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[...] THE REASONABLENESSE OF Divine Service: OR Non-Conformity TO Common-prayer, PROVED, Not conformable to Common Reason.

In Answer To the contrary pretensions of H. D. in a late Dis­course concerning the interest of words in Prayer and Liturgies.

By IRENEUS FREEMAN, M. A.

LONDON, Printed, and are to be sold by Tho. Basset in St. Dunstans Church-yard in Fleet-street, 1661.

The Epistle to the Reader.

Reader,

THat I deal in matters of this quality, would be interpreted by those who know me, as a doing violence to my nature; since that these Controversies have still been very insipid to the Gust of my otherwise dispo­sed Genius. And I have alwayes pittied those Salamanders that live in the flames of these fiery quarrels. So that in this undertaking I tread quite counter to my self, and war with my own particular inclinations. And therefore my thus engaging against my intellectual Crasis, argues the strength of the Motive, which I must confess to have such power with we, that it can make me any thing, and change me beyond the fabled transforma­tions of Magick and Inchantment. I would have no self to hold me back, when the publick interest may receive any thing by my deserting it. And methinks it is a disgrace to humane Nature to be lesse generous then Inanimates, in not quitting the interests of their private natures for the gene­ral advantage. Therefore that which hath inspired my reso­lutions to this collateral attempt, is a sence that it may prove some way serviceable to the Publick. And in a general combustion it is every ones duty to bring what wa­ter he can to throw upon the Flames. What the Church and Kingdom have suffered from the Principles I have sate down against, is a theam too sad to be insisted on. It is part of a misery to recount it. And what the same troublesome and seditious dogmata are still a doing, is of as easie as lamen­table observation. The disease, which hath done such exe­cution, [Page] is still raging in our borders, and therefore there would be no superfluity, if every man were a Physician. The Fathers danger taught speech to the dumb Organs of the affectionate Son: And the distresses of our dear Mo­ther the Church should animate the endeavours of her du­tiful children; and where abilities are wanting, even create them. My experience can vouch the power of this affection; and if in this discourse I have spoke to purpose, I owe it to this my respectful passion.

The design of this present Essay is to undeceive them, who are not fond of their own delusion. And could I obtain an impartial perusal from those that are wedded to a contra­ry perswasion, I should not despair of disabusing them. But their strong presumptions that they are in the right, and their irreconcileable antipathy to the things I am a pleading for, will I doubt only canker them against the charitable at­tempter, and occasion those bold censurers to conclude me in state of damnation, for endeavouring to depretiate and shame their darling trifles. Therefore I confess, that as to those resolved confidents, I cannot but expect, that my en­deavours should prove frustraneous, since they will never cast an eye, saving of contempt and scorn, upon any thing which makes not for their opinions, and tends not to the confirm­ing of them in their beloved conclusions. But I have con­ceived better hopes of the judicious and more indifferent perusers: and if I may hinder any such from being abused, or disentangle them from any former deceptions, I shall have no reason to complain of disappointment or defeature in my intentions. Nor yet shall I be quite succesless upon the former, the stubborn and confirmed Opinionists; since by this Reply I shall do something in order to the removing of that vaunting complaint of theirs, That their Books are not answered, but that they must be beaten down by club-law, as they phrase it. For they cannot reasonably take [Page] it ill, that I have deferred the publication of it till now, since hitherto there have been great expectations from certain conferences, that the yoak, which dissatisfies their tender con­sciences, would be relaxated. But things standing as they did when they put forth their Discourse of Liturgies, I thought this publication would be now no more too soon then it is too late. Wherein I am not conscious to my self of having balkt their strength, with whom I deal in any of my Replies; and am confident no careful examiner will find cause to charge me with any wilful subterfuges or evasions. I de­sign not to impose on any man, but to convince him: nor have I need to shuffle in a cause which may be so easily and fairly defended. And as I have not sought credit to my cause by impugning only the weakest grounds that its assailants have against it; so neither have I thought to help it, by passionate out-cryes against the contrary opinions, or scurrilous bitter­nesse against their Patrons. The cause that needs such assi­stance, shall, I hope, never gain me its Advocate. If those I deal with, find my retortions something cutting, they must thank themselves, who put the knife in my hands, by bringing Arguments against the practice of others, which naturally recoyl upon their own.

It would be improper and impertinent to trouble the Reader here with much about my management of the Pro­vince I have undertaken: Only I may take leave to intimate, that I have served up this my Answer in a careless natural stile, only attending to the congruity and fitness of my expres­sions, instead of comptness of phrase and language, whence they might have taken occasion to deal with me, as they did with the learned and florid Bishop of Exeter, viz. shuffle off the edge of mine arguments and answers with a pretence, that they were but meer words and Rhetorick. They can­not or will not see a Reason, that is set forth in any pomp or elegancy, which yet is somewhat strange, that they [Page] should see the lesse for light and colours, or that illustrati­ons should obscure things. It were therefore better I should be wanting to the gust [...] of nicer curiosities, then seem to be so to the cause I am defending. If boldness and presumption be objected to me, for attempting a discourse so highly made of by the party it comes from, and composed (as I hear from some of their own) by a Club of some of the ablest Non-conformists, it will not be hard to return an answer, since they cannot well expect, that their fondness of their own productions should be a reason why I should revere or admire them. Be the Authors what they will, I have nothing to do with them under any better titles then H. D. not dealing properly with them but their Arguments; which I must confess I was so daring as to think my self well enough provided to enter the lists with, and therefore thought I might do well to prevent the disturbance of a more able pen.

And now, Reader, I had eased thee of this trouble, and re­mitted thy eye from attendance in the porch into the dis­course it self; but that thou mayst the better judge con­cerning the sufficiency of the following Answer, I beg thy further notice of a few Advertisements.

My design is only to shew the weakness of those Rea­sons, which are pretended to justifie those Ministers who forbear to use the Common-prayer, not that I may ren­der their persons more odious and obnoxious, but rather that I might perswade them to walk in the wayes of Peace, or at least disswade others from following so bad an example up­on such unconclusive inducements, as the Book I oppose presents them with. I say, my only end in this undertaking is Peace, and the fruits of Peace. For though they say page 69. of that Book, that it poseth them to prophecy how the reimposing of the Liturgy should bring us to Peace; yet it needs not an Oedipus to aread, how submission to those im­positions [Page] should conduce thereto; which is the only thing I drive at in this discourse. Indeed they affirm again and again, that the Common-prayer is not established by Law: and therefore it would be requisite to my purpose to prove such an establishment, were it not that they have saved me the labour by professing, that they would never the more con­form if it were established. For these are their words; page 60. If we thought we could use these forms without sin, we should never dispute the Law in the case. So that the Question betwixt them and me is to be stated thus, Whe­ther they ought to conform upon supposition that it were established by Law. For the same reason they have also excu­sed me from taking pains to disprove, what they alledge against the Antiquity of Liturgies, in these words, page 94 We have no great value for any Arguments they bring us meerly from antiquity, as to matters that con­cern the worship of God; because we think the Word of God a perfect and sufficient rule in the case; and we want Vouchers to prove those pretended pieces of an­tiquity which they produce, &c. Lastly, I meddle not with their Reply to the Bishop of Exceters Considerations concerning the excellency of the Liturgy, because if his Lordship thinks it worthy an Animadversion, he will doubt­lesse make it with his own or some other more able hand then mine is. And besides such a presumption in me would not have helped my cause in the way that I take to maintain it, who hold that a lesse excellent Liturgy, when imposed by lawful Authority, is rather to be used, then a more excellent me when standing in opposition. So that all which I have to do, agreeably to my scope, is to maintain this Proposition, That there is no reason to warrant any Ministers for­bearance to use the Common-prayer, upon supposition that it is established by Law. And now, Reader, judge without prejudice of their Reasons, which are contained [Page] without any method in the eighth, ninth, tenth, eleventh, twelfth Chapters of the fore-mentioned Book, and scat­tered up and down in other pages, the same over and over again: and therefore I deserve pardon, if I am forced to repeat the same Answers, to the great tryal not only of the Readers Patience, but also of my own.

ERRATA.

PAge 13. line 7. for land r. hand: p. 33. l. 24. for they may not, r. may they not: p. 36. l. 35. for Periphasis r. Periphrasis: p. 46. l. 11. for thought r. though: p. 49. l. 36. for his kind r. its kind: p. 58. l. 26. for are not so, r. are so: p. 81. l 24. for I know what r. I know not what: p. 82. l. 4. for examination r. exam [...] [...]

The Reasonableness of Divine Service.

CHAP. I.

SECT. I.

The Ministers are not discharged from conformity, by their dis­satisfaction as to the imposing of any Forms Ʋniversally. That may be lawfully used, which is unlawfully imposed; Proved by divers instances. That lawfull Authority may impose significative Ceremonies in divine Worship; infer­red from their own Concessions. Yet it will not hence fol­low, that any but God, may institute Sacraments. The right notion of Superstition.

THE title of the eighth Chapter begins thus, The first Reason of divers Ministers not using the Common Prayer. Their dissa­tisfaction as to the imposing of any Forms universally.

Answer 1. Wherein lyes the reason of this consequence, yea though the Antece­dent be put in more advantagious terms, for their purpose, then they have put it? No forms ought to be imposed universally; Ergo, We ought not to use the Common Pray­er. The most that can follow from thence, is but this; That the Common Prayer ought not to be universally imposed. But they pretend to bring a Reason wherefore it should not be used. But may be they think it all one to say, it ought not to [Page 2] be imposed, and it ought not to be used. But how absurd is such a thought? Since I could instance in hundreds of things, which ought not to be commanded; and yet ought to be done, when commanded. Suppose the Magistrate command me to go three miles to Church, when there is as good a Minister in every re­spect within a mile: This command hinders the exercise of my devotion not a little, and therefore it ought not to have been imposed: Yet for all that, it must be obeyed. If it be re­plyed, that every man is bound to take the course which tends most to his edification in it self, though it be forbidden by Au­thority: and consequently that in such a case I should go to the nearest Church, and make use of extempore prayers, rather then prescribed ones: I answer, that by this Rule every houshold-servant should leave all attendance on his Master on Sun­days, and go into his Closet; that way tending most directly in it self to his edification. But the servant should wisely con­sider, If I disobey my Master, that I may have a better opportu­nity and help for my devotion now; I shall be outed of his fami­ly, and put into a condition attended with far more distractions at other times. And the wise Christian subject will argue in like manner. If I disobey the Magistrate in going to the next Church, or not using the Common Prayer; and many others do as I do: the Laws being exposed to contempt, wars and confusions will arise in the Kingdom: or, if the Laws are vindicated, I who break them must be under restraint: and both these wayes I shall have worse advantages of edification afterward, for using those which I thought absolutely best; against the will of my Rulers. So then, though it were unlawfull to impose the use of the Com­mon Prayer; yet the use is not for that reason unlawful, but is notwithstanding a necessary duty. And that similitude they use page 39. runs on four legs on my Errand, as well as theirs. It is true, the Magistrate should not make a Law, that sound men must use a staff, because it is needful for lame men: But in case there should be such a Law, he that remembers [not for wrath, but conscience sake] will carry his staff, and not content him­self with suffering the Mulct which the Statute determines. And therefore the Author, or Authors, of the book under debate, do very impertinently (to this subject) urge over and over the pretended ill consequences of imposing this book, as that it hath been the cause of separations, the loss of many learned and [Page 3] holy mens Ministry, &c. pag. 91. For if these things were grant­ed (which no considerate man will grant) to have been the proper Products of the forementioned cause: Yet it is nothing to the Question in hand, what have been the effects of imposing the Liturgy; but rather, what have been the effects of using it. This answer (for ought any thing that I can Imagine in my most close and anxious thoughts) is sufficient to satisfie those in this Question, who do remain obstinately unsatisfied about the lawfulness of imposing the Liturgy universally. But I am not out of hope of proceeding a little further in my second an­swer to convince some; even that the Magistrate (whether Ci­vil or Ecclesiastical, I need not dispute here) hath a power to impose a Liturgy; yea this Liturgy under question, if it seems to him most conducible to the Publick Good.

Answer 2. Therefore I shall begin my second answer with those things in the Liturgy, which usually are most scrupled, and seem to be by those I deal with pag. 88. in these words; though I suppose they are false printed, for they sound oddly. Nor is it true that they have any Authority to appoint significa­tive Ceremonies, where are sensible signs to affect the understand­ing. They tell us what particular Ceremonies they aim at under this notion, pag. 91. Sect. 14. The Surpli [...], the Cross, and kneeling at Sacrament are (we think) all. But I shall prove, that lawful Autho­rity have power to appoint such significative Ceremonies, by al­ledging other instances of the same kind, [and bearing the same analogy in point of significancy, and affecting the understanding] which I suppose themselves allow. Therefore I ask them, whether the Magistrate hath not power to command us to be uncovered at the time of Prayer to God? This putting on the Hat, is a signifi­cative Ceremony, professing our Reverence, and affecteth the un­derstanding, as much as those fore-mentioned. If it be replied, that to pray covered is not decent, and therefore it may be for­bid, because the Magistrate may make constitution [...] about de­cency: I reply, that it is [...]ndecent only because it signifies not [...]e reverence; and by consequence; the Magistrate may require other significative Ceremonies, which he thinks necessary to de­cency, because necessary to signifie due devotion. Whether they are really necessary or no, concerns not the Question; but whe­ther he really thinks them to be so: For his own conscience must [Page 4] guide him in his own Acts. If therefore he thinks it necessary to express the separation and higher order of the Priest from the People, that he should wear a Surplis; whereby he may be put in mind of his duty both to God and the People, and they of their respect to God through him, as the Messenger of God; Or if the Magistrate thinks it necessary to express our humble and thankfull acceptation of our Saviour, that we receive the Sacrament on our knees: or if he thinks it necessary to express our obligation to God by Baptism, that we should do homage by receiving and suffering some sensible Badge and Sign; it is not material whether these Ceremonies be indeed as necessa­ry to those ends (which come under the notion and name of decency) as he thinks them to be. Nothing can justly deny him this authority obliging the subject, except they be forbid­den by Gods Law, to be used; which whosoever will under­take to prove, I am ready to answer him. But then the proof must not be (an usually it is) that the Magistrate hath no power to command them; for then we should only run in a Circle; but that they are unlawfull in themselves to be used, as being for­bid by the Law of God. For it is clear from what I have said, that he may as well command these as to pray bare-headed: if these be no more forbidden by God then that. If it be re­plied, that to be uncovered is commanded by the Apostle to the Corinthians, as a Ceremony which nature teacheth: I answer, that we are not to understand by it the absolute nature of Man universally; but the conditional nature and Idiopathy of of such Countrey-men, the word [...] many times signify­ing Birth and Breeding. Otherwise Nature would teach the Turks the same manners; who yet signifie their respects by keeping on their T [...]bant. So that if it should be enacted in England, that men should keep on their Hats before Courts of Justice, &c. and that the contrary should be accounted an af­front to the dignity of their Superiours: In such case the Ma­gistrate might with the same equity make a Law, that we should keep on our Hats in Prayer, to express our Reverence. It may be further replied, that yet still the putting on the Hat, or keeping it off, signifies no more in Gods worship then it doth in civil commerce: But the Cross and Surplice signifie that in Gods worship, which they do not in civil commerce. To which I answer, though the Materials of these Ceremonies signifie not [Page 5] any where else what they do here; yet they may be apt signs to signifie, what they properly signifie here. As the flower de Luce signifies one thing on a sign Post, and quite another in the Scucheon of France; and yet both naturally, as the word hath been expounded before, that is, 1 Cor. 11.16. custo­marily. And in the Kings Coronation, there are many Cere­monies used, which signifie quite another thing there from what they signifie, applyed in another case. But this will ap­pear better (ad homines) by instancing in that high piece of Gods Worship, An Oath. The holding up the hand sometimes signifies an intention to strike, sometimes other things: But in the Solemn League and Covenant it signi­fied a calling God to witness. The same may be said of laying the Hand upon a Bible, and kissing the Book in a cor­poral Oath.

From whence, if the scrupulous Ministers are satisfied of the Magistrates Power to impose those Ceremonies of an Oath; Me thinks it must needs follow, that he hath Power to impose significative Ceremonies, and sensible signs affecting the understanding in the outward exercise of Divine Worship: And those Quakers which refuse to take such an Oath, do act more evenly to their Principles; then those great Divines, whose Scholars they are.

Indeed they bring some shew of a Reason in the place last cited pag. 88. for their denying, that Rulers have any authority to appoint significative Ceremonies, and sensible signs to affect the understanding. Their Words are these: This is to give them Authority to institute Sacraments. God hath appointed us Ordinances, where by sensible signs spiri­tual Mysteries are represented to us. These are his Sacra­ments; we know no Authority men have to add to them, though they avoid the Popish Rock of conferring Grace, which we say no true Sacrament doth ex opere operato. But the answer is ready, viz. That this Argument makes as much against the Ceremonies annexed to a solemn Oath, as against any other significant Ceremonies, quatenus significant: But indeed, it makes against neither the one, nor the other. For to make a Sacrament (as the word is properly and strictly taken) it is not enough, that there be a sign representing spiritual my­steries. I doubt, the Authors scorn to learn out of the de­rided [Page 6] Catechism in the Common Prayer-Book: else they might see there, that it must be ordained by Christ himself to be a means and a pledge. How ever, that may convince them that the imposers of those Ceremonies, against which they are so querulous, never intended them to be Sacraments: for, they never say, that they were ordained by Christ himself to be pledges and means. But I hope they have a better value for Mr. Perkins: and I am sure, when I was a School-boy, I learn­ed of him, that a Sacrament is not only a sign to represent, but also a seal to confirm, and consequently implies a Di­vine institution. Humane Authority may appoint our seals, by which we have our engagements to God confirmed; as the Cross after Baptism: but they cannot make Gods seals, by which his promises may be confirmed to us (for that is pro­per to him;) and therefore they can make no new Sacra­ments. But though they can make no new seals; yet they may make new signs without making a Sacrament; Yea, and new seals on our part, though not on Gods. It is wont to be objected, What place can be then left for Superstition, if men may add new Ordinances which God hath not declared to be necessary? To which I answer, that Superstition con­sists not in using these things, as helps to Worship; which are only not commanded by God, but withall not forbidden: But in using them as necessary pieces of Religion sanctified by divine institution, when they are not. And so there may be as much Superstition in sitting at the Sacrament, as in kneeling; in wearing other Garments, as a Surplis.

SECT. II.

The Text Deut. 12.32. doth not forbid all humane inventions in Gods Worship any more then in Civil Government. It condemns as much the approved practice of David and Salomon, and our present disuse of the Ceremonial Law. The seal of the Canon, Rev. 22. considered, as to this matter.

I Have heard many more such exceptions made against these humane inventions, as they call them: But I remember I am not now writing a Treatise, but answering a Book; and shall only answer the objection, which the Authors make from that Scripture which hath the greatest appearance of patronage to their cause, of any I know of in the Bible. It is Deut. 12.32. What thing soever I command you, observe to do it: thou shalt not add thereto, nor diminish from it. This they cite to their purpose in the Question under consideration, with this Gloss pag. 100. By this Text certainly all humane inventions in the worship of God are forbidden. But [...] is an Argument themselves much cry down: Therefore let us take the Liberty they give us, to examine their interpretation by the Rule of Right Reason; by which it will easily appear, that their cer­tain truth is a certain falshood. For (1.) If this Scripture forbids all humane inventions in Gods Worship; then all hu­mane inventions in the Civil Government are forbidden also. The Consequent is false by their own confession, unless they will deny that the Act of Indempnity is either an Humane Invention, or a Lawful Act: Ergo, the Antecedent is false also. I prove the Consequence thus: Those words, which are applyed both to the commands of God about his Worship, and to the com­mands of God about the Civil Policy; do as much forbid hu­mane inventions in Civil Policy, as in the worship of God. But these words [Thou shalt not add thereto, nor diminish from it] though in the twelfth of Deuteronomy they are indeed applyed to the commands of God concerning his own Worship; yet in other places they are applyed to all his commandments in general. Ergo, They do no more forbid humane inventions in the Wor­ship of God, then in Civil Policy. The Minor is clear from Deut. 4.1, 2. Now therefore Hearken O Israel unto the Statutes [Page 8] and unto the Judgements, which I teach you, for to do them You shall not add to the word that I command you, neither shall you diminish ought, from it. Now the Laws made to regulate Civil commerce, and Judicial proceedings, were some of those Statutes and Judgements, to which all additions are forbid: And therefore if such a Prohibition forbids all humane inventions in the Worship of God; it must needs forbid humane inven­tions in the Civil Government, which I hope those I oppose, are not so wild as to assert. (2.) We find good and holy men (notwithstanding this Prohibition) setting their own Prudence a work to invent new things in the Worship of God: which may well serve, as an Argument ad homines, to convince those, which place so much in Examples as usually the Non­conformists do. But that it may be the more easily and univer­sally succesful; I shall further demonstrate, that these examples were approved by God also. We have an instance, 2 Sam. 7. David purposed to build God an house. The Reason which grounded this Purpose, was no command of God; but meerly Prudential, ver. 2. The King said to Nathan the Prophet; See now I dwell in an house of Cedar, but the Ark of the Lord dwelleth within Curtains. The Prophet Nathan approveth the Motion in the next words, Go do all that is in thy Heart, for the Lord is with thee. And though afterward God by Nathan stopped the execution; yet it is evident from the divine Oracle, that he liked the Intention: as he took pleasure in the readiness of Abrahams mind to offer Isaac, though he would not have him be actua ly slain. This divine approbation of Davids purpose appears from Gods promise made thereupon, to build David an house, &c. And so doth his Son Salomon comment upon the foresaid Oracle in his prayer at the dedication of the Temple, 1 Kings 8.18. The Lord said to David my Father, Whereas it was in thy Heart to build an house to my Name: thou didst well that it was in thy Heart. Nevertheless thou shalt not build the House, but thy Son. If it be said, that David had a particular command for it by divine and extraordinary Revelation, beyond the Dictates of his sanctified Reason: This is said clearly with­out Book: yea, and against Book. For thus God answereth David, 1 Chron. 17.6. Spake I a word to any of the Judges of Israel, saying Why have ye not built me an house of Cedars? And besides, if God commanded David before; why did he forbid [Page 9] him afterward? For though God did forbid that to Abraham, which he had first commanded him: Yet the two cases (as to our purpose) are not alike in many respects; which I could instance, and shall if there be need. It remaineth therefore, that there was no Divine direction given to David concerning this, beside the light of his own Reason, the Candle of the Lord; the commands of which are the commands of God: But that I insist not on here. God never commanded any where in the Levitical Law (to my best Remembrance) that a Temple should be built in future Ages. I confesse I read more then once that when the Israelites should be settled in their inheritance, there should be a stated place in some of the Tribes, where God would be worshipped, and where he would place his Name. But that might be by settling the Tabernacle there, without an house of Wood and Stone. In like manner Salo­mon, though indeed God had said he should build the Temple, yet stayeth not for a command from God about the form, the measure, the materials, and many other adjuncts of the same: though all these things were determined by God himself in the Tabernacle, and not left to Humane Prudence. Neither doth Salomon in these and many other Points keep to the Pattern of the Tabernacle, but follows his own Wis­dom. Accordingly at the Dedication he kept a Feast [and it was an holy Feast, For it was kept before the Lord God, 1 Kings 8.65.] seaven dayes and seven dayes, even fourteen dayes: a Feast, that was never commanded nor kept before; and therefore by the reasonings of these men a more monstrous and abominably anomalous holy-day then Christmass it self. Other inductions might be made; and shall be when there is occasion, if this doth not suffice to evince, that the forecited Prohibition [Thou shalt not add thereto] doth not forbid all humane Inventions in the Worship of God. (3.) The Text under consideration saith, Thou shalt not add to [it] nor diminish from [it.] The Pronoun Relative [it] doth plainly refer to the Law delivered by Moses in the Wilder­ness; whether Moral, Political, or Ceremonial. And if this Prohibition binds us in the sense which they affix unto it, I see not how we can avoid, but we must turn Jews. If it be replyed, that the Ceremonial Laws are ab­rogated by the coming of Christ, and therefore we may [Page 10] do things which are not by them enjoyned, and leave un­done things that are; but yet that there remains the same analogy and Common Reason in respect of the Precepts of the Gospel: I answer, that the Proportion and Common Reason is not the same in our case, till it be proved that God hath by Revelation determined all things in his Worship in the sayings of Christ and his Apostles, which are upon Re­cord, as perfectly as he did in the Law of Moses, wherein not so much as the s [...]uffers and other such Punctilio's are pretermitted. It is usually urged, that the same Prohibiti­on, which now we dispute off, doth seal up the whole Canon of Scripture; Revel. 22. where Saint John concludes, If any man add to these things, God shall add to him the Plagues, &c. But if these words in the latitude of their meaning are not to be restrained to the Book of the Reve­lations (which yet is most probable) but extended to the whole Body of Scripture; Yet they are not to be interpre­ted as forbidding those actions in Gods Worship, that are not prescribed in the Bible. For there are other precepts in the Bible, beside those which are Directive of Gods Wor­ship; as about Good husbandry and Good huswifry in the Pro­verbs. And therefore these Words in the end of the Apocalyps, prohibiting with an equall peremptoriness any additions to any Parts of the Bible; they must needs con­demn humane inventions in good Husbandry, as much as in the Worship of God: and Mr. Hartlib will be found Po­pishly affected at the Tribunal of these Expositors.

SECT. III.

By the Ministers sense of the Text we are obliged to the obser­vation of the Political Laws of Moses. The Answer [that we are so to the Reason of them] retorted. The things meant in that Text are such, as were an abomination to God an­tecedently. Their sense of the words not only absurd, but exotick.

(4.) IT was as much unlawfull to add to the Political Laws of the Jewish State, as to the Ceremonial and Moral; or to di­minish from them. And yet [as these men understand the Words, add, and diminish] we do continually add to them, and dimi­nish from them; and they blame us not. For when a Thief is hanged, instead of making the assigned restitution, here is an addition: and when the Dam is taken with her Young ones, or an house made without Battlements, or a Rebellious Son not stoned to Death, here is a diminution. The Fifth Mo­narcy men do more exactly live up (or rather down) to their Principles, then they who taught them. I cannot see, but ac­cording to the forementioned reasons we are bound by the Ju­dicial Laws of Moses. If it be said, so we are so far as the Rea­son of the command remains; I answer, that in such cases it is clear that the command doth not oblige us, but the Rea­son of the command; and the same Reason would oblige as much when there is no command: which is all I contend for, that human Reason may invent new constitutions about the commerce of Men; and consequently about the Worship of God with a non-obstante to the Text alledged. By these four Reasons it ap­pears to any unprejudiced and considerate Reader, that these Words [Thou shalt not add to it] do not signifie [There shall be no humane Inventions in the Worship of God;] Yea, although this should be the most literal and obvious sense of the words. The Reason is, because of those many plain contradictions and gross absurdities, that would necessarily be consequent there­upon; as I have already instanced. I might add, that there were new and difficult cases sometimes contingent, in which the Judges could not proceed by the stated Rules of Law; but were to make their address to Persons appointed by God, and to stand to their sentence. Moreover if [Thou shalt not add to it] did signifie in the place quoted [Thou shalt not do, what [Page 12] is not commanded]; yet the context maketh it appear, that those things were meant that were an abomination to God antecedent­ly to the giving of his Law, or at least by their contrariety to his Law. It doth not appear that those things were at all meant, which are an abomination only because they are not commanded by his Law (if there be any such things, as those I deal with suppose.) To speak more clearly, if it may be; The Text forbids the adding of such things that are an abomi­nation to the Lord, not because they were not prescribed in the Law, but because they were condemned by the Law, or were con­demnable before the giving of the Law. This will be evident, if we consider the words immediately preceding, Deut. 12.30 31. Enquire not saying, How did these Nations serve their Gods? Even so will I do likewise. Thou shalt not do so to the Lord thy God: For every abomination to the Lord, which he hateth, have they done to their Gods, And then it follows, Whatsoever thing I command, observe to do it; thou shalt not add thereto, nor diminish from it. Now it is granted, that such things are not to be added in Gods Worship (no nor any where else) by hu­mane Invention, which are an abomination to the Lord in their own nature, or by being contrary to some Divine positive Law, and not meerly by being not prescribed in the Law; Such as burn­ing of the Children in the fire, the instance of the Text: For that is the Reason given, wherefore the Hebrews should not do as the Gentiles did without Gods command; because the Gentiles did such abominations. I confess the words also do implicitly and by the mediation of a Rational Inference forbid the doing of such things as are not an abomination, out of any emulation or mimical desire to be like the Gentiles: Because the doing of such things, as are no abomination, out of such a disposition, would naturally tempt and easily lead the Israelites to imitate the Heathens in such things also which are an abomination. But to do those things which the Gentiles did in the Worship of God, not out of any value and authority given to their ex­ample, whose Modes they be; but because of any goodness or usefulness apprehended by Reason in the things themselves: This I deny to be absolutely forbidden to the Hebrews by vertue of this Text, as hath been made to appear by the Example of David in building a Temple after the manner of the Heathens, much less are we Englishmen under any such prohibition. But [Page 13] so far as this Scripture toucheth the doing of such things in Gods Worship, as the Idolaters did, it shall be considered afterward with others of the like nature, which the Authors cite in their appendix to their Second Reason. The result of what hath been said is this: that if the sense which they give of the Words were the most literal, unconstrained, and next at I and; Yet being so absurd [as I have proved it to be] it ought to be rejected. But now I go a step higher. (5.) This sense, which they fasten to them [Thou shalt not add to it, i. e. There shall be no humane Inventions in Gods Worship] is very exotick and far fetched. The Master bids his servant to be at home at one a clock: The servant is at home both at one, and at six: being not otherwise forbid to be at home at six. Doth the servant add to his Masters words, because he doth something more then his Master bade him? No, except he either sayes or thinks, that his Master bade him to be at home at both those hours; Then indeed he adds to his Words. To apply this analogous instance to one of the Points under debate, being applicable to them all: Christ hath commanded us to baptize in the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. The Minister doth so: as also he doth afterwards sign the Party with the sign of the Cross, in token that he shall not be ashamed to confess the faith of Christ crucified, and manfully to fight under his banner, &c. doth the Minister here add to the Words of Christ? No, except he either sayes or thinks that Christ hath bid him do both (I mean by a Particular command; for in general he hath as the case may be, and is in England; since he hath commanded us, to obey those that are over us in the Lord, and submit our selves:) then indeed he adds to the words of Christ, and not else; be­cause he makes Christ to say more then he said. And this was the fault of the Scribes and Pharisees, that they did teach for divine doctrines the traditions of men; clayming that Authori­ty to their own words or those of the Elders, which is only due to the Words of God. These things, which I have alledged, being considered, I willingly expose my self to be derided after the Bishop of Exceter in pag. 89. of their Book; for holding, that the Power of Lawfull Rulers to institute such Ceremonies, is a principle to death to be asserted. For if the Laws of the Land grant such a power, God hath nowhere forbad it. And this were to dye a Martyr to Justice, which is not so small a [Page 14] part of Religion, as some make it: and so their loud laughter eccho's back upon themselves. I have stayed thus long upon their Reason, as it is worded in the contents of the eighth chapter; because I suppose they would set the best foot formost: and because I do not find it [in terms of the same import] to be the subject of the chapter it self; as will appear by the Particulars of that chapter, which I now come to examine.

SECT. IV.

The Ministers first Reason against conformity, viz. [that it is not clear to them to be lawfull for all persons at all times to limit themselves by Forms] examined. (1.) We are to obey the Magistrate in some things whose lawfulness we are not clear in. (2.) The Liturgy doth not limit all men at all times. (3.) There is a difference betwixt limiting a mans self, and being limited. That a man may limit himself, proved by their own words.

THey begin that which they call their first Reason, thus. It is not clear to us, that it is lawfull for all Persons, and at all times, to limit themselves by any stinted Forms of Prayer. This stands in the Place of an Argument; and therefore requires an answer, if a man could but divine whereabouts the Vis ar­guendi lies in it. Let us search it all over according to the Pro­verb, which bids us look where it is not, as well as where it is. When they say [It is not clear to us] they must mean, if they will shape their Argument for their present use, That the Magistrate is not to be obeyed, except in such things whose law­fulness is clear to us. And when they say [At all times] their words cannot amount to a Reason proper for the case, unless they suppose, that the Common prayer cannot be used without li­miting themselves at all times by some stinted Forms of Prayer. And when they say [Limit themselves] their words have no shew of an Argument to their purpose, except it be implyed, that it is all one in the Present case for a person to limit himself, or to be limited by the Magistrate. For if either that, which is not clearly to us lawfull, may and ought to be done when com­manded: or the using of the Common Prayer doth not neces­sarily [Page 15] infer a mans limiting himself by stinted forms at all times; or it be not all one to limit himself, and to be limited by the Magistrate: if either of these things be so, and confessed to be so by the Authors; then it is manifest, that the words un­der examination have not the face of an Argument in their own eyes. Therefore, that we may put it into the best Posture of Strength; we must needs suppose, that it implyes the truth of the three mentioned Positions: all which will be found too light. (1.) The lightness of the first I demonstrate thus. The Lawfulness of an action is not clear to that man who doubteth of the Lawfulness: not being certain that the action is lawfull, nor yet certain that it is unlawfull. But yet such a man is bound to do that action, when it is commanded by the Magistrate. The Reason is, because it is certain the Magistrate is to be obeyed, commanding Lawfull things: but it is uncer­tain, whether the thing commanded be unlawfull. From whence it follows, that the Person so doubting, sins more hainously in not doing that action, then in doing it. And since he must needs venture one of the two wayes, he should choose to ven­ture the safer. Now it is safer to obey doubtingly, then to dis­obey doubtingly. For if the action be lawfull; the omitting of it [besides the injury done to the Magistrate] is of evil con­sequence to the publick by the violation of the Laws: But if it be unlawfull, the bad influence of the action is much more private. The Authors will give me occasion afterward to re­sume this case; and therefore now I dismiss it with with a say­ing of that excellent Casuist Dr. Sanderson now Bishop of Lin­coln, who hath fully resolved this Question in his fourth Ser­mon Ad Clerum. Surely, when things hang thus even, if the weight of Authority will not cast the Scale either way; we may well suppose that either the Authority is made very light, or else there is a great fault in the Beam. (2.) Neither is the second Thesis any whit sounder, which must be supposed to make good their Argument, viz. that the use of the Common Prayer doth infer a limiting themselves to stinted Forms of Prayer at all times. I cannot find any such limitation in the Liturgy, nor in the Act which authoriseth the same: But if the Minister useth it at the times appointed, he is left to his Liberty to pray otherwise at other times; if not in publick, at least in private. (3.) Of the same validity is their Third Supposi­tion, [Page 16] That it is all one for a man so to limit himself, or to be limited by the Magistrate. For how can an Action and a Passion fall under the same Category? It is lawfull to any one to be injured (to put the case to their best advantage;) and yet it is not lawfull to him to injure himself. Even so, if it were not lawfull for a man to limit himself to stinted Forms; Yet it might be lawfull to him to be limited. Indeed, if it were a thing unlawfull in it self, and to be done in no case; their Reason would hold: because the Magistrate cannot limit us, that is, we ought not to be limited by him, where submission to such limitations is unlawfull. But that is not granted, and is under present disputation. They themselves grant in the next words, that those which have not the gift, may help themselves by forms. Now that which is lawfull in any case that may fall out, is not unlawfull in it self. And why is not the Magistrates Pro­hibition as considerable a case, as want of a Gift? Id possumus quod jure possumus. There is a Civel Faculty and Licence, as well as a Natural one: And both are required in Persons under Government, to the doing of an Action well. Doth the ac­quiring of a Gift make that unlawfull, which was lawfull before in every case? I know in some cases it doth; because God re­quireth that of him who hath a gift, which he doth not of others. But if the case under question be such, the Authors should shew where God hath commanded those that have the Gift, alway to pray ex tempore: and not argue meerly from the Gift it self. For it is most certain, that it is most lawfull not to do many things, which a man hath a Gift to do. Otherwise, a man that hath a Gift to drink his Beer cold, sinneth in drinking it warm, though prescribed by the Physitian: And a School-boy, that can make a speech extempore to salute a stranger, sinneth in taking time, and consulting his Phrasiology at the injunction of the Schoolmaster. Besides, who shall judge of the sufficiency of the Gift? The Physitian, or the Patient? The Master, or the Scholer? The Magistrate, or the Subject? The Authors grant in their gene­ral discourse about the use of Words in Prayer, that many a Pri­vate Christian hath an excellent degree of this extempore vein: By their Reason he should use it in the Publick, and at the time appointed for the Common Prayer; for that use of it is only restrained by the Liturgy. If the non-ordination of the private man be pretended to diversifie his case, from that of the Mini­sters: [Page 17] I reply, That those which be ordained, are ordained to exercise their gifts in a Lawfull way only, and not contrary to the Rules prescribed them by their Superiours: as an Univer­sity Orator is chosen to use his Rhetorical Gift, but not contra­ry to the will of the University, if they make known their will to him; and if they will have him at some times to put into his Letter the very words, which they dictate to him, he is bound to do it though he be ordained to exercise his Gift.

SECT. V.

Some things premised to the answer of their Argument from a mans obligation to use his gift. The (1.) Answer, A man may use his gift otherwayes, both (1.) In Gods Service, and (2.) Out of it. (2.) A man is not bound to use his gift, when the use of it would hinder another. It is no sin when hindered by Providence; applyed to the present case. A double reason, why Forms of Sermons might not as well be imposed.

AND now way is made to answer the Reason they bring in the next words: wherefore a Minister, that hath the Gift of extempore Prayer, is bound to use it in Publick. It is in these words; Where God hath given any that Gift, we conceive it is a manifestation of the Spirit given him to profit others by; and that he is defective to his duty, that doth not use it to this end. They press the same Argument in other terms, pag. 28. of their Book thus, The restraining of Christians, especially of Mi­nisters, in the exercise of the gift of Prayer in the publick Assem­blies of the Church, looks like that quenching of the Spirit, which is forbid to all men by the Apostle; and the choaking the coveting of the best gifts, which is commanded all Christians. For to what purpose should those Talents be desired, which man hath Authority to command to be laid up in a Napkin? Before I give my answer to this Argument, it will be seasonable to take no­tice of some expressions of Moment in the last clause, which are not in the First. For there they speak of restraining not only Ministers, but other Christians from the use of the gift of Pray­er in publick Assemblies. So it seems they would have Lay­men [Page 18] make extempore prayers in the Church: For otherwise their gift is no more restrained by joyning with the Common Prayer, then with the Ministers extempore prayer. But I hope better things of those I deal with, from some Prints of Learning they have left upon their discourse; and therefore let that go, as a slip of their Pen, rather then Error of their Mind. Again, they speak here of an active restraining, and not of a Passive: But I have noted already, that to restrain others, is quite of another Reason from being restrained by others: as to imprison, differs from being imprisoned. Again they say, that it is to no purpose to desire such a gift, which the Magistrate hath power to command to be laid up in a Napkin. But this is contrary to experience, if they keep to the Question of Publick restraints; For many a man would desire Learning for the use of his own soul, though he should be restrained from teaching others: and in particu­lar, the science of Medicine. The Gifts of sundry Artificers are not to be exercised freely, but in some places and Corporati­ons, and under such and such limitations of the Magistrate: and yet these gifts are desireable notwithstanding. I confess, the Gift they speak of, is not so much to be desired by publick Officers, when the Publick use is forbidden, as it would and ought to be otherwise: But in this case, the remission of their desires is no fault of theirs (if it be any fault at all) but ra­ther of those who have taken away the Reason which should intend the said desires. So much for that, which is emphatical in the words last quoted above what is in the first. I now pro­ceed to answer the Argument common to them both. The summ is this, That he, who hath the Gift of extempore Prayer, if he useth it not in publick, doth quench the Spirit, and is defective to his duty: seeing the said gift is a manifestation of the Spirit given to profit others by. To this Argument, I answer, (1.) That the same gift may serve to several uses; and he that useth it to one, is in some cases excused, especially if he be hindered by Lawfull Authority to use it in another. Take their own confes­sion pag. 78. There are an hundred things that are the Gifts of God; of which yet there is no use in the Worship of God. And again, Is there no way to serve God with the use of his Gift, but to use it in his worship? I confess they speak of the Gift of sing­ing, and an hundred more: but I say, their words, are applicable to the Gift of extempore praying in Publick. It may be put to [Page 19] another use: both in the Worship of God, and out of it. (1.) In the Worship of God. Because the same faculty which en­ables a man to utter a good Prayer to God, enables him also to make a good exhortation to the People. He that can confess sin in such a method and way, as to stir up contrition in those that joyn with him, can also aggravate sin to his hearers, to the same end in a Sermon. He that can back his Petitions with forcible and Rhetorical Arguments [not to affect God, but men,] can use the same arguments in a popular address to encourage the faith of his Auditors. He that hath a good gift of displaying and advancing the Love and gifts of God in his Thanksgiving, may use the same Mediums to excite and in­flame Dvine Love in the People. They that become Publick Readers of Divinity in the Ʋniversities, though they use not their gifts to those ends to which they might be used in a Countrey Church, yet cannot be said to quench the Spirit, because they use them to other ends to which also they have an utility. (2.) The Gift of Prayer may be put to other uses out of the Worship of God also. Otherwise those Lay-men, that have it, did highly sin that they are not Ministers. But this is their excuse, that the same gift is of use in their secular em­ployment; even as the same Learning, which helps a Minister to interpret the Scripture, helps the Philosopher to expound the Text of Aristotle. The Authors themselves say in the begin­ning of their book, that he that is able [supposing his know­ledge of Philosophical and Political notions] to make a good speech upon those Themes; is also able (supposing the like knowledge of Theological subjects) to make a good Prayer to God. From whence may be reciprocally gathered, that he that hath the gift of making Prayers, is by the same gift en­abled to make Orations: And if he useth it one way for the Publick profit, he is not guilty of hiding his Talent in a Nap­kin, though he useth it not the other way. My second Answer follows. (2.) That man, who useth not a gift, sinneth not, when the using of it would hinder the use of another. And this excuseth Ministers that they do not pray without end; but afford some time for the gift of Preaching, yea, and for the gift of reading too. Yea, without this, most men would be in­excusable, except they come into the Church, and make pray­ers there. For in that they do not so, it is manifest they use [Page 20] not this Gift: And that they have it, or ought to have it, must needs be confessed by the Authors, since, pag. 7. they make it to consist in Meditation and Speech, with Gods ordinary bles­sing upon Industry. Now every man hath the power of medita­ti n, most men of speech: And, if the Authors Reason be good, every man is bound to join industry, that so he may make Pray­ers in the publick Assemblies. But he is not bound to this, be­cause he hath other gifts to exercise, and one cannot do all: ‘Tu supplex ora, tu protege, tu (que) labora.’ To apply this answer, If a Minister that hath the Gift of extem­pore prayer, cannot use it without hindring the exercise of his preaching gift, he is discharged from the use of the former, that he may continue the use of the Latter. So that if the Laws say, He that useth his gift of praying, shall not use his gift of preaching, but lie in Prison, or worse; it is manifest that it is better to use but one of those gifts, then by using them both, to be suffered the use of neither. (3.) The Authors confess in the Place now under examination, that in case the exercise of this Gift be hinde­red by providence, then it may be not used: But when the Ma­gistrate forbids it, it is hindered by providence. The confes­sion is more plain against themselves, pag. 57. We dare leave our Ministry, if Authority command. What, dare you leave the use of all your Ministerial gifts at once; and yet not leave the use of one of them, when the discontinuance of the use of one may prove the continuance of the use of all! Put another case, A Minister hath no Living, and no body will lend him his Pulpit: How doth he use his gift in Publick? If it be said, he cannot; it is true: though he hath a natural Power to usurp another mans Pulpit, yet he cannot do it of Right. Why? Because the Laws forbid it. For were it not for humane Laws, a stranger might use his gift in any Church, as well as the Parochial Minister. So then the Result is this, He cannot use his gift, because the Laws for­bid him; and because he cannot, therefore he is excused. In like manner he cannot use his gift of prayer in his own Church, who is forbid by the Laws; and becase he cannot, he is guiltless, not­withstanding this objection drawn from the use and end of the gift.

They go on in the same page thus, We are yet to learn that it [Page 21] is not as lawfull to impose Forms of Sermons upon Ministers, as forms of Prayer: Both of them are lamentable restraints put upon the Gifts of God bestowed on his Ministers. From which words cha­rity will gather, That the Authors of this Book were none of the contrivers or approvers of the Directory: For these lamenta­ble restraints both of Prayers and Sermons are to be found there. But I cannot conceive them so unlearned, as to be yet to learn, why Forms of Sermons should not be imposed as well as forms of Prayer. A mans Mother wit without the help of much learning will prompt him easily with two Reasons. (1.) Because in the Sermon the Minister speaks what he thinks is the Truth; and if it appear otherwise, they may reject it. But in prayer the Minister in the name of the people (for he saith not I but We] presenteth desires to God, which sometimes happen to be quite contrary to the desires of some of the Peo­ple, yea of all the People: it may possibly fall out, that the people can joyn with him not in one expression: whereby it comes to pass both that the Ministers prayer is a falshood, and that the people being in a praying posture, do make a kind of profession that they say Amen to those Petitions, which their souls abominate, which makes it appear, why there is more reason the people should know before hand what shall be prayed, then what shall be preached: which fore-knowledge is the effect of Forms. (2.) Because the Minister in his preaching is to ex­pound, confirm, and apply to his people all the Articles of Faith, as shall be occasion; a work which will require many dayes, if not years. It would be endless to comprise the sub­jects of all Sermons in forms: But we pray for the same things continually: and therefore the directory saw reason to put down the sense and Matter of Prayer, though not of Sermons. But this is so eccentrical to the Question, I am sorry I have said so much of it. For if it were granted, that both forms of Pray­er and Sermons were miserable restraints; Yet the gifts of ma­ny an honest Prisoner have been under miserable Restraints, and yet he never the less honest for that.

SECT. VI.

Another of their Arguments [That a man must pray with the greatest intention and fervour: which is abated by Forms] answered. No man is bound to a greater intention, then may be procured by lawfull means. In some cases a man may law­fully do that, which naturally will remit his fervour. Their own experience proves not, that a man may not be as fervent with a form, as without it. This kind of Fervour argues not the excellency of those Prayers, in which it is most procured; It being often the Result of meer natural and animal forces.

I Proceed to the next words, because they have some shew of an Argument. The Major Proposition whereof is this, We are sure it is the unquestionable duty of every one that pray­eth, to do it with the highest intention of mind imaginable, and with the greatest fervency of Spirit: And that it is not lawfull for any man in Prayer to allow himself in any thing, which may either divert his mind from the most fixed contemplation of God, or intention upon his duty, or which may any way cool the Heat and Fervency of his Spirit.

I answer to this Proposition by a distinction thus. True, Eve­ry man is bound to pray with the highest intention of Mind, and with the greatest fervency of Spirit, that can be obtained by the use of just means: But no man is to use unjust means to pro­cure that intention and fervency. And again, True, it is not lawfull for any man to allow himself in any thing that may hinder the foresaid intention and fervency; if the phrase [allow] signifies only to approve and like such an impediment, or such a condition as is necessarily exposed to it: But if [allowing] signifies not accusing himself, or the vindication of himself from the accusations of others that impute sin to him for praying while he labours under such an impediment: then I say, a man may allow himself in something that may hinder the intention of his mind, and fervency of his spirit in Prayer. If He, or they, that made this book, take their Proposition in that sense, wherein I grant it, it is nothing to the purpose: For a man may use the Common Prayer, and yet wish he might be at his Liberty if the Magistrate thought good. Therefore the Pro­position [Page 23] must needs be taken in the sense wherein I deny it: and the Reason of my denyal is evident from the forementioned Instance. He that is forbid by the Magistrate to go to the next Church, and therefore is necessitated to go to one more remote, must needs be more indisposed to Prayer by his long journey (except some men of a temper by themselves:) so that he shall not perform that duty with so high an Intention of mind, or with so great a fervency of Spirit, as might probably be experi­enced, in case he came into the Church less weary, and weather-beaten. But yet such a man may lawfully go to the furthest Church, and pray there: though these hinderances of intention and fervour be consequent thereupon. The Reason is, Because they are necessary, and not voluntary: He wisheth the case were otherwise with him: but, as things stand, if he should go to the next Church contrary to the Magistrates prohibition, he should sin; and Evil is not to be done, that good may come of it: especially, when a greater evil would come of it then the good aimed at, as it is in this case. And consequently he may allow himself, that is, not accuse himself for praying under such clogs and remora's of his devotion. By the same Reason, though it were granted that the use of the Common Prayer did hinder that height of Intention and fervour of spirit they speak off; yet, the not using it being forbid by the Magistrate, a man may use it and allow himself in the use. For it is clear, that these incon­veniences render it only inexpedient, but not unlawfull. Indeed p. 90. they urge, that things which (though otherwise lawfull) are inexpedient, ought not to be done. I say so too, if a man be left to the liberty of action: and be not otherwise restrained by a Na­tural or Political necessity. For if the Law restrains a man from that which otherwise were more expedient: then that which was more expedient, becomes less expedient: Not only because it is made unlawfull, but also because in such a case (all things considered) it hath no tendency or instrumentality to that end whereto it was conducible before, but rather to the contrary. Such Actions as before the Prohibition would have a good effect, after the prohibition will have a bad one: supposing that be­fore the prohibition they were meerly and purely lawfull and expedient, and not also otherwise necessary, which only are the subject of the present debate. To bring down my Answer again to the Hypothesis: If it should be granted, that extempore [Page 24] Prayers are most expedient to procure the highest intention and greatest fervency in Prayer; Yet, being forbid by the Law, they are most inexpedient to such an end, all things considered, and that for the Reason I have already propounded, viz. Because if this violation of the Law escape that penal animadversion, which is due to it by the Law; then Seditions and Wars must needs ensue thereupon, which rough weather is no fit season for the fruits of Righteousness, which are sown in peace: But if the Authority of the Law be asserted by exemplary punishments; then the transgressours in the case must lose the publick exercise of their Ministry; which will be much more incommodious and in­expedient to the foresaid intention and fervour in publick Pray­ers, since they will be suffered to pray none in publick at all. The Major Proposition being thus proved either false, or imperti­tinent; false in that sense I take it in, and impertinent in any other: Their Argument must needs fall without any more ado, since no Argument can stand on one Legg. But much more, if the Minor also be found exceeding doubtfull, as will be found, when we have rehearsed it in its terms, which are these; We cannot be induced to believe that any one can possibly so keep his soul fixed upon God, or so intent upon God, while he reads a Pray­er, as whiles he speaks it from his own conception. To which I answer, That he who rationally believes any thing impossible in the series of moral effects, where temper, education, custom, and the influence of private affections doth so commonly intend and remit the Power of the Agent, must have more to propound then the meer experience of the Non-event. But the producers of this Argument plead nothing to prove it not possible, but on­ly experience; and that not universal, but their own: not daring to deny, but that others may experience the contrary, as may be seen in their next words. We find by experience (not to de­termine positively of the frame of other persons spirits) a great difference in the intention and fervency of our spirits, when our words in prayer are directed and determined by the inward heat, fervency and affection of our hearts, from what is, when our words are determined for us by other men; yea by our selves before the time of Prayer. Thus the Authors say for themselves: But if others may be admitted to tell their Experiences, they will say the quite contrary for themselves. And though the Authors find it thus, as they express; Yet, may be, the intention and [Page 25] fervour is such as argueth not the excellency of ex tempore Pray­ers above others, being no excellent symptom it self; but pos­sibly being the result of the meer natural and animal forces, or worse, as will appear by five Instances I shall immediately pro­duce; and if the Authors impartially search themselves, they may possibly find a sixth.

SECT. VII.

Five sorry causes assign'd, wherefore some men may be more fer­vent in extempore Prayers then in Forms. (1.) An Anti­pathy against the one, and a perswasion that the other is a mark of Grace. 2. The Novelty which extemporary Prayers give scope for. (3.) Nature is more intent in the exercise of gifts then of Graces. (4.) Self-love, mens natural affection to their own Inventions, and impatience of Restraints. (5.) In ex­tempore Prayers there is room for Ostentation of Parts, and (as some will interpret it) of divine experiences. Two other causes of this Fervour.

(1.) SOme men by their education have received an Anti­pathy against forms, having been taught that to pray by a Form is no prayer; and on the contrary, it is a sign of grace to pray without one. This opinion hath so prevailed, that many men have gained a great name and repute of Reli­gion, meerly by their prayers, among some well-meaning, but simple people, who undertook to be as skilful as the tryers, who could taste mens spirits by their tones and phrases. Now it is no wonder, that he can have but little intention or fervour in reading a form of Prayer, who hath a deep rooted antipathy against it; as he will but coldly recite a Poem, who nauseates it. He may well be struck cold in reading a Form, who either believes he sins in doing it, or scruples whether he sin or no. And on the other hand no marvel, though he be intent and fer­vent in making an extempore Prayer, who judgeth in any mea­sure of the sincerity of his heart, either by the copia verborum, which some call enlargements; or by the sudden and easie sug­gestion of pertinent places of Scripture, or experience, to serve as arguments in his Petitions. But that those which have the [Page 26] gift, do too much thus judge of their grace by it, is evident, in that often, if they be straitened, they let down their crist, and question their estate; though before they had a full plerophory bred in them by some precedent enlargements, and though they are conscious to themselves of no new sin, or neglect, that might have altered the case. (2.) Some men may be more intent and fervent in extempore Prayers; because there is so much place for novelty, which is so taking with the nature of mans mind. This is so prevalent, that some have con­fessed, that whereas at one time a Scripture hath been set on their hearts in prayer, to the powerful actuation and accen­sion of their spirits, and hath continued in proportiona­ble force for some time; yet by degrees it grows stale and out of date: So that when the same Scripture-expression is used by them (though not industriously, but fortuitously, and with­out study) it hath lost its sting and Energy; it hath no more savour then the old Mumpsimus of Common-Prayer to their variable Gusto. And then a new phrase comes upon the stage, and acts its part with like vigour for a time, and Exit; till at length by difuse the old one hath recovered its edge again. I know some will solve this Phenomenon, by supposing the diver­sity of the Spirits impressions, sometimes bringing one expres­sion into the mind, and working it on the affections, and some­times another. But Entia non sunt multiplicanda sine necessi­tate; there is no necessity to assign a Metaphysical cause for such an accident, as we see obviously effected by the powers of Nature. For Schollars experience the same thing in them­selves, where the Spirit cannot be pretended, beginning to read or meditate on a new subject with great intention and fervency, but soon calmed, and ready to lay it aside, till the diversion of a new one hath made the old one new again. (3.) Nature it self is apt to be more intent and fervent in the exercise of a Gift then in the exercise of a Grace; and therefore where there is place for the exercise of both, there may probably be more intention and fervour, then where there is place only to exer­cise grace: And in this case the less intention is as acceptable to God as the greater: For the over-plus may arise from the gift, and not from the grace: whereas the Lord delighteth not in the legs of a man, nor in his wit and tongue neither; but his delight is in them that fear him. To apply this answer, He [Page 27] that reads the Common-Prayer, exerciseth no gift in compa­rison of that which is exercised in extempore Prayes; all that is left him to do, is, to exercise Grace, as faith, love, humility, de­sire: But the other exerciseth his memory, fancy, invention, an harder piece of judgement, besides method. Now since we are most stupid to the best and most spiritual duties; and had rather read a book where our parts and gifts are exer­cised, then a plain one (though more practical) where the ex­ercise of Grace is more purely and singly required: it is mani­fest, that caeteri [...] paribus, there will be more intention and heat in the use of extempore Prayer, which sets so many gifts a work, then if the same man should use the Common-prayer, which employs little else then his graces. And yet this overplus of in­tention and heat is hardly a better sign to the person in whom it is, that he or his Prayer is any whit more acceptable to God, then the intention and heat which a school-boy finds in using his invention, and making his verses, above that which he finds in reading an Author. For invention takes up the soul, be it in what subject it will. And this brings me to a fourth Rea­son, wherefore some men may be more intent and fervent in extempore Prayers, then in the Common-prayer. (4.) Men are naturally more affected with their own inventions, then with those of others; and therefore extempore Prayers may more affect them then prescribed forms, upon no better an ac­count then that of self-love. May be some have experienced, that they can better joyn with others in an extempore Prayer, then in a Form: but that may proceed from the first Reason, and moreover from this I shall now name; That it is natural to be intent and fervent in hearing others to exercise their parts notably; and it is no more then we find in reading or hearing any piece of Wit. But the Authors have professed, that they come not under this Reason, being not so much affected with premeditated forms of their own: therefore because it reacheth not them, though it doth others, I will not account it a fourth Reason, but substitute another, which, for ought I know, may agree to them. It is natural to the mind of man to be impatient of restraint, and love to be at its own liberty; whence it comes to passe, that a plausible fancy doth more pre­vail then a severe and sullen Argument; as Doctor Reynolds, now Bishop of Norwich, hath excellently noted, in his Trea­tise [Page 28] of the Passions and Faculties of the Soul, cap. 4. Now men using their own liberty in extempore Prayers, but being limited and tyed up by Forms, they may be more intent and fervent in the former then in the latter, upon no better principle then that which is most predominant in the most corrupt men, which are the most independent, and say, Let us break their bonds asunder, and cast their cords from us. (5.) In unpremedi­tated Prayers there is far greater room, and scope, and oppor­tunity for ostentation and vain glory in the discovery of mens parts and gifts; yea (as some hearers will interpret) of their graces and divine experiences. And what can flesh and blood be more intent and earnest about, then such an employment? And that the intention and fervour of many in their Prayers proceeds from this Reason, is evident from hence, in that when they pray before others, they will weep and make other such signs of intention and fervour; but it is not so when others pray before them. I have now mentioned the five Reasons I promised, which may probably cause the overplus of intention and fervour in these men, while they use extempore Prayers, above what they find in using of Forms. I say not only possi­bly, but probably. For seeing the self-same things are prayed for in the Letany, which can be the matter of the longest extem­pore Prayer, though not in that novelty, variety, and elegancy of phrase, if the heat and intention they speak of did purely proceed from the strength of their desire to the things them­selves, it would be equal in both cases. But since it is not equal, it must needs proceed from some other cause, and probably from one or all those I have assigned, since it is known that they are apt in their own nature to produce such an inequality, It might be further considered, that some persons, having entertained some private opinions of their own, are engaged by them to pray for such things, which the Prayers of the Church do not beg of God, but rather the contrary; as it was in the late wars, when the late King thought one Reason of disliking the Common-prayer was, that there were so many Petitions put up for him. I shall only add a Reason, which relates more pro­perly and especially to the fervency spoken of, then to the in­tention of mind: And it is this, when a man doth strongly bend his wit in study (most of all in invention) he feels a sensible heat in his body, insomuch that I have known some to put a [Page 29] napkin dipped in cold water on their heads. Any man (I think) may experience, that in such an employment he doth not breath so freely and frequently as ordinarily he doth; which will be most apparent to such as take Tobacco; even as a man holds his breath when he is about with all his might to strike a blow. And this obstruction of the breath alone is sufficient to effect an extraordinary fervency in the blood and spirits. Besides, when a man is not only to invent, but to invent as fast as the Auditors expect he should utter: in case matter comes not fast enough, he will be apt to draw out his last words to the great straining of his body, and to make up the defect of matter with more then ordinary earnestnesse in the delivery. Like him, whose notions being out before the glasse, lifted up his voyce the higher, to make amends for the frivolousnesse of that which he produced; of whom one of the hearers said, This Minister will be hot in spight of his matter. Now this kind of fervency, being only the tumult of the bodily spirits, is not much to be reckoned of, as de­pending much upon age, temper, and the weather it self: The aged and grown Christian hath the least of it, whose devotion, in respect of stilnesse and quietnesse, comes nearer to that of the soul in state of separation. The basenesse of this kind of fervour is excellently displayed by that holy and learned Doctor Henry More, in his divine Poem of the Life of the Soul, in the description of Glaucis. And if any man would be better informed of the naturall Reasons of such heats and fervours, let him consult Doctor Casaubon of Enthusiasme.

SECT. VIII.

The Ministers Reason, why unpremeditated Prayers beget inten­tion, answered. The Mind is not abstracted from all Crea­ted Objects in them. The advantage of the Prints and Cha­racters in a Book, in order to the easie bringing of the Idea's into the head. The disadvantages to the Hearers by extempore Prayers. The Soul dictates to the Tongue in Forms.

I Would not willingly passe over any thing in the Book which I oppose, that hath any shew of Patronage to the cause maintained therein, and am careful to answer every allegati­on under that head to which it doth most properly appertain. And therefore remembring, that page 28. this Reason is gi­ven, wherefore the mind may be more intent in unpreme­ditated Prayers, viz. Because the Soul is more abstracted from all created objects, then it can be while a great piece of the work is to look on the Book to see what to say next: I think this the most proper place for a reply. My Answer is this. Every man that is an expert reader (especially in reading that, which he hath read often, in a fair print) doth probably find, that he heeds the characters little, or not at all, but minds the sense, or something else. Nor is the Soul necessarily more abstracted from all created objects in extempore Prayers, then it may be in reading a Prayer out of a Book. The created objects, which are met with in a Book, are the Prints and Characters in the Book: But he that prayes without book (especially with vocal prayer) must needs look upon the like prints and stamps made in the Brain: or whatsoever things the species are, without which a man can neither speak nor think, they must needs be created objects; The very Idea of a God be­ing a Creature in the opinion of all that are not Plato's Schollers, as I suppose the Authors are not. And the legi­ble signes in the Book do serve to bring the inward phantasmes more readily into actual view, and to marshall them with lesse labour, diversion, and disturbance. That which they say next, We do believe this may be experienced by any persons speaking to a man for his life, comes not at all into my Creed. [Page 31] But whatever advantages extempore prayers have to fix and in­flame the spirit of the Minister, that which he should most aim at in Publick, is to affect his hearers. And those things which most affect him, do many times least affect them, not being able to understand what he doth understand, nor to follow him at the first hearing through a long-winded sentence. He that writes never so deliberately and slowly, in the review sees cause to alter many things for perspicuity sake; and much more may a sudden Speaker labour under such obscurity, since an Hearer hath not that time and other advantages of finding out the sense which a Reader hath. Therefore the main thing to be considered, is, not the Ministers own experience of what altera­tions he finds in himself by these two ways of Praying; but which is best for the People. They give their Opinion upon that Question in these words; Nor can we believe that any Minister praying in any form, useth so rational and experimented a means to affect his hearers hearts, as he that useth none. As in preach­ing there is a certain lively efficacy of the voice, which every hearer discerneth more in the Ministers speaking ex animo, then from his reading a Sermon. I know not what others discern: I should think extempore Sermons made by the most able Preachers, much inferior to the preprared ones of much worse Preachers. I have been more affected with a Sermon read, then remembred: And when the Minister reads his Sermon, I expect a good one. But let us see the Reason why they believe other­wise. Because the Speaker himself is discernibly not so much af­fected in reading as in speaking. To make up this Reason, it must be supposed, that he who appears affected himself in speaking, is most likely to affect others: which is true, if other advantages be equal, as if he be as clear as rational, and other­wise perswasive, but not else, except among men but a small degree above bruits, who are more convinced by a strained voice then a sober Reason, and take every knock on the Pul­pit for an Argument. Besides I have known some as discernibly affected in reading the Common-Prayer, as others are in their extempore Prayers. However, I think it not much worth a Ministers labour to raise such affections in his People, that are not founded upon the truth and reason of what he asserts; but only on the boldnesse, confidence, and eagerness of the Asser­tion. I wish some course might be taken to prevent such af­fections, [Page 32] rather then promote them: For such Persons that are so easily passive under a loud voice, or other Symptoms of the the Speakers affection, will hardly be able to withstand the assaults of a bawling Quaker: whereas a wise man is so far from being affected with a noise without Reason, or with Reason for the noises sake (for it is all one); that nothing is more nause­ous to him, then to hear that stoutly inculcated which is but weakly demonstrated. The Authors add but one more Note upon this Point of the expediency of extempore Prayers: and it is this in the Chapter under animadversion, Sect. 4. Speaking is an immediate act of the tongue, but commanded by the soul; The tongue is but the souls Organ, by which it exerciseth that Power which God hath given it, and it cannot be so well performed, as when the soul that directs, performs its work by dictating imme­diatly to it. So that much of the life and spirit of Prayer is lost in praying by forms. How comes this conclusion in, when there was no such thing as [forms] in the Premisses? I have but one shift to understand the Argument; and that is by supposing that the soul performs not its work by dictating immediatly to the tongue in forms, which is so plain a falfity that I am loth to suppose it. And I cannot imagine what moved these men to assert it, unless it be this, that the words which a man utters in using a form are dictated by a Book. That is true, by the Book mediatly, but not immtdiatly, as they say. The Words are first in the Book, but they are conceived by the soul, and thence dictated before they be uttered by the tongue. Indeed after much study for their meaning, I fancy at length, that they in­tend a greater Emphasis in the word [directs] then I was aware of. If so, possibly this may be their import; That the same person who contrives the form of a Prayer, is most likely to utter it to the best advantage: which would be true, if he could contrive as well while he speaks as before he speaks, (because himself best knows the weight of his own words) but not else.

SECT. IX.

The fifth branch of their first Argument, viz. ['Tis disputable whether it be lawful, since there is no precept or president for it in the word] answered, (1.) Disputable actions are law­full, when commanded. (2.) Few Actions are indisputable; Non-conformity is not. (3.) We may do what we have nei­ther precept nor example for. (4.) There are General com­mands for the use of Forms: and Particular are not necessary; proved from the Ministers own words and deeds. (5.) There are Particular commands and examples of Forms in Scripture. Their Objection, [that the Liturgy is not fitted to their neces­sities] answered. Three Reasons for the restraining of those in some cases who can pray otherwise.

I proceed now to the fifth and last branch of their first reason, contained in the eigth chapter of their book. The Paragraph begins thus; Nay lastly (to add no more), if there were nothing else in the case, we should think it very disputable, whether it be lawful for us in the publick worship of God, especially as to the mo­mentous acts and parts of it, to do that for which we have no com­mand in the Word, no President or example. To which objecti­on, I have ready no lesse then four answers, and the Reader may take which he pleaseth; for that which will not satisfie one man, will another.

1. First, What though the lawfulness of such actions be disputable? they may not therefore be done, when com­manded? I have proved the contrary, Sect. 2. Besides what I said there, I add now another consideration. Such is the diver­sity of the principles which men go by, that there are but few actions that are not disputable. By this Reason the Authors have confuted their own non-conformity. For its certainly a a disputable point: since many good and learned men have actually disputed it to the satisfaction of many Readers of the same stamp; and their Arguments have never been answered by their Adversaries. For all they write, is no answer, till they undertake Hookers Ecclesiastical Polity in the full body, and Dr. Sandersons Sermons with the Prefaces thereof.

[Page 34]2. Secondly, I have already proved, that it is lawful in the publick worship of God, yea in the momentous acts and parts thereof, to do that which we have no command, President, or example for in Scripture; as in an Oath, &c.

3. Thirdly, There is a General command for forms of prayer when they are imposed by the Magistrate. For we are enjoyn­ed in Scripture to obey our Rulers, when they command such things as Gods word nowhere forbids; and such things are Forms in our Case. As for a particular command or example in Scripture, it is not requisite by the Authors own concessions, which they make both in their deeds and words. For if you observe their deeds, they praise God in prescribed forms made by Hopkins and St [...]rnhold; whereas Praise being a part of Prayer, there is the same Reason for extempore Hymns as ex­tempore Petitions. Again, when they visit the sick, they an­noint him not with Oil: And yet they shall be so far from pro­ducing a command for such a visitation in Scripture, that they shall find the contrary in Saint James. If they say there is not the same Reason for that annointing now, which was then; I re­ply, Neither is there the same Reason for unpremeditated prayers now as was then: For now forms are commanded by the Rulers; but according to the Authors opinion, they were not then. But because it is usual with men to say one thing and do another, condemning themselves in that which they allow; May be this giving of the Question which we find in their deeds, will seem to be of less weight: see therefore how they grant it in their words too, Pag. 73. Sect. 9. where they give more then I ask at this time. For I contend only for the lawfulness of doing things which are not particularly commanded; but there they grant the lawfulness of imposing such things: freely allowing the Magistrate a Power to command us to keep the sta­tutes and commandments of God, and besides that to do three things (1.) To command as in the circumstances relating to divine Worship, to do those things which are generally commanded in the word of God. Now a Form of Prayer is doubtless but a circum­stance of Prayer; and I have proved, that if the Magistrate thinks them convenient, Forms are generally commanded in Scripture. (2.) To appoint time and place. Now, if he can ap­point a time which he thinks most convenient, though other­wise it would be less convenient; and so of place: I would fain [Page 35] know a reason why he may not appoint a Form, which he thinks most expedient, though possibly otherwise it would be lesse expedient. And to appoint to begin at such a time, or to end at such a time, is as really a limitation of the Spirit as to ap­point a Form. (3.) To appoint such circumstances, without which the worship of God, in the judgement of ordinary reason must be indecently and disorderly performed. Now this ordinary Reason which they speak of, must be either the reason of the Magistrate, or the reason of the people, or both, or neither of them, but that reason which is best, whether of the one or the other. If they mean the reason of the people, then the sense is, that the Magistrate hath power to appoint such things as the subjects judge reasonable, and we thank them for no­thing: if both, we thank them for as much: if they mean that reason which is best, without restraining it to any subject; I reply, That reason in the Idea doth nothing, but only as it is some bodies reason. The best reason hath influence on no mans actions any further then it is apprehended as best. And except the Magistate hath power to command what he apprehendeth most agreeable to the best reason; he must command what the subjects apprehend so, or else he must command nothing at all. Therefore it remaineth, that the reason which is to judge what is undecent, is the reason of the Magistrate; and if he com­mand such things as be undecent, so that they be not otherwise unlawful, the people must submit by the Authors own concessi­ons.

4. Fourthly, There are particular commands and examples in Scripture for forms of Prayer. For Davids Psalms are Prayers: many of them consist more of Petitions then of Thanksgivings; and some of them are expresly called so in their Titles. Yet he appoints these Prayers to be uttered by others: li [...]ting the persons that officiate, not only in the sense and matter, but in the phrase and form; yea not only in the tune but tone, prescribing the instruments wherewith they are to be sung. Indeed the Authors take notice of this Instance, and gather from it a clean contrary conclusion. We cannot but think that the holy Psalmists variety of Prayers (none of which, as to words and phrases, agre per omnia with another) sheuld rather teach us, when we go to God in prayer, that we should rather take unto us words de novo, as God shall put them into [Page 36] our hearts, &c. Mark the argumentation: the fore-menti­oned Prayers were to be prayed over and over again in the same words; Ergo, we should in every Prayer take words de novo. Indeed the variety they speak of, shews that they did not use only one form of prayer; but the Liturgy is so far from confining us to one, that the greatest offence that some take at it, is that there are so many Prayers for the same things in divers phrases. Thus some will be pleased neither full nor fasting, I might add to this Instance of Davids Psalms another in the Propnet Hosea, chap. 14. v. 2. Take with you words, and turn unto the Lord, and say unto him, &c. and another in Joel 2.17. Let the Priests, the Ministers of the Lord, weep between the porch and the Altar; and let them say, Spare thy people, O Lord, &c. It is frivolous to object, that this is the old Testa­ments Directory; themselves, I believe, laugh at such a conceit in the Antinomians; Yea they argue for their own purpose from the variety of phrase in these Prayers, as hath been noted. But if any require a new Testament example or command, we pro­bably have both, I am sure one. For, Acts 4.24. we have a president, which in probability without any stretching will come home to our case. For we find there a whole company of the Primitive Christans in consort with the Apostles themselves, lifting up their voyce with one accord, and saying a Prayer, which is there registered in its terms. If it be said, that the form was not composed before-hand, but that they all lighted upon the same words by inspiration; this is more then any man knows; however it will justifie the joyning of voyces as well as hearts in prayer. Beside this probable example, we have a particular precept for the use of one form, Luke 11.2. When you pray, say, Our Father, &c. as will better appear in its proper place, where I shall cite their own words in the 55. page of their book, We doubt not but we may use it in the form: For b [...] this Reason of theirs under consideration, they might not use it, except they had a command for it in the Word of God.

The next thing to be observed, is that Periphasis where­with they would disparge the use of Forms, calling it a borrow­ing of words from others, hardly fitted to their hearts or present necessities. Whether the Liturgy be fitted to their hearts, I cannot tell, because I know not their hearts. But if their hearts be as they should be, the Prayers there cannot but be fit­ted [Page 37] to their hearts; the matter of the petitions being only such things as every Englishman should desire. But if they would have every man utter that in prayer, which is set upon his own heart (as the phrase is) whether reasonably or un­reasonably, there would be mad work. And I wonder how the said Prayers should not be fitted to their necessities, since they ask all good things. Indeed some men have more necessities then others, and the Liturgy will not fit them; which no doubt did much help to bring it into discredit, because it would not serve on fast-dayes in the late wars, to beg those victories, which were accounted the one thing necessary by some men. And yet were it granted that it did not fit the heart and necessities of the Minister, so well as a Prayer of his own invention; yet possibly it may better fit the peoples; and a Minister is to ac­commodate both his Prayers and Sermons rather to his peoples hearts and necessities then his own. For (unlesse he be like one of Jeroboams Priests) if he should preach upon those points which sometimes are most material to be pressed on him­self, and in that way which is most effectual and prevalent upon his own more learned Soul, it would have but small successe among the most of his hearers.

They conclude the Chapter to this purpose in many words, too long to be here inserted: That if stinted forms be allowed for some that canne [...] pray otherwise, yet it is not lawful, much lesse necessary, for their sakes to restrain the abilities of those others that can. As for the lawfulnesse of restraining a gift, when such a restraint is judged useful, I have proved it before. As for the necessity of it to some end intended, it will appear in three cases. (1.) In case uniformity is aimed at. If the Captain will have his Souldiers keep their ranks, he must forbid the sound to out-march the lame. (2.) In case liberty grant­ed to some to do that which they have a gift for, will provoke others which have it not, to imitate them beyond their ability. Thus the way to make mean men not to wear gold lace to the empoverishing of their estates, is for great men to leave it of. And thus the way to keep weak Ministers from extemporising beyond their power, is for more able men to use the Common-prayer. For if the denyal of liberty to some who have the gift for the sakes of those their brethren which have it not, be to cut the man fit for the bed; the granting such a liberty [Page 38] will be to stretch a man fit for the bed, that I may retort the Authors similitude. Now since both will needs lie together, it is more equitable that the tall man pull up his legs, then that the low man be put on the Rack. (3.) In case liberty given to an Officer to do something he hath a gift for, and the denial of that liberty to another Officer of the same society, which hath no such ability, but cannot be spared any more then the former, would make the weaker Officer contemptible and use­lesse, especially if he be the weaker only in that particular, but the stronger in others. In our case, one Minister having spent more time in hearing the Sermons and Prayers of others, or brought up from his childhood to make his Prayers himself, or living among people which applaud extempore Prayers, and so excite his invention, hath got the knack of such Prayers; but by this reason is not so well studied, so solid, and judicious, nor so able to contrive a discourse upon premeditation: Another having been taught from his childhood to pray by a book, and afterward having exercised himself alone in reading and medi­tating of deep points, rather then abroad in hearing popular harangues, prayers and preachments; or lastly, living among a people which are more affected and edified by the prayers of the Church, and so giving no encouragement to labour for the extempore faculty, comes to have but little of it; yet is as needful an Officer as the other, more able to oppose gain-sayers, to regulate Church affairs, and to make a speech to the people on any occcasion, if you give him time to contrive, and to com­mit to memory what he hath so contrived. Should this lattter Minister be rendered contemptible, and so far uselesse in his place, by anothers liberty to use his extempore gift? But that the lat­ter by this means is in danger to become contemptible among silly and self-conceited people, is plain by experience, and asserted many times by the Authors in their book: And much more would it be so, if he should be publickly prohibited, and others allowed. And so much for the Authors first Reason in their eighth Chapter, which is levelled against stinted forms in general.

CHAP. II.

SECT. I.

The Ministers second Reason [that these Forms have been de­filed by having been used in an Idolatrous service] eventila­ted. A man may do that about and in the worship of God, which hath been done in an Idolatrous worship, proved. The gross Idolatry of certain Non-conformists, pollutes not their ex­temporary expressions.

THe ninth Chapter contain their second Rea­son, which goes on supposition, that it is law­ful to use some forms of Prayer, but denies it of the English Liturgy. It is drawn (as the Title of the Chapter tells us) from the dispu­tableness of the lawfulness of using any forms of humane composure, formerly defiled by use in an Idolatrous service, conjoyned with the scandal of many Chri­stians arising upon that account. But that I may not conceal the strength of their Argument, but bring it into view in the full body, before I oppose it; I shall put it down first as it is word­ed, not only in the title, but in the Chapter it self. Their termes are these; We cannot but have some doubts, whether it be lawfull for us in the worship of God, by an act of ours, to offer up any thing to God (of meer humane composition) which hath been once of­fered in an Idolatrous service, especially when our Brethren say unto us, This hath been so offered. That the worship of the Church of Rome is idolatrous, we hope no sober Protestant will deny: Their veneration of Images, adoration of the Eucharist, invocation of the Saints, are all idolatrous. Some of these are done as oft as their Mass-book is used; so that their worship, toties quoties, as it is performed is idolatrous, though not in every [Page 40] part, yet in the complex. To make up the Argument, it must be supposed, that some of the Prayers in the Liturgy are taken out or the Mass-book; which may be true for ought I know, and therefore I shall answer on that supposition. (1.) I wonder wherefore that Parenthesis is cram'd in [of meer humane com­position]. For when they come to give an instance out of Scripture, they make it in Flesh offered to Idols. Now I never heard that flesh was of meer humane composition. If the Authors have an art to make flesh by meer humane power, they have more then the Transubstantiating Masse-Priest pretends to, and would do well to teach it the world against a Famine. (2.) They say only, that they have some doubts about the Question; but I have proved already that a meer doubt is to be over-born by the certain in junctions of lawful Authority. And besides that which here they doubt, themselves affirm elsewhere, if they know the meaning of their own words. As page 63. The reverend Persons, which had an hand in composing the Litur­gy, did worthily in their Generation. I wonder how they can be said to do worthily in imposing this Liturgy, if it be unlawful, unlesse they mean only, that they did not all out so wickedly as their Predecessors, which imposed the Masse: But by that rea­son he that murders a stranger, doth worthily, because others murder their Parents. The same confession is made by them page 65. Certainly those first Reformers did like wise and pious men. It is true, they put in, With respect to their age. But is it the part of a wise and pious man in any age, to impose such acti­ons as are unlawful? Again in the same page, Their judge­ment was excellent as to those times. So it seems by what they say in both places, that it is a piece of an excellent judgement in some times to command men to sin. But (3.) To let this passe, and proceed to the main strength of their Reason. Their Criticisme about the term [to offer] shall be considered in its place. In the mean time I will suppose the sense of their words to be this, That a man may not do such things relating to the worship of God, as means, instruments, modes, or formes, which have been so done in an idolatrous worship, i. e. a wor­ship whereof some parts are idolatrously performed. This I deny, and I give instances of my denyal. The love of money is idolatry; and the covetous actions done out of love to it, and to procure its assistance, are not only mixed with idolatrous [Page 41] actions, (as in the present case) but themselves are idolatrous, Yet we may do such actions to testifie our respects to God and to win his presence; at covetous men do out of their ho­nour to Mammon, and to procure his presence. That is, we may fast, we may watch, we may go to Church as duly as they to the Exchange; we may think of God, and talk of him, as they do of their money, we may say, that he answereth all things; we may lay out upon charitable works, as they do on a good bargain. Yea (to prevent an Objection) these things we might do if God did never command them. For what can be said against them? Are they not good? have they not a na­tural tendency to expresse our love to God, and to procure his gracious presence with us? What though these actions were done to a false God, to whom they were not due? may they not be done to a true God, to whom they are due? And for the Ferm of those actions, we may use that which we think best, though used by the said Idolaters; as to fast from dinner, or supper, to rise early, or go to bed late, to lay out our stock in alms, in money, or mony worth. In like manner, look what actions the Glutton doth in the service of his god, which is his belly, many of the like actions we may do in the service of the true God. Again, there be others which do not indeed worship the true God before an Image, as the Papists, but they worship an Image it self of their own framing, and that a most deformed one, and not so like God at a piece of bread, wood, or stone, or a glorified Saint, the objects of Popish worship. The God of some men is a cruel, unnatural thing, like Saturn, who devoured his own children; only herein more ugly, that he begets them on purpose to devoure them. The God of others, yea of many the same, is a fond thing like Cupid, taking no notice of the sins of his darlings. The God of others, yea of many the same, is a wicked thing, infallibly necessita­ting by his Decree, and powerfully instigating them by his con­course to the lewdest actions. The God of others, yea of many the same, is a false thing, making great and precious pro­mises, but maintaining an infinite malice and hatred in his heart. Now these Idolaters (the grossest that ever I read of) have many times pretty phrases in their Prayers: yet some, who would bring the like Argument with the Authors against the Liturgy, are so far from abominating those phrases [Page 42] upon this account, that they affect them; they are worn thred­bare in every Pulpit; ‘Notior in coelis fabula nulla fuit.’ And I doubt not, but it is very lawful to use some of those forms of words in prayer to the true God, which these Idolaters use to their false Gods. Ind [...] I beleive these men do not think them­selves Idolaters; no more do the Papists: But supposing the opinions of them both, that which they both do, is consequen­tially idolatrous; They both do disown the idolatry which is consequent upon their doctrines; but they both maintain their own opinions which infer the idolatry. The worst opinion, which the Papists are said to hold in reference to idolatry, is, that Bread is God, and therefore to be worshipped: And the others are said to hold, that something worse then the most course or mouldy bread, is God, and therefore to be worship­ped. And in truth the Papists opinion, and consequently their practice thereupon, is much more tolerable of the two: For they cannot have an higher opinion of the bread, then of the humane nature of Christ in the concrete, which (though God he predicated of it by vertue of the hypostatical union, yet) is but a means to bring us to God, that God may be all in all, and therefore cannot terminate our worship. But now the worship of the others is terminated ultimately and lastly upon that monstrous Image, which they call God. Which things, and many more that might be alledged, being considered, I cannot much wonder, that though the worship of the Church of Eng­land be cryed down as idolatrous and superstitions, yet some give this Reason, wherefore their judgements cannot side with the opposite party, namely, because of the superstition and ido­latry which abounds among them: For that it is among some of them, I am as confident as I am that it is among the Pa­pists.

SECT. II.

By their Reason the Scriptures would be defiled; and the Papists might pollute the most darling phrases of unprepared Prayers. The Lords Prayer as much polluted by Idolaters as the Com­mon-prayer. Such Prayers as are not contrary to the Scri­ptures, are as incapable of defilement as the Scriptures them­selves, and such are those of the Liturgy.

THey next go about to answer an Objection against this con­ceit of theirs, which they quote from Doctor Causabon on the Lords Prayer: Their words are these; We are not so silly us to think that the holy Scriptures (dictated by the Spirit of God) or any thing else of purely divine institution is capable of corruptions, and therefore cannot but with some laughter read the Argumentations of them, who argue, that if we reject the Litur­gy because the idolatrous Papists used it, we must also refuse the Scriptures and the Lords Prayer. These are but toyes to blind common people, &c. The holy Scriptures are uncapable of pollu­tion by any idolatrous service. By this it appears, that it is not the meer using of a form of words in an idolatrous service, which makes it unlawful to be used in the service of God, be­cause the Authors except the Scriptures; otherwise they know, A quatenus ad de omni valeret consequentia. I say (if a man may understand their mind by their words) they mean not, that such an use renders it unlawful; but that corruption and pollution which is contracted by such an use to phrases of humane invention, though not to Scripture phrases. And now they had done their work, if they had but proved, that a true proposition, if not in Scripture, is polluted by using it in idola­trous services any more, then a proposition of like truth in Scripture; or that Churches, Bels, Fonts, Pews, praying with a book, and preaching without book, are any more polluted by such an usage, then the Lords Prayer, Baptisme, or the Eucharist. It will (I believe) be beyond their power to prove such a vast difference between things of divine institution and humane. I am sure, that though the Temple was of divine institution, yet it might have been defiled by bringing an Idol into it, much more then the cart could, on which the Idol was brought, which [Page 44] could pretend to no more divine institution then that of the wheelwright. In like manner, if a man should take the consecra­ted wine of the Communion, carry it into the Ale-house, & there make himself drunk with it, the wine which is of divine institu­tion, is (one would think more, but at least) as much polluted by the said drunkennesse, as the Ale-house can be, yea as much as other wine not consecrated could be. In some cases things of divine Institution are so far from being priviledged from pollution above things of humane institution, that indeed the priviledge lies more on the other side, as the purest white is capable of most fouling; and as that which pollutes a Minister, pollutes not another man. The Authors should have told us what they mean by that pollution of words and phrases which they say is effected by using them in an Ido­latrous service, though they were otherwise never so good. Do they mean such a pollution as is described in the Leviti­cal Law? No sure: For they never read there, that he who hath spoken any words used by Idolaters in their worship, should wash his tongue, and be unclean till the Even. What pollution is it then, that by a kind of Theomagical con­tagion is contracted by good words and sentences from the Idolatrous services wherein they were used: when in the mean time the words of Scripture, having been in the same infected house, escape sound, entire, and untainted? Indeed if words be abused to a bad end, or if they should chance to be forbid to be used to some persons by a positive command, in both these cases I could allow to call them figuratively corrupted and pollu­ted. But this pollution is no such pollution as makes the use of those words unlawful to all persons. For the Scriptures them­selves are sometimes thus polluted both these ways. Its as certain that they are sometimes abused to a bad end, as that they may be used to an excellent end: And the Authors themselves tell us, pag. 67. that [Baali] was a name applied to the true God by himself, Isa. 54.5. Yet this word was polluted by abusing it to a bad end, and by a positive command not to use it, Hos. 2.16. Thou shalt call me no more Baali; so that forms of Scripture are capable of corruption and pollution, as well as forms of humane invention: and therefore the Authors distinction hinders not the Argument, which they thought to have avoided by it from returning again upon them in its [Page 45] full strength. If they mean some other kind of pollution, which I cannt conjecture; a kind by it self, which contrary to the method and course of its fellows chuseth not to infect the most refined and delicate, but rather the more gross and feculent constitutions: I can say nothing of it till they tell me what that strange pollution is. For my part, I can at present imagine no other pollutions, which words that are true and good, are ca­pable of, besides those which I have named; to which the phrases of Scripture have been shewn obnoxious as well as others. I know good speeches have been rendered nauseous by a bad speaker; and therefore they have been sometimes put in­to a good mans mouth to make them more acceptable: But the disliking of good sayings when uttered by bad men, is not grounded upon reason but weakness. For in truth they are worthy of the more acceptation upon that account, as when the Devil confessed our Saviour; since that is a most evident truth which extorts a confession from the Adversarie. I re­member what the Apostle saith. That to the pure all things are pure; and Every creature of God is good, and nothing to be re­fused. The Papists might if they would, spoil all the quaint and trite phrases of extempore Prayers, if their use of them ren­dred them impure, and to be refused. If when the Authors say that words are polluted, they mean only that they are rendred unlawful to be used; then they beg the Question in their Reason, dispute in a circle, and their Argument runs round: The Liturgy may not be used, because it is polluted, i. e. because it may not be used. Therefore I conceive, that they mean such a pollution as I have granted competible to words: But then they are out in affirming that Scripture cannot be so polluted. And the Lords Prayer wil come into the same condemnation, which is by name exempted by them from the said pollution. Yea, though it were granted that the Scri­pture could not be polluted, yet the use of the Lords Prayer as a Form of words, and not meerly of sense, would be pollu­ted by their Reason. For though the Lords Prayer be a part of Scripture, yet since they will not grant that it was appointed by the Scripture to be used as a Form of words in Prayer, it must needs follow by their Reason that we may not use it as a Form, because the Papists did so. For though the form of words be not polluted, yet the use of them as a form of Prayer [Page 46] must be polluted according to their opinions, as much as the sign of the cross. Again (that I may overthrow their Reply to Dr. Causabon another way) since the deceit which lurks in generals, is discovered in particulars, let us put a case. The Scri­pture saith, God is rich to all that call upon him. If the Mass­book had this Prayer, Be thou Lord, rich to all that call upon thee, I ask whether this Prayer be polluted by being in the Mass book. When they say it is polluted, I must deal with them another way: in the mean time let us charitably suppose that they are not so absurd, but will grant that this prayer is not polluted, thought it were in the Mass book; and that their Reason is, because this prayer consists of Scripture Phrase. This answer being supposed, I reply thus: Indeed some of the single terms of the Proposition are in the Scripture I quoted be­fore; But the words so put together in this form are not. For in Scripture the Verb substantive is of the Indicative Mood, in the prayer of the Imperative; In the Scripture it is of the third Person, in the Prayer of the second. Now if the Mass-book defiles not a sentence, in which the single words (which are the Elements of a sentence) are so joyned together as no­where in Scripture; why should any man imagine that the Mass-book can defile a word, wherein the Syllables and Let­ters (which are the Elements of a word) are so put together as they are nowhere in Scripture? Besides, if they say it is sufficient to keep a Petition from the pollution of the Mass, that the words be Scripture-words, though found together no­where in Scripture in that form of construction wherein they stand in the Petition; I answer, that in saying so they justifie the Liturgy. For I do not think, there is a prayer there, the single terms whereof (and sometimes whole enunciations) are not to be found in Scripture, excepting when some particular Persons or Offices are prayed for: And yet sure a man might pray for the said persons and offices by the same names, though they were so termed in the Mass book. Once more, This Petition [Forgive us our trespasses] is Scripture; not only in the simple terms, but also in the form of the Proposition: and therefore if there be any sentences which can escape the profa­nation of the Mass-book, this must be one by their Reason. But I challenge any man to give a satisfactory Reason, where­fore the said Proposition cannot be polluted, by the Mass-book [Page 47] as easily as any of these I shall name: [Let our iniquities be pardoned by thee] or, [acquit us from the guilt of our trans­gressions] or, condemn us not for our sins] or any other the like, which speak the same sense, though they be not found word for word in Scripture. I conclude therefore, since the Au­thors confess that the Scriptures cannot be polluted by mens using them in an Idolatrous service; and since I have proved that such Prayers whose sense keeps an harmony with that of Scripture, are as uncapable of pollution as the Scriptures them­selves: if it be but further granted, that the Prayers of the Li­turgy in their sense do agree with the Scriptures (which I here affirm, and shall make good when called thereto) it must needs follow that the prayers of the Liturgy remain unpolluted, though they had been used in an Idolatrous worship, and con­sequently may be lawfully used in the service of the true God, which will further appear in the next Section.

SECT. III.

Ʋpon the Ministers Reason its unlawful to use Churches for di­vine worship, built in time of Popery. The impertinency of their Answer, that Churches are not offered up to God. Churches are offered as truly as Words. Yea upon their Rea­son Churches may be put to no use at all, proved by the case of Meats offered to Idols.

I Have shewed how ill they can justifie the use of Scripture-phrases themselves in prayer, if that phrases of humane com­position are so polluted by the Papists use of them, that a Pro­testant may not use them. The same may be easily demon­strated concerning the use of such Churches as were dedicated in the Raign of Popery, and then used not only in the pure parts of that worship which the Authors by the Verdict of a most partial Synecdoche call idolatrous in the complex (which yet is the worst that they say against the Liturgy) but even in the very Idolatrous parts themselves, yea some of them in the celebration of the Ethnick Mysteries before Christianity visited our Iland. Let us hear now how they can use these Churches in the reformed worship of the true God, while they stand up­on the grounds they have laid down in this Chapter. That [Page 48] which they say upon this point, is word for word as followeth. Their Answer is silly, who tell us, that then we must use none of our Churches. When we offer up Churches to God by any rational act, we will consider of this frivolous answer; which indeed may concern them which dream of an holiness in them by reason of dedication or the like: It concerns not us, which only use them as convenient places, in which we meet to serve God, &c. The sum of this answer is clearly this, that the Authors do not offer Churches to God, as they should do words if they used the Common-prayer; and that they account no holiness to be in Churches, as they account in the words wherewith they utter their Prayers. And so the Answer implies also, that what things have been offered in idolatrous worship, may be used in right worship, but not offered to God. But I wonder how the words that are used in vocal Prayer, are offered to God any more then Churches. It is our affections, and more directly our desires, that are offered to God in Prayer: The words are only means and instruments to signifie these desires before men, or to excite them to concur in the same desires. And the fittest and best words are but the fittest and best means and instruments; and so the words are rather the censers then the incense. If we can be said properly to offer words to God, we must offer him the Air; or else we only offer a bodily quality without the subject, a meer articulate motion of the Air. But if words are said to be offered, because they are means and instruments used about the offering; then Churches may be said to be offered too, be­ing likewise fit means and instruments to the same purpose, though another way. For doth not the builder of Churches signifie his desire, that God may be worshipped? And is not a Church, when built, a means to unite many in the same de­sires? And is not the most fit and convenient Church the most fit and convenient means, as I said before of words? And why are not Churches holy, as much as phrases and forms of words that are used in prayer? Is not holinesse a separation from a common use to a sacred and religious use? And are not Churches as much set apart for prayer as words be? If not, the more is the pity and shame. But whether the Authors dedicate, offer, or place any holiness in Churches, or no, it is nothing to the pur­pose (though they think the Argument concerns not them till they do): For whosoever shall consider their second Reason [Page 49] (as it is explained, paralleld, and proved in this Chapter) will easily discern that by that by that Reason it is unlawful for them not only to offer, dedicate, or place holinesse in them, but even to make use of them to those ends, for which they have a fitnesse, either of their own nature, or by institution; so that they may not pray or preach in them, yea they may not con­vert them into stables, or prisons, which the Authors make more tolerable then to dedicate them to God. Now that their reason forbids them as much to make a common and natural use of Churches, as sacred, it appears by that case put by St. Paul, which they imagine to be parallel to theirs. He resolves that the meat which a man was told was offered to Idols, should not be eaten. The Authors think the Analogy of his determination makes it unlawful to pray to God with such forms of words that were used in an idolatrous service. Their Opposites to drive them from this absurdity, put another case (as like to the first as the second is, and more too) and say, that by the same reason it were unlawful to use Churches that have been used in an idola­trous service. The Authors reply, that the second and third case are not alike: for they offer words in prayer, but they do not offer Churches to God. Now let it be granted them, that the third case is not like the second; that is not material; Is not the third as like the first as the second is? Yea the case of Churches is more like to the case of meats offered to Idols (which is the first and ruling case put by Saint Paul) then the case of the Liturgy is. They say the proportion fails, because they offer words to God, but not Churches. Let it be granted; Yet on which side doth the proportion fail? Not in the case of Churches, but of words. The Authors say, they offer words to God: and therefore what hath that case to do with Saint Pauls? in which it is not questioned, whether meat offered to Idols might be offered to God, but whether it might be naturally and commonly used and eaten for a mans dinner. But now the case of Churches is more exactly like to that of St. Pauls: For he speaks not of offering meat to God, but of using it accord­ing to his kind; and therefore by the Authors reason it should forbid not only the offering of the said Churches to God, but the using them according to their kind. Therefore it is imper­tinent to dispute, whether Churches are offered to God, by the Authors, as much as Prayers: We are only to consider, whether [Page 50] Churches were offered to God by the said Idolaters as much as Prayers, that is, the words used in prayer. And we shall find, that Churches were more consecrated to God, by the said ido­latrous worshippers, then the words of their Prayers. For they accounted it sacriledge to take away the least part of a Church, and to divert it to a common use; but themselves used many of those words about their common businesses, which they used in their Prayers.

SECT. IV.

Another consideration of theirs, viz. [That we might provide other forms not used by Idolaters] answered. The mischiefs of an affected running from the Papists. What distinguisheth a true Catholick from a Papist: Not phrases, tones, habits, and gesture; but a greater Humility, Charity, and Freedom of spirit. No reason but a man may offer the same to God, which had been offered to an Idol.

IN the two immediately foregoing Sections I have made it ap­pear, that while the Authors labour to extricate themselves out of the stringent nooses of their Opposites retortion, they have only more intricatly involved and entangled themselves. It is time now to proceed in my animadversions to the next Pa­ragraph of their Chapter under debate, in which they explain their fore-cited Reason in other words, and enlarge it with one consideration not hinted by them before, viz: that there be other forms of prayer to be had beside those used by Idola­ters. Their words are these exactly; Prayer is a piece of Go­spel-sacrifice, and by a Rational act of our souls to be offered to God. Now whether it be lawful for us, when the earth is the Lords and the fulness thereof, whereas God hath given us an abi­lity to speak words in another form, to take-those very forms, and to offer them up to God in true Gospel-worship, which have been offered in an idolatrous service (though the matter of those forms be not idolatrous) is to us a great doubt, nor can we be satisfied in the lawfulness of it. This affectation of using diversity of phrase from the Papists, I never saw pleaded for before, but have often observed to be practised to my sorrow. For some men [Page 51] labouring to get far enough from the Papists in their Dialect, have spoken like Turks in point of mans will, and like Gnosticks and Libertines in point of good works. But the true Catholick Christian can approve a good saying, whoever be the speaker, and will behave himself to the Papists, as Seneca to the Epicu­reans; who, though he was a Stoick, confesseth he borrowed many things from Epicurus, and gives this reason, because he could call truth his own, though he found it in the enemies camp, and under the enemies colours. The true Shibboleth, which must distinguish a true Catholick from a Papist, and all other Hereticks, is not words and phrases, tones, countenances, habits, and gestures, by which characters Popery is usually de­fined and distinguished among us; but it is a greater Humility, Charity and Freedom of spirit. And that the Papists and other Hereticks may see that we differ from them, and place the diffe­rence of our Religion in these excellent, uncontrovertible, and most material points; I with with all my heart, that our lan­guage and phrase were as like to theirs, as truly and lawfully may be, provided we still retain our Christian liberty of vary­ing from them. For if the words and forms of prayer, which they use, be in themselves true and good, it is not their using them which can make them unlawful, notwithstanding what I have newly quoted to the contrary. For what though prayer be a piece of Gospel sacrifice, &c.? so are our bodies, so are our estates, and both to be offered to God by a rational act of our souls. Suppose then that my right knee hath bowed to an Idol, upon my conversion must not I bow to the true God with that knee, seeing I have another, but only with my left? Surely I should use that knee to chuse in Gods worship, which had been defiled in the service of Idols. Again in point of Alms, which is no lesse a piece of Gospel-sacrifice to be offered to God by a ratio­nal act of our souls, then prayer is; may not a man give that money to the poor, which he knoweth hath been offered to a false God, or to the true God in an idolatrous service? When the Temples of the Pagans were in many places demolished, might not the Emperour as well, yea much better, have given the gold and silver, that was found there consecrated to Idols, unto the poor, then have employed it about the use of his Pal­lace or the affairs of State? But since I see this Reason on foot, I lesse wonder, that those who had the Revenues of the Church [Page 52] so long in their hands, did so little good with them. May be they thought that they had been offered to an Idol before, and therefore ought not to be given to the true God, but to be cal­led Nehushtan, and condemned to the base service of their belly. I shall conclude my notes on the last quoted passage with one more Instance of common practice, which I hope the Authors themselves allow of, though it be vertually condemned by the Reason which they alledge. Who the Authors of the Book are, I know not, nor what their way is. But I am sure others of their mind in point of non-conformity, will use some sen­tences of the Common-prayer in their extempore Prayers, as, [...]hat Gods service is perfect freedom, and the like. Now if a whole Prayer be defiled by the Papists use of it, every part of it must be so defiled. If they say, that they use no Sentences in their prayers, which have been used by Idolaters in theirs, excepting such as are agreeable to the Scriptures; I must re­quire them to shew what sentence of a Prayer in the Liturgy is not agreeable to the Scriptures; and when they have shewn that, I yield them the cause. But their present reason argues against the lawfulnesse of using such forms of words, which themselves confesse are for the matter of them true and agree­able to the Scriptures.

SECT. V.

Their Argument from 1 Cor. 10. about Meats offered to Idols answered. Several Reasons why Forms of prayer can­not be liable to those pollutions, which those meats were.

THese confessed absurdities following from their assertion, let us now see upon what grounds it is built; to which end I shall here transcribe their next words. The ground of our scruple is in that known Text, 1 Cor. 10. where the Apostle treateth concerning the lawfulnesse of eating meats that had been once offered to Idols. He determines as to a double case. (1.) That it is not lawful to eat such meats in an Idols Temple. (2.) In case it be sold in the shambles, and we know it not, he determines that we may buy and eat it. But in case our Brother saith unto us, This hath been offered to an Idol; he saith, eat it not: so that [Page 53] our Brothers scandal upon such a foundation is to be avoided by us. He gives the Reason, because there is other meat to eat. The earth is the Lords and the fulnesse thereof. Here they interweave an Argument from scandal with that they have been so long upon, drawn from the unlawfulnesse of offering that to God, which had been offered to Idols. I shall consider the case of scandal by it self in the next Chapter. For they are two Argu­ments, though the Authors observing (its likely) the weak­nesse of each of them, confound them together in these words. But I shall distinguish them in my answer; since if neither of them is of force singly, they cannot be of force conjunctly. For if the Common-prayer may not be used because it hath been polluted by the known use of it in an idolatrous service (as they have spent a whole leaf to prove already, without menti­oning scandal) then it were a sin to use it, though no man took offence at it; and to come afterward with the consideration of scandal, doth not help on the proof that it is a sin, but only makes it a double one.

And again on the other hand, if there were more and more weighty scandal taken at the use of the Common-prayer, then at the non-use, in such a case a man were bound not to use it (supposing it were everywhit as indifferent, as the chusing a piece of meat in the shambles) though it had never been used in an idolatrous service. And indeed it doth not appear to me that the Apostle saith Eat not, meerly to avoid scandal. For I doubt whether the case would not have been the same, if the person had seen it offered to Idols himself, or if not a brother, but an Infidel had told him; or if he had bought it in a disguise, that no body knew of it. I am sure the Apostle argues from a more intrinsecal Topick then the scandal of the spectator, viz. that by eating meats offered to Idols they were in danger to have fellowship with devils; since those that eat of the sacrifi­ces are partakers of the Altar. Indeed the men I deal with seem to restrain those words to eating in the Idols Temple; but I know not upon what Reason; for whosoever shall read the eighth Chapter, shall find that the Apostle makes eating the said flesh in the Idols Temple to be no worse then eating it in a pri­vate, house at an invitation; for there is no worse said of the one then of the other. By this which hath been said, the Reader will easily, see a way made to the discovery of a wide difference be­tween [Page 54] the case of flesh offered to Idols and the Liturgy; ex­cept he be one of those which are wont to blaspheme it with the Nick-name of Porridge. When it is proved that the Common Prayer is flesh offered to Devils, and so brings us into danger of having fellowship with devils, then somthing is done to make good the Reason, and not till then. The most which the Au­thors say to this purpose, is in the next words; For our part, we are not able to fathom a Reason why a form of words fitted up for use in prayer, should not be liable to the same corruption and pollution, which a dish of meat fitted for natural use is. But I can quickly tell them more reasons then one, wherefore some dishes of meat (namely such as Saint Paul speaks of, offered to Idols) should be more polluted, as they word it. I mean more unlawful to be used then some forms of words can be, and in particular those which are in the Liturgy, notwithstanding the fore-mentioned use of them in time of Popery. (1.) The said Flesh was offered to an Idol; but the prayers of the Li­turgy were offered to the true God, while used by the Papists. For the God to whom they prayed, hath the same Attributes with the God which we pray to. What though they think that bread in the Sacrament is turned into the flesh of Christ, & con­sequently hypostatically united to the Godhead! I do not believe that they think the bread is God. And they have a Scripture, which if taken litterally, would warrant their adoration of the bread; which the Pagans have not for their Idols. However none of the prayers in the Liturgy were made to this breaden God. If it be said, that though the prayers were not made to an Idol, yet the putting up of these prayers was joyned with other acts of Idolatrous worship; I answer that still they have not left the case in the same state with that which Saint Paul tteats of: For those meats were offered to false Gods. Therefore to make the cases alike, we must suppose the Hea­thens to offer flesh to a false God; and at the same Assembly, either before or after, to offer other flesh to the true God. The Question is, whether it were not lawful to eat the one, though not the other? I must see the one forbid as clearly as the other, before I can doubt of the difference. I might add, that if the Papists apprehend the Bread to be God, or if they wor­ship it with divine worship, yet they do not apprehend it to be Mars, or Venus, or other false gods, neither do they in­tend [Page 55] to worship any such God; but they intend to worship the true God, the same whom the Protestants worship: But the meats which Saint Paul speaks of, were offered to other Gods then that which the Christians worship. The Scripture saith they worshipped Devils; and that they did intentionally, calling them by that name themselves. And this is one, and that no inconsiderable alteration of the case. (2.) The Apostle only forbids the eating of the same numerical flesh which was offered to Idols, not the same specifically. Though flesh was offered to Idols, yet a man might eat flesh; and though Mut­ton or Beef was offered to Idols, yet a man might eat Mutton or Beef, so that it were not that same individual Flesh, Mut­ton or Beef that was offered to Idols. But now the words, sentences and orations which are in the Common prayer-book, are not the same numerically with those in the Masse-book. Latine and English differ certainly as much as Male and Female, if not as green and blew. Therefore when a Minister reads the Liturgy, he doth not speak one word which is numerically the same with those which the Popish Priest speaks while he says Masse. As to instance, The Protestant Reader says [Grant us thy peace]: But the Popish Reader offers not these words to God in his Idolatrous service. May be he saith, Da nobis pa­cem tuam. But the word [Dae] is not the same numerically with the word [Grant]: Yea, the Ear discerns as great a difference between them, as the Eye doth between red and yellow. The Genus of every word spoken is a sound; and if the sound be not the same, the word is not the same. Nay if the Popish Priest should read in English, grant us thy peace: the sound which he makes, is not the same numerically with that which the protestant makes. For the same numericall accident cannot be in two subjects. And there is another plain alteration of the case. (3.) By eating meats offered to devils, the Corinthians would be in danger of having fellowship with Devils, as the Apostle saith, and may be seen in the writings of those that relate the Pagan rites and Ceremonies in their myste­ries, and how the Devils were attracted by them. Thus to this day those which use charms, amulets, or the like, do many times come under the power of the Devil in their bodies or estates; and are said by Divines to make an implicite, though not an explicite contract with him. But no such danger of [Page 56] having fellowship with Devils, can be pretended in using those words in our prayers to God, which were used to the same God, though in a service performed to the same God after a false manner: supposing that the said words are otherwise true and good, which my Opponents do them­selves suppose in this argument; And there is a third alteration of the case. (4.) The Authors give this Reason wherefore meats offered to Idols might not be eaten, as may be seen in their words cited already, viz. because there was other meat to eat; The earth is the Lords, and the fulness thereof: which implies that it was lawful to eat such meats, in case none other could be had. Now this is our case in respect of the Liturgy, supposing it to be established by Law. At such times as are appointed for the use of the Liturgy, there are no other prayers to be had. I know, a man hath a natural power to put up other prayers: and so, if a Corinthian could by buying, or begging, or other lawful means procure no meat, but what had been offered to Idols; yet he had a natural power to steal some. But doubtlesse he should rather eat meat offered to Idols, then take those meats which were another mans propriety by the Laws of Corinth, and consequently such as he had no right to. And doubtlesse an English Minister should rather use the prayers of the Liturgy, though they had been offered in an idolatrous service, then those which the Laws of England forbid him to meddle with at such a time: But that so many do otherwise, it may well pro­ceed from the sweetnesse of stollen waters. But besides this restraint of the Laws which allow us no other words to use, most men are further restrained by the nature of the thing, ex­cept they have ready at hand as rich a Sylva of Synonimous words, as there is a variety of meats in natures cornucopia. For a man can hardly put up a petition without using some words that are used in the Mass. And so by this Reason we should not pray at at all with vocal prayer. I might bring the Authors to another absurdity by arguing that their Reason makes it un­lawful to use the Creed as a publick profession of Faith, since the Papists use it, and the Authors will not allow it to be of the Apostles making: But I fear they will grant the absurdity, and therefore I dare not tempt them.

SECT. VI.

The Scripttures that they bring, which forbade the Jews to use such words, gestures, and actions, as Idolaters did, signifie nothing to their purpose. Their Argument from Hos. 2.15, 16. and Zech. 13.2. considered. Popish Idolatry is but an improve­ment of the Non-conformists principles. Their Pretence [that conformity is a step to Popery] confuted and returned upon themselves, who cannot confute a Papist but by quitting their own Principles.

I Have now produced the Ministers second Reason with all the forces which they have assigned for its defence in their ninth chapter; and have I think, manifested the very strength of it to be weaknesse. But they come up with a reserve in the Post­script, where they cite multitudes of Scriptures which forbid the Hebrews to use such words, gestures and actions that Ido­laters did: as to wear Linsie-woolsie garments, to let cattel en­gender with a diverse kind, to sow a field with mingled seed, to call God by the name of Baali. But I suppose the Authors can lawfully do these things themselves: Therefore I ask them, if these Prohibitions bind us Englishmen? If they say they do, let them give a Reason why they transgresse them, and it will serve their brethren. If they say that such prohibitions bind us not to forbear the actions which are named there in terminis, but other actions of the like Reason as having been done by Idolaters, as using the forms of prayer that were used by the Papists; then they make themselves ridiculous. For how can a Law be supposed to forbid only those things which are not na­med, because they bear analogy and proportion to the things which are named, when the things themselves which are na­med expressly in the Law, are not forbidden? If they interpret those prohibitions as forbidding us to do such things as Idola­ters did, not in civil usages, but only in divine worship (as somewhere they make the distinction); then we are to labour in all words, actions, and gestures, in which we are left to our Liberty, to go contrary to the said Idolaters: and consequent­ly, if they have the Sacrament at Noon, we should have it at Midnight; if they worship toward the East, we should worship [Page 58] toward the West (as the Authors say the Jews were commanded to do for the same Reason); if their Churches stand East and West, ours should be situate North and South; if they preach out of a Pulpit, we should preach out of a pew; if their heads are bare in prayers, ours should be covered; if their Communion-table stands in the chancel, ours should stand in the bell-fry. In all which re­spects, I believe, the Authors themselves think it not unlawful to be like the Papists; so that I wonder what they mean to quote so many Texts, forbidding the Jews to be like the Idolaters not only in such circumstances of Worship as I have named, but even in some punctilio's much more trivial and inconsiderable, and some of them not at all concerning the Worship of God, as sowing a Field with two sorts of seed. There is more shew of strength in a Marginal note, which they put down, pag. 97. in these words. Note that both in Hos. 2.15, 16. and in Zech. 13.2. two Texts plainly relating to the times of the Gospel, God forbids all mention of Idolatry, and declares his will, that it should not be so much as remembred. Now we cannot see how we should obey those precepts in keeping their very rites, modes and methods of Worship. But I would fain know a Reason why they break these Precepts (or rather Prophecies) by using such Rites and Modes of Worship as Idolaters have used, (so that no Idolatry be committed in the using of them) any more then by remem­bring and using the names of false gods, which are the things specified in both those Texts: which certes are not so to be ex­pounded, that Saint Luke may not be found a transgressor in putting down the names of Castor and Pollux in the Bible it self; or (if he be priviledged by inspiration) that the Authors may not condemn their Brethren, that in the cause of Non-conformity, have sometimes left reading the Scriptures to their Parishioners, to read Ovids Metamorphosis to their Scholars. I can conceive how Saint Luke and the said Schoolmasters may be said to mention and remember the name of Idols: but I can­not imagine how I remember the name of Idols by saying O God, the Father of heaven, have mercy on us! or any other prayer of the Liturgy. Those who in their Books, Sermons, yea and in their very Prayers, tell the people that the said forms are taken out of the Masse-book [...], which for my part, I professe to be more then I know; these are they which [Page 59] keep up the names of Idols: The greatest part of the people would not think of them, but that their Ministers are their in­stant Remembrancers. The same may be said of the usual names of the moneths, and dayes of the week, which do include the names of heathenish Gods and Goddesses, which some have taken much pains to shew and presse for the credit of Mr. Jesse's Almanack: But his Almanack would be needlesse except these things were first pressed by such tinkerly Refor­mers, who make work, that so they may mend it. For who thinks of Venus when he mentions Friday, though Frea signifie the same? And who thinks of keeping a Feast to Saturn, when he celebrates the Nativity of our Saviour; or of honouring Flora in a May pole? None, I dare say, or but very few, ex­cepting such as have been endroctrinated by the said Reformers: No more then a man means to swear by Hercules, when he saith or writeth Mehercule; which I am sure I have met with in Theological discourses made by Authors, never suspected of any good inclination to Popery or other Idolatry. In like manner, who thinks of the Lady of Loretto, or other Popish Idols, in reading of the Liturgy? Only the discourse I oppose, is the direct way to effect that, which they pretend to pre­vent.

I have argued all this while upon the Authors supposition, That the worship of the Church of Rome in the whole complex is idolatrous. But they might more properly say, that a bushel filled half with wheat and half with rye, is a bushel of wheat, or that a Sermon is nonsentical in the whole complex, if some few phrases of it be non-sense; or that a Translation is erro­neous in the whole complex, if there be some few Errata's in it. Whosoever faith a Blackamore is white ih the whole complex, according to my Criticks, tels a lye, though he be white in his teeth. I might also add, that the Papists in the grossest part of their idolatry, in adoration of the bread, are justified by a Prin­ciple, which the Non-conformists (or most of them) do main­tain; and their idolatry is but the lawful emprovement of this Principle; viz. That Reason is not to judge what points are to be received as articles of faith, and what not. For this principle being supposed, there is no warrant to interpret those words figuratively, This is my body, since all the warrant which is pre­tended, is, that the literal sense is repugnant to Reason, which [Page 60] pronounceth it absolutely impossible that one body should be in two places at once. But according to this Hypothesis of the exclusion of reason from the judgement seat, the Papist might reply, Indeed my reason tels me that it is impossible, but the Scripture saith, This is my body; and therefore I ought not to mince the words at the command of reason, which hath nothing to do in matters of faith. Indeed the Scripture saith, the Body of Christ is in heaven; but I believe it is on earth too at the Eucha­rist. Nothing but Reason gain-sayes, and she hath nothing to do to judge in the case. What can a man that goes on this Princi­ple, reply to the so much condemned Idolater? Out of his own mouth he is confuted: He laid down the doctrine, and the other makes the natural and genuine use. Those therefore which hold this principle, cannot judge the action of the Papists in adoring the Bread to be idolatrous without self-contradicti­on; and if they will act according to their light, this se­cond Reason signifies nothing to them though it may to others.

I cannot conclude my notes on their second Reason without reflecting upon another, extracted from the same Topick; and by what they have said upon this Reason, rendered more cre­ditable to the unwary and half observing Reader. For they have sprinkled in several pages of their book many shrewd hints, as if the Liturgy ushered in the Masse, and conformity were a step toward Popery. As page 67. We know that those Ministers and people, who are most zealous against Popery, are most averse to this Liturgy. But a zeal for any cause, except it be bridled by discretion, and attended with an equal pace of strength, is not the way to protect it, but to betray it. We saw lately, that the States-men which were most zealous for the good old Cause, lost it; and the King had not better friends then his most implacable enemies. Fury is as bad in a Champion as torpour; it is an even temperature of wisdom and valour which doth the execution: A sober Protestant, though he rageth lesse, shall prevail more on a Papist then a mad Fanatick. The greatest part of the zeal against Popery, which is found among the Non-conformists, is like that of one frantick, who wounds himself while he would strike his foe. They are mad against Popery, but they cannot tell why; they cannot confute it with­out condemning themselves, as I could prove in many Instances. [Page 61] This unguided zeal will be sure to run far enough from Popery, and so runs into it; as he that sails round the Globe, the fur­ther he goes, after he is half way, the nearer he approacheth to the place from whence he set out. Thus the Quakers, a consi­derable part of the Non-conformists, rayled at Popery till they began to be taken for Jesuites, or their disciples. I have heard of several Papists that have turned Protestants by the reason­ings of men zealous for the Liturgy: But I professe unfained­ly, I never heard of one that of late years was won by any Non-conformist, excepting by Mr. Baxter: And I believe he would have been as unsuccessful as others, but that he goes upon more moderate principles. Me thinks the example of Doctor Cosens, now Bishop of Durham, once most suspected of Popery for his zeal for the Liturgy, and yet exercising a no lesse couragious then considerate zeal against Popery in the time of his exile; me­thinks, I say, this example alone were sufficient, not only to stop the mouth of calumny in this particular, but to non-plus jealousie it self. I confesse in some things the Conformists come nearer to the Papists then others; but it is as Souldiers make their approaches to the enemy to fight with him, and are therefore many times thought to fall away; but when they return with their spoils, captives, and Trophees, none is so hard-faced as to maintain the suspition. Mr. Baxter himself, it is known, hath not only been suspected, but verily believed to be a Papist, and that by some Rabbi's, meerly for his conceding some Positions to the Papists, which no reasonable and just man can deny them; whereby he hath done more to the shaking of the very foundations of the Papal Sea, then all the Non-conformists that ever mannaged the Controversie, which I ever heard of. But I have so much to say upon this subject, that it would require a Book by it self: Doctor Sanderson in both his Prefaces to his Sermons hath shewed, how much ser­vice is done to the Pope by the Non-conformists in ma­ny particulars; where the Reader may be satisfied concern­ing the falsenesse of that which they affirm page 109. That there is nothing of more tendency to confirm the Papists in their way of worship, then for them to see us keep much the same. Indeed they may be confirmed in the good parts of their worship by seeing us do the same, and all the better; it is better they were Papists then Atheists: But how can they be [Page 62] confirmed in the bad parts of their worship, by seeing us to use the good, and refuse the bad? They are rather confirmed by such as refuse the whole: For then they will think all to be re­fused out of humour, since some apparently is; and that we have no more reason against the bad then against the good, since we carry our selves with the same aversation to both. So that the experiment they relate in the same page, How some forreign Papists, listening at the doors, where they have heard Service read and sung, cryed out, This is the same with ours: This experiment, I say, is for the credit of the Liturgy, as more facilitating the Papists coming over to us, and being a more easie stride then extempore Prayers. The Authors tell me very good news, and I am heartily glad to hear, that the Papists begin to like that service which heretofore they persecuted with fire and faggot. And so much for the Ministers second Reason, contained in their ninth Chapter.

CHAP. III.

SECT. I.

Their third reason from scandal, considered. (1.) No scan­dall hath any foundation in re. (2.) No scandal is allow'd in Scripture. (3.) It is but juggling for those to plead scandal, who hold the things unlawful. Or (4.) who endea­vour not to convince the scandalized of their errour, but do themselves most confirm them in it. (5.) The command of Authority out-weighs scandal, and alters the case from that in St. Pauls dayes. (6.) Their Argument stands charged equally against the Directory as the Liturgy.

THe Authors finding their Reason, drawn from the usage of the Liturgy in times of Popery, to be too light, and the other taken from the scandal of Brethren that are offended therewith, to be no more solid and weighty, have sophistically joyned them both in one in the ninth Chapter, that their Re­spondent might be as much cumbered in the defence of his cause, as a man that fights with two at once. For one Answer will not serve for these two Arguments, which they have con­founded together. But I have manifested already that they are two distinct Arguments, since neither of them is rendered more accomplished for the purpose by the accession of its fel­low; and the Authors themselves acknowledge the distinction, as by the many words they spend to prove the unlawfulnesse of offering that to God, which hath been offered in an idolatrous service (without mentioning the case of scandal) so also in the Title of their Postscript, where they plainly say, that the latter is another Reason from the former.: Therefore having answered the former, it is very reasonable according to the laws of Method, that I make the examination of the latter [Page 64] (taken from the scandal of brethren) to be the proper subject of this present Chapter. In the fortification of which, the first thing they do, after the naked proposition of it, is to prevent an answer: The Prolepsis is in these words; We are aware what the Doctors of Aberdeen said of old, to prove that the scandal of Brethren weighs light, when put in the scale with the command of Authority. There may something be said for their Assertion, where the scandal is meerly passive, and hath no foundation in re; only men are offended, because they are offended. But where the scandal is such, as is so far allowed by Scripture, that a negative precept is given upon it, Eat it not; we are not of so easie a faith as to believe what they say when Gods Word saith, Do it not. To this I reply (1.) That no scandal hath a foundation in re; The foundation of scandal is the errour and weaknesse of the Person scandalized: And we ought to be so far from respecting least such offended persons, that seem to labour under the greatest weaknesse, that we are to respect them most. For to offend the little ones is worse then to offend the Pharisees, Doctors, and Rabbies. But now generally those which are offended at the Liturgy, as they do think themselves the most able men and women, and accordingly declaim against the grosse ignorance of others, yea even of the Clergy, making it their recreation to scoffe and scorn at them, and to contrive and tell ridiculous fables of them; so by the Authors them­selves they are many times acknowledged to be the ablest sort of Christians and Ministers; and therefore they ought not to abstain from conformity for fear of offending them, whose offence is rather counterfeit then real, having no foundation in re, that is, in weaknesse, nor in any errour, which is not easily vincible, if they are of so great gifts as they have the credit of. (2.) Whereas they say, that the scandal alledged is such, and so far allowed in Scripture, that a negative Precept is given upon it, Eat it not: I answer, that no scandal is allowed in Scripture, and no Sctipture doth so far allow a respect to the scandal taken at the Common-Prayer, as to say, use it not, especially when the Laws both Ecclesiastical and Civil say, use it. For I have de­monstrated in the Chapter fore-going a vast difference between the case of meats offered to Idols and the Liturgy. (3.) It is but juggling for those persons to use an Argument drawn from scandal, who believe the thing unlawful, though no [Page 65] offence were taken. For whosoever saith, he he doth not an action because people are offended, doth thereby confesse, that he thinks it an indifferent thing. As if a man should say, I commit not adultery, because if I did, I should offend the Brethren: The hearer would conclude, that the speaker either thinks, that adultery is otherwise lawful, or else doth hugely prevaricate. Therefore, seeing the Authors do think the use of the Common-prayer unlawful, though no body took offence at it, they should have done ingenuously to cut short the controversie, and not mention scandal, that a speedy issue might be procured. For I cannot see how I can argue with them upon the point of scan­dal, but by supposing that the persons, who fear to give scandal, by doing the action, grant the action to be lawful, though they, whom they fear to scandalize, judge it unlawful. And there­fore I am forced to proceed here on that supposition. (4.) Such Persons cannot reasonably pretend the scandal of their Bre­thren as a Reason of their Non conformity, till they have used all means within their power to convince the scandalized Bre­thren, that their offence is canselesse, and the thing is lawful. But if they on the contrary by their actions, sermons, and familiar conferences, beside their writings, do labour to confirm them in that weaknesse and errour, which causeth the scandal (as usually they do) then this scandal is no more excuse for their forbearance of conformity, then it would be for a child which comes not when called by his Father, to say, the dores were locked, when he had locked them himself. (5.) A man is to forbear many things, that he may nor give offence to others, in case he is left to his liberty; which yet he is bound not to forbear, but to do, in case he be commanded by Authority, which is the case in hand. (6.) This Argument (if it were of force) would evince it unlawful to use the Directory, as well as the Li­turgy. For there was never Liturgy or Directory made, nor can any be made, as things stand, but some will be offended at it. Therefore other circumstances are to be considered, which have a power to render the offence in considerable; of which hereafter.

SECT. II.

(7.) The several Sects of Non-conformists make nothing of offending one another. An Instance in taking the Scandalous Tithes. (8.) An unanimous Essay of these Ministers might remove the Scandal. What they count, scandal, is losse of Re­putation. Ʋpon what account it is better that some suffer, then that Forms should be laid aside. Persecution lies at their own dores. Their little engaging against the known enemies of God, mens vices.

(7.) THe several Sects of Non-conformists make nothing to offend one another. The Presbyterians the Inde­pendents, and they the Anabaptists, and they the Quakers, and so vice versâ, while every one of them doth what seems good in their own eyes. Why then do they scruple it in using a pre­scribed Form of worship? May they offend the Brethren on their own heads, but not when commanded by Authority? If they answer, that those things wherein they offend one another, are by each party counted necessarily good; but the use of the Liturgy they account a thing indifferent (for so we must sup­pose them to speak, if they argue upon scandal) and therefore, though they boldly offend one another in the former actions, they dare not in the latter: I reply, that they ought to account conformity necessarily good so long as it is required by Autho­rity; and they ought not to account those actions necessarily good, by which they offend one another. As to instance, how many were offended at the Ministers for taking Tithes? Yet I never knew any man who feared to give the offence, though it was not a necessary duty to take them. For why might not the Minister remit the Tithes of his Parish, as well as Saint Paul did remit the contributions of the Corinthians? Nothing can be said for taking Tithes, notwithstanding the offence taken thereat; but the same may be said in the defence of Conformity, for all the offence which is taken at it. Yea, and that which makes the case worse, Tithes were as really offered to God in times of Idolatry, as the Prayers of the Liturgy; and their offended Bre­thren usually called them Antichristian Tithes for the same rea­son. But may be, the Authors make light of offending other Sects [Page 67] beside their own; May be, they would use the Common Prayer, if only other Parties were offended: but they dare not offend their own Party. Therefore I answer. (8.) Lastly, That there is no fear but that the Ministers whose case is here pleaded, have so much Authority and influence upon their own party (whom I have found more submissive to one sentence quoted from their own Teachers, then to an hundred Reasons in this case), that if they would, they might easily change the Peoples minds; especially, if they were unanimously resolved on the Essay, as they seem to be on the quite contrary. Yea those who had so much power to bring them into the Error, cannot have much lesse to bring them out; and they are the more bound to endeavour it. But in that they do not so much as attempt it, it is very probable even to the Judgment of charity it self, that what they call scandal of the Brethren, is losse of Reputation among their own Sect; and the Bishop of Exceters censure is easily reconcilable with that Charity and Candor which the Authors misse in the same, and complain thereof in these words; The Bishop of Exceter is mistaken therefore in suggesting that we forbear the using of the Liturgy out of a little point of Reputation amongst some People rather weak then wise, and to be pittied more then imitated; and he shews little candor or charity in saying, we sacrifice our Judge­ments to our credits, and out of a fear and lothness to offend some people, whom we may easily convince and satisfie as well by our examples as Arguments, &c. This is not spoken like a tender and good Christian. Why not? For if the People are in an Error, and that such an one which hath already done much mischief in Church and State, and is likely to do the like again, except Gods great mercy prevent, and the Ministers know it is an Er­ror (for that must be supposed, if they expect the benefit of this Argument), and yet will not labour to undeceive their People, especially if they have been means of bringing them into this Error themselves; can Charity it self imagine other­wise, but that this tendernesse proceeds only out of a point of Reputation? Whether it be so, God only knows; to their own Master they must stand or fall: But so it appears. For though they oppose to this censure a profession that they do not think Non-conformity to be now the way to credit; yet they must certainly mean only a Credit with some Persons, whom [Page 68] they care not for. But that Non-conformity is the way to get Credit with other Persons, it is manifest by that which the Authors say in their Postscript of their own observation, viz. That those who have returned to the use of the Common Prayer, have made themselves the scorn of some, and the grief of others. There is no such Reputation to be gained by a Divine as to preach against that which is established by Law, and to be the Head of a discontented Faction. For that cause which hath least of the civil Power to maintain it, stands in most need of wit and abilities to defend it: And the abilities which are so used, shall be taken notice of and admired, when those which defend the opposite cause shall be over-looked as needlesse. Beside that it is glorious in the Eyes of the vulgar, to out-face Authority, to go in a singular way; and for a man by his ir­regular actions to censure his Superiors as if he were above them. Upon which account the Cynicks of old, and the Quakers now, for all their pretences to humility, have deser­vedly obtained from wise men the name of the proudest and most ambitious Sects that ever were.

The Authors stay most upon this Argument in their Postscript; and therefore thither I must follow them when I have first left an animadversion upon the exclamation they make in this chapter aganist certain persons, who (they say) had rather their Brethren should be persecuted, and all the Christian World scandalized, then that the forms of Prayer under question should be laid aside. If there were any such Persons; I know not but others may be more blame-worthy, who had rather provoke those persecutions and pull them down on their own heads, besides the scandali­zing of a far greater part of the Christian World, then that that the said forms of Prayer should be used. But indeed I know no such Persons as those whom they stigmatize with this description. For neither are all the Christians in the world scandalized with the Prayers; neither. do I know any that had rather their Brethren should be persecuted, then the Prayers laid aside, the laying of them aside being singly considered in the comparison, and with abstraction from those things which are pretended as a Reason why they should be laid aside, or would follow there-from. The exacters of conformity exact their due; give them their due, & then you may expect a dispen­sation: otherwise the comparison is unjustly made betwixt the [Page 69] sufferings of those which submit not, and the keeping up of the forms: The comparison should be made betwixt the said suf­ferings, and the keeping up of the Credit and Authority of the Laws. It were surely better that the Magistrate should keep them up, then that the contempt of his Authority being grown so insolent and mighty that he cannot master it, should force them to lay them down. For the keeping them up notwithstand­ing the sufferings which by accident of humane corruption are consequent thereto, can prove only to the prejudice of some particular Persons, who (while the Law is in force) deserve to incur it by their own Act: But the laying them down upon such an account, would be dangerous to the whole Church and Kingdom, by submitting the discipline of both to the head-strong outrage of the Subject. Suppose a Master command his servant some light matter upon pain of suffering: It is not in­deed better that the servant should suffer, then that the com­mandment should be revoked, the terms of the comparison being simply and abstractly considered. But it is better that the commandment should not be revoked, then that the servant should get head over his Master. Let the servant shew his willingnesse, and th [...]n he may expect his Masters indulgence in remitting the command. Let the prescriptions of the Litur­gy be never so light matters; yet certainly obedience is a matter of importance, and that is it which is contended for; and it were better that the Subject should suffer, then that obedience should be denied. By which note I may also answer another Argument which they bring in the 90. page of their Book: viz. That though the ceremonies were lawful, yet they are not expedient, because they will bring so many scandals and sufferings: and every thing which is not expedient, so far as it is not expedient, is not law­ful. To which I answer (1.) A private mans using of these cere­monies cannot be inexpedient in neither of those respect; neither in respect of scandal, nor in respect of sufferings. For as for the former respect, The good of obedience doth overpoise the evil of scandal. And as for the latter, The use of them brings no sufferings on him that useth them; neither doth his using them make another suffer who useth them not, but only as he who doth his duty by accident aggravateth the case of him who omits it. (2.) Suppose that the ceremonies were too light and inconsiderable to be imposed by such penal Laws; and [Page 70] consequently that the making of the Law was inexpedient, though the keeping of it be not; yet, if the Magistrate judge it expedient, he is bound to make it; and much more may he look for obedience to it, when it is already made, until it be re­pealed, yea though he judged it inexpedient. Nay further­more, the case may be, that the same Law, which was once inex­pedient to make, it may be no lesse inexpedient to repeal, as I instanced before, when the repealing of it shall let loose the reins to popular insolency, and shall be interpreted as done out of fear of a mutiny and insurrection. To conclude, the suffer­ings which are pretended, can at most be only an Argument to the Magistrate to alter the Law; but this can be no reason wherefore a Minister should not keep the Law while it is in force, which is the end it is alledged for in the Book. There is no man can be more against placing much moment in the light appurtenances of Religion then I am; or for Liberty to vary, so it be extra casum contemptus: But to see men take this Li­berty, because the Magistrate thinks not fit to give it; and while they expect his indulgence in things which they scruple, not to obey him so far as they can without scruple; and lastly to see those claiming that liberty as a due, which they would not grant to others as a Largesse, if they were in power, but would forbid things under as great pains as they are now com­manded; I will say no more, but Quis tulerit — For that these rigid exactions of such things, as the Authors call light and frivolous, is not the only fault of the Conformists, appears from hence, That when they had lost their power, men were as severely dealt with for not taking the Covenant, or for saying Gloria Patri, or the Creed in their Churches. Therefore I can say an hearty Amen to the Authors wish, That men would use their heat against the known enemies of God, such as drunkards, blasphemers, unclean persons, cursers, and swearers (or rather against their vices) then against the Servants of the living God. But here I find the Non-confor­mists most at a fault, who (to my observation) preach least against these vices; which makes their Auditors usually to call such a Minister as bends his strength against them, a meer moral Preacher; and to account that the most Gospel-preaching, which declaims more against the supposed faults of the Magistrate, then the real ones of the People; more against Bishops, Cere­monies, [Page 71] Common-Prayer, and the like, then any of the vices fore-mentioned.

SECT. III.

Their Question answered, Whether the Magistrate may com­mand such things as are matter of scandal. (1.) He may if the good to be procured by them be greater then the evil of scan­dal. (2.) If the offence be taken after the Command, he may continue it. This Question is quite beside the Question. Their pretence [that the Magistrates command cannot justifie any man in breaking Gods Command] answered. That which was scandal before the Command, is none after: As that which is murder in a private man, is not so in a commissioned Officer.

THis Reason (as I said before) is most largely insisted on in their Postscript; where having quoted a multitude of Precepts, which forbid offending the weak Brethren, they take notice of an Answer which is usually given, viz. That these Precepts only concern us where the command of our Superi­ors doth not make the thing necessary. Whereto they reply thus, We would gladly know, whether the Magistrate be not as much obliged not to command things indifferent, where such a scan­dal will arise, as the inferiours not to do them. I answer, (1.) If the things (though indifferent in themselves) be ne­cessary to procure a greater good, then the scandal which will arise from them be an evil, he may; and if he thinks that the scandal is not considerable or worthy to be respected, he is bound in such a case to command the said things. For he must be judge of his own Acts; otherwise he is in worse case then a private Christian, and must enact nothing, as I shewed in my first Chapter. (2.) For the same Reason (and with much more) if the Magistrate hath commanded an indifferent thing, and the offence be taken after the command, he may continue his com­mand. For else it were in the power of the Subject to bind the Magistrate at pleasure, to repeal all his Laws concerning indiffe­rent things. As if he should make a Law, that there should be no traffick with a Nation that he is minded to make war with: [Page 72] The people misliking the Law might say, they are offended therewith; and so make it his duty to reverse that Law. And this is the case under question. For the Authors themselves cannot say, that the greatest part of the better sort were offend­ed at the use of the Common-prayer, when it was first impo­sed; but on the contrary it was highly liked and approved by all, or most, except the Papists: and therefore a better Reason against the Common-prayer might be drawn from the offence which the Papists took at it, because they were offended before it was established by Law. But the offence, which is pleaded by the Authors, is an offence taken since; and so it is an offence taken at that which was made necessary in its use before, and therefore not to be regarded. (3.) Though it should be granted, that the Magistrate himself is by the Law of God re­strained from commanding any thing, by which weak Christians may be offended; yet that is nothing to the Question contro­verted: For the Question is not, what the Magistrate is forbid to do, but what the Minister ought to do. Now though the Magistrate might not, for this Reason, impose the Liturgy; it doth not from thence follow, that the Minister may not use it.

Indeed in the same place the Authors frame an Argument to prove, that a man may not do any thing which shall scandalize his Brother, though he be commanded to do it by the Magi­strate. The Argument is in these following Termes. We suppose our Brethren will not say, that the Magistrates command can justifie any soul in violating the expresse Law of God. And as they themselves would not interpret the Law of God thus, Thou shalt not steal, that is, except thy Superiour command thee; or, Thou shalt not commit adultery, that is, except thou beest com­manded: so they must pardon us, if we cannot so interpret the Law of God in the case of scandal. To which I answer, That those Material Actions, which would be transgressions of the Moral Law before they are commanded by the Civil Law, are sometimes no such transgressions after they are so commanded. And the reason is, because these Actions have not the same for­mality which they had before; and consequently many times the change of their Nature is commonly owned and expressed by the change of their denomination, which will easily appear by particular Instances. For that very Action (for the matter of it) which would be Theft and a breach of the eighth Com­mandement [Page 73] before the act of humane Authority commanding it, or only permitting it, is not theft after such an humane pre­cept or permission, nor any breach of the eighth Command­ment. And the self-same Action (for the matter of it) which would be Murder before commanded by humane Authority, and a violation of the sixth Command, is afterward neither Murder, nor any breach of that Command. And therefore by good proportion I may add, that the self-same action, which was scandal in property of speech before commanded by hu­mane Authority, is no such scandal afterward, nor any violation of those precepts of the Apostle, which the Authors cite. The Reason is, because that scandal, which is forbid by the Apostle, lies in an indifferent action: So it might be scandal before com­manded by the Magistrate, because indifferent; but it is not scandal after commanded, because made necessary by the divine Law requiring obedience to Rulers, which Law binds in parti­cular upon the Emergency of an humane Law. To make this answer most plain: If I should drive away my neighbours Cat­tel, and convert them to my own use, or to another mans, this were Theft, and a sin against the eighth Commandment. But then there comes the command of a lawful Magistrate, which makes me a Constable or other Officer, and binds me to strain them, and convert them to the use he prescribeth: this is no theft, nor any breach of the eighth Command, though the Action be the same materially; for I drive away the same Cattel. Nay if there be no command, but only a Permission, the case is the same: For if my Neighbours goods be confiscated and given to me, I may do the same Action, and yet be guiltlesse of theft. In like manner for John, being a private man, wittingly and willingly to kill Thomas, or to cause him to be killed, this is murder, and a sin against the sixth Command: But for John, being a Sheriff, and receiving a humane injunction to kill Tho­mas, so to do is no Murder, nor any breach of the sixth Com­mand. So then I need not make such a silly interpretation of the Precepts of the Moral Law, as the Authors suppose ne­cessary to defend my Cause. I need not argue thus; The Command saith, Thou shalt not steal, i. e. unlesse thy Supe­riour command thee. But rather thus, Thy Superiour com­mands thee to do that action, which would be stealing otherwise; but in that he commands it, it is no stealing. In this Instance [Page 74] the very Appellation and name is altered with the Nature of the thing, meerly by the Magistrates Command, nothing else inter­vening de novo: But in other cases also, though the name be retained, yet the nature of the Action is changed; so that whereas before it was contrary to the Moral Law, now it is made agreeable to it. For examples sake, let us read the sixth Commandement, as the last Translation hath Englished it; Thou shalt not kill: The Sheriff doth that Action, which is called killing, and yet breaks not that Commandment, be­cause th s killing which he doth, is not of the same kind with that which is forbid in the sixth Command. And wherein lyes the difference but in this? That the Moral Law forbids a private man to kill without publick Authority: But the She­riff kils by vertue of a power so to do, derived to him from humane Laws. In the case under hand, Do no action, saith Saint Paul, that may give offence: I am commanded by the Magistrate to do an action, which is otherwise lawful, but giveth offence; I do the action, and yet I break not the Apo­stles precept, because it is not such an offence as he means, though it go under the same general name, as the Act of the Sheriff and of the private man doe. For Saint Paul means (as the Authors Confesse) an offence taken from an action which in other respects and antecedently to the offence I might do or not do: But in this case my action is no such; it is not an action which I might either do or leave undone antecedently to the offence; but I was bound in conscience to do it, if no offence had been taken, and that by the Command of God, requiring obedience to the Magistrate, and therefore the duty being necessary antecedently to the offence in order of nature, yea and in order of time too, the falling out of the offence cannot warrant the omission of it, much lesse oblige to the said omission.

SECT. IV.

Conformity is not in its own Nature so scandalous as Diffor­mity, both in provoking Distast, and in laying stumbling-blocks in the way of the weak. The Ministers Reasons make as much against the Oath of Allegiance as the Common-prayer. It is absurd to offend the Magistrate, that they may avoid the offence of private men. Their Reply to this is but a meer begging of the Question, and betraying their cause.

IN the next place they describe the scandal which they say would be taken at their reading of the Common-Prayer, and make it consist in two particulars. (1.) That people would scorn and vilifie them, and withdraw themselves from communion with them; And (2.) That they would be encouraged by the examples of these Ministers to do the like, although not convin­ced of the lawfulnesse of so doing, and so sin against their own consciences. But I reply to them thus: As for the first part of the scandal, supposing that you are satisfied of the lawfulnesse of using the Common-prayer, and have nothing to say against it but the scandal (as the supposition is made by your selves upon this Argument) I say, supposing your selves thus satis­fied, then the people have more cause to vilifie you, and with­draw themselves from your communion on the other hand for disobeying those to whom God hath commanded you to sub­mit your selves. This hath evidently more appearance of evil in it then the other: I mean disobedience hath much more ap­pearance of evil in it then obedience, and consequently is much more scandalous in its natural tendency, and more apt to give offence of this first kind; that is, to procure a disrepute and contempt among men who stand not on their heads, and have not their Opticks inverted. May be men will take a pretence from your conformity to call you Time-servers, Men pleasers, and the like. But they may much more reasonably take an occasi­on from your Non-conformity (supposing your selves are sa­tisfied of the lawfulnesse of conformity, were it not for the scorn which attends it) to accuse you of a far greater sin, which the Scripture parallels with that of Witchcraft. If therefore you stick on your credit, you should rather fear a greater re­proach, [Page 76] to which you give not only a greater pretext, but also a real cause; then a lesse reproach, to which you yield a lesse pretence, and no real cause at all. For though people (at least those whose votes you most regard) are more apt to vilifie where there is lesse cause, then where there is more; yet you ought more to fear the giving cause of reproach, then to be reproached: And besides, who knows how soon their minds may be turned? For we see how men alter in their opinions about Religion; and then may be they will reproach you for omitting of that which now they would reproach you for do­ing. And as for the second part of the scandal, you may by your example as much encourage some to sin against their con­sciences, by not using of the Common Prayer as by using it: For why may they not be as well-emboldned to Non conformi­ty with a doubting conscience by your example, as you think others will be encouraged to Conformity by the same example? In case they be, you lead them into a far greater sin: For to conform purely in imitation of you, is their sin only because they do it with a doubting conscience; But the contrary is a sin without any respect to the said doubts. If it be said that there are none, or but a few of such Persons whom these Mi­nisters ought to regard that scruple the Lawfulnesse of Non-conformity; and therefore that there is no danger they should be led into sin that way: I answer, that the Peoples Non-conformity is a sin, whether they do it doubtingly or no; and the Ministers practice doth confirm them in this sin, and hinder them from doubting of it, that so they might leave it. Yea though the People think it lawful to disobey the Act for the Common Prayer; yet they are very wild indeed, if they think without any scruple that they may violate other Acts: But now seeing their Ministers to break one act as well as themselves, they will the more easily be carried on in their Error, till they come to think they may break others also, And how the contempt of Laws hath proceeded by degrees from one to another, till the most fundamental Laws were overturned, we have seen by late and lamentable experience. And it is no wonder: For the very same Arguments which are brought against the use of Common Prayer, do serve as much against the taking of the Oath of Alle­giance; For a Form of words in Prayer is there imposed, since an oath is an invocation of God, and so are significative cere­monies: [Page 77] which the first Argument of this book, which I oppose, pronounceth unlawful. Again, such words, actions and gestures are there used in divine worship (for such is an oath) which were used by Idolaters; and this is pronounced unlawful by their second Argument. And lastly, to take the Oath of Allegiance, is scandalous and offensive to many of the weak Brethren which are offended at the Common Prayer; and therefore it ought not to be taken, if the third Reason was of any force, which is under my present examen. And I cannot let this passe without putting this question, Should a man refuse to take the Oath of Allegiance when required thereto, because others are offended at it? I hope the Authors will allow such an offence (how ma­ny or how good soever the Persons are that are offended) to be inconsiderable. And yet it cannot be denied that the thing is indifferent in it self, and only made necessary by humane Laws: For till the Law was made, no man was bound to take that Oath. Therefore, since humane Laws have force in this case to make that action lawful which many are offended with, they must needs have the like force in the case of the common Prayer, supposing it to be indifferent; save only for the scandal, which the Authors do suppose, and yet will not grant what is so evi­dently inferred from the Hypothesis.

With no better successe do the Authors make an Essay to overthrow another answer, which is usually given to this Rea­son of theirs, pag. 110. Whereas we are told that we offend many others, yea and those our Superiours too, because we do not do it; We answer, we are not willing to offend any, much less our Superiors: but if we be brought to this strait, that we must either offend God or men, the choice is not difficult. By these words they must needs signifie, that to do it is to offend God; and so they beg the questi­on, and are gone quite beside their present Argument, which sup­poseth the action indifferent, were it not for the offence which is taken at it, and that God is offended only because men are of­fended. Yea that is the Reason which themselves give in their very next words, wherefore God would be offended by their use of the Common Prayer, viz. because some men would be offend­ed. The question is, whether God would be offended by the use of the Common Prayer: To prove he would, they urge the offence of some men: To this it is replied, that others more to be con­sidered, are offended by their not using it: They answer its true; [Page 78] But God is offended by the using of it: and that is the very question, and so their Reason runs in a most ridiculous round. Therefore the comparison which they make, is sophistically sta­ted betwixt the offending of God by the use, and the offending of so me men and their Superiors by the Non-use. The compa­rison should be made between the offending of some men by the use, and the offending of other men by the Non-use; yea between the offending of Private men by the use, and the of­fending of our Superiors by the Non-use. And thus the force of arguing in those words which the Authors pretend to an­swer, stands firm. For how can it be supposed that God should be offended with their offending of some by reading the Com­mon Prayer, rather then that he should be offended at their offending of others by not reading it? Yea who can conceive that God should be offended at their offend­ing of private men by using the Common Prayer, and not be offended rather at their offending of Superiors by not using it, supposing the thing otherwise indifferent, as they sup­pose in this Argument: So that the only thing to be considered, is, which of the two offences is the most weighty; that of some, or that of others; that of private men, or that of the Ma­gistrate: For look which offence is most considerable, God is most offended with that offence. And no doubt it is a greater offence for a Servant to offend his Master by not doing an in­different action which his Master bids him do, then to offend a fellow-servant by doing it: And there is the same Reason of offending a Magistrate, rather then a fellow-subject. Therefore the comparison which they make betwixt offending God and offending the Magistrate, will be much more odious, if it be made betwixt the offending of God who requires obedience to the Magistrate, and the offending of some inferiour Persons who dislike this obedience in this case. Thus the Authors have underpropt this their third Reason taken from scandal, till they have made it fall down. They confesse their Argument cannot be made good without supposing that God is offended at the use of the Common-Prayer as well as men: They confesse that men are offended on one side, as well as on the other; and so the case is at least equal on both sides: They are forced for their last refuge to fly to the unlawfulness of using the common pray­er, whosoever be offended; and so they fly from this Argument, by [Page 79] which they undertook to prove that the Liturgy is not to be used because of scandal, though in all other respects it were never so law­ful: since therefore themselves have relinquished the Fort, I may well withdraw my Battery.

CHAP. IV.

SECT. I.

Their fourth Reason from the Covenant, answered, (1.) Sup­posing that Oath a lawful one, it can at most but bind them to endeavour the repeal of the Act for Common prayer, and that only by lawful means; But it doth not free them from the obli­gation of it while in force. (2.) Conformity is not inconsistent with endeavours to root out Superstition, or (3.) To promote the power of Godliness. Thetr Oath could not make Forms unlawful, if they were indifferent before. The New light they talk of, not comparable to the old. Their Argument [That the establishment of the Liturgy by Law is not pleadable against the Covenant] answered. And what they urge from Numb. 30.

THe Title of their Fourth Reason, in the tenth chapter of their book, is this, Because they have sworn to endeavour a Reformation in worship, and to endeavour to extirpase super­stition, and what hindreth the Power of God­linesse. Suppose that Oath wete lawful to be taken, why may they not keep so much of it as here is recited, notwithstanding the use of the Com­mon Prayer? For (1.) If it were granted that the worship prescribed in the Liturgy did need a Reformation; yet they may endeavour such a Reformation, and use the worship pre­scribed as it is, till it be altered; since nothing unlawful is pre­scribed, [Page 80] though we suppose a Reformation might make it more expedient: Even as the Judges and Lawyers may endeavour a Reformation of the Laws, and yet proceed according to the le­gally setled course, till it be legally altered. Their Oath on such a supposition binds them to endeavour that they may be free (and yet to endeavour by the use of lawful means only) from the imposition which lies on them: But it doth not remit or re­lease them while they stand bound. (2.) They may endeavour to root our Superstition, and yet use the Common Prayer, since no superstition needs to be committted in the use of it. For if there did, sure these Authors would have proved it; which they do not, as hath been made to appear already. Yea their main charge with this weapon amounts to no more but this ti­morous and partial supposition; Nor possibly is it clear to every one, that there is nothing in those Forms of worship savouring of Superstition. But I may retort, nor possibly is it clear to every one, that there is nothing savouring of Superstition in the Directory made by the Assembly; or in any other that can be made. And when they question whether there be Nothing savouring of Superstition in the Common Prayer, they seem to confesse that all things there savour not of Superstition. If then they would use so much of it, omitting that one thing which possibly some doubt to be superstitious, they would expresse a more moderate and peaceable Spirit. Neither (3.) Is the use inconsistent with the third point of their oath, to endeavour to promote the Power of Godliness: since obedience to the Ma­gistrate in lawful things, is so far from being inconsistent with it, that it is most necessary thereto.

They proceed in the same page to tell us that if heretofore they looked on the use of those forms as indifferent, surely the oath which they have taken, puts it into another capacity. But that cannot be, both because in the former Section I proved it consistent with their Oath so far as they quote it; and also be­cause that which was before the oath thought by themselves indifferent in it self, was at the same time necessary in its use, be­ing commanded by Act of Parliament; and therefore being in truth necessary, and not then apprehended by themselves as un­lawful, it could not be dispensed with, much less rendred un­lawful by the following Oath. For if it could, a man might evade every Act of Parliament about indifferent things with a [Page 81] safe conscience: It is but swearing that he will not do what the Act requires; and so according to this doctrine that which is commanded, though lawful before the Oath, is put into another capacity after. They add, It is no wonder though their judgements be altered, and they hold the use now to be unlawful, considering how much Light hath shone into the World in that space of time. But I wonder in what Horizon that Light dwells, since for ought I can find by my best enquiry, the ancient Divines were more moderate and clear in their positions; and the Mo­dern Divinity (like the Book which goes under that name) hath only strained the several Points of our Religion into ab­surd extremities; and run out of one Errour into ano­ther.

In the sixth Section of the Chapter under animadversion, they say that the establishment of the Common Prayer by Law, is not pleadable against the Covenant agreed upon by Lords and Commons legally assembled in Parliament; though contrary to some former Act of Parliament. But let the Lawyers say, whether the Lords and Commons without the Kings consent can bind by oath (or give permission) to do any thing contrary to a former Act of Parliament, while it is not repealed. For whereas they add, that the Covenant was so far ratified by the King, as unquestionably in conscience would suffice to discharge any that shall keep it: I know what Ratification they mean. Indeed in their next Section they seem somewhat to explain their mind, urging Numb. 30. where they say, God expresly deter­mines the Oath established for ever, if the Husband of the Wife, or Father of the child, either at first consented, or did not pre­sently dissent, but hold his peace. But let Histories and the Me­mory of men speak, whether the King consented, or did not dissent, but held his Peace. Besides, his consent might warrant an Oath taken to do something that was lawful before, which is the case in Numbers: but if the Wife, or Child, or Subject swear to do any thing contrary to any Law in force, the con­sent of the Husband, Father, or Soveraign cannot ratifie that Oath, but it is dissolved by its own Principles. Now such is the Covenant, if it were contrary to any former Act of Parlia­ment, as the Authors themselves make the supposition in this case; and therefore so far as I could ever learn, the Lords and Commons with the consent of the King could not ratifie it [Page 82] without an Act disannulling the former Act, to which it is sup­posed to be contrary. But I dismiss this their Fourth Reason, ho­ping that the Burning of the Covenant since hath saved me the labour of any further exanimation.

SECT. II.

Their Other Reasons answered. (1.) Their pretence against the perfection of the Common prayer, since it is more perfect then the Directory. None can be perfect. And it is lawful to use an imperfect Good. (2.) what they except against the Matter of the Liturgy. And (3.) against Particular prayers for every day, dividing the Service between Minister and People, and the Number of short prayers.

I Shall add as an Appendix to this Chapter, a Reply to the Authors eleventh Chapter, containing other Reasons why di­vers Ministers are not satisfied concerning the use of the Common Prayer, and to their twelfth, entituled, A summary recapitu­lation of the Ministers Reasons.

And first they accuse the Common Prayer of imperfection thus: Surely none can say that take the Ordinary Prayers appoint­ed to be read every morning-Prayer or Evening-Prayer, they do contain all things requisite to be confessed or petitioned for. But a little use of unbiassed consideration would have easily promp­ted them with this triple solution. (1.) The Prayers appoint­ed for every Morning and Evening Prayer are palpably more perfect then any appointed for those times by the Directory: For that prescribes none at all to be used every Morning and Evening. And besides, the Letany which is appointed to be read thrice a week, is a more perfect prayer then I believe ever was any put up extempore. For I will appeal to any man, how seldom he hath heard this most necessary Petition used in an extempore Prayer, which yet is in the Liturgy, viz. Forgive our Enemies, Persecutors, and slanderers, and turn their hearts. (2.) If they would have every particular sin confessed, and good thing petitioned for explicitly and expresly in prayer, they would allow no room for Preaching, which they declaim against in others: For to utter such a Prayer, would take up a [Page 83] whole day. Wherefore then do they argue from the imper­fection of the Common Prayer, that it is unlawful to use it? since their own prayers are more imperfect then it; and though a Prayer may be made more perfect, yet still it must be imperfect, except it shoulder out Preaching. (3.) What though the Common Prayer be not perfect? what is that to prove a man may not use it? May not a man use a Bible where much is torn out? or make a Petition for his Life, except he says all which can be said, and forgets or omits nothing? A good thing may be used, though it be imperfect; as an hand which hath lost a finger. Otherwise these Ministers should discard their own Sermons; since they must confesse with Paul, that they prophesie but inpart.

(2.) They next argue from the Matters of some things in the Liturgy, which in their judgement is not so approveable. But I wonder where they ever heard or spake a Prayer wherein were not some things not approveable in their own judge­ments, at least in the judgements of others. Take the best extempore prayer that they have ever made, and let it be copied out and published, and be extant an hundred years together, and in all mens hands for every body to pick a fault in it; and let it be the interest of the examiners to find it faulty: and no doubt but they will find many things not so approveable in their Judgements. But let us see the particulars of the Liturgy, which in their Judgement are not so approveable. They name two. (1.) That they understand not how they can say to God eight days together, that he sent his Son to redeem us as upon that day, nor yet as to any particular day. For satisfaction in this point, let us make use of the Method so much commended by Socrates in Plato, who saith, That comparing, and as it were colliding two parallel cases, we may easily make the justice of that which is under enquiry, to flash forth as light from the attrition of two flints. And the Parallel which I shall present to this purpose, is the Jewish Passover. Let it be supposed first (what the objection seems to intimate) that Christ-mass day (when the words are to be used which are disliked) hath not exactly the same place in the Revolution of the Solar year which the day on which Christ was born, had. No more (some years) did the day on which the Jews began the Pas­sover, agree with that whose deliverances occasioned it, as [Page 84] any man will grant, who holds Saint Austins reason to be good, viz. The Ecclipse of the Sun at the death of our Saviour was in the Time of the Passover; ergo in the full moon. And as our Liturgy annexeth to the twenty fifth of December seven suceeding dayes to make up the same Feast; so besides the night wherein the Paschal Lamb was killed, when unleavened bread began to be used, The Feast of unleavened bread continued se­ven dayes in remembrance of those deliverances which were wrought for the Israelites in the night of the fourteenth day of the Moneth Abib: All which days being appointed for one solemnity, may be well termed one day of thanksgiving. For how else could that self same day wherein the Israelites were brought out of Egypt, be possibly observed seven days together, as it is commanded Exod 12.17. These things being considered, let any reasonable man judge whether the Isra­elites (not only on the first night, but also on the seven fol­lowing dayes) might not very lawfully say in their Anniversary Thanksgivings, Lord, we thank thee for delivering us from the destroying Angel, and from Egypt, as upon this day. For the sense is notoriously known to be figurative, if there had been never a quasi exprest. Now that which is false in one sense, is not only true in another, but it hath not as much as the shew of an Aequivocation to speak it, if the sense be notoriously known. Besides, it may as well be said, that God sent his son for eight dayes together, as that his Mother was puerpera, for a moneth. (2.) That they understand not how we can pray in Faith to be delivered from lightning, and tempest, and sudden death: And yet they add, that they can understand how we may pray for deliverance from these Judgements, if it be the Lords will; and so in the same breath they grant what they deny. For that condition is as notoriously included in all prayers for temporal blessings, as homo is understood in quidam. Did not the Saints in the Old Testament pray for children? and is it not usual in extempore prayers to beg temporal blessings without expressing the condition? But any Argument will serve them to delude silly people, though it make as much against themselves.

(3.) They add, that the spirits of sober People are no wayes Reconcileable to the Liturgy, who cannot understand what founda­tion is either in Scripture or right Reason for using particular [Page 85] prayers for every day, or dividing the entire service of God be­twixt Ministers and People, or for using so many shreds or ends of Prayer, or repeating the Lords Prayer so often. But these sober People give no testimony of their sobriety by their irreconcile­ableness to that which it good, meerly because their own Eyes cannot see any ground for it in Scripture or Reason. If they were wise to sobriety, they would conclude that those who have greater abilities, and have more studied the case alone, and debated it in Convocation, may see Reason for those things which they see no Reason for. And as for the Particulars ex­cepted against, those who use extempore prayers, do the same things whether they see a ground for it or no, as will appear by running over the four things instanced in. For (1.) as for using particular prayers for every day, it is accounted the ex­cellency of the extempore faculty to bring a particular Prayer for every day, and not to be guilty of saying the same Prayer any two days. And (2.) as for dividing of the entire service of God betwixt Ministers and People, this is usuallly done in private meetings, where Ministers and Lay-men pray alternis: Yea and in publick too, since the People sing Praises in the meeters of Thomas Sternhold, as well as the Minister, and not only Praises but Prayers too. And as in some places of the Liturgy the People are enjoyned to say after the Minister, so in the foresaid singing they say after the Clerk. (3.) I know not what they mean by the shreds or ends of Prayer which they speak of, except it be the several Prayers appointed to be read in the Liturgy; which possibly they would have put all into one long and continued Prayer. If that be their mind, they seem to forget themselves. For pag. 44. they commended Variety of prayers. And why may not many Prayers be said at one and the same assembly, as well as at several? And yet they are very earnest for this last. Yea they themselves if they follow the Directory, use three prayers at the same assembly; one before they read, another before they preach, and a third after. And in extraordinary daies one Minister comes with one Prayer, another with a second, and a third with a third, and so forth. Yea the several Petitions put up in every prayer, may as well be called shreds and ends of prayer, as the several collects and short ejaculations of Morning and Evening-Prayer, Leta­ny, or Communion-service. (4.) As for the repeating of the [Page 86] Lords prayer so often, it is repeated twice in some Churches at the same Assembly where no Common Prayer is admitted. Now if it be lawful to repeat it twice, why not thrice? Yea where the Lords Prayer it self is ejected, thete are frequent iterations of new-coyned Petitions. We know it is so where but one man is the speaker especially in a long prayer; but much more in a Fast, when four or five succeed one another, not only in long Prayers, but for one and the same thing.

SECT. III.

(4.) They aggravate their Argument from scandal; from the loosenesse of many of the Persons who are for the Liturgy. Four Answers given to this charge. (5.) Another of their considerations is, that the Liturgy is made an Idol, which is re­torted on their own Party. Those which have a true esteem for the Liturgy, cannot disesteem Preaching.

(4.) THey next aggravate their Argument from scandal by this consideration; Many of the persons offended at our forbearance of the Liturgy, are not of the stricter, but looser sort of Prefessors, such at his Majesty hath stigma­tized in his Proclamation, as vitious, profane and de­baucht persons, Drunkards, Tavern-haunters, Swea­rers. But I answer (1.) That the Qualifications of the Champions or Assertors, are but a deceitful Rule to try a cause by. For sometimes good men may have a private inte­rest against a duty, and bad men none. Sometimes those who are under an habit of general vitiousnesse, may do something right; yea Herod did many things: And on the other hand a sanctified person may do something wrong. If we should judge of a cause by the Adherents, Christ himself should be condemned, since owned by the Devil, and denied by Peter. The receiving of the Sacrament at night should be the most ap­provable celebration, since practised by the Anabaptists, and not by the Papists: except these Ministers prefer a Papist before an Anabaptist. There are many high and Heroick pieces of justice, clemency, and fidelity acted by the Heathens, which many that have the name of precious Christians are impatient [Page 87] of: Are these things the worse for that? In like manner, if the foresaid stigmatized persons yeild a better obedience to the Magistrate then others of a contrary quality, the difference of the persons is impertinent to the Question, The Authors should Parcere person is, dicere de vitiis; not speak of the viti­ousnesse of the persons, which are for the Common-prayer, but whether it be a vice to be for it; nor of the vertues of those which are against it, but whether that opposition be any of their vertues. (2.) Desinant maledicere, malefacta ne noscant sua. They say, that many, who are for the Liturgy, are Drunkards, &c. and so are many which are offended at the use of it, and some such as curse and swear against it in the open Church. (3.) A very great, if not the greatest part which are against it, if they are not drunkards, &c. yet they are much worse, and such as blaspheme their vertues by entertaining them in a den of most beastly vices; of whom I may say, Horum temperantia male habitat. Persons which are notoriously malicious, and envi­ous, and seditious, traytours, heady, high minded, Quakers, Ranters, and the like, it is these mens cause which this book patronizeth. I will not add into the catalogue the Anabaptists and Independents, though some of the Presbyterian Brethren have publickly charged the more sober Sect of the two to have done more hurt then all the Drunkards and debaucht persons in the Land. But methinks this Argument of theirs was suffici­ently retorted by that horrible Insurrection, which was made at London last Christmas. For if it be asked, Who were those in­humane and diabolical persons, who rose up to murder man, woman, and child, in such a manner, that no ink is black enough to represent it! the answer must be, that these were some of those, which are so impatient of the Common-prayer. (4.) Let those which are for the Liturgy be never so bad, and their op­posites never so good, yet since the use of it upon the com­mand of the Magistrate is a necessary duty, it ought not to be forborn out of fear of offending, no not the better sort, as hath been sufficiently evinced. And therefore this conclusion of theirs is a very frivolous one, viz We cannot think it lawful for us to scandalize the far greater number of strict Christians, that we may gratifie a few others, &c. For it is not to gratifie others, but the Magistrate and the Laws; or rather to gratifie right reason and conscience, in complyance with that plain Command [Page 88] of God, Obey those that rule over you in the Lord, and submit your selves.

5. They add another consideration to the like purpose, That that sort of people, who are most zealous for the Liturgy, do so dote upon it, that it is clearly become their Idol. Possibly it may be so with some: For every one is for their own form and way of worship, and need the counsel of Saint Ambrose to Monica, to follow the custome of the Church she comes to. But are not the Non-conformists as much for their way, and make as much an Idol of extempore Prayers (many of them thinking a mans prayers cannot be accepted, unlesse not premeditated) yea and with much lesse reason, since those Prayers are some­times forbidden, but the Liturgy is sometimes commanded? But I cannot believe what they subjoyn, since both my observation and reason evidence the contrary, viz. With many people we see it demonstrably true, that if a Minister did never preach the Word of God, yet if he did but read the Common-prayer, it would be enough. My reason wherefore I believe not this testimony (to say nothing of my experience, which is quite contrary) is this, because the Liturgy prescribes Sermons, and therefore whoso­ever hath an high esteem of the Liturgy, must needs care for Sermons. But however it be with many people in that respect, what doth the Minister contribute to all this by reading the Common-prayer? which is the thing they should have de­monstrated. Certainly no more then he, who sets two dishes of wholesome meat before a man that likes one better, is the Reason why the other is neglected or possibly not touched. I would fain know, how the joyning of Prayer with Preaching, according to the Liturgy, doth nurse the people up in this con­ceit, that preaching is needlesse?

SECT. IV.

Both Precept and Example are alledged for Forms, though neither is necessary. Their Reasons [wherefore its lawful to use the Lords Prayer, and yet not the Common-prayer] refelled.

I Now proceed to the twelfth Chapter, entituled, A summary recapitulation of the Ministers Reasons; where they argue against limiting our selves to a form of Prayer, because they can find no precept for it in the word of God. But that is notori­ously false. For the Prophet saith, Take unto you words and return unto the Lord, and say unto him, Take away iniquity, &c. And I have already proved the same from the titles of Davids Prayers, which clearly speak them appointed, for the use of others. Yea I have proved also, that if the use of a Form be not forbid in Scripture, it is lawful, though there were no pre­cept for it, nor example neither. But I must needs deny what follows, That there is no pattern of it in Scripture, but the Lords Prayer. For I have already produced a Form used by the Pri­mitive Disciples. As for the Lords Prayer, they say, that they doubt whether it were intended for a form of Prayer or no, and rather think it a Direction for the matter of Prayer; one Evan­gelist saying no more then After this manner. But that hin­ders not, but that it might be intended to be said in termes: For he that saith the expresse words, saith After this manner; though he that saith after this manner, doth not alway say the same words. So then he that saith the words, hath both Evan­gelists to warrant him; he that doth not, hath but one. And what though Christ and his Apostles leave no record of their using of this form, which is another thing they urge, where do they leave record of their not using it? which if it were re­corded, would never the more prove the use unlawful. For where do they leave any record of singing Psalms in Rime and Meeter, and other forms of worship, which yet are thought [Page 90] lawful? Indeed this is the Antisabbatarians argument, If the seventh day was sanctified from the creation, then the celebration and keeping of it by the Patriarchs before the giving of the Law would have been recorded. But they have been answered by these Authors, Brethren in non-conformity, That many things may have been done which are not recorded. For all this they add, Yet we doubt not but we may use it in the form; and so put it to an use for which God never intended it. Their Reasons are, (1.) Because it is holy Scripture. But I would fain know a reason why a form of words which are not holy Scripture, may not as lawfully be used as those which are. [...] sure all the phrases or forms of speech, which are used in extempore Prayers, are not holy Scripture. (2.) Because (say they) it is so short, that we may easily get it by heart, and not employ our souls at our eyes by reading, while they should be wrestling with God It seems then, that (whatsoever they said before) though there be no precept or pattern in the Word of God, yet a man may use a set form of Prayer, if it be so short that it may be easily remembred; and that one thing, which they have against the Common-prayer, is, that it cannot be remembred, but must be read. But I answer, that the reading of the Common-prayer, which they disallow, is not such a diversion of the soul from wrestling with God, as the remembring of the Lords Prayer, the use whereof without book they allow. I never knew a man in reading of a Prayer frequently to skip what he intended to say: but I have been told of a man, and that of very great parts, who never offered to say the Lords Prayer in publick but he was out. The employing of the soul at the eye in reading, is nothing so much as her employment in that part of the brain which is the shop of memory, since the characters imprinted on the book are not so easily obliterated and defaced as those instamped on the brain. Let any man tell me, whether his thoughts be not lesse roving from the subject, while he is read­ing a book which he remembers not, then while he is remem­bring a speech got by heart? or whether the soul be not put to more labour by saying it memoriter, then by reading it in a plain print. (3.) They say, that they can use the Lords Prayer, because the divine authority of it is such, as it hath another man­ner [Page 91] of influence on their spirits in using, as all the Scripture hath, then can be pretended for any other forms. But if they mean by this divine Authority they speak of, a divine institution, this cannot be pleaded by them, except they will grant, that Christ appointed us to use these words in prayer, which before they denyed; and therefore I think that not to be their meaning. If by this divine authority they allow to the Lords Prayer, they understand only that the form of words came out of the di­vine Mint, not excogitated by man, but dictated by the Spirit of God; then the same influence may be expected from some other forms, being of divine authority as well as the Lords Prayer, as those in the Liturgy, O Lord open our Lips, save thy people, blesse thine inheritance. But if the Reason wherefore they can lawfully utter the Lord Prayer before God, be the divine authority of it, then something (at least) tantamount to divine authority must be found in the Prayers which they in­vent themselves, that they think it lawful to vent them. For it seems, if the Lords Prayer were not of divine authority, they would not use it. By the same Reason they would not use their own Prayers, if they were not of divine authority, or were not endowed with something of an equivalent credit with di­vine authority. But now their own Prayers are not of divine authority; therefore without doubt the Authors believe some excellency to be in them, which renders them as good and law­ful as if they were. And what is that, but clearly the extempore uttering of them? This is laid in the scales with divine autho­rity, and out-ballanceth it too, as will appear by these two cases compared together. These Authors would not use the Lords Prayer so as to utter the expresse words, if it were not of di­vine authority; but because it is of divine authority, therefore they will. In like manner these Authors would not utter those words, which usually they do in prayer (besides the Lords Prayer) if they were not invented ex­tempore, but dictated by another, or by themselves before-hand; but because they are invented extempore, therefore they will. So that you see extempore invention is as much preferred before divine authority, as their own invented prayers are infe­riour to the Lords Prayer. And now no marvel, though men [Page 92] stickle so much for the liberty of the extempore vein; for so did Alexander for divine honours. How otherwise shall they be deified by the people? If you take away the divine authority of their Prayers, they may complain with Micah, What have we more? (4.) They give this as their last Reason, wherefore though they cannot use other forms, yet the Lords Prayer they can; Because, say they, By the length of it we easily understand, that it was never intended to be used without any other Prayer. But that, which they easily understand, will not enter into the head of a rigid Non conformist whom I know; who, while he stayed in his place, was wont very often to begin at Church with the Lords Prayer, and to joyn no other Prayer with it. Yet if they were all of as easie a conception as these Authors, and agreed in the premises, that the Lords Prayer was never intend­ed to be used alone; yet how doth the conclusion follow thence, that therefore the Lords Prayer may be used, though not the Common Prayer? By this Reason they might more lawfully use the Common Prayer, if they might be suffered to joyn their extempore Prayers with it: But who can conceive that it should be lawful to use a set form, so that it be in com­pany with some other Prayers of their own framing, and yet it should be unlawful to use it alone! For that Prayer, which is bad when alone, can make no better a sound among a pack of good ones then a Goose among Swans. But it seems they compare forms of prayer, as the Wag did the Committee men to Fidlers, as if they were Rogues when single, but in consort with extempore Prayers were Gentlemen-Musicians.

SECT. V.

Their pretence, that no Forms were in use till four hundred years after Christ, answered. Their Arguments from the uselesness of Forms, from the Heresies, Persecutions, and separations, which they cause, and from peoples resting in them, considered and retorted.

THeir next Argument against the Common-prayer is this; Because we cannot find, that there was ever any Forms of prayer used in the Church till four hundred years, or very nigh after Christ. But (1.) they must needs except the Lords Prayer, and many other Scripture Forms. (2.) As for other formes, I have noted at first, that it were needlesse to rake into Antiquity for a Solution of this Question, since they will not stand to the judgement of Antiquity. And therefore I thought it fitter to argue with them upon common and agreed Princi­ples, then upon an Authority which must be demonstrated to them.

They argue thus in their following Section, Because we can­not imagine any use at all of them, or any good they ever did, espe­cially when imposed. This Argumentation is frequently incul­cated; We see no need. What good do they? What use is there? and the like. But take this Argument singly, as it is pla­ced in their Book, and it sounds nothing. For this Argument cannot prove, that a Minister ought not to use the Common-prayer, except it be supposed that he must do nothing (though otherwise lawful) but what himself seeth to be useful and ne­cessary; and by consequence he ought not to conform to the Directory, except he should see the usefulnesse of the several Directions; and so it seems that the Directory bound men not only to a conformity of practice, but also of judgement, which is a much more Tyrannical imposition then that which these Authors so much complain of. But I wonder to see, that [Page 94] those who would be left to the liberty of Practice to do what themselves think best, will not allow others the liberty of their consciences, but would have all men not only to act like them in things lawful, but also to think like them touching the expediency of lawful things. A man knowing it lawful to conform to the Liturgy may do it, and yet keep his judge­ment free, thinking that it might be much bettered and mend­ed; so that though he be bound in his practice, he is left to the liberty of his thoughts. But when a man is required to subscribe the long Confession made by the Assembly of Di­vines, he is bound not only to do what he thinks might bet­ter be undone, but to think that to be true which he thinks to be false. There is no comparison betwixt the imposing of Ceremonies, and the imposing of a Confession of Faith. A man may dislike the Ceremonies, and yet use them; as he that said he would preach with a pair of horns on his head, rather then not at all: But a man that subscribes a Confession of Faith, is at no liberty to dislike it. Now my Observation is this, That those men who are most against the imposing of Ceremonies, are most for the imposition of Confessions of Faith, and complain against the Articles of our Church, because there is not enough cramd into them to choak the swallow of an Arminian. Those who think themselves highly injured, when they are required to wear such a white Garment as others do, in the mean time have the consci­ence to expect that all men should be of the same mind that they are of. But to return to what I said at first, A Minister may lawfully do some things which he knows no use of, were it only to conform to custom, or to gratifie some private persons; supposing that as he knows no good it doth, so he knows no hurt by it neither. But now when a thing of an innocent quality is commanded, there is this Ʋse of it, if there were none else, that by doing this thing we render obedience to our Rulers, which is an high part of our Religion. It is for them to judge, what use and need there is of it, and what good it doth: It belongs to us to en­quire only whether it be lawful. He is a naughty Son or Ser­vant, who will not do a lawful thing commanded by his Father [Page 95] or Master, except himself be informed what good it will do, or what use there be thereof. The Question is, what hurt the use of Liturgies hath done, or is likely to do. And indeed in that place I am now upon, the Authors speak something to this pertinent point, asserting that Liturgies have been the Mothers of Heresies, causing separations, and dreadfull persecutions, and will do so still in Reason. But (1.) How have they caused se­parations any more then Christ (if you understand it of Li­turgies in the general, and not only of naughty ones) only by accident? They should prove that there is in a Liturgy qua­tenus a Liturgy, a natural and proper tendency of it self to cause separations and Heresies, or else they do nothing but ac­cuse the Gospel it self. Who have made the greatest Separa­tions and Heresies among us? those who used the Liturgy, or they who forsook it? Ask the Quakers and Ranters where they began, and they will tell you. (2.) As for Persecutions, what the imposing of Liturgies hath done to raise them, is no­thing to the Question: For the Authors pretend to give Rea­sons wherefore a Minister may not use them when imposed, not wherefore Rulers may not impose them. Now a Minister may use that which a Magistrate may not impose; as I have shewed already, & could do it in an hundred undeniable instan­ces. It is most certain indeed that some men have been persecu­ted for the use of the Liturgy: but without their fault, and only by men of the same mind with the Authors. If any others have been persecuted for not using it, such instances assist not this their Argument, but make against it: For they should shew how the using of it, and not how the not using of it doth raise persecutions. But for my part I cannot see how such Persons who use it not, can be said to be persecuted while no other Mulcts are inflicted on them, then what are established by the sanction of the Laws; unlesse by Persecution we understand Prosecution: For so I confesse, not only they, but many a Thief and other Law-breakers have been perse­cuted.

The next Argument which hath not been already fully an­swered, is in their eighth Section; Because the Generality of those given up to all manner of loosness, are impatient for it, and [Page 96] rest in it; it is as the Papists beads to them, and they care for no other worship of God: and we conceive it far from our duty to har­den any in what we know is their sin and wickedness. To which I answer, That any persons care for no other worship of God, then what is prescribed in the Common-prayer-Book, it is no wonder; since all is there prescribed, Prayer, Reading, Singing, Preaching, Sacraments. If they mean that they care only for the Prayers, and not for the preaching: what they say, cannot enter into my faith, no not in a dream; and I have given the Reason of my disbelief already. If any rest in the common prayer, they should be taught better; as those which rest in afternoon Sermons, or extempore prayers, who place their Religion in them, and think that a man cannot pray in the spirit, if he pray by a Form. Why do not the Authors fear to harden such Persons in their sin by their example? Certain­ly those which think the Common-prayer may lawfully be used, saving for fear of scandal, ought sometimes to use it, were it only for this Reason, that their Example might not tempt weak Christians to think Religion consists in Non-confor­mity, as many do, restraining the name of Christians, the Godly, the Brethren, to the Non-conformists. For such an opinion wrought or confirmed by such an Example, would prove by much a more grievous scandal, then that which the Authors pretend to be so tender of; since there is more Reason for a man to rest in conformity, then in Non-con­formity: For the former is a piece of obedience performed to the Moral Law, Honour thy Father; but the latter is dis­obedience thereto.

SECT. VI.

The impertinency of pleading that the Liturgy is pressed on them out of Malice. Such a supposition makes ra­ther for Conformity. Their scruple at the obsolete words, dubious phrases, and antique Responds, answered. Their Conclusion, and mine.

THey produce another Reason wherefore they cannot use the Common Prayer in the next Section, in these words, Because we are assured in our consciences that very many of those who are earnest for it, presse the use of it upon no other account, then from a principle of Malice against Gods Ministers and People. But I think there was never seen a more feeble objection brought in a case of so much moment. For may not good and necessary duties be pressed out of Malice? Was not the solemn League and Covenant accounted a good and necessary duty? and yet upon many a man was it pressed out of Malice by those who thought he would not take it, and so they should have advantage against him. Is not the taking of the Oath of Allegiance a good and necessary duty? and yet possibly it may be pressed upon some out of Malice. The truth is, this Argument taken from Malice is so far from making against conformity, that it makes strong­ly for it. For by how much the more the Enemies of these Ministers watch for their fall, and desire a just occasi­on against them; so much the more careful they should be to give them none, but conform to the Laws, and stop the mouths of their ill-willers by an orderly and peace­able conversation.

In their next Section they say they cannot use the Com­mon Prayer, because it is full of obsolete words, dubious phrases, antick Responds. But (1.) As for the Obsolete [Page 98] words, I have heard that there is an intention of reforming them. However there are the like in Sternholds and Hop­kins translation, and yet probably these Authors do sing them with their People. Besides, these obsolete words are not so hard to be understood, as many which the Assembly hath put down in their childrens Catechism; and may be all interpreted to the meanest capacity in one Sermon, and the hour better spent then often it is. And so may (2.) The Dubious phrases, though I believe there is hardly made an extempore prayer which for the length of it hath not as many dubious phrases; especially if capti­ously examined as long as our Liturgy hath been. (3.) If by Antick Responds they mean Ancient; what hurt is there in that? Can these Authors use nothing that is an­cient? why then do they quarrel at Innovations? If by Antick they mean foolish and ridiculous; they should remember that it is with modes, forms, fashions, and ceremonies, as it is with other things: secundum modum Recipientis, salves all. That which is foolish and ridiculous to one, is grave and wise to another. Broad-brim'd Hats are ridiculous generally, when out of fashion, and so are narrow ones when the others have been used awhile. If the Authors and the rest of their minds would but unanimously use these Responds, the seeming antickness and ridiculousnesse in the Eyes of some at present would quickly be worn out. But therefore men think the fashion ridiculous, because it is not worn by such Persons as they most esteem.

The Authors add in the same Section, that the Method of the Common Prayer (through the whole) is like to none in any reformed Church in the World. But I wonder that the Church of England should be so inconsiderable a part of the Christian world, that she must go to other Churches, and not they rather come to her. I am sorry that Divines of se­veral forraign Churches have spoken much more reverently of our Liturgy, then the Authors.

They conclude, This is the sum of our Apology: alway re­serving to our selves further liberty of adding any further Ar­guments or Exceptions. Indeed they had need to reserve [Page 99] that liberty; otherwise they have left their cause in a very poor condition. But we may easily see that they are so far from seeking satisfaction in these disputes to their present doubts and scruples; that they are purposed to study and devise new Cavils, when these are answer'd. And therefore I sadly prognosticate, that neither this of mine, nor any other more able attempt will prevail with many such persons; that are rather active then passive in their doubts, and that study more how to fortifie their own Objections, then how to confute them. But if this undertaking may be but so suc­cessful, as to preserve other more indifferent Readers fi [...] being misled by the Reasons whose sophistry I have detect­ed, I am infinitely recompenced for my pains, and can con­tentedly wait on the divine Suada to give a satisfactory an­swer to the Rest.

FINIS.

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