OBSERVATIONS UPON THE WARRE OF HUNGARY.

LONDON, Printed, and are to be sold by Randall Taylor, near Stationers-Hall; and Tho. Newborough, at the Golden Ball in S. Paul's Church Yard. 1689.

THE PREFACE.

THese Observations were written, soon af­ter the Things were done: that is, to­ward the latter end of that Winter, which followed the Taking of Newhausel. And they have now lost much of their Relish: in regard the Actions are less fresh in memory, and the Ide­as of later Events and Accidents have taken pos­session of Mens Minds. But the delay could not be avoided. For in the late Reign they would by no means be suffer'd to be Printed. though they had been severely Garbled by some Friends; and though they were submitted to any further Expurgations; and lastly though nothing could be Objected, against the truth of the Matters here deliver'd. However there were several Written Copies went abroad. Some whereof were perused by the most Eminent in the late Court, and particularly by the French Embassadour. Who freely declared, that he a­greed with the Author in every point. But you [Page]may imagine, those passages were then struck out, which seemed to touch too hard upon his Master the French King; or that Kings Masters, the Jesuites.

Perhaps it may seem presumptuous, to give any Judgment of the Actions of great Men. But the thing well consider'd, it is no more then what every body does. Every body does that in Discourse, which is here done in Writing: that is, He says what he thinks, of such Occurrences as he reads or hears of. They that have the Glory to appear pub­lickly in the Eyes of Mankind, do at the same time come under their Judgment. and as in the common Stages, so in the Grand Theater of the VVorld, the most principal and greatest Actors must undergo the Censure, even of the meanest and most unskil­ful Spectators.

You will say; We cannot give a Judgment of those Actions, of which we do not know the rea­son. But if this hold good, none can judge of Actions, save only They that designed them: for They only have a full knowledge of the Rea­sons. And at this rate, the Lookers on may not dis­like the play of the most bungling Gamester. Also it would hence follow, that all Actions must be e­steemed alike, and we must give an implicit appro­bation [Page]of every thing that's done. So that our Expedition to the Isle of Rè, which (as some think) had as many Errors as Actions, must be thought a piece of as good Conduct, as the Conquest of Egypt by Sultan Selim.

But we do well know that very famous Comman­ders are noted and confest to have had their Mi­stakes. I forbear to enlarge upon this Subject (which it were easie to do) and shall instance only in Pompey: who was one of the greatest Captains that the World hath known. Caesar observes, that he acted unskilfully in the Battel of Pharsalia, when he order'd his Men to stand their ground, and receive their Enemies Charge. whereas plainly it adds Courage to the Soldier, to be in motion and advancing upon the Enemy. But Tully (who pre­tended to judge of few things which he did not well understand) condemns Pompey for fighting at all. Signa tirone & collectitio Exercitu cum Legionibus robustissimis contulit. And he tells us what led him into that Error. Quadam ex Pugnâ (that of Dyrrhachium he means) coepit suis militibus confidere. And then he adds; Ex eo tempore Vir ille summus, nul­lus Imperator fuit. There was yet a greater Error, though no notice be taken of it, which [Page] Pompey committed in this Affair. And that was; That he staid at all in Greece, after that Caesar and his Army were got thither. There he staid, as if he had been tied by some Charme, to be bearded, and besieged, and at last beaten; when, being Master at Sea, and his whole Naval Force being come to him, he might with the greatest ease have crost over into Italy, and have shut Caesar out of it. And nothing could then hinder his March­ing to Rome: where he might have had his full Revenge upon the adverse Faction. Which was the thing he long'd after. For the same Tully writes of him; Animus ejus Sullaturit & Proscripturit jam diu. He that would know the Intrigues of those Affairs, must read Tully.

We must beg pardon of the Illustrious Heroe of Lorrain, if his Conduct sometimes hath not been understood. But this may be said in his Vindica­tion once for all; that there is great reason to be­lieve, that he was too often bound up by strict Or­ders. The giving of which sort of Orders is a thing that hath been always condemn'd, and will be always practis'd. It is a fine thing to sit contri­ving in a Cabinet, and cutting out work for those that must undergo the labour and the danger. But if Princes will have their work well done, (with [Page]the lowest Submission be it spoken); they should either go themselves, or trust those they send. If ever any Council were qualified to manage Wars by particular Orders, it was the Roman Senate: which was composed, for the most part, of Per­sons that had been in high Command. it was in ef­fect a Council or Assembly of Generals. Yet they never took upon them to prescribe to, or direct, the Persons they employed; but left them to their full liberty, to act according to their own Judgment and Discretion.

The Author cannot promise a Continuation of the Work here begun. He hath made some farther Remarks upon things that have happen'd in the progress of this VVar. and he hath imprint­ed them in his Mind. But it is uncertain, whe­ther he will have the leisure to digest them, and to make them fit for publick View. If he do pro­ceed, Prince Lewis of Baden (for any thing yet appears) will be the prime Favourite of those Observations.

OBSERVATIONS UPON THE War of Hungary.

CHAP. I. TECKELY.
Observations.

WHile his Imperial Majesty is engaged in a War with France, by the Instigation of the Jesuits (as it is constant­ly affirmed), who therein served the French Interest, great Severities are used against his Protestant Subjects of Hungary. who till then, and for a long time, had en­joyed the liberty of their Religion, establish'd by Law. but both their Re­ligious, and likewise their Civil Liberties, (as themselves complain) were now invaded and subverted. After extreme Sufferings, and to avoid a total Destruction, the Hungarians take Arms, Count Teckely being their Head: and maintain a War with various Fortune. The Empe­rour concludes a Peace with the French King: and his Forces (now grown stronger in Hungary) having some Successes, impale their Prisoners. The others in Revenge impale theirs. and both sides grow weary of Impaling. But the Hungarians, being press'd very hard, fly to the Turk for Suc­cour. The Grand Signior takes them into his Protection: and in their Quarrel, sends a mighty Army against the Emperour, under his Grand Visier Kara Mustapha. Which the Emperour opposes with all the Force he can make, commanded by the High-born Prince, Charles Duke of Lor­rain.

1. I shall not here meddle with the Justice of the Emperour's or the Hungarians Cause. Since is depends much upon the Constitu­tion of that Kingdom, which I do not pretend to know. That may be just and lawful in Hungary or Poland, which would be very un­lawful [Page 2]in England or France. But surely it is much doubted, whether his Imperial Majesty did well in point of Prudence, to suffer his Sub­jects to be thus provoked, in such Circumstances of Time and Place. It was in a Time, when he had an Enemy upon his Arm, that was rea­dy to swallow up all Europe: and it was in a Place bordering upon the Turks, who are both willing to take, and able to use such Advantages.

2. If the French did secretly incite the Emperour to Severities, and his Subjects to Resistance, it is no great wonder. For they had then a dangerous War with Him and his Confederates: and it is thought no Crime to use all ways and means, to weaken and distract an Enemy. But the wonder is, that the Jesuits would be the Instruments of so great Mischief to his Imperial Majesty, who had so great a Favour for their Order. However this may seem less strange, if we consider that the Jesuits are wise: and regard their Interest, more than their Inclina­tions or Obligations. They know that in great Affairs, Gratitude and good Nature look like foolish things. And therefore they might think fit to forsake, or even to betray, a Prince that loved them; thereby to gratify a Prince that was useful to them. The truth is, they wanted the Power of France, to defend and support them against their great Enemy the Pope. who 'tis thought had much rather see the Jesuits root­ed out of Christendom, than the Protestants out of Hungary. So that as things stood, we must not blame the Fathers, if they could deny no­thing to the French King.

3. By the Impaling the Prisoners, and the Success of it, we may ob­serve; that extraordinary Severities are not to be used to Prisoners of War, where the Enemy is in a Condition to retaliate. Upon the first Revolt of the Hollanders, the Duke of Alva caused all those that he took in fight, to be executed by the hands of the Hangman. But when he saw that the Dutch caused all whom they took, to be executed likewise without mercy; his dire Soul was forced to submit to the necessity of fair War. as Grotius informs us, in his most excellent Belgick History.

4. Count Teckeley is severely censur'd for calling in the Turk to his Assistance. And surely if the Emperour's proceedings were just and good, and Teckeley's Arms unlawful; his joyning with the Infidels was a great aggravation of his Crime. Nor doth the Necessity he was redu­ced to, in any measure excuse him: since it was a Necessity of his own making. As he that hath robb'd a Man, may find a Necessity to kill him too, to prevent pursuit or discovery. Or as Catiline says in the Play;

The Ills that I have done cannot be safe,
But by attempting greater.

On the other side, if the Imperial Ministers did unjustly persecute and oppress; the Necessity was then of their making, and the Conse­quences of it ly at their Doors. For where a Necessity brings Mischief, the Authors of the Necessity are the Authors of the Mischief. And to think it unlawful to joyn with Infidels against Christians in any case whatsoever, is a very great Mistake. For if Merchants be set upon by Christian Pirates, and a Squadron of Algerines come by; who can con­demn the Merchants, if they joyn with those worst of Infidels to pre­serve themselves, and to destroy the Christians that would destroy them? Upon which account the English, at our first trading into the East-Indies, did several times joyn with Mahometans and Pagans against the Portugals.

5. The Grand Visier and the Duke of Lorrain are now enter'd the Lists. And surely it is a noble Sight, when two great Champions are engaged against each other. They draw the Eyes of the whole World upon them, and are the Subject of all Mens Discourses. Many such Pairs have their Names recorded in the Books of Fame. But those are most remarkable, who have had a Tug of some Continuance: whereby they might shew their Play, and give the utmost Efforts of their Skill and Courage. Such were Hannibal and Marcellus, the two elder Scipio's and the two Hasdrubals, Michridates and Lucullus, Pompey and Serto­rius, Caesar and Vercingetorix, Caesar and Pompey. And after them, Ger­manicus and Arminius, Cerealis and Civilis, Trajan and Decebalus. Char­lemain and Wittikind, who fought twelve Battels, may justly claim a room among these famous Combatants. So may Francis the First and Charles the Fifth: who had almost continual Wars, and were brave Captains as well as mighty Princes. To whom may be added, the Great Gonsalvo and Monsieur Lautrec, stiff adversaries in the Wars of Naples: and in the Wars of Piemont, Dom Ferdinand Gonsaga and the Marshal of Brissac. Then follow, Henry the Fourth and the Duke of Parma, Maurice Prince of Orange and Spinola, Gustavus Adolphus and Count Tilly, the same Gustavus and Walstein, Turenne and Montecuculi. Others I omit, and hasten back to the Hungarian War.

CHAP. II. VIENNA.
Observations.

THE Duke of Lorrain being first in the Field, sits down before Newhausel: but upon the Enemies Advance he raises the Siege. [Page 4]And finding himself much over-power'd, he encamps near Raab: upon a River of that name, which there falls into the Danube. The Grand Visi­er comes on: and while his Main Body confronts the Duke, the Tartars tracing the River towards the head, soon find or make their way over. For which great blame is laid upon the Hungarians, who had the Guard of the passages committed to them. But the Duke hereupon draws off to Raab Town, where he divides his Army. Himself and the Cavalry make their Retreat directly to Vienna: being shrewdly ruffled by the Tartars, who fell upon them in their March unawares. The Foot are ordered to pass the Danube, and to march to the same Place, there being Men first drawn out of them, to make up very strong Garrisons for Raab, Comorra, and Leo­poldstat. Ʋpon the Duke's arrival at Vienna (from whence the Emperour and his whole Court were now retired) he marches over the Bridge into an Island of the Danube called St. Leopold, that lies over against the City. This Post he maintains a while: but afterwards deserts it, for Reasons not known, and marches clear away. Moreover his Foot arrive also in good time, and before the Grand Visier could come up with the Main of his Army. Who laid all things aside, and overlook'd all Difficulties, to attacque this Imperial City. The Siege is carried on for two Months with all vigour and violence, and with very great loss of Men. Count Staremberg commanded within the Place, and did well defend it. But however it was brought at last to great Extremities. Then come the Christian Forces, command­ed by the King of Poland, the Electors of Saxony and Bavaria, the Duke of Lorrain and Prince Waldeck: who rout the Turkish Army, and relieve the City. And now Count Teckely desires to submit upon fair terms: but no terms would be given him. whereupon he renews his Alliance with the Turks. The Duke of Saxony marcheth home with his Troops. The rest of the Christian Army advance into Hungary; and take Gran, Lewents, and other places. The Grand Visier, having rallied he remains of his bro­ken Army, and strangled several Bassa's and other Officers for not doing their Duties; is afterward strangled himself, to appease the Rage of the Soldiers and People.

1. IT must be confess'd, that in this beginning of the Campagne, the Duke of Lorrain had a hard Game to play. as all have that must act upon the defensive, against a much over-matching Enemy. But the Duke seems to have dangerously mistaken his measures, in choosing a Post which he was not able to maintain. which brought all things to the utmost hazard. How could he expect that the Tartars (of whom [Page 5]the Grand Visier had thirty thousand) should be stopt by a small short River; that make it their practice to swim over the Nieper, the Niester, and the Danube? Nor let the Hungarians be blamed for not defending the Passes, for it doth not appear how it was possible to be done. Had the Duke strongly encamp'd under the Walls of Raab, and not at that distance he did, which was seven or eight Miles; as he had covered the Country in effect as well, so he had secured his Army much better. And perhaps he had done best, to have posted himself yet more back­ward. What though some Frontier places had been thereby exposed? It had been more advisable to sacrifice a part, than so greatly to en­danger the whole. And this seems to have been the Sentiment of the Marshal of Crequi, when he managed a defensive War against this Duke, in his own Country of Lorrain. He posted himself at once up­on the Moselle: leaving the Saar (as good a Stream as the Raab) and all the Places upon it, with the whole Country between those two Ri­vers, open to the invading Army. Which he thought a less Evil, than to grasp what he could not hold; and thereby put his own Army (upon which the Fortune of France depended) in danger of a hasty and disgraceful Retreat, or perhaps a total Ruine.

2. In the Duke's retreat to Vienna some People are unsatisfi'd with two things. The One is, that as his Troops were marching, the Tartars were upon them and among them, before they were in the least aware of it. Which they think could not be, if the Duke had not strangely want­ed Intelligence in the Emperour's own Country; and if he had taken care to send out his Scouts in due manner, and throughly to discover the ways by which he was to march, as cautious and skilful Generals use to do. The other thing is, that when these Troops were got to Vi­enna, they never turn'd their faces toward the Enemy: but lay in that Island of St. Leopold, as it were without Life and Soul. I confess they might well be daunted with the disgraces and dangers of their Retreat, and the dismal condition of Affairs. But then they should have been made to recover their Spirits by some successful Encounters: of which there were fair Opportunities by the posture the Turks were in. Who came up in scambling Parties, their main Body not arriving till several days after.

3. If the Duke of Lorrain had now a hard Game, sure the Grand Visier had an easy one. He commanded a mighty Force, which had no­thing to withstand or oppose it: the Christian Army being broken up, and as it were quite vanish'd. So that he was now (if I may use an odd [Page 6]Expression) like a Lord in a Hutch; he might turn himself which way he pleased. There was only one Caution to be used; That whereas the Christians had mainly provided for the defence of four Towns, let what will become of the rest; he would for the present forbear medling with those Towns. but every where else he might go on conquering and to conquer: no other place being capable to make resistance. A few Ex­amples of barbarous Cruelty toward those that stood it out (to which the Grand Visier's nature would easily have enclin'd him), and of good usage to those that readily yielded, would in that terror have open'd him the Gates of all those Places. And in humane probability, he might that Summer have subdu'd all the Austrian Dominions on the South side the Danube, the Towns of Raab and Vienna excepted. Or if he would be content with destroying the open Country, he might have done it so throughly in two or three Months time, as not to leave a House standing, nor hardly a Man or Beast living. And in the like space of time he might have serv'd Bohemia so too, and other parts of Germany. It would have been such a Destruction, as never was since the time of Attila. But the Visier's pride and folly and evil Genius, made him leave these advanta­ges and these certainties; to fall upon a strong and populous City, that had a Army in Garrison, that was a hundred Miles within the Enemies Country, and upon a great River which he was not sure nor likely to command on both sides. Nothing could break his Army, nor deliver those Countries out of his hands, but such a Siege

4. As it was a grand Error in the Visier to undertake this Siege, so he committed divers others in the Prosecution of it. In the first place he destroy'd all the Country near him with Sword and Fire: by which means great quantities of Provisions were destroy'd, that should have been preserved for the sustenance of his Army. for want of which, he was fain to supply himself by Convoys from Hungary. Also when the Chri­stians advanced to relieve Vienna, he caused his Men to leave the ad­vantage of their Camp, in which they were strongly fortified, and to meet their Enemies in the open Field. When as the Christians could not stay by it: having no Provisions, wherewith the Turks abounded. More­over when his Army went out to fight, he went not out with them; but shamefully stay'd behind, and kept at a distance. And when they were routed, and fled, he fled with the foremost, as fast as his Horse could carry him. without any offer to rally, or any endeavour to make a Re­treat. His strangling some of the run away Bassa's afterward, did no way purge his own baseness. take them at the worst, they did but fol­low his Example. He therefore seems to have well deserved his igno­minious [Page 7]End: going off the stage inglorious and with the Character of a proud and cruel Coward.

5. I believe most men conclude, that the Emperour did very pru­dently, in retiring from Vienna upon the Enemies Advance: thereby se­curing his own Sacred Person. And I confess the safety of the Prince is a matter of highest Importance. But yet sometimes wise Princes do lay aside the thoughts of securing their own Persons, when all lies at stake. for in such cases, the place of greatest danger is the place where the Prince should be. The Emperour Otho did absolutely ruine his Affairs by securing his Person: and by avoiding present danger, did fall into a total and final Destruction. If the King of Denmark had retir'd from Co­penhagen, when it was set upon by the Swede; he might have secur'd his Person, but he had lost both his City and his Kingdoms. whereas by his Presence, and personal Gallantry, he preserved all. And surely it can­not be deny'd, but that this withdrawing of the Emperour did much weaken Vienna: from whence above threescore thousand People are said to have retired or fled upon that occasion. If it be said, that most of these were an unwarlike Multitude, I will admit they were. But had the Em­perour staid, every Man (and almost every Woman) would have been a Soldier in the presence of his Imperial Majesty. Moreover it had then been easy to defend the Island of St. Leopold: whereby the passage over the Danube had been kept open, and a Communication with all the Countries behind it. Which had made the Emperours stay at Vienna to be much more safe, and likewise much more honourable; than if he had been laid up in a place, which the Enemy might have begirt on all sides.

6. Some think that the Duke of Lorrain, notwithstanding the with­drawing of the Emperour, and of those that went out with him and after him, might well enough have defended the Island of St. Leopold. This Island lies close to Vienna: being made by the Danube, and about four English miles in length. There is a Bridge into it from the City: and from it you pass on, over two other small Islands and three other Bridges, to the most Northern bank of the River: the City standing up­on the most Southern. In the Island first mention'd the Duke placed himself, as hath been related. But he departed thence when the Grand Visier came up with his whole Army; which was seven or eight days after. Concerning which departure I shall set down the words of John Peter a Valcaren, Judge Advocate of the Imperial Army: who hath gi­ven us a particular account of this Siege. and I think it is the best we have. The Duke of Lorrain, saith he, who hitherto remained with the [Page 8]Cavalry in the Island of St. Leopold, and as we thought did not intend to stir from thence, altering his resolution, marched over the Bridges that lead towards Moravia with these Regiments, &c. And afterward he adds; As for those that were besieged, they wished nothing more, than that the Duke would have staid in the Island of St. Leopold: which would have pre­served a free Communication and Entercourse, as well with the Emperour, as with the territories of Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia, and other parts of the Empire, from whence we might have receiv'd Supplies of every thing we needed. This was the opinion of the besieged, who afterward felt those hard. ships, that were brought upon them by the quitting of that place. But how­ever we are not to doubt of the sufficiency of the Reasons, that moved the Duke of Lorrain to hasten his departure thence.

If the Author knew those sufficient Reasons, he did not well to con­ceal them. for it highly concern'd the Duke's honour, that Satisfaction should be given to all men in this matter: whereas now, many remain unsatisfied. For the Duke of Lorrain had his whole Cavalry with him, which could not be less then eight or nine thousand. And there was come to him the Prince Lubomirski with 4000 Polish Horse, and Gene­ral Schultz with 3000 Germans. He had also a great River between him and the Enemy. for though the Danube do there divide it self in­to four Branches, yet every Branch is a large and deep Stream. And of this he had but four English Miles to guard: two above the Ci­ty, and two below it. Then as to Forrage, 'tis hard to believe but that all the one side of the Danube might maintain fifteen or sixteen thou­sand Horse, as well as fifty or sixty thousand were maintain'd by the other.

7. Though the Islands of the Danube were thus unhappily quitted, yet still (the Christians commanding the River, as having all the Vessels both above and below the City); the best and easiest way to relieve it, seems to have been by those Islands. Had Maurice Prince of Orange been now alive, and directed these Affairs, (who as he had all the Arts of War, so particularly he seem'd in his Element when he was amongst great Waters; and both exquisitely knew, and could most dexterous­ly use, all the advantages of commanding them): he would very pro­probably have gone this way, and have done his business without much hazard. The Turks had no Camp on this side, so fortifi'd as that on the other side was. Nor would their vast numbers (particularly of Horse) have stood them in much stead amongst these small Islands. And though they might possibly have defended these their Quarters, yet so great a Force must be upon this Duty, that the Siege must in the [Page 9]mean time have stood still, or at least could not be carried on with re­quisite Vigour. Moreover the Christians might have attempted a Re­lief this way, much sooner than the other. for which they were so long preparing, that the City was in great danger to be lost in the mean time. But the Christian Army went the plain way to work: that is, they cross'd the River, and marched in fair Order along the Southern bank of it, openly and directly upon the Ottoman Camp. And their glorious Success seems to have justified their Counsels. But yet we must bear in mind; that they had certainly miscarried, if their Enemies had not been quite mad; and by a prodigious Error quitted the advantage of their Ground.

8. The Christian Army had such Illustrious Commanders, and so ma­ny great Princes were there engaged in person, that few Armies in the World can shew the like. The King and the two Electors commanded their own Forces, Lorrain commanded the Forces of the Emperour, and Waldeck the Forces of the Empire. And they all did their work substan­tially and bravely. It must likewise be granted, that the Turks on their part left nothing undone for the gaining of their prize; and that they strain'd themselves to the utmost, to take the City before the Relief came up. continuing also to press very hard upon it, even while their Army was routing, and their Camp forcing. Nevertheless if their whole Car­riage of the Affair be well consider'd, we may observe in them more Industry and Pertinacy, than either Skill or Valour.

9. By the raising of Vienna's Siege, and the destruction of the Otto­man Army, the Scene of Affairs was quite alter'd. and the Emperour's Condition was now as high, as it had been low before. He could now think of nothing less, than of beating the Turk out of Hungary, and af­terward out of Europe. which later is the easier of the two. To accom­plish which glorious and dazling Enterprise, it much concern'd him to make up with his own revolted Subjects, upon any reasonable terms. Which the King of Poland, and likewise the Pope himself (as it is confi­dently affirm'd) did advise and exhort him to. The Pope (whom all his actions declare to be a wise man) might well consider, That the gi­ving ease to a few underling Protestants for a time, was an Inconveni­ence of no value: when it would bring with it such vast advantages ano­ther way, and so great an enlargement both of the Emperour's Tempo­ral, and his own Ecclesiastical Dominion. Moreover the Hungarians were now very inclinable and desirous to make their peace. in order whereunto, they made humble and repeated Aplications to his Imperial [Page 10]Majesty. But no Treaty with them would be hearken'd to: and they were given to understand, that they must submit without Conditions. 'Tis true, they had afterwards a Pardon granted them: with a promise to preserve their Civil and Religious Liberties. But the Terror of Vienna was then over: and they had renewed and strengthened their Confede­racy with the Turks: and they were then more hardened against the Emperour. So that Count Teckely and most of the chief Men, and all the strong Places, still refus'd to come in.

The want of a Peace on this side was an infinite prejudice to the Em­perour's Affairs. For the Hungarians, who might have greatly increas­ed his Force, did now much divide and distract it. The King of Poland was not able to make good his Quarters in Upper Hungary, where the Revolters had so many Garrisons. And the Germans, who staid it out, were put upon hard Duty. Also the same disadvantage continued in the two following Campagnes: a great Force being employ'd all along a­gainst the Hungarians. They are at last in a manner totally reduced. But this Work might have been much more difficult, if Teckely's Impri­sonment had not made it easy. And now the Castle of Mongatz, which is the only place remaining, doth still make a considerable diversion, and occasions no small hardships. Another ill Effect was, that soon after the Emperour's return to Vienna, the Duke of Saxony went away home with his Troops, being ten thousand good Men. Which it is believed he did, because the Resolutions against the Hungarians were so severe and inflexible, and because his Intercession for them was rejected.

7. Count Staremberg hath made himself famous to the Worlds end by his gallant defence of Vienna. and he is worthily honour'd for it. But he suffers a little diminution, in the opinion of some Men, by a Letter he wrote to the Duke of Lorrain during the Siege. which was also print­ed and made publick. Herein they are scandalized at it, because it is so abominably Complemental. And truly I could wish, that this Let­ter had not been written. Flattering and fawning doth no way become a Man of Honour; and it also blemishes those to whom it is direct­ed, as if they delighted in it.

CHAP. III. BƲDA. 1684.
Observations.

THE Grand Signior makes Kara Ibrahim Bassa, his Chief Visier; and Cheitan Ibrahim Bassa, his Serasquier or General for the War of Hungary. They get together a sorry Army; most of them being new Men, [Page 11]and as much without Courage as Discipline. The Duke of Lorrain takes the Field about the same time. His first Action is the taking of Vicegrad: which is a Castle upon the Danube, between Gran and Buda. Then he march­es back to Gran; and passing the Danube, he advances toward the Enemy on that side. Part of the Turks Army engage the Imperialists, and are bea­ten. Whereupon the Duke possesses himself of Vacia, abandon'd by the Turks; and he batters and takes Pest, which lies over against Buda. Then he re­passes the Danube upon a Bridge of Boats. The Serasquier retires, leav­ing in Buda fifteen thousand Men: which place the Duke besieges. And be­ing incommoded by the Serasquier, who lay at some distance; he marches a­gainst him with his Horse and Dragoons, (which were about twelve thou­sand), beats him, and routs his whole Army. Then he returns to the Siege, and falls close to battering and storming. By which, and by the Sallies of that rampant Garrison, he soon lost the greatest part of his Infantry. So that now the Siege was at a stand. In the mean while a Peace is concluded in Flanders: chiefly by the Mediation and Labour of the States of Holland. By which means the Germans (whom the Flemish Affairs did much con­cern, and who therefore kept a good Force upon the Rhine) were set free to march into Hungary. This they immediatey do: and particularly the Duke of Bavaria, with a good Army of his own. After these great Reinforcements, the Attacques at Buda are push'd on with all vigour. and on the other side the Turks makes an obstinate defence. The Serasquier mean while rallies and increases his Army. But not trusting to them, he keeps at a distance. However he hinders the Christians, all he can, from having Forage and Provisions. By the want of which, and by the approaching Winter, and by other hardships and difficulties, they are enforced at last to raise the Siege. They draw off without disturbance: their Army being in very ill condition. and being got over the Danube; they abandon Pest, leave a small Garrison in Vacia, and retire to their Winter Quarters. Nor was it long, before Vacia was taken by a party of Turks out of Buda. During these Transacti­ons, General Schultz (in Ʋpper Hungary) takes Count Teckely to task, who holds him hard to it. At last Teckely is surprized: and loses his Baggage, with a good part of his Army. But yet afterward he makes good his Garrisons, and stands his ground.

1. UPon the first Defeat of the Serasquier, and the taking of Pest and Vacia, the Duke of Lorrain was in the same high Condition, that the Grand Visier was the year before. For there was now no Army that durst look him in the face. And the Turks were shut out of Upper [Page 12] Hungary; having lost their only Pass upon the Danube, by losing Pest. Also the Duke's advantage was yet greater, when he had been suffer'd to lay his Bridge over the River. for now he might act on which side he pleased. He might March after the Serasquier: and either drive him o­ver the Bridge of Esseck (and so out of the Country) without fighting; or certainly beat him, if he had fought. They that were so easily rout­ed by his Cavalry, would have stood much less against his whole Ar­my. Then for the Garrisons; if he could but let Buda alone, there was scarce any other that was like to make any considerable resistance. And Count Lesly being then in those Parts, with a good Army, and prospe­rous; the Duke and he joyning, must have born down all before them. Also if the Duke had kept on the other side of the Danube, he had found things there as easy. only Newhausel was to be avoided at present: there being then in it an intractable Garrison of ten thousand Men. And perhaps Agria and Waradine might have held out a week or two. But for the other Places, they had been nothing in his hands. The easy taking of Zolnock and Saravas afterward (which are two of the best of them), doth plainly make it appear, how weak a defence they were like to make. So that in all probability, he might in a few Months have beat­en the Turks out of Upper Hungary. And then Teckely's party must have fallen in likewise: together with the Prince of Transylvania. In this way the War would in a great measure have maintain'd it self: and not have exhausted the Emperour, in that grievous manner that the Siege of Buda did. The Duke's numbers would also have increased, by the coming in of the Christian Hungarians, and Men flocking from all parts to the conquering Army. And all would have been in a flourish­ing condition.

These things might have come to pass, if the Duke had been pleased, (after the old Rule), to strike the Nail where it would drive: and had taken care, not to put any thing to hazard, when he had so much sure play. But nothing would content him but the Siege of Buda, which was too heavy for him. As if a man should be amongst Ingots of Gold; most of them portable, and some few not. and he should choose, rather to break his back at once, with one that he could not carry; than take away the lesser, at ease, one after another. after which, the greater, with a little patience, might be broken or melted down. One would think the fresh Example of the Grand Visier's Fool-hardiness, and the fatal Consequences of it, should have kept the Duke from committing the like Error. And 'tis a wonder how he could expect, that eighteen thou­sand Foot (for his Army was reckon'd at thirty thousand, and twelve thousand of them were Horse and Dragoons) could force a City, though [Page 13]not very well fortified, that had fifteen thousand in Garrison. It is con­fess'd that the Duke had very good Men. But then it was great pity that they should be so used; so miserably thrown away. Had they been put upon reasonable services, they might in all likelihood have crown'd themselves with Victory and Honour, and their General with Glory.

The best Army upon Earth may be baffled by an ordinary Enemy, if it attacque him in his strength. which therefore good Generals avoid. Cambray was the Frontier against the French, and stood in their very teeth, the best part of two hundred years. But withal it was exceed­ing strong, and always very well mann'd and furnish'd. and therefore in all that space they never attempted it, till now lately the time they took it. When the same French marched against Holland, Mastricht lay just in their way. and they had threaten'd it hard. But since it had got a Garrison of ten or twelve thousand Men; they fairly past it by, as if there had been no such Town. Afterwards, when the Garrison was less by half, they fell close to it; and had it upon reasonable terms. But if they had fallen upon it at first, it might have broke their whole Army.

The Rhetoricians tell us, that in Statu deliberativo there are two principal Questions; an utile? an possibile? and to both these, there must be good answers given, to make a Design advisable. For 'tis idle to engage upon things that are easy, unless they be profitable withal; nor should any prospect of advantage tempt us to an Undertaking, if the thing be not possible, or (as the French and We better express it) not feasible. 'Tis confess'd that Buda was very convenient for the Duke. But must he therefore take it, whether he can or no? Must he therefore throw away his Army upon it, to no purpose? If a Stone Wall stand in a Mans way, must the Man run his head against it? The Advice which Quintilian gives his Orator, may be applied full well to a Ge­neral; Consulat vires suas.

I do again confess, that Buda is a place of great importance for carry­ing on the War. But is there no other Place worth the looking after? Surely there are many such upon this Frontier; beside those farther in. There is upon the North side the Danube, Waradine, and Zolnock, and Agria, and Newhausel: and upon the South side, there is Alba Regalis, Caniza, and Gradisca. I will allow that Buda with Pest is more worth than any two of them. But the worst two of them is more worth than Buda without Pest: which is the present case, the Duke having Pest al­ready. We can therefore only conclude, that the gaining this City is to be mainly intended and endeavour'd, in a reasonable way, and when ever there is power and opportunity.

That which is extraordinary in Buda is, its situation upon the Danube: and that the taking it opens this River to the Christians, giving them free passage farther down for their Provisions and other Necessaries. Gradisca would do the same upon the Save, and Zolnock upon the Teys. but the Navigation of the Danube is much more considerable than either of these; it being the grand River, and coming from the chief Parts of the Emperour's Dominions. But I must take notice; That since the Christians had Pest already on the opposite bank, it seems hardly possi­ble to hinder their passage up and down, in so great a Stream, near their own side, under the favour of dark Nights. Which makes the advantage of the Water, to be much less to this Town of Buda than was imagin'd. Then as for commanding the Land, the Towns before named do far ex­cell Buda, as it is now without Pest. for it now commands but one side of the River. And surely it is plain to any that will consider; that a Town which stands upon a great River, not having a passage over it, is half block'd up. But the Towns before named command the Coun­tries clear round. especially Agria, Newhausel, and Caniza: which three are the farthest advanc'd, and which are the three Horns that gore the Imperial Territories. And Alba Regalis and Waradine do alse command far and wide.

But it may be said farther of Buda, that here is the lowest Bridge and Pass upon the Danube: nor is there any other in Hungary, Gran only excepted. Which place and Barkan do yoke this River about forty miles higher, in the same manner as Pest and Buda do here. In the old Maps of these Countries, there is the Mark and Picture of a Bridge at Colocza, forty miles lower. but there is no such Bridge now to be found. It ap­pears then, that Gran was of the same Consideration last year, that Bu­da is now. But the Grand Visier (if I may look back on what I have before omitted) did not do his part in defending it. He had got an Ar­my together after his defeat at Vienna, by rallying and recruiting: the Christians giving him leisure to do it. for they made no great haste to pursue their Victory. Part of his Army he lost foolishly, by fighting the Christians in their March to no purpose. who thereupon possess'd themselves of Barkan, on which side the Fight was. Then he let them pass the River to attacque Gran, without Opposition. And which was worst of all, He did not put Men enow into the Town, when he might have put in what number he would. Had he fill'd Gran, as the Seras­quier fill'd Buda, Gran might have been as well preserv'd. And indeed much better and easier, because of the Winter then approching. But this is a Digression in this place: I return to the Siege of Buda.

2. It is taken for granted by most Men, that when the Duke of Lor­rain had with his Cavalry defeated the Serasquier, he could do no less than return to Buda, and push on the Siege. But some are of a contrary opinion. They think, that having try'd the Strength of that Place and Garrison (which was still the same, notwithstanding the Serasquier's de­feat) he had now a fair Occasion given him, to leave a Siege upon which he had rashly engaged. that he might pursue his Victory in a more effe­ctual manner, and march with his whole Army after the slying Enemy. Which if he had done, in all probability he had broke them to pieces; they could never have made head against him. If they found it so hard to get an Army again together, though the Siege of Buda gave them so great respite and leisure; how could they have done it, if they had been closely followed? But the Duke would have been stop'd by the Bridge of Esseck, to which place the Enemy was fled. I answer, that this Bridge was then in a weak Condition, being not well fortified at either End. And the farther End being attacqued by Count Lesley next year, we know how easily it was taken. Also this Bridge of Esseck is four or five English miles in length; partly over several Branches of the Drave, and partly over low Grounds. Admitting therefore that the Ends were not to be taken: yet the middle part could not be defended, nor the Christians hindred from passing over to it, without great numbers of Foot. and the Serasquier had scarce any Foot left: the two defeats, and the Manning of Buda, having taken away most of them.

Moreover it did much sacilitate the Enterprize of Esseck, that Count Lesley was then in those parts with a good Body of Men. where he had taken Virovitza, a strong Town upon or near the Drave: between which Town and the Bridge of Esseck there was no Place of Strength. And Lesley commanded both sides the River: and had laid (or was about to lay) a Bridge of Boats over it, having plenty of Vessels for that pur­pose. And these might have been sent down the Stream to the Duke at Esseck, as likewise Provisions and other Necessaries. It appears then plainly, that the Taking of this Bridge was much more seasible than Buda. And by the taking of it, Buda must fall in short time, and all that the Turks have in Lower Hungary; this being their only passage to it.

But what if the Duke had found this Bridge very strongly guarded, and the gaining it very difficult? I answer, That then he must have let it alone as well as Buda. There was other easy work good store, ready to his hand. and the more strongly this Place had been guarded, the more unguarded other Places must be. Also the whole Country had lain open to him. the Country on this side the Drave, and that between the Drave and the Save, and beyond the Save also. He might have gone [Page 16]which way he pleased, there being in effect no Army to oppose him. For as for the Serasquier and his fugitive Rabble, they would have sig­nified nothing. And all had been full of Terror and Confusion.

Thus the Duke of Lorrain was fairly invited by his Victory to raise his Siege. Which also he should have done without any such Invitati­on. He could not but be quickly sensible, that he had taken wrong mea­sures in attacquing this City. and to persist in an Error, wise Men say is the greatest Error. Therefore very famous Commanders, when they have found themselves engaged in a bad business, have esteem'd it their wisest course to get clear of it without delay. I shall instance only in two. The great Hannibal of old, after he had tasted the strength of Pla­centia, made no scruple to leave it. And of later times, the great Gusta­vus thought it no dishonour to rise from before Ingolstat, when he found it too hot for him. Had the Duke of Lorrain done so here, he had been glorious: and in all probability the Turk had been totally ruin'd. As the Siege of Vienna, the year before, was the thing that preserv'd the Ger­man Emperour; so nothing could now preserve the Ottoman, but the Siege of Buda.

It may seem by the pains I have taken in this matter, that the design upon Buda is as hard to beat down, as the Walls of it are. But the dif­ficulty is not yet quite over: for there remains a grand Objection against all that hath been said. They say, That for the Duke to have marched on into the Enemies Country, leaving Buda behind him with such a Garrison in it, might have been of fatal Consequence. That Buda must first be taken, to open the way to other places. And therefore since the attacquing of Buda was necessary, it could not be imprudent.

To this I answer; First, that where a Frontier carries a breadth of three or four hundred miles, (and such is the Frontier between the Turk and the Emperour, it reaching from the northerly parts of Transylvania to the Gulf of Venice); it were very strange, if there should be but one way for a mastering Army to break in upon it; and that all should be guarded by one Town, without the taking of which nothing else could be done. I have already named seven Capital Garrisons, beside Buda, upon this Frontier. And there are divers lesser Places besides. Particu­larly there is Novigrad and Hatwan: which, after that the Duke had got Pest and Vacia, seem'd next in course; being not far off, and on the same side the River. But where there is such Choice of Places to fall up­on, it is the use of skilful Generals to learn the condition of each place, and to fall upon those that are worst provided. for all Places cannot be provided alike. And surely had the Duke been minded to do the easiest things first, he might always have been doing the easiest things; or to [Page 17]speak plainer, he might have found all things easy. whereas now by at­tempting the hardest thing first, he hath made all things hard. For the Turks do now, by the Example of Buda, defend their Places after ano­ther rate than they did before. But had the Duke fallen upon likely things; he would, in all probability, have found no greater resistance any where, than he found at Gran: which we know was very little. There was therefore no necessity for the Duke to fall upon Buda: since the Country was wide enough, and he might go either to the right hand or the left, as far as he could reasonably desire. By going to the Right hand, he had gone straight upon the Drave, which brings all sorts of Supplies out of the Hereditary Countries. down which River he had met with no Turkish place worth naming, till he came to Esseck: of whose weakness I have spoken before, and of its great Importance withal. On the other side, by going to the left hand he had gone straight upon the River Teys: which brings all necessaries out of the Emperour's Upper Hungary. And the Place which the Turks have highest upon this stream is Zolnock: which we know was very easily taken next year, with divers Places about it. all which Places, and many more, might have been taken as easily now. We see therefore, that which way soe­ver the Duke had turn'd, he might have found it commodious. But

Secondly, if the Matteraright, Duke had turn'd no way, but had march'd straight on by Buda, and left that Place behind him; plainly there had been no harm nor danger in it. We find the like is frequently done by others. Not to run upon new Instances, the French (as hath been noted) past by Mastricht, and have often past by Cambray: and even in this War, the Grand Visier, when he march'd to Vienna, left behind him Comorra, and Raab, and Altenburg, and Newstat, beside other places. Newstat was near his Camp: and he might have taken it with ease. which yet he neglected to do, and no harm came of it. It must be granted, that where the invading Army is opposed by an Army almost as good, in that case it were very hazardous to engage too deep in the Enemies Country. be­cause the Enemy by the help and favour of his Garrisons, might distress them very much, and have great advantaces upon them. But if the Ene­my be quite over match'd, and dare not abide within distance; (which was now the condition of the Turks); there is then no such danger. And Garrisons without an Army to stand by them, cannot hurt much: nor hinder the Invaders from going or staying where they please, nor from picking and choosing what work they will do. But they must take heed of undertaking any long and difficult Siege: as the Grand Visier did last year. though he furmounted the Incommodities of it, by the great Force he had about him. But it may be presumed, that for the most part [Page 18]their work will be easy. in regard the Places that lie farther inward, cannot in likelihood be so well fortifi'd and furnish'd, as the Frontier Places are.

I confess the taking of the outmost Frontier Garrisons, is a healing Work. since thereby we clear, and set at peace, such parts of our own Country, as those Garrisons did before command and harrass. But it must be acknowledg'd on the other side, that the Places farther inward do more annoy the Enemy, as lying within their Bowels. If it be said, that these Places, though perhaps they may be easily got, yet are hard to be kept, and hard to be relieved; I answer, that the Christians may keep and relieve such Places, as well as the Turks do Newhausel, Agria, and Caniza. which though it be done with some difficulty, yet this is abundantly recompensed by the great Mischief, which those Towns do to the Emperour. For which reason the Turks do justly set a high va­lue upon those Towns. And surely I think it will not be denied, but that it were a very great Service, if the Christians could get three or four Places, as far advanced as the Towns last named. and which might gall and gore the Ottoman Countries, as much as the Towns last named do the Austrian. They that are the stronger, (which the Christians are now), need not be affraid to scatter the War: but should rather desire it. Since thereby they do more distract the Enemy, and put him upon a strong­er Guard, and make him yet more unable to keep the Field.

These Notions are easily conceived by any considering Person: they naturally flowing from the things themselves. but I have found it a work of some difficulty, to digest and express them, and make them plain. Though perhaps to those that read, even this also may seem easy, now it is done. Moreover I am very sensible, that I have been unreasonably prolix upon this Subject. But I could not work my Matter aright, with fewer words.

3. It was a rare felicity to the Duke of Lorrain, and such as befals few Generals; that when he had lost (I may not say destroy'd) one Army, he could sit still till another was brought to him. It calls to mind the Centurion in Tacitus, whom the Soldiers call'd Cedo alteram. because when he had broken one Cudgel upon them, he us'd to cry Cedo alteram, give me another. But the Duke of Lorrain if he had had an Enemy any thing near his Match, and if at this time the Turks had not been strange­ly weak, could not have had this leisure. Also he might have stay'd and call'd long enough for a new Army, if the Peace of Flanders (which hap­pen'd just at this time) had not given the Germans liberty to march to him. And this Peace was obtain'd beyond all Expectation. It was al­most [Page 19]miraculous, that the French should let go so great an Advantage: They that envy their Greatness, hope they will never have the like a­gain. But to say the truth, the advantage was lost the year before. Had the French then fallen upon the Towns with all their Force, instead of Quartering upon the Country, (which they might have done with e­qual Justice, and as some conceive with less Insolence); they might have carried Flanders that very year, or at least put it out of condition to sub­sist. But now such Alliances were form'd to preserve it, and so many Mediators had concern'd themselves, that perhaps it was not safe to displease them. However it may be truly said upon the whole matter, that the French did not pursue their Interest in this occasion, so closely as they use to do.

Machiavell tells us of divers Men, that sadly miscarried in their Affairs by not being perfectly wicked. which he saith is frequently the ruin of great Designs. Some may apply this to the French Ministers: and may think that they lost their Advantage here mention'd, because they had not the Heart nor the Face to prosecute it. It seeming a little too hor­rid, while the Turk was destroying and devouring on the one side, for Them to do the like on the other. But it must be consider'd, that it was not altogether so scandalous to fall upon Flanders, as it had been to fall upon Germany it self, which was engaged in the Turks War. Also the Turks, after their defeat at Vienna, were not in an invading condition. and it was much more tolerable to stop the Emperour's Conquests, than to promote the Turkish. But moreover, the French Ministers are of a stronger temper, than to be hinder'd from doing those things that are convenient, either by the checks of Conscience, or by the rebukes of Shame.

What was the true Cause therefore of this strange slack Conduct at this time? If the thing be well examin'd, it will be found to proceed from the Jesuits: who we know have a great Ascendant over that Court. They had several times betray'd the Emperour; and now they thought fit, in requital, to betray the French King: and to sacrifice his Interests to theirs. It was the Interest of their Order, that the Emperour should make great Conquests. By whose Favour (he being their fast Friend) they might well hope to have many new Colledges, and some new Pro­vinces, of Jesuits. which plainly would be much to the advantage of the Society. And though this might bring ruine to their great Patron of France, on whom the Emperour would in all likelihood turn his Victo­rious Forces, they did not value it. The thing they mind, is the Inte­rest of their Order. And this seems the true Reason, why the French King did let slip this golden Opportunity, of making himself the Uni­versal Monarch.

4. Of all the Mediators that labour'd in this Peace of Flanders, the Dutch did labour most: and indeed it did most concern them. The Con­dition of their Commonwealth at this time was full of difficulty and danger. for thus it stood. By the loss of Flanders they must be certainly ruin'd: the French were resolved to have a Limb of it, that is, the Town of Luxenburg: and the Spaniards were resolved to lose all, rather than part with any thing. But they took little Care, and made little Provisi­on for their defence: and seemed to cast that wholly upon the Hollan­der. as making account, that the Preservation of Flanders did concern Holland more than Spain. And now was the Emperour engaged against the Turk: Denmark, Brandenburg, and Collen were closely ally'd with France: and the rest of Europe seemed cool, and willing to be quiet. This was the perplext Estate of Affairs abroad. And it was as bad with the Dutch at home, by reason of their intestine Divisions. The City of Amsterdam, and the Province of Friesland, did utterly refuse to engage in the War. and they gave such Reasons for it, as seem not easy to be answer'd. On the other side, the Heroick Prince of Orange, and the rest of the States, were fully determin'd to hazard all, rather than the French should get Flanders. Moreover these Divisions, in a Matter so impor­tant and in so dangerous a Conjuncture, were carried on with all the Animosity imaginable: and were ready to break out into open Hosti­lities. So that upon the whole they were brought to very great Straits. their best Friends gave them for lost: and their Republique seem'd to be come to its fatal period. It may safely be affirm'd, that their Affairs were in a worse posture when the French besieged Luxenburg, then when (some years before) they were possess'd of Ʋtrecht. But out of this grievous Labyrinth they extricated themselves to admiration. For by great Patience, Art, and Industry, they at last hammer'd out a Peace between the two Crowns; whereby the Spaniards were forced to sit down with the loss of Luxenburg, and were made incapable to lose or part with any more. The French being obliged not to take it, either by Conquest, Exchange, Gift, Cession, or by any other way or Pretence.

This Treaty may, in point of Negotiation, be accounted the Master­piece of that Republique. Wherein they shewed as much Skill and Dex­terity, as they did Constancy and Fortitude in the time of the French Invasion. for which they will be admir'd in all After Ages. They then sustained such a Shock, such a Ruffle, such a terrible Storm, as never did any People sustain and endure the like. The Romans put a high va­lue upon themselves, for that when Hannibal lay on the one side of their City, they sent out at the other side Supplies for Spain. And I confess it was brave and great. But it may be consider'd, That they then with great [Page 21]Force held Capua besieged, which Hannibal had in vain attempted to relieve: that in the main they had got the better end of the Staff: and that plainly their City was in no danger. How much more firm and steady were the Dutch, who though they had a mighty Enemy in their Bowels, that was quite too strong for them; though most of their Coun­try was over run and subdu'd, and to save the rest they were fain to lay a good part of it under Water; though at the same time they had a dreadful Concussion within themselves, having with Violence chang'd their Government, not only into other Hands, but into another Form; Yet in the midst of these dismal Circumstances they carried on a War at Sea, as if nothing had ailed them, as if they had had nothing else to think on. Where they sought three Battels this very year, against the conjoyned Forces of England and France. I must crave pardon if I could not pass this by, though it be a little beside my Subject.

5. Upon the Grand Visier's defeat at Vienna, and afterward his death, two things had been proper for his Master the Great Sultan to do. The first was, to go to the Hungarian War in Person: the Occasion being so important, and all his Fortunes lying now at stake. How could he ex­pect that others should fight for him, if he would not fight for himself? And how could he trust his Empire, and the very Being of the Ottoman Race, in other mens hands and to the Conduct of others; and himself ly lurking amongst his Concubines? His Presence would have given Life and Vigour to his Affairs: and raised up the Spirits of his dismai'd and drooping Subjects. Nor is there any Office so proper to a Prince, and wherein he appears so glorious, as to lead his People to Battel. The other thing was, that if he could not go himself, he would take care that he that did go (in Chief), should be invested and irradiated with the highest Authority. Or to speak plainer, That none less than the Grand Visier should be General in that War. So that if the Grand Visier was not the very fittest to be General, he that was fittest to be General was to be made Grand Visier. For this was not a time to advance Favourites, but to employ the best Men to most advantage. The want of the Sul­tan's presence would have been made up in good measure by the presence of so great an Officer. His Army (on which all depended) would have been better supplied, being supplied by him that commanded it. And the General Himself would have been better followed and obeyed, ha­ving the full Power of Rewards and Punishments. We know the Ro­mans, in times of extreme danger, made Dictators with absolute Power. Ferdinand the Second had never stop'd the Swedish Torrent (which then was very impetuous); if he had not given absolute Power to Walstein [Page 22]his Generalissimo. It seems therefore a Mistake in the Great Sultan here, that he committed this so important Service to an Underling General: not giving him Authority suitable to the occasion. For he made one Man his Grand Visier, and another Man his Serasquier. To the one he gave the Honour and Authority, and expected the Service from the other. He appointed one Man for Preparations (which sort of People Sir Wal­ter Rawleigh doth contemne), and another for Action: and this Prepa­ration-Man was to command the Man of Action.

6. It must be avow'd, that this Serasquier did extraordinary things, considering the disadvantages he lay under. He not only wanted Au­thority requisite, that is, the whole command of the whole Turkish Em­pire; but also he had in effect no Army. For the People he had about him did not deserve that name. They were partly such as had fled from the Rout at Vienna, where all the best Men had been cut off; and partly raw undisciplin'd People. And all of them (together with that whole Empire) were under exceeding Discouragement and Consternation. So that the Duke of Lorrain had gain'd no great Honour, though he had to­tally beaten a General so ill followed, being so well followed himself. But though the Serasquier were in this low condition, yet he bore up for two Summers, and maintained his ground without considerable Loss: when in all likelihood he must have lost all. Which must be ascribed to his own good Conduct, as well as to the Errors of his Enemies. That which he did this year, was the relieving of Buda: which was a signal Service. He durst not come within danger of fighting with the Christi­ans. for he could not trust his Men: finding they would not stand, and having been already twice routed. But he chiefly effected his Design by lying at a distance from his Enemies, and cutting off their Forrage and Victuals. whereby he greatly distressed and disabled them. Gustavus Horn advised, that the like might be done at the Siege of Ratisbon: but his Counsel was not followed. And some think that the Duke of Lor­rain might have done the like at Vienna: and not ly at Lintz, a hundred miles off, as he did the most part of that Siege.

Though the Serasquier's Conduct in the Main were excellent, yet in some particulars it is thought he did not do well. He should not have been so forward (or so easily forced) to fight, when there was no oc­casion for it. And he should not have suffer'd his Enemies to lay a Bridge and pass over the Danube, in the face of his Army, without fighting. He seems also to have lost Pest too easily: while Himself and his whole Army were on the other side the River, with a free passage to it over the Bridge. Whereas he should have engaged his whole Force, together with [Page 23]his own Person, in defence of that Place. For it was of very great Con­sequence; Buda being without it but like a half-fac'd Groat, if I may so express the Matter. And he could never expect to cope with his Ene­my at better advantage. Nor could he hope to recover the Place, when he had thus lost it, so easily as he did soon after. There was another thing that did more offend his great Master, and for which he was in disgrace for some time: and that was, his not falling upon the Christians when they drew off from Buda. But others think, that he was not to be blamed, if, notwithstanding the ill Condition of the Enemy, he could not yet trust his Men: that he might well be content with the great Success of raising the Siege, and had now no reason to hazard all by fighting. And surely it was much wonder'd that the Sultan should frown upon his Preserver: when it was rather expected, that the highest Re­wards and Honours should be heaped upon him.

7. Since the Duke of Lorrain could not obtain what he principally design'd, it concern'd him the more to keep what he had gotten: name­ly Vicegrad, Pest, and Vacia. Of these Pest was the most considerable, in that it held Buda still in fetters, and pinn'd it up to one side of the Da­nube. And the Men there in Garrison might be supplied with all Necessa­ries down the Stream, with almost as much ease as Quarter'd in Austria. And the more Men were there, the farther would they command, and the more Forrage, Victuals, and Contribution would they get. We are therefore to learn the Reasons, why this important Place was quitted; and that without Burning or Demolishing. When there could be no fear of a present Siege, the Winter being so far advanced; and when the E­nemy could not easily come at them, by reason of the River between. Pest being thus abandon'd, one would think they should have the great­er care of Vacia: which is also a Port Town (as I may call it) upon the Danube, and now the farthest advanced into the Enemies Country. But such a paltry Garrison is left in it, that after a few Weeks were past, a Party from Buda seizes it, almost without resistance. These After-Claps, though they made no great noise, doubled the disasters of the Campagne. For Vacia and Pest may be accounted of equal value with Buda: and the losing of these was as bad, as the not gaining the other.

8. The Hungarians of Teckely's party that have been in England, have given him a very high Character. Extolling his Courtesy, Courage, and Conduct, and likewise the Comeliness of his Person. It must be con­fess'd, that by the great Resistance he hath made, and the great Autho­rity he hath maintain'd amongst his Party in a Condition so ruinous, [Page 24]he appears to be no ordinary Man. But he lost his Honour by suffer­ing himself to be shamefully surpriz'd: whereby his Forces were shrewd­ly shatter'd, himself hardly escaping. The best Commander may receive a Defeat: but to suffer a Surprize is inexcusable. On the other side, this Count shewed a notable Resolution, in that after such a terrible Blow he still stood firm; and undauntedly continued his defence, against an Active and vigorous Assailant.

CHAP. IV. NEWHAƲSEL. 1685.
Observations.

THE Duke of Lorrain begins the Campagne once more with the Siege of Newhausel: having a brave Army of between fifty and sixty thousand good Men, and the Garrison within being now but two thousand. The Place is fiercely defended: and in one of their Sallies, the Duke is put to the Exercise of his Personal Valour, to save his Batteries from ruine. How­ever in a Months time or thereabouts, the besieged are brought into an ill Condition. In the mean while the Serasquier, with an Army not much outnumbring that of the Christians, had invested Gran and Vicegrad. To re­lieve which Places, the Duke (with the Elector of Bavaria) marches with about two Thirds of the Army: leaving the rest, under the Count Caprara, to continue his Siege. The Turks, having taken Vicegrad in three days, rise from before Gran, fight the Duke with their whole Force, and are bea­ten. However, they make their retreat to Buda, pass over the Bridge there, and threaten to march straight to Newhausel and relieve it, with the hazard of a second Battel. But now they hear that the Place was taken by Storm: where all were put to the Sword, save the Governor and a few Offi­cers. Nevertheless, the Serasquier still gives out, that he is resolved to fight. But when the Christians with their whole Army were coming up to him, he repasses the Danube at the same Bridge, having first demolish'd and abandon'd Vacia and Novigrad. Being got to the other side of the Ri­ver, he continues there with his Army for some Weeks: and then, for want of Forrage and Victuals, retires to Belgrade. While he staid, he sent seve­ral Messages to the Duke with Overtures of Peace: which were rejected. Ʋpon the Serasquier's repassing the Danube, the Duke of Lorrain march­ed up to the place where the Turkish Army had lain, and there Encamped for about a Month. And Forage growing scarce, he draws back his Army, and en­camps for another Mouth between the Rivers of Gran and Ipol: having first sent the Count Caprara with a Detachment towards Agria. While the Turk­ish Forces are drawn from all parts to the Serasquier, Count Lesley marches to the Bridge of Esseck and having routed the Forces that made head against him, he takes the Town of Esseck (which lies at the Bridge end) by storm: [Page 25]and burns it, with eight or nine hundred Paces of the Bridge. Which done, he returns to Virovitza. The Works of Newhausel are repaired with all diligence, and neither labour nor cost is spared: but Novigrad and Vacia are not thought worth the repairing. General Schultz doth again fall close to Teckely, is soundly repuls'd at Unguar, and then takes Esperies after a hard Siege. Whence he marches straight to Caschaw, Count Teckely's chief Town. Caprara having bombarded Agria without Success, marches to Caschaw likewise: bringing with him an Authority over all the Forces there. Whereupon Scultz lays down his Command. General Mercy and Co­lonel Heusler, with a Party from hence, fall into the Turkish Quarters: take Zolnock, Saravas, and several other Places; which they hold and make good against the Enemy, and are victorious in divers Encounters. The Siege of Caschaw going on, Teckely goes to the Bassa of Waradine to solicit for relief: by whom he is made Prisoner, and sent in Chains to Belgrade. Hereupon the brave Peterhasi, and all the Chief of Teckely's party, come in to Caprara. by whose Example and Perswasions Caschaw Surrenders, and all the other revolted Places, Mongatz only excepted. While these things are doing in Hungary, the Venetians are not idle on their side. Af­ter the Victory at Vienna, they had joyn'd in a League against the Turks, with the Emperour and King of Poland. And against the next Summer, they rigg'd out their Fleet, and fill'd it with Land Soldiers, Morosini be­ing Captain General. who took the Island of St. Maure, together with the Fortress of Prevesa upon the Main Land of Greece. This Summer they go to Sea again, with greater Force: and make a Descent into Morea. where they take Corone, Calamata, and some other places. Also they rout the Turks more than once, and divers Christian Greeks revolt to them. As for the Poles, both the last year and this, their Forces are not great, came late into the Field, and did little.

1. THE Siege of Newhausel was carried on very substantially by the Duke of Lorrain. He first made a great semblance of be­sieging Novigrad, so that no body doubted of it: And then he clapp'd down suddenly before Newhausel. which though it be usual amongst the Dutch, French, and Spaniards, and other wily Gamesters; yet in these Wars of Hungary it may pass for a Stratagem. Also before he began his Attacques, he strongly intrenched himself, and finished his Lines of Circumvallation. at which he made his whole Army labour for a full Week. And this being done, he push'd on his Attacques with great Con­stancy and Vigour. Moreover he signalized himself by his own Perso­nal [Page 26]Valour, when the Turks (in a furious Sally) were just upon the point to burn his Platformes and ruin his Batteries. In which Exigence, the Duke himself did run into the face of danger; to encourage and direct his Men, and to beat back the Enemy. continuing several hours in this ter­rible Service. This was a most Heroique Action. If Alexander, or Cae­sar, or Gustavus Adolphus had been here, they could not have done more. Nor did he thus hazard his Person upon a small or slight occasion. For the Success of the Siege, and consequently of the whole Campagne, now lay at stake. Furthermore, when the Duke was called away to the relief of Gran, Caprara did well supply his place here. And he did not expose and throw away his Men by vain and multiplied Assaults; but having throughly batter'd the Place, fill'd the Ditches, and broke the Defences, he carried it at once. One thing hath been omitted, which is, that the Duke's Judgment must be approved, in choosing to fall upon Newhausel, rather than any place else. For it sorely infested the Empe­rour's Quarters, and by taking it he cleared a Country as big as Kent. And though it was believed, that they were already distress'd for Victu­als, so that there was no need of Force; yet it was good to make sure of a Place so important. Nor was their want of Victuals so great as was imagin'd: as it appeared afterward.

These are the just Commendations of this memorable Siege. But on the other side, Some think that it was slow. The Town was but indif­ferently mann'd; and fortified by one single Line, and a Ditch about eighteen foot broad. And yet they were more than a Month about it. Whereas it is verily believed, that a French Army would have had it in a Week. They took Mastricht in fifteen days, which was twice as strong, had thrice as many Men, and was full as well defended; with an Army no way better, or to speak more truly, not so good. Some al­so wonder, that Caprara did spare the Governor Bassa. which look'd as if he had had a mind, to encourage others to hold out with the like Ob­stinacy. Had this Bassa had Caprara thus in his power, he would have impaled him. To speak more calmly, the Bassa seem'd no fit Object of Mercy, upon two accounts. First, because he had been barbarously cru­el to his Christian Prisoners: whom he had made work in Chains in the Mouth of the Besiegers Cannon, whereby most of them were destroy'd. Secondly, because he had stood it out beyond all Reason and the Rules of War. Which allow not Men to do all the Mischief they can, when there is no hope left, nor possibility of defence. In such a Case, the Offi­cers ought to find less favour than others, and the Governor least of all. for that He was chiefly (if not only) in fault. The Turks, and especi­ally their Commanders, should be made to fear their Enemies as much [Page 27]as they do their Masters. If they yield, they are sure to dy: and they should be as sure on't, if they yield nor. which is the way to deal with those People, that fight for fear of death. Some think that the Bassa's Ransom might incline Count Caprara to spare him. wherein I am consi­dent they do the Count Wrong. For we must not believe, that so brave an Officer should omit a necessary and exemplary piece of Severity, out of a sordid desire of Gain. But this Bassa dyed of his Wounds not long after: and then they cut off his Head, and set it upon a Pole. Which seem'd very idle and foolish.

2. Let us now consider the Serasquier's Conduct: which surely ap­pears very neat and clean. He had Orders from the Grand Signior to re­lieve Newhausel at any rate, and what ever the hazard were. And these Orders he must obey, whether they were wise or foolish. But he saw plainly, that to march to that place, and fight the whole Christian Ar­my, had been certain destruction. they so much over-matching him in goodness of Men, and the place being so far within the Enemies Coun­try. He therefore, by way of diversion besieges Gran and Vicegrad, which ly on the other side the Danube. Upon which, one of these three things must follow. Either the whole Christian Army must come to re­lieve these Places, and then Newhausel had been at liberty; or else they must all continue their Siege, and then both Vicegrad and Gran had been his own; or part of them must march against him, and part must stay at the Siege: and then those that staid, would carry on the Siege but weakly; and those that march'd, would be in a fair way to be bea­ten. The Christians took this last Course, and divided their Army. But they proved so strong; that they that staid, were enow to take the Town; and they that march'd, were enow to beat the Serasquier. However it must be confess'd, that he plaid the utmost of his Game. I know it hath been related, that he was drawn by a Wile to fight. But plainly at that time fighting was his Business: for without it Newhausel must be lost, and all the Christian Army would then be upon him. It was therefore much better, to engage part of the Enemies Force, thereby to save the Town; then sustain their whole Force, after the Town was lost. More­over he set upon that part of the Christians which he was to Encounter, with all the Force that he could possibly get together. And he brought them up bravely to the Charge, and tryed to the utmost what every part of them could do. But they were beaten every where: not being able to stand against the Germans, who plainly hewed them down. Being thus totally routed, he nevertheless got off strangely without extraordinary loss, and made his retreat to Buda. There he march'd over the Bridge, [Page 28]and put on a fresh countenance of fighting. Which made the Dukes of Lorrain and Bavaria, after some time, to come down upon him with the whole Christian Army, throughly prepar'd for a second Battel. And then the Serasquier slipt back over the River, and left his Enemies at gaze. for truly he was not in a fighting Condition. The Bridge of Buda stood him now in good stead: and in it he reaped the fruit of his labours. for he had been repairing it all Winter with great diligence; it having been ruin'd, when the Christians held Pest.

3. It may truly be said of the Serasquier, that he lost Newhausel glo­riously. because, to preserve it, he did all that could be done. But it can­not be said, that the Duke did so by Vicegrad, for it was pitifully lost. This Castle stood (for it is now demolish'd) upon the Danube, with a Town under it: almost the mid-way between Gran and Buda. And it was the farthest Frontier on that side. If the French had had this Place, how would they have fortified and furnish'd it? And what a tearing Garrison would they have had in it? The Imperialists had time enough to do what they would to it, it being a year in their Possession. But it was so miserably unprovided, that first a Party out of Buda surprized (or seized) the Town, plunder'd it, and burnt it: for which the Go­vernour was never question'd. And now a Detachment from the Seras­quier took the Castle by Surrender in three days: in a manner within sight of the Duke and his Army. Which I confess was a very sensible disgrace. This place and Gran had been threaten'd for a Month before, and the Duke might have put into them what Men he pleased: they standing on the one side the River, and he commanding the other. 'Tis true, he put five hundred Men into Gran (when he might and should have put in five thousand.); but Vicegrad seem'd quite forgotten. If he could not or would not defend it, why did he not slight it? To conclude this Matter, the loss of Newhausel was far the greater in point of profit, and advantage, and importance; but in point of honour, the loss of Vicegrad was a hundred times worse.

4. To the Messages of Peace, which were sent by the Serasquier, the Duke return'd this Answer, That a Victorious Army was not to be a­mused by such Messages. But what doth he do with this Victorious Ar­my? What Conquests, or even what Attempts doth he make? Why first he encamps upon the Danube, a little short of Pest. And that he might be sure to want Forrage in good time, it was just in place where the Turks had lain before. Accordingly Forrage is wanting, and he must re­move. But now instead of advancing into the Enemies Country, which [Page 29]lay right before him and open to him, he Marches quite back into his own: and there makes another encamping between the Rivers of Gran and Ipol. Which two encampings having taken up two pretious Months, and the year being now well spent (though as yet no hard weather); he sends his Army into their Winter Quarters. Was ever Victorious Army so employed? Was ever Victory so pursued? If Alexander, or Caesar, or Gu­stavus Adolphus had been here, they would have pursued it after ano­ther manner. Caesar's Victory at Alexia, was one of the greatest that e­ver was obtain'd by Man. He had driven a brave Army of fourscore thousand Men into that Place, and held them there besieged: his own Army being much less. And two hundred and fifty thousand bold Sol­diers came to relieve them. They fell upon his Trenches, (for here was the pattern of all our Circumvallations) T they fell upon his Trenches on both sides, with the most obstinate Fury. But those without, were not only repulsed, but totally routed, leaving fifty thousand dead upon the place; and those within were beaten back with great loss, and for­ced to surrender at discretion. Of this glorious Victory Caesar had lost the fruit, if he had not closely followed his blow: keeping his Men up­on service, for a good part of the next hard Winter.

All the World condemns Hannibal, for that he did not march straight to Rome, after the Battel of Cannae. And we find him in Livy cursing and banning himself for this fatal Omission, when afterwards he left Italy (full sore against his Will) to rescue his own dear Carthage. But though Hannibal did not do that which was best, yet he did something; where­as here our Duke does just nothing. It was Hannibal's Error, that he did march to Capua, when he should have marched to Rome: But Our Duke doth march neither one way nor other, takes no work in hand, but trifles away his Time in idle encampings.

Our Illustrious Duke is justly reputed one of the Greatest Captains of this or any Age. But we have found by former Experience, that he is a little too much given to encamping, when the Season calls for Action. When he march'd with a mighty Imperial Army into his own Lorrain, and the French (under Crequi) were in a manner fled out of the Country; in this so inviting, so provoking an Occasion, he for several Weeks lay encamped upon the Banks of Saar: when all Europe expect­ed his progress with impatience. I confess this might have done well, if he had come only to take the Air: but considering the Business he was upon, 'tis hard to be understood. I meddle no further with that un­fortunate Campagne; which went on as it began.

To return therefore to Hungary; it seems very strange (for I cannot yet leave this Matter) that the Duke of Lorrain, having so great an ad­vantage, [Page 30]did not bear in upon the Enemy with all his power: and parti­cularly upon the Country between the Danube, and the Tibisque, or Teys. It is a very good Country, and was then fresh and untouch'd: no Army having lain upon it, or so much as march'd through it. And it was close at hand: and lay as open to him, as Kent doth to Surrey. Also there was no Enemy to oppose him. For the Serasquier and his heartless Rabble were on the other side the River, not daring to look towards him; and after a while were gone clean away. so that now there was no Army in Hungary beside the Duke's. These Invitations notwithstanding, he could not dispose his mind to move that way; though he had nothing else to do. As if he had been Enchanted; or some Spell had been laid before him, which he had not the power to pass over. I believe the like Exam­ple is no where to be found. They that favour the Glory of this High­born Prince, are troubled that he should lose the Opportunity to en­crease it. If Mercy and Heusler are so renowned, for the Conquests they made with a Detachment of a Detachment; how glorious might the Duke have been by the Atchievements of his whole Army? Fifty thou­sand men may do a great deal of such Work, where five thousand can do nothing. because an equal Force (which is easily had) opposing them, will frustrate all their Attempts. But where five thousand can do any thing, fifty thousand will do ten times more, if there be so much to do.

How did Hatwan (in particular) as it were invite the Duke to be­siege it, lying close by him? Where he was not likely to find greater Resistance, than Mercy and Heusler did afterward at Zolnock, a more con­siderable Place. By the taking of Hatwan, the Duke had been left with­out blame for not repairing Vacia or Novigrad. since he had now a Fron­tier Town, to cover the Country which the Enemy had quitted, and to press upon the Country which the Enemy still kept: which was the thing wanting in those Parts. Also the Communication of Buda and Agria had been cut off, Hatwan lying between them.

I am not ignorant that a wise Reason is given, why the Duke of Lor­rain, laying aside at present the thoughts of these things, drew so soon into Winter Quarters. It is, that he might be the sooner in the Field next year. But who knows what may happen, before the next year comes? Who knows how long the Pope will live, or whether another Pope will be so liberal? Who knows how long the King of Spain will live? Or how long the King of France will continue in this Mind? Or how long this League will last between the Germans, Poles, and Veneti­ans? Or how soon there may be some Accident, which may disturb the Peace of Christendom, and by consequence stop the progress of this War? Or whether the Turks will ever be again, in so bad a posture to defend [Page 31]themselves? The Proverbial Advice, To make hay while the Sun shines, doth extend to all sorts and conditions of People. Nor should we leave any thing to be done to morrow, which may be done to day. The Duke had now a pretious Opportunity in his hands. The neglecting of one such Opportunity, may turn the Fortune of Kingdoms and Empires. Such an Opportunity ought to be embraced and made use of, as if it were never to return again, nor any like it.

The Successes of Mercy and Heusler (of which I have said something already, and must say more hereafter) do make it plainly appear; that the Duke of Lorrain, had it been his hap to try it, might with ease have seized most of the Turkish Places on that side: and gone near to have clear'd the whole Country on the North of Danube, quite down to Bel­grade. But admitting he had found all the fortified Places impregnable, or at least the attacking them not advisable: yet by Marching in amongst them, and eating up the open Country (as the French did in Flanders), he had done great Service. thereby maintaining his Army at his Ene­mies Cost, and depriving the Enemies Armies and Garrisons of their Sub­sistence. If an Army be but in the Enemies Country (which yet the Christians in this War seem industriously to avoid, or they have strange ill luck at it), they are sure to be doing one great part of their Work, and that is, devouring.

Moreover though it should be supposed, that this also could not be done, and that no Impression of any kind could be made upon the Ene­my; yet some are of opinion, that the Duke had no need to spend his time in idle Encampings, and then run into Winter Quarters before Win­ter: since he might have employed his Army to very good pur­pose. He might have laid a Bridge upon the Danube, somewhere near and above Buda, and cover'd it at each end with a strong and large In­trenchment: where a good part of his Army might have quartered all Winter. This Work had been both feasible and profitable. To make it the more feasible, the Duke had Vessels, and a Bridge ready framed, which came down the River by him when he marched last against the Enemy. Also his Army was twice as strong, as it was at the making of his last Bridge. And the Serasquier, who had not hinder'd That, was no way likely to hinder This. He did not so much as Quarter against him or near him: within a while he drew off yet further, and lay quite below Buda: and a little after he marched clear away over the Bridge of Esseck. The making of these Intrenchments I confess was a great Work. But there was the whole Army to do it; and such things have been fre­quently done by less Armies. As for the Soldiers Lodgings who were here to Quarter, they might have made Baraques here, as we find they [Page 32]have been forced to do at Newhausel. Also they might here have had Victuals and Forrage (as before hath been noted) almost as conveni­ently as in Austria it self, by reason of the easy Conveyance down the River▪ and some they would have got out of the Country, command­ing it far and wide. Then as to Profit and Advantage; This Bridge, with these Intrenchments, would have made large amends for the loss of Vice­grad, for the not repairing of Vacia or Novigrad, and the not taking of Hatwan. since it had been better by many degrees, than all of them put together. And this Place, with the Force within it, would have cover­ed all that large Tract of good Land lying behind it towards Gran: it would have driven the Turkish Garrisons into corners, and harrased all the open Country forward, almost as far as the Drave on the one side, and quite to the Teys on the other. It might have been the Mastricht of Hungary: that is, might have done the Christians here as much service, as Mastricht did to the French while they held it. The Turks would have had a warm Winter on't, having such a Fire in their Bowels. And Pest and Buda, Hatwan, Agria, and Alba Regalis, and their other Garrisons hereabouts, had been sorely distressed this Winter for Victuals. We find they have much ado to subsist, though they have no Enemy near to di­sturb or annoy them. Moreover the Christians, by the help of this Bridge so fortified, would have been in a brave posture to carry on the War next Spring. These advantages the Christians might have had, if they would have taken some pains to procure them. But it is too truly ob­served of them, that in all this War they have been very sparing of their labour. Whereas the Romans of old, and the French of late, have owed their Successes as well to their hard Labour; as to their Money, their Skill, and their Valour.

Before I leave this imaginary Bridge, I must answer an Objection con­cerning it: which is this. It is made a chief End of having here a great Strength of Men; that they might distress and starve Buda, themselves being the while supplied by the Danube. But since Buda stands upon the Danube likewise, why might it not be as well supplied the same way? I answer, that there is a very great and wide difference: in that Provisi­ons, &c. must come up against the Stream to the Turks, whereas they fall down the Stream to the Christians. Also the Christian Countries up­on the River are much better cultivated, and can yield far greater Quan­tities of Provisions, than the Turkish Countries upon the same River. And we see by Experience, that the Turks make but little use of this kind of Conveyance, in comparison of the Christians. It is certainly a mighty Advantage to the Christian Armies in Hungary, that not only the Danube, but also the Drave, the Save, and the Teys, bring them down all sorts of Necessaries, out of the Emperour's Countries.

5. The burning of the Bridge of Esseck was a fine Exploit perform­ed by Count Lesley: who hath deservedly the reputation of one of the Emperour's best Commanders. But in the Conduct of this Affair, there are some things not easy to be apprehended. In the first place, it seems to have been carried with the least secrecy, that ever any thing was. The Gazettes gave us advice (from Virovitza), what Count Lesley and his Council of War had resolved upon. Which was, To go first to Caniza, and destroy the Country about it, thereby to incommode and distress that Garrison; and then to march down to Esseck, with design to ruine that Bridge. And a week or a fortnight after, they tell us from the same place; That according to former resolutions, Count Lesley had been at Caniza and done his work there, and was now marching to the Bridge of Esseck. Who can deny but that this is fair open dealing, and play­ing above-board? They let the World know what they intend to do, and they do it accordingly. In the next place, it is a wonder to some, that he did not keep the Town of Esseck when he had taken it. Though his Forces were not great, as not exceeding six thousand Men, yet there was nothing that could disturb or endanger him. For he had beaten the Enemy out of the Field; those that escaped the Rout he gave them, being fled quite to Belgrade. And the Serasquier was far off, and engaged against the Duke of Lorrain: and on the other side the Drave, over which he had no passage but by this Bridge. Moreover the making good this Town was a thing of mighty importance. For the Turks had been there­by deprived of their only Pass into Lower Hungary, and consequently made incapable to defend it or maintain a War in it. In the third place, if the Town was not tenable, or (for Reasons we are yet to learn) it was not advisable to keep it, it is still a wonder he did not do something else. There was not a Man in the Field to oppose him. And the easy taking of Esseck, and of Michalowitz in his March thither, makes it ap­pear, how little difficulty he would have met with in other places, had he had the Heart to try them. Or he might have spent some time in fortifying and furnishing that same Michalowitz. which (by De Witt's particular Map of Hungary, for I find it in no other) lies commodious­ly upon the Drave, about the half way between Virovitza and Esseck. [but I doubt they have quitted this Place, because we hear no more of it.] Or at least he might have Quarter'd upon the Enemy: all that noble Country between the Drave and Save being at his Command. and if he would be moving homeward, he might have done it by slow and ea­sy Marches, and have grazed up the Country as he went. But instead of doing any of these things. the Count marched straight away to Vi­rovitza with all diligence. If a great Army of Turks and Tartars had [Page 34]been at his heels, he could not have gone much faster. Being thus got back into his own Quarters, and out of danger of being burdensome to any but his Friends; he lay there very quietly and contentedly all the rest of the Summer, and did just nothing.

6. It was by special Order from Vienna, that Newhausel was reforti­fied. Which makes some think that the great Walstein was wise: who when he accepted the Supreme Command against the Swede, made it in his bargain (amongst other things) that they should send him no Orders from Vienna. for surely these Orders about Newhausel seem much mistaken. The Place was in a manner totally destroyed by the Siege. the Assailants had filled up a great part of the Ditch: the Ram­part was beaten down by the Cannon: and the Bombs had so torn and ruin'd the Houses, that only twelve of them were left standing. Since therefore in effect it must be all new-built, it is to be consider'd, whether the Situation did deserve that Labour and Charge. It is con­fess'd that Newhausel was a place important, when Comorra and It were the Christians Frontier on the North side the Danube, against Gran and Lewentz possessed by the Turks. Gran and Comorra standing upon the River, and Lewentz and Newhausel ten or twelve miles from it: and the Turkish Towns being about thirty miles distant from the Christian. A­bout twenty miles more backward the Turks had Novigrad and Vacia, standing like the other: the first in the Upland, the last upon the River. and twenty miles yet farther back, they have Pest, Hatwan, and Agria, all abreast: their Land on this side the Danube growing now broader. This was the posture till about forty years ago; and then the Turks took Newhausel. Whereupon the Christians, to curb this Garrison, new­built Leopoldstat, upon the River Waag; and they strongly fortified Nitria, upon the same River on which Newhausel stands. Also now lately, and after the Victory of Vienna, the Christians took Gran and Lewentz: and (to come to the present time) this year they took New­hausel. Here it must plainly appear to any considering Person, that by the Christians having Lewentz and Gran, Newhausel was become useless. And it became more useless by the Turks abandoning Novigrad and Vacia, which happened soon after. And it had become more useless yet, if the Christians had fortified Novigrad or Vacia, and had carried on the Frontier so far. [To say nothing of the Bridge upon the Danube, which I so much fancied in the lines fore-going.] A strong Garrison there, had covered all the Country behind it, and commanded a great way for­ward. But Newhausel is now deep within the Christian Quarters, being almost seventy miles from any Turkish Garrison. It doth not cover one [Page 35]soot of the Christian Country, nor command one foot of the Enemies. Was it not therefore a strange Resolution, to bestow nothing upon Pla­ces that had been highly useful; and to labour so much, upon a Place that is wholly useless? There was more need to slight two or three Garrisons about Newhausel, than to make more. As things are now, there is not such a Cluster of Garrisons upon the face of the Earth. Here stands Newhausel: and behind it Leopoldstat within fifteen miles: on the left hand Nitria in the same distance: on the right hand Comor­ra within ten miles, and Raab within ten miles more. Then before it (toward the Turks) are Gran and Lewentz within thirty miles. And these two last, which are nearest the Enemy, are almost forty miles from any Garrison they have. So that this multiplying of Garrisons, in this place, serves to small purpose.

The condition of Affairs is now such, that the Turks are not likely ever to come so far as Newhausel. And what if the Scene should be al­ter'd? and the Turks should advance with a mighty Force this way? Were it better in this case, that Newhausel lay rased to the Ground, or were fortified as now it is, and had a Garrison (as now it hath) of four thousand Men? It seems very plain that it were better rased to the Ground. For the Town might be well spared, there being more than enow hereabout besides; and the Men might be made better use of, ei­ther in the Field, or for the reinforcement of the Neighbouring Garri­sons. A convenient number of Garrisons, well fortified and well mann'd, is certainly the best. Where they are too many, they cannot all be well mann'd: whereby some or other will become an easy Prey to the Enemy. But they may prove hard to be recover'd; and the Enemies nestling and fixing in them may prove the destruction of the whole Country. So that too great a number is not only impertinent, but also dangerous and pernicious. If therefore a hundred strong Holds could be had with a Wish in the Christian Hungary, more than now are, there be­ing (we may presume) enow already; the next Wish should be to have them all demolish'd.

That the Mistake in fortifying Newhausel may more plainly appear, I will make an Instance (by Supposition) in our own Country. Sup­pose England and Scotland were under two distinct Kings, as they are now happily united under One. The Scots take Barwick, and then they take Newcastle, with all the Places between. And at last they take Dur­ham also. to curb which last, as being the farthest advanced, the English make several strong Garrisons near it. Afterwards the English retake Newcastle; and all the other Places, Durham and Barwick excepted. At another time they likewise retake Durham: but having first ruin'd [Page 36]it with their Bombs and Cannon. And hereupon the Scots demolish Barwick, and abandon it. Would not the World think us to be perfect­ly mad, if we should now refortify Durham with might and main, when it signifies nothing; and should wholly neglect Barwick? It is the ve­ry same case here. The Danube is their Sea: Vacia answers Barwick: Gran is Newcastle; and Newhausel is Durham.

7. We must believe General Schultz to be a Person of great Courage and Activity. One sign of it is this; that he was always in the Field, and at work, some Weeks before other Men. Nevertheless he made no great progress: having to do with a tough Enemy, that held him hard to it. The Places that he besieged, were defended with the ut­most Obstinacy: Nor did Count Teckely fail on his part, to use unwea­ried diligence in relieving them. At last by the taking of Esperies, and the investing of Caschaw it self, Schultz seemed to have brought his Af­fairs into a very hopeful posture. But now another is set over his head: and takes his work out of his hands. We cannot blame him for laying down his Command upon it.

8. Count Caprara is the Man that now Commands at Caschaw. He was first sent to Agria by the Duke of Lorrain, upon an unusual Errand: which was, To take it (if he could) with Bombs. And this design was publish'd to the World, some time before it was put in Execution: for all the Gazettes had it. I think an Example will hardly be found, of a Town this way taken. Of a small Castel perhaps there may. The French, 'tis true, have attacqued some Towns in this manner: as Oude­nard by Land, and Genoa by Sea. But this was not with any hope or expectation to take the Places. The design therefore upon Agria was not like to succeed, and it succeeded not.

9. But Agria was only a thing by the by. and though it be one of the chief Fortresses of the Turkish Empire, yet it was to be taken by a par­ty, in their passage. We must therefore know, That this Force under Caprara was by the Duke of Lorrain sent chiefly against Count Tec­kely. But how comes the Duke of Lorrain to concern himself thus with Teckely, who had Schultz upon him already? we thought the Duke had been engaged against the Serasquier: and that the Serasquier (with the Ottoman Forces) was his Antagonist; with whom he was to cope, and to try Masteries. And we expected, that since the Duke had already worsted him, he would never leave him off till either he had beaten him to pieces, or chas'd him out of Hungary. But the Duke of Lorrain, it [Page 37]seems, entertain'd no such Thoughts: and all that little that he did was against Teckely. As if a Mastiff, having a Bear by the Throat, should let go his hold to snap at a Cur.

10. Though Caprara fail'd at Agria, yet at Caschaw he had great Suc­cess: having that strong Fortress yielded to him in a short time. But for this he was beholden to Teckely's ill Usage by the Turks. Which was a strange Hit to Caprara; and made those things smooth and easy to him, which might otherwise have been exceeding difficult. For surely at the Surrender of Caschaw, they were found so well provided at all points; that had it not been for Teckely's Imprisonment, Caprara might have been as well repuls'd, as ever Man was.

11. When Caprara had made such quick work at Caschaw, it was ex­pected, that he would immediately have marched after Mercy and Heu­sler, (who were now in the course of their Victories); or at least have sent them a good Reinforcement. Since the Nail did drive here so well, 'twas pity there should want hands to strike it. These brave Command­ers wanted nothing but greater Forces, to make greater Conquests: those they had with them, being hardly sufficient to Man the Places they took. It had therefore been well done by Caprara, if he had sent a good supply after them. But if he had gone himself, he had gain'd the Glory of the whole Action: as well of the things that had been done be­fore his coming, as of those that should be done after. all would have been ascribed to the General Caprara. But he seemed little to mind these Matters. All that he now did, was to ly hatching over his new Conquest of Caschaw, and to put his Men in Winter Quarters. And this last he did sooner then he needed, the Season being yet favourable. For we find that Mercy and Heusler continued in Action, and in the Field, for seve­ral Weeks after Caschaw was surrender'd.

12. It hath been said before, that the Surrender of Caschaw and other Places was occasion'd by Teckely's Imprisonment. And surely the Im­prisonment of Count Teckely by the Turks, was a most horrid Act even amongst Infidels. He fell by the Fraud of faithless Barbarians, to whom himself had been too faithful. But the Turks were sufficiently punish'd for it: since it caused the Submission of the revolted Hungarians to the Emperour, which to the Turks was one of the greatest Blows they have receiv'd in all this War.

13. Among all the Champions engaged in this War of Hungary, Mercy and Heusler have born away the prize. It must be confess'd they [Page 38]went about their Business like Workmen. These are they that with a handful of Men, and when the year was almost quite spent: fell into the Enemies Country, and made very considerable Conquests. Which they have bravely maintain'd ever since: upon all Occasions (and many such Occasions happen'd) beating and chasing the Enemy. Heusler had made himself famous before the Campagne began: and had given great proofs of his diligence and courage in hindering the Relief of Newhau­sel. for the effecting of which important Service the Turks made conti­nual Attempts. He was almost all the Winter on Horseback: while others were in there Stoves, at Vienna and Inspruck. And now, as Ca­prara had been detached from Lorrain, so Mercy and Heusler were de­tached from Caprara. and with their Party (for it may not be called an Army) they put themselves upon Action, when the great ones were got into their Winter Quarters. They took Zolnock first, and afterward they took Saravas: both which are considerable Passes. the last upon the great River of Keroz, and the first upon the greater River of Teys. And the potent City of Debreczen, which before was neutral, they made to be wholly Imperial. They also took several other Places of less name, cleared a large Country, and pierced deep into the Enemies Quarters. They shewed what the Duke of Lorrain might have done, if he had pleased with his whole Army to March that way. He might as easily have taken Waradine, and Segedine, and Temeswar, as they took Saravas and Zolnock. He might have master'd the whole Country on this side the Danube, as easily as They did part. And as They Quarter'd their party upon the Enemy all Winter, so He might have done by his Army: not needing to send them so far as he did, some of them to the remotest parts of Germany. To make the thing shorter; if the Duke of Lorrain, after the Battel of Gran, had deliver'd his victorious Troops to Mercy and Heusler; we may well imagine what work they had made, and how like a Torrent they had born down all before them.

14. When the Venetians broke with the Turk, and joyn'd in the War against him; a Judgment might easily be from thence made▪ that he was in a very ill Condition. For we might well think, that this wary People (who also have perfect Intelligence of the State of that Empire) would not engage but upon sure terms. I believe this is the first time that they have been guilty of taking voluntary Arms against the Turk. they not being much given to that sort of fooling, which some call Gallantry. This is not spoken in derogation of the Serene Republique. They deserve great Honour upon several accounts. Nor ought we to heed the Cha­racter given them by Joseph Scaliger, in his Invective Poem. Which I [Page 39]think is the bitterest Satyr that ever was written, next to that of Catul­lus against Caesar. It seems the Pretensions of this Family to Verona, had fill'd the Mans Pen with Gall and Vinegar.

The Venetians having thus undertaken the War, let us see how they prosecute it. Their Terra firma, or Land upon the Continent, lies round the bottom of their Gulf: within which, upon certain small Islands, Ve­nice it self is situate. Most of the Land by much, doth ly on the Western side: and takes up a good part of Lombardy. The Eastern Extremity joyns upon Dalmatia: some of which Country they also have, the Turk possessing the greatest part. and this is the only place, where they bor­der upon the Turks by land. Hither their Armies may march by land; or be transported cross the Gulf, by a short Cut and at an easy Charge. and here they might also be supplied at pleasure. Moreover the Coun­try of Dalmatia lies extended upon this Gulf of Venice, from Istria to Al­bania, between three and four hundred miles in length: and it would be to the Venetians a thing of mighty importance to be sole Masters of it. It lies just at their doors: It would make their Dominion almost as weighty on this side of the Gulf as on the other: and it would establish and secure their Soverainty over that Sea, something better then their yearly m [...]rrying their Doge to it. Of all the places in the World it lies most convenient for them. one foot of ground in Dalmatia is worth two or three elsewhere. And since the Enemy had likewise the Germans and Poles upon him, against whom his utmost Endeavours were required, and probably would be all too little; it could not otherwise be, but that Dalmatia would be very slenderly guarded. And it proved so in the Event: the Turks Forces there being inconsiderable.

It was therefore with reason expected, that the Venetians would make it their principal Care, to get a good Army in Dalmatia. Which if they had done, it was hardly possible for them to fail of Success. So that in all humane probability they might have made an easy Conquest of that whole Country. And then, their Forces being increased by the accessi­on of the Christians there, and maintain'd in great measure by the Coun­try they had conquer'd; they might have carried the War into Albania, or Servia, or Bosnia: which border upon it, and would have been found as much unprovided. But in stead of this, they fall with might and main to Rigging out their Fleet, for which there was no occasion: and they fill it with their Land Forces. As much neglecting Dalmatia out of Choice, as the Turks did out of Necessity. The Turks could not have a Force there, and it seems the Venetians would not. And the second Cam­pagne was worse then the first. For in the first they had there an Army, though it were small and inconsiderable: but in the second, they had none at all.

And what did they do with their Fleet, in which we see was all their Confidence, and which took up all their Care? The first Summer was almost all spent in Preparations. At last they got to Sea: and took a small Island, with a Fort near it upon the Main. And this was all they did that year: which did no way answer the Charge. The next year, as their Force was greater, so also they got out sooner. And they carried their Army to the farther part of Morea, above a thousand Miles from Venice. It cannot be denyed, but that they did their Work here very substantially and Soldier like. And they had as much Success as could be expected from such an Army. Which also was a good Army, consi­dering how far they were carried on Shipboard, and how great the Charge was of the Fleet that attended them. But here lies the Wonder, that they should send an Army so far, when with the same Expence they might have had one in Dalmatia three or four times as big. as it is well known to those, that know the Charge of a Fleet. What could they promise to themselves in Morea, more than in Dalmatia? Did they hope to find them unprovided there, and a small Force there to oppose them? they could not be worse provided then in Dalmatia, where there was no Force at all. Also the Places in Morea were as well fortified as in Dalmatia: and the Christians were as likely to come into the Con­querors, and revolt from the Turks, in the one Country as in the other. The Matter therefore in short stands thus demonstrable. Forty or fifty thousand Men in Dalmatia could do much more then twelve or fifteen thousand in Morea: But forty or fifty thousand might as easily be had in Dalmatia, as twelve or fifteen thousand in Morea: Therefore it had plainly been more advisable, to fall upon Dalmatia then Morea.

For a further Illustration, let me make another Instance at home, and suppose once more that we had War with Scotland. In a time also when they were under great discouragement and disorder, had other Enemies upon them, and were very weakly provided to defend themselves. And We were willing to make the best use of such an Opportunity. Would it not now be a rare Contrivance, if in stead of pouring a main Army into the South Parts of that Kingdom, which border upon us and ly open to us, we should send a great Fleet with a small Army, round by Sea to the farthest North? There to ly Hawking after Ports, when we might the while have been Conquering whole Countries. The Cases are ex­actly parallel: only with this difference, that whereas We should have gone two or three hundred miles out of Our way, the Venetians have gone a thousand out of Theirs. I might also instance in the French: and shew how contrary their Sentiments are to the Venetians in this matter. When They are minded to invade the Spanish Kingdoms, they never [Page 41]dream of carrying Armies by Sea, to Cales, or Gibraltore, or other pla­ces remote; but fall directly into Catalonia or Biscay. The Dutch, 'tis true, in the great War of the Confederates against the French; though they had work enough in Flanders, yet they sent a Fleet with some Land-Men in it, to the farther parts of France. But they did this but once: they never thought fit to repeat it. Well perceiving, that the Money which such a Fleet must cost, would be much better bestowed upon increasing their Army in Flanders. Beside, they did not design to make any great Conquests, or carry on a War at Land, as the Venetians do: but meerly to alarm and infest the Sea Coasts. I cannot but observe by the by; that the Dutch did manage this Affair, in the Execution of it, as weakly, and awk wardly, and unskilfully, and unlearnedly, as ever did Men. I know this may seem incredible: but I could make it plain­ly and particularly to appear, if it were not too long a digression.

It must be confess'd, that a Fleet and Army have notable Advanta­ges by the Swiftness of their Motion: especially where a large Sea-Coast lies exposed to them. For it is impossible to hinder their Landing, as Rawleigh doth well demonstrate. And before their Opposers can come up, they will for some time be Masters of the Field: so as to be able to ravage the open Country, and likewise to possess themselves of some Ports. which being relievable by Sea, will not easily be recover'd. By this way, he that is Master at Sea may put great hardships upon an E­nemy, that at Land is much stronger then himself. And wise Men are of opinion, that the English might shrewdly trouble France this way, if a War should happen. But the Venetians were now above these things: and had a better Game to play. A Country of the Enemies lay open to them, at their doors, and but weakly guarded, and joyning to them by Land. I think there cannot be stronger Invitations. What greater Advantage can be desired, then to have a good Army in the Enemies Country, clearly Master of the Field? And this they might certainly have had, if they had employed their main Force upon Dalmatia. To be Master of the Field, though but for a time, is the End and Aim even of a desultory Sea-War: as it hath been already noted. And surely if the temporary advantage be so desirable, to have it constant and perma­nent must be so much more. The Venetians moreover had not now a stronger Enemy to deal with▪ considering the Circumstances he lay un­der, he was much weaker then themselves. And therefore they had no need to run a Wild goose Chase, when they might carry their Business sure before them, the plain way.

It must also be confess'd, that it was necessary the Venetians should have a Fleet at Sea. But a much less had been sufficient. We find that [Page 42]the Fleet or Squadro, which Molino commanded in the Archipelago, was more then the Turks could deal with.

But here it will be objected, That the Venetians could not bring this great Army into Dalmatia, for want of Men to do it with. To this I answer; That the Money they spent in equipping and maintaining their great Fleets, would have drawn Men to them from all parts of Europe. And the fame of so hopeful and glorious an Expedition, would have roused up the most effeminate even of their own Subjects.

It may be objected also, That regard must be had to the general In­terest of the Confederates. And this is best served by giving the greatest diversion to the Turks. And the diversion is greater by attacquing Morea, which is far from Hungary the chief Scene of Action; then by attacqu­ing Dalmatia, which is near it.

To this I answer; First, that the greatest Force makes the greatest Diversion: and therefore since there might be a much greater Force in Dalmatia then in Morea, the Diversion would be much greater in Dal­matia. Or according to what I said before, forty or fifty thousand Men in Dalmatia, would give the Turks a greater Diversion, then twelve or fifteen thousand in Morea. Secondly, As I have said upon another oc­casion, that Diversion is as good as Conjunction; so I say here and now, that Conjunction is as good as Diversion: and therefore it cannot be hurtful, that the Christian Armies be near one another. It is the com­mon Interest of Confederates, that they all fall on where they can act with the greatest Strength and Vigour. but whether near one another, or a great way off, is no way material. Thirdly, It is confess'd, that Dal­matia being near to Hungary, if those were the places chiefly attacqued, the Turkish Armies that defended them might relieve and assist each o­ther, as there was occasion. And would not the Christian Armies, that act in those parts, have the same Convenience? Fourthly, It is confess'd likewise, that the Turks that defend Morea are quite divided from the rest. but so also are the Christians that attacque it. If therefore we distract the Enemies Force by distracting our own, where lies the advantage? Fifthly, Herein the Turks had the advantage, that their Forces were found ready in Morea; which must have marched as far as Dalmatia, if that had been vigorously invaded. And so they were saved the labour of some Months, which that long March had required. Sixthly, If the best way of Diversion be to go far off, then the farther the better. And therefore the Venetians should have sent their Fleet and Army, another thousand Miles farther. which they might have done. Egypt or the Ho­ly Land lay very fitly for their purpose: and this had been a rare Diver­sion. [Page 43]But if we will speak seriously, no man can think that such a Project had been advisable.

Thus we see that the common Interest did not oblige the Venetians to go so far as Morea. And as for their own Interest, it plainly led them to Dalmatia, as the most commodious, which thing hath been noted before. It may now be added, that if they could get Dalmatia, they might keep it: but except the Turk be beaten out of Europe, he will find Opportu­nities to beat the Venetians out of Morea. And in the mean time, let them do what they can, it will be a Charge and a Burden to them. whereas Dalmatia would maintain and defend it self. 'Tis granted, that the Conquest of Morea would finely enlarge their Sea Dominion: but there is nothing like securing their Gulf, which is done by the Conquest of Dalmatia.

Admitting therefore that the attacquing of Morea were better for the Austrians and Poles, and would more facilitate their Conquests: yet clearly the Venetians are to do what is best for themselves. They are not bound to be beating the Bush, while others catch the Hare: nor to hold the Man's hands, while others rifle him: nor to be making Di­versions, while others are making Conquests.

They must not think that those others, who have chosen the better part, will allow them any share in Their Acquisitions: nor must they reckon that they shall gain any more by the War, then what Them­selves get possess'd of.

The Venetians, it is believed, have advanced more Money towards this War, since the time they engaged in it, then the Emperour hath done. And they might have had as good Armies at least, and have been in a fair probability to make as great Conquests; had they not gone the wrong way to work, and begun at the wrong end. You will say the Emperour was vastly help'd by the Popes Money. But the Venetians might have had an equal share with him, if they had made their bargain wisely.

They that would excuse the Venetians Conduct, are still of opinion, that they were obliged to it by Agreement with their Confederates. But we do not know this: nor is it to be presumed. It being much more u­sual, that Confederates in these cases be left at liberty, each to make the best of his own Game. But if there were such an Agreement, it was their great Error to consent to it.

It hath been observed of the House of Austria, that they have a par­ticular faculty of putting hard Conditions upon their Allies. But the Venetians were not now to be imposed upon. For they came voluntari­ly into a War, in which the others were engaged before: and therefore [Page 44]might have had what terms they pleased. So that it was their own great fault if they were not good ones.

It is the opinion of some Men; that the wise State of Venice, in this Affair, were over swayed by natural Inclination: which it is very hard to withstand. They are much better provided for a War at Sea then at Land. which might make them apt to turn their Forces that way. We see all Creatures, by a certain Instinct, love to make use of that Part, which Nature hath most strongly arm'd them withall. And the Venetians did now as naturally make use of their Fleet, as Bores use their Tusks, or Bulls use their Horns, or Horses their Heels.

I cannot leave the Venetians without one Remark more. It was much wonder'd, That when they had been victorious in Morea, and re­main'd Masters of the Field, they yet carried their Army thence, to their own Neighbouring Islands for Winter Quarters. As if they had thought it a breach of good Manners, to quarter upon an Enemies Coun­try. Or as if they had made Hungary their pattern: where all were highly Civil in this kind, two rude Fellows (Mercy and Heusler) ex­cepted. But what could the Venetians get by so doing? Certainly the Victuals which the Army consumed in their Quarters, would have done as well if it had been brought to them at Morea. And why should not the Victuals be carried to the Men, as well as the Men to the Vi­ctuals? Moreover had the Army staid here, if they could not have maintain'd themselves wholly, they must have got something towards their Maintenance. And the Winter in Morea is mild and gentle: it be­ing the most Southern part of all the Continent of Europe. Also by their stay they had better protected the poor revolted Greeks: who contrariwise were in a very hard Condition, when they were abandon'd by their new Friends, and left to the rage of their old Masters. And this, as the case here stands, is one great Evil of a desultory Sea-War. The Greeks are ruin'd by the Christians, if they come not in to them; and by the Turks, if they do. Such a War being fit to infest and destroy, but not to protect.

This sending Men so far to Winter Quarters, seems to be a new fa­shion. And so doth the proclaiming beforehand the time and place of Rendezvous. Caesar was nine years in conquering Gaul: but we can­not find that ever he did either of these things. If he had drawn back his Army every Winter, to Quarter in Italy; he might have been nine­teen years about this Work, and left it undone at last. But his way was, to Quarter them in the midst of their Business, and either upon his E­nemies, or as near them as he could, in several Camps which they strong­ly intrenched. And when Spring came, he did not use to make a for­mal [Page 45]appointment of a Rendezvous; but by close Orders, and without noise, he drew his Men together; and fell in among the Enemies, where he was least expected, as sudden as a Clap of Thunder. Commonly the first notice they had of him, was by seeing their Country in flames.

The Prince of Orange hath, of late years, given us a Pattern of a Rendezvous. and it was at the Siege of Bon. To which Place he made his Army march, from several Quarters and by several ways: none of them knowing or guessing, whither they were going or what they were to do, till they all met at one and the same time (their Marches being so admeasur'd) under the Walls of the Town. We heard they had in­vested the Place, before we heard that they were marching towards it; and we heard they had taken it, almost as soon as we heard that they were before it. This important Success may justly be accounted the first step of Holland's deliverance from the French.

To shew the advantage yet further, of keeping an Army close up upon the Enemy all Winter, if it may possibly be done; I shall here bring a domestique Example. though the memory of it I confess is not pleasing. Our rebellious Rumpers got their Victory at Dunbar in Sep­tember: after which they took in Edenburg, Lieth, and some other places; with the Countries on this side Sterling. and then the Winter came on. They now well saw, that these new Conquests would not be able to give Winter Quarters to their Army. But did they therefore draw them back into England? No, not a Man of them: they kept them all in Scotland. And moreover they were sending them Recruits all Win­ter: with the addition of divers new Regiments. Then for their Sub­sistance; they sent them by Sea, both Victuals for their Men, and Hay for their Horses. So that against Spring, their Army was more then doubled, upon the place, and ready for Action. Here now were Fel­lows that prosecuted their Business to the utmost. And surely without this vigorous Persistance, they had not brought that Kingdom so soon under their Yoke; nor forced the King to that most Glorious, (but withal most hazardous, and only not fatal) March into England. To apply this Example, I do affirm; That the Christian Armies might as easily have been kept all Winter in Hungary or Morea, as the Blasphem­ing Army (so the Scots elegantly call'd it) was in Scotland.

15. The Magnanimous King of Poland is not to be blamed for the slack Proceedings of that Kingdom. but all the fault must be laid upon their unhappy Constitution: which seems to be meerly a tryal of Skill, how far Monarchy and Republique being mixed together, may ener­vate and confound each other. And it is from the wretched defects [Page 46]in their Government, that so mighty a Country makes so small a fi­gure in the World. This King, after the Relief of Vienna and the de­feat of the Grand Visier, (in which glorious Service he had a principal hand); and after the taking of Gran and some other Places; retired into his own Kingdom. the Quarters assign'd him in Upper Hungary being made too uneasy by Teckely's Garrisons. Now the Poles con­sult how to prosecute the War. And since they joyn upon the Turk themselves, they resolve to employ their Forces upon their own Fron­tier. Which surely was well consider'd▪ for now they might work for themselves: whereas in Hungary they must work for another. And as to the Common Interest and Service, Diversion and Conjun­ction are equipollent. or to speak more at length, It doth as much good to divert the Enemy, as to joyn with the Friend.

The Turks border upon the Poles in Moldavia: which is a Christian Country, but tributary to the Turks, and at their Command. being al­so Govern'd by a Vaivod or Hospodar, appointed by the Great Sultan. It was formerly dependent upon Poland: and it is divided from it by the River Niester. Into this fertile Country the Poles resolve to March. where they could meet with little opposition; almost all the Turkish Forces being drawn into Hungary. And we may be sure the Christian Inhabitants were not unwilling to be freed from their Servitude: espe­cially if fair terms were offer'd them. But the Polish Levies and Recruits went on so exceeding slowly, that it was toward the end of September, before they got into the Field. And then they were about a Month in laying a Bridge over the Niester. So that by that time they were got into Moldavia, it was towards the end of October. And after they had been there some five or six days, without doing or attempting any thing; they found the Winter come on so fast, that they concluded it their best way to March back into their Winter Quarters. And they did March back to their Winter Quarters accordingly. Was not this a most famous Expedition? We may defy all Places and Ages to shew the like. The next year they got sooner into the Field, though not with so good an Army. But the Turks, having now recover'd their Spirits, brought such a Force against them, and beset them so close, that they had much ado to make their Retreat.

By what hath been here related and observ'd, it plainly appears; That the Christians have lost the greatest Opportunity, that ever they had against the Turks. These last, by the destruction of their Ar­my at Vienna, were brought to such a condition; that they were no way [Page 47]able to resist the united Powers of the Germans, Poles, and Venetians. Whose Force also was much increased by the great Sums of Money ad­vanced by the Pope. And the whole Turkish Empire was in a strange Consternation and Confusion. But in this so favourable a Conjuncture; the Germans engaged themselves before Buda, against Sense and Rea­son, where they were held in Shackles: the Poles were asleep, when they should have been most active: and the Venetians spent their time and their Money, in rigging out a Fleet to no purpose, and then in play­ing at small Game. Had the Christians on all sides, and with their whole Power, press'd briskly and vigorously upon the Enemy; it is probably believed, That the Duke of Lorrain might (the very first year) have beaten them out of Hungary; the Venetians might have conquered Dalmatia, and the adjoyning Countries: and the King of Poland might have seized Moldavia, together with Valachia which stood upon the same terms, and Marched to Constantinople.

FINIS.

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