SAint Paul (for him wee'le suppose with all the Greek Fathers, and Saint Augustine, Ambrose and Gregory among the Latine, to be the authour of this Epistle) know­ing prayer to be the golden key that un­locketh the cabinet both of earthly and heavenly blessings, in these words useth an argument or reason to move the Hebrews to remember him in their prayers, and that is his confidence upon good ground that he hath a good conscience; For we trust we have a good con­science, in all things willing to live honestly.

Which words without any rack or violence offer them­selves to this division: first, The Apostles confident perswasi­on, we trust: secondly, the Object of it, that we have a good conscience: thirdly, the foundation or ground upon which this edifice of trust which towers up to heaven is built, and that is in these words, in all things willing to live ho­nestly. Which words are not referred to the predicate good conscience, as though they were a bare description thereof, or a difference to distinguish what kind of good consci­ence the Apostle means, and to be read thus, We trust we have a good conscience, or a good heart, which is willing in all things to live honestly; or not able to fulfill the law of God as [...] propounded unto Adam, but yet willing to perform Evangelicall obedience, and in all things to live honestly: but they are referred to the subject, we, [...], and are to be read thus, We, willing in all things to live honestly, trust we have a good consci­ence. And so they note unto us not barely the object of his trust, but the ground thereof. And then the reasoning [Page 2]stands thus. First, To move them to pray for him, he useth this argument. If I have a good conscience, then you are bound by a speciall relation to pray for me, not onely as a man but as a believer: but I have a good conscience. Therefore pray for me. Secondly, To prove his minor, he reasons thus, He that is carefull and willing in all things to live honestly, he hath a good conscience, or he may be con­fident that he hath a good conscience: but I am willing in all things to live honestly. Therefore I trust I have a good conscience.

To omit the coherence of these words with the former, noted unto us in the conjunction For, and to consider them absolutely, and in themselves, they afford these three pro­positions: first, From the object of S^t. Pauls trust. for that is in nature before the act conversant about it, That S^t. Paul had a good conscience: secondly, From the act conversant about this object, That S^t. Paul was confidently perswa­ded that he had a good conscience: thirdly, That he was per­swaded upon this ground, because he was carefull and wil­ling in all things to live honestly.

First, S^t. Paul had a good conscience. For these words, we have a good conscience, though read in the plurall number, are to be understood in the singular, as appeareth by the context, And I beseech you somewhat more earnestly so to do, that I may be restored to you more quickly.

And here by the way, we may take notice of S^t. Pauls modesty (verba haec modestiae serviunt, saith a Commenta­tour upon this place) who, when he is to speak any thing that tends to his own commendation, sometimes useth the third person, as if he spake of some other, not of himself, 2. Cor. 12. sometimes the plurall number, as ashamed to appropriate that praise to himself, which indeed belong­eth unto him. A good example for them to think upon, whose vainglorious mouths are wont to trumper out their own praises, whilst they forget that of the Greek Come­dian, [...], nothing is more lamentable then vain glory; or that of Chrysostome, Homil. 4. in 1. cap. Matth. Si glorificari cupis, gloriam despice, & eris [Page 3]omnibus gloriosior; but of this a word onely by the way.

Now for the better understanding of this proposition, it is necessary first to lay open the nature of conscience in generall, and the severall acts & offices thereof: secondly the nature of good conscience, and the severall kinds there­of: thirdly, to shew what kind of good conscience S^t. Paul meaneth, when he saith, we trust we have a good con­science.

First, What conscience is. Conscience is a part of the pra­cticall understanding, in all reasonable creatures, applying their actions to some rule, which it conceiveth to be the Law of God, and determining either with them, or against them.

It is a part: not that the understanding hath parts pro­perly, it being one simple and undivided faculty, but by way of analogy in respect of divers objects and actions: And I call it a part, to shew that it is a naturall power, or quality created together with the soul, and inseparable from it, and not an act or a habit or any thing that may be lost.

Secondly, It is a part of the understanding, not of the will or affections. For however some effects there are in the will, and affections, which proceed from conscience, as fear and terrour, which are therefore called fear and ter­rour of conscience; yet these are but extrinsecall effects of conscience, and flow not immediately from it, but from the will, as from the next and immediate cause, from con­science remotely, in respect of that influence, which the understanding hath upon the affections.

Thirdly, It is a part of the practicall understanding; be­cause conversant about action, about things done or to be done, and not about mere speculation.

Fourthly, in all reasonable creatures; to let you see the proper subject of conscience. For first every one that hath conscience must needs have reason. For conscience com­pareth a mans life with his rule, which requireth discourse. And therefore things that have no life, or having life that have not reason, cannot be said to have conscience. Se­condly [Page 4]it must be a creature. For God the creatour of all things having no superiour to impose a law upon him, and consequently none that hath either right or power to in­flict any punishment, cannot be said properly to have a conscience; yet we may conceive some analogy betwixt some acts of his understanding, and the excusing acts of conscience properly so called. For there being in him an eternall law or rule, which he hath purposed from eterni­ty in all his works of creation to observe, his understand­ing may reflect upon the works of his hands, compare them with this rule, and judge them conformable thereunto. Thus God saw every thing that he had made, and behold it was exceeding good, Gen. 1. that is very artificiall, agree­able to that idea, which God, the most skilfull workman, before the beginning had set down for himself to do all things by. Nor onely doth the understanding of God re­flecting upon his actions judge of that artificiall bonity which is in them, but also of the morall: For there being certain generall practicall notions of good and evil natu­rally seated in the understanding of God, according to which his will, the fountain of action, is moved (for his will is not, properly to speak, the rule of it self, but is gui­ded by counsel) his understanding may reflect upon the mo­rall acts of his will, compare them with their rule, and ac­cordingly judge them just and good, pronouncing an ap­proving sentence upon them, which hath much analogy and agreement with the excusing act of conscience proper­ly so called.

Thirdly, In all reasonable creatures: because it is impos­sible that any reasonable creature should be without con­science, it being a part of the understanding; and if any seem to have lost it, they have onely lost the use thereof, as a mad man, or a drunken man hath lost the use of reason, and that but for a time. For God will one day awake those consciences that were here asleep, give mouths to those that here were dumbe, so that they shall speak, and never cease to speak, judgement, horrour, confusion, death. For the condemning sentence of such a conscience doth but [Page 5]remain like letters written with the juice of Oranges to be made legible by the fire of Gods wrath.

Fourthly, Applying their actions to some rule: Here we have the proper act of conscience, together with the ob­ject of it. Where first we are to understand morall actions, not such as are merely naturall: For these latter cannot be comprehended in the object of conscience, none being ever so mad as to think there was either virtue or vice in them, they being the actions not of us, but of nature in us; and consequently conscience cannot to speak properly either excuse or accuse us for them. Indeed it may tell us we have not done ill in them, because they are neither good nor bad; but this is not properly to excuse: for to excuse properly is to judge that a man hath done well and vir­tuously, either in a voluntary choosing of some good, which he had power to have refused, or in a voluntary re­fusing some evil, which he might have chosen.

Secondly, we are to take action not strictly, for exter­nall morall action onely; but largely, as it comprehendeth both words and thoughts. For though mans law extend no further then the outward man (Hominum leges non nisi ex­ternam honestatem requirunt, nec penetrant usque ad inter­num cor & animum; ratio est, quia neque corda vident legis­latores, nec ipsorum providentia extenditur ultra civilitatem externam) yet Gods Law, which is the rule of conscience, is a discerner of the thoughts, and intents of the heart, Heb. 4.12. And therefore the Psalmist calleth it a per­fect law converting the soul, Psal. 19.

Thirdly, all omission of morall action is hither to be referred, whether it be directè or indirectè volita, whe­ther it be a velle non agere, or a non velle agere when we may and ought. For conscience beareth witnesse of our omission as well as of our commission, of our not doing as well as of our doing.

Fourthly, their actions: for the object of conscience is our own actions. For conscience is a power that the soul hath to reflect upon it self, and to judge it self: And there­fore not others actions, but onely so farre as they are [Page 6]made ours, either by imputation grounded upon nature, as the sinne of Adam; or else because we are some way a cause of the sinnes of others, either positively by furthering them, or privatively by not hindring them when we should and might: And in this sense that saying of S^t Gregory is true, Qui non corrigit resecanda, committit; so likewise in the same sense another prayeth, Lord forgive me my other mens sinnes. But otherwise the sinnes of others, which we are no wayes guiltie of, though they may be objects of our science, and must be objects of our grief too, if we see and know them, yet they need not at all to trouble our con­science.

Fifthly, Which it conceiveth to be the law of God. These words I adde for a twofold reason: 1. Because it is not necessarily required to the generall nature and working of conscience, that the thing we make conscience of should be truly commanded; it is sufficient if conscience appre­hend it to be so. Thus some out of an erroneous principle make conscience of worshiping reliques, of adoring ima­ges, of praying to Saints: others again oppose those lau­dable ceremonies which tend to order, decency and edifi­cation in the Church, though God never required these things at their hands, because they conceive themselves bound thereunto by a true and reall command. 2. Be­cause it is not necessary that are party commanding or gi­ving the law should be truly and indeed God: it is suffici­ent to the generall working of conscience, that conscience conceive him so. And therefore the Heathen made con­science of those commands which the Devil gave them in the Oracles, because they thought that God spake by them, and in them. Virgil giveth us two examples of this in one place of his second book of his Aeneid.

But it is necessary that conscience conceive both the com­mand to be reall, and the party commanding to be truly God, else it cannot bind us to obey the command, or to fear the commander. For God onely, who is creatour of conscience, hath this priviledge to bind conscience: And none can give this subjection to any, but to such a one as he apprehendeth to be more then a creature. And there­fore the Heathen were wont to call those that were sent to inquire of their oracles [...] or [...], vel ex [...], quasi Dei curam gerentes, and the ships wherein they were sent, [...], and their sa­crifices, [...].

And if any object and say, That we are and ought to be obedient to the laws of men for conscience sake, Rom. 13.5. And therefore humane laws bind conscience. I answer, That humane laws bind not conscience properly by inherent virtue in themselves, but by virtue of the ge­nerall law of God, which commandeth obedience unto men; as water may burn or scald, not by any naturall qua­lity from it self, but by heat received from fire: and a breach is made in conscience, not simply because mans law is neglected, but because Gods law is broken. For, Whosoever resisteth the power resisteth the ordinance of God, Rom. 13.2.

Lastly, Determining either with them, or against them, which is another act of conscience, and that is, after ap­plication of our actions to their rule, to judge of their con­formity or difformity thereunto.

But for the better understanding of conscience, consider with me these distinct acts, and offices of conscience.

First, to know and keep the law and rule which a man thinketh himself bound to observe: and conscience in this respect is called [...].

Secondly, To take notice of a mans actions before they are done to consider what he is about to do, after, to re­member and bear witnesse of them upon occasion, judging [Page 8]of the entity and existence of the action, as whether done or not done, whether with such and such circumstances, or without.

Thirdly, To apply the action to the rule, and compare these two together; which act is called [...], and from it conscience in the Schoolmans opinion hath its name, be­cause it is a knowing of the action together with the rule, or an applying of these two together.

Fourthly, To judge of the quality of the action according to the rule, or of its agreeing or disagreeing to the same; and this act is called [...], the last and perfectest act of reason, or of conscience. And because every law con­taineth two things. 1. A command of obedience: 2. A threatning of punishment in case obedience be not perfor­med: First conscience judgeth whether the command be kept or transgressed, and consequently whether the action for quality be good or evil, which is to excuse or accuse: Secondly, It judgeth of the guilt and desert, whether the punishment threatned belong to the agent for this action or not, and so absolveth or condemneth.

These are the intrinsecall acts of conscience, which flow immediately from it; but by reason of that influence which the understanding hath upon the affections, there is a sift act of conscience which is to comfort and torment in re­spect of good and bad actions past; to spurre on, to bridle and restrain in respect of good and bad actions to come: which it doth by stirring up those foure principall affecti­ons of the soul, as Aquinas calleth them, viz. Joy and Sorrow, Hope and Fear; but this is but an extrinsecall effect of conscience, as I have already shewed. All this is done by a practicall syllogisme thus, —

Every one that committeth murder transgresseth the law of God, and deserveth everlasting damnation: But, saith the conscience of him that is guiltie, I have committed such an act, at such a time, in such a place, which is murder: There­fore I have transgressed the law of God, &c.

He that committeth murder transgresseth the law of God, and deserveth everlasting damnation: there is the first act of [Page 9]conscience, viz. knowledge of the command, and of the punishment due to the transgression of it. But I have com­mitted such an act, in such a place, at such a time; there is the second act of conscience, which is to remember and bear witnesse of a mans actions, whether done, or not done, whether with such and such circumstances or without. Which is murder: there is the third act, application of the generall knowledge to this particular action. Therefore I have transgrèssed the law of God: there is accusation; and deserved everlasting damnation; there is sentence of condem­nation. And upon this sentence in the understanding, fol­loweth fear and terrour in the affections. And thus much for the explication of the generall nature of conscience, and the severall acts and offices thereof.

The next thing that I am to insist upon, is the nature of good conscience, and the severall kinds thereof. Consci­ence thus described is either good or bad: A good consci­ence is such a one as is conformable to that rule, by which it ought to be guided; A bad one, is such a one as wants conformity thereunto. Both may be distinguished according to their severall subjects, into the good and bad conscience of men, and of Angels.

Mans conscience (for that onely we are to speak of now) is good when conformable to the will of God re­vealed in the Scriptures. Now because the Scripture hath two parts, answering to the twofold estate of man before and since the fall, viz. the Law and the Gospel, hence it cometh to passe that good conscience is twofold; either Le­gally good, which hath that perfection which the law re­quireth; or Evangelically good, which hath that perfection which the Gospel accepteth unto salvation: Of the former sort was the conscience of Adam before his fall; of the latter sort was the conscience of Adam after his repen­tance. I might be large in shewing the difference, betwixt these two kinds of good conscience; but I haste. This latter may again be distinguished into an upright conscience, and a peaceable conscience. An upright conscience is a con­science sprinkled with the blood of Christ, or, a conscience [Page 10]purified by faith, such as is in every man that hath repent­ed him truly of his sinnes past, being for the present carefull and willing above all things in all things to live honestly.

There are these things required to it.

First, That it be well principled, and know in some good measure Gods commandments, accounting them the rule by which all action is to be guided. According to that Psal. 119. vers. 105. Thy word is a lamp unto my feet, and a light unto my paths. For as it is necessarily required to the generall nature and working of conscience, that it have some principles which it may upon occasion apply to par­ticular actions; so it is essentiall to a good or an upright conscience, that it know the true rule, and be informed with good and honest principles, so that so farre as con­science is either ignorant of the true rule, or guided by a false, so farre it is not good, but evil and corrupt: and if it be either altogether ignorant of any of the main com­mandments, the practice of which is necessarily required to a Christian life, as namely, that we must believe in Christ, repent of our sinnes, and the like; or entertain any prin­ciple, which doth by direct and immediate consequence overthrow any of these, it is not onely secundùm quid, but simpliciter and absolutè mala, and falleth short of that evan­gelicall goodnesse, which is spoken of in my text. And be­cause knowledge of the commandment and things to be practiced doth necessarily presuppose knowledge of the creed and of things to be believed, it being impossible he should not erre in principles of action, who is ignorant of the fundamentall points of faith; for example, he that thinketh there is no God, or no Christ, or that they regard not mens actions, to reward the good and punish the bad, or that is ignorant of any of these three propositions, he can never lay down this for a practicall conclusion, That God is to be served, or Christ to be obeyed: For he that cometh to God must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of them that diligently seek him, Heb. 11.6. hence it cometh to passe that a knowledge & assent to the fundamentall points of faith, at least generall and confused, is necessarily required [Page 11]to integrity of conscience, as being the foundation of that practicall knowledge, which ought to be the rule of our actions.

Secondly, As the second act of conscience in generall was to take notice of a mans actions, so it is required in the second place to the nature of an upright conscience, that out of a godly solicitude and fear to offend God, it observe a mans carriage, and take notice of his actions; that it consider before his actions what he is about to do, that it remember and bear witnesse afterward what he hath done, that so they may be applyed to their rule: And this is actio intellectûs imperaeta à voluntate. And therefore those men that out of a naturall strength of memory, or because of some extraordinary impression that some noto­rious sinnes have made in them, remember their evil actions against their will, whereas they would forget them, that so they might be secure; or those that out of carnall secu­rity take no notice of their actions, but do things rashly, hand over head, & afterward carelessely forget what they have done, have not integrity of conscience. I speak not here of that forgetfulnesse which proceedeth from a de­fect in memory, but either from a custome of sinne, as those that have got such a habit of swearing that they know not when they swear; or from grosse security, and want of fear of the Lord.

Thirdly, That it apply a mans actions to the right rule impartially. And this likewise is actio intellectûs imperata à voluntate, and proceedeth from that godly solicitude, which I spake of before. And therefore those men that apply not their actions at all to the law of God, or if they do, do it partially, grossely favouring themselves in their sinnes as being loth to find them out or to part with them, have not integritie of conscience. Nay, these are far from having it: For, Nemo periculosiùs peccat, quàm qui peccata defendit, None sinne more desperately then those that find out colours and excuses to cover and extenuate their sinne. And this impartiall application must be before and after our actions: before, that sinne may be avoyded; after, that [Page 12]if we have sinned we may repent. Of the former we have a notable example in Joseph, who when his Mistresse temp­ted him to that wicked act, consented not immediately unto her, but out of a godly solicitude and fear to offend God, applyeth the action to the law of God, and upon im­partiall application finding it to be unlawfull, returneth her this answer, How shall I do this great wickednesse, and sinne against God? Of the latter we have an example in the Prophet David, Psalm. 119.59. I thought on my wayes, and turned my feet to thy testimonies. And the want of this impartiall application, as it is the cause of mens ly­ing in sinne without repentance, so it is the cause of their first fall into sinne. Hoc nos pessimos facit, quòd nemo vitam suam respicit, saith Seneca,

For upon impartiall application necessarily followeth the fourth act of an upright conscience, which is the con­clusion of the former premisses, to wit, a true and sincere judgement of the action according to the commandment, at least so farre as conscience shall be inlightned and in­abled to judge; or a determination, that those particular actions are good, which are indeed such, and that those are evil, which are in their nature evil; And this likewise is either before or after our actions. If this practicall judge­ment of an upright conscience be before our actions, then the effect of it is cohibere à malo, & instigare ad bonum, to spurre us on to the practice of good, and to restrain us effe­ctually from evil: which efficacious power the under­standing hath upon the will and affections, and consequent­ly upon the whole man, virtute prioris actûs voluntatis, by virtue of a former complete and peremptory resolution of the will, whereby we are resolved to choose that which is good, and refuse that which is evil, where ever we meet with it; which is that very desire in all things to live honestly, which the Apostle speaketh of in my text. For that desire which is the foundation of the Apostles trust, is not a bare velleity, but a completa voluntas, which when he came to particulars put him upon action. And therefore those men whose consciences put them not upon the pra­ctice [Page 13]of good, nor restrain them effectually from evil; but suffer them to live in the wilfull omission of good, or com­mission of evil, have not integritie of conscience.

If the action be past, and bad for quality, then the judge­ment of an upright conscience is to accuse and condemne, that is, to judge the sinne worthy damnation: And the ef­fect of this is grief and sorrow, not onely for the punish­ment we have made our selves obnoxious to, but for the sin it self. And therefore seared consciences, which never smite men for their sins; and secure consciences, which do it but sometimes, and for grosser sinnes; and on the other side wicked tormenting consciences, which cause grief onely for the punishment and not for the offence (such as was Cain's, My sinne is greater then I can bear) these kinds of consciences are not upright.

But if the action past be good for matter and manner, then the act of conscience should be to excuse and absolve, that is, to pronounce it such as God is well pleased with, and doth accept to salvation in Christ: And the effect of this is joy and comfort, such as none can expresse, and such as a carnall man cannot conceive.

But because no action is accepted with this kind of ac­ceptation, unlesse it proceed from justifying faith, (For without faith it is impossible to please God to salvation, Heb. 11.6.) and consequently from an upright conscience, which is a necessary attendant of faith; (For faith purifieth the heart) hence it cometh to passe that a man cannot know that any act he doth is such, unlesse he know his con­science to be upright and purged by faith: which reflexed act, because it necessarily presupposeth integrity of con­science, (for a man cannot know that his conscience is pure unlesse it be so) therefore this is not essentiall to inte­grity, but to peace of conscience. And so I proceed to the second kind of good conscience, which is a peaceable conscience.

A peaceable conscience includeth all that I have said of an upright conscience, and superaddeth something more. For though every peaceable conscience be an upright con­science; [Page 14]yet every upright conscience is not alwayes able to speak peace. That which it superaddeth is a power to reflect upon it self, and to testifie that it is upright, and pur­ged with the bloud of Christ. For as a man may be alive, and not know that he is alive, as a child in his mothers wombe, or a man in some distemper; so it is possible that a man may have faith and a good conscience, and yet ei­ther through his own weaknesse, or some other extraordi­nary distemper or temptation, not know for the present that his conscience is good. But when he is confidently per­swaded upon good ground, that all his sinnes are pardoned, and that his person is justified and at peace with God, then he hath not onely uprightnesse but peace of conscience.

And so I have done with the second thing I was to treat of, the nature of good conscience in generall & the kinds of it: I passe unto the third. And that is, what kind of good conscience S.^t Paul meaneth when he saith, We trust we have a good conscience.

First, His words are not to be understood of a consci­ence Legally good, or at the barre of Justice. For it impli­eth a contradiction, that any sonne of fallen Adam should have such a conscience: for then he should be fallen and not fallen; faln because a son of fallen Adam, not fallen be­cause his conscience were legally good. For this is the sen­tence of the law, Cursed is every one that abideth not in all things that are written in the book of the law to do them. it must therefore be understood of a conscience Evangeli­cally good, or at the barre of mercy.

Secondly, An upright conscience must be understood, and not a peaceable one: For though without doubt S^t Paul had a peaceable conscience, and these very words do imply as much, because he was perswaded upon good ground that his conscience was good; yet that goodnesse which is the object of his trust, is goodnesse of integrity, not of tranquillity; because his trust is built upon this groūd, that he was willing in all things to live honestly: which necessarily inferreth integritie but not tranquillitie of con­science; because a man may desire in all things to live ho­nestly, [Page 15]and yet sometime for the present not have peace of conscience.

Thus you see the meaning of the proposition, S^t Paul had an upright conscience.

This I might demonstrate à priori, from the causes of integritie, as 1. The Spirit of God, the chief authour there­of, which was not wanting to S^t Paul. 2. The word of God, the externall instrument, which S^t Paul was not igno­rant of. 3. Faith resting upon the promises of that word, the internall instrument thereof, wherewith he did abound. I might likewise prove it à posteriori, and shew you that S^t Pauls whole life after his conversion, which lasted from the year of our Saviours passion, till the fourth year before the destruction of Jerusalem (in all, about thirty seven years) was nothing else but a continuall exercise of an upright conscience. And here I might shew you what he did for conscience sake, how he travelled to preach the word of God in Arabia, in Galatia and phrygia, in Syria, Asia and Italy, in France, Spain and other countries; and that in the mean time whereas he might (as good reason he might) waiting on the altar have been partaker with the altar, he notwithstanding laboured working with his hands, that he might not be burdensome to any, 1. Cor. 4. He wronged no man, corrupted no man, defrauded no man, 2. Cor. 7. 'Tis not his own testimony of himself, but the testimony of the spirit of truth by him, and of him.

I might here shew likewise what he suffered for con­science sake: of the Jews five times he received fourty stripes save one, thrice he was beaten with rods, once sto­ned; he was stock'd at Philippi, after again apprehended at Jerusalem, kept prisoner two years at Caesarea, from thence sent bound to Rome, where he was put to death by Nero, that sanguisuga, that cruell and blood-thirstie ty­rant. But that time which is remaining bids me make haste.

First, then it followeth from this proposition, That every man is bound to get integrity of conscience. For what S^t Paul saith here of himself, is not proper to him, but com­mon to all believers: And therefore if S^t. Paul, not as S^t Paul [Page 16]but as a believer, have an upright conscience, it followeth secundùm id generis, quod est in specie, That every true be­liever hath an upright conscience, and that every man is bound to get one.

Here likewise vanisheth, like the morning dew before the sun, the opinion of those that are so farre from good­nesse themselves, that they think there is no such thing in rerum natura, in the wide world, as good conscience, that the state of regeneration is but precisenesse, that true ho­linesse is but an idea or an ens rationis, a Plato's common­wealth or a mere phansie created in the heads of some fond and scrupulous men; That think with the Thnetopsychitae that the souls of men are mortall, and perish with their bo­dies; or with the Sadduces and Simon Magus that there is no resurrection; or with Pope Leo the tenth, that the story of the birth, death and resurrection of Christ is but futilis & anilis fabula, an old-wifes tale, fit for nothing but to fear fools, and keep people in awe, or perhaps to be a bait to catch such fish as St Peter fished for, that have their mouths full of silver; or that think with the Atheist that there is no God, or at least with Epicurus, that there is no providence, that forsooth it cannot stand with the majesty of God to regard what is done in this inferiour world (sci­licet is superis labor est) making God, as Tertullian com­plaineth, Otiosum & inexercitum neminem in rebus humanis. But this web is not worth sweeping down: I will not therefore honour the heresie (pardon my mistake, I cannot afford it so good a name, because it is a universall revolt) but the Apostacy, the Atheism so much as to spend time to coufute it; I will rather turn my arguments against them into prayers to God for them, that if it be possible, the thought of their hearts may be forgiven them: for they are in the gall of bitternesse, and in the bond of iniquitie. And for our selves, let it ever be our humble prayer to Al­mighty God, that of all judgements he would keep from us spirituall judgements, blindnesse of mind, hardnesse of heart, a reprobate sense, &c. Ever praying as the Church Letany directeth us, From all false doctrine & heresie, from [Page 17]hardnesse of heart and contempt of thy word and com­mandments, good Lord deliver us. And, Grant we beseech the, O Lord, that we may never make shipwrack of faith and good conscience, the Ark and ship wherein faith is pre­served.

And so I proceed to a just censure of those that neglect in­tegrity of conscience: and here it is no lesse then a wonder to behold how conscience is neglected on every side, which yet is not so wonderfull as lamentable.

The covetous man sells the integrity of his conscience for a little red and white earth, one of the basest things in the world, if we except the party that adores it, and ma­keth it his God: which when he hath got, the Chest he putetth it into may be said to possesse it as truly as he. For it keepeth it (clausum possidet arca Jovem) and he doth no more: For he is afraid to use it. Quaerit, & inventis miser abstinet, & timet uti. The ambitious man selleth it for the thing called Honour which can neither be got nor enjoyed without labour and travail. Fructus honos oneris, fructus honoris onus. And therefore the Hebrew [...] which signifieth honour cometh à radice [...] which signifies ponderosum esse, to be heavy or burthen­some. To which we may apply that of S^t. Augustine, Qui te amat, non te cognoscit; qui te contemnunt, ipsi te intelli­gunt. The envious man, for a little [...], or a short rejoycing at the misery of his brethren. The vain glorious man, for the breath of the multitude, which he can enjoy no longer then he is every mans servant, Ʋniversis singulis (que) servit servus gloriae. The adulterer, for a momentany dalli­ance, which perhaps leaveth rottennesse behind it in his bones.

The proud person that doteth upon apparell, the thing that blazons mans downfall and the devils conquest, puts of integrity of conscience as a wear out of fashion, to put on a phantastick garment, which may force the beholders into wonder, not so much at the strangenesse of the unwon­ted habit as the monstrous folly of the party that wears it. Nazianzen affords these no better a name then silk-wormes [Page 18]or butterflies; and doubtlesse such ridiculous creatures they are in the eyes of God, and his Saints and Angels, who va­lue not the adorning of the outward man, but the comely ornament of an upright and undefiled conscience.

The beastly intemperate drunkard and glutton (par­don the weaknesse of the expression) chops away the in­tegrity of his conscience for a sinne which turnes men into swine, with such devilish charms, that they would not leave their bruitish nature for their former reason; or if you will, for a pleasure scarce two fingers long, quae non durat nisi quantum durat transitus ille per gulam, which continues but whilst the meat passeth from mouth to stomach; and that too is but an anteambulo to usher in a thousand pains and distempers. Such pleasures as these are but [...], deceitfull mistresses, or rather [...], bitter-sweet delights, or, pleasures mixt with pain: Of which S^t. Cyprian excellently, Voluptatem vicisse voluptas est maxima, The greatest pleasure, is to overcome these pleasures.

The sacrilegious Church-robber puts out the integrity of his conscience, by putting forth his unhallowed hand to purloyn that which is sacred, and to eat the forbidden fruit, upon which God hath set a noli me tangere. This stole a good conscience from Adam, and cast him out of para­dise, whilst he robbed God of his forbidden fruit; and I fear it hath deprived many a sonne of Adam, not onely of the integrity of his conscience, but of his earthly inheri­tance.

Ile adde but one instance more, and that is those restlesse spirits, whose cheif study it is, without call from God, by wicked contrivement and sinfull practices to enervate and weaken that wholesome established government, which through the provident care of vertuous kings and religious parliaments hath a longe time flourished and still doth flourish (thanks be to God and a good King) both in Church and state. These sell integrity of conscience for swarms of discontented thoughts, whereby they do but turn themselves into hives of unnumbred cares, sorrows [Page 19]and passions, make themselves in an especiall manner the outlawryes of heaven, and sometimes procure their own just and deserved punishment.

Thus I have run through some sinnes no lesse dangerous then common: it would not be hard, were it not too tedi­ous, to do the like in all professions; but I'le onely instance in one, without private spleen to place or person, and that is the unconscionable tradesman: And for the rest, because time will not permit, I leave their own consciences to make the application.

A man would blesse himself to think what a world of mysteries are found out in every trade, what tricking and counterfesance to delude the sense, what intricate devices of sophistry & dissimulation, what lying, equivocating, per­haps swearing and forswearing, and all this for the getting of a little mony, which when it is lawfully got is but [...], Luke 16.9. that is, not Mamon about which the sonnes of men use to be unrighteous, as some un­derstand the words; but Mamona fallax, so Beza, that is, deceivable and uncertain riches, when compassed by law­full means, and no fit objects for us to trust upon, being such things as are but got out of the bowels of the earth, and which they that have them are forced many times (like Euclio in Plautus) to hide there again. And yet notwith­standing how ordinary is it with men, for the getting of this trash, to transgresse both against religion and reason, as if they hoped that after this life there were nothing to be hoped for; and to violate the laws of justice in their une­quall weights and measures, in their abusing ignorant and unskilfull chapmen, whereas commutative justice observes proportionem arithmeticam, an arithmeticall proportion, which is immutably one and the same in respect of all per­sons of what quality soever. Such as these sell integrity of conscience for gain, and yet gain nothing by that bargain but the losse of their souls, whilst with the golden book they swallow down the worm of conscience, and barter away their own eternall happinesse for very trifles, which, if they did but like the good merchant buy that pearl our [Page 20]Saviour speaks of, Matth. 13. should as farre as were con­venient as a mantissa or an overplus be cast in at their bargain. But if any shall make profession of religion profits stirrup to get up by, and bait craft with humility, rough cast­ing his countenance as if by an hypocriticall monopoly he had ingrost all honesty and integrity of conscience, that he may the more easily deceive, his case is farre worse then the former. Is religion grown now to be an art of decei­ving? or doth he deserve the name of Christian, whose chief study it is scitè mentiri, id est, mentiri ut lucro sit, nec tamen possis deprehendi, as Erasmus speaketh. Nay I must tell him heis stark nought as well as the former, and doubleth his fault by seeming good. And if any notwithstanding this perswasion shall still persist, either in this or in any other sinfull way, let them go on to please themselves, and dis­please their God in their over greedy pursuit of unprofita­ble vanitie. Let me onely have an upright conscience for my portion, [...], as Isocrates of virtue; and let me never want it till I envy them.

And for our selves, if we delight not to weave the web of our future wo, let it be our chiefest care to get, and having got, to keep integritie of conscience. Ile adde but two motives to move you thereunto; A good conscience will be your best friend, and a bad conscience will be your worst enemy.

1. A bad conscience will be your worst enemy. It de­prives us for the present of union with God, of communion with Christ, of interest in his promises, of protection of his angels, and of title to heaven; and when God shall awake it and arm it against us, it will sting us with such torments, as I pray God we may rather know by relation then expe­rience. An ancient Father calls this horrour of conscience, primitias infernalis flammae; and I may call it a walking hell. For our Saviour himself seemeth to intimate that the rack­ings of a self-accusing conscience are the greatest part of their torments that are condemned to that dungeon where darkessen putteth on her blackest garment.

[Page 21]2. A good conscience will be our best friend. It will be our most plain-dealing friend, our fastest friend, and our po­tentest friend.

1. Our most plain-dealing friend. Some are flattering friends and will not speak and inform men of their miscar­riages, but rather make them believe that all their vices are virtues, and all their dusky actions chrystalline. Nimis sciti sycophantae, to use Plautus his phrase, men that live altoge­ther out of themselves studying other mens humours. Like Gnatho in Terence, Quicquid dicunt laudo, id rursum si ne­gant, laudo id quoque: negat quis? nego; art? aio. Others again are fearfull friends, and dare not speak lest they incurre dis­pleasure, and indeed all men naturally are displeased with those that inform them of their misdoings, especially those that are great, and unwonted to be crost in their desires. These many times reward good counsel with ill turns, and account reall injuries the just recompence of wholsome reproof: witnesse John the Baptist, who lost his head for tel­ling Herod it was not lawfull for him to keep his brothers wife. Witnesse Calisthenes, who lost his life, not for betray­ing Alexander to others, but because he would not betray Alexander to himself, and account him worthy of divine worship, as all his detestable flatterers did. Witnesse S^t paul in my text, who, if S^t Chrysostoms testimony be true in his first book adversùs vituperatores vitae monasticae, was slain by Nero for diswading an harlot of his from prostituting her self to his ungodly desires. The observation of which pra­ctices of great ones caused a witty speach to fall from a famous man of our times, that whosoever should follow truth too near the heels it might happily strike out his teeth. And in this regard the most are affraid to admonish, especially great ones when they do amisse, and all generally are shie and loth to speak truth. But now a good consci­ence neither desireth to flatter us, nor feareth to tell us the truth, be we what we will or can be however it be taken.

2. It is our fastest friend. The relation betwixt man and wife is a near relation; but the relation betwixt a man and his conscience is nearer. Conscience lieth with us, [Page 22]sits with us, rides with us; a man may as soone fly from him­self as from his conscience. Jonathan never adhered so to David, though the text saith, he loved him, as his own soul. Nisus never stuck so close to Euryalus, though he desired by his own death to ransome the others life, Me, me, adsum qui feci, in me convertite ferrum, &c. Nor This be to her beloved Pyramus, though she endevoured to accompany him after death, Quique, à me morte revelli Heu solâ peteras: poteris nec morte revelli. I say none of these did so adhere to other, as good conscience will to us; when riches, when friends when parents, when life and breath forsake us, good conscience can, yea cannot choose but cleave unto us:

Thirdly, It is our potentest friend. Good conscience is the darling of the Almighty, which if we do but continue faithfull in her service will crown us with peace of consci­ence here, and hereafter with eternall happinesse. For though these two may happily be severed for some time, as I have already shewed, yet the fruit of constancy in righte­ousnesse is peace even in this life. And therefore S^t. Augu­stine calls them duas sorores; & he that is constant in his love to the one, shall be sure to be beloved of the other. For in­tegrity and peace, like Martha and Mary, dwell under one roof. O sweet and blessed name of peace, the beauty of heaven, the desire of earth, the joy of angels, that every good, and every thing, that all that man delights in! Who but a man possest with frenzie would not labour for thee? who but a cruell tyrant against his own soul can be con­tent with any other reward but thee? ô selix conscientia jucun­ditas (cries out holy Augustine, as in an extasy) paradisus de­litiarum, palatium Dei, thalamus Christi, habitaculum Spiritûs sancti: Tu in terra ad huc es, & in caelis habitas. O happy, thrice happy peace of conscience; thou art yet on earth, and yet thou dwellest in heaven, or rather thou changest the earth thou art in, into heaven, what have not the blessed Saints done for thee? what have not the crowned martyrs suffered with thee? Blessed is that soul which possesseth the, or rather which thou possessest. For it hath in deepest sor­row height of joy, prosperity in adversity, liberty in capti­vity, [Page 23]and life in death. 'Tis an instrument that 's sweetly tuned, 'tis an angell clad in flesh, 'tis a mint of golden thoughts, 'tis a world of joy and concord, where there is nothing but halcyon and summer dayes of peace. Happy is the man that is in such a case, yea blessed is he that hath peace of conscience for his portion.

And now me thinkes it is labour in vain for Cosmogra­phers to spend themselves in finding out the place where paradise was seated. It was not the whole earth, as some conceive; nor a place mounted higher then the middle region of the air, as others; nor betwixt the tropicks in the torrid zone under the equinoctiall; nor in the countrey of Eden, or in the parting of the two regions Assyria and Babylonia: It is not in your pleasant gardens, though they perhaps may excell those of Alcinous mentioned by Homer, when in the pride of their spring they are bespangled with all choyse of eye-pleasing flowers; nor in your orchards of delight, surpassing the Elysian fields, adorned with variety of beautifull walks, & those shaded with the green canopy of every pleasant and fruitfull tree: It is not in your glorious wardrobes, though they perhaps be fild with garments of silk, and of broydered work, of fine linen corall and pearl: It is not upon your couches of Ivory, nor in venereous im­braces upon beds of down, deckt with coverings of tapistry, and of carved work, perfumed with myrrhe, aloes, and sy­namon. It is not on your richly furnished tables, though they abounded with all variety of creatures that earth, and sea, and air can afford: But if you will needs know where to find out this place of blisse, believe me (for you may) it ever was, and is, and there onely is, where there is tran­quillity and peace of conscience.

Lastly, good conscience, if we continue faithfull in her service, will crown us with eternall happinesse. What pre­ferments hath she procured at the mercifull hands of God, for all those that have lived and dyed in her service? How doth joy now triumph in the eyes, and comfort lodge in the hearts of all those, that whilst they were here upon earth were carefull with S^t. Paul to keep a consciencevoyd of [Page 24]offence toward God, and toward men. How must their souls needs be full of angels pleasures, and swell with over­flowing delights, how do they bury the miseries that be­fell them here, in the triumph of that conquest which they have obtained over the enemies of their salvation? Though my speech should be as endlesse, as their joyes, yet would it come too short of a full expression. For the excellency of happinesse can neither come out of the speaker by rela­tion, nor enter into the hearer by apprehension, yet I'le tell you what S. Augustine saith of it, in the 22. Chap. of his meditation. O tu vita quam praeparavit Deus iis qui diligunt eum: vita vitalis, vita beata, vita tranquilla, vita secura, vita pulchra, vita munda, vita casta, vita ignara mortis, nescia tristitiae, &c. Quantò plùs valeo mecum considerare, tantò plùs amore tui langueo. And no marvel, holy Augustine. For those that enjoy this life behold to their unspeakable comfort the host royall of the blessed Angels, the holy spirits of Saints departed, the noble army of martyrs, which now shine much brighter then those flames, which here put a period to their transitory lives, the glorious company of the Apostles, the goodly fellowship of the prophets, and which is more, the most sacred humility of our Saviour, and his comely face, fairer then the sonnes of men, clearer then the sun, and that which infinitely transcends what is or can be said, the glo­rious presence of him, who is all in all; a power ineffable, a vertue infinite, a light by abundant clarity invisible. I will therefore conclude with S: Augustines exclamation, O ergò felix ju ounditas, & jucunda felicitas sanctos videre, cum sanctis esse, & sanctum esse; Deum videre, & Deum in aeter­num habere, & ultrá.

God of his infinite mercy teach our consciences now whilst we live to nature, to dy to sinne, that so when we dy to nature we may live with him in this blissefull life of glory.