MEN do alwaies commend, but not alwaies with reaſon, the times of old, and blame the preſent: and they take part ſo much with things paſt, that they celebrate not onely thoſe ages which they have known by the memory writers have leſt them, but thoſe alſo, which now being old, they remember they have ſeen in their youth. And when this their opinion is falſe, as moſt commonly it is, I perſwade my ſelf the reaſons that bring them into this error, are divers. And the firſt I take to be, that of matters of old the truth is not wholly known, & of thoi • actions moſt commonly thoſe things are conceal'd that would bring any infamy upon the times, but whatſoever advances their credit & glory is ſet out with magnificence. For moſt writers do ſo much follow the conquerors fortune, that to make their victories glorious, they not only augment what they have vertuouſly done but they ſo illuſtrate their enomies actions, that thoſe that are afterwards born in any of their countreys, either conquering or conquered, have cauſe to admire thoſe men and times, and ſo conſequently are forc'd exceedingly to praiſe and love them. Beſides this, men hating things either for fear, or envic, two very powerfull cauſes of hatred are quite ſpent in things that are paſſed, being they are not able to hurt, nor can give occaſion of envic. But on the contrary part, it comes to paſs that thoſe things that are now in hand, and we ſee, which by reaſon of the through knowledge we have of them, no tittle thereof being conceal'd from us, and knowing in them together with the good, many things worthy diſlike, hereupon we are compell'd to judge them much Inferior to matters of old, although that in truth the preſent deſerve far more glory and reputation: this I ſay, not arguing touching the arts, which are now brought to ſuch perfection, that the times cannot take from them, nor add but little more glory to them; but ſpeaking of things belonging to means lives and manners, whereof the proofes are not very evident; I anſwer, that this cuſtome above written of praiſing and blaming is ſometimes falſe and ſometimes true: for ſometimes they muſt needs light upon the truth; becauſe all humane things are continually in motion, and either riſe or fall. As we ſee the civil government of a city or countrey ſo ordain'd by ſome rare perſon, that for a time even by reaſon of the worth of this man, the State mends much, and is more and more amplified: he that is then borne in that State, and commends more the times of old, than thoſe moderne, is much deceiv'd: and the cauſe of his errour proceeds from thoſe things that have bin formerly ſayd. But thoſe that are afterwards born in that City or countrie, whoſe dayes are onely during their decline from their excellence, then erre nor. And I deviſing with my ſelfe whence theſe things proceed, I think the world hath continued alwayes in one manner, and that in i • hath beene alwayes as much good as evill; but that that good and evill does change from country to country, as it appeares by that which is diſcover'd to us of thoſe ancient kingdomes, which alter'd from the one to the other, by change of manners. But the world continued the ſame. There was onely this difference, that where it firſt had plac'd its vertue in Aſſiria, it afterwards remov'd it into Media, then into perſia, in ſo much that at length it came into Italie, and ſo to Rome. And if after the Romane Empire there ſucceeded not any other that laſted, nor where the world had retired all its vertue together; yet we ſee it was ſpread abroad into ſeverall Nations, where men behav'd themſelves very bravely and valouroufly, as in the Kingdome of France, the Kingdome of the Turks, and that of the Soldan; ſo now adayes in Germanie, and ſo among thoſe that were firſt of the Saracin ſect, which did great exploits, and made themſelves maſters of ſo great a part of the world, after they had deſtroyed the Eaſterne Empire of Rome. In all theſe Provinces then, after the Romanes were ruined, and in all theſe ſects hath that vertue reſided; and now in ſome of them indeed it may be wiſhed for, but in otherſome worthily commended. And he that is borne in thoſe Countries, and praiſes the times paſt more than the preſent, may be deceived: but he that is borne in Italy and not in Greece, and is not become either in Italy, a Tramontan, or in Greece, a Turk, hath reaſon to blame the times preſent, and commend the former, for therein were many things made them marvail, but in theſe there is nothing can recover them out of extream miſery, infamy, and diſgrace, where there is no obſervance either of Religion or Lawes, nor of warlike diſcipline, but they are wholly beſpotted with all manner of filthineſs. And ſo much the more deteſtable are theſe vices, by how much they are moſt in thoſe that are greateſt, who ſitting in their Tribunals command all, and will be ador'd. But returning to our diſcourſe, I ſay, that if mens underſtandings are corrupted in matter of judgment, touching which age is the better, the preſent or that of old, in thoſe things by reaſon of their antiquitie they could not have ſuch an exact knowledge, as they might have of their own times, yet ſhould they not be corrupted in old men touching the judgement of the times of their youth, and old age, having known and ſeen equally the one and the other; Which thing would be true, if thoſe men all the time of their lives continued ſtill at the ſame ſtate of judgement, and had the ſame deſires. But they altering, though the times, change not, yet cannot ſeem ſo to men to continue the ſame, they having other deſires, other delights, and other conſiderations in their old age, than in their youth: for the ſtrength of mens bodies, when they grow old, decaying, and their judgements and underſtandings increaſing, as muſt needs be, that thoſe things which in their youths they thought ſupportable and good, becomes afterwards to them growing old intollerable and hurtfull: and where theſe men ought herein to lay the fault upon their own judgements, they blame the times. Beſides this, the deſire of man being inſatiable (becauſe of nature he hath it, that he can and will deſire every thing, though of fortune he be ſo limited, that he can attain but a few) there ariſes thence a diſlike in mens minds, and a loathing of the things they injoy which cauſes them to blame the times preſent and commend thoſe paſs'd, as alſo thoſe that are to come, although they have no motives grounded upon reaſon to incite them thereto. I know not then, whether I ſhall deſerve to be numbred among them that are deceiv'd; if too much in theſe diſcourſes of mine I ſhall praiſe the times of the ancient Romans, and blame our own. And truly if the vertue that then reign'd, and the vice that now reigns, were not more clear than the Sun, I ſhould not ſpeak ſo freely, for fear I ſhould incur the cenſure of that error whereof I have now blam'd others: but the matter being ſo evident, that every man ſees it, I ſhall with boldneſs ſpeak that plainly which I conceive of thoſe & theſe times, to the end thoſe young men who ſhall chance to read theſe my writings, may avoyd the evil of theſe times, and prepare their minds to imitate the good of theſe of old, whenſoever their good, fortune ſhall give them occaſion: for it is the duty of a good man, to reach unto others that good, which by reaſon of the malignity of the times, and of fortune, thou haſt not bin able to do thy ſelf, to the end that many being given to underſtand hereof, ſome of them, whom the heavens ſhall more favor, may put it in practice. And having in my former book of diſcourſes ſpoken of the Romans deliberations, touching their affairs within the City; in this we ſhall treat of thoſe which the people of Rome did, belonging to the enlargement of the Empire.

MAny have bin of opinion, among whom is Plutarch a great Writer, that the people of Rome were more favor'd by fortune, than aſſiſted by their vertues, in gaining their Empire. And among other reaſons which he alleadges to that purpoſe, he ſayes, it appears by the confeſſion of the ſame people, that they acknowledged all their victories from fortune, having conſecrated more Temples to her, than to any other god. And Livie ſeems to ſide with this opinion: becauſe it is very ſeldome, that he brings in any Roman ſpeaking where he makes mention of vertue, but that he joynes fortune therewith. Whereunto I will not yield in any termes, nor think I it can be maintain'd: for if never any Republique made the ſame Progreſs that Rome made; it is becauſe never hath any Republique bin ſo order'd to make its advantage, as Rome was: for the valour of their armies gain'd them their Empire, and their order of proceeding, and their own mannor with that which their firſt founder likewiſe deviſed for them, made them keep what they had gotten, as hereafter in ſeveral diſcourſes ſhall be declar'd. That two ſtrong wars never at the ſame time met together to ſhake their ſtate, they ſay, it was the people of Romes fortune, and not their valor: for they had no wars with the Latins, til they had not onely beaten the Samnites, but were fain to undertake a war in defence of them. Neither war'd they with the Tuſcans, til they had firſt ſubdued the Latins, and wholly weakned the Samnices with many routes: whereof if two entire powers (when they were freſh) had joyned together againſt the Romans, without doubt a man may eaſily conjecture that the ruine of the Roman Republique would have followed thereupon. But however this thing came to paſs, it never befell them to have two ſtrong wars made againſt them at once, but rather luckily it proov'd, that when one began, the other ended, and at the end of one another began, Which we may eaſily ſee, by viewing their wars, how they followed in order: for letting alone thoſe wars which they made before Rome was taken by the Frenchmen, we ſee, that whileſt they fought with the Aequi and the Volſci, never (ſo long as theſe people were of any conſiderable power) did any other people ſet upon them. They they being conquer'd, the war againſt the Samnites began; and though before the finiſhing of this war the Latins Rebel'd againſt the Romans, nevertheleſs, when that rebellion followed, the Samnites were in league with Rome, and with their army help'd the Romans to bring down the Latins pride; and when they were ſubdued, the war with the Samnites again was reviv'd. But their forces being broken by divers defeats given them, the war with the Tuſcans aroſe; and when that was quieted, the Samni es began anew to ſtir, upon Pyrrhus has paſſage into Italy; when he was defeated, and beaten back into Greece, then firſt was kindled the fire of the Carthaginian wars: nor was that quenched til that all the French, as well beyond, as on this ſide the Alpes, conſpired againſt the Romans; ſo that between Pobolonia and Piſa, where now is the tower at Saint Vincenti, they were vanquiſh'd with a very great ſlaughter. After this, for the ſpace of 20 years, they had not any war of much importance: for they had no quarrel with any but with the Ligurians, and the remainder of thoſe French that werein Lombardie: and ſo they continued, til the ſecond Carrhaginian war begin; Which troubled Italie for 16 years ſpace. Which being made an end of with great glory, that of Macedon ſprung up, and was ended, when that of Antiochus, and afterwards that of Aſia took their turns. After which victorie, there remained not in the whole world neither Prince nor Republique that either by themſelves or altogether could oppoſe the Roman Forces. But before that laſt victory, he that conſiders the order of theſe wars, and the manner of their proceeding, ſhall find mingled with their fortune much valour and wiſdome; ſo that he who examines the occaſion of ſuch fortune, ſhall eaſily diſcover it: for it is very certain, that when a Prince or a people have gained ſuch a reputation, that neither prince nor people bordering upon him dares by himſelf aſſault him, and is afraid of him, it will alwaies ſo fall out, that none of them all will ſet upon him, unleſs forc'd thereto, ſo that it ſhall be at that great Princes choyce, to war with which of his neighbors he ſhall pleaſe, and the reſt with little pains to quiet. Who, partly in regard of his power, partly beguil'd by ſome devices he ſhall make uſe of to lull them aſleep, are eaſily kept from ſtirring. And for other powerfull Princes, who are more remote and have no dealing with him, they look upon the matter, as a thing afar off, and nothing belonging to them. In which error they continue ſo long, til the fire comes cloſe to their doors: which then being come ſo near, they have no means to extinguiſh it, but only to uſe their own armes, which ſuffice nor, the enemy being now grown exceeding mighty. I will let paſs, how the Samnites ſtood ſtill and look'd upon the Romans, while they overcame the Volſci and the Aequi: and that I may not be too tedious, I will ſatisfie my ſelf with the Carthaginians, who were of great power and eſtimation, when the Romans war'd with the Samnites and Tuſcans: for even then they were Maſters of all Affrica, and had Sardinia and Scicily in their hands, and had the rule of ſome part of Spain. Who being that their forces were remote from the people of Romes confines, never thought of aſſaulting them, nor of giving ſuccours to the Samnites, and Tuſcans; but as if the Romans increaſe had bin the Carthaginians advantage, they made a confederacy with them, ſeeking their friendſhip: nor did they perceive their error committed, til the Romans having ſubdued all thoſe peoples that lay between them and the Carthaginians, began to make war with them for the rule of Scicily and Spain. The ſelf-ſame befell the French, that hapned to the Carthaginians, and ſo to Philip of Macedon, and Antiochus; and every one of them beleeved (while the Romans were buſy with another) that that other might chance to vanquiſh them, and that they had time enough, either by peace or war, to defend themſelves from them. So that, I beleeve, that the ſame fortune herein the Romans had, all Princes would have had, provided, that they proceeded as the people of Rome did, and were of equal valour with them. To this purpoſe it would not be unfit, to declare the courſe the people of Rome held in their entryes into other Princes countreys, but that inour treaty of Principallities, we have diſcourſed thereupon at laege. I will only ſay this in brieſ, they alwaies did put in practice to make themſelves ſome friends in the Countreys they came newly acquainted with, who ſerved them for a ladder to climb up to them, or a gate to enter them, or a tye to hold them; as it appears, by means of the Capuans they enterd into Samnium, by the Camertins into Tuſcany, by the Mamertins into Scicly, by the Saguntins into Spain, by Mafiniſſa into Affrica, by the Ae olians into Greece, by Eumenes and other Princes into Aſia, by the Maſilians and the Heduans into France. And ſo they never fail'd of the like ſupports, whereby to facilitate their undertakings, either in the inlargement of their dominions, or in the maintaining them. Which, thoſe people that ſhall obſerve, ſhall find themſelves in leſs want of good fortune, than they who neglect it. And to the end, that every one may know of what avail our vertue was beyond their for une, in the conqueſt of their Empire, we will treat in the Chapter following, concerning the quality of thoſe people with whom they were to make war, and with what obſtinacy they defended their liberty.

NOthing made it more painfull to the Romans to vanquiſh their neighbors near about them, as alſo ſome other Countreys further off, then the affection that in thoſe days many people did bear to their liberty, which they ſo obſtinately defended, that they had never bin ſubdu'd, but by an exceſſive valour: for, by many examples, we know to what dangers they expos'd themſelves, as well for the maintenance as the recovery of it; and what revenges they took againſt thoſe that had laid hold on it. We know likewiſe what dammages peoples and cities receive by ſervitude And whereas now adayes, there is onely one Countrey that can ſay, ſhe hath free Cities in her: in ancient-times people liv'd very free in all countreys. We ſee that in thoſe times whereof at this preſent we ſpeak, in Italy from the Alpes (which make a partition between Tuſcany and Lombardy) even to the very point of Italy, there were many free peoples, as were the Tuſcans, the Romans the Samnites, and many others, that dwelt in the other parts of Italy: nor does any man relate, that there was any King, beſides thoſe that raign'd in Rome, and Porſena King of Tuſcany; whoſe race how it came to an end, hiſtory leaves us no memory. But we plainly ſee, that at the ſame time the Romans went to incamp before Vejum, Tuſcany was free, and ſo abſolutely injoy'd their liberty, and withall ſo much hated the name of a Prince, that the inhabitants of Vejum for their defence having made a King among them, ask'd aid of the Tuſcans againſt the Romans; but they reſolv'd after many deliberations taken, to give them none whiles they liv'd under a King, judging it not right to defend their countrey, who of themſelves had ſubjected it to another. And it is an eaſy thing to gue • s, whereupon it is that people take ſuch an affection to their liberty: becauſe we ſee by experience, that cities have never bin much amplified neither in domition nor riches, unleſs only during their liberty. And truly it is a ſtrange thing to conſider, unto what greatneſs Athens attained in the ſpace of a hundred years, after ſhe had freed her ſelf from Piſiſtratus his tyranny: but above all it is moſt ſtrange to think unto what greatneſs Rome attained after ſhe was deliver'd from her Kings: The reaſon thereof is eaſy to be underſtood: for it is no mans particular go •• , but the common good, that amplifies the city. And without queſtion this common good is not regarded but in Republiques, for there whatſoever makes for their advantage is put in practice: and though it turns to this or that private mans loſs, yet are they ſo many, whom the ſaid good concerns, that they are alwaies able to put it forward, in deſpight of thoſe few that ſuffer by it. The contrary falls our, when there is a prince; where, moſt commonly, that which makes for him endammages the City, and that which makes for the city hurts him; ſo that ſuddenly where a Tyranny * How this will hold with the general and moſt received tenent, I cannot ſee; being that the Prince and the people are ſaid to make onely one politique body; and the welfare of the part cannot be ſeparated from the good of the whole. Famous is that fable of Aeſops, which Menenius Agrippa made uſe of, to reconcile the Commons of Rome, upon diſtaſte againſt the Senate, gone a part in the holy mount: On a time that in man all things accorded well together, each particular member advis'd, and complaind that by their care and pains all things neceſſary were ſought after, and provided for the belly, and that the belly onely remaind idle amongſt them, injoying, thoſe delicates which their labor had prepar'd: and thereupon conſpir'd together that the hands ſhould not put meat to the mouth, nor the mouth receive it, nor the teeth chaw it: but thus while in this choler they thought by famine to ſubdue the belly, the whole body fainted. Whereby it came to appear that the belly afforded its ſervice too, and as well gave as receiv'd nouriſhment, diſtributing by the veins, throughout the whole body, out of this meat which it had diſgeſted, the blood well concocted, whereby each part was nouriſh'd. Who is it that feels not, when any part fails, the whole is in diſorder? and who ſees not likewiſe, when any part of the body drawes unto it more then its proportionable nutriture, that the whole pines thereupon? as from the ſwelling of the ſpleen, the health of the whole body is diſturb'd, and therefore by ſome Politiques not unfitly compared to a Princes exchequer, which when it exceſſively abounds beggers the whole countrey. And it is a folly to think (ſaith a Spauiſh author) that the poverty of the Comminalty will not redound to the breaking of private patrimonies, nor can great revenues continue there, where the Commonwealth is rack'd to the very bones. All theſe things ſerve to argue the mutual ſympathy, as between the head and the members, ſo between the Prince and his ſubjects; and to divide the intereſt of the Prince from that of the people, cannot agree with good policy; for as in the natural body it breeds diſeaſes, ſo in the politique it produces diſorder and deſtruction. growes upon a free ſtate, the leaſt ill that can thence reſult to thoſe cities, is not to proceed, nor increaſe more in power, nor wealth: but for the moſt part, or rather alwaies, it comes to paſs, that they go backward: And if hap would have it, that a Tyranc ſhould proove valorous, who by his courage and proweſs ſhould inlarge his dominions, there would thence no profit ariſe to the Republique, but to him alone: for he cannot advance any of theſe citizens that are brave and worthy, over whom he tyrannizes, unleſs he deſires to give himſelf ſome jeulouſy of them. Nor can he yet ſubject or make tributary the cities that he conquers, to that city which he tyrannizes over; for it is not for his advantage to make it powerfull; it rather makes for him, to hold the ſtate disjoyn'd, that each town and province acknowledge him, in ſo much that of his conqueſts, he onely reaps he good, and not his countrey. And he hat would ſee the confirmation of this opinion, let him read Xenophon in his treaty of a Tyranny It is no marval then, that the peoples of old did ſo extreamly harc Tyrants, and lov'd the free gouernment, & that the very name of liberty was in ſuch requeſt amongſt them: as it happen'd, when Hieronymus, nephew of Hiero the Siracuſan, was ſlain in Siracuſa: for the news of his death being brought to his army, which lay not far from the city, they began to riſe up in tumult, and take their armes in hand againſt them that ſlew him: but when they perceiv'd that in Siracuſa all cried out liberty, allured with the delight of that name, they were all appeas'd, and laid aſide their anger conceiv'd againſt them that kil'd the Tyrant, & advis'd together by what means there might be ordain'd in that city a free government. And it is no marvail, that people take extraordinary revenge of thoſe that have laid hold of their liberty. Touching which there are many examples, whereof I intend to relate onely one, that fell out in Corcira a City of Greece, in the times of the Peloponneſian wat: where the province being divided into two factions, one of which followed the Athenians, the other the Spartans; it came to paſs, that of many cities which were divided among themſelves, the one part follow'd the friendſhip of the Spartans, the other that of Athens; it happening ſo, that in the ſaid city the Nobility prevail'd, and tooke from the people their liberty; but the people by means of the Athenians took heare again, and having laid hold on the Nobility, ſhut them up into a priſon capable of them all, from whence they drew them out by eight and by ten at a time, pretending to baniſh them into ſeverall parts, but they put them to death after a cruell manner. Whereof they that remain'd having ſome notice, reſolv'd as much as lay in their power, to avoid this ſhamefull death; ſo that arm'd with what they could get, and fighting with thoſe that ſought to enter, they defende'd the paſſage into the priſon: whereupon, the people running together uncovered the top of the houſe, and with the ruines thereof overwhelm'd them. There follow'd alſo in the ſaid province many ſuch other horrible chances, ſo that we find it true, that people purſue more agerly the revenge of a liberty once taken from them actually, then of that which was onely contriv'd in the intention to be pluck'd from them. Weighing then from whence it may ariſe, that in the times of old people eſteem'd more of liberty, then now a dayes, I beleeve it proceeds from the ſame cauſe which makes men leſſe valiant now adayes then formerly, which I thinke is the difference of our education from that of old, grounded upon the difference of our Religion from the ancient: for our Religion having ſhew'd * Here Machia. falſely imputes the cauſe of mens cowardlineſſe to Chriſtian Religion. I need not alleadge any battells fought by the Chriſtians, to proove him a lyar; hiſtories frequently affoard us examples, as well ancient as moderne, where they have bin as reſolutely fought by the Chriſtians, as ever were any by the Pagans: nay our owne memories may well ſupply us with ſome if we want. If we marke from whence Machiavell takes his argument, it is from that the Pagans ſlew a multitude of ſacrifices, the ſight of which being terrible made men of theſame diſpoſition. By the ſame reaſon muſt it follow that our butchers and ſurgeons are more valiant then other men, as who cuſtomarily have their hands imbrued in bloud: I may well allow them to be more cruell, and therefore our lawes exclude them from being of the Iury of life and death: but of being more valiant I never heard they had the reputation. us the truth, and the true way, cauſes us leſſe to make account of the honour of this world; whereupon the Gentiles eſteeming much of it, and placing therein their greateſt good, became braver in their actions. Which may be conſider'd from many of their orders, beginning from the magnificence of their ſacrifices and the pooreneſſe of ours, where indeede the pompe is more delicate then magnificke, but not any action of bravery or fierceneſſe. And with the Gentiles alſo there was no want of pompe and magnificence in the ceremonies, but thereunto was added the action of the ſacrifice full of bloud and cruelty, ſlaying a multitude of beaſts; The ſight of which being terrible made men of the ſame diſpoſition. Beſides, the ancient Religion did not beatificate but onely men fraught with worldly glory, as were the Commanders of armies, and Princes of nations. Our Religion hath rather glorified humble and contemplative men, then thoſe of action. Moreover it hath plac'd the chiefe good in humility, and in the rejecting and contempt of worldly things. That other imagin'd the chiefe happineſſe to conſiſt in the greatneſſe of courage, in the ſtrength of body, and in all other things fit to make men exceeding valiant: and if our Religion requires valour in a man, it is rather that he be fit for a ſtrong ſufferance, then for a ſtrong action. This manner of living then, as it ſeemes, hath made the world become feeble, and given it in prey to wicked perſons, who may ſecurely rule over it, as they liſt, ſeeing that all men to obtaine paradiſe, think rather of ſuffering their wrongs, then revenging them: and though it may appeare, that the world is growne effeminate, and the heavens diſarm'd, it proceeds without doubt from the cowardiſe of men, who have given an interpretation of our Religion according to their owne lazy and idle diſpoſitions, and not agreeable to vertue: for if they would conſider how much it allowes the advancement and defence of ones country, they ſhould ſee that it wills, that we ſhould love and honour it, and ſo prepare our ſelves that we may be able to defend it. Theſe kindes of educations then, and falſe interpretations, cauſe that there be not ſo many Republiques now adayes in the world as were of old. Nor by conſequence do we ſee among people ſuch an affection to liberty as formerly: although I beleeve rather the reaſon hereof is, becauſe the Roman Empire with its force and power extinguiſh'd all the Republiques and free governments. And though afterwards that Empire was diſſolv'd, yet could not the cities againe be reſtor'd, and anew order'd in a civill government, unleſſe it were in very few places of that Empire. Yet howſoever it was, the Romans in every little corner of the world found, as it were, a conſpiracy of Commonwealths very ſtrongly arm'd, and very obſtinate to defend their liberties; which ſhewes that the people of Rome without an extraordinary and rare valour had never made conqueſt of them. And to give an example of ſome member thereof, that of the Samnires ſhall ſ • ffice me: who (and indeed it is admirable, and ſo Titus Livius avowes it) were ſo powerfull and warlike, that they were of force, till the time of Papirius Curſor the Conſul, ſonne of the firſt Papirius, to reſiſt the Romans, which was for the ſpace of forty ſix yeares, after ſo many routes, deſtruction of their townes, and ſo many ſlaughters made in their country: eſpecially conſidering the country then, where ſo many cities were, and ſuch a vaſt number of men, though now almoſt not inhabited. And then there was ſuch order, and ſo great force, that it was inſuperable, had it not bin aſſaulted by a Roman power. And it is an eaſy thing to know, whence that order and this diſorder ariſe, for all that came from the free manner of living then, and this from the ſlavery now. For all countries and provinces which live free in every part, as formerly I ſaid, make exceeding large progreſſes: for here we ſee the people more numerous, becauſe the marriages are more free, and deſir'd by men: being that every one willingly begets thoſe children which he beleeves he can bring up, and nouriſh, without doubting their patrimony will be raviſh'd from them; and when he knowes they are borne free and not ſlaves, ſo that by meanes of their vertue they may become Princes. We ſee riches likewiſe increaſe there in greater meaſure, as well thoſe which ariſe from cultivation, as thoſe which are gotten by the trades of handicraftsmen: for every one is more provident in gaining and multiplying of thoſe goods, which, when he hath gotten, he beleeves he ſhall peaceably injoy. From whence it comes to paſſe, that men even contend who ſhall more advance the private and publique good; ſo that the one and the other increaſe exceedingly. The contrary hereof followes in al thoſe countries that live in ſervitude; and ſo much the more faile they of their accuſtomed good, by how much their ſervitude is harder. And of all hard ſervitudes, none exceeds that which is ſubject to a free Republique, becauſe ordinarily it is of longeſt continuance, and ſo leaſt hopes there are of being deliver'd from it: a ſecond reaſon is, the end of a Republique is to enfeeble and weaken all other bodies in her, whereby to augment her owne. Which thing a Prince that brings thee under his rule does not, eſpecially if it be not ſome Barbarian Prince, a ruiner of countries, and a deſtroyer of all civill ſocietyes among men, as are the eaſterne Princes. But if any of them have bin inſtructed in humane cuſtomes and the arts ordinary among men, they moſt commonly affect equality in the cities they have ſubdued, and let them ſtill poſſeſſe all their arts and ancient cuſtomes; ſo that, if they cannot increaſe, as in liberty, they goe not to wracke, as in thraldome, ſpeaking of that thraldome into which cities fall, when they ſerve a ſtranger; for I have formerly ſpoken enough of ſubjection to a native. Whoſoever then conſiders well all that which is ſaid, will not much marvaile at the power which the Samnites had being free, nor at their weakeneſſe into which afterwards they fell by ſervitude. And Titus Livius gives us good teſtimony thereof in many places, in Hanniballs warres, where he declares, that the Samintes being oppreſſed by one Legion of ſouldiers, that were in Nola, ſent Ambaſſadours to Hanniball to intreat him for ſuccours; whoſe ſpeeches were to this purpoſe, that they had for a hundred yeares warr'd with the Romans, ſerving themſelves onely of their owne ſouldiers and Captaines, and had many times withſtood two Conſular armies, and two Conſuls, and that now they were brought ſo low, they had much a doe to defend themſelves from one ſmall Roman legion that was in Nol •• .

ALL this while Rome wax'd great upon the Creſeit in terea Roma Albae ruinis ruines of Alba. Thoſe that intend a city ſhould farre inlarge the bounds of her domnions, ought withall indeavour provide, that ſhe be well fraught with inhabitants: for without a great multitude of men in her, ſhe will never be able to grow great. And this is done two wayes, either by love or by force: by love holding the wayes open and ſecure to ſtrangers, that might have a deſign to come and dwell in it, to the end that every one might come willingly to inhabit it; by force ruining and defacing the neighbour cities and ſending out the inhabitants thereof to dwell in thine: all which was punctually obſerv'd in Rome, ſo that in the timeof the ſixth King in Rome there dwelt 80 thouſand men able to beare armes: for the Romans meant to behave themſelves like the good husbandman, who to make a plant grow big, and fructify, and ripen well its fruits, cuts off the firſtſprouts it thruſts forth, that ſo the vertue thereof remaining yet in the roote of the plant, may ſhortly after bring forth others more lively and fruitfull. And that this courſe held was neceſſary and good for the founding and inlarging of an Empire, the Example of Sparta and Athens ſhewes us plaine, who being both very warlike Republiques, and furniſhed with excellent lawes, yet could they never attaine to the Roman Empires greatneſſe, which ſeemed indeed a little more tumultuary and not ſo well ordered as they, whereof can be alleadged no other reaſon, then that aforeſaid. For Rome having inlarged by thoſe two wayes the body of her city, was able to put in armes ſix hundred and 80 thouſand ſouldiers, whereas Sparta and Athens never exceeded each of them twenty thouſand men. Which proceeded not from that the ſcituation of Rome was more bountifull then theirs, but onely from the different courſe they tooke: for Licurgus founder of the Spartan Republique conſidering that nothing could ſoone take away the power of his lawes, then a commixtion of new inhabitants, did what he could to hinder ſtrangers from living with them; and that they ſhould neither joyne matrimonies with them, nor admit them into their civill government, nor have any thing to do with them, which are the ordinary occaſions of accord among men. He ordained likewiſe that leather money ſhould paſſe currant, thereby to take from every one the defire to come thither and bring any merchandiſe, or art to them: ſo that, that citie could never grow big by multiplying her inhabitants. And becauſe all our actions imitate nature, it is neither poſſible, nor naturall, that the ſlender body of a tree ſhould beare a groſſe bough; therefore a ſmal Republique cannot hold cities nor kingdomes of greater power and ſtrength then ſhe her ſelfe is; and if perchance it comes to paſſe that ſhe layes hold on them, it befalls her as it does that tree the boughs whereof are greater then the body, that ſuſtaining it with much adoe, with every ſmall b'aſt it is broken, as we ſee it happen'd to Sparta: which having ſeized on the rule of all the cities of Greece, Thebes no ſooner rebell'd againſt her, but all the other cities likewiſe fell from her, and ſo remain'd as the dead trunk of a tree without branches: which could never befall Rome, having her body and ſtocke ſo huge, that it was of force with eaſe to ſupport any bough whatſoever. This manner then of proceeding, together with thoſe others which we ſhall afterwards ſpeake of, made Rome exceeding great and powerfull. Which Titus Livius ſhewes in few words where he ſayes, All this while Rome Creſcit in terea Roma Albae ruinis. wax'd great upon the ruines of Alba

HE that hath read the ancient hiſtories with obſervation, findes that Commonwealths have three manner of wayes to amplify their ſtates. The one hath bin that which the ancient Tuſcans followed, to make a league of many Republiques together, where no one is preſerred before the other, neither in authority nor in dignity; and to make other cities partakers with them in their gains; juſt as now adayes the Swiſſes do, and formerly in Greece the Achaeans and Etolians were wont. And becauſe the Romans had much war with the Tuſcans, the better to ſhew the quality of this firſt way, I will inlarge my ſelf in giving notice of them par ieularly. Before the Romans had any great power in Italy, the Tuſcans were very mighty both by ſea and by land: and though there is no particular hiſtory that touches their affairs, yet is there ſome ſmall remembrance thereof, and ſome ſignes left us of their greatneſs; and we know, how they ſent a colony to the ſea coaſt above, called by them Adria, which prooved of ſuch renown, that it gave the name to that ſea, and the Latins call it the Adri tick to this day. Moreover we know, that they had conquered all from Tiber, to the very foot of the Alpes, which encompaſs the whole body of Italy. Notwithſtanding that two hundred years before the Romans grew to any conſiderable ſtrength, the ſaid Tuſcans loſt the dominion of that countrey which is now called Lombardy; Which was ſeized on by the French; who either driven by neceſſity, or allured by the delicacy of the fruits, eſpecially the wines, came into Italy under the conduct of Belloveſus their Captain, and having defeated and chaſed out the natives; ſeated themſelves in that place, therein built many cities, and called the Countrey Gallia, from the name they then bare; and this they held til they were conquered by the Romans. The Tuſcans then liv'd with that equality, and proceeded in the amplifying their State, in that firſt manner, ſpoken of before: and there were twelve Cities, among which were Cluſium, Vejum, Deſola, Aretium, and Volaterra and the like; who by way of league rul'd their dominions; nor could they inlarge their conqueſts beyond the bounds of Italy, whereof alſo there was a great part left untoucht by them, for the reaſons which we ſhall afterwards tell. The other manner is to make allies, yet not ſo thought, that thou ſtill reſerveſt not to thy ſelf the principal place in the command & rule and title of all the exploits, which courſe was alwaies obſerv'd by the Romans. The third manner is, to make them immediatly ſubjects, and not allies, as did the Spa • tans and Athenians: of which three waies, this laſt is altogether unprofitable; as it appears, it was in the two foreſaid Republiques, which, for no other cauſe went to ruine, but for poſſeſſing themſelves of thoſe dominions, which they were not able to hold. For it is a thing of great difficulty and pains to hold the government of Cities by violence, eſpecially of thoſe that have bin accuſtomed to live free. And if thou beeſt not in armes, and well furniſhed with good numbers of ſoldiers, thou canſt neither command, nor rule them. And to be able to do this, it is neceſſary to make friends and companions, who may aſſiſt thee in multiplying the people of thy City. And becauſe theſe two Cities, did neither the one nor the other of theſe, their manner of proceeding was of no advantage to them. And becauſe Rome which gives us an example touching this third manner, did the one and the other, therefore grew it to that exceſſive power: and for that ſhe alone took this courſe of living, ſhe alone therefore became ſo mighty: For ſhe having taken to her throughout all Italy many for her companions to help her, who in many things liv'd with her upon equal termes; but on the other ſide, as is aboveſaid, reſerving to her ſelf alwaies the ſeat of the Empire, and the title of commanding, theſe their companions (who were never aware of it) with their own pains & loſs of their own bloud came to bring their own necks to the yoke: for when they began to tranſport their Armies out of Italy, and to reduce Kingdomes into Provinces, & to make thoſetheir ſubjects, who for that they were uſed to live under Kings, were never much troubled to become Subjects; and receiving Roman Governors over them, and having bin overcome by Armies, whereof the Romans had the name and title, they acknowledged no other head, but Rome. So that thoſe allyes of Rome that were in Italy, found themſelves on a ſudden begirt round by Romes Subjects, and oppreſſ'd by an exceeding vaſt City, as then Rome was: and when they perceiv'd the deceit into which they had bin train'd, it was too late to help it, Rome had then gotten ſuch authority with forrein Nations, and was then of ſuch ſtrength within it ſelf, the people of their City being grown very numerous and warlike. And although thoſe their companions, to be reveng'd on them for theſe injuries, conſpir'd together againſt them, yet in a ſhort time were they loſers by the war, making their own conditions worſe: for of allies, they became Subjects. Which manner of proceeding (as is ſaid) hath bin obſerv'd onely by the Romans: nor can a Republique that would enlarge her State take any other; for experience hath not ſhew'd us any courſe more certain or true. This way formerly ſpoken of concerning the leagues, wherein anciently the Tuſcans, Acheans, and Aeroſians liv'd, and which now adayes the Swiſſes uſe, is the better way next after that the Romans took: for, it being not poſſible by it to grow very great, thou gaineſt two advantages thereby, the one, that eaſily thou draweſt no war upon thee; the other, that what thou getteſt thou eaſily holdeſt. The reaſon why they cannot grow great, is, becauſe they are diſunited Republiques, and placed in divers ſeats; which makes it more difficult to conſult and reſolve. And beſides, becauſe they are not very greedy of extending the limits of their dominions; for that divers Commonalties being to participate of that rule, they value not ſo much ſuch conqueſts, as does a Republique alone, which hopes to injoy it all her ſelf. Moreover, they govern themſelves by common advice and counſel, and therfore of force they muſt be ſlower in every deliberation, then they that live within the walls of the ſame City. It is plain alſo by experience, that this manner of proceeding preſcribes it ſelf certain bounds, which it paſſes not; nor have we any example that they were exceeded. And theſe were to joyn together ſome dozen or fourteen Commonalties, and afterwards never ſeek to go beyond that: for being come to thoſe terms, that they think they are able to defend themſelves againſt every one, they deſire no greater power, as well becauſe neceſſity does not bind them to have greater force; as alſo becauſe they underſtand not any great profits that ariſe from ſuch like purchaſes, for the cauſes formerly alledged: for then of neceſſity they muſt either go on forward to make themſelves allyes, and ſo the multitude would make a confuſion; or els to make them their ſubjects: and becauſe they ſee herein many difficulties, and no great advantage in holding them, they make no account of them. Whereupon, when they have attaind to ſuch greatneſs, that they think they may live ſecure, they apply themſelves to two things; the one to entertain others in their protection, and undertake their defences, and by theſe means to draw money from every part, which they can very eaſily divide among one another, and the other to ſerve in the wars under another, and to take pay of this or that Prince, who gives them wages for their ſervice, as now adayes the Switzers do, and as we read, thoſe we ſpoke of before did, whereof Titus Livius bears witneſs, where he ſayes, that when Philip King of Macedon came to a parley with Titus Quintius Flamminius, to treat an accord in preſence of a Prercur of the Aetolians, the ſaid Pretour comming to ſome words with Philip; was reproved by him for avarice and infidelity, ſaying, that the Ae • olians were not aſhamed to take pay and ſerve in the wars on both ſides, ſo that many times their enſignes were ſeen in two contrary Armies. We know withall, that this manner of proceeding by Leagues hath bin alwayes alike, and hath prodec'd the ſame effects. We ſee alſo, that that way of making people become ſubjects hath bin alwaies weak, and brought forth but ſmall advantages; and when they have exceeded the due mean, they have gone to ruine, And if this courſe of making Subjects, be unprofitable in warlike Commonwealths, ſurely in thoſe that are diſordered, it muſt needs be far worſe, as in our daies have bin the Republiques of Italy. Wherefore we find that to be the true way, which the Romans held, which is the rather to be admired, in ſomuch as there was no other example thereof before that of Rome, nor ſince hath bin any that hath imitated it. And touching the leagues, there are the Switzers onely & the Swevian league that follows them. And, as in the concluſion of this matter ſhall be ſaid, ſo many orders obſerv'd by the Romans, as well concerning the affairs within the City, as thoſe without, in theſe our times are not onely not followed, but made no account of; ſome of them are deem'd untrue, ſome unpoſſble, others nothing to purpoſe, or unprofitable: ſo that whiles we ſtand ſtill in this ignorance, we become a prey to any that invades our Countrey. And though it ſhould ſeem difficult to imitate the Romans, yet ought it not ſeem ſo, to follow the ſteps of the ancient Tuſcans, eſpecially to the Tuſcans now living: for though they were not able for the reaſons alledged, to make themſelves an Empire like that of Rome, yet could they gain them that power in Italy, that their manner of proceeding would permit them, which for a long time was with great glory of their rule, and wars, and with exceeding great commendation of their manners and religion. Which power and glory was firſt abated by the French, and afterwards quite put out by the Romans, and ſo put out, that of this power, which two thouſand years ſince was very great, at this preſent we have no memory left. Which hath made me muſe, what the cauſe is that matters are thus forgotten, whereof in the Chapter following we ſhall treat.

TO thoſe Philoſophers, who would have made men beleeve that the world is eternal, I think one might have replyed, that if ſuch antiquity were true, it would be conſequent, that we ſhould have ſome notice of more then five thouſand years time paſt, being that it is not apparent, how the remembrances of times by ſeveral occaſions were aboliſh'd. Whereof part proceeds from men, and part from heaven. Thoſe that proceed from men, are the changes of ſects and tongues: for when a new ſect begins, that is, a new religion, the firſt endeavor, to gain it ſelf reputation, is, to blot out the memory of the old; and when it ſo falls out, that the founders of the new ſect are of a different language, they eaſily extinguiſh it: which thing is known, by conſidering the waies, which the Chriſtian Religion uſed againſt the Sect of the Gentiles, whereby it hath cancel'd all their orders and ceremonies, and defac't the whole remembrance * This is all calumny; for we find not that any have preſerv'd the records of learning more than the Chriſtians, however much intermixt with Paganiſine. I take it that that theſe memorials were laſt in the vaſt deluges of the Vandals, Goths, and Hunns, who themſelves being barbarous and ignorant, envyed others learning; and therefore deſtroyd all the regiſters of antiquity they could find: which our Author injuriouſly imputes to the Chriſtians, being that they time out of minde, have caus'd thoſe books to be taught the youth in their ſchools and we find that the moſt eſteemd Fathers in the Church were adorn'd with that learning, which they are raxed to have perſecuted; which ſerves alſo very neceſſarily for the better underſtanding and illuſtrating of Theology, and affords good arguments many times to our Divines for the conviction of the Gentiles out of their own writers. Nor do I find there was any other reſtraint in thoſe ſtudies, than that men were advis'd to apply themſelves ſoberly thereunto, as not being ſtudies to dwell in, but tending rather to the ſervice of Theology. of thatancient Theology. It is true, that they attaind not thorowly to wipe out the knowledge of the prime men thereof, which was occaſioned by their maintaining of the Latin tongue, to which they were forc't, being they were to write this new Law in it: for if they could have writ it in a new tongue, conſidering the other perſecutions they made againſt it, there would have bin no remembrance left of things paſt. And whoſoever reads what courſes St. Gregory took, and the other heads of the Chriſtian Religion, ſhall ſee with what obſtinacy they perſecuted all the ancient memorials, burning all the Poets and Hiſtorians works, defacing their images, and deſtroying every other thing that gave any lightwww. of that antiquity; ſo that if to this p • rſecution, they had added a new language, we ſhould have ſeen every thing in a ſhort time forgotten. It is very likely therefore that what the founders of the Chriſtian Religion did againſt the ſect of the Gentiles, they of Gentiliſ •• e had done formerly to the Sect that preceded it: and becauſe the ſects in a five or ſix thouſand years chance two or three times, the memory of things paſt before that time is utterly loſt. And though yet there remain ſome remembrance thereof, we take it as ſome fabulous thing, whereunto no man gives credit, as it befalls the ſtory written by Diodorus Siculus, in which though he gives account of a forty or fifty thouſand years, nevertheleſs is it eſteemed (and ſo I think it too) a falſe tail. As for the cauſes that proceed from heaven, they are ſuch as extinguiſh the race of mankind, and reduce to a ſmall number the inhabitants of part of the world; and this comes to paſs, either by peſtilence or famine, or by a deluge of waters; but that of moſt importance is this laſt, becauſe it is more univerſal, and becauſe thoſe that eſcape, are all ſuch as live among the mountains and are ſimple and ignorant people, who having no knowledge of antiquity, cannot derive it to their poſterity: and if among them any knowing man chance to eſcape, to gain himſelf, reputation and a name, he conceals it, and alters it at his own pleaſure, ſo that there is left to his ſucceſſors only ſo much as he hath bin pleas'd to commit to writing, and no more. And that theſe in undations, peſtilences, and famines ſometimes come, I beleeve there is no doubt, as well becauſe all hiſtories are full of them, as for that we ſee this effect of defacing the memory of things, as alſo becauie it accords well with reaſon that it is ſo: for nature, as in ſimple bodies, when there is gatherd together enough ſuperfluous matter, moves many times of it ſelf, and makes a purgation, which is the preſervation of that bodie; ſo it falls out in this mixt body of mankinde, that when all countries are ſtuffed with inhabitants, that they can neither live there, nor go otherwhere, becauſe all places are already poſſeſſed and repleniſh'd, and when the ſubtilty and wickedneſs of man is grown to that fulneſs it can attain to, it holds with reaſon, that of force the world be purged by one of theſe three waies, that men being become few, and having ſuffer'd much, may live with more convenience and grow better, whereupon it is nothing ſtrange, that, as it is aboveſaid, the Tuſcan nation in old time was very potent, full of Religion and vertue, had their own manners and their native tongue, which the power the Romans quite aboliſh'd, ſo that, as it is ſaid, onely their name remains ſtill in the memory of poſterity.

HAving diſcours'd, how the Romans proceeded in enlarging their State, we will now treat of their proceedings in making of war, and in every one of their actions it will appear with how great judgement, they left aſide the common way that others went, whereby they might more eaſily attain the higheſt pitch of greatneſs. The intention of that man, that makes war, either by election or by ambition, is to get, and keep what he hath gotten, and to proceed ſo there with, that he may enrich and not impoveriſh his own country. It is neceſſary for him then, both in getting and holding, to take a care not to diminiſh, but rather to augment the publique profit of his countrey. He that will do theſe things, muſt follow the way and courſe the Romans took, who at firſt made their wars great and ſhort; for comming into the field with huge armies, all the wars they had with the Latines, Samnites and Tuſcans, they diſpatcht in a very ſhort time: and if notice were exactly taken of all thoſe wars they made from the beginning of Rome, til the ſiege of Veium, we ſhould find they were all ended, one in ſix dayes, another in ten, and a third in ſome twenty dayes ſpace: for their cuſtome was this; ſo ſoon as ever they had diſcover'd the war, they preſently went out with their armies and fought with their enemies, who being overmaſter'd (to ſave their Countrey from ſpoil) yeilded to their conditions, and the Romans condemn'd them in loſs of ſome of their territories, and thoſe they turn'd to their private Profits, or beſtow'd them upon ſome Colony they ſent thither, which being ſeituate upon ſome Frontier of theirs, became Guardians of their confines, to the advantage of the inhabitants of that Colony, who had thoſe fields in poſſeſſion, and with the profit of the generality of Rome, that held this guard without expence. Nor could there be any way more aſſured, nor of more ſtrength or advantage: for til the enemy went into the field, this guard was ſufficient. And when they went forth ſtrong into the field to oppreſs that Colony, the Romans alſo went out with their forces, and join'd battel with them, wherein having got the day, they laid more heavy burdens on them, and ſo return'd home. Thus came they by little and little to great credit among them, and forces in themſelves. And this courſe held they alwaies, till they chang'd their manner of proceeding in war: which was after the ſiege of Vejum, where to enable them to make a long war they determined to pay the ſoldiers, whereas formerly, being that the wars were ſhort, there was no need to give them pay. And though the Romans gave pay, and that by vertue hereof they were able to make longer wars, and to make thoſe more remote, they were forc'd to ſtay longer in the field, yet did they never alter from their firſt order, to diſpatch them quickly, according to the time and place. Nor did they ever leave ſending of Colonies: for beſides their natural guiſe, the Conſuls ambition held them to their firſt cuſtome of making their wars ſhort; for being created but for a years time, and thereof to ſtay at home ſix moneths, they deſired to finiſh the war, that they might triumph. To ſend Colonies, the profit and great advantage they made thereof, ſtill prevail'd with them. They altered indeed ſomwhat touching the ſpoiles, whereof they were not ſo liberal, as in former times they had bin; becauſe they thought there was not ſo great need, the ſoldiers receiving their ſtipends; as alſo becauſe the ſpoiles being greater, they intended therewith ſo to fill the common treaſure, that they might not be conſtrain'd upon any enterpriſe in hand to leavy monies upon the City. Which order in a very ſhort time much enrich'd their treaſury. Theſe two courſes then they took, about the dividing the ſpoiles, and ſending of Colonies, caus'd Rome to grow rich by the war, whereas other Princes and Republiques, if they find that means to releeve themſelves, become impoveriſhd; ſo that it came to this at laſt, that a Conſul thought he might not triumph unleſs he brought much gold and ſilver and ſpoils of every kind into the treaſury: Thus the Romans by their above written waies, ſometimes by making a quick end of the wars, otherwhiles by drawing them out at length with diſcomfitures and invaſions and treaties to their advantage, grew alwaies more mighty.

BY what parcels the Romans did divide the land among them, I beleeve it is hard to find out the truth, becauſe I think they beſtow'd on them more or leſs, according to the places, whether they ſent the Colonies; and it is credible, howſoever the caſe went, and whether ſoever they were ſent, the allowance was but ſmall. Firſt to the end they might be able to ſend the more men thither, they being intruſted with the guard of that countrey. Beſides, becauſe they living ſparingly at home, it agrees not with reaſon, that they would allow their men, where wiſhall to abound much abroad And Titus Livius ſayes, that, Terna jugera & ſeptunnces viritim diviſe • ant when they had taken Veium, they ſent a Colony thither, and to each man they gave three acres and a half and a twelfth part. For beſides the things above written, they judge it was not the quantity of the land that ſuppli'd their wants, but the well c •• tiating of it. And moreover it is very neceſſary, that the whole Colony have fields in common, were every one may freely feed his cattel, and woods from whence to fetch fuell for firing, without which a Colony cannot well ſubfiſt.

Seeing that we have formerly diſcours'd of the manner of proceeding in war which the Romans us'd, and how the Tuſcans were aſſail'd by the French, me thinks it were not much from the matter, to ſhew, that there are two ſorts of war made. The one is through the ambitions of Princes, or Commonwealths, who indeavor the inlargement of their dominions; ſuch as were the wars of Alexander the Great, and the Romans, and ſuch as now adayes every Prince and Potentate makes one with another. Which wars are dangerous indeed, but yet they do not wholly chaſe the inhabitants out of a countrey; for the Conqueror is contented onely with the obedience of nations, and moſt commonly ſuffers them to live under their own Laws, and enjoy their own goods in their own houſes. The other kind of war is, when the whole people with all their families, riſe from a place, forced either by famine or war, and goe to ſeek a new habitation and new Countrey, not out of ambition to command, as the others, but to poſſeſs it by themſelves, and to drive thence or deſtroy the ancient inhabitants thereof. This kind of war is very cruel and terrible: And touching theſe wars, Saluſt ſpeaks in the end of the Jugurthin, where he ſayes, that when Jugurth was overcome, the French were perceived to ſtir, who then came into Italy: and there he relates, that the people of Rome fought with all other Nations for rule and command, but with the French every one fought for his life and ſafety: For it ſufficeth a Prince or Commonwealth that aſſails a Countrey, to deſtroy onely thoſe that command, whereas theſe populations muſt make a general deſtruction, being that they will live upon that, which formerly ſuſtained others. The Romans had three ſeveral wars of theſe, exceeding dangerous. The firſt was that when Rome was taken, which was ſeis'd on by thoſe Frenchmen, that (as is above ſaid) had taken Lombardy from the Tuſcans, and ſeated themſelves there; whereof Titus Livius alledges two reaſons; The firſt, as we ſaid before, is, that they were allur'd by the pleaſantneſs of the fruits and the wines of Italy, whereof they had ſcarcity in France: the ſecond, that the people in France being exceedingly multiplyed, the Countrey could not ſeed them, whereupon the Princes of thoſe places thought it fit, that part of them ſhould goe to ſeek ſome new habitation, and that reſolution being taken, they choſe for Captains of them that were to depart, Belloveſſus, and Sicoveſſus, two French Kings, whereof Belloveſſus came into Italy, and Sicoveſſus went into Spain. Upon the paſſage of which Belloveſſus follow'd the ſeiſure of Lombardy, and thereupon the war, which firſt the French made againſt Rome. Next this was that, they made after the firſt Carthaginian war, when between Piombin and Piſa they ſlew more then hundred thouſand, French. The third was, when the Germans and Cimbrians came into Italy, who having overcome ſeveral Roman Armies, were ſubdu'd by Marius. The Romans then maſterd theſe three very perilous wars, nor was there need of leſs valor than theirs to overcome them: for we ſee, how that after the valor of the Romans faild, and their armies loſt their ancient vertue, that Empire was ruind by ſuch like people, as the Goths, Vandalls, and ſuch others, who poſſeſsd themſelves of the whole weſtern Empire. Such people come out of their own Countreys, as is above ſaid, compell'd thereto by neceſſity, which neceſſity proceeds either from famine, or from ſome war and oppreſſion inflicted on them in their own Countreys. So that they are conſtraind to ſeek new habitations. And theſe either are in great multitudes, and then they break with violence into others countreys, deſtroy the Inhabitants, poſſeſs their goods, make a new Kingdome, and change the name of the country, as Moſes did, and thoſe people likewiſe that ſeiz'd upon the Romane Empire; for theſe new names, that are in Italy, and in the other Provinces, grew from nothing elſe, than that they were ſo named by their new Lords. As is Lombardy now, which was called Gallia Ciſalpina; France was called Gallia Tranſalpina, and now is named of the French; for ſo were thoſe people called, that made themſelves maſters of it. Sclavonia was called Illyrium; Hungary, Pannonia; England, Brittanny; and many other Countreys, that have changed their names, which it would be too long to recite. Moſes allſo called that part of Syria, which he made himſelf maſter of, Jury. And, becauſe I have formerly ſaid, that ſome people are driven out of their own habitations by war, whereupon they are forc'd to ſeek a new, where to ſeat themſelves, I will alleage an example to that purpoſe, of the Mauruſians, ancientiy a people of Syria; Who having notice of the Hebrews comming, and thinking they could not reſiſt them, thought it better to leave their Countrey, than in ſtriving to ſave that, loſe themſelves; And ſo riſing thence with their families, they went into Affrique, where they ſate down, driving out the Inhabitants they found in thoſe places. And ſo they, who could not defend their own Countrey, could yet take that of others from them. And Procopius, who writes of the war, that Bellifarius made with the Vandals, that poſſeſſed themſelves of Affrique, reports that he read Letters written in certain pillars, in thoſe parts where theſe Mauruſians did inhabite, thus ſaying, Nos Mauruſij, qui fugimus a facie Ieſu latronis filij Navae. We are Mauruſians who fled from the face of Jeſu the robber, who was Son of Nave. Where the occaſion of the departure of theſe people out of Syria plainly appears; wherefore theſe people are very terrible, when they are driven out by extream neceſſity, and unleſs they be encountred by puiſſant forces, cannot be ſtopd: but when thoſe that are conſtraind to abandon their Countrey are not very numerous, there is no ſuch danger of them, as of thoſe people we ſpoke, becauſe they cannot uſe ſuch violence, but ought rather by ſome ſtratagem, make themſelves maſters of ſome ſtrong place, and therein being ſetled, keep it by making of friends and allies; as we ſee Aeneas did with Dido, the Maſſilians and others, who all by agreement with their neighbors, where they once ſet themſelves down, were able to continue. The people that goe forth in the greateſt multitudes, and thoſe alſo that have gone forth, almoſt all came out from thoſe parts of Scythia, cold, and poore Countries, where, becauſe there are men in abundance, and the Country of that condition, that it cannot feed them all, they are compeld to goe forth, having many cauſes to drive them out, and nothing to keep them in. And if now for theſe five hundred years it hath not happend, that any of theſe nations have made an inundation upon any Countrey, it hath proceeded from ſeveral reaſons. The firſt is, the great evacuation that Countrey made in the declining of the Empire, they having ſince ſent out huge ſwarms more than thirty ſeveral times: the ſecond is, becauſe Germany, and England, from whence theſe people came, have their Countries well mended, ſo that they are able to live there, with better conveniency; and thereupon not neceſſitated to change their ſeat. On the other ſide, theſe men being very warli • , are as it were a Bulwark againſt the Scythians, who border upon them, to keep them within their confines and territories: and many times there chance great riſings among the Tartars, who are kept in by the Hungarians and Polacks: who vaunt, and not without reaſon, that were it not for their forces, Italy and the Church had often felt the weight of the Tartars Armies. And this ſhall ſuffice, touching thoſe forenam'd peoples.

BEcauſe every one can begin a warre at his owne pleaſure, but not end it, a Prince ſhould before he undertake an enterpriſe, meaſure his owne forces, and order himſelfe according to them; he ſhould alſo have ſo much judgement, that he deceive not himſelfe with the conceit of his owne forces; and he ſhall alwayes be ſure to be deceiv'd when he meaſures them, either by the ſcituation, or by the good will of men towards him, his owne proper forces on the other ſide fayling him: for the things aforeſayd may increaſe well thy forces, though give thee them they cannot; and by themſelves alone they are of on worth, nor nothing avayle without the helpe of Souldiers fathfull to thee: for great ſtore of treaſure ſerves to no purpoſe without that; nor the ſtrength of thy Country, neither doth the faithfulneſſe nor good will of men laſt; for theſe cannot be faithfull to thee, thou not having force to defend them. Every mountaine, every lake, every unacceſſible place is made plaine, where the ſtrong defendants are wanting. Nay rather moneys are ſo far from defending thee, that they expoſe thee for a prey. Nor is there any thing more falſe than that common opinion that affirmes Moneys to be the ſinews of warre, which ſentence was firſt given by Q. Curtius, in the warre betweene Antipater the Macedonian, and the King of Sparta; Where he relates, that for want of moneys, the King of Spar • a was forc'd to fight, and was broken whereas if he had deferd the battell a few dayes, newes had come into Greece of Alexanders death, where he had remaind conqueror without combat. But his treaſure fayling, and he doubting his Armie would leave him for want thereof, was conſtraind to hazard the battell; whereupon Q Curtius ſayes, that moneys are the firews of war; which ſentence is alledgd every day, and followd too by ſome Princes, not quite ſo wiſe as they ſhould be: for making this their ground, they beleeve, that this is able to defend them, if they have treaſure enough; and never conſider, that if treaſure were of force to overcome, that Darius would have conquerd Alexander, the Greekes maſterd the Romanes, and in our dayes the Duke Charles ſubdu'd the Swiſſers, and not long time ſince the Pope and the Florentins together would have found no difficultie in overcomming Francis Maria nephew of Pope Julius the ſecond in the warre of Orbin. But all theſe above nam'd, were overcome by thoſe who eſteemd not mony, but good Souldiers the ſinews of warre. Among other things, that Croeſus King of Lydia ſhewd to Solon the Athenian, was a treaſure unmeaſurable, and asking him what he thought of his power, Solon anſwerrd him, he thought him no whit the more powerfull for that; for warre was made with iron and not with gold, and ſome one might come, who had more iron than be, and take his gold from him. Moreover, when after the death of Alexander the Great, a vaſt multitude of French paſſ'd over into Greece, and after into Aſia, the French ſending Ambaſſadours to the King of Macedon to treate ſome accord, that King to ſhew them his power, and to fright them, let them ſee his treaſure, where was much gold and ſilver, whereupon theſe French, who had in a manner concluded a firme peace, brake t; their deſire grew ſo great then to take his gold from him: and ſo was that King deſpoyld for that which he had gatherd together to defend him. The Venetians alſo, a few yeares ſince, having their treaſury full of coyne, loſt their whole State, being not able to defend themſelves thereby. Wherefore I ſay, that gold as the common opinion cryes it up, is not the ſinewes of warre, but a good Armie of ſlour Souldiers; for gold is not ſufficient to finde good Souldiers, but good Souldiers are able well to finde our gold. As for the Romanes (if they would have waged warre by moneyes rather tha with the ſword) the treaſure of the world, conſidering their vaſt undertakings, and the great difficulties they had therein, would not have ſervd their turnes. But they making their warres with the ſword, never found ſcarcitie of gold; for they had it in abundance brought even into their Camps by thoſe that ſtood in feare of them. And if that Spartan King for want of money, were to hazard the fortune of a battell, that befell him upon the matter of moneys, which many times hath chanc'd upon other occaſions: for it hath been often ſeene, that when an Armie wants proviſion of victualls, and is neceſſitated either to ſamiſh or ſight, uſually they make choyce to fight, becauſe it is greater honour, and where in ſome ſort Fortune hath in her power to ſavour thee. Moreover, it hath often come to paſſe, that a Commander perceiving ſuccours comming to his enemies Armie, muſt either fight with them quickly, and make tryall of the chance of battell, or expecting the i • groſſing of the Armie, come at length to fight perforce upon many diſadvantages. Beſides, it hath been ſeene, as it befell Aſdruball, when in the Mar • hes he was aſſ • ulted by Claudius Nero, together with the other Romane Conſull, that when a Captaine is necſſtated either to fly or fight, he alwayes makes choyce to fight; thinking by this bargaine, though exceeding hazardous, he may gaine; but in that other he muſt needs loſe in any caſe. There are therefore many neceſſities that can force a Captaine beyond what he intended, to reſolve to put it to a battell, among which ſometimes may happen the ſcarcitie of moneys, though not therefore ſhould wee eſteeme moneyes to be the ſinews of warre rather, than other things, which bring men into the like neceſſities. Wee may therefore reſolve the queſtion, that money is not the ſinews of warre, but good Souldiers rather. It is true, moneys are neceſſary in the ſecond place, but it is ſuch a neceſſitie, which good Souldiers themſelves may overcome: for it it as impoſſible that good Souldiers ſhould lack money, as by moneys alone to produce good Souldiers. What we here averre, every Hiſtory ſhews us to be true in many places, notwithſtanding that Pericles perſwaded the Athenians to make warre with a • l Peloponneſus, declaring, that they might overcome that warre with induſtry and by force of money; and though in that warre the Athenians ſometimes proſpeed, yet at laſt they loſt it, and the advice, and good Souldiers of Sparta prevayld more, than the induſtry and money of Athens. But Titus Livius gives us a better teſtimony for this opinion then any one elſe, where diſcourſing of Alexander the Great, whether if he had come into Italie, he had been able to vanquiſh the Romans, he ſhews there three things neceſſary in the warre; a great number of Souldiers, & thoſe good, wiſe Commanders, and good fortune: where examining, whether eyther the Romanes or Alexander excelld herein, at length he concludes, without making any mention of moneys. The Capuans, when they were requird by the Sidicins, to take Armes in their behalfe againſt the Samnites, ſhould not have meaſurd their power by their treaſure, but by their good Souldiers: for by taking that courſe they tooke to aſſiſt them, after two overthrowes, to ſave themſelves, they were forc'd to become tributaries to the Romanes.

TItus Livius having a purpoſe to ſhew the Sidicins errour in relying upon the Capuans aid, and the Capuans errour alſo in beleeving they were able to defend them, could not expreſſe it in more lively termes then theſe, The Capuans contributed to the Campani magis nomen in auxilium ſidiciorum, quam vires ad praeſidium attulerunt. Sidicins ayd, rather more reputation then forces. Where we may obſerve, that thoſe leagues that are made with Princes, who have not either the commodity to aſſiſt thee by reaſon of the diſtance of place, or forces to do it, becauſe of ſome diſorder of their owne at home, or for ſome other occaſion, add rather reputation to them that truſt in them, then any ſtrength to their party: as in our dayes it befell the Florentines, when in the yeare 1479. the Pope and the King of Naples aſſayl'd them: who being allyes of the King of France, drew from that allyance more reputation to their ſide, then ſafe guard: as likely enough it would befall that Prince now, who under Maximilian the Emperours protection ſhould undertake any enterpriſe: for this is one ſort of thoſe allyances, which bring more fame then advantage, as here in this text is alledg'd, that of the Capuans brought the Sidicins. Therefore in this point the Capuans committed an errour, in eſteeming their owne forces greater then they were. And ſo ſometimes the ſmall diſcretion men have, cauſes them when they neither know how, nor have the meanes to defend themſelves, to take upon them the protections of others which the Tarentines alſo did: who, when the Roman army was going to joyne battell with that of the Samnites, ſent their Ambaſſadours to the Roman Conſul, to let him underſtand that they will'd there ſhould be peace betweene thoſe two people; and how that otherwiſe they ſhould make warre againſt the party that ſhould refu • e it. So that the Conſul ſcoffing at this propoſition, caus'd the triumphs to ſound in preſence of their ten Ambaſſadours, and ſo made his army march towards the enemy, ſhewing the Tarentins by his deeds and not by words what anſwer they deſerv'd. And having now diſcours'd in this Chapter againſt ſome courſes Princes take amiſſe for others defence, I will in that that followes ſpeake touching thoſe they take for their owne defence.

I Have heard it diſputed ſometimes by men well practis'd in military diſcipline, if there be two Princes neare of equal force, and the one that is the more reſolute have proclaim'd warre againſt the other, which were the beſt courſe for that other, either to attend quietly in his owne confines whiles his enemy come upon him, or elſe to goe finde him at home, and there aſſaile him. And I have heard them alledge arguments on both ſides; and thoſe that argue for this going to aſſaile him, produce the counſell that Croeſus gave Cyrus, when being arriv'd upon the borders of the Meſſagetes to make warre againſt them, their Queene Thomyris ſent him word, that he ſhould take his choice, either to enter into her kingdom where ſhe would awaite him, or if he would rather that ſhe ſhould come and ſi • nde him in his owne. And when the matter came to diſpute, Croeſus advis'd againſt the opinion of the reſt, to goe & ſeeke her in her owne country; urging that otherwiſe if he overcame her farre from her owne confines, he could not take her kingdome from her, becauſe ſhe would have time to repaire her loſſes; but if he conqur'd her within her owne territories, he might purſue her juſt upon her ſlight; & ſo giving her no time of recovery, take the ſtate from her. Moreover they alledge the advice that Hanniball gave Antiochus, when that King had a purpoſe to make warie againſt the Romans, where he ſhewes how the Romans could not be overcome but in Italy; for there another might availe himſelfe of their armes, their wealth, and their friends alſo. But whoſoever fought with them out of Italy, leaving Italy free to them, left them that ſtrength, that never would want life to give them freſh ſupplies at all occaſions. And concluded, that it was eaſier to take Rome from them, then the Empire; and Italy, rather than their other provinces. Agathocles alſo is alleadg'd, who not being able to ſupport the war at home, aſſail'd the Carthaginians, who then had made warre againſt him, and brought them to aske peace. The example of Scipio is likewiſe urg'd, who to take the warre out of Italy, aſſail'd Affricke. They that maintaine the contrary, ſay, that he that would bring his enemy to deſtruction, ſhould withdraw him from home. The Athenians are brought for example, who while they made a convenient warre at their owne homes, remain'd victors: but when they departed out of their country, and tranſported their army into S • cily, they quite loſt their liberty. They alledge the poeticall ſables withall, where it is ſhew'd, how that Anteus King of Lybia aſſail'd by Egyptian Hercules was inſuperable, whiles he ſtaid for him within the confines of his owne Kingdome, but when by Hercules ſubtilty he was trained out of it, he loſt both ſtate and life. Whereby occaſion was given to the fable of Anteus, that while he was upon the ground, he recovered forces from his Mother, which was the ground, which Hercules perceiving, took him up in his armes, and held him from the earth. Moderne advices alſo are alledged; every one knowes that Ferdinand King of Naples was in his dayes held a very wiſe Prince; and ſome two years before his death fame flying, that Charles the eight then King of France had a determination to come and aſſail him, after he had made much preparation fell ſick, when on his death-bed, among other memorials he left his ſonne Alphonſus, was this alſo, that he ſhould attend his enemies comming within his Countrey, and upon no caſe ſhould dr • w any of his forces out of his ſtate, but ſhould await them within his own confines with his ſtrength entire. Which was not followed by him, but there was an army ſent into Romania, which without any combat, loſt both it ſelf and the ſtate. The arguments, which beſides the things aboveſaid, are brought on each ſide, are theſe; that he, that aſſailes, comes on with more courage, then he that attends, which gives the army more confidence: Beſides this, it takes away from the enemy divers conveniencies of being able to make uſe of what is his own; for he cannot help himſelf upon thoſe ſubjects, whoſe houſes have firſt bin ſackt and their goods pillaged: and for having the enemy in the houſe; the Prince is conſtrained to take more care how he wrings money from them, and vexes them: ſo that he comes to dry that fountain, as Hannibal ſayes, which furniſhes, him with means to ſuſtain the war. To this may be added, that the ſouldiers being in a forrain countrey, are forced to fight, and of that neceſſity makes a vertue, as we have often ſaid; on the other ſide, they ſay, when one awaits his enemy, he does it with much advantage: for without any diſcommodity to thy ſelf thou art able to give thine enemy much trouble to come by his proviſions, and other neceſſaries belonging to an army. Thou canſt alſo better hinder his deſigns, becauſe thou knoweſt the countrey better then he. Thou canſt alſo incounter him with more forces, becauſe there they may eaſily be united, which thou canſt not draw all from home. Thou canſt alſo being routed, recover thy ſelf with more eaſe, becauſe many of thy army will ſave themſelves, in that they have their places of refuge near, as well becauſe the ſupplies are not to come from far; thou bringſt to the hazzard all thy forces, and not all thy fortune; whereas parting thence thou hazzardſt all thy fortune with but a part of thy forces. And ſome there have bin who the better to weaken their enemie, ſuffer him to enter many dayes journies into their countrey, and take divers townes, to the end that leaving gatriſons in all of them, he may weaken his army, and ſo they may afterwards fight with him at more ods. But to give my opinion herein what I think, I beleeve, this diſtinction is to be made; Either my countrey is armed, as was that of the Romans, or that of the Switzers is, or it is diſarmed as that of the Carthaginians was, or elſe that of the King of France, or the Italians countrey is. In this caſe the enemy is to be kept off from comming in, becauſe thy advantage than conſiſts in thy revenue, and not in thy men, ſo that whenſoever the current thereof is cut off from thee, thou art quite ſpoil'd; nor doth any thing ſo much hinder thee, as the war within thy doores. The Carthaginians yeeld us evident examples hereof, who, whiles they had their own home free, were able with their revenue to make war againſt the Romans, which, when it was aſſaild, could not ſupply them againſt Agathocles. The Florentines had not any remedy againſt Caſtruccius Lord of • ucca, becauſe he warr'd with them in their owne country, ſo that they were faine, for their defence, to yeeld themſelves to Robert King of Naples. But Caſtruccius being dead, the ſame Florentines had the courage to aſſail the Duke of Milan at his owne home, and wrought ſo far as to take his countrey from him; ſo much valor ſhew'd they in forrain wars, and ſuch cowardiſe in their domeſtick. But when countries are armed, as that of Rome was, and as the Switzers are, the nearer thou commeſt to them, the harder they are to vanquiſh; for theſe bodies are able to bring together more forces to reſiſt a ſuddain violence, then they are to, aſſail an enemy abroad. Neither in this caſe does the authority of Hanniball move me, becauſe his paſſion, and his own intereſt, made him ſay ſo to Antiochus; • r if • h • Romans had in that ſpace of time received thoſe three routs in France, which they had in Italy by Hanniball, without doubt they had bin quite undone: for then they could not have helped themſelves by the remainders of their armies, nor could they have had thoſe conveniencies to repair their loſſes, nor made head againſt their enemies with ſuch ſtrength as they did. We never find, that to afſail any countrey they ſent out an army paſſing the number of 50000. But to defend themſelves at home againſt the French after the firſt Punicke war, they armed eighteen hundred thouſand men. Nor could they afterwards defeat them in Lombardy, as they did in Tuſcany: becauſe againſt ſo great a maltitude of enemies, they had never been able to draw ſo great forces ſo far out, nor fight with them upon the like advantage. The Cimbrians broke an army of the Romans in Germany, nor could the Romans any way help themſelves. But when they came into Italy, that they once united their forces together, they preſently diſpatched them. The Switzers it is eaſy to vanquiſh our of their own Countrey, whether they cannot ſend above thirty or forty thouſand men: but to overcome them at home, where they are able to make a body of a hundred thouſand men, is exceeding difficult. I conclude therefore anew, that that Prince, who hath his people armed and addreſt for war, may alwaies well expect a mighty and dangerous war at his own home, neither let him goe to meet it. But he, whoſe ſubjects are unarmed, and his countrey unaccuſtomed to war, let him alwaies keep it as far from home as he can. And ſo the one and the other, each in their degree, will better defend themſelves.

WEE often ſee that humility does not onely not help, but hurt ſome times, eſpecially when it is uſed towards inſolent men; who either for envie or ſome other occaſion, have conceiv'd hatred againſt thee. Whereof our Hiſtorian gives us good teſtimony in this occaſion of war between the Romans and the Latins: for the Samnites complaining to the Romans, that the Latins had aſſaild them, the Romans would not yet forbid the Latins that war, being deſirous nor any way to incenſe them. Whereby they did not onely not incenſe them, but made them become more inſolent towards them, ſo that they ſooner diſcover'd themſelves enemies, whereof the words us'd Tentaſtis patientiam, negando militem; quis dubitat exarſiſſe eos? Pertulerunt tamen hunc doloren; exercitus nos parare adverſus Samnites faeritos ſuos audierunt nec moy erunt 〈◊〉 ab • urbe; unde laec illi • nanra modeſtia niſi conſcientia virium & noſtrarum & ſuarum? by the forenamed: Latin Pretour, Annlus in the ſame aſſembly, give good proof, ſaying: Te tryed their patience in refuſing them ſouldiers; who doubts but they were angry, yet this diſgrace have they ſufferd: they have heard we prepare an armie againſt the Samnites their allyes; nor for this ſtirred they one foot out of the City: and whence came this modeſty of theirs think ye, but from their knowledge as well of your Forces as their own? And therefore hereby we plainly ſee, how much the Romans patience increaſed the Latines arrogance. Wherefore a Prince ſhould never agree to deſcend a whit from his ra • ck, not ever let goe any thing upon accord, if he have a minde to leave it honorably, but onely then when he is able, or when he thinks alſo he is able to maintain it: for it is better for the moſt part (the matter being brought to ſuch termes, that thou canſt not let it goe in the manner above ſaid) to let it be taken from thee by force, rather than by fear of forces: for it thou letteſtit goe for fear, thou doeſt it to free thy ſelf from war, which moſt commonly it will not doe; for he to whom with ſuch open cowa • diſe thou haſt yeelded this, will not there with reſt ſatiſfi'd, but take other things from thee alſo, and will the rather be incited againſt thee, in that he values thee leſs; when likewiſe on the other ſide, thou ſhalt finde thy friends more ſlack in thy defence, eſteeming thee either weak or cowardly. But if thou forthwith upon diſcovery of thy enemies intent, getteſt thy forces in a readineſs, howſoever they be inferior to his, he will begin to make account of thee, as alſo will other Princes thy neighbours abou thee, ſo that ſome there will be who will have a minde to ayd thee (thou being in armes) who, if thou hadſt abandon'd thy ſelf, would never have ſtruck ſtroke for thee. This is meant, when thou haſt but one enemy. But in caſe thou haſt more, thou ſhalt do very wiſely, to render what thou haſt belonging to any one of them for to regain him to thee, notwithſtanding the war be diſcoverd, that thou mayeſt take him aſunder from the other confederates thine enemies.

IN this very ſame matter, and in the ſame beginnings of the War between the Latins and the Romans, we may obſerve, that in every conſultation it is good to come to the particular of that which is to be deliberated on, and not to ſtay long in doubt, and upon the uncertainty of a thing. Which is manifeſt in the conſultation the Latins made, when they thought to quit themſelves of the Romans: for the Romans having had ſome ſent of this ill humour that had poſſeſſed the Latins, to be aſcertained of the maſter, and to try if without armes they could regain thoſe people, gave order they ſhould ſend eight Citizens to Rome, to the end they might adviſe with them. The Latins, underſtanding this, and being conſcious to themſelves of many things done contrary to the will of the Romans, called an aſſembly together, to appoint who ſhould go to Rome, and to give them order what they ſhould Ad ſumma rerum noſtrarum pertinere arbitror, ut cogitetis magis quid agendum nobis quam quid loquendum ſit; facile erit explicatis conſillis, accommodate • ebs verba. ſay. And Annius their Pretour being in the aſſembly during this diſpute, utter'd theſe words: The ſum of our affairs is, as I take it, that ye ſhould adviſe rather what we ſhould do, than what we ſhould ſay; for it is an eaſy matter, when things are once reſolved on, to put them into fit termes. Without queſtion theſe words are moſt true, and ought to be reliſhed by every Prince, and every Commonwealth: for during the uncertainly and doubt of that which a man will do, there is no man knowes what he ſhould ſay: but when the mind is once ſetled and reſolved of what is to be done, words to the purpoſe eaſily follow. I have the more willingly noted this paſſage, by reaſon that many times I have known that ſuch doubt hath much wrong'd publick actions, even to the loſs and diſgrace of our Republike. And it ſhall ever come to paſs, that, in doubtfull caſes, and where there is need of judgement to deliberate, this reſolution ſhall be when they are to be adviſed, and deliberated on by weak man. No leſs hurtfull alſo are ſlick and ſlow conſultations, than theſe ambigu • us, eſpecially thoſe that are to be taken in favour of any friend; for ſlowneſs helps no body, and hurts ones ſelf. Theſe reſolutions ſo taken, proceed either from weakneſs of courage, or forces, or from their malignity that ſhould reſolve, who guided by their own paſſtors, to ruine a State, and to fulfill ſome deſire of their own, ſ • ff • r not the conſultation to goe forward, but rather hinder and croſs it. For good Citizens, though they perceive the whole ſtream of the people to run the more dangerous way, yet will they never hinder the delibaration, being that thoſe affairs attend not time. When Jerome the Tyrant in Syraacuſa was dead, there being a great war between the Carthaginians, and the Romans, the Syracuſians put it to queſtion, which allyance they ſhould take, the Roman or Carthaginian; and ſuch was the eagerneſs of the parties, that the matter remain'd in doubt, and they took to neither ſide, til' that Apollonides one of the cheif men in Syracufia, in a very diſcreet Oration of his, ſhewed that they were not to be blam'd that adviſed to adhere to the Romans, nor they that would take part with the Carthaginians, but rather that irreſolution and ſlowneſs in taking to any ſide was deteſtable; for he ſaw fully in that ambiguity the ruine of the Republique. But were it that the party were once made, on which ſide ſoe'r it were, a • man might conceive ſome good hopes upon it. Nor could Titus Livius more fully ſhew, than in his part he does, the harme which this hanging in ſuſpence drawes after it. He makes it plain alſo in this caſe of the Latins; for the Lavinians being ſought to by them for ayd againſt the Romans, put off the reſolut on of it ſo long, that when they were juſt going forth of the town to give ſuccors to them, news came that the Latins were defeated. Whereupon their Pretour Milonius ſaid, We ſhall pay • ear to the Romans for this little way we have gone: for if at firſt they had reſolv'd either to help, or not to help the Latins, not helping them they had not given offence to the Romans; but helping them, had their aid, come in time, with the addition of their Forces, they might have gain'd them the victory; but by delay loſs came every way, as it befell them. And had the Florentines obſerv'd this well, they had never receiv'd ſo many dammages nor troubles by the French, as they had in Lewis the twelfths paſſage into Italy againſt Lodowicke Duke of Milan: for the King treating of ſuch a paſſage, ſought the Florentines for their conſent; and their Agents that were with the King, agreed with him, to ſtand neuters, and that the King comming into Italy, ſhould maintain them in their State, and receive them into his protection, and gave the City a moneths time to ratifie this. Which ratification was delayd by ſome, who in their little wiſdome favour'd Duke Lodowicks affairs, til that the King was even upon the point of victory, when the Florentines offering the ratification, it would not be accepted by the King, who knew the Florentines came by force, and not willingly to his friendſhip. Which the City of Florence was to buy out dear, and like enough to have loſt the ſtate, as afterwards another time upon the like accident it chanc'r. And ſo much the worſe was the courſe they took; for it was of no advantage to Duke Lodowicke, who if he had bin victour, would have ſhewed more diſpleaſure againſt them, than did the King. And though touching the miſchief this weakneſs brings upon a Republique, we have formerly ſpoken in another Chapter; yet upon a new occaſion offerd by a new accident, I had a minde to repeat it thinking it very ſpecially a matter worthy to be noted by all Republiques like unto ours.

THe Romans fought not a battel in any war they undertook with any Nation, of greater importance than this with the Latins, in Torquatus and Decius his Conſulſhip: for in all reaſon it had followed, that as the Latins by loſing it became Subjects, the Romans ſhould have undergone the ſame condition, had not they got the maſt • ry; and of this opinion is Titus Livius: for on each part he makes the Armies equal for their order, valour, reſolution, and number; he makes there this difference only, that the Commanders of the Roman Army were of more valour than thoſe of the Latins. It appears alſo that in the ordering of this battel, there befell two accidents, the like whereof was never ſeen before, nor ſince have we had but rare examples following them: that of two Conſuls, to hold their Soldiers minds firm and obedient to their commands, and reſolute to fight, the one kill'd himſelf, the other his Son. The equality which Titus Livius ſayes in theſe two Armies, was, becauſe they had both ſerv'd in the wars a long time together; they uſed the • ame language, order, and armes: for in the ordering of their battel, they had the ſame manner, and their Troupes and the Captains of them had the ſame names; there was a neceſſity being they were of equal force and valour, that ſomething extraordinary ſhould happen, that could ſe • tle and fix the ones reſolution, rather than the others: in which (as otherwhere we have ſaid) conſiſts the victory: for while that laſts in the combarants hearts, the Armies never turne their backs. And to the end it might laſt the longer in the Romans breaſts than in the Latins, partly fortune, and partly the Conſùls valour were cauſe; for Torquatus killed his ſon, and Decius himſelf. Titus Livius, where he ſhews the equality of their forces, ſets downe the whole order the Romanes uſed in their Armies and in their battels. Which being that he relates at large, I will not rehearſe againe, but diſcourſe onely upon that I ſhall thinke remarkable, and which, becauſe it hath been neglected by all our Captaines of later times, hath been the occaſion of many diſorders in ſeverall Armyes stand battells. I ſay therefore, that out of Livius his words wee gather that the Romane Army had three principal diviſions, which in proper termes may be calld Squadrons; the firſt was of the Haſtati, the ſecond of the Prencipi, the third of the Triarij: and each of theſe had their horſemen. In the ordering of a battell, they plac't the Haſtati for moſt, in the ſecond place on the right ſide, upon the ſhoulders of thoſe the Prencipi were ſet, and in the third place yet in the ſame file, the riarij came. The horſe of all theſe ranks they plac't on the right hand and on the left of theſe three battells: which Squadrons of horſe from their formes and Places were call'd wings: becauſe they lookt like the two wings of that body. They rangd the firſt Squadron of the Haſtati, which was in front, in a manner cloſe ſhut together, that it might be able either to force upon, or ſuſtain the enemy. The ſecond Squadron of the Prencipi (becauſe it was not the firſt to fight, but was ordeind to ſuccour the for moſt, in caſe it was either beaten or driven backe) this they made not ſo compact together, but kept their ranks thinne, ſo that they might receive in to them without diſordering themſelves the firſt Squadron, whenſoever being preſt on by the enemy, they were forc't to retire. The third Squadron of the Triarij had their ranks yet thinner than the ſecond; that, if need were, they might receive the two former Squadrons of the Haſtati and Prencipi. The troupes then being all plac'd in this order, began the fight: and if the Haſtati were forc'd or overcome, they retir'd into the thinneſſe of the ranks of the Prencipi, and they united together, and having made of two battallions one body, undertooke the fight afreſh; and if theſe were beaten back and routed, they fell backe into the thinner rankes of the Triarij, and ſo all the battallions became one body, renewd the fight againe, where if they vanquiſhed, becauſe they had not other repayre, they loſt the day. And becauſe that alwayes when this laſt quadron of the Triarij came to try for it, the Army was in danger, thereupon grew his Proverb, Thematter came ſo farre as the Triarij. The Res redacta eſt ad Triatios. Commanders of our dayes, as they have abandoned all the other inſtructions, and follow nor in any part the ancient diſcipline, ſo have they quite neglected this part, which is of no ſmall importance: for he that ſo arrang • s his Armie, that in the fight he can three times repair himſelf, to loſe he muſt have fortune three times his enemy, and be to incounter a valour ſufficient to vanquiſh him. But he that ſtands onely on the firſt ſhock (as now our Chriſtian Armies doe) may eaſily loſe: for every little diſorder, or meane valour, is able to take from him the victory. That which makes our Armyes not able to recover themſelves three times, is, becauſe they have loſt the manner of receiving one Squadron within another: Which comes to paſſe, becauſe now adayes battells are rangd which one of theſe two diſorders; either they place their troupes at the ſhoulders the one of another, and make their battell large of breadth, and thinne in depth; which makes it weaker, becauſe there is but ſmall diſtance from the breſt to the backe. And when to make it ſtronger, they reduce the troupes to the Romane manner, if the firſt front be broken, not having order to be receivd in the ſecond, they fall together into a confuſion, and rout themſelves: for if that before be beaten backe, it falls upon the ſecond; if the ſecond ſtrives to advance, it is hindred by the firſt: Whereupon the firſt and the ſecond both beating upon the third, cauſes ſuch a confuſion, that commonly a very little matter deſtroys a whole Army. The Spaniſh and French Armyes in the battle at Ravenna, where the Lord de Pors Generall of the French forces dyed, which was (according to our times) a well fought battell, was arranged in one of theſe forenam'd wayes: which is, that one and the other Armie came on with all their people plac'd to ſhoulder the one the other, ſo that neither army had but one front, and were much more in breadth then in depth. And this befalls them alwayes, where they have a large plaine, as they had at Ravenna. For knowing the diſorder they make in retiring, by placing themſelves in one file, they avoide it when they can, which they do by making the front large, as it is ſaid. But when the ſcite of the country reſtraines them, they remaine in the forenam'd diſorder, without adviſing themſelves of the remedy. In which they paſſe through their enemies countries, they goe out to forrage, or venture on any other exploit. And at Saint Regulus in that occaſion of Piſa, and otherwhere, where the Florentines were routed by the Piſans, during the warre which was betweene the Florentines and that city, for their rebellion, after Charles the King of France his paſſage into Italy, thoſe defeates were cauſed by nothing elſe but by their owne horſe: which being in vantgard, and by the enemies beaten backe into the Florentine foote, routed it, whereupon all the remainder turn'd their backes; and Criacus de Borgo, the ancient generall of the Florentine infantery, hath ſaid it many times in my hearing, that they had never bin routed but by their own horſe. The Swiſſes who are the principall maſters of our modern warres, when they ſerve with the French, above all things have a care to place themſelves on the ſide, for feare their owne horſe driven backe ſhould beate upon them. And howbeit theſe things ſeeme eaſie to underſtand, and very eaſie to practiſe, yet hath not there been any of our contemporary Commanders, that would follow theſe ancient orders, or amend the moderne. And though they have made their Armies tripartite, terming the one the Vauntguard, the other the Battell, and the laſt the Rereguard: they make no other uſe thereof, but to command them when they are quatered in their lodgings, but in any ſervice, very ſeldome it is (as is formerly ſaid) but that they make all theſe bodies run one fortune. And becauſe many to excuſe their own ignorance, alledge that the violence of the Artillery permits not that many of the ancient orders be obſervd, I will argue it in the next Chapter, and examine, whether the Artillery doe hinder the practiſe of the ancient valour.

WHen I conſider, beſides the things formerly written, how many pitcht battells were fought by the Romans at ſeverall times, that general opinion which many hold, comes into my minde, that if a • tilery had bin uſed in thoſe dayes, the Romans could never ſo eaſily have ſubdued the countryes they did, nor have brought theſe nations they did, to become their tributaries, nor in any caſe could they have made ſuch brave conqueſts. They ſay moreover, that by reaſon of theſe guns, men cannot put in practice nor ſhew the valour they could of old. And then they adde a third matter, that it makes it more difficult to come to a battell now, then formerly; nor can they containe themſelves within the orders of thoſe times, ſo that in time the warre will be all reduced to the artillery. And being deſirous now not out of purpoſe to argue touching the the truth of ſuch opinions, and how much artillery hath augmented or diminiſhed the force of armies, and whether they bereave or affoard good Captaines occaſion to behave themſelves valourouſly, I will begin to ſpeake concerning, their firſt opinion; that the ancient Roman armies would never have made thoſe conqueſts they did, had artilery bin then in uſe. Whereupon I ſay in anſwer, that warre is made either in defence or offence. And then we are to examine, to which of theſe two parts it does more good or hame. And though reaſons may be alledged on both ſides, yet I thinke, that without compariſon the defendant receives more dammage by it, then the aſſailant. The reaſon, which hereof I give, is, that the defendant is either within a walled towne, or in the field within trenches: If he be in a towne, either it is but little, as moſt commonly for treſſes are, or great and large. In the firſt caſe, the defendant is quite loſt; for ſuch is the force of artillery, that no wall be it of what thickneſſe it will, but in a few dayes is ruined by it. And if thoſe that are within the walls, have not good roome to retire themſelves, with retrenchments and fortifications, they are loſt; nor can they ſupport the ſhocke of the enemy, when he would enter by breach in the wall, nor hath he any helpe herein of his artillery: for this is a maxime, that where met can enter in by throngs and with violence, the artillery cannot keep them off. Therefore the furious aſſaults of the Tramontaines it is not poſſible for the defendant to reſiſt; but the aſſaults the Italians give, are well enough endured, who never all in a • hrong, but ſcatteringly come to the fight, which they by a name very fit for the purpoſe, call skirmiſhes. And theſe that goe with this diſorder and timcrouſneſſe to enter a breach, where artillery is, go to an apparent death, and againſt them artillery is a good uſe: but thoſe who in throngs, when the one preſſes forward the other, come to the breach, unleſſe ſuſtained by ditches and ramparts, will enter any place, and the artillery ſhall never beat them off; and though ſome few of them be ſlaine, yet can they never be ſo many as can hinder them of victory. That this is true, we finde in many conqueſts which fortainers have here made in Italy, eſpecially in that of Breſcia: for that towne having rebelled againſt the French, and the fort holding good yet for the French King, the Venetians were to ſupport all the violence, that from thence could fall in upon the towne, having all that way guarded with artillery, that deſcended from the fortreſſe into the city, ſome of them being planted againſt the front, others upon the flankes, and ſo in every other place fir. Whereof the Lord of Fois made not any account, but deſcending a foote with his troopes paſſed through the midſt of them, and tooke the towne, nor ever appeared it that he had received thereby any notable loſſe. So that he who defends a little towne (as it is ſaid) which is walled in, but hath not ſpace to retire with • etrenchments and fortifications, and truſts upon the artillery, is preſently loſt. And thou defendeſt a great towne, and haſt conveniency for retreat, yet without compariſon is the artillery more availeable to thoſe without, then within the walls. Firſt, becauſe thou wouldeſt with thy artillery annoy thoſe without, thou muſt of force raiſe thy ſelfe with it above the levell: for while thou art on the levell, every ſmall fence or trench that the enemy makes ſecures him, and thou canſt no wayes dammage him; ſo that thou being to raiſe thy ſelfe, and to mount thy peeces on the curtaine of the wall, or ſome other way, draweſt two difficulties upon thee. The firſt is, that thou canſt not bring ordnance thither, neither of that bigneſſe nor effect, that he without can, being that great things are not manageable in ſmall ſpaces. The other is, that though we grant thou canſt bring ſuch peeces thither, yet canſt thou not make thoſe ſafe and ſtrong fortifications to ſecure thy artilery within which they without can, being upon the plaine ground, and having thoſe conveniences, and that roome, they can deſire. So that it is impoſſible for him that defends a towne to keepe his artillery mounted on thoſe high places, when thoſe without have ſtore of great and good peeces. And if he brings them into lower places, they become for the moſt part unprofitable, as it is ſaid. So that the defence of a city is to be made by the bodies of men, as it was the cuſtome of old, and with the ſmall ſhot: Whereby if they make any ſmall advantage, in regard of the ſmall ſhot, they ſuffer as much loſſe, which counterpoiſes all the good the artillery can do them: for by them the towne walls are all laid flat, and, as it were, buried in the ditches, ſo that when the enemy comes to enter by aſſault, either becauſe the walls are beaten downe, or that the ditches are filled, he that is within, hath more diſadvantages thereby, then otherwiſe he had. And therefore (as it was formerly ſaid) theſe inſtruments of wa • re do more helpe the beſieger, then the beſieged. Touching the third point, which is to retire into the campe, and there to make intrenchments, to keepe off from battell till ſome convenience or advantage gotten, I ſay, that herein thou haſt no more helpe ordinarily to keepe thee from fighting, then had the ancients. And ſometimes by reaſon of the artillery thou haſt more diſadvantage: for if the enemy come upon thee, and have ſome ſmall advantage of the field, as it may eaſily chance that he gets the upper ground of thee, or that at his arrivall thou haſt not fully caſt up thy trenches, nor cover'd thy ſelfe well with them, preſently he diſlodges thee whithout remdy, and thou art forced to come cut of thy fortifications and fight: which befell the Spaniards in the battell at Ravenna, who, being fortified betweene the river Roncus, and a trench they had caſt up, the fence whereof was not of that hight was needfull, ſo that the French had gotten ſome ſmall advantage of the ground, were forc'd by the artillery out of their fortifications to come to fight. But grant (as moſt commonly it ſhould be) that the place where thou haſt encamped, were higher then thoſe others whereof the enemies were maſters, and that their fortifications were good and ſecure in ſuch ſort as by meanes of ſcituation and other thy preparations the enemy dares not aſſaile thee, in this caſe they will be forced to uſe thoſe meanes, which of old they were wont, when any one lay with his army, where he could not be endammag'd, which were to forrage the country and pillage it, to beleager ſome of the cheife townes, to hinder thy proviſions, ſo that by ſome neceſſity thou ſhalt of force diſlodge and be brought to fight, where the artillery, as we ſhall hereafter ſhew is not of ſo great effect. Conſidering then what ſort of warres the Romars made, being in all moſt all of them they were aſſailants, and not defendants, it ſhall appeare (being that theſe things above written are true.) that they would have had greater advantages, and ſooner have made their conconqueſts, had the artillery bin in thoſe times. Touching the ſecond point, that men cannot make proofe of their valour as of old they might, by reaſon of the artillery, I ſay, that it is true, that where men are to ſhew themſelves in ſcattered troops, they run more hazard, then when they are to ſcale a wall or make ſuch like aſſaults, where they are not all in one body, but each one a part ſhewes himſelfe. It is true alſo that the Captaines and Commanders of armies are expoſed to more danger of death, being that then the artillery can reach them in any place; nor availes it them to be in the hindermoſt rankes, or invironed by their valianteſt Souldiers. Yet we ſee, that neither of theſe two dangers do often endammage much; for places fortified are not eaſily ſcal'd, nor do they weakly goe to aſſaile them: but if they will take them, they muſt beſieges them, as it was the cuſtome of old. And where they take their townes by aſſault, the dangers now a dayes are not much greater then they were wont to be: for even in thoſe times they who defended the townes, wanted not their inſtruments of warre where with to ſhoote at their enemies, which (though perhaps they were not of that violence) yet for ſlaughter were of the ſame effect. Touching the death of Captaines and Commanders, in foure and twenty yeares time, that theſe laſt warres have bin in Italy, we have not ſo many examples, as in ten yeares the ancients had: for from Count Lodowicke of Mirandola, that died at Ferrara, when the Venetians, a few yeares ſince, aſſai'd that ſtate, and the Duke of Nemours, that died at Cerignuola, there hath not any one bin ſlaine by the canon: For the Lord of Fois was ſlain by the ſword at Ravenna, and not by the Cannon. So that if men give no particular proofs of their valour, it is not cauſed by their canon, but prooeeds from their evil orders, and the feebleneſs of their armies, which when they want valour in the groſs, cannot then in any particular make ſhew of it. Touching the third allegation made by them, that they can never come to joyne battel, but that the ſum of all will depend upon the artillery, I ſay that this opinion is utterly falſe, and ſo ſhall it be held by thoſe who according to the valour of old will imploy their armies: for whoſoever will have a good army, muſt uſe them in trainings or rather in battels to come up cloſe to the enemy, and there fall to handy blows with him, and take him by the coller: and they ought to ground more upon the infantry then the cavallery, for ſome reaſons we ſhall here, after alledge. And when they ſhall rely moſt upon the foot, and upon theſe waies we have ſpoken of, the artillery becomes quite unprofitable; for more eaſily can the infantry avoyd the blow of the cannon by comming up cloſe to the enemy, then of old they could eſcape the ſury of the Elephants, the chariors arm'd with hooks, and ſuch other unaccuſiomed encounters which the Roman infantry met with, and ſound remedy againſt, which they would to much the more eaſily have found againſt theſe, as much as the time is of very ſhort durance in which the artillery can harme thee, in compariſon of of that wherein the Elephan • s and chariots • id miſcheif: for theſe in the very middle and heat of the battle did put all into diſorder; whereas the artillery hinders thee onely before the battel: which hinderance the infantry eaſily avoid, either by going cover'd under the naturall ſcite of the place, or by ſtooping towards the ground when they ſhoot: which alſo we ſee by experience is not neceſſary, eſpecially to eſcape the canon, which can hardly be ſo right levell'd, but that if they go high they miſs thee, if low they come ſhort of thee. Afterwards when the armies are come to handy blowes, this is more clear then the light, that neither the great nor ſmall ſhot can do thee much harm: for if the enemy places the artillery before him, thou mayſt eaſily take it; if behind him, it hurts himſelf before it can touch thee: or if it be on either ſide of thee, it cannot ſo gall thee, but that thou mayeſt come up cloſe to it; whereupon will follow the effect we have ſaid. Nor needs there much diſpute upon this: for we have ſeen it by the example of the Switzers, who at Navarra in the year 1513. without arrillery or horſe aſſail'd the French army within their fortifications being guarded with artillery, and yet routed them being no way hinder'd thereby: and the reaſon is, (beſides the things formerly alledged) becauſe the artillery hath need to be guarded, if we would it ſhould make any good execution, either by ſome wall, or trenches or ſome kind of fortifications, and when it fails of theſe defences it becomes a prey to the enemy, & ſo is made unprofitable, as it comes to paſs when it is defended onely by men, or as it may be in field battels, it cannot be plac'd on the flank, unleſs it be on that manner, that the ancients used their inſtruments of war, when they plac'd them without their ſquadrers, becauſe they ſhould play from without the ranks; and whenſoever they were put at, either by the horſe or others they retired behind the legions: whoſe ever accounts otherwiſe of them, does not well underſtand the uſe of them, and truſts'upon that, which may eaſily deceive him, and if the Turk by the help of his artillery, have gaind any victory of the Sophy and the So'dan, it was not occaſion'd by other vertue of it, then by the affright the unuſual noiſe thereof put the horſe into. Therefore I conclude, comming to the end of this diſcourſe, that the artillery is proſſitable in an army, where there is a mingle of the ancient valour, without which it avails little againſt a couragious army.

WEE can plainly ſſhew it by many reaſons and examples, how much the Romans in all military actions did prefer the infantry before the cavalry, and thereupon grounded the aſſurance of all their executions, as it appears by many examples, and among others, when they ſought with the Latins near the lake of Regillum, where the Roman Army giving ground a little, for their ſuccours, the horſe-men were commanded to light and ſerve a ſoct whereby they made good the fight and gaind the victory. Where it is manifeſt, the Romans had more confidence in them being a foot, than a horſeback, They us'd the ſame termes in many other fights, and ſound it alwaies a preſent help in their dangers. Nor let Hannibals opinion counterballance this, who ſeeing in the battel at Canna that the Conſuls made their horſemen light and ſerve afoot, ſcoffing at the courſe they took, ſaid, I Quam mallem vinctos mihi traderent equites. had rather indeed they ſhould be delivered bound into my hands. Which opinion however that it was utterd by a very able man, yet if we are to follow authorities, we may rather give credit to a Roman Commonwealth, and ſo many excellent Captains, that flouriſhed in it, than to one Hanniball alone, though without this authority the reaſons are evident: for a man on foot can go in many places, where a horſeback he cannot: he may be able to inſtruct them, how to keep their ranks, and being ſomewhat confus'd, how they may be reſtored again. It is very hard to make the horſe keep their ranks, and when once they are in diſorder, it is impoſſible to recover them. Beſides this, as we ſee it among men, ſo is it among horſes; ſome there are which have but ſmall courage, others again exceeding couragious. And many times it falls out, that a brave horſe is back'd by a cowardly fellow, and ſometimes a timerous jade is mounted by a ſtout Souldier; and there which way ſoever it is that this diſparitie follows, ariſes uprofitableneſs and diſorder. The infantry well united in their ranks are eaſily able to rout the horſe, and very hardly can they be routed by them: Which opinion is confirmed (beſides many ancient moderne examples) by their authorities who have left us the records of ancient Republiques, where they ſhew us, how that at firſt they began to make war a horſeback, becauſe they underſtood neither the order nor the uſe of the foot, which when they once had the knowledge of, they quickly conceiv'd how much more profitable they were than the horſe. But hereupon it follows not that the horſe are not neceſſary in armies, to diſcover, and to forrage and prey about in the Countrey, and to purſue the enemies in their ſlight, and in part alſo to oppoſe all the attempts of the the adverſaries horſe. But the ground-worke, and the very nerves of the army, and whereof moſt account is to be made, is the Infantry. And among the Italian Princes faults, which have euthral'd Italy to ſtrangers, there is none greater than that they made no account of this order, and turn'd all their regard towards the ſervice of horſemen: Which diſorder proceeded from the evil diſpoſition of the Captains, and their ignorance that govern'd the State: by reaſon that for theſe twenty-five years laſt paſt all the military affairs in Italy were in the hands of men that had no ſetled eſtates, but were Captains adventurers, ſerving where they could have pay, who preſently deviſed how they could maintain their reputation, they continuing in armes when the Princes were unarmed. And becauſe they could not continually get pay for a good number of foot, nor had any ſubjects whereof to ſerve themſelves, and a ſmall number got them no credit, they be took themſelves to horſe: for a Captain having pay for 200 or 300 horſe, ſubſiſted thereby in good repute, and the payment was not ſuch, but that thoſe that rul'd the State could eaſily ſatisfie it. And to the end this ſhould come on more eaſily, and to keep themſelves the better in eſteem, they took all reſpect and reputation from the foot, and reſerred all to their cavallery; And ſo far increas'd they this diſorder, that in the greateſt Armie they levyed, the leaſt part of them was foot. Which cuſtom, together with many other diſorders intermixt with it, hath much weakned the Italian Soldiery, ſo that this Country hath eaſily bin trodden under foot by all ſtrangers. This error, of eſteeming the horſe more than the foot, is laid open yet more plainly, by another example of the Romans. The Romans were incamped at Sora; and a troop of horſe having made a ſally out of the town to aſſualt the Camp, a Captain of the Roman horſe went to incounter them with his Cavalry, whereupon the firſt ſhock, meeting breſt to breſt, it chanc'd that the Commander of each troop was ſlain, and the reſidue being left without government, and the skirmiſh ſtill continuing, the Romans that they might the better vanquiſh their enemies, light from their horſes, and forc't their enemies (if they would defend themſelves) to do the like, wherewith the Romans carried away the victory. This example could not ſerve better to the purpoſe, in ſhewing of how much value the infantry is, above the horſe: for if in other occaſions the Conſuls made the horſemen to diſmount, it was to ſuccour the foot that were in diſtreſs, and had need of ayd. But in this place they light not to aſſiſt the foot, nor to fight with their enemies foot, but fighting a horſeback with horſemen, they thought that though they were not able to maſter them on horſeback, that alightning they could more eaſily vanquiſh them: I will therefore conclude, that a body of foot in good order and array cannot without much difficulty be overcome by another body of foot. Craſſus and Marchus Antonius both Romans, made an introde of many daies journeys into the Parthians Kingdome, with a very few horſe and a good number of foot, where they incountred with numberleſs troops of the Parthian horſe. Craſſus was left there dead with part of the Army; Marcus Antonius valorouſly ſav'd himſelf. Nevertheleſs, in theſe Roman loſſes it appears, how much the Infantry exceeded the horſe: for being in an open Country, where there are few mountains, and very few rivers, and the Sea-coaſt far off, and remote from all conveniency, yet for all this did Marcus Antonius even in the opinion of the Parthians themſelves, very valourouſly eſcape, nor ever durſt the whole Parthian Cavalry venture to break into the ranks of his Army. If Craſſus periſh'd there, whoſoever well reads his actions, ſhall find, that he was rather treacherouſly beguild, than forc'd, nor ever in all his diſorders, durſt the Parthians ſet upon him, but alwaies went along by him, to keep in his ſoldiers from ſtragling, and getting of proviſions, and by promiſing fairly, but obſerving nothing, brought him at length unto extream diſtreſs. I ſhould think I were to take much pains in perſwading that the valour of the infantry does much excel that of the horſe, but that there are many modern examples which give us a very ſatisfactory teſtimony. And tis well known that 9000 Swiſſes at Navarra, formerly alleaged by us, went to encounter 10000 horſe and as many more foot, & vanquiſh'd them: for the horſe could no way harm them, and the foot being for the moſt part Gaſcoignes and ill ordered, they made ſmall account of. We ſee likewiſe that afterwards 36000 Swiſſes, went to find Francis the French King about Milan, who had an army of 20000 horſe and 40000 foot, and a 100 tire of Ordnance; and though they gaind not the battel at at Navarra, yet they fought bravely two dayes together, and when at length they were broken the moity of them eſcap'd. Marcus Regulus Attilius preſum'd with his infantry to incounter not onely the enemies horſe, but their Elephants; and though his purpoſe came not to effect, yet was it not ſo, but that the valour of his infantry was ſuch, that he had very good reaſon to hope he might well overcome that difficulty. And therefore I anſwer, that he that would overcome a body of foot in good array, muſt oppoſe them with another body of foot in better order than they; otherwiſe he ſuſtains an evident loſs. In the dayes dayes of Philip Viſconti Duke of Milan, there came down into Lombardy ſome 16000 Swiſſes, whereupon the Duke Carmignuola being then his General, ſent him with neare upon a thouſand horſe and ſome few foot to incounter them: Who not knowing the manner of their fighting, went to meet them with his horſe, not doubting but that he could preſently rout them. But finding them to ſtand firm, and having loſt many Souldiers, retir'd; yet being a very able man, and knowing in new accidents how to try new wayes, having repaird his broken troupes, he went again to meet them, where he made all his armed men a light, and ſerve on foot, and ſo by them having made a head to thoſe of his infantry, he inveſted the Swiſſes, who found no way to help themſelves: for Carmignuolaes horſemen bring lighted, who were wel arm'd, were able with facilitie to enter into the Swiſſes ranks without much hurt: which when they had pierc'd, they could eaſily harme; ſo that of their whole number there was left onely that part alive, that was by Carmignuolaes curteſie preſerv'd. I beleeve well that many know this difference of valour that is between the one and the other of theſe orders, but ſo unhappy are theſe times, that neither the ancient nor modern examples, nor the acknowledgement of the error is of force to prevail with modern Princes to readviſe themſelves and conſider, that to recover the reputation of the Souldiery of a Countrey or State, it is neceſſary to revive again theſe orders and entertain them near their perſons, to encourage them and allow them means to live, to the end they may reſtore to them both life and reputation. But as we uſe to forſake theſe cuſtoms, ſo we leave other orders alſo formerly ſpoken of; whereupon it comes to paſs, that the very conqueſts we make turne to our loſſes, and not to the advancement of a State, as hereafter we ſhall ſay.

THeſe opinions contrary to the truth, and grounded on evil precedents, which have bin introduced by theſe our corrupt ages, cauſe men not to ſtand much upon ſtraying from old wonted uſes. Some thirty years agoe, an Italian would never have bin perſwaded, that ten thouſand foot in a plain had ever bin able to aſſault ten thouſand horſe and ſo many more foot, and not only fight with them, but vanquiſh them too, as it is plain by the example of the battel at Navarra; by us ſundry times alleag'd. And however that Stories are full of them, yet would they not have given us credit: and if they had beleeved us, they would have ſaid, that in theſe dayes men are better arm'd, and that a ſquadron of men at armes would have bin of force to have ſhock'd with a rock, and not only with a body of foot, and thus with theſe falſe excuſes they corrupted their judgments. Nor would they have taken into conſideration, that Lucullus with a few foot routed a 150000 horſe that Tigranes led, and yet among thoſe horſemen there was a ſort of them very like our men at armes. And ſo this fallacy was diſcover'd by the example of forrain Nations. And as thereby it proves true, touching the infantry, which is related in Story, ſo ought it be beleev'd that all the reſt of the ancient orders are true and uſefull. And when this we re once credited, Republiques and Princes would fail leſs, and be of more ſtrength to reſiſt any force ſhould come upon them, nor hope ſo much in the flight; and thoſe that ſhould have in their hands the government of State, would be better able to guide it, either by way of amplification or by way of preſervation, and would think that to increaſe the number of their Citizens, and make them as their aſſociates and not vaſſals, to ſend forth Colonies to keep the countries gained, to make a general ſtock out of the booties taken, to tame the enemy with incurſions, & by ſet battels, & not long ſieges, to maintain the publique ſtate in wealth, & the private in ſcarcity, and to be induſtrious in keeping the armies in good diſcipline, are the means to inlarge a Commonwealth & gain an Empire. And when this way of amplification ſhould not like them, then ſhould they think that all addition to their ſtate are the ruine of Commonwealths, and therefore ſhould reſtrain all ambition, regulating their City according to their lawes and cuſtoms, forbidding all inlargments, only ayming at defenee of what they have, and keeping them under good government, as the Republicks of Germany do, and ſo have liv'd free a good while. Notwithſtanding (as otherwhere I have ſaid, when I diſcours'd touching the difference there was in the ordering of a State to become fit to conquer; and the ordering of one to be able to maintain it ſelf) it is impoſſible, that a Republick ſhould have the hap to ſtand quiet, and enjoy her own liberty, with her ſmall Territories: for though ſhe moleſt not others yet ſhe ſhall be moleſted her ſelf: ſhe may alſo have ſome mind or ſome neceſſity in ſome part to extend her bounds: and in caſe ſhe have no enemy abroad, yet may ſhe find ſome one at home, as it muſt needs be alwaies that ſuch be found among a great many potent citizens, and if thoſe Republicks of Germany can ſubſiſt in that manner, & have been able to continue for a time it ariſes from ſome conditions, that are in that Country, & which are no where elſe ſound, nor could they maintain ſuch a manner of government without them. This part of Germany, whereof I ſpeak, was ſubject to the Roman Empire, as were France & Spain; but when the Empire began to decline, & the title of the Empire was brought into that Country, the moſt potent of thoſe Cities began (according to the baſeneſs or the neceſſity of thoſe Emperors) to ſet themſelves at liberty, buying themſelves out from the Empire, and reſerving thereunto only a a certain annual rent. Inſomuch as by little and little, all thoſe Cities, which he • d immediatly of the Emperor, and were no way in ſubjection to any Prince, in ſuch like manner ſet themſelves free. It happened in the ſame times, when theſe Cities bought out their liberties, that certain communalties of the Duke of Auſtria's ſubjects, rebell'd agianſt him, among which were Tilibourg, the Swiſſes and others, who proſpering in the beginning, by little and little came to ſuch growth, that they not only ſhook off the Auſtrian yoke, but even became a terror to all their neighbours, and theſe are thoſe they call Swiſſes. This Country therefore is divided into the Swiſſes, Republcks, which they call-free Townes, Princes, and the Emperor. And the reaſon why among ſuch variety of governments there ariſe no warres, or if any do, why they continue not, is that reverence they yeeld to the Emperor, who albeit he hath no great forces, yet is held in ſuch eſteem among them, that he alwaies reconciles them, & with his authority interpoſing himſelf as Mediator, takes away all diſcontents: & the greateſt & longeſt warrs that have been there, were thoſe that follow'd between the Swiſſes & the Duke of Auſtria; and though now for theſe many years the Emperor and the Duke of Auſtria have been one and the ſame thing, yet was he never ſo powerful as to tame the Swiſſes inſolence, where there was never any means of accord, unleſs it were by force; nor hath the reſidue of Germany ever given him much aſſiſtance: partly becauſe thoſe communalties cannot find in their hearts to hurt thoſe that deſire to live under a civil government, as they themſelves do and partly becauſe thoſe Princes are not able, being poor, or will not, by reaſon that they envy too great puiſſance. Thoſe commonalties therfore may live contented with their ſmall dominions, becauſe they have no occaſion (in regard of the Imperial Authority) to wiſh it greater. They may live the better in union within their owne walls, becauſe they have the enemy near at hand, who would willingly take any opportunity to lay hold on them, whenſoever they ſhould fall into diſcord: but if that country were otherwiſe conditioned, it were fit for them to ſeeke the inlargement of their State, & ſo interrupt their owne reſt: and becauſe otherwhere there are not the like termes, this manner of living cannot be followed, and there is a neceſſity either to ſtrengthen the State by way of leagues, or to amplifie it as the Romans did. And whoſoever undertake any other courſe of government, ſeeke not their owne life, but ruine and deſttruction: for many wayes, and for many reaſons are conqueſts hurtfull: for it is very poſſible to gaine dominion, and not ſtrength; and he that does increaſe his dominions, & yet growes not in ſtrength, muſt needs go to wrack. They cannot grow ſtrong, that grow poore in the wars, although they prove victorious, becauſe their conqueſts coſt them more then they get by them, as the Venetians & the Florentins did, who have bin much weaker, when the one commanded all Lombardy, and the other Tuſcany, then when the one was contented with the ſeaonley and the other with ſix miles round of territories: for al this preceeded from their deſire to conquer, & their ignorance to take the right courſe: and they deſerve the more blame, in that they have very little excuſe having ſeene the ways the Romanes went, becauſe they might have followed their example, being that the Romanes without any patterne to follow, by their own judgment, found out a fit way to go. Moreover ſometimes ſuch gains gotten do no ſmal harm to a well govern'd Commonwealth, when either ſuch a city or country is conquer'd that abounds with pleaſures, where by converſation with them, their manners are learned, as it happen'd to Rome at firſt in the conqueſt of Capua, & afterwards to Hannibal. And had Capua been of further diſtance from the City, that the ſoldiers error had not had the remedy near hand, or that Rome had been in ſome part corrupted, without queſtion that conqueſt had prov'd the Roman Republicks ruine. And T. Livius witneſſes the ſame in theſe words: Even then was Capua little good for the military diſcipline, Jam tunc minime ſal bris militari diſciplinae Capua, inſtrun entum omnium voluptatum, delinitos militum animos avertit a memoria patriae. which being the inſtrument of all ſorts of pleaſures, beſotted the ſoldiers minds ſo, that they forgot their native Countries. And truly ſuch like Cities ſufficiently avenge themſelves on their Conquerors without fight, or loſs of blood; for by infecting them with their contagious vices, they expoſe them to the conqueſt of whoever aſſailes them. And Juvenal could not better have expreſſed this, then where in his Satyres he ſaies, that by their conqueſts of forrain nations, their minds were poſſeſſed with forrain vices, in exchange of parſimony, & other excellent vertues; Glutrony and luxury making their habitation there, revenged the Gula & Luxuris incubuit, • ictunique ulci 〈…〉 orbem. worlds Conqueſt on them. If therefore theſe gettings were likely to have been dangerous to the Romans, in the times that they proceeded with ſuch wiſdome and vertue, how will they prove to thoſe who go on in much different waies from them? and who beſides the other errors they run into (whereof we have formerly ſpoken enough) ſerve themſelves of either mercenary or auxiliary ſoldiers? whereupon thoſe miſchiefs often befall them, which we ſhall mention in the following chap.

IF in another work of mine I had not treated at large of mercenary and auxiliary ſoldiers how unprofitable they are, and how very profitable the native ſoldiers of the Country are, I would much more have inlarged my ſelf in this diſcourſe, than now I purpoſe; but having otherwhere diſcours'd hereupon at length, I ſhall now only point at it. Not yet did I think fit wholly to paſs it over, having found in Titus Livius ſo large an example belonging to thoſe ſoldiers: for auxiliary ſoldiers are thoſe that a Prince or Commonwealth ſends with their Captains and pay ready furniſh'd in thy aid. And comming to the text of T. Livius, I ſay, that the Romans having in ſeverall places broken two armies of the Samnites with their forces, which they ſent to ſuccor the Capuans, and thereby freed them from that warr the Samnites made againſt them, purpoſing to return to Rome, to the end the Capuans diſpoyl'd of ayd ſhould not a new becom a prey to the Samnites, left behind them in the country about Capua two legions to defend them. Which legions growing corrupt through idleneſs, began to be inſnar'd with the delicacies thereof So that having for gotten their owne country, and the reverence they ought to the Senate, they reſolved to take armes, and make themſelves Lords of that Country, which they by their valours had defended, thinking thoſe inhabitants not worthy to injoy thoſe goods, which they knew not how to defend. Which thing, the Romanes having had ſome inkling of it before, was ſtopped, and puniſhed by them, as, where we ſpeak of conſpiracies, it ſhall be ſhow'd at large. Therefore I ſay again, that of all kindes of ſouldiers the auxiliaries are the moſt dangerous; Becauſe among thoſe, that Prince or Republique that uſes them for ayd, hath no authority, but onely he that ſends them: for auxiliary ſouldiers are thoſe that are ſent th • e by a Prince, as I have ſayd, under the command of his own Captaines, under his own enſignes and pay alſo, as this army was, which the Romanes ſent to Capua. Theſe kinds of ſouldiers, when they have vanquiſhed, moſt commonly pillage as well them that have hir'd them, as the enemy againſt whom they have hired them; and this they do, either through the maligne diſpoſition of their Prince that ſends them, or through their owne ambition And however the Romanes had no intention to violate the agreement and conventions made with the Capuans, yet the facility wherewith thoſe ſouldiers thought themſelves able to take their towne, was ſuch that it might have been of force to perſwade them to think of taking the town and State from the Capuans: Many examples to this purpoſe may be alledg'd; but this, and that of the inhabitants of Rhegium ſhall ſuffice me, from whom both lives & town were taken by one legion of ſoldiers, which the Romans had there left in garriſon. Therefore a Prince or a Republick ſhould rather take any other courſe, than ſeek to bring auxiliary ſoldiers into his Country, principally when he is moſt to rely upon them: for any accord or agreement (though very hard) to which he ſhall yeeld with his enemy, ſhall be more tolerable than this. And if things paſt were well call'd to mind, and thoſe that are preſent well conſider'd on, for one that hath had good ſucceſs in ſuch a buſineſs, a man ſhall find exceeding many who have been abus'd. And a Prince, or an ambitious Republick can never have a fitter opportunity to ſeiſe on a Town or Country, than when they are requir'd to ſend their armies for defence thereof. Wherefore he that is ſo ambitious, that not only for his own defence, but for offence to another, calls in ſuch like aids, ſeeks to gain that he cannot hold, and which alſo he that gets it for him, can at his pleaſure take from him, But ſo great is mans ambition, that if he can fulfill his deſire for the preſent, he is never aware of that evill, which ſhortly after may thence redound to him. Nor do the ancient examples avail any thing with him, as well in this, as in other things we have treated of: for were men hereby mov'd, they would perceive that the more freely and fairly they dealt with their neighbours, and the farther of they were from making themſelves maſters of them, the more readily would they offer to caſt themſelves into their armes, as hereafter ſhall appear by example of the Capuans.

THe Latins were now reduc'd 〈◊〉 Jam Latio is ſtatus erat rerum, ut neque pecem, neque bellum pati poſſent. to ſuch termes, that they could neither endure peace, nor maintain War. Of all unhappy conditions this is the worſt, unto which a Prince or Republick can be brought, that they can neither accept of peace, nor ſupport the War; unto which thoſe are reduc'd, who are overmuch offended at the conditions of peace, and on the other ſide, if they have a mind to make war, either they muſt caſt themſelves as a prey into the hands of thoſe that ayd them, or become a prey to their enemy. And into theſe miſchances men fall by evil advices and evil courſes, by not having well weighed their own forces, as before it was ſaid: for that Republique or Prince, that ſhould well weigh them, very hardly would ever be brought to thoſe termes the Latines came, who when they ſhould not have made accord with the Romans, made it, and when, they ſhould not have broke peace with them brake it. Whereby they brought it ſo to paſs that their agreement and diſagreement with the Romans did equally endammage them. The Latins then were overcome and much broken at firſt by Manlus Torquatus, and afterwards by Camillus; who having forc't them to yeeld and render themſelves to the Romans, and put Garriſons in all the I owns in Latium, and taken hoſtages of them all, when he came back to Rome, related to the Senate, that all Latium was in the people of Romes hands. And becauſe this judgement is remarkable, and deſerves note, to the end it may be follow'd, when Princes have the like occaſions given them, I will produce the very words, that Livie put in Camillus his mouth, which did teſtifie both of the manner the Romans held in amplifying the State, and that in their judgements touching the State, they alwaies avoided the middle way, and turn'd to the extreams: for a government is nothing elſe, but to have ſuch a tye upon the ſubjects, that they either cannot, or will not hurt thee. This is done either by making thy ſelf fully ſure of them, in taking away from them all means to hurt thee, or by doing them ſo much good, that it is not probable they will wiſh to change their ſtate: all which is there comprehended; firſt by the propoſition Camillus made, and afterwards by the judgement the Senate gave thereupon. His words were theſe, In this conſultation, the immortal Gods have given you ſo much power, that it is wholly in your hands to chuſe, whether Latium ſhall continue ſtill a Nation or no. And Dij mortales ita vos potentes hujus conſilit fecerunt, ut, ſit Latium, an non fit, in veſtra manu poſuerint. Ita que pacem vobis (quò ad Latinos attinet) parere in perpetuum, vel ſaeviendo vel ignoſcendo poteſtis. Vultis crudelius conſulere in deditos victoſque, licet delere nomen Latinum. Vultis exemplo majorum augere re • n Romanam, victos in civitatem accipiendo, materia creſcendi per ſummam gloriam ſuppeditat. Certe id firmiſſimum imperium eſt, quo obedientes gaudent. Illorum igitur animos, dum expectatione ſtupent, ſeu paena ſeu beneficio praeoccupari oporcet. therefore now may ye for ever procure your ſelves repoſe and ſecurity from thence, either by rigor and puniſhment, or by clemency and pardon; chuſe ye whether. Are ye minded to proceed by way of cruelty againſt thoſe that have yeelded, and are vanquiſh'd? ye may indeed blot out the very name of Latium; But will ye, as your anceſtors have done before you, enlarge the Roman Empire, by receiving into your City thoſe whom ye have conquer'd? Then have ye here means to grow mighty to your great glory. Certes that government is of all other moſt ſure, where the ſubjects take joy in their obedience. And therfore it is behoovefull, whiles their mindes are in ſuſpence between fear and hope, to prevent them either with ſpeedy puniſhment or benefit. To this purpoſe followed the Senates deliberation, which was according to the Conſuls words; for calling them Town by Town, before them, thoſe that were of any moment, they either much benefited, or quite ruined them, granting divers exemptions and priviledges to thoſe they would do good to, freely making them Citizens, and giving them ſecurity every way. They diſmantled the other ſtrong Towns, and ſent Colonies thither, and brought the people from thence into Rome, and ſo diſperſed them, that neither with their arms nor counſel they could do any more harm: Nor ever did they make uſe of any neutral way, in things (as I have ſaid) of moment. Princes ſhould imitate this judgment given; and hereunto the Florentines ſhould have intended, when in the year 1502. Arezzo and the valley of Chiana rebelled; which had they done, they had ſecured their Government, and much amplified the City of Florence, and likewiſe might have given them thoſe fields they wanted for their ſuſtenance: But they made uſe rather of that middle way, which is the moſt pernicious, in giving judgment upon men, ſo that part of the Aretins they confined, part they condemned, and took from all of them their honors, and ancient degrees in the City, and yet left the City whole and untouched: And if any Citizen in their Conſultations adviſed that Arezzo ſhould be diſmantelled, and razed, they who ſeemed to be of the wiſer ſort, ſaid it would be a diſgrace to the Florentines to raze it; becauſe it would be thought then that Florence wanted forces to hold them; which are ſome of thoſe Reaſons that ſeem to be, but are not true: For by the ſame reaſon a patricide were not to be put to death, not any vile or ſcandalous perſon, it being a ſhame for that Prince to ſhew that he is not able to bridle ſuch a man alone: and theſe kind of men having ſuch opinions, perceive not, how men in particular, and ſometimes a whole City together too, do wrong a State: ſo that for others example, and his own ſafeguard, a Prince hath no other remedy, but uterly to raze it. And indeed the honor conſiſts in the knowledg and power to chaſtiſe, and not in being able to hold a City under ſtil with many dangers: for the Prince that puniſhes not him that offends, ſo that he cannot offend more, is eſteemd ignorant and unworthy. This ſentence which the Romans gave, is confirm'd by the judgement they gave upon the Privernates. Where by the Text in Livie two things may be obſerved: the one, which is formerly ſpoken of, that ſubjects are either to be oblig'd by good done them, or elſe to be quite extingniſh'd; the other is, how much avails the generous conrage of the minde, and true ſpeaking in the preſence of ſage and diſcreet men. The Senate of Rome was aſſembled to give their ſentence upon the Privernates, who having been in Rebellion, were by force reduc'd to the Roman obedience. Many Citizens were ſent from the Privernates to crave pardon of the Senate, who Quam poenam meritos Privernates cenſeret. Eas inquam merentur, qui ſe libertate dignos cenſent. Quid ſi poenam remittimus vobis, qualem nos pacem vobis cum habituros • ſpere mus? Si • onam dederitis, & fidelem & perpetuam; ſin malam, haud diuturnam. Se audiviſſe vocem & liberi & viri, nec credi poſſe ullum populum, aut hominem deni que in ea conditione, cu • us eum poenite at diutius quam neceſſe ſit manſurum; ibi pacem; iſſe fidam, ubi voluntarij pacatiſint, ne que eo loco, ubi ſervitutem eſſe velint, fidem ſperandam eſſe. Eos demum, qui nihil praeserquam del ibertate cogitant, dignos; eſſe qui Romanifiant. being come before them, were thus ask'd by one of the Senators, What Puniſhment he ſhould cenſure the Privernates worthy of? Whereunto one of the Privernates reply'd, The ſame that they deſerve, who think themſelves worthy of liberty. Whereunto the Conſul anſwerd, What if we remit you your puniſhment, what peace ſhall we hope for with you? To which he ſaid again, If it be good you give us, you ſhall have it faithfully and perpetually obſerv'd, if ill, not long. Whereupon the wiſeſ of thoſe of the Senate, howbeit many were angry thereat, ſaid, That they had heard a ſtout and a free man ſpeak; neither was it credible that any Nation, or any man indeed, would continue any longer, than he muſt needs, in ſuch a condition, whereof he repents himſelf; and there onely was it likely a peace would be inviolably kept, where it was made of their own good wills and freely; but it was in no caſe to be hop'd for there, where they were brought into bondage and ſervitude. and upon theſe words they decreed, that the Privernates ſhould be made Citizens of Rome, and honoured them with all the priviledges of their Bourgeſſie, ſaying, That they finally were worthy to be Citizens of Rome, who valu'd nothing elſe in compariſon of their liberty. So much were theſe generous ſpirits taken with this ſtout and free anſwer: for, an anſwer elſe would have been falſe and cowardly. And thoſe that think otherwiſe of men (eſpecially ſuch as are us'd to be free, or to their thinking are free) are much deceiv'd, and by this deceit are they feduc'd to take wrong courſes for themſelves, and of little ſatiſfaction to others: from whence ariſe the often rebellions and ruines of States. But to return to our diſcourſe, I conclude as well by this, as by that judgement given upon the Latins, when ſentence is to paſs upon puiſſant Cities, and that have been accuſtomed to enjoy their liberties, it is neceſſary either utterly to raze them, or by benefiting of them to oblige them; otherwiſe it is all to no purpoſe; for the middle way here in is abſolutely to be avoided, which is dangerous, as it prov'd to the Samnites, having incloſ'd the Romans at the gallows of Gaudium, when they would not follow that old mans counſell that adviſ'd them, either to let them go with all courteſie and love, or put them all to the ſword. But they taking that neutral way, diſarming them, and putting them all to paſs under the gallows, let them go with ſhame and diſdain ſo that a while after they found by their own dammage how advantageous that old mans advice had been, and how hurtfull their own reſolution was, as we ſhall diſcourſe thereof more at large in its own place.

PEradventure it may ſeem to the wiſe men of our times a matter not well adviſed on, that the Romans, when they would make themſelves ſure of the people of Latium, and of the City of Privernum, never thought upon the building of ſome Fortreſs which might ſerve for a bridle to hold them in obedience, eſpecially being it paſſes for a Proverb in Florence, alledg'd by our States men, that Piſa and other ſuch like Cities ſhould be kept with Citradells. And truely had the Romans been like them, they would have provided for the building of them: but becauſe they were of another kind of courage, and judgement, and had another manner of power, therefore they never built any. and whiles Rome liv'd free, and obſerv'd her own ordinances, & inſtitutions, for the propagation of vertue, ſhe never built any one to keep under Cities or Provinces, though it may be, ſhe preſerv'd ſome of them ſhe found already built. Whereupon having ſeen the manner of the Romans proceedings herein, and that of the Princes of our times, I think to take it into conſideration, whether it be good to build Fortreſſes, & whether they advantage or wrong him that builds them. We muſt conſider then, that Fortreſſes are built either for reſiſtance againſt the enemy, or for defence againſt any tumult of the ſubjects. In the firſt caſe they are unneceſſary, in the ſecond hurtfull. And to give a reaſon, wherefore in the ſecond caſe they are hurtfull, I ſay, that that Prince or Republick that is afraid of his own ſubjects, and their rebellion, muſt needs have his fear ariſing from the hatred his own ſubjects bear him; and that hatred from his own evill carriages, which evill carriages proceed from thence, either that he beleeves he is able to keep them under by force, or from the Princes ſmall diſcretion: and one of the cauſes that makes him think himſelf able to rule them by force, is the having built theſe Citradels, over them: for evill treatings, which are the cauſes of hatred, for the moſt part are deriv'd from thence, that that Prince or Republick hath Cittadels upon them; which (when this is true) are far more hurtful, than profitable: for firſt (as it is ſaid) they make thee bolder and more rough among thy ſubjects, being that thou haſt thy ſecurity within them: for all theſe forces and violences which are in uſe to bridle a people withall, are of no value, but theſe two; either that thou haſt alwaies a good Army ready to ſend into the field, as the Romans had, or that thou doeſt diſperſe, extinguiſh, diſorder, and diſunite them ſo, that in no caſe they can make ſuch a body as can hurt thee: for be it that thou doeſt impoveriſh them, They that are deſpoil'd of their Spoliatis arma ſuperſunt. •• • or arma miniſtrat. goods, have weapons left them. If thou diſarmſt them, Even rage will find them weapons. If thou deſtroyeſt their heads, and proceedeſt ſtill to injure the reſt, there will grow up again new heads, as faſt as thoſe of Hydra. If thou buildeſt Cittadels, they are quite unprofitable in time of peace, becauſe they encourage thee to wrong them; but in time of war they are of leaſt uſe; for then are they aſſaulted by the enemy, and thy ſubjects too; nor is it poſſible they can reſiſt them both. And if ever they were unprofitable, they are now a dayes ſo, in regard of the Artillery, by reaſons of whoſe fury and violence, it is unpoſſible to defend ſmall fortreſſes, and where there is no place for retiring with new retrenchments, as formerly hath been ſhew'd. But I will diſpute this matter more plainly yet. Wilt thou O Prince with theſe Cittadels curb thy Citizens? or wilt thou whether Prince or Commonwealth that thou art, bridle a City thou haſt taken by war? I will addreſs my ſelf to the Prince, and tel him, that ſuch a Fortreſs to curb his Citizens cannot be more unprofitable, for the reaſons above alleadgd: becauſe it makes thee prompter, and leſs careful how thou doeſt oppreſs them, which oppreſſion makes them deſperate in attempting thy ruine, and ſo inrages them, that that Fortreſs, which is the cauſe thereof, can no way preſerve thee; ſo that a ſage and good Prince, to keep himſelf ſtill good, and that he may not give occaſion to, nor imbolden his children to become bad, will never build fortreſs, to the end they relie not upon the Cittadels, but rather upon the hearts of men. And if Count Francis Storce that came to be Duke of Milan was reputed wiſe, and yet in Milan he built a Cittadel, I ſay, that herein he little ſhewd his wiſdome, as appeard by the effect, ſeeing that Fortreſs proved rather a diſadvantage and loſs, then any ſafeguard to his heirs: for thinking that by means thereof they might paſs their time in ſecurity, and yet injure their Citizens and ſubjects, they forbare not any kind of violence; whereupon being grown very odious, they loſt the ſtate, ſo ſoon as they were aſſail'd by their enemy. Nor could that fortreſs defend them, nor did it any way advantage them in the war, and in time of peace it had done them much harme; for if there had been no ſuch citradel, and they for want of diſcretion onely had ſharply handled ſome of their ſubjects, they might ſooner have diſcover'd the danger, and withdrawn themſelves from it, and ſo afterwards they would have bin able with more courage to have reſiſted the French fury, having their ſubjects to freind without any fortreſs, then having them become thine enemies with thy fortreſs, which gives thee no help at all. For either it is loſt by the treachery of him that guards it, or is forced by the aſſailant, or elſe by famine. And if thou wouldeſt that theſe ſhould avail thee, and help the to recover a ſtate loſt, where only the fortreſs holds for thee, thou muſt have an army, wherewith thou maiſt aſſault him that chaſed the from thence. And whenſoever thou haſt this army, thou couldeſt not in any wiſe faile of recovering the State, howſoever there were no fortreſs at all; and that the more eaſily, by how much the Inhabitants would be more thy friends, then if thou hadſt ill-treated them through preſumption upon thy fortreſs. And it hath been proved by experience, how that this Cittadell of Milan hath little availed either the forces or the French party in the adverſity of the one or other, but hath rather brought upon them many ruins and miſchiefes, having never adviſed, by means thereof, upon any fair way to keep that ſtate. Guido Ʋbaldo Duke of Ʋrbin, ſon to Frederick, who in his daies was eſteemed a great Captain, being driven out of his ſtate by Caeſar Borgia ſon to Pope Alexander the ſixt, when afterwards upon a new grown occaſion he returned thither again, he cauſed all the fortreſſes to be demoliſhed that were in the Country, thinking they did more harme then good: for he having gained mens hearts to him, for their ſakes would not abide them; and in regard of enemies, he ſaw they were not able to defend him, it being needfull to have a good army in the field to preſerve them withall, ſo that he reſolved to raze them all. Pope Julius, having driven the Bentivogli out of Bolonia, built a Cittadell there, and cauſed a governor of his to ranſacke them ſhrewdly, inſomuch that the people rebelled, and he ſuddenly loſt the Cittadel, ſo that it ſerved him to little purpoſe, or rather wronged him as much, as carrying himſelf otherwiſe it could have helped him. Nicolas of Caſtello father of the Ʋitelli, returning into his Country from whence he had been baniſhed, forthwith demoliſhed two ſeveral fortreſſes, which Pope Sextus the fourth had built there, deeming that not the fortreſs, but the peoples good wills were more likely to continue him in his State. But of all other examples, the freſheſt and of moſt remarke in every point, and that which is fitteſt to ſhew the incommodity of building them, and the fruit of razing them, is that of Genua which fell out in theſe latter times. It is well known how that Genua in the yeare 1507. rebelled againſt Lewis the Twelfth, King of France, who came in perſon, and with all his ſtrength to regain it: which being done, he cauſed an exceeding ſtrong Cittadel to be built there, ſurpaſſing in ſtrength all others that are now adaies known: for in regard of the ſcituation, and the other circumſtances belonging thereto, it was impregnable, being placed upon the very point of a hill, which ſtretched it ſelf out into the ſea, called by the Genueſes, Godefa. And hereby the whole port, and a great part of the Town of Genua was ſubject to its battery: It happend afterwards in the year of our Lord God 1512. when the French were driven out of Italy, for all the fortreſs, Genua rebelled and Octavian Fregoſo recovered the State thereof, who by his induſtry in the terme of 16 moneths took it by famine, and as every one beleeved, ſo he was adviſed by many, to reſerve it for his refuge in any accident. But he, as he was exceeding wiſe, knowing that they were not fortreſſes, but mens good wills that preſerved Princes in their ſtate, razed it to the ground, And ſo without laying the foundation of his dominion upon the fortreſs, but rather upon his own valour and judgement, he hath continually held it, and holds it yet. And whereas a thouſand foot were formerly of force to charge the ſtate of Genua, his adverſaries have ſince aſſailed it with ten thouſand, and have not been able to hurt him. By this therefore it appears, how the demoliſhing of the fortreſs hurt not Octavian at all, nor did the building of it advantage the King of France: for when he was able to come into Italy bringing an army with him, he might recover Genua, though he had no fortreſs there; but when he could bring no army with him into Italy, neither could he keep the Genueſes in obedience, though he had a fortreſs there. It was therefore an expence to the King to build it, and a ſhame to loſe it, and to Octavian a glory to regain it. But let us come to thoſe Republiques that raiſe up fortreſſes, not in their native countries, but in thoſe they have conquered. And to ſhew this fallacy, if that example of France and Genua ſuffice not, this of Florence and Piſa may, where the Florentines had built a cittadel, to keep that town in ſubjection: And never adviſed themſelves, that a City which had alwaies been a proſeſſed enemy to the Florentines, having lived free, which hath a recourſe to liberty for a colour of Rebellion, it was neceſſary (being deſirous to keep her) to uſe that manner the Romans had, either to take her as a companion into the ſtate, or to deface and ruine her: for of what value cittadels are, we ſaw in King Charles his comming into Italy, to whom they were yeelded, either through the treachery or cowardiſe of their governors. Whereas if they had not been, the Florentines would never have grounded their ability of keeping Piſa ſtil upon them, nor would the King have been of power that way to have bereaved the Florentines of that City; and thoſe means, whereby untill that time it had been maintained, would peradventure have been of force to preſerve it. And without doubt they could not have made a worſe triall, then that of the fortreſſes. I conclude therefore, that for the ſafety of ones native Country, a ſtrong hold is but hurtfull; & to keep under Towns that are conquered, cittadels availe little. And hereunto the Authority of the Romans ſhall ſuffice me, who diſmantelled the Towns they intended to hold by force, & never built up their walls; and if any one againſt this opinion ſhould alledge me the example of Tarentum in ancient times, and in theſe modern that of Breſcia, which places, by means of the cittadells, were recovered from the ſubjects rebellion: I anſwer, that at the years end Fabius Maximus was ſent with the whole Army to recover Tarentum, who would have been able to recover that, though thete had been no cittadell there. And though Fabius put thoſe means in practiſe, yet had they never been, he would have us'd ſome other, which would have produced the ſame effect. And I know not what advantage a cittadell yeelds, that to regain thee the Town, requires a Conſular Army, and a Fabius Maximus for commander, before it can be done. And that the Romans in any caſe had recover'd it plainly, appears by the example of Capua, where there was no cittadell, but they got it by the ſoldiers valor. But to that of Breſcia, I ſay, that ſeldome chances which befell in that rebellion, that the fortreſs which is poſſeſſed ſtill by thy forces (the Town being fallen into rebellion) ſhould have a great army to friend and near hand, as was that of the French: for the Lord De Fois the Kings General being with his army at Bolonia, when he underſtood the loſs of Breſcia, by means of the Fortreſs indeed recover'd the Towne. Therefore that Fortreſs yet ſtood in need (to do any good) of ſuch a one as was the Lord of Fois, and a French army, that in three daies might relieve them; ſo that this example againſt thoſe on the contrary ſide is of ſmall weight: for many fortreſſes have been taken in the wars in our daies, and recover'd by the ſame fortune that the field hath been taken, and recovered again, not only in Lombardy, but in Romania, in the Kingdom of Naples, and in all parts of Italy. But touching the building of ſortreſſes for defence againſt forrain enemies, I ſay, they are not uſefull to thoſe people, nor Kingdoms, who have good armies on foot; they are rather unprofitable, becauſe that good armies without fortreſſes are of force to keep them: but fortreſſes without good armies cannot defend thee. And this we ſee by experience of thoſe who have been held excellent in matters of ſtate and government and other things, as we know the Romans and Spartans were: for if the Romans built no fortreſſes, the Spartans did not only forbear from them, but ſuffered none of their Cities to be wall'd in neither, becauſe they would have no other guard but a mans own valor, to defend him. Whereupon when a Spartan was asked by an Athenian, whether the walls about Athens were not very faire, he anſwered him, yes, if all the inhabitants of the Town were women. To that Prince then that hath good armies, when upon the maritime frontiers of his ſtate he hath a fortreſs, that for ſome few daies he is able to ſuſtain the enemy, till things are ſomewhat order'd, it would ſometimes be of ſmall avail, but of no neceſsity. But when a Prince hath no ſtrong army, fortreſſes either in the heart of his State, or at his frontiers, are hurtfull, or unprofitable: hurtfull, becauſe he eaſily loſes them, and being loſt they make war upon him; or put caſe they are ſo ſtrong, that the enemy cannot take them, they are left behind by the enemies army, and ſo they become of no ſervice. For good armies, if they meet not with very ſharp encounters, enter far into their enemies Countries, 〈◊〉 thout regard either of Town or fortreſs they leave behind them: As it was evident in the ancient Stories, and as we ſee Francis Maria did, who in theſe latter times without any regard of them, left ten of the enemies Cities behind him, to aſſayl that of Vrbin, That Prince then that can raiſe a good army, can do well enough, without having any ſtrong holds: but he that cannot have an army ready, ſhould never build any: well may he fortifie the City of his abode, and keep it in good ſtrength, and the Citizens thereof well diſpoſed, whereby he may be able to ſupport the enemies violence, till either ſome accord, or ſome forrain aid come to his relief. All other deſignes are expenſive in time of peace, and unfruitfull in time of war. And whoſoever ſhall well weigh all this that I have ſaid, ſhall perceive that the Romans as they were in all other their affairs very judicious, ſo were they very well adviſed in this judgement they gave upon the Latins, and the Privernates, where taking no care at all for citadels, they aſſur'd themſelves of them by wiſer and better waies.

IN the Roman Republick the people and the Nobility were ſo far fallen aſunder, that the Veyentes together with the Eburans by means of their diſagreement, thought they might be able quite to root out the Romans: and having levied an Army, and forrag'd all the Country of Rome, the Senate armed out Cneus Manilius and M. Fabius againſt them, who having brought their Army near to that of the Veyntes, they forbear not with all inſolences and reproaches to revile them, and diſgrace the Roman name, and ſuch was their fool-hardineſs and preſumptions that the Romans though then they were ar • ods one with another, came to agreement, and ſo comming to the combat, broke and vanquiſh'd them. We ſee therefore how much men deceive themſelves (as formerly we have treated) in the courſes they take, and that many times where they think to get, they loſe. The Veyentes beleev'd, that by getting upon the Romans that were at variance one with another, they ſhould overcome them, but it prov'd the occaſion of reconcilement to the Romans, but of ruine to themſelves: for the cauſes of diſcord in Republicks, is moſt commonly idleneſs and peace; and the cauſe of union and concord is fear and war. Wherefore had the Veyentes been wiſe, the more at variance they had perceived Rome to have been, ſo much the more ſhould they have forborn from war againſt them, and with devices of Peace caſt about how to maſter them. The way is, to endeavour to be reputed a confident friend of that City, which is in diſcord: and whiles they come not to armes, to carry himſelf as an Umpire between both parties. And when they do come to armes, to afford ſome ſlow favours to the weaker party, as well to keep them ſtill at war, and conſume them, as to hinder them from doubting that with thy great forces thou meaneſt to ſuppreſs them, and become their Prince. And when this part is well plaid, it cannot fail ordinarily, but that it will directly have the ſucceſs thou lookeſt for. The City of Piſtoya (as in another diſcourſe and to another purpoſe I ſaid) came to the Florentines Republick, by no other trick than this: for it being divided in factions, the Florentines now favouring the one, and then the other without any imputation of blame from either, brought them to ſuch terms, that being tir'd with their tumultuous living, they came willingly to caſt themſelves into the Florentines armes. The City of Siena never changed her State upon the Florentines favour, but when their courteſies came but thin and ſmall: for when they were frequent and ſtrong, they united them rather for the defence of the State in which they liv'd. I will adde to theſe aforeſaid one other example. Philp Viſconti Duke of Milan, ſeveral times made war againſt the Florentines, grounding much upon their diſagreements, and alwaies came off a loſer. Whereupon he was wont to ſay, when he complained of the evill ſucceſs of his undertakings, that the Florentines follies had made him ſpend two millions of gold to no purpoſe. Therefore (as it was ſaid before) the Veyentes and the Etruſcans deceived themſelves by this conceit of theirs, and were at laſt in a ſet battell vanquiſh'd by the Romans. And thus will others find themſelves deceiv'd, whoever ſhall ſeek by the like courſe, and upon the ſame occaſion to ſubdu any nation or people.

I Eeleeve it is one of the greateſt parts of wiſdome in men, to abſtain from threatning or injuring of any one in words; for neither the one nor other bereave the enemy of any part of his ſtrength; but the one makes him more wary of thee, and the other bear more deadly hatred againſt thee, and deviſe by all manner of waies he can to hurt thee. This is plain by the example of the Veyentes, whereof we ſpake in the former Chapter: who to the wrong of making war againſt the Romans, added the reproach of words, from which every prudent Commander ought to reſtrain his ſoldiers: ſo that they are things that incenſe and provoke the enemy to revenge, and are no defence (as it is ſaid) againſt the hurt he does, inſomuch that they are all weapons thrown from thee, which returne againe upon thee, Whereof there followed a notable example a good while ſince in Aſia, where Gabades a Commander of the Perſians, having a long while lien incamped before Amida, and determined upon the tediouſneſs of the ſiege to depart, and therefore to that purpoſe riſing with his campe, thoſe of the Town being come all upon the walls, and grown inſolent upon their victory, forbore no kind of outrage, diſgracing, blaming and reproaching the enemy with his baſeneſs and cowardiſe: whereupon Gabades being incenſed, alter'd his purpoſe, and return'd to the ſiege, where ſuch was their indignation at the contumely, that in a few daies they took and ſack'd the Town. In the ſame manner it befell the Veyentes, who were not content (as is ſaid) to make war againſt the Romans, but they rayl'd on them in vile termes, going even to their very trenches to reproach them, ſo that they incenſed them more with their words then blowes: and thoſe ſoldiers which were hardly drawn to fight, conſtrein'd the Conſul to begin to fight, ſo that the Veyentes ſuffer'd, as the others we ſpoke of before, for their inſolence. Wherefore every good Commander of armies, and good Governor of Commonwealths is to practice all poſſible remedies, that theſe injuries or reproaches be not us'd either in the city or the army, neither one among another, nor againſt the enemy: for being practiſed againſt the enemy, there ariſe from thence the aforeſaid inconvenients: and among themſelves they would do worſe, when there is no reparation made, which wiſe and judicious men have alwaies awarded. When the Roman legions left at Capua conſpired againſt the Capuans, as in its place ſhall be related, and a ſedition was there occaſioned by this conſpiracy, (which was afterwards quieted by Valerius Corvinus) among other conſtitutions which were made in the agreement, they ordained very grievous puniſhments for thoſe that ſhould ever reproach any of thoſe ſoldiers with that ſedition. Tiberius Gracchus, who during the warrs with Hannibal was made a Captain over ſome certain number of ſlaves, whom the Romans for want of men had put into armes, ordained ſpecially a capital puniſhment for any that ſhould object to any of them their ſervitude: ſo hurtful a matter (as it is ſaid) was it thought by the Romans to ſet men at nought, and reproach them with any diſgrace; for there is nothing ſo much incenſes men to rage or breeds more hatred in them, whether it be ſpoken in earneſt or in jeaſt. Bitter taunts when they have too Facetiae aſperae quae nimium ex vero traxerunt, acrem ſui memoriam reliquunt. great a mingle of truth with them, leave behind them a very diſtaſtfull remembrance.

IF we conſider well the courſe of humane affaires, wee ſhall many times ſee things come to paſs, and chances happen which the heavens altogether would not, that order ſhould be taken to prevent. And in as much as this, which I ſpeak of, befell Rome, where there was ſo much valor, ſo much Religion and good order, it is no marvail if the ſame thing often fall out in a City or Country that wants the ſaid things: and becauſe this place is very remarkable to ſhew the power heaven hath over human things, T. Livius at large and with words of very great efficacy repreſſes it, ſaying, that the heavens would for ſome end, that the Romans ſhould know their power; and therefore caus'd thoſe Fabij to erre, that were ſent Ambaſſadors to the French, and by their means provokt them to make war againſt Rome. And afterwards ordaind, that for the ſuppreſſing of that war, there was nothing done in Rome worthy of the Romans, having firſt ordain'd, that Camillus, who only was able to remedy ſo great a miſchief ſhould then be baniſhed to Ardea. And then the French comming towards Rome, they who to reſiſt the fury of the Volſci and many their neighbouring enemies, had ſeveral times created a Dictatour; now upon the approach of the French never created any. Moreover, for their choyce of Soldiers, it was very weake, and without any extraordinary diligence: & they were ſo ſlow in taking of arms, that they were hardly time enough to incounter the French at the river Allia, ten miles from Rome. Here the Tribuns pitcht their campe without any ordinary diligence: not viewing the ground firſt, neither incompaſſing it with trench or pali • ado, making uſe neither of human nor divine helps. And in ranging of their battell, they left their ranks so thin and weak, that as well the Soldiers as the Captains did nothing worthy of the Roman diſcipline. They fought afterwards without any effuſion of blood, for they fled before they were aſſayl'd: the greater part went thence to Veium, the other retir'd to Rome, who never going into their own houſes, went unto the Capitoll: ſo that the Senate taking no care to defend Rome, did not ſo much as ſhut the gates, and part of them fled from thence, and part got into the Capitoll; yet in defence thereof, they had not ſuch diſorder; for they did not cloy it with unuſual people, they furniſhed it with all the Corne they could poſſibly get, that it might endure out the ſiege: and the greater part of the unprofitable multitude of old men, women, and children, fled unto the neighbouring Towns about, the reſt ſtaid at Rome for a prey to the French. So that whoever ſhould have read of the brave atchievements of that people many years before, and afterwards of theſe times following them, would have much a do to beleeve it were the ſame people. And T. Livius having reckon'd up the aforeſaid diſorders, concludes thus, So much does fortune Adeò obcaecat animos fortuna, cum vim ſuam refringi non vult. blind mens eyes, when ſhee would not have her force withſtood. Nor can this concluſion be more true. Whereupon men that are alwaies under hard croſſes deſerve the leſs blame, as they that enjoy continuall proſperity alſo merit leſs prayſe; for we ſhall many times ſee thoſe led to their deſtruction, and theſe advanc'd to an extraordinory greatneſs by ſome occaſion the heavens have preſented in their furtherances hereto, giving means to the one to behave himſelf vertuouſly, & quite bereaving the other of them. And we may well ſay fortune does this, for ſhe makes choyce of a man (when ſhe purpoſes to bring great matters to paſs) of ſuch judgement and ſpirit, that knows how to make uſe of thoſe occaſions ſhe preſents him. So in like manner, when ſhee would bring horrible deſtructions upon any Place, ſhe there preferrs men to that purpoſe, that they may help to draw on that ruine. And in caſe there be any that may prevent theſe miſchiefes, ſhee either brings him to his end, or elſe deprives him of all abilities to do any goood. This we very well know by our Authors diſcourſe, how that fortune for to amplify Rome, and to bring it to that greatneſs it attain'd to, deemd it neceſſary to ſcourge it, as we ſhall diſcourſe at large in the beginning of the next book following, but yet would not wholly ruin it. And this appears, in as much as ſhee baniſhed Camillus, but put him not to death: ſhee made Rome be taken, but not the Capitoll: ſhee ordein'd that the Romaus ſhould not think out any thing of avayle to ſave Rome; yet for defence of the Capitoll, they wanted of no good advice. To the end Rome ſhould be taken, ſhe cauſd the greater part of thoſe Soldiers, that were routed at Allia, to go to Vejum. And as for defence of the City of Rome, ſhe cut off all the waies to order it, ſo ſhee prepar'd every thing ready to recover it again, having conducted an intire Roman Army to Vejum, and Camillus to Ardea, whereby they might be able to make a ſtrong head under the command of a Captain never blemiſhed with any diſgrace of loſs yet, & throughly whole in his reputation, for the recovery of his Country. Wee might here produce ſome modern example to confirm what wee have ſaid: but becauſe I think it unneceſſary, being this may well ſuffice, I ſhall omit it. I avow therefore this to be very true, as by many hiſtories wee may ſee it, that men may well follow fortune, but not oppoſe it; they may well weave her webs, but not break them. Wherefore let men never abandon themſelves, being they know not what ſhall become of them in the end, the paſſages of their fortunes being through crooked and unknown waies; they ſhould ever hope, and ſo hoping put on ſtill, and never give over in deſpaire, whatſoever chance or trouble they be faln into.

THe Romans were ſtraightly beſiegd in the Capitoll, and however they lookt for ayd from Vejum, and from Camillus, being forc't by famine, they came to termes of agreement with the French, to redeem themſelves for a certain ſum of money, upon which agreement, as they were weighing the gold, Camillus, arriv'd with his Army, which fortune brought to paſs (ſaies our Hiſtorian) to the end that the Romans ſhould not live Ut Romani auro redempti non viverent redeemd by gold. Which thing is not only remarkable in this part, but in the proceſe of this Commonwealths actions, where it is evident, that they never vanquiſhed Towns with moneys, nor ever bought peace by mony, but by proweſſe in the warres. Which I think never befell any other Republick; and among other ſignes by which a man diſcerns the power of a State, he is to marke in what manner it lives with the neighbouring States. And when it is ſo orderd, that they become tributaries thereunto, to keep friendſhip with it, there is an aſſured ſign, that that State is powerfull. But when the ſaid neighbours, though inferious to it, draw money from thence, there is then a great evidence of the weakneſs thereof. Read all the Roman Stories, and ye ſhall ſee how the Maſſilians, the Aeduans, the Rhodians, Hiero, the Siracuſan, Enmenes, and Maſſiniſſa Kings joyning upon the confines of the Roman Empire, to have friendſhip with it, concur'd in expences and tribute at all times that need was, ſeeking after no other requitall thereof, but to be protected by it. Wee ſhall ſee the contrary in poor and feeble States; and ſo beginning at ours of Florence in the times paſt, even when the reputation thereof was at the greateſt, there was never a great Lord in Romania, that had not ſome allowance from thence, and beſides ſhe gave to thoſe of Perugia, and Caſtella, & to all the reſt of her neighbours. For had this City been warlick and ſtrong, the contrary would have followd; for all thoſe to have been under the protection of it, would have given money, and have ſought to buy its friendſhip, and not to ſell their own. Neither have the Florentines alone liv'd in this baſeneſs, but the Venetians, and the King of France, who, though a Prince of great Dominions, lives tributary to the Swiſſes, and the King of Engl. The cauſe whereof is, in that he diſarmes his ſubjects, and becauſe that King and thoſe other afore-named had rather enjoy a preſent profit to rack their people and ſqueeſe them, and avoid rather an imaginary than a real danger, than do ſuch expedients as would ſecure and for ever make their States happy. Which diſorder, though ſome while it may produce quiet, yet in time it proves the cauſe of want, loſſes, and unrecoverable ruine. And it would be too long to relate, how many times the Florentines, the Venetians, and this Kingdome, have redeemd themſelves even in the warrs, and how many times they have ſubjected themſelves to diſgrace, which the Romans were only once like to have done. It would be tedious to tell, how many Towns the Florentines and Venetians have bought, whereof afterwards the inconvenience hath been found, and how that thoſe things that are bought with gold, men know not how to deſend with the ſword. The Romans obſervd this brave way and manner of living, while they were free; but after they came under their Emperors governments, and that thoſe Emperors grow naught, and lov'd the ſhade, and could not endure any toyle in the Sun, they began alſo to redeem themſelves, ſomtimes from the Parthians, ſomtimes from the Germans, and now and then alſo from ſome others of their neighbours, which was the beginning of that great Empires ruine. Whereupon aroſe the like inconvenients from their having diſarm'd their people, from whence alſo proceeds another greater, that the nearer thy enemy comes to thee, the weaker he finds thee; for whoſoever lives after that manner we have ſpoken of above, treats evill thoſe ſubjects he hath within his dominions, becauſe his men are not ſo well diſciplin'd in the wars, as to keep the enemy from entring into the heart of their Country Whence it proceeds, that to keep the enemy off: he allows ſome proviſion of moneys to thoſe Princes or people that border upon his Country. And thereupon, thoſe States make ſome reſiſtance upon the confines only, which when the enemy hath paſt, they have no kind of remedy left: and they perceive not, that this their manner of proceeding, is quite contrary to all good order: for the heart and the vital parts of a body are to be arm'd, and not the extremities thereof; for it can live without thoſe, but if theſe be hurt it dyes: but theſe States keep the heart diſarm'd, and arme their hands and feet. What this diſorder hath done at Florence, hath been and is daily ſeen: for when any Army poſſes the frontiers, and enters near to the heart of the Country, there is no further remedy. Wee ſaw not long ſince the ſame proof of the Venetians; and had not their. City been begirt by the waters, we ſhould have ſeen an end of it. Wee have not ſo often ſeen this tryal in France, becauſe it is ſo great a Kingdom, that it hath few enemies mightier than it: nevertheleſs. when the Engliſh invaded that Country in the year 1513. the whole Country quak'd, and the King himſelf, and every one thought, that one defeat alone would have been ſufficient to loſe him the State. The contraty befell the Romans; for the nearer the enemy approached to Rome, the more able he found the City to make reſiſtance. And it was evident, when Hannibal came into Italy, that after three defeats, and the ſlaughters of ſo many Captains and ſoldiers, they were not only able to ſuſtain the enemy, but to vanquiſh him. All this proceeded from that they had well armd the heart, and made ſmall account of the extremities; for the foundation of their State was the people of Rome; and the Latins, and the other Townes their allyes in Italy, and their Colonies, from whence they drew ſo many Soldiers, that with them they were able to fight with and keep in awe the whole world. And that this is true, it appears by the queſtion Hanno the Carthaginian put to Hannibals agents, after that great overthrow at Canna, who having exceedingly magnified Hannibals great acts, were asked by Hanno, whether any of the Komans were yet come to demand peace, or if any Town of the Latins, or any of their Colonies had yet rebelld againſt the Roman; and they denying the one and the other, Hanno reply'd, Then is the warr yet as intire as it was at firſt. We ſee therefore by this diſcourſe, and what wee have otherwhere ſaid, what difference there is between the proceedings of Republicks now adayes, and thoſe of the ancients. Wee ſee alſo hereupon every day exceeding great loſſes, and wonderfull great conqueſts: for where men are but of ſmall valour and reſolution, fortune ſhews much power: and becauſe ſhee is alwaies various, therefore do Common-wealths and States change often, and will alwaies change, till at length ſome one ſtand up, who is ſo much a lover of antiquitie, as to regulate her, that ſhe take not occaſion to ſhew at every turne of the Sun, how great her power is.

I Think it fit for him (that by reading of Livies ſtory would make advantage thereof) wel to conſider all the waies of the people and Senate of Romes proceedings: and among other things that merite conſideration, his is one, to ſee with what authority they ſent forth their Conſuls, Dictators, & Commanders of armies, which we ſee was very great, and the Senate reſerved thing elſe to themſelves, but a power to make new wars, and to confirme peace, but they referred every thing elſe to the arbitrement and power of the Conſul: for when the people and the Senate had once reſolved on the war, (as for example ſake againſt the Latines) they left all the reſt to the Conſuls diſcretion, who had free power either to fight a batttel, or to leave it, and to beſiege either this, or any other town elſe as he pleas'd. Which things by many examples are verified, and eſpecially by that which fell out in an expedition againſt the Tuſcans: for Fabius the Conſul having overcome them near unto Sutrium, and intending with his army to paſs the wood Cimina, and go into Tuſcany, he did not onely not adviſe with the Senate, but gave them no notice at all of it, though he was to make the war in a new countrey full of doubts and dangers: which is witneſſed by a reſolution of the Senate taken directly againſt this very courſe; who having underſtood of the victory Fabius had gotten, and doubting he would venture to paſs the ſaid woods into Tuſcany, thinking it would be well not to try that war, nor ruin that hazzard, ſent two Deputies unto Fabius, to give him notice, they would not have him paſs into Tuſcany: who came thither, when he had already paſt, and gotten the victory, and in liew of hindring the war, they returned Ambaſſadors of his conqueſt and victory gotten. And whoſoever conſiders theſe termes, will find them diſcreetly uſed: for if the Senate would have had the Conſull to proceed on forwards in the war, onely as they gave him order, they had made him leſs circumſpect, and ſlower in his actions: for he would have thought, that the glory of the victory had not bin wholly his, but that the Senate had participated with him, by whoſe counſe he had bin governed. Beſides this, the Senate then obliged themſelves to adviſe in things they could not have the means to underſtand. For, notwithſtanding than among them there were men exceedingly well experienced in the wars, yet being they were not upon the place, and therefore ignorant of very many particulars, which are needfull for him to know that will adviſe well, by interpoſing their Councell, they would have committed many errors. And for this cauſe they ſuffered the Conſul to do all of himſelf, and that the glory thereof ſhould be entirely his, the love of which they thought would provoke and encourage him to do well. I have the more willingly marked this place, becauſe I ſee that the Republiques now adayes, as the Venetian and the Florentine, underſtand it not ſo: and if their Commanders, Proveditours, and Commiſſioners are to plant any battery, they will know it firſt, and adviſe thereupon. Which courſe deſerves the ſame praiſe the others do, which altogether have brought them into thoſe miſeries they now ſuffer.

IT is moſt true, that all things in the world have an end of their life: but thoſe things eninjoy that courſe that is generally ordaind them by heaven, whichdiſorder not their body, but govern it in ſuch a regular courſe, that either it changes not, or if it does, it is for the better, and not for the worſt. And becauſe I ſpeak of mixt bodies, ſuch as are Republiques and ſects, I ſay, that thoſe changes are for the health thereof, which bring them back to their firſt beginnings: and therefore are they the beſt order'd, and ſubſiſt the longeſt which (by the help of their own orders) may often be renewed, or that by accident without the ſame orders attain to the ſaid renovation. And it is more clear than the light, that theſe bodies not being renewed, laſt not; and the way to renew them is (as is ſaid) to reduce them to their firſt beginnings; for all beginnings of Sects, Commonwealths and Kingdoms, muſt needs contain ſome goodneſs in them, by means whereof they recover their firſt reputation and increaſe: for in proceſs of time that goodneſs growes corrupt, and unleſs ſomething happen, that reduces it to the juſt mark, that body muſt needs be deſtroyed. And our Doctors of Phyſick ſay (ſpeaking of the bodies of men) That a man daily gathers ſome • tidie aggregatur ali •• , quod quandoque get curatione. evil, which ſometimes hath need of cure. This reducing to the beginning (ſpeaking of Commonwealths) is done either by ſome outward accident, or by ſome prudence within. Touching the firſt, we ſee it was neceſſary, that Rome ſhould be taken by the French, if we would have her ſpring again; and thus ſpringing again, ſhould recover a new life, and a new vertue, and take her ſelf a new to the obſervance of religion, and juſtice, which began in her to be much blemiſh'd, which we may eaſily gather by the Story of Livie, where he ſhews that in drawing gut the army againſt the French, and in creating the Tribunes with Conſular power, they obſerved not any religious ceremonie: ſo in like manner, they did not onely not puniſh the three Fabij who againſt the law of nations had fought againſt the French, but created them tribunes. And we may well think, that of other good laws alſo ordained by Romulus, and their other ſage Princes, they began now to hold leſs eſteem than was reaſonable, or neceſſary to maintain a free government. This forrain blow therefore lit on them, to the end they ſhould anew betake themſelves to all the old orders of their City, and to ſhew that people, that it was not neceſſary not only to maintain religion and juſtice, but to eſteem well of their good Citizens, & to make more account of their vertue, than of thoſe profits, which they thought they loſt or got by their means: Which we ſee, came directly to paſs; for preſently after Rome was recovered from the French, they renewed all the rites of their ancient Religion, they puniſhed thoſe Fabij who fought againſt the Law of Nations, and afterwards made ſuch account of Camillus his vertue and goodneſs, that the Senate & all others wholly laying envy aſide, gave the whole government of the Commonwealth into hit hands. It is neceſſary therefore (as I have ſaid) that men, who live together in any order, ſhould often reviſe themſelves, either upon occaſion given by outward, or elſe by inward accidents. And for theſe laſt, they muſt either proceed from a law, which may take a review as it were of the men that are in that body, or elſe from ſome good man that may ariſe among them, who by his example & vertuous actions may work the ſame effect, which that law or order can. This good then ariſes in Common-wealths, by the vertue of ſome man, or the force of ſome order. And touching this laſt, thoſe orders that reduc'd the Roman Republick to its own beginning, were the Tribuns of the people, the Cenſors, & all thoſe other laws, which were made againſt the ambition or inſolence of men, which orders have need to be quicken'd by the vertue of ſome one Citizen, that couragiouſly joynes with them for their execution, maugre the power of thoſe that break them. The executions whereof, before the ſacking of Rome by the French, were notable, the death of Brutus his ſons, the death of thoſe of the Decemvirate, that of Melius touching the laying down the price of their corne: after the taking of Rome, was the death of Manlius Capitolinus, the death of the ſon of Manlius Torquatus, the execution which Papirius Curſor did upon the Commander of his Cavallerie, the accuſation of the Scipios: which things being they were extraordinary & remarkable, whenoſever any of them did chance, cauſed men more ſtrictly to conforme themſelves to the exact rule; and when theſe began to fall out ſeldom, then began they to give men more leiſure to grow naught, and become more dangerous and tumultuous; for from one to another of ſuch like executions, there ſhould not paſs more than ten years time; for after ſuch a time men begin again to change their manners and treſpaſs againſt the lawes: and unleſs ſomething chance, which anew calls the puniſhment to memory, and puts them in fear thereof, there meer together ſo many delinquents, that without danger they cannot be puniſhed. To this purpoſe, they who govern'd the State of Florence from 1434. to 1494. ſaid it was neceſſary every fift year to reforme the State, otherwiſe it was hard to maintain it; and they call'd reforming of the State, to put that terror and fear in men, which they caus'd in them at the firſt founding of the lawes, having then ſeverely puniſh'd thoſe that had offended againſt their manner of living. But when the memory of that puniſhment is once extinguiſhed, men again take the boldneſs to attempt ſome innovations, and ſpeak ill of the preſent State: and therefore it is neceſſary to take order for it by reducing it to the firſt grounds. Alſo this bringing back of Republiques to their beginnings, ariſes ſometimes from the plain vertue of ſome one man, without dependance on any law, inciting thee to any execution: yet are they of ſo great reputation, and of ſuch remarke, that the good men deſire to follow them, and the bad are aſham'd to live contrarily to them. Thoſe that in Rome particularly worked theſe good effects, were Horatius Cocles, Scevola, Fabritius, the two Decij, Regulus, Attilius, and ſome others, who by their rare and worthy examples, in Rome wrought the ſame effect that good lawes and good orders could. And if the forenamed executions of lawes together with theſe particulars examples had ſucceeded every ten years in this City, it had been of neceſſary conſequence that it could never be corrupted: but as the one and the other of theſe two things began to fall out ſeldome, the corruptions multiplied: for after Marcus Regulus the like example was never more ſeen. And though in Rome there aroſe the two Catoes, yet ſuch was the diſtance between him and them, and between them, from th'one to th'other, and they remained ſo alone, that with their good examples they could effectuate no good thing, and eſpecially the laſt Cato, who finding a great part of the City corrupted, could not prevaile ſo by his example, as to better his Citizens And this may ſuffice for Republicks. But touching Religions, wee ſee alſo theſe reformations are neceſſary, by example of our Religion: which had it not been reduc'd again to its principles by Saint Francis, and Saint Dominique, it would have been quite defac'd: for theſe by their poverty, and their imitation of Chriſts life, made a new impreſſion thereof in mens minds, which was quite blotted our thence: and their new rules were ſo powerfull, and now are the cauſe that the diſhoneſty of the Prelates, and the heads of the Religion, do not ruine it, partly by their living in poverty, and partly by the great credit they have in confeſſing the people, and preaching to them, whereby they give them to underſtand that it is evill, to ſpeak evil againſt him that is evill; and that it is good, rather to live in obedience to them; and if they are faulty, to leave them to the chaſtiſement of God. And ſo they offend the moſt they can; for they feare not the puniſhment they ſee not, and beleeve not. This reformation then hath and does maintain this Religion. Kingdomes alſo have need of reforming and reſtoring their laws to their firſt beginnings. And wee ſee how much good this does in the Kingdom of France; Which Kingdom is governed more by its lawes and cuſtomes than any other Kingdom elſe. Of which lawes and cuſtomes, the Parliaments are the principal maintainers, and eſpecially that of Paris, which reſtores them again to life, whenſoever it makes any execution againſt a Prince of the Realm, and that they condemn the King in their ſentences: and till this preſent it hath maintained it ſelf, by being an obſtinate executioner againſt that Nobility: but whenſoever it ſhould ſuffer any of their faults to eſcape unpuniſhed, and they chance to multiply, without doubt it would come to paſs that either they were to be corrected with great diſorder, or that Kingdom come to a diſſolution. Therefore we conclude that there is nothing more neceſſary in a politick government, Sect, Kingdom, or Commonwealth that it be, than to reſtore it to that reputation which in its firſt beginning it had, and take a care that either the cuſtomes be good, or the men good, that they may rather work this effect, that it be not left to ſome forraign force to do it: For (however that ſometimes it be an excellent remedy, as it prov'd to Rome) yet is it ſo dangerous, that it is in no caſe to be deſir'd: And to make it appear to any man, how much the actions of particular men ſerved to advance Romes greatneſs, and wrought many good effects in that City, I will come to the narration and diſcourſe of them, within the bounds whereof wee will conclude this third Book, and laſt part of this firſt decade. And howbeit the Kings actions were great and remarkable, being the Hiſtory ſets them down at large, we ſhall omit them, nor ſpeak of them otherwiſe, unleſs it be touching ſome thing they did belonging to their private advantage; and here we will begin with Brutus, Father of the Roman liberty.

NO man was ever reputed ſo ſage or wiſe for any thing that ever he did, as Junius Brutus deſerves to be accounted for taking upon him the perſon of a fool; and though Titus Livius expreſſes no other but one reaſon to induce him thereto, which was to live in ſecurity, and preſerve his patrimony; yet if we conſider his manner of proceeding, we may beleeve, that he thus diſſembled, to the end he might be leſs obſerved, & have the more conveniency to ſuppreſs the Kings, and free his Country, upon any occaſion offered. And that he thought upon this, it appears firſt in the interpretation he made of Apolloes Oracle, when he fained to fall down, that he might kiſs the ground, deeming thereby that the Gods favour'd his deſignes; and afterwards when at the occaſion where Lucretia was ſlain, among the Father, husband, and other of her kindred, he was the firſt that drew the knife out of the wound, and made thoſe that were preſent ſweare they would never more endure in time to come a King in Rome. From his example are thoſe to learn, that are diſcontented with any Prince: and firct they ſhould meaſure and weigh their own forces: and if they are ſo powerfull, that they are able to diſcover themſelves as enemies, and openly make war againſt him, then ought they plainly go that way, as leaſt dangerous and the morehonorable. But if they be of ſuch condition, that they are not able to enter into termes of open hoſtilitie againſt him, then ought they to uſe al induſtry in ſeeking to gain his favour; and to this effect enter into him by all thoſe waies that are fit, following him in his ſports, and taking pleaſure in all thoſe things they ſee he delights in. This familiarity firſt cauſes thee to live ſecure, and without running any hazard, gives thee means to enjoy that Princes good fortune with him, and layes the way open to thee to ſatisfie thy own mind. It is true that ſome ſay, they would not ſtand ſo near the Princes, as to be oppreſſed with their ruines, nor ſo far off, but that when their ruine comes, they may be able time enough to riſe upon ſome part of their ruines. Which middle way would be the trueſt, were it rightly kept. But becauſe I think it is impoſſible, it is meet to reduce it to the two waies above mentioned, which is either to be at large from them, or cleave cloſe to them. Hee that does otherwiſe, if he be a man of eminent qualities, lives in continuall danger. Nor ſufficeth it to ſay, I care not for any thing, I deſire neither honors, nor wealth, I will live quietly, and without entring into any faction; for theſe excuſes are heard, but paſs not as current. Neither can men of quality chuſe this ſtanding quiet, however that heartily they make choyce of it and without any ambition, becauſe they are not beleeved in it, in ſo much as though they themſelves would, yet others will not let them live ſo. They muſt then play the fool as Brutus did; and he plaies the fool a great deal, that prayſes, and prates to them, is preſent at, and bears a part in thoſe things that are againſt his own mind, to comply with his Princes delights. And ſeeing we have ſpoken of this mans wiſedome in recovering of the State, we will now ſpeak of his ſeverity in maintaining it.

B Butus his ſeverity was no leſs neceſſary than uſefull to maintain Rome in the liberty ſhe had gotten, which was of rare example in all memorials of things happen'd, to ſee the Father ſit on his Tribunal, and not only condemn his ſons to death, but be preſent and aſſiſtant at it. And this is alwaies well known to thoſe that read ancient ſtories, how that after the change of a State, either from a Republick into a Tyranny, or from a Tyranny into a Republick, ſome memorable execution upon the enemies of the preſent condition is needfull. And hee that ſets up a Tyranny, and flaies not Brutus; and hee that brings in liberty, and ſlayes not Brutus his ſons, can hardly ſubſiſt. And becauſe for merly wee have diſcourſed hereof at large, I referr my ſelf to what was then ſpoken hereof. I ſhall alledge here only one example which was in our times, and in our Country: that of Peter Soderini, who thought with his patience and goodneſs to overcome that paſſionate deſire which was in the ſons of Brutus, to return under another government, but deceived himſelf therein. And albeit hee by his wiſdome perceived well this neceſſity, and that the way and ambition of thoſe that ſhov'd againſt him, gave him occaſion to extinguiſh them, yet hee never bent his mind to it: for beſides his opinion that he was able by patience and goodneſs to worke out all ill humors, and by liberality towards them, to weare out any enmity was borne againſt him, hee was of advice (as many times by diſcourſe hee ſhewed ſome of his friends) that if hee would ſtrongly incounter the oppoſitions were made againſt him, and maſter his adverſaries, he had need take upon him extraordinary authority, whereby he ſhould break the civil equality among them. Which thing (however that hee ſhould never afterwards act tyrannically) would ſo much affright the multitude, that they would never agree after his death to create a new ſtandard-bearer for life, which dignity he held fit to put forward and maintain. This reſpect was wiſe and good: yet muſt we never ſuffer any evill to continue in regard of a good, being that good may eaſily be ſuppreſt by that evill. And he ſhould beleeve, being his actions and his intentions were to bee judged by their end (in caſe that good fortune and life ſhould have accompanied him) that he could have aſſured every one, how that what he had done, was for the ſafety of his Country, not for his own ambition, whereby he might have been able to regulate things in ſuch a manner, that no ſucceſſor of his could do that for evill, which hee had done for good. But the firſt opinion deceived him, not knowing that malice is not abated by time, nor appeaſed by any good turne. So that becauſe he was ignorant how to imitate Brutus, he loſt together with his Country the State, and his own reputation. And as it is a hard thing to ſave a free State, ſo is it not eaſie to preſerve a Monarchy, as in the Chapter following it ſhall be ſhewed.

THe death of Tarquinus Priſcus cauſd by the ſons of Ancus, and the death of Servius Tullus cauſd by Tarquinius the proud, ſhew how hard and dangerous it is, to deſpoyle any one of a Kingdome, and ſuffer him to live, though he indevour by many favours to gaine him. And we ſee how Tarquinius Priſons was deceived in thinking legally to poſſeſs that Kingdom, in that it was given him by the people, and confirm'd by the Senate. Neither did he beleeve that diſdain could ſo much prevaile with Ancus his ſons, that they would not be ſatisfied, with what all Rome was contented. And Servius Tullus deluded himſelf, in thinking he could with new obligations gain the good will of Tarquins ſons. So that touching the firſt, every Prince may well be adviſd that he cannot live ſure of his Principality, while they live who were bereavd of it. Touching the ſecond, every one that is of power may well remember, that never were old injuries cancelld with new favours, eſpecially when the new favours are leſs of value than the wrongs done And without all doubt Servius Tullus was nothing wiſe to think that Tarquins ſons would patiently endure to be his ſons in law, whoſe King they thought by right they ought to be. And this deſire of reigning is ſo great, that it not only enters their breaſts, that look to ſucceed in the Kingdome, but they alſo who no waies expect it. As in Tarquinius his wife, Servius his young daughter, who would wiſh this rage againſt that piety ſhee ought her father, ſet her husband againſt him, to take his life from him, and his Kingdome thereby; ſo much more accounted ſhe to be a Queen, than the daughter of a King. If then Tarquininus Priſcus and Servius Tullus loſt the Kingdom for not aſſuring themſelves of thoſe upon whoſe right they had uſurpd, Tarquinius the proud loſt it for not obſerving the ancient Kings Cuſtomes, as ſhall be ſhewd in the Chapter following.

I Would not omit to diſcourſe ſomewhat touching Conſpiracies, being they are dangerous for Princes and private men alſo: for wee ſee that more Princes have loſt their lives thereby, and States too, than by open war: becauſe few are able to make open war againſt Princes, but every one may conſpire againſt them On the other ſide, private men enter not into a more dangerous nor raſh enterpriſe than this: for it is full of difficulties, and exceeding perillous every way; From whence proceeds it, that many of them are practiſd, but few ſucceed. To the end there of that Princes may learn to beware of theſe dangers, and private men be more fearful to thruſt themſelves into them, or rather learn to content themſelves to live under that rule which their fortune hath allotted them, I ſhall ſpeak thereof more at large, not omitting any thing remarkable, that may ſerve for inſtruction of the one or the other. And truly that of Tacitus is well termd a golden ſentence, where he ſaies, that men are to reverence things paſt, and ſubmit to what is preſent; and ſhould wiſh for good Princes, but whatſoever they are, endure them: and verily he who does otherwiſe, ruines both himſelf and his Country. Wee muſt then (entring into the matter) conſider againſt whom Conſpiracies are made and wee ſhall find they are plotted againſt amans Country, or againſt his Prince, of which two I intend this preſent diſcourſe: for touching thoſe that are practiſ'd to deliver a Town into the enemies hands that beſiege it, or that have likelihood with this for any cauſe, wee have already ſufficiently ſpoken. And wee will treat in this firſt part, touching that againſt a Prince: and firſt we will examine the reaſons thereof, which are many, though one there is of more importance than all the reſt. And this is general hatred: for that Prince, that hath provok'd general hate, muſt needs have net • ed ſome particulars, ſomwhat more than others, inſomuch that they long to be revengd on him: and they are the more incited hereto, by the general hatred they find conceivd againſt him. A Prince then ought to avoyd theſe publick blames, and how he ſhould behave himſelf to avoid them (having treated otherwhere) I will not now middle: for if he beware well of them, offences againſt particulars ſhall be of ſmall force to hurt him: one reaſon is, becauſe Princes ſeldom light upon men that are ſo ſenſible of an injury as to run ſuch extream hazard to revenge them; the other is, that though they were of ſuch reſolution, and force, as might ſerve to do it, yet would that general good will of men to that Prince withhold them from it. The injuries muſt be either touching the fortunes, lives, or honors. Of thoſe that are touching mens lives, the threats are more dangerous than the execution, or rather the threats are very dangerous; but in the execution there is no danger at all; for he that is dead cannot think upon revenge; and thoſe that remain alive, moſt commonly leave to think of him that is dead: but he that is threatned, and ſees himſelf put to a point, either to do or ſuffer, becomes a very dangerous man to the Prince, as we ſhall ſay particularly in due place. The fortunes and honours of a man are thoſe two things which excepting this neceſſity, touch men more nearely then any other offence, where of a Prince ſhould be wel aware: for he can never ſtrip a man ſo bare, but that he may find a kinfe to revenge himſelf, nor ſo much diſhonour any one, but that he may ſtill hold an obſtinate reſolution of vengeance. And touching honours, the diſhonoring of women is of moſt importance, and after this the ſcorne and diſgrace of their perſons. This armed Pauſanias againſt Philip of Macedon, and this hath put weapons in many others hands againſt divers Princes. And in our dayes Julius Belanti had no other motive to conſpire againſt Pandulphus the tyrant of Siena, but onely for that he had given him one of his daughters to wife and afterwards taken her away from him, as in its place we ſhall relate. The greateſt cauſe the Pazzi had to conſpire againſt the Medici, was, the inheritance of John Bonroſnei, whereof they were diſpoſſeſs'd by their order. And another cauſe, and a very great one too, why men plot treachery againſt a Prince, is a deſire which they have to free their countrey, which hath bin ſeis'd on by him. This mov'd Brutus and Caſſius againſt Caeſar. This incited many others againſt Falaris, Dionyſius, and ſuch other uſurpers of their Countries. Nor can any Tyrant free himſelf from the danger of his humor by other means then by laying down his Tyranny. And becauſe we find none will doe this, there are but few of them that come not to ill ends; Which gave Iuvenal occaſion to ſay, Few Tyrants unto Plutoes Court do goe, Ad generum Cereris ſine caede & ſanguine pauci Deſcendunt Reges & ſic ca morre Tiranni. But that are thither ſent by bloody blow.

The dangers that (as I ſaid before) accompany conſpiracies, are great, and continual: for in ſuch caſes there is danger in plotting them, in executing them, and after they are executed too. Thoſe that conſpire, are either one or more; that of one cannot be termed a conſpiracy, but a ſetled reſolution bred in a man to ſlay a Prince. This alone of all the three dangers, which conſpiracies hazard, is free from the firſt. For before the putting it in execution, it carries no hazard with it, being none is made privy to his ſecret, nor is there any danger, that his purpoſe come to the Princes eare. A reſolution after this ſort may happen to be found in any man of any condition, little or great, Noble or ignoble, familiar or not familiar with he Prince: for at ſome times it is permitted to any man to ſpeak with him and; he that comes to ſpeak with him may vent this paſſion of his minde. Pauſanias, of whom we have otherwhere ſpoken, ſlew Philip of Macodon, as he was going to the Temple environ'd with a thouſand armed men, and between his own ſon and ſon in law; but he was one of the Nobles, and well known to the Prince. A poore and abject Spaniard ſtrook Ferdinand King of Spain with a knife in the neck; however the wound was not mortal, yet hereby it appeared, that he had both courage and opportunity to do it. A Turkiſh Prieſt nam'd Dervis, drew a ſcimitarre againſt Bajazet, father of this preſent Turk, but hit him not, yet wanted he neither courage nor commodity for his purpoſe. Of this ſort of reſolutions thus bent, I think there are many, that would do it: for in willing this, there is neither puniſhment, nor danger at all, but few venture to act it; and of thoſe that do, exceeding few or none there are, that are not ſlaine in the act. Therefore no man willingly will thruſt himſelfe upon a certaine death. But let us leave theſe ſingle reſolutions, and come to conſider the conſpiracies have bin made by great men, or thoſe that are very familiar with the Prince: for others (unleſs they be ſtark mad) will never offer to conſpire: for mean men, and not familiar with the Prince, want all thoſe conveniencies, which are required in the executing of a conſpiracy. Firſt • , mean men cannot find thoſe that will be true to them: for no one man can apply himſelf to their wills for any of thoſe hopes which cauſe men to adventure upon deſperate dangers, ſo that when they have enlarged themſelves to two or three perſons, ſome one of them becomes an accuſer, and ruines all. But in caſe they ſhould be ſo happy, that none ſhould diſcover their plots, yet in the execution are they beſet with ſuch difficulties having not free acceſs unto the Prince) that it is impoſſible, but that there in they muſt periſh: for if great men, who ordinarily come near him, are oppreſs'd with ſuch difficulties, which we ſhall preſently mention, it muſt needs be that with thoſe theſe difficulties muſt perpetually increaſe. Therefore men (becauſe where there is loſſe both of life and fortunes they are not ſtark mad) when they find themſelves weak, are well aware of what they do: and when they are very weary of a Prince, they are contented onely to curſe him, and expect, while thoſe that are of higher quality then themſelves, do avenge them. And yet in caſe that any of ſuch like as theſe ſhould have aſſailed any thing, the deſign they had might well be laudable, but not their wiſdome. We ſee therefore, that thoſe that have conſpired, were all great men, or familiar with the Prince: Whereof many have conſpired, as well being mov'd by too many favors, as by too many injuries. As Perennius was againſt Commodus, Plautianus againſt Severus, Sejanus againſt Tiberius. All theſe were by their Emperors ſo enriched with wealth, and dignified with titles and honours, that it ſeemed there wanted not any thing to perfect their power but the Empire it ſelf, which they meaning not to fail of, betook themſelves to conſpire againſt their Prince, and their treaſons all had that end, which their ingratitude well deſerved. However that among thoſe of this ſort in theſe latter times that of Iacob Apianus againſt Petrus Gambacorti Prince of Piſa ſucceeded fortunately, which Iacobus having had his education and breeding and credit too from him, afterwards took the ſtate from him. Of this ſort was that of Coppola in our dayes againſt Ferdinand King of Arragon, which Coppola having attained to that greatneſs, that he thought he wanted nothing but the Kingdom, meaning not to go without, loſt his life. And indeed if any conſpiracie againſt Princes made by great men be ever like to take effect, this was very probable, being made by one that might have been termed a King for his power and conveniencies he had to work his will. But that greedy ambition which blinds them in their deſire to rule, blinds them as well in the mannaging of this enterpriſe: for if they know how to act this villany with diſcretion, it were impoſſible but it ſhould ſucceed. A Prince then that would be well wary of conſpiracies, ſhould be more jealous of thoſe to whom he hath afforded moſt favours, then of thoſe to whom he hath done moſt wrongs: for theſe want the means, and thoſe have them at pleaſure, and the will is a like; for the deſire of rule is as great or greater then that of revenge. Wherefore they are to confer but ſo much authority upon their favourites, that ſtill between it and the Principality they keep a diſtance, and leave (as it were) ſome obſtacle in their way; otherwiſe ſeldome falls it out but that it chances to them, as to the forementioned Princes. But let us return to our order. I ſay, that being they are to be great men that plot theſe treaſons, and have eaſie acceſs unto the Prince, we are to diſcourſe upon the ſucceſſes of theſe their undertakings, what they have been, and point at the reaſon that hath caus'd them to prove happy or unhappy. And (as I formerly ſaid) at three ſeverall times, herein are dangers found. In the plotting, in the acting, and after. Therefore are there very few that prove lucky: for it is almoſt impoſſible to paſs all theſe happily. And beginning to treate touching the dangers of the the firſt, that are of moſt importance, I ſay, there had need be much circumſpection and adviſement, which likewiſe had need be ſeconded by good fortune, that in the contriving and ordering of a conſpiracy, it be not diſcloſed; for that is done either by relation, or by conjecture. This relation proceeds from the ſmall faith; or ſmall diſcretion of thoſe men with whom thou communicateſt thy ſecret. And it is a thing ordinary to find but ſmall ſaith; for thou canſt not communicate it but to thy confidents, who for love of thee may adventure death, or to men that are diſcontented with the Prince. Of confidents, poſſible it is that one or two may be found; but when thou openeſt thy ſelf to more; it is impoſſible thou ſhouldeſt find them. Beſides the good will they beare thee, had need be very great, to the end they be not affrighted at the puniſhment and peril they incurre. Moreover men are often deceived touching the love, which thou beleeveſt another bears thee, nor canſt thou ever aſſure thy ſelf of it, unleſs thou haſt had experience thereof; and to make proof of it herein is exceeding dangerous; and though thou haſt had proof thereof in ſome other dangerous exploit, where they have ſtuck cloſe upon thee, yet canſt thou not from thence meaſure them for this, being this danger ſurpaſſes all others. If thou meaſureſt their faith by their diſcontent againſt their Prince, therein thou mayeſt eaſily deceive thy ſelf: For ſo ſoon as thou haſt revealed thy mind to that malecontent, thou giveſt him a ſubject whereupon to work again his own content; and either his hatred had need be great, or thy power with him of much force to keep him faithful. Hereupon it ariſes, that very many of them are diſcover'd & cruſh'd even in the egge; and when one of them among many men hath bin kept ſecret any time, it hath bin thought of as a miracle as was that of Piſo againſt Nero, & in our daies that of Laurence and Iulian of Medici, whereunto above fifty perſons were made privy, who met together all to diſcover themſelves in the execution thereof. As for the diſcovery for want of diſcretion, that falls out when a conſpirator is not wary in his talk, ſo that a ſervant or another third perſon comes take notice thereof, as it befe Brutus his ſonnes, who in contriving the buſineſs with Tarquins Ambaſſadors, were underſtood by a ſlave who accuſed them: or elſe through a certain lightneſs of thine own, thou communicateſt it to a woman, or a child which thou loveſt, or ſome ſuch ſlight perſon, as Dimus did, one of thoſe that conſpir'd with Philotas againſt Alexander the Great, who told the treaſon to Nicomacus, a child which he lov'd, who preſently told it to Ciballinus his brother, and Ciballinus to the King. Touching diſcovery by conjecture, we have an example for it, where Piſo conſpired againſt Nero, at which time Sceuinus one of the conſpirators, the day before that he was to ſlay Nero, made his will, and gave order that Milichius his freeman ſhould cauſe his old and ruſty dagger to be ſcoured; he made all his ſlaves free, and gave them money; he appointed many clouts to bind up wounds to be prepared; by which conjectures Milichius being aſſured of the buſineſs, accuſed, him before Nero. Scevinus was taken, and with him Natalis one of the Conſpirators, who had bin ſeen the day before to talk a good while and privately in his company, who not agreeing concerning the diſcourſe they held, were forc'd to confeſs the truth. So that the treaſon was bewraied, and the conſpirators utterly ruin'd. From theſe occaſions of diſcovery it is impoſſible to beware, but that through malice, indiſcretion, or fondneſs all comes to light, whenſoever the complotters thereof paſs the number of three or four; and in caſe that more then one of them chance to be taken, it is impoſſible but that it muſt be ſo; for two cannot be ſo well agreed of all their diſcourſes together, but that in ſome things they ſhall jarre. When one alone that is reſolute, is laid hold on, he may through the ſtrength of his courage, be able to conceal the reſt of his complices: but then muſt his conſors ſhew no leſs reſolution than he, in ſtanding firm and not diſcovering themſelves by flight: for on which ſide ſoever courage failes, either on his that is taken, or his that is at liberty, the conſpiracy is diſcloſd. And the example alleadgd by T. Livius, is very rare in the treaſon that was plotted againſt Ier lamus King of Siracuſa, where Theodorus one of the conſpirators being taken, with a ſtout courage conceald all his companions, and accuſed the Kings friends; and on the other part, all the confederates were confident of Theodorus his reſolution, that not one of them forſook Siracuſa, or made any ſhew of fear, Wherefore all theſe dangers are to be paſſed in the ordering of a conſpiracy, before the acting of it. Againſt which theſe are the remedies; The firſt and trueſt whereof, or better to term it, the only one is, not to give leiſure to our complices to accuſe us, nor communicate the matter unto them, till juſt when thou meaneſt to put it in execution, and not before. They who have thus done, aſſuredly eſcape the dangers belonging to the practiſe thereof; and oftentimes the others alſo, or rather have they all had good ſucceſs: and I think every one that is wiſe ſhould endeavor to carry the matter thus. I will content my ſelf to produce only two examples. Nelematus not being able to indure the tyranny of Ariſtorimus, Tyrant of Epirus, aſſembled together in his houſe many of his friends and kinsfolke, and having encourag'd them to ſet their Country at liberty, ſome of them requir'd time to be adviſed and prepared: whereupon Nelematus cauſd his ſervants to ſhut the doors, and told thoſe he had cald together, That they ſhould either ſwear preſently to do this, or if not, he would deliver them all priſoners to Ariſtotimus: whereby all of them, being mov'd, ſwore, and ſo without more delay, went and put in execution what Nelematus had orderd. One of the Magi having by treachery ſeiſd upon the kingdom of Perſia, Orthanus a great man had notice thereof, and found out the deceit, and thereupon conferd with ſix other Princes of that State, ſaying, he was now underraking to vindicate the Kingdom from the Tyranny of that Magician; and when ſome of them demanded time, Darius roſe up (one of the ſix that was cald by Orthanus) and ſaid, Either wee will all now go and execute this, or elſe I will go and accuſe you all: ſo riſing all by conſent, and not giving any one time to repent himſelf, they happily effected what they deſir'd. Like unto theſe two examples alſo, is the courſe the Aetolians took to put Nabis the Spartan Tyrant to death, who ſent Aleſſamenes a Citizen of theirs with 300 horſe and 1000 foot to Nabis, under colour of giving him ayd: the ſecret they communicated to Aleſſamenes only; the others that were with him they charged to obey him in whatſoever matter it were, under pain of baniſhment. This man went into Sparta, never communicating his Commiſſion to any, till juſt he was to put it in execution, whereupon it fell out that he ſlew him. They then by theſe means eſcap'd the dangers that accompany the plotting and ordering of Conſpiracies; and whoever ſhall do as they did, ſhall alwaies be ſure to eſcape them: And that every one alſo is able ſo to do, I will ſhew by the example of Piſo alledged before. Piſo was a very great man, and of much eſteem, and very familiar with Nero, on whom we much rely'd: And Nero went oftentimes to banquet with him in his gardens: Piſo therefore might have procur'd himſelf friends of ſpirit and courage, and willing too to put ſuch a thing in execution, being a matter eaſie for any great man to compaſs; and when he had had Nero in his gardens, then communicated the buſineſs to them, and with fit words perſwaded them to it, ſo that they could not have had time to refuſe, and impoſſible had it bin, but that it muſt have taken effect. And if we ſhall examine all the others we have mentiond, we ſhall find very few could have bin otherwiſe carried. But men that ordinarily do not well weigh the actions of the world, often commit very great errors, and the greater in thoſe actions, that have ſomething of extraordiry in them, as this. The matter then is never to be communicated, but upon neceſſity, or even at the very acting of it, and yet if thou wilt communicate it, let that be but unto one of whom thou haſt had long experience, or that therein is intereſted upon the ſame reaſons thou art. It is eaſier to find one man of that condition than many, and thereby alſo is leſs danger. Moreover, when he ſhould deceive thee, there were ſome means left yet to deſend thee, which could not be where the conſpirators are many: for it is the ſaying of a wiſe man, that with one alone a man may ſpeak any thing for one man; I, is as good as another mans No, provided that nothing be given by thee under thine own hand-writing. And of writing any thing a man ſhouldbe as wary as of a perilous rock; for nothing convicts thee ſooner than thine own hand. Plautianus having a mind to skill Severus the Emperor, Antonius his ſon, committed the execution of it to Saturninus a Tribune: who purpoſing to accuſe and not obey him, yet doubting when he ſhould come to the tryal, Plautianus would be beleev'd before him, asked him a note under his hand, that might give him aſſurance of his Commiſſion; which Plautianus, blinded with ambition, gave him, whereupon it follow'd, that he was accus'd and convicted by the Tribune, without which, and certain other tokens, Plautianus had carried it clear againſt him, ſo boldly he deny'd it. Therefore when one only accuſes, there may be ſome remedy, eſpecially in caſe thou beeſt not convicted by any writing of thiue, or countermarks, whereof a man ſhould be well aware. In Piſoes conſpiracie there was a woman called Epicaris, which formerly had bin one of Neroes Miſtreſſes, who thinking it would ſerve well to purpoſe to joyn with the conſpirators, one that was a Captain of ſome galleys, which Nero kept for his ſafeguard, opened to him the conſpiracie, but not who were the conſpirators, whereupon that Captain contrary to his word given, accus'd her before Nero; but ſuch was her boldneſs in denying it, that Nero was aſtoniſh'd thereat, & condemned her not. There are then in communicating the matter to one alone two dangers; the one that the party go not voluntarily to accuſe thee, alledging ſome proof againſt thee; the other that he detect thee not conſtraind and forc't thereunto by torture, having been apprehended upon ſome conjecture or ſuſpition had of him: but in either of theſe two dangers there is ſome remedy, being that in the one it may be deny'd, by ſaying the party did it out of hatred he bore thee; and in the other, by alledging that the extremity of torture compell'd him to utter any thing, though falſe. It is wiſdome then to make no man privy to ſuch a ſecret, but rather to order it conformably to the above alledged examples; or in caſe thou revealſt it, not to exceed one, where though there be ſomwhat more danger, yet is there much leſs than when it is diſcoverd to divers. Near unto this courſe is, when a neceſſity conſtrains thee to do that to the Prince, which thou ſeeſt he would do unto thee, which neceſſity is ſo exceſſive, that it gives thee leiſure only to provide for thy ſecurity. This neceſſity brings the buſineſs ordinarily to a good end; and to prove it, two examples ſhall ſuffice mee. Cammodus the Emperor did uſe Lettus and Elettus, Captains of his guard, among his familiar and principal friends, and Martia among his chief Concubines and Miſtreſſes: but becauſe ſometime he had been reprehended by them for ſome things done, whereby he had diſgrac'd his perſon and the Empire, he reſolve'd to put them to death, and writ in a liſt the names of Martia, Lettus, and Eletius, and ſome others, who the night following he meant ſhould die, and ſo put that liſt under his pillow; and when he went to riſe, a little boy which he lov'd, playing about his chamber and his bed, found that liſt, and going out with it in his hand met with Martia, who took it from him, and read it, and having ſeen the contents thereof, ſent for Lettus and Elettus, whereupon they three knowing the danger they were in, reſolv'd to prevent it, and ſo without longer delay the night following ſlew Commodus. Antoninus Caracalla the Emperor was in Meſopotamia with his Armies, whereof Macrinus was chief Commander, a man more politick than wa • lick; and as it comes to paſs, Princes that are not good, are alwaies fe • rfull, leaſt others work againſt them, what they are guilty to themſelves they well deſerve; Antoninus writ to Mate nianus his friend at Rome, that he ſhould inquire of the Aſtrologers if any one aſpird to the Empire, and ſhould adviſe him of it. Whereupon Maternianus writ back unto him, Macrinus was he that aſpired therto; but the Letter comming firſt to Macrinus his hand, before the Emperors, and he thereby perceiving the neceſſity impoſd upon him, agreed with Martialis 〈◊〉 Centurion, one of his confidents (whoſe brother a few daies before Antoninus had ſlain) that he ſhould kill him, which was luckily done by him. It is evident then, that this neceſſity which gives no leiſure, works even the ſame effect which that courſe did, I formerly ſaid, Nelematus of Epirus took. We ſee alſo that prov'd which I ſpoke of in the beginning of this diſcourſe, that Princes threats r • tort more miſchiefes on them, and occaſion more deſperate conſpiracies, than the wrongs they do; wheroef a Prince • ought to take good heed: for men are either to be well treated by them, or at leaſt to be put out of doubt of them, that they be not reducd to ſuch terms, as to think they muſt of force either kill or be kild: Touching the dangers that are incurrd upon the execution, they ariſe either from changing the order given, or from want of courage in the actor, or from ſome error the actor commits for want of judgement, or from the fayle of fully perfecting the matter in hand by leaving ſome of thoſe ſurviving who were appointed for death. I think therefore that nothing ſo much diſturbs or hinders mens actions, as at an inſtant without reſpite of time, to be compeld to alter an order once given, or divert the courſe of it a different way from that it was firſt intended And if this variation cauſes diſorder in any thing, it is in the actions of warr, and ſuch like matters, whereof we now ſpeak: for in ſuch occaſions, there is nothing ſo neceſſary for men to do, as to reſolve with themſelves to execute fully all that is look'd for at their hands. And if men have a good while bent their minds to one courſe or order, and that chance ſuddenly to be alterd, it muſt needs breed ſome diſturbance to them all, and ruine the whole deſign, ſo that it is much better for them to execute any thing according to the order firſt given (however that ſome inconvenient enſue thereupon) then, by deſiring to cancell that, to enter into a thouſand inconveniences. This happens when they have not time to put themſelves in order again: for when a man hath leiſure, he may go his own way he likes beſt. The Conſpiracy of the Pazzi againſt Laurence and Julian of the houſe of Medi • ia, is well known: the order given amongſt them was this, that they ſhould invite the Cardinal of Saint George to dinner, and thereat kill them they intended; where they had their appointments who were to ſlay theſe, as thoſe alſo that were to ſeize on the Palace, and they that were to run about the ſtreets, and call the people together to lay hold of their liberty. It ſo fell out, that the Pazzi and the Medici together with the Cardinal being in the Cathedral Church of Florence at Maſſe, notice was given that Julian would not dine there that day, which cauſed the Conſpirators to conſult together, and what they were to have done in the houſe to thoſe of Medici, they reſolv'd to do in the Church, which gave diſturbance to the whole order: for John Baptiſta de Monte ſacro, would not be guilty of murder committed in the Church, inſomuch as they were forc't to change the actors in every part, who having not time to ſettle & confirm their reſolutions, committed ſuch errors, that in the very execution thereof they were all ruin'd. Courage ſayles him that is to execute any thing, either through reverence of the perſon he is to do the miſchief upon, or through the executioners own innate cowardiſe. Such is the Majeſty and reverence which the preſence of a Prince carries along with it, that it is an ordinary thing for it, either to mitigate or toaffright an executioner. A Slave was ſent to Marius, when he was taken priſoner by the Minturveſes, to kill him, who amaz'd at the preſence of the man, and at the remembrance of his name prov'd ſo cowardly, that he loſt all power to ſlay him. And if there be ſuch power in the perſon of a man that is bound, and in priſon, and in a manner choak'd up with ill fortune, how much more may we think there is in a Prince that is at liberty at • ir'd in the Majeſty of his ornaments of ſtate, and inviron'd with his trayne, inſomuch that the pompe thereof is of force to affright, or elſe with the leaſt courteſie he ſhall receive thee, to humble thee again before him. There were ſome conſpir'd againſt Sitalces King of Thrace, and they appointed amongſt them a day for the execution, and met at the place agreed on where the Prince was, but none of them once mov'd to hurt him, ſo that they parted all thence without attempting any thing, and without knowing what it was that hinder'd them, but blaming one another for the fayle: into ſuch errors they often fall afterwards, in ſo much as the treaſon was diſcover'd, and they ſuffer'd puniſhment for that evill, which they could, but durſt not act. Againſt Alfonſus Duke of Ferrara, two of his own brothers conſpir'd together, and us'd the helpe of one Giannes a Prieſt & Muſitian belonging to that Duke who many times at their intrety brought the Duke amongſt them, ſo that it was in their power to kill him; yet never was any of them ſo hardy as to do it, whereupon at length being diſcoverd they ſuffered for their wickedneſs, and want of wit. This negligence could not proceed from elſewhere then from that of neceſſity the Princes preſence did affright them, or that ſome courteſie he ſhew'd them humbled them. In ſuch executions an inconvenient or error many times ariſes, either for lack of diſcretion or courage: for when the one or other of theſe two once amazes thee, thou art borne forward in ſuch confuſion of thy underſtanding, that it makes thee both ſay and do what thou oughtſt not. And that men are thus aſtoniſhed and confounded, Livie does very well ſhew it, where he ſets forth Alexamenes the Etolian, as he went about to kill Nabis the Spartan, whereof we ſpake formerly, that when hee came to the execution, and diſcoverd to thoſe that were with him, what he was to do, T. Livius ſaies theſe words: He gathers together his wits to him, which Colligit & ipſe animum confuſum tantae cogitatione rei. the conſideration of ſo weighty a matter had ſomewhat diſorderd For it is impoſſible, that any man (though of a reſolute courage, & accuſtomed to the ſlaughters of men, and uſe of his weapons) ſhould not be quite aſtoniſhed. Therefore choice is to be made of men experienced in ſuch matters, nor ſhould one commit them to any other, however he be eſteem'd very couragious: for let no man that hath not formerly made tryall of himſelf, preſume too much upon his courage in the performance of any great exploit. This amazement then may either cauſe thee to let thy weapons fall out of thy hands, or ſuch words from thy month, as may work the ſame effect. Luciila Commodus his ſiſter had ſo order'd it, that Quintianus ſhould kill him. And he awaited Cowmodus in the paſſage into the Theater, where with a naked poinard comming up to him, he cryed out, This the Senate ſends thee; which words caus'd him to be firſt laid hold on, before hee could bring down his arme to ſtrike him. M. Antonius of Volterra appointed (as wee ſaid before) to kill Laurence of Medici, as hee came near him, ſaid, Ah Traitor! which ſaying of his occaſioned the ſafety of Laurence, and the wrack of that Conſpiracy. Such a matter may be fully perfected, when it is practiſed only againſt one head, for the reaſons alledged: but very hardly can it well be accompliſhed againſt two principals, or rather impoſſibly: for it is impoſſible that one and the like action ſhould ſucceed at the ſame inſtant in ſeveral places: for it cannot be, but whither a man will or no, the one ſhall ruine the other, being done at ſeveral times. So that if it be a thing very hazardous and full of danger and ſmall adviſedneſs to practiſe againſt the perſon of one Prince alone; certainly to conſpire againſt two, is wholly vain and to no purpoſe. And were it not for the reverence I bear to the Hiſtorian, I would never beleeve, that were poſſible, which Herodian ſays of Plautianus, that he gave the charge to Saturninus the Centurion to kill Severus and Antoninus abiding in ſeverall place; for it diſſents ſo much from reaſon, that nothing elſe but this authority would make me credit it. Certain young men of Athens conſpir'd together againſt Diocles and Hippias Tyrants of that City, and ſlew Diocles; but Hippias that remaind, revenged it. Chiones and Leonides, Heracleans, that were Platoes Diſciples, conſpird againſt Clearchus and Satirus that were Tyrants; they ſlew Clearchus, and Satirus that was left alive puniſhed the fact. And the Pazzi, ſeveral times alledged by us, has not the fortune to kill but Iulian alone. Inſomuch as every one ſhould be ſo wiſe as forbear to conſpire againſt ſeveral principals: for he neither advantageth himſelf, nor his Country, nor any body elſe: but rather they that are left behind, become more intolerable and fiercer, as Florence, Athens, and Heraclea, which I ſpoke of before, know well It is true, that the conſpiracy which Pelopidas practiſed to free Thebes his native Country, had all manner of difficulties, yet it ſucceeded luckily: for Pelopidas conſpired not only againſt two Tyrants, but againſt ten: and not only was he not a confident of any of theirs, and ſo had no eaſie acceſs unto any of thoſe Tyrants, but he was a rebell: yet for all this came he into Thebes, ſlew the Tyrants and ſet the Country at liberty. Nevertheleſs he affected all this with the aſſiſtance of one Carion a Counſellor belonging to thoſe Tyrants, by whoſe means he had eaſie acceſs to execute his purpoſe. Yet let none take example from him: for it was an enterpriſe almoſt impoſſible, and a miracle it was that it ſucceeded; and ſo it was, and is now eſteemed by thoſe writers that celebrate the memory thereof, as a matter of great rarity, and without patterne. Such an execution may be hindred by a falſe imagination, or upon ſome ſudden accident, that ariſes juſt upon the fact. On the morning that Brutus and the other Conſpirators purpoſed to kill Caeſar, it fell out ſo that he talked a good while with Cn. Popilius Len •• , one of the Conſpirators, whereupon the others ſeeing this long diſcourſe, they were in fear leaſt the ſaid Popilius had revealed the Conſpiracy to Caeſar, and they were about to attempt to ſlay Caeſar there, & not expect till he came into the Senate, had it not been that when the diſcourſe ended, they ſaw that Ceſar made not any extraordinary motion thereat, and ſo they ſettled themſelves anew. Theſe falſe conceits are to be conſider'd, and weigh'd with diſcretion, & the rather, becauſe they are eaſy to be taken; for he that hath aguilty conſcience, eaſily beleeves that others talk of him a word may be herd ſpoken to another purpoſe, that may much trouble thy mind, and make thee beleeve it touches the matter thou haſt in hand, and cauſe thee by thy flight to diſcover thine own Conſpiracy, or put the action into diſorder by haſtening it faſter than its time. And this comes to paſs the more eaſily, where Many are made privy to the Conſpiracy. Touching the accidents (becauſe they fall out unexpected) they cannot be ſhewed but by examples, and make men wary, according to their rule. • ulius Belanti of Siena (of whom I have formerly made mention) for the hatred which he bore to Pandulphus that had taken his daughter from him, whom he had firſt given him to wife, reſolv'd to kill him, and choſe this time. Pandulphus went almoſt every day to viſit a kinſman of his that was ſick, and in going thither paſſed by Julius his houſe: Who perceiving this, provided ſo, that his Conſpirators were altogether ready in his houſe to kill Pandulphus, as hee ſhould paſs and having plac'd them all arm'd in the entry, he had one ſtood in the window, that as Pandulphus ſhould paſs, when he came near to the entry, ſhould make a ſign. It chanc't that Pandulphus comming, & the other having given the ſign, he met a friend that ſtopt him, and ſome of thoſe that were with him paſſed forward before him, and hearing the noiſe of armes, they diſcoverd the ambuſh laid, ſo that Pandulphus eſcap'd, and Julius with his confederates were conſtrain'd to fly from Siena. The chance of that meeting hindred the ſucceſs of that action, & ruin'd quite Julius his enterpriſe. For which accidents (becauſe they are very rare) we cannot find any remedy, it is very neceſſary to examin well thoſe that may chance, and help them as we can. It remaines now only, that we diſcourſe of the dangers which they run after the execution done, which are all but one, and this it is, when any one is left alive to revenge the dead Prince. There may then his brothers or his ſons be left, or other of his allyes to whom the Principality may belong, & may be left alive by thy negligence, or upon ſome occaſions (formerly ſpoken of) that may execute this revenge, as it befell John Andreas of Lampognano, who together with his Complotters having ſlain the Duke of Milan, and there being left alive one ſon of his and two brothers, they were ready at hand time enough to revenge his death. And truly in this caſe theſe conſpirators are excuſable: becauſe they have here no remedy, but when any of them ſurvives, for lack of good adviſement, or through their negligence, then indeed thereis no excuſe to be made for them. Some conſpirators at Forly ſlew Count Ierolamus their Lord, took priſoners his wife and ſons, which were but little ones; and thinking they could have no ſecurity, unleſs they became maſters of the fortreſs, which the governour was not willing to give into their hands; whereupon the Lady Katherine (for ſo the Counteſs was called) promiſed the Traitors, that if they would let her enter therein, ſhe would cauſe it to be delivered up to them, and that they ſhould keep her ſons for pledges. They upon her word thus given, ſuffered her to enter in, who ſo ſoon as ſhee was within the walls, reproached them with the murder of her husband, and threatned them with all manner of revenge; & to let them know ſhee had no regard of her children, ſhe ſhewed them her privy parts, ſaying ſhe had the means left her to bring forth others, ſo that they not knowing what to do, and too late perceiving their own error, ſuffered perpetual exile in puniſhment of their lack of wit. But of all dangers that can befall after the execution, there is node mone certain, nor more terrible, then when the people is a friend to that Prince thou haſt ſlain: for againſt this the conſpirators can have no remedy: for they can never ſecure themſelves. We have Caeſar for example hereof, who becauſe he had the people of Rome to friend, was by their means revenged: for when they had chaſed the conſpirators from Rome they cauſed all of them in ſeveral places to be ſlain. Treaſons that are practiſed againſt ones own Countrey, are leſs dangerous for thoſe that work them, then thoſe that are practiſed agaiſt Princes: for in the ordering of them the dangers are leſs then in the others, and in executing of them they are the ſame, and after the execution there is none at all. In the plotting and working them the dangers are not many: for a Citizen may frame himſelf ſo, as to be capable of power, without manifeſting his mind therein or intention to any one; and unleſs thoſe his purpoſes receive ſome interruption, he may happily proceed in his deſign: but if any law made, chance to croſs them, he muſt ſtay his time, and ſeek ſome other courſe. This is to be underſtood of a Republique where in corruption is entred in ſome part; for in one not corrupted (no evil beginning taking 〈◊〉 place there) theſe thoughts cannot enter into the heart of any citizen. The Citizens then may by ſeveral means and many waies aſpire unto the Principality, where they run no hazard of being oppreſs'd, as well becauſe Republiques are more ſlew then a Prince and ſtand leſs in doubt, & •• h refore are leſs wary as alſo becauſe they carry more reſpect towards their principal citizens, and therefore are they the more audacious and more inſolent to practiſe againſt them. Few there are but have read Catalines conſpiracy written by Saluſt, & know how that afterwards when it was diſcovered, Cataline, did not only abide in Rome, but came into the Senatehouſe, & ſpoke in villanous termes againſt the Senate and the Conſul; ſo great was the reſpect that that City bore to her Citizens ſo that when he was departed from Rome, and had his Armies already on foot, Lentulus nor thoſe others had never been layd hold on, had not there been letters of his own hand brought againſt him, which manifeſtly accuſed him. Hanno the moſt potent Citizen in Carthage, aſpiring to a Tyranny, had provided at the marriage of one of his own daughters to poiſon all the Senate, and afterwards make himſelf Prince. When this matter was known, the Senate took no other order then to make a law which limited the exceſs of expences anbanquets and weddings; ſuch was the reſpect they bore to men of their qualities. It is very true that in the executing of a treaſon againſt ones native Country, there is more difficulty, and greater dangers; for very ſeldome is it, that thy own forces ſuffice, being to conſpire againſt ſo many; for every one hath not an Army at his command, as Ceſar Agathocles or Cl • omenes, and ſuch like, who at one pluck have been able to ſeiſe on the Country: for unto ſuch the way is eaſie and ſafe enough, But others that have not ſuch advantages of forces, muſt do it either with ſome ſlight or artifice, or by the aide of forraine forces. As for ſlights and tricks, Piſiſtratus the Athenian having over come the Megarenſes, and thereby got credit with the people, one morning came out among them wounded, ſaying, The nobility through envy had thus wrong'd him, and ask'd leave of them for his defence to have a guard of armd men about him. By this power he eaſily attain'd to ſuch greatneſs, that he brought Athens under his Tyranny. Pandulfus Petrucci return'd himſelf with others that were out-law'd into Siena, & there he had the charge given him over the common guard of Juſtice, as a Mecanick office, and which others refus'd, yet in time thoſe arm'd men gave him ſuch reputation, that ſhortly after he became Lord of the Town. Many others have uſed other endeavors, and other waies, and in a ſhort ſpace, and without danger have attained to the ſame. Thoſe that by their own force, or by help of forrain-forces have conſpir'd to make themſelves Lords over their native Countries, have had ſeveral ſucceſſes, as fortune hath befriended them or otherwiſe. Cataline we ſpoke of before, was ruined thereby. Hanno (of whom we formerly made mention) when the poiſon took not effect, armed many thouſands of his partiſans, who with himſelf were all ſlain. Some of the prime Citizens of Thebes, to the end they might become Lords of the Town, called to their aid a Sparian army, and ſo took upon them the rule of that City. So that when we ſhall have examined all the conſpiracies made againſt a Country, we ſhall not find any, at leaſt very few, that in the plotting thereof have been ſuppreſſed, but all of them either have taken effect, or bin ruined in the execution rather. When they are once acted, they carry not with them any further dangers, then the nature of a Principality hath in it ſelf: for when a man hath once gotten to be a Tyrant, he hath his own proper and ordinary dangers belonging to him, againſt which there are no other remedies then thoſe we have formerly touch'd. This is that which I had to write touching conſpiracies: and if I have diſcours'd of thoſe onely that are executed with the ſword, and not done by poiſon, it is becauſe they have all the ſame rule. It is rue, that thoſe done with poiſon, are the more dangerous, becauſe they are more uncertain, for that a man cannot adminiſter by every one, and he muſt needs reveal it to him that he makes his inſtrument; and from this neceſſity of revealing it, ariſes thy danger: moreover upon many accidents a draught of poiſon cannot prove deadly, as it befell thoſe that ſlew Co • modus; for he having vomited up the poiſon which they gave him, they were forced to ſtrangle him, before they could make him dye. Whereupon I judge that Princes have not a greater enemy then treaſon; becauſe when a treaſon is once practiſed againſt them, it either brings them to their end, or procures them much infamy; for if it ſucceeds, they die; if it be diſcovered, and they ſlay the traitors, men always ſuppoſe it hath been ſome device of that Princes, to vent his ava • ice and cruelty againſt the bloods and eſtates of thoſe he hath put to death. I would not fail therefore to warn thoſe Princes or Republiques againſt which treaſons have been deviſed, that they be wary, when a conſpiracy is once diſcloſed to them, before they go about to revenge it, but firſt to pty narrowly into it, and to ſeek to underſtand well the qualities thereof, and weigh well the conditions of the conſpirators, and their own; and when they finde them great and mighty, never to diſcover them, till they be furniſhed with ſufficient forces to cruſh them; for in doing otherwiſe, they ſhould diſcover it to their own ruin: Wherefore they ought to diſſemble it with all poſſible care; becauſe the conſpirators, when they finde themſelves diſcovered, of force are driven to act what they can without reſpect. We have an example hereof from the Romanes, who having lift two legions of ſouldiers to guard the Capuans againſt the Samnitcs, as otherwhere we have ſaid, the heads of thoſe Legions conſpired together to oppreſs the Capuans: Whereof notice being given at Rome, the matter was committed to Rutilius the new Conſul, that he ſhould take order for it, who to lull aſleep the conſpirators, gave it out, that the Senate had again confirmed the Capuan Legions aboad there: Which thoſe ſoldiers giving credit to, and thinking they had time enough to execute their purpoſe, they never went about to haſten the matter: And ſo they ſtood ſtill, till they began to ſee that the Conſul ſeparated them one from another, which thing having begotten ſuſpicion in them, made them diſcover themſelves, and execute their deſign. Nor can there be a fuller example on the one or the other part: for hereby it appears how ſlow men are in matters, where they think they have time enough; and how quick, when a neceſſity drives them to it. Nor can a Prince or Republique (that would defer the diſcovery of a treaſon for his own advantage) take a better courſe, then by ſome device or trick offer the conſpirators ſhortly ſome handſome opportunity, to the end that they attending that, or thinking they have time enough, may give leaſure to that Prince or Commonwealth to puniſh them. They who have done otherwiſe, have haſtened their own deſtruction, as the Duke of Athens did, and William of the family of the Pazzi. The Duke being become the tyrant of Florence, and underſtanding that there was a conſpiracy plotted againſt him, cauſed without further examining the matter, one of the conſpirators to be laid hold on, which gave and alarme to the reſt, whereupon arming themſelves, they took the ſtate from him. William being a Commiſſary in the valley of Chiana in the year 1501. having had notice, that in Arezzo there was a conſpiracy in favour of the Vitelli, to take that Town from the Florentines, preſently went to the town, and not conſidering his own forces, nor the conſpirators, nor taking order to furniſh himſelf with any, by the Biſhops advice, who was his ſons, cauſed one of the conſpirators to be laid hands on, whereupon the firſt preſently took arms, got away the town from the Florentines, and William of a Commiſſary was made a priſoner. But when thoſe conſpiracies are feeble, they may and ought without any regard be ſuppreſſed. Yet in any caſe we muſt not follow two courſes which have been uſed in a maner contrary one to the other: The one by the forenamed Duke of Athens, who to ſhew he believed that he had the citizens of Florence good wills, put one to death that detected a conſpiracy againſt him: The other by Dion a Siracuſan, who to ſound the minde of one whom he had in ſuſpicion, agreed that Callippus, of whom he was very confident, ſhould make him believe that he were working a plot againſt him; but theſe matters fell out ill for them both. For the one took all courage away from the accuſers, and encouraged traitors; the other made the way eaſie to his own ruine, or rather he himſelf was principal of the conſpiracy againſt himſelf, and ſo it fell out; for Callippus (being that he could without any reſpect practiſe ſuch a thing againſt Dion) did it ſo in earneſt, that he took both his life and his State from him.

SOme will marvail perchance from whence it comes to paſs, that of many changes which are made from a free State to a Tyrannical, and contrarily, ſome are with much effuſion of blood, others quite without any: for, as we learn by Hiſtories, in ſuch like alterations ſometimes very many men have been ſlain, and ſometimes again not one hath ſuffered any injury, as i • befell in the change that Rome made from her Kings to Conſuls, wherein none but the Tarquins were baniſhed, without wrong done to any body elſe. Which depends hereupon; for that State that is changed, begins firſt either by violence, or without it: and when it begins with violence, it muſt needs begin with doing wrong to many; and it is neceſſary afterwards that in its deſtruction, they who have been wronged, revenge themſelves, and ſo from their deſire of revenge proceeds the effuſion of blood and death of many. But when that State is begun by the common conſent of an univerſality, and thereby hath been amplify'd, it hath no cauſe afterwards, when that univerſality is ruined, to wrong others then the head onely; and of this kinde was the State of Rome, and the Tarquins baniſhment, as alſo was in Florence the State which the Medici held, when afterwards in their deſtructions in the year 1444. none elſe were hurt but they. And ſo ſuch like changes never prove very dangerous; but thoſe rather are very full of danger, which are wrought by thoſe that endeavor to revenge themſelves withall, which have been ſuch, that they have cauſed horror even in him that reads them. And becauſe of examples to this purpoſe hiſtories are full fraught, I will let this paſs.

IT hath been formerly treated how that a malicious Citizen cannot work miſchief in a Republique that is not grown corrupted; which concluſion is confirmed (beſides the reaſons that then were alledged) with the example of Sp. Caſſius, and of Manlius Capitolinus. Which Spurius being an ambitious man, and deſirous to take upon him extraordinary authority in Rome, and gain the people to him by doing them many good turns, as was that, to ſell them thoſe fields, which the Romans had taken from the Hermici, this his ambition was deſc • yed by the Fathers, and ſo much ſuſpected, that when hh ſpoke to the people and offered to give them thoſe moneys, which the Corn was ſold for, that the Publique had cauſed to be brought from Sicily, they wholly refuſed them, thinking that Spurius meant to give them the price of their liberty. But had that people been already corrupted, they would not have refuſed the ſaid price, but rather have opened him that way to the tyranny, which now they ſhut againſt him. A fuller example hereof Manlius Capitolinus repreſents unto us; for in him we ſee, what excellencies of mind and body, how many brave exploits acted in defence of a mans native Country, a brutiſh deſire of rule quite raſes out: which (as it appeared) grew in him, through the envy he bore Camillus for the honors were done him, whereby his underſtanding was ſo blinded, as not conſidering the manner of Government uſed in the City, nor examining, whereupon he was to work, unapt as yet to receive ſo evil a form, betook himſelf to raiſe tumults in Rome againſt the Senate, and contrary to the Laws of his Country. Wherein the perfection of that City is very evident, and the goodneſs of the matter thereof; for in his caſe none of the Nobility, however that they were very eager defenders the one of another, never ſtirred in his favour, nor any of his kindred undertook any thing in his defence: whereas ordinarily when others were accuſed, they uſed to accompany them in a rueful manner, clad in black, and all ſorrowful; whereby they might gain compaſſion in favor of the defendant, and with Manlius none of theſe were ſeen. The Tribunas of the people, who were wont to favour thoſe things, which ſeemed to be mov'd for the peoples advantage, and the more they were againſt the Nobility, ſo much the forwarder uſed to thruſt them, in this caſe held with the Nobility to ſuppreſs a common miſchief. The people of Rome exceedingly deſirous of their own advantage, and a great favourer of any thing that thwarted the Nobility, however they afforded Manlius many favors, nevertheleſs, when the Tribunes cited him, and referred his cauſe to be judged by the people, that people being become judge of a defendant, without regard condemned him to death. Wherefore I believe there is not any example in this Hiſtory more proper to ſhew the goodneſs of that Common-wealths orders, then this, ſeeing that not one of this whole City moved in behalf of a very valourous Citizen, who as well publikely as privately had done many worthy acts: becauſe in all of them the love of their country was of more force than any other regard, and they conſidered more the preſent danger; that depended on him, than his fore-paſt deſerts, ſo that by his death they ſet themſelves at liberty. And T. Livius ſays, This end had that man, who had he not been born in a Hunc exitum habuit vir, niſi in libera civitate natus eſſet, memorabilis. free State, was worthy of admiration. Where two things are to be conſidered; the one, that by other means a man ought to ſeek after glory in a City corrupted, than in one that lives ſtrictly according to the civil government; the other is (wich is almoſt the ſame with the firſt) that men in their proceedings, and the rather in actions of conſequence ſhould conſider the times, and conforme themſelves thereunto: and thoſe that by their evill choice, or natural inclination diſagree with the times, moſt commonly live unhappily, and their actions have but ill ſucceſſes. The contrary befalls thoſe that can accord with the times: and without queſtion, by the Hiſtorians words which we for merly mentioned, we may make this concluſion, that if Manlius had been borne in the times that Marius and Silla were, where the matter was already corrupted, that his ambition could have made ſome impreſſion therein, he might, have workd the ſame effect, and had the ſame ſucceſs that Silla and Marius had, and others afterwards, who after them aſpird to the Tyranny. So in like manner, if Silla and Marius had liv'd in Manlius his daies. they had been cruſhd in the very egge: for one man may indeed begin with his evill courſes and miſchievous waies to debauch the people of a City: but it is impoſſible that one mans life can ſuffice to corrupt it ſo, that he himſelf can make any advantage thereof. And in caſe it were poſſible, that in tract of time, he could do it, yet would it be impoſſible, in regard of the manner of mens proceedings, who are impatient, and cannot defer any paſſion of theirs long. Moreover, they erre in their affairs, and in thoſe eſpecially which they much deſire, in ſo much as either through their ſmall patience, or through their error, they would venture upon the executing of their purpoſes, in counter time, and ſo come to an evill end. Therefore is it neceſſary, if a man would gain authority in a Republick, and induce ſome ill for me thereinto, to find the matter already diſorderd by time, and that by little and little, and from age to age is brought into diſorder, which of force comes thereunto, when it is not (as formerly hath been ſaid) refreſhd by vertuous examples, or by new • aws reduc'd to the firſt principles. Manlius • hen had been a rare man, and famous, had he been borne in a corrupted City. And therefore ſhould thoſe Citizens that in Republicks undertake any thing either in favour of liberty, or in favour of Tyranny, conſider the ſubject they are to work on, and from thence conjecture the difficulty of the worke: for it is as hard and dangerous to ſet free a people that would live in thral • om, as to inthrall a people that would live free. And becauſe we have before rouchd, that in all manner of actions men ſhould conſider the quality of the times, and proceed conformably to thoſe, we will ſpeak of them at length in the Chapter following.

I Have many times conſider'd, how the occaſion of mens good or evill fortunes depends upon the manner of the encounter of their proceedings with the times: for it is evident, that ſome men proceed in their affaires with violence, others with regard and warineſs. And becauſe that in the one and other of theſe two ways, the convenient terms are tranſgreſſed, being that they cannot hit upon the true way; both in the one and the other they fail. But he fails leaſt, and oftneſt lights upon good ſucceſs, that meets (as I have ſaid) time in its own way, and always proceeds according as his own nature puts him forward. Every one knows how Fabius Maximus proceeded with his Army carefully and warily, far from all that kind of metle and confidence which other whiles the Romans uſed; and his good fortune would have it, that this his way agreed well with the times: for Hannibal being come a young man into Italy, and with a freſh gale of fortune, and having twice broken the Romane Armies, and that Republike almoſt loſt all her good ſoldiers, and therefore being affrighted, could not light upon better fortune than to have ſuch a Captain, who by his ſlowneſs and warineſs ſhould keep the enemy in play with vain delaies: Nor could Fabius have met with times fitter for his ways: whereupon came it to paſs that he grew glorious. And that Fabius did this upon the inſtigation of his own nature, and not upon a meer choice, we ſee that when Scipio deſired to paſs over into Affrica with thoſe Armies, whereby to make an end of the war, Fabius much contradicted it, as he that could not go out of his own pace, nor leave his own cuſtome, ſo that for all him, Hannibal might have continued ſtill in Italy; for he perceived not, that the times were changed, and it was needful to alter the manner of making war. And had Fabius been King of Rome, he might eaſily have ſpoiled that war, becauſe he would not have known how to alter his proceedings with the alteration of times. But being he was born in a Republike, where there was divers Citizens, and divers humors, as ſhe had Fabius, who was excellent in thoſe times, when the war was onely to be ſupported; ſo had ſhe Scipio in the times when their enemies were to be overcome. Whence ariſes it, that a Republike hath a longer life, and longer enjoys good fortune than a principality: becauſe ſhe can better fit her ſelf for ſeveral accidents, by reaſon of the variety of her Subjects that are in her, then can a Prince: for a man that is accuſtomed to proceed in one manner, never alters, as it is ſaid, and muſt of neceſſity, when the times diſagree with his way, go to wrack. Peter Soderini, formerly ſpoken of, proceeded in all his affairs with mildneſs and patience: and he and his Country proſpered, while the times agreed with his manner of proceedings: but when the times fell out ſo, that it was needful to break off all patience and mildneſs, he knew not how to do it: ſo that together with his Country he fell to ruine. Pope Julius the ſecond carried himſelf all the time of his Pontificate with great violence and rage, and becauſe the times ſorted well therewith, all his undertakings ſucceeded well. But if other times had come, that would have required other advice, of force he muſt have gone to deſtruction: becauſe he would never have altered his manner nor order in his proceedings. And that we cannot change our ſelves, there are two reaſons; the one becauſe we cannot reſiſt that which our nature is inclined to; the other is, becauſe when one man in ſuch a kind of proceeding hath gone on luckily, it is impoſſible to perſwade him, that things will prove well, where hee proceeds otherwiſe. Whereupon it comes to paſs, that in one man fortune varies, becauſe ſhee changes the times, and he changes not his courſes. Thence ariſes alſo the ruine of a City, becauſe the orders of Common wealths change not with the times, as we have treated heretofore at large, but they are flower: for it is a greater trouble to them to change; and to effect it, they have need of times which ſhould in a manner take a Republick quite off the things whereby a thorough alteration ſhould be made in her: for which one man alone ſuffices not by changing the manner of her proceedings. And becauſe wee have made mention of Fabius Maximus, who held off Hannibal with delayes, I purpoſe to treate in the following Chapter, whether a Captain, being deſirous to fight a battel with the enemy in any caſe, can be ſo hindred that he do it not.

CNeus Sulpitius the dictator held off from Cneus Sulpitius Dictator adverſus Gallos bellum trahebat, nolens le fortunae committere adverſus hoſtem, quem tempus deteriorem in dies, & locus alienus faceret. fighting with the French, being not willing to ſtand at fortunes diſcretion in a tryall againſt his enemy, whom time and a ſtrange Country would continually weaken and conſume. When ſuch an error en • ues, where all men or the greater part of them erre, I think it not much amiſs mary times to reprove it. Wherefore though I have formerly ſeveral times ſhewed, how the actions about great matters now adays differ from thoſe of ancient times; yet I think it not ſuperfluous at this preſent to repeat it: for if in any part it differs from the ancient orders, it is eſpecially in military orders, where now is not any of thoſe things obſerved, which the ancients made much account of. And this inconvenient grew firſt hereupon, becauſe Commonwealths and Princes, have committed this care to o • hers, and to avoid dangers, have much lai • aſide that exerciſe; and if perchance ſometime a King in our days venture to go in perſon, we believe not therefore that he ſeeks out any new orders, that are more commendable: for when they chance to give themſelves to that imployment, they do it rather in ſhew of their pompe, then upon any other laudable occaſion. Yet do theſe commit leſſer errors, perſonally viſiting their armies, and keeping in their own hands the Majeſty of their Government, then Republikes do, eſpecially thoſe of Italy, which truſt to others, not underſtanding any thing in the wars, or attending to any thing belonging to them: and on the other ſide, when they are deſirous (whereby they may ſeem to be Princes) to take any thing into deliberation, they commit therein exceeding many errors. And however that other where I have treated of ſome of them, yet at this preſent I will not forbear to tell one of very great importance. When theſe lazy Princes, or effeminate Commonwealths ſend forth any Commander of theirs, the wiſeſt commiſſion that they think they can give him, is to charge him, that in any caſe he fight not a battel, but avoid it, and conceiting with themſelves that herein they imitate Fabius Maximus his diſcretion, who by forbearing to fight, ſaved the Romane State; they underſtand not that moſt commonly, this commiſſion is either to no purpoſe, or elſe hurtful. For we muſt take this for a concluſion, that a General, that will abide in the field, cannot avoid a battel, when the enemy will in any caſe fight. So that this commiſſion is but thus, as if he ſhould ſay, fight with thine enemy at his pleaſure, and not at thine own. For if a man will abide in the field and not fight, the ſureſt way is to keep himſelf fifty miles off from his enemy at leaſt, and then keep good eſpiouns, ſo that if he chance to bend towards thee, thou maiſt avoid him at leiſure. Another courſe is to immure himſelf up in a City; but the one and the other of theſe two courſes is very pernicious. In the firſt he leaves his Country in prey to the enemy; and a valiant Prince will rather hazard the battel than prolong the war with ſo much dammage to his Subjects. And in the ſecond the loſs is evident; for it muſt needs be, that retiring thy ſelf within the walls of a Town with thy Army, thou be beſiged, and at length ſuffer famine, and ſo be forced to yeeld: inſomuch as to avoid battel by either of theſe two means, muſt needs prove very hurtful. The courſe that Fabius Maximus held, to abide in ſtrong places is very good, when thou haſt an Army ſo valorous, that the enemy dares not come to find thee in thy advantages. Nor can it be ſaid that Fabius avoided fighting, but rather that he would fight at his advantage. For if Hannibal had gone to find him, Fabius would have ſtaid for him, and fought with him; but Hannibal durſt not deal with him after his manner. So the battel was as well avoided by Hannibal as by Fabius; but if one of them had been deſirous to have hazarded in any caſe, the other had but one of theſe three remedies, to wit thoſe two we have before mentioned, or to flie. There are many examples and maximes in the war, which the Romanes made with Philip of Macedon, Father of Perſes, to make good what I ſay; for Philip being aſſailed by the Romanes, reſolved not to come to battel; and therefore firſt he thought to do as Fabius Maximus had done in Italy, and placed himſelf with his Army upon the top of a mountain, where he fortified himſelf all he could, deeming that the Romans had not the heart to come and find him there; but when they went thither, and fought with him, and drove him from the mountain, being not able to withſtand them, he fled with the greater part of his people: and that which ſaved him was the roughneſs of the Country, ſo that the Romans could not follow the purſuite. Philip then being unwilling to fight, and having pitcht his campe near the Romans, had no other mean but to fly; and having found by this experience, that when they meant not to fight, it was not enough for them to get upon the top of the mountains; and having no mind to incloſe himſelf in any Town, reſolved to take the other courſe, to remove many miles diſtant from the Romanes Campe. Whereupon, if the Romanes were in one Province, they went into another, and ſo always they went thither from whence the Romanes were parted: and conſidering in the end, how that in prolonging the war this way, his own eſtate declined, and how that his Subjects were ſometimes by himſelf, otherwhile by his enemies daily oppreſſed, reſolved to put it to the tryal of a day, and ſo came to a ſet battel with the Romanes. It is profitable then not to fight, when the Armies have theſe conditions which Fabius his Army had, or that then had that of Cneus Sulpirius, which are, to have an Army ſo good, that the enemie dares not come and find thee within thy fortifications, and that the enemy though he be in thy Country, yet hath he not much footing therein, where he may ſuffer want of proviſions; and in this caſe the courſe is advantagious for the reaſons Titus Livius alledges: Ʋnwilling to ſtand at fortunes diſcretion on a tryal Nolens ſe fortunae committere adverſus hoſtem, quem tempus deteriorem indies, & locus alienus faceret. againſt his enemy, whom time and a ſtrange Country would daily weaken and conſume. But in any other caſe the battel cannot be avoided, but with thy ſhame and danger: for to flie (as Philip did) is the ſame that it is to be routed, and that with the more diſgrace, by how much the leſs thou haſt made proof of thy valor. And however he had the luck to eſcape, another could not have had the like, unleſs he had help by the ſcituation of the Country, as well as he. That Hannibal was a maſter in the art of war, I think every one will acknowledge, and being to oppoſe Scipio in Affrica, if he had ſeen any advantage in prolonging the war, without doubt he would have done it, and peradventure could too (being a good Commander and having a good Army) as well as Fabius did in Italy. But being he did it not, we may well believe, that ſome important reaſon perſwaded him ſo; for a Prince that hath an Army levied, and ſees that for want of moneys or friends he cannot keep them long together, is a very fool if he ventures not his fortune, before his Army falls aſunder; for by delaying he certainly loſes, whereas hazzarding he might overcome. Another thing there is yet much to be accounted of, which is, that a man ought (even in his loſing) ſeek to gain glory; and it is more glory, to be overcome by force, than by any other inconvenient, that may have made thee loſe. Therefore it muſt needs be that Hannibal was forc't by theſe neceſſities; and on the other ſide Scipio, if Hannibal would have protracted the war, and he durſt not have adventured to go ſeek him in his Trenches, had not ſuffered therein, in that he had already overcome Siphax, and taken ſo many Towns in Affrick, ſo that he could have continued there with ſecurity and conveniency, as well as in Italy. Which was not ſo with Hannibal, when he had to deal with Fabius, nor with thoſe French-men, when they were oppoſed by Sulpitius. So much the leſs alſo can he avoid the fight, that with an Army invades another mans Country, he muſt (whenſoever the enemie faces him) fight with him, and if he incampes before any Town, ſo much the rather is he obliged to fight, as in our days it befell Duke Charles of Burgundy, who being ſet down before Morat, a Town belonging to the Swiſſers, was aſſaulted by them and broken: and ſo it chanc'd to the French Army, that incamping at Novarra, was in like manner routed by the Swiſſers.

COriolanus being baniſhed from Rome, went from thence to the Volſci, where having gotten together an Army to be reveng'd of his own Citizens, came from thence to Rome; from whence he was mov'd to depart, rather for pitty to his mother, than by the Romans forces. Upon which place T. Livius ſaies, that hereby it is known that the Commonwealth of Rome grew more by the Captains valours, than the ſoldiers, conſidering that the Volſci formerly had been alwaies loſers, and only then had overcome when Co • iolanus was their General: And how ever that Livie holds ſuch an opinion, yet we ſee in many places of his Hiſtory, that Soldiers without any Captain have given extraordinary proofs of their valors, and have been better ordered and fiercer after the death of their Conſuls, than before they were ſlain, as it happend in the Army which the Romans had in Spain under the Scipioes, which when the two Captains were ſlain, was able by its own valor not only to ſave it ſelf, but overcome the enemy, and keep that Province for the Republick. So relating all, wee ſhall find many examples where the Soldiers valor alone hath got the day, and many others where the Generals valor only hath done the ſame effect. In ſo much as wee may well judge, that either of them hath need of the other. And here it is not amiſs to conſider firſt, whether is moſt to be feared, either a good Army led by an unskilfull Commander, or a good Commander followed by a bad Army. And taking after Ceſars opinion, ſmall account is to be made of the one or the other: for when he went into Spain againſt Afranius and Petrejus, who had with them a good Army, he ſaid he little doubted them, Becauſe he went againſt an Army that Ibat ad exerci um ſine da 〈…〉 . lacked a Commander, ſhewing the Commanders weakneſs. On the contrary when he went into Theſſaly againſt Pompey, he ſaid, I go againſt a Commander without an Army. Vado ad ducem ſine exercitu. Another thing may be conſiderd, which is more eaſie, either for a good Commander to make a good Army, or for a good Army to make a good Commander; Whereupon I anſwer, that the queſtion ſeems already decided: for more eaſily many ſhall find one, or ſhall inſtruct one ſo that he become good, than one alone ſhall many. Lucullus when he was ſent againſt Mithridates, was altogether unexpert in the war; yet that good Army, wherein were ſo many good Chieftaines, quickly made him a skilful Commander. For want of Soldiers the Romans put many ſlaves in Armes, and gave order to Sempronius Gracchus to train them, who in a ſmall time made a very good Army of them. Pelopidas and Epaminondas (as we have ſaid otherwhere) after they had delivered Thebes their native Country out of the Spartans bondage, made the Thebans exceeding good Soldiers in a ſhort time, that they were able not only to ſuſtain', but overcome the Soldiers of Sparta; ſo that the caſe is equal on both ſides: for the one being good, may ſoon find the other ſo: yet a good Army without a good head, ordinarily becomes inſolent and dangerous; as was the Macedonian Army after Alexander his death, and likewiſe the Veterane ſoldiers in the civil warres. So that I think, that much more account is to be made of a Commander that hath time and convenience to train up and arme his Soldiers, than of an inſolent Army, having a Captain from among them tumultuarily made their Chief. Wherefore double glory and renown may well be aſcrib'd to thoſe Commanders, who have not only taken upon them to overcome the enemy, but before their comming to fight with them, have to make them fit for the occaſion, diſciplind and inſtructed their Armies well: for therein appears their vertuo double and admirable; whereas if the charge hereof were communicated to many, far leſs account or eſteem would be made of them.

OF what moment in combates and fights a new accident is, that ariſes upon any new matter ſeen or heard, appears in many places, and eſpecially in that occaſion, where the Romans fought with the Volſci, where Qu • ntius ſeeing one of the horns of his Army beginning to fayle, began to cry out aloud, that they ſhould ſtand firm: becauſe the other horne of the Army was already victorious: by which words, having encourag'd his own, and affrighted his enemies, hee overcame them. And if ſuch vociſerations in an Army well orderd be of great effect, in one then that is but tumultuary and ill diſciplind, they muſt needs be of much greater: becauſe the whole frame thereof moves by the like wind. To this purpoſe I will alledge a notable example befaln in our dayes. The City of Perugia, a few years ſince, was divided into two factions, of the Oddi, and the Bagliori; theſe raignd there, the others were baniſhd men, who having by help of their allies gotten an Army together, and brought it into ſome Town conſining upon Perugia, by favour of their faction one night enterd the City, & without being deſcryd, came to take the Piazza; & becauſe that City hath chains on all the corners of the waies, which kept them bard, the Soldiers belonging to the Oddi had a man went before them, who with a bar of Iron was to break the locks of thoſe chains, to the end the horſe might paſs, & there being but one only left them to break, which immediately opened into the Piazza, and now a generall alarme being given, and he that broke them, being oppreſſed by the multitude that followd him, and not able therefore well to lift up his armes with his bar, whereby to imploy it, chanc'd to ſay Stand back; which word going by degrees, ſaying back, began to cauſe the furtheſt off to flie, and ſo by little and little the reſt with ſuch force, that they all routed one another. And thus the deſign of the Oddi, by occaſion of ſo poor an accident, became fruſtrate. Where we may conſider, that diſcipline and order is not uſefull in an Army ſo much for orderly fighting, as that every ſmall accident put thee not quite into diſorder: for, were it for nothing elſe, the ordinary multitude is unfit for the warrs, becauſe every rumor, every voice, every noiſe changes them, and puts them to flight. And therefore a good Commander, among his other orders, ought appoint thoſe that are to take the word from him, & to paſs it to others, and accuſtome his Soldiers, ſo that they give no credit ſave only to their own officers, to the end that they tell them only, what is given them in charge from him: for when this part is not well obſerv'd, many diſorders often fall out. Touching the ſight of theſe new things every Commander ought well bend his wits, to make ſome ſhew whiles the battail is in tryal, whereby to encourage his own, and diſhearten the enemy, becauſe among thoſe accidents which may give thee the victory, this is the moſt effectuall. Whereof wee alledge for teſtimony the example of Cneus Sulpitius the Roman Dictatour, who comming to fight a battell with the French, arm'd all the poor drudges and raſcality of the Camp: and having mounted them upon Mules and poor Aſſes with armes and enſignes, to make them ſeem as if they were cavallry, he plac'd them behind a hill, and commanded that at a ſignall given, whiles he was in the hotteſt of the battel they ſhould ſhew themſelves to the enemy, which thing ſo ordered and done, put the French men in ſuch a fright that they loſt they day. And therefore a good Commander ought to do two things; the one is, to try ſome of theſe inventions to ſtartle the enemy: the other, to ſtand ſo prepard that the enemy offering any ſuch to him, he may be able to diſcover and quite fruſtrate them, as did the Indian King to Semiramis; who ſeeing, that King had a great number of Elephants, to affright him, and make him think ſhee had more her ſelf than he, made a great many of them of Bulls and Bufaloes hides, and having put them upon Camells, ſent them before: but that King finding out her deceit, turnd it upon her not only vain but hurtfull. Mammercus was ſent Dictator againſt the Fidenates, who to affright the Roman Army, appointed that in the heat of the skirmiſh a good number of ſoldiers ſhould ſally forth of Fidenas with lights upon the top of their Lances, to the end that the Romans taken a while with the novelty of the matter, ſhould fall into ſome diſorder. Whereupon it is to be noted, that when ſuch devices carry more truth than appearance with them, they may well be repreſented to the view of men, becauſe that having in them a great deal of that which is lively and likely, their weakneſs cannot ſo quickly be diſcoverd: but when they have more of fiction in them than of truth, it is better either not to uſe them, or uſing them to keep them off at ſuch a diſtance that a full diſcovery of them cannot ſuddenly be made, as was that trick of the Muleters Cn. Sulpitius practiſd: for when there is nothing but weakneſs within them, as they are approached, they are quickly ſeen through, and do thee wrong rather than give thee advantage, as thoſe Elephants did to Semiramis, and the fires to the Fidenates; which however that at firſt they a little troubled the Army, yet when the Dictatour came up to them, and began to cry out, That they might be aſhamd to fly from the ſmoak like Bees, but that they ſhould rather turn back their ſlames upon them, ſaying, Bnrne out theſe people of Fidenas with fire, Suis flammis delete Fidenas, quas veſtris beneficijs placare non potuiſtis. whoſe rancorous ſpirits you could never aſſwage with all your courteſie. Thus that device of the Fidenates ſervd them to no purpoſe, and ſo they loſt the fight.

IT was alwaies and ever will be, that great perſonages and the worthyeſt men, in peaceable times, are of ſmall eſteem: for becauſe of envy, following the reputation which their vertue hath gained them, in ſuch times there are many Citizens, that are ambitious, not only to bee their equals, but ſuperiors; and to this purpoſe there is a place in Thucydides the Greeke Hiſtorian, which ſerves very fitly, where he ſhewes that when the Athenian Republick came off victour in the Peloponneſian war, and had taken down the Spartanes pride, and in a manner ſubjected all Greece, the Athenians conceited ſo highly of themſelves, as that they deſigned the conqueſt of Sicile alſo. This enterpriſe came to be diſputed in Athens: Alcibiades and ſome other Citizens perſwaded it, as they that little caring for the publick good, thought only upon the advancing their own particular reputations, each one of them having hopes to bee ſent Commander in the imployment. But Nicias that was the principal among the beſt reputed of Athens, diſſwaded it: and the greateſt reaſon he alledged in perſwading the people to give credit to his words, was this, becauſe while hee adviſed them thus that the warr ſhould nor proceed, he perſwaded them to that which was not for his advantage; for while Athens was in peace, he knew, there were many Citizens would go before him; but in time of war hee was ſure none could go before, no nor come near him. Wee ſee therefore, that in Republicks there is this diſorder, in times of peace to make ſmall account of able men, which thing enrages them two ſeveral waies, the one to ſee their own degrees fayl them; the other to ſee unworthy men, and of ſmaller abilities then themſelves, made their companions or rather their ſuperiors: which diſorder in Republicks hath cauſed much deſtruction; for thoſe Citizens who ſee themſelves undeſervedly deſpiſed, and know that quiet times are the occaſion thereof, deviſe all the wayes they can to diſturbe them, ſuggeſting inducements to new wars in prejudice of the Commonwealth. And deviſing what might be the remedies hereof, we find two; the one to keep the Citizens alwaies poor, to the end that riches without vertue ſhould not be able to corrupt neither thoſe nor others: the other to be alwaies ſo ready for the war, as that they may be able continually to make war, & may have need alwaies of well reputed Citizens, as Rome did in her firſt beginnings; for that City having alwaies ſome Armyes abroad, there was ever place left to mens vertues, nor could they bereave ſuch a one of his dignity, that deſerved it; or confer it upon another not deſerving it; for in caſe that ſuch a thing were done, ſome times upon miſtake or for tryall, there quickly enſued ſuch a diſorder thereupon and a danger, that all returned preſently into the right way. But theſe other Common-wealths, that are not ſo ordered as ſhee, and that then only make war when neceſſity conſtrains them, cannot free themſelves of ſuch an inconvenient, or rather they will alwaies incurr it, and there will ever ſome diſorder be ready to ariſe, when that vertuous Citizen thus neglected is of a revengefull diſpoſition, and hath in the City ſome good repute and correſpondence; and from this the City of Rome kept her ſelf free a good while. Yet ſhe (after ſhe had ſubdu'd Carthage and Antiochus, as we ſaid otherwhere, being no more in doubt of the iſſue of her warrs) thought ſhe might give the Command of her Armies to whom ſhe pleas'd, not ſo much regarding their vertues as their other qualities, ingratiating them with the people: for we ſee Paulus Emilius had ſeveral repulſes in demanding the Conſulate, before he was made Conſul, till the Macedonian war chanc'd, which becauſe it was thought dangerous, by general conſent of the City was committed to him. In our City of Florence after the year 1494. many warrs following, one upon the neck of the other, and all the Citizens of Florence having made unlucky tryal of themſelves, the City by chance lit upon one man who-ſhewed them the manner how their Armies were to be commanded, which was Antoni Giacomini: and whiles the warrs in hand were perillous, the other Citizens ambitions ceaſ'd; and in the election of Commiſſary or Commander of their Armies, he had no competitor ſtood with him. But when as any war was to be made where no hazard was, but a great deal of honor and dignity, he found alwaies ſo many competitors, that they being to make election of there Commiſſaries to beleager Piza, he was left out of the number. And however it was not perceiv'd evidently, that evill would befall the State, becauſe Antony was not ſent thither, yet may we eaſily conjecture, becauſe the Piſans having no means for further defence or ſuſtenance, had Antony been ſent thither, they would before that have been ſo ſtraightly beſet, that they ſhould have ſurrendred themſelves to the Florentines directions. But they being beſieged by Commanders that underſtood not how to begirt, nor force them, were ſo long held in hand, that the City of Florence bought them, whereas they might have had them by force. It was likely that ſuch a diſtaſte with Antony might have done much, and he had need truly of much patience, and ſo good a diſpoſition as not to deſire revenge hereupon, either with the deſtruction of the City (if he were able) or with the wrong of any particular Citizen, where of a Republick ought to beware, as in the Chapter following we ſhall treate.

EPaminondas the Theban ſaid, that nothing was more advantageous or uſeful to a Commander, than to know the enemies deſignes and purpoſes; and becauſe it is hard to attaine to that knowledge. • he deſerves the greater commendations, who takes ſuch a courſe that he gheſſes it out. And it is not ſo hard to diſcover the enemies purpoſes as ſome times to underſtand his actions, and not ſo much his actions, which by him are done a far off, as thoſe preſent and near hand: for it hath many times chanc'd, that a fight having continued til night, he hath vanquiſhed that thinks he hath lo • , and he loſt that thought he had overcome; which error hath caus'd ſome to take reſolutions clean contrary to their own good, as it befell Brutus and Caſſius, who upon this miſtake loſt their war; for Brutus having overcome on his wing, Caſſius beleev'd he had loſt, that the whole Army was broken, and upon this error deſpairing of his own ſafety, ſlew himſelf. In our daies in the battell at Saint Cecily in Lombardy that Francis the King of France ſought with the Swiſſers, the night overtaking them, that part of the Swiſſers, which remained entire, thought they had got the victory, knowing nothing of thoſe that had been broken and ſlain. Which error was the occaſion that they themſelves eſcap'd not, ſtaying to fight again on the morning much at their diſadvantage: ſuch like error alſo cauſed to miſtake, and well near ruined thereby the Popes & the Spaniſh Army, which upon this falſe advice of victory paſſed the Po, and had it gone never ſo little on for warder, had been priſoner to the French, who were the Conquerors. The like error to this happened in the Romans Campe, and in that alſo of the Equi, where Sempronius the Conſul was with the Army to enconnter the enemy, and the battell being joyned, the combat laſted while night with variable fortune on the one and the other ſide: and night being come, each Army being halfe broken, neither of them returned to their quarters, but both of them choſe rather to withdraw themſelves unto the adjoyning hills, where they thought they might bē more ſecure, and the Roman Army divided itſelf into two parts, whereof the one went with the Conſul, the other with one Tempanius a Centurion, whoſe valor that day kept the Roman Army from being wholly routed; the morning being come, the Roman Conſul, without hearing further of the enemy, retired towards Rome, and the like did the Equies Armie, becauſe each of theſe thought the enemy had been victour, and therefore they each withdrew themſelves, without any regard that they left their Campes in prey to the Enemy. It fell out that Tempanius who was there with the remainder of the Roman Army, retiring too, learned by certain wounded ſoldiers of the Equi, that their Captaines were gone and had abandoned their quarters, upon which news he went into the Roman quarters and ſaved them, but ſacked thoſe of the Equi, and ſo returned victorious to Rome: which victory (as wee ſee) conſiſts only in, who hath notice of the enemies diſorder. Where we ſhould conſider, that it may often come to paſs, that the two Armies which are in front one againſt another, may be both in the like diſorder, and ſuffer the ſame wants, and that after remaines vanquiſher that firſt comes to knowledge of the others neceſſities. And hereof I will give a domeſtick and moderne example. In the year one thouſand four-hundred ninty eight, when the Florentines had a great Army about Piſa, and beleaguerd the Town very ſtrongly, whereof the Venetians having undetaken the protection, and notſeeing any otherway to ſave it, reſolved to divert the war, by aſſayling the territories of Florence on the other ſide; wherefore with a ſtrong Army they entred by the vally of Lamona, and ſeiſed upon the Village of Marradi, and beſieged the Fortreſs of Caſtiglione which is upon the hill above: Which the Florentines perceiving, reſolved to ſuccour Marradi, and yet not leſſen their forces which they had about Piſa; ſo that having levied new foot, and appointed new horſe, they ſent them that way, whoſe Commanders were Jacobus Quartus of Appian, Lord of Piombin, and Count Rinuccius of Marcian. Theſe then being come to the hills above Marradi, the enemies leſt beleaguering Marradi, and betook themſelves to the Village; where theſe two Armies being infront one againſt the other for ſome daies, both ſuffered much for the ſcarcity of proviſions. and other neceſſaries; and neither daring to ſet upon the other, nor either knowing the others wants, both at once reſolved over night to raiſe their Campes the morning following, and retire, the Venetian toward Berzighella and Faenza, the other toward Caſaglia and Mugello. the morning then come, and each Campe having begun to ſend away their carriages, by chance a woman parted from the Bourg of Marradi, and came towards the Florentine Campe, being ſecure enough from wrong, becauſe of her old age, and poverty, deſirous belike to ſee ſome of her friends in that Campe, by whom the Florentine Captains underſtanding of the Venetian Camps departure, upon this news grew a little more couragious, and having changed their purpoſe, as if they had diſlodged their enemies, went out, and took their quarters, and writ to Florence, they had repulſed and vanquiſhed them. Which victory proceeded from nothing elſe, than from having firſt had notice of their enemies departure: which notice had it been given on the other ſide, would have wrought the ſame effect againſt ours.

THe Commonwealth of Rome was in a combuſtion, becauſe of the differences between the Nobles and the Commons: nevertheleſs as occaſion of wars was offered them, they ſent forth with their Armies Quintius and Appius Claudius: Appius becauſe he was cruell and rough in commanding, was ill obeyed by thoſe that followed him, ſo that almoſt quite broken he fled from his charge. Quintius by uſing a mild and gentle behaviour towards his ſoldiers, found them very obedient, and returned with victory. Whereupon it ſeems, that to governe a multitude, it is better to be courteous then inſolent, compaſſionate rather then cruel. Notwithſtanding Cornelius Tacitus with whom many other writers agree, in a ſaying of his, concludes the contrary, where he ſaies, To rule a multitude, ſeverity is of more force then mildneſs. And In multitudine regenda, plus paena quam obſequium valet. deviſing with my ſelf how each of theſe opinions may be made good, I ſay either thou art to governe men that ordinarily are thy companions, or that are alwaies in ſubjection to thee. When they are thy companions, ſeverity or rigour cannot fully be us'd againſt them according as Cornelius argues: and becauſe the common people of Rome had equal power in the Roman government with the Nobility, he that became Prince among them for a time, could not rule them with roughneſs and rigor. And many time it was evident, that the Roman Commanders did more good that got the good wills of their ſoldiers, and held but a gentle hand over them, then thoſe that by rough handling kept them in a ſlaviſh aw of them, unleſs they were accompani'd with extraordinary endowments, as was Manlius Tarquatus. But he that commands over ſubjects (whereof Cornelius diſcourſes) to the end they grow not inſolent, and by reaſon of thy two great mildneſs tread thee not under foot, ought rather betake himſelf to rigor then gentleneſs. But this a ſo is not to exceed moderation, for fear of incurring hatred: for it never turns to any Princes advantage to gain the peoples hate. The way to avoid it is, to lay no hands on the ſubjects eſtates: for of blood (when rapine is not the covert cauſe there) no Prince is thirſty, unleſs forc'd thereto, which ſeldome he is: but where rapine is mixt, this neceſſity comes alwaies upon them, nor ever want they occaſion, nor deſire to ſhed blood, as in another treaty to this purpoſe is diſcours'd at large. Quintius was more praiſe worthy then Appius; and yet the ſaying of Cornelius limited as it ought to be, but not in the caſe obſerv'd by Appius, deſerves approbation. And becauſe we have ſpoken of ſeverity and mildneſs, methinks it is not more then needs to ſhew, how one action of humanity was of more force with the Faliſci, then many violent acts of hoſtility.

CAmillus with the Army being ſet down before the Faliſcies Town, and beſieging it, a Pedagogue that taught the children of the cheifeſt men of the City, thinking to gratify Camillus and the people of Rome, under colour of exerciſe going forth with them out of the Town, brought them all into the Campe before Camillus: where having preſented them he ſaid, that by means of them the Town would forth with be deliver'd into his hands. Which preſent was not only not accepted by • amillus, but having caus'd the Pedagogue to be ſtrip'd, and his hands bound behind him, and given to each one of thoſe children a rod in his hand, caus'd him to be whip'd back again by them with many ſtripes into the Town. Which when they of the Town underſtood, Camillus his humanity and integrity ſo much pleasd them, that not deſiring longer to defend themſelves, they reſolv'd to render up the Town to him. Where it is to be conſidered by this true example, how much more a curteous and charitable act works in mens minds then any one full of cruelty and violence; and how that many times thoſe countries and cities; that no weapons, nor warlick inſtruments, nor any other force of man hath been able to open, one action of humanity, piety, chaſtity, or liberality hath laid wide open. Whereof in ſtories (beſides this) we have many other examples. And we all ſee that the Romans by war were not of power to drive Pyrrhus out of Italy; and yet Fabritius his Frankeneſs ſent him out, when he diſcover'd to him the offer which a familiar friend of his had made the Romans to poiſon him. We ſee alſo, that the conqueſt of new Carthage got not Scipio Affricanus ſo much credit in Spaine, as the example he gave of his chaſtity, when he reſtored a young woman he took, which was exceeding beautifull, untoucheed by him to her huſband. The fame of which action got him friendſhip throughout all Spaine. We ſee moreover how much theſe vertues are by the people wiſhed for in great men, and how much commended by writers, both by thoſe that ſet forth Princes lives, and thoſe alſo that give inſtructions how they ought to live. Among whom Zenophon takes much painesin ſhewing what honours, how great conqueſts, and how exceeding good reputation Cyrus gained by his humanity and affability, and by abſtaining from all actions of pride, cruelty, luxury, and other vices, which blemiſh men lives. Yet notwithſtanding, ſeeing Hannibal by courſes contrary to theſe, gained great fame, and great victories, I purpoſe to diſcourſe thereupon in the Chapter following, from whence this proceeded.

AT the ſame time there were in Rome two famous Captaines, Monlius Torquatus and Valerius Corvinus: who both of equal vertue, had a like triumph'd, and liv'd in equal credit & reputation in Rome; & each of them (touching the enemy) had with equal valor gained it; but as for the Armyes, and treating of their Soldiers, they proceeded exceeding differently: for Manlius with all kind of ſeverity commanded them, without intermitting his Soldiers pains or puniſhments. Valerius on the other part in all kinds and termes of courtefie treated them with a familiar way of affability; for it appears, that the one to keep his Soldiers in obedience put his own ſon to death, and the other never hurt any. Yet in ſuch a differency of proceeding, each produc'd the ſame fruit, as well to the enemies loſs, as the Commonwealths profit, and his own particular; for never any Soldier refus'd the fight or mutini'd againſt them, or in any part diſagreed from their wills, however that Manlius his commands were ſo rigorous, that all other kinds of commands, which exceeded meaſure in everity, were termed Manlian commands. Where we are firſt to conſider, whence it was that Manlius was conſtrained to proceed ſo rigidly: the next is, what was the cauſe that theſe two different waies brought forth the ſame effect: and in the laſt place, which is the better of the two, and more profitable to imitate. If any man conſider well Manlius his diſpoſition, from the time that T. Livius begins to make mention of him, he ſhall find him, a very valiant man, religiouſly loving his Father and his Countrey, and exceedingly reverencing his Superiors. Theſe things we gather from the ſlaughter of the Frenchmen, from the defence of his Father againſt the Tribune, and in that before he went to fight with the Frenchmen, he went to the Conſul, with theſe words, Without thy allowance, Injuſſu tuo adverſus haſtem nunquam pugnabo, non ſi certam victoriam videam. I will never fight with the enemy; no though I were aſſured of victory. When a man then ſo diſpos'd attains to ſuch dignity as to command, he deſires to find all other men like himſelf, and his ſtrong courage moves him to command ſtrong and ſtout things: and the ſame (when once they are commanded) will likewiſe that they be obſerved; and the rule is moſt certain, that when rigid and hard things are commanded, it is fit with rigour to ſee them obſervd; otherwiſe wouldſt thou find thy ſelf much deciv'd. Where it is to be noted that if a man will be obeyed, it is neceſſary he know how to command; and they know how to command, that make a compariſon between their own quality, and theirs that are to obey; and when they ſee a proportion, then let them command; but when a diſproportion, let them forbeare. And therefore a wiſe man ſaid, that to hold a Common-wealth by violence and force, it was needfull there were a proportion between the perſon forcing, and the party forced: and whenever that proportion was, there it was credible that that violence would laſt: but when the party forced was of more force than the perſon forcing, it might be doubted that violence would every day fail. But returning to our diſcourſe. I ſay, that to command ſtout and ſtrong things it is neceſſary to be ſtout too: and he that is of this ſtoutneſs, and commands ſuch things, can never by mildneſs cauſe them to be obſerv'd: but he that hath not thiſ ſtrength of courage, ought beware of theſe extraordinary commands, and in thoſe ordinary he may well uſe his own humanity: for ordinary puniſhments are not imputed to the Prince, but to the lawes and cuſtomes. We ought then to bebelieve, that Manlius was forced to proceed ſo roughly, by his own extraordinary commands, whereunto his own nature was inclinable, which are very uſeful in a Commonwealth, becauſe they reduce the orders thereof to their originals and ancient vigor. And if a Republike were ſo fortunate, that ſhe often had (as we have formerly ſaid) ſome one by his example to renew and revive the Laws, and not retain them onely from running to ruine, but draw them quite back to their beginnings, ſhe might be perpetual. So that Manlius was one of thoſe, who by the rigor of his commands maintained the military diſcipline in Rome, drawn thereunto firſt by his own nature, afterwards from a deſire which he had that that ſhould be obſerved, which his natural inclination had made him ordain. On the other ſide Valerius might as he pleaſed proceed with curteſie, as he, whom it ſufficed, that the accuſtomed orders were obſerved in the Romane Armies: which cuſtome (becauſe it was good) was enough to honor him, and yet not painful to obſerve; nor did it force Valerius to puniſh the offenders, as well becauſe it may be there were none, as for that if there had been any, they imputed (as it is ſaid) their puniſhments to the wonted orders and cuſtomes, and not to the Princes cruelty. So that Valerius had power to cauſe all humanity and mildneſs to fl • w from himſelf, whereby he might eaſily gain his ſouldiers good wills. Whereupon it came to paſs that the one or the other having the ſame obedience, were able, though proceeding diverſly, to work the ſame effect. They that would follow theſe, may chance to fall into thoſe vices of contempt and hatred, as I ſaid in my diſcourſe before of Hanaibal and Scipio, which is avoided by an exceſſive worth in thee, and not otherwiſe. It remains now that we conſider which of theſe ways of proceeding is the more commendable: which I take to be a matter diſputable, becauſe as well the one as other is much prais'd by writers. Yet they that write how a Prince ſhould rule his ſubjects, come nearer to Valerius then Manlius. And Xenophon, alledged formerly by me, giving many examples of Cyrus his humanity, accords much with that which T. Livius ſays of Valerius: for being made Conſul againſt the Samnites, & the day come he was to fight, he ſpake to his ſouldiers with that affability and familiarity, with which he uſed to behave himſelf towards them and after ſuch ſpeaking, T. Livius ſaies theſe words; There was never any Captain more familiar with his ſouldiers, among the meaneſt of Non alius militi familiatior dux fuit, inter infimos militum omnia baud gravatè munia obeun do; in ludo praeterea militari cum velocitatis, viriumque inter ſe aequales certamina incunt; comiter facilis vincere, ac vinci vultu eodem, nec quenquam aſpernari parem qui ſe offerret; factis benignus; pro redactis, haudminus libertatis alienae, quam ſuae dignitatis memor; & quo nihil popularius eſt, quibus artibus petierat magiſtratus, iiſdem gerebat. them, freely undergoing all ſervices: beſides in military exerciſes, whereas the ſoldiers uſe to contend with their equals either in ſwiftneſs or ſtrength, he himſelf without change of countenance as graciouſly and eaſily loſt as won, nor ſcorned he any one that offered himſelf to match him; liberal he was, and affable, no leſs mindful of other mens liberties then of his own dignity; and which is the greateſt point of popularity, the ſame courſe he took to attain to his magistracy, the ſame he followed in executing it. In like manner T. Livius ſpeaks honorably of Manlius, ſhewing that his ſeverity in putting his ſon to death, made the Army ſo obedient to the Conſul, that it was a cauſe the Romans gain'd the victory of the Latines: and he proceeds ſo far in commending him, that after this victory, having ſet down all the order of the battel, and ſhewed all the dangers which the people of Rome ran, and the difficulties there were to overcome, he concludes thus, that onely Manlius his valour gave the Romans that victory. And comparing the forces of the two Armies together, affirms, that that ſide would have overcome, which ſoever had had Manlius for their Conſul. So that conſidering all that writers ſpeak hereof, it would be hard to give a good judgement hereupon. Nevertheleſs, not to leave this part undecided, I ſay, that in a Citizen living under the laws of a Republike, it is more laudable and leſs dangerous to proceed as Manlius did; for that way is wholly in favour of the publike, and no whit regards private ambition; for by ſuch a courſe a man cannot gain any partiſans, ſhewing himſelf rigid to every one, favoring onely the common good: for no man behaving himſelf thus, can get any particular friends, which we term (as it was ſaid before) Partiſan. In ſo much that a like manner of proceeding cannot be more profitable nor more approved in a Republike: the publike advantage nothing failing in it, and being impoſſible to give thereby any jealouſie of private ambition. But in the courſe Valerius tooke it is contrary; for, however that in regard of the publike, the ſame effects are produc'd, yet there ariſe many doubts, by reaſon of the particular good will, which this man gaines of his ſoldiers, which in a long continuance of government might much wrong the common liberty. And if in publike there grew no miſchief hereupon, the reaſon was, becauſe the Romans minds as yet were not corrupted, nor he long continued in his command. But if we are to conſider a Prince as Xenophon does, we muſt wholly take to Valerius, and leave Manlius: for a Prince ought in his ſoldiers and ſubjects aim at love and obedience: that he maintains the old orders, and is eſteemed vertuous, will yeeld him obedience: and love his affability, humanity, his pity and thoſe other indowments Valerius had, which Xenophon alſo writes were in Cyrus: for to be a Prince wellwilled in particular, and to have his whole Army as particularly affected to him, agrees well with all other parts of his ſtate. But in a Citizen, having an Army ſo to take part with him, this part agrees not with the reſt, which are to oblige him to live under the Laws, and obey the Magiſtrates. We read among the ancient ſtories of the Venetian Republike, how that the Galleys of Venice being returned home, and a difference ariſing between them of the Gallies and the people, whereby an uprear and tumult was raiſed, nor could the matter be quieted by force of officers, reverence of Citizens, nor fear of the principal Magiſtrates, of a ſudden when Peter Loredanus ſhewed himſelf to thoſe Mariners, who the year before had been their Commander, for love of him they departed and left the fight. Which obedience. begot ſuch a ſuſpition in the Senate, that a little while after the Venerians either by im • priſonment or death aſſured themſelves o, him. I conclude therefore that Valerius his manner of proceeding is profitable in a Prince, and hurtful in a Citizen, not onely to his country, but to himſelf: to his country, becauſe thoſe courſes prepare a way to tyranny: to himſelf; for when his country is ſuſpicious of his proceedings, it is conſtrained to make ſure of him with his damage. So on the contrary I affirm that Manlins his proceeding in a Prince is hurtful, and in a citizen profitable, and eſpecially to the country, and alſo ſeldom offends, if now this hatred which thy ſeverity draws after it, be not increaſed by ſuſpicion which by means of thy great reputation thy other vertues charge thee with, as by and by ſhall be diſcourſed touching Camillus.

WE have formerly concluded that by proceeding as Valerius did, a man hurts both his country and himſelf. And by proceeding as Manlius did, a man advantages his country, and ſometimes hurts himſelf. Which is ſufficiently proved by the example of Camillus, who in his manner of proceeding came nearer to Manlius then Valerius. Whereupon Titus Livius ſpeaking of him, ſays, His vertue the ſouldiers Eius virtutem milites oderant, & mirabantur. hated, and yet admired. That which cauſed the admiration of him, was his carefulneſs, his wiſdom, the magnanimity of his ſpirit, and the good order in imploying and commanding his Armies. That which got him hatred, was, that he was more fevere in chaſtiſing then liberal in rewarding them. And Titus Livius alledges theſe occaſions of this hatred. The firſt was, that the monies which were made of the ſale of the Veientes goods, he brought all into the treaſury, and divided not together with the ſpoile among the ſoldiers. The ſecond, that in his triumph he made his triumphal Chariot be drawn with four white horſes, where they ſaid that in his pride he ſtrove to equal the Sun. The third, that he made a vow to give Apollo the tenth part of the prey taken from the Veientes, which (he deſiring to pay his vow) was to be taken out of the ſoldiers hands, who already had got poſſeſſion of it. Where thoſe things are very eaſily marked, that make a Prince odious with his people. Of which the principal is, to bereave them of any profit, which is a matter of much importance: for the things that carry any profit with them, when a man is deprived thereof, he never forge • s, and every little neceſſity puts thee in mind of them; and becauſe neceſſities haunt us every day, thou remembreſt theſe things every day: the other thing is to appear lofty and puft up with pride, then which nothing is more odious to the people, eſpecially thoſe that enjoy their liberty. And however that from that pride and ſtat • lineſs of theirs the people receive no hur •• ye do they always hare them that uſe it: whereof a Prince ought to beware, as of a rock; for to procure hatred without advantage, is but a raſh and fooliſh courſe.

BY the example of the Roman Conſuls, who made a reconciliation among the Ardeates, the way is ſhewed how, matters are to be compoſed in a City at variance; which is no other, nor can otherwaies be held, then by putting to death the chief ringleaders of ſeditions: for of neceſſity one of theſe three waies is to be goneeither to put them to death, as they did, or remove them out of the City, or cauſe them to make peace one with another, with aſſurance given not to wrong either the other. Of theſe three waies this laſt is the moſt pernicious, leſs certain, and moſt unprofitable: for it is unpoſſible, where much blood hath been ſhed, and other like outrages, that a peace made by force ſhould continue, looking one another in the face every day: and it is very hard for them to forbear injuring one another, being there may every day be given amongſt them by reaſon of their dayly converſation new occaſions of quarrels. Whereupon a better example cannot be alledged then the City of Piſtoya. That City was divided (as ſtill it is) fifteen years agoe, into the Panciatichi, and the Cancellieri: but then were they in armes, now they have laid them aſide. And after many brabbles among them, they came at length to the ſhedding of blood, to demoliſhing of houſes, and pillaging of goods, and to all other termes of hoſtilitie. And the Florentines that were to reconcile them, alwaies took that third courſe: and thereupon alwaies aroſe greater tumults and greater ſcandals: So that weary hereof, they came to take that ſecoud courſe, to remove the heads of the factions, ſome of which they put in priſon, others they confined in ſeveral places: in ſo much as the agreement was able to continue, and ſo hath done till this preſent day; but without doubt the ſafeſt way had been the firſt. But becauſe ſuch like executions have ſome thing in them of greatneſs of ſpirit and magnanimity, a feeble Republick knows not how to put them in practiſe, but is ſo far there from, that hardly arrives ſhe to uſe the ſecond remedy. And theſe are ſome of thoſe errors, of which I ſpake in the beginning, that the Princes of our times commit, being to give their judgements in matters of weight: for they ſhould have a mind to ſe, how they have carried themſelves, who of old have deliverd their opinions in like caſes. But the weakneſs of men now a daies, cauſed by their weak education, and their little knowledge of things makes them eſteem thoſe opinions of the ancients partly in human, partly impoſſible. Whereas they have certain of their moderne opinions, quite contrary to the truth, as is that, where the wiſe man of our City a while agoe ſaid, it was neeedfull to hold Piſtoia by factions; and Piſa with Cittadells: nor perceive they how unprofitable the one and the other of theſe things is. I will paſs over the Cittadels, becauſe formerly wee ſpake of them at large, & now diſcourſe of the incommodity that ariſes from holding the Towns thou haſt under thy government, divided into factions. And touching the former, it is impoſſible thou canſt maintain both thoſe ancient factions, Prince or Republick thou art that governſt them: for by nature men are inclined to take part in any thing that is divided, and to be pleaſed more with this than with that; ſo that the having a faction in that Town diſcontented with thee, is a cauſe that the firſt war that comes, thou loſeſt it: for it is impoſſible to guard a City, that hath enemies without dors, & within dores. If it be a Republick that governes this City, there is no readier way to make thy Subjects become nought, and to ſet thy City at variance, than by having in thy dominions a Town thus at odds; for each faction ſeeks favour, and each part ſtrives to gain friends by all manner of corruption, ſo that two very great inconveniences ariſe thereupon: the one is, that thou canſt never make them thy friends, becauſe thou canſt not well govern them, the rule ofttimes varying, ſometimes with the one humor, ſometimes with the other: the other is, that that favouring of ſides muſt needs divide thy Republick. And Blondus ſpeaking of the Florentines, and the Piſtoyeſes, tells us certainly, that while the Florentines thought to reconcile thoſe of Piſtoya, they divided themſelves. Whereupon wee may eaſily perceive the evill which grows upon this diviſion. In the yeare 1501. when Aretium was loſt, and the whole vale of Tiber, and that of Chiana was taken by the Vitelli and the Duke Valentine, there came a Gentleman call'd de Lant, ſent by the King of France, to cauſe a reſtitution of all thoſe Towns loſt to the Florentines again: and this de Lant finding in every one of thoſe Fortreſſes men, who when they came to viſit him, told him they were of the faction of Marzocco, he much blamd their diviſion, ſaying that if in France one of the Kings Subjects ſhould ſay hee were of the Kings party, he would be puniſhed: becauſe ſuch a ſpeech could ſignifie no leſs, than that there in the Country were people enemies to the King, whereas that King will that all thoſe Towns be his friends, united in themſelves, and without factions. But all theſe waies, & opinions diſſerting from the truth, ariſe from the weakneſs of thoſe that are Princes, who ſeeing they are not able to hold their States by force and valour, betake themſelves to ſuch like devices, which ſometimes when things are in quietneſs helpe ſomewhat; but if they come to any diſtreſs, and that they have warrs, they quickly ſhew them what little truſt thereis to be had in them.

THe City of Rome being much oppreſſed by famine, and the publick proviſions unſufficient to eaſe it, one Spurius Melius had a mind, being very rich in thoſe times, out of his private eſtate to make proviſion of Gorn, and feed the common people to their content. Whereupon the people flocked ſo thick about him in favour of him, that the Senate perceiving the inconvenient that grew upon this his liberality, to ſuppreſs it before it took better hold, created a Dictatour, and ſet him on his back, who put him to death. Here is to be noted, that many times thoſe works which ſeem to be done upon charity and piety, and no way with reaſon to be condemn'd, prove very pernicious and dangerous, when they are not looked to in good time. And to argue this matter more particularly, I ſay that a Republick cannot ſubſiſt, nor in, any caſe be well govern'd without Citizens of good credit and reputation. On the other ſide the Citizens reputation, is the occaſion of Tyranny in a Commonwealth. And if we will regulate this matter, it muſt ſo be order'd, that the Citizens ſtand upon ſuch manner of reputation, as may advantage and not endammage the City, nor the liberty thereof. And therefore the means are to be examin'd, whereby they gain reputation, which in effect are two, either publick or private. The publick means are, when one by adviſing well, and doing better for the publick benefit, gains reputation. To this honour the way ſhould be ſet open to the Citizens, and rewards given, as well for good advices, as good actions, ſo that they are therefore both to be honoured and ſatisfied: for when theſe reputations are gotten by theſe plain and honeſt courſes, they will never prove dangerous. But when they are gain'd by particular waies (which is the other means by us alleadged before) they are very dangerous and hurtfull. The private waies are the benefiting this and that other particular, lending monies, matching with their daughters, protecting them againſt the magiſtrates, and doing them ſuch other like favours, which make men become factions, and encourage him that is thus favour'd by them, to think he may be able to corrupt the publick, & violate the laws. Therefore ought a Republick that is well ordered, give eaſy acceſs to thoſe that ſeek favour by publick means, but bar out thoſe that work by their own private by waies, as Rome did, we ſee. For in reward of him that did the publick goood ſervice, ſhe ordain'd their triumphs and all thoſe other honors, which ſhe beſtowed on her Citizens: and to puniſh thoſe, who under diverſe colours aſpired to greatneſs by private waies, ſhe appointed the publick accuſations: and when theſe would not ſerve, becauſe the people was blinded with the ſhew of a falſe good, ſhe created a Dictator, who by a Kinglike power ſhould reduce thoſe into their rankes again that were broken out, as ſhe did to puniſh Spurius Melius. And when one of theſe things is left unpuniſhed, it is of force to ruine a Republick; for hardly upon ſuch an example may ſhe afterwards be brought into the right way again.

PRinces have no reaſon to complain of any fault, which the people that is under their governments do commit: for their faults muſt needs proceed either from their negligence, or becauſe they are blemiſhed with the like errors. And whoever ſhall run over the nations that in our dayes have been accounted full of robberies, and ſuch like offences, ſhall perceive they all wholly proceeded from thoſe that govern'd them who were of the like condition. In Romania thoſe Princes in it before they were extinguiſh'd by Pope Alexander the ſixth, gave patterns to every one of a moſt ungodly and unconſcionable life: for here a man might ſee horrible executions upon every ſlight occaſion, and exceeding great rapines: Which firſt grew from the wickedneſs of thoſe Princes, not from the miſcheivous diſpoſition of the people, as they ſaid: for thoſe Princes being but poor, and yet having a mind to live as ſtately as thoſe that were rich, were neceſſitated to apply themſelves to many rapins, and to practiſe them diverſe waies, and among other diſhoneſt waies they toook, this was one; they made lawes and forbad ſome kind of action to be done; afterwards they were the firſt that gave the occaſion to break it, nor ever puniſh'd they the breakers of it, till afterwards when they ſaw many others had committed the ſame fault, and then they began to puniſh the breach, not for any zeal towards the law made, but for covetouſneſs to recover the penalty: whereupon grew many inconvenients: and above all this, that the people were impoveriſh'd, and no way amended, and thoſe that were impoveriſh'd uſed all their wits to work upon thoſe that were their inferior. Whereupon aroſe all theſe evils (we have now ſpoken of) whereof the Prince was the only cauſe. And that this is true, T. Livius ſhews us, where he relates, that the Roman Ambaſſadors, carrying a gift of the ſpoile taken from the Vejentes to Apollo, were taken by the Corſaires of Lipari in Sicily, and there brought to land. But Timaſitheus their Prince, having underſtood, what gift it was, whether it went, and who ſent it, though he were borne in Lipari, yet behaved he himſelf like a worthy Roman, and told the people, that it was impiety to lay hands on ſuch a gift, in ſo much as by general conſent they ſet the Ambaſſadors at liberty with all that was theirs: and the Hiſtorians words are theſe, Timaſitheus made all the multitude religious, which Timaſitheus multitudinem religinne implevit, quae ſemper regenti eſt ſimilis. is done alwaies like a true governor, And Laurence of Medicim confirmation ſo this opinion ſaies,

THe Romane Senate having notice, that all Tuſcany had made a new levy of ſouldiers, with purpoſe to endammage Rome, and that the Latini and Hernici, who formerly had been their friends, were now joyned to the Volſoi, the perpetual enemies of Rome, conſidered that this war might prove perillous. And Camillus at that time being Tribune with Conſular power, thought all might be well done without creating a Dictator, if the other Tribunes his collegues would yeeld up unto him the ſum and whole command of the Empire, which the ſaid Tribunes willingly did. Nor thought they (ſays T. Livius) Nec quicquam de majeſtate ſua detractum credebant quod majeſtati ejus conceſſiſſent. it any thing derogated from their Majeſty, what they had yeelded to his. Whereupon Camillus having taken this obedience upon their words, commanded they ſhould inroll three Armies. Of the firſt he would be general to go againſt the Tuſcans; Of the ſecond he made Quintus Servilius Conmander, whom he would have to abide near about Rome, to withſtand the Latini and the Hernici, if they ſhould ſtir. He gave Lucius Quintius the command of the third Army, which he levied for the guard of the City, the defence of the gates and the court of juſtice, in caſe any chance ſhould happen; beſides this he ordained, that Horatius one of his Collegues, ſhould make proviſion of arms and corn and other things requiſite in time of war. He made Cornelius alſo his Collegue chief of the Senate, and over the publike Councel, to conſult upon thoſe things which in general were to be executed. Thus were the Tribunes in thoſe times diſpoſed for the good of their Country to command, and to obey. It is noted by the text here, what a vertuous and prudent man may do, and what great good he may becauſe of, and how much he may be able to advantage his country, when by means of his goodneſs and vertue, he hath quite extinguiſhed all envy, which many times is the cauſe that men cannot effectuate a good work, the ſaid envy not allowing them that authority which it is neceſſary they ſhould have in matters of importance. And this envy is quite put out two ways; either by ſome ſtrong and difficult accident, where every one ſeeing themſelves ready to periſh, laying ambition aſide, willingly run to obey him, whom they believe by his vertue able to deliver them, as it befell Camillus: who having given ſo many proofs of his being an admirable man, and having been thrice Dictator, and performed that place alwayes with the advantage of the publike, and no way to his own profit, had now cauſed men not to be afraid of his greatneſs And becauſe he was ſo magnanimous, and of ſuch great credit, they thought it no ſhame to them to be inferiors to him: And therefore ſaies Titus Livius very wiſely theſe words, Nor thought they it any things, &c. Another way is envy blotted out, when either by violence or by courſe of nature they dye that have been thy competitors in attaining to any reputation, or greatneſs; who ſeeing the more eſteemed then they, it is unpoſſible they ever ſhould be at reſt, or have any patience. And when they are accuſtomed to live in a corrupted City, where their education hath not bred any goodneſs in them, it is unpoſſible, let what accident will fall out, that they ſhould ever go back from any thing; and without doubt to have their wills, and ſatisfy the waywardneſs of their minds, they would be contented even to ſee the ruine of their native Country. To overcome this envy, there is no other remedy but the death of thoſe that bear it: and when fortune is ſo favorable to that vertuous man, as that thoſe men dye a natural death, he becomes glorious without giving any ſcandal, when without any obſtacle or offence he may diſplay his vertues. But when he hath not this good luck, he muſt deviſe by any means to take them out of his way. And before he can do any thing he muſt practiſe thoſe wayes whereby to overcome this difficulty. And he that reads the Bible with underſtanding, ſhall ſee that Moſes was forced (if he would have his lawes and ordinances proceed) to put a great number of men to death, who provoked by nothing elſe but envy, withſtood his purpoſe. This neceſſity I deubt that the underſtanding which he adviſes others of, he wants himſelf: not knowing the meaning of, or not believing the holy writ; whereby he puts men paſt ſuſpition of his Atheiſme. For what he alledges of Moſes, he muſt needs take originally from Moſes his books, being we have not any author of that antiquity, as could write any thing of his own knowledge touching thoſe times. But thoſe Mach. ſeems not to believe further then ſerved his own humor, reading the Scriptures onely to a politicke end, not ſo much for the ſtrengthening of his belief, as the bettering of his diſcourſe. Yet however Machiavel did not, I hope others will believe that Moſes delivered to the Iſraelites the true Oracles of GOD; and that it was not Moſes that puniſhed the delinquents among them, but GOD ſending his immediate judgements. As in the rebellion of Corah and his complices, Numbers the 16. Moſes did but citie them as to appearance: but GOD immediately ſent his vengeance: For the earth under them opened, verſ. 31. And when that wretched fellow gathered ſticks on the Sabboth, Numb 15. Moſes awaited till GOD paſſed • the ſentence upon him for his death; and the manner thereof, verſ. 35. Therefore Machiavell may juſtly be taxed for traducing Moſes here of more then he hath warrant for, making no other eſteem of Moſes his bringing the Iſraelites out of Egypt, and his leading them through the wilderneſs, then of Romulus his gathering together a • ſcattered multitude, and laying the foundation of that Common-wealth, which action his courage and ambition of rule and glory thruſt him upon; not ſeeming to take notice, that Moſes was immediately called by GOD, and ſent to ſhew his wonders and judgements againſt the Egyptians, and to conduct the Iſraelites into Canaan (according to GODS promiſes formerly made to their forefathers) wherein he behaved not himſelf either ambitiouſly or inſolently, nor was any thing done by his own proweſs or policy, but meerly by the ordinance of GOD. Fryar Jerom Savonarola knew very well, and Peter Soderini chief ſtandard-bearer of Florence knew it alſo. The one could not overcome it, becauſe he had not power to do it, which was the Fryar, and becauſe he was not well underſtood by thoſe that followed him who might have had power to have done it. But it was not his fault, and his ſermons are full of the blames he lays upon the wiſe men of the world, and of invectives againſt them; for ſo he terms thoſe envious men, and all that oppoſed his ordinances. That others believed that in time, by his goodneſs, and good fortune, and doing good turns to ſome of them, quite to extinguiſh this envy, ſeeing himſelf young enough too, and then wearing ſo many new favors, which the manner of his proceeding afforded him, ſo that he thought he was able to overcome thoſe many that enviouſly oppoſed him, without any ſcandal, violence, or tumult. And did not know that time cannot ſtay; goodneſs is not ſufficient, fortune changes; and there is no gift can appeaſe malice. So that the one and the other of theſe two went to ruine, and their ruine proceeded either from their ignorance, or their diſability to overcome this envy. The other thing remarkeable is the order which Camillus took both within and abroad for the preſervation of Rome. And indeed not without reaſon the good Hiſtorians (as ours here is) ſet down particularly and diſtinctly certain caſes, to the end poſterity ſhould learn how in the like accidents they are to defend themſelves. And it ought well be obſerv'd in this text, that there is not a more dangerous nor unprofitable defence then that which is confuſedly made, and with out order, and this appears by this third army which Camillus cauſed to be inrolled, and to be left at Rome to guard the Town: for many would have judg'd that part ſuperfluous, where the people is moſt commonly arm'd, and warlick; and for this cauſe a man would not think it needfull to have them inroll'd otherwiſe, but only that it ſufficed to cauſe them to be in armes as occaſion ſhould require. But Camillus and who elſe were wiſe as he was, think otherwiſe, who never allow a multitude to take armes, unleſs by certain order and appointment: Wherefore upon this example, he that is appointed over the guard of a City, ſhould avoid, as a rock, the arming of men in confuſion, but ought firſt have thoſe choſen and regiſtred? which he would have in armes, and whom he would have them obey, where their rendezvous, and whether to go, and command thoſe that are not inrolled to abide every man at his own houſe, for the ſafeguard thereof. They that ſhal take this order in a City aſſailed, will eaſily be able to defend themſelves: whoever does otherwiſe, ſhal neither imitate Camillus, nor defend himſelf.

CIrcei and Velitre two Roman Colonies being rebelled, in hope that the Latines would defend them, afterwards the Latines being overcome, and ſo thoſe hopes failing them, divers of the Citizens adviſed, they ſhould ſend Ambaſſadors to Rome, to recommend them to the Senate: which courſe was hindred by thoſe that had been Authors of the rebellion, who were afraid leaſt the whole puniſhment ſhould fall upon their heads; and therefore to cut off all treaty of peace, they incited the multitude to take arms, and make an incurfion upon the Rome territories. And truely when any one deſires that a people or Prince ſhould wholly take their minds off from agreement, there is no truer nor certainer way than to make them do ſome foul act againſt him, with whom thou wouldſt not have the accord made. For the fear of that puniſhment which he ſhall think he hath deſerved for his fault, ſhall always keep him off. After the firſt wars which the Carthaginians had with the Romanes, thoſe ſoldiers who had ſerved the Carthaginians in that war in Sicily and Sardinia, when the peace was concluded, went back into Affrica, where not being ſatisfied for their pay, they made wars againſt the Carthaginians, and having choſen two out of themſelves for their heads, Mathus, and Spendius, they took divers Towns of the Carthaginians, and ſacked divers. The Carthaginians willing to try any other way then battell, ſent Aſdrubal a Citizen of theirs Ambaſſadour to them, who they thought had ſome credit with them, having formerly been their General. And he being come, and Spendius and Mathus deſiring to oblige all theſe Souldiers, never to hope they could have peace again with the Carthaginians, and to engage them in the war, perſwaded them it was better to kill him, with all the Citizens of Carthage, which then they had priſoners, Whereupon they not only ſlew them, but put them to death with torments, to this villainy adding an edict, that all Carthaginians, who in time to come were taken, ſhould in the ſame ſort be ſlain. Which deliberation and execution made that Army exceeding cruell and obſtinate againſt the Carthaginians.

IT much helpes an Army towards the winning of a battell, to make them confident, that in any caſe they cannot chuſe but vanquiſh. The things that give them this confidence, are, that they be well armed and well orderd, and be acquainted one with another. Nor can this confidence or this order be but among thoſe Soldiers that have been borne and liv'd together. The Commander alſo muſt be of repute, ſo that the Soldiers may be confident of his wiſdome: and they ſhall alwaies be ſo, when they perceive him to be a man orderly carefull, and couragious, and that maintains well, and with eſteem the Majeſty of his dignity: and he ſhall alwaies be able to do ſo, while he puniſheth their faults, while he tires not out the ſoldiers to no purpoſe, keeps his word with them, ſhewes them an eaſie way to vanquiſh the enemy; thoſe things that may endanger them, conceals from them; or if they be evident, by his ſpeeches leſſons their opinion of them: which things well obſerved, are a great occaſion of confidence in the Army; and that confidence of victory the Romans us'd to make their Armies thus confident by way of Religion: from hence proceeded, that by their ſouthſayings and auſpiees they created their Conſuls, they levied their ſouldiers, march'd with their armies, and fought their battels; and without having done ſome of theſe things, never would a good or diſcreet Commander, have put any thing to hazard, deeming that he might eaſily loſe, unleſs his ſouldiers had firſt underſtood that the gods were on their ſide. And when any Conſul or Captain of theirs ſhould have fought contrary to the auſpices, they would have puniſhd him, as they did Claudius Pulcher. And however we find this true in all the Roman Hiſtories, yet it is proved more certain by the words which Livie brings in Appius Claudius ſpeaking, who complaining to the people of their Tribunes inſolency, and ſhewing that by means of them the auſpices and other matters pertaining to Religion were corrupted, ſayes thus: Let Eludant nunc licet Religionem; quid enim eſt, ſi pulli non paſcentur, fi ex cavea tardius exierint, 〈◊〉 occinuerit avis? parva ſunt haec: ſed parva iſta non contemnendo, Majores noſtri maximam hanc Rempublicam fecerunt. them now ſcoffe at Religion; for, what matter is it, whether the chickens feed, or whether they come ſlower out of their cage, whether a bird hath ſung or no? theſe, tis true, are all ſmall things: but by not contemning of theſe little things, our Aunceſtours have exceedingly amplified this Commonwealth. For in theſe ſmall matters there is force to hold the ſouldiers united and confident, which thing is a principall occaſion of any victory. Yet muſt theſe things be accompanied with valour, otherwiſe they will avail little. The Preneſtini having their Army abroad againſt the Romans, went to incampe upon the river of Allia, a place where the Romans had been overcome by the French, which they did to make their own ſouldiers confident, and to affright the Romans with the fortune of the place. And though the courſe they took, was probable for thoſe reaſons wee have already ſaid, yet the concluſion of the matter ſhewed, that true valour feares not every ſmall accident: Which the Hiſtorian ſayes very well, in thoſe words which he makes the Dictatour ſpeak, who ſaies thus to the Maſter of his Cavallerie: Seeſt thou how they taking benefit of their Vides tu fortunâ illos fretos ad Alliam conſediſſe. At tu fretus armis animiſ que invade mediam aciem. fortune, have incamped themſelves upon the river Allia? But thou making uſe of thy Armes and courage aſſayle the very heart of their Armie. For a true valour, a good diſcpline, and an aſſurance taken from ſo many victories, cannot be extinguiſhed by matters of ſmall moment, nor does any vain matter affright them, nor one diſorder hurt them, as we ſaw it; for two Manlij being Conſuls againſt the Volſei, by reaſon that they had raſhly ſent part of their Army to forrage, it followed, that both they that were gone and thoſe that ſtaid behind, were beſieged; from which danger, not the wiſedome of the Conſuls, but the Souldiers own valour freed them, where T. Livius ſays theſe words, The Souldiers valour even without a Commander was Militum etiam ſine rec • ore ſtabilis virrus putata eſt. thought firme and conſtant. I will not let paſs one terme us'd by Fabius, being newly entred with his Army into Tuſcany, to make them confident, deeming ſuch a confidence to be the more neceſſary, now that he had brought them into a new Country, and to fight with new enemies; who ſpeaking to his ſouldiers before the fight, and having told them many reaſons, whereupon they might hope for the victory, ſaid, that he could alſo tell them certain good things, and where they might plainly ſee the victory, but that it was dangerous to diſcloſe them. Which courſe as it was diſcreetly us'd, ſo deſerves it it to be followed.

OTherwhere we ſaid, that T. Manlius, who afterwards was termed Torquatus, ſav'd L. Manlius his Father from an acccuſation, which M. Pomponions Tribune of the people had made againſt him. And however the manner of ſaving him, was ſomewhat violent and extraordinary, yet that filial piety towards his Father, was ſo acceptable to the generall, that it was not only not blamed, but when Tribune were to be appointed over the Legions, T. Manlius was choſen in the ſecond place. Upon which ſucceſs, I beleeve it fit to conſider, what way the people take to give their judgements upon men in diſtributing of their charge that thereby we may ſee, whether that be true which we formerly concluded, that the people is a better diſtributer than a Prince. I ſay then, that the people in their diſtribution follows the report that goes of one by publick voyce and fame: when they know him not otherwiſe by his ordinary behaviour, or by preſumption or opinion conceived of him. Which two things have been cauſed either by the Fathers of ſuch, who for that they have been great perſonages, and of ability in the Cities, it is thought their ſons ſhould be like them, untill by their actions the contrary be found: Or elſe it is cauſed by the courſes ſuch a one takes, of whom we ſpeak: the beſt courſes and waies that can be held, are to keep company with grave men, well dispos'd, and ſuch as by every one are reputed wiſe. And becauſe there cannot be a greater marke or diſcovery of a man then by the company he frequents, without queſtion he that uſes good company, gaines a good name: for it is impoſſible but that he ſhall much reſemble them. Or indeed this publick reputation is gotten by ſome extraordinary and notable exploit, however private, that hath proved in thy hands very honorable. And of all theſe three things, which in the beginning gain any one a good reputation, nothing gives if more amply then this laſt: for that firſt of parents, and fathers is ſo deceitfull, that men advance therein very leiſurely, and that is preſently quite ſpent, when it is not accompanied by the the proper vertue of him that is to be cenſured. The ſecond way, which makes thee be known by the company thou uſeſt, is better then the firſt; but is much inferior to the third; for untill thou haſt given evidence of thy ſelf by ſome worthy exploir, thy repute is wholly grounded upon opinion, which is very eaſily cancelled. But that third being begun and grounded upon thy workes, gives thee at firſt ſuch renown, that needs muſt it be, that afterwards thou commit many acts contrary thereunto, if thou wouldſt diſannul it. Therefore ought thoſe men that ſpring up in a Common-wealth, take this courſe, and indeavour by ſome extraordinary act to begin their riſe. Which many at Rome did in their youths, either by publiſhing of a law, furthering the common good, or by accuſing ſome potent Citizen as a breaker of the laws, by doing ſuch like notable things, and unwonted, whereof men ſhould have occaſion to ſpeak afterwards. Neither are ſuch like things needfull only to begin ones reputation, but they are as neceſſary for the maintenance and advancement of it. And to do this, a man had need to renew them again, as Manlius did during his whole life: for when he had defended his father ſo vertuouſly and beyond the ordinary ſtrain, and by this action taken his firſt degree of reputation, after ſome years he fought with that Frenchman, and took from him that chain of gold, which gave him the name of Torquatus: nor ſtay'd he upon this, but afterwards in riper years he put his ſon to death for having fought without his allowance, however he had vanquiſhed his enemy. Which three actions gave him a greater name, and throughout all ages make him more famous, then ever any triumph or victory did, wherewith he was adorn'd as much as any other Roman. And the reaſon is, becauſe in thoſe victories Manlius had very many like him, but in theſe particulars he had either very few or none. Scipio the elder got not greater glory by all his triumphs, then that action of defending his father upon the Teſin gained him in his youth, and that other when after the defeate at Canna, couragiouſly with his ſword drawn he made many young Romans ſwear they would never abandon Italy, as already then among them it was reſolv'd which two actions were the beginnings of his reputation, which made him a way to his triumphs of Spain and Africa, which opinion of him was alſo increaſed, when he ſent back the daughter to her Father, and the wife to her husband in Spain. This manner of proceeding is not alone needful for thoſe Citizens, that would gain reputation, whereby to attain the dignities in their Commonwealth, but is alſo neceſſary for Princes to maintain their credits in their Principalities: for nothing gives them ſo great eſteem as to yeeld ſome rare examples of themſelves, by ſome deed or pithy ſaving, agreeable with the common good, which may evidently prove the Prince either magnanimous, or liberall, or juſt; and that he is ſuch a one, that his life may ſerve for a patterne, and his wiſe ſayings may be uſed by his ſubjects as proverbs. But to returne, whereat we began this diſcourſe, I ſay' that the people, when they begin to confer any dignity upon one of their Citizens, grounding upon any of thoſe reaſons before alledged, take no ill ground; but when afterwards the frequent examples of one mans good carriage makes him better known, then is a better ground taken; for in ſuch caſe there can never fall any deceit. I ſpeak only of thoſe honours which are given to men in the beginning, before they be well known by a certain experience, or that they tranſgreſs from one action to another unlike it; Where both touching the ſalfe opinion and the corruption, they alwaies commit leſs errors, then Princes. And becauſe it may fall out, that the people might be deceived in the report, in the opinion, and actions of a man, conceiving them greater then in truth they are, which would not be ſo with a Prince, becauſe it is like it ſhould be told him, or that he ſhould be advertiſed thereof by ſome of his Counſellours; to the end therefore that the people want not theſe advertiſements, the good founders of Republicks have ordained, that when the cheiſeſt dignities of Cities are to be beſtowed, whereunto it might prove dangerous to prefer unſufficient men, and ſeeing the peoples wills ſometimes bent to advance ſome one unfit, that it may be lawfull for any Citizen, and accounted as an honour to him, to publiſh in their aſſemblies that mans defects, that the people (this notice not failing them) may the better give their judgments thereupon. And that this was cuſtomary at Rome, the oration which F. Maximus made, witneſſed, which he uttered before the people in the ſecond Punicke warr, when at the creation of the Conſulls they took a liking to T. Ottaſilius; and Fabius; deeming him unſufficent to marnage the Conſulate in thoſe times, ſpake againſt him, declaring his unſufficiency, inſomuch as he hindred him of that dignity, and converted the peoples favours to one that deſerved it better then he. The people then in the choice of their Magiſtrates judge according to the trueſt markes they can have of men. And when they can be adviſed, as Princes are, they run into fewer errors then Princes; and that Citizen that will begin to ſeek the peoples favour, muſt with ſome notable exploit gain it, as Titus Manlius did.

HOw dangerous a thing it is for any man to become the ringleader of any new matter, which belongs to many, and how hard a thing it is to meddle in it, and bring it on forwards, and make it good being thus brought forwards, would be too long and too deep a matter to diſcourſe on. Therefore reſerving it for a fitter place, I will only treate of thoſe dangers, which Citizens incur, or thoſe that adviſe a Prince, making themſelves chief in perſwading him to any weighty and important reſolution, ſo that the Councell thereof is wholly imputed to them: for, men judging things by their events, of all the evill that ariſes thereupon, the blame is wholly laid on him as author; and if good come of it, he is commended for it; but the reward comes much ſhort of the loſs is hazarded. This preſent Sultan Selimus' termed the great Turk, having made preparation (as ſome report, who now come from his Country) for the Conqueſt of Syria and Egypt, was encouraged by one of his Baſhawes, who was then upon the confines of Perſia, to undertake rather an expedition againſt the Sophy; by whoſe Counſell being perſwaded, he went to that enterpriſe with an exceeding great army, and comming into a very vaſt country, where a great part of it is deſert, and rivers very few, and finding there thoſe difficulties, which long ſince had ruin'd many Roman armies, was ſo diſtreſſed thereby, that he loſt there by famine and plague (however that in the war he were the vanquiſher) a great part of his army. Whereupon being errag'd againſt the author of that Counſell, he put him to death. We reade of many Citizens, that were the adviſers to ſuch and ſuch enterpriſes, who becauſe theſe had evill ſucceſs, have ſtraightway been baniſhed. Certain Citizens of Rome there were, who as authours of the advice, ſtood to have a Conſul from among the Commons in Rome; it happened, that the firſt of them, that went abroad with their armies, was defeated. Whereupon it had prov'd but unluckily to the authors of that Counſell, had not their party been ſtrong, by whoſe favour ſuch reſolution was taken. It is then moſt certain, that they who adviſe a Republick and they that Counſell a Prince, are equally brought into theſe ſtreights; and if they do not adviſe thoſe things, which they take to be profitable either for the City or the Prince without reſpect, they faile of their duties; and in caſe they do counſell them, they run the hazard of their lives, and of their eſtates; all men herein being ſo blind as to judge advices good or evill by the ſucceſs they take. And deviſing with my ſelf by what means they might eſcape this infamy or danger, I ſee no other way, then that they put things forward moderately, and not take any thing upon them as their own enterpriſe, and give their opinion without paſſion, and defend it alſo modeſtly without paſſion, ſo that if either the City or the Prince followthat advice. it may ſeem they willingly took that courſe, and were not drawn thereto by thy importunity. When thou doſt ſo, it is not reaſonable that a Prince or a people ſhould ſeek revenge on thee for thy counſell, it being not followed againſt other mens wills: for here the danger is, that many having contradicted thee, in the unhappy ſucceſs of thy advice they will concur in working thy ruine. And if in this caſe, one ſhould ſay, that when he failes of that glory which another gets by being one alone againſt many in adviſing any courſe, when it proves luckily, we meete here with two advantages to countervail it: the firſt is to be quite exempt out of all danger: the ſecond is, if thou adviſeſt any thing modeſtly, and by reaſon of the oppoſition made againſt it, thy Counſell be not taken, and ſome diſaſter follow upon the advice another hath given, thou gaineſt much glory thereby. And however the glory, which is gotten by miſchiefs, befallen thy City or thy Prince, cannot well be ſaid to be enjoyed, yet is there ſome account to be made of them. I beleeve there is no other advice can be given to men in this part; for the perſwading them to hold their peace, and not give their opinion, would be a thing very unprotable to the Commonwealth and their Princes, & they would hardly be able to eſcape danger; for in a ſmall time would they be ſuſpected; it might alſo befall them, as it did thoſe friends of Porſe the King of Macedon, who having been defeated by Paulus Emilius, & flying with a few of his confidents, it chanc'd, that in relating things paſt, one of them began to tell Perſe of many errors committed by him, which were the occaſion of his ruine, to whom Perſe turning ſaid, Traitor, and haſt thou delay'd to tell me it, untill now that I have no remedy? and upon theſe words ſlew him with his own hand. And thus he ſuffer'd puniſhment for his ſilence when he ſhould have ſpoken, and for having ſpoken when he ſhould have held his peace: neither avoided he the danger, by not giving his advice. Wherefore I beleeve the rules above given, are to be kept and obſerv'd.

THe fierceneſs of that Frenchman who challeng'd any Roman whatſoever, near the river Anien, to fight with him, and afterwards the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 him and T. Manlius, put 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of that which T. Livius ſayes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , 〈◊〉 the Frenchmen in the beginning of the combat are more then men, and in the end thereof prove leſs then women. And weighing well from whence this may proceed, many beleeve that naturally they are ſo dispos'd, which I think is true: but hence it followes not that this their naturall humor, which makes them ſo fierce in the beginning, might not be ſo order'd by art, as to continue them fierce till the very concluſion: And for proof hereof, I ſay, that there are armies of three ſorts: the one where there is both fury and order, for from the order ariſes fury and valour, as was that of the Romans; for it appears in all their hiſtories, that there was a very good order in that army, which military diſcipline in tract of time had brought in amongſt them. For in a well train'd army, no man is to do any thing but by rule and order. And we find hereby, that in the Roman Army (from which, inſomuch as it conquer'd the whole world, all others may take example) they neither ate, nor ſlept, nor bought, neither did they any military action nor domeſtick without the Conſuls order: for thoſe armies which do otherwiſe, are not right armies; and if they come to make any trial of themſelves in any action, they do it by force of rage and violence, and not by valour: but where valour is accompanied with due ordinances, it makes good uſe of the fury in ſuch manner and in ſuch times that no difficulty abates it, nor ever quailes the courage, becauſe thoſe good ordinances reinforce the ſpirit, and the fury, both being ſtill maintained by the hope of over comming, which never failes while the orders hold firme. The contrary falls out in thoſe armies wherein is fury and not order, as were thoſe of the French, who ever faild by little and little For it proved not, that their firſt aſſault prevailed, and that their fury whereon they much relied, was not maintained by an ordinate valour, not having any thing elſe, beſides that, wherein to truſt, as that grew coole, ſo they failed. On the other ſide the Romans doubting leſs of dangers by reaſon of their good orders, not diſtruſting the victory, fought reſolutely and obſtinately with the ſame courage and valour as well in the end as in the beginning, or rather enraged by fighting, they grew ſtill more fierce. The third kind of armies is, where there is no naturall fury, nor accidentall order, as the Italian armies are in our daies, which are quite unprofitable: and unleſs they incounter with an army which upon ſome accident chances to run away, they ſhall never overcome: and without alledging other examples, we every day ſee that they give good proofes they have no valour at all. And becauſe by T Livius his teſtimony, every one may underſtand, how the good ſ • uldiery ought to be ordered and how the bad is, I will ſet down Papirius Curſor his words, having a mind to puniſh Fabius the commander of the horſe; where he ſaid, Let neither GOD nor man be had in any reverence, nor Nemo hominum, nemo Deorum verecundiam habeat, non edicta Imperatotun; non auſpicia obſerventur; ſine commeatu vagi milites in pacato & in hoſtico errent, immemores ſacramenti, licentia ſola exauctorentur; infrequentia deſerantur ſigna, neque conveniatur ad edictum, nec diſcernatur interdiu, nocte, aequo an iniquo loco, injuſſu Imperatoris pugnent; non ſigna, non ordines ſervent. Iatrocinij modo caeca & fortuita pro ſolenni & ſacrata militia ſit. the Generals commands, nor his auſpices be regarded; let the ſouldiers pillaging up and down for want of proviſion as well in their friends country as in their foes, let them caſheere themſelves, at their pleaſures, for, getting their oaths, let them quit their Enſignes, nor come together at command: let them fight without the Generals leave by night or by day in place of advantage or diſadvantage, caring neither for ranke nor order: and let the ſacred and and ſolemn rites of warfare become like the blind and obſcure tricks and chances of robberies. By the text here we may eaſily ſee whether the warfare in our daies, be blind and caſuall, or ſacred and ſolemn, and how much it comes ſhort of reſembling that which properly is termed a warfare, & how it differs from a furious and ordinate warfare as was that of the Romans, or from a furious only as was that of the French.

IT ſeemes that in humane actions (as otherwhere we have diſcourſed) beſides other difficulties, found in bringing any thing to its perfection, there is alwaies ſome evill very nearly neighbouring to the good: Which ſo eaſily grows up with that good, that it ſeems unpoſſible, if a man would injoy the one, to be quit of the other. And this wee ſee in all the works of man: and therefore is that good attain'd with difficulty, unleſs by thy good fortune thou be ſo aſſiſted, that ſhe by her power overcome this ordinary and natural inconvenient. The Combate between Manlius T • rquatus and the Frenchman hath put me in mind hereof, where T. Livius ſaies That combate ſo much imported Tanti ea dimicatio ad univerſi bellieventum fuit, ut Gallorum exercitus, relictis trep dè Caſtris, in Tiburtinum agrum, mox in Campaniam tranſierint. the event of the war, that the French Army leaving their Campe in a fright, went into the Tiburtine Country, and thence into Campania. For I conſider on the one ſide, that a good Commander ought wholly avoid to do any thing which being but of ſmall moment, may produce but evill effects in his Army: for to begin a skirmiſh or a combate wherein the whole forces are not imployed, and yet the whole fertune is there laid to ſtake, is a thing ſavouring too much of raſhneſs, as I ſaid before, when I condemn'd the guarding of the paſſages. On the other ſide I conſider, that wiſe and experienced Commanders, when they meet with a new enemy, and that is of reputatſon, are forc'd before they come to joyne battell, to cauſe their ſouldiers to make tryall of them by light skirmiſhes, to the end that beginning to know them, and to have to deale with them, they may be rid of that terror which the report and reputation of theſe men have put them in. And this part in a Generall is of exceeding great importance; for there is a kind of neceſſity in it, which forceth thee thereunte; for thou wilt think that thou goeſt to thy manifeſt deſtruction, unleſs thou have firſt by theſe ſmall experiences made thy ſoldiers caſt out that terror, which by means of the enemies reputation had poſſeſſed their minds. Valerius Corvinus was ſent by the Romans with an Army againſt the Samnites, who were new enemies, and theſe formerly had never proved the one the others forces, where T. Livius ſayes, that Valerius cauſed the Romans. to make ſome ſmall skirmiſhes with the Samnites, That a new Ne eos novum bellum, ne noves hoſtis terre. et. war, and a new enemy might not affright th • m. Notwithſtanding it is a very great hazzard, that thy Souldiers in thoſe skirmiſhes remaning loſers, their fear and cowardiſe grow not more upon them, and that effects contrary to thy purpoſe follow not thereupon, that is, that thou fright them not, whereas thy deſign was to aſſure them. So that this is one of thoſe things, which hath the evill ſo near neighbouring unto the good, or rather they are ſo neare joyn'd together, that it is very eaſy to miſtake the one for the other: Whereupon I ſay, that a good Commander ſhould be very careful, that nothing ariſe, which upon any accident may take away the courage and heart of his ſoldiers. That which may be of force to take away their courage, is to begin to loſe: and therefore a man ſhould be well aware of theſe ſmall skirmiſhes, and no way ſuffer any of them, unleſs with exceeding great advantage, and certain hope of victory. Nor ought he undertake to guard any paſſages, where he cannot bring his whole Army together. Nor ſhould he keep any Towns unleſs it be thoſe that by loſing of them, his utter ruine followes thereupon; and thoſe that he guards, he ſhould take ſuch care both with their defences and alſo with his Army, that whenever the enemy hath any deſign to aſſayle them, he may make uſe of all his forces in reſcue of them: the others he ſhould leave undefended: for whenſoever any thing is loſt, that was before abandon'd, the Army being yet afoot, there is neither the reputation of the war loſt, nor the hope of conqueſt. But when any thing is loſt, which thou hadſt purpoſed to defend, and every one beleeve, thou mightſt, defend, there is the dammage and loſs, and there thou haſt in a manner, as thoſe Frenchmen did, by a matter of ſmall moment loſt the whole war. Philip of Macedon the Father of Perſe, a warlick man, and of great eſteem in his time, being aſſavl'd hy the Romans, forſook and laid waſt much of his Country, as he, who becauſe he was wiſe, thought it more pernicious to loſe reputation by not being able to defend that which he undertook to defend, then by leaving it in prey to the enemy, to loſe it as a thing neglected. The Romans when after the defeat at Canna, their eſtate was in great perplexity, refus'd many that were under their protection, and ſo alſo divers of their own Subjects, charging them to defend themſelves the beſt they could, which are better courſes far, than to undertakes defences, and afterwards nor be able to go through with them; for hereby thoſe friends are loſt, and forces only in thoſe friends. But returning to the ſmall skirmiſhes, I ſay; that yet if a Commander be forc'd by reaſon of the newneſs of the enemy to make any skirmiſh, he ought take ſo much advantage in it, that he run no hazard to loſe it, nor do, as Marius did, which is the better way. Who going againſt the Cimbrians, which were an exceeding fierce people, and came to make a prey of Italy, and whereſoever they came, caſting a great terror, becauſe of their fierceneſs and multitude, and by reaſon they had formerly vanquiſh'd a Roman Army, Marius thought it neceſſary before he came to joyn battell, to worke ſomewhat, which might make his Souldiers lay aſide that terrour, which the feare of the enemy had put them in; and as a very well advis'd Commander, brought his Army ſeveral times, where the Cimbrians with their troupes were to paſs: And thus within the fortifications of his Campe he would that his Souldiers ſhould ſee them, and accuſtome their eyes to the view of that enemy, to the end that by ſeeing a diſordinate multitude loaded with baggage and unprofitable armes, and in part too diſarm'd, they might reaſſure themſelves, and grow deſirous of battell, which courſe as it was diſcreetly practis'd by Marius, ſo likewiſe ought it be diligently imitated by others, whereby they might not be forc'd to incurre thoſe dangers which I mentioned before, nor to do as the Frenchmen did: Who for a matter of ſmall moment Qui ob rem. parvi ponderis, trepidi in Tiburtem agrum, & in Campaniam tranſie • unt. fled in a fright into the Triburtine Country, and ſtreight after into Compania. And becauſe wee have alledg'd Valerius Corvinus in this Treaty, in the Chapter following I intend, by the helpe of his words, to ſhew what manner of man a Commander ſhould be.

VAlerius Corvinus was (as we faid formerly) abroad with an Army againſt the Samnites, new enemies of the people of Rome, whereupon partly to aſſure his own Souldiers, and partly to make them know the enemy, he caus'd ſome of his to enter into certain light skirmiſhes with them, nor contented herewith, before the day of battell would needs ſpeak to his own ſouldiers, and ſhew with all efficacy, how little eſteem they were to make of ſuch enemies, putting them in minde of their own and his valour alſo: where it may be noted by the words that Livius brings him in ſpeaking, what manner of man a Commander ought to be, in whom an Army is to have confidence: which words are theſe; And alſo to conſider, under whoſe conduct and auſpices you fight; whether he you are to Tum etiam intueri cujus ductu, auſpicioque incunda ſit pugna; utrum audiendus duntaxat magnificus ad hor tator ſit verbis tantum ferox, operum militarium expers, an qui & ip a tela tractare, procedere ante ſigna, verſari media in mole pugnae ſciat: facta mea, non dicta vos milites ſequi volo: nec diſciplinam modo, ſed exemplum etiam a me petere, qui hac dextrà mihi tres conſulatus, ſummamque laudem peperi. hearken unto, be only a magnificent exhorter, fierce in words, but not of proweſſe to ſhew you any military examples, or elſe ſuch a one that knows how to make uſe of your armes to march before your enſignes, and behave himſelf bravely in the thickest of your troops. I would have yon my ſouldiers to follow my deeds rather then my words, and not to ſeek your diſcipline only from me, but your example, who by this right hand have gained three Conſulſhips and the height of honour. Which words well conſider'd teach every man how he ought to proceed if he would hold the dignity of a Commander; and whoſoever ſhall otherwiſe carry it, ſhall find in time that dignity (when either by chance or ambition he is raiſed thereunto) will rather take from him, then any way gain him reputation: for titles honour not men, but men their titles. And from the beginning of this diſcourſe we may conſider, that if great Commanders have us'd extraordinary means to confirme the reſolutions of an Army of old ſoldiers, when they were to encounter with unaccuſtomed enemies, how much rather is there pains to be taken with an army of freſhwater ſoldiers, who never yet look'd the enemy in the face for if an unaccuſtomed enemy terrifies an army of old ſoldiers; much more probable is it that any enemy ſhould affright an army of new ſoldiers, Yet we have many times ſeen all theſe difficulties overcome by the exceeding great wiſdome of good Commanders, as Gracchus the Roman did and E • aminondas the Theban, of whom we have ſpoken otherwhere, who with their armies of new ſouldiers vanquiſhed armies of Veteranes, who had been of long experience. The courſes they took, were for many months to exerciſe them in counterfeit skirmiſhes, and train them up in obedience and order, and from thence they came to imploy them with a great deal of aſſurance in very fierce battells. Therefore ought no warlike man doubt, but that he may be able to make good ſoldiers when he wants not men: for that Prince who hath many men, and wants ſouldiers, ſhould complain rather of his own ſloth and ſmall wiſdome, then of the peoples cowardiſe.

HOwever that the uſe of fraud in any action be deteſtable, yet in the managing of a war it is a thing laudable and glorious, and he is as much praiſe, that vanquiſhes the enemy by deceit, as he that overcomes him by force. And this we ſee, by the judgment of thoſe that write the lives of great perſonages, who commend Hannibal and others, who have been very notable in ſuch like ways of proceeding. Whereof becauſe there are many examples every where obvious, I will not adde any. I will ſay this only, that I mean not, that that fraud is glorious, which cauſes thee to breake thy faith given, and agreements made: for that, though it may ſometimes gain thee a ſtate or Kingdom, as formerly hath been ſaid, yet will it never get thee any glory But I ſpeak of ſuch a deceit, which is put in practiſe againſt ſuch an enemy that truſts not in thee, and that conſiſts properly in matter of war: as was that of Hannibal, when at the lake of Perugia he feigned a flight, whereby he might have inclos'd the Conſul and the Roman Army; and when to eſcape out of Fabius Maximus hishand, he tied flaming fire-brands to the horns of his whole heard of cattel. The like unto which was that, which Pontius the Samnites General practiſed to ſhut in the Roman Army at the gallows of Caudium, where having placed his army behind the mountains, he ſent many of his ſoldiers clad like ſhepherds with much cattel through the plain, and they being taken by the Romans, and required of where the Samnites army was, agreed all, according to the order received from Ponutis, to ſay that it was gone to the ſiege of Nocera. Which thing the Conſuls believing, gave them opportunity to ſhut them up in thoſe precipices of Caudium, wherein as ſoon as they entred, they were preſently beſieg'd by the Samnites; and this victory gained by fraud, would have proved very glorious to Pontius, if he had followed his fathers counſel, who adviſed either to ſet the Romans freely at liberty, or put them all to the ſword, and in no caſe take the middle way, Which neither gaines friends, nor takes Quae neque amicos parat, neque inimicos tollit. foes out of the way. Which middle way was always pernicious in matters of ſtate, as other where it hath formerly been ſaid.

THe Conſul and the Romane Army, as is above ſaid, were beſieged by the Samnites, who having propounded to the Romans exceeding diſhonorable terms, as was that to make them go under the gallows, and ſend them without Arms to Rome; and hereupon the Conſuls ſtanding amazed, and the whole army in deſpair, Lucius Lentulus the Romanc Lieutenant ſaid, that, as he thought, no conditions were to be refuſed to ſave their country: for the ſafety of Rome conſiſting in the life of that Army, he thought it good to ſave it in any caſe: and that the Country is well defended, by what means ſoever it be, either with diſgrace, or with glory: for that Army being ſaved, Rome might in very good time cancel all that ignominy; but in caſe it were not ſaved, however it ſhould dye gloriouſly. Rome and her liberty was utterly loſt, and ſo his adviſe was followed. Which thing deſerves well to be noted by any Citizen that chances to be called to counſel his country: for where the deliberation is wholly touching the ſafty of the country, there ought no conſideration to be had of juſt or unjuſt, pitiful or cruel, honorable or diſhonorable, but rather all other reſpect being laid aſide, that courſe is to be taken which may preſerve the life and maintain the liberty thereof, which thing is followed by the ſayings and deeds of the French, in defence of the Majeſty of their King, and the power of their Kingdom; for they heat nothing with more impatience, then that it ſhould be ſaid Such a courſe was diſhonorable to their King; for ſay they, their King cannot ſuffer diſhonor in any reſolution taken by him, either in proſperous or adverſe fortune: for whether he wins or loſes, they commend the action, and ſay it was done like a King.

WIſe men are wont to ſay (and not by chance nor without reaſon) that he who will ſee what ſhall be, let him conſider what hath been: for all things in the world at all times have their very incounter with the times of old, Which comes to paſs, becauſe thoſe things are wrought by men, who were always & are ſubject to the ſame paſſions; & therefore follows it of neceſſity, that they take the ſame effect. It is true, that their actions ſometimes in this province are more vertuous, then thoſe in that, & ſo ſometimes in that more then in this, according to the forme of their education, wherein thoſe people have taken their manner of living. It gives a facility alſo in the knowledge of future things by thoſe that are paſt, to ſee one Nation a long time hold the ſame cuſtomes and conditions, being either alwayes covetous, or always treacherous, or having ſome other ſuch vice or vertue. And whoſoever ſhall read the things paſt belonging to our City of Florence, and conſider alſo what hath happened in the latter times, ſhall finde the Germans and French very covetous, proud, cruel, and unfaithful: for in all theſe four, ſeveral times have they much wronged our City. And touching their ſmall faith, every one know monies were given to King Charles the 8. of France, and he promiſed to render the Cittadels of Piſa, and yet he never did it. Wherein that King manifeſted his ſmall faith, and muth avarice. But let us paſs over theſe matters of late memory. Every one may well have heard of that which followed in the war that the Florentines had with the Vicounts of Milan: when Florence being deprived of all other expedients, thought to bring the Emperor into Italy, by his reputation and forces to aſſail Lombardy. The Emperor promiſed to bring a good Army with him, and undertake that war againſt the Vicounts, and defend Florence againſt their whole power, in caſe that at his riſing up in arms the Florentines would pay him an hundred thouſand ducates, and at his arrival in Italy another hundred thouſand; to which agreements the Florentines conſented, and having made the firſt paiment, and afterwards the ſecond, he came onely to Verona, and thence returned back again, having not done any thing in their behalf, blaming them, as if it were their fault, for not having obſerved the conditions between them. So that if Florence had not been either conſtrained by neceſſity, or overcome by paſſion, and had read and known the ancient cuſtomes of the Barbarians, ſhe would never have been neither this time, nor many other times deceived by them, they having behaved themſelves always after one manner, and in every part, and with every one uſed the ſame terms, as it appears they formerly did to the Tuſcans, who being oppreſſed by the Romans, by reaſon they had been ſeveral times put in flight by them and routed, and ſeeing that by their own forces alone they were not able to make reſiſtance, they agreed with the French, who dwelt on this ſide the Alps in Italy, to give them a ſum of mony, to oblige them to joyn their Armies with them, whereby to make head againſt the Romans. Whereupon it followed, that they having taken the monies, would not afterwards take arms for them, ſaying theſe they had received, not to make war upon their enemies, but that they ſhould forbear to forrage the country of Tuſcany. And thus the Tuſcans through the covetouſneſs and ſmall truth of the French, were bereft of their monies and left without the ſuccors they expected from them. Inſomuch as we ſee by this example of the ancient Tuſcans, and that of the Florentines, that the French have continually uſed the ſame terms: and hereby may it eaſily be conjectured, what truſt Princes can repoſe in them.

DEcius and Fabius the Roman Conſuls were in the field with two armies againſt the Samnites and Tuſcans, and coming to the skirmiſh and to joyn battel together, it is worth the noting in that ſervice, which of thoſe ways of proceeding, practiſed by thoſe two Conſuls, were the better: for D •• ius with all his force and violence aſſailed the enemy; Fabius only held them up, judging the ſlow aſſault to be of more advantage, reſerving his blow till the laſt, when the enemy ſhould have loſt his firſt heat of fight, or rage (as ſome terme it) where we ſee by the ſucceſs that follow'd, that Fabius his deſign took effect better then that of Decius, who tir'd himſelf ſo in the firſt onſet, that ſeeing his ſouldiers ready to turne their faces, to attain to that glory by death which by victory he could not, in imitation of his father, he ſacrific'd himſelf for the Roman Legions. Which thing when Fabius underſtood, that he might gain no leſs glory by living, then his Collegue had gotten by dying, put forward all theſe forces, which he had reſerv'd for the laſt pinch, whereby he carried away a very happy victory. From hence is it evident, that Fabius his manner of proceeding is the more ſecure and warrantable.

IT ſeems that not only one City hath certain wayes and orders different from thoſe of another City, and breeds men either more hardy or more effeminate, but in the ſame City we ſee the ſame difference among families: which we find to be true in every City: and in Rome we reade of many examples to this purpoſe: for we ſee the Manlij were hard and obſtinate men, the Publicoli courteous and lovers of the people, the Appij ambitious and enemies of the commonalty, and ſo many other families, have had their qualities differing one much from the other. Which thing cannot proceede from the blood only, for that muſt needs alter by reaſon of the variety of marriages; but it muſt come from the education, which one family hath diverſe from another. For it avails much, that a youth from his tender years begins to reliſh well or ill any one thing: for of neceſſity it muſt make an impreſſion, and thereupon give a rule to his manner of proceeding all the dayes of his life: and were not this ſo, it would be impoſſible that all the Appij ſhould have had the ſame will, and been led by the ſame paſſions, as T. Livius rema • kes in many of them: and for the laſt, one of them being made Cenſor, and his Collegue at the end of eighteen moneths having (as the law order'd it) depos'd his magiſtracy, Appius would not depoſe his, ſaying that he might hold his yet five years, according to the firſt law ordain'd by the Cenſors. And however hereupon many ſpeeches were made, and many tumults were caus'd; yet was there no helpe to make him lay it down, maugre the people and the greater part of the Senate. And whoſoever reads the oration he made againſt P. Sempronious Tribune of the people, ſhall note upon that occaſion all the Appian inſolences, and the goodneſs and humanity uſed by many other Citizens in obedience of the laws and in their love to their Country.

FƲlvius remaining Lieftenant in the Army which the Romans had in Tuſcany, for that the Conſul was gone to Rome by reaſon of ſome ceremonies there, the Tuſcans to ſee if they could draw this man forth, laid an ambuſcado near the Romans campe, and ſent ſome ſoldiers clad like ſhepherds with good ſtore of cattel, and cauſed them to come inſight of the Roman army, who ſo diſguiſed came near their very trenches, whereupon the Lieftenant marvelling at this their preſumption, not thinking it a thing reaſonable, found ſuch an expedient as diſcovered the deceit, and ſo the Tuſcans, plot was ſpoiled. Here it may firly be noted, that the commander of an army ought not to give much credit to an errour, which he plainly ſees the enemy run into: for there will alwaies be ſome treachery lurking, it being not a thir 〈◊〉 reaſonable that men ſhould be ſo unwary. But oftentimes the deſire of victory ſo blinds mens eyes, that they can ſe nothing elſe, but what they think makes all for their advantage. The Frenchmen having overcome the Romans at Alia, and comming to Rome, and finding the gates open, and without guard, ſtayed all that day, and the next night, without entring in, fearing ſome treachery, and not poſſibly beleeving, there could be ſuch cowardiſe and ſo ſmall underſtanding in the Romans, as utterly to abandon their Country. When in the year 1508 the Florentines beſieged Piſa, Alphonſo del Mutola, a Citizen of Piſa, was then the Florentines priſoner, and promiſed if he were ſet free that he would open a gate of Piſa to the Florentine army, whereupon he had his liberty; afterwards as if it had been to put the matter in execution, he came many times to treate with the commiſſaries Deputies, but came not privately nor by ſtealth, but openly and accompanied by ſome Piſans, who ſtood aſide, while he talked with the Florentines: ſo that a man might well have gueſt at his double heart: for there was no probability, that if the end of this practice had been faithfuly intended, as it was promis'd, it ſhould ever have been ſo openly treated. But the deſire the Florentines had to be maſters of Piſa, did ſo blind them, that by his order comming to the gate of Lucca, they left there divers of their Captains and many others, to their great diſhonour, by meanes of the ſaid Alphonſoes double dealing with them.

THere is a neceſſity (as it hath been ſaid • other where) that every day in a vaſt City ſuch accidents, happen as have need of the Phyſitian: and according as they are of more conſequence, ſo have they need of the wiſer Phyſician. And if in any City the like: accidents ever happen'd, it was in Rome, where there fell out both ſtrange and unexpected, as was that, when it ſeemed, that all the Roman dames had conſpir'd to kill their husbands: ſo many were there that had poiſoned their husbands, and ſo many that had prepared the poyſon to give their husbands. Such like alſo was that conſpiracy of the Baccanalls, which was diſcovered in the time of the Macedonian wars, wherein were intangled many thouſands of men and women: and had it not been revealed, it would have proved very dangerous for that City, or elſe if the Romans had not been accuſtomed to chaſtiſe a whole multitude of offenders: for were there not other exceeding many evident tokens to ſhew forth the greatneſs and magnificence of that Republick and power of her executions, yet would it ſufficiently appear by the quality of the puniſhment ſhe impoſed on the offenders. She never ſtood upon it, to put to death by way of juſtice a whole legion at once, and a whole City, and to confine eight or ten thouſand men, with extraordinary hard conditions, had it been to one man alone, much more to ſo many. As it befell thoſe ſouldiers, who had fought unfortunately at Canna, whom ſhe confined to Sicily, and layd this on them, that they ſhould never lodge in any Townes, andſhould always eate ſtanding. But of all the other execution, the moſt terrible was that decimation of armies, where by lot throughout a whole army one of ten was put to death. Nor could there, to chaſtiſe a whole multitude, a more horrible puniſhment be found: for when a multitude offends, where the author is not certain, all cannot ſuffer, becauſe they are too many: and to puniſh one part, and let the other go ſcotfree, were to wrong thoſe they ſhould puniſh, and thoſe that eſcaped free would be encouraged to offend another time. But to put to death the tenth part by lot, when all deſerve it, he that ſuffers, blames his evill fortune: and he that eſcapes, is afraid leaſt that another time the lot may fall on him, and ſo is wary not to offend. Thoſe empoiſoners then & Baccanalls were puniſhed as their offences deſerved: And however theſe diſeaſes in a republick produce evill effects, yet are they not deadly: for that almoſt alwayes there is time given to correct them; but there is hardly any leaſure in thoſe that regard the ſtate, which unleſs they fall under the hand of ſome wiſe man, ruine the City. There was in Rome, by reaſon of the liberality the Romans uſed in beſtowing the Burgeouſhip & freedom of their City upon ſtrangers, ſo many new people borne, that they began to have ſuch a part in the ſuffnages, that the government began to vary, and parted with thoſe things and from thoſe men, by whom it was accuſtomed to walke. Which Q. Fabius, who was then Cenſor, perceiving, the placed all theſe new people upon whom this diſorder depended, under four Tribes, to the end that being reduced into ſo ſmall ſpaces they might not corrupt the whole City of Rome. This thing was well underſtood by Fabius, and by him was there a convenient remedy applied without much change: which was ſo well accepted by the City, that they always after gave him the title of Maximus.