may be effected nine several wayes.

The first and most usual is so to place the parts of the Syllogism, as Logicians do, that is the Major first, and the arguments by which it may be proved. The Minor next with the arguments for that; And lastly the Conclusion.

CHAP. V.
Of the parts in an Oration.

WHen by the former directions yo [...] have put the invented matter, i [...] to a certain order; then consider of ho [...] many parts your Oration shall consist. [...] tells us that an Oration ought generall [...] to consists of these five parts.

• 1. Exordium.
• 2. Proposition.
• 3. Narration.
• 4. Confirmation.
• 5. Peroration.

As for Confutation it is comprised in Con­firmation. But all these parts, are not al­waies necessary; for the ingenious Orator, may as he shall see it convenient, some­times omit the Narration, somtimes the Exor­dium, sometimes the Peroration or Conclusion; yea & the Confirmation is many times scarce discernible; as when the things pro­pounded [Page 67] are certain, there is more need of [...]rnament than proof, as in Gratulatory Orations and the like. As for the placing of these parts, their natural order is that [...] which we have named them 1. The Exordium, 2. The Proposition, 3. The Narration, if it be not thought fit to omit [...]. 4. The Confirmation; and lastly the Per­ [...]ration.

Of each of these I will here set down some few directions; and first for Exordi­ums.

An Exordium is as it were the door of the Oration, in which the Oratour doth prepare the minds of the Auditors for that which is to follow: and this is commonly done by one of these three waies; by bespeaking their fa­vour; by making them docible; or by begging their attention. The favour of the Auditors is bespoke either from the person of the Ora­tour, from the persons of the Auditors, from the persons of the Adversaries, or from the subject matter of the discourse. The Orator may bespeake the favour of the Au­ditors, in respect of himself, if his gesture and deportment be suitable unto theirs that are his Auditors, and express himself modestly. And in respect of the Auditors, if he shew how well they have deserved [Page 68] of the Common wealth, of him, and o­ther men. And in respect of the Adversa­ries, if he modestly shew wherein they [...] faulty and render them to the Auditors in­axcusable. And lastly in respect of th [...] matter in hand, if he say, that it is som [...] excellent, necessary and profitable thing.

Secondly, the Orator may be said to make the Auditors docible, if he clearly explain the thing of which he is to speake, and how he purposeth to enlarge upon i [...]

Thirdly, the Attention will be quickned if he saith, that he intends to speak of som [...] great and wonderfull thing, and some thing that is delightful, necessary, and very much concerns his Auditors, &c..

An Exordium may be said to be faulty, or not so commendable. First, if it be vulgar or common, that is, such as may be used in many if not in all cases. Secondly, if it be long and tedious, not proportionable to the length of the Oration. Thirdly, if it consist of some different matter, not suitable to the other parts of the Oration. Fourthly if it effect not that which is required or expected.

And that is said to be a good Exordium, which is neate and elegant, fit for the purpose, making the Auditor docible and well affected, and from which the access [Page 69] to the proposition is not violent and for­ [...]ed, but easie and agreable. Though Tully [...]oth very much insist on this, that all Ex­ [...]diums should be such, as will afford an [...]asie and proper access unto the propo­ [...]tion; yet practice which is the best master, [...]nd a diligent observing, what manner of Exordiums others make to their Orations, will afford the best directions; but yet Rhetoricians are wont to prescrbe some [...]ertain formes according to which, begin­ [...]ers may exercise themselves in framing [...]heir Exordiums aright: the chiefest of them [...]re these following.

CHAP. VI.
Of Elocution.

OF all the parts of Rhetorick, Elocution in my judgment is the most excellent, for that it is but to little purpose to have a good invention, and an excellent way of me­thodizing or disposing of arguments, unless we can also express them in apt and fitting words, and handsomely adorn them with Tropes and Figures. In the wording therefore of an Oration care must be had, that the words thereof be first plain and significant, and then neat and elegant, and hence this [Page 95] part of Rhetorick may be thus defined.

Elocution or the garnishing of speech, is an [...]rt by which the speech is beautified with the e­ [...]gancy of words and sentences.

And this is performed two ways, by the [...]ine manner of words called a Trope, or by [...]he fine frame of speech called a Figure.

A Trope is such an Elocution or manner of speech, as doth change the signification of a word into a different signification from the natural.

In a Trope two things are to be conside­ [...]ed.

• 1. The Affections.
• 2. The Kinds.

The Affections of a Trope are 4.

• Catachresis
• Hyperbole
• Metalepsis
• Allegoria.

Catachresis is a harsh and unpleasant change of a word; as namely when one word or name is put for another, not by any proper relation, but by a kind of force. He threa­tens me a good turn. Enoch was translated, that he should not see death.

Hyperbole is a very false relation of a thing, or a more bold excess of a Trope, which doth ex­ceed belief, either by augmentation or by dimi­nution. Note, that though an Hyperbole doth [Page 96] vary from the truth, yet doth it not deceive us through fiction or such variation.

An Hyperbole is twofold

• Auxesis, or
• Meiosis.

An Auxesis is, when for augmentation sake or Amplification, we interpose a more vehement ex­pression, in his proper place; as when we say, Magnificent for Liberal, Cruel for Severe, Sa­crilegious for Wicked.

A Meiosis, or a Tapinosis is when for exte­nuation sake we use a milder or more favou­rable expression, than the matter requireth: as when we say a Flatterer is a courteous and an affable person.

A Metalepsis is that which conteineth many Tropes in one expression; as when we by an im­proper speech, signifie, first that which is improper, and by that improper speech per­haps another, and so forward till we come to that which is proper, making way for transition by interposing a mean degree; as All the City was moved. Math. 21. 10. where the City is put for Jerusalem, by a Synecdoche Generis: and Jerusalem for its in­habitants, by a Metonymy of the subject.

An ALLEGORY is the continuation of a Trope, as where many Tropes of the same [Page 97] kind are joyned together: as put on the whole armour of God. Ephes. 6. 11. He shall be as a Tree planted by the rivers of water. Psalm. 1.

In an Allegory observe to end with the same kind of Trope with which you begin, or else the inconsequence will be absurd.

The several kinds of Tropes are these four.

• 1. A Metonymy.
• 2. An Irony.
• 3. A Metaphore, and
• 4. A Synechdoche.

A Metonymy is a Trope of the Cause to the effect, of the subject to the adjunct: and the con­trary, of the effect to the cause, or of the ad­junct to the subject.

4. There are four kinds of Causes.

• 1. The Efficient cause, by which a thing is.
• 2. The Material cause, of which a thing is made.
• 3. The Formal cause, by which a thing is what it is.
• 4. The Final cause, for which a thing is: of which the two first only belong to our present purpose.

A Metonymy of the Cause is twofold, [...]at is, of the Efficient or of the Material Cause.

A Metonymy of the efficient Cause is, when [Page 98] the Author or inventor of any thing is put for those things which they have effected, or of which he is Author, as Mars for war, Vulcan for fire, Neptune for the Sea, Ceres for bread, Bacchus for wine, Venus for love, Livie for the History written by Livie, Virgil for the poems or works composed by Virgil.

And thus the instrument is also put for the thing effected by it. As the tongue for speech, the hand for writing, the sword for slaughter, Arms for war.

A Metonymy of the Material Cause is, when the name of the matter is put for the effect; as Brass for brass mony, Silver for Silver mo­ny, Gold for goldcoin: they worshipped wood and stone; i. e. Idols made of wood and stone: the iron entered into his soul, i. e. fetters.

A Metonymy of the effect is, when the effici­ent cause is signified by the effects: as Victory is by nature proud and insolent; that is, it maketh men proud and insolent. Pale death; which, maketh pale.

Note. That is called the effect which de­pendeth upon the efficient cause.

Thus Wickedness is put for the ungodly [...]r of wicked actions, the work for the

[Page 99] Quas meruit poenas jam dedivillud opus.

The work hath received that punishment which it did deserve; that is Ovid the Author of the work.

A Metonymy of the Subject is, when the proper name of any subject is made to signi­fie the adjunct.

Note. That is said to be a Subject, in which a thing may be any way said to be or adhere.

There may be a Metonymy of the subject these nine several ways.

1. When a Subject is put for an inherent accident; as, Curii for Victory, Curius being the name of a certain victorious Captain.

2. When the thing conteining is put for the conteined. As the Cup for the drink in the Cup, the purse for the mony.

3. When the place is put for the inhabi­tants; as, The City for the Citizens. They smote the city with the sword, i. e. the men in it.

4. When the place is put for the things done in the place; as, Psal. 68. 29. Because of thy Temple at Jerusalem; where by Tem­ple is understood the holy exercises and di­vine worship used in the Temple.

[Page 100] 5. When the possessor is put for the thing possessed by him; as, Joel, 3. 20. Judah shall be inhabited for ever: where Ju­dah the Son of Jacob is put for the Land of Jury, which was promised to his posterity and by them possessed.

6. When the Captain is put for his army; as, Annibal is conquered, that is, Annibal's army.

7. When a Patron or advocate is put for his client; as, The cause will go against the Attorney General, that is, against his client.

8. When a thing which is done in time is put for the time in which it was done; as, Harvest for Summer, Job. 32. 7. I said days should speak, and multitude of years should teach wisdom, i. e, the aged who have seen many days.

9. When the name of the thing signified is put for the sign; as, Ovid. Fast: 1. vers. 201.

Virg. Eclog. 3.

[Page 101] Orphea (que) in medio posuit, sylvas (que) sequentes.

In the midst he set Orpheus and the woods f [...]l­lowing, that is, the carved images of Orpheus and the woods.

A Metonymy of the adjunct is, when the adjunct is put for the subject. Gen. 31. 53. Jacob sware by the fear of his father Isaac, i. e. by God whom Isaac feared.

There may be a Metonymy of the adjunct eight several ways.

1. When the names of vertues are put for good men, of vices for wicked, and of many other things for the persons to whom they belong, or to whom they may be cal­led Adjuncts; as, on this side modesty con­tendeth, impudence on that; where modesty is put for modest men, and impudence for impudent men.

2. When the thing conteined is put for the thing conteining; as, Psal. 11. 7. The righteous Lord loveth righteousness, i. e. righ­teous men.

3. When the adjunct of the time is put for the subject. Thus the night is put for sleep, which is usually taken in the night. Ephes. 5. 16. The days are evil, i. e. the hearts and conversations of the men of these days are evil.

[Page 102] 4. When the Sign is put for the thing sig­nified; as, The Scepter for the Kingdome, a gown for peace, Arms for war.

5. When the thing placed is put for the place it self: we sought thee in all books, that is, in booksellers shops.

6. When the Antecedent is put for the consequent; as, pray hear, meaning, pray observe.

7. When the consequent is put for the an­tecedent; as, He is buried, instead of, he is dead.

8. When one Concomitant is put for a­nother; as, Annibal staid there, that is the Army of Annibal.

An Irony is a Trope from one opposite to ano­ther; or, in which we speak by contraries.

An Irony may be perceived three ways 1. by the manner of pronunciation; 2. by the person; 3. by the nature of the thing: for if any of these do differ from the words, it is clear, that the intention doth differ from them also.

Opposites are of two sorts,

• Unlike, or
• Contrary.

All things of different natures are said to be unlike: as, A man, a Stone, a Book, a Dog; [Page 103] and therefore one particular thing, may be equally opposed to many things.

All things are said to be contrary to one another that are of contrary natures: as light and darkness, heat and cold: and there­fore one particular thing may be equally op­posed to another particular.

An Irony of a thing unlike is, when any thing is spoken of one person and under­stood of another: whether it be affirmed of both, or denyed of one, as, Virgil Eclog. 3.

Where Menalcas naming himself means Dametas. Denied of one, as, Ovid Metam. 13.

Where Ulysses accusing Ajax tells him that none of his kindred were either hang­ed or banished; thereby intimating that some of Ajax's generation were, to wit, [Page 104] his father Telamon, and his Uncle Peleus, for killing of Phocas.

An Irony from the contrary is, when one contrary is signified by another; as,

meaning that he was a very rogue and had been very careless.

Paralepsis is a kind of Irony, by which we seem to pass by or take no notice of such things which yet we strictly observe and remember.

The forms of this figure are these; I let pass, I am silent, I omit, I will leave out, I say not &c. as thus, I say nothing of your li­centious life, incestuous marriage, or your being perjured in such a cause, &c. Where in a kind of elegancy we seem to pass by those crimes, which we do more eminently re­member.

Apophasis is a kind of Irony, by which we deny to say or do, which yet we speak with great­est earnestness, and do with all our might; as, nor will I mention these things, which if I should, you could not I am sure, deny them. This figure differs from the former, in no­thing but the manner of speaking.

[Page 105] A Metaphore is a Trope by which we ex press our selves by a word, which is of like sig­nification, with that we mean. There is no­thing in the world, of which there is not a­nother thing to which it may be resembled; and therefore there is nothing from whence a Metaphore may not be deducted; as, Prin­ceps caput Rei-publicae, The King is the head of the common wealth.

There are eight sort of things especially, from which a Metaphore may be deduced.

• 1. From sacred and holy things; as, One man is a God to another.
• 2. From the Heavens; as, Virgil the sun of Poets.
• 3. From the Elements; as, The fire of en­vy; the flood of eloquence and Rhetorick.
• 4. From Meteors; as, The lightning of an Oration.
• 5. From Minerals; as, Golden ages; an Iron breast.
• 6. From Vegetables; as, The flower of no­bility.
• 7. From living creatures; as, England is the eye of Islands; Orators do bark not speak.
• 8. From Artificial things; as, Appion is the Cymbal of the world, so called for his much talking.

[Page 106] And hence are these expressions, To file a writing, to polish an oration, to rip or unsow friendship.

Synecdoche is a Trope, by which a part is put for the whole and the contrary; i. e. the whole is put for a part.

A part is twofold.

• A Member, or
• A Species.

A Synecdoche of a Member is, when by a member the whole is signified. As the Roof for the house, the swords point for the sword it self, a General for his Army, the soul for a man.

Thus the singular number is put for the plural; as, The Roman was victor in battel, meaning the army of the Romans.

Note. That the singular number is a part or member of the plural, not a distinct na­ture: especially considering that every mul­titude doth consist of unities, as of so many particulars.

A Synecdoche of the Species is, when the Species is put for the Genus; as, when Ari­stides is put for a just man, Croesus for a rich man.

Thus we put an infinite number for a great number; as, you may bring six hun­dred [Page 107] such; Six hundred, one species or sort of a great number, for a great number in the general.

A Synecdoche of the whole is, when the whole is put for a part.

The whole is either an

• Integer, or
• A Genus.

A Synecdoche of an Integer is, when an In­teger is put for a member; as, His Army was so great as that is drank the rivers dry: meaning a great part of the water in the ri­vers.

Thus the plural number is put for the sin­gular; as, Cicero to Brutus; we deceived the people and seemed Orators: When the Orator spake of himself only.

A Synecdoche of the Genus is, when the General is put for the Special; as, a man for Catiline, Vertue for fortitude, Poet for Homer or Virgil, Orator for Demosthenes or Tully. Mark. 16. 15. Preach the Gospel to every creature: meaning manking only, and not any other creature.

Hitherto of Tropes the first kind of elo­cution; the second kind of elocution is by Figure.

CHAP. VII.

A Figure is a kind of Elocution by which the form of a speech is changed from its right and plain use.

A Figure is either of

• A Word, or
• A Sentence.

A Figure of a word is that, by which an Oration or speech is composed of words apt­ly and sweetly suitable to one another. And this consists either in the Dimension or Repe­tition of sounds or words.

A Figure in the Dimension of sounds is the sweet number of sounds in a sentence.

Number is either Poetical or Oratorical.

A Poetical number is that, which is confi­ned to a perpetual observation of certain spaces.

A Number Poe [...]ical is either Rhyme or Me­ter.

Rhyme is a poetical number containing a certain number of feet, without any re­gard to the quantity of the Syllables whe­ther long or short. But here many times [Page 109] there are several sentences joyned together in which the last Syllables are like; as,

A Meter is a poetical number consisting of certain feet, of which the last foot hath the last Syllable indifferent or common, that is, long or short.

In this kind of Poetical number, there is a liberty granted for a certain Metaplasm or transformation of a word, namely when there is something wanting in it, or when there is too much, or when there is some­thing changed.

There are four kinds of Metaplasms.

1. By Elision or taking away something from the end of a word, in the scanning of a verse.

And this is either, Synalaepha or Ecthlipsis.

Synalaepha is an elision or striking out of one vowel before another in divers words; as, 'tis, for it is.

Ecthlipsis is when the letter m with his vowel is taken away, because the word fol­lowing beginneth with a vowel; as, Syncer' est, for Syncerum est.

2. The second kind of Metaplasm is by [Page 108] [...] [Page 109] [...] [Page 110] adding something to, or deducting some­thing from a word: and of this there are six kinds.

Prosthesis, Aphaeresis, Epenthesis, Syncope, Paragoge, and Apocope.

Prosthesis is the adding of a letter or Sylla­ble to the beginning of a word.

Aphaeresis is the taking away of a letter or a Syllable from the beginning of a word.

Epenthesis is the putting of a letter or Syl­lable into the middle of a word.

Syncope is the taking away of a letter or Syllable from the middle of a word,

Paragoge is the putting of a letter or sylla­ble to the end of a word.

Apocope is the taking of a letter or syllable from the end of a word.

3. The third kind of Metaplasms is by di­viding and contracting of words, the one is called Diaeresis, the other Synaeresis.

Diaeresis is that which maketh two sylla­bles of one.

Synaeresis is the contracting of two sylla­bles into one.

4. The fourth kind of Metaplasms is by changing something in a word, and of this there are five kinds. Tmesis, Metathesis, An­tithesis, Diastole and Systole.

Tmesis is that which divides the parts of a [Page 111] compound or simple word by putting ano­ther word between them.

Metathesis is the transposition or mispla­cing of a letter in a word.

Antithesis is the putting of one letter for another.

Diastole is that which maketh a short syl­lable long.

Systole is that which maketh a long sylla­ble short.

Oratorical number doth indeed consist of feet, but not of any certain number of feet, but of as many or as few as the Orator plea­seth. And although for testimony or de­light he may sometimes recite the verses of others, yet must he not make verses, when he writeth prose. He should not make the begin­ning or the end of a verse to be either the be­ginning or end of prose. But a greater care is to be had of the close than either of the be­ginning or middle of a speech, for in that the perfection of number doth chiefly appear; but these things will be better understood by the practice of the meanest Orator, than the precepts of the most skilful.

What the Figure of a word is, in the Di­mens on of the sound thereof, hath been shewed: now followeth the Figure of a word in respect of the repetition thereof.

[Page 112] And this is twofold, Like, or Unlike.

A Figure of a word in the repetition of like sound is either with or without intermission.

Repetition of like sound without intermissi­on is either an Epizeuxis or an Anadiplosis.

An Epizeuxis is, when a like sound is re­peated in the same sentence without inter­mission, and that either a part or a whole word.

An Epizeuxis or repetition of the part of a word is either in the beginning or in the end of a word.

An Epizeuxis or repetition of a whole word may be in the beginning, middle, or end of a sentence; as, Ezek. 21. 9, 27. A sword, a sword is sharpened &c. I will over­turn, overturn, overturn it. And thus David bewaileth the death of his son Absolon in 2 Sam. 18. 33. O my son Absolom, my son, my son Absolom; would God I had died for thee, O Absolom, my son, my son.

An Anadiplosis is, when a like sound with­out intermission is repeated in divers sen­tences, that is when it ends one and begins another; as, in Dr. Donne's Poems, Page 210.

[Page 113] And in the use of this Figure there is some­ [...]imes a Climax; as when an Anadiplosis is con­ [...]inued with many degrees. Pro Milon: Nor [...]did he only render himself to the people, but to the Senate: nor to the Senate only, but to the publick Garisons and Armies: nor to these only, but even to him, with whom the Senate hath [...]ntrusted the common-wealth. Ad Heren: What hope of liberty now remaineth; if it be lawful for them to do what they please, and that they can do what is lawful, and dare do, what they can, and actually do, as múch as they dare, and you like whatever they do? Wherein we thought each line, each word, each syllable breath'd out the passions of a clear and candid soul. Howels Ep. 3. Epist. 18.

Repetition of like sound but with some in­termission is either in the same or in divers places.

Repetition of like sound with intermissi­on in the same place is either an Anaphora, or an Epistrophe.

An Anaphora is, when a like sound is re­peated in the beginning of sentences; as,

Ovid de Arte amandi. lib. 1. Garm. 3. and 4. [Page 114] 'Tis safe and frequent, fraud through lov [...] frame.

'Tis safe and frequent, but deserveth blam [...]

Ovid de Arte amandi. lib. 1. page 197.

An Epistrophe is, when a like sound is re­peated in the close of sentences; as, 2 Cor [...] 11. 22. Are they Hebrews? so am I: are the [...] Israelites? so am I: are they the seed of Abra­ham? so am I.

From an Anaphora and an Epitrophe joyn­ed together is made another figure calle [...] Symploce; which is, when a like sound [...] both in the beginning and the ending of se­veral sentences; as, Can the host of heave [...] help me? can Angels help me? can these inferi [...] ­our creatures help me.

Repetition of like sound with intermission, i [...] divers parts or places, is either an Epanalips [...] or an Epanados.

An Epanalipsis is, when a like sound is re­peated in the beginning and ending of the [...] same sentence; as, In sorrow was I born, and I must die in sorrow. 1 Cor. 3. 21, 22. All things are yours, whether things present, or things to come, all are yours.

An Epanodos is, when the like sound is in the beginning and ending of divers sen­tences, [Page 115] an Anadiplosis coming between; as, Parthenia desired above all things to have Ar­galus; Argalus feared nothing but to miss Parthenia. Isaiah 5. 20. Wo unto them who call good evi', and evil good; who put dark­ness for light, and light for darkness; who glo­ry in their shame, and are ashamed of their glo­ry.

Hitherto of the Figure of a word repeated of like sound, now follow two figures more made by the repetition of sounds somewhat unlike, Paronomasia and Polyptoton.

Paronomasia is, when a word being chan­ged in a letter or a syllable, it is also chan­ged in sence and signification; as, Though you advise me to repent, I have not grace to follow your advice. Eminent men of great note, are now a days most subject to imminent dangers. 'Tis not so tedious to me as to others, to be thus immur'd, because I have been inured and habituated unto troubles. Howels Epist. 1. Volu. sect. 6. Epist. 50.

[Page 116] A Polyptoton is, when words of the sam [...] original are reiterated but with some varia­tion, whether it be in mood or tense or per­son or number or any other; as, Vanity [...] Vanities, all is vanity. Deceiving and being de­ceived. The Lord when he visiteth, in visiting will visit you.

CHAP. VIII.

HItherto of a figure in reference to word [...] A Figure in reference to a sentence is a fi­gure which affecteth the whole sentenc [...] with some motion of the mind.

A Figure in reference to a sentence is eithe [...] in absolute reasoning, or in reasoning Dia­logue-wise

Logismus or absolute reasoning is, when a sentence is composed without any talking with other supposed.

And this is either E [...]phonesis, a recalling of one self, Apostrophe or Prosopopeia.

Ecphonesis is a figure in reasoning, ex­pressed or understood by an Adverb of ex­claiming: it is a very great instrument o [...] [Page 117] moving the mind, and affections of those [...] whom we speak.

1. By way of Admiration; as, Oh the won­derful clemency! or, Oh happy people that are in such a case!

2. Derision; as, Mark 15. 29. Ah thou [...]hat destroyest the Temple and buildest it in three days.

3. Wishing; Psal. 14. 17. O that the sal­vation of Israel were come out of Sion.

4. Detestation; as, Rom. 7. 24. O wrethed man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death?

5. Reprehensi [...]n; as, O Foolish Galathians who hath bewitched you &c. Gal. 3. 1.

6. Indignation; Act. 13. 10. O full of all subtilty and mischief, thou child of the Devil, thou enemy of all righteousness.

7. Love; as, Psal. 84. 1. O how amiable are thy Tabernacles, thou Lord of hosts.

8. Exultation; as, 1 Cor. 15. 15. O death where is thysting, Oh grave where is thy victo­ry?

9. Commiseration and Grief; as, Luke 13. 34. O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, which killest the Prophets &c. How often would I have gathered thy children together, &c.

12. Epiphonema is also a kind of excla­mation, which is wont to be added to the [Page 118] end of the narration or explication of a mat­ter. Thus the Psalmist having highly se [...] forth the glorious excellency of the name o [...] God, in Psal. 72. shuts up his praise with this acclamation; Blessed be his glorious name for ever, and let the whole earth be filled with his glory.

Recalling of ones self is, when something is called back: and it is as it were a diminu­tion of the over hastiness or heat of speech [...] and this is either Epanorthósis or Aposiopésis.

An Epanorthósis is, when something pre­ceding is called back by correcting it: as, I had one only young man to my Son; ah! what have I said? I had? yea I had: it is new un­certain whether I have or not.

An Aposiopésis is, when the close of a sen­tence begun is stopped by keeping in a part which yet is understood; as, you rogue, if I live. Heb. 3. 11. To whom Isware in my wrath, if they enter into my rest; i. e. they shall never enter into my rest.

Hitherto of perfect and absolute reason­ing by way of exclamation and revocation. Now followeth that which is in Apostrophe and Prosopopoeia.

An Apostrophe is, when a speech is dire­cted to another, than was by the speech it self at first intended.

[Page 119] And this may be done divers ways.

As when a speech is directed

1. To God. 2. To Angels good or bad.

To men in their several ranks, whether [...]sent or present, dead or alive, as Ad­ [...]rsaries or friends, to the present Auditors, [...] ones self. 4. To brute creatures, and 5. [...]o things inanimate.

A Prosopopoeia is, when in our Oration, [...]e suppose another person to be speaking. [...]nd by this figure, God, Angels, men dead [...] alive, the heavens, earth, sea, and such [...]ke are brought in speaking, hearing, &c. [...], Josh. 24. 27. Behold this shall be a witness [...]to us; for it hath heard all the words of the [...]ord which he hath spoken unto us.

A Prosopopoeia is either imperfect or perfect.

An Imperfect Prosopopoeia is, when anothers [...]eech is lightly declared and as it were by [...]he by; as, Psal. 11. 1. David brings in the wicked as saying unto his soul, flee as a Bird [...]nto your mountain.

A perfect Prosopopoeia is when in our own Oration the whole fiction of another per­son is plainly declared; as, Prov. 8. Wisdome [...]ryeth at the Gates &c. Unto you, O men, I [...]all, &c.

A Figure in reasoning Dialogue-wise is, when a sentence is composed in form of a [Page 120] conference; this consisteth in Question an [...] Answer: of which kind of reasoning the [...] are two parts Hypophora and Anthypophor [...]

But Dialogism or reasoning by Questio [...] and Answer is twofold, Consenting and Dissen­ting.

Dissenting is when ones answer doth im­pugne or cross the objection.

A Figure of a dissenting Dialogism is either Deliberation or Occupation.

Deliberation is either an Aporia or an Ana­coenósis.

An Aporia is a deliberation with ou [...] selves; as, Philip. 1. 22. But if I live in t [...] flesh, this is the fruit of my labour: yet what [...] shall chose I know not; for I am in a strai [...] between two, having a desire to depart, and to be with Christ, which is far better: nevertheless to abide in the flesh is more needful for you &c.

An Anacoenósis is, a deliberation with o­thers; as thus, what shall I say? what think you? if it had been your own case, would you have done otherwise?

Occupation is when we prevent anothers objection and give an answer to it our selves. This Dialogism therefore from the former part is called a Prolepsis, from the latter a Prosapódosis.

A Prolepsis or an Hypophora propounds [Page 121] the objection; as, Isaiah 37. 23. Whom hast thou reproached, and blasphemed? And a­gainst whom hast thou exalted thy voice, and lifted up thine eyes on high? even against the holy one of Israel.

A Prosapódosis or an Anthypophora answers the objection; as, Rom. 6. 15. What then? shall we sin because we are not under the law, but under grace? God forbid.

A Prolepsis for the most part hath a Pro­sopopoeia joyned with it, and is therefore either oblique or direct.

An Oblique Prolepsis is that which hath an imperfect Prosopopoeia joyned with it.

A Direct Prolepsis is that which hath a full Prosopopoeia; as, some one may say, is this then your Discipline? Do you thus instruct youth?

A Figure of Consenting Dialogism is, when ones answer doth admit of the objection expressed or understood: yet so, as that from thence the inconsequence of the ob­jection may be shewed, if need be.

But this is either an Epitrope or a Syn­choresis.

An Epitrope is when any ones fact is free­ly permitted. This is twofold Serious or I­ronical.

Serious permission; as, Take this Church [Page 122] plute, seeing thou hast need, for 'twas thy An­cestors gift.

Ironical permission; as, Eccles. 11. 9. Rejoyce O young man, and let thy heart [...] thee, &c. And walk in the ways of thy heart, &c.

A Synchoresis is when some word or deed is forgiven; as, let him be sacrilegious, let him be a theef, let him be the vilest person in the world; for all that he is a good Governour. James 2. 19. Thou believest that there is one God, thou dost well: the Devils also believe and tremble.

CHAP. IX.
Of Secundary Figures.

TO these Primary Figures of words and sentences there may some secundary fi­gures be added in both kinds.

[Page 123] The Secundary figures of a word are eight.

• 1. Ellipsis.
• 2. Pleonasmus.
• 3. Asyndeton.
• 4. Polysyndeton.
• 5. Hyperbaton.
• 6. Zeugma.
• 7. Antithesis.
• 8. Graeeismus.

An Ellipsis is, when some necessary word, to express the passion, is omitted in the con­struction; as, Isaiah 1. 13. I cannot iniqui­ty, that is, I cannot bear iniquity.

A Pleonasmus is, when there is some word in an oration, more than it seemeth to need; yet doth emphatically and eminently express some vehemence and certainty; as, I saw it with these eyes. And that which hath not such an Emphasis is idle and vicious.

An Asyndeton is, when in a number of words, a conjunction copulative is omit­ted, either through hast, or vehemence of speech; as, By thy folly and wickedness thou hast lost thy substance, thy good name, thy friends, thy parents, and offended thy Creator.

A Polysyndeton is, when for gravity sake, more conjunctions are used than seem need­ful, but not without some Emphasis; as, overmuch sleep also, and wine, and banquets, and queaus, and bathes enervate and enfeeble the body and mind.

[Page 124] An Hyperbaton is a Transposition of words from the right order of construction, into some more neat and compact form, for ele­gancy and variety sake; as, Ephes. 1. And you bath he quickened who were dead in tres­passes and sins.

A Zeugma is, when some verb or adje­ctive but once expressed in a sentence, is sup­posed to be referred to several others of di­vers genders, numbers or persons, agreeing with that which is nearest; as, lust overcom­eth modesty, boldness fear, and passion reason.

This is threefold.

Prozeugma, when this common word is set in the beginning; as, For neither art thou he, Cataline, whom shame could at any time call back from dishonesty, fear from perils, or reason from madness.

Mesozeugma, when in the middle; as, what a shame is this, that neither hope of re­ward, nor fear of reproach could any thing move him, the perswasion of his friends, nor the love of his Country?

Hypozeugma, when in the end; as, the foundation of freedome, the fountain of equity, the safeguard of wealth, and custody of life is preserved by law.

An Antithesis is, when the things opposed do answer one another; as, Flattery procu­reth [Page 125] friendship, truth hatred.

A Graecismus is when the proper Idiom of the Greek is used in another speech or lan­guage; as, Edm. Spencer Chap. 13. For not to have been dipt in Lethe lake, could save the son of Thetis from to die; that is, Achilles.

To these may be added

An Hyperologia or an Hyteron Proteron, when that which in the natural order should be first spoken, is brought in last; as, he is in health and alive, for, he is alive and in health.

An Antiptosis, when one case is put for a­nother.

An Hypallage, when two words do com­mute or change cases with one another; as, Thou hast hid their heart from understand­ing, Job 17. 4. that is, thou hast hid un­derstanding from their heart.

The Secundary figures in a sentence are ten.

• 1. Parrhésia.
• 2. Erotesis.
• 3. Parenthesis.
• 4. Parathesis.
• 5. Periphrasis.
• 6. Synonymia.
• 7. Hypotyposis.
• 8. Praemunitio.
• 9. Transitio.
• 10. Rejectio.

Parrhesia is a free and a bold speaking of [Page 126] such things in their presence whom we should fear or reverence, as are displeasing or may provoke them to envy.

And this is either when we confidently acknowledge and defend a fault not proved against us, or when we boldly upbraid and rebuke others, for faults by them commit­ted.

Erotesis is a manner of speech, whereby we either,

1. Demand a question; as, How oft shall [...]ny brother sin against me, and I forgive him? till seven times? Matth. 18. 21. Or when we

2. Earnestly affirm and reprehend; as, O faithless Generation! how long shall I be with you? how long shall I suffer you? Mark 9. 19. Or when we

3. Vehemently avouch the contrary, whe­ther the interrogation be affirmative or ne­gative; as, can the blind lead the blind? shall they not both fall into the ditch? that is, the blind cannot lead the blind, they shall both fall.

Parenthesis is the interposing of one or more words of perfect sence, within another sentence, for the perfecting thereof; with­out which interposition, the sence would yet be perfect and entire.

[Page 127] Concerning which, two rules are obser­veable, viz.

1. That the interposition should neither be long, nor frequent, because it will ren­der the sentence obscure.

2. That one Parenthesis be but seldome inserted within another; as, Are they mi­nisters of Christ (I speak as a fool) I am more; 2 Cor. 11. 23.

Parathesis, is a figure of construction, whereby one substantive is for declaration and distinction sake added unto another in the same case; as, the river Isis, or the river Wye. Judas saith unto him, not Iscariot. John 14. 22.

Periphrasis, is the explication of a thing by more words, which may be expressed by one.

This figure is principally made four ways.

1. When some notable enterprise, ones native countrey, or some strange sect or o­pinion, is put instead of the proper name; as, The writer of the Trojan war for Homer.

2. In Etymology, when the cause or reason of a name is unfolded; as, a man studious of wisdom, for a Philosopher.

3. In Annotation, when by certain marks or tokens something is described; as, Anger is a vehement heat of the mind, which brings [Page 128] paloness to the countenance, burning to the eyes, and trembling to the parts of the body.

4. When a thing is described by defini­tion; as, the art of speaking eloquently, for Rhetorick. An oppressor of the laws and li­berties of the people, for a Tyrant.

Synonymia or Palilogia, is a heaping to­gether of many words of one signification; as, Wisdome in a poor man lyes as a thing despised, rejected, oppressed, buried and utter­ly extinct.

Hypotypoois is a figure by which a whole matter is particularly and orderly expressed, as that it seems to be represented unto ocu­lar inspection; as, It is a place which now humbling it self in fallowed plains, now proud in well husbanded hills, marries barren woods to cultivated valleys, and joyns neat gardens to delicious fountains, &c.

Praemunition or preparation is, when we presuppose what may be said by way of de­fence for those, whom we intend to repre­hend or reprove.

Transition is that by which the parts of an oration are joyned together. And this is

1. Perfect, by which is declared what hath been spoken, and what remaineth to be said; as, hitherto we have spoken of tillage and Astronomy, now we will treat of &c.

[Page 129] 2. Imperfect, by which is declared either what hath been said, or what remaineth to be spoken.

This may be done eight several ways.

• 1. By something that is equal or parallel; as, Those are most pleasant, nor are these less delightful.
• 2. By something that is unequal; you have heard very sad things; but I shall now tell you sadder things than these.
• 3. By something that is like.
• 4. By something that is contrary; These things he did when he was young; hear now his vertuous progress in his elder days.
• 5. By something that is divers; as, you have heard of his behaviour, I will now inform you of his learning.
• 6. By preoccupation; as, We will now hasten to the rest, only give me leave to adde this one thing.
• 7. By reprehension; Why should I dwell on this subject; I hasten to that which is the cause of all.
• 8. From some consequent or relative; as, you have heard what I have done for him; hear now how he hath required me.

Rejection is, when we deferre a thing to some other time or place, or wholly reject it as absurd and impertinent, and by no [Page 130] means to be admitted of; as, But of Luculus I will speak in some other place: and I will speak so, as that my speech shall not falsely accuse him, or yet derogate from his just praise.

And thus much concerning Elocution. As for Memory and Pronunciation, which are the other two parts of Rhetorick, I purposely omit them, as being natural endowments, which may be better improved by constant practice, than by any precepts which can be given.

Laus Deo.