Englands appeal from the private cabal at White-hall to the great council of the nation, the Lords and Commons in Parliament assembled. By a true lover of his country

THis is an Age of wonders: And if with a conſidering eye we take a careful view of Europe, we ſhall find that ſome years laſt paſt have preſented us with as many things worthy of admiration as any former age hath afforded to our forefathers. The Revolution of Portugal, and the wonderful ſecrecy with which it was carried on, is not to be matched in any Age. The Tragy-Comedy of Maſſauello looks more like a Poetical fiction then a real truth. The Depoſing of Kings, and (which is much more ſtrange) their Voluntary reſignation (of which the Annals of Ancient times furniſh us, but with very few Examples) are become the common Theame of our Journals, and if from the reſt of Europe we turn our eyes toward this Iſland, our ſurpriſal will increaſe, and we ſhall find that this little Britiſh World is a ſmall Enchiridon or Epitome of all the ſtupendious events that ever hapned in the great one. We have all ſeen or had a ſhare in thoſe paſſages which Poſterity will hardly give more credit to, then we do to what is ſaid of King Arthurs Round Table. And 'tis not improbable that ſome hundred years hence the Hiſtory of our late revolutions will be ranked among the fabulous Romances of Gildas, and ſuch other Writers.

But it may be among all our unexpected changes, revolutions and Counſels, there is ſcarce any more juſtly to be wondred at, then the preſent alliance with France, and the war we have undertaken, and do ſtill perſiſt to proſecute againſt Holland, in ſo dangerous an aſſociation with the French. It was undoubtedly above the reach of an ordinary underſtanding to imagine or ſuſpect (in the leaſt) that a Proteſtant Kingdom, without being compelled to it by ſome urgent and unavoidable neceſſity, ſhould ever fight with ſo much fierceneſs for the deſtruction of the Proteſtant intereſt: or that Engliſh Counſellors ſhould adviſe his Majeſty to run the fortune of a French King without a rational proſpeſt of advantage to himſelf. Would any man that judgeth of things according to the ordinary rules of prudence, have thought that in order to the making good our Title to the Kingdom of France, we ſhould able their preſent King to invade all Chriſtendom, and to extend his Empire without bounds, or that to ſecure to our ſelves the ſoveraignty of the Seas, we ſhould with ſo much induſtry endeavour to force all the Dutch Ships, with all their Naval Power into the French Arms, and rejoyce at their Victories, as if by conquering the Land, they did not Maſter at the ſame time their Havens, their Rivers, and their Fleets? We have been often told of brisk meſſenges ſent formerly to the French Kings, as ſoon as they did but lay the Carkaſe of ſome pitiful Ship upon the ſtocks. But we did never ſo much as dream that Vice Admirals, and other conſiderable Sea Officers ſhould be ſent to the French Court to encourage and promote the ſetting out of their Fleets: That pittying their want of experience in Sea Affairs, we would out of Compaſſionate and Brotherly love lead their raw Sea-men by the hand, Train them up in our Fleets, and amongſt the beſt of our Sea-men, teach them what Skill we have learnt in a long and dear bought experience. And to Crown all, even fight for them, and interpoſe between them and danger with ſo good ſucceſs (as it proved) that the French Squadron (as if the engagement had been only deſigned for an entertainment and diverſion to them) came off as freſh and as whole as when they firſt ſailed out of their Ports. The ſurpriſing novelty and ſtrangeneſs of theſe unexpected Councils hath occaſioned the following reflexions. And all men being equally concerned in the preſervation of the Ship they ſail in, though all do not ſit at the Helm, it is every ones duty as well as their undoubted right to prevent as much as they are able, a fatal running upon Rocks, which may chance not to be diſcerned by others, upon this juſt and well grounded confidence, I preſume to direct theſe papers to the real Counſel of the Nation, humbly begging that they be read with an unbyaſſed mind, and truth weighed in the balance of the Sanctuary. Before all I muſt premiſe I do not intend to write an Apology for the Dutch, nor to juſtifie all their proceedings, much leſs to encreaſe the number of the ſcurrilous Pamphlets againſt them, which I am confident will affect no ſober man in the Nation, and need only to be read to be confuted. I'le only ſay that ſince all Chriſtians ſhould above all things enquire into the juſtice of their Arms before they either take them up, or refuſe to lay them down. It will become the wiſdom and prudence of both houſes to hear what the Dutch may ſay for themſelves, and to take into their ſerious conſideration the proteſtations they make both in publick and in private, of their unfeigned deſires as well as readineſs to give England all poſſible ſatisfaction, and buy his Majeſties Friendſhip at a more then ordinary Rate.

But my preſent deſign being not to enter further into theſe particulars, not to examine the Juſtice or Injuſtice of this War, but rather to conſider and quere (ſuppoſing it had heen never ſo juſt at firſt) how far it may be adviſable to continue it, I will with as much clearneſs as I am able, and in as few words as the matter will bear, confine my ſelf to theſe following heads.

1. A Short account of the Crown with which his Majeſty is entred into League. 2. The neceſſity and unavoidable Conſequences of this War. 3. Some general reflections upon the whole, with ſome Account of the manner and ſteps by which this War was both promoted and begun.

1. All thoſe who are not altogether Strangers to the World will eaſily grant that of all the Kingdoms of Europe there are none but may be ſaid inferiour to France in ſome reſpect or other, and to want ſome advantages which France enjoyeth in a very eminent degree. The greatneſs of its Territories, the Populouſneſs of it, the number of their Gentry and Nobility. Their natural courage; together with the advantage of being trained up either to Military Actions or to Warlike Exerciſes, ever ſince the Foundation of their Monarchy, the ſituation of their Country, and the opportunities they have by it to annoy their Neighbours upon all occaſions. The fruitfulneſs and riches of the Soyle, together with the prodigious quantity of all ſorts of Commodities manufactured & unmanifactured with which they ſupply their neighbours. And laſtly the great Revenues of their Kings, who governing of late without controul or check, are ſo much the more able to oppreſs their Neighbours; All theſe Advantages meeting together, they have in all Ages had aſpiring thoughts, and under Charlemain had erected a new Weſtern Empire, which in all likelyhood would have proved of longer continuation, had not thoſe great Dominions been ſhared and divided between the ſaid Charlemains Children, which in the ſucceeding Ages proved an occaſion of many great and bloody Wars.

2. A Second and memorable ſtop to the increaſe of the French war, when by the ambition of Hugh Capett, who aymed at the Crown, to uſurpe it with leſs oppoſition, and to draw the Grandees into his party, he made all their governments hereditary, & erected them into a kind of Principalitys held in Capite, from thence ſprang ſo many great Famylies able afterwards to wage War againſt the French King. And whilſt they were thus in a kind of Minority, the Houſe of Burgandy having joyned with England, brought that Kingdome to the Low condition, every one knows.

Lewis the 11th. was the firſt who after the Engliſh had loſt not only their new Conqueſt, but alſo what they had poſſeſſed of old in France, raiſed the French Crown to a greater height, and his Son Charles the 8th. beſides the acquiſition of Brittany, frighted all Europe by his ſurpriſing conqueſt of the Kingdom of Naples.

This occaſioned a general confederacy of all neighbouring Princes againſt him, whereby he ſoon loſt what he had gotten. But ſtill the ambitious thoughts of his Succeſſors would have much endangred the liberty of Europe, if the Auſtrian family (raiſed on a ſudden to a vaſt Grandeur by the occaſion of an innumerable number of Provinces united in Charles the 5th.) had not carried the Imperial Crown from Francis the 1ſt. who ſtood with much Eagerneſs for it, and had already engaged ſeveral of the Electors.

This haveing over ballanced the French power, the ſaid Francis the 1. though helped ſeveral times by the great Solyman Emperor of the Turke, was at laſt forced to yeild to the victorious Armes of Charles the 5th. who took him priſoner and forced him to buy his liberty with a very diſadvantageous peace.

But his Son Henry the ſecond had better ſucceſs, and amongſt other advantages he added to his Dominions three very fair Imperial and Epiſcopal Towns, and was likely to have gon further had he not been prevented by a ſudden death, England all this while (true at that time to their own intereſt) with a skilful hand holding the ballance and keeping the conteſting parties in as great an equality as their owne occaſions would permit.

Under the minority of his Children, the bloody Maſſacres and civil Wars, begin, which laſted forty years, and would have put an end to that Monarchy if the Ambition of Philip the ſecond would have given way to the dividing of it into the ſeveral Principalities, which the reſpective Grandees aymed at.

But Henry the 4th. ſtrengthned by the diviſions which grew between the Spaniards ond the holy League, having won many Battels, made his Title to the Crown good, by the ſucceſs of his Arms, and not long after concluded peace with Spain to gain time to breath, and to recover new ſtrength.

No ſooner was he at reſt, but he bent all his thoughts upon a project as vaſt in the deſign of it as Extraordinary in its nature, intending no leſs then to caſt Europe into a new Mould, & to reduce all the Kingdoms and Common Wealths, that were in his time to a certain number, and to bring them within ſuch bounds as he ſhould preſcribe to them, being ſure however in this Marſhalling to take ſuch ſhute to himſelf as would have enabled him (or or leaſt his Succeſſors) to grow into an univerſal Monarch.

To effect this he had already made choice of his Generals and other great Officers, and was preparing both Arms and money when a ſudden and unexpected death puts an end as well to his undertaking as to his life.

The beginning, and in truth the greateſt part of the Reign of Lewis the 13th. his Son was much diſquieted by inteſtine broils and Civil Wars, during which the houſe of Auſtria was very near bringing all Germany under their ſubjection, and after the Battel of Prague ſtood very fair for the univerſal Empire. But France having at laſt quieted all at home, did (under pretence of oppoſing the Auſtrian Family, and whilſt they were courted by ſeveral Princes to aſſiſt and protect them againſt the Emperour) vaſtly increaſed their own power, and conquered new Provinces, and conſiderable Towns in Spain, Italy, Germany, and the Low Countries, which raiſing new jealouſie in their own Allies occaſioned the peace of Munster to frevent their further progreſs.

About the ſame time the new Civil wars which broke out in France under the minority of the preſent King, gave opportunity to Spain to recover part of their Loſſes, till the (ſate) Protector of England joyning with the French (for the advancement of ſome private ends of his own, and by a policy from which the deſtruction of Europe may chance to take its date before we are much older) brought them into a decaying condition, and made the Pyrenean Peace (after the death of Cromwel) moſt welcome to them.

Before we go further and come to give a more particular account of the preſent French Court, I will beg leave to ſtop here a while, and deſire the Reader to take along the following inferences, from what hath already been hinted, a more full knowledge thereof being left to the peruſal of their Hiſtories.

1. That no greater proofs can be given of the internal ſtrength of the French Nation, then their overcoming the many dangerous convulſions of ſtate, they have from time to time ſtrugled, with which in all appearance would have deſtroyed any other Nation.

2. That in all Ages, aſſoon as their inteſtine troubles have been over, they have ſtill out of a reſtleſh Warlike humour endeavoured to encroach upon their neighbours, and to encreaſe their own Dominions, laying hold of all opportunities to diſturb mankind, and having never able as yet to ſet bounds to their Ambition.

3. That this Ambitious humor of theirs, ſupported by the greatneſs of their power would long before this time have brought all Europe under their Subjection, if their own diviſion and private quarrels had not from time, to time, put back their deſigns for many years, or their greateſt Princes been cut off before they cauld finiſh their intended work.

4. And Laſtly as a conſequence of the three former, that it was eever, and will be ſtill, the true intereſt of Europe to oppoſe the French deſigns, or if there be any occaſion of making uſe of them againſt ſomer other oppoſſers, not to accept of their aſſiſtance, longer or further then publick utility requires it, nor to ſuffer them to proceed after the danger is over, as it was practiced in the peace of Paſſaw, in the the time of Henry the 2. and that of Munſter, in both which the French were ſtopped in their full carreere by their own Allies, though they ſtill came off with profit.

The French having thus in the laſt Wars, added many fair Provinces and Tows to their Territories, this preſent Court had no ſooner made Peace with Spain, but they thought of laying the foundations of a vaſter Empire than ever. And perceiving that ſince the diſcovery of the Indies, and increaſe of Trade, Naval ſtrength was the moſt important of all others, and Navigation and commerce the greateſt (if not the only) ſupporters of it. They firſt erected and encouraged ſeveral Trading Companies, and in the ſecond place they ſpared no coſt & ſtuck at no charge or expence, to purchaſe a conſiderable Fleet of men of War wherein they have been ſo ſucceſsful. That I fear their Fleet (excepting the true courage of our Seamean) is not much inferour to that of his Majeſties, as incredible as it may ſeem at firſt, conſidering how few years they have applied themſelves to it.

But whilſt they were thus intent upon the increaſe of their intereſt at Sea, they let no opportunity ſlip, of enlarging their Empire at Land, for during the late War with Holland, they invaded in (1667.) and maſtered a conſiderable part of the Spaniſh Low Countries in 1669. they hunted the poor Duke of Lorrain out of his Dutchy, and to this day poſſeſs it all, and now this laſt year they have conquered the half the United Provinces, much leſs then all this was more then ſufficient to awaken all Europe; and his Majeſty above all others being out of his Princely wiſdom very ſenſible that the keeping a true ballance between the Princes and other States of Europe, was the onely ſecurity of all, and that by a timely ſtop to the French Conqueſts he would reap an infinite Honour and Profit. Aſſoon as the French King fell upon Flanders, he begun to think of applying fit Remedies to ſo dangerous a Diſeaſe, and having concluded a Peace at Breda with the Hollanders, he ſent them in private in January 1668. Sir William Temple, who was then his Reſident at Bruſſels, to propoſe a nearer Alliance with them, and to take joynt meaſures againſt the French.

No ſmall Argumet by the way, of his Majeſties averſion to the French deſigns, and of the fear he had of their increaſe, ſince to prevent it, he went ſo far as to ſeek the Hollanders firſt, and to propoſe ſtricter Alliances with them after ſo fierce and Recent a War ended with the unpleaſant circumſtances of Chatham.

Sir William Temples Propoſals having been entertained with all ready complyance by the Dutch, he waited on his Majeſty to give him an account of his Negociation, and within five days after he was ſent back to the Hague with all neceſſary powers and inſtructions, by vertue of and in conformity to which he concluded and agreed upon, two ſeveral Treaties with the Dutch, the one a defenſive and ſtricter League than before between the two Nations; and the other a joynt and reciprocal Engagement, to oppoſe the conqueſt of Flanders, and to procure either by way of Mediation or by force of Arms, a ſpeedy peace between France and Spain, upon the Terms therein mentioned, and becauſe Sweden came unto the ſame Treaty very little after, from the three Parties concerned and engaged, it was called the Triple League. In purſuance of this, the Treaty of Aix la Chapel was forced upon the French, and in ſome manner upon the Spaniards, who were very unwilling to give away by a ſolemn Treaty ſo great a part of their Country. But both his Majeſty and the Hollanders thought it a very great and good work, and judged it a great happineſs not onely for Spain, but for all Europe to come off with a broken Pate, and to have at leaſt for that while kept France from going further.

This repreſented to the Parliament with all the advantages of Language, and nothing omitted in the reſpective Speeches of his Majeſty himſelf, the Lord Keeper, and many private Members, that could make both Houſes (and with them the whole Kingdom) ſenſible of the great Service done to England, and in a manner to all mankind, by chaining up a devouring Lion, who was never ſatiated with prey.

This Triple League grew ſo famous that it proved the politick Inſtitute of our Juſtinian. In the name of the Triple League, and of the Treaty of Aix la Chapel, ſeveral ſubſidies were both demanded and granted, for 2. or 3. Seſſions together, the Triple League ſtoped or annulled all Impeachments: for its ſake Inquiries into Miſcarriages were laid aſide. And the Parliament did conceive they could neither give nor forgive too much, if by their compliance they could but contribute ſome what towards binding the French to their good behaviour.

Beſides this to tie the Knot faſter, and take even the very thoughts from the French King of ever ſtirring, or being troubleſome to his neighbours, his Majeſty ſent an Extraordinary Envoy to ſeveral Princes of Germany, to invite them into a Triple League: His Miniſter to perſwade them to it, laying open with no leſs heat than plaineſs, the danger all Europe was in. The inſenſibility of moſt Princes, and their careleſneſs, the watchful ambition of the French, the greatneſs of their Forces, and the little reaſon one had to truſt them. In fine, omitting nothing that could Alarm all the world, and procure a general conſederacy againſt the common Oppreſſor. Nay, to evince and demonſtrate (beſides all we ſaid now) that this Triple League was not entred into out of a particular reſpect, or perſonal kindneſs to the Spaniard (not to ſpeak now of the Miſunderſtanding and Jarring between England and Spain in the Weſt Indies) the Spaniards being very much wanting to themſelves, by their backwardneſs in the payment of the Subſidies promiſed to Sweden. His Majeſtie not to be wanting to Europe, and conſequently to his own Kingdoms, out of the deep ſenſe he had of the neceſsity or preſerving the Triple Leagues entire, and being not without feares, the Swedes might fall off, unleſs the Money agreed upon was paid them, without further delay; he offered in September or October 1668. to advance himſelf part of it, and had accordingly done it in caſe the Dutch would have advanced the reſt.

All this doth abundantly ſhew what opinion his Majeſty and his Council were uſed to have of France as well as both Houſes, and the reſt of the Nation: And therefore without conſidering how things came to be altered (which we may take hereafter ſome notice of) we may lay down as an Undeniable Engliſh Pri ciple, and a Maxim never to be ſwerved from: That France is no waies to be ſuffered to grow great, much leſs to have their deſignes promoted, as it is plain to all man kind they are now.

But we muſt go ſomewhat further, and there being nothing more dangerous then to joyn in any ambitious deſign with a Prince againſt whom we can no waies ſecure our ſelves, in caſe he break his word to us, it will not be amiſs to conſider how far one may rely upon the Candor and in egrity of the French Court, and what may rationally be expected from their generoſity.

In Order to this, ſince the heart of man is not known otherwiſe then by a careful obſervation of their Act ons, and that we cannot iudge of things to come but by Inferances and Arguments drawn from thoſe that are paſt; the beſt way to ſatisfy our ſelves is to take a ſhort ſurvey of the carriage and conduct of the French Court for theſe laſt 13. Years, during which they have had ſtill the ſame Miniſters, who are not like to Act henceforth upon any other Principles, or by other Methods then they have done hitherto, and they having been brought up in ſo good a School as that of Cardinal Mazarine whoſe motto was that an honeſt man ought not to be a ſlave to his word, it muſt not be wondered at, if they do ſtill as much as they are able, influence their preſent Maſter and endeavour to perſwade him that.

Si Violandum eſt jus, Reguendi cauſa Violandum eſt.

The firſt proof of the honeſty both of the Cardinal himſelf, and of his Diſciples, is their Carriage in the Pireneam Treaty & their performance of what was moſt Eſſential in it, wherein is to be obſerved that.

By the endeavours of the Queen Mother of France, a peace being promoted between the two Crowns, with a Marriage between the French King and the Infanta of Spain, the whole Treaty was grounded upon two conſiderable points, which till granted by France, had ſtill hindred the concluſion of that great work, the one, was the forſaking of Portugal, and the other a renunciation of the Infanta, (conſented to and ratified by the French King) of all her preſent and future Pretences, Titles or Claimes whatſoever to the Spaniſh Monarchy and Dominions thereof, or to any part of the ſame:

Leſt, ſaith the Treaty, The Glory of their reſpective Kingdoms ſhould come to decay, and be diminiſhed if by reaſon and through the ſaid Marriage they came to be united and joyned, in any of their Children, and Poſterity, which would occaſion to the Subjects and Vaſſals, ſuch troubles and afflictions as might eaſily be imagined.

As to the firſt, viz. the excluſion and forſaking of Portugal. The words of the Treaty are theſe, His ſaid Majeſty (the French King) will indermedle no further in the ſaid Buſineſs, and doth promiſe and obliege himſelf upon his honor, and upon the faith and word of a King, both for himſelf and his ſucceſſors, not to give neither in common nor to any Perſon or Perſons thereof in Particular of what Dignity, Eſtate or Condition ſoever, either at preſent or for the future, any help or aſſiſtance, neither publick nor ſecret, directly nor indirectly, of men, Arms, Munitions, Victualling, Veſſells nor money, under any pretence, nor any other thing whatſoever, by Land or by Sea, nor in any other manner, as likewiſe not to ſuffer any Levies to be made in any part of his Kingdoms, and Dominions nor to grant a paſſage to any that might come from other Countries to the Relief of the ſaid Kingdom of Portugal.

I ſuppoſe all the World will grant, it were hard for the wit of man, to find out, or ſo much as imagine ſtronger words, or fuller expreſſions in a Treaty, to prevent what the Spaniards were ſo much afraid of, viz. the Aſſiſtance of Portugal, Let us now ſee how it was performed.

As ſoon as this was agreed on, and before the Treaty was ſigned Cardinal Mazarin (ſtill reſolved as well in this as upon all other occaſions, not to be (Eſclave De ſa parelle) ſent privately the Marqueſs the Choupes into Portugal, to aſſure them that in Order to the concluſion of the Treaty then on foot with Spain, they were forced to leave them out, and to engage not to aſſiſt them: but that whatever they promiſed they would never forſake them, and would ſtill protect them againſt Spain as much as they had done before. The truth is, they kept their word to Portugal, much better then they did to Spain. And the Peace was no ſonner made, but they ſent them the uſual ſupplies of Men, Arms and Money, And a while after notwithſtanding their former Treaty with Spain, and in the view of the whole world, they entred into an Offenſive League with that Kingdom againſt all their Enemies, whereby, amongſt other things, the French were to have all the Sea-Towns that ſhould be taken from Spain delivered to them. All which with many other particulars, too long to be inſerted in this ſhort diſcourſe, may be ſeen more at large, in the incomparable Books of the Baren de Iſſ • la; intituled the Buckler of State and Juſtice which to this day could not be anſwered by the French though often challenged (and ſo much concerned in honor) to do it.

The other ſecurity of the Pirenean Treaty as to Spain, and that without which they could never have given their conſent to their Marriage of the Infanta, was the Renunciation before mentioned, And whoever read it will be apt to think, a General Councel of the Civilians was called, to outdo all former Expreſſions uſed in ſuch contracts, and to find out new binding Clauſes, to take of all poſſibility of Evaſion. And to make it more ſacred yet and more inviolable, There being no greater tie upon Soveraign Princes then that of Publique and ſolemn Treaties, the Act of the Renunciation was incorporated into the very Treaty of Pe ce, to make up of both of them but one body; though digeſted unto different Inſtruments as is expreſly declared in the 33. Article of the Treaty of Peace, wherein ſpeaking of the Contract of Marriage, to which they refer themſelves, theſe words are added, which though it be ſeperated hath the ſame force and vigour with the preſent Treaty of Peace, as being the principal part thereof, and the moſt precious pawn of its greater ſecurity and laſting.

But the French Lawyers preferring the little quirks of Law before publique faith; And pretending they might bring the Authority of ſolemn Treaties (which are the true, and indeed the only Law between Soveraign Princes) under the Cavil of Municipal Laws, and Local Cuſtoms, endeavouring to perſwade the World that their Maſter was not bound to ſtand to what he had ſo ſolemnly promiſed and confirmed by ſacred Oaths: And the French King after the death of the late King of Spain, claimed (notwithſtanding the ſaid Renunciation) a great part of the Spaniſh Low-Countries, as being devolved to him in right of his Wife, by the Municipal Lawes of thoſe Countries; And to back his unexpected Claime with more effectual meanes, he Invaded the Country with a powerful Army.

This Invaſion, ſo contrary to his Engagements, and ſo deſtructive to the very eſſence of the P • renean Treaty, was attended with ſome circumſtances no leſs ſurpriſing than the breach it ſelf.

The one was what paſſed at Paris between the French King himſelf, and the Marquiſs De la Fuente Extrordinary Embaſſador from Spain; And the other, what the French Embaſſador (the Arch Biſhop of Ambrun) declared at Madria in his Maſters name.

As to the Firſt, The ſaid Marqueſs De la Fuente being upon his Return into Spain, after the Death of the late King his Maſter, and being not without apprehenſion and jealouſie, the great preparation, made in France were intended againſt the Queen his Miſtreſs, and the King her Son, was very earneſt with His Moſt Chriſtian Majeſty, to give ſome new and greater Aſſurances to the Queen of Spain, of the reality and ſincerity of his intentions to quiet and ſettle her mind, againſt all the contrary advices, ſhe received from all parts; whereupon the moſt Chriſtian King did, with all poſsible Aſſeveration, engage his Faith and his Royal Word, to the ſaid Queen, that he would Religiouſly keep the Peace, and continue a faithful friendſhip both to her and to her Son.

And the Arch Biſhop of Anbrun, after the French Army was already in the Field, and had poſſeſſed Charleroy, ſome four or five days before the News of it came to Madrid; did in Verbi Sacerdotis, and upon all that is moſt ſacred amongſt the Roman Catholicks, proteſt and vow to the Q een, that his Maſter intended nothing leſs, than what was reported of him: And would never break with the King of Spain, or invade his Dominions as long as he was under Age.

But the March of the French Army, and the Hoſtilities they committed, agreeing ſo little with their promiſes, and the ſame being complained of; They anſwered, it was no Breach, and that they only went to take poſſeſsion of what belonged to them.

This War, or as the French term it; this friendly poſſeſsing themſelves of the Spaniſh Dominions, ended by the Treaty of Aix. After which, contrary to the Treaty it ſelf; they firſt diſmantled all the ſtrong Places and Holds of the County of Bargundy! carried away all the Munitions out of the Country, and would have deſtroyed the rich Salt Pits of that Province, had not the powerful interpoſition both of England, and Holland prevented that ſpoil.

Notwithſtanding the ſame Treaty of Aix, they exacted great Contributions from the Dutchyes of Lymbourg, and Luxembourg: They lay a new claim to ſome Towns, as important as any of thoſe that have been granted to them by the Peace: They have confiſcated the Eſtates of the Subjects of the King of Spain, that would not forſwear their Allegiance; and have not ſpared the very Royal Houſe of Mary Mont: Nay, as if theſe infractions were not ſufficient and ſtill to encroach as far as they were able, they forced their way with great quantities of Merchandiſe through the Spaniſh Territories without paying the Cuſtoms, and not long after endeavoured to ſurpriſe the Town of Hainault.

Thus they have dealt with Spain ever ſince the Pyrenean Treaty.

Let us ſee now how other Princes have fared with them; we'l begin with the Duke of Lorrain.

By the Pyrenean Treaty, the ſaid Duke was to be reſtored to his Dutchy of Lorrain, with all the Places and Towns which he had poſſeſſed in the Biſhopricks of Mentz, Toul, and Verdun. But France after the execution of the other Articles of the ſaid Treaty, deferred as long as they could the performance of that part, which related to the Duke, and refuſed ſtill to return him his Country; till they had brought him to make another Treaty with them, whereby he was forced to part with ſeveral conſiderable places over and above what had been granted to them by the general Peace; Then after a year and an half of an unſettled poſſeſſion, during which under ſeveral unjuſt pretences, new quarrels were picked every day: They forced him with a conſiderable Army, to give them his Town of Marſal.

And not long after, they again compelled him to ſign a new Treaty, more diſadvantagious yet then the two former; ſince which he could, as little as before have a quiet enjoyment of that little they had left him. They every day encroached upon his Jurisdiction, the Limits of his Territories, and his Soveraignty it ſelf; They laid enormious Taxes upon his Subjects: They cauſed him to disband his Forces, and to raiſe new men again as they thought fit, they kept him from revenging his own quarrels, to take part in that of others, they let looſe all his Enemies againſt him, and ſtopped the Progreſs of his Armies, as ſoon as he had the leaſt advantage: And in few words he was all that while more a Vaſſal to France, then a Soveraign. But yet all this while would not ſatisfie the French Court: And taking it ill that his Obedience was not altogether ſo blind as they would have it, they ordered one of their Generals to ſeize his Perſon, and to bring him either dead or alive, as it was very near being effected. A new way of dealing with a Soveraign Prince, not known yet in theſe parts of the World, and which may give ſome hopes to Europe of ſeeing ere long the Weſt Governed by Basſhaws as well as the Eaſt.

The Kingdom of Poland comes next, which hath lain a bleeding ever ſince they have had a French Queen, & which is at this inſtant in an eminent danger of being conquered by the Turks, through the means of the French Cabal, who having called into the Kingdom the Enemy of the Chriſtian name meerly becauſe they could not have a King either of French bloud, or of French intereſt.

The Duke of Newburg was not much better uſed, and whilſt they cauſed him to engage the greateſt part of his Eſtate almoſt beyond redemption in hopes of the Poliſh Crown, which they had promiſed to raiſe him to by the help of a ſtrong party they had made in that Kingdom. They underhand contrary both to their Treaties (as well with the Elector of Brandenburg as with himſelf) and to their reiterated promiſes and vows both by word of mouth and in writing, did by their Creatures and Agents Oppoſe the ſaid Dukes pretentions, and endeavoured with all induſtry to have the Prince of Conde preferred before all his Competitors. A particular deduction whereof will (if ever publiſhed) without any other inſtance be a ſufficient warning to all Princes, and give them a perfect Character of the French Court.

The Emperour hath as little reaſon to thank them, and at the very time the moſt Chriſtian King ſent him Forces to joyn with his Army aagainſt the Turks, they begun to ſettle a Correſpondence with the Count Serin, Franchipaeny, Nadaſti, and Tottenback, from whence they ſo well known Conſpiracy hath ſince broken out, as hath appeared by the depoſitions and confeſſions of ſome of the Accomplices who had been inſtrumental in carrying both Money and Letters, from the French Miniſter at Vienna to the ſaid Conſpirators.

Not to ſpeak now of what arts they uſed to hinder his Election at firſt, and ſince that to leſſen his Authority and diſturb all Germany by their Intrigues and private Treaties, with ſeveral Privacies, contrary to the Treaty at Munſter.

To which may be added, that one of the great Motives of bringing the Turks into Poland was the marriage of the Emperors Siſter with their King.

Yet it muſt be owned alſo that the French ſeem to have repented their pernitious intrigues and Caballing in that Kingdom, for when they ſaw the Emperor preparing in Earneſt to aſſiſt the Dutch, to diſwade him from that deſign, and to engage him (if it had been poſſible) not to concern himſelf or take part in the Quarrel, they very fairly offered him to put into his hands and deliver him all the Original Letters they had from their Creatures and Friends in Poland. To the end both his Emperial Majeſty and the King of Poland, his Brother might take what courſe they thonght fit with thoſe Rebels: A fair warning to all thoſe that prefer French money before their Loyalty, and the true intereſt of their Country.

Nay I doubt the Swedes, their good Friends have not alwayes been pleaſed with them: And they cannot to this day forget that ſome ten Years ſince, having made a Treaty with the French whereby they were to receive, by way of Gratuity or Penſion, Sixteen hundred Thouſand Crowns, the French (upon ſecond thoughts) finding their Treaty with Sweden of little uſe to them refuſed to ratifie it, and ſent them Monſieur de Trelon, who without more words told them in ſhort, that the the King his Maſter declared it to be void. A fine Court ſtyle for one Prince to uſe to another! And a ſhort Majeſtick way of Reſcinding all Treaties.

It were both needleſs and tedious, to examine now how well they have obſerved their Treaties with Holland, ſince they cannot ſo much as aſſign the leaſt Cauſe of the War they make now, and in their Declaration tell us onely of a Mauvaiſe ſatisfaction, of their being ill pleaſed, which would tend to the Diminution of the glory of a moſt Chriſtian King, unleſs to pleaſe himſelf better, he put Europe in a Flame, and endeavour to bring all under his ſubjection.

But it may be thought all other Princes and States have had much cauſe to complain of the French not to ſay worſe, his Majeſty hath been hitherto either more fortunate or more beholding to their generoſity and kindneſs. This muſt be now inquired into. I will not inſiſt much upon the expreſſions of their kindneſs to his Majeſties Perſon, whilſt he was abroad, ſince they may pretext the intereſt of their Kingdom, and palliate their dureſs and inhumane dealing, by a neceſſity of preſerving themſelves. But I hope no ſuch neceſſity compelled them to oppoſe his Majeſties happy Reſtauration with ſo much violence as they did, and to Cabal with his greateſt Enemies to keep him out of his Kingdoms, which his Majeſty was ſo ſenſible of, that upon his coming into England he commanded away the French Embaſſadour Bordeaux, and would not ſuffer him to come into his preſence.

Since that time they have often endeavoured to ingratiate themſelves, & have made great proteſtations. But after ſeveral propoſitions of Leagues, and many Arts uſed to raiſe Jealouſies between us and the Hollanders (Dreading nothing more then a durable & firm friendſhip between two Nations, who if united might eaſily ſet what bounds they pleaſed to their ambition) they at laſt ſided with the Dutch, though with no other intention then to ſee us deſtroy each other, or at leaſt ſo far weaken and exhauſt our ſelves, that they might with leſs oppoſition invade their Neighbours, and encreaſe their Naval ſtrength, nay their policy went further, and in the very heat of the War they ſtill kept Negotiations on foot, and made Overtures and Propoſals of Peace by means of the late Queen Mother, whom in the end they deceived ſo far, as to aſſure her (and by her his Majeſty) that the Dutch would ſet no Fleet out (that Summer, the Peace was concluded) whilſt underhand they preſſed the ſaid Dutch with all the Vigour and Earneſtneſs imaginable to fit out their Ships, with a promiſe of joyning theirs to them.

Upon this Paroll of the French Court, 'tis too well known we had no Fleet out as well as what followed upon it, when the Dutch meeting with no oppoſition, entred into the River of Chatham; ſo that though the French had no other hand in't, they had been ſtill the true cauſe of that unhappy accident: But withal, it is more then probable they were themſelves the Authors of that Counſel, and moſt certain it is they knew of the deſign before the attempt was made: As might be proved by ſeveral inſtances if neceſſary:

After this, the Peace being concluded at Breda; the French were by the Treaty, to return us St. Chriſtophers, in the manner and form therein expreſſed. But inſtead of performing it according to the true meaning (and the very Letter of the Article) they have ſtill from time to time, upon ſeveral unjuſt and frivolous pretences, put off his Majeſties Commſſioners that went to receive it; till ſeeing a neceſſity of complying with us in ſo a ſmall matter, whilſt we were preparing to run ſo great a danger for their ſake; they delivered it at laſt to Sir Charles Wheeler, ſomewhat above a year ſince. But before the delivery of it, they deſtroyed all the Plantations, plundered and carried away all that was portable; laid the whole Country waſte, and left it in a much worſe condition, than if it had never been Planted. And as if the detaining of his Majeſties Territories had not been ſufficient, they interrupted the Trade of his Subjects in thoſe parts; and aſſuming to themſelves the Soveraignty of thoſe Seas; they would not ſuffer any Ships but their own, to Sail by, or about their Iſlands. And in Truth upon no other Ground, have brought in as Prizes, and confiſcated ſeveral Veſſels. Not to ſpeak now of the great diſcouragement our French Trade hath many years ſince lain under; through their unjuſt practiſes and manifold devices, which have been ſuch, that we do not of late ſend into France the fourth or fifth part of what Goods and Commodities were formerly ſent over.

This late carriage of theirs in America brings us to their preſent Alliance with his Majeſty. And as the greateſt care of thoſe that have adviſed the King to this League, have been to keep from the view and from the knowledge of the World, what Articles are agreed upon; it is not to be expected we ſhould inſtance in the particular Breaches of what we are all Strangers to. For Example, we cannot tell whether it was agreed the French Squadron ſhould fight, and ſo dare not aſſure they have broken their Treaty by not fighting. But I ſuppoſe there are very few, but have heard of the Wager laid by the Spaniſh Embaſſador in the beginning of the War; and how far the French Conduct agreed with his Predictions. I would not neither impeach any man upon general Reports and Rumors, but however it is obſervable, that the greateſt number of the Dutch Commanders are of Opinion, and have often publickly declared, that the French Ships were thus kind-uſed by theirs out of particular reſpect De Witts Brother had to them.

If from the Sea we come aſhore, we'l find (as far at leaſt as they came to our knowledge) moſt of their promiſes deceitful; all the Art imaginable uſed to enſnare his Majeſty.

And laſtly, a perfect and reiterated Breach of tho eſſence of their Treaty, whatever the words may be; all thoſe that have been never ſo little converſant at Court, may remembred that one of the great Arguments uſed and ſuggeſted by the French, to make the conqueſt of Holland appear both ſafe and eaſie; was that his moſt Chriſtian Majeſty had aſſurances from all the great Princes in Europe, they would no ways concern themſelves in the Quarrel. Spain would be glad to ſee their old Rebels Chaſtiſed. The Emperour had his hands full, and durſt not ſtir if he would for fear of the Turks. Brandenburg ſhould demand his Towns, and the Northern Crowns, would either ſit ſtill or endeavour to have a ſhare in the ſpoyl. And then this was ſo readily embraced, that even after the Exchange of the Ratifications of the Treaty betwixt Spain and the Ʋnited Provinces; they would not own there was ſo much as any agreement. And for a good while we flattered our ſelves that the Leagues with the Catholick King and other Princes, were ſurmiſes of the Dutch, to raiſe their Reputation, and quiet the minds of their People. But when this was paſt denying, they came off with ſlighting Diſcourſes of the Forces of the Dutch Allies; and Monſieur de Turenne would cut them all to pieces, if ever their Temerity did brings within his reach.

At the Rate the Alliance with France was diſcourſed of before the War broke out-ſtanders by could not but think (and I believe if Truth were enquired into, it will be found his Majeſty intended no more at firſt, and was engaged no farther) the French ſhould be the Principal in this War, and England joyn their Forces with them as Auxiliaries, to have in caſe of need, a ſafe and honourable Retreat in their Power. But as ſoon as the French thought his Majeſtie could not well go back nor take new Counſels; they openly declared it was none of their Quarrel, and that they onely engaged in it to aſſiſt his Majeſty, out of reſpect to his perſon. By which means his Majeſty was perſwaded and induced to declare War firſt, and to expect afterwards the aſſiſtance of the French.

I ſuppoſe his Majeſty will not thank them neither forgiving out in all Roman Catholick Princes Courts, That this is a War of Religion, undertaken meerly for the propegation of the Catholick Faith, and as the French Miniſter at Vienna, expreſſed it in a ſolemn Speech to the Emperors Counſel, which hath been ſince Printed in French, that the Hollanders being Heriticks, who had forſaken their God; all good Chriſtians are bound to joyn and unite to extirpate them and to implore Gods bleſſing upon ſo good a work. Nay to confirm this the more they have lately declared and aſſured many Princes, that to let Europe ſee how far they are from any ſuch deſign as have been laid to their Charge; and to ſatisfie all the World they entred into this War out of a Religious Zeal; and for the Glory of God, they are ready to part with all their Conqueſts, and return to the Hollanders all the Towns they have taken from them; if they will but re-eſtabliſh the true Worſhip they have baniſhed from their Territories.

How far now this may be agreeable to his Majeſties Intereſt, or to the XXXIX Articles, let any unprejudiced man judge.

But an undeniable proof of the uprightneſs of the French Court, is their carriage in the Negotiations of Peace with the States. In ſhort, the matter of Fact is thus:

The paſſage of the Erench Army over that Branch of the Rhyne, called the Waal; having cauſed a general conſternation all over the Country, and the confuſion they were in, being ſuch, that they could hardly reſolve whether to yield or defend themſelves.

The States on the 11th. of June, named ſeveral Deputies to be ſent, ſome to his Majeſty, and the reſt to the French King; to know of them both upon what terms they would be willing to agree and come to a Peace.

Thoſe that came to his Majeſty, were met upon the way as far as Graves End, to forbid them the Court, and were conveyed to Hampton Court; there to continue in an honourable confinement, till we could hear from the moſt Christian King, and know of him whether the ſaid Deputies might be admitted; his Majeſty being unwilling to give the leſt offence to the French; And not thinking it either lawful or convenient (without their participation) ſo much as to hear what the Dutch Deputies Errand was.

But the other Deputies came no ſooner to the French Court, but two Secretaries of State were ſent to them, and without further delay, deſired to know firſt if they had full Power to Treat; and in the next place, what the States could propoſe in order to a ſpeedy Peace. The Deputies anſwered, they were only ſent to know his moſt Chriſtian Majeſties Pleaſure, and that their Maſters had thought it a greater reſpect to him to receive his Propoſals then to offer any Conditions themſelves, with this anſwer: the French Miniſters went to their Maſters and came back immediately to the Deputies, to let them know, it was expected the States ſhould make the Propoſals, and that the moſt Chriſtian King could not enter upon any Treaty unleſs they had full Power. Telling them withal (to quicken them and to haſten the concluſion of the work) that they were to conſider, That whatever his moſt Chriſtian Majeſty had Conquered, was already his own; and therefore he could no ways part with it, unleſs they gave him an Equivalent, as well for what he might Conquer farther, before the Concluſion of the Treaty, as for what he poſſeſſed at that time: Wherupon Monſieur de Groot (one of the Deputies) being gone to the Hague, he was ſent back with all ſpeed, and Authoriſed in a very ample manner together with his Collegues to treat and conclude a Peace with the French.

Upon the return of the ſaid De Groot, with the Powers after ſome conferences (part of them with De Groot alone) Monſieur de Louvoy, one of the Secretaries of State) gave the Dutch Deputies a project of a Treaty, or rather the pretentions of the King his Maſter: Upon the granting of which, he was both willing and ready to return to his former Amity with the States, and conclude a firm Peace with them.

Whereupon two things are to be obſerved; The one that the Conditions were ſuch, that (if granted) would have made the French King as perfectly Maſter of the Country, as if he had conquered all by the Sword: and the other, that in all the Articles (which are ſtill in being, and may be produced if need be) there was not the leaſt word relating to England; and no more notice taken of his Majeſty, or greater care of his intereſt, then if he had not been concerned in the War, or in no League with the French. So that if by a wonderful providence of God, the ſaid Treaty, had not been unexpectedly broken off, Europe had in one day loſt it's Liberty; And all we could have expected afterwards, had been the favour Polyphemus ſhewed to his Gueſts.

And to demonſtrate further, that the intention of the French Court was not his Majeſty ſhould be a gainer by the War, Monſieur de Groot (whoſe word if he be not very much wronged ought to go a great way when he ſpeaks of the French) declared at his ſecond coming to the Hague, with the before mentioned Articles that the French Miniſters had anſwered him, the States his Maſters might deal as they pleaſed with England, and come off as cheap as they would, becauſe (as they pretended) they were not bound or engaged by their Treaty to procure them any advantages. A happy thing in the mean while to be engaged in ſuch a War, with ſo Generous an Allie.

While this negotiation was on foot, and before the Treaty could be Concluded; the Prince of Orange was miraculouſly reſtored to the dignity and Authority of his Anceſtors, which having altogether Eclipſed the party that was inclined to treat with France upon almoſt any Terms, and the reſt of the Country being all under Water, the French loſt at once both their hopes of carrying the whole matter by a Treaty, and the opportunity of making a further Progreſs by their Armes.

At the ſame time My Lord Duke of Buckingham and my Lord Arlington went into Holland. And the French who knew already they could neither bring the Dutch to a compliance, nor Swim over to the remaining Townes. And with all being full of Apprehenſions and fear that by the Authority of the Prince of Orange, and through the intereſt he was like to have in his Majeſty (chiefly if their practices and honeſt dealings came to be diſcovered) a Seperate peace might be made between England and the Ʋnited Provinces, they Acted their part ſo ſuccesfully with our Plenipotentiaries, that they perſwaded them to enter (in his Majeſties name) into a new engagement, not to treat or conclude with the Dutch any Peace or Truce without them: For as to their promiſing the like, it was a perfect mockery on their part, ſince they had already done their utmoſt to Treat without England, and that after they had miſcarried in the attempt, nothing could ſecure them but his Majeſties refuſing to accept of what conditions the Dutch would be willing to grant Him.

After this new Contract made, our Plenipotentiaries together with the French Miniſters ſent their joynt demands, and propoſalls to the Dutch, to be granted in Ten days or elſe no Peace to be made, which was the next Maſter-peece of the French, for it is to be obſerved, firſt that the French Demands were in ſubſtance the ſame as they had made at firſt in their negotiation with Monſieur de Groot, And ſince they were ſo unjuſt, and ſo Enormious, that the beſt friends they had then amongſt the States could hardly ſwallow them themſelves, (much leſs to bring the generality to give their cenſent) without ſome Modification. It was not to be expected that the Government being ſince the late Change, much more avers to the French then before, the ſame propoſalls again, ſhould be better entertained, which was rendred the more improbable by the addition of the Engliſh demands.

Secondly, The French, by the exceſſive height of their demands, ſeemed to have encouraged (if not perſwaded by ſome more effectual means) the ſaid Plenepotentiaries not to come much ſhort of them, which was attended with Two Fatal conſequences, the one, that the War was certainly, by it, entayled upon his Majeſty; And the other that it was a means to alienate the minds and affections of the Dutch, who were then inclined to give thoſe advantages to England, which cannot rationally be expected hereafter.

Thirdly, Though the reſpective claimes of the Two Kings had been ſingly tolerable; yet the joyning of them together made it impoſſible for the Dutch to grant either. From whence the French (and very rationally) conceived hopes that the Dutch finding themſelves over ballanced by the joynt power of their Enemies, and ſeeing no way to come out of ſo deſtructive a War, and to have peace (and not a firm nor a durable one neither) without dividing their Country into a hundred pieces, and cutting of all their Sinews, had rather caſt themſelves into the Arms of their Conqueror, and laying aſide all thoughts of Soveraignty, live in an entire Body under the French Domination. At leaſt it were ſome comfort, if the French Court had but kept to this laſt agreement, which in ſo many reſpects was advantageous to them. But that they have not done neither: And as ſoon as they ſaw moſt Princes in Europe begin to be in Earneſt, and that great ſuccours were preparing for the Aſſiſtance of the Dutch, beſides what forces were already in the Field, They underhand made new overtures of Peace, and have ſtill to this day been ſending private Meſſages to the Dutch, wherein they take no greater care of England than they had done at Ʋtrecht. And if the Dutch had not perſiſted in their refuſal to Treat without their Allies, the French had long ſince concluded without theirs, and that upon very moderate Terms, as to the Dutch.

I ſuppoſe this will ſeem very ſtrange, and will hardly be credited, but ſince as long as I am under this diſguiſe, I cannot juſtifie it as fully as otherwiſe I might do it. All I can ſay at preſent is, there are thoſe in the Kingdom that know the truth of it as well as my ſelf, and I hope the world will not be long without a full diſcovery of it. And thus I end the firſt part of this diſcourſe which hath ſwelled unawares into a greater bulk then I intended at firſt, though the matter would bear a great deal more without being exhauſted.

II.

Let us now come to the Second Head, and examine what the iſſue of this War may prove, and what may rationally be expected it will come to.

Were it either poſſible in nature, or ſo much as to be imagined that Holland might be turned into a new Lake, their Towns burnt and depopulated, and their Inhabitants either deſtroyed or Tranſported into remote Colonies, or part of them brought into this Kingdom, to encreaſe the Number of our People; I fear no Arguments drawn from either natural Juſtice or Chriſtian Charity could be forceable enough to put a ſtop to ſuch a deſign: And in the caſe it would be hard for the ingenious and worthy Author of the Intereſt of England ſtated (as unanſwerable as his Arguments are) to perſwade men either Biaſſed, or not very well acquainted with the ſtate of Forreign Affairs, That it muſt be the chief Intereſt of England to ſupport the preſent Government of Holland.

But ſuch a deſtruction being not to be thought on, or expected by any man that is in his Wits; and ſince the Scituation of the Country, and its Commodiouſneſs for trading in many reſpects, together with the Natural and Laborious Induſtry of the Inhabitants, will ſtill continue under any change; To ſatisfy our ſelves how far we may be gainers by this War, we muſt conſider in order to the general events that may be looked upon as in any degree of poſſibility.

In order to that I conceive all men will grant one of theſe four things muſt be ſuppoſed.

Firſt, The abſolute conqueſt of the Ʋnited Provinces by the French. Or,

Secondly, Our Conquering of them.

Thirdly, A Diviſion and Sharing of the Country between us and the French.

Fourthly, and Laſtly, The Dutch recovering their loſſes, and with the help of their Allies, their withſtanding both England and France. Of each of them in Order.

The abſolute Conqueſt of the Ʋnited Provinces by the French, and their being brought under their ſubjection, is a thing of that dreadful conſequence, that the very thoughts of it muſt needs raiſe the blood of al true Engliſh men And there is hardly any remedy too violent for ſo deſperate a cure or means that could be called unjuſt, if neceſſary to prevent ſo great an evil, And therefore inſtead of loſing time to prove what is ſo manifeſt and ſo obvious to the meaneſt capacities, I only beg of all my dear Countrymen to lay the preſent ſtate of things to heart, and humbly move both Houſes to conſider, whether we be not already too near that evil day, and how far it is conſiſtant with that Intereſt, with which they are intruſted, to haſten it by unſeaſonable and pernicious compliance.

Secondly, As to our Maſtering the Low Countries, it can be but one of theſe two ways:

Firſt, Our ſubduing of them by a Landing; and withal, beating the French out of what they poſſeſs already: Or,

Secondly, Their voluntary yielding to us, and ſubmiting themſelves to his Majeſty.

The firſt can hardly be ſo much as ſuppoſed or imagined by any Rational Man: For 1. If in the middeſt of their late diſtractions and the unſpeakable confuſion, which was in every part of the Country, no opportunity of Landing could be found though often attempted: How can it be expected it ſhould be practicable by the next Summer, now they are all United and ſtrengthned by the aſſiſtance of their Allies. 2. How can it be thought poſſible to Land an Army conſiderable enough to take all their Towns, and Conquer the whole Country; Nay, to Conquer the Conquerers themſelves, and beat the French out. 3. Granting that the approach of our Fleet, would occaſion a great diſorder and conſternatian in the Countrey; and that the Dutch ſhould not prove able to oppoſe our Landing; and at the ſame time to keep the French out, and defend themſelves to the Landwards, what would the conſequence of this be, but only to enable the French to Maſter the whole Country, whilſt the Dutch ſhould divide and draw off their Forces to oppoſe us? It being much eaſier for the French who are already in the Country, to Ma ch with all their Forces to Amſter am, and to the reſt of their Towns, before we can Land; then for us to prevent them by our Landing. 4. Laſtly, if the French Ships are to have a ſhare in the Expedition, what Security have we, their men will promote our own ends, and not their Maſters; and that they ſhall not rather turn tayl againſt us, if occaſion be?

And as to the voluntary yeilding of the Dutch, and their giving themſelves up to us; I may ſay it is as irrational and as fond a conceit as the other: And which therefore doth hardly need being confuted. But becauſe ſome of our great men, have (even in Print) made uſe of this as of an Argument, both to juſtifie the War in point of prudence, and to perſwade the Nation to joyn and concur with the Cabal in their dark Counſels: It will be neceſſary, and we owe that reſpect to their quality, as to lay the matter open and unfold it with a little more care.

Were the Ʋnited Provinces ſtill entire, and untouched and they in an election to joyn with and ſubmit themſelves (upon terms) either to France or England, it would be no hard matter to demonſtrate and make it to appear that the ballance of true policy and reaſon ſhould weigh down by much on the French ſide. And that the beſt part of their Trade would ſoon, if incorporated with us run out of their Chanels into ours; which all underſtanding men amongſt them are ſo ſenſible of, that in Caſe this were in agitation, the intereſt of Religion (which beſides they could ſecure ſome other way) ſhould hardly carry it againſt profit and ſelf preſervation. But not to multiply debates, and granting now that in ſuch a Caſe, the Ducth would prefer our Domination before that of the French; Let us not examine what might have been if our ſuppoſitions were true: But what is like to be De facto, & may rationally be expected as the Cauſe ſtands..

Firſt it muſt be obſerved that though their Maratime Provinces be far the moſt conſiderable, and thoſe which have made that Commonwealth ſo powerful and ſo famous all over the World, yet their In-Land Provinces are of no leſs importance to the preſervation of the whole, and are the Bull-works and Out-works of the other, without which the main Body would be ſoon ſtreigtned and brought in a little time to the greateſt extremities,

For this Reaſon the Spaniards never offered Peace to the Dutch, nor could they have accepted of it if offered, till being Maſters of Seven Provinces, and having withall conquered ſeveral Towns in Brabant and Flanders, to be a fence to their out Provinces, their Territories proved of a Competent extent to Lodge and Maintain upon their Frontiers the greateſt Armies. And by removing the Seat of the War from their Trading Provinces, be ſo much the more able to continue it, rather with advantage to them, then with the leaſt inconvenience or trouble.

2. The Second thing we muſt take notice of is, that the greateſt advantage of the Situation of the Ʋnited Provinces lyeth, in that ſeveral of the greateſt Rivers in Europe not onely run through their Country, but diſimbogue into the Ocean within their Precincts. This openeth them an eaſie and an advantagious Trade into moſt parts of Germany, the Spaniſh Low Countries, and ſome Provinces of France, and makes a Reciprocation of commerce, and as it were an Ebb and Flow, between their Rivers and the Ocean, being enabled by the firſt to carry at a cheap rate to the furtheſt parts of the world what goods & commodities the above mentioned Countries afford, and to return them by means of the ſame, the Richeſt ſpoyles of the Eaſt and Weſt.

Theſe natural Advantages accrewing to the Inhabitants of theſe reſpective Provinces, by their being all Ʋnited under the ſame Government, do link and tie them ſo faſt together, that nothing but an external and irreſiſtable force can divide them; and who ever comes to be Maſter of the Rivers, muſt needs in a ſhort time either be beaten out of his Conqueſts, or elſe bring all the Havens and all the Inhabitants Bordering upon the Sea, under the ſame ſubjection? The Sea Ports without the Rivers, and the Rivers without the Ports, being altogether uſeleſs, and a Foundation for an Endleſs and Deſtructive War.

This being premiſed, the Concluſion will eaſily be drawn, and ſince the French do already poſſeſs half of their Country, and are Maſters of their cheif Rivers, if the Dutch come either to loſe the Ambition of Ruling, and being a Soveraign State, or elſe are brought to the neceſſity of chooſing a Maſter: It is plain they'l rather ſubmit themſeves to the French King, who hath half conquered them already, and hath in his own hands that part of the Country without which they cannot ſubſiſt, than by giving up the remaining part to England to entail a War upen them, which beſides their ſubjection to a Foreiner, as well as if they were under the French, will exhauſt what Treaſury they may have leſt, and from a Flouriſhing Eſtate bring them to perfect Beggery.

To ſumme up all: It cannot be ſuppoſed the Dutch will ever chuſe a Maſter, and ſubmit themſelves to the Government of a Forein Prince, unleſs they are driven to it by an unavoidable neceſſity. This neceſſity cannot proceed but from the ſenſe they may have of their own weakneſs, and of a deſire to live in peace, and free themſelves of a War which is ſo deſtructive to them. Now if they do ſubmit themſelves to England, in oppoſition to the French, the Peace they ſeek will be further off them then ever, & their remaining Country will be the ſeat of an endleſs War; whereas, if they give themſelves up to the French, they will be United again in an entire body, enjoy reſt and peace, and live under the Protection of a Prince, who of all Princes in Europe is beſt able to defend them againſt all their Enemies, and whoſe intereſt will be to give all poſſible encouragement to their Trade, and to make their Country the Nurſery of his Seamen, and in all other reſpects the ſupport of his Naval Strength. Not to mention that if they muſt be ſlaves, firſt, they might rationally hope to have the ſatisfaction afterwards, of lending a helping hand to bring their Neighbours, and in truth all Europe into the ſame condition with them.

Thirdly, We come now to the dividing and ſharing of the Country with the French, which by what hath already been ſaid will appear either impracticable, or rathor hurtful than advantageous, for this ſharing muſt be either by a Conqueſt on both ſides, as the Duchies of Cleve and Juliers were formerly, when Prince Maurice and the Marqueſs of Spinola entred at the ſame time into thoſe Countries with two great Armies, and took each what they could, the one on the behalf of the Elector of Brandenburg, and the other of the Duke of Newburg, or elſe that the French having Conquered and poſſeſſed all, ſhould give us part of their acquiſition.

The firſt cannot be ſuppoſed as long as we have no Army in tho Country. And in truth can bring none able to match that of the French, and to Conquer as faſt as they, though they had not a foot of Ground in the Ʋnited Provinces: But as the caſe doth now ſtand, it is plain, they would be Maſters of all before our long Boats could come on Shore.

And as to their giving us a ſhare, after an abſolute Conqueſt, there are three things to be conſidered, 1. It is worth the inquiry, how far they are engaged by their Treaty, and what ſhare we are to have: for all appearances are very deceitful, if the French have promiſed to give any thing more then a fair leave to take what we can. 2. It is apparent by what hath been ſaid before, at what rate their promiſes and other ſuch engagements are to be valued. 3. The nature and conſtitution of the Country being ſuch that it cannot ſtand divided, without not only very great inconvenience to both parties, but the deſtruction of one of them. The French King, what ever he had promiſed, cannot be willing to give us ſuch a ſhare as would bring his own under the Enuliſh ſubjection. And if his Majeſty ſhould have but an inconſiderable part of the Conqueſt, he could neither reap any benefit by it, nor protect it againſt the French power without exhauſting both his Treaſure and his Men. Nay it may be ſaid further, and all that know the Country will grant that unleſs Amsterdam with the Zuyder Sea were ſplit, and all the ſhipping divided to have each one half of the whole, no true diviſion can be made: And whoever is Maſter of that Town will ſoon or late ſubdue all the reſt.

It is true, if we had ſome Sea Towns, and the French had nothing to do with the reſt, it might be for a while a Curb to Holland and procure us ſome advantages in Trade. But if the French poſſeſs all the Country, what proportion can there be between the acquiſition and ours? And after the acceſſion of ſo great a power to their Empire, can any rational man imagin ſome few places they ſhould give us, would be a balance to their Forces, or a ſecure Fence againſt their Ambitious and aſpiring thoughts?

To clear this further, and to demonſtrate how dangerous it is for England to deſtroy the balance of Europe, in hopes of having a ſhare in the ſpoil, and of encreaſing our Dominions. It is to be conſidered that in the peruſal of our Engliſh Hiſtories, we find all our Forein Conqueſts either unfortunate in the end, or an unprofitable charge to the Kingdom; whilſt to maintain them, the Seas muſt be perpetually croſſed, for ſupplying them with Men, Money, and Neceſſaries. Nay, after the Conqueſt of the beſt part of the Kingdom of France we could not defend it long againſt the remaining part, and even loſt what belonged to his Majeſties Royal Anceſtors by right of Inheritance, after a quiet and uninterrupted poſſeſſion for ſome hundreds of years. Since that time what new acquiſitions hath been made, hath likewiſe been returned either for conſiderable Sums of Money, or upon ſome other conſiderations relating to the State of Europe in thoſe days.

And leaſt it might be objected, That thoſe former Conqueſts were either leſs prudently undertaken, or harder to be kept than theſe we ſeem to go upon now: It is obſervable firſt that our Fore-fathers either undertook alone the ſaid Conqueſts, or elſe if he joyn'd with any other Prince (as when they were aſſiſted by the Houſe of Burgundy) they ſtill had kept to themſelves the greateſt and moſt conſiderable ſhare. Secondly, That it was ever the intereſt of ſome of the Neighbouring Princes; England ſhould preſerve ſome part (at leaſt) of the ſaid Acquiſitions, and have ſtill a footing on the main, for the Common ſafety and for the ſpeedier and eaſier relief of our Allies. And yet though theſe two Conditions met together, either the eſſential difficulty of the thing it ſelf, or our natural unaptneſs to preſerve what we have once gotten, hath made all European Conqueſts unſuccesful, and in truth prejudicial to us.

But the Caſe being thus, what Judgement can we make, and what can we rationally expect or promiſe our ſelves of our intended joynt conqueſt with the French, where thoſe Conditions before mentioned are are altogether wanting? And where firſt far from Conquering our ſelves we onely countenance and promote (by our ſtrieghtning the Dutch by Sea) the Invaſion of a Country, which even whilſt it was nothing near ſo conſiderable as it is now all Europe hath looked upon, not onely as a fair ſtep, but as the beſt part of the way to the Univerſal Monarchy: And which did once occaſion ſo great a confederacy againſt the Houſe of Austria to wreſt thoſe Provinces out of their hands. 2. It is as plain, it is not the French Kings Intereſt to give his Majeſty a conſiderable part of the Conqueſts, nor to let us enjoy long what he might peradventure give us at firſt for ſome other ends of his own. And to ſecure this unknown ſhare to us, I do not ſee we have now any Talbots or Earls of Bedford at the head of our Victorious Armies to ſet up his Majeſties Standard in the Conquered Towns, and leave Engliſh Garriſons in them. But inſtead of that whilſt the French march on, and do enlarge their Empire, we pleaſe our ſelves with calling the French Forces our Forces, And endeavour, if not to perſwade our ſelves, at leaſt to perſwade others, All this is done for the honour and glory of the Engliſh Nation, for the Advancement of Trade, for the ſafety of his Majeſties Perſon, the ſupport of his Royal Authority, and the happineſs of his Kingdoms. It is true, we do not well know as yet (what) we are to have, but ſomewhat wel'e have however (ſay our Great men.) And we will not believe the French King ſhall let us go without a reward, for the pains we take in raiſing him, as much as in us lyeth, to the Throne of the univerſal Monarchy. Nay, ſuppoſing the worſt (ſaith a great and noble Champion for the French, in a Printed Letter to Sir Thomas Osborn) that we ſhould be ſo ill adviſed, as to let the French take all and leave us nothing, yet even in that Caſe, the French King would rather make their ſtrength at Sea inconſiderable, by their being ſubject to him, than his own more formidable, by his being their Maſter.

I confeſs this is a now Demonſtration in Poiticks which few men would have dreamed of: and if that be all our ſafety, I hope no true Engliſh man will be ſwayed by the authority or quality of thoſe who go about thus to argue the Kingdom out of its liberty, and turn England into a French Province.

Fourthly. The extream danger and fatal Conſequences of ſome of the former ſuppoſitions, and the impracticableneſs of the other, being thus (& I hope clearly) demonſtrated; we need not looſe much time to preſs that increaſe (which is the onely poſſible event that remaineth) the Dutch ſhall recover their loſſes, and with the help of their Allies be able to deal both with England and France. It cannot be his Majeſties intereſt to continue a War which will miſerably impoveriſh his Kingdoms, and by the continual Loſſes the Merchants do and are like to ſuſtain, bring the Trade of the Nation into ſuch a decaying condition, as will not be repaired in many years of Peace. Eſpecially if Spain be further provoked to proceed to an open Breach with us, as it is more than probable, they will ere long be forced to do.

But becauſe I ſee many are apt to look upon this War through a kind of Cloud, and ſeem to be unwilling to have a diſtinct Notion of the ill conſequences with which it is attended, but reflect only in General and confuſedly upon a ſuppoſed deſtruction of the Dutch, & ſeme imaginary Advantages accrewing to us by it, which yet they cannot inſtance in; much leſs demonſtrate upon any Rational Grounds: I think it neceſſary to add what we have ſaid already, ſome few Conſiderations relating both to Spain and the Empire.

As to Spain, it is firſt well known what that Crown is to expect from France, as ſoon as theſe may have any opportunity of deſtroying them. And I ſuppoſe no body doubts but that the Spaniſh Court will by all poſſible mears oppoſe the Encreaſe, and ſtop the Progreſs of the greateſt and formidableſt Enemies they have.

2. It is as plain, that in Caſe the French come to be Maſter, the Ʋnited Provinces, the Spaniſh Netherlands will of Courſe and unavoidably fall into their hands, notwithſtanding the famous Triple League which by the way will be Triple no longer, when the Dutch Common wealth is gone.

3. Although the Crown of Spain had no Domions in the Low-Countries, It would be as much their intereſt to preſerve the Ʋnited Provinces entire. And in true policy, they ought to venture all their Kingdoms: and to the very laſt of their men to prevent if it be poſſible ſo formidable an acceſſion of Naval Power to the French, after which no Plate Fleet or Gallions could ever come ſafe, nor conſequently their Monarchy ſtand much Longer.

4. The Emperour being already engaged, and hoſtilities begun between him and the French, Spain can no longer ſtand out, and they are bound to run the ſame fortune as well by late and private Treaties as by the Joynt-intereſt of their Family.

5. And laſtly Spain having already by their Aſſiſtance given to the Dutch, whereby all the conſiderable Towns in Brabant, where preſerved, and by the late Attempt upon Charleroy ſo highly incenſed the French againſt them, they cannot venture nothing more by an open Breach, it is much ſafer for them to declare whilſt the hands of the French are full, then to be expoſed to their fury after their Conqueſt ended. From all this it plainly followeth, that a breach between Spain and France is not to be avoided. But the ſame Arguments prove likewiſe, that, in caſe we do perſiſt in our Alliance with the French, they muſt break with us as well as with them: And ſince they are ſo far concerned in the preſervation of the Dutch, they cannot think themſelves ſafe if the others are deſtroyed.

It is their Intereſt by making this War as deſtructive to us as they can, to perſwade us more effectually, than they could do hitherto into a friendſhip with their Allies, for to ſay they dare not proceed to a breach; they are afraid of us, and we know how to Order them in the Weſt Indies: This were good if their All did not ly at ſtake, and if by their breach with us they could endanger more then the ſame All, Whereas to the Contrary by venturing all, they may, and will in all likelyhood, ſave both themſelves and all Europe.

This being Granted (as it muſt needs be, if truth do in the leaſt prevail with us;) I need not uſe many words to make all England ſenſible of the ſad conſequences of a Spaniſh War; I'le hint only thoſe that are undeniable: As firſt, the ſeizure of all our Merchants Eſtates, amounting in the whole to a vaſt Sum. 2. The loſs of our Trade with them, which of all other is the moſt beneficial to the Kingdom; And without which our Wollen goods muſt lie upon our hands, and half of our Weavers, Spinners, &c. go a begging. 3. The Interruption of our Levant and Plantations Trade, which cannot in caſe of Breach be ſecured by ordinary Convoys. And (not to mention the Spaniſh Men of War which both as to number and ſtrength are ſufficient to cruiſe in the Streights) With what either encouragement or ſafety can our Traders venture abroad; if, beſides the Dutch Capers, the Seas come to be infeſted with Oſtenders, Biſcaines, Majorcans, and Minorcans? Who are none of them inferiors to the Fluſhingers, and are as well Skilled as they are in the Art of Piracy; Nay, did not theſe very men without any help take above fifteen hundred Ships from us, in the late Spaniſh War, when Spain was at the loweſt; and ſought alone againſt us and France. 4. By the loſs or at leaſt the interruption of our Trade, his Majeſties Cuſtomes, which is the conſiderableſt Branch of his Revenue, will come to little or nothing; ſo that to ſupport the War, new Taxes muſt be raiſed in lieu of it: And proportionably ſo much greater Subſidies granted to his Majeſty.

If from Spain we come to the Empire; we find the Emperor himſelf and the Elector of Brandenburg, already engaged in the quarrel, and many other Princes upon declaring, ſo that it is now high time both for the Parliament and all true Engliſhmen, to look farther then we have done yet, and to examine with more care the conſequence of this War. For the Fire, which both we and France have kindled, is like to conſume all Europe, if we do not make haſt to quench it, and by a timely Retreat give way to ſafe Counſels. And for a cloſe to this ſecond Part of our Diſcourſe, I deſire the following Conſiderations may be ſeriouſly Debated and weighed.

Firſt, What horrid ſpilling of Chriſtian Bloud we'l be the occaſion of, if by our wilful promoting of the Ambitious deſigns of the French (even ſo palpable againſt our Intereſt) we force all the reſt of Europe to take up Arms in their own defence, and to unite all for their Common ſafety, and for the preſervation of that Liberty which (as though we were led by Witchcraft) we merrily go about to deſtroy.

2. How prejudicial this War will be to us, in caſe the confederate Princes do over-ballance the Power of France; And by raiſing the Reputation and the Credit of the Dutch (which laſt is the only thing they want) enable them not only to pay their Land Armies, but likewiſe to ſet out as great and conſiderable Fleets as ever. And I do not ſee that either of them ought to be looked upon as very improbable; ſince firſt it is very certain, and all thoſe that knew the Country will grant, That if the Hollanders had but ſome proſperous ſucceſs (either by their own Armies, Or by the help of their Allies) they'l be able to take up without trouble, and in a very ſhort time, as much Money as they may have occaſion for. And in the ſecond place it ſeemeth pretty rational to judg that the houſe of Auſtria with the conjunction of many Potent Princes, will ſtruggle a while for their lives, and may be hard enough for the French

3. But how much greater will the danger be if neither Germany nor Spain are able to ſtop the Progreſs of the French? And in caſe they muſt all yield, and ſubmit themſelves to the Victorious Arms of the moſt Chriſtian King, what will become of Poor England? muſt his Majeſty, (I ſpeak it with due reſpect to his Royal and ſacred perſon) be Tenant at will? or elſe Do we preſume ſo far on our own ſtrength as to imagin we may do what the reſt of Europe cannot? And that though the French had conquered all, we ſhould not fear them the more? and could ſtill defend our ſelves againſt them? Let thoſe that have Adviſed his Majeſty to this War ſpeak, they muſt now pull their Vizard off, they muſt appear in their true ſhape; & tell us plainly whether they are paid for making the French King the Univerſal Monarchy, And whether to bring down new Golden ſhowers into their Laps, England muſt at Leaſt be made Tributary to the French, ſome few Hackney writers will not ſerve the Turn now, And twenty ſilly ſtories againſt Holland, cannot make it adviſable for us, to joyn with the French King againſt the Greateſt part of Europe. When this War was entred upon, no Enemies were thought on, at leaſt ſpoken of, beſides the Dutch. This was the only game we followed at firſt, And we expected no other prey to divide between us and the French. But now, ſuppoſing that we had taken never ſo much care for an equal ſharing of the Ʋnited Provinces, concerning which we refer our ſelves to what hath been ſaid before, will our great men aſſure us further, That the Lines are alſo fallen to us in the pleaſant places of Europe? And that his Majeſty is to ſhare the Ʋniverſal Empire with the moſt Chriſtian King. I grant the Dutch have offended us, And that our War againſt them is not unjuſt. But is it Juſt therefore to deſtroy ſo many Princes who cannot Subſiſt without them, & who for their own preſervation are forced to Venture all to preſerve the Ʋnited Provinces? In few words; the Scene is altered: And though our infinite charity leads us, not to ſuſpect the ſincerity of the French or fear the encreaſe of their power, moſt Princes of Europe are of another mind; And whatever comes of it; they are reſolved to ſtand by and protect the Dutch, as long as they are able to protect themſelves; ſo that to conquer Holland All their Allies muſt be deſtroyed firſt: And the French King muſt needs be Maſter of the beſt part of Europe before we can have to our ſhare either the Briel or Fluſhing.

I might Add ſeveral other conſiderations (And perhaps of no leſs weight then the former) to evidence the fatal conſequences of this War. But by reaſon they do relate to the ſafety and preſervation of our Lawes (as well Eccleſiaſtical as Civil) I forbear, leaſt it ſhould be thought I go about (or intend in the leaſt) to raiſe a Jealouſie between his Majeſty and his people: leaving it wholly to the care and wiſedom of the both Houſes to provide againſt it, by thoſe means, and wayes as to them ſhall ſeem meet and neceſſary, and as the Importance of the thing it ſelf requireth.

III.

So far I hope we have made good what we have ſaid in the beginning of this Diſcourſe; That this was an age of wonders, and that of thoſe wonders the greateſt was the preſent Alliance with France, And our proſecuting the War in ſo dangerous an Aſſociation. But ſince there are no effects ſo rare or ſo wonderful, as well in the Civil Government as in the Courſe of Nature, but have proper Agents to produce them, it is very fit to enquire into the cauſes of our Miſterious Councills, the better to judge of their true nature.

In order to that, It will not be amiſs, to look a little abroad and conſider whether the Policy of ſome other Princes, who are engaged in the ſame Alliance with the French may not be a Leading caſe for us And help our diſcovery at home.

Thoſe Princes are the Biſhop of Munſter and the Elector of Collen, And as to the firſt, All the world knows and we have had a ſufficient experience our ſelves how far Money will go with him. Nay he is ſo far honeſt in this, that he doth think it no ſhame to own and profeſs it openly, He is but a Tennant for life, And whatever fills his Coffers, that he takes to be his true intereſt. The Univerſal Monarchy doth not intrench upon the Soverainity of either, his Brothers or Nephews, And a conſiderable and rich Legacy is the only Principality he can leave them; Whilſt his preſent Subjects are deſtroyed, he hoards up Treaſuries for his Family, And let the worſt come. Some rich Abbeyes in France will bring him more Revenues then his Biſhop-rick, As lately a Northen King did for the like, exchange his Crown, ſo that the caſe is clear with him. And if the States wovld out bid the French, his Highneſs would ſoon forget his Old Querrells, and prove the beſt of their friends.

The next is the Elector of Collen, who (to do him right) is a Religious and a worthy Prince, And one who in his own nature, is a great lover of peace: But how could he be perſwaded then to make his Country the Seat of War? To give his ſtrong holds to a Forreigner? And to expoſe his Subjects to all the Calamities, which the inquartering of an Inſolent Army doth bring along with it. To this the anſwer is plain, The Softneſs of his nature, and the Eaſineſs of his diſpoſition, hath made him devolve upon his Chief Miniſters the whole Government of his Dominions, and the abſolute direction of his Counſells. His great favorite (another Biſhop) is of the ſame Religion and Principles which that of Munſter and the Debonarity of the Maſter, is no fence againſt the corruption of the Servant. Quid vultis mihi dare & tradam eum vobis? Nay if the Biſhop of Stratsburg (the ſaid Favorite) doth ſtick at any hard thing, and is at any time ſomwhat troubled in his mind; for the undoing of ſo many thouſands of Fam lies, and for betraying his Truſt ſo ſhamefully, he hath his Brother at his Elbow the late Biſhop of Ments a ſworn Champion for the French, and of whom they uſed to ſay in jeaſt (that he was a dear friend to them) ready to comfort them upon all occaſions and to ſpur him on with more fury. Thus if you ask, where the Intereſt of the Arch-Biſhop of Collen lyeth in this Alliance with France, And how comes it he will ſuffer his Country to be laid as waſt, as if the Turks had over run it? Let it not be wondred at, The French Penſioners will have it ſo, And the two Brothers Furſtenburgs are paid for it.

The Caſe being thus abroad, I wiſh our Iſland might boaſt of the ſame happineſs as to corrupt Councellors, Which Ireland injoyeth in their being free from all Venimous Creatures, And that no politick Vipers might be able to breath in our Engliſh Ayr without ſoon breathing out their lives, But alas! our Chronicles do furniſh us with two many Inſtances of the contrary, And without looking any further back for Preſidents his Majeſty himſelf, and this Very Parliament have (not many years ſince) ſufficiently expreſſed how far they are of opinion, that Great Miniſters may betray their truſt.

On the other ſide, becauſe ſome have been guilty, they muſt not be all indifferently condemned, And we ought to have a great care not to paſs a raſh Verdict upon Perſons whom his Majeſty hath irradiated with ſo many Illuſtrious beams of his Princely favour. The ſafeſt way then not to wrong neither the Cabel nor the Truth, is to take a ſhort ſurvey of the Carriage of the chief Promoters of this War, Leaving the Judgment of either their Innocency or their Guilt to the unprejudiced Reader.

1. I will not inſiſt much upon ſome whiſpers (come too loud talking of late) of the wonderful effects the French Kings Liberality had (almoſt four years ſince in converting the ſtrongeſt oppoſers of his Intereſt, and though there be many od paſſages in it which are come to the Knowledg of ſeveral conſiderable members of both houſes) yet being not able my ſelf to lay the whole matter open, and having it only at the ſecond hand, I leave the full diſcovery of it to the party Concerned, who (I am enformed upon the leaſt encouragement, and provided he may do it with ſafety to his Perſon) will at any time be ready to trace out (in the view and to the ſatisfaction of the whole world) the firſt ſteps towards our undoing, and to ſhew plainly when the foundation of this Miſtery of iniquity was laid.

2. But howſoever whether all that is reported of this be true or not, I ſuppoſe it is not uſual to ſee ſo great a familiarity (as hath been obſerved long ſince between Forreign Embaſſadors and Firſt Miniſters of State, Continual treatings and frequent goings to Country Houſes, there to ſtay ſeveral daies, and weeks, is a new thing in the World. And an Embaſſadors uſing ſo Noble a Houſe with ſo much freedom, gave a juſt cauſe to all obſerving men to conclude he had paid dear for it. I am ſure his Majeſty himſelf was not very well pleaſed with it at firſt, Though they have proved pretty ſucceſsful, in the Art they have uſed ſince to reconcile him to their intrigues.

3. We have ſeen in the firſt part of this diſcourſe, how far not only his Majeſty, but his Great men likewiſe thought it neceſſary to keep a true ballance between the reſpective Princes and States of Europe, and to ſtop the progreſs of the French. What Steps where firſt made in order to it, and how the Dutch were Courted into an Alliance with us; joyntly to allay the Storms the diſturbers of mankind had raiſed, and Quench their devouring Flames. Nay, we made it appear the Tripple League was not entred into, out of a perſonal kindneſs to the Spaniards, but only for ſelf preſervation, and to prevent the over-running of Chriſtendom. Whereupon 'tis worth the while to enquire of the ſame parties, and deſire them to inform both Houſes, and the reſt of the Nation, which way the ballance of Europe came to be ſo much altered; And what hath made the French ſince the Treaty of Aix 〈◊〉 formidable than before? hath the Houſe of Auſtria had any new acceſſion of Power? or did the Invaſion of Lorain weaken the moſt Chriſtian King? Could we value our ſelves four or five years ſince, by raiſing ſome few Bancks againſt ſome few French Waves, and now be as proud again of letting in their whole Ocean? The Jeopardy Europe was ſuppoſed to be in was (moſt certainly) infinitely increaſed, And the ſame Hanibal is now much neerer our Gates than ever he was, And yet we never thought our ſelves ſo ſecure; and whilſt the Ship of Europe is neer ſinking, the Cabballe (which is the Meaſure of their faith) no not apprehend the leaſt danger. Happy men who can ſo ſuddenly be tranſformed into new Creatures! Who would not wiſh to have a ſhare in your enlightning Graces?

But to the matter of fact, by the Treaty of Aix la Chappelle all Princes in Chriſtendom were invited into the garently for the greater ſecurity and ſtrengthning of the Agreement then made between Spain and France. Purſuant to this (as we have ſaid before) his Majeſty ſent a Miniſter to the Proteſtant Princes in Germany to invite them into the Garenty of the ſaid Treaty of Aix, or in other words, into the Tripple League. And not long after, upon the ſame Grounds Propoſals were made to ſeveral other Princes, to draw them into the ſame League; To which, the Duke of Lorrain (with ſome other that had promiſed to come in) being very much inclined, and the thing being brought very neer a concluſion, the moſt Chriſtian King (who by that time was moſt manfully working under ground to deſtroy the Tripple League, and who dreaded nothing more than a faſter trying of that Gordiun knot) to prevent the Aſſociation, did very fairly invade Lorrain, and was neer taking the Duke himſelf Priſoner.

In this Invaſion, there are three or four things that are obſervable. 1. Beſides the ſcandal of ſuch an unjuſt oppreſſion, and the indignation it ought to have raiſed in all Princes, to ſee a Soveraign Prince thus • ranted out of his own Dominion; nothing could ever give a greater inſight into the Ambitious Deſigns of France, nor diſcover more fully their Intentions; none but an Univerſal Monarch, can pretend to a right of diſplacing Princes, and diſpoſing both of their lives and of their Territories, and therefore nothing could deſerve a higher reſentment, nor a more vigorous oppoſition from thoſe that had appeared ſo lately the Aſſerters of the liberty of Europe. 2. This Violance was an open breach of the Pirenean Treaty, and conſequently of the Treaty of Aix la Chappelle, which was a renewing and a further confirming of the other. And ſo far the Tripple League was concerned in it. 3. It was deſtructive to the very end and ſcope of the ſaid Treaty of Aix, which was to put a ſtop to the progreſs of the French, and to the encreaſe of their Power, the Addition of that fair Dukedome, being as conſiderable, if not more, than their Conqueſt in the Spaniſh Netherlands, and with all part of the Spaniſh Dominions, either blocked up and Beſieged by it (as Luxemburg) or cut off from the reſt, and all communication taken from them, as the County of Burgandy. 4. The great Zeal which the Duke of Lorraine had expreſſed to joyn with the other Princes engaged in the Tripple League, was the true cauſe why he was thus perſecuted; though ſome other unjuſt and frivolous pretences were uſed.

Upon all theſe grounds, the Duke of Lorrain was in good hopes the Tripple League would protect his innocency, and not forſake Europe by forſaking him. And to quicken them, he ſent ſome of his Servants to the reſpective Courts of the Parties Engaged. Whereupon our great Men adviſed his Majeſty not to concern himſelf in the Quarrel, though his own inclinations and love to Juſtice, led him not to refuſe his Aſſiſtance to a Prince who had laid upon him many great and high Obligations, and eſpecially in an occaſion wherein the Liberty as well as the Honor of Criſtendom was ſo far concerned. But the Miniſters it ſeemeth, carried it againſt their Maſter, and the Duke of Lorrains Envoy was ſent back with a Complement, and many expreſſions of kindneſs, but told withal, the French Invaſion was a Torrent not to be ſtopped at that time. A Torrent not to be ſtopped at that time! And what was then the uſe of the Tripple League? what will become of all the fine Speeches made in its Commendation? and was it harder to oblige the French King to return Lorrain, than to force him to reſtore the French Counte, as he was by the Treaty of Aix; in caſe we had been ſtill true to our intereſt, and had been ſwayed by no other conſideration? Idem manens idem, ſemper facit idem.

About the ſame time, whereas we had ſent to ſeveral Princes to invite them into the Tripple League, the Emperor who might as juſtly have expected the ſame Complement, did by a letter to his Majeſty invite himſelf, and in conformity to one of the Articles of the Treaty of Aix deſired to be admitted into the Garanty.

Upon the receiving of the Letter (his Majeſty upon whoſe goodneſs ſome of our great Men had not had time to work yet) aſſured the Spaniſh Embaſſador (who had delivered the Letter) he was glad his Emperial Majeſty was ſo ready to come into the League, and told him he would cauſe an Inſtrument to be prepared in order to the ſaid Admiſſion. But when the reſolution was taken, and Orders given for preparing the ſaid Inſtrument; It was firſt moved that Mr. Secretary Trevor (who was not initiated in their holy Miſteries) might not have the drawing of it though it was his proper Province, And then having made themſelves the ſole Maſters of the thing, a tollerable and reaſonable honeſt draught was firſt brought in, but before it was perfected, they acted their part ſo ingeniouſly (with the help of Monſieur Colbert) that in the end they poſſeſſed his Majeſty with the opinion, that the admitting of the Emperor, would be attended with very dangerous conſequences; and that in caſe he came into the League, his Majeſty would be engaged in all his Quarrels, and bound to make his Forces March (as the before mentioned Author of the Letter to Sir Thomas Osborne expreſſes himſelf) into the fartheſt part of Germany, as often as it ſhould happen to be Invaded by the Great Turk. The late Secretary Trevor, oppoſed this as much as he was able, and endeavoured to ſatisfie his Majeſty, that the Garanty of the Tripple League, as well as of the Treaty of Aix la Chapelle, related only to the Agreſſion and other Hoſtilities from either France or Spain; Propteria (ſaith the Treaty) by reaſon of the ſaid Allyance. But the wary cautious men (as well as of the greater number) carried it, And the Emperors proffer was rejected.

Nay, as ſoon as ſome of our Semi Gods, had cut the fatal Tripple Knot, with the Diamond Sword of their Alexander, the poor now, but formerly vaunted Tripple League, was trampled under foot, turned into Ridicule and leſs vallued than a Ballade: His Majeſty and they themſelves ſince the Treaty of Aix, had thought it very rational and very neceſſary withal, to invite other Princes into the ſaid League, or in other words, into the Garanty of the Treaty of Aix: purſuant to the VII. Article of the ſaid Treaty, whereby all Kings, States, and Princes, are invited into it. But as if they remembred neither his Majeſties ſending of Envoyes to the Princes of Germany, nor the words of the Treaty it ſelf: They tell us now (in the ſame Printed Letter) That the neceſſity of inviting all Princes into the Tripple League, is a Maxime much in vogue with ſome who looking very grave, do therefore take it very ill if for that reaſon, you will not allow them to be infallible: And afterwards becauſe the Tripple League is often mentioned, without mentioning the Garanty of Aix, (which is in truth the thing meant by it) to ſay (ſaith the Author) we ſhould invite them into the Tripple League — That, if you mark, is ſuch a kind of Figure in diſcourſe, as commonly is called a Bull. Fidem veſtram, Dij imortales.

4. We have gone yet farther than all this, And the civil applications of the French, and their kind entreaties, did ſo prevail with us, that loathing the very thoughts of the Tripple League, and hating almoſt any thing that related unto it; we ſufferd an Agent of ours, one Marſilly, whom we had ſent to the Switzers to invite them into the Garanty of Aix (and who was intercepted and taken Priſoner by the French, whilſt he was very buſie in the execution of what commands he had received not many Months before from our Great-men) to be broken upon the Wheel at Paris, although one ſingle word from us would have ſaved his life. Neither did we take it ill (ſuch is our good nature) that upon the very Scaffold, twenty Queſtions were put to him relating to his Majesties Perſon. And (in that publick and infamous Place) a ſtrict enquiry made into the particulars of what had paſſed between him and the King of England, for thus was his Majeſty often mentioned and named.

5. But to take off ſomewhat of the wonder and ſtrangneſs of our neglecting, and forſaking our Leagued Friends for the moſt Christian Kings ſake, we ſoon ſhewed as much ſelf-denyal in our own concerns and grew civiliſed to admiration, by our inward converſe with the Monſieurs, whereof we'll give only three Inſtances.

The firſt is that whilſt we ſtormed againſt the Dutch, for not promoting as for as they were bound, the coming away of ſome Families that would leave Suranam. we found no fault with the French, their keeping us above four years out of St. Chriſtophers, No more than with their deſtroying, in the mean while, that part of the Iſland which belonged to his Majeſties Subjects. And we would have thought it a rudeneſs in us, to have preſſed too hard on his moſt Chriſtian Majeſty for a ſpeedy or punctual performance of his Articles. Nay if the French Commanders in thoſe parts are to be believed, there was very good underſtanding in relation to the ſaid Iſland, between ſome of our Grandees and the Erench Court, as doth appear by the Narrative my Lord Willoughby delivered to the Council of Plantations, and which is Entered in their Books.

The next is, That by any Ordinance of the French Privy Council, (which is now the Statute Law of that Kingdom) all their Sea and Land Officers, and Commanders in the Iſlands of America being ſtrictly enjoyned and required to ſecure their Maſter the Soveraignty of thoſe Seas; the ſaid Ordinances having been brought in by a Perſon of Quality to the Cabinet Council, it was at firſt to be declaimed againſt, but ſoon buried in oblivion, and put up amongſt the uſeleſs Papers, though the French Purſuant to it, hath ſince much interrupted our Trade, and have proved infinitely vexatious in ſo much (as I am credibly informed) that the preſent Governour of Jamaica hath ſent word ſince his being there) that notwithſtanding their old Quarrel with the Spaniards it would be much eaſier to keep a good Correſpondence with them than with the French our dear Allies.

And for a laſt Inſtance of our more than ordinary civility to the French ſeveral Traders in London have prepared a Petition to his Majeſty in Council, to complain of the oppreſſion their Factors and Agents lay under in France, with a true ſtate of their Caſe, and a ſhort account of their grievances, this came to the knowledge of ſome of our Great Miniſters, and they having had the peruſal of them before the delivery of it, ſtopt by their Authority all further proſecution of the matter, and put off the ſaid Merchants with a promiſe they would acquaint the French Embaſſador with their Complaints, and ſee it ſhould be redreſſed through his means. How far they have been incouraged in their Trade ſince that promiſe, they are beſt able to judge, but however it was not fit the Nakedneſs of our dear Friends ſhould be thus expoſed to the whole view of the whole Council-Board.

And the foregoing particulars are more than ſufficient to ſatisfie any impartial and underſtanding Reader, how far the French have influenced our Counſels; and withal they give us a great light, and help us much to diſcern, whether in truth we have broken the Tripple League (or at leaſt let it fall, and diſſolve of it ſelf) for no other reaſon, but becauſe we are conſtrained to fall out with the Dutch, and to defend our ſelves againſt their oppreſſion as the ſo often cited noble Author would perſwade us, or elſe if it may not be ſaid rather (and upon much better grounds) that becauſe it was not the French Kings Interest the Tripple League ſhould ſubſiſt, we have therefore reſolved to break with the Dutch, Thus to be ſubſervient to the ends of his moſt Christian Majeſty.

But by reaſon this might ſeem ſomwhat harſh at firſt, and be looked upon as too ſevere a conſtruction of our Great mens intentions, it is neceſſary to evidence further, how induſtrious the Caballe have been in their endeavours to make this War juſt (or to be thought ſo at leaſt) after they had once reſolved to make War.

Thus they firſt made a great noiſe of infamous Libells, horrid Pictures, Pillars ſet up and Medalls coyned; to the infinite diſhonour of his Majeſties Perſon, and of his Royal Dignity, whereas to this day, none of thoſe Libells or Pictures could be produced, And the Pillars had never any being but in the imagination of thoſe who made it their work to raiſe a Jealouſie between the Two Nations, and ſet Europe in a Flame. It is true there was a Medal Coyned which might have been ſpared; but as ſoon as it was known in Holland, ſome exceptions were taken at it, the Stamp was broken in pieces, and withal, all impartial men that have ſeen it, could not diſcern any thing in it which could give ſo much offence, or that looked like an affront intended to his Majeſty.

Beſides this, thinking it very material to have in this, as well as an the late War, if not the clamour, at leaſt the concurrence of the Traders; they ſent for ſeveral of them, and endeavoured to draw from them ſome complaints againſt the Dutch for the ſtrengthening of the Good Cauſe. Wherein it is very obſervable, that the Committee of the Eaſt India Company, being (amongſt others) deſired to bring in their Grievances, they anſwered and gave it under their hands, they knew of no wrong done to them by the Dutch ſince the Traty at Breda. (or words to that effect) But it ſeemeth the Compiler of his Majeſties Declaration was better informed, and knew more of the Companies concerns than their Committee.

But all this not ſerving the turn, the difficulties which did ariſe in the performance of the Conditions of the Surrender of Suranam, muſt be improved to the height, And even after Secretary Trevor had adjuſted the matter with the States, and had received from them the Orders which were agreed upon, Baniſters going was retarded, and Sir John Trevors agreement (as if he had not faithfully diſcharged his truſt in it) ſubmitted to the cenſure of the Counſel of Plantations, where at laſt the ſaid Baniſter pleaded ſo well his own and Secretary Trevor's cauſe, that with much a do the one was cleared, and the other diſpatched away, though with many devices and tricks (too tedious to be inſerted here) which (if not prevented) might have made his Voyage altogether unſucceſsful: But we muſt not forget, that, the very men who found ſo much fault with what Mr. Secretary Trevor had done, were themſelves ſatisfied with much leſs, before they had harkned to new Counſels: And were not a little Angry with Collonel Baniſter for deſiring more than the States were willing to grant. What (was it ſaid at that time) do you think we muſt make War for you: Or that We are bound to procure you whatſoever may be advantagious, to your ſelf, and to your fellow Planters? Quantum mutatus ab illo.

Their next work and (in truth) Great Maſter Piece, was the ſending the Yacht, with Orders to Sayl through the Dutch Fleet, and require ſtriking to his Majeſties Flag. And I am ſo far from juſtifying or excuſing in the leaſt the refuſal which the Dutch Admiral made to pay what reſpect was due to the Engliſh Colours, that the States themſelves do not own it, and are ready to enter into any new Engagement for preventing the like for the future. But there are ſeveral circumſtances in it which are worthy of Obſervation: as, That the Dutch Fleet was then at Anchor not far from their own Coaſt, and in a Station which by many Geographers is accounted no part of the Britiſh Seas.

2. That the Dutch were out at that time in purſuance of the Tripple League, and to be ready upon occaſion to relieve the Spaniſh Nether Lands which were threatned by the French, who were then in March with a conſiderable Army, and came as far as Dunkerk, which one would think was a very unfit time to ſend out on purpoſe to pick a Quarrel with them: And the rather becauſe we had promiſed the Dutch to ſet out a Fleet as well as they, to joyn with theirs, for the common ſafety. 3. That the Penſionaire De Witt who Governed Holland at that time with a more than Miniſterial Authority, took a pride in ſtanding in punctillioes in all things relating to England, which maketh the Common Wealth it ſelf to be leſs guilty of any diſreſpect ſhewed, either to his Majeſty, or to the Nation, through the haughtineſs and private animoſity of their Miniſter. And truly I muſt needs ſay, that of all the things that are laid to the ſaid De Witts charge, there is hardly any which would make me apt to believe there was a Private underſtanding between the French and Him, than his carriage in this buſineſs, and his demurring ſo long upon the ſatisfaction, which the greateſt part of the States were willing to give to England, whilſt he knew full well, that it was a Quarrel ſought by our Miniſters, who wanted ſome popular pretence to make War, and keep their word to the French King. 4. That we ſtayed ſeveral months before we demanded ſatisfaction, leaſt if we had demanded it too early, it had been granted us too ſoon. 5. That when Sir George Downing was ſent over, he was bound by his Inſtructions not to accept of any ſatisfaction from the Dutch after a certain number of days wch were preſcribed to him, which is a very irregular and unuſual of proceeding in Embaſsyes, and much leſs practicable in Holland than any where elſe, It being impoſſible to have the reſolutions of their Towns, and afterwards of their Provinces without a conſiderable time. 6. That this was made ſo much the more difficult by our demanding not only the uſual ſtriking, which (though ever practiced and due to England) was firſt Nationally agreed upon, in 1654. and confirmed by the two Treaties with his Majeſty in 1662. and 1667. But alſo a new kind of acknowledgment of the Soveraignty of the Seas, which is not mentioned in the ſaid Treaties. So that by joyning them both in A memorial, if the Dutch did demur upon the ſecond and ſo delayed the Granting of the firſt, it was a ready way for us to clamour and poſſeſs the whole Nation, the Dutch had broken their Treaty and refuſed to Strike to the Engliſh Flagg. 7. That after the Dutch had given their anſwer to the ſaid Sir George Downings Memorials, he refuſed to receive it, and came away without it, againſt a ſecond Order he had received under his Majeſties own hand, for which alſo he was Committed to the Tower. But not to wrong the Gentleman, we muſt alſo own, that though he had a poſitive and latter Command from his Maſter, which did ſo far reſcind his Inſtructions, yet his friends have whiſpered in his behalf for his Juſtification, that he had received at the ſame time Letters from ſome of our Great Miniſters, who conjured him as he tendred his own good to follow his Inſtructions and keep cloſe to them. 8. Laſtly it is very obſervable that the Dutch having ſent an Expreſs, the Anſwer, Sir George Downing would not receive, we firſt replyed it was dark obſcure and inſufficient. Upon which they ſent an Extraordinary Embaſſador who joyntly with the Leiger Embaſſador told our Miniſters, that his Maſters intentions and deſire to give his Majeſty all poſſible ſatisfaction in the buſineſs of the Flagg, they both Ordered and Impowred him, to clear what might be obſcure or dark in their Anſwer, and ſupply what was inſufficient, and therefore deſired them to inſtance in what they did not approve of, or did think amiſs, or elſe that they would be pleaſed to draw up themſelves after their own Method and way what Article they thought neceſſary for the preventing of the like inconvenience. They Anſwered, the States with their Miniſters knew beſt how to Frame and Word their own Anſwers, neither could it be expected they ſhould draw up papers for them. Whereupon the Dutch Embaſſadors brought them a Project of an Article to be agreed upon concernig the Flagg, and asked them whether it was Worded to their mind, and if that would ſatisfie them. To which they gravely anſwered, that when they had ſigned and delivered it they would tell them their mind concerning it. And the Embaſſadors refuſing ſtill to deſign it, unleſs they knew before hand it was Satisfactory, their conference thus broke off, yet upon ſecond thoughts, the Embaſſadors having reſolved to ſign the ſaid Paper, and to deliver it at a venture, they demanded a New Conference, which was promiſed them, and Seven of the Clock at night appointed, on the Sunday after the Engagement with the Smyrna Fleet. But on the very ſame day leaſt the Dutch might comply further with us then we deſired, our Grandees did prevail with his Majesty to call extraordinarily a Counſel and to have without further delay the Declaration of War, read and approved. So that when the Embaſſadors came at their appointed time, with their Paper ready ſigned, they were told in ſhort they came too late.

7. I might Add as many and as conſiderable inſtances of what Arts and Policy our great Men have uſed to deceive his Majeſty; And to bring him by degrees into a liking of their War. But this matter being ſo tickliſh and nice, That I fear I ſhould not be able to go through with it (although I took never ſo much care) without expoſing my ſelf to the cenſure of the World, and having either my intention or ſome of my expreſſions miſconſtrued. I think it much ſafer and more prudent to draw a Curtain over that part of the Miniſtry of the Cabal, and leave their Reputation ſo far untouched, ſince they have had the fill to weave it (as it were) in more then one place into that of their Master.

8. For a farther clearing of this, and to ſatisfie our ſelves, as far as we are able, whether the Conſtruction we do ſeem to make of the Carriage and Deſigns of the Cabal, be not to partial. It will not be amiſs if we endeavour to diſcover what their own Opinion was of it at firſt, and how far they were perſwaded themſelves, their New Counſels were agreeable to the true Intereſt of England, which will beſt appear by the two following particulars.

The firſt is, Their great care of not truſting with their Myſterious Intrigues, perſons, whoſe either quality natural Courage, Honeſty, or Experience, made them ſuſpect they would be either too inquiſitive, before they would joyn and concur with them, or elſe too reſty and froward, if they chanced to be of another mind. And upon theſe fair and honeſt Grounds, they reformed their Cabinet Counſel; and turned at once out of the Commitee for Forein Affairs, Prince Rupert, the Duke of Ormond, the Lord Keeper, and the late Secretary Trevor: This being the firſt Secretary of State that was ever kept out of a Commiſſion of that Importance. Not to mention ſeveral other eminent and conſiderable Privy Counſellors, who till then had been Commiſſioners in all Negotiations and Treaties with France.

Now in caſe the Cabal had no Deſigns but what were for the Honour and the Safety of the Nation, why they ſhould ſo induſtriouſly to conceal it from perſons that have deſerved ſo well both from his Majeſty, and from the whole Kingdom, is what paſſeth my poor underſtanding: and whoever is able to unriddle this, Erit mihi magnous Apollo.

But if this be convincing Argument, The next I hope will be ſomewhat plainer; And both Houſes are beſt able to judge, whether their ſitting was ſo dangerous: or how faithful thoſe Counſellors muſt be who could adviſe his Majeſty to Prorogue ſo often upon the French Kings deſire; A Parliament whoſe Loyalty and Zeal for their Soveraign, is not to be matched in no former Age. We do not hear that either the Cecils or Walſingham ever adviſed the Queen their Miſtreſs not to call her great Counſel, or ſuffer them to meet, when ſhe was preparing to aſſiſt the Proteſtants in France, or to Protect the Ʋnited Provinces againſt Philip the Second. King James had no reaſon to fear his Parliament, who if they came together, would not oppoſe the aſſiſtance of the Palſgrave. And his Majeſty now Reigning, hath in the former War againſt the very ſame Enemies, had a ſufficient experience of the readineſs of both Houſes, to promote as far as they are able, any deſign which they conceived may tend to the honour and ſafety of his Government, and the proſperity of the Kingdom. Why then ſhould our Great men obſtruct the chearful Compliance of his Majeſties faithful Subjects. 3. Why not to call upon thoſe whoſe Aſſiſtance was ſo neceſſary, and who never denied it when demanded? Let us not condemn them before we have all. Parliaments (I ſpeak it with due Reverence) are now and then Peeviſh things that will not be ſatisfied with fair Words, and pry too far into Secrets that are not to come to publick view. Our Grandees were afraid, if ſo many clear-ſighted men came together; ſome one or other would ſpy out the Snake that lay in the Graſs, and if their mine had once taken vent, the whole Deſign had miſcarried. No, no, we'l do better (ſaith the Cabal) we'l be wiſer than to run that hazard; we are reſolved to make War, and will not be croſſed in it by any Parliamentary Clamours. If for want of a Parliament, we can have no Engliſh Subſidies, we'l make a ſhift with French Supplies: And if that doth not ſerve the turn (obſerve the Gradation,) we'l ſhut up the Exchequer. In the mean while the Smyrna and Eaſt India Fleets, will fall into our hands: And when we have all that Treaſure; who ſhall dare to find fault with us?

Having brought the Cabal thus far, we muſt before we part, wait once more on ſome of them as far as Holland, and ſo take our leave of them.

We have already given ſome account in the firſt Part of this Diſcourſe, of the new Agreement entred into with the French King, by our Plenipotentiaries, and demonſtrated the fatal conſequences of the ſame, what followeth will clear it farther.

The wonderful Progreſs of the French having ſurprized and frighted all Europe; Our Court (who knew what ſlender proviſion was made for England in that Conqueſt) was little leſs Alarm'd than the reſt: And our Grand Miniſters were diſpatched in Poſt haſte, both to the Dutch and to the French, their greateſt fear, when they went, being left they ſhould come too late, and find the whole Country under the French Subjection. After their Arrival in the Hague, they begun their firſt Complements to the States Commiſſioners, that were ſent to wait upon them with all the Expreſſions imaginable, both of kindneſs to Holland, and of concernmant and trouble to ſee the French ſo far advanced. There they received an account of Monſieur de Groots Negociation, and of the great care the French took of his Majeſty; which raiſed ſuch an Indignation in them, that nothing would ſerve their turn, but deſtroying out of hand, or at leaſt Maſtering the French Fleet. And from thence removing to the Prince of Orange his Camp; they renewed their kind Proteſtations: Aſſured his Highneſs, That his Majeſties intention had never been to give way to the Conqueſt of the Ʋnited Provinces: The moſt Chriſtian King himſelf, having often times declared he onely intended to humble their Commonwealth, neither was it fit to ſuffer the French ſhould go on at that rate. In the end they took upon them, and engaged to do their utmoſt to bring the French Court to be Satisfied with Maeſtricht, and the right of keeping Garriſons in the Towns upon the Rhyne, that belong to the Electors of Brandenburg and Collen. And that in Caſe the French refuſed to accept of thoſe terms, they would then take new meaſures with the States, and conſider joyntly of the beſt ways, to prevent the deſtruction of their Common wealth, as well as the dangerous encreaſe of the French.

With theſe fair promiſes and friendly aſſurances, they proceeded on their Journey to his moſt Chriſtian Majeſty, who was ſome few hours riding from thence; having behind them an infinite ſatisfaction in the minds of all Perſons, with great expectation of a happy Change, through their zealous interpoſition. But what may not the Royal Eloquence of a moſt Chriſtian King do? What, will not his Golden Word perſwade, after our Grand Ministers had been ſome few dayes in the French Army, they found they were not miſtaken before, and began to have a clearer apprehenſion of things. The Negotiation of De Groote, with the particulars imparted to them at the Hague, was a meer ſlander; for ſo the French Court told them. The encreaſe of the French Power was not to be ſuſpected or feared; they were too generous to abuſe it. And therefore after they had left the Prince of Orange, three or four days without News from them, they at laſt ſent him word, The States were to give ſatisfaction to both Kings joyntly: And that neither Crown could or would treat ſeperately. This unexpected Meſſage did infinitely ſurpriſe as well the Prince of Orange, as the States. And his Highneſs (who had full power given him by the States to Treat and conclude with England) not to be held longer in ſuſpence anſwered the Pl nipotentiaries, he deſired to know what would ſatisfie both Crowns, and what their reſpective demands were? Whereupon they ſent him the joynt Propoſals before mentioned, together with a Copy of the new agreement they were entred into; concerning which we'l add onely to what hath already been ſaid, theſe following Queries:

1. Whether they were ſent onely to promote the French Conqueſt; and if not how they could think it adviſable, by making the Peace impoſſible, to force the Dutch (as far as in them lay to caſt themſelves into the Armes of the French King, and ſubmit themſelves to his Domination?

2. Whether they can deny they knew the joynt Propoſalls tendred to the Dutch ſhould not be granted, ſince the French demands alone had been unanimouſly rejected, and in that caſe, how agreeable it was to the Intereſt of England to make it impoſſible for the Dutch to give his Majeſty any ſatisfaction.

3. Whether, they had not received, as well from the Prince of Orange as from the States Commiſſi ners, all poſſible Aſſurances of the infinite deſire they had to ſee his Majeſty return to his former Amity with them, and of their readineſs to purchaſe it, at any rate, that the Condition they were in would bear? If ſo how faithfully the Plenipotentiaries, diſcharged their truſt in neglecting thoſe proffers, and entring into a New Engagement, which was ſo Prejudicial to England as we have made it appear?

4. How far thoſe that were joyned in Commiſſion with them did concur with them in their Judgment, and whether all thoſe conſiderations, with man other, were not repreſented to them; And urged by ſome who had no other end, but to ſerve their Maſter faithfully?

5. Whether or no it was for that Reaſon, they oppoſed ſo fiercely, My Lord Vicount Hallifax (who came a day or two after them) his appearing and acting joyntly with them, though Commiſſionated in as full and as ample manner as themſelves.

6. Who were thoſe (after my Lord Hallifax could be kept out no longer) who went privately to the French Camp under ſeveral pretences, and had ſtill Negotiations of their own on foot?

7. Whether they had Order to call the French King, the King of France, and to name him ſtill before his Maſter, as well as to ſet in the firſt place the French demands before thoſe of their Majeſty; As all this was done in the Copies of the Agreement they had made, and of both Kings pretenſions which they ſent together to the Prince of Orange by Sir Gabriel Sylvius: And to which we may appeal if the truth of this be doubted?

8. And Laſtly, how far their Inſtructions will juſtifie their ſtanding in the behalf of the French, upon a Publick Exerciſe of the Roman Catholick Religion in the Ʋnited Provinces, the Churches to be divided, and the Romiſh Prieſts maintained out of the Publick Revenue? As is ſet down more at large in the ſecond Head of the French Demands?

Having thus in all uprightneſs of heart ſtated as clearly as I am able the preſent Grand caſe of the Nation, wherein I may truly ſay before God and his Angells, I have Averred no one thing without Good Vouchers, (and ſuch reſpectively) as the nature of the thing doth bear, I'le end with a few Summary Hints of what we have diſcourſed at Large, and laying in all Humility both my ſelf and theſe reflections, as well at his Majeſties as at his Great Councills Feet, I beg of them to take into their Serious conſiderations.

1. The Natural ſolid Greatneſs of the French Monarchy.

2. Their Ambitious and aſpiring thoughts in all ages with the conſequences of the ſame.

3. The great Encreaſe of their power under their Preſent King, both by Sea and Land.

4. How far it was, not long ſince, thought fit to ſtop their Progreſs; And what ſteps were made in Order to it, as well as the zeal, with which it was carried on.

5. The carriage of the preſent French Court, and how they have dealt with moſt Princes of Europe.

6. How kindly they have uſed both his Majeſty in particular, and the whole Nation.

7. How true they have been to their word, and to their reiterated promiſes and other Engagements.

8. How faithfully they have performed Articles hitherto. And what ſecurity we have, they ſhall be ſtill ready to do worſe.

9. The neceſſity of keeping a true Ballance between the European Princes.

10. How dangerous it is to alter that Ballance, when once ſettled on a ſolid Baſis.

11. The dreadful conſequences of the Conqueſt of the Ʋnited Provinces by the French.

12. The unpoſſiblity of our Conquering them.

13. The Impracticableneſs or Diſproportion of the ſuppoſed ſharing and Diviſion of their Country, with the little advantage and benefit which at the beſt would accrew to us.

14. How prejudicial and hurtful, would to the contrary, any poſſibility and practicable ſharing prove, the ſame being in truth no other than an abſolute French Conqueſt in a diſguiſe.

15. How deſtructive the preſent War muſt needs be in the end, in Caſe the Dutch ſhall be enabled by the aſſistance of their Allies, to recover what they have loſt, and to come out with as conſiderable a Fleet as ours.

16. How conſiderable theſe Allies are, and how much Christian Blood will be ſhed by our wilful adhering to the French.

17. How unavoydable a breach with Spain will be, in caſe we perſiſt in our Alliance with France.

18. And how fatal the conſequence of a Spaniſh War.

19. How much greater the danger will prove if the French be able to conqu • r as well Germany and Spain as the United Provinces, and that no Confederacy of Princes, how great and how powerful ſoever be a ſufficient Balance to their Forces.

20. And laſtly, How faithful our Miniſters have diſchrged their Truſt in theſe great Emergences. How free they have been from dependences upon Forein Courts. How far they have been Jealous of their reputation in that particular. What great care they have had of keeping up the Credit and the Reputation of the Triple League, and of their own Maſters with it. Their Backwardneſs (not to ſay worſe) in redreſſing, or at leſt declaring against all the wrongs done by the French, as well to his Majeſty himſelf as to his Subjects. Their industrious indeavours and various Stratagems to engage his Majeſty, and the Nation in this War, their Engroſſing all buſineſs of concernment, and concealing the moſt Important debates and reſolutions from his Majeſties Privy Council. Nay their keeping it unſeaſonably from his great Council, and putting off their Seſſions leſt they might croſs their deſigns. Laſtly, the carriage of ſome of them in Holland, and of the care they took of the Intereſt both of England and of the Proteſtant Religion.

Now I call Heaven and Earth to record this day that I have ſet before you Life and Death, Bleſſing and Curſſing; Therefore chooſe Life, that both you and your Seed may Live.

FINIS.