I thank you for your news and the news-books you sent me, which neither of them by any art of mine are to be reconci­led with themselves, for you tell me while a Common-wealth seemeth to be declared for, Common-wealths-men are as it were kickt out of all imployment, civil or military. Much hath been said heretofore of a threefold cord, but I like not your Statesmen, that work like Ropers, nor see, how a slippery trick should be the cause of a steddy Government. But however your Commonwealths-men may do, by your news, their principles by your books, I mean the Votes, and Acts of Parliament, will shift well enough for themselves. It is true that the whip and the bell, the scourges of the RUMP, with the sound of a lash, so fatal unto themselves, have influenced this Nation in such manner, that the genius, as some, or the spirit, as others call it, of the same people, who in time of the Court would rather have chosen a Tapster then a Courtier, now under the name of a Common-wealth, but in the dregs of confusion, would rather elect a ballad-singer then a Commonwealth-man; Nevertheless, while the next Parliament is summoned, as it were in the name of the people, and without regal authority, while the full power and free choise of the Government to succeed is wholly devolved upon the De­puties of the people, the present Acts and Votes run in stile, and every way else unto a Common-wealth, nay pitch and settle, (to [Page 4]the best of my understanding) upon no other principles or founda­tions, then such, whence no other superstructures or frame of Go­vernment, (without violence) can arise but that of an equal Com­mon-wealth or perfect democracy, for what clearer testimony of this can be afforded by Art or nature then is expressed in the pre­sent act for the Militia? By this Act you have the Earl of Nor­thumberland, where he weighes most, joyned with Iohn Hudson Esq. and some thirty more of the Commons of that County, the like respectively for some forty more Earls, Viscounts and Ba­rons, holding fat less proportion unto the Commons with whom they are indifferently joyned, without any advantage in Vote or otherwise. Nor, should a man add the whole Peerage of this Na­tion to the whole Comminalty, were it to be doubted but they would hold yet less: Sir, all the rest is but superstructure, how it is at the root (though perhaps unseen) is unavoydably felt. The sword is in the people, and not (without moving propriety) to be wrenched out of their hands. Whereas the people were an­tiently arraied by the Nobility, the Nobility (you see) are now arraied by the people; whereas a King could not anciently be brought in but by the Lords, now the King (you will confess) can­not be brought in but by the Commons. Let them come with you to the next Parliament that may, let them go whether they can; if Government be not to be preserved by any other means then the same by which it was acquired, the King can no more be sustained, as heretofore by the Lords, but must hereafter (what­over in alteration of the forme it may cost) be sustained by the Commons.

Sir I beseech you, was this our old Government? or if (through time as well the innovator as devourer of things) it be of it self become a new one, must it be still (as in the reignes of learned predecessors) an Vtopia or Chymera? There is much daring of Larks, but Sir I am upon good grounds, I go (you see) upon an act of Parliament let them answer to this. Are foundations in En­gland altered or not altered? for such as the Government is in the root or foundation, such of necessity must it be in the branch or superstructure. If the sword in the hand of the Lords made an A­ristocracy, then the sword in the hands of the Commons must [Page 5]make a Democracy, or there will be more windfals, for where foundations come to be altered or stand one way, and superstru­ctures are left hanging another way, it can tend to nothing but ru­ine. Hence that which hath fallen, hence that (if not prevented) which is falling upon this Nation. And what prevention: what remedy! If the Militia be not in the Commons, what means this Act? if the Militia be in the Commons what power have the Lords? if the Lords have no power where is the old Govern­ment? if the old Government be gone, what remains but coufu­sion or to introduce a new one?

To remove unto a new house, though from a worse unto a bet­ter, is one of the most troublesome, one of the impatient affaires, a business in which, how necessary soever, the family to be well or­dered must be as it were totally disordered. The case of a people necessitated unto change of government is of like nature. And as the genius or humor of a family may be one thing in it self, and upon this occasion seem another, so the humor or genius of a peo­ple, be it that they were never so weary or impatient of the incu­rable inconveniencies of their last house or Government, yet upon question of removal unto a new one, they conceive a kind of ab­horrency, they bemoan themselves as it were of exile from their native soil. Thus it ever was, thus it will ever be in like revoluti­ons, wherein to set much by the Genious of a people, is to com­ply with them unto their own destruction. Leave them in a form under which they know whom to quarrel with, or what to quar­rel for, and this sickly genious, this quarrelsome humor of theirs is incurable, but bring them under a form in which they can never finde whom to quarrel with, nor what to quarrel for, (which or none is the proper work) and this sickly genius, this quarrelsome humor of theirs is perfectly cured. There is no looking back for a people advanced by so apparent steps, by so many years travail upon such a journey as the people of England now are; to think by a calme of popular impatience to be at home again, is as if a man near the Indies,should think to be in England again by a turn upon the toe. The foundation of the old government is sunk, it is fallen it is fallen, when an house is fallen it is not grief, not rage, [Page 6]not any obstinacy in the owner can make him live there as he did, it must bee new built.

Nor is newness of Government alone (in which case our feli­city were certain) sufficient to make it secure or lasting, without such prudence in formation of the same, as may exactly shape and sit it unto the subject matter. To rise otherwise (as hath been a­bundantly seen and felt) unto the greatest heighth, is but to fall lowest. With such as are in power and under a necessity to intro­duce a new form, there is no mean between the greatest security and the greatest danger, the highest glory, and the basest infamy.

This by pollititians hath been pronounced universally, but now in England is more holding then elsewhere it hath ever been, for whereas other governments which have suffered like changes, for example that of Rome antiently, and that of la [...]er times in Holland, were such from the very beginning, as to be­come more perfect Common-wealths, needed but to remove or change their topstones, as a King into Consuls, or a Prince for a Stateholder, in which case an oath of abjuration was sufficient: the ancient Government of England being ruined in the very foundation, that is in the Aristocracy, requires a renovation or reordering of the whole superstructures, in which an oath of ab­juration can come but to little, for that whether the King be re­stored or not restored it is equally necessary the building be such as may stand; and that the building of a Government now in En­gland be such as may stand, engageth unto the greatest prudence in hitting, or the vastest danger in missing. The greatest prudence in hitting, because not a topstone, or some part is to be altered, but the whole frame to be renewed: the vastest danger in missing because to work otherwise is to work against the only foundation which is now the whole people, and for the interest of someparty.

The parties now in England are three, the Royalist, the Pres­biterian, and the Sectary. Nor appears it by what the Sectary hath done, the Presbiterian is doing, or the Royalist prepares to do, that there is any thought amongst them of union or of a Go­vernment, but of tyrannizing one over another. If the King there­fore be restored by some one of these, it amounts, (if unto any Government at all) unto one, as new as any, and cantend nei­ther [Page 7]unto the safety of the King, nor of the people, but must in­troduce, a Royal, a Presbiterian, or a Sectarian Oligarchy: where­of, which ever reigns must keep down the other two, by unnatu­ral force, in the head of which the King must be perpetually expo­sed, and if any other then the King be advanced unto the head of any one of these parties it must be with the greatest scandal, and tend but unto the worse effect, the vaster discontent, disunion and danger of the people.

The Salus Populi, the safety of the people, if ever they attain to it, must consist in such a forme of Government, as may appa­rently and effectually take in and hold them and all parties of them united.

To attain unto such a form in England, (the Aristocracy being irreparably broken) there is no other way whatsoever but by in­troduction of a well ordered Democracy, to which end, the game would easily play it self in any hand, but for the parties that are still snatching the cards one out of anothers.

That the Aristocracy is broken the act cited maketh not plain confession, but proof. That it is not to be repaired, as some medi­tate, by the resumption of such estates, as since the later war have been demolished, is plain in that the war began by the sword in the hand of the people, and ended accordingly; nor, as others, by the recruting of the decayed Nobility with some of the richest of the Gentry, in that, all such as hold above two thousand pound a year in this Nation, are not above three hundred persons, nor, all that which is holden by these three hundred persons, above one tenth of the whole territory. The other nine parts, and so by consequence the whole, being holden by the Democracy, the Go­vernment able to hold the whole people united, can be no other then an equal Common-wealth.

In Democracy or in an equal Common-wealth, a Nobility or a Gentry usurping the leading, never hold it, and not usurping the leading, never lose it. The reason whereof, throughout ancient experience is not clearer, then at this present amongst us, where no man can imagine, but the Lords in a distinct house, must fol­low the Commons, and not in a distinct house, no [...] otherwise preferred then by election of the people must lead them, to give [Page 8]any peculiar priviledges, under the name of well affected or the like, unto some of the Lords in the Senate, were to allow the like claim unto some of the Commons in the popular assembly, either of which, infects the Common-wealth with inequality, and a Common-wealth infected with inequality is so apt to break out into war or discord, that it never failed of this effect, where the people have not been the sole donors of all Magistracies and ho­nours by their votes or elections. Certainly it must be confessed, that elections regularly and freely made, were as easie and effica­tious, as confusedly and partially, and elections regularly and free­ly made, would amount unto an equal Common-wealth. But be it as it will, let the annimosities now broken loose, elect into the Parliament, elect into the Militia, of the most averse unto Demo­cracy, so much the better, it reduceth the whole controversy un­to a point; for here it lies, If they can so patch up the Aristocra­cy, that is, the Lords house as to make it sustain the ancient weight, the old Government is recovered, and they have confu­ted the Commonwealths-men; but, let them fail in this one, whatever else they hit, the old Government is irrecoverable, and they have confuted themselves, in which case apparently, there must be a new form.

For the introduction of a new form, it is not sufficient that Acts or Declarations be exclusive of the old, unless they be positive of some new one thet is practicable, there being no certain way of barring any one form, though such an one as cannot stand, but by introduction of another, and such an one as can stand. If it have been said that a Common-wealth is a Government without a King or Lords, it implies two absurdities; first, that our ancient Government under a King, well ballanced by his Lords, the as­sertors and vindicators of ancient Liberty, was no Common-wealth, and secondly, that our later Governments consisting of some two or three hundred of the Commons sitting as long, and doing whatsoever they pleased was a Common-wealth, whereas in truth the former Government was much more a Common-wealth (though an unequal one) then the latter. From these two absurdities have arisen two like effects, one the mistaken ge­nius of the people, which under the name of a Monarchy, driveth [Page 9]at a Common-wealth; the other the destruction of that form, which under the name of a Common-wealth, being no form of a Common-wealth, nor indeed of a Government, durst take upon it self such weight, as now in England is in no wise to be sup­ported but by the best form of Government even the full and per­fect form of an equal Common-wealth.

To the introducing of the full and perfect form of an equal Common-wealth in England, there goes no more, but, without other qualifications then such as have been anciently in use, to call a free Parliament in the form of an equal Common-wealth. For, (Formis dat esse, dat operari) the form gives the being and the natural or necessary operation or working to every thing.

To the calling of a free Parliament in form of an equal Com­mon-wealth, there goeth no more of charge, or trouble, then, that the territory, (to the end the Common-wealth may find no rubs in her bowling or rotation) be first more equally divided.

The territory once equally divided, and the people in every di­vision, electing annually, equally and freely, two assemblies, or (more particularly) into each house of Parliament one third part of the Members for three years to act there, (as they must whe­ther they will or no) according to the nature of their form, they by this means perpetuate, not one assembly in the same men, the certain end whereof is, dividing and subdividing, till it come to nothing, but, two assemblies, changeable in the persons, and duly qualified for the whole matter of Government, as not con­sisting of any party, but of the wisdome and interest of the whole Nation, and cast not themselves upon trust in men, nor upon the faction incident to a single assembly, but, upon the strongest securi­ty in nature, even that whence the operation of each creature pro­ceeds, and which the operation of no creature can exceed, I mean, of form, of such form as transformeth the genius of a people, and rightly ordered, is that onely which in a popular State can, and of necessity must hold all parties united.

It must be confessed how unseasonably soever, that Common-wealths-men, such I mean as are principled, cannot be with the forwardest, where it is arbitrary, to advise that in such a form as this, there [...] be any Prince or single person: nevertheless it [Page 10]neither hath been nor can be denyed by them, but a like form may (regno laconico or veneto) admit of a King with royal digni­ty, and revenue: Which kind of reign (like that of Evander in Livy, magis authoritate quam imperio) is that which the ancients (particularly Aristotle) call Heroick, and oppose to the Eastern, which they call barbarous. And indeed if you observe the pray­ses and pleadings that are now in mens mouths for our old Go­vernment, they run all upon this that the power of the Kings in that was no more. All which practise and pleadings are therefore the Stronger arguments against the old Government, in that such being the intention of it, the form was not sufficient to secure that intention, witness the many bloody wars made formerly by the Nobility, and of later times by the Commons, for nothing else but to hold Kings to the true intention of that form; nor is this (were there no other) less then good and sufficient reason, to change that form which never made good the true intenti­on of the Government, for such a Government, as must at all points secure unto us for the future the true and full intention of that form: And to hold the King in fruition of his royal dignity and revenue, from invading the rights and liberties of the people.

Of the royal dignity there is nothing imbezeld; and for the re­venue. Putting the case that the publike debts amount to three Millions, if the excise and custome amount annually to one, this with the Regalia yet remaining, might in a matter of twelve years pay off the publike debts, maintaining the Court in due splendor, and raise a royall revenue in new lands. Whereas resumption of the old, they being for the greater part in the hands of Souldiers, and in themselves but small, would be obstructive and not effectu­all.

It is not insinuation but an apparent truth, that the King thus restored would have these not conveniencies, but felicities. He would have the whole honour of the Common-wealth without any of the burthen. He would bring in his party, otherwise in danger to be loft out, and by equal participation of such a Govern­ment repair them. He would have his hands fairly rid for him of the Scotch Presbytery, a Fanaticisme neither consistent with a Monarchy nor with a Common-wealth, the basest kind of bon­dage, [Page 11]a Pedantisme, which they who press most to have imposed, by the rod, or by power, are lest able to defend by reason. He would look down upon other Kings, as being armed with, or fol­lowed (without Hyperbole) by the most potent Militia in Chri­stendome both at land and Sea. Had Queen Elizabeth or King Iames been founder of the like Government in England, how lit­tle had the Crown lost? How much had the people saved in blood and Treasure? Queen Elizabeth who it is known had good ad­vise, surcesed courting of her Lords, for God bless you my good people: it is true since that, different courses with what success I leave to your judgement, have been taken. But other means of Empire than what have been shewn, were they definable, are not now attainable in the present state of England, where, a King henceforth either can have no power at all, or must have such power as cannot be limited; for all the waies whereby any King can have any power are but two, either a potent Nobility, or a standing Army. Where a King is founded upon a Nobility, they are the limits of his power, but where he is founded upon an Ar­my his power can have no limit. Where the Nobility then are gone wholly to decay, there is no limiting the power, by which a King shall reign, seeing it is without a standing Army impossible to give him any such power whereby a King may reign.

But England seemeth to have a reach, I cannot say beyond, but beside all ages and all Nations. Whether she have an Army or no Army, she is still running upon an invention of her own. A Parliament with a Council in the intervals, this if she have no King must be the Government, this if she have a King, unless he get an Army: and this Parliament must have both the debate and the result too, that is, be a single Counsel without any check at all and so be a Government and no Government, but a tumult as the faction or humor hits, sometimes popular, sometimes Oligarchi­cal, somtimes a Divan. For all the kindes of Government that have been or can be are but three. That is a Counsel with a monarch for the check, in which the Counsel debates as the Senate of Rome after the Common-wealth, or the Turkish Divan, and a Monarch resolves as the Roman Emperour, or the great Turk. Or a coun­sel with an Aristocracy for the check; in which the people debate [Page 12]as anciently in the house of Commons and the Lords resolve, or are such without which there can be no result, as the ancient house of Peers, in which case the Peers will have a King, and this comes to the Government of King Lords and Commons. Or a councel with a Democracy so the check as the Senate of Rome in time of the Common-wealth, debating and the assembly of the people resolving, which the Senate o [...] popular assembly being rightly ordered, amounts unto an equal Common-wealth. Nor are these cheeks such as may be arbitrary, but to be holding must each of them sufficiently preponderate in riches or territory, that is the King, in the absolute Monarchy, the Lords in the mixed Mo­narchy, and the people in the equal Common-wealth, must hold the perfect overballance in wealth or freehold; but if these be all the kinds of Government that are in Art or Nature, then a single assembly as I said before, can be none at all; which were it o­therwise to be doubted is sufficiently acknowledged by it self; In that, a single assembly debating and resolving sayleth not to fall immediately into faction, and in factions the stronger party kick­ing out the weaker, .divides and subdivides till the whole come to nothing, as we have had sufficient experience in England, where such an assembly having a King, will be thinking to mend it self by pulling him down, and having no King, by setting one up. Nor can I conceive which way this in our case should be curable, but as hath been shewn already, that is, by assembling a free Parlia­ment in the true form of an equal Common-wealth. An equal Common-wealth is the most certain root of the most prudent and righteous Laws, because in this form no law can be passed but by the wisdome of the nation, and the true test of the publike in­terest.

An equal Common-wealth is the mother of the most potent and lest chargeable Militia, because in this form the whole body of the people is one disciplin'd Army, taking equally and metho­dically their turns, as there shall be occasion upon the Guard or in Arms.

An equal Common-wealth is of all other the most proper soyle for the plantation and preservation of true Religion. For wheras the causes of corruption in matter of Religion are but two, ambi­tion [Page 13]in a Clergy vying for rule with the state, or ignorance. In this form all hope of propagating any by interest of their own, is in­tirely cut off from a Clergy, in regard that no Clergy without a co-ercive power in matters of Religion, can betake themselves un­to any such designe: now civil and spiritual liberty being insepera­ble, or imperfect, it follows that for the maintenance of civil li­berty (without which this Government is none) an equal Com­mon-wealth must also assert and maintain the liberty of consci­ence, which wholly frustrates a Clergy of co-ercive power in mat­ter of Religion, and yet defends Religion from the other corrup­tion or that which might redownd from ignorance, by a known rule and exercise of the same, or by the prudent institution of a National religion.

National Religion as to the form, is arbitrary, and therefore in different Countries, or different times, according as a people shall grow up in light▪ or increase in knowledge of divine truth, may be different. But in England through the education of the people, and as their judgement now stands, ought, in my mind, to con­sist of the Articles of the Church, and the Common Prayer Book mutatis mutandis. For if education amount unto matter of con­fidence, and liberty of conscience be (as the Sectaries now feel) not to be secured unto our selves, but by giving it unto others, this is that w [...]y of worship, which the Sectaries (their liberty be­ing safe) had as leif as any, and the people rather. Nay, whereof the people of England are not to be debarred, without conceiving themselves to be under a force, and resolving to revenge it as soon as they are able.

In sume of all, and for a fuller answer to your main query, whether a Common-wealth taking in all other interests may not be brought to take in that also of the King? I say whether the King be restored or not resto­red, the form of Government in England must be new and democratical, which that it be also rightly ordered is of great concernment: for there is no firme State of [Page 14]peace or security, save onely under a proper form of Government. Absence or imperfection of form produ­ceth a State of War, or of tumult. Whence apparently to restore the King upon security of the form, is to pro­vide for the safety of the King and the people, but to restore him upon any other conditions then security in the form, is to cast both the safety of the King and of the people upon the faith of men, nay upon the faith of men, in matters, wherein men cannot keep that faith, and so a crime against God and man, exposing a Nation unto ruine.

Sir, you are obeyed, I have given you my judge­ment upon the point proposed, in order unto the Feast for which you prepare. Never tell me that I observe not the manner of your invitation, or that those pro­ceedings which I assert to be from the necessity of things, are therein excused upon the necessity of the times, it moves not me that I reckon without your Host, seeing by his means, you and your Fellow-Members go up resolved to eat Venison, where you will find nothing but Beeve.

But I am (like the Monky) at Chests with my Masters, if you make any further use of this Paper, I beseech you to lay a cushion upon my head, by tearing out the name of,