THat which gives the formal obligation to all Contracts both public and pri­vate, those betwixt Princes and Go­vernments, and those betwixt particular Per­sons, is the will or assent of the Persons con­tracting. And what the mind or meaning and intention of those Persons was at the time of their contracting, that, and no more, is the Subject matter contained in the contract. I add those words no more , because in matters of Pact and Promise, as no Man is obliged to what he never assented, so no Man can assent to what he never intended.

But these Acts of the will and mind of Men are intrinsic, secret, and not known, till mani­fested and declared by some outward sign, such as words, which of all others are the most na­tural and proper signification of our inward sentiments. Now a Man having signified his [Page 4]meaning by his words, and thereby also testified his assent thereto, the obligation of his Will be­comes extended to comprehend, not his intrin­sic meaning only, but his words also. And he is bound to the true and just performance of them, as they are the declarative testimony made by himself, of his invisible, and otherwise unknown intention.

And least we should still be in the dark, con­cerning the meaning of the very words them­selves, Reason dictates, that in matters of Con­tract they ought to be given, and taken also (with­out manifest cause to the contrary,) in their most plain and simple sense, according to their popular use, and received Propriety. For Contracts and Covenants transfer a Right from one Man to another, and if every Man were left at liberty in his own cause, and to his own ad­vantage, either to Substitute or Suborn what tacit meaning he pleases, though never so re­pugnant to his words; or to affix what Sense he will upon his words, though never so disagree­ing to his otherways signified intention; these, and either of these, if admitted, would sub­vert the faith of all Contracts. Things stipu­lated betwixt Man and Man would be under loose uncertainties; no Mans Right could be [Page 5]known, and Controversies would be endles [...] Things destructive to humane Society, and which introduce Confusion into the Moral World.

But still tis true elso, that a man is obliged to no more, than what his will and intention was to oblige himself unto; nor doe his words super induce any new obligation upon him, but onely declare a former arising from his inward as­sent, and consequently extend that former Obli­gation to what is now declared. And have no pow­er to alter his secret meaning but onely to testifie it. And are not to be considered as disjoind from it, but conjoind with it. And if a man does not rightly express what he truly means, he is unhappy therein, and it may involv him in trouble and inconvenience.Quid? verbis satis hoc can­tum erat? mi­nimè. Quae res igitur valuit? Voluntas. Quae si tacitis nobis intelligi posset verbis omnino non uteremur, quia non potest, verba reperta, sunt, non quae impedirent sed quae indi­carent vo­luntatem. Cic. Orat. prc A. Caec. Yet if by the most probable conjectures it can be found, that his true meaning was different from what his words seemingly import, equity will relieve him, by preferring his meaning before his words. Nay if the meaning of men in their mutual Pacts and Stipulations could certainly be known without words, the superaddition of words would be wholly useless and superfluous.

Therefore in the Interpretation of all con­tracts, that which primarily and principally is [Page 6]to be regarded in case any doubt arises, is, what the mind of intention of the Contractors was. And this must be collected from all the pro­bable signs and indications not only of words whither spoken or written, but of other rational Conjectures, fetch'd from their several Topics of Precedent Causes, concurring Circum­stances, necessary Consequents or effects and the like. And where there is no Reason to the con­trary, nothing of absurdity that would follow, or which admitted would render the Contract useless, we ought to stand to the Propriety of the words; yet still with this difference, that in matters odious they ought to be restrain'd to their narrowest signification, in matters fa­vourable enlarged to their full latitude, in both according as the Nature of the thing, and the Equity of the case shall direct. But never to be extended to things unlawful, impossible, con­trary and repugnant, absurd and irrational. What's unlawful a man ought not to will, and if he docs, his Act morally considered is a nul­lity, and so not obligatory. What's impossible he cannot perform, and so in vain to will it. Contraries he cannot will at the same time be­cause repugnant. And 'tis to be presum'd, that a man of Reason will not will what's irrational.

It was a manifest Caption and Cavil in the Romans, who being to diviee the Ships betwixt them and Antiochus by equal shares, cut every Ship into two equal parts.Dimidia par [...] Navium. For half the Ships, according to the usual Propriety of the words, is not the half of every Ship cut asunder, but half of their entire number, with respect first had to their goodness and dimen­sions.

It was not said, Non infe­rat, but non generent bel­lum.After the second Punic War it was Cove­nanted by League, that the Carthagenians should not have or wage War with any with­out leave of the Roman People. The word War is generical and partible into the two Spe­cies of invasiv and defensiv. The Question is, whether in this case it shall be extended to both Species, or restrained only to Invasiv. Here tis to be considered that the subject matter of the Question is of a thing odious and bur­densome, viz. the Diminution of Liberty, both Civil and Natural. For Nature allows every man a Right of defending himself, by repelling force with force, and if every man, then much more a Politick Society. The Equity of thir case directs us to believe that the Carthagenians would not renounce so necessary a Right. The propriety of the word War is salv'd well enough [Page 8]by restraining it to the Principal Species of War, viz. Invasive, which carries with it a greater ostentation of power than a Defensive. Thus in a matter Odious, the Equity of the Case di­recting, and the Propriety of the Words ha­ving or Waging War allowing, they shall be construed, only to restrain the Carthagenians from any Hostile Aggression or Invasion of o­thers, but not from the necessary Defence of themselves when attaqu'd by an Enemy.

But suppose the words of the said League had been to forbid the Carthagenians the fur­nishing or relieving any Enemy of the Roman People with Arms. Here the word Arms is likewise general, and may be divided into Offensive and Defensive. The Question is, whither in this case it shall be taken general­ly to comprehend all Arms, or restrictivly to Arms offensiv onely, which are the nobler sort of Arms, and sometimes the Nobler spe­cies is taken for the whole Genus, as in the former Case of War. If we proceed by the former method we shall find, that the matter of the Question is of a thing Favourable and Be­nificial, viz., the hindring the Relief of an Ene­my. That the intentional Equity of the Case is to debar an Enemy from all Instruments of [Page 9]Hostility, not only those whose proper use is to hurt as Swords, Bows, Javelins, &c. but those also whose proper use is to repel all Hostile hurt, such, as Shields, Helmets, Coats of Maile or what else were the use of that Age. But so as not to extend the words beyond the Subject matter of Arms, to Clothes, Victuals and the like, for such are not Arms, and though they repel Hurt as cold and Hunger, yet tis not Hostile him. And we find also that the propriety of the words best agrees here with their largest Accepta­tion. Tis clear therefore that in this Case the releiving of an Enemy with Arms, shall be understood Contrary to what in the for­mer, not restrictively to Arms offensive onely, but extensively so as to Comprehend all Arms whatsoever.

All Leagues and Confederacies properly so called, made and contracted betwixt Prin­ces and Nations, are but the Deductions and Political Results of natural justice and Wisdom as they are particularly applicable to the present Emergencies of State. Justice Examins their Principles, Wisdom their Ends. So that if two or more Princes Confeder­ate [Page 10]together against a Third, whom tehy Declare their Common Enemy, And the War so declared be in its Nature Manifestly unjust, this is an ill grounded War through defect of the Principle, and is rather a Com­bination then a League,Liga [...]à ligando. for every League both in name and nature implies a Tie or ob­ligation, But no Prince is tied to be unjust. Suppose then the War to be as to its Princi­ple, just, and so the League initially good, yet if by the necessary Concomitants and Consequents thereof it be found that in the Event it will certainly involv one of the Confederates in apparent ruin and destruct­tion, This if continued is an ill advised War, and the obligation to it ceases through defect of the End. For no Prince is bound to destroy himself. And the proper and adequate end of all Leagues and Alliances betwixt Princes and Governments is the safety and benefit of each others Crown and People.

The French King declared England Prin­cipal in the War against Holland.If there be Principal and Accessory in a War, and the Principal be satisfied as to the terms and conditions of Peace offered, the other Prince who is but the Accessory ought to acquiesce, But if both be Principals, the [Page 11]one is free to pursue his Right though the other desists.

A Prince cannot oblige himself to conti­nue a War during the pleasure of his Confe­derate or which is all one, not to make a Peace without the others consent. When I say he cannot, I mean not any Civil Impo­tency or defect of power on the part of the Prince, but a moral impossibility or repug­nancy on the part of the thing. And if a Treaty be couch'd in such like terms, they are either meerly insignificant, or must ad­mit of some equitable construction to make them reducible to a practical sense. For o­therwise according to the rigour of the Letter such Words would oblige a Prince to continue an unreasonable an untimely a calamitous War, onely to gratifie the Am­bition, will, or humour of another. And this will be to tie a Prince to do what he is already tied not to do, which is a Moral Contra­diction.

But put Case the Treaty obliges both Prin­ces to continue the War by a Conjunction of forces till both may obtain reasonable [Page 12]Conditions from their Common Enemy. In this Case each Prince shall have the Judgment not onely of his own but of the others con­ditions also, so far forth as they relate to the continuance or discontinuance of the War on his part, else upon pretext that his Conditions are not reasonable, the one may everlastingly Opiniastre the War and Con­sequently engage the other in it during his single pleasure.

All Leagues and Contracts as well with Princes as with private Persons are ever mu­tual and reciprocal, and are always made be­twixt two parties at fewest, and where there are but two in the contract, if one of them departs from it, tis no longer a contract. Now a Prince by the non performance of every material point contained in the League or Treaty violats the Faith thereof and departs from the League it self. And this non performance on the part of the one Prince does not operate by way of inves­ting in the other a power or moral faculty of breaking or nonperforming with him in a matter of the like nature; for then it would tantamount to this, because one is false to [Page 13]me therefore I may be false to him. But it operates by way of annulling and avoiding the whole League, as having no longer any obligation in it. It becomes a meer canceld Bond, and is so far from being, an agree­ment that in the issue and effects it proves a Disagreement,

No Prince is bound by any League to perish singly or in company with another, and the safety welfare and prosperity of his People are his Primary obligation. First in Time and first in Dignity, to which all Treaties and Transactions with forrain Prin­ces are but secondary and subservient, nei­ther can any of them be pleaded to evacuate that original and fundamental obligation. And though private Persons may in several Instances contract to their own great Hurt and Dammage, and still be bound up there­by, yet tis otherwise with Princes in their public and politic capacities because of the Conjugate Interest of Prince and People. Forasmuch as a Prince cannot greatly hurt himself without hurting them to the preser­vation of whom, and to the procuring of whose good and benefit, he is already pre­ingaged [Page 14]In which sense tis infallibly true, Actus Posterior non praejudicat priori.

Princes, in their making Leagues and con­federacies each with other, take their measures from the Consideration of the present pos­ture and condition of their Affairs in the whole complex of them both at home and a­broad. If the same reasons and inducements remain, which first moved them to enter into the League, not to persist in it would be levity at least, and if conjoind with a design of de­cieving and hurting another no less then per­fidy. But if a new Scene of affairs opens quite different from the former, if unexpected Ac­cidents fall out which Chang the reason of the Case, such, as if either of the Confede­rates could have had the foreknowledg of, He would never have entered into the League. here the cause of it ceases. The foundation fails. The Prince is to consult the present conjuncture, to take other measures suited and adapted to the now State of things. For to debar a Prince from accommodating his Councils to new and unforeseen Emergen­cies. is equally absurd, as to oblige a mariner not to shift his sails according to the variation [Page 15]of the Winds. A Prince thinks it just and reasonable under his present circumstances to enter into a Society of Arms with another, and be Confederate with him in a common War. The Condition of his Affairs after­wards changes, and as then considered, ren­ders the War unreasonable, His people fall into distempers at home, his Arms more requisite elsewhere. The continuation of the War followed with a train of fatal Conse­quences at first not so easily discoverable. In this Case the Prince needs none to dispense or absolv him, if any other could do it be­sides the Person contracted with, from the Tie and Bond of his Confederacy. He was never obliged under these Circumstances, nothing of this case was included in the League, and therefore tacitly excepted; the then State and condition of his Affairs, which was the moving and leading cause to his consenting to it, is now quite different and become another thing, and the former motivs to a War are now changed into more powerful arguments for a Peace.

Tis the same in all pacts and promises be­twixt private persons; they are all subject to [Page 16]the tacit condition of Things abiding in the same state, Not as if humane Affairs could long abide without chang, but tis meant onely of things relating to the Pact or Pro­mise, such as contributed to the Being of it, and without which implied it had not been made.

Omnia esse de­debent eadem quae fuerunt cam promitte­rem, ut pro­mittantis fi­dem teneas. Quie quid m [...] ­tatur liberta­tem facit de iutegro consu­lende & meam fidem liberat. Sen. de Benet. lib. 4. cap. 35.For Example, I promise my friend I will relieve him as long as I live and never suffer him to want. But I was then in the possessi­on of a plentiful fortune, am now reduced to penury, so that what I have, barely suffi­ces my own necessities. Here my promise binds me not, Nature teaching and Chari­ty permitting to prefer my self. Perhaps my friend becomes a Criminal to the State, and by Law, though a subsequent one, I am forbid to relieve him. Here my Duty to the Government forecludes my promise. Or if an Usurper forbids me under Capital Penalties, though I owe him no duty of Obedience, yet self-preservation acquits me. Nor can it be supposed that I meant to oblige my self to supply anothers wants, with the loss or im­minent hazard of my own life. Perhaps I promised to a friend, and he afterwards [Page 17]turns my enemy, and what I intended for his good he perverts to my hurt, here I may justly retract my abused benefit. Infi­nite Cases may be framed, wherein the chang of things shall change the Reason, and consequently the Obligation of a Promise. And though when I promised, I did not cau­tion expresly against such Accidents and E­vents, under which I would be under­stood not to be bound, because I could not know nor foresee them all; yet common and universal Reason shall be pleaded in aid of the weakness of my private understanding. For bare words ought not to be extended to over-rule the reason of things, but on the contrary, the reason of things ought to re­gulate the interpretation of words. And all Stipulations and contracts consist as well of what is rationally implied as what is verbal­ly expressed.

But if Common Reason and equity be just­ly pleaded in benefit of a private Person where his Life and Fortune lye at Stake, how much more shall it be in the Case of a Prince, where the Conservation of a Community is concern'd. And if unforeseen Accidents fall [Page 18]out in the ordinary Occurrences of humane Life, how much oftner in the Case of a War, that Grand Scene of Vicissitudes and muta­bility.

The case of the Gibeonites recorded in Sa­cred History, who by Surreption and not without a fraudulent Lye, obtained a League, wherein they yeilded their Persons Slaves and Bondmen to Redeem their Lives, will, if duly examined make nothing towards the invalidating of what's before affirmed, as may to his saitsfaction be seen by him who has the leisure to consult Grotius in his 2d, Book de Jure Belli ac Pacis Cap. 13. Paragr. 4.

England is Confederate with France, in a War a­gainst Holland, and France at the same time makes War a­gainst Spain, who is an Al­lie of England.In Case two Princes be Confederates in a War against a third, and one of them by Ho­stile Provocations Occasionally arising from this War, or by Voluntary design Engages himself in a new War against a fourth Prince, who is a Friend and Allie of the other Con­federate, to the Multiplication still of more Wars by a Superfaetation. In this Case the state of Affairs is quite altered from what it was when the League was first entred into, and that other Consederate will labour un­der [Page 19]a double disadvantage, For first, the Forces of his Confederate will by this new War be distracted and divided, and conse­quently more of the burden and danger of the War devolv'd upon him. 2dly. The assistance which he gives his Confederate, and which is intended for maintenance of the War against a Common Enemy, will either wholly or in part be diverted to a War a­gainst his own Allie; and by this means shall with one hand Fight against his Enemy, and with the other against his Friend. And in Case the Conservation of the Amity of that Allie be of great use to him and his Peo­ple, and his true Interest complicated there­with, he shall now become Engaged in an unnatural War against himself.

But put the Case still Stronger. Suppose it was caution'd in the Treaty of the League, that if the War which the two Confederates were to make against a third Prince or State should occasion a new War against one of those Confederate from a fourth Prince, that in such Case both the said Confederates should still assist each other in the Prosecu­tion of the War, and moreover declare [Page 20]that fourth Prince or State their Common Enemy. Here an unforeseen Accident or unexpected change cannot be pleaded, be­cause this new War is not onely supposed but provided against by express Covenant.

To this I answer two ways. First if one of the Confederates has already a League and Alliance with that fourth Prince , against whom this new War is to be undertaken, and no violation of the League on the part of that Prince, that Proviso how express so­ever is absolutely Void. For no Prince is ob­liged in compliance with his Word to a new Confederate to break his Faith with an old One, and where Contracts prove repugnant one to another, the first stands good, the second is a nullity.

If it be said there has been a violation of the League on the part of that Prince by his giving Assistance to an Enemy. As in the Case now before us, Spain assists Holland with whom England is at War. To this will be answered Spain assists not Holland against England, but against France. And never did any League or Treaty forbid a Prince, or can [Page 21]forbid him to assist his Friend, against his own, and his Friend's Common Enemy, for this were utterly to subvert the fundamental Principels and Maxims of all Political Pru­dence and Reason.

But Secondly, though this Accident of a new War arising with another Prince was supposed, yet many others as weighty as that may fall out wholly unforeseen, for tis not possible for humane understanding to Enumerate all future Contingencies. Perad­venture the disposition of a Prince's Affairs at home, the temper of his People, some im­portant Considerations of a private nature and not sit to be Published, may render a peace Absolutely Necessary, of which the Prince is the sole Judg. And if upon serious and mature thoughts he finds his Inducements. Real not Feigned, Weighty not Frivolous, not Levity or Inconstancy in the Case, but Necessity, and such a one as he suffers under, not sought for by him to palliate a fraud. If upon such Circumstances he Treats a Peace exclusive of his Confederate, who upon no­tice given him, refuses to be Included, espe­cially if just and honorable Conditions be [Page 22]offered him from his Enemy, the adequate End of all just Arms, and which when rejected may make a War Originally just become un­just, I say in so doeing the Faith and Honour of the Prince remain unblemish'd. Nor is it any more Imputation to him then to the Master of a Ship Bound upon a Voiage, though it requires haft, not to put out to Sea when the Wind is contrary, or to put back to Port when the Storm arises.

For no supposed Covenants, Stipulations or Conditions may be admitted to interpose betwixt the safety and welfare of a Prince or People, all such are directly contrary to the Intention of the Contractors and the End of the Contract; And are nothing but Words depraved and distorted from their genuine meaning by the Artifice of them, who would either preserve or aggrandise themselves by anothers Ruine.

And as no humane understanding can E­numerate all future Accidents, so no finite being can engage its self against all future In­vents, This is a task onely for Omniscience and Omnipotence for an infinitely extended [Page 23]Wisdom, which overtakes Futurities, and for a Power Commensurate to that Wisdom

The Honour of a Prince, which is his mo­ral Conscience, is too Nice and Delicat a thing for the ungentle touch of a private hand. And tis difficult to give a particular solution to all the Phaenomena without an ex­act knowledg of the Original Treaties, with their Relatives, Dependencies and Circum­stances, wherein the Honour of the Prince is supposed to be concernd. But this may be confidently affirm'd, if one Prince shall mea­sure the obligation of his Leagues and Trea­ties with forrain Nations by the Standard of his own Interest, and no longer abide by them then they abide that test; And in so doing justify himself by the Common Prac­tice and Usage of the most Civilised Nations in all ages, whilst the other is tied up to all the niceties & punctilios of Words heightned by an Interessed Casuist, this scrupulous Prince will be subjected to mighty disadvantages, and be fast bound when the other is lose. Now that the Practice and usage of Nations has been such is a plentiful Topic in History, and a larg Feild to expatiate in, It may suf­fice [Page 24]in this place slightly to touch some few Instances.

See Thuan. & Cambd. Ann. Henry the Fourth of France made a League offensive and defensive with Queen Eliza­beth of England and the States Gen. of the United Provinces, with Express Covenants that no one should make Peace with Spain without Consent of both the others.

The Treaty was solemnly ratified at Paris with many Vows and Protestations made by the King in the presence of the Earl of Shrews­bury the English Ambassador, and repeated in sundry Letters under his own hand to the Queen; to whom he also owed a great debt of gratitude for many signal kindnesses, and seasonable supplies of Men and Moneys. Yet afterwards finding his People tired and ex­hausted with continual Wars which had las­ted Forty Years, and having good Condi­tions offered him from Philip of Spain, he signifies to the Queen and States his disposi­tion to a Peace. And though secretary Cecil from hence, and Barnevelt from the States, were sent expresly to him to confirm him in the League, who spared not to press home [Page 25]upon him the Faith thereof, and that not without some sharp expostulations. Yet that King excused himself by the importunity of his Affairs, protesting, that his refusal of a Peace with Spain would involv him in Com­motions at home. That the Law of Nature prefer'd self preservation. That the Kingly of­fice will'd his Peoples good should be the su­preme Law. That Christian Duty: required the sparing of Christian Bloud. And so conclu­ded a seperate Treaty at Vervins and left the Queen and the States to prosecute their War against Spain.

In the Year 1635, began the open rup­ture of the Peace made at Vervins, and War was solemnly proclaimed betwixt the two Crowns of France and Spain. From which time sundry Treaties were made betwixt France and the States General for carrying on a Common War against Spain their Com­mon Enemy, with defences of the one to make a separate Treaty without comprehen­sion of the other. Yet the States Gen. awa­kened at length to discern, that the Lower the Spanish Scale was depressed, the higher that of France would be lifted; And that [Page 26]whiles they enlarged their Border upon the Spanish Netherlands, They fought themselves the nearer to France. And that as it was neces­sary for them on the one side to maintain Banks for securing their low Countries a­gainst Inundations of the Sea. so it was as needful for them on the other side to pre­serve a Spanish Barriere in Flanders, interpo­fed betwixt them and the Impetuous over­flowing torrent of a French Power. They at last embraced the Honorable and Advanta­ges Conditions tendred them, and Con­cluded a Peace with Spain. Which though France resented, and Monsieur Servient the French Plenipotentiary at Munster could tel them, That though he had but one eye, he could see that one day they would Re­pent it. Yet the States thought themselves out of Pupillage, and Capable to Judg their own Concerns in the last resort. Nor did they think it reasonable that France should be the sole Arbitrator of Peace and War, not onely for themselves, but for their Allies also. They did nod exclude France from the Peace, but France would not be Included. And they conceived the French King had no more reason to formalise against them, for [Page 27]Concluding a separate Peace, then the States had to be offended with Him, for carrying on a separate War, which, continued near twelv Years longer, down to the Treaty at the Pirenees in the Year 1659, Both had e­qual Right of Judging and of Chusing what they Judged their proper Interest And Qui jure suo utitur nemini facit Injuriam.

Frederic the third of Denmark being con­federated with the Pole and Brandenburger against Sueden under Strict defenses of en­tring into a separate Treaty without the in­clusion of the other Allies, yet the Suedish King having made that Miraculous March over the Frozen Seas into Zeland, the Dane impelled by the Necessity of his affairs, Con­cluded that memorable Treaty at Roschild, which under the Mediation of England and France, saved Denmark. And his Father Chris­tiern the fourth, had done the like in the Year 1629, when worsted by the Imperialists, af­ter he had Confederated with the Princes of Saxony Pomeren and Mecklenburgh. In both which Cases there was a force put, and a-Moral Necessity, which resolved into this, Quicquid Cogit excusat.

But what shall we say to the aforementiond Treaty at the Pirenees, where France Cove­nanted by Article to abandon Portugal and send them no more succours of Moneys, Men, Munition, &c. contrary to former Conventions with that Crown, and that up­on no Cogency of their Affairs, for they were then in a Flourishing Condition, but in exchang for several advantagious Concessions from Spain, of which when France was in Pos­session, that Article was soon superseded.

But this is nothing to my purpose, Neither am I Willing to inlarge further, because I did not design a ful Tract but onely a Brief and Modest Enquiry.