A COMPENDIUM Of the …

A COMPENDIUM Of the ART of LOGICK AND RHETORICK in the English Tongue.

Containing All that PETER RAMUS, ARISTOTLE, and Others have writ thereon: WITH Plaine DIRECTIONS for the more easie un­derstanding and pra­ctice of the same.

LONDON, Printed by Thomas Maxey, 1651.

To the Courteous Reader.

BEnevolent Reader, I do here present this small work, ho­ping it may produce good ef­fects. Certainly it hath assai'd before time to thrust it selfe into the world, but that it found so kind friends, who considering the unworthy­ness, were pleased to suppresse it, and keep it prisoner in the Jail of their own houses. Howbeit now it is adventu­red abro [...]d, and with the spring be­ginneth to spring afresh. It's Winters imprisonment is like to better it's Summers condition [...]; for I have la­boured, so far as I could, to prune and lop off the former errours, that it may be the more plausible. I have also a­dorned it with a new weed, to wit, of a Dialogue, or Questions and An­swers, that so my Book may even learn to stoop to the weakest capacities. If i [...] shall be thought to come in a new fa­shion, may you please to look into the [Page] world, you may see abundance in this habit, our common Catechismes wear this gown; yea, Mr. St. Egerton of the Black Fryers in London, hath con­tracted the same treatises of Mr. Ro­gers into this form. For my part, I hold it more easie then the former tract, neither greatly prejudiciall to the Authour.

This adorned, I have given this my second sonne full liberty to be a free­man, banishing my first and worst la­bours from the view (so far as I can) of all men. For seeing it would not, when I would, I hold it not fit, that now it should be published. Touching that work, it flowed so inconsiderately from my penne, and slipped so rashly out of my hand, that it escaped not without many defaults, imperfections, obscurities and blemishes: that with the Egyptian Grashopper, it will not on­ly consume some part, but utterly [...]at up and waste the golden season, and happy hours of the curteous Reader. Let this last work then, kind Reader, find favour in thine eyes: if that win­ter bird should be seen, it would ap­pear like a Cuckow at Christmas, or [Page] like the Owle, which is the admiration of other birds. I will only now shew thee the causes producing this last work, and the use thereof, and so leave it to thy discreet judgement. The cau­ses are manifold, first to stoppe the springing of that Abortive fore-spoken of, that so it might not thrive to the dis­credit of it's parent Secondly, that the gratuity and thankfulnesse to my Un­kle aforesaid, might not to be buried in oblivion; for Tritum est perire, quod fa­cis ingrato. Thirdly, for the benefit, as I said, of the simpliest capacity. And finally, for the zeal I bear to mine own Countrey, being willing and de­sirous, that not onely men, but even women should exercise themselves in the studie of the sacred Arts.

If any shall demand what benefit shall redound hereby? or what may be the use hereof? I answer, it will a­vail greatly, not onely for Civil, and Moral discourse, but also for the over­throwing of all Errors, either in Manners or Doctrine, for saith O­vid,

Adde quod ingenuas didicisse fideli [...]er artes,
[Page]Emollit mores, nec sinet esse feros.

But may some say, I live privately, [...]onverse not in the world; what need have I of this Science? It seemeth to consist chiefly in disputing, but I im­ploy my self most in silence and medi­tation. Well friend, thou mayst have great benefit by this Science, even in that likewise: an example of which, word for word, I have here produced out of Mr. Egertons Treatie aforesaid, that so thou mightest know how to be­nefit thy self by this science, even in thy Meditation.

What thing is this, O my soul, that doth so besot thee? or what manner of thing may it be, wherewith thou art so delighted, or rather bewitched? And how doth the Holy Ghost in the Scri­pture define it, and set it forth? who sinners but they that rebel against God, and against his holy will re­vealed in his Word? And what other thing is sin, but a breach and trans­gression of the Law of God, 1 Iohn, 3.4. A turning out of the way of life, as the phrase of the Old Testament doth import; and a swerving from the [Page] right mark and end, as the word useth in the New Testament to signifie, viz. The glory of God, and thine own salvation.

This cursed thing called sin, is not of one sort or kind; it is as a Monster of many heads, and (as it were) a beast of many Horns.

It is both original, bred and born with us; and actuall springing out of us from that venomous root of our O­riginal Corruption.

Again, it is either inward, lurking [...] and boiling in the heart; or outward, shewing it self in the life and conversa­tion: sometimes it onely inhabi [...]th and dwelleth in us, and oft-times it doth reign and over-rule us; some­times it is but an error and infirmity, and sometimes, it is a wilful and pre­sumptious evil, Psal. 19.11,12. Some­times it is pardonable by the Free Grace and Mercie of God, to them that truely believe and repent; and some­times it is utterly unpardonable, and never to be forgiven, being such, that it is impossible that the Committers thereof should be renewed by repen­tance, Math. 12. Heb. 6. Sometimes [Page] it rusheth mediately, and directly a­gainst God; and sometimes it reach­eth more properly to the hurt of our neighbour.

But who is able to reckon up all the Branches of this most bitter and veno­mous Tree; wherefore (to look more nearly unto it) whence proceedeth this d [...]adly poyson? what may be the cause whereof it cometh? and the Fountain from whence it springeth? Surely, my Soul, it is even thy self: thou art the Root that bringeth forth all this bitterness; thou art the Foun­tain from whence all this deadly Ve­nome doth arise. For every man is tempted to sin, and he is drawn away of his own Concupiscence, and enti­ced.

Beware, therefore, O rebellious Soul! that thou lay not the blame up­on the Lord; neither make him the Author of thy sin: For thou, O God, as thou canst not be tempted to evil they self, so thou temptest no man to commit sin, being a thing which thou so strictly forbiddest to all, and so se­verely threatnest in whomsoever it is found; and for which thou so grie­vously [Page] plaguest the wicked, and so sharply correctest thine own Children, Iames 1,13,14. Heb. 12. 7,8. Thou, O Lord, art holiness it self, and the Fountain thereof; And there is none eternally, and unchangeably good, but thee alone, Math. 19. Thou madest man good at the beginning, but he sought many inventions, Eccles. 12. So all the imaginations and thoughts of his heart became onely evil conti­nually, or every day, Sabbath and all, Gen. 6. 5.

True it is indeed, That the Divel that old Dragon, using the subtil Ser­pent for his instrument, did offer the first occasion of sinning, whereby he became an external cause of sin, and is called a Mutherer from the beginning, and the Author and Father of all de­ceit, Iohn 8.44. Yet man had power to have resisted him if he would, which he not doing, became the true and proper efficient cause of Corrupting himself, and all his posterity; who likewise, by means of the poyson de­rived from his Loyns, became also the proper and immediate causes o [...] their own sins.

[Page]Mark well then (O my Soul) the Root of this evil; and furthrr consi­der, what unsavory and cursed fruit it bringeth forth; surely, even such as it self is, for such as the Tree is, such are the fruits: as is the root, so are the branches: a poysoned fountain, cast­eth forth no wholesome streams, Iames 3. And who can bring (as the Wiseman saith) a clean thing out of filthiness? surely there is not one, but onely he who is holiness it self, Iohn 14.4. And without all Controversie, the reward and wages of sin, is death [...] and that not onely temporal, and bo­dily, which is a separation of the bo­dy from the soul for a season, but also spiritual and eternal, both of soul and body for ever and ever. Is any good thing with [...]held from us? let us thank our sin for it: is any plague or punish­ment laid upon us? be sure that sin is the cause, or at the least (even in the dearest Children of God) the occasi­on of it. Is any good blessing of God made of no force, or even turned to a Curse to us? we may be sure that it is by reason of our sin: for (as the Pro­phet saith) The Lords hand is not short­ned [Page] that it cannot save, nor his ear heavy that it cannot hear, but our iniquities se­parate betwixt us and our God, and our sins do hide his face from us that he will not hear, Esay 59. 1, 2. Finally (as Iob saith) Misery springeth not forth of the dust, neither doth Affliction spring one of the earth, but man is born to la­bour as the sparkles flie upward, Job. 5. 6, 7. As if he should say, Man is as prone by nature to sin against God, and consequently to pull Gods judge­ments upon himself, as the fire (which is a light Element) is naturally prone to ascend and mount aloft.

And to the end that thou (my soul) maist see upon what an ugly monster thou hast set thy delight, dost do [...]e up­on, and art bewitched withall, consi­der how fair and how amible piety and vertue are; for as they make a man lovely and honourable, so sin maketh him loathsome and contemptible: The fear of God (saith Solomon) makes the face of a man to shine and be beautifull, but impiety and profanesse do deface and disfigure the image of God in him, and cause both God and all good men to loath & detest him as a polluted and [...] [Page] filthy thing, Favour (saith the same Wise-man) is deceitfull, and beauty is vanity; but the woman that feareth [...]he Lord, shee shal be praised, Prov. 31.39. A vile person is contemned (that is, a prophane man and basely esteemed, how great soever he be in the world) in the eyes of him that feareth God, Psal. 15.4. And piety is the only beauty that the Lord himselfe is delighted with, 1 Pet. 3.4. Therefore it is clear in the contrary part, that he loatheth and ab­horreth impiety and sin. And yet my soul, to bring thee further out of love with this most ugly monster, consi­der whereunto it is like, and to what it may be compared. It is like (saith Esay) to filthy raggs, that are cast a­side upon the dunghill, and detested of all the passers by. It biteth as a serpent, and stingeth as a Coccatrice, creepeth as a gangrene or deadly can­ker, that eateth to the heart and can­not be cured; and though it seeme sweet in the begiuning, yet it is most bitter in the end, and that which reli­sheth like hony in the mouth, will prove ranke poyson in the bowels. Finally, O my soul if thou peruse the holy [Page] Scriptures, thou shalt find no book, no leafe, no chapter [...] nor scarce any verse, wh [...]rin there is not some precept, some prohibition, some promise, some threat­ning or some example which seems not very fitly and profitably to shew forth the amiableness of vertue, and the ugli­nesse of sin, and with what care, zeal, wat [...]lnesse, &c. the one is to be shun [...], and the other to be imbra­ced. Thus far Mr. Egerton, Lib. 3, Cap. 6.

Now that thou maist attain (kind reader) unto this sweet delight of medi­tation, or to the top of whatsoever feli­city thou aimest at by this art, use my book in this manner following.

It consisting only of rules and exam­ples, will be no great burthen for thee to commit it all to memory; and so, whether thou meditatest or discoursest of sin or piety in the generall, or any vice or vertue in the particular, thou shalt find from the head of this Art, af­ter the example foreshewed, abundance of matter to furnish thy meditation. So, cum paucis sapientibus, I commit my la­bour to thy discreet and favourable construction, and with equall respect to all indifferently rest.

R. F. Iunior.

PETER RAMUS to the READER.

ARchymedes (O Reader) would have the re [...] of the Spheres and Cli [...]tes (in which Invention hee had more vehemently laboured) ingraven upon his sepulchre. And truly, shouldst thou ask me of my vigils and studies, I desire a pil­lar to be raised upon my grave from the instructions of the Art of Logick. Touching the cause of the wish; they answer, first to the accurateness of the Art: the books of invention of Arguments, and their disposition to be judged, not onely from Aristotle Organicall, Rhetoricall, Physicall: but from Cicero and Quintilian, and so [Page] many Orators. In all which wee have strived with all study and diligence, by all reasonable wayes to contract them briefly into these two Books, that no particle, or the least shadow of Logick might be there confused, whose truth might not be expresly deli­vered. And this shall be first made known touching Archymedes his Probleme. They answer secondly to the use of Logick, the elegance and dignity of all the parts to be explicated, to stir up Logicall me­ditations, as well the popular phrases of Poets, Orators, Histo­riographers; as also the liberall and ingenuous arts of a new Body, delivered in a new form to the stu­dious, adorned with excellent in­dowments: And le [...]t any should fear le [...]t they should happen to be strangers, they are given and committed to the liberall custodies [Page] of their schools. This shalbe second­ly made known touching Archy­medes his problem. Those there­fore shall be witness of so many day and night watches, touching the truth and utility of Logick, and shall answer for the cause of our wish; shall also admonish thee (Reader) as I hope, of I know not what madnesse is in most Acade­mies of Europe, disputing of their sophisticall precepts, how that they are far unlike both to the verity and utility of Logick, and shall al­so inflame thee to the study of the more true and profitable Facul­ties. But beside this, there is ob­jected, a great company, exstru­cted with theatricall reproaches, threatning pains of tribunal judg­ment, condemnation at the least of filthy ignorance and calumny, will thrust us from the whole King­dom of Philosophy, as strange and [Page] unheard o [...] prescription, both with hands and tongue. Whither will they forbid the small cause of our wish? what freedom was obtained by King Henry from the envie of so mad a Iudg; or to the more so­lid judgment of a milder Censu­rer? What afterward (when this Logicall order had set foot in the cause of Religion) was a more great offence, the life and health of us being aimed at by those three civill wars? will these shew no cause of our wish? yea, ra­ther they do admonish, That we give great thanks to the Almigh­ty, who hath ayded and protected the course of our studies hitherto, neither would suffer them by any means to be interrupted. There­fore I witnesse, that this light of Logick will avail greatly to the studious in setting forth the truth, as also to adorn the ingenuous [Page] Arts; as chiefly the illustrating the heavenly mysteries of the sa­cred Doctrine: I pray that it may grow up more and more to these things; and that this Book may be happily concluded, to the glory of God.

A TABLE OF THE Chapters in the two Books of Peter Ramus his DIALECTICA.

In the first Book.

  • 1. The definition of Dialectica.
  • 2. The parts and kinds of arguments.
  • 3. The Efficient procrean [...] and Conser­vant cause.
  • 4. The Efficient alone, and with others.
  • 5. The Efficient by himself, or an Ac­cident.
  • 6. The Matter.
  • 7. The Form.
  • 8. The End.
  • 9. The Effects.
  • 10. The Subject.
  • 11. The Adjunct.
  • 12. Diverses.
  • 13. Desperates.
  • 14. Relates.
  • 15. Adverses.
  • 16. Contradicents.
  • 17. Privants.
  • 18. Equalls.
  • 19. Greaters.
  • 20. Lessers.
  • 21. Likes.
  • 22. Dislikes.
  • 23. Conjugates.
  • 24. Notation.
  • [Page]25. Distribution.
  • 26. Distribution of the Causes.
  • 27. Distribution of the Effects, whether of Kind or Species.
  • 28. The Distribution from the Subjects
  • 29. The Distribution from the Adjunct
  • 30. Definition. 31. Description.
  • 32. Testimony Divine.
  • 33. Testimonies humane of Laws and Sentences.

In the second Book.

  • 1. Of Iudgement.
  • 2. Axiomas affirming or denying.
  • 3. True and False.
  • 4. The simple Axioma.
  • 5. the copulate Axioma.
  • 6. The connexed Axioma.
  • 7. The Descrete Axioma.
  • 8. The disjunct Axioma.
  • 9. The Syllogisme and his parts.
  • 10. The [...]imple and contraected syllogism.
  • 11. The first kind of the simple explicate Syllogism.
  • 12. The simple explicate Syllogism.
  • 13. The first connexed Syllogism.
  • 14. The second connexed Syllogism.
  • 15. The first disjunct Syllogism.
  • 16. The second disjunct Syllogism.
  • [Page]17. The onely method according to Ari­stotle.
  • 18. The first illustration of Method by ex­amples of arts.
  • 19. The second example of Poets, Orators. and Historiographers.
  • 20. The secrets of Method.

In Laudem Scientia Dialecticae sacrae.

THe sacred Sciences do Praeise deserve,
And merit Laud, because that they conserve,
The use of Manners; also do declare
What things in Man most acceptable are.
But 'mongst them, all there's none so high in Reach
As Dialectica, which reasoning doth teach.
This at the first from God Almighty came,
From Heaven descended this bright shining flame.
God Reason taught, and Man he did inspire
[Page]With Faculties, which Logick doth require.
The Matter, Precepts, Form Methodical,
The end is Reasons use, to teach t'h unlearned all.
Th' effects are divers, which I cannot tell,
Except I had a tongue which did excell.
The Artes before confusedly did lie,
Till Logicks use compos'd them curiously.
But what do I discoursing of this thing,
When Praises to the worth the Learned cannot sing?

THE FIRST BOOK OF PETER RAMUS His DIALECTICA of Invention.

CAP. 1. What Dialectica is.

Question.

WHat is Dialectica?

A. Dialectica is the art of disputing well, and in that sense is called Lo­gick.

CAP. 2. The parts of Dialectica, and kinds of Arguments.

Q. How many parts hath Dialectica?

A. Dialectica hath two parts, In­vention and Judgment.

Q. What is Invention?

A. Invention is a part of Dialecti­ca [Page 2] of inventing Arguments.

Q. What is an Argument?

A. An Argument is that which i [...] affected to argue any thing: such a [...] are all reasons considered a part and b [...] themselves.

Q. What be the Kinds?

A. Artificiall and Inartificiall.

Q. What is an Artificiall Argument

A. That which argueth of it self.

Q. What be the Kinds?

A. First, or derived from the First

Q. What is First?

A. First is that which is of its own Originall.

Q. What be the Kinds?

A. Simple or Comparative.

Q. What is Simple?

A. Simple is that which is considered simply and absolutely.

Q. What be the Kinds?

A. Agreeing or disagreeing.

Q. What is Agreeing?

A. That which agreeth with t [...] thing which it argueth.

Q. What be the Kinds?

A. Agreeing absolutely or after certain manner.

Q. What is agreeing absolutely?

[Page 3] A. The Cause and Ef [...]ect.

CAP. 3. The Efficient, Procreant, and Conservant Cause.

Q. What is the Cause?

A. The Cause is that by whose force the thing is.

Q. What is the Pro [...]it of it?

A. This first place of invention is the foundation of all knowledge: and he is beleeved to know, of whom the cause is held.

As the Poet sayeth worthily:

The man sure happy is, who cause of things doth know.

Q. How is the Cause divided?

A. Into two kinds, Efficient and Matter, or Forme and End.

Q. What is the Efficient Cause?

A. The Efficient Cause is that from which the thing is.

Q. How many kinds hath it?

A. There appeareth to us no true Kinds, yet the great plenty of it is di­stinguished by certain means.

Q. What is that which effecteth by [...]he first means?

A. That which procreateth or de­ [...]endeth.

[Page 4]Q. Give me an example out of som [...] Poet.

A. Ovid 1. Remedio Amoris.

Therefore when thou shalt look in this ou [...] med' cinall Art
My admonition do, set Idlenesse apart.
This causeth thee to love, this doth defen [...] it still;
This is the cause of joy, as meat somtime [...] breeds ill.
Take lastly sloth away, God Cupids bow is lost
His torches lose their light, contemn'd away they'r tost.

Q. Give me a more familiar example [...]

A. The Father and Mother procreate, the Nurse defendeth.

Q. Give an example of this out of some Poet.

A. 4. AEneid.

Th'art not Gods Child, ne Dardanus his son,
Thou rather from the steep [...]ard rocks didst come
Of Caucasus: it seemeth of that breed,
Hyrcanian Tygers thee with brests did feed.

AEglog. 8.

Now what this whorson love is I well wo [...]
It is a little busie boy, begot
[Page 5]Not of mans seed, ne like to one of us;
But farthest Garamants and Ismarus,
Or rockie Rhodope, as it should seem,
In their rough ragged hils ingēdred him.

Q. Do not builders and governours of Cities come under this head?

A. Yes: Romulus the builder of the City of Rome, also all other Kings, Consuls, and Emperors are defenders and keepers.

CAP. 4. The Efficient alone and with others.

Q. What is that which effecteth by the second means?

A. That which effecteth alone, or with others.

Q. What are those others?

A. Some oftentimes are Principall, others are helping and Ministers.

Q. Give an example of the Cause that effecteth by it self.

A. AEneid. 6. Nisus calleth back both the blame and the punishment of the Slaughter, from Euryalus upon him­self, because he was the only Author.

Loe here I am who only did this deed,
Latians, against me turn your swords with speed.
[Page 6]'Twas my deceit: He could it never do,
Ne would his courage serve him therunto [...]

Q. Give an example of the solitary Cause, with Principalls and Fellow [...] out of some Orator.

A. The solitary cause with many both Principalls and Fellows, is di­versly set forth pro Marcello. For the warlike Praises (saith the Orator) they are wont to extenuate truly by words [...] and to detract them from their Leaders, to communicate them with many, least they should be proper to their Com­manders: and certainly in war, the strength of the Souldiers, opportunity of places, help of fellows, ranks, pro [...]vision do much availe. But Fortune (as it were) by her own right, challen­geth the cheifest part to her self, and whosoever is prosperously carried, that altogether she leadeth. But yet of this glory (ô Caesar) which a little before thou didst obtain, thou hast no com­panion: all that, how much soever it is, (which truly is the chiefest) all (I say) is thine. The Centurion, Pre­sident, Ranks and Companies have ta­ken from thee none of this praise: Yea, even the Lady of humane affairs, For­tune [Page 7] offereth not her self into the society of this glory, to thee she giveth place, and confesseth it all and wholly to be thine.

Q. Are not Instruments numbred a­mong helping Causes?

A. Yes.

Q. Give an example of it?

A. By this Argument the impious Epicure disputeth that the world was never made. Primo de Nat. For by what eys of the minde (saith he) could your Plato behold the frame of so great a work, whereby he maketh it constru­cted and builded of God? what labour? what iron Ingine? what Leaver? what Devises? what Ministers were there of so great a work?

CAP. 5. The Efficient by it self, or an Accident.

Q. What is that which effecteth by the third means?

A. That which effecteth by it self, or an Accident.

Q. How effecteth it by it self?

A. When it effecteth by its own faculty.

Q. How effecteth it by its own faculty?

[Page 8] A. When it effecteth by Nature or Counsel.

Q. Give an example of that which effecteth by Nature.

A. The Efficient of the windes is Naturall. AEneid. 1.

The East and South winds on the Sea do blow,
They rush through deep, till on the top they show.
The Africks oft with these his blasts conjoynes,
And so the floods are cast up by the Winds.

Q. Give some example of that which effecteth by counsell.

A. That confession of Cicero, touching himself, is an example of Counsell. The war taken in hand (ô Caesar) wa­ged also for the most part; not con­strained by any of my Judgment and Will, I came forth to those wars which were undertaken against thee.

Q. How doth the Efficient Cause effect by an A [...]cident?

A. When it effecteth by an external faculty.

Q. How doth it effect by an externall faculty?

A. When it is done by Necessity or Fortune.

[Page 9]Q. How by Necessity?

A. When as the Efficient is con­strained to the Effect.

Q. Give an example of this.

A. There is one in the excuse of the Pompeians. But to me truly (saith the Orator) if there may be sought out a proper and true name of our evil, it doth seem, that we are faln into a certain fa­tall calamity, that hath occupied the unprovident minds of men; that none should wonder how humane Counsel is overcome by Divine Necessity.

Q. How by Fortune?

A. When somwhat happeneth be­yond the Scope of the Efficient.

Q. Give an example.

A. So the case chanced, saith Tulli­us (tertio de [...]at. deo.) That Pherius the enemy was profitable to Iason, who opened his impostume with his sword; which the Physicians could by no means heal.

Q. May not imprudence be numbred amongst these kinds of Causes?

A. Yes.

Q. Give an example.

A. Ovid. de Trist. 2.

Why hurtfull light or ought else did I see?
[Page 10]The fault was mine, & not unknown to me.
Wise Acteon Diana naked saw,
And food became to's doggs devouring maw.
Blind fortune amongst the Gods is surely blamed,
Ne pardon gets, the Gods she hath so harmed.

Q. Do not Deprecations then proceed from hence?

A. Yes.

Q. Give an example.

A. Pro P.L. Pardon ô Father: he hath erred: he is slipped: he thought not: if ever hereafter. And a little after, I have erred: I have done rashly: it repenteth me: I flie to thy clemency: I aske pardon for mine offence: I intreat thee that thou wilt pardon me.

Q. What first causeth [...]he name of Fortune?

A. The ignorances of the Caus [...]s hath feigned this name: for when as somthing happened beyond Counsell and Hope, it was called by the com­mon people Fortune.

Q. What is Juvenals opinion of it?

A. Wise if we were, no God should want but Fortune,

We place thee high, & oftē thee importune.

CAP. 6. The Matter.

Q. What is the Matter?

A. The Matter is the cause of which the thing is.

Q. Give an example out of some Poet.

A. By this feigned Argument, the house of the Sunne is compounded of gold, carbunkles, Ivory and Silver.

Ovid. 2. Metamorph.

The Suns high place was built with pil­lars tall,
The gold did shine, Carbunkles flames let fall.
The top thereof was layd with Ivory neat,
And silver doors in portall shined feat.

AEglog. 3.

A merry Musor fram'd of beechen-tree,
Carv'd work, by hand of divine Alci­meden,
'Tis round impaled with a scattring trail
Of tender Vine, and over all between,
A pale green Ivy, wherewith as a vale,
The thick diffussed clusters shaded been.

Q. Give an example out of some Orator?

A. Caesar 1. Bel. Civil. Caesar com­manded his souldiers to make ships of [Page 12] that kind, which in former years the use of the Brittains had taught him: first they made the Keel and Pins of ligh [...] matter, the rest of the body of the ship being knit together with Osiers, was covered over with Leather.

CAP. 7. The Forme.

Q. The first kind of the Cause, in the Efficient and Matter being expounded; the second followeth, in the Forme and the End; What therefore is the Forme?

A. The Forme is the Cause by which the thing is that which it is.

Q. What is the benefit of it?

A. From hence the thing is distin­guished from all other things, and the Forme is ingenerated together with the thing it self.

Q. Give some example of it.

A. A reasonable soul is the form of a man, because by it a man is a man, and is distinguished from all other creatures thereby. The form of the geo­metricall figures is in traingles and quadrangles. Heaven, Earth, Trees, Fishes are the form of Physicall things [...] From whence the chief explication of [Page 13] things, as it is by nature, so (if it may be found out) it shall be, as in artific [...] ­all things it is more easily met with­all.

Q. Give example out of some Orator.

A. Caesar lib. 7. B [...]t all the French walls are almost of this form; the beams long and plain, with equall distance between themabout two foot, are placed upon the foundation. These are bound within, and fastened very strongly: for those spaces (of which we speak) are filled up to the top with great stones. These placed and knit to­gether, an other row is also added, that the same might keep the spaces: neither do the beams touch one another, but being distant by equall spaces, all of them are strongly fastened, great stones being placed between them. And even so is the whole work knit together until the just height of the wall be fulfilled. This work therefore is not deformed, as well for the comlinesse and variety, beams and stones being by courses, which keep their rows in right lines; as, because it hath the cheif strength for profit and defence of Cities, because it doth defend both from the misch [...]efe of [Page 14] stones, and the materiall ram, which with its forty feet, being oft bound to the long beams inward, can neither be broken or drawne back again.

Q. Give an example out of some Poet.

A. AEneid. 1. Virgil describeth the forme of this port.

Between two seas, two Ilands there do lie,
Sidwayes they'r made, the waters run fast by.
Huge double Rocks that do reach up to heaven,
Vnder the which the sea lie stil and calm:
And by that place the green woods there are growing,
Forth from the same comes great black darknesse flowing.
Vnder which rock a den's made very fleet,
Wherein's rich living stones and waters sweet,
Houses for Nymphs and chains for ships there laid,
Which would not by the Anchor chains bestaid.

CAP. 8. The End.

Q. What is the end?

A. The end is the Cause for whose sake the thing is.

[Page 15]Q. Give example.

A. To Physicall things the proposed end is man: to man, God. There is some cheif good and last end of all Arts: as to speak well, of Grammer: to plead well, of Rhetorick: to dispute well, of Logick.

Q. Give example out of some Poet.

A. AEneid. 1. Iuno assumeth the end of Marriage when as she promiseth Deiopeia to Eolus, to wit, for solace and childrens sake.

Nymphs ful fourteen I have of bodies rare;
But who so is most beautiful and faire,
Even Deiopeia, I to thee do give
Her year in Marriage state with thee to live,
Thee to reward for thy love unto me,
And cause thine off-spring beautiful to be.

Q. Give an example out of some Orator.

A. Cicero pro Lig. Urgeth Tubero his accuser, when as he presseth the end of the wars taken up against Caesar. And truly (saith he) he is come forth armed against Caesar himself. But what did this Tubero his sword do in the Pharsa­lian Army? whose sides did the sharp point aime at? who was to feel the force of thy weapon? where was thy minde, eyes, hands, courage? what didst thou [Page 16] desire? what didst thou wish?

CAP. 9. The Effect.

Q. What is the Effect?

A. The Effect is that which ariseth from the Causes, whether begotten or corrupted, or whether any thing be moved by any means. Here the mo­tion, and the thing done by motion, is called the Effect. Of this place are praises and dispraises, of which sacred and profane books are full.

Q. Give example of this out of some Poet.

A. AEneid 6. The facts of divers people are compared to the praises of the Romans.

Some finly carve upon the boyling brasse,
They'l on the marble grave a living face:
They wish the causes better, they'l descry
Heavens shining parts, and tell the stars i'th sky.
Remember thou Romes people brave to rule.
These things shal be thine Art, peace to impose,
To spare thy subjects, and subdue proud foes.

Q. What else cometh under this head?

A. Hitherto are speeches and wri­tings refer [...]ed.

Q. Give an example?

[Page 17] A. Pericles and Hortentius did cele­brate the praise of pleading well and by the same argument also Demosthenes and Cicero of writing well.

Q. What farther?

A. To this place are referred coun­sels and deliberations, although not brought to their end.

Q. Give an example.

A. Permenio and Phylotus were bea­ten to death, because they were suspected to be of the conspiracy against Alex­ander, as Curtius and Arianus have re­membred touching Lentulus, Cethegus and others, the complices of Catiline; they suffered punishment by judgment of the Senat.

Q. Have not vertue and vices their Effects also.

A. Yes.

Q. Give an example.

A [...] Horace after this manner descri­beth the Eff [...]cts of drunkennesse.

Secrets it shews, & hope it doth command,
Vnto the wars it drives, although unarmd:
It takes the burden from the carfull man,
It teacheth Art to all that will or can.
Who ere was drunk that wāted Eloquēce?
Was any poor that used this defence?

CAP. 10. The Subject.

Q. The argument agreeing after [...] certain manner succeedeth, what is tha [...] then?

A. The Subject and Adjunct.

Q. What is the Subject?

A. The Subject is that to which any thing is adjoined.

Q. Make this plainer by examples.

A. The minde is the Subject of sci­ence, ignorance, vertue, vice, becaus [...] these happen beside the being. The bo­dy, of health, sicknes, strength, weaknes [...] beauty, deformity. Man is the Subject of riches, poverty, honour, infamy, ap­parell, company. The place is the Subject of the thing placed.

Q. How prove you this last by testimo­ny and example?

A. The Philosophers attribute a place to divine beings, although wan­ting part and greatnesse. So the place of Geometry, and the difference o [...] places is in Geometricall things: so o [...] physick, it is more diligently considered in physicall things: In the world, in simple elements, in compound things.

[Page 19]Q. Give example out of some Poet.

A. So Virgil in his Georgicks ad­monisheth that the place be diligently sought out for things proposed, as corn, trees, plants, pa [...]tures.

Before we passe into a sea unknown,
Know we the wind and various manner of Heaven:
Our native soyle and every habitation,
What will refuse or grow in any nation.
Some beareth corne, th'other with grapes doth passe,
Some with tall trees, the rest with unsown grasse.

Q. Proceed further in explicating the subject?

A. The Subjects of senses are cal­led sensibles; of vertues or vices, things proposed to vertues or vices.

Q. Give an example of the former.

A. Colour is the subject of the sight, sound of the hearing; because these sen­ses are occupied and exercised in the sensibles.

Q. Give an example of the later.

A. Vertues and vices are set forth in morall Philosophy by this argument: temperance and intemperance, by plea­sure: magnanimity and sloth, by dan­ger: liberality and covetousnesse, by riches.

[Page 20]Q. Explicate the Subject further?

A. So things numerable of Arith­metick: miserable (as I may say) are the Subjects of Geometry.

Q. Give example of the Subject o [...] of some Orator.

A. By the same Subject Cicer [...] (second Agra) disputeth that there was no contention amongst the people [...]o [...] Campania, because there was no ho­nour. They are not carried (saith he) with the desire of glory: because wher [...] there is no publick honour, there th [...] desire of glory cannot be. There is n [...] discord, neither by contention nor am­bition: for there is nothing for which they should strive, nothing for which they should war, nothing for which they should contend.

Q. Give example out of some Poet.

A. [...]ropertius useth this argument.

Of winds the Saylors talk, the Husband. men of Bulls,
The souldiers of their wounds, and shep­herds of their woolls.

CAP. 11. The Adjunct.

Q. What is the Adjunct?

A. The Adjunct is that to which any [Page 21] thing is subjected: which argument, though it be lighter then the subject, yet more copious and frequent: therfore of its signes Ovid speaketh 2. Rem. Am.

Some man (for such there be) may count this small:
Yet that helps some which doth not profit all.

Q. Make this plainer.

A. Those things which are called good and evil of the mind, body, and the whole man, are the Adjuncts of the mind, body, man: also whatsoever hap­pens without the Subject is the Adjūct.

Q. May not Time also be reduced unto this head?

A. Yes, as Place was in the Subject, so is Time in the Adjunct, viz. the indu­ring of things past, present, to come.

Q. What further is comprised under this head?

A. All those Qualities beside the Cau­ses adjoyned to the Subject, whether they be proper or common.

Q. What is Proper?

A. That which agreeth only & wholly with the subject, as laughing with a man, neying with a horse, barking with a dog.

Q. What is Common?

A. That which is not Proper after [...]his manner.

[Page 22]Q. Give example of the Adjunct o [...] of some Orator.

A. By this kind of argument, Cicer [...] in the defence of Roscius the Comedia [...] cavilleth with Fanius Chercus. Do [...] not his head and eye-brows, altogeth [...]bald, seem to savour of malice, and [...] out of deceit? doth he not seem to b [...] compounded from the foot to the he [...] (if a man may conjecture by his shape [...] of frauds, fallacies, lyes? Who ther [...]fore is altogether bald on the head an [...] eye-brows, lest he should be said to ha [...] one haire of a good man.

Q. Give example out of some Poet?

A. So Martial lib. 2. mocketh Zoil [...]

Red haire, black mouth, short feet and il [...] squint-eyes,
'Tis marvell Zoilus if goodnesse in th [...] lie [...]

Q. What further may be reduced u [...]der this head?

A. Garments and company are A [...]juncts.

Q. Give example.

A. By this kind of circumstanc [...] Dido going a hunting is magnificentl [...] set forth, AEneid: 4.

The morne appear'd, Dido forsook the s [...]
The day stir up, to th'heaven youth guid [...] the way.
[Page 23]Both nets and gins with pickst [...]ves all were ready,
Messalian horse with hunting dogs so greedy:
Princes did wait, the slow queen did expect,
With fair clad horse, her way for to direct.
Forth cometh she at length with mighty traine,
In her long robe with many a long seame:
Her horse down trapt, with gold her haire was tress'd,
Her robes with golden hooks she close did wrest.

Q. What is the benefit of Adjuncts?

A. There is great use of Adjuncts to the Subjects by which they are occu­pied.

Q. Give example.

A. By this argument Plato foretold those Cities to be miserable, where the multitude of Physicians and Judges were wanting: because, of necessity, there was conversant in those cities both intemperance, and injustice.

And thus much for the place of a­greeings, from whence every agreeing argument may be said to be one or the same: and all manner of unity and (as I may say) identity are referred [Page 24] hither [...] as the first and simple fou [...]taines.

CAP. 12. Diverses.

Q. You have expounded the first agre [...] ­ing Argument: the disagreeing followe [...] What then is Disagreeing?

A. That which disagreeth from th [...] thing.

Q. How are Disagreeings manifeste [...]

A. Disagreeings are equally man [...]fested amongst themselves, and equal [...] argued one of another, although th [...] do more clearly shine in their Dis [...]greeings.

Q. What are the kinds of Dis [...]greeings?

A. Two, Diverse and Opposite.

Q. What are Diverses?

A. Diverses are Disagreeings whi [...] disagree only in reason.

Q. What are the most frequent no [...] of speech for this Argument?

A. These; Not this, but that; a [...]though, yet.

Q. Give example from some Orator.

A. Pro Pompeio. He carried not th [...] victory, but the ensignes of the victo [...]

[Page 25]Q. Give some other examples?

A. Ovid. secund. Art. Amand.

Ulysses was not fair but Eloquent.

AEneid. 2.

This Priamus though held in dust of death,
Yet ceased not.

Also this of the like matter, Pro. Lig. Callest thou that wicked (ô Tubero)? Why, he hath not hitherto deserved this name. For some called error, some fear; that which more hardly, hope, de­fire, hatred, pertinacy; the most grave, [...]emerity: none wicked, besides thy self.

CAP. 13. Desperates.

Q. What are Opposites?

A. Opposites are disagreeings, which disagree in reason and thing; there­fore cannot be attributed to the same, according to the same, and at the same time.

Q. Make this plain by example.

A. So Socrates cannot be black and white of one and the same part; Fa­ther and Son of the same man; whole and sick at the same time; b [...]t he may [Page 26] be white on the one part, black on ano­ther; Father of this, Son of that man; [...]ound to day, sick to morrow.

Q. It should seem by this, that the one being affirmed, the other is denied.

A. So it is.

Q. What are the [...]inds af Opposites?

A. Disparates or Contraries.

Q. What are Disparates?

A. Disparates are opposites, whereo [...] one is opposed equally to many.

Q. Give example.

A. Green, Ash-color, Red, are means between White and Black, which ar [...] Disparates, both with the extreams, an [...] among themselves. So liberality an [...] covetousnesse are disparates among themselves. So a man, a tree, a ston [...] and infinite of this kind are Disparates neither can one thing be a man, a tree [...] a stone.

Q. Give example out of some Poet.

A. Virgil. (AEneid. 1.) disputeth b [...] this Argument.

O virgin, how shall I remember thee,
Whose countenance not mortal seems to be
Thy voyce is sure above the humane reac [...]
Both which thee Goddess proves, and so [...] teach.

CAP. 14. Relates

Q. What are Contraries?

A. Contraries are Opposites, where­of one is opposed to one only.

Q. What are the kinds of it?

A. They are either affirming, or de­nying.

Q. What is affirming?

A. Affirming is that of which both of them affirme.

Q. How many kinds hath it?

A. Two, Relates and Adverses.

Q. What are Relates?

A. Relates are Contraries affirm­ing; of which one consisteth of the mu­tuall affection of the other: and from hence they are named Relates.

Q. Make this plain by example.

A. The Father who hath a Sonne; and the Sonne who hath a Father, are Relates.

Q. They may seeme by this, to be toge­ther by nature.

A. So they are: so that he which per­fectly knoweth the one, knoweth also the rest.

Q. Give some examples of Relates.

[Page 28] A. Pro Marc. By which thou truly understandest how much praise there is for the benefit given, when as for the receiving, is so much glory, Marc. a­gainst Sosib.

Sosibian, thou yeeld'st thou wast bor [...] thrall,
When flattering thou thy Father Lord dos [...] call

So Quint. lib. 5. cap. 10. If it b [...] honest to place himself at Rhodes, and to lodge at Hirmaereon. After whic [...] manner Tullius, in the perfect oration [...] It is therefore dangerous (saith he) les [...] any should think it dishonesty, to teac [...] that in the great and glorious Art to o­thers, which it was honesty for him to learn.

Q. Doth not earnest affection some­times flow from these Relates?

A. Yes.

Q. Give example out of some Orator.

A. Cicero in his oration hath brough [...] forth a certain earnest affection fro [...] these Relates. Now these are grav [...] (saith he) wife of the son in law, step­mother of the son, and baud of th [...] daughter.

Q. Give example out of some Poet.

A. All this Ovid hath affected m [...]nifestly [Page 29] in his description of the Iron age. Met 1.

Ne doth the guest safe in his Inn [...] r [...]main,
His host him troubles who doth him r [...]ain.
Sisters ev'n from their brethren are not free,
The husband longs the death of's wife to see.
She hateth him, and 'gainst him doth con­sp [...]re;
The cursed stepdame 's alwayes in an ire.
The sonne [...]re's time doth's fathers years inquire.

Q. But the argument of such relations hath nothing contrary: yea it rather ar­gueth mutuall causes: as, thou art my Father, I therefore am thy son. How then appeareth the Contraries?

A. When I say I am thy father, I am not therefore thy son, then are the Contraries true.

CAP. 15. Adverses.

Q. Wh [...]t are Adverses?

A. Adverses are Contraries affirm­ing, which are perpetu [...]lly adverse a­mong themselves.

Q. Give example out of some Po [...]t.

A. AEneid. 11.

[Page 30]
No health in war, we all desire peace,

Q. Give further example.

A. White and black, hot and cold [...] vertue and vice, are opposed.

Q. Give example out of some Orator.

A. Parad. 1. Cont. Epe. Yet they do hold strongly, and defend accurately, that pleasure is the chief good: which to me truly doth seem to be the voyce of beasts, not of men; when as, whether God or Nature (as I may say) the mo­ther of all things, hath given thee a soul, then which nothing is more excellent, nothing more divine; dost thou so cast and throw down thy self, as that thou thinkest there is no difference betwix [...] thee and the four-footed beasts?

Q. Wherein consists the force of this example?

A. Cicero hath opposed beasts and men, Adverses: pleasure is the good of beasts, and therefore of men.

Q. Give another example out of some Poet.

A. So liberty and servitude in Tib. lib. 2.

So servitude I see prepar'd for me,
Yet, parents, freedom would far better be.

Q. Give example out of an Orator.

[Page 31] A. Pro Marcell. For [...]emerity is ne­ver joyned with wisdom [...] neither is chance admitted to counsell.

CAP. 16. Contradicents.

Q. Having spoken of Contraries Affirm­ing, we are come to Contraries Denying: What are they then?

A. Contraries denying are such, of which one saith, the other denyeth the same.

Q. What are the kinds?

A. They are Contradicents or Pri­vants.

Q. What are contradicents?

A. Contradicents are contraries de­nying, of which one denyeth every where.

Q. Give example.

A. Just, not Just; a creature, not a creature; it is, it is not: These are Contradicents.

Q. Give example out of some Orator.

A. Pro Murena. The sentences of Cato and Cicero are Contraries; this of the Stoicks, that man of the Acade­micks. The Dialogue is in these words; [Page 32] Thou hast known nothing: yea som­things, but not all things. Thou hast done nothing meerly for thanks; yet re­fuse not thanks when as thine office and trust requireth it. Be not moved wit [...] mercy in condemning; But yet ther [...] is some praise of humanity. Stand in thine own opinion: except a better should overcome.

Q. Give example from some Poet.

A. Mart. lib. 2.

Th'art fair Fabulla, rich, & als' a maid
Can you deny tis truth that I have said [...]
But if thou boastest of thy self too much,
Th'art neither fair, a virgine, nor yet rich.

Q. Give another example out of som [...] Orator.

A. Cicero (primo Tusc.) forceth At­ticus the Epicure by this argument to confesse, That the dead were not mis [...] ­rable, if they were not at all, as the Epi­cures beleeve: I had rather (saith he) thou shouldst fear Cerberus, then spea [...] so inconsiderately. Attic. Why? Mar­cus, That which thou denyest, that thou sayest. Where is thy wit? For whenas thou sayest, He is miserable; thou then sayest, He is, which is not. Then after long disputation Atticus said, Go to, [Page 33] now I grant, that those which are dead are not miserable; because thou hast forced me to confesse, that, they be not at all, lest they should be miserable.

Q. Give another example.

A. Terrence in Ev. Phedria frameth his speech to Dorus, when as he had af­firmed that which hee denyed after­wards. After a manner (saith he) he saith; after a manner he denyeth.

CAP. 17. Privants.

Q. What are Privants?

A. Privants are Contraries denying, of which one denyeth in the same Sub­ject only, in which the Affirmative (of its own nature) is.

Q. What is the A [...]firmative called?

A. The Habit.

Q. And what the Negative?

A. Privation.

Q. Make this plainer.

A. Motion and Rest, Drunkenness and Sobriety are comprised under this head.

Q. Give example.

A. Mart. lib. 3.

[Page 34]
Th' art drunken s [...]re; sober thou would not do't.

Q. What may further be under th [...] head?

A. To be blind, and to see.

Q. Give example.

A. Pro Celio. There is therefore one of this family, and he truly is grea [...]ly blinde: For he shall take no grief who shall not see her.

Q. What may further be under this head?

A. Poverty and Riches are thus op­posed.

Q. Give example.

A. Mart. lib. 5.

Poore shalt thou be, Emilian if poore:
Wealth's never given but to th' rich be­fore.

Q. What further?

A. Death and Life.

Q. Give example.

A. Cont. Mil. Sit ye still, O reven­gers of this mans death; Whose life, if you thought you could restore, would you?

Q. What further?

A. Silence and Speech.

Q. Give example.

[Page 35] A. Primo Cat. What expectest thou the authority of the speakers, whose si­lence thou beholdest to be their plea­sures?

Q. What more?

A. Mortality and Immortality.

Q. Give example.

A. Pro Marc. I grieve when as the common-wealth ought to be immor­tal, that it consisteth of one mortal life.

And this sufficeth to be spoken of Disagreeing, from whence every thing may differ from another by certain means.

CAP. 18. Equals.

Q Simple arguments were Agreeings & Disagreeings; we are now come unto Comparatives. What are Comparatives therefore?

A. Comparatives are those which are compared amongst themselves.

Q. How are they manifested?

A. Although they be equally known by the nature of Comparison; yet one to another is more known and illust [...]a­ted then another: and oftentimes are [Page 36] judged by shorter notes, somtimes di [...]stinguished by fuller parts.

Q. What may these parts be call'd?

A. They are named the Propo [...]ition and Reddition.

Q. May not Comparatives also arg [...] fictions?

A. Yes, Comparatives doe argu [...] feigned things, and doe cause trust.

Q. What be the kindes of Compari [...]sons?

A. Comparison, is in Quantity, o [...] Quality.

Q. What is Quantity?

A. Quantity is that whereby [...] shewed how much the thing compa­red is.

Q. What be the kindes of Quantity [...]

A. Equals or Unequals.

Q. What are Equals?

A. Equals are those of which ther [...] is one quantity.

Q. What is an Equall argument then [...]

A. An equall argument is, when an Equall is explicated by an Equall.

Q. What are the notes of it?

A. Even, equall, like, the same, that, so much the more, how much the more, by so much, by how much [Page 37] so much, how much, not more nor lesse.

Also AEneid. 2. Equall with light windes. AEneid. 3.

And now't should grow in equal age with thee, AEneid 6.
Behold this thing, Great Rome with earth is euen:
The spirit of man shall also equall heauen.

Q. What further is necessary to these Equalls?

A. A proposition or Reddition doth distinguish them.

Q. Give example out of some Ora­tor.

A. Quart. Cat. Whose things done, and the vertues to the same; by which things onely the course is contained in its regions and bounds.

Q. Give example out of some Poet.

A. AEneid 4.

As well a bruter of things false that be,
As messenger of truth and verity.

Cat.

By how much I am worst of poets all,
By so much thee men best of Patrons call.

Ovid de Trist. 4.

As many shels on shore, as roses sweet;
As many sleeps as men by poppy get;
[Page 38]As many beasts in woods, fish in sea lie;
As many birds as in the ayr do fly;
So many griefs me pass, which could I tel,
Icarian waters I might number well.

Q. Proceed to further examples.

A. Phil. 9. Neither had he more skill of the Law then of Justice: there­fore those things which the Laws had brought forth, chiefly the civill, he always referred to ease and equity: neither had he rather approve actions of strife, then take away controver­sies.

Ovid. de Art. Amand.

'Tis no less vertue for to keep then get.

Pro Mur. I acknowledge this to be equall for Lucius Murena: and so e­qual, that neither he shall bè overcome by dignity, neither by dignity shall o­vercome thee.

Phil. 2. Whose burthen being com­mon, why not a common pay of them?

Ter. in Adelph. When as I care not for thine, care not thou for mine.

Q. What may further be comprised under this head?

A. Of this place are those that follow derived truely from Contra­ries, but treated of in the place [Page 39] of Equalls; as this of Mart.

Sosibla [...], thou yeeld'st thou wast born thrall,
When flattring thou thy father Lord dost call.

Ovid 1. Fast.

There's price in price, the Censors honors give;
He giveth friendship: poor alone do live.

Q. But are they not more frequen [...] from Adverses?

A. Yes.

Q. Give example.

A. Cicero Syl. Neither do I under­stand my self to have been angry. But if I defend him whom [...]thou accusest, why should I not be angry with thee, who accusest him whom I defend? he saith, I accuse mine own enemy: and I said, I defend my friend. So, primo Tus [...]. But when they confess that there is force enough in vices to cause a mi­serable life; why should it not be gran­ted, that there is force enough in ver­tues to effect a blessed life?

Q. it should seem by this, that Contra­ries are sequences of Contraries.

A. So they are.

Q. What may further be comprised under this head?

[Page 40] A. Somtimes there is put forth like for like.

Q. Give example.

A. Such is the contention of the shepherds in Virg. Eclog. 3. Dame­tas first of all putting forth this riddle;

Tell in what place (and I will reckon thee
For great Apollo's self) the welkin large
Iust three els broad & no more seems to be.

And Menal [...]as answering in this o­ther riddle;

Tell in what place the flowers have their marge
With kings names in their leaves inscri­bed plain,
And to thy self take Phillis for thy pain.

Q. Give example of feigned Equalls.

A. Feigned equalls are such as is in AEschinus Sacraticus, wherein Socra­tes sheweth Aspatìa speaking to Xeno­phons wife, and Xenophon himself. Tell me I pray thee, thou wife of Xenophon, if thy neighbour should have better gold then thou, whether hadst thou rather have hers or thine? Hers, said she. And if she have a gowne, and other womens garments of a greater price then thou, whether hadst thou rather have hers or thine? Hers, said [Page 41] she. Go to then, If she have a better husband then thou, hadst thou rather have hers? Here the wo­man blushed. But Aspatia spake to Xenophon himself; I pray thee (said she) if thy neighbour have a better horse then thou, hadst thou rather have his or thine? His, said he: but if he have better ground then thou, whe­ther hadst thou rather have his? His, said he: viz. the best. But if he have a better wife then thou hast, whether hadst thou rather have his or thine? And here Xenophon also himself held his peace.

CAP. 18. Greaters.

Q. What are unequals?

A. Unquals are those of which the quantity is not one.

Q. What be the kindes of unequals?

A. Unequall is greater or lesser.

Q. What is Greater?

A. Greater is that which quantity exceedeth.

Q. What be the proper notes of it?

A. Not only, but also; I had rather

[Page 42]Q. Give example.

A. Cicero pro Mur. There is take [...] from amongst us not onely that verb [...] counterfeit of prudence, but also that Lady of things, Wisdom it self: The thing is carried by force; not onely the hatefull Orator in pleading, or the pratler, but also the truly good is despi [...]sed. A horrid souldier is loved.

Q. Is not a certain logicall gradation [...] somtime joyned with a rhetorical climax, taken from hence?

A. Yes.

Q. Shew example.

A. Pro Mil. Neither did ho [...]se handle himself to the people onely, but also to the Senate; neither to the Senate only, but also to the publick President and souldiers: neither to these alone, but also to the power of those [...] to whom the care of the Senate, souldi­ers, and the whole common-wealth of Italy was committed.

Q. Give a poeticall example.

A. Iu. Sat. 8. against a proud noble­man.

Rather had I Thirses thy Sire should be,
Whil'st that AEatides is like to thee:
And that thou shouldst with Vulcan ar­mour make,
[Page 43]Then for Achilles son men should thee take,
Or that thy feature should like Thir­ses be.

Q. Proceed to further example.

A. Pro. Marc. Having more admira­tion then glory. AEneid. 1.

O fellows, we these evils knew before;
God will them end, we greater far have bore.

Cic. pro Mur. Be not so unjust, that when as thy fountains are opened by thine enemies, our rivers should be stopped up even by our friends.

Q. [...]ve an example of a gradation, without a rhetorical climax.

TER. Thr. But doth Thais give me many thanks for it? Gn. Many. Thr. Sayest thou so? is she glad? Gn. Not so much for the gift it self, as that i [...] was given by thee: for that she triumpheth in good earnest.

Q. Are not also Greaters feigned?

A. Yes, and of great force.

Q. Give example

A. TER. Hert. A Noble-man, if he be made a Lover, can never under­go the charges: much lesse thou then.

AEneid. [...].

O great AEneas, although Jove should not
[Page 44]Promise to help or aid me now one jot,
I hope that Italy shall reach to heaven,
The winds once chang'd, their forces cros [...] have driven,
Arising from black night i'th city cast,
Our pow'r is weak, our greatest streng [...] but wast

CAP. 20. Lessers.

Q. What is Lesser?

A. Lesser is that whose quantity is exceeded.

Q. How is a Lesser judged?

A. Oftentimes by proper notes.

Q. What be these notes?

A. Not only: But not all: Rather this then that: Whenas [...] As also.

Q. How else?

A. By Grammaticall comparison.

Q. How lastly?

A. By the denying of parts.

Q. Give example of the notes out of some Orator.

A. CIC. secund. Cat. No man, not onely of Rome, but in no corner of all Italy was ever oppressed with so great a Tax, as that he once knew of so incre­dible [Page 45] a Cesar. Cat. 1. Thou canst ra­ther as an Exul tempt, then as a Con­sul. vex the Common-wealth. Ag. 2. Which, when to all it is very hard, and an evill reason, then truly to me above the rest.

Q. Give poeticall examples.

A. Ovid. Trist. 1.

More fierce then Busiros, more fierce then he
Who in slow fire his ox burnt furiously.

Ovid. 1. de Remed. Amor.

Thy body to redeem, bear sword and fire,
Ne drink to cool thy thirsty hot desire:
To save thy soul wilt thou not all forbear?
This part exceeds the other price by far.

Q. Give example of those which are done by the denying of parts.

A. Phil. 9. All in all ages who have had the understanding of the Law in this city, if they might be brought to­gether into one place, are not to be e­qualled with Servius Sulpitius. Cat. 2. Although those which say that Catilina is gone to Messilia, do not so much com­plain of it, as fear it.

Q. Is it not somtimes without notes?

A. Yes.

Q. Give example.

A. Pro Mur. Thou art so much [Page 46] wanting from the perfection of g [...] works, as the foundation, which thou thinkest thou hast not yet layd. Pu [...] Arch. The stones and desarts ofte [...] times answer to the voyce; wild beas [...] are tamed and subdued by singing [...] shall not then the instructions of the Poets in the best thing move us?

Q. Is there not also a gradation fr [...] Lesses?

A. Yes.

Q. Give example.

A. Ver. 7. Is it a great act to over­throw the city Rome, to beat a knave, to kill a Parricide? What shall I say? to hang him upon the gallows?

Q. Are not Lessers also somtimes feign­ed?

A. Yes.

Q. Give example.

A. Virg. Eclog. 1.

The light heel'd Hinds in th' air shal fe [...] therfore,
And in the Ocean all the fishes die
For want of water, on the naked shore:
The wandring Parthian first shall drin­ken dry
Huge Araxis; and gus [...]ing Germany
Suck down their thirsty throats swif [...] Tigris tide,
[Page 47]Ere his sweet face shall from my bosome slide.

Q. Give another example.

A. Phil. 2. O filthy thing, not on­ly to the sight, but also to hear of! If it had happened to thee amongst thine inhumane pots, who would not have accounted it filthy? but in the assem­bly of the Romans about publick af­fairs, the Master of the Horse, to whom it is not comely to belch, he vomiting a crust of bread and wine, filled his lap and all the Tribunal with stink.

CAP. 21. Likes.

Q. You have expounded Comparison in Quantity, Comparison in Quality fol­loweth. What therefore is Quality?

A. Quality is that whereby the things compared are said to be such.

Q. What are the kindes of Quality?

A. Like or Dislike.

Q. What are Likes?

A. Likes are those of which there is the same quality.

Q. What are Likes called?

A. Like is called Proportion, as [Page 48] the Likes are proportionable.

Q. What are t [...]e notes of Likenes, whereby it is concluded in one word?

A. Like, effigies, in that man­ner; as also denials of dislikenes.

Q. What be they?

A. Such as this; Not otherewise.

Q. Give example of the first sort.

A. AEn [...]id. 1. His mouth and shoul­ders being like to God. Phi. 9. Thoug [...] S [...]rvius Sulpitius could leave no cleare monument then his son, the effigies o [...] his māers, vertues, constancy, piety, wi [...]

Q. Give example out of some Poet.

A. Ovid. Trist. 1.

For he or none, even he that made th [...] wound
Onely Achilles 'tis can make me sound.

Q. Proceed to farther examples.

A. In Phis. There was one day [...] which was to me the likenes of immor­tality, wherein I returned to my coun­try. Ver. 1. But presently from the sam [...] likenes of a man, as it were by som [...] Circean pot, he is made a Beare. P [...] Pomp. Therefore all in this place d [...] behold Cons. Pompeius not as one sen [...] from the city; but fallen from heaven. AEneid. 3. They do not that which I hav [...] commanded. Ter. I am not, neithe [...] [Page 49] have beene otherwise then he.

Q. What is the partition of like­ness?

A. Disjoyned or continued.

Q. What is a disjoyned similitude?

A. A disjoyned similitude is when as foure termes are distinguished to the thing.

Q. Give example.

A. Eclog. 5.

So me thy song as sleep on grass doth please
The traveller, his weary limbs to ease.

Q. What is the force of this exam­ple?

A. The songs to the hrarers, as sleepe to the weary, are foure distinct termes.

Q. Give another example.

A. Ad fratrem: As the best gover­nours cannot overcome the force of the tempest, so the wisest men oftentimes cannot overcome the violence of for­tune.

Q. Shew the force of this example.

A. Here are four termes, as the governour to the shippe, so wise men to fortune.

Q [...] Proceed to farther examples.

A. Trist. 1.

[Page 50]
As yellow glod in flaming fire is seen,
So men may trust in time that's sharp and keen.

Cic. Phil. 2. But even as those who in a great sickness do not taste the sweetnesse of meat; so the lustfull, covetous, wicked have not the taste of true praise. Virgil made these Verses;

All night it rain'd, next day the signes were seen.
Th' Empire's parted Cesar and Jove be­tween.

Battillus arrogated them to himself, and obtained a great reward: there­fore Virgil in these Verses mocketh Battillus:

I made these rhimes, another had the land,
So Birds, you nests not for your selves have made:
So you, ô Bees, make hony not for you:
So you, ô Sheep, bear wool, but not for you:
So you, ô O xen, plough, but not for you.

Q. Ar [...] not the notes sometimes o­mitted?

A. Yes, somtimes there is no note at all.

Q. Give an example.

A. Virg. Eclog. 2.

Ah my fair boy, trust not thy hue too much
[Page 51]Hurtles, though black, by every handsome hand
Are pluck'd; while Daysies none vouchsafe
Though they be white, yet shed they as they stand.

Q. What is continuall likeness?

A. A continuall likenesse is when as the first terme is to the second, so the second to the third.

Q. Give an example.

A. De Leg. 3. See you not that this is the Magistrates power, that he should rule and prescribe right, profi­table, and agreeing things with the lawes? for as the lawes do govern the Magistrates, so the Magistrates do rule the people.

Q. What is the force of this example?

A. Here are three terms, Laws, Ma­gistrates, People.

Q. Have not feigned likeness equal force with these above?

A. Yes.

Q. Give example.

A. It appeareth chiefly in this expli­cated similitude of Esope his Apology, taken out of Horace, Epist [...] 1.

But if Romes people ask me happily,
Why not 'mongst Iudges on the bench fit I,
[Page 52]And do that which they love, fly that they hate?
I answer as the crafty Fox of late,
When toth' sick lion he this message sen [...],
Fain would I come, to that thing was I bent;
But that! I saw the steps of many feet
That way to go, none back again to get.

CAP. 22. Dislikes.

Q. What are dislikes.

A. Dislikes are comparatives, whose quality is diverse.

Q. What are the proper notes of di­slikes?

A. Dislike, different, another.

Q. Give example.

A. Pro Plan. Although the paying of mony and thanks be unlike. AE­neid. 1. O ancient house! O how un­like for that Lord to govern! Caes. Pri. Bel. Gal. All these differed in their tongues, instructions, lawes. Agra. 2. One is known by his countenance, a­nother by his voyce, another by his gate. De Nat. Deo. 2. Because I have begun to do otherwise then I had said in the beginning.

[Page 53] Q. Are not dislikes also knowne by denying the likes?

A. Yes.

Q. Give an example.

A. De orat. 2. Philosophy is not like the other artes. AEneid 2. But he was not of that seed wherein thou remembrest Achilles, such was Priamus his enemy. Lor. Epist. 1. There is not the same age, the same minde. Ad frat. 1. So thy ring is not as a certain vessel, but as thy self. Phil. 3. This certain day he is wont to expect not so much of sa­crifice as counsel.

Q. Give some poeticall examples.

A. By this argument the shepherd confesseth his error, AEclog. 1.

Ah fond friend Melie, I whilom deem'd
That famous city which I now and then
In common chat amongst our country men,
Have heard denoted by the name of Rome
For all the world like to our homely home.

And by and by;

—so did I dare
Kids liken to their Goats, whelpes to their dams,
And Moul-hills wont to mountains to compare.

Q. Shew the force of this example.

A. As neither the whelpes to the [Page 54] dogges, nor kids to their dams; so n [...] ­ther is Mantua like to Rome.

Q. Be not notes of dislikes sometime [...] wanting?

A. Yes, oftentimes, and the dislike­ness is more clearly explicated.

Q. Give an example out of some Ora­tor.

A. Quint. l. 1. [...] 11. Brutus slew th [...] children of the traitors: Muntius di [...] punish by death the vertue of his sonne.

Q. Give another example.

A. Cat: the sunne sets and riseth a­gain: but when our little light set­teth, there is a perpetual night.

CAP. 23. Conjugates.

Q. Hitherto you have expounded th [...] first arguments, those derived from the first follow; What are they then?

A. Those derived from the first are these, which are even to that which they argue, as the first from whence they are derived.

Q. What be the kinds of these argu­ments?

A. A Conjugate, a Notation, [...] [Page 55] Distribution, and a Definition.

Q. What are Conjugates?

A. Conjugates are names drawn di­versly from the same principle.

Q. Give example.

A. Justice, just, justly.

Q. Is there not a symboll in conjugate [...] of agreeing arguments?

A. Yes.

Q. Give example.

A. Propert. lib. 2.

Because in love there is no liberty,
Who ever loves, that man can ne'r be free.

Q. Shew the force of this example.

A. Here liberty is the cause why we should be free.

Q. Give another example.

A. Cic. Nat. Deo. 2. Where he spea­keth of Dionysius the Tyrant. He commanded that the tables of silver in which were the images o [...] the gods, should be taken away; in which, after the manner of the Graecians, should b [...] ingraven, The goods of the gods; say­ing, that he was willing to use of their goodness.

Q. Shew the force of this example.

A. The Gods are good, therefore their goodnesse is to be used; here [Page 56] from the Effects it is directed to the Causes.

Q. Give another example.

A. Ter. I am a man, no humane thin [...] is strange to me.

Q. Is it not sometimes from the sub­ject to the adjunct?

A. Yes.

Q. Give example.

A. Phil. 2. I will not handle thee as a Consul, lest thou handle me as one st [...]nding for the Consulship. In Pis. When as all the cause was of the Con­suls and Senate, both the Consuls and Senate had need of my help.

CAP. 24. Notations.

Q. What is notations?

A. Notation is the interpretation of a name.

Q. What are names?

A. Names truely are notes of things.

Q. May there not be rendred a reason of the names?

A. Yes, either from the deri­ation or composition, if they be made [Page 57] by true notation, from some first argu­ment.

Q. Give example.

A. Homo ab humo. Ovid. Fast. 6.

[...]tat vi terra sua, vi stando vesta vocatur.

Q. Shew the force of this example.

A. This is a notation from the cause.

Q. Give another example.

A. At focus à flammis, & quod fovit omnia dictus.

Q. Shew the force of this example.

A. This is a notation from the effects.

Q. Give another example.

A. Vir. 4. O Verrea praeclara [...] quid enim accessisti, quo non attuleris tecum istum diem? & enim quam tu domum, quam urbem adiisti, quod fanum denique, quod non eversum, atque extersum reliqueris? quare ap­pellentur sanè ista Verrea, quae non ex nomine, sed ex moribus, naturâque tuâ constituta esse videantur?

Q. Shew the force of this example.

A. This is also a notation from the effects.

Q. Give another example.

A. Ovid. Fast. 1.

Prima dies tibi carna datur, dea cardinis haec est,
[Page 58]Nomine clausa aperit, claudit aper [...] suo.

Q. Wherein is the force of this exāple?

A. This is a notation from the sub­jects in the inward, about which the de­ity of this goddesse is exercised.

Q. Give another example.

A. From the adjuncts there is [...] notation from Bambalion, Phil. 2. Quia balbus & stupidus: hinc igitu [...] cavillatio in Antonium generum. Tu [...] conjugis, bonae foeminae, locupletati [...] quidem certè, Bambalio quidem pater, ho [...]o nullo numero, nihil illo contem­ptius, qui propter haesitantiam linguae, stuporémque cordis, cognomen ex con­tumelia traxerit.

Q. Shew the force of this example.

A. This is a notation from ad­juncts.

Q. Are there not notations also from disagreeings?

A. Yes.

Q. Give example.

A. Quint. lib. 1. cap. 6. Lucus, quia umbra opacus parum luceat [...]: & ludus, quia sit longissimè a lusu; & dis, quia minimè dives.

Q. May not notation be also from com­paratives?

[Page 59] A. Yes.

Q. Give example.

A. Pyropus, quod ignis flammam imitetur.

Q. But is there not, as to the notation to his name, so an affection of the name to the notation?

A. Yes.

Q. Give example.

A. Animi plenus, ergo animosus.

Q. Shew the contrary.

A. Animosus, ergo animi plenus.

CAP. 25. Distribution.

Q. What are the other derived argu­ments?

A. Distribution and Definition.

Q. Is there not a reciprocall affection in both these?

A. Yes.

Q. What is the affection in the distri­bution?

A. Of all parts with the whole.

Q. What is the affection in the de [...]i­nition?

A. Of the Definition with the things defined.

[Page 60]Q. What is a Distribution?

A. A Distribution is, when the whole is distributed into parts.

Q. What is the whole?

A. The whole is that which contain­eth parts.

Q. What are parts?

A. Parts are those which are contain­ed of the whole.

Q. It should seem then that the distin­ction of the whole into parts, is Distri­bution.

A. So I said.

Q. What is then the collection of the parts to the making up of the whole?

A. It is called Induction.

Q. Whence is Distribution taken?

A. Distribution is taken from ar­guments altogether agreeing, but disa­greeing amongst themselves: therefore it shall be by so much more accurate, by how much the agreeings of the parts shall be with the whole, and the disa­greeing among themselves.

CAP. 26. The destribution from the cause.

Q. Whence is the First Distribution?

[Page 61] A. The first distribution is from ab­solute Agreeings.

Q. What are these absolute Agree­ings?

A. The Causes and Effects.

Q. What is distribution from the Causes?

A. Distribution from the Causes, is when the parts are causes of the whole. Here the distribution of per­fect into its members is greatly prai­sed.

Q. What is Perfect?

A. Perfect is the whole, to which the parts are essentiall.

Q. What is a member?

A. A member is a part of the whole.

Q. Give example.

A. Grammer is divided into E­tymology and Syntaxis; Rhetorick, into Elocution and Action; Dialecti­ca, into Invention and Judgment: for those Arts are constituted of those parts.

Q. What is the principall Distri­bution?

A. When the explication of a longer thing is received.

Q. Give example.

[Page 62] A. Georg. 1.

What makes glad corn, and how to till the ground,
How to plant elms, that be so strong and sound:
How to guide oxen, cattell how to tend,
And how the little pretty B [...]e defend,
I will declare.—

Q. Give another example.

A. Cic. pro Mur. I understand, O you Judges, that the whole accusation hath three parts; one of which is in re­prehension of life, another in conten­tion of dignity, the third touching the fault.

Q. How is the second kinde of handling this kinde of argument?

A. Either from the Parts to the Whole; or from the Whole to the Parts.

Q. Give example.

A. Cat.

Quintia is faire to many, so to me,
I will not therefore this same thing deny;
But wholly faire I will not say she's not,
True beauty in her there is not a jot.
Lesbius faire in every part, most fine,
Venus adorn'd her, cleer did make her shine.

CAP. 27. The distribution from the Effects; also the Genus and Species.

Q. What is the Distribution from the Effects?

A. The Distribution from the Ef­fects, is when the Parts are Effects.

Q. Give example.

A. In a ship the sea-men, some scale the masts, some run in at the doors, some draw water, the Governour holdeth the rudder in the ship.

Q. May not distribution of Genus into Species be comprised under this head?

A. Yes, distribution of Genus into Species doth here excell.

Q. What is Genus?

A. Genus is the whole essential in par [...]s

Q. What is Species?

A. Species is the parts of Genus.

Q. Give example.

A. We say, A living creature is the genus of a man, and a beast; for a li­ving creature is the whole of that effect; viz. a corporall living substance, which commonly pertaineth to the beasts and men: We say, the species of a man and [Page 64] a beast is living, because they are parts of a living subject, which living es­sence they have common: We say, A man is the genus of every man, and a lion the genus of every lion; but con­trary, every man the species of a man, every lion of a lion.

Q. What is the kinds of the Genus?

A. The Genus is most generall, or subalternat.

Q. What are the kinds of the Species?

A. The Species is subalternate, or most speciall.

Q. What is the most generall Genus?

A. The most generall Genus, is that of which there is no kinds.

Q. Give example.

A. In Logical Invention, an argu­ment is the most generall genus of ar­tificials, and inartificials.

Q. VVhat is the subalternate Genus, and the subalternate Species?

A. The subalternate Genus, as also the subalternate Species, is that which is the species of this, but the genus of that.

Q. Give example.

A. The Cause is the species of an absolute arguing Argument, but the genus of the Matter, and Form.

[Page 65]Q. But what is the most special Species?

A. The most speciall Species is that which is individable into other species.

Q Give example.

A. The matter and forme si [...]gly.

Q. What are the Genus and Species notes of?

A. Of the Causes and Effects.

Q. Give example.

A. In a living thing there is a corpore­al essence, which in the matter is belong­ing commonly to the species, as also the faculty of life & sense, which in the form pertaineth commonly to the species.

Q. It should seeme that the Genus con­tains the causes which attain to the [...]pecies of it; and therefore contrarily, the Spe­cies contains the Effects of their Genus.

A. So it is.

Q. From whence then is that univer­sall famousnes and excellency?

A. From hence, because it decla­reth the causes.

Q. Shew some example now of the di­stributions of the Genus into Species.

A. Distribution of Genus into Spe­cies is very excellent truly, but hard and seldom found; yet we wil bring what illustrations and examples wee [Page 66] can. Ovid. (Met. 1.) divideth living creatures in [...]o five Species; Starrs, Birds Beasts, Fish, Men: hee giveth life to the stars, as the Philosophers doe.

No region is without some living thing,
Stars in the skies, the forms of gods being;
Birds in the aire in abundance be,
Beasts on the earth, and fishes in the sea.
But yet 'mongst these a creature more di­vine,
Who may them rule & govern all, in fin [...]
There wanted much, until the man w [...] born.

So Cic. (Offic. 1.) divideth vertue into four Species, Prudence, Justice, Fo [...]titude, and Temperance; but all that is honest springeth out of one of these four parts; for either it is con­versant in the knowledg and skill of the truth, or in the defending the society of men, and giving every one his owne; Also in trust of things bargained, or in a high mind and admirable great­ness and courage. Or lastly, in all things which are made and called or­der and means, in which is modesty and temperance.

Q. What is distribution of the Genus into the formes of the Species?

[Page 67] A. Distribution of the Genus into the formes of the Species is the same; because the forme with the Genus, con­stitute their Species.

Q. Give example.

A. Of living creatures, one is spea­king, another dumb.

Q. May not Genus and Species be [...]andled apart and severally?

A. Yes, Genus and Species are not only handled after this simple forme of division, but also apart one from another.

Q. Give example.

A. Pro Arc. But least any should won­der that we say so, that there is a cer­tain faculty of wit, and this reason or discipline of speaking; neither that we have truly given our selves altogether to this study: For all Arts which per­tain to humanity, have a certain com­mon hand, and are contained (as it were) in a certain knowledg amongst themselves.

Q. Shew the force of this example.

A. Art is the Genus, Poesie and Elo­quence the Species.

Q. Is not the Genus handled also by the Species?

[Page 68] A. Yes.

Q. Give example.

A. Ovid de Trist. 4.

Fill thy sad matter with thy vertues grave.
Hot glory doth decay, it none can save.
Who had known Hector, if Troy well had been?
Through publick vices way to vertue' [...] se [...]
Thine Art, ô Typhis lyes, if in the sea
There be no floods: if men be well, truly,
Then Phoebus Art decayeth instantly.
That which they hid, and is not known f [...] good,
Appears at last, and shews where evi [...] stoo [...]

Q. But are there no speciall example [...] fitted to this kinde?

A. Yes, such as this. Attic. 7. Wil [...] thou leave the city? what if the French­men come? The common-weal [...] (he saith) is not in walls, but Altars and Religion. Themistocles did the same, and a whole host of Barbaria [...] were not able to take one city. B [...] Pericles did not so, who in the year al­most before fifty, when he kept no­thing but a wall; our city before being taken, they kept the tower notwithstan­ding.

CAP. 28. Distribution from the Subject.

Q. What is the other distribution?

A. The other distribution is of A­greeings after a certain manner.

Q. What are Agreeings after a certain manner?

A. The subjects and adjuncts.

Q. What is the distribution from subjects?

A. The distribution from Subjects, is, when the parts are subjects.

Q. Give example.

A. Cat.

Thy maiden-head's not wholly thine, I ween,
One part thy father gave, the part between
Thou of thy mother had'st; so that to thee
None but the third remaineth for to be:
Therefore resist not two, cast not away
The thing thy parents gave to thee, I say.

Q. Give example out of some Ora­tor.

A. Cic. Tnsc. 1. There are therefore three kindes of good, as I un [...]erstond from the Stoicks, to whose use, ofte­ner then I am wont, we give place. There are therefore those kinde [...] of [Page 70] good, which may be externally enjoy­ed of the body: Also because others ar [...] to be undertaken, they are therefore called good. There are other divine things which do more nearly concern us, and are heavenly; so that those who have attained them, why may I not call them after a manner blessed, yea most happy?

CAP. 29. Distribution from adjucts.

Q. What is distribution from A [...] ­juncts.

A. Distribution from Adjuncts is [...] when the parts are Adjuncts.

Q. Give example.

A. Of men, some are sound, some sick, some rich, some poor.

Q. Give a poeticall example.

A. Virgil (Georg. 1.) divideth th [...] world into five parts; the middle scorc [...] ­ing hot, the other two extream col [...] the two last temperate.

Five zones the heavens do hold, the [...]i [...] ­dle hot,
The sun there burns, cold in it the [...] is n [...]
But on the right and left ha [...] there i [...] seen
[Page 71]Rain, frost and cold, that's bitter, sharpe and keen.
The two last temperate, yet in them is
Mortality, and many sicknesses.

Q. Give an Orators example.

A. Caes. Bel. Gal. 1. All France is di­vided into three parts; of which, one the Belgians inhabite, the other the AEquitans, the third those who in their tongue are called Cetts, in our language the Gaules.

CAP. 30. Definition.

Q. What is definition?

A. Definition is when it is expli­cated what the thing is, and that inter­changeably may be argued with the thing defined.

Q. What are the [...]des of Definition?

A. A Definition is perfect or im­perfect.

Q. What is the Perfect definition callde?

A. This is properly called a Defi­nition.

Q. What is the Imperfect called?

A. A Description.

[Page 72]Q. VVhat is a perfect Definition?

A. A Perfect definition is a definiti­on consisting of the onely Causes which constitute the Essence: such as the causes comprehended by the genus and form.

Q. Give example.

A. After this manner is a man desi­ned, viz. by the genus (a living crea­ture) we understand (as it is said) a Corporeal Essence full of life and sense, which is the Matter, and a part of the Form of a man; to which, if thou addest reasonable, thou compre­hendest the whole form of a man, by the whole faculty of his Life, Sense, Reason.

Q. It should seem then that the Per­fect definition is nothing else then an u­niversall symbol of the Causes constitu­ting the Essence an [...] Nature of things?

A. So it is.

Q. Give an example.

A. the Arts have such definitions; Grammer, of well speaking; Rhe­toricke, of pleading well; Dialecti­ca, of disputing well; Arithmetick, of numbring well; Geometry, of measu­ring well.

CAP. 31. Description.

Q. VVhat is Description?

A. Description is a definition de­fining the thing from other arguments also.

Q. Give example.

A. This is the description of a man; A man is a living creature, mortall, ca­pable of discipline.

Q. Are not proper circumstances also mingled with common causes some­times?

A. Yes.

Q. Then it seemeth that succint brevi­ty is not alwayes in this kinde.

A. No, oftentimes it desireth a clea­rer and greater explication.

Q. Give an example out of some O­rator.

A. In Mil. Glory is described. But yet of all rewards of vertue (if there be a reason of rewards) the greatest is glory; this one comforteth us tou­ching the shortness of our life, causeth that we are present with the absent; of [Page 72] dead, maketh us to live. To conclude; by these steps we do seem to ascend in­to heaven.

Q. Give a poeticall example.

A. AEneid. 4. Fame is described.

From Lybians temple cometh forth great fame,
Nought swifter then ill news which bears this name,
Moving she goes, by going strength she gets;
She feares at first, at last with windes she fleets,
VValkes on the earth, her head she lifts to th' skie;
Earth brought her forth, the gods were angery;
In Coeus and Encelladus his land
She was at last, as I do understand;
Her feet were swift, her wings most hurt­ful were,
A horrid monster, wicked, ful of feare.
As many feathers as upon her are,
So many eyes attend her every where,
So many tongues, so many mouths do sound,
So many ears do listen her around.
In night she flies through heaven, and in the shade
About the earth she goes, no noyse is made:
She [...]itteth by the light on houses high,
And causeth townes to quiver fearfully;
As well a bruiter of things false that be,
[Page 73]As messenger of truth and verity.

Q. Procced to further example?

A. Such are the descriptions of plants and living creatures, in Physicke: al­so of rivers, mountains, cities, in Geo­graphy and History.

CAP. 32. Divine testimony.

Q. You have expounded the Artificial arguments, the Inartificiall followeth; Tell me then what an Inartificiall argu­ment is?

A. An Inartificiall argument is, that which argueth not by its own na­ture, but taketh force from some artifi­ciall argument.

Q. It seemeth by this, when a hidden truth of things is more subtily searched for, that this argument hath small force of proofe.

A. So it is: but in civill and humane things oftentimes this argument effe­cteth the greatest trust from the mo­ving arguments, if wisdome, vertue, and good will be present.

Q. VVhat is it called?

A. In one name it is called Testimo­yn.

[Page 74]Q. What are the kindes of Testimo [...]y [...]

A. Divine or Humane.

Q. What may be comprised under the head of Divine Testimony?

Q. Not onely the miracles of the gods, but also the answers of pro­phets and fortune-tellers are counted amongst divine Testimonies.

Q. Give example.

A. All these are brought forth, Cat. 3 For that I may omit (saith the Ora­tor) the fires seen in the night from the West, and the burning of heaven, as also lightning, and earthquakes, with other many things done to us Consuls, as those which are now done, do seem to proclaime the gods immortality. And a little after; At which time, when the Araspatians were come toge­ther out of all Hetruria, they said that slaughter, burning, perishing of the lawes, civill and domesticall war, and the fall of the whole City and Empire approached, unless the immortall gods (pleased by all reason) by their pow­er should change those destinies. At length, when he had said that they mocked at the answer of the Arispati­ans, and that they did more regard the [Page 75] signe of Iove turning to the East; He then said; But is not he so present, that it should, seem to be done at the beck of the mighty Iove, that when this, morning before my doore, by my command and conjuration, the Judges being then in the house of Concordia; at the same time there appeared a signe which being turned towards you and the Senate, both you and the Senate saw manifestly laid open, who they were that were against the health of all men?

Q. Give another example.

A. That of Tibullus is more short.

But if that oracles true things do tell,
Then this in our name see thou do declare:
That he doth promise Delius to give
To be thy spouse, with whom thou'lt hap­py live.

CAP. 33. Testimony from humane law and sentences.

Q. What be the kindes of humane Te­stimony?

A. Humane Testimony is common, or proper.

[Page 76]Q. What is common?

A. Law, and a famous Sentence.

Q. What is legall testimony?

A. Legall testimony is both un­written and written.

Q. Bring forth authority for this.

A. Pro Mil. For there is (O ye Judges) a law not writtē, but born with us, which we have not received, lear­ned, read; but taken, drawn, ex­pressed from Nature: as if our life should be in some hazard, force, dan­ger either of theeves or enemies, all honest reasō were to be sought of safe­ty; but if the twelve Tables will have the night thee [...]e, yea the day theef too, if he defend himself after any manner, killed without punishment; who is there that will thinke him that is slain to be punished, when as there is a sword reached to us, to kill that man by the Lawes themselves?

Q. What are famous Sentences?

A. Proverbs.

Q. Give example.

A. They be such as these. Pares cum paribus facillimè congregantur. Spartam nactus es, hanc exorna.

Q. What may further be under this head?

[Page 77] A. Sayings of wisdome also.

Q. Give example.

A. Nosce teipsum. Nequid nimis. Sponde praestò ad detrimentum.

Q. What is Proper testimony?

A. Such as this of Plato. 1. ad Quint. fratr. And then truely, Plato the Prince of wisdome, and learning, thought those cōmon-wealths blessed, if either learned and wise men gover­ned them, or those that did govern, placed all their study in wisdome and learning.

Q. Proceed to further example.

A. Such were in the Poets, AEneid 4 Learn justice and admonitions, and contemn not the rich. So in Homer.

[...]
Ajax led out of Salaminus 12 ships.
The Magatenses were overcome by the Athenians.

Q. What are testimonies of the li­ving?

A. Testimonies of the living, are not only when it is inquired of ground, felling of wood, and such like business; but also there are testimonies of obli­gation, confessing, oath.

[Page 78]Q. Give an example of obligation.

A. Phil. 5. For I dare bind my faith (P.C.) to you and the people of Rome, that truly, when no force constrained me, I durst not do; and I feared an o­pinion of temerity, in a thing greatly hurtfull; I promise and swear (P.C.) to become alwayes such a citizen to Ce­sar, as he himself is, and as we ought chiefly to wish or desire.

Q. Have we not an obligation set forth sometimes with a pledge?

A. Yes: Virg. Eclog. 3.

Wilt then by turnes, we hand to hand do try
What either can, and prove each by our deed?
Ile pawn this heiser (which lest thou de­ny)
She twice hath come already to the payle,
And two twins suckles at this time. Now say,
What pawn thou'lt gage with her to coun­tervail.

Q. What are the kindes of confessi­on?

A Confession is free, or extorted by torments.

Q. What is this later properly called?

A A question.

Q. Give example.

[Page 79] A. Such an argument there is against Milon, who [...] Cicero derided. Go to then, VVhat, or how is the question? how? where was Roscius? where was Casca? Doth Clodius lay snares for Mi­lon? he hath done, surely the gallows. He had done nothing.

Q. What further may be reduced hi­therto?

A. Hitherto may be referred the ar­gument which we use when we bring forth our approbation, and experience of our affirmative.

Q. Give example.

A. Ver. 4. Even Volcatio, if he had come freely, would he have given a little book? he shall come, he shall be tryed; no man truely receiveth it. Ter. Spend thy time in letters, in the woods, in musick: It is meet for youth to know these liberal things. I will give diligence.

Q. Give a poeticall example.

A. Ovid. Trist. 3.

The which, that thou mayst better credit me,
Try thou my pains, beleeve it then to be.

Q. Give an example also of the Testi­mony of an oath.

[Page 80] A. AEneid. 6.

I swear by th' gods, and all in earth un­seen,
I have departed from thy shore, ô Queen.

Q. This reciprocation seemeth to be more obscure, as because the testimony is true, the witnes is also true.

A. So it is: and thus much sufficeth to have spoken of Invention, the first part of the science Dialectica.

THE SECOND BOOK OF PETER RAMUS His DIALECTICA of Iudgement.

CAP. 1. What Iudgement is.

Q. HItherto the first part of Dialectica in Invention hath bin expoun­ded; the other part followeth, in Judg­ment. [Page 81] What then is Iudgment?

A. Judgment is the second pa [...]t of Logick, of disposing arguments to be judged well.

Q. How are they judged?

A. Every thing is judged by a cer­tain rule of disposition.

Q. It may be thought then, that this part of Logick is called both Iudgment and Disposition from hence.

A. So it is.

CAP. 2. An aff [...]rmative or negative Axioma.

Q. What are the kindes of judgment?

A. Judgment is Axiomatical, or Di­anoeticall.

Q. What is an Axioma?

A. Axioma is the disposition of an argument with an argument; where­in somwhat is judged to be, or not to be.

Q. What is it called, and whence recei­veth it the name?

A. In the Latin of Enuntiatum, it is called Enuntiation; of Pronuntiatum, Pronuntiation.

[Page 82]Q. What are the the affections of an Axioma.

A. An Axioma is Affirmative, or Negative.

Q. What is affirmative?

A. Affirmative is when the force of it is affirmed.

Q. And what Negative?

A. When it is denied. From hence springeth the contradiction of Axio­mas, when the same argument is affir­med or denied.

CAP. 3. True and false.

Q. What may be a second kinde of the affections of an Axioma?

A. An Axioma secondly is true or false.

Q. How true?

A. VVhen it pronounceth as the thing is.

Q. How false?

A. Contrary.

Q. What are the affections of a true Axioma?

A. A true Axiomas is contingent or necessary.

[Page 83]Q. How contingent?

A. When it is so true, that it may somtimes be false.

Q. Give example.

A. Fortune helpeth the bold; for it may be that which is true to day, to morrow may be false: and therefore the judgment of this contingent verity, is called Opinion: those things of the time past or present, may be certain to a man; but of time to come they can­not by nature, although with God all things are present. Therefore Mar­tial doth worthily mock Priscus.

Priscus, thou often ask'st what I shall be;
If now most rich, hereafter what, truly?
Things for to come canst thou not tel them me?
If thou a Lion art, what wilt thou be?

Q. How necessary?

A. When it is alwayes true, nei­ther can be false.

Q. What is this affirmative called?

A. This affirmative is called [...], of every thing.

Q. How impossible?

A. Contrarily, where it can be true of nothing.

Q. What belongeth to an Axioma of the artes?

[Page 84] A. An axioma of the arts ought to be [...]; as also Homogene & Catholick.

Q. What is an homogene axioma?

A. An homogene axioma is when the parts are essentiall among them­selves: as the form to the thing for­med, the subject to its proper ad­junct.

Q. VVhat is this called?

A. This Genus of the Species is cal­led [...], by it self.

Q. VVhat is a Catholick axioma.

A. A Catholick axioma is when the consequent is alwayes true of the anti­cedent; not onely in every thing and by it self, but also reciprocally.

Q. Give example.

A. A man is a living creature, rea­sonable: Number is equal or unequal.

Q. VVhat is this called?

A. This is called [...], universally first.

Q. What then are the lawes of the proper documents of the arts?

A. These three: the first, [...], the law of ve [...]ity: the second, [...], the law of justice: the third, [...], called the law of wisdom. [Page 85] And such is the judgment of catholick axiomas, the most true and chief know­ledge.

CAP. 4. The simple Axioma.

Q. You have expounded the common affection of axiomas, the kindes follow: what are then the kindes of an axioma,

A. An axioma is simple or com­pound.

Q. VVhat is simple?

A. Simple is that which is contained in the force of one word; and there­fore by an affirmative or negative word it affirmeth or denieth.

Q Give example.

A. Fire burneth, fire is hot, fire is not water.

Q. Shew the force of these examples.

A. Here fire is the antecedent, burneth the consequent: and this is the first dis­position of invented things; of the cause with the effect, as in the first example; the subject with the adjunct, as in the second; the disagreeing with the disa­greeing, in the third: After a certain [Page 86] manner any argument may be enun­tiated (except those full of comparison and distribution); ag [...]eeings, truely, by affirming; disagreeings by denying.

Q. What are the kindes of a simple a­xioma.

A. A simple axioma is generall, or speciall.

Q. What is generall?

A. Generall is when the common consequent is attributed generally to the common antecedent: And this con­tradiction doth not alwayes divide the true and false; but both parts of the contingent, as also not of con­tingents may be false.

Q. Give example of the first.

A. Each place delighted is with Baiis pleasant Rooms.

No place delighted is with Baiis plea­sant Rooms.

Q. Give example of the second.

A. Every creature is reasonable: no creature is reasonable.

Q. What is a speciall axioma?

A. A specall axioma is when the con­sequent is not attributed to every ante­cedent: and here the contradiction e­ver divideth the true from the false.

[Page 87]Q. What are the kinds of speciall?

A. Speciall is particular, or proper.

Q. VVhat is particular?

A. Particular is when the common consequent is attributed particularly to the antecedent: but to this axioma it is generally cont [...]dicted.

Q. Give examples.

A. Somewhat is to be pardoned: Nothing is to be pardoned. Some cle­mency is not to be praised: All cle­mency is to be praised.

Q. VVhat is a proper axioma?

A. A proper axioma is when the consequent is attributed to a proper antecedent.

Q. Give example.

A. Fabulla is fair: whose negative and contradiction is, Fabulla is not fair.

CAP. 5. The copulative axioma.

Q. What is the compound axioma?

A. The compound axioma is that which is contained in the force of a conjuncti­on. Therefore from an affirmative oR negative conjunction it is a affir­med [Page 88] or denyed. And a part of the contradiction is true, a part false.

Q. What are the kindes?

A. A compound Enunciate is for his conjunction congregative, or se­gregative.

Q. What is congr [...]ative?

A. Congregative is that which enun­tiateth all agreeings by affirming, and disagreeings by denying.

Q. VVhat are the kinds?

A. Copulative or connexed.

Q. What is copulative?

A. Copulative is that whose con­junction is copulative.

Q Give example.

A. AEneid. 1.

The east and south windes on the seas do blow
They rush through deep till on the top they show,
The Affrick oft with these his blasts con­joynes.
This therefore shall be the negative and contradiction.
The east and south windes not on seas do blow,
The rush not through the deep, ne on top show:
The Affrick doth not oft his blasts conjoyn.

Q. But whereupon dependeth the judgment of the copulative enunciate?

[Page 89] A. The judgment of the copulative Enunciate being true, dependeth of the truth of all parts: false, at the least of one part false.

Q. What may further be comprised un­der this head?

A. The enunciate of a relate quality is of this kinde, whose conjunction is the relation it self.

Q. Give example.

A. Eclog. 3.

Some thy song as sleep on grass doth please
The traveller, his weary limbs to ease.

Q. Shew the force of this example.

A. Here the copulative judgment is as if he should say, sleep is gratefull to the weary, and so thy song is pleasing to me.

Q. What is the Negative hereof?

A.

Not me thy song as sleep on grass doth please
The traveller, his weary limbs to ease.

CAP. 6. The connexed Axioma.

Q. What is a connexed Axioma.

A. A connexed axioma is congrega­tive, whose conjection is connexive.

Q. Give example.

[Page 90] A. AEneid. 2. If fortune doth feign Simon miserable, it dishonestly feig­neth him to be vain and a lyer. Whose negative is, If fortune doth not feign Simon miserable [...] it dishonestly feigneth him to be vain and a lyer.

Q. Is not this conjunction also denyed more manifestly, by denying the conse­quent?

A. Yes.

Q. Give example.

A. Pro Amer. I am not a murtherer, though in their company: De fato: Neither if every Enunciation be true or false, doth it follow therefore that the causes are immutable; For affir­mation signifieth, if the Antecedent be, that the consequent is also. Negati­on therefore and Contradiction deter­mineth, If the Antecedent be, that therefore the consequent is not. Wherefore, when thou shalt judge the connexive to be absolutely true, thou shalt judge it also necessary; and thou shalt understand this necessity to spring from the necessary connexion o [...] parts, the which may also be even in false parts.

Q. Give example of this.

[Page 91] A. If a man be a Lyon, he is also four footed; this is a necessary conne­xion.

Q. But if the connexion be contingent, and only put for his probability, how shall it be judged then?

A. Its judgment then shall be only opinion.

Q. Give example.

A. Ter: and Phamphilus, if thou dost this, this day is the last thou shalt see me.

Q. What may be further under this head?

A. This relation connexive of con­sequence is like to the connexed axio­ma. As when Tullius is said to be an o­rator, he hath also skil in pleading well. And thus much of the Congregative a­xioma.

CAP. 7. The discrete Axioma.

Q. What is a segregative axioma?

A. A segregative axioma is that whose conjunction is segregative, and therefore enunciateth disagreeing ar­guments.

[Page 92]Q. What are the kindes?

A. A segregative enunciation is dis­crete or disjunct.

Q. What is discrete?

A. Discrete is that whose conjuncti­on is discretive; and therefore of dis­agreeings it chiefly enunciateth di­verses.

Q. Give example.

A. Tusc. 5. Although they may be judged by the sense of the body, yet they are referred to the minde: Whose negative and contradiction is, Al­though they may not be judged by the sense of the body, yet they are refer­red to the mind; or, although they may be judged by the sense of the body, yet they are not referred to the mind. For yet is here a chief conjunction,

Q. How is the discrete Enunciat judg­ed to be true?

A. The discrete enunciation is judg­ed to be true and lawfull, if the parts be not only true, but may be also dis­crete.

Q. How is the false or ridiculous judged?

A. Contrarily.

CAP. 8. The disjunct Axioma.

Q. What is a disjunct axioma?

A. A disjunct axioma is a segrega­tive axioma, whose conjunction is dis­junct.

Q. Give example.

A. Goerg. 1.

There, as they say, is either silent night,
Always most dark, and void of any light;
Or else the morning from us here doth go,
And brings the day unto them there also.

Q. Shew another example.

A. De fato, Every enunciation is true or false.

Q. Here it seemeth is signified from the disjunct, that one only is true.

A. So it is.

Q. What shall the negative and con­tradiction be.

A. Not every enunciation is true or false.

Q. And what doth the contradiction signifie?

A. That one of them is not true by necessity: for if the disjunction be absolutely true, it is also necessary: [Page 94] and the parts of the disjunct are oppo­site without any means.

Q. But although the disjunction be absolutely true, and also necessary; may there not be a necessity, that the parts should be separately necessary?

A. No.

Q. Give example.

A. A man is good or not good. Here the disjunction is necessary, and yet A man is good, is not a necessary enun­ciation; also A man is not good, is not a necessary enunciation.

Q. Whereupon then dependeth the ne­cessity of the disjunction?

A. The necessity of the disjuncti­on dependeth on the necessary oppo­sition and disjunction of the parts, not as their necessary verity.

Q. But is not the disjunction often­times from condition?

A. Yes.

Q. Give example.

A. As if it be thought whether Cleon will come, or Socrates, because it was so agreed that one of them only should come.

Q. It seemeth by this, that if the dis­junction be contingent, it is not abso­lutely [Page 97] true, but is only opinionable.

A. So it is, and that more frequent­ly in the use of man.

Q. Give example.

A. Ovid. Epist. Lean.

Either good hap shall now unto me fall,
Or else fierce death the end of loving thral.

CAP. 9. The Syllogisme and its parts.

Q. You have manifested in its selfe the axiomaticall judgement by axiomas: the dianoetical followeth: What therefore is dianoia?

A. Dianoia is when one axioma is derived from another.

Q. What are the kinds of Dianoia?

A. A Syllogisme or Method.

Q. What is a Syllogisme?

A. Syllogism is a Dianoia whereby the question is so disposed with the ar­gument, as the antecedent put, it is necessarily concluded.

Q. Make this plainer.

A. When the axioma is doubtfull, the question is effected, and there is need of a third argument to be placed with the question, for its trust.

[Page 98]Q. How many parts hath the antece­dent?

A. The antecedent of a Syllogi [...]me hath two parts, a Proposition, and an Assumption.

Q. What is a proposition?

A. A proposition is the first part of the antecedent, whereby the consequent of the question is at least disposed with the argument.

Q. What is the assumption?

A. The assumption is the second part of the antecedent, which is affir­med from the proposition.

Q. But what is the consequent part of the syllogisme?

A. The consequent part of the syl­logisme, is that which imbraceth the part of the question, and concludeth it.

Q. What is it called?

A. It is called from the nature of its Complexion and Conclusion.

Q. If any part of the syllogisme want, what is said to be?

A. It is called Enthymema.

Q. But what if any part happen to be besides its parts?

A. Then it is called a Porsyllogisme.

Q. Is not the order of the parts often­times confounded?

[Page 99] A. Yes.

Q. What then if any doubt shall arise from it?

A. Then that shal be filled up which wanteth, those cut off which abound, and every part digested into his place.

CAP. 10. The simple contracted Syllogism.

Q. What are the kinds of a syllogisme?

A. A syllogisme is simple or com­pound.

Q. What is simple?

A. Simple is, where the consequent part of the question is placed in the proposition, the antecedent part in the assumption.

Q. What are the affections of it?

A. It is affirmed, denyed, generall, special, and proper.

Q. How is it affirmed?

A. From al the affirmative parts.

Q. How is it denyed?

A. From one negative of the ante­cedent parts, with complexion.

Q. How is it general?

A. From the general proposition and assumption.

[Page 100]Q. How is it speciall?

A. From one of the generals only.

Q. And how is it proper?

A. From both propers.

Q. What are the kinds of the simple syllogisme?

A. The simple syllogisme is con­tracted by parts, or explicated.

Q. What is contract?

A. Contract is when the argument for the example is so subjected to a particular question, that the antece­dent may be understood to affirm each part; and in the assumption.

Q. Give an example.

A. Certain confidence is vertue, as constancy: certain confidence is not vertue, as boldnesse.

Q. Shew the force of this example.

A. This argument is understood to go before each part of the question, as if it were expressed; constancy is a vertue, and confidence, and there­fore certain confidence is a vertue: al­so boldnesse is not a vertue, and yet it is confidence; and therefore some con­fidence is not a vertue. So in the use of disputing, the Master of the syllo­gisme draweth the judgement, neither [Page 101] is it set forth otherwise. And by this ex­position the beginning of the syllogism is expounded by Aristotle, so that the syllogisme in its full judgement is more clear and manifest.

CAP. 11. The first kinde of the sim­ple explicated Syl­logisme.

Q. What is the explicated Syllogisme?

A. The explicated Syllogism is, whose parts are explicated.

Q. What are the proprieties in this explicated Syllogisme?

A. Two, first the proposition is ge­nerall or proper: secondly, the conclu­sion is like to the antecedent, or the the weaker part.

Q. What are the kinds of it?

A. The kinds are two-fold.

Q. What is the first?

A. The first is, where the argument always followeth the negative in the other part.

Q. Shew some Syllogisme of this kind.

[Page 102] A. GEN. 1.

Ce- A troubled man useth not his reason well:

sa- But a wise man useth his reason well:

re. A wise man is not therefore troubled.

Q. Produce the example of some Ora­tor for this Syllogisme.

A. This judgment is so brought forth of Cicero, Tusc. 3. And when (saith he) the eye is troubled, it is not honestly affected to the fulfilling of its duty: and the rest of the parts, as also the whole body, when it is moved from its state, wanteth its office and functi­on; so a troubled mind is not honestly affected to fulfill his duty. But the du­ty of the mind is to use reason, and a wise man is always so affected, that he useth reason most excellently; he is therefore never troubled.

Q. Give example of another generall Syllogisme.

A. GEN. 2.

Ca- A mortall thing is compound.

me- A soul is not compound.

stres. A soul therefore is not mortall.

Q. Produce the authority of some [Page 103] Ancient, avouching this Syllogisme.

A. Cicero judgeth the soul to be immortall by this syllogisme. Tusc. 1. For we cannot doubt, saith he, in our minds, unlesse we be perchance igno­rant in physicall things, but that there is nothing knit to soules, nothing con­nexed, nothing copulate, nothing joy­ned, nothing double; which when it is so, can surely never be parted, nor divided, nor severed, nor drawn a­sunder, therefore neither perish: for perishing is as it were a departure and separation or breach of those parts, which before the perishing were joy­ned together.

Q. Give an example of a speciall syllo­gisme.

A. SPEC. 1.

Fe- A pale man is not couragious.

sti- Maximus is couragious.

no. Maximus therefore is not pale.

Q. Produce authority for this syllo­gisme.

A. But this judgment Ovid. conclu­deth, De Pont. 3. El. 3.

Paleness and sloth are not in the high mind,
Rather with vipers them on ground we finde:
[Page 104]In highest things thy minde excels, we see,
No name I finde t' express the wit of thee.
Some miseries do taste, hurt and outworn,
Are made to feel sharpe pricking of the thorn:
Yet thou art wont to help complaining men,
Amongst which number, pray, let me be then.

Q. Shew another example of the speci­all syllogisme.

A. SPEC. 2.

Ba- A dancer is Lecherous.

ro- Murena is not Lecherous.

co. Murena therefore is no dancer.

Q. Produce some Orator for this syllo­gisme?

A. Cic. pro Mur. For no man almost, being sober, danceth, unlesse per­chance he be mad; neither alone, nor at a moderate and honest banquet; for dancing is the companion of un­timely banquets, pleasant places, and many delights: Thou snatchest that from me, that it is necessary that vices should be: thou leavest that whereby this removed, this vice ought not to be at all; no filthy banquet, no love, no gluttony is shewed: and when we [Page 105] finde not all these things which have the name of pleasure, and vices; there thou canst not finde lechery: nay, thin­kest thou to finde a shadow of lust in such?

Q. Avouch some other authority after the like manner?

A. After this manner of judgement Ovid de Trist. 1. concludeth triply, whil'st he sets forth the excuse of his verses.

They that make verses should not merry be,
Our time is clouded with adversity:
They that write verses should enjoy their ease,
The seas, the windes, with winter fierce me presse.
Good poets should not fear, but I feare death,
I dread lest swords do take away my breath:
Then what is here, a right judge will admire,
If reading them they satisfie's desire.

Q. Give example of proper syllogisms.

A. PRO. 1.

Agesilaus is not painted by Apelles.

Alexander is painted by Apelles.

Alexander therefore is not Agesilaus.

Q. Give another example of a proper Syllogism.

[Page 106] A. PRO. 2.

Cesar oppressed his countrey.

Tullius opressed not his countrey.

Tullius therefore is not Cesar.

CAP. 12. The second kinde of the simple explicate Sollogism.

Q What is the second kinde of the ex­plicate Syllogisme?

A. The second kinde of the expli­cate Syllogisme is, when the argument goeth before in the proposition, the af­firmative followeth in the assumption.

Q. Give an example of an affirmative generall after this kinde.

A. AFF. GUN.

Bar- Every just thing is profitable.

ba- Every honest thing is just.

ra. Every honest thing therefore is profitable.

Q. Produce some Orator avouching this Syllogisme.

A. Thus Cicero concludeth, Offic. 2. The Philosophers, truly, with great au­thority, severely, soundly, and honest­ly do distinguish these three confused kindes by cogitation. For whatsoever [Page 107] is just, that also they think to be profit­able: also, whatsoever is honest, that is just; from whence ariseth, That whatso­ever is honest, that is also profitable.

Q. Give an example of a Negative Generall Syllogisme?

A. NEG. GEN.

Ce- A fearfull man is not free.

la- A covetous man is fearfull.

rent. A covetous man therefore is not free.

Q. Prove this by some Poet.

A. It is thus concluded and judged by Horace: Epist. 1.

Who freer is, he that as servant dwelleth,
Or he that in his monies love excelleth:
I do not see, he that desires doth fear,
And he that fears, his freedom doth not bear.

Q. Give another example of this kind of Syllogisme.

A. Ter. in Eu. concludeth and judg­eth this; That which is void of coun­sell, cannot be governed by counsell: Love is void of counsell: It cannot therefore be governed by counsell.

Q. Produce the words of Terrence.

A. The former Syllogism followeth in these words: Master, that thing which [Page 108] hath in it neither counsell nor means, that thou canst not govern by counsell. In love are all these vices, injuries, suspitions, enmities, flatteries, warre, peace again: these uncertain things, if thou wouldest guide by certain reason, thou doest no more then if thou shoul­dest labour to be mad with reason.

Q. Give an example of the affirma­tive speciall Syllogisme.

A. AFF. SPE.

Da- Consuls made by vertue, ought studiously to defend the com­mon-wealth.

ri- Cicero is made Consul by vertue.

i- Cicero therefore ought studiously to defend the common-wealth.

Q. Produce Tullies words avouch­ing this Syllogisme.

A. The Orator doth both conclude and judge his own diligence. Agr. 2. For the great care and diligence as wel of all the Consuls, ought to be placed in defending the common-wealth, as of those, who not in the cradle, but in the camp were made Consuls: none of our ancients promised to the people of Rome for me, that I ought to be trusted: to ask of me that I ought, even when [Page 109] I did ask, none of our ancestors com­mended me to you; therefore if I neg­lect any thing, there is none who shal in­treat me for you. Yet while my life lasts (I being he who am able to defend it from their wickednesse) I promise to you, O Quirites, that you have com­mitted the common-wealth to the pro­vidence of a good trust: to a watchfull man, not a coward; to a diligent man, not a sluggard.

Q. Shew another Syllogisme of this kind.

A. That which comes wished for, is gratefull.

Lesbia comes wished for to Ca­tullus.

She is therefore gratefull.

Q. Set forth Catullus his words, wherein he thus concludeth.

A. That which we long for with de­sires great,

Is acceptable to us when we have't:
Wherefore this gratefull is, more dear then gold,
That Lesbia is come, our friend of old.
Thou dost our wishes grant, our hope re­store:
O light most clear! who is there that is more
[Page 110]Happy then I, who have what I desire;
Even what I wish, ther's nought I can require.

Q. Give an example of an Negative Speciall.

A. NEG. SPE.

Fe- The deceiver of a loving maid is not to be praised.

ri- Demophoon is the deceiver of a lo­ving maid, to wit Phillis.

o [...] Demophoon therefore is not to be praised.

Q. Set forth the words of Phillis in Ovid, so judging.

A. It is no glory virgins to deceive,

Who love a man, and wish him for to have;
Simplicity should rather favour gain.
But I that love, and als [...] a woman a [...],
Deceived am by thee with flattering stile;
The gods thy praises make it all the while.

Q. Give an example of an Affirma­tive Proper.

A. AFF. PRO.

Octavius is Cesars heir.

I am Octavius.

I am therefore Cesars heir.

Q. Give an example of a Negative Proper.

[Page 111] A. NEG. PRO.

Anthony is not Cesars son.

Thou art Anthony.

Thou art not therefore Cesars son.

CAP. 13. The first connexed Syllogisme.

Q. You have expounded hitherto the simple Syllogism: What now is the com­pound Syllogisme?

A. The compound Syllogisme is a Syllogisme where the whole question is another part of the affirmed and compound proposition, the argument is another part.

Q. But what if any thing were taken away in the compound Syllogisme?

A. That were to put a speciall con­tradiction.

Q. What are the kindes of a compound Syllogisme?

A. A compound Syllogisme is con­nexed or disjunct.

Q. What is a connexed syllogisme?

A. A connexed syllogisme, is a com­pound syllogisme of a connexed propo­sition.

[Page 112]Q. How many are the manners o [...] di­stinction?

A. It is of two manners.

Q. What is the first?

A. The first manner of the connex­ed syllogisme is that which assumeth the antecedent, and the consequent concludeth.

Q Give an example of th [...]s.

A. After this manner Cicero con­cludeth. lib. 2. De Divinatione.

If they be gods, it is divination.

But they are gods.

It is divination therefore.

Q. Give another example.

A. Offic. 3. And if also nature pre­scribeth this, that a man to a man, whatsoever he be, for that same cause that he is a man, will use consul­tation, it is necessary according to the same nature, that the pro­fit of all should be common. Which if it be so, all of us are contained in one and the same law of nature; and this, if it be so indeed, we are certainly forbidden by the law of nature to vio­late one another: but the first is true: the last therefore is also true.

Q. Give another example.

[Page 113] A. AEncid. 4. Dido adjureth AEneas to remain with her.

Dost thou me fly? by these tears I thee pray,
By thy right hand thee I beseech to stay:
Else thou wilt leave me wretched here a­lone.
By our dear marriage, our dear love, like none.
If I do ought deserve, if thou hast been
Sweet unto me, have pity on me then.
Look on my slippery house, and now I pray,
If any place for prayers be, I say,
For Lybians sake, for Nomades his kings,
Who hated me, and for all other things
Which I for thee did bear. My credit's lost,
I am alone, for thee thus am I crost:
Besides all this, my fame is quite decay'd,
Rather I had my flesh in dust were laid.

Q. Doth it alwayes assume the same?

A. Oftentimes not the same, but a greater.

Q. Give example.

A. Cat. 1. If thy parents feared and hated thee, neither couldest thou please them by any reason, in my opinion, thou wert to abstain a little from their sight: now the countrey (which is our common parent) hateth and feareth thee, and of a long time judgeth no­thing of thee, except it be touching thy [Page 114] death. Canst thou neither avoyd its au­thority, neither follow its judgment, neither fearest thou its force?

Q. What may further be under this head?

A. This manner of concluding is the very same when the proposition is a re­late of time.

Q. Give example.

A. After this kinde the nymph Oe­non in Ovid, concludeth the error of her foolishness.

When Paris Oenon hoped to forsake,
It would to Xanthus with all speed be­take:
Xanthus, make haste, return thou back again,
That so this Paris Oenon may sustain.

CAP. 14. The second connexed Syllogisme.

Q. What is the second manner of the connexed syllogisme?

A. The second manner of the con­nexed syllogisme taketh away the con­sequent, that it may take away the an­tecedent.

[Page 115]Q. Give example.

A. If a wise man assent to any thing, sometimes also he shall be opinated.

But he shall never be opinated.

Therefore he shall assent to no­thing.

Q. Give another example.

A. By the like syllogisme Ovid. Trist. 12. judgeth his foolishness.

If I were wise, those sisters I should hate,
Deities hurtfull to whom on them wait [...]
But now so great my foolishness is seen,
I build them altars who my hurt have been.

These two kindes of the syllogisme are most usuall of all.

CAP. 15. The first disjunct Syllogisme.

What is the disjunct syllogisme?

A. The disjunct syllogisme is the syllogisme composed of a disjunct pro­position.

Q. What are the manners of distinction?

A. Two.

Q. What is the first?

[Page 116] A. The first taketh away one, and concludeth the rest,

Give example.

A. Either it is day, or it is night.

But it is not day.

It is therefore night.

Q. Give another example.

A. The judgment of Cicero in de­fence of Cluventius is such: But when as this condition was proposed to him, [...]at either he should accuse justly and piously, or die sharpely or unworthily: he would rather accuse after that man­ner, then die after this.

Q. Make the disjunction appear clea­rer.

A. Either he must accuse or die:

He must not die.

He must accuse therefore.

Q. Give another example like to this.

A. There is the like reasoning, Phil. 2. Dost thou not understand it is deter­mined, that either those who have done this thing are homicides, or revengers of liberty? But attend a little, and take the thoughts of a sober man for a little time; and I who am of them, as my self doth confesse, will familiarly argue with thee as a fellow: I deny that there is [Page 117] any mean: I grant, that they are, except they be deliverers and conservers of the Roman Common-wealth, more then villans, more then homicides, more then parricides: if truely it be cruelty, rather to be a father to the country, then a murtherer of ones self: Thou art a wise and considerate man, what sayest thou? if they be parricides, why were they honoured of thee, and called to this order by the Roman People? why was Marcus Brutus by thy means freed from the law, if he were absent more then ten days from the city? why did Apolinares receive Marcus Brutus with incredible honour? why was the pro­vinces given to Cassius and Brutus? why were there Questors added? why were the numbers of Legates increa­sed, and this done by thee? they are not therefore homicides. It followeth then, that by thine own judgement, they are deliverers, when as truly there can be no third admitted.

Q. If the parts of the disjunct pro­position shall be more then two, how shall they be judged then?

A. The art of judging them, and concluding them shall be the same.

[Page 118] Q. Give example.

A. So Cicero judgeth Rabitius to be among the Consuls: And we see (saith he) these three to be in the na­ture of things, to wit, that either he should be with Saturninus, or with the good, or that he should lie hid. But to lie hid is proper to the dead and rotten: to be with Saturnius, of fury and wick­ednesse: Vertue, and honesty, and shamefastnesse constrained him to be with the Consuls.

CAP. 16. The second disjunct Syllogisme.

Q. What is the second disjunct?

A. The second disjunct, from the proposition the affirmative assumeth one, and taketh away the rest.

Q. Give example.

A. It is day, or it is night:

But it is day:

It is not therefore night.

Q. Give another example after this manner.

A. Thus Iuno concludeth with Iove touching Turnus, AEncid. 10.

What if thou sayest the thing thou dost not mean,
[Page 119]And should to Turnus give his life again?
Now I remain in misery and woe,
And hope for that which will not happen so:
But rather then this ill should come to pass,
I'le mock my self, and hope past hope, alas.

Q. Shew another Syllogisme of this kind.

A. There is the like Syllogism effected from a proposition copulative negative, which is called n [...]gative complexion, and which obtaineth the force of an affirmative disjunction.

Q. Give example.

A. It is not both day and night:

But it is day:

It is not therefore night.

CAP. 17. The only Method according to Aristotle.

Q. What is Method?

A. Method is a dianoia of divers homogene axioma, preposed for the clearnesse of their nature, from whence the agreeing amongst themselves of them are judged and comprehended in memory.

[Page 122]Q. VVhat is to be considered in Me­thod?

A. As verity and falsity is beheld in the Axioma, consequence and inconse­quence in the Syllogisme; so in Method it is to be considered, that by it the more clear may precede, the more ob­scure may follow; and that altogether order and confusion be judged.

Q. Make this plainer.

A. After this manner is disposed from homogene axiomas in the first place by an absolute notion, the first; in the second place the second, in the the third place the third, and so for­ward.

Q. It seemeth by this, that Method doth continually pass from universals to [...]ingu­lars?

A. So it is: for by this sole and only way it proceedeth from antecedents al­together, & absolute notions, to the de­claring of unknown consequences. And this is the only Method that Aristotle taught.

CAP. 18. The first illustration of Methods by illustra­tion of Arts.

Q. But do not Examples set forth this head more clearly?

A. Yes, the examples of doctrines and artes do chiefly demonstrate and set forth the unity of Method; in the which, although all the rules are gene­rall and universall, yet the degrees of them are distinguished: and by how much every thing shall be more generall, by so much it shall more pre­cede.

Q. Why shall the first be in the most ge­nerall place and order?

A. because in light and knowledge it is first.

Q. Why shall the subalternates fol­low?

A. Because in their clearness they are next.

Q. It seemeth by this, that those things which by nature are more known shall pre­cede, those which are less known are [Page 124] substitute, and at length the most speciall follow.

A. So it is.

Q. What then shall precede and be first?

A. The most general definition shall be first.

Q. VVhat shall follow?

A. The distribution.

Q. But how if there be many?

A. Then the partition in perfect parts shal precede.

Q. VVhat shall follow?

A. The division into kindes.

Q. VVhat then?

A. The parts themselves and the kindes, are in the same order to be handled and defined again, in which they were distributed.

Q VVhat further is required?

A. If there shall be a long explicati­on of them, they are to be chained toge­ther by the chains of transition.

Q. What benefit redoundeth from hence?

A. It refresheth and recreateth the Auditor.

Q. But may not Example be under this head?

[Page 125] A. Yes; as a more familiar thing is taken, so a more familiar example must be used.

Q. Give example of what you have here shewed out of the art of Grammer?

A. All definitions, distributions, are found in the rules of grammer, and every one of them severally judged; and all these documents, inscribed in diverse tables, are confounded and mingled together as it were in a certain pot.

Q. What part of Dialectica teacheth us to compose these confused rules, and digest them into orders? first there is no need of the places of Invention, when as they are all found: neither of the first judgment of Axiomas, when as every a­xioma is proved and valued: neither of the second judgment of the Syllogisme, when as all of them are disputed and con­cluded controversies of severall things by these onely syllogismes: it seemeth therefore to be onely Method, is it not?

A. Yes, it is onely Method.

Q. How is it done?

A. The Logician by this light of ar­tificiall Method selecteth out of this [Page 126] pot the definition of Grammer (for that is most generall) and placeth it in the first place: Grammer is the do­ctrine of speaking well. Then he ta­keth out of the same Oven the partiti­on of Grammer, and placeth it in the second place: the parts of Grammer are two: Etymology and Syntaxis. Then out of the same vessel he separateth the definition of Etymology of words, and joyneth it in the third place to those that go before: then he seeketh out the parts of words in letters and syllables, and the kinds in words of number, and without number, and placeth them with their transitions in their severall places. And so the defi­nitions of all the parts of Etymology, together with their distributions, colli­gations, and most speciall examples he placeth in their severall places, and so likewise in the Syntax. This way all the Arts have proposed to themselves.

CAP. 19. The second example of Method by example of Poets, Ora­tors, Historiographers.

Q. But is Method only set forth in matter of the arts and doctrines?

A. No, it is also declared in all things which we would teach easily and plainly: therefore Poets, Orators, and all manner of writers, as often as they propose any thing to teach to their au­ditors, do follow this way, although they do not enter and insist upon it all alike.

Q. Give an example out of some Poet.

A. Virgil in his Georgicks dist [...]bu­teth, as I said before, the proposed mat­ter into four parts; and in the first book followeth common things, as Astro­logy, Meteorology, and of corn and tillage; this was the first part of his work: then the transition is adhibi­ted in the beginning of the second book.

Thus [...] far of tillage and of stars were we;
Now of thee, Bacchus, we'l sing presently.

Then he writeth generally of trees, [Page 128] as also specially of plants; the second transition is adhibited to the third part, but more imperfect and without an Epilogue. In the beginning of the third book of Oxen, Horses, Sheep, Goats, Dogs.

Wee'l sing of goddesse Pales, als' of him,
Who by Amphryso kept his sheep most trim.

At length in the beginning of the fourth book, there is the third transi­tion of the fourth part, but also im­perfect from the only preposition of their Bees.

Now of the eyre hony Bee I'le speak.

So therfore the Poet studieth to place the most generall first, the subalternate middle, the most special in the last place.

Q. Give another poeticall example.

A. Ovid in Fast. useth this kind of disposition, proposing in the begin­ning the sum of his work.

I'le sing of times that passe throughout the year,
Fall of the stars, and rising I'le declare.

By and by, having made imploration, he determineth the partition of the year, made first by Romulus, into ten months, which he reprehendeth.

[Page 129]
When as Rooms builder did the year divide,
In it he made five months, and five beside.

And a little further he adjoyneth Numa his more full Divisor.

But Numa neither Janus did omit,
Nor yet the ancient shadows out did put;
But to th' old months two more appointed he.

Here the Poet having interpreted the common differences of holy-dayes, working-dayes, banquet-dayes, ka­lends, nones, ides, at the last he fol­loweth every month in his place, and with a preface after this order, he passeth from generals to the study of specials.

Ith' whole I have you shew'd what these things be,
It now remains we part them presently.

At length after the exposition of e­very part, the transition is joyned, as in the end of the first, and beginning of the second book.

The first part of my task is ended now,
The month is done, my little book also:
Janus is done, another month beginneth,
Another book now with that month renew­eth.

And in every one of his books after­ward [Page 130] the transitions are adhibited, but lesse accurately.

Q. How do the Orators follow this Method?

A. The Orators in poems, narrati­ons, confirmations, perorations do fol­low this order, as the nature both of the art, and the order of the thing do re­quire, & somtimes more studiously too.

Q. Give example.

A. Cicero in an accusation first by propounding, then by parting, follow­eth this order. Questor Cu. Paxeris, saith he, thou hast been Consul unto this time fourteen years, and from that day unto this day, in which thou hast made me, I call thee into judgement; there was no void hour found in rob­bery, wickednesse, cruelty, iniquity. This is the proposition and definition of the chief matter, as in this judg­ment most generall. The partition followeth; these are the years consu­med in the Questorship, and a Sciatica [...] Embassage, and the Urban Pretorship, and in the Sicilian Pretorship: where­fore this shall be the fourfold dispositi­on on of my accusation, which four parts with their particular partitions he hath [Page 131] also handled in their severall order and place, and coupled them with transiti­ons; the three first in the third book. Wherefore (saith he) his Questorship being shewed, and his first magistracy, together with his theft and wickednesse looked unto, let us attend to the rest. Then having expounded the faults of his embassadorship, the transition to his Pretorship followeth. But let us now come to that famous Pretorship, & those faults which were more known to those which were present, then to us who come meditated and prepared to plea­ding. This transition is more imperfect without an epilogue; at length in the beginning of the fourth oration there is the like transition to the fourth part of the Sicilian Pretorship. Many ne­cessary things, O Judges, I must preter­mit, that I may in some manner speak of those things which are committed to my trust: for I have received the cause of Sicilia; that Province hath drawn me unto this businesse.

Q. Give an example out of the same Historiographer.

A. Livy doth so imbrace the sum of 70. years in the beginning, then divi­deth them by tens.

CAP. 20. The secrets of Method.

Q. It seemeth that in the diverse a­xiomaticall homogenes, as also in the judgment of the syllogisme, the notes of Method shall be as often as any thing is taught clearly: but is there no other kinde of Method?

A. Yes, when as the auditor shall be deceived in a certain part with dele­ctation and a greater motion [...] then certain homogenes are rejected, as the lights of definition, partition and transition: and certain heterogenes are assumed, as digressions from the matter, and commotations upon the thing; but chiefly the order of things in the beginning is turned over, and cer­tain antecedents are put after conse­quents. Therefore to that rule of perfect Method this may seem som­what more imperfect; the form is not only lame, things being detracted; or abounding, things being added; but also the order of i [...] being inverted by certain degrees, is preposterours.

[Page 133]Q. Give an example of it.

A. The like the Poet maketh with a certain greater kinde of artificialness, while he [...] propoundeth to himself to lead the people, viz. the beast-like heads of the multitude, and therefore he deceiveth divers wayes; he begin­neth in the middle, & there oftentimes he comprehendeth the first; to conclude the last, he placeth an uncertain and an unthought of chance. So (as Ho­race saith) Homer disposeth his Ili­ads.

Ne doth this man Troyes wars divide so well,
He alwayes maketh haste th'event to tell:
Even in the midst his reader he doth catch,
Leaves off his tract, with haste from it doth snatch;
And thus he lies, thus mingles false with true,
So that ne first nor midst in it I view.

Q. Proceede to furt [...]er example.

A. So Virgil taketh AEneas from Sicilia, and makes a narration of him in the banquet of Carthage; and at last bringeth in his diverse troubles. So the Commedian Poets, although with great judgment they have distin­guished [Page 134] their Comedies by acts and scenes, yet do so effect, that all things seem to be done by chance. The O­rators attribute all to victory. Ther­fore this seemeth to be placed chiefly by them, not so much to teach, as to per­swade; when as also those things which do equally excell, are kept even unto the last, and the means are con­ferred into the middle, ac­cording to Homers disposition.

FINIS.
A BRIEF OF THE ART O …

A BRIEF OF THE ART OF RHETORICK.

Containing in substance All that ARISTOTLE hath written in his Three Books of that Subject, Except onely what is not ap­plicable to the English TONGUE.

A BRIEF Of the ART of RHETORICK. The first Book.

CHAP. 1. That Rhetorick is an Art consisting not only in moving the passions of the Iudge; but chiefly in Proofes. And that this Art is profitable.

WE see that all men natu­rally are able in some sort to accuse and excuse: some by chance; but some by method. This method may [Page 138] be discovered: and to discover Method is al one with teaching an Art. If this Art consisted in Criminations only, and the skill to stirre up the Jud­ges to Anger, Envy, Feare, Pity, or other affections; a Rhetorician in well ordered Common wealths and States, where it is forbidden to digress from the cause in hearing, could have nothing at all to say. For all these per­versions of the Judge are beside the question. And that which the plea­der is to shew, and the Judge to give sentence on, is this only: 'Tis so: or not so. The rest hath been decided already by the Law-maker; who jud­ging of universals, and future things, could not be corrupted. Besides, 'tis an absurd thing, for a man to make croo­ked the ruler he means to use.

It consisteth therfore chiefly in Proofes; which are Inferences: and all Inferences being Sllyogismes, a Lo­gician, if he would observe the diffe­rence between a plain Syllogisme and an Enthymeme, (which is a Rhetoricall Syllogisme,) would make the best Rhetorician. For all Syllogismes and Inferences belong properly to Logick; [Page 139] Whether they inferre truth or probabi­lity: and because without this Art it would often come to pass, that evill men by the advantage of naturall abil­lities, would carry an evil cause against a good; it brings with it at least this profit, that making the pleaders even in skill, it leaves the oddes only in the merit of the cause. Besides, ordinari­ly those that are Judges, are neither patient, nor capable of long Scienti­ficall proofes, drawne from the princi­ples through many Syllogismes; and therefore had need to be instructed by the Rhetoricall, and shorter way. Lastly, it were ridiculous, to be asha­med of being vanquished in exercises of the body, and not to be ashamed of being inferiour in the vertue of wel expressing the mind.

CHAP. 2. The Definition of Rhetorick.

RHetorick, is that Faculty, by which wee understand what wil serve our turne, concerning any subject to win beliefe in the hearer.

[Page 140]Of those things that beget beleefe; some require not the help of Art; as Witnesses, Evidences, and the like, which we invent not, but make use of; and some require Art, and are in­vented by us.

The beleefe that proceedes from our invention, comes partly from the behaviour of the speaker; partly from the passions of the hearer: but especi­ally from the proofes of what we al­ledge.

Proofes are, in Rhetorick, either Examples, or Enthymemes; as in Lo­gick, Inductions, or Syllogismes. For an Example is a short Induction, and an Enthymeme a short Syllogisme; out of which are le [...]t as superfluous, that which is supposed to be necessarily un­derstood by the hearer; to avoid pro­lixity, and not to consume the time of publick business needlesly.

CHAP. 3. Of the severall kinds of Orations: and of the Principles of Rhetorick.

IN all Orations, the Hearer does ei­ther hear only; or judge also.

[Page 141]If he heare onely, that's one kind of Oration, and is called Demonstra­tive.

If he judg, he must judg either of that which is to come; or of that which is past.

If of that which is to come, ther's another kind of Oration, and is called Deliberative.

If of that which is past; then 'tis a third kind of Oration, called Iudiciall.

So there are three kinds of Orations; Demonstrative, Iudiciall Delibera­tive.

To which belong their proper times. To the Demonstrative, the Present; To the Iudiciall, the Past; and to the Deliberative, the time to come.

And their proper Offices. To the Deliberative, Exhortation and Dehor­tation. To the Iudiciall, Accusation and Defence. And to the Demonstra­tive, Praysing and Dispraysing.

And their proper ends. To the De­liberative, to Prove a thing Profita­ble, or Unprofitable. To the Iudici­all, Iust, or Unjust. To the De­monstrative, Honourable, or Dishonou­rable.

[Page 142]The Principles of Rhetorick out of which Enthymemes are to be drawn; are the common opinions that men have concerning Profitable and Unprofita­ble; Iust and Vnjust, Honourable and Dishonourable; which are the points in the severall kinds of Orations questionable. For as in Logick, where certain and infallible knowledg is the scope of our proofe, the Princi­ples must be all infallible truths: so in Rhetorick the Principles must be com­mon opinions, such as the Judg is already possessed with: because the end of Rhe­torick is victory; which consists in having gotten beleefe.

And because nothing is Profitable, Unprofitable, Iust, Unjust, Honourable or Dioshonourable, but what has been done, or is to be done; and nothing is to be done, that is not possible: and be­cause there be degrees of Profitable, Unprofitable, Iust, Unjust, Honoura­ble, and Dishonourable; an Orator must be ready in other Principles; namely, of what is done and not done; possible and not possible, to come and not to come, and what is Greater, and what is Lesser, both in general, and particularly [Page 143] applyed to the thing in question; as what is more and less, generally; and what is more profitable, and less profita­ble, &c. particularly.

CHAP. 4. Of the subject of Deliberatives; and the abilities that are required of him that will deliberate of businesse of State.

IN Deliberatives there are to be consi­dered the subject, wherin; and the ends whereto the Oratour exhorteth, or from which he dehorteth.

The Subject is alwayes somthing in our own power, the knowledg whereof belongs not to Rhetorick, but for the most part to the Politicks; and may be referred in a maner to these five heads.

  • 1. Of levying of mony. To which point he that will speak as he ought to do, ought to know before hand the re­venue of the State, now much it is, and wherin it consisteth: and also how great are the necessary charges and expences of the same. This knowledge is gotten partly by a mans owne expe­rience, partly by Relations, and ac­counts in writing.
  • 2. Of Peace and Warre. Concer­ning [Page 144] which the Counsellor or Delibe­rator, ought to know the strength of the Commonwealth; how much it both now is, and hereafter may be; and wherein that power consisteth. Which knowledge is gotten, partly by experience, and Relations at home; and partly by the sight of Wars, and of their events abroad.
  • 3. Of the safeguard of the Country. Wherein he onely is able to give coun­sell, that knows the forms, and num­ber, and places of the Garrisons.
  • 4. Of Provision. Wherein to speak well, it is necessary for a man to know what is sufficient to maintain the State; what Commodities they have at home growing; what they must setch in through need; and what they may car­ry out through abundance.
  • 5. Of making Laws. To which is necessary so much Politicall, or Civill Philosophy, as to know what are the se­verall kinds of Governments; and by what means, either from without or from within, each of those kinds is preserved, or destroyed. And this knowledge is gotten, partly by obser­ving the several Governments in times [Page 145] past, by History; and partly by obser­ving the Government of the times pre­sent in severall Nations, by Travell.

So that to him that will speak in a Councell of State, there is necessary this; History, Sight of Wars, Travel, Knowledge of the Revenue, Expences, Forces, Havens, Garrisons, Wares, and Provisions in the State he lives in; and what is needfull for that State, either to export, or import.

CHAP. 5. Of the ends which the Orator in Deli­beratives, propoundeth, whereby to exhort, or dehort.

AN Orator in exhorting always pro­poundeth Felicity, or some part of Felicity to be attained by the actions he exhorteth unto: and in Dehortation the contrary.

By Felicity, is meant commonly, Prosperity with vertue, or a continuall content of the life with surety. And the parts of it are such things as we call good, in body, mind, or fortune; such as these that follow.

  • [Page 146]1. Nobility, which to a State or Na­tion is, to have been antient inhabitants; and to have had most antiently, and in most [...]umber, famous Generals in the Wars, or men famous for such things as fall under emulation. And to a private man, to have been descended lawfully of a family, which hath yeilded most anti­ently, and in most number, men known to the world for vertue, riches, or any thing in generall estimation.
  • 2. Many and good Children. Which is also publick and private. Publick, when there is much youth in the State en­dued with vertue, (namely, of the body, stature, beauty, strength, and dexterity: Of the mind, valour, and temperance) Private, when a man hath many such Children, both Male and Female. The vertues commonly respected in women, are of the body, Beauty, and Stature; Of the mind, Temperance, and Hous­wifery, without sordidnesse.
  • 3. Riches. Which is, Money, Cattel, Lands, Houshold-stuffe; with the power to dispose of them.
  • 4. Glory. Which is the reputation of Vertue, or of the possession of such things as all, or most men, or wise men desire.
  • [Page 147]5. Honour. Which is the glory of be­nefitting, or being able to benefit others. To benefit others, is to contribute some­what, not easily had, to another mans safety, or riches. The parts of Honour are, Sacrifices, Monuments, Rewards, Dedication of places, Precedence, Sepul­chres, Statues, publick Pensions, Ado­rations, Presents.
  • 6. Health. Which is the being free from Diseases, with strength to use the body.
  • 7. Beauty. Which is to different A­ges different. To Youth, strength of body, and sweetnesse of aspect. To full men, strength of body fit for the Wars, and Countenance sweet, with a mixture of Terrour. To old men, strength e­nough for necessary labours, with a Countenance not displeasing.
  • 8. Strength. Which is the ability to move any thing at pleasure of the Mo­ver. To move, is to pull, to put off, to lift, to thrust down, to presse together.
  • 9. Stature. Which is then just, when a man in heighth, breadth, and thicknesse of body doth so exceed the most, as neverthelesse it be no hinderance to the quicknesse of his motion.
  • [Page 148]10. Good old Age. Which is, that which comes late, and with the least trouble.
  • 11. Many and good Friends. Which is, to have many that will do for his sake that which they thinke will be for his good.
  • 12. Prosperity. Which is, to have all, or the most, or the greatest of those goods which we attribute to Fortune.
  • 13. Vertue. Which is then to be de­fined, when we speak of Praise.

These are the grounds from whence we exhort.

Dehortation is from the contraries of these.

CHAP. 6. Of the Colours or common opini­ons concerning Good and Evill.

IN Deliberatives, the Principles, or Elements from whence we draw our Proofes, are common Opinions concer­ning Good and Evill. And these Principles are either Absolute, or Comparative. And those that are Ab­solute, are either Disputable, or Indi­sputable.

[Page 149]The Indisputable Principles are such as these;

Good, is that which we love for it self.

And that, for which we love some what else.

And that which all [...]hings desire.

And that to every man which his reason dictates.

And that, which when we have, we are well, or satisfied.

And that which satisfies.

And the Cause or Effect of any of these.

And that which preserves any of these.

And that which keepes off, or de­stroyes the contrary of any of these.

Also to take the Good, and reject the Evill, is Good.

And to take the greater Good, rather then the lesse; and the lesser Evill, ra­ther then the greater.

Further, all Vertues are Good.

And Pleasure.

And all things Beautifull.

And Justice, Valour, Temperance, Magnanimity, Magnificence; and o­ther like habits.

[Page 150]And Health, Beauty, Strength, &c.

And Riches.

And Friends.

And Honour, and Glory.

And Ability to say or do: also To­wardliness, Will, and the like.

And Whatsoever Art, or Science.

And Life.

And Whatsoever is Just.

The Disputable Principles are such as follow.

  • That is, Good, whose contrary is E­vill.
  • And whose contrary is good for our Enemies.
  • And whose contrary our Enemies are glad of.
  • And of which there cannot be too much.
  • And upon which much labour and cost hath been bestowed.
  • And that which many desire.
  • And that which is praised.
  • And that which even our Enemies and evill men praise.
  • And What good me prefer.
  • And What we do advise.
  • And that which is Possible, is Good (to undertake.)
  • [Page 151]And that which is Easie.
  • And that which depends on our own Will.
  • And that which is proper for us to do.
  • And what no man else can do.
  • And whatsoever is Extraordinary.
  • And what is sutable.
  • And that which wants a little of being at an end.
  • And what we hope to master.
  • And what we are fit for.
  • And what evill men do not.
  • And what we love to do.

CHAP. 7. Of the Colours, or common Opi­nions concerning Good and Evill comparatively.

THE Colours of Good comparatively depend partly upon the following Definitions of Comparatives.

  • 1. More, is so much, and somewhat besides.
  • 2. Less, is that, which and somwhat else is so much.
  • 3. Greater and more in number are [Page 152] said only Comparatively to Less, and Fewer in number.
  • 4. Great and Little, Many and Few, are taken Comparatively to the Most of the same kind. So that Great and Many, is that which exceeds; Little and Few, is that which is exceeded by the Most of the same kind.

Partly from the precedent Definiti­ons of Good absolutely.

Common Opinions concerning Good Comparatively then are these.

Greater Good is Many, then Fewer, or one of those many.

And Greater is the kind, in which the greatest is greater then the greatest of another kind. And greater is that Good then another good, whose kind is greater then another's kind.

And Greater is that from which a­nother Good followes; then the Good which followes.

And of two which exceed a third, Greater is that which exceeds it most.

And that which causes the greater Good.

And that which proceeds from a greater Good.

And Greater is that which is cho­sen [Page 153] for it selfe, then that which is cho­sen from somewhat else.

And the end greater then that which is not the end.

And that which less needs other things, then that which more.

And that which is independent, then that which is dependent of ano­ther.

And the Beginning, then not the Be­ginning.

[Seeing the Beginning is a grea­ter Good, or Evill, then that which is not the Beginning; and the End, then that which is not the End; One may argue from this Colour both wayes: as Leo­damas against Chabri [...]s, would have the Actor more to blame then the Advisor; and against Calli [...]tratus, the Advisor more then the Actor.]

And the Cause, then not the Cause.

And that which hath a greater Begin­ning or Cause.

And the Beginning, or Cause of a greater Good, or Evill.

And that which is scarce, greater then that which is Plentifull; because harder to get.

[Page 154]And that which is Plentifull, then that which is Scarce; because oftner in Use.

And that which is Easy, then that which is Hard.

And that whose Contrary is grea­ter.

And that whose Want is greater.

And Vertue then not Vertue, a grea­ter Good. Vice, then not Vice, a grea­ter Evill.

And greater Good, or Evill is that, the effects whereof are more Honora­ble or more Shamefull.

And the effects of greater Vertues, or Vices.

And the Excesse whereof is more to­lerable, a greater Good.

And those things which may with more honour be desir'd.

And the desire of better things.

And those things wherof the Know­ledge is better.

And the Knowledge of better things.

And that which wise men preferre.

And that which is in better men.

And that which better men chuse.

And that which is more, then that [Page 155] which is lesse delightfull.

And that which is more, then that which is less Honourable.

And that which we would have for our selves and Friends, a greater Good; and the contrary a greater Evill.

And that which is Lasting, then that which is not Lasting.

And that which is Firme, then that which is not Firme.

And what many desire, then what few.

And what the Adversary, or Judge confesseth to be greater, is greater.

And Common then Common.

And not Common then not Common.

And what is more Laudable.

And that which is more Honour'd, a greater Good.

And that which is more Punish'd, a greater Evill.

And both Good and Evill divided then undivided, appeare greater.

And Compounded then Simple, ap­peare greater.

And that which is done with Op­portunity, Age, Place, Time, Means disadvantageous, greater then other­wise.

[Page 156]And that which is naturall, then that which is attained unto.

And the same part of that which is great, then of that which is lesse.

And that which is nearest to the end designed.

And that which is Good or Evill to ones self, then that which is simply so.

And Possible, then not possible.

And that which comes toward the end of our Life.

And that which we do really, then that which we do for shew.

And that which we would be, rather then what we would seem to be.

And that which is good for more purposes, is the greater Good.

And that which serves us in great necessity.

And that which is joyned wi [...]h less trouble.

And that which is joyned with more delight.

And of the two, that which added to a third makes the whole the greater.

And that which having, we are more sensible of.

And in every thing, that which we most esteem.

CHAP. 8. Of the severall kinds of Governments.

BEcause Hortation and Dehortation concern the Common-wealth, and are drawn from the Elements of Good and Evill; as we have spoken of them already in the Abstract, so we must speak of them also in the Concrete; that is, of what is Good or Evill to each sort of Common-wealth in speciall.

The Government of a Common-wealth, is either Democracy, or Aristo­cracy, or Oligarchy, or Monarchy.

Democracy is that, wherein all men with equall right, are preferred to the highest Magistracy by Lot.

Aristocracy is that wherein the high­est Magistrate is chosen out of those, that had the best education, according to what the Lawes prescribe for best.

Oligarchy is that, where the highest Magistrate is chosen for wealth.

Monarchy is that, wherein one man hath the Government of all; which Government, if he limit it by Law, is called Kingdom; if by his own will, Tyranny.

[Page 158]The end of Democracy, or the Peo­ples Government, is Liberty.

The end of Oligarchy, is the riches of those that govern.

The end of Aristocracy, is good Laws, and good ordering of the City.

The end of Monarchy, or Kings, is the safety of the People, and conserva­tion of his own authority.

Good therefore, in each sort of Go­vernment is that which conduceth to these their ends.

And because beliefe is not gotten only by proofes, but also from manners; the manners of each sort of Commonwealth ought to be well understood by him that undertaketh to perswade, or dis­swade in matter of State. Their manners may be known by their designs; & their designs by their ends; and their ends by what we see them take pleasure in. But of this more accurately in the Politicks.

CAP. 9. Of the Colours of Honourable and Dishonourable.

IN a Demonstrative Oration, the sub­ject whereof is Praise, or Dispraise; [Page 159] the proofs are to be drawn from the E­lements of Honourable, and Dishonou­rable.

In this place we anticipate the se­cond way of getting beliefe; which is from the manners of the Speaker. For Praise, whether it come in as the prin­pall businesse, or upon the by, de­pends still upon the same Principles. Which are these.

Honourable, is that, which we love for it selfe, and is withall laudable.

And that Good, which pleaseth us only because 'tis Good.

And Vertue.

Vertue is the faculty of getting and preserving that which is Good; and the faculty of doing many, and great things well.

The kinds of it are these;

  • 1. Iustice; which is a Vertue wher­by every man obtains what by law is his.
  • 2. Fortitude; which is a Vertue by which a man carries himself honourably, and according to the Lawes, in time of danger.
  • 3. Temperance; which is a Vertue whereby a man governs himself in mat­ter [Page 160] of pleasure according to the Law.
  • 4. Liberality; which is a Vertue, by which we benefit others in matter of money.
  • 5. Magnanimity; which is a Vertue, by which a man is apt to do great be­nefits.
  • 6. Magnificence; which is a Vertue, by which a man is apt to be at great cost.
  • 7. Prudence; which is an Intellectu­all Vertue, by which a man is able to deliberate well concerning any Good leading to Felicity.

And Honourable, are the Causes, and Effects of things Honourable.

And the Works of Vertue.

And the signes of Vertue.

And those actions, the reward wher­of is Honor.

And the reward wherof is rather Ho­nor, then Money.

And that which we do not for our own sakes.

And what we do for our Contries good, neglecting our own.

And those things are Honorable, which good of themselves, are not so to the Owner.

[Page 161]And those things which happen to the dead, rather then to the living.

And what we do for other men, e­specially for Benefactors.

And bestowing of Benefits.

And the contrary of those things we are ashamed of.

And those things which men strive for earnestly, but without fear of Ad­versary.

And of the more Honorable, and better men, the Vertues are more Ho­norable.

And more Honorable are the vertues that tend to other mens benefit, then those which tend to ones own.

And Honorable are those things which are Just.

And Revenge is Honorable.

And Victory.

And Honor.

And Monuments.

And those things which happen not to the living.

And things that excell.

And what none can do but we.

And Possessions we reape no profit by.

And those things which are had in [Page 162] honor particularly in severall places.

And the signes of praise.

And to have nothing of the servile, mercenary, or Mechanick.

And that which seemes Honorable; Namely such as follow;

  • Vices confining upon Vertue.
  • And the extreams of Vertues.
  • And what the Auditors think Ho­norable.
  • And that which is in estimation.
  • And that which is done according to custome.

Besides, in a Demonstrative Oration, the Orator must shew, that he whom he prayseth, did what he prayseth un­constrainedly, and willingly.

And he does so, who does the same often.

Prayse, is speech, declaring the magnitude of a Vertue, Action, or Work.

But to praise the Work from the Vertue of the Worker, is a circular Proofe.

To Magnifie, and to Praise, differ in themselves, as Felicity and Vertue. For Praise declares a mans Vertue; and Magnifying declares his Felicity.

[Page 163] Praise is a kind of inverted Precept. For to say, Do it because 'tis good, is a Precept. But to say, He is good because he did it, is Praise.

An Orator in Praising must also use the formes of Amplification; such as these:

  • He was the first that did it.
  • The onely man that did it.
  • The speciall man that did it.
  • He did it with disadvantage of Time.
  • He did it with little help.

He was the cause, that the Law or­dained Rewards and Honors for such Actions.

Further, he that will praise a Man, must compare him with others; and his actions with the actions of others; especially with such as are renowned.

And Amplification is more proper to a Demonstrative Oration then to any other. For here the Actions are con­fess'd; and the Orators part is only this, to contribute unto them Magnitude and Luster.

CHAP. 10. Of Accusation and Defence, with the Definition of Injury.

IN a Iudiciall Oration, which consists in Accusation and Defence, the thing to be proved is, that Injury has been done: and the heads from whence the proofes are to be drawne, are these three:

  • 1. The causes that move to Injury.
  • 2. The Persons apt to do Injury.
  • 3. The Persons obnoxious, or apt to suffer Injury.

An Injury is a voluntary offending of another man contrary to the Law.

Voluntary is that which a man does with knowledge, and without com­pulsion.

The causes of Voluntary Actions are Intemperance, and a Vicious disposi­tion concerning things Desirable. A [...] the Covetous man does against [...]he Law, out of an intemperate desire of Money.

All Actions proceed either from [Page 165] the doers disposition, or not.

Those that proceed not from the Doers disposition are such as he does by Chance, by Compulsion, or by Natu­rall necessity.

Those that proceed from the Doers disposition, are such as he does by Cu­stome, or upon Premeditation, or in An­ger, or out of Intemperance.

By Chance are said to be done those things, whereof neither the Cause, nor the Scope is evident; and which are done neither orderly, nor alwaies, nor most commonly after the same manner.

By Nature are said to be done those things, the Causes whereof are in the Doer; and are done orderly, and al­waies, or for the most part after the same manner.

By Compulsion are done those things, which are against the Appetite, and Ordination of the Doer.

By Custome those Actions are said to be done, the Cause whereof is this, that the Doer has done them often.

Vpon Premeditation are said to be done those things which are done for profit, as the End, or the way to the End.

[Page 166] In Anger are said to be done those things which are done with a purpose of Revenge.

Out of Intemperance are said to be done those things which are delightful.

In sum, every Voluntary Action tends either to Profit or Pleasure.

The Colours of Profitable are alrea­dy set down.

The Colours of that which is Plea­sing follow next.

CHAP. 11. Of the Colours, or Common O­pinions concerning Pleasure.

PLeasure is a suddain and sensible motion of the Soule, towards that which is Naturall.

Grief is the Contrary.

Pleasant therfore is that, which is the cause of such motion.

And to return to ones own Nature.

And Customes.

And those things that are not vio­lent.

Unpleasant are those things, which proceed from Necessity, as Cares, [Page 167] Study, Contentions. The contra­ry whereof, Ease, Remission from Labour and Care: also Play, Rest, Sleep, are Pleasant.

Pleasant also is that, to which we have an appetite.

Also the appetites themselves, if they be sensuall; as Thrist, Hunger, and Lust.

Also those things to which we have an appetite upon perswasion and Rea­son.

And those things we remember, whether they pleased, or displeased, then when they were present.

And the things we hope for.

And Anger.

And to be in Love.

And Revenge.

And Victory. Therefore

Also contentious Games; as Ta­bles, Chess, Dice, Tennis, &c.

And Hunting.

And Suites in Law.

And Honor and Reputation a­mongst men in Honor and Reputa­tion.

And to Love.

And to be Belov'd and Respected.

[Page 168]And to be admir'd.

And to be Flatter'd.

And a Flatterer: (for be seems both to love and admire.)

And the same thing Often.

And Change, or Variety.

And What we return to afresh.

And to Learn.

And to admire.

And to do Good.

And to receive Good.

And to help up again one that's fal­len.

And to finish that which is unper­fect.

And Imitation.

And therefore the Art of Painting.

And the Art of Carving Images.

And the Art of Poetry.

And Pictures and Statues.

And other mens Dangers, so they be neer.

And to have escaped hardly.

And things of a kind please one ano­ther.

And every one himself.

And ones own pleases him.

And to bear Sway.

And to be thought Wise.

[Page 169]And to dwell upon that which he is good at.

And ridiculous actions, Sayings and Persons.

CHAP. 12. Presumptions of Injury drawn from the persons that do it: or Common O­pinious concerning the aptitude of Persons to do Injury.

OF the Causes which move to Injury, namely, Profit and Pleasure, has been already spoken, Chap. 6. 7. 11.

It follows next to speak of the Per­sons, that are apt to do Injury.

The Doers of Injury are.

  • Such as think they can do it.
  • And such as think to be undiscover'd when they have done it.
  • And such as think, though they be discover'd, they shall not be called in question for it.
  • And such as think, though they be called in question for it, that their Mulct will be lesse then their Gain, which either themselves or their friends receive by the Injury.

[Page 170] Able to do Injury are.

  • Such as are Eloquent.
  • And such as are practis'd in busi­nesse.
  • And such as have skill in Processe.
  • And such as have many Friends.
  • And Rich Men.
  • And such as have Rich Friends; or Rich Servants; or Rich Partners.

Undiscover'd when they have done it, are

  • Such are not apt to commit the crimes whereof they are accused: as Feeble Men, Slaughter: Poor, and not Beau­tifull Men, Adultery.
  • And such as one would think could not chuse but be discovered.
  • And such as do Injuries, whereof there hath been no Example.
  • And such as have none, or many e­nemies.
  • And such as can easily conceale what they do.
  • And such as have some body to trans­ferre the fault upon.

They that do Injury openly, are

  • Such, whose friends have been injured.
  • And such as have the Judges fo [...] friends.
  • [Page 171]And such as can escape their triall at Law.
  • And such as can put off their triall.
  • And such as can corrupt the Judges.
  • And such as can avoid the paiment of their fine.
  • And such as can deferre the paiment.
  • And such as cannot pay at all.
  • And such as by the Injury get mani­festly, much, and presently; when the fine is uncertain, little, and to come.
  • And such as get by the Injury, mo­ney; by the penalty, shame only.
  • And such on the contrary, as get honour by the Injury, and suffer the mulct of money only, or banishment, or the like.
  • And such as have often escaped, or been undiscovered.
  • And such as have often attempted in vain.
  • And such as consider present plea­sure, more then pain to come; and so intemperate men are apt to do Injury.
  • And such as consider pleasure to come, more then present pain; and so temperate men are apt to do Injury.
  • And such as may seem to have done it by Fortune, Nature, Necessity, or [Page 172] Custome; and by Errour rather then by Injustice.
  • And such as have means to get par­don.
  • And such as want Necessaries, as poor men: or Unnecessaries, as rich men [...]
  • And such as are of very good, or ve­ry bad Reputation.

CHAP. 13. Presumptions of Injury drawne from the Persons that suffer, and from the matter of the Injury.

OF those that doe Injury, and why they do it, it hath been already spoken.

Now of the persons that suffer, and of the Matter wherein they suffer, the common Opinions are these:

Persons obnoxious to Injury are,

  • Such as have the things that we want either as necessary, or as delightfull.
  • And such as are far from us.
  • And such as are at hand.
  • And such as are unwary, and Cre [...]dulous.
  • [Page 173]And such as are Lazy.
  • And such as are Modest.
  • And such as have swallowed many Injuries.
  • And such as we have injured often before.
  • And such as never before.
  • And such as are in our danger.
  • And such as are ill belov'd generally.
  • And such as are envied.
  • And our Friends.
  • And our Enemies.
  • And such as, wanting friends, have no great ability either in speech or acti­on.
  • And such as shall be loosers by go­ing to Law; as Strangers, and Work­men.
  • And such as have done the Injuries they suffer.
  • And such as have committed a crime, or would have done, or are about to do.
  • And such as, by doing them an In­jury, we shall gratifie our friends or su­periours.
  • And such, whose friendship we have newly left, and accuse.
  • And such as another would do [Page 174] the Injury to, if we should not.
  • And such as by injuring, we get greater means of doing good.

The Matters wherein men are ob­noxious to Injury are,

  • Those things wherein all, or most men use to deal unjustly.
  • And those things which are easily hid, and put off into other hands, or altered.
  • And those things which a man is a­shamed to have suffered.
  • And those things wherein prose­cution of Injury, may be thought a love of contention.

CAP. 14. Of those things which are necessary t [...] be known for the Definition of Just and Unjust.

WHen the fact is evident, the next inquiry is, whether it be just, or unjust.

For the Definition of Iust and Un­just, we must know what Law is; tha [...] is, what the Law of Nature, what the Law of Nations; what the Law Civil, [Page 175] what written Law, and what unwrit­ten Law is: and what Persons; that is, what a publick Person, or the City is; and what a private Person, or Citi­zen is.

Vnjust in the opinion of all men, is that which is contrary to the Law of Nature.

Vnjust in the opinion of all men of those Nations which traffick and come together, is that which is contra­ry to the Law common to those Nati­ons.

Vnjust onely in one Common-wealth, is that which is contrary to the Law Civill, or Law of that Common-wealth.

He that is accused to have done any thing against the Publick, or a private Person, is accused to do it either igno­rantly, or unwillingly, or in anger, or upon premeditation.

And because the defendant does many times confesse the fact, but deny the unjustice; as that he took, but did not steal; and did, but not adultery; it is necessary to know the Definitions of Theft, Adultery, and all other crimes.

VVhat facts are contrary to the [Page 176] written Lawes, may be known by the Lawes themselves.

Besides written Lawes, whatsoever is Iust, proceeds from Equity, or Good­ness.

From Goodness proceeds that which we are praysed, or honored for.

From Equity proceed those actions, which though the written Law com­mand not, yet being interpreted rea­sonably, and supplyed, seems to require at our hands.

Actions of Equity are such as these.

Not too rigorously to punish Errors, Mischances, or Injuries.

To pardon the faults that adhere to Mankind.

And not to consider the Law so much, as the Law-makers mind; and not the Words so much, as the mean [...] of the Law.

And not to regard so much the Fact, as the intention of the Doer; nor part of the Fact, but the Whole; nor what the Doer is, but what he has been alwaies, or for the most part.

And to remember better the Good received, then the Ill.

And to endure injuries patiently.

[Page 177]And to submit rather to the sentence of a Judge, then of the sword.

And to the sentence of an Arbitra­tor, rather then of a Judge.

CHAP. 15. Of the Colours or Common Opini­ons concerning Injuries, compara­tively.

Common Opinions concerning Inju­ries comparatively, are such as these:

Greater is the Injury which proceed from greater Iniquity.

And from which proceedeth greaters dammage.

And of which there is no revenge.

And for which there is no remedy.

And by occasion of which, he that hath received the Injury, hath done some mischief to himself.

He does the greater Injury, that does it first, or alone, or with few.

And he that does it often.

Greater Injury is that, against which Lawes and Penalties were first made.

And that which is more brutall, or [Page 178] more approaching to the actions of beasts.

And that which is done upon more premeditation.

And by which more Lawes are bro­ken.

And which is done in the place of execution.

And which is of greatest shame to him that receives the Injury.

And which is committed against well deservers.

And which is committed against the unwritten Law; because good men should observe the Law for Justice, and not for fear of punishment.

And which is committed against the written Law; because he that will do Injury neglecting the penalty set down in the written Law, is much more likely to transgress the unwritten Law, where there is no penalty at all.

CHAP. 16. Of Proofes Inartificiall.

OF Artificiall Proofes we have al­ready spoken.

[Page 179] Inartificiall Proofes, which we in­vent not, but make use of, are of five sorts.

  • 1. Lawes. And those are Civill, or written Law: the Law or Custome of Nations: and the universall Law of Nature.
  • 2. Witnesse. And those are such as concern Matter; and such as concern Manners. Also, they be ancient, or present.
  • 3. Evidences, or Writings.
  • 4. Question, or Torture.
  • 5. Oathes. And those be either gi­ven, or taken, or both, or neither.

For Lawes, we use them thus.

When the written Law makes a­gainst us, we appeal to the Law of Na­ture, alledging,

  • That to be greatest Justice, which is greatest Equity.
  • That the Law of Nature is immuta­ble; the written Law mutable.
  • That the written Law is but seeming Justice; the Law of Nature very Ju­stice. And Justice is among those things which are, and not which seem to be.
  • That the Judge ought to di­scern [Page 180] between true and adulterate Ju­stice.
  • That they are better men that obey unwritten, then written Laws.
  • That the Law against us does contra­dict some other Law. And when the Law has a double interpretation, that is the true one, which makes for us.
  • And that the cause of the Law being abolished, the Law is no more of Va­lidity.

But when the written Law makes for us, and Equit [...] for the Adversary, we must alledg,

  • That a Man may use Equity, not as a liberty to judg against the Law; but only as a security against being forsworn, when he knowes not the Law.
  • That men seek not Equity because 'tis good simply, but because good for them.
  • That it is the same thing not to make, and not to use the Law.
  • That as in other Arts, and namely in Physick, Fallacies are pernicious; so in a Common-wealth 'tis pernitious to use pretexts against the Law.
  • And that in Common-wealths well [Page 181] instituted, to seem wiser then the Lawes, is prohibited.

For Witnesses, we must use them thus:

  • VVhen we have them not, we must stand for Presumptions, and say,
    • That in Equity sentence ought to be given according to the most probabili­ty.
    • That Presumptions are the testi­mony of the things themselves, and cannot be bribed.
    • That they cannot lie.
  • VVhen we have witnesses, against him that has them not, we must say,
    • That Presumptions, if they be false, connot be punished.
    • That if Presumptions were enough, witnesses were superfluous.

For writings, when they favour us; we must say,

  • That writings are private and par­ticular Laws; and he that takes away the use of Evidences, abolisheth the Law.
  • That since Contracts and Negoti­ations passe by writings, he that bars their use, dissolves humane Society.
  • Against them, if they favour the Ad­versary, we may say,
  • [Page 182]That since Laws do not bind, that are fraudulently made to passe, much lesse writings.
  • And that the Judge being to dis­pense Justice, ought rather to consi­der what is just, then what is in the Writing.
  • That Writings may be gotten by fraud or force; but Justice by neither.
  • That the Writing is repugnant to some Law, Civill, or Naturall; or to Iustice; or to Honesty.
  • That 'tis repugnant to some other writing before, or after.
  • That it crosses some commodity of the Judge (which must not be said di­rectly, but implied cunningly.)

For the Torture, if the giving of it make for us, we must say,

  • That 'tis the only testimony that is certain.
  • But if it make for the Adversary, we may say.
  • That men inforced by Torture, speak as well that which is false, as that which is true.
  • That they who can endure, conceal the truth; and they who cannot, say that which is false to be delivered from pain.

[Page 183]For Oaths; he that will not put his Adversary to his Oath, may alleadge,

  • That he makes no scruple to be for­sworn.
  • That by swearing, he will carry the cause; which not swearing, he must lose.
  • That he had rather trust his cause in the hand of the Judge, then of the Adversary.

He that refuseth to take the Oath, may say,

  • That the matter is not worth so much.
  • That if he had been an evill man, he had sworn, and carried his cause.
  • That to trie it by swearing for a re­ligious man against an irreligious, is as hard a match, as to set a weak man against a strong in Combate.

He that is willing to take the Oath, may pretend.

  • That he had rather trust himselfe, than his Adversary; and that 'tis e­quall dealing for an irreligious man to give, and for a religious man to take the Oath.
  • That 'tis his duty to take the Oath, since he has required to have sworn Iudges.

[Page 184]He that Offers the Oath may pre­ten [...],

  • That he does piously commit his cause to the Gods.
  • That he makes his Adversary him­self Judge.
  • That 'twere absurd for him not to swear, that has required the Judges to be sworn.
  • And of these are to be compounded the Formes we are to use, when we would give, and not take the Oath; or take, and not give; or both give and take; or neither give nor take.

But if one have sworn contrary to a former Oath, he may pre­tend;

  • That he was forced.
  • That he was deceived, and that ne­ther of these is Perjury, since Perjury is voluntary.

But if the Adversary do so, he may say;

  • That he that stands not to what he hath sworn, subverteth humane soci­ety.
  • And (turning to the Judge) What reason have we to require, that you should be sworn, that judg o [...]r cause; [Page 185] when we will not stand to that we swear our selves.
  • And so much for Proofes inartifi­ciall.

The second Book.

CHAP. 1. The Introduction.

OF Beleefe proceeding from our Invention, that part which consisteth in proofe, is already spoken of.

The other two parts follow; wher­of one ariseth from the manners of the speaker; the other from the passions of the Hearer.

The Principles, Colours, or Common Opinions upon which a mans beleefe is grounded concerning the manners of him that speaks, are to be had partly [Page 186] out of that which hath been said before concerning Vertue, Book. 1. Chap. 9. partly out of those things which shall be said by and by, concerning the Pas­sions. For a man is beleev'd either for his Prudence, or for his Probity, which are Vertues; or for good will: of which among the Passions.

The Principles concerning beleefe, arising from the passion of the Hearer, are to be gather'd from that which shal now be said of the severall Passions in order.

In every one of which three things are to be considered.

  • 1. First, how men are affected.
  • 2. Secondly, Towards whom.
  • 3. Thirdly, For what.

CHAP. 2. Of Anger.

ANger is desire of revenge, joyned with grief for that He, or some of his, is, or seems to be neglected.

The object of Anger is alwayes some particular, or indiduall thing.

In Anger there is also pleasure pro­ceeding [Page 187] from the imagination of re­venge to come.

To Neglect, is to esteem little or nothing: and of three kinds.

  • 1. Contempt.
  • 2. Crossing.
  • 3. Contumely.

Contempt, is when a man thinks ano­ther of little worth in comparison to himself.

Crossing is the hinderance of ano­ther mans will without design to pro­fit himself.

Contumely, is the disgracing of ano­ther for his own pastime.

The common Opinions concerning Anger are therefore such as fol­low.

  • They are easily Angry that think they are neglected.
  • That thinke they excell others; as the Rich with the Poore; the Noble with the Obscure, &c.
  • And such as thinke they deserve wel.
  • And such as grieve to be hindered, opposed, or not assisted. And ther­fore sick men, poor men, Lovers, and generally all that desire, and at­tain not, are Angry with those that [Page 188] standing by, are not moved with their wants.
  • And such as having expected good, find evill.

Those that men are Ang [...] with, are,

  • Such as mock, deride, or jest at them.
  • And such as shew any kinde of Con­tumely towards them.
  • And such as despise those things which we spend most labour and stu­dy upon: and the more, by how much we seem the lesse advanced therein.
  • And our friends, rather then those that are not our friends.
  • And such as have honored us, if they continue not.
  • And such as requite not our cour­tesie.
  • And such as follow contrary courses, if they be our inferiours.
  • And our friends, if they have said, or done us evill, or not good.
  • And such as give not eare to our in­treaty.
  • And such as are joyfull, or calm in our distress.
  • [Page 189]And such as troubling us, are not themselves troubled.
  • And such as willingly hear or see our disgraces.
  • And such as neglect us in the pre­sence of our Competito [...]s; of those we admire, of those we would have admire us; of those we reverence, and of those that reverence us.
  • And such as should help us, and neg­lect it
  • And such as are in jest, when we are in earnest.
  • And such as forget us, or our Names.

An Orator therefore must so frame his Iudg or Auditor by his Oration; as to make him apt to Anger: and then make his Adversary appear such as men use to be angry withall

CHAP. 3. Of Reconciling, or Pacifying Anger.

REconciliation is the Appeasing of Anger.

Those, to whom men are easily re­conciled, are,

  • [Page 190]Such as have not offended out of Neglect.
  • And such as have done it against their will.
  • And such as wish done the contrary of what they have done.
  • And such as have done as much to themselves.
  • And such as confesse and repent.
  • And such as are humbled.
  • And such as do seriously the same things, that they do seriously.
  • And such as have done them more good heretofore, then now hurt.
  • And such as sue to them for any thing.
  • And such as are not insolent, nor mockers, nor slighters of others in their own disposition.
  • And generally such as are of a con­trary disposition to those, whom men are usually angry withall.
  • And such as they fear or reve­rence.
  • And such as reverence them.
  • And such as have offended their Anger

Reconcilable are,

  • Such as are contrarily affected to [Page 191] those whom we have said before to be easily angry.
  • And such as play, laugh, make mer­ry, prosper, live in plenty; and in sum, all that have no cause of grief.
  • And such as have given their anger tme.

Men lay down their Anger for these causes.

  • Because they have gotten the Vi­ctory.
  • Because the Offender has suffered more then they meant to inflict.
  • Because they have been revenged of another.
  • Because they think they suffer justly.
  • And because they think the revenge will not be felt, or not known that the revenge was theirs, and for such an in­jury.
  • And because the Offender is dead.

Whosoever therefore would as­swage the anger of his Auditor, must make himself appear such, as men use to be reconciled unto: and beget in his Auditor such opinions, as make him re­concileable.

CHAP. 4. Of Love and Friends.

TO Love, is to will well to another, and that for others, not for our own sake.

A Friend is he that loves, and he that is beloved.

Friends one to another, are they that mutually love one another.

A Friend therefore is he,

  • That rejoyceth at anothers Good.
  • And that grieves at his hurt.
  • And that wishes the same with us t [...] a third, whether good, or hurt.
  • And that is enemy or friend to the same man.

VVe love them,

  • That have done good to us, or ours especially if much, readily, or in seaso [...]
  • That are our Friends Friends.
  • That are our Enemies Enemies.
  • That are Liberall.
  • That are Valiant.
  • That are Just.
  • And that we would have love us.
  • And good Companions.
  • [Page 193]And such as can abide Jests.
  • And such as break Jests.
  • And such as praise us, especially for somewhat that we doubt of in our selves.
  • And such as are neat.
  • And such as upbraid us not with our vices, or with their own benefits.
  • And such as quickly forget injuries.
  • And such as least observe our Er­rours.
  • And such as are not of ill tongue.
  • And those that are ignorant of our Vices.
  • And such as crosse us not when we are busie, or angry.
  • And such as are officious towards us.
  • And those that are like us.
  • And such as follow the same course or trade of life, where they impeach not one another.
  • And such as labour for the same thing, when both may be satisfied.
  • And such as are not ashamed to tell us freely their faults, so it be not in contempt of us, and the faults such, as the world, rather then their own consciences condemnes.
  • And such as are ashamed to tell us of their very faults.
  • [Page 194]And such as we would have honour us; and not envie, but imitate us.
  • And such as we would do good to, except with greater hurt to our selves.
  • And such as continue their friend­ship to the dead.
  • And such as speak their mind.
  • And such as are not terrible.
  • And such as we may rely on.

The severall kinds of friendship, are Society, Familiarity, Consanguinity, Affinity, &c.

The things that beget love, are,

  • The bestowing of Benefits. Gratis.
  • The bestowing of Benefits. Unasked.
  • The bestowing of Benefits. Privately.

CHAP. 5. Of Enmity and Hatred.

THE Colours, or Common Opinion concerning Hatred are to be take [...] from the contrary of those, which con­cern Love and Friendship.

Hatred differs from Anger in this,

  • That Anger regards only what i [...] [Page 195] what is done to ones selfe; but Ha­tred not.
  • And in this, that Anger regards particulars only; the other universals also.
  • And in this, that Anger is curable, Hatred not.
  • And in this, that Anger seeks the vexation, Hatred the damage of ones Adversary.
  • That with Anger there is always joyned Griefe; with Hatred not al­ways.
  • That Anger may at length be satia­ted, but Hatred never.

Hence it appears how the Judge, or Auditor may be made Friend, or Ene­my to us; and how our Adversary may be made appear Friend or Enemy to the Judge; and how we may answer to our Adversary, that would make us appear Enemies to him.

CAP. 6. Of Fear.

FEar is a trouble, or vexation of the mind, arising from the apprehensi­on [Page 196] of an evill at hand, which may hurt or destroy.

Danger is the nearnesse of the evill feared.

The things to be Feared, are,

  • Such as have pow [...]r to hurt.
  • And the signes of will to do us hurt, as Anger and Hatred of powerfull men.
  • And Injustice joyned with power.
  • And Valour provoked, joyned with power.
  • And the fear of powerfull men.

The men that are to be feared, are,

  • Such as know our faults.
  • And such as can do us injury.
  • And such as think they are injured by us.
  • And such as have done us injury.
  • And our Competitors in such things as cannot satisfie both.
  • And such as are feared by more powerfull men then we are.
  • And such as have destroyed greater men then we are.
  • And such as use to invade their in­feriours.
  • And men not passionate, but dis­semblers, and crafty, are more to be [Page 197] feared [...]hen those that are hasty and free.

The things especially to be feared are,

  • Such, wherein if we erre, the er­rour cannot be repaired; at least, not according to ours, but our Adversaries pleasure.
  • And such as admit either none, or not easie help.
  • And such as being done, or about to be done to others, make us pity them.

They that fear not, are

  • Such as expect not evill; or not now; or not this; or not from these.
  • And therefore men fear little in prosperity.
  • And men fear little that think they have suffered already.

An Orator therefore that would put Fear into the Auditor, must let him see that he is obnoxious; and that greater then he do suffer, and have [...]uffer'd from those, and at those times they least thought.

CHAP. 7. Of Assurance.

ASsurance is hope, arising from an imagination that the help is near, or the evill afar off.

The things therefore that beget Assurance are,

  • The remoteness of those things that are to be feared, and the nearness of their contraries.
  • And the facility of great, or many helps or remedies.
  • And neither to have done; nor re­ceived Injury.
  • And to have no Competitors, or not great ones, or if great ones, at least friends; such as we have obliged, or are obliged to.
  • And that the danger is extended to more, or greater than us.
  • Assured, or Confident, are, They that have oft escaped danger.
  • And they to whom most things have succeeded well.
  • And they that see their Equals, or inferiours not afraid.
  • And they that have wherewith to make themselves feared, as wealth, st [...]ength, &c.
  • [Page 199]And such as have done others no wrong.
  • And such as think themselves in good terms with God-Almighty.
  • And such as think they will speed well, that are gone before.

CHAP. 8. Of Shame.

SHame is a perturbation of the Mind arising from the apprehension of Evill, past, present, or to come, to the prejudice of a Mans own, or his friends reputation.

The things therefore which men are ashamed of are those Actions which pro­ceed from Vice, as,

  • To throw away ones armes; to run away, signes of Cowardliness.
  • To deny that which is committed to ones trust, a sign of Injustice.
  • To have lyen with whom, where, and when we ought not, signes of In­temperance.
  • To make gain of small and base things; not to help with money whom and how much we ought; to receive help from meaner men; to ask mony at [Page 200] use from such as one thinks will borrow of him; to borrow of him that expect payment of somwhat before lent; and to redemand what one has lent, of him that one thinks will borrow more; and so to praise, as one may be thought to ask; signes of Wretchedness.
  • To praise one to his face; to praise his vertues too much, and colour his vi­ces; Signes of Flattery.
  • To be unable to indure such la­bours as men indure that are elder, tenderer, greater in quality, and of less strength then he, signes of Effeminacy.
  • To be beholding often to another; and to upbraid those that are beholding to him, [...]ignes of Pusillanimity.
  • To speak and promise much of ones self more then his due, signes of Arro­gance.
  • To want those things which ones Equals, all, or most of them have attained to, is also a thing to be asha­med of.
  • And to suffer things ignominious, as to serve about anothers person; or to be imployed in his base actions.
  • In Actions of Intemperance, whe­ther willingly, or unwillingly com­mitted; [Page 201] there is shame in Actions of Force, only when they are done un­willingly.

The men before whom we are asha­med, are such as we respect; namely,

  • Those that admire us.
  • And those whom we desire should admire us.
  • And those whom we admire.
  • Those that contend with us for ho­nour.
  • Those whose opinion we contemne not.

And therefore men are most ashamed in the presence

  • Of old and well bred men.
  • Of those we are alwayes to live with.
  • Of those that are not guilty of the same fault.
  • Of those that do not easily pardon.
  • And of those that are apt to reveal our faults; such as are men injured, Backbi­ters, Scoffers, Comick Poets.
  • And of those before whom we have had alwayes good success.
  • And of those who never asked any thing of us before.
  • And of such as desire our Friendship.
  • [Page 202]And of our familiars, that know none of our Crimes.
  • And of such as will reveal our faults to any of those that are named be­fore.

But in the presence of such whose judgment most men despise, men are not ashamed.

There [...]ore we are ashamed also in the presence

  • Of those whom we reverence.
  • And of those who are concerned in our own, or Ancestors, or Kinsfolkes actions or misfo [...]tunes, if they be shamefull.
  • And of their Rivals.
  • And of those that are to live with them that know their disgrace.

The Common Opinions concerning Impudence are taken from the contrary of these.

CHAP. 9. Of Grace, or Favour.

GRace is that Vertue, by which a man is said to do a good turn, or do service to a man in need; not for his [Page 203] own, but for his cause to whom he do [...] it.

Great Grace is when the need is great; or when they are hard, or dif­ficult things that are conferr'd, or when the time is seasonable, or when he that conferr's the favour is the only, or first man that did it.

Need, is a desire joyned with grief for the absence of the thing desired.

Grace therefore it is not, if it be not done to one that needs.

Whosoever therfore would prove that he has done a Grace, or Favour, must shew that he needed it to whom it was done.

Grace it is not,

  • Which is done by Chance.
  • Nor which is done by Necessity.
  • Nor which has been requited.
  • Nor that which is done to ones E­nemy.
  • Nor that which is a trifle.
  • Nor that which is naught, if the Giver know the fault.

And in this manner a man may go over the Praedicaments, and ex­amine a benefit, whether it be a Grace for being This, or for being [Page 204] so Much, or for being Such, or for being Now, &c.

CHAP. 10. Of Pity, or Compassion.

PIty is a perturbation of the mind, arising from the apprehension of hurt or trouble to another that doth not deserve it, and which he thinks may happen to himselfe, or his.

And because it appertains to Pity, to think that he, or his may fall into the misery he pities in others, it fol­lows that they be most compassionate,

  • Who have passed through Misery.
  • And old men.
  • And weak men.
  • And timorous men.
  • And learned men.
  • And such as have Parents, Wife, and Children.
  • And such as think there be honest men.

And that they are lesse Compas­sionate,

  • Who are in great despair.
  • Who are in great prosperity.
  • [Page 205]And they that are Angry; for they consider not.
  • And they that are very Confident; for they also consider not.
  • And they that are in the Act of contumely; for neither do these con­sider.
  • And they that are astonished with fear.
  • And they that think no man honest.

The things to be pitied are,

  • Such as grieve, and withall hurt.
  • Such as destroy.
  • And Calamities of fortune, if they be great: as none or few friends, de­deformity, weaknesse, lamenesse, &c.
  • And evill that arrives where good is expected.
  • And after extream Evill, a little Good.
  • And through a mans life to have no good offer it self; or being offer'd, not to have been able to enjoy it.

Men to be pitied are,

  • Such as are known to us, unlesse they be so near to us, as their hurt be our own.
  • And such as be of our own years.
  • Such as are like us in manners.
  • [Page 206]Such as are of the same, or like stock.
  • And our Equals in dignity.
  • Those that have lately suffer'd, or are shortly to suffer injury: and those that have the markes of injury past.
  • And those that have the words or a­ctions of them that be in presēt misery.

CHAP. 11. Of Indignation.

OPposite in a manner to Pity in good men, is Indignation, which is grief for the prosperity of a man unworthy.

With Indignation there is alwayes joyned a joy for the prosperity of a man worthy, as Pity is always with con­tentment in the adversity of them that deserve it.

In wicked men the opposite of pity is,

Envy; as also the companion there­of, delight in the harm of others, which the Greeks in one word have called [...]. But of these in the next Chapter.

Men conceive Indignation against o­thers, not for their vertues, as Justice, &c. For these make Men worthy; and in Indignation we think men unworthy.

[Page 207]But for those goods which men in­dued with vertue, and noble men, and handsome men are worthy of.

And for newly gotten power and riches, rather than for ancient, and e­specially if by these he has gotton o­ther goods, as by Riches, Command. The reason why we conceive greater Indignation against new then ancient Riches, is, that the former seem to possess that which is none of theirs. but the antient seem to have but their own. For with common pleople, to have been so long, is to be so by Right.

And for the bestowing of goods in­congruously: as when the arms of the most valiant Achilles were bestowed on the most eloquent Vlysses.

And for the comparison of the In­feriour in the same thing, as when one Valiant is compared with a more Va­liant; or whether absolutely Superi­our, as when a good Scholer is com­pared with a good Man.

Apt to Indignation are,

  • They that think themselves worthy of the greatest goods, and do possess them.
  • And they that are good.
  • And they that are ambitious.
  • [Page 208]And such as think themselves de­serve better what another possesseth, then he that hath it.

Least apt to Indignation are,

  • Such as are of a poor, servile, and not ambitious Nature.
  • Who they are, that Rejoyce, or Grieve not at the Adversity of him that suffers worthily, and in what oc­casions, may be gathered from the con­trary of what has been already said.
  • Whosoever therefore would turn a­way the compassion of the Judge, he must make him apt to Indignation; and shew that his Adversary is unworthy of the Good, and worthy of the Evill which happens to him.

CHAP. 12. Of Envy.

ENvy is griefe, for the prosperity of such as our selves, arising not from any hurt that we, but from the good that they receive.

Such as our selves, I call those that are equall to us in bloud, in age, in a­bilities, in glory, or in means.

[Page 209]They are apt to Envy,

  • That are within a little of the highest.
  • And those that are extraordinarily honoured for some quality that is sin­gular in them, especially Wisdom or good Fortune.
  • And such as would be thought wise.
  • And such as catch at glory in every action.
  • And men of poor spirits: for every thing appears great to them.

The things which men envy in o­thers are,

  • Such as bring glory.
  • And goods of Fortune.
  • And such things as we desire for our selves.
  • And things in the possession whereof we exceed others, or they us a little.

Obnoxious to envy are,

Men of our own time, of our own Countrey, of our own age, and Com­petitors of our glory.

And therefore,

  • Those whom we strive with for ho­nour.
  • And those that covet the same things that we do.
  • And those that get quickly, what [Page 210] we hardly obtaine, or not at all.
  • And those that attain unto, or do the things that turn to our reproach, not being done by us.
  • And those that possesse what we have possessed heretofore. So old and decay­ed men envy the young and lu [...]ty.
  • And those that have bestowed little, are subject to be envied by such as have bestowed much upon the same thing.

From the contraries of these may be derived the Principles concerning Joy for other mens hurt.

He therefore that would not have his Enemy prevail, when he craves pity, or other favour; must dispose the Judge to Envy; and make his Adversary ap­pear such, as are above described, to be subject to the Envy of others.

CHAP. 13. Of Emulation.

EMulation is griefe arising from that our Equals possesse such goods as are had in honour, and wher­of we are capable, but have them not; not because they have them, but be­cause not we also.

[Page 211]No man therefore Emulates ano­ther in things whereof himselfe is not capable.

Apt to Emulate are,

  • Such as esteem themselves worthy of more then they have.
  • And Young and Magnanimous Men.
  • And such as already possesse the goods for which men are honoured: for they measure their worth by their having.
  • And those that are esteemed wor­thy by others.
  • And those whose Ancestours, Kin­dred, Familiars, Nation, City, have been eminent for some good, do Emu­late others for that good.

Objects of Emulation are, for things;

  • Vertues.
  • And things whereby we may profit others.
  • And things whereby we may please others.

For Persons,

  • They that possesse such things.
  • And such as many desire to be friends or acquainted with, or like unto.
  • [Page 212]And they whose praises flie abroad,
  • The contrary of Emulation is Con­tempt.
  • And they that Emulate such as have the goods aforementioned, Contemne such as have them not: and thence it is, that men who live happily enough, unlesse they have the goods which men honour, are neverthelesse Contemned.

CHAP. 14. Of the Manners of Youth.

OF Passions we have already spoken.

We are next to speak of Manners.

Manners are distinguished by Pas­sions, Habits, Ages, and Fortunes.

What kind of Manners proceed from Passions, and from Vertues and Vices (which are Habits,) hath been already shewed.

There remains to be spoken of the Manners, that are peculiar to severall Ages and Fortunes.

The Ages are Youth, Middle-Age, Old-Age.

And first of Youth.

Young men are,

  • [Page 213]Violent in their desires [...]
  • Prompt to execute their desires.
  • Incontinent.
  • Inconstant, easily forsaking what they desired before.
  • Longing mightily, and soon satis­fied.
  • Apt to anger, and in their anger Vi­olent: and ready to execute their anger with their hands.
  • Lovers of Honor, and of Victory more then Money, as having not been yet in Want.
  • Well natured, as having not been ac­quainted with much malice.
  • Full of hope, both because they have not yet beē often frustrated, & because they have by naturall heat that disposi­tion that other Ages have by VVine; Youth being a kind of naturall drunk­ness. Besides, Hope is of the time to come, whereof Youth hath much, but of the time past little.
  • Credulous, because not yet often deceived.
  • Easily deceived, because full of Hope.
  • Valiant, because apt to Anger and full of Hope; whereof this begets con­fidence, the other keeps off Fear.
  • [Page 214]Bashfull, because they estimate the Honour of Actions by the precepts of the Law.
  • Magnanimous, because not yet de­jected by the misfortunes of humane life.
  • And lovers of Honour more than of Profit, because they live more by Cu­stom than by Reason; & by Reason we acquire Profit, but Vertue by Custom.
  • Lovers of their Friends and Com­panions.

Apt to err in the excess, rather then the defect, contrary to that precept of Chilon, Ne quid nimis; for they over­do every thing: they Love too much, and Hate too much, because thinking themselves wise, they are obstinate in the opinion they have once delivered.

Doers of Injury rather for Con­tumely then for dammage.

Mercifull, because measuring others by their own Innocence, they think them better than they be, and there­fore less to merit what they suffer; which is a cause of Pity.

And Lovers of Mirth, and by conse­quence such as love to jest at others.

Iesting is witty Contumely.

CHAP. 15. Of the Manners of Old Men.

THe Manners of Old men are in a manner the contraries of those of Youth.

They determine nothing: they do every thing less vehemently then is fit: they never say they know; but to eve­ry thing they say, perhaps and perad­venture; which comes to pass from that having lived long, they have often mistaken and been deceived.

They are peevish because they inter­pret every thing to the worst.

And suspicious through Incredulity, and Incredulous by reason of their Ex­perience

They Love and Hate, as if they meant to continue in neither.

Are of poor spirits, as having been humbled by the chances of life.

And Covetous, as knowing how ea­sie 'tis to lose, and hard to get.

And Timorous, as having been coo­led by years.

And greedy of life: for good things [Page 216] seem greater by the want of them.

And Lovers of themselves out of Pusillanimity.

And seek profit more than Honour, because they love themselves; and Profit is among the goods that are not simply good, but good for ones self.

And without bashfulness, because they despise seeming.

And hope little; knowing by Experi­ence that many times good Counsell has been followed with ill event, and because also they be timorous.

And live by Memory rather than Hope; for Memory is of the time past, whereof Old men have good store.

And are full of Talk, because they delight in their Memory.

And Vehement in their anger; but not stout enough to execute it.

They have weak, or no desires, and thence seem Temperate.

They are slaves to Gain.

And live more by reason then Cu­stome; because reason leads to Pro­fit, as Custome to that which is Ho­norable.

And do Injury to indammage, and not in Contumely.

[Page 217]And are mercifull by Compassion, or imagination of the same Evils in themselves; which is a kind of Infir­mity, and not Humanity, as in Young Men, proceeding from a good opinion of those that suffer Evill.

And full of complaint, as thinking themselves not far from evill, because of their Infirmity.

Seeing then every man loves such men, and their discourses, which are most agreeable to their own Manners; 'tis not hard to collect, how the Ora­tor, and his Oration may be made ac­ceptable to the Hearer, whether Young or Old.

CHAP. 16. Of the Manners of Middle-aged men.

THe Manners of Middle-aged men, are between those of Youth, and Old Men: and therefore,

  • They neither dare, nor fear too much: but both as is fit.
  • They neither believe all; nor re­ject all; but judge.
  • They seek not only what is Honou­rable, [Page 218] nor only what is Profitable; but both.
  • They are neither Covetous, nor Prodigall; but in the mean.
  • They are neither easily angry; nor yet stupid: but between both.
  • They are Valiant, and withall Temperate.

And in generall, whatsoever is di­vided in Youth, and Old Men: is com­pounded in Middle-age.

And whereof the Excesse, or Defect is in Young or Old men; the Mediocri­ty is in those of Middle-age.

Middle-age for the Body, I call the time from thirty to five and thirty years: for the Mind, the nine and for­tieth, or thereabouts.

CHAP. 17. Of the Manners of the Nobility.

OF Manners that proceed from the severall Ages we have already spo­ken.

We are next to speak of those th [...] rise from severall Fortunes.

The Manners of the Nobility are,

  • To be Ambitious.
  • [Page 219]To undervalue their Ancestors E­quals. For the goods of Fortune seem the more precious for their Antiquity.
  • Nobility is the Vertue of a Stock.
  • And Generosity, is not to degenerate from the vertue of his Stock.

For as in Plants; so in the Races of Men, there is a certain progresse; and they grow better and better to a cer­tain point; and change, viz. Subtill Wits into Madnesse; and staid wits into stupidity and Blockishnesse.

CHAP. 18. Of the Manners of the Rich.

RIch men are Contumelious, and Proud. T [...]is they have from their Riches For seeing every thing may be had for Mony, having Mony, they think they have all that is good.

And Effeminate; because they have wherewithall to subminister to their Lust.

And Boasters of their Wealth: and speak [...] in high terms foolishly. For men willingly talk of what they [...] love and admire; and think others affect [Page 220] the same that they do: and the truth is, all sorts of men submit to the Rich.

And think themselves worthy to to command, having that by which men attain Command.

And in general, they have the Man­ners of Fortunate Fools.

They do Injury, with intention not to hurt, but to disgrace; and partly also through Incontinence.

There is a difference between New and Ancient Riches: for they that are newly come to Wealth have the same faults in a greater degree: for new riches are a kind of rudeness and apprentiship of Riches.

CHAP. 19. Of the Manners of Men in Power, and of such as prosper.

THe Manners of Men in Power, are the same, or better then those of the Rich.

They have a greater sense of Ho­nour then the Rich; and their Man­ners are more Manly.

They are more Industrious then [Page 221] the Rich: for Power is sustained by Industry.

They are Grave, but without Au­sterenesse: for being in place conspi­cuous, they carry themselves the more modestly; and have a kind of gentle and comely Gravity, which the Greeks call [...].

When they do Injuries, they do great ones.

The Manners of Men that prosper, are compounded of the Manners of the Nobility, the Rich, and those that are in Power; for to some of these all Prosperity appertains.

Prosperity in Children, and goods of the Body, make men desire to ex­ceed others in the goods of Fortune.

Men that Prosper have this ill, to be more proud, and inconsiderate then others

And this good; that they worship God; trusting in him, for that they find themselves to receive more good then proceeds from their Industry.

The Manners of Poor Men, Obscure Men, Men without Power, and Men in Adversity, may be collected from the Contrary of what has been said.

CHAP. 20. Common Places or Principles con­cerning what May be Done, what Has been Done, and what Shall be Done; or of Fact Possible, Past and Future. Also of Great and Little.

WE have hitherto set down such Principles as are peculiar to several kindes of Orations.

Now we are to speak of such Places as are Common to them all; as these, Possible, Done or Past, Future, Great, Small.

Possible is that

  • The Contrary whereof is Possi­ble.
  • And the like whereof is Possible.
  • And then which some harder thing is Possible.
  • And the beginning whereof is Possible.
  • And the end whereof is Possible.
  • And the usuall consequent whereof is Possible.
  • And whatsoever we desire.
  • And the beginning whereof is in [Page 223] the power of those whom we can either compell or perswade.
  • And part whereof is Possible.
  • And part of the whole that is Pos­sible.
  • And the Generall if a Particular.
  • And a Particular if the Generall.
  • And of Relatives, if one, the other.
  • And that which without Art and Industry is Possible, is much more so with Art and Industry.
  • And that which is Possible to Worse, Weaker, and Unskilfulller men, is much more so to Better, Stronger, and more Skilfull.

The Principles concerning Impossi­ble are the Contraries of these.

That Has been done.

  • Then which a harder thing has been Done.
  • And the Consequent whereof Has been done.
  • And that which being Possible, he had a will to, and nothing hindred.
  • And that which was Possible, to him in his Anger.
  • And that which he longed to Do.
  • And that which was before upon the point of Doing.
  • [Page 124]And whose antecedent has been Done; or that, for which it uses to be Done.

And if that, for whose cause we do this, then this,

The Principles concerning Not done are the Contraries of these.

That Shall be done.

  • Which some man can, and means to do.
  • And which some man can, and de­sires to Do.
  • And which is in the way, and up. on the point to be Done.
  • And the antecedents whereof are Past.
  • And the Motive whereof is past.

Of Great and Small, More and Less, see Chap. 7. Book. 1.

CHAP. 21. Of Example, Similitude, and Fa­bles.

OF the Principles both generall and speciall from whence Proofes are to be drawn, has been already spoken.

Now follow the Proofes themselves, [Page 125] which are Examples or Enthymemes.

An Example is either an Example properly so called (as some Action past:) or a Similitude (which also is, called a Parable:) or a Fable (which contains some Action fained.)

An Example properly so called, is this; Darius came not into Greece, till he had first subdued AEgyp [...]. Xerxes also con­quered AEgypt first; then afterwards crossed the Hellespont. We ought there­fore to hinder the King of Persia from conquering AEgypt.

A Similtude, or Parable, is such as followeth: They who choose their Ma­gistrates by Lot, are like them that choose for their Champions those on whom the Lot shall fall, rather then those w [...]o have the greatest strength; and for their Pilot, not him that hath skill; but him whose name is drawn out of the Urnc.

A Fable is in this manner. The Horse desiring to drive out the Stag from his common pasture, took a man to as­sist him and having received into his mouth a bridle, and a rider upon his back, obtained his intent, but became subject to the Man. So you of Himaera, having (in hope to he revenged of your Enemies) [Page 226] given unto Phalaris Soveraign Autho­rity, that is to say, taken a bridle into your mouthes; if you shall also give him a gard to his person, that is, let him get up upon your backs, you become his slaves presently past recovery.

To find out Examples, that is, Actions done that may serve our pur­pose, is therefore hard, because not in our power.

But to find Fables and Similitudes, is easier; because by conversing in Philosophy, a man may fain [...]omewhat in nature like to the case in hand.

Examples, Similitudes and Fables, where Enthymemes are wanting, may serve us in the beginning of an Ora­tion for Inductions; otherwise are to be alledged after Enthymemes for Testimonies.

CAP. 22. Of a Sentence.

A Sentence is an universall Propo­sition concerning those things which are to be desired or avoided, in the Actions or Passions of the common life. As,

[Page 227] A wise man will not suffer his Chil­dren to be over-learned.

And is to an Enthymeme in Rheto­rick, as any Proposition is to a Syllo­gisme in Logick.

And therefore a Sentence, if the rea­son be rendred, becomes a Conclusion, and both together make an Enthymeme.

As for Example.

To be over-learned, besides that it begets effiminacy, procures envy. There­fore he that's wise will not suffer his Children to be over-learned.

Of Sentences there be four sorts.

For they either require Proofs, or not: that is, are manifest, or not.

Such as are manifest, are either so, assoon as they are uttered; as,

Health is a great Good.

Or as soon as they are considered; as,

Men use to hate, whom they have hurt [...]

Such as are not manifest, are either Conclusions of Enthymemes; as

He that's wise, will not suffer his Children, &c.

Or else are Enthymematicall; that is, have in themselves the force of an Enthymeme; as

Mortal men ought not to carry immortal anger.

[Page 228]A Sentence not Manifest, ought to be either Inferr'd, or Confirm'd.

Inferr'd thus.

'Tis not good to be effeminately min­ded, nor to be envied by ones fellow Citizens. A wise man therefore will not have his Children over-learned.

Con [...]irm'd thus.

A wise man will not have his Chil­dren over-learned, seeing too much lear­ning both softens a mans mind, and pro­cures him envy among his fellow Citi­zens.

If a reason be added to a manifest Sentence, let it be short.

Sentences become not every man; but only old men, and such as be well versed in businesse. For to hear a young man speak Sentences, is ridicu­lous; and to hear an ignorant man speak Sentences, is absurd.

Sentences generally received, when they are for our purpose, ought no [...] to be neglected, because they passe for truths. And yet they may be denied, when any laudable custome, or hu­mour may thereby be made appear in the Denyer.

The commodities of Sentences, are two.

[Page 229]One proceeding from the Vanity [...] of the Hearer, who takes for true u­niversally affirmed, that which he has found for true only in some particu­lar; and therefore a man ought to consider in every thing what opinion the Hearer holds.

Another is, that Sentences do dis­cover the manners and disposition of the speaker; so that if they be estee­med good Sentences, he shall be estee­med a good man; and if evill, an e­vill man.

Thus much of Sentences, what they be; of how many sorts; how to be used; whom they become; and what is their profit.

CAP. 23. Of the Invention of Enthymemes.

SEeing an Enthymeme differs from a Logicall Syllogisme, in that it nei­ther concludes out of every thing, nor ou [...] of remote Principles; the Places of it, from whence a man may argue ought to be certain, and determinate.

And because whosoever makes a [Page 230] Syllogisme Rhetoricall, or other, should know all, or the most part of that which is in question; as, whoso­ever is to advise the Athenians in the question, whether they are to make war or no, must know what their re­venues be; what, and what kind of power they have: and he that will praise them, must know their acts at Salamis, Marathon, &c. It will be ne­cessary for a good speaker to have in readinesse the choicest particulars of whatsoever he foresees he may speak of.

He that is to speak ex tempore, must comprehend in his speech as much as he can of what is most proper in the matter in hand.

Proper, I call those things which are least common to others; as, He that will praise Achilles, is not to de­clare such things as are common both to him, and Diomedes; as that he was [...] Prince, and warred against the Tro­jans; but such things as are proper only to Achilles; as that he killed He­ctor and Cygnus; went to the warre young, and voluntary.

Let this therefore be one generall Place, from that which is Proper.

CHAP. 24. Of the Places of Enthymemes O­stensive.

FOrasmuch as Enthymemes either in­fer truely, or seeme onely so to do; and they which do infer indeed, be either Ostensive; or such as bring a man to some impossibility; we will first set down the Places of Enthymemes O­stensive.

An Ostensive Enthymeme is, wherein a man concludes the question from somwhat granted.

That Enthymeme which brings a man to an impossibility is an Enthymeme wherein from that which the Adversa­ry maintaineth, we conclude that which is manifestly impossible.

All Places have been already set down in a manner in the precedent Propositions of Good, Evill, Iust, Unjust, Honourable and Dishonourable: namely, they have been set down as ap­plied to particular Subjects, or in Con­crete.

Here they are to be set down in ano­ther [Page 232] manner; namely in the Abstract or Universall.

The first Place then let be from Contraries, which in the Concrete or Particulars is exemplified thus. If Intemperance be hurtfull, Temperance is profitable: and if Intemperance be not hurtfull; neither is Temperance profi­table.

Another Place may be from Cogno­mination or affinity of words: as in this Particular. If what is Just be Good; then what is Justly is well: but Justly to die is not well: therefore not all that is Just is Good.

A third from Relatives; as, This man has Iustly Done, therefore the other has Iustly suffered. But this Place som­times deceives: for a man may suffer justly, yet not from him.

A fourth from Comparison, three wayes.

From the Great to the Lesse; as, He has stricken his father; and therefore this man.

From the Less to the Greater: as, The Gods know not all things; much less man.

From Equality: as, If Captains be [Page 233] not alwayes the worse esteemed for losing a victory; why should Sophisters?

Another from the Time: as Philip to the Thebans: If I had required to passe through your Country with my army, before I had ayded you against the Pho­caeans, there is no doubt but you would have promised it me. It is absurd there­fore to deny it me now, after I have trusted you:

A Sixth from what the adversary sayes of himself: as, Iphicrates asked Aristophon, whether he would take a bribe to betray the Army: and he answe­ring no; What (sayes he) is it likely that Iphicrates would betray the Army; and Aristophon not?

This Place would be ridiculous, where the Defendant were not in much more estimation then the accuser.

A seventh from the Definition; as that of Socrates; A Spirit is either God, or the Creature of God: and therefore he denies not that there is a God, that con­fesses there are Spirits.

An eighth from the distinction of an ambiguous word.

A ninth from Divi [...]ion: as, If all men do what they do for one of three cau­ses, [Page 234] whereof two are impossible; and the Accuser charge not the Defendant with the third; it followes that he has not done it.

A tenth from Induction: as, At A­thens, at Thebes, at Sparta, &c. And therefore every where.

An eleventh from Authority, or pre­cedent sentence; as that of Sappho, that Death is evill, for that the Gods have judged it so, in exempting themselves from mortality.

A twelfth from the Consequence: as, 'Tis not good to be envied; Therefore nei­ther to be learned. 'Tis good to be wise, therefore also to be instructed.

A thirteenth from two contrary Con­sequences; as, 'Tis not good to be an O­rator, because if he speak the truth, he shall displease men: if he speak falsely, he shall displease God.

Here is to be noted, that somtimes this argument may be retorted: as thus, If you speak truth, you shall please God; if you speak untruth you shall please men; therefore by all means be an Orator.

A fourteenth from the quality that men have to praise one thing, and approve another: as, We ought not to war against [Page 235] the Athenians upon no precedent injury; for all men discommend injustice. Again, We ought to warre against the Atheni­ans; for otherwise our Liberty is at their mercy, that is, is no liberty: but the pre­servation of liberty is a thing that all men will approve.

A fifteenth from Proportion: as, see­ing we naturalize strangers for their vertues, why should we not banish this stranger for his vices?

A sixteenth from the similitude of Consequents: as, He that denies the im­mortality of the Gods, is no worse then he that has written the generation of the Gods. For the same Consequence follows of both, that somtimes there are none.

A seventeenth from that, that men change their mind: as, If when we were in banishment, we fought to recover our Countrey, why should we not fight now to retain it?

An eighteenth from a fained end: as, that Diomedes chose Ulysses to go with him, not as more valiant then another; but as one that would partake lesse of the glory.

A nineteenth from the Cause; as if he would infer he did it from this, that he had cause to do it.

[Page 236]A twentieth from that which is In­credible, but True: as, that Lawes may need a Law to mend them; as well as Fish bred in the salt water, may need salting.

CHAP. 25. Of the Places of Enthymemes that lead to Impossibility.

LEt the first Place be from inspection of Times, Actions, or Words, ei­ther of the Adversary, or of the Speaker, or Both. Of the Adversary; as, He sayes, he loves the People, and yet he wa [...] in the conspiracy of the Thirty. Of the Speaker; as, He sayes, I am contentious; and yet I never began sute. Of Both; as He never conferr'd any thing to the benefit of the Commonwealth, whereas I have ran­somed divers ci [...]izens with mine own mony.

A second from shewing the cause of that which seemed amisse, and serves for men of good reputation that are accu­sed; as, The Mother that was accused of Incest for being seen imbracing her Son, was absolved as soon as she made appear, that she imbraced him upon his arrivall from far, by way of Salutation.

A third, from rendring of the cause; as, Leodamas, to whom it was obje­cted, [Page 237] that he had, under the thirty Ty­rants, defaced the Inscription (which the People had set up in a Pillar) of his Ignominy; answered, He had not done it; because it would have been more to his commodity to let it stand; thereby to indear himselfe to the Tyrants, by the testimony of the Peoples hatred.

A fourth from better Counsel; as, He might have done better for himself; ther­fore he did not this. But this Place de­ceives, when the better Counsel comes to mind after the Fact.

A fifth, from the Incompatibility of the things to be done; as, They that did deliberate whether they should both mourn and sacrifice at the Funerall of Leucothea, were told, that if they thought her a Goddesse, they ought not to mourn; and if they thought her a Mortall, they ought not to sacrifice.

A sixth (which is proper to Iudicial Orations) from an Inference of Errour; as, If he did it not, he was not wise, ther­fore he did it.

Enthymemes that lead to Impossibility, please more then Ostensive: for they compare, and put contraries together, whereby they are the better set off, and [Page 238] more conspicuous to [...]h [...] Auditor.

Of all Enthymemes, they be best, which we assent to as soon as hear. For such consent pleaseth us; and makes us favourable to the speaker.

CHAP. 26. Of the Places of seeming Enthymemes.

OF seeming Enthymemes, one Place may be from the form of speaking; as when a man has repeated divers Sen­tences, he brings in his conclusion, as if it follow'd necessarily, though it do not.

A second from an ambiguous word.

A third from that which is true divi­ded, to that which is false joyned; as that of Orestes, It was justice that I should revenge my Fathers death, and it was justice my Mother should die for kil­ling my Father, therefore I justly killed my Mother. Or from that which is true joyned, to that which is false divided; as, one cup of Wine, and one cup of Wine, are hurt [...]ull; therefore one cup of Wine is hurtfull.

A fourth from amplification of the [Page 239] Crime. For neither is the Defendant likely to have committed the Crime he amplifies; nor does the Accuser seem, when he is Passionate, to want ground for his Accusation.

A fifth from signes; as, when a man concludes the doing of the Fact from the manner of his life.

A sixth from that which comes by Chance, as if from this, that the Tyran­ny of Hipparchus came to be overthrown from the love of Aristogeiton to Harmo­dius, a man should conclude, that in a free Common-wealth loving of Boyes were profitable.

A seventh from the Consequence, as Banishment is to be desired because a ba­nish'd man has choice of places to dwell in.

An eighth from making that the cause which is not; as, In Demosthenes his government, the war began; therefore Demosthenes governed well. With the Peloponnesian war began the Plague, therefore [...]ericles that perswaded that war, did ill.

A ninth from the omission of some Circumstance, as, Helen did what was lawfull, when she ran away with Paris, because she had her Fathers consent to [Page 240] chuse her owne Husband; which was true onely during the time that she had not chosen.

A tenth, from that which is probable in some case, to that which is probable simply; as, 'Tis probable, he fore-saw, that if he did it, he should be suspecte [...]; therefore 'tis probable he did it not.

From this Place one may inferre both ways, that he did it not. For if he be not likely to do it, it may be thought he did it not: again, if he were likely, to do it, it may be thought he did it not, for this, that he knew he should be sus­pected.

Upon this Place was grounded the Art, which was so much detested in Protagoras, of making the better caus [...] seem the worse; & the worse the better.

CHAP. 27. Of the wayes to answer the Arguments of the Adversary.

AN Argument is answered by an op­posite Syllogisme, or by an Obje­ction.

The Places of opposite Syllogisme are the same with the Places of Syllo­gismes, [Page 241] or Enthymemes: for a Rheto­ricall Syllogisme is an Enthymeme.

The Places of Objections are four.

  • First, from the same, as, To the Ad­versary that proves Love to be good by an Enthymeme, may be objected, that no [...]a [...]t is good, and yet Love is want; or particularly thus; The Love of Myrrha to her Father was not good.
  • The second from Contraries: as, if the Adversary say, A good man does good to his friends, an Objection might be made, that then an evill man will do also evill to his friends.
  • 3. From Similitude: as thu [...], if the Ad­versary say, all men that are injured, do [...]ate those that have injured them, it may be Objected, that then, all men that had received benefits should love their bene­factors, that is to say, be gratefull.
  • The fourth from the authority of fa­mous men; as when a man shall say, that drunken men ought to be pardo­ned those acts they do in their drunken­nesse, because they know not what they do; the Objection may be, that Pittacus was of another mind, that ap­pointed for such acts a double punishment; one for the Act, another for the Drunken­nesse.

[Page 242]And forasmuch as all Enthymemes are drawn from Probability, or Exam­ple, or from a Signe fallible, or from a Signe infallible: an Enthymeme from Probability may be confuted Really, by shewing that for the most part it fals out otherwise; but Apparantly, or So­phistically, by shewing only that it does not fall out so alwayes; whereupon the Judg thinks the Probability not suf­ficient to ground his Sentence upon.

[The Reason whereof is this, That the Judge, while he hears the fact proved Probable, conceives it as true. For the Understanding has no Object but Truth. And ther­fore by and by, when he shall hear an Instance to the contrary; and thereby find that he had no necessity to think it true, presently changes his opinion, and thinks it false, and consequently not so much as Probable. For he cannot at one time think the same thing both Pro­bable and False: and he that sayes a thing is Probable, the meaning is, he thinkes it True, but finds not a [...] ­guments enough to prove it.]

An Enthymeme from a fallible signe, [Page 243] is answered, by shewing the signe to be fallible.

An Enthymeme from an Example, is answered, as an Enthymeme from Probability; Really, by shewing more Examples to the contrary; Apparently, if he bring Examples enough to make it seem not necessary.

If the Adv [...]sary have more Exam­ples then we, we must make appeare, that they are not applicable to the Case.

An Enthymeme from an infallible Signe, if the Proposition be true, is un­answerable.

CHAP. 28. Amplification and Extenuation are not Common Places. Enthyme­mes by which Arguments are an­swered, are the same with those by which the matter in question is pro­ved, or disproved. Objections are not Enthymemes.

THe first, that Amplification and Ex­tenuation are not Common Places [Page 244] appears by this, that Amplification, and Extenuation do prove a fact to be great, or little; and are therefore En­thymemes, to be drawn from Common Places, and therefore are not the Places themselves.

The second, that Enthymemes, by which Arguments are answered, are of the same kind with those by which the matter in question is proved, is mani­fest by this, that these infer the oppo­site of what was proved by the other.

The third, that an Objection is no EnthymemE, is apparent by this, that an Objection is no more but an Opinion, Example, or other Instance, produced to make appear, that the Adversaries Argument does not conclude.

Thus much of Examples, Sentences, Enthymemes, and generally of all things that belong to Argumentation; from what Places they may be drawn, or an­swered.

There remains Elocution, and Dis­position to be spoken of in the next Book.

The third Book.

CHAP. 1. Of the Originall of Elocution and Pronunciation.

THree things being necessary to an Oration, namely Proof, Elocution and Disposition; we have done with the first, and shall speak of the other two in that which followes.

As for Action, or Pronuntiation, so much as is necessary for an Orator may be fetcht out of the Book of the Art of Poetry, in which we have treated of the Action of the Stage.

For Tragedians were the first that invented such Action, and that but of late; and it consisteth in governing well the Magnitude, Tone, and Measure of the Voice; a thing less subject to [Page 246] Art, then is either Proofe, or Elocu­tion.

And yet there have been Rules deli­vered concerning it, as far forth as serve for Poetry.

But Oratoricall Action has not been hitherto reduced to Art.

And Orators in the beginning, when they saw that the Poets in barren and faigned Arguments, nevertheless at­tained great Reputation; supposing it had proceeded from the choice, or con­nexion of words, fell into a Stile, by imitation of them, approaching to Verse, and made choice of words.

But when the Poets changed their St [...]le, and laid by all words that were not in common use, the Orators did the same, and lighted at last upon words and a government of the Voice and Measures proper to them selves.

Seeing therefore Pronuntiation, or Action are in some degree necessary al­so for an Orator, the Precepts thereof are to be fetcht from the Art of Poetry.

[In the mean time this may be one generall Rule. If the Words; Tone, Greatness of the Voice, Ge­sture of the body and Countenance, [Page 247] seem to proceed all from one Pas­sion, then 'tis well pronounced. O­therwise not.

For when there appear more passions then one at once, the mind of the Speaker appears un­naturall and distracted. Other­wise, as the mind of the speaker, so the mind of the Hearer al­wayes.]

CHAP. 2. Of the choise of Words and Epithets.

THe vertues of a Word are two; the first, that it be perspicuous; the second, that it be decent; that is, neither above, nor below the thing signified; or, neither too humble, nor too fine,

Perspicuous are all Words that be Proper

Fine Words are those, that are borro­wed, or translated from other significati­ons; of which in the Art of Poetry.

The reason why borrowed Words please, is this. Men are affected with Words, as they are with Men, admiring in both that which is forrain and new.

[Page 248]To make a Poem gracefull, ma­ny things help; but few an Orati­on.

For to a Poet it sufficeth with what Words he can to set out his Poem: but an Orator must not only do that: but also seem not to do it: for else he will be thought to speak unnaturally, and not as he thinks; and thereby be the less beleeved; whereas beelefe is the scope of his Oration.

The Words that an Orator ought to use are of three sorts. Proper; Such as are Received; and Metaphors.

Words taken from forrain languages, Words compounded, and Words new coyned are seldome to be used.

Synonimaes belong to Poets, and E­quivocall words to Sophisters.

An Orator, if he use Proper words, and Received, and good Metaphors, shal both make his Oration beautifull, and not seem to intend it; and shall speak perspicuously. For in a Metaphor alone there is perspicuity, Novity, and Sweet­nesse.

Concerning Metaphors the Rules are these.

  • 1. He that will make the best of a [Page 249] thing, let him draw his Metaphor from somwhat that is better. As for Exam­ple, let him call a Crime, an Error. On the other side, when he would make the worst of it, let him draw his Metaphor from somwhat worse, as, calling Error, Crime.
  • 2. A Metaphor ought not to be so far fetcht, as that the Similitude may not easily appear.
  • 3. A Metaphor ought to be drawn from the noblest things, as the Poets do that choose rather to say, Rosy-finger'd; then Red finger'd Aurora.

In like manner the Rule of Epi­thets is,

That he that will adorn, should use those of the better sort; and he that wil disgrace, should use those of the worse: as Simonides being to write an Ode in ho­nor of the victory gotten in a Course by certain Mules, being not well paid, called them by their name [ [...]] that signifies their propinquity to As­ses: but having received a greater reward, Stiles them the sons of swift footed Cour­sers.

CHAP. 3. Of the things that make an Oration Flat.

THe things that make an Oration flat, or insipide, are four.

  • 1. Words Compounded; [and yet a Man may Compound a word, when the Composition is necessary, for want of a simple word; and easie, and seldom used.]
  • 2. Forrain words. As for example, such as are newly derived from the La­tine; which though they were proper a­mong them whose tongue it is, are for­rain in another Language: and yet these may be used, so it be moderately.
  • 3. Long, impertinent, and often Epi­thets.
  • 4. Metaphors, indecent, and obscure. Ob­scure they are, when they are far fetcht. Indecent when they are ridiculous, as in Comedies; or too grave, as in Tragedies.

CHAP. 4. Of a Similitude.

A Similitude differs from a Metaphor only by such Particles of Comparison as these, As; Even as; So; Even so, &c.

A Similitude therefore is a Me­taphor dilated; and a Metaphor is a Similitude Contracted into one Word.

A Similitude does well in an Ora­tion, so it be not too frequent; for 'tis Poeticall.

An example of a Similitude, is this of Pericles; that said in his Orati­on, that the Baeotians were like to so many Oaks in a Wood, that did nothing but beat one another.

CAP. 5. Of the Purity of Language.

EOure things are necessary to make Language Pure.

  • 1. The right rendring of those Par­ticles [Page 252] which some antecedent particle does require: As to a Not only, a Not also; and then they are rendred right, when they are not suspended too long.
  • 2. The use of proper Words, rather then Circumlocutions, unlesse there be motive to make one do it of purpose.
  • 3. That there be nothing of double construction, unlesse there be cause to do it of purpose. As the Prophets (of the Heathen) who speak in generall terms, to the end they may the better main­taine the truth of their Prophecies; which is easier maintained in generals, then in particulars. For 'tis easier to divine, whether a number be even or odd, then how many; and that a thing will be, then when it will be.
  • 4. Concordance of Gender, Num­ber, and Person; as not to say Him for Her; Man for Men; Hath for Have.

In summe; a Mans Language ought to be easie for another to read, pro­nounce, and point.

Besides, to divers Antecedents, let divers Relatives, or one Common to them all, be correspondent: as, He saw the Colour; He heard the Sound; or he [Page 253] perceived both Colour and Sound: but by no means, He heard, or saw both.

Lastly, that which is to be interpo­sed by Parenthesis, let it be done quick­ly: as, I purposed, having spoken to him (to this, and to this purpose) afterward to be gone. For to put it off thus; I re­solved, after I had spoken to him, to be gone; but the subject of my speech was to this and this purpose, is vitious.

CHAP. 6. Of the Amplitude and Tenuity of Lan­guage.

A Man shall adde Amplitude, or Dig­nity to his language, but by such means as these.

  • 1. By changing the Name with the Definition, as occasion shall serve [...] As, when the Name shall be Indecent, by using the Definition; or Contrary.
  • 2. By Metaphors.
  • 3. By using the plurall Number for the singular.
  • 4. By privative Epithets.

CHAP. 7. Of the Convenience, or Decency of Elocu­tion.

ELocutions are made Decent,

  • 1. By speaking Feelingly; that is, with such Passion as is fit for the matter he is in; as Angerly in matter of Injury.
  • 2. By speaking as becomes the Per­son of the Speaker; as for a Gentleman to speak Eruditely.
  • 3. By speaking proportionably to the matter; as of great affaires to speak in a high; and of mean, in a low stile.
  • 4. By abstaining from Compounded, and from Out-landish Words; unlesse a man speak Passionately, and have al­ready moved, and, as it were, inebriated his Hearers. Or Ironically.

It confers also to perswasion very much, to use these ordinary formes of speaking, All men know; 'Tis confessed by all; No man will deny, and the like. For the Hearer consents, surprized with the fear to be esteemed the onely Ignorant man.

'Tis good also, having used a word [Page 255] that signifies more then the matter re­quires, to abstain from the Pronunci­ation and Countenance that to such a word belongs; that the Disproportion between it and the matter may the lesse appear. And when a man has said too much, it will shew well to cor­rect himselfe: For he will get beliefe by seeming to consider what he sayes.

[But in this a man must have a care not to be too precise in shewing of this Consideration. For the o­stentation of Carefulnesse is an ar­gument oftentimes of lying; as may be observed in such as tell par­ticularities not easily observed, when they would be thought to speak more precise truth then is required.]

CHAP. 8. Of two sorts of Stiles.

THere be two sorts of Stiles.

The one continued or to be com­prehended at once; the other divided, or distinguished by Periods.

The first sort was in use with anci­ent Writers; but is now out of date.

[Page 256]An example of this Stile is in the History of Herodotus; wherein there is no Period till the end of the whole History.

In the other kind of Stile, that is di­stinguished by Periods, a period is such a Part as is perfect in it selfe; and has such length, as may easily be compre­hended by the understanding.

This later kind is pleasant; the for­mer unpleasant, because this appeares finite, the other infinite: in this the Hearer has alwayes somewhat set out, and terminated to him; in the other he fore-sees no end, and has nothing finished to him: this may easily be committed to memory, because of the measure and cadence (which is the cause that verses be easily remembred;) the other not.

Every Sentence ought to end with the period, and nothing to be interpo­sed.

Period is either simple, or divided in­to Parts.

Simple is that which is Indivisible; as, I wonder you fear not their ends, whose actions you imitate.

A Period divided, is that which not [Page 257] only has perfection and length conve­nient for respiration, but also Parts. As, I wonder you are not afraid of their ends, seeing you imitate their actions: where in these words, I wonder you are not afraid of their ends, is one Colon, or Part; and in these, Seeing you imitate their actions, another: and both toge­ther make the Period.

The parts, or members, and peri­ods of speech ought neither to be too long, nor too short.

Too long are they, which are produ­ced beyond the expectation of the Hea­rer.

Too short, are they that end before he expects it.

Those that be too long, leave the Hearer behind, like him that walking, goes beyond the usuall end of the walk, and thereby out-goes him that walkes with him.

They that be too short, make the Hea­rer stumble; for when he looks farre before him, the end stops him before he be aware.

A period that is divided into Parts, is either divided only; or has also an Opposition of the parts one to another.

[Page 258] Divided onely is such as this; This the Senate knowes; the Consull sees; and yet the man lives.

A Period with Opposition of Parts, called also Antithesis, and the parts Antitheta, is when contrary parts are put together; or also joyned by a third.

Contrary parts are put together, as here, The one has obtained Glory, the other Riches; both by my benefit.

Antitheta are therefore acceptable; because not only the parts appear the better for the opposition; but also for that they carry with them a certain ap­pearance of that kind of Enthymeme, which leads to Impossibility.

Parts, or Members of a Period, are said to be equall, when they have alto­gether, or almost equall Number of Syllables.

Parts, or Members of a period, are said to be like, when they begin, or end alike: and the more Similitudes, and the greater equality there is of Syl­lables, the more gracefull is the Pe­riod.

CHAP. 9. Of those things that grace an Oration, and make it delightfull.

FOrasmuch as there is nothing more delightfull to a man, then to finde that he apprehends and learns easily; it necessarily follows, that those Words are most gratefull to the Eare, that make a man seem to see before his eyes the thing signified.

And therefore forrain Words are un­pleasant, because Obscure; and Plain Words, because too Manifest, making us learn nothing new: but Metaphors please; for they beget in us by the Ge­nus, or by some common thing to that with another, a kind of Science: as when an Old Man is called Stubble; a man suddainly learns that he growes up, flo­risheth, and withers like Grass, being put in mind of it by the qualities com­mon to Stubble, and to Old Men.

That which a Metaphor does, a Si­militude does the same; but with less grace, because with more prolixity.

[Page 260]Such Enthymemes are the most grace­ful, which neither are presently very Ma­nifest, nor yet very hard to be under­stood; but are comprehended, while they are uttering, or presently after, though not understood before.

The things that make a speech grace­full, are these; Antitheta, Metaphors, and Animation.

Of Antitheta, and Antichesis hath been spoken in the precedent Chap­ter.

Of Metaphors the most graceful is that which is drawn from Proportion.

[Aristotle (in the 12 Chap­ter of his Poetry) defines a Me­taphor to be the translation of a name from one signification to another; whereof he makes four kinds, 1. From the Generall to the Particular. 2. From the Particu­lar to the Generall. 3. From one Particular to another. 4. From Proportion.]

A Metaphor from Proportion is such as this, A State without Youth, is a Year without a Spring.

Animation is that expression which makes us seem to see the thing before [Page 261] our eyes; as [...]he that said, The Athe­nians powred out their City into Sicily, meaning, they sent thither the greatest Army they could make; and this is the greatest grace of an Oration.

If therefore in the same Sentence there concur both Metaphor, and this Animation, and also Antithesis, it can­not choose but be very gracefull.

That an Oration is graced by Metaphor, Animation and Antithesis, hath been said: but how 'tis graced, is to be said in the next Chapter.

CAP. 10. In what manner an Oration is graced by the things aforesaid.

TIs graced by Animation, when the actions of living Creatures are at­tributed to things without life; as when the sword is said to devoure.

Such Metaphors as these come into a Mans minde by the observation of things that have similitude and propor­tion one to another. And the more unlike, and unproportionable the [Page 262] things be otherwise, the more grace hath the Metaphor.

A Metaphor without Animation, adds grace then, when the Hearer finds he learns somewhat by such use of the word.

Also Paradoxes are graceful, so men in­wardly do beleeve them: for they have in them somewhat like to those jests that are grounded upon the similitude of words, which have usually one sense, and in the present another; and som­what like to those jests which are groun­ded upon the deceiving of a mans expe­ctation.

And Paragrams; that is, allusions of words are gracefull, if they be well placed; and in Periods not too long; and with Antithesis: for by these means the ambiguity is taken away.

And [...]he more of these; namely, Metaphor, Animation, Antithesis, E­quality of members a Period hath, the more gracefull it is.

Similitudes grace an Oration, when they contain also a Metaphor.

And Proverbes are gracefull, be­cause they are Metaphors, or translations of words from one species to another.

[Page 263]And Hyperboles, because they also are Metaphors: but they are youthfull, and bewray vehemence; and are used with most grace by them that be an­gry; and for that cause are not comly in Old men.

CHAP. 11. Of the difference between the Stile to be used in Writing, and the Stile to be used in Pleading.

THe Stile that should be Read ought to be more exact and accurate.

But the Stile of a Pleader ought to be suted to Action and Pronuntiation.

Orations of them that Plead, pass a­way with the Hearing.

But those that are Written men car­ry about them, and are considered at Leasure; and consequently must en­dure to be sifted and examined.

Written Orations appear flat in Plea­ding.

And Orations made for the Barr, when the Action is away, appear in Reading insipide.

[Page 264]In Written Orations Repetition is justly condemned.

But in Pleadings, by the help of Acti­on, and by some change in the Pleader, Repetition becomes Amplification.

In written Orations Disjunctives do ill; as, I came, I found him, I asked him: for they seem superfluous, and but one thing, because they are not distin­guished by Action.

But in Pleadings 'tis Amplification; because that which is but one thing, is made to seem many.

Of Pleadings, that which is Iudiciall ought to be more accurate, then that which is before the people.

And an Oration to the people ought to be more accommodate to Action, then a Iudiciall.

And of Iudiciall Orations, that ought to be more accurate, which is uttered to few Judges; and that ought to be more accommodate to Action, which is uttered to Many. As in a Pi­cture, the farther he stands off that be­holds it, the less need there is that the co­lours be fine: so in Orations, the far­ther the Hearer stands off, the less need there is for his Oration to be Elegant.

[Page 265]Therefore Demonstrative Orations are most proper for writing, the end whereof is to be Read.

CHAP. 12. Of the parts of an Oration, and their Order.

THe necessary Parts of an Oration are but two; Propositions, and Proos; which are as it were the Probleme, and Demonstration.

The Proposition is the explication, or opening of the Matter to be proved.

And Proof is the Demonstration of the Matter propounded.

To these necessary parts, are som­times added two other, the Proeme and the Epilogue, neither of which are any proof.

So that in sum, there be four parts of an Oration; the Proeme, the Propositi­on, or (as others call it) the Narration, the Proofes (which contain Confirma­tion, Confutation, Amplification, and Diminution;) and the Epilogue.

CHAP. 13. Of the Proem.

THe Proem is the Beginning of an Oration, and, as it were, the pre­paring of the way before one enter in­to it.

In some kinds of Orations it resem­bles the Prelude of Musicians, who first play what they list, and afterwards the Tune they intended.

In other kinds it resembles the Pro­logue of a Play, that contains the Ar­gument [...]

Proems of the first sort, are most proper for Demonstrative Orations; in which a Man is free to fore-tell, or not, what points he will insist up­on; and for the most part 'tis better not: because when a man has not ob­liged himselfe to a certain matter, Di­gression will seem Variety: but if he have ingaged himselfe, Variety will be accounted Digression.

In Demonstratives the matter of the Proem consisteth in the Praise or Dis­praise of some Law or Custome, or in [Page 267] Exhortation, or Dehortation; or in something that serves to incline the Hearer to the purpose.

Proemes of the second kind are most proper for Iudiciall Orations. For as the Prologue in a Dramatick, and the Exordium in an Epique Poeme, setteth first in few words the Argument of the Poeme: so in a Iudicial Oration the Orator ought to exhibit a Modell of his Oration, that the mind of the Hearer may not be suspended, and for want of fore-sight, erre or wander.

Whatsoever else belongs to a proeme, is drawn from one of these four; From the Speaker, From the Adversary, From the Hearer, or from the Matter.

From the Speaker and Adversary are drawn into Proems such Criminations and Purgations as belong not to the cause.

To the Defendant 'tis necessary in the Proeme to answer to the accusations of his Adversary; that those being clea­red, he may have a more favourable en­trance to the rest of his Oration.

But to the Plaintife 'tis better to cast his Criminations all in to the Epilogue, that the Judge may the more easily re­member them.

[Page 268]From the Hearer and from the Mat [...]ter are drawn into the proem such thing [...] as serve to make the Hearer favourable or angry [...] attentive, or not attentive [...] as need shall require.

And Hearers use to be attentive to persons that are reputed good; to thing [...] that are of great Consequence, or that concern themselves, or that are strange, or that delight.

But to make the Hearer attentive, is not the part of the proeme only, but of any other part of the Oration, and ra­ther of any other part, then of the pro­eme. For the Hearer is every where more remisse then in the beginning. And therfore wheresoever there is need, the Orator must make appear both the probitie of his own person, and that the matter in hand is of great Consequence; or that it concerns the Hearer; or that it is new; or that it is delightfull.

He that will have the Hearer atten­tive to him, but not to the Cause, must on the other side make it seem that the matter is a trifle, without relation to the Hearer, common, and tedious.

That the Hearer may be favourable to the Speaker, one of two things is re­ [...]ired; [Page 269] that he love him, or that he [...] them.

In Demonstrative Orations, he that [...]ises, shall have the Hearer favourable [...]e think himself, or his own manners, course of life, or any thing he loves, [...]mprehended in the same praise.

On the contrary, he that dispraises, [...]all be heard favourably, if the Hearer [...]nd his enemies, or their courses, or any [...]ing he hates, involv'd in the same [...]spraies.

The Proeme of a Deliberative Ora­ [...]ion is taken from the same things, from [...]hich are taken the proemes of Iudicial Orations. For the matter of a Delibe­ [...]ative Oration needeth not that naturall [...]oeme, by which is shewen what we [...]re to speake of; for that is already known: the Proeme in these, being made onely for the Speakers, or Ad­ [...]ersaries sake; or to make the Matter ap­pear great, or little, as one would have it, and is therefore to be taken from the persons of the Plaintife or Defen­dant; or from the Hearer, or from the Matter, as in Orations Iudiciall.

CHAP. 14. Places of Crimination, and Purga­tion.

1. ONe is from the removall of ill opinion in the Hearer, imprin­ted in him by the Adversary, or o­therwise.

2. Another from this, That the thing done is not hurtfull, or not to him, or not so much, or not unjust, or not great, or not dishonourable.

3. A third from the Recompence; as, I did him harm, but withall I did him honour.

4. A fourth from the Excuse; as, It was Errour, Mischance, or Con­straint.

5. A fifth from the Intention; as, One thing was done, another meant.

6. A sixth, from the Comprehension of the Accuser; as, What I have done, the Accuser has done the same; or his Father [...] Kinsman, or Friend.

7. From the Comprehension of thos [...] that are in Reputation; as, What I did, such, and such have done the same, who [Page 271] neverthelesse are good men.

8. From Comparison with such as have been falsly accused, or wrongfully suspected, and neverthelesse found up­right.

9. From Recrimination; as, The Accuser is a man of ill life, and therfore not to be believed.

10. From that the Iudgement be­long to another Place, or Time; as, I have already answered, or am to an­swer else-where to this Matter.

11. From Grimination of the Cri­mination; as, It serves onely to pervert Iudgement.

12. A twelfth, which is common both to Crimination and Purgation, and is taken from some signe; as Teu­cer is not to be believed, because his Mo­ther was Priam's Sister. On the other side, Teucer is to be believed, be­cause his Father was Priam's enemy.

13. A thirteenth, proper to Cri­mination onely, from praise and dis­praise mixt; as, To praise small things, and blame great ones; or to praise in many words, and blame with effectuall ones; or to praise ma­ny things that are good, and then [Page 272] adde one evill, but a great one.

14. A fourteenth, common both to Crimination and Purgation, is taken from the interpretation of the fact: [...]or he that purgeth himself interpreteth the fact alwaies in the best sense; and he that Criminates, alwaies in the worst; as when Vlysses said, Diomedes chose him for his companion, as the most able of the Grecians, to aid him in his exploit: but his Adversary said, He chose him for his cowardize, as the most unlikely to share with him in the Honor.

CAP. 15. Of the Narration

THe Narration is not alwaies conti­nued and of one Peece; but som­times, as in Demonstratives, interrup­ted, and dispersed through the whole O­ration.

For there being in a Narration somthing that falls not under Art; as namely, the Actions themselves, wihch the Orator inventeth not; he must therefore bring in the Narration of them where he best may. As for ex­ample, [Page 273] if being to praise a Man, you would make a Narration of all his Acts immediately from the beginning, and without interruption, you will finde it necessary afterwards to repeat the same Acts again, while from some of them you praise his Valour, and from o­thers his Wisdom; whereby your Ora­tion shall have less variety, and shall less please.

'Tis not necessary alwaies that the Narratio [...] be short. The true measure of it must be taken from the matter that is to be laid open.

In the Narration, as oft as may be, 'tis good to insert somwhat commenda­ble in ones self, and blameable in ones Adversary: As, I advi [...]ed him, but he would take no Counsell.

In Narrations, a man is to leave out whatsoever breeds compassion, indig­nation in the Hearer besides the pur­pose; as Ulysses in Homer, relating his Travels to Alcinous, to move compassi­on in him, is so long in it, that it consists of divers books: but when he comes home, tells the same to his wife in thir­ty Verses, leaving out what might make her sad.

[Page 274]The Narration ought also to be in such words as argue the Manners; that is, some vertuous or vicious habit in him of whom we speak, although it be not exprest; As, setting his arms a ken­bold, he answered, &c. by which is insi­nuated the Pride of him that so answe­red.

In an Oration a man does better to shew his affection then his judgment: that is, 'Tis better to say, I like this; then to say, This is better. For by the one you would seem wise, by the other good. But favour followes Goodness; whereas wisdome procures envy.

But if this Affection seem incredible, then either a reason must be rendred, as did Antigone. For when she had said, She loved her brother better than her Hus­band, or children; she added, for husband and children I may have more; but ano­ther brother I cannot, my Parents being both dead. Or else a man must use this forme of speaking; I know this affecti­on of mine seems strange to you; but never­theless it is such. For 'tis not easily be­leeved, that any man has a mind to doe any thing that is not for his own good.

[Page 275]Besides in a Narration, not onely the Actions themselves; but the Passi­ons, and signes that accompany them, are to be discovered.

And in his Narration a man should make himself and his Adversary be considered for such, and such, as soon, and as covertly as he can.

A Narration may have neede somtimes not to be in the begin­ning.

In Deliberative Orations; that is, wheresoever the question is of things to come; a Narration, which is alwayes of things past, has no place: and yet things past may be recoun­ted, that men may Deliberate bet­ter of the future: But that is not as Narration, but Proof; for 'tis Ex­ample.

There may also be Narration in De­liberatives, in that part where Crimina­tion and Praise come in: But that part is not Deliberative, but Demonstra­tive.

CHAP. 16. Of Proofe, or Confirmation, and Refu­tation.

PRoofs are to be applied to something Controverted.

The Controversie in Iudiciall Ora­tions is, Whether it has been don; whe­ther it has been hurtfull; whether the matter be so great, and whether it be Iust, or no.

In a question of Fact, one of the Parties of necessity is faulty (for ig­norance of the Fact is no excuse) and therefore the Fact is chiefly to be in­sisted on.

In Demonstratives, the Fact for the most part is supposed: but the ho­nour and profit of the Fact are to be proved.

In Deliberatives, the question is, Whether the thing be like to be, or like­ly to be so Great; or whether it be Iust; or whether it be profitable.

Besides the application of the proofe to the question, a man ought to ob­serve, whether his Adversary have ly­ed [Page 277] in any point without the Cause. For 'tis a signe he does the same in the Cause.

The proofes themselves are either Examples, or Enthymemes.

A Deliberative Oration, because 'tis of things to come, requireth rather Ex­amples, then Enthymemes.

But a Iudiciall Oration, being of things past, which have a necessity in them, and may be concluded Syllo­gistically, requireth rather Enthymemes.

Enthymemes ought not to come too thick together: for they [...]hinder one anothers force by confounding the Hearer.

Nor ought a man endeavour to prove every thing by Enthymeme, lest like some Philosophers, he collect what is known, from what is lesse known.

Nor ought a man to use Enthy­memes, when he would move the Hea­rer to some affection: For seeing di­vers motions do mutually destroy or weaken one another, he will lose ei­ther the Enthymeme, or the affection that he would move.

For the same reason, a man ought not to use Enthymemes when he would expresse Manners.

[Page 278]But whether he would move affe­ction, or insinuate his Manners, he may withall use Sentences.

A Deliberative Oration is more dif­ficult then a Iudiciall, because 'tis of the future, whereas a Iudiciall is of that which is past, and that conse­quently may be known; and because it has principles, namely the Law; and it is easier to prove from principles, then without.

Besides, a Deliberative Oration wants those helps of turning to the Adversary, of speaking of himself; of raising passi­on.

He therefore that wants matter in a Deliberative Oration, let him bring in some person to praise or dispraise.

And in Demonstratives he that has nothing to say in commendation or dis­commendation of the principall party, let him praise or dispraise some body else, as his Father, or Kinsman, or the very vertues or vices themselves.

He that wants not proofes, let him not only prove strongly, but also insi­nuate his Mannerss: but he that has no proofe, let him nevertheles [...]e insinu­ate his Manners. For a good man is [Page 279] as acceptable, as an exact Oration.

Of proofs, those that lead to an absur­dity, please better then those that are direct or osten [...]ive; because from the comparison of Contraries, namely, Truth and Falsity, the force of the Syllogisme does the better appear.

Confutation is also a part of proofe.

And he that speaks first, puts it af­ter his own proofs, unlesse the Contro­versie containe many and different matters. And he that speakes last, puts it before.

For 'tis necessary to make way for his own Oration, by removing the Ob­jections of him that spake before. For the mind abhors both the Man, and his Oration, that is damned before-hand.

If a man desire his Manners should appear well, (lest speaking of himselfe he become odious, or troublesome, or obnoxious to obtrectation; or spea­king of another, he seem contumelious, or scurrilous) let him introduce ano­ther person.

Last of all, le [...]t he cloy his Hea­rer with Enthymemes, let him vary them somtimes with Sentences; but such as have the same force. As here [Page 280] is an Enthymeme. If it be then the best time to make peace when the best condi­tions of peace may be had, then the time is now, while our Fortune is entire. And this is a Sentence of equall force to it. Wise men make peace, while their For­tune is entire.

CHAP. 17. Of Interrogations, Answers, and Iests.

THe times wherein 'tis fit to ask ones Adversary a question are chiefly four.

  • 1. The first is, when of two Pro­positions that conclude an Absurdity, he has already uttered one; and we would by Interrogation draw him to confesse the other.
  • 2. The second, when of two Propo­sitions that conclude an Absurdity, one is manifest of it selfe, and the o­ther likely to be fetch'd out by a questi­on; then the Interrogation will be sea­sonable; and the absurd Conclusion is presently to be inferr'd, without ad­ding that Proposition which is mani­fest.
  • 3. The third, when a man would make appear that his [...] Adversary does contradict himselfe.
  • [Page 281]4. The fourth, when a man would take from his adversary such shifts as these, In some sort 'tis so; In some sort 'tis not so.

Out of these Cases 'tis not [...]it to In­terrogate. For he whose question suc­ceeds not, is thought vanquished.

To equivocal questions a man ought to answer fully, and not to be too brief.

To Interrogations which we fore-see tend to draw from us an Answer, con­trary to our purpose, we must, together with our Answer, presently give an An­swer to the objection which is im­plied in the question.

And where the question exacteth and an­swer that concludeth against us, we must together with our answer present­ly distinguish.

Iests are dissolved by serious and grave discourse: and grave discourse is deluded by Iests.

The severall kinds of Iests are set down in the Art of Poetry.

Whereof one kind is Ironia, and tends to please ones selfe.

The other is Scurrility, and tends to please others.

The later of these has in it a kind of basenesse: the former may become a man of good breeding.

CAP. 18. Of the Epilogue.

THe Epilogue must consist of one of these four things.

Either of inclining the Judg to favour his own, or disfavour the Adversaries side: For then when all is said in the cause, is the best season to praise, or dis­praise the Parties.

Or of Amplification or Diminution. For when it appears what is good or e­vill, then is the time to shew how great, or how little that good or evill is.

Or in moving the Judge to Anger, Love or other Passion. For when 'tis manifest of what kind, and how great the good or evill is, then it will be op­portune to excite the Judg.

Or of Repetition, that the Judge may remember what has been said.

Repetition consisteth in the matter, and the manner. For the Orator must shew, that he has performed what he promised in the beginning of his Orati­on, and how: Namely, by comparing his Arguments one by one with his Ad­versaries, repeating them in the same order they were spoken.

FINIS.
THE ART OF RHETORICK …

THE ART OF RHETORICK Plainly set forth; With Pertinent EXAMPLES for the more easie un­derstanding, and Pra­ctice of the same.

By a concealed Author.

LONDON, Printed by Thomas Maxey, 1651.

THE ART OF RHETORICK.

RHetorick is an Art of speaking finely.

It hath two parts.

  • 1. Garnishing of speech, called Elocution.
  • 2. Garnishing of the manner of ut­terance, called Pronunciation.

Garnishing of speech is the first part of Rhetorick, whereby the speech it self is beautified and made fine.

It is either,

  • 1. The fine manner of words, called a Trope, or,
  • 2. The fine shape or frame of speech, called a Figure.

[Page 286]The fine manner of words is a gar­nishing of Speech, whereby one word is drawn from his first proper signifi­cation, to another; as in this sentence: Sin lyeth at the door: where Sin is put for the punishment of sin adjoyned unto it: Lyeth at the doore signifieth at hand; as that which lieth at the Door, is ready to be brought in.

This changing of words was first found out by necessity, for the want of words; afterward confirmed by Delight, because such words are plea­sant and gracious to the ear. There­fore this change of signification must be shame fa'cd, and, as it were, maiden­ly, that it may seem rather to be led by the hand to another signification, to be driven by force unto the same: yet somtimes this fine manner of Speech swerveth from this perfection, and then it is,

Either

  • 1. The abuse of this fine Speech, called Katachresis, or
  • 2. The excess of this fineness, call'd Hyperbole.

Be not too just, nor too wicked: which speech, although it seem very hard, [Page 287] yet it doth not, without some fineness of Speech, utter thus much, That one seek not a righteousness beyond the Law of God; and that when none can live without all sin, yet that they take heed that sin bear not Dominion over them: As, My tears are my meat day and night. Those that hateme are mo in number, than the hairs of my head. Both which do utter by an expresse of Speech, a great sorrow, and a great number of ene­mies.

The abuse of Speech, is, when the change of speech is hard, strange, and unwonted, as in the first example.

The excess of speech is, when the change of signification is very high and loftie, as in the second Example, and Ps. 6.7.

But the excellencie, or fineness of Words, or Tropes, is most excellent, when divers are,

Shut up in one; or,
Continued in many.

An Example of the first sort is in the 2 Kings: I pray thee, let me have a double portion of thy Spirit: where by Spirit, is meant the gift of the Spirit; and by thy Spirit, the gift of the Spirit like to thine.

[Page 288]The continuance of Tropes, called an Allegorie, is, when one kind of Trope is so continued; as, look with what kind of matter it be begun, with the same it be ended. So in the 23. Psal. The care of God towards his Church, is set forth in the words proper to a Shep­herd. So in the whole book of Canti­cles, the sweet conference of Christ and his Church, is set down by the words proper to the Husband and the Wife. So old age is set down by this garnishing of speech, Eccles. 12. 5,6.

Hitherto of the properties of a fine manner of words, called a Trope.

Now the divers sorts do follow.

They are those which note out,

  • 1. No Comparison, and are with some Comparison; or,
  • 2. No respect of Division, or some respect.

The first is double:

  • 1. The change of name, called a Metonymie.
  • 2. The mocking speech, called an Ironie.

The change of name, is where the name of a thing, is put for the name of a thing agreeing with it.

[Page 289]It is double,

  • 1. When the cause is put for the thing caused, and contrariwise,
  • 2. When the thing to which any thing is adjoyned, is put for the thing adjoyned; and contrari­wise.

The change of name of the cause, is when, Either the name of the Maker, or the name of the Matter, is put for the thing made.

Of the Maker, when the finder out, or the Author of the thing, or the instrument wherby the thing is done, is put for the thing made. So Moses is put for his Writings: so Love is put for Liberality, or bestow­ing Benefits, the fruit of Love: so Faith the Cause, is put for Religi­ous serving of God, the thing caused. Rom. 1. So the tongue, the instrument of speech, is put for the Speech it self. Rule thy tongue, Iames 3.

Of the Matter: Thou art dust, and to dust shalt thou return; that is, one made of dust.

Now on the other side, when the [Page 290] thing caused, or the effect is put for a­ny of these causes. So the Gospel of God is called the Power of God to Salvation; That is, the instrument of the power of God. So love is said to be bountifull; because it causeth one to be bountiful. S. Paul [...]aith, The Bread that we break, is it not in the Communion of the Body and Bloud of Christ? That is, an instru­ment of the Communion of the body of Christ. So, the body is said to be an earthly Tabernacle: That is, a Ta­bernacle made of earth.

The change of Name, or Metony­mie, where the subject, or that which hath any thing adjoyned, is put for the thing adjoyned, or adjoynt. So the place is put for those, or that in the place: Set thine house in an order: That is, thy Houshold matters. It shall be easier for Sodom and Gomorra: that is, the People in Sodom and Gomorra. So Moses Chair is put for the Doctrine, taught in Moses Chair. So, all Jericho and Jerusalem came out: That is, all the men in Iericho and Ierusalem. So, before, Sin was put for the punishment of sin: Let his bloud rest upon us and our children: That is the punishment [Page 291] which shall follow his death. So Christ said, This is my bodie, That is, a sign or Sacrament of my body. This wine is the new Testament in my bloud; That is, a Sign or Seal of the New Testa­ment in my bloud. So Iohn saith, He saw the Spirit descending in the likeness of a Dove: That is, the sign of the Spi­rit.

On the other side, the Adjunct is put for the thing to which it is Ad­joyned. As Christ is called our hope. 1. Tit. That is, on whom our hope did depend: So, we are justified by Faith, That is, by Christ, applyed by Faith: So, Love is the fulfilling of the Law, That is, those things to which it is Adjoyned. Hope for the things hoped for, Rom. 8.28. So in the Epist. [...]o the Eph. The daies are evil: That is, the Manner, Conversation, and Deeds of men in the daies.

Hitherto of the Metonymie, or change of name.

Now followeth the Mocking speech, or Ironie.

CHAP. 2.

THE mocking Trope is, when one contrary is signified by another, as God said, Man is like to one of us. So Christ saith, sleep on; and yet by and by, Arise, let us go: so Paul saith, you are wise, and I am a fool.

This Trope is perceived, either by the contrariety of the Matter, or the Manner of utterance, or both: so Eli­as said to the Prophets of Baal, Crie a­loud, &c. So the Jews said unto Christ; Hail, King of the Iews.

Hitherto appertaineth the passing by a thing, which yet with a cer­tain elegancy noteth it: so Phi­lemon, 19. That I say not, thou ow­est thy self unto me.

Hitherto of the fineness of words which respect no division.

Now followeth that which respect­eth division, called Synechdoche.

A Synechdoche is when the name of the whole is given to the part; [Page 293] or the name of the part to the whole.

And it is double;

  • 1. When the whole is put for the Member, and contrarily.
  • 2. when the General, or whole kind is put for the Special, or contrarily.

So S. Iohn, Not onely for our sins, but for the sins of the whole world. So Righteousness, a member of Good­ness, is put for all goodness: so Un­righteousness is put for all manner of sins.

Examples of the second sort, as these: So Israel is put for those of Iuda sometimes: So Nations for the Heathen: A Minister of Christ, for an Apostle of Christ, Rom. 1. A Minister put for a di­stributer, Rom. 12.

On the other side, one sort or speci­al is put for the whole sort, or general, in the Examples following. In the Lords Prayer, Bread, one help of life, is put for all helps: This day, one time, for all times: so Solomon saith, The thing of the day in his day; That is, the thing of the time, in his time.

So sometimes less is spoken, and yet more is understood; which is called [Page 294] Diminution, or Meiosis: As Iames saith, to him that knoweth how to do wel, and doth not, it is sin: That is, a great sin. So our Saviour Christ saith, If they had not known, they had had no sinne: that is, no such great sin as they have now. Likewise the denial by Com­parison: so Solomon saith, Receive my words, and not silver: That is, my words rather than silver: so Paul saith, I was sent to Preach, and not to Baptise: That is, not so much to Baptise, as to Preach.

Hitherto of the fineness of words, which note out no Comparison. Now followeth the fineness of words which noteth out Comparison, called a Me­taphor.

CHAP. III.

A Metaphor is when the like is signi­fied by the like: as 1 Cor. The A­postle saith, Doctrine must be tried by fire; That is, the evidence of the Word, Spirit, trying Doctrine, as fire doth Mettals. So Christ is said to Baptize with fire; where Fire is put for the power of the Holy Ghost, pur­ging as fire: so Christ saith, None [Page 295] shall enter into the Kingdom of God, but [...]e that is born of the Holy Ghost and Water: so Paul calleth him self the Fa­ther of the Corinths, who saith, That he begat them in Christ: so he calleth Ti­mothy and Titus his Natural sons in the Faith.

Hitherto of a Trope, or Garnishing of speech in one word, where the Metaphor is most usual; then the change of name; then the Synechdoche; and last of all, the Ironie. Now followeth the [...]ine frame or shape of speech, cal­led a Figure.

A Figure is a Garnishing of speech; wherein the course of the same is chan­ged from the more simple and plain manner of speaking, unto that which is more full of Excellency and Grace. For as in the fineness of words, or a Trope, words are considered asunder by themselves: so in the fine shape or frame of speech or a figure, the apt and pleasant joyning together of many words is noted.

The garnishing of the shape of speech or a Figure, is garnishing of speech in Words, or in a Sentence.

[Page 296]The garnishing of speech in words, called Figura dictionis, is wherein the speech is garnished by the pleasant and sweet sound of words joyned toge­ther.

This is either,

  • 1. In the measure of sounds; or
  • 2. In the repetition of sounds.

The measure of sounds is belong­ing either to,

  • 1. Poets, with us called Rhymers; or,
  • 2. Orators, with us called Eloquent Pleaders.

The first is the measure of sounds by certain and continual spaces: And it is either,

  • 1. Rh yme; or,
  • 2. Ve rse.

Rhyme is the first sort, containing a certain measure of Syllables ending a like, and these in the Mother Tongues are most sit for Psalms, Songs, or Sonnets.

Verses are the second sort, contain­ing certain Feet fitly placed.

A Foot is a measure framed by the length and shortness of Syllables: For the several sorts whereof, as also of the verses of them, [Page 297] because we have no worthy examples in our English tongue, we judge the larg handling of them should be more curi­ous then necessary.

The measure of sounds belonging to Orators is that which, as it is not un­certain, so it differeth altogether from rime and verse, and is very changeable with it selfe. Therefore in that elo­quent speech you must altogether leave rime and verse, unless you alledge it for authority and pleasure.

In the Beginning of the Sentence little care is to be had, in the midle least of all, and in the end chiefest regard is to be had, because the fall of the sen­tence is most marked, and therefore lest it fall out to be harsh and unplesant both to the minde and eare, there must be most variety and change.

Now this change must not be above six syllables from the end, and that must be set downe in feet of two syl­lables.

And thus much of garnishing of speech by the measure of sounds, ra­ther to give some tast of the same to the Readers, then to draw any to the cu­rious and unnecessary practise of it.

[Page 298]Now followeth the repeating of founds.

CAP. 4.

REpetition of sounds is either of the Like, or the Unlike sound.

Of the Like, is either continued to the end of, or broken off from the same, or a diverse sentence.

Continued to the end of the same sentence is, when the same sound is re­peated without any thing coming be­tween, except a parenthesis; that is, something put in, without the which, not­withstanding the sentence is full. And it is a joyning of the same sound, as Rom. 1. As unrighteousnesse, fornicati­on, wickednesse. And in the prayer of Christ, My God, my God. From men by thine hand, O Lord, from men, &c. Psal. 17.

Continued in a diverse sentence is, either a Redoubling, called Anadyplo­sis; or A pleasant climing, called Cly­max.

Redoubling is when the same sound is repeated in the end of the former sen­tence, and the beginning of the sen­tence [Page 299] following. As, Psal. 9.8. The Lord also will be a refuge to the poor, a refuge, I say, in due time. Psal. 81. 14. For this God is our God. But more plain in Ps. 8. As we have [...]eard, so have we seen in the city of our God. God will establish it for ever.

A pleasant climing is a redoubling continued by divers degrees or steps of the same sounds: As Rom. 8. 17. If we be children, we be heirs, even heirs of God, annexed with Christ. Rom. 8.30. Whom he predestinated, them also he cal­led; and whom he called, them also he ju­stified; and whom he justified, them also he glorified. Also Rom. 9. 14. 15.

And hitherto of the same sound con­tinued to the end.

Now followeth the same sound bro­ken off.

CHAP. 5.

THE same sound broken off is a re­petition of the same in the Begin­ning; or In the end.

In the Beginning it is called Anapho­ra, a bringing of the same again; As Rom. 8. 38.

[Page 300] Nor death, nor life, nor Angels, &c. nor any other creature shal be able to se­parate us, &c. So likewise Ephe. 4. 11. Some to be Apostles, some preachers, &c. So Gal. Nor Iew, nor Gentile, &c. So likewise Hebr. 11.1.2.

Repetition of the same sound in the end is called Epistrophe, a turning to the same sound in the end. So Ezech. Behold greater abominations then these. Lament. 3.41. Let us lift up our hearts with our hands unto God in the heavens; we have sinned, and have, rebelled there­fore thou hast not spared.

When both of these are joyned to­gether, it is called a coupling or Sym­plote. As, 2 Cor. 6.4. to the 11. But in all things we approve our selves, as the Ministers of God, in much patience, in afflictions, &c. See also 2 Cor. 22. 23.

Hitherto of the repetitions in the same place.

Now of those that do interchange their place.

They are either Epanalepsis, which signifieth to take back; or Epanados which [...]ignifieth a turning to the same tune.

The first is when the same sound is [Page 301] repeated in the beginning and the en­ding, as My son Absolom, my son, 2 Sam. 19. 1.

Epanados is when the same sound is repeated in the beginning and the mid­dle, in the middle and the end, E­zech. 35. 6. I will prepare thee unto blood, and blood shall pursue thee: ex­cept thou hate blood, even blood shal persue thee. And 2. Thes. 2. So that he that doth sit as God, in the temple of God, sheweth h [...]mself that he is God.

Hitherto of the repetition of those sounds which are like.

Now of those that are unlike.

CHAP. 6.

UNlike A small changing of the name, as Paronomasia. A small changing of the end or case, as Polypto­ton.

A small change of name is, when a word by the change of one letter or Syl­lable, the signification also is changed, As, Patience, experience. Rom. 5.4. 19. We walk after the flesh, not war in the flesh. So by honor and dishonor, as unknown and yet known.

[Page 02]A small changing of the end or case, is when words of the same beginning rebound by divers ends: Christ being raised from the dead, dieth no more, death hath no more power over him. He that doth righteousness is righteous. If ye know that he is righteous, know ye that he that doth righteously, is born of him. And of both these there are many in the Scripture, but the translations cannot reach them.

Hitherto of the garnishing of the shape of speech in words.

Now followeth the garnishing of the shape of speech in a sentence.

CHAP. 7.

GArnishing of the frame of speech in a sentence, is a garnishing of the shape of speech, or a figure; which for the forcible moving of affections, doth after a sort beautifie the sense and very meaning of a sentence. Because it hath in it a certain manly majesty, which far surpasseth the soft delicacy or dainties of the former figures.

It is either the garnishing of speech Alone; or with others.

The garnishing of speech alone, [Page 303] is when as the sentence is garnished without speech had to other. And it is either in regard of the Matter; or of the Person.

In regard of the Matter, it is either

  • 1. A crying out, called Exclamati­on; or
  • 2. A pulling or calling back of himself, called Revocation.

A crying out or Exclamation is the first, which is set forth by a word of calling out: Sometimes of wonder, As, Rom. 8. O the depth of the Iudg­ments of God! Psa. 8. O Lord, how excel­lent is thy Name!

Sometimes of pity; also these words, Behold, Alas, Oh, be signes of this fi­gure: As, O Ierusalem, Ierusalem, which stonest the prophets. Somtimes of desperation; As, My sin is greater then can be forgiven. Behold, thou drivest me out, &c. Somtimes of wishing: As, O Lord of hosts, how amiable are thy ta­bernacles? Somtimes of disdayning: As, Rom. 7. in the end, O miserable wretch that I am, who shall deliver me from this body of sin? Sometimes of mocking: as they which said to our Saviour Christ, Ah, thou that, &c.

[Page 304]Somtimes of cursing and detestation, as in David, Let their table be made a snare, and bow down their back alwaies. Also when this Figure is used in the end of a sentence, it is called a shooting out of the voyce, or Epiphonema; as when the sins of Iezabel were spoken against, this is added at the end, Seemed it a little to her to do thus and thus.

So after the high setting forth of the name of God, David shutteth up his praise with this: Blessed be his glorious name, and let all the earth be filled with his glory. Somtimes here is used a cer­tain liberty of speech, wherein is a kind of secret crying out: As Peter, Act. 3. saith: Ye men of Israel, hear these words. And Paul, 1. Cor. 11. Would to God you could suffer a little my foolishnes, and in­deed ye suffer me.

Thus much of crying out [...]

Now followeth the Figure of calling back, or Revocation.

Revocation is when any thing is cal­cal back, and it is as it were a cooling and quenching of the heat of the excla­mation that went before.

And this is either A correction of ones self, called Epanorthrosis; A holding [Page 305] of ones peace, called Aposiopes [...]s.

Epanorthrosis is correction, when some thing is called back that went be­fore: as Paul correcteth his doubtful­ness of Agrippa's beleefe, when he saith, Beleevest thou. King Agrippa, I know thou beleevest. So, 1. Cor. 15. I laboured more aboundantly then they all, yet not I, &c.

A keeping of silence or Aposiopesis is, when the course of the sentence bygon is so stayed, as thereby some patt of the sentence not being uttered, may be un­derstood. So our Saviour Christ saith, My soul is heavy: what shall I say? John. 12. 27.

Thus much of a Figure garnishing the speech alone in regard of the matter.

Now followeth the garnishing of the speech alone in regard of the person.

CHAP. 8.

GArnishing of the speech alone in re­gard of the person is double.

Either in Turning to the person, called Apostrophe, or Faining of the per­ [...]on, called, Prosopopoeia.

Apostrophe or turning to the person, is when the speech is turned to another person, then the speech appointed [Page 306] did intend or require. And this Apo­strophe or turning is diversly seene, according to the diversity of persons. Sometimes it turneth to a mans person; As David in the 6. Psalme, where ha­ving gathered arguments of his safety, turneth hastily to the wicked, saying, A­way from me, all yee workers of iniquity, for the Lord hath heard the voice of my petition.

Sometimes, From a man to God, as Psal. 3. David being dismayed with the number of his enemies, turneth himself to God, saying: But thou art my buck­ler, &c.

Sometimes to unreasonable creatures without sense. Esai. 1. & Esai. 20.1.

Prosopopoeia or a feigning of the per­son, is whereby we do feigne another person speaking in our speech; And it is double; Imperfect, and Perfect.

Imperfect is when the speech of ano-person is set downe lightly and indi­rectly, As in the Psal. 10. David brin­geth in the wicked, Who say unto my Soul, Fly as the Bird unto yonder hill.

A perfect Prosopopoeia is when the whole feigning of the person is set down in our speech, with a fit entring [Page 307] into the same, and a leaving it off. So Wisd. Pro. 8. Where the entrance is in the first Verses, her speech in the rest of the Chapter.

Hitherto of the figures of sentences concerning one speaking alone.

Now follow the other, which con­cerne the speeches of two.

CHAP. 9.

THey which concerne the speeches of two, are either In Asking; or in Answering.

That of Asking, is either in Delibe­ration; or, in preventing an Objecti­on.

Deliberation is when we do ever now and then ask, as it were, reasons of our consultation, whereby the minde of the hearers wavering in doubt, doth set downe some great thing.

This deliberation is either in Doub­ting; or in Communication.

A Doubting is a deliberating with our selves, as Paul. 1. Philip. 22. doub­ting whether it were better to die then to live, he garnisheth his speech on this manner: For I am greatly in doubt [...]o [...] [Page 308] both sides, desiring to be loosed, and to be with [...] Christ, which is best of all: neverthelesse, to abide in the flesh is m [...]re needfull for you.

Communication is a deliberation with others. Gal. 3. 1,2. O foolish Ga­latians, who hath bewitched you, &c.

And hitherto of the figure of speech between two, called Deliberation.

Now followeth the figure of speech between two, called the preven­ting of an Objection, or occupa­tion.

Occupation is when wee do bring an objection, and yeeld an answer unto it: Therfore this speech between two in the first part, is called the Setting down of the Objection or Occupati­on. In the later part, an Answering of the Objection, or the subjection: as Rom. 6. What shall we say then? Shall we continue still in sin that grace may a­bound? In which words is set downe the Objection: the answering in these words, God forbid. And here this must be marked, that the Objection is ma­ny times wanting, which must be wise­ly supplyed by considering the occasi­on and answere of it: As, 1. Tim. 5. They [Page 309] will marry, having condemnation. Now least any might say, what, for marry­ing? He answereth: No, For deny­ing their first faith.

Hitherto of the figures of Asking.

Now followeth the figures of An­swering.

They are either in Suffering of a deed, called Permission [...] or, Granting of an argument, called concession.

Suffering of a deed or permission is, when mockingly we give liberty to any deed; being never so filthy, as Rev. Let him that is filthy be filthy still [...] And 1. Cor. 14. If any be ignorant, Let him be ignorant.

Concession or granting of an argu­ment is, when a argument is mocking­ly yeelded unto, as, Eccle. 11. Rejoyce, O young man in thy youth, and let thy heart chear thee, &c.

[Hitherto of the first part of Rhetorick, of the garnishing of Speech: the second part, which is the garnishing of Vtterance, be­cause it is not yet perfect (for the precepts for the most part pertain to an Orator) which when it shal be perfect, it shall either only con­tain [Page 310] common precepts for the garnishing of Utterance in all, or also proper precepts for the same in Magistrates, Ambassadours, Captains, and Ministers; therefore untill it be so perfected, we think it unnecessary to be translated into English.

Although the Rules of SOPHI­STRY be needlesse for them that be perfect in LOGICK; yet because the knowledge of them bringeth some profit to young beginners, both for the ready answering of the subtil arguments, and the better pra­ctising of Logick and Rheto­rick, we have thought good to turn it into the English Tongue.

SOphistry is the feigned art of Elneches, or coloured rea­sons.

A colourable reason, or Elench, is a shew of reason to deceive withall.

It is either When the deceit lyeth in [...]he Words; or in the default of Logick, [...]alled a Sophism.

In words is, either when the deceit [...]eth in one word; or in Words joyned [...]ogether. [Page 312] if it were, it should be, Whosoever.

In one word, is either the darknesse of a word; or, the doubtfulnesse of a word.

The darknesse of a word, or an in­solencie deceiveth, when by a reason the meaning is not understood, whe­ther the strangenesse be through the oldnesse, newnesse, or swelling vanity of the words; and of the last sort, is that spoken of in 2 Pet. 2. 18.

By this fallacie the Papists con­clude, the Fathers to be on their side, for deserving by good works.

Whosoever saith mans merits are crowned, they say mans works do deserve.

But the Fathers say, mans merits are crowned.

Therefore the Fathers say, mans works do serve.

Where Merits is an old word, put for any works done under the hope of reward, whether it come by desart, or freedom of promise.

Doubtfulnesse of a word, Likenesse of name, is either called Homonymia; or by a Trope or finenesse of speech.

The Likenesse of name, or Homo­nymia, is when one word is given to signifie divers things: As,

[Page 313]
He that believeth shall be saved.
The Hypocrites to whom our Saviour Christ would not commit himself, believed.
Therefore they shall be saved.

Where faith doth note out both a justifying faith, and a dead faith.

Doubtfulnesse by a Trope, is when a word is taken properly, which is meant figuratively, or contrarily: As

That which Christ saith is true.
Christ saith that bread is his body.
Therefore it is true.
Where by body is meant the Signe or Sacrament of his body.

Unto the first, a perfect Logician would answer, that the proposition is not an axiome necessarily true, accor­ding to the rule of truth, because of the doubtfulnesse of the old and new signification of merit. And if the word be farre worn out of use, that it be not understood, then the answer must be, I understand it not, or put your axiome in plain words.

To the second, he would answer, that the proposition or first part, is not according to the rule of righteousnesse, because the proper subject and ad­junct are not joyned together: which [Page 313] hath justifying faith, or believeth sin­cerely, shall be saved; and then the as­sumption being in the same sense in­ferred, is false.

Unto the third he would answer, that the assumption is not necessarily true, because if the word Body be ta­ken properly, it is not then true that is set down: but if it be taken figu­ratively, it is true, and therfore would bid him make the assumption neces­sarily true, and then say, Christ faith in proper words, It is my body; and then it is false.

Hitherto of the fallacies in single words.

Now of those that are joyned toge­ther.

It is either Amphibolia, or the doubtfulnesse of speech: or, Expositi­on, or u [...]apt setting down of the rea­son.

The first is, when there is doubtful­nesse in the frame of speech; as thus, If any obey not our word by a letter, note him: where some referre by a letter, to the first part of the Sentence, and some to the later, where the significa­tion of the word, and right pointing [Page 315] doth shew, that it must be referred to the first.

The answer is, that the right & wise placing of the Sentence is perverted.

U [...]hap [...] setting down of the Rea­ [...]on, is, when the parts of the question [...]nd the reasons intreated, is not set [...]own in fit words: as,

All sinne is evill.
Every child of God doth sinne.
Therefore every child of God is evill.

Here the answer according to Lo­ [...]ick, is that the assumption doth not [...]ke the argument out of the proposi­ [...]ion, but putteth in another thing, and [...]o it is no right frame of concluding, [...]s appeareth by the definition of the [...]ssumption.

Hitherto of the deceits of reason which lie in words.

Now of the default of Logick, cal­led Sophisme.

It is either Generall, or Speciall.

The Generall are those which can­not be referred to any part of Logick.

They are either begging of the que­ [...]tion, called the petition of the prin­ciple, or bragging of no proof.

Begging of the question is when [Page 316] nothing is brought to prove but the question, or that which is doubtful: As,

That righteousnesse which is both by faith and works, doth justifie.

But this righteousnesse, is inherent righteousnesse: Ergo.

Here the proposition in effect is no­thing but a question.

If together with the bloud of Christ we must make perfect satisfaction for our sins, before we come to Heaven.

Then there must be purgatory for them that die without perfection.

But the first is so: Ergo. Where the argument they bring is as doubt­full, and needeth as much proofe as the question.

The answer is this out of the definition of the Syllogisme that there is no new argument invented, there­fore it cannot be a certain frame of concluding.

Bragging of no proofe, is when that which is brought is too much, cal­led Redounding.

It is either impertinent to another matter, called Heterogenium; or a vain repetition, called Tautologia.

Impertinent, or not to the purpose, [Page 317] is when any thing is brought for a proofe, which is nothing near to the matter in hand, whereunto the com­mon proverb giveth answer; I ask you if chee [...]e, you answer me of chalk.

A vain repetition is, when the same [...]hing in effect, though not in words, is repeated; as they that after long time of prayer say, Let us pray. And this fallacie [...] our Saviour Christ condem­neth in prayer, Mat. 5. and this is a fault in Method.

Speciall are those which may be re­ferred to certain parts of Logick, and [...]hey are of two sorts.

Such as are referred to the spring of reasons, called invention; or to judge­ment.

Those referred to Invention are, when any thing is put for a reason, which is not, as no cause for a cause, no effect for an effect, and so of the [...]est.

In the Distribution this is a proper fallacie, when any thing simply or generally granted, thereby is inferred a certain respect or speciall not meant nor intended: as,

He that saith, there are not seven Sa­craments, saith true.

[Page 318] He that saith, there are onely three, saith, there are not seven.

Therefore he that saith, there are three, saith true.

The right answer is, that the pro­position is not necessarily true, for there may be a way to say, there are not seven, and yet affirm an untruth.

Fallacies of judgement are those that are referred to the judgement of of one sentence, or of more.

Of one Sentence, either to the Pro­prieties of an Axiom; or to the Sorts.

To the proprieties, as when a true is put for a false, and contr [...]rily: and affirmative for a negative, and cont [...]a­rily. So some take the words of Sain [...] Iohn, I do not say concerning it, that you shall not pray, for no deniall; when as it doth deny to pray for that sin.

To the Sorts are referred, either to the Simple, or Compound.

The first when the generall is taken for the speciall, and contrarily. So the Papists by this fallacy do answer to that generall saying of Paul; We are justified by faith without the works of the law. Which they understand of works done before faith, when that was [...]ver called in doubt.

[Page 319]The fallacies which are referred to a compound Axiome, are those which are referred either to a disjoyned, or knit­ting Axiome.

To a disjoyned axiome when the parts indeed are not disjoyned: As, Solomon was either a King, or did bear rule.

To a Knitting axiome is, when the parts are not necessarily knit together, As,

If Rome be on fire, the Popes chayre is burnt.

And hitherto of the first sort of fal­lacies referred to judgment.

Now followeth the second.

And they be either those that are re­ferred To a Syllogism.; or To Method.

And they again are Generall, and Speciall.

Generall which are referred to the generall properties of a Syllogisme.

It is either when all the parts are Denied; or are Particular.

All parts denied: As,

No Pope is a Divell.
No man is a Divell.
No man is a Pope.

Therefore.

And this must be answered, that it [Page 320] is not according to the definition of a Negative syllogisme, which must have alwayes one affirmative.

All particular: As,

Some unlawfull thing must be suffe­red, as namely that which cannot be taken away.
The stews is some unlawfull thing.
Therefore the stews must be suffered.

This is answered by the definition of a speciall syllogism, which is that hath one part generall.

The speciall are those which are Simple, or Compound.

The Simple is of two sorts.

  • The first is more Plain.
  • The second less Plain.

More plain is when the assumption is denied, or the question is not particu­lar: As,

Every Apostle may preach abroad:
Some Apostle is not a Pope,

Therefore.

Some Pope may not preach abroad.

Also.

Every Pope is a Lord:
Some Pope may give an universall li­cence.
Therefore every Lord may give an uni­versal licence.

[Page 321] Less plain hath one fallcy in cōmon when the proposition is speciall: As,

Some player is a rogue:
Every vagabond is rogue,
Therefore, every player is a vagabond.

Also,

Some player is a rogue:
Every vagabond is a player.
Therefore every player is a Rogue.

The fallacie of the first kind is when all the parts be affirmative: As,

All Pauls Bishops were ordained for unity.
All Arch-Bishops be ordained for u­nity.
Therefore, all Arch-Bishops are Pauls Bishops.

The fallacie of the second kind is when the assumption is denied: As,

Every puritane is a Christian.
No L. Bishop is a puritane.
Therefore, No L. Bishop is a Christian.

Hitherto of the fallacies referred to a simple Syllogism.

Now follow those which are refer­red to a compound, which are those which are referred either To the Con­nexive, or To the disjoyned.

Of the first sort one is when the first [Page 322] part or antecedent is denied, that the se­cond or consequent may be [...]o likewise: As,

If any man have two benefices, [...]e may escape unpunished at the Bishops hands.
But he may not have two benefices,

Therefore.

He may not escape unpunished at the Bishops hands.

The second part is affirmed, that the first may be so also. As,

If every ignorant minister were put out of the Church, and a Preacher in his place, we should have good order:
But we have good order, Therefore
Every ignorant minister is put out of the Church; and a Preacher in his place.

Of those referred to the disjoyned, the first is, when all the parts of the disjunction or proposition are not af­firmed: As,

Every ignorant minister is to be al­lowed, or not.
But he is not.
Therefore he is.

The second kind is when the se­cond part of the copulative negative axiome is denied, that the fir [...]t may be so; As,

[Page 323]
A non-resident, is either a faithfull, or unfaithfull Minister.
But he is unfaithfull, Ergo, &c.

And thus much of the fallacies in a Syllogisme.

The fallacie in Method is when, to deceive withall, the end is set in the beginning, the speciall before the ge­nerall, good order be gone, confoun­ded: And finally, when darknesse, length and hardnesse is laboured af­ter.

FINIS.

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