II.

Let us now come to the Second Head, and examine what the issue of this War may prove, and what may rationally be expected it will come to.

Were it either possible in nature, or so much as to be imagined that Holland might be turned into a new Lake, their Towns burnt and de­populated, and their Inhabitants either destroyed or Transported into remote Colonies, or part of them brought into this Kingdom, to en­crease the Number of our People; I fear no Arguments drawn from either natural Justice or Christian Charity could be forceable enough to put a stop to such a design: And in the case it would be hard for the ingenious and worthy Author of the Interest of England stated (as un­answerable as his Arguments are) to perswade men either Biassed, or not very well acquainted with the state of Forreign Affairs, That it must be the chief Interest of England to support the present Govern­ment of Holland.

But such a destruction being not to be thought on, or expected by any man that is in his Wits; and since the Scituation of the Country, and its Commodiousness for trading in many respects, together with the Natural and Laborious Industry of the Inhabitants, will still conti­nue under any change; To satisfy our selves how far we may be gain­ers by this War, we must consider in order to the general events that may be looked upon as in any degree of possibility.

In order to that I conceive all men will grant one of these four things must be supposed.

First, The absolute conquest of the Ʋnited Provinces by the French. Or,

Secondly, Our Conquering of them.

Thirdly, A Division and Sharing of the Country between us and the French.

Fourthly, and Lastly, The Dutch recovering their losses, and with the help of their Allies, their withstanding both England and France. Of each of them in Order.

The absolute Conquest of the Ʋnited Provinces by the French, and their being brought under their subjection, is a thing of that dreadful consequence, that the very thoughts of it must needs raise the blood of al [Page 24] true English men And there is hardly any remedy too violent for so desperate a cure or means that could be called unjust, if necessary to prevent so great an evil, And therefore instead of losing time to prove what is so manifest and so obvious to the meanest capacities, I only beg of all my dear Countrymen to lay the present state of things to heart, and humbly move both Houses to consider, whether we be not already too near that evil day, and how far it is consistant with that Interest, with which they are intrusted, to hasten it by unseasonable and pernicious compliance.

Secondly, As to our Mastering the Low Countries, it can be but one of these two ways:

First, Our subduing of them by a Landing; and withal, beating the French out of what they possess already: Or,

Secondly, Their voluntary yielding to us, and submiting themselves to his Majesty.

The first can hardly be so much as supposed or imagined by any Rational Man: For 1. If in the middest of their late distractions and the unspeakable confusion, which was in every part of the Coun­try, no opportunity of Landing could be found though often attemp­ted: How can it be expected it should be practicable by the next Sum­mer, now they are all United and strengthned by the assistance of their Allies. 2. How can it be thought possible to Land an Army considerable enough to take all their Towns, and Conquer the whole Country; Nay, to Conquer the Conquerers themselves, and beat the French out. 3. Granting that the approach of our Fleet, would occasion a great disorder and consternatian in the Countrey; and that the Dutch should not prove able to oppose our Landing; and at the same time to keep the French out, and defend themselves to the Landwards, what would the consequence of this be, but only to enable the French to Master the whole Country, whilst the Dutch should divide and draw off their Forces to oppose us? It being much easier for the French who are already in the Country, to Ma ch with all their Forces to Amster am, and to the rest of their Towns, before we can Land; then for us to prevent them by our Landing. 4. Lastly, if the French Ships are to have a share in the Expedition, what Security have we, their men will promote our own ends, and not their Masters; and that they shall not rather turn tayl against us, if occasion be?

And as to the voluntary yeilding of the Dutch, and their giving them­selves up to us; I may say it is as irrational and as fond a conceit as the other: And which therefore doth hardly need being confuted. But because some of our great men, have (even in Print) made use of this as of an Argument, both to justifie the War in point of prudence, and to perswade the Nation to joyn and concur with the Cabal in their dark Counsels: It will be necessary, and we owe that respect to their quality, as to lay the matter open and unfold it with a little more care.

Were the Ʋnited Provinces still entire, and untouched and they in an election to joyn with and submit themselves (upon terms) either to France or England, it would be no hard matter to demonstrate and make it to appear that the ballance of true policy and reason should weigh down by much on the French side. And that the best part of their Trade would soon, if incorporated with us run out of their Cha­nels into ours; which all understanding men amongst them are so sen­sible of, that in Case this were in agitation, the interest of Religion (which besides they could secure some other way) should hardly car­ry it against profit and self preservation. But not to multiply debates, and granting now that in such a Case, the Ducth would prefer our Do­mination before that of the French; Let us not examine what might have been if our suppositions were true: But what is like to be De facto, & may rationally be expected as the Cause stands..

First it must be observed that though their Maratime Provinces be far the most considerable, and those which have made that Common­wealth so powerful and so famous all over the World, yet their In-Land Provinces are of no less importance to the preservation of the whole, and are the Bull-works and Out-works of the other, without which the main Body would be soon streigtned and brought in a little time to the greatest extremities,

For this Reason the Spaniards never offered Peace to the Dutch, nor could they have accepted of it if offered, till being Masters of Seven Provinces, and having withall conquered several Towns in Brabant and Flanders, to be a fence to their out Provinces, their Territories proved of a Competent extent to Lodge and Maintain upon their Fron­tiers the greatest Armies. And by removing the Seat of the War from their Trading Provinces, be so much the more able to continue it, ra­ther with advantage to them, then with the least inconvenience or trou­ble.

2. The Second thing we must take notice of is, that the greatest ad­vantage of the Situation of the Ʋnited Provinces lyeth, in that several of the greatest Rivers in Europe not onely run through their Coun­try, but disimbogue into the Ocean within their Precincts. This o­peneth them an easie and an advantagious Trade into most parts of Ger­many, the Spanish Low Countries, and some Provinces of France, and makes a Reciprocation of commerce, and as it were an Ebb and Flow, between their Rivers and the Ocean, being enabled by the first to car­ry at a cheap rate to the furthest parts of the world what goods & com­modities the above mentioned Countries afford, and to return them by means of the same, the Richest spoyles of the East and West.

These natural Advantages accrewing to the Inhabitants of these re­spective Provinces, by their being all Ʋnited under the same Govern­ment, do link and tie them so fast together, that nothing but an exter­nal and irresistable force can divide them; and who ever comes to be Master of the Rivers, must needs in a short time either be beaten out of his Conquests, or else bring all the Havens and all the Inhabitants Bordering upon the Sea, under the same subjection? The Sea Ports without the Rivers, and the Rivers without the Ports, being altoge­ther useless, and a Foundation for an Endless and Destructive War.

This being premised, the Conclusion will easily be drawn, and since the French do already possess half of their Country, and are Masters of their cheif Rivers, if the Dutch come either to lose the Ambition of Ruling, and being a Soveraign State, or else are brought to the ne­cessity of choosing a Master: It is plain they'l rather submit themseves to the French King, who hath half conquered them already, and hath in his own hands that part of the Country without which they cannot subsist, than by giving up the remaining part to England to entail a War upen them, which besides their subjection to a Foreiner, as well as if they were under the French, will exhaust what Treasury they may have lest, and from a Flourishing Estate bring them to perfect Beg­gery.

To summe up all: It cannot be supposed the Dutch will ever chuse a Master, and submit themselves to the Government of a Forein Prince, unless they are driven to it by an unavoidable necessity. This necessity cannot proceed but from the sense they may have of their own weakness, and of a desire to live in peace, and free themselves of a War which is so destructive to them. Now if they do submit them­selves [Page 27] to England, in opposition to the French, the Peace they seek will be further off them then ever, & their remaining Country will be the seat of an endless War; whereas, if they give themselves up to the French, they will be United again in an entire body, enjoy rest and peace, and live under the Protection of a Prince, who of all Princes in Europe is best able to defend them against all their Enemies, and whose inte­rest will be to give all possible encouragement to their Trade, and to make their Country the Nursery of his Seamen, and in all other re­spects the support of his Naval Strength. Not to mention that if they must be slaves, first, they might rationally hope to have the satisfacti­on afterwards, of lending a helping hand to bring their Neighbours, and in truth all Europe into the same condition with them.

Thirdly, We come now to the dividing and sharing of the Country with the French, which by what hath already been said will appear ei­ther impracticable, or rathor hurtful than advantageous, for this sha­ring must be either by a Conquest on both sides, as the Duchies of Cleve and Juliers were formerly, when Prince Maurice and the Marquess of Spinola entred at the same time into those Countries with two great Armies, and took each what they could, the one on the behalf of the Elector of Brandenburg, and the other of the Duke of Newburg, or else that the French having Conquered and possessed all, should give us part of their acquisition.

The first cannot be supposed as long as we have no Army in tho Country. And in truth can bring none able to match that of the French, and to Conquer as fast as they, though they had not a foot of Ground in the Ʋnited Provinces: But as the case doth now stand, it is plain, they would be Masters of all before our long Boats could come on Shore.

And as to their giving us a share, after an absolute Conquest, there are three things to be considered, 1. It is worth the inquiry, how far they are engaged by their Treaty, and what share we are to have: for all appearances are very deceitful, if the French have promised to give any thing more then a fair leave to take what we can. 2. It is apparent by what hath been said before, at what rate their promises and other such engagements are to be valued. 3. The nature and constitution of the Country being such that it cannot stand divided, without not only very great inconvenience to both parties, but the de­struction of one of them. The French King, what ever he had pro­mised, [Page 28] cannot be willing to give us such a share as would bring his own under the Enulish subjection. And if his Majesty should have but an inconsiderable part of the Conquest, he could neither reap any bene­fit by it, nor protect it against the French power without exhausting both his Treasure and his Men. Nay it may be said further, and all that know the Country will grant that unless Amsterdam with the Zuy­der Sea were split, and all the shipping divided to have each one half of the whole, no true division can be made: And whoever is Master of that Town will soon or late subdue all the rest.

It is true, if we had some Sea Towns, and the French had nothing to do with the rest, it might be for a while a Curb to Holland and pro­cure us some advantages in Trade. But if the French possess all the Country, what proportion can there be between the acquisition and ours? And after the accession of so great a power to their Empire, can any rational man imagin some few places they should give us, would be a balance to their Forces, or a secure Fence against their Ambitious and aspiring thoughts?

To clear this further, and to demonstrate how dangerous it is for England to destroy the balance of Europe, in hopes of having a share in the spoil, and of encreasing our Dominions. It is to be considered that in the perusal of our English Histories, we find all our Forein Conquests either unfortunate in the end, or an unprofitable charge to the Kingdom; whilst to maintain them, the Seas must be perpetually cros­sed, for supplying them with Men, Money, and Necessaries. Nay, after the Conquest of the best part of the Kingdom of France we could not defend it long against the remaining part, and even lost what be­longed to his Majesties Royal Ancestors by right of Inheritance, after a quiet and uninterrupted possession for some hundreds of years. Since that time what new acquisitions hath been made, hath likewise been returned either for considerable Sums of Money, or upon some other considerations relating to the State of Europe in those days.

And least it might be objected, That those former Conquests were either less prudently undertaken, or harder to be kept than these we seem to go upon now: It is observable first that our Fore-fathers ei­ther undertook alone the said Conquests, or else if he joyn'd with any other Prince (as when they were assisted by the House of Burgundy) they still had kept to themselves the greatest and most considerable share. Secondly, That it was ever the interest of some of the Neigh­bouring [Page 29] Princes; England should preserve some part (at least) of the said Acquisitions, and have still a footing on the main, for the Com­mon safety and for the speedier and easier relief of our Allies. And yet though these two Conditions met together, either the essential difficulty of the thing it self, or our natural unaptness to preserve what we have once gotten, hath made all European Conquests unsuccesful, and in truth prejudicial to us.

But the Case being thus, what Judgement can we make, and what can we rationally expect or promise our selves of our intended joynt conquest with the French, where those Conditions before mentioned are are altogether wanting? And where first far from Conquering our selves we onely countenance and promote (by our strieghtning the Dutch by Sea) the Invasion of a Country, which even whilst it was nothing near so considerable as it is now all Europe hath looked upon, not onely as a fair step, but as the best part of the way to the Universal Monarchy: And which did once occasion so great a confederacy against the House of Austria to wrest those Provinces out of their hands. 2. It is as plain, it is not the French Kings Interest to give his Majesty a con­siderable part of the Conquests, nor to let us enjoy long what he might peradventure give us at first for some other ends of his own. And to se­cure this unknown share to us, I do not see we have now any Talbots or Earls of Bedford at the head of our Victorious Armies to set up his Majesties Standard in the Conquered Towns, and leave English Garri­sons in them. But instead of that whilst the French march on, and do enlarge their Empire, we please our selves with calling the French Forces our Forces, And endeavour, if not to perswade our selves, at least to perswade others, All this is done for the honour and glory of the English Nation, for the Advancement of Trade, for the safety of his Majesties Person, the support of his Royal Authority, and the happiness of his Kingdoms. It is true, we do not well know as yet (what) we are to have, but somewhat wel'e have however (say our Great men.) And we will not believe the French King shall let us go without a reward, for the pains we take in raising him, as much as in us lyeth, to the Throne of the universal Monarchy. Nay, suppo­sing the worst (saith a great and noble Champion for the French, in a Printed Letter to Sir Thomas Osborn) that we should be so ill advised, as to let the French take all and leave us nothing, yet even in that Case, the French King would rather make their strength at Sea inconsi­derable, [Page 30] by their being subject to him, than his own more formidable, by his being their Master.

I confess this is a now Demonstration in Poiticks which few men would have dreamed of: and if that be all our safety, I hope no true En­glish man will be swayed by the authority or quality of those who go about thus to argue the Kingdom out of its liberty, and turn England into a French Province.

Fourthly. The extream danger and fatal Consequences of some of the former suppositions, and the impracticableness of the other, be­ing thus (& I hope clearly) demonstrated; we need not loose much time to press that increase (which is the onely possible event that remaineth) the Dutch shall recover their losses, and with the help of their Allies be able to deal both with England and France. It cannot be his Majesties interest to continue a War which will miserably impoverish his King­doms, and by the continual Losses the Merchants do and are like to sustain, bring the Trade of the Nation into such a decaying condition, as will not be repaired in many years of Peace. Especially if Spain be further provoked to proceed to an open Breach with us, as it is more than probable, they will ere long be forced to do.

But because I see many are apt to look upon this War through a kind of Cloud, and seem to be unwilling to have a distinct Notion of the ill consequences with which it is attended, but reflect only in General and confusedly upon a supposed destruction of the Dutch, & seme imaginary Advantages accrewing to us by it, which yet they cannot instance in; much less demonstrate upon any Rational Grounds: I think it necessa­ry to add what we have said already, some few Considerations relat­ing both to Spain and the Empire.

As to Spain, it is first well known what that Crown is to expect from France, as soon as these may have any opportunity of destroying them. And I suppose no body doubts but that the Spanish Court will by all possible mears oppose the Encrease, and stop the Progress of the great­est and formidablest Enemies they have.

2. It is as plain, that in Case the French come to be Master, the Ʋni­ted Provinces, the Spanish Netherlands will of Course and unavoidably fall into their hands, notwithstanding the famous Triple League which by the way will be Triple no longer, when the Dutch Common wealth is gone.

3. Although the Crown of Spain had no Domions in the Low-Countries, [Page 31] It would be as much their interest to preserve the Ʋnited Provinces entire. And in true policy, they ought to venture all their Kingdoms: and to the very last of their men to prevent if it be possible so formidable an accession of Naval Power to the French, after which no Plate Fleet or Gallions could ever come safe, nor consequently their Monarchy stand much Longer.

4. The Emperour being already engaged, and hostilities begun be­tween him and the French, Spain can no longer stand out, and they are bound to run the same fortune as well by late and private Treaties as by the Joynt-interest of their Family.

5. And lastly Spain having already by their Assistance given to the Dutch, whereby all the considerable Towns in Brabant, where pre­served, and by the late Attempt upon Charleroy so highly incensed the French against them, they cannot venture nothing more by an open Breach, it is much safer for them to declare whilst the hands of the French are full, then to be exposed to their fury after their Conquest ended. From all this it plainly followeth, that a breach between Spain and France is not to be avoided. But the same Arguments prove like­wise, that, in case we do persist in our Alliance with the French, they must break with us as well as with them: And since they are so far concerned in the preservation of the Dutch, they cannot think them­selves safe if the others are destroyed.

It is their Interest by making this War as destructive to us as they can, to perswade us more effectually, than they could do hitherto into a friendship with their Allies, for to say they dare not proceed to a breach; they are afraid of us, and we know how to Order them in the West Indies: This were good if their All did not ly at stake, and if by their breach with us they could endanger more then the same All, Whereas to the Contrary by venturing all, they may, and will in all likelyhood, save both themselves and all Europe.

This being Granted (as it must needs be, if truth do in the least prevail with us;) I need not use many words to make all England sensible of the sad consequences of a Spanish War; I'le hint only those that are undeniable: As first, the seizure of all our Merchants Estates, amounting in the whole to a vast Sum. 2. The loss of our Trade with them, which of all other is the most beneficial to the Kingdom; And without which our Wollen goods must lie upon our hands, and half of our Weavers, Spinners, &c. go a begging. [Page 32] 3. The Interruption of our Levant and Plantations Trade, which cannot in case of Breach be secured by ordinary Convoys. And (not to mention the Spanish Men of War which both as to number and strength are sufficient to cruise in the Streights) With what ei­ther encouragement or safety can our Traders venture abroad; if, besides the Dutch Capers, the Seas come to be infested with Ostenders, Biscaines, Majorcans, and Minorcans? Who are none of them infe­riors to the Flushingers, and are as well Skilled as they are in the Art of Piracy; Nay, did not these very men without any help take above fifteen hundred Ships from us, in the late Spanish War, when Spain was at the lowest; and sought alone against us and France. 4. By the loss or at least the interruption of our Trade, his Majesties Cu­stomes, which is the considerablest Branch of his Revenue, will come to little or nothing; so that to support the War, new Taxes must be raised in lieu of it: And proportionably so much greater Subsidies granted to his Majesty.

If from Spain we come to the Empire; we find the Emperor him­self and the Elector of Brandenburg, already engaged in the quarrel, and many other Princes upon declaring, so that it is now high time both for the Parliament and all true Englishmen, to look farther then we have done yet, and to examine with more care the conse­quence of this War. For the Fire, which both we and France have kindled, is like to consume all Europe, if we do not make hast to quench it, and by a timely Retreat give way to safe Counsels. And for a close to this second Part of our Discourse, I desire the following Considerations may be seriously Debated and weighed.

First, What horrid spilling of Christian Bloud we'l be the occasion of, if by our wilful promoting of the Ambitious designs of the French (even so palpable against our Interest) we force all the rest of Europe to take up Arms in their own defence, and to unite all for their Com­mon safety, and for the preservation of that Liberty which (as though we were led by Witchcraft) we merrily go about to destroy.

2. How prejudicial this War will be to us, in case the confederate Princes do over-ballance the Power of France; And by raising the Reputation and the Credit of the Dutch (which last is the only thing they want) enable them not only to pay their Land Armies, but like­wise to set out as great and considerable Fleets as ever. And I do not see that either of them ought to be looked upon as very improbable; [Page 33] since first it is very certain, and all those that knew the Country will grant, That if the Hollanders had but some prosperous success (either by their own Armies, Or by the help of their Allies) they'l be able to take up without trouble, and in a very short time, as much Money as they may have occasion for. And in the second place it seemeth pretty rational to judg that the house of Austria with the conjunction of many Potent Princes, will struggle a while for their lives, and may be hard enough for the French

3. But how much greater will the danger be if neither Germany nor Spain are able to stop the Progress of the French? And in case they must all yield, and submit themselves to the Victorious Arms of the most Christian King, what will become of Poor England? must his Majesty, (I speak it with due respect to his Royal and sacred person) be Tenant at will? or else Do we presume so far on our own strength as to imagin we may do what the rest of Europe cannot? And that though the French had conquered all, we should not fear them the more? and could still defend our selves against them? Let those that have Advised his Majesty to this War speak, they must now pull their Vizard off, they must appear in their true shape; & tell us plainly whether they are paid for making the French King the Universal Monarchy, And whether to bring down new Golden showers into their Laps, England must at Least be made Tributary to the French, some few Hackney writers will not serve the Turn now, And twenty silly stories against Holland, cannot make it advisable for us, to joyn with the French King against the Greatest part of Europe. When this War was entred upon, no Enemies were thought on, at least spoken of, besides the Dutch. This was the only game we followed at first, And we expected no other prey to divide between us and the French. But now, supposing that we had taken never so much care for an equal sharing of the Ʋnited Pro­vinces, concerning which we refer our selves to what hath been said be­fore, will our great men assure us further, That the Lines are also fallen to us in the pleasant places of Europe? And that his Majesty is to share the Ʋniversal Empire with the most Christian King. I grant the Dutch have offended us, And that our War against them is not unjust. But is it Just therefore to destroy so many Princes who cannot Subsist without them, & who for their own preservation are forced to Venture all to preserve the Ʋnited Provinces? In few words; the Scene is alte­red: And though our infinite charity leads us, not to suspect the sin­cerity [Page 34] of the French or fear the encrease of their power, most Princes of Europe are of another mind; And whatever comes of it; they are resolved to stand by and protect the Dutch, as long as they are able to protect themselves; so that to conquer Holland All their Allies must be destroyed first: And the French King must needs be Master of the best part of Europe before we can have to our share either the Briel or Flushing.

I might Add several other considerations (And perhaps of no less weight then the former) to evidence the fatal consequences of this War. But by reason they do relate to the safety and preservation of our Lawes (as well Ecclesiastical as Civil) I forbear, least it should be thought I go about (or intend in the least) to raise a Jealousie between his Majesty and his people: leaving it wholly to the care and wisedom of the both Houses to provide against it, by those means, and wayes as to them shall seem meet and necessary, and as the Importance of the thing it self requireth.

III.

So far I hope we have made good what we have said in the beginn­ing of this Discourse; That this was an age of wonders, and that of those wonders the greatest was the present Alliance with France, And our prosecuting the War in so dangerous an Association. But since there are no effects so rare or so wonderful, as well in the Civil Go­vernment as in the Course of Nature, but have proper Agents to pro­duce them, it is very fit to enquire into the causes of our Misterious Councills, the better to judge of their true nature.

In order to that, It will not be amiss, to look a little abroad and consider whether the Policy of some other Princes, who are engaged in the same Alliance with the French may not be a Leading case for us And help our discovery at home.

Those Princes are the Bishop of Munster and the Elector of Collen, And as to the first, All the world knows and we have had a sufficient ex­perience our selves how far Money will go with him. Nay he is so far honest in this, that he doth think it no shame to own and profess it openly, He is but a Tennant for life, And whatever fills his Coffers, that he takes to be his true interest. The Universal Monarchy doth not intrench upon the Soverainity of either, his Brothers or Nephews, [Page 35] And a considerable and rich Legacy is the only Principality he can leave them; Whilst his present Subjects are destroyed, he hoards up Treasu­ries for his Family, And let the worst come. Some rich Abbeyes in France will bring him more Revenues then his Bishop-rick, As lately a Northen King did for the like, exchange his Crown, so that the case is clear with him. And if the States wovld out bid the French, his Highness would soon forget his Old Querrells, and prove the best of their friends.

The next is the Elector of Collen, who (to do him right) is a Religi­ous and a worthy Prince, And one who in his own nature, is a great lover of peace: But how could he be perswaded then to make his Coun­try the Seat of War? To give his strong holds to a Forreigner? And to expose his Subjects to all the Calamities, which the inquarte­ring of an Insolent Army doth bring along with it. To this the answer is plain, The Softness of his nature, and the Easiness of his disposition, hath made him devolve upon his Chief Ministers the whole Govern­ment of his Dominions, and the absolute direction of his Counsells. His great favorite (another Bishop) is of the same Religion and Prin­ciples which that of Munster and the Debonarity of the Master, is no fence against the corruption of the Servant. Quid vultis mihi dare & tradam eum vobis? Nay if the Bishop of Stratsburg (the said Favorite) doth stick at any hard thing, and is at any time somwhat troubled in his mind; for the undoing of so many thousands of Fam lies, and for betraying his Trust so shamefully, he hath his Brother at his Elbow the late Bishop of Ments a sworn Champion for the French, and of whom they used to say in jeast (that he was a dear friend to them) rea­dy to comfort them upon all occasions and to spur him on with more fury. Thus if you ask, where the Interest of the Arch-Bishop of Collen lyeth in this Alliance with France, And how comes it he will suffer his Country to be laid as wast, as if the Turks had over run it? Let it not be wondred at, The French Pensioners will have it so, And the two Brothers Furstenburgs are paid for it.

The Case being thus abroad, I wish our Island might boast of the same happiness as to corrupt Councellors, Which Ireland injoyeth in their being free from all Venimous Creatures, And that no politick Vipers might be able to breath in our English Ayr without soon breathing out their lives, But alas! our Chronicles do furnish us with two many Instances of the contrary, And without looking any fur­ther [Page 36] back for Presidents his Majesty himself, and this Very Parliament have (not many years since) sufficiently expressed how far they are of opinion, that Great Ministers may betray their trust.

On the other side, because some have been guilty, they must not be all indifferently condemned, And we ought to have a great care not to pass a rash Verdict upon Persons whom his Majesty hath irradi­ated with so many Illustrious beams of his Princely favour. The safest way then not to wrong neither the Cabel nor the Truth, is to take a short survey of the Carriage of the chief Promoters of this War, Lea­ving the Judgment of either their Innocency or their Guilt to the un­prejudiced Reader.

1. I will not insist much upon some whispers (come too loud talking of late) of the wonderful effects the French Kings Liberality had (almost four years since in converting the strongest opposers of his Interest, and though there be many od passages in it which are come to the Know­ledg of several considerable members of both houses) yet being not able my self to lay the whole matter open, and having it only at the second hand, I leave the full discovery of it to the party Concerned, who (I am enformed upon the least encouragement, and provided he may do it with safety to his Person) will at any time be ready to trace out (in the view and to the satisfaction of the whole world) the first steps towards our undoing, and to shew plainly when the foundation of this Mistery of iniquity was laid.

2. But howsoever whether all that is reported of this be true or not, I suppose it is not usual to see so great a familiarity (as hath been ob­served long since between Forreign Embassadors and First Ministers of State, Continual treatings and frequent goings to Country Houses, there to stay several daies, and weeks, is a new thing in the World. And an Embassadors using so Noble a House with so much freedom, gave a just cause to all observing men to conclude he had paid dear for it. I am sure his Majesty himself was not very well pleased with it at first, Though they have proved pretty successful, in the Art they have used since to reconcile him to their intrigues.

3. We have seen in the first part of this discourse, how far not on­ly his Majesty, but his Great men likewise thought it necessary to keep a true ballance between the respective Princes and States of Eu­rope, and to stop the progress of the French. What Steps where first made in order to it, and how the Dutch were Courted into an Alliance [Page 33] with us; joyntly to allay the Storms the disturbers of mankind had raised, and Quench their devouring Flames. Nay, we made it ap­pear the Tripple League was not entred into, out of a personal kind­ness to the Spaniards, but only for self preservation, and to prevent the over-running of Christendom. Whereupon 'tis worth the while to enquire of the same parties, and desire them to inform both Houses, and the rest of the Nation, which way the ballance of Europe came to be so much altered; And what hath made the French since the Treaty of Aix [...] formidable than before? hath the House of Austria had any new accession of Power? or did the Invasion of Lorain weaken the most Christian King? Could we value our selves four or five years since, by raising some few Bancks against some few French Waves, and now be as proud again of letting in their whole Ocean? The Jeopardy Europe was supposed to be in was (most certainly) infinitely increased, And the same Hanibal is now much neerer our Gates than ever he was, And yet we never thought our selves so secure; and whilst the Ship of Europe is neer sinking, the Cabballe (which is the Measure of their faith) no not apprehend the least danger. Happy men who can so suddenly be trans­formed into new Creatures! Who would not wish to have a share in your enlightning Graces?

But to the matter of fact, by the Treaty of Aix la Chappelle all Princes in Christendom were invited into the garently for the greater security and strengthning of the Agreement then made between Spain and France. Pursuant to this (as we have said before) his Majesty sent a Minister to the Protestant Princes in Germany to invite them into the Garenty of the said Treaty of Aix, or in other words, into the Tripple League. And not long after, upon the same Grounds Proposals were made to several other Princes, to draw them into the same League; To which, the Duke of Lorrain (with some other that had promised to come in) being very much inclined, and the thing being brought very neer a con­clusion, the most Christian King (who by that time was most manfully working under ground to destroy the Tripple League, and who dreaded nothing more than a faster trying of that Gordiun knot) to prevent the Asso­ciation, did very fairly invade Lorrain, and was neer taking the Duke himself Prisoner.

In this Invasion, there are three or four things that are observable. 1. Besides the scandal of such an unjust oppression, and the indignation it ought to have raised in all Princes, to see a Soveraign Prince thus [...]rant­ed [Page 34] out of his own Dominion; nothing could ever give a greater in­sight into the Ambitious Designs of France, nor discover more fully their Intentions; none but an Universal Monarch, can pretend to a right of displacing Princes, and disposing both of their lives and of their Territories, and therefore nothing could deserve a higher resent­ment, nor a more vigorous opposition from those that had appeared so lately the Asserters of the liberty of Europe. 2. This Violance was an open breach of the Pirenean Treaty, and consequently of the Treaty of Aix la Chappelle, which was a renewing and a further confirming of the other. And so far the Tripple League was concerned in it. 3. It was destructive to the very end and scope of the said Treaty of Aix, which was to put a stop to the progress of the French, and to the encrease of their Power, the Addition of that fair Duke­dome, being as considerable, if not more, than their Conquest in the Spanish Netherlands, and with all part of the Spanish Dominions, either blocked up and Besieged by it (as Luxemburg) or cut off from the rest, and all communication taken from them, as the County of Burgandy. 4. The great Zeal which the Duke of Lorraine had expressed to joyn with the other Princes engaged in the Tripple League, was the true cause why he was thus persecuted; though some other un­just and frivolous pretences were used.

Upon all these grounds, the Duke of Lorrain was in good hopes the Tripple League would protect his innocency, and not forsake Europe by forsaking him. And to quicken them, he sent some of his Servants to the respective Courts of the Parties Engaged. Where­upon our great Men advised his Majesty not to concern himself in the Quarrel, though his own inclinations and love to Justice, led him not to refuse his Assistance to a Prince who had laid upon him many great and high Obligations, and especially in an occasion wherein the Liberty as well as the Honor of Cristendom was so far concerned. But the Ministers it seemeth, carried it against their Master, and the Duke of Lorrains Envoy was sent back with a Com­plement, and many expressions of kindness, but told withal, the French Invasion was a Torrent not to be stopped at that time. A Torrent not to be stopped at that time! And what was then the use of the Tripple League? what will become of all the fine Speeches made in its Commendation? and was it harder to oblige the French King to return Lorrain, than to force him to restore the French Counte, [Page 35] as he was by the Treaty of Aix; in case we had been still true to our interest, and had been swayed by no other consideration? Idem ma­nens idem, semper facit idem.

About the same time, whereas we had sent to several Princes to invite them into the Tripple League, the Emperor who might as justly have expected the same Complement, did by a letter to his Majesty invite himself, and in conformity to one of the Articles of the Treaty of Aix desired to be admitted into the Garanty.

Upon the receiving of the Letter (his Majesty upon whose good­ness some of our great Men had not had time to work yet) as­sured the Spanish Embassador (who had delivered the Letter) he was glad his Emperial Majesty was so ready to come into the League, and told him he would cause an Instrument to be prepared in order to the said Admission. But when the resolution was ta­ken, and Orders given for preparing the said Instrument; It was first moved that Mr. Secretary Trevor (who was not initiated in their holy Misteries) might not have the drawing of it though it was his proper Province, And then having made themselves the sole Masters of the thing, a tollerable and reasonable honest draught was first brought in, but before it was perfected, they acted their part so ingeniously (with the help of Monsieur Colbert) that in the end they possessed his Majesty with the opinion, that the admitting of the Emperor, would ‘be attended with very dangerous consequences; and that in case he came into the League, his Majesty would be engaged in all his Quar­rels, and bound to make his Forces March (as the before mentioned Author of the Letter to Sir Thomas Osborne expresses himself) into the farthest part of Germany, as often as it should happen to be In­vaded by the Great Turk.’ The late Secretary Trevor, opposed this as much as he was able, and endeavoured to satisfie his Majesty, that the Garanty of the Tripple League, as well as of the Treaty of Aix la Chapelle, related only to the Agression and other Hostilities from either France or Spain; Propteria (saith the Treaty) by reason of the said Ally­ance. But the wary cautious men (as well as of the greater number) car­ried it, And the Emperors proffer was rejected.

Nay, as soon as some of our Semi Gods, had cut the fatal Tripple Knot, with the Diamond Sword of their Alexander, the poor now, but formerly vaunted Tripple League, was trampled under foot, turned into Ridicule and less vallued than a Ballade: His Majesty and [Page 36] they themselves since the Treaty of Aix, had thought it very rational and very necessary withal, to invite other Princes into the said League, or in other words, into the Garanty of the Treaty of Aix: pursuant to the VII. Article of the said Treaty, whereby all Kings, States, and Princes, are invited into it. But as if they remembred nei­ther his Majesties sending of Envoyes to the Princes of Germany, nor the words of the Treaty it self: They tell us now (in the same Print­ed Letter) That the necessity of inviting all Princes into the Tripple League, is a Maxime much in vogue with some who looking very grave, do therefore take it very ill if for that reason, you will not allow them to be infallible: And afterwards because the Tripple League is often men­tioned, without mentioning the Garanty of Aix, (which is in truth the thing meant by it) to say (saith the Author) we should invite them into the Tripple League — That, if you mark, is such a kind of Figure in discourse, as commonly is called a Bull. Fidem vestram, Dij imortales.

4. We have gone yet farther than all this, And the civil applica­tions of the French, and their kind entreaties, did so prevail with us, that loathing the very thoughts of the Tripple League, and hating al­most any thing that related unto it; we sufferd an Agent of ours, one Marsilly, whom we had sent to the Switzers to invite them into the Garanty of Aix (and who was intercepted and taken Prisoner by the French, whilst he was very busie in the execution of what com­mands he had received not many Months before from our Great-men) to be broken upon the Wheel at Paris, although one single word from us would have saved his life. Neither did we take it ill (such is our good nature) that upon the very Scaffold, twenty Questions were put to him relating to his Majesties Person. And (in that publick and in­famous Place) a strict enquiry made into the particulars of what had passed between him and the King of England, for thus was his Maje­sty often mentioned and named.

5. But to take off somewhat of the wonder and strangness of our neglecting, and forsaking our Leagued Friends for the most Christian Kings sake, we soon shewed as much self-denyal in our own concerns and grew civilised to admiration, by our inward converse with the Monsieurs, whereof we'll give only three Instances.

The first is that whilst we stormed against the Dutch, for not pro­moting as for as they were bound, the coming away of some Families [Page 37] that would leave Suranam. we found no fault with the French, their keeping us above four years out of St. Christophers, No more than with their destroying, in the mean while, that part of the Island which belonged to his Majesties Subjects. And we would have thought it a rudeness in us, to have pressed too hard on his most Christian Ma­jesty for a speedy or punctual performance of his Articles. Nay if the French Commanders in those parts are to be believed, there was very good understanding in relation to the said Island, between some of our Grandees and the Erench Court, as doth appear by the Narrative my Lord Willoughby delivered to the Council of Plantations, and which is Entered in their Books.

The next is, That by any Ordinance of the French Privy Council, (which is now the Statute Law of that Kingdom) all their Sea and Land Officers, and Commanders in the Islands of America being strictly enjoyned and required to secure their Master the Soveraignty of those Seas; the said Ordinances having been brought in by a Person of Quality to the Cabinet Council, it was at first to be declaimed a­gainst, but soon buried in oblivion, and put up amongst the useless Papers, though the French Pursuant to it, hath since much interrupt­ed our Trade, and have proved infinitely vexatious in so much (as I am credibly informed) that the present Governour of Jamaica hath sent word since his being there) that notwithstanding their old Quarrel with the Spaniards it would be much easier to keep a good Correspon­dence with them than with the French our dear Allies.

And for a last Instance of our more than ordinary civility to the French several Traders in London have prepared a Petition to his Maje­sty in Council, to complain of the oppression their Factors and Agents lay under in France, with a true state of their Case, and a short account of their grievances, this came to the knowledge of some of our Great Ministers, and they having had the perusal of them before the delive­ry of it, stopt by their Authority all further prosecution of the matter, and put off the said Merchants with a promise they would acquaint the French Embassador with their Complaints, and see it should be re­dressed through his means. How far they have been incouraged in their Trade since that promise, they are best able to judge, but howe­ver it was not fit the Nakedness of our dear Friends should be thus exposed to the whole view of the whole Council-Board.

And the foregoing particulars are more than sufficient to satisfie [Page 38] any impartial and understanding Reader, how far the French have influenced our Counsels; and withal they give us a great light, and help us much to discern, whether in truth we have broken the Tripple League (or at least let it fall, and dissolve of it self) for no other reason, but because we are constrained to fall out with the Dutch, and to de­fend our selves against their oppression as the so often cited noble Au­thor would perswade us, or else if it may not be said rather (and upon much better grounds) that because it was not the French Kings Inter­est the Tripple League should subsist, we have therefore resolved to break with the Dutch, Thus to be subservient to the ends of his most Christian Majesty.

But by reason this might seem somwhat harsh at first, and be look­ed upon as too severe a construction of our Great mens intentions, it is necessary to evidence further, how industrious the Caballe have been in their endeavours to make this War just (or to be thought so at least) after they had once resolved to make War.

Thus they first made a great noise of infamous Libells, horrid Pict­ures, Pillars set up and Medalls coyned; to the infinite dishonour of his Majesties Person, and of his Royal Dignity, whereas to this day, none of those Libells or Pictures could be produced, And the Pillars had never any being but in the imagination of those who made it their work to raise a Jealousie between the Two Nations, and set Europe in a Flame. It is true there was a Medal Coyned which might have been spared; but as soon as it was known in Holland, some exceptions were taken at it, the Stamp was broken in pieces, and withal, all imparti­al men that have seen it, could not discern any thing in it which could give so much offence, or that looked like an affront intended to his Majesty.

Besides this, thinking it very material to have in this, as well as an the late War, if not the clamour, at least the concurrence of the Tra­ders; they sent for several of them, and endeavoured to draw from them some complaints against the Dutch for the strengthening of the Good Cause. Wherein it is very observable, that the Committee of the East India Company, being (amongst others) desired to bring in their Grievances, they answered and gave it under their hands, they knew of no wrong done to them by the Dutch since the Traty at Breda. (or words to that effect) But it seemeth the Compiler of his Majesties De­claration was better informed, and knew more of the Companies con­cerns than their Committee.

But all this not serving the turn, the difficulties which did arise in the performance of the Conditions of the Surrender of Suranam, must be improved to the height, And even after Secretary Trevor had ad­justed the matter with the States, and had received from them the Orders which were agreed upon, Banisters going was retarded, and Sir John Trevors agreement (as if he had not faithfully discharged his trust in it) submitted to the censure of the Counsel of Plantations, where at last the said Banister pleaded so well his own and Secretary Trevor's cause, that with much a do the one was cleared, and the other dis­patched away, though with many devices and tricks (too tedious to be inserted here) which (if not prevented) might have made his Voy­age altogether unsuccessful: But we must not forget, that, the very men who found so much fault with what Mr. Secretary Trevor had done, were themselves satisfied with much less, before they had hark­ned to new Counsels: And were not a little Angry with Collonel Ba­nister for desiring more than the States were willing to grant. What (was it said at that time) do you think we must make War for you: Or that We are bound to procure you whatsoever may be advanta­gious, to your self, and to your fellow Planters? Quantum mutatus ab illo.

Their next work and (in truth) Great Master Piece, was the sending the Yacht, with Orders to Sayl through the Dutch Fleet, and require striking to his Majesties Flag. And I am so far from justifying or excusing in the least the refusal which the Dutch Admiral made to pay what respect was due to the English Colours, that the States them­selves do not own it, and are ready to enter into any new Engagement for preventing the like for the future. But there are several circum­stances in it which are worthy of Observation: as, That the Dutch Fleet was then at Anchor not far from their own Coast, and in a Station which by many Geographers is accounted no part of the British Seas.

2. That the Dutch were out at that time in pursuance of the Tripple League, and to be ready upon occasion to relieve the Spanish Ne­ther Lands which were threatned by the French, who were then in March with a considerable Army, and came as far as Dunkerk, which one would think was a very unfit time to send out on purpose to pick a Quarrel with them: And the rather because we had promised the Dutch to set out a Fleet as well as they, to joyn with theirs, for the [Page 40] common safety. 3. That the Pensionaire De Witt who Governed Holland at that time with a more than Ministerial Authority, took a pride in standing in punctillioes in all things relating to England, which maketh the Common Wealth it self to be less guilty of any dis­respect shewed, either to his Majesty, or to the Nation, through the haughtiness and private animosity of their Minister. And truly I must needs say, that of all the things that are laid to the said De Witts charge, there is hardly any which would make me apt to believe there was a Private understanding between the French and Him, than his carriage in this business, and his demurring so long upon the satis­faction, which the greatest part of the States were willing to give to England, whilst he knew full well, that it was a Quarrel sought by our Ministers, who wanted some popular pretence to make War, and keep their word to the French King. 4. That we stayed several months before we demanded satisfaction, least if we had demanded it too early, it had been granted us too soon. 5. That when Sir George Downing was sent over, he was bound by his Instructions not to accept of any satisfaction from the Dutch after a certain number of days w^ch were prescribed to him, which is a very irregular and unusual of pro­ceeding in Embassyes, and much less practicable in Holland than any where else, It being impossible to have the resolutions of their Towns, and afterwards of their Provinces without a considerable time. 6. That this was made so much the more difficult by our demanding not only the usual striking, which (though ever practiced and due to Eng­land) was first Nationally agreed upon, in 1654. and confirmed by the two Treaties with his Majesty in 1662. and 1667. But also a new kind of acknowledgment of the Soveraignty of the Seas, which is not mentioned in the said Treaties. So that by joyning them both in A memorial, if the Dutch did demur upon the second and so delayed the Granting of the first, it was a ready way for us to clamour and pos­sess the whole Nation, the Dutch had broken their Treaty and refused to Strike to the English Flagg. 7. That after the Dutch had given their answer to the said Sir George Downings Memorials, he refused to re­ceive it, and came away without it, against a second Order he had re­ceived under his Majesties own hand, for which also he was Commit­ted to the Tower. But not to wrong the Gentleman, we must also own, that though he had a positive and latter Command from his Master, which did so far rescind his Instructions, yet his friends [Page 45] have whispered in his behalf for his Justification, that he had re­ceived at the same time Letters from some of our Great Ministers, who conjured him as he tendred his own good to follow his Instructions and keep close to them. 8. Lastly it is very observable that the Dutch having sent an Express, the Answer, Sir George Downing would not receive, we first replyed it was dark obscure and insufficient. Upon which they sent an Extraordinary Embassador who joyntly with the Leiger Embassador told our Ministers, that his Masters intentions and desire to give his Majesty all possible satisfaction in the bu­siness of the Flagg, they both Ordered and Impowred him, to clear what might be obscure or dark in their Answer, and supply what was insufficient, and therefore desired them to instance in what they did not approve of, or did think amiss, or else that they would be plea­sed to draw up themselves after their own Method and way what Article they thought necessary for the preventing of the like inconvenience. They Answered, the States with their Ministers knew best how to Frame and Word their own Answers, neither could it be expected they should draw up papers for them. Whereupon the Dutch Embas­sadors brought them a Project of an Article to be agreed upon concer­nig the Flagg, and asked them whether it was Worded to their mind, and if that would satisfie them. To which they gravely an­swered, that when they had signed and delivered it they would tell them their mind concerning it. And the Embassadors refusing still to design it, unless they knew before hand it was Satisfactory, their con­ference thus broke off, yet upon second thoughts, the Embassadors having resolved to sign the said Paper, and to deliver it at a venture, they demanded a New Conference, which was promised them, and Seven of the Clock at night appointed, on the Sunday after the En­gagement with the Smyrna Fleet. But on the very same day least the Dutch might comply further with us then we desired, our Grandees did prevail with his Majesty to call extraordinarily a Counsel and to have without further delay the Declaration of War, read and appro­ved. So that when the Embassadors came at their appointed time, with their Paper ready signed, they were told in short they came too late.

7. I might Add as many and as considerable instances of what Arts and Policy our great Men have used to deceive his Majesty; And to bring him by degrees into a liking of their War. But this [Page 46] matter being so ticklish and nice, That I fear I should not be able to go through with it (although I took never so much care) without exposing my self to the censure of the World, and having either my intention or some of my expressions misconstrued. I think it much sa­fer and more prudent to draw a Curtain over that part of the Mi­nistry of the Cabal, and leave their Reputation so far untouched, since they have had the fill to weave it (as it were) in more then one place into that of their Master.

8. For a farther clearing of this, and to satisfie our selves, as far as we are able, whether the Construction we do seem to make of the Carriage and Designs of the Cabal, be not to partial. It will not be amiss if we endeavour to discover what their own Opinion was of it at first, and how far they were perswaded themselves, their New Counsels were agreeable to the true Interest of England, which will best appear by the two following particulars.

The first is, Their great care of not trusting with their Mysterious Intrigues, persons, whose either quality natural Courage, Honesty, or Experience, made them suspect they would be either too inquisitive, before they would joyn and concur with them, or else too resty and froward, if they chanced to be of another mind. And upon these fair and honest Grounds, they reformed their Cabinet Counsel; and turned at once out of the Commitee for Forein Affairs, Prince Rupert, the Duke of Ormond, the Lord Keeper, and the late Secretary Trevor: This being the first Secretary of State that was ever kept out of a Commission of that Importance. Not to mention several other emi­nent and considerable Privy Counsellors, who till then had been Commissioners in all Negotiations and Treaties with France.

Now in case the Cabal had no Designs but what were for the Ho­nour and the Safety of the Nation, why they should so industri­ously to conceal it from persons that have deserved so well both from his Majesty, and from the whole Kingdom, is what passeth my poor understanding: and whoever is able to unriddle this, Erit mihi mag­nous Apollo.

But if this be convincing Argument, The next I hope will be somewhat plainer; And both Houses are best able to judge, whether their sitting was so dangerous: or how faithful those Counsellors must be who could advise his Majesty to Prorogue so often upon the French Kings desire; A Parliament whose Loyalty and Zeal for their Sove­raign, [Page 47] is not to be matched in no former Age. We do not hear that ei­ther the Cecils or Walsingham ever advised the Queen their Mistress not to call her great Counsel, or suffer them to meet, when she was preparing to assist the Protestants in France, or to Protect the Ʋnited Provinces against Philip the Second. King James had no reason to fear his Parliament, who if they came together, would not oppose the assistance of the Palsgrave. And his Majesty now Reigning, hath in the former War against the very same Enemies, had a sufficient experience of the readiness of both Houses, to promote as far as they are able, any design which they conceived may tend to the honour and safety of his Government, and the prosperity of the Kingdom. Why then should our Great men obstruct the chearful Compliance of his Majesties faithful Subjects. 3. Why not to call upon those whose Assistance was so necessary, and who never denied it when demanded? Let us not condemn them before we have all. Parlia­ments (I speak it with due Reverence) are now and then Peevish things that will not be satisfied with fair Words, and pry too far in­to Secrets that are not to come to publick view. Our Grandees were afraid, if so many clear-sighted men came together; some one or o­ther would spy out the Snake that lay in the Grass, and if their mine had once taken vent, the whole Design had miscarried. No, no, we'l do better (saith the Cabal) we'l be wiser than to run that haz­ard; we are resolved to make War, and will not be crossed in it by any Parliamentary Clamours. If for want of a Parliament, we can have no English Subsidies, we'l make a shift with French Supplies: And if that doth not serve the turn (observe the Gradation,) we'l shut up the Exchequer. In the mean while the Smyrna and East India Fleets, will fall into our hands: And when we have all that Trea­sure; who shall dare to find fault with us?

Having brought the Cabal thus far, we must before we part, wait once more on some of them as far as Holland, and so take our leave of them.

We have already given some account in the first Part of this Dis­course, of the new Agreement entred into with the French King, by our Plenipotentiaries, and demonstrated the fatal consequences of the same, what followeth will clear it farther.

The wonderful Progress of the French having surprized and fright­ed all Europe; Our Court (who knew what slender provision was [Page 48] made for England in that Conquest) was little less Alarm'd than the rest: And our Grand Ministers were dispatched in Post haste, both to the Dutch and to the French, their greatest fear, when they went, being left they should come too late, and find the whole Country un­der the French Subjection. After their Arrival in the Hague, they begun their first Complements to the States Commissioners, that were sent to wait upon them with all the Expressions imaginable, both of kindness to Holland, and of concernmant and trouble to see the French so far advanced. There they received an account of Monsieur de Groots Negociation, and of the great care the French took of his Ma­jesty; which raised such an Indignation in them, that nothing would serve their turn, but destroying out of hand, or at least Mastering the French Fleet. And from thence removing to the Prince of Orange his Camp; they renewed their kind Protestations: Assured his High­ness, That his Majesties intention had never been to give way to the Conquest of the Ʋnited Provinces: The most Christian King himself, having often times declared he onely intended to humble their Commonwealth, neither was it fit to suffer the French should go on at that rate. In the end they took upon them, and engaged to do their utmost to bring the French Court to be Satisfied with Maestricht, and the right of keeping Garrisons in the Towns upon the Rhyne, that belong to the Electors of Brandenburg and Collen. And that in Case the French refused to accept of those terms, they would then take new measures with the States, and consider joyntly of the best ways, to pre­vent the destruction of their Common wealth, as well as the dangerous encrease of the French.

With these fair promises and friendly assurances, they proceeded on their Journey to his most Christian Majesty, who was some few hours riding from thence; having behind them an infinite satisfaction in the minds of all Persons, with great expectation of a happy Change, through their zealous interposition. But what may not the Royal E­loquence of a most Christian King do? What, will not his Golden Word perswade, after our Grand Ministers had been some few dayes in the French Army, they found they were not mistaken before, and began to have a clearer apprehension of things. The Negotiation of De Groote, with the particulars imparted to them at the Hague, was a meer slander; for so the French Court told them. The encrease of the French Power was not to be suspected or feared; they were too gene­rous [Page 49] to abuse it. And therefore after they had left the Prince of O­range, three or four days without News from them, they at last sent him word, The States were to give satisfaction to both Kings joynt­ly: And that neither Crown could or would treat seperately. This unexpected Message did infinitely surprise as well the Prince of Orange, as the States. And his Highness (who had full power given him by the States to Treat and conclude with England) not to be held long­er in suspence answered the Pl nipotentiaries, he desired to know what would satisfie both Crowns, and what their respective demands were? Whereupon they sent him the joynt Proposals before mentioned, to­gether with a Copy of the new agreement they were entred into; concerning which we'l add onely to what hath already been said, these following Queries:

1. Whether they were sent onely to promote the French Conquest; and if not how they could think it advisable, by making the Peace impossible, to force the Dutch (as far as in them lay to cast them­selves into the Armes of the French King, and submit themselves to his Domination?

2. Whether they can deny they knew the joynt Proposalls tendred to the Dutch should not be granted, since the French demands alone had been unanimously rejected, and in that case, how agreeable it was to the Interest of England to make it impossible for the Dutch to give his Majesty any satisfaction.

3. Whether, they had not received, as well from the Prince of Orange as from the States Commissi ners, all possible Assurances of the infinite desire they had to see his Majesty return to his former Amity with them, and of their readiness to purchase it, at any rate, that the Condition they were in would bear? If so how faithfully the Pleni­potentiaries, discharged their trust in neglecting those proffers, and entring into a New Engagement, which was so Prejudicial to England as we have made it appear?

4. How far those that were joyned in Commission with them did concur with them in their Judgment, and whether all those conside­rations, with man other, were not represented to them; And urged by some who had no other end, but to serve their Master faithfully?

5. Whether or no it was for that Reason, they opposed so fierce­ly, [Page 50] My Lord Vicount Hallifax (who came a day or two after them) his appearing and acting joyntly with them, though Commissionated in as full and as ample manner as themselves.

6. Who were those (after my Lord Hallifax could be kept out no longer) who went privately to the French Camp under several preten­ces, and had still Negotiations of their own on foot?

7. Whether they had Order to call the French King, the King of France, and to name him still before his Master, as well as to set in the first place the French demands before those of their Majesty; As all this was done in the Copies of the Agreement they had made, and of both Kings pretensions which they sent together to the Prince of Orange by Sir Gabriel Sylvius: And to which we may appeal if the truth of this be doubted?

8. And Lastly, how far their Instructions will justifie their standing in the behalf of the French, upon a Publick Exercise of the Roman Catholick Religion in the Ʋnited Provinces, the Churches to be divided, and the Romish Priests maintained out of the Publick Revenue? As is set down more at large in the second Head of the French Demands?

Having thus in all uprightness of heart stated as clearly as I am able the present Grand case of the Nation, wherein I may truly say before God and his Angells, I have Averred no one thing without Good Vouchers, (and such respectively) as the nature of the thing doth bear, I'le end with a few Summary Hints of what we have discoursed at Large, and laying in all Humility both my self and these reflections, as well at his Majesties as at his Great Councills Feet, I beg of them to take into their Serious considerations.

1. The Natural solid Greatness of the French Monarchy.

2. Their Ambitious and aspiring thoughts in all ages with the conse­quences of the same.

3. The great Encrease of their power under their Present King, both by Sea and Land.

4. How far it was, not long since, thought fit to stop their Progress; And what steps were made in Order to it, as well as the zeal, with which it was carried on.

5. The carriage of the present French Court, and how they have dealt with most Princes of Europe.

6. How kindly they have used both his Majesty in particular, and the whole Nation.

7. How true they have been to their word, and to their reiterated promises and other Engagements.

8. How faithfully they have performed Articles hitherto. And what se­curity we have, they shall be still ready to do worse.

9. The necessity of keeping a true Ballance between the European Prin­ces.

10. How dangerous it is to alter that Ballance, when once settled on a solid Basis.

11. The dreadful consequences of the Conquest of the Ʋnited Provinces by the French.

12. The unpossiblity of our Conquering them.

13. The Impracticableness or Disproportion of the supposed sharing and Division of their Country, with the little advantage and benefit which at the best would accrew to us.

14. How prejudicial and hurtful, would to the contrary, any possibility and practicable sharing prove, the same being in truth no other than an abso­lute French Conquest in a disguise.

15. How destructive the present War must needs be in the end, in Case the Dutch shall be enabled by the assistance of their Allies, to recover what they have lost, and to come out with as considerable a Fleet as ours.

16. How considerable these Allies are, and how much Christian Blood will be shed by our wilful adhering to the French.

17. How unavoydable a breach with Spain will be, in case we persist in our Alliance with France.

18. And how fatal the consequence of a Spanish War.

19. How much greater the danger will prove if the French be able to conqu [...]r as well Germany and Spain as the United Provinces, and that no Confederacy of Princes, how great and how powerful soever be a suffici­ent Balance to their Forces.

20. And lastly, How faithful our Ministers have dischrged their Trust in these great Emergences. How free they have been from dependences upon Forein Courts. How far they have been Jealous of their reputa­tion in that particular. What great care they have had of keeping up the Credit and the Reputation of the Triple League, and of their own Masters [Page 52] with it. Their Backwardness (not to say worse) in redressing, or at lest declaring against all the wrongs done by the French, as well to his Majesty himself as to his Subjects. Their industrious indeavours and various Stratagems to engage his Majesty, and the Nation in this War, their En­grossing all business of concernment, and concealing the most Important de­bates and resolutions from his Majesties Privy Council. Nay their keep­ing it unseasonably from his great Council, and putting off their Sessions lest they might cross their designs. Lastly, the carriage of some of them in Holland, and of the care they took of the Interest both of England and of the Protestant Religion.

Now I call Heaven and Earth to record this day that I have set be­fore you Life and Death, Blessing and Curssing; Therefore choose Life, that both you and your Seed may Live.