SECT. II. Of the Objections form'd against this Enquiry.

THe Objection which assaults this Obj. 1 Enquiry with the Rudest Vio­lence is this, That Happiness is not a thing attainable, and therefore the study of it and endeavour after it, is a vain thing: This Objection de­serves to be thorowly examin'd as that which will otherwise Subvert the very Foundation of this Work; and there­fore I'le reserve the Consideration of it to an entire Chapter, v. Ch. 2.

There are other Objections which are framed partly from the Nature of Happiness, partly from the Nature of Man, which thô, as all Errours, they Contradict one another; yet do they all unite their forces to oppose the Truth, and to deter Men from the Noblest and most Rational Study and Travail, That of Happiness.

[Page 16] Obj. 2 Various is the working of humane Fancy, they that will pretend to be Acute and Wise above the vulgar part of Mankind (for such are always apt to despise Speculation and Learning) look upon Happiness as too Divine and Glorious a State for so mean a Crea­ture as Man to affect; it was the not only vain but sinful Ambition of our first Parents to aspire to the likeness of God,Gen. 3. Ye shall be as Gods; and what can be more truly the Preroga­tive and peculiar possession of God than Happiness? or what can make us more like God? to affect this therefore were the folly of those Earth-Born Creatures in the Poet which sacri­legiously invaded Heaven;Omnis enim per se Divûm natura ne­cesse est, Immortali aevo summâ cum pace f [...]u­atur, — Privata dolore omni, privata perîclis Ipsa suis pollens opibus. Lucret. let us be content with the Portion of Man, and rest satisfy'd with those easie and obvious Pleasures which best suit this imperfect Nature and im­perfect State: I know not how well some may please themselves with this sort of Talk; but this is plain to me, [Page 17] these Men are contradictions to them­selves and their Philosophy to all true Reason; for notwithstanding this affe­cted debasing of humane Nature, the transports of these Voluptuaries are as bold and ambitious as those of the haughtiest Stoic, and 'tis no strange thing to hear an Epicurean boast of a Parity or Equality with his Jupiter in the point of Happiness or Pleasure. But to answer the Objection in a word, be the Nature of Mankind what it will, I do readily confess, that it were, if not a sinful, yet a vain ambition for Man to affect any other Happiness than what was suitable to his Nature; for it were to pursue what he were not capable of, it were like the folly of Semele in the Poet when she desir'd that she might be entertain'd by Jupi­ter, not only with the Passion of a Lover, but the Glory and Majesty of a God, and so being fatally success­ful in her wish, she perished in the Embraces she had so proudly begg'd; this therefore we readily grant, Hap­piness is a state of Pleasure, and Plea­sure is the Result of the proportion and [Page 18] agreeableness of the Object to the capa­city or appetite; so that he that aspires to a state of Happiness that infinitely exceeds his nature, foolishly doats on Contradictions, and affects a Happi­ness devoid of Pleasure: or which is all one, covets a Pleasure which he cannot enjoy: This being yielded to on the one hand, that we ought to pursue no other state of Happiness than what suits and fits our Capacities; they ought as readily to yield on the other hand if they will suppose God the Creator of Man, and concern'd in his Actions (as these seem to do) that he does not only allow of, but delight in all the Endeavours of Man after such a state: those Faculties and Capacities he endows us with being the fairest Declarations of his Will what he designs us for: the sole Diffi­culty therefore that remains will be this, what the Nature of Man is? what the Dignity and Excellency of the Rational Soul? which shall be dis­cussed in its place.

[Page 19]There are others of that sluggish Obj. 3 and bruitish temper, that being un­able to raise their Conception above Sence, or discover any Charm in a Rational and Philosophical pleasure, they seem to despise that Happiness, the Wise and Religious part of Man­kind profess to seek after, and to think all the Pleasure Man can enjoy, so little, that 'tis scarce worth the while to take much pains for it: It is true I am but Man, that is, a little Atom in the vast bulk of matter, and my life is but a short moment in an end­less stream of time: but then I feel a strange kind of Comprehensiveness in my Soul, it stretcheth forth it self to times past and to come, it enjoys things that are not seen by Faith and Hope, and sometimes things that are not at all by Memory and Fancy; and thô my life be but a moment, Satis­faction and Pleasure hath its degrees; and therefore if I can possess it in its height and perfection, I shall live much thô not long, I shall enjoy Eternity in a moment, the World in a little Globe: nor is this mere fancy and Romance, [Page 20] for when I read St. Austin so far in­flamed with the Love of true Philo­sophy by Cicero's Book ad Hortensium, that he presently abandons all the luscious Pleasures of his Pagan Con­versation for the sake of those which he should afterwards find in a Philoso­phical life; when I find Cicero in sure­ly a holy ravishment of Soul, preferring one Day sp [...]nt according to the Precepts of Vertue before a sinful Immortality; and the Psalmist almost in the same words as well as the same passion,Psal. 84. One day in thy Courts is better than a thou­sand; I cannot choose but think there are irresistible Charms and Beauties in Vertue, and Pleasures in true Philo­sophy as ravishing as they are pure and sacred and who then can restrain himself from the glowing desires of, and resolute Endeavours after a share in them? when I have read Socrates dying with a generous Charity, and serene Hopes, and with an undisturb'd Mind, easily parting with all here be­low; when I have read of Simeon wait­ing for, and expecting Death, as weary Labourers do the Evening Shades, or [Page 21] Hirelings the Reward of their work; when I read St. Paul with humble Im­patience expressing his devout desire of Death and Dissolution; when I have seen some (as some I have seen) set­ting in Calm, and Majesty, and Tri­umph, as if they had attended Death, as the old Romans once did the barba­rous Gaules in their Chairs and Robes; when I have seen men dye, not only with Content, but almost in Extasie, and the Soul breath'd forth not in a Groan, but an Ejaculation, I must needs say I could not choose but wish with Balaam, Numb. 23. that I might dye the Death of the Righteous, and that my latter end might be like his. These are degrees of Happiness which I should judge it reasonable to purchase at any Rate, whatever there be here­after; a smooth, contented, delightful life, such as would not only bear but invite Reflexions on it, a chearful, light­some Death, able to make the living in love with it.

But after all, whether this present life be all my Portion, whether I dye all of me together with my Body, or [Page 22] whether this life be only the time of our probation and preparation for ano­ther, and Death be nothing but the rough passage from one shore to ano­ther, or the Horizon that parts the Hemisphere of Darkness from that of Light, is a question I will not now de­termine: 'tis sufficient to propose it here as a doubt whereof one side or other must be true. If therefore this life be in Order to Eternity, it nearly imports me to consider my present Re­lation to a future state; if it be not, then this life, call it what you please, a Span, a Dream, or a Bubble, yet is it my All, and I must make the most of it: But,

Obj. 4 Are not Nature and Custom the best guides to Happiness? what needs there so much poring to find out that which mere instinct leads us to? we do not see that the most learned Clerks are always the most Happy men; let such demonstrate the truth of their Philosophy by their own success: And thus they magnifie Nature, not out of any honour they design to do it or the [Page 23] Author of it, but that they may with the greater Security contemn the one, and deprave the other by sluggish Luxury and unbridled Lust. I am not easily tempted to a Contempt of Na­ture or of Customs, for by the one I should seem injurious to God, who is the Author of Nature; and by th' other I should seem injurious to Mankind, whose concurrent Sense and constant Practice creates a Custom. Therefore as to the former part of the Objection, were it but once truly determin'd what were to be understood by Nature, this Objection would vanish: I think our Souls within us may be justly suppos'd to constitute a part of our Nature as well as our Bodies; and therefore I can­not be content that the Body, much less vicious habits (commonly call'd indeed a second Nature) should usurp the Name and Authority of Nature; nor consequently can I be content to allow of the mere sensual Appetites of the Body, much less the Dictates of vicious habits for the Laws of Nature: The Body indeed is an Essential part of our Nature, but then it must be remem­bred [Page 24] 'tis not the governing part; and therefore it's Instinct cannot Arrogate to it self the Authority of a Law. It remains therefore that thô the Rational Soul within us be but a part of our Nature, yet being the better part, the Ruling part, its Dictates must have the force of Laws; so that the Law of Nature will be nothing else but the Commands of right Reason: I shall be most ready to grant, that we ought to follow the Conduct of our Nature, taking it in this sense,Aug. contra Academi­cos. Beatè vivit qui secundum eam partem animi vivit quam dominari in homine fas est, he in­deed lives Happily who follows the Conduct of that part to which belongs the undoubted Right of Soveraignty and Dominion in man. As to the lat­ter part of this Objection; By Customs is commonly mean't those Principles and Practices which are generally re­ceiv'd and fashionable in the place we live; I have a just Veneration for whatever is the sense of Mankind, but I think their suffrage is not to be taken by number, but by weight: nor are we to follow the Opinion or Example [Page 25] of the most, but of the best, nor in­deed is it possible to understand what is the sense of Mankind in this point; for we have Custom against Custom, Na­tion against Nation, and Religion a­gainst Religion.

It ought farther to be consider'd, That Principles taken upon trust have seldom an equal influence upon us, with those which we take up upon strict Examination and mature Delibe­ration: that men will easily be tempted to desert those for which they have no better Authority than the vote of a Multitude: Nor can any thing tend more to the Disparagement of any per­suasion than this, that 'tis not the Re­sult of our Judgment but our Fortune; or to the Dishonour of any Religion than this, that 'tis Magisterially ob­truded by the Authority of Laws and terrour of Force, and will not submit it self to the tryal of sober Philosophy: and so I take it to be a Credit to the Christian Religion, that it did not force assent, but gain it by irresistible Argu­ments; that tis so far from shunning the tryal of Impartial Philosophy, that [Page 26] it did always invite men to a sober Examination of its Evidence: and commanded its Disciples,1 Pet. 3. be ready to give an answer to every man that asketh you a Reason of the hope that is in you. 'Tis true indeed as the Case now stands, Religion may, nay must be recommen­ded by Authority of Law and Custom, and ingratiated by particular Practice of it; but afterwards must grow up and be confirm'd by Reason, like a tender Plant that is first fix [...]t by the help of another's hands, but afterwards it stands firmest upon its own Roots: and this Method our Saviour himself did sometimes make use of, when ei­ther the stupidity of Nature or Preju­dice of Education rendred those to whom he addressed his Doctrine un­capable of entring into a thorow Exa­mination of it; Then if any man will do my will, he shall know of the Doctrine whether it be of God.

Lastly, That to trust to others who themselves with like Rashness and Cre­dulity do in the same manner trust to others in the matter of the highest moment of my life, seems to me incon­sistent [Page 27] with common Prudence, with the very Constitution of a rational Na­ture: for what use can be as much as fancied of Reason, if I slight its service in so important an affair as this?

It is true, Temper Fortune and Edu­cation have de facto so great a share in the Happiness or Misery of some kind of men especially, that I must not yet dismiss this Objection till I have taken a little notice of such for whose defence and service it was at first found out; These are,

First, The stupid and bruitish part of Mankind, these seem to have met with Happiness whilst they seek it not: their Fancy's flat, their Prospect short, and their Desires few and easie, and consequently if their Pleasures be not rais'd, neither are their troubles deep; Time and Chance happen to 'em, and they bear the one, and wear out the other without any very melancholy or tender Resentments: Stupidity in them outdoes all the habits of Philosophy in others, and want of sence makes them laugh more loudly, live more secure­ly, and dye more unconcern'dly than [Page 28] the acutest and thoughtfullest of Men can.

Were the Incapacity of these Men great enough to justifie their Con­tempt of Reason and Religion, I should almost be tempted to call them Hap­py: but at the same moment I should despise their Happiness, Non ideo tamen quisquam felicia dixerit, Senec. de Vit. Beatâ. quibus non est felicitatis Intellectus. I cannot call those Happy, whate're their Enjoy­ments be, whose Souls are too slug­gish and drousie to understand or reflect upon their Happiness: or if I must call this Happiness, 'tis the Happiness of a Beast not of a Man: with me to live is somewhat greater than to feed and Rest, and to be Happy must be much more than to live. The Extream to these are,

Secondly, The Gay, the Gaudy, the Modish, the unthinking part of Mankind; these in their own Opinion, and truly in the Opinion of the World (most men being either Flatterers or Enviers of their good luck) may pre­tend to Happiness: and if their pre­tence be well founded, their way to [Page 29] Happiness is a more ready, plain, and compendious one than any that ever was or ever will be discover'd.

But alass shortness of sight cannot pass with me for Wit, nor an unthink­ing Confidence for Wisdom: I have seen most of those Dreams the World can present the gayest fancy with, and upon the utmost of my trial, I have perhaps found something that could di­vert, nothing that could satisfie a Ra­tional Soul: I will not here Examine what is the Imployment, what the Pleasure proper to a Rational Being: Nor will I now go about to shew, that that Mind can enjoy no sober or lasting Peace, much less Pleasure, which is engag'd in such a Method of life as it cannot give a good account of, or ra­tionally justifie to it self; both which Considerations would be plain Refuta­tions of this gay Objection: 'tis enough in this place to say that this, sort of life is repugnant to those Principles which Religion reveals, which Reason seems readily to embrace, and which are back't by all the Authority which the unanimous Approbation of the wisest [Page 30] and best part of Mankind can give 'em. It behoves us therefore not to aban­don our selves to this kind of life, till we have narrowly discus't and try'd these Principles; for if they should prove true, then will this sensual care­less life betray us to a miserable Eter­nity: and thô they should be false, yet till we are upon Rational Grounds convinc'd that they are so, we have little Reason to commit our Happiness to so great a hazard, where the Odds are very great against us that we are in the wrong.

It remains notwithstanding all these Objections that it behoves every man to pursue his Happiness by a Rational Enquiry after it, neither undervaluing Humane Nature or its Happiness, nor giving up himself to the guidance of the bruitish and blind part of him, but seriously and thorowly to Examine whatever End be propos'd to him as his Happiness, or whatever Method be propos'd to him as the way to it; but when we have blown off these not formidable Objections against this En­quiry, but loose and wanton Excuses [Page 31] of the neglect of it; there are others yet that seem by a fairer shew of Reason to deter us from it by the Difficulty and unsuccessfulness of the Attempt.

Happiness (say they) is like Proteus Obj. 5 in the Poet, it puts on so many diffe­rent Forms and Shapes, that it seems impossible to circumscribe it within general Rules, or to represent it under any one fixt, definite and single No­tion or Idea; and it deserves well to be examin'd, what weight or Truth there is in the Vulgar Notion of Hap­piness, That for a man to be Happy is nothing else but to live according to his Fancy, and it seems no less absur'd to invite every man to the same Hea­ven, or gratifie every humour by the same kind of Happiness, than to en­tertain all Appetites with one and the same Dish. But as in that great varie­ty of Complexion, Feature, Shape and Motion, and in that great diversity of Capacities and Endowments which we behold in men, there is yet one Com­mon Nature wherein they all agree, [Page 32] whereby they are constituted Crea­tures of the same Species: just such accidental Varieties may the Happi­ness of man be capable of, and yet the Life and Being, the Soul and Substance of Happiness may be one and the same, and consequently may be comprehen­ded under general Rules. And if this answer were not sufficient, it would not be absurd to say, that Happiness like Beauty may put on various Dres­ses, and yet be still charming and de­lightful in each, or that this Bread like that of Heaven (for so the Rab­bins tell us of Manna) has that in it which gratifies every Palate; there are Soveraign and unallay'd Blessings, such as Lise, and Perfection, and Indo­lence, &c. which take with every ap­petite, and are universally welcom'd to all the Sons of men. Or I may truly say, That Happiness must not only be prepared and fitted for Man, but Man for his Happiness; he must become a Rational Creature e're he can enjoy a Rational Pleasure: 'tis from this want of Preparation that diver­sity of Opinions concerning Happi­ness [Page 33] springs, which is so universal a Discouragement. For,

It cannot lastly be deny'd but that Obj. 6 the Opinions of Men concerning Hap­piness have been and are extreamly Various: All the Different Sects of Phi­losophy and Religion being so many differing Paths which the differing Ap­prehensions of the Minds of Men have mark't out to Happiness. I have no un­dervaluing thoughts of the Abilities of Mankind, or overweening Opinion of my own, I cannot think my self clearer sighted, nor can I promise that I shall be more fortunate or more industrious in my search than others; this is my Comfort, that my miscarrying in this Attempt is more honorable than Success in a trifling and imperti­nent one— ‘—Magnis tamen excidit ausis.’

Nor can I think that uncertainty which this Diversity of Opinions seems to imply, sufficient to deter any wise man's Enquiry; no Sick man in his [Page 34] Wits will renounce the Desires or Hopes of a Cure, because Physicians differ in their Opinions about the Me­thod of it: the study of Philosophy has never been utterly forsaken, thô that of one age baffle and o'rethrow that of another, and yet even this again stands rather upon the weakness and obscurity of the former, than its own Strength or Evidence. The Academics do not seem to have entertain'd so gross an absurdity as some have fancy'd, when they taught that Wisdom con­sisted in the search of Truth, even at the same time when they believ'd that it could not be fully found out: for where Certainty cannot be had, it is not unreasonable to follow the fairest probabilities. And if this were ratio­nally practised in any Study, certainly much more in that of Happiness; since the Necessity of this Study above any other doth more indispensibly oblige us to it; for all Labour and Learning that promotes not the great End of Happiness is to no purpose, since we are ne're the better for't; for to be the better, and to be the happier for't is all one.

[Page 35]But there is no Reason why we should take up with these cold and life­less Answers which will satisfie none, but those who are extreamly well in­clin'd: we may now boldly say, the Difficulties that former Ages met with, are of no force now to deter us we can now free our selves from the distra­cting Terrours of an Invisible Power without banishing him out of that World which himself creat [...]d, we can now prove a Judgment to come with­out the Assistance of Poetic Dreams; and the Existence of Souls after Death, without their Praeexistence before our Birth: To be short, we have now Revelation for our Rule, and every good Man a Divine Spirit for his guide; nay, every man (if he be sincere) in such Enquiries as these. If any of you lack Wisdom, James 1. let him ask of God who giveth to all men liberally and upbraid­eth not; and it shall be given him. So that now, we may very rationally con­clude, that fatal Ignorance or fatal Er­rour in this Point must be imputed ei­ther to a lazy and sottish Contempt of that Knowledge we are most nearly [Page 36] concern'd in, and the means conducing to it, or to an obstinate Resistance of that Conviction which God endea­vours to beget in us by his Word and his Spirit, or at least to the want of that just Consideration we ought to allow to reveal'd Truths, or of that Necessary preparation which fits us for Divine Assistance, and enables us to understand the Divine Will; and for this Reason the Dissentions and sharp Contentions of Christians ought to be no prejudice to the Authority or Per­spicuity of Revelation, or to the Asser­tion of the Spirit's Conduct and Assi­stance: for besides that Unity of Faith is an Unity of Fundamentals not of Fancies, it must be confessed that our Sects and Divisions have their Rise and Propagation from these and such like Causes; nothing being more common than that men's Tempers and Com­plexions, and Educations, and Interests and Passions shou'd give a Byass to their Judgments, and a Tincture to their Tenets and Opinions: it is easie to see that the Errors of some are the Dreams of a drouzy Carelessness; of [Page 37] others, the wandrings of a wanton Confidence; of others, the crooked windings of Designing Interest, and so on; for it may with much truth be affirm'd, that all Erroneous Philosophy in matters Necessary and Fundamental, is the Result of some unworthy Lust and Passion; But all these Matters, namely the use of Revelation and God's Spirit, the Vanity of all Objections form'd against Religion from Dissen­tions about it, the Difficulties the Heathens were to encounter in their Enquiries after Happiness, &c. shall be more fully treated of in their proper places.

Thus I think I have sufficiently evinc'd the Importance and Necessity of an Enquiry after Happiness, since 'tis impossible to steer the Course of Life aright without a clear Knowledge of that which ought to be the End, the Centre of all our Desires and Endea­vours, that is, Happiness: without this 'tis not only impossible to be happy, but what ought seriously to be weigh­ed, impossible not to be miserable: nor let us ever so far disparage and under­value [Page 38] Humane Nature or dishonour the Author of it, as ever once to fancy, that Happiness is too great for us, or we too little for it; or that God should disallow as a Sacrilegious Ambition the most rational attempts of a rational Creature, I mean those of becoming Happy: since we seek no other Happi­ness than what the Make and Frame of Nature, and consequently the God of Nature app [...]ars plainly to capacitate us for, and design us to; the greatness of which, nothing can so well express as the Transports and Raptures of Hap­py Men.

But let us not think this Happiness so easie a purchase that it will run into the lap of the sluggish Body, or prosti­tute it self to the Embraces of senseless bruitish Lusts. No, no, nothing but Industrious Reason, pure and vigorous Philosophy can e're attain it; The Sluggard or the Wanton, the Fool and Vain may have some Fits of Ease and Mirth, only the Rational, only the Philosopher can possess true and lasting Happiness: Nor let the endless Quar­rels, the numerous Contentions of vain [Page 39] and proud Pretenders discourage us from following the Conduct of Reason and Revelation, these are the Conten­tions of Lust, not Philosophy; Truth and Happiness, (as some have lately fancy'd of Love) inhabit a Palace into which none can enter, but humble, sincere, and constant Lovers.

SECT. I. As to the sense of Rev [...]lation in this Point.

Religion denies not the possibi­lity of pre­sent Happi­ness.REligion ever had, and always must have the Character of it's Author visibly stamp't upon it; nothing that is not infinitely kind and infinitely wise can be found in any part of Revelation truly Divine, from whence we may rationally conclude, that the great aim of God in the Establishing Reli­gion is to advance the Happiness of Man, and to advance it in a Method Consonant to those natural Principles he has implanted in him: Nor did any one-inspir'd-Author ever think otherwise;Prov. 29. He that [...]eepeth the Law (saith Solomon) Happy is he. Psal. 119. Great Peace have they that love thy Law, and nothing shall offend them. Prov. 3. Happy is the man that findeth Wisdom, and the man that getteth Ʋnderstanding. That this was to be understood of actual and present Happiness in this life is apparent from what follows a little [Page 51] after, Length of days are in her right hand, and in her left hand Riches and Honour. Her ways are ways of pleasant­ness, and all her paths are peace. She is a tree of life to those that lay hold upon her. And thô the Gospel as a higher and more perfect Dispensation doth propose to us as our great and Chief End, Life, and Immortality, yet it doth by no means exclude us from Happiness here; but rather doth esta­blish it upon proper and firm Founda­tions; and fences it about with Im­pregnable Bulwarks.John 14.27. Peace I leave with you, my peace I give unto you, not as the world gives, give I unto you; let not your heart be troubled, neither let it be afraid. Gal. 5.22. Now the fruit of the Spirit is joy, peace, &c.Rom. 15. Now the God of hope fill you with all joy and peace in believing, and make you abound in hope through the power of the Holy Ghost. 1 Tim. 4.8. Godliness is profitable to all things, having promise of the life that now is, and of that which is to come. Nor can I indeed conceive how the state of a Righteous and Holy Soul should be other than a Happy and [Page 52] blessed one: The belief and confident Expectation of a Heaven must needs be more transporting and ravishing than the richest Fancy of a Sinner, and that Security both in respect of this and a future life, which a good Man enjoys in the Protection of God and the Assurance of his Favour, who is Almighty, Immutable, &c. must infi­nitely exceed any thing that a Sinner can attain to, and must exclude those uneasie Fears which do frequently in­terrupt the Sinner's Enjoyment and o're cast his hopes: he that loves God and Vertue, cannot but be Happy in the daily Practice and Enjoyment of what he most delights in: and he, lastly, that hath subdued his Passions and o'recome the World, cannot choose but reap the daily Fruits of so glorious a Conquest, and be constantly enter­tain'd with pleasing Reflexions and delightful Prospects; and yet if he should enjoy nothing else, that Sove­raignty, Liberty, Magnanimity, and Divine Charity, and Enlargement of Soul which he thereby gains, were an abundant Reward of his Victory. The [Page 53] sum of all is this, A good Man has the best Title to the Blessings of this life, and the Glories of another, he enjoys this World with as great Secu­rity as Wisdom and Moderation, and has an assur'd hope of a far better when he quits this; the Anticipations of which by Faith, Love, and Hope, do at once facilitate and confirm his Con­quest over all unworthy Lusts and en­tertain him with unexpressible Satisfa­ction and Pleasure.

For this Reason, I do in this Chap­ter discourse of Happiness without that immediate regard to another life, which might be expected: not judging my self oblig'd either to prove the Certainty of it, or to demonstrate the Reasonableness of embracing Misery during the space of this short life, in Expectation of that Perfect and Eter­nal Happiness which is promised here­after; since I saw well enough that in the ordinary course of Providence, the Happiness of this life and the other, were not incompatible: but on the Contrary, that that wherein the Life and Being of true Happiness in this [Page 54] World doth consist, was but a necessary Introduction to, or Qualification of us for the Happiness of another; which doth in some measure already appear, and will much more in the progress of the following Discourses.

The Do­ctrine of the Cross no Ob­struction of this life's Happiness. Math. 16.24.But what becomes now of the Do­ctrine of the Cross? this is a very soft and mild Commentary upon that of our Saviour, If any man will come after me, let him deny himself and take up his Cross and follow me. But this is not so formidable an Objection as it may at first sight seem, 'tis true Suffering through all the Progress and Stages of Evils even to the last, that is, Death it self, was a Common, nay almost an Universal Duty in the beginning of Christianity, being indispensibly Ne­cessary to the Propagation of the Go­spel; but blessed be God, the obligation of that Duty has long ago ceas'd; And all that I can think necessary to be said here in pursuance of my Design is, That the Pleasures of those Confessors and Martyrs did far out-weigh their Suffe­rings whil'st they lived; That when they suffer'd Death it self, the time was [Page 55] come when they must exchange Tem­poral for Eternal Happiness: Nor doth this at all infringe the Truth of my Proposition, which doth not vainly assert an Eternal Duration of Happi­ness in this life, but only teaches the possibility of attaining it. And I think the Death of Martyrs and Confessors, is rather a great Confirmation than Confutation of this Opinion: teaching us plainly that in despight of all Cala­mities, 'tis not only possible to live, but to dy Happily; which last is no small accession to Temporal Happi­ness. From this little I have said on this Occasion, 'tis easie to shape an answer to what is objected from St. Paul, 1 Cor. 15. If in this life only we have hope in Christ, we are of all men most miserable; 'tis confessedly indispu­tably true, that had these Christians been destitute of that hope which was their Support, they had sunk under the weight of such Sufferings, and so had been the most miserable of all men: but since their hopes did not only support 'em under their Affli­ctions, but also render 'em somewhat [Page 56] more than Conquerours; all that can follow hence is, That the Resurrection and Eternal life are unquestionable Truths, and that life who believes 'em as firmly as Confessors and Martyrs did, may like them be Happy, thô a thousand Seas of Calamities and Trou­bles should break in upon him.

Mortifica­tion recom­mended by the Light of Nature as subservient to our pre­sent Happi­ness.As to Mortification which is a Duty of perpetual Obligation, (for the Puri­ty of Religion is still the same, thô its fortune in the World be alter'd) this did at first signifie the Renunciation and Extirpation of Jewish and Pagan Lusts, according to that of St. Paul, Mortifie therefore your members which are upon the Earth; Fornication, Ʋn­cleanness, Inordinate affection, Evil Con­cupiscence, and Covetousness which is Idolatry; and it still signifies the same thing, and whatever difficulty we are to encounter in the performance of this Duty, it must be vanquished, for 'tis impossible to be wicked and Hap­py: a wicked man is his own Hell, and every Passion, every Lust is a Fiend, a Fury that doth outrage and torment him: and all this the Hea­thens [Page 57] themselves did not only con­stantly acknowledge, but also paint out with as lively Eloquence as any Christian could ever do: their Expe­rience, (over whom Sin had an uncon­trolled dominion) most effectually con­vincing 'em of the Outrages, Tyranny, and unspeakable Mischiefs of wicked and abominable Passions; Nay, so ma­nifest is it that the subduing these Ir­regular Passions is necessary to our Happiness, that even the Epicureans themselves (notwithstanding their confining the Happiness of Man to this short life, and by a probable Consequence, resolving it ultimately into the Enjoyments of the Body) did yet look upon themselves as ex­tremely injur'd by Tully, and others, when they represented 'em as re­volted from, and Enemies to Vertue. 'Tis not my business here to Examine what foundation for Vertue their Phi­losophy could leave, or what rank and place they could assign it, 'tis enough that they could not but acknowledge it as necessary to Happiness.

[Page 58]'Tis true, Mortification in the Gospel-sense requires us not only to restrain these Irregular Lusts, but also not to over-rate and over-value this World and the things of it; not to look upon this life as our only or chief Portion, and doat upon it with fondness and passion; and I cannot think that this is any thing more than what is imply'd and included in the former Notion of Mortification: this Moderation of our Inclinations to the World, being a proper and necessary foundation of the former Abstinence; it being very Im­probable that he who values and doats upon the World above all things, should refrain from irregular Pursuits and En­joyments of it. Now even this De­gree of Mortification was as clearly taught, and the Necessity of it in order to Happiness, by the Wise men amongst the Heathens, as by our Saviour and his Apostles, by those conducted by the Light of Nature, as by these con­ducted by the Light of Revelation: and that together with the Discipline which promotes it, I mean the obser­vation of great Abstinence from sen­sual [Page 59] Pleasures: No Monk or Anchoret can speak with a more glorious con­tempt of the World than a Stoic; but their flights who would allow the Bo­dy, the World, and the things of it no place nor degree in the Number of Good things are too daring and bold to lay any stress upon; but the Opi­nion of other Philosophers who allow'd these their proper place and value ought to be of weight with us, because they shew us plainly, That Mortifica­tion was ever thought by the Light of Nature subservient to our true Happi­ness. Hierocles in the beginning of his Divine Comments gives us a short but full account of the Pythagorean (and I may add, Platonic Philosophy) in this Point. [...]. The substance of which is, The business of Philosophy is [Page 60] to purifie the Soul of Man from sensual Lusts and inordinate Passions, and to transform it into the likeness and Image of God; This is that which it pursues by discovering to us Excellent Truths, and by recommending to us the practice of Excellent Vertues. And this was that Philosophy which the best and acutest of the Heathens look't upon as the on­ly way to Happiness, so far were they from judging it inconsistent and incom­patible with it; nay, they deem'd this very state of Vertue a state of more Exalted Happiness, and an Image of the Divine Life: hence is that little less than Inspir'd Heat or Rapture of Tully, L. 2. de Leg. Cum animus cognitis perceptis (que) virtutibus à Corporis obsequio, indulgen­tia (que) discesserit, voluptatem (que) sicut la­bem decoris oppresserit, omnem (que) mortis Doloris (que) timorem effugerit, Societatem (que) Charitatis colerit cum suis, omnes (que) na­tura conjunctos suos duxerit, Cultum (que) Deorum & puram Religionem susceperit, & exacuerit illam, ut oculorum sic In­genii Aciem ad bona deligenda & reji­cienda Contraria. Quid eo dici aut ex­cogitari poterit beatius? When the [Page 61] Soul having discover'd and entertain'd Vertue, has extinguish't its fondness for, and indulgence of the Body, and stifled Lust as the Reproach and Stain of its Honour and Beauty, and hath put off all dread of Death and Pain, &c. What can be said, or as much as fancied, more blessed than the state of such a man? Nay, after all, the greatest Pa­trons and Abettors of Pleasure did ever acknowledge this moderation in our Passions and Enjoyments indispensibly Necessary to our Happiness.

And 'tis well known how much the followers of Epicurus gloried in his Abstinence; that these Voluptuaries should prescribe and practise the Do­ctrine of Mortification! but this they were compelled to by the irresistible force of Reason; for how can he who [Page 62] doats upon the World, and melts in soft and sensual Pleasures, be able to secure the repose of his Mind against those melancholy Alterations which may daily and some time or other will certainly befall himself and his Enjoy­ments? on what foundation can the Peace or Liberty of his Mind be Esta­blish't? or can he be Happy who is distress't by every change of Weather, and is divided and distracted between numerous, contrary Passions, and a slave to each?

To come to a Conclusion, the Scrip­ture is so far from denying, that it do's affirm the possibility of attaining Happiness; nor are the Sufferings of Confessors and Martyrs, or the Do­ctrine of Mortification any prejudice to this Assertion; for neither Affliction nor Mortification are inconsistent with the true Happiness of Man; that Affli­ction is not, the Example of those very Martyrs and Confessors triumphing over it do's sufficiently evince; that Mortification is not, is unanimously confess'd by the Suffrages of such as were conducted by the Light of Na­ture, [Page 63] and of such too as were en­tirely devoted to the Pleasures of this life, and that upon undeniable Grounds.

Having thus remov'd this first Ob­jection against the Possibility of at­taining Happiness by vindicating Scrip­ture from Requiring any thing inju­rious to the Happiness of this life, or asserting any thing that may damp or discourage our hopes of it, it is now high time to proceed to the second thing I propos'd; that is,

SECT. II.

TO make good the Truth of this Assertion, That Happiness may be attain'd by plain and obvious Proofs. And here that I may not be mistaken,The Happi­ness of this life granted Imperfect. I think 'tis fit that I should tell the Reader, that I do not promise him a Heaven upon Earth, that I do not promise him the Happiness of An­gels but of Men; and that I do not understand Happiness in this Proposi­tion of that which is every way per­fect and absolute, to which fancy it [Page 64] self can add nothing, but of that which is like our Nature incomplete and im­perfect, speaking Comparatively, and yet truly great and excellent in it self too. Seneca doth somewhere describe his Happy man much after this man­ner, ‘He is one who despises all those things which are subject to Change, who accounts nothing good or bad but Vertue or Vice, who is not pufft up by prosperous Events nor cast down by Adverse ones, one whose great Pleasure is to despise Pleasure, one above either Desire or Fear, con­tent with the Riches which are the true and proper possession of Vertue, and coveting nothing more; such a one, he thinks cannot choose but be Happy.’ And I think so too, and I fear a great deal Happier than any man on Earth can ever be; this is a gay Dream, but well-suiting that Phi­losophy which requires the Tranquil­lity and Steadiness or Constancy of God to be joyn'd with the frailty of Man; a Composition of things infi­nitely more incompatible than that of an Immortal Soul and Mortal Body [Page 65] can be fancy'd to be: for my part, I am content to call a Building beauti­ful, thô there be something in it which doth not answer the Test of the stri­ctest Art, or at least of the most accu­rate fancy; I am content to call it Day, thô flitting Clouds and Showers do now and then a little obscure the Light: so can I not choose but call him Righteous who is sincere thô not perfect, whose life is generally speaking bright and exemplary, thô not utterly void of spots and blemishes, whose motion is a progress towards Vertue, thô it be sometimes retarded, nay sometimes interrupted: and so am I content to think him a Happy man, not who is utterly exempt from all di­sturbances in Mind or Body, not who lives in constant Extasie; but him whose Pleasures are more and greater than his Troubles, whose Hopes are more and greater than his Fears: one whose Enjoyments, thô they do not transport, do satisfie him; one whose Serenity and Calm of mind, though it may suffer Interruptions, suffer but few and slight ones: I will intreat the Rea­der [Page 66] to admit of this Notion of Happi­ness here, till we gradually advance to a clear and full discovery of it. Now as we are not to lay aside any advice of being Vertuous, because we cannot arrive at the height and constancy of holy Angels; so neither are we to cast off all thoughts of Happiness, because we cannot equal theirs: for if we are Happy in such a degree as the Imper­fection of our Nature and this Inferiour state will permit; if we can free our selves from those Miseries which do in­volve the foolish and vicious part of Mankind, if we can possess our selves of those humble and modest joys that Humane Nature is here capable of, it will be worth all the time and travail we can spend upon the Design: and that we may advance thus far, the following Considerations will,The possibi­lity, &c. prov'd. I think, render it more than probable.

Because some are happier than others.1. It cannot be deny'd but that some Men are more Happy, or at least less Miserable than others; who will de­ny Titus to have been infinitely more Happy than Nero? Titus whose Go­vernment of the Roman People was not [Page 67] more mild and gentle than the impar­tial Reflexions of his Conscience upon himself and actions,Sueton. in vitâ Titi. if we credit Sue­tonius in his Relation of his Death? Nero that guilty Wretch, whose Con­science was no less a Plague to him than he to Rome? Who prefers not the Character of Mitio in the Comedian before that of Demea? Terent. Mitio whose smooth and kind as well as prudent Behaviour rendred him easie and amia­ble to his Family and Relations, and made the Fortune of his whole life flow calmly and gently to the End: Demea whose four, suspicious and se­vere Behaviour did exasperate and ruffle the minds of all that related to him, and did disturb and muddy that stream of his affairs, which would have otherwise run smooth and clear: who will com­pare the pleasant Retirements, the mo­dest Contentments, the regular & vir­tuous Enjoyments of Atticus, with the turbulent popularity of Gracchus or the fatal Luxuries of Catiline, or the proud Cruelties of Sylla and Marius? what then? Shall we attribute no share of Happiness or Misery to the [Page 68] Vertues or the Vices of the one or other? or no part of their Vertues or Vices to themselves, but to (I know not) what fatal and irresistible Causes? If we assert the former, with frontless Confidence we contradict unquestio­nable Matters of Fact; if the latter we rob the Vertuous of that merit which rendred 'em belov'd in their Lives, and ever since has preserv'd their Memories Sacred and Honoura­ble, and we acquit those from all blame or guilt which the Laws of their own Countrey and the Common sense o [...] Mankind have ever condemn'd and de­tested. What gross and monstrous absurdities are these? shall we now af­ter the Improvement of so many Ages (for we pretend to grow more Wise and Learned daily) dispute whether Vice or Vertue be the better guide of Humane Actions, or the more service able to Humane Life? Shall Sloth and Luxury be thought to conduce as much to the prosperity and decency o [...] our Lives, as Industry and frugal Tem­perance? Shall Ambition, Pride, and Choler be now judg'd as instrumental [Page 69] to promote or preserve the Peace and repose of our Minds and States, as Mo­desty, Meekness, and Charity? or if this be too daring a defiance to Sense and Experience, shall we contend that the slothful and luxurious, the unjust, and cruel, &c. are as blameless and in­nocent; nay, if we will extend Prin­ciples to their just Consequence, as commendable and worthy of Praise as the Industrious and Temperate, the Meek and Gentle, the Just and Cha­ritable? for this must inevitably fol­low, if neither Men's Vertues nor Vi­ces be in any degree to be ascribed to themselves: wretched and desperate is that shift that equals the just and un­just, the industrious and the sluggard, the great Mind that stands upright un­der and outbraves Misfortune, and the degenerous one which effeminately shrinks and breaks under it! wretched the Shift that equals the Tyrant and most gracious Prince, the loyallest Sub­ject and the Traitor, the faithful Friend and the perfidious Flatterer, and all this we must be driven to, or else, as we cannot deny, that some are [Page 70] Happier than others, so we must not deny that the Happiness of the one, or Misery of the other, is owing in some measure at least to their Vertues and Vices, and these to themselves. And if this be true, 'tis evident, we may be Happy if we will; and thô we may not equal the most Happy (for I will not exclude Temper, Education, For­tune from all share in Men's Misery or Happiness) yet since every degree of Happiness is truly valuable, let us with all our might endeavour to be as Happy as we can.

But to pursue our proof,

[Page 71]2.Because there is Good and Evil in the World. It is a great absurdity to confound or equal Vertue and Vice, but 'tis not the greatest they commit who deny the possibility of attaining Happiness; for he that banishes Happiness out of the World, do's at the same time ba­nish Good and Evil out of it too: for Good being nothing else but the sub­serviency of some things to our true Interest and Pleasure, and Evil the ten­dency of others to our trouble and in­jury; it must needs follow if there be Good and Evil in the World, that he who has a greater share of Good than Evil is a Happy man; and he that de­nieth Good and Evil, may with as plausible a Confidence deny all Hu­mane Passions, and assert that there is neither Love nor Hatred, neither Joy nor Grief, nor Hope, nor Fear, nor Pity, nor Envy; for Good or Evil are the Objects or Causes of all these. I may then, I think, take it for granted, that no man will take the Confidence to say, that there is no such thing as Good or Evil in the World; and con­sequently all men must be oblig'd to acknowledge such a state as Happi­ness [Page 72] in the World too, unless they will affirm one of these three things, either First, That Evil grows up every where in thick Crops; Good thin, scatter'd and rarely to be found, epecially grown up to its maturity; That consequently there are none whose share of Evil doth not infinitely outweigh that of Good. Or Secondly, That Evil hath so much of Venom and Malignity in it, that a little Evil contributes more to our Misery than a great Deal of Good can to our Happiness; so ripe and full grown, is Evil, so lank, under­grown, and every way imperfect, is Good in this World. Or Thirdly, That we our selves can contribute no­thing to that Good or Evil which is our Portion, 'tis the Product not of Reason or Industry, but of Time and Chance, or of some other Principle which is not in our Power. All these deserve to be weigh'd, not only be­cause the Examination of 'em will tend to chear and encourage the Minds of Men, and to render the great Creator and Governour of the World more dear and venerable to us; but also, be­cause [Page 73] it will be of some use and service to the whole Inquiry.

First,1. Evils not more than Goods in the World. Therefore let us examine what Truth there is in that fancy which supposes the weight and num­ber of Evils in the World infinitely to exceed that of Good things. I know there are a sort of sour and murmu­ring, of proud and ambitious Wretches, who deal with their God, as with their Prince or Patrons; and estimate Favours and Benefits, not according to their Merit, but Expectation; gree­dy and haughty Expectation, which even Prodigal Bounty cannot satisfie: 'tis the strange temper of some men that they wither and grow lean with Discontent and Envy; even whil'st their studied Meals distract the wanton Appetite, and their very Attendance are sleek, and full, and fat with the Remains of their Feasts; and the mea­nest of their Relations thrive into Pride and Insolence by the mere sprinklings of their Plenty: I know 'tis Natural to some to Blaspheme God and the King, to quarrel with and reproach Provi­dence, and the Government; while [Page 74] loaded with good things, they stretch themselves on Silken Couches under Roofs of Cedar, or loll at Ease in their gilt Coaches; and yet at the same time the honest Countrey-man, who with Security thô much Drudgery Ploughs, and Sows, and Reaps a few Acres, Eats his plain Meals with Cheer­fulness, Sleeps without Disturbance, Blesses God, and magnifies the good­ness of his Prince: The Contentment of the One is an evident proof of the Divine Bounty and Goodness, whose Provision doth far exceed the Necessi­ties of his Creatures: The Discontent of th'other can be no disparagement to the Goodness of our Creator, who has dealt extremely liberally with 'em, thô they enjoy not what they possess: we are not therefore to judge of the World by the Clamours and Invectives of such as are always mutinous and dissa­tisfy'd, but by the suffrages of those humble, modest, and grateful Souls who know how to value the Favours of Heaven and themselves as they ought to do; who do not marr and corrupt every Blessing by Peevishness, [Page 75] or Envy, or Pride, or Wantonness, but can weigh their Enjoyments, their Hopes, and their Merits in just and equal Ballances, and discerning how much the one do's exceed the other, chearfully adore and praise the World's Author and Governour. If this Con­troversie were to be determin'd by such, we should find these even under uneasie and Tyrannical Governments, and in the more barren and niggardly Countries, confuting this Objection by their Chearfulness and Contentment: what would they have done, if Pro­vidence had planted 'em there where a fertile Soil and thriving Trade had unladed the Wealth and Plenty of the World into their Arms, and a mild and gentle Government had secur'd and guarded their Enjoyments? But let us decide the Controversie not by Votes but Reasons, let us consider the State and Nature of the World; is there one in a Thousand who is left utterly un­furnish't of all means of wise and wholesome Instruction, which is the Good of the Soul of Man? or is there one in a Thousand maim'd and defe­ctive [Page 76] in the Powers and Faculties of the Soul, or Senses and Members of the Body? is there one in a Thousand born under so unlucky and envious Planets that he cannot by any Industry or Vertue provide himself a comforta­ble Subsistence? View and Survey the World; Examine and Consider Man, and then tell me whether there be any room for those Reproaches and spite­ful Reflexions by which some men have so outrag'd Nature and Provi­dence? Phylo Judaeus tells us a Rabbi­nical Story to this purpose, that when God had created the World, he deman­ded of a Prophet, whether he saw any thing wanting to consummate and compleat the glorious Work; who told him,Phylo-Jud. de Planta­tione Noae. Nothing, but an Intelligent Being to praise the wise and gracious Architect: God approving the Ad­vice, &c. The Hebrew Philosophers (it seems) thought the World exactly perfect, such a Work as might bespeak God the Author of it: and no wonder, for they were inspired by Moses, who brings in God reflecting upon his own Creation, thus: And God saw [Page 77] every thing that he had made, Gen. 1. and be­hold it was very good. How unlike is all this to the Epicurean Philosophy, whose great Patron Lucretius endea­vours to infer from the Ill-Contrivance, the manifold Defects, the innumera­ble Evils of the World, that God could not be the Creatour of it! That ever that Work by which God design'd to exalt his Glory should be drawn into an occasion of Dishonouring and Re­proaching them! That ever that work which deserv'd the praises of Men and Angels, should at last stand in need of Apologies and Defences! If we look up to the Heavens, such is the Beauty of those Bodies, so uniform and regu­lar their Motions, so exactly are they dispos'd both for Ornament and Ser­vice, that the Speculation naturally exalts the Mind, and insensibly raises it above the Body: Nay, it has temp­ted some to think every Star moved and acted by some understanding Spi­rit. If we look upon the Earth, so wonderful is the Variety, so inconcei­vable the Wealth and Plenty of it, that it is not only sufficient for the Needs [Page 78] and Desires of the Sober and Tempe­rate, but even for the Luxury and Wantonness of the fancyful and In­temperate: Every place almost is a Paradise, there is no Country almost which cannot afford us Tempe, or Cam­pania, opus gaudentis naturae, a Work which Nature seems to have Created when in the gayest and the kindest humour. If there were room for fancy in Sacred things, one would almost think that Moses out of Ignorance of other Countries or love of his own, had confin'd Eden within those narrow Bounds he sets it: and that it had only been lost there, because a fuller Dis­covery of the World had now found it almost every where: This is the World we complain of. Let us now consider Man,Psal. 139. and we shall find with the Psal­mist that he is wonderfully made, he is but a little lower than the Angels; he is crown'd with Glory and Honour, and all the Creatures are put under his Feet: Psal. 8. All the Fowls of the Air, and all the Beasts of the Field, &c. How infinitely wise as well as kind do's God appear in his Contrivance? So modest [Page 79] his Appetites that a small Portion of Nature's good is a full Meal or Feast, and yet so various, that there is nothing in all the provision, in all the joyes and luxuries of Nature, which he is not capable of Tasting and Enjoying: If we regard the Mind of Man, 'tis capable of a most surprizing Satisfa­ction in the Contemplation of the hid­den Powers, the secret Laws and Ope­rations of Nature; nay, it rises higher, it passes the Bounds of Mechanic Na­ture, it entertains it self with Moral Perfections, and the Spiritual Excel­lencies of an invisible World, and gazes on those Charms and Glories which are not subject to the bodily Eye: Vultus nimis lubricos aspici: Such is the Nature of the Soul that when it pleases it can retire within it self, with­draw from Sense, and be secure and Happy in its own Strength and Wealth, Ipsa suis pollens opibus, and when it pleases it can walk forth like Dinah to see the Daughters of the Land, those Beauties that Sense presents it with, and that too (if guarded by aweful Vertue) without the Danger of a [Page 80] Rape. To say all of it in a word, 'tis capable of a share in all the Good, and not necessarily subject to any of the Evil of this World.

If this be a true account of Man, and the state of that World which he inha­bits, if the one be fill'd with all things Necessary and Delightful, and the other be endow'd with all those Capa­cities and Appetites that fit him to en­joy 'em, nay, if his Soul can raise it self above the Pleasures, and exempt it self from the Changes and Revolu­tions of it, nothing is more manifest than that the Evil in life cannot be greater than the Good, unless it be owing to our selves; and to leave this matter beyond Dispute, no man pre­tending to receive Revelation should admit of the contrary Opinion, for no Texts of Divine Writ are more plain than those which proclaim to us God's love of Mankind: that he doth not [Page 81] afflict or grieve willingly the Children of men, that the Book of Creation and Providence is writ all over with the legible Characters of Love, so legible that it renders the Idolatry and Wick­edness of the Gentiles inexcusable, and finally that he gives us Richly all things to enjoy: 1 Tim. 6. where the Apostle excellent­ly expresses at once the Bounty and Design of God. His Bounty in that he gives us all things Richly; his De­sign, not to enkindle and then delude our Desires, by being like the Tree of Life or Knowledge forbidden us, but on purpose to be enjoy'd by us: So then the Christian cannot without contradicting Revelation embrace this Opinion, nor the Atheist or Epicurean without contradicting himself: if Na­ture has contriv'd the World so ill, if it has scatter'd good things with such a sparing and envious hand, whence are all those Transports and Extasies we meet with amongst these Men? what tis the Ground? what is the Matter of [...]'em? whence so rich a Crop of World­ly sensual Pleasures? whence so much dotage on, and fondness for the World [Page 82] we so complain of? whence are the Charms and Irresistible Temptation which the generality of Mankind i [...] vanquish't by? whence is it that Men are so willing to set up their Rest on this side Canaan? whence that dread and aversion of Death as the most formidable Evil? If Nature has been such a Step-mother to Man, if it has fro­wardly and peevishly design'd him lit­tle else but Mischief, whence that sa­gacity and penetration of Mind sear­ching with delight into all the Retire­ments of Nature? whence that Com­prehensive and almost immense Capa­city of Pleasure? whence that strength and greatness of Soul, enabling no [...] only to confront, but to despise Evil and to be Happy in despight of 'em these are Advantages so incomparabl [...] great and good, that no Evils can be ballanced against 'em: and 'tis Eviden [...] that no Writings, no not of the Stoics themselves were ever more stuffed with boasting and daring accounts of the Nature of Man, than those of the Epi­cureans. And thus from all put toge­ther, whether we consult the Nature [Page 83] and state of the World and Man, testi­mony of Revelation or Reason, the Suffrages of the good humour'd and grateful part of Mankind, or the Con­fessions of the Voluptuous and Atheisti­cal, 'tis Evident that Good do's out­weigh Evil in the Design of God or Nature. But have I not my self in the beginning of this Treatise presented the Reader with a large Catalogue of E­vils? Yes, But not of God's Creation but our own: for the Truth of the whole is [...]. Not things themselves but the Shades and Fantasms, wanton, su­perstitious, effeminate or froward Minds do raise about 'em, disturb the quiet and repose of Man. So then, if we our selves do not multiply the Number of our Evils, our share of Good in life may be much greater than our share of Evil; and if we be not accessory to our own Misery, we may be Happy. Unless,

Secondly,2. The Effi­cacy of Evil not greater than that of Good. Evil hath so much of Ve­nom and Malignity in it, that a little Evil contributes more to our Misery, [Page 84] than a great deal of Good can to our Happiness. We may here judge of the force and energy of Good and Evil either by that Influence they generally have, or that they ought to have upon the state of Mankind: if we consider what Impressions they ought to make upon Men, the question will come to a speedy and a Happy Issue; for then we must either reckon nothing an Evil but a Moral one, that is Sin and Vice; or at least we must acknow­ledge that the Venom and Malignity of other Evils is not comparable to that of Moral ones: This latter opinion is an unquestionable Truth, for who wil [...] not make a wide difference between a Misfortune and a Crime, between an Affliction and a Punishment, between those Inconveniences, Trouble, and Pain which we suffer as guilty Crimi­nals, and those we suffer as unfortu­nate Innocents, or afflicted Hero's or Saints? for notwithstanding the Evils or Pains should be in the matter of 'em the same; yet there is a vast difference in the Suffering, the one makes Man much more miserable than the other [Page 85] for our Misfortunes should only reach the Body not the Mind: But when we suffer for our Crimes, the whole Man suffers, the Soul as well as Body: Mis­fortunes, when the Storm is o'repast leave no deform'd Ruines, no Wounds nor Scars behind 'em; but our Crimes leave stains and guilt behind, which haunt the Mind with perpetual horrour. From this Distinction of the Nature and Effect of Evils we may infer this Comfortable Conclusion; That no­thing can make man wholly, truly mi­serable but himself; Nothing can op­press him by the weight of Moral Evils, but his own Choice, for nothing can compel or necessitate him to be wicked; the stroaks, the wounds of natural Evils (so I will call all the rest distinct from moral and owing their Being to the Revolutions of time and Chance and Nature, &c.) are faint and slight; the Mind of Man ought not to suffer it self to be too deeply and sensibly affected by them: it is the work of Reason and Religion to fortifie the Mind against the Impressions of these Evils: and truly that Mind that [Page 86] is furnish't with true Notions of things, with a rational and solid Faith, with steady and well-grounded hopes may bear the impetuous shock of all these Waves and Storms, calm and unmov'd; Nay, I may boldly affirm, not only that Vertue checks and controuls these Evils, blunts their Edge and abates their force; but what is more, that their natural strength, their own pro­per force is weak and contemptible; unless our own Vices be combin'd and confederated with 'em against us: Our Pride must aid our Enemy to ren­der his affront provoking; Our Cove­tousness and Ambition must assist For­tune to render its Contempt or Hatred of us destructive to the Tranquillity of our state. Falshood under a disguise of Friendship could never have abus'd our Confidence, by betraying our Infir­mities, or forsaking us in Affliction, had not our own folly and self-conceit first betray'd us, exposing us a naked prey to Flattery and Treachery: The Cold­ness or Neglect of great Men could never wound us, the hollow deceitful Professions of those above us could ne­ver [Page 87] fool or fret us, did not the fond­ness of our own desires betray us first into vain Presumption and a flattering Credulity: The Storm that snatcheth away a Relation or a Friend could ne­ver overthrow me, if I stood upon my own Bottom, if I were not guilty of one of the greatest weaknesses, of pla­cing my Happiness in any thing out of my own Power, and so making my self dependent upon another mans fan­cy or fortune. Finally Death it self must derive its terrors from the mourn­ful Solemnities we dress it in, from the darkness and horrours of our deluded Imaginations; or else it would prove but a contemptible Bugbear, a very inconsiderable Evil, or none at All. Thus 'tis Evident, that if we distin­guish Evils into Natural and Moral, we shall have little reason to think the In­fluence of Evil so Malignant and Dead­ly, since 'tis in our own Power to avoid moral Evils, and natural ones strike but half way, they wound not the Soul that is arm'd and guarded with Reason and Religion. But now,

[Page 88]If with the Stoics we should admit of no other sort of Evil but what is Mo­ral, if we should allow the name of Good to nothing but Vertue, or of Evil to nothing but Vice, then we must look upon Temporal and External Misfortunes as Inconveniences and Disadvantages only, they may make us less Happy, but they cannot make us miserable; And truly if we should here suppose or take for granted that there were another life, or that the pleasure of Vertue triumphing over Calamities and Afflictions were consi­derably great, this opinion cannot im­ply so great an Absurdity as some would fasten upon it; or be a mere [...] or Idle Contention of words, since I cannot tell, with what Conso­nancy to Truth, or Propriety of Speech we can call those troubles or hardships Evils which directly tend to procure for us an infinite Good, a Pleasure which doth abundantly out­weigh our Sufferings. I 'think 'tis now sufficiently Evident that natural Evils are not of that mighty Efficacy & deadly Venomous quality that it should [Page 89] be thought that a little Evil doth more effectually contribute to our Misery than a great deal of Good can to our Happiness: 'tis apparent how slight the Impressions are which they ought to make upon us. It will now be time to consider what impressions they do generally make upon us, what their real Effect commonly is, how men ge­nerally are mov'd and affected by them. 'Tis true there are some that mix Heaven and Earth upon every slight occasion, that will receive Good but no Evil at the hand of God, most insensible of Blessing, but extremely tender and sensible of any Evil; but this speaks not the Nature of Evil, but of the Man; it speaks him ingrateful, but not the Evil intolerable. Nor is humane Nature to be measur'd by this whining querulous humour of a few, but by the sense and temper of the Ge­nerality; amongst whom 'tis easie to observe, how Instinct teaches us to elude the stroak and force of Evil, Nature opens its Arms and enlarges it self to receive good, and all the Pow­ers of the mind greedily strive to share [Page 90] in it, but it contracts and shrinks, re­tires and stands upon its Defence at the Approach of Evil, 'tis apt to flatter it self, and apt to hope, apt to lessen Evil, and magnifie Good, apt to put off the thoughts of approaching trouble, and to anticipate its Pleasures; 'tis full of great Designs and gaudy Projects, and easily prone to delight, and content it self with thin, airy, and imaginary Schemes of Good; this and much more is Evident in a Thousand daily instances of humane life, by which 'tis plain Nature in the Contrivance of Man kindly designed to fit and dispose him for Happiness by giving him such In­clinations as might serve to lessen the Evil, to increase the Good, to supply the Defects of this mortal and imper­fect state. Is it not manifest that whereas Evil looks less to us, Good looks bigger at a Distance, we are wil­ling to help Fortune, and call in the Aids of fancy to adorn and enrich her gifts; nor is it easie to defeat Man of this Humour, he Dreams of a bottom­less Abyss in every Good, in every Pleasure, and notwithstanding the dai­ly [Page 91] Confutations of Experience, he still desires to repeat his Enjoyments o're again, as if he did still hope to find some new untasted sweet, some plea­sure undiscover'd untry'd before: how apt are we to flatter our selves, and willing to be flatter'd, every Man re­presents himself and state under the fairest Idea that he can possibly frame of it, and turns away his Eye and Thought from every thing that may offend him: Beauty, Strength, Health, Understanding, Wisdom, Reputation, Attendants, Power, Wealth, and what­ever future Good he can form thô but a slender Pretension to, make up the gay Idea, nay, and even long life and undisturb'd security are there drawn as two Pillars to support the Building; the Daring but kind Confidence of Man that makes himself the Master of Fate and Fortune! if you should mark this Tablet with e're so prying and curious an Eye, you would not be able to discover either Deformity or Folly, or Dishonour, or Poverty, or Disease or Death: for these Man kind to himself banishes far from his [Page 92] Thoughts, and suffers not to enter in­to the Portraicture of himself: And hence 'tis that most Men never disturb life with the Apprehension of its End, and never feel Death till they are dy­ing; Kind Instinct shewing us an easier way to lessen this Evil, than the Rea­son of most Philosophers ever could, making our suffering extreamly short, and even then too almost in the midst of Death men fondly Dream of and hope for life, and can scarcely suffer their hope to expire in the last gasp: Nay, so willing to be deluded, so easie to be impos'd upon are Men, that they make even those things which are the Trophies of Death, and the Monu­ments of Man's Frailty and Vanity, minister to them some slight Comforts at least against Mortality; they di­vert and entertain themselves with the Mourning and Pomp of their Ob­sequies, with Blacks and Tombs, with the dying Eccho's of surviving Repu­tation, and with the grandure and fe­licity of their Posterity; as if they did fondly perswade themselves that they should be concern'd in all these things, [Page 93] that something beyond the Grave did relate to them, and that they did not utterly perish and dye. And if this kind as well as obstinate hope do in some measure break the force of the greatest Evil that is Death; we cannot but expect that it should be highly serviceable to Man in moving him to despise, or enabling him to vanquish less Evils; hence 'tis that no examples of the Inconstancy or Change of for­tune, of the incertainty of Royal or Po­pular favour, no Instances of slighted Service, deluded Hope, sudden Death, or any thing of this kind are sufficient to discourage the attempts, the pur­suits of Mankind after worldly things, we boldly adventure upon those Seas which we see scatter'd o're with nume­rous Wrecks, and confidently pursue those Paths where we every moment meet with the ominous Ruines of dis­appointed hope, and fruitless drudge­ry, and baffled presumption. Thus it is, I determin'd not that thus it ought to be, I examin'd not what is here the office of Philosophy or the work of Vertue, I have only barely represented [Page 94] the humour and inclination of Man, only that you may see that he is not such a defenceless shiftless Creature, but that his Reason dares confront and can vanquish Evils in open Battle, and by downright force, and instinct tea­ches him how to elude 'em by various and those (if well conducted) useful and innocent Arts. After all it doth therefore manifestly appear that as the Number of Evils is not greater than that of Goods, so neither is the Vigour and Energy of the one so much greater than that of the other, that a little Evil should out-weigh a great deal of Good, that a little Evil should contri­bute more to a man's Misery, than a great deal of Good to his Happiness There remains nothing further to be examin'd, but

3. Man's Good or E­vil depends upon him­self.Thirdly, That Fancy which ascribes Man's portion of Good and Evil, to time or chance, &c. not Man's Vertue or Industry, to any thing but to him­self; and he that can with Confidence affirm this, may with as good grace assert, that there is neither Wisdom nor Folly in the World; for if there [Page 95] be, this Imagination must soon vanish, since Wisdom is nothing else but the choice of true Good and rejection of Evil, the pursuit of our true Happiness by all the most rational and probable means, and a declining and flying from all those things that are repug­nant to it. And thô success and good fortune do not always attend Wisdom and Vertue, yet you shall never per­swade any but Madmen or Fools that 'tis in vain to be Vertuous, or irratio­nal to be Wise. Solomon has indeed observ'd as an instance or proof of the vanity of all things,Eccles. 9. That the Race is not to the swift, nor the Battle to the strong, neither yet Bread to the Wise, nor yet Riches to men of Ʋnderstanding, nor yet favour to men of Skill: I ex­empt not the wise from subjection to Time and Chance, which is all that Solomon complains of here; but not­withstanding I must ever think with him,Eccles. 2. that Wisdom excels folly as much as light doth darkness; not only be­cause chearful, delightful to it self, but also because 'tis the Happiest guide of humane Life, blest generally with suc­cess [Page 96] as well as Rich in intrinsick Good, and in some measure self-sufficient: Nor do's our English Proverb Fools have the fortune, imply any more than that the Prosperity of Fools is to be imputed to their Fortune, that of Wise men to their Merit, that success do's com­monly wait upon Vertue and Wisdom, and nothing but an extraordinary Chance can turn it upon the Fool or Sinner; thô all this while I under­stand Success in things necessary not superfluous, for I cannot see how it can be any disparagement to Providence to turn that Plenty another way, which would not like soft distilling Rains and Dew cherish, refresh, and increase the tender Plants, Wisdom and Vertue, but like a Flood wash away the Earth from their Roots, and either utterly extirpate 'em, or leave 'em oppress'd and buried in Rubbish: If this were not true, if the Experience as well as Reason of Mankind did not confirm it, Men would not serve Apprentiships to Trades, Men would not study Arts or Sciences, Men would not strive with toil and hazard to make their [Page 97] Point, but lazily and securely stay till Fortune rain its Golden Showers into their Laps.

By a Recapitulation of all that has been hitherto discours'd, it may easily appear how far I have advanc'd in the proof of that Assertion I undertook to make Good, namely, that Happiness may be attain'd in this World; I have shew'd that Religion doth no way ob­struct our present Happiness, that Du­ty of Mortification which it enjoyns, not forbidding us to allow the World a proper place in our Esteem, but to over­value it, but to doat upon it; not for­bidding us the Enjoyment, but abuse of the things of this World. No man therefore will ever be able to prove that this Doctrine is injurious to our Happiness, till he be able to convince us that 'tis indispensibly necessary to our Happiness to doat upon these Tem­poral things, and to be as irrational and intemperate in our Enjoyment of 'em as our Passion for 'em: which he can never go about to do, without contradicting not only reveal'd Truth, but also the Universal Reason and Ex­perience [Page 98] of Mankind. I have in the next place shew'd, that some are hap­pier than others, or at least less misera­ble, That this Distinction of the Con­dition or state of Men is to be imputed to the Vertues of some, and the Vices of others. I have shew'd in the last place that the World abounds with good things, that there is no Appetite nor Capacity of Man that may not find Objects proper and agreeable, and such as in a great measure may delight and satisfie; and that Man is endow'd with such a variety of faculties, and senses, that there is scarce any thing in all the variety of Beings the World contains, which he is not capable of enjoying. From whence it clearly fol­lows, That Man may be happy in the Enjoyment of these good things, un­less the Evil of life sour and imbitter the Good, or the attainment of the Good be out of the Power of Man, to remove all suspicion of both which, I discours'd something thô briefly of the Nature of Evil, and the Nature of Man, evincing plainly the Impotence and Feebleness of the one, and the Strength [Page 99] and Preparations of the other; and for the Close of all, I have endeavour'd to make it manifest that Good and Evil are not so much the Result of Time or Chance, &c. as the Necessary Conse­quence of Wisdom and Folly. From all which the Conclusion that naturally arises is this; That if Man be misera­ble 'tis his own fault, or which is all one, a Man may be happy if he will, which was the thing to be prov'd. Let us try now by a Close Application of all that has been said to the Wants and Necessities of Mankind, what the Evi­dence, what the Conviction, what the real use and force of this Discourse is. I am unhappy, I am miserable; whoe're thou art that say'st so, thou must needs mean one of these two things. Thou do'st enjoy no good or art opprest with Evil: If the latter, I demand what Evil? speak out; speak plainly. There are three sorts of Evils; the Evils of the Mind, the Evils of the Body, the Evils of Fortune. Which of those art thou opprest by? The Evils of the Mind? These are either sinful Passions, or what is the Effect of them, [Page 100] guilty Fears: Nothing can compel thee to be wicked, cease to be wicked, and thou wilt cease to fear. The Evils of the Body? they are generally the Ef­fect of unruly Passions and a disorderly Life; and where they are not, the Pleasures of the Mind will outweigh the Pains of the Body. The Evils of Fortune? 'tis in thy Power, whether these shall be really Evils, or no; they befall thy Possessions not thee; the foo­lish and vicious Mind only suffers in these, the Wise and Vertuous one is much above them; 'tis therefore thy own fault if thou be oppressed with Evil. But wilt thou say the former? I enjoy no Good, no satisfactory Good. why? is there no Good to be enjoy'd? I have already prov'd the contrary; and if I had not, how easie were it here to do it? there's Truth to enter­tain thy Understanding; Moral Per­fections to delight thy Will; Variety of Objects to treat thy senses, the Excel­lencies of the visible and invisible World to be enjoy'd by thee: why then do'st thou defer to live? why do'st thou not begin to enjoy? here [Page 101] 'tis Evident that thou must be forc't to say one of these Two things, either That thou art not capable of Enjoying these Blessings, or that they are out of thy Reach, out of thy Power: to say thou art not capable of 'em is to re-renounce the faculties of thy Soul and the senses of thy Body; to say they are out of thy Reach, is in Effect to say that Vertue and Vice, Wisdom and Folly are all one; or which is every jot as absur'd, that thou art wicked and sottish, and can'st not help it. And this is that indeed which in Effect, all do say that accuse Fortune, or Fate, or Nature, or any thing but themselves as the Causes of their Misery: and yet as absur'd as this is, it must be now examin'd, because the Minds of Men are perverted and discourag'd by such Notions, I will proceed there­fore to the Third thing propos'd. That is,

SECT. III. To answer the Objections against the At­tainment of Happiness.

THose who deny the Possibility of attaining Happiness in this Life, are of two sorts; First, such who argue from Experience and Ob­servation (without troubling them­selves to assign any Reason or Cause of what they affirm) No man ever has been Happy; and therefore No man can: This has in part been already answer'd, and shall more fully in the close of this Chapter. Secondly, Such who assign a Cause or Reason, why some are miserable and cannot possibly be otherwise. The Number of these, if men would talk Coherently, if they would be firm, and steady to their Principles, would be very small: for as the Belief of a God, the Creator and Governor of the World, destroys Fate; so doth the Denial of a God destroy the Liberty of the Mind of Man, and render all its motion as Determinate [Page 103] and Necessary, as that of Fire, or Air, or any inanimate Body whatever: and therefore (as it were fit) the Atheist only should oppose this Proposition, and he who has excluded God out of the World, should exclude Happiness too: for if whatever be not voluntary (I speak of Humane Misery) be neces­sary and unavoidabe, and whatever be so, be Fatal, as needs it must, for I am not able to distinguish between a fatal Event, and one that is Necessary and unavoidable: Then it naturally follows, that the Atheist only should deny the possibility of attaining Hap­piness, as he who only asserts Fate. But the Reasonings of many men are wild and inconsistent, and therefore some who widely differ in their Princi­ples, do yet conclude and center in one common Errour; and thus it hap­pens here, Theists as well as Atheists endeavouring to introduce Fate into the World, and consequently to make the misery of such as are miserable in­voluntary, fatal, and unavoidable: 'tis true, he that affirms some men to be unavoidably miserable, doth not [Page 104] deny, that others may be Happy; but he doth in Effect discourage all who are not already Happy, from endea­vouring to be so: and therefore must here be oppos'd by me.

Now 'tis true that I might this way with one stroke cut off all Objections at once; for he that baffles the Opi­nion of Fate, leaves every man in a Capacity of Happiness, and proves his misery voluntary; for that Choice which Man makes, being not necessa­rily or fatally determin'd to it, is a vo­luntary one; and this were a very easie Task. For first, I do not know, that there were ever any in the World (a few only excepted) so addicted to maintain an Universal Fate, as that they did not exempt the Mind of Man from its Soveraignty and Dominion (of which anon) and in the second place, if any at this Day do not, as a Philosopher once prov'd, motion by walking; so were it as easie and ready a way to prove the Liberty of Man­kind by some free Choice or other: But when one is oblig'd to answer Objections, that Method must be ta­ken, [Page 105] not which the Nature of things invites to, but the manner of Mens proposing their Opinions compels to; Therefore because men do generally impute their Misery to either God, Fortune, Fate, or their own Incapacity of Happiness; I will speak distinctly to each of these. And,

First, I'le endeavour to shew that God is not the Cause of any man's Misery, to which purpose I must assert and vindicate the infinite Goodness of God, and his love of Mankind: If what Epictetus said with respect to many Gods had been spoke, with re­spect to one, nothing had ever been said with more exact truth, or a better pois'd judgment,Epicteti. Enchirid. c. 37. [...]. The first and Chief thing in Religion is to have Rational and true Notions of God, it being otherwise impossible that Religion should serve the great Inte­rest of God's Glory, and Man's Hap­piness: for false and unworthy No­tions of him must needs bereave God of the Honour and Worship due to him [Page 106] from his Creatures, by alienating the Minds of Men from him, and betray­ing 'em into Superstition, Idolatry or Atheism: and thus that Religion which was design'd to glorifie God by the manifestation and acknowledgment of his Divine Excellencies and Perfections, and to advance Man into a state of Blessedness, by influencing his life, and filling his Mind with Security and Chearfulness, shall be perverted to Ends directly contrary, and prove instru­mental to Dishonour God and render Man miserable. The truth of this has been too too Evident in those visible Effects the Ignorance, or misrepresen­tation of the Divine Nature produc't amongst the Gentils, the want of con­ceiving aright his Omnipotence and Immensity, &c. joyn'd with the nu­merous Necessities of Mankind did bring forth, or at least confirm Poly­theism; Groundless Apprehensions of Cruelty in God brought forth Super­stition, and the Absurdities of Poly­theism and Superstition gave Being to Atheism: and at this Day there are many mischiefs which I must impute [Page 107] either to false Notions of God, or want of just Consideration of the true Ones, or at least to not arguing clearly and truly from 'em. For from one of these Reasons it proceeds, that the Worship of some Men is so slight, empty and trifling; the Religion of others so me­lancholy and uncomfortable, and tru­ly Superstitious; and I am afraid there is too much of Atheistical loos­ness, sensual, carnal Presumption and wretchless Despair, and many other Evils owing to the same Cause: had Men worthy Notions of God, how were it possible they should ever fancy, that God would accept the Sincerity and Devotion of a Communicant sit­ting, but not kneeling? after Supper, but not in the Morning? that the whiteness of the Garment would pol­lute and unhallow the Spiritual Sacri­fice of Prayer and Praises? and such like. Would not a right Notion of God easily convince such a weak and scrupulous trifler, That God were not to be pleas'd but by sincere and sub­stantial Holiness and Righteousness, nor to be displeas'd but by voluntary [Page 108] wickedness? All things else weighing nothing in the Ballance of the Sanctu­ary, and not deserving the Notice or Regard of the Governour of the World: and thô such a one should suppose his scruples warranted by Divine Com­mand, and consequently because the Soveraignty of God renders all his Commandments indisputably Authori­tative and binding, he should therefore think himself as indispensibly oblig'd to reject these things, as to shun a Sin; yet even here a right Understanding of the Divine Nature, would soon instruct him how to distinguish the Divine Commands, and teach him that those which did enjoyn Holiness and Righ­teousness were the standing and Fun­damental Laws of the Divine Govern­ment; that those which did enjoyn Duties subservient to that End were of an Inferiour Nature, and did bind in proportion to their Necessity and Ten­dency; that such as did enjoyn or for­bid things of a more remote and di­stant Nature, Circumstantial, Ri­tual, &c. were merely Positive and Arbitrary, Temporary and mutable, [Page 109] and the interposing Necessity of Supe­riour Duties is at any time sufficient to supersede their Obligation. To pro­ceed to other Effects of mis conceptions of the Divine Nature, how were it possible that any one who rightly un­derstood the unspeakable goodness of God should, after he had done all he could, be tormented with doubtful Fears and Jealousies concerning his state, nay sometimes with a melancho­ly dread of God, as if he were a hard Master and impossible to be pleas'd? or how could such a perswasion as this, That one were Damn'd from Eternity, and that neither Prayers, nor Tears, nor Industry could ever reverse the fatal Sentence, find any Entertainment in that Man who were possessed with a true sense and firm belief of the boundless love which God has for all his Rational Creatures?

It is evident therefore of what Im­portance 'tis to propagate and settle in the Minds of Men a right Understand­ing of the Divine Nature; and of all the Attributes of God, there are none that have a more immediate and pow­erful [Page 110] Influence either upon the Con­duct of Man's Life, or the Comfort of his Mind, than these two, his Holiness and Goodness: These make us willing and desirous to believe that there is a God, these make us love him and de­pend upon him, as one from whom we may rationably expect all that is Good, [...], Epict. He that comes to God (saith St. Paul) must believe that he is, and that he is a Rewarder of all those that diligently seek him. These words do not only assert the Being of a God; but also his Holiness and Goodness; both which may be clearly infer'd from three Propositions couch'd in those words of the Apostle, that he is a Rewarder of them that diligently seek him: First, That all men may seek God diligently if they will; Secondly; That it is the desire of God that they should do so; and Thirdly, That God will reward all that do so: On these Principles is Religion founded, on these Principles the Honour of God, and the Happiness of Man must be esta­blish't: I will therefore discourse here, First, of the Goodness; and Secondly, [Page 111] of the Holiness of God, which I distin­guish from one another only for Me­thods sake.

Cruelty was the property of the Gentil Gods, not of the true God,Of the Good­ness of God. Humane Blood in which the Canaa­nites, Carthaginians, and others Sa­crific'd, was an Oblation fit for Baal, Moloch, &c. that is, for Devils not for God: Innate Wrath and Cruelty is in­consistent with a Happy Nature or a Happy state, for these are furious and tormenting Passions: Nor can we ima­gin that such a Being should make its Residence in Heaven, a place of Peace and Love, or be delighted with Halle­lujah's and Adorations of Angels; This were no Pleasure, no Musick to a Be­ing in whom Wrath and Cruelty were Predominant. Nor were those Good, those Holy, those Charitable Spirits fit Attendance, fit Ministers for such a Being; No, could we suppose (as some Hereticks once fancy'd) that there were two first Principles, A good and bad one? could we sup­pose there were an Evil God? one in whom Cruelty, and Wrath were his [Page 112] beloved Attributes? We must necessa­rily conclude that he would make Hell his Court, that his Guards and Cour­tiers would be Fiends and Furies, and that the shrieks and torments of wret­ched Creatures would be the Pleasure, the Harmony he delighted in; this were a God fit for a Hobbist, one who can discern no difference between Ver­tue and Vice, between Good and Evil, between Love or Charity and Devil­lishness. And yet, I cannot in Charity, but retract and condemn this thought; for Oh! no other God is fit for him, but he whom he denieth! no other God is fit for such a Wretch but the God of Love and Mercy! to whom I recommend him and proceed. All who believe a God, must believe him a most perfect Being, for whence else should the scatter'd Perfections of his Creatures have Beginning? But if any man will say, that there is no Diffe­rence between Perfections and Imper­fections, I would know, why doth he reverence Wisdom more than Folly? or why he doats on Beauty rather than Deformity? or if he tell me, that he [Page 113] acknowledges a Distinction between Natural, but none between Moral Per­fections or Imperfections; not to urge that the Vertues of the Will are as truly Natural as those of the Under­standing, the Capacities of and Apti­tudes to each being born with us, not the habits, and the one being as agree­able to the Nature and Consonant to the Interest of Man as the other; I will ask him, why he do's not love the froward and peevish as well as the Sweet and Gentle? the Cruel and Im­placable, as well as the Kind and Cha­ritable? the Proud and Wilful as well as the Humble and Modest? and what­ever answer he gives me, will abun­dantly serve to refute his fancy; If then there be Natural and Moral Per­fections, and God be the most perfect Being, we must needs ascribe to him those Properties which we look upon as Perfections in his Rational Crea­tures, and that in such degrees as ex­empt him from all Imperfection; if therefore Goodness, Charity, Clemency be universally acknowledg'd for Perfe­ctions, we must necessarily suppose [Page 114] them in God in the most perfect De­gree: Nor let any one think it absurd that the same should be the Vertues o [...] God and Man, of a finite and an infi­nite Being, for we suppose them in God in a manner suitable to His Maje­sty, and in Man in a manner suitable to his meanness; and unless we ac­knowledge this, there cannot possibly be any settled and certain Reason for our Love, or Hope, or Dependence the great parts of Divine Worship: That therefore God is Good and Mer­ciful, a lover of Mankind, was ever the constant and unanimous sense o [...] the wise and good part of Mankind▪ Poets indeed and Painters degenerous dastardly, [...], Plu­tarch De Supersti­tione. cruel and vicious Men did represent the Deity under hideous Shapes and in such Colours, as their guilty Fears or Vices furnish't 'em with but Philosophers, as Plutarch observes, were always wont to represent him most amiable and lovely, always tem­pering his Majesty with Love and Goodness, his Power and Justice, with Tenderness, Mercy and Compassion to­wards Mankind. Hence it was that [Page 115] they were wont to attribute all those things that were extreamly useful and beneficial, to God as the Author of 'em, as Government, Laws, Arts and Sciences, &c. they look't upon their Gods as the Guides and Guardians of Men, and ascrib'd to 'em whatever they atchiev'd bravely and Happily in life: But on the other hand, froward­ness, wrath and cruelty did ever seem so ugly and detestable to Wise and Ver­tuous men, that they not only despis'd but abhorr'd as well the wickedness as folly of Superstition, which represented God, or rather dishonour'd him under such Characters:Ibid. [...]. And this Notion of the Deity which represented that Be­ing which was kind and benign, as terrible and dreadful; which was gra­cious and fatherly, as Tyrannical; which was friendly and careful of us, as injurious and hurtful; which was mild and gentle as fierce and savage; gave such a distast and disgust to all ingenious Tempers, that they thought [Page 116] Atheism a much more Excusable Im­piety than Superstition; Hence is that of Plutarch (so generally prais'd by all Writers) [...],Ibid. [...]. I had rather men should say of me, there neither was, nor is such a one as Plu­tarch, than that they shou'd say, that he was a man of a fickle, unconstant froward, revengeful and implacable temper. Let us not therefore enter­tain such an Idea of God, as Humane Nature would recoil from, and start back pale and scared at the sight: Let us not fasten those Characters upon God, which a good-temper'd man, if charg'd with 'em would look upon, as the foulest Reproaches and most inju­rious Accusations; Especially since a Defect is not only more Conspicuous, but more Reproachful, where there should be nothing but Perfection: And Peevishness and Cruelty are infinitely more mischievous in an Almighty than [Page 117] Impotent Being: I might shun Poly­crates, Dionysius, Periander, &c. but how should I shun God? I might leave Samos, Sicily, or Corinth, and where Clemency and Justice made their Abode, I might make mine: But whi­ther should I go, what place should be my Refuge, if the Governour of the World were but an Almighty Tyrant? Thus 'tis manifest such kind of Repre­sentations of God tend not to enamour Man of God, but to alienate and estrange him: they tend not to ad­vance Religion but Superstition; they tend to make Men dread God, but not love him; they are therefore to be banish't out of the World, and God is to be represented such as our Dear Lord, who lay in the Bosom of his Father has reveal'd him, A God of Hope, a God of Love, a God who is a Rewarder of them that diligently seek him. This is the Dictate of Nature, This is the Dictate of the Spirit, God is Love. Let it not be thought an absurd or barren Tautology, thô I should recite this one Text a Thousand times oft'ner than I do: for no Tongue can express the Di­vine [Page 118] Nature so much to the life, as his who was inspir'd by the Spirit of God, the Spirit of Love.

Nor let God's dealings with the Gentil World before the Revelation of Christianity be alledg'd as an Objection against the Goodness of God, and his Tenderness and Compassion for Man­kind;Act. 14. and 17. 'tis true, God in times past suf­fer'd all Nations to walk in their own ways; and the times of this Ignorance he winked at: he published no reveal'd Law to the Gentiles from Heaven, he deputed no Prophets to 'em, as to his People the Jews, with a Commission to restore by Signs and Miracles, that Natural Religion conformably to which they were to Worship God: which is the Import of those places of St. Paul; and yet 'tis true that the Belief of the Living and true God, and the natural Law of Good and Evil was strangely effac'd and obliterated amongst the Gentils: but notwithstanding all this, it must be remembred too; 1. That God left not himself without a witness in any age of Gentilism: the Heathen were never destitute of so much Light [Page 119] as might have conducted 'em to God, and that Happiness he design'd 'em: for besides the Traditions transmitted from Noah to Posterity, the Book of Nature and Providence was ever open to 'em, and this did in most legi­ble Characters assert the Being of one Supreme God, and instructed 'em in the Knowledge of his Power and Good­ness; Thus St. Paul, Acts 14. Nevertheless he left not himself without witness, in that he did good, and gave us Rain from Heaven, and fruitful Seasons, filling our hearts with Food and Gladness. Nor was this Testi­mony so unsuccess­ful,Sunt autem alii Philosophi & hi quidem magni at (que) nobiles, qui Deo­rum mente at (que) ratione omnem mun­dum administrari & regi censeant, ne (que) verò id solum, sed etiam ab iisdem vitae hominum consuli & Provideri: Nam & fruges & re­liqua quae terra pariat, & tempe­states, ac tem porum Varietates, coeli (que) mutationes, quibus omnia, quae terra gignat, maturata pubes­cant, à Diis Immortalibus tribui generi humano putant. Cic. l. 1. De Natura Deorum. but that in all Ages there were some Excellent men who did ascribe the Ori­ginal & Government of the World to God, and gave such an ac­count of his Holiness and Goodness as was sufficient to have founded a Rational and Excellent Worship upon: these were so many Lights shining in dark [Page 120] places, as so many Justifications of Di­vine Providence, and Reproaches of Man's wilful Stupidity.

2. 'Tis not in the least to be doubt­ed, but that the Nature of their Duty and consequently the Condition of their Happiness was Proportion'd and Conform'd to those Manifestations which God made 'em, to those Obli­gations which he laid before 'em, and to that Strength and Assistance which he Vouchsafed 'em: for God is not a hard Master, he will not make good the Accusation of the wicked Servant; he will not take up what he laid not down, Luk. 19. nor reap what he did not sow. In a word, if God do at the last Day deal with Men according to those several Oeconomies of his Providence which they were under, and if he has afforded all Nations means proportionable to those Duties he requir'd of them, and to those Degrees of Happiness to which he design'd them, then he was always the God of the Gentiles as well as once of the Jews, or now of the Chri­stians, and there is no one part in the whole series of Providence which can [Page 121] give us any Colour to call into que­stion the Care or Goodness of God to­wards Mankind. This I think is enough to remove this Objection as it lay in my way: if my Design did not hasten me on, and I did not judge this Satisfa­ctory, I could easily make appear God's Goodness to the Gentils, by pre­senting the Reader with a Scheme of the Religion of the Pythagoreans, Pla­tonics, and Stoics; by examining the Difference of the Idolatry of the Wise and Vertuous part of the Gentil World, and that of the sottish and vicious part of it; by considering the Assistances that God vouchsafed 'em, and giving an Account whence it came to pass that the Worship of one true God by Holiness and Ver­tue, was so far stifled and oppress'd in the Gentil World: But I have said enough to Vindicate the Goodness of God; and the state of Gentils and In­fidels do's not so nearly concern my present Enquiry, as to deserve so exact a Discussion.

The Barrenness of some Countries, the Servitude and Poverty of some Peo­ple [Page 122] is a much slighter Objection; for till it can appear, that Poverty is an Enemy to Vertue, or that Wealth which is the Instrument of Luxury, and the Nurse of Sloth and Wantonness, is absolutely necessary to Man's Happi­ness, it will weigh but very little a­gainst so many Demonstrations of Di­vine Love, that he has not heap'd upon all Nations so many Temporal Blessings as might put 'em into a Ca­pacity of being Lazy, Wanton and In­solent.

Now give me leave to make a stand, and like a Traveller when he has gain'd an Ascent, look back upon the way I have gone, and see how much of my Journey I have dispatch't: My Under­taking was to demonstrate the Love of God to Mankind; thus far I have ad­vanc'd towards this with undeniable Evidence; I have proved, That Pee­vishness, Malignity and Cruelty can­not belong to God, because this were inconsistent with the Perfection of his Nature, or the Happiness of his State: nor can it rationally be suppos'd, that the same Properties should belong to [Page 123] those Evil Spirits which for a long time deluded the World, and that God who has done so much to destroy that King­dom of Darkness, and rescuing Man, to restore him to a Capacity of Happiness and Glory: how could it be, that God should have done so much, as it is apparent he has, in the Contexture of our Nature, and the Contrivance of our state, to make us in Love with Goodness, and irreconcileably Enemies to Tyranny, Cruelty, Arbitrary Re­venge, &c. if he himself were passio­nate, furious, and Arbitrary in his Cruelties? Nay, I have advanc'd fur­ther, and have prov'd, Secondly, That boundless Love and Goodness are the unquestionable Attributes of God, for the very same Arguments which ex­clude all manner of Imperfections and Evils from the Deity, do necessarily assert to it all manner of Perfection and Good: Nor doth the unconceivable Majesty and Eminence of the Divine Nature only, but also the Indigence and Weakness of Humane Nature re­quire this; since without it, he could not be the Object of our Love or De­pendence, [Page 124] nor consequently our Wor­ship: Having proceeded thus far and prov'd that Tyranny or Cruelty are utterly repugnant to the Divine Na­ture; and boundless Love and Good­ness the Essential and Inseparable Pro­perties of it; I do not think it Neces­sary to prove that the Emanations o [...] this his Goodness do extend even to Man; for thô the Epicureans acknow­ledging God Perfect, did at the same time allow him no other Imployment than the Enjoyment of his own Perfe­ctions; and thô Aristotle confin'd the Providence of God, and consequently the Irradiation of his Goodness within Heaven; and thô lastly before the Cre­ation of the World, we are uncapable of conceiving any Subjects, about which Divine Love could exercise it self, and consequently can conceive of it no otherwise than confin'd within himself; All which seems to conclude thus much that the Deity may be infi­nitely good, and yet this Goodness not extend it self to Man: All this con­cerns not our present question, for thô Man should not be the Object of Di­vine [Page 125] Goodness, yet if God be infinitely good, this will be enough to free Man from unreasonable and superstitious fear of him, and to acquit God from the least suspicion of being the Cause of Humane Misery; which is the ut­most I was oblig'd to make good, in pursuance of the design of this Chap­ter: Besides, they who accuse God of their Misery, do not suppose him un­concern'd about all things but himself, as Epicurus, nor bound and limit his Providence within the Enclosures of Heaven, but do plainly suppose all the affairs of Mankind to depend upon the first Contrivance of God in the Crea­tion, or upon the Over-ruling Influen­ces of his Providence in his present Government of the World: However, I am not willing to quit one Inch of the ground I have got, and therefore I cannot but acknowledge, that the World being now created, and Man­kind form'd after God's Image ( [...], we are his Offspring, saith St. Paul out of the Poet) unactive and unconcern'd Love seems to me a Con­tradiction, and infinite, boundless Good­ness [Page 126] confined within Heaven cannot but seem as gross a one: let it there­fore remain an unshaken truth, The God is Good, and that this Goodness doth exert and express it self toward Mankind, and we shall from hence gain these two Points.

1. That God is not the Cause o [...] Man's Misery, and what is more yet,

2. That he is most ready and willing to further and assist him in all his En­deavours after Happiness.

The first of these is apparent, for if God be infinitely Good, then every thing that came out of his hands must in the state of its Creation have been exceeding Good; the End of the Cre­ation must have been something ex­treamly kind and gracious, and the Law he prescrib'd his Creatures for the Attainment of that End, must be as Good as Wise; this must have been the glorious state of things, when God contrived this wonderful frame of Na­ture, when he erected this vast Work the World; and in all the continued progress of Divine Providence we are to expect no other acts of Government [Page 127] than what may become the most gra­cious Prince, the most tender Father; for the same Immense Goodness that once created, doth ever continue to Rule the World: Let us not therefore accuse God but our selves if we be not Happy; Blessings indeed and Mercies, like warm Sun and fruitful Seasons, descend upon us without our Importu­nity or Merit, but Evils and Mischiefs come not till our Sins and Provoca­tions have pull'd 'em down upon us: Solon indeed in Herodotus tells Croesus [...], That the Deity was envious and froward, and delighted to magnifie it self in the Di­sturbance of the settled Happiness and Calm of Poor Men: But alas! 'tis our Fondness or our Pride, our Peevish­ness or our Wantonness, which raises in us these unworthy thoughts of God; he may indeed like a kind Parent train up a Son through a strict Discipline to Vertue and Glory, he may throw diffi­culties into our way on purpose to re­ward our Conquest, he may like a wise Physician restore us to our Health by bitter Potions, and will like an Excel­lent [Page 128] Governour vindicate, if need be, our wanton Contempt of Love and Mercy by Severity and Chastisements, but he will never, like a Salvage Ty­rant, delight in the Sufferings or Ruine of Innocent or humble Subjects: he will never prescribe Impossible Laws, that he may enjoy the Pleasure of bloo­dy Executions; he will never make the groans of wretched People his Musick; nor think Misery and Death the best marks of his absolute Power, or fairest Ornaments of his Throne; No, we shall never need any other proof to clear the Divine Majesty from any such Imputation, than to Examine our selves and reflect upon our own behaviour, we shall soon find that we alone are guilty of our Ruine, and that God is utterly free from it; our ex­cessive Enjoyments create the Diseases of the Body, and our excessive Passion the pains and torments of the Mind, and most of the Changes in our For­tune derive themselves from both; a languishing Body, and a languishing Reputation, a broken Estate, and a dejected Mind are the Common Effects [Page 129] of a Disorderly and Debauch't life; and such a life is the natural Effect of a Mind enslav'd to the Body and estran­ged from God, not only by a Neg­lect, but by a Contempt and Defiance of all those means by which a Good God design'd to bring him through Vertue to Glory; and then at last a guilty Conscience, a distracted Mind, and a most melancholy, miserable Death is the Consequence and End of all: This is the Progress which our Voluntary Sin and Folly makes, we cannot think that a Good God can di­rect or Necessitate us to these Courses; they are as repugnant to his Laws, as to our own Interest, and the same time we forfeit our Happiness, we disap­point his Love and Goodness; all the Ways and Methods of God are Kind and Gracious, and Wise and Rational, inanimate Bodies do not desert those Offices he has prescrib'd 'em, Animals move regularly by those Instincts he has implanted in them, and so both the one and the other do necessarily serve those Excellent Ends, for which they were Created: But Man having [Page 130] no Necessity but Liberty wove into the Constitution of his Nature, and ha­ving no Compulsory, but only dire­cting Law prescrib'd him, has perver­ted his own ways, abus'd his Liberty and made that his Ruine, which [...] well-us'd, had enhanc'd his Merit and Reward; This is the Account which the Scripture gives us of Man's Mise­ry, it imputes it wholly to himself, and represents his Obstinacy as ungrateful and displeasing to God, as 'tis fatal to himself:Hos. 13. Ezek. 38. O Israel, thou hast destroy'd thy self: As I live, I delight not b [...] the Death of a Sinner, turn ye, into ye, Math. 23. why will ye die? O Jerusalem, Je­rusalem, thou that killest the Prophets and stonest them which are sent unto thee: how often would I have gather'd thy Children together, even as a He [...] gathers her Chickens under her wings, and ye would not? Nor is this account of things which the Scripture gives [...]s any other than that which was gene­rally embrac'd by the Heathens, this being not the sense of any particular prepossessions or private Opinions in­still'd by Custom or Education, but of [Page 131] natural Reason, and fairly and easily deduc'd from those Notions of Divine Goodness which were universally en­tertain'd by all judicious and under­standing Heathens: and how scanda­lous a thing were it, if that Comforta­ble and Heavenly Truth which the Darkness and Idolatry of the Supersti­tious could not extinguish in the Pagan World, should be rejected or suppress'd by Christians,Jambli­chus de Vi­tâ Pythag. l. 1. [...], &c. [...]—That is,

Not the Will of the Gods,Idem l. 2. but the Luxury and Riot of Men is the Cause of those Evils which infest the Body, &c. Hence that Charitable piece of Hea­then Devotion.

[Page 132]But from themselves—

I will here add a Testimony of Apu­leius, as containing the Sense of the Platonic Philosophy in this Point of God's Government of Mankind:Apul. de Dogmate Platonis. Om­nia quae naturaliter & propterea rectè feruntur, Providentiae Custodiâ guber­nantur, nec ullius mali Causa Deo poterit ascribi: All the Motions of Providence are wise and regular, nor must any Evil be ascrib'd to God as its Cause: But this is not all we gain from the Assurance of God's Infinite Goodness, that we have no Reason to apprehend any harm or mischief from him, that he cannot be the Author of our Mise­ry. But we may confidently perswade our selves on the other side,

Secondly, That he is most ready and willing to further and assist us in all our Endeavours after Happiness. And now methinks, I am so far from questioning the possibility of attaining Happiness, that I begin already to feel and enjoy it; I see the Day breaking in upon me from above; how can he choose but be Happy who is the Love, the Care of God! I may walk like [Page 133] Peter on the Waves, and bid defiance to the Storms, I know I shall never sink, whil'st that God upholds me, who calls me this way to him; I can now easily believe that my temper may be transform'd, my Corruptions may be put off, and I be made partaker of a Divine Nature; since the Spirit of God will dwell with me, the Light of God will always shine upon me, and the Power of God will always succour and aid me; can I imagine as much as any Colour or Pretext, why I should not now be able to attain to an Excel­lent state of Vertue, or why this Ver­tue should not be able to Vanquish all those Difficulties that oppose my Hap­piness, since I am assur'd that God will not refuse me his Spirit if I ask it, and that his Grace will be sufficient for me? You see, of what vast Importance this Truth is, that God will be always ready to assist every man in his Endea­vours after Happiness; and therefore thô it stand here as a Necessary and undeniable Conclusion from the fore­going Discourse, thô the Perfection of the Divine Nature do amount to a lit­tle [Page 134] less than a Demonstration of it; for [...]; Max. Tyrius Disser. 22. Beneficence to his Creatures is as neces­sarily included in the Notion of Perfection, as Perfection is in the Notion of a God; yet as well for my own Plea­sure, as that interest which is nearly con­cern'd in this Truth, I will dwell a little longer on the Confirmation and Illustra­tion of it: There are three Eminent Acts of Divine Assistance; The First, is such a Direction of the Events of Secular Af­fairs, that they may tend to our Good: The Second is his Assistance of us in the Attainment of Vertue; And the Third is, his recruiting us by fresh supplies of Strength in all our hazardous Conflicts and Extraordinary Trials: Now thô I could not give an account of the manner how God performs this kind Work of his Providence, yet ought not that to disswade me from the belief of it; be­cause we know that our Comprehen­sion ought not to be the Standard of Divine Perfections, nor the narrow [Page 135] bounds of our Imagination be the ut­most extent of the Almighty's Power. However 'tis not difficult so to explain this Assistance of God in such sort as may free it from the least suspicion of Implying a Contradiction: For First, as to his Direction and Conduct of Temporal Events, how easie will it be for us to Conceive this possible to God, if we consider, First, That God can form what Impressions he pleases in the Minds of Men, and inspire 'em with what Affections he shall think most serviceable to his Designs? for there is not the least pretext or colour to imagine that the Soul is any more ex­empt from the Soveraignty of God than the Body: or that God cannot do that which the Great, or the Cun­ning, or the Eloquent, nay the Po­pular and Ambitious, do seldom fail to do, raise what Passions he pleases in the Mind of Man. Or if we consider Secondly, That the Power and Effica­cy of Nature is wholly in his hands, that Life or Death, Plenty or Poverty, every thing depends upon his Will; for the Winds and Seas, Earth and Air, [Page 136] Fire, Hail and Vapour obey his Voice, and are all of 'em, as often as he plea­ses the Instruments and Executioners of his Will: he that stills the Ragings of the Multitude, and becalms the Passions of the Mighty; he at whose Command, new Creatures enter upon the Stage of the World, and the old leave it, what is it impossible for him to do? nay, what is it this Almighty Governor cannot do, without moving one step out of the Common Road of his Providence, without imploying any extraordinary Instrument, or exerting any Act of extraordinary Power? for what Secular Interest can there be ima­gin'd whose Success or Disappointment depends not upon some or other of these Natural Causes? And yet we must acknowledge further, Thirdly, That the Almighty has not prefixt or set himself such immutable, inalterable Laws, but that he has reserv'd to him­self the Prerogative of suspending or over-ruling 'em when he pleases, I mean with respect to the Motions of Natural Bodies, or Revolutions of Se­cular Affairs; and if such an Inter­posal [Page 137] of Divine Power cannot be con­ceiv'd to be other than a Miracle, I must confess, I do not look upon one Age only, but every Age an Age of Miracles; Nay, I believe such as these wrought every Day for the Protection or Relief of those who depend upon this Governor of the World; for I know not to what purpose I should, like Jonah or his Mariners, call upon God in a Storm, if it were never to be laid, till it had naturally spent its force and fury: I know not, to what pur­pose I should implore the Almighty's direction upon all my Deliberations in perplex't and intangled Affairs, if I could expect no other Light than what my Labouring Mind could give it self: I know not why I should address my self to God in the Pains and Danger of an insupportable Disease, if the Medi­cines will be the same, and their Ver­tue the same, if the Feaver will abate, and its flames be extinguish't or extin­guish life in the same degree and man­ner, if I Pray or if I do not. All these ways of Divine Providence are very plain and intelligible, and therefore [Page 138] 'tis manifest that we may without any absurdity ascribe to God such a Super-intendency and Direction over Hu­mane Affairs, as may render the issue of 'em most serviceable to the true inte­rest of those that Worship him.

As to the second Part of Divine Assi­stance which consists in aiding us in the Attainment of Holiness and Ver­tue, I do readily acknowledge as far as this is perform'd by the internal Ope­rations of his Spirit, by the Influx of Divine Light or Heavenly Vigour, I do no more understand the [...] the manner of Sanctification, than that of the Creation of the Soul; This I know, that Vertue is the Rational work of a Rational Creature, 'tis the work of Man, thô assisted by God, 'tis a Ra­tional work which implies the Know­ledge of our Duty, and a Power to perform it: and therefore this I know, that this aid must consist in the Im­provement of my rational Faculties in some accession to the Reason of my Understanding, and to the Power and Liberty of my Will; Now thô I can­not comprehend how God does this, [Page 139] yet how easily can I believe it possible for him to do it, since 'tis natural to imagine, that he who created my Un­derstanding can improve it, and he who invested me with a Rational Li­berty can confirm or enlarge it, or if you please, rescue it from that diseas'd and servile Condition, unto which it was degenerated, and restore it to the health and soundness of its first State?

The Third Act of Divine Providence does not imply a new manner, but a new degree of Assistance, and there­fore contains in it no further Difficul­ty: this time which I have spent upon the illustration of Divine Goodness to­wards Man, will not I hope be judg'd mis-imploy'd or lost, if it be consider'd, that such is the Confidence, or rather such is the wantonness of some Men, that they reject every thing which carries in it, I will not say, any seem­ing Contradiction, but any seeming Difficulty.

But it doth not so nearly concern the Happiness of Man to be instructed in the manner, as to be throughly per­swaded [Page 140] of the Truth of Divine Assi­stance; and therefore choosing rather to be tedious than defective in the proof of it, I will add to those Argu­ments taken from the Nature of God, whatever force and strength can be de­rived from the Consideration of Divine Government, which is the Expression of the Divine Nature and the Image of its Perfection visible in its Effects; The Gospel contains this Doctrine in almost every Page, and the lives of Apostles and Martyrs are so many il­lustrious Instances of the Divine Faith­fulness and Love, performing those Pro­mises which he had made 'em by his Son. The Jewish Polity was a Theo­cracy, God did for a great while pre­side over 'em immediately, and govern 'em (if I may so speak) without a Sub­stitute or Vice-roy; Repeated Mira­cles, repeated Prophecies, extraordi­nary Manifestations of himself, and extraordinary Revelations were the Il­lustrious proofs of God's affection and care for that People; so that it were to insult over my Reader's Patience, or to reproach his Stupidity if I should go [Page 141] about to confirm this Truth from the old or New Testament: 'tis therefore only necessary to Examine what the Heathen thought of the Necessity of this Divine Assistance, and what in­stances of it may be found amongst them: whether the Gentiles had any Notion of the Fall and Corruption of Man is not here Necessary to be en­quir'd, but this I am sure, they were extreamly sensible of that opposition, which Vertue met with from the World and the Body; they were extreamly sensible that the Inclinations of the one, and the Affluence and Troubles of the other did naturally tend to en­gage 'em in Vice; and therefore thô they do sometimes magnifie Humane Nature, yet they were not so forgetful of their own Infirmities, or the Con­dition of this Life as not to judge the Assistance of God indispensably ne­cessary to render them Vertuous and Happy: Hence 'tis that Pythagoras, Socrates and Plato were Eminent in that part of Religion which consists in Prayer and Invocation:Max. T [...]t. Disser. 30. [...] [Page 142] [...]. The life of Socrates was a life of Prayer. And hence it was that they did generally ascribe their Laws to those Gods from whom they received their Oracles; The Cre­tanes, Romans, &c. not more Confi­dently believing that they received their Laws from Minos, Numa Pompi­lius, &c. than that these received them from Jove, Aegeria and other Gods: and I wonder not that Cicero should somewhere say, Nunquam vir magnus sine Divino afflatu, That there never was a great Man who enjoy'd not some Divine Impulse; since it did so generally ob­tain through the Pagan World to attri­bute all the surprizing Excellencies, or extraordinary Exploits of their He­roes and eminent Men to the imme­diate Favour and Patronage of their Gods.Hist. Rom. Must Vespasian restore life to the expiring State of Rome? Prodigies and Miracles shall prepare his way; and the extraordinary marks of some Divine Assistance shall consecrate and destine him to this great Work. Must Alexander conquer the Eastern World? [Page 143] Miracles shall attend his March as it did that of Moses, Josephus. & the Pamphylian Sea retreat before the one, as the Red Sea did before the other; Nor let any one think, that this was usual only amongst the barbarous People, Athens it self, Athens the very abode of Wit and Phi­losophy did attribute the Perfections of Eleusinian Melesagoras and Cretan Epi­menides to the Instruction of some Di­vine Being, and those of Socrates to his Guardian Angel, as well as the Scythians those of their Zamolxis, or they of Proconesus those of Aristeas to the peculiar favour and assistance of their Gods; nor ought it to seem strange that the Works of Hesiod, Homer, or other Poets should be ascribed by the Heathens to Divine Inspiration, since those of Aholiab and Bezaleel are by Moses himself ascrib'd to the Spirit of God: for the Poems of the former could not but seem to the Heathens as Rich a piece of Fancy, as the Embroi­deries of the Latter, did to the Jews: and this puts me in Mind of an excel­lent Argument Maximus Tyrius makes use of to prove Vertue to be deriv'd [Page 144] from the Assistance and Bounty of God, If Arts (saith he) less Excellent in their Nature, and less useful in their End, be owing to God, how much more Vertue the Divine Guide and Comfort of Humane life? If there be no Good that descends not from above,Max. Tyr. Dissert. 22. much less surely the Chief and Soveraign good of Man, [...]. Thus far I have proceeded to shew you what the Heathens thought of the Necessity of Divine Assistance, particularly in the Attainment of Vertue; for as to Secular Matters and Temporal Events their sense of the over-ruling Power and Influence of Divine Providence, was so notorious that 'tis not to be call'd into question; the Being, and Providence of God (in this sense of it) seemed so inseparable, that the Epicu­rean who deny'd the latter, could ne­ver find belief, when he profess'd him­self to own the former; Nay, even those very Men who could not be con­vinc't of a Providence by the Bounty, were convinc't of it by the Severity of God in his Chastisement of Sins, hence [Page 145] that bold and brisk, thô not very Re­ligious Reflexion of Tacitus upon the Miseries the Roman Empire suffer'd under Galba, Otho and Vitellius, Nec enim unquam atrocioribus populi Ro­mani Cladibus,Tacit. l. 1. Hist. magisvè justis Judiciis approbatum est: non esse Curae Diis securitatem Nostram, esse Ultionem. The justice and the greatness of our Plagues abundantly evince the Gods con­cern'd, thô not for our Prosperity, yet for our Punishment; such is Man's dis­ingenious temper, that he is more ea­sily convinc'd by the wideness and fa­tality of a Wound, that it was inflicted by an Almighty Arm, than he is by the greatness of the Benefits he receives, that they are distributed by a Divine Munificence; thô the number and in­finite value of the good things we re­ceive be in it self a much clearer proof of a Divine Providence, than the Evils we suffer, can be; for these we can create our selves, those none but a God can be­stow: there needs then nothing to be said to convince you what the Heathens thought of Providence with respect to outward and temporal things; nor is [Page 146] it I think now to be question'd, whe­ther it were their opinion that the Di­vine Assistance was necessary to the At­tainment of Vertue and Happiness; nor would I add a word more but that the words of Hierocles on this Subject carry in 'em not only so full a Con­viction, but also so extraordinary a Re­lish of a Wise and Religious Humility, that I cannot prevail with my self to pass 'em by:Hierocles in Pythagori Aurea Carm. [...] that is, We need no Motive or Incentive to Vice but our Own Inclinations, But to make us Vertuous we stand in need [...] the aid of God, joyn'd with that [...] Reason.

And this Opinion of the Necessity of God's Assistance sprung not only from the Experience of the weakness and corruption of Humane Nature, but also of the Power and Goodness of the Divine Nature; for I cannot think [Page 147] that the Order, Beauty, and greatness of the Creation, the fixt and constant Returns of fruitful Seasons, the filling men's hearts with food and gladness, were the only Testimonies which God gave the Gentiles of himself and his Care for Mankind: when I read that Angels are the ministring Spirits of God; when I read in Daniel of the Princes of Grecia and Persia, and find that Provinces were committed to An­gels as the Vice-Roys and Lieutenants of God, I cannot think, that these Devout and Charitable Spirits did with less Zeal in their Provinces labour to promote the Honor of God, and the Good of Man, than Evil Spirits did the Dishonor of the one and the Ruine of the other: and unless the frequent Appearances of Angels in the Begin­ning had possess'd Men's Minds with a firm perswasion that there was a constant Commerce maintain'd be­tween Heaven and Earth; and that Spirits very frequently did visibly en­gage themselves in the Protection and Assistance of Men; I cannot as much as Imagine, what foundation there could [Page 148] be for the numerous Impostures of Ora­cles, or upon what ground the Custom of putting themselves under the Patro­nage of some Tutelary Spirit, could so generally have prevail'd in the Pagan World: without this Supposition the Poetry of Homer had been so far from being entertain'd as Sacred and In­spir'd, that it had been universally con­temn'd and dislik't as an idle Rapsody of un-natural, incredible and fulsome Characters of their Gods: how could any Man, who had never heard of the Appearances of Spirits, nay who could not conceive any other Notion of such Fancies than as something absurd and impossible, ever digest the gross Con­fidence of a Poet bringing in a God upon the Stage at every turn? I do not therefore doubt, but that the Gentile World received very many good Offi­ces and Advantages from good Angels, as well as suffer'd many Mischiefs from Evil ones: and I think I might with good probability believe that every good Heathen as well as Socrates had the Assistance of a good Spirit very frequently.

[Page 149]Nor was the Ministry of Angels the only assistance that God afforded the Gentil World, but in every Age he rais'd up Wise and Good Men to be his Prophets or Interpreters of Nature's Law to the Gentils: I know St. Austin does in two places at least of his Retra­ctations censure and condemn that Charity which he had elsewhere ex­press'd for the Philosophers or Excellent Men among the Gentils, which is the more to be wondred at, since he so frequently acknowledges himself to have been first enflam'd with the Holy Love of true Philosophy by reading a Piece of Tully; but were the matter to be carried by Votes, I do not question, but I could produce Testimonies in fa­vour of those Men, of such whose An­tiquity, Learning and Piety might more than Ballance the Authority of St. Austin: 'tis true, their Faith differ'd much from that of a Christian, and no Man, I think, in his Wits could expect it otherwise; for how vast is the Di­stance between the Light of Nature and that of Revelation? but if we look upon those Motives and Principles to [Page 150] Vertue by which they were acted, they were such as a Christian need not blush at, or be asham'd of; they look't upon it not only as the Perfection of Hu­mane Nature; the Bond and Support of Society; the Delight, the Guide and Comfort of every particular Man's life; but also as the Image of God, that which did render us like him, and therefore acceptable to him; as the only thing that could unite Man to God, that could raise Man above the bodily Pollutions of sensuality; that could enable him to outbrave the fears of Fortune and of Death; as that which could fit him for the Conversation of Heaven; And lastly, they look't upon it as the gift of God. 'Tis true, toge­ther with all this, you'l say, they were Idolaters: I do not question, but they did often partake in the Pollution of the Idolatrous multitude; But if we regard the Idolatry of their Religion, and compare it with that of the Hea­then Multitude, there was a vast diffe­rence between both; and that in these three Points: the Object, the Acts of Worship, and the Effects of it.

[Page 151]As to the Object, the Philosophers, 'tis true, did Worship Spirits, but good ones; the Multitude did worship De­vils: how contradictory are those Cha­racters which the sensual, infatuated Multitude bestow'd upon their Idols, and those by which the Philosophers describe the Nature of their Gods or their Genii? Lust and Cruelty make up the one; Purity, Goodness and Charity the other: This needs no proof, 'tis Evident from almost all the Writings of ancient Philosophy that are extant: yet I think it cannot seem superfluous to produce one Testimony containing an Account of the Nature of their Genii or Guardian Angels, by which it will be easie to conclude what Notion they had of those Superiour Spirits whom they suppos'd to dwell al­ways in Heaven in the presence of the Supreme God: and whom, thô they call'd 'em Gods, they thought infinite­ly inferiour to that one God, their Creator and ours; But yet much Su­periour as well in the Excellency of their Nature as Dignity of their place to those Angels which they look't upon [Page 152] as the Messengers and Ministers of God to Man, and as the Guardians of Man, and the Interpreters or Conveyers of his Requests to God. These are thus describ'd by Apuleius, Apuleius de Deo Socra­tis, p. 68. Hic quem Dico prorsus Custos, singularis praefe­ctus, Domesticus speculator, proprius Curator, intimus Cognitor, assiduus Ob­servator, individuus Arbiter; insepara­bilis testis, malorum improbator, bonorum probator, si ritè animadvertatur, sedulò cognoscatur, religiosè colatur, ita ut à Socrate justitiâ & Innocentiâcultus est, in Rebus incertis prospector, dubiis prae­monitor, periculosis tutator, egenis opi­tulator, qui tibi quaeat tum in Somniis, tum in Signis, tum etiam fortassè cor [...]m, c [...]m usus postulat mala averruncare, bona prosperare, humilia sublimare, nutantia fulcire, obscura clarare, secunda regere, adversa corrigere. The substance of all which is, This our truly Guardian Angel, our immediate Superintendent, the Domestic spy of all our Actions, the Conscious witness of our Desires and Thoughts, the Approver and En­courager of our Vertue, and the Hater and Discourager of our Vice, if he be heedfully minded by us, rightly known, [Page 153] and religiously worship'd with Righte­ousness and Innocence, as he was by Socrates, will be our Council in doubt­ful, our Guard in hazardous Affairs, &c. But all this while they were Idolaters? admit it if they were damn'd for this Idolatry, Good God! what will be­come of that great part of the Christian Church, whose Practice at this Day is infinitely more inexcusable than theirs was? because God has publickly de­clar'd that he has appointed one Me­diator, through whom he wills us to approach him: there was then Room for the Plea of Humility; but now a pretence of Humility, what can it be in Reality, but wanton fondness or Pre­sumptuous wilfulness?

Thus widely did the vertuous and understanding part of Mankind differ in the Object of their Worship from the sensual and stupid Herd; and since the manner of Worship is naturally de­rived from the Notions men entertain, of that Being, which is the Object of it; it could not be otherwise, but that they must differ as widely in the Essen­tial parts of Worship, as they did in [Page 154] the Objects of it: Hence it was, that while the People offer'd to their Gods their Lusts and Passions, and sacrific'd to 'em in Uncleanness or Cruelty, the Philosophers thought, that nothing could be so welcom a Sacrifice to Their's, as the Imitation of their Puri­ty and Goodness, holy Affections, and good Works: From both these diffe­rences, there follow'd a

Third, Consisting in the different Effects which the Religion of the one and the other did produce; the Ido­latry of the one, (as Wickedness always will) utterly estrang'd them more and more from the true God; the Idolatry of th' other (for so I'le call it to avoid dispute) seem'd to unite them more and more to him, since they look't upon the Spirits they worshipp'd, not only as the Creatures, but most lively Images of the true God; and acknow­ledg'd that all good Gifts proceeded from him, thô they receiv'd 'em by the Ministry and Mediation of Angels, and that Vertue which they look't up­on as the only grateful Worship of God did exalt their Minds, and by ren­dring [Page 155] 'em more like him, must needs render 'em more near to him: Thus they talk't, whether thus they liv'd or no, is not very material to my present purpose; for after all, thô their lives shou'd not have come up to their Phi­losophy, these their Discourses could not choose but be some way service­able to Mankind, being a manifest reproof to the stupid Idolatry, to the bruitish and barbarous Worship which then prevailed in the World. These Doctrines could not but manifestly tend to convince the World of the Be­ing and Nature of the Supream God, they could not but tend to re­store the Law of Nature to its just Au­thority, and present the corrupt and degenerous World with a natural, that is lovely, Idea of Vertue; and give 'em a just sense of the Obligation they lay under, and of the Sanctions, by which God establish't that Law which he writ in the Minds of Men: who sees not now, that God by raising up such Men, and by assisting 'em with a Spirit of Wisdom and a Spirit of Cou­rage, which the Constancy of a great [Page 156] many of 'em in Suffering for these Truths, and the Lustre and Beauty of their Writings in those dark Times do abundantly testifie, was an undoubted proof of God's Goodness to the Gen­tiles, and of his Concern for their true Interest and Happiness? why should not this Light, which God lent the then-wandring benighted part of Man­kind, be as kindly interpreted by Man as it was design'd by God? why shou'd not the Philosophers of the Gen­tiles be look't upon as Priests and Pro­phets, well enough suited to the Oe­conomy of the Law of Nature? very excellent use have Christians, even the most Learned and Pious made of 'em; and surely they ought to have prov'd as much more beneficial to the World they lived in, as they were then more necessary.

I think I have by this time said enough not only to extinguish in any Man all superstitious Fears, and unwor­thy Apprehensions of the Divine Ma­jesty, but also to enkindle in him a grateful Love of God, and chearful hopes of true Happiness by establishing [Page 157] this perswasion upon unshaken founda­tions, That God is a Good and gra­cious God, That he is always ready to further and assist every Man in his Endeavours after Happiness: But now let not that Doctrine be perverted to the betraying of us into sloth, which was design'd to inspire the Mind with a fresh vigour, to quicken and confirm us in an Industrious pursuit after our true Happiness: for we must remember, that God is not only good and gracious, but also

Holy too; I shall not insist long on this Point,2 Holiness of God. because I think 'tis already prov'd; Holiness being as necessarily imply'd in Perfection, as Love or Good­ness: I know some have talk't, as if God were a mere Arbitrary Being, as if his Laws were not the Image or Ex­pression of his Nature, but merely the positive Precepts of an Arbitrary Will. If any Man can be so senseless, as to believe that the most perfect Being can love or hate without any Reason for't; or that all the Laws and Actions of God shall be Consonant to the Stric­test Rules of Justice and Goodness, and [Page 158] all this by Chance, for mere Arbitrary Motion is blind and unguided; such a one seems to me as uncapable as he is unworthy of Instruction: I can as soon believe Lightning and Thunder, Wind and Storm a God, as believe him to be a mere Arbitrary Being: The Hea­thens believ'd a God, Proteus that could turn himself into all shapes; but these Men believe what is infinitely more absurd, a God, not of various and uncertain shapes only, but also of an unfixt, uncertain, indetermin'd Na­ture: for the Will must always be a­greeable and consonant to the Nature of that Being whose Will it is: thus Liberty and Indetermination of Will in Man proceeds from some contrariety in the Principles which Constitute him; unsteady Judgment produces unsteady Will, and bruitish Nature bruitish Will or Inclination. If we consult the Scrip­tures, nothing is more Evident than the Sanctity of the Divine Nature, we are there exhorted to walk in the Light, because God is light; and to be holy, because he is holy; which Holiness doth not regard the Declaration of his Will, [Page 159] but his Nature; this being given as a Motive to oblige us to walk according to his Righteous Precepts, because this alone is that which can please a Righ­teous God, this alone is that which can make us like and dear to him. From this Attribute of God, that is Holiness, we may plainly infer,

First, That we are not to expect any Assistance from him; but then, when that which we Enterprize, is just and lawful, and we our selves are not wan­ting to our selves; for 'tis inconsistent with the Holiness of God to make his Providence the Refuge of Laziness or Impiety. [...],Plutarch de Super­stitione. [...], God is the Hope of Vertue, not the Excuse of Sloth and Cowardize. 'Tis a rational and well-weighed Prayer, which Josephus puts into the Mouth of Moses standing on the Shore of the Red Sea; inaccessible Rocks and Mountains deny'd the Israelites passage one way, the numerous Host of the Egyptians had fill'd all other's: only before them was the Red Sea, whose Waves threatned as certain, and more dreadful a Destruction as the [Page 160] Sword of the Egyptians, there was no Weapon for Fight, no Provision for a Camp, no place for Flight. In this Case Moses Prayes thus, [...], &c. Lord thou knowest, that no Contrivance, Industry, nor force of ours can here avail us, 'tis in thee alone to find out a way to the Rescue of this People, who by thy Command and un­der thy Conduct, have left Egypt: despairing of all other ways, we fly to thee alone for succour; Lord let it come speedily, give us a Clear Proof of thy Divine Omnipotence and Faithfulness; we are in great straights, great to us, but slight and inconsiderable to thee. The Sea is thine that stops our Progress, the Mountains that shut us up are thine, thou can'st divide this Sea, or turn its Waves into firm Land, and make us find a safe passage through the devou­ring Deep: or if thou think'st fit, thou can'st make us march in Triumph aloft through the open Sky: This was a No­ble Faith, this was indeed an Expecta­tion, almost as wonderful as the suc­cess it met with: But then, it was no less rational than successful, their Con­dition [Page 161] was capable of no Deliverance but a miraculous one, and it was their Obedience to the Divine Commands had reduc'd 'em to this Condition: This is a safe Rule to guide our Faith and Relyance by, in all our Distresses and Difficulties, we must have recourse unto God, for these are the times wherein Humane infirmity requires the Support and Comfort of Divine Assistance; The utmost Strength and Perfection of Vertue is too weak to bear the shock and brunt of Calamity alone,Max. Tyr. Disser. 26. [...], it must be rein­forc'd by Power from above. But then these Difficulties must be such to which our Vice has not betray'd us; and our own Courage and Industry must be as vigorous as our Prayers; for in vain do we beg new supplies of Strength, if we use not what we enjoy'd before. Divine Bounty doth never supersede Man's Industry, fruitful Showers, and enlivening Rayes do not prevent, but second the Labours of the Husband­man: God observes the same Method in the Production of a nobler sort of [Page 162] fruit, Wisdom and Vertue: the Soul, as well as the Field of the Sluggard shall be o'rerun with Weeds; there on­ly shall the Divine fruit of Philosophy and Happiness grow where Religious Discipline Tills the Ground, and wake­ful Study sows the seeds of thriving Truths among the furrows. Accor­dingly, if we consider the lives and pra­ctice of Excellent Men, none were ever so much Favourites of Heaven, that its Gifts grew up in 'em, like Corn and Wine in the Golden Age without Culture or Dressing: Inspiration it self did not exempt Man from the Necessi­ty of Industry, but oblige him to a greater: Thus under the Old Testa­ment a Prophetic life was a life of greater strictness and retirement than that of others; and in the New, not to mention the Watchings, the Fast­ings, the Retirements, the Prayers of our Lord and Master, that account of himself which St. Paul gives us, will inform us, not only what his life was, but what it was expected the life of eve­ry one should be that shar'd with him in the Ministry and Dignity of an Apo­stle. [Page 163] But in all things approving our selves as the Ministers of God, in much Patience, in Afflictions, in Necessities, in Distresses: — in Labours, 2 Cor. 6. in Watch­ings. By Pureness, by Knowledge. A­mongst the Heathens whatever Perfe­ction and Excellency they attributed to Humane Nature, whatever they attributed to an [...], a Contexture and frame of Nature more than Com­mon, whatever lastly they attributed to the favour, the Extraordinary fa­vour of God; yet did they always judge a strict life and indefatigable In­dustry necessary to the acquiring of true Philosophy and Happiness: their Pythagoras so dear to their Gods, that it seem'd to be a doubt among'st 'em, whether he were not himself a God in­carnate, not content to have been the Scholar first of Pherecydes Syrus, and afterwards of Hermodamas, travail'd first into Egypt, and afterwards to Ba­bylon, and I know not whither, pursuing Wisdom and Happiness with great In­dustry, and as great Abstinence. So­crates, however inspir'd by his Genius, did yet learn Musick of Connus, Poetry [Page 164] of Evenus, Agriculture of Ischomachus, Geometry of Theodorus, &c. And to all this he added the Religious Disci­pline of Mortification even to a volun­tary Poverty: what should I multiply Instances? there is not a Man amongst the Gentiles remarkable for Wisdom or Vertue, that is not as remarkable for that Travail and Self-denyal by which he purchas'd both; I add Self-denyal, Industry alone being not judg'd suffi­cient; for,

Secondly, 'Tis easie in the next place to infer from the Sanctity of God, that they who expect his Assi­stance shou'd endeavour to be Good and Holy: 'tis Vertue that constitutes a Man a Subject of the Heavenly King­dom and a Favourite of God, and therefore 'tis this that gives him the best Claim to his Protection and Patronage: Vice is a state of Rebellion and Defiance against God, and he that has put off his Allegiance, cannot expect rationally the Benefits of that Government which he refuses to be under. 'Tis true, the Infinite Goodness and Clemency of God which is not easily vanquish't by [Page 165] Man's Ingratitude, may pursue such a Man with repeated overtures & tenders of Grace and Pardon, and may leave him in the possession of common Benefits, such as Health, Plenty, Friends, &c. but God will never confer upon him the most Excellent Gifts, the marks of his especial Presence, and particular Favour, he will withdraw from him the aids of his Spirit, and leave him to himself a blind indigent, and forlorn Creature:Wisd. 1. The Holy Spirit of Discipline will fly Deceit, and will not abide, when unrighteousness comes in. Which is nothing more than what the Heathen by the Light of Nature did affirm concerning his Genius, Max. Tyr. Dissert. [...]6. [...], Wicked Souls have no good Angels sojourning with 'em or pre­siding over them. Our Souls, like Tem­ples must be prepar'd and consecrated to him, if we would have God dwell in them: Righteousness and Holiness are the only things that Charm and Captivate God, nothing else can invite him to dwell with Man, this very Rea­son Maximus Tyrius assigns for the Re­sidence [Page 166] and abode of a Demon with Socrates after so extraordinary a man­ner.Idem ibid. [...]. Dost thou wonder that a Prophetic Spirit should dwell with So­crates so intimately united, so friendly, so inseparable, that he seem'd only not mixt, and become one with his own mind? with Socrates whose Purity of Body, Charity and Goodness of Soul, strictness of Conversation, depth of Judgment, Melody, and perswasiveness of Speech, Religion towards God, and Integrity towards Man, rendred him worthy of such a Guest, such a Friend? From all which 'tis Evident,

Thirdly, What different Rates we are to set upon the different Gifts of God:James [...]. Every good gift, and every per­fect gift comes down fr [...]m above; but every Gift is not equally Good, equally Perfect, being neither equally necessa­ry, nor profitable. Wealth, Power, [Page 167] Friends, Relations, Health, Strength, Beauty, Wit, Discretion, Vertue, are all good; but not all equal, their va­lue is different, and therefore the De­grees of our Importunity and of our Faith or Reliance upon God, must be proportion'd accordingly: a confident Faith, and an almost impatient Zeal doth well become us when we seek the Kingdom of Heaven and the Righ­teousness thereof; when we seek of God the Divine gifts of Wisdom and Vertue; but an humble Modesty, and a most profound Submission is the Or­nament and Beauty of those who are Petitioners for inferior temporal Bles­sings: for God has promis'd the for­mer to all that earnestly sue for them, peremptorily and without any Tacit Reservations; but his promises of the latter do always imply this Condition, If they shall be for our Good; for the Perfections of the Mind are Moral and Immutable Beauties; but those of the Body, and all the gaudy things of For­tune are like the fading Beauties of a Flower, the heat scorches it, the cold nips it, every little chance cracks the [Page 168] stalk, and the hand of a Child, will serve to crop it: Nothing therefore is more acceptable to God than the mo­desty of our Petitions for these good things, and the fervency of them for the other, nothing more delightful to him, unless the granting of them: the things therefore that we are to beg of God, not only with the greatest Im­portunity; but also in the first place, are those which Maximus Tyrius thought the subject of Socrates his Prayers,Max. Tyr. Dissert. 30. [...], what were these? a ver­tuous Mind, a quiet State, an unblame­able Life, and a chearful Death full of good Hopes. These were the matter of his requests, not Wealth, or Ho­nour, or Popularity, or Power, or So­veraignty. This at once brings to my thought another Objection rais'd against the possibility of attaining Hap­piness, and instructs me how to an­swer it.

[Page 169]A Second thing which Men charge Obj. 2 with the guilt of their Ruine is For­tune. I might pass over this Point slightly, because Afflictions will come more properly to be consider'd in the Third Volume, where I treat of Indo­lence, and because I have already clear'd two great Truths, which are of them­selves abundantly sufficient to baffle and defeat this trifling Objection, Namely First, That Vertue and Vice, Wisdom and Folly, are the things to which generally speaking, we owe our Temporal Prosperity or Adversity: and consequently that those, supposing the Ordinary assistance of God being in our Power, these must be so too. Secondly, That we are assur'd of the Assistance of God even in these things, as far as he shall see them truly subser­vient to our Good. However, because the perswasion of the Usefulness, nay absolute Necessity of the favour of For­tune has taken such deep root in the Minds of Men, that it wou'd be thought little less than a Contradiction to ima­gine that a Man can be Ʋnfortunate and Happy, (so that even Seneca him­self [Page 170] has let fall one of the greatest Paradoxes, a Stoic was ever guilty of) such an Expression as this better be­coming the mouth of a Peasant than a Philosopher.Seneca de Vit. Beatâ. Sed ei qui ad Virtutem tendit, etiamsi multum processit, opus est tamen aliquâ Fortunae Indulg [...]ntiâ, ad­huc inter humana Luctanti, dum Nodum illum exolvit, & omne vinculum Mor­tale: That not only Beginners but Pro­ficients in Vertue, till they have put off Mortality, will stand in need of some Indulgence of Fortune; and few Men find any belief with the World, when they talk of the contempt of Wealth, it being generally interpreted either the Laziness of an unactive and degenerous Mind, or the Dissimulation of one who affects to be thought to defie Fortune, while he doth secretly and inwardly re­pine and fret at the Neglect and Cold­ness she expresses towards him; I will therefore bestow a little time on the Consideration of this Objection.

Fortune cannot pre­vent our Happiness.What dost thou mean by Fortune? If mere Chance, then to envy the Lot of others, or murmur at thine own, is Folly: if Providence, then 'tis Impiety; [Page 171] for whatever goodness guided by un­erring Wisdom doth, must be so well done, that it cannot be mended: and whatever is merely in the Power of a blind, giddy, and inconstant humour, (which is the Notion, by which Men choose to express Fortune) can neither be prevented, fix't nor regulated: But what is it Secondly, thou dost put in the power of Fortune? the Understanding and Liberty of mens Minds? Wisdom, Temperance, Industry, Courage, and in one word Vertue? if not, she has no Influence on thy Happiness, she cannot prevent thy attainment of it, nor bereave thee of it when attain'd: If thou dost, thou dost enlarge the Em­pire of Fortune too too far, let her rule and insult over Soldiers, Courtiers, Lovers, Factious Demagogues and Time-servers, but not over Philoso­phers: Let those who are her Minions be her Slaves: Let her dispose of Money, Lands, Farms, Commissions, Benefices, Honours, Graces, Fame; nay, if you will, Crowns and Scepters too: Ver­tue, and Happiness, and Souls are too precious Commodities to be the [Page 172] Sport and Traffic of Fortune: Solom [...] observ'd long ago, Wisdom crys out, [...] uttereth her voice in the streets; Prov. 1. [...] cries in the chief place of Concourse, [...] the openings of the Gates; in the City she utters her words. John 7. Our Saviour [...] the great Day of the Feast cried saying If any man thirst, let him come unto me and drink: which is an Invitation of the same Nature with that in the Prophet,Isaiah 55. Ho every one that thirsteth come ye to the waters, and he that hath no money: come ye buy and eat, buy wine and milk without money, and with out price. This ever was, and ever will be true; a great Fortune is not necessary for the Attainment of Faith Hope, or Charity. And he that is endow'd with these, can't be miserable: you may learn the whole Systeme of Divine and Important Truths, you may acquaint your self with all the Beauty and Enjoyments of Vertue, at a very cheap rate, and you may learn Temperance, Fortitude, Justice, Mo­desty, Constancy, Patience, Contempt of the World, without the Assistance of much more Wealth than will serve [Page 173] [...]o Feed and Cloath you: and can'st [...]hou not be content with these Posses­sions? is not this a sort of Merchan­dize to be prefer'd before that of fine Gold? I kow the greater part of [...]hose who accuse their Fortune of their Misery do at least pretend that their Condition and Circumstances of life are so incommodious, that they have not time to attend to the great Interest of the Soul, or at least not with that Application which they should. Alas, thus not the mean only, but almost all talk, from the Porter to the Prince, the Circumstances of one are too strait, too narrow; of another too full of Trouble, because too full of State: one complains that he is withdrawn from his great End, by the many allurements & sensual temptations, to which his rank and quality in the World exposes him: another that he is daily fretted and indisposed by the little cross Accidents and the rugged Conversation which he is necessarily oblig'd to bear with: one complains of too much Business, ano­ther of too little; the hurry and mul­titude of things distracts the one, [Page 174] Infidel Fears, and Anxious Desponden­cies the other. One complains that his Acquaintances and Friends are too numerous; and intrench too far upon his precious hours; another's querulous melancholy, and peevish, because he looks upon himself either for his mean­ness neglected, or for his misfortune deserted and forsaken: Company is burdensom to the one, and Solitude to the other. Thus all Conditions, are full of Complaints from him that trud­ges on his clouted Shoo, to him who can scarce mention the Manners or the Fortunes of the Multitude without some Expressions of contumely and disdain. Thou Fool, do'st thou not see that all these Complaints are Idle and Contradictions? for shame cor­rect the wantonness of thy humour, and thou wilt soon correct thy For­tune; learn to be Happy in every state and every place: learn to enjoy thy self, to know and value the Wealth that is in thine own Power, I mean Wisdom and Goodness: learn to assert the Soveraignty and Dignity of thy Soul; methinks that if Philosophy could [Page 175] not, Pride and Indignation might con­quer Fortune: 'tis beneath the Digni­ty of a Soul that has but a grain of sense, to make Chance, and Winds, and Waves, the Arbitrary disposers of his Happiness; or what's worse, to de­pend upon some Mushroom upstart which a chance-smile rais'd out of his Turff and Rottenness, to a Condition to which his mean Soul is so unequal, that he himself fears and wonders at his own height. O how I hugg the memory of those honest Heathens, who in a rugged Gown, and homely Cot­tage, bid defiance to Fortune, and laugh't at those pains and hazards, the Vanity and Pride of Men, not their Misfortune drove 'em to! Men may call this Pride, or spite in them; as the beggarly Rabble do's usually envy the Fortune which it doth despair of; But there were a great many of these, who laid by, envied Greatness, to en­joy this quiet, thô generally-despicable meanness: But let the Contempt of the World be, what it will, in a Hea­then; let it be Pride or Peevishness, Vain-glory or any thing, rather than [Page 176] a Reproach to Christians, what say you to the followers of our Lord and Ma­ster? Then said Peter, Silver and Gold have I none; Acts 3. None? what hast thou then, thou poor Disciple of a poor Ma­ster? a true Faith, a God-like Charity, and unshaken Hope: Blessed art thou amongst men, nothing can make thee Greater, nothing Richer, nothing Hap­pier, but Heaven. You see plainly then, a Man may be vertuous, thô not wealthy, and that Fortune which prevents his being Rich, cannot pre­vent his being Happy. This Discourse will never down; This is not calcula­ted for this Age; Philosophy must be a little more mannerly, and Religion a little more gentile and complaisant than formerly, 'ere it can be adapted and accommodated to the present state of things. Go on then, let's try how far it will be Necessary to condescend; You cannot be Happy, why? because you are not Rich; go then to God, and beg you may be Rich; I have not the face to put up such Arrogant and In­temperate Requests to God; 'tis plain then, 'tis not necessary to be Rich in [Page 177] Order to be Happy: for whatever is necessary to this, thou mayest with good Assurance beg of God. But thy Desires are more humble and modest, thou aim'st at nothing but what is very Necessary, a fairer House, another Ser­vant, a dish or two of Meat more for thy Friends, a Coach for thy Conve­nience and Ease, and a few Hundred Pounds a piece more for thy Children: O Heavenly Ingredients of a Rational Pleasure! O Divine Instruments of hu­mane Happiness! O the humble and mortify'd requests of modest Souls! well, if these things be so necessary, and these desires be so decent and ver­tuous, if thou can'st not be Happy, and consequently must be miserable with­out them; put up a Bill, represent thy Condition in it, Such a one—wants a more Commodious House, more Ser­vants, more Dishes, &c. and desires the Prayers of the Congregation for Support under this Affliction: you are Prophane; far be it from me; I would only let thee see the wantonness of thy Desires: if thou think'st this would expose thee to public Laughter, go to [Page 178] thy Minister, unfold thy Case to him, let him Pray for thee, he is a good Man, and his Prayers will go far: you rally and ridicule me; Enter then in­to thy Closet, shut thy Door, thou may'st trust God, he Pities and Con­siders even Humane Infirmities, I could even almost in my Mind desire it of him, but I am asham'd to do it in a Set and Solemn Prayer, I could almost make the Petition in the Gross, but I blush to think of Descending to Particu­lars. Well, then I see plainly that Wealth in any Degree of it is so far from being necessary to our Happiness, that it has so little of Usefulness, or Conveniency in it, that in thy Conscience between God and thee, thou can'st not think it fit to complain of the want of it.

Every Man the Archi­tect of his own For­tune.But this Answer will never satisfie him who complains of Want, or of be­ing engag'd in continual Troubles, and toss't by the daily Changes and Revo­lutions of the World: I confess it, it will not; But I must tell such a one, if Solomon's Observation be true,Prov. 10. The hand of the diligent makes Rich, and that other,Prov. 22. Seest thou a man diligent in his [Page 179] business, he shall stand before Kings, he shall not stand before mean men: then his Poverty is his Crime as well as his Calamity, he must redeem himself from this his Punishment by Industry and Prayer: As to Calamities, this must be acknowledg'd, that the Mind of a good and great Man which stands firm upon its own Basis, a good God, a Good Saviour, and a Good Conscience, may remain unmov'd, when the Earth trem­bles and the Sea roars round about him; Changes indeed befall things Tempo­ral, but he leans not upon them; I may say farther, that he who upon mature Deliberation, and upon necessa­ry Obligations of Duty engages him­self in a just Cause, may be unfortunate, but he cannot be miserable; his Suf­ferings carry a secret Pleasure in 'em, and his Misfortunes are full of Hope and Glory, if he consider, if he reflect, if he do not feed on vain and airy Pro­jects, and suffer himself to be unwarily transported by very irrational, thô seem­ingly just Passions: I must lastly add, that 'tis not the Necessity of their Affairs, nor the Iniquity of Times, [Page 180] which doth commonly involve and in­tangle Men in public or private Cala­mities, but some secret Vanity, some blind impetuous Passion, some ill-laid Project, or some treacherous or disho­norable fear. The State of Rome never felt more or greater Changes than in the life of Atticus, as is obvious to any one, who shall reflect upon the History of his time, and yet in all the turns and mighty Changes of Fortune, Atti­cus enjoy'd a constant Tranquillity and well-settled Peace, being scarce ever reduc't as much as to the Necessity of a Retirement but once, as I remember: nor was it the meanness of his Quality, or the narrowness of his Fortune that se­cur'd him, he was a Man great in both; nor was it the secrecy of a private life, or the sluggishness of a stupid Mind, which rendred him unworthy of any Man's fear, and unable to provoke a Danger; No, he was a Man, as well for the Eminence of his Parts, and Vi­gour of his Mind, as for the Largeness of his Fortune, well known to the greatest and most Active men of all Pa [...]ties; and yet steering his life by [Page 181] the Rules of Vertue and true Wisdom, he lived untouch't by, unconcern'd in, the strange Alterations of so long a life as his, which were such and so ma­ny, that the Historian has observ'd, that they who were one day in the height of Power and Honour, were the next in the Gulph of Danger and Despair; so that his Remark is gene­rally very true,Corn. Nep. in Vitâ At­tici. Sui cui (que) mores fin­gunt Fortunam. Every man may fashion and shape his fortune as he will his manners. Nor was the success of his Behaviour less in private than public. For Cornelius Nepos has observ'd in his Life, That those Friendships he entred into, he was very Happy and Constant in; nay, such was the Gentleness, such the Discretion of his Behaviour, that it preserv'd him in the favour of an Unkle (I think) of his, who was so sowr and peevish that none could please him, such a Nabal a man could not speak to him, nay he not only kept in with him, but possessed him so entirely, that he was left his Heir. Nor was all this in Atticus, the Effect of Temper or Nature, but of Vertue:Ibid. Ne (que) id fecit [Page 182] naturâ Solum, quanquam omnes ei parê­mus, sed etiam Doctrina: nam & Prin­cipum Philosophorum ita percepta habuit praecepta, ut iis ad vitam agendam, non ad Ostentationem utebatur; For he had studied Philosophy not for Ostentation, but the Conduct of his life. I might now presume. I had given satisfaction to this Objection, especially, since I oblige my self to take the Case of Tem­poral and outward Calamities into full Consideration hereafter. But the infe­ction is got into the mass of Blood, and has diffus'd it self through Mankind, and 'tis not a slight and weak Medicine that can Purge it out; therefore I have observ'd that the Heathen were never more copious or more vehement than in the Refutation of this Errour, our Baptism doth scarce proclaim a more solemn War against the Pomps and Va­nities of the World, than Philosophy did in all Ages: No doubt therefore the Expugning this Fancy which makes Man's Happiness depend upon his For­tune in the World, must needs be a matter of great Importance, since both Revelation and Reason have so earnestly [Page 183] and solemnly endeavour'd it; I shall not therefore I hope seem impertinent or tedious, if looking upon this Obje­ction as considerable, in Opinion thô not in it self, I treat it with more Respect and Solemnity than it really deserves.

My Design here is to examine what real Good or Convenience there is in Wealth, how Valuable,Fortune not necessary to Happiness. or how Ne­cessary 'tis, and that not in a Declama­tory or Sophistical, but such a sober and rational manner as may be Satisfa­ctory and Convictive to every un­prejudic'd Mind. First therefore, I 1 will give some account, whence 'tis that Men are so intent upon their Worldly interest, so wholly bent upon being Rich: Secondly, I will state what 2 is meant by a Competency, and what the Advantage and Necessity of it is. Thirdly, I will consider what the natu­ral tendency of Wealth is. From all which, it will easily appear, what Con­nexion & Dependence there is between our Fortune and our Happiness.

If we enquire whence 'tis, Men are so intent upon the World; one Reason is, a secret Infidelity, Men are desirous [Page 184] to lay such a Foundation as Time can­not wear, nor Winds and Tempests o'rethrow: they cannot trust Provi­dence, till they see, or at least fancy themselves in a Condition to defie it: and this they look upon as a great piece of Prudence, to provide for themselves a safe Retreat at once from the Storms and Changes that generally pursue Mankind; and the Contempt which unjustly pursues those: I cannot tell which is the greater, the Folly or the Impiety of this Humour; for 'tis a wretched Folly to flatter our selves with the vain hopes of a Security which is not to be found any where beneath Heaven; or to imagine that a great State is less liable to the blasts of Fortune, than a small one; or to fancy that the Contempt which attends those who never rise, is more insupportable than that which attends those who fall: Nor is the Impiety one jot less than the Folly; for what can be more wicked than amidst so many visible and unde­niable proofs and assurances of a God, and Providence, to let the same anxious and jealous Fears fill and disturb our [Page 185] Minds, which would scarce be pardo­nable, if there were neither? what greater Affront can we offer to the Goodness, the Wisdom, the Omnipo­tence and Faithfulness of God, than to refuse to repose the Care, the Trust of providing for us upon him, when he not only offers, but presses himself upon the Imployment? a second Cause why we so eagerly pursue Wealth, is Sen­suality; Being Strangers to the Peace and Joy of Faith, insensible of the Di­vine Delight of Charity, uncapable of the Extasies, of the full Assurance of Hope, and in general of the Rational Pleasure of a Philosophical Mind; what can be expected but that both Wind and Tide should drive us violently on another shore? I mean the whole Force and Inclination of our Nature shou'd impetuously tend towards sensual, worldly Pleasures and Enjoyments; and consequently towards Wealth, as the Necessary Instrument of Both: you grant therefore that Wealth is Necessa­ry to a pleasurable life? To a pleasu­rable one 'tis, to a pleasant one 'tis not. The sensual Pleasure of a sensual [Page 186] Man, i. e. one who is all Body and Fancy requires a good Fund of Wealth, but the Temporal Enjoyments of a vertuous Man do not: I grant, that ease and rest are Necessary to the Slug­gish, state and height to the Proud, variety to the Intemperate and the Wanton, and to all this Wealth is Ne­cessary; but I deny that Sloth or Pride, Intemperance (I will add Niceness) or Wantonness is Necessary to our Happi­ness; nay, I will confidently affirm, that a vigorous Mind and active Body is a much greater Pleasure than slug­gish Ease; that an humble, if conten­ted state is much more easie than Proud Grandure and the [...], or the Ostentation of life in St. John, that sober and thrifty Temperance is a far greater Pleasure than Variety, and the Modesty, Constancy, and Friendship of a Vertuous affection is not only a more calm, generous and steady, but a more transporting satisfaction than the fancyful Rambles of a wandring Lust: And I hope none will be so fond as to judge Wealth Necessary to the obtaining these Vertues; if any are, [Page 187] their Silliness and Vanity is to be ex­ploded and laught at, not seriously confuted: For who in his Wits can be­lieve, that Ease is the best Nurse of In­dustry; that affected State and Ambi­tious Grandure, are the Parents of Humility and Contentment; That Af­fluence and daily Delicacies are the most Effectual Instruments of Absti­nence; and that Variety is the Mother of Chastity? If not, then 'tis apparent how far serviceable Wealth is, for all that lies in its Power is to provide for us these Temptations: But thô a Wise and Vertuous Man wants no Wealth, I deny not but that he needs a Compe­tency; what this is, is the next thing to be enquir'd: for this pretext of Having what is enough, is fre­quently made use of to justifie and legitimate Avarice and Ambition.

The measure of Competency is the Necessities of Nature,2. Compe­tency. not the Extrava­gancies of Fancy: A little Heap, where frugal Temperance and humble Indu­stry are the Stewards, is a plentiful Pro­vision; But wherever wastful Luxury and wanton Fancy rule and govern, [Page 188] Plenty it self is a mere Dearth: what Treasures would not the Expensive Riots of Apicius, Orata, Clodius ex­haust? how small a Particle of which wou'd have been ample Revenues to Curius, Aemilius Pappus, or Fabricius? Competency then is that Provision which the Vertuous Man needs as his Viaticum, as the Support of Life, and Instrument of Vertue, the modest wish of Jacob, Gen. 28. Bread to eat, and Raiment to put on: The Use and Advantage of this, is not to keep us or our Children from being expos'd to the Contempt (that is too slight an Evil for a Christian or Philosopher to dread) but to the barbarous Pity or Charity of Rich and great Friends. A second Use or Advantage of it is, that it helps to keep the Mind erect and free; that it puts us into a Capacity of Imploying our Reason, and enjoying our selves our own way; and leaves us not under any Temptation to unmanly Compliances, or Unchristian Jealousies and Fears: for he whose Ambition goes not beyond this, will easily trust Providence, if he believe there be any; [Page 189] or his own Industry, if he believe none: how he that divides and separates Pro­vidence and Industry will thrive in this matter, I know not; but he that joyns his own Industry with God's Blessing obtain'd by Prayer, can never miss of this his aim. Having proceeded thus far, I shall be more easily able to re­solve,

Thirdly, What the Value,The Ten­dency of Wealth. Serm. 89. ex Tele [...]e. what the Necessity of Riches is. 'Tis a pretty Speech which Pluto in Stobaeus makes in the Defence and Commendation of Wealth; but in the first place, I do not call every thing Wealth, that is not mere Beggary; I have allow'd of a Competency as very Convenient even for a Vertuous and Wise man; in the next place, I trouble not my self about the Grandure or Security of Kingdoms, thô Peradventure the Scythian Poverty, or Roman Vertue is a stronger Bulwark, a better Guard of these than the Ri­ches of Asia: And in the last place, I do not enquire, what use Wisdom and Vertue are able to make of Wealth, which can extract Pleasure and Hap­piness even out of Troubles and Affli­ctions, [Page 190] but what the Natural tendency of Wealth is; these things being ob­serv'd, that and all other Discourses of the like Nature will appear to contain very little of solid Truth, and to have very little of weight in them: let us come to a tryal of the Matter. If Contentment and Security were the natural Effects of Wealth, if to be Rich and to be Happy were the same thing, then it were not to be wondred at, that Wealth should be the great Idol and Ambition of Mankind; but if it nei­ther free Men from those Passions of the Mind, nor those Diseases of the Body, nor other Calamities which im­bitter life to the Inferiour part of Man­kind; what then is the Advantage of it? Let us then stand still and consider this, do not Hatred and Anger, Envy and Anxiety, Ambition and Lust reign more frequently and more insolently in the Bosom of the great and wealthy, than of the labouring Cottager? Nay, I believe upon a narrow search we shall find that some Passions are the Prero­gative of a proud and insolent Fortune, and are not incident to a mean one, [Page 191] such as haughty Anger, irreconcilea­ble Hatred, an unlimited Ambition and an uneasie Wantonness: the Plow­man and the Artist, the Labourer and the Hind know none of these; Ambi­tion do's not break their Sleep, nor a fastidious Niceness make 'em disgust and nauseate their best Meals, Nor are they troubled with wild and ungover­nable Lusts, bred by Excess, and nurs'd by gaudy Bravery, deluding Arts and more deluding Fancy: Nor are the Rich more Exempt from the Diseases of the Body, than from the Passions of the Mind; excessive Meals, disorderly Sleeps, much Sloth and much Wanton­ness, as they are the priviledges of a gay Fortune, so are they the sources of Innumerable Diseases: Scurvies, Gouts, Rheumatisms, Surfeits, Putrid Feavers, and I know not what are the Conse­quences of Proud Idleness, and Exces­sive Enjoyments, i. e. of ill govern'd Wealth: whereas a plain Table and a sober Life, Regular and Cheap Plea­sures and moderate Labour beget and improve an entire Habit of Health, and prolong life to the utmost Period [Page 192] of Nature: This is a second great Ad­vantage of Wealth, that it gives us a diseas'd Body, and a short Life: Sure then, the Rich are the Minions of For­tune, and the Disasters which oppress the rest of Mankind touch not them: On the quite contrary, all Annals are stuff'd with the Calamities and Misfor­tunes of these Men, rifled Wealth, de­feated Hopes, baffled Ambition, blasted Honours, broken dejected Power, and in a word mighty Changes are the Argument of Tragedies, and the Sub­ject of a loud and raving Passion: whereas the Strokes of Fortune are soft and gentle, when they light upon the mean, these are not capable of Tragi­cal Alterations; their Minds are of a stronger Temper, their Bodies firmer, their Senses not nice and delicate, and their little Sufferings draw not after 'em the mournful Pomp and State which attends the fall, I may call it, the Funeral of a great one: Here Envy insults not, Malice traduces not, the petulant Multitude do not follow the Corps with confus'd Clamours and Censures: Nor do Acquaintance flock [Page 193] to express outwardly a Cold and formal Regard, while they feel inwardly a secret Joy, for that Man's fall is always unpittied whose Power was a barren and useless Title: But to come closer yet, what is it that makes up the Com­fort of Humane Life? a quiet State, faithful Friends, good Wives and good Children? if we consider it, we shall find the Life of Man a little beholden to Wealth in these Points: in all Chan­ges of time, are not the Rich the grea­test Sufferers? the mark of Envy, the prey of Violence and Usurpation? have they not more Enemies as well as more Friends than other Men? Friends did I say? they have None. They have Dependents, Flatterers, Companions and Ministers of their Pleasures, no Friends. Hence is it, that nothing is more Common, than for those above us to wish for the Content, the Ease, and Enjoyment of those below 'em: for the truth of it is, (if we proceed) Relations which are the pleasure of Men of Middle Fortune, are the Bur­den and Incumbrance of the Rich and Great, for in all their Contracts and [Page 194] Disposals, they are Servants to their Fortune, not their Inclination, Mar­riages amongst these are the Matches of Estates, not Minds; and therefore they attend not to the Temper or the Ho­nour of the Families they link with, nay, what is worse, they have no re­gard to their Education, or Vertue, or Wisdom: But Money weighs all down, whatever Objections are put in the op­posite Scale; in the whole Method of their Lives, they are Slaves to their Fortune, and to their Reputation in the World, judging themselves obliged to live, not according to their Reason, but their quality and the Humour, that is, the Folly of the Age, and of the Acquaintance they converse with: Nor dare they walk by any other Maxims, in the Government of the nearest to them, or in the Education of their Children, in all these things they must do what becomes Men of their figure in the World, not what becomes true Wisdom. Who sees not now that upon the whole, there is in this State or Condition of life more incumbrance and less true freedom; more of shew, [Page 195] and less of Enjoyment than in any other? If all this be true, you'l be apt to conclude Mankind is Mad, if Wealth neither makes us more Wise, nor more healthy, more free in our selves, nor more fortunate in our Relations, what bewitches Men into this Extravagant Dotage? what makes the World gaze upon and envy the Rich, as the only Happy Creatures? what makes us fawn upon 'em and flatter 'em, as the only Powerful and great things the World has? Something there is in it, and that's this, we see the outside, the Pomp and the Pageantry of Wealth: we see the gilt Coaches, the rich Live­ries, the little Town of Buildings, gay Furniture, and a whole Squadron of Dishes; and together with all this, the gaudy Trappings the Happy Man's bedight with; the Port, the Grace, the Confidence that all this gives to Ignorance and Nonsense: But if you'l consider this truly, you will find all this mere Pageantry and Apparition, nothing solid nor real in it. As for gay Cloathing; 'tis an Advantage not worth the speaking to, 'tis the Pride [Page 196] of Children, and the weakest of Wo­men, the little Soul that converses no higher than the Looking-glass and a Phantastick Dress may help to make up the shew of the World, but must not be reckon'd among the rational In­habitants of it; serving only as Pain­ture, Images, and Ornaments to the Stage, not Actors on it: as to all the Rest, they seem to enjoy some Prehe­minence, but doth not; the mean Man eats his Morsel with more Pleasure, because more appetite; and sleeps with more delight, because with more ease, neither oppress'd in Body by Luxury, nor in Mind by Care:Eccles. 5.12. The sleep of a labouring man is sweet, whether he eat little or much; but the Abundance of the Rich will not suffer him to sleep: All the rest, as numerous Attendents, many Dependents, Flocks of Parasites, and the like, are but mere incumbrance, the unwieldiness of a gross and heavy Body: all these serve to increase the Noise and Hurry, the Care and the Pomp, but not the Pleasure or Enjoy­ment of the Wealthy. Hence was that Observation of Solomon, If Riches in­crease, [Page 197] they are increas'd that eat them, Ibid. and what profit has the owner thereof, saving the beholding of it with his Eyes? a most Extraordinary Happiness, this, to be the Host of the Neighbourhood, to have one's House the Rendezvous of the Idle and the Gluttonous, of Buffoons and Flatterers, and yet if the Rich live otherwise, presently they grow in­famous and stink, they are look't upon as Indian Graves, where Wealth is not laid up, but lost and buried: they are loaded with the Curses of some, with the Hatred of others, and with the Censures of all; and this is almost as bad as to be pester'd with Impertinen­ces and Flattery; This is the whole of the matter, if People gaze and admire, 'tis their Ignorance: if they fawn or flatter, 'tis their Baseness; but still re­member, 'tis the People, 'tis the Croud that doth this: should a Man of Let­ters or of Spirit, be over-awed by the Laws of Custom or some unhappy Ne­cessity into the Commission of this Ido­latry, he could not but despise the Idol he bow'd down to, and see it a mere lump of Wood or Stone, not­withstanding [Page 198] its gaudy Dresses; thô I acknowledge, I comprehend not, what can reduce a Philosopher to this piece of shameful Dissimulation; the Soul that is great in it self is so in despight of Fortune: he that can live vertuously, can live Happily in the lowest Sate: he that desires but little, has no need of much: he that can despise Riches, can despise the Insolence and Pride of the Rich: in one word, he that can Command himself, needs be a slave to none. After all, I think it were possi­ble to evince the mischievousness of Wealth as plainly, as I have its useless­ness; but that were to press the point further than my present Design requires, for my Business was to shew, either that Fortune, was not necessary to our Hap­piness, or as far as it is, that 'tis in our own Power: both which I may now presume my self to have sufficiently per­form'd. I will therefore pass on to the

Obj. 3 3. Objection from Fate. Amongst the many Shifts and Devices Men have in­vented to quiet Conscience,From Fate answer'd. and at once to excuse and enjoy their Lusts, this is none of the least that they impute all [Page 199] to Fate, not only the Events that befall 'em, but, even their Crimes and Fol­lies, as Juvenal did the Dissoluteness of Peribomius; that is, they believe or wou'd be thought to do so, that all our Affections and Actions, and all Events that befall us are fatal and inevitable; That no Prudence can prevent, no In­dustry frustrate the Decrees of Fate, against which we struggle but in Vain. This is the popular and general Notion of Fate taught first by Democritus, Em­pedocles, Heraclitus and Leucippus, and so deriv'd down from Age to Age, and prevailing mostly amongst the Multi­tude. Thus Bacchylides in Stobaeus his Eclogee expresses the popular No­tion of Fate,Stob. Ec. Phys. c. 9. [...]. 'Tis not in Man to choose his state, whether wealthy Peace, or Inexorable War, or all-con­founding Sedition; but Fate the Sove­raign Arbiter of Each, leads us on blind and hood-wink't to our Ruine. And Euri­pides expresses the other part of the opinion containing the Adamantine [Page 200] Chain, the insuperable Necessity of Fate thus, [...]. 'Tis not permitted us to shun our Destiny, nor can any Hu­mane Prudence ward its blows, nor can any thing but endless and fruitless trou­bles attend our Contention with it. 'Tis a sign of a Desperate Cause or Despe­rate Impudence to dispute against our Common sense, and to defie the daily Experience of Mankind; and yet all this, the Abettors of an Universal Fate (such as this is) are guilty of; for they deny that Liberty in Man which all Laws Divine and Humane, all Exhor­tations and Advices, all Commenda­tion and Reproof, i. e. plainly God and Man, do suppose; for if the Mind of Man were o're-rul'd, if his present and future State were fixt and deter­min'd by a Fatal and Inexorable Neces­sity; then as Laws, Advice and Exhor­tation would be useless and impertinent, so all Reproof and Punishment would be unjust, and all Praise and Reward undeserv'd: and yet thô the Assertion of Fate be oppress'd and o're-born by [Page 201] all these Absurdities, yet it wants not at this Day its maintainers and stick­lers; For there are who maintain a Necessity in humane Affairs, and Events deriv'd from the Influence of Heavenly Bodies, which Notion of Fate take in the words of Manilius:

And there are others, who thô they condemn Judicial Astrology in set Trea­tises writ against it, do yet maintain such Eternal Decrees as Imploy a more [Page 202] inflexible Fate than any Pagan but De­mocritus, and those just now mention'd with him, did ever hold; Nay, a Fate more impious than that of Democritus, for what he imputed to senseless mat­ter, these do to God; and as much more rigid as it is more impious than his, for he never thought of another life wherein Eternal Misery shou'd pu­nish those Actions that were unavoida­ble in this.

Now the Reason why this Doctrine of Fate, this absurd and baffled Do­ctrine is so greedily embrac'd and ea­gerly defended by many, is very plain; it feeds the Vanity and Curiosity of some, and the Pride of others, 'tis a luscious Pleasure to curious and vain Minds to fancy themselves Masters of the starry Cabala, able to spell out and interpret the Laws of Fate, and pry into the Destinies of future Ages, which are cover'd with thick Clouds and Im­penetrable Darkness to all but them alone; 'tis a delicious pleasure no doubt of it, to the Proud and haughty, and ill-natur'd, to see themselves caressed and exalted by God as his particular Fa­vourites, [Page 203] while the miserable Multi­tude, the rest of Mankind are excluded from the Capacity and much more, the Hopes of Happiness and Heaven: and in general 'tis an acceptable opinion to the loose and profligate, since 'tis a ready Apology for Idleness and Lust, and all manner of Sins: for Men might Sin confidently and without remorse, if they did Sin fatally; or rather no­thing could be branded with the Infa­my of Sin and Shame, when whatever Men did, were the Effect, the un­avoidable Effect of Nature and Necessi­ty, an act of Obedience to those Fatal Laws which they could not transgress. Tertullian therefore speaks very pro­perly when he saith,Tertul. Apol. Mentis malae im­petus vel Fato vel Astris imputant, no­lunt suum esse quod malum agnoscunt: They impute the Heat and Sallies of their Lust to Stars and Fate, being un­willing to Charge themselves with the guilt of that which they own to be Evil. This is the use Cerealis makes of this Doctrine of Fate in Tacitus, Donec Cerealis mulceret animos, Fato acta Dictitans quae militum Ducum (que) Discordiâ, vel fraude Hostium evenissent. Tacit. l. 4. Histor. the Roman Legions had be­hav'd [Page 204] themselves very unworthy of that Name and Reputation they possess't, and were extreamly dejected under the Conscience of it; therefore he to chear and encourage 'em, and to wipe off the stain and dishonour of their Misdemea­nour, imputed to Fate, that which ought with truth to have been impu­ted to the Dissention of their Leaders and themselves, and to the Fraud and Cunning of their Enemies. From this little that has been said, as it appears why Proud and Vicious Men contend for Fate; so does it likewise of what importance it is, to free Men's Minds from a perswasion so pernicious to the Interest of Vertue, the Peace of the Public, the Happiness of Man, and the Honour of God. To which pur­pose that I may contribute all I can, 1 I'le consider, First, On which side stands the Advantage of Authority, 2 whether for or against Fate. Secondly, what plain Reason and as plain Reve­lation do dictate in this Point.

As to the first, I will not pretend to make a just and intelligible Collection of the Different Notions which have [Page 205] been taken up of Fate, 'tis Evident from that which Grotius has done of this kind, not only how tedious and volu­minous, but also how obscure and con­fus'd the Discourses of Men have been on this Subject; I shall only therefore as far as my Memory will serve me, consider their Opinions in such a man­ner as the Nature of this present Enqui­ry shall oblige me. Most Philosophers do agree in one general Notion of Fate, that it is a Connexion or Series of Cau­ses successively depending upon one another,Nomesius. and producing a Necessary Effect or Event, [...]; But their Opinions concerning the first Ground or Original of this Ne­cessary Connexion or Dependence were very Various, some ascribing it to Dae­mons or Spirits, some to the Influence of Stars, some to the Circumaction or whirling about of the Heavens, some to an Universal Soul, some to the Force of Motion, some to the Contexture and Contrivance of Nature, others to Atoms, and others to God; and in­deed since Matter or Mind, are the two only things into which all Philoso­phers [Page 206] have ultimately Resolv'd their Search and Enquiries after the Origi­nal of all things, they ought to have look't for no other Original of Fate than one of these two: but this con­cerns my present Question but very little, for if Man be over-rul'd and de­termin'd by Fatal Laws, it matters lit­tle how he came to be so: Nor did I mention this variety of Opinions for any other Reason than this, that it gives us just Occasion to suspect Fate it self as an Erroneous and ill-grounded Posi­tion; for obscurity and intricacy and multiplicity of different Notions about the same thing are the general Marks of Falshood and Error: but there are two things very material to be enquir'd. First, How far the Empire or Domi­nion of Fate was generally extended: And Secondly, what kind of Necessity, or what degrees of it were generally suppos'd to constitute Fate. As to the Extent of its Power, this one thing is very Remarkable, that the Heathens did Exempt the Mind of Man from its Soveraignty. Democritus indeed be­liev'd the Soul of Man as Necessarily and [Page 207] Fatally mov'd by the Impression of his Atoms as any other Natural or Irratio­nal Body, but Epicurus deserted him in this, and following the Conduct of common Sense & Experience, acknow­ledg'd the Liberty of the Soul of Man, and labour'd (as Plutarch tells us) with all his might to assert it, and to pre­serve the Distinction of Vertue and Vice, which Fate destroys; to serve this Hypothesis, it was that he invented that new Motion of his Atoms, call'd by Lucretius Clinamen, sufficiently ex­pos'd by Tully, and how well defended by Gassendus, I am not concern'd to Examine; for I have produc'd his Opi­nion only as an Instance of the clearness of this Truth, That the Soul of Man is not subject to Fate; for had not its Liberty been undeniable and self-evident, the Principles of Epicurus his Philosophy had certainly oblig'd him to follow Democritus in this, as in all other Points, and to have believ'd the Soul it self, o're-rul'd by Fate. The Poets indeed made the Monarchy of Fate so Universal, that they believ'd the Gods themselves subject to it. Thus [Page 208] Jupiter in Homer bemoans the Fate of his Sarpedon, which he could not pre­vent: And thus another Poet repre­sents Apollo striving in vain by all the Power of Art, and Vertue of Herbs to restore life to his Hyacinthus. Nor was this only a Poetic Fancy, 'tis usual with Plato to extend the Dominion of Fate over the Gods themselves; but this was no wonder, for Fate with him imports the immutable Laws of the Supreme God, and God's those Spirits that were created by him. The Stoics indeed (at least some of them) assign'd a worse Reason for this Soveraignty of Fate, namely, That the Supreme Ar­chitect could not Correct the Defects and Incapacities of Matter. De Civ. Dei l. 5. c. 1. After all this, 'tis no wonder that St. Austin should take this to be the general Notion of Fatal Events, that they were such as proceeded from the Necessity of I know not what Order, maugre God and Man: But all this while, it must be remem­bred, that this Dominion of Fate, thô it limited the Power, did not over-awe or necessitate the Will of their Gods. And no wonder, for I never find as I re­mark't [Page 209] before, that any but Democri­tus and his Tribe, did extend the Do­minion of Fate over the Soul of Man: Hierocles makes the Pythagorean Fate nothing else but the Execution of that immutable Divine Decree, That the Vertuous should be rewarded, and the Vicious punish't, and at the same time doth utterly deny that Man is any way necessitated or over-rul'd in his Choice or Actions.De Decret Platonicis, c. 19. Alcinous representing the Platonic Fate, determines indeed the Events of things fatal, but at the same time, he leaves the Minds of Men pos­sess't of their just and natural Liberty. And whatever unavoidable Connexion of Causes the Stoic talk't of, no one did more exalt and magnifie the Liber­ty and Power of the Mind of Man: So that [...], Nemes. c. 37. Nemesius might very well in general affirm, That the wisest of the Greeks believ'd Mens Minds free, and the Events of their Actions Fatal, whe­ther he had respect to the former or the Latter. Thus far then, the Pytha­gorean, Platonic, and Stoic agreed, That [Page 210] the Mind of Man was free, That Events were Fatal: Now 'tis not to be wondred at, that they who did not judge the Calamitous or Prosperous Is­sues of outward things to deserve the Name of Good or Evil, should place such Events wholly out of our own Power, and deem 'em no way depen­dent upon our Behaviour: 'tis enough that they left Man's true Happiness, i. e. Wisdom and Vertue in his own Power,Marcus An­tor, l. 2. which they always did. [...]. (scil. [...]) [...]. And it deserves here to be remembred that they confin'd this Fatality of Events to this life, for such of them as did believe the Eternal Duration or Immortality of the Soul, did also believe that its Misery or Hap­piness in that State, did depend on its Behaviour in this. But how came the Platonics and Pythagoreans, who set that Value upon Temporal things which they deserv'd, to agree thus far with the Stoics in Asserting the Fatali­ty of Events? or how came the storm [Page 211] and fury of all Writers to Light so hea­vily only upon the Stoic's Fate, if these taught the same thing with Pythagoras and Plato? they did indeed all of 'em acknowledge Events Fatal, and yet they differ'd widely in their Notion of this Fatality; for first the Stoic Fate de­pended partly upon Matter, partly up­on God, whereas the Platonic Fate de­pended wholly upon the Will of a Wise Powerful and good God. Secondly, The Pythagorean and Platonic did be­lieve Good and Evil to be dispens'd by a Divine and immutable Law, but so, that the one should be the Reward of Vertue, and the other the Punishment of Vice: So that Fate with 'em was nothing else but the Execution of that Decree of God in the Prophet, Say ye to the Righteous that it shall be well with him; for they shall eat the fruit of their doings. Wo unto the Wicked, Isaiah 3. it shall be ill with him; for the Reward of his hands shall be given him. But the Stoics in their Assertion of the Fa­tality of Events had no such Regard to the Vertue or Vice of Man; nor did they settle or suppose any such Necessa­ry [Page 212] Connexion or Dependence between Vice and Vertue of Man on the one hand, and Punishment and Reward on the other. Thirdly, thô the Platonics taught that all things were compre­hended within the Compass of Fate, that is the general and immutable Laws of the Supreme Being, yet did they not believe th [...]t all particulars were decreed and determin'd, whereas the Stoics (if we follow the Common Opinion) did not exempt any particu­lar Event from the Over-ruling Neces­sity of Fate.

And lastly, The Necessity of the Stoic Fate was Rigid and Inflexible, but that of the Platonic was not, or at least not in all Cases. And this puts me in Mind of the

Second thing Considerable in the [Page 213] Notion of Fate, i. e. what kind of Ne­cessity or what degrees of it are sup­pos'd to render an Event Fatal? The Stoics. did indeed think that the Ne­cessity of Fate was uncontroulable, irre­sistible, inevitable; thô I cannot deny but that the Opinion of Chrysippus and Seneca too (as he explains it somewhere in his Natural Que­stions concerning Fate, if placed in an advantageous Light wou'd look with a more pleasing and favourable Aspect upon the Liberty of Man; but let the Stoics think what they will, I do not find that others thought such a Necessity as this alone, and nothing less sufficient to make up Fate; for the Egyptians which suppos'd an Astro­logical Fate, or o're-ruling Influence of the Stars did yet believe that the Evil they threatned might be diverted by Prayers, Sacrifices and other Reli­gious Rites, according to that of Neme­sius, Nom [...]s. p. 262. [...] [Page 214] [...]. Which is, There are no Influences, no Aspects of Stars so froward and Malignant, so fatal and irresistible, but that Prayers and Expiations may sweeten and miti­gate them, or else prevail with those Powers which govern them to divert their Menaces. Besides this, the Di­stinction of Fate into Denunciative and Peremptory or Conditional, was very well known to the Heathens; this Last was a Fate whose Necessity depended upon some Antecedent Conditions, up­on some Suppositions which might or might not be fulfill'd: This, Servius discourses largely of upon that place of Virgil:

[Page 215] Where he that pleases may see many Instances of this Conditional Fate; and to come to an End, the Necessity of Fate in the opinion of Aristotle and Epicurus, if Gassendus represents it rightly, was not an inflexible, uncon­troulable one, but one subject to Alte­ration and Change, to Chance and ma­ny Impediments, being nothing else but that Energy or Efficacy in Natural Bodies, which the Wisdom of Man did often prevent, the Industry and Cou­rage of Man did often master, and Chance did often hinder and over-rule. By all this we see plainly how careful the Heathens were, that the Necessity of Fate might not destroy the Liberty of Man, how earnestly they contended for such a Fatality of Events, as might not cancel Man's Obligation to Ver­tue, nor discourage him from the Ex­pectation and Pursuit of Happiness; for now to draw to a Point, and to make some use of this tedious Recital of the Pagan Notions of Fate: If we assert a Stoical Fate, we yet leave the Wise Man whatever Encouragements he can derive from the Rewards of another [Page 216] life, and whatever Satisfaction he can derive from Vertue it self in this. And certainly thô temporal Events were Fatal without any Connexion to, or Dependence upon the Choice and Actions of Man; yet even on this Sup­position, Vertue were eligible, as that which teaches us to enjoy Prosperity, and bear bravely that Adversity which we could not prevent: But if with other Philosophers we did believe, not only that the success of another life, but even that of this too, did depend wholly upon our behaviour, and that Events were therefore only Fatal, be­cause those Decrees of God which did award Happiness to the Vertuous, and Misery to the Wicked, are fix't and immutable; then we could not desire more powerful Encouragements to Vertue, or more Evident proof that it is in our own Power to be Happy. If we grant the Necessity that makes up Fate flexible and mutable, or if we suspend a fatal Event upon Conditions, as it were but reasonable to imagine that all Evil ones are suspended: there will be no Reason to question whether [Page 217] Man's Happiness be in his own Power. If we make the Necessity of a Denun­ciative Fate, which even Wisdom and Vertue cannot surmount, extend it self to some few things; and that Fate or Fortune, which drags only Fools and Sluggards in Chains after it, more ge­neral and universal, which is a Notion Caelius Rodiginus seems to have taken from the Platonics; Celius Ro­digium, l. x. c. 20. we meet with no­thing in all this which can rationally deter the Industry and Hopes of any Man. If lastly, with Aristotle and Epicurus, we attribute no more force or strength to Fate, than to that Effi­cacy of Natural Causes, which we ex­perience every Day, is not irresistible (for the Mind over-comes those Incli­nations we derive from Natural Tem­per, and life may be lengthen'd or shortned by Temperance or Luxury, it being a flame which is not of it self so inextinguishable, but that it requires our Care to cherish it, and barren Grounds may be improv'd and culti­vated, &c.) then nothing is more Evi­dent than that it behoves us to act like Men, since our Reason and Vertue have [Page 218] their Necessary tendency and efficacy as well as any other natural Causes; and since the Concurrence of our En­deavours may so much more properly be suppos'd Necessary to promote our Happiness than the Influence of Stars, as it has a more direct and immediate operation upon our Affairs, than the Motion of those Heavenly Bodies can have. And now who would expect to find that Fate in the Christian which was banish't the Pagan World? who would expect that the Mind of Man should be fetter'd and bound by a more inexorable and deplorable Necessity now in this Age of Light and Grace, than ever it was in the thickest Dark­ness of Paganism? who cou'd now be­lieve that Man's Eternal success, in ano­ther life, should be as Fatal as ever the Stoic did believe his Temporal one in this? or who could ever imagine that Christians would Charge that upon the Decrees of a Wise and Good God, which the Heathens out of their Ho­nour for him, did ever refuse to do? for those of them who made Fate en­tirely the Decree of God did believe [Page 219] that in the Dispensation of Evils God did wholly regard Men's Crimes and Sins; that there was no other Fate at­tended any Man than what he was himself the Author of. And they who did believe a Fatality of Events with­out any dependence upon the Beha­viour of Man, did impute it to Matter, not to God, to the deficiency of the one, not to the Will of the other.

'Tis true, such a Fate is not to be found in the Scriptures, as we shall see anon; nor is it to be found in the Fa­thers of the Church, we may find Ju­stin Martyr, Tertullian, Lactantius, and St. Austin himself, (however ac­cus'd by some as a Fatalist) zealously Disputing against the Pagan Fate: what would they have done, had there been then such a Notion of Fate, as has since prevail'd amongst some Christians, which is briefly this, That the Eternal misery of Nineteen Parts of the World, (I speak modestly) and the Eternal Happiness of the Twentieth, is Fatal; that the means conducing to these Ends are Fatal; the one being shut up un­der the invincible Necessity of Natural [Page 220] Impotence, and Rejection from sufficient Grace: the other being called and acted by Grace, Irresistible. That this Necessity of Fate is the Result of a Di­vine Decree, That this Decree procee­ded from mere Arbitrary Will, without any regard to the Behaviour of Man, they that cried out against the Pagan Fate, that it subverted Humane life, that it defeated all Laws, that it left Man no use of his Reason, that it left no place for rational Hopes or Fears, with what bitter invectives must they needs have assaulted this Fate? the Pagan Fate left the Will free, this bound and fetter'd, not only bereav'd of Natural Power and Liberty (for we contend not about that) but destitute of Grace and Divine Assistance: The Pagan Fate in the Opinion of a great many, if not most, did not teach a ri­gid and inflexible Necessity, this doth: they amongst the Pagans who taught the Necessity of Fate inexorable, un­derstood it of Necessity in Temporal Events, but this Fate extends it to Eter­nal ones. The Stoic the great Asser­tor of Fate acknowledg'd, nay, eagerly [Page 221] contended, that Man might be Ver­tuous and Happy in despight of Fate, but these Men make humane Happi­ness and Vertue the very Object of their Fate, making Sin and Misery, Vertue and Happiness as Fatal as any Events whatever. In vain now shall any one of 'em think to excuse their Doctrine from the Imputation of Fate, by telling us (asCalvin. brevis Res­ponsio, &c. in Praef. some do) that Fate in the Pagan Notion did involve God as well as Man within the Compass of its Necessity; that what they teach, is nothing else but God's voluntary De­cree: this is a miserable shift, for this doth not at all lighten the weight of that Fatal Necessity that lies upon unhappy Man, to think that God is not subject to the same: Nay, on the quite contrary, the Pagan Notion was more easie to the Mind, and whil'st it freed God from the guilt of Man's Ruine, it frees Man from all hard and irreligious thoughts of God.

It was pure Piety in the Stoic, to impute that Fatality of Event, which he thought independent of the good or ill-behaviour of Man, to any thing ra­ther than to God, what Impiety!— But I have done, I have sufficiently consider'd which way the stream of Authority runs, and it evidently ap­pears to be against all such Notions of Fate, as put it out of a Man's Power to be Virtuous and Happy, and deter­mine his Sin and Misery wholly Ne­cessary and unavoidable. I will now proceed to consider,

Reason and Revelation against Fate. Secondly, What plain Reason and as plain Revelation do dictate in this point. Thou dost believe Fate, and therefore dost despair of Happiness; Thy sense must be plainly this, All is in the Power of Fate, nothing in thine own, there is nothing in thee to do that can contribute to make thee Ver­tuous or Happy. Whence can this Ne­cessity, [Page 223] this Fate proceed? there are but two Principles that were ever fan­cied to be the first Causes of all things, God and Matter. Dost thou believe this Necessity proceeds from Matter, from the Motion of Atoms, or the In­fluence of Stars? This belief as St. Au­stin argues, doth subvert the Founda­tion of all Religion, for he who believes that he depends upon Fate not God, can have no sufficient Reason for the Worship of that God, on whom he hath no Dependence: but this is that peradventure thou wouldst have; well, when thou art able to prove Reason and Understanding to derive them­selves from senseless Atoms, when thou can'st find out any kind of Natural Mo­tion of Matter or Atoms, which can be the Cause of Liberty or Freedom in the Will, any Motion that can at once be Necessary (for so all Motion of Atoms must, be it of what kind it will) and yet free too, for such all my Deliberations and all my Choices I make, prove the Motion of the Mind to be, then I will acknowledge a Fate, not only independent from, but [Page 224] if thou wilt, Superiour to God; then I will forbear all farther attempts of Charity, as vain, and leave thee to thy Fate and Misery: But these are Notions so absurd in themselves, that no Similitudes, no Arguments, can make 'em appear one jot more ridicu­lous or irrational than they do to all Men of sense at the first hearing. There are some Errors as well as Truths that are self-evident, there needs no Demonstration to convince us that the one are Errors, and the other Truths, and of this kind are the Errors we are speaking of; if a Man should assert that Death is the Original of Life, that sense­less Matter gives Being to an Under­standing Mind, that Necessity is the Parent of Liberty and such like, it were an unpardonable weakness in any Man to think, that such assertion did stand in need of a laborious Confutation. But there are who suppose God the Author of all things, and yet suppose Events fatal too, the former Opinion was ridiculous, this is impious; for suppose Mankind fatally guided by the Influence of the Stars, and these Stars [Page 225] to have received this Power and Energy from God, is it not natural for every Man to break out into the words of St. Austin, Aug. de C. D. l. 5. c. 1. Illi verò qui positionem Stol. larum quodammodo decernentium qualis quis (que) sit, & quid ei proveniat boni, quid­ve mali accidat, ex Dei voluntate suspen­dunt, si easdem stellas putant habere hanc potestatem traditam sibi à summâ illius potestate, ut volentes ista decer­nant, magnam Coelo faciunt Injuriam: in Cujus velut Clarissimo senatu ac Splen­didissima Curiâ scelera facienda decerni, qualia si aliqua terrena Civitas decre­visset, genere humano decernente fuerat evertenda. How outragiously do these Men reproach Heaven whilst they be­lieve those Crimes and Villanies de­creed by that August Senate and glorious Court in Heaven, which had any City upon Earth decreed, it had deserv'd to have been damn'd by the Common Vote, and raz'd to the ground by the united Arms of Mankind. When I consider that the Stars are the Work of God, that their Order and Motion was pre­scrib'd by him, that whatever Vigour and Efficacy they have, they have re­ceived [Page 226] it from him; and then Remem­ber that God is a most infinitely kind and good Being; I shou'd easily suffer my self to be perswaded that they could shed no influence upon this lower World, but what were extreamly be­neficial to it, that they could have no Aspects but what were favourable and benign: I could easily believe that all the Inclinations they form in the Body (if they form any) could be no other than Innocent and Vertuous; I can ne­ver believe that Lust or Falshood, Ma­lice or Cruelty can come down from above; or that our Minds should be impregnated with Sin and Folly by the Influences of Heaven. No certainly, if there be any Vertue in the Stars that extends it self to Man, it must rather be the seed of Life, and Health, and Vertue; than of Diseases, Death or Vice.Antiq. Lect. l. x. c. 20. I can easily fall in with the opi­nion of those Learned Men in Coelius Rhodiginus, who thought that that Vertue of Coelestial Bodies, which ten­ded of it self to excellent Ends, was marred and perverted by a vitious Edu­cation. And so the Gravity of Saturn [Page 227] did degenerate into Sullenness, Nig­gardliness and Melancholy. The Mag­nanimity of Mars into Rashness and Fool-hardiness. The Sharpness and Sagacity of Mercury into mischievous Craft and deceitful Subtilty. The Sweetness and Gentleness of Venus into filthy Lust, and so on: And this Thought does well become every one that pretends to any Religion, whether Revealed or Natural; for this is Con­sonant to the excellency of the Divine Nature; But this sort of Fate springing from the Influence of any Natural Bo­dies, is not only repugnant to Reason, but to our Sense and Experience: for nothing is more plain than this, that any such Influence cannot affect the Mind, but through the Body, and we do frequently find our Reason asserting its Power and Dominion against all the force and strength of the Body: Nor doth Reason only but in every Nation, Law and Custom triumph over the strongest Inclinations of Nature. As the Innocence of the Seres, the Cha­stity of those in Arabia and Osroene, the Abstinence of the Brachmans, and nu­merous [Page 228] Instances which he that pleases may see in Bardesanes the Syrian, and others, does abundantly manifest, that their manners are the Effects not of the Influence of those Planets that Rule their Birth, but of those Laws and Customs that Rule their Countrey. Since therefore that Necessity which our Natural Tempers and Inclinations do impose upon the Mind, is the ut­most Fate that we can imagine to pro­ceed from the Influence of any Natu­ral Bodies, 'tis Nonsense to suppose that Fate insuperable or incontroulable which we see baffled and defeated every day, and in every Nation.

The sum of those Reasons I have offer'd against Fate is this, If we make God the Author of it, we impiously Charge him with what is repugnant to his Nature, for a Good God cannot be the Cause of Man's Sin and Misery: if Matter, we ridiculously suppose, that what is it self senseless and inanimate should produce and govern a Being en­dow'd with Life, Ʋnderstanding and Liberty: If the Stars, we run again into the same absurdities; for if they [Page 229] have their fatal Influence from God, then properly speaking, God is the Author, they but the Instrument of our Fate. If from themselves, then our Depen­dence on, and Worship of God is vain, and besides we absurdly subject the Reason and the Liberty of the Mind of Man to the senseless Tyranny of Atoms. If from the Consideration of the Cau­ses of Fate we descend to examine what our Experience teaches us, what com­mon sense informs us, each of 'em bears witness to the Soveraignty and Liberty of the Mind of Man. If we shou'd come in the last place to Examine what wou'd be the Consequences of a Fatal Necessity over-ruling Man and Humane Affairs, they are such as are not only grosly Contradictions in them­selves, but Fatal and Destructive both to the public and private Good of Man­kind. 'Tis true, were the Liberty of doing Evil taken from Man, we shou'd have no Reason to complain, for then there wou'd be nothing wanting to make the state of Man Happy as that of Angels, but Immortality: But to bereave Man of all Power to do good, [Page 230] to necessitate and compel him to be wicked, how dreadful are the Effects which must follow this? he that stains his hands in the Blood of his Soveraign or his Parent, will accuse his Stars not himself; he that pollutes himself in the incestuous Embraces of a Mother or a Daughter, may defend his action as his Fate not Choice; and how readily shall we do all that Rage or Lust in­vites us to, when there is an Excuse prepar'd for all we do? for he is no more blameable who commits the Evil which he could not help, than he is worthy of Praise who did the Good which he could not forbear. Were it true, that whatever mischief Man did, he were necessitated to do, we might with more Justice arraign the Stars and Atoms, than Malefactors; and all the Instruments of Mischief would be every jot as Guilty and Criminal, as the Man that us'd them. Were this true we might as properly betake our selves to Magic and Inchantments, as to Advices and Exhortations, when we wou'd reclaim the vicious; nor yet could the one be more Effectual than [Page 231] the other; for what could alter what is unalterable? and for the same Rea­son, we might forbear our Sacrifices and Prayers, since what will be, must be, and cannot be otherwise.

Repentance and Tears may be what Seneca calls Expiation on this Supposi­tion Aegrae mentis solatia, The deluding Dreams of a superstitious Mind; but could never procure us any real Ad­vantage; so that on this Supposition, what is now thought the only Wisdom, would be then the only Folly of a Sin­ner, Repentance. I think I may con­clude here, for if it be not by this time Evident, whether Reason be for or against Fate, we may justly despair of discovering what Reason dictates in this or any other Question. I will now proceed to Examine,

[Page 232]What plain Text of Scripture speaks in this Point. And here in the first place we are to expect no other Fate than what depends upon God, for the Scripture makes all things derive their Original from him, and all things de­pend upon him, there is but one Cre­ator, and one Lord, and therefore the Creature can be subject to no Laws but such as he Enacts; so that what­ever Fate we now lye under, must be imputed to the voluntary Decree of God. Is then the Eternal Ruine of Man Fatal and unavoidable? If we en­quire into the Original of this Unhappy Necessity, it must be ultimately re­solv'd into the Divine Will; when God then decreed the inevitable Ruine of Man, under what Notion did he con­sider his Ruine? under that of Misery? or that of Punishment? If under the Notion of Punishment, this Implies plainly, that we are to thank our selves for our Ruine: for Punishment is no­thing else but the Infliction of that Mi­sery which our Sin and Folly have de­serv'd. But if under the Notion of Misery, how can this consist with the [Page 233] Infinite Goodness or Wisdom of God? Alas! how Contradictory is this to Scripture? there God swears that he delights not in the Death of a Sinner, This Decree would suppose him to de­light in the Death of the Innocent: there he is represented full of Compas­sion, and slow to wrath, even upon re­peated Provocations, this Decree re­presents him so addicted to Wrath, and Cruelty, that he made a World on purpose to have whereon to exercise it, and doth exercise it merely for the delight he takes in it; The Scripture finally represents him full of Divine love for Mankind, and not only not desirous that they should perish, but extreamly desirous that they should be partakers of Everlasting life; this De­cree supposes him so utter an Enemy to, and hater of Mankind, that he made the far greater part to no other End, but only to make 'em miserable. Let any unprejudiced Man judge now, whether this be not as Contradictory to Scripture as it is to Sense: Nor is it possible that any unprejudic'd Man should look into Holy Writ, and not [Page 234] discern evidently that Man's Ruine is the Effect of Sin, not only wilfully and presumptuously Committed, but also obstinately and impenitently persisted in: and that God is so far from being fond of our Sufferings and Calamities, that he is ever and anon bewailing the Disappointment of his Love, the defeat of his Grace and Mercy by our Obsti­nacy and Impenitence: it is the voice of his Son, 'tis the voice of God. O Je­rusalem, Matth. 23. Jerusalem, thou that killest the Prophets, and stonest them which are sent unto thee: how often would I have gather'd thy Children together, even as a Hen gathers her Chickens un­der her wings, and ye would not! If therefore we desire to know what the Will of God is, with respect to Man, this is a full and plain Declaration of it; there can be no other, much less any Contradictory to this, if I may not con­fidently rely upon this Declaration of the Divine Will, there is no reveal'd Truth that I can depend upon; Nor can Revelation stand us in any stead, for nothing can be asserted with grea­ter perspicuity or stronger Assevera­tion. [Page 235] But I have no Scruples in me about this Matter, I have no Fears nor Jealousies of any secret Decree or La­tent Will repugnant to his declar'd one; I am as sure that God is Good and True as that he is Eternal or Almighty: and were he not, we could reap but very little Comfort from all his other Attri­butes how great or glorious soever in themselves. But blessed be God, if we proceed from examining those Decla­rations of his Will, which God has made us to examine the Manner and Method of his Government as it relates to Mankind (which is another and the only way left us to judge of his Will and Decrees) we shall find no Instance in the whole Series of Divine Dispensa­tions, which can create in us the least Suspition of lying under an Arbitrary and Tyrannical Fate; nay, if we con­sider the Acts of Divine Providence, we shall find the quite Contrary, that God so governs the World, that the Issues of things are not fatal and unavoi­dable, but dependent upon our selves, that God is free, Man free, and the Events of things free from any inevi­table [Page 236] Necessity; God indeed is ever bound to do what is best, what is wi­sest, and can do no otherwise; This is the only Fate that God is subject to; But a possibility of Different Events is no way repugnant to his Wisdom, Ju­stice, or Goodness. In a proper sense therefore there is no Fate above him, that can impose a Necessity upon him, nor does he impose any upon himself: if there were in any part of his Go­vernment, a fatal and a peremptory Necessity, we should certainly find the tracks and footsteps of it amongst inanimate and sensitive Beings: how great a Liberty does God make use of in this part of his Government;Josh. x. The Sun, whose Course seems certain and invariable as the Imaginary Laws of Fate, shall if need be, stand stock still, or what is more, move backwards to­wards it's East. An instance of both we read of in Scripture, when God thought fit to execute his Judgments upon the Amorites, [...] Kings 20. and condescended to give Hezekiah a miraculous Assu­rance of his Mercy: The fire shall not exert its natural Heat, but shall cease [Page 237] to burn and consume,Dan. 3. and when he sees fit (as in the case of the three Children) become as harmless as the morning light: The Waters shall cease to flow as did the Red Sea, when the Army of Israel march't through it, and saw with horrour and delight, the rowling Waves stand fix't and un­mov'd, as the Rocks and Shores that bounded them; and yet what Necessity, what Fate can we conceive more im­mutable, what ever Connexion of Na­tural Causes it be produc't by, than that which makes the Sun move, the Fire burn, the Water flow? If we consider his Government of Kingdoms, where if any where the Periods and Revolu­tions of Misery and Prosperity should seem Fatal and immutable; here again we shall find the footsteps of unque­stionable Liberty: Let us for Instance consider God's Government of the Jews, what are the Laws which God obliges himself to observe towards them; If ye walk in my Statutes, Levit. 26.3, 4, &c. and keep my Commandments and do them; then I will give you rain in due Season, and the Land shall yield her increase; [Page 238] and the trees of the field shall yield their Fruit. And your threshing shall reach unto the Vintage, and the Vintage shall reach unto the sowing time; and ye shall eat your bread to the full, and dwell in your Land safely, &c. But if ye will not hearken unto me, and will not do all these Commandments. And if ye shall despise my Statutes, or if your Soul ab­hor my Judgments, so that you will not do all my Commandments, but that ye break my Covenant. I also will do this unto you; And 14, 15, 16, &c. I will even appoint over you Terrour, Consumption, and the burning Ague that shall consume the Eyes and cause sorrow of Heart: and ye shall sow your seed in vain, for your Enemies shall eat it, &c. Doth not God here lay Life and Death, Good and Evil before 'em? is not the one and the other to be the Effect of their own Choice, their own behaviour? are we not reasonably to suppose the Israelites at the time of entring into that Cove­nant, whereof these are the Sanctions, as capable of Happiness, as they were of Misery? what was finally the Issue of things? the Jews rebelled and re­volted [Page 239] from God, and as he threatned they were harrassed and exhausted by continual Plagues and Punishments. Well, did this happen so, because it could not happen otherwise? was this the Event, the fatal Event of things which God did really Will, and immu­tably and peremptorily resolve from the beginning, notwithstanding what­ever Professions he might make of his sincere desire of the welfare and pro­sperity of that People? Let God him­self be the Judge, who best under­stands his own Mind.Psal. 81. O that my Peo­ple had hearken'd to me, and Israel had walk't in my ways! I should soon have sub­dued their Enemies, and turn'd my hand against their Adversaries: the haters of the Lord should have submitted them­selves unto him, but their time should have endur'd for ever. By this sure, if we can judge of the meaning of God by any of his Expressions, we may safely con­clude, not only that the Obedience and Prosperity of Israel were things possible, and consequently their Disobedience and Ruine was not fatal; but also that their obedience and prosperity were the [Page 240] things which God did most heartily and sincerely desire If we come to God's Government of particular Men, we may be sure that this is of a piece with his Government of Mankind or Kingdoms, it being nothing else but a more particular Application of those Universal Laws of Wisdom, Goodness, and Justice by which he Rules: An Instance of Liberty in Temporal E­vents, we meet with in that Voyage which St. Luke describes Acts 27.Acts 27. Verse the Tenth, we have St. Paul foretelling the Fate that was like to attend them­selves and their Ship, if they pursued the Voyage they had resolved on: Verse 19. we meet with the Accom­plishment in part, of his Prediction, Darkness and Horror invades 'em, Seas break in upon 'em, and at the same breach had Death entred, had not Di­vine Providence interpos'd in favour, and at the Request of St. Paul. Was this their Suffering fatal? was it un­avoidable? had they not escaped the Tempest, if they had believed St. Paul, and not departed from Crete? or was their obstinacy or unbelief as fatal as [Page 241] the Danger and Damage which atten­ded it? The Expostulation of St. Paul, Ver. 21. will easily clear this Doubt, Ye should have hearkened unto me, and not have loos'd from Crete, and to have gain'd this harm and loss. What then! Shall we think the Issues of Eternity fatal, when those of time wherein we are comparatively so little concern'd are free? Shall God not only leave us the use of our Reason, but also assist us by the Aid of his Providence for the avoiding temporal Evils, and will he allow us neither for the avoiding of Eternal ones? must temporal Ruine be the Effect only of our sinful Choice and Obstinacy, Eternal Ruine the Effect not of our Folly or Sin, but Fate? No sure­ly, how often do we find God in the Revelation respiting his final Sentence, and giving Men space and time to re­pent? but they repented not: 'tis true, and this was their Obstinacy, not their Fate; for if Repentance had been im­possible, to what purpose did God al­low 'em time for't? that they might fill up the Measure of their Iniquity: an excellent Paraphrase! whom shall [Page 242] I believe? God saith, he gave the Sin­ner, time to Repent; thou say'st he gave him time to Sin: God says, he gave him time to make himself capable of Mercy; thou say'st, he gave him time only to increase his Guilt and Punish­ment: How cruel are the Mercies of some Men! this is just such a Grace or Favour as griping Usurers vouchsafe the careless Debtor, whose Fortune and Estate they would swallow up and devour.

I have now I hope dispers't those Clouds which seem'd to hover over our heads big with Storm and Ruine; I mean those melancholy Imaginations which scare and terrifie the weak and superstitious Minds of Men: we may now boldly pursue, and possess our selves of Happiness; the way to it is open, there is no cruel Deity, no spite­ful Fortune, no inexorable Fate that will oppose us; there is no God but one of Love and Goodness, which moderate his Almighty Power, and temper the Severity of his Justice; a God who passionately desires our Happiness, and delights in nothing more than in pro­moting [Page 243] it; All is lightsom and chear­ful where he is, Perfection and Happi­ness dwell with him,Psal. 16. in his presence is fulness of Joy, and at his right hand are Pleasures for evermore. He scatters and dissipates Evil, and troubles by the Light of his Countenance, Death and Hell fly far from before him, and hide themselves in their own Darkness. What can we apprehend from such a God as this is! how can he delight in our Misery who is all Love! No, no­thing but our guilt or folly can raise our Fears, we may rest secure of his Favour, if we do not despise it; nor can he ever be made our Enemy, unless we first become the Enemies of Vertue and Goodness: what then have we to fear? there is no Fate but the immu­table Law of God, that Universal Law which adjudges Happiness to the Righ­teous and Misery to the Wicked: there is no Fortune but his Providence; which is nothing but the Execution of that one general Law, and the Appli­cation of its several parts, in particular Instances: 'tis plain therefore we have nothing now to fear but our selves, if [Page 244] we be but true to our own Reason, and faithful to our own Interest, we may confidently presume both of the Assi­stance and Reward of Heaven; there is therefore nothing left now to excuse us from the guilt of our own Ruine; but only that which is wont to be objected by such as are enslav'd to some impious Lust, and groan under the weight of those Chains which they made them­selves, I mean an Incapacity of Happi­ness, which is a fourth Objection against the possibility of Attaining Happiness, and is now to be consider'd.

Obj. 4 They who urge their Incapacity as an Objection against the possibility of attaining Happiness do suppose Happi­ness to consist in Vertue in the Plea­sure that flows from it,Incapacity of Happi­ness. and the bliss that will one Day or other Eternally reward it: they acknowledge, could they but be Vertuous, they should be Happy; but they despair of obtaining such a Conquest over their Vices as may suffice to render their life smooth, equal and steady; and preserve the Peace of their Conscience by giving [Page 245] 'em an unquestionable proof of their Sincerity towards God; without which 'tis impossible that they should be fill'd with a rational Joy and Peace, or abound in a rational Hope. This therefore must be the supposition of my following Discourse.

There may be three different kinds of Incapacities fancied, which for Di­stinction sake I'le call Natural, Moral, and Penal: each of which may be thus explain'd in the Notion the Objector forms of 'em: Penal Incapacity is that desperate state wherein Man is by God immutably rejected both from Pardon and Assistance. Moral Incapacity re­sults from the Strength and Absolute­ness of that Dominion which Sin has establish't over some Men, through a long and continued course of Wicked­ness. Natural Incapacity consists in such an inteachable stupidity of Tem­per, or in such violent and invincible Inclinations to Vice, or in such a slight­ness, levity and inconstancy of Mind, as render Men utterly unfit to receive any lasting Impressions of Vertue, or to make any steady and resolute At­tempt [Page 246] of attaining it.No Incapa­city from Nature. I'le begin with this first, and here I desire to be ex­cus'd if I do not take upon me to mark out the distinct bounds and limits of Nature and Grace; These two Sisters are not like those Chaldee BrethrenGen. 13. Abraham and Lot, that were too migh­ty to dwell together. No, they de­light to mix in loving Embraces, their Wealth and Power encreases by being United; and like some Plants I have read of, they never thrive when divi­ded: I shall not dispute, what Power in Man is a Birthright, what a Dona­tive; for alas! Every thing he possesses is a Grace, a Favour of his Prince: his Natural Abilities are so many Graces he derives from God, and as properly such as any accession to 'em which is inspir'd afterwards: So that when ever I contend that any thing is in the Power of Man, I desire to be understood of all that Power which God has invested him with, whether Natural or Su­pernatural.

Did Men decry and vilifie Nature, to beget in themselves the more profound Humility, and the more wakeful and [Page 247] solicitous Industry, did they like the Semnones, inMorib. German. Tacitus, load them­selves with Chains as the Badge of their subjection to and dependence upon the Deity, did they magnifie Divine Grace, in order to convince themselves of the Necessity and Efficacy of it, and so to enflame their Importunity and Industry in Quest of it; This were Piety and Devotion, not Error; or however they might exaggerate the Impotence of Na­ture beyond strict Truth, yet this wou'd be a Safe and Pious Errour, as all humble and modest ones are: But when they Endeavour to represent Na­ture vile and corrupt, on purpose that they may the more licentiously pollute and abuse it, when they magnifie and exalt Divine Grace out of a most con­tradictious and preposterous Design to justifie their Neglect and Contempt of it, for they wou'd fain have all to be so intirely imputed to Grace, that they wou'd not themselves be put to as much as the trouble of seeking it, 'tis not only an Error, but a pernicious and fatal one: for he that abandons the use of his Reason, renders himself incapa­ble [Page 248] of any Heavenly aid; God gives his Grace to Men, not Beasts; I must therefore oppose this Fancy and Endea­vour to perswade Men, that it is in their Power to be Virtuous and Hap­py: Nor can I think this Assertion any way injurious to the Honour or Good­ness of God, if it be remembred, that whatever Power I attribute to Man, I acknowledge deriv'd from God. I will therefore with good Assurance proceed and try whether I cannot take in and demolish this Fort which stops our way to Happiness.

They who affirm a great part of Mankind incapable of Vertue, forget that they dishonour God whilst they reproach their Nature: for were it so, To what End could we imagine such Men endow'd with Reason and Under­standing? not to worship but defie their Maker? and was it for this End that they were made immortal too? had God made Man only to take his Pastime in the World, like the Levia­than in the Waves, such a Soul as that which moves the Fish of the Sea, or the Beasts of the Earth, a Sensitive [Page 249] Soul had been most proper for this End; Then might he have enjoy'd himself without Reluctancy, without Controul, without Remorse, without Shame: what can be the proper work of a rational Creature, to which you allow not a Capacity of Vertue and Religion? till you can shew me this, I can never believe that God shou'd en­dow Man with a Rational and Immor­tal Mind out of any other Design than such a one as might become such a Be­ing Created after his own Image, which is the Practice of Holiness and Vertue. But what shou'd I wonder that Men shou'd not be aware of their contradi­cting Reason when they seem to be in­sensible of that Contradiction even to the common Sense and Experience of Mankind which they are guilty of? To what purpose are there so many Schools of Learning and good Manners founded? To what purpose are there so many Treatises of the Education of Youth writ? To what purpose does the wakeful Parent strive to inculcate the Seeds of Vertue into the Child, and train him up by a wise Discipline to [Page 250] the Practice and Custom of Vertue? To what purpose is the proposal of Re­wards and Punishments, and the Re­straint of Laws, if either they do not raise those Hopes and Fears they aim at, or if Hopes and Fears be altogether use­less and ineffectual, if no Instruction no Discipline can mould and fashion rough, unpolish't, crooked, incorrigi­ble Nature? Now here thô any Man might have confidence enough to di­sparage the judgment of Mankind, and attribute all the Pains they take in the Education of Youth, or the Govern­ment and Direction of riper Years, to Custom not to right Reason; yet sure­ly he wou'd not so far disparage his own Observation and Knowledge as ut­terly to deny the success of these means; for not to instance in particu­lars, 'tis not unknown to any one the least vers'd in the History of the World, that there have been National Vertues as well as Vices, That there have been times wherein Learning and Religion have been as much in Fashion and Reputation, as Wickedness and Barbarism in others, shall we say, those [Page 251] Nations, those times bred none of those Natures, which the Objector af­firms are uncapable of Vertue? Let 'em shew what Heavenly Influences, what miraculous Power produc'd this Change in Nature: what shou'd I urge the Power of vain and false principles, the mighty force even of irrational Customs, vanquishing those Inclina­tions which are more deeply rooted, more closely interwove with our Blood and Spirits than any Inclination to Vice and Folly can be? Such are for Exam­ple the love of Life, and the Abhorrence of Pain; and yet what a Contempt of Death is to be found even in the most timorous Sex, as in the Indian Women! what a Contempt of Pain even in the weakest Age, as in the Spartan Youth! And all this having no stronger Foun­dation than irrational Custom, and vain Phantastic Principles: why shou'd we therefore be unwilling to attribute to excellent Principles and vertuous Customs, blessed and aided by Hea­ven, as much Power and Vertue as we do to such as these? if the Natural ten­dencies of Man to wickedness can be [Page 252] curbed, if his most furious and violent Passions can be restrain'd and stifled, then I think, it may be as reasonably suppos'd that Divine Truths, Religious Discipline, together with the Grace of God may effect this, as any thing else whatever. If the pressing Necessities and Perplexities of the State could change the softness and luxury of Otho into Military Hardship and Courage; I know not why a rational sense of the true Honour and Glory of Vertue, and of our Eternal Interest, and innu­merable other Considerations which the Gospel lays before us Christians, shou'd not be able to work the same wonders? if the Reverence of Seneca or the Senate, or any other Motive could produce a Quinquennium Neronis, could restrain the violent Inclinations of that wretched Man, so that his Go­vernment for so many years, should be as gentle and just as that of the most Gracious and Vertuous Princes, why should not the Reverence of God and the Terrors of Eternity be able to awe and curb the most vicious Nature? This methinks ought well to be [Page 253] weigh'd by all who assert Man's Impo­tence and Incapacity of Vertue, they disparage the Gospel and reproach Grace as well as Man with Impotence and Insufficiency; and yet both the one and the other is the Power of God, and that in order to Salvation: do you Consider, that if you suppose Man by Nature unable to do any thing that is Good, and then deny him, and utterly debar him from God's Grace, you in­troduce Fate? for what more fatal Ne­cessity can a wretched Creature lie un­der than Natural Impotence utterly de­stitute and for ever forsaken of Divine Assistance? or if you bereave not Man of Grace, but yet bereave Grace of its Sufficiency, do you not understand that the fatal Necessity continues still the same? there is no Change in the Man's Condition, only in this Hypo­thesis, Grace is dishonoured and re­proach't as well as Nature: and this reflects very rudely too upon God, it calls the Wisdom, the Goodness, the Sincerity, the Power of God into Dis­pute: 'tis inconsistent with the Power of God not to be able by his Spirit and [Page 254] Truth to subdue and over-power the Corruptions of Nature; 'tis Inconsistent with his Goodness, not to be willing to aid his poor Creatures, when they call upon him; inconsistent with his Sin­cerity to afford 'em such aid as must tend to their greater mischief not good, as Grace its self wou'd, if it were only sufficient to increase their Guilt, but not to subdue their Sin: This were in­deed when a Child ask't Bread to give him a Stone, Matth. 7. and when he ask't Fish to gie him a Scorpion. 'Tis lastly, as in­consistent with the Wisdom of God to confer Grace to no purpose, as it was with his Goodness to confer it to an ill one. These with many others are the absurd Consequences which attend the Denyal of the Ʋniversality or Suffi­ciency of Grace; but if on the other hand, we do grant that God Almighty is ready to assist every Man who calls on him in his Endeavours after Vertue and Happiness, and that his Assistance is sufficient to the End, for which 'tis design'd; then we must needs acknow­ledge that 'tis in every Man's Power to be Good and Happy: for 'tis no [Page 255] more than to acknowledge that Man can do what he can do, or which is all one, what God has put in his Power to do. By what a croud of Arguments might I confirm this Truth, sufficient to bear down and even shame the most Impudent Caviller? why are not Men Good? why are they not Happy? shall we say that God doth not Vouch­safe 'em his Grace? shall we impute Men's misery to God? shall we charge that glorious and most perfect Being with want of Compassion or Sincerity towards his poor Creatures? how ea­sie will it be for him to appeal to the Sufferings of his Son; to the vigorous Attempts and Endeavours of his Spi­rit; to Heaven and Earth stamp't with the Impress of his Power and Goodness, on purpose to teach, invite and almost compel us to worship and obey him; to the various Methods of his Provi­dences contriving and pursuing our Happiness? How easily lastly may he appeal for his Purgation to our own Consciences? And these will tell us, as they ever do, in the Distresses of our Fortune, and the Approaches of Dan­ger [Page 256] and Death to what we are to im­pute the Cause of our Ruine: what shall we say then? doth God vouch­safe Men his Grace, the Revelation of his Truth, and the Assistances of his Spirit, but that this Grace is not suffi­cient for us? Alas! how easie were it for any of us to refute this Fancy by appealing to the solemn Covenant of our Baptism, to the Characters and De­scriptions of Good Men in the Gospel, to the Effects which our Reason teaches us, must be Natural and Inseparable from a true Faith and Divine Assi­stance? But I will choose to make use of one Argument which St. Paul fur­nishes us with,Heb. 11. Heb. 11. there the Apo­stle proves the possibility of pleasing God by Faith from undeniable Instan­ces of Matter of Fact, inferring from what Men have actually done, what 'tis still possible for 'em to do. Omit­ting the miraculous and extraordinary Effects of Faith, I will reduce the In­stances of this Chapter to three Heads. 1 First, Such wherein Faith appears vi­ctorious over the Temptations which arise from the vicious Customs of the [Page 257] Place Men live in, from the prevalency & fashionableness of Sin amongst those they Converse with. Secondly, Such 2 wherein Faith triumphs over Temptati­ons arising from sensual Pleasures. Third­ly, 3 Such wherein it overcomes the sense of Pain, and fear of approaching Evil.

I will begin with the first sort of Instances. It must be confessed that considering the Propensions of our Bo­dy and the Vanity and Sensuality which the Mind naturally derives from it, and from its Commerce with the World, that 'tis a difficult thing to en­counter Temptations naked and alone; how much more Difficult when back't and assisted by Custom and Fashion, when universal Practice gives Autho­rity and Reputation to Sin and Folly; and the poor Man is left destitute of the Assistance of Good Counsel and the Encouragement of good Examples to encounter not only the Difficulty with which the Reluctancies of our Nature, but also the Reproach with which the popularity and prevalency of Sin cloggs and imbitters Vertue: And yet behold Enoch in a World (it seems) given up [Page 258] to Sin, did not only keep up in private to the Practice of despis'd forsaken Ver­tue; but was openly and in an extra­ordinary manner Eminent and Exem­plary in it; and therefore was his End as extraordinary as his Life: for having obtain'd this Testimony that he pleas'd God he was translated. This was ow­ing to his Faith, he was content to en­dure the Reproach of the World, that he might obtain the Approbation of God; and despise the Honour and Ap­plause of popular Vice, and fashionable Compliances that he might gain the Kingdom wherein dwells Righteous­ness. Such an other Example was Noah, his Righteousness, was like his Ark afterwards, rais'd above a Deluge not of Waters but Impiety; he liv'd in a World so wicked, that it grieved God at his heart that he had made it; in this World he was a Preacher and Example of Righteousness, and his Zeal by an Antiperistasis, was not quench't but en­kindled by the wickedness of the World he lived in: This too was owing to his Faith, he fear'd those threats which that Impious World scoffed at, and so [Page 259] prepar'd an Ark to the saving of his House, C. 7. by which he Condemn'd the World, and became Heir of the Righte­ousness which is by Faith. No doubt when this strange Building was prepa­ring, Noah was assaulted by all the Raillery and Contempt by all the shews of Wit and Reason, Lust and Prophane­ness could furnish an impious Age with: This Man (say they) has ever been Singular and Phantastick in the whole Method of his Conversation; there wanted but such a prank as this to compleat Fancy into Madness: He ever dream't of Judgments, and yet we (he threatned) continued our Mirth and Pleasure, he alone in Fears and Anxie­ties has suffer'd the Evils which his Melancholy Fancy created, and which are all that we shall ever see: for how long has he been Preaching dreadful things, and yet still the Sun shines, the Heavens are fair and clear, our Feasts and Lusts have the same relish still: nor do's our Experience only con­vince us of the Falshood, but our Rea­son of the Impossibility of this Man's Dreams; for which way shall the fixt [Page 260] state of Nature be turn'd upside down? Whence will this universal Deluge come? will his God break up the Foun­tains of the Deep? or will he open the Cataracts of Heaven? but while they thus prophanely scoff'd and measur'd the Divine Power by their deprav'd Fancies, Noah religiously fear'd who had a different sense of the Majesty of God and Provocation of Sin: he knew that as Mercy, so Wrath is with God: That as he is mighty to forgive, Eccles. 16. so is he too to pour out Displeasure. And by this Faith he preserv'd himself as from the Impiety so from the Punishment of the Old World: for thô he was not like Enoch translated, yet being preserv'd out of a general Ruine, he liv'd to see an End of the Old World, and give beginning to the New.—To these I might add Lot, whose righteous Soul was not in­fected, but provok'd and griev'd by the Impieties of Sodom. Joshuah, as Eminent for his Faith, as Victories, who resolv'd whatever Course the Is­raelites wou'd take (who to the last stood in need of as great Prodigies to rescue 'em from Idolatry, as once from [Page 261] Egypt) He and his House would serve the Lord. Josh. 24. These Instances are suffi­cient to shew the Power of Faith in its Victory over popular Errors and fa­shionable Sins, and by Consequence, over many Inclinations at once; for the popularity and prevalency of any Sin is a bait appropriated to our Pride and Vanity, which makes Men affect Precedence and Superiority in all things which the World admires and applauds; nor is this all, it awakens our Natural Inclinations, and Invites us to gratifie 'em, nay, it enrages Na­tural Appetite by giving it Security and Confidence, and by working upon the Fancy and Imagination: for the Sin is always wonderfully set off, that is prevailing and fashionable. I will now pass on to the

Second sort of Instances, wherein we may behold the Strength and Power of Faith in its Victory over all Tempta­tions which sensual Pleasure can pre­sent us. Numerous are the Instances of this kind which I might produce among the Heathens, where we may find a sense of the Dignity of Humane [Page 262] Nature, of the Decency and Honour of Vertue, and a perswasion of the Necessi­ty of Purity in order to a future state, atchieving most manifest Victories o­ver all Carnal and Sensual Lusts; but I will confine my self to two in this Chapter: The first is that of Moses, and this is a very full and Comprehen­sive one. His Station being so near the Crown of Egypt presented him at once with all that the World can entertain sensual Man with: There was Plea­sure the Snare of the Soft: There was Power and Wealth the Temptations of the Ambitious Mind; (falsly call'd great) and there was Honour the airy Bait of vain unballasted Minds. These each of 'em single and Stone have like Saul and David slain their Thousands and ten Thousands; and yet that it may appear that their overthrow is to be imputed to their own Negligence and Folly, behold here Moses triumph­ing by Faith over all these, i. e. over all the strengths and forces of sensual Plea­sures joyn'd and united together: when he was come to years, he refus'd to be called the Son of Pharaoh's Daughter, [Page 263] and so deserted a Station wherein no­thing was bigger than his present En­joyments if he had pleas'd, unless his future Hopes, which is the utmost Fe­licity of a state of sensuality. And what is more yet, what was it he did quit all this for? what was it that he did choose in Exchange? was his Soul too little to fill the great place he left? No, Moses his Courage was great as any thing, but his Meekness and Hu­mility; was that height too open and too busie for sensual Enjoyments, and so he retir'd like Tiberius to Capria, that he might indulge himself with more security and freedom, and fewer Inter­ruptions? No, he chang'd Pleasure for Affliction, Treasure for Reproach, the Court of Egypt for the Desart of Mi­dian, he chose rather to suffer Affliction with the People of God, than to enjoy the Pleasures of Sin for a season: Estee­ming the Reproach of Christ greater Riches than the Treasures of Egypt. This was all the great work of Faith: his Mind was betimes possessed with a just Notion of, and awful Reverence for the God of his Fathers, the God of [Page 264] Heaven and Earth; and therefore be­yond the Wants and Dangers of the Desart, he discover'd the Peace and Plenty of a Canaan, and beyond both the Glories of Eternity; and therefore reasonably concluded that it was more eligible to be the Son of God than of Pharaoh's Daughter, to be the Heir of Heaven than of the Crown of Egypt; all this is intimated Verse 26. for he had respect to the Recompence of the Reward.

I will add but one Instance more to that of Moses, and indeed there can be but one Instance added that is greater, which is that of Abraham offering up Isaac. In the former we have seen Faith triumphing over superfluous and unnecessary Pleasures; in this we shall see it triumphing over the Natural and inseparable Appetites of Man. What might not Abraham, if he had been under the Power of any Principle but that of Faith, have objected against this Command of God? what, shall I sacrifice my Son, my only Son? This is a Sacrifice might become Baal or Moloch, but how unsuitable to the Na­ture of that God I worship? Nor is [Page 265] this less repugnant to his Veracity than his Goodness; Shall I sacrifice the Son of the Promise? is it for this I have forsook my Home, my Countrey, my Birthright, and follow'd God through Inhospitable Desarts, and more Inhospi­table Nations? are all my Expectations of a numerous and glorious Posterity come to this at last? Thus might Abraham have argued, but having a firm belief of the Power, Goodness, and Faithfulness of God, he wou'd not go about to prescribe his Wisdom Me­thods, or to limit his Omnipotence by unbelieving Fancies, or derogatory Conceptions concerning it, but firmly believing that he could do whatever he pleased, that he wou'd do whatever he proms'd; he that had received the pro­mises offer'd up his only begotten Son, of whom it was said, That in Isaac thy Seed shall be called, accounting that God was able to raise him up even from the Dead; from whence also he received him in a Figure. We have seen Men vanquishing all the Pleasures that the World can present us with, and conse­quently all those Inclinations and Appe­tites [Page 266] by which we are carried towards 'em. Faith in these Men encountred and defeated whatever strength and force can be suppos'd either in Fancy or Imagination or in sensual Appetite, or in Natural Affection. The Conclu­sion deducible from hence is, That there is no desire of worldly Pleasure in Man so vehement, but that it may be con­quer'd; and consequently that we can­not be necessarily betray'd into Sin by any inbred Inclination of this kind: there is but one Natural Principle more, from whence we can imagine any Necessity of sinning to arise, which is an Aversion to all Pain or Trouble: there are therefore Temptations suited to this Principle in us, such as deter us from our Duty, either by the sense of present, or the fear of impending Evil: And it is thought to be the highest and difficultest trial of Vertue to sur­mount these Temptations, i. e. to be vertuous when Virtue is immediately attended or visibly threatned with great Evils. And yet behold,

Thirdly, In this Chapter numerous Instances of as great Constancy in suf­fering [Page 267] Pain, as we have seen before of Continence in Rejecting Pleasure, Vers. 35, 36, 37. Others were tortur'd not accepting Deliverance, that they might obtain a better Resurrection. And others had trial of Cruel Mockings and Scourgings, yea moreover of Bonds and Imprisonment, they were ston'd, they were sawn asunder, were tempted, were slain with the Sword; they wandred a­bout in Sheep-skins and Goat-skins being destitute, afflicted, tormented. See here Faith triumphing over all those things that are the Dread and Terrour of Hu­mane Nature, Reproach, Imprisonment, Banishment, Death, Death in all its most affrightful Shapes, Death in all its variety of Torments, nay, many Deaths in the lingring Torments they were frequently put to; how strong, how firm is this frail weak Nature when supported by a Divine Faith! All these expected a Happy Resurre­ction, they saw beyond these Midnight-Clouds the Dawnings of Eternity, and unspeakable Comforts ready to swal­low up and extinguish the memory of their Sufferings; and in this Confi­dence [Page 268] they out-brav'd all sorts of Evils. Nor is it to be wondred at, if Faith which overcomes the sense of present Evils shou'd disperse the fears of future ones: Hence it was that the Parents of Moses despis'd the Menaces of Pha­raoh, a Prince Arbitrary in his Power, Cruel in his Temper, resolv'd and bloody in the Execution of Mischief.— Hence it was that Moses in the same manner despis'd the Wrath of this King, and well knowing that no place would be able to protect him from his Power and Cruelty but the Desart, he forsook Egypt, and fled thither; where he could not but foresee he was to encoun­ter insuperable Difficulties; but he en­dur'd, as seeing him who is invisible, and knew that the God of Heaven was every where present, & that in despight of every thing under his Protection he shou'd be both Safe and Happy.

Now since there is no Evil the World can threaten us with equal to that of Torments and Death, it were vain and superfluous after we have seen these Conquer'd, to fancy other Evils of a much slighter Nature unconquerable; [Page 269] it were absurd to think that that Man could be frightned from his Duty by popular Reproach, or the Displea­sure of great Men, or the Diminution of his Estate, who cannot by Death it self? 'twere absurd to Fancy that he who despises Imprisonments, Stripes, Hunger, Nakedness, Torment in Obe­dience to his Duty and respect to its Reward, shou'd be discouraged by any little Austerities or Hardships which Vertue may sometimes exact from him.

Tell me now then, you who com­plain of the Corruption and Impotence of Man, you who magnifie the Force and Power of Temptation, and from both infer the Impossibility of being Vertuous and consequently of being Happy, what have you to answer to these things, these Matters of Unque­stionable Fact? you see Resolution and Faith in these Examples rais'd to that height and strength, which no Worldly no Carnal Temptation can resist; tell me then why shou'd the Faith of a Jew out do that of a Christian? were their Promises more Glorious and therefore [Page 270] more Efficacious than ours? Look how far short Time is of Eternity, Corrup­tion of Incorruption, so far was their Canaan of our Heaven: But suppose they had (as these sure had) a Prospect of the same Heaven, had they a clea­rer sight of it; or more convincing Evidence of the certainty of it than we have? Alas their Shechina, Bath-col, the Thunders and Lightnings of Mount Sinai, their Pillar of Cloud and Fire were not half so clear assurances of God amongst 'em, as that Glory which shun in the face of Jesus Christ, that Power Communicated from above to his Apo­stles, the Resurrection of Jesus from the Dead, and his Ascension into Heaven, were a manifest Testimony of God, asserting and bearing witness to the truth of our Religion, and particularly of that Fundamental Article in it, the Resurrection of the Body, and Ever­lasting life. What then, are our Temp­tations greater than theirs? the Confi­dence of the most sensual Sinner dares not arrive at this Plea: Let the Volup­tuary, the Ambitious confront his Temptations with the Enjoyments or [Page 271] the Hopes of Moses: Let the most afflicted, miserable Man ballance his Temptations with Abraham's Sacrifice of his Son; or with the Sufferings of those Righteous Men mention'd in the latter part of this Chapter, and he must confess, that his Temptations are as much weaker than their's, as is his Faith. What then can be said? no­thing, unless plainly this, that our Case is not the same with their's either in Respect of our Inclinations or our Assistances: if this were so, then how could these Men stand as a Cloud of Witnesses against us in the last Day? which St. Paul intimates in the begin­ning of the following Chapter: how Natural wou'd it be for us, to wipe off any Accusation or Reproach which their Vertue could fasten upon us by this easie answer? 'Tis true we were foil'd and o'rethrown by those Temp­tations which these Men conquer'd, and well might this happen, for neither had they our Infirmities, nor we their Grace; their Nature was not so depra­ved as our's, nor our Grace so sufficient as their's. Were this so, the Sinner [Page 272] might be more infortunate, but not more Criminal than the Saint; the different Event of things at the last Day were to be imputed to the different Dispensation not different use of Grace, i. e. to the partiality of God, not the negligence or wilfulness of Man, than which nothing can be more impiously or absurdly affirm'd.

And now, let not hereafter a fancied Impossibility of Vertue discourage the Weak, nor a pretended one excuse the wilful; nothing is more Evident than that there is no Inclination in Man that is Incorrigible, nor any temptation In­cident to our State which is Insupera­ble: Let any Man that pretends the contrary, consider what Reason has done in some, what Custom, what Faith in others; Let him himself try, what Reason, what Discipline, what Faith, (from all which I never separate Di­vine Assistance) can do in him, and I am Confident, he will not then stand in need of any further answer to his Objection; his own success as well as that of others, will be a sufficient proof of its weakness: Thus I think I have [Page 273] in general given a satisfactory answer to as many at least as plead Natural Incapacity against the Possibility of be­ing Happy: however that no Discou­ragement, no scruple may remain, I will give a particular and clear thô brief answer to each part of this Ob­jection. There are three things suppos'd by it to render Man naturally incapa­ble of Vertue and Happiness. First, Vio­lent and invincible Inclinations to Vice: against this, as the most considerable part of the Objection, the whole bent and force of the precedent Discourse was levell'd, and therefore this needs no farther answer, only here it will be worth our remarking, That those dif­ferences that are in the Natures and Tempers of Men are not Essential, but Accidental, and consequently they may make the way to Happiness more difficult to some than others, but im­possible to none. The strongest Incli­nation to Vertue (I speak of that which is the result of Natural Temper) seems to me but a weaker Inclination to Vice, every Man has naturally a propension to Pleasure, and consequently the [Page 274] sensitive Part of us to sensitive Plea­sure; how much finer mould our our first Parents were made of than we are, I know not; but this I find, the Desire of Pleasure was Natural to 'em even in Innocence; This was that which the Beauty of the Apple did ea­sily enflame, and that was such a De­gree, that I am not able to discern by the Text, to which I shou'd rather im­pute their Sin and their loss of Para­dise, to the Desire of Knowledge, or the Desire of Pleasure: This tendency of the Sensitive Part is Natural to all, but in some 'tis more, in some less vio­lent; unless we may say upon one ground, 'tis equal in all, for the diffe­rence of Temper discovers it self rather in the different kinds of Pleasure we pursue, than in the different degrees of our Inclination to it; we are all equal­ly allur'd and drawn, yet not by the same but several Objects, so that if Lust prevail in one, Ambition as much prevails in another, and Covetousness in a third, and in others Intemperance or Sloth: So that the difficulty of Ver­tue seems much the same to all the [Page 275] Sons of Adam, the strength of Temp­tation consisting especially in our weak­ness; not in the Excellency of the Ob­ject we are taken with, but in our In­clination to it: hence is it as Difficult for one Man to overcome his Cove­tousness, as to another to o'recome his Lust; and restless toilsom Ambition is as luscious and taking with some tem­pers as lazy and delicious Luxury with others: if this were well-weighed, it would make us more mild and gentle in our Censure of others, and not so soft and easie in excusing our selves. 'Tis further worth our observing here, that every Man's Vertue derives some tincture from his Constitution and Temper, so that generally speaking, 'tis not difficult to guess a Man's Natu­ral Constitution by the Complexion of his Religion; however Vertue ceases not to be Vertue; nor will that slight Allay of the natural Constitution extin­guish its Vigour and Merit, thô it be­hooves every Man to keep a strict and jealous guard upon his Inclinations, for Nature soon revives even after it has been some time Buried, and to la­bour [Page 276] most after that Perfection which does most contradict and oppose the particular Vice of his Constitution; for it will be otherwise morally impos­sible to gain a Conquest over it, and as impossible to gain a Rational Peace and Security without this Conquest.

A Second thing which is supposed in the Objection to incapacitate Man for Happiness is an unteachable stupi­dity, consisting in a slow Conception and treacherous Memory: 'Tis true indeed, the Heathen Philosophers did require in their Scholars the Knowledg of many abstruse and difficult Matters, as antecedently necessary to Vertue and Happiness, Skill in Mathematicks fitted a Man for the Platonic Philoso­phy, and the Knowledge of Natural things was the Foundation on which the Epicuraean pretended his Divine Happiness and Vertue was to be built; and Seneca reckons the unthinking Croud amongst the Beasts that Perish: all of 'em did with one consent require three things to Compleat a Vertuous and Happy Man; Nature, Education or Instruction, and Custom. To the [Page 277] First, they attributed the Disposition to Vertue; To the Second the Begin­ning; To the Third, the Easiness and Constancy; and to all three together the Perfection of it. And hence it is that they did distinguish between Per­fect and Imperfect, between Political or Social and Philosophical Vertue, and did not deem every Nature Capa­ble of that Vertue which was Perfect and Philosophical. But our blessed Lord and Master the Author of the Christian Philosophy requires no such qualifications in those who will be his Disciples; All that he requires, is, an humble and an honest Mind, freed from proud Prejudices, possess'd with a sincere Love of the Truth, and a sincere Resolu­tion of obeying it: accordingly St. Paul observes that such were most wrought upon by the Preaching of the Gospel:1 Cor. 1. Ye see your Calling Brethren, how that not many wise men after the flesh, not many mighty, not many noble are called; But God has chosen the foolish things of the world to confound the wise: and God has chosen the weak things of the world to confound the things which are mighty: [Page 278] And base things of the world, and things that are despis'd has God chosen. Nor will any one imagine that Acute and Eminent parts are Necessary to render a Man capable of Being a Christian, who shall consider the Brevity and Plainness of the Christian Faith and Law: doth it require a deep and pene­trating Judgment, or a firm and tena­cious Memory, to enable us to under­stand or remember that plain and short Summary of Christian Practice? The Grace of God teacheth us to deny all ungodliness and wordly Lusts, Titus 2. and live Righteously, Soberly and Godlily in this present world: or that as brief and per­spicuous Abridgment of the Christian Faith?John 17. This is life Eternal, to know thee the only true God and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent: or that excellent Abridgment of both by St. Paul? Acts 20. Re­pentance towards God and Faith in our Lord Jesus Christ. 'Tis true all things are now ravell'd and entangled, and the Faith and Vertue of Christianity is not half so conspicuous amongst Chri­stians as their Theological Wars, Tu­mults and Factions; But this is owing [Page 279] to Man, not to the Gospel, to the Pride and Superstition of the one, not to the Obscurity of the other: Nor may any one here with any shew of Reason ob­ject, That thô the substance of the Chri­stian Faith and Practice is clear, yet the Reasons of both are not so; for who can ever imagine such a Stupidity of Nature as can disable any one to under­stand the Proofs by which the Scrip­ture establishes the great Fundamental Article of our Faith, That Jesus is the Christ, the Messias or Mediator be­tween God and Man? or what Stupi­dity of Nature can render it an im­possible Task to us to comprehend the two Fundamental Reasons of Evange­lical Righteousness, namely, the Sub­serviency of it to the Happiness of this, and of another Life, and the Holiness of the God we Worship? I do not write this as if I mean't hereby to represent Industry in search of Divine Truths, as Superfluous and un-necessary; but to assure all of how mean Capacities so­ever, of the success of it. I am not Ignorant how much some applaud themselves on the account of acquir'd [Page 280] Knowledge of doubtful or abstruse things; how much others value them­selves on a peculiar sort of Politicks re­mote enough indeed from Vertue; and others on Accomplishments as re­mote from Reason, as the others Poli­ticks from Vertue; and how much all of 'em do despise the dulness of those who cannot, and the simplicity of those who strive not to equal 'em in these Attainments: But all this doth not be­get in me the least Scruple or Suspition of the Truth I have before asserted; I know that our Duty is plain, and that the Path of Duty is the most direct and Compendious one to the Happiness of this life and of another: for I know that nothing is so taking with God as an humble Faith, Devout, Pure, Peace­able and Charitable Religion. As to worldly Happiness I know that a Man's own Vertue supported by God's Spirit, and guided by his Truth is the safest and the plainest Guide he can follow in Dark and Tempestuous times; true Policy consists not in that Address or subtilty of Spirit, which furnishes a Man at all times with plausible Shifts, [Page 281] but in that Integrity and Vertue that needs none: and the Beauty and Life of Conversation consists not in Artifi­cial Faces, Phantastick Dresses, Mecha­nick Motions, Shrugs and Cringes, much less in Mechanick (for so I may call set forms of Chat) but in an hum­ble, diligent and faithful discharge of the Duties we owe to all those several Relations we stand in, and the obser­vance of those Laws of Conversation which true Philosophy prescribes; This is that which will make us acceptable to all, and dear to the Wise and Good; Slights, and Tricks, and Arts may di­vert and entertain, but Vertues do charm and captivate, those may open us the way to mens Houses and their Tables, but these to their Bosoms to their Hearts. The sum of all is, Great Endowments of Nature seem to be Ne­cessary for the Attainment of Un­necessary Accomplishments, common Endowments are sufficient to make us capable of Vertue and Happiness. This Marcus Antoninus had well observ'd, and has as well expressed in several places, more fully, Lib. 5. Sect. 3. [Page 282] more briefly elsewhere thus,Marc. Ant. lib. 7. §. 41. [...]. Though thou despair'st of being a Logician, a Natu­ralist, a Mathematician, a Courtier, a State-Empiric, a Talkative Bigot, or a Mimical Fop, (for these too pass for Ac­complishments with some) yet despair not of becoming a Wise Man and a Phi­losopher; though thou hast not Abilities big enough to make thy Confidence pass for Wit and Demonstration, though thou hast not the Art of Wheedling, nor the Talent of shifting and deluding, though thou hast no faculty for deep Dissimula­tion nor slight Insinuation, though thy parts lye below all these and a great many other Perfections, yet for all this despair not, thou hast Parts sufficient to make thee Happy, thou may'st be free (Redeemed from the Servitude of Vice) Modest, Humble, Charitable, and Obsequious to God, And in these very few things consists [...], The Blessedness of Life.

[Page 283]A Third thing wherein the Obje­ction supposes Natural Incapacity to consist, is such a slightness, levity, and inconstancy of Temper as seems to render Men neither fit for any close Application, nor susceptible of any deep and lasting Impression; it cannot be denied but that some are of such an airy, volatile, and various Temper, that they seem to be design'd for no­thing serious, nothing great, as if like Flowers, they were the Sport not Work of Nature, made not for Use but Ornament: But I have always obser­ved, that Nature makes up defects of one kind by Advantages of another; Thus it happens here, those Constitu­tions which do most want solidity and strength do most partake of Softness and Tenderness; so that they are as much more apt to receive Impressions, as they are more unapt to retain 'em than others, like yielding air which the gentlest stroak doth as easily divide and part, as it doth easily return and unite it self again. Hence 'tis generally observ'd, that that Age and that Sex which are supposed to have least of fixt­ness [Page 284] and Constancy, have most of Heat and Passion in Religion, and those Minds which are worst furnish't with Courage and Experience, with Judg­ment and Resolution are most apt and easie to be mov'd and wrought upon by Religious, or deluded by Superstitious Fears; and as apt to be tenderly affe­cted by the Representations of Divine Goodness and Compassion; so that like Bodies which have less bulk, but more agility, their Motion's nimbler, thô their, force and strength be less. Now if this be so, then the Disadvantage of this Temper is not so great as it is fan­cied, for though their Passions last not long, they are easily rais'd; and con­sequently, if our Addresses to such a Temper be but a little more frequently repeated, they cannot but prove suc­cessful, and such Persons by the fre­quent Returns of Holy Passions will grow habitually devout, and their De­votion will be as steady and more elevated than that of a slower and firmer Constitution: But after all wherever there appears an Exuberancy of this Humour, this is to be imputed [Page 285] rather to their Fortune than their Na­ture; a wanton Fortune and too indul­gent an Education is generally attended with a gay, wanton and unfix't Mind. And 'tis true that it is a difficult Mat­ter for such Minds as these to attain to Wisdom and Vertue, but 'tis not be­cause they cannot consider, but because they will not; let but such exchange their haunts of Pleasure for the House of Mourning; let 'em but now and then intermix the Conversation of the wise and serious with that of the giddy, fanciful, and frolicksom; and they will soon find their Humour much corrected, and their Minds better fix'd; to all this, if they could be perswaded to add the Contemplation of a suffer­ing Saviour, of a Holy God and of a Judgment to come; and to this the Devotion of the Closet made up of serious Reflexion on these Subjects and their own Eternity, this wou'd soon reduce their loose and scatter'd De­sires, it wou'd soon recall the ro­ving, wandring Mind, and make it delight to dwell at home in the Company of Wise, Devout and Im­portant Thoughts.

[Page 286]And now I think, I have left no part of this Objection founded upon Natural Incapacity unconsider'd. Do Men complain of their heaviness and stupidity? acute Parts and a tenacious Memory are not necessary to make us Vertuous or Happy; do they complain of their violent Inclinations to Sin? I have shew'd 'em Reason, Custom, Faith, curbing and subduing the most Natural or the most outragious and ungover­nable Appetites of Man: do they Com­plain of the Levity and Inconstancy of their Temper? let 'em retire from the Flatteries and Caresses of a wanton For­tune, and a wanton Conversation; let 'em acquaint themselves with the Wise or the Afflicted, with Divine Truths and their Closets, and this will soon work a Happy change upon 'em, if they are too soft and delicate for the bitterness and severity of these Prescrip­tions, nothing but the much severer Discipline of Afflictions and Judgments can effect their Cure. Under this Head of Natural Incapacity that other Objection from Moral Incapacity has been sufficiently answer'd, for Custom [Page 287] is at most but a second Nature; and I have at large discours'd of the Power of Reason and Faith over Nature; I have produc't many and unquestiona­ble Instances, wherein we have seen 'em overcome our most natural and most necessary Appetites, such as are, our Aversion to pain, our love of Life, and such like. Nor is it possible that any vitious Custom shou'd have taken deeper Root in us, or united them­selves more closely with our very Be­ings than these, and therefore it were absurd to fancy 'em more violent, stub­born, or insuperable; That Expression of the Prophet,Jer. 13. Can the Ethiopian change his skin? or the Leopard his spots? Then may ye also learn to do Good, who are accustomed to do Evil; is but a Pathetic Exaggeration (which is usual in a Prophetic stile) of the Difficulty, not an Assertion of the Im­possibility of an habitual Sinner's Change; what has been done, and daily is done can be done, and 'tis in vain to prove what no Man can deny; St. Paul when he had recited a Cata­logue of such Sinners as shou'd not en­ter [Page 288] into the Kingdom of God, doth afterwards add,1 Cor. 6. and such were some of you; but ye are wash't, but ye are san­ctified, but ye are justified in the Name of the Lord Jesus, and by the Spirit of our God. And Tertullian does appeal to the Power and Efficacy of the Chri­stian Religion visible in the Extirpation of vicious Habits wrought by it, as a proof of its Divine Original; nor are such Instances as these wanting this Day, These, as they do now refute all the Idle Excuses of Sinners, so will they one Day be urg'd in Judgment against 'em to convince 'em that they owe their Ruine to their sloth and obstina­cy, not their Impotence; thô these Men ought to remember too, that Mo­ral Impotence is ever deriv'd from a voluntary Neglect or Contempt of all the means of Happiness and Vertue: I think I might now dismiss this Obje­ction, having given full satisfaction to all scruples that might disturb or dis­courage any well-meaning and honest Mind: and evidently defeated the pretences of such as wou'd fain shroud and shelter their voluntary Sin & Folly [Page 289] under the feign'd Excuses of Impotence, Incapacity and insupportable Infirmi­ty or insuperable Temptations: for all these are mix't and combin'd in every part of the former Objection, and receive one and the same Answer. But I foresee, I shall be thought in this whole Discourse to have had too little regard to our Original Corruption, and Divine Assistance; and therefore thô I endeavour'd to guard it in the be­ginning against all sinister Interpreta­tion, I will here add a brief account of both; especially as far as it shall ap­pear to me to concern my present En­quiry.

First, The Corrup­tion of Na­ture Consi­der'd. As to the Natural Corruption of Man, if Corruption may be call'd Natural, on the account of the Ten­dency of our sensitive Inclinations; some things are very plain, some very obscure; what is plain is this, what the present state of Man is with respect to that Righteousness which the Gospel requires; what is obscure is this, what the state of Adam before the Fall was, without a clear knowledge of which 'tis impossible to determine how much [Page 290] our Nature is now degenerated (as is supposed) from the Primitive Purity and Excellency of its Creation. Se­condly, how Guilt and Corruption could be transmitted or deriv'd from Adam upon his Posterity; Third [...]y, What can be suppos'd properly speaking to be the Demerit, Offence, or Provoca­tion of Original Corruption; what Punishment can be due to it, divided and separated from Voluntary Trans­gressions: These and a great many things of the like Nature I purposely pass over, as either of no great Impor­tance in themselves, or at leastwise of no great Use to my present Enquiry, and go on to what is Plain and Necessa­ry, and that is, What the present state and Condition of Humane Nature is, for nothing can be more Evident than that the Flesh lusteth against the Spi­rit, Gal. 5. and the Spirit against the Flesh; These two being contrary one to ano­ther in their Tendencies and Inclina­tions, This Conflict or Opposition of Spirit and Body discovers it self the more, the more pure and perfect the Law is, that we are under; This ten­dency [Page 291] of the Body is so apparent and undeniable, that it was ever acknow­ledg'd by all Wise Heathens. Hence thePlotinus Ennead. 1. lib. 1. c. 9. Enn. 2. lib. 3. c. 15. Enn. 3. lib. 1. c. 8. Aug. de Civ. Dei. Platonics frequently impute the Diminution of the Power and Liberty of the Soul of Man to its Conjunction with the Body; and Hence it was that some of 'em whom St. Austin refutes by giving an Account of the Nature of the rais'd Body, rejected the Christian Doctrine of the Resurrection, judging the restitution of the Body, rather a diminution of than accession to the Happiness of the Mind. The Pytha­goreans look't upon the Body as the Prison and the Punishment of the Soul, and in short the Philosophy of the Heathens did consist chiefly in this, the subduing the Appetites of the Body to the Reason of the Mind: and this ap­pears most plainly to be the Drift and Scope of Christian Philosophy; From whence it follows, that the Disorder of Humane Nature (call it Original Corruption or what you please) con­sists in the [...], the Lust and Concupiscence of the Flesh, This is Evident from all the Writings of [Page 292] St. Paul, especially Romans the 7th, and this is the sense of our Church Art. the 9th; Nor indeed are we Ca­pable of Imagining any other Corrup­tion in Man; for if there be a Conflict betwixt Right Reason, and Carnal Appetite, if the Tendency of the Body and the Mind be opposite and contro­dictory, 'tis Nonsence to suppose both Corrupt and Sinful; for then the Con­tradiction and Conflict wou'd cease: From hence it follows plainly, that we are born with Capacities of and Incli­nations to Vertue as well as Vice, thô nothing be more manifest than that the Appetite of the Body exerts it self first, grows up to Strength and Matu­rity soonest, and doth more powerfully and forcibly move than the Suggestions and Perswasions of Reason: Secondly, It is from hence plain, that a state of Righteousness consists in the prevalency of the Mind over the Body, and a state of Sin in the prevalency of the Body over the Mind. And from hence ap­pears the Necessity ofDivine Assistance or Grace Consider'd. Divine Grace or Assistance; for since the Dominion of Righteousness cannot be Establish't, but [Page 293] in the subjection of the Body, and the Body doth in Power so much o'rematch the Mind, the Appetites of it being both more forward, more violent, more constant, I had almost said, more Na­tural, than the Dictates of Reason; and this Power receiving daily increase and augmentation by a sensual Education, and by a daily and unavoidable Com­merce with the World, and those Temp­tations which awaken, gratifie and enflame the Appetites of the Body, it were morally impossible that the Mind shou'd master and o'recome the Body, if it were not aided by Divine Grace and Assistance; but then it must be remembred, that 'tis repugnant to the very Notion of Aid or Assistance, that it should make void the Necessity of our own Endeavours; as the Light of Re­velation doth not extinguish that of Reason but increase it; so neither does the strength of God's Grace render our Natural strength useless, but improve and help it: This added to what I have said before, comprises all that is neces­sary to be known concerning Grace, and may be reduc'd to these three or [Page 294] four Heads. First, That the Grace of God is necessary to enable us to live Vertuously and Happily; Secondly, That Grace does not extinguish Nature, or cancel our Obligation to Industry or a careful use of that Natural Power God has invested us with; Thirdly, That God is most ready and desirous to fur­ther and assist all Men in their Endea­vours after Vertue and Happiness: And lastly, That the Grace of God is sufficient for us, or, that we receive by it as great an addition of Strength or Spiritual Aid, as being joyn'd with our sincere Endeavours, is necessary to make us Vertuous and Happy: if we deny the first of these, we subvert the Foundation of Prayer to and depen­dence upon God, we can give no to­lerable account of at least one third part of the Gospel of Christ, and we unavoidably discourage Mankind from all hopes of Happiness; if we deny the second, we destroy the very Nature of Man, render all Laws, Exhortations, Admonitions, Rewards and Punish­ments useless, silly and impertinent; and make Divine Grace the very foun­dation [Page 295] of carnal Security, of desperate and destructive Negligence and Sloth: if we deny the third or fourth, we must unavoidably affirm, either that the Happiness of Man does no way de­pend upon the Grace of God, or that his Misery is fatal and unavoidable: All which are Absurdities gross and palpa­ble to all Minds which lie not under the thickest darkness of blind Supersti­tion and Prejudice. Whoever shall now reflect upon all that has been said will easily be able to conclude, that we have no Enemy without us, none with­in us that can necessitate and compel us to be miserable; Misery may be our Choice or Punishment, it can never be our Fate: Our natural Corruption may invite and incline us, but can never force and compel us to be wicked: for there is no Temptation, no Inclination, which God's Grace and our Industry are not able to resist and o'recome: So that now there remains at last no other Incapacity of Happiness than what is Penal, which is the next thing to be spoke to.

[Page 296] Of Penal Incapacity.Penal Incapacity consists in God's final and immutable rejection of Man from Grace and Pardon. The matter of this Objection shall be fully handled, Vol. 3. where I shall be oblig'd to treat of the Troubles of the Mind, and their Cure; In the mean time, all that is Necessary to be observ'd here is, First, That this state of final Rejection from Grace and Pardon is Penal, a state to which no thing but Mens voluntary Transgressions can betray 'em, and those too Transgressions of the deepest guilt, and most crying aggravations; for surely nothing less can provoke a God who delights to exercise loving Kindness and Mercy, a God of infinite long-Suffering and Patience, to pass a Sentence, an irreversible Sentence of eternal Ruine and Damnation upon any of his Creatures. Secondly, That no mistaken Fancies of the Unpardonable­ness of our state may either tempt us desperately to renounce God, our Sa­viour, and Vertue; it behoves us to consider what ought to be the proper Influence of this Perswasion that there is such a Penal state on this side the Grave.

[Page 297]First, If they who believe such a state will act consonant to their own Opini­on, they must not allow themselves in a course of wilful Sin, lest they be insen­sibly betray'd into that dreadful state.

Secondly, Since Impenitence and Hardness of heart is a Necessary and inseparable Consequence of that dread­ful Sentence which excludes Men from Grace and Pardon; therefore no Man can rationally conclude himself in this state, till he has made all possible at­tempts to recover himself from his Sin, and that without success; And because,

Lastly, No man can conclude his Endeavours unsuccessful, till Death sur­prise him in an Obdurate and Impeni­tent state; for habitual Sinners have become eminent Saints, and laps't Christians, nay Apostates have not on­ly recover'd their former state, but re­deem'd their Crimes by more than Or­dinary degrees of Repentance, Devo­tion, and Charity, and by unde­niable Consequence have been restor'd to God's Favour; for Grace is in order to Pardon, Sanctification in order to [Page 298] Justification, Vertue in order to Glory; therefore no Man must give over his Attempts of appeasing God, and sub­duing his Corruptions, while God con­tinues him in the Land of the Living: These Rules if observed will, I question not render the Perswasion of such a Penal state, as the Objection supposes, very profitable and useful to some, and not pernicious to the eternal Interest of any: For he who by the Dread of such a state, is deterr'd from bold and pro­voking Sins, and from an habitual Course of wilful Impiety, reaps an Un­speakable Advantage by it; and he who adheres to Religion and Vertue, and continues to his life's End, sincere­ly endeavouring to please God and ob­tain his Pardon, shall never suffer any Prejudice in another life by his melan­choly and mistaken Fancies in this. I have now spoke to all those Objections which seem to oppose and assault my Position of the Possibility of Attaining Happiness with any shew of Reason. It is now high time I should proceed.

SECT. II.

TO answer those who against this Assertion oppose not Reasons and Arguments, but Observa­tion and Experience; they do not find that ever any have been Happy, and therefore they conclude that none ever can. The Answer to this Objection will be a most convincing Argument of the Truth of my Position, That Hap­piness is attainable in this Life; for if I prove this Observation false, and can produce undeniable Instances of Happy Men, the Dispute falls of it self.Instances of Happy Men. But where shall I find them? Shall I pre­sent you with the Envied Happiness or Glory of Mighty Princes? Alas! the Wisest of the Heathen Gods preferr'd the Happiness of Aglaus Sophydius be­fore that of Gyges! And the wisest of Men (in his time at least) preferr'd the Happiness of Tellus before that of Croe­sus! And this Sentence seems not only to deny those particular Princes Hap­py but also to pronounce the very state of Royalty uncapable of Happi­ness, [Page 300] or at least less capable than that of a Plough-man; indeed this state when active and glorious is full of Fears, and Cares, and Hazards; when sluggish and unactive full of shame: what can be the Happiness of a state too big for Friendship or for Pleasure? for love is the Business and Enjoyment of Equals; Obedience is all Subjects can offer, or indeed Monarchs can re­ceive; All higher and nearer approa­ches to the Throne are but Intrusions of Ambition and Design: Nor can I possibly discern what Satisfaction the great Mortal can take in any Expres­sions of Duty or Affection, which he can never distinguish from the fawning and flattery of those who in their hearts despise and hate him: How shall he know that any truly love him, when none dare slight him? or how shall he discern who serves him out of Duty, where every Man even obtrudes him­self upon his Commands out of Inte­rest? In a word, the Passions of a Prince are so much greater than other Men's as is his Mind and Fortune; his Conversation is not with the Minds of [Page 301] Men, but with Faces, or rather Masks and Disguises. And as to his Pleasures, his gust of 'em is very flat, being cloy'd and surfeited by his Affluence: And whereas all other Men as the Ambi­tious, the Vain-glorious, the Cove­tous, the Lover seem to ascend and rise above themselves in the Acquisition of those Pleasures they aspire to; the Monarch debases himself, descends and stoops below his Fortune to meet his. And yet I am not of Apollo's nor Solon's Mind, I cannot think there is any great Happiness in the Ignorance and the quietness of a labouring Cottager, such as Tellus or Aglaus Sophydius; I love Security, but not that which Con­tempt breeds, I would have my Secu­rity owing not to the Littleness of my Fortune, but the Greatness of my Mind: I love a Quiet, but a Philosophical life, I would have my Tranquillity spring not from the Ignorance but Reason of my Mind; from the Right Government of my Passions, not from the Meanness of my Education or Fortune. For the same Reason I do not call Men happy, whose slow and easie Temper like the [Page 302] waters of the Dead Sea, is not to be mov'd even by Wind and Storm: I do not call Stupidity a Calm, the Soul that is insensible of Trouble, is so of Joy too: whoever is incapable of any deep Im­pression, is so of any serious Reflexion too, and what is the state of such a Man? I would not have my life pass by like a Dream, whil'st fleeting or im­perfect Images of things do scarce awake, and too too slightly affect my drouzy or dazled sense. In a word, the Happiness I seek after is such a one which is owing neither to Natural Constitution, nor to Fortune: for then, it would not be in our Power. The Men then whom I call Happy, are such who are possessed of true and solid Goods, and those such which Fortune cannot give nor take away; such were Christ and his Apostles, and such are all those at this Day as are transform'd into the Glory and Image of the Divine Nature by the mighty Energy of the Divine Spirit and Divine Truths. Let us consider therefore what the state of Christ and his Apostles was in this Life: I will not take notice of those Ecstatic [Page 303] Pleasures which they felt when they did those God-like Works which we call Miracles, what Triumph could be equal to theirs who saw Diseases, De­vils and Death subject to their Com­mands? what joy could be equal to theirs, when they gave Life to the Dead, Sight to the Blind, Strength to the Lame, &c? To what a height was Wonder and Delight rais'd in each of these Performances? for nothing could be more wonderful than the Power, or delightful than the Charity conspicu­ous in 'em: but this I pass over, because this Power is not to be attain'd by us: Let us come to that which is, I mean the Vertues of Christ and his Apostles; He had not a hole where to lay his Head: 'tis true, but how truly great was he in himself? how much above the mean and unmanly desires of Ambition, Co­vetousness, or Lust? he indulg'd him­self in no sensual Carnal Pleasures, 'tis true, but how Calm that Soul which no Angry or Envious Passion disturb'd, where nothing but sacred Love dwelt? the love of God, the love of Man, and the rational and wise love of himself? [Page 304] how Happy that Soul which was illu­minated with Divine Knowledge, sup­ported by an unshaken Faith, fill'd with joyful Reflexions and glorious Hopes? that Soul which in the silence of the Night, and the Retirements of the Mount did pour forth it self in Prayers and Hallelujah's, that Soul which full of God and full of Heaven, had no room for uneasie Cares or afflicting Sorrows? 'tis true, our Saviour met Death with pale looks and melancholy pangs of Soul; but 'tis as true, that his Faith surmounted his Fears, his Agony endur'd but for a little while an undi­sturb'd Peace, and a well-settled sere­nity of Mind immediately follow'd it, and his trouble and Pain in Death, like the Ecclipse that attended it, did but o'recast and darken the joy, the light within, not extinguish it: who could finish the last Act of Life with more humble Majesty, or with more settled Peace? in the Life and Death of our dear Lord we behold that of his Disci­ples, for they were all Followers of him, as they desir'd we should be of them: what can be happier than their [Page 305] state here was? their Life was Regu­lar and Philosophical, their Joy steady and Rational, their Love of God vigo­rous, their Charity to Man servent and Diffus'd; their Desires, as to the World, modest; their Minds resolv'd and brave in Afflictions, Chearful and Compos'd in Death it self.

Let it stand then as an unshaken Truth, That Happiness may be attain'd in this Life; for what the Followers of our Lord and Master attain'd to, that may we; their Natural Passions and Infirmities were the same with our's, our Trials and Temptations are far less than theirs; we serve the same God, we are guided by the same Truths, sup­ported by the same Power, elevated by the same Hopes; we have the same Peace bequeath'd us, the same Spirit, the same Heaven promis'd us, and we march under the Conduct of the same Captain of our Salvation, who by his Death has Abolish't Death, and brought Life and Immortality to Light. Nor ought this to seem to us an over-daring or presumptuous Position, since the Possibility of Happiness is a Notion [Page 306] Consonant to the Common sense of all Mankind: for 'tis Happiness which Laws enacted for the Government of the Multitude, and Philosophical Rules prescrib'd for the Government of our Passions, do aim at; All Law-givers have ever promis'd the people Wealth, and Peace, and Glory, and Security, as the fruits of their Obedience: and all Philosophers have ever promis'd Tranquillity of Mind and Rational Pleasure to their Followers as the Re­wards of Conformity to their Precepts: And as it cannot surely be deny'd, but that the Kingdom is most Happy, which by just Laws and a well-tem­per'd Authority, is freed from those Fears and Distractions, from those Mis­chiefs and Confusions to which others are expos'd by Anarchy or Tyranny by the Insolence of the Multitude, or the Impotence of the Prince; so it cannot be deny'd, but that the Man is most Happy, whose well-settled Peace is establish't upon solid Grounds of true Wisdom; being neither oppress'd by the Tyranny of Superstition, nor vex't and disquieted by the Insolence of un­ruly [Page 307] Passions, to which the weakness of Reason subjects Men. As to Reli­gion, which is a third governing Prin­ciple, this only proposes a more perfect Happiness, and a more plain and direct way to it, than Nature of it self could: it only relieves and recruits our Natu­ral Power by that of Grace, and en­creases the Light of Reason by a parti­cipation of new Rays of Revelation. If then Happiness be the great End which Law and Philosophy, Revelation and Reason, God and Man, do unanimously propose to us, how absurd and palpa­ble a Contradiction were it to all these, to deny the Attainment of it possible?

To look back now upon this whole Chapter,The Con­clusion and sum up the substance and force of it, 'tis this, God who made us, made us on purpose to be Happy; for what other design could Infinite Love propose to it self in our Creation? and proposing to himself this End, he endow'd us with Facul­ties and Capacities that might fit us for the Contemplation and Enjoyment of himself, and of his Works: The World [Page 308] provided by him for our Entertain­ment, he filled with all things that could Minister either to our Necessities or Delights: here God has planted us, not as Inhabitants but Sojourners; for this is but our state of Probation, An­gels had their times of Trial, so have Men; here he wou'd have us aspire after, as near as we can, that life Angels lead in Heaven; for we are one Day to be equal to 'em: here he wou'd have us learn and practise those Vertues which fit us for the Society & Enjoyment of that Kingdom where­in dwells Righteousness, for that is the blessed End and Consummation of all our Endeavours, Desires and Hopes; but when we make Heaven the Abode, the Seat of Perfect Happiness, we do not thereby suppose that it is banish't from the Earth, but rather on the con­trary, if that state be the Consumma­tion of all things, 'tis Necessarily to be concluded that every step we advance nearer to it, we mount and ascend higher, into brighter, calmer and pu­rer Regions: Heaven is like a Glorious Building, whose access is full of De­light [Page 309] and Beauty; for as that Youth which precedes our Manhood, has its Sweetness, its Beauty, its natural Per­fection and Pleasure; so has this mor­tal-state which precedes our Angelical, its proper Degree of Perfection and Blessedness: and this is no small one neither, for as we are created but a little lower than the Angels in respect to the Dignity of our Nature, so sure­ly our Happiness begins nearly to ap­proach and resemble theirs: When our Mind fill'd with Divine Truths, Charity and Hope becomes Free, Gene­rous, Resolv'd, Constant, Chearful, Meek, Gentle, Devout Heavenly: when it has so accustom'd it self to Vertue, and familiarly acquainted it self with Hea­ven, that the Sins and Pleasures of the sensual Part of the World look like the Manners and Entertainments, not on­ly of a Foreign, but Barbarous and Impoverish't Countrey; and when last­ly by its frequent Retirements from the Body and daily Commerce with Rational and Spiritual Pleasures, it not only asserts its Soveraignty over it, but begins to live so independent of it, that [Page 310] at the last when it shall in Death mount up upon the Wings of pure Flame to Heaven, it shall not suffer as if the Body needed to be torn from it, but shall let it fall, as Elijah did his Mantle. Those Complaints therefore which we make against our present state, and those Reproaches with which we outrage and vilifie our Nature, are false and unjust, for we are by God created and design'd for Happiness, and this Happiness God hath been pleas'd to put in our own power to place with­in our reach: There is no Fate, but what God has made us our selves Ar­biters of; we lye under no Necessity, no Fatality, but what our own Vices betray us to; Nor do we stand in need of the Indulgences of Fortune, the Tran­quillity and Pleasure of a Vertuous Man is an Image of God's own; it springs from within, not from without; 'tis true there are Difficulties which ob­struct our Progress to Happiness; but they are such as all Wise and Good Men have conquer'd: 'tis true, Nature labours under its Infirmities, that is, sen­sual Propensions and Inclinations; but [Page 311] it is strengthen'd and supported by Reason, by Revelation, by Grace: we may fall ('tis true) a Sacrifice to God's Wrath, but it must be after we have liv'd long in Contempt of his Mercy, and obstinate Defyance of his Grace. Methinks these Considerations should raise and exalt the Mind of Man, they should inspire us with De­sires and Hopes worthy of Rational and Immortal Souls, like the Israelites when they march't out of Egypt, we should dream of nothing but Triumph, Glory, and Happiness.