The management of the present war against France consider'd in a letter to a noble lord by a person of quality. Littleton, Edward, b. 1626. 1690 Approx. 65 KB of XML-encoded text transcribed from 17 1-bit group-IV TIFF page images. Text Creation Partnership, Ann Arbor, MI ; Oxford (UK) : 2011-04 (EEBO-TCP Phase 2). A48743 Wing L2579 ESTC R18766 12730270 ocm 12730270 66434

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Early English books online. (EEBO-TCP ; phase 2, no. A48743) Transcribed from: (Early English Books Online ; image set 66434) Images scanned from microfilm: (Early English books, 1641-1700 ; 987:14) The management of the present war against France consider'd in a letter to a noble lord by a person of quality. Littleton, Edward, b. 1626. [2], 30 p. Printed for R. Clavel, C. Wilkinson and J. Hindmarsh : And are to be sold by Randal Taylor ..., London : 1690. Reproduction of original in Union Theological Seminary Library, New York.

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THE MANAGEMENT OF THE Preſent War AGAINST FRANCE CONSIDER'D. IN A LETTER TO A Noble Lord.

By a Perſon of Quality.

LONDON, Printed for R. Clavel, C. Wilkinſon and J. Hindmarſh, and are to be ſold by Randal Taylor near Stationers-Hall, 1690.

THE MANAGEMENT OF THE Preſent War againſt France CONSIDER'D.

YOU did me the great Favour, My Nobleſt Lord, to peruſe my Obſervations upon the War of Hungary, ſome time before they were Printed. And You were pleaſed to give them your Approbation. Wherein, 'tis like, your Friendſhip and Candour might prevail much upon your Judgment. Your Lordſhip doth at preſent diſpenſe with my Continuation of that Work, (which indeed I have but faintly, or rather have not promiſed): and You demand my Opinion of that which more neerly concerns us, namely, the preſent War of the Confederates againſt the French King.

Without making Excuſes, to which I have too juſt a Title, I humbly return this Anſwer; that according to my weak apprehenſion of things, the grand Error of the Hungarian War, hath now been acted over again by the Confederates. I think I have ſhewed plainly in thoſe Obſervations, that the Chriſtians did greatly miſtake in falling upon Buda: thereby attacquing their Enemy in his Strength. by which they expoſed themſelves to great Hazards and Loſſes, brought infinite prejudice to their Affairs, and retarded their Conqueſts which might otherwiſe have been ſwift and eaſy. And the ſame may be ſaid of the Sieges of Mentz and Bon: which have cauſed ſo great an Expence, of pretious Time, and Bloud, and Treaſure.

At the beginning of the Campagne the Confederates were in a dreadful poſture: having ſuch a Force in the Field, as hath ſeldom been ſeen in Europe. Their ſeveral Armies were reckoned to make up a hundred and ſeventy thouſand Men: and ſurely by the moſt moderate Computation, they muſt be above a hundred and forty thouſand. There were above twenty thouſand in the Duke of Bavaria's Army: the Imperial Troops under the Duke of Lorrain were about the ſame number: and thoſe of Saxony, Heſſe, and Lunenbourg, could not be leſs than thirty thouſand. Theſe were in the upper Parts of the Rhine; and put together, made up ſeventy thouſand Men. Then in the lower Parts, the Spaniſh Army, with the Troops of Liege and Munſter added to it, was above twenty thouſand: and the whole Dutch Force, with that of Brandenburg, were neer upon fifty thouſand. So that the Total of theſe amounted to ſeventy thouſand likewiſe.

Here now were two mighty Armies: which if they had march'd forward, would have made France to ſhake. Yet it is confeſs'd, that 'twas very poſſible they might have made no great progreſs or impreſſion, if they had been oppoſed by an equal Force, or any thing neer equal. But the Matter was cleer otherwiſe. For the French, notwithſtanding they had quitted ſo many Places beyond the Rhine, could get but a ſmall Force in the Field this year. Their Generals in theſe Parts were Humieres and Duras. Under Humieres there might by thirty thouſand Men: but we do not find that Duras, though joyn'd by the flying Armies (or Parties) of Monclar, Montal, and Boufflers, could ever make twenty.

It may here be demanded, what became of their Men? for even thoſe that were drawn out of the Towns they quitted, would have made a good Army. To this I anſwer; that their Men were beſtowed in thoſe ſtrong Places they held upon the Rhine, to fill them with very ſtrong Garriſons. They plainly made this their Barrier againſt the mighty Force that threaten'd. By the great Reſiſtance theſe Garriſons were like to make, in caſe they were attacqued, they might well hope to keep their Enemies at the armes End, and ſtave off the War from France. And it may truly be affirm'd, that the chief ſtrength of the French Monarchy lay now in theſe Garriſons.

The French Garriſons upon the Rhine, at the opening of the Campagne, were theſe that follow; Hunningen, Briſach, Strasburg with the dependencies, Fort Louis, Philipsburg, Mentz, Bon, Keyſerwert, and Rhinberg. And theſe took up the whole length of that River from Swiſſerland to Holland: only the Germans had the great City of Collen between Keyſerwert and Bon, and Coblentz between Bon and Mentz. But moreover beyond the Rhine, or on the French ſide of it, the Germans had all Flanders at their devotion; with the Dutchy of Juliers, and the Dioceſs of Liege.

This being the Condition of Affairs, the great Queſtion is, Whether it were better for the Confederates to attacque theſe very ſtrong Places upon the Rhine, or to March ſtraight into France. And it ſeems very evident, that the marching into France had been more adviſable.

Let any man of reaſon conſider, what were the Sentiments of the French King; when there was a mighty Force againſt him, which he was no way able to withſtand. I ſay, let it be conſider'd, which of theſe two things he moſt dreaded: whether their Sitting down before ſome of his remote Garriſons, or their falling with the whole weight of the ſevenſcore thouſand Men, into the Bowels of his Kingdom. I think there is no doubt, but that he moſt dreaded this later. For in the former he had his Wiſh: He ſaw his deſign ſucceeded: and things fell out juſt as he would have them. He had left thoſe Garriſons there, for that very End and Purpoſe. He could not hope but that theſe Places would be taken at laſt: for he never ſo much as attempted their Relief. But his hopes were, that his Enemies would ſpend their Time and their Strength upon them. And I dare ſay he wiſhes with all his Soul, that they would do the like next year.

The Miſeries of a defenſive War (I mean where the Enemy is cleerly an Over-Match) are beyond Expreſſion. David choſe rather to ſubmit to a Peſtilence, then to fly before the Enemy for three Months: which is the Condition of thoſe that are upon the defenſive, againſt Enemies much ſtronger then themſelves. And this muſt have been the Condition of France for the laſt whole Summer, and the whole Winter too, had the Confederates march'd forward.

The great and ſwift Conquerours in all Ages (ſuch as the Cimbrians of old, and after them the Goths, Vandals, and Lombards) never lay pelting at Frontier Garriſons, but broke into the Countries; overwhelming and ſeizing whole Countries. And the Confederates might have done ſo now. You'll ſay the ſtrength of modern Fortifications makes Conqueſts now more ſlow and difficult. Not at all. for Places were ſtronger in the old times, then they are at preſent: that is, they were harder to be taken. The Engines of Aſſailing being now ſo violent, that there is no Fence againſt them. No place is now impregnable (ſays a Man of Skill) unleſs it be inacceſſible. Rohan.

The Confederates were now cleerly Maſters of the Field: which is a glorious Condition. To be Maſter of the Field is the Soldiers delight. He that is cleerly Maſter of the Field, if he underſtand his Buſineſs, will not want any thing. And he hath this very great advantage, that he may fall upon his Enemy where he is worſt provided. But if he fall upon him where he is beſt provided, he loſes and throws away that great advantage. And this the Confederates have done, by attacquing the ſtrong Garriſons upon the Rhine, and particularly Mentz and Bon. Both which Places the French had been fortifying all Winter, with extreme diligence: and had put ſeven or eight thouſand Men into Bon, and into Mentz ten or twelve thouſand. I know that, at the beginning of theſe Sieges, we had an account of far leſſer numbers. But he that ſhall conſider, how many marched out of thoſe Places when they were ſurrender'd; and ſhall conſider likewiſe, what loſs of Men the Defendants muſt ſuſtain, in Sieges of that length, carried on with ſo great Forces, and with ſo much Vigour and Violence; may reaſonably conclude, that the Garriſons could not be leſs numerous at firſt, then I have made them.

But why don't I likewiſe find fault with the beſieging of Rhinberg and Keyſerwert? I anſwer, Becauſe theſe Places were quickly and eaſily taken. You'll ſay, This is to judge of things by the Event. I own its but withall I add, that it is a good way of judging in matters of this nature. The beſieging and taking of Towns is a thing wherein Men of Skill go upon Certainties, and wherein Fortune hath little or no ſhare. So that if the deſign ſucceed, we may conclude that it was adviſable. In the former Confederate War againſt the French, we might obſerve, that where ever the French attacqu'd any Town, they carried it with Eaſe and Speed. (Never ſpeak of Mons, for that was only a Blockade.) But the Confederates were often repulſed; and what they got, was with extreme difficulty. From whence we may ſafely make a Judgment, that the French did manage their Affairs with greater Skill.

Where a Siege proves long and bloudy, either the Difficulties are unexpected, or they were foreſeen. If they are unexpected, this ſhews that the Aſſailants did unskilfully miſtake their meaſures. And ſurely a Workman that cannot take his meaſures aright, is of no value. But if they foreſaw the difficulties of the Undertaking, and yet did wilfully engage in it; the Error is yet more inexcuſable, and it ſhews a greater want of Judgment.

In the Preface to my Obſervations I made a ſhort (but hohourable) mention of the Prince of Baden. And your Lordſhip knows, that that Preface was both written and printed, before we heard of any of that Prince's Actions laſt Summer. But by what he had done before, I had great Confidence and Aſſurance (which alſo I expreſſed often) that he would do better then other Men. This brave Prince, if we will conſider things aright, hath chiefly got his Glory by falling upon eaſy things, and by avoiding the difficult. The firſt time that he acted ſeparately was after the Taking of Buda: when he ſell into the Turks lower Hungary, late in the year, with part of the Army which had been ſo ſorely harraſed and maul'd at that Siege. The chief Fortreſs the Turks had in thoſe Parts was Zigeth: and it lay fairly before him, but it was too ſtrong for him. Had he attacqu'd it, it might have proved another Buda. he might perhaps have beſieged it one year, and have taken it the year following. and in the mean time all other things muſt be left undone. Wherefore he wiſely paſs'd it by; and took other work in hand. And in a ſhort ſpace of time, he ſubdued all the reſt of that Country.

The next year, after the Battel of Harſan, he was called away by ſome Occaſions. and General Dunwalt did very well ſupply his place: by the ſame Methods, ſubduing moſt part of Slavonia with ſmall Force. But the year after, while the main of the Chriſtian Force was engaged againſt Belgrade, this Prince invaded Boſnia: where he made great Conqueſts, and took every place that he attacqued. But he did not think fit to attacque Seraio, the Capital City of the Province: which, if he had taken it, would have Crown'd all his Victories. But there was too great a Force within it. He therefore paſt by it; and took Zwornick, a place that lay further in: beſide other Places. Laſt year he commanded the main Army: and Seraio being of ſo great importance, he might fairly have thrown away his Men and his Time upon it. But he choſe rather to leave it behind him: and he run in as far as Niſſa. at which Place, and at other Places about it, we know he made ſhort work. Upon the whole, he made a Conqueſt this year of a great and large Country. And if Places were not fit to be kept, he preſently ſlighted them; if they were fit, he made them better. For he fell hard to work where ever he came. And he hath made it appear; That a good General ſhould take up the Motto of the Roman Emperour, (I think it was Pertinax), Laboremus. Thus we ſee, that this renowned Prince hath accompliſht with ſpeed what ever he undertook; becauſe he undertook nothing, but what he knew he could ſpeedily accompliſh.

I am well informed, that the Duke of Lorrain undertook this Siege of Mentz full ſore againſt his Will, and at the Inſtance of the other Confederates. And it was juſt ſo formerly with the Emperour Charles the fifth. During the diviſions of Germany the French had ſeized upon Metz: and the Germans, having made Peace, were mad to recover it. To which Service they went with an Army of a hundred thouſand Men, under the Conduct of that Emperour. And the French were in no condition to make head againſt them: only Metz was then as well provided for defence, as Mentz was now. The wiſe Emperour, who was one of the greateſt Captains of his Age, was cleerly for marching into France: where he knew he could eaſily make ſuch Conqueſts, as would (at leaſt) oblige the French to an Exchange. But nothing would content the Germans but the Siege of Metz. they muſt needs attacque their Enemy in his ſtrength. And we know the ill Succeſs of it.

There were other Perſons now, and thoſe no mean ones, to whom this Siege was as little pleaſing as to the Duke of Lorrain. Duke Schomberg was here at the Engliſh Court, when the firſt Tidings came that the Siege of Mentz was reſolved upon. And I am well informed likewiſe, that both Duke Schomberg, and a greater Man then He, did utterly diſlike the Reſolution. judging the March into France to be infinitely more adviſable. And I dare ſay that the Prince of Baden was of the ſame Mind. Had He been at Coblentz (where the Confederates paſs'd the Rhine), and might have had his way; he would have choſen much rather to march on to Paris, then to march back to Mentz. for from Coblentz to Mentz, by reaſon of the bending of the River, is plainly backward: as any one may ſee, that will look upon the Map of thoſe Countries. Did the Prince ever declare his Mind in this Matter? I do not ſay it. But we may ſafely preſume, that he would have been for falling in upon the French, in the ſame manner as he fell in upon the Turks. And he might well hope to have the like Succeſs, and to make the like Impreſſion, with a Power ſeven times as great.

In the time of the third Carthaginian War, when the War was carried on heavily by others, and Scipio had laid about him though in an inferiour Command; Cato was pleaſed to ſay, That Scipio only was a Man, and the reſt were Shadows. So we may ſay now, that the Prince of Baden hath done great things; and the reſt have done nothing, in compariſon of what they might have done.

If the Confederates had engaged themſelves before Mentz only, it had been tolerable. For they might nevertheleſs have had one maſtering overbearing Army, which might have done great Matters. though it would have been much better if they had had two: ſince each would have found their work eaſier, the Enemy being diſtracted and confounded. But their attacquing of Bon at the ſame time, quite diſabled them, and compleated the Miſchief.

The Miſchief of theſe two Sieges conſiſted, partly in the Advantages which thereby they loſt, and partly in the Diſadvantages or Evils they fell under. By theſe Sieges they loſt the grand Advantage, of carrying the War into the Enemies Country: which contains in it many Advantages. In this way they might have maintain'd their Armies at the Enemies Charge. which is no ſmall matter though they could have done nothing elſe, and though they could have maſter'd no Places of importance. But many ſuch Places muſt have fallen into their hands, if they had broke into the Country with an overwhelming Power. For it had been impoſſible in ſuch a caſe, that all Places ſhould be well provided for defence; and it had been their own great fault, if they had not fallen upon thoſe that were worſt provided. When they had once got paſt the Frontier, it muſt be a good Place that could have held out a Week againſt ſo great Force. Few Places within a Country are compleatly fortified: and thoſe that were beſt fortified would have been an eaſie prey, unleſs they had been likewiſe well manned: and thus to Man all Places had been infinite. Moreover they might have ſeized ſeveral weaker Places, but of commodious Situations, which if (by the example of the Prince of Baden) they had taken the pains to fortify, would have been Places of importance.

Theſe things might have been done by the Confederates, in regard their Forces were ſo much ſuperiour. But where the Forces of each ſide are equal, or near an equality, (as it was between the Dutch and Spaniards for many years); in this caſe he that will be the Aſſailant, if his Enemy be cautious, hath a hard Chapter: ſince he muſt get ground by Inches, and muſt always be doing difficult things. which is now excuſable becauſe it is neceſſary, there being no eaſy things to be done. For if in this caſe he ſhould run into the Country, and leave the ſtrong Frontier Places behind him, the Enemy would hamper him as a Spider doth a Fly. whereas if he had a mighty overbearing Force, the Enemy could do no more harm to him, then a Spider can to a Hornet. But ſince he hath it not, he muſt be content to attacque the Frontier Places, and to clear as he goes. And if he can get one or two of thoſe Places in a Summer, it is a fortunate Campagne.

As it hath been already intimated, where there is an overbearing Force, the way to make ſhort work is to break into the Country. Guſtavus Adolphus judg'd it and found it eaſier to conquer Bavaria, then to take Ingolſtat. if the Grand Viſier, ſeven years ago, could have let alone Vienna, his ſubduing the reſt of Auſtria had been inevitable. Nor could the Frontier Places he left behind him (as Raab, Veſprin and Serinſwar) have been any hindrance. And ſome think that the High-born Elector, who lately took Belgrade with ſo much Gallantry, might in leſs time, and with much leſs difficulty, have over-run and ſubdued both Servia and Bulgaria, and have chaſed Yeghen Baſſa over Mount Haemus. In like manner it may be here affirm'd; That the Confederates, in all humane Probability, might have made great Conqueſts in France, while they lay toyling before Mentz and Bon. Let me ſmite him to the Earth at once, ſaid Abiſhai to David: I will not ſmite him a ſecond time. Even ſo there was now an Opportunity to ſmite the French Monarch to the ground: he might have been laid ſo low, as never to riſe more. We might, very probably, have ſeen an end of the War in one Summer.

It hath been ſaid before, that the French were but weak in the Field this year. and a powerful Invaſion would have made them yet weaker. This laſt may ſeem a Paradox: but we have a clear Experient of it in the former War of the Confederates. In one of thoſe Campagnes, the Prince of Conde commanded about fifty thouſand men in Flanders: where he was confronted by an Army of Dutch and Spaniards of near the ſame number. But after ſome time, the later were joyn'd by a matter of twenty thouſand Germans. Whereupon the Prince was forced to ſend ten thouſand of his Men, to renforce ſeveral Garriſons: which were now, by the Increaſe of the Enemies Force, in greater danger. The like would have befallen the Marſhal of Humieres this laſt year, if the Duke of Brandenburg, after the taking of Keiſerwert, had marched up to Prince Waldeck: with whom the Marſhal had been tugging for ſome time, their Forces being near equal. Whereas now on the contrary, when Humieres found that the Duke was engaged before Bon, he drew great Numbers out of his Garriſons to renforce his Army. And by this means he became ſtrong enough to carry the War into Flanders; where he kept his Army all the latter end of the year, obliging the Spaniards and the Dutch to draw thither likewiſe.

I might alſo ſhew by another late Experiment, That the actual Invaſion and breaking in of an over-powering Enemy, doth weaken the Army of the Defendants, by putting them upon ſo ſtrong a Guard of ſo many Places. When the Grand Viſier above-mentioned marched againſt Auſtria, the Duke of Lorrain oppoſed him with Forces much Inferior. and he kept him off a while by the help of Raab River. But when the Viſier had broke through that Impediment, and was got into the Country, the Duke was forced to divide his Army, thereby to Man ſome Garriſons (and they were but few) that were moſt important. So that his Force in the Field was vaniſh'd and gone. Thus we ſee, that even in theſe matters, Whoſoever hath, to him ſhall be given, and he ſhall have more abundance; but whoſoever hath not, from him ſhall be taken away, even that he hath.

I THINK I have made it appear, that the Confederates have loſt great Advantages, by engaging upon hard Sieges on the Rhine when they ſhould have invaded France. I come now to ſhew, what Evils or Diſadvantages they have fallen under. And ſurely the Evils are neither few nor ſmall, which the Confederates have ſuffered by theſe Sieges.

The firſt Evil I ſhall mention is their loſs of Men. Which muſt needs be very great (whatever Accounts we have had of it) in ſuch continued violent Attacques, finding ſuch ſtout Reſiſtance. And here we muſt obſerve, That in Approaches and raiſing of Batteries, and in Aſſaults and Sallies, we uſually compute the Loſſes by the number of Men that were ſlain out right: not much regarding how many were wounded. When perhaps a great part of theſe might dy afterward of their Wounds, or be diſabled from ever bearing Arms. Moreover we muſt bear in mind, that there was not only great loſs at the very Places beſieged; but by occaſion of theſe Sieges, the Enemy having his free Range the while, many were cut off in other places. To paſs by leſſer matters, Duras (in one of his Courſes) is ſaid to have ſent ſome thouſands of the Bavarians, into whoſe Quarters he had fallen, Priſoners to Strasburg: having killed great numbers likewiſe. And it is confeſſed on all ſides, that eight hundred Germans (ſome ſay they were twelve hundred) being lodged in a ſmall Town call'd Cochem; the Marqueſs of Boufflers ſtorm'd the Place, and put them all to the Sword. We do not know the reaſons, why they were thus expoſed.

The ſecond Evil of theſe hard Sieges was the infinite Expence of Ammunition. Upon which I need not to enlarge, the matter being plain and evident of it ſelf.

Thirdly, Whereas the Confederates might have carried the War into the Enemies Country, by engaging upon theſe Sieges they kept it in their own. By which means they have been forced to maintain their Armies as it were upon the peny, all at their own Charge and with their own Proviſions. Whereas if their Armies had marched into France, they would have been there maintained. And that, not only during the Campagne, but alſo after it. It had been very hard fortune, if they could not in France have found or made Winter Quarters. But now, as matters have been order'd, they were forced (when the Campagne was over) to draw their Armies home, and there keep them all Winter.

Fourthly, It is owing to the Sieges of Mentz and Bon, that a great part of Germany now lies in ruines. The Germans themſelves have been in effect the Authors of this Miſchief. They that would engage their whole Force in difficult Sieges, and thereby give advantage to the Enemy to deſtroy whole Countries with Fire, may juſtly be accounted the chief Incendiaries. Had they marched into France, they had been in a condition to retaliate: and this had obliged the Enemy to fair War. Whereas their not being in ſuch a condition, emboldened the French to execute thoſe Barbarities. But the French durſt as well have eaten fire, as made thoſe Fires in Germany, had the German Armies been then in France. Moreover if the Germans had been in France, no French Armies would have been in Germany: all muſt have been drawn back to defend their own. I ſhall not go about to compute the Damage, which the French have done by theſe Devaſtations. But by a part we may make ſome Gueſs at the whole. In one Courſe beyond the Rhine (the ſame that hath before been mention'd) we are told that Duras burnt twenty thouſand Houſes. And theſe being valued but at fifty pound a Houſe one with another, come to a Million of pounds. which is a good deal more, then Mentz and Bon are worth.

Fifthly, Poor Flanders hath felt the diſmal Effects of the long Sieges upon the Rhine. For it hath laſt Summer been made the Seat of War; which might have been carried into France, had it not been for thoſe Sieges. All the beginning of the year Humieres lay encamped at Nivelle, between Mons and Bruſſels. And Prince Waldeck, with the Dutch Army, encamped likewiſe not far from him. At laſt Waldeck advanced (by exceeding ſlow Marches) and Humieres retreated. And now the Dutch talk'd of falling into the French Quarters: but they never went above ten Engliſh Miles beyond Charleroy, a Spaniſh Garriſon upon the Frontier. Then Humieres takes heart from the Germans being engaged before Bon, and marches in again to the neighbourhood of Bruſſels: whither he drew Prince Waldeck after him, whom the Spaniſh Army now joyn'd. And here they lay, confronting each other, all the latter end of the Campagne. But Flanders groaned in the mean time under the burden of three Armies. Such another Campagne would bring it very low.

Sixthly, The other Confederates have alſo ſuffer'd much, by the War going on thus heavily. their mighty Force, which with much ado they had got together, and which ſeem'd ſufficient to overturn Kingdoms and Empires, having ſpent it ſelf in the Taking of two Towns. We ſee the Emperour knows not which way to turn himſelf between the French and the Turk. The other German Princes, with whom Money is ſcarce though they abound with Men, muſt be hard put, to it to maintain their old Troops all Winter, and raiſe new ones againſt Spring. The Dutch alſo muſt ſtrain their utmoſt, in ſetting out their Fleets and Armies. Their Commerce is diſturbed, and their Charges are exceeding great, and they find the burden of this lingring War doth preſs ſore upon them. And even in England we feel the Incommodities of the ſlow Work abroad. The difficulties we meet with in reducing Ireland; our Loſſes of Ships, our great decay of Trade; the Fall of our Rents, and the heavy Taxes we ly under; all muſt be imputed to the Sieges of Mentz and Bon, and all might have been prevented by a powerful Invaſion of France. which had put the French out of condition to conteſt it with us.

Laſtly, By undertaking theſe Sieges, and omitting better things, the Confederates are forced to be all this Winter in a wretched defenſive poſture. All that they aim at, and employ their utmoſt Labour and Diligence upon, is only to ſave their own, and oppoſe the Inſults of the Enemy. Whoſe Country in the mean time is out of their reach, and Themſelves in no condition to requite them.

I HAVE laid before your Lordſhip the Reaſons which induce me to believe; that the Confederates had much better have fallen into France it ſelf, then ly toyling a whole Summer about two Out-Garriſons. But there are ſome Objections, which may ſeem very ſtrong againſt the Invading Deſign: and which therefore ought to be well anſwered. And theſe ariſe, either from the Difficulties that muſt attend the Invaſion, or from the Inconveniences that muſt follow upon it other ways.

The main Difficulty objected is the want of Victuals: with which they could not eaſily be ſupplied from home, when they were engaged far and deep in the Enemies Country. But to this I anſwer; that in all likelyhood they would not much need ſuch Supplies, having the Enemies Country at their Command. And they that make this Objection would do well to give us an Example, where an overwhelming Army was ever diſtreſs'd for Victuals. They will have it, if it be above ground; there is no keeping it from them. Therefore we do not read, that the great and ſwift Conquerours before named were ever that way diſtreſs'd. And the like may be ſaid of Tamerlan, and Attila the Hunne: who drew after them ſuch numerous and devouring Armies. Alſo the Grand Viſier who of late years broke into Auſtria, leaving divers ſtrong Places behind him; hath given full and clear Evidence of this matter. He lay under divers particular diſadvantages in point of Victuals. For he engaged upon the hard and long Siege of Vienna, where he was tyed faſt by the Leg: he had firſt with Fire and Sword deſtroyed all the Country near it, and conſequently the Proviſions: and the City ſtanding on the Danube, and the Viſier having no clear paſſage over it, his Army could range but on the one ſide the River to get Forrage and Victuals. Which things notwithſtanding, he never wanted; and when the Chriſtians forced his Camp, they found there Proviſions in abundance. At the end of the laſt Confederate War, we know Crequi marched againſt the Duke of Brandenburg: to the farther parts of Germany, through ſeveral Countries, over ſeveral great Rivers. Which Expedition, as ſome think, was the moſt Heroick Enterprize in the kind, that hath been known ſince Hannibal marched into Italy. But what care did he take, and what Proviſion did he make, for Victuals; a thing ſo needful for his Voyage? Truly as far as we can learn, it was not much. It ſeems he made account, that his Army did carry Victuals, and all other Neceſſaries, upon the point of their Swords. And the Duke of Brandenburg was no way able to hinder their being ſupplied with thoſe things. Otherwiſe he would never have ſubmitted to the hard terms they impoſed upon him.

But the Objection concerning this difficulty, that is, the want of Victuals, is enforced yet further. 'Tis true, they ſay, a Commanding Army will get it, if it be to be had. But it is not to be had, where the Defendants have themſelves deſtroyed it, by Waſting thoſe parts of their Country in which the Enemy is expected. Which, they add, muſt ſo diſtreſs him, that he cannot poſſibly ſubſiſt.. Here now is a rare Receipt againſt all Invaſions. For if theſe things hold good, no Conqueſt could be made: and the weakeſt People that are, might defend themſelves againſt the moſt puiſſant Enemy. ſince even the weakeſt People can deſtroy their own Country. But if this device doth ſuch Wonders, why did not the Duke of Brandenburg make uſe of it againſt Crequi, and the Emperour againſt the Grand Viſier, and the Bavarian againſt the Swede? And why were not all the other great Conquerours, by this one way defeated and diſappointed? But many things may be eaſily ſaid, which are not ſo eaſily done. And ſurely I think we can hardly find, that ever this deſtroying Device proved effectual, againſt an overwhelming Power, ſuch as the Confederates had now. The thing was ſtrongly attempted in this France, when they made their brave and reſolute defence againſt Caeſar: but they were not able to go thorough with it. The ſame France was invaded by Attila: but the thing which then preſerv'd it, was the oppoſing him with an equal Force. Had it not been for that, how could they have turn'd themſelves to this work of deſtroying, when He might have broke in upon them in ſeveral places, with four or five Armies at once, each of them conſiſting of above a hundred thouſand? when alſo every Army might have divided into four or five parts, and every part had been a good Army.

Here we may be told, how Charles the fifth was driven out of Provence, and this King of Poland out of Moldavia, by deſtroying or cutting off their Forrage and Victuals. But their Forces were not to compare with the preſent Force of the Confederates: for which reaſon that Inconvenience might be eaſier put upon them. And they were cloſely waited on by Armies near as good as their own. the King by the ſwift and nimble Tartars; who infeſted him with great Skill, for ſuch Barbarians, as well as Boldneſs and Activity. and the Emperour by the Power of France; which was grown ſtrong at laſt, though at firſt it were much inferiour, the Invaſion having been ſudden and unexpected. Alſo the Emperor was got into a Nook or Corner of the Country; having the Sea on one ſide, and on another ſide the Rhoſne. And he had likewiſe, unadviſedly, engaged be a difficult Siege, namely that of Marſeilles. I think it may in truly affirmed, that he did not, in this Expedition, ſhew ſo good Conduct as at other times.

But to proceed; This deſtroying one part of a Country to preſerve the other, (if we conſider things aright) is a very ſad and diſmal Remedy. What will they do with the People of thoſe parts that are thus deſtroyed? Will they cut their Throats? or will they leave them to be ſtarved? or muſt they be maintain'd by the Countries that are untouch'd? which will be a heavy burden. So that it is no wonder, if this way be ſeldom practis'd. Moreover it is not a ſmall deſtruction that will ſerve the turn in this caſe: it muſt extend far and wide. ſo great a Tract of ground is to be waſted, that the Enemy may be diſtreſs'd for Victuals in marching through it, and before he can reach the Countries untouch'd. If therefore it be but three or four days march, it will ſignifie nothing, nor diſtreſs the Enemy in any meaſure: ſince he may bring ten or twenty days Proviſion with him. I mean Proviſion for the Men: for as for the Horſes, Forrage will be had for them, (in the Summer) even in a waſted Country. there being no way, that we know of, to deſtroy Graſs upon the Ground.

I HAVE anſwered the grand Difficulty, which ſeems to attend the Invading Deſign; that is, the Want of Victuals. Another Difficulty is this. In caſe the Confederates here ſhould make a large Conqueſt (which indeed is the thing aim'd at) they would be obliged to Garriſon a great many Places: and this taking up great numbers, would very much diminiſh their Marching Army, ſo that at length they would want Men. But this is a thing, which the Confederates needed not to fear: ſince they had Germany at hand, that great Magazine of Men, (to ſay nothing of all the North of Europe beſide); which would have ſupplied them with People to any number, if they could find means to maintain them. And the Plunder of France had been a high Invitation. In all probability there had been ſuch an Inundation of the Northern People, as hath not been ſeen of late Ages. Moreover a great number of Garriſons had been no way neceſſary. The Romans kept Countries under, by Armies and not by Garriſons. And a few Garriſons at forty or fifty miles diſtance, as they would over-ſpread a large Country, ſo they would throughly command it. for it muſt be a weak Garriſon, that cannot command twenty or thirty miles round.

There is another Difficulty, which hath ſome dependence upon this laſt: and that is, That when the Confederates had diſtracted their Force by large and remote Conqueſts, they might with the ſame ſpeed loſe all they had gotten. This might have ſome weight, if they had only laid hold upon a preſent Occaſion to break in upon an Eremy, who afterwards might prove the ſtronger. But there was no ſuch danger here. For in all humane probability, the French Monarchy had been broken to pieces. I confeſs the Prince of Baden broke in thus upon his Enemy, when he had no advantage over him, ſave in his own excelling Vertue. And perhaps it may prove difficult to maintain his Conqueſts. But however he gave the Emperour an Opportunity to make a good Peace: which conſidering he was now engaged (or indeed had engaged himſelf) in another great War, it was his Intereſt to do. At leaſt it was the intereſt of his Confederates, and they ſhould have obliged him to it. It ſeeming very unreaſonable, that They ſhould bear the brunt of the War againſt France, in His Quarrel, while He is making Conqueſts upon the Turk. We are told that the chief difference in the Treaty of Peace, was about Tranſylvania and Valachia. where the true queſtion was, whether the Proteſtant Religion in thoſe Countries ſhould continue, by their remaining under the Turk; or ſhould be rooted out, by their coming under the Emperour, and the Proteſtant Confederates muſt fight for this •• ter Which ſeems to make good the Saying of the French Gazettier, that the Confederates fight for the Emperours Greatneſs.

I think I have made it appear, that if great Conqueſts could have been made in France, they might have been well maintained. But there is ſtill a Difficulty remaining, and that is, How they ſhould be divided. Which is a thing of no ſmall Conſequence; and a diſagreement in it might bring all to Confuſion. The moſt natural way in this matter ſeems to be; That each Army ſhould keep what they got; and They whoſe Forces compoſe it, ſhould ſhare according to their ſeveral Quota's. Or perhaps there may be other ways, that may be thought more convenient. But the Proteſtants need not trouble their heads with the Methods of dividing the Spoil; for they act, as if they were reſolved to get nothing. I will not enlarge in this matter, though I can hardly forbear: and ſhall only add, That there are two things from which we might hope well in this buſineſs of Partition, in caſe a Conqueſt had been made. The one is, that the Germans (being a ſincere Nation and exact Performers of Bargains, and being alſo accuſtom'd to intermixt Dominions) would agree better then other People. The other is, that if there muſt be diſagreement, yet they would hardly come to it, till after that the French Tyranny had received its fatal Blow. And then perhaps it might have fared with Them, as it did with the old Romans, Poſtquam remoto metu Punico Simultates exercere vacuum fuit: which are the words of Saluſt.

I thought that by what hath been ſaid, I had clear'd all Difficulties. But I find it is ſtill the opinion of ſome Men, that for the Confederate Armies to have marched into France, leaving Mentz and Bon behind them, had been certain Deſtruction; and that they could not poſſibly have ſubſiſted. But the great danger here muſt be from the want of Victuals. whereas I have ſhewed already, that this danger cannot befall a maſtering and much over-matching Force, ſuch as the Confederates now had. Moreover the Confederates, paſſing the Rhine at Coblentz and Collen (which were theirs) and marching ſtraight on towards France, had not left Mentz and Bon behind them, but beſide them. For the Places behind them were Coblentz and Collen. And in their way to France there was the Dutchy of Juliers, which was in the Germans hands: and this brought them to the Land of Luxenburg, a French Conqueſt (tho now for the moſt part quitted and laid open) joyning upon France it ſelf. Alſo a little beſide Juliers is the Country of Liege, which is German likewiſe; and Flanders a little further. And here they had the River Maes at their Command quite up to Namur, which City lies cloſe to the French Frontiers. So that to this Place they might have had all Neceſſaries convey'd by Water. A hundred Barks (and how eaſily could Holland furniſh a far greater number?) would carry as much as two thouſand Waggons, reckoning each Bark but at twenty Tun. And what hindrance or diſturbance could Mentz or Bon have given, to the Execution of theſe things?

But I have made it out already, in my Obſervations, that an over-powering Army runs no great hazard, by leaving ſtrong Garriſons behind it. The Grand Viſier before mention'd left divers ſtrong Places behind him: and they did him no harm. So the French left Maſtricht behind them, when they fell upon Holland with ſo great Succeſs: and they left Cambray behind them, all the while they were making their Conqueſts in Flanders: I think it was the laſt Place they took.

But that we may ſee yet more plainly, how little hurt there had been to the Invading Armies, by leaving Mentz and Bon; let us make a Suppoſition at home, where we better know the Places and Diſtances. Suppoſe then, that England were divided into two Warring Kingdoms; the one on the South of Thames, the other on the North. Upon which River the Northern men have London and Oxford, and the Southern men have Maidenhead and Crekelade: London and Crekelade being ſomething bigger then the other two; and all of them exceeding ſtrong, and very well mann'd and furniſht. Let us further ſuppoſe, that the Northern men have Kent alſo at their devotion: and that they have two mighty Armies, the one at London and the other at Oxford, ready to invade the South Parts. Here I would fain know, whether theſe ſtrong Garriſons of Maidenhead and Crekelade, can hinder the Army at London (who have likewiſe Kent to befriend them) from falling into Surrey and Suſſex; or can hinder the Oxford Army from marching to Newbury or Hungerford, and ſo into Hampſhire or Wiltſhire and whither elſe they pleaſe. And I would likewiſe know, whether it were now adviſable for theſe mighty Armies, to ſpend a whole Summer in taking theſe two Garriſons, by chargeable, laborious, and bloudy Sieges; when as they might probably, in the ſame time, make an entire Conqueſt of the Country. No man of reaſon, I think, will here affirm; that theſe Garriſons (as the caſe is put) could be any hindrance, or that it was neceſſary or convenient to beſiege them. I have, by this Suppoſition, truly repreſented the Affair of the Confederates in the lower parts of the Rhine. By the Northern Kingdom is meant Germany; by the Southern France; and by Kent, Flanders. And London, Maidenhead, Oxford, and Crekelade ly up the Thames; in the ſame order as Collen, Bon, Coblentz, and Mentz ly up the Rhine. Only the Diſtances upon the Rhine are greater. For Coblentz is near thirty miles diſtant from Bon, and more then thirty from Mentz; whereas from Oxford to Maidenhead is but twenty five, and to Crekelade but twenty.

I HAVE DONE at laſt with the Difficulties, that might have attended the Invaſion of France by the Confederates: and am come to the Inconveniences they might have lain under, while their Forces were engaged in this Invaſion. The chief of which Inconveniences are theſe two. Firſt, the Incurſions which they muſt ſuffer from the French Garriſons upon the Rhine. Secondly, the loſs of the Trade and Navigation of that River.

As to the firſt, I confeſs the Incurſion of thoſe Garriſons is a great and ſore Inconvenience. And what Remedy do I propoſe againſt it? Why the ſame Remedy that the Hungarians uſed againſt Newhauſell, Agria and Caniza; while they were Turkiſh Garriſons, and in their full ſtrength and Vigour. The ſame that the Flemmings did uſe againſt Maſtricht, when the French held it, and do now uſe againſt Liſle and Tournay. And the ſame that the French uſed againſt Cambray and Landrecy, while they were in the Spaniards hands. The ſame alſo that the Germans have uſed theſe many years againſt Briſach, and for ſome years againſt Strasburg and Hunningen. In a word, the Remedy which all People make uſe of againſt Frontier Garriſons. And that is, that the Countries near them ſubmit to Contribution. For there is no other Remedy in the caſe: there is no Medium between Contribution and Deſtruction.

'Tis natural for Garriſons to command the Countries about them. And he that would hinder them from it, would put a force upon Nature: he may as well endeavour to keep Fire from burning. Or 'tis like the checking of a Fever; which doth but enrage it, and make it more violent. A Garriſon is a Diſeaſe, which will have its courſe. and there is no way to prevent or avoid it, but by curing the Diſeaſe, that is, by taking the Place. This therefore ought to be endeavour'd, if the thing may be done with eaſe and convenience. And for this reaſon the attacquing of Rhinberg and Keiſerwert cannot be diſlik'd, becauſe theſe Places were eaſily reduced. But if the Work be of great difficulty, it ſeems the wiſeſt courſe rather to aim at an Equivalent: that is, to endeavour to get ſomething elſe (as good or better) upon the Enemy. And in the mean time, we muſt be content to be under Contribution.

But the Contributions which theſe Garriſons exact, will perhaps be unreaſonable and exceſſive. I anſwer, that it is not for their profit to be too hard upon People: thereby to drive them from their dwellings, and make a deſolation. But the ſure remedy for this Evil is the courſe mention'd juſt now; that is, to get ſome Places in the Enemies Country. For then, if They uſe Our People baſely, We can uſe Theirs as bad. which thing will bring them to reaſon, if any thing will.

But what if it ſhall appear, that a powerful Invaſion of France would be the readieſt way to reduce theſe Places upon the Rhine? If you ask how this ſhould be; the anſwer is, By obliging the Enemy to quit them. We have ſeen the time, when this Lewis the Great hath, upon the like occaſion, quitted very important Places on the ſame River It was, when the laſt great Confederacy was formed againſt him. At which time he took his laſt leave of Weſel and Burick, together with Rees, Emerik, Schenkſoonce, and Nimegen, all ſtanding upon this River of Rhine: to ſay nothing of the Towns in Holland. In a word, he diſgorged all his Conqueſts in theſe parts, Maſtricht and Grave excepted. And this he was forced to do, that he might draw his Forces more cloſe, to reſiſt the terrible Storm that threaten'd him. If therefore he threw up ſo many good Places then, only for fear of an Invaſion; how much more muſt he have done ſo now, had he been actually Invaded? He muſt have laid aſide the thoughts of keeping rampant Garriſons upon the Rhine, when Paris it ſelf had been in danger: with his dear Palace of Verſailles, the Domus aurea of the French Nero.

THUS I HAVE anſwer'd the Inconvenience firſt objected; namely the Miſchiefs which might have been done, by the French Garriſons upon the Rhine. But before I proceed to the ſecond, I have ſomething more to ſay in particular, about Mentz and Bon; and ſomething about Mentz only.

That which I ſay of Mentz and Bon is this; that it had been no hard matter, wholly to hinder their Incurſions on the German ſide of the Rhine. I do ſtill confeſs, as I have ſaid before, that (ordinarily) there is no hindering of Garriſons (ſave only by a cloſe Blockade) from commanding the Countries about them. Or if the thing be poſſible, ſo great Forces are required to do it, as will devour the Countries in ſtead of defending them. But the Caſe of Mentz and Bon is extraordinary. They both do ſtand upon the Weſtern or French ſide of the Rhine. and on the other ſide the River, Mentz hath the Suburb of Caſſel, and Bon hath the Fort of Bueil. But Bueil was a thing of no •… : being eaſily taken at the firſt Bombarding of the Town, and before the Siege was form'd, or ſo much as reſolved on. And Caſſel was quitted by the French, after they had laboured upon it all Winter. a ſign of their great weakneſs and want of Men at that time. I ſay then, that if the Confederates had well fortified and enlarged theſe Places, and put ſtrong Garriſons in them; they had thereby ſecured all the Countries on the German ſide. By this means they had pinn'd up Mentz and Bon to their own ſide of the Rhine. For the truth is evident of what hath been ſaid in my Obſervations; That a Town which lies upon a great River, and hath no paſſage over it, is half block't up.

Having done with Mentz and Bon conjunctly, let us now conſider Mentz by it ſelf. This Place, by what hath been done to get it, may ſeem to be of ſo great importance, that nothing elſe might compare with it. But yet we ſhall find, that (to ſay nothing now of the general deſign of Invaſion, which gave way to this Siege), other Places in particular, as the City of Treves for inſtan •… had been full as good, and might have been had much eaſier. When the Imperial Army was paſs'd the Rhine at Coblentz. theſe two Cities lay equally fair for them. They might have marched forty miles forward to Treves, or forty miles ſideward (or rather backward to Mentz. but to meaſure more exactly, they had ſomething above forty miles to Treves, and to Mentz. ſomething leſs.

The firſt Queſtion then will be; ſuppoſing theſe Places to be equally weak, or equally ſtrong and capacious, which of them is better in reſpect of the Situation? the one ſtanding upon the utmoſt Frontier, and the other forty miles within the Enemies Country. for all thoſe Countries to the Weſt of Rhine were now become French. To this Queſtion I give this Anſwer; that if the Places be equal in themſelves, their Situation makes no inequality. For the one commands as much ground as the other: and to command the Countries is the chief End of Garriſons. We may well ſuppoſe; that each of theſe Places, with a Garriſon of ten thouſand Men, will command forty miles round. But that which Mentz Cemmands, is ſome of it on the one ſide the Rhine, and ſome on the other: that which Treves commands is wholly on the one ſide. the having of Mentz doth partly eaſe and cleer Germany, and partly annoy the French Quarters: the having of Treves clears nothing, and annoyes twice as much. So that upon the whole matter, and putting one thing againſt another; the Situation makes no inequality, if the Places were equal in themſelves.

But there is a Conſideration, from which one of theſe Places may juſtly be eſteemed better then the other, though of themſelves they were equal: and that is, the preſent poſture of the War, and the ſtrength or weakneſs of the Warring Parties. For if the Germans were weaker and upon the defenſive, Mentz were more convenient for them, becauſe by having it they might better defend themſelves. But ſince they were now clearly the ſtronger, and upon the Invading hand, Treves was more convenient, becauſe it would more advance their Conqueſts. And as I have ſaid in my Obſervations, They that are the ſtronger, ſhould make it their buſineſs to puſh on; and need not fear (but ſhould rather covet) to featter the War. Which Obſervations I cite, in regard the Arguments there uſed in another like occaſion, may be applied to this.

Hitherto we have diſputed, whether Mentz or Treves had been better to the Germans and more deſirable, ſuppoſing them to be of equal Goodneſs in themſelves. But the matter in fact was clean otherwiſe: for Mentz was very ſtrong and well furniſht, whereas Treves was laid open and quitted. but then Mentz was held by a great Garriſon of the Enemies. So that if the Germans will have Mentz, it muſt firſt be taken; if they will have Treves, (in the like condition), it muſt firſt be fortified. Here therefore ariſeth another Queſtion, which of theſe two things was eaſier to be done, the Taking of the one, or the Fortifying of the other.

The World knows, and the Confederates feel, what the Taking of Mentz hath coſt them. It coſt them the hard labour of a mighty Army for two Months, wholly maintained the while at their own Charge, and fed with Proviſions from home. It coſt them a vaſt Quantity of Ammunition, the Lives of many thouſands of their beſt Men, together with the Deſtruction of a good part of Germany which the French effected during that Siege. Of which things, and of ſome other Particulars, I have ſpoken more largely before.

As for the Fortification of Treves, the great Expence would have been the labour of Men. And the whole Army that beſieged Mentz, might in one Month have put them in ſuch a Forwardneſs, that ten thouſand Men left in Garriſon might have finiſh'd them in a few Months more; and have defended the Place in the mean time, againſt all the Force that France could then bring againſt them. Alſo the very repairing of Mentz would have gone a great way in fortifying Treves. 'Tis true, the Confederates muſt have put in great Guns, and Ammunition. But the Ammunition that was ſpent, and the Guns that were ſpoil'd at Mentz, would plentifully have furniſht Treves with Guns and Ammunition, and all other Neceſſaries. But Treves would have been incommoded by Montroyal, which the Germans muſt have left behind them. I anſwer, Not ſo much as Montroyal would have been by Treves, the ſtronger Garriſon: which the French muſt leave behind them, to come to Montroyal. Alſo we may remember, how little Maſtricht was incommoded, while the French held it, by Namur and other Places that lay between it and France; or the ſame Maſtricht by Ruremond and Venlo, in former times, while there was War between Spain and Holland.

BUT BESIDE the Incurſions of the French Garriſons upon the Rhine, there is another grand Inconvenience Objected, which the Germans (in caſe they had invaded France) muſt in the mean time have undergone likewiſe; and that is, the want and loſs of the Navigation of that River. In anſwer to this I muſt confeſs, that the Navigation of the Rhine is of mighty importance both to Holland and Germany: by reaſon of the great Trade carried on between thoſe Countries by that Conveyance. But though it be highly beneficial, yet it is not neceſſary; and thoſe Countries can live without it. As they have done formerly for many a year, at ſuch times as the Spaniards (being in War with Holland) were poſſeſs'd of Rhinberg, or Weſel, or ſome other Places upon the Rhine.

I know there are ſome that will affirm, that this Navigation was abſolutely neceſſary, at this time, to the German Armies: for ſupplying them with ſeveral things from Holland, which could not be brought them other wayes. But if theſe Armies had carried the War to the Moſe, which was their own up as far as Namur, they would not have ſtood in much need of the Navigation of the Rhine. But if the Rhine muſt be cleared, a ſtrong Invaſion of France might have been the readieſt way to do it. It being highly probable (as I have ſaid before), that the French would thereby have been forced to abandon their Places upon the Rhine, the better to defend their own Country. Moreover though the Navigation of this River were never ſo pretious a Commodity, yet it might be bought too dear. And ſurely the Confederates have had a hard bargain of it. It coming at the price of thoſe long and difficult Sieges, which (according to what hath been ſhewed already) have brought ſo many and ſo great Evils upon them. I confeſs the clearing of the Rhine to Collen (which is almoſt the half of what hath been done) was a good and eaſie bargain: being effected by taking Rhinberg and Keiſerwert, in a ſhort time and with little loſs. But that which was got by taking Mentz and Bon, was too dear of all Conſcience.

THUS I HAVE ſhewed my Reaſons for Invading France, and anſwer'd the Objections againſt it. I ſhould now deſcend to other Particulars relating to this War. But theſe may be the Subject of another Letter: this is too long already. If I ſhould go on, though I have equal Candor for all the Illuſtrious Actors, yet 'tis like I may give my Opinion (freely, but ſincerely) that ſome Men have done better then others. I confeſs, for thoſe that perform gallant Actions, if I might have my Will, I would make their Names ſhine. So ſhall it be done to Him, whom the King delighteth to Honour: was ſaid when Mordecai rid in pomp. And they that have Pens, though they be not Kings or Princes, yet they can beſtow good words upon thoſe whom they delight to honour. But I do not pretend to theſe things: I am not one of thoſe Writers, who (as Barclay expreſſes it) Dividunt Mortalibus Famam. To me it is ſufficient that I have the Honour to be

May it pleaſe your Lordſhip, Your Lordſhips thrice humble and truly devoted Servant POSTSCRIPT.

I Beg leave of your Lordſhip to make a ſmall Addition to what I have written. There are ſome that will argue yet further for theſe difficult Sieges. They will grant it to be very convenient, that the Confederates ſhould carry the War into the Enemies Country. but all in good time. it was fit they ſhould clear the Rhine this year, that they might with greater Force and Advantage invade France the next. But how did they know what the next year would bring forth? If there were nothing elſe, a League of ſo many Parts is ſubject to many Miſchances, and is much eaſier broken then made. They had now an Opportunity of Conquering France: which was to be embraced with Readineſs; I had almoſt ſaid, with Greedineſs. Such an Opportunity they muſt not think to meet with every day. This next year, I doubt, they will not have it: when they are not like to be ſo ſtrong, and the French much ſtronger. If they have it, it is to be wiſh'd that they would uſe it. But if they are ſtill for hard Sieges, if they like that Sport; there are Things yet left which will find them Play; and (as Mr. Bayes doth phraſe it) will rub their Gums. To inſtance in a few, there is Montroyal, and there is Philipsburg, with the other remaining Places upon the Rhine. And why ſhould not the Upper Rhine be clear'd as well as the Lower? Alſo the City of Treves is now making fit for them. But the Elector Palatine will think himſelf undone for want of Philipsburg: and probably will uſe all his Intereſt, which is very great, to engage the reſt upon it. So the Duke of Saxony and the Landgrave carried it for the Siege of Mentz. they would not be in danger of that Garriſon, though they were fair and far off. So likewiſe the Dutch took a great deal of pains, and were out a great deal of Money, to get the Duke of Brandenburg to take Bon for the Archbiſhop of Collen. The Dutch are not often miſtaken: but now I think they were. For the Duke might have done both Himſelf and Them much better Service, by joyning Prince Waldeck, then by attacquing Bon. However we may ſee, that little particular Intereſts, whether true or fancied, do too often bear down the general. But away with theſe retailing Projects: a vigorous and powerful Invaſion would do all at once.

FINIS.