CHAP. I.

IN the preceeding Book we have treated of the Senses, and have endeavoured to explain their Nature, precisely observing what use ought to be made of them. We have discovered the chief, and most general Errors which they make us subject to, and have attempted so to limit their power, that we may expect much, and fear nothing from them, if they are always kept within these limits we have pre­scribed. In this second Book, we shall treat of the Imagination, Natural Order obliging us to it, for there being so great a Relation between the Senses and the Imagination, we ought not to separate them. It will afterwards appear, that these two Powers differ a­mongst themselves only as to more or lest.

This is the order we shall observe in this following. Treatise: It is divided into three Parts. In the first we shall explain the Physical Causes of the disorder and Errors of the Imagination. In the second, we shall make some application of these Causes to the most general Errors of the Imagination; and shall also speak of what may be call'd the Moral Causes of these Errors. In the third, we shall speak of the con­tagious Communication of strong Imaginations.

If the generality of those things that are contain'd in this Treatise, are not so New, as what has been already said in explaining the Errors of the Senses, they will not however be of less use. Thinking Per­sons are sensible enough both of the Errors, and even of the Causes of the Errors whereof I treat; but ve­ry few make a sufficient reflexion thereon. I pretend not to instruct all the World, 'tis the Ignorant I wou'd teach, and only inform others, or rather I en­deavour here both to instruct and inform my self.

We have said in the first Book, I. A gene­ral Idea of the Imagi­nation. that the Organs of our Senses were composed of little Fibres, which on one side terminate in the outward parts of the body and skin, and on the other, at the middle of the Brain. Now these little Fibres may be moved two ways, either by beginning at the ends which termi­nate in the Brain, or those that terminate in the Ex­terior parts of the body. The agitation of these Fi­bres cannot be communicated unto the Brain; but the Soul must perceive something; If this Motion be­gins by an impression that the objects make upon the extremity of the Fibres of our Nerves, is so com­municated to the Brain, then the Soul perceives and judges that what it By a Na­tural judg­ment, which I [...] be­fore judge of in many places. feels, is without, that is, it per­ceives an object as present. But if it is only the in­ward Fibres which are agitated by the course of the [...] of Spirit, or by some other way, the Soul ima­gines and judges that what it imagines is not without, but within the Brain, that is, it perceives an object as absent. This is the difference there is between Sensa­tion and Imagination.

But it is requisite to observe, that the Fibres of the Brain, are much more agitated by the impression of Objects, than by the course of the Spirits; and that, that is the reason why the Soul is made more sensible by external Objects, which it looks upon as present, and, as it were, capable of making it immediately feel either pleasure or pain, than by the course of the Ani­mal Spirits. Nevertheless, it sometimes happens in Persons who have their Animal Spirits very much agi­tated by Fasting, Watching, a high Fever, or by some violent Passion, that these Spirits move the internal Fibres of the Brain, with as much force as outward objects could do, so that these Persons perceive what they ought only to imagine, and think they see those objects before their Eyes, which are only in their Imagination. From whence it plainly appears, that in respect to what passes in the Body, the Senses and Imagination differ only as to More or Less, as I have before advanced.

But to give a more particular and distinct Idea of Imagination, we must know, that every time there happens any change in that part of the Brain where the Nerves meet, there likewise happens some change in the Soul, that is, as we have already explain'd, if in this part there is any Motion that changes the or­der of its Fibres, there also happens some New per­ception in the Soul, and it feels or imagines some New thing; and the Soul can never perceive or imagine a­ny thing anew, except there be some change in the Fibres of this same part of the Brain.

So that the faculty of Imagining, or the Imagina­tion, consists only in the power that the Soul has of forming to its self Images of objects, in producing a change in the Fibres of this part of the Brain, which may be called the principal part, since it answers to all the parts of our bodies, and is the place where our Soul immediately resides, if we may be permitted to say so.

That shews us very evidently, that this power which the Soul hath of forming Images includes two things, the one depending upon the Soul it self, and the other [Page 120]upon the Body. II. Two fa­culties in the imagi­nation, one Active, and the other Passive. The first is Action, and the Com­mand of the Will. The second is the Obedience that is given to it by the Animal Spirits, which trace these Images, and to the Fibres of the Brain, upon which they must be imprinted. In this discourse the name of Imagination is indifferently given to either of these two things, nor are they distinguished by the words Active and Passive which might be given to them; because, by the sense of what we shall speak, may easily be understood which of the two we mean, whe­ther it be of the active imagination of the Soul, or passive imagination of the Body.

We have not yet determined in particular, what that principal part is, which we have just spoke of, First, because we believe it very unnecessary. Second­ly, because we have not a certain knowledge of it. And in fine, we think it better to be silent in a matter whose truth cannot here be demonstrated to others, altho it were manifest to us what that principal part is.

Let it be then according to the opinion of Willis, that common Sense resides in those two Corpuscles he calls Corpora Striata; Let the sinuosity of the Brain preserve the Species of the Memory; and let the Cal­lous body be the seat of the Imagination; or follow­ing the Opinion of Fernellius, let us suppose it in the Pia Mater which involves the substance of the Brain, or with D'Cartes in the Glandula Pinealis; or, in fine, let it be in some other part, hitherto unknown, that our Soul exercises its principal functions, 'twill will be very indifferent to me. It suffices, that there is a principal part; Nay, it is absolutely necessary there shou'd be such an one, as also that the foundation of D'Cartes system should subsist; for it ought to be well observed, that althô he were deceived when he assures us that the Soul is immediately united to the Glandu­la Pinealis, that ought not nevertheless to injure the foundation of his System, from which we shall always gather all the usefulness that can be expected from Truth, to improve our selves in the knowledge of Man.

Since then the Imagination consists only in the power that the Soul has of forming to it self Images of Ob­jects, by imprinting them, if we may so say, III. The ge­neral cause of the Changes that happen in the Ima­gination, and the de­sign of the 2d Book. in the Fibres of its Brain; the more distinct and larger the footsteps of these Animal Spirits be, which are the traces of these Images, the more strongly and distinct­ly the Soul will imagine these Objects. Now even as breadth, depth, and clearness of the traces of any Graving, depend upon the force wherewith the Instru­ment is acted, and on the Obedience that the Copper renders to the Workman; so the depth, and clearness of the Impressions made on the Imagination depend upon the force of the Animal Spirits, and the Consti­tution of the Fibres of the Brain; 'tis the variety that is found in both these, which makes almost all this great difference that we observe in Persons Minds.

For 'tis no difficult thing to give a reason for all the different Characters which we meet with in the Mind of Man. On the one side, through Abundance and Want, Agitation and Slowness, or largeness and smalness of the Animal Spirits; and on the other side, through the Delicateness and Courseness, Humidity and Dryness, Flexibility or Inflexibility of the Fibres of the Brain; and in fine, through the relation that these Animal Spirits may have with these Fibres. And it would be very reasonable for every one, first to endeavour to represent to himself the different Combinations of these things, and to apply them to all the different Dispositions they meet with; because it is always more useful, nay, even more agreeable to make use of our own Wit, and so accustom it of it self to discover truth, then to suffer it to be spoiled with idleness, by only applying it to such things as are al­ready well known and discover'd. Besides, there are some things to be observed in the difference of Peoples Genii that are so fine and so delicate, that althô we may be able to discover and perceive them well our selves, yet we cannot represent them to, nor make o­thers sensible of them.

But to explain as much as possible, all these diffe­rences that are to be observed in Dispositions; and that very one may the more easily observe in himself the Cause of all the changes that he feels at different times, it seems very proper in general to examine the Cause of these Changes which happen in the Animal Spirits, and in the Fibres of the Brain; because there­by we shall discover all that are found in the Ima­gination.

Man never continues very long in the same Mind; every one hath sufficient inward proofs of his own inconstancy, he judges of the same Subject sometimes after one manner, and sometimes after another. In a word, the Life of Man consists only in a Circulation of Blood, and in another Circulation of Thoughts and Desires; and it seems the best way of imploying his time would be, in seeking after the Cause of these Changes which happen to us, so that way to know our selves.

CHAP. II.

'TIS agreed by every on, I. Of the Animal Spirits. that the Animal Spirits are only the most subtile and active parts of the Blood, which subtilises and agitates it self chiefly by the Fermentation that it receives in the Heart, and by the violent Motion of the Muscles, whereof this part is composed; that the Spirits are conducted with the most of the blood through the Arteries into the Brain; and that there they are separated by some parts that are destined to this use, which are not yet agreed upon.

From hence may be concluded, that where the Blood is very subtile, there are much Animal Spirits, but where it is gross there are but a sew; that if the Blood is composed of such parts as are easily received into the Heart, or very proper for Motion, the Spi­rits which are in the Brain, will be extreamly heated or agitated; and if on the contrary the Blood ferments not sufficiently in the Heart, the Animal Spirits will be languishing without action, and without strength: so that according to the solidity which shall be found in the parts of the Blood, the Animal Spirits shall be more or less solid, and consequently have more or less strength in their Motion. But these things must be explained more at length, by Examples and in­contestible Experiments, to make the truth evident.

The Authority of the Antients has not only blinded the Minds of some Men, II. That the Chyle goes to the heart and causes some change in the Spi­rits. but we may say it has shut their Eyes also. For many Persons have still such a respect for their opinion, or it may be, so opiniona­tive, that they will not see some things, which they could no longer contradict, if they would only please to open their Eyes. We may see every day Persons that are much esteemed for their Learning, who write Books and publish Conferences against the visi­ble and sensible Experiences of the Circulation of the Blood, against that of Weight, the Exastick power of the Air, and others of the like Nature. The dis­covery that Mr. Pecquet has made in our time, which we make use of here is in the Number of those that are unfortunate only, because he discover'd it before he had grey Hairs and a venerable Beard. But we shall nevertheless make use of it, not fearing but there will be some Judicious Persons who will not find fault with it.

According to this discovery the Chyle goes not im­mediately from the Bowels into the Liver by the Me­saraick Veins, as the Antients believed, but passes from the Bowels into the Lacteal Veins, and afterwards in­to certain receptacles where they meet, and from thence it goes by the Thoraick Duct or Canal along the Vertebres of the Back, and so mingles it self with [Page 124]the Blood in the Axillary Vein, which enters into the upper part of the Vena Cava; and thus being mingled with the Blood it meets in the Heart.

From this Experiment may be concluded that the Blood thas is mingled with the Chyle, being very different from the other Blood, which has already Circulated many times through the Heart, the Animal Spirits which are only the most subtile parts thereof, will be also very different, in Persons that are Fasting, and others who have just Eat. More­over, because that amongst Meats and Drinks which are generally used, there is great variety, and even those Persons that use them have bodies diversly dis­posed; two Persons that have just Dined, and at the same Table, will feel in their faculties of Imagina­tion so great a variety of changes, that it would be impossible to describe.

It is true, that those who are in perfect health di­gest so quick, that the entring of the Chyle into the Heart, scarcely augments or diminishes any of its heat, and hinders not the Blood from fermenting there almost the same manner, as if it entered only by it self; so that their Animal Spirits, and by consequence their faculty of imagining, receives very little, if any change. But for Old and infirm People, they observe in themselves very sensible changes after they have Eat, they grow very dull and sleepy, or at least their imagination becomes very Languishing, and they have neither Vivacity or quickness left; they no longer con­ceive any thing distinctly, nor can they apply them­selves to any thing whatsoever; in a word, they are perfectly altered from what they were before.

But that the most healthful and strongest may also have sensible proofs of what we have already said, III. That Wine pro­duces the same effect. they need only reflect upon what happens to them when they have drunk more Wine then they are ac­customed to, or else by observing what would be the effects if they drink Wine one Meal, and Water another. For 'tis certain, that if they are not entirely stupid, or if their bodies are not composed after a very extraordinary manner, they shall soon perceive [Page 125]a gayety of temper, some little drowsiness, or some other like accident.

Wine is so Spiritous, that it comes near the nature of our Animal Spirits; but are these a little too luxuri­ous to submit to the command of the Will, because of their Solidity and excessive Agitation. Thus even in the strongest and most vigorous Men, it produces greater changes in the Imagination, and in all the parts of the body, Vinum Lu­ctator delo­sus est. then Meat or any other Liquors do. It gives us the Foil, to speak with Plautus, and produces many effects in the Mind, which are not so advantageous as those that Horace describes in these Verses.

It would be easie enough to give a reason of the principal effects, that the mingling of the Chyle with the Blood produces in the Animal Spirits, and after­wards in the Brain, and even in the Soul it self. As why Wine rejoyces us, and gives a certain Vivacity to the Wit, when it is taken with Moderation? and for sometime besots Men, when 'tis drank to Excess? From whence proceeds the heaviness after Meals, and many other such things, for which generally very ri­diculous reasons has been given. But though we shall not here make a Book of Natural Philosophy, yet it will be necessary to give some Idea of the Ana­tomy of the Brain, or make some Suppositions as Mr. D'Cartes has done in his Treatise of Man, with­out which 'twill be impossible to explain our selves. But if one reads this Treatise of Monsieur D'Car­tes with attention, we may satisfie our selves upon these questions, because he explains all these things, or at least, gives a sufficient light to discover them, as he has done by Meditation, provided one has some Knowledge of his PRINCIPLES.

CHAP. III.

THE second general Cause of the changes which happens in the Animal Spirits, is the Air we breath; for, altho' it does immediately make as sensi­ble impressions as the Chyle, nevertheless, in some time, it produces the same effect as the Juice of our Food does presently. This Air enters from Branches of the Wind-pipe into that of the Venous Artery, and from thence it mingles it self, and ferments with the rest of the Blood in the Heart; and according to its particular disposition, and that of the Blood, it pro­duces great changes in the Animal Spirits, and by consequence, in the faculty of Imagining.

I know that there are some Persons, who do not believe that the Air mingles it self with the Blood, in the Lungs and Heart, because by their Eyes they cannot discover, in the branches of the Wind-pipe and those of the Venous Artery, the passages whereby the Air is communicated. But we must not confine the Action of the Mind to that of the Senses, it can penetrate what is impenetrable by them, and apply it self to such things which they cannot. 'Tis certain, that some parts of the Blood continually pass from the branches of the Venous Artery, into those of the Wind-pipe, as the smell and moistness of the breath sufficiently proves, and yet the passages of this com­munication are imperceptible; why, therefore, can­not the subtile parts of the Air pass from the branches of the Wind-pipe into the Venous Artery, altho' the passages of this communication are not so visible. In short, more humours are evacuated by transpira­tion, from the imperceptible Pores of the Arteries and [Page 127]Skin, than by any other passages of the Body; and even the Pores of the most solid Metals are not so small, but that there are Bodies in Nature small enough to find a free passage, for otherwise these Pores would be clos'd up. It is true, that the Gross, and branchy parts of the Air, cannot pass through the ordinary Pores of Bodies; and that even Water, altho' very gross, can glide through those passages, where this Air is sometime forced to stop. But we are not speaking here of those gross and branchy parts of the Air; they are, it seems, unuseful enough for fermentation, 'tis only of the smallest parts, such as are swift and sharp, that we speak of, and which have none, or very small branches, to stop them, be­cause they are the most proper for the fermentation of the Blood.

I might, nevertheless, affirm, upon the Relation of Silvius, that even the grossest part of the Air pass from the Wind-pipe into the Heart, since he assures us, that he hath seen it pass thither by the help of M. de Swamerdam; for it is more reasonable to believe a Man, who says he has seen it, than a thousand others, who only speak of it by chance. It is then certain, that the most subtile parts of the Air, which we breath, enters into our Heart, and with the Blood and Chyle, maintains there that fire which gives Life and Motion to our Bodies; and that, according to their different Qualities, they produce great changes in the fermentation of the Blood, and in the Animal Spirits.

The truth of this is every day made evident, by the divers Humours, and different Characters of Per­sons dispositions that are of different Countries. For Ex­ample, the Gascons have a more lively Imagination than the Normans; those of Roan, Diep, and Picardy, differ very much among themselves, and that much more from the Lower Normans, Nunquid non ultra est sapientia in Teman? Jer. c. 49. v. 7. altho' they be very near together: But if we consider Men, whose Coun­tries are at a greater distance, we shall meet with dif­ferences still more strange, as an Italian, and German, or a Dutchman. In fine, there has in all times been [Page 128]some places that have been renowned for the Wisdom of their Inhabitants, as Teman and Athens; and others for their Stupidity, as Thebes, Abdera, and some others.

CHAP. IV.

THE third Cause of those changes that happen to the Animal Spirits, is the most general and most active of all, because it is that which produces, maintains, and fortifies all the Passions. To appre­hend which well, it's necessary that we know that the fifth, sixth, and eighth pair of the Nerves, have most of their branches extended through the Breast and Belly, where they are very useful for the pre­servation of the Body, but extreamly dangerous to the Soul, because the action of these Nerves do not depend upon the Will, as those do, which serve to move the Arms, Legs, and other external parts of the Body, I. of the change of the Spirits, caus'd by the Nerves, which go to the Lungs and Heart. for they act much more upon the Soul, than that does upon them.

It must therefore be consider'd, that many branches of the eight pair of the Nerves, cast themselves amongst the chief Fibres of all the Muscles, which is [Page 129]the Heart; that they encompass its Orifices, Auricles, and Arteries; that they spread themselves even in the substance of the Lungs, and so, by their different motions, produce very considerable changes in the Blood: For the Nerves, which are dispersed through the Fibres of the Heart, cause it somerimes to extend, and then again to contract, with too much force and precipitancy, pushing, with much violence, a great quantity of Blood towards the Head, and all the ex­ternal parts of the Body; yet, sometimes, these Nerves produce an effect directly contrary. And the Nerves, which encompass the Orifices, Auricles, and Arteries of the Heart, cause very near the same effect with those Spiracles, or breathing Holes, with which the Chymists moderate the heat of their Fur­naces; and as the Spouts do, which are made use of in Fountains, to diminish or encrease the force of the stream: For the use of these Nerves is diversly to contract, or dilate the Orifices of the Heart, and so to hasten or retard the filling, and evacuation of the Blood, and thereby to augment of diminish its heat. Thus the Nerves, which are dispersed through the Lungs, have also the same use; for the Lungs are compos'd only of the branches of the Wind-pipe, of the Venous Artery, and Arterious Vein, interwoven one with another; it is visible that the Nerves, which are extended throughout the whole substance, by con­tracting of them, hinders the Air from passing with so much liberty through the branches of the Wind­pipe, and likewise impedes the motion of the Blood through the Venous Artery into the Arterious Vein, and so into the Heart. Thus these Nerves, accord­ing to their different agitation, still augment and di­minish the heat and motion of the Blood.

In all our Passions, we have very sensible Experi­ments of these different degrees of heat in our Heart. Sometimes we feel it manifestly encrease and diminish all of a sudden; and as we falsely judge that our Sen­sations are in the parts of our Bodies, and so by that means excite our Soul, as it was explained in the first Book, so almost all our Philosophers have imagined, [Page 130]that the Heart was the principal seat of the Passions of the Soul; and this is still the most commonly received Opinion.

Now, because the faculty of Imagining receives great changes by what happens to the Animal Spirits, and that the Animal Spirits differ very much, according to the different fermentation of the Blood which is made in the Heart, it is very easie to discover why passionate Persons imagine things quite after another manner, from those who consider them in cold Blood.

The other Cause, which contributes very much either to the augmenting, or diminishing these extra­ordinary fermentations of the Blood in the Heart, consists in the action of many other branches of the Nerves, which we have already spoke of.

These branches spread themselves in the Liver, II. Of the change of the Spirits caus'd by the Nerves which go to the Liver, to the Spleen, and the rest of the Bowels. which contains the most subtile part of the Blood, or what is commonly called the Bile; and in the Spleen, which contains the more gross or Melancholy; in the Pancreas, which contains an acid Juice very proper for fermentation; In the Stomach, Bowels, and other parts which contain the Chyle: And indeed, they are dispersed through every place which can contribute any thing to the varying the fermentation of the Blood in the Heart. Also, the Arteries and Veins are uni­ted to these Nerves, as Willis has discovered of the lower Trunk of the great Artery, which is ty'd to them near the Heart, of the Axillary Artery on the right side the Emulgent Vein, and of some others.

Thus the use of the Nerves, being diversly to act those parts to which they are join'd, it is easie to con­ceive how the Nerve, which environs the Liver, may, in contracting it, cause a great quantity of Bile to run into the Veins, and into the Duct of the Bile, which being mingled with the Blood in the Veins, and with the Chyle, enters into the Heart through the Duct of the Bile, and there produces a more violent heat than ordinary.

Thus, when we are mov'd with certain Passions, the Blood boils in the Arteries and Veins, and this [Page 131]heat spreads it self through the whole Body; the Head is inflamed, and filled with so great a number of Animal Spirits, which being too brisk, and too much agitated by their impetuous course, hinder the Ima­gination from representing any other things, than those whose Images they form in the Brain; that is, from thinking of any other Objects, besides those of the Passion which Rules.

It is the same of the little Nerves that go to the Spleen, or to other parts, which contain a thicker Matter, and less susceptible of Heat and Motion; it renders the Imagination altogether languishing and dull, in causing some gross Matter, and such as is difficult to be put in Motion to run into the Blood.

As for those Nerves which environ the Arteries and Veins, their use is to hinder the Blood from passing, and by contracting them, compel it to run into such places as it finds the freest passage to: So that part of the great Artery, which supplies all the parts above the Heart with Blood, being connected and com­pressed by these Nerves, the Blood must necessarily enter into the Head in great quantities, and this way produce a change in the Animal Spirits; and, by con­sequence, in the Imagination.

But it must be well observed, III. That these Judg­ments hap­pen without the concur­rence of our Will, by the order of Providence. that all this is per­formed meerly by Mechanism: I mean, that all the different Motions of these Nerves, in all the different Passions, are not produced by the Command of the Will, but, on the contrary, are made without, nay, even contrary to its Orders: So that a Body, whose Soul is not so well disposed as that of a healthful Man, shall be capable of all the Motions which ac­company our Passions. Thus even Beasts may have the like, altho' they should be only pure Machines.

And, indeed, this ought to make us admire the incomprehensible Wisdom of him, who hath so well ordered all these Springs, that it is sufficient for an Object to move the Optick Nerve after such and such a manner, to produce so many different Motions in the Heart, the other parts of the Body, and even in the Face it self; for it hath lately been discovered, that [Page 132]the same Nerve, which extends some of its branches into the Heart, and into the other interior parts; also communicates some of its branches to the Eye, to the Mouth, and to the other parts of the Face: So that it cannot raise any Passion within us, but it also appears outwardly, because there can no motion happen to the branches which go to the Heart, but it also com­municates it self to some one of those which are dis­persed through the Face.

The Correspondence and Sympathy which is found between the Nerves of the Face, and some others that answer to other parts of the Body, and which want a Name, is yet more remarkable, and that which produces this great Sympathy, is, that (as in the other Passions) the little Nerves that go to the face, are only branches of that which descends lower.

When we are surprized with any violent Passion, if we carefully reflect upon what we feel in our Bow­els, and the other parts of the Body, where these Nerves infold themselves, as also upon the changes which accompany it in the face, and if we consider that all these diverse agitations of our Nerves are wholly involuntary, and that they happen notwith­standing all the resistance our Will can make against them, we shall not find it so difficult, to suffer out, selves to be perswaded of this plain Exposition that has been made, of all those Relations the Nerves have one to another.

But if we examine the reasons and end of all these things, we shall find therein so much Order and Wis­dom, that but a little serious attention will be requi­site to convince those Persons, that are the most Wed­ded to Epicurus and Lucretius, that there is a Provi­dence which rules the World. When I see a Watch. I have reason to conclude that there is an Intelligence, since it is impossible that Chance shou'd have produc'd and dispersed all its Wheels into order. How then can it be possible, that Chance, and the meeting to­gether of Atoms, shou'd be able so justly, and propor­tionably, to dispose all those divers Springs, as appear both in Man, and other Animals? And that Man. [Page 133]and all other living Creatures, shou'd beget others, which bear such an absolute resemblance to them? So it is ridiculous to think, or say, with Lucretius, that 'tis Chance that has form'd all the parts whereof Man is composed; that the Eyes were not made to see, but Men were induced to see, because they had Eyes, and so of the other parts of the Body. These are his Words:

Must not one have a strange aversion for a Provi­dence, thus voluntarily to be blinded for fear of ac­knowledging it, and endeavour to render our selves insensible to proofs so strong and convincing, as those that Nature has furnished us with? It is true, that if once we come to affect being thought great Wits, or rather Impious, as the Epicureans have done, we shall immediately find our selves surrounded with darkness, and perceive only by false Lights, boldly deny those things that are most clear, and arrogantly and ma­gisteriously affirm what is most false and obscure.

This Poet may serve for a proof of the blindness of these mighty Wits, for he boldly determines, tho' contrary to all appearance of Truth, upon the most difficult and obscure Questions; and it seems, that he did not perceive even those Idea's that are most clear and evident. If I shou'd stay to relate some more passages of this Author, to justifie what I say, I shou'd make too long and tedious a digression; altho' it may be permitted to make such reflections, as may for a [Page 134]moment divert the Mind from more essential Truths, yet is it never permitted to make such digressions, as for a considerable time take off the Mind from giving attention to the most important Subjects, to apply it to trivial things.

CHAP. V.

WE have already explain'd the general Causes, as well external as internal, which produce any change in the Animal Spirits; and by consequence, in the faculty of Imagining, we have show'd that the external are the Food which nourishes us, and the Air we breath; and that the internal consists in the invo­luntary agitation of certain Nerves. We know of no other general Causes, and even dare affirm there are none. So that the faculty of Imagining depending, in respect to the Body, only upon these two things, the Animal Spirits, and the disposition of the Brain upon which they act, there remains nothing more, in order to the giving a perfect knowledge of the Ima­gination, but only to shew the different changes that can happen in the substance of the Brain.

We will examine them, after we have given some Idea of the Memory, and of Habits; that is, of the faculty that we have of thinking of those things that we have before thought of, and of acting things over again which we have already done. Order requires this Method.

For the Explanation of the Memory, I. Of the Memory. 'tis necessary to remember what has already been repeated so ma­ny times; that all our different Perceptions depend upon the changes that happen to those Fibres that are in that part of the Brain in which the Soul more particularly resides.

This only supposed, the nature of the Memory is explained; for even as the Branches of a Tree, which have continued sometime bent in a certain form, still preserve an aptitude to be bent anew after the same manner: So the Fibres of the Brain, having once re­ceived certain impressions by the course of the Animal Spirits, and by the action of Objects, along time re­tain some facility to receive these same dispositions. Now the Memory consists only in this facility, since we think on the same things, when the Brain receives the same impressions.

As the Animal Spirits act sometimes with more, and sometimes with less force, upon the substance of the Brain, and that sensible Objects make a much greater impression than the Imagination alone, it is easie, from thence, to discover why we do not equally remember all things we perceive. For example, why what one often perceives, is commonly represented more lively to the Soul, than what one perceives but once or twice; why we remember more distinctly what we have seen, than what we have only ima­gined; and so likewise, why one shou'd know better how the Veins are dispersed through the Liver, after having but once seen a dissection of this part, than af­ter having many times read in a Book of Anatomy, and other like things.

But if we shou'd reflect upon what hath been be­fore said of the Imagination, and the short discourse made on the Memory, supposing us once delivered from this prejudice, that our Brain is too small to preserve a very great number of traces and impres­sions, we shall have the pleasure to discover the cause of all these surprizing effects of the Memory, whereof St. Austine speaks with so much admiration in his tenth Book of Confessions. We shall not explain these things more fully, because 'twill be more proper for every one to examine them himself with some ap­plication of Mind, because such things as we discover by this Method, are always more agreeable, and make a deeper impression on us, than what we learn from others.

In order to explain Habits, II Of the Habits. it is necessary to know the manner how we believe the Soul moves those parts of the Bodies to which it is united.

According to all appearance, there is always in certain places of the Brain, be they where they will, a great number of Animal Spirits, much agitated by the heat of the Heart from whence they come, and are ready to run into those places into which they find free passage. All the Nerves end in the receptacle of these Spirits, and the Soul hath the I explain elsewhere in what this power con­sists. power of deter­mining their Motion, and conducting them by these Nerves into all the Muscles of the Body; these Spi­ri [...]s being entered there, they swell them up, and by consequence contract them. Thus they move those parts to which the Muscles are united.

We shall not find it so difficult to be perswaded, that the Soul moves the Body after the same manner already explained, if we observe, that when we have been a long time without Eating, and are willing to give certain motions to our Bodies, we cannot essect it, and even feel it very troublesome to stand upon our feet. But if we find the means to make any thing, that is very spiritous, run into our Heart, as Wine, or some other like Nourishment, we are loon sensible that the body obeys with much more facility, and moves it self after what manner we desire: For this Ex­periment alone makes it seem very plain to me, That the Soul could not give Motion to the Body through the defect of Animal Spirits, and that 'tis by their means that it hath recovered its Empire over it.

Now the infiations of the Muscles are so visible, and so sensible, in the agitation of our Arms, and all the parts of our Body, and it is so reasonable to be­lieve that these Muscles cannot be blown up, but be­cause some body enters into them, even as a Foot-ball cannot grow big and turgid, except by the Admission of Air, or some such like thing: It seems, I say, that there can remain no doubt, but that the Animal Spi­rits are pushed from the Brain, through the Nerves into the Muscles, to blow them up, and to produce there all the Motions that we can wish; for a Muscle [Page 137]being full it is necessarily shorter then if it was empty, so it draws and moves the part to which it is united, as we may see more at large in D'Cartes Book of the Passions. We don't give this Explanation as perfectly demonstrated in all its parts: For to make it entirely evident, there are still many things to be wish'd, which 'tis almost impossible to explain. But it is also useful enough in our subject to know them; for whether this Explanation be true or false, it remains however equally useful to discover the Nature of Habits: Be­cause if the Soul does not move the Body after this manner, it necessarily moves it some other way which is very like it, from whence we may draw such con­sequences as we shall make use of.

But in order to the pursuing our Explanation, it must be observed, that the Spirits do not always find the ways so open and free by which they should pass, and that makes us, for example, sometimes have so much difficulty in the moving our Fingers so quick as is necessary for the playing upon Msiucal Instruments, or the Muscles that serve for pronounciation, to pro­nounce the word of a strange tongue. But by little and little the Animal Spirits by their continual course open and clear these passages, so that in time one finds no longer resistance. Now Habits consist in this facility, that the Animal Spirits have to pass through the Members of our Bodies.

It is very casie, according to this Explanation, to resolve an infinite Number of questions which respect Habits: As for Example, why Children are more capable of acquiring new Habits then older Persons are? Why it is so difficult to break our selves of long habits? Why Men by much speaking have acquired so great a facility to it, that they pronounce their words with an incredible swiftness, and even without thinking thereof. As it too often happens to those that say the Prayers which they have been accustomed to many years, and yet to pronounce one word only, many Muscles must move together, in a certain time, and order, as those of the Tongue, the Lips, Throat, and Diaphragme. But one cannot with a little Me­ditation [Page 138]satisfie ones self about these questions and many others very curious and useful, but it is not necessary to insist upon these things here.

It is visible from what has been said, that there is much relation between the Memory and Habits, and that in one sense the Memory may pass for a kind of Habit. For even as Corporeal Habits consist in the facility that the Spirits have acquired to pass through certain places of our Bodies, so the Memory consists in the traces that the same Spirits have impressed on the Brain which are the causes of the facility we have in recalling things again to our Mind: That if there were no perceptions that depended upon the Course of the Animal Spirits, nor on these traces, there would be no difference between the Memory, and the other Habits. It is not also more difficult to conceive that Beasts, although without a Soul and incapable of any perception, after their manner remember such things as have made an impression in their Brain, then to conceive they are capable of acquiring different Ha­bits; See the Ex­planations upon Memo­ry and Spi­ritual H [...] ­bits. And after what I have said of Habits, I don't see much more difficulty in representing to our selves how the Members of their Bodies may by degrees ac­quire different Habits, then in conceiving how a Ma­chine first made is not so fitly disposed for Action, as after it has been used for some time.

CHAP. VI.

ALL the Parts of Living Bodies are in continual Motion, both the Solid and Fluid parts, the Flesh as well as the Blood; there is only this difference between their Motions, that that of the parts of the Blood is visible and sensible, and that of the Fibres of our Flesh is wholly imperceptible. There is then this difference between the Animal Spirits, and the sub­stance of the Brain, that the Animal Spirits are very much agitated, and very fluid, and the substance of the Brain hath some Solidity and Consistence; so that the Spirits divide themselves into little parts, and in a few hours are dissipated by transpiration through the Pores of those Vessels that contain them, and it very often happens that others succeed which do not perfectly resemble them; but the Fibres of the Brain are not so easily dissipated, there does not often hap­pen any considerable Change in them, and their whole substance cannot be changed but after many years.

The most considerable differences that are found in a Man's Brain, during the whole Course of his Life, are in Infancy, at his full Strength, and in Old Age.

The Fibres of the Brain in Children are soft, flexi­ble, and delicate, in perfect Age they become more dry, hard, and strong; but in Old Age, they become wholly inflexible, gross, and sometimes mingled with superfluous humours, that the feeble heat of this Age cannot be any longer dissipated. For as we see the Fibres which compose the Flesh harden in time, and that the [Page 140]Flesh of a young Partridge is without dispute more tender than that of an old one, so the Fibres of the Brain of a Child or Youth, will be much more soft and delicate, than those of Persons that are more ad­vanced in years.

We shall soon see the reason of these Changes, if we but consider how these Fibres are continually agi­tated by the Animal Spirits which run round about them in many different ways. For as the Wind drys the Earth by blowing upon it, so the Animal Spirits, through their continual agitation, by little and little render the greatest part of the Fibres of Man's Brain more dry, compressed, and solid; so that Persons a little advanced in Years will almost always have them more inflexible, then those that are Younger. And for those that are of the same Age, as Drunkards who for many years have used Wine to Excess, or such Liquors as have been able to stupifie them, will also have them more solid and more inflexible then such as are deprived of those Drinks during their whole Lives.

Now the different Constitutions of the Brain in Children, Men at full growth, and old Men, are very considerable Causes of the difference that is observed in their faculty of Imagining, of which we shall af­terwards speak.

CHAP. VII.

IT is sufficiently evident to me, that we incline to all things, and that we have a Natural relation to every thing about us that is most useful for the Pre­servation and conveniency of Life. But these relati­ons are not equal; we are more inclined to France than to China, to the Sun, than to any Star, and to our own House more than to our Neighbours. There are invsible ties which unite us more strictly to Men than to Beasts; to our Relations and Friends than to Strangers; to those we depend upon for the preser­vation of our Lives, than such from whom we neither fear nor hope any thing.

What is chiefly to be observed in this Natural U­nion which is between us and other Men is, that 'tis so much the greater as we have more need of them. Relations and Friends are strictly United one to ano­ther, we may say their Griefs and Miseries are Com­mon, as well as their Joys and Happiness; for all the Passions and Sensations of our Friends are com­municated to us by the impression of their aspect and air of their Face. Yet because we cannot absolutely live without them, there is also another stricter Uni­on then that Natural and Mutual one which is be­twixt us and them.

Children in their Mothers Bellies, I. Of the Communi­cation which is be­tween the Brain of a Mother and that of a Child. whose Bodies are not yet entirely formed, who are of themselves in as weak and helpless a condition as can be con­ceived, must also be united with their Mothers in the stricktest manner that can be imagined. And alth [...] their Souls are separated from their Mothers, yet their Bodies being linked together, we must think they have the same Sensations and Passions; and in­deed the same thoughts which are excited in the Soul by the motions that are produced in the Body.

Thus Infants see what their Mothers see, they hear the same Crys, receive the same impressions of Ob­jects, and are agitated with the same Passions. For since the air of a passionate Mans face, penetrates those who look upon him, and naturally imprints in them a passion like that which agitates him, although the Union of the Man with those that consider him is not so great; it seems reasonable to me to think that Mothers are capable of impressing upon their Chil­dren all the same Sensations they are affected with, and all the same passions by which they are agitated. For the body of an Infant makes but one with that of the Mothers, the Blood and Spirits are common to both, and Sensations and Passions are the Natural Consequence of the Motion of the Spirits and Blood, which Motions necessarily Communicate themselves from the Mother to the Child. Therefore the passi­ons sensations, and generally all the thoughts which proceed from the body, are common both to the Mother and Child.

These things appear unquestionable for many rea­sons, and I advance them only here as a supposition agreeable to my thoughts, but shall sufficiently de­monstrate them hereafter: For whatsoever hypothe­sis can resolve all difficulties that can be brought a­gainst it, ought to pass for an unquestionable prin­ciple.

The invisible bonds, by which the Author of Nature unites all these Works, are worthy the Wisdom of God, and admiration of Men, there is nothing that's both more surprizing and instructive together; but we [Page 143]think not of it; we suffer our selves to be conducted without considering who it is that conducts us. Na­ture is hidden from us as well as its Author, and we feel the Motions which she produces in us, without considering the Causes of 'em; yet are there few things more necessary to be known, for 'tis upon their knowledge that the Explanation of whatsoever be­longs to Man depends.

There are certainly springs in our Brain which Na­turally incline us to Imitation, II. Of the Communi­cation there is between our Brain and the other parts of our bodies which in­clines us to Imitation and Com­passion. for it is very necessary to Civil Society. It is not only requisite that Chil­dren should believe their Fathers, Disciples their Masters, and Inferiors those which are above them, for all Men must have some disposition to take the same manners, and to do the same actions with those they live with. To unite Men together there must be a resemblance both of Body and Mind; this is the principle of an infinite Number of things that we shall afterwards treat of, but for what we shall speak of in this Chapter, it is necessary that we know there is Natural dispositions in the Brain which incline us to Compassion as well as Imitation.

We must then consider, that not only the Animal Spirits carry themselves Naturally into the parts of our Bodies, to cause the same Actions and Motions we see in others, but also in some manner to receive their Injuries, and to take part in their Miseries; for Experience teaches us, that when we very attentively consider any one that is rudely hurt, or that hath any great wound, the Spirits are carried with great force into such parts of our Bodies as answer to those that we see hurt in another: Provided that we do not turn the course of the Animal Spirits otherways, by an industrious and voluntary titillation of some other part of the body: Or except their Natural course to the Heart and Bowels, which is wont to happen in sudden Motions, draw them along with it self, or change that course which we speak of: Or lastly, ex­cept some extraordinary connection with the tra [...]s of the Brain, and Motions of the Spirits produce the same effect.

The Spirits being thus carried into the parts of the Body which answer to those that we see hurt in o­others, make a very sensible Impression in delicate Persons who have a lively Imagination, and very ten­der and soft flesh; for they very often feel a kind of trembling in their Legs, if they attentively look upon any one that hath an Ulcer, or that has actually re­ceived some blow there. This that one of my Friends writ me an account of, confirms my Opinion. An Old Man that lived at one of my Siste [...]s being sick, a young Maid Servant of the House held the Candle whilst he was let blood in the Fo [...]t, and when she saw the Sur­geon give the prick with the Lancet, she was seized with such an apprehension, that she felt so lively a pain in the same place of the Foot for three or four days afterwards, that she was forced to keep her Bed all that time. The reason of these accidents is, that the Spirits forcibly diffusing themselves into those parts of our body, which answer to what we see hurt in others, being kept more bent they make the Soul more sensible, and put it upon its guard, to avoid those evils that it sees happen to others.

This Compassion in the Body, produces one in the Mind, it excites us to help and assist others, because in that we relieve our selves; and it also stops our Malice and Cruelty; for the horrour of Blood, the fear of Death, and in a word, the sensible impressi­on of Compassion, often hinders those from killing of Beasts, who even are much perswaded that they are only Machines, because the generality of Mankind cannot kill them without hurting themselves by the counterstroke of Compassion.

What is chiefly to be observed here, is, that the sen­sible sight of a wound that any Person receives, pro­duces in those that see it another hurt, so much the more sensible as the beholder is more weak and deli­cate; because this sensible sight pushes the Animal Spi­rits with more violence into those parts of the body which answer to what they see hurt, and so make a greater Impression in the Fibres of a delicate body, than in one that is more strong and robust.

So Men, who are strong and vigorous, are not hurt by the sight of a Murder, they are not so much in­clined to Compassion, because this sight offends their Bodies, but because it offends their Reason. These Per­sons have no pity for Criminals, they are immoveabie and inexorable. But Women and Children suffer much Pain by the Wounds they see others receive; they have a Mecanical Compassion for the Miserable; Nay, they cannot see a Dog beat, or hear him cry, with­out being disturbed at it.

As for Infants who are yet in their Mothers Belly; the delicacy of the Fibres of their Flesh, being infi­nitely greater than that of Women or Children, the Course of the Spirits will produce more considerable changes in them, as we shall afterwards observe.

Let what I have said be look'd upon as a simple Supposition, if it is desired; yet we must endeavour to comprehend it well, if we will distinctly conceive what I would explain in this Chapter. For the two Suppositions that I have made are the principles of an infinite Number of things, which have been gene­rally believed very hidden and mysterious, and which appear impossible to me to be explained, without re­ceiving these Suppositions: Of which here are some Examples.

About Seven or Eight years ago I saw in the An Hospi­tal in France for such as we past Cure. III. An Ex­planation of the genera­tion of M [...]n­strous Chil­dren, and of the pr [...] ­pag [...]tion of the Species. In­curables a young Man who was born a Fool, and his body broken after the same manner as Criminals are broke on the Wheel. He had lived near twenty Years in this condition, many Persons have seen him, and the late Queen-Mother going to visit this Hospi­tal had the Curiosity to see him, and to touch the Arms and Legs of this young Man in the same places where they were broke.

According to the principles that I have esta­blished, the Cause of this sad Accident was, that his Mother, who heard a Criminal was to be broken, went to see him executed; all the blows that this miserable Man received, so strongly smote the Imagination of this Mother, and by a kind of Counter-blow the render delicate Brain of her According to the first Supposition. [Page 146]Child. The Fibres of this Womans Brain were strangely shaken, and it may be broke in some places by the impetuous Course of the Animal Spirits, caused by the sight of so terrible an Action, but she was strong enough to hinder their absolute ruine; though on the contrary, the Fibres of this Child's Brain, being not able to resist the torrent of these Spirits, were entirely dissipated, and the shock was great enough to make him wholly lose his Wits; and this was the reason he came into the World deprived of his Understanding, this was likewise the cause that the same parts of his body was broken as those of the Criminal, whom his Mother saw executed.

At the sight of this Execution, which was so capa­ble of frighting a Woman, the violent course of the Mothers Animal Spirits, went impetuously from her Brain to all the parts of her Body, which answer'd to those of the Criminal, According to the second Supposition. and the same thing passed in the Infant. But because the Bones of the Mother were able to resist the Violence of these Spirits, they received no hurt; Nay, it may be, she did feel no pain, nor the least trembling in her Legs, when the Crimi­nal was broken; but the rapid stream of the Spirits was capable to separate the soft and tender Bones of the Infant, for the Bones are the last parts of the Body that are formed, and they have very little consistence in Infants, while they are in the Womb: And it must be observed, that if this Mother had determined the Motion of these Spirits to any other part of her Body by some violent titilation, her Child would not have had his Bones broken, but that part which had answer'd to that to which the Mother determined these Spirits, had been much hurt, as I have already said.

The Reasons of this accident may serve to explain in general how Women, who during their being with Child, upon seeing Persons with certain Marks in their Faces, imprint the same on their Children, and in the same part of the Body. And from thence we may judge that advice very reasonable, which bids 'em touch some hidden part of the Body, when they perceive any thing which surprizes 'em, and when [Page 147]they are agitated with any violent Passion, for that may cause the Marks to be traced rather upon these hidden parts, than upon the Face of their Infants.

We should often have instances like to what I have now related, if Infants could live after having re­ceived such great Wounds, but generally it causes Abortions. For we may conclude, that almost all Infants who dye before they are born, except they be sick, have no other cause of their Death than a fright, some ardent desire, or some other violent passion of their Mothers. Here is also another very particular instance.

'Tis not above a Year since, that a Woman having with too much application consider'd the Picture of Saint Pius (when the Feast of his Canonization was celebrated,) was brought to bed of a Child which was perfectly like the Representation of this Saint. He had the Face of an Old Man, as much as it was possible in an Infant that has no Beard, his Arms were crossed upon his Breast, his Eyes turned towards Hea­ven, and he had a very low Forehead, because the Image of this Saint being raised towards the Vault of the Church, and looking towards Heaven, had al­most no Forehead likewise. He had a kind of a con­fused Miter upon his Shoulders, with many round marks in the places where Miters are covered with Stones: And indeed this Child very much resembled the Picture by which his Mother had formed him through the power of her Imagination. 'Tis a thing that all Paris might have seen as well as I, because 'twas a long time preserved in Spirits of Wine.

This instance is the more particular, because there was not the sight of a Man living, and agitated with some passion, who moved the Spirits and Blood of the Mother to produce so strange an effect, but only the sight of a Picture; which yet was very sensible and accompanied with a great emotion of Spirits, caused either through the Zeal and application of the Mo­ther, or through the agitation that the noise of the Feast had produc'd in her.

This Mother therefore looking upon this Picture with some application and emotion of Spirits, the Child, according to the first supposition, saw it as she did with the same application and emotion of Spirits. The Mother being lively affected imitated him at leaft in the Posture, according to the second Supposi­tion, for her body being entirely formed, and the Fi­bres of her Flesh hard enough to resist the course of the Spirits, she could not imitate or make her self like to him in all things; but the Fibres of the In­fant's Flesh being extreamly soft, and consequently susceptible of all sorts of impressions, the violent course of the Spirits, produced in his Flesh whatsoe­ver was necessary to make him entirely like the Image that he saw, and the imitation to which Children are much more disposed, perfected it as much as possible; but this imitation having given to the body of this Child a figure so very extraordinary, it was also the cause of its Death.

There are many other Examples in Authors, of the power of the Imagination of Mothers, and there is no­thing so fantastical but has caused Abortions some­times. For they not only make Children deformed, but also marked with such Fruits as they have longed for, as Plumbs, Pears, Grapes, and such like things. For instance. some Mothers having a strong Inclina­tion to eat Pears, the Children imagine and desire them with the same ardour, and the course of the Spirits excited by the image of this desired fruit, disposing it self through the little body, is able to change its sigure, because of its sostness: So that these poor Children become like those things they wish'd for with so much ardour. But the Mothers suffer no In­jury, because their bodies are not soft enough to take the figure of such things as they imagine: Thus they cannot imitate them, or render themselves entirely like 'em.

Now, it must not be imagined that this Correspon­dence that I have explained, and which is sometimes the cause of such great disorder, is useless or ill or­dered by Nature; for on the contrary, it seems very [Page 149]useful in the Propagation of Humane Bodies, or in the formation of the Foetus; and it is absolutely ne­cessary to the transmitting certain dispositions of the Brain, which ought to be different, at different times, and in different Countrys. For instance, it is requi­site in some Countrys that Lambs should have their Brains to disposed as to fly at the sight of a Wolf, be­cause there are many of 'em there, and they have a great deal to fear from them.

'Tis true, that this Communication of the Mothers Brain with her Infants, has sometimes ill consequences, when the Mothers suffer themselves to be surprized by any violent passion. Yet it seems to me, that without this Communication Women and Animals could not easily beget young ones of the same kind; for although some reason might be given of the for­mation of the Foetus in general, as D'Cartes has hap­pily enough attempted: However 'tis very difficult, without this Communication of the Mothers Brain with the Childs, to explain how a Mare should not beget an Ox, or an Hen lay an Egg which contains a little Partridge, or some Foul of a new kind; I be­lieve those that have considered the sormation of the Foetus, will be of this opinion.

The most reasonable thought, and that which is most conformable to experience about this difficule question of the formation of the Foetus, is, that Chil­dren are perfectly formed, even before the action by which they are conceived, and that their Mothers only contribute to their growth whilst they continue in the Womb. However, this Communication of Animal Spirits, and of the Mothers Brain with the Spirits and Brain of the Child, seems still serviceable to regulate this growth, and determine the parts which serve for its Nourishment, and by little and little to dispose the Child like the Mother, or else like some of the same Species. This appears plain enough by the accidents which happen when the Imagination of the Mother is disordered, and the Natural Disposition of her Brain is changed by some violent passion, for then, as we have already explain'd, this communication charges [Page 150]the conformation of the body of the Child, and the Mother is so much the more apt to miscarry of the the Foetus, as it has more resemblance to the desired Fruits, and as the Spirits find less resistance in the Fi­bres of the Infants body.

Now it cannot be deny'd, but that God, without this Communication, was able to have disposed all things in so exact and regular a manner, as would have been necesary for the Propagation of the Species for insinite Ages, that Mothers should never have Miscar­ried, and even that they should always have had Children of the same bigness, of the same Colour, and that would have resembled in all things: For we must not measure the power of God by our weak Ima­gination, and we know not the Reasons he had in the construction of his work.

We see every day that without the help of this Communication, Plants and Trees produce their kinds regularly enough, and that Fowls and many other Animals have no need of it to cherish and bring forth other Animals, when they sit upon Eggs of different kinds as when a Hen sits on a Partridges Eggs. For although we may reasonably conclude that the Seeds and Eggs contain in themselves the Plants and Birds which proceeds from 'em; and that they may produce the little bodies of these Birds, having received their Conformation by the Communication we have spoke of, and the Plants theirs by another Equivocal Com­munication, yet we cannot be certain of it. But al­though we cannot discover the reasons why God has made every thing as it is, we must not conclude from thence, that he could make 'em no otherwise.

If we consider further, that Plants who receive their growth by the action of the Female Plant, re­semble her much more than those which come from the seed, as Tuleps for instance, which come from the Root, are of the same Colour as the Tulep it self, and yet those that proceed from the Seed thereof, are almost very different, we cannot doubt, that if the Communication of the Female Plant with the Fruit, is not absolutely necessary to form the same kind, yet it [Page 151]is always requisite to make the Fruit intirely like her.

So that although God foresaw that this Commu­nication of the Mothers Brain with that of the Infants, would sometimes destroy the Foetus, and pro­duce Monsters, because of the Irregularity of the Mo­thers imagination; yet this Communication is so ad­mirable, and so necessary, for the Reasons before­mentioned, and for many others that I could yet add, that this knowledge, that God had of these inconvencies, ought not to have hindred him from executing his design. We may say in one sense, that God never had a design to make Monsters, for it appears evident to me, that if God should create one Animal only, it would not be Monstrous. But designing to produce an admirable work by the most simple ways, and unite all these Creatures one to another, he foresaw certain effects that would necessarily follow from the Order and Nature of things, and this hath not diverted him from his design: For, although a Monster, simply considered, be an imperfect work, yet when it is joyn'd with the rest of the creatures, it does not render the World imperfect.

We have sufficiently explain'd what power the Ima­gination of a Mother has over the body of her Child, let us now examine the power it hath over its Mind, and that way discover the first Irregularities of the Mind and Will of Men in his Original: For this is our chief design.

It is evident that the traces of the Brain are accom­panied with Sentiments and Ideas of the Soul, IV. An Ex­planation of some irregu­larities of the Mind, and of the inclinations of the Will. and that the emotion of the Animal Spirits have no effect in the Body, but what the Motions in the Soul answer to; and in a word, it is certain that all the Sensations and Passions of the Body are accompany'd with true Sentiments and Passions in the Soul. Now according to our first supposition, Mothers first communicate the traces of their Brain to their Children, and afterwards the Motions of their Animal Spirits, and so produce the same passion in the mind of their Children, with which they themselves are affected, and by conse­quence [Page 152]they cortupt both their affections and reason in several respects.

If so many Children are observed to bear upon their Faces the Marks and Traces of the Idea that affected their Mother, although the Fibres of the skin make much more resistance against the course of the Spirits than the soft parts of the Brain, and thô the Spirits are much more agitated in the Brain than to­wards the Skin; we cannot reasonably doubt but that the Animal Spirits of the Mother produce in the Brain of the Infant many traces by their irregular emo­tions. Now the great traces of the Brain, and the emotion of the Spirits which answer to them, conti­nuing a long time, and sometimes all the life; it is certain, that as there are few Women who have not some weaknesses, and who have not been moved with some Passion during their being with Child, it cannot be expected but that there will be very few Children, who are not ill inclined to something, and who have not some predominant passion.

We have only too much experience of these things, and all the World is sensible that there are whole Fa­milies who are afflicted with great weakness of Ima­gination, which they have drawn from their Parents; but it is not necessary here to give any particular Examples thereof. On the contrary, 'tis more proper for the consolation of some Persons to assure 'em, that those weaknesses of the Parents not being Natural, or proper to the Nature of Man, the traces and impressi­ons of the Brain, which are the cause of them, may be effaced by time.

We may yet add here the Example of King James I. of England, of whom Sir Kenelm Digby speaks in his Book which he writ of the Sympathetic Powder. He tells us, that Mary Stuart being with Child of King James, some Scotch Lords entred her Chamber, and in her presence killed her Secretary, who was an Ita­lian, altho' she cast her self before him to hinder them, that this Princess received some slight hurts by them, and the frights she had, made so great an im­pression in her Imagination, that she communicated it [Page 153]to the Child in her Womb: So that King James cou'd never endure to see a Naked Sword. He says that he himself was a witness of it, for when he was Knighted, this Prince coming to lay the Sword upon his Shoulder run it strait at his Face, and had woun­ded him, if some body had not directed it aright where it ought to be. There are so many instances of the like Nature, that 'twould be needless to search Authors for them. I believe there is no body that will dispute these things; for we see a great number of Persons that can't suffer the fight of a Rat, of a Mouse, a Cat, a Frog, and particularly creeping Ani­mals, as Serpents, and Adders; who know no other cause of these extraordinary aversions, but the fear their Mothers had of these several Animals whilst they were with Child of them.

But what I chiefly desire should be observed, is, An Expla­nation of Concupi­scence and of Original Sin. that there is all possible probabilities, that Men re­tain in their Brain to this day the traces and impressi­ons of our first Parents. For as Animals produce their own likeness, and with the like traces in their Brain, which is the cause that Animals of the same Species, have the same Sympathies and Antipathies, and that they perform the same actions in the same occurrences. Thus our first Parents, after their Sin, received such great impressions, and profound traces of sensible things in their Brain as they might very well communicate to their Children; so that this great propensity we have from the Womb to all sensible things, and the great distance from God we are in, by our present state, may in some manner be explained by what has been said.

For as it is necessary, according to the established order of Nature, that the thoughts of the Soul should be conformable to the traces that are in the Brain. We may say, that as soon as we are formed in the Womb, we are polluted with Sin, and infected with the Cor­ruption of our Parents, since from that time we are strongly inclined to the pleasures of our Senses; having in our Brain traces resembling those of the Persons who hath given us being, it is necessary also, that we [Page 154]shou'd have the same thoughts, and the same inclina­tions which have any relation to sensible objects. Rom. ch. 6.5.12, 14. &c

Thus it is impossible but that we should be born with Concupiscence, and Original Sin. We must be born with Concupiscence, if Concupiscence is only the Natural effort that the traces of the Brain make upon the Mind to engage it to sensible things; and we must be born in Original Sin, if Original Sin is nothing else but the Dominion of Concupiscence, and that these efforts become Victorious and Masters over the Mind and Heart of the Child. Now it is very probable, that the dominion or victory of Concupiscence, is what we call Original Sin in Children, and actual in Men.

Objections and An∣swers. This difficulty seems only to recur, that contrary to Experience we might conclude from the principles I have established, that the Mother would always communicate to her Child Habits and Inclinations re­sembling her own, and a facility of imagining and learning the same things as she knows; for all these things depend, as has been already said, only upon the traces and impressions of the Brain; and it is certain that the impressions and traces of the Mothers Brain are communicated to the Child. This has been proved by the Examples that has been brought con­cerning Men, and is also confirmed by the Example of Animals, whose young ones have their Brains filled with the same impressions, which is the reason that all those that are of the same kind have the same Voice, the same manner of moving their Members, and also the same craft to take their Prey, and de­fend themselves from their Enemies: Therefore it must from thence follow, that since all the traces of the Mothers Brain are imprinted in that of the Childs, that the Children must be born with the same Habits, and all the other qualities that the Mothers are pos­sessed of; and even commonly so to preserve them all their Lives, since the Habits they have from their Infancy, are those that are the longest kept; which nevertheless is contrary to experience.

To answer this Objection, it is requisite it should be known that there are two sorts of traces in the [Page 155]Brain; the one Natural, or proper to the Nature of Man, the other acquired. The Natural are very deep and it is impossible to esface them perfectly, but on the contrary the acquired may be easily lost, because commonly they are not deep; Now although the Na­tural and acquired differ only as to the More or Less, and that often the first have less force than the second, since we every day accustom Animals to do things per­fectly contrary to what they are inclined by these Natural traces (for Example, we use a Dog not to touch Bread, nor to run after a Partridge, although he sees and smells it.) Yet there i [...] this difference between these traces, that the Natural ones have, if we may so say, secret alliances with the other parts of the body; thus all the Springs of our Machines assist one the other to preserve them­selves in their Natural state. All the parts of our bodies mutually contribute to all necessary things for the preservation, or re-establishment of these Natural traces. Thus we cannot wholly efface them, and they begin to revive when we believe we have destroyed them.

On the contrary, the acquired Traces, although greater, more profound, and stronger than the Natu­ral, are lost by little and little, if they are not care­fully preserved by a continual application of those things that produced them, because the other parts of the body contribute nothing to their preservation, but on the contrary continually endeavour to efface and loose them. We may compare these traces to the common Wounds of the body, they are wounds that our Brains receive which heal of themselves, as these wounds of the body do, by the admirable constru­ction of the Machine.

As then there is nothing in all the body which is not conformable to the Natural traces, they transmit themselves into Children with all their force: So Parrots hatch little ones, which have the same or Natural voices with themselves: but be­cause acquired traces are only in the Brain, and not dispersed through the rest of the body, except [Page 156]some few of 'em, as when they have been imprinted by the Motions that accompany violent Passions, they must not be transmitted into Children. Thus a Par­rot who gives the good Morrow, and good Night to his Master, will not make his little ones as Learned as himself; and so Wise and able Persons will not have Children which resemble them.

Thus although it be true, that all which passes in the Mothers Brain, passes also in the same time into that of the Child, and that the Mother can see nothing, feel nothing, imagine nothing, that the Child does not likewise see, feel, and imagine, and that a [...] the false traces of the Mother corrupt the Imagination of the Child: Yet those traces not being Natural in the sense before explained, it must not be wonder'd at, if they are commonly effaced as soon as the Child is born; for then the cause that formed and maintained these traces, no longer subsists, the Natural Consti­tution of the [...]world [...] contributes to their destruction; and sensible [...] in their room others that are new, deeper, [...] greater Number, which efface, almost all those that [...] had whilst in the Womb. For since it every day [...] that a great pain causes us to forget those that [...], it is not possible but that such lively [...] Children receive the first time the impression of [...] is made upon the delicate organs of their [...] efface the greatest part of the traces that they ha [...] received from the same objects, only by a kind of [...] stroke, when they were, as it were, covered in their Mothers' Womb.

Yet when these traces are formed by a strong pas­sion, and accompanied with a violent agitation of the Blood and Spirits in the Mother, they act with so much force on the Child's Brain, and on the rest of its body, that they imprint there Traces as deep and lasting as Natural ones: As in the Example of Sir Kenelm Digby, in the Child that became a Fool, and all broken in the Brain, and all the Members in which the Imagination of the Mother had produced such great disorders, and likewise in the example of the general corruption of Man's Fature.

Nor is it to be wondered, if the Children of King James had not the same weakness as their Father; First, because these sort of Traces are never imprint­ed so far into the rest of the Body as the Natural ones are: Secondly, because the Mother not having the same weakness with the Father, she hinder'd its hap­pening through the goodness of her Constitution, and because the Mother acts insinitely more upon the Brain than the Father does, as is evident by what has been already said.

But it must be observed, that all these reasons, which prove that the Children of King James cou'd not participate of the weakness of their Father, prove nothing against the Explanation of Original Sin, or this powerful Inclination for Sensible Things, nor this great distance from God, which we hold from our first Parents; because the Traces, that sensible Objects have imprinted in the Brain of the first Man, were very deep, and were accompanied and augmented with violent Passions, and fortified by the continual use of sensible Things, and such as were necessary to the preservation of life, not only in Adam and Eve, but also, which must be well observed, in the greatest Saints, in all Men and all Women from whom we descend, so that there is nothing which can put a stop to this corruption of Nature. So far are these Tra­ces of our first Fathers, from being effaced by little and little, that, on the contrary, they are augmented daily, and without the Grace of JESƲS CHRIST, which continually opposes this torrent, what this Hea­then Poet has said, wou'd be absolutely true.

For it must be well observed, that those impressions that stir up Sentiments of Piety in the most Devout Mothers, do not communicare it to their unborn In­fants; and that, on the contrary, the Traces which excite the Idea of sensible Things, and which are fol­lowed [Page 158]lowed with Passions, fail not to communicate to the Infants the Sensation and Love of Sensible Things.

A Mother, for Instance, who is excited to love God by the Motion of the Spirits, which accompany the Trace of the Image of a venerable Old Man, because this Mother has united the Idea of God to this Trace of the Old Man; for, as we shall soon see in the Chapter of the connexion of Idea's, that it may easily be done, altho' there is no relation between God and the Image of an Old Man. This Mother, I say, can only produce in the Brain of her Child the Trace of an Old Man, and an inclination for Old Men, which is not the love of God wherewith she was affected: For, indeed, there is no Traces in the Brain, which can of themselves stir up any other Idea's than those of Sensible Things, because the Body is not made to Instruct the Mind, and speaks not to the Soul as to it self.

Thus a Mother, whose Brain is filled with Traces, which by their nature relate to sensible things, and which she cannot efface, since concupiscence still re­mains in her, because her Body is not brought under subjection, necessarily communicates them to her Child, and begets it a sinner altho' she be righteous. This Mother is righteous, because actually loving, or having loved God by a love of choice, this concupi­scence makes her no longer criminal, altho' she shou'd follow the Motions thereof in her sleep: But the Child she begets not loving God by a love of choice, and its heart not being turned towards God, it is evident that it is subject to disorder and irregularity, and that there is nothing in it which deserves not the wrath of God.

But, when they are regenerated by Baptism, and have been justified either by a disposition of heart, like to that which remains in righteous Persons du­ring the illusions of the Night, or it may be by a free act of love to God, as they have made, being deli­vered some moments, from the dominion of the Body through the power of this Sacrament; (for, as God hath made them to love him, we cannot conceive that [Page 159]they are actually in the righteousness and order of God, if they love him not, or have not loved him; or, at least, if their heart is not disposed after the same manner, as it wou'd be if they actually loved him) Then, altho' they submit to concupiscence du­ring their Infancy, their concupiscence is no longer Sin; it makes them no longer guilty and worthy of wrath; they cease not to be righteous and agreeable to God, by the same reason as we do not lose Grace, altho' in our sleep we shou'd follow the Motions of concupiscence; for the Brain of Infants is so soft, and they receive so lively and strong impressions of the weakest Objects, as they have not sufficient freedom of Mind to resist them. But I stay too long upon these things, which do not absolutely belong to the subject I treat of. 'Tis enough, that I may conclude here from what I have explained in this Chapter, that all these false Traces, See the Explana­tions. that Mothers imprint in the Brain of their Children, make their Minds false, and corrupt their Imagination; and that thus the gene­rality of Men, are subject to imagine things other­wise than they are, in giving some false colour, or irregular draught to the Idea's of those things they perceive.

CHAP. VIII.

IN the precedent Chapter, we have consider'd the Brain of an Infant whilest in the Womb; let us now examine what happens to it as soon as it is Born. In the same time that it quits Darkness, and first sees Light, the cold of the outward Air seizes it; the tenderest embraces of the Woman that receives it, of­fends its delicate Members; all external Objects sur­prize it; they are all Subjects of fear to it, because it does not yet know them, nor has it any power of it self, to defend it self, or to fly from them; the Tears and Cries by which it condoles it self, are infallible marks of its pains and fears; for they are, indeed, the Prayers that Nature makes to procure it assistance, to defend it from the evils it suffers, and those it apprehends.

To be able to conceive well the perplexity of its Mind in this condition, we must remember that the Fibres of its Brain are very soft and delicate; and by consequence, all external Objects make very deep impressions upon them: For since the least things are sometimes capable of hurting a weak Imagination, so great a number of surprizing Objects must certainly injure and perplex that of a Child.

But to have a more lively apprehension of the agi­tations and pains of Infants, at the time of their first coming into the World, and the prejudices which their Imaginations must receive, let us represent to our selves what would be the astonishment of Men, if they saw Giants five or six times higher than themselves ap­proach near them, without knowing any thing of [Page 161]their design; or if they saw any new kind of Animal, which had no resemblance to those they have already seen; or only, if a Flying-Horse, or some other Chi­mera of our Poets, shou'd suddenly descend from the Clouds. These Prodigies wou'd make deep Traces in the Spirits, and the Brain wou'd be confuted, only to have seen them once.

Unexpected and frightful events fall out every day, which makes even Men lose their Wits, whose Brains are not very susceptible of new impressions, altho', they have some Experience, and can defend them­selves; or, at least, are able to make use of some resolution. Children, when first come into the World, suffer something from every Object that strikes their Senses, to which they are not accustomed: All the Animals they see, are of a new kind to them, since they have seen nothing before like to them; they have neither strength nor experience; the Fibres of their Brain are very delicate and flexible: How then is it possible, but that their Imagination shou'd be injured by so many different Objects?

It is true, that Mothers have already a little ac­customed their Children to the impressions of Objects, since they have already traced them in the Fibres of their Brain, before they were born, and so they are much less hurt, when they see with their own Eyes what they had before in some manner perceived by those of their Mothers. It is also true, that false Traces, and the injuries that their Imagination re­ceives at the sight of so many frightful Objects, are effaced and cured by time; because not being Na­tural, all Bodies are contrary to them, and extir­pate them, as we have seen in the precedent Chap­ter. And this is the reason that generally all Men are not Fools from their Infancy, yet it does not hinder, but that there is always some Traces so strong and deep, that cannot be effaced all our Lives

If Men wou'd but seriously reflect upon what passes within themselves, and upon their own thoughts, they wou'd not want Experience to prove what I have [Page 162]said: They wou'd commonly discover in themselves inclinations, and secret aversions, which others have not, for which there can be no other cause ascribed than these Traces of our Infancy. For since the cau­ses of these inclinations and aversions are particular to us, they are not founded in the Nature of Man; and since they are unknown to us, it must be that they have acted in a time, wherein our Memory was not capable to retain the circumstances of things, so as to make us able to remember them; and this time can only be that of our most tender Infancy.

Mr. D'Cartes hath told us in one of his Letters, that he had a particular kindness for all squinting Persons, and that in having carefully examined the cause of it, he at last found 'twas a defect he had met with in a young Maid whom he had loved, whilest he was yet a Child, and the affection he had for her, made him love all persons that resembled her in any thing.

But it is not these little Irregularities of our Incli­nations which mostly deceive us; it proceeds from this, That all our Minds are weak in some respect or other, and we are all subject to some kind of Folly, altho' we are not sensible of it. When we carefully examine the Genius of those with whom we converse, we easily perswade our selves of this, altho' we are our selves an Original of some particular Folly, and may be so accounted by others; yet we shall also find others that have Follies peculiar to themselves, and who differ only as to the more and less.

Now one of the causes of the different Characters of Dispositions, and without doubt, the difference of the impressions that we receive at our Birth, (as we have shown of the particular and extraordinary Incli­nations,) is, because these kinds of folly being common­ly constant and durable, they can only depend upon the Constitution of the Animal Spirits, which very easily change; and by consequence, it is necessary that they proceed from false Impressions, which are made in the Fibres of the Brain, when our Memory [Page 163]was not capable of preserving the Idea's thereof; that is, from the beginning of our Life. A general source of the Errors of Man, is the great disorder of their Brain, caused by the impression of external Objects when first they come into the World; but this cause ceases not so soon as may be imagined.

The common Conversation that Children are obli­ged to have with their Nurses, or even with their Mothers, who often have no Education, does preju­dice, and entirely corrupts their Disposition; these Women entertain them only with silly things, as ridi­culous Stories, or such as are only fit to fright them. They never speak to them but of sensible things, and after such a manner as is too sure to confirm them in the false Judgments of their Senses. And, in a word, they cast into their Minds the Seeds of all the weak­nesses they themselves have, as of their extravagant apprehensions, ridiculous superstitions, and other the like prejudices; by which means, they neither being accustomed to search after Truth, nor to have any gust of it, they become at last incapable of discerning it, or of making any use of their reason; upon which account, a certain fearfulness and weakness of Spirit seizes them, which continues with them a long time; for there are many persons, who at the Age of fifteen or twenty, that perfectly retain the Spirit of their Nurse.

It is true, that Children don't appear very proper for the Meditation of Truth, and for abstracted and elevated Sciences, because the Fibres of their Brain, being very delicate, they are easily agitated, even by the weakest and least sensible Objects; and their Soul necessarily having Sensations proportionated to the agitation of these Fibres, she lets go her Meta­physical Thoughts, and pure Intellections, to apply her self only to her own Sensations. Thus, it seems, Children cannot consider the pure Idea's of Truth with sufficient attention, being so often and easily di­sturbed by the confused Idea's of their Senses.

Yet we may answer, first, that it is more easie for a Child of seven years to be deliver'd from the Er­rors whereinto the Senses lead it, than for a person of Sixty, who has all his life time followed the pre­judices of Infancy. Secondly, that if a Child is not ca­pable of the clear and distinct Idea's of Truth, it is at least, capable of being advertised, that its Senses deceive it upon every occasion; and if we do not teach it the Truth, we ought not, at least, to enter­tain, or fortify it in its Errors. And, lastly, that the youngest Children, how wedded soever they may be to agreeable and painful Sensations, learn soon what grown Persons can't do in much more time; as the Knowledge of the Order and Relations that there is between all Words, and all Things, which they see and hear: For altho' these Things depend chiefly on the Memory, yet it is plain enough, that they must make great use of their Reason in the manner where­by they learn their Tongue.

But since the facility that the Fibres of Childrens Brains have for the receiving the impressions of sensi­ble Objects, II. Advice for the well Educating of Children. is the reason why they are incapable of Judging of abstracted Sciences, it is very easie to re­medy it. For 'tis certain, that if Children were ta­ken without fear, without desires, and without hopes; if we did not make them suffer pain, and if we kept them as much as possible from their little pleasures, we might, as soon as they cou'd speak, teach them the most difficult, and most abstracted, or, at least, the most sensible parts of the Mathematics, Mecha­nics, and other things of the like Nature, which are necessary in the sequel of life: But their Minds are not fit to be applied to abstracted Sciences, when they are agitated by desires, and troubled with frights, which is requisite to be well considered.

For, as an ambitious Man, who shou'd lose his Riches and Honour, or who shou'd have been raised, all of a sudden, to a great Dignity, which he cou'd not have hoped for, wou'd not be in a condition to resolve Metaphysical Questions, or Algebraick Equa­tions, [Page 165]but only to do such things as his present passion inspired him with. So Children, in whose Brain an Apple, and Sugar-plumb, make as deep impressions, as Offices and Grandeurs do in that of a Man of Forty, are not in a condition of hearing such abstracted Truths as we teach them. So that it may be affirm­ed, there is nothing more contrary to the advance­ment of Children in the Sciences, than the continual Divertisements wherewith they recompence them, and the continual Punishments they threaten them with.

But what is infinitely more considerable, is, that these fears of Chastisement, and these desires of sen­sible Recompence, with which they fill Childrens Minds, extreamly diverts them from Piety. Devo­tion is yet more abstracted than Science, it is less re­lished by corrupted Nature. The Mind of Man is very much inclined to Study, but it is not so to Piety. If, therefore, great agitations permit us not to stu­dy, altho' we naturally have some pleasure in it, how is it possible that Children, which are taken up with sensible Pleasures wherewith they recom­pence them, and with the Pains they fright them with, shou'd preserve a sufficient freedom of Mind, to give them any inclination to Piety?

The capacity of the Mind is very much limited, many things are not requisite to fill it, and when it is full, it is incapable of new Thoughts, except it emp­ties it self of some it had before: But when the Mind is filled with sensible things, it cannot part with them when it will; to conceive this, we must consi­der we are all naturally inclined to Good, and Plea­sure being the Character whereby we distinguish it from Evil, it is necessary that Pleasures shou'd affect us, and employ us more than all the rest. Pleasure then being united to the use of sensible things, because they are the Goods of Mans Body, there is a kind of necessity that these goods shou'd fill the capacity of our Minds, until God by imbittering them, gives us a distaste and horror of them, and by his Grace, [Page 166]makes us feel the sweetness of Heaven, which effaces all the Pleasures of this World. S. Aug. Dando menti caelestem delectationem, quâ omnis terrena delectatio superetur.

But because we are as much inclined to shun Evil as to love Good, and Pain is the Character that Na­ture has united to Evil, all that we have said of Plea­sure, must, in a contrary sensce, be understood of Pain.

Since those things, therefore, that make us feel Pleasure and Pain, fill the capacity of the Mind, and that it is not in our power to quit, or not to be affect­ed with them, when we please; it is plain, that we cannot make Children be inclined to Piety no more than Men, if we do not begin with them according to the Precepts of the Gospel, by a privation of all things that touch the Senses, and which excite great desires and great fears, since all the Passions darken and extinguish Grace, and that inward love to our Duty, which God has implanted in us.

The least Children have reason as well as Men, al­tho' they have not experience, they have also the same natural inclinations tho' they are carried to very different Objects; they must, therefore, be accustom'd to guide themselves by reason, since they have it, and excited to their Duty by rightly managing their good Inclinations. It destroys their reason, and corrupts their best inclina­tions to engage them to their Duty by sensible im­pressions. They appear then to be in their Duty, but 'tis only an appearance; Virtue is neither engraven in their Mind nor Heart; they scarcely know it, and they love it much less. Their Mind is full of fears and desires, of aversions to, and love of sensible things, which they cannot disingage themselves from to gain their Liberty, and to make use of their Rea­son. Thus Children, who are educated after this base and servile manner, accustom themselves by lit­tle and little, to a certain insensibility of all the Sentiments of honest Men, and good Christians, which continues with them all their Lives; and when they think themselves freed from Chastisements, either by their Authority or Craft, they abandon themselves [Page 167]to whatever flatters their Concupiscence and their Senses, because, indeed, they know no other good than what is sensible.

It is true, there are some occurrences wherein it is necessary to instruct Children by their Senses, but it must only be done when Reason is not sufficient. They must first be perswaded to their Duty by Rea­son, and if they are not capable of acknowledging their obligations to it, it will be best to let them alone for some time; for to force them to do outwardly, what they did not believe their Duty, wou'd not be to instruct them, since 'tis the Mind must be taught and not the Body: Qui parcie virgae edit filium su­um. Pro. 13.24. But if they refuse to do what Reason tells them they ought to do, it must never be suffered, some sort of severity must rather be used, for in such a case, according to the Wise man, He that spares the Rod hates his Son.

If Chastisements neither Instruct the Mind, nor incline us to love Virtue, yet at least, in some mea­sure, they correct the Body, and hinder it from relish­ing Vice, and by consequence, prevent it from being a slave to it. But what must chiefly be observed, is, that Punishments fill not the capacity of the Mind as Pleasures do, for they are no sooner at an end, and we free from the danger of suffering them again, but we are easily induced to forget them, because then they neither solicit the Imagination, nor excite the Passions; nor provoke the Concupiscence. In fine, they leave the Mind wholly at liberty to think on what it pleases, so that we may exercise it to­wards Children, to keep them in their Duty, or, at least, in the appearance of it.

But tho' it is sometimes necessary to deter and punish Children by sensible Chastisements, yet it must not from thence be concluded, that we ought to perswade them by sensible rewards; we must never make use of any thing that very much affects the Senses, but when the utmost necessity requires it: And there is no need of affecting them with sensible rewards, by representing Pleasures to them as the [Page 168]end of their Labours. For, on the contrary, it wou'd corrupt their best Actions, and rather incline them to Sensuality than Virtue.

The Impressions of those Pleasures we have once tasted, continue very strongly to affect the Imaginati­on, and often revive in us the Idea's of sensible Goods, always exciting importunate desires which disturb the peace of the Mind: And, in short, they stir up the Concupiscence upon every occasion, and it is as Leaven that corrupts the whole lump. But this is not a proper place to explain these things as they ought to be.

CHAP. I.

WE have given some Idea in the other Pa [...] of the Physical Causes, that occasion the Irregularity of the Imagination of Men. In This, we shall endeavour to make some Application of those Causes, to the General Er­rors of the Imagination, and we shall likewise Treat of the Causes of those Errors, which may be term'd Moral.

It may be seen, by what has been said in the fore­going Chapter, that the extream fineness of the Fibres of the Brain is one of the Principal Causes that hin­der us from applying our selves with so much thought and study as we ought, to the Discovery of Truths that are but a little Mysterious.

I. This extream smallness of Fibres is usually met with in Women; Of the Ima­gination of Women. and thence it is that their Under­standing is so great in every thing that strikes the Senses. 'Tis for Women to determine Fa [...]ons, to judge of Language, to distinguish Beauty, and Genteel [Page 162]Manners. In such things as these their Knowledge, Capacity, and Acuteness surpasses that of Men. What­ever depends upon the Senses is under their Jurisdicti­tion; but usually they are unable to dive into Truths, that are any thing difficult to be discover'd. What­ever is Abstracted, to them is incomprehensible. They cannot make use of their Imagination to unfold intangl'd and intricate Questions. They only consider the outside of things; nor has their Imagination either Strength or Extent enough to penetrate to the Bottom, or to Compare all the Parts without distracting them­selves. A Trifle puts them out of the way; the least noise affrights 'em; the slightest Motion finds 'em work. In short, the Manner and not the Reality of things, is sufficient to fill the whole Capacity of their Mind; because the smallest Objects producing vio­lent Motions in the Delicate Fibres of the Brain, raise in the Soul those Sentiments which are active and large enough to possess it wholly.

If it be certain that this delicacie of the Fibres of the Brain is the Principal Cause of these Effects, 'tis not so sure however that 'tis to be met with in all Women; but admit it be, their Animal Spirits have some times such a proportion with the Fibres of their Brains, that there are some Women who have more Solidity of Judgment then some Men. For the strength of Wit consists in a certain Temperament of the gross­ness and Agitation of the Animal Spirits with the Fibres of the Brain; and Women sometimes have this same just and Equal Constitution. There are some Women strong and constant, others feeble and incon­stant. There are some Women Learned, Courageous, and Capable of every Thing. On the other side, there are some Men unactive and Effeminate, uncapa­ble of understanding or doing any Thing. In short, when we attribute any Defects to this or that Sex, to certain Ages, or such and such Conditions, we mean it with a proviso, for the most part; supposing always, that there is no general Rule without an Exception.

For it is not to be imagin'd, that all Men, or all Women, of the same Age, Country, or Family, have [Page 163]Brain of the same Constitution. 'Tis more proper to believe, that as we cannot meet with two Faces that resemble each other in every Lineament, so we cannot meet with two Imaginations that are absolutely alike; and that all Men, Women, and Children, differ one from another in the grosser or more resin'd delicacy of the Fibres of the Brain. For as we are not over hasti­ly to suppose an Essential Identity between Things, amongst which we see no Difference, so neither are we to make Essential Differences, where we do not find a Perfect Identity; for these are the Errors into which we usually fall.

That which is then to be said concerning the Fibres of the Brain, is this, that they are very soft, and very small in Children; that with Age they harden and get strength; that nevertheless they are extreamly small in the generality of Women, and in some Men, all their Life-time. There is nothing more to be de­termin'd. And this may suffice to be said of Women and Children, that as they make it not their Business to search after Truth and instruct others, so their Errors are not very prejudicial; for they are seldom believ'd in those things which they advance. Let us therefore speak of Men full grown; whose Wit is in its full strength and vigor; and who may be thought capable to sind out the Truth and teach it to Others.

II. The usual time that the Mind and Understand­ing of Man are in their greatest perfection, Of the Ima­gination of Men in the prime of their yea [...] is from Thirty to fifty years: At that Age the Fibres of the Brain have generally acquir'd a moderate consistence. The Pleasures and Pains of the Senses for the most part make no farther Impression upon 'em; so that they need no more then to defend themselves from violent Passions, which rarely happen, and this they may do, provided they carefully avoid all occasions that excite 'em; so that the Soul being no longer distracted with such kind of Interruptions, may with more ease apply it self to the Contemplation of Truth.

A Man in such an Estate, and who has quitted the prejudices of his Infancy, who from his Youth [Page 168] [...] [Page] [...] [Page 162] [...] [Page 163] [...] [Page 164]has acquir'd a Promptness to Meditation, who not only retains a clear and distinct Notions of the Mind, and carefully rejects all the confus'd Idea's of the Senses, and who has both leisure and a Wit to meditate, such a Man will hardly fall into Errors. But 'tis not of such a Man that we are now to Dis­course; 'tis of the common sort of Men, who for the most part are of another Constitution.

The Consistence then, which we meet with at the years of Discretion in the Fibres of Mens Brains, is the cause, if it may be so said, of the Solidity and Consistence of their Errors: 'Tis the Seal that Seals their Prejudices, and all their false Opinions, and shelters 'em from the strength of Reason. In a word, the more Advantageous this Constitution of the Fibres of the Brain is to Persons well Educated, the more Disadvantageous it is to the greatest part of Men, since it confirms both the one and the other in their Present Thoughts and Opinions.

But Men are not only confirm'd in their Errors, when they are arriv'd at the Age of Forty or Fifty years; they are also more subject to fall into new ones; because, that believing themselves at that time able to judge of every thing, as indeed it would be­come 'em to be so, they decide with presumption, and only consult their own Prepossessions; for Men never argue upon things, but in some relation to those Idea's which are most familiar to 'em. When a Chymist would Argue about some Natural Body, presently his Three Principles come into his Mind. A Peripatic immediately thinks of the four Elements, and the four first Qualities; another Philosopher refers every thing to other Principles. So that nothing can enter into the Mind of Man, which is not immediately infected with the Errors to which it is subject, or which does not augment the number of its Errors.

This Consistence of the Fibres of the Brain pro­duces another very bad Effect, especially in Persons more advanced in years, which is, to make 'em un­capable of Meditation: They cannot set themselves to the Consideration of those Things which they de­sire [Page 165]to know; and so they can never penetrate into those Truths which are but a little conceal'd. They cannot relish the most Rational Sentiments, when they are supported by Principles which appear new to them; though they are otherwise very intelligent in things of which their years have given 'em great Expe­rience. But all that I have here said extends no far­ther, than only to such as have spent their Youth without making use of their Wit or applying them­selves to Study.

To clear these things, 'tis requisite to know, that we cannot learn any thing whatever it be, without giving our minds to it, and that we cannot be atten­tive upon any thing, if we do not imagine, and ad­mit a lively representation of it into the Brains. Now, that we may imagine Objects, 'tis necessary that some some part of the Brain give way, or that there should be imprinted on it some other Motion, that so it may be able to form the Traces which are affix'd to the Idea's that represent those Objects to us; so that if the Fibres of the Brain are but a little harden'd, they will admit no Inclinations or Motions, but what they were formerly accustom'd to. Whence it comes to pass, that the Soul can never imagin, nor conse­quently be attentive upon what it desires, but only upon things that are familiar to it.

From hence we must conclude, that it is of great advantage for a Man to Exercise himself in me [...]it [...]t­ing upon all sorts of Subjects, that so he may be able to acquire a Readiness to think upon what he pleases. For as we acquire an extraordinary facility to stir our Fingers after various manners, and with a swiftness even to wonder, by frequent use in playing upon In­struments; so the Parts of the Brain, the Motion o [...] which is requisite to imagine what we desire, do by use and custom acquire a certain easiness and slexibility; which is the reason that Things are imagin'd more easily, more readily, and more distinctly.

Now the best way to acquire this Habitude, which makes the chief distinction betwixt a Wise Man and another Person, is to accustom our selves in our youth [Page 166]to search after the truth of such things as are very difficult, because at that Age the Fibres are more pliable and apt to give way.

Nevertheless I do not pretend that this Facility is to be acquir'd by those who are call'd Men of Study, yet make it their business only to read without me­ditating, and without searching of themselves, the Decision of a Question before they read it in an Au­thor: For 'tis visible, that by that means only a Man acquires a facility to remember things that he has read. 'Tis every day observable, that they who read much, can never apply their Minds to new things that are told 'em, and that the vanity of their Learning hur­rying 'em to judge of those things before they have conceiv'd 'em in their Minds, throws 'em into those Errors▪ which other Men avoid.

But though the want of Application be the princi­pal Cause of their Errors, there is one that is peculiar to 'em. That in regard they always carry in their Memories an infinite number of confus'd Species, they presently choose out some one which they look upon to be the Subject of the Dispute, and because the Things that are told 'em do not agree therewith, they judge ridiculously that their Opponent is deceiv'd. If you make it out to 'em, that they themselves are de­ceiv'd, and that they do not so much as understand the State of the Question, then they are mad, and not able to apprehend what is said to 'em, and they still keep stedfast to the first false Species which their Me­mory presented to 'em. If you shew 'em their Mi­stake too apparently, they will start a Second and a Third, which they will defend sometimes against all Appearance of Truth; nay, even against their own Consciences; because they have no respect or love for Truth, and because they are asham'd to acknowledge, that there are some things which others know better than themselves.

What ever has been said concerning Persons of Forty or Fifty years of Age, III. Of Old Men. with more Reason ought to be understood of Old Men, because the Fibres of their Brain are still more inflexible, and that for want [Page 167]of Animal Spirits to trace out new Footsteps, their Imagination becomes altogether languishing. And because the Fibres of their Brain are usually inter­mixt with many superfluous Humours, therefore they loose by little and little the memory of things past, and fall into Infirmities that are common to Children. So that in their decrepit Age they have those Defects which depend upon the Constitution of the Fibres of the Brain, which are to be met with both in Children and grown Men; though it may be said that they are Wiser than either, because they are no longer so sub­ject to their Passions, which proceed from the vehe­ment Agitation of the Animal Spirits.

We shall not undertake any farther Explanation of these things, because it is easie to make a judgment of this Age, by the others that we have spoken of before, and to conclude from thence, that Old Men with much more difficulty conceive what is said to 'em, than those that are younger, that they are more ob­stinately tied to their Prejudices and long receiv'd Opinions, and consequently that they are more har­den'd and confirm'd in their Errors and Ill Habits. Though this ought to be observed, that the State of Old Age does not happen precisely at Sixty or Seventy years; that all Old Men do not doat; nor are all those, who are past Sixty, always free from the Pas­sions of young People, and that we should proceed too far to draw General Consequences from Establish'd Principles.

CHAP. II.

I Suppose I have sufficiently explain'd in the foregoing Chapters the various alterations that are to be met with in the Animal Spirits, and in the Constitution of the Fibres of the Brain, according to the several Ages of Man. So that but a little Meditation upon what has been said, will help us to a distinct Knowledge of the Imagination, and of the most common Natural Causes of the Differences that are to be observ'd a­mong Wits, since all the Alterations that befall the Imagination and the Mind, are but Consequences of those in the Animal Spirits, and in the Fibres of which the Brain is compos'd.

But there are several Particular Moral Causes of the Alterations that befall the Imagination of Man, viz. their different Conditions, Employments, and manner of Living; to the Consideration of which we must oblige our selves, since these sorts of Alterations are the Causes of almost an infinite number of Errors, every one judging of Things according to the relation they have to his Condition. We do not think it necessary to spend time in Explaining the Effects of some in­different Causes, as great Sicknesses, surprising Mis­fortunes, and other unexpected Accidents, which make most violent impressions upon the Brain, and extreamly disturb it, because these things but rarely happen; and for that the Errors, into which such sort of Persons fall, are so palpable, that they are no way contageous, seeing they are so easily found out and rejected by all the World.

Now for the more perfect apprehending all the Alterations, which Different Conditions produce in the Imagination, 'tis absolutely necessary to remember that we never imagine Objects but by first forming Images of 'em; and that these Images are nothing else, but the Traces which the Animal Spirits delineate in the Brain, that we imagine things so much the more strongly, the deeper and more plainly these Traces are impress'd, and the oftner and more violently the Ani­mal Spirits have past through them; and that when the Spirits have past through several times, they enter in more easily than into other parts adjoining, through which they never past, or at least not so often. This is the most usual Cause of the Confusion and Falshood of our Idea's. For the Animal Spirits, that are di­rected by the Action of External Objects, or else by the Orders of the Soul, to produce certain Traces in the Brain, many times produce others, which in truth resemble 'em in something; but which are not alto­gether the Traces of the same Objects, nor those which the Soul desired to represent to it self; for that the Animal Spirits finding some Resistance in those parts of the Brain, through which they ought to have past, readily turn aside and croud into the deeper Traces of those Idea's which are more familiar to us. And here we shall produce very manifest and sensible Examples of these Things.

When they who are not extreamly short sighted, behold the Moon, they see two Eyes, a Nose, and a Mouth; in a word, it seems to them as if they saw a Face: Nevertheless there is nothing at all in the Moon of what they imagine there. Many Per­sons behold there quite another Thing. And they, who take the Moon to be such as she seems to be to them, may be easily undeceived, if they look upon her with a small Prospective Glass; or if they consult the De­scriptions which Hevelius, Riccioli, and others have publish'd. Now the Reason why Men generally be­hold a Face in the Moon, and not the Irregular Spots which are there, is this, because the Traces of the Face, which are in the Brain are very deep, for that we [Page 170]frequently and with great Attention look upon Faces. So that the Animal Spirits finding some Resistance in other parts of the Brain, easily turn aside from the Direction which the Light of the Moon imprints, and enter into those Traces to which the Idea's of a Face are naturally affixt. Besides, that the Appearing Big­ness of the Moon, not being much different from the largeness of an ordinary Head at a certain distance, the Impression of it forms those Traces which have a great Affinity with those that represent a Nose, a Mouth, and Eyes; and by that means determines the Spirits to take their Course in the Traces of a Face, Some there are who see a Man a Horseback in the Moon, or any thing else, which is not a Face; because their Imagination having been strongly af­fected by certain Objects, the same Traces are open'd by the least things to which they have any Relation.

For the same Reason it is, that we imagine we be­hold Chariots, Men, Lions, and other Animals in the Clouds, when there is the least resemblance between those Creatures and their Figures; and that all Men, but chiefly they who are accustomed to Designing and Drawing, many times see Heads of Men upon the Walls, where there are several Irregular Spots.

'Tis for this Reason also, that the Spirits of Wine, entring without any direction of the Will into Traces most familiar to us, help to discover Secrets of the greatest Importance; and that in our sleep we most commonly dream of those Objects which we have seen in the day time, and which had form'd the largest Traces in the Brain; for that the Soul always repre­sents to her self those things of which she has the largest and deepest Traces. To these we may add other Examples more Compos'd.

A Distemper is a Novelty, it makes such Havock as surprizes the World. This imprints such deep Traces in the Brain, that the Distemper is always pre­sent to the Mind. Suppose this Disease, for Ex­ample, be call'd the Scurvy, all Distempers will be the Scurvy. The Scurvy is new, therefore all Di­stempers shall be the Scurvy. The Scurvy is attended [Page 171]with several Symptoms, many of which are common to other Diseases. That's nothing to the purpose; if it happen that the Sick Person has any one of those Symptoms, he shall be sick of the Scurvy, and they shall not so much as think of other Distempers that are accompanied with the same Symptoms; they will ex­pect that all the Accidents that they have known Scor­butic Persons labour under, befal them also. They shall prescribe the same Remedies, and shall wonder why they do not work the same Effects, as they have wrought in others.

An Author applies himself to one sort of Study; upon which the Traces of the Subject of his Employ­ment make so deep an Impression, and irradiate so vigorously over all the Brain, that many times they confound and deface the Traces of such things as are very different one from another. There was one, for Example, who compil'd several Volumes upon the Cross; this made him see Crosses where ever he came: Nor was it without reason, that Father Morin derides him for believing that a Medal represented a Cross, when it represented quite another thing. And by Vertue of such a sort of Imagination as this it was, that Gilbert, and several others, after they had study'd the Loadstone, and admir'd its Properties, would needs apply, to Magnetick Qualities, a great Number of Natural Effects, which have not the least Correspondence with them.

The Examples here cited, are sufficient to prove, that (from this extraordinary easiness of the Imagina­tion, to represent to it self the Objects which are most familiar to it, and the difficulty which it under­goes to imagine those which are new and unusual,) it come to pass, that Men are always forming Idea's, which may be call'd Mix'd and Impure, and that the Mind never Judges of things, but with reference to it self, and its first Thoughts. Thus the different Passions of Men, their Inclinations, their Condi­tions, their Employments, their Qualities, their Stu­dies; in a word, all their various Manners of Li­ving, producing very great differences in their [Page 172]Idea's: And this it is, that makes them fall into an Infinite number of Errors, of which we shall discourse more at large hereafter. This was it that made the Lord Chancellor Bacon utter these Judicious Expres­sions: All Perceptions, as well of the Sense as of the Mind, are, Ex analogia Hominis, not ex analogia Ʋni­versi, estque intellectus humanus instar speculi inequalis ad radios rerum, qui suam naturam naturae rerum immiscet, cam (que) destorquet & inficit.

CHAP. III.

AMong all Material Things, there is none more worthy the serious Study of Men, than the Structure of their Bodies, and the Correspondence between all the Parts that Compose it; and of all Spiritual Things, there is none of which the Know­ledge is more Necessary than that of the Soul, and how it is Related indispensably to God, and naturally to the Body.

'Tis not sufficient to perceive, or know confusedly, that the Traces of the Brain are united one to another, and that they are attended by the Motion of the Ani­mal Spirits; that the Traces being stirred up in the Brain, likewise stir up the Idea's in the Mind, and that the Motions excited in the Animal Spirits, excite the Passions in the Will. 'Tis requisite therefore, as much as may be, to understand distinctly the cause of all those different Unions, and chiefly the Effects which they are capable of producing.

We must understand the cause of them, to the end we may attain to the Knowledge of Him who is on­ly [Page 173]able to act within us, and to make us Happy or Miserable; and it becomes us to understand the Ef­fects, because we should know our selves as much as in us lyes, and other Men, with whom we Converse: For then, we shall understand the ways and means of Conducting, Governing, and Preserving our selves, in the most Happy and Perfect condition, to which it is possible for us to attain, according to the Order of Nature, and the Rules of the Gospel; and we shall be able to live with other Men, when we know how to make use of them in our Necessities, and assist them in their Miseries.

I do not pretend to explain in this Chapter, a Sub­ject of so vast and so large an Extent: Nor do I pre­tend to it altogether in the whole Work. There are many things of which I am Ignorant as yet, and which I never hope to understand exactly; there are other things which I believe I know, but which I cannot for all that Explain: For there is no Wit, how mean soever it be, that by Meditation cannot discover more Truths, than the most Eloquent Man in the World can relate.

I. We are not to imagine, Of the Union of the Soul with the Body. as the greatest part of Philosophers do, that the Soul becomes Corporeal, when it is united with the Body, and that the Body be­comes a Spirit when it is united with the Soul. The Soul is not diffus'd into all the Parts of the Body, to give it Life and Motion, as the Imagination fan­cies; nor does the Body become capable of Sensation by its union with the Soul, as our deluding Senses would seem to convince us. Every Substance remains what it is, and as the Soul is not capable of Extension and Motion, neither is the Body capable of Sensation and Inclinations. All the Alliance of the Bo­dy and Soul, which is known to us, consists in a Na­tural and Mutual correspondence of the Thoughts of the Soul, with the Traces or Phantoms of the Brain, and the Emotions of the Soul with the Motions of the Spirits.

So soon as the Soul receives some new Idea's, it im­prints new Traces in the Brain; and so soon as the [Page 174]Objects produce new Traces, the Soul receives new Idea's: Not that it considers those Traces, for it has no knowledge of them; nor that those Traces include those Idea's, because they have no Relation one with another: Nor, lastly, that the Soul receives her Idea's from those Traces; for, as we shall show in another place, it is not to be conceiv'd that the Soul can re­ceive any thing from the Body, or that it becomes more Knowing, or more Enlightned, by adverting to it, as the Philosophers pretend, who would have it, that the Soul should perceive all Things, per conversio­nem ad Phantasmata, by Conversion to the Phantasmes, or Traces of the Brain.

So soon as the Soul would have the Arm to move, the Arm is moved, tho' it does not so much as know what it ought to do to make it move; and so soon as the Ani­mal Spirits are agitated, the Soul finds it self mov'd, tho' it does not so much as know there are Animal Spirits in the Body.

When I come to treat of the Passions, I shall speak of the Connexion between the Traces of the Brain, and the Motions of the Spirits, and of that between the Idea's and Emotions of the Soul, for that all the Passions depend upon it. My business here, is only to treat of the affinity between Idea's and Traces, and the Connexion of the Traces one with another.

There are three very considerable Causes of the Connexion of the Idea's with the Traces; Three consi­derable Cau­ses of the union be­tween the Idea's and Traces. the first, and most general, is the Identity of Time. For fre­quently it suffices, that we had certain Thoughts, at such time as some new Traces came into our Brain, so that those Traces cannot be produced again, without renewing the same Thoughts. If the Idea of God present it self to my Mind, at the same time that my Brain was struck with the sight of these three Characters, Iah, or with the sound of the Word it self, 'tis enough if the Traces, which those Characters have produc'd, be excited to make me think of God. And I cannot think of God, but there will be produc'd in my Brain some confused Traces of the Characters, or Sounds, which accompany'd the Thought, which I [Page 175]had of God; for the Brain, being never without Phantasmes, there are always such, as have some Re­lation to what we think, tho' many times these Phan­tasmes are very imperfect, and very confus'd.

The second Cause of the Connexion of the Idea's with the Traces, and which always supposes the first, is the Will of Man: This Will [...] necessary, that this con­nexion of the Idea's, with the Traces, may be regulated and proper for Use. For if Men had not Naturally an Inclination, to agree between themselves, to affix their Idea's to Sensible Signs, not only this Connexion of Idea's wou'd be absolutely unprofitable for Society, but it would be also very Irregular and Imperfect.

First, because Idea's are never strongly united with the Traces, but when the Spirits being agitated, they render those Traces deep and durable. So that the Spirits being never agitated but by the Passions, if Men had no such Union to communicate their Senti­ments, and participate of those of others, 'tis evident that the exact Union of their Idea's with certain Tra­ces, would be very weak, because they do not sub­ject themselves to those Exact and Regular Con­nexions, but to render themselves Intelligible.

Secondly, the Repetition of the Meeting of the same Idea's, with the same Traces, being necessary to form a Connexion, that may be of long continuance, since the meeting, unless it be accompany'd with a violent Motion of the Animal Spirits, suffices not to make strong Connexions; 'tis clear, that if Men should refuse to assent, it would be the greatest Chance in the World, if the same Traces, and Idea's, should meet together; so that the Will of Man is necessary to regulate the Connexion of the same Idea's with the same Traces, tho' this Will of Agree­ment be not so much an effect of their Choice and Reason, as an Impression of the Author of Nature, who has made us altogether one for another, and with a strong Inclination to unite in Mind, as well as in Body.

The third Cause of the Connexion of the Idea's with the Traces, is the Constant and Immutable Na­ture or Will of the Creator. For example; There is [Page 176]a Natural Connexion, and which depends not upon our Will; between the Traces produc'd by a Tree or Mountain, which we behold, and the Idea's of a Tree or Mountain; between the Traces which the Cries of a Man or Beast, that suffer Pain, beget in our Brain, the Air of one who threatens us, or of whom we stand in fear, and the Idea's of Grief, of Strength, or Weakness; as also between the Sentiments of Com­passion, of Fear, and Courage, which are excitedin us.

These Natural Bands are the strongest of all; they are generally alike in all Men, and they are absolutely necessary for the Preservation of Life: For which reason it is that they depend not upon our Will; for if the Band or Connexion of Idea's, with certain Sounds and Characters, be but feeble, and very dif­ferent, in several Countries, 'tis because it depends upon the weak and changeable Will of Men. And the reason why it depends upon it, is, because this Connexion is not absolutely necessary for Life, but only for living like Men that are to form, among themselves, a Rational Society.

Here we must observe, that the Connexion of Idea's that represent to us Spiritual Things, and such as are distinct from us, with the Traces of our Brain, is not, nor can be Natural; and by consequence, it is, or may be different in all Men, for that it has no other Cause than their Will, and the Identity of Time, of which I have spoken before. On the other side, the Connexion of the Idea's of all Mate­rial Things, with certain particular Traces, is Natu­ral; and hence there are certain Traces that stir up the same Idea in all Men. For Example, there is no question but that all Men have the Idea of a Square, upon the sight of a Square, because that Connexion is Natural, but 'tis to be doubted whither all Men have that Idea, when they hear the Word Square pronoun­ced, because that Connexion is entirely voluntary. The same thing may also be thought of all Traces, that are tyed to the Idea's of Spiritual Things.

But because the Traces, which have a Natural Con­nexion with Idea's, do affect the Mind, and conse­quently [Page 177]render it attentive, the greatest part of Men do easily enough comprehend and retain Sensible Truths; that is, the mutual Relations that are between Bodies. On the other side, because the Traces that have no other Connexion with the Idea's then what is voluntary, do never vigorously strike the Mind, 'tis not without a great deal of trouble that all Men Comprehend, and with much more difficulty retain abstracted Truths; that is, the mutual Relations be­tween things that fall not under the Imagination. But when these Relations are never so little com­pounded, they appear absolutely Incomprehensible, especially to those that are not accustomed to them, in regard they have not fortify'd the Connexion of those abstracted Idea's with their Traces, by continu­al Meditation; and tho' others have perfectly com­prehended them, they forget them in a short time, be­cause this Connexion is seldom or never so strong as the Natural one.

It is so true, that all the trouble Men have to com­prehend, and retain Spiritual and Abstracted Things, proceeds from the difficulty of fortifying the Con­nexion of their Idea's with the Traces of their Brain, that when they find a way to explain the Analogies of Spiritual Things, by the Relations of Material Things, they are easily apprehended, and imprinted after such a manner in the Mind, that we are not on­ly strongly convinced of them, but they are also much more easily retain'd. The General Idea which we have given of the Mind, in the first Chapter of this Work, is, perhaps, a sufficient Proof of this.

On the contrary, when the Relation between Mate­rial things are express'd in such a manner, that there is no Connexion requir'd between the Idea's of the Things, and the Traces of their Expressions, 'tis a difficult matter to apprehend them, and they are easi­ly forgot.

For Example: They, who begin the Study of Alge­bra, or the Analytic Art, cannot but with great difficulty apprehend the Algebraic Demonstrations; and when they have once understood them, they never remem­ber [Page 178]them long, because the Squares, for Example, the Parallelograms, Cubes, Solids, &c. being ex­press'd by aa, a3, abc, &c. whose Traces have no Natural Connexion with their Idea's, the Mind is not able to six the Idea's of them, and examme their Re­lations.

But they who begin plain Geometry, do presently, and clearly, conceive the Demonstrations that are explain'd to them, provided they distinctly under­stand the Terms that are made use of, because the Idea's of a Square, a Circle, &c. are Naturally ty'd to Traces of the Figures which they see before their Eyes. It also frequently happens, that the Exposition of the Figure alone, which serves for the Demonstra­tion, causes them sooner to apprehend it than the Discourses that explain it, because the Words not being united to the Idea's, but by an Arbitrary Insti­tution, they do not excite those Idea's with sufficient quickness and clearness, to afford a ready apprehen­sion of their Relations; for this is the principal Rea­son, why it is so hard a matter to understand the Sciences.

It may be observ'd by the By, and from what has been already said, that those Writers who Coyn a great many new Words, and new Figures, to explain their Sentiments, many times spend their time to lit­tle or no benefit; they think to render themselves In­telligible, when indeed they make themselves Incom­prehensible. We define all our Terms, and Cha­racters, say they, and others ought to agree to them. 'Tis true, others agree to them in their Will, but their Nature is repugnant thereto. Their Idea's are not joyn'd to those new Terms, because there is requir'd both Use and great Practice for that. The Authors, perhaps, have been accustom'd to that Practice, but the Readers have not. When a Man goes about to Instruct the Mind, 'tis requisite to understand it, be­cause he ought to follow Nature, and not to pro­voke or hurt it.

Nevertheless, we ought not to condemn the Care that Mathematicians take in defining their Terms, [Page 179]for 'tis evident they ought to define them, to prevent the trouble of Equivocal Words. But, as much as may be, they ought to make use of Terms that are received, or whose signification is not very remote from that which they go about to introduce; and this is that which Mathematicians do not always observe.

Nor do we pretend, by what we have said, to con­demn Algebra; more especially, that which M. De­scartes has re-establish'd. For tho' the Novelty of a few Expressions, in that Science, gives the Mind some little trouble at first, yet there is so little variety and confusion in the Expressions; and the Assistance, which the Mind receives by them, so far surpasses the diffi­culty it meets with, that we can hardly think it possi­ble to find a better way of expressing his Reason­ing, or which better suits with the Nature of the Mind, so as to carry it farther into the Discovery of unknown Truths. The terms of that Science have no share at all in the Capacity of the Mind, they do not burthen the Memory; they wonderfully abridge all our Idea's and Reasonings, and render them in some measure sensible by Practice. In short, their Be­nefit is much greater than that of Expressions, tho' Natural, or of Figures design'd by Triangles, Squares, and the like, which cannot be serviceable to the search­ing after, and unfolding Truths, which are but a lit­tle Mysterious. But let this suffice, for the connexion of Idea's with the Traces of the Brain. 'Tis necessa­ry now to say something of the connexion of the Traces one with another, and by consequence, of that agreement which is between the Idea's that an­swer to the Traces.

This connexion consists in this, II. Of the mutual con­nexion of the Trac [...]. that the Traces of the Brain are so well united together, that they can no longer be excited, but all those that were im­printed at the same time will be also excited. For Example, when a Man happens to be at some pub­lick Ceremony, if he observes all the circumstances of it, and all the principal Persons that were present, the Time, the Place, the Day, and all other particu­lars, [Page 180]'twill be enough that he remembers the Day, or some other circumstance of the Ceremony less remark­able, to represent to himself all the rest. For this reason it is, that when we cannot call to mind the principal Name of a Thing, we sufficiently design it by making use of the Name, that signifies some cir­cumstance of that Thing. As when we cannot call to mind the proper Name of a Church, we may make use of another Name, which signifies a Thing that has some Relation to it. We may say, 'tis that Church where there was such a Croud, where Mr.—Preaches, or whither we went last Sunday. And not being able to remember the proper Name of a Person, or it being more convenient to design it af­ter another manner, we may denote it by saying, such a one that has a Face pitted with the Small-Pox, such a tall Man well Proportioned, or a little Crook­back'd Man, according to the Inclinations we have for the Man, tho' he is to blame that makes use of Scornful Expressions.

Now the Mutual Connexion of the Traces, and consequently, of the Idea's one with another, is not only the foundation of all the Figures of Rhetorick, but of an infinite number of other things of greater Impertance, as in Morality, Politicks, and generally in all Sciences, which have any Relation to Man, and by consequence, of many things which we shall treat of in the sequel of this Discourse.

The cause of this Connexion of several Traces, is the Identity of Time, when they were imprinted in the Brain; for 'tis sufficient, that several Traces were produc'd at the same time, to renew them altogether: For the Animal Spirits, finding the way of all the Traces open, that are made at the same time, they continue their way, because they pass more easily through it than other parts of the Brain. This is the cause of Memory, and of the Corporeal Habits which are common to us with Beasts.

These Connexions of the Traces, are not always accompanied with the Emotions of the Spirits, be­cause all things which we see, do not appear to us [Page 181]always either Good or Evil. These Connexions also, may alter and break off, because not being always requisite for the Preservation of Life, they ought not always to be the same.

But there are Traces in our Brains, that are Natu­rally united one with another, as also with certain Emotions of the Spirits, because such a Connexion is necessary for the Preservation of Life; and their Con­nexion cannot be broken off, or at least, not very easily, because it's convenient that it should be always the same. For Example, the Trace of a Precipice which a Man sees under himself, and from which he is in danger of falling, or of some great Body which is ready to fall upon us, and crush us to Death, is Naturally join'd to the Trace which represents Death, as also to an Emotion of the Spirits, which disposes us to fly, or desire an Escape. This Connexion of Traces never changes, because it is necessary that it should be always the same; and it consists in a Dis­position of the Fibres of the Brain, which we have from our Birth.

All those Connexions which are not Natural, may, and ought to be broken, because the various Circum­stances of Time and Place ought to alter them, so that they may be useful to the Preservation of Life. 'Tis convenient, for Example, that Partridges should fly from Men with Birding-Pieces in their Hands, especially at such times, and in such places, where Men are accustomed to Hunt after them; but it is not necessary that they should fly at other times, and in other places. Thus, for the Preservation of all Creatures, 'tis necessary that there should be certain Connexions of Traces, which may be easily form'd and destroy'd; and that there should be others, which may not be broken without great difficulty. And lastly, others which are never to be broken.

'Tis very useful, to enquire carefully into the diffe­rent Effects, which these different Connexions are ca­pable of producing; for they are very numerous, and of great importance for the Understanding of Man, and of all things, between him and which there is [Page 182]any Relation. We shall find in the sequel of this Dis­course, that these Things are the Principal Cause of our Errors: But 'tis time to return to what we pro­mis'd to treat of, and to explain the different Changes that befal the Imagination of Men, by reason of their various Manner of Living.

CHAP. IV.

THE Differences that are in the various Manners of Mens Living, are almost Infinite. There are a great Number of different Conditions, Employ­ments, and Societies. These Differences are the rea­son, that almost all Men pursue different Designs, and argue upon different Principles. It would be very difficult to meet with several Persons, who have absolutely the same Prospects in one, and the same Community, wherein particular Persons ought to be all of the same Spirit, and have the same Designs: Their different Employs and Conversation, do neces­sarily give a different Turn and Humour in the way of Managing the Execution of those Things in which they agree: This shews, that it would be an impossible Undertaking to particularize the Moral Causes of Error. But besides, it would be of no use to do it here, 'tis our business only to speak of such Manners of Living, as betray Men into the greatest Number of Errors, and to such as are of the highest Importance. When we shall have Explained those, we shall have open'd a Way sufficient to ena­ble the Mind to proceed farther, and every body may be able to Survey, at once, and very easily, the most bidden Causes of several particular Errors, which [Page 183]cannot be explain'd but with a great deal of Time and Labour. When the Mind sees clearly, it delights it self with pursuing Truth, which it does with an in­expressible swiftness. I. That Stu­dicus Per­sons are the mst subject to Error. The Employment which seems most necessary to be treated of in this place, because it produces the most considerable changes in the Ima­gination of Men, and which lead us most into Error, is the Employment of Studious Persons, who make more use of their Memory than Wit. For Expe­rience always shews us, that they who apply them­selves most eagerly to the Reading of Books, and to Search after Truth, are those who have lead us into the greatest number of Errors.

'Tis the same thing with those that Study, as with those that Travel. When a Traveller, by misfortune, has taken the wrong Road, the farther he advances, the more remote he is from the Place whither he de­signs to go; and the more diligent and hasty he is to arrive to the end of his Journey, the more he wanders out of the way. In like manner, those ardent de­sires which Men have for Truth, cause 'em to preci­pitate themselves into the Reading of Books, where they think to find it; or to frame to themselves a Chimerical Systeme of things which they desire to know, for which they have a strong fancy, and which they endeavour by the vain Efforts of Wit to make others relish, to the end they may receive the Honour which is usually due to the Inventors of Systemes. Now let us explain these two Defects.

'Tis a difficult thing to apprehend, how it comes to pass, that Men of Sense should rather choose to make use of other Persons Judgment in the Search of Truth, than of that which God has bestow'd upon 'em. Without doubt, there is infinitely much more plea­sure and honour for a Man to guide himself with his own than other Men's Eyes; nor does any Man who has good Eyes ever dream of shutting 'em, or of put­ting 'em out, in hopes of one to guide him; never­theless 'tis the same thing with the use of Judgment as with the use of the Eyes; for as the Judgment is [...]nitely above the Eyes, the use of it is accompa­nied [Page 184]with satisfactions far more solid, and which con­tent it after another manner, than Light and Colours do the Sight. However Men always make use of their own Eyes to be their Guides; but they seldom or never make use of their own Judgment to discover the Truth.

But there are several Causes which contribute to this same Perturbation of the Mind. II. Reasons why they rather choose to follow Au­thority than make use of their own Judge­ment. First, the Na­tural Sloath of Men, that will not give themselves the Trouble of Meditation.

Secondly, Their Inability of Meditating, into which they are fallen, for want of applying themselves to it in their Youth, as has been shew'd in the Ninth Chapter.

In the third place, the little Love Men have for Abstracted Truths; which are the foundation of every thing that is to be known here below.

In the fourth place, the Satisfaction that Men re­ceive from the Knowledge of Probabilities, which are very agreeable and very sensible, because they are built upon Taking Notions.

In the fifth place, that foolish Vanity which makes us covet to be esteem'd Learned: For we call those Learned who have Read most. The knowledge of Opinions is of more use in Conversation, and to be able to puzzle the Minds of the Common Sort, than the knowledge of true Philosophy which is attain'd by Meditation.

In the sixth place, because Men, without any Rea­son, imagine, that the Ancients were more enlightened than we can be; and that there is nothing farther for us to Search after, but what they have already been successful in finding out.

In the seventh place, a certain false Respect, inter­mix'd with foolish Curiosity, causes us more to ad­mire Things that are most remote, the most ancient, and that come from Countreys unknown; and even the most obscure Books. Clarus ob obscuram Linguam Lueres. Thus was Heraclitus here­tofore admir'd for his Obscurity. Men enquire for old Medals, though all defac'd with Rust, and pre­serve, as the Apple of their Eye, the Lanthorn, or [Page 185]Slipper of some ancient Philosophers, though almost eaten up with Worms; their Antiquity enhaunces their Price. Some apply themselves to Read the Rab­bies, because they wrote in a strange Language, very corrupt and very obscure. Men have a high Esteem for Ancient Opinions, because Time has remov'd 'em at a great distance from us. And doubtless, had Nimrod wrote the History of his own Reign, all the most refin'd Politicks, all the Sciences, had been con­tain'd in it; even as there are some who discover, that Homer and Virgil had the Knowledge of all the Secrets of Nature. Antiquity is to be respected, they crie. How! could Aristotle, Plato, Epicurus, those Great Men, be deceiv'd? They never consider that Aristotle, Plato, and Epicurus, were Men as we are, and of the same Mould and Shape; and that now the World is grown Two thousand years older; Veritas filia tem­poris non autherita­tis. that it has more Experience, that it ought to be more en­lighten'd; and that it is the Age of the World and Experience that enable us to discover the Truth.

In the Eighth place, because that when a new Opi­nion or an Author of the time is cried up, it seems that their Fame ecclipses ours, because it shines too near it; but they are afraid of no such Injury from the Honour which they pay the Ancients.

In the Ninth place, because Truth and Novelty can never concur together in Matters of Faith. For Men not being willing to make a distinction between Truths that depend upon Reason, and those that de­pend upon Tradition, never consider that they ought to be apprehended after a very different manner. They confound Novelty with Errors, and Antiquity with Truth. Luther, Calvin, and others have intro­duc'd Innovations, and have been mistaken, therefore Galileo, Harvey, and Descartes are mistaken in their Discoveries. The Impannation of Luther is new, and likewise false; therefore the Circulation of Harvey is false, because it is new. For this Reason it is, that they indifferently, bestow that Odious name of Inno­vators, both upon Hereticks and new Philosophers. The Idea's and Words of Truth and Antiquity, of [Page 186] Falshood and Novelty have been joined together There's no remedy; the Common sort never sepa­rate 'em, and Men of Sense find difficulty enough in it.

In the Tenth place, because we live in a Time wherein the Knowledge of the Ancient Opinions is still in vogue; and because there are none but those that make use of their Judgment, who can by Force of their Reason wrest themselves from the Contagion of Depraved Customs. When we are in the Throng and the Croud, 'tis a hard matter not to give way to the Impetuosity of the Torrent that carries us along with it.

In the last place, because Men act only upon tho score of Interest; and this is the Reason, that even they who deceive themselves, and who perceive the vanity of these sorts of Studies, cease not to apply themselves to 'em for all that; because Honours, Dignities, and Benefices are annexed to 'em; and for that they are always more capable of 'em, who excel in those sorts of Studies, than those that are ignorant of 'em.

All these Reasons, in my Opinion, sufficiently shews us why Men blindly follow the ancient Opi­nions, as True; and why, without any Judgment, they reject the new ones, as False: In a word, why they make none or very little use of their Judgment. There are, without question, a great number of Rea­sons more particular which contribute to it; but if those which we have produced, be but attentively consider'd, there will be no cause of surprize to see how some People are prejudic'd with the Authority of the Ancients.

CHAP. V.

THis same False and unworthy Respect, which Men have for the Ancients, produces a great number of most pernicious Effects, which it is convenient to observe.

The first is, that want of using their own Judg­ment, does, by little and little, really disable Men from making any use of it at all. For it is not to be ima­gin'd, that they who grow old over the Volumes of Plato and Aristotle, make use of their Judgment; they commonly spend so much time in the Reading of those Books, only to endeavour to know the Sen­timents of their Authors; and their principal aim is, to know certainly what Opinions they held, without ever troubling themselves much, whither they be consentaneous to Reason or no, as we shall prove in the following Chapter. Thus the Science, and Philosophy which they learn, is properly a Science of Memory, and not a Science of Judgment: They only under­stand Histories, and Matters of Fact, not evident Truths; and they are rather Historians than true Phi­losophers.

The second Effect, which the Reading of the An­cients produces in the Imagination, is, that it puts a strange confusion into all their Idea's who apply themselves to it. There are two different ways to read Authors; the one very good, and very prosita­ble; the other very useless, and even dangerous 'Tis very profitable to read, when we meditate upon what we read: When Men endeavour to find out, by some effect of their Wit, how to resolve the Questions which they meet with in the Titles of the Chapters, before they begin to read them: When they digest, and compare the Idea's of things one with another: [Page 188]In a word, when they make use of their Reason. On the other side, there is no Profit in Reading, when Men understand not what they read; but 'tis dan­gerous for Men to read, and conceive what they read, when they never examine it sufficiently, to make a good Judgment of it; especially, if they have Memo­ry enough to retain what they have conceiv'd, and do not unwarily assent to what they have read and understood. The first way enlightens the Mind, it fortifies it, and enlarges its Capacity: The second contracts its Extension, and by little and little, renders it both weak, obscure and confus'd.

Now the greatest part of those who boast of know­ing the Opinions of others, never Study but after the second Manner; and so the more Reading they have, the more their Judgment becomes Feeble and Con­fus'd. The Reason is, because the Traces of their Brains are confounded one with another, being very numerous; and because Reason has not digested 'em in order; which hinders the Mind from imagining and representing clearly to it self the Things which it stands in need of. When the Mind goes about to open certain Traces, meeting with others more fa­miliar, it never seeks another Passage. For the Ca­paciousness of the Brain not being Infinite, 'tis impos­sible but the great number of Traces form'd irre­gularly, must interfere one with another, and cause a Confusion among the Idea's: 'Tis for this very Rea­son, that Persons that have great Memories are in­capable of judging such things as require much at­tention.

But that which is chiefly to be observed is this, that the Knowledge they acquire, who Read without Meditation, are only to retain the Opinions of o­thers. In a word, that all Sciences that depend upon the Memory, are properly these kinds of Knowledge that puff Men up, because they make a great noise, and infuse a World of Vanity into those that possess them. Thus, they who are learned after that man­ner, being usually full of Pride and Presumption, pre­tend they have a Right to Judge of every thing, tho' [Page 189]they are very uncapable; which causes them to fall into a great number of Errors.

But this false Knowledge does more mischief still; for these Persons fall not alone into Error, they draw along with them almost all the Minds of the Vulgar sort, and a very great Number of young People, who believe all their Decisions as so many Articles of Faith. These falsely Learned, having often prevail'd over them, with the weight of their profound Learn­ing, and having deafned them, as well with extraor­dinary Opinions, as with the Names of ancient and unknown Authors, have gain'd so powerful an Autho­rity over them, that they respect and admire, as Ora­cles, whatever they utter, and no less unadvisedly, embrace all their Sentiments. Persons also, much much Ingenious, and more Judicious, who had never known them before, or could not be inform'd by others what they are, hearing them talk at such a rate, and with so haughty, so imperious, and grave an Air, would have much ado to refrain their respect and esteem for what they say, because it is a difficult thing to forbear paying somewhat to Air and Deport­ment: For, as it often happens, that a Man who is fierce and daring, abuses others who are stronger, but more prudent and moderate than himself; so they, who maintain Things which are neither true nor pro­bable, put their Adversaries to Silence, by speaking after an imperious, haughty, and grave manner, which surprizes them. Now these People, of whom we speak, have a high Conceit of themselves, and de­spise other Men, as being fortify'd with a certain Air of Pride, intermix'd with Gravity, and a Counterfeit Modesty, which prepossesses, and wins those that hear them.

For it is to be observ'd, that all the different Airs of Persons of different Conditions, are only the Natu­ral consequences of that Esteem which every Man has of himself, in reference to others, as it is easie to per­ceive, if we never so little consider it. Thus the Air of Fierceness and Brutality, is that of a Man, that magnifies himself, and little values the Merit of others. [Page 190]The Modest Air, is that of a Man, who has a low Conceit of himself, a high Esteem for others. The Grave Air, is that of a Man, who has a high Conceit of himself, and greatly Ambitious of others Esteem. And the Simple Air, is that of one who has no great Conceit either of himself, or of any body else. So that all the different Airs, which are almost Infinite, are only the Effects which the different Degrees of Esteem that Men have of themselves, or of those with whom they Converse, naturally produce in our looks, and over all the Exterior parts of our Bo­dies. We have in the Fourth Chapter, explain'd the Correspondence between the Nerves that raise the Passions within us, and those which demonstrate them outwardly, by the Air which they Imprint upon the Face.

CHAP. VI.

THere is another fault of great consequence, where­into great Students usually fall; which is, That they Dote upon some certain Author. If there be any thing true and good in the Book, they cry it up even to excess; every thing is true, the whole is good, every thing in it is to be admir'd. They please themselves with admiring what they understand not, and they would have all the World admire it as well as themselves. They assume Honour to themselves, from the Praises which they give to those obscure Authors, because thereby they perswade others that they understand them perfectly well; and this affords them no small occasion of Vanity. They va­lue [Page 191]themselves above other Men, because they believe they understand a Piece of Impertinency in an Old Author, or in a Man that, perhaps, never understood himself. How many Learned Men have Sweated, to Illustrate some obscure Passages of the Ancient Philo­sophers and Poets; and how many great Wits are there, who make it their whole delight to Criticize upon a Word, or the Sentiment of an Author: But 'tis convenient to bring some Instance for what I alledge.

The Question concerning the Immortality of the Soul, is, without all doubt, a Question of great Im­portance. The Philosophers are not to be blam'd, for using all their endeavours to resolve it; and tho' they compile large Volumes, to prove, tho' weakly enough, a Truth that may be demonstrated in a few Words, or in a few Pages at most, yet they are excu­sable. But who can refrain from laughing, to see them put themselves to such a World of Trouble, to decide what Aristotle thought of it: 'Tis, in my Opinion, a thing of little benefit to those that live now, to know whether there were ever such a Man who was call'd Aristotle; whether that Man ever wrote those Books which go under his Name; whe­ther he meant such or such a thing, in such a part of his Works; it can neither make a Man more Wise, or more Happy: But 'tis of great Importance to know, whether what he has said be true or false in it self.

'Tis to no purpose then, to know what Aristotle be­liev'd touching the Immortality of the Soul, tho' it be of great moment to know that the Soul is Immortal. However, we are not afraid to assert, that several Learned Men have put themselves to more trouble, to know the Opinion of Aristotle, upon this subject, than the Truth of the Thing in it self, since there are some who have compos'd whole Folio's, on purpose to un­fold what that Philosopher believ'd of it, but never did so much to know what he ought to have believ'd of it.

But tho' so great a number of People have tir'd their Brains, to resolve what was Aristotle's Opinion, they labour'd all to no purpose, since they cannot as yet agree about this trifling Question; which shews, that the Followers of Aristotle are very Unfortunate, to have a Man so obscure to enlighten them; and who himself affected obscurity, as he testifies in a Letter which he wrote to Alexander.

The Opinion then, of Aristotle, touching the Immor­tality of the Soul, has been at several times a very great Question, and very considerable among Studi­ous Persons; but because it may not be thought that I talk at Random, and without any Foundation, I am oblig'd to recite in this place a passage out of La Cerda, somewhat long, and somewhat tedious, wherein that Au­thor has heap'd together as many different Authorities upon that subject, as upon a Question of great mo­ment. His words are these that follow, upon the second Chapter of Tertullian, de Resurrectione Carnis.

Quaestio haec in scholis utrimque validis suspicionibus agitatur, num animam immortalem, mortalemve fecerit Aristoteles. Et quidem Philosophi haud ignobiles asseve­raverunt Aristotelem posuisse nostros animos ab interitu alienos. Hi sunt è Graecis & Latinis interpretibus Am­monius uterque, Olympiodorus, Philoponus, Simplicius, Avicenna, uti memorat Mirandula l. 4. de examine va­nitatis Cap. 9. Theodorus, Metochytes, Themistius, S. Tho­mas 2. contra gentes cap. 79. & Phys. lect. 12. & praete­rea 12. Metap. lect. 3. & quodlib. 10. qu. 5. art. 1. Al­bertus, tract. 2. de anima cap. 20. & Tract. 3. cap. 13. Aegidius lib. 3. de anima ad cap. 4. Durandus in 2. dist. 18. qu. 3. Ferrarius loco citato contra gentes, & late Eu­gubinus l. 9. de perenni Philosophia cap. 18. & quod plu­ris est, discipulus Aristotelis Theophrastus, magistri men­tem & ore & calamo novisse peritus qui poterat.

In contrariam factionem abiere nonnulli Patres, nec in­firmi Philosophi; Justinus in sua Parainesi, Origenes in [...], & ut fertur Nazianz. in disp. contra Eu­nom. & Nyssenus l. 2. de anima cap. 4. Theodoretus de cu­randis Graecorum affectibus l. 3. Galenus in historia Phi­losophicâ, Pomponatius l. de immortalitate animae, Simon [Page 193]Portius l. de mente humana; Caietanus 3. de anima cap. 2. In eum sensum, ut caducum animum nostrum putaret Aristoteles, sunt partim adducti ab Alexandro Aphodis auditore, qui sic solitus erat interpretari Aristotelicam mentem; quamvis Eugubinus cap. 21. & 22. eum excu­set. Et quidem unde collegisse videtur Alexander morta­litatem, nempe ex 12. Metaph. inde S. Thomas, Theodo­rus, Metochytes immortalitatem collegerunt.

Porro Tertullianum neutram hanc opinionem amplexum credo; sed putasse in hac parte ambiguum Aristotelem. Itaque ita citat illum pro utraque. Nam cum hic adscri­bat Aristoteli mortalitatem animae, tamen l. de anima c. 6. pro contrario opinione immortalitatis citat. Eadem men­te fuit Plutarchus, pro utraque opinione advocans eundem Philosophum in l. 5. de placitis Philosop. Nam cap. 1. mortalitatem tribuit, & cap. 25. immortalitatem. Ex Scholasticis etiam, qui in neutram partem Aristotelem con­stantem judicant, sed dubium & ancipitem, sunt Scotus in 4. dist. 43. qu. 2. art. 2. Harveus quodlib. 1. qu. 11. & 1. senten. dist. 1. qu. 1. Niphus in Opusculo de immortalitate animae cap. 1. & recentes alii interpretes: quam mediam existimationem credo veriorem, sed scholii lex vetat, ut autoritatum pondere librato illud suadeam.

We give ye all these Citations for true, upon the Credit of the Commentator, believing it would be loss of time to justifie them; and because we have not all the Books from whence they were Extracted. Nor do we add any new ones, because we do not envy him the Honour of having well collected them, and for that it would be still more loss of time, had we a desire to do it, tho' we should only, for that pur­pose, turn over the Indices of the Commentators up­on Aristotle.

We see then, by this passage of La Cerda, that Studious Men, who pass for able Scholars, have put themselves to the Trouble to know what Aristotle be­liev'd of the Immortality of the Soul, and that there were some of them that never scrupled to Write Books on purpose, upon this subject; among whom was Pomponatius: For the principal Aim of that Au­thor, in his Book, is to shew that Aristotle believ'd the [Page 194]Soul to be Mortal. And, perhaps, there are some People, who do not only enquire what Aristotle be­liev'd upon this subject, but also, look upon it as a Question of great Importance to know, whether, for Example, Tertullian, Plutarch, or others, believ'd or not, that the Opinion of Aristotle was, that the Soul was Mortal, as we have great reason to believe of La Cerda himself, if we consider the last part of the Passage which we have cited, viz. Porro Tertullianum, &c.

If it be not very Profitable to know what Aristotle thought, concerning the Immortality of the Soul, nor what Tertullian and Plutarch thought what Aristotle be­liev'd, however, the main of the Question about the Immortality, or Mortality of the Soul, is, at least, a Truth very necessary to be known. But there are an infinite number of things, the knowledge of which is very unnecessary, and of which, by consequence, 'tis to yet less purpose to know what the Ancients thought of them: Nevertheless, they put themselves to a World of trouble, to guess at the Sentiments of Philo­sophers upon subjects of the like Nature. We meet with Books full of these Inquisitions, and these are the Trisles that have rais'd so many Wars among the Learned. These vain and impertinent Questions, these frivolous Genealogies of unprofitable Opinions, are the Important subjects of the Criticisms of the Learned: They imagine themselves the Absolute Masters of the Genealogical History of substantial Forms, and the World is Ingrateful if it does not ac­knowledge their Merit. How do these things dis­play the Weakness and Vanity of Human Wit! When Reason does not, that regulates our Studies; our Stu­dies not only grow incapable of perfecting Reason, but even darken, corrupt, and absolutely pervert it. But 'tis necessary here to observe, that in Questions concerning Faith, they are no way to blame, who search what St. Austin, for Example, or any other Fa­thers of the Church, have believ'd concerning those things; as neither are they, who enquire whither St. Austin believ'd what they believ'd who preceded [Page 195]him, because we cannot attain to Matters of Faith, but by Tradition, Reason not being able to discover them. The most Ancient Belief being the most true, 'tis requisite to know what was that Belief of the An­cients, which cannot be done but by examining the Opinions of several Persons, who succeeded each other at different times. But in things that depend upon Reason, the case is alter'd, and there is a necessity for Men to trouble themselves what the Ancients be­liev'd, that we may know what is needful for our selves to believe concerning them: Nevertheless, I know not through what confusion of the Mind, cer­tain People are affrighted, if we speak otherwise in Philosophy than Aristotle; but are never mov'd, if we speak otherwise in Divinity than the Gospel, the Fa­thers, and the Councils. It seems to me, that they who make the loudest noise against the Novelties of Philosophy, which ought to be esteem'd; are they that favour and defend Innovations in Divinity, with the greatest obstinacy, and which ought to be detested. For 'tis not their Language which we blame, as being Authorized by Custom, tho' altogether unknown to Antiquity, but the Errors which they disperse abroad, or which they maintain under the Protection of their confus'd and equivocal Terms.

In Matters of Divinity, we shou'd follow Antiquity, because we ought to love Truth, and because Truth is found in Antiquity: 'Tis necessary that all Curiosity shou'd cease, whence once we have sound out the Truth, but in Matters of Philosophy 'tis quire the con­trary: we ought to love Novelty, for the same reason that we ought always to love the Truth; we must search after it, and have an uncessant Curiosity for it. If we thought that Aristotle, and Plato, were Infal­lible, it wou'd be sufficient for us to apply our selves to understand them, but Reason will not permit us to believe it; for, on the contrary, it requires that we shou'd believe them more ignorant than the New Phi­losophers, since the World is now grown older by two thousand Years, and has more Experience than it had in Aristotle's and Plato's Days, as we have already [Page 196]said; and because the New Philosophers may not on­ly know all the Truths which the Ancients have left behind them, but may likewise discover many others: Nevertheless, Reason forbids us to believe these New Philosophers upon their own Words, rather than the Ancients. It requires, on the contrary, that we should diligently examine their Thoughts, and refuse our Assent, till it is impossible for us, any longer, to doubt the certainty of their Truth; without being ridicu­lously prepossed with their great Learning, or other Qualities of their Wit.

CHAP. VII.

THis excess of Prejudice, appears much more strange in those who Comment upon any Author, because they, who undertake that Work, which seems in it self beneath a Man of Sense, imagine that their Authors deserve to be admir'd by all Men. They also look upon themselves, as making but one Person with their Author; and with this Conceit, Self-love most admirably plays it's part. They are cunningly profuse in the Praises of their Authors; they set them off with the best advantage, and heap Honours upon them, well knowing that this Honour will reflect upon themselves. And this Idea of Gran­deur, does not only magni [...]ie Aristotle or Plato, in the Minds of many Persons, but it imprints also a Respect for all those that have Commented upon them: And such a one would never have Deify'd his Author, but that he imagin'd himself, as it were, comprehended in the [...].

I do not believe, however, that all Commentators praise their Authors in hopes of a Return; many would abhor it, if they consider'd it; they Praise [Page 197]them sincerely, and don't think they do it in respect to themselves, but Self-love does it for them, without their perceiving it. Men are not sensible of the Heat which is in their Hearts, tho' it gives Life and Mo­tion to all the other parts of their Body; 'tis necessa­ry that they feel it, by laying their Hands upon their Breast, to be convinc'd of it, because that Heat is Natural. 'Tis the same thing with Vanity; 'tis so Natural to Man, that he is not sensible of it, tho' it be that, which, as I may so say, gives Life and Mo­tion to the greatest part of his Thoughts and Designs; it does it many times, in such a manner, as is imper­ceptible to him. A Man must feel, handle, and search himself, to be convinc'd that he is Vain. There's no Man yet, has sufficiently been sensible, that 'tis this Vanity which sets the first Wheel of the greatest part of our Actions a going; for tho' Self love, in­deed, knows it well enough, yet is that Knowledge to no other end, than to conceal it from all Man­kind.

A Commentator then, having some Relation and Affinity with the Author, upon whom he Comments, his Self-love fails not to discover to him the great subjects of Praise in that Author, to the end he may reap the benefit of them himself: And this is done so dexterously, so subtilely, and so delicately, that it is not to be perceived. But this is not a place to dis­cover the Artifices of Self-love.

Commentators not only Praise their Authors, be­cause they are prepossessed with an Esteem for them, and because they Honour themselves in Praising them, but also, because it is the Custom, and for that it seems as if there were a necessity of doing it. There are some Persons, who not having any great value for [...] Authors, forbea [...] not, however, to Comment upon them, and that with great Application too, be­cause their Employment, Chance, or their own Ca­pritious Fancy, engages them to undertake the Work. And these People believe themselves oblig'd, to extol, after a Hyperbolical manner, the Sciences, and Au­thors upon which they Comment, tho' the Authors [Page 198]are Impertinent, and the Sciences mean and use­less.

And, indeed, it would be a very ridiculous thing for a Man to Comment upon an Author, whom he believes to be Impertinent, and seriously to apply himself to write, in such a manner, as he thought to be of no use. He must therefore, for his Reputation's sake, praise those Sciences, and those Authors, altho' both were Contemptible, and tho' the fault, which he has committed in undertaking an ill Work, may be repaired by another fault as bad. This is the Rea­son that Learned Men, who Comment upon different Authors, frequently contradict themselves.

For this Reason also it is, that almost all Prefaces are scarce ever agreeable to Truth or good Sense. If the Comment be upon Aristotle, he is the Genius of Nature: If they Write upon Plato, he is the Divine Plato. They never Comment upon the Works of Men without Additions to their Names. They are always the Works of Men wholly Divine; of Men who are the Admiration of their Age; or such as have received from God particular Gifts. 'Tis the same thing also, with the Matter which they treat of; 'tis always the most Noble, the most Sublime, and the most useful of all other subjects.

But that I may not be thought to speak upon my own word, see here, after what manner a famous Commentator among the Learned, writes of the Au­thor upon which he Comments. 'Tis Averroes speak­ing of Aristotle: He says, in his Preface to the Physic; of that Philosopher, that he was the Inventor of Lo­gie, Ethies, and Metaphysies, and that he brought them to Perfection. Complevit, says he, quia nullus eorum, qui seenti sunt eum us (que) ad hee tempus, quod est mille & quingentorum annorum, quid [...]am addidit; nee invenies in ejus verbis errorem alicnjus quantitatis: Et talem esse virtutem in Individu [...] un [...], miracul [...]sum & extrancum existit; & [...] dispositio cum in uno Ho­mine reperi [...]ur, dignus est esse divinus magis quam Hum [...] ­nus. And in other places, he gives him far m [...]re Pompous and Magnificent Praises Com [...]. de generatione Animal. Laudemus De­um, [Page 199]qui separavit bunc virum ab aliis in perfectione: appropriavit (que) ei ultimam dignitatem humanam, quam non omnis homo po [...]est in quacun (que) aetate attingere. The same Author also says, Comm. l. 1. destruc. disp. 3. Aristotelis Doctrina est SƲMMA VERITAS, quoniam [...]jus Intellectus fuit Finis Humani Intellectus: quare bene dicitur de illo, quod ipse fuit creatus & datus nobis di­vina Providentia, ut non ignoremus possibilia sciri.

Was not this a Mad-man for talking at this rate? Was not the Dotage of this Author degenerated into Extravagance and Phrenzy? The Doctrine of Aristotle is SOVERAIGN TRƲTH, because no body had Ʋnder­standing like to his, or which came near to his. 'Twas he who was created by God, to teach us what it is possible for us to know. 'Tis [...]e who makes all Men Wise; and they are so much the more Learned, the deeper they enter into his Thoughts. And in another place, Aristoteles fuit Princeps, per quem persiciuntur omnes sapientes qui fuerunt p [...]st cum, licet different [...]nter se in intelligendo verba eju, & in co quod sequitur ex eis. Nevertheless, the Works of this Author are dis­pers'd all over Europe, as also over Countries far more remote. They have been Translated out of Arabic into Hebrew, out of Hebrew into Latin, and it may be into many other Languages, which suffi­ciently shews the Esteem which the Learned had of him: So that we could not have produc'd a more ma­nifest Example than this, of the Prejudic'd Opinions of Studious Persons; for it shews us, that they are not only many times Prejudic'd with an Author, but also, their Prejudice is communicated to others, pro­portionably to the Esteem which they have in the World: So that the false Pr [...]is [...] which Commentators gives him, are the reason that Persons of meaner Parts, and less Education, who are addicted to Reading, be­come prepossess'd, and fall into an infinite number of Errors. But here's another Eample:

A certain Doctor, famous among the Learned, Prelectiones 12. in prin. Elementor. Euclidis. who has founded Lectures of Geometry and Astronomy in the University of Oxford, begins a Book, which he made upon the Eight first Propositions of Euclid, with [Page 200]these Words: Consilium meum, Auditores, si vires & vaietudo suffecerit, explicare definitiones, petitiones, com­munes sententias, & Octo priores Propositiones primi Li­bri Elementorum, caetera post me venientibus relinquere, And he concludes thus, Exolvi per dei gratiam, Domi­ni Auditores, promissum, liberavi fidem meam, expli­cavi pro modulo meo, definitiones, petitiones, communes sententias, & octo priores propositiones Elementorum Eu­clidis. Hic annis fessus, cyclos artem (que) repono. Succe­dent in hoc munus alii fortasse magis vegeto corpore, vivi­do ingenio, &c. Certainly one hour would be enough for a very mean Capacity to learn of himself, or with the help of the most ordinary Geometrician, the De­finitions, the Postulates, Axioms, and the eight first Propositions of Euclid; they have hardly need of any Explanation: Yet here's an Author, that talks of this Enterprise as if it were extreamly hard and difficult. He is afraid lest his strength should fail him, si vires & valetudo suffecerint. He leaves it to his Successors to perfect what he has left undone, Caetera post me ve­nientibus relinguere. He thanks God, for that by his particular favour, he has performed what he promis'd. Exclvi per dei gratiam premissum; liberavi fidem me­am; explicavi pro modulo meo: What? The Quadra­ture of a Circle? The Duplication of a Cube? This great Man has explain'd, pro modulo suo, the Definitions. Postulates, Axioms, and the eight first Propositions of the first Book of Euclids Elements. It may be, that among those that are to succeed him, there will be some that will have more health and strength than himself, to continue this Noble Work. Succedent in hoc munus alii FORTASSE magis vegetes corpore & vivido ingenio. But as for his part, 'tis time for him to take his rest, his annis fessus, cyclos artem (que) reponit.

Euclid, certainly, never thought of being so ob­scure, or of speaking things so extraordinary, when he compos'd his Elements, that there should be a ne­cessity of making a Book of near three hundred Pa­ges, In Quarte. to explain his Definitions, his Postulates, his Axioms, and his Eigh [...] first Propositions. But this Learned Gen­tle-man, well knows how to magnify the Science [Page 201]of Euclid, and had Age permitted him, and his Strength not fail'd him, we should have had, by this time, twelve or fifteen large Folio's only upon the Elements of Geometry, which would have been very useful to those that are desirous to learn that Science, and much to the Honour of Euclid.

These are the odd Designs which false Learning qualifies us for: This Man understood the Greek Lan­guage, for we are beholding to him for a Greek Edi­tion of St. Chrysostome's Works. He had also read, perhaps, the Ancient Geometricians: He knew, histo­rically, their Propositions, as well as their Genealogy. He had all the same Respect for Antiquity that Men ought to have for Truth: And what does this same Qualification of Wit produce? A Commentary upon the Definitions, Postulates, Axioms, and the eight first Propositions of Euclid, much more difficult to un­derstand and retain; I do not say, than the Propo­sitions upon which he Comments, but than all that Euclid has Writ upon Geometry.

There are many People, whose Vanity causes them to speak Greek, and sometimes a Language which they do not understand; for Dictionaries, as well as Index's, and Common Places, are a great help to ma­ny Authors, but there are few Men that caution themselves, about heaping up Greek upon a subject where it is little to the purpose to make use of it. And this it is, which makes me believe 'twas a pre­judic'd Opinion, and an irregular Esteem for Euclid, which form'd the design of that Book in the Ima­gination of its Author.

Had this Man made as much use of his Reason as of his Memory, in a subject where Reason ought to be employ'd; or had he had as much Love and Re­spect for Truth, as Veneration for the Author upon whom he Comments, 'tis very probable, that having spent so much time upon so little subject, he would have acknowledg'd, that the Definitions which Euclid gives of a Plain Angle, and Parallel Lines, are de­sective, and that they do not sufficiently explain the Nature of them; and that the second Preposition is [Page 202]Impertinent, since it cannot be prov'd but by the third Postulate, which cannot be granted, unless you like­wise grant the second Proposition. For in granting the third Postulate, which is, On any Centre, and at any Distance, to describe a Circle, they not only grant, that one Line equal to the other, may be drawn from a Point, which Euclid demonstrates by great Circum­locutions in his second Proposition, but also, that an infinite number of Lines, of any length, may be drawn from every Point.

But the Design of the most part of Commentators is not to illustrate their Authors, and to enquire after Truth, but to shew their Learning, and inconsiderate­ly to desend the faults themselves, of those upon whom they Comment: They speak not so much to be understood themselves, or to make their Authors to be understood, as to procure Admiration to them­selves and them. Had not the Person, whom we have mention'd, stuft his Book with Greek Passages, seve­ral Names of Authors little known, and other Re­marks of the same Nature, of little use to the Under­standing of Common Notions, Definitions of Names, and Postulates in Geometry, who would have read his Book? Who would have admir'd him? And who would have given the Author of it, the Title of a Learned Man, or a Man of Sense?

After what has been said, I do not believe it can be doubted, that the indiscreet Reading of Authors often prepossesses the Mind. Now so soon as the Mind of a Man is prepossess'd, he ceases to be owner of what we call Common Sense: He can no longer give a found Judgment upon any thing, that has Rela­tion to the subject of his Prejudic'd Opinion, it in­fects every thing he thinks on; he can apply himself but very little to any thing, besides what he is Preju­dic'd in favour of. Thus a Man that admires Aristo­tle, can never relish any body but Aristotle; he Judges of every thing as it relates to Aristotle; what­ever is contrary to his Philosophy, is in his Opinion false, he will have always some Passage of Aristotle in his Mouth; he will Quote him upon all occasions, [Page 203]and upon all sorts of subjects; to prove things ob­scure, which no body understands, to prove things as clear as day, and which are known to every Child i'th' Street: 'tis all one, because that Aristotle is to him what Reason and Evidence are to others.

In like manner, if a Man Dote upon Euclid, and Geometry, he shall refer to the Lines and Proposi­tions of his Author, whatever you say to him: He will not talk to ye, but his Words shall have some de­pendence upon his Science. The whole shall not be greater than a part, only because Euclid says it, and he will not be asham'd to Quote him to prove it, as I have observ'd. But this is much more usual with those who adhere to other Authors than those of Geo­metry; and we frequently find large Greek, Hebrew, and Arabic Passages in their Books, to prove things that are perfectly evident.

All this befalls them, because the Traces, which the Objects of their Prejudic'd Opinion have imprinted on the Fibres of their Brains, are so deep, that they always remain open, and for that the Animal Spirits, passing continually quite through them, will not per­mit them to close: So that the Mind, being con­strain'd to have always those Thoughts that are an­nex'd to the Traces, she becomes, as it were, their Slave, and is always troubled and disquieted by them, when knowing her Errors, she endeavours to apply a Remedy to them. Thus the Mind is continually in danger of falling into a great number of Errors, if she does not always stand upon her Guard, and, with an unalterable Resolution, observe the Rule which we have spoken of at the beginning of this Work, that is to say, never to assent but to Things that are in­tirely evident.

I speak not here of the ill choice of those Studies to which they apply themselves, that is a subject to be handled in E [...]ics, tho' it might be referr'd to what has been said concerning Prejudic'd Opinions: For when a Man throws himself desperately upon the study of the Rabbins, and other Books in all forts of Languages, and consequently the most unprofitable, [Page 204]and wastes his whole Life therein, he does it, doubt­less, out of a Prejudic'd Opinion, and an Imaginary hope of becoming Learned, tho' he will never be able to acquire any real Knowledge by this way of Study. But because this Application to an unprofitable Study, does not so much lead us into Error, as it wastes our Time, and fills us with a foolish Vanity, we shall not here discourse of those, who take pains to become Learned in all sorts of mean, or unprofitable Scien­ces, whose Number is very great, and who, for the most part, Study with too much Passion.

CHAP. VIII.

WE have shew'd the State of the Imagination of Stu­dious Persons, who abandon themselves wholly to the Authority of certain Authors: There are others, who are very much opposite to them. These are a sort of Persons that never respect any Authors, what­ever esteem they have among the Learned: If they had a Value for them once, they have since chang'd their Minds, and now they set up themselves for Au­thors. They would fain become the Inventors of some New Opinion, thereby to acquire some Reputation in the World; and they assure themselves, that if they can but say something that has not been said al­ready, they shall not fail of Admirers.

These sort of Men have usually a strong Imagina­tion, the Fibres of their Brain are of such a Nature, that they preserve a long time, the Traces that are im­printed in them. Thus, when they have once ima­gin'd a System that has some Probability, 'tis impossi­ble to undeceive them of their Error: They retain, and tenderly preserve all things, that may be ser­viceable, [Page 205]in any manner, to confirm it. On the other side, they never take notice of the Objections which are made against it, or else they evade them by some frivolous distinction. Inwardly they please them­selves with the sight of their Work, and with the Re­putation which they hope to get by it. They only ap­ply themselves to consider the Image of Truth, which their probable Opinions carry: They keep that Image fix'd before their Eyes, but they never stedfastly be­hold those other sides of their Sentiments, which would discover the falshood of them.

Great Endowments are requir'd for the framing of any true System; it's necessary that there be a great vivacity and sharpness, besides a certain sublimeness and extension of Judgment, able to survey a great number of things at the same time. Men of mean parts, with all their vivacity, and all their delicacy, are too short sighted, to see what is necessary for the Composing of a System; they stoop at some little dif­ficulties that discourage them, or at some glimmerings that dazle them: They have not a fight sharp enough to survey the whole Body of a large subject, all at a time.

But let the Extent and Penetration of the Mind, be never so great, if it be not withal exempt from Passion and Prejudice, there is little to be expected from it; Prejudices possess one part of the Mind, and infect the rest; Passions confound the Idea's a thousand ways, and represent to us, in Objects, whatever we desire to find there. That Passion also, which we have for Truth it self, sometimes deceives us, when it is too vehement; but the desire of ap­pearing Learned, is that which drives us farthest off from attaining true Knowledge.

There is nothing more rate, than to meet with Persons capable of making new Systems; but it is not so rare a thing, to meet with such as have compos'd Systems after their own Fancies. There are few People, that Study much, who argue according to Common Notions, there is always some Irregulari [...]y in their Idea's; and this sufficiently shews, that they [Page 206] rely upon some particular Systems, which is not known to us: 'Tis true, that all the Books which they Compose do not make it manifest; for when we settle our selves to Write any Book, which we design to Publish, we take heed, as near as is possible, of what is to be said; and this Attention alone, is oft­times sufficient to convince us of our Error. Never­theless, we see from time to time, some Books which prove sufficiently what we have said; for there are Authors, who pride themselves in observing, at the beginning of their Book, that they have invented some new System.

The Number of Inventors of New Systems, is also very much augmented, by Prejudices conceiv'd against some Authors; for it often happens, that because they have not met with any thing true or solid, in the Opinions of those Authors which they have read, they fall, in the first place, into a great dislike and scorn of all sorts of Books, and afterwards imagine a new Opinion, that carries some Probability, which they greedily embrace, and which becomes more deeply rooted in them, in such manner as we have set forth.

But when this extraordinary Zeal, which they have for their Opinion, grows cool, or the design of transmitting it to the Publick, has oblig'd them to examine it more exactly and seriously, they discover, and quit the falshood; but with this condition, that they will never embrace any others, and will con­demn all those who pretend to have discover'd any Truth.

Therefore the last, II. A consi­ [...] [...] Er­ror of Sta­dions Per­sons. and most dangerous Error of Studious Persons, is this, that they believe there is nothing can be certainly known: They have read ma­ny Books, both Ancient and Modern, wherein they could not meet with Truth; they have had several curious Thoughts, which, upon a more strict Exami­nation, they have found false. From whence they conclude, that all Men are like them, and that if they, who believe they have consider'd some Truths, would but a little more seriously consider them, they would [Page 207] be convinc'd of their Errors, as well as themselves. This to them, is sufficient to condemn 'em without entring into any farther particular Examination; since, if they did not condemn 'em, it would in some measure be an acknowledgment, that they had more Wit than themselves; which they are not apt to think very probable.

Therefore they esteem, as obstinate, all those that hold any thing for certain; nor will they by any means hear talk of the Sciences as Evident Truths, which are beyond all contradiction, but only as Opinions of which it is not convenient to be ignorant: However these Persons ought to consider, that though they have read a great number of Books, yet they have not read all, or at least with that attention which is re­quisite for the right understanding 'em; or if they had many curious thoughts which they sound false in the conclusion, it does not follow they had all the thoughts they might have had; and so it's possible that others have done better than they. For all this, it is not necessary that the others should have more Sense than they, if that be the business that offends 'em, for it's enough that they were only more Fortu­nate; Nor is there any wrong done 'em by those who profess to know evidently what they are ignorant of, since they say at the same time, that several Ages have been ignorant of the same Truths; not for want of good Wits, but because these good Wits did not first light upon them.

Let 'em not then be offended, if others see more clearly than they, and speak as they see. Let 'em ap­ply their Minds to what is propos'd to 'em, (if their Wit be more capable of Application, after all their Wandrings) and let 'em then judge: there's no body will hinder 'em; but let 'em be patient and hold their Tongues, if they resolve to examine nothing. Let 'em consider a little, whether the Answer, which they usually give to most Questions that are ask'd 'em, they know nothing of the ma [...], no Body has hithert [...] attain'd it, be a Judicious Answer [...] since that when they make that Answer, they must believe they know [Page 208] all that other Men know, or all that other Men can know. For if they had not these thoughts of them­selves, their Answer were still more impertinent. And why do they think it so difficult a thing to con­fess they know nothing of it, when upon certain Oc­casions they grant that they knew nothing at all? And wherefore must they conclude that all other Men are ignorant, because they are inwardly convinc'd that they themselves are ignorant?

There are these three sorts of Persons who apply themselves to Study. The first doat to little purpose upon some Author, or some false unuseful Science. The second are prepossest in their own Fancies. The last, which partake of the Qualifications of both the former, are they who imagine they know all that can be known; and who being persuaded that they know nothing of certainty, conclude in general, that no­thing can be evidently known; and look upon all things that are propos'd to 'em as meer Opinions.

'Tis easie to see that all the Defects of these three sorts of Persons, depend upon the Properties of the Imagination, which we have explain'd in the Tenth and Eleventh Chapters, but chiefly in the First, that all this befalls 'em only through Prejudices, in Opi­nions that blind their Minds, and will not permit 'em to apprehend any other Objects than those of their Prepossessions. It may be said that their Prejudices act their Minds, as the Ministers of Princes do in re­ference to their Masters. For as those Persons, do, as much as in 'em lies, never permit any but such as are devoted to their Interests, or such as they are no way afraid of, to speak to their Masters; so the Pre­judices of these Men will not permit the Mind to behold with a fixed Eye the Idea's of Objects that are wholly pure and unmix'd; but they disguise 'em; they cover 'em with their Liveries, and present 'em in that manner all masqu'd; so that 'tis a difficult thing for 'em to undeceive themselves, and acknowledge their Errors.

CHAP. IX.

WHat we have said, is sufficient, in my Opinion, to set forth in general what are the Defects of the Imagination in Studious Persons, and the Errors to which they are most subject. Now in regard there are none but these Persons who trouble themselves with Searching after Truth, and because all the rest of Mankind depends upon them for it, it might be thought that we should here conclude this Second Part. Nevertheless, 'tis convenient to say something more concerning the Errors of other Men, because it will not be amiss to know what they are. Of the Effe­mina [...]e Wits. Whatever flatters the Senses, extreamly affects us; and to what­ever affects us, we apply our selves proportionably to the pleasure we take in it. Thus they, who give themselves up to all manner of the most sensible and pleasing Divertisements, are incapable of penetrating Truths that include any considerable difficulty; be­cause the Receptacle of the Mind, which is not infi­nite, is wholly taken up with their Pleasures, or at least they have a very great share therein.

The generality of Great Men, Courtiers, Rich Men, young People, and they that are call'd by the name of fine Wits, being taken up with continual Pastimes, and only Studying the Art of flattering their Concupiscence and Voluptuous Appetites, by degrees acquire such a Delicacy of Skill in these things, or rather such a Softness, that they may be often said to be rather Effeminate than fine Wits, as they pretend to be. For there is a great difference between Fineness and Softness of Wit, though they are generally con­founded one with another.

Fine Wits are they who discern, by the Conduct of Reason, the most minute differences of things, who foresee the uncommon and almost imperceptible Effects that depend upon Hidden Causes: In short, these are they who penetrate into the Subjects which they consider. But soft Wits have nothing but a false Delicacy; they are neither lively nor pierceing; they discern not the Effects from the Causes, even of the most gross palpable thing: Lastly, they neither apprehend nor penetrate into any thing, but are ex­treamly nice as to Manners; A Clownish Word, the Accent of a particular County, a little Grimace, pro­vokes 'em more than a torrent of confus'd and frivo­lous Arguments; they cannot know the Defect of Reasoning, but are immediately very sensible of a false Measure, or an irregular Gesture: In short, they un­derstand sensible things perfectly, because they keep their Senses in continual Exercise; but they want the true understanding of things that depend upon Rea­son, because they seldom or never make use of their own.

Nevertheless, these are the Persons who are most esteemed in the World, and easily acquire the Repu­tation of Curious Wits. For when a Man speaks with a free and disengag'd Air; when his Expressions are pure and well chosen, when he makes use of Si­mile's that flatter the Senses, and move the Affections after an imperceptible manner, though he utter no­thing but trivial things, though there be nothing found, nothing true in all his fine Words, He, accord­ing to the Common Opinion, shall be cried up for a Curious Wit, a Refin'd Wit, a Polish'd Wit. They never perceive that he is only a Soft Effeminate Wit, and shines only by false Lights, that never enlighten the Mind; and that his persuasions prevail only be­cause we have Eyes, but not because we have Reason.

Lastly, We do not deny but that all Men are in some measure guilty of this weakness, which we have observ'd in some. There is not any Man whose Mind is not touch'd by the Impressions of his Senses and Affections, and who by consequence is not a little [Page 211] sway'd by outward Formalities and Language. As to this, all Men differ but in the more or the less. But the reason why this defect is attributed to some par­ticularly, is this; because there are some who ac­knowledge it to be a fault, and strive to reform it. Whereas they, who have been mentioned by us, look upon it as a very advantageous Accomplishment. Far from acknowledging this same false Delicacy to be the Effect of an Effeminate Softness, and the Original of an Infinite number of the Diseases of the Mind; they imagine it to be an Effect and Mark of the Beauty of their Genius.

To these, of whom we have spoken, Of Superfi­cial Wits. we may join a very great number of Superficial Wits, who never dive into any thing, and who never apprehend, unless it be confusedly, the differences of things; Not through their own fault, as in those before mention­ed, for their Minds are neither fill'd up, nor con­tracted by their Divertisements only they have natu­rally Slender Wits. However this same Slenderness of Wit, proceeds not from the Nature of the Soul, as may be well imagin'd; but it is caus'd sometimes by the great scarcity, or the more than ordinary slowness of the Animal Spirits, sometimes through the Inflexibility of the Fibres of the Brain; sometimes also through an immoderate abundance of Spirits and Blood, or for some other Reason which it is not worth while to examine.

There are then two sorts of Wits. Some readily observe the difference of things; and these are True Wits. Others imagine and suppose a Resemblance between 'em, and these are Superficial Wits. The first have a Brain proper to receive clean and distinct Traces of the Objects which they consider; and be­cause they are very attentive to the Idea's of the Traces, they see those Objects, as it were, near at hand, and nothing escapes 'em. But Superficial Wits receive none but feeble or confus'd Traces of their Objects. They see 'em only, as it were, cursorily at a distance and very confusedly; so that they seem alike to 'em, like the Faces of those which we see [Page 212] afar off, because the Mind supposes always Likeness and Equality, for the Reasons which I shall give in the Third Book.

The greatest part of those that speak in Publick, all those that are call'd great Talkers, and many of those who are fluent of Speech, though they speak but little, are of this sort. For they who meditate seriously and accurately, are very rarely known to have a Copious Utterance of their own Meditations. Usually they hesitate when they begin to speak, be­cause they are somewhat cautious of making use of Terms that excite in others a false Idea, being asham'd to speak meerly for Talkings sake, like many that speak boldly of every thing that comes next 'em; they are therefore concern'd to find out Words proper to express, as they ought to do, their thoughts, which are not common.

Though we have a great Veneration for Persons of Piety, Divines, Old Men, and generally for all those who have justly acquir'd great Authority over other Men, nevertheless we thought our selves oblig'd to say this of 'em, it often happens that they be­lieve themselves infallible, because all other Men hearken to 'em with Respect; because they make little use of their Reason in the discovery of Speculative Truths, and for that they condemn with too much freedom, whatever they dislike, before they have se­riously consider'd it. Not that they are to be blam'd for not applying themselves to many Sciences of little use; for they are allow'd both to let 'em alone, and to despise them if they think convenient; but they are not to judge of 'em rashly as their fancies lead 'em, nor upon ill grounded suspitions. For they are to consider, that the Gravity of their Delivery, the Authority which they have acquir'd over the Minds of Men and their common custom of confirming what they say by some Passage of the Holy Scripture, will infallibly lead into Error all those that listen to 'em out of Respect, and who being incapable throughly to examine things, suffer themselves to be surpriz'd by Manners and Appearances.

When Error hath the appearance of Truth, it is oftimes more respected than Truth it self; and this false Respect is attended with dangerous Inconveni­encies. Pessima res est errorum Apotheosis, & pro peste intellectus habenda est; si vanis accedat veneratio. Thus, when certain Persons, either out of false Zeal, or out of a Love for their own thoughts, have made use of Scripture to establish false Principles of Natural Phi­losophy, or any other Science, they have oft been li­sten'd to as Oracles by Men that have believ'd 'em upon their Words, because of that Veneration which they owe to Sacred Authority; but it has likewise happen'd so, that Vicious and Corrupted Minds have hence taken an occasion to despise Religion: So that by a strange Inversion, the Holy Scripture has been the Cause of Error to some, and Truth has been the Motive and Original of Impiety to others. We ought therefore to be careful, as the Author above cited well observes, how we seek for dead things a­mong the living, and never to pretend by the strength of our own Wits to discover in Sacred Scripture what the Holy Ghost hath not thought fit to reveal. Ex divinorum & humanorum malesana admixtione, continues he, non solum educitur Philosophia Phantastica, sed etiam Religio Haretica. Itaque salutare admodum est, si mente sol [...]ia fidei cantum deatur, quae fidel sunt. All Persons then who have Authority over others, ought to be so much the more cautions in their Decisions by how much they find 'em to be most adher'd to. Divines especially ought to take care how they being Religion into contempt through their false Zeal, out of vain glory either to exalt themselves, or disseminate their Opinions. But because it is not for me to tell 'em their Duty, let 'em bear St. Thomas, Opuse. 9. who being inter­rogated by his General, what he thought of some Ar­ticles, answered him out of St. Austin in the following manner.

Multum autem nocet, alia, que ad pietatis Doctrinam non speclant, vel asscrere vel negate, quasi p [...]tinentia ad sacram doctrinam. Dicit enim in 5. Conf [...]ss. cum audio Christianum aliquem fratrem ista quae Philosophi le cae [...], [Page 214] aut stellis, de Solis & Lunae motibus dixerunt, nescientem, & aliud pro alio sentientem, patienter intucor opinan­tem hominem; nec illi obesse video, cum de te, Domine, Creator omnium nostrorum, non credat indigna, si forte sitûs & habitûs Creaturae Corporalis ignoret. Obest autem si haec ad ipsam doctrinam Pietatis pertinere arbitretur, & pertinacius affirmare audeat quod ignorat. Quod autem obsit, manifestat August. in 1. super Genesin ad Litte­ram. Turpe est, inquit, nimis & perniciosum, ac maxi­me cavendum, ut Christianum de his rebus veluti secun­dum Christianas literas loquentem, ita delicare quilibet Infidelis audeat, ut quemadmodum dicitur toto Coelo errare conspiciens, risum tenere vix possit. Et non tamen Mole­stum est quod errans homo videatur: Sed quod Auditores nostri, ab eis qui foris sunt, talia sensisse creduntur, & cum magno eorum Exitio, de quorum salute satagimus, tanquam indocti reprehenduntur & respumtur. Ʋnde mi­hi videtur tutius esse, ut haec que communes Philosophi sen­serunt, & nostrae Fidei non repugnant, ne (que) esse sic asse­renda ut dogmata Fidei, licet aliquando sub nomine Philo­sophorum introducantur, ne (que) sic esse neganda, tanquam Fi­dei contraria, ne Sapientibus hujus Mundi contemnendi Doctrinam Fidei occasio praebeatur. It's very dangerous to speak decisively upon Matters which do not belong to Faith, as if they did. St. Austin tells us in his 5th Book of Confessions, When I see, says he, a Christian that is not acquainted with the Opinions of Philoso­phers, concerning the Heavens, the Stars, and the Mo­tions of the Sun and Moon, and would take one thing for an other; I let 'em alone in these Opinions and Doubts: For I don't see that Ignorance in the situation of Bodies, the different ordering of Matter, can injure 'em; provided he has not unworthy Sentiments of thee our Lord, who art the Creator of us all. But it does him an Injury, if he is persuaded that these things con­cern Religion, and if he is so bold as obstinately to affirm what he knows not. The same Saint explains his Thoughts yet more clearly upon this Subject in the first Book of the Literal Explication of Genesis in these Terms: A Christian must take a great deal of Care that he does not speak of these Things, as if they [Page 215] were Holy Scripture, for an Infidel who should hear him speak Extravigances that should have no appea­rances of Truth could not forbear laughing at him, so the Christian is only Confounded, and the Infidel would be very little Edified. Yet what is more mis­chievous in these Encounters than a Man's being de­ceiv'd, is, that these Infidels that we endeavour to Convert, imagine falsely, and to their inevitable ruine, that our Authors have very extravigant Sentiments; so that they condemn and despise 'em as ignorant Men; it is therefore in my Opinion more proper, not to affirm the common receiv'd Opinions of Philoso­phers, as Matters of Faith, which are not contrary to our Faith, although we may sometimes make use of the Authority of Philosophers to make 'em be receiv'd. We must not also reject these Opinions as contrary to our Faith, that we may give no occasion to the Wise Men of this World to Dispute the holy Truths of the Christian Religion.

The greatest part of Mankind are so negligent and void of Reason, that they make no distinction between the Word of God and that of Men, when they are joined together, so that they fall into Error, while they approve both, and into Impiety while they despise both indifferently. Nor is it a difficult thing to see the Cause of these last Errors; They proceed from the Connexion of Idea's explain'd in the Eleventh Chapter; nor is it necessary to insist any farther upon the Explanation of 'em here.

However it seems worth our while to say something of Chymists, Of those that make Experi­ments. and generally of all those that spend their time in making Experiments. They are People that Search after Truth; and their Opinions are usu­ally follow'd without any Examination. Therefore their Errors are so much the more dangerous, because they are imparted to others with so much the more ease.

'Tis better, without question, to Study Nature than Books. Visible and sensible Experiments are cer­tainly much more evident Proofs than the Arguments of Men. Nor are they to be blam'd, who, being en­gag'd by their Profession in the Study of Natural Phi­losophy, [Page 216]endeavour to improve their Skill by conti­nual Experiments, provided they apply their Labours to the Improvement of the most necessary Sciences. Therefore Experimental Philosophy is not to be found fault with, nor they who make it their practise, but only their Defects.

The first is, that they are seldom guided, in mak­ing their Experiments by the Light of Reason, but by Chance. From whence it comes to pass that they become but little more Learned or Knowing, after they have spent much time and Money.

The second is, because they are more Sedulous in Curious and Extraordinary Experiments, than such as are most common and familiar. Nevertheless the most Common Experiments are the most Simple; and there­fore they ought first of all to apply themselves to those, before they settle to such as are more com­pounded, and which depend upon a greater number of Causes.

The third is, because they prosecute those Experi­ments that bring in Profit, and neglect those that serve to illuminate the Mind.

The fourth is, because they do not accurately enough observe all the particular Circumstances of Time, Place and Quality of the Drugs which they make use of; though the least of these Circumstances is sufficient to frustrate the Effect which they desire. For it is to be observ'd, that all the Terms of which the Physicians make use of are Equivocal: For Ex­ample, Wine, has as many various significations as there are varieties of Soil, different Seasons, different Manners of making Wine, and different Manners of preserving it; so that in general we may say, that there are not two Tuns of Wine altogether alike. Therefore when a Physician, in order to the making such an Experiment, says, take Wine, no body knows, but very confusedly, what he means. Therefore there is very great Caution to be us'd in Experiments; nor ought they to attempt Compounded ones, till they know the Reason of the more Simple and Com­mon.

The fifth arises from hence, that too many Conse­quences are drawn from one Experiment: Whereas, on the contrary, we want several Experiments to in­fer one true Conclusion.

Lastly, the greatest part of Physicians and Chymists consider only the Particular Effects of Nature; they never return to the first Notions of Things, that com­pose Bodies; Nevertheless, 'tis most certain, that no Man can clearly and distinctly understand the parti­cular Phenomena of Natural Philosophy, unless he be Master of the more General Principles, and unless he also know something in Metaphysics. In a word, they often want Courage and Constancy; they are terri­fied and tired with the Labour and Expence. There are many other Defects in the Persons before mention­ed; but it is not our business here to enlarge.

The Causes of these Defects are little Application, and the Properties of the Imagination explain'd in the Tenth and Eleventh Chapter; and because we never judge otherwise of the difference and alterations of Bodies, than by the Apprehensions we have of 'em, as has been said in the First Book.

CHAP. I.

HAving Explain'd the Nature of Imagina­tion, the Defects to which it is subject, and how our own Imagination leads us into Error, there nothing more remains for us to Discourse of in this Second Book, but of the Contagious Communication of Strong Imaginati­ons, and that is, of the Prevailing Power which some Men have to engage others in their Errors.

Strong Imaginations are extreamly Contagious; they prevail over those that are weak; they make 'em stoop to their own Laws, and imprint upon 'em their own Characters. Therefore, because Men that have particular Idea's, and a Strong and Vigorous Imagina­tion, most commonly exceed the Bounds of Reason, there are few more General Causes of Error than this pernicious Communication of the Imagination.

For the better understanding what this Contagion is, and how it is transmitted from one to another, we must consider that all Men have need of one another, and that they are made to compose, among themselves, several Bodies, of which the Parts should have a mu­tual Correspondence one with another; for the up­holding of which Union it is, that God has command­ed 'em to be Charitable one toward another; but be­cause Self-Love might by little and little extinguish Charity, and by that means dissolve the Bond of Civil Society, the Almighty judg'd it convenient that Men should be united together by Natural Ties, which might subsist when Charity fail'd, and which might defend it against the Efforts of Self-Love.

These Natural Ties which are common to us with Beasts, consist in a certain Disposition of the Brain, with which all Men are endued, to imitate those with whom they Converse, to make the same Judgments which they do, and to be subject to the same Passions of the Mind to which they are subject. And this same Disposition usually unites Men together much more close and firmly than Charity grounded upon Reason, which sort of Charity is very rare.

Unless a Man be endu'd with this same Disposition of the Brain, to partake of our Sentiments and our Pas­sions, he is incapable of his own Nature to unite him­self with us, and compose one Body. He is like those Stones of an irregular form, for which there is no room in a Building, because they cannot be joined to the rest.

It requires a larger Portion of Vertue than Men are aware of, not to break with those that no way sympathize with our Passions, but whose Sentiments are in all things contrary to ours. Nor is it altoge­ther without Reason: For when a Man has good cause to be Sad or Joyful, 'tis in some measure an Af­front not to correspond with him in his Sentiments. If he be Sad, 'tis not proper to appear before him with a brisk and jolly Air, which argues Gladness, and which strongly imprints the Motions of it in his Imagination; for this is to put him out of that Con­dition which is most convenient and pleasing to him, Sadness being the most delightful of all the Passions to a Man in Misery.

All Men therefore have a certain Disposition of the Brain, Two Princi­pal Causes that in­crease our Inclination to imitate one another. which naturally inclines 'em to be affected after the same manner as some of those with whom they Converse. Now there are two Principal Causes that foment and increase this Disposition, the first is in the Soul, the second in the Body: The first consists in the Natural Propensity of Men to Grandeur and Advance­ment. This Propensity it is, which imperceptibly ex­cites us to imitate Persons of Quality, in their manner of Speaking, Walking, Dress, and Outward Air. This is the Original of New Modes, of the Instability of living Languages, and of certain general Cor­ruptions of Manners. This is the chief Origine of all Extravagant and Fantastick Novelties, which are not supported by Reason, but Human Fancy and Pleasure.

The other Cause which much incline to imitate others, and which we ought chiefly to Discourse of here, consists in a certain Impression which Persons of a Strong Imagination make upon Feeble Minds, and upon Tender and Delicate Brains. What a Strong Imagina­tion is. I un­derstand by a Strong and Vigorous Imagination that Constitution of the Brain which makes it capable of Traces extreamly deep, and fill the Receptacle of the Mind in such a manner, that it cannot attend to other things than such as the Images themselves represent to it.

There are two sorts of Persons who have a Strong Imagination in this Sense. Two sorts of it. The first receive these deep Traces by an Unvoluntary and Irregular Impression of the Animal Spirits; and the others, of whom we intend principally to Discourse here, receive 'em from a certain Disposition which is observ'd in the Sub­stance of the Brains.

'Tis visible that the first are absolute Mad Men, seeing they are constrain'd by the Natural Connexion which is between their Idea's and their Traces, to think upon things not thought of by others with whom they Converse; which renders 'em incapable of speak­ing to the purpose, and answering directly to Questi­ons that are ask'd 'em.

There are an infinite number of this sort of People who only differ in the more or the less; and it may be said, that all such as are agitated with some violent Passion are of their number, since at the time of their Emotion, the Animal Spirits so forcibly imprint the Traces and Images of their Passion, that they are incapable of thinking upon any thing else.

But 'tis to be observ'd, that all these sort of Per­sons are not capable of corrupting the Imagination of any Man, let his Mind be never so weak, and his Brain never so soft and delicate; and this for two Reasons. The first, Because they are not able to an­swer conformably to the Idea's of others, they can perswade 'em to nothing; And secondly, Because the Disturbance of their Mind being altogether manifest, whatever they say is hearken'd to with contempt.

Nevertheless, 'tis true that Passionate Persons put us into Passions, and make Impressions in our Imagina­tion like those with which they themselves are affected. But in regard their Transports are manifestly visible, we resist those Impressions, and get rid of 'em soon after. They rub out of themselves, when they are not fomented by the Cause that produc'd 'em, that is to say, when the Transported Persons are departed out of our presence, and when the sensible sight of the Characters, which Passion form'd in the Counte­nance, produces no farther Alteration in the Fibres of [Page 223]our Brain, nor any Agitation in our Animal Spirits.

I only Examine here that sort of Strong and Vigo­rous Imagination which consists in a Disposition of the Brain proper to receive very deep Traces of more feeble and less active Objects.

'Tis no defect, to have a Brain proper for a Strong Imagination of Things, and for the Reception of the most distinct and lively Images of the most inconsi­derable Objects, provided that the Mind be always Mistress of the Imagination, that these Images be imprinted by her Orders, and that they may be de­fac'd when she pleases; for hence arises sagacity and strength of Wit. But when the Imagination over­rules the Soul, and these Traces form themselves by the Disposition of the Brain, and by the Activity of the Objects and Spirits, without expecting the Or­ders of the Will, this is a most Mischievous Vice, and a kind of Madness. We shall therefore endeavour to set forth the Character of those who have a Strong Imagination of this sort.

To that purpose it behoves us to remember that the Receptacle of the Mind is confin'd to narrow limits. 2. That it is fill'd with no Object more easily than with the Sensations of the Mind, and generally with the Perceptions of Objects that affect us very much. 3. That the deep Traces of the Brain are always ac­companied with Sensations, or other Perceptions that vigorously affect us. For thereby 'tis easie to know the Genuine Characters of their Wit who have a Strong Imagination.

The first is, Two consi­derable De­fects in those who have a Strong Ima­gination. that these Persons are not capable of giving a sound Judgment of things that are a little difficult and perplext, because the Receptacle of the Mind being fill'd with Idea's that are by Nature con­nex'd with those very deep Traces, they have not the Liberty to think of several things at the same time. But in Compound Questions, 'tis requisite that the Mind should survey with one quick and suddain mo­tion the Idea's of many things, and discover, at one single view, the Correspondencies and Connexions that [Page]are necessary for the resolving of those Questions.

All Men know by their own Experience, that they are not capable of applying themselves to the Search of any Truth, at such time as they are afflicted with any violent Pain, because then, there are in the Brain those deep Traces which take up the Capacity of the Mind. Thus, those Persons of whom we speak, ha­ving deeper Traces of the same Objects, (as we sup­pose) they cannot have so great an Extension of Mind, nor comprehend so many things together as the others. The first Defect of these Persons is to have a narrow Wit, and how much the narrower it is, so much the deeper Traces their Brain receives of inconsiderable Objects.

The second Defect is, they are Visionaries, yet after a Delicate Manner, and difficult to be dis­cover'd. The Vulgar sort of Men believe 'em not to be such; there are none but just and clear Wits that perceive their Visions, and the Deviations of their Imagination.

Now that we may be able to conceive the Original of this Defect, 'tis necessary to remember what we have said at the beginning of the second Book: That as to those things which are acted in the Brain, the Senses and Imagination differ only in the more and less; that it is by reason of the largeness and deepness of the Traces, that the Mind becomes sensible of Objects; that it judges of 'em as present, and capable of affecting it, and so near it as to make it sensible of Pain and Pleasure. For when the Traces of an Ob­ject are small, the Soul imagines only that same Ob­ject; it does not judge it to be present, nor does it look upon it to be very great or very considerable; but as the Traces become deeper and greater, the Mind also judges that the Object becomes greater and more considerable, approaches nearer to us, and lastly is more apt to affect and injure us.

Those Visionaries of whom we here discourse, are not arriv'd to that Excess of Folly, to believe they see present before their Eyes those Objects which are Ab­sent. The Traces of their Brain are not yet deep [Page 229]enough; they are but half Mad; were they absolute­ly so, 'twere in vain for us to talk of 'em here. See­ing that all Men being sensible of their Errors, they would not suffer themselves to be deluded by 'em. They are not Visionaries in respect of the Senses, but only in reference to the Imagination. Madmen are Visionaries in reference to the Senses, because they see not Things as they are, and many times believe they see those Things which are not. However 'tis evi­dent that Visionaries in reference to the Senses, and in reference to the Imagination, differ only in the more and less; neither is the Passing from one Condition to the other very difficult. Whence it comes to pass, that the Distemper of Mind in the latter, ought to be re­presented by comparing it with the Distemper of the former, which is more manifest, and more strongly affects the Mind; since in things which differ no o­therwise than in the more or less, those things that less sensibly affect us are always to be explain'd by those things that affect us more vehemently.

The second Defect of those who have a strong and vigorous Imagination, is, that they are Visionaries as to the Imagination, or barely Visionaries; for we call those Madmen, that are Visionaries in reference to the Senses. And thus we have enumerated the Vices of Visionary or Fantastick Wits.

These People exceed their Bounds in every thing; they extol mean and abject things; they magnifie small things, and bring remote things near to the sight. No­thing appears to 'em what it really is. They admire every thing; they exclaim against every thing with­out Discretion. If they are naturally dispos'd to be fearful; I mean, if their Animal Spirits are in small quantity, without vigor, without motion, they are afraid of every thing, they tremble at the shaking of a Leaf. But if they abound in Blood and Spirits, which is most usual, they feed themselves with vain Hopes, and give themselves up to their Imagination which is fruitful in Idea's, and according to the Pro­verb, they build Castles in the Air, with extraordi­nary joy and satisfaction. They are vehement in their [Page] [...] [Page 229] [...] [Page 230]Passions, obstinate in their Opinions, always full of, and highly satisfied in the Contemplation of them­selves. When they have a fancy to be accounted fa­mous Wits, and to set up for Authors, (for there are Authors of all sorts, as well Visionaries as others;) What Extravagancies, what Deliriums, what Ravings are they not guilty of! They never imitate Nature, every thing is affected, forced, and rapturous; they rather Skip and Leap than Walk, they speak in Mea­sure, they utter nothing but Figures and Hyperboles. If they addict themselves to Godliness, and to follow it according to their own Fancies, they put on a Spi­rit of Judaism and Pharisaic Hypocrisie; their Minds are altogether intent upon the outside of things, Ex­ternal Ceremonies, and performances of no moment: They become scrupulous, fearful, and superstitious. If you will believe them, every thing belongs to Faith, and every thing is Essential, except what really belongs to Faith, and what is truly Essential. For many times their Minds being taken up with Duties of little moment, they neglect the more useful and more important Precepts of the Gospel, in reference to Justice, Mercy, and Faith. What needs any more? They that desire to be convinc'd of these Defects, and many others, need only to consider what passes in their daily Conversations.

But they that have a Strong and Vigorous Imagi­nation are endu'd with other Qualities, which 'tis very necessary for us to explain in this Place. We have only spoken hitherto of their Defects, we are now to Discourse of their Vertues and Prerogatives; among which they have one that principally regards our sub­ject; for by means of that Prerogative they rule over the Minds of the Vulgar, obtrude their Idea's upon 'em, and communicate to 'em all those false Impres­sions with which they are affected.

This Prerogative consists in a strong and vigorous manner of expressing themselves, That they who have a st [...]ong Ima­gination castly per­suade others. though it be not na­tural. They who have a strong Imagination of things, express 'em vigorously, and perswade all those who are convin [...], rather by outward shew, and sensible [Page 231]Impression, than by the force of Reason. For the Brains of those who excel in Strength of Imagination, admitting deep Traces of the Subjects which they imagine, as we have said before, those Traces for the most part are not imprinted without a great Com­motion of the Animal Spirits, which dispose the whole Body after a quick and lively manner to express the Cogitations of the Mind. Thus the Air of their Face, the Tone of their Voice, and Elegancy of Speech en­livening their Expressions, they gain Attention of their Spectators and Hearers, and prepare 'em to receive Mechanically the Impression of the Image that vio­lently moves 'em. For in short, those things that are deeply infus'd into our Mind, are usually as deeply infus'd by us into the Minds of others. He that is mov'd by a vehement Passion, still moves others with the same Passion; and though his Rhetoric be often Irregular, yet for all that, 'tis very perswasive: Be­cause the External Air and Gesture, as being most sen­sible, acts more vigorously upon the Imagination of Men, than the most solid Arguments, that are se­dately pronounced, because those Ratiocinations nei­ther flatter the Senses, nor strike the Imagination.

Persons then, who excel in Imagination, have the advantage to please, to affect, and perswade, because they form the most lively and sensible Images of their thoughts. But there are other Causes that contribute to their easie gaining upon the Mind: For they never Discourse but upon easie Subjects, and such as are within the reach of Vulgar Apprehensions: They never make use of other Expressions and Terms than such as only excite the Confus'd Notions of the Senses, which always most vehemently affect us: They never talk of Sublime and Difficult Matters but after a Ram­bling manner, and by way of Common Places: For they dare not venture themselves to dive into Particu­lars, and stick close to Principles; whither it be, be­cause they do not understand those Matters; or whe­ther they are afraid lest they should for want of Terms intangle themselves, and tire the Minds of those that are not accustom'd to a serious Attention.

From what has been said, it is easie to judge, that the Vie [...]s of an Irregular Imagination are extreamly Contagious and th [...] they very easily insinuate and dispe [...]e themselves into the Minds of most People. But they who have a Strong Imagination, being usu­ally En [...]es to Reason and good Sense, because of their want of Wit, and the Phantomes of their Brain, to which they are subject, it may be thence readily in­ferr'd, that there are few Causes of our Errors more universal, than the Contagious Communication of the Disorders and Distempers of the Imagination. But we ought to prove these Truths by Examples and Ex­periments Familiar to all the World.

CHAP. II.

THere are frequent Examples of this Communica­tion of the Imagination in Children, in respect of their Parents, more especially in Girles, in respect of their Mothers; in Men Servants in respect of their Masters; and Maid Servants in respect of their Mistresses; in Scholers in respect of their School-masters; Courtiers in respect of their Princes, and generally in all Inferiors in respect of their Superiors. Provided that Parents, Masters, and other Superiors be endued with some­thing of a Strong Imagination; otherwise the Weak Imagination of Parents or Masters will make no con­siderable Impression in Children or Servants.

The Effects of this Communication are also to be observ'd in Persons of Equal Conditions; but that is not so usual; because there is not that Veneration among them, which disposes the Mind in such a man­ner as to admit the Impression of Strong Imaginations without any Examination. Lastly, these Effects are to be met with in Superiors in respect of their Infe­riors: For many times Inferiors are endu'd with an [Page 233]Imagination so lively and imperious, that they bend the Minds of their Masters and Superiors which way they please themselves.

It will be an easie thing to apprehend how Fathers and Mothers make very strong Impressions upon the Imaginations of their Children, if we consider, that these Natural Dispositions of our Brain, which in­clines us to imitate those with whom we Converse, and to be affected with the same Sentiments and Pas­sions, are far stronger in Children, in respect of their Parents, than in other Men: For which several Rea­sons may be given; and the first is, because they are of the same Blood: For as Parents frequently trans­mit to their Children a Disposition to certain Here­ditary Distempers, as the Gout, the Stone, Madness, and generally all those Diseases which do not come by accident, or from some extraordinary Fermenta­tion of the Humours, as Fevers, Agues, &c. for it is visible, that as those Diseases cannot be communi­cated, so they imprint the Dispositions of their own upon the Brains of their Children, and bend their Ima­ginations in such a manner, as to render 'em capable of the same Sentiments with themselves.

The second Reason is, because that Children have very little Familiarity with other Men, who might sometimes else impress other Traces in their Brains, and in some measure frustrate the continual Effort of Paternal Impressions. For as a Man that never stirr'd out of his own Country usually imagines the Manners and Customs of Foreign Nations to be altogether con­trary to Reason, so a Child that never stirr'd out of his Fathers House, imagines the Sentiments of his Pa­rents and their manner of living to be the Standard of Universal Reason; or, rather he does not believe there are any other Principles of Reason or Vertue, than what he has imbib'd from his Parents: He there­fore believes whatever he hears his Parents say, and conforms himself in whatever they do.

But this Imagination of Parents is so strong, that it not only acts upon the Imagination of Children, but also upon other parts of the Body. A Son imitates [Page 234]the Gate, the Speech, and Gestures of his Father. A Daughter imitates the Dress, the Pace, and Voice of her Mother: If the Mother Lisps, the Daughter Lisps; if the Mother have an ill Habit of holding her Head awry, the Daughter does so too. Lastly, Children imitate their Parents in every thing, in their Defects and their ill Gestures, in their Errors and their Vices.

There are several other Causes which augment the Effect of this Impression: Of which the chiefest are the Authority of Parents, the Dependency of Chil­dren, and the mutual Affection both of the one and the other. But these Causes are common to Courtiers, and Servants, and generally to all Inferiors as well as to Children. We shall now Explain the Matter by the Example of Courtiers.

There are some People who judge of what they see, by what is conspicuous before their Eyes; as of Sublimness, Power, and Capacity of Mind, which lie conceal'd from their Knowledge, by that Nobility, those Dignities, and that Wealth which is known to 'em. They frequently measure one by the other. And our dependance upon Great Men so much above us, our desire to participate of their Grandeur, and the vast Splendour that environs 'em, incline us fre­quently to pay Divine Honours to Mortal Men, if it may be lawful for me to say so. For if God confer Authority upon Princes, Men ascribe Infallibility to 'em; an Infallibility so universal as not to be circum­scrib'd within any bounds in any thing, or upon any occafion, nor tied to any Ceremonies. Great Men know all things naturally: Though they decide Que­stions of which they have no knowledge, yet they have always Reason on their side. He that dares ad­venture to Examine what they say, is ignorant, and knows nothing; He that raises any doubts, derogates from that Veneration which is due to 'em; He that condemns 'em, is guilty of Rebellion; or at least is a Sott, a Madman, and fit for nothing but to be made a Laughing Stock to all the World.

But if Great Men vouchsafe us their Favours; then, if we do not approve all their Sayings, we are not only Obstinate, Headstrong, and Rebellious, but Un­grateful and Perfidious; this is a fault beyond repai­ration, that renders us unworthy of their Favours, which is the Reason that Courtiers, and by a necessary Consequence, almost all other People without any Consideration, swear to the Sentiments of their So­vereign, and frequently surrender themselves, even in Matters of Religion, to their Humours and Ca­pricio's.

France and Germany furnish us with too many Ex­amples of these Irregular Submissions to the Impious Commands of their Princes. The Histories of later Ages are full of 'em. Nor were there wanting some Persons well advanced in years, who chang'd their Religion 4 or 5 times in compliance with the Incon­stancy of their Princes in that Particular.

The Revolutions of Religion in Sweden and Den­mark, may serve us for a Proof of the Dominion which some Minds have over others. But there were also other very considerable Causes of these Revolu­tions. And these surprizing Changes are so many Proofs of the Contagious Communication of the Ima­gination. But these Proofs are too general and great, they rather astonish and dazle the Mind, than illumi­nate it, because there are too many Causes that concur to produce these great Events.

If Courtiers and other Men many times abandon Truths that are Essential, and not to be forsaken, but with the hazard of Eternity, 'tis visible that they will venture less to uphold abstracted Truths, less certain and of little use. If the Religion of the Prince be the Religion of his Subjects, the Reason also of the Prince must be the Reason likewise of his Subjects. And so the Sentiments of the Prince, will be always Alamode. His Pleasures, his Passions, his Words, his Habit, and generally all his Actions, will be imitated. For the Prince is himself the Essential Rule of Man­ners: And it rarely happens that he does any thing but what is absolutely modish. Now as all the Al [...] ­rations [Page 236]of the Mode are no more than so many vari­ous Ornaments and Graces, 'tis no wonder that Princes act so strongly upon the Imagination of other Men.

If Alexander hangs his Head on one side, all his Cour­tiers do the same. If Dionysius the Tyrant applies himself to Geometry, upon the arrival of Plato at Syracuse, Geometry presently becomes Alamode, and the Kings Palace, says Plutarch, is immediately co­ver'd with a Mist of Dust, through the great number of those that draw Figures upon the Ground. But so soon as Plato is offended with the Prince, and that the Prince indulging his Pleasures, begins to be weary of Geometry, the Courtiers also lay it quite aside. A Man would think, In Moral Works; How to di­stinguish a Flatterer from a Friend. (continues the same Author) that they were inchanted, and that some Circe had trans­form'd 'em into other Men: They pass from their Love of Philosophy, to their Inclination to Debau­chery, which before they abhorr'd. Thus 'tis in the Power of Princes to change Vertues into Vices, be­cause they are able to change all Idea's with a Word only; There needs no more than the least Nodd of their Heads, or the least motion of their Bodies, their Eyes, or their Lips, to make Knowledge and Learn­ing pass for contemptible Pedantry; Rashness, Bru­tishness, and Cruelty, for greatness of Courage; and Impiety and Libertinism for Strength and Liberty of Wit.

But in this, as well as in other things, I would have it presuppos'd, that Princes excell in Strength and Vigor of Imagination: For had they an Imagination Weak and Languishing, they could never enliven 'em with that Turn, and Energie, that invincibly subdues and vanquishes feeble Minds.

If the force of Imagination alone, without the as­sistance of Reason, be able to produce such wonder­ful Effects, there is nothing so Fantastick or Extrava­gant which is not sufficiently powerful to perswade, let it be only supported by some Appearance of Rea­son. I thus prove it by Examples.

An Ancient Author reports, Diodorus Siculus Bi­blioth. Hist, l. 3. that in Ethiopia the Courtiers made themselves Lame, and Deformed, [Page 237]nay, that they even dismember'd, and laid violent hands upon themselves, that they might resemble their Princes: They look'd upon it as Ignominious to ap­pear with two Eyes, or to walk upright in the Train of a Prince that was blind of one Eye, or halted of one Leg; in like manner, they durst not appear at Court but with a little indented Hat, with White Buskins, and Gilt Spurs: That Fashion of the Ethio­pians was very Fantastical and Inconvenient, never­theless it was the Mode: They follow'd it with a World of Joy, and defying the Pain which they were to endure, minded only the Honour which they did themselves, in shewing their Generosity and Affection for their King. Lastly, this False Argument of Friend­ship supporting the Extravagance of the Fashion, has made it pass into a Custom and a Law that has been a long time observ'd.

The Relations of those who have Travell'd into the East, inform us that this Custom is still observ'd in se­veral Countreys: But what necessity of twice cros­sing the Line to fetch from thence the Religious ob­servation of unreasonable Laws and Customs, or to find out People that follow inconvenient and Fantasti­cal Modes; we need not go any farther than France; For wheresoever Men are indulgent to their Passions, wherever the Imagination is Mistress of Reason, there is also a prodigious Fantasticalness and Inconstancy of Manners: What think you of our Women, that dur­ing the most bitter Frosts and Snow in Winter, display their Naked Breasts, but in the Excessive Heats of Summer they hide their Necks and Bosoms, and go so streight Lac'd that they can hardly Breath? Cer­tainly if by that Custom they suffer not so much Pain as the Ethiopians, they ought at least to be more a­sham'd: The Pain is not so great, but their Reason for enduring it is not so apparent, and there is at least an equal Fantasticalness. An Ethiopian may alledge, that 'tis out of Generosity that he digs out one of his Eyes; but what can a Christian Lady say for her self, that makes a vaunting shew of that which Nature and Religion oblige her to conceal? Only that 'tis the [Page 238]Mode, and nothing more. But this Mode is Fan­tastick, Inconvenient, Undecent, and Unworthy the Manners of a Christian. It has no other Original, but a Reason manifestly depraved, and a secret Cor­ruption of the Heart; 'tis scandalous to observe it; 'tis openly to side with the Irregularities of the Ima­gination against Reason; to revolt from Purity to Im­purity, from the Spirit of God to the Spirit of the World: In a Word, 'tis a violation of the Laws of Reason and the Gospel, to follow this Mode. 'Tis no matter,— 'tis the Mode,— that is to say a Law more Sacred and Inviolable than that which God him­self wrote upon the Tables of Moses, or which he en­grav'd by his Holy Spirit in the Hearts of Chri­stians.

In truth, I know not whether the French have any Reason to Laugh at the Ethiopians and Savages: 'Tis true that the first time a Man should happen to see a Lame and One-Eyed Prince, attended by a Company of Cripples and Single-Eyed Persons, 'twould be a hard matter to abstain from Laughter: However time would familiarize the Sight, and the greatness of their Courage and Friendship would be more ad­mir'd, than the weakness of their Judgment would be derided: But 'tis not the same thing with the Modes of France; their Fantasticalness is not supported by any Probable Reason; so that if they are not so troublesome, they are still the more Ridiculous. In a word, they wear the Character of a most Corrupted Age, wherein there is nothing sufficiently powerful to moderate the Irregularity of the Imagination.

What we have said of Courtiers is to be understood of the greatest part of Men Servants in reference to their Masters, and Maid Servants in reference to their Mi­stresses, and that we may not spend too much time, I would have it to be understood of all Superiors; but chiefly of Children in reference to their Parents: because Children are under a particular Dependency upon their Parents because their Parents have a par­ticular Love and Tenderness for 'em, which other [Page 239]Persons have not; Lastly, because Children are in­duc'd by Reason to that Submission and Obsequious­ness, that many times exceed the Bounds of Reason.

But 'tis not always necessary, that other Men should have Authority over us, or that we should depend in some measure upon 'em, to enable 'em to work upon the Imagination: For the only power of the Imagina­tion is sometimes sufficient for that purpose, seeing it frequently falls out, that Persons, such as are unknown, of no Reputation, and for whom we are not prepos­sess'd with any Esteem, are endu'd with such a force of Imagination, and by Consequence so lively and moving, that they perswade us we neither know which way, nor how. 'Tis true, it seems very strange, but there is nothing so common.

Now this Imaginary Persuasion can only come from the power of a Visionary Person, who speaks with­out understanding what he says, and by that means inclines the Minds of those that hearken to him to believe strongly without knowing what they believe: For most Men are so stupified with the Effort of a Dazling Expression, that they judge as their Passion leads 'em, of those things which they understand but very confusedly. And I desire the Readers of this Treatise to observe such Examples as they meet with in their daily Conversations, and to revolve in their Minds what passes upon those Occasions; for I make no question but they will find more Benefit by it than they can imagine.

But it is farther to be observed, that there are two things that wonderfully contribute to the Operations of the Forcible Imagination of others over us: The first is an Air of Piety and Gravity; The second, an Air of Libertinism and Confidence. For according to our Propensity either to Devotion or Licentiousness, Persons that speak with a Grave and Pious Air, or an Air of Confidence, and Libertinism work very diffe­rently upon us.

'Tis true, that of these there are some more dan­gerous than others. However have a care of being deluded by the outward shews either of the one or [Page 240]the other; or of submitting to any thing but the force of solid Arguments, To this may be utter'd after a Grave and Modest manner, and Impiety and Blas­phemy may be cover'd with the Cloak of Piety. It behoves us to Examine according to the Precept of St. John, whether the Spirits are of God or no, and not confide in every Spirit. The Devils sometimes trans­form themselves into Angels of Light. Nor are there wanting some Persons, who having, as it were, a Na­tural Air of Piety, are look'd upon as Men endu'd with true Devotion, and under that Mask are so dar­ing as to pronounce Men free and exempted from their Essential Obligations, and even from the Love of God and their Neighbours, on purpose to enslave 'em to some Pharisaical Practice or Ceremony.

But the Imaginations, whose Impression and Conta­gion we ought most chiefly to avoid, are those of cer­tain Persons in the World who affect the Title of Great Wits, which they acquire with little difficulty: For now there needs no more than with a certain Air of Impudence to deny Original Sin, the Immortality of the Soul, or to scoff at some receiv'd Opinion of the Church, to acquire the Rare Title of a Great Wit among the Common sort of Men.

These slender Wits are usually full of Fire, and I know not by what Air of License and Boldness they impiously impose upon other Mens Minds, and incline weak Imaginations to surrender to Lively and Plausi­ble Words, but such as signifie nothing to those which duely weigh and consider 'em. They are very happy in their Expressions, though very unfortunate in their Reasons. But because even Men, how reasonable so­ever they are, rather choose to be affected with the sensible Pleasure of Gesture and Expressions, than to tire themselves with the difficult Examination of Rea­son; therefore 'tis visible that those Wits are preferr'd to others, and by that means communicate their Errors and Malignity through the Power which they have over the Imaginations of other Men.

CHAP. III.

ONE of the greatest and most Remarkable Proofs of the Power which some Imaginations have over others, is the Power that certain Authors have to per­suade, though they bring no Reasons for what they say. For Example, Tertullian, Seneca, Montaigne, and some others give a Turn to their Words, that have so many Charms, and such a Lustre as dazles the Minds of most People, though in their Writings the Imaginations of those Authors be but imperfectly painted and shadow'd. Their Words, though they want Life, have a greater Efficacy in 'em, than the Reasons of some Persons: They enter, they penetrate, and command the Mind after so imperious a manner, that they force it to a blind Obedience, and tyranni­cally compel it to an unthought of Submission. The Mind is willing to believe, but knows not what to be­lieve; for when it fain would know what it desires to believe, and approaches near those Phantomes, to di­stinguish what they are, they vanish into Air with all their Pomp and Splendour.

Though the Writings of the Authors above men­tion'd are very proper to demonstrate the Force of Imagination, and though I propose 'em for Example sake, yet do I not go about to condemn 'em in all things: There are some certain Beauties in 'em that I cannot but applaud; nor is it my design to inveigh against the Universal Approbation of many Ages. I protest that I have a high Respect for some of Ter­tullian's Works; more especially for his Apology against the Gentiles, and his Book of Prescriptions against He­reticks; I also admire Seneca in some parts of his [Page 242]Writings; but as for Montaigne's whole Book, I very little value it.

Tertullian was in truth a Man of profound Learn­ing; but he had a better Memory than Judgment; he had more of Penetration and Extent of Imagina­tion, than of Wit: Nor can it be denied but that he was a Visionary in that sense which I have already ex­plain'd, and that he was infected with all those Vices which I have attributed to Visionary Wits. The Re­spect which he had for Montanus and his Prophetesses, is an undeniable Proof of the Weakness of his Judg­ment. That Heat, those Transports, those Enthusi­asms of his upon Petty Subjects, palpably demonstrate the Disorder of his Imagination. How many irre­gular Ceremonies are there in his Hyperboles, and his Figures? How many Pompous and Magnificent Ar­guments, that only force Persuasion and Proof by astonishing and dazling the Mind?

Of what use, for Example, is it to that Author, when he would justifie himself for having put on the Philosopher's Gown, and not the Garment he was wont to wear, to tell us, that the Gown had formerly been in fashion at Carthage? Would it be a sufficient Excuse for a Man now to wear a Cap and a Ruff, because our Fore-fathers made use of them? And would it look decent for the Women in this Age to wear Fardingales and French Hoods, unless it were in Carnaval time, when they had a mind to disguise themselves?

What could he infer from those Pompous and Mag­nificent Descriptions of the Revolutions and Casua­lities that happen in the World, or what could they contribute to his Justification? The Moon varies in her Aspects; the Year in the Seasons of it; the Fields look of another Hue in the Winter, than in Sum­mer. There happen Inundations that drown whole Provinces, and Earthquakes that swallow up entire Cities. New Cities are built, new Colonies settled; we have heard of Inundations of People that have over-run and subdu'd Kingdoms: in a Word, all Na­ture is subject to change. Therefore Tertullian lays [Page 243]aside his common Garment to put on his Gown. What, I would fain know, have all those various Mu­tations, and others without number which he anxi­ously enquires into, and describes with forc'd, ob­scure, and wrested Expressions, to do with his Mat­ter? The Peacock cannot move his Foot, but he changes colour; the Serpent creeping through some narrow Hole strips off his Skin and renews his Age; therefore Tertullian had reason to change his Habit. Who, in cold Blood, and with a Sedate Mind, but would draw these Conclusions; or, who would not laugh at the Author himself, to hear him make such Inferences; Did he not trouble and dizzy the Brains of his Reader with the noise of his Rhetorick?

Almost all the rest of his Little Book De Pallio, is full of Reasons as remote from his Subject, as These, which certainly could prove nothing at all, if the Mind did not suffer it self to be stupified; but 'tis to no purpose to stay any longer upon these Things. 'Tis sufficient to say thus much farther only, that if Exactness of Mind, as also Perspicuity and Clearness in Words ought always to appear in every thing we Write, seeing we Write to no other end but to be un­derstood; If this, I say, be true, then is Tertullian never to be excus'd, who, by the Confession of Sal­masius himself, the greatest Critick of this Age, did all he could to render himself obscure, Multos etiam vidi, post quam bene aestuassent ut eum assequerentur nihil praeter sudorem, & inanem animi satigationem lucrat [...]s, ab ejus lectione discessisse. Sic qui Scotinos haberi videri­que, dignus qui hoc cogno­mentum haberet, voluit, adeo quod voluit a semetipso impetravit, & efficere id quod optabat valuit, ut li­quido jurare ausim, nimi­nem ad hoc tumpu [...] extitisse qui possit jurare hunc libel­lum a capite ad calcem us­que totum a se non minus bene intellectum quam le­ctum. Salm. in Epist. ded. Comm. in Textum. and so well accomplish'd his de­sign, that the Commenta­tor himself is not afraid to swear, that he was ne­ver as yet perfectly un­derstood by any Man. But though the Genius of that Nation, the Custom then in fashion, or the Na­ture of Satyr and Raillery at that time in use, might in some measure justifie his design of Studying [Page 244]Obscurity, and setting himself above the Reach of Human Understand­ing, all this can never be able to excuse the Idle Reasons, and Deviations of an Author, who in se­veral other of his Works, as well as in This, adven­tured to utter whatever came into his Mind, provided it were some extraordinary Thought, or some bold Expression by which he was in hopes to make a vaunt­ing shew of the power, or to say better, of the irre­gularity of this Imagination.

CHAP. IV.

SEneca's Imagination is sometimes no better regulated than that of Tertullian. His Impetuous Commo­tions frequently hurry him into Countreys unknown to him, where nevertheless he Travels with the same assurance, as if he had known where he was, and whither he was going. Provided he make large Steps, and adorn his Periods with Figures and just Caden­cies, he thinks he has gone a great way: But he is like your Dauncers, who always end at the same place where they began.

It behoves us to distinguish rightly between the Force ond Beauty of Words, and the Force and Beauty of Reasons. 'Tis true there appears much of Efficacy and Elegancy in Seneca's Words, but there is little of Strength or Clearness in his Reasons. By the Strength of his Imagination he gives such a certain Turn to his Words, as to render 'em moving, stirring, and persuasive by Impression, but he does not afford 'em that perspicuity, nor that pure Light, whereby [Page 241]the Mind may be enlighten'd and persuaded by Evi­dence. He convinces because he moves, and pleases; but I can hardly believe that they are convinc'd by him that read him sedately, and who being aware of surprizal, never yield but when vanquish'd by per­spicuity, and demonstrations of Reason. In a word, provided he speaks and speaks well, he is not very sol­licitous what he says; as if a Man could speak well, yet not know what he said. And thus he convinces by a blind persuasion, which they who admit, do not well apprehend after what manner they came to ad­mit; as if the Mind ought to suffer it self to be con­vinc'd, unless it distinctly understand the Matter after due Examination.

What is more Pompous and Magnificent than his Idea of a Wise Man, yet at the Bottom, what more Vain and Imaginary? His Portraiture of Cato is too Illustrious to be accounted Genuine: They are Adul­terations and Paintings that only impose upon such as never study or know the Nature of Man. Cato was a Man subject to all the Miseries that befall Mankind; and therefore to say he was invulnerable was an egre­gious Mistake: They that strike him, hurt him. Itaque non refert, quam multa in illum tela conii­ciantur, cum sit nulli pene­trabilis. Quomodo quorum­dam lapidum inexpugnabi­lis ferro duritia est, nec se­cari adamas, aut caedi vel teri potest, sed incurrentiae ultro retundit: quemadmo­dum projecti in altum s [...]pu­li mare frangunt, nec ipsi ulla saevitiae vestigia tot ver­berati saeculis ostentant. I [...] sapientis animus solidus est, & id roboris collegit, ut tam tutus sit ab injuria quam illa quae extuli. Sen. c. 5. Tract Quod in sapientem, &c. He had neither the Hardness of an Adamant, which Iron cannot bruise; nor the Firmness of Rocks, which the Waves cannot shake, as Seneca pretends. In a word, he was not in­sensible. And the same Seneca finds himself o­blig'd to grant it, when his Imagination was a little cool'd, and he be­gan to reflect upon what he had said.

But will he not agree that his Wise-man may be reduc'd to Misery, since [Page 242]he grants him not to be insensible of Pain: No, with­out question, Pain does not affect his Wise-man; the fear of Pain does not disturb him: He is above the Frowns of Fortune, and the Malice of Men; they are not able to disquiet him.

There are no Walls or Towres in the strongest Places, Adsum hoc vobis proba­turus: sub isto tot civita­tum eversore munimenta in­cursu arietis labefieri, & turrium altitudinem cuni­culis ac latentibus fossis re­pente residere, & aequaturum editissimas arces aggerem crescere. At nulla machi­namenta posse reperiri quae bene fundatum animum agi­tent. And a little lower, Non Babylonis muros ill [...] contule­ris, quos Alexander i [...] [...]it; non Cartaginis, aut Numan­tiae moenia una manu capta; non Capitolium arcemve: habent ista hostile vestigium. Chap. 6. which the Ramms and other Engines do not cause to shake; or which are not overturn'd by time. But there are no Engines so strong, as to be able to shake the Constant Mind of a Wise-man. You must not compare him to the Walls of Babilon that A­lexander forc'd, nor those of Carthage or Numantia, which the same Arm over­threw nor the Capitol and Citadel; they still retain the Marks of the Enemies having been Master of 'em.

Those Arrows which are shot against the Sun, Quid tu putas cum stoli­dus ille Rex multitudine te­lorum diem obscurasset, ul­lam sagittom in solem inci­disse. Ʋt caelestia humanas manus effugiunt, & ab his qui templa diruunt, aut si­mulachra conflant, nihil di­vinitati nocetur, ita quid­quid fit in sapientem proter­vé, petulanter, superbé, fru­stra tentatur, chap. 4. Inter fragorem templorum super Deos suos cadentium uni homini pax fuit. chap. 5. never mount so high as to come near it. The Sa­ctiledges that are com­mitted in destroying Temples, and melting down the Images, never injure the Deity: The Gods themselves may be overwhelm'd under the Ruine of their Temples, but h [...]s Wise-man shall ne­ver be overwhelm'd, or if he be, he shall receive no harm.

But never think, Non est ut dicas ita ut so­les, hunc sapientem nostrum nusquam inveniri. Non fin­gimus istum humani ingeni [...] vanum decus, nec ingentem imaginem rei falsae concipi­mus: sed qualem confirma­mus, exhibuimus, & exhi­bebimus. Caeterum hic ipse M. Cato vereor ne supra no­strum exemplar sit. ch. 7. (says Seneca) that this Wise-man whom I describe to thee, is no where to be found. 'Tis not a vain fiction to raise the Mind of Man. It is not a great Idea with­out Reality and Truth. It may be also that Cato surpasses this Idea.

But methinks, Videor mihi intueri ani­mum tuum incensum, & ef­fervescentem: paras accla­mare. Haec sunt, quae aucto­ritatem praeceptis vestris de­trahant. Magna promitti­tis, & quae ne optari qui­dem, ne dùm credi possunt. And a little lower, Ita sub­lato altè supercilio in eadem, quaecaeteri, descendetis, mu­tatis rerum nominibus; tale itaque aliquid & in hoc esse suspicor, quod prima spe­cie pulchrum atque magnifi­cum est, nec injuriam, nec contumeliam accepturum esse sapientem. And a little lower, Ego vero sapientem non imaginario honore ver­borum exornare constitui, sed eo loco ponere, quò nulla per­veniat injuria. continues he, that I see your Spirit mov'd and in a heat. You will say perhaps that this is a way to make a Man contemptible, to promise things that can neither be believ'd nor hop'd for, and that the Stoicks only change the names of things, to speak the same things after a more mag­nificent and pompous manner. But you are de­ceiv'd. I do not go about to extol a Wise-man by these magnificent and plausible words: I only pretend, that he is in an inaccessi­ble place, where he can receive no injury.

Thus you see how Seneca's strong Imagination pre­vails over his weak Reason. But is it possible that Men, continually sensible of their Miseries and Weak­nesses, can admit into their Breast such vain and soar­ing Thoughts? Can a Rational Man ever be con­vinc'd in himself, that his Pain never affects or hurts him? But wherefore does he force Cato upon us? [Page 244]For certainly let him attribute as much fortitude and wisdom to him as he pleases, he never arrived at that height as to endure without any commotion; I will not say, the hainous Injuries of Men falling upon him, Beating and Robbing him, but the very Sting of a Flie. What can there be more weak against such strong and convincing Proofs, as those of our own Experience, than this Egregious Reason of Seneca's? and yet 'tis one of his Principal Proofs.

He that wounds, Validius debet esse quod laedit, eo quod laeditur. Non est autem fortior nequitia virtute. Non potest ergo lae­di sapiens. Injuria, in bonos non tentatur nisi à malis, bo­nis inter se pax est. Quod si laedi nisi infirmior non po­test, malus autem bono in­firmior est, nec injuria bonis nisi à dispari verenda est; injuria in sapientem virum non cadit, chap. 7. (says he) ought to be stronger than he that is wounded: Vice is not stronger than Vertue. Therefore a Wise­man cannot be injur'd: For there needs no more than to answer, either that all Men are Sinners, and consequently deserve the Misery which they suffer; which Religion teaches us: Or if Vice be stronger than Vertue, the Vicious may be stronger some­times than good Men, as Experience shews us.

Epicurus had reason to say, Epicurius ait injurias tolerabiles esse sapten­ti, nos in­jurias non esse, c. 15. that Injuries were tole­rable to a Wise Man. But Seneca was in the wrong to affirm, that Wise Men could not be injur'd. The Ver­tue of the Stoics could not render 'em Invulnerable, since true Vertue does not hinder us from being Mi­serable, nor from being fit Objects of Pity when we suffer any Mischief. St. Paul and the Primitive Chri­stians had more Vertue than Cato and all the Stoics; nevertheless they confess'd, that the Pains which they suffer'd reduc'd 'em to misery, though they were happy in the hopes of Eternal Reward. Si tantum in hac vita sperantes sumus, miserabiliores sumus omnibus Homi­nibus, says St. Paul.

God alone by his Grace can endue us with true and solid Vertue; and therefore he alone can bring us to [Page 245]true and solid Happiness. But he neither promises nor bestows it in this Life. 'Tis in the other Life that we must hope for it from his Justice, as the Re­ward of those Miseries which we suffer'd for Love of him. We are not at present in possession of that Re­pose which nothing can trouble. Neither does the Grace of our Lord Jesus Christ afford us invincible strength; it leaves us to the feeling of our own weak­ness, that being convinc'd of our frailty, we may un­derstand that there is nothing in this World where­with we may not be injur'd; and that we may be en­abled to bear those injuries which are offer'd us, with that true Patience, which arises from Christian Humi­lity and Modesty, not with a lofty haughty Patience, that appear'd in the Constancy of proud Cato.

Cato took in good part a Box of the Ear that was given him; he never reveng'd himself; nor did he pardon it; but he arrogantly deny'd that he had any injury done him. He would have it believ'd that he was above those that struck him: His Patience was nothing but Pride and Insolency: It was injurious to those that affronted: For by that same Stoical Pa­tience did Cato shew, that he look'd upon his Enemies as Beasts, that are not worth the anger of a Wise­man, and therefore he takes no notice of 'em. 'Tis this same Scorn of his Enemies, and high Esteem of himself, that Seneca calls greatness of Courage. Ma­jori animo, says he of the injury done to Cato, non agnovit quam ignovisset. How madly does he con­found Magnanimity with Pride, and separate Patience from Humility, to join it with insufferable Arrogancy! But how delightfully does this same Madness flatter the Vanity of Man, who always refuses to submit and debase himself? And how dangerous is it, espe­cially for Christians, to imbibe the Doctrine of a Master so Indiscreet and void of Judgment as Seneca; but whose Imagination is so strong, so vigorous, and so impetuous, that it dazles, and like a Torrent hur­ries along with it People of weak Understanding, and such as are prone to the Flatteries of Pleasure and Concupiscence.

Rather let Christians learn from their Master, that the Wicked are they who are able to hurt 'em, and that Good Men are sometimes liable to the Injuries of the Impious by the permission of Providence. When one of the Officers belonging to the High-Priest smote Jesus Christ upon the Face, He, the Wisest of all the Wisest among Christians, infinitely Wise, and likewise as Powerful as he is Wise, does not deny but that he was injur'd by the Officer; however he was not angry; he does not, as Cato did, revenge him­self, but he pardons, as one that had suffer'd a real Injury; He could have reveng'd himself, and de­stroy'd his Enemies; bu the suffer'd with an humble and modest Patience, which was no way injurious to any body; no, not to the Miscreant that did him the Mischief. Cato on the other side, neither being able, nor daring to take a real Revenge for the Injury he had receiv'd, feigns at least an Imaginary Vengeance that flatters his own Vanity and Pride; he raises him­self in his own mind above the Clouds; from thence he beholds poor Mortals as small as Flies, and he con­temns 'em as Infects uncapable of hurting him, and unworthy of his Anger. This is a Fiction becoming the Wise Cato. From this Fiction arises that Magna­nimity and Constancy of his Courage that resembles him to the Gods. It is this that renders him invul­nerable, since it advances him above all the Strength and Malig [...]ity of other Men. Poor Cato! who by thy Vertue think'st thy self superior to all other Mor­tals! Thy Wisdom is but Madness, and thy Magna­nimity an Abomination in the sight of God, what­ever the Wise Men of the World thinks of it; Sapieutia huj [...]s mun­di est stulti­tia coram Deo. Q [...]d homimbus altum est, abominatio est ante Deum. Luc. 16. There are Visionaries of several sorts; some imagine them­selves to be transform'd into Cocks and Hens; others believe themselves to be Kings or Emperors; others in imitation of the Deity, arrogate an absolute Inde­pendency to themselves. But though Men are al­ways look'd upon as Madmen who believe themselves to be transform'd into Cocks or Kings, yet are they not always number'd among the Frantick Visionaries, who believe that their Vertue resembles 'em to God, and Independent from all Authority and Command, [Page 247]The Reason of it is, that it is not enough to have Raving Thoughts to be counted a Madman; they must be accounted Phrentick and Ridiculous by o­thers: For Madmen never pass for what they are a­mong such as resemble themselves, but only among Men of Sense and Wisdom, as Wise-men are never look'd upon to be such by those that are Mad: Men then acknowledge those to be Fools who conceit them­selves to be turn'd into Cocks and Kings, because all Men of Sense believe that it is not so easie for any Body to become a Cock or a King. But Men in all Ages have thought they might be equal to the Gods. Their Vanity has infus'd this Opinion into 'em as a thing probable enough: They learn't it from their first Parents: For without doubt our first Parents were of that Opinion, when they obey'd the Devil, who tempted 'em with a Promise that they should be like to God, Eritis sicut Dii. The most pure Intelli­gences endu'd with Celestial Precepts and Clear Un­derstandings, were so blinded by their own Pride, that they thought they might throw off the Yoak of Divine Authority, and seat themselves upon the Throne of God. So that 'tis no wonder, if Men, who are inferior to Angels in Purity and Understanding, aban­don themselves to the same Motions of their Vanity which blinds and seduces 'em.

If the Temptation of Grandeur and Independency be the strongest of all, 'tis because it seems to us, as it did to our Forefathers, more comformable to our Reason as well as to our Inclination; for we are not always sensible of our own Weaknesses and Wants that cause us to stand in need of every thing. Had the Serpent menac'd our first Parents by telling 'em, That unless they eat of the Fruit which God had for­bid 'em to eat, they should be transform'd, the one into a Cock, the other into a Hen, I question whether they would not have derided so foolish a Tempeation; for we should have derided it our selves. But the Devil judging of others by himself, well knew that Ambition and desire of Independency were the P [...]ind sides against which he was to plant his Batteries.

The Second Reason why we look upon those to be Madmen that believe themselves to be transform'd into Cocks and Kings, and yet have not the same thoughts of those who believe that no Body can hurt 'em, as being above all Pain, is this, because they who are Hypochondraical display their Mistakes visibly to all People, so that every body may be an Eye-wit­ness of their Error. But when Cato assures us, that they who struck him never hurt him, he asserts it, or may assert it, with so much Confidence and Gravity, that a Man may justly question whether he be really the same as he appears to be: And we may be inclin'd to think, that his Soul is not to be shaken, because his Body seems to be immovable. For the outward Air of the Body is generally a mark of the inward dis­position of the Mind. So that a daring and undaunt­ed Lyar perswades us sometimes to believe things incredible; because their talking with so much Confidence, is a Proof that affects the Senses; and therefore a most effectual Argument that strongly con­vinces the generality of People. Few there are there­fore, who look upon the Stoicks as Visionaries, or as Audacious Lyars, because we have no sensible Proof of that which lies reserv'd in their Breast, and be­cause the Air of the Face is a most sensible Proof that easily imposes upon us; besides that our innate Vanity readily induces us to believe, that Man is capable of that Grandeur and Independency to which he pre­tends.

Hence it is apparent, that those Errors which abound in Seneca's Writings are of all others the most Perni­cious and Contagious; because they are a sort of De­licate, Insinuating Errors, proportion'd to the Vanity of Mankind, and like to that wherein the Devil en­gag'd our first Parents. They are likewise array'd with those Pompous and Magnificent Ornaments, which make way for 'em into most Mens Minds. They enter, take possession, stupifie, and captivate 'em, not with a Blindness that inclines those miserable Mortals to Humility, a sensibleness of their own Ig­norance, and an acknowledgment of it before others, [Page 249]but with a Haughty dazling Blindness, and a Blind­ness accompanied with some false Glimmerings. And when once Men are smitten with this blindness of Pride, they presently rank themselves in the number of fine and great Wits. Others also reckon 'em in the same Order, and admire 'em. So that there is no­thing that can be thought more Contagious than this Blindness, because the Vanity and Sensuality of Men, the Corruption of their Senses and Passions, dispose them to be known thereby, and puts 'em also upon infecting others with it.

I believe then there is no Author more proper than Seneca, to demonstrate how contagious the Imagination of some Men is, who are call'd fine and great Wits; and what a Command strong and vigorous Imagina­tions have over Weak and more Illiterate People; not by the strength or evidence of their Arguments, which are the productions of Wit; but by a certain turn and liveliness of Expression, which depends upon the Force of Imagination.

I know well that this Author is highly esteem'd in the World, and that I shall be accus'd of more than ordinary rashness, for having spoken of him, as of a Man that had a Strong Imagination, but little Judg­ment. But it was chiefly by reason of this Esteem, that I undertook to speak of him; not out of Envy or any Morose Humour, but because his great Repu­tation will excite many to consider more attentively those Errors of his which I have hinted. We ought, as much as in us lies, to produce famous Examples for the confirmation of things that we assert, when they are of Consequence, and he that Criticizes upon a Book sometimes does it an honour. However it be, if I find fault with any thing in Seneca's Writings, I am not single in that Opinion; For not to speak of some Illustrious Persons in this Age, 'tis about 1600 years ago that a certain Judicious Author observ'd;

1. In Philosophia parum diligens. 2. Velles eum dixis­se suo ingenio, alieno judi­cio. 3. Si aliqua Contemp­sisset, &c. consensu potius Eruditorum, quam puero­rum amore comprobaretur. Quintil. l. 10. c. 1. 1. That there was little Exactness in his Philoso­phy. 2. Little Judgment or Exactness in his Elocu­tion. [Page 250] 3. That his Repu­tation was more grounded upon the Imprudent Heat of Young Men, than con­firm'd by the consent of the Wise and Learned.

'Tis in vain to Encounter palpable Errors with Pub­lick Writings, because they are not Contagious. 'Tis ridiculous to admonish Men that Hypochondraical Per­sons are in some measure mad; they know it well enough: But if they for whom they have a high value, mistake, 'tis necessary to bid 'em have a care of such, for fear lest they adhere to their Errors. Now it is manifest that Seneca's Spirit is a Spirit of Pride and Vanity. Therefore since Pride, according to the Scripture, is the Original of Sin, Initium peccati Su­perbia, the Spirit of Seneca cannot be the Spirit of the Gospel. Nor can his Morals have any alliance with Christian Morals, which are only true and solid.

'Tis certain, that all Seneca's thoughts are neither false nor dangerous: They who being endu'd with a found Wit, have attain'd the Doctrine of Christian Morals, may read him to good advantage. Great Men have made a profitable use of him; neither is it my intention to blame those, who being willing to comply with the weakness of other Men, who had so high an esteem for him, have drawn Arguments from the Writings of that Author to defend the Morals of Jesus Christ, and to engage the Enemies of the Gospel with their own Weapons.

There are some good things in the Alcoran, and we find some true Prophecies in the Centuries of Nostra Damus. We make use of the Alcoran to con­found the Religion of the Turks; and the Prophecies of Nestra Damus may be serviceable to convince some Whimsical Persons. But it does not follow, because there is something good in the Alcoran, that the Alco­ran is to be call'd a good Book; as some true Expla­nations of Nostra Damus's Centuries will not make Nostra Damus a Right Prophet; and they who make use of these Books to the ends aforesaid, cannot be said to have a real Esteem for 'em.

It would be in vain for any Man to oppose what I have said concerning Seneca, by bringing a great num­ber of Passages out of that Author conformable to the solid Truths of the Gospel. I agree that there are some such, as there are also in the Alcoran, and in other Impious Books: And they would do me wrong, to overwhelm me with the Authority of an infinite number of People that have made use of Se­neca; because we may sometimes make use of a Book which we believe to be impertinent, provided they with whom we have to deal, have not the same Opi­nion of the Author as we have.

To ruine all the Philosophy of the Stoicks there needs but only one thing, sufficiently prov'd by Experience, as also by what we have already said: That we should be bound to our Body, our Parents, our Friends, our Prince, our Country, by those ties that we neither can, and which it would be a shame for us to endea­vour to break. Our Soul is united to our Body, and by means of our Body to all things visible, by a Hand so powerful, that it is impossible for us to break that Union. 'Tis impossible to prick our Body, but the whole Individuum must be prick'd and hurt: Be­cause we are in that condition, that this mutual Har­mony between us and the Body is absolutely necessa­ry. In like manner it is impossible for us to be at­tack'd with Injuries and Contumelies, but we must be offended at 'em. For that God, who has made us to maintain Society with other Men, has endu'd us with a Propensity to all that can join us together, which can never be vanquish'd by our selves. 'Tis meerly chimerical to say, that Pain does not hurt us, that Words of Scorn and Contempt do not offend us, because we are above all this. No Mortal Man was ever above Nature, unless by an accession of Grace; and never any Stoic despis'd Honour and the Esteem of Men by the Strength and Constancy of his Mind only.

Men may overcome their Passions by contrary Pos­sions: They may vanquish Fear or Pain by [...]ity; that is, they may scorn to fly, or to complain; when [Page 252]perceiving the Eyes of many People upon 'em, desire of Honour supports 'em, and stops those Corporeal Motions that would induce 'em to fly. This is their Victory, if it may be call'd a Victory; but this is no delivering themselves from Servitude; it may perhaps be said, that they have only chang'd their Master for some time, or rather enlarg'd their Bondage: Such Men are only wise, happy, and free in outward ap­pearance, but in reality undergo a most severe and cruel Servitude. We may resist our Natural Union with our Body by the help of our Union with Men. We may resist Nature by the Strength of Nature: We may resist God by the Strength that he has given us: But no Man can resist God by the Strength of his own Wit; nor can Nature be overcome but by Grace, because God cannot be overcome, if I may be per­mitted to say so, without the special Assistance of God.

Thus that Magnificent Division of all things, into those things that have no dependence upon us, and upon which we ought not to depend, seems to be consen­taneous to Reason, but not conformable to that disor­derly condition to which Sin has reduc'd us. We are united to all Creatures by the Appointment of God, but we absolutely depend upon 'em through the Dis­order of Sin. So that since Felicity cannot subsist with Pain and Anxiety, we can never hope to be happy in this Life by imagining with our selves, that we do not depend upon those Things to which we are na­turally enslav'd. All our Felicity in this Life is grounded upon a Lively Faith, and a Strong Hope, which afford us some sort of Enjoyment of our fu­ture Bliss by way of Anticipation; and we may live according to the Precepts of Vertue, and vanquish Na­ture, if supported by that Grace which Jesus Christ has merited for us.

CHAP. V.

MOntagne's Essays may serve for another Proof of the Power which some Imaginations have over others. For that Author has a certain Free Air, and gives such a natural and so lively a Turn to his Thoughts, that it is a difficult thing to read him with­out being entangled in his Snares. The Carelesness which he affects becomes him so well, that it renders him belov'd of all Men, but despis'd of none; and his Haughtiness is the Haughtiness of a worthy Good Man, that procures him all Veneration, but no Ha­tred. The Genteel and Free Air, supported by some Learning, works so prodigious effects upon Mens Minds, that they often admire him, and surrender to his De­cisions, without daring to examine him, and some­times before they understand him. His Reasons ne­ver convince, because he never produces any, but what are weak and without any solidity: And indeed he has no Principles upon which to ground his Argu­ments; nor does he observe any Order in drawing his Conclusions from Principles. For a Passage out of some History proves nothing: a short Fable demon­strates nothing: two Verses out of Horace; an Apo­thegme out of Cleomenes's or Caesars, are not sufficient to convince any Rational Man: Nevertheless his Es­says are no more than a Rapsody of Histories, Fables, Sentences, Elegant Words, Disticks, and Apothegms.

'Tis true that Montagne is not to be look'd upon in his Essays as a Man that argues, but only writes to divert himself, he indulges his Genius, and makes it his Business to please, but not to instruct; so that if all his Readers read him only to divertise themselves, his Book would not be so dangerous. But 'tis almost [Page 254]as impossible not to have that which delights us, as to refram from Meats that please our Taste. The Mind can take no delight in reading an Author without im­bibing his Sentiments, or at least without receiving some Tincture, which, intermixing with his Idea's, render 'em confus'd and obscure.

'Tis not only dangerous to read Montagne for di­version sake, because the pleasure Men take in read­ing him, engages them insensibly in his Opinions, but because that Pleasure is more capital than it is vulgarly thought to be: For certain it is, that Pleasure arising principally from an eager Appetite, does but ferment and fortifie the Passions; and the Style of that Author therefore pleases us, because it actects us and awakens our Passions after an imperceptible manner.

It would be much to the purpose to prove what we have said in particular of Montagne's Essays, and ge­nerally that the delight we take in all the variety of Styles proceeds only from a secret Corruption of the Heart; but it is not here our design, it would carry us too far from our subject: Nevertheless, if we would but reflect upon the Connexion of the Idea's, and the Passions already mention'd, and upon what passes in our selves, at the same time we read a Piece that is well writ, we shall easily discover our selves to be most delighted with that Author that is most ac­commodated to our Affections and Dispositions; if we are delighted with a sublime noble and free Style, it is because Vanity aspires to Rule and Empire; if with a Soft and Effeminate Style, 'tis because we are prone to Softness and Pleasure. In a word, 'tis a certain Perception of Sensible Things, and not from any Perception of Truth, that we are even in spight of our Wills cherish'd and affected with certain Authors.

But to return to Montagne, I am of Opinion his chiefest Votaries give this reason for their admiring him, because he is an Author judicious and free from Pedantry, and for that after a diligent Scrutiny he in a wonderful manner detected the Nature and In­fitmities of Mans Reason. If I then make it out that Montagne as much a Gentleman as he was, yet for [Page 255]all that, was as much a Pedant as many others, and that he had a very mean knowledge of Human Reason, certainly I shall then make it evident that his Ad­mirers were not compell'd into an Admiration of him by Convincing Reasons, but by the Strength of that Authors Imagination.

The Word Pedant is very Equivocal, but in my Opinion Custom and Reason require that we should call those Pedants, who to make a fair shew of their false Learning, quote at random all sorts of Authors; who, to gain a Popular Applause, talk only for talk­ing's sake, and to make themselves admir'd by Fools; who rake together without Judgment or Discretion Apothegms and Passages of History, to prove, or make a shew of proving Things that cannot be prov'd but by Reasons.

Pedants are oppos'd to Men that make use of their Reason, and that which renders 'em odious to Men of Worth and Sense is this, that Pedants are Enemies to Reason. For Men of true Ingenuity love naturally sound Arguments, nor can they endure the Conversa­tion of Men that will not admit of the use of Reason. Now those Persons whom we have describ'd can never argue truly, because their Brains are very shallow, and stuff'd with false Learning besides. Nor will they argue, because they find that some Men admire 'em more when they cite any unknown Author, or any Sentence of an ancient Writer, than when they pretend to Reasoning: So that their Vanity Congra­tulating it self for the Veneration that is paid 'em, causes 'em to apply themselves to the Study of all those Obsolete and unusual Sciences, that procure the gaping astonishment of the Vulgar.

Pedants then are Vain and Arrogant, Men of great Memories, but of little Judgment, quick and abound­ing in Quotations, unfortunate and weak in their Ar­guments; endu'd with a vigorous and spacious Ima­gination, but volatile, irregular, and no ways able to contain it self within the bounds of Exactness.

After all this, it will be no difficult thing to prove, that Montagne was as much a Pedant as several others, [Page 256]according to the Notion of the Word Pedant, which seems most conformable to Reason and Custom. I speak not here of Gown'd Pedants, or Schoolmasters; 'tis not the Gown that makes a Pedant. Montagne, who had such an aversion for Pedantry, might never wear a long Gown, but he could not so easily discharge himself of his peculiar Vices. He has labour'd to acquire a Gen­teel Air, but he never studied how to be Master of a Just Mind, or at least his Studies prov'd ineffectual: And therefore he adorn'd his Wit with a sort of Learn­ing that did not taste of the School, but was empty, vain, and trivial; while he neglected to cultivate his Reason, to corroborate his Judgment, and acquire to himself the Vertues of a Worthy Man.

Montagne's Book is stuff'd with so many Proofs of the Pride and Vanity of the Author, that it would be a needless thing perhaps to spend time in the par­ticular enumeration of 'em. For he must be a Man extreamly conceited to believe, that People would read such a large Book on purpose to understand the Ge­nius and Humour of the Author. Certainly he must think himself separated from the Vulgar, and look upon himself as some extraordinary Person. All Men are essentially oblig'd to turn the Mind of those that are prone to reverence 'em, towards him who alone deserves to be ador'd: And Religion teaches, that the Mind and Heart of Man, which were only made for God, should never be taken up with our selves, nor step at self-admiration and self-love. When St. John fell prostrate at the Feet of the Angel of God, the Angel bid him rise, Apoc. 19.10. Conser­vus tuus sum, adora deum. I am thy Fellow-servant, said he, and of thy Brethren, worship God. Only the Devils, and those that partake of their Impious Pride, aspire to Adoration. But to exact, that other Men should employ themselves in meditating upon our Affections and Cogitations, What is this but to seek after not only an External, but an Internal and Real Adorati­on? and ardently to desire the same Worship which God requires to be paid to himself in Spirit and Truth?

Montagne wrote his Essays, to no other end but to paint forth his own Humours and Inclinations; he himself confesses as much in his Advertisement to the Reader inserted in all the Editions, 'Tis my self that I paint forth, 'tis I that am the Subject of my own Book. And this is apparent enough to them that read it. For there are very few Chapters wherein he does not make some Digression or other to speak of him­self. And there are some whole Chapters which he consumes in talking of no body else but himself. Wherefore, though he compos'd his Book to make the Portraiture of himself, yet he publish'd it for others to read. 'Twas therefore his design to turn the Gaz­ing Eyes and Attentions of all Men upon himself, though he says, he knew not any reason he had to imploy his Leisure upon a Subject so vain and frivolous. Thus his own words condemn him. For if he thought there was no reason why Men should employ them­selves in reading his Book, certainly he acted against Common Sense in causing his Essays to be publish'd: Whence we are oblig'd to believe, that either he spoke one thing and thought another, or that he did amiss to Print his Book.

'Tis also a very pleasant Excuse of his Vanity, to say, that he had never written but for the sake of his Friends and Relations: For if that were true, where­fore did he suffer three Impressions? Would not one have been enough for his Friends and Relation? How came it to pass that he enlarg'd his Book in the last Impressions, and never expung'd any thing out of it, unless it were because Fortune favour'd his Intentions: I add, says he, but I never correct, for he that has once mortgag'd his Work to the Publick, in my Opinion, has no farther right to it. Let him say better if he can in ano­ther Book. But let him not corrupt the work that he has sold. At this rate nothing is to be purchas'd from such Men till after they are dead. Let Men consider well before they appear in publick: Who bids 'em make such haste? My Book is always one and the same. And therefore he mortgag'd and publish'd his Book as well to pleasure other Men, as his Relations and Friends. But though [Page 258]he had endeavour'd to oblige his Friends and Rela­tions only, and to have turn'd their Minds and Hearts upon his Picture made by himself, all the time that was to be spent in reading his Book, certainly his Va­nity was ne're the more to be excus'd.

If it be a fault for a Man to speak often of him­self, certainly 'tis a piece of Impudence, or rather a kind of Madness for a Man to be always making Panegyries upon himself as Montagne does; for it is not only a Sin against Christian Humility, but against Right Reason.

Men were made to live together, and to form Ci­vil Bodies and Societies; but it is to be observ'd, that the Private Members which compose those Societies, would not take it well to be accounted the meanest Member of the Body which they constitute. No wonder then if those Men, that praise and extol them­selves above others, looking upon the rest as the meanest Members of the Society, and considering themselves the chiefest and most Honourable, incur the Hatred of all Men, instead of procuring their Love and Esteem.

Therefore 'tis a Vanity, an Indiscreet and Ridicu­lous Vanity for Montagne continually to speak in Praise of himself; and it is a Vanity still more ex­travagant in the same Author to describe his own Faults: For, if you observe it, you shall find, that he only discovers those Vices, which through the Cor­ruption of the Age Men pride themselves in being guilty of; that he willingly ascribes to himself those that he thinks will procure him the Honour of a good Wit, and the Air of a Gentleman. And all this, that by a seeming ingenuous Confession of his Vices, he may gain the more easie Belief when he flies out into his own Praises. L. 3. c. 13. And therefore he might justly say, That Self-Praise and Self-Scorn arose from the same Air of Arrogance. This is always a cer­tain Sign that a Man is puff'd up with a high Conceit of himself; and, in my Opinion, Montagne seems more Haughty and Vain when he displays his Vices, than when he cries up his Vertues; for who would [Page 259]bear with such an unsanctified Pride, that glories in those Vices which should rather be an occasion of Humility. I should less impatiently brook a Man who is asham'd to confess his faults, than another who is not afraid to make open proclamation of 'em. And, in my Opinion, there is no Man but ought to have a just dildain of that over free and unchri­stian-like way wherein Montagne displays his Vices. But let us examine the other Qualities of his Mind.

If we may believe Montagne upon his own Word; L. 2. c. 1 [...] a little thing will persuade as, L. 1 c. 24. that he was a Man of no Retention, that his Memory was capable of nothing, unfaithful and creacherous, L. 2. c. 17. but that he wanted neither Sense nor Judgment. Nevertheless, if we may be­lieve the Portraiture of his own Wit, I mean, his own Book, we must be of another Opinion. I can­not receive a Command, says he, without my Pocket-Book, or if I have any Discourse to remember, if it be very long, I am reduc'd to that miserable necessity to learn by Heart, Verbatim, what I have to say; otherwise both behaviour and assurance would fail me, as being afraid lest my Memory shou'd fail me. A Man that can get by Heart a long Discourse, Word for Word, and to a tittle, that he may the better be enabled to compose his outward Gesture, and for the em­boldning his Delivery, does he seem to want rather Memory than Judgment? Or may a Man believe Mentagne when he says this of himself? I am forc'd to call my Servants by the Names of their Employments, or of the Countreys where they were born; for I can hardly remember their Proper Names; and if I should live long, I question whether I should remember my own Name. Can a Lord of a small Village have such a Croud of Servants, that he cannot remember their Names, and yet get by Heart a long Oration? A Man, L. 12. c. 17. who was born and bred in the Country among Pea­sants and Hinds, who has his Head and Hands full of Family Cares and Business, and who confesses, that 'tis his Opinion, that we ought not to neglect these things which lie under our Feet, whatever we have in our Hands nor what is of most concernment to us for the Necessities of [Page 260]Life; L. 12. c. 17. Can he, I say, forget the Names of his Do­mestick Servants? Can he be ignorant (as he says him­self) of the greatest part of the Coyns; of the difference of one Grain from another, either growing, or in the Barn, unless they be such as he sees every day, or such things as every Child knows, as the use of Leaven in making Bread, or why People Tun up their Wine, and yet have a Memory stuff'd with the Names and Principles of the Ancient Philosophers, the Idea's of Plato, Epicu­rus's Atomes, Leucippus and Democratus's Vacuum, Thales's Water, Anaxiamander's Infinite Nature, Dio­genes's Air, L. 2. c. 12. Pythagoras's Numbers and Symmetry, Par­menides's Infinity, Musclus's Ʋnit, Apollodorus's Water and Fire, Anaxagoras's Similar Parts, Empedocles's Sympathy and Antipathy, Heraclitus's Fire, &c. Can a Man that within the space of three or four Pages cites above Fifty Names of several Authors, with their different Opinions, who has fill'd his whole Work with Fragments of Histories, and indigested Apo­thegms, who says, that History and Poetry are his Di­version in Books; L. 1. c. 25. who contradicts himself every mo­ment, and in the same Chapter, even in things which he pretends to have the most certain knowledge of, as the Endowments of his Mind and Affections; Is it for such a Man, I say, to boast a Judgment superior to his Memory?

Let us confess then, that Montagne excell'd in For­getfulness; since he assures us, that he wishes we had the same Opinion of him, more especially since it is no way repugnant to Truth. But we are unwilling to believe him upon his Word, or by the Applauses which he bestows upon himself, that he was a Man of Great Judgment, and extraordinary Sagacity of Mind. For being led by such a prejudic'd Opinion, we might too easily assent to those false and dange­rous Opinions which he obtrudes upon the World with an Impious Confidence and Boldness, which only stupifies and dazles weak Minds.

Another thing for which Montagne is in the second place so highly commended, is, that he had a perfect knowledge of the Mind of Man, that he penetrated [Page 261]into the most hidden Recesses of it, the Nature and Properties, the Strength and Weakness of it; and in a Word, that knew all that could be known of it. Let us now see whether he merits these Elogies, and whence it comes to pass that they are so liberally be­stow'd upon him.

They who have read Montagne, well know that he affected to be thought a Pyrrhonian, and that he took a pride in doubting of every thing. L. 1. c. 12. The Belief of Certainty, says he, is a Certain Testimony of Extream Folly and Ʋncertainty; nor are there any greater Fools, or less Philosophers, than the Philodoxes of Plato. On the other side, he bestows such large Encomiums up­on the Pryhonians in the same Chapter, that 'tis im­possible to question but that he was one of the same Sect. 'Twas necessary in his time for one that would be accounted an able and accomplish'd Man, to doubt of every thing: And the Title of a great Wit, of which he was ambitious, engag'd him farther in those his Opinions. Supposing him therefore to be an Aca­demic also, we might, at once, convince him to be one of the most ignorant among Men; not only in what concerns the Nature of the Mind, but in every thing else. For since there is an Essential Difference between Knowing and Doubting, if the Academics speak what they think, when they assure us they know nothing, we may justly say they are the most ignorant of all Men.

Nor are they only the most ignorant of all Men, but they are also the most obstinate Assertors of the most Irrational Opinions: For they not only reject whatever is most certain, and most universally re­ceived, that they may be accounted great Wits; but by the same violence of the Imagination, they please themselves with talking after a decisive manner of the most uncertain and improbable things. Montagne ap­parently labours under this Distemper; and therefore of necessity we must conclude, that he was not only ignorant of the Nature of Mans Mind, but also that he was intangled in many gross Errors in reference to that Subject, granting that he spoke what he thought, as it became him to do.

For what may we say of a Man, who confounds Mind and Matter together, who recites the most ex­travagant Opinions of the Philosophers upon the an­ture of the Soul yet so far from condemning 'em, that he rather approves 'em, though most repugnant to Reason; who sees not the Necessity of the Immorta­lity of our Souls; who believes that Human Reason is not capable of understanding it; [...]. 2. c. 12. and looks upon all the Prooss that are brought to confirm it, as so many 'Dreams which the desire of Immortality pro­duces in us. Somnia non decentis, sed optantis; who is angry with Men; because they separate themselves from the Croud of other Creatures, and distinguish them­selves from Beasts, which he calls, our Fellow Brethren, and our Companions; and which, as he believes, dis­course together, understand one another, and laugh at us, as we speak, understand each other, and de­ride them; who believes there is a greater difference between a Man and a Man, than between a Man and a Beast; and who attributes even to Spiders, Delibe­ration, Thought, and Conclusion; and who after he has asserted that the Frame of Mans Body has no advan­tage over that of Beasts, willingly embraces the fol­lowing Sentiment, That it is not Reason, nor Ratioci­nation, nor the Soul, that renders M [...]n more Excellent than Beasts, but our Beauty, our Complexion, and the Structure of our Limbs; above which Prerogatives we ought not to prefer our Ʋnderstanding, our Prudence, and other Vertues, &c. Can a Man, who relying upon these Whimsical Opinions, conclude, That 'tis not for his Ratiocination, but his Pride and Obstinacy that Man Extolls himself above Beasts: Can such a Man, I say have an exact knowledge of the Mind of Man, or is it to be thought that he can persuade others he has it?

But we must do Justice to all the World, and give a faithful Character of Montegne's Parts. He had a bad Memory, and a worse Judgment, 'tis true, but those two Qualities together do not compose that which usually the World calls the Beauty of the Mind. 'Tis the Elegancy, the Vivacity, the Extenti­on of the Imagination, that procures a Man the Re­putation [Page 263]of being a good Wit. The Common sort of People admire that which glitters, not that which is solid, because they have a greater value for that which affects their Senses, than for that which informs their Reason. And therefore mistaking Elegancy of Imagination for Elegancy of Wit, it may be said that Montagne had an Elegant and Extraordinary Wit. His Idea's are false, but splendid; his Expressions ir­regular or bold, but pleasant; his Discourses ill sup­ported by Reason, but well imagin'd. There is throughout his Book a Character of an Original which pleases infinitely: Though he be an Usurper of others Mens Draughts, it may be said that his Bold and Strong Imagination gives the Turn of an Origi­nal to every thing he Copies. Lastly, he has all those things ready at hand, which are necessary to please and allure; nor have I obscurely demonstrated, as I am apt to believe, that he has acquir'd Admiration among so many Men, not by convincing their Reason by Evident Arguments, but by subduing their Minds by the Commanding and Victorious power of his Ima­gination.

CHAP. VI.

THere is nothing wherein the force of the Imagi­nation more prodigiously shews it self, than in the hideous number of Goblines, Apparitions, Witch­crafts, Characters, Inchantments, Charms, and gene­rally of all those things which are thought to depend upon the Power of the Devil.

There is nothing more terrible, or formidable to the Mind, or which produces in the Brain deeper Traces, than the Idea of an Invisible Power, which we are not able to resist, and which meditates nothing [Page 264]but to do us Mischief: All Discourses which revive that Idea are listen'd to with Fear and Curiosity. Men adhering to every thing that is extraordinary, take a Phantastic delight to tell surprizing and prodigious Stories of the Power and Malice of Wizards, as well to frighten others, as to terrifie themselves. So that 'tis no wonder that Wizards are so common in some Countreys, where the Belief of those Nocturnal Meetings of Wizards called Sabbaths, has too much prevail'd; where all the most extravagant Tales of Witchcrafts are heard as so many Authentic Histories, and where real Madmen and Visionaries, whose Ima­gination was at first disordered as well by the rehear­sal of such Tales, as by the Corruption of their own Hearts, are burnt for Wizards. I know that many People will blame me for attributing the greatest part of Witchcrafts to the force of Imagination, because there are some Men who delight in terrifying things, and are angry with those that go about to disabuse 'em; and who are like those that are sick through the power of Imagination, who listen most awfully to their Physicians, that foretell some dismal thing that is to befall 'em, and obey their Prescripti­ons exactly. Superstition is not easily destroy'd, and when ever it is attacqued, it finds a great number of Champions; and this same proneness to believe all the Dotages of Daemonographers, is produc'd and cherish'd by the same cause that renders the Supersti­tious obstinate, as may be easily prov'd. However it will not be amiss to set down in few Words, how, in my Judgment, such Opinions as these came to get footing in the World.

A Shepherd in his Cottage, after Supper, tells his Wife and Children what was done at the Convention of Wizards called the Sabbat. Now when his Ima­gination comes to be heated by the Vapours of the Wine, and that he begins to believe himself to have been present at that Imaginary As­sembly, he fails not to speak of it after a strong and vigorous manner. His Natural Eloquence, together with the Proneness of his Family to give Ear to so [Page 265]new and terrible a Story, could not but produce strange Traces in their weak Imaginations: Nor is it otherwise naturally possible, that a Woman and little Children being frighten'd, should be able to penetrate and resist what they hear him say. 'Tis a Husband, 'tis a Father that talks of what he has seen, of what he has done; he is beloved and respected; why should they not believe him? The Shepherd also re­peats his Story several days one after another. The Imagination of the Mother and the Children, admit by degrees much deeper traces of it: they are ac­customed to it; the fear vanishes, but the conviction remains; and by and by their Curiosity will not be at quiet till they go and anoint themselves; they lay themselves in their Beds in such a posture, and the same disposition of their Mind, still heats their Ima­gination more and more; the traces which the Shep­herd has form'd in their Brain, are so very much open'd, as to cause 'em in their Sleep to see as present all the Motions of the Ceremony, the description of which they had heard. They rise, ask one another, and tell each other what they have seen; by this means they confirm the traces of their Vision; and they that have the strongest Imagination more easily perswading the rest, they fail not in a few Nights to make a formal Story of this Imaginary Nocturnal Convention. Thus has the Shepherd made compleat Wizards; and they in a short time will make a great many others, if being endu'd with a strong and vigo­rous Imagination, fear does not hinder them from relling such like Stories.

There have been sometimes Wizards in good ear­nest, that is, such as thought themselves really so, and believed they went to Nocturnal Conventions; and who were so convinc'd of it, that though several Per­sons wak'd them, and assur'd them that they never stirr'd out of their Beds, they would not believe their Testimony.

All the world knows, that stories of Hobgoblins being told to Children, affright 'em to that degree, that they will not be alone in the dark or without [Page 266]Company. Because, when the Brain admits no Tra­ces of any present Object, that which was imprinted in their Brain by the help of the story, opens it self afresh, and many times vehemently enough, to repre­sent before their Eyes the Apparitions they were told of; nevertheless these stories are not told 'em other­wise then as Fables. They that tell 'em, do not re­late them with the same Air, as if they were convinc'd of the Truth of them, and many times the Relation it self is cold and languishing. No wonder then, that a Man who believes he has been at a Nocturnal Con­vention, and by consequence talks with a stedfast and confident utterance, easily perswades some Persons, that hear him with a kind of respect, of all the Circum­stances which he particularizes, and transmits traces into their Imagination like to those by which he him­self was received.

When Men discourse with us, they imprint traces in our Brains like to those which they have themselves. If they are deep, then they talk to us after such a manner, as impresses 'em deep: for they cannot talk to us, but they must make us in some measure like themselves. Infants in the Mothers Womb see nothing but what the Mother sees; and when they come in­to the World, they imagine very few things, of which their Parents are not the cause; since the wisest of Men, are govern'd rather by the Imagination of others, that is, by Opinion and Custom, than by the Rules of Reason. Therefore in places where Wizards are burnt, there we find a great number of them, be­cause in the places where they are condemn'd to the Fire, 'tis really believed that they are Wizards, and that Opinion is more and more confirm'd by the va­rious discourses concerning them. Let 'em but cease to punish them, and deal with 'em as Mad Folks, and you shall see that in a little time there will be no Wizards; because they who are only so by the force of Imagination, and who are doubtless the Greatest Number, would return from their Errors.

Most certainly real Wizards deserve death: and they who are only so through the power of Imagina­tion [Page 267]ought not to be reputed altogether Innocent, for they usually believe themselves to be Witches because they find in themselves a disposition to frequent No­cturnal Conventions, and for that reason anoint them­selves with certain Drugs, in order to accomplish their wicked design, But while we punish without distinction all these Criminals, the Vulgar Opinion is confirm'd, Wizards multiply through the strength of Imagination, and thus an Infinite number of People are lost and condem'd to Eternal Damnation: Which is the reason that several Parliaments never punishing Wizards, there are fewer or hardly any to be found in places under their Jurisdiction, where the Envy, Hatred, and Malice of wicked People cannot make use of that pretence to destroy the Innocent.

The apprehension of Lycanthropi, or Men who sup­pose themselves chang'd into Wolves, is a Chimera no less Ridiculous. A Man, through an Irregular effort of his Imagination falls into such a Phrenzie, that he believes himself transform'd into a Wolf every Night. This disorder of his Mind disposes him to all the Actions that are natural to Wolves, or whatever he has heard reported of them. Away he goes then, out of his House at Midnight, runs about the Streets, falls upon the next Child he meets, bites him and handles him very rudely: Also stupid and superstiti­ous People believe this Madman to be a real Wolf; because the Poor unfortunate Fellow believes it him­self; and for that he told it in private to some Persons that told it again.

Were it casie to form in the Brain those Traces that perswade Men they are chang'd into Wolves; or were it as easie to run about the Streets, and commit the Ravages which these Miserable Wolf-Men commit without being absolutely Mad, as it is to go in a Dream to a Nocturnal Convention, these stories of Men transform'd into Wolves, would not fail to pro­duce the same effects as the Tales of Nocturnal Con­ventions, and we should have as many Wolf-men as Wizards. But the belief of being transform'd into a Wolf supposes a great disorder of the Brain, which is [Page 268]more difficult to be produc'd, then the Delirium of a Man that only believes his going in the Night to a Nocturnal Convention; that is, who believes he sees in the Night-time things that are not, and who when he wakes, cannot distinguish his Dreams from his Thoughts in the day time.

'Tis a usual thing for some People to Dream such lively Dreams in the Night time, as to remember 'em exactly when they wake, though the Dream in it self be not very terrible: therefore 'tis no difficult thing for some Men to perswade themselves that they were at a Nocturnal Convention; for 'tis sufficient to that end, that the Brain preserve the Traces that were made in it by the Dream it self.

The chief thing that hinders us from taking Dreams for Realties is, because we cannot unite our Dreams to those things which we did when we were awake; for thereby we find they were only Dreams. Now Imaginary Wizards cannot judge from thence whe­ther their Nocturnal Convention were nothing but a meer Dream. For they never go to their Conven­tion but in the Night, and what passes in the Assem­bly cannot be united to their other Actions in the day time: So that 'tis Morally impossible that way to undeceive 'em. Nor is it necessary, that what Imaginary Wizards think they see in their Nocturnal Assemblies should be united together in any Natural Order: for the more confused and Extravagant they are, so much the more real they appear to be. 'Tis therefore sufficient that the Idea's of things done in the Assembly should be Lively and Terrible; which will of necessity happen, because that always unu­sual news, and extraordinary things, are there believed to be performed.

But it requires so great a disturbance of the Ima­gination for a Man to believe himself to be tranform'd into a Cock, a Goat, a Wolf, or an Ox, that it can­not happen but very rarely; though these great dis­orders of the Brain do sometimes fall out, either as a Punishment inflicted from Heaven, as the Scripture relates of Nebuchadnezzar, or through a Natural [Page 269]transport of Melancholly in the Brain; of which we find several Examples among Physical Writers.

Although I am perswaded that real Wizards are very rare, that these Nocturnal Conventions are meer Dreams, and that the Parliaments who dismiss those accusations of Witchcraft, are the most just and Equitable: Nevertheless, I doubt not but that there are any Wizards Charms, Inchantments, &c. or that the Devil does sometimes thus exercise his Malice up­on Men by a particular permission of God, For the Scripture teaches us that the Kingdom of Satan is de­stroyed; that the Angel of God has thrown the De­vil bound in Chains into the deep Abyss, from whence he shall not be released till the end of the World: that Jesus Christ has despoil'd him of his Weapons, and that the time shall come, when the Prince of the World shall be Expell'd out of the World.

He had Reign'd indeed till the coming of our Sa­viour, and he still Reigns in such places where our Saviour is not known: but he has no longer any Right or any Power over those that are regenerated in Christ. He cannot tempt them but by the per­mission of God; or if God gives him leave, 'tis be­cause they are able to vanquish him: Therefore they too much honour the Devil, who relate Stories as Arguments of his Power, as some of our Modern Demonographers do; since such kind of stories render him formidable to weak People.

Devils are to be despised, as we despise Hangmen. For we ought to tremble only before God. His Power only is to be fear'd. We ought to be afraid of his Judgments and Wrath, and not provoke him by the Contempt of his Laws and Gospel. He de­serves our Attention when he speaks, or when Men speaks to us concerning him. But when Men speak to us concerning the Power of the Devil, 'tis a ridi­culous thing to be troubled and dismay'd: Our Ter­ror is an Honour to him: He loves to be respected and fear'd, and his Pride is satisfy'd, when we hum­ble our selves before him.

'Tis now time to conclude this Second Book, and only to observe from what has been said in this and the preceding. 1. That all our thoughts which the Mind has by means of the Body, or by depen­dance upon the Body, are only for the use of the Body it self. 2. That they are all false and Obscure. 3. That they serve to no other use then to unite us to sensible Good, and to all things that can procure 'em for us; and that this Union leads us into infinite Errors, and very great Miseries. Though we are not always sensible or them, no more then we know the Errors from whence they arise, Of this we shall give the following remarkable Example.

Our Union with our Mothers in the Womb, which is far more strict then any we can have with Men, is the cause of our greatest Mischiefs; that is to say, of Sin and Concupiscence, which are the Original of all our Miseries. Nevertheless, there was a Necessity that this Union should be so strict as it is to compose the structure of Bodies.

This Union which was broken by our Birth is suc­ceeded by another, whereby Children are joyn'd to their Parents and Nurses. This Union is less strict than the first, and therefore does less mischief. It only enclined us to believe and imitate our Parents and Nurses in all things. 'Tis visible also, that this Second Union was necessary for us, not as the first for the Forming but the Preservation of the Body; to the end we might understand all things that conduce to the Benefit of it, and to dispose the Body to those Motions which are necessary for the procuring those Things.

Lastly, The Union which we have at present with all Men does us a great deal of Mischief, though it be not so strict, as being less necessary for the Preser­vation of the Body. For by reason of this Union it is, that we live by Opinion, that we love and esteem what other Men love and value, though contrary to our Consciences, and the true Idea's which we have of things. I speak not here of that Union which conjoyns us with the Minds of other Men; for that [Page 271]Union may prove serviceable for our Instruction: I speak of the Sensible Union between the Imagination, and the Air and Manner of those with whom we con­verse. Thus it is plain, that all our thoughts that we, have by way of dependency upon the Body, are false, and so much the more pernitious to the Mind, as they are more useful to the Body.

Let us therefore endeavour by degrees to free our selves from the Delusions of our Senses from the Vi­sions of our Imagination, and the Impression which the Imagination of other Men makes upon our Minds. Let us carefully reject all these confused Idea's, which we have drawn from that Servitude wherein our Body detains us; and let us only admit the clear and manifest Ideas which the Mind receives from that Union which it necessarily has with the WORD, or WISDOM and ETERNAL TRƲTH; as we shall ex­plain in the following Book, which treats of the Un­derstanding, or Pure Mind.

CHAP. I.

THE Subject of this Third Treatise is a little Dry and Barren: We here examine the Mind considered in it self, and Independent of the Body, to know the Weaknesses which are peculiar to it, and the Errors which it has only from it self. The Senses and Imagination are Fruitful and Inexhaustible Sources of our Errors and Illusions, but the Mind [Page 2]acting of it self is not so subject to Error. We were troubled to finish the two preceding Treatises, and we are uneasie to begin this; it is not because the Nature or Properties of the Mind is a barren Subject, but because we enquire not so much here into its Pro­perties as Weaknesses. Let no one be Surprised if this Treatise is not so large, nor discovers so many Errors as the preceding Books; nor let any one com­plain if the Subject is a little dry, ab [...]r [...]cted and diffi­cult. The Senses and Imagination [...]ot always be moved, nor is it necessary they should. When a Sub­ject is abstracted, he that would ren [...] it Sensible, will obscure it, it's enough to make it Intelligible: There is nothing so Unjust, as the common Com­plaints of those, who would know every thing, but would apply their Mind to nothing; they are angry if we desire them to become Attentive; they would always have us Affect and Flatter their Senses and Passions. But why? We know we cannot satisfie them. Those who make Romances and Comedies, are oblig'd to please and captivate the Attention; 'tis enough for us to instruct those who endeavour to be­come Attentive.

The Errors of the Senses and Imagination depend upon the Nature and Constitution of the Body, and are discover'd by considering the Power they have over the Soul; but the Errors of the Pure Understanding cannot be discover'd, but by considering the Nature of the Mind it self, and of the Idea's which are necessary to it, in order to know Objects. So that to penetrate into the Causes of the Errors of the Pure Understand­ing, it will be necessary for us to insist in this Book, upon the Consideration of the Nature of the Mind, and of Intellectual Idea's.

We shall first speak of the Mind as it is in it self, and without any relation to the Body to which it is united: So that what we shall say of it, might be said of Pure Intelligences, [...]nd with greater Reason, be­cause we here call it the Pure Understanding: By the word Pure Ʋnderstanding, we pretend not to design that Faculty which the Mind has of knowing Objects [Page 3]without us, without framing Corporeal Images of them in the Brain to represent them: We shall after­wards treat of Intellectual Idea's, by whose means the Pure Understanding perceives Objects with­out us.

I do not believe, that after having thought Seriously, I. Thought only is Es­sential to the Mind. To Think and Ima­gine are only its Mo­difications. we can doubt, that the Essence of the Mind consists only in Thought, even as the Essence of Matter con­sists in Extension: And that according to the different Modifications of Thinking, the Mind can now Will, then Imagine, and lastly Participate of many other particular Forms; so that according to the different Modifications of Extension, Matter is now Water, then Fire, and is capable of infinite other particular Forms.

By the word Thought, By the Es­sence of a thing, I un­derstand that which is first con­ceived in a thing, upon which all the Modifi­cations, ob­served in that thing, depend. I do not here understand particular Modifications of the Soul, that is, Such or such a Thought, but a Thought that is capable of all kinds of Modifications or Thoughts, even as by Extension, I do not understand such or such a sort of Extension, as Round, Square, &c. but an Extension capable of all sorts of Modifications or Figures: And there was no need of this Comparison, but because we have not so clear an Idea of Thought as of Exten­sion; for Thought is only known by an interior Sentiment or by Conscience, as shall hereafter be ex­plained.

I do not believe it possible, Second Part of the Pure Mind, Chap. 7. to conceive a Mind which cannot Think, although it's easie to conceive one which neither Thinks, Imagines nor Wills; even as it's impossible to conceive Matter that is not ex­tended; though one may easily conceive it to be neither Earth, Metal, Square, Round, and even with­out Motion. Hence we may conclude, That as there may be Matter, which is neither Earth, Metal, Square, Round, or without Motion; so there may also be a Mind, which is neither Sensible of Heat or Cold, which neither Rejoyces, is Sad, Imagines or Wills any thing: So that all these Modifications are not Essential to it; Thought only is of the Essence of the Mind, as Exten­sion only is of the Essence of Matter.

But even as if Matter or Extension were without Motion, it would be wholly useless, and incapable of this Variety of Forms for which it was design'd: And as it would be impossible to conceive an Intelligent Being to Will such a Creation, (that is, Matter with­out Motion, or incapable of Form,) so, if the Mind or Thought were without Will, it's evident that it would be wholly useless, since it would be sometimes carried towards the Objects of its Perceptions, and would not love the Good for which it was made; so that it is impossible to conceive that an Intelligent Being would create it in this Estate. Nevertheless, as Motion is not Essential to Matter, as Extension is, so to Will is not Essential to the Mind, since Willing supposes Perception.

Therefore Thought only is properly Constitutive of the Essence of the Mind, and the different Manners of Thinking, as Perceiving and Imagining, are only the Modifications of which it is capable, and with which it is not always modified: But to Will, is a Property which always accompanies it, whether it be united to, or separated from the Body; which never­theless is not Essential to it, since it supposes Thought, and we may conceive a Mind without Will, even as a Body without Motion.

The Power of Willing is always Inseparable from the Mind, although it is not Essential to it; for even as it is impossible to conceive Matter that cannot be moved, so it is impossible to conceive a Mind which cannot Will, or which is incapable of any Natural Inclination; but as we conceive Matter can exist without Motion, so we can conceive a Mind to exist without any Impression from the Author of Nature towards Good, and consequently without Will, for the Will is nothing else but an Impression of the Author of Nature, II. We do not know all the Mo­difications of which our Soul is capable. which carries us towards Good in general, as we have more largely explain'd in the first Chapter of the Treatise upon the Senses.

What we said before in the Treatise upon the Senses, and what we have just now said of the Nature of the Mind, does not suppose that we know all the [Page 5]Modifications whereof it is capable; we do not sup­pose such things, but rather believe that there is in the Mind of Man a Capacity of receiving Successively an infinite Number of different Modifications which the Mind it self is Ignorant of.

The least Portion of Matter can receive a Figure of three, six, ten, or Ten Thousand sides, or a Cir­cular or Ecliptick Figure, which may be consider'd as made up of an Infinity of Angles and Sides. There is an infinite number of different Species of each of these Figures; an infinite number of Triangles of different kinds; besides other Figures of four, six, ten, or Ten Thousand sides, and infinite Poligons. For the Circle, the Ellipsis, and generally every regular or irregular curve-lin'd Figure, may be consider'd as an infinite Poligone. The Ellipsis, for example, as an infinite Poligone, but whose Angles or sides are unequal, being greater towards the lesser Diameter than the other. And thus of infinite other Poligones more compounded and irregular.

A simple piece of Wax is capable of infinite, or ra­ther infinitely infinite different Modifications which no Mind can comprehend. What reason then is there to imagine, that the Soul which is more noble than the Body, is not capable of more Modifications besides those which it has yet receiv'd.

If we had never felt Pain nor Pleasure, if we had never seen Colour or Light, or if we had been as Blind or Deaf in relation to Colours and Sounds, ought we thence to conclude, that we were incapable of all the Sensations which we now have of Objects, since these Sensations are only Modifications of our Soul, as we have proved in the Treatise of the Senses?

We must then grant, that the Capacity which the Soul has of receiving different Modifications, is pro­bably greater than the Capacity which it has of con­ceiving; I mean, as the Mind cannot draw out, or conceive all the Figures whereof Matter is capable; so it cannot comprehend all the different Modifica­tions, which the powerful Hand of God can produce in the Soul, even though we should as distinctly know [Page 6]the Capacity of the Soul, as that of Matter: Which is Absurd from the Reasons brought in the Seventh Chap­ter of the Second Part of this Book.

Our Soul therefore receives very few Modifications here, because it is united to the Body upon which it depends: All its Sensations carry it to its Body; and whereas it cannot enjoy God, it can have no other Modifications besides what the other Enjoyments pro­duce. Matter, which our Body is composed of, is capable of very few Modifications in this Life; this Matter cannot be resolv'd into Earth and Vapour till after Death; it cannot now become Air, Fire, Diamond, Metal; it cannot be Square, Round, Triangular, it must be Flesh, and have the Figure of Man, that the Soul may be united to it. It is even so with our Soul, it is necessary that it have Sensations of Heat, Cold, Colour, Light, Sounds, Odours, Sapors, and many other Modifications, that it may be united to its Body. All these Sensations engage it to the Preservation of its Machine, they agitate it and terrifie it so soon as the least Spring is loosed or broken: And thus the Soul must be subject thereto, as long as the Body shall be subject to Corruption; but as soon as it shall be in­vested with Immortality, and there shall be no farther Fear of a Dissolution of its Parts, it's reasonable to believe, that it will no longer be affected with these Incommodious Sensations which we unwillingly feel, but with an Infinity of all other different Things, of which we have now no Idea; which shall surpass all our Thoughts, and be worthy of the Greatness and Goodness of God, whom we shall enjoy.

'Tis therefore against all Reason, that Men imagine to penetrate so into the Nature of the Soul, as to be well assur'd, that it's only capable of Knowing and Loving. This indeed might be maintain'd by those who attribute their Sensations to External Objects, or to their own Body, or who pretend that their Passions are in their Heart: For indeed, if we retrench from the Soul, all its Passions and Sensations, whatever can be known in that which is left behind, is only a Chain of Knowledge and Love. But I cannot apprehend [Page 7]how those who have taken their leave of the Illusions of their Senses, can be perswaded that all our Sensa­tions and Passions are only Knowledge and Love; I mean, the confused kinds of Judgments which the Soul draws from Objects relating to the Body which it Animates.

I do not apprehend how it may be said, That Light, Colours, Odours, &c. are Judgments of the Soul, for on the contrary it seems to me, that Colours, Odours, and other Sensations, are Modifications very different from Judgments.

Let us choose some of the quickest Sensations which most affect the Mind, and let us see what these Men can say of Colour or of Pleasure: They think ac­cording to many very Famous St. Aug. Book 6. De Musica Descartes, dans son homme, &c. Authors, that these Sensations are only Consequences of the Faculty, which we have of Knowing and Willing; and that Pain, for Example, is nothing else but a certain Solli­citude, Repugnancy and Aversion of the Will, against things which it knows to be Hurtful to its Dear Body: But it's evident to me, that this is to confound Pain with Sadness, and make Pain a Consequence of the Knowledge and Action of the Will, whereas on the contrary it precedes both.

For Example, If a hot Coal was put into the Hand of a Person that was asleep, or should hold his Hands behind his Back, no one, I believe, with any proba­bility of Truth, would affirm, that this Person would forthwith know, that there were some Motions in his Hands contrary to a good Constitution of Body, that afterwards his Will would oppose it, and that this Pain would be a Consequence of this Knowledge of his Mind, and this Opposition of his Will: But ra­ther on the contrary, the first thing that this Person would conceive, when the Coal touch'd his Hand, would be Pain; and this Knowledge of the Mind, and Opposition of the Will, would be only Conse­quences of Pain, though indeed they were the Cause of Sadness which followed the Pains.

But there is much difference between the Pain and the Sadness which it produces, Pain is the first thing [Page 8]which the Soul feels, it precedes Knowledge, and can never be agreeable in it self: But on the contrary, Sadness is the last thing which the Soul feels, Know­ledge always precedes it, and it is always pleasant in it self: This is evident from the Pleasure we perceive at the Lamentable Representations of Tragedies, for this Pleasure increases with the Sadness, but Pleasure never increases with Pain. Comedians, who study the Art of Pleasing, know well that the Stage is not to be imbru'd with Slaughter, because the Image of a Murder is rather Terrible than Pleasant: But they are not afraid to affect the Spectators with too great a Sadness, because indeed Sadness is always agreeable, when there is a proper Subject of Sadness; there is then an Essential Difference betwixt Sadness and Pain, and one cannot say that Pain is only a Knowledge of the Mind joyn'd to an Opposition of the Will.

As for other Sensations, such as Odours, Sapours, Sounds, Colours, &c. the greatest part of Men do not think them to be Modifications of the Soul, but on the contrary, that they are dispersed upon Objects; or at least, they are in the Soul as the Idea of a Square or Circle, that is, They are united to the Soul, but are not Modifications thereof: They judge thus of them, because they are not more affected by them, as was shown in the Explanation of the Errors of the Senses.

We must therefore agree, that we know not all the Modifications whereof our Soul is capable; and be­sides, those which it has by the Organs of the Senses, it may have innumerable more which it has not yet try'd, nor shall know, till it be deliver'd from the Prison of its Body.

However we must confess, that even as Matter is capable of infinite Configurations, because of its Ex­tension, so it's visible that the Soul would not be in­capable of the Modifications of Pleasure, Pain, nor even of all others which are indifferent to it, if it were incapable of Perception or Thought.

It is sufficient therefore to know, that the Principle of all these Modifications is Thought; and if any one [Page 9]will have it, that there is any thing in the Soul ante­cedent to Thought, I shall not dispute it; but as I am certain that no one has any knowledge of his Soul but by Thought, or by an internal Sentiment of what­ever passes in his Mind, so I am also assur'd, that if any one will reason upon the Nature of the Soul, he must consult this internal Sentiment, which will al­ways represent him to himself such as he is; and he must not imagin against his own Conscience, that the Soul is an invisible Fire, a subtil Air, a Harmony, or other like thing.

CHAP. II.

WE discover at first sight, I. The mind being limi­ted cannot compre­hend any thing which re­lates to in­finity. that the Human Mind is very much limited; from whence two very important Consequences may be drawn. The first, That the Soul can have no perfect Knowledge of Infinity. The second, That it can't know distinctly many things at the same time. For as a piece of Wax is not capable of having many different Figures at the same time; so neither is the Soul capable of having the knowledge of many things at the same time. Like­wise a piece of Wax cannot be Square, and Round at the same time, but only part Square and part Round; and so many more different Figures it shall have, they will be so much the less perfect, and distinct: Thus the Soul cannot perceive many things at once, and its Thoughts are so much the more confused as they are greater in Number.

If a piece of Wax should have a Thousand Sides, and in each Side a different Figure, it would be nei­ther [Page 10]Square, Round, nor Oval, and we could not say of what Figure it would be; so it happens sometimes, that we have so great a number of different Thoughts, that we imagin we think nothing at all, as happens to those that are in a Swound. The Animal Spirits turn­ing irregularly in the Brain, stirs up so great a number of Traces, that they do not sufficiently open any one of 'em, to excite a particular or distinct Idea in the Mind; so that these persons perceive so great a number things at once, that they perceive nothing distinct, which induces them to think, they have perceived nothing at all.

There are some who sometimes Swound away for want of Animal Spirits; but then the Soul having only thoughts of pure Intellection, which leave no Traces in the Brain, they remember nothing when they come to themselves again; which makes them believe they thought of nothing. I have said this by the by, to shew those are mistaken, who believe the Soul does not think always, because it sometimes ima­gins that it thinks on nothing.

Every one that does but reflect a little upon their own Thoughts, II. The li­mitation of the mind is the Ori­ginal of many Er­rors. have experience enough, that the Mind cannot apply it self to many things at the same time, and much more, that it cannot penetrate into Infi­nity. Yet I know not by what Caprice some persons, who are not ignorant of this, busie themselves more about the study of infinite Objects, and such Questions as require an infinite Capacity of the Mind, than about what better suits the Capacity of their own Minds; and also why there are a great number of others that are desirous to know every thing, and apply them­selves to so many Sciences in the same time, that it confounds them, and makes them uncapable of know­ing any Science truly.

How many Men are there who would comprehend the infinite Divisibility of Matter, and how a little Grain of Sand contains as many parts as the whole World, although much less in proportion. How many Questions are formed upon these Subjects which are never resolved; and upon many others which include [Page 11]any thing of Infinity, which yet they would find a Solution of in their own Minds. They apply them­selves to it with all possible Attention: But at last all they gain is this, they are prejudic'd with some Extra­vagance, and Error.

Is it not a pleasant thing to see some Men, who de­ny the infinite Divisibility of Matter, from hence only, because they cannot comprehend it? Although they very well comprehend the demonstrations that prove it, and at the same time confess, that the Human Mind cannot comprehend Infinity. The Proofs which are brought for the infinite Divisibility of Matter, are as Demonstrative as any thing else in Nature, and these Men confess it when they seriously consider them; however, if we propose to them such Objections as they cannot Solve, their Mind leaves that Evidence, which just before they perceived, and they begin to doubt of it; they are strongly possest with the Ob­jection they cannot Resolve, and invent some frivolous distinction against the demonstrations of the Infinite Divisibility of Matter; and at last they conclude they were deceiv'd, as also the World with them; and so embrace the contrary Opinion. This they defend with Chimerical Atoms, and other like Absurdities with which the Imagination always furnishes them: Now the Original of all their Errors is this, they are not inwardly convinc'd, that the Mind of Man is Fi­nite, and that to be perswaded of the infinite Divisibili­ty of Matter, it is not necessary to Comprehend it; be­cause all Objections that cannot be resolv'd without Comprehending it, are Objections which its impossible to Resolve.

If Mens Curiosity would be terminated by Questi­ons of this Nature, we should have no great reason to be concern'd; for if some Men were prepossessed with such Errors, they are Errors of little Conse­quence: As for others, they have not wholly lost their time, in thinking of things which they cannot comprehend; for they are at least convinc'd of the weakness of their Mind. It is good, says a very Ju­dicious Author, thus to fatigue the Mind with these The Art of think­ing. [Page 12]kind of Subtilties, to tame its Presumption, and abate its Arrogance in opposing its little Light to the myste­ries of Religion, which it cannot comprehend. For since all the Vigour of Mans Mind is constrained to submit to the least Atom of Matter, and to confess, that it sees clearly that it is infinitely Divisible, with­out being able to comprehend how it may be done, Is not this to Sin against evident Reason, to refuse an Assent to the marvellous Effects of Divine Omnipo­tence (which is incomprehensible in it self) for this reason, because our Mind cannot comprehend them?

The most pernicious Effect of Ignorance, III. And chiefly of Heresies. or rather inadvertency, wherein the weakness and limitation of Mans Mind is Notorious, and consequently, of his incapacity to comprehend whatever relates to infinity, is Heresie. These present times gives more instances than the former, of a great number of Men who are the Authors of a particular Theology, which is only founded upon their own Mind, and the Natural Weakness of Reason, they will not believe what they cannot comprehend.

The Socinians cannot comprehend the Mysteries of the Trinity, nor of the Incarnation. This is sufficient for them not to believe them, and to Censure others with a fierce and libertine Air that do believe them, as Men born for Slavery.

A Man who is convinced in himself that he is free, if he troubles his Head very much in endeavouring to reconcile the Knowledge of God and his Decrees with that Liberty: Such a Man I say, is very likely to fall into their Error, who believe that Men are not free. For on the one hand, being unable to conceive how the Providence of God can consist with the Liber­ty of Man; and on the other, a respect for Religion will hinder him from denying a Providence, he will believe himself constrain'd to Abridge their Liber­ty; not sufficiently reflecting upon the Weakness of his own Mind, he will imagine that he can pene­trate into the means that God has to reconcile his De­trees with our Liberty.

But they are not only Hereticks which are not at­tentive enough to consider the Weakness of their Mind, and which take too great a liberty of judging things out of their Jurisdiction; almost all Men have this defect, particularly some Divines of these last Ages; for some of them do so often make use of their Hu­mane Reasonings, to prove or explain Mysteries which surpass Reason, although they may do it out of a good design, and to defend Religion against Hereticks, that they often give occasion to the same Hereticks to persist obstinately in their Errors, and to treat of My­sheries of Faith as Human Opinions.

The Motions of the Mind, and the Subtilties of the Schools, are improper to inform Men of their Weak­ness, and to inspire them with a Spirit of Humility, which is so necessary in the Mysteries of Religion. But all these Human and Subtle Reasonings may, on the contrary, stir up their secret Pride, and incline them to make an ill use of their Judgment, and so to form a Religion agreeable to their own Capacity. We do not see Hereticks submit themselves to Philo­sophick Arguments, or that the reading of Scholastick Books purely does inform them, or condemn their Er­rors: But on the contrary, they continually take occa­sion from the weakness of some Scholastick Reason­ings, to Ridicule the most sacred Mysteries of our Re­ligion, which indeed are not establish'd upon all these Human Reasonings and Explanations, but only upon the Authority of the written Word of God.

Indeed Human Reason does not teach us that there is one God in three Persons; [...]or how can it be, that the mind of Man is free, although God knew from Eternity all that Man would do: The Reasons that are brought to prove and explain these things, are such only as prove them to those, which will admit them without examining them; but which often seem extravagant to those who will oppose them, denying the foundation of these Mysteries. It may be said on the contrary, that the Objections which are form'd against the principal Articles of our Faith, and especially against the Mystery of the Trinity [Page 14]are so strong, that its impossible to give clear and evi­dent Solutions of them, and which do not in the least shock our weak Reason; because indeed these Mysteries are incomprehensible.

'Tis a better way to Convert Hereticks, not to ac­custom them to make use of their Reason, by propo­sing to them such uncertain Arguments as are drawn from Philosophy; because the Truths in which we should instruct them do not depend upon Reason; nor is it always necessary to make use of these Rea­sonings in Truth that may be prov'd by Reason, as well as by Tradition; as the Immortality of the Soul, Original Sin, the necessity of Grace, the disorder of Nature, and some others; for fear lest their Mind having once tasted the Evidence of Reason in these Questions, should not afterwards be content to sub­mit to those that cannot otherwise be proved but by Tradition: We must on the contrary, oblige them to distrust their own Mind, by shewing them its weak­ness, limitation, and disproportion to mysterious Truths; and when the Pride of their Spirit shall be abated, they will be more easily brought over to Re­veal'd Religion, by shewing to them its Authority, and explaining the Tradition of all Ages if they are capable of it.

But if Men continually divert themselves from see­ing the weakness and limitation of their Mind, an indiscreet presumption will lift them up, a deceitful Light will dazle them, and the Love of Glory will blind them: Thus Hereticks will be Eternally Here­ticks; Philosophers, opinionative and prejudic'd; and there will never be any end of Disputation so long as we shall be willing to Dispute with them.

CHAP. III.

MEN do not only fall into a great number of Errors, I. Philos [...] ­phers want Order in their Stu­dies. because they prosecute such Questions as relate to infinity, their Mind being finite, but also be­cause they advert to those that have much Extension, their Mind being very narrow.

We have said already, that a piece of Wax is in­capable of receiving many different and distinct Fi­gures at the same time; and thus the Mind is incapa­ble of receiving many distinct Idea's, that is, of per­ceiving many things, and very distinctly, at the same time; whence it's easie to conclude, that we must not at first apply our selves to an Enquiry into hidden Truths, whose knowledge depends upon too many things, and whereof some are not familiar enough to us. For we ought to Study methodically, and make use of what we know distinctly, to apprehend what we know not, or what we know but confusedly: However, the greatest part of those who Study do not take this Course; they make no Essay upon their own Strength; they consult not themselves, to know what they are capable of. 'Tis a secret Vanity, and an irregular desire of knowing; and not Reason which rules their Studies: They begin inconsiderately to en­quire [Page 16]into the most secret and impenetrable Truths; and to resolve Questions, which depend upon so great number of Relations, that the most quick and penetra­ting Mind cannot discover them with any absolute certainty, but after many Ages, and almost an infinity of Experiments.

There are a great number of Questions of this Nature in Physicks and Morality. All Sciences of Bodies and their Qualities, (as of Animals, Plants, Metals, and of their respective Qualities) are Sci­ences which can never be sufficiently evident nor cer­tain, especially if they be not manag'd after another Method than heretofore; or if we begin not by the most Simple and least compounded Sciences upon which they depend. But studious Persons will not give themselves the trouble of Philosophizing in Or­der; they do not agree upon the Certainty of Physi­cal Principles, they know not the Nature of Bodies in General, nor their Qualities, but confess it them­selves. However, they imagin they can give a reason, why, for Example, the Hairs of Old Men wax White, and yet their Teeth grow Black; which depends upon so many Causes, that it's impossible to give any cer­tain reason for it. To know this, it's necessary to understand in what consists the Whiteness of Hairs in particular, the Humours with which they are nourish­ed, the Philtres through which these Humours pass, the Conformation, and the Root of the Hairs, or the Skin through which they pass, and the difference of all these things in a Young and an Old Man, which it's absolutely impossible, or at least very difficult to know.

Aristotle, II. An ex­ample of want of Order in Aristotle. for example, hath pretended to know the Cause of this Whiteness which happens to Old Mens Hairs; he hath given many reasons in different places of his Books: But because he is the Genius of Nature, he stays not there, he enquires deeper: He hath dis­cover'd that the Cause, which makes Old Mens Hairs White, was the same which made some Persons, and some Horses, have one Eye Blew, and the other of another Colour: These are his words, [...]. [Page 17]This is sufficiently Surprising, Book V. De Gener. Anim. C. 1. but there is nothing hid from this great Man; and he gives reasons of so great a Number of things in almost all places of his Phy­sicks, which the sharpest Persons of this Age believe Impenetrable; that it was deservedly said of him, That God gave him to us, that we might be Ignorant of nothing that was to be known. Aristotelis Doctrina est Summa Veritas quoniam ejus intellectus fuit finis Humani Intellectus. Quare bene dicitur de illo, quod ipse fuit creatus & datus nobis Divina Providentia ut non ignoremus possibilia Sciri. Averroes ought to have added, That Divine Providence gave us Aristotle, to teach us what was impossible to be known. For it's true, that this Philosopher does not only teach us things which may be known, but if, since he must be believ'd upon his word, his Doctrine be the Soveraign Truth, Summa Veritas, he also teaches us those things which are im­possible to be known.

Certainly one must have much Faith, thus to be­lieve Aristotle, when he gives us only Logical Reasons, and only explains the Effects of Nature, by the Con­fus'd Notions of the Senses; especially since he boldly decides Questions which will never be resolv'd by other Men. Thus Aristotle takes a particular Care to inform us, that we must believe him upon his word; for 'tis an incontestable Axiom with this Author, that the Disciple must believe, [...].

It is true, that Disciples are sometimes oblig'd to believe their Master, but their Faith ought to be ex­tended only to Experiments and Matter of Fact; for if they intend to become true Philosophers, they must examine the Reasons of their Masters, and then re­ceive them only when they discover the Evidence of them by their own Judgment. But to be a Peripa­tetick, it is absolutely necessary to believe and to re­tain; and the same Disposition of Mind ought to be had at the reading of that Philosophy, as at the read­ing of an History; for if any one takes the Liberty of making use of his Judgment and Reason, he must not [Page 18]expect ever to be a great Philosopher. [...].

But the reason why Aristetle, and many other Philo­sophers, have pretended to know what can never be known, is, That they have never known the diffe­rence betwixt Knowing and Knowing; betwixt having a certain and evident Knowledge, and having but a probable one: And the reason why they never under­stood this difference, is, That the Subjects to which they applied themselves, being beyond the perfect reach of their Mind, they saw but a part of them without being able to comprehend them all together; which indeed is enough to discover many Probabi­lities, but not to discover Truth evidently. Besides, they seeking after Science meerly out of Vanity, and probabilities being more apt to gain the Esteem of Men than Truth it self, because they are more proporti­onated to the common reach of the Mind, they have neglected to seek after necessary Means to increase the Capacity of the Mind, and to give it more Extension than it has; so that they have not been able to pene­trate the bottom of Truths that are but a little hidden.

Geometricians have well known how little Exten­sion the Mind has, Geometri­cians be­have themselves well in their Search af­ter Truth. at least they behaved themselves in their Studies after such way, as shews they know it perfectly; especially those that have made use of Algebra, which Vieta and Descartes have renewed and improv'd in this Age. What I say appears from this, That those Persons have not undertaken the Resolu­tion of very compound Difficulties, before they knew clearly the more Simple on which they depend. They did not apply themselves to the Consideration of Lines, as Conick Sections, until they were Masters of com­mon Geometry.

But that which is particular to Algebraists, IV. Their Method in­larges the Capacity of the Mind, that of A­ristotle contractsit is, That they see their Mind cannot be at the same time applied to many Figures, they cannot imagine Solicts that have more than three Dimensions, although it's often necessary to conceive they may have more; they make use of Common and very Familiar Letters to express and abridge their Idea's: Thus the mind not being [Page 19]embarrassed nor imploy'd upon any Representation which it would be oblig'd to make upon many Figures and Lines, it may perceive at one view, all that it is capable of seeing otherwise. And thus the Mind can penetrate deeper, and extend it self much farther when its Capacity is well manag'd.

The Art of rendring the Mind more penetrating and Extensive, consists, as we have elsewhere ex­plain'd, in a good Management of its Powers and Capacity, not in imploying it to no purpose upon things which are not necessary to discover the Truth it seeks after, which ought to be well observ'd. Book VI. The Second Part of Method. For this only shows, that common Logicks are fitter to lessen the Capacity of the Mind than to inlarge it; because it is evident, That if in a Search after any Truth, we use the Rules they prescribe us, the Capa­city of the Mind is divided, so that it will be unfit to be attentive, and to apprehend all the Extension of the Subject it examines.

It is therefore sufficiently evident from what I have said, That the greatest part of Men make but little Reflection upon the Nature of the Mind, whilst they apply themselves to a Search after Truth; for indeed they have never been well convinc'd of its little Ex­tension, and the necessity there is of well managing and enlarging it. And this is one of the most consi­derable Causes of their Errors, and from hence it is that they have so unhappily perfected their Studies.

But we do not pretend that there were ever any Men, which were not conscious of their own Limita­tion, and their little Capacity and Extension of Mind; all the World confesses it, but the Generality of them only know it confusedly, and confess it only with their Mouths. The Method they take in their Study, gives the Lye to their Confession, since they act as if they truly thought their Mind bad no Limits; and they would penetrate into things that depend upon a great many Causes, whereof generally they do not know one.

There is also another Defect which is very com­mon in these Studious Men, V. Another Defect in Studious Men. which is the applying themselves to too many Sciences at once, and if they [Page 20]Study but six Hours in a day, they will sometimes study six different things: 'Tis plain, this Defect pro­ceeds from the same Cause as the rest that I have before mention'd: For 'tis very probable, that if those that study after this manner, know certainly that it was not agreeable to the Capacity of their Minds, and that it was more likely to fill them with Errors and Confusion, than with true Science, they would not suffer themselves to be hurried away by the irre­gular Motions of their Passions and Vanity; for in­deed that is not the way to satisfie the Mind, since 'tis not the proper Means to know any thing.

CHAP. IV.

THE Mind of Man is not only subject to Error because it is Finite, or more limited than the Objects they consider, as has been explained in the two precedent Chapters; but also because it is In­constant, and has no Firmness in whatsoever it does, and cannot keep it self fix'd long enough upon any Subject, to examine it entirely.

To conceive the Cause of this Inconstancy and Levity of our Minds, it is necessary to know, that its Action is directed by the Will; which applies it to such Objects as it loves, and is of it self continually Incon­stant and unsettled, of which this is the Cause.

We cannot doubt but God is the Author of all things, that he hath made them for himself, and has inclined the Heart of Man towards him, by a Natural and Invincible Impression that he continually imprints upon him. God cannot Will the Existence of any Mind which cannot love him, or which should love him less than any other Good, if any other besides himself could be found; because he cannot Will that any Mind should not love that which is most Amiable, or love it more than that which is less Amiable.

Thus it is requisite that a Natural Love should carry us to God, since it comes from him; and that there is nothing that can stop the Motions of it, only God himself who imprinted them. Every bodies Will therefore necessarily follows the Motions of this Love. The Righteous and Wicked, the Happy and the Damned, Love God with this Love; for the Natural Love which we have for God, being the same thing as the Natural Inclination that carries us to Good in General, to the Infinite and Soveraign Good, it is evi­dent that all Minds Love God with this Love, since he only is the Universal, Infinite, and Soveraign Good. For indeed all Spirits, and even the Devils, have an Ardent Desire to be Happy, and to possess the Chief Good: And they desire it without Choice, without Deliberation, without Liberty, and by a Necessity of their Nature. Being therefore made for God, for an Infinite Good, for a Good which comprehends all others in it, our Hearts can never be satisfied but by the Possession of this Good.

Thus our Will always labouring under an eager Thirst, always agitated with Desires, Anxieties, II. The In­constancy of the Will, Causes the Defect of our Appli­cation, and consequent­ly causes our Error. and full of Inquietudes for the Good that it does not possess, cannot without much Pain suffer the Mind for any time to stop at abstracted Truths, which affect it not, and which it judges uncapable of making it Happy. Thus she Incessantly pushes it forward to search after other Objects, and when in this Agitation, which the Will communicates to it, it meets with any Object, that has the Appearance of a Good, I mean, such as makes the Soul Sensible of any Pleasure, or inward [Page 22]Satisfaction at its approach; then this Thirst is ex­cited anew; these Desires, these wishes, and these Ardours, take new Life; and the Mind being oblig'd to obey them, engages it self only to that Object, which causes or seems to cause them, to draw it nearer to the Soul which tasts it, and feeds on it for some time. But the Emptiness of Creatures cannot fill the Infinite Capacity of Man's Mind; these little Pleasures irritate its Thirst rather than allay it, and give the Soul a vain sort of a Hope of being satisfied in the Multiplicity of the Pleasures of this Life; which also produces an Inconstancy and an inconceivable Levity in the Mind, which was to discover to it all these Goods.

It's true, that when the Mind accidentally meets with any Object which is related to Infinity, and which includes in it self some great thing, its Incon­stancy and Agitation ceases for some time; for dis­covering this Object to bear the Character of what the Soul desires, it joyns and adheres to it for a long time. But this Adhesion, or rather this Prejudice of the Mind, to examine Subjects that are Infinite or very great, is as useless to it, as that Levity with which it considers things that are proportion'd to its Capacity; it is too weak to finish so difficult an Enterprise, and it is vain to force it self to accomplish it. The Comprehension of an Infinite Object, if I may so say, cannot render the Soul Happy, it is incapable of it, but the Love and Enjoyment of an Infinite Good may do it, whereof the Will is capable, by the Motion of that Love which God continually impresses upon it.

After this we must not be surprised at the Ignorance and Blindness of Men, since their Mind being subject to the Inconstancy and Levity of their Heart, which renders it incapable of considering any thing with a Serious Application, it cannot penetrate into any thing which includes some considerable Difficulty. For, in fine, the Attention of the Mind to the Objects of the Mind, is the same thing as fixing our Eyes upon the Objects of our Eyes; even as a Man who cannot fix his Eyes upon Objects that are about him, cannot see [Page 23]clearly enough to distinguish the Differences of their least Parts, and to know all the relations these little parts have with each other: So a Man who cannot fix the Eyes of his Mind upon things which he would know, cannot sufficiently know them to distinguish all their Parts, and to know all the Relations which they may have among themselves, or to other Subjects.

However 'tis evident, That all Knowledge consists only in a clear View of the Relations that things have to one another: Therefore when it happens, as in difficult Questions, that the Mind must see at one view, a great Number of Relations which two or more things have amongst themselves, it's evident, That if it has not consider'd these things with much Atten­tion, and only knows them confusedly, it will be im­possible for it to perceive distinctly their Relations, and consequently to form a solid Judgment of them.

One of the chief Causes of the Want of Application of Mind to abstracted Truths, is, III. Our Sensations affect us more than the Pure Idea's of the Mind. That we see them at a distance; and things which are nearer, are con­tinually represented to our Mind; a great Attention of Mind approaches, if I may so say, to the Idea's of Objects with which it is affected. But it often hap­pens, that when we are Attentive upon Metaphysical Speculations, we are diverted from them, because some Sensation comes upon the Soul which is nearer to it than those Idea's; the least Pain or Pleasure is sufficient to effect this; the reason of it is, Pain and Pleasure, and generally all Sensations, are within the Soul it self, they modifie and affect it, much nearer than the simple Idea's of Objects of Pure Intellection, which though present to the Mind do not modifie it. Thus the Soul being on the one hand very narrow, and on the other, not being able to hinder Pain, Plea­sure, and other Sensations, See Ch. 7. Second Part of this Book. its Capacity is fill'd with them; and it cannot at the same time be Sensible of any thing, and think freely of other things of which it cannot be Sensible. The Buzzing of a Fly, or some other little Noise, supposing it to be communi­cated even to the chief part of the Brain, so that the Soul perceives it, is capable, notwithstanding all our [Page 24]Efforts to the contrary, of hindering us from consi­dering abstracted and elevated Truths, because all abstracted Idea's do not modifie the Soul, though all Sensations do. IV. What is the Ori­ginal of the Corruption of Manners

'Tis this that causes a Stupidity and Dullness of Mind, in respect of the great Truths of Christian Morality; hence it is that Men only know them after a Speculative and Unfruitful Manner, without the Grace of Jesus Christ. All the World knows that there is a God, that he must be Ador'd and Wor­shipped; but who is it that Serves and Worships him without Grace, which makes us taste a Sweetness and Pleasure in all our Duties? There are very few who are not Sensible of the Emptiness and Instability of the Goods of this World, and even who are not touch'd with an abstracted, yet always with a very certain and evident Conviction, that they deserve not our Application and Concern. But where are those that Practically Despise these Goods? and who are not Anxious and Careful to obtain them? 'Tis those only who perceive some Bitterness and Disgust in their Enjoyment, or else by the Grace of God are made Sensible of Spiritual Good by an inward De­light which God hath joyn'd to them, who overcome the Impressions of their Senses and the Efforts of Con­cupiscence. The bare Contemplation of the Mind, does not therefore make us ever resist the Efforts of Concupiscence as we ought to do; an Internal Motion of the Heart must also second it. This Light of the Mind only is, as some say, a Sufficient Grace, which enables us to Condemn our selves, and informs us of our Weakness, and that we ought to have re­course by Prayer to him who is our Power. But this inward Sentiment of Heart is a Lively Grace which operates, 'tis this which affects and fills us, which perswades the Heart, and without there is no one can think heartily, Nemo est qui cogitet corde. All the most constant Truths of Morality lie hid in the Secret Recesses and Windings of the Mind, and so long as they stay there, are Barren, and with­out any Power, since the Soul does not taste them. [Page 25]But the Pleasures of the Senses are nearer the Soul, and it being impossible that it should not be sensible of, and love its With a Natural Love, for one may hate Plea­sure with a Hatred of choice. Pleasure, it's impossible to be freed from the World, Because a Love of Choice can­not long re­frain from conforming to a Natu­ral Love. and shake off the Charms of its Senses by its own Power.

However I do not yet deny that the Righteous, whose Heart hath been livelily turn'd towards God by prepossessed Delight, cannot without this parti­cular Grace, do some deserving Actions, aad resist the Motions of Concupiscence; there are some that are Generous and Constant in the Law of God, by the Power of their Faith, by an assiduous Privation of sensible things, and by a Contempt and Disgust of all Temptations. There are some who act for the most part without tasting preventing and unthought of Pleasure; the only Joy which they find in acting Piously, is the Pleasure alone they are sensible of, and this Pleasure is sufficient to stay them in that Estate, and to confirm the Disposition of their Heart. Those who begin their Conversion, have commonly need of a prepossessed and an indeliberate Pleasure, to free them from their Sensible Goods, to which they are united by other preventing and indeliberate Pleasures. Sadness and Remorse of Conscience is not enough, and they do not yet taste any Joy: But the Just can live by Faith and in Want; and it's even in this Condition that they deserve more; because Men being reasonable, God will be lov'd by them with a Love of Choice, rather than with a Love of In­stinct, and an indeliberate Love; like that by which they love Sensible things, without knowing them to be Good, otherwise than by the Pleasure which they receive from them. However, the greatest part of Men have little Faith, and being continually led to taste Pleasure, they cannot long preserve their elective Love for God, against a Natural Love for Sensible Goods, if their Delight in Grace does not uphold them against the Efforts of Pleasure; for a Delight in Grace, begets, preserves, and increases Charity, as Sensible Pleasures do Desire.

It is evident from what has been said, V. Of Mens Ignorance. That Men being never without some Passion, or agreeable or disagreeable Sensations; much of the Capacity and Extension of their Mind is taken up with them: And when they are willing to employ the rest of their Capacity to examine some Truth, they are often di­verted by some new Sensations, or by a Disgust which they find in this Exercise; and by an Inconstancy of the Will, which agitates and runs the Mind from one Object to another; so that unless they have ac­custom'd themselves to overcome these Oppositions from their Youth, as has been explain'd in the Second Part, they will at last be incapable of penetrating into any thing that is a little Difficult, or which requires a little Application.

We must then conclude, That all Sciences, espe­cially those that include Questions very difficult to be resolv'd, are full of an infinite Number of Errors; and that we ought to suspect all those great Volumes, which are every day composed upon Physicks, Natu­ral Philosophy, and Morality; and especially upon the particular Propositions of these Sciences, which are much more compounded than general ones. We ought even to judge, that these Books are so much the more to be Contemned, as they are better re­ceived by the generality of Men; I mean, those who are but little capable of Application, and who know not how to make a good use of their Judgment; be­cause the Applause of the Vulgar, in any difficult Matter, is a certain Argument of the Falsity of that Opinion, and that it is only maintained upon the de­lusive Notions of the Senses, or some false Lights of the Imagination.

Yet it is not impossible, but that a Man may of himself discover a greater Number of Truths which have been conceal'd from former Ages, provided he does not want a good Judgment, but lives in some retired place, where nothing can divert him, if he Seriously apply himself to an enquiry into Truth.

Wherefore those are very unreasonable, who de­spise the Philosophy of Descartes without knowing it; only for this reason, because it appears impossible, that one Man of himself should be able to discover the Truth in so Mysterious a Subject as that of Nature: But if they knew the Manner how this Philosopher lived; the Method he took in his Studies, to prevent the Capacity of his Mind from being diverted by any other Objects, besides those whose Truth he would discover; the Clearness of the Idea's upon which he establish'd his Philosophy, and gene­rally all the Advantages he had over the Ancients by new Discoveries: I say, If they consider these things, they would doubtless receive a more reason­able Prejudice in favour of Descartes than of Anti­quity, which Authorizes Aristotle, Plato, and many others.

Yet I advise them not to stop at this Prejudice, nor to believe that Descartes is a great Man, and that his Philosophy is good, because he may be advan­tageously spoke of: Descartes was a Man subject to Error, and mistakes like others: There are none of his Works, even not excepting his Geometry, wherein there are not some Footsteps of the Weak­ness of the Humane Mind: He must not therefore be believ'd upon his Word, but be read with Precau­tion, as he himself advises us to do; examining if he was not deceiv'd, and believing nothing of what he says, but what Evidence, and the Secret Re­proaches of our Reason oblige us to believe; for in­deed the Mind knows nothing truly, but what it sees evidently.

We have shown in the preceding Chapters, that our Mind is not infinite; but on the contrary, that it had a very mean Capacity, which is commonly filled with the Sensations of the Soul. And lastly, That the Mind receiving its Direction from the Will, cannot firmly consider any Object, without being soon diverted from it, through its Inconstancy and Levity. These things are certainly the most [Page 28]general Causes of our Errors, and we might longer insist upon them here, but what I have said, is suffi­cient to discover the Weakness of the Humane Mind, to Persons that are capable of any Attention. In the Fourth and Fifth Book we shall treat more largely of the Errors which our Inclinations and Passions lead us into, and of which we have already said something in this Chapter.

CHAP. I.

I Think every one will confess, that we do not perceive External Objects by themselves. We see the Sun, the Stars, and many Objects without us; and it is not probable that the Soul should go out of the Body, and walk as it were, through the Heavens, to Contemplate all those Objects there. She does not then see them by themselves, and as the imme­diate Object of Mind; when it sees the Sun, for instance, it is not the Sun, but something which is nearly united to our Soul; and it is that which I call Idea: So that here by this word Idea, I mean only what [Page 30]is the immediate Object, or the nearest the Mind when it perceives any thing.

It must be observed, that to make the Mind per­ceive any Object, it is absolutely necessary that the Idea of this Object should be actually present, of which we can have no doubt; but it is not requisite that there should be some external Object which resem­bles this Idea; for it often happens, that we perceive things which are not, and which never had a being. So that we often have in our Minds real Idea's of things which never were. For instance, when a Man imagins a Mountain of Gold, it is absolutely necessary that the Idea of this Mountain should be really present to his Mind: When a Mad Man, a Man in a high Fever, or a Man that is asleep, sees any terrible Animal before his Eyes, it is certain that the Idea of this Animal truly Exists; and yet this Mountain of Gold, and this Ani­mal, never were.

However, Men being Naturally inclined to believe that there is none but Corporeal Objects which Exist, they Judge of the Reality and Existence of things quite after another manner than they ought to do; for as soon as they are sensible of any Object, they will cer­tainly have it that this Object Exists, although it often happens, that there is nothing without: And further, they affirm, that this Object is exactly the same as they see it, which never happens. But in respect to the Idea which necessarily Exists, and which can be nothing else besides what it appears to be, they with­out any reflection, commonly Judge it to be nothing; as if Idea's had not a very great number of Proper­ties: As if the Idea's of a Square, for instance, was not very different from that of some number, and did not represent things perfectly distinct; which could never happen to nothing, since nothing has no Pro­priety. It is therefore indisputable, that Idea's have a real Existence. But let us examine their Nature and Essence, and see what it can be in the Soul that is capable of representing all things.

Whatever things the Soul perceives, are either in, or out of its self, those which are in the Soul, are its [Page 31]own thoughts; that is, all its different Modifications; for by these words, Thought, manner of Thinking, or modification of the Soul, I understand in general all things, that can be in the Soul without her perceiv­ing them, as her own Sensations, Imaginations, pure Intellections, or simple Conceptions, even her Passi­ons, and Natural Inclinations. Now our Soul has no need of Idea's to perceive all these things, because they are within the Soul; or rather, the Soul it self, after such or such a manner: Even as the real round­ness of some Body, and its Motion, are only this Body Figured, and moved after such or such a manner.

But as for things that are out of the Soul, we can perceive them only by the means of Idea's, supposing that these things cannot be intimately united to it. There are two sorts of them, Spiritual, and Material: As for the Spiritual, there is some probability that they may discover themselves to the Soul without Idea's, and by themselves. For although Experience teaches us, that we cannot immediately, and of our selves, declare our Thoughts to one another, but only by words, or some other sensible Sign, to which we have assixed our Idea's: We may say, that God has ordained it so only during this Life, to hinder those Disorders that would soon happen, if Men could make themselves be understood as they pleased. But when Justice and Order shall Reign, and we shall be deli­vered from the Captivity of our Bodies, we shall per­haps make our selves mutually understood by an inti­mate Union of our selves, as its probable the Angels do in Heaven; so that it does not seem absolutely ne­cessary to admit Idea's to represent spiritual things to the Soul, because it may be, we may see them by themselves, although after a very imperfect manner.

I examine not here how two Spirits can be united one to the other, and if they can after this manner mutually discover one anothers Thoughts. I believe however, that there is no Substance purely intelligible, but that of God; nothing can be evidently known but in his Light; and that the Ʋnion of Spirits cannot make them Visible: For although we are most strictly united to our selves, we are, [Page 32]and shall be unintelligible to our selves, until we see our selves in God; and that he represents to us the perfect in­telligible Idea that he hath of our being included in his. So that although I may seem here to grant, that Angels can manifest one to another what they are, and what they think; 'tis only because I will not dispute of it, provided I am granted what is not to be doubted, viz. That we can­not see material things by themselves, and without Idea's.

I shall explain in the Seventh Chapter, my Opinion how we know Spirits; and will shew, that at present we cannot absolutely know them by themselves, al­though it may be they are united to us. But I speak here chiesly of material things, which certainly cannot be united to the Soul, in such a manner as is necessary for us to perceive them: Because being extended, and the Soul not, there is no proportion between them. Besides, our Souls go not out of our Bodies to measure the greatness of the Heaven, and consequently, they can­not see External Bodies, but by the Idea's which repre­sent them. This is what all the World ought to grant.

We are assured then, II. A divi­sion of the several ways whereby External Objects may be seen. that it's absolutely necessary, that the Idea's we have of Bodies, and of all other Objects which we perceive not by themselves, pro­ceed from these Bodies, or these Objects; or else that our Soul has the power of producing these Idea's, or that God Created them with our Souls; or that he produces them every time that we think of any Ob­ject; or else that the Soul has all those Perfections in it self that it sees in these Bodies: Or in fine, that it is united with a perfect Being, which in general in­cludes all the Perfections of Created Beings.

We cannot see Objects but after one of these ways: Let us examin without prejudice, and without fright­ing our selves with the difficulty of the Question, which of them seems most probable: It may be we may resolve it very clearly, although we do not pre­tend here to give such Demonstrations as will satisfie all sorts of persons; but only convincing Proofs to those at least, as will meditate with serious Attention upon them; for perhaps it would be thought too rash if we should pretend otherwise.

CHAP. II.

THe most common received Opinion is that of the Peripateticks, who think that External Objects emit Species which resemble them, and that those Spe­cies are carried by the External Senses to the Com­mon Sense or Understanding. They call these Species impressed, because the Object imprints them on the External Senses. These impressed Species being Ma­terial and Sensible, are render'd intelligible, by means of the active, or active intellect; and are fit to be re­ceived in the passive intellect. These Species thus spi­ritualiz'd, are called express'd Species, because they are express'd by the impress'd ones; and 'tis by them that the Passive Intellect knows all material things.

We shall not stay to explain at large these sine things, and the divers manners in which different Phi­losophers conceive them; for although they do not agree as to the number of Faculties which they attri­bute to the Interior Sense, and the Understanding; and though there are not a few, who doubt whether they have need of any active Intellect, to know sensible Objects, yet however they generally agree, that Ex­ternal Objects emit the Species or Images which re­present them. And 'tis only upon this Foundation that they multiply their Faculties, and defend their active intellect: So that this Foundation having no So­lidity, as shall soon be shewn, it will be unnecessary to spend any time to overturn the Superstructure.

We are assur'd then, that it is improbable that Ob­jects should emit their Images, or Species which re­present them, for these reasons. 1. From the impe­netrability of Objects: All Objects, as the Sun, Stars, and all such as are near the Eyes, cannot emit Species which are different from their respective Natures: Wherefore Philosophers commonly say, that these [Page 34]Species are Gross and Material, in which they differ from express'd Species which are Spiritualised. These impress'd Species of Objects then are little Bodies, they cannot therefore be penetrated, nor all the Spaces which are betwixt the Earth and the Heaven, which must be full of them. Whence it's easie to conclude, they must be bruis'd and broken, in moving every way; and thus they cannot render Objects visible.

Moreover, one may see from the same place or point, a great number of Objects in the Heavens, and on the Earth; therefore the Species of these Objects can be reduc'd into a Point. But they are impene­trable since they are extended, Therefore, &c.

But one may not only see a multitude of very great and vast Objects: There is no Point in all the great Spaces of the World, from whence we cannot disco­ver an almost infinite number of Objects, and even Objects as large as the Sun, Moon, and the Heavens, there is therefore no Point in all the World where the Species of all these things ought not to meet; which is against all appearance of Truth.

The Second Reason is taken from the Change which happens in the Species; Such as would know how all im­pressions of Visible Ob­jects, how­ever eppo­site, may be communi­catedwith­out being weaken'd, may read Monsicur Descartes his Diop­tricks. it's evident, that the nearer any Object is, the greater its Species ought to be, since we see the Object's greater. But what is yet more difficult to conceive, according to their Opinion, is, That if we look upon this Object with a Telescope, or a Microscope, the Species immediately becomes Six Hundred times as great as it was before; for 'tis yet more difficultly conceiv'd from what Parts it can grow so great in an instant.

The Third Reason is, when we look upon a per­fect Cube, all the Species of its Sides are unequal; nevertheless, we see all the Sides equally Square. So when we consider Ellipses and Parallelograms in a Picture, which cannot but emit like Species, yet we see Circles and Squares: This manifestly shews, that it is not necessary that the Object beheld, should emit Species like it self, that it may be seen.

In fine, it cannot be conceiv'd how it can be, that a Body, which does not sensibly diminish, should al­ways [Page 35]emit Species on every Side, which should conti­nually fill all the great Spaces about it, and that with an inconceivable swiftness. For an Object that was hidden, in that Instant that it discovers it self may be seen many Millions of Leagues on all Sides; and what appears yet more strange is, that Bodies in great Motion, as Air, and some others, have not that power of pushing outwards these Images which resemble them; as the more gross and quiescent Bodies, such as the Earth, Stones, and generally all hard Bodies have.

But I shall not stay any longer to enumerate all the contrary Reasons to their Opinion, there would be no end, a very ordinary Judgment would raise innume­rable Objections. Those that we have brought are sufficient, though they were not so necessary after what has been said upon the Subject of the First Book, where the Errors of the Senses were explain'd. But there are so great a number of Philosophers wedded to this Opinion, that we believe it will be necessary to say something to encline them to reflect upon their own Thoughts.

CHAP. III.

THe Second Opinion is that of those who believe our Souls have any power of producing the Idea's of such things as they will think upon, and they are excited to produce them by the Impressions which Ob­jects make upon Bodies, although these Impressions are not Images like the Objects which cause them; they believe that 'tis in this, that Man is made after the Image of God, and participates of his Power, That even as God Created all things out of nothing, [Page 36]and can reduce them to nothing again, and then Cre­ate them anew; so Man can Create, and Annihilate the Idea's of all things as he pleases. But there is great Reasons to distrust all these Opinions which ex­tol a Man, these are the Common Thoughts which arise from a vain and proud Original, and which the Father of Light hath not inspir'd.

This participation of the power of God which Men boast of having, to represent Objects, and of doing many other particular actions, is a participation which seems to relate to something of independance, as independance is commonly explain'd; it is also a Chimerical Participation, which Mens Ignorance and Vanity make them to imagine. They depend much more than they think, upon the Goodness and Mercy of God: But this is not a place to explain these things. It's enough if we endeavour to shew, that Men have not the Power of forming the Idea's of things which they perceive.

No one can doubt that Idea's are real Beings, since they have real Properties, since they differ from one another, and represent all different things; Nor can we reasonably doubt that they are Spiritual, and very different from the Bodies which they represent. But it seems reasonable to doubt, whether Idea's, by whose means we see Bodies, are not more Noble than the Bo­dies themselves: for indeed the Intelligible World must be more perfect than the Material and Earthly, as we shall see hereafter. Thus when we affirm that we have the Power of Forming such Idea's as we please, we shall be in danger of perswading our selves, to make more Noble and Perfect Beings, than the World which God hath Created. However, some do not re­flect upon it, because they imagin that an Idea is Nothing, since it is not to be felt; or else if they look upon it as a Being, 'tis a very mean, contempti­ble one, because they imagin it to be annihilated as soon as it is no longer present to the Mind.

But supposing it true, that Idea's were only little contemptible Beings, yet they are Beings, and Spiri­tual Ones; and Men not having the power of Be­lieving, [Page 37]it follows that they cannot produce them; for the production of Idea's after the manner before explain'd, is a true Creation; and although Men en­deavour to palliate and mollifie the hardness of this Opinion, by saying, that the production of Idea's pre­supposes something else, but Creation nothing; yet the difficulty is not solv'd by this Subterfuge.

For we ought to consider, that it is not more diffi­cult to produce something out of nothing, than to pro­duce one thing out of another; which cannot at all contribute to its Production. For example, it is not more difficult to Create an Angel, than to produce him from a Stone; because a Stone being of another sort of Being wholly different, it cannot in the least be useful to the Production of an Angel. But it may contribute to the Production of Bread, Gold, &c. for a Stone, Gold, and Bread, are but the same thing differently configur'd, and are all Material.

It is even more difficult to produce an Angel of a Stone, than to pronuce him out of nothing; because to make an Angel out of a Stone; (so far as it can be done) the Stone must be annihilated, and afterwards the Angel Created; But simply to Create an Angel, nothing is to be annihilated. If therefore the Mind produces its Idea's from the material Impressions which the Brain receives from Objects, it must always do the same thing, or a thing as difficult, or even more difficult than if it Created them; since Idea's being Spiritual, they cannot be produc'd of material Images, which have no proportion with them.

But if it be said, that an Idea is not a Substance, I consent to it, yet it is always something that is Spiri­tual; and as it is impossible to make a Square of a Spirit, although a Square be not a Substance, so it is also impossible to Form a Material Substance from a Spiritual Idea, although an Idea was no Substance.

But although we should grant to the Mind of Man a Soveraign Power to Annihilate, and Create the Idea's of things, yet it would never make use of that Power to produce them; for even as a Painter, how skilful soever he be, could not represent an Animal [Page 38]which he had never seen, and of which he never had any Idea: So that the Picture which he should make, should be like to this unknown Animal. Thus a Man cannot form the Idea of an Object, if he knew it not before, that is, if he has not already had some Idea of it, which does not depend upon his Will; and if he already had an Idea of it, he certainly knows this Object, and it would be unnecessary for him to Form it anew. It is therefore in vain to attribute to the Mind of Man the Power of producing his Idea's. It might be said perhaps, that the Mind of Man hath general and confused Idea's which it does not pro­duce; and that those which it produces are particular, more clear and distinct; but it is always the same thing. For even as a Painter cannot draw the Picture of a particular Person, so as to be sure that he hath perfected it, if he had had no distinct Idea of him; and even if the Person had not been present: Thus the Mind, for example, which could only have the Idea of a Being, or an Animal in general, could not re­present to its self a Horse, nor Form a distinct Idea of one, and be assured that it is perfectly like a Horse, if it had not already the first Idea with which it might compare this second: Now if it had a first, it is un­useful to Form a second; and the Question respects this first. Therefore, &c.

It's true, that when we conceive a Square by pure Intellection, we can also imagin it, that is, perceive it in our selves, by tracing an Image of it in the Brain; yet it must be first observ'd, that we are not the true nor principal Cause of this Image: But it will be too long to explain it here. Secondly, So far is the se­cond Idea which accompanies this Image, from being more distinct and more exact than the other, that on the contrary, it is not so Exact, because it resembles the first, which was only a pattern for the second. For indeed we must not believe that the Imagination and Senses represent Objects more distinctly to us than the pure Understanding; but only that they ap­ply them more to the Mind; for the Idea's of the Senses and Imagination are not distinct, but only so [Page 39]far as they are conformable to the pure Intellection: The Image of a Square for example, which the Ima­gination Traces in the Brain, is not exact and perfect, but only so far as it resembles the Idea of the Square, which we conceive by pure Intellection. It is this Idea which regulates this Image, 'tis the Mind which Con­ducts the Imagination; and which Obliges it, if we may so say, to behold from time to time, whether the Image it Paints, be a Figure of four right and equal Lines, whose Angles are alike. In a word, whether what it Imagins, is like to what it Conceives.

After what has been said, Tanto me­liora esse judico qua oculis cer­no, quanto pro sui na­tura vici­niora sunt iisquae ani­mointelligo Aug. 63. de Vera Religione. I do not believe it can be doubted, but those are deceived, who affirm, the Mind is able to Form the Idea's of Objects; since they at­tribute the Power of Creation to the Mind, and even of Creating with Wisdom and Order, although it has no knowledge of what it does; for that is not Con­ceivable: But the cause of their Error is, that Men always Judge that a thing is the Cause of some Effect, when both are joined together, supposing the true Cause of this Effect be unknown to them. That makes all the World conclude, that a Bowl put in Mo­tion, and meeting another, is the true and principal Cause of the Motion that it communicates to it; as the Will of the Soul is the true and principal Cause of the Motion of the Arm, and other the like prejudices; because it always happens, that a Bowl is shaken when it is met by another that runs against it: As our Arms are moved almost always when we Will, and we do not see any other apparent Cause of this Motion.

But when an Effect does not so often follow some­thing which is not the Cause of it, there is neverthe­less a great many Men, who believe this thing is the Cause of the Effect which happens.; yet every Body is not guilty of the same Error. For instance, if a Comet appears, and after this Comet a Prince Dies: Some Stones lie exposed to the Moon, and they are eaten with Worms: The Sun is joined with Mars at the Nativity of a Child, and something extraordinary happens to this Child: All this is enough to perswade a great many Men, that the Comet, the Moon, and [Page 40]the Conjunction of the Sun with Mars, are the Causes of these Effects, and others like them; and the rea­son why all the World does not believe it, is, that they do not always see these Effects follow these Causes.

But all Men having commonly the Idea's of Ob­jects present to their Minds as soon as they wish it, and it happening many times in a day, almost all con­clude, that the Will which accompanies the producti­on, or rather the presence of Idea's, is truly the Cause of them: Because they see nothing in the same time that they can attribute it to; and they imagin the Idea's no longer Exist, when the Mind sees them no longer; and that they revive again anew, when they are again represented to the Mind.

'Tis for these Reasons some Judge, that External Objects emit Images which resemble them, as we have mention'd in the precedent Chapter: For it being impossible to see Objects by themselves, but only by their Idea's, they judge the Object produces the Idea; because as soon as it is present they see it; and as soon as absent they see it no longer; and because the pre­sence of the Object almost always accompanies the Idea which represents it to us.

Yet if Men were not prejudiced in their Judgments from this, that the Idea's of things are present to their Mind as soon as they Will them, they should only con­clude, that according to the Order of Nature, their Will is commonly necessary for them to have those Idea's. Not that the Will is the true and principal Cause which presents them to the Mind, and much less, that the Will produces them from nothing, or after the manner they explain it. Nor ought they to con­clude, that Objects emit Species resembling them, be­cause the Soul commonly perceives them only when they are present; but only that the Object is for the most part necessary, in order to the Idea's being pre­sent to the Mind. And lastly, that a Bowl put into Motion, is the principal and true Cause of the shaking of another Bowl that it meets in the way, since the first had not the power of Motion in its self. They can only determin, that the meeting of two Bowls is [Page 41]an occasion to the Author, of the Motion of Matter to execute the Decree of his Will, which is the Universal Cause of all things, See Ch. 3. Of the Se­cond Part of Method. in communicating to the other Bowl a part of the Motion of the first; that is, to speak more clearly, in willing that the last should ac­quire so much more Motion as the first lost; for the moving force of Bodies can proceed only from the Will of him who preserves them, as we shall shew else­where.

CHAP. IV.

THE Third Opinion is, That of those who say all Idea's are created with us.

To discover the Improbability of this Opinion, it will be necessary to consider that there is many diffe­rent things in the World of which we have Idea's. But to speak only of simple Figures, it is certain that the Number of them is Infinite: Nay, even if we con­sider but one only, as the Ellipsis, we cannot doubt but the Mind conceives an infinite Number of diffe­rent Kinds of them, when it considers that one of the Diameters may be lengthened out to Infinity, and the other always continue the same.

So the heighth of a Triangle may be augmented or diminished infinitely, the base being always the same, we may conceive there is an infinite Number of different Kinds of them: And also, which I desire may be consider'd here, The Mind in some manner perceives this infinite Number, although we can ima­gine but very few of them; and that we can at the same time have particular and distinct Idea's of many Triangles of different Kinds. But what must chiefly [Page 42]be observed is, That this general Idea that the Mind has of this Number of Triangles of diffe­rent Kinds is sufficient to prove, That if we do not conceive each of these different Triangles by particular Idea's: And in short, If we comprehend not their Infinity, 'tis not the Defect of the Idea's, or that Infinity is not represented to us, but only the Defect of the Capacity and Extension of the Mind. If a Man should apply himself to consider the Pro­perties of all the diverse Kinds of Triangles, although he should eternally continue this sort of Study, he would never want new and particular Idea's, but his Mind would be unprofitably fatigued.

What I have said of Triangles, may be applied to five, six, a hundred, a thousand, or ten thousand sided Figures, and so on ad infinitum. Now if the sides of a Triangle, which have infinite relations one with the other, make Triangles of infinite Kinds, it is plain that four, five, or a thousand sided Figures are capable of admitting much greater Differences, since they are capable of a greater Number of Relations and Combinations of their sides, than simple Triangles are.

The Mind then sees all these things; it hath Idea's of them; and these Idea's would never fail it, although it should employ infinite Ages in the Consideration of one Figure only: And if it perceived not these infinite Figures all of a sudden, or comprehended not their Infinity, 'tis only because its Extension is very much limited. It hath then an infinite Number of Idea's: Do I say an infinite Number? It hath as many infinite Numbers of Idea's, as there are different Figures to be consider'd: So that since there is an infinite Num­ber of different Figures, it's necessary that to know the Figures, the Mind have an infinitely infinite Number of Idea's.

Now I ask, If it's probable that God should Create so many things with the Mind of Man? For my part it does not appear so to me; chiefly, since that might be made in a more simple and easie manner, as we shall soon see. For as God always acts by the most simple [Page 43]ways, it does not seem reasonable to explain how we know Objects, by admitting the Creation of an in­finite Number of Beings, since we can resolve this Difficulty in a more Easie and Natural way.

But although the Mind should have a Magazine of all the Idea's, which are necessary for it to see things, it would be yet more difficult to explain how the Soul should make choice of them to represent them: For instance, how it can represent the Sun to it self, whilst it is present to the Eyes of its Body?

For whereas the Image which the Sun imprints in the Brain, resembles not the Idea we have thereof, as has been elsewhere proved; and since the Soul per­ceives not the Motion that the Sun produces in the bottom of the Eyes, and in the Brain, it's inconceiva­ble how it should exactly guess, amongst these infinite Number of Idea's that it has, which it must represent to it self, to imagine or to see the Sun: We cannot therefore say, That the Idea's of things were created with us, it is sufficient that we see the Objects that are about us.

Nor can we say that God produces as many of them every Moment, as we perceive different things; this has been sufficiently refuted from what has been said in this Chapter. Besides it is necessary that at all times we actually have in our selves the Idea's of all things, since we are always able to think of all things; which we could not if we perceiv'd them already con­fusedly; that is, If an infinite Number of Idea's were not present to our Minds; for we cannot will to think of Objects, of which we have no Idea.

CHAP. V.

THE Fourth Opinion is, That the Mind stands in need of nothing besides it self, to perceive Ob­jects; and that it can, in considering it self and its own Perfections, discover all things that are with­out it.

It is certain that the Soul sees within it self, and without Idea's, all the Sensations and Passions it is capable of, as Pleasure, Pain, Cold, Heat, Colours, Sounds, Odours, Sapors, its Love, its Hatred, Joy and Sadness, &c. because all the Sensations and Passions of the Soul represent nothing External which is like them; and because they are only Modifications, which nothing but the Mind is capable of. But the Difficulty is, to know whether the Idea's which repre­sent something that is without the Soul, and which resembles them in some measure, as the Idea's of a Sun, a House, a Horse, a River, &c. are only Modi­fications of the Soul; insomuch that the Soul cannot stand in need of any thing besides it self, to represent to it self all External Things.

There are Persons who make no Scruple to affirm, That the Soul being made to think, it has in it self, I mean, in considering its own Perfections, whatever is necessary to perceive Objects; for indeed the Soul being nobler than all the things it conceives distinctly, it may be said, that it contains them in some measure Eminently, according to the Notions of the Schools; that is, after a Nobler and more Sublime Manner than they are in themselves. They pretend, that thus Superior things comprehend the Perfections of those that are Inferior. And thus being the Noblest of the [Page 45]Creatures they know; they fancy they have in them­selves, after a Spiritual Manner, all that is in the visible World. In a word, They will have the Soul to be like an Intelligible World, which comprehends in it self, whatever the Material and Sensible World com­prehends; nay, Infinitely more.

But in my Opinion it is a great Presumption to maintain that Thought: If I am not mistaken, it is Natural Vanity, the Love of Independence, and the Desire of resembling him who comprehends all Beings in himself, which Confounds the Mind, Dic quia tu tibi lu­men non es. Serm. 8. De Verbis Do­mini. and inclines us to believe, we possess what we have not: Do not say that you are a Light to your self, says St. Austin; for there is none but God who is a Light to himself, and who can, in considering himself, see whatever he has produced, or can produce.

It is certain that there was none but God alone before the World was Created, and he could not pro­duce it without Knowledge and without Idea's: Con­sequently those Idea's which God had of the World, are not different from himself; and thus all Crea­tures, even the most Material and most Terrestrial, are in God, though in a manner altogether Spiritual, which we cannot apprehend. God therefore sees all Beings in himself, in considering his own Perfections which represent them to him. He also knows their Existence perfectly, for since the Existence of all things depend on his Will, he cannot be Ignorant of his own Will; it follows then, that he cannot be Igno­rant of their Existence. And thus God does not only see in himself the Essence of all things, but also their Existence.

But the case is different as to Created Spirits, they can neither see the Essence of things, nor their Ex­istence within themselves: They cannot see their Essence within themselves, because being very much limited, they do not contain all Beings, like God whom we may call the Universal Being, or plainly He that is, as he calls himself. Since therefore the Humane Mind may know all Beings and Infinite Beings, and yet not contain them, it is a certain Proof, that it does [Page 46]not see their Essence in it self. For the Mind does not only see sometimes one thing, and sometimes another successively, it also actually perceives Infinity though it does not comprehend it. So that not being actually Infinite, nor capable of Infinite Modifications at the same time, it is absolutely Impossible that it should see within it self what is not there. Therefore it does not see the Essence of things in considering its own Per­fections, or by modifying it self diversly.

Neither does it see their Existence within it self, because the Existence of Beings do not depend upon its Will; and because the Idea's of those Beings may be present to the Mind, though they do not Exist; for every body may have the Idea of a Mountain of Gold, though there be no Mountain of Gold in Nature: And though we rely on the report of the Senses to judge of the Existence of Objects; neverthe­less Reason does not assure us, that we should always believe our Senses, since we find clearly that they de­ceive us. When a Man's Blood, for instance, is very much inflam'd; or barely when he Sleeps, he some­times beholds Fields, Combats, and the like, which nevertheless are not present, and which perhaps never were. Therefore it is certain that it is neither within it self, nor by it self, that the Mind sees the Existence of things, but that in this case it depends upon some other things.

CHAP. VI.

WE have examin'd in the preceding Chapter four different Manners in which the Humane Mind may see External Objects, which do not appear pro­bable to us: There only remains the Fifth, which alone appears consonant to Reason, and the most proper to shew the Dependence that Spirits have on God in all their Thoughts.

In order to apprehend it rightly, we must remem­ber what has been said in the preceding Chapter, that it is absolutely necessary that God should have in him­self the Idea's of all the Beings he has created, since otherwise he could not have produced them; and that thus he sees all those Beings, by considering the Per­fections which he includes in himself, and to which all Beings are related. Moreover, it is necessary to know that God is very strictly united to our Souls by his Presence, so that we may say that he is the place of Spirits, as Space is the place of Bodies. These two things being supposed, it is certain that the Mind may see what there is in God, which represents Created Beings, since that is very Spiritual, very Intelligible, and most present to the Mind. Thus the Mind may see in God the Works of God, supposing God be will­ing to discover to it what there is in him which re­presents them. These are the Reasons which seem to prove, that he rather Wills than Creates an Infinite Number of Idea's in every Mind.

First, Although we do not absolutely deny, that God was able to produce an Infinitely infinite Num­ber of Beings, which represent Objects with every Mind he Creates; yet we ought not to believe that he does so. For it is not only consonant to Reason, but it also appears by the Oeconomy of Nature, that God never does by very difficult means, what may be done by a plain easie way: God does nothing in vain and without Reason: That which shews his Wisdom and his Power, is not to do little things by difficult Means; for that is repugnant to Reason, and shews a limited Knowledge: But on the contrary, it is to do great things by plain easie Means. 'Tis thus that out of Extension only he produces whatever we see that is admirable in Nature, and even that which gives Life and Motion to Animals. For those who will needs have Substantial Forms, Faculties, and Souls in Animals, different from their Blood, and from the Organs of their Body, in order to perform their Functions, at the same time seem to argue that God wants Understanding, or that he cannot do those ad­mirable [Page 48]things by Extension only. They measure the Power of God, and his Soveraign Wisdom, by the smallness of their own Capacity. Then since God may make Humane Minds see all things, by willing barely that they should see what is in themselves; that is, what is in him that has a relation to those things, and which represents them, there is no pro­bability that he would do it otherwise; and that he should produce, in order thereunto, as many In­finities of Infinite Numbers of Idea's, as there are Created Spirits.

But we must observe, that we are not to conclude, that Spirits see the Essence of God, because they can see all things in God in that manner: Since what they see is very Imperfect; but that God is very Perfect: They see Matter Divisible and Figured, &c. and there is nothing in God that is Divisible or Figured; for God is all Beings, because he is Infinite and Compre­hends all; but he is no Being in particular. Never­theless that which we see is but one, or several Beings in particular, and we do not apprehend that perfect Simplicity of God which includes all Beings. Besides that it may be said, that we do not so much see the Idea's of things, as the things which those Idea's re­present; for when we see a Square, for instance, we do not say that we see the Idea of that Square, which is united to the Mind, but only the Square which is without us.

The Second Reason which may induce us to be­lieve, that we see all Beings, because God Wills, that that which is in him, which represents them, should be discover'd to us; and not because we have as many Idea's created with us as we can see things; for this puts all created Spirits in an absolute Dependence upon God, and the greatest that can be: For this being so, we cannot only see nothing, but what God is willing we should see, but we can also see nothing, unless God himself shews it us. 2 ad Cor. 3.5. Non sumus sufficientes cogitare aliquid à nobis, tanquam ex nobis, sed sufficientia nostra ex Deo est. 'Tis God himself which instructs and enlightens Philosophers in that Knowledge which [Page 49]ungrateful Men call Natural, although it is an imme­diate Gift from Heaven: Deus enim illis manifestavit. Rom. 1.19 It is he that is properly the Light of the Mind, and the Father of Light or Knowledge. Pater Luminum. Jac. 1.17. It is he that teaches Wisdom to Men: Psa. 53. Qui docet homi­nem scientiam. In a word, He is the true Light, which enlightens all those that come into this World: Lux vera quae illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc Mundum. Joan 1.9.

For in fine, It is pretty difficult distinctly to appre­hend the Dependence which our Minds have on God in all their particular Actions, supposing they have all that which we distinctly know to be necessary for them in order to Act, or all the Idea's of things pre­sent to their Mind, and truly that general and con­fused word Concurrence, by which Men pretend to explain the Dependence that Creatures have on God, does not awaken any distinct Idea in an attentive Mind; and yet it is very necessary Men should know distinctly, that they can do nothing without God.

But the strongest of all Reasons, is the manner how the Mind perceives all things. It is certain, and every body knows by Experience, that when we have a mind to think on any thing in particular, we first cast our Eyes on all Beings; and in the next place we apply our selves to the Consideration of the Object we design to think on. Now it is most certain that we see it already, though confusedly and in general: So that as we may desire to see all the Beings, some­times one and sometimes another, it is certain that all Beings are present to our Mind; and it appears that all Beings can only be present to our Mind, be­cause God is present to it, that is, He who includes all things in the Simplicity of his Being.

It seems moreover, That the Mind would not be capable of representing to it self universal Idea's of Kinds and Species, &c. unless it saw all Beings in­cluded in one. For every Creature being a parti­cular Being, we cannot say that we see any thing Created, when we see, for instance, a Triangle in [Page 50]general. In fine, I am of opinion, that it is impossi­ble to give a good Reason of the Manner how the Mind comes to know several abstracted and general Truths, unless it be by the presence of him that can direct the Mind in a World of different Manners.

In fine, The Best, the most Sublime, the most Solid, and the chief Proof of the Existence of God, or that which supposes the fewest things, is the Idea we have of Infinity, though it does not comprehend it; and that it has a very distinct Idea of God, which it can only have by the Union it has with him; since it cannot be conceiv'd that the Idea of a Being infinitely perfect, as that we have of God, should be any thing that is Created.

But the Mind has not only the Idea of Infinity, it has it even before that of Finite. For we conceive the Infinite Being, from this alone that we conceive a Being, without considering whether it is Finite or Infinite. But in order to conceive a Finite Being, we must needs retrench something of that general Notion of a Being, which consequently must precede. Thus the Mind perceives nothing but in Infinity; and that Idea is so far from being form'd by the confused Mix­ture of all the Idea's of particular Beings, as Philo­sophers imagine; that on the contrary all those parti­cular Idea's are only Participations of the general Idea of Infinity: As God does not derive his Being from the Creatures, but all Creatures only subsist by him.

The last Proof, which perhaps will be a Demon­stration to those that are used to abstracted Arguments, is this, It is impossible that God should have any other principal End of his Actions but himself: It is a Notion that is common to all Men that are capa­ble of any Reflection; and Holy Writ does not allow us to doubt, but that God has made every thing for himself. Therefore it is necessary, that not only our Natural Love, I mean the Motion he produces in our Mind, should tend towards him: But more­over, That the Knowledge and the Light which he bestows upon it, should make us know any thing that [Page 51]is in him; for whatever comes from God can only be for God. Should God Create a Spirit, and give it for an Idea, or for the immediate Object of its knowledge the Sun: In my Opinion, God would Create that Spi­rit, and the Idea of that Spirit, for the Sun and not for him.

God cannot therefore Create a Spirit to know his Works, unless that Spirit sees God in some measure, by beholding his Works. So that we may say, that unless we do see God in some measure, we should see nothing: In like manner, unless we do Love God, I mean, unless God did continually Imprint in us the Love of Good in general, we should Love nothing. For that Love being our Will, we can Love nothing, nor Will any thing without him; since we cannot Love particular Goods, without determining towards those Goods, the motion of Love, which God gives us towards him. So that as we Love nothing but by the necessa­ry Love we have for God, so we see nothing but by the Natural Knowledge we have of God: And all the particular Idea's we have of Creatures, are only Limi­tations of the Idea of the Creator, as all the Motions of the Will for the Creatures, are only determinations of the motion for the Creator.

I believe there are no Divines but what will grant, that the Impious Love God with that Natural Love I speak of: And St. Austin and some other Fathers af­firm as an undeniable thing, That the Impious behold in God the Rule of Manners, and Eternal Truths. So that the Opinion I explain ought not to trouble any Body. Thus St. Austin speaks: L. 14. de Trin. c. 3. Ab illa incommutabili luce veritatis, etiam impius, dum ab ea avertitur, quo­dammodo tangitur. Hinc est quod etiam impii cogitant aeternitatem, & multa rectè riprehendunt rectéque laudant in hominum moribus. Quibus ea tandem regulis judicant, nisi in quibus vident, quemadmodum quisque vivere debeat, etiam si nec ipsi eodem modo vivant? Ʋbi autem eas vi­dent? Neque enim in sua natura. Nam cùm procul du­bio mente ista videantur, corumque mentes constet esse mu­tabiles, has vero regula [...] immutabiles, videat quisquis in eis & hoc videre potuerit — ubinam ergo sunt istae regulae [Page 52]Scriptae, nisi in libro lucis illius, quae veritas dicitur, unde lex omnis justa describitur—inqua videt quid operandum sit, etiam qui operatur injustitiam, & ipse est qui ab illa luce avertitur à qua tamen tangitur.

There are many passages in St. Austin like unto this. by which he proves, that we see God even in this Life, by the knowledge we have of Eternal Truths. Truth is uncreated, Immutable, Immense, Eternal, above all things. It is true by it self. It derives its Perfection from nothing: It makes Creatures more perfect; and all Spirits naturally endeavour to know it. Nothing but God can have all those Perfections. Therefore Truth is God. We see some of those Immutable Eternal Truths. Therefore we see God. These are St. Austin's Reasons, ours differ a little from them; and we are unwilling to use the Authority of so great a Man unjustly, to second our Sentiment.

We believe that Truths, even those that are Eter­nal; as that twice two are four, are not so much as ab­solute Beings: So far are we from believing that they are in God. For it is visible, that that Truth only consists in a relation of Equality, which is between twice Two and Four. Therefore we do not say that we see God in seeing Truths, as St. Austin says, but in seeing the Idea's of those Truths: For Idea's are real, but the Equality between the Idea's, which is Truth, has no reality. When for example, Men say that the Cloth they measure contains Three Yards; the Cloth and the Yards are real: But the Equality between Three Yards and the Cloth is not a real Be­ing; it is only a relation that is between the Three Yards and the Cloth. When we say that twice Two are Four. the Idea's of the Numbers are real; but the Equality there is between them is only a Relation. Thus according to our Sentiment we see God, when we see Eternal Truths; not that those Eternal Truths are God, but because the Idea's on which those Truths depend are in God; perhaps St. Austin understood it so. We also believe, that we know in God Change­able and Corrubtible things, although St. Austin only speaks of Immutable and Incorruptible things; be­cause [Page 53]it is not necessary for that to place any Imper­fection in God; since it suffices, as we have already said, that God should shew us what there is in him that has a Relation to these things.

But though I say, we see in God the things that are Material and Sensible, it must be observ'd, that I do not say we have a Sensation of them in God, but only that it is from God who Acts in us; for God Knows sensible things, but he does not Feel them. When we perceive any thing that is sensible, Sensation and pure Idea is in our Perception. Sensation is a Modification of our Soul, and it is God that Causes it in us: And he may Cause it, though he has it not, because he sees in the Idea he has of our Soul, that it is capable of it. As for the Idea which is joyn'd to Sensation, it is in God, we see it, because it is his pleasure to discover it to us: And God joins Sensation to the Idea, when Objects are present, to the end that we may be­lieve them as they are; and that we may have such Sensations and Passions as we ought to have in rela­tion to them.

Lastly, We believe that all Spirits see the Eternal Laws as well as other things in God, but with some difference: They know the Eternal Order and Eter­nal Truths, and even the Beings which God has made according to those Truths, or according to the Order by the Union which those Spirits have necessarily with the Word, or Wisdom of God which directs them, as we have shewn; But 'tis by the Impression they re­ceive continually from the Will of God, which inclines them to him, and endeavours, as it were, to render their Will absolutely like unto his; that they know Order is a Law, I mean, that they know the Eternal Laws: How we must love Good, and fly from Evil: That we must love Justice more than all Riches: That it is better to Obey God than to Command Men, and many other Natural Laws. For the knowledge of all those Laws is not different from the knowledge of that Impression, which they always feel in themselves, though they do not always follow it by the free choice of their Will; which they know to be [Page 54]Common to all Spirits, though it is not equally strong in all.

It is by that Dependance, Relation, and Union of our Mind to the Word of God, and of our Will to his Love, that we are made after the Image and Likeness of God: And although this may be very much defac'd by Sin, yet it is necessary that it should subsist as long as we do. But if we bear the Image of the Word humbled upon Earth; and if we follow the Motions of the Holy Ghost, that Primitive Image of our first Creation, that Union of our Mind with the Word of the Father, and to the Love of the Father and of the Son, will be re-established, and render'd indelible. We shall be like God, if we are like the Man God. In fine, God will be all in us, and we all in God, in a far more per­fect manner than that by which it is necessary for us to subsist, that we should be in him, and he in us.

Here are some reasons which may perswade us, See the Ex­planations. that Spirits perceive all things by the immediate Pre­sence of him who Comprehends all in the Simplicity of his Being. Every one will Judge of it according to the Internal Conviction he shall receive of it, after having seriously consider'd it. But 'tis thought that there will be no probability in all the other ways of explaining these things; and that this last will appear more than probable. Thus our Souls depend on God in all respects. For as it is he who makes them feel Grief, Pleasure, and all other Sensations, by the Na­tural Union he has Establish'd between them and our Body, which is no other than his Decree and general Will. Thus it is he, who by the Natural Union which he has made between the Will of Man, and the Re­presentation of the Idea's which the Immensity of the Divine Being includes, that makes them know what­ever they do know; and that Natural Union is also nothing else but his general Will. So that none but he can direct us, by representing all things to us; as none but he can make us Happy, by making us taste all manner of Pleasures.

Let us therefore keep to this Opinion, That God is the Intelligible World, or the place of Spirits, as the [Page 55]material World is the place of Bodies. That they receive all their Modifications from his Power: That they find all their Idea's in his Wisdom: And that it is by his Love that they are acted in all their regular Motions; and since his Power and Love are nothing but himself, let us believe with St. Paul, that he is not far from every one of us; and that it is in him we have Life, Motion, and a Being. Act. A­post. c. 17.28. Non longe est ab uno­quoque nostrum, in ipso enim vivimus, movemur, & sumus.

CHAP. VII.

IN order to Abridge and Illustrate the Opinion I have set down, concerning the manner how the Mind perceives the different Objects of its Knowledge, it is necessary to distinguish in it four ways of knowing.

The First is, to know things by themselves.

The Second, to know them by their Idea's; that is, in the Sense I take it here, by something that is dif­ferent from them.

The Third, to know them by Conscience, or by Internal Sentiment.

The Fourth, to know them by Conjecture.

Things are known by themselves, I. Four ways of seeing things. and without Idea's, when being very Intelligible, they are able to Penetrate the Mind, or Discover themselves to it. Things are known by their Idea's, when they are not Intelligible of themselves, either because they are Cor­poreal, or because they cannot penetrate the Mind, or discover themselves to it. We know all those things by Conscience which are not distinguish'd from us. Lastly, we know those things by Conjecture which [Page 56]are different from us, and from those that are known of themselves, and by Idea's, when we think that some things are like unto others which we know.

God only is known by himself: II. How we know God. for though there are other Spiritual Beings besides himself, which seem to be Intelligible by their Nature, there are none at present but he only, which penetrate the Mind, and discover themselves to it. We only see God with a direct and immediate Sight. Perhaps he only can direct the Mind by his own Substance. Lastly, in this Life it is only by the Union we have with him that we are capable of knowing what we know, as we have shewn in the preceding Chapter: Humanis mentibus nulla inter­posita na­tura praesi­de. Aug. l. de Vera Religione, c. 55. For he is our only Master, that presides in our Mind, according to St. Austin, without the Mediation of any Creature.

We can never conceive, that any thing that is Cre­ated should be able to represent Infinity; that the un­limited Being, the immense Being, the universal Being can be perceiv'd by an Idea; that is, by a particular Being, by a Being different from the Universal and Infinite Being. But as for particular Beings, it is not difficult to conceive, that they may be represented by the Infinite Being which includes them, and which in­cludes them after a Spiritual and consequently very intelligible manner. Therefore it is necessary to say, that we know God by himself, notwithstanding the know­ledge we have of him in this Life is very imper­fect; and that we know Corporeal Things by their Idea's, that is, in God; since God only includes the Intelligible World, in which we find the Idea's of all things.

But though all things may be seen in God, it does not follow that we see them all in him: We only see such things in God of which we have Idea's; and there are things which are seen with­out Idea's.

All the things that are in this World, III. How we know Bedies. of which we have some Knowledge, are either Bodies or Spirits; proprieties of Bodies, or proprieties of Spirits. No body can question but that we see Bodies with their Proprieties by their Idea's; because not being Intelli­gible [Page 57]in themselves, we can only see them in the Be­ing which includes them after an intelligible manner. Thus it is in God, and by their Idea's that we see Bo­dies with their Proprieties; and for that reason the knowledge we have of them is very perfect: I mean the Idea we have of Extension is sufficient to make us know all the Proprieties which Extension is capa­ble of; and we can never desire to have a more distinct and fuller Idea of Extension of Figures and Motions than that which God gives us of them.

Whereas the Idea's of the things which are in God, include all their Proprieties, whoever sees their Idea's, may successively have all their Proprieties: For when we see things as they are in God, we see them always after a very perfect manner; and it would be infi­nitely perfect, if the Mind that sees them there were Infinite. That which is wanting in the knowledge we have of Extension of Figures and Motions, is not a defect of the Idea which represents it, but of our Mind which considers it.

It is not so with the Soul, IV. How we know our Soul. we do not know it by its Idea: We do not see it in God; we only know it by Conscience; and therefore the know­ledge we have of it is imperfect. We know no more of our Soul, than what we feel passes within us. Had we never felt Pain, Heat, Light, &c. we could not know whether our Soul would be capable of them, because we do not know it by its Idea. But did we see in God the Idea which answers to our Soul, See the Explanati­ons. we should know at the same time, or might know, all the properties it is capable of: As we know all the Proper­ties that Extension is capable of; because we do know Extension by the Idea of it.

It is true, we know by our Conscience, or by the Internal Sense we have of our selves, that our Soul is something that is Great: But it may be, that which we do know of it is hardly any thing of what it is in it self. If we had no more knowledge of Matter than that of Twenty or Thirty Figures it had been modified into, certainly we should hardly know any thing of it, in comparison of what we do know by [Page 58]the Idea which represents it. It is not therefore sufficient to have a perfect knowledge of the Soul, to know what we do know of it by the Internal Sense alone; since the Conscience we have of our selves, perhaps only shews us the least part of our Being.

It may be concluded from what has been said, that though we know the Existence of our Soul more di­stinctly than the Existence of our Body, and of those that are about us, yet we have not so perfect a know­ledge of the Nature of the Soul, as of the Nature of Bodies; and may serve to reconcile the different Opi­nions of those that say nothing is better known than the Soul; and of those that maintain, there is nothing of which they have less knowledge.

It may also serve to prove, that the Idea's which represent some External thing to us, are not Modifica­tions of our Soul. For if the Soul saw all things in considering its own Modifications, it would know its Essence or Nature more clearly than that of Bodies; and all the Sensations or Modifications it is capable of, than the Figures or Modifications which Bodies are capable of. Nevertheless, it does not find that it is capable of such a Sensation by the sight it has of it self, but only by Experience: Whereas it knows, that Extension is capable of an infinite number of Fi­gures, by the Idea it has of Extension. Moreover, there are certain Sensations, as Colours and Sounds, which most Men cannot discover, whether or no they are Modifications of the Soul; and Men know all manner of Figures by the Idea they have of Extensi­on to be the Modification of Bodies.

What I have said, also shows the Reason why it is Impossible to give a Definition that may explain the Modifications of the Soul; for since we neither know the Soul, nor the Modifications of it by Idea's, but only by Sensations; and that such Sensations of Pleasure, for instance, of Pain, of Heat, &c. are not tied to words; it is evident, that if a Man had never seen Colours, nor felt Heat, it would be impossible to make him Sensible of those Sensations, by what­ever [Page 59]Definitions we could give him in order thereunto. Now Men having only their Sensations upon the ac­count of the Body, and their Bodies not being dispos'd in the same manner in all of them, it often happens that words are Equivocal; that those which are used to express the Modifications of our Souls, signifie quite contrary to what we design; and we often make Men think on Bitterness, for Example, when we design to make them think on Sweetness.

Although we have not a full Knowledge of our Soul, that which we have by Conscience suffices to demonstrate the Immortality, Spirituality, Liberty and some other Attributes of i [...], which it is necessary we should know: And for that reason God does not give us the Knowledge of it by its Idea, as he gives us the Knowledge of Bodies. 'Tis true, The Knowledge we have of our Souls by our Conscience is Imperfect, but it is not False: The Knowledge, on the contrary, which we have of Bodies by Sensation or Conscience, (if we may call the Sensation of what passes in our Body Conscience) is not only Imperfect, but False. Therefore it was necessary we should have an Idea of Bodies to correct the Sensations we have of them: But we do not stand in need of the Idea of our Soul, since the Conscience we have of it does not engage us into Error: And not to be deceiv'd in the Knowledge of it, it is sufficient not to Confound it with the Body, which our Reason might induce us to do. In sine, Had we had a clear Idea of the Soul, like unto that we have of the Body, that Idea would have made us consider it too much, as separated from it. And thus it would have lessen'd the Union of our Soul with our Body, by hindering us from looking upon it, as being diffus'd through all our Members, which I shall explain no farther. V. How we know the Souls of other Men.

Of all the Objects of our Knowledge, there only remains the Souls of other Men, and the Pure Intelli­gences; and it is evident that we only know them by Conjecture. We know them now neither in them­selves, nor by their Idea's; and as they are distinct from us, it is impossible that we should know them [Page 60]by Conscience: We conjecture that the Souls of other Men are of the same Species with ours; we think they feel what we feel in our selves; and even when those Sensations have no relation to the Body, we are certain that we are not deceiv'd: Because we see in God certain Idea's, and certain Immutable Laws, ac­cording to which we know certainly that God acts equally in all Spirits.

I know that two and two are four, that it is better to be Just than Rich; and I am not mistaken in be­lieving that others know those Truths as well as my self. I love Good and Pleasure, I hate Evil and Pain, I would be Happy; and I am not mistaken in be­lieving that Men, Angels, and even Devils, have these Inclinations. I know moreover, that God will never Create any Spirits, but what will desire to be Happy, or that can ever desire to be Unhappy: But I know it with Evidence and Certainty, because God tells me so: For who but God could give a Knowledge of the Designs and Will of God? But when the Body has any Share in what passes within me, I am for the most part mistaken, in judging of others by my self. I feel Heat, I see such a Magnitude, such a Colour; I relish such a Taste at the approach of certain Bodies: I am deceiv'd, when I judge of others by my self. I am subject to certain Passions, I have a Kindness or Aversion for such or such things; and I fancy that others are like me; my Conjecture is often False. Thus the Knowledge we have of other Men, is very liable to Error, when we judge of them by the Sensa­tions we have of our selves.

If there be any Beings different from God, from our selves, from Bodies, and from Pure Spirits, it is unknown to us: We have much ado to perswade our selves that there are any such: And after having ex­amin'd the Reasons of certain Philosophers who pre­tend the contrary, we have found them False; which has confirm'd us in our former Opinion, that being all Men of the same Nature, we had all the same Idea's; because it behoves us all to know the same things.

CHAP. VIII.

THE clear, intimate, necessary Presence of God, (I mean the Unlimited, Infinite, and General Being) with the Mind of Man, acts with more Force upon it, than the Presence of all Finite Objects. It is impossible that it should absolutely lay aside that general Idea of Being, because it cannot subsist out of God. Perhaps some might urge, that it may wander from it, because it may think on those particular Beings; but they would be mistaken: For when the Mind considers any Being in particular, it is not so far from removing from God, that it rather draws near, if I may so speak, to some of his Perfections, in removing from all others: However it removes from them in such a manner, that it never wholly loses the sight of them, and it is for the most part in a Condi­tion to seek them out, and to draw near to them. They are always present to the Mind, but the Mind only perceives them in an inexplicable Confusion, because of its smallness, and the greatness of its Idea of Being. We may chance sometimes not to think on our selves; but I believe we cannot subsist one Mo­ment without thinking on Being; and even at that very time when we fancy we think on nothing, we are of necessity full of the wandering and general Idea of Being. But whereas those things that are very usual in us, and which do not concern us, do not excite the Mind with any force, nor oblige [Page 62]it to make any Reflection upon them; this Idea of Being, so Great, so Vast, so Real, and so Positive as it is, is yet familiar to us, and touches us so little, that we almost believe we do not see it; that we do not reflect upon it; that we afterwards judge there is but little Reality in it; and that it is only form'd by the confus'd mixture of all particular Idea's: Though on the contrary, it is in that alone, and by that alone, that we perceive all Beings in particular.

Although that Idea, which we receive by the im­mediate Union we have with the Word of God, does never deceive us in it self, like those which we receive from it by means of the Union we have with our Body, which represent things to us different from what they are: Yet I am not afraid to say, that we make so ill a use of the best things, that the indelible Presence of that Idea is one of the principal Causes of all the Irregular Abstractions of the Mind; and con­sequently of that Abstracted and Chimerical Philo­sophy, which explains all Natural Effects by general Terms of Act, Power, Cause, Effect, Sustantial Forms, Faculties, occult Qualities, Sympathy, Anti­pathy, &c. for it is certain that all those Terms, and many others, never excite any Idea's in the Mind, but such as are Wandering and General; that is, of those Idea's which present themselves to the Mind of their own accord, without Pain, or any Application on our part.

Let Men read with all Attention imaginable, all the Definitions and Explications which are given of Sub­stantial Forms: Let them carefully inquire wherein the Essence of all those Entities does consist, which Philosophers fancy as they please, and in so great a Number, that they are oblig'd to make several Divi­sions and Sub-divisions of them; and I am confident that they will never stir up any other Idea's in their Mind of all those things, than that of Being, and of Cause in General.

For this is what commonly happens to Philosophers: They see some new Effect; they immediately ima­gine a new Being to produce it. Fire warms; there­fore [Page 63]there is some Being in the Fire which produces that Effect that is different from the matter which composes the Fire: And whereas Fire is capable of several different Effects; as of separating Bodies, of reducing them to Ashes and into Earth; of drying them, hardning them, softning them, dilating them, purifying them, &c. they liberally allow Fire as many Faculties or real Qualities, as it is capable of producing different Effects.

But those that reflect on the Definitions they give of those Faculties, will easily discover that they are only Logical Definitions, and that they excite no other Idea's than that of Being, and of Cause in General, which the Mind compares with the Effect which is produced: So that Men are not the more Learned, after having studied them very much; for all they get by that kind of Study, is, that they imagine they know better than others, what they notwithstanding do not know near so well; not only because they admit many Beings which never were, but also be­cause being prejudiced, they make themselves incapa­ble of conceiving, how it can be possible that matter alone, as that of Fire, being moved against Bodies differently disposed, should produce all the different Effects which we see Fire does produce.

It is Notorious to all those that have read a little, that most of the Books of Sciences, particularly those that treat of Natural Philosophy, Physick, Chymistry, and all the particular things of Nature, are full of Arguments grounded upon Elementary Qualities, Se­cond Causes, as Attractive, Retentive, Digestive, Expulsive, and such like; upon others they call oc­cult; upon Specifick Vittues, and upon several Beings which Men compose out of the General Idea of Being, and that of the Cause of the Effect which they see; which seems not possible to happen, unless by the Faculty they have of considering the Idea of the Being in General, which is ever present to their Mind, by the Infinite Presence of him that includes all Beings.

If common Philosophers would content themselves with publishing their Natural Philosophy barely as a Logick, which would furnish proper Terms to speak of the things of Nature; and if they would let those alone that fix distinct and particular Idea's to those Terms in order to be understood, no body would find fault with their proceeding. But they even pre­tend to explain Nature by general and abstracted Idea's, as if Nature were Abstracted. And they will needs have it, that their Master Aristotle's Natural Philosophy is a real Natural Philosophy, which through­ly explains things, and not meerly a Logick; though it contains nothing that is tolerable, besides some wan­dering Definitions, and some Terms that are so general, that they may serve for all sorts of Philosophy. Lastly, They are so strangely conceited with all those Ima­ginary Beings, and wandering undetermined Idea's, which naturally arise within their Mind, that they are Incapable of fixing their Mind long enough to consider the real Idea's of things, II. Of the Essence of Matter. If that De­finition is receiv'd of the word Essence, all the rest is absolutely demonstra­ted: If it be not re­ceiv'd, it only re­mains a question of Name, to know wherein consists the Essence of the Matter, or rather it cannot be question'd. so as to discover the Solidity and Evidence of them. And this is the true Cause of the extream Ignorance they are in, as to the true Principles of Natural Philosophy. It is convenient to give some Proofs of it.

Most Philosophers do partly agree, That we ought to look upon that as the Essence of a thing, which we acknowledge to be the first in that thing, that which is Inseparable from it, and on which the Properties that agree to it do depend. So that to discover wherein the Essence of Matter does consist, we must look upon all the Properties that are agreeable to it, or which are included in the Idea we have of it; as Hardness, Soft­ness, Fluidity, Motion, Rest, Figure, Divisibility, Impenetrability and Extension, in order to consider which of all these Attributes is Inseparable from it. Therefore since Fluidity, Hardness, Softness, Motion, Rest, may be separated from Matter, since there are several Bodies that are without Hardness, Fluidity, or Softness, that are not in motion; or lastly, that are not in Rest: It follows clearly, that all those Attributes are not Essential to it.

But there still remains four which we do conceive to be Inseparable from Matter, viz. Figure, Divi­sibility, Impenetrability and Extension: So that in order to see which is the Attribute that is to be taken for the Essence, we must no longer think of dividing them, bu [...] only to examine which is the first, and which supposes no other. It is easily apprehended, that Figure, Divisibility, and Impenetrability, supposes Ex­tension, and that Extension supposes nothing; but as soon as it is given, Divisibility, Impenetrability, and Figure are given. Therefore we must conclude, That Extension is the Essence of Matter, supposing it has only the Attributes we have mentioned, or others like them; and I do not believe that any body in the World can question it, after serious Conside­ration.

But the Difficulty is to know, whether Matter has not some other Attributes different from Extension, and from those that depend on it: So that Extension it self is not Essential to it, but supposes something that may be the Subject and Principle of it.

Several Persons, after having attentively consider'd the Idea they had of Matter by all its known Attri­butes; and after having likewise meditated on the Effects of Nature, as much as the Powers and Capa­city of the Mind will permit, have been strongly per­swaded that Extension supposes nothing in Matter; whether it be that they have not had a distinct and particular Idea of that thing which may be believed to precede Extension, or whether they have seen no Effect to prove that thing.

For, as to be perswaded, that a Watch has no being different from the Matter whereof it is composed, it is sufficient to know, how the different disposition of the Wheels, can produce all the Motions of a Watch, without having any distinct Idea of that which might be the cause of those Motions, though several Logical ones might be given: So because those Persons have no distinct Idea of that thing which might be in mat­ter, if Extension were taken from it; because they see no Attribute to discover it; and because, if Ex­tension [Page 66]be given, all the Attributes which we con­ceive to belong to Matter, are given; and also that Matter is the cause of no Effect, but such as we may conceive Extension differently configur'd, and diversly agitated may produce; from whence they perswade themselves that Extension is the Essence of the Matter.

But whereas Men have no certain Demonstration, that there is no Intelligence or new Being created in the Wheels of a Watch: So no body can, without a particular Revelation, assert as a Geometrical Demon­stration, that there is nothing in a Stone besides Ex­tension diversly consigur'd: For Extension may abso­lutely be joyn'd with something else which we do not conceive, because we have no Idea of it: Though it seems very unreasonable to believe and affirm it; since it is unreasonable to affirm what we neither know or conceive.

Nevertheless though we should suppose, that there is something besides Extension in Matter, that would not hinder (if rightly observ'd) Extension from being the Essence of it, according to the Desinition we have given of that word. For it is absolutely necessary that whatever is in the World, should be either a Being, or the manner of a Being; an attentive Mind cannot deny it. Now Extension is not the manner of a Being; therefore 'tis a Being. But whereas Matter is not a Composition of several Beings, like Man, who is composed of Body and Mind; since Matter is but one Being only, it is evident that Matter is only Extension.

Now to prove that Extension is not the manner of a Being, but that it is really a Being, we must ob­serve that the manner of a Being cannot be conceiv'd, unless the Being, of which it is the manner, be con­ceiv'd at the same time: It is impossible, for Example, to conceive Roundness without conceiving Extension, because the manner of a Being, is nothing but the Being it self so modified: The roundness of Wax, for instance, being nothing but the Wax it self so modified, it's evident that we cannot possibly conceive the man­ner without the Being. Therefore if Extension were [Page 67]the manner of a Being, we could not conceive this Extension without that Being, of which this Extension should be the manner. Nevertheless it is easily con­ceiv'd by it self. Therefore it is not the manner of any Being, and consequently it is a Being it self. Thus it proves the Essence of Matter, since Matter is only one Being, and not a Compound of divers Beings as abovesaid.

But many Philosophers are so wedded to general Idea's, and Logical Entities, that their Mind is more taken up with them, than with those that are Parti­cular, Distinct and Physical. This is sufficiently appa­rent, in that their Arguments upon Natural Things, are only grounded upon Notions of Logick, Act and Power, and of an Infinite Number of Imaginary Entities, which they do not distinguish from those that are Real. Therefore those Men finding a wonderful Facility of seeing according to their own way, what they have a mind to see, fancy that they see better than others; and that they see distinctly that Exten­sion supposes something, and that it is only a Propriety of Matter, of which it may even be divested.

Nevertheless, when they are desir'd to explain that thing, which they pretend to see in Matter besides Extension, they do it in different ways, which all shew that they have no other Idea of it than that of Being, or of Substance in General. This appears clearly to those that observe, that the said Idea in­cludes no particular Attributes which are proper to Matter. For in removing Extension from Matter, they take away all the Attributes and all the Pro­prieties which we distinctly conceive do belong to it, although one should leave that thing which they fancy to be the Essence of it: It is visible that they could neither make a Heaven nor Earth of it, nor any thing that we see. And on the contrary, in removing what they fancy to be the Essence of Matter, provided Ex­tension be left, we leave all the Attributes and all the Proprieties, which we conceive to be distinctly in­cluded in the Idea of Matter: For it is certain, that with Extension alone may be form'd a Heaven, an [Page 68]Earth, and all the visible World, besides an infinite Number of others. Therefore, that something which they suppose besides Extension, having no Attributes, which can be distinctly conceiv'd to belong to it, and which are clearly included in the Idea we have of it, is nothing real, if we believe Reason; and it can be of no use to explain Natural Effects. And what they urge, that it is the Subject, and the Principle of Ex­tension is spoken at random, without conceiving di­stinctly what they say; that is, without having any other Idea thereof, than a General or Logical one, as of Subject and Principle.

So that one might still imagine a new Subject, and a new Principle of that Subject of Extension, and thus on ad Infinitum; because the Mind represents to it self general Idea's of Subject, and of Principles, as it pleases.

Indeed it's very probable, that Men would never have obscur'd the Idea they have of Matter so much, unless they had had some Reasons for it; and several maintain Sentiments contrary to ours, through Prin­ciples of Divinity. Without doubt Extension is not the Effence of Matter, if that be contrary to Faith, we grant it. We are, Thanks be to God, fully per­swaded of the Weakness and Limitation of the Hu­mane Mind. We very well know, that it has too little Extent to measure an Insinite Power; That God can do Infinitely more than we can conceive; That he only gives us Idea's to know things that happen according to the Order of Nature, but he conceals the rest from us. Therefore we are ever ready to submit our Mind to Faith; but there must be better Proofs than those that are commonly alledg'd, to destroy the Reasons abovesaid, because the manner of Explaining the Mysteries of Faith is not of Faith, and they are believ'd, even without apprehending that the manner of them can ever be clearly explain'd.

We believe, for Example, the Mystery of the T [...]nity, though the Humane Mind cannot conceive it; and nevertheless we believe, that things which do not dister from the same Third, do not di [...]er among them­selves; [Page 69]though this Proposition seems to destroy it. For we are perswaded that we must never make use of our Mind, unless on Subjects that are proportion'd to its Capacity; and we must not look fixedly on Mysteries, for fear of being dazled by them, according to this Advertisement of the Holy Ghost: Qui scru­tator est Majestatis opprimetur à Gsoria.

Nevertheless, if it were thought proper, for the Satisfaction of some Men, to explain how far the Opinion we have of Matter, agrees with what Faith teaches us about Transubstantion, we might perhaps do it clearly and distinctly enough, and without offending the Decisions of the Church; but we are of Opinion, that we may very well forbear making that Explication, especially in this Work.

For we must observe, that the Holy Fathers have mostly spoken of that Mystery, as of an Incomprehen­sible Mystery; that they have not Philosophis'd to explain it; and that commonly they have only us'd Comparisons that have not much Exactness in them; fitter to discover the Doctrine, than to give an Expla­nation that might satisfie the Mind: So that Tradi­tion is for those who do not Philosophise upon that Mystery, and who submit their Mind to Faith, with­out puzzling themselves to no purpose in those dissicult Questions.

Therefore it would be unreasonable to desire Philo­sophers to give clear and easie Explanations of the manner how the Body of Jesus Christ is in the Eucha­rist; for that would be to desire them to tell No­velties in Divinity. And should Philosophers Impru­dently answer that Question, they could not avoid the Condemnation either of their Philosophy, or of Divi­nity: For if their Explanations were Obscure, the Principles of their Philosophy would be despis'd; and thould their Answer prove clear or easie, Men would reasonably suspect the Novelty of their Divinity.

Since then Novelty, in Point of Divinity, bears the Character of Error, and that Men have a Right to despise Opinions, only because they are new, and have no Foundation in Tradition; we ought not to under­take [Page 70]to give easie and intelligible Explanations of things, which the Fathers and the Councils have not fully explain'd; and it is sufficient to believe the Doctrine of Transubstantiation, without pretending to explain the manner of it. For otherwise we should spread Seeds of new Disputes and Quarrels, of which there are but too many already; and the Enemies of Truth would not fail to make a malicious use of it to oppress their Adversaries.

Disputes in Point of Explanations of Divinity, seem to me to be the most Useless and the most Dangerous; and they are the more to be fear'd, by reason that even Pious Persons think themselves oblig'd to break the Bonds of Charity with those that are not of their Opi­nion. We have but too many Instances of it, and the reason of it is plain enough. Therefore it is always the best and safest way, not to be over-hasty in speak­ing of things of which we have no Evidence, and which others are not disposed to conceive.

Neither must obscure and uncertain Explanations of the Mysteries of Faith, serve us as a Rule and Prin­ciple to reason in Philosophy, in which nothing but Evidence ought to perswade us. We must not change the clear and distinct Idea's of Extension, Figure, and Local Motion, for these general and confuse Idea's of Principles, or of the Subject of Extension, of Form, and of Quiddities, of real Qualities, and of all those Mo­tions of Generation, of Corruption, of Alteration, and the like, which differ from Local Motion. Real Idea's produce a Real Science, but the general Idea's of Lo­gick will never produce any thing but a rambling, superficial and barren Science. Therefore it behoves us to consider attentively, those distinct and particular Idea's of things, in order to discover the Proprieties they include; and thus to study Nature, instead of losing our selves in Chimera's, which only exist in the Opinion of some Philosophers.

CHAP. IX.

WE have hitherto spoken of Errors, I. The last General Cause of our Errors. for which we can assign some occasional Cause in the Nature of the Pure Understanding, or of the Mind consider'd, as acting of it self, and in the Nature of Idea's, that is, in the manner how the Mind perceives External Objects. There now remains only to explain a Cause, which may be call'd a Universal and General Cause of all our Errors; because we conceive no Error, but what depends in some measure on it. That Cause is, That Nothing having no Idea to represent it, the Mind is induc'd to believe, that things it has no Idea of, do not Exist.

It is certain, that the general Source of our Errors, as we have already often declar'd, is, because our Judgments have more Extension than our Perceptions. For when we consider some Object, we commonly behold it only on one side, and we are not contented with judging of so much as we have consider'd, but we also judge of the whole Object. Therefore it often happens that we are deceiv'd, because, though the thing be true on that part we have examin'd it, it commonly proves false on the other, and that which we believe to be true only proves likely. Moreover it is evident, that we should not judge absolutely of things as we do, if we did not think we had consi­der'd them on all sides, or if we did not suppose them answerable to those we have examin'd. Therefore the [Page 72]general Cause of our Errors, is, That having no Idea of the other sides of our Object, or of their difference from that which is present to our Mind; we fancy that those other sides are not, or at least we suppose that they have no particular difference.

This manner of proceeding seems pretty reasonable to us: For Nothing forming no Idea's in the Mind, we have some reason to believe, that those things which form no Idea's in the Mind, while they are examin'd, resemble Nothing. And that which con­firms us in this Opinion, is, That we are perswaded, by a kind of Instinct, that the Idea's of things are due to our Nature, and that they are submitted to the Mind in such a manner, that they ought to present themselves before it, as soon as it desires it.

Nevertheless if we did but reflect on the present State of our Nature, II. The Idea's of things are not present to the Mind as soon as 'tis desir'd. we should not be so ready to believe, that we have all the Idea's of things as soon as we desire them. Man, as I may say, is only Flesh and Blood since the Fall. The least Impression of his Senses, and of his Passions, breaks the strongest Attention of his Mind; and the Course of the Spirits, and of the Blood, draws it away, and drives it con­tinually towards Sensible Objects. It often strives in vain against the Torrent which drives it along; and 'tis but seldom that it makes any Opposition; for there is too much Delight in following it, and too much Fatigue to oppose it. Therefore the Mind is disgusted and sinks as soon as it makes the least Effort to take hold of, and to six upon some Truth: It is absolutely False in the State in which we are, that the Idea's of things are pre­sent to our Mind whenever we have a Mind to consider them. Therefore we ought not to judge that things are not, only because we have no Idea's of them.

But though we should suppose Man to be ab­solure Master of his Mind and of his Idea's, III. All Et­nite Minds are liable to Error. he would nevertheless be subject to Error by his Na­ture: For the Mind of Man is limited, and a [Page 73]Mind that is limited, is Naturally liable to Error. The reason of it is, the least things have many Relations among themselves, and nothing but an Infinite Mind can apprehend them. Therefore a limited Mind not being able to imbrace, or to apprehend all those Relations, whatever Effort it makes, is induc'd to believe, that those which it per­ceives not, do not exist, particularly when we do not reflect on the Weakness and Limitation of our Mind, which is very usual. Thus the Limitation of the Mind alone, infers a Capability of falling into Error.

Nevertheless, if Men, even in the State of Weak­ness and Depravations in which they are, did al­ways make a good use of their Liberty, they would never be deceiv'd. And therefore all Men that fall into Error, are justly blam'd, and deserve to be punish'd: For if we would not be deceiv'd, we must only judge of what we see, and never make entire Judgments, but on such things which we are sure we have examin'd in all their parts, which we can do. But they had rather submit to Error, than to the Rule of Truth: They will decide without much difficulty and Examination. Therefore we need not wonder if they fall into many Errors, and very often make uncertain Judgments.

Men, for Example, IV. We ought not to judge that there are only Bodies and Spirits created, nor that God is a Spirit as we con­ceive Spi­rits. have no other Idea's of Sub­stance, than that of the Mind and Body; that is, Of a Substance that Thinks, and of a Substance that is Extended. And from thence they pretend to have a Right to conclude, that whatever Exists is Body or Spirit: Not that I pretend to affirm, that there is any Substance that is neither Body nor Spirit: For we ought never to affirm, that things Exist which we have no Knowledge of; since it is to be thought, that God who does not conceal his Works from us, would have given us some Idea's of them. Nevertheless I am of Opinion, that we ought not to determine any thing about the Number of Spe­cies of Beings which God has Created, by the Idea's [Page 74]we have of them; since it is absolutely possible that God may have Reasons to Conceal them from us, which we do not know; if it were only because those Beings having no Relation to us, it would be useless for us to know them: By the same reason as he has not given us Eyes good enough to tell the Teeth of a Hand-worm, because it is not very material for the preservation of our Body, to have such a piercing Sight.

But though we think no body ought to Judge rash­ly, that all Beings are Spirits or Bodies; we think ne­vertheless, that it is directly contrary to Reason, that Philosophers in order to explain Natural Effects, should use other Idea's, than those that depend on Thought and Extension, since indeed they are the only we have, that are distinct or particular.

Nothing can be more unreasonable, than to imagin an Infinity of Beings upon bare Idea's of Logick; to impute an Infinity of Proprieties to them; and thus to endeavour to explain things we do not understand, by things which do not only conceive, but which is not possible for us to conceive. 'Tis just as if the Blind having a mind to speak of Colours among themselves, and to maintain a Thesis about them, should in order thereunto, make use of the Definitions which Philo­sophers give them, and draw several Conclusions from the same. For as those Blind could only give pleasant and ridiculous Arguments upon Colours, because they could have no perfect Idea's of them, and yet would argue about them upon General and Logical Idea's: So Philosophers can never argue solidly upon the Effects of Nature, when to that end, they only make use of general Logical Idea's, of Act, Power, Being, Cause, Principle, Form, Quality, and the like. It is absolutely necessary for them only to rely on distinct and particu­lar Idea's of Thought and Extension, and those they in­clude, as Figure, Motion, &c. For it is in vain to pre­tend to understand Nature, but by the Consideration of the distinct Idea's we have of it; and it is better never to meditate, than upon Chimera's.

Nevertheless we cannot affirm that there are only Bodies and Spirits, Beings that think, and that are ex­tended, because we may be deceiv'd in it. For though they are sufficient to Explain Nature, and conse­quently we may conclude without fear of being de­ceiv'd, that the Natural Things we have some know­ledge of, depend on Extension and Thought; yet it is certainly possible, that there may be others of which we have no Idea, and of which we see no Effects.

Men therefore Judge rashly, when they Judge as an Infallible Principle, that all Substances are Bodies or Spirits. But they also infer a rash Conclusion from thence, when they conclude by the bare Testimony of Reason that God is a Spirit. It is true, that since we are Created after his Image and Likeness, and that Holy Writ teaches us in several Places that God is a Spirit, we ought to believe it, and to call him so: But Reason alone cannot teach it us. That tells us only that God is a Being infinitely Perfect; and that he is rather a Spirit than a Body, since our Soul is more perfect than our Body: But it does not assure us that there are no Beings besides more perfect than our Spirits; and more above our Spirits, than our Spirits are above our Bodies.

Now supposing that there were such Beings, (as it undeniably appears that it was in the power of God to Create such) it is clear that they would participate more of the likeness of God than we do. The same Reason teaches us, that God would sooner have the Perfections of their Beings than ours, which would only be Imperfections compar'd to them. Therefore we must not Judge rashly, that the word Spirit which we use to express what God is, and what we are, is an Equivocal Term, which signifies the same things, or things that are very like. God is more above Cre­ated Spirits, than those Spirits are above Bodies; and we ought not so much to call God a Spirit to shew positively what he is, as to signifie that he is not Mate­rial. He is a Being infinitely Perfect, no body can [Page 76]question it. But as we must not imagin with the An­thropomorphites, that he must have a Human Figure, because it seems to be most perfect, although we should suppose him Corporeal, neither must we imagin that the Spirit of God has any Human Thoughts: And that his Spirit is like unto ours, because we know no­thing that is more perfect than our Spirit. We must rather believe, that as he possesses the Perfections of Matter without being Material, since it is certain that Matter has a relation to some Perfections that are in God; he also possesses the Perfections of Created Spi­rits, without being a Spirit in the manner as we con­ceive Spirits: That his Name is, He that is; that is, the unlimited Being, the All-Being, the Infinite and Universal Being.

CHAP. X.

WE have seen in the preceding Chapter, that Men Judge rashly, when they Judge that all Beings are only of two sorts, Spirits or Bodies. We will shew in the following, that their Judgments are not only rash, but also very false, which are the principles of an infinite number of Errors, when they Judge that Beings are not different in their Relations nor Man­ners, because they have no Idea's of those diffe­rences.

It is most certain, that the Mind of Man only looks for the relations of Things; first those which the Ob­jects it considers may have with it; and in the next place, those they have towards one another. For the Mind of Man only seeks its Good and Truth. In order to find its Good, it carefully considers by Rea­son, and by Taste or Sensation, whether Objects have a Relation of agreement with it. To discover the Truth, it considers whether Objects have a Rela­tion of Equality, or of Likeness one with another, or what is the exact measure of their Inequality. For as Good is only the good of the Mind, because it is convenient for it: So Truth is only Truth by the Relation of Equality, or of Likeness that is found be­tween two or many things: Whether between two or many Objects, as between a Yard and Cloth; for it is true that this Cloth holds out a Yard, because there is an Equality between the Yard and the Cloth: Whe­ther between Two, or many Idea's, as between the two Idea's of Three and Three, and that of Six; for [Page 78]it is true that three and three are Six, because there is an Equality between the two Idea's of Three and Three, and that of Six: Lastly, Whether between Idea's and Things, when the Idea's represent what the Things are: For when I say that there is a Sun, my proposition is True; because the Idea's I have of Ex­istence, and of the Sun, represent that the Sun does really Exist. So that all the Action, and all the Attention of the Mind upon Objects, is only in order to endeavour to discover the Relations of them, since Men only apply themselves to Things, that they may discover the Truth or Goodness of them.

But as we have already noted in the preceding Chapter, Attention Fatigues the Mind. It is soon tir'd with resisting the Impression of the Senses which removes it from its Object, and leads it to others, which the Love it has to its Body renders agreeable to it. It is extreamly limited; and thus the differences which are between the Subjects which it Examins, being Infinite, or almost Infinite, it is not capable to distinguish them. The Mind therefore supposes Ima­ginary Resemblances, in which it observes no positive and real differences: The Idea's of Resemblance be­ing more present to it, more familiar, and plainer than others. For it is plain, that Resemblance includes but one Relation; and that one Idea is sufficient to Judge that a Thousand Things are alike: Whereas in order to Judge without fear of being deceiv'd, that a Thousand Objects are different among themselves, it is absolutely necessary to have a Thousand different Idea's present to the Mind.

Therefore Men imagin that things of a different Nature are of the same Nature; and that all things of the same Species scarce differ from one another. They Judge that unequal things are Equal; that those that are Inconstant are Constant; and that those that are without Order and Proportion, are well order'd and proportion'd. In a word, they often think that Things that are different in Nature, Quality, Exten­sion, [Page 79]Duration, and Proportion, are alike in all those things. But that deserves to be explain'd more at large by some Examples, because it occasions many Errors.

The Mind and Body, the Substance which Thinks, and that which is Extended, are two kinds of Being altogether different, and directly opposite: What is proper for the one, is improper for the other. Never­theless, most Men reflecting but little on the Idea they have of Thought, and being continually affected with Bodies, look upon the Soul and Body as one and the same thing: Imagining a Resemblance between two things that are different. They fancy the Soul to be Material, that is, Extended throughout the whole Body, and Figur'd like the Body. They impute that to the Mind, which only suits with the Body.

Moreover, Men being sensible of Pleasure, Pain, Odours, Tastes, &c. and their Body being more pre­sent to them than their Soul: That is, easily imagin­ing their Body, and not being able to imagin their Soul, they attribute to it the faculties of Feeling, Imagining, and even sometimes of Conceiving; which can only belong to the Soul. But the following Exam­ples will be more sensible.

It is certain that all Natural Bodies, even those that are call'd Species, differ one from another; that Gold is not absolutely like Gold; and that one drop of Wa­ter is different from another. It is with all Bodies of the same Species, as it is with Faces. All Faces have Eyes, a Nose, a Mouth, they are all Faces, and Mens Faces; and yet there never were two perfectly alike. So a piece of Gold has parts like unto another piece of Gold; and a drop of Water has undoubtedly a great Resemblance with another drop of Water: Ne­vertheless one may affirm, that it is impossible to give two drops of it, though taken out of the same River, perfectly alike. And that Philosophers inconsiderably suppose Essential Resemblances between Bodies of the same Species, or Resemblances which consist in Indi­visibility; [Page 80]for the Essences of Things consist in an In­divisible, according to their False Opinions.

The Reason of their falling into so gross an Error, is, because they will not consider those things carefully, upon which they nevertheless compose large Volumes. For as Men do not allow a perfect Resemblance be­tween Faces, because they observe them nearly; and the habit of distinguishing them, makes us observe the least differences in them: So, if Philosophers would consider Nature with some Attention, they would dis­cover a sufficient number of Causes of Diversity in those very things, which produce the same Sensations in us, and which for that reason we say, are of the same Species; nor would they so easily suppose Essen­tial Resemblances. Blind Men would be to blame, in supposing an Essential Resemblance between Faces which should consist in Indivisibility, because they do not sensibly perceive the differences of them: There­fore Philosophers ought not to suppose such Resem­blances in Bodies of the same Species, because they observe no difference in them, by the Sensations they have of them.

The Inclination we have to suppose a Resemblance in Things, inclines us also to believe, that there is a determin'd number of Differences and Forms; and that those Forms are neither capable of more or less. We Fancy that all Bodies differ one from another, as it were by degrees: That those very Degrees observe certain Proportions among them: In a word, we Judge of Material Things as of Numbers.

It is clear, the Reason of all this is, that the Mind loses it self in the Relations of Incommensura­ble Things, such as Infinite Differences are, which are not within Natural Bodies, and that it pleases it self when it imagins some Resemblance, or some Propor­tion among them; because then it represents several things to it self with a great deal of Ease. For as I haue already said, one Idea is sufficient to Judge that several things are alike, and there must be several to Judge that they are different from one another. For [Page 81]instance, if the Number of Angels be known, and there are Ten Arch-Angels for every Angel; and Ten Thrones for every Arch-Angel; and thus for­ward, keeping the same proportion from One to Ten, unto the last Order of Intelligences; the Mind may easily know the Number of those Blessed Spirits; nay, even Judge of them partly at one Prospect by a strong Attention, which delights it infinitely. And perhaps it is that which has induc'd some Persons to Judge thus of the Numbers of Celestial Spirits: Which is the Case of some Philosophers, who have put a Decuple proportion of Weight and of Light­ness among the Elements, supposing Fire to be Ten times Lighter than Air, and so of the rest.

When the Mind finds its self oblig'd to admit dif­ferences between Bodies by the different Sensations it has of them, as also by some other particular Reasons, it always puts the least it can. For that reason it is easily perswaded that the Essences of Things consist in an Indivisibile, and that they are like Numbers, as we said before; because one Idea is sufficient to Represent to us all the Bodies which are call'd of the same Species. For example, if you put a Glass of Water in an Hogshead of Wine, Philoso­phers will have it, that the Essence of the Wine still remains the same; and that the Water is converted into Wine. That as between Three and Four there can be no Number, since true Unity is Indivisible, so it is necessary that the Water be Converted into the Nature and Essence of the Wine, or that the Wine lose its Nature; That as all Quaternary Num­bers are perfectly alike, so the Essence of the Water is perfectly alike in all Waters. That as the Num­ber of Three differs Essentially from the Number of Two, and that it cannot have the same Proprieties as that has, so two Bodies of different Species differ Essentially, and in such a manner, that they have never the same Proprieties which proceed from Entity, and other like things. Nevertheless, if Men would consider the true Idea's of things with some [Page 82]Attention, they would soon discover, that all Bodies being Extended, their Nature or Essence has nothing resembling Numbers; and that it cannot consist in an Indivisible.

Men do not only suppose Identity, Resemblance, or Proportion in the Nature, Number, and Essential Differences of Substances, they also suppose them in all things they see. Most Men Judge, that all the fix'd Stars are fastened to the Heavens, as to a Roof at an Equal Distance from the Earth. Astronomers did pretend for a long while, that the Planets mo­ved in perfect Circles; and they have invented a great number of them, as Concentriques, Excentriques, Epi­cycles, &c. to Explain the Phoenomena which contra­dicted their Opinions.

It is true, that in these later Ages, the most Learned have Corrected the Errors of the Ancients, and believe that the Planets describe Ellipses by their Motion. But if they pretend that the Ellipses are Regular, as People are inclin'd to believe; be­cause the Mind supposes Regularity, where it sees no Irregularity; they fall into an Error which is more difficult to be Corrected, because the Obser­vations that can be made on the Course of the Pla­nets, cannot be so Exact, and so Just, as to shew the Irregularity of their Motions. Nothing but Natural Philosophy can Correct that Error; for it is infinitely less remarkable, than that which we find in the System of perfect Circles.

But something particular has happened about the Distance and Motion of the Planets. For Astrono­mers not having been able to find an Arithmetical or Geometrical Proportion in the same, that being absolutely repugnant to Observations some ima­gin'd, that they observ'd a kind of Proportion, which is called Harmonical in their Distances and Motions. From thence it is that an Riccioli Vol. Astronomer of this Age, in his New Almageste, begins the Secti­on which is Entitled, De Systemate Mundi Harmo­nico, with these words:

There is no Astronomer, Neme est paulo eru­ditior in Astronomi­cis, qui Coe­lorum ordi­nem con­templatus non agnos­cat har­moniam quamdam in Plane­tarum in­tervallis, & motibusthough never so little acquainted in what relates to Astronomy, but acknowledges a kind of Harmony in the Motions and Intervals of Planets, if he considers the Order of the Heavens At­tentively.

Nor is this the only Author that is of this Opi­nion: For Observations have made him suffici­ently sensible of the Extravagancies of that Ima­ginary Harmony, which has nevertheless been ad­mir'd by several Ancient and Modern Authors, whose Opinions Father Riccioli Relates and Refutes. Moreover, some affirm Pythagoras, and his Fol­lowers, to have believ'd that the Heavens, by their Regular Motions, made a most Wonderful Con­cert; which Men do not hear, because they are used to it; just like those that Inhabit near the Fall of the Waters of Nile, do not hear the Noise of it. But I only relate that particular Opi­nion of the Harmonical Proportion of the Distances and Motions of the Planets, to shew that the Mind is delighted with Proportions, and that it often Fancies them where they are not.

The Mind also supposes Uniformity in the dura­tion of things, and imagins they are not liable to Change and Instability, when it is not in some measure forced by the Relation of the Senses, to Judge otherwise.

All Material Things being Extended are capable of Division, and consequently of Corruption: Those who reflect on the Nature of Bodies, discover Visibly that they are Corruptible. Yet there has been a great number of Philosophers who fancied that the Heavens though Material, were Incorrup­tible.

The Heavens are at too great a Distance from us, to discover the Revolutions that happen there; and 'tis very rare that any happen there so great, as to be discovered here. That alone has been sufficient to perswade many that they were really Incorruptible. And which has the more Confirm'd [Page 84]their Opinion, is, that they attribute to the Con­trariety of Qualities, the Corruption to which Sublunary Bodies are subject. For as they have never been in the Heavens to see what passes there, so they have had no Experience that this Con­trariety of Qualities is there; which has indu­ced them to believe that there is really no such thing there. Therefore they have concluded that the Heavens were free from Corruption; because that which Corrupts all Bodies here below, accord­ing to their Opinion, is not above.

It is Visible that this Argument has no Solidity; for I cannot see, why there should be no other Cause of Corruption, than those Contrarieties of Qualities which they imagin; nor upon what Foun­dation they can affirm, That there is neither Heat, nor Cold, nor Drought, nor Moisture in the Heavens; That the Sun is not Hot, and that Sa­turn is not Cold.

There is some appearance of Reason to say, that very hard Stones, Glass, and other Bodies of that Nature do not Corrupt, since we see they subsist long in the same State; and though we are near enough to see the Alterations that should happen to them. But being at so great a distance as we are from the Heavens, it is directly con­trary to Reason to conclude, that they do not Corrupt, because we feel no contrary Qualities in them, nor see that they Corrupt. Nevertheless, some not only say that they Corrupt not, but they affirm absolutely, that they are Unalterable and Incorruptible. And the Peripateticks want but little of saying, that the Celestial Bodies are so many Divinities; as Aristotle their Master did believe of them.

The Beauty of the Universe does not consist in the Incorruptibility of its Parts, but in the Va­riety that is found in them: And this great Work of the World would not be so admirable without that Vicissitude of things which we observe in it. [Page 85]Matter infinitely Extended, without Motion, and consequently without Form and Corruption, would indeed discover the Infinite Power of its Author; but it would give no Idea of his Wis­dom. This is the reason that all Corporeal Things are Corruptible; and that there is no Body, but what receives some Change, which Alters and Cor­rupts it in Time. God Forms even in the Bosom of Stones and Glass, Animals more perfect and admirable than all the Works of Men. Those Bodies though very hard and dry, are Corrupted in time: The Air and Sun to which they are ex­posed, alter some of their Parts; and some Worms Feed upon them, as Experience has shew'd.

There is no other difference between those Bo­dies that are very hard and dry, and others, un­less it be that they are compos'd of very gross and solid Parts; and consequently less capable of being agitated and separated one from another, by the Motion of those that hit against them; for which reason they are looked upon as Incorrup­tible: Nevertheless, they are not so by their Nature, as Time, Experience, and Reason suffi­ciently shew us.

But as for the Heavens, they are Compos'd of the most Fluid and subtle Matter, and particular­ly the Sun: And he is so far from being void of Heat and Incorruptible, as Aristotle's followers say, that on the contrary, he is the hottest of all Bo­dies, and the most liable to Change. It is he that Heats, Moves, and Changes all things: For it is he who produces by his Action, which is no­thing but his Heat, or the Motion of his Parts, all the Novelties we see in the Change of Sea­sons. Reason demonstrates these things: But though some may contradict Reason, yet no Body can re­sist Experience. For since some have discovered in the Sun by means of Telescopes, Spots as large as the whole Earth, which have been form'd in it, and have been dissipated in a little time: It [Page 86]is no longer to be deny'd, but that he is more subject to Change than the Earth we inhabit.

All Bodies are therefore in a continual Motion and Change, and particularly those that are the most Fluid, as Fire, Air and Water; next the parts of Living Bodies, as Flesh, and even the Bones, and lastly, those that are the most solid: The Mind ought not to suppose a kind of Immutability in things, because it sees no Corruption or Altera­tion in them; for it is not a proof that a thing is always like unto it self, because no difference is ob­serv'd in it; or that things are not, because we have no Idea or Knowledge of them.

CHAP. XI.

THe Faculty of the Mind imagining and suppo­sing Resemblances where-ever it perceives no Visible Differences, also engages most Men into Errors, which are yet more dangerous in Points of Morality. Here are some Examples of them.

A French Man meets an English Man, or an Ita­lian: That Stranger has peculiar Humours: He has a Niceness of Mind; or if you please, he is Haugh­ty and Troublesome. This will at first induce this French-man to Judge, that all English-men, or Ita­lians, have the same Character of Mind with the Person they have convers'd with. He will Praise, or Blame them all in General: And if he meets with any other, he will fancy at first that he is like unto him he has already seen; and therefore will suf­fer himself to be inclin'd to some Affection or secret Aversion towards him. In a word, he will Judge of all the Individuals of those Nations by this famous proof, that he has seen one or many that had cer­tain Qualifications of Mind: Because he knew not whether the rest were different, supposing them all alike.

A Religious of some Order commits a fault: This is a sufficient Reason for those who know it to Con­demn all the Individuals of that Order indifferent­ly. They all wear the same Habit, and have the same Name, they are alike in that: This is e­nough for the Common Sort of Men to Fancy that they are all alike. They suppose that they are all alike, because not being able to search into their Hearts, they cannot see positively whether they differ.

Calumuiators, who study how to Blast the Repu­tation of their Enemies, commonly make use of this, and Experience teaches us that it succeeds for the most part. And indeed it is very suitable to the Capacity of the Common Sort of Mankind. For it is not difficult to find in numerous Communities, though never so Holy, some irregular Persons, or such as have Ill Sentiments; since in the Company of the Apostles, of which Jesus Christ himself was the Head, there was a Thief, a Traitor, an Hypocrite; in a word, a Judas.

The Jews without doubt, would have been very much to blame, to pass an Ill Judgment against the most Holy Society that ever was, because of the Avarice and Fault of Judas; and if they had Condemned them all in their Hearts, because they suffered that Ill Man among them; and Jesus Christ himself did not punish him, though he was sensible of his Crimes.

Therefore it is a manifest Fault against Reason, and Breach of Charity to pretend, That a Commu­nity is in some Error, because some of their Members were so, although the Heads should dissemble it, or were the promoters of it themselves. It is true, that when all the Members will defend an Error, or Fault of their Brother, the whole Community may be thought Guilty; but that seldom or never happens; for it seems morally impossible that all the Members of an Order should have the same Sentiments.

Men therefore should never conclude thus from Par­ticulars to Generals; but they cannot Judge simply of what they see, they always fly out into Excess. A Religious of such an Order is a Great Man, an Honest Man; they conclude that all the Order is composed of Great Men, of Good Men. Likewise a Religious of an Order has Ill Sentiments: Therefore all that Order is Corrupted, and has Ill Sentiments. But these last Judgments are far more dangerous than the first; because it is a Duty to Judge well of our Neigh­bours, and the Malignity of Man occasions that Ill [Page 89]Judgments, and Discourses held against the Reputa­tion of others, make a stronger Impression upon the Mind than advantageous Judgments and Discourses do.

When a Worldly Man, who iudulges his Passions, fixes strongly upon his Opinion, and pretends in the heighth of his Inclination, that he is in the right to in­dulge it, Men Judge reasonably that he is obstinate, and he owns it himself as soon as his Passion is over. So when a Pious Person, who is perswaded of what he says, and who has discover'd the Truth of Religi­on, and the Vanity of Worldly Things, endeavours according to that Knowledge to reform the Vices of others, and reprehends them with some Zeal, Men of the World also take him to be an obstinate Man; and therefore they conclude that Devout Men are obstinate. They Judge moreover, that Good Men are far more obstinate than Vain, Ill Men; because the latter only defending their Ill Opinions according to the different Motions of the Blood, and Passi­ons, they cannot continue long in their Sentiments: They come to themselves again. Whereas persons of Piety remain steddy; because their Foundation is un­alterable, and does not depend on a thing so inconstant as the Circulation of the Blood.

Therefore ordinary Men conclude, that Pious Men are obstinate as well as the Vicious: Because they are as Passionate for Truth and Virtue, as Ill Men are for Vice and Falshood. Both speak almost in the same manner, to maintain their Sentiments; they are alike in that, though they differ in the main. This is sufficient for those who do not weigh the dif­ference of Reasons, to Judge that they are alike in all things, because they are alike in that manner, which every Body is capable to Judge of.

Devout Persons are not then obstinate, they are only steddy, as they ought to be; But the Vicious and Libertines are always obstinate, though they should not persist one Hour in their Sentiments: Because Men are only obstinate when they defend a False [Page 90]Opinion, although they should only defend it a little while.

This is the Case of some Philosophers, who have maintain'd Chimerical Opinions, which they lay aside at last. They would have those who defend constant Truths, whose certainty they see evidently, to part with them as bare Opinions, as they have done with those they had foolishly been prejudic'd with. And because it is difficult to have a deference for them in prejudice of Truth; as also because the Love we have Naturally for it, inclines us to defend it earnestly, they Judge us to be obstinate.

Those Men are to blame to defend their Chimera's obstinately; but the others are in the right to defend Truth with Vigour and Steddiness of Mind. The manner of both is the same, but their Sentiments are different; and it is that difference of Sentiment, which makes the one constant, and the others obstinate.