CHAP. I.

1. The usefulness of the present Speculation for the understanding of Providence, and the management of our lives for our greatest happiness; 2. For the moderate bearing the death and disasters of our Friends; 3. For the begetting true Magnanimitie in us, 4. and Peace and Tranquillitie of minde. 5. That so weighty a Theory is not to be handled perfunctorily.

1. OF all the Speculations the Soul of man can entertain her self withall, there is none of greater moment, or of closer concernment to her, then this of her own Immortality, and Independence on this terrestriall body. For hereby not onely the intricacies and perplexities of Providence are made more easy and smooth to her, and she becomes able, by unravelling this clue from end to end, to pass and repass safe through this Labyrinth, wherein many both anxious and careless Spirits have lost themselves; but also (which touches her own interest more particularly) being once raised into the knowledge and belief of so weighty a Conclusion, she may view from this Prospect the most certain and most compendious way to her own Happiness; which is, the bearing a very moderate affection to what ever tempts her, during the time of this her Pilgrimage, and a carefull preparing of her self for her future condition, by such Noble actions and Heroicall qualifications of mind, as shall render her most welcome to her own Countrey.

2. Which Belief and Purpose of hers will put her in an utter incapacity of either envying the life or successes of her most imbittered Enemies, or of over-lamenting the death or misfortunes of her dearest Friends; she having no friends but such as are friends to God and Vertue, and whose afflictions will prove advantages for their future Felicitie, and their departure hence a passage to present possession thereof.

3. Wherefore, being fully grounded and rooted in this so concerning a Perswasion, she is freed from all poore & abject thoughts and designes; and as little admires him that gets the most of this World, be it by Industry, Fortune or Policie, as a discreet and serious man does the spoiles of Schoolboyes, it being very inconsiderable to him, who got the victory at Cocks or Cob-nut, or whose bag returned home the fullest stuffed with Counters or Cherry-stones.

4. She has therefore no aemulation, unless it be of doing good, and of out-stripping, if it were possible, the noblest examples of either the present or past Ages; nor any contest, unless it be with her self, that she has made no greater proficiency towards the scope she aimes at: and aiming at nothing but what is not in the power of men to confer upon her, with courage she sets upon the main work; and being still more faithfull to her self, and to that Light that assists her, at last tasts the first fruits of her future Harvest, and does more then presage that great Happiness that is accrewing to her. And so quit from the troubles and anxieties of this present world, staies in it with Tranquillitie and Content, and at last leaves it with Joy.

5. The Knowledge therefore and belief of the Immortalitie of the Soule being of so grand Importance, we are engaged more carefully and punctually to handle this so weighty a Theory: which will not be performed by multiplying of words, but by a more frugall use of them, letting nothing fall from our pen, but what makes closely to the matter, nor omitting any thing materiall for the evincing the truth thereof.

CHAP. II.

1. That the Soules Immortality is demonstrable, by the Authors method, to all but mee • Scepticks. 2. An Illustration of his Firs • Axiome. 3. A confirmation and example o • the Second. 4. An explication of the Third. 5. An explication and proof of the Fourth. 6. A proof of the Fifth. 7. Of the Sixth. 8. An example of the seventh. 9. A confirmation of the truth of the Eighth. 10. A demonstration and example of the Ninth. 11. Penetrability the immediate proper •• of Incorporeall substance. 12. As also Indiscerpibility. 13. A proof and illustration of the tenth Axiome.

1. ANd to stop all Creep-holes, and leave no place for the subterfuges and evasions of confused and cavilling spirits, I shall prefix some few Axiomes, of tha • plainness and evidence, that no man in his wits but will be ashamed to deny them, if he will admit any thing at all to be true. But as for perfect Scepticisme, it is a disease incurable, and a thing rather to be pittied or laught at, then seriously opposed. For when a man is so fugitive and unsetled, that he will not stand to the verdict of his own faculties, one can no more fasten any thing upon him, then he can write in the water, or tye knots of the wind. But for those that are not in such a strange despondency, but that they think they know something already and may learn more, I doe not doubt, but by a seasonable recourse to these few. Rules, with others I shall set down in their due place, that they will be perswaded, if not forced, to reckon this Truth, of the Immortality of the Soul, amongst such as must needs appear undeniable to those that have parts and leisure enough accurately to examine, and throughly to understand what I have here written for the demonstration thereof.

CHAP. III.

1. The general notions of Body and Spirit. 2. That the notion of Spirit is altogether as intelligible as that of Body. 3. Whether there be any Substance of a mixt nature, betwixt Body and Spirit.

1. THE greatest and grossest obstacle to the belief of the Immortality of the Soul, is that confident opinion in some, as if the very notion of a Spirit were a piece of Non-sense and perfect Incongruity in the conception thereof. Wherefore to proceed by degrees to our maine designe, and to lay our foundation low and sure, we will in the first place expose to view the genuine notion of a Spirit, in the generall acception thereof; and afterwards of several kindes of Spirits: that it may appear to all, how unjust that cavill is against Incorporeall substances, as if they were meer Impossibilities and contradictious Inconsistencies. I will define therefore a Spirit in generall thus, A substance penetrable and indiscerpible. The fitness of which definition will be the better understood, if we divide Substance in generall into these first kindes, viz. Body and Spirit, and then define Body to be A Substance impenetrable and discerpible. Whence the contrary kind to this is fitly defined, A Substance penetrable and indiscerpible.

2. Now I appeale to any man that can set aside prejudice, and has the free use of his Faculties, whether every term in the definition of a Spirit be not as intelligible and congruous to reason, as in that of a Body. For the precise notion of Substance is the same in both, in which, I conceive, is comprised Extension and Activity either connate or communicated. For matter it self once moved can move other matter. And it is as easy to understand what Penetrable is, as Impenetrable, and what Indiscerpible as Discerpible; and Penetrability and Indiscerpibility being as immediate to Spirit, as Impenetrability and Discerpibility to Body, there is as much reason to be given for the attributes of the one as of the other, by Axiome 9. And Substance in its precise notion including no more of Impenetrability then Indiscerpibility, we may as well wonder how one kind of Substance can so firmly and irresistibly keep out another Substance (as Matter for example does the parts of Matter) as that the parts of another Substance hold so fast together, that they are by no means Discerpible, as we have already intimated: And therefore this holding out in one being as difficult a business to conceive as the holding together in the other, this can be no prejudice to the notion of a Spirit. For there may be very fast union where we cannot at all imagine the cause thereof, as in such Bodies which are exceeding hard, where no man can fancy what holds the parts together so strongly; and there being no greater difficulty here, then that a man cannot imagine what holds the parts of a Spirit together, it will follow by Axiome 7. that the notion of a Spirit is not to be excepted against as an incongruous notion, but is to be admitted for the notion of a thing that may really exist.

3. It may be doubted, whether there may not be Essences of a middle condition betwixt these Corporeal and Incorporeal Substances we have described, and that of two sorts, The one Impenetrable and Indiscerpible, the other Penetrable and Discerpible. But concerning the first, if Impenetrability be understood in reference to Matter, it is plaine there can be no such Essence in the world; and if in reference to its own parts, though it may then look like a possible Idea in it self, yet there is no footsteps of the existence thereof in Nature, the Souls of men and Daemons implying contraction and dilatation in them. As for the latter, it has no priviledge for any thing more then Matter it self has, or some Mode of Matter. For it being Discerpible, it is plain it's union is by Juxtaposition of parts, and the more penetrable, the less likely to conveigh sense and motion to any distance. Besides the ridiculous sequel of this supposition, that will fill the Universe with an infinite number of shreds and rags of Souls and Spirits, never to be reduced again to any use or order. And lastly, the proper notion of a Substance Incorporeal fully counter-distinct to a Corporeal Substance, necessarily including in it so strong and indissoluble union of parts, that it is utterly Indiscerpible, whenas yet for all that in this general notion thereof neither sense nor cogitation is implyed, it is most rational to conceive, that that Substance wherein they are must assuredly be Incorporeal in the strictest signification; the nature of cogitation and communion of sense arguing a more perfect degree of union then is in meer Indiscerpibility of parts. But all this Scrupulositie might have been saved; For I confidently promise my self, that there are none so perversly given to tergiversations and subterfuges, but that they will acknowledge, whereever I can prove that there is a Substance distinct from Body or Matter, that it is in the most full and proper sense Incorporeal.

CHAP. IV.

1. That the notions of the several kindes of Immateriall Beings have no Inconsistencie nor Incongruitie in them. 2. That the nature of God is as intelligible as the nature of any Being whatsoever. 3. The true notion of his Ubiquity, and how intelligible it is. 4. Of the union of the Divine Essence. 5. Of his power of Creation.

1. WE have shewn, that the notion of a Spirit in general is not at all incongruous nor impossible: And it is as congruous, consistent and intelligible in the sundry kindes thereof; as for example that of God, of Angels, of the Souls of Men and Brutes, and of the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or Seminal Forms of things.

2. The notion of God, though the knowledge thereof be much prejudiced by the confoundedness and stupidity of either superstitious or profane men, that please themselves in their large Rhetorications, concerning the unconceiveableness and utter incomprehensibleness of the Deity; the one by way of a devotional exaltation of the transcendency of his nature, the other to make the belief of his exsistence ridiculous, and craftily and perversly to intimate that there is no God at all, the very conception of him being made to appear nothing else but a bundle of inconsistencies and impossibilities; Nevertheless I shall not at all stick to affirm, that His Idea or Notion is as easy as any Notion else whatsoever, and that we may know as much of him as of any thing else in the world. For the very Essence or naked Substance of nothing can possibly be known by Axiome 8. But for His Attributes, they are as conspicuous as the attributes of any Subject or Substance whatever; From which a man may easily define him thus; God is a Spirit eternal, infinite in essence and goodness, omniscient, omnipotent, and of himself necessarily existent. I appeal to any man, if every term in this Definition be not sufficiently intelligible. For as for Spirit, that has been already defined and explained. By Eternal I understand nothing here but Duration without end or beginning: by Infiniteness of essence, that his Essence or Substance has no bounds, no more then his Duration: by Infinite in goodness, such a benign will in God as is carried out to boundless and innumerable benefactions: by Omnisciency and Omnipotency, the ability of knowing or doing any thing that can be conceived without a plain contradiction: by Self-existency, that he has his Being from none other: and by necessary Existence, that he cannot fail to be. What terms of any Definition are more plain then these of this? or what Subject can be more accurately defined then this is? For the naked Subject or Substance of any thing is no otherwise to be known then thus. And they that gape after any other Speculative knowledg of God then what is from his Attributes and Operations, they may have their heads and mouths filled with many hot scalding fancies and words, and run mad with the boysterousness of their own Imagination, but they will never hit upon any sober Truth.

3. Thus have I delivered a very explicite and intelligible notion of the nature of God; which I might also more compendiously define, An Essence absolutely perfect, in which all the terms of the former Definition are comprehended, and more then I have named, or thought needful to name, much less to insist upon; as his power of Creation, and his Omnipresence or Ubiquity, which are necessarily included in the Idea of absolute perfection. The latter whereof some ancient Philosophers endeavoring to set out, have defined God to be a Circle whose Center is every where and Circumference no where. By which description certainly nothing else can be meant, but that the Divine Essence is every where present with all those adorable Attributes of Infinite and absolutely perfect Goodness, Knowledg and Power, according to that sense in which I have explained them. Which Ubiquity or Omnipresence of God is every whit as intelligible as the overspreading of Matter into all places.

4. But if here any one demand, How the parts, as I may so call them, of the Divine Amplitude hold together, that of Matter being so discerpible; it might be sufficient to remind him of what we have already spoken of the general notion of a Spirit. But besides that, here may be also a peculiar rational account given thereof, it implying a contradiction, that an Essence absolutely perfect should be either limited in presence, or change place in part or whole, they being both notorious Effects or Symptoms of Imperfection, which is inconsistent with the nature of God. And no better nor more cogent reason can be given of any thing, then that it implyes a contradiction to be otherwise.

5. That power also of creating things of nothing, there is a very close connexion betwixt it and the Idea of God, or of a Being absolutely perfect. For this Being would not be what it is conceived to be, if it were destitute of the power of Creation, and therefore this Attribute has no less cohaerence with the Subject, then that it is a contradiction it should not be in it, as was observed of the foregoing Attribute of Indiscerpibilitie in God. But to alledge that a man cannot imagine how God should create something of nothing, or how the Divine Essence holds so closely and invincibly together, is to transgress against the 3. 4. and 5. Axiomes, and to appeal to a Faculty that has no right to determine the case.

CHAP. V.

1. The Definition belonging to all Finite and Created Spirits. 2. Of Indiscerpibility, a symbolical representation thereof. 3. An Objection answered against that representation.

1. WE have done with the notion of that Infinite and Uncreated Spirit we usually call God; we come now to those that are Created and Finite, as the Spirits of Angels, Men and Brutes, we will cast in the Seminal Forms also, or Archei, as the Chymists call them, though haply the world stands in no need of them. The Properties of a Spirit, as it is a notion common to all these, I have already enumerated in my Antidote, Lib. 1. cap. 4. Self-motion, Self-penetration, Self-contraction and dilatation, and Indivisibility, by which I mean Indiscerpibility: to which I added Penetrating, Moving, and Altering the matter. We may therefore define this kind of Spirit we speak of, to be A substance Indiscerpible, that can move it self, that can penetrate, contract, and dilate it self, and can also penetrate, move, and alter the matter. We will now examine every term of this Definition, from whence it shall appear, that it is as congruous and intelligible, as those Definitions that are made of such things as all men without any scruple acknowledg to exist.

2. Of the Indiscerpibility of a Spirit we have already given rational grounds to evince it not impossible, it being an Immediate attribute thereof, as Impenetrability is of a Body, and as conceivable or imaginable, that one Substance of it's own nature may invincibly hold its parts together, so that they cannot be disunited nor dissevered, as that another may keep out so stoutly and irresistibly another Substance from entring into the same space or place with it self. For this 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or Impenetrability is not at all contained in the precise conception of a Substance as Substance, as I have already signified. But besides that Reason may thus easily apprehend that it may be so, I shall a little gratifie Imagination, and it may be Reason too, in offering the manner how it is so, in this kind of Spirit we now speak of. That ancient notion of Light and Intentional species is so far from a plain impossibility, that it has been heretofore generally, and is still by very many persons, looked upon as a Truth, that is, That Light and Colour doe ray in such sort as they are described in the Peripatetical Philosophie. Now it is observable in Light, that it is most vigorous towards its fountain, and fainter by degrees. But we will reduce the matter to one lucid point, which, according to the acknowledged Principles of Opticks, will fill a distance of space with its rays of light: Which rayes may indeed be reverberated back towards their center by interposing some opake body, and so this Orbe of light contracted; but, according to the Aristotelean Hypothesis, it was alwayes accounted impossible that they should be clipt off, or cut from this lucid point, and be kept apart by themselves. Those whom dry Reason will not satisfy, may, if they please, entertain their Fancy with such a representation as this, which may a little ease the anxious importunity of their mind, when it too eagerly would comprehend the manner how this Spirit we speak of may be said to be Indiscerpible. For think of any ray of this orbe of light, it does sufficiently set out to the imagination how Extension and Indiscerpibility may consist together. See further in my Antidote, Lib. 1. cap. 4. as also the Appendix cap. 3. and 10.

3. But if any object, That the lucid Center of this orbe, or the Primary substance, as I call it, in the forecited places, is either divisible or absolutely indivisible, and if it be divisible, that as concerning that Inmost of a Spirit, this representation is not at all serviceable to set off the nature thereof, by shewing how the parts there may hold together so indiscerpibly, but if absolutely indivisible, that it seems to be nothing; To this I answer, what Scaliger somewhere has noted, That what is infinitely great or infinitely small, the imagination of man is at a loss to conceive it. Which certainly is the ground of the perplexedness of that Probleme concerning Matter, whether it consists of points, or onely of particles divisible in infinitum. But to come more closely to the business; I say that though we should acknowledg the Inmost Center of life, or the very first point, as I may so call it, of the primary Substance (for this primary Substance is in some sort gradual) to be purely indivisible, it does not at all follow, no not according to Imagination it self, that it must be nothing. For let us imagine a Perfect Plain, and on this Plain a perfect Globe, we cannot conceive but this Globe touches the Plain, and that in what we ordinarily call a point, else the one would not be a Globe, or the other not a Plain. Now it is impossible that one body should touch another, and yet touch one another in nothing. Wherefore this inmost Center of life is something, and something so full of essential vigour and virtue, that though gradually it diminish, yet can fill a certain Sphere of Space with its own presence and activity, as a spark of light illuminates the duskish aire. Wherefore there being no greater perplexity nor subtilty in the consideration of this Center of life or Inmost of a Spirit, then there is in the Atomes of Matter, we may by Axiome 7. rightly conclude, That Indiscerpibility has nothing in the notion thereof, but what may well consist with the possibility of the existence of the Subject whereunto it belongs.

CHAP. VI.

1. Axiomes that tend to the demonstrating how the Center or First point of the Primary Substance of a Spirit may be Indiscerpible. 2. Several others that demonstrate how the Secondary Substance of a Spirit may be Indiscerpible. 3. An application of these Principles. 4. Of the union of the Secondary Substance considered transversly. 5. That the notion of a Spirit has less difficulty then that of Matter. 6. An answer to an Objection from the Rational faculty. 7. Answers to Objections suggested from Fancy. 8. A more compendious satisfaction concerning the notion of a Spirit.

1. AND thus we have fairly well gratified the Fancy of the Curious concerning the Extension and Indiscerpibility of a Spirit; but we shall advance yet higher, and demonstrate the possibility of this notion to the severest Reason, out of these following Principles.

CHAP. VII.

1. Of the Self-motion of a Spirit. 2. Of Self-penetration. 3. Of Self-contraction and dilatation. 4. The power of penetrating of Matter. 5. The power of moving, 6. And of altering the Matter.

1. WE have proved the Indiscerpibility of a Spirit as well in Center as Circumference, as well in the Primary as Secondary Substance thereof, to be a very consistent and congruous Notion. The next property is Self-motion, which must of necessity be an Attribute of something or other; For by Self-motion I understand nothing else but Self-activity, which must appertain to a Subject active of it self. Now what is simply active of it self, can no more cease to be active then to Be; which is a sign that Matter is not active of it self, because it is reducible to Rest: Which is an Argument not only that Self-activity belongs to a Spirit, but that there is such a thing as a Spirit in the world, from which activity is communicated to Matter. And indeed if Matter as Matter had motion, nothing would hold together but Flints, Adamant, Brass, Iron; yea this whole Earth would suddenly melt into a thinner Substance then the subtil Aire, or rather it never had been condensated together to this consistency we finde it. But this is to anticipate my future purpose of proving That there are Spirits existing in the world: It had been sufficient here to have asserted, That Self-motion or Self-activity is as conceivable to appertain to Spirit as Body, which is plain at first sight to any man that appeales to his own Faculties. Nor is it at all to be scrupled at, that any thing should be allowed to move it self, because our adversaries that say there is nothing but Matter in the world, must of necessity (as I have intimated already) confess that this Matter moves it self, though it be very incongruous so to affirm.

2. The congruity and possibility of Self-penetration in a created Spirit is to be conceived, partly from the limitableness of the Subject, and partly from the foregoing attributes of Indiscerpibility and Self-motion. For Self-penetration cannot belong to God, because it is impossible any thing should belong to him that implyes imperfection, and Self-penetration cannot be without the lessening of the presence of that which does penetrate it self, or the implication that some parts of that essence are not so well as they may be, which is a contradiction in a Being which is absolutely perfect. From the Attributes of Indiscerpibility and Self-motion (to which you may adde Penetrability from the generall notion of a Spirit) it is plain that such a Spirit as we define, having the power of Motion upon the whole extent of its essence, may also determine this Motion according to the Property of its own nature: and therefore if it determine the motion of the exteriour parts inward, they will return inward towards the center of essentiall power; which they may easily doe without resistance, the whole Subject being penetrable, and without damage, it being also indiscerpible.

3. From this Self-penetration we doe not only easily, but necessarily, understand Self-contraction and dilatation to arise. For this self-moving Substance, which we call a Spirit, cannot penetrate it self, but it must needs therewith contract it self; nor restore it self again to it's former state, but it does thereby dilate it self; so that we need not at all insist upon these termes.

4. That power which a Spirit has to penetrate Matter we may easily understand if we consider a Spirit only as a Substance, whose immediate property is Activity. For then it is not harder to imagine this Active Substance to pervade this or the other part of Matter, then it is to conceive the pervading or disspreading of motion it self therein.

5. The greatest difficulty is to fancy how this Spirit, being so incorporeall, can be able to move the matter, though it be in it. For it seems so subtil, that it will pass through, leaving no more footsteps of it's being there, then the Lightening does in the Scabbard, though it may haply melt the sword, because it there findes resistance. But a Spirit can find no resistance any where, the closest matter being easily penetrable and pervious to an Incorporeall substance. The ground of this difficulty is founded upon the unconceivableness of any Union that can be betwixt the matter, and a Substance that can so easily pass through it. For if we could but once imagine an Union betwixt Matter and a Spirit, the activity then of the Spirit would certainly have influence upon Matter, either for begetting, or increasing, or directing the motion thereof. But notwithstanding the Penetrability and easy passage of a Spirit through matter, there is yet for all that a capacity of a strong union betwixt them, and every whit as conceivable as betwixt the parts of Matter themselves. For what glue or Cement holds the parts of hard matter in stones and metalls together, or, if you will, of what is absolutely hard, that has no pores or particles, but is one continued and perfectly homogeneous body, not only to sense, but according to the exact Idea of Reason? what Cement holds together the parts of such a body as this? Certainly nothing but immediate Union and Rest. Now for Union, there is no comparison betwixt that of Matter with Matter, and this of Spirit with Matter. For the first is only superficiall; in this latter the very inward parts are united point to point throughout. Nor is there any feare it will not take hold, because it has a capacity of passing through. For in this absolutely solid hard Body, which let be A, in which let us conceive

some inward superficies, suppose E. A. C, this superficies is so smooth as nothing can be conceived smoother: why does not therefore the upper E. D. C. slide upon the neather part E. F. C. upon the least motion imaginable, especially E. F. C. being supposed to be held fast whilst the other is thrust against? This facility therefore of one Body passing upon another without any sticking, seeming as necessary to our fancy as a Spirits passing through all Bodies without taking hold of them, it is plain by Axiome 7. That a firm union of Spirit and Matter is very possible, though we cannot conceive the manner thereof. And as for Rest, it is competible also to this conjunction of Matter with Spirit, as well as of Matter with Matter. For suppose the whole body A. moved with like swiftness in every part, the parts of A. then are according to that sense of Rest, by which they would explain the adhaesion of the parts of Matter one with another, truly quiescent. So say I that in the Union of Matter and Spirit, the parts of the Matter receiving from the Spirit just such a velocity of motion as the Spirit exerts, and no more, they both rest in firm Union one with another. That which comes to pass even then when there is far less immediate Union then we speak of. For if we doe but lay a Book on our hand▪ provided our hand be not moved with a swister motion then it communicates to the Book, nor the Book be pusht on faster then the swiftness of our hand; the Book and our Hand will most certainly retain their Union and goe together. So naturall and easy is it to conceive how a Spirit may move a Body without any more perplexity or contradiction then is found in the Union and motion of the parts of Matter it self. See the Appendix to my Antidote, Cap. 3.

6. The last Terme I put in the Definition of a Spirit, is the power of altering the Matter; which will necessarily follow from it's power of moving it or directing its motion. For Alteration is nothing else but the varying of either the Figures, or postures, or the degrees of motion in the particles; all which are nothing else but the results of locall motion. Thus have we cleared the intelligibility and possibility of all the Termes that belong to the Notion of a created Spirit in generall, at least of such as may be rationally conceived to be the causes of any visible Phaenomena in the world: We will now descend to the defining of the chief Species thereof.

CHAP. VIII.

1. Four main Species of Spirits. 2. How they are to be defined. 3. The definition of a Seminall Forme; 4. Of the Soule of a Brute; 5. Of the Soule of a Man. 6. The difference betwixt the Soule of an Angel and an humane Soule. 7. The definition of an Angelical Soule. 8. Of the Platonicall 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . 9. That Des Cartes his Demonstration of the Existence of the Humane Soule does at least conclude the possibility of a Spirit.

1. WE have enumerated four kindes of Spirits, viz. The 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or Seminall Formes, the Soules of Brutes, the Humane Soule, and that Soule or Spirit which actuates or informes the vehicles of Angels: For I look upon Angels to be as truly a compound Being, consisting of Soule and Body, as that of Men and Brutes. Their Existence we shall not now goe about to prove, for that belongs to another place. My present design is onely to expound or define the notion of these things, so far forth as is needful for the evincing that they are the Ideas or Notions of things which imply no contradiction or impossibility in their conception; which will be very easy for us to perform: the chief difficulty lying in that more General notion of a Spirit, which we have so fully explained in the foregoing chapters.

2. Now this General notion can be contracted into Kindes, by no other Differences then such as may be called peculiar powers or properties belonging to one Spirit and excluded from another, by the 8. Axiome. From whence it will follow, that if we describe these several kindes of Spirits by immediate and intrinsecall properties, we have given as good Definitions of them as any one can give of any thing in the world.

3. We will begin with what is most simple, the Seminal Formes of things which, for the present, deciding nothing of their existence, according to their 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 possibilis, we define thus; A Seminal Forme is a created Spirit organizing duely prepared matter into life and vegetation proper to this or the other kind of plant. It is beyond my imagination what can be excepted against this description, it containing nothing but what is very cohaerent and intelligible. For in that it is a Spirit, it can move Matter intrinsecally, or at least direct the motion thereof, But in that it is not an Omnipotent Spirit, but Finite and Created, it's power may well be restrained to duely prepared Matter both for vital union and motion. He that has made these particular Spirits, varying their Faculties of Vital union according to the diversity of the preparation of Matter, and so limiting the whole comprehension of them all, that none of them may be able to be vitally joyned with any matter whatever, and the same first Cause of all things, that gives them a power of uniting with and moving of matter duely prepared; may also set such lawes to this motion, that when it lights on matter fit for it, it will produce such and such a Plant, that is to say, it will shape the matter into such Figure, Colour and other properties, as we discover in them by our Senses.

4. This is the first degree of Particular Life in the world, if there be any purely of this degree particular. But now, as Aristotle has somewhere noted, the Essences of things are like Numbers, whose Species are changed by adding or taking away an Unite; adde therefore another Intrinsecall power to this of Vegetation, viz. Sensation, and it becomes the Soule of a Beast. For in truth the bare Substance it self is not to be computed in explicite knowledg, it being utterly in it self unconceivable, and therefore we will onely reckon upon the Powers. A Subject therefore from whence is both Vegetation and Sensation is the general notion of the Soule of a Brute. Which is distributed into a number of kindes, the effect of every Intrinsecal power being discernible in the constant shape and properties of every distinct kind of Brute Creatures.

5. If we adde to Vegetation and Sensation Reason properly so called, we have then a setled notion of the Soule of Man; which we may more compleatly describe thus: A created Spirit indued with Sense and Reason, and a power of organizing terrestrial matter into humane shape by vital union therewith.

6. And herein alone, I conceive, does the Spirit or Soule of an Angel (for I take the boldness to call that Soule, what ever it is, that has a power of vitally actuating the Matter) differ from the Soule of a Man, in that the Soule of an Angel may vitally actuate an aëreal or aethereal body, but cannot be born into this world in a terrestrial one.

7. To make an end therefore of our Definitions: an Angelical Soule is very intelligibly described thus; A created Spirit indued with Reason, Sensation, and a power of being vitally united with and actuating of a Body of aire or aether onely. Which power over an aëreal or aethereal Body is very easily to be understood out of that general notion of a Spirit in the foregoing Chapters. For it being there made good, that union with Matter is not incompetible to a Spirit, and consequently nor moving of it, nor that kind of motion in a Spirit which we call Contraction and Dilatation; these powers, if carefully considered, will necessarily infer the possibility of the Actuation and Union of an Angelical Soule with an aethereal or aiery Body.

8. The Platonists write of other orders of Spirits or Immaterial Substances, as the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . But there being more Subtilty then either usefulness or assurance in such like Speculations, I shall pass them over at this time; having already, I think, irrefutably made good, That there is no incongruity nor incompossibility comprised in the Notion of Spirit or Incorporeal Substance.

9. But there is yet another way of inferring the same, and it is the Argument of Des-Cartes, whereby he would conclude that there is de facto a Substance in us distinct from Matter, viz. our own Minde. For every Real affection or Property being the Mode of some Substance or other, and reall Modes being unconceivable without their Subject, he inferres that, seeing we can doubt whether there be any such thing as Body in the world (by which doubting we seclude Cogitation from Body) there must be some other Substance distinct from the Body, to which Cogitation belongs. But I must confess this Argument will not reach home to Des-Cartes his purpose, who would prove in Man a substance distinct from his body. For being there may be modes common to more Subjects then one, and this of Cogitation may be pretended to be such as is competible as well to substance Corporeal as Incorporeal, it may be conceived apart from either, though not from both. And therefore his argument does not prove that That in us which does think or perceive is a Substance distinct from our Body, but onely That there may be such a Substance, which has the power of thinking or perceiving, which yet is not a Body. For it being impossible that there should be any real mode which is in no Subject, and we clearly conceiving Cogitation independent for existence on Corporeal Substance; it is necessary, That there may be some other Substance on which it may depend; which must needs be a Substance Incorporeal.

CHAP. IX.

1. That it is of no small consequence to have proved the Possibility of the Existence of a Spirit. 2. The necessity of examining of Mr. Hobbs his Reasons to the contrary. 3. The first Excerption out of Mr. Hobbs. 4. The second Excerption. 5. The third. 6. The fourth. 7. The fifth. 8. The sixth. 9. The seventh. 10. The eighth and last Excerption.

1. I Have been, I believe, to admiration curious and sollicitous to make good, that the Existence of a Spirit or Incorporeal Substance is possible. But there is no reason any one should wonder that I have spent so much pains to make so small and inconsiderable a progresse, as to bring the thing only to a bare possibility. For though I may seem to have gained little to my self, yet I have thereby given a very signal overthrow to the adverse party, whose strongest hold seems to be an unshaken confidence, That the very notion of a Spirit or Substance Immaterial is a perfect Incompossibility and pure Non-sense. From whence are insinuated no better Consequences then these: That it is impossible that there should be any God, or Soule, or Angel, Good or Bad; or any Immortality or Life to come. That there is no Religion, no Piety nor Impiety, no Vertue nor Vice, Justice nor Injustice, but what it pleases him that has the longest Sword to call so. That there is no Freedome of Will, nor consequently any Rational remorse of Conscience in any Being whatsoever, but that all that is, is nothing but Matter and corporeal Motion; and that therefore every trace of mans life is as necessary as the tracts of Lightning, and the fallings of Thunder; the blind impetus of the Matter breaking through or being stopt every where, with as certain and determinate necessity, as the course of a Torrent after mighty stormes and showers of Rain.

2. And verily considering of what exceeding great consequence it is to root out this sullen conceit that some have taken up concerning Incorporeal Substance, as if it bore a contradiction in the very termes, I think I shall be wanting to so weighty a Cause, if I shall content my self with a bare recitation of the Reasons whereby I prove it possible, and not produce their Arguments that seem most able to maintain the contrary. And truly I doe not remember that I ever met with any one yet that may justly be suspected to be more able to make good this Province then our Countreyman Mr. Hobbs, whose inexuperable confidence of the truth of the Conclusion, may well assure any man that duely considers the excellency of his natural Wit and Parts, that he has made choice of the most Demonstrative Arguments that humane Invention can search out for the eviction thereof.

3. And that I may not incurre the suspicion of mistaking his Assertion, or of misrepresenting the force of his Reasons, I shall here punctually set them down in the same words I find them in his own Writings, that any man may judge if I doe him any wrong. The first place I shall take notice of is in his Leviathan, Chap. 34. The word Body in the most general acceptation signifies that which filleth or occupieth some certain room, or imagined place; and dependeth not on the Imagination, but is a real part of that we call the Universe. For the Universe being the Aggregate of all Bodyes, there is no reall part thereof that is not also Body; nor any thing properly a Body, that is not also part of (that Aggregate of all Bodyes) the Universe. The same also, because Bodyes are subject to change, that is to say, to variety of appearance to the sense of living Creatures, is called Substance, that is to say, subject to various Accidents; as sometimes to be moved, sometimes to stand still, and to seem to our senses sometimes Hot, sometimes Cold, sometimes of one Colour, Smell, Tast, or Sound, sometimes of another. And this diversity of seeming, (produced by the diversity of the operation of Bodyes on the Organs of our Sense) we attribute to alterations of the Bodyes that operate, and call them Accidents of those Bodyes. And according to this acception of the word, Substance and Body signifie the same thing; and therefore Substance incorporeal are words which when they are joyned together destroy one another, as if a man should say an Incorporeal Body.

4. The second place is in his Physicks, Part 4. Chap. 25. Article 9. But it is here to be observed that certain Dreames, especially such as some men have when they are betwixt sleeping and waking, and such as happen to those that have no knowledg of the nature of Dreames, and are withall superstitious, were not heretofore nor are now accounted Dreames. For the Apparitions men thought they saw, and the voices they thought they heard in sleep, were not believed to be Phantasmes, but things subsisting of themselves, and Objects without those that Dreamed. For to some men, as well sleeping as waking, but especially to guilty men, and in the night, and in hallowed places, Fear alone, helped a little with the storyes of such Apparitions, hath raised in their mindes terrible Phantasmes which have been and are still deceitfully received for things really true, under the names of Ghosts and Incorporeal Substances.

5. We will adde a third out of the same book, Part 1. Chap. 5. Art. 4. For seeing Ghosts, sensible species, a shadow, light, colour, sound, space, &c. appear to us no less sleeping then waking, they cannot be things without us, but onely Phantasmes of the mind that imagines them.

6. And a fourth out of his Humane Nature, Chap. 11. Art. 4. But Spirits supernaturall commonly signifie some Substance without dimension, which two words doe flatly contradict one another. And Article 5. Nor I think is that word Incorporeal at all in the Bible, but is said of the Spirit, that it abideth in men, sometimes that it dwelleth in them, sometimes that it cometh on them, that it descendeth, and goeth, and cometh, and that Spirits are Angels, that is to say, Messengers; all which words doe imply locality, and locality is Dimension, and whatsoever hath dimension is Body, be it never so subtile.

7. The fifth Excerption shall be out of his Leviathan, Chap. 12. And for the Matter or Substance of the Invisible agents so fancyed, they could not by naturall cogitation fall upon any other conceit, but that it was the same with that of the Soule of Man, and that the Soule of Man was of the same Substance with that which appeareth in a Dream to one that sleepeth, or in a Looking-glass to one that is awake: Which, men not knowing that such Apparitions are nothing else but creatures of the Fancy, think to be reall and external Substances, and therefore call them Ghosts, as the Latines called them Imagines, and Umbrae; and thought them Spirits, that is, thin aereal bodies; and those invisible Agents, which they feared, to be like them, save that they appeare and vanish when they please. But the opinion that such Spirits were Incorporeal or Immateriall, could never enter into the minde of any man by nature; because, though men may put together words of contradictory signification, as Spirit and Incorporeal, yet they can never have the imagination of any thing answering to them. We will help out this further from what he writes in his Humane Nature, Cap. 11. Art. 5. To know that a Spirit is, that is to say, to have natural evidence of the same, it is impossible. For all evidence is conception, and all conception is imagination, and proceedeth from Sense; and Spirits we suppose to be those Substances which work not upon the Sense, and therefore are not conceptible.

8. The sixth, out of Chap. 45. where he writes thus: This nature of Sight having never been discovered by the ancient pretenders to naturall knowledg, much less by those that consider not things so remote (as that knowledg is) from their present use, it was hard for men to conceive of those Images in the Fancy and in the Sense, otherwise then of things really without us. Which some (because they vanish away they know not whether nor how) will have to be absolutely incorporeal, that is to say, Immaterial, or Forms without Matter, Colour and Figure, without any coloured or figured body, and that they can put on aiery bodyes, (as a garment) to make them visible when they will to our bodily eyes; and others say, are Bodyes and living Creatures, but made of Aire, or other more subtile and aethereal matter, which is then, when they will be seen, condensed. But both of them agree on one general appellation of them, Daemons. As if the dead of whom they dreamed were not the Inhabitants of their own Brain, but of the Aire or of Heaven or Hell, not Phantasmes but Ghosts; with just as much reason as if one should say he saw his own Ghost in a Looking-glass, or the Ghosts of the stars in a River, or call the ordinary Apparition of the Sun of the quantity of about a foot, the Daemon or Ghost of that great Sun that enlightneth the whole visible world.

9. The seventh is out of the next Chapter of the same book. Where he again taking to task that Jargon, as he calls it, of Abstract Essences and Substantial Formes, he writes thus: The world (I mean not the Earth onely, but the Universe, that is, the whole mass of all things that are) is corporeal, that is to say, Body, and hath the Dimensions of Magnitude, namely Length, Breadth and Depth; also every part of Body is likewise Body, and hath the like dimensions; and consequently every part of the Universe is Body, and that which is not Body is no part of the Universe: And because the Universe is all, that which is no part of it is nothing, and consequently no where.

10. The eighth and last we have a little after in the same Chapter, which runs thus; Being once fallen into this errour of separated essences, they are thereby necessarily involved in many other absurdities that follow it. For seeing they will have these Formes to be real, they are obliged to assign them some place. But because they hold them incorporeal without all dimension of Quantity, and all men know that Place is Dimension, and not to be filled but by that which is corporeall, they are driven to uphold their credit with a distinction, that they are not indeed any where Circumscriptivè, but Definitivé. Which termes, being meer words, and in this occasion insignificant, pass onely in Latine, that the vanity of them might be concealed. For the Circumscription of a thing is nothing else but the determination or defining of it's place, and so both the termes of distinction are the same. And in particular of the essence of man, which they say is his Soule, they affirm it to be all of it in his little finger, and all of it in every other part (how small soever) of his Body, and yet no more Soule in the whole Body then in any one of these parts. Can any man think that God is served with such Absurdities? And yet all this is necessary to believe to those that will believe the existence of an incorporeal Soule separated from the Body.

CHAP. X.

1. An Answer to the first Excerption. 2. To the second. 3. An Answer to the third. 4. To the fourth Excerption. 5. An Answer to the fifth. 6. To the sixth. 7. To the seventh. 8. An Answer to the eighth and last. 9. A brief Recapitulation of what has been said hitherto.

1. WE have set down the chiefest passages in the Writings of Mr. Hobbs, that confident Exploder of Immaterial Substances out of the world. It remains now that we examine them, and see whether the force of his Arguments beares any proportion to the firmness of his belief, or rather mis-belief, concerning these things. To strip therefore the first Excerption of that long Ambages of words, and to reduce it to a more plain and compendious forme of reasoning, the force of his Argument lies thus: That seeing every thing in the Universe is Body (the Universe being nothing else but an Aggregate of Bodies) Body and Substance are but names of one and the same thing; it being called Body as it fills a place, and Substance as it is the Subject of severall Alterations and Accidents. Wherefore Body and Substance being all one, Incorporeal Substance is no better sense then an Incorporeal Body, which is a contradiction in the very termes. But it is plain to all the world that this is not to prove, but to suppose what is to be proved, That the Universe is nothing else but an Aggregate of Bodyes: When he has proved that, we will acknowledge the sequel; till then he has proved nothing, and therefore this first argumentation must pass for nought.

2. Let us examine the strength of the Second, which certainly must be this, if any at all; That which has its originall meerly from Dreames, Feares and Superstitious Faneyes, has no reall existence in the world. But Incorporeall Substances have no other Originall. The Proposition is a Truth indubitable, but the Assumption is as weak as the other is strong; whether you understand it of the reall Originall of these Substances, or of the Principles of our knowledge That they are. And be their Originall what it will, it is nothing to us, but so far forth as it is cognoscible to us by Axiome first. And therefore when he sayes, they have no other Originall then that of our own Fancy, he must be understood to affirme that there is no other principle of the knowledge of their Existence then that we vainly imagine them to be; which is grossly false. For it is not the Dreams and Feares of Melancholick and Superstitious persons, from which Philosophers and Christians have argued the Existence of Spirits and Immaterial Substances, but from the evidence of Externall Objects of Sense, that is, the ordinary Phaenomena of Nature, in which there is discoverable so profound Wisdome and Counsell, that they could not but conclude that the order of things in the world was from a higher Principle then the blind motions and jumblings of Matter and meer Corporeall Beings. To which you may adde what usually they call Apparitions, which are so far from being meerly the Dreams and Fancyes of the Superstitious, that they are acknowledged by such as cannot but be deemed by most men over Atheisticall, I mean Pomponatius and Cardan, nay by Vaninus himself, though so devoted to Atheisme, that out of a perfect mad zeale to that despicable cause he died for it. I omit to name the operations of the Soule, which ever appeared to the wisest of all Ages of such a transcendent condition, that they could not judge them to spring from so contemptible a Principle as bare Body or Matter. Wherefore to decline all these, and to make representation onely of Dreames and Fancyes to be the occasions of the world's concluding that there are Incorporeall Substances, is to fancy his Reader a meer foole, and publickly to profess that he has a minde to impose upon him.

3. The third argumentation is this: That which appears to us as well sleeping as wakeing, is nothing without us: But Ghosts, that is Immateriall Substances, appeare to us as well sleeping as waking. This is the weakest argument that has been yet produced: for both the Proposition and Assumption are false. For if the Proposition were true, the Sun, Moon, Stars, Clouds, Rivers, Meadows, Men, Women, and other living creatures were nothing without us: For all these appeare to us as well when we are sleeping as waking. But Incorporeall Substances doe not appeare to us as well sleeping as waking. For the notion of an Incorporeall Substance is so subtile and refined, that it leaving little or no impression on the Fancy, it's representation is meerly supported by the free power of Reason, which seldome exercises it self in sleep, unless upon easy imaginable Phantasmes.

4. The force of the fourth Argument is briefly this: Every Substance has dimensions; but a Spirit has no dimensions. Here I confidently deny the Assumption. For it is not the Characteristicall of a Body to have dimensions, but to be Impenetrable. All Substance has Dimensions, that is, Length, Breadth, and Depth: but all has not Impenetrability. See my Letters to Monsieur Des-Cartes, besides what I have here writ, Cap. 2, and 3.

5. In the Excerptions belonging to the fifth place these Arguments are comprised. 1. That we have no principle of knowledge of any Immateriall Being, but such as a Dream or a Looking-Glasse furnisheth us withall. 2. That the word Spirit or Incorporeall implyes a contradiction, and cannot be conceived to be sense by a naturall Understanding. 3. That nothing is conceived by the Understanding but what comes in at the Senses, and therefore Spirits not acting upon the Senses must remain unknown and unconceivable.

We have already answered to the first in what we have returned to his second Argument in the second Excerption.

To the second I answer, That Spirit or Incorporeall implyes no contradiction, there being nothing understood thereby but Extended Substance with Activity and Indiscerpibility, leaving out Impenetrability: Which I have above demonstrated to be the notion of a thing possible, and need not repeat what I have already written.

To the third I answer, That Spirits do act really upon the Senses, by acting upon Matter that affects the Senses; and some of these operations being such, that they cannot be rationally attributed to the Matter alone, Reason by the information of the Senses concludes, that there is some other more noble Principle distinct from the Matter. And as for that part of the Argument that asserts that there is nothing in the Understanding but what comes in at the Senses, I shall in it's due place demonstrate it to be a very gross Errour. But in the mean time I conclude, that the Substance of every thing being utterly unconceivable by Axiome 8. and it being onely the Immediate properties by which a man conceives every thing, and the properties of Penetrability and Indiscerpibility being as easy to conceive, as of Discerpibility and Impenetrability, and the power of communicating of motion to Matter as easy as the Matters reception of it, and the Union of Matter with Spirit, as of Matter with Matter; it plainly followes, that the notion of a Spirit is as naturally conceivable as the notion of a Body.

6. In this sixth Excerption he is very copious in jearing and making ridiculous the opinion of Ghosts and Daemons; but the strength of his Argument, if it have any, is this, viz. If there be any such things as Ghosts or Daemons, then they are (according to them that hold this opinion) either those Images reflected from water or Looking-glasses, cloathing themselves in aiery garments, and so wandring up and down, or else they are living Creatures made of nothing but Aire or some more subtile and AEthereall Matter. One might well be amazed to observe such slight and vain arguing come from so grave a Philosopher, were not a man well aware that his peculiar eminency, as himself somewhere professes, lies in Politicks, to which the humours and Bravadoes of Eloquence, especially amongst the simple, is a very effectuall and serviceable instrument. And certainly such Rhetorications as this cannot be intended for any but such as are of the very weakest capacity. Those two groundless conceits that he would obtrude upon the sober Assertors of Spirits and Daemons belong not to them, but are the genuine issue of his own Brain. For, for the former of them, it is most justly adjudged to him, as the first Author thereof; it being a Rarity, which neither my self nor (I dare say) any else ever met with out of Mr. Hobbs his Writings. And the latter he does not onely not goe about to confute here, but makes a shew of allowing it, for fear he should seem to deny Scripture, in Chap. 34. of his Leviathan. But those that assert the existence of Spirits, will not stand to Mr. Hobbs his choice for defining of them, but will make use of their own Reason and Judgment for the setling of so concerning a Notion.

7. In this seventh Excerption is contained the same Argument that was found in the first; but to deal fairly and candidly, I must confess it is better backt then before. For there he supposes, but does not prove, the chief ground of his Argument; but here he offers at a proof of it, couched, as I conceive, in these words [and hath the dimensions of Magnitude, namely Length, Breadth and Depth] for hence he would infer that the whole Universe is corporeall, that is to say, every thing in the Universe, because there is nothing but has Length, Breadth and Depth. This therefore is the very last ground his Argument is to be resolved into. But how weak it is I have already intimated, it being not Trinall Dimension, but Impenetrability, that constitutes a Body.

8. This last Excerption seems more considerable then any of the former, or all of them put together: but when the force of the Arguments therein contained is duely weighed, they will be found of as little efficacy to make good the Conclusion as the rest. The first Argument runs thus; Whatsoever is reall, must have some place: But Spirits can have no place. But this is very easily answered. For if nothing else be understood by Place, but Imaginary Space, Spirits and Bodyes may be in the same imaginary Space, and so the Assumption is false. But if by Place be meant the Concave Superficies of one Body immediately environing another Body, so that it be conceived to be of the very Formality of a Place, immediately to environ the corporeall Superficies of that Substance which is said to be placed; then it is impossible that a Spirit should be properly said to be in a Place, and so the Proposition will be false. Wherefore there being these two acceptions of Place, that Distinction of being there Circumscriptivè and Definitivè is an allowable Distinction, and the terms may not signify one and the same thing. But if we will with Mr. Hobbs (and I know no great hurt if we should doe so) confine the notion of Place to Imaginary Space, this distinction of the Schools will be needless here, and we may, without any more adoe, assert, that Spirits are as truly in Place as Bodyes.

His second Argument is drawn from that Scholastick Riddle, which I must confess seems to verge too near to profound Nonsense, That the Soule of man is tota in toto and tota in qualibet parte corporis. This mad Jingle it seems has so frighted Mr. Hobbs sometime or other, that he never since could endure to come near the notion of a Spirit again, not so much as to consider whether it were a meer Bug-beare, or some reall Being. But if Passion had not surprised his better Faculties, he might have found a true setled meaning thereof, and yet secluded these wilde intricacies that the heedless Schools seem to have charged it with: For the Immediate properties of a Spirit are very well intelligible without these aenigmaticall flourishes, viz. That it is a Substance Penetrable and Indiscerpible, as I have already shewn at large.

Nor is that Scholastick AEnigme necessary to be believed by all those that would believe the existence of an Incorporeal Soul; nor do I believe Mr. Hobbs his interpretation of this Riddle to be so necessary. And it had been but fair play to have been assured, that the Schools held such a perfect contradiction, before he pronounced the belief thereof necessary to all those that would hold the Soule of Man an Immateriall Substance, separable from the Body. I suppose they may mean nothing by it, but what Plato did by his making the Soule to consist 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 nor Plato any thing more by that divisible and indivisible Substance, then an Essence that is intellectually divisible, but really indiscerpible.

9. We have now firmly made good, that the notion of a Spirit implyes no contradiction nor incompossibility in it; but is the notion or Idea of a thing that may possibly be. Which I have done so punctually and particularly, that I have cleared every Species of Substances Incorporeall from the imputation of either obscurity or inconsistency. And that I might not seem to take advantage in pleading their cause in the absence of the adverse party, I have brought in the most able Advocate and the most assured that I have hitherto ever met withall; and dare now appeal to any indifferent Judge, whether I have not demonstrated all his Allegations to be weak and inconclusive. Wherefore having so clearly evinced the possibility of the Existence of a Spirit, we shall now make a step further, and prove That it is not onely a thing possible, but that it is really and actually in Nature.

CHAP. XI.

1. Three grounds to prove the Existence of an Immateriall Substance, whereof the first is fetcht from the Nature of God. 2. The second from the Phaenomenon of Motion in the world. 3. That the Matter is not self-moveable. 4. An Objection that the Matter may be part self-moved, part not. 5. The first Answer to the Objection. 6. The second Answer. 7. Other Evasions answered. 8. The Conclusion, That no Matter is self-moved, but that a certain quantity of motion was impressed upon it at its first Creation by God.

1. THere be three main Grounds from whence a man may be assured of the Existence of Spirituall or Immateriall Substance. The one is the consideration of the transcendent excellency of the nature of God; who being, according to the true Idea of Him, an Essence absolutely perfect, cannot possibly be Body, and consequently must be something Incorporeall: and seeing that there is no contradiction in the notion of a Spirit in generall, nor in any of those kinds of Spirits which we have defined, (where the notion of God was set down amongst the rest) and that in the very notion of him there is contained the reason of his Existence, as you may see at large in my Antidote, Lib. 1. Cap. 7. 8; certainly if we find any thing at all to be, we may safely conclude that He is much more. For there is nothing besides Him of which one can give a reason why it is, unless we suppose him to be the Author of it. Wherefore though God be neither Visible nor Tangible, yet his very Idea representing to our Intellectuall Faculties the necessary reason of his Existence, we are by Axiome 5. (though we had no other Argument drawn from our Senses) confidently to conclude That He is.

2. The second ground is the ordinary Phaenomena of Nature, the most generall whereof is Motion. Now it seems to me demonstrable from hence, that there is some Being in the world distinct from Matter. For Matter being of one simple homogeneal nature, & not distinguishable by specificall differences, as the Schools speak, it must have every where the very same Essentiall properties; and therefore of it self it must all of it be either without motion, or else be self-moving, and that in such or such a tenor, or measure of Motion; there being no reason imaginable, why one part of the Matter should move of it self lesse then another; and therefore if there be any such thing, it can onely arise from externall impediment.

3. Now I say, if Matter be utterly devoid of Motion in it self, it is plain it has it's motion from some other Substance, which is necessarily a Substance that is not Matter, that is to say, a Substance Incorporeall. But if it be moved of it self, in such or such a measure, the effect here being an Emanative effect, cannot possibly fail to be whereever Matter is, by Axiome 17. especially if there be no externall impediment: And there is no impediment at all, but that the terrestriall parts might regain an activity very nigh equall to the aethereall, or rather never have lost it. For if the Planets had but a common Dividend of all the motion which themselves and the Sun and Stars, and all the AEthereall matter possess, (the matter of the Planets being so little in comparison of that of the Sun, Stars and AEther) the proportion of motion that will fall due to them would be exceeding much above what they have. For it would be as if four or five poor men in a very rich and populous city should, by giving up that estate they have, in a levelling way, get equall share with all the rest. Wherefore every Planet could not faile of melting it self into little less finer Substance then the purest AEther. But they not doing so, it is a signe they have not that Motion nor Agitation of themselves, and therefore rest content with what has extrinsecally accrued to them, be it less or more.

4. But the pugnacious, to evade the stroke of our Dilemma, will make any bold shift, and though they affront their own faculties in saying so, yet they will say, and must say, That part of the Matter is self-moving, part without motion of it self.

5. But to this I answer, That first this evasion of theirs is not so agreeable to experience; but, so far as either our Sense or Reason can reach, there is the same Matter every where. For consider the subtilest parts of Matter discoverable here below, those which for their Subtilty are invisible, and for their Activity wonderfull, I mean those particles that cause that vehement agitation we fell in Windes: They in time loose their motion, become of a visible vaporous consistency, and turn to Clouds, then to Snow or Rain, after haply to Ice it self; but then in process of time, first melted into Water, then exhaled into Vapours, after more fiercely agitated, do become Wind again. And that we may not think that this Reciprocation into Motion and Rest belongs onely to Terrestriall particles; that the Heavens themselves be of the same Matter, is apparent from the Ejections of Comets into our Vortex, and the perpetuall rising of those Spots and Scum upon the Face of the Sun.

6. But secondly, to return what is still more pungent. This Matter that is Self-moved, in the impressing of Motion upon other Matter, either looses of its own motion, or retains it still entire. If the first, it may be despoiled of all its motion: And so that whose immediate nature is to move, shall rest, the entire cause of its motion still remaining, viz. it self: which is a plain contradiction by Axiome 17. If the second, no meaner an inconvenience then this will follow, that the whole world had been turned into pure AEther by this time, if not into a perfect flame, or at least will be in the conclusion, to the utter destruction of all corporeall Consistencies. For, that these Self-moving parts of Matter are of a considerable copiousness, the event does testify, they having melted almost all the world already into Suns, Stars and AEther, nothing remaining but Planets and Comets to be dissolved: Which all put together scarce beare so great a proportion to the rest of the Matter of the Universe, as an ordinary apple to the ball of the Earth. Wherefore so potent a Principle of Motion still adding new motion to Matter, and no motion once communicated being lost, (for according to the laws of motion, no Body looses any more motion then it communicates to another) it plainly follows, that either the world had been utterly burnt up ere now, or will be at least in an infinite less time then it has existed, nay, I may say absolutely in a very little time, and will never return to any frame of things again, which though it possibly may be, yet none but a mad-man will assert, by Axiome 2. And that it has not yet been since the first Epoches of History, is a Demonstration this second Hypothesis is false.

7. There is yet another Evasion or two, which when they are answered there will be no scruple remaining touching this point. The first is, That the Matter is all of it homogeneall, of the like nature every where, and that it is the common property of it all to be of it self indifferent to Motion or Rest; and therefore, that it is no wonder that some of it moves and other some of it rests, or moves less then other some. To which I answer, That this Indifferency of the Matter to Motion or Rest may be understood two wayes: Either privatively, that is to say, That it has not any reall or active propension to Rest, more then to Motion, or vice versâ, but is meerly passive and susceptive of what Motion or Fixation some other Agent confers upon it, and keeps that modification exactly and perpetually till again some other Agent change it; (in which sense I allow the Assertion to be true, but it makes nothing against us, but for us, it plainly implying that there is an Incorporeal Substance distinct from the Matter, from whence the Matter both is and must be moved.) Or else, this Indifferency is to be understood positively, that is to say, That the Matter has a reall and active propension as well to Motion as to Rest, so that it moveth it self and fixeth it self from its own immediate nature: From whence there are but these two Absurdities that follow: the first, That two absolutely contrary properties are immediately seated in one simple Subject; then which nothing can seem more harsh and unhandsome to our Logicall faculties; unless the second, which is, That Motion and Rest being thus the emanative effects of this one simple Subject, the Matter will both move and rest at once; or, if they doe not understand by Rest, Fixation, but a meer absence of motion, That it will both move and not move at once. For what is immediate to any Subject, will not cease to be, the Subject not being destroyed, by Axiome 17. Nor will they much help themselves by fancying that Matter necessarily exerting both these immediate powers or properties at once of Motion and Rest, moves her self to such a measure and no swifter. For this position is but coincident with the second member of the Dilemma, Sect. 3. of this Chapter; and therefore the same Argument will serve for both places. The other Evasion is, by supposing part of the Matter to be Self-moving, and part of it Self-resting, in a positive sense, or Self-fixing: Which is particularly directed against what we have argued Sect. 6. But that this supposition is false is manifest from experience. For if there be any such Self-fixing parts of Matter, they are certainly in Gold and Lead and such like Metalls; but it is plain that they are not there. For what is Self-fixing, will immediately be reduced to Rest, so soon as externall violence is taken off, by Axiome 17. Whence it will follow that though these Self-fixing parts of Matter may be carried by other matter while they are made fast to it, yet left free they will suddainly rest, they having the immediate cause of Fixation in themselves. Nor can any one distrust that the change will be so suddain, if he consider how suddainly an externall force puts Matter upon motion. But a Bullet of gold or lead put thus upon motion, swift or slow, does not suddainly reduce it self to rest. Whence it plainly appears that this last Evasion contradicts Experience, and therefore has no force against our former Arguments.

8. Wherefore it is most rationall to conclude, That Matter of its own Nature has no active Principle of Motion, though it be receptive thereof, but that when God created it, he superadded an impress of Motion upon it, such a measure and proportion to all of it, which remains still much-what the same for quantity in the whole, though the parts of Matter in their various occursion of one to another have not alwayes the same proportion of it. Nor is there any more necessity that God should reiterate this impress of Motion on the Matter created, then that he should perpetually create the Matter. Neither does his conservation of this quantity of Motion any thing more imply either a repetition or an augmentation of it, then the conservation of the Matter does the superaddition of new Matter thereunto. Indeed he need but conserve the Matter, and the Matter thus conserved will faithfully retain, one part with another, the whole summe of Motion first communicated to it, some small moments excepted, which are not worth the mentioning in this place.

CHAP. XII.

1. That the Order and Nature of things in the Universe argue an Essence Spirituall or Incorporeall. 2. The Evasion of this Argument. 3. A preparation out of Mr. Hobbs to answer the Evasion. 4. The first Answer. 5. The second Answer. 6. Mr. Hobbs his mistake, of making the Ignorance of Second Causes the onely Seed of Religion.

1. WE have discovered out of the simple Phaenomenon of Motion, the necessity of the Existence of some Incorporeall Essence distinct from the Matter: But there is a further assurance of this Truth, from the consideration of the Order and admirable Effect of this Motion in the world. Suppose Matter could move it self, would meere Matter, with Self-motion, amount to that admirable wise contrivance of things which we see in the world? Can a blind impetus produce such effects, with that accuracy and constancy, that, the more wise a man is, the more he will be assured That no Wisdome can adde, take away, or alter any thing in the workes of Nature, whereby they may be bettered? How can that therefore that has not so much as Sense, arise to the effects of the highest pitch of Reason or Intellect? But of this I have spoke so fully and convincingly in the second Book of my Antidote, that it will be but a needless repetition to proceed any further on this Subject.

2. All the evasion that I can imagine our Adversaries may use here, will be this: That Matter is capable of Sense, and the finest and most subtil of the most refined Sense, and consequently of Imagination too, yea haply of Reason and Understanding. For Sense being nothing else, as some conceit, but Motion, or rather Reaction of a Body pressed upon by another Body, it will follow that all the Matter in the world has in some manner or other the power of Sensation.

3. Let us see now what this Position will amount to: Those that make Motion and Sensation thus really the same, they must of necessity acknowledg that no longer Motion no longer Sensation, as Mr. Hobbs has ingenuously confessed Physic. Chap. 25. And that every Motion or Reaction must be a new Sensation, as well as every ceasing of Reaction a ceasing of Sensation.

4. Now let us give these busie active particles of the Matter that play up and down every where the advantage of Sense, and let us see if all their heads laid together can contrive the Anatomicall fabrick of any Creature that lives. Assuredly when all is summ'd up that can be imagined, they will fall short of their account. For I demand, has every one of these particles that must have an hand in the framing of the Body of an Animal, the whole design of the work by the impress of some Phantasme upon it, or, as they have severall offices, so have they severall parts of the design? If the first, it being most certain, even according to their opinion whom we oppose, that there can be no knowledg nor perception in the Matter, but what arises out of the Reaction of one part against another, how is it conceivable that any one particle of Matter or many together (there not existing yet in Nature any Animal) can have the Idea impressed of that Creature they are to frame? Or if one or some few particles have the sense of one part of the Animal (they seeming more capable of this, the parts being far more simple then the whole Compages and contrivement) and other some few of other parts; how can they confer notes? by what language or speech can they communicate their counsell one to another? Wherefore that they should mutually serve one another in such a design, is more impossible, then that so many men blind and dumb from their nativity should joyn their forces and wits together to build a Castle, or carve a Statue of such a Creature as none of them knew any more of in several, then some one of the smallest parts thereof, but not the relation it bore to the whole.

5. Besides this, Sense being really the same with Corporeal Motion, it must change upon new impresses of Motion, so that if a particle by Sense were carried in this line, it meeting with a counterbuffe in the way, must have quite another Impress and Sense, and so forget what it was going about, and divert its course another way. Nay though it scaped free, Sense being Reaction, when that which it beares against is removed, Sense must needs cease, and perfect Oblivion succeed. For it is not with these particles as with the Spring of a Watch, or a bent Crosbow, that they should for a considerable time retain the same Reaction, and so consequently the same Sense. And lastly, if they could, it is still nothing to the purpose; for let their Sense be what it will, their motion is necessary, it being meerly corporeall, and therefore the result of their motion cannot be from any kind of knowledg. For the corporeall motion is first, and is onely felt, not directed by feeling. And therefore whether the Matter have any Sense or no, what is made out of it is nothing but what results from the wild jumblings and knockings of one part thereof against another, without any purpose, counsell or direction. Wherefore the ordinary Phaenomena of Nature being guided according to the most▪ Exquisite Wisdome imaginable, it is plain that they are not the effects of the meer motion of Matter, but of some Immateriall Principle, by Axiome 10.

6. And therefore the Ignorance of Second Causes is not so rightly said to be the Seed of Religion, (as Mr. Hobbs would have it) as of Irreligion and Atheisme. For if we did more punctually and particularly search into their natures, we should clearly discern their insufficiency for such effects as we discover to be in the world. But when we have looked so closely and carefully into the nature of Corporeall Beings, and can finde no Causality in them proportionable to these Effects we speak of, still to implead our selves rather of Ignorance, then the Matter and Corporeall motion of Insufficiency, is to hold an opinion upon humour, and to transgress against our first and second Axiomes.

CHAP. XIII.

1. The last proof of Incorporeall Substances from Apparitions. 2. The first Evasion of the force of such Arguings. 3. An answer to that Evasion. 4. The second Evasion. 5. The first kind of the second Evasion. 6. A description out of Virgil of that Genius that suggests the dictates of the Epicurean Philosophy. 7. The more full and refined sense of that Philosophy now a dayes. 8. The great efficacy of the Stars (which they suppose to consist of nothing but Motion and Matter) for production of all manner of Creatures in the world.

1. THE Third and last ground which I would make use of, for evincing the Existence of Incorporeall Substances, is such extraordinary effects as we cannot well imagine any naturall, but must needs conceive some free or spontaneous Agent to be the Cause thereof, when as yet it is clear that they are from neither Man nor Beast. Such are speakings, knockings, opening of doores when they were fast shut, sudden lights in the midst of a room floating in the aire, and then passing and vanishing; nay, shapes of Men and severall sorts of Brutes, that after speech and converse have suddainly disappeared. These and many such like extraordinary effects (which, if you please, you may call by one generall terme of Apparitions) seem to me to be an undeniable Argument, that there be such things as Spirits or Incorporeall Substances in the world; and I have demonstrated the sequel to be necessary in the last Chapter of the Appendix to my Treatise against Atheisme; and in the third Book of that Treatise have produced so many and so unexceptionable storyes concerning Apparitions, that I hold it superfluous to adde any thing here of that kind, taking far more pleasure in exercising of my Reason then in registring of History. Besides that I have made so carefull choice there already, that I cannot hope to cull out any that may prove more pertinent or convictive; I having pen'd down none but such as I had compared with those severe lawes I set my self in the first Chapter of that third Book, to prevent all tergiversations and evasions of gain-sayers.

2. But, partly out of my own observation, and partly by information from others, I am well assured there are but two wayes whereby they escape the force of such evident narrations. The first is a firm perswasion that the very notion of a Spirit or Immateriall Substance is an Impossibility or Contradiction in the very termes. And therefore such stories implying that which they are confident is impossible, the Narration at the very first hearing must needs be judged to be false, and therefore they think it more reasonable to conclude all those that profess they have seen such or such things to be mad-men or cheats, then to give credit to what implyes a Contradiction.

3. But this Evasion I have quite taken away, by so clearly demonstrating that the notion of a Spirit implies no more contradiction then the notion of Matter; and that its Attributes are as conceivable as the Attributes of Matter: so that I hope this creep-hole is stopt for ever.

4. The second Evasion is not properly an evasion of the truth of these stories concerning Apparitions, but of our deduction therefrom. For they willingly admit of these Apparitions and Prodigies recorded in History, but they deny that they are any Arguments of a truly Spirituall and Incorporeall Substance distinct from the Matter thus changed into this or that shape, that can walk and speak, &c. but that they are speciall effects of the influence of the Heavenly Bodyes upon this region of Generation and Corruption.

5. And these that answer thus are of two sorts. The one have great Affinity with Aristotle and Avenroes, who look not upon the Heavenly Bodies as meer Corporeall Substances, but as actuated with Intelligencies, which are Essences separate and Immateriall. But this Supposition hurts not us at all in our present design; they granting that which I am arguing for, viz. a Substance Incorporeall. The use of this perverse Hypothesis is only to shuffle off all Arguments that are drawn from Apparitions, to prove that the Souls of men subsist after death, or that there are any such things as Daemons or Genii of a nature permanent and immortall. But I look upon this Supposition as confutable enough, were it worth the while to encounter it. That of the Sadduces is far more firm, they supposing their 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 to be nothing else but the efficacy of the presence of God altering Matter into this or the other Apparition, or Manifestation; as if there were but one Soule in all things, and God were that Soule variously working in the Matter. But this I have already confuted in my Philosophicall Poems.

6. The other Influenciaries hold the same power of the Heavens as these; though they do not suppose so high a Principle in them, yet they think it sufficient for the salving of all Sublunary Phaenomena, as well ordinary as extraordinary. Truly it is a very venerable Secret, and not to be uttered or communicated but by some old Silenus lying in his obscure Grot or Cave, nor that neither but upon due circumstances, and in a right humour, when one may find him with his veins swell'd out with wine, and his Garland faln off from his head through his heedless drousiness: then if some young Chromis and Mnasylus, especially assisted by a fair and forward AEgle, that by way of a love-srollick will leave the tracts of her fingers in the blood of Mulberies on the temples and forehead of this aged Satyre, while he sleeps dogsleep, and will not seem to see for fear he forfeit the pleasure of his feeling; then, I say, if these young lads importune him enough, he will again sing that old song of the Epicurean Philosophy, in an higher strain then ever, which I profess I should abhor to recite, were it not to confute; it is so monstrous and impious. But because no sore can be cured that is concealed, I must bring this Hypothesis into view also, which the Poet has briefly comprised in this summary. Nam que canebat, uti magnum per inane coacta Semina terrarum que animae que maris que fuissent, Et liquidi simul ignis; ut his exordia primis Omnia, & ipse tener mundi concreverit orbis.

7. The fuller and more refined sense whereof now a daies is this; That Matter and Motion are the Principles of all things whatsoever; and that by Motion some Atomes or particles are more subtil then others, and of more nimbleness and activity. That motion of one Body against another does every where necessarily produce Sense, Sense being nothing else but the Reaction of parts of the Matter. That the subtiler the Matter is, the Sense is more subtil. That the subtilest Matter of all is that which constitutes the Sun and Stars, from whence they must needs have the purest and subtilest Sense. That what has the most perfect Sense, has the most perfect Imagination and Memory, because Memory and Imagination are but the same with Sense in reality, the latter being but certain Modes of the former. That what has the perfectest Imagination, has the highest Reason and Providence; Providence and Reason being nothing else but an exacter train of Phantasmes, Sensations or Imaginations. Wherefore the Sun and the Stars are the most Intellectuall Beings in the world, and in them is that Knowledg Counsell, and Wisdome by which all Sublunary things are framed and governed.

8. These by their severall impresses and impregnations have filled the whole Earth with vital Motion, raising innumerable sorts of Flowers, Herbs and Trees out of the ground. These have also generated the severall Kindes of living Creatures. These have filled the Seas with Fishes, the Fields with Beasts, and the Aire with Fowles; the Terrestriall matter being as easily formed into the living shapes of these severall Animals by the powerfull impress of the Imagination of the Sun and Stars, as the Embryo in the womb is marked by the strong fancy of his Mother that bears him. And therefore these Celestiall powers being able to frame living shapes of earthly matter by the impress of their Imagination, it will be more easy for them to change the vaporous Aire into like transfigurations. So that admitting all these Stories of Apparitions to be true that are recorded in Writers, it is no Argument of the Existence of any Incorporeall Principle in the world. For the piercing Fore-sight of these glorious Bodies, the Sun and Stars, is able to raise what Apparitions or Prodigies they please, to usher in the Births or fore-signify the Deaths of the most considerable persons that appear in the world; of which Pomponatius himself does acknowledg that there are many true examples both in Greek and Latine History. This is the deepest Secret that old Silenus could ever sing to ensnare the ears of deceivable Youth. And it is indeed 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , in the very worst sense, Horrendum mysterium, a very dreadfull and dangerous Mystery, saving that there is no small hope that it may not prove true. Let us therefore now examine it.

CHAP. XIV.

1. That the Splendor of the Celestiall Bodies proves no Fore-sight nor Soveraignty that they have over us. 2. That the Stars can have no knowledg of us, Mathematically demonstrated. 3. The same Conclusion again demonstrated more familiarly. 4. That the Stars cannot communicate Thoughts, neither with the Sun nor with one another. 5. That the Sun has no knowledg of our affairs. 6. Principles laid down for the inferring that Conclusion. 7. A demonstration that he cannot see us. 8. That he can have no other kind of knowledg of us, nor of the frame of any Animall on Earth. 9. That though the Sun had the knowledg of the right frame of an Animal, he could not transmit it into Terrestriall matter. 10. An Answer to that Instance of the Signature of the Foetus. 11. 12. Further Answers thereto. 13. A short Increpation of the confident Exploders of Incorporeall Substance out of the world.

1. THat the Light is a very glorious thing, and the lustre of the Stars very lovely to look upon, and that the Body of the Sun is so full of splendour and Majesty, that without flattery we may profess our selves constrained to look aside, as not being able to bear the brightness of his aspect; all this must be acknowledged for Truth: but that these are as so many Eyes of Heaven to watch over the Earth, so many kinde and carefull Spectators and intermedlers also in humane affairs, as that phansifull Chymist Paracelsus conceits, who writeth that not onely Princes and Nobles, or men of great and singular worth, but even almost every one, near his death has some prognostick sign or other (as knockings in the house, the dances of dead men, and the like) from these compassionate Foreseers of his approaching Fate; this I must confess I am not so paganly Superstitious as to believe one syllable of, but think it may be demonstrated to be a meer fancy, especially upon this present Hypothesis, That the Sun and Stars have no immateriall Being residing in them, but are meer Matter consisting of the subtilest Particles and most vehemently agitated. For then we cannot but be assured that there is nothing in them more Divine then what is seen in other things that shine in the dark, suppose rotten wood, glo-worms, or the flame of a rush-candle.

2. This at least we will demonstrate, That let the Sun and Stars have what knowledg they will of other things, they have just none at all of us, nor of our affairs; which will quite take away this last Evasion. That the Stars can have no knowledg of us is exceeding evident. For whenas the Magnus Orbis of the Earth is but as a Point compared with the distance thereof to a fixed Star, that is to say, when as that Angle which we may imagine to be drawn from a Star, and to be subtended by the Diameter of the Magnus Orbis, is to Sense no Angle at all, but as a meer Line; how little then is the Earth it self? and how utterly invisible to any Star, when as her Diameter is above 1100. times less then that of her Magnus Orbis? From whence it is clear that it is perfectly impossible that the Stars, though they were endued with sight, could so much as see the Earth it self, (much less the inhabitants thereof) to be Spectators and Intermedlers in their affaires for good or evil; and there being no higher Principle to inspire them with the knowledg of these things, it is evident that they remain utterly ignorant of them.

3. Or if this Demonstration (though undeniably true in it self) be not so intelligible to every one, we may adde what is more easy and familiar, viz. That the Stars being lucid Bodies, and those of the first magnitude near an hundred times bigger then the Earth, and yet appearing so small things to us, hence any one may collect, that the opake Earth will either be quite invisible to the Stars, or else at least appear so little, that it will be impossible that they should see any distinct Countries, much less Cities, Houses, or Inhabitants.

4. Wherefore we have plainly swept away this numerous Company of the celestiall Senators from having any thing to doe to consult about, or any way to oversee the affairs of Mankind; and therefore let them seem to wink and twinkle as cogitabundly as they will, we may rest in assurance that they have no plot concerning us, either for good or evill, as having no knowledg of us. Nor if they had, could they communicate their thoughts to that great deemed Soveraign of the world, the Sun; they being ever as invisible to him, as they are to us in the day time. For it is nothing but his light that hinders us from seeing so feeble Objects, and this hindrance consisteth in nothing else but this, That that motion which by his Rayes is caused in the Organ is so fierce and violent, that the gentle vibration of the light of the Stars cannot master it, nor indeed bear any considerable proportion to it: What then can it do in reference to the very Body of the Sun himself, the matter whereof has the most furious motion of any thing in the world?

5. There is nothing now therefore left, but the Sun alone, that can possibly be conceived to have any knowledg of, or any superintendency over our terrestriall affairs. And how uncapable he is also of this office, I hold it no difficult thing to demonstrate. Whence it will plainly appear, that those Apparitions that are seen, whether in the Aire or on Earth (which are rightly looked upon as an Argument of Providence and Existence of some Incorporeall Essence in the world) cannot be attributed to the power and prevision of the Sun, supposing him purely corporeall.

6. For it is a thing agreed upon by all sides, That meer Matter has no connate Ideas in it of such things as we see in the world; but that upon Reaction of one part moved by another arises a kind of Sense, or Perception. Which opinion as it is most rationall in it self to conceive (supposing Matter has any sense in it at all) so it is most consonant to experience, we seeing plainly that Sense is ever caused by some outward corporeall motion upon our Organs, which are also corporeall. For that Light is from a corporeal motion, is plain from the reflexion of the rayes there of, and no Sound is heard but from the motion of the Aire or some other intermediate Body; no Voice but there is first a moving of the tongue; no Musick but there must either be the blowing of wind, or the striking upon strings, or something Analogicall to these, and so in the other Senses. Wherefore if there be nothing but Body in the world, it is evident that Sense arises meerly from the motion of one part of Matter against another, and that Motion is ever first, and perception followes, and that therefore perception must necessarily follow the laws of Motion, and that no Percipient can have any thing more to conceive then what is conveighed by corporeall motion. Now from these Principles it will be easy to prove that, though we should acknowledg a power of perception in the Sun, yet it will not amount to any ability of his being either a Spectator, or Governor of our affairs here on Earth.

7. According to the Computation o • Astronomers, even of those that speak more modestly, the Sun is bigger then the Earth above an hundred and fifty times. But how little he appears to us every eye is able to judge. How little then must the Earth appear to him? If he see her at all, he will be so far from being able to take notice of any Persons or Families, that he cannot have any distinct discerning of Streets, nor Cities, no not of Fields, nor Countries; but whole Regions, though of very great Extent, will vanish here, as Alcibiades his Patrimony, in that Map of the world Socrates shewed him, to repress the pride of the young Heire. The Earth must appear considerably less to him then the Moon does to us, because the Sun appears to us less then the Moon. It were easy to demonstrate that her discus would appear to the Sun near thirty, nay sixty times less then the Moon does to us, according to Lansbergius his computation. Now consider how little we can discern in that broader Object of sight, the Moon, when she is the nighest, notwithstanding we be placed in the dark, under the shadow of the Earth, whereby our sight is more passive and impressible. How little then must the fiery eye of that Cyclops the Sun, which is all Flame and Light, discern in this lesser Object the Earth, his vigour and motion being so vehemently strong and unyielding? What effect it will have upon him, we may in some sort judge by our selves; For though our Organ be but moved or agitated with the reflection of his Rayes, we hardly see the Moon when she is above the Horizon by day: What impress then can our Earth, a less Object to him then the Moon is to us, make upon the Sun, whose Body is so furiously hot, that he is as boyling Fire, if a man may so speak, and the Spots about him are, as it were, the scum of this fuming Cauldron? Besides that our Atmosphere is so thick a covering over us at that distance, that there can be the appearance of nothing but a white mist enveloping all and shining like a bright cloud; in which the rayes of the Sun will be so lost, that they can never return any distinct representation of things unto him. Wherefore it is as evident to Reason that he cannot see us, as it is to Sense that we see him; and therefore he can be no Overseer nor Intermedler in our actions.

8. But perhaps you will reply That though the Sun cannot see the Earth, yet he may have a Sense and perception in himself (for he is a fine glittering thing, and some strange matter must be presumed of him) that may amount to a wonderfull large sphere of Understanding, Fore-knowledg, and Power. But this is a meer fancyfull surmise, and such as cannot be made good by any of our Faculties: Nay the quite contrary is demonstrable by such Principles as are already agreed upon. For there are no connate Ideas in the Matter, and therefore out of the collision and agitation of these Solar particles, we cannot rationally expect any other effect in the Sun, then such as we experiment in the percussion of our own eyes, out of which ordinarily followes the sense of a confused light or flame. If the Sun therefore has any sense of himself, it must be only the perception of a very vigorous Light or Fire, which being still one and the same representation, it is a question whether he has a sense of it or no, any more then we have of our bones, which we perceive not, by reason of our accustomary and uninterrupted sense of them, as Mr. Hobbs ingeniously conjectures in a like supposition. But if you will say that there is a perception of the jogging or justling, or of what ever touch or rubbing of one Solar particle against another, the body of the Sun being so exceeding liquid, and consequently the particles thereof never resting, but playing and moving this way and that way; they hitting and fridging so fortuitously one against another, the perceptions that arise from hence must be so various and fortuitous, so quick and short, so inconsistent, flitting and unpermanent, that if any man were in such a condition as the Sun necessarily is, according to this Hypothesis, he would both be, and appear to all the world to be, stark mad; he would be so off and on, and so unsetled, and doe, and think, and speak all things with such ungovernable rashness and temerity. In brief, that the Sun by this tumultuous agitation of his fiery Atoms, should hit upon any rationall contrivance or right Idea of any of these living Creatures we see here on Earth, is utterly as hard to conceive, as that the Terrestriall particles themselves should justle together into such contrivances and formes, which is that which I have already sufficiently confuted.

9. And if the Sun could light on any such true frame or forme of any Animall, or the due rudiments or contrivance thereof, it is yet unconceivable how he should conveigh it into this Region of Generation here on Earth, partly by reason of the Earths Distance and Invisibleness, and partly because the deepest Principle of all being but meer Motion, without any superior power to govern it, this imagination of the Sun working on the Earth can be but a simple Rectilinear impress, which can never arise to such an inward solid organization of parts in living Creatures, nor hold together these Spectres or Apparitions in the Aire, in any more certain form then the smoak of chymnies, or the fume of Tobacco.

10. Nor is that instance of the power of the Mothers fancy on the Foetus in the womb, any more then a meer flourish; for the disparity is so great, that the Argument proves just nothing: For whereas the Mother has an Explicite Idea of the Foetus and every part thereof, the Sun and Stars have no distinct Idea at all of the parts of the Earth; nay I dare say that what we have already intimated will amount to a Demonstration, That though they had Sense, yet they do not so much as know whether this Earth we live on be in rerum Naturá or no.

11. Again, the mark that is impressed on the Foetus, the Mother has a clear and vivid conception of; but the curious contrivance in the Idea of Animals, I have shewn how incompetible it is to the fortuitous justling of the fiery particles of either Sun or Stars.

12. Thirdly, the impress on the Foetus is very simple and slight, and seldome so curious as the ordinary impresses of Seals upon Wax, which are but the modifications of the surface thereof; but this supposed impress of the Imagination of the Sun and Stars is more then a solid Statue, or the most curious Automaton that ever was invented by the wit of man; and therefore impossible to proceed from a meer Rectilinear impress upon the AEther down to the Earth from the Imagination of the Sun, no not if he were supposed to be actuated with an Intelligent Soule, if the Earth and all the space betwixt her and him were devoid thereof. Nor do I conceive, though it be an infinitely more slight business, that the direction of the Signature of the Foetus upon such a part were to be performed by the Fancy of the Mother, notwithstanding the advantage of the organization of her body, were not both her self and the Foetus animated Creatures.

13. Wherefore we have demonstrated beyond all Evasion, from the Phaenomena of the Universe, That of necessity there must be such a thing in the world as Incorporeall Substance; let inconsiderable Philosophasters hoot at it, and deride it as much as their Follies please.

CHAP. I.

1. An addition of more Axiomes for the demonstrating that there is a Spirit or Immateriall Substance in Man. 2. The Truth of the first of these Axiomes confirmed from the testimony of Mr. Hobbs. 3. The proof of the second Axiome. 4. The proof of the third. 5. The confirmation of the fourth from the testimony of Mr. Hobbs, as also from Reason. 6. An explication and proof of the fifth. 7. A further proof thereof. 8. A third Argument of the Truth thereof. 9. An Answer to an Evasion. 10. Another Evasion answered. 11. A further Answer thereto. 12. A third Answer. 13. A fourth Answer, wherein is mainly contained a confirmation of the first Answer to the second Evasion. 14. The plainness of the sixth Axiome. 15. The proof of the seventh.

1. HAving cleared the way thus far as to prove that there is no Contradiction nor Inconsistency in the notion of a Spirit, but that it may Exist in Nature, nay that de facto there are Incorporeall Substances really Existent in the world, we shall now drive more home to our main design, and demonstrate That there is such an Immateriall Substance in Man, which, from the power it is conceived to have in actuating and guiding the Body, is usually called the Soule. This Truth we shall make good first in a more generall way, but not a whit the lesse stringent, by evincing That such Faculties or Operations as we are conscious of in our selves, are utterly incompetible to Matter considered at large without any particular organization. And then afterwards we shall more punctually consider the Body of man, and every possible fitness in the structure thereof, that is worth taking notice of for the performance of these Operations we ordinarily find in our selves. And that this may be done more plainly and convincingly▪ we will here adde to the number of our Axiomes these that follow.

CHAP. II.

1. That if Matter be capable of Sense, Inanimate things are so too: And of Mr. Hobbs his wavering in that point. 2. An Enumeration of severall Faculties in us that Matter is utterly uncapable of. 3. That Matter in no kind of Temperature is capable of Sense. 4. That no one point of Matter can be the Common Sensorium. 5. Nor a multitude of such Points receiving singly the entire image of the Object. 6. Nor yet receiving part part, and the whole the whole. 7. That Memory is incompetible to Matter. 8. That the Matter is uncapable of the notes of some circumstances of the Object which we remembred. 9. That Matter cannot be the seat of second Notions. 10. Mr. Hobbs his Evasion of the foregoing Demonstration clearly confuted. 11. That the freedome of our Will evinces that there is a Substance in us distinct from Matter. 12. That Mr. Hobbs therefore acknowledges all our actions necessary.

1. WE have now made our addition of such Axiomes as are most usefull for our present purpose. Let us therefore, according to the order we propounded, before we consider the fabrick and organization of the Body, see if such Operations as we find in our selves be competible to Matter looked upon in a more generall manner. That Matter from its own nature is uncapable of Sense, plainly appears from Axiome 20. & 21. For Motion and Sense being really one and the same thing, it will necessarily follow, that where ever there is Motion, especially any considerable duration thereof, there must be Sense and Perception: Which is contrary to what we find in a Catochus, and experience daily in dead Carkasses; in both which, though there be Reaction, yet there is no Sense. In brief, if any Matter have Sense, it will follow that upon Reaction all shall have the like, and that a Bell while it is ringing, and a Bow while it is bent, and every Jack-in-a-box that Schoolboyes play with, while it is held in by the cover pressing against it, shall be living Animals, or Sensitive Creatures. A thing so foolish and frivolous, that the meer recitall of the opinion may well be thought confutation enough with the sober. And indeed Mr. Hobbs himself, though he resolve Sense meerly into Reaction of Matter, yet is ashamed of these odd consequences thereof, and is very loth to be reckoned in the company of those Philosophers, (though, as he sayes, learned men) who have maintained that all Bodies are endued with Sense, and yet he can hardly abstain from saying that they are; onely he is more shie of allowing them Memory, which yet they will have whether he will or no, if he give them Sense. As for Example, in the ringing of a Bell, from every stroak there continues a tremor in the Bell, which decaying, must according to his Philosophie be Imagination, and referring to the stroak past must be Memory; and if a stroak overtake it within the compass of this Memory, what hinders but Discrimination or Judgment may follow? But the conclusion is consonant enough to this absurd Principle, That there is nothing but Matter in the Universe, and that it is capable of perception. See Mr. Hobbs his Elements of Philos. Chap. 25.

2. But we will not content our selves onely with the discovery of this one ugly inconvenience of this bold Assertion, but shall further endeavour to shew that the Hypothesis is false, and that Matter is utterly uncapable of such operations as we find in our selves, and that therefore there is something in us Immateriall or Incorporeall. For we finde in our selves, that one and the same thing both heares, and sees, and tasts, and, to be short, perceives all the variety of Objects that Nature manifests unto us. Wherefore Sense being nothing but the impress of corporeall motion from Objects without, that part of Matter which must be the common Sensorium, must of necessity receive all that diversity of impulsions from Objects; it must likewise Imagine, Remember, Reason, and be the fountain of spontaneous Motion, as also the Seat of what the Greeks call the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or liberty of Will: Which supposition we shall finde involved in unextricable difficulties.

3. For first, we cannot conceive of any Portion of Matter but it is either Hard or Soft. As for that which is Hard, all men leave it out as utterly unlike to be endued with such Cognitive faculties as we are conscious to our selves of. That which is Soft will prove either opake, pellucid, or lucid. If opake, it cannot see, the exterior superficies being a bar to the inward parts. If pellucid, as Aire and Water, then indeed it will admit inwardly these Particles and that Motion which are the conveighers of the Sense, and distinction of Colours; and Sound also will penetrate. But this Matter being heterogeneall, that is to say consisting of parts of a different nature and office, the Aire, suppose, being proper for Sound, and those Round particles which Cartesius describes for Colour and Light; the perception of these Objects will be differently lodged; but there is some one thing in us that perceives both. Lastly, if lucid, there would be much-what the same inconvenience that there is in the opake, for its own fieriness would fend off the gentle touch of externall impresses; or if it be so milde and thin that it is in some measure diaphanous, the inconveniences will again recurre that were found in the pellucid. And in brief, any liquid Matter has such variety of particles in it, that if the Whole, as it must, (being the common Sensorium) be affected with any impress from without, the parts thereof must be variously affected, so that no Object will seem homogeneall, as appeares from Axiome 22. Which Truth I shall further illustrate by a homely but very significant representation. Suppose we should put Feathers, Bullets and Spur-rowels in a Box, where they shall lye intermixedly, but close, one with another: upon any jog this Box receives, supposing all the stuffage thereof has Sense, it is evident that the severall things therein must be differently affected, and therefore if the common Sensorium were such, there would seem no homogeneall Object in the world. Or at least these severall particles shall be the severall Receptives of the severall motions of the same kinde from without, as the Aire of Sounds, the Cartesian Globuli of Light and Colours. But what receives all these, and so can judge of them all, we are again at a loss for, as before: unless we imagine it some very fine and subtill Matter, so light and thinne, that it feels not it self, but so yielding and passive, that it easily feels the several assaults and impresses of other Bodies upon it, or in it; which yet would imply, that this Matter alone were Sensitive, and the others not; and so it would be granted, that not all Matter (no not so much as in Fluid Bodies) has Sense. Such a tempered Matter as this is analogous to the Animal Spirits in Man, which, if Matter could be the Soule, were the very Soule of the Body, and common percipient of all Motions from within or without, by reason of the tenuity, passivity and neare homogeneity and imperceptibility of any change or alteration from the playing together of its own tenuious and light particles; and therefore very fit to receive all manner of impresses from others. Whence we may rationally conclude, That some such subtile Matter as this, is either the Soule, or her immediate instrument for all manner of perceptions. The latter whereof I shall prove to be true in its due place. That the former part is false I shall now demonstrate, by proving more stringently, That no Matter whatsoever is capable of such Sense and Perception as we are conscious to our selves of.

4. For concerning that part of Matter which is the Common Sensorium, I demand whether some one point of it receive the whole image of the Object, or whether it is wholly received into every point of it, or finally whether the whole Sensorium receive the whole image by expanded parts, this part of the Sensorium this part of the image, and that part that. If the first, seeing That in us which perceives the externall Object moves also the Body, it will follow, That one little point of Matter will give locall motion to what is innumerable millions of times bigger then it self, of which there cannot be found nor imagined any example in Nature.

5. If the second, this difficulty presents it self, which also reflects upon the former Position, How so small a point as we speak of should receive the images of so vast, or so various Objects at once, without Obliteration or Confusion; a thing impossible, as is manifest from Axiome 24. And therefore not receiving them, cannot perceive them by Axiome 25. But if every point or particle of this Matter could receive the whole image, which of these innumerable particles, that receive the Image entirely, may be deemed I my self that perceive this Image? For if I be all those Points, it will come to pass, especially in a small Object, and very neare at hand, that the line of impulse coming to divers and distant Points, it will seem to come as from severall places, and so one Object will necessarily seem a Cluster of Objects. But if I be one of these Points, what becomes of the rest? or who are they?

6. There remains therefore onely the third way, which is that the parts of the image of the Object be received by the parts of this portion of Matter, which is supposed the common Sensorium. But this does perfectly contradict experience; for we finde our selves to perceive the whole Object, when in this case nothing could perceive the whole, every part onely perceiving its part; and therefore there would be nothing that can judge of the whole. No more then three men, if they were imagined to sing a song of three parts, and none of them should heare any part but his own, could judge of the Harmony of the whole.

7. As concerning the Seat of Imagination and Memory, especially Memory, what kinde of matter can be found fit for this function? If it be Fluid, the images of Objects will be prone to vanish suddainly, as also to be perverted or turned contrary wayes. For example C. a particle

of this fluid Matter receiving an impress from B. must feel it as coming from B: but it toying and tumbling up and down, as the particles of fluid Matter doe, turnes the side E. F. which received that impress from B. towards L. whence it will feel as if the impress had been from L. for it must feel it as from the place directly opposite to it self: and the same reason will be in other particles of this fluid Matter, which must needs force a great deal of preposterous confusion both upon the Fancy and Memory. If it be Hard, it will soon be composed to rest, as in a Bell whose tremor is gone in a little time; but we remember things some years together, though we never think of them till the end of that terme. If Viscid, there is the like inconvenience, nay it is the unfittest of all for either receiving of Motion, or continuing it, and therefore unlikely to be the Seat of either Fancy or Memory. For if Motion or Reaction and Sense, whether internall or externall, be all one, Motion ceasing Memory must needs cease, by Axiome 21. Nor can it any more remember when it is again moved in the same manner, then a Stone or a piece of Lead that was flung up into the Aire, can become more light or more prone to flie upwards when they have once ceased from Motion; for they are both exquisitely as if they had never been moved.

8. Lastly, we remember some things, of which there can be no Signatures in Matter to represent them, as for example, Wideness and Distance. For as for both of them, there is no note

can be made in the Matter E. by lines from the two Objects A. B. and C. D. whereby the difference of remoteness of A. E. above C. E. or of the wideness of A. B. above C. D. can be discerned; for both the Objects make one and the same signature in the matter E.

9. Those that are commonly called by the name of Secundae notiones, and are not any sensible Objects themselves, nor the Phantasmes of any sensible Objects, but onely our manner of conceiving them, o • reasoning about them, in which number are comprehended all Logicall and Mathematicall termes; these, I say, never came in at the Senses, they being no impresses of corporeall motion, which excite in us, as in Doggs and other Brutes, the sense onely of Sounds, of Colours, of Hot, of Cold, and the like. Now Matter being affected by no perception but of corporeall impression, by the bearing of one Body against another; it is plain from Axiome 23. that these second Notions, or Mathematicall and Logicall conceptions, cannot be seated in Matter, and therefore must be in some other Substance distinct from it, by Axiome 10.

10. Here Mr. Hobbs, to avoid the force of this Demonstration, has found out a marvelous witty invention to befool his followers withall, making them believe that there is no such thing as these Secundae Notiones, distinct from the Names or Words whereby they are said to be signified; and that there is no perception in us, but of such Phantasmes as are impressed from externall Objects, such as are common to Us and Beasts: and as for the Names which we give to these, or the Phantasmes of them, that there is the same reason of them, as of other Markes, Letters, or Characters, all which coming in at the Senses, he would beare them in hand that it is a plain case, that we have the perception of nothing but what is impressed from corporeall Objects. But how ridiculous an Evasion this is, may be easily discovered, if we consider, that if these Mathematicall and Logicall Notions we speak of be nothing but Names, Logicall and Mathematicall Truths will not be the same in all Nations, because they have not the same names. For Example, Similitudo and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and Proportio, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and Ratio, these names are utterly different, the Greek from the Latine; yet the Greeks, Latines, nor any Nation else, doe vary in their conceptions couched under these different names: Wherefore it is plain, that there is a setled Notion distinct from these Words and Names, as well as from those corporeall Phantasmes impressed from the Object; which was the thing to be demonstrated.

11. Lastly, we are conscious to our selves of that faculty which the Greekes call 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , or a Power in our selves, notwithstanding any outward assaults or importunate temptations, to cleave to that which is vertuous and honest, or to yield to pleasures, or other vile advantages. That we have this Liberty and freedome in our selves, and that we refuse the good, and chuse the evill, when we might have done otherwise; that naturall Sense of Remorse of Conscience is an evident and undeniable witness of. For when a man has done amiss, the paine, grief, or indignation that he raises in himself, or at least feels raised in him, is of another kind from what we finde from misfortunes or affronts we could not avoid. And that which pinches us and vexes us so severely, is the sense that we have brought such an evill upon our selves, when it was in our power to have avoided it. Now if there be no sense nor perception in us, but what arises from the Reaction of Matter one part against another; whatever Representation of things, whatever Deliberation or Determination we fall upon, it will by Axiome 26. be purely necessary, there being upon this Hypothesis no more Freedome while we deliberate or conclude, then there is in a paire of scales, which rests as necessarily at last as it moved before. Wherefore it is manifest that this faculty we call Free-will is not found in Matter, but in some other Substance, by Axiome 10.

12. Mr Hobbs therefore, to give him his due, consonantly enough to his own principles, does very peremptorily affirm that all our actions are necessary. But I having proved the contrary by that Faculty which we may call Internall Sense or Common Notion, found in all men that have not done violence to their own Nature; unless by some other approved Faculty he can discover the contrary, my Conclusion must stand for an undoubted Truth by Axiome 5. He pretends therefore some Demonstration of Reason, which he would oppose against the dictate of this Inward Sense; which it will not be amiss to examine, that we may discover his Sophistry.

CHAP. III.

1. Mr. Hobbs his Arguments whereby he would prove all our actions necessitated. His first Argument. 2. His second Argument. 3. His third Argument. 4. His fourth Argument. 5. What must be the meaning of these words, Nothing taketh beginning from it self, in the first Argument of Mr. Hobbs. 6. A fuller and more determinate explication of the foregoing words, whose sense is evidently convinced to be, That no Essence of it self can vary its modification. 7. That this is onely said by Mr. Hobbs, not proved, and a full confutation of his Assertion. 8. Mr. Hobbs imposed upon by his own Sophistry. 9. That one part of this first Argument of his is groundless, the other sophisticall. 10. The plain proposall of his Argument, whence appeares more fully the weakness and sophistry thereof. 11. An Answer to his second Argument. 12. An Answer to the third. 13. An Answer to a difficulty concerning the Truth and Falsehood of future Propositions. 14. An Answer to Mr. Hobbs his fourth Argument, which, though slighted by himself, is the strongest of them all. 15. The difficulty of reconciling Free-will with Divine Prescience and Prophecies. 16. That the faculty of Free-will is seldome put in use. 17. That the use of it is properly in Morall conflict. 18. That the Soule is not invincible there neither. 19. That Divine decrees either finde fit Instruments or make them. 20. That the more exact we make Divine Prescience, even to the comprehension of any thing that implies no contradiction in it self to be comprehended, the more cleare it is that mans Will may be sometimes free. 21. Which is sufficient to make good my last Argument against Mr. Hobbs.

1. HIS first Argument runs thus (I will repeat it in his own words, as also the rest of them as they are to be found in his Treatise of Liberty and Necessity) I conceive, (saith he) that nothing taketh beginning from it self, but from the action of some other immediate agent without it self; and that therefore, when first a man hath an appetite or Will to something, to which immediatly before he had no appetite nor Will, the cause of his Will is not the Will it self, but something else not in his own disposing: So that whereas it is out of controversy, that of voluntary actions the Will is the necessary cause, and by this which is said the Will is also caused by other things, whereof it disposeth not, it followeth, that voluntary actions have all of them necessary causes, and therefore are necessitated.

2. His second thus, I hold (saith he) that to be a sufficient cause, to which nothing is wanting that is needfull to the producing of the effect: The same also is a necessary cause. For if it be possible that a sufficient cause shall not bring forth the effect, then there wanteth somewhat which was needfull for the producing of it, and so the cause was not sufficient; but if it be impossible that a sufficient cause should not produce the effect, then is a sufficient cause a necessary cause, for that is said to produce an effect necessarily that cannot but produce it. Hence it is manifest, that whatsoever is produced, is produced necessarily. For whatsoever is produced, hath had a sufficient cause to produce it, or else it had not been. What followes is either the same, or so closely depending on this, that I need not adde it.

3. His third Argument therefore shall be that which he urges from Future disjunctions. For example, let the case be put of the Weather, 'Tis necessary that to morrow it shall rain, or not rain; If therefore, saith he, it be not necessary it shall rain, it is necessary it shall not rain, otherwise there is no necessity that the Proposition, It shall rain or not rain, should be true.

4. His fourth is this, That the denying of Necessity destroyeth both the Decrees and the Prescience of God Almighty. For whatsoever God hath purposed to bring to pass by man, as an Instrument, or foreseeth shall come to pass, a man, if he have liberty from necessitation, might frustrate, and make not to come to pass; and God should either not foreknow it, and not decree it, or he should foreknow such things shall be as shall never be, and decree that which shall never come to pass.

5. The Entrance into his first Argument is something obscure and ambiguous, Nothing taketh beginning from it self: But I shall be as candid and faithfull an Interpreter as I may. If he mean by beginning, beginning of Existence, it is undoubtedly true, That no Substance, nor Modification of Substance taketh beginning from it self; but this will not infer the Conclusion he drives at. But if he mean, that Nothing taketh beginning from it self, of being otherwise affected or modified then before; he must either understand by nothing, no Essence, neither Spirit nor Body, or no Modification of Essence. He cannot mean Spirit, as admitting no such thing in the whole comprehension of Nature. If Body, it will not infer what he aims at, unless there be nothing but Body in the Universe, which is a meer precarious Principle of his, which he beseeches his credulous followers to admit, but he proves it no where, as I have already noted. If by Modification he mean the Modification of Matter or Body, that runs still upon the former Principle, That there is nothing but Body in the world, and therefore he proves nothing but upon a begg'd Hypothesis, and that a false one; as I have elsewhere demonstrated. Wherefore the most favourable Interpretation I can make is, That he means by no thing, no Essence, nor Modification of Essence, being willing to hide that dearly-hug'd Hypothesis of his (That there is nothing but Body in the world) under so generall and uncertain termes.

6. The words therefore in the other senses having no pretence to conclude any thing, let us see how far they will prevail in this, taking no thing, for no Essence, or no Modification of Essence, or what will come nearer to the Matter in hand, no Faculty of an Essence. And from this two-fold meaning, let us examine two Propositions, that will result from thence, viz. That no Faculty of any Essence can vary its Operation from what it is, but from the action of some other immediate agent without it self; or, That no Essence can vary its Modification or Operation by it self, but by the action of some other immediate Agent without it. Of which two Propositions the latter seemes the better sense by far, and most naturall. For it is very harsh, and, if truly looked into, as false, to say, That the Mode or Faculty of any Essence changes it self, for it is the Essence it self that exerts it self into these variations of Modes, if no externall Agent is the cause of these changes. And Mr. Hobbs opposing an Externall Agent to this Thing that he saies does not change it self, does naturally imply, That they are both not Faculties but Substances he speakes of.

7. Wherefore there remains onely the latter Proposition to be examined, That no Essence of it self can vary its Modification. That some Essence must have had a power of moving is plain, in that there is Motion in the world, which must be the effect of some Substance or other. But that Motion in a large sense, taking it for mutation or change, may proceed from that very Essence in which it is found, seemes to me plain by Experience: For there is an Essence in us, whatever we will call it, which we find endued with this property; as appears from hence, that it has variety of perceptions, Mathematicall, Logicall, and I may adde also Morall, that are not any impresses nor footsteps of Corporeall Motion, as I have already demonstrated; and any man may observe in himself, and discover in the writings of others, how the Minde has passed from one of these perceptions to another, in very long deductions of Demonstration; as also what stilness from bodily Motion is required in the excogitation of such series of Reasons, where the Spirits are to run into no other posture nor motion then what they are guided into by the Mind it self, where these immateriall and intellectuall Notions have the leading and rule. Besides in grosser Phantasmes, which are supposed to be somewhere impressed in the Brain, the composition of them, and disclusion and various disposall of them, is plainly an arbitrarious act, and implies an Essence that can, as it lists, excite in it self the variety of such Phantasmes as have been first exhibited to her from Externall Objects, and change them and transpose them at her own will. But what need I reason against this ground of Mr. Hobbs so sollicitously? it being sufficient to discover, that he onely saies, that No Essence can change the Modifications of it self, but does not prove it; and therefore whatever he would infer hereupon is meerly upon a begg'd Principle.

8. But however, from this precarious ground he will infer, that whenever we have a Will to a thing, the cause of this Will is not the Will it self, but something else not in our own disposing; the meaning whereof must be, That whenever we Will, some corporeall impress, which we cannot avoid, forces us thereto. But the Illation is as weak as bold; it being built upon no foundation, as I have already shewn. I shall onely take notice how Mr. Hobbs, though he has rescued himself from the authority of the Schools, and would fain set up for himself, yet he has not freed himself from their fooleries in talking of Faculties and Operations (and the absurditie is alike in both) as separate and distinct from the Essence they belong to, wich causes a great deal of distraction and obscurity in the speculation of things. I speak this in reference to those expressions of his of the Will being the cause of willing, and of its being the necessary cause of voluntary actions, and of things not being in its disposing. Whenas, if a man would speak properly, and desired to be understood, he would say, That the Subject in which is this power or act of willing, (call it Man or the Soul of Man) is the cause of this or that voluntary action. But this would discover his Sophistry, wherewith haply he has entrapt himself, which is this, Something out of the power of the Will necessarily causes the Will; the Will once caused is the necessary cause of voluntary actions; and therefore all voluntary actions are necessitated.

9. Besides that the first part of this Argumentation is groundless (as I have already intimated) the second is sophisticall, that sayes That the Will is the necessary cause of voluntary actions: For by necessary may be understood either necessitated, forced and made to act, whether it will or no; or else it may signify that the Will is a requisite cause of voluntary actions, so that there can be no voluntary actions without it. The latter whereof may be in some sense true, but the former is utterly false. So the Conclusion being inferred from assertions whereof the one is groundless, the other Sophisticall, the Illation cannot but be ridiculously weak and despicable. But if he had spoke in the Concrete in stead of the Abstract, the Sophistry had been more grossly discoverable, or rather the train of his reasoning languid and contemptible. Omitting therefore to speak of the Will separately, which of it self is but a blind Power or Operation, let us speak of that Essence which is endued with Will, Sense, Reason, and other Faculties, and see what face this argumentation of his will bear, which will then run thus;

10. Some externall, irresistible Agent does ever necessarily cause that Essence (call it Soule or what you please) which is endued with the faculties of Will and Understanding, • o Will. This Essence, endued with the power of exerting it self into the act of Willing, is the necessary cause of Voluntary actions. Therefore all voluntary actions are necessitated. The first Assertion now at first sight appears a gross falshood, the Soule being endued with Understanding as well as Will, and therefore she is not necessarily determined to will by externall impresses, but by the displaying of certain notions and perceptions she raises in her self, that be purely intellectuall. And the second seems a very slim and lank piece of Sophistrie. Both which my reasons already alledged doe so easily and so plainly reach, that I need add nothing more, but pass to his second Argument, the form whereof in brief is this;

11. Every Cause is a sufficient cause, otherwise it could not produce its effect: Every sufficient cause is a necessary cause, that is to say, will be sure to produce the effect, otherwise something was wanting thereto, and it was no sufficient cause: And therefore every cause is a necessary cause, and consequently every Effect or Action, even those that are termed Voluntary, are necessitated. This reasoning looks smartly at first view, but if we come closer to it, we shall find it a pittifull piece of Sophistry, which is easily detected by observing the ambiguity of that Proposition, Every sufficient cause is a necessary cause: For the force lyes not so much in that it is said to be Sufficient, as in that it is said to be a Cause; which if it be, it must of necessity have an Effect, whether it be sufficient or insufficient; which discovers the Sophisme. For these relative terms of Cause and Effect necessarily imply one another. But every Being that is sufficient to act this or that if it will, and so to become the Cause thereof, doth neither act, nor abstain from acting necessarily. And therefore if it doe act, it addes Will to the Sufficiency of its power; and if it did not act, it is not because it had not sufficient power, but because it would not make use of it. So that we see that every sufficient Cause rightly understood without captiositie is not a necessary cause, nor will be sure to produce the Effect; and that though there be a sufficiency of power, yet there may be something wanting, to wit, the exertion of the Will; whereby it may come to pass, that what might have acted, if it would, did not: but if it did, Will being added to sufficient Power, that it cannot be said to be necessary in any other sense, then of that Axiome in Metaphysicks, Quicquid est, quamdiu est, necesse est esse: The reason whereof is, because it is impossible that a thing should be and not be at once. But before it acted, it might have chosen whether it would have acted or no; but it did determine it self. And in this sense is it to be said to be a free Agent, & not a necessary one. So that it is manifest, that though there be some prettie perversness of wit in the contriving of this Argument, yet there is no solidity at all at the bottome.

12. And as little is there in his third. But in this, I must confess, I cannot so much accuse him of Art and Sophistrie, as of ignorance of the rules of Logick; for he does plainly assert That the necessity of the truth of that Proposition there named depends on the necessity of the truth of the parts thereof; then which no grosser errour can be committed in the Art of reasoning. For he might as well say that the necessity of the truth of a Connex Axiome depends on the necessity of the truth of the parts, as of a Disjunct. But in a Connex, when both the parts are not onely false, but impossible, yet the Axiome is necessarily true. As for example, If Bucephalus be a man, he is endued with humane reason; this Axiome is necessarily true, and yet the parts are impossible. For Alexanders horse can neither be a man, nor have the reason of a man, either radically or actually. The necessity therefore is only laid upon the connexion of the parts, not upon the parts themselves. So when I say, To morrow it will rain, or it will not rain, this Disjunct Proposition also is necessary, but the necessity lyes upon the Disjunction of the parts, not upon the parts themselves: For they being immediately disjoyned, there is a necessity that one of them must be, though there be no necessity that this must be determined rather then that. As when a man is kept under custodie where he has the use of two rooms only, though there be a necessity that he be found in one of the two, yet he is not confined to either one of them. And to be brief, and prevent those frivolous both answers and replyes that follow in the pursuit of this Argument in Mr. Hobbs; As the necessity of this Disjunct Axiome lyes upon the Disjunction it self, so the truth, of which this necessity is a mode, must lye there too; for it is the Disjunction of the parts that is affirmed, and not the parts themselves, as any one that is but moderately in his wits must needs acknowledg.

13. There is a more dangerous way that Mr. Hobbs might have made use of, and with more credit, but yet scarce with better success, which is the consideration of an Axiome that pronounces of a future Contingent, such as this, Cras Socrates disputabit. For every Axiome pronouncing either true or false, as all doe agree upon; if this Axiome be now true, it is impossible but Socrates should dispute to morrow; or if it be now false, it is impossible he should: and so his Action of disputing or the omission thereof will be necessary, for the Proposition cannot be both true and false at once. Some are much troubled to extricate themselves out of this Nooze; but if we more precisely enquire into the sense of the Proposition, the difficultie will vanish. He therefore that affirms that Socrates will dispute to morrow, affirms it (to use the distinction of Futurities that Aristotle somewhere suggests) either as a 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , or 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , that is, either as a thing that is likely to be, but has a possibility of being otherwise, or else as a thing certainly to come to pass. If this latter, the Axiome is false; if the former, it is true: and so the liberty of Socrates his action, as also of all like contingent effects, are thus easily rescued from this sophistical entanglement. For every Future Axiome is as incapable of our judgment, unless we determine the sense of it by one of the forenamed modes, as an Indefinite Axiome is, before we in our minds adde the notes of Universality or Particularity: Neither can we say of either of them, that they are true or false, till we have compleated and determined their sense.

14. His fourth Argument he proposes with some diffidence and dislike, as if he thought it not good Logick (they are his own words) to make use of it, and adde it to the rest. And for my own part, I cannot but approve of the consistency of his judgment, and coherency with other parts of his Philosophie: For if there be nothing but Body or Matter in the whole comprehension of things, it will be very hard to find out any such Deity as has the knowledg or foreknowledg of any thing: And therefore I suspect that this last is onely cast in as argumentum ad hominem, to puzzle such as have not dived to so profound a depth of naturall knowledg, as to fancy they have discovered there is no God in the world.

15. But let him vilifie it as he will, it is the only Argument he has brought, that has any tolerable sense or solidity in it; and it is a Subject that has exercised the wits of all Ages, to reconcile the Liberty of mans Will with the Decrees and Praescience of God. But my Freeness, I hope, and Moderation shall make this matter more easy to me, then it ordinarily proves to them that venture upon it. My Answer therefore in brief shall be this;

16. That though there be such a Faculty in the Soule of man as Liberty of Will, yet she is not alwaies in a state of acting according to it. For she may either degenerate so far, that it may be as certainly known what she will doe upon this or that occasion, as what an hungry Dog will doe when a crust is offered him; which is the generall condition of almost all men in most occurrencies of their lives: or else she may be so Heroically good, though that happen in very few, that it may be as certainly known as before what she will doe or suffer upon such or such emergencies: and in these cases the use of Liberty of Will ceases.

17. That the use of the Facultie of Freewill is properly there, where we finde our selves so near to an AEquiponderancy, being toucht with the sense of Vertue on the one side, and the ease or pleasure of some vitious action on the other, that we are conscious to our selves that we ought, and that we may, if we will, abandon the one and cleave to the other.

18. That in this Conflict the Soule has no such absolute power to determine her self to the one or the other action, but Temptation or Supernaturall assistance may certainly carry her this way or that way; so that she may not be able to use that liberty of going indifferently either way.

19. That Divine Decrees either find men sit, or make them so, for the executing of whatever is absolutely purposed or prophesied concerning them.

20. That the Praescience of God is so vast and exceeding the comprehension of our thoughts, that all that can be safely said of it is this, That this knowledg is most perfect and exquisite, accurately representing the Natures, Powers and Properties of the thing it does foreknow. Whence it must follow, that if there be any Creature free and undeterminate, and that in such circumstances and at such a time he may either act thus or not act thus, this perfect Foreknowledge must discern from all eternity, that the said Creature in such circumstances may either act thus, or so, or not. And further to declare the perfection of this Foreknowledg and Omniscience of God; as His Omnipotence ought to exten so far, as to be able to doe whatsoever implyes no contradiction to be done; so his Praescience and Omniscience ought to extend so far, as to know precisely and fully whatever implies no contradiction to be known. To conclude therefore briefly; Free or Contingent Effects doe either imply a contradiction to be foreknown, or they doe not imply it. If they imply a contradiction to be foreknown, they are no Object of the Omniscience of God, and therefore there can be no pretence that his Foreknowledg does determinate them, nor can they be argued to be determined thereby. If they imply no contradiction to be foreknown, that is to acknowledg that divine Praescience and they may very well consist together. And so either way, notwithstanding the divine Omniscience, the Actions of men may be free.

21. The sum therefore of all is this, That mens actions are sometimes free and sometimes not free; but in that they are at any time free, is a Demonstration that there is a faculty in us that is incompetible to meer Matter: which is sufficient for my purpose.

CHAP. IV.

1. An Enumeration of sundry Opinions concerning the Seat of Common Sense. 2. Upon supposition that we are nothing but meer Matter, That the whole Body cannot be the Common Sensorium; 3. Nor the Orifice of the Stomack; 4. Nor the Heart; 5. Nor the Brain; 6. Nor the Membranes; 7. Nor the Septum lucidum; 8. Nor Regius his small and perfectly solid Particle. 9. The probability of the Conarion being the common Seat of Sense.

1. I Have plainly proved, that neither those more Pure and Intellectual faculties of Will and Reason, nor yet those less pure of Memory and Imagination, are competible to meer Bodies. Of which we may be the more secure, I having so convincingly demonstrated, That not so much as that which we call Externall Sense is competible to the same: all which Truths I have concluded concerning Matter generally considered. But because there may be a suspicion in some, which are over credulous concerning the powers of Body, that Organization may doe strange feats (which Surmise notwithstanding is as fond as if they should imagine, that though neither Silver, nor Steel, nor Iron, nor Lute-strings, have any Sense apart, yet being put together in such a manner and forme, as will (suppose) make a compleat Watch, they may have Sense; that is to say, that a Watch may be a living creature, though the severall parts have neither Life nor Sense) I shall for their sakes goe more particularly to work, and recite every opinion that I could ever meet with by converse with either men or books concerning the Seat of the Common Sense, and after trie whether any of these Hypotheses can possibly be admitted for Truth, upon supposition that we consist of nothing but meer modified and organized Matter. I shall first recite the Opinions, and then examine the possibility of each in particular, which in brief are these. 1. That the whole Body is theSeat of Common Sense. 2. That the Orifice of the Stomack. 3. The Heart. 4. The Brain. 5. The Membranes. 6. The Septum lucidum. 7. Some very small and perfectly solid particle in the Body. 8. The Conarion. 9. The concurse of the Nerves about the fourth ventricle of the Brain. 10. The Spirits in that fourth ventricle.

2. That the first Opinion is false is manifest from hence, That upon supposition we are nothing but meer Matter, if we grant the whole Body to be one common Sensorium, perceptive of all Objects, Motion which is impressed upon the Eye or Eare, must be transmitted into all the parts of the Body. For Sense is really the same with communication of Motion, by Axiome 20. And the variety of Sense arising from the modification of Motion, which must needs be variously modified by the different temper of the parts of the Body, by Axiome 22. it plainly followes that the Eye must be otherwise affected by the motion of Light, then the other parts to which this motion is transmitted. Wherefore if it be the whole Body that perceives, it will perceive the Object in every part thereof severall wayes modified at once; which is against all Experience. It will also appear in all likelihood in severall places at once, by reason of the many windings and turnings that must happen to the transmission of this Motion, which are likely to be as so many Refractions or Reflections.

3. That the Orifice of the Stomack cannot be the seat of Common Sense, is apparent from hence, That that which is the common Sentient does not only perceive all Objects, but has the power of moving the Body. Now besides that there is no organization in the mouth of the Stomack, that can elude the strength of our Arguments laid down in the foregoing Chapters, which took away all capacity from Matter of having any perception at all in it, there is no Mechanicall reason imaginable to be found in the Body, whereby it will appear possible, that supposing the mouth of the Stomack were the common Percipient of all Objects, it could be able to move the rest of the members of the Body, as we finde something in us does. This is so palpably plain, that it is needless to spend any more words upon it.

4. The same may be said concerning the Heart. For who can imagine, that if the Heart were that common Percipient, that there is any such Mechanical connexion betwixt it and all the parts of the Body, that it may, by such or such a perception, command the motion of the Foot or little Finger? Besides that it seems wholly imployed in the performance of its Systole and Diastole, which causes such a great difference of the situation of the Heart by turns, that if it were that Seat in which the sense of all Objects center, we should not be able to see things steddily resting in the same place.

5. How uncapable the Brain is of being so active a Principle of Motion as we find in our selves, the viscidity thereof does plainly indicate. Besides that Physitians have discovered by experience, that the Brain is so far from being the common Seat of all senses, that it has in it none at all. And the Arabians, that say it has, have distinguished it into such severall offices of Imagination, Memory, Common Sense, &c. that we are still at a loss for some one part of Matter, that is to be the Common Percipient of all these. But I have so clearly demonstrated the impossibility of the Brains being able to perform those functions that appertain truly to what ordinarily men call the Soule, in my Antidote against Atheisme, that it is enough to refer the Reader thither.

6. As for the Membranes, whether we would fancy them all the Seat of Common Sense, or some one Membrane, or part there of; the like difficulties will accur as have been mentioned already. For if all the Membranes, the difference and situation of them will vary the aspect and sight of the Object, so that the same things will appear to us in several hues and severall places at once, as is easily demonstrated from Axiome 22. If some one Membrane, or part thereof, it will be impossible to excogitate any Mechanicall reason, how this one particular Membrane, or any part thereof, can be able so strongly and determinately to move upon occasion every part of the Body.

7. And therefore for this very cause cannot the Septum lucidum be the Common Percipient in us, because it is utterly unimaginable, how it should have the power of so stoutly and distinctly moving our exteriour parts and limbs.

8. As for that new and marvelous Invention of Henricus Regius, that it may be a certain perfectly solid, but very small particle of Matter in the Body, that is the seat of common perception; besides that it is as boldly asserted, that such an hard particle should have sense in it, as that the filings of Iron and Steel should; it cannot be the spring of Motion: For how should so small at Atome move the whole Body, but by moving it self? But it being more subtile then the point of any needle, when it puts it self upon motion, especially such strong thrustings as we sometimes use, it must needs passe through the Body and leave it.

9. The most pure Mechanical Invention is that of the use of the Conarion, proposed by Des-Cartes; which, considered with some other organizations of the Body, bids the fairest of any thing I have met withall, or ever hope to meet withall, for the resolution of the Passions and Properties of living Creatures into meer corporeall motion. And therefore it is requisite to insist a little upon the explication thereof, that we may the more punctually confute them that would abuse his Mechanicall contrivances to the exclusion of all Principles but Corporeall, in either Man or Beast.

CHAP. V.

1. How Perception of externall Objects, Spontaneous Motion, Memory and Imagination, are pretended to be performed by the Conarion, Spirits and Muscles, without a Soule. 2. That the Conarion, devoid of a Soule, cannot be the common Percipient, demonstrated out of Des-Cartes himself. 3. That the Conarion, with the Spirits and organization of the Parts of the Body, is not a sufficient Principle of Spontancous motion, without a Soule. 4. A aescription of the use of the Valvulae in the Nerves of the Muscles for spontaneous motion. 5. The insufficiency of this contrivance for that purpose. 6. A further demonstration of the insufficiency thereof, from whence is clearly evinced that Brutes have Soules. 7. That Memory cannot be salved the way above described; 8. Nor Imagination. 9. A Distribution out of Des-Cartes of the Functions in us, some appertaining to the Body, and others to the Soule. 10. The Authors Observations there upon.

1 THE sum of this Abuse must in brief be this, That the Glandula Pinealis is the common Sentient or Percipient of all Objects; and without a Soule, by vertue of the Spirits and Organization of the Body, may doe all those feats that we ordinarily conceive to be performed by Soule and Body joyned together. For it being one, whenas the rest of the Organs of Sense are double, and so handsomely seated as to communicate with the Spirits as well of the posteriour as anteriour Cavities of the Brain; by their help all the motions of the Nerves (both those that transmit the sense of outward Objects, and of inward affections of the Body, such as Hunger, Thirst and the like) are easily conveighed unto it: and so being variously moved, it does variously determine the course of the Spirits into such and such Muscles, whereby it moves the Body. Moreover that the transmission of Motion from the Object, through the Nerves, into the inward concavities of the Brain, and so to the Conarion, opens such and such Pores of the Brain, in such and such order or manner, which remain as tracts or footsteps of the presence of these Objects after they are removed. Which tracts, or signatures, consist mainly in this, that the Spirits will have an easier passage through these Pores then other parts of the Brain. And hence arises Memory, when the Spirits be determined, by the inclining of the Conarion, to that part of the Brain where these tracts are found, they moving then the Conarion as when the Object was present, though not so strongly. From the hitting of the Spirits into such like tracts, is also the nature of Imagination to be explained; in which there is little difference from Memory, saving that the reflection upon time as past, when we saw or perceived such or such a thing, is quite left out. But these are not all the operations we are conscious to our selves of, and yet more then can be made out by this Hypothesis, That Perception of Objects, Spontaneous Motion, Memory and Imagination, may be all performed by vertue of this Glandula, the Animal Spirits, and meer organization of the Body; as we shall plainly find, though but upon an easy examination.

2. For that the Conarion, devoid of a Soule, has no perception of any one Object, is demonstrable from the very description Cartesius makes of the transmission of the image, suppose through the Eye to the Brain, and so to the Conarion. For it is apparent from what he sets down in the 35. Article of his Treatise of the Passions of the Soule, that the Image that is propagated from the Object to the Conarion, is impressed thereupon in some latitude of space. Whence it is manifest that the Conarion does not, nor can perceive the whole Object, though severall parts may be acknowledged to have the perception of the severall parts thereof. But something in us perceives the whole, which therefore cannot be the Conarion. And that we doe not perceive the external Object double, is not so much because the Image is united in the Organ of Common Sense, as that the lines come so from the Object to both the Eyes, that it is felt in one place; otherwise if the Object be very near, and the direction of our Eyes be not fitted to that nearness, it will seem double however. Which is a Demonstration that a man may see with both eyes at once; and for my own part, I'me sure that I see better at distance, when I use both, then when one.

3. As for Spontaneous Motion, that the Conarion cannot be a sufficient Principle thereof, with the Spirits and organization of other parts of the Body, though we should admit it a fit seat of Common Sense, will easily appear, if we consider, that so weak and so small a thing as that Glandula is, seems utterly unable to determine the spirits with that force and violence we find they are determined in running, striking, thrusting and the like; and that it is evident, that sometimes scarce the thousandth part of the Conarion shall be directer of this force; viz. when the Object of Sight, suppose, is as little as a pin's point, or when a man is prick'd with a needle, these receptions must be as little in the Glandula as in the exteriour Sense. But suppose the whole Conarion alwaies did act in the determining the motion of the Spirits into this or that Muscle; it is impossible that such fluid Matter as these Spirits are, that upon the noddings of the Conarion forward may easily recede back, should ever determine their course with that force and strength they are determined. But haply it will be answered, That such subtile and fluid bodies as the Animall Spirits, that are in a readiness to be upon Motion any way, the least thing will determine their course, and that the Muscles themselves, being well replenisht with Spirits, and framed with such Valvulae as will easily intromit them from the Brain, and also conveigh them out of one opposite Muscle into another upon the least redundance of Spirits in the one above the other, and so shut them in; that that force we find in spontaneous Motion may very well be salved by this Mechanicall Artifice.

4. That the insufficiency of this answer may appear, let us more accurately consider the contrivance in the following Figure, which must be some such

thing as Regius has, Philosop. Natural. Lib. 4. cap. 16. and which may serve for the more easy understanding of what Des-Cartes writes in his book of Passions Artic. II. Here B. C. are two opposite Muscles, the known Instruments of spontaneous Motion; K. some part of the Body to be moved; D. E. and F. G. are the Nerves through which Spirits are transmitted from the Brain into the foresaid Muscles; D. and F. two Valvulae to let pass the Spirits from the Brain into the Muscles, but stop them if they would regurgitate; G. is a Valve that lets the Spirits out of the Muscle C. into B, and E. another Valve that lets the Spirits out of B. into C. Now in brief, the result of this Mechanicall contrivance is this, viz. That the Spirits being determined by the Conarion never so little more copiously into B. then into C, those in C. will pass through the Valve G. into B, and so B. swelling, and consequently shortning it self, it must needs bring up the member K.

5. We will not here alledge that this may be onely a meer fancy, these Valvulae in the Nerves not being yet discovered by any Anatomist to be part of the Organization of the Body of any Animal; but rather shew, that they would not effect what is aimed at, though they were admitted. For first it does not appear that the Spirits will make more hast out of C. into B, then the pressure caused in B. by the determination of the Spirits from the Conarion forces them to. For all places being alike to them to play in, they will goe no further then they are driven or pressed, as Wind in a Bladder. And how the Conarion should drive or press the Spirits into B, so as to make it press those in C, and force them out so quick and smart as we find in some Actions, is a thing utterly unconceivable.

6. Besides, admit that the Conarion could determine them with some considerable force so into B, that they would make those in C. come to them through the Valve G, there being the Valve E. to transmit them into C. again, it is impossible but that the Tenth part of that force which we ordinarily use to open a mans hand against his will, should whether he would or no easily open it. For a very ordinary strength moveing K. from B. towards C. must needs so press the Spirits in B, that they will certainly pass by E. into C, if our Body be nothing but Matter Mechanically organized. And therefore it is the meer Imperium of our Soule that does determine the Spirits to this Muscle rather then the other, and holds them there in despite of externall force. From whence it is manifest that brute Beasts must have Soules also.

7. Concerning Memory and Imagination, that the meer Mechanical reasons of Des-Cartes will not reach them, we shall clearly understand, if we consider that the easy aperture of the same Pores of the Brain, that were opened at the presence of such an Object, is not sufficient to represent the Object, after the Conarion has by inclining it self thitherward determined the course of the Spirits into the same Pores. For this could onely represent the Figure of a thing, not the Colours thereof. Besides a man may bring an hundred Objects, and expose them to our view at the same distance, the Eye keeping exactly in the same posture, insomuch that it shall be necessary for these images to take up the very same place of the Brain, and yet there shall be a distinct remembrance of all these; which is impossible if there be no Soule in us, but all be meer Matter. The same may be said of so many Names or Words levell'd if you will out of a Trunk into the Eare kept accurately in the same posture, so that the Sound shall beat perpetually upon the same parts of the Organ, yet if there be five hundred of them, there may be a distinct memory for every one of them; which is a power perfectly beyond the bounds of meer Matter, for there would be a necessary confusion of all.

8. Lastly, for those imaginations or representations that are of no one Object that we ever see, but made up of severall that have taken their distinct places in the Brain, how can the Conarion joyn these together? Or rather in one and the same Object, suppose this Man or that House, which we see in a right posture, and has left such a signature or figure in the Brain as is fit to represent it so, how can the Conarion invert the posture of the image, and make it represent the House and Man with the heels upwards? Besides the difficulty of representing the Distance of an Object, or the Breadth thereof, concerning which we have spoken already. It is impossible the Conarion, if it be meer Matter, should perform any such operations as these. For it must raise motions in it self, such as are not necessarily conveighed by any corporeall impress of another Body, which is plainly against Axiome 26.

9. And therefore that sober and judicious Wit Des-Cartes dares not stretch the power of Mechanicall organization thus far, but doth plainly confess, that as there are some Functions that belong to the Body alone, so there are others that belong to the Soule, which he calls Cogitations; and are according to him of two sorts, the one Actions, the other Passions. The Actions are all the operations of our Will, as in some sense all Perceptions may be termed Actions. And these Actions of the Will are either such as are meer Intellectuall Operations, and end in the Soule her self, such as her stirring up her self to love God, or contemplate any Immateriall Object; or they are such as have an influence on the Body, as when by vertue of our Will we put ourselves upon going to this or that place.

He distinguishes again our Perceptions into two sorts, whereof the one has the Soule for their cause, the other the Body. Those that are caused by the Body are mostwhat such as depend on the Nerves. But besides these there is one kind of Imagination that is to be referred hither, and that properly has the Body for its cause, to wit, that Imagination that arises meerly from the hitting of the Animall Spirits against the tracts of those Images that externall Objects have left in the Brain, and so representing them to the Conarion; which may happen in the day-time when our Fancy roves, and we doe not set our selves on purpose to think on things, as well as it does in sleep by night. Those Perceptions that arrive to the Soule by the interposition of the Nerves, differ one from another in this, that some of them refer to outward Objects that strike our Sense, others to our Body, such as Hunger, Thirst, Pain, &c. and others to the Soule it self, as Sorrow, Joy, Fear, &c.

Those Perceptions that have the Soule for their cause, are either the Perceptions of her own Acts of Will, or else of her Speculation of things purely intelligible, or else of Imaginations made at pleasure, or finally of Reminiscency, when she searches out something that she has let slip out of her Memory.

10. That which is observable in this Distribution is this, That all those Cogitations that he calls Actions, as also those kind of Perceptions, whose cause he assignes to the Soule, are in themselves (and are acknowledged by him) of that nature, that they cannot be imitated by any creature by the meer organization of i'ts Body. But for the other, he holds they may, and would make us believe they are in Bodies of Brutes, which he would have meer Machina's, that is, That from the meer Mechanical frame of their Body, outward Objects of Sense may open Pores in their Brains so, as that they may determine the Animall Spirits into such and such Muscles for spontaneous Motion. That the course of the Spirits also falling into the Nerves in the Intestines and Stomack, Spleen, Heart, Liver, and other parts, may cause the very same effects of Passion, suppose of Love, Hatred, Joy, Sorrow, in these brute Machina's, as we feel in our Bodies, though they, as being senseless, feel them not; and so the vellication of certain Tunicles and Fibres in the Stomack and Throat, may affect their Body as ours is in the Sense of Hunger or Thirst; and finally that the hitting of the Spirits into the tracts of the Brain, that have been signed by Externall Objects, may act so upon their Body as it does upon ours in Imagination and Memory.

Now adde to this Machina of Des-Cartes, the capacity in Matter of Sensation and Perception, (which yet I have demonstrated it to be uncapable of) and it will be exquisitely as much as Mr. Hobbs himself can expect to arise from meer Body, that is, All the Motions thereof being purely Mechanicall, the perceptions and propensions will be fatall, necessary, and unavoidable, as he loves to have them.

But being all Cogitations that Des-Cartes terms Actions, as also all those kind of Perceptions that he acknowledges the Soule to be the cause of, are not to be resolved into any Mechanicall contrivance; we may take notice of them as a peculiar rank of Arguments, and such, as that if it could be granted, that the Soules of Brutes were nothing but sentient Matter, yet it would follow that a Substance of an higher nature, and truly Immateriall, must be the Principle of those more noble Operations we find in our selves, as appears from Axiome 20. and 26.

CHAP. VI.

1. That no part of the Spinall Marrow can be the Common Sensorium without a Soule in the Body. 2. That the Animal Spirits are more likely to be that Common Percipient. 3. But yet it is demonstrable they are not: 4. As not being so much as capable of Sensation; 5. Nor of directing Motion into the Muscles; 6. Much less of Imagination and rationall Invention; 7. Nor of Memory. 8. An answer to an Evasion. 9. The Authors reason, why he has confuted so particularly all the suppositions of the Seat of Common Sense, when few of them have been asserted with the exclusion of a Soule.

1. THere remain now onely Two Opinions to be examined: the one, That place of the Spinall Marrow where Anatomists conceive there is the nearest concurse of all the Nerves of the Body; the other, the Animall Spirits in the fourth Ventricle of the Brain. As for the former, viz. That part of the Spinall Marrow, where the concurse of the Nerves are conceived to be, as I have answered in like case, so I say again, that besides that I have already demonstrated, that Matter is uncapable of Sense, and that there is no modification thereof in the Spinall Marrow, that will make it more likely to be indued with that Faculty then the pith of Elder or a mess of Curds; we are also to take notice, that it is utterly inept for Motion, nor is it conceivable how that part of it, or any other that is assigned to this office of being the Common Percipient in us of all Thoughts and Objects, (which must also have the power of moving our members) can, having so little agitation in it self, (as appearing nothing but a kind of soft Pap or Pulp) so nimbly and strongly move the parts of our Body.

2. In this regard the Animal Spirits seem much more likely to perform that office; and those, the importunity of whose gross fancyes constrains them to make the Soule Corporeall, doe nevertheless usually pitch upon some subtile thin Matter to constitute her nature or Essence: And therefore they imagine her to be either Aire, Fire, Light, or some such like Body; with which the Animall Spirits have no small affinity.

3. But this opinion, though it may seem plausible at first sight, yet the difficulties it is involved in are insuperable. For it is manifest, that all the Arguments that are brought Chap. 2. Sect. 3. will recur with full force in this place. For there is no Matter that is so perfectly liquid as the Animal Spirits, but consists of particles onely contiguous one to another, and actually upon Motion playing and turning one by another, as busy as Atomes in the Sun. Now therefore, let us consider whether that Treasury of pure Animall Spirits contained in the Fourth Ventricle be able to Sustain so noble an office as to be the common Percipient in our Body, which, as I have often repeated, is so complex a Function, that it does not onely contain the perception of externall Objects, but Motion, Imagination, Reason and Memory.

4. Now at the very first dash, the transmission of the image of the Object into this crowd of particles cannot but hit variously upon them, and therefore they will have severall Perceptions amongst them, some haply perceiving part of the Object, others all, others more then all, others also perceiving of it in one place, and others in another. But the Percipient in us representing no such confusion or disorder in our beholding of Objects, it is plain that it is not the Animall Spirits that is it.

5. Again, that which is so confounded a Percipient, how can it be a right Principle of directing Motion into the Muscles? For besides what disorder may happen in this function upon the distracted representation of present Objects, the power of thinking, excogitating and deliberating, being in these Animal Spirits also, (and they having no means of communicating one with another, but justling one against another; which is as much to the purpose, as if men should knock heads to communicate to each other their conceits of Wit) it must needs follow that they will have their perceptions, inventions, and deliberations apart; which when they put in Execution, must cause a marvelous confusion in the Body, some of them commanding the parts this way, others driving them another way: or if their factions have many divisions and subdivisions, every one will be so weak, that none of them will be able to command it any way. But we find no such strugling or countermands of any thing in us, that would act our Body one way when we would another; as if when one was a going to write 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 — something stronger in him, whose conceits he is not privy to, should get the use of his hand, and, in stead of that, write down Arma virúmque cano. And the like may be said of any other Spontaneous Motion, which being so constantly within our command as it is, it is a sufficient Argument to prove that it is not such a lubricous Substance as the Animal Spirits, nor so disunited; but something more perfectly One and Indivisible.

6. We need not instance any further concerning the power of Invention and Reason, how every particle of these Animal Spirits has a liberty to think by it self, and consult with it self, as well as to play by it self, and how there is no possible means of communicating their Thoughts one to another, unless it should be, as I have said, by hitting one against another: but that can onely communicate Motion, not their determinate Thought; unless that these particles were conceived to figure themselves into the shape of those things they think of, which is impossible by Axiome 26. And suppose it were possible one particle should shape it self, for example, into a George on Horse-back with a Lance in his hand, and another into an Inchanted Castle; this George on Horse-back must run against the Castle, to make the Castle receive his impress and similitude. But what then? Truly the encounter will be very unfortunate. For St. George indeed may easily break his Lance, but it is impossible that he should by justling against the Particle in the form of a Castle conveigh the entire shape of himself and his Horse thereby, such as we find our selves able to imagine of a man on horse-back. Which is a Truth as demonstrable as any Theorem in Mathematicks, but so plain at first sight, that I need not use the curiosity of a longer Demonstration to make it more firm. Nor is there any colourable evasion by venturing upon a new way, as if this particle having transformed it self into a Castle, and that into an Horse-man, all the others then would see them both. For by what light, and how little would they appear, and in what different places, according to the different posture of the particles of the Animal Spirits, and with what different faces, some seeing one side, others another? But besides this, there is a further difficulty, that if such Sensible representations as these could be conveighed from one particle to another by corporeall encounters and justlings, or by that other way after alledged; Logicall and Mathematicall notions can not. So that some of the Animal Spirits may think of one Demonstration in Mathematicks, or of part of that Demonstration, and others of another: insomuch that if a Mathematician be to write, while he would write one thing upon the determination of these Animal Spirits, others may get his hand to make use of for the writing something else, to whose Thoughts and Counsell he was not at all privy; nor can tell any thing, till those other Animal Spirits have writ it down. Which Absurdities are so mad and extravagant, that a man would scarce defile his pen by recording them, were it not to awaken those that dote so much on the power of Matter (as to think it of it self sufficient for all Phaenomena in the world) into due shame and abhorrence of their foolish Principle.

7. The last Faculty I will consider is Memory, which is also necessarily joyned with the rest in the Common Percipient; of which not onely the fluidity of parts, but also their dissipability, makes the Animal Spirits utterly uncapable. For certainly, the Spirits by reason of their Subtilty and Activity are very dissipable, and in all likelihood remain not the same for the space of a week together; and yet things that one has not thought of for many years, will come as freshly into a mans minde, as if they were transacted but yesterday.

8. The onely Evasion they can excogitate here is this, That as there is a continuall supply of Spirits by degrees, so, as they come in, they are seasoned, fermented, and tinctured with the same notions, perceptions and propensions that the Spirits they find there have. These are fine words, but signifie nothing but this, that the Spirits there present in the Brain communicate the Notions and Perceptions they have to these new-comers; which is that which I have already proved impossible in the foregoing Sections. And therefore it is impossible that the Animal Spirits should be that Common Percipient, that hears, sees, moves, remembers, understands, and does other functions of life that we perceive performed in us or by us.

9. We have now particularly evinced, that neither the whole Body, nor any of those parts that have been pitched upon, if we exclude the presence of a Soul or Immaterial Substance, can be the Seat of Common Sense. In which I would not be so understood, as if it implyed that there are none of these parts, but some or other have affirmed might be the common Sensorium, though we had no Soule; but because they have been stood upon, all of them, by some or other to be the Seat of Common Sense, supposing a Soule in the Body, that there might no imaginable doubt or scruple be left behind, I have taken the pains thus punctually and particularly to prove, that none of them can be the place of Common Sense without one. And thus I have perfectly finished my main design, which was to demonstrate That there is a Soule or Incorporeall Substance residing in us, distinct from the Body. But I shall not content my self here, but for a more full discovery of her Nature and Faculties, I shall advance further, and search out her chief Seat in the Body, where and from whence she exercises her most noble Functions, and after enquire whether she be confined to that part thereof alone, or whether she be spred through all our members; and lastly consider after what manner she sees, feels, hears, imagines, remembers, reasons, and moves the Body. For beside that I shall make some good use of these discoveries for further purpose, it is also in it self very pleasant to have in readiness a rationall and cohaerent account, and a determinate apprehension of things of this nature.

CHAP. VII.

1. His enquiry after the Seat of Common Sense, upon supposition there is a Soule in the Body. 2. That there is some particular part in the Body that is the Seat of Common Sense. 3. A generall division of their Opinions concerning the place of Common Sense. 4. That of those that place it out of the Head there are two sorts. 5. The Invalidity of Helmont's reasons whereby he would prove the Orifice of the Stomack to be the principall Seat of the Soule. 6. An Answer to Helmont's storyes for that purpose. 7. A further confutation out of his own concessions. 8. Mr. Hobbs his Opinion confuted, that makes the Heart the Seat of Common Sense. 9. A further confutation thereof from Experience. 10. That the Common Sense is seated somewhere in the Head. 11. A caution for the choice of the particular place thereof. 12. That the whole Brain is not it; 13. Nor Regius his small solid Particle; 14. Nor any externall Membrane of the Brain, nor the Septum Lucidum. 15. The three most likely places. 16. Objections against Cartesius his Opinion concerning the Conarion answered. 17. That the Conarion is not the Seat of Common Sense; 18. Nor that part of the Spinall Marrow where the Nerves are conceived to concurre, but the Spirits in the fourth Ventricle of the Brain.

1. IT will therefore be requisite for us to resume the former Opinions, altering the Hypothesis; and to examine which of them is most reasonable, supposing there be a Substance immateriall or Soule in man.

2. That there is some particular or restrained Seat of the Common Sense, is an Opinion that even all Philosophers and Physitians are agreed upon. And it is an ordinary Comparison amongst them, that the Externall Senses and the Common Sense considered together are like a Circle with five lines drawn from the Circumference to the Centre. Wherefore as it has been obvious for them to finde out particular Organs for the externall Senses, so they have also attempted to assign some distinct part of the Body for to be an Organ of the Common Sense; that is to say, as they discovered Sight to be seated in the Eye, Hearing in the Eare, Smelling in the Nose, &c. so they conceived that there is some part of the Body wherein Seeing, Hearing and all other Perceptions meet together, as the lines of a circle in the centre: and that there the Soule does also judge and discern of the difference of the Objects of the outward Senses. They have justly therefore excluded all the Externall parts of the Body from the lightest suspition of any capacity of undergoing such a function as is thus generall, they being all employed in a more particular task, which is to be the Organ of some one of these five outward Senses; and to be affected no otherwise, then by what is impressed upon themselves, and chiefly from their proper Objects, amongst which five, Touch properly so called has the greatest share, it being as large as the Skin that covers us, and reaching as deep as any Membrane and Nerve in the limbs and trunk of the Body, besides all the Exteriour parts of the Head. All which can no more see, then the Eye can hear, or the Eare can smell.

3. Besides this, all those Arguments that doe so clearly evince that the place of Common Sense is somewhere in the Head, is a plain demonstration that the whole Body cannot be the Seat thereof, and what those Arguments are you shall hear anon. For all those Opinions that have pitched on any one Part for the Seat of Common Sense, being to be divided into two Ranks, to wit, either such as assign some particular place in the Body, or else in the Head, we will proceed in this order; as first to confute those that have made choice of any part for the Seat of Common Sense out of the Head; and then in the second place we will in generall shew, that the common Sensorium must be in some part of the Head; and lastly, of those many opinions concerning what part of the Head this common Sensorium should be, those which seem less reasonable being rejected, we shall pitch upon what we conceive the most unexceptionable.

4. Those that place the Common Sensorium out of the Head, have seated it either in the upper Orifice of the Stomack, or in the Heart. The former is Van-Helmont's Opinion, the other Mr. Hobbs his.

5. As for Van-Helmont, there is nothing he alledges for his Opinion but may be easily answered. That which mainly imposed upon him was the exceeding Sensibility of that part, which Nature made so, that, as a faithfull & sagacious Porter, it might admit nothing into the Stomack that might prove mischievous or troublesome to the Body. From this tender Sensibility, great offences to it may very well cause Swoonings, and Apoplexies, and cessations of Sense. But Fear and Joy and Grief have dispatched some very suddainly, when yet the first entrance of that deadly stroak has been at the Eare or the Eye, from some unsupportable ill newes or horrid spectacle. And the harsh handling of an angry Sore, or the treading on a Corn on the Toe, may easily cast some into a swoon, and yet no man will ever imagine the Seat of the Common Sense to be placed in the Foot. In fine, there is no more reason to think the Common Sensorium is in the mouth of the Stomack, because of the Sensible Commotions we feel there, then that it is seated in the Stars, because we so clearly perceive their Light, as Des-Cartes has well answered upon like occasion. Nor can Phrensies and Madnesses, though they may sometimes be observed to take their rise from thence, any more prove that it is the Seat of the Common Sense, then the Furor uterinus, Apoplexies, Epilepsies, and Syncopes proceeding from the Wombe, doe argue that the common Sensorium of Women lyes in that part.

6. And if we consider the great Sympathy betwixt the Orifice of the Stomack and the Heart, whose Pathemata are so alike and conjoyned, that the Ancients have given one name to both parts, calling them promiscuously 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , and the pains of the Stomack 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , as also that the Heart is that part from which manifestly are the supplyes of life, whence the Pulse ceasing life cannot long continue for want of warmth and Spirits; here is an evident reason, how it may happen that a Wound about the mouth of the Stomack may dispatch a man more suddainly then a wound in the Head, they being both supposed mortal, though the seat of the Sensitive Soule be not chiefly in the aforesaid Orifice. For partly the naturall Sympathy betwixt the Orifice of the Stomack and the Heart, and partly the horrour and pain perceived by the Soule in the common Sensorium, which we will suppose in the Head, does so dead the Heart, that, as in the suddain Passions above named, it ceases to perform the ordinary functions of Life, and so Pulse and Sense and all is gone in short time; when as the Head being wounded mortally, Perception is thereby so diminished, that the Heart scapes the more free from the force of that lethiferous passion; and so though Sense be gone, can continue the Pulse a longer time: which is a perfect answer to Helmont's stories he recites in his Sedes Animae.

7. To all which I may adde, That himself does acknowledg in the end of that Treatise, that the power of Motion, of Will, Memory and Imagination, is in the Brain; and therefore unless a man will say and deny any thing, he must say that the Common Sense is there also.

8. The Opinion of Mr. Hobbs bears more credit and countenance with it, as having been asserted heretofore by Philosophers of great fame, Epicurus, Aristotle, and the School of the Stoicks: but if we look closer to it, it will prove as little true as the other; especially in his way, that holds there is no Soule in a Man, but that all is but organized Matter. For let him declare any Mechanicall reason whereby his Heart will be able to move his Finger. But upon this Hypothesis I have confuted this Opinion already. It is more maintainable, if there be granted a Soule in the Body, that the Heart is the chief Seat thereof, and place of Common Sense, as Aristotle and others would have it, as also the spring of Spontaneous Motion. But it is very unlikely, that that part that is so continually employed in that naturall Motion of contracting and dilating it self, should be the Seat of that Principle which commands Free and Spontaneous progressions: Perceptions also would be horribly disturbed by its squeezing of it self, and then flagging again by vicissitudes. Neither would Objects appear in the same place when the Heart is drawn up and when it is let down again, as I have above intimated: the extream heat also of it could not admit that it be affected with the gentle motions of the Objects of Sense, the Blood being there in a manner scalding hot. And it is in this sense that that Aphorisme in Aristotle is to be understood, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , That which must receive the variety of externall impresses, must not be it self in any high temper or agitation.

9. Wherefore it is a very rash thing to assert, that the Heart is the Seat of Common Sense, unless by some plain experience it could be evinced to be so, whenas indeed Experiments are recorded to the contrary. As, that if we bind a Nerve, Sense and Motion will be betwixt the Ligature and the Brain, but not betwixt the Heart and the Ligature. And that the Crocodile, his Heart being cut cut, will live for a considerable time, and fight, and defend himself. The like is observed of the Sea-Tortoise, and the wild Goat, as Calcidius writes. To which you may adde what Galen relates of sacrificed Beasts, that their Hearts being taken out and laid upon the Altar, they have been seen in the mean time not onely to breath, and roar aloud, but also to run away, till the expence of Blood has made them fall down. Which Narrations to me are more credible, I having seen with mine own eyes a Frog quite exenterated, heart, stomack, guts and all taken out by an ingenious friend of mine, and dexterous Anatomist, after which the Frog could see, and would avoid any object in its way, and skipped as freely and nimbly up and down, as when it was entire, and that for a great while. But a very little wound in the Head deprives them immediatly of Life and Motion. Whence it is plain that the derivation of Sense and spontaneous Motion is not from the Heart. For if the Motion be intercepted betwixt the Brain and the Heart, by Mr. Hobbs his own concession, there will be no perception of the Object. And there is the same reason of the Orifice of the Stomack: so that this one Experiment does clearly evince these two Opinions to be erroneous.

10. And that no man hereafter may make any other unhappy choice in the parts of the Body, we shall now propose such Reasons as we hope will plainly prove, That the common Sensorium must needs be in the Head; or indeed rather repeat them: For some of those whereby we proved that the Heart is not the Seat of Common Sense, will plainly evince that the Head is. As that out of Laurentius, that a Nerve being tied, Sense and Motion will be preserved from the ligature up towards the Head, but downwards they will be lost. As also that experiment of a Frog, whose brain if you pierce will presently be devoid of Sense and Motion, though all the Entrals being taken out it will skip up and down, and exercise its senses as before. Which is a plain evidence that Motion and Sense is derived from the Head; and there is now no pretence to trace any Motion into a farther fountain, the Heart (from whence the Nerves were conceived to branch by Aristotle, and from whence certainly the Veins and Arteries doe, as appears by every Anatomie) being so justly discharged from that office. To which it may suffice to adde the consideration of those diseases that seize upon all the Animal functions at once, such as are the Lethargie, Apoplexie, Epilepsie, and the like, the causes of which Physicians find in the Head, and accordingly apply remedies. Which is a plain detection that the Seat of the Soule, as much as concerns the Animal Faculties, is chiefly in the Head. The same may be said of Phrensy and Melancholy, and such like distempers, that deprave a mans Imagination and Judgment; Physitians alwaies conclude something amiss within the Cranium. Lastly, if it were nothing but the near attendance of the outward Senses on the Soule, or her discerning Faculty, being so fitly placed about her in the Head; this, unless there were some considerable Argument to the contrary, should be sufficient to determine any one that is unprejudiced, to conclude that the Seat of Common Sense, Understanding, and command of Motion, is there also.

11. But now the greatest difficulty will be to define In what part thereof it is to be placed. In which, unless we will goe overboldly and carelesly to work, we are to have a regard to Mechanicall congruities, and not pitch upon any thing that, by the advantage of this Supposall, That there is a Soule in man, may goe for possible; but to chuse what is most handsome and convenient.

12. That the whole Brain is not the Seat of Common Sense, appears from the wounds and cuts it may receive without the destruction of that Faculty; for they will not take away Sense and Motion, unless they pierce so deep as to reach the Ventricles of the Brain, as Galen has observed.

13. Nor is it in Regius his small solid particle. For besides that it is not likely the Centre of Perception is so minute, it is very incongruous to place it in a Body so perfectly solid, more hard then Marble, or Iron. But this Invention being but a late freak of his petulant fancy, that has an ambition to make a blunder and confusion of all Des-Cartes his Metaphysicall Speculations, (and therefore found out this rare quirk of wit to shew, how though the Soule were nothing but Matter, yet it might be incorruptible and immortal) it was not worth the while to take notice of it here in this Hypothesis, which we have demonstrated to be true, viz. That there is a Soule in the Body, whose nature is immateriall or incorporeall.

14. Nor are the Membranes in the Head the common Sensorium; neither those that envelop the Brain, (for they would be able then to see the light through the hole the Trepan makes, though the party Trepan'd winked-with his eyes; to say nothing of the conveyance of the Nerves, the Organs of externall Sense, that carry beyond these exteriour Membranes, and therefore point to a place more inward, that must be the Recipient of all their impresses) nor any Internall membrane, as that which bids fairest for it, the Septum Lucidum, as being in the midst of the upper Ventricle. But yet if the levell of Motion through the externall Senses be accurately considered, some will shoot under, and some in a distant parallel, so that this Membrane will not be struck with all the Objects of our Senses. Besides that it seems odd and ridiculous that the centre of Perception should be either driven out so into plates, or spread into hollow convexities, as it must be supposed, if we make either the externall or internall Membranes of the Brain the Seat of Common Sense.

15. The most likely place is some one of those that the three last Opinions point at, viz. either the Conarion, or the Concurse of the Nerves in the fourth Ventricle, or the Animal Spirits there.

16. The first is Des-Cartes Opinion, and not rashly to be refused, neither doe I find any Arguments hitherto that are valid enough to deface it. Those that are recited out of Bartholine, and subscribed to by the learned Author of Adenographia, in my apprehension have not the force to ruin it: we will first repeat them, and then examine them.

The first is, that this Glandula is too little to be able to represent the Images of all that the Soule has represented to her.

The second, that the externall Nerves doe not reach to the Glandula, and that therefore it cannot receive the impress of sensible Objects.

The third, that it is placed in a place of excrements which would soile the species of things.

The fourth, that the species of things are perceived there where they are carried by the Nerves. But the Nerves meet about the beginning or head of the Spinall Marrow, a more noble and ample place then the Glandula pinealis.

To the first I answer, That the amplitude of that place where the Nerves meet in the Spinall Marrow, is not large enough to receive the distinct impresses of all the Objects the mind retains in Memory. Besides, that the other parts of the Brain may serve for that purpose, as much as any of it can. For it is the Soule it self alone that is capable of retaining so distinct and perfect representations, though it may make an occasionall use of some private marks it impresses in the Brain; which haply may be nothing at all like the things it would remember, nor of any considerable magnitude nor proportion to them, such as we observe in the words Arx and Atomus, where there is no correspondency of either likeness or bigness, betwixt the words and the things represented by them.

To the second, That though there be no continuation of Nerves to the Conarion, yet there is of Spirits; which are as able to conveigh the impresses of Motion from externall Sense to the Conarion, as the Aire and AEther the impress of the Stars unto the Eye.

To the third, That the Glandula is conveniently enough placed, so long as the Body is sound, for no excrementitious humours will then overflow it or besmeare it. But in such distempers wherein they doe, Apoplexies, Catalepsies, or such like diseases will arise; which we see doe fall out, let the seat of Common Sense be where it will.

To the last I answer, that the Nerves, when they are once got any thing far into the Brain, are devoid of Tunicles, and be so soft and spongy, that the motion of the Spirits can play through them, and that therefore they may ray through the sides, and so continue their motion to the Conarion, whereever their extremities may seem to tend.

17. But though these Arguments doe not sufficiently confute the Opinion, yet I am not so wedded to it, but I can think something more unexceptionable may be found out, especially it being so much to be suspected, that all Animals have not this Conarion; and then, that what pleased Des-Cartes so much in this Invention, was that he conceited it such a marvelous fine instrument to beat the Animal Spirits into such and such Pores of the Brain, a thing that I cannot at all close with for reasons above alledged. Besides that Stones have been found in this Glandula, and that it is apparent that it is environ'd with a net of veines and arteries, which are indications that it is a part assigned for some more inferiour office. But yet I would not dismiss it without fair play.

18. Wherefore that opinion of the forecited Author, who places the Seat of Common Sense in that part of the Spinall Marrow where the Nerves are suspected to meet, as it is more plain and simple, so it is more irrefutable, supposing that the Soul's Centre of perception (whereby she does not onely apprehend all the Objects of the externall Senses, but does imagine, reason, and freely command and determine the Spirits into what part of the Body she pleases) could be conveniently seated in such dull pasty Matter as the Pith of the Brain is; a thing, I must needs profess, that pleases not my Palate at all, and therefore I will also take leave of this opinion too, and adventure to pronounce, That the chief Seat of the Soule, where she perceives all Objects, where she imagines, reasons, and invents, and from whence she commands all the parts of the Body, is those purer Animal Spirits in the fourth Ventricle of the Brain.

CHAP. VIII.

1. The first reason of his Opinion, the convenient Situation of these Spirits. 2. The second, that the Spirits are the immediate instrument of the Soule in all her functions. 3. The proof of the second Reason from the generall Authority of Philosophers, and particularly of Hippocrates; 4. From our Sympathizing with the changes of the Aire; 5. From the celerity of Motion and Cogitation; 6. From what is observed generally in the Generation of things; 7. From Regius his experiment of a Snaile in a glass; 8. From the running round of Images in a Vertigo; 9. From the constitution of the Eye, and motion of the Spirits there; 10. From the dependency of the actions of the Soule upon the Body, whether in Meditation or corporeall Motion; 11. From the recovery of Motion and Sense into a stupified part; 12. And lastly from what is observed in swooning fits, of paleness and sharpness of visage, &c. 13. The inference from all this, That the Spirits in the fourth Ventricle are the seat of Common Sense, and that the main use of the Brain and Nerves is to preserve the Spirits.

1. THat which makes me embrace this Opinion rather then any other is this, That first, this situation of the common Sensorium betwixt the Head and the trunk of the Body, is the most exactly convenient to receive the impresses of Objects from both, as also to impart Motion to the Muscles in both the Head and in the Body. In which I look upon it as equall with the last Opinion, and superiour to all them that went before. For whatever may be objected is already answered in what I have said to the last Objection against Des-Cartes.

2. But now in the second place, (wherein this opinion of mine has a notorious advantage above all else that I know) It is most reasonable that that Matter, which is the immediate instrument of all the Animal functions of the Soule, should be the chiefest Seat from whence and where she exercises these functions, and if there be any place where there is a freer plenty of the purest sort of this Matter, that her peculiar residence should be there. Now the immediate instrument of the functions of the Soule is that thinner Matter which they ordinarily call Animal Spirits, which are to be found in their greatest purity and plenty in the fourth Ventricle of the Brain. From whence it must follow that that precious and choice part of the Soule which we call the Centre of perception is to be placed in that Ventricle, not in any pith of the Brain thereabout, but in the midst of these Spirits themselves; for that is the most naturall situation for the commanding them into the parts of the Head and Body, besides a more delicate and subtile use of them at home, in pursuing various imaginations and inventions.

3. That this thin and Spirituous Matter is the immediate engine of the Soule in all her operations, is in a manner the generall opinion of all Philosophers. And even those that have placed the Common Sensorium in the Heart, have been secure of the truth of this their conceit, because they took it for granted, that the left Ventricle thereof was the fountain of these pure and subtile Spirits, and please themselves very much, in that they fancied that Oracle of Physitians, the grave and wise Hippocrates, to speak their own sense so fully and significantly, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 that is to say, That the mind of man is in the left Ventricle of his Heart, and that it is not nourished from meats and drinks from the belly, but by a clear and luminous Substance that redounds by separation from the blood: which is that which happens exactly in the Brain. For the Spirits there are nothing else but more pure and subtill parts of the blood, whose tenuity and agitation makes them separate from the rest of the mass thereof, and so replenish the Ventricles of the Brain.

4. Moreover our sympathizing so sensibly with the changes of the Aire, which Hippocrates also takes notice of, that in clear Aire our thoughts are more clear, and in cloudy more obscure and dull, is no slight indication that that which conveighs Sense, Thoughts and Passions immediately to the Soule, is very tenuious and delicate, and of a nature very congenerous to the Aire with which it changes so easily.

5. The strange Agility also of Motions and Cogitations that we find in our selves, has forced the most sluggish witts, even such as have been so gross as to deem the Soule Corporeall, yet to chuse the freest, subtilest and most active Matter to compound her of, that their imaginations could excogitate. And Lucretius, the most confident of the Epicurean Sect, thinks he has hit the naile on the head in his choice, De rerum Nat. lib. 3. where he concludes thus, Nunc igitur quoniam est animi natura reperta Mobilis egregie, per quam constare necesse est Corporibus parvis & laevibus atque rotundis: whose testimony I account the better in this case, by how much the more crass Philosopher he is, the necessity of the tenuity of particles that are to pervade the Body of a Man being convinced hence to be so plain, that the dimmest eyes can easily discover it.

6. But we will advance higher to more forcible Arguments, amongst which this, I think, may find some place, That we cannot discover any immediate operation of any kind of Soule in the world, but what it first works upon that Matter which participates in a very great measure of this fineness and tenuity of parts, which will easily yield and be guided; as may be universally observed in all Generations, where the Body is alwaies organized out of thin fluid liquor, that will easily yield to the plastick power of the Soule. In which I doe not doubt but it takes the advantage of moving the most subtile parts of all first, such as Des-Cartes his first and second element, which are never excluded from any such humid and tenuious substance: which elements of his are that true Heavenly or AEthereal matter which is every where, as Ficinus somewhere saith Heaven is; and is that fire which Trismegist affirms is the most inward vehicle of the minde, and the instrument that God used in the forming of the world, and which the Soul of the world, whereever she acts, does most certainly still use.

7. And to make yet a step further, That ocular demonstration that Henricus Regius brings Philos. Natur. lib. 4. cap. 16. seems to me both ingenious and solid. It is in a Snail, such as have no shells, moving in a glass: so soon as she begins to creep, certain Bubbles are discovered to move from her tail to her head; but so soon as she ceases moving, those Bubbles cease. Whence he concludes, That a gale of spirits that circuit from her head along her back to her tail, and thence along her belly to her head again, is the cause of her progressive motion.

8. That such thin Spirits are the immediate instruments of Sense, is also discovered by what is observed in a Vertigo. For the Brain it self is not of such a fluid substance as to turn round, and to make external Objects seem to doe so. Wherefore it is a sign that the immediate corporeal instrument of conveying the images of things is the Spirits in the Brain.

9. And that they are the chief Organ of Sight is plain in the exteriour parts of the Eye; for we may easily discern how full they are of that 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , pure and lucid substance which Hippocrates speaks of, though he seat it in a wrong place; and how upon the passions of the minde these Spirits ebbe or flow in the Eye, and are otherwise wonderful-significantly modified, insomuch that the Soul even seems to speak through them, in that silent voice of Angels, which some fancy to be by nothing but by dumb shews, but I doe not at all believe it. It is also plain enough, that dimness of sight comes from deficiency of these Spirits, though the parts of the Eye otherwise be entire enough. The wider opening also of the pupill of one Eye upon the shutting of the other does indicate the flux and more copious presence of Spirits there, as Galen has ingeniously collected.

10. To which we may adde that in those more noble operations of the Minde, when she meditates and excogitates various Theorems, that either she uses some part of the Body as an Instrument then, or acts freely and independently of the Body. That the latter is false is manifest from hence, that then the change of Air, or Distemper and Diseasedness, could not prejudice her in her Inventive and purely Intellectuall Operations; but it is manifest that they doe, and that a mans Minde is much more cloudy one time then another, and in one Country then another, whence is that proverbiall Verse, Boeotûm crasso jurares aere natum. If she uses any part of the Body, it must be either these animal Spirits, or the Brain. That it is not the Brain, the very consistency thereof so clammy and sluggish is an evident demonstration, which will still have the more force, if we consider what is most certainly true, That the Soul has not any power, or else exceeding little, of moving Matter; but her peculiar priviledge is of determining Matter in motion; which the more subtile and agitated it is, the more easily by reason of its own mobility is it determined by her. For if it were an immediate faculty of the Soul to contribute motion to any matter, I doe not understand how that faculty never failing nor diminishing no more then the Soul it self can fail or diminish, that we should ever be weary of motion. In so much that those nimble-footed Maenades or she-Priests of Bacchus, with other agile Virgins of the Country, which Dionysius describes dancing in the flowry meadows of Maeander and Cayster, might, if life and limbs would last, be found dancing there to this very day, as free and frolick as wanton Kids (as he pleases to set out their activity) and that without any lassitude at all. For that immediate motive faculty of the Soul can still as fresh as ever impart motion to all the Body, and sooner consume it into air or ashes by heating and agitating it, then make her self weary or the Body seem so. Wherefore it is plain that that motion or heat that the Soul voluntarily confers upon the Body is by vertue of the Spirits, which she, when they are playing onely and gently toying amongst themselves, sends forth into the exteriour members, and so agitates and moves them: but they being so subtile and dissipable, the Soul spends them in using of them; and they being much spent, she can hardly move the Body any longer, the sense whereof we call Lassitude. These are the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 of Hippocrates, and the Souls immediate engine of motion through all the parts of the Body.

11. As they are also of Sense in the more remote parts, as well as in the Head, as Spigelius handsomely insinuates by that ordinary example of a mans legge being stupified or asleep, as some call it, by compression or whatever hinderance may be of the propagation of the Spirits into that part. For as sense and motion is restored, a man may plainly feel something creep into it tingling and stinging like Pismires, as he compares it; which can be nothing but the Spirits forcing their passage into the part. Wherein what they suffer is made sensible to the Soul, they being her immediate Vehicle of life and sense.

12. Lastly, in swooning fits, when motion and sense fails, the exteriour parts are pale and fallen, the Face looking more lean and sharp; of which there can be no other meaning, then that that benign gale of vital air, that fill'd up the parts before, is now absent and retreated from them; that is, that the fluid Spirits are retired, without which no sense nor motion can be performed: whence it is apparent that they are the immediate instrument of both.

13. I have proved that the Animal Spirits are the Souls immediate organ for sense and motion. If therefore there be any place where these Spirits are in the fittest plenty and purity, and in the most convenient situation for Animal functions; that in all reason must be concluded the chief seat and Acropolis of the Soul. Now the Spirits in the middle ventricle of the brain are not so indifferently situated for both the Body and the Head, as those in the fourth are; nor so pure. The upper Ventricles, being two, are not so fit for this office, that is so very much one and singular. Besides that the sensiferous impresses of motion through the eyes play under them; to say nothing how the Spirits here are less defaecate also then in the fourth Ventricle. Wherefore there being sufficient plenty, and greatest purity, and fittest situation of the Spirits in this fourth Ventricle, it is manifest that in these is placed the Centre of Perception, & that they are the common Sensorium of the Soul. And that as the Heart pumps out Blood perpetually to supply the whole Body with nourishment, and to keep up the bulk of this edifice for the Soul to dwell in, as also from the more subtile and agile parts thereof, to replenish the Brain and Nerves with Spirits, which are the immediate instrument of the Soul for Sense and Motion; so it is plain likewise that the main use of the Brain and Nerves is to keep these subtile Spirits from over speedy dissipation, and that the Brain with its Caverns is but one great round Nerve; as the Nerves with their invisible porosities are but so many smaller productions or slenderer prolongations of the Brain.

CHAP. IX.

1. Several Objections against Animal Spirits. 2. An Answer to the first Objection touching the Porosity of the Nerves. 3. To the second and third from the Extravasation of the Spirits and pituitous Excrements found in the Brain. 4. To the fourth fetcht from the incredible swiftness of motion in the Spirits. 5. To the last from Ligation. 6. Undeniable Demonstrations that there are Animall Spirits in the Ventricles of the Brain.

1. BEfore we proceed to our other two Enquiries, we are forced to make a stop a while, and listen to some few Objections made by some late Authours, who against the common stream of all other Philosophers, Physitians and Anatomists, are not ashamed to deny that there are any such things as Spirits in the Body; or at least that there are any in the Ventricles of the Brain. For as for the Nerves, say they, they have no Pores or Cavities to receive them; and besides, it is plain that what is fluid in them is nothing but a milky white juice, as is observed in the pricking of a Nerve. And as for the Ventricles of the Brain, those Cavities are too big, and the Spirits if they issue into them, will be as extravasated Blood, whence they must needs be spoiled and corrupt. Besides that they will evaporate at those passages through which the mucous or pituitous excrements pass from the Brain. Whose appearance there is, say they, another great argument that these Ventricles were intended onely for receptacles and conveyances of such excrementitious Humours which the Brain discharges it self of. Lastly, if Spontaneous Motion be made by means of these Spirits, it could not be so extremely sudden as it is, for we can wagge our finger as quick as thought, but corporeal Motion cannot be so swift. And if the Spirits be continued from the Head to the Finger, suppose, in the ligation of the Nerve there would be sense from the Ligature to the Fingers end; which is, say they, against Experience. These are the main Objections I have met withall in Hofman and others; but are such as I think are very easily answered: and indeed they doe in some sort clash some of them one with another.

2. For how can the Nerves derive juice if they have no Pores, or are not so much as passable to these thin active Spirits we speak of? or from whence can we better conceive that juice to arise, then from these Spirits themselves, as they loose their agitation, and flag into a more gross consistency?

3. Neither can the Spirits be looked upon as extravasated in the Ventricles of the Brain, more then the Blood in the Auricles or Ventricles of the Heart. Nor is there any fear of their sliding away through the Infundibulum, the pituitous excrements having no passage there but what they make by their weight, as well as their insinuating moistness, which always besmearing these parts makes them more impervious to the light Spirits, whose agility also and componderancy with the outward Aire renders them uncapable of leaving the Caverns in which they are. That arguing from the pituitous excrements found there, that they were made onely for a Receptacle of such useless redundancy, is as ineptly inferred, as if a man should argue from what is found in the Intestinum rectum, that the Stomack and all the Intestines were made for a Receptacle of Stercoreous excrement. The Spirits in the Ventricles of the Brain, playing about and hitting against the sides of the Caverns they are in, will in process of time abate of their agitation, the grosser parts especially; and so necessarily come to a more course consistency, and settle into some such like moist Sediment as is found at the bottome of the Ventricles, which nature dischargeth through fit passages, whereby the Spirits are left more pure. But because this necessary faeculency is found in these Cavities, to conclude that that is the onely use of them, is as ridiculous as to inferre That because I spit at my Mouth, and blow my Nose, that that was the chief end and use of these two parts of my Body, or that my Eyes were not made for seeing, but weeping.

4. The nature of the swiftness of Motion in these Spirits is much like that of Light, which is a Body as well as they. But that Lucid Matter in the Sun does not, so soon as he appears upon the Horizon, fly so many thousand miles in a moment to salute our eyes; but Motion is propagated as it were at once from the Sun to our Eye through the aethereal Matter betwixt. Or suppose a long Tube, as long as you will, and one to blow in it; in a moment, so soon as he blows at one end, the Motion will be felt at the other, and that downwards as well as upwards, and as easily; to satisfie that other frivolous Objection I find in Hofman, as if it were so hard a business that these Spirits should be commanded downwards into the Nerves. But the Opposers of this ancient and solid Opinion are very simple and careless.

5. That of the Ligature proves nothing. For though the Nerve betwixt the Ligature and the Finger be well enough stored with Spirits, yet the Centre of Perception being not there, and there being an interruption and division betwixt the Spirits that are continued to their Common Sensorium, and these on the other side of the Ligature; 'tis no more wonder, that we feel nothing on this side of the Ligature, then that we see nothing in our neighbours garden, when a wall is betwixt, though the Sun shine clearly on both sides of the wall.

6. We see how invalid their Arguments are against this received Opinion of almost all both Physitians and Philosophers: It is needless to produce any for the confirmation of it, those which we have made use of for proving that the Spirits are the immediate Instrument of the Soule, being of equall force most of them to conclude their existence in the Body. And yet for an overplus I will not much care to cast in a brief suggestion of the use of the Lungs, which the best Physitians and Anatomists adjudge to be chiefly for conveighing prepared aire to the Heart; as also of the Rete mirabile and Plexus Choroides, whose bare situation discover their use, that they may more plentifully evaporate the thinner and more agile particles of the Blood into the Ventricles of the Brain. The Diastole also of the Brain keeping time with the Pulse of the Heart, is a manifest indication, what a vehement steam of Spirits, by the direct and short passage of the Arteriae Carotides, are carried thither. For if one part of the Blood be more fiery and subtill then another, it will be sure to reach the Head. From whence considering the sponginess & laxness of the Brain, and thinness of the Tunicles in the little Arteries that are there; it will follow by Mechanical necessity that the Ventricles thereof will be filled with that 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 which Hippocrates so fitly describes, though he fancy the Seat of it in an unfitting place. But the purest of these Spirits being in the fourth Ventricle, as Bartholine and others have judiciously concluded, it follows plainly from what has been alledged, That the Common Sensorium is to be placed in the midst of these purer Spirits of the fourth Ventricle of the Brain.

CHAP. X.

1. That the Soule is not confined to the Common Sensorium. 2. The first Argument from the Plastick power of the Soule. 3. Which is confirmed from the graduall dignity of the Soules Faculties, of which this Plastick is the lowest; 4. Externall Sensation the next; 5. After that Imagination, and then Reason. 6. The second Argument from Passions and Sympathies in Animals. 7. An illustration of the manner of naturall Magick. 8. The third Argument from the Perception of Pain in the exteriour parts of the Body. 9. The fourth and last from the nature of Sight.

1. WE are now at leisure to resume the two remaining Enquiries; the former whereof is, whether the Soule be so in this fourth Ventricle, that it is essentially no where else in the Body, or whether it be spread out into all the Members. Regius would coup it up in the Conarion, which he believes to be the Common Sensorium, and so by consequence it should be confined to the fourth Ventricle, and not expatiate at all thence, supposing that the Seat of Common Sense. The reason of this conceit of his is this, That whatever is in the rest of the Body, may come to pass by powers meerly Mechanical; wherein he does very superstitiously tread in the footsteps of his Master Des-Cartes. But for my own part, I cannot but dissent, I finding in neither any sufficient grounds of so novell an Opinion, but rather apparent reasons to the contrary.

2. As first the Frame of the Body, of which I think most reasonable to conclude the Soule her self to be the more particular Architect (for I will not wholly reject Plotinus his opinion;) and that the Plastick power resides in her, as also in the Soules of Brute animals, as very learned and worthy Writers have determined. That the Fabrick of the Body is out of the concurse of Atomes, is a meer precarious Opinion, without any ground or reason. For Sense does not discover any such thing, the first rudiments of life being out of some liquid homogeneall Matter; and it is against reason, that the tumbling of Atomes or corporeall particles should produce such exquisite frames of creatures, wherein the acutest wit is not able to find any thing inept, but all done exquisitely wel everywhere, where the foulness and courseness of Matter has not been in fault. That God is not the immediate Maker of these Bodyes, the particular miscarriages demonstrate. For there is no Matter so perverse and stubborn but his Omnipotency could tame; whence there would be no Defects nor Monstrosities in the generation of Animals. Nor is it so congruous to admit, that the Plastick faculty of the Soul of the World is the sole contriver of these Fabricks of particular creatures (though I will not deny but she may give some rude preparative stroaks towards Efformation:) but that in every particular world, such as Man is especially, his own Soule is the peculiar and most perfective Architect thereof, as the Soule of the World is of it. For this vitall Fabrication is not as in artificiall Architecture, when an external person acts upon Matter, but implies a more particular and near union with that Matter it thus intrinsecally shapes out and organizes. And what ought to have a more particular and close union with our Bodies then our Souls themselves? My opinion is therefore, That the Soule, which is a Spirit, and therefore contractible and dilatable, begins within less compass at first in Organizing the fitly-prepared Matter, and so bears it self on in the same tenour of work till the Body has attained its full growth; and that the Soule dilates it self in the dilating of the Body, and so possesses it through all the members thereof.

3. The congruity of this Truth will further discover it self, if we consider the nature of the faculties of the Soule (of which you may read more fully in Enthusiasmus Triumphatus Artic. 3, 4, 5.) in what a natural graduality they arise till they come to the most free of all. The deepest or lowest is this Plastick power we have already spoke of, in virtue whereof is continued that perpetuall Systole and Diastole of the Heart, as I am more prone to think then that it is meerly Mechanical, as also that Respiration that is performed without the command of our Will: For the Libration or Reciprocation of the Spirits in the Tensility of the Muscles would not be so perpetuall, but cease in a small time, did not some more mysticall Principle then what is meerly Mechanical give Assistance, as any one may understand by observing the insufficiency of those devices that Henricus Regius propounds for adaequate causes of such motions in the Body. These I look upon as the First Faculties of the Soule, which may be bounded by this generall character, That the exercise of them does not at all imply so much as our Perception.

4. Next to these is the Sensation of any externall Object, such as Hearing, Seeing, Feeling, &c. All which include Perception in an unresistible necessity thereof, the Object being present before us, and no externall Obstacle interposing.

5. Imagination is more free, we being able to avoid its representations for the most part, without any externall help; but it is a degree on this side Will and Reason, by which we correct and silence unallowable fancies. Thus we see how the Faculties of the Soule rise by Degrees; which makes it still the more easy and credible, that the lowest of all is competible to her as well as the highest.

6. Moreover, Passions and Sympathies, in my judgment, are more easily to be resolved into this Hypothesis of the Souls pervading the whole Body, then in restraining its essentiall presence to one part thereof. For to believe that such an horrible Object as, suppose, a Bear or Tiger, by transmission of Motion from it through the eyes of an Animal to the Conarion, shall so reflect thence, as to determine the Spirits into such Nerves as will streighten the Orifice of the Heart, and lessen the Pulse, and cause all other symptomes of Fear; seems to me little better then a meer piece of Mechanical Credulity. Those Motions that represent the Species of things, being turned this way or the other way, without any such impetus of Matter as should doe such feats as Des-Cartes speaks of in his Book of Passions. And that which he would give us as a pledg of this Truth is so false, that it does the more animate me to dis-believe the Theorem, Artic. 13. For the wafting of one's hand neare the Eye of a mans friend, is no sufficient proof That externall Objects will necessarily and Mechanically determine the Spirits into the Muscles, no Faculty of the Soule intermedling. For if one be fully assured, or rather can keep himself from the fear of any hurt, by the wafting of his friends Hand before his Eye, he may easily abstain from winking: But if fear surprise him, the Soule is to be entitled to the action, and not the meer Mechanisme of the Body. Wherefore this is no proof that the Phaenomena of Passions, with their consequences, may be salved in brute Beasts by pure Mechanicks; and therefore neither in Men: but it is evident that they arise in us against both our Will and Appetite. For who would bear the tortures of Fears and Jealousies, if he could avoid it? And therefore the Soule sends not nor determines the Spirits thus to her own Torture, as she resides in the Head. Whence it is plain that it is the effect of her as she resides in the Heart and Stomack, which sympathize with the horrid representation in the Common Sensorium, by reason of the exquisite unity of the Soul with her self, & of the continuity of Spirits in the Body, the necessary instrument of all her Functions. And there is good reason the Heart & Stomack should be so much affected, they being the chief Seats of those Faculties that maintain the life of the Body▪ the danger whereof is the most eminent Object of Fear in any Animal.

7. From this Principle, I conceive that not onely the Sympathy of parts in one particular Subject, but of different and distant Subjects, may be understood: such as is betwixt the party wounded, and the Knife or Sword that wounded him, besmeared with the Weapon-salve, and kept in a due temper: Which certainly is not purely Mechanical, but Magical, though not in an unlawful sense; that is to say, it is not to be resolved into meer Matter, of what thinness or subtilty soever you please, but into the Unity of the Soul of the Universe, and Continuity of the subtile Matter, which answers to our Animal Spirits. And in this sense it is that Plotinus sayes, that the World is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , the grand Magus or Enchanter. And I doe not question, but that upon this score meerly, without the association of any Familiar Spirit, several odde things may be done, for evil as well as good. For this Spirit of the World has Faculties that work not by Election, but fatally or naturally, as several Gamaitus we meet withall in Nature seem somewhat obscurely to subindicate. Of this Principle we shall speak more fully in its due place.

8. But we have yet a more clear discovery, that our Soul is not confined to any one part of the Head, but possesses the whole Body, from the Perception of Pain in the parts thereof: For it is plainly impossible, that so high a torture as is felt but in the pricking of a Pin, can be communicated to the Centre of Perception upon a meer Mechanical account. For whether the immediate Instrument of Sense be the Pith of the Nerves, as Des-Cartes would have it, or whether it be the Spirits, as is most true; it is ridiculous to think, that by the forcible parting of what was joyned together at ease (when this case is not communicated to either the Spirits, or Pith of the Nerves, from the place of the Puncture, to the very seat of Common Sense) that the Soul there seated should feel so smart a torment, unless that her very Essence did reach to the part where the pain is felt to be. For then the reason of this is plain, that it is the Unity of Soul possessing the whole Body, and the Continuity of Spirits that is the cause thereof. And it is no wonder, if the continuation and natural composure of the Spirits be Rest and Ease to the Soul, that a violent disjoyning and bruising of them, and baring the Soul of them, as I may so speak, should cause a very harsh and torturous sense in the Centre of Perception. This Argument bears undeniable Evidence with it, if we doe but consider the fuzziness of the Pith of the Nerves, and the fluidity of the Spirits, and what little stress or crouding so small a thing as a Pin or Needle can make in such soft and liquid Matter.

9. Lastly, unless the very Essence of the Soul reach from the Common Sensorium to the Eye, there will be very great difficulties how there should be so distinct a representation of any visible Object: for it is very hard to conceive that the Colours will not be confounded, and the bigness of the Object diminished, and indeed that the image will not be quite lost before it can come to the Soul, if it be onely in the Common Sensorium. For it is plain, and experience will demonstrate that there is a very perfect Image of the Object in the bottome of the Eye, which is made by the decussation of the lines of Motion from it, thus: The Line A. B. from the Object A. C. bears against that point in the bottome of

the Eye in B, and the line C. D. against the point D; whereby C. and A. are felt in their place, and in such a distance as they are in the Object C. A: and so of all the lines which come from the Object C. A. into the bottome of the Eye B. D. From whence the Object is felt in such a length and bredth as it is capable of being perceived in at such a distance from the Eye. And as the Motion that is conveyed from A. to B, and from C. to D, is felt there; so the modification of it, whereby the Object in those parts may seem red, yellow, green, or any other colour, is felt there also. Whence it is plain that there will be an exquisite impression, according to all circumstances of the Object, in the bottome of the Eye: so that if the Soul receive it there, and convey it thence to her Centre of Perception intirely in the same circumstances, the representation will be compleat. But if the Soul be not there, but the conveyance thereof must be left to the bare laws of Matter, the Image will be much depraved, or lost, before it can come to the Common Sensorium. For this Motion must be propagated from B and D, till it come to the hole E, and so pass into the Optick Nerve, to be carried into the Brain, and so to the seat of Common Sense: but betwixt B and E, or D and E, there may be the depainture of sundry colours, whence it will be necessary that F be tinctured with the colour D, and G with the colour of both D and F; and so of the rest of the Lines drawn from the Object to the Eye: so that all their colours would be blended before they came to E. Now at that harsh flexure at E, where the visual Line is as crooked as B E R, according to the experiments of Reflection and Refraction, the breadth or length of the Object C A. would be lost. For we must needs expect, that as it is in Reflections and Refractions, where the Object will appear in that Line that immediately conveys the sense of it, so here it must be also, and therefore the point C and A must appear about Q, whence the Object will shrivel up in a manner into nothing. And suppose it might appear in some tolerable latitude, for all this, the Brain being an opake substance, so soon as the Motion comes thither, it would be so either changed or lost, that the Image could not pass the opacity of it, in any splendour or entireness. Wherefore I do not doubt but that the Image which the Soul perceives is that in the Eye, and not any other corporeally producted to the inside of the Brain (where Colour and Figure would be so strangely depraved, if not quite obliterated) I mean it is the concourse of the lucid Spirits in the bottome of the Eye, with the outward Light conveyed through the Humours thereof (which is the best sense of the Platonick 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 that Plutarch speaks of) wherein the great Mystery of Sight consists.

CHAP. XI.

1. That neither the Soul without the Spirits, nor the Spirits without the presence of the Soul in the Organ, are sufficient causes of Sensation. 2. A brief declaration how Sensation is made. 3. How Imagination. 4. Of Reason and Memory, and whether there be any Marks in the Brain. 5. That the Spirits are the immediate Instrument of the Soul in Memory also; and how Memory arises; 6. As also Forgetfulness. 7. How spontaneous Motion is performed. 8. How we walk, sing, and play, though thinking of something else. 9. That though the Spirits be not alike fine every where, yet the Sensiferous Impression will pass to the Common Sensorium. 10. That there is an Heterogeneity in the very Soul her self; and what it is in her we call the Root, the Centre, and the Eye; and what the Rayes and Branches. 11. That the sober and allowable Distribution of her into Parts, is into Perceptive and Plastick.

1. AFter our evincing that the Soul is not confined to the Common Sensorium, but does essentially reach all the Organs of the Body; it will be more easy to determine the Nature of Sensation and other Operations we mentioned. For we have already demonstrated these two things of main consequence; That the Spirits are not sufficient of themselves for these Functions; nor the Soul of her self, without the assistance of the Spirits: as is plain in the interception or disjunction of the Spirits by Ligature or Obstruction; whence it is, that Blindness sometimes happens meerly for that the Optick Nerve is obstructed.

2. Wherefore briefly to dispatch our third Querie; I say in general, That Sensation is made by the arrival of motion from the Object to the Organ; where it is received in all the circumstances we perceive it in, and conveyed by vertue of the Souls presence there, assisted by her immediate Instrument the Spirits, by vertue of whose continuity to those in the Common Sensorium, the Image or Impress of every Object is faithfully transmitted thither.

3. As for Imagination, there is no question but that Function is mainly exercised in the chief seat of the Soul, those purer Animal Spirits in the fourth Ventricle of the Brain. I speak especially of that Imagination which is most free, such as we use in Romantick Inventions, or such as accompany the more severe Meditations and Disquisitions in Philosophy, or any other Intellectuall entertainments. For Fasting, fresh Aire, moderate Wine, and all things that tend to an handsome supply and depuration of the Spirits, make our thoughts more free, subtile, and clear.

4. Reason is so involved together with Imagination, that we need say nothing of it apart by it self. Memory is a Faculty of a more peculiar consideration; and if the Pith of the Brain contribute to the Functions of any power of the mind, (more then by conserving the Animal Spirits) it is to this. But that the Brain should be stored with distinct images (whether they consist of the Flexures of the supposed Fibrillae, or the orderly puncture of Pores, or in a continued modified Motion of the parts thereof, some in this manner, and others in that) is a thing, as I have already proved, utterly impossible. If there be any Marks in it, it must be a kind of Brachygraphie, some small dots here and there standing for the recovering to Memory a series of things that would fill, it may be, many sheets of paper to write them at large. As if a man should tie a string about a friends finger to remember a business, that a whole daies discourse, it may be, was but little enough to give him full instructions in. From whence it is plain that the Memory is in the Soule, and not in the Brain. And if she doe make any such Marks as we speak of, she having no perception of them distinct from the representation of those things which they are to remind her of, she must not make them by any Cognitive power, but by some such as is Analogous to her Plastick Faculty of organizing the Body, where she acts and perceives it not.

5. But whether the Soule act thus or no upon the Brain, is a Matter of uncertain determination; nor can it be demonstrated by any experiment that I know. And therefore if we will contain our selves within the capacities of the Spirits, which I have so often affirmed to be the immediate instrument of the Soule in all her operations, that Position will be more unexceptionable. And truly I doe not understand but that they and the Soule together will perform all the Functions of Memory that we are conscious to our selves of. And therefore I shall conclude that Memory consists in this, That the Soule has acquired a greater Promptitude to think of this, or that Phantasm, with the circumstances thereof, which were raised in her upon some occasion. Which Promptitude is acquired by either the often representation of the same Phantasme to her; or else by a more vivid impress of it from its novelty, excellency, mischievousness, or some such like condition that at once will pierce the Soule with an extraordinary resentment; or finally by voluntary attention, when she very carefully and on set purpose imprints the Idea as deeply as she can into her inward Sense. This Promptitude to think on such an Idea will lessen in time, and be so quite spent, that when the same Idea is represented again to the Soule, she cannot tell that ever she saw it before. But before this inclination thereto be quite gone, upon this proneness to return into the same conception, with the circumstances, the Relative Sense of having seen it before (which we call Memory) does necessarily emerge upon a fresh representation of the Object.

6. But Forgetfulness arises either out of meer Desuetude of thinking on such an Object, or on others that are linked in with it, in such a Series as would represent it as past, and so make it a proper Object of Memory. Or else for that the Spirits, which the Soule uses in all her Functions, be not in a due temper; which may arise from overmuch Coolness, or Waterishness in the Head, to which alone Sennertus ascribes Obliviousness.

7. The last thing we are to consider is Spontaneous Motion. Which that it is performed by the continuation of the Spirits from the Seat of Common Sense to the Muscles, which is the gross Engine of Motion, is out of doubt. The manner how it is, we partly feel and see; that is to say, we find in our selves a power, at our own pleasure to move this or the other member with very great force, and that the Muscle swels that moves the part; which is a plain indication of influx of Spirits, thither directed or there guided by our meer Will: a thing admirable to consider, and worth our most serious meditation. That this direction of the impresse of Motion is made by our meer Will, and Imagination of doing so, we know and feel it so intimately, that we can be of nothing more sure. That there is some fluid and subtile Matter, which we ordinarily call Spirits, directed into the Muscle that moves the Member, its swelling does evidence to our sight; as also the experience, that moderate use of wine which supplyes Spirits apace, will make this motion the more strong. As for the manner, whether there be any such Valvulae or no in the Nerve, common to the opposite Muscles, as also in those that are proper to each, it is not materiall. This great priviledge of our Soules directing the motion of Matter thus, is wonderfull enough in either Hypothesis. But I look upon the Fibrous parts of the Muscle as the main engine of motion; which the Soule moistning with that subtil liquor of the Animal Spirits, makes them swell and shrink, like Lute-strings in rainy weather: And in this chiefly consists that notable strength of our Limbs in spontaneous motion. But for those conceived Valvulae that Experience has not found out yet, nor sufficient Reason, they are to wait for admission till they bring better evidence. For the presence of the Animal Spirits in this Fibrous flesh, and the command of the Soule to move, is sufficient to salve all Phaenomena of this kind. For upon the Will conceived in the Common Sensorium, that part of the Soule that resides in the Muscles, by a power near a-kin to that by which she made the Body and the Organs thereof, guides the Spirits into such Pores and parts, as is most requisite for the shewing the use of this excellent Fabrick.

8. And in virtue of some such power as this, doe we so easily walk, though we think not of it, as also breath, and sing, and play on the Lute, though our Mindes be taken up with something else. For Custome is another Nature: and though the Animal Spirits, as being meerly corporeall, cannot be capable of any habits; yet the Soule, even in that part thereof that is not Cognitive, may, and therefore may move the Body, though Cogitation cease; provided the members be well replenished with Spirits, whose assistance in naturall motions of Animals is so great, that their Heads being taken off, their Body for a long time will move as before: as Chalcidius relates of Wasps and Hornets, who will fly about, and use their wings, a good part of an houre after they have lost their Heads: which is to be imputed to the residence of their Soule in them still, and the intireness of the Animal Spirits, not easily evaporating through their crustaceous Bodies. For it is but a vulgar conceit to think, that the Head being taken off, the Soule must presently fly out, like a Bird out of a Basket, when the Lid is lifted up. For the whole World is as much throng'd with Body, as where she is; and that Tye of the Spirits as yet not being lost, it is a greater engagement to her to be there then any where else. This motion therefore in the Wasp, that is so perfect and durable, I hold to be vitall; but that in the parts of dismembred creatures, that are less perfect, may be usually Mechanicall.

9. We have now, so far forth as it is requisite for our design, considered the Nature and Functions of the Soule; and have plainly demonstrated, that she is a Substance distinct from the Body, and that her very Essence is spread throughout all the Organs thereof: as also that the generall instrument of all her Operations is the subtile Spirits; which though they be not in like quantity and sincerity every where, yet they make all the Body so pervious to the impresses of Objects upon the externall Organs, that like Lightning they pass to the Common Sensorium. For it is not necessary that the Medium be so fine and tenuious as the Matter where the most subtile motion begins. Whence Light passes both Aire and Water, though Aire alone is not sufficient for such a motion as Light, and Water almost uncapable of being the Seat of the fountain thereof. This may serve to illustrate the passage of Sense from the Membranes (or in what other seat soever the Spirits are most subtil and lucid) through thicker places of the Body to the very Centre of Perception.

10. Lastly, we have discovered a kind of Heterogeneity in the Soule; and that she is not of the same power every where. For her Centre of Perception is confined to the Fourth Ventricle of the Brain; and if the Sensiferous Motions we speak of be not faithfully conducted thither, we have no knowledg of the Object. That part therefore of the Soule is to be looked upon as most precious; and she not being an independent Mass, as Matter is, but one part resulting from another, that which is the noblest is in all reason to be deemed the cause of the rest. For which reason (as Synesius calls God, on whom all things depend, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 ) so, I think this Part may be called the Root of the Soule. Which apprehension of ours will seem the less strange, if we consider that from the highest Life, viz. the Deity, there does result that which has no Life nor Sense at all, to wit the stupid Matter. Wherefore in very good Analogie we may admit, that that pretious part of the Soule in which resides Perception, Sense, and Understanding, may send forth such an Essential Emanation from it self, as is utterly devoid of all Sense and Perception; which you may call, if you will, the Exteriour branches of the Soule, or the Rayes of the Soule, if you call that nobler and diviner part the Centre; which may very well merit also the appellation of the Eye of the Soule, all the rest of its parts being but meer darkness without it. In which, like another Cyclops, it will resemble the World we live in, whose one Eye is conspicuous to all that behold the light.

11. But to leave such lusorious Considerations, that rather gratifie our fancy then satisfy our severer faculties; we shall content our selves hereafter, from those two notorious Powers, and so perfectly different, which Philosophers acknowledg in the Soule, to wit, Perception and Organization, onely to term that more noble part of her in the Common Sensorium, the Perceptive, and all the rest the Plastick part of the Soule.

CHAP. XII.

1. An Answer to an Objection, That our Arguments will as well prove the Immortality of the Souls of Brutes, as of Men. 2. Another Objection inferring the Praeexistence of Brutes Souls, and consequently of ours. 3. The first Answer to the Objection. 4. The second Answer consisting of four parts. 5. First, That the Hypothesis of Praeexistence is more agreeable to Reason then any other Hypothesis. 6. And not onely so, but that it is very solid in it self. 7. That the Wisdome and Goodness of God argue the truth thereof. 8. As also the face of Providence in the World. 9. The second part of the second Answer, That the Praeexistence of the Soul has the suffrage of all Philosophers in all Ages, that held it Incorporeal. 10. That the Gymnosophists of AEgypt, the Indian Brachmans, the Persian Magi, and all the learned of the Jews were of this Opinion. 11. A Catalogue of particular famous persons that held the same. 12. That Aristotle was also of the same minde. 13. Another more clear place in Aristotle to this purpose, with Sennertus his Interpretation. 14. An Answer to an evasion of that Interpretation. 15. The last and clearest place of all out of Aristotles Writings.

1. HAving thus discovered the Nature of the Soul, and that she is a Substance distinct from the Body; I should be in readiness to treat of her Separation from it, did I not think my self obliged first, to answer an envious Objection cast in our way, whereby they would make us believe, that the Arguments which we have used, though they be no less then Demonstrations, are meer Sophisms, because some of them, and those of not the least validity, prove what is very absurd and false, viz. That the Souls of Brutes also are Substances Incorporeal, distinct from the Body: from whence it will follow, that they are Immortal. But to this I have answered already in the Appendix to my Antidote, &c. Cap. 10. and in brief concluded, That they are properly no more Immortal then the stupid Matter, which never perishes, and that out of a terrestrial Body they may have no more sense then it. For all these things are as it pleases the first Creatour of them.

2. To this they perversly reply, That if the Souls of Brutes subsist after death, and are then sensless and unactive, it will necessarily follow that they must come into Bodies again. For it is very ridiculous to think that these Souls, having a Being yet in the world, and wanting nothing but fitly-prepared Matter to put them in a capacity of living again, should be always neglected, and never brought into play, but that new ones should be daily created in their stead: for those innumerable Myriads of Souls would lie useless in the Universe, the number still increasing even to infinity. But if they come into Bodies again, it is evident that they praeexist: and if the Souls of Brutes praeexist, then certainly the Souls of Men doe so too. Which is an Opinion so wilde and extravagant, that a wry mouth and a loud laughter (the Argument that every Fool is able to use) is sufficient to silence it and dash it out of countenance. No wise man can ever harbour such a conceit as this, which every Idiot is able to confute by consulting but with his own Memory. For he is sure, if he had been before, he could remember something of that life past. Besides the unconceivableness of the Approach and Entrance of these praeexistent Souls into the Matter that they are to actuate.

3. To this may be answered two things. The first, That though indeed it cannot be well denied, but that the concession of the Praeexistence of the Souls of Brutes is a very fair introduction to the belief of the Praeexistence of the Souls of Men also; yet the sequel is not at all necessary, but one may be without the other.

4. The second is this, That if the sequel were granted, that no Absurdity can be detected from thence in Reason, if the prejudices of Education, and the blinde suggestion of unconcerned Faculties, that have no right to vote here, be laid aside. To speak more explicitely, I say, This consequence of our Souls Praeexistence is more agreeable to Reason then any other Hypothesis whatever; has been received by the most learned Philosophers of all Ages, there being scarce any of them that held the Soul of man immortal upon the meer light of Nature and Reason, but asserted also her Praeexistence; That Memory is no fit Judge to appeal to in this Controversy; and lastly, That Traduction and Creation are as intricate and unconceivable as this opposed Opinion.

5. I shall make all these four parts of my Answer good in order. The truth of the first we shall understand, if we compare it with those Opinions that stand in competition with it, which are but two that are considerable. The one is of those that say, the Soule is ex traduce; the other of those that say it is created, upon occasion. The first Opinion is a plain contradiction to the notion of a Soul, which is a Spirit, and therefore of an Indivisible, that is of an Indiscerpible, Essence. The second Opinion implies both an Indignity to the Majesty of God, (in making Him the chief assistant and actour in the highest, freest, and most particular way that the Divinity can be conceived to act, in those abominable crimes of Whoredome, Adultery, Incest, nay Buggery it self, by supplying those foul coitions with new created Souls for the purpose:) and also an injury to the Souls themselves; that they being ever thus created by the immediate hand of God, and therefore pure, innocent and immaculate, should be imprisoned in unclean, diseased and disordered Bodies, where very many of them seem to be so fatally over-mastered, and in such an utter incapacity of closing with what is good and vertuous, that they must needs be adjudged to that extreme calamity which attends all those that forget God. Wherefore these two opinions being so incongruous, what is there left that can seem probable, but the Praeexistency of the Soul?

6. But I shall not press the Reasonableness of this Opinion onely from comparing it with others, but also from the concinnity that is to be found in it self. For as it is no greater wonder that every particular mans Soul that lives now upon Earth should be à mundo condito, then the particular Matter of their Bodies should (which has haply undergone many Millions of Alterations and Modifications, before it lighted into such a contexture as to prove the entire Body of any one person in the world, has been in places unimaginably distant, has filed, it may be, through the triangular passages of as many Vortices as we see Stars in a clear frosty night, and has shone once as bright as the Sun (as the Cartesian Hypothesis would have all the Earth to have done) in so much that we eat, and drink, and cloath our selves with that which was once pure Light and Flame;) so that de facto they do bear the same date with the Creation of the World, that unavoidable certainty of the Praeexistence of the Souls of Brutes does, according to the very concession of our Adversaries, fairly insinuate.

7. But this is not all. Both the Attributes of God, and Face of things in the world, out of which his Providence is not to be excluded, are very strong Demonstrations thereof to Reason unprejudiced. For first, if it be good for the Souls of men to be at all, the sooner they are the better. But we are most certain that the Wisdome and Goodness of God will doe that which is the best; and therefore if they can enjoy themselves before they come into these terrestrial Bodies (it being better for them to enjoy themselves then not) they must be before they come into these Bodies; that is, they must be in a capacity of enjoying themselves without them for long periods of time, before they appeared here in this Age of the World. For nothing hinders but that they may live before they come into the Body, as well as they may after their going out of it: the latter whereof is acknowledged even by them that deny the Praeexistence. Wherefore the Praeexistence of Souls is a necessary result of the Wisdome and Goodness of God, who can no more fail to doe that which is best, then he can to understand it: for otherwise his Wisdome would exceed his Benignity; nay there would be less hold to be taken of his Goodness, then of the Bounty of a very benign and good man, who, we may be well assured, will slip no opportunity of doing good that lies in his power, especially if it be neither damage nor trouble to him; both which hinderances are incompetible to the Deity.

8. Again, the face of Providence in the World seems very much to suit with this Opinion; there being not any so naturall and easy account to be given of those things that seem the most harsh in the affairs of men, as from this Hypothesis, That their Soules did once subsist in some other state; where, in severall manners and degrees, they forfeited the favour of their Creatour. And so according to that just Nemesis that He has interwoven in the constitution of the Universe, and of their own natures, they undergoe several calamities and asperities of fortune, and sad drudgeries of Fate, as a punishment inflicted, or a disease contracted from the severall Obliquities of their Apostasie. Which key is not onely able to unlock that recondite mystery of some particular Mens almost fatal aversness from all Religion and Vertue, their stupidity and dulness and even invincible slowness to these things from their very child-hood, and their uncorrigible propension to all manner of Vice; but also of that squalid forlorneness and brutish Barbarity, that whole Nations for many Ages have layen under, and many doe still lye under at this very day. Which sad Scene of things must needs exceedingly cloud and obscure the wayes of Divine providence, and make them utterly unintelligible; unless some light be let in from the present Hypothesis we speak of. It is plain therefore that there are very weighty Reasons may be found out, to conclude the Praeexistence of Soules. And therefore this Opinion being so demonstrable from this Faculty, and there being no other that can contradict it, (for that the verdict of Memory in this case is invalid I shall prove anon) we are according to the Light of Nature undoubtedly to conclude, that the Soules of Men doe praeexist, by Axiome 5.

9. And as this Hypothesis is Rationall in it self, so has it also gained the suffrage of all Philosophers of all Ages, of any note, that have held the Soule of Man Incorporeal and Immortall. And therefore I am not at all sollicitous what either the Epicureans or Stoicks held concerning this Matter; this contest being betwixt those onely that agree on this Truth, That the Soule is a Substance Immateriall. And such amongst the Philosophers as held it so, did unanimously agree that it does Praeexist. This is so plain, that it is enough onely to make this challenge; every one in the search will satifie himself of the Truth thereof. I shall onely adde, for the better countenance of the business, some few instances herein, as a pledge of the Truth of my generall Conclusion. Let us cast our Eye therefore into what corner of the World we will, that has been famous for Wisdome and Literature, and the wisest of those Nations you shall find the Assertours of this Opinion.

10. In Egypt, that ancient Nurse of all hidden Sciences, that this Opinion was in vogue amongst the wise men there, those fragments of Trismegist doe sufficiently witness. For though there may be suspected some fraud and corruption in severall passages in that Book, in reference to the interest of Christianity; yet this Opinion of the Praeexistency of the Soule, in which Christianity did not interest it self, cannot but be judged, from the Testimony of those Writings, to have been a Branch of the Wisdome of that Nation: of which Opinion not onely the Gymnosophists and other wise men of Egypt were, but also the Brachmans of India, and the Magi of Babylon and Persia; as you may plainly see by those Oracles that are called either Magicall or Chaldaicall, which Pletho and Psellus have commented upon. To these you may adde the abstruse Philosophy of the Jewes, which they call their Cabbala, of which the Soules Praeexistence makes a considerable part; as all the learned of the Jewes doe confess. And how naturally applicable this Theory is to those three first mysterious chapters of Genesis, I have, I hope, with no contemptible success, endeavoured to shew in my Conjectura Cabbalistica.

11. And if I should particularize in persons of this Opinon, truly they are such, of so great fame for depth of Understanding and abstrusest Science, that their testimony alone might seem sufficient to bear down any ordinary modest man into an assent to their doctrine. And in the first place, if we can believe the Cabbala of the Jewes, we must assign it to Moses, the greatest Philosopher certainly that ever was in the world; to whom you may adde Zoroaster, Pythagoras, Epicharmus, Empedocles, Cebes, Euripides, Plato, Euclide, Philo, Virgil, Marcus Cicero, Plotinus, Iamblicus, Proclus, Boethius, Psellus, and severall others which it would be too long to recite. And if it were fit to adde Fathers to Philosophers, we might enter into the same list Synesius and Origen: the latter of whom was surely the greatest Light and Bulwark that antient Christianity had; who unless there had been some very great Matter in it, was far from that levity and vanity, as to entertain an Opinion so vulgarly slighted and neglected by other men: and the same may be said of others that were Christians, as Boethius, Psellus, and the late learned Marsilius Ficinus. But I have not yet ended my Catalogue: that admirable Physitian Johannes Fernelius is also of this perswasion, and is not content to be so himself onely, but discovers those two grand Masters of Medicine, Hippocrates and Galen, to be so too; as you may see in his De abditis rerum causis. Cardan also, that famous Philosopher of his Age, expresly concludes, that the Rationall Soule is both a distinct Being from the Soule of the World, and that it does praeexist before it comes into the Body: and lastly Pomponatius, no friend to the Soules Immortality, yet cannot but confess, that the safest way to hold it, is also therewith to acknowledg her Praeexistence.

12. And that nothing may be wanting to shew the frivolousness of this part of the Objection, we shall also evince that Aristotle, that has the luck to be believed more then most Authors, was of the same opinion, in his Treatise De Anima Lib. 1. Cap. 3. Where he speaks of the necessity of the qualification of the Body that the Soule is to actuate; and blaming those that omit that consideration, sayes, that they are as careless of that Matter, as if it were possible that, according to the Pythagorick fables, any Soule might enter into any Body. Whenas every Animall, as it has its proper species, so it is to have its peculiar form. But those that define otherwise, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , saith he, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , i. e. They speak as if one should affirm that the skil of a Carpenter did enter into a Flute or Pipe; for every Art must use its proper Instruments, and every Soule its proper Body. Where (as Cardan also has observed) Aristotle does not find fault with the opinion of the Soules going out of one Body into another, (which implies their Praeexistence:) but that the Soule of a Beast should goe into the Body of a Man, and the Soule of a Man into a Beasts Body; this is the Absurdity that Aristotle justly rejects, the other Opinion he seems tacitely to allow of.

13. He speaks something more plainly in his De Generat. Animal. Lib. 3. Cap. 11. There are generated, saith he, in the Earth, and in the moisture thereof, Plants and living Creatures; because in the Earth is the moisture, and in the moisture Spirit, and in the whole Universe an Animal warmth or heat; insomuch that in a manner all places are full of Soules, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Adeò ut modo quodam omnia sint Animarum plena, as Sennertus interprets the place: Aristotle understanding by 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , the same that he does afterwards by 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , that Principle we call Soule, according to the nobility whereof he asserts, that Animals are more or less noble; which assertion therefore reaches Humane Soules as well as these of Beasts.

14. Nor can this Text be eluded by being so injurious to Aristotle, as to make him to assert that there is but one Soule in the world, because he sayes 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , not 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . For the text admitting of Sennertus his exposition as well as this other; that which is most reasonable is to be attributed to him. Now if his meaning was, that there is but One Soule in the World that goes through all things, and makes the Universe one great Animal, as the Stoicks would have it, he need not say that all places are in a manner full of this Soule, but absolutely full of it, as our Body is wholly actuated by the Soule in it. And therefore the Sense must be, that all places indeed are in a manner full of Soules: not that they have opportunity to actuate the Matter, and shew their presence there by vitall operation; but are there dormient as to any visible energie, till prepared Matter engage them to more sensible actions.

15. We will adde a third place still more clear, Lib. 2. Chap. 3. where he starts this very question of the Praeexistency of Soules, of the Sensitive and Rationall especially; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , whether both kindes doe 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , that is praeexist, before they come into the Body, or whether the Rationall onely; and he concludes thus, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 i. e. It remains that the rationall or intellectual Soule onely enter from without, as being onely of a nature purely divine, with whose actions the actions of this gross Body have no communication. Concerning which point he concludes like an Orthodox Scholar of his excellent Master Plato; to whose footsteps the closer he keeps, the less he ever wanders from the truth. For in this very place he does plainly profess, what many would not have him so apertly guilty of, that the Soule of man is immortall, and can perform her proper Functions without the help of this terrestriall Body. And thus I think I have made good the two first parts of my answer to the proposed Objection; and have clearly proved, that the Praeexistence of the Soule is an opinion both in it self the most rationall that can be maintained, and has had the suffrage of the renownedst Philosophers in all Ages of the World; and that therefore this sequel from our arguments for the Immortality of the Soule is no discovery of any fallacy in them.

CHAP. XIII.

1. The third part of the second Answer, That the forgetting of the former state is no good argument against the Soules Praeexistence. 2. What are the chief causes of Forgetfulness. 3. That they all conspire, and that in the highest degree, to destroy the memory of the other state. 4. That mischances and Diseases have quite taken away the Memory of things here in this life. 5. That it is impossble for the Soule to remember her former condition without a Miracle. 6. The fourth part of the second Answer, That the entrance of a Praeexistent Soule into a Body is as intelligible as either Creation or Traduction.

1. AS for the two last Difficulties, concerning the Soules Memory of her former state, and the manner of her coming into the Body; I hope I shall with as much ease extricate my self here also, especially in the former. For if we consider what things they are that either quite take away, or exceedingly diminish our Memory in this life; we shall find the concurse of them all, and that in a higher degree, or from stronger causes, contained in our descent into this earthly Body, then we can meet with here: they none of them being so violent as to dislodge us out of it.

2. Now the things that take away our Memory here, are chiefly these; either the want of opportunity of being reminded of a thing, as it happens with many, who rise confident they slept without dreaming such a night, and yet before they goe to bed again, recover a whole Series of representations they had in their last sleep, by something that sell out in the day, without which it had been impossible for them to recall to minde their Dream. Or else, in the second place, Desuetude of thinking of a Matter; whereby it comes to pass, that what we have earnestly meditated, laboured for, and pen'd down with our own hands when we were at Schoole, were it not that we saw our names written under the Exercise, we could not acknowledg for ours when we are grown men. Or lastly, some considerable change in the frame and temper of our Body, whether from some externall mischance, or from some violent Disease, or else from old age, which is disease enough of it self: which often doe exceedingly impaire, if not quite take away, the Memory, though the Soule be still in the same Body.

3. Now all these Principles of Forgetfulness, namely the want of something to reminde us, Desuetude of thinking, and an Extraordinary change in the Body, are more eminently to be found in the Descent of the Soule into these Earthly prisons, then can happen to her for any time of her abode therein. For there is a greater difference, in all probability, betwixt that Scene of things the Soule sees out of the Body and in it, then betwixt what shee sees sleeping and waking: and the perpetuall occursions of this present life continue a long Desuetude of thinking on the former. Besides that their descent hither in all likelihood scarce befalls them but in their state of Silence and Inactivity, in which myriads of Soules may haply be for many Ages, as the maintainers of this Opinion may pretend, by reason of the innumerable expirations of the aëreal periods of life, and the more narrow Lawes of preparing terrestrial Matter. And lastly, her coming into this Earthly Body is a greater and more disadvantageous change, for the utter spoiling of the memory of things she was acquainted with before, then any Mischance or Disease can be for the bringing upon her a forgetfulness of what she has known in this life.

4. And yet that Diseases and Casualties have even utterly taken away all memory, is amply recorded in History. As that Messala Corvinus forgot his own name; that one, by a blow with a stone, forgot all his learning; another, by a fall from an Horse, the name of his Mother and kinsfolks. A young Student of Montpelier, by a wound, lost his Memory so, that he was fain to be taught the letters of the Alphabet again. The like befell a Franciscan after a Feaver. And Thucydides writes of some, who after their recovery from that great Pestilence at Athens, did not onely forget the names and persons of their friends, but themselves too, not knowing who themselves were, nor by what name they were called: Atque etiam quosdam cepisse oblivia rerum Cunctarum, ne que se possent cognoscere ut ipsi; as the Poet Lucretius sadly sets down in his description of that devouring Plague, out of the fore-named Historian.

5. Wherefore without a miracle it is impossible the Soule should remember any particular circumstance of her former condition, though she did really praeexist, and was in a capacity of acting before she came into this Body, (as Aristotle plainly acknowledges she was) her change being far greater by coming into the Body then can ever be made while she staies in it. Which we haply shall be yet more assured of, after we have considered the manner of her descent, which is the last Difficulty objected.

6. I might easily decline this Controversie, by pleading onely, that the entrance of the Soule into the Body, supposing her Praeexistence, is as intelligible as in those other two wayes, of Creation and Traduction. For how this newly-created Soule is infused by God, no man knowes; nor how, if it be traducted from the Parents, both their Soules contribute to the making up a new one. For if there be decision of part of the Soule of the Male, in the injection of his seed into the matrix of the Female, and part of the Female Soule to joyn with that of the Males; besides that the decision of these parts of their Soules makes the Soule a Discerpible essence, it is unconceivable how these two parts should make up one Soule for the Infant: a thing ridiculous at first view. But if there be no decision of any parts of the Soule, and yet the Soule of the Parent be the cause of the Soule of the Childe, it is perfectly an act of Creation; a thing that all sober men conclude incompetible to any particular Creature. It is therfore plainly unintelligible, how any Soul should pass from the Parents into the Body of the seed of the Foetus, to actuate and inform it: which might be sufficient to stop the mouth of the Opposer, that pretends such great obscurities concerning the entrance of Praeexistent Souls into their Bodies.

CHAP. XIV.

1. The knowledge of the difference of Vehicles, and the Soules Union with them, necessary for the understanding how she enters into this Earthly Body. 2. That though the name of Vehicle be not in Aristotle, yet the thing is there. 3. A clearing of Aristotles notion of the Vehicle, out of the Philosophy of Des-Cartes. 4. A full interpretation of his Text. 5. That Aristotle makes onely two Vehicles, Terrestriall and AEthereall; which is more then sufficient to prove the Soul's Oblivion of her former state. 6. That the ordinary Vehicle of the Soule after death is Aire. 7. The duration of the Soule in her severall Vehicles. 8. That the Union of the Soule with her Vehicle does not consist in Mechanicall Congruity, but Vitall. 9. In what Vitall congruity of the Matter consists. 10. In what Vital congruity of the Soule consists, and how it changing, the Soule may be free from her aiery Vehicle, without violent precipitation out of it. 11. Of the manner of the descent of Souls into Earthly Bodies. 12. That there is so little Absurdity in the Praeexistence of Soules, that the concession thereof can be but a very small prejudice to our Demonstrations of her Immortality.

1. BUT I shall spend my time better in clearing the Opinion I here defend, then in perplexing that other that is so gross of it self, that none that throughly understand the nature of the Soule, can so much as allow the possibility thereof: wherefore for the better conceiving, how a Praeexistent Soule may enter this Terrestriall Body, there are two things to be enquired into; the difference of the Vehicles of Soules, and the cause of their union with them. The Platonists doe chiefly take notice of Three kindes of Vehicles, AEthereal, AEreal, and Terrestrial, in every one whereof there may be several degrees of purity and impurity, which yet need not amount to a new Species.

2. This notion of Vehicles, though it be discoursed of most in the School of Plato, yet is not altogether neglected by Aristotle, as appears in his De Generat. Animal. Lib. 2. Cap. 3. where, though he does not use the Name, yet he does expresly acknowledge the Thing it self: For he does plainly affirm, that every Soule partakes of a Body distinct from this organized terrestriall Body, and of a more divine nature then the Elements so called; and that as one Soule is more noble then another, so is the difference of this diviner Body; which yet is nothing else with him then that warmth or heat in the seed, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , which is not fire, but a Spirit contained in the spumeous seed; and in this Spirit a nature analogous to the element of the Stars.

3. Of which neither Aristotle himself had, nor any one else can have, so explicite an apprehension as those that understand the first and second Element of Des-Cartes; which is the most subtill and active Body that is in the World, & is of the very same nature that the Heaven and Stars are, that is to say, is the very Body of Light, (which is to be understood chiefly of the first Element) though so mingled with other Matter here below that it does not shine, but is the Basis of all that naturall warmth in all generations, and the immediate instrument of the Soule, when it organizeth any Matter into the figure or shape of an Animall; as I have also intimated elsewhere, when I proved, that the Spirits are the immediate instrument of the Soule in all Vital and Animal functions. In which Spirits of necessity is contained this Coelestiall Substance, which keeps them from congealing, as it does also all other liquid bodies, and must needs be in the Pores of them; there being no Vacuum in the whole comprehension of Nature.

4. The full and express meaning therefore of Aristotles text must be this, that in the spumeous and watry or terrene moisture of the seed is contained a Body of a more spirituous or aëreal consistency, and in this aëreal or spirituous consistency is comprehended 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , a nature that is analogous or like to the Element of the stars, namely that is of it self aethereal and lucid.

5. And it is this Vehicle that Aristotle seems to assert that the Soule does act in, separate from the Body; as if she were ever either in this terrestrial Body, or in her aethereal one: which if it were true, so vast a change must needs obliterate all Memory of her former condition, when she is once plunged into this earthly prison. But it seems not so probable to me, that Nature admits of so great a Chasme; nor is it necessary to suppose it, for this purpose: the descent of the Soule out of her aiery Vehicle into this terrestrial Body, and besmearing moisture of the first rudiments of life, being sufficient to lull her into an eternall oblivion of whatever hapned to her in that other condition; to say nothing of her long state of Silence and Inactivity before her turn come to revive in an earthly body.

6. Wherefore not letting go that more orderly conceit of the Platonists; I shall make bold to assert, that the Soule may live and act in an aëreal Vehicle as well as in the aethereal; and that there are very few that arrive to that high happiness, as to acquire a Coelestial Vehicle immediatly upon their quitting the terrestrial one: that heavenly Chariot necessarily carrying us in triumph to the greatest happiness the Soule of man is capable of: which would arrive to all men indifferently, good and bad, if the parting with this earthly Body would suddainly mount us into the heavenly. Wherefore by a just Nemesis, the Soules of Men that are not very Heroically vertuous, will finde themselves restrained within the compass of this caliginous Aire, as both Reason it self will suggest, and the Platonists have unanimously determined.

7. We have competently described the difference of those three kinds of Vehicles, for their purity and consistency. The Platonists adde to this the difference of duration, making some of them of that nature as to entertain the Soule a longer time in them, others a shorter. The shortest of all is that of the Terrestrial Vehicle. In the Aëreal the Soule may inhabit, as they define, many Ages, and in the AEthereal for ever.

8. But this makes little to the clearing of the manner of their descent 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , which cannot be better understood, then by considering their Union with the Body generated, or indeed with any kinde of Body whatever, where the Soul is held captive, and cannot quit her self thereof by the free imperium of her own Imagination and Will. For what can be the cause of this cohaesion, the very essence of the Soul being so easily penetrative of Matter, and the dimensions of all Matter being alike penetrable every where? For there being no more Body or Matter in a Vessel filled with Lead then when it is full of Water, nor when full with Water then when with Aire, or what other subtiler Body soever that can be imagined in the Universe; it is manifest that the Crassities of Matter is every where alike, and alike penetrable and passable to the Soul. And therefore it is unconceivable how her Union should be so with any of it, as that she should not be able at any time to glide freely from one part thereof to another as she pleases. It is plain therefore, that this Union of the Soul with Matter does not arise from any such gross Mechanical way, as when two Bodies stick one in another by reason of any toughness and viscosity, or straight commissure of parts; but from a congruity of another nature, which I know not better how to term then Vital: which Vital Congruity is chiefly in the Soul it self, it being the noblest Principle of Life; but is also in the Matter, and is there nothing but such modification thereof as fits the Plastick part of the Soul, and tempts out that Faculty into act.

9. Not that there is any Life in the Matter with which this in the Soul should sympathize and unite; but it is termed Vital because it makes the Matter a congruous Subject for the Soul to reside in, and exercise the functions of life. For that which has no life it self, may tie to it that which has. As some men are said to be tied by the teeth, or tied by the ear, when they are detained by the pleasure they are struck with from good Musick or delicious Viands. But neither is that which they eat alive, nor that which makes the Musick, neither the Instrument, nor the Air that conveys the sound. For there is nothing in all this but meer Matter and corporeal motion, and yet our vital functions are affected thereby. Now as we see that the Perceptive part of the Soul is thus vitally affected with that which has no life in it, so it is reasonable that the Plastick part thereof may be so too; That there may be an Harmony betwixt Matter thus and thus modified, and that Power that we call Plastick, that is utterly devoid of all Perception. And in this alone consists that which we call Vital Congruity in the prepared Matter, either to be organized, or already shaped into the perfect form of an Animal.

10. And that Vital Congruity which is in the Soul, I mean in the Plastick part thereof, is analogous to that Pleasure that is perceived by the Sense, or rather to the capacity of receiving it, when the Sense is by agreeable motions from without or in the Body it self very much gratified, and that whether the Minde will or no. For there are some Touches that will in their Perception seem pleasant, whether our Judgement would have them so or not. What this is to the Perceptive part of the Soul, that other Congruity of Matter is to the Plastick. And therefore that which ties the Soul and this or that Matter together, is an unresistible and unperceptible pleasure, if I may so call it, arising from the congruity of Matter to the Plastick faculty of the Soul: which Congruity in the Matter not failing, nor that in the Soul, the Union is at least as necessary as the continuation of eating and drinking, so long as Hunger and Thirst continues, and the Meat and Drink proves good. But either satiety in the Stomack, or some ill tast in the Meat may break the congruity on either side, and then the action will cease with the pleasure thereof. And upon this very account may a Soul be conceived to quit her aiery Vehicle within a certain period of Ages, as the Platonists hold she does, without any violent precipitation of her self out of it.

11. What are the strings or cords that tie the Soul to the Body, or to what Vehicle else soever, I have declared as clearly as I can. From which it will be easy to understand the manner of her descent. For assuredly, the same cords or strings that tie her there, may draw her thither: Where the carcass is, there will the Eagles be gathered. Not that she need use her Perceptive faculty in her descent, as Hawks and Kites by their sight or smelling fly directly to the lure or the prey: but she being within the Atmosphear (as I may so call it) of Generation, and so her Plastick power being reached and toucht by such an invisible reek, (as Birds of prey are, that smell out their food at a distance;) she may be fatally carried, all Perceptions ceasing in her, to that Matter that is so fit a receptacle for her to exercise her efformative power upon. For this Magick-sphere, as I may so term it, that has this power of conjuring down Souls into earthly Bodies, the nearer the Centre, the vertue is the stronger; and therefore the Soul will never cease till she has slided into the very Matter that sent out those rays or subtile reek to allure her. From whence it is easy to conceive that the Souls of Brutes also, though they be not able to exercise their Perceptive faculty out of a terrestrial body, yet they may infallibly finde the way again into the world, as often as Matter is fitly prepared for generation. And this is one Hypothesis, and most intelligible to those that are pleased so much with the opinion of those large Sphears they conceive of emissary Atomes. There is also another, which is the Power and Activity of the Spirit of Nature or Inferiour Soul of the World, who is as fit an Agent to transmit particular Souls, as she is to move the parts of Matter. But of this hereafter.

12. What has been said is enough for the present to illustrate the pretended obscurity and unconceivableness of this Mystery. So that I have fully made good all the four parts of my Answer to that Objection that would have supplanted the force of my strongest Arguments for the Souls Immortality, and have clearly proved, that though this sequel did necessarily result from them, That the Souls both of Men and Beasts did Prae-exist, yet to unprejudiced reason there is no Absurdity nor Inconvenience at all in the Opinion. And therefore this Obstacle being removed, I shall the more chearfully proceed to the demonstrating of the Souls actual Separation from the Body.

CHAP. XV.

1. What is meant by the Separation of the Soul, with a confutation of Regius, who would stop her in the dead Corps. 2. An Answer to those that profess themselves puzled how the Soul can get out of the Body. 3. That there is a threefold Vital Congruity to be found in three several Subjects. 4. That this triple Congruity is also competible to one Subject, viz. the Soul of Man 5. That upon this Hypothesis it is very intelligible how the Soul may leave the Body. 6. That her Union with the aereal Vehicle may be very suddain, and as it were in a moment. 7. That the Soul is actually separate from the Body is to be proved either by History or Reason. Examples of the former kinde out of Pliny, Herodotus, Ficinus. 8. Whether the Exstasie of Witches prove an actual separation of the Soul from the Body. 9. That this real separation of the Soul in Exstasie is very possible. 10. How the Soul may be loosned and leave the Body, and yet return thither again. 11. That though Reason and Will cannot in this life release the Soul from the Body, yet Passion may; and yet so that she may return again. 12. The peculiar power of Desire for this purpose. 13. Of Cardans Exstasies, and the Ointment of Witches, and what truth there may be in their confessions.

1. COncerning the actual and local Separation of the Soul from the Body, it is manifest that it is to be understood of this Terrestrial Body. For to be in such a separate state, as to be where no Body or Matter is, is to be out of the World: the whole Universe being so thick set with Matter, or Body, that there is not to be found the least vacuity therein. The question therefore is onely, whether upon death the Soul can pass from the Corps into some other place. Henricus Regius seems to arrest her there by that general law of Nature, termed the law of Immutability; whereby every thing is to continue in the same condition it once is in, till something else change it. But the application of this law is very grosly injust in this case. For as I have above intimated, the Union of the Soul with the Body is upon certain terms; neither is every peece of Matter fit for every Soul to unite with, as Aristotle of old has very solidly concluded. Wherefore that condition of the Matter being not kept, the Soul is no longer engaged to the Body. What he here says for the justifying of himself, is so arbitrarious, so childish and ridiculous, that, according to the merit thereof, I shall utterly neglect it, and pass it by, not vouchsafing of it any Answer.

2. Others are much puzled in their imagination, how the Soul can get out of the Body, being imprisoned and lockt up in so close a Castle. But these seem to forget both the nature of the Soul, with the tenuity of her Vehicle, and also the Anatomy of the Body. For considering the nature of the Soul her self, and of Matter which is alike penetrable every where, the Soul can pass through solid Iron and Marble as well as through the soft Air and AEther; so that the thickness of the Body is no impediment to her. Besides, her Astral Vehicle is of that tenuity, that it self can as easily pass the smallest pores of the Body, as the Light does Glass, or the Lightning the Scabbard of a Sword without tearing or scorching of it. And lastly, whether we look upon that principal seat of the Plastick power, the Heart, or that of Perception, the Brain; when a man dies, the Soul may collect her self and the small residue of Spirits (that may haply serve her in the inchoation of her new Vehicle) either into the Heart, whence is an easy passage into the Lungs, and so out at the Mouth; or else into the Head, out of which there are more doors open then I will stand to number. These things are very easily imaginable, though as invisible as the Air, in whose element they are transacted.

3. But that they may still be more perfectly understood, I shall resume again the consideration of that Faculty in the Plastick part of the Soul, which we call Vital Congruity. Which according to the number of Vehicles, we will define to be threefold, Terrestrial, AEreal, and AEthereal or Coelestial. That these Vital Congruities are found, some in some kinde of Spirits, and others in othersome, is very plain. For that the Terrestrial is in the Soul of Brutes and in our own is without controversie; as also that the AEreal in that kinde of Beings which the Ancients called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and lastly, that the Heavenly and AEthereal in those Spirits that Antiquity more properly called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , as being Inhabitants of the Heavens. For that there are such AEreal and AEthereal Beings that are analogous to Terrestrial Animals; if we compare the nature of God with the Phaenomena of the world, it cannot prove less then a Demonstration. For this Earth that is replenisht with living Creatures, nay put in all the Planets too that are in the world, and fancy them inhabited, they all joyned together bear not so great a proportion to the rest of the liquid Matter of the Universe (that is in a nearer capacity of being the Vehicle of Life) as a single Cuminseed to the Globe of the Earth. But how ridiculous a thing would it be, that all the Earth beside being neglected, onely one peece thereof no better then the rest, nor bigger then the smallest seed, should be inhabited? The same may be said also of the compass of the Aire; and therefore it is necessary to enlarge their Territories, and confidently to pronounce there are AEthereal Animals, as well as Terrestrial and AEreal.

4. It is plain therefore that these three Congruities are to be found in severall Subjects; but that which makes most to our purpose, is to finde them in one, and that in the Soule of Man. And there will be an easy intimation thereof, if we consider the vast difference of those Faculties that we are sure are in her Perceptive part, and how they occasionally emerge, and how upon the laying asleep of one, others will spring up. Neither can there be any greater difference betwixt the highest and lowest of these Vitall congruities in the Plastick part, then there is betwixt the highest and lowest of those Faculties that result from the Perceptive. For some Perceptions are the very same with those of Beasts; others little inferiour to those that belong to Angels, as we ordinarily call them; some perfectly brutish, others purely divine: why therefore may there not reside so great a Latitude of capacities in the Plastick part of the Soule, as that she may have in her all those three Vitall Congruities, whereby she may be able livingly to unite as well with the Coelestial and AEreal Body, as with this Terrestrial one? Nay, our nature being so free and multifarious as it is, it would seem a reproach to Providence, to deny this capacity of living in these several Vehicles; because that Divine Nemesis which is supposed to rule in the world, would seem defective without this contrivance. But without controversy, Eternall Wisdome and Justice has forecast that which is the best: and, unless we will say nothing at all, we having nothing to judge by but our own Faculties, we must say that the Forecast is according to what we, upon our most accurate search, doe conceive to be the best. For there being no Envy in the Deity, as Plato somewhere has noted, it is not to be thought but that He has framed our Faculties so, that when we have rightly prepared our selves for the use of them, they will have a right correspondency with those things that are offered to them to contemplate in the world. And truly if we had here time to consider, I doe not doubt but it might be made to appear a very rationall thing, that there should be such an Amphibion as the Soule of man, that had a capacity (as some Creatures have to live either in the Water or on the Earth) to change her Element, and after her abode here in this Terrestrial Vehicle amongst Men and Beasts, to ascend into the company of the AEreal Genii, in a Vehicle answerable to their nature.

5. Supposing then this triple capacity of Vital Congruity in the Soule of Man, the manner how she may leave this Body is very intelligible. For the Bodies fitness of temper to retain the Soule being lost in Death, the lower Vitall Congruity in the Soule looseth its Object, and consequently its Operation. And therefore as the letting goe one thought in the Perceptive part of the Soule is the bringing up another; so the ceasing of one Vitall Congruity is the wakening of another, if there be an Object, or Subject, ready to entertain it; as certainly there is, partly in the Body, but mainly without it. For there is a vitall Aire that pervades all this lower world, which is continued with the life of all things, and is the chiefest Principle thereof. Whence Theon in his Scholia upon Aratus interprets that Hemistich — 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , in a secondary meaning as spoken of the Aire, which he calls 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , the naturall Jupiter, in whom, in an inferiour sense, we may be said to live, and move, and have our Being: for without Aire, neither Fishes, Fowls, nor Beasts can subsist, it administring the most immediate matter of life unto them, by feeding & refreshing their Animal Spirits. Wherefore upon the cessation of the lowest Vitall Congruity, that AEreal capacity awakening into Act, and finding so fit Matter every where to employ her self upon, the Soule will not faile to leave the Body; either upon choice, by the power of her own Imagination & Will; or else (supposing the very worst that can happen) by a naturall kinde of Attraction, or Transvection, she being her self, in that stound and confusion that accompanies Death, utterly unsensible of all things. For the Aire without being more whole some and vitall then in the corrupt caverns of the dead Body, and yet there being a continuation thereof with that without; it is as easy to understand, how (that Principle of joyning therewith in the Plastick part of the Soule being once excited) she will naturally glide out of the Body into the free Aire, as how the Fire will ascend upwards, or a Stone fall downwards: for neither are the motions of these meerly Mechanicall, but vitall or Magicall, that cannot be resolved into meer Matter, as I shall demonstrate in my Third Book.

6. And being once recovered into this vast Ocean of Life, and sensible Spirit of the world, so full of enlivening Balsame; it will be no wonder if the Soule suddainly regain the use of her Perceptive faculty, being, as it were in a moment, regenerate into a naturall power of Life and Motion, by so happy a concurse of rightly-prepared Matter for her Plastick part vitally to unite withall. For grosser generations are performed in almost as inconsiderable a space of time; if those Histories be true, of extemporary Sallads, sowne and gathered not many hours before the meale they are eaten at: and of the suddain ingendring of Frogs upon the fall of rain, whole swarms whereof that had no Being before, have appeared with perfect shape and liveliness in the space of half an houre, after some more unctuous droppings upon the dry ground; as I find not onely recited out of Fallopius, Scaliger, and others, but have been certainly my self informed of it by them that have been eye-witnesses thereof; as Vaninus also professes himself to have been by his friend Johannes Ginochius, who told him for a certain, that in the month of July he saw with his own eyes a drop of rain suddenly turned into a Frog. By such examples as these it is evident, that the reason why Life is so long a compleating in Terrestrial generations, is onely the sluggishness of the Matter the Plastick power works upon. Wherefore a Soule, once united with Aire, cannot miss of being able, in a manner in the twinckling of an eye, to exercise all Perceptive functions again, if there was ever any intercessation of them in the astonishments of Death.

7. How the Soule may live and act separate from the Body, may be easily understood out of what has been spoken. But that she does so de facto, there are but two wayes to prove it; the one by the testimony of History, the other by Reason. That of History, is either of persons perfectly dead, or of those that have been subject to Ecstasies, or rather to that height thereof which is more properly called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , when the Soule does really leave the Body, and yet return again. Of this latter sort is that example that Pliny recites of Hermotimus Clazomenius, whose Soule would often quit her Body, and wander up and down; and after her return tell many true stories of what she had seen during the time of her disjunction. The same, Maximus Tyrius and Herodotus report of Aristaeus Proconnesius. Marsilius Ficinus adjoyns to this rank that narration in Aulus Gellius, concerning one Cornelius, a Priest, who in an Ecstasie saw the Battel fought betwixt Caesar and Pompey in Thessalie, his Body being then at Padua; and yet could, after his return to himself, punctually declare the Time, Order and Success of the Fight. That in Wierus of the Weasell coming out of the Souldiers mouth when he was asleep, is a more plain example: which, if it were true, would make Aristaeus his Pigeon not so much suspected of fabulosity as Pliny would have it. Severall Relations there are in the world to this effect, that cannot but be loudly laughed at by them that think the Soule inseparable from the Body; and ordinarily they seem very ridiculous also to those that think it is separable, but as firmly believe that it is never, nor ever can be, separate but in Death.

8. Bodinus has a very great desire, notwithstanding it is so incredible to others, that the thing should be true; it being so evincing an argument for the Soules Immortality. And he thinks this Truth is evident from innumerable examples of the Ecstasies of Witches: which we must confess with him not to be natural; but that they amount to a perfect 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or carrying away the Soule out of the Body, the lively sense of their meeting, and dancing, and adoring the Devill, and the mutuall remembrance of the persons that meet one another there at such a time, will be no infallible Demonstration that they were there indeed, while their Bodies lay at home in Bed. Conformity of their Confessions concerning the same Conventicle is onely a shrewd probability, if it once could be made good, that this leaving their Bodies were a thing possible. For when they are out of them, they are much-what in the same condition that other Spirits are, and can imitate what shape they please; so that many of these Transformations into Wolves and Cats, may be as likely of the Soule having left thus the Body, as by the Devils possessing the Body and transfiguring it himself. And what these aiery Cats or Wolves suffer, whether cuttings of their limbs, or breaking the Back, or any such like mischief, that the Witch in her Bed suffers the like, may very well arise from that Magick Sympathy that is seated in the Unity of the Spirit of the World, and the continuity of the subtill Matter dispersed throughout. The Universe in some sense being, as the Stoicks and Platonists define it, one vast entire Animal.

9. Now that this reall Separation of the Soule may happen in some Ecstasies, will be easily admitted, if we consider that the Soule in her own Nature is separable from the Body, as being a Substance really distinct therefrom; and that all Bodies are alike penetrable and passable to her, she being devoid of that corporeall property which they ordinarily call 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , and therefore can freely slide through any Matter whatsoever, without any knocking or resistance; and lastly, that she does not so properly impart Heat and Motion to the Body, as Organization: and therefore when the Body is well organized, and there be that due temper of the Blood, the Heart and Pulse will in some measure beat, and the Brain will be replenish't with Spirits, and therewith the whole Body, though the Soule were out of it. In which case (saving that the Spirit of Nature cannot be excluded thence) it would be perfectly Cartesius his Machina without Sense; though seemingly as much alive as any animate Creature in a deep sleep. Whence it appears, that if the Soule could leave the Body, that she might doe it for a certain time without any detriment thereto, that is, so long as she might well live without Repast. Which fully answers their fears, who conceit that if the Soule was but once out of the Body, perfect Death must necessarily ensue, and all possible return thither be precluded.

10. But all the difficulty is to understand how the Soul may be loosned from the Body, while the Body is in a fit condition to retain her. That is a very great Difficulty indeed, and in a manner impossible for any power but what is supernatural. But it is not hard to conceive that this vital fitness in the Body may be changed, either by way of natural Disease, or by Art. For why may not some certain Fermentation in the Body so alter the Blood and Spirits, that the powers of the Plastick part of the Soul may cease to operate, as well as sometimes the Perceptive faculties doe, as in Catalepsies, Apoplexies, and the like? Wherefore this passing of the Soul out of the Body in Sleep, or Ecstasie, may be sometime a certain Disease, as well as that of the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , those that walk in their sleep. Now if it should happen that some such distemper should arise in the Body, as would very much change the Vital Congruity thereof for a time, and in this Paroxysm that other Disease of the Noctambuli should surprise the party; his Imagination driving him to walk to this or that place, his Soul may very easily be conceived in this loosned condition it lies in, to be able to leave the Body, and pass in the Aire, as other Inhabitants of that Element doe, and act the part of separate Spirits, and exercise such Functions of the perceptive faculty, as they do that are quite released from Terrestrial Matter. Onely here is the difference, That that damp in the Body that loosned the Union of the Soul being spent; the Soul, by that natural Magick I have more then once intimated, will certainly return to the Body, and unite with it again as firm as ever. But no man can when he pleases pass out of his Body thus, by the Imperium of his Will, no more then he can walk in his Sleep: For this capacity is pressed down more deep into the lower life of the Soul, whither neither the Liberty of Will, nor free Imagination can reach.

11. Passion is more likely to take effect in this case then either of the other two Powers, the seat of Passions being originally in the Heart, which is the chief Fort of these lower Faculties; and therefore by their propinquity can more easily act upon the first Principles of Vital Union. The effect of these has been so great, that they have quite carried the Soul out of the Body, as appears in sundry Histories of that kinde. For both Sophocles and Dionysius the Sicilian Tyrant died suddainly upon the news of a Tragick Victory; as Polycrita also a Noble-Woman of the Isle of Naxus, the Poet Philippides, and Diagoras of Rhodes, upon the like excess of Joy. We might adde examples of sudden Fear and Grief, but it is needless. It is a known and granted Truth, that Passion has so much power over the vital temper of the Body, as to make it an unfit mansion for the Soul; from whence will necessarily follow her disunion from it. Now if Passion will so utterly change the Harmony of the Blood and Spirits, as quite to release the Soul from the Body by a perfect Death; why may it not sometime act on this side that degree, and onely bring a present intemperies, out of which the Body may recover, and consequently regain the Soul back again, by virtue of that Mundane Sympathy I have so often spoke of?

12. Now of all Passions whatever, excess of Desire is fittest for this more harmless and momentany ablegation of the Soul from the Body; because the great strength thereof is so closely assisted with the imagination of departing to the place where the party would be, that upon disunion not amounting to perfect Death, the power of Fancy may carry the Soul to the place intended; and being satisfied and returned, may rekindle life in the Body to the same degree it had before it was infested by this excess of Desire. This is that, if any thing, that has made dying men visit their friends before their departure, at many miles distance, their Bodies still keeping their sick bed; and those that have been well, give a visit to their sick friends, of whose health they have been over-desirous and solicitous. For this Ecstasie is really of the Soul, and not of the Blood or Animal Spirits; neither of which have any Sense or Perception in them at all. And therefore into this Principle is to be resolved that Story which Martinus Del-Rio reports of a Lad who, through the strength of Imagination and Desire of seeing his Father, fell into an Ecstasie; and after he came to himself, confidently affirmed he had seen him, and told infallible circumstances of his being present with him.

13. That Cardan and others could fall into an Ecstasie when they pleased, by force of Imagination and Desire to fall into it, is recorded and believed by very grave and sober Writers: but whether they could ever doe it to a compleat 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , or local disjunction of the Soul from the Body, I know none that dare affirm; such events being rather the chances of Nature and Complexion, as in the Noctambuli, then the effects of our Will. But we cannot assuredly conclude but that Art may bring into our own power and ordering that which natural causes put upon us sometimes without our leaves. But whether those Oyntments of Witches have any such effect, or whether those unclean Spirits they deal with, by their immediate presence in their Bodies, cannot for a time so suppress or alter their Vital fitness to such a degree as will loosen the Soul, I leave to more curious Inquisitors to search after. It is sufficient that I have demonstrated a very intelligible possibility of this actual separation without Death properly so called. From whence the peremptory Confessions of Witches, and the agreement of the story which they tell in several, as well those that are there bodily, as they that leave their Bodies behinde them, especially when at their return they bring something home with them, as a permanent sign of their being at the place, is (though it may be all the delusion of their Familiars) no contemptible probability of their being there indeed where they declare they have been. For these are the greatest evidences that can be had in humane affairs: And nothing, so much as the supposed Impossibility thereof, has deterred men from believing the thing to be true.

CHAP. XVI.

1. That Souls departed communicate Dreams. 2. Examples of Apparitions of Souls deceased. 3. Of Apparitions in fields where pitcht Battels have been fought; as also of those in Churchyards, and other vaporous places. 4. That the Spissitude of the Air may well contribute to the easiness of the appearing of Ghosts and Spectres. 5. A further proof thereof from sundry examples. 6. Of Marsilius Ficinus his appearing after death. 7. With what sort of people such examples as these avail little. 8. Reasons to perswade the unprejudiced that ordinarily those Apparitions that bear the shape and person of the deceased, are indeed the Souls of them.

1. THE Examples of the other sort, viz. of the appearing of the Ghosts of men after death, are so numerous and frequent in all mens mouths, that it may seem superfluous to particularize in any. This appearing is either by Dreams, or open Vision, In Dreams, as that which hapned to Avenzoar Albumaron an Arabian Physitian, to whom his lately-deceased friend suggested in his sleep a very soverain Medicine for his sore Eyes. Like to this is that in Diodorus concerning Isis Queen of AEgypt, whom he reports to have communicated remedies to the AEgyptians in their sleep after her death, as well as she did when she was alive. Of this kinde is also that memorable story of Posidonius the Stoick, concerning two young men of Arcadia, who being come to Megara, and lying the one at a Victuallers, the other in an Inne; he in the Inne while he was asleep dream'd that his Fellow-traveller earnestly desired him to come and help him, as being assaulted by the Victualler, and in danger to be killed by him: But he, after he was perfectly awake, finding it but a Dream, neglected it. But faln asleep again, his murdered friend appeared to him the second time, beseeching him, that though he did not help him alive, yet he would see his Death revenged; telling him how the Victualler had cast his Body into a Dung-cart, and that if he would get up timely in the morning, and watch at the Town-gate, he might thereby discover the murder: which he did accordingly, and so saw Justice done on the Murderer. Nor does the first Dream make the second impertinent to our purpose: For as that might be from the strength of Imagination, and desire of help in the distressed Arcadian, impressed on the Spirit of the World, and so transmitted to his friend asleep (a condition fittest for such communications;) so it is plain that this after his Death must fail, if his Soul did either cease to be or to act. And therefore it is manifest that she both was and did act, and suggested this Dream in revenge of the Murder. Of which kinde there be infinite examples, I mean of Murders discovered by Dreams, the Soul of the person murdered seeming to appear to some or other asleep, and to make his complaint to them. But I will content my self onely to adde an Example of Gratitude to this of Revenge. As that of Simonides, who lighting by chance on a dead Body by the Sea side, and out of the sense of Humanity bestowing Burial upon it, was requited with a Dream that saved his life. For he was admonisht to desist from his Voyage he intended by Sea, which the Soul of the deceased told him would be so perillous, that it would hazard the lives of the Passengers. He believed the Vision, and abstaining was safe: those others that went suffered Shipwrack.

2. We will adjoyn onely an Example or two of that other kind of Visions, which are ordinarily called the Apparitions of the dead. And such is that which Pliny relates at large in his Epistle to Sura, of an house haunted at Athens, and freed by Athenodorus the Philosopher, after the Body of that person that appeared to him was digged up, and interred with due solemnity. It is not a thing unlikely, that most houses that are haunted, are so chiefly from the Soules of the deceased; who have either been murdered, or some way injured, or have some hid treasure to discover, or the like. And persons are haunted for the like causes, as well as houses; as Nero was after the murdering of his Mother; Otho pull'd out of his bed in the night by the Ghost of Galba. Such instances are infinite: as also those wherein the Soule of ones friend, suppose Father, Mother, or Husband, have appeared to give them good counsell, and to instruct them of the event of the greatest affairs of their life. The Ghosts also of deceased Lovers have been reported to adhere to their Paramours, after they had left their Bodies; taking all opportunities to meet them in Solitude, whether by day or by night.

3. There be also other more fortuitous occursions of these deceased Spirits; of which one can give no account, unless it be, because they find themselves in a more easy capacity to appear. As haply it may be in Fields after great slaughters of Armies, and in publick Buriall-places. Though some would ridiculously put off these Apparitions, by making them nothing but the reek or vapour of the Bodies of the dead, which they fancy will fall into the like stature and shape with the man it comes from: Which yet Cardan playes the fool in as well as Vaninus and others; as he does also in his account of those Spectra that appear so ordinarily in Iseland, where the Inhabitants meet their deceased friends in so lively an Image, that they salute them and embrace them for the same persons; not knowing of their death, unless by their suddain disappearing, or by after-information that they were then dead. This he imputes partly to the Thickness of the Aire, and partly to the foule food and gross spirits of the Islanders; and yet implies, that their fancies are so strong, as to convert the thick vaporous aire into the compleat shape of their absent and deceased acquaintance, and so perswade themselves that they see them, and talk with them, whenas it is nothing else but an aiery Image made by the power of their own Fancy. But certainly it had been better flatly to have denied the Narration, then to give so slight and unprobable reason of the Phaenomenon.

4. That the Spissitude of the Aire in that place may contribute something to the frequency of these Spectra, is rationall enough. For it being more thick, it is the more easily reduced to a visible consistency: but must be shaped, not by the fancy of the Spectatour, (for that were a monstrous power) but by the Imagination of the Spirit that actuates its own Vehicle of that gross Aire. For the same reason also in other places these Apparitions haply appear oftner in the Night then in the Day, the Aire being more clammy and thick after the Sun has been some while down then before. To which also that custome of the Lappians, a people of Scandia, seems something to agree; who, as Caspar Peucerus relates, are very much haunted with Apparitions of their deceased friends. For which trouble they have no remedy but burying them under their Hearth. Which Ceremony can have no naturall influence upon these Lemures, unless they should hereby be engaged to keep in a warmer aire, & consequently more rarified, then if they were interred elsewhere, Or rather because their Bodies will sooner putrify by the warmth of the hearth; whenas otherwise the coldness of that Clime would permit them to be sound a longer time, and consequently be fit for the Souls of the deceased to have recourse to and replenish their Vehicle with such a Cambium or gluish moisture, as will make it far easier to be commanded into a visible consistence.

5. That this facilitates their condition of appearing, is evident from that known recourse these infestant Spirits have to their dead Bodies. As is notorious in the History of Cuntius, which I have set down at large in my Antidote, Lib. 3. Cap. 9. and of the Silesian Shoomaker and his Maid in the foregoing Chapter. To which you may adde what Agrippa writes out of the Cretian Annals, How there the Catechanes, that is the Spirits of the deceased Husbands, would be very troublesome to their Wives, & endeavour to lye with them, while they could have any recourse to their dead Bodies. Which mischief therefore was prevented by a Law, that if any Woman was thus infested, the Body of her Husband should be burnt, and his Heart struck through with a stake. Which also put a speedy end to those stirs and tragedies the Ghost of Cuntius and those others caused at Pentsch and Breslan in Silesia. The like disquietnesses are reported to have hapned in the year 1567. at Trawtenaw a city of Bohemia, by one Stephanus Hubener, who was to admiration grown rich, as Cuntius of Pentsch, and when he died, did as much mischief to his fellow-Citizens. For he would ordinarily appear in the very shape he was when he was alive, and such as he met would salute them with so close embraces, that he caused many to fall sick and several to die by the unkinde huggs he gave them. But burning his Body rid the Town of the perilous occursations of this malicious Gobling. All which instances doe prove not onely the appearing of Souls after they have left this life, but also that some thickning Matter, such as may be got either from Bodies alive, or lately dead, or as fresh as those that are but newly dead (as the Body of this Hubener was, though it had lyen 20 weeks in the Grave,) or lastly from thick vaporous Air, may facilitate much their appearing, and so invite them to play tricks, when they can doe it at so cheap a rate; though they have little or no end in doing them, but the pleasing of their own, either ludicrous, or boisterous and domineering, humour.

6. But of any private person that ever appeared upon design after his death, there is none did upon a more noble one then that eximious Platonist Marsilius Ficinus; who having, as Baronius relates, made a solemn vow with his fellow-Platonist Michael Mercatus (after they had been pretty warmly disputing of the Immortality of the Soul, out of the Principles of their Master Plato) that whether of them two died first should appear to his friend, and give him certain information of that Truth; (it being Ficinus his fate to die first, and indeed not long after this mutual resolution) he was mindful of his promise when he had left the Body. For Michael Mercatus being very intent at his Studies betimes on a morning, heard an horse riding by with all speed, and observed that he stopped at his window; and therewith heard the voice of his friend Ficinus crying out aloud, O Michael, Michael, vera, vera sunt illa. Whereupon he suddenly opened the window, and espying Marsilius on a white Steed, called after him; but he vanisht in his sight. He sent therefore presently to Florence to know how Marsilius did; and understood that he died about that hour he called at his window, to assure him of his own and other mens Immortalities.

7. The Examples I have produced of the appearing of the Souls of men after death, considering how clearly I have demonstrated the separability of them from the Body, and their capacity of Vital Union with an aiery Vehicle, cannot but have their due weight of Argument with them that are unprejudiced. But as for those that have their minds enveloped in the dark mist of Atheism, that lazy and Melancholy saying which has dropt from the careless pen of that uncertain Writer Cardan, Orbis magnus est, & aevum longum, & error ac timor multum in hominibus possunt, will prevail more with them then all the Stories the same Authour writes of Apparitions, or whatever any one else can adde unto them. And others that doe admit of these things, praeconceptions from Education, That the Soul when she departs this life, is suddenly either twitched up into the Coelum Empyreum, or hurried down headlong towards the Centre of the Earth, makes the Apparitions of the Ghosts of men altogether incredible to them; they always substituting in their place some Angel or Devil which must represent their persons, themselves being not at leisure to act any such part.

8. But Misconceit and Prejudice, though it may hinder the force of an Argument with those that are in that manner entangled, yet Reason cannot but take place with them that are free. To whom I dare appeal whether (considering the aereal Vehicles of Souls which are common to them with other Genii, so that whatever they are fancied to doe in their stead, they may perform themselves; as also how congruous it is, that those persons that are most concerned, when it is in their power, should act in their own affairs, as in detecting the Murtherer, in disposing their estate, in rebuking injurious Executors, in visiting and counselling their Wives and Children, in forewarning them of such and such courses, with other matters of like sort; to which you may adde the profession of the Spirit thus appearing, of being the Soul of such an one, as also the similitude of person; and that all this adoe is in things very just and serious, unfit for a Devil with that care and kindness to promote, and as unfit for a good Genius, it being below so noble a nature to tell a Lie, especially when the affair may be as effectually transacted without it;) I say, I dare appeal to any one, whether all these things put together and rightly weighed, the violence of prejudice not pulling down the ballance, it will not be certainly carried for the present cause; and whether any indifferent Judge ought not to conclude, if these Stories that are so frequent every where and in all Ages concerning the Ghosts of men appearing be but true, that it is true also that it is their Ghosts, and that therefore the Souls of men subsist and act after they have left these earthly Bodies.

CHAP. XVII.

1. The preeminence of Arguments drawn from Reason above those from Story. 2. The first step toward a Demonstration of Reason that the Soul acts out of her Body, for that she is an immaterial Substance separable therefrom. 3. The second, That the immediate instruments for Sense, Motion, and Organization of the Body, are certain subtile and tenuious Spirits. 4. A comparison betwixt the Soul in the Body and the AEreal Genii, 5. Of the nature of Daemons from the account of Marcus the Eremite, and how the Soul is presently such, having once left this Body. 6. An Objection concerning the Souls of Brutes: to which is answered, First by way of concession; 7. Secondly, by confuting the Arguments for the former concession. 8. That there is no rational doubt at all of the Humane Soul acting after death. 9. A further Argument of her activity out of this Body, from her conflicts with it while she is in it. 10. As also from the general hope and belief of all Nations, that they shall live after death.

1. BUT we proceed now to what is less subject to the evasions and misinterpretations of either the Profane or Superstitious. For none but such as will profess themselves meer Brutes can cast off the Decrees and Conclusions of Philosophy and Reason; though they think that in things of this nature they may, with a great deal of applause and credit, refuse the testimony of other mens senses if not of their own: all Apparitions being with them nothing but the strong surprisals of Melancholy and Imagination. But they cannot with that ease nor credit silence the Deductions of Reason, by saying it is but a Fallacy, unlesse they can shew the Sophisme: which they cannot doe, where it is not.

2. To carry on therefore our present Argument in a rational way, and by degrees; we are first to consider, That (according as already has been clearly demonstrated) there is a Substance in us which is ordinarily called the Soul, really distinct from the Body, (for otherwise how can it be a Substance?) And therefore it is really and locally separable from the Body. Which is a very considerable step towards what we aim at.

3. In the next place we are to take notice, That the immediate Instrument of the Soul are those tenuious and aereal particles which they ordinarily call the Spirits; that these are they by which the Soul hears, sees, feels, imagines, remembers, reasons, and by moving which, or at least directing their motion, she moves likewise the Body; and by using them, or some subtile Matter like them, she either compleats, or at least contributes to the Bodies Organization. For that the Soul should be the Vital Architect of her own house, that close connexion and sure possession she is to have of it, distinct and secure from the invasion of any other particular Soul, seems no slight Argument. And yet that while she is exercising that Faculty, she may have a more then ordinary Union or Implication with the Spirit of Nature, or the Soul of the World, so far forth as it is Plastick, seems not unreasonable: and therefore is asserted by Plotinus; and may justly be suspected to be true, if we attend to the prodigious effects of the Mothers Imagination derived upon the Infant, which sometimes are so very great, that, unless she raised the Spirit of Nature into consent, they might well seem to exceed the power of any Cause. I shall abstain from producing any Examples till the proper place: in the mean time I hope I may be excused from any rashness in this assignation of the cause of those many and various Signatures found in Nature, so plainly pointing at such a Principle in the World as I have intimated before.

4. But to return, and cast our eye upon the Subject in hand. It appears from the two precedent Conclusions, that the Soul considered as invested immediately with this tenuious Matter we speak of, which is her inward Vehicle, has very little more difference from the aereal Genii, then a man in a Prison from one that is free. The one can onely see, and suck air through the Grates of the Prison, and must be annoyed with all the stench and unwholsome fumes of that sad habitation; whenas the other may walk and take the fresh air, where he finds it most commodious and agreeable. This difference there is betwixt the Genii and an incorporated Soul. The Soul, as a man faln into a deep pit, (who can have no better Water, nor Air, nor no longer enjoyment of the Sun, and his chearful light and warmth, then the measure and quality of the pit will permit him) so she once immured in the Body cannot enjoy any better Spirits (in which all her life and comfort consists) then the constitution of the Body after such circuits of concoction can administer to her. But those Genii of the Aire, who possess their Vehicles upon no such hard terms, if themselves be not in fault, may by the power of their minds accommodate themselves with more pure and impolluted Matter, and such as will more easily conspire with the noblest and divinest functions of their Spirit. In brief therefore, if we consider things aright, we cannot abstain from strongly surmising, that there is no more difference betwixt a Soule and an aëreal Genius, then there is betwixt a Sword in the scabbard and one out of it: and that a Soule is but a Genius in the Body, and a Genius a Soule out of the Body; as the Antients also have defined, giving the same name, as well as nature, promiscuously to them both, by calling them both 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , as I have elsewhere noted.

5. This is very consonant to what Michael Psellus sets down, from the singular knowledge and experience of Marcus the Eremite, in these matters; who describes the nature of these 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , as being throughout Spirit and Aire; whence they heare and see and feel in every part of their Body. Which he makes good by this reason, and wonders at the ignorance of men that doe not take notice of it, viz. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , that it is neither Bones, nor Nerves, nor any gross or visible part of the Body, or of any Organ thereof, whereby the Soule immediately exercises the functions of Sense; but that it is the Spirits that are her nearest and inmost instrument of these operations: Of which when the Body is deprived, there is found no Sense in it, though the gross Organs and parts are in their usuall consistency, as we see in Syncopes and Apoplexies. Which plainly shewes, that the immediate Vehicle of Life are the Spirits; and that the Soules connexion with the Body is by these; as the most learned Physicians doe conclude with one consent. Whence it will follow, that this Vinculum being broke, the Soule will be free from the Body, and will as naturally be carried out of the corrupt carkass that now has no harmony with the Soule, into that Element that is more congenerous to her, the vital Aire, as the Fire will mount upwards; as I have already noted. And so Principles of Life being fully kindled in this thinner Vehicle, she becomes as compleat for Sense and Action as any other Inhabitants of these aiery regions.

6. There is onely one perverse Objection against this so easy and naturall Conclusion, which is this; That by this manner of reasoning, the Soules of Brutes, especially those of the perfecter sort, will also not onely subsist, (for that difficulty is concocted pretty well already) but also live and enjoy themselves after death. To which I dare boldly answer, That it is a thousand times more reasonable that they doe, then that the Soules of Men doe not. Yet I will not confidently assert, that they doe, or doe not; but will lightly examine each Hypothesis. And first, by way of feigned concession, we will say, They doe; and take notice of the Reasons that may induce one to think so. Amongst which two prime ones are those involved in the Objection, That they doe subsist after death; and, That the immediate instrument of their Vitall Functions is their Spirits, as well as in Man. To which we may adde, That for the present we are fellow-inhabitants of one and the same Element, the Earth, subject to the same fate of Fire, Deluges and Earthquakes. That it is improbable, that the vast space of Aire and AEther, that must be inhabited by living creatures, should have none but of one sort, that is the Angels or Genii, good or bad. For it would seem as great a solitude, as if Men alone were the Inhabitants of the Earth, or Mermaids of the Sea. That the periods of vitall congruity, wound up in the Nature of their Soules, by that eternall Wisdome that is the Creatress of all things, may be shorter or longer, according as the property of their essence and relation to the Universe requires; and that so their Descents and Returns may be accordingly swifter or slower. That it is more conformable to the Divine goodness to be so then otherwise, if their natures will permit it: And that their existence would be in vain, while they were deprived of vital operation when they may conveniently have it. That they would be no more capable of Salvation in the other state, then they are here of Conversion. That the intellectual Inhabitants of the Aire having also externall and corporeall Sense, variety of Objects would doe as well there, as here amongst us on Earth. Besides that Historyes seem to imply, as if there were such kind of aereal Animals amongst them, as Dogs, Horses, and the like. And therefore to be short, that the Soules of Brutes cease to be alive after they are separate from this Body, can have no other reason, then Immorality the Mother of Ignorance, (that is, nothing but narrowness of spirit, out of over-much self-love, and contempt of other Creatures) to embolden us so confidently to adhere to so groundless a Conclusion.

7. This Position makes indeed a plausible shew, insomuch that if the Objection drove one to acknowledge it for Truth, he might seem to have very little reason to be ashamed of it. But this Controversy is not so easily decided. For though it be plain that the Soules of Beasts be Substances really separable from their Bodies; yet if they have but one Vital congruity, namely the Terrestriall one, they cannot recover life in the Aire. But their having one or two, or more Vital congruities, wholy depends upon his wisdome & counsel that has made all things. Besides, the Souls of Brutes seem to have a more passive nature, then to be able to manage or enjoy this escape of Death, that free and commanding Imagination belonging onely to us, as also Reminiscency. But Brutes have onely a passive Imagination, and bare Memory; which failing them in all likelyhood in the shipwrack of their Body, if they could live in the Aire, they would begin the World perfectly on a new score, which is little better then Death: so that they might in this sense be rightly deemed mortall. Our being Co-inhabitants of the same element, the Earth, proves nothing: for by the same reason, Worms and Fleas should live out of their Bodies, and Fishes should not, who notwithstanding, their shape, it may be, a little changed (for there is no necessity that these creatures in their aiery Vehicles should be exactly like themselves in their terrestriall ones) might act and live in the more moist tracts of the Aire. As for the supposed solitude that would be in the Aire, it reaches not this Matter. For in the lower Regions thereof, the various Objects of the Earth and Sea will serve the turn. The winding up of those severall circuits of vitall congruity may indeed pass for an ingenious invention, as of a thing possible in the Soules of Brutes: but, as the Schools say well, A posse ad esse non valet consequentia. As for that Argument from Divine Goodness, it not excluding his Wisdom which attempers it self to the natures of things, & we not knowing the nature of the Soules of Brutes so perfectly as we doe our own, we cannot so easily be assured from thence what will be in this case. A Musitian strikes not all strings at once; neither is it to be expected that every thing in Nature at every time should act: but when it is its turn, then touched upon it will give its sound; in the interim it lies silent. And so it may be with the Soules of Brutes for a time, especially when the vitall temper of Earth and Aire and Sea shall fail; yea and at other times too, if none but Intellectual Spirits be fit to manage AEreall Vehicles. I confess indeed, that Salvation can no more belong to the Soules of Brutes then Conversion; but that is as true of the Soules of Plants, (if they have any distinct from the Universall Spirit of Nature) but yet it does not prove that the Soules of Vegetables shall live and act in Aiery Vehicles, after an Herbe or Tree is dead and rotten here. To that of conveniency of variety of Objects for the aiery Inhabitants I have answered already. And for the Apparitions of Horses, Doggs and the like, they may be the transformation of the aerial Genii into these shapes: Which though it be a sign that they would not abhor from the use and society of such aeriall Animals, if they had them; yet they may the better want them, they being able so well themselves to supply their places. We will briefly therefore conclude, that from the meer light of Reason it cannot be infallibly demonstrated, that the Soules of Brutes doe not live after death, nor that it is any Incongruity in Nature to say they do. Which is sufficient to enervate the present Objection.

8. But for the life and activity of the Soules of Men out of this Body, all things goe on hand-smooth for it, without any check or stop. For we finding the aerial Genii so exceeding near-a-kin to us in their Faculties, we being both intellectuall Creatures, and both using the same immediate instrument of Sense and Perception, to wit, aeriall Spirits, insomuch that we can scarce discover any other difference betwixt us then there is betwixt a man that is naked and one clad in gross thick cloathing; it is the most easy and naturall inference that can be, to conclude, that when we are separate from the Body, and are invested onely in Aire, that we shall be just like them, and have the same life and activity they have. For though a Brute fall short of this Priviledge, it ought to be no disheartning to us, because there is a greater cognation betwixt the Intellectual Faculties and the aiery or aethereal Vehicle, then there is betwixt such Vehicles and those more low and sensuall powers common to us with Beasts. And we finde, in taking the fresh aire, that the more fine and pure our Spirits are, our thoughts become the more noble & divine, and the more purely intellectuall. Nor is the step greater upwards then downwards: For seeing that what in us is so Divine and Angelicall may be united with the body of a Brute, (for such is this Earthly cloathing) why may not the Soule, notwithstanding her terrestriall Congruity of life, (which upon new occasions may be easily conceived to surcease from acting) be united with the Vehicle of an Angel? So that there is no puzzle at all concerning the Soul of Man, but that immediately upon Death she may associate her self with those aeriall Inhabitants, the Genii or Angels.

9. Which we may still be the better assured of, if we consider how we have such Faculties in us, as the Soul finds hoppled and fettered, clouded and obscured by her fatal residence in this prison of the Body. In so much that, so far as it is lawful, she falls out with it for those incommodations that the most confirmed brutish health brings usually upon her. How her Will tuggs against the impurity of the Spirits that stir up bestial Passions, (that are notwithstanding the height and flower of other Creatures enjoyments) and how many times her whole life upon Earth is nothing else but a perpetual warfare against the results of her union with this lump of Earth that is so much like to other terrestrial Animals. Whence it is plain she finds her self in a wrong condition, and that she was created for a better and purer state; which she could not attain to, unless she lived out of the Body: which she does in some sort in divine Ecstasies and Dreams; in which case she making no use of the Bodies Organs, but of the purer Spirits in the fourth Ventricle of the Brain, she acts as it were by her self, and performs some preludious Exercises, conformable to those in her aiery Vehicle.

10. Adde unto all this, that the Immortality of the Soul is the common, and therefore naturall, hope and expectation of all Nations; there being very few so barbarous as not to hold it for a Truth: though, it may be, as in other things, they may be something ridiculous in the manner of expressing themselves about it; as that they shall retire after Death to such a Grove or Wood, or beyond such a Hill, or unto such an Island, such as was 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , the Island where Achilles Ghost was conceived to wander, or the Insulae Fortunatae, the noted Elysium of the Ancients. And yet, it may be, if we should tell these of the Coelum Empyreum, and compute the height of it, and distance from the Earth, and how many solid Orbs must be glided through before a Soul can come thither; these simple Barbarians would think as odly of the Scholastick Opinion as we do of theirs: and it may be some more judicious and sagacious Wit will laugh at us both alike. It is sufficient, that in the main all Nations in a manner are agreed that there is an Immortality to be expected, as well as that there is a Deity to be worshipped; though ignorance of circumstances makes Religion vary, even to Monstrosity, in many parts of the world. But both Religion, and the belief of the Reward of it, which is a blessed state after Death, being so generally acknowledged by all the Inhabitants of the Earth; it is a plain Argument that it is true according to the Light of Nature. And not onely because they believe so, but because they do so seriously either desire it, or are so horribly afraid of it, if they offend much against their Consciences: which properties would not be in men so universally, if there were no Objects in Nature answering to these Faculties, as I have elsewhere argued in the like case.

CHAP. XVIII.

1. That the Faculties of our Souls, and the nature of the immediate instrument of them, the Spirits, doe so nearly symbolize with those of Daemons, that it seems reasonable, if God did not on purpose hinder it, that they would not fail to act out of this earthly Body. 2. Or if they would, his power and wisdome could easily implant in their essence a double or triple Vital Congruity, to make all sure. 3. A further demonstration of the present Truth from the Veracity of God. 4. An Answer to an Objection against the foregoing Argument. 5. Another Demonstration from His Justice. 6. An Answer to an Objection. 7. An Answer to another Objection. 8. Another Argument from the Justice of God. 9. An Objection answered. 10. An invincible Demonstration of the Souls Immortality from the Divine Goodness. 11. A more particular enforcement of that Argument, and who they are upon whom it will work least. 12. That the noblest and most vertuous Spirit is the most assurable of the Souls Immortality.

1. BUT finally, to make all sure, let us contemplate the Nature of God, who is the Author and Maker of all things, according to whose Goodness, Wisdome and Power all things were created, and are ever ordered; and let us take special notice how many steps towards this Immortality we now treat of, are impressed upon the very nature of the Soul already; and then seriously consider, if it be possible that the Soveraign Deity should stop there, and goe no further, when there are so great reasons, if we understand any thing, that He perfect our expectations. For we have already clearly demonstrated, That the Soul of man is a Substance actually separable from the Body, and that all her Operations & Functions are immediately performed, not by those parts of the Body that are of an earthly and gross consistency, but by what is more aeriall or aethereall, the Vitall and Animall Spirits; which are very congenerous to the Vehicles of the Angels or Genii. Insomuch that if the Divine power did but leave Nature to work of it self, it might seem very strange, considering those Divine and Intellectuall Faculties in us, (as conformable to the essences or Soules of Angels as our Animal Spirits are to their Vehicles) if it would not be an immediate sequel of this Priviledge, that our Soules, once separate from the Body, should act and inform the Aire they are in with like facility that other Genii doe, there being so very little difference betwixt both their natures.

2. Or if one single Plastick power, in a Subject so near a-kin to these aerial people, will not necessarily suffice for both states, certainly it must be a very little addition that will help out: and how easy is it for that Eternall Wisdome to contrive a double or triple Vitall Congruity, to wit, aeriall and aethereal, as well as terrestrial, in such an Essence, whose Faculties and properties doe so plainly symbolize with those purer Inhabitants of both the AEther and Aire?

3. But this is not all we have to say. For if there be one thing more precious in the Deity then another, we shall have it all as a sure and infallible pledge of this present Truth, That our Souls will not fail to prove Immortall. And for my own part, I know nothing more precious in the Godhead then his Veracity, Justice and Goodness; and all these three will assure us and secure us, that we shall sustain no loss or damage by our departure out of these Earthly Bodies, in either Life or Essence. For it were a very high reproach to that Attribute of God which we call his Veracity, he so plainly and universally promising to all the Nations of the World, where there is any Religion at all, a happy state after this life; if there should in reality be no such thing to be expected. For he does not onely connive it the Errour, if it be one, by not declaring himself against it, (as any upright person would, if another should take upon him, in his presence or hearing, to tell others that he intended to bestow such and such gifts and revenues upon them, when there was no such matter:) but he has, as a man may say, on set purpose indued men with extraordinary parts and powers, to set this Opinion on foot in the Earth; all Prophets and Workers of Miracles that have appeared in the world, having one way or other assured to Man-kind this so weighty Truth. And the most Noble & Vertuous Spirits in all Ages have been the most prone to believe it. And this not onely out of a sense of their own Interest; but any one that ever had the happiness to experience these things, may observe, That that Clearness & Purity of temper that most consists with the Love and admiration of God and Vertue, and all those divine Accomplishments that even those that never could attain to them give their highest approbation of, I say, that this more refined temper of Minde does of it self beget a wonderful proneness, if not a necessity, of presuming of the Truth of this Opinion we plead for. And therefore if it be not true, God has laid a train in Nature, that the most vertuous and pious men shall be the most sure to be deceived: Which is a contradiction to his Attribute of Veracity.

4. Nor can the strength of this Argument be evaded by replying, that God may deceive men for their good, as Parents doe their Children; and therefore His Wisdome may contrive such a naturall Errour as this, to be serviceable for States and Polities, to keep the people in awe, and so render them more faithfull and governable. I must confess that there does result from this divine Truth such an usefulness, by the by, for the better holding together of Common-weals; but to think that this is the main use thereof, and that there is nothing more in it then so, is as Idioticall and Childish, as to conclude, that because the Stars, those vast lights, doe some small offices for us by Night, that therefore that is all the meaning of them, and that they serve for nothing else. Besides, there is no Father would tell a Lye to his Child, if he were furnisht with truth as effectual for his purpose; and if he told any thing really good, as well as desirable, to his Childe, to induce him to Obedience, if it lay in his power, he would be sure to perform his promise. But it is in the power of God to make good whatever he has propounded for reward; nor need he make use of any falshood in this matter. Wherefore if he doe, he has less Veracity then an ordinary honest man; which is blasphemous, and contradictious to the nature of the Deity.

5. Again upon point of Justice, God was engaged to contrive the Nature and Order of things so, that the Soules of Men may live after death, and that they may fare according to their behaviour here upon earth. For the Godhead, as the Philosopher calls him, is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , and does immutably and inevitably distribute Justice, both Reward and Punishment, in the world. But how difficult a thing it is to be good and to live according to Vertue, the common practise and complaint of all men doe confess with one consent; and that it is exceeding hard to perswade any one to doe that violence to their own natures, as to endeavour after a due degree and right sense of Vertue (for Craft and Policy are easy enough, and other things there are that, set against the contrary Vices, look like Vertues, but are not:) But to perswade to those that truly are, is, I say, exceeding hard, if not impossible, without the inculcation of this grand concernment, the State of the Soule after Death, and the Reward that will then follow a Vertuous life. Of which hopes if we be frustrated by the Soules Mortality, we are defrauded of our Reward, and God of the honour of Justice.

6. Nor can the force of this Argument be enervated by either that high pretension of Stoicisme, That Vertue to it self is a sufficient reward; or that the very hopes of this Immortality, it being accompanied with so much joy, tranquillity and contentment, will countervail all the pain and trouble of either acquiring, or keeping close to Vertue once acquired. For as for the first, It is one thing to talk high, and another thing to practise. And for my own part, I think in the main, that Epicurus, who placed the chiefest good in Pleasure, Philosophized more solidly then the paradoxical Stoicks. For questionless that is that which all men ought to drive at, if they had the true notion of it, and knew wherein to place it, or could arrive to the purest and most warrantable sense of it. But there can be no Pleasure, (without a perfect Miracle) while our Spirits are disturbed and vitiated by sordid and contemptible Poverty, by Imprisonments, Sicknesses, Tortures, ill Diet, and a number of such Adversities, that those that are the most exactly vertuous have been in all Ages most lyable to. Besides the care and sollicitude of perpetually standing upon their guard, the stings of Calumny and Defamation, and a continuall vexation to see the baseness and vileness of mens tempers, and ugly oblique transactions of affairs in the world. Which inquietudes cannot be avoided by any other remedy but what is as ill as the disease, or worse, it being altogether incompetible to a true Heroicall tenour of minde; I mean their Stoical Apathy; of which the best that can be said is, that it is a kind of constant and safe piece of fullenness, stating us onely in the condition of those that are said to have neither wone nor lost: So poor a reward is persecuted and distressed Vertue of it self, without the hope of future Happiness.

7. But to say, the Hope thereof without Enjoyment is a sufficient compensation, is like that mockery Plutarch records of Dionysius towards a Fidler, whom he caused to play before him, promising him a reward; but when he demanded it of him for his pains, denied it him, or rather said it was paid already, putting him off with this jest, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , i. e. So long as you pleased me with playing, so long you rejoyced your self with hoping after the reward; so that you are sufficiently paid already. Which piece of injurious mirth may be passable in a ludicrous matter, and from a Tyrant, where height of Fortune makes proud and forgetful Mortality contemn their inferiours: But in a thing of this nature, that concerns not onely this transient life, but the sempiternal duration of the Soul, Injustice there is unspeakably grievous; and so much the more harsh and uncomely, if we consider that it is supposed to be committed, not by a frail earthly Potentate, (the height of whose Honours may make him regardless of smaller affairs and meaner persons,) but by the God of Heaven, who can with the like ease attend all things as he can any one thing; and who is perfectly and immutably just, not doing nor omitting any thing by changeable humours, as it happens in vain Men, but ever acting according to the transcendent Excellency and Holiness of his own Nature.

8. Neither is Divine Justice engaged onely to reward, but also to punish; which cannot be, unless the Souls of men subsist after Death. For there are questionless many thousands that have committed most enormous Villanies, persecuted the Good, taking away their possessions, liberties, or lives; adding sometimes most barbarous tortures and reproachful abuses; and in all this highly gratified their covetousness, ambition and revenge; nay, it may be the bestial ferocity of their own spirits, that have pleased themselves exceedingly to bring the truly religious into disgrace, and have laughed at all vertuous actions as the fruits of Ignorance and Folly; and yet for all this have died in peace on their beds, after their lives have been as thick set with all sensual enjoyments of Honour, Riches and Pleasure, as their Story is with Frauds, Rapines, Murders, Sacriledges, and whatever crimes the impious boldness of lawless persons will venture on.

9. Such things as these happen proportionably through all the ranks and orders of men. Nor is it sufficient to reply that their own Consciences, as so many Furies, do lash them and scorch them in this life: For we speak of inveterate and successful wickedness, where that Principle is utterly laid asleep; or if it at any time wake and cry, the noise of the affairs of the world, and hurry of business, and continual visits of friends and flatterers, false instructions of covetous Priests or mercenary Philosophers (who for gain will impudently corrupt and pervert both the Light of Nature and Sense of Religion) the sound and clatter of these, I say, will so possess the ear of the prosperously wicked, that the voice of conscience can be no more heard in this continual tumult, then the vagient cries of the Infant Jupiter amidst the rude shuffles and dancings of the Cretick Corybantes, and the tinckling and clashing of their brazen Targets. And therefore if there be no Life hereafter, the worst of men have the greatest share of happiness, their passions and affections being so continually gratified, and that to the height, in those things that are so agreeable, and, rightly circumstantiated, allowable to humane Nature: such as are the sweet reflection on the success of our political management of the affairs of the World; the general tribute of Honour and respect for our Policy and Wit, and that ample testimony thereof, our acquisitions of Power or Riches; that great satisfaction of foiling and bearing down our Enemies, and obliging and making sure our more serviceable Friends; to which finally you may adde all the variety of Mirth and Pastime that flesh and blood can entertain it self with, from either Musick, Wine, or Women.

10. Thirdly and lastly, the Mortality of the Soul is not onely inconsistent with the Veracity and Justice of God, but also with his Goodness, the most soveraign and sacred Attribute in the Deity, and which alone is enough to demonstrate, That the Soul of man cannot perish in Death. For suppose that God had made no promise to us, either by any extraordinary Prophet, or by the suggestion of our own natural Faculties, that we shall be Immortal, and that there was neither Merit nor Demerit in this life, so that all plea from either the Divine Veracity or Justice were quite cut off; his Goodness alone (especially if we consider how capable the Soul is of after-subsistence) is a sufficient assurance that we shall not fail to live after Death. For how can that soveraign Goodness, assisted by an omnipotent Knowledge, fail to contrive it so; it being so infinitely more conformable to his Transcendent Bounty, to ordain thus then otherwise? that is to say, so soon as he created the World, to make it so compleat, as at once to bring into Being not onely all Corporeal Substance (according as all men confess he did) but also all Substances Immaterial or Incorporeal, and as many of them as can partake of Life, and of enjoyment of themselves and the Universe, to set them upon living and working in all places and Elements that their Nature is able to operate in; and therefore amongst other Beings of the Intellectual Order, that the Souls of men also, whereever they were, or ever should be, especially if it were not long of themselves, should have a power of Life and Motion, and that no other Nemesis should follow them then what they themselves lay the trains of; nor this to utter annihilation, but by way of chastisement or punishment: and that they being of so multifarious a nature, as to have such Faculties as are nearly a-kin to Brutes, as well as such as have so close an affinity with those of the aereal Genii and celestial Angels, that their Vital Congruity should be as multifarious, and themselves made capable of a living Union with either Celestial, AErial, or Terrestrial Vehicles; and that the leaving of one should be but the taking up of another, so long as the Elements continue in their natural temper, and as soon as the Laws of Generation will permit.

11. These, and a long series of other things consonant to these, represent themselves to their view that have the favour of beholding the more hidden treasures of the Divine Benignity. But they being more then the present occasion requires, I shall content my self with what precisely touches the matter in hand, which is, That the Soul of Man being capable to act after this life in an AErial Vehicle, as well as here in an Earthly; and it being better that she do live and act, then that she be idle and silent in death; and it depending meerly upon the Will of God whether she shall or no; He ordering the natures of things infallibly according to what is best, must of necessity ordain that the Souls of men live and act after death. This is an unavoidable Deduction of Reason to those that acknowledge the Being of God, and rightly relish that transcendent Attribute in the Divine Nature. For those that have a true sense thereof, can as hardly deny this Conclusion as the Existence of the Deity. Nor can they ever be perswaded, that He who is so perfectly good in himself, and to whom they have so long adhered in faithful obedience and amorous dedevotion, has made them of such a nature, that when they hope most to enjoy him, they shall not be able to enjoy him at all, nor any thing else; as not being in a capacity to act but in an earthly Body. But to those that be of a meer animal temper, that relish no love but that of themselves and their own interest, nor care for any but those that are serviceable to them, and make for their profit, these being prone to judge of God according to the vileness of their own Spirit, will easily conceit, that Gods care of us and tenderness over us is onely proportionable to the fruit he reaps by us; which is just none at all.

12. And therefore this Argument especially, and also the two former, though they be undeniable Demonstrations in themselves, yet they requiring a due resentment of Morality, that is of Veracity, Justice and Goodness, in him that is to be perswaded by them; it will follow, that those whose mindes are most blinded and debased by Vice, will feel least the force of them; and the Noblest and most generous Spirit will be the most firmly assured of the Immortality of the Soule.

CHAP. I.

1. Why the Authour treats of the state of the Soul after Death, and in what Method. 2. Arguments to prove that the Soule is ever united vitally with some Matter or other. 3. Further Reasons to evince the same. 4. That the Soule is capable of an aiery and aethereal Body, as well as a terrestrial. 5. That she ordinarily passes out of an earthly into an aereal Vehicle first. 6. That in her aiery Vehicle she is capable of Sense, Pleasure, and Pain. 7. That the main power of the Soule over her aereal Vehicle is the direction of Motion in the particles thereof. 8. That she may also adde or diminish Motion in her aethereal. 9. How the purity of the Vehicle confers to the quickness of Sense and Knowledge. 10. Of the Soules power of changing the temper of her aereal Vehicle; 11. As also the shape thereof. 12. The plainness of the last Axiome.

1. WE have, I hope, with undeniable evidence demonstrated the Immortality of the Soule to such as neither by their slowness of parts, nor any prejudice of Immor • ality, are made incompetent Judges of the truth of Demonstrations of this kind: so that I have already perfected my main Design. But my own curiosity, and the desire of gratifying others who love to entertain themselves with speculations of this nature, doe call me out something further; if the very Dignity of the present Matter I am upon doth not justly require me, as will be best seen after the finishing thereof: Which is concerning the State of the Soule after Death. Wherein though I may not haply be able to fix my foot so firmly as in the foregoing part of this Treatise, yet I will assert nothing but what shall be reasonable, though not demonstrable, and far preponderating to whatever shall be alledged to the contrary, and in such clear order and Method, that if what I write be not worthy to convince, it shall not be able to deceive or entangle by perplexedness and obscurity; and therefore I shall offer to view at once the main Principles upon which I shall build the residue of my Discourse.

CHAP. II.

1. Of the Dimensions of the Soul considered barely in her self. 2. Of the Figure of the Souls Dimensions. 3. Of the Heterogeneity of her Essence. 4. That there is an Heterogeneity in her Plastick part distinct from the Perceptive. 5. Of the acting of this Plastick part in her framing of the Vehicle. 6. The excellency of Des-Cartes his Philosophy. 7. That the Vehicles of Ghosts have as much of solid corporeal Substance in them as the Bodies of Men. 8. The folly of the contrary Opinion evinced. 9. The advantage of the Soul, for matter of Body, in the other state, above this.

1. THat we may now have a more clear and determinate apprehension of the nature and condition of the Soul out of the Body, let us first consider her a while, what she is in her own Essence, without any reference to any Body at all, and we shall finde her a Substance extended and indiscerpible, as may be easily gathered out of what we have written, Lib. 1. Cap. 3, 5, 8. as also Lib. 2. Cap. 1, 2. And it is a seasonable contemplation here (where we consider the Soul as having left this Terrestrial Body) that she hath as ample, if not more ample, Dimensions of her own, then are visible in the Body she has left. Which I think worth taking notice of, that it may stop the mouths of them that, not without reason, laugh at those unconceivable and ridiculous fancies of the Schools; that first rashly take a way all Extension from Spirits, whether Soules or Augels, and then dispute how many of them booted and spur'd may dance on a needles point at once. Fooleries much derogatory to the Truth, and that pinch our perception into such an intolerable streightness and evanidness, that we cannot imagine any thing of our own Being; and if we doe, are prone to fall into despair, or contempt of our selves, by fancying our selves such unconsiderable Motes of the Sun.

2. But as it is very manifest that the Soule has Dimensions, and yet not infinite, and therefore that she is necessarily bounded in some Figure or other; so it is very uncertain whether there be any peculiar Figure naturall to her, answerable to animal shape, or whether she be of her self of either a Round or Oval figure, but does change her shape according as occasion requires. It is not material to define any thing in this Question more then thus, That when the Soule acts in Terrestrial Matter, her Plastick part is determined to the Organization of the Body into humane forme; and in the AEreal or AEthereal, that she is neither more nor less determined to any shape then the Genii or Angels, and that if their Vehicles are more naturally guided into one shape then another, that hers is in the same condition; so that in her visible Vehicle she will bear the ordinary form of Angels, such a countenance, and so cloathed, as they.

3. That which is more material, I think is more easy to be defined, and that is, whether the Soule be one Homogeneal Substance, or whether it be in some manner Heterogeneal. That the latter is in some measure true, is manifest from what we have written Lib. 2. Cap. 11. viz. That the Perceptive faculty reaches not throughout the whole Soule, but is confined to a certain part, which we called the Centre or Eye of the Soule, as also her Perceptive part; but all the rest Plastick. But here arises a further Scruple, whether there be not an Heterogeneity in the very Plastick part also of the Soule. The Aristotelians seem to be confident there is not, and doe affirm that if there were an Eye in the Toe, the Toe would see as well as the Head. Of which I very much doubt: For hence it would follow that some Creatures would have a glimmering of Light all over, they being in a manner all over transparent; and some thin and clear Complexions might haply have the perception of Light betwixt the lower parts of their Fingers, which are in some good measure pellucid; and therefore Life and Spirits being continued from thence to the Conarion, as they are, or to the fourth Ventricle of the Brain, it would follow that the Soule would have a perception of some glimmerings of Light from thence, which were to see there as well as to feel.

4. Wherefore it seems more rationall to admit an Heterogeneity in the Plastick part of the Soule also, and to acknowledge that every removall from the Seat of Common Sense, that is to say, every Circle that surrounds the Centre of the Soule, has not the same bounds of power, neither for number nor extent. But that as concerning the former, there is a gradual falling off from the first excellency, which is the Perceptive part of the Soule; the closest Circle to which is that part of the Plastick that is able to convey Objects of Sight as well as of Touch and Hearing, and what other Senses else there may be in the Soule. The next Circle is Hearing without Seeing, though not without Touch: for Touch spreads through all, but in its exteriour region, which is excessively the greatest, it transmits the circumstantiated Perceptions of no Objects but those that are Tactile; but to others it is onely as a dead Medium, as the Circle of Hearing is but as a dead Medium to the Objects of Sight. So that if we would please our Imagination with Ficinus, in fancying the Soule as a Star, we shall doe it more perfectly, if we look upon her in her Circles, as having an Halo about her: For the Soule to our Reason is no more homogeneal, then that Spectacle is to our Sight.

5. But if we look upon the Soule as ever propending to some personall shape, the direction of the Plastick rayes must then tend to a kind of Organization, so far as is conducent to the state the Soule is in, whether in an Aiery or AEthereal Vehicle. For that the Plastick power omits or changes as she is drawn forth by the nature of the Matter she acts upon, is discoverable in her Organization of our Bodies here. For in all likelihood the Soule in her self is as much of one sex as another; which makes her sometimes signe the Matter with both, but that very seldome: and therefore it is manifest that she omits one part of her Plastick power, and makes use of the other, in almost all efformations of the Foetus. Whence it is easy to conclude, that supposing her Plastick power naturally work the AEthereal or AEreal Vehicle into any animal shape, it may put forth onely such stroaks of the efformative vertue as are convenient and becoming the Angelical Nature. But according to this Hypothesis haply all Objects of Sense will not arrive to the Centre of the Soule from every part of the Horizon; no not though this Organization were not naturall but meerly arbitrarious. But be the Soule conceived either bound up thus into animal forme, or spread loose into any careless round shape, according as her rayes shall display themselves in her Vehicle of Aire or AEther, yet the seat of sight will be duely restrained, which is a consideration of no contemptible consequence.

6. This in generall may suffice concerning the very Nature of the Soule it self, her Extension and Heterogeneity. I shall onely adde to this one Observable concerning her Aiery and AEthereal Vehicle, and then I shall descend to more particular disquisitions. Rash fancies and false deductions from misunderstood Experiments have made some very confident that there is a Vacuum in Nature, and that every Body by how much more light it is, so much less substance it has in it self. A thing very fond and irrational, at the first sight, to such as are but indifferently well versed in the incomparable Philosophy of Renatus Des-Cartes, whose dexterous wit and through insight into the nature and lawes of Matter, has so perfected the reasons of those Phaenomena, that Demooritus, Epicurus, Lucretius and others have puzzled themselves about, that there seems nothing now wanting as concerning that way of Philosophizing, but patience and an unprejudiced judgment to peruse what he has writ.

7. According therefore to his Philosophy and the Truth, there is ever as much Matter or Body in one consistency as another; as for example, there is as much Matter in a Cup of Aire as in the same Cup filled with Water, and as much in this Cup of Water as if it were filled with Lead or Quicksilver. Which I take notice of here, that I may free the imagination of men from that ordinary and idiotick misapprehension which they entertain of Spirits that appear, as if they were as evanid and devoid of Substance as the very shadowes of our Bodies cast against a Wall, or our Images reflected from a River or Looking-glass: and therefore from this errour have given them names accordingly, calling the Ghosts of men that present themselves to them, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and Umbrae, Images and Shades. The which, the more visible they are, they think them the more substantial; fancying that the Aire is so condensed, that there is not onely more of it, but also that simply there is more Matter or Substance, when it appears thus visible, then there was in the same space before. And therefore they must needs conceit that Death reduces us to a pittifull thin pittance of Being, that our Substance is in a manner lost, and nothing but a tenuious reek remains, no more in proportion to us, then what a sweating horse leaves behind him as he gallops by in a frosty morning. Which certainly must be a very lamentable consideration to such as love this thick and plump Body they beare about with them, and are pleased to consider how many pounds they outweighed their Neighbour the last time they were put in the ballance together.

8. But if a kinde of dubious Transparency will demonstrate the deficiency of Corporeal Substance, a Pillar of Crystal will have less thereof then one of Tobacco-smoak; which though it may be so doubtful and evanid an Object to the Eye, if we try it by the Hand, it will prove exceeding solid: as also these Ghosts that are said to appear in this manner have proved to them that have touched them, or have been touched by them. For it is a thing ridiculous and unworthy of a Philosopher, to judge the measure of corporeal Matter by what it seems to our sight; for so Air would be nothing at all: or what it is to our handing or weighing of it; for so indeed a Cup of Quick-silver would seem to have infinitely more Matter in it then one fill'd with Air onely, and a vessel of Water less when it is plung'd under the water in the River, then when it is carried in the Air. But we are to remember, that let Matter be of what consistency it will, as thin and pure as the flame of a candle, there is not less of corporeal Substance therein then there is in the same dimensions of Silver, Lead, or Gold.

9. So that we need not bemoan the shrivell'd condition of the deceased, as if they were stript almost of all Substance corporeal, and were too thinly clad to enjoy themselves as to any Object of Sense. For they have no less Body then we our selves have, onely this Body is far more active then ours, being more spiritualized, that is to say, having greater degrees of Motion communicated unto it; which the whole Matter of the world receives from some spiritual Being or other, and therefore in this regard may be said the more to symbolize with that immaterial Being, the more Motion is communicated to it: As it does also in that which is the effect of Motion, to wit the tenuity and subtilty of its particles, whereby it is enabled to imitate, in some sort, the proper priviledge of Spirits that pass through all Bodies whatsoever. And these Vehicles of the Soul, by reason of the tenuity of their parts, may well pass through such Matter as seems to us impervious, though it be not really so to them. For Matter reduced to such fluid subtilty of particles as are invisible, may well have entrance through Pores unperceptible. Whence it is manifest that the Soul, speaking in a natural sense, loseth nothing by Death, but is a very considerable gainer thereby. For she does not onely possess as much Body as before, with as full and solid dimensions, but has that accession cast in, of having this Body more invigorated with Life and Motion then it was formerly. Which consideration I could not but take notice of, that I might thereby expunge that false conceit that adheres to most mens fancies, of that evanid and starved condition of the other state.

CHAP. III.

1. That the natural abode of the Soul after death is the Air. 2. That she cannot quit the AErial Regions till the AEthereal Congruity of life be awakened in her. 3. That all Souls are not in the same Region of the Aire. 4. Cardans conceit of placing all Daemons in the upper Region. 5. The use of this conceit for the shewing the reason of their seldome appearing. 6. That this Phaenomenon is salved by a more rational Hypothesis. 7. A further confutation of Cardans Opinion. 8. More tending to the same scope. 9. The Original of Cardans errour concerning the remote operations of Daemons. 10. An Objection how Daemons and Souls separate can be in this lower Region, where Winds and Tempests are so frequent. 11. A preparation to an Answer from the consideration of the nature of the Winds. 12. Particular Answers to the Objection. 13. A further Answer from the nature of the Statick Faculty of the Soul. 14. Another from the suddain power of actuating her Vehicle. 15. What incommodations she suffers from haile, rain, &c.

1. THose more particular Enquiries we intend to fall upon, may be reduced to these few Heads: viz. The place of the Souls abode, Her employment, and Her moral condition after Death. That the place of Her abode is the Aire, is the constant opinion of the ancient Philosophers and natural Theologers, who doe unanimously make that Element the Receptacle of Souls departed: which therefore they called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , that is, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , because men deceased are in a state of invisibility, as the place they are confined to is an Element utterly invisible of its own nature, and is accloy'd also with caliginous mists, and enveloped by vicissitudes with the dark shadow of the Earth. The truth of this opinion of theirs is plainly demonstrable from the 29. and 31. Axiomes. For Nature making no enormous jumps, it must needs follow, that separate Souls must take their first station in the Aire, because that Vital Congruity that fits an AErial Vehicle does of order awaken immediately upon the quitting of the Earthly Body.

2. Wherefore the Soul being thus vitally united with a Body or Vehicle of Aire, it is impossible that she should drive out of those Regions: because her motions are onely according to the capacity of her Vehicle, she being not able to alter the consistency thereof into any more subtile or purer temper then the Aire will admit of, keeping still its own Species. Onely she may conspissate the Aire by directing the motion thereof towards her, and so squeezing out a considerable part of the first and second Element may retain more Aire then ordinary: But she cannot command the Air from her so entirely, as to actuate these two Elements alone, or any considerable part of them, because the AEthereal Congruity of life is as yet wholy asleep; nor is it in the power of the Soul to awake it as she pleases: and therefore it would be Pain and Death to her to attempt the removal of the aerial Matter quite from her. Besides that it would require such a force as would imply a contribution of motion to it, as well as direction of it, to make it able to bear against other parts of the Aire that love not to be streightned nor crouded: which though it may haply be done in some measure, yet that she may by this force of direction recover a whole Vehicle of AEther, seems excessively improbable, as is plain from the 31. Axiome.

3. Wherefore it is necessary that the Soul departed this life should be somewhere in the Aire, though it be not at all necessary that they should inhabit all of them the same Region thereof. For as some Souls are more purified then others when they leave the Body, so a more pure degree of Vital Congruity will awake in them: whence by that Divine Nemesis that runs through all things, they will be naturally conveyed to such places, and be associated to such company as is most congruous to their Nature; and will be as distinctly sorted by that eternal Justice that God has so deeply ingrafted in the very essential contexture of the Universe, as humane Laws dispose of persons with us, sending some to Prisons, some to Pest-houses, and others to the Prytaneum.

4. It will therefore, in all likelihood, fall to some of their shares to be fatally fettered to this lower Region of the Aire, as I doubt not but many other Spirits are; though Cardan much pleases himself with a peculiar conceit of his own, as if the supreme Region of the Aire was the onely habitation of all Daemons or Spirits whatever, and that their descent to us is as rare as the diving of Men into the bottome of the Sea, and almost as difficult, this thick Aire we breathe in being in a manner as unsutable to their tenuious consistencies as the Water is to us; in which we are fain to hold out breath, and consequently to make a very short stay in that Element. Besides that he fancies the passage of the Middle Region tedious to them, by reason of its Coldness; which therefore he saith is as it were a fence betwixt us and them, as the Sea is betwixt the Fishes and us; whom though we exceed much in Wit and Industry, and have a great desire to catch them and kill them, yet we get very few into our hands in comparison of those that scape us: And so these Daemos, though they bear us no good will, by bodily conflict they can hurt none of us (as being so difficult a thing to come at us) and very few of us by their Art and Industry. For this fancyfull Philosopher will have them onely attempt us as we do the Fishes, by Baits, and Nets, and Eel-spears, or such like Engines which we cast into the bottom of the Water: So these aerial Genii, keeping their station above in the third Region of the Aire (as we doe on the bank of the River, or in a Boat on the Sea, when we fish) by sending down Dreams and Apparitions, may entangle some men so, that by affrightments and disturbances of minde at last, though at this distance, they may work their ruine and destruction.

5. This Hypothesis, I suppose, he has framed to give an account why the appearing of the Genii is so seldome, and why so little hurt is done by them as there is. For an Answer would be ready, that this lower A •• e is no Element for them to abide in: and that it is as foolishly argued by those that say there are no Spirits, because they are so seldome seen, as if the Fishes, upon a concession of Speech and Reason to their mute Tribe, should generally conclude, that there are no such Creatures as Men or Horses, because it happens so very seldome that they can see them; and should contemn and laugh ac those Fishes that, having had the hap to meet with them, should say they have seen such Creatures, as if they were fanatick and lunatick, and not well in their wits, or else too much in them, and that they contrived such fictions for some political design.

6. Which Parable may hold good, though not upon the same grounds, onely by substituting difference of condition for distance of place; and the similitude will prove as sound as before. For, for a Spirit to condensate his Vehicle to almost a Terrestrial grossness and Visibility, is as rare and uncouth as for Terrestrial animals to dive to the bottom of the Sea, and its likely every jot as difficult: and so the reason as obvious why so few are seen, & the confident denial of their existence as rash and foolish, by then that have not seen them themselves. For it is as if the Fishes should contest amongst themselves about the existence of Men, and their diving into the Water, and whether there were any places haunted in the Sea; as those would be the most famous where they fish for Pearls, or that cause the most frequent Shipwracks, or are most pleasant to swim in. And some notable occasion, mischance, or weighty design, such as occurre more rarely, must be reasonably conceived the onely invitements to the Genii to expose themselves to our view.

7. That there is so little hurt done by them, need not be resolved into the distance of their habitation, but into the Law of the Universe, whose force penetrates through all orders of Beings. Besides, it is too trivial and idiotick a conceit, & far below the pitch of a Philosopher, to think that all AErial Spirits are Haters of Mankinde, so as to take delight meerly in destroying them. For Men do not hate Fishes because they live in another Element different from theirs, but catch them meerly in love to themselves, for gain and food; which the aiery Genii cannot aim at in destroying of us. But to doe Mischef meerly for Mischiefs sake, is so excessive an Enormity, that some doubt whether it be competible to any Intellectual Being. And therefore Cardan ought to have proved that first: as also, if there be any so extremely degenerate, that there be many of them, or rather so many that they cannot be awed by the number of those that are less depraved. For we may observe that men amongst our selves that are sufficiently wicked, yet they abhor very much from those things that are grossly & causlesly destructive to either Man or Beast; & themselves would help to destroy, punish, or at least hinder the attempters of such wild & exorbitant outrages that have no pretence of Reason, but are a meer exercise of Cruelty and Vexation to other Creatures. He also ought to have demonstrated, that all Mankind are not the Peculium of some Spirits or other, and that there are not invisible Governours of Nations, Cities, Families, and sometime of particular Men; and that at least a Political Goodness, such as serves for the safety of Persons and what belongs to them, is not exceedingly more prevalent even in these Kingdomes of the Aire, then gross Injustice. For all this may be on this side of the Divine Life: so that there is no feare of making these aerial Inhabitants over-perfect by this Supposition. In a word, he should have proved that Political Order, in the full exercise thereof, did not reach from Heaven to Earth, and pierce into the Subterraneous Regions also, if there be any Intellectual Creatures there. For this will suffice to give a reason that so little hurt is done, though all places be full of AErial Spirits.

8. Adde unto all this, that though they may not be permitted to doe any gross evill themselves, and to kill men at pleasure without their consents, yet they may abet them in such wayes, or invite them to such courses, as will prove destructive to them: but, it may be, with no greater plot then we have when we set Doggs together by the eares, fight Cocks, bait Beares and Bulls, run Horses, and the like; where often, by our occasion, as being excited and animated by us, they pursue their own inclinations, to the loss of their lives. But though we doe not care to kill a Dog or a Cock in this way; yet there is none so barbarous as to knock these Creatures on the head meerly because they will doe so. So these worser kind of Genii, according as their tempers are, may haply follow some men prone to such or such vices, in which they may drive them in way of contest, or to please their own fancies, to the utmost they can doe in it; and, taking their parts, sport themselves in making one man overcome another in duelling, in drinking, in craft and undermining, in wenching, in getting riches, in clambering to honours; and so of the rest. Where it may be their pastime to try the Victory of that Person they have taken to; and if he perish by the hurry of their temptations and animations, it is a thing they intended no more, it may be, then he that sets his Cock into the pit desires his neck should be broke: but if it happen so, the sorrow is much alike in both cases. And therefore these Spirits may doe mischief enough in the world, in abetting men that act it, though haply they neither take pleasure in doing of it upon any other termes, nor if they did, are able to doe it, there being so many watchfull eyes over them. For these AErial Legions are as capable of Political Honesty, and may as deeply resent it, as the Nations of the Earth doe, and it may be more deeply.

9. But if these Creatures were removed so far off as Cardan would have them, I doe not see how they could have any communion at all with us, to doe us either good or hurt. For that they are able to send Apparitions or Dreames at this distance, is it self but a Dream, occasioned from that first errour in the Aristotelian Philosophy, that makes God and the Intelligences act from the heavenly sphears, and so to produce all these effects of Nature below; such as can never be done but by a present Numen and Spirit of Life that pervades all things.

10. This conceit therefore of his shall be no hindrance to our concluding, That this lower Region of the Aire is also replenisht with Daemons. Which if it be, it is not unlikely but that the impurer Souls wander there also; though I have taken all this pains to bring still greater trouble upon my self. For it is obvious to object that which Lucretius has started of old, that this Region being so obnoxious to Windes and tempests, the Souls will not be able to keep their Vehicles of Aire about them, but that they will be blown in pieces by the roughness of these storms. But we may be easily delivered of this solicitude, if we consider the nature of the Windes, the nature of these Vehicles, & the Statick power of the Soule. For to say theywil make as good shift as the Genii here, is not fully satisfactory, because a man would also willingly understand how the Genii themselves are not liable to this inconvenience. My Answer therefore shall reach both.

11. That Windes are nothing else but Watery particles at their greatest agitation, Cartesius has very handsomely demonstrated in his Meteors: Which particles doe not so much drive the Aire before them, as pass through it, as a flight of arrowes and showers of haile or rain. One part of the Aire therefore is not driven from another; but it is as if one should conceive so many little pieces of haire twirling on their middle point as at quarter-staffe, and so passing through the Aire; which motion would pass free, without carrying the Aire along with it. This therefore being the nature of Winde, the Aire is not torn apieces thereby, though we finde the impetus of it moveing against us, because it cannot penetrate our Bodies with that facility that it does the Aire.

12. But the Vehicles of the Genii and Souls deceased are much-what of the very nature of the Aire; whence it is plainly impossible that the Winde should have any other force on them, then what it has on the rest of that Element; and therefore the least thing imaginable will hold all the parts together. Which is true also if the Winde did carry along the Aire with it: for then the Vehicles of the Genii would move along with the stream, suffering little or no violence at all, unless they would force themselves against it. Which they are not necessitated to doe, as indeed not so much as to come into it, or not at least to continue in it, but may take shelter, as other living Creatures doe, in houses, behind walls, in woods, dales, caverns, rocks and other obvious places; and that maturely enough, the change of Aire and prognostick of storms being more perceptible to them then to any terrestrial animal.

13. And yet they need not be so cautious to keep out of danger, they having a power to grapple with the greatest of it, which is their Statick faculty; which arises from the power of directing the motion of the particles of their Vehicle. For they having this power of directing the motion of these particles which way they please, by Axiome 31. it necessarily followes, that they can determinate their course inwards, or toward the Centre; by which direction they will be all kept close together, firm and tight: which ability I call the Statick power of the Soule. Which if it can direct the whole agitation of the particles of the Vehicle, as well those of the first and second Element as those of the Aire, and that partly towards the Centre, and partly in a countertendency against the storme, this force and firmness will be far above the strongest windes that she can possibly meet with.

14. Wherefore the Soules Vehicle is in no danger from the boisterousness of the Winds, and if it were, yet there is no fear of cessation of Life. For as the Wind blowes off one part of Aire, it brings on another which may be immediately actuated by the presence of the Soule; though there be no need to take refuge in so large an Hypothesis. And it is more probable that she is more peculiarly united to one part of the Aire then another, and that she dismisses her Vehicle but by degrees, as our Spirits leasurely pass away by insensible Perspiration.

15. We see how little the Souls Vehicle can be incommodated by storms of Winde. And yet Rain, Haile, Snow and Thunder will incommodate her still less. For they pass as they doe through other parts of the Aire, which close again immediately, and leave neither wound nor scarre behinde them. Wherefore all these Meteors in their Mediocrity may be a pleasure to her and refreshment; and in their excess no long pain, nor in their highest rage any destruction of life at all. From whence we may safely conclude, that not onely the Upper Region, but this Lower also, may be inhabited both by the deceased Souls of Men and by Daemons.

CHAP. IV.

1. That the Soule once having quitted this earthly Body becomes a Daemon. 2. Of the Externall Senses of the Soule separate, their number and limits in the Vehicle. 3. Of Sight in a Vehicle organized and unorganized. 4. How Daemons and separate Souls hear and see at a vast Distance: and whence it is that though they may so easily hear or see us, we may neither see nor hear them. 5. That they have Hearing as well as Sight. 6. Of the Touch, Smell, Tast, and Nourishment of Daemons. 7. The external employment that the Genii and Souls deceased may have out of the Body. 8. That the actions of Separate Souls, in reference to us, are mostwhat conformable to their life here on Earth. 9. What their entertainments are in reference to themselves. 10. The distinction of orders of Daemons from the places they most frequent.

1. THE next thing we are to enquire into is the Employment of the Soul after Death; how she can entertain her self, and pass away the time, and that either in Solitude, in Company, or as she is a Political member of some Kingdome or Empire. Concerning all which in the general we may conclude, that it is with her as with the rest of the AErial Genii, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , for the Soul having once put off this terrestrial Body becomes a Genius her self; as Maximus Tyrius, Xenocrates, Philo and others expresly affirm. But we shall consider these things more particularly.

2. As for those employments wherewith she may entertain her self in solitude, they are either Objects of the External Senses, or of the Inward Minde. Concerning the former whereof it is more easie to move Questions then satisfy them; as Whether she have the same number of Senses she had in this life. That she is endued with Hearing, Sight and Touch, I think there can be no scruple, because these will fall to her share necessarily, whether her Vehicle be organized or not; and that of Seeing and Touch is the most uncontrovertible of all. For the sense of visible Objects being discovered to us by transmission of Motion through those Spherical particles that are continued along from the Object through the Aire to our very Organ of Sight (which sees meerly by reason of these particles vitally united with the Soul) the same particles pervading all the Souls Vehicle, it is impossible but that she should see. But the Question is, whether she sees in every part thereof. To which I must answer, No: partly from what I have already declared concerning the Heterogeneity of her Plastick part; and partly from a gross inconvenience that would follow this Supposition. For if we should grant that the Soul saw in every part of her Vehicle, every Object that is near would not onely seem double, but centuple, or millecuple; which would be a very ugly enormity and defacement of Sight. Wherefore we have, with very good reason, restrained the Visive faculty of the Soul in this state of Separation, as well as it was in the Terrestrial Body.

3. But this hinders nothing but that the Soul, when she lies in one Homogeneal orb of Aire, devoid of organization, may see round about her, behinde, before, above, beneath, and every way. But if she organize her Vehicle, Sight may haply be restrain'd, as in us who cannot see behinde us. Which Consideration we toucht upon before.

4. It is plain therefore that these AErial Spirits, though we cannot see them, cannot miss of seeing us; and that, it may be, from a mighty distance, if they can transform their Vehicle, or the Organ of Sight, into some such advantageous Figure as is wrought in Dioptrick Glasses. Which power will infinitely exceed the contracting and dilating of the pupil of our Eye, which yet is a weaker and more defectuous attempt towards so high a Priviledge as we speak of: which notwithstanding may seem very possible in Spirits from 31. and 34. Axiomes. The same also may be said of their Hearing. For the same principle may enable them to shape themselves Organs for the receiving of Sounds, of greater art and excellency then the most accurate Acoustick we read of, or can excogitate. Wherefore it is a very childish mistake to think, that because we neither see the shape nor hear the discourse of Spirits, that they neither hear nor see us. For soft Bodies are impressible by hard ones, but not on the contrary; as melted Wax will receive the Signature of the Seal, but the Seal is not at all impressed upon by the Wax. And so a solid Body will stop the course of the Aire, but the Aire will not stop the course of a solid Body; and every inconsiderable terrestrial consistency will reflect Light, but Light scarce moves any terrestrial Body out of its place, but is rebounded back by it. That therefore that is most tenuious and thin, is most passive, and therefore if it be once the Vehicle of Sense, is most sensible. Whence it will follow, that the reflexion of Light from Objects being able to move our Organs, that are not so fine, they will more necessarily move those of the Genii, and at a greater distance. But their Bodies being of diaphanous Aire, it is impossible for us to see them, unless they will give themselves the trouble of reducing them to a more terrestrial consistency, whereby they may reflect light. Nor can we easily hear their ordinary speech, partly because a very gentle motion of the Aire will act upon their Vehicles, and partly because they may haply use the finer and purer part of that Element in this exercise, which is not so fit to move our Sense. And therefore unless they will be heard datâ operâ, naturally that impress of the Aire in their usual discourse can never strike our Organ.

5. And that we may not seem to say all this for nought; that they will have Hearing as well as Seeing, appears from what I have intimated above, that this Faculty is ranged near the Common Sensorium in the Vehicle, as well as that of Sight, and therefore the Vehicle being all Aire, such percussions of it as cause the sense of Sound in us will necessarily doe the like in them; but more accurately, haply, if they organize their Vehicle for the purpose, which will answer to the arrection of the Ears of Animals, for the better taking in the Sound.

6. That they have the sense of Touch is inevitably true, else how could they feel resistance, which is necessary in the bearing of one Body against another, because they are impenetrable? And to speak freely my mind, it will be a very hard thing to disprove that they have not something analogical to Smell and Tast, which are very near a-kin to Touch properly so called. For Fumes and Odours passing so easily through the Aire, will very naturally insinuate into their Vehicles also: which Fumes, if they be grosser and humectant, may raise that diversification of Touch which we Mortals call Tasting; if more subtile and dry, that which we call Smelling. Which if we should admit, we are within modest bounds as yet in comparison of others; as Cardan, who affirms downright that the AErial Genii are nourished, and that some of them get into the Bodies of Animals to batten themselves there in their Blood and Spirits. Which is also averred by Marcus the Mesopotamian Eremite in Psellus, who tells us that the purer sort of the Genii are nourished by drawing in the Aire, as our Spirits are in the Nerves and Arteries; and that other Genii, of a courser kinde, suck in moisture, not with the Mouth as we doe, but as a Sponge does water. And Moses AEgyptius writes concerning the Zabii, that they eat of the blood of their Sacrifice, because they thought it was the food of the Daemons they worshipped, and that by eating thereof they were in a better capacity to communicate with them. Which things if they could be believed, that would be no such hard Probleme concerning the Familiars of Witches, why they suck them. But such curiosities, being not much to our purpose, I willingly omit.

7. The conclusion of what has been said is this, That it is certain that the Genii, and consequently the Souls of men departed, who ipso facto are of the same rank with them, have the sense of Seeing, Hearing, and Touching, and not improbably of Smelling and Tasting. Which Faculties being granted, they need not be much at a loss how to spend their time, though it were but upon external Objects; all the furniture of Heaven and Earth being fairly exposed to their view. They see the same Sun and Moon that we doe, behold the persons and converse of all men, and, if no special Law inhibit them, may pass from Town to Town, and from City to City, as Hesiod also intimates, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . There is nothing that we enjoy but they may have their fees out of it; fair Fields, large and invious Woods, pleasant Gardens, high and healthful Mountains, where the purest gusts of Aire are to be met with, Crystal Rivers, mossy Springs, solemnity of Entertainments, Theatrick Pomps and Shews, publick and private Discourses, the exercises of Religion, whether in Temples, Families, or hidden Cells. They may be also (and haply not uninteressed) Spectators of the glorious and mischievous hazards of War, whether Sea-fights or Land-fights; besides those soft and silent, though sometimes no less dangerous, Combats in the Camps of Cupid; and a thousand more particularities that it would be too long to reckon up, where they haply are not men Spectators but Abettors, as Plutarch writes: Like old men that are past Wrestling, Pitching the Barre, or playing at Cudgels themselves, yet will assist and abet the young men of the Parish at those Exercises. So the Souls of men departed, though they have put off with the Body the capacity of the ordinary functions of humane Life, yet they may assist and abet them, as pursuing some design in them; and that either for evil or good, according as they were affected themselves when they were in the Body.

8. In brief, whatever is the custome and desire of the Soul in this life, that sticks and adheres to her in that which is to come; and she will be sure, so farre as she is capable, either to act it, or to be at least a Spectator and Abettor of such kinde of actions. —Quae gratia currûm Armorumque fuit vivis, quae cura nitentes Pascere equos, eadē sequitur tellure repostos. Which rightly understood is no poetical fiction, but a professed Truth in Plato's Philosophy. And Maximus Tyrius speaks expresly even of the better sort of Soules, who having left the Body, and so becoming 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , i. e. being made ipso facto Genii in stead of men, that, beside the peculiar happiness they reap thereby to themselves, they are appointed by God, and have a mission from him, to be Overseers of humane affairs: but that every Genius does not perform every office, but as their naturall Inclinations and Customes were in this life, they exercise the like in some manner in the other. And therefore he will have AEsculapius to practise Physick still, and Hercules to exercise his strength, Amphilochus to prophesy, Castor and Pollux to navigate, Minos to hear causes, and Achilles to war. Which opinion is as likely to hold true in Bad Souls as in Good; and then it will follow, that the Souls of the wicked make it their business to assist and abet the exercise of such Vices as themselves were most addicted to in this life, and to animate and tempt men to them. From whence it would follow, that they being thus by their separate state Daemons, as has been said already, if they be also tempters to evil, they will very little differ from meer Devils.

9. But besides this employment in reference to us, they may entertain themselves with Intellectuall Contemplations, whether Naturall, Mathematical, or Metaphysical. For assuredly Knowledge is not so easy and cheap in this state of Separation, but that they may advance and improve themselves by exercise and Meditations. And they being in a capacity to forget by reason of desuetude, it will be a new pleasure to them to recall to minde their almost obliterate speculations. And for those that take more pleasure in outward Sense then in the operations of their Understanding; there being so much change in Nature, and so various qualifications of the Aire and these inferiour Elements, which must needs act upon their aerial Bodies to more or less gratification or dislike, this also will excuse them from being idle, and put them upon quest after such refreshments and delights as Nature will afford the multifarious presages and desires of their flitting Vehicles.

10. Not but that they keep constant to some generall inclination, which has divided these aerial wanderers into so many Orders or Tribes; the ancient Philosophers and Poets (which are Philosophers of the antientest standing of all) having assigned places proper to each Order: the Sea, Rivers and Springs to one, Mountains and Groves to others, and so of the rest. Whence they imposed also those names of the Nereides, Naiades, Oreades, Dryades, and the like: to which you may adde the Dii Tutelares of Cities and Countries, and those that love the warmth of Families and homely converse of Men, such as they styled Lares familiares. All which, and hundreds more, which there is no need to recite, though they be engaged ever in one natural propension, yet there being so great variety of occasions to gratify it more or less, their thoughts may be imployed in purchasing and improving those delights that are most agreeable to their own nature. Which particularities to run over would be as infinite as useless. These short intimations are sufficient to make us understand that the Genii and separate Souls need want no Employment, no not in Solitude: for such must their stay also amongst us be esteemed, when they doe not sensibly and personally converse with us.

CHAP. V.

1. That the Separate Soule spends not all her time in Solitude. 2. That her converse with us seems more intelligible then that with the Genii. 3. How the Genii may be visible one to another, though they be to us invisible. 4. Of their approaches, and of the limits of their swiftness of motion: 5. And how they far exceed us in celerity. 6. Of the figure or shape of their Vehicles, and of their privacy, when they would be invisible. 7. That they cannot well converse in a meer simple Orbicular forme. 8. That they converse in humane shape, at least the better sort of them. 9. Whether the shape they be in proceed meerly from the Imperium of their Will and Fancy, or is regulated by a natural Character of the Plastick part of the Soule. 10. That the personal shape of a Soule or Genius is partly from the Will, and partly from the Plastick power. 11. That considering how the Soul organizes the Foetus in the Womb, and moves our limbs at pleasure; it were a wonder if Spirits should not have such command over their Vehicles as is believed. 12. A further Argument from an excessive vertue some have given to Imagination.

1. BUT the separate state of the Soule does not condemn her to this Solitude, but being admitted into the order of the Genii, she is possessed of their Priviledges, which is to converse personally with this AErial people, and also upon occasion with the Inhabitants of the Earth; though the latter with far more difficulty.

2. As for her converse with the AErial Genii and other Souls separate, it must be in all reason concluded to be exceeding much more frequent then that with men, and yet this latter is in some sort more intelligible; because it is certain she can see us, light being reflected from our opake Bodies unto her Sense, and by conspissating her Vehicle she may make her self visible to us. But the Vehicles of the Genii and of Souls being in their natural consistence purely AErial, and Air being a transparent Body, it will transmit the light wholly; and so no reflexion being made from these aiery Bodies, they can have no perception of one anothers presence, and therefore no society nor communion one with another.

3. This seems a shrewd Difficulty at the first view. But it is easily taken off, if we consider that Aire will admit of many degrees of Rarefaction and Condensation, and yet still appear unto us alike invisible, as one may observe in the Weather-glass. But it were more proper to propose in this case the experiment of the Wind-gun, wherein the Aire is compressed to a great number of degrees of condensatiō beyond its natural state; within the compass of many whereof there is no doubt, if not in the utmost, that the Aire does remaine invisible to us. But there is no scruple to be made but that in the progress of these degrees of Condensation the Aire, if it were in a Glass-barrel, might become visible to the Genii, by reason of the tenderness and delicacy of their Senses, before it would be so to us. Whence it followes, that the Vehicles of the Genii may have a consistency different from the Aire, and perceptible to them, that is to say, to one anothers sight, though it be as unperceptible to us as the rest of the Aire is. As, it may be, a man that has but bad eyes would not be able to distinguish Ice immersed in the Water from the Water it self by his Sight, though he might by his Touch. Or if their Vehicles could be supposed purer and finer then the rest of the Aire, their presence might be perceptible by that means too. For this vaporous Aire having without question a confused reflection of light in it, every way in some proportion like that in a Mist, or when the Sun shines waterishly and prognosticks rain; these repercussions of light being far more sensible to the Genii then to us, the lessening of them would be more sensible, and therefore the diminution of reflection from their Vehicles would be sufficient to discover their presence one to another: and for the illustrating of this Hypothesis, the experiment of the Weather-glass is more proper. But the other supposition I look upon as the more likely to be true; and that as the aquatil Animals that live in the Sea have a consistency grosser then the Element they move in, so it is with these that live in the Aire, though there be nothing near so great a difference here as in that other Element.

4. It is plain therefore, that the Persons of the Genii and separate Souls are visible one to another. But yet not at any distance, and therefore there is necessity of approaching to one another for mutual converse: which enforces us to say something of their Local Motion. Which is neither by Fins nor Wings, as in Fishes or Birds, who are fain to sustain themselves by these instruments from sinking to the bottome of either Element: but it is meerly by the direction of the agitation of the particles of their Vehicle toward the place they aime at; and in such a swiftness or leasureliness as best pleases themselves, and is competible to their natures. For they can goe no swifter then the whole summe of agitation of the particles of their Vehicle will carry so much Matter, nor indeed so swift; for it implies that their Vehicles would be turned into an absolutely hard Body, such as Brass or Iron, or whatever we find harder; so that necessarily they would fall down to the Earth as dead as a Stone. Those therefore are but phantastick conceits that give such agility to Spirits, as if they could be here and there and every where at once, skip from one Pole of the World to another, & be on the Earth again in a moment: whenas in truth they can pass with no greater swiftness then the direction of such a part of the agitation of the particles of their Vehicles will permit, as may be spared from what is employed in keeping them within a tolerable compass of a due aerial fluidity.

5. And this alone will suffice to make them exceed us in activity and swiftness by many degrees. For their whole Vehicle is haply at least as thin and moveable as our animal Spirits, which are very few in comparison of this luggage of an earthly Body that they are to drive along with them. But the spiritual Bodies of the Genii have nothing to drive along with them but themselves; and therefore are more free and light, compared to us, then a mettl'd Steed that has cast his Rider, compared with a Pack-horse loaden with a sack of Salt.

6. The next, thing to be considered, touching the mutual conversation of these aerial Genii, is the shape they appear in one to another, of what Figure it is, and whether the Figure be Natural, or Arbitrarious, or Mixt. For that they must appear in some Figure or other is plain, in that their Vehicles are not of an infinite extension. It is the more general Opinion, that there is no particular Figure that belongs unto them naturally, unless it be that which of all Figures is most simple, and most easy to conform to, even by external helps, which is the equal compression of the Aire on every side of the Vehicle, by which means drops of Dew and Rain and pellets of Hail come so ordinarily into that shape. Which also will more handsomely accord with the nature of the Soul, supposing she consist of Central and Radial essence, as I have above described, and the Common Sensorium be placed in the midst. In this Figure may the Soul reside in the Aire, and haply melt her self, I mean her Vehicle, into near so equal a liquidity with that part of that Element adjacent to her, that it may be in some measure like our retiring into secrecy from the sight of men, when we desire to be private by our selves.

7. But she may, if she will, and likely with farre more ease, change this consistency of her AErial Body into such a degree of thickness, that there may be a dubious discovery of her, as in the glimpse of a Fish under the water, and may still make her self more visible to her fellow-Genii, though keeping yet this simple Orbicular form. But what converse there can be betwixt two such heaps of living Aire, I know not. They may indeed communicate their affections one to another in such a way as is discovered in the Eye, wherein the motions of the Spirits doe plainly indicate the Passions of the Minde: so that it may seem possible, in this simple Figure, to make known their joy or grief, peaceableness or wrath, love or dislike, by the modification of the motion of the Spirits of their Vehicle. But how there can well be entertained any Intellectual or Rational Conference, without any further organization of their Aiery Bodies, I profess my self at a loss to understand.

8. Wherefore the Genii and separate Souls, whatever their shape be in private, appear in a more operose and articulate form when they are to converse with one another. For they can change their Figure in a manner as they please, by Axiome 34. Which power, I conceive, will be made use of not onely for service, but ornament and pulcritude. And the most unexceptionable Beauty, questionless, is that of Man in the best patterns (chuse what Sex you will) and far above the rest of Creatures; which is not our judgement onely, but His that made us. For certainly he would give to the Principal of terrestrial Animals the noblest form and shape; which though it be much obscured by our unfortunate Fall, yet questionless the defacement is not so great, but that we may have a near guess what it has been heretofore. It is most rational therefore to conclude, that the AErial Genii converse with one another in Humane shape, at least the better sort of them.

9. But the difficulty now is, whether that Humane shape that the Soul transforms her Vehicle into, be simply the effect of the Imperium of her Will over the Matter she actuates, or that her Will may be in some measure limited or circumscribed in its effect by a concomitant exertion of the Plastick power; so that what proceeds from the Will may be onely more general, that is, That the Souls Will may onely command the Vehicle into an Animal form; but that it is the form or shape of a Man, may arise in a more natural way from the concomitant exertion of the Plastick vertue. I say, in a more easy and natural way: For vehemency of desire to alter the Figure into another representation may make the appearance resemble some other creature: But no forced thing can last long. The more easy and natural shape therefore that, at least, the better Genii appear in, is Humane: which if it be granted, it may be as likely that such a determinate Humane shape may be more easy and natural then another, and that the Soul, when she wills to appear in personal Figure, will transform her Vehicle into one constant likeness, unless she disguise her self on set purpose. That is, the Plastick power of every Soul, whether of Men, or of the other Genii, does naturally display it self into a different modification of the Humane shape, which is the proper Signature of every particular or individual person: which though it may be a little changed in Generation by vertue of the Imagination of the Parents, or quality of their seed, yet the Soul set free from that Body she got here, may exquisitely recover her ancient form again.

10. Not that the Plastick virtue, awakened by the Imperium of her Will, shall renewall the lineaments it did in this Earthly Body (for abundance of them are useless and to no purpose, which therefore, Providence so ordaining, will be silent in this aiery figuration, and onely such operate as are fit for this separate state; and such are those as are requisite to perfect the visible feature of a Person, giving him all parts of either ornament or use for the pleasure of rational converse;) nor that this Efformative power does determine the whole appearance alone (for these aerial Spirits appear variously clad, some like beautiful Virgins, others like valiant Warriours with their Helmets and Plumes of feathers, as Philostratus would make us believe Achilles did to Apollonius:) But there is a mixt action and effect, resulting partly from the freeness of the Will and Imagination, and partly from the natural propension of the Plastick virtue, to cast the Vehicle into such a personal shape.

11. Which Prerogative of the Soul, in having this power thus to shape her Vehicle at will, though it may seem very strange, because we doe not see it done before our eyes, nor often think of such things; yet it is not much more wonderful then that she organizes the Foetus in the womb, or that we can move the parts of our Body meerly by our Will and Imagination. And that the aerial Spirits can doe these things, that they can thus shape their Vehicles, and transform themselves into several Appearances, I need bring no new instances thereof. Those Narrations I have recited in my Third Book against Atheism doe sufficiently evince this Truth. And verily, considering the great power acknowledged in Imagination by all Philosophers, nothing would seem more strange, then that these Aiery Spirits should not have this command over their own Vehicles, to transform them as they please.

12. For there are some, and they of no small note, that attribute so wonderful effects to that Faculty armed with confidence and belief (to which Passion Fear may in some manner be referred, as being a strong belief of an imminent evil, and that it will surely take effect, as also vehement Desire, as being accompanied with no small measure of perswasion that we may obtain the thing desired, else Desire would not be so very active) I say, they attribute so wonderful force to Imagination, that they affirm that it will not onely alter a mans own Body, but act upon anothers, and that at a distance; that it will inflict diseases on the sound, and heal the sick; that it will cause Hail, Snows and Winds; that it will strike down an Horse or Camel, and cast their Riders into a ditch; that it will doe all the feats of Witchcraft, even to the making of Ghosts and Spirits appear, by transforming the adjacent Aire into the shape of a person that cannot onely be felt and seen, but heard to discourse, and that not onely by them whose Imagination created this aiery Spectrum, but by other by-standers, whose Fancy contributed nothing to its existence. To such an extent as this have Avicenna, Algazel, Paracelsus, Pomponatius, Vaninus and others, exalted the power of humane Imagination: which if it were true, this transfiguration of the Vehicles of the separate Souls and Genii were but a trifle in comparison thereof.

CHAP. VI.

1. More credible Instances of the effects of Imagination. 2. A special and peculiar Instance in Signatures of the Foetus. 3. That what Fienus grants, who has so cautiously bounded the power of Fancy, is sufficient for the present purpose. 4. Examples approved of by Fienus. 5. Certain Examples rejected by him, and yet approved of by Fernelius and Sennertus. 6. Three notorious Stories of the power of the Mothers Imagination on the Foetus, out of Helmont. 7. A conjectural inference from those Stories, what influence the Spirit of Nature has in all Plastick operations. 8. A further confirmation of the Conjecture from Signatures on the Foetus. 9. An application thereof to the transfiguration of the Vehicles of Daemons.

1. BUT I shall contain my belief within more moderate bounds, that which the most sober Authors assent to being sufficient for our turn; and that is the power of Imagination on our own Bodies, or what is comprehended within our own, viz. the Foetus in the Womb of the Mother. For that Imagination will bring real and sensible effects to pass is plain, in that some have raised diseases in their own Bodies by too strongly imagining of them; by fancying bitter or soure things, have brought those real sapours into their mouths; at the remembring of some filthy Object, have faln a vomiting; at the imagining of a Potion, have faln▪ a purging; and many such things of the like nature. Amongst which, that of prefixing to ones self what time in the morning we will wake, is no less admirable then my. Which alterations upon the Spirits for the production of such qualities, is every jot as hard as the ranging them into new figures or postures. But the hardest of all is, to make them so determinately active, as to change the shape of the Body, by sending out knobs like horns, as it hapned to Cyppus, of which Agrippa speaks in his Occult. Philosoph. Which I should not have repeated here, had I not been credibly informed of a later example of the like effect of Imagination, though upon more fancyful grounds. That feare has killed some, and turned others gray, is to be referred to Imagination also: the latter of which examples is a signe that the Plastick power of the Soule has some influence also upon the very haires: which will make it less marvellous that the Souls Vehicle may be turned into the live effigies of a Man, not a haire, that is necessary to the perfecting of his representation, being excluded, free Imagination succeeding or assisting the Plastick power in the other state.

2. But of all Examples, those of the Signatures of the Foetus by the Imagination of the Mother come the nearest to our purpose. For we may easily conceive, that as the Plastick power in the Foetus is directed or seduced by the force of the Mothers Fancy; so the Efformative virtue in Souls separate and the Genii may be governed and directed or perverted by the force of their Imagination. And so much the more surely by how much the union is more betwixt the Imagination of the Soule and her own Plastick faculty, then betwixt her and the Plastick power of another Soule; and the capacity of being changed, greater in the yielding aerial Vehicle, then in the grosser rudiments of the Foetus in the Womb.

3. And yet the effects of the force of the Mothers Imagination in the signing of the Foetus is very wonderful, and almost beyond belief, to those that have not examined these things. But the more learned sort both of Physitians and Philosophers are agreed on the truth thereof, as Empedocles, Aristotle, Pliny, Hippocrates, Galen, and all the modern Physitians, being born down into assent by daily experience. For these Signatures of less extravagance and enormity are frequent enough, as the similitude of Cherries, Mulberries, the colour of Claret-wine spilt on the woman with child, with many such like instances. And if we stand but to what Fienus has defined in this matter, who has, I think, behaved himself as cautiously and modestly as may be, there will be enough granted to assure us of what we aime at. For he does acknowledge that the Imagination of the Mother may change the figure of the Foetus so as to make it beare a resemblance, though not absolutely perfect, of an Ape, Pig, or Dog, or any such like Animal. The like he affirms of colours, haires, and excrescencies of several sorts: that it may produce also what is very like or analogous to horns and hoofs, and that it may encrease the bigness and number of the parts of the Body.

4. And though he does reject several of the examples he has produced out of Authors, yet those which he admits for true are Indications plain enough, what we may expect in the Vehicle of a departed Soule or Daemon. As that of the Hairy girle out of Marcus Damascenus; that other out of Guilielmus Paradinus, of a Child whose skin and nails resembled those of a Bear; and a third out of Balduinus Ronsaeus, of one born with many excrescencies coloured and figured like those in a Turky-cock; and a fourth out of Pareus, of one who was born with an head like a Frog; as lastly that out of Avicenna, of chickens with hawks heads. All which deviations of the Plastick power hapned from the force of Imagination in the Females, either in the time of Conception, or gestation of their young.

5. But he scruples of giving assent to others, which yet are assented to by very learned writers. As that of Black-moores being born of white Parents, and white Children of black, by the exposal of pictures representing an AEthiopian or European: which those two excellent Physitians, Fernelius and Sennertus, both agree to. He rejects also that out of Cornelius Gemma, of a Child that was born with his Forehead wounded and running with blood, from the husbands threatning his wife, when she was big, with a drawn sword which he directed towards her Forehead. Which will not seem so incredible, if we consider what Sennertus records of his own knowledg, viz. That a Woman with child seeing a Butcher divide a Swines head with his Cleaver, brought forth her Child with its face cloven in the upper jaw, the palate, and upper lip to the very nose.

6. But the most notorious instances of this sort are those of Helmont De injectis materialibus. The one of a Taylors wife at Mechlin, who standing at her doore, and seeing a souldiers hand cut off in a quarrel, presently fell into labour, being struck with horrour at the spectacle, and brought forth a child with one hand, the other arm bleeding without one, of which wound the infant died by the great expense of blood. Another woman, the wife of one Marcus De Vogeler Merchant of Antwerp, in the year 1602. seeing a souldier begging who had lost his right arme in Ostend-siege, which he shewed to the people still bloody, fell presently into labour, and brought forth a Daughter with one arme struck off, nothing left but a bloody stump to employ the Chirurgions skill: this woman married afterwards to one Hoochcamer Merchant of Amsterdam, and was yet alive in the year 1638. as Helmont writes. He adds a third example, of another Merchants wife which he knew, who hearing that on a morning there were thirteen men to be beheaded (this hapned at Antwerp in Duke D' Alva his time) she had the curiosity to see the execution. She getting therefore a place in the Chamber of a certain widow-woman, a friend of hers that dwelt in the market-place, beheld this Tragick spectacle; upon which she suddainly fell into labour, and brought forth a perfectly-formed infant, onely the head was wanting, but the neck bloody as their bodies she beheld that had their heads cut off. And that which does still advance the wonder is, that the hand, arme, and head of these infants, were none of them to be found. From whence Van-Helmont would infer a penetration of corporeal dimensions; but how groundlessly I will not dispute here.

7. If these Stories he recites be true, as I must confess I doe not well know how to deny them, he reporting them with so honest and credible circumstances; they are notable examples of the power of Imagination, and such as doe not onely win belief to themselves, but also to others that Fienus would reject, not of this nature onely we are upon, of wounding the body of the Infant, but also of more exorbitant conformation of parts, of which we shall bring an instance or two anon. In the mean time, while I more carefully contemplate this strange virtue and power of the Soule of the Mother, in which there is no such measure of purification or exaltedness, that it should be able to act such miracles, as I may call them, rather then natural effects; I cannot but be more then usually inclinable to think that the Plastick faculty of the Soule of the Infant, or whatever accessions there may be from the Imagination of the Mother, is not the adaequate cause of the formation of the Foetus: a thing which Plotinus somewhere intimates by the by, as I have already noted, viz. That the Soule of the World, or the Spirit of Nature, assists in this performance. Which if it be true, we have discovered a Cause proportionable to so prodigious an Effect. For we may easily conceive that the deeply-impassionated fancy of the Mother snatches away the Spirit of Nature into consent: which Spirit may rationally be acknowledged to have a hand in the efformation of all vital Beings in the World, and haply be the onely Agent in forming of all manner of Plants. In which kinde whether she exert her power in any other Elements then Earth and Water, I will conclude no further, then that there may be a possibility thereof in the calmer Regions of Aire and AEther. To the right understanding of which conjecture, some light will offer it self from what we have said concerning the Visibility and Consistency of the aerial Daemons in their occursions one with another.

8. But this is not the onely Argument that would move one to think that this Spirit of Nature intermeddles with the Efformation of the Foetus. For those Signatures that are derived on the Infant from the Mothers fancy in the act of Conception, cannot well be understood without this Hypothesis. For what can be the Subject of that Signature? Not the Plastick part of the Soul of the Mother; for that it is not the Mothers Soul that efforms the Embryo, as Sennertus ingeniously conjectures from the manner of the efformation of Birds, which is in their Egges, distinct from the Hen, and they may as well be hatched without any Hen at all, a thing ordinarily practised in AEgypt; nor the Body of the Embryo, for it has yet no Body; nor its Soul, for the Soul, if we believe Aristotle, is not yet present there. But the Spirit of Nature is present every where, which snatcht into consent by the force of the Imagination of the Mother, retains the Note, and will be sure to seal it on the Body of the Infant. For what rude inchoations the Soul of the World has begun in the Matter of the Foetus, this Signature is comprehended in the whole design, and after compleated by the presence and operation of the particular Soul of the Infant, which cooperates conformably to the pattern of the Soul of the World, and insists in her footsteps; who having once begun any hint to an entire design, she is alike able to pursue it in any place, she being every where like or rather the same to her self. For as our Soul being one, yet, upon the various temper of the Spirits, exerts her self into various imaginations and conceptions; so the Soul of the World, being the same perfectly every where, is engaged to exert her efformative power every where alike, where the Matter is exactly the same. Whence it had been no wonder, if those Chickens above-mentioned with Hawks heads had been hatched an hundred miles distant from the Hen, whose Imagination was disturbed in the act of Conception: because the Soul of the World had begun a rude draught, which it self would as necessarily pursue every where, as a Geometrician certainly knows how to draw a Circle that will fit three Points given.

9. This Opinion therefore of Plotinus is neither irrational nor unintelligible, That the Soul of the World interposes and insinuates into all generations of things, while the Matter is fluid and yielding. Which would induce a man to believe, that she may not stand idle in the transfiguration of the Vehicles of the Daemons, but assist their fancies and desires, and so help to cloath them and attire them according to their own pleasures: or it may be sometimes against their wills, as the unwieldiness of the Mothers Fancy forces upon her a Monstrous birth.

CHAP. VII.

1. Three notable Examples of Signatures, rejected by Fienus: 2. And yet so farre allowed for possible, as will fit our design. 3. That Helmonts Cherry and Licetus his Crab-fish are shrewd arguments that the Soul of the World has to do with all Efformations of both Animals and Plants. 4. An Example of a most exact and lively Signature out of Kircher: 5. With his judgement thereupon. 6. Another Example out of him of a Child with gray hairs. 7. An application of what has been said hitherto, concerning the Signatures of the Foetus, to the transfiguration of the aiery Vehicles of separate Souls and Daemons. 8. Of their personal transformation visible to us.

1. THose other Examples of the Signation of the Foetus from the Mothers Fancy, which Fienus rejecteth, the one of them is out of Wierus, of a man that threatned his wife when she was bigge with child, saying, she bore the Devil in her womb, and that he would kill him: whereupon, not long after, she brought forth a Child well shaped from the middle downwards, but upwards spotted with black and red spots, with eyes in its forehead, a mouth like a Satyre, ears like a Dog, and bended horns on its head like a Goat. The other out of Ludovicus Vives, of one who returning home in the disguise of a Devil, whose part he had acted on the Stage, and having to doe with his wife in that habit, saying he would beget a Devil on her, impregnated her with a Monster of a shape plainly diabolical. The third and most remarkable is out of Peramatus, of a Monster born at S. Laurence in the West-Indies, in the year 1573▪ the narration whereof was brought to the Duke of Medina Sidonia from very faithful hands. How there was a Child born there at that time, that besides the horrible deformity of its mouth, ears and nose, had two horns on the head, like those of young Goats, long hair on the body, a fleshy girdle about his middle, double, from whence hung a peece of flesh like a purse, and a bell of flesh in his left hand, like those the Indians use when they dance, white boots of flesh on his legges, doubled down: In brief, the whole shape was horrid and diabolical, and conceived to proceed from some fright the Mother had taken from the antick dances of the Indians, amongst whom the Devil himself does not fail to appear sometimes.

2. These Narrations Fienus rejecteth, not as false, but as not being done by any natural power, or if they be, that the descriptions are something more lively then the truth. But in the mean time he does freely admit, that by the meer power of Imagination there might be such excrescencies as might represent those things that are there mentioned; though those diabolical shapes could not have true horns, hoofs, tail, or any other part, specifically distinct from the nature of Man. But so farre as he acknowledges is enough for our turn.

3. But Fortunius Licetus is more liberal in his grants, allowing not onely that the Births of women may be very exqulsitely distorted in some of their parts into the likeness of those of Brutes, but that Chimaerical imaginations in Dreams may also effect it, as well as Fancies or external Objects when they are awake. Of the latter sort whereof he produces an Example that will more then match our purpose, of a Sicilian matron, who by chance beholding a Crab in a Fishermans hand new caught, and of a more then ordinary largeness, when she was brought to bed, brought forth a Crab (as well as a Child) perfectly like those that are ordinarily caught in the Sea. This was told him by a person of credit, who both knew the Woman, and saw the Crab she brought forth. Helmonts Cherry he so often mentions, and how it was green, pale, yellow, and red, at the times of year other Cherries are, is something of this nature; that is to say, comes near to the perfect species of a Cherry, as this did of a Crab, the plantal life of a Cherry being in some measure in the one, as the life of an Animal was perfectly in the other. Which confirms what we said before, that strength of our Desire and Imagination may snatch into consent the Spirit of Nature, and make it act: which once having begun, leaves not off, if Matter will but serve for to work upon; and being the same in all places, acts the same upon the same Matter, in the same circumstances. For the Root and Soul of every Vegetable is the Spirit of Nature; in virtue whereof this Cherry flourisht and ripened, according to the seasons of the Country where the party was that bore that live Signature. These two instances are very shrewd arguments that the Soul of the World has to doe with all Efformations of either Plants or Animals. For neither the Childs Soul nor the Mothers, in any likelihood, could frame that Crab, though the Mother might, by that strange power of Desire and Imagination, excite the Spirit of the World that attempts upon any Matter that is fitted for generation, some way or other, to make something of it; and being determined by the fancy of the Woman, might sign the humid materials in her Womb with the image of her Minde.

4. Wherefore if Fienus had considered from what potent causes Signatures may arise, he would not have been so scrupulous in believing that degree of exactness that some of them are reported to have: or if he had had the good hap to have met with so notable an example thereof, as Kircher professes himself to have met with. For he tells a story of a man that came to him for this very cause, to have his opinion what a certain strange Signature, which he had on his Arm from his birth, might portend; concerning which he had consulted both Astrologers and Cabbalists, who had promised great preferments, the one imputing it to the Influence of the Stars, the other to the favour of the sealing Order of Angels. But Kircher would not spend his judgement upon a meer verbal description thereof; though he had plainly enough told him, it was the Pope sitting on his Throne, with a Dragon under his feet, and an Angel putting a Crown on his head. Wherefore the man desirous to hear a further confirmation of these hopes (he had conceived from the favourable conjectures of others) by the suffrage of so learned a man, was willing in private to put off his doublet, and shew his Arm to Kircher: who having viewed it with all possible care, does profess that the Signature was so perfect, that it seemed rather the work of Art then of exorbitating Nature; & yet by certain observations he made, that he was well assured it was the work of Nature, and not of Art, though it was an artificial piece that Nature imitated, viz. the picture of Pope Gregory the thirteenth, who is sometimes drawn according as this Signature did lively represent, namely on a Throne, with a Dragon under his feet, leaning with one hand on his Seat, and bearing the other in that posture in which they give the Benediction, and an Angel removing a Curtain, and reaching a Crown towards his head.

5. Kircher therefore leaving the superstitions and fooleries of the spurious Cabbalists and Astrologers, told him the truth, though nothing so pleasant as their lies and flatteries, viz. That this Signature was not impressed by any either influence of the Stars, or Seals of Angels, but that it was the effect of the Imagination of his Mother that bore him, who in some more then ordinary fit of affection towards this Pope, whose picture she beheld in some Chappel or other place of her devotion, and having some occasion to touch her Arm, printed that image on the Arm of her Child, as it ordinarily happens in such cases. Which doubtless was the true solution of the mystery.

6. The same Author writes, how he was invited by a friend to contemplate another strange miracle (as he thought that did invite him to behold it) that he might spend his judgement upon it. Which was nothing else but an exposed Infant of some fourteen days old, that was gray-hair'd, both head and eye-brows. Which his friend, an Apothecary, look't upon as a grand Prodigy, till he was informed of the cause thereof. That the Mother that brought it forth, being married to an old man whose head was all white, the fear of being surprized in the act of Adultery by her snowy-headed husband, made her imprint that colour on the Child she bore. Which Story I could not omit to recite, it witnessing to what an exact curiosity the power of Fancy will work, for the fashioning and modifying the Matter, not missing so much as the very colours of the hair, as I have already noted something to that purpose.

7. To conclude therefore at length, and leave this luxuriant Theme. Whether it be the Power of Imagination carrying captive the Spirit of Nature into consent, or the Soule of the Infant, or both; it is evident that the effects are notable, and sometimes very accurately answering the Idea of the Impregnate, derived upon the moist and ductil matter in the Womb: Which yet, not being any thing so yielding as the soft aire, nor the Soule of the Mother so much one with that of the Infant as the separate Soule is one with it self, nor so peculiarly united to the Body of the Infant as the Soule separate with her own Vehicle, nor having any nearer or more mysterious commerce with the Spirit of Nature, then she has when her Plastick part, by the Imperium of her Will and Imagination, is to organize her Vehicle into a certain shape and form, which is a kind of a momentaneous birth of the distinct Personality, of either a Soule separate, or any other Daemon; it followes, that we may be very secure, that there is such a power in the Genii and Separate Souls, that they can with ease and accuracy transfigure themselves into shapes and forms agreeable to their own temper and nature.

8. All which I have meant hitherto in reference to their visible congresses one with another. But they are sometimes visible to us also, under some Animal shape, which questionless is much more difficult to them then that other Visibility is. But this is also possible, though more unusual by far, as being more unnatural. For it is possible by Art to compress Aire so, as to reduce it to visible opacity, and has been done by some, and particularly by a friend of Des-Cartes, whom he mentions in his Letters as having made this Experiment; the Aire getting this opacity by squeezing the Globuli out of it. Which though the separate Souls and Spirits may doe by that directive faculty, Axiome 31. yet surely it would be very painful. For the first Element lying bare, if the Aire be not drawn exceeding close, it will cause an ungratefull heat; and if it be, as unnatural a cold; and so small a moment will make the first Element too much or too little, that it may, haply, be very hard, at least for these inferiour Spirits, to keep steddily in a due mean. And therefore, when they appear, it is not unlikely but that they soak their Vehicles in some vaporous or glutinous moisture or other, that they may become visible to us at a more easy rate.

CHAP. VIII.

1. That the Better sort of Genii converse in Humane shape, the Baser sometimes in Bestial. 2. How they are disposed to turn themselves into several Bestial forms. 3. Of Psellus his 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , or Igneous splendours of Daemons, how they are made. 4. That the external beauty of the Genii is according to the degree of the inward vertue of their minds. 5. That their aerial forme need not be purely transparent, but more finely opake, and coloured. 6. That there is a distinction of Masculine and Feminine beauty in their personal figurations.

1. AFter this Digression, of shewing the facility of the figuring of the Vehicles of the Genii into personal shape, I shall return again where we left; which was concerning the Society of these Genii and Souls separate, and under what shape they converse one with another; which I have already defined to be Humane, especially in the better sort of Spirits. And as for the worst kind, I should think that they are likewise for the most part in Humane form, though disguised with ugly circumstances; but that they figure themselves also in Bestial appearances; it being so easy for them to transform their Vehicle into what shape they please, and to imitate the figures as dexterously as some men will the voices of brute beasts, whom we may hear sing like a Cuckow, crow like a Cock, bellow like a Cow and Calfe, bark like a Dog, grunt and squeak like a Pig, and indeed imitate the cry of almost any Bird or Beast whatsoever. And as easy a matter is it for these lower Genii to resemble the shapes of all these Creatures, in which they also appear visibly oftentimes to them that entertain them, and sometimes to them that would willingly shun them.

2. Nor is it improbable, but the variety of their impurities may dispose them to turn themselves into one brutish shape rather then another; as envying, or admiring, or in some sort approving and liking the condition and properties of such and such Beasts: as Theocritus merrily sets out the Venereousness of the Goatheard he describes, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , As if he envied the happiness of the he-Goats, and wisht himself in their stead, in their acts of carnal Copulation. So according to the several bestial properties that symbolize with uncleanness and vitiousness of the tempers of these Daemons, they may have a propension to imitate their shape rather then others, and appear ugly, according to the manner and measure of their internal turpitudes.

3. As it is likely also that those 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , those Igneous Splendours Psellus makes mention of, (as the end and scope of the nefarious ceremonies those wicked wretches, he describes, often used) were coloured according to the more or less feculency of the Vehicle of the Daemon that did appear in this manner, viz. in no personal shape, but by exhibiting a light to the eyes of his abominable Spectatours and Adorers: which, I suppose, he stirred up within the limits of his own Vehicle; the power of his Will and Imagination, by Axiome 31, commanding the grosser particles of the Aire and terrestrial vapours, together with the Globuli, to give back every way, from one point to a certain compass, not great, and therefore the more easy to be done. Whence the first Element lyes bare in some considerable measure, whose activity cannot but lick into it some particles of the Vehicle that borders next thereto, and thereby exhibit, not a pure star-like light (which would be, if the first Element thus unbared, and in the midst of pure aire, were it self unmixt with other Matter) but the feculency of those parts that it abrades and converts into fewel, and the foulness of the ambient Vehicle through which it shines, makes it look red and fiery like the Horizontal Sun seen through a thick throng of vapours. Which fiery splendour may either onely slide down amongst them, and so pass by with the Motion of the Daemons Vehicle, which Psellus seems mainly to aime at; or else it may make some stay and discourse with them it approaches, according as I have heard some Narrations. The reason of which lucid appearances being so intelligible out of the Principles of Cartesius his Philosophy, we need not conceit that they are nothing but the prestigious delusions of Fancy, and no real Objects, as Psellus would have them; it being no more uncompetible to a Daemon to raise such a light in his Vehicle, and a purer then I have described, then to a wicked man to light a candle at a tinderbox.

4. But what we have said concerning the purity and impurity of this light, remindes me of what is of more sutable consequence to discourse of here, which is the Splendour and Beauty of personal shape in the better sort of the Genii. Which assuredly is greater or lesser, according to the degrees of Vertue and moral Affections in them. For even in this Body, that is not so yielding to the powers of the Mind, a man may observe, that according as persons are better or worse inclined, the aire of their visage will alter much, and that vicious courses, defacing the inward pulcritude of the Soul, doe even change the outward countenance to an abhorred hue. Which must therefore necessarily take place, in a far greater measure, in the other state; where our outward form is wholy framed from the inward Imperium of our Minde: which by how much more pure it self is, it will exhibit the more irreprehensible pulcritude in the outward feature and fashion of the Body, both for proportion of parts, the spirit and aire of the Countenance, and the ornament of cloaths and attirings: there being an indissoluble connexion in the Soule of the Sense of these three things together, Vertue, Love, and Beauty; of all which she her self is the first Root, and especially in the separate state, even of outward Beauty it self: whence the converse of the most vertuous there must needs afford the highest pleasure and satisfaction; not onely in point of rational communication, but in reference to external and personal complacency also. For if Vertue and Vice can be ever seen with outward eyes, it must be in these aerial Vehicles, which yield so to the Will and Idea of good and pure affections, that the Soule in a manner becomes perfectly transparent through them, discovering her lovely beauty in all the efflorescencies thereof, to the ineffable enravishment of the beholder.

5. Not that I mean, that there is any necessity that their Vehicle should be as a Statue of fluid Crystal; but that those impresses of beauty and ornament will be so faithfully and lively represented, according to the dictates of her inward Sense and Imagination, that if we could see the Soule her self, we could know no more by her then she thus exhibits to our eye: which personal figuration in the extimate parts thereof, that represent the Body, Face and Vestments, may be attempered to so fine an opacity, that it may reflect the light in more perfect colours then it is from any earthly body, and yet the whole Vehicle be so devoid of weight, as it will necessarily keep its station in the Aire. Which we cannot wonder at, while we consider the hanging of the Clouds there, less aerial by far then this consistency we speak of: to say nothing of aerial Apparitions as high as the clouds, and in the same colours and figures as are seen here below, and yet no reflexions of terrestrial Objects, as I have proved in my Third Book against Atheism.

6. The exact Beauty of the personal shapes and becoming habits of these aiery Beings, the briefest and safest account thereof that Philosophy can give, is to referre to the description of such things in Poets: and then, when we have perused what the height and elegancy of their fancy has penn'd down. to write under it, An obscure Subindication of the transcendent pulcritude of the AErial Genii, whether Nymphs or Heroes. For though there be neither Lust, nor difference of Sex amongst them (whence the kindest commotions of minde will never be any thing else but an exercise of Intellectual love, whose Object is Vertue and Beauty;) yet it is not improbable but that there are some general strictures of discrimination of this Beauty into Masculine and Feminine: partly because the temper of their Vehicles may encline to this kinde of pulcritude rather then that; and partly because several of these aerial Spirits have sustained the difference of Sex in this life, some of them here having been Males, others Females: and therefore their History being to be continued from their departure hence, they ought to retain some character, especially so general a one, of what they were here. And it is very harsh to conceit that AEneas should meet with Dido in the other World in any other form then that of a Woman: whence a necessity of some slighter distinction of habits, and manner of wearing their hair, will follow. Which dress, as that of the Masculine mode, is easily fitted to them by the power of their Will and Imagination: as appears from that Story out of Peramatus, of the Indian Monster that was born with fleshy boots, girdle, purse, and other things that are no parts of a man, but his cloathing or utensils; and this meerly by the Fancy of his Mother, disturb'd and frighted, either in sleep or awake, with some such ugly appearance as that Monster resembled.

CHAP. IX.

1. A general account of the mutual entertains of the Genii in the other World. 2. Of their Philosophical and Political Conferences. 3. Of their Religious Exercises. 4. Of the innocent Pastimes and Recreations of the better sort of them. 5. A confirmation thereof from the Conventicles of Witches. 6. Whether the purer Daemons have their times of repast or no. 7. Whence the bad Genii have their food. 8. Of the food and feastings of the better sort of Genii.

1. WE have now accurately enough defined in what form or garb the aerial Genii converse with one another. It remains we consider how they mutually entertain one another in passing away the time. Which is obvious enough to conceive, to those that are not led aside into that blind Labyrinth which the generality of men are kept in, of suspecting that no representation of the state of these Beings is true, that is not so confounded and unintelligible that a man cannot think it sense, unless he wink with the inward eyes of his Minde, and command silence to all his Rational Faculties. But if he will but bethink himself, that the immediate instrument of the Soul in this life is the Spirits, which are very congenerous to the body of Angels; and that all our passions and conceptions are either suggested from them, or imprest upon them; he cannot much doubt but that all his Faculties of Reason, Imagination and Affection, for the general, will be in him in the other state as they were here in this: namely, that he will be capable of Love, of Joy, of Grief, of Anger; that he will be able to imagine, to discourse, to remember, and the rest of such operations as were not proper to the Fabrick of this earthly Body, which is the Officine of Death and Generation.

2. Hence it will follow, that the Souls of men deceaed, and the rest of the aerial Daemons, may administer much content to one another in mutual Conferences concerning the nature of things, whether Moral, Natural, or Metaphysical. For to think that the quitting the earthly Body entitles us to an Omnisciency, is a Fable never enough to be laught at. And Socrates, somewhere in Plato, presages, that he shall continue his old Trade when he comes into the other World; convincing and confounding the idle and vain-glorious Sophists whereever he went. And by the same reason Platonists, Aristotelians, Stoicks, Epicureans, and whatever other sects and humors are on the Earth, may in likelihood be met with there, so far as that estate will permit; though they cannot doubt of all things we doubt of here. For these aerial Spirits know that themselves are, and that the Souls of men subsist and act after death, unless such as are too deeply tinctured with Avenroism. But they may doubt whether they will hold out for ever, or whether they will perish at the conflagration of the World, as the Stoicks would have them. It may be also a great controversie amongst them, whether Pythagoras's or Ptolemies Hypothesis be true concerning the Motion of the Earth; and whether the Stars be so bigge as some define them. For these lower Daemons have no better means then we to assure themselves of the truth or falshood of these Opinions. Besides the discourse of News, of the affairs as well of the Earth as Aire. For the aerial Inhabitants cannot be less active then the terrestrial, nor less busie, either in the performance of some solemn exercises, or in carrying on designs party against party; and that either more Private or more Publick; the events of which will fill the aerial Regions with a quick spreading fame of their Actions. To say nothing of prudential conjectures concerning future successes aforehand, and innumerable other entertains of Conference, which would be too long to reckon up, but bear a very near analogy to such as men pass away their time in here.

3. But of all Pleasures, there are none that are comparable to those that proceed from their joynt exercise of Religion and Devotion. For their Bodies surpassing ours so much in tenuity and purity, they must needs be a fitter soil for the Divinest thoughts to spring up in, and the most delicate and most enravishing affections towards their Maker. Which being heightned by sacred Hymns and Songs, sung with voices perfectly imitating the sweet passionate relishes of the sense of their devout minds, must even melt their Souls into Divine Love, and make them swim with joy in God. But these kinds of exercises being so highly rapturous and ecstatical, transporting them beyond the ordinary limits of their Nature, cannot in Reason be thought to be exceeding frequent; but as a solemn Repast, after which they shall enjoy themselves better for a good space of time after.

4. Wherefore there be other entertainments, which though they be of an inferiour nature to these, yet they farre exceed the greatest pleasure and contentments of this present state. For the Animal life being as essential to the Soul as union with a Body, which she is never free from; it will follow that there be some fitting gratifications of it in the other World. And none greater can be imagined then Sociableness and Personal complacency, not onely in rational discourses, which is so agreeable to the Philosophical Ingeny, but innocent Pastimes, in which the Musical and Amorous propension may be also recreated. For these three dispositions are the flowr of all the rest, as Plotinus has somewhere noted: And his reception into the other World is set out by Apollo's Oracle, from some such like circumstances as these. — 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . Of the meaning of which Verses that the Reader may not quite be deprived, I shall render their sense in this careless paraphrase: Now the blest meetings thou arriv'st unto Of th'airy Genii, where soft winds do blow, Where Friendship, Love, & gentle sweet Desire Fill their thrice-welcom guests with joys entire, Ever supply'd from that immortal spring Whose streams pure Nectar from great Jove doe bring: Whence kind converse and amorous eloquence Warm their chast minds into the highest sense Of Heav'nly Love, whose myst'ries they declare Midst the fresh breathings of the peaceful Aire. And he holds on, naming the happy company the Soul of Plotinus was to associate with, viz. Pythagoras, Plato, and the purer Spirits of the Golden Age, and all such as made up the Chorus of immortal Love and Friendship. These sing, and play, and dance together, reaping the lawful pleasures of the very Animal life, in a far higher degree then we are capable of in this World. For every thing here does as it were tast of the cask, and has some coursness and foulness with it. The sweet motions of the Spirits in the passion of Love can very hardly be commanded off from too near bordering upon the shameful sense of Lust; the Fabrick of the terrestrial Body almost necessitating them to that deviation. The tenderer Ear cannot but feel the rude thumpings of the wood, and gratings of the rosin, the hoarsness, or some harshness and untunableness or other, in the best consorts of Musical Instruments and Voices. The judicious Eye cannot but espy some considerable defect in either the proportion, colour, or the aire of the face, in the most fam'd and most admired beauties of either Sex: to say nothing of the inconcinnity of their deportment and habits. But in that other state, where the Fancy consults with that first Exemplar of Beauty, Intellectual Love and Vertue, and the Body is wholly obedient to the imagination of the Minde, and will to every Punctilio yield to the impresses of that inward pattern; nothing there can be found amiss, every touch and stroak of motion and Beauty being conveyed from so judicious a power through so delicate and depurate a Medium. Wherefore they cannot but enravish one anothers Souls, while they are mutual Spectators of the perfect pulcritude of one anothers persons, and comely carriage, of their graceful dancing, their melodious singing and playing, with accents so sweet and soft, as if we should imagine the Aire here of it self to compose Lessons, and send forth Musical sounds without the help of any terrestrial Instrument. These, and such like Pastimes as these, are part of the happiness of the best sort of the aerial Genii.

5. Which the more certain knowledge of what is done amongst the inferiour Daemons will further assure us of. For it is very probable that their Conventicles, into which Witches and Wizzards are admitted, are but a depraved adumbration of the friendly meetings of the superiour Genii. And what Musick, Dancing and Feasting there is in these, the free confession of those Wretches, or fortuitous detection of others, has made manifest to the World, viz. How Humane and Angelical Beauty is transformed there into Bestial Deformity, the chief in the company ordinarily appearing in the Figures of Satyres, Apes, Goats, or such like ugly Animals; how the comely deportments of Body, into ridiculous gesticulations, perverse postures and antick dances; and how innocuous love and pure friendship degenerates into the most brutish lust and abominable obscenity that can be imagined: of which I will adde nothing more, having spoke enough of this matter in the Appendix to my Antidote Chap. 12.

6. What is most material for the present, is to consider, whether as the Musick and Dancing of these lower and more deeply-lapsed Daemons, are a distorted imitation of what the higher and more pure Daemons doe in their Regions; so their Feasting may not be a perverted resemblance of the others Banquetings also: that is to say, it is worth our enquiring into, whether they doe not eat and drink as well as these. For the rich amongst us must have their repast as well as the poor, and Princes feed as well as Prisoners, though there be a great difference in their diet. And I must confess, there is no small difficulty in both, whence the good or bad Genii may have their food; though it be easy enough to conceive that they may feed and refresh their Vehicles. For supposing they doe vitally actuate some particular portion of the Aire that they drive along with them, which is of a certain extent, it is most natural to conceive, that partly by local motion, and partly by the activity of their thoughts, they set some particles of their Vehicles into a more then usual agitation, which being thus moved, scatter and perspire; and that so the Vehicle lessens in some measure, and therefore admits of a recruite: which must be either by formal repast, or by drawing in the crude Aire onely, which haply may be enough; but it being so like it self alwaies, the pleasure will be more flat. Wherefore it is not improbable but that both may have their times of Refection, for pleasure at least, if not necessity; which will be the greater advantage for the Good, and the more exquisite misery for the Bad, they being punishable in this regard also.

7. But, as I said, the greatest difficulty is to give a rationall account whence the bad Genii have their food, in their execrable feasts, so formally made up into dishes. That the materials of it is a vaporous aire, appears as well from the faintness and emptiness of them that have been entertained at those feasts, as from their forbidding the use of Salt at them, it having a virtue of dissolving of all aqueous substances, as well as hindering their congelation. But how the Aire is moulded up into that form and consistency, it is very hard to conceive: whether it be done by the meer power of Imagination upon their own Vehicles, first dabled in some humidities that are the fittest for their design, which they change into these forms of Viands, and then withdraw, when they have given them such a figure, colour, and consistency, with some small touch of such a sapour or tincture: or whether it be the priviledge of these AErial Creatures, by a sharp Desire and keen Imagination, to pierce the Spirit of Nature, so as to awaken her activity, and engage her to the compleating in a moment, as it were, the full design of their own wishes, but in such matter as the Element they are in is capable of, which is this crude and vaporous Aire; whence their food must be very dilute and flashie, and rather a mockery then any solid satisfaction and pleasure.

8. But those Superiour Daemons, which inhabit that part of the Aire that no storm nor tempest can reach, need be put to no such shifts, though they may be as able in them as the other. For in the tranquillity of those upper Regions, that Promus-Condus of the Universe, the Spirit of Nature, may silently send forth whole Gardens and Orchards of most delectable fruits and flowers, of an aequilibrious ponderosity to the parts of the Aire they grow in, to whose shape and colours the transparency of these Plants may adde a particular lustre, as we see it is in precious Stones. And the Chymists are never quiet till the heat of their fancy have calcined and vitrified the Earth into a crystal-line pellucidity, conceiting that it will be then a very fine thing indeed, and all that then growes out of it: which desirable Spectacle they may haply enjoy in a more perfect manner, whenever they are admitted into those higher Regions of the Aire. For the very Soile then under them shall be transparent, in which they may trace the very Roots of the Trees of this Superiour Paradise with their eyes, and if it may not offend them, see this opake Earth through it, bounding their sight with such a white splendour as is discovered in the full Moon, with that difference of brightness that will arise from the distinction of Land and Water; and if they will recreate their palats, may tast of such Fruits, as whose natural juice will vie with their noblest Extractions and Quintessences. For such certainly will they there find the blood of the Grape, the rubie-coloured Cherries, and Nectarines. And if for the compleating of the pleasantness of these habitations, that they may look less like a silent and dead solitude, they meet with Birds & Beasts of curious shapes and colours, the single accents of whose voices are very grateful to the ear, and the varying of their notes perfect musical harmony; they would doe very kindly to bring us word back of the certainty of these things, and make this more then a Philosophical Conjecture. But that there may be Food and Feasting in those higher aerial Regions, is less doubted by the Platonists; which makes Maximus Tyrius call the Soul, when she has left the Body, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and the above-cited Oracle of Apollo describes the felicity of that Chorus of immortal Lovers he mentions there, from feasting together with the blessed Genii, — 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . So that the Nectar and Ambrosia of the Poets may not be a meer fable. For the Spirit of Nature, which is the immediate instrument of God, may enrich the fruits of these AErial Paradises with such liquors, as being received into the bodies of these purer Daemons, and diffusing it self through their Vehicles, may cause such grateful motions analogical to our tast, and excite such a more then ordinary quickness in their mindes, and benign cheerfulness, that it may far transcend the most delicate Refection that the greatest Epicures could ever invent upon Earth; and that without all satiety and burdensomeness, it filling them with nothing but Divine Love, Joy, and Devotion.

CHAP. X.

1. How hard it is to define any thing concerning the AErial or AEthereal Elysiums. 2. That there is Political order and Lawes amongst these aiery Daemons. 3. That this Chain of Government reaches down from the highest AEthereal Powers through the AErial to the very Inhabitants of the Earth. 4. The great security we live in thereby. 5. How easily detectible and punishable wicked Spirits are by those of their own Tribe. 6. Other reasons of the security we find our selves in from the gross infestations of evil Spirits. 7. What kind of punishments the AErial Officers inflict upon their Malefactours.

1. I Might enlarge my self much on this Subject, by representing the many Concamerations of the AErial and AEthereal Elysiums, depainting them out in all the variety of their Ornaments: but there is no prudence of being lavish of ones pen in a matter so lubricous and Conjectural. Of the bare existence whereof we have no other ground, then that otherwise the greatest part of the Universe by infinite measure, and the most noble, would lye as it were uncultivate, like a desart of Sand, wherein a man can spie neither Plant nor living Creature. Which though it may seem as strange, as if Nature should have restrained all the Varieties she would put forth to one contemptible Mole-hil, and have made all the rest of the Earth one Homogeneal surface of dry clay or stone, on which not one sprig of Grass, much less any Flower or Tree, should grow, nor Bird nor Beast be found once to set their foot thereon: yet the Spirits of us Mortals being too pusillanimous to be able to grapple with such vast Objects, we must resolve to rest either ignorant, or sceptical, in this matter.

2. And therefore let us consider what will more easily fall under our comprehension, and that is the Polity of the aiery Daemons. Concerning which, that in general there is such a thing among them, is the most assuredly true in it self, and of the most use to us to be perswaded of. To know their particular orders and customes is a more needless Curiosity. But that they doe lye under the restraint of Government, is not onely the opinion of the Pythagoreans (who have even to the nicity of Grammatical Criticisme assigned distinct names to the Law that belongs to these Three distinct ranks of Beings, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , calling the Law that belongs to the first 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , the second 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , and the third 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 ) but it is also the easy and obvious suggestion of ordinary Reason, that it must needs be so, and especially amongst the AErial Genii in these lower Regions, they being a mixt rabble of good and bad, wise and foolish, in such a sense as we may say the Inhabitants of the Earth are so, and therefore they must naturally fall under a Government, and submit to Lawes, as well & for the same reasons as Men doe. For otherwise they cannot tolerably subsist, nor enjoy what rights may some way or other appertain to them. For the Souls of men deceased and the Daemons, being endued with corporeal Sense, by Axiome 30. and therefore capable of Pleasure and Pain, and consequently of both Injury and Punishment, it is manifest, that having the use of Reason, they cannot fail to mould themselves into some Political form or other; and so to be divided into Nations and Provinces, and to have their Officers of State, from the King on his Throne to the very lowest and most abhorred Executioners of Justice.

3. Which invisible Government is not circumscribed within the compass of the aiery Regions, but takes hold also on the Inhabitants of the Earth, as the Government of Men does on several sorts of brute Beasts, and the AEthereal Powers also have a Right and Exercise of Rule over the AErial. Whence nothing can be committed in the World against the more indispensable Laws thereof, but a most severe and inevitable punishment will follow: every Nation, City, Family and Person, being in some manner the Peculium, and therefore in the tutelage, of some invisible Power or other, as I have above intimated.

4. And such Transgressions as are against those Laws without whose observance the Creation could not subsist, we may be assured are punished with Torture intolerable, and infinitely above any Pleasure imaginable the evil Genii can take in doing of those of their own Order, or us Mortals, any mischief. Whence it is manifest that we are as secure from their gross outrages (such as the firing of our houses, the stealing away our jewels, or more necessary Utensils, murdering our selves or children, destroying our cattel, corn, and other things of the like sort,) as if they were not in rerum natura. Unless they have some special permission to act, or we our selves enable them by our rash and indiscreet tampering with them, or suffer from the malice of some person that is in league with them. For their greatest liberty of doing mischief is upon that account; which yet is very much limited, in that all these Actions must pass the consent of a visible person, not hard to be discovered in these unlawful practices, and easy to be punished by the Law of Men.

5. And the AErial Genii can with as much ease inflict punishment on one another, as we Mortals can apprehend, imprison, and punish such as transgress against our Laws. For though these Daemons be invisible to us, yet they are not so to their own Tribe: nor can the activity and subtilty of the Bad over-master the Good Commonwealthsmen there, that uphold the Laws better then they are amongst us. Nor may the various Transfiguration of their shapes conceal their persons, no more then the disguises that are used by fraudulent men. For they are as able to discern what is fictitious from what is true and natural amongst themselves, as we are amongst our selves. And every AErial Spirit being part of some Political subdivision, upon any outrage committed, it will be an easy matter to hunt out the Malefactor. No Daemon being able so to transfigure himself, but upon command he will be forced to appear in his natural and usual form, not daring to deny upon examination to what particular Subdivision he belongs. Whence the easy discovery of their miscarriages, and certainty of insupportable torment, will secure the World from all the disorder that some scrupulous wits suspect would arise from this kinde of Creatures, if they were in Being.

6. To which we may adde also, That what we have, is useless to them, and that it is very hard to conceive that there are many Rational Beings so degenerate as to take pleasure in ill, when it is no good to themselves. That Socrates his Aphorism, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , may be in no small measure true in the other World, as well as in this. That all that these evil Spirits desire, may be onely our lapse into as great a degree of Apostasy from God as themselves, and to be full partakers with them of their false Liberty; as debauched persons in this life love to make Proselytes, and to have respect from their Nurslings in wickedness. And several other Considerations there are that serve for the taking away this Panick fear of the incursations and molestations of these aerial Inhabitants, and might further silence the suspicious Atheist; which I willingly omit, having said more then enough of this Subject already. See Cap. 3. Sect. 7, 8.

7. If any be so curious, as to demand what kinde of Punishment this People of the Aire inflict upon their Malefactors, I had rather referre them to the Fancies of Cornelius Agrippa, De Occult. Philosoph. Lib. 3. Cap. 41. then be laught at my self for venturing to descend to such particularities. Amongst other things he names their Incarceration, or confinement to most vile and squalid Habitations. His own words are very significant: Accedunt etiam vilissimorum ac teterrimorum locorum habitacula, ubi AEtnaei ignes, aquarum ingluvies, fulgurum & tonitruorum concussus, terrarum voragines, ubi Regio lucis inops, nec radiorum Solis capax, ignaráque splendoris syderum, perpetuis tenebris & noctis specie caligat. Whence he would make us believe, that the subterraneous caverns of the Earth are made use of for Dungeons for the wicked Daemons to be punished in: as if the several Volcano's, such as AEtna, Vesuvius, Hecla, and many others, especially in America, were so many Prisons or houses of Correction for the unruly Genii. That there is a tedious restraint upon them upon villanies committed, and that intolerable, is without all question; they being endued with corporeal Sense, and that more quick and passive then ours, and therefore more subject to the highest degrees of torment. So that not onely by incarcerating them, & keeping them in by a watch, in the caverns of burning Mountains, where the heat of those infernal Chambers and the steam of Brimstone cannot but excruciate them exceedingly, but also by commanding them into sundry other Hollows of the ground, noysome by several fumes and vapours, they may torture them in several fashions and degrees, fully proportionable to the greatest crime that is in their power to commit, and farre above what the cruellest Tyranny has inflicted here, either upon the guilty or innocent. But how these Confinements and Torments are inflicted on them, and by what Degrees and Relaxations, is a thing neither easy to determine, nor needful to understand. Wherefore we will surcease from pursuing any further so unprofitable a Subject, and come to the Third general Head we mentioned, which is, What the Moral condition of the Soul is when she has left this Body.

CHAP. XI.

1. Three things to be considered before we come to the moral condition of the Soul after death: namely, her Memory of transactions in this life. 2. The peculiar feature and individual Character of her AErial Vehicle. 3. The Retainment of the same Name. 4. How her ill deportment here lays the train of her Misery hereafter. 5. The unspeakable torments of Conscience worse then Death, and not to be avoided by dying. 6. Of the hideous tortures of external sense on them, whose searedness of Conscience may seem to make them uncapable of her Lashes. 7. Of the state of the Souls of the more innocent and conscientious Pagans. 8. Of the natural accruments of After-happiness to the morally good in this life. 9. How the Soul enjoys her actings or sufferings in this Life for an indispensable Cause, when she has passed to the other. 10. That the reason is proportionably the same in things of less consequence. 11. What mischief men may create to themselves in the other world by their Zealous mistakes in this. 12. That though there were no Memory after Death, yet the manner of our Life here may sow the seeds of the Souls future happiness or misery.

1. FOR the better solution of this Question, there is another first in nature to be decided; namely, Whether the Soul remembers any thing of this Life after Death. For Aristotle and Cardan seem to deny it; but I doe not remember any reasons in either that will make good their Opinion. But that the contrary is true, appears from what we have already proved Lib. 2. Cap. 11. viz. That the immediate seat of Memory is the Soul her self, and that all Representations with their circumstances are reserved in her, not in the Spirits (a thing which Vaninus himself cannot deny) nor in any part of the Body. And that the Spirits are onely a necessary Instrument whereby the Soul works; which while they are too cool and gross and waterish, Oblivion creeps upon her, in that measure that the Spirits are thus distempered; but the disease being chased away, and the temper of the Spirits rectified, the Soul forthwith recovers the memory of what things she could not well command before, as being now in a better state of Activity. Whence, by the 33. Axiome, it will follow, that her Memory will be rather more perfect after Death, and Conscience more nimble to excuse or accuse her according to her Deeds here.

2. It is not altogether beside the purpose to take notice also, That the natural and usual Figure of the Souls AErial Vehicle bears a resemblance with the feature of the party in this life; it being most obvious for the Plastick part (at the command of the Will to put forth into personal shape) to fall as near to that in this life as the new state will permit. With which act the Spirit of Nature haply does concurre, as in the figuration of the Foetus; but with such limits as becomes the AErial Congruity of life, of which we have spoke already: as also how the proper Idea or Figure of every Soul (though it may deflect something by the power of the Parents Imagination in the act of Conception, or Gestation, yet) may return more near to its peculiar semblance afterwards, and so be an unconcealable Note of Individuality.

3. We will adde to all this, the Retainment of the same Name which the deceased had here, unless there be some special reason to change it: so that their persons will be as punctually distinguisht and circumscribed as any of ours in this life. All which things, as they are most probable in themselves, that they will thus naturally fall out, so they are very convenient for administration of Justice, and keeping of Order in the other State.

4. These things therefore premised, it will not be hard to conceive how the condition of the Soul after this life depends on her Moral deportment here. For Memory ceasing not, Conscience may very likely awake more furiously then ever; the Mind becoming a more clear Judge of evil Actions past, then she could be in the Flesh, being now stript of all those circumstances and concurrences of things that kept her off from the opportunity of calling her self to account, or of perceiving the ugliness of her own ways. Besides, there being that communication betwixt the Earth and the Aire, that at least the fame of things will arrive to their cognoscence that have left this life; the after ill success of their wicked enterprises and unreasonable transactions may arm their tormenting Conscience with new whips and stings, when they shall either hear, or see with their eyes, what they have unjustly built up, to run with shame to ruine, and behold all their designs come to nought, and their fame blasted upon Earth.

5. This is the state of such Souls as are capable of a sense of dislike of their pastactions: and a man would think they need no other punishment then this, if he consider the mighty power of the Minde over her own Vehicle, and how vulnerable it is from her self. These Passions therefore of the Soule that follow an ill Conscience, must needs bring her aiery body into intolerable distempers, worse then Death it self. Nor yet can she die if she would, neither by fire, nor sword, nor any means imaginable; no not if she should fling her self into the flames of smoaking AEtna. For suppose she could keep her self so long there, as to indure that hideous pain of destroying the vital Congruity of her Vehicle by that sulphureous fire; she would be no sooner released, but she would catch life again in the Aire, and all the former troubles and vexations would return, besides the overplus of these pangs of Death. For Memory would return, and an ill Conscience would return, and all those busie Furies, those disordered Passions which follow it. And thus it would be, though the Soule should kill her self a thousand and a thousand times; she could but pain and punish her self, not destroy her self.

6. But if we could suppose some mens Consciences seared in the next state as well as this, (for certainly there are that make it their business to obliterate all sense of difference of Good and Evil out of their minds; & hold it to be an high strain of wit (though it be nothing else but a piece of bestial stupidity) to think there is no such thing as Vice and Vertue, and that it is a principall part of perfection, to be so degenerate as to act according to this Principle without any remorse at all;) these men may seem to have an excellent priviledge in the other world, they being thus armour-proof against all the fiery darts of that domestick Devil: As if the greatest security in the other life were, to have been compleatly wicked in this. But it is not out of the reach of meer Reason and Philosophy to discover, that such bold and impudent wretches as have lost all inward sense of Good and Evil, may there against their wills feel a lash in the outward. For the divine Nemesis is excluded out of no part of the Universe; and Goodness and Justice, which they contemn here, will be acquainted with them in that other state, whether they will or no▪ I speak of such course Spirits that can swallow down Murder, Perjury, Extortion, Adultery, Buggery, and the like gross crimes, without the least disgust, and think they have a right to satisfy their own Lust, though it be by never so great injury against their Neighbour. If these men should carry it with impunity, there were really no Providence, and themselves were the truest Prophets and faithfullest Instructers of mankind, divulging the choicest Arcanum they have to impart to them, namely That there is no God. But the case stands quite otherwise. For whether it be by the importunity of them they injure in this life, who may meet with them afterward, as Cardan by way of objection suggests in his Treatise of this Subject; or whether by a general desertion by all of the other world that are able to protect, (such Monsters as I describe being haply far less in proportion to the number of the other state, then these here are to this;) they will be necessarily exposed to those grim and remorsless Officers of Justice, who are as devoid of all sense of what is good as those that they shall punish. So that their penalty shall be inflicted from such as are of the same principles with themselves, who watch for such booties as these, and when they can catch them, dress them and adorn them according to the multifarious petulancy of their own unaccountable humours; and taking a speciall pride and pleasure in the making and seeing Creatures miserable, fall upon their prey with all eagerness and alacrity, as the hungry Lions on a condemned malefactour, but with more ferocity and insultation by far. For having more wit, and, if it be possible, less goodness then the Soule they thus assault, they satiate their lascivient cruelty with all manner of abuses and torments they can imagine, giving her onely so much respite as will serve to receive their new inventions with a fresher smart and more distinct pain. Neither can any Reason or Rhetorick prevail with them, no Expostulation, Petition or Submission. For to what purpose can it be, to expostulate about injury and violence with them whose deepest reach of wit is to understand this one main Principle, That every ones Lust, when he can act with impunity, is the most sacred and soveraign Law? Or what can either Petitions or Submissions doe with those who hold it the most contemptible piece of fondness and filliness that is, to be intreated to recede from their own Interest? And they acknowledging no such thing as Vertue and Vice, make it their onely interest to please themselves in what is agreeable to their own desires: and their main pleasure is, to excruciate and torture, in the most exquisite wayes they can, as many as Opportunity delivers up to their power. And thus we see how, in the other life, the proud conceited Atheist may at last feel the sad inconvenience of his own Practises and Principles. For even those that pleased themselves in helping him forward, while he was in this life, to that high pitch of wickedness, may haply take as much pleasure to see him punisht by those grim Executioners, in the other. Like that sportful cruelty (which some would appropriate to Nero's person) of causing the Vestal virgins to be ravisht, and then putting them to death for being so.

7. But this Subject would be too tedious and too Tragical to insist on any longer. Let us cast our eyes therefore upon a more tolerable Object; and that is The state of the Soul that has, according to the best opportunity she had of knowledge, liv'd vertuously and conscientiously, in what part or Age of the world soever. For though this Moral Innocency amongst the Pagans will not amount to what our Religion calls Salvation; yet it cannot but be advantageous to them in the other state, according to the several degrees thereof; they being more or less Happy or Miserable, as they have been more or less Vertuous in this life. For we cannot imagine why God shoud be more harsh to them in the other world then in this, nothing having happened to them to alienate his affection but Death; which was not in their power to avoid, and looks more like a punishment then a fault: though it be neither to those that are well-meaning and consciencious, and not professed contemners of the wholsome suggestions of the light of Nature, but are lovers of Humanity and Vertue. For to these it is onely an entrance into another life, —Ad amoena vireta Fortunatorum nemorum, sedes que beatas, Which Truth I could not conceal, it being a great prejudice to Divine Providence to think otherwise. For to those that are free, her wayes will seem as unintelligible in overloading the simple with punishment, as in not rewarding the more perfectly righteous and illuminate. For from a fault in either they will be tempted to a misbelief of the whole, and hold no Providence at all.

8. Let there therefore be peculiar priviledges of Morality, every where, to those that pass into the other State. For unless God make a stop on purpose, it will naturally follow, that Memory after Death suggesting nothing but what the Conscience allows of, much Tranquillity of minde must result from thence, and a certain health and beauty of the AErial Vehicle; also better Company and Converse, and more pleasant Tracts and Regions to inhabit. For what Plotinus speaks of the extreme degrees, Ennead. 4. Lib. 4. Cap. 45. is also true of the intermediate, else Divine Justice would be very maime. For a man, saith he, having once appropriated to himself a pravity of temper, and united with it, is known well what he is; and according to his nature is thrust forward to what he propends to, both here, and departed hence, and so shall be pulled by the drawings of Nature into a sutable place. But the Good man his Receptions and Communications shall be of another sort, by the drawing as it were of certain hidden strings transposed and pulled by Natures own fingers. So admirable is the power and order of the Universe, all things being carried on in a silent way of Justice, which none can avoid, and which the wicked man has no perception nor understanding of, but is drawn, knowing nothing whither in the Universe he ought to be carried. But the good man both knows and goes whither he ought, and discerns before he departs hence where he must inhabit, and is full of hopes that it shall be with the Gods. This large Paragraph of Plotinus is not without some small Truth in it, if rightly limited and understood; but seems not to reach at all the Circumstances and accruments of happiness to the Soul in the other State, which will naturally follow her from her transactions in this life.

9. For certainly, according to the several degrees of Benignity of Spirit, and the desire of doing good to mankinde in this life, and the more ample opportunities of doing it, the felicity of the other World is redoubled upon them; there being so certain communication and entercourse betwixt both. And therefore they that act or suffer deeply in such Causes as God will maintain in the World, and are just and holy at the bottome, (and there are some Principles that are indispensably such, which Providence has countenanced both by Miracles, the suffrages of the Wisest men in all Ages, and the common voice of Nature) those that have been the most Heroical Abetters and Promoters of these things in this life, will naturally receive the greater contentment of Minde after it, being conscious to themselves how seriously they have assisted what God will never desert, and that Truth is mighty, and must at last prevail; which they are better assured of out of the Body, then when they were in it.

10. Nor is this kinde of access of Happiness to be confined onely to our furtherance of what is of the highest and most indispensable consideration here, but in proportion touches all transactions that proceed from a vertuous and good principle, whereof there are several degrees: amongst which those may not be esteemed the meanest that refer to a National good. And therefore those that, out of a natural generosity of Spirit and successful fortitude in Warre, have delivered their Country from bondage, or have been so wise and understanding in Politicks, as to have contrived wholsome Laws for the greater happiness and comfort of the People, while such a Nation prospers and is in being, it cannot but be an accrument of happiness to these so considerable Benefactors, unless we should imagine them less generous and good in the other World, where they have the advantage of being Better. And what I have said in this more notable instance, is in a degree true in things of smaller concernment, which would be infinite to rehearse. But whole Nations, with their Laws and Orders of Men, and Families may fail, and therefore these accessions be cut off; but he that laies out his pains in this life, for the carrying on such designs as will take place so long as the World endures, and must have a compleat Triumph at last, such a one laies a train for an everlasting advantage in the other World, which, in despite of all the tumblings and turnings of unsetled fortune, will be sure to take effect.

11. But this matter requires Judgement as well as Heat and Forwardness. For pragmatical Ignorance, though accompanied with some measure of Sincerity and wellmeaning, may set a-foot such things in the World, or set upon record such either false, or impertinent and unseasonable, Principles, as being made ill use of, may very much prejudice the Cause one desires to promote; which will be a sad spectacle for them in the other State. For though their simplicity may be pardonable, yet they will not fail to finde the ill effect of their mistake upon themselves. As he that kills a friend in stead of an enemy, though he may satisfy his Conscience that rightly pleads his innocency, yet he cannot avoid the sense of shame and sorrow that naturally follows so mischievous an error.

12. Such accruencies as these there may be to our enjoyments in the other World, from the durable traces of our transactions in this, if we have any Memory of things after Death, as I have already demonstrated that we have. But if we had not, but Aristotles and Cardan's Opinion were true, yet Vertue and Piety will not prove onely useful for this present state. Because according to our living here, we shall hereafter, by a hidden concatenation of Causes, be drawn to a condition answerable to the purity or impurity of our Souls in this life: that silent Nemesis that passes through the whole contexture of the Universe, ever fatally contriving us into such a state as we our selves have fitted our selves for by our accustomary actions. Of so great consequence is it, while we have opportunity, to aspire to the best things.

CHAP. XII.

1. What the Spirit of Nature is. 2. Experiments that argue its real Existence; such as that of two strings tuned Unisons. 3. Sympathetick Cures and Tortures. 4. The Sympathy betwixt the Earthly and Astral Body. 5. Monstrous Births. 6. The Attraction of the Loadstone and Roundness of the Sun and Stars.

1. WE had now quite finished our Discourse, did I not think it convenient to answer a double expectation of the Reader. The one is touching the Spirit of Nature, the other the producing of Objections that may be made against our concluded Assention of the Souls Immortality. For as for the former, I can easily imagine he may well desire a more punctual account of that Principle I have had so often recourse to, then I have hitherto given, and will think it fit that I should somewhere more fully explain what I mean by the terms, and shew him my strongest grounds why I conceive there is any such Being in the World. To hold him therefore no longer in suspence, I shall doe both in this place. The Spirit of Nature therefore, according to that notion I have of it, is, A substance incorporeal, but without Sense and Animadversion, pervading the whole Matter of the Universe, and exercising a plastical power therein according to the sundry predispositions and occasions in the parts it works upon, raising such Phaenomena in the World, by directing the parts of the Matter and their Motion, as cannot be resolved into meer Mechanical powers. This rude Description may serve to convey to any one a conception determinate enough of the nature of the thing. And that it is not a meer Notion, but a real Being, besides what I have occasionally hinted already (and shall here again confirm by new instances) there are several other considerations may perswade us.

2. The first whereof shall be concerning those experiments of Sympathetick Pains, Asswagements and Cures, of which there are many Examples, approved by the most scrupulous Pretenders to sobriety and judgment, and of all which I cannot forbear to pronounce, that I suspect them to come to pass by some such power as makes strings that be tuned Unisons (though on several Instruments) the one being touched, the other to tremble and move very sensibly, and to cast off a straw or pin or any such small thing laid upon it. Which cannot be resolved into any Mechanical Principle, though some have ingeniously gone about it. For before they attempted to shew the reason, why that string that is not Unison to that which is struck should not leap and move, as it doth that is, they should have demonstrated, that by the meer Vibration of the Aire that which is Unison can be so moved; for if it could, these Vibrations would not fail to move other Bodies more movable by farre then the string it self that is thus moved. As for example, if one hung loose near the string that is struck a small thred of silk or an hair with some light thing at the end of it, they must needs receive those reciprocal Vibrations that are communicated to the Unison string at a far greater distance, if the meer motion of the material Aire caused the subsultation of the string tuned Unison. Which yet is contrary to experience. Besides that, if it were the meer Vibration of the Aire that caused this tremor in the Unison string, the effect would not be considerable, unless both the strings lay well-nigh in the same Plane, and that the Vibration of the string that is struck be made in that Plane they both lie in. But let the string be struck so as to cut the Plane perpendicularly by its tremulous excursions, or let both the strings be in two several Planes at a good distance above one another, the event is much-what the same, though the Aire cannot rationally be conceived to vibrate backwards and forwards, but well-nigh in the very Planes wherein the strings are moved. All which things do clearly shew, that pure corporeal causes cannot produce this effect: and that therefore we must suppose, that both the strings are united with some one incorporeal Being, which has a different Unity and Activity from Matter, but yet a Sympathy therewith; which affecting this immaterial Being, makes it affect the Matter in the same manner in another place, where it does symbolize with that other in some predisposition or qualification, as these two strings doe in being tuned Unisons to one another: and this, without sending any particles to the Matter it does thus act upon; as my thought of moving of my Toe being represented within my Brain, by the power of my Soul I can, without sending Spirits into my Toe, but onely by making use of them that are there, move my Toe as I please, by reason of that Unity and Activity that is peculiar to my Soul as a spiritual substance that pervades my whole Body. Whence I would conclude also, that there is some such Principle as we call the Spirit of Nature, or the Inferiour Soul of the World, into which such Phaenomena as these are to be resolved.

3. And I account Sympathetick Cures, Pains and Asswagements to be such. As for example, when in the use of those Magnetick Remedies, as some call them, they can make the wound dolorously hot or chill at a great distance, or can put it into perfect case, this is not by any agency of emissary Atoms. For these hot Atoms would cool sufficiently in their progress to the party through the frigid aire; and the cold Atoms, if they could be so active as to dispatch so far, would be warm enough by their journey in the Summer Sun. The inflammations also of the Cowes Udder by the boyling over of the milk into the fire, the scalding of mens entrails at a distance by the burning of their excrements, with other pranks of the like nature, these cannot be rationally resolved into the recourse of the Spirits of Men or Kine mingled with fiery Atoms, and so re-entring the parts thus affected, because the minuteness of those toms argues the suddainness of their extinction, as the smallest wires made red hot soonest cool. To all which you may adde that notable example of the Wines working when the Vines are in the flower, and that this sympathetick effect must be from the Vines of that country from which they came: whence these exhalations of the Vineyards must spread as far as from Spain and the Canaries to England, and by the same reason must reach round about every way as far from the Canaries, besides their journey upwards into the Aire. So that there will be an Hemisphere of vineall Atoms of an incredible extent, unless they part themselves into trains, and march onely to those places whither their Wines are carried. But what corporeal cause can guide them thither? Which question may be made of other Phaenomena of the like nature. Whence again it will be necessary to establish the Principle I drive at, though the effects were caused by the transmission of Atoms.

4. The notablest examples of this Mundane Sympathy are in histories more uncertain and obscure, and such as, though I have been very credibly informed yet, as I have already declared my self, I dare onely avouch as possible, viz. the Souls of men leaving their Bodies, and appearing in shapes suppose of Cats, Pigeons, Wezels, and sometimes of Men, and that whatever hurt befalls them in these Astral bodies, as the Paracelsians love to call them, the same is inflicted upon their Terrestrial lying in the mean time in their beds or on the ground. As if their Astral bodies be scalded, wounded, have the back broke, the same certainly happens to their Earthly bodies. Which things if they be true, in all likelihood they are to be resolved into this Principle we speak of, and that the Spirit of Nature is snatcht into consent with the imagination of the Soules in these Astral bodies or aiery Vehicles. Which act of imagining must needs be strong in them, it being so set on and assisted by a quick and sharp pain and fright in these scaldings, woundings, and stroaks on the back; some such thing happening here as in women with child, whose Fancies made keen by a suddain fear, have deprived their children of their arms, yea and of their heads too, as also appears by two remarkable stories Sr. Kenelme Digby relates in his witty and eloquent Discourse of the Cure of Wounds by the powder of Sympathy, besides what we have already recited out of Helmont. See Lib. 2. Cap. 15. Sect. 8, 9, 10.

5. Which effects I suppose to be beyond the power of any humane Fancy unassisted by some more forceable Agent; as also that prodigious birth he mentions of a woman of Carcassona, who by her overmuch sporting and pleasing her self with an Ape while she was with Child, brought forth a Monster exactly of that shape. And if we should conclude with that learned Writer, that it was a real Ape, it is no more wonderfull, nor so much, as that birth of a Crabfish or Lobster we have above mentioned out of Fortunius Licetus; as we might also other more usual, though no less monstrous births for the wombs of women to bear. Of which the Soul of the Mother cannot be suspected to be the cause, she not so much as being the efformer of her own Foetus, as that judicious Naturalist Dr. Harvey has determined. And if the Mothers Soule could be the efformer of the Foetus, in all reason her Plastick power would be ever particular and specifick as the Soul it self is particular. What remains therefore but the universal Soule of the World or Spirit of Nature that can doe these feats? who, Vertumnus like, is ready to change his own Activity and the yielding matter into any mode and shape indifferently as occasion engages him, and so to prepare an edifice, at least the more rude stroaks and delineaments thereof, for any specifick Soule whatsoever, and in any place where the Matter will yield to his operations. But the time of the arrival thither of the particular guest it is intended for, though we cannot say how soon it is, yet we may be sure it is not later then a clear discovery of Sensation as well as Vegetation and organization in the Matter.

6. The Attraction of the Load-stone seems to have some affinity with these instances of Sympathy. This mystery Des-Cartes has explained with admirable artifice as to the immediate corporeal causes thereof, to wit, those wreathed particles which he makes to pass certain screw-pores in the Load-stone and Iron. But how the efformation of these particles is above the reach of the meer mechanical powers in Matter, as also the exquisite direction of their motion, whereby they make their peculiar Vortex he describes about the Earth from Pole to Pole, and thread an incrustated Star, passing in a right line in so long a journey as the Diameter thereof without being swung to the sides; how these things, I say, are beyond the powers of Matter, I have fully enough declared & proved in a large Letter of mine to V. C. and therefore that I may not actum agere, shall forbear speaking any farther thereof in this place. To which you may adde, that meer corporeal motion in Matter, without any other guide, would never so much as produce a round Sun or Star, of which figure notwithstanding Des-Cartes acknowledges them to be. But my reasons why it cannot be effected by the simple Mechanical powers of Matter, I have particularly set down in my Letters to that excellent Philosopher.

CHAP. XIII.

1. That the Descent of heavy Bodies argues the existence of the Spirit of Nature, because else they would either hang in the Aire as they are placed, 2. Or would be diverted from a perpendicular as they fall near a Plate of Metall set stooping. 3. That the endeavour of the AEther or Aire from the Centre to the Circumference is not the cause of Gravity, against Mr. Hobbs. 4. A full confutation of Mr. Hobbs his Opinion. 5. An ocular Demonstration of the absurd consequence thereof. 6. An absolute Demonstration that Gravity cannot be the effect of meer Mechanical powers. 7. The Latitude of the operations of the Spirit of Nature, how large and where bounded. 8. The reason of its name. 9. Its grand office of transmitting Souls into rightly-prepared Matter.

1. AND a farther confirmation that I am not mistaken therein, is what we daily here experience upon Earth, which is the descending of heavy Bodies, as we call them. Concerning the motion whereof I agree with Des-Cartes in the assignation of the immediate corporeal cause, to wit, the AEtherial matter, which is so plentifully in the Air over it is in grosser Bodies; but withall doe vehemently surmise, that there must be some immaterial cause, such as we call the Spirit of Nature or Inferiour Soule of the World, that must direct the motions of the AEtherial particles to act upon these grosser Bodies to drive them towards the Earth. For that surplusage of Agitation of the globular particles of the AEther above what they spend in turning the Earth about, is carried every way indifferently, according to his own concession; by which motion the drops of liquors are formed into round figures, as he ingeniously concludes. From whence it is apparent, that a bullet of iron, silver or gold placed in the aire is equally assalted on all sides by the occursion of these aethereal particles, and therefore will be moved no more downwards then upwards, but hang in aequilibrio, as a piece of Cork rests on the water, where there is neither winde nor stream, but is equally plaied against by the particles of water on all sides.

2. Nor is it imaginable how the occursions of this aethereal Element here against the surface of the Earth, being it is so fluid a Body, should make it endeavour to lift it self from the Earth at so great a distance as the middle Region of the Aire and further. Besides, that this is not the cause of the descent of heavy Bodies is manifest, because then a broad Plate of the most solid Metal and most perfectly polisht, such as is able to reflect the aethereal particles most efficaciously, being placed slooping would change the course of the descent of things, and make them fall perpendicularly to it, and not to the Plane of the Horizon; as for example, not from A to B, but from A to C: which is against experience. For the heavy Body will always fall down from A to B, though

the recession of the aethereal Matter must needs be from C to A according to this Hypothesis.

3. Nor can the endeavour of the celestial Matter from the centre to the circumference take place here. For besides that Des-Cartes, the profoundest Master of Mechanicks, has declin'd that way himself (though Mr. Hobbs has taken it up,) it would follow, that near the Poles of the Earth there would be no descent of heavy Bodies at all, and in the very Clime we live in none perpendicular. To say nothing how this way will not salve the union of that great Water that adheres to the body of the Moon.

4. But to make good what I said, by undeniable proof that heavy Bodies in the very Clime where we live will not descend perpendicularly to the Earth, if Mr. Hobbs his solution of the Phaenomenon of Gravity be true; we shall evidently demonstrate both to the Eye and to Reason the proportion of their declination from a perpendicular in any Elevation of the Pole. In the

Circle therefore A B D, let the AEquator be B D, and from the point C draw a line to E, parallel to B D: which line C E will cut the circle in F 60. degrees, suppose, from B. Imagine now a heavy Body at E; according to Mr. Hobbs his solution of the Probleme of Gravity, it must fall towards the Earth in a line parallel to the AEquator, viz. in the line E F; which, say I, declines from the line H F drawn perpendicular to the Horizon L K two third parts of a right angle, that is to say, 60. degrees. For the E F H is equal to G F R, which again is equal to the alternate angle B G F, which is two third parts of a right angle ex thesi. Whence it is plain that E F declines from a perpendicular no less then 60. degrees. By the same reason, if we had drawn the Scheme for the elevation of 50. which is more Southern then our Clime, we might demonstrate that the descent of heavy Bodies declines from a perpendicular to the Horizon 50 degrees, or 5/9 of a right angle, and so of the rest. From whence it will follow, that men cannot walk upright, but declining, in the elevation suppose of 60. degrees, as near to the ground as E F is to F L, and much nearer in the more remote parts of the North, as in Norway, Russia, Frisland, Island, Scricfinnia, Greenland and others; and there is proportionably the same reason in other Climes less Northern. So that Mr. Hobbs need not send us so farre off as to the Poles to make the experiment.

5. For if for example we drew a Scheme for the Parallel under which we live, suppose about 52. degrees of Elevation, we might represent truly to the eye in what posture men would walk at London or Cambridge, according to Mr. Hobbs his determination of the causes of Gravity. For it is plain

from what has been above demonstrated, that the natural posture of their Bodies upon the Horizon L K would be in the line E F, out of which if they did force themselves towards the perpendicular H F, it would be much pain to them, neither could they place themselves in the line H F, without being born headlong to the ground, and laid flat upon the Horizon F K; the force of the Aire or whatever more subtile Elements therein pressing in lines parallel to E F, and therefore necessarily bearing down whatever is placed loose in the line H F, as is plain to any one at first sight. But we finding no such thing in experience, it is evident that Mr. Hobbs his solution is salse; nay I may say that he has not rendred so much as a possible cause of this so ordinary a Phaenomenon. A thing truly much to be lamented in one who, upon pretence that all the Appearances in the Universe may be resolved into meer Corporeal causes, has with unparallell'd confidence, and not without some wit, derided and exploded all immaterial Substance out of the World; whenas in the mean time he does not produce so much as possible Corporeal causes of the most ordinary effects in Nature. But to leave Mr. Hobbs to his own ways, and to return to Des-Cartes.

6. Adde unto all this, that if the motion of gross Bodies were according to meer Mechanical laws, a Bullet, suppose of Lead or Gold, cast up into the aire, would never descend again, but would persist in a rectilinear motion. For it being farre more solid then so much Aire & AEther put together as would fill its place, and being moved with no less swiftness then that wherewith the Earth is carried about in twenty four hours, it must needs break out in a straight line through the thin aire, and never return again to the Earth, but get away as a Comet does out of a Vortex. And that de facto a Canon Bullet has been shot so high that it never fell back again upon the ground, Des-Cartes does admit of as a true experiment. Of which, for my own part, I can imagine no other unexceptionable reason, but that at a certain distance the Spirit of Nature in some regards leaves the motion of Matter to the pure laws of Mechanicks, but within other bounds checks it, whence it is that the Water does not swill out of the Moon.

7. Now if the pure Mechanick powers in Matter and Corporeal motion will not amount to so simple a Phaenomenon as the falling of a stone to the Earth, how shall we hope they will be the adaequate cause of sundry sorts of Plants and other things, that have farre more artifice and curiosity then the direct descent of a stone to the ground. Nor are we beaten back again by this discovery into that dotage of the confounded Schools, who have indued almost every different Object of our Senses with a distinct Substantial form, and then puzzle themselves with endless scrupulosities about the generation, corruption, and mixtion of them. For I affirm with Des-Cartes, that nothing affects our Senses, but such variations of Matter as are made by difference of Motion, Figure, Situation of parts, &c. but I dissent from him in this, in that I hold it is not meer and pure mechanical motion that causes all these sensible Modifications in Matter, but that many times the immediate Director thereof is this Spirit of Nature (I speak of) one and the same every where, and acting alwaies alike upon like occasions, as a clear-minded man and of a solid judgment gives alwaies the same verdict in the same circumstances. For this Spirit of Nature intermedling with the efformation of the Foetus of Animals (as I have already shewn more then once) where notwithstanding there seems not so much need, there being in them a more particular Agent for that purpose; 'tis exceeding rational that all Plants and Flowers of all sorts (in which we have no argument to prove there is any particular Souls) should be the effects of this Universal Soule of the World. Which Hypothesis, besides that it is most reasonable in it self, according to that ordinary Axiome, Frustra fit per plura quod fieri potest per pauciora, is also very serviceable for the preventing many hard Problems about the Divisibility of the Soules of Plants, their Transmutations into other Species, the growing of Slips, and the like. For there is one Soule ready every where to pursue the advantages of prepared Matter. Which is the common and onely 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 of all Plantal appearances, or of whatever other Phaenomena there be, greater or smaller, that exceed the pure Mechanical powers of Matter. We except onely Men and Beasts, who having all of them the capacity of some sort of enjoyments or other, it was fit they should have particular Souls for the multiplying of the sense of those enjoyments which the transcendent Wisdome of the Creatour has contrived.

8. I have now plainly enough set down what I mean by the Spirit of Nature, and sufficiently proved its Existence. Out of what has been said may be easily conceived why I give it this name, it being a Principle that is of so great influence and activity in the Nascency as I may so call it, & Coalescency of things: And this not onely in the production of Plants, with all other Concretions of an inferiour nature, and yet above the meer Mechanical lawes of Matter; but also in respect of the birth of Animals, whereunto it is preparatory and assistent. I know not whether I may entitle it also to the guidance of Animals in the chiefest of those actions which we usually impute to natural Instinct. Amongst which none so famous as the Birds making their Nests, and particularly the artificial structure of the Martins nests under the arches of Church-windowes. In which there being so notable a design unknown to themselves, and so small a pleasure to present Sense, it looks as if they were actuated by another, inspired and carried away in a natural rapture by this Spirit of Nature to doe they know not what, though it be really a necessary provision and accommodation for laying their Eggs, and hatching their young, in the efformation whereof this Inferiour Soule of the World is so rationally conceived to assist and intermeddle: and therefore may the better be supposed to over-power the Fancy, and make use of the members of the Birds to build these convenient Receptacles, as certain shops to lay up the Matter whereon she intends to work, namely the Eggs of these Birds whom she thus guides in making of their nests.

9. But this argument being too lubricous, I will not much insist upon it. The most notable of those offices that can be assigned to the Spirit of Nature, and that sutably to his name, is the Translocation of the Souls of Beasts into such Matter as is most fitting for them, he being the common Proxenet or Contractor of all natural Matches and Marriages betwixt forms and matter, if we may also speak Metaphors as well as Aristotle, whose Aphorisme it is, that Materia appetit formam ut foemina virum. This Spirit therefore may have not onely the power of directing the motion of Matter at hand, but also of transporting of particular Souls and Spirits in their state of Silence and Inactivity to such Matter as they are in a fitness to catch life in again. Which Transportation or Transmission may very well be at immense distances, the effect of this Sympathy and Coactivity being so great in the working of Wines, as has been above noted, though a thing of less concernment. Whence, to conclude, we may look upon this Spirit of Nature as the great Quartermaster-General of divine Providence, but able alone, without any under-Officers, to lodge every Soule according to her rank and merit whenever she leaves the Body: And would prove a very serviceable Hypothesis for those that fancy the praeexistence of humane Souls; to declare how they may be conveighed into Bodies here, be they at what distance they will before; and how Matter haply may be so fitted, that the best of them may be fetcht from the purest aethereal Regions into an humane Body, without serving any long Apprentiship in the intermediate Aire: as also how the Souls of Brutes, though the Earth were made perfectly inept for the life of any Animal, need not lye for ever useless in the Universe. But such speculations as these are of so vast a comprehension and impenetrable obscurity, that I cannot have the confidence to dwell any longer thereon; especially they not touching so essentially our present designe, and being more fit to fill a volume themseves, then to be comprised within the narrow limits of my now almost-finish'd Discourse.

CHAP. XIV.

1. Objections against the Souls Immortality from her condition in Infancy, Old age, Sleep and Sicknesses. 2. Other Objections taken from Experiments that seem to prove her Discerpibility. 3. As also from the seldome appearing of the Souls of the deceased; 4. And from our natural fear of Death. 5. A Subterfuge of the adverso party, in supposing but one Soule common to all Creatures. 6. An Answer concerning the Littleness of the Soule in Infancy: 7. As also concerning the weakness of her Intellectuals then, and in Old age. 8. That Sleep does not at all argue the Souls Mortality, but rather illustrate her Immortality. 9. An Answer to the Objection from Apoplexies and Catalepsies: 10. As also to that from Madness. 11. That the various depravations of her Intellectual Faculties doe no more argue her Mortality, then the worser Modifications of Matter its natural Annihilability. And why God created Souls sympathizing with Matter.

1. AS for the Objections that are usually made against the Immortality of the Soule; to propound them all, were both tedious and useless, there being scarce above one in twenty that can appear of any moment to but an indifferent Wit and Judgment. But the greatest difficulties that can be urged I shall bring into play, that the Truth we doe maintain may be the more fully cleared, and the more firmly believed. The most material Objections that I know against the Souls Immortality, are these five. The First is from the consideration of the condition of the Soule in Infancy, and Old age, as also in Madness, Sleep, and Apoplexies. For if we doe but observe the great difference of our Intellectual operations in Infancy and Dotage from what they are when we are in the prime of our years, and how that our Wit grows up by degrees, flourishes for a time, and at last decayes, keeping the same pace with the changes that Age and Years bring into our Body, which observes the same lawes that Flowers and Plants; what can we suspect, but that the Soule of Man, which is so magnificently spoken of amongst the learned, is nothing else but a Temperature of Body, and that it growes and spreads with it, both in bigness and virtues, and withers and dies as the Body does, or at least that it does wholly depend on the Body in its Operations, and therefore that there is no sense nor perception of any thing after death? And when the Soule has the best advantage of years, she is not then exempted from those Eclipses of the powers of the Minde that proceed from Sleep, Madness, Apoplexies, and other Diseases of that nature. All which shew her condition, whatever more exalted Wits surmise of her, that she is but a poor mortal and corporeal thing.

2. The Second Objection is taken from such Experiments as are thought to prove the Soule divisible in the grossest sense, that is to say, discerpible into pieces. And it seems a clear case in those more contemptible Animals which are called Insects, especially the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , as Aristotle describes them, and doth acknowledge that being cut into pieces, each segment will have its motion and sense apart to it self. The most notable Instance of this kind is in the Scolopendra, whose parts Aristotle (Histor. Animal. Lib. 4. Cap. 7.) affirmes to live a long time divided, and to run backwards and forwards; and therefore he will have it to look like many living Creatures growing together, rather then one single one, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . De Juvent. & Senect. Cap. 2. But yet he will not afford them the priviledge of Plants, whose Slips will live and grow, being set in the Earth. But the instances that belong to this Objection ascend higher, for they pretend that the parts of perfect Animals will also live asunder. There are two main instances thereof. The one, that of the Eagle Fromondus mentions, whose head being chopt off by an angry Clown, for quarrelling with his dog, the Body flew over the barn near the place of this rude execution. This was done at Fromondus his fathers house: nor is the story improbable, if we consider what ordinarily happens in Pigeons and Ducks, when their heads are cut off. The other instance is, of a Malefactour beheaded at Antwerp, whose head when it had given some few jumps into the crowd, and a Dog fell a licking the blood, caught the Dogs eare in its teeth, and held it so fast, that he being frighted ran away with the mans head hanging at his eare, to the great astonishment and confusion of the people. This was told Fromondus by an eye-witness of the fact. From which two examples they think may be safely inferred, that the Souls of Men, as well as of the more perfect kinde of Brutes, are also discerpible. That example in the same Authour out of Josephus Acosta, if true, yet is finally to this purpose. For the speaking of the sacrificed Captive, when his Heart was cut out, may be a further confirmation indeed that the Brain is the Seat of the Common Sense, but no argument of the Divisibility of the Soule, she remaining at that time entire in the Body, after the cutting out of the Heart, whose office it is to afford Spirits, which were not so far yet dissipated, but that they sufficed for that suddain operation of life.

3. The Third Objection is from the seldome appearāce of the Souls of the deceased. For if they can at all appear, why do they not oftner? if they never appear, it is a strong suspicion that they are not at all in Being.

4. The Fourth is from the Fear of Death, and an inward down-bearing sense in us at some times, that we are utterly mortal, and that there is nothing to be expected after this life.

5. The Fifth and last is rather a Subterfuge then an Objection, That there is but One Common Soul in all Men and Beasts, that operates according to the variety of Animals and Persons it does actuate and vivificate, bearing a seeming particularity according to the particular pieces of Matter it enforms, but is one in all; and that this particularity of Body being lost, this particular Man or Beast is lost, and so every living creature is properly and intirely mortal. These are the reallest and most pertinent Objections I could ever meet withall, or can excogitate, concerning the Souls Immortality: to which I shall answer in order.

6. And to the First, which seems to be the shrewdest, I say, that neither the Contractedness of the Soule in Infancy, nor the Weakness of her Intellectual Operations either then or in extream Old age, are sufficient proofs of her Corporeity or Mortality. For what wonder is it that the Soule, faln into this low and fatal condition, where she must submit to the course of Nature, and the lawes of other Animals that are generated here on Earth, should display her self by degrees, from smaller dimensions to the ordinary size of men; whenas this faculty of contracting and dilating of themselves is in the very essence and notion of all Spirits? as I have noted already Lib. 1. Cap. 5. So she does but that leisurely and naturally now, being subjected to the lawes of this terrestrial Fate, which she does, exempt from this condition, suddainly and freely: not growing by Juxta-position of parts, or Intromission of Matter, but inlarging of her self with the Body meerly by the dilatation of her own Substance, which is one and the same alwaies.

7. As for the Debility of her Intellectuals in Infancy and Old age, this consideration has less force to evince her a meer corporeal essence then the former, and touches not our Principles at all, who have provided for the very worst surmise concerning the operations of the Minde, in acknowledging them, of my own accord, to depend very intimately on the temper and tenour of the Souls immediate instrument, the Spirits; which being more torpid and watry in Children and Old men, must needs hinder her in such operations as require another constitution of Spirits then is usually in Age and Childhood: though I will not profess my self absolutely confident, that the Soule cannot act without all dependence on Matter. But if it does not, which is most probable, it must needs follow, that its Operations will keep the lawes of the Body it is united with. Whence it is demonstrable how necessary Purity and Temperance is to preserve and advance a mans Parts.

8. As for Sleep, which the dying Philosopher called the Brother of Death, I doe not see how it argues the Souls Mortality, more then a mans inability to wake again: but rather helps us to conceive, how that though the stounds and agonies of Death seem utterly to take away all the hopes of the Souls living after them; yet upon a recovery of a quicker Vehicle of Aire, she may suddainly awake into fuller and fresher participation of life then before. But I may answer also, that Sleep being onely the ligation of the outward Senses, and the interception of motion from the external world, argues no more any radical defect of Life and Immortality in the Soul, then the having a mans Sight bounded within the walls of his chamber by Shuts, does argue any blindness in the immured party: who haply is busy reading by candle-light, and that with ease, so small a print as would trouble an ordinary Sight to read it by day. And that the Soule is not perpetually employed in sleep, is very hard for any to demonstrate; we so often remembring our dreams meerly by occasions, which if they had not occurred, we had never suspected we had dreamed that night.

9. Which Answer, as also the former, is applicable to Apoplexies, Catalepsies, and whatever other Diseases partake of their nature, and witness how nimble the Soule is to act upon the suppeditation of due Matter, and how Life and Sense and Memory and Reason, and all return, upon return of the fitting temper of the Spirits, suitable to that vital Congruity that then is predominant in the Soule.

10. And as for Madness, there are no Apprehensions so frantick but are arguments of the Souls Immortality, not as they are frantick, but as Apprehensions. For Matter cannot apprehend any thing, either wildly or soberly, as I have already sufficiently demonstrated. And it is as irrational for a man to conclude, that the depraved Operations of the Soule argue her Mortality, as that the worser tempers, or figures, or whatever more contemptible modifications there are of Matter, should argue its annihilation by the meer power of Nature; which no man that understands himself will ever admit. The Soule indeed is indued with several Faculties, and some of them very fatally passive, such as those are that have the nearest commerce with Matter, and are not so absolutely in her own power, but that her levity and mindlesness of the divine light may bring her into subjection to them; as all are, in too sad a sort, that are incarcerate in this terrestrial Body, but some have better luck then other some in this wild and audacious ramble from a more secure state. Of which Apostasy if there be some that are made more tragick examples then others of their stragling from their soveraign Happiness, it is but a merciful admonition of the danger we all have incurr'd, by being where we are; and very few so wel escaped, but that if they could examine their Desires, Designs, and Transactions here, by that Truth they were once masters of, they would very freely confess, that the mistakes and errours of their life are not inferiour to, but of worse consequence then, those of natural Fools and Mad-men, whom all either hoot at for their folly, or else lament their misery. And questionless the Souls of Men, if they were once reduced to that sobriety they are capable of, would be as much ashamed of such Desires and Notions they are now wholly engaged in, as any mad-man, reduced to his right Senses, is of those freaks he played when he was out of his wits.

11. But the variety of degrees, or kindes of depravation in the Intellective faculties of the Soule, her Substance being indiscerpible, cannot at all argue her Mortality, no more then the different modifications of Matter the Annihilability thereof, as I have already intimated. Nor need a man trouble himself how there should be such a Sympathy betwixt Body and Soule, when it is so demonstrable that there is. For it is sufficient to consider, that it is their immediate nature so to be by the will and ordinance of Him that has made all things. And that if Matter has no Sense nor Cogitation it self, as we have demonstrated it has not, it had been in vain, if God had not put forth into Being that Order of immaterial Creatures which we call Souls, vitally unitable with the Matter: Which therefore, according to the several modifications thereof, will necessarily have a different effect upon the Soule, the Soule abiding still as unperishable as the Matter that is more mutable then she. For the Matter is dissipable, but she utterly indiscerpible.