A DISCOURSE UPON THE PASSIONS.

In Two Parts.

Written Originally in FRENCH.

English'd by R.W. Esq

LONDON, Printed by Tho. Newcomb, for Hen. Her­ringman, at the Anchor on the Lower Walk of the New-Exchange. 1661.

THE CHARACTERS Of th …

THE CHARACTERS Of the PASSIONS.

Written in French

BY THE Sieur de la CHAMBRE, Physitian to the Lord Chancellor of FRANCE.

Translated into English.

LONDON, Printed by Tho. Newcomb, for JOHN HOLDEN, at the Anchor in the New-Exchange. 1650.

TO The Lord SEGƲIER, Chancellor of FRANCE.

MY LORD,

IT is nothing strange to you, to see the effects and disorders which the Pas­sions cause, since the Justice you dispence is most commonly em­ployed in hearing and condemn­ing of them. But it is a most [Page]unheard-of thing to crave your protection for them, that they might even be authorized by you; and that your name should be used to make them pass in Publick, and give them a general approbation. Yet, my Lord, it is what I this day do; in dedicating this Work unto you, I make you the protector of the excesses I therein present; even in some sort I speak you to be the Author of them, since your com­mands were the cause of their pro­duction: and, by a boldness with­out example, I use the illustrious name of The Seguiers, to be the prop of Vices; and I bring them to light with such advan­tages, [Page]wherewith Vertue would esteem her self highly honoured. It is true, they are not of the nature of those which corrupt Manners, or which fear the severity of the Laws; these are but their Images and Figures, which may be received as those of Monsters and of Tyrants, and which ought to be no less pleasing to sight, then the pictures of con­quered persons use to be to their Conquerours. But although hereby my Temerity becomes less odious, yet I perceive it is nothing less excusable, and that you will ever blame me for having profaned your Name, mixing [Page]it with so many defaults; for ha­ving exposed to your eyes things the Art of which is not much less vitious then their Matter; and for having thought that I could have told you some new thing on a Subject in which you are ignorant of nothing but the ill usage: yet if your Greatness please to re­member, that you are the object of all my thoughts, that I can make nothing but it must bear the marks of your benefits, and that even the Tempests which I here shew, are the effects of the Calm and Tranquillity you have procu­red me; you will then perceive that it is as well out of Necessity [Page]as Election, that I consecrate this little Work unto you; and that finding my self obliged to publish the resentment I have of the ex­treme favours which you have heaped on me, J ought to leave in the violent Passions a way to ex­press that which J love to be all my life;

My Lord,
Of your Greatness, The most humble, most obedient, and most faithful servant, La Chambre.

Advertisement TO THE READER.

HAving already spoken of those Passions which respect Good. Wee were oblig'd to examine those who have Ill for their Object. But because the Soul may two waies consider Ill; and that it is sometimes an Enemy, which she com­bates, and sometimes flyes; according to those two several designs, she also forms two Ranks of different Passions. The one of which may be call'd the Courageous, and the other the Timerous. For since Courage is nothing but a Power of the Soul, which employs the forces of the Animal to stop or overcome Evills, Wee need not doubt but those Passions which serve those purposes are conducted by the same Power; and that consequently they [Page]ought not to be otherwise call'd, then Couragi­ous. Even as Such as dare not expect the Enemy, may certainly be concluded Timerous.

When the Soul indeed thinks her self weaker then the Ill, She endeavors to shun the en­counter, and according to the motions she makes to enstrange her self from it, she forms Hatred, Aversion, Grief, Fear, and Des­paire. But when she thinks her self sufficient­ly strong to overcome it, or at least to bear its assaults, then she raiseth up Boldness, Anger, and Constancy; which are the Couragious Passions, whose Nature and Characters Wee shall now examine. But perhaps, Reader, the Preposition wee have made and established as the Principle of all the differences of these Passions, will beget a very reasonable doubt, which thou would'st willingly have clear'd be­fore thou enterest on the Subject. For if the Soul thinks it self stronger or weaker then the Ills, she must compare her forces with theirs; and consequently she must Reason; forasmuch as without reasoning wee cannot compare one thing with another. So that the Soul of Beasts which is susceptible of these Passions must be oblig'd to reason, when she would make use of them; And so she would become Reasonable. And so Reason would no longer be that diffe­rence which distinguisheth Man from other Animals.

Would'st thou but content thy self with Resolutions which are commonly given in the Schools upon such like differences, I could easily resolve this, saying that in these encoun­ters she forms no true Reasonings, that they are only gross and imperfect images of it, and that they are the effects of that instinct which God hath given to all Animals to en­lighten them, and guide them in their actions, But because this answer is not capable to satis­fy such Minds who would clearly discerne things, and that the word Instinct seems to be in the rank of those termes wherewith our Ignorance flatters it self, and under which she thinks to find shelter, I thought fit to sa­tisfie thy curiosity, and even to give some light to those things of which I am hereafter to speak; and therefore oblig'd my self more exactly to inquire what the Nature of this Instinct, which makes such a noise, and which so few under­stand, was; and to observe how far the know­ledge of the sensible Soul can reach: and last of all to shew thee that there accrews no great In­convenience in believing that Beasts reason.

And doubtless this was the place where we ought to examine these Noble & famous questi­ons, which contain the Principles of all the Souls motions, and which may serve for a Preface and ground-work for all what we have to say of [Page]those Passions, who have Ill for their object. Yet this Discourse being somewhat overlong, and the difficulty of the subjects treated there­in requiring a great assiduity of Mind, I thought it not fit to place these thornes at the entrance into the work, which perhaps might have disgusted thee to have proceeded, or might have tir'd thee before thou wert arriv'd in the way wherein I would have engag'd thee; I therefore leave it at this time: yet if thy curiosity desires satisfaction in things of that Nature, The Discourse of the Reason of Beasts is already printed, which yet for our mutuall satisfaction, I shall entreat thee not to under­take the reading of, unless thou wilt perform it at once, and without interruption. Its a Discourse whose parts are so linked together, that they cannot be divided without diminish­ing the force and grace which the whole pre­tends to.

As for the rest, wonder not if in the Pictures of the Passions I present, thou find­est some touches of vertues and vices; and if (for example) in the description of Bold­ness thou encountrest actions which seem to belong to valor and generosity. I consider Passion in its nature and in its essence; and as it is a motion of the Soul every where, where I know this Motion to be, I also acknowledge the Passion. So that vertue being nothing but a [Page]regulated motion, and a Passion moderated by Reason, and since a moderated Passion is still a Passion, Discoursing in general of the Passions, I may speak of those which are un­der Vertues direction, aswell as those which are directed by Vice.

The Stationer to the Reader.

THe Gentleman whose pastime it was to English these Chara­cters, as they had pleased him, so he judged they could not but be grateful to an ingenuous Reader; and therefore commended them to the Press. And to shew how far he was from the new vanity of erecting his Statue in the front, he thought fit rather to use the practice of Painters, who, how well soever they may have copied Master-pieces, never set their names but to Originals; that as he pretends no Praise, he may thereby frustrate Censure. Yet he is consident of his Authors merit, and that this Work of his will move love and delight in all but those who are possest with malignant Passions; they indeed [Page]may quarrel with Love, oppose De­sire, vex Joy, frown on Laughter, and even put Hope out of patience: but against such, Laughter alone will be sufficient. And for the rest, if the English Chanel run too neer the French Coast, and that some may think the Translation over-fraught with Gallicisms; perhaps they are such as themselves in their ordinary discourse often use with affectation. But from them the Passions take a­bout, and steer their course to the Ladies, acknowledging them the one­ly Admirals of these Seas; to whom, whether they come safe, or are ship­wrack'd, they of right belong, since none do more powerfully cause, or more sensibly suffer them; to whose fair hands I am obliged to present them, and from whom alone they promise themselves protection.

JOHN HOLDEN.

A Necessary Advertisement To the READER.

WHat I here present, is but a small part of a Great Designe, wherein I intend to examine the Passions, the Vertues and the Vices, the Manners and Customs of People; the several inclinations of Men, their tempers, the features of their faces: in a word, in which I pretend to shew thee what is most excellent and most rare in Physicks, Morality, and in Politicks. I know thou already thinkest that my undertaking is full of Temerity, that it is beyond my strength, and that there is no likelihood I should ever accom­plish a Work, the least pieces whereof [Page]have startled the greatest men of the former times▪ But I intreat thee, Reader, to consider that I am but at the beginning of it, and that I shall not proceed without the knowledge of thy opinion and further advice therein. For if this Essay please thee not, and if thou believest that so rich a matter requires more expert and more cunning hands then mine, I am ready to quit the Work, and to finish it where I com­menced it: I shall at least have the sa­tisfaction to have endeavoured to please thee, and to have found for thy divertisement a designe which may pass for the greatest and the fairest which was ever conceived, had it been but performed. And that I may give thee a more particular knowledge thereof, I will shew thee the Platform, and make it appear that ill Architects may have fair Capriccio's, and may sometimes form noble Designes.

What I then proposed to my self, was, to present thee with The Art to know Men; which contains Five general Rules. The first is founded on the Characters of the Passions, of the Ver­tues and the Vices; and shews that those who naturally have the same air which accompanies the Passions or Actions of Vertue or Vice, are also na­turally inclined to the same Passions, and to the same Actions. The second is drawn from the resemblance Men have with other Creatures; and teach­eth us, that those who have any part like to those of beasts, have also the in­clinations they have. The third is grounded on the beauty of the Sex; and shews that men who have any thing of a feminine beauty, are naturally effe­minate; and that those women who have any touch of a manly beauty, par­ticipate also of manly inclinations. The fourth is drawn from the likeness [Page]which the men of one Climat have with that of another. So those who have short noses, thick lips, curl'd hair, and a tawny skin, as the Moors have, are sub­ject to the same vices to which they are inclined. The fifth and last may be cal­led Syllogistick, because that without using particular signes, which usually designe the Manners of persons, it dis­covers them by discourse and reason­ings: which is done by two principal means: The first is the knowledge of Tempers: for without knowing the signes of the inclination a man hath to be angry, so as we know that he is cho­lerick, it will suffice to speak him to be inclined to that Passion. The second is the most ingenuous, and is drawn from the connexion and concatenation which the Passions and the Habits have a­mongst themselves. So when we know a man is fearful, we may assure our selves that he is inclined to Avarice, that he [Page]is cunning and dissembling, that he usu­ally speaks sofily and submissively, that he is suspicious, incredulous, an ill friend, and the like. And although we do not observe particular signes of all these later qualities, yet we believe they are found in him, because we know the principle whence they deduce their origine.

These are the first strokes which de­signe the Platform of the Great Work we intend. For as all those Rules are grounded on the relation which Men have with other things, its impossible to apply them well, without the know­ledge of those very things. And it is bootless to say that any man is inclined to such a Passion, because he bears the Character thereof, unless we know what the Character thereof is. We must therefore make as many Discourses as there are grounds for these general Rules; and divide the whole Work into seven parts.

The I shall treat of the Characters of the Passions, of Vertues and of Vices.

The II of the nature of the creatures which may be useful to this knowledge.

The III of the beauty of men and wo­men, and of the inclinations which fol­low them.

The IV of the difference of the bo­dies and manners of people.

The V of Tempers, and of the effects which they cause in the Minde and on the Body.

The VI of the connexion which the Passions and the Habits have amongst themselves.

The VII shall reduce in order all the signes which shall have been drawn from these great Springs; shall teach their use; and finally, shall shew The art to know Men.

Now, Reader, you may perceive why I have undertaken the Characters of the Passions, and why I make it my first [Page]entry, and the Frontispice of my Work. But because I therein observe a very particular Order, I thought it fit to acquaint thee with the Reasons which obliged me to follow it.

I suppose then the Passions are motions of the Appetite, by which the Soul seeks to draw neer Good, and to shun Ill; and that there are two Appetites in Man, The Sensitive, and the Intellectual, which is the Will. All the actions of the Sensitive Ap­petite are called Passions, forasmuch as the Minde is agitated by them, and that the bo­dy suffers and sensibly changeth in its mo­tions. But all the actions of the Will, al­though they are Motions, bear not the name of Passions: For there are two kindes of them; some, which are not for him who acts, but for another; as all actions are, whether just or unjust. Others, which are onely for him who acts them; as Love, Hate, Pride, and other Motions of the Will. The first are simply called Actions, or Operati­ons; the other are called Passions, by reason [Page]of the likeness they have with the motions of the Appetite. In effect, the motions the Will makes for the good or ill which concerns it, are altogether like those of the Appetite, if we did not consider the alteration of the body which accompanies the later, and which is no part of the essence of the Passion, being but the effect. For the Will loves and hates, rejoyceth and grieveth, fears and hopes in the same manner as the Appetite, and hath with it its Concupiscible and Irasci­ble part. However, Humane Passions, whether they be raised in the Will, or whe­ther they are formed in the Sensitive Appe­tite, are of two kindes: for some are Sim­ple, which are not to be found, but either in the Concupiscible part, or in the Irascible: others are Mixt, and proceed from both together.

The Simple ones which come from the Concupiscible part, respect the Good or the Ill, without considering whether there be either a difficulty in their pursuit, or flight [Page]from them; and are, Love, Hate, De­sire, Aversion, Pleasure, Grief.

Those which belong to the Irascible, con­sider the difficulties there are, whether it be in the pursuit of good, or flight of Ill; and are, Hope, Despair, Boldness, Fear, Anger.

The most considerable of the Mixt Pas­sions are, Shame, Impudence, Pity, Indignation, Envie, Emulation, Jea­lousie, Repentance, Astonishment. For, Shame is a mixture of Grief and Fear, caused by Infamy: Impudence proceeds from the Pleasure and Boldness we take in doing of dishonest things. In­dignation comes from Anger and Grief, that we see Good or Ill happen to those who are unworthy of it. Pity proceeds from the sorrow we feel for other mens mischiefs, and the apprehension we have of falling into the same affliction. Envie comes from Grief, and from Despair of possessing the Good which happens to another. Emulation [Page]springs from the regret we have not to enjoy those perfections which we finde in others, and from the hope to attain them. Jealou­sie is a confusion of Love, of Hate, of Fear, and of Despair. Repentance is bred from the sorrow we feel for having done ill, and out of a hope of pardon. Last­ly, Astonishment is mixt with Surprise, Fear, Grief, and Despair; as I shall make it appear in the Characters of every of those Passions.

According to this Method, I shall first treat of the Simple Passions, and afterwards of the Mixt. And because that amongst the Simple Passions there are some which tend towards Good, others which assault Ill, and others which flee from it; I thought it more fit, in stead of ranking them, as is common­ly done, with their contraries, to examine them after this Order, because that they naturally keep it in their production, and that those of one gender commonly are of a company; and because their motions having [Page]a great agreement together, make one the other the better known; and so form Idea's more perfectly of every Passion, then if we mixt them with their contraries. You shall therefore here have those Passions which have Good for their object, to wit, Love, Ioy, Laughter, Desire, & Hope. For I do not consider Laughter as a pure corporal effect; but I comprehend therein the emotion of the Minde which causeth it; and, out of that respect, it may pass for a particular Passion, and for a species of Ioy. But stick not at this: It is indifferent for my designe, whether it be one, or but the effect of one. There are many things which I exa­mine not with the severity of the Schools. Sometimes I distinguish those they have not separated; and I often confound those which they believe to be different: Yet it never hap­pens, but when I am obliged thereto by the necessity of the Subject, which suffers me not always to enlarge my self; or for the want in our Language, which in Dogmatical Dis­courses [Page]is often poor and barren: In many places you may observe where I betray the purity and elegancy thereof in Physick­terms not yet approved, which yet I have been constrained to use.

Besides, every Passion shall be divided into four principal parts. The first shall give you the Description thereof: The second shall shew its Nature: The third, the motion it causeth in the Spirits and in the Humours: The fourth shall discover the Causes of all these effects. There shall also be a fifth in Love, wherein I shall enquire the nature of Beauty in general, and why it causeth Love. Perhaps in that and divers other places, you will not finde the satisfaction you promised your self, and I may be blamed for having obscured those things which seem most appa­rent, by difficulties which were before un­known. But before you condemn me, remem­ber that those things which we think were best understood, are often those we least know; that the best part of our selves is unknown [Page]to us; that we are ignorant of their nature, and of their motions; and that it is very difficult to penetrate those depths wherein there is to be found nothing but a very great obscurity. Yet have I thither brought all the light I could possible; and if I am not de­ceived, it is great enough to shew thee all those new Observations, I believe, I have taken. If they are right, I assure my self that thou wilt no less esteem them, then those new lately discovered Stars, since our inte­rest is greater to know our selves, then the things which are without us. If I have not succeeded herein, yet it is very much that I have shewed the way, and marked the places which are to be followed. It is not that I beleeve I am the first who have obser­ved the want we had of a full knowledge of the Passions. There have been so many great Spirits who have wrought on this Subject, that it is impossible but they must have made better discoveries then I, of what was to be added. But as they are actions common to [Page]the Minde and to the Body, and Physick and Moral Philosophy must help one the other to discourse exactly of them; it hap­pened that those who have undertaken it, could never employ them both; and that those who could have done it, have had other designes, which have hindered them from discovering to us the nature of these things, whose good or ill use causeth all the felicity or mischief of our lives. In effect, if they are well regulated, they form the Vertues, and preserve Health: but if they grow to excess, they are the source whence the disor­ders of the Soul and of the Body deduce their origine. And whoever would consider the great number of Sicknesses which mo­mentanily assault the life of Man, and the several ways whereby she customarily loseth her self, will finde but few whose first cause was not some one of the Passions of the Minde. So that we may say, that the most profitable parts of Wisdom and Phy­sick have not hitherto been discovered; and [Page]that if I have endeavoured to give them any part of my cares, and of my small labour, I have not so much strayed from my Duty and my Profession as some may imagine. To conclude, what success soever my Under­taking have, it in my opinion deserves some approbation, or at least excuse: and indeed, Reader, I must have both, to oblige me to pursue it. In a word, if thy judgement be favourable, it will afford me both very much glory, and very much pains.

ERRATA.

In the Epistle dedicatory, page ult. line 6. for leave, read learn. l. 8. for love, read have.

In the Book, p. 7. l. 14. for ever, read even. P. 13. l. 25. for Maintica, read Maintion. P. 32. l. 4. for other, read others. P. 48. l. 22. for enlights, read enlightens. P. 99. l. ult. for diffent, read different. P. 103. an accent upon Catoché. P. 133. It would be, &c. P. 149. l. 24. for thicks, read thickens. P. 192. l. 14. for ardors, read orders. P. 226. l. 27. for graceful, read grateful. P. 260. l. 25. for venters, read re-enters P. 272. l. 2 for general, read generous, P. 282. l. 21. for Theorictus, read Theocritus.

THE CHARACTERS OF THE PASSIONS.

CHAP. I. What the Characters of the PASSIONS are in generall.

NATURE having destin'd Man for a civil life, thought it not sufficient to have given him a tongue to discover his intentions; but she would also imprint on his fore­head, and in his eyes, the images of his thoughts; that if his speech happened to belye his heart, his face should give the lye to his speech. In effect how secret soever the motions of his soul are, [Page 2]what care soever he takes to hide them, they are no sooner formed but they appear in his face; and the disquiet they cause is sometimes so great that they may be truely called tempests, which are more violent at Shore then out at Sea: And that he who advised a man to consult his glass in his an­ger, had reason to beleeve that the Passi­ons are better known in the eyes, then in the soul it self. But that which is more wonderful, those actions which spring from vertue and vice, discover themselves in the same manner: And although the goodness or malignity they have, seem to have nothing to doe with the body, yet they leave with it, I know not what kind of images: And even the soul not perceiving what it doth, disposeth the parts in such a manner, that by the plight and posture which they take, we may judge whether its actions are good or ill; Neither can the understanding work so secretly but the senses must perceive it: If it elevate its thoughts, if it recollect it self, the looks grow fixed, the car hears not; in fine, there is a general suspension of sense, and moti­on: And whether it be that at the same time the soul cannot intend such different functions, or that the inferiour part re­spects, [Page 3]and wil not divert its Mistris, we know that this is imployed when the other operates not. Its a most certain thing that the body changeth and varies it self, when the soul is moved, and that this performs almost no actions but it imprints the marks thereof, which we may call Characters, since they are the effects of them, and that they bear their image and figure.

Now, because the first Rule of Physio­nomy is grounded on these Characters, and that it maketh use of them to discover in­clinations, assuring us, that those who na­turally have the same air, and the same countenance which accompanies their moral actions, are inclined to the same actions; The designe which we have un­dertaken makes us here propose the parti­cular Characters of all the Passions, and af­ter them of Vertues, and Vices: But first we must know wherein these Characters consist and what are the causes of them.

The Characters of Passions, and of ha­bits, being the markes of the motions, and designs of the soul, are also its effects, as is already said; but because there are also two sorts of effects, those which are perfor­med in the soul, and those which are effect­ed in the body; there are also two kinds [Page 4]of Characters; the one Moral, the other Corporal. For if you consider a man in an­ger, Violence appears in all his actions; his words are full of threats and injuries; he crys out, he runs, he strikes; reason and remonstrances offend him, and he knows no friends but those who favour his passion. On the other side, his counte­nance is inflam'd, his eyes sparkle, he wrinc­kles his forehead, his words are fierce, his voice is terrible, his lookes are frightful, and his whole behaviour is furious. These then are two kinds of effects, and two sorts of Characters; the one whereof consists in moral actions, and the other in the change and alteration of the body.

Now we must see what these actions are, and what this change is; for all moral a­ctions cannot be used for Characters; o­therwise, some would be Characters of themselves, since Passions, and Vertues, are moral actions.

To take away this difficulty, you must observe that the essence of human actions consists in the inward emotion which the object forms in the appetite; and that all those things which are done in pursuance thereof, are but as rivolets running from the same spring. So anger is nothing but a [Page 5]desire of Vengeance; and in the pursuit of that emotion, the soul produceth exterior actions, which may serve to this purpose; as threatnings, blows, and other violences, which we call Characters because they express and discover the alteration and in­terior motion of the appetite.

But there is also another thing to be here considered; and it is that when we speak of Passions, of Vertues, and of Vices, we are not to conceive them as qualities, or sim­ple actions; but as compleat qualities and actions which are accompanyed by many others, and yet, which all tend to one principal end which the soul proposeth. For although love, (to speake properly) is but a simple emotion of the soul, by which it unites it self to that which is lovely; Yet we doe not therein form its whole Idea; we consider it as a Passion that hath beauty for its object, and which to possesse it, em­ploys desire, hope, delight, &c. In the same manner, Justice is a stedfast will to render to every one what belongs to him. But to effect it, she makes use of Prudence, which makes her consider the quality of persons, the time, the place, and all other circumstances. She makes use of Tempe­rance, and of strength, to moderate those [Page 6]passions which often traverse her design; and although they are actions which pre­cisely concern her not, yet she forbears not to appropriate them, because they conduce to her principal end. Now all these bor­rowed, and posterior actions are also a part of moral Characters; because they design the passion, or principal habit, which is the spring, and first cause whence they are derived.

Its far more difficult, to say wherein the Corporal Characters consist, and what in­tention nature hath in forming them. We see, that every passion carries I know not what air on the face; that vertue sheds in­to its actions a certain grace, and an agree­able aspect, which is not to be found a­mongst the vitious; but as we have always called it The I know not what, it seems that we are thereby taught, that it could not be said what it was. For I suppose, (as it is true) that the Characters we seek, are no­thing but the air of which we have but now spoken. Now this is found in so many dif­ferent things, that its almost impossible to observe what of common they have whereupon we may establish its essence; for it most commonly happens in the moti­on of the parts, and some have beleev'd [Page 7]that this air was nothing but that motion. But its certain, there is a sixt and natural air wherein the parts move not, and which is no effect of the souls emotions. So that it would be more likely, that this air were nothing but a certain relation of the parts amongst themselves; which happens from the situation they take when they move, or when they rest: But nether is this sufficient, since the colour which that relation compriseth not, partly gives the air to the face; and that ruddiness is one of the principal Characters of shame, as pale­ness is of fear; this ever encreaseth the dif­ficulty, since that in defining beauty, we say that its a just proportion of the parts accompanied with a pleasing colour, and with a grace; and that colour and grace are esteem'd as two different things. For grace is nothing but a pleasing air; nay e­ven custome, often applyes it to what it is not, when we say a man hath an ill grace; and in this case, grace is the same with air: That we may know then what this marvelous air is, where the serenity, and the storms of the minde appear, we are first to observe, that the air of persons is discovered in their pictures; that the grace of a fair face is exprest by colours, [Page 8]and that consequently, there must be somewhat of fixt, and which flyes not away, since there are none but stable and perma­nent things, which painting hath power o­ver; and that of all visible objects, there is only motion, which subjects not it self to the pencil. Now it is impossible to finde any thing stable, common to living things, and their pictures, besides the figure and colour of the parts. So that it seems this air is to be there placed. But because there is yet another thing in the grace, which the art of painting cannot attain to, and that there is a certain vivacity, which can never be fixt on the cloth; we must with reason beleeve that motion serves also to this grace; its that which renders the beauty lively and piercing; without which its sad, dead, and without attraction. We cannot (in effect) doubt but that the motion of the parts gives something to this vivacity, since 'tis a part of its perfection. But because that after it hath ceased, there is yet I know not what which remains on the face, and that we see a certain splendor shine in the eyes, which depends neither upon their figure, motion nor colour; we must neces­sarily add to all this a certain secret influ­ence, which being sent into the eyes di­sperseth [Page 9]it self over the parts of the face; and without doubt, after having well en­quired what it may be, we shall finde it to be the spirits which the soul continually sends into those parts, which leave there the brightness of the natural light they have; and indeed there are faces which neer seem well, and afar off appear very ill coloured, because the spirits animate it not, and that the splendor they give is so weak that the species of it cannot reach far, and so they leave those of the colour more withered. This grace then is in the colour, in the figure, in the motion of the parts, and of the spirits. And yet this doth not say that all these things are this grace: For were they in other subjects then man, they would not please; and green which is the most perfect of all colours, would cause a frightful deformity, were it on a face. It must then be, that as sounds are not pleasing of themselves, but as they are in a certain proportion; so all these things are pleasing to the sight but only because they have a certain relation, and a certain agree­ment, which pleaseth the eyes, and con­tents the minde.

To know this concordance, you are to un­derstand that there are two sorts of beau­ties [Page 10]in man; The Intelligible, and the Sensible. The first is but the interiour per­fection, the just connexion of all faculties necessary for a man to perform the functi­ons whereto he is designd; and the sensible beauty consists in the disposition which the Organs ought to have to serve these facul­ties. So that what renders the figure, the colour and the motion agreeable, is the fit­ness which those things have with the na­ture of man. For how fair soever the co­lour be, how perfect soever the figure of the parts are, how regular soever the motions are, if they are not conformable to his nature, they produce neither a beauty nor a grace; on the contrary, they cause a deformity, and render the body un­seemly. Now although there be but God alone who knows the principle of this con­formity, and why the forms have more in­clination for one figure, colour, or some other accident then for another: yet there are in our soul secret seeds of this knowledge, which is the cause she plea­seth herself in these objects without know­ing the reason; in the same manner as she findes them displeasing, when that con­formity and proportion which they ought to have is wanting.

Some will perhaps say, that I here con­found grace with beauty, placing grace in the proportion of the parts, and in the co­lour, which in the ordinary definition of beauty are separated from grace. But I beleeve there is no inconvenience herein, and that its true that all that is fair is plea­sing, and that the proportion of parts be­ing fair, must needs please the sight, and that therefore they are graceful.

And indeed the ancients who in these things were wiser then we, made not this difference, and always placed the graces where beauty was: For although A­ristotle says, that little ones might be call'd pretty and pleasing, but that they were not to be esteem'd fair; 'tis that he spake of an entire and perfect beauty, which is not to be found in little bodies, for as much as they want that just proportion which be­longs to the perfection of man.

Yet there is some ground for the diffe­rence which hath been since made between beauty and grace; for as the matter and the form enter into the composition of man, we have placed beauty in the figure and in the colour which belongs to the matter, and grace in the motions which are effects of the soul: not that grace is not in [Page 12]the colour and in the figure; or that beau­ty is not in the motions; but because she is more excellent in these, by reason that the soul who is the principle thereof, is more perfect then the matter, and that action is the last perfection of things. Beauty which ought to be the most agreeable, hath been call'd by the name of grace, although in ef­fect it ought to be common to all that is fair; and that the colour, figure and motion which have all their beauties, ought also to have every one their particular graces.

But to return to our subject; the grace is a kind of air and means; nothing more but that conformity and proportion whereof we have spoken. For when the air is ac­companied with this proportion, its plea­sing; so that this air in general is in all those things which have a grace, and it may be de­fin'd, A certain exterior and sensible quality which is bred from the colour, figure, and motion of the parts. And if we add that these things are proportionable, and conformable to the perfection of man, it will be the defi­nition of grace.

We are notwithstanding to observe that the air appears more in one of these three things in some encounters then in the rest: For that which is fixt and natural, is chief­ly [Page 13]in the figure and situation of the parts. That which accompanies the passions, de­pends most from the motion and the co­lour; that of vertuous actions is sometimes in rest, because reason hinders those moti­ons which would not befit the moderation and quiet she seeks: such is the grave and modest Mine, such is the countenance of a man who meditates and thinks on great matters: And it may be that even vices which are in excess, have an active and tur­bulent air; and those which are in the de­fect, have quite the contrary: so a hot and precipitate man is always in action, and the lazy is immoveable: besides the air appears sometime more in one part then in ano­ther; and although it be more remarkable in the face then in any other place, yet there is one which belongs to walking, another in the carriage of the armes, and another of the whole body. The French hath been more happy to express those differences then any other language, whatsoever. Not content to say l'Air & la Grace, Air and Grace, it adds la Mine, la Contenance, le Main­tica, le Geste, & le Port, which as neer as we can render them, are, The Mine, the Pre­sence, the Behaviour, the Carriage, and the Port. The Mine chiefly belongs to the [Page 14]face, the port to the gate, the carriage and the behaviour to the arms; the Air, the Grace, and the Presence to the whole body. And as the Port, and the Gesture, or Carriage, de­note motion, so the Mine, the Behaviour, and the Presence apply themselves best to rest: but the air and the grace are common to both of them. However it be, the air which is in Passions, and in moral actions, principally comes from motion; but you must know what the cause of this motion is: For upon this knowledge depends the greatest part of what we are to say; and because it will better appear in the passions, we will therefore by them begin the en­quiry.

We have already said, and we shall of­ten be obliged to repeate, that Passions are nothing but the emotions of the appetite, by which the soul moves towards good, and estrangeth it self from evil; and as she hath divers organs which may be used to that end, she also employs them, and moves ac­cording to her intention: Now the Spi­rits without question are the first she makes use of, being the most agil, and which take their birth from the same place where she forms her designs; so that we need not wonder that they are the first to execute [Page 15]them, since they seem to be the first who have the knowledge of them.

The soul then sends forth the spirits, and scatters them over all the exterior parts, ei­ther to acquire good, or to oppose ill: But when this is too powerful, and she is sensible that she is not strong enough to resist it, she retires them in and brings them back to the heart. Now this flux and reflux brings two great changes, because the humors being drawn along with them, their arrival swels and agitates the parts, and paints them of the same colour of which themselves are: on the contrary, their flight makes them fail, looke pale, and renders them immove­able.

Perhaps it would not be unprofitable to examine whether every passion hath a par­ticular motion of the spirits; and whether anger moves them otherwise then shame, love, joy, or the rest which carries them outwardly: Whether Fear retire them inwardly after another manner then Hate, Aversion or Greif. For if this were true, and that we could know these differences, we could with the more facility discover the causes of the alterations they produce. For my part, I beleeve that since in every Passion the appetite hath an emotion and [Page 16]a particular end, the means it useth ought also to be particular; and that the motion of the spirits must be conformable to the intention it hath, and to the agitati­on it gives it self: and therefore that that is done in one passion, is different from those which are done in others. So that its very likely that in one they cast them­selves with impetuosity, and high boylings like torrents: and in another slide as sweet­ly as rivers, that some make them over­flow their banks, others restrain them in their bounds: that now their course is di­rect, and presently again irregular. Lastly, That we may say love dilates them, desire shoots them forth, Joy sheds them abroad, Hope holds them fast, boldness drives them, and that anger throws them forth in great boyling gulps, and so of the rest, as we shall more particularly see in the discourse of the Passions; although to speak Truth, our spirit is not clear-sighted enough to dis­cern exactly all these differences, and that in this case the window of Momus were very necessary for it. How ever it be, the soul is not content after this manner only to agi­tate the spirits and the humors in the pas­sions: she also causeth those parts to move which are capable of a voluntary motion, [Page 17]as being those which are the most power­ful to seek and imbrace good, and to re­pel or flye evil; and to speak truth, this motion of the spirits is often a succour ve­ry useless to the soul, and which serves ra­ther to shew her precipitation and blind­ness then to obtain what she proposed to her self; for when they cast themselves into the face, she fancies to her self that it is she her self that runs thither; and when they retire themselves to the heart, its she also who hides her self there, although she be already at the place where she would arrive, and that she abandons not that wheene she thinks to estrang herself; and what benefit is it to a Creature for the spirits and the blood to goe to the en­counter of an agreeable object, since nei­ther the soul nor the body come nearer to it, nor are any more united to it, and that the sences only are they which ought to make this union? we may say the same of the resistance she would make to those ills which present themselves; for what relation is there betwixt the spirits and an injury, and what effect can they make to drive back an ill which most commonly is only in opinion, which sometimes is no more or which even is not yet made?

But it is not thus with voluntary moti­on; for indeed here the hands draw and take what's useful, the body is carryed towards what is lovely; it truly keeps a distance from whats ill, and flyes or drives away what incommodates it.

Its true that there are some of these moti­ons where the soul deceives it self aswel as in that of the spirits: how many lost steps, ridiculous postures and idle words are there in Passions? to what use are these several motions of the head, those diffe­rent figures which the forehead, the eyes, the nose, and the mouth form? There may be some relation with the design which the soul proposed, since its certain that in shame she casts down the eyes, as if she would hide herself, that she lifts them up in Anger as if that served to repel an inju­ry, and that in scorn she lifts up the nose as if she would drive away what she dis­dains. But its easie to perceive that here­in also she deceives her self, and that the blindness and trouble in which she is, cau­seth her to use means which benefit her nothing to the obtaining of what she desires.

'Tis not that she is therefore to be con­demned in all these motions; there are [Page 19]many which happen without any design of hers; which although they are not a­gainst her intention, yet she is not the cause of them, 'tis but by a certain neces­sity that they follow those motions which the soul inwardly excites; for we cannot with reason say, that she proposeth in an­ger the hinderance of respiration and of speech, the inflammation of the face, and the sparkling of the eyes. But these are effects which follow the agitation of the spirits, which impetuously cast them­selves on the exterior parts as we shall say hereafter.

By this discourse we may not only per­ceive what the causes of those motions which the Passions excite are, but also which those are which make moral Cha­racters, and which make the corporal. For those which the soul imploys by a clear and distinct knowledge to obtain the end she pretends in every Passion, make the moral Characters; and those which she useth by a pure instinct, or which happen without any intention of hers, form the corporal Characters. For these latter are of two sorts, the one are by the command of the soul, the other are by necessity, as you will see more particularly in the fol­lowing discourses.

CHAP. II. The Characters of Love.

LOVE is not only the Spring of all the Passi­ons, but even of all the good and of all the ill which happens to men; without it there would be no Sciences in the world; Vertue would be without fol­lowers, and Civill society would be but an imaginary good; it is that which breeds in us the desire of fair things, and makes us possesse them, and by a wonder­ful incantation changeth and transform­eth us into them: to it we owe all the good things we possesse, it may give us those which we want, and if it drive not from us the ills which necessarily accom­pany this life, at least it sweetens them, nay and even renders them pleasing, & makes them the instruments of our felicity.

But this is it also that corrupts vertue, ruins society, and renders art despicable. [Page 21]And if it hath truely brought into the world these excellent things, it seems it is only to drive them out again. That no­ble vigor which incites the minde to fair actions, that divine fire wherewith they say the soul is clothed, and which natural­ly raiseth it towards Heaven, languisheth and dys under the weight of base and ter­restrial things, upon which this Passion fixeth it. In short its this that forms all the tempests which agitate our life there would be no grief, no fear, nor no de­spair; were there no love; and who ever will neerly consider all the passions, will easily beleeve that they are but several motions which it causeth, and different figures which it assumes.

Now as there are but few objects which can reach the soul, which are not able to move this passion: And whereas Riches, Honor, Pleasure, and in a word all Goods whether false or true may raise it, we will not here disimbroile this Chaos, and our design gives us not leave to speak of any other kind of love but that which beauty begets in the appetite.

Neither is it a slight enterprize, not­with standing the helps those great men of the times past have given us, and what [Page 22]endeavour soever we have already made to discover its origine, yet are we con­strained to confesse that there is some­what in it which is divine, whereto our spirit cannot attain; and the same pover­ty which we finde as they say at its birth, happens also in our thoughts when we would speak of it; so that were it neces­sary to observe all the effects thereof, we might sooner count the waves of the sea, then the motions it causeth in the soul: neither doth heat produce or corrupt more things in the world, then love causeth both good and evil actions.

In effect its the instrument of that di­vine Art which Nature hath provided to preserve her most exellent works; with­out it long since we had no more spoken of Families, of Peoples, or of Common­wealths; and those which were esteem'd the most flourishing, had been but the As­semblys of a sort of wild & savage beasts, had not love sweetned and civilz'd them; for its it that forms us to a civil life, which is the true life of men, since thereby we become liberal, courteous, and generous; it teacheth us to be discreet, obedient, and faithful; it renders us abundant, eloquent, and ingenious; and for that same cause [Page 23]the wisest man among the ancients for­merly, said that he was ignorant in all things but in the art of love, forasmuch as he esteem'd that love is the school of honor and vertue, and that wheresoever it reigns it brings peace, abundance and Felicity. And indeed had it not been alte­red by men, it had never produced any o­thereffects but those, and we had not been obliged to have added to its Elogies, the crimes of which it is accused, and the ills which at all times it hath done through the whole world: but as the fire how pure soever it be, raiseth stinking and dan­gerous fumes if it take in a corrupted mat­ter, you are not to wonder if this divine flame being bred amongst those vices wherewith the nature of man is infected, produceth only filthy desires, forms only evil designs, and if instead of the good things it ought to bring mankinde, it cause only troubles, anxiety and mis­fortunes.

We have not undertaken here to give an account of all its disorders, neither will we stain this discourse with the blood and the infamy it hath brought into Fa­milies and States, nor with the sacriledges wherewith it hath violated the most [Page 24]sacred things; it will be sufficient to say, that its the most dangerous enemie wise­dom can have: For as much as of all those passions wch may disturb her, there is only love against whom she hath no defence; those which enter nimbly and impetuous­ly into the minde, are but almost of a mo­ments continuance, and reason finds its excuse in their precipitation; those others which move slowly by little and little, she perceives them coming and can ei­ther stop their passage, or in that weak condition drive them away. But love slides in so secretly that its impossible to observe its entry, or its progresse, like a maskt enemy it advanceth and seazeth on all the principal parts of the soul, be­fore it is discovered, when there is no means to be found to get him out; then he triumphs, and wisedom and reason must become his slaves: and 'tis what in my opinion the ancients would have said when they fained Love sometimes to be the Father of the gods, and sometimes that he was a Demon which causeth them to descend from Heaven to Earth: Be­cause its certain that this passion hath mastered the wisest men in the world, and that it was not without cause that Lais [Page 25]once vaunted to have seen more Philoso­phers with her, then of any other kinde of men. But let us leave these subjects for lovers to entertain their complaints withall, and without inter­essing our selves either in the praise or dispraise of love, lets consider from the Port where we are, the stormes it raiseth in the soul and in the body.

The first wound that beauty gives the soul, is almost insensible, and although the poyson of love be already in her, and that its even disperst through all her parts, yet doth she not beleeve herself sick, or at least thinks not her mischief so great. For as we doe not give to Bees the name they bear, but only when they have a sting and wings: so neither is love called love but when he hath his arrows and can flye, thats to say when he is pungent and un­quiet. At first we take it for a simple like­ing, or a complacency we bear to so love­ly a Person with whose presence we are pleased, of whom we delight to discourse, whose remembrance is sweet; and the de­sires we have to see and entertain her, are so calm that wisedom with all its severity cannot condemn them, even she approves them, and passeth them for civilities and [Page 26]necessary duties: but they are not long at a stand, they by little and little en­crease, and at last by the frequent agitati­ou of the Soul, they kindle that fire which was there hid, and cause that flame to en­crease which burns and devours it; then this pleasing image which never present­ed it self to the minde but with sweetness and respect, becomes insolent and imperi­ous; it enters every moment, or more fully to express it, it never leaves it, it mixeth with its most serious thoughts, it troubles the most pleasing, and profanes the most sacred, it even slides into our dreams and by an insufferable perfidious­ness, it shews it self in them severe and cruel, when there is nothing to be fear'd, or abuseth us with a vain hope when we ought truly to dispair; then love who before was but a child, becomes the Fa­ther of all the passions, but a cruel Father, who hath no sooner produced one, but he stiffles it to make room for an other, which he spares no less then the former; at once he causeth a hundred kinds of de­sires and designes to live and dye; and to see Hope and Dispair, Boldness and Fear, joy and grief, which he causeth continually to succeed one another, Despight and An­ger, [Page 27]which he makes to flash out every mo­ment, & the mixture of all these passions; its impossible but you must fancie some great tempest where the fury of the wind raiseth, throws down and confounds the waves, where lightning and thunder breaks the clouds, where light and dark­ness, heaven and earth, seem to return to their first confusion.

But as there are times when storms are more violent and more common, there are also encounters wherein this tempest of Love is stronger, and more frequent. The chief in my opinion are, the presence, and the absence of the beloved person, her love, and her hate, and the concur­rence of a rival; and we may say, that these are the five acts wherein all the ac­cidents and all the intricacies of this Passi­on are represented; at least if there are others, they pass behind the curtain, and out of the spectators sight.

If it happen then that a lover be absent from his beloved object, disquiet and fretting pursue him everywhere, he hath no friends but are importunate, the di­vertisements which were most pleasing to him are troublesome; in short there is nothing in his life which displeaseth him [Page 28]not, but silence and solitude, as if he were possest with those strange diseases which makes us hate the light and men; he loves nothing but darkness and deserts, there he entertaines the woods, the brooks, the winds, and the stars, they have nothing as he fancies but what is conformable to the humour of her he loves, and to the pains he suffers; he calls them insensible as she is, and finds them like him in perpetual agitation, and after having a long time tormented his spi­rit with such like Chimeras, he begins to think of those happy moments when he shall again see that desirable object that he may speak to her, and give her an account of his sighs and of the tears he shed in her absence; sometimes he medi­tates the complaints wherewith he must soften her rigor, the thanks with which he will receive her favours, and the vows wherewith he will confirm his servitude; sometimes he puts pen to paper, he writes, blots out, tears, and if he have any thoughts which may securely stay on the paper, they are those only which witness the excess of his love and fidelity; and then what artifices doth he not imploy to procure the delivery of his letters? what [Page 29]extravagances doth he not commit when he receives any, or even when any thing that hath but touched the person he loves comes to his hands? he keeps them always joyned to his eyes or to his lips, he makes them his idols, and would not change them for Scepters and Diadems; to con­clude, we may say that absence is the true night of lovers, not onely because their Sun as they say illuminates them no more, but also because that all their plea­sures are but as in a dream, and at that time all their ills are irritated and aug­mented.

But lets consider the day which followes this night, 'tis infallibly the presence of the person beloved; indeed a lover calls it no other, who beleeves that when he comes neer it, all the beauty in the world is discovered to his eyes; he finds a new heat disperst through his soul, and a cer­tain mixture of joy & astonishment causeth him so pleasant a trouble that he is ravisht therewith and as it were out of himself: then how proud, bold or eloquent soever he be, he must humble himself, be afraid and lose his speech; it avails him nothing to have prepared his courage and his dis­course, they prove but so many dreams [Page 30]and fantasies which vanish at the sight of this light; nothing but his eyes can speak for him which witness by their looks what an excess of pleasure and respect this meeting affords him; but what ever is said, that this is the particular language of Love, there is yet another which is much more proper, and which is also far stranger then this: for although there are passions as violent as this, yet is there none which inspires like this, such extra­vagant and such ridiculous words; for a lover scarce utters one probable word, what care and what interest soever he employs to make himself beleeved; all his discourses and writings are perpetual hyperboles; he burns, he languisheth, he dyes, he speaks of nothing but of prisons, of chains, and of torments; he calls her he loves his sun, his heart, his soul, and his life; he swears that he alone hath more love then all men besides, that his passion is infinite and shall be eternal: In breif, all his words are beyond the truth, his designes and his promises beyond his power, and all his actions beneath his cou­rage; for there is no so base submission which he will not make; there is no ser­vice so low or vile which he will not ren­der; [Page 31]there is no subjection amongst slaves so diligent, so careful and so express as his; he often adores a person that disdains him, courts a confident that betrays him, cherisheth servants that mock him; he must use his enemies with respect, his friends with indifferency, and all the rest of the world with scorn; he must suffer without complaining, he must fear all, de­sire much, hope for little: in a word he must love his ill, and hate himself. I o­mitt the profuse expence he makes, the dangers he runs through to gain only a word or a favourable look, the transports of joy which a good reception yeelds him, the excess of grief and despair which a disdain causeth, and the furies which jea­lousie inspires when a rival traverseth his pursuit. When we shall speak of those passions in particular, then also will we shew the rest of the extravagancies which love causeth, although indeed they can­not be all discovered. For besides that there are no disorders in the other passi­ons which are not to be found in this, that its capable of all the follies which can possesse a distracted mind, it hath so ma­ny faces and several countenances, that its impossible to take their picture; some­times [Page 32]its violent and impetuous, some­times sweet and peaceable, in some plea­sant and toying, in others peevish and se­vere, in other bold and insolent, in o­ther timerous and modest; it appears in­genious and stupid, fantastical, light, fu­rious, and in a hundred other fashions, which in my opinion was the cause that some fained Love to be the son of the wind, and of Iris; to shew the wonder and the variety which there was in this pas­sion, and to teach us that his original is as much hid as that of those two kinds of Meteors. But before we undertake to discover it, lets see what change it cau­seth in the face.

I do not beleeve that he who first painted Love with a vail before his eyes, intended thereby to shew the blind­ness which is in that passion, but either through the debility or by the priviledge of his art, he was obliged to hide what he could not express: In effect, what co­lour, nay even what words can express all the changes which Love causeth in our eyes? how can that resplendent humidi­ty be represented which we see shine in them? that modest disquiet, that laughing grief, and that amorous anger which is [Page 33]to be perceived in them; now you shall see them turn this way, and now that, now sweetly lift themselves up, by little and little fall down again and pittifully turn towards the beloved object. Sometimes they dwel on it as if they were fix'd, some­times they turn from it as if they dazled, sometimes their looks are quick, some­times sweet and languishing; now they fly out with liberty, and now they steal and escape from between the lids; which seem as if they would shut upon them: In a word, all the motions wherewith the eyes in other passions are agitated are to be observ'd in this: you shall always finde laughter or tears, which somtimes agree & mingle together; although they are sunk and hollow, they do not therefore drie up or lessen; on the contrary they seem big­ger and more humid then they were be­fore, unless it be after a tedious grief or an extream despair, for then they become dry, dimm, cast down and set. The fore­head in this passion seldom gathers it self; on the contrary it seems as if it were ex­tended, and if sorrow sometimes casts it down, the wrinkels do scarce so much as break its evenness; 'tis there where the redness begins to appear which Love [Page 34]often raiseth in the face, and even then when the other parts are pale, this always retains something of its first colour; some­times the lips are red and moist, some­times pale and dry, and they never almost move without forming a pleasing smile, sometimes the undermost is seen to trem­ble and to whiten with a subtil froth, sometimes the tongue passeth over them, and by a light touch and trembling which it gives, it flatters and tickles them; when it would form words it lispes, and the hu­midity which the desire raiseth in the mouth, stiffles and drowns them: Even the ears are of no use to a lover, he hears not half what you say to him; if he answers 'tis with confusion, and his discourse is e­very moment interrupted by deep and long sights, which his heart and his lungs incessantly exhale: If he speak of his passion 'tis with a trembling and softned voice which he lets fall at every stroke by those passionate accents, which desire, grief, & admiration usually form: he grows pale, lean, & he loseth his appetite, he can­not sleep, and if somtimes grief and weari­ness overtake him, his slumbers are con­tinually interrupted by dreams, which do often more afflict his minde then the true [Page 35]ills which he suffers. When the beloved person presents herself to his eyes, when she is but named, or when any thing a­wakens his remembrance of her, at the same instant his heart riseth, and is agita­ted, his pulse becomes unequal and irre­gular, and he grows so unquiet that he cannot stay in one place, sometimes chil­ness seiseth him, somtimes heat fires all his blood, sometimes he feels himself anima­ted with an extraordinary force and cou­rage, sometimes he is cast down and lan­guisheth, and even sometimes he faints; lastly he feels himself strucken with a sick­ness which laughs at the Physitians skill and which findes no remedy but in death or in love it self. But let's no farther, let us finish this discourse with the artifice of the Painter as it begun, let's hide what we cannot describe, & be content to enquire the causes of those effects which we have now observed in the essence and Nature of this Passion.

PART. 2. Of the Nature of LOVE.

ONe of the greatest wonders in Love is, that this Passion being so general and so common, and wherewith we may say all knowing men have been touched, there hitherto hath none been found who hath clearly discovered its nature and origine; for after having seen all what hath been writ­ten thereof, we may affirm that the love of Phi [...]osophers was as well blind as that of Poets: and that he who said it was I know not what, which came I know not whence, and went away I know not how, made not one of the worst encounters: Now although I will not examine all the definitions which are given it; the bounds which I have prescribed being too narrow to permit so long a discourse; yet there are some which are esteem'd the most rea­sonable, whose defects I must observe [Page 37]that I may well establish that which I mean to propose; and you may wonder that I approve not that of Socrates, who was more knowing in Love then all the Philosophers in Antiquity; nor that of S. Thomas who understood Morality bet­ter then any man after him; So that I am oblig'd to tell you the reasons which make me dissent from their opinions, And which make me steer another course then they have done.

For the first, who defin'd Love to be a desire of Beauty, he confounds two Passi­ons in one, nay even he destroys them both, since desire moves only towards those things which we have not, and is quenched when we possesse them: al­though Love continue in its possession, and even sometimes therein renders it self more violent; and then if love be a de­sire it would be no more Love, since we cannot desire what we enjoy; and by the same reason desire would no longer be desire. I know well you will say, that there is no possession so entire and full where desire may not finde its place, and were it but the continuation of the good we enjoy, 'twere sufficient to employ it, and to render it inseparable from Love: [Page 38]but this escape is unprofitable; for if the possession be not entire, it supposeth a part which yet we have not enjoyed; and who wisheth the continuation of a good, considers it not as present but as a thing to come; and therefore he forms a new Idea of the good he possesseth, and hath a different motive from that which its presence gives, and this is enough to cause two several passions; otherwise we should confound Love with Hope, and even with all the other motions of the soul, which are often found by one only object according as we consider it several ways.

For S. Thomas, who says that Love is a complacency of the appetite in the thing which is lovely; either he takes the word compla­cency for the sutableness which the appe­tite finds in the object which the imagi­nation proposeth; or else for the plea­sure and the joy which the object yeelds it; if it be that sutableness, it is formed be­fore Love; if it be the pleasure, it follows it: For its certain that when the imagina­tion or the understanding have judged a thing to be good, the first thing the appe­tite doth, is to agree & consent to the judg­ment which they made of it; and although [Page 39]this more clearly appears in the will then in the sensitive appetite; because the will is free to consent or refuse what is proposed to it, and that consent seems to be an act particular to it; yet there is in the appetite a certain image of that a­ction, and its likely it approves what the imagination presents before it carries or moves it self towards it; and this appro­bation and agreement is the complacency of which we speak; which is nothing else but the satisfaction and the quiet the ap­petite takes at sight of the objects which are conformable to it. So light rejoyceth the eyes even before it move the appe­tite; and the pleasure they receive in this encounter, is not a Passion nor a Motion, but a certain calm which coms from the conformity of the object with that power: The same happens to the appetite; when the imagination proposeth any thing that is lovely, it afterwards likes and moves to possess it; so that this agreement pre­cedes Love, and Joy follows it, as you shall perceive by the sequel.

To form then a definition of Love without these difficulties and defects, we are first to suppose the difference betwixt that Love which is a habit, and that which [Page 40]is a Passion; for being a Motion, when that Motion ceaseth, the Passion also is at an end, and we may say, that there is no more Love; but the habit forbears not to be there still, which is nothing else but the impression of the beloved object which remains in the Mind, and which causeth that at all times when the thought proposeth it to the appetite, it moves and forms the passion of which we speak; the Passion of Love is then a Mo­tion, and because Motions draw their dif­ferences from the end whereto they tend, we are to observe what its end is. Now as the appetite stirs not but to possess good and fly from ill, we cannot doubt but the possession of good is the end of Love; but as we cannot possess a thing without in some manner uniting our selves therunto; it necessarily follows that Love is a Motion of the appetite by which the Minde unites it self to that which seems good unto it.

Its true that at first this will not seem true, because that most commonly in Love the beloved object is absent, with whom it is not likely the soul should unite it self; but if you consider that objects may be united to the powers by their [Page 41]species and by their images, or by their true beings; and that consequently there is a real union, and another that is not, which the schools call intentional, and which we may name Ideal; you may ob­serve that the union which the appetite makes with the object which the imagi­nation proposeth, is of the latter rank; because the true being of things enters not into the imagination, its their Idea and their image only; and this union is that alone which naturally belongs to the appetite, for that it can no otherwise for its part unite it self to the good which is presented unto it; if it move towards any other union 'tis not for it self that it seeks it, but for other powers which may really unite themselves to their objects: for the the appetite is a politick faculty which works not only for it self, but for all o­thers which are beneath it: and as the imagination is the Center of all the sen­ces, the appetite is it also of all the incli­nations which are in the parts; so that the imagination or the understanding propo­sing to it what is fit, it seeks it for them, and endevors to procure them the enjoyment thereof; and then if they are capable re­ally to unite themselves with their ob­jects, [Page 42]it covets their union; but this hin­ders not but that it unites it self before with them by a union proper to it, and which is as the principle and spring of all other unions belonging to the soul.

Perhaps you will say that the under­standing and the imagination in the same manner unite themselves to what is fit for them, and that therefore Love may be aswel formed there as in the appetite; but the difference is great, because that the objects come and go in the under­standing and in the imagination; and the knowledge they have of them is ra­ther gained by rest then by motion, as A­vistotle says, quite contrary to the appetite which moves it self towards its object and goes out as it were of it self to unite it self thereto; so that the union which is made in the understanding and in the imagination, is purely passive without a­ny motion of its faculties: but that of the appetite is active and performed with agitation, considering also that the union made by the appetite is more perfect then that which is made by knowledge; for as much as the minde may have an aversion from some [Page 43]thing which it hath conceived, which is a kind of separation, and therefore the u­nion thereof is not so perfect as that of the appetite, which cannot endure this divi­sion, and which consequently is the most accomplished which can be found in the actions of life.

But if Love be a motion of the Soul to unite it self to what is lovely, it seems as if when it is united thereunto, there then should be no more motion, and conse­quently no more Love; and as this union may be made in a moment, for that there is nothing can hinder it, it seems as if this motion also were made in an instant; and that therefore Love should not last any longer, which would be a very strange proposition and contrary to the truth.

To answer this objection, you must ob­serve, that there are things which move themselves to attain to some end separate from their motion; and that there are o­thers which finde in the motion it self the end they seek; the first cease to move when they have attain'd their end; But those who have no other end but motion, or at least none that is separated from their motion, never pretend to rest; and as rest is a perfection in those, so 'tis an im­perfection [Page 44]in these; now the appetite is of this latter kinde, which truly moves to unite it self to what is good, but the union it seeks cannot be effected but in motion, and when that ceaseth it vanish­eth; so that whilest the beloved object is present it must incessantly agitate it self to obtain the end it desires, which is to unite it self thereunto; and if it chance to rest, it proceeds from that the object is no longer present with it, or at least that it is no more offered unto it as good; Love then is a motion and a union of the appe­tite to what is lovely whether absent or present; because its absence hinders not the imagination from proposing the Idea thereof to the appetite, which is the only one with which it naturally can unite; its true that working for other powers (as we have said) it stops not at this simple uni­on; it seeks what is fit also for them; it de­sires for the seeing and hearing that their objects may be at a reasonable distance; for touching and tasting, that theirs may be immediatly united to their organs; In fine as many ways as things can be united, the appetite and the will wish a fit union for them; and you must confess that the concourse of all those motions makes [Page 45]the Passion of Love compleat and entire, and the first of which we have spoken, al­though it contains all its essence and its form, yet hath it not all its extent; we may say it is the source, and that the others are the brooks which encrease it.

Lets now see what this particular agi­tation is, which the appetite causeth to make this union, and in what its different from that which is to be found in Joy, in Desire, and in Hope, by which as wel as by love, it seems that the soul would unite it self to the good which is presented to it. For tis not sufficient for the perfect know­ledge of the Passions to say that they are motions, unless you observe the differen­ces of these motions, and unless you make known the different impressions; and the diverss progress which the diversity of these objects cause in the appetite.

You must then suppose there is some re­lation between the motions of the Soul and those of the body, and that the diffe­rences which are found in these in some manner happen in the others. For since the effects are like their causes, the moti­ons of the body which are the effects of the Soul, ought to be the images of that [Page 46]agitation which it gives it self. In effect they say that the understanding moves directly towards its object, that it reflects and redoubles it self on it, that it reen­ters it self, that it wanders and confounds it self; which are all phrases drawn from sensible motions and which ought to make us beleeve that somewhat like it is done in the soul, and chiefly in its appe­titive part, because it is by it that in effect it moves and agitates it self; neither is it to any purpose to say that they are not true motions, but that they only are Me­taphorical; for besides that you must confess that all definitions of the Passions where the word Motion is always used, are Metaphorical; its nevertheless certain that there may be a resemblance between both although they are of several kinds: But I shall say farther, that to consider exactly the corporal motions, we may say they are not such perfect and true moti­ons as those of the soul, and that they are but gross and imperfect images of them; since its true that in the order of things, those which are inferiours are more no­ble and more perfectly in the superiors, and that all of them are but copyes drawn the one from the other, whose [Page 47]original is in the Soveraign Idea of all beings.

How ever it be, since that in defining Passion in general the word Motion is used, we must necessarily observe the differen­ces of the Passions, and therein employ the differences of Motion, and finde in every of them some particular agita­tion, which hath an agreement and relation to some of the sensible Mo­tions.

To discover then that which is most fit for Love, we must first know where the image of good is; and whether it dwels in the imagination, or whether it insinu­ates it self into the appetite; it being cer­tain that if the appetite go abroad to seek it, it ought to agitate it self in another manner then if it comes home to it; its true it is not easie to be decided, and take which side you will, you will finde incon­veniences which seem inevitable: For, if the image of good issues not out of the i­magination, the appetite which is a blind power can never know it; and therefore ought not to move to unite it self to it not knowing it to be there: To say also that it comes forth of the imagination and slides into the appetite, it will be use­less [Page 48]there by the same reason, since it on­ly serves to represent things and give ne­tice of them, which the appetite is not ca­pable of; besides its hard to conceive how this image can run from the imagination into another power, because besides that the accidents cannot pass from one sub­ject to another, its the term and formal effect of an immanent action, which hath this property never to go out of that fa­culty wherein it was produced.

To avoid these entanglings, and that we may no farther engage our selves in the doubts of the schools, we must say that the image which is in the imaginati­on, in effect goes not out of it for the rea­sons we have discoursed; but as in the presence of luminous bodies, light is shed through the air which environs them; so when this image is formed in the imagi­nation, it multiplies in all the parts of the Soul, it enlights them and excites after them those which are capable to be mo­ved; Its even very likely that 'tis in ef­fect a refined and purified light, since the images of corporal things which strike our eyes are nothing else but lights as we have showen in its place; and that there is nothing more conformable to the mind [Page 49]then this quality which is as the middle, or horizon of spiritual and corporal things; however it be, we ought not to doubt but these images are as well multi­plyed as those of the body, since they are more excellent, and that we have as­sured proofs of them in the effects of the memory and the forming faculty, which ought necessarily to be imbued with these images, to form parts conformable to the designe which the imagination of­ten proposeth contrary to its ordinary conduct.

But if it be true that these Ideas are only fit to represent things, and give you the knowledge of them, how can they be useful to those faculties which know no­thing, as those are of which we have spo­ken? We must answer that there are two kinds of knowledge, the one clear and distinct which belongs to the sences, to the imagination, and to the understan­ding: the other obscure and confused, which is in the appetite and in all the o­ther powers, which have a natural know­ledge of their objects, and of what they are to do.

Its then true, that the image of good is in the imagination, as a light which sheds [Page 50]its rays into the appetite, which inligh­tens, and afterwards excites it to move to unite it self thereunto: For although it be multiplyed, and that the appetite be full of the splendor it casts, it contents not it self with this influence; it seeks to unite it self at the Center, and at the spring whence it comes; as we may see it happens to iron, which having received the magnetick vertue moves towards the Loadstone, which is the principle and source thereof, that it may the more strictly unite it self thereunto.

So that its very likely, that to form the Passion of Love, the appetite carries it self strait towards the Idea of good which is in the imagination, and that this moti­on is like to that of all other natural things, which move thus toward what is conformable to them.

But this breeds great difficulties; for though you may conceive this kinde of motion in the sensitive appetite, by rea­son that it is placed in an organ different from that of the imagination, and that there is a space between both, where we may fancy that this motion is made; this cannot take place in Love which is form­ed in the superior part of the Soul, where [Page 51]the will is not separate from the under­standing, and towards which consequent­ly it moves not it self, since it's always naturally united to it; moreover I say, were the sensitive appetite only in questi­on, it's hard to comprehend how it could move thus; for there is no likelyhood that it should go out of its place and from its organ to joyn with that of the imagi­nation, since all its motions are immanent actions; if likewise it doe not go out, how should it unite it self to this Idea which is in the imagination?

To resolve these difficulties, and an­swer these seeming urgent reasons, we are to remember that the motions of the Soul, although they have conformity with those of the body; yet are they not altogether like them, and if they parti­cipate somewhat of their nature, yet have they none of their defects. For they re­quire not that succession of time, nor that change of place which is alwayes found in those, and which are necessary follow­ers of the imperfections of the matter: they are made in one moment and in one place, at least they do not goe out of that power where they are formed: for you must not think that the appetite in draw­ing [Page 52]toward good or from evil quits its na­tural bounds, and that it passeth from one place to another like animated bodies. All these agitations are made in it self; and as water which is shut up in a gulf may move in several manners without issuing out; so this power which is as an abysse in the soul, may be several ways agitated within its own bounds, and by the diffe­rent transport of its parts sometimes dash against its bounds, sometimes retire to­wards its Center; in a word make all the motions which are to be observed in the Passions. It is not then necessary that the will be separate from the understan­ding, and that there be a space betwixt the two, to cause the motion of which we speak agitating it self in it self, and drive­ing its parts towards the Idea of good which is represented it by the understan­ding; it unites it self to it as much as it can, and so canseth the Passion of Love; it is just so with the sensitive appetite; for al­though its principal organ be far from that of the imagination, we must not beleeve that these two faculties are quite shut up in these parts, they disperse them­selves through the whole body and are al­wayes joyned together, as we will more [Page 53]at large shew in the discourse of Joy. So that the motion which is there made is like that of the will; and in the one and the other, Love is but a motion of the appetite, which directly carries it self to­wards the Idea of good and unites it thereunto, which is not effected in the rest of the Passions: as we will make it appear.

You have now seen what Love is in general, whence its easie to observe its differences, by the differences of those objects which may move it: for as there are goods of the minde, of the body, and of fortune, and as every of them is ho­nest, useful or delightful: its certain that although the motions whereby we Love all these things are of the same nature, and that in general they have the same end, which is to unite the appetite to what is good; yet are they different between themselves, because these goods are dif­ferent; so there is a Love of Riches, Plea­sures, Honours, and Vertues; in a word, as many as there are kinds of false or true goods, so many sorts of Love there are, of which we have here no intention to speak, because the greatest part of those kinds are comprehended in the vertues [Page 54]and the vices of which we shall treat here­after; And because we have restrained our selves to that Love which beauty breeds in the appetite.

This Love may be defined a Motion of the appetite, by which the soul unites it self to what seems fair unto it: So that all the di­versity that there is betwixt this definiti­on, and that of Love in general, consists in beauty; wherefore we have two things to examine. First what beauty is; in the second place, why it causeth Love; but because this search is extreamly high and difficult, and that it may break the con­nexion of this discourse, we have remit­ted it to the end of this Chapter, to speak of the effects which Love causeth in the humors and in the spirits.

PART. 3. What that Motion is which Love causeth in the Spirits and in the Humors.

SInce that the motions of the spirits and of the blood are in the Passions conformable with those which the Soul feels in it self: There is no doubt but that Love uniting the appetite to the Idea of the good which is represented to it, produceth also in the spirits a certain motion which seconds its design, and ren­ders this union the more forcible: but as the sences serves us but little to know the difference of these motions, the un­derstanding must supply their defect, and must by discourse shew us what this moti­on of the spirits is which is the most uni­ting, since 'tis that which ought to accom­pany this Passion, to which end you must suppose two things to be most true: The first that the Heart is the chief organ of [Page 56]the sensitive appetite; The second that the Brain is that of the imagination: now as the Idea of good is formed in the ima­gination, and the motion of the spirits begins at the Heart, the soul must of ne­cessity having a design to unite them to the good it hath conceived, transport them from the place where they begin to move, towards that where they are to meet this object: And because this first birth of Love is from the inward union of the appetite whereof we have spoken; the first motion which the spirits also suf­fer must drive them to the brain, where it seems this union ought to be; for the Idea goes not out of the Faculty which produceth it, as hath been showen; and forasmuch as the spirits carry with them heat and blood, from thence it comes that the imagination of Lovers is heated, and afterwards brings forth so many fair productions, and sometimes too extrava­gancies, if the motion and heat be too violent; we may say besides that the pale­ness which is so common to them, partly comes from the transport of the spirits which are within the brain, which for­saking the face, leave it without heat or splendor: but if the beloved object be [Page 57]presented to the sences, then do the great­est part of these spirits run to the out­ward parts colouring them with the blood they draw along with them, and which is the purest of the veines as we will shew you anon. Its true there are Passions which mingle with this, and of­ten cause a contrary motion (to that whereof we have spoken) in the humors: But we shall consider here only the effects proper to Love, and not those he bor­rows from others; so that we may con­clude, that the first effect of Love upon the spirits, is, to send them out of the heart, and to transport them to the brain and to the exterior parts.

But this is not enough, we ought to ob­serve, whether in this motion they move either with liberty or with constraint; that's to say, whether they dilate or re­strain themselves. For these seem to be the two first differences of local motion: now as there are but two encounters which may oblige the soul to restrain the spirits in their Motion; to wit when ei­ther she repels or flyes from what's ill; because in the one she hath a care of forti­fying her self, and to that end to gather and reunite the spirits; and in the other [Page 58]the flight is not made without a com­pression which precipitates and con­founds them together; its evident that there are none of these motions in this Passion, which considering nothing but the goodness of its object, it sees no ene­my which it would assault, or that it ought to fear; so that it agitates the spirits with liberty, it dilates them and seems to open them, the better to receive the pretend­ed good, and so the more perfectly to unite it thereunto.

Let's go on and see whether this moti­on be unequal, and whether it be made with that vehemency which happens in impetuous Passions. Its certain that an­ger moves the spirits and the humors with more confusion and disorder then Love, by reason of divers and often en­deavours which the minde is forced to make to drive out the ill; and that it is like those Torrents whose waves precipi­tate themselves one upon the other, and make a stream full of boylings and foam­ings; but that Love makes the spirits and the blood slide in the veins, in the same manner as water runs in the Channels of Fountains, or in Rivers, whose beds are large and even; for Love which dilates [Page 59]the spirits, proportionably enlargeth the vessels, and so giveth them the more li­berty, it renders their course less turbu­lent and confused. But the chief reason of this equality, is, because Love hath commonly no other Passions following it, which have contrary motions, as anger which is always accompanied with grief, and which retires the spirits towards the heart, at the same time when it drives them forth.

For although Joy, Desire, and Hope, which are almost always with Love, di­versly move the blood, yet they doe not imprint motions quite opposite, as we shall make it appear; so that it is not sub­ject to that tumult, nor to that unequal agitation which the contrarities cause in fluid bodies; but with what violence soever it be driven, all its parts flow equally and without confusion; and there is no doubt but that secret joy which Lovers feel without thinking even of the beloved ob­ject, proceeds from some kinde of moti­on whose impression remains in the hu­mors after the cessation of the minds agi­tation. For as Nature loves order and equality in all her actions, when she sees the motion of the blood conformable to [Page 60]her inclination, she is sensible of a certain joy whose image or shaddow presents it self to our minds, and disposeth us to mirth without knowing the cause; and I beleeve for the same reason, that if the humors were always agitated with this flux, and reflux, which the opposite Pas­sions use to cause, there would not be a moment in Love exempt from grief and perplexity; and that those excesses of joy would never be felt, which so often happen, because that the soul cannot suf­fer contrary motions, but that she must at the same time suffer some pain, and some kinde of grief. But what shall we say then when these turbulent Passions, as Anger, Fear, and Despair, mingle with Love? ought it to give them place when they enter the minde and dye when they spring forth, seeing its motion is contrary to theirs? truly I beleeve, that the habit of Love remains still, but the Passion ceaseth when another destroys its motion, and principally if it be violent; and in­deed a man in anger or possessed with fear thinks not on the beloved object, and at the least the thoughts he hath of it, are stiffled by those of revenge or of the dan­ger he would shun. Its true that as these [Page 61]Passions enter instantly into the minde, they commonly go out as readily, when at the same time the first returns, the im­pression of the beloved object furnishing new Idea's which awaken the appetite, and cause therein a new commotion, which is nothing difficult to beleeve, if we consider that the appetite and the spi­rits are agitated more easily then the air, And that their motion is in some manner like that of lightning, which pierceth the clouds in an instant, which followes flash after flash, and leaves no trace of the way they made: And if these Passions are weak, they may be well enough compa­tible with Love, but they diminish its ar­dor; because the soul dividing it self to se­veral objects, cannot wholly give it self to what is lovely; and because the agita­tion which this causeth in the humors is hindred, by the flood of those others which oppose its course.

Now let's see what this vehemency is, which accompanies this motion of the spirits, and whether it be as great in this Passion as it is in anger, in fear, and in the rest. For its certain there are some which naturally are not so violent, as Hope, and Compassion, where there [Page 62]never is those extreme transports which are to be observed in the rest. Now you must not think that Love is as the two lat­ter, and that it hath the moderation they have; the sallies it makes, and the tem­pests it raiseth are sometimes so great that it wracks the minde; and the alteration which all the body suffers in those en­counters is an evident witness that the hu­mors are moved with a great impetuosi­ty; the beginnings truly are sweet, and we may say they are like to those peaceable winds which a weak heat raiseth, and which afterwards change into whirl­windes when it grows stronger; for as at the birth of this Passion the Idea of the beloved object makes no great impression in the minde, being if we may so speak, but lightly and superficially printed, so it also causeth in the appetite but a light emotion; but when it hath insinuated it self into the bottom of the minde, and hath rendered it self master of the imagi­nation, then it puissantly raiseth all the moving faculties, and causeth those great storms which often make us lose both our reason and our health.

Yet will I not say when the soul is come to this excess, but that the appetite [Page 63]and the spirits are continually agitated with this violence; I confess the tempest is not always alike, that it often abates and even dissipates it self; whether it be that the divers designes this Passion in­spires, divert the Soul from its first and principal thoughts, or that all things which are in nature cannot always last in one violent estate, and that the minde is weary to be long stretched towards one object; whence it happens that the strongest Passions at last become languish­ing and quiet themselves; and indeed those great transports of which we speak, are never but when the beloved object presents it self to the imagination with some powerful charmes, as it happens in the first thoughts it hath of it, or when unawares it presents it self to the sence, or when the minde figures new perfecti­ons in it, and forms new designs to com­pass the possession thereof; for then the Soul being surprised with this lovely No­velty is shaken all at once, and drives the Spirits like a great billow which ought to transport it to its offer'd good.

But what if Love moves the spirits thus, it must needs produce the same effects as joy doth; and that its violence must [Page 64]quench the heat of the entrails and cause fainting and syncopes as this doth; it seems that even necessarily these acci­dents must be in it, since these two passi­ons have the same object, that they are but little separate and that they have a growth alike; for where Love is, extreme joy ought also to be so: and yet none of those symptomes whereof we have spoken have been observed to be in Love: at least if any such like thing hath happened to Lovers, the excess of those two Passi­ons never was the cause; but it must have been Grief, Despair, and the like; how comes it to pass then that the Love of beauty produceth not the same effects as Joy doth, or that Joy causeth not the same accidents in this Passion, which it often causeth alone?

To discover this secret, you must first suppose that these disorders seldom hap­pen, that they have been observeable on­ly in old men and women; and that the joy which moved them was caused either by the gain of some unhoped for victory, or by the encounter of some very ridiculous object, or by the discovery of some great secret in learning, which are joyes which only belong to the minde: In effect, as [Page 65]spiritual things have that beyond corpo­ral, that they are more noble and that they enter into the soul wholly without separating themselves; the possession ought also to be more perfect and the joy the more ravishing: so that it is likely, that the syncopes which are the effects of all violent Passions follow those spiritual joyes as the greatest and most powerful; and that they rather happen to weak na­tures, then to those which are stronger and more capable of resistance: the soul then finding herself surprised at first sight with these objects, and agitating with precipitation to unite her self to them; the spirits which follow those motions issue from the heart, and dart themselves with so much violence to the superior parts, that they lose the union they had with their principle in the same manner as water divides it self, being driven with too much impetuosity; and because the heat ought continually to inspire the parts with its vertue; and that the spirits only can communicate it when they come to disunite themselves from it; these influ­ences must then stop, and the sensitive and vital actions which depend upon them, must also cease till their reunion: [Page 66]And because the soul is then quite ravish­ed in the injoyment of that good which she esteems so excellent, she cannot minde to remedy that interruption which is made in the spirits, nor to bring back those which are scattered, or to send o­thers to fill those empty places they left. So that these faintings often last long, and sometimes cause death; heat being quite perished, and nature not having strength enough to repair its loss, nor to recover its first estate.

But this disorder cannot happen in the Love whereof we speak; for that corpo­ral beauty is never wholly possest, and that there is still somewhat which enter­taines Desire, Hope, and Fear: So that the soul dividing it self to several designs, and suffering it self not to be so powerful­ly transported as she doth in the enjoy­ment of spiritual goods, the spirits throw themselves not with so much precipitati­on nor impetuosity, and are not so subject to the division which they sometimes suf­fer in Joy; and which is the cause of those syncopes of which we have spoken. We shall touch upon this matter again in other places; let's now consider what heat it is which this Passion raiseth, and what hu­mors [Page 67]it particularly moves: Its certain that Love, Joy, and Desire, disperse through all the body a moist and pleasing heat, for as much as the spirits in those Passions stir the most temperate humors whose vapors are sweet and humid; but these humors are sooner mov'd then o­thers; because that the spirits which have a great likeness with the purest and most subtil parts of the blood, as being those whence they draw their origine, ought to mingle and unite with them more easily then with those which are grosser and far­ther from its nature; & therefore we must not doubt but when they are agitated they first of al draw along with them those parts of the blood whereto they are more strongly tyed, & which being the most sub­til, are also the more easie to be moved: Be­sides that the soul to whom the humors serve as instruments to arrive at the end she proposeth, employs both the one & the other according as they have qualities sit to execute what she wills; whence it is that amongst venemous beasts it moves the venome in anger, and in all the rest it moves flegme and melancholy, because they are the malignant humors which may destroy the ill she assaults: so that [Page 68]there being no enemies to combat in the Passion of which we speak, it ought not to move any other humors but those which are conformable to the good she would enjoy; So that there is only the sweetest and purest blood which common­ly moves in Love, and causeth that sweet and vaporous heat which disperseth it self through the whole body.

PART. 4. What the causes are of the Cha­racters of LOVE.

BUt its time to come to the point we proposed; from these principles we have established, we must draw the causes of the Characters of this Pas­sion; let's first therefore examine mo­ral actions.

There being no Passion which produ­ceth so many different actions, or causeth so many extravagancies as this, it would prove a troublesome thing to enquire in­to them all, and besides unprofitable, since the greatest part of them proceed from o­ther Passions which accompany it, of which we are particularly to speak; for which cause we will only touch here the principal; which in my opinion are, The continual thought a Lover hath of the beloved Object, The high esteem he values it at, The [Page 70]means he imploys to possesse it, And the extra­vagancy of the words he makes use of to discover his passion; for there are few actions in Love which may not be reduced to some of these four.

For the first, although it be a thing common to all the Passions powerfully to possesse the minde, and to keep it fix'd on the object which entertains them; yet there are none who do it more powerful­ly or longer then Love. For either they are impetuous or turbulent, or else they are pliable and docile; the first are pre­sently dissipated, and the others are to be appeased or diverted by the power of dis­course, nay even by other Passions. So the angry ones sweeten themselves by pleasure, and the delightful diminish by affliction; and all of them may change in­to others more strong, if more powerful objects then those which have raised them present themselves; for a great grief makes us forget a less, and an ex­cess of joy takes away a mean one: But with Love it is nothing so; it hath the propriety to be vehement and long last­ing, not to hearken to reason, and can seldom be changed or diminished by the force of what Passion soever; for­asmuch [Page 71]as the imagination is so wounded, that it fancies there is no greater good to be possest, and which can affoord it more contentment then its beloved object; so that there is no other, how excellent so e­ver it be, that can divert its inclination and draw it to it, because the soul never leaves a greater good to seek a less; 'tis in the same manner with displeasure; for if we are beloved, there is no pain nor grief which vanisheth not by the content­ment which we receive thereby; and if we are not, as the soul knows no greater ill then that, all others are too weak to dispossess that thought; for which cause it continually considers the good whereof its deprived, it uncessantly desires it, and seeks in the possession thereof the only re­medy which may cure all its displeasures. But the first origine of all its effects is the powerful impression which beauty makes in the minde; so that in making it appear how the objects of other Passions cannot make it so strong and deep, it will also be manifest why its of a longer continuance, and why it keeps the minde more intent then any of the rest.

Its a certain truth that there is a secret knowledge in us of those things which [Page 72]serve for our preservation; and its likely that this knowledge is gotten by means of some Idea's which nature hath imprinted in the bottom of the Soul, which being as it were hid and buried in its abysses, excite and stir up themselves at the com­ing of those which the sences present, and so beget in the appetite Love, or Hate, Desire or Aversion. Now as there are but two things which serve to preserve us, the seeking of good, and the flying from evil; its evident nature inclines rather to seek good then to shun ill; and as there are also goods, which are more ex­cellent & profitable then others, she hath a greater care of those of higher, then of these of a lower value; & she forms a more exact Idea, and makes a stronger and more profoud impression of them; which be­ing granted, you cannot doubt the pre­servation of the species being a more general and more excellent good then all others which respect only a particular good, but that it hath oblig'd nature to give the soul a more efficacious know­ledge, & a more ardent desire of that then of any other thing whatsoever; and but that consequently she hath powerfully imprinted the Idea of beauty, since its the [Page 73]mark which makes that good known, and that charme which excites the soul to its possession: so that exterior beauty en­tring the imagination, and meeting that general Idea which nature hath graven therein, unites it self, therewith awakens and excites that secret and powerful de­sire which accompanies it, and applyes it to the object it represents unto it; thence is that strong attention which fixeth a Lovers minde on the person of the belo­ved, and which causeth in him after the Love of silence and solitude the disgust of all other divertisements which were most delightful to him, and all those visions which a solitary life inspires in a soul a­gitated with Hope and Fear; in a word, wounded by the cruellest of all the Passions.

We are now to enquire the source of that high esteem which we make of the beloved object; for from thence issue all the respects, the submissions, the services, and the greatest part of the dialect which Lovers use: and truly its a strange thing and almost incredible, were it not dayly observed, to see Kings submit their crowns and their power to the beauty of a slave; the wisest men to adore a vitious person, [Page 74]and the most couragious to subject them­selves to base and feeble mindes worthy of nothing but contempt; whence can that powerful spell proceed which makes us lose the knowledge of what we are, and of what we love, and makes us have so ill an opinion of our selves, and so ad­vantagious a thought of what we love? we need not doubt but the imagination is the chief cause of this error: As it hath the power to enlarge the images it re­ceives, and to cloath them in the new fantasmes which disguise the things and make them appear quite otherwise then they are; it sets on the image of that beau­ty which is represented unto it, what it useth to do in dreams, or on a light Idea which it hath from the humor which is a­gitated, it forms a hundred several Chimae­ra's, which have a conformity with that humor; for the imagination receiving the image of the beloved object, forms it self on the model of that general Idea of beauty which nature hath imprinted in it, adorning it with the same graces she confounds it therewith, and so makes the beloved person appear more perfect then in effect it is; and we may further say, that herein it happens as in the sickness of [Page 75]the minde, where the particular er­ror which disorders it changeth and cor­rupts all the thoughts which have any re­lation to it, those who are at distance from it remaining still enough reasona­ble; forasmuch as a Lover may preserve his judgement free in those things which do not concern the person beloved; but as soon as that is interested he becomes a slave to his passion, and judgeth of things according to that pleasing error which it hath inspired into him; in effect, its a wonder that a deformed face, and which we should have judged such, should pre­sently appear full of attractives, as if the imagination had painted it, or at least had blotted out all its defects: But the paint or the perfection it gives comes from that Idea wherewith its filled, and which na­ture hath affoorded to oblige it to en­quire the greatest good which can happen to it.

However it be, the soul being abused in the judgement it made of beauty, and ta­king it for a most excellent good, whose possession ought to render it more perfect, wholly submits to it, and considers it no otherwise then as a Queen who is to com­mand it. For good hath that property [Page 76]that it communicates it self with Empire, and renders it self master of those that re­ceive it; forasmuch as it is a perfection which is in stead of act and form, as the thing which receives it is in stead of pow­er and matter. Now its a certain maxime that the form renders it self master of the matter, otherwise it could not receive perfection.

And consequently beauty must have that predominant quality that the soul which is touched with it must subject her­self to its Empire; thence followes all those submissions and respects, all those termes of servitude and of cap­tivity which are so common with Lo­vers; whence its easie to draw the rea­sons of the principle we have established; let's now examine the means Love hath invented to possess the good it tends to.

Although Love may subsist in the on­ly union which the appetite makes with the Idea of the beloved object; we may further say, that this union and this Love are not perfect; Love stayes not there, but always seeks really to unite it self, but by the communication of thoughts, and by the actual presence which the sences re­quire, [Page 77]the soul in a manner going out of her self by speech, and the sences ser­ving for channels by which the objects flow into the imagination; so that the soul beleeves that by means of discourse she strongly unites her self to the beloved person, and that it unites it self to the soul by means of the sences: Whence it comes that Lovers wish they may conti­nually see, hear, and entertain those they love; even the kiss wherein they place their highest felicities, hath no other end but to unite their soul to the beloved object.

So that only those parts by which it seems most to communicate it self, give and receive it; as the mouth because its the door of the thoughts, the eyes be­cause they are the channels through which the Passions issue out, and the hands because they are the principal or­gans of its actions: But amongst all the means which nature hath taught us to at­tain to this perfect union, there is none more considerable then reciprocal Love; because union supposing two things, the Lover, and the Object, to render it ac­complished, both the one and the other must really unite. Now if the beloved [Page 78]object is capable of loving, it can no o­therways unite it self but by Love, for­asmuch as the soul unites it self with things which are without it, only by that Passion: wherefore the first care of a Lover, is to make himself beloved, and to that end to render himself grateful; whence it happens consequently that he accommodates himself to the inclinations of the person beloved, that he changeth his humor, his manner of living, that he growes liberal, curteous, neat, and in a word that he doth all what he thinks may make him be beloved.

We are now to enquire the cause of that extravagant manner of speaking which is so particular to Lovers: In ge­neral we may say, that the soul in that Passion carrying it self out of its self, car­ries also other things beyond what they are, and forms thoughts of them beyond the natural expression they should have; whence it is that the good and ill it con­ceives is alwayes in excess; and if the na­ture of the thing cannot suffer it, it bur­thens it with some strange Idea to en­crease the meaning thereof, and so builds those bold Metaphors which give to the beloved object the title of the fairest and [Page 79]the noblest things in the world, which of a gentle heat cause a burning fire, of a mean disquiet a torment and a punish­ment, of a little submission which beauty requires a captivity, prisons, and chains, and so of the rest; whereunto the error of the imagination contributes very much, which being wholly fill'd with that vio­lent instinct which it hath from beauty, beleeves that there is no greater good, nor heavier ill then it expects from Love; so that it alwayes represents them in ex­tremes, and consequently useth more ex­travagant termes then in any other Passi­on, considering also that Lovers who commonly employ in their entertain­ments but very few thoughts, and who are never weary to repeat them, are ob­lig'd to diversify the termes that they may be the less tedious; which they can­not do but by many Metaphors, which at last become extravagant, being to seek to finde out reasonable ones enough, for the variety they endeavor.

Besides these general reasons, there are yet particular ones for some words, which are always in the mouths of those that love; and when they call the beloved person Their Heart, Their Soul, and Their [Page 80]Life; when they call them Ungrateful, Ho­micides, and Cruel, and when they so of­ten say, They dye for Love: for although all these kinds of expressions seem extra­vagant, yet they come from a principle which in some sort renders them true; forasumch as Love keeping the Soul al­ways stretched towards the beloved ob­ject, and transporting it out of it self to unite it thereto, separates it also morally from the subject it animates, and in effect takes away from it the remem­brance and the cause of all that belongs to it: So that in that respect we may say, that it lives no more in him nor for him, being wholly in the beloved person; that a Lover hath reason to call her his Heart, and his Soul, since his desires and thoughts which are the noblest parts of his life, are alone in her, and that its true that he dyes, nay even that he is dead, since that he no longer lives in himself. Now as there is but reciprocal Love only which can make them live again; forasmuch as then the beloved person transforms herself in him, and communicates to him both soul and life; if he be unhappy to so high a degree that he cannot be loved, it seems that he hath cause to call her Ungrateful, Cruel, [Page 81]and Murtheress; since giving himself wholly to her alone, she is oblig'd to ac­knowledge so high a liberality, and in se­parating his soul from him she kills him; and it is a cruelty to let him dye whose life she may save. Its true, that to speak really, we may say that there is but a very light shadow of truth in all these words, that the soul operates here as in a dream, and that Platonick Philosophy which ap­prov'd these visions kept intelligence with this Passion, or would consolate Lovers in the miseries they suffered; let's leave her employed on so fair a designe, and seek the causes of the corporal Characters which we have described.

But we will not here examine whence that great diversity comes which appears in this Passion, which makes it in some ei­ther sportful or pensive, in others peacea­ble or turbulent; & in a word, perhaps two persons have never been found, in whom it hath bin altogether alike; for its evident that it comes from the divers inclinations which the temperature or custome hath introduced into the soul, which draw the Passions to the bend they take, and makes them follow the same course which they are accustomed to; the mixture of other [Page 82]Passions also contribute thereunto, it be­ing impossible that Love should be frolick when its accompanied with Grief or Anger, or that it should be severe when Hope or Joy are of the party: But all these diversities are easie to be compre­hended; let's now to our principal de­signe.

To follow the Method we have esta­blished, we are here to place two kinds of these Characters; some of which are done for some certain end, others which happen by a pure necessity; the first are made by the souls command, who judg­eth them fit to execute her passion, al­though they are often unprofitable as we have said, the other are purely natural, and are made without design being only effects which by a necessary consequence come from the trouble and the agitation which is inwardly made.

Those of the first rank, are the motions of the eyes and forehead, the faultring of the tongue, the sweetning and several falls of the voice, laughter, and the beha­viour of the body; All the rest are pure­ly natural; as for the Motion of the eyes there are so many several kinds of it, that its al­most impossible to observe them: For as [Page 83]all the Passions may spring from Love, and suffer also with it, and every of them causing the eyes to move diversly; It also happens that all their motions meet there: So that pleasure makes them sparkle, Desire advanceth them forward, Grief casts them down, Fear renders them unquiet, Respect inclines them, Despight kindles them, and so of the rest; whose causes we will deduce in the dis­course of every Passion; all what we can herein do, is to enquire which are the A­morous eyes and looks, and what obligeth the Soul to use them by reason of the great difficulty there is both in the one and the other.

For the first, there are some who be­leeve that amorous eyes are those whose looks are quick and nimble, and which in a moment are cast about on every side; forasmuch as Aristotle speaking of lascivi­ous eyes which he calls [...], some Translators have rendred Insanos, which are properly those wild eyes which are in perpetual motion; But besides that they have not met with the sence of Aristotle, and that he would have intimated those which he calls Devorantes, of which we are going to speak; its certain that those wild [Page 84]eyes do not become Love, and are more proper for Anger, Disquiet, and the Lightness of the minde then for this Pas­sion; Others think them to be those whose balls lift up themselves up on high, and half hide themselves under their lids, which are the dying eyes, because those who die commonly have them so, as Aristo­tle has observed in his Problems, where he adds, that it also happens in some actions of Love: But at that time the soul hath no designe to cause that motion and 'tis purely a natural effect which followes the excess of pleasure, as we will say in its due place; for otherwise those kinde of looks are marks of Grief and Langour; we might even also say, that they are those urgent looks by which the eyes seem to throw themselves on their objects, and as if they would as they say devour them, which the Latins so happily name Instan­tes, Procaces, Devorantes, but we have al­ready said that they were bred from de­sire, and not from Love.

For my part, I beleeve that the eyes in question, are those which the Latins call Paetos, and which for the same reason they have given to Venus; for they are smiling, and send forth their looks as it [Page 85]were by stealth, the lids sweetly inclining and half shutting themselves. In effect, there are none which have so much cor­respondency with the nature of Love as these have; forasmuch as in one look they make known all the principal motions which are to be found in this Passion: for we have made it appear, that Love chief­ly consisted in the interior union of the appetite with the beloved object; That pleasure always accompanied it, That Beauty inspired submission and re­spect; That to Love was nothing but to dye, and that if a Lover possess not the beloved person, Desire incessantly so­licited him: Now the look whereof we have spoken makes all these motions ap­pear; for laughter is an effect of joy; re­spect and submission inclines the lids; the ball which sweetly turns towards the be­loved object is a signe of that amorous languor whereof the soul is sensible; and the looks it darts on it, witness the Desire which provokes it: In fine although the eyes half shut themselves, laughter con­tracting the muscles of the lids, yet we may say, that they shut themselves so, as if the soul would retain the image it newly re­ceived the more attentively to consider [Page 86]it and even that it would quite shut them up, had it not a new one which every moment presented it self, and which it would not lose, but which obligeth it so to divide its cares, as it often doth, be­tween Fear and Anger, where it seems as if at the same time it would see and not see the ill, which it either flees or disdains.

The Forehead in love is always clear and laughing, and seems as if it opened and extended it self, which is a mark of Flat­tery: so that the Dog, which is a flatter­ing creature, hath his always so, when he caresseth any one, as Aristotle will have it. Now the word Flattery signifies nothing else here, but complacencie and dearness, and not that vice which is the pest of the Court, and of Friendship. You need not then wonder if Love, being complacent and flattering, disposeth thus the fore­head. But the first cause of this effect, is the Joy which accompanieth all these Passions; whose property it is, to ren­der the countenance open, calm, and smiling, as in its place we will declare.

Let us pass to another effect, the cause whereof is extremely hid; 't is the Motion of the Tongue, which often trembles be­tween the lips, and seems even to tickle [Page 87]them. Now this happens in a great ex­cess of Love; whether it be, that the ar­dor which this Passion kindles, dries the lips, and obligeth the Soul to moisten them; or that the Spirits, which sparkle everywhere, cause the same agitation in that part, which appears in all the rest of those which are very moveable: or, last­ly, whether it comes from the vehemency of the Desire: for the same effect often happens to those who see another eat what they ardently desire: And it seems also more befitting the appetite for meat, then any other desire whatsoever, as well as that humidity which comes in ones mouth, as shall be said; because the mo­tion of the tongue, and the humour in which it moistens it self, serves to raste the aliments, and to convey them into the sto­mack. But as the Soul hath no distinct knowledge of what it doth, and the vio­lence of Passion troubles and distracts it, it also happens that it employs the means necessary for one designe, in another where they are useless; and so doth in the desire of Beauty, what it ought onely to do in that of Aliments.

The sweetning of the voice signifies the respect and submission of a Lover: and [Page 88]although it be a necessary effect of Fear, which, straitning the passages, and render­ing the motion of the Lungs more loose, makes the voice soft, sweet, and languish­ing, even very often without any such ne­cessity; the soul hath a designe to form it so, to witness its modestie and respect; knowing, that a strong and vehement voice is an effect of Boldness; and that that which is rude and sharp, follows a harsh humour; which are qualities in­compatible with Love, and which a Lover must hide, if Nature or Custom have given him them.

As for what concerns all the inflexions of the voice, they proceed from the several motions which agitate the Soul; whether it be that admiration ravish it, or grief op­press it; whether desire transport it, or that some difficulties oppose its content­ment: forasmuch as in all these encoun­ters it burdens the voice with particular accents, sometimes raising it with excla­mations, sometimes letting it fall with languishings; sometimes cutting it short, and sometimes drawing it out, according to the nature of the Passions it suffers.

Laughter, being an effect of Joy, is to be examined in that Passion, where we [Page 89]will at large speak of its nature, and of its causes. So that we have nothing but the Gesture and the Behaviour which seem to detain us. But, if you observe it, there is none particular to love; and that which is there observable, and is so changeable, follows the several Passions which ac­company this: for, sometimes Respect renders him modest, Joy and Fear dis­quiet him, and Sorrow casts him down, and makes him languish; sometimes a Lover is in the posture of a suppliant, or a contented, or of a desperate man; sometimes he walks fast, slowe, or stands still, according as Desire, Astonishment or Grief possess him. So that all his mo­tions going with the spring of other Passi­ons, we are not here obliged to their exa­men; but we must remit it to the discourse we will make of every one in particular. Now let us to that of those Characters which are purely natural and necessary, and wherein it seems the Soul hath no share.

The eyes are sparkling in Love, by rea­son of the quantity of spirits which flie thither: for it is not to be doubted, but that from them it is, that that resplendent vivacity comes, which is so visible in them, [Page 90]since they lose it when they retire or dis­perse themselves; as it happens to those who are possest with fear, or who die. But what addes to augment this lustre weh appears in the eyes, 'tis, that the Mem­brane which in virons them, being swelled and extended by the confluence of those vapours and spirits, becomes more smoothe, and consequently more shining; and that there is still over it a certain humidity, where light resplends and sparkles.

But whence proceeds this Humidity? Is it not that the heat and agitation which the spirits cause in the brain, liquifies and makes the humours flow over the eyes? for even Tears are so caused in Joy: Or rather, that those subtil vapours of blood, which the Soul drives with impetuosity, flie out, and presently thicken, by reason of the coldness of the air, and of the Membranes. And indeed, here the eyes are hollow and sunk, though they still seem great and humid; which would not be, if this humidity came from the hu­mours which fall from the brain; for they would fill the parts which are all about the eye, and would keep it lifted up: And therefore this humidity must come [Page 91]from within, and the muscles and fleshie parts which inviron it must shrink: for as their substance is soft, and is made of a very subtil blood, it falls and dissolves presently; whence it happens, that the eye sinks: but its body remains still full, moist, and sparkling, by reason of the va­pours and spirits which incessantly gather there: Unless it be at last, when the long continuance of the Malady, Grief, and Despair, have quenched the natural heat, which makes the eyes lose their splendor and vivacity, and become obscure, dry, and set; as we will shew in the Chapter of Grief, where we will also give a rea­son for Tears which are so common to Lovers.

The redness which love so often makes appear on the forehead, hath a cause to be discovered, of no small difficulty: For although it be easie to say, that the blood riseth into the face in all those Passions wherein the soul drives out the spirits, yet there are those which carry it rather to one place then to another: The red­ness which Choler excites, begins by the eyes; that of Shame, by the extremities of the cheeks and ears; and that of Love, by the forehead. And 'tis from this diver­sity, [Page 92]that the cause of this effect is most difficult to be found out. Yet I think that we may say, for what concerns Anger, that the eyes being the first wherein the Passions appear, are also the first sensible of the motions of the Spirits. Now as the blood boils in Anger, and as the Tem­pest which agitates it drives it with dis­order and confusion to the exteriour parts, thence it comes that the spirits which run to the eyes draw along with it the waves of this agitated blood, which swells their veins, and makes them appear red, in stead that in other Passions they carry with them the purest and most sub­til parts of the blood, which cannot cause this effect. And it is therefore true, that Anger causeth redness to arise in the face sooner then any other Passion, and that it begins to discover it in the eyes, because the blood follows the spirits, which ga­ther in that place rather then in any other. As for Shame, you must know, that the Soul, which is moved therewith, at the same time forms a designe both to resist and flee the ill; and we may say, that, fleeing, she assaults it; for which cause, it forceth the blood to the face to drive it away; but Fear at the same time makes [Page 93]it retire back; whence it happens, that the extremities of the cheeks and ears grow red, as in its place shall be more am­ply discoursed. Let us now examine the redness which Love brings into the Forehead. Should it not proceed from Joy, wherein the spirits, after having united themselves to the good which the soul conceives, overflow the neighbour­ing parts? For, if it be so, the forehead must first resent it. Or else the Imagina­tion being placed in the fore-part of the brain, that part is heated by the continual agitation of the spirits, and, after its al­teration, communicates it to the forehead, wherewith, as Physick teacheth, it hath a great sympathy. And indeed, since pale­ness which appears in the rest of the face, happens often from the transport of spi­rits into the brain, its very likely, either that there is a reflux made on the neerest parts, or that they are sensible of the heat which they there cause: whence it hap­pens, that they are less pale and wan then the rest. Now although this redness be particular to Love, that of other Passions forbears not to encounter therewith; and it may happen, that a Lover may blush for Shame, for Anger, for Joy, or Desire, [Page 94]according as those Passions mixe them­selves with this; but this is no place to speake of them.

The lips are often red and moyst by the arrival of the vaporous blood which sheds it self in the face, and which so easily co­lours those parts, by reason of their soft­ness and the delicacy of their skin; and this chiefly happens at the beginning of those motions which are so frequent in this passion; for at last those parts grow dry and pale, whether the heat consume the sweetest and most subtil parts of the blood, or that the spirits in their retreat carry them back again inwardly, and so leave paleness and driness on the lips.

But whence chanceth it that the under lip sometimes trembles; you must not be­leeve it an effect of Fear or of Anger, since it happens in the highest heat of Love; its then very likely that the spi­rits which the Desire drives in a crowd, sparkle in those places, and cause that part which is very moveable, and without that support which the rest have, to shake, and 'tis in that encounter that it sometimes grows white with a subtil foam, the humi­dity which riseth in the mouth, and which [Page 95]sheds it self on the lips being agitated by these spirits.

The tongue faulters, because that the soul which is distracted with Passion thinks not upon the words it is to form, and retires the spirits which should serve for that action to those places where she is employed; whence it happens that the tongue stops or loosly moves it self, and that infirmity looseth the speech, or if we do speak, it is with pain and stam­mering, whereto the quantity of humors also contributes, which through Desire fill the mouth; for it hinders that the tongue cannot so easily turn it self, and that it strikes not the voice clearly; Be­sides the distraction we now speak of, is also a cause that Lovers hear not half what others say, and that their discourse is commonly confused & extravagant: Even the sighs whch every moment cut one ano­ther, owe their first original to that great attention of spirit which diverts the soul, and makes it lose the remembrance of the most necessary actions of life; for send­ing not spirits enough to cause respirati­on, the lungs beat but slowly, and the heart draws not that help which is expect­ed from their service; forasmuch as they [Page 96]furnish not it sufficiently with air to tem­per that fire which this Passion kindles, and that they discharge it not often e­nough of those fumes and vapors which the agitation of the humors raiseth there: Now after this disorder hath continued some time, and that at last it might ruine all the natural ceonomy, the soul being urged by necessity awakes again, and seeks to supply its defect by these great and extraordinary respirations; and indeed sighs are principally begot at the issue out of some thought which hath forcibly de­tained the minde, and not whilst it was employed therein.

The face grows pale, whether it be that the spirits retire within the brain as we have already said, or because that in the progress of this Passion the stomack grows weak and the blood changeth; for since that the diversion of the spirits diverts al­so the heat & vertue which ought to pass into the stomack to cause digestion, you must not wonder if it become languishing, if the aliments change into crudities, and if the blood it makes be impure, since that the last concoction corrects not the defects of the former.

But what helps forward this disorder, [Page 97]is the continual ardor which this Passi­on kindles in the blood, and the several agitations which Fear, Grief, and Anger, at every moment excite; for that dissi­pates the spirits and makes the faculties become languishing, and the humors enflame and corrupt themselves, which at last grows to that Erotick sickness which the Physitians place in the ranck of folly and fury. The blood being then in this condition retains no more nether its vertue nor its natural colour; It be­comes useless to the nourishment of the parts and no longer communicates that pleasing vermillion which formerly it be­stowed upon them, and so they must needs become pale, lean, and withered.

By the same reason the appetite is lost, because that the beloved object occupy­ing all the thoughts of the Soul, takes a­way its care of all the functions of Life; the spirits being also diverted no longer bear into the stomack that sentiment which causeth the appetite: In fine, the disorder which is in the humors, and in all the natural parts, hinders this from per­forming its function.

Sleep being the rest of common sence, & of the spirits, seldom happens in violent [Page 98]Passions, detaining the Soul and the bo­dy in a continual agitation; but Love en­dures it less then the rest, because that be­sides the tempest it raiseth, it at last cor­rupts the blood, whose vapours are sharp, and which consequently want that sweet humidity which Iulleth the Senses.

Its true, that langour and weariness sometimes procure it, because the soul knows that life cannot subsist without it, and that after so great a dissipation of spi­rits its necessary to repair them, to which end it gathers them together and stays them; For although this moist vapor which commonly provokes sleep happen not here, as we said but now, yet must we not beleeve that sleep can come by no other means; it hath two ordinary and natural causes; the vapor which stops the passage of the spirits, and the soul which binds and stays them; now here being no vapor to produce this effect, necessity obligeth the soul to labour it a­lone of her self.

But this sleep is interrupted with dreams which continually agitate the minde; forasmuch as the imagination which in that condition loseth not the li­berty of working, and being full of those [Page 99]images which Passion suggests, turns over continually, confounds and augments them, so that they always present to it things greater then in effect they are, and afterwards form in the appetite more powerful motions then the true objects would do.

The remembrance or the unexpected arrival of the beloved party swels the heart and the pulse, because the soul di­lates the organs to receive the good, and to send forth spirits to its encounter; a great difficulty upon this occasion is pro­posed, to wit, whether Love have a kind of pulse proper to it alone? for that some have vaunted the discovery of this Passion by the beating of the arteries: But with­out stopping at the contests which are formed hereupon, we will boldly say that there is no more reason to give one which is proper to Anger, and to Grief, then to Love. That the heart can no less resent the motion which this Passion cau­seth in the appetite then it can that which the others excite; and that the organs mo­ving conformably to the intention of the minde, this part must be otherwise agi­tated in Love then in other passions, since it hath a diffent designe from what the o­thers [Page 100]have. Its true, its hard exactly to discover this difference, because men have made no just observation thereof, and perhaps it is impossible to make it; for that the heart is shut up in the Center of the Body, and that it suffers motions, which it communicates not with the arte­ries; yet amongst such kinds of pulses as have been observed, we may yet find some one which particularly belongs to Love. To understand this, you must know that the heart hath many motions which are common to several Passions; for it di­lates it self in Joy, in Hope, and in An­ger; and contracts it self in Grief, and in Fear, and in Despair; in some it goes quick and with violence, in others slow and languishing, and its certain these ge­neral differences cannot all alone mark those which are proper to every Passion; but as Physick teacheth us that there are twenty kinds of simple pulses, and that they may diversly mix the one with the other, every Passion may finde in this great variety, that kind which is proper to it: thus the pulse of Anger is not only great and lifted up, or quick, or frequent, or vehement, but it is composed of all these differences: That of Fear is quick, [Page 101]hard, unequal, and irregular; That of Joy is great, rare and slow; That of Grief is weak little slow and rare; and as they say, these are the kindes of pulses which are proper to these Passions, we may also observe in the same manner one proper to Love; and indeed therein the beating of the arteries is great, large, un­equal, and irregular; it is great and large, because the heart opens to receive the good which presents it self as was before said; it is unequal and irregular, by rea­son of the several Passions with which this is continually traversed; for as we do not here speak of that simple and im­perfect Love which is yet but in the soul; but of that which is compleat and finished and which hath already made impressions on the body; it is impossible but Desire, and Fear, Joy, and Grief, should at e­very moment confound themselves with it, whence consequently happens the un­equal motion of the heart and of the arte­ries; and this is chiefly to be observed at the remembrance or unexpected arrival of the beloved person.

For after this first elevation which is made at this encounter, it changeth a hundred wayes; it appears little and lan­guishing, [Page 102]and immediately returns to its first vehemency; from swift and light, it becomes slow and heavy, and all at once it reassumes its first quickness, which it loseth again in an instant, and passeth thus from one difference to another, without order and without proportion.

There are but very few Characters which remain to be examined, whose causes are not very evident; For the dis­quiet comes from the divers agitations which the soul feels; the shiverings and the ardors follow the flowing and ebbing of the Spirits; forasmuch as Fear and Grief, which retire them within, take a­way from the exterior parts the heat they had, even as Joy and Hope restore and augment it, and as Boldness and Anger ga­ther the spirits together, strength also en­creaseth, as it diminisheth when Joy dis­sipates, or Grief stiffles them: There re­maines no more difficulties to be found but in the Syncopes and Extasies which sometimes happen to Lovers; but we have already shewed that Love could not alone cause Syncopes nor faintings, but that it must be Grief, Despair, or Joy.

For the Extasie its true it may proceed from Love, yet we must observe that the [Page 103]word hath divers significations; the Phy­sitians often take it for an extreme alie­nation of the spirit, such as those have who are frantick or mad; sometimes for that strange disease which they call Catoche, which all at once takes away the use of sence and motion, and keeps the body stiffe in the same posture in which it surprised it; there are some who beleeve that the true Extasie is made when the soul doth no action in the bo­dy, whether it dwell there, or that indeed it issue forth for a time; as it happens in those which are possest, and in those who are ravished by the spirit of God; but that whereof we speak is nothing else but a certain ravishment of the soul, which takes from the body the use of ex­terior sence and motion, the imagination and the understanding not forbearing to operate, which happens by a strong at­tention which binds the soul to the be­loved object, which makes it lose the care of all animal functions, and which imploying all the spirits in that thought, hinders them from flowing to the or­gans of sence and motion; and this ra­vishment may sometimes Pass to such an excess that the vital faculties may [Page 104]receive no more influence from the soul, so that respiration will cease, and that there will be onley natural vertue to sustain life.

PART. 5. Of the nature of Beauty in general; and why it begets LOVE.

ALthough the Senses were given to the Minde, to help it to know things, yet it seems that those things which are the most sensible, are the least known: And I know not whether it be a grace, or an artifice of Nature, to bring those things neerest our Senses, which ought to be furthest from our Mindes; and, by that exteriour know­ledge, to recompense the little progress we might make in that which was true and essential. However it be, its most evident, that we are sensible of nothing in the world more then of Beauty, nor nothing is more difficult to be known: the greatest men, who have been most sensible of its effects, were ignorant of the Causes thereof; and we may say, that [Page 106]it hath made them lose their Reason, when they were but touched with it, and would have discoursed of it: For, some have said that it was a just proportion of the parts; others, that it was the form of things; in fine, that it was the splen­dor and glittering of Goodness it self: But this last definition is equivocal, and meta­phorical; and the other cannot be appli­ed but to the Divine beauty, which is the source and model of all Beauties; for­asmuch as in the Unity and infinite Sim­plicity of God, there can be no proportion or form.

That we may therefore steer a more certain course then what hitherto hath been followed, and that we may not wan­der in so vast and difficult a matter; we must consider, that things are not esteem­ed fair, but as they fall under a very di­stinct and exact knowledge: So that there are only the objects of the Understanding, and of Seeing, and of Hearing, to which we allow Beauty; because that all the Knowing faculties are those which most perfectly judge of their objects, and are the least mistaken in them: And these same objects which we judge Fair, are also esteemed Good: for we do not onely [Page 107]say, A fair minde, a fair speech, or a fair colour, but they may be also called good. But the objects of the other Senses, and all the other powers, may onely be stiled Good, and can never deserve the title of Fair: for, it were a ridiculous thing to say, that heat or humidity, sweetness or bitterness were fair: Whence we must necessarily conclude, that all what is Good, is not Fair; but all that is Fair, is good; and therefore, that Fair is a species of Good. Now as Good is not good, but as it is agreeable; the Fair, since it is good, must be agreeable to something; and therefore if what is fair serve but for an object onely to the knowing facul­ties, we must necessarily conclude, that Fair is that which is agreeable to the intelligent faculties, as good is agreeable to what ever it be. Now because Knowledge hath no other object, but the essence and the truth of things, Beauty must needs be of that kinde; and the objects must be the fairer, where the essence and the truth are best exprest: for which cause, Souls are fairer then Bodies; and the Understanding, which knows interiour things, is more capable to judge of Beauty then the Senses, which know onely the exteriour. [Page 108]Whence it also happens, that Beasts are seldom moved by Beauty, because Sense onely works in them; in stead that in Man the Understanding concurs to his action, and penetrates further into the Nature and Essence of its objects. And we experiment in our selves, that those things which we do not greatly heed, and whose nature we do not well know, seem less fair unto us; and that its onely for Masters in an Art to judge of the beauty of a work, because they alone have the true knowledge thereof.

We do not therefore say, that Beauty consists in Knowledge onely: for it would then follow, that things would not be fair until they are known; although it be most true, that God would not cease to be infinitely fair, although he were not known. And there are things whose knowledge is equally clear and certain, which are not equally fair: for, the Un­derstanding distinguisheth the Natures as more or less perfect, in the same manner as the eyes and ears judge that there are Colours and Harmonies the one fairer then the other. Now as things are sensi­ble, not by reason of our sensibleness, but because they can make themselves sensi­ble; [Page 109]and as the essence is not good, in that it communicates it self, but in that it can communicate it self: so Goodness is not fair because it is known, but because it may be known. So that Beauty is no­thing but Goodness in that order and es­sential relation it hath to Knowledge; that is to say, that it can communicate it self to the intelligent faculties. And, in my judgement, we are so to understand Plato, when he says, that Beauty is a glit­tering and splendor of Goodness: for as the brightness of light is that which ren­ders it visible; the brightness of good­ness is that also which makes it known; and this brightness is no other but the act whereby goodness resplends, enlightens, and communicates it self to the knowing faculties. Now because there are two kindes of faculties, the Intellectual and the Sensitive, there must also be two kindes of Beauty, the one intelligible, the other sensible: And because that in either kinde there are subjects which are fairer and more excellent some then other some, we must, on the foundation we have esta­blished, observe the cause of this differ­ence. It is true, it requires a higher medi­tation and a longer discourse then our de­signe [Page 110]will permit: but we will onely touch on the principal, and on what is ne­cessary to understand what we shall say in consequence of Humane Beauty.

Suppose then that Beauty is but an ef­fect of Goodness, so far as it hath a rela­tion to the knowing faculties; and that Goodness is nothing, also, but the be­ing and perfection of things, so far as it can communicate it self, as the School teacheth: those things which have more of being and of essence, must be better, fairer, and more perfect: And we know they have more of being, when they have more unity; and, in that unity, they have more power and different vertues. So God hath an infinite perfection, because that in a most perfect and most simple uni­ty, he hath a power to do all things. The intelligences, which are the most simple and the most active of all creatures, are also the most excellent. Even amongst Bodies, the mixt are more perfect then the simple whereof they are composed: the Animate more then the Natural; and those which have a Reasonable soul, more then those which are onely Sensitive; Be­cause that in comparison of those, they have more different vertues, and more [Page 111]actions, and therefore divers degrees more of essence. Thus much for what concerns Intelligible Beauty. But in Sensible objects, the perfection is not ab­solutely considered, as in that: it must de­pend not onely from the being they have, but also from the organs of the Senses which receives them, and from the fitness they ought to have with the bodies where they appear. So the Light, which is most resplendent, is more perfect then all Colours; but, in respect of the eyes, Green is more, although even that colour is displeasing in some subjects. Now the cause of this diversity first of all comes, for that the Senses having been given to creatures for their preservation, they must not destroy them. And as their action is performed by the impression which the objects make on their organs, if this impression is not proportionable to them, their action will be imperfect: So that it ought to be strong enough to give knowledge of the thing, but not so vio­lent as to corrupt the organs. Whence it is, that the Senses cannot judge well of their objects in their extremity; as the eyes of too great a light, or of dark­ness; the ears of a too violent sound, or [Page 112]of silence: And Aristotle says, that neither of them are sensible, because that this makes no true impression, and that the other destroys the organ. So that there are onely those objects which are be­tween both extremities, which can make a just impression proportionable to what the Senses require. It is not therefore that all the objects equally touch the Senses; there are some amongst them which are more perfect, and more agree­able then the rest: Green is fairer then Grey or Black; the Eighth in Harmony is sweeter then the Fourth: But the cause of this difference is extremely obscure; yet if you observe what we have said of the perfection of Intelligible things, you will finde that it depends from the same principle.

For it is certain, that Colours and Har­monies have their beauty from the pro­portion they have; and those which have it the most perfect, are also the most a­greeable. Now proportions have the more perfection, the neerer they are to unity, and the more they are in that unity composed. So the Diapason, which is the most pleasing of all simple harmonies, is made in a double proportion, to wit, of [Page 113]two to one, which is the most perfect of all simple proportions, because it is neer­est the unity, nothing being neerer unity then the number of Two; and is the most composed: for, what is twice as much more, is more composed then that which is but once and a half, or once and a third part, as the other proportions, which are the Diapente and the Diatessaron. It is the same with Colours: for, the propor­tions which make perfect harmonies, make also, as Aristotle says, fair colours. For which cause, Green, which is the most agreeable of all others, is to be in the same proportion with the Diapason; and that of Blue and Purple with that of Diapente and Diatessaron. But seeing we have examined these things in their place, it sufficeth to shew, that Beauty, and the perfection of Sensible things, is dedu­ced from the same principle as that of In­telligible things, to wit, in that they have more unity, and that in this unity they have more powers; in a word, from that they have more of a sensible being.

It is easie, by this Discourse, to perceive, that Light, considered as in it self, is the fairest thing which can be presented to our sight; but that Green, in respect of [Page 114]the organs, is yet more pleasing then it. It remains onely to discover why this co­lour renders not all those Bodies fair wherein it is. To this end, you must re­member that things work not but accord­ing to the powers they have, and that these powers follow onely the degrees of their being. Now as there are things which cannot work without matter, it is evident this matter ought to be fitted and proportioned to their actions and their powers; and this proportion makes cor­poral Beauty, which is nothing but a just joyning together of all the dispositions which are necessary for bodies to perform those fun­ctions whereto they are ordained: So that all the material qualities, how excellent soe­ver they be, will render the subjects wherein they are, deformed, if they are not proportionable to the essence, and to the interiour vertue which they have. So the Round figure, which is the most perfect of all, because it is the simplest, and comprehends all the rest, cannot ac­commodate it self with the actions of all the parts of the humane body, which would be monstrous and horrible, had it onely that figure. It is the same of the fairest Colours, which have no conformi­ty [Page 115]with the temperature of Man, and which would make an extreme change ap­pear in the humours, if they were visible in the face. The tone even of the voice, which in men ought to be stronger and more resounding, were a defect in a wo­man, because it is not conformable to her temper, which ought to be proportiona­ble to the natural power of her sex. This is then the reason which shews, that the beauty of Sensible objects is drawn, not onely from their absolute being, and from the relation which they have with the or­gans, but also the connexion which they ought to have with their subjects.

I speak not now of the particular senti­ments we may have of Beauty, nor why Red is more esteemed then Green, the Brown hue more then the Vermilli­on, and Blue eyes more then Black: We have no room here for the examination of these things; we do but touch on ge­nerals; and we think we have satisfied our designe, when we have said somewhat more of Humane Beauty, because it is that which causeth the Love whereof we speak.

There are several sorts or divers de­grees of Beauty in Man: For first, there [Page 116]is the Intelligible, which is essential, or ac­cidental: the Essential is considered in the Species, or in the Sex; the Acciden­tal in the Habit, and in the Actions. Last­ly, there is a Sensible and Corporal Beauty.

The reason of this is, because the spe­cies of every animal hath its beauty in it, which is nothing but its being and its es­sence, wherein are comprised all the powers and vertues due unto it. But because that amongst these powers there are some which are destined for the en­tertainment of the Species, which would be lost with the life of the creatures, had not God given them the vertue to ingen­der their like; and that generation can­not be, unless there also be an active and a passive power: it was necessary that there should be two Sexes, between which these two powers should be divi­ded. And forasmuch as Sensible beauty is nothing but an assembling together of all corporal dispositions necessary for the powers to perform their functions, every Sex must also necessarily have different dispositions, since they have different powers: And thence is the source whence the difference comes of Male and Female­beauty, [Page 117]which is not onely to be found in some parts, but in the whole body: Be­cause the first qualities being the princi­pal dispositions of these two powers; and heat and driness, which amongst them are the most working, being obliged to ac­company the active power, as cold and humidity the passive power: it must needs be, that all the mass of humours must taste of these qualities: So that the temperature of the Male being hot and dry, and that of the Female cold and moist, it follows that all the parts of ei­ther Sex ought to have different disposi­tions and beauties.

But forasmuch as Man hath Under­standing and Reason beyond all other creatures, and that that faculty, being na­turally capable of all things, cannot have its perfection, but by possessing them, it must acquire dispositions necessary to at­tain this perfection; and these are the In­tellectual and Moral habits, which cause that accidental and acquired Beauty of which we have spoken, and which receive their last accomplishment in the actions they ought to produce: for, the end is the last perfection, there being no­thing absolutely perfect without an [Page 118]end; and Action being the end of all things.

This is what we can say in general of the Name of Beauty, and must be known, before we seek the cause which obligeth us to the love thereof: For although some have said, we should not ask, why Beauty pleaseth, and that it was as much as if we would know why Fire warms, That it is its Nature, and the es­sential propertie it hath, whereof there is no reason to be given; yet all have not been of this opinion: Plato did not be­lieve that this enquiry was unworthy of his Socrates: And there is no body who doth not freely confess, that if the know­ledge may be attained, it must needs be very rare and excellent. Now although I do not altogether disapprove this thought of Plato, who says that the beau­ty of created things ravisheth us, because it is a ray and an image of the Divine beauty, which, being Soveraignly good, necessarily inspires love, when it makes it self known: yet, as there are several things to be supposed in this opinion which the School of Aristotle will not ad­mit, and that at last we must always come to that, To know wherefore the Sove­raign [Page 119]Goodness is amiable; we are obli­ged to take another way, which may lead us to these Supreme truths.

We must then say, that what is good and convenient to a thing, perfects it; for it addes what it wanted, and in some manner also augments its being, giving it what it had not, and uniting what was di­vided. And this is the foundation of all the inclinations which are to be found in Nature, and of the love we have for all that is truly and apparently good.

Now as in the Knowing faculties there is nothing at all of what they ought to know, the Understanding and the Senses being to their Objects what the Matter is to the Form; when these Objects unite themselves to these Faculties, they give them a perfection which they had not, and of which they were capable: And the knowledge they have of this perfection, is the cause of the agreement they finde therein, which is afterwards followed by that Love and Pleasure which the Appe­tite forms, when the Understanding and the Imagination have proposed it as a thing good and convenient for them.

But forasmuch as there are Objects which cause more love and pleasure then [Page 120]others, they must necessarily much more perfect the knowing faculties, and it is those infallibly which are the most per­fect, to wit, those who have the most of being and of essence as we have said; be­cause they do much more fill the natural capacity which these faculties have to know the extent of that being which serves for their object. So it is onely God who can fill the understanding and give a perfect Love and Joy to the Will, because it is he alone that possesseth all beeing; and consequently those things which have the most of it, perfect them proportionably, and cause also by their knowledge a greater satisfaction and a greater pleasure: It is not but that often less perfect things do more content the Senses and the Understanding; but this proceeds from the error which their ill inclinations give them, which commonly come from the temper, from custome, and from weakness of spirit.

Now forasmuch as knowledge is a good which respects not onely the facul­ties which exercise it, but also all others to which it may be profitable, because that the Senses were not given to the creature for themselves, but for the pre­servation [Page 121]thereof, and that reason is a light which lights not it self alone, but also all the other vertues which are in man; hence it is that the knowledge which the Senses & the understanding have of things, which in som manner are useful to the creature, perfects these faculties; because that being destined to its service they at last attain the end whether they tend, when they operate for it, and in that respect they ac­quire a perfection which in some sort is more excellent then that which re­spects them onely being their last end, and the mark nature proposed for them; even thence it is that the eyes esteem fair, all which makes the goodness of asi­ments known; and the colour of the wine or even of the water is for the same reason more pleasing for a thirsty man to behold, then the fairest green of the fields; In a word, all what the under­standing and the imagination know of seeing and hearing, being the observers of what is profitable or agreeable, is esteemed fair, and perfects these faculties; forasmuch as their perfection consists to know what is for our use; it is thus that corporal beauty ravisheth the soul and the Senses; because it is the mark of that [Page 122]interior power which ought to render us more perfect; and its principally in this sence that we may truely say, that beau­ty is the flower and splendor of goodness. But before we shew how this power ought to render us more perfect, we must observe what we have already said of these powers; for there are those which respect the nature of man in general, and others which are proper to the sexes.

These have their particular dispositi­ons which make the male and female beauty, and which being nothing but the instruments which they are to use in the performance of their functions, are also the marks which make known whether they may be well or ill done; for certain­ly a male beauty is nothing else to our Senses, but the mark of a good constitu­tion of the active power in generation, in the same manner as a female beauty is the signe of a passive power to all that is necessary for the performance of that function. Now as generation is the most natural and most excellent of all the ope­rations, which are common to creatures, for that it in som manner renders them e­ternal, it in som sort also approacheth the [Page 123]Divine perfection and renders them like their cause and principle; we cannot doubt but nature hath imprinted in them a most powerful desire, and also endued them with a knowledge which may serve to this inclination; its true, that this knowledge is obscure and hid, and that it is to be found in our selves without the help of discourse, and even without our thinking of it; and indeed it is in the same rank with that which nature hath inspired in all the things of the world who know without understanding what is use­ful for them; for even in the actions of the Senses and the Understanding we per­ceive that there are objects, which are more pleasing to us then others, the reason whereof is unknown to us, and we have nothing to say, but that there is in our souls a certain spring of Under­standing, or rather that it is the Spirit of God which hides it self in his works, and drives things to that end which is fit for them. For as an Artist manageth the action of natural things to the end he pretends, & as we must ascribe all that order which ap­pears in the artifice to his knowledge, and not to the things he useth, which are in­capable of that knowledge; so in all the [Page 124]things of nature, where we perceive so many marks of admirable wisedom, we must not beleeve that it is from them that it proceeds, but that it is the Spirit of God which flowes in their effects, which gives the order and the motion, and which guids them to the end which he hath prescribed for them.

However it be, it is by this obscure and hid knowledge, that corporal beauty pre­senting it self to our Senses, the soul knows it for the mark of the natural power of that Sex wherein it is; & at the same time that secret and powerful desire which it hath to perpetuate its species, awakens and forms in it that Love which after­wards agitates it with so much vio­lence.

Yet do I know very well, that an ill­favoured person, may cause the same mo­tion in the soul; and that it is not always true that beauty is the certain mark of the perfect disposition of the powers which serve for generation; and to con­clude, that it may affect those who are of the same sexe to whom this motive is useless.

But as for unhansomeness, we have [Page 125]shewed in the Treatise of the Love out of inclination, that although that this Passi­on seems not to draw its origine from Beauty, yet there is in the soul a certain Idea of perfection contrary to that which the Senses represented, which causeth this admirable charm. For the two other Objections which remain, we must con­fess, that Nature suffers defects in parti­culars, because she doth not always finde the matter obedient; whence it happens, that there are parts which remain imper­fect: and because we often abuse the gifts she bestows, employing them in things contrary to the end which she pro­posed her self.

There is amongst men another kinde of Love, which corporal beauty also may move, but whose motive is different from that whereof we speak; for it re­spects not the sexe, but all the species; which being to have its vertues and its powers, ought also to have those corporal dispositions which are to serve it.

Now these dispositions are natural, or acquired: The natural are those which come from our births, and which render men capable of the functions of the Un­derstanding: for, as all what is in Man is [Page 126]destined for the service of that faculty which is mistress of all the rest, since it cannot know things but by the intermis­sion of the Senses, and the Senses cannot operate if their organs are not well dis­posed; of necessity the parts of the body must have some proportion and agree­ment with the Understanding: and then the Soul, which sees by this secret senti­ment, of which we have spoken, that it is the mark of humane perfection, plea­seth it self in this object, and forms that love which unites it to the good it knows. 'Tis thus, that well-form'd men are de­lightful to the sight, because that the cor­poral beauty which they have, is a signe that they are naturally fit for the most perfect actions of the Minde; and the knowledge which we thus have of their vertues, makes us love them as an excel­lent good, which ought to render us the more perfect: For there is no vertue without doing good, either by giving us example, and obliging us to its imitation, or by the good things which its effects bring to every one of us in particular, and to all that society for which Man is born, and to which all vertues, as well Intelle­ctual as Moral, are as a foundation. As [Page 127]for those dispositions which are acquired, they also mark the acquired vertues and powers, such as those habits are which are known by the Characters we here dis­course of; that is to say, by their actions, as well Intellectual as Moral, and by the air, by the carriage and behaviour of the body, which makes one part of the cor­poral beauty: for, as there is a certain grace which accompanies vertuous acti­ons, when it appears to our eyes it makes us believe the vertues are there, and so forms that love which we have naturally for them.

It is not but that these marks are often deceitful, and that they often make us love subjects which we ought to hate; But it is from that the Knowledge, which cau­seth this love, is as we have said, obscure and confused; it carries away the Appe­tite before discourse can examine it, and so makes us love an imaginary good. Yet whatever the errour be, the Imagination and the Understanding always finde their perfection in the knowledge which the Senses afford them, because they do not believe they are deceived; and they think to discover, by that sensible beauty, that good which ought to accompany it, and [Page 128]whose possession might render us more perfect: wherefore they finde it agree­able, and propose it to the appetite as an object worthy of love, and affording pleasure.

These are the principles which may give to us the knowledge of the name and effects of Beauty: For, to examine all what could be said in particular, we should need whole Volumes; and these Subjects being too elevated, would tire the spirit with the length of the Dis­course, and would cause us to disgust a thing which ought never to be distastful. There is but one difficulty in this subject, which we dare not leave without exami­nation; and the resolution whereof is no­thing easie to finde: For, those who are esteemed fair in one Climate, are not so in another; and, even where ever it be, a face which may seem fair to some, will appear ugly to divers: Whence some have believed, that Beauty is neither a true nor real quality, and that it is but in opinion onely: but no man can disavow, but that the proportion of the parts, and those other things which make beauty, are true and real, and are qualities which ennoble the subject where they are, and [Page 129]satisfie the minde and the sight. Now since Nature proposeth always to it self perfection, and that there is but onely one true perfection in the order of all things; it must needs be, that she designed a par­ticular beauty to every species, which ought to be the Model of all those which particulars may have: And as the Hu­mane body is the best tempered of all others which are in Nature, it is probable that this perfect being ought to be in the most temperate Climate. But whence comes it then, that it is not acknowledged in other Climates; but on the contrary, there that is esteemed fair, which in this is esteemed ugly? For, the blackest amongst the Moors are esteemed the fairest, the most short-nos'd amongst the Chinois; and so of the rest.

For my part, I belive we must say that the Climate gives a certain disposition to the body, and makes it change in tempe­rature; and that such a temper gives such an inclination and such a power to the Minde. Now because the bodies ought to be proportionable to the powers, it is a necessary consequence, that the bodies in those Climates must have the marks of these inclinations. So that Beauty con­sisting [Page 130]in the proportion which the bodies have with their vertues and powers; and Men having such powers in certain Cli­mates, they must esteem those fair which have those marks, because that these in­clinations are as it were natural and com­mon to them: so that they judge of Beau­ty according to their natural inclination, in the same manner as in temperate Coun­tries there are those found who judge di­versly of Beauty, by reason of the parti­cular temper they have, which carries their judgements to prize what is con­formable to them.

CHAP. III. The Characters of Joy.

ALthough Nature seem avari­tious of Pleasure and of Delight, and that ming­ling it always with Grief, she makes us beleeve that she affords it us but with regret and restraint; yet must we confess that there is nothing in the world, wherein her liberality and magnificence appear more; and we may say, that all her o­ther presents are debts which she pays, but that this is purely a grace and favour of hers; for although she gives a being to every thing, that she hath a care of its preservation, and brings it to its end, she is obliged thereunto; and there is nothing in the Universe, which may not with justice ask her what is necessary for the perfection of its being; but as action is [Page 132]the end and perfection of all things, when they are arrived there they can exact no­thing from nature, who hath acquitted herself of all she owed them, and if she contributes any thing, it is by favour and not by obligation; so that causing always delight to flow on those actions which are conformable to it, and in a manner crown­ing them with it, we ought not to doubt that it is a singular effect of her munisi­cence, or the better to express it, the sum fo all the graces she could bestow.

Knowing also how pretious it was, she hath onely communicated it to the most noble and the most excellent things; she esteemed those without knowledge un­worthy of it, and that Sence and Reason onely could deserve it; even as if it were a good which ought not to be possest but in heaven, she would not permit it to be pure and perfect here below; she hath mingled it with cares and with pains, she hath brewed it with tears and hath cau­sed it to begin or to finish alwayes with grief.

But as the Sun ceaseth not to be the fairest and most profitable thing in the world, although it hath blemishes and suffer eclipses: So how imperfect soever [Page 133]pleasure be, by what mixture soever it hath been weakened, yet ought it not to hinder us from prizing it as the most excellent and most desirable thing which could ever happen to mankinde; and we may truely say, that it is the light of all other good things, and that were it taken away from our lives, it would nothing but horrour and confusion; our life it would indeed rather be a con­tinual flood of ills then of yeers; the Sen­ses would rather serve for gates of grief then of knowledge; knowledge it self would pass for an affliction of spirit, and vertue for a grievous servitude. Its plea­sure onely which sets a price on all things, and which renders them delightful; at least they appear not good, but by so much as it is found mingled with them; and did not the soul hope to encounter it in all it acts, it would remain languish­ing and immoveable, it would be with­out action and without vigor, and we must speak no more of life, of happiness or of felicity.

Certainly, to see the effect, it causeth, as mistris and despencer of all good things, calling back those which are past, making us sensible of those which are not yet, [Page 134]rendring even melancholy, tears and dan­gers pleasing; we must confess that with reason Nature is called the great Magici­an, and that pleasure is the most power­ful charme she useth to produce her mi­racles; In effect, its a charm which makes all the ills which assault us vanish, which lifts us up beyond our selves, which changeth us into other men, and from men transforms us into Demy-Gods; but we often use it as a poyson, which quencheth all that is Divine in our Souls, which renders our mindes brutish, and makes us like, even inferiour to beasts.

For although the pleasures of the body are of themselves innocent, and that they were given us for inticements to the most necessary and most noble actions of life; yet when we pervert their use, and when we do not render them obedient to rea­son, they rebel against it, pull it out of its throne, precipitate it in dirt and mire, and stifle all the seeds of vertue and understanding which are born with it.

Neither is there any thing wherein wisedom hath more been imployed, then to seek the means whereby to shun so [Page 135]dangerous an enemy, who flatters at its admittance, and afterwards causeth eve­ry where trouble and confusion, which fills the Soul with blood and flames, the Body with grief and infirmity, and leaves nothing behind it but repen­tance.

We will not propose the counsels and advice she hath given on this subject; we should bring hither all those lawes, which Physick, Morality, and Religion have prescribed; at least there are but few which were not made either to pre­vent or correct the disorders which sensu­ality may cause; yet we think to second its design, by shewing the deformity which the excess of this Passion produceth in the Soul and in the Body.

The Picture of voluptuousness cannot be made without representing many figures, besides that there are joys which have no commerce with the body, and which are to be found in the highest part of the soul: those of the Sense are so dif­ferent amongst themselves, that as many pleasing objects as there are which may move them, we may say that there are also as many several sorts of Pleasures: And truely, whoever would designe the [Page 136]portraicture we undertake according to the order of the Senses, and describe the pleasure which every of them may be sensible of, the invention and the com­posure could not be ill; but we may not use it without prejudice to other de­signes, wherein we are to imploy the same touches, and the same colours which this requires; for if we stayed to express the Characters of Pleasure, which is in tasting and touching; we must necessarily also describe those of Gluttony, Drunken­ness, Impudency, and so of the rest, whereof we should make particular Ta­bles; wherefore without parcelling these things, we will chuse what is common to all Pleasures, dividing this discourse into two parts; the one of which shall treat of a serious Joy, where laughter is not to be found, and the other of a laughing puft up Joy, which is nothing but the Passion of Laughter.

Joy is not amongst those Passions whose beginning is weak, and whose progress is vehement; it hath all its force and greatness from its birth, and time serves for nothing but to weaken or dimi­nish it; as soon as it enters the Soul it transports it and carries it out of it self, [Page 137]and the ravishment it causeth is some­times so violent that it takes away the use of the Senses, makes it forsake the cares of life and often lose it; but although it come not to this excess, yet it is alwayes known by that puft up impatience, which appears in all its actions, that it hardly can contain it self within its bounds, that it makes escapes and endeavours to goe out.

For the thoughts and words of a con­tented man are not to be stopt; he dreams onely of his good fortune, he speaks continually of it, and if he be not inter­rupted he hath nothing in his heart which he carries not on his tongue; he dis­covers his most secret designes, and so makes his joy an enemy to his rest and to his contentment.

If he is silent, you must entertain him with discourses onely which favour his Passion; how divertising soever others are, to him they are importunate; he breaks them at every moment, and it brings in alwayes somewhat of his trans­port: [...] or at least his little minding of them, seems a signe of his scorning them, or a reproaching that they interrupt his Pleasure.

But if you speak of the subject which begot them, if you admire his happiness, if you witness a fellow-feeling with him; then, how angry or severe soever he be, he becometh complacent, he caresseth, embraceth, and often, by ridiculous ci­vilities and favours, he forgeteth the re­spect he owes, or loseth that which is due to him.

The first that comes to him, is made his friend and his confident; he takes coun­sel of him, he follows his advice; and it often happens to be a childe, a servant, or an enemy whom he trusts with his secret, and with its conduct. In this blindness, he approves all what is proposed to him to the advantage of his Passion: What­ever vanities he nourisheth, whatever suc­cesses he flatters himself withal, there is nothing in his opinion which he ought not to believe, and may not hope; as if all things were to respect his pleasures: He believes that there are none which dare traverse them; he sees the dangers which every way inviron them, without startling at it; and with a blinde confi­dence he believes himself secure, when his loss is often most assured: So that we may say, that there is no man so credulous [Page 139]with so little appearance, so bold with so much weakness, nor so unhappie with so much good hap.

He would make us believe he were content, he perswades it himself, and in the mean time his desires betray his de­signe and his contentment: for they are irritated by the enjoyment; and carrying themselves onely towards those goods which he hath not, they render those use­less which he possesseth, and even of his joy cause the subject of his disquiet. Pleasure hath that property, that although we enjoy it, it forbears not to make it self desirable; so that it is never content, and that it is rather weary of the good which entertains it, then fully satisfied there­with. But we have spoken enough of the trouble it moves in the Minde: let us see what it causeth in the Face.

There are some pleasures of which we may say the Soul is jealous, which it seems she would possess in secret, and which she dares not communicate to the Senses: But what care soever she takes to hide them, she cannot do it so well, but she must discover something; her retreat renders her suspected; and when she would hide, 'tis then she the more disco­vers [Page 140]her self: For, the looks become fixt and staid; all the body is immove­able; the Senses forget their functions; in fine, there is a general suspension made of all the animal vertues. And although at first we might doubt whether it pro­ceeds from astonishment or grief, which often produce the same effects, 'tis after­wards discovered by a certain gloss which remains on the face, and by I know not what sweetness which it leaves in the eyes, and by a light image of smiling which appears on the lips, that these trou­blesome Passions have no share in this transport, and that it comes from that in­ward joy, which ravisheth, and as it were inebriates the soul.

But when Pleasure hath the liberty to disperse it self abroad, and that the Senses bear a part, and that the Minde and the Body seem to enter again into commerce and intelligence; then it is easie to know the agitation which is made in the soul, by what appears in the exteriour parts: You see on the face a certain vivacity, a pleasing disquiet, and a laughing boldness. Pleasure sparkles in the eyes, sweetness accompanies all their motions; and when they happen to weep, or to cast forth [Page 141]some dying looks, you would say, Laugh­ter confounded it self with Tears, and that Jollity mixed it self with Languish­ings: The Forehead is in this calm and se­rene, the eye-brows are not lifted up with wrinkles nor with clouds; and it seems as if it opened, and every way extended it self. The Lips are red and moist, and are never forsaken by smiles; and that light trembling which sometimes happens to them, would make one think they danced for joy: The Voice becomes greater then ordinary; sometimes it is resounding; and it never goes out but with earnest­ness: for there is no Passion so talkative as Joy; how barren soever the Minde be, what heaviness soever there be on the tongue, it makes one speak continu­ally: and nothing but its own violence sometimes stops the mouth, and at once cuts short the speech. To conclude, all the face takes an extraordinary good plight; and from pale melancholy and severe, which it was before, it becomes ruddy, affable, and pleased.

The rest of the body is also sensible of this alteration: A sweet heat & vapor sheds it self thorow all its parts; which swells, and gives them a lively colour: even they [Page 142]become stronger, and do their actions more perfectly then they did before. In effect, of all the motions of the Minde, there is none more a friend to Health then this, so as it be not extreme. It drives away sickness, it purifies the blood and the spirits, and renders, as the Wise man says, our yeers flourishing. As soon as it enters the heart, it swells it with great beatings; it lifts up the heart by long re­spirations. In the Arteries it causeth a large and extended pulse. And yet al­though all these motions are made slow­ly, and without vehemency, those of the other parts are made with precipitation and vigour. The head and the eyes are in a continual agitation: the hands move without ceasing: we go, we come, we leap; we cannot stay in one place. But it sometimes also happens, that the vio­lence of this Passion takes quite away the use of Sense and Motion; it quencheth natural heat, it causeth syncopes, and in a moment bereaves one of life. Let us then examine how it can produce so many effects so contrary and so wonderful.

PART. 2. Of the Nature of JOY.

SOme perhapes may think it strange, that Joy which speaks so much of it self, hath not as yet told what it was; but you may much more wonder that Philosophy, which promiseth us the knowledge of all things, falls short in this; although there be nothing which endea­vours more to make it self known then Pleasure; It penetrates to the bottome of our soul, it environs it on all sides, it sollicites it by all the wayes of its know­ledge; it is the end of all its desires, the crown of all its actions, and yet for all that its nature is unknown to it, and the grea­test understandings which have enquired it, are not agreed under what kinde it ought to be placed.

For some have said that Pleasure was nothing but the rest and tranquillity of [Page 144]the minde; others that it was a Passion in which the Soul operated not; and a­mongst those who have ranked it amongst actions, some did beleeve it proceeded not from appetite but from knowledge. In fine, there having been some who not daring to put it in the rank of other Pas­sions, have said it was the principle of them, others that it was their gender, or their first species.

Had we not banished from our designe the wrangling and the Criticisms of the Schools, we should be obliged to examine all these opinions, and to seek in their ruines foundations whereon we should build the definition and Idea of Plea­sure: But since we have not that liberty, and that we should render delight impor­tunate and unpleasing by the length of the discourses we should use, without advising with any we will consult the thing it self, and see whether it will dis­cover it self to us after having hid it self to so many excellent spirits.

We say then that we need not doubt, but that Pleasure is a motion of the mind, and that its impossible to conceive a calm and rest in the tempest which it raiseth in our thoughts, in our spirits, and in our [Page 145]humors; as those things doe not move of themselves, it must be the minde which agitates them, and she gives her self the same shake which she imprints in them; For it is evident that effects being like their causes, the motions of the bo­dy which are the effects of the minde, ought also to be the images of the agitati­on she gives her self; I know well that the Schooles will not call these agitations true motions; but that stops us not, it will suffice that they are such as the soul can have, & that pleasure is one of that order.

But yet as she hath two parts which may be moved, we might doubt to which of the two Pleasure belongs; for al­though all the world confess it is a Passi­on, and consequently a motion of the appetite, yet it seems that there are some which are proper to knowledge, since the Senses and the understanding finde a complacency in the objects which are conformable to them, even before that the appetite is moved; but also as we have already shewed in our discourse of Love, that this complacency is no true pleasure; and that the Daemons which are capable of that acceptableness, cannot be touched with Joy, which yet they [Page 146]ought most perfectly to have; if it come from knowledge alone, we must then stick to the common opinion, and with it say, that Pleasure is a motion of the ap­petite, since its good which moves that part of the minde, and that pleasure hath no other object but the same good.

Yet this raiseth another difficulty; for if it be true that the soul ceaseth to move, when it arives at the end whereto it tended moving to possess a good, the possession ought to be the end and term of its motion: So that the pleasure which comes alwayes after the possession is rather a rest then a motion of the appe­tite; and yet if we were agreed that pos­session is the aim and end of the motions of the minde, we would say that that onely ought to be understood of those which it employs to arrive thereunto; for although it bear it self not towards the good it possesseth, it hinders it not from a­gitating to taste it again, and from being ravished in the enjoyment it hath had; but to speak more exactly, possession is not the last end which the soul proposeth; it is the enjoyment which is the perfecti­on and accomplishment of the possession. For it is certain we possess things which [Page 147]we enjoy not, and we may say that the good renders it self master of the Soul when it presents and unites it self unto it, but that she becomes mistris of it when she enjoys it: After all this we can never say that rest is the end which the soul proposeth to it self, since the end is the perfection of things, and that there are some which must be always in action to be perfect: Now the soul is of this kinde, she never tends to rest unless out of weak­ness, and it is therefore necessary that Joy and Enjoyment be in motion; let us then see what an one it is.

To discover it, we must observe that Pleasure and Joy are never formed in the soul, till after the good hath inspired Love therein; for as the first motion of the appetite towards good is to unite it self thereunto, and Love consists in this union; it is impossible that any man should fan­cy any other motion which could be poste­rior to that; and therefore if Pleasure be a motion of the soul towards good, it ought to presuppose love, & always come after it.

Now as this Love always precedes, it follows not that it must always accompa­ny it; there may be obstacles which may hinder the appetite from moving to [Page 148]form this Passion, and grief perhaps may be so great that it may employ the whole soul, that it will not admit the least ray of Joy; but its also certain, that if there be nothing which retains the appetite, it always goes from Love to Pleasure, be­cause the soul unites it self to good, but to enjoy it, and it is impossible it should enjoy it but by Pleasure; and to speak truth, enjoyment is nothing but pleasure which we finde in the possession of good; and according as enjoyment is more per­fect, it is also the greater and the more excellent. What motion can the appe­tite then suffer in pleasure and enjoy­ment beyond that of Love, whereby it unites it self to what is good? certainly it is a thing very difficult to conceive, how these actions should pass into a power which is quite blinde and hid in the bot­tome of the soul; they must be extream­ly obscure, and what light soever the minde can bring, they suffer themselves to be seen not without a great deal of trouble; yet since we have engaged our selves to shew the difference of the Passi­ons, by the difference of corporal moti­ons, we must necessarily, to know what Joy is, finde in sensible things a kinde of [Page 149]motion which may resemble the agitation which the Minde suffers in this encounter. As it happens then in the Passion of Love, that the Appetite carries it self towards the beloved object, that it runs thither, and unites it self thereunto; we may say, that this motion is like to that of fluid bodies, which run toward their centre, and think to finde their rest there: but because when they are there, they for all that stop not, they return, and scatter themselves on themselves; they swell, and consequently over-flow. So, after that the Appetite is united to its good, its motion ends not there; it re­turns the same way, scatters it self on it self, and over-flows those powers which are neerest to it. By this effusion, the soul doubles on the image of the good it hath received, mixeth and confoundeth it self with it, and so thinks to possess it the more by doubly uniting it self thereunto. Nay, even as the Appetite swells, and thicks by this reflux; it cannot contain it self within its bounds, and is constrained to distil it self into that faculty which ac­quainted it with the knowledge of the object; sharing with it the good it hath received, and by that means making all [Page 150]the parts of the soul concur to the posses­sion thereof, wherein perfect enjoyment consists: For, since the soul hath no other end, but perfectly to possess the good, and that, perfectly to possess it, it must have the knowledge of that possession; the Appetite having no knowledge, cannot alone make it enjoy what it loves; the Imagination and the Understanding must contribute: and then, after they have proposed the good to the Appetite, and that the Appetite is united thereunto, it returns to the one and to the other, and gives them an account of what it hath done, to the end that by uniting their functions, the soul may unite it self to its good in all its parts, and that it may make for it that circular motion which is natural to it, and wherein the accomplish­ment and perfection of its operations consists, as the Platonick Philosophy teacheth. After all, if it be true that the Soul and the Spirits work in the same manner in the Passions, we may not doubt but that the motion which the soul suffers in Joy, is such as we have said, since that of the spirits is altogether like it: For, after Love hath carried them to good, they scatter and over-flow themselves on [Page 151]the organs of the Senses, as we are about to make known: So that we cannot miss in saying, That Joy is an effusion of the Appetite, whereby the Soul spreads it self on what is good, to possess it the more perfectly.

I know that the definition of Aristotle is quite different from this: for he says that it is a motion of the Soul which sud­denly and sensibly puts it in a state agree­able to Nature. But the place where he proposeth it, shews sufficiently that he had no intention to render it very exact, treating in that place but with Orators, and not with Philosophers. And truely, whoever will neerly examine it, will finde nothing less then the essence of that Pas­sion. How many of those motions will there be found, such as he hath observed, wherein Pleasure will never be? All natural actions, do they not put the soul in a state agreeable to its nature? and may they not be suddenly and sensibly perfor­med without being for all that delightful? The Passion of Love, is it not so formed, and is it not an estate agreeable to Na­ture, to unite it self to good, and to pos­sess it; and yet Pleasure need not always accompany it? And may we not then say, that it is not Joy which makes this [Page 152]condition agreeable to Nature; but ra­ther, that it is that which breeds Joy?

Besides, what need we say it is a sudden motion, seeing the Appetite hath none that are other? For, if it happens that the soul moves not so readily in some Passi­ons, that Iaziness comes not from the Ap­petite, but from the faculty which propo­seth that good with too much difficulty, and too loosely commands the pursuit thereof: Being a blinde power, it goes but as 'tis led; and as soon as the com­mand is given, it obeys, and moves in an instant.

It is true, there may be obstacles on that side, which may hinder it from so readily obeying; as, when there are con­trary Passions to those which the object ought to inspire; for an extreme grief will never suffer Joy to form it self in the Appetite: But also, when the hin­derance is away, it quickly moves, and always in a moment produceth the Pas­sion as perfect as the knowledge and mo­tive was which it proposed: For, if Love hath weak-beginnings, 'tis because the good is weakly represented, and the progresses it makes, are new motions of the Appetite, caused by the representa­tion [Page 153]of new Ideas and new perfections.

In effect, we may say of all the conse­quences, and of all the increase of Passi­ons, that they are as the flame and the light, which entertain and augment one the other every moment, by an infinite many reiterated productions; that which appears, being not that which was before, and which even presently will be follow­ed by a new: for, all of them succeeding thus one the other without interruption, seem to be but the self-same thing which hath preserved and entertained it self.

So it is in Joy, and in all other Passions; they form themselves all at once, and pass in an instant: they are also renewed eve­ry moment, causing thus a continual flux of divers perfect motions, which last as long as the knowledge sollicites the Ap­petite to move.

It is then true, that the Appetite hath no motions which are not sudden; That nevertheless it begins to move it self ra­ther at one time then another, by how much the faculty which commands is diligent or lazie, or because there is some contrary motion which retains it: And that is easie to be conceived, by the ex­ample of the Eyes, which see things in an [Page 154]instant, although to see them they some­times open quicker or slower; and even after being open, they may have some in­disposition which may hinder them to act.

I know that the Physitians seem to use the same definition with Aristotle, when they say that Pleasure is a quick and sensi­ble motion which puts Nature in an estate which is agreeable to it; and that if the objects make not a quick and sensible im­pression on the Senses, or if they do not make it proportionable to Nature, they can never cause Pleasure. But it is easie to perceive, that the Motion whereof they speak, is not that of the Appetite, where Pleasure consists, and that it is but the cause thereof: for, before that the Appetite moves, the objects must make such an impression as we have said; and then the Soul, which feels it, and which sees what is its good, sheds it self on it, to possess it the more perfectly, and so forms that pleasure, which is augmented by the effusion of spirits, as we will anon declare. I stay not to examine how grief some­times happens in this quick motion which moves Nature to an estate convenient for it; as when we put our hands to the fire when they are extremely cold; that con­cerns [Page 155]the Passion of Grief: It will suf­fice here to observe, that those objects which make not this ready impression, do not cause Pleasure; because that insinu­ating themselves by little and little, Na­ture accustoms her self unto them, and feels not the change which happens to her; wherefore, not knowing the good which she receives, the Imagination pro­poseth it not to the Appetite, which con­sequently is not moved thereby. We are even thus tir'd with the most agreeable things, after having too long tasted them. But of this more amply at the end of this Discourse.

Let us continue again the thred of that Discourse which we have left, and say, that although all the motions of the Ap­petite are made suddenly, yet it is true, that of all the objects which move Passi­on, there are none whose arrival so quick­ly and so easily moves the Appetite, as Joy. And this comes in my conceit, from that the object of Pleasure is the good, so far as it is already loved: for we have al­ready shewed, that Love always precedes Joy; so that being already united to the Appetite by the means of Love, there is nothing in that respect which hinders the [Page 156]motion which that power ought to em­ploy to relish it. But it is not so in the rest of the Passions, whose objects are to be examined by the Knowledge, before they are proposed to the Appetite. And as there are but few Goods or Evils which are pure, so there are always found ma­ny things which diminish their goodness or their ill, and suspend the judgement we ought to make of them. But to move Joy, this examen is useless: the Appetite already possessing the Good, all its coun­sels are taken, all its doubts are razed; and of necessity it ought to move at the same instant when it united it self to its enjoyment, wherein Joy and Pleasure consist.

But 'tis to penetrate too far into the se­crets of the Soul, and to stay too long on things which have no stay. Let us leave these imperceptible motions, and see whether those which are made in the hu­mours and in the spirits, are more easie to be discerned.

Yet before we begin this enquiry, we shall do well to say somewhat of the Ob­ject which moves this Passion. For al­though we have already said it was Good, we must examine out of what considera­tion [Page 157]it merits that quality, being assured that out of divers respects it causeth di­vers motions in the soul.

As then good, forasmuch as it is amia­ble, is the object of Love; so forasmuch as it is delightful it is that of Joy: nei­ther is it powerfully delightful, but when it is loved, for that Pleasure presupposeth Love; so that good forasmuch as it is loved, ought to be the true object of Joy; perhaps you will say, that desire also presupposeth Love, and that good must be loved to be desired; it is true, but desire demands another condition, to wit, absence which never happens in Joy, where the good must be alwayes present; for when past things, or those which are to come delight us, it is an effect of the imagination, which renders them present, and makes them pass for such as they are in the thoughts.

For the rest, by the word Good, we must not onely conceive what is truely and ap­parently good, but even also the ills which we have eschewed: It is thus, that the memory of the paines we have suffe­red, and of the dangers we have escaped is pleasing, forasmuch as it is good to have been delivered from them; it is thus that [Page 158]vengeance is so sweet; because that by overcoming the ill, we no more fear the assaults thereof; it is thus, that tears are sometimes delightful, because they dis­charge nature of an unprofitable burthen, and that it even seems as if the grief which excited them, runs and slides away with them.

You must besides observe, that good being a thing agreeable to nature, this is aswel to be understood of depraved na­ture, as of that which is perfect; for a sick man takes pleasure in things which are contrary to him, and a vitious man finds contentment in his debauches, be­cause they are conformable to his cor­rupted and irregular nature.

Now after this to examine by retail all what may cause pleasure, besides that it would wrong both our design, and the Reader, both which ask for brevity, we may easily know it were but to lose time and words.

It will then suffice to say, that since good is the source of all the sweets which this Passion causeth to flow into the soul, and that it is nothing but what is fit for our nature, and what perfects it, it must be that the good which makes us the [Page 159]more perfect, raises also the greater & the more solid pleasures: Now as we are com­posed of two parts, of soul and body, and as that is incomparably more excellent; and therefore it follows that the perfecti­on which it acquireth is also more excel­lent, and that the goods which cause it, are the most noble and the most delightful.

But because the goods of the body are for the preservation of the species, or of the individuals, and that that is more considerable to nature, as being the most common or the most general good; from thence it is that the pleasure which ac­companies it is the sweetest and most sen­sible of all others; and by the same rea­son the objects of Tasting and feeling de­light most, because they are the Senses most necessary for life, and without which the creature cannot subsist.

It is true that the objects of Seeing and Hearing may contest the preheminency, being more noble then those base and ma­terial qualities which respect the inferior Senses: But if we consider that there are almost no creatures, which delight themselves with the beauty of sounds and colours; we may confess speaking gene­rally, that the objects of Tasting and [Page 160]Touching are the most delightful; and yet that in Man those of Seeing and Hear­ing have the advantage, because that those two Senses having a great affinity with the Understanding, and being chiefly destined to its service, their end is also more noble & necessary then it is in beasts, where they are for no other use, but to preserve the animal life which they have.

From all these considerations, it is easie to deduce the principal differences of Pleasure: For it is either Intellectual or Sensible, Pure or Impure, True or False. True Pleasures are those which are pure, to wit, which are not linked or mixed with Grief; and they are those which are fit for Man, in the most perfect condition that Nature could place him. Such are the pleasures which are found in Contempla­tion, and in the exercise of Vertue: such are those which follow the actions of a se­cure Health, and the functions of Senses perfectly disposed.

Now these Pleasures have this proper­ty, that they are long lasting, that they never tire, that they may be relished at all times, and that Grief never precedes nor follows them: For a man who is in a state of Natural perfection, is never weary of [Page 161]Meditation, nor of performing good acti­ons: Life is always sweet and pleasing to him; and the Senses are always disposed to receive their Objects with Delight.

Some may now say, that Eating and Drinking, and other natural actions, are convenient for the perfect nature of Man, which yet cause also disgust: For Musick, and the sight of the fairest things, at last tires the ears and eyes; and the sweetest flowers wherewith Venus was ever crown­ed, as Pindarus says, at last become impor­tunate and displeasing. It is true: But we must also remember, that all these things being sutable to Nature, ought to have the conditions which perfection re­quires: they must be moderate in quan­tity and quality: the circumstance of time, place, and persons, must meet. Be­sides, that the greatest part are not of themselves convenient for Nature, but onely by accident; that is to say, they are onely convenient, by reason of the irre­gularities which preceded them whose re­medy they are. So eating and drinking cure hunger and thirst: so rest and sleep cause labour and weariness to cease. In a word, the greatest part of our actions afford pleasure onely because Nature [Page 162]empties or fills it self, and corrects the one with the other; wherefore the pleasure which follows them is not absolutely pure nor real, but onely by accident: whence it is that it tires, that it lasts but little, and that we are not at all times capable to taste it, as those which are absolutely pure.

But let us leave these Moral Specula­tions, and, without staying any longer on things which are notorious to all the world, let us seek new ones, and see whe­ther the Tempest which this Passion ex­cites in us, will not throw us into some unknown Land, and make us know the motions of the Spirits which act as the wandering Stars, whose courses and pe­riods have not yet been observed.

PART 3. What the Motion of JOY is in the Spirits.

IN all kinde of Motion, we must always fancie two terms: The one where it is to begin, the other where it ought to finish. If the Spirits then move in Joy, it seems they ought to come from the heart, since it is their source; and thence they move themselves towards what is Good, wheresoever it presents it self to the soul. Truely, could Joy form it self all alone, the motion of the Spirits must be so made, and must by it be issued out of the heart to the meeting of what is good: but because it never comes but with Love, which ought always to precede it, it is he who ought to cause that motion, whereto Joy contributes nothing: So that we must seek another for it, conformable [Page 164]with that of the Appetite. In a word, we must discover how the Spirits in some manner disperse themselves, even as that doth in this Passion. This will not un­easily be conceived, after having obser­ved how Love carries them towards Good: for when they can go no further, they must either stop, or return to their source, or disperse themselves. They cannot stop themselves, since they follow the then-disturbed agitation of the soul: they cannot return to the heart, since no­thing but the presence of Ill can constrain them thereunto: They must then over­flow and disperse themselves. And the Soul, which employs the same motives for the motion of the Spirits as for her own, takes care to make them move so, that they may be the more united to Good, as we have before said: For, by this effusion, they dilate themselves in their organs; and, occupying more room, they think to touch the Good in more of its parts.

But where can they disperse them­selves? To understand this, you must remember, that Good toucheth not the soul but by its presence, and that it is Knowledge onely which renders it pre­sent. [Page 165]Now this Knowledge is made by the Understanding, and by the Imagina­tion, or by the Senses: And as the Imagina­tion is seated in the brain, and the Senses in their particular organs; so Good must be in the one or the other of them, and consequently Love must carry the Spirits to those places, and Joy disperse them in the same precincts. For, if Good be one­ly in the Fancie, and that it toucheth not the exteriour Senses, all the Spirits ar­rive at the seat of the Imagination, and disperse themselves in the brain: But if any of the Senses possess this Good, then the Spirits which ran thither disperse themselves also on their organs, and car­ry thither heat, redness, and vivacity.

This effusion augments the Pleasure of the Minde, by reason of that sweet and temperate heat which runs thorow the parts, which flatters and tickles them: So that those Pleasures which are accompa­nied with this corporal agitation, are greater, and more sensible, then when they are without it. Nay, even after the emotion of the Appetite hath ceased, the agitation of the Spirits continuing, leaves the soul in a certain confused Joy, which comes not from the object which at first [Page 166]touched it, but from that tickling which the Senses made known unto it, as a thing conformable and convenient for their na­ture.

And this makes me believe that all those secret Joys which we feel without knowing a reason of them, come from the same cause, and that there must ne­cessarily be something which disperseth the Spirits, and which inspires Pleasure in the soul; whether it be the knowledge it hath of the tickling of those parts, or whether that all the differences of the mo­tions which it employs in every Passion, being known unto her, she sees this to be fit for Joy, and at the same time forms a delightful object, as we said it happened in that love which is out of inclination.

You will perhaps say, that this effusion of Spirits may often be without Pleasure; That Anger which casts them into the face, that Grief which draws them to the diseased parts, and that the Fever which drives them everywhere with impetuosi­ty, afterwards disperseth them, and cau­seth the same alteration which Joy im­prints on the body; and yet that the Soul is then sensible of no pleasure.

But we may two ways answer this: [Page 167]First, it is true, that the most delightful objects are often diverted by little griefs, from making an impression in the soul. This motion of the Spirits which is so se­cret, and which the Senses can scarce dis­cover, ought to be far less powerful a­gainst great obstacles which cause these troublesome encounters. But supposing they did cause pleasure, it is so weak, and so light, that it is stifled by the least sensi­ble inconvenience. For it is an observa­ble thing, that although it seems that the Sensitive Appetite at the same time can­not suffer contrary Passions, it is not ab­solutely true, since we evidently know, that the tongue is pleased with agreeable savours, whilst the heart is full of bitter­ness and grief. And the reason of this is, that the Sensitive Appetite is not shut up in one part onely, as the most part of the other faculties are; it is dispersed thorow all the organs of the Senses: and we may say, that its stock and root are in­deed in the heart, but that its boughs and branches are extended thorow all the body: For its a general and necessary power to all the parts of the Creature, and it must have been communicated to all, that Motion might not be far off from [Page 168]knowledge, and that the Soul might not languish in expectation to possess a good, or flee from an ill, when they were once come to her knowledge: Nature having made for the appetite what she made for the pulse whose principal organ is the heart, and yet which forms it self in all the arteries, where even it is sometimes found different from that which agitates the heart.

Which being so, Pleasure may be in one place, and Grief in another, although they are in one part incompatible: But it is also true that when Passion is raised in the Centre, and source of the appe­tite, that which is in the little rivulets is very weak and seems to vanish, al­though the Spirits cease not to agitate in those places where it was formed, whence these secret feelings of Plea­sure follow, which often steal them­selves from the knowledge of the un­derstanding, nay even of the imagina­tion.

This is the first answer which may be made to the proposed objection; now for another which pleaseth us more, as being better fitted to our designe; for we will show how every Passion hath a particular [Page 169]motion of the spirits; and that then if the effusion be in others as well as Joy, there must be some difference which renders it fit and particular, and which is not to be found in the rest.

We must then confess that Anger, Grief, and Terrour, and divers other ex­terior things may disperse the spirits, but by violence, and as a tempest which scat­ters the rain, and transports it here and there with impetuosity; in stead where­of Joy sweetly disperseth them, and makes them distil on the parts as a sweet dew; now this causeth many different impressions on the Senses: For the spirits which are driven with force, which pre­cipitate themselves one on the other cause a troublesome sentiment to nature, and rather provoke it then flatter it; but those which disperse themselves as themselves, and sweetly insinuate themselves into the parts, tickle and content it: Considering that in those Passions which have ill for their object, the spirits keep themselves united & con­tracted to assault or flee from it; whence it is that they are piercing, and offend the parts they light on; but in Joy, wherin they dilate themselves to embrace the good [Page 170]it must needs blunt their point, and make them lose the impetuosity they had be­fore; So that what effusion soever there is in Anger and in Grief, its never accom­panied with pleasure, because it is not like that which is with Joy; to avow this, we must onely consult the countenance of a joyful man; for you will finde therein I know not what kinde of a more plea­sing vivacity, a clearer and purer splen­dor, and a sweeter heat then in all the Pas­sions we have made mention of; by reason that the purity of the spirits is not chang­ed by those sharp and darksome fumes which are raised in the rest, and that their motion is more free, more equal, and more conformable to their nature; it might be asked whether this effusion of spirits be onely made in those places where Good is presented to the soul; and truly its there only necessary for it, since they onely disperse themselves to possess this good, and that good toucheth it no­where but where it makes it self known; yet it is true that it abundantly pours them into the intrails, and that when Joy is high, there is no part which it over-flowes not; for which cause the heart and the lungs loosen themselves as Hippocrates [Page 171]says, we are sensible of I know not what pleasing emotion which moves all the in­terior parts, and a sweet heat and va­por, which disperseth it self through the whole body: Now this happens according to my opinion, from that the sensitive soul hath not always a clear and certain knowledge of its object, and being charmed by that of Joy, she fancies that she ought everywhere to encounter it, and that she ough also to send spirits every way to entertain it: or rather the urgency which presseth her forwards to the quick enjoyment of the presented good, is the reason she drives them on all sides, without choice or order, or so much as discerning the places whether they are to move.

This shall suffice for the knowledge of the Motion of the spirits in Joy; in pur­suit of the examen we have already made in the Treatise of Love. But one difficulty remaines which the former dis­course hath bred, and whose resolution will give some light to the obscurity of this matter; for we have said, that the spirits are not agitated here with vio­lence, and that their motion is always sweet and calm; although this seem not [Page 172]to agree with the transports, the ravish­ments, and the excesses which are so common in this Passion, and which can­not be conceived without a violent agi­tation of the spirits: And in effect, when we compared this motion with that which is made in Love, we were not afraid to say, that they were driven in Joy as a great wave, and that it seemed then as if the soul would cast it self wholly and all at once before its object: So that it be­ing not to be done without violence, and having certified that there was none in the effusion of the spirits, we cannot escape the reproach to have spoken con­trary to Truth, and against Our Selves.

Yet it is very easie to answer this Ob­jection, remembring, that Joy and Love are inseparable; and that these two Pas­sions being for that cause often consider­ed as if they were but one onely, these Motions were also confounded with their effects: so that Love drawing the spirits from the heart, and driving them out, we commonly say, that Joy also transports them. And as this motion is made with violence, and causeth troublesome acci­dents, the same thing may be said of Joy: For thus we discoursed of it in the for­mer [Page 173]Chapter, where we did not abso­lutely compare Love with Joy, but onely the love of Beauty with the love of other things wherein Joy causeth faintings and syncopes, confounding, as commonly they do, these two Passions in one: But here, where we make an exact Anatomy of them, we separate the motions of the one from the other; and conclude, that the transport of the spirits towards Good, is a particular effect of Love; and that the effusion which follows it, is that of Joy: So that if there be violence in the first motion, it proceeds all from Love; Pleasure hath no share in it; and how impetuous soever it be, it must break and soften it self, when the spirits begin to disperse themselves; otherwise Joy would destroy it self, by that troublesome sensi­bleness which that impetuous and turbu­lent motion would excite in the parts.

Yet it follows not, that because this effusion is not violent and impetuous, it must be made slowly: for the spirits are such stirring and subtil bodies, that they without resistance penetrate everywhere: and their motions are so quick, that no­thing in Nature could be found to com­pare them to, but Light: and it is by [Page 174]that also that we can make appear how they disperse themselves in Joy: For it in a moment insinuates it self in Diapha­nous bodies without violence, and without confusion runs thorow all their parts; without constraint dilates and extends it self: and we might say, that had these bodies any knowledge, they would be sensible of an extreme plea­sure in that sweet, although sudden effu­sion of Light. So is it with that which is made in Joy: for after the soul hath car­ried the spirits towards its Good, and that she believes she hath united them toge­ther, she leaves that pressing, that disquiet and precipitation which she caused before that she might arrive there: and, thinking she can then with security enjoy the good she possesseth, she with liberty dilates her self, without hinderance extends her self, and in an instant penetrates all the parts of her object; causing the spirits to move in the same manner, which she findes always obedient to her command. It is true, that in pursuit thereof there is a great dissipation of them made, which the soul takes no care to repair, being wholly employed in the enjoyment of the good she pursued, and being as it [Page 175]were charmed and ravished with her good fortune; whence those weaknesses follow, those faintings, and those other actions, of which we have already spoken.

PART. 4. The causes of the Characters of Joy.

YOu have seen what we had to say of the nature of this Passion, be­fore we enquire the causes of those Characters which make it appear. Let us then now examine first the Moral acti­ons, and enquire why Joy is so talkative, so vain, and so credulous; why it confides so much in it self, why it makes it self to be defired, even when it is present, and why it is so soon weary of the Good which begot it: For these are the most observable effects which it produceth in the Minde, and whence it seems the rest proceed. Let us seek then the causes of its Prattle.

There are Passions which will always speak, and others which love to be silent. Silence commonly accompanies grief, de­spair, and fear: Joy, boldness and anger, [Page 177]and generally, all those which move to­wards Good, or resist Ill, are given to Talk; but none so much as Joy: all the rest seem to drive out their words, and cast them forth with violence, as if they were a burden which the soul would dis­charge; this dispenseth them with liber­ty, makes them flow with pleasure; and we may say, that it is rather abundance then constraint which sends them forth. Indeed, Joy is full of babble, is pleased to talk, and always findes wherewith to en­tertain its chat.

The reason hereof is easie enough to be discovered, if you consider, that words being the images of the thoughts, to say many things, divers thoughts must form themselves in the Minde; that they must have liberty to issue; that the organs must be disposed to express them. Now as Imagination is the source of the thoughts, and that it is more or less fruit­ful, according as it is more or less active; and that all its vivacity depends from that of the spirits which serve it in its operati­ons: it is necessary for great talkers, that the spirits should be extremely active, and that the organs of the speech should be very moveable: And therefore, since it is [Page 178]heat which renders the spirits active, and that humidity renders the body supple and pliable; these two qualities must be found in those who speak much: And besides, the Judgement must not be so strong as the Imagination, that it may not severely examine the thoughts, that it may not withhold them, but that they may all freely vent themselves. This is the reason why young folks and women, the sanguine and the flegmatick, talk more then others; why wine, good chear, and folly, provoke talk so much; and why birds most commonly sing when they wooe, because being naturally pro­voked to get their young ones, their blood works, and becomes fumy, their spirits increase and kindle, and afterwards agitate the Imagination and the organs of the voice.

Which being supposed, it is easie to know why these Passions which move to­wards Good, or resist Ill, cause us to speak more then the others do; Because in the designe they have to go out, the Spirits must carry themselves to the Brain, and to the exteriour parts, which augments the heat, and disperseth the hu­mors, & in pursuit moves the Imagination, [Page 179]and makes the organs beoom more move­able: So that all these dispositions meeting with the weakness of the Judgement, which accompanies all the Passions, a great flood of words must necessarily fol­low there: And chiefly in Joy, since by it the Soul dilates and diffuseth it self, and that there is nothing whereby it can more disperse it then by speech, which is the true flowing of the thoughts; be­sides that the Imagination is freer in this Passion then in the rest, in which either the absence of the good or the pre­sence of the ill constrain it, and involve it in cares which it hath not in Joy, pos­sessing its good with security and confi­dence, without distraction, and without finding any obstacle to stop its concepti­ons, or hinder the issue of them.

For what concerns Confidence, as 'tis a Passion which perswades us that ill is far from us, and that although it should pre­sent it self, we have power enough to overcome it; we need not doubt but those who are joyful and content, are of the same belief, being in possession of Good: For Good hath that property, that by its presence it estrangeth ill, and fortifies the soul in the enjoyment there­of: [Page 180]because that in perfecting of it, it in some manner increaseth it, & makes it ap­peare greater & more vigorous then it was: Considering that being wholly occupied and ravished in the enjoyment of Good, and not minding those difficulties which may traverse its designes, it trusts that it can have no ill success: and filling it self thus with good hopes, it believes and un­dertakes all, and nothing seems difficult unto it. But what foments its audacity the more, 'tis the heat it stirs up in all the parts: For, as this quality is the princi­ple of all the vigour they have, the Soul, which perceives how she hath enlarged her self, perswades her self that her strength is also increased, and consequent­ly imagines that she is the more secure, ha­ving so much affistance both to assault and resist Ill. Now because this vain Confidence is a kinde of Pride, which lifts up the Minde above it self, and flat­ters it with an imaginary excellency, thence it happens that the Joy thereof is commonly Insolent and Presumptuous, that it loves to be flattered, and easily falls into the praises of it self, being, as it is, so babling, and so greedy to express it self.

Yet, this presumption hinders it not from being Complacent, Facile, and Credu­lous; although pride render men opinio­nate and untractable; because that en­tertaining it self but with the vain hopes it conceives, and justling onely those which oppose them; it willingly hears those which favour them, and is easily perswaded by their flattery; its confi­dence making it fancy all things possible; besides the possession it hath of good, is that which produceth and foments it; it follows the qualities of good, which is to communicate it self; and so conse­quently renders it self sociable, easie, and complacent.

But how can joy leave in the soul a de­sire of it self, seeing it is there present; and that it seems it is a thing incompati­ble with that satiety which we said it brought? To resolve this difficulty, we must suppose that pleasure may be pre­sent two manner of ways, when it actu­ally toucheth the soul, or when memory calls it back to the thoughts; necessa­rily begetting desire; forasmuch as its conceived as a thing which is no more, and which yet leaves in the memory all those allurements which render it desire­able: [Page 182]the other being actually present can­not in that respect be wished for; for, that desire moves only towards those things which we have not; but onely then what we conceive something which we do not yet possess: as when we desire the conti­nuation of it, or that the delightful object doth not wholly, or all at once present it self to our knowledge; and then what remains to be possest, entertains and en­flames the desire.

Now the object presents it self not all at once, either by its own defect, or by that of the power which receives it; for there are things which we cannot enjoy but by a succession of time, and which must be several times retaken, to get an entire and perfect possession of them. Thus an excellent discourse, a sweet musick le­cture, the delight of eating and drinking, require time and several repetitions to be throughly possest: But there are o­thers also which depend not on time, and yet wherein the soul must employ it, to have a perfect enjoyment of them; whe­ther it be by reason of the difficulties it meets, as in the enquiry of Sciences; or by reason of their excellency that they cannot all at once be comprehended, and [Page 183]wherein it always findes new subjects of admiration: Such is the knowledge which we have here below of Divine things, which cause that torrent of de­light to flow into the will, which never quencheth its drought, and always leaves it an ardent thirst, which even Eternity it self cannot quench.

Thus see you have how Pleasure can beget desire; let us now see how it can cause Satiety; It is evident, that things may satisfie two wayes, either when they no longer flatter the Senses with pleasure, or when they disgust them; False Plea­sures, as those of the Senses, become distastful and importunate; because they are not absolutely convenient for nature, they surpass the natural capacity of the powers, and their use weakens and cor­rupts the organs: but those which are pure and true do never disgust, because they never exceed the natural reach of the Soul, but they perfect it, and instead of burthening and weaking, they ease and fortifie it: It is true, they may give a lit­tle, because the minde being a lover of novelty, and finding it no longer in an ob­ject whereto it hath long applied it self, it also findes not that satisfaction which it [Page 184]took at the begining, and seeks by change to nourish its desire and inclination. But we have spoken enough of these things wherewith Moral Philosophy is full; let us examine the Characters which Joy imprints on the Body.

Of all the many Characters which Joy imprints on the body, There are the looks onely, the serenity of the forehead, Laughter, Caresses, and disquiet, which are caused by the Souls command; all the rest happen without her thought, and have no other cause but the agitation of the humors which necessarily produce those effects.

For the Looks, there are three kindes common to this Passion, for it renders them sweet, dying, and unquiet; we will say, what is the cause of these last, when we speak of the disquiet, and im­patience which appears in all its other actions.

The Looks are sweet, either because they are modest, or because they are laughing; and these are proper to Joy, which causeth the lids to fall a little, and contract themselves; and which fills the eyes with a certain pleasant splendor. Now this splendor comes from the spirits [Page 185]which arrive in those parts; and the moti­on of the lids is effected by smiling, and by the design which the soul hath to preserve the image of the desirable object, as we shewed in seeking the causes of amorous Looks; so that we have onely these which are called dying, which require a long examen.

We have already said in the discourse of Love, that they were called so, be­cause those which dye cast forth the like, lifting up their eyes on high, and half hiding them under their lids. But that seems very difficult to conceive, that Looks which accompany Languor, Grief, and Death, should be found in the ex­cess of Pleasure.

Yet as there are several things contra­ry which have common effects, because they have common causes; it may also be that this kinde of Look findes the same cause in Grief, and in Joy, in the pangs of Death, as in the ravishment of Plea­sure. Let us then examine the reasons why they are to be found in these trou­blesome Passions, that we may see whe­ther there be any which may be accom­modated to Joy. First we need not doubt [Page 186]but Grief lifts up the eyes on high, and looks up to heaven, as the place whence it expects help to drive away the ill which afflicts it: For Nature hath given that in­stinct and inclination to man, to have re­course to superiour powers, when he be­lieves himself abandoned by the rest: So that without minding it, his mouth in­vokes them, his eyes turn towards them, and his arms are lifted up to crave their assistance. It also happens that this Pas­sion, which would flee the ill which pre­sents it self, gathering up within it self, draws along with it all the more move­able parts, and so retires the eyes in, as if it thought to hide it self, by hiding those organs whence she seems most to shew her self. Or rather, it comes from that the parts, being void of spirits, which the force of Grief dissipated or transported elsewhere, they of themselves repossess their natural situation, which is to be a little lifted up: For it is certain, that the situation of the parts, when they rest, is more natural then that which they have in action, wherein there is always some kinde of constraint: And we must con­sequently believe, that the eyes which take that site in sleeping, seek it as the [Page 187]most calm, and most natural for them: So that it seems the looks become dying in Grief, as they do in Sleep by the flight of the spirits which leave the eyes to their rest. Death may also cause this effect, by the convulsion which often accompanies it, and which makes the nerves retire to their origine; or, by reason of weakness, cannot retain the parts in that tension which their action requires; so that the lids fall, and the eyes are lifted up, taking again, as we have said, their natural situa­tion. Of all these causes, there is onely the gathering up of the Soul, and the drawing back of the Spirits, which are to be found in Joy, and from whence these dying looks may take their birth: for they have no assistance to implore, nor convulsion to fear. But in the transport which the enjoyment of Good gives the Soul, it often quits the exteriour parts, gathers the spirits inwardly together, or carries them elsewhere; and so forsaking the eyes, leaves them the liberty to regain their natural situation, which makes them appear languishing and dying.

The Forehead is serene, when it is smoothe and without wrinkles; and this smooth­ness comes from that all the muscles are [Page 188]extended, and equally draw it out on every side; or from that they are all at rest, and leave it in its ordinary situation. Now it seems that Joy causeth a serenity of the forehead in both manners: For it is certain, that as it hath the property to dilate and disperse the soul and the spi­rits, it seeks to do the same in all the parts of the body: So that because the muscles cannot move but by contracting them­selves, it never intends to move those of the forehead, since it would cause a moti­on contrary to its designe, chiefly, their action being not necessary in this encoun­ter, as that of the eyes might be, and of the tongue, and of others which it agitates in this Passion for particular reasons. The Forehead then remains calm, and with­out contracting it self. On the contrary, it seems to open, and on all sides to ex­tend it self, by reason of the spirits which rarifie the parts, and makes them appear the larger. Yet because that in Laughter the forehead becomes smoothe by the stretching of the muscles, which equally draw it upwards and downwards, it might seem that Joy which causeth Laughter, caused also that tension, and brought that serenity to the forehead as well by [Page 189]moving as by slacking the muscles. But in the following Discourse we will shew, that it is not Joy which produceth that effect, but the Surprize, which is the true cause of Laughter. 'Tis not but that the Soul without that Surprize may extend the forehead, by contracting the muscles; but then it is a feigned and forced sereni­ty, as that of Flatterers, of which Aristotle says, that the Forehead is [...], that is to say, stretched, and not contracted, as the Translators have explained it: for it is the Muscles which are contracted, but the Forehead which is extended and made smoothe by their contraction.

All Caresses are not properly effects of Joy: Take but away the serenity of the countenance, the smile, and the sweetness of the eyes, the rest proceed from the Passion of Love, which subjects the soul to the good which it conceives, and fills it with a desire to possess it: For the of­fers of service, respectful complements and civilities, are so many marks of sub­mission which it renders to the perfecti­on and excellency of the person it loves: and the embraces, kisses, and amorous looks, are witnesses of its desire, and of the care it takes to unite it self thereunto.

For Laughter, although it seem to be a particular effect of Joy, yet it is not always to be found with it: And when it accom­panies it, it ows not its birth to it alone: there are other causes which contribute thereunto, and which excite an emotion in the Soul quite different from that of Pleasure. So that we were not afraid to call it a Passion; not considering the out­ward motion onely which appears on the face, but that which the soul inwardly suffers, the nature and effects whereof we will examine in the following Cha­pter.

There remains now the Disquiet and Impatience onely, whose causes we are to enquire. But we must first observe, that they are not in all kinde of Joy: there are calm Pleasures, wherein the soul feels nothing of Impatience; wherein we may say, she rests in her motion. Such are those which accompany the exercise of Vertue, the knowledge of the Sciences, and the possession of Supernatural good. In a word, pure and true Delights do ne­ver disquiet the soul; they always leave a calm, and a pleasing serenity: And al­though they often moves desires which agitate it, we may say, they are little [Page 191]windes which purifie it without causing any storms; or, that they are like those sweet smoaks which the flame raiseth, which nourish it in stead of dissipating it, and which rather entertain the equality of its motion, then disturb it. But it is not so with false delights: As by little and little they make themselves felt and seen as a remedy for grief, there must, un­til they are wholly possest, always remain somewhat which is displeasing in the Minde. And then you cannot wonder if Impatience accompany the desires it hath to be delivered from it, and to see it self enjoying that perfect pleasure wherein the end of its grief consists. But it foresees not that its contentment is to finish there also, and that assoon as it hath an entire possession of the Good it seeks, it will be disgusted: So that being not to be satisfied, it cannot but suffer perpetual disquiets; seeking what it cannot finde, and meeting what it never sought. Be­sides, all these vain hopes which Joy in­spires, breed divers designes: and as it runs from one to another, without stop­ping at any, it is impossible, in this agita­tion, but that all its actions must appear uuquiet, its discourse without order, its [Page 192]looks inconstant, & all the body in a con­tinual motion; whereunto also the spark­ling of the spirits contributes, which tickles the nerves and sollicities the parts to move themselves; considering also that those Pleasures cannot be had, but by the action of the corporal powers which at last tire themselves, disquiet must accompany them, since its an effect of wearisomeness.

These are the Characters which Joy imprints in the body by the souls com­mand: Now let us see those which are caused without her ardors, and which by a necessary consequence, proceed from the agitation which is made in the hu­mors, and in the spirits.

The vivacity of the eyes comes from their splendor and motion, which are the un­doubted signes of life and vigour, since death renders them obscure and fixt: as the Spirits then disperse themselves in Joy, and as they are luminous and active, the eyes which abundantly receive them, and which are transparent, and easie to move, become agile and resplendent; be­sides that the humidity which is spred over them, being agitated by the motion they make, the light becomes more trembling, [Page 193]and causeth a certain moving luster, which strikes the sight with several rays, and presents to the imagination the motion and noise which the sparkes of fire cause at their birth whence they are said to crackle: Now this humidity may come from two causes; either because the lids in shutting themselves crush the humors they contain, and render the eyes moist; as we will more particularly shew in the discourse of Laughter; Or because that heat and the spirits open their passages, and dissolve those humors, which after­ward runs on the parts and make them moist: nay even if the brain be very moist, thence they draw rivulets of tears, which are as they say quite different from those which Grief useth to move, not on­ly in their cause, but even in their quality; for they are cold in Joy, and hot in grief, although it seems as if the contrary should happen, since Joy heats, and Grief cooles; and that hath even obliged some to say, that the teares of Joy were warm; but it is easie to agree, and give a reason for the difference; by saying, that the tears which Joy sheds, are truely cold in comparison of others; but that they seem colder, because they run down a [Page 194]face which that Passion hath heated by the effusion of spirits: On the contrary, those of Grief are colder in effect; but as they fall on the cheekes, which the flight of spirits hath deprived of heat, they seem to be hotter; in the same man­ner, as hot water affoords divers senti­ments of hot and cold, according as the hand is hotter or colder. But of this more exactly hereafter in the discourse you have of Tears.

For that redness, that good case, and that vaporous heat which appears through the outward parts, they also proceed from that effusion of spirits, which draw along with them the blood, and the sweetest vapours which raise themselves in the veins, and swell the parts they arrive at, colouring them vermillion, and inspiring them with a sweet and moist heat.

The trembling of the lips comes also from the Spirits, which abundantly flowing into those parts which are soft and suspend­ed, agitate them with the motion they have, and make them appear trembling, as it happens to leaves which are shaken with the winde, or with rain.

The voice grows fuller, because the mu­scles which serve to form it are loosned [Page 195]by heat, and give it a greater and larger passage; it is true; that it sometimes be­comes sharp and shrill, but that is the effect of a vehement laughter, which con­tracts the muscles, & streightens, the con­duit of the voice; or else of impatience, or some other impetuous Passions which mingle themselves with it, and oblige the soul to drive it out with violence: it often stops it self all at once by the souls ravishment, which causeth it to forget the most part of its ordinary functions, and leaves the organs of the voice without motion, and without action.

In fine, it is from thence that all na­tural vertues draw their force and vigour; for as they do not work but by the as­sistance of the spirits, when they come and shed themselves on the organs, they must necessarily grow stronger, and their functions must be done more perfectly: so there are no ill humours which may cor­rupt the purity of the blood, seeing the vertue which concocts them is always mistris of them, and that which expels them findes them obedient: for the spi­rits melt them and send them to the sur­face, and open the passages to let them out: So that it is true, there is no Passion [Page 196]which is so great friend to health as Joy, so as it be moderate: for if it be exces­sive, it changeth all natural oeconomy, it quencheth the heat of the intrails, and at last by Mortal Syncopes, or by incurable languors, it causes even the loss of our lives. We have already touched the Reasons in the former Discourse, where we shew­ed, that Love and Joy carried the spirits abroad with precipitation; it often hap­pens that in the violence of that trans­port they lose the union which they should have with their principle, whence follow Faintings and Syncopes. For I doe not esteem that the dissipation of the Spirits, as is commonly said, is the prin­cipal cause of those actions, since so ma­ny watchings, so many toyles, so many sicknesses, which dissipate them more then any Passion whatsoever, cause not these sad Symptomes; but according to my opinion it comes from that they dis­unite, and separate themselves from the heart; and that the Soul being unable to animate the separated parts, or communi­cate any vertue to them, the actions which they ought to do must cease by this sepa­ration which the vehemency of their mo­tion caused. This is the cause why water [Page 197]cast on the face, oft-times puts away those faintings, and sends back the straggling spirits to the heart, which would not be, were they quite lost: It is not but that here they make a great dissipation, as they a­bundantly disperse themselves on all the parts, and principally on the outward; and the soul, which is wholly occupied in the enjoyment of good, takes no care to continue the course; and to produce new ones, it must necessarily make a great loss of them, and consequently, natural heat must diminish; whence comes weak­ness, and the languishing of the parts, the corruption of the humours, corroding diseases, and at last death. It might be demanded, why Joy causeth death rather then Love or Anger: but we have shew­ed this in the particular discourse of the Passions.

There remains nothing now but the Mo­tions of the Heart, of the Arteries, and of Respiration to be examined, which are all alike in this; that they are great, rare, slow, and without vehemency, unless this Passion be excessive; for then they be­come little, weak and frequent, and even often they quite cease to be. The hearts motion then is rare and flow, because the [Page 198]heat is not vehement, having sent it with the spirits towards the outward parts. So that having no need of any great refresh­ing, it hasts not so much to move; consider­ing that also the soul, which is ravished in the enjoyment of good, minds not the mo­tion of the heart, but as it is urged by neces­sity; whence it comes that it moves slowly, and with great intervalls. But to supply its negligence, it every time very much o­pens, and extends it, recompencing its neglect by the greatness of its motion. Now because there must be always some vigour, thus to open and extend that part, when the violence of the Passion hath dissipated its forces, the motion of the heart must become weak and little, and the necessity it hath to move for the ge­neration of spirits, renders it quick and frequent, because it cannot supply its slowness by the greatness of the motion: So that if the weakness be extreme, it loseth also its swiftness, and so becomes slow and rare, and at last quite ceaseth. The same is done in the Pulse, and in Re­spiration; for they have the same customs, and the same causes with the hearts moti­on, as Physick teacheth us.

CHAP. IV. The Characters of Laughter.

I Know not why Socrates hereto­fore said, that Man was a ridicu­lous creature: But I know, if any reason can make it credible, we need go no further to seek it, then in Laughter it self; since there is nothing so ridiculous, as to see him who under­takes to control all Nature, and who be­lieves himself to be her Confident, to be ignorant of what is most proper and fa­miliar to him; To laugh at every mo­ment, without knowing wherefore; and to know neither the subjects nor the mo­tions which form this Passion. For all the great men of the past ages, which have enquired the causes thereof, have freely confess'd that their mindes were incapable of that knowledge; remitting [Page 200]us to that Philosopher who laughed con­tinually; and that it was hid in the same depth wherein he had enclosed the Truth.

Now although we do not think our selves clearer sighted then they, yet our designe having obliged us to handle this Subject, we are constrained to go beyond them, and to undertake a thing wherein they lost their courage. But what success soever we have, the Discourse cannot but divert and please us: for, if it do not dis­cover the nature of Laughter, yet it will at least augment the number of ridiculous things.

To begin therefore according to the Order we have hitherto observed, we must first draw the picture thereof, and then enquire the causes which produce it.

Now as it may be weak, mean, or vehe­ment, it is certain that we are chiefly to observe the Characters of the later, be­cause that in all kinde of things the Grea­ter is always to be the measure of the Lesser, because its effects are more sensi­ble then the others: nay, we may even say, that there are no Passions, how violent soever, which cause such great alterations in the body as this doth.

For if you consider the Face; The Forehead extends it self, the Eye brows decline themselves, the Lids contract themselves at the corners of the eyes; and all the skin about them becomes un­even, and wrinkles it self all over: the Eyes extenuate and half shut themselves; they grow sparkling and humid; and even those from which Grief could never draw a tear, are then obliged to weep: the Nose crumples up, and grows sharp; the Lips retire, and lengthen themselves; the Teeth discover themselves; the Cheeks lift themselves up, & grow more firm; and sometimes the middle of them sweetly hollows it self, and forms those delightful pits wherein the Poets lodg'd Laughter with the Graces: the Mouth, which is for­ced to open it self, discovers the trembling and suspended Tongue; and the Voice which issues, is nothing but a piercing and interrupted sound, which cannot be stopped, & which ends onely with the loss of our breath: the Neck swells, and shor­tens it self; all the Veins are great and ex­tended; a certain sweet splendor disper­seth it self over all the face; and how pale or severe soever it be, it must needs grow red, and appear content.

But all this is nothing in comparison of what the other parts suffer: The Brest is so impetuously agitated, and with such suddenly-redoubled shakes, that we can hardly breathe, that we lose the use of speech, and that it is impossible to swal­low whatsoever it be. So pressing a pain riseth in the Flanks, that it seems as if the intrails were torn, and that they would unfold themselves. In this violence, we see all the body bend, and wreathe, and gather it self together. The Hands are set on the sides, and press them forcibly; sweat gets up in the Face; the Voice is lost in hickocks, and the Breath in stifled sighs. Sometimes this agitation gets to so high an excess, that it produceth the same effects as Medicaments do, that it puts the Bones out of joynt, that it cau­seth syncopes, and in fine, that it gives death. The Head and the Arms suffer the same throws with the brest and the flanks; but you may perceive how in these motions they throw themselves here and there with precipitation and disorder; and that after they have been cast from one side to the other, as if they had lost all their vigour. The Hands be­come feeble, the Legs cannot support [Page 203]themselves, and the body is constrained to fall.

These are the principal parts which usually form vehement Laughter: For, to describe all the diversity of motions, air, mine, and the posture it puts every one in, were as much as if one would de­lineate all Men at once: since there is not one who in laughing makes not some particular face; And it is certain, that there are as many kindes of laughter as there are different faces. Even that inter­rupted sound which accompanies it, is so divers, that two men are hardly to be found, who shall have it every way alike.

For the Mean Laughter, it causeth al­most the same alteration in the face, and agitates the brest and the flanks in the same manner as vehement Laughter; but 'tis with far less violence. It also takes not away respiration nor speech; it onely renders the voice grosser. Even some­times it causeth it to pass the nostrils, and make an interrupted bellowing. Neither doth it cause grief or languor in the parts, or any of those troublesome accidents which are in the other.

To conclude, the Smile, which is the weakest & the least of all, causeth no alte­ration [Page 204]but in the face, and chiefly on the lips and eyes: for the lids a little contract themselves, the eyes sweeten, and the lips lengthen out themselves, without obli­ging the mouth to open, and without changing either the voice or speech: Even often it is onely observable in the lips, as when it comes from disdain, or from dis­simulation, or from some sickness.

To discover then the source of all these motions, we must first see what those things are which move us to Laughter: for, being as the Object and the Matter, they are also the first Causes which con­tribute to its birth. Yet is it not a thing so easily determined. And it seems as if Nature would render it self ridiculous in ridiculous things, having made them so far distant the one from the other, and so different amongst themselves, that it is almost impossible to finde any general no­tion, or common reason, which may re­duce them under one kinde.

For we see that Laughter comes from pleasant and facetious actions and words, from admiration, despight, scorn, cares­ses, tickling, and even from some sick­nesses. And as at first it seems as if there were no relation between all these things, [Page 205]we may easily believe that Laughter is an equivocal word, which marks effects of a different nature; and that that which comes from the most part of these Ob­jects, is feigned and lying, and hath no real form of Laughter.

In effect, all those who have spoken of it, have placed them under divers kindes; some more, some less, according to the several motives of that Laughter which they fancied in ridiculous objects: (I take here the word ridiculous, for all what moves Laughter.) Now because the re­solution of this difficulty wholly depends on the knowledge of this motive, and that it is impossible to discern true Laughter, or those objects which are truely ridicu­lous, if we know not the principle, and the reason why it moves it; we must ex­amine the opinions which have been on this Subject, that we may chuse the most reasonable, which may serve for a founda­tion to know the nature and the effects of this Passion.

But we must first observe, that Laugh­ter which is made by the convulsion of the muscles of the face, was never taken by any for a true Laughter, being a thing against Nature, whereto the Will never [Page 207]contributed, as it doth in all other things: Such perhaps is that which succeeds the wounds of the Diaphragma, and that which that herb of Sardinia causeth, which is called Apium risus, whence the Proverb is of the Sardinian laughter. Even they say that Saffron, the Tarantu­la, and some other Potions, produce the same effect. But perhaps the Laughter which is caused by these later, is no true convulsion, no more then that which ar­rives in doatings, and in the fits of the Mo­ther; and that it may have the same mo­tive as true Laughter hath, as you will see hereafter.

This being supposed, we might at first suspect, that those objects which cause Laughter, are those which are pleasing and delightful; because that Laughter and Tears being contrary, they must have contrary causes; and therefore that Laughter comes from Joy, since Tears proceed from Grief. In effect, it seems that Laughter is never separate from Pleasure; and even those who force themselves to laugh, endeavour always to appear merry and contented. Yet be­cause all pleasing things do not move Laughter, that even it happens not when [Page 206]Joy is at the highest; and that Beasts, which are affected with that Passion, are not capable of Laughter; we must hold it for undoubted, that that then is not the general motive, and that the Reasons to maintain this opinion do onely prove that the objects ought onely to be pleasing, but not that they are therefore ridiculous. And if Scorn and Indignation cause a true Laughter, it is most likely that accepta­bleness and pleasure are not always to be found with it.

This consideration hath made some think that Admiration was the cause of Laughter, and that when any wonderful thing presented it self to our Mindes, it at the same time formed this Passion; and that for that cause Man onely laughed, because there was none but he that admired; That facetious words and actions were ridiculous, because they are new, and that Novelty is the source of Admiration; That, in fine, ignorants and fools laughed more then wise men, be­cause they finde more things to be admi­red then they did. But although at first this opinion take the Minde, yet doth it not satisfie it; and hath its difficulties as well as the former: For, there are divers [Page 208]things wonderful, and which we admire, which do not make us laugh: even if ad­miration be very great, it hinders Laugh­ter. And it is to no purpose to say that it ought to be mean and light to move it, since it often happens that we laugh at those things which we very much admire. Indeed, the address which a facetious man hath to represent the actions, the words, the gestures of another, to tell jests, to make subtil and ingenious en­counters, is no less to be admired then that of a Painter who makes some excel­lent designe, or of a man who seriously relates very fine things: Why then doth the admiration which that causeth, excite Laughter, and that of this hinder it? Are there not an hundred kinde of things which are new, which are admired with mediocrity, as the most part of those are which are rare, which yet cause not Laughter? On the contrary, are there not some which seem to have lost the grace of a novelty, and which cannot be­get admiration, which yet are ridiculous? He who tells a good tale, is often the first that laughs at it; and yet it is neither new nor admirable, seeing he knew it before. As there are then ridiculous things which [Page 209]are marvellous, and others which are not so, we must seek the cause elsewhere then in Admiration.

Many, to shun these difficulties, have joyned these two opinions together, and said, that Joy and Admiration was the true motive of Laughter; and that if there are wonderful things which move it not, it is because they are not agreeable, in the same manner as the agreeable are not ri­diculous unless they are marvellous. But it is certain, that the greatest part of the inconveniences which we have observed, are herein also to be found; and that there are divers things which are pleasing and wonderful, which never move Laugh­ter. Is there any thing so fair or so ad­mirable as the Sun? All the diversi­ties of flowers and fruits which the sea­sons bring us, all the treasures which the earth affords us, all those master-pieces wherewith Art furnisheth us, and all those rarities which strangers send us, Are they not delightful? do they not oblige us to admire them? Yet was never any body seen to laugh at the sight of all these things.

Others have imagined that all these opinions might be maintained with mo­dification; [Page 210]that it was true, to speak ab­solutely, Joy and Admiration did not cause Laughter, but when they were re­creative, that is to say, when they were not serious, and that they happened in Plays; then they move it; and that Na­ture requiring these divertisements to refresh the Minde and the Body, and give them new forces, it by that exteriour mo­tion made the pleasure appear which it there searched. But are there not Plays and divertisements which do not cause Laughter? And should we reduce them to facetious things, how should we finde them in ticklishness, in the encounter of friends, in indignation and in anger, and even in the admiration of serious things?

This is what the Philosophers have left us touching ridiculous things▪ But since they do not satisfie us, let us see what the Poets and Orators have said on the Subject: for the Ridiculous is the object of Comedy; and the Orator is sometimes obliged to employ it in his Discourses. Aristotle and Cicero must be consulted about the business. The first, treating of Comedy, defined what was ri­diculous to be A deformity without a [Page 211]grief. And truely it seems, that what we call Ridiculous, is an imperfection which in appearance causeth no ill to him who hath it: For, did we think it would cause any, it would not move Laughter, but Compassion. And this deformity is ob­servable in all what's done or said against the custom, expectation, or opinion of the Wise.

As for Cicero, he confesseth there is de­formity in the ridiculous; but he will have another condition then that which Aristotle observed: For he says, that its Nature consists in representing ugly and deformed things with a good grace. And if there are words and actions to be found which delightfully discover the defects of others, they will infallibly move Laugh­ter.

These two Opinions have without rea­son been followed or rejected by many Philosophers. For those who say it com­prehends not all ridiculous things, and that there is no ugliness or deformity at the first sight in persons which are dear unto us, in tickling, and in divers other serious things which make us laugh; last­ly, that an impertinent performs acti­ons and discourses with an ill grace, [Page 212]which are extremely ridiculous: Those, I say, are deceived as well as others who in general seek the nature and essence of what is Ridiculous, binding themselves to these definitions, as if they perfectly exprest it, and perplexing their mindes to excuse the defects they meet in them: for it is certain, that neither the one nor the other consider the Ridiculous but in re­lation to the Stage or the Bar; that Cicero observes that which befits an Orator, and that Aristotle comprehends all the ridicu­lous Subjects which may serve in Comedy. So that the Objections made against them are vain and weak, forasmuch as tickling belongs no ways to the Theatre, no more then impertinencies done with an ill grace are not admitted into the Rules of Oratory. And indeed, to shew you that Aristotle did not discourse of the Ridicu­lous like a Philosopher, and that he en­quired not its essential form, he hath not mentioned those deformities in those places where he examined the causes of Laughter. And were we to suppose it, would it not be useless to know the nature of this Passion? What reason is there that an object should move Laughter for being deformed without grief?

I know well that there are some who have said that Laughter was composed of Grief and Joy; that that proceeds from deformity, as Joy comes from that it is without Grief; and that in the com­bat which these two Passions give the Minde, are formed those contrary moti­ons of the heart, of the Diaphragma, and of the other parts, which appear in Laugh­ter. But what likelihood is there that Sorrow should have a share in this acti­on? How can it cause a violent agitation, or subsist so long with that excess of Plea­sure, being so little and so light as it is fi­gured? What Grief can we be sensible of at the meeting of persons we love, in the relation of good news, or in some in­genious encounter? And we must not say that the Smile, which these objects move, is no true Laughter: for the one differs not from the other, but in that one is greater or less; and we see every moment, that the same object moves Laughter in some, and but Smiles in others.

These are the most considerable opini­ons which have been on this Subject, which in my opinion are all wanting, in that they suppose that there are divers kindes of ridiculous things and of Laugh­ters; [Page 214]and that there can no general noti­on be found, which can be equally com­mon to them: for I cannot imagine that Nature, who is so regular and so uniform in all its other actions, should forget it self in this; that she would give several cau­ses to one effect; and that it being true that all kinde of Laughter hath somewhat that is common, the soul should have no general motive for so common and gene­ral an action.

We must then endeavour to discover it, and if we do not succeed, use the same excuses which the difficulty of the enqui­ry afforded those who made, it before us; since perhaps, there is nothing in na­ture whose knowledge is more hid, then that of this.

Whereunto that we may attain, we must first consider: that we never laugh, but when the soul is in some manner de­ceived, and surprised; as may be seen in all the ridiculous actions which Aristotle calls deformities without grief; since they are all against the custome, against the expectation, and against the sence of the Wise.

It is the same thing in the unex­pected encounter of a pleasing thing, [Page 215]and in an injury which we receive from a man we did beleeve ought not to offend us; in the good, or in the ill, which happens to those who are worthy of it: For there is therein every way somewhat, which by its novelty surpriseth the minde, which is to be found even in tickling; whence it comes to pass, that we laugh not when we tickle our selves, because we are not new, nor strange to our selves.

Yet this surprise must be light; for if it be violent, it astonisheth the minde, and so powerfully averts it, that it cannot go to the outward parts to make them move. So that objects which are very wonder­ful, and extremely pleasing move us not to laughter, but to ravishment and ex­tasies, as terrible ones cause fear and astonishment; 'tis not that we say that the lightest surprise is that which moves laughter the more; it is onely to be un­derstood, in comparison of that which a­stonisheth or ravisheth the minde; for it is evident that the greater, so as it do not disturb and carry away the spirit, will cause the more vehement laughter; making not only the muscles of the face move, but even those of the flanks and brests, as in its place hereafter.

This surprise must also be pleasing, and those ridiculous objects must produce some kinde of Joy in the soul. It is mani­festly sensible in facetious things, and in the encounter of friends: and we never seek the occasions of laughing, but for the pleasure we think to finde therein. And although we may doubt of that Laughter which indignation, scorn, and anger some­times move; yet we will shew, that ne­vertheless there is still somewhat which affords contentment, either true or feign­ed: for it is certain, there is a lying and dissembled Laughter, wherein effectually there is no sensible pleasure, and in which we onely feign we receive some; which is very common in flattery and complacen­cy. Often, even although the object be pleasing, the soul will finde in it more pleasure then it is capable to yeeld, and so moves, and, as they say, tickles it self into a Laughter.

But what I esteem most considerable to understand the nature of Laughter, it is, that we seldom use it alone, and that the most part of those objects which power­fully excite it in company, move it not at all in a solitude; so that it seems company affords somewhat to its production, that [Page 217]the soul will make it appear that she is surprised; which would be needless, were there no witness of what she would do: so that she ought not to move Laughter when we are alone. And if in company there happen a pleasant surprise which moves it not, it is because she will not make it appear; as when there is somwhat that displeaseth her, or when prudence or dissimulation hinder it. Yet must we not believe that she makes use of laughter as a mark taken at pleasure, such as those are which proceed from our choice and invention; but as a natural mark, which hath a necessary connexion with the emo­tion she represents.

To know what this connexion is, and the particular reason which obligeth the Soul to use this motion rather then ano­ther, to mark the surprise she is in; you must suppose that in all surprises the Soul retires, and reenters her self, the encoun­ter of an unthought-of thing opposing it self to the liberty of her thoughts, and forcing her to recollect her self the better to discern the presented Object: and then if she intend to make her condition known, she must, according to the Law which proportions the organs and the [Page 218]effects to their causes, stir up in the out­ward parts some motion like unto that which she suffers, and consequently cause the muscles to retire towards their ori­gine as she retires and recollects her self in her self.

Now because the Minde may be surpri­sed by troublesome objects as well as by pleasing ones, this retraction of the muscles may be as well with grief as with joy: and indeed, you see that in Tears the lips and some other parts of the face retire in the same manner as in Laughter. Whence it is, that there are persons in whom it would be difficult to discern at first sight the one from the other, so like they are to one another: which hath made some think that Nature, who be­gins our life with crying and tears, made an essay, and designed these touches which were to be perfected in Laughter, which is never formed before fourty days after birth. Yet as we can never say that the retraction of the lips, which accompanies grief, is a true Laughter; so we must thence conclude that Laughter consists not in the simple motion of the muscles, but that there is also a certain air which Joy sheds over the face, and which [Page 219]causeth the principal difference.

However it be, Laughter being princi­pally destin'd for conversation, the ob­jects which particularly respect it, are those also which the most easily cause Laughter: Such are the actions and face­tious words which comprehend all what is uncomely and deformed, light hurts purposely done or received out of folly, cheats of small consequence, jeers; in a word, all deformities without grief: for all these things move Laugher, forasmuch as they mark the defects of those qualities which are necessary for conversation; as, of a good grace, of decency, of advised­ness, of kindness, and of the rest: the Minde finding it self surprised, when it sees contrary actions to those vertues which are the foundations of society and of a civil life.

All the difficulty which there is herein, is, to know why the Soul would have the sur­prise it suffers in these encounters appear; for it seems as if it were a defect, which she would do better to hide then to disco­ver. In effect, it is a badge of Ignorance, to suffer our selves to be surprised with a Novelty, as it is a mark of Malice to be pleased at the defects of others: Whence [Page 220]it is that Wise men laugh seldomer then others, because that they are neither Ig­norant nor Malicious; that few things are new to them, and that they easily excuse imperfections. Yt if you consider that Man is naturally a lover of himself, that he always pretends excellency and supe­riority; we will not think it strange, if, seeing the defects of others, he seeks to testifie that he is exempt from them, and so would make you believe, by the sur­prise and astonishment they give him, that he is more perfect then they are. Now if a man laugh at his own defects, it is the same as when he is angry with him­self: for, the trouble which these Passi­ons involve the Minde in, hinders it from discerning the objects which move it, and make it esteem that strange, which is its own. However it be, this reason is ge­neral for all ridiculous deformities, and for all things which we scorn: It may even sometimes be applied to that laugh­ter which Anger and Indignation move, forasmuch as either of them supposing some injustice, either in the offence re­ceived, or in the good or ill which we see happen to those who are unworthy of it; the Soul, which testifies the astonishment [Page 221]it causeth, would also silently perswade, that she is not capable of those ill actions, and that she is too just to do good or ill to those who deserve it not. And it is evi­dent, that in this thought she findes her self tickled with some secret joy which accompanies this pretended excellency; but it is small, by reason of the displeasure which goes along with these Passions; the thought of the present ill stifling it even almost at the same time that it is formed: whence it also happens, that this Laugh­ter is light, and of a short continu­ance.

Now if in these encounters we are sen­sibly touched with any pleasure, we need not doubt but that all the objects which cause Laughter are not pleasing, as we said at the beginning of this Discourse. All the difference which there is therein, is, that the Pleasure which follows them hath divers principles: To some, it comes from self love, and from that proper ex­cellency which the soul is glad to make appear: to others, it comes from the love of benevolence, and respects society, which requires the communication of goods and pleasures: For when we laugh at the sight of a friend with caresses and [Page 222]complacencies, we endeavour by that na­tural language to perswade that the per­sons, the actions, and the words are plea­sing to us, and that we esteem them, ei­ther by reason of the excellency they have, or for the pleasure or profit they afford us.

You will perhaps say, that all these con­ditions are not in Tickling, since that in stead of moving Joy, it causeth Sorrow; That there are few persons which appre­hend it not; and therefore that it is not likely that Laughter which comes from it, should be accompanied with pleasure; and that the soul should use it for a mark of that pleasant surprise which she is sen­sible of. But if these Reasons were good, we must banish Pleasure from all the Passions; the object of Love would no longer be pleasing, because that is pungent and unquiet, and that there are but few who fear not to be found there­with. We must even say as much of Joy, since it causeth faintings, and that we fear the excesses thereof, and that sometimes it causeth death. I must confess that Grief mixeth it self with these Passions but as a stranger, having no share in their birth or preservation; they owe both the [Page 223]the one and the other to Pleasure; and when that is no more, then they must ne­cessarily dy. Whatsoever we will believe, we cannot doubt but there is Pleasure in Tickling, since it is never made but by a delicate touch which flatters the Senses: For we cannot say that that kinde of Touching can hurt them; since it pro­vokes sleep, and that by harder pressing the parts we harm them not. On the contrary, you must allow it for granted, that the soul is pleased with that kinde of touch, and that it is ranked amongst the caresses; since we never expect displea­sure from those who tickle us, but esteem them always as our friends: So that Laughter which accompanies that moti­on, is a witness that the soul will return the pleasure it receives, and that the per­son which moves it is grateful to her. Per­haps also that that excellency whereof we have spoken contributes somewhat there­unto; forasmuch as the sense of Feeling being the mark of the good or ill quality of the Minde, and that accordingly as that is more perfect, men are also more spright­ly, as Physiognomy and experience teach us, Man by a natural instinct is pleased with Tickling, and forms a Laughter [Page 224]to signifie the perfection of his Senses and of his Minde.

This then is the nature of this Passion, whence in my opinion it is easie to draw the motive of ridiculous objects: for al­though it seems we have the same Sense with those who have placed the ridicu­lous amongst new and pleasing things; and that the same absurdities which we have observed in that opinion, are to be met in ours: yet if you observe what we have said, you will see a very great difference; because that we add to novelty a circum­stance which they have omitted; to wit, that the soul will witness the surprise which that novelty gives her: so that there are new and pleasant things which do not make us laugh; forasmuch as the soul intends not to discover the sence it hath thereof; so when we are alone, and fancy some merry matter, we usually do not laugh at it, but onely when we re­late it, because then the minde designes to witness the surprise it caused.

I know well it will hereupon be said, that we often laugh alone, and that there are objects which are so powerful that they draw Laughter from the wisest and most solitary men; and that it is common [Page 225]for Fools to laugh in the same manner. But this Truth destroys not that which we have established; forasmuch as all this happens from the errour of the Imagina­tion, which diverts it self from the end Nature had prescribed it. And there are few effects in the Passions, wherein the same disorder may not be: For Exam­ple, the Voice, which was given to crea­tures to shew forth the motions of their Soul, doth often go away through the vi­olence of Grief: Even there are persons who speak and complain when they are alone; and yet it is against the institution of Nature, who destined the voice and speech for instruments of society, and to serve for that communication which crea­tures ought to have together. Now all this proceeds from the disturbance the soul feels, and which makes it wander from the way it should keep.

And without doubt, the laughter which is observed in doatings, comes from the same source; the Imagination forcing ridiculous objects, which afterwards move the Appetite to produce Laughter. For although it be difficult to comprehend how she can figure any pleasant thing a­mongst the griefs those evils produce; [Page 226]and that Reason, which is sometimes at liberty in these encounters, sees nothing which contents it; that she even confes­seth this Laughter to be forced, and yet that she cannot hide it: it is nevertheless very true, that there is still a secret plea­sure, either in the superiour part of the soul, or in the sensitive. For the alienation of the Minde takes away from frantick persons the sense of ill; and giveth liking to the Ridiculous Chimera's which are there formed, to move Laughter: So that if Reason be not hurt, the Pleasure must be hid in the Senses, and unwitting­ly to the Understanding it causeth that commotion there. The Imagination dis­cerns not always exactly the Pleasure which the objects form in the particular Senses, either because it is distracted or surprised, or because the impression they make is secret; although still the spirits, the humours, and the bodies agitate them­selves powerfully. So the first motions of Passions happen in the Minde unawares: and there are divers things which move us, which we can hardly say whether they are troublesome or graceful: we must not then wonder if we sometimes laugh without knowing the cause thereof; it is [Page 227]sufficient if the Senses have a confused and secret knowledge to stir up after­wards that motion in the Appetite: for there is so strong a connexion between these powers, that the one is no sooner touched by the object, but the other re­sents it. In this precipitation, the Soul hath not time to discern what it doth; and the parts are sooner touched, then she is advised of it; and she is not then able to stop the shake which she hath given her self; the spirits and the humours having received the impression thereof, whose impetuosity cannot be so suddenly stayed. And hence the difficulty comes to hinder Laughter when it is vehement, although it be a voluntary action; in the same man­ner as it happens in other Passions, where­in the Soul suffers the same violence as he who runs into a precipice: for although he gave himself that motion, it is no more in his power to stop it; he must abandon himself to the swinge he hath taken, and to that steepness whence he hath precipi­tated himself.

What remains of most importance, is to know why, of all creatures, Man onely laughs, since it appears that other beasts also may be surprised with Novelty: and [Page 228]it is not impossible but that they may have a designe to shew how sensible they are thereof, since they make other things known by their voice and by their acti­ons. But as there are but two motives which oblige Man to witness the surprise which ridiculous objects cause; to wit, his own excellency, and civil society; it is certain that the first is useless to beasts, who are never touched with glory or with vanity. And for Society, it is so im­perfect amongst them, that it respects but the necessities of the body, to which in­deed they work in common, but yet it is but for their particular interest; so that there is no communication of the plea­sure which every one resents; consider­ing that the novelty of agreeable things surpriseth them not, to speak properly, no more then they do men who are quite stupid; because they do not discern whether things are new or no, consider­ing them but as if they had always been present, although, for to know them new, we must imagine they were not always so.

And it is for that reason, that children laugh not before the fourtieth day: for the Soul, which is as it were wholly bu­ried, [Page 229]and as it were drown'd in the great quantity of the humors they have, is ca­pable of no knowledge, but acording as humidity diminisheth these lights en­crease, and so by degrees she gets the power of laughing, beginning by a smile, and after being capable of vehement Laughter. Perhaps some will say, that the excellency wherewith man flatters himself, and the love of society, can no more reach a childe at forty days old then other creatures, being not of a condition to minde either of them; & therefore that they then are not more capable of laugh­ing then beasts are, if there be no other motions but those for laugher.

But it is not necessary exactly to know those things for which we have a natural inclination; for desires being born with us, carry us also by the pure instinct of nature to the enquiry of those goods; and from the time that our soul hath the liberty to act, she produceth actions which shew the secret fence she hath of her own excellency, and of her being destined to a civil life. Now as beasts are capable of neither of them, they have also no share in this instinct, whose sourse is hidden in the intellectual parts of the [Page 230]Soul, and can come from no inferior power: for although there are some kinds of Laughter, which seem wholly to depend from the sensitive, as that which comes from tickling: it is certain that without the influence of the Reaso­nable Faculty, the Senses cannot produce that effect; its light insensibly disperseth it self on all its actions, and the neighbour­hood they have therewith alwayes com­municates somewhat of its perfection, which still serves to shew that beasts are not capable of laughter, because their Senses are deprived of that brightness, and of that influence which Reason cau­seth to flow in ours.

Before I finish this discourse, I must tell you by the way, who those are who are most given to laughter; it is certain, that young folkes laugh more willingly then old ones, women then men, fools then wise men, sanguine then cholerick, flegmatick then melancholy; And this comes from that laughter being made by a pleasing surprise, which we would make known, those are more easily surprised, & are naturally merrier then these: For the spirits which move quick, and which con­sider not things are most easie to be decei­ved; [Page 231]and those who are the most mer­ry, are the most easily touched with pleasant objects, and are more fit for con­versation then others who are severe and serious: Yet as there are divers sorts of ridiculous objects, that some respect our proper excellency, and others society; that there are some which require a great knowledge, as quaint jeers, and others wherein a mean one is onely requisite: So there are also some persons which are more easily touched then others; the young and cholerick laugh rather at the defects of others, then the old and the wise, being naturally insolent and proud; fools & ignorants observe not jests, or wit­ty encounters, women and those of a san­guine, complexion are more fit for the laughter which caresses occasion, because they have a natural inclination to flattery.

After having thus discovered the na­ture of laughter, and of ridiculous things, we shall easily give a reason for all the ef­fects which this Passion produceth on the body; for there are none which proceed not from the surprise, and Joy which the Soul resents: the splendor of the eyes, the redness of the face, and tears come [Page 232]chiefly from Joy; all the rest come from surprise which contracts the muscles to­wards their principle; the soul using that exterior motion to shew that which it suffers interiourly; because as we have said, she retires into her self when she is surprised; so that this contraction of the muscles is as the spring of all the other effects of laughter: And perhaps there is no other made by the souls command, all the rest being of necessity and without design: For it is very unlikely that the soul should intend to form all those plights and wrinkles which are to be at the corners of the eyes, to hold the eyes half shut, and the mouth open to render the voice piercing and interrupted, and so of the rest. But these are effects which by a necessary pursuit accompany the mo­tion of the muscles.

The better to understand this, you must remember from what we have already said, that when the surprise is light, the muscles of the lips, forehead, and lids onely move; because the Soul intending to make the emotion it feels appear, useth this as the most manifest and most sensi­ble motion: But when the Surprise is [Page 233]great, it moves all the muscles of the face and brest; and in fine, if it be very vehe­ment, there are none in the whole body which are not moved.

Now as there are but few muscles which have not their contraries, and that there are some which lift up a part, or car­ry it on one side; there are also those which bring it down, and draw it on the other side: And yet in this contrariety of motion there are some stronger then others; the actions they are to perform requiring more or less strength: From thence it comes, that in Laughter you see the parts take that figure which this con­trariety of motions gives them. So the Mouth keeps half open, because the mus­cles which serve to open and shut it, each moving his way, it must necessarily retain that figure; and even it must appear more shut then open, because the muscles which serve to shut are the strongest. So the Forehead remains smoothe and stretch­ed, being equally drawn upwards and downwards. The Eyes also are half shut, because the muscles which incline the lids, are stronger then those which lift them up; and so consequently the wrin­kles are formed about the temples, the [Page 234]skin, which is delicate and fleshless, being drawn by the motion of those muscles, and constrained to grow uneven. The Nose shrinks up, and grows sharp, because the muscles which lift it up, having no contraries, have always the liberty to lift it up, which cannot be done, but that the skin which covers them must wrinkle, and the extremity of the Nose appear sharp. The Lips lengthen out themselves, because the muscles which draw them on the side, are stronger then those which contract them; and even the upper lip stretcheth it self more then the under, because its muscles are more powerful. The Tongue shortens it self a little, and suspends it self, being equally drawn on either side. The Neck contracts and thickens it self, because the muscles shorten when they retire themselves. The Cheeks for the same reason lift them­selves up, and grow firmer; and, in some, a little dent is formed in the middle of them, the skin being tied in those parts by some small veins which restrain it whilst the surrounding parts lift them­selves up.

Before we seek the causes of the brests and flanks motions, and of that interrupt­ed [Page 235]voice which appears here; we must observe that the muscles do not retire themselves in a vehement laughter by an uniform and continued contraction, but by several girds and shakes; whether it be that in the designe the Minde hath to witness its surprise, it moves it self, and redoubles its struglings; or that the no­velty of the object sollicites it, and by fits represents it self unto it, as it chan­ceth to be in other Passions, wherein eve­ry moment the soul animates and trans­ports it self by those new Idea's which the object forms in the Fancie.

This then is the reason why those re­doubled motions appear in Laughter, and chiefly in the flanks, by reason of the Dia­phragma which is there situated, and which is extremely moveable. And be­cause the agitation is violent, it causeth also a pain in this part, whither the hands cast themselves, as if they ought to ease it. For although they unwittingly do it, Nature who takes care for the preservation of its parts, directs the hands to those places where the ill may offend them, without being led thither by Rea­son or Discourse. So when a man falls, or is ready to receive a blowe, the hands by [Page 236]a natural instinct cast themselves present­ly before the face.

As for the rest, as the Diaphragma is the chief organ of respiration, that must necessarily be made with the same shakes which that part suffers: and afterwards the voice must be interrupted, because the air issues not equally, and the muscles which should form it, start up as the Dia­phragma doth. For we said, that all the muscles retired themselves by surprises in a vehement laughter: Whence it hap­pens that the head, the shoulders, and the arms shake themselves in the same fashion as the flanks do. In fine, this general con­traction which is made in all the organs of voluntary motion, is the cause that all the body folds up and contracts it self, that it is impossible to swallow any thing, be­cause the muscles which serve for that action, contract and shut up their passages; and that Laughter sometimes causeth the same effects as Medicines do, by the com­pression of those parts which contain the humours. Now forasmuch as these fre­quent girds of the Diaphragma hinder the liberty of respiration, and are the cause it cannot contract and enlarge it self as it ought; thence it comes, that at last [Page 237]breath and speech is lost, that the pulse grows irregular, weakness follows, and sometimes death: For respiration is so necessary for life, that when it is hinder­ed, the forces are lost, and the whole oeco­nomy of Nature changed. For which cause, in this necessity the soul struggles very much to oppose this disorder: some­times she makes haste to draw a great quantity of air, as if she stole that refresh­ment from the violence of her passion: sometimes she makes a long breathing, to drive away those fumes which the heat of the heart at every moment produceth, and so forms those precipitated sobs and sighs which mingle themselves with Laughter.

I do not stay particularly to examine why the Pulse beats irregularly, nor why weakness and syncopes happen in this en­counter: It is well known that the Pulse and Respiration follow one the other, be­ing both destined to one end; and that weakness and faintings come from the disorder which is made in the heart, which cannot suffer a greater, then the hinderance of respiration.

Before we end this enquiry, it will not be amiss to rehearse the opinions which [Page 238]have been hitherto held touching the motion of the muscles in Laughter; be­cause the absurdities in them, will the more confirm the causes we have dedu­ced. All who have spoken thereof, have agreed in this point, that this motion is made out of necessity, and that the Soul is not mistress thereof: But some have believed the Spirits were the cause; o­thers, that it was the agitation of the heart. The first say that Joy driving the Spirits to the outward parts, it there­withal fills the muscles, which are thereby constrained to shrink up and contract themselves, as it happens in convulsionfits. But if this were true, all the Passions which carry the Spirits outwardly, must move Laughter: Shame, Anger, and Desire would never appear without it; and a Fever and pain would cause a man to laugh continually, seeing they fill the face with blood and spirits. Others who believe the agitation of the heart is the source of all these motions, say that Joy causing it to move, the Diaphragma which is tied to it, must necessarily do so follow­ing its motion, and that after it moves the muscles of the brest and lips, where­with it hath communication and sympa­thy, [Page 239]as it is easie to judge by the convul­sion of the lips, which always accompa­nies the hurts of the Diaphragma. To confirm this, they assure us, that beasts laugh not, because their Diaphragma is tyed to the heart with looser and weak­er ligatures then it is to mans, whence it is that the heart cannot shake it whate­ver commotion Joy make.

But this opinion is no less absurd then the former; for then in all the Passions where­in the heart is extraordinarily agitated, the Diaphragma must be shaken in the same manner, and must move Laughter; and even Laughter could never be with­out the agitation of the Diaphragma, if it were true that its contraction causeth that of the lips, which are all contrary to experience: And therefore the observa­tion they bring of the ligaments of the Diaphragma is inconsiderable, and serves not at all to prove what they pre­tend: For if that of men is more strong­ly tyed to the membrane that covers the heart, then to that of beasts; that comes from that it being inclined downwards, and altogether hanging in the humane body, by reason of its upright figure, it is necessary it should be more strong­ly [Page 240]born up then that of beasts which hath not that situation.

As for the sympathy it hath with the lips, I finde it somewhat doubtful, because besides that it communicates not to them all the dispositions it hath, we have often observed great hurts in that part, which have not excited Laughter; and if that have sometimes happened, I beleeve not that it was an effect of the convulsion; since Hippocrates says, that who so re­ceives a wound in that part, laughs from the first of his hurt, and feels no convul­sion till the third day after; so that it is likely it was not the convulsion, but rather the raving whereinto he fell, which caused that Laughter after the manner beforesaid.

It is then a most certain thing, that the motion of the muscles which forms Laughter, is a voluntary action made by the souls command, and not by necessity, as tears, sweat, the lustre and the redness of the face are, so that they may be hindered and restrained at first, when the humours and the spirits are not yet much shaken; and thence it comes that oftentimes hold­ing your mouth shut, your breath and voice being constrained to pass through [Page 241]the nostrils, cause an interrupted bel­lowing, which is observed in laugh­ing.

As for the luster of the eyes, the colour and blthness which appears in the face; for the voice which becomes grosser for sweat and tears, we have already said they come from Joy, which every way disper­seth the spirits, dissolves the humours, and opens the passages. But I would add for what concernes Tears; that the mo­tion of the muscles, which causes the eyes and the lids to move, is the principal cause thereof. For when they come to close themselves, they press and squeeze the humors and the spirits, and constrain them to issue; and indeed all those parts are soft and moist, and the under-lid is situated so, that it easily receives the hu­mors which run from the neighbouring parts: It seems even that Nature desti­ned them to that end; were it to enter­tain the freshness, and natural humidity of the eye, or to discharge it from that which might incommodate it? And there is a great appearance that the little holes which appear on the side of that lid, when it begins to quit the corner of [Page 242]the eye, was onely made to void those humors, when they are in too great a quantity; which being so, we need not doubt but when that part contracts it self, the humour which is contained therein, must be forced to issue at that lit­tle passage, and must render the eyes moist: And what confirms me in this o­pinion, is, that tears run not in Laughter, as in Joy, and in Grief: it seems that they are forced, and that they issue but by compulsion; and it is easie to judge that their source comes not from so high a place as the others, and that you need go no farther then the neighbourhood to seek it; neither are they ever so abundant as in those Passions, the eyes from whence they come being not capable to contain so much humor as the brain; and even those whom sorrow hath never caused to weep, by reason of their natural driness, finde tears when they laugh, because they come but from the neighbouring parts, no more then those which sore eyes some­times cause. Let us then conclude that Joy carries the humors, and the spirits to the outward parts, and that the agitati­on of the muscles stirs them, and sends [Page 243]them out, whence comes teares in the eyes, and sweat in the face, and flanks; Because that it is in that place where the Motion is most violent, and the skin most delicate.

CHAP. V. The Characters of Desire.

IF the Soul (according to Socrates) hath wings, they can onely be in the Desires; it is they which move her wherever she will go: they raise her up to heaven, and make her descend into the abyss; and by a strange and wonderful kinde of motion, they cause her to go out of her self without di­viding her, and transport her everywhere without ever quitting the place wherein she is. And we may say, that Nature was never so wise or ingenious in any of her works, as in this: For, having made the Soul void and unprovided of all things, and having placed all necessary goods without her, she was obliged to furnish her with a vertue which might carry her towards them, and which might unite [Page 245]them together. She must have afforded her, in the prison wherein she hath enclo­sed her, the use of that liberty which was born with her; and without breaking her chains, she must suffer her to go thorow the Universe, which she hath submitted to her laws and judgements. In fine, after having been drawn from heaven, and been banished from the place of her birth, she must needs give way, at least to her thoughts, to return sometimes thither. And that during her exile she may have some commerce with those Divine things wherewith she is allyed, which at last ought to crown the pains and labours of her banishment; now she hath given her Desires, to draw her to those goods she was without; to set her at liberty, and to raise her up to heaven, which is the place of her nativity, and the source of her fe­licities.

We must indeed believe that the princi­pal objects which ought to move this fair Passion in us, are not to be found on earth, nor amongst vile & transitory things: our Soul being immortal, needs not corrupti­ble things: And if there are things which conduce to her perfection, they must be more noble and more excellent then she: [Page 246]she must seek them from above. In a word, God alone should enflame her Desires, since he alone can fill that infinite depth and immense vastness of hers.

Neither did this wise Philosopher who fancied she had wings, think they were for any other use but to carry her towards that primary and soveraign Idea of Good. When he perceived her to descend, and run after corruptible things, he then be­lieved she had lost them; that she rather got a fall, then made a flight; that she was then in the body, not onely as in a Prison, but as in a Tomb: For being sen­sible of no natural motion therein, nor seeing no agitation of that Divine fire wherewith they say she is clothed, he had reason to believe that she ceased to live, or that she transmigrated into the nature of those Bruits which onely look on the earth, and which according to his opinion are rather shadows then that they have true beings. It is true, that the Senses which are under her conduct, oblige her to seek what is fit for her; that she must provide for the necessities of the body, which serves her in her functions: But Reason hath reduced her cares to such narrow bounds, and Nature hath render'd [Page 247]necessary things so common, that there is scarce a way left to wish them: at least, if we must employ thereabouts a part of our Desires, it ought to be the weakest, and the least.

It were indeed to offend the dignity of the Soul, and the excellency of those Goods whereto she ought to aspire, to destine so many noble desires which she can form, to such vile and useless things; it were even in stead of enriching her, to ren­der her necessitous, since it is certain, that Desire is the measure of Poverty, and that as many things as the Soul desires, so many things doth she stand in need of: So that, in seeking more goods for the body then are needful, she renders it so much the more necessitous, and oppresseth it with the poverty she hath caused.

Lastly, the Desires being as the pawns and earnests which the Soul gives of her subjection to those things she seeks, if they are conformable to Nature, and her dignity, this subjection is honest and law­ful; they are her first steps towards ver­tue and felicity: But if she engageth her self to subjects unworthy of her, she sub­mits her self to her enemies, and opens a door to all vices & mischances which may befal her.

We ought to engage our selves no fur­ther in these Considerations which belong to Moral Philosophy; we will therefore pursue our Designe, and present you with the Characters of this Passion.

It is a bold undertaking, to designe the picture of Desire. It is so subtil and so changeable a Passion, that it is almost im­possible to finde colours wherewith to re­present it: It is a Proteus which assumes as many figures as there are imaginary goods: It incessantly flies like the winde, it everywhere mixeth it self like the air: And Picture cannot have a greater trou­ble to form bodies for these things, then the Minde to designe the Characters of this Passion.

It is true, there are Desires which may easily be exprest; that without difficulty we may describe Ambition, Avarice, and Luxury; that Hunger, and other Appe­tites of Sense, may easily be exprest. But to touch these differences, is not to form a general Idea of Desire, as we have ob­liged our selves to do. To follow then the Order we have proposed, we must take off this Passion from all particu­lar objects, and consider onely the ef­fects which are common to all kindes. [Page 249]We will then begin by its Moral acti­ons.

Although Desires, as children of Love, make the same advance and growth with Love it self, and that at their birth they are but small sparks which by little and little inrease, and afterwards become great flames; yet it often happens that they break out all at once, and that at first they have the same force and vehemency which time useth to give them; you would think them those artificial fires which kindle in an instant, and whose flame no sooner appears, but it devours all the matter which serves for its food, which carries with it all that stops it, and over­comes all that opposeth its course. For at the same time that they take in the Minde, they occupie all its thoughts, they take away its reason, and hurry it towards the desired good thorow all obstacles and hinderances that oppose it. At that time, she slights all counsels, and all danger. Prohibition kindles her lusts, & difficulty provokes them: Neither doth she believe that her Desires can be noble, unless they are extreme; nor generous, unless they be rash.

In pursuit of these dangerous Maximes, [Page 250]you need not wonder that he who is mo­ved with this Passion, becomes insolent and importunate; he speaks but of what he wishes, he incessantly demands it, nei­ther doth a refusal give him the check; and when his mouth is stopt, his eyes still sollicite for it, and beg more eagerly then his words did before. You may observe a certain impatient ardor, and I know not what urging avidity which seems to pur­sue the desired good. And when it is pre­sented to them, you would say they throw themselves on it, that they ravish it, and devour it even with their looks.

But if in this encounter his eyes are clear sighted, his judgement is blinded; he neither considers his own nor other mens condition. In his pursuits, there al­ways is either an insolent liberty, or an infamous submission: and all the excuse he hath for his impudence or baseness, is, that he believes he deserves what he de­sires, and that absolutely he must have it. To obtain it, what cares and what pains he takes! He goes, he comes, he seeks; he adviseth with one, he asks help of ano­ther; he threatens, he begs: in fine, he is never at rest, & suffers no body to be so; for even when he is alone, he turns over in [Page 251]his mind all those powers which may serve or travers him. He hath no thoughts where­in some of his friends or of his enemies are not interessed: and whoever could see the designes he meditates in his heart, would say that it was there where all the storms were formed, which were to trou­ble all the world. But indeed, all these tempests commonly are nothing else but a noise; they vanish in useless and impo­tent designes; and all the ill they cause, is that they drive away the tranquillity of the Minde they move in. And truely, whoever desires, is exposed to four Passi­ons, which, as impetuous windes, inces­santly agitate him: Audacity and Fear, Hope and Despair, do alternatively shake him, and often so hastily succeed one the other, that they mix and confound them­selves together. He fears, he hopes, he despairs at the same time; he wills, and he will not; and often, through the vio­lence of desiring, he knows not what he desires.

His irresolution and his disquiet ap­pears even outwardly: for he cannot re­main in one place, or in one posture; he turns from the one side to the other; he sits, he riseth, he goes with long strides, [Page 252]and stops of a sudden. Sometimes he so profoundly doats, that you would think him ravished in an Extasie; and at that instant he awakes, sending forth, with great sighs, now a sharp, and now a lan­guishing voice. His words are interrupt­ed with sobs and tears, and his discourse is full of long exclamations and passionate accents, which commonly accompany im­patience, regret, and languor. He most commonly speaks to himself, interrogates and answers himself: And if others en­tertain him, his minde is always distract­ed, his answers confused and entangled, and sometimes even his speech is cut quite off, what endeavour soever he makes to utter it. His mouth is filled with a clear and subtil water; his tongue trembles by intervals; and licking his lips, he moistens and whitens them with froth. His face is swelled, and grows red; his head advan­ceth it self on the desired object; his arms extend themselves towards it. Even his heart, as straitned and contracted as it is, darts it self out in great throbs, and raiseth the brest with so much vio­lence, that the ribs sometimes are dis­joynted. Appetite and Sleep fosake him. Sometimes he grows Gray in a [Page 253]moment; all his radical moisture is con­sumed; his body grows lean and dry; and nothing but Enjoyment or Death can terminate his languor and his de­sires.

PART. 2. Of the Nature of Desire.

AT first, it seems as if there were no difficulty to say what desire is; as it never forms it self, but for those things which we have not, and which we would have, we may easily beleeve that the object which excites it, is an absent good that the Soul endeavours to draw neer unto it, and that the motion it makes towards it, causeth also all the essence of this Passion.

But who ever examines it carefully, will finde more doubts then resolutions, and in pursuit will confess that there are many things to be desired in the com­mon knowledge of the desires; for be­sides that we desire the good we possess, and that ill oftentimes is wished; it is e­vident that this definition confounds de­sire [Page 255]and Love, and makes no essential difference which may distinguish them one from another; for if the good by be­ing absent moves the desire, we must cease to love that good when it is absent from us, or Love and Desire must be but one Passion, although it be an unheard of thing amongst the Philosophers, that two species should be confounded in one, and that we should cease to love good when it is no longer present. Besides that absence seems not to be the true Object of Desire, nor to be any part of it, as some have thought, since there is nothing in it which is able to draw the appetite to it, being ra­ther an il then a good; & therefore the de­sire having no other object but goodness, and seeing the motion it makes towards it ought to be like that of Love, it must needs be (against the maximes of the most wholesome Philosophy) that they are not two different Passions; and that Love, Desire, and Joy it self, are but the same thing.

Now this conclusion took its original from that these Passions were defined in too general termes, and that the diffe­rence of the motion was not specified, wch was proper to every of them: for since [Page 256]all their essence consists in motion, if they are different amongst themselves, it must be by the diversity of their motions, and their definitions must express the particu­lar agitation which is found in every of them.

To finde that then of Desire, we must suppose that this Passion alwayes follows Love: because we onely Desire the things we beleeve good; and when ill excites our desires, it is always under the show and appearance of good: For the death which an unhappy man seeks, seems to him the haven and end of his mise­ries: danger to men of courage is the fountain of glory and honour. In fine, all the world desires the estrangement of ill, for that it is a good to be delivered from it.

Desire therefore hath good for its ob­ject, and consequently it alwayes follows Love; since Love is the first motion the Soul makes after good; in effect assoon as the appetite hath received the image, and Idea of good, it moves towards it, and at that instant unites it self to it, be­cause it is presented to it; and this union causeth the Passion of Love, as we have said before: but because this union gives [Page 257]us not always the perfect possession, whe­ther it be that the good presents it self not alwayes wholly, or whether the things besides that Ideal being which they have in their thoughts, have another true and real one, which also requires a real uni­on; when the Soul hath acknowledged that it hath not wholly enjoyed the good which was presented to it, it is unsatisfied with the first motion it made towards it, not to have been united to its Idea, it seeks it out of it self, and forms this Passion which we call Desire.

This being granted, it is easie to con­ceive what the motion of the appetite is, when it is agitated in this encounter: for in Love it moves straight forwards to the Idea of good; but in Desire it seems to quit it, and as if it would run out of it self, it darts it self towards the absent ob­ject: So that it is very likely these two motions are made one after the other, principally if they are violent; for eve­ry of them wholly moving the Soul, and driving it several wayes, it seems as if they could not meet together, and that of necessity the appetite must first unite it self to the imagined good; since it pursues it, when it is absent, and that [Page 258]afterwards it takes its first course going from one to the other, after the same man­ner from time to time; in effect we experi­ment, that the desires appear not in the Soul, but as lightnings; that they are onely throws and flashes which it gives it self, and that their continuance depends onely from the doubles and frequent re­prizes they make.

So that they may be exactly defined, in saying, That they are Motions of the Appetite, by which the Soul darts it self towards the ab­sent good, purposely to draw near and unite it self thereunto.

Yet must you not imagine, that the Ap­petite in darting it self so, goes beyond its natural bounds, and that as animate bo­dies it goes from one to another, to ad­vance towards the absent good: all this agitation is made in it self, as we said in the discourse of Love; and although it seems as if it would cast it self out, it one­ly beats against its bounds, and drives those parts as waves, which beat on the shore without being able to go far­ther.

But since in effect the Soul goes not out of it self, and that consequently it ap­proacheth not the destined good, we may [Page 259]enquire to what purpose the motion serves which it makes in this encounter: we must doubtless confess that it is often useless to it, if it penetrates not into the Faculties, which may move the creature towards the good, and give it the posses­sion thereof: For Nature hath given the Appetite the power to move it self thus, onely to inspire the same Motion into those Faculties which are under its di­rection. The agitation it gives it self, is the Idea of that which the moving quali­ties ought to have outwardly; it is like the chalk, and the designe of a work which is to be finished in the Organs; but if it rest there, they prove vain and useless throws and sallies; they are imperfect Motions and unformed desires, which in some manner offend Nature; for that she having destined them for action, they destroy the order and commerce which she hath established amongst the Facul­ties of the Soul, when they drive them not to the end she proposeth.

In effect, there is so great a relation, and so essential an order between the De­sire and the enjoyment; that we never form desires for those things which we beleeve impossible; because the Soul at [Page 260]that time hath no end nor aim to work, and can produce no action, unless it have a motive to excite it, and which staggers it, since that the end is the first of all cau­ses, and that which gives them efficacy and Motion.

I know that there are several things we unprofitably seek which can never be ac­quired, what care or pains soever we take: but for that we do not consider the impediments and obstacles, which we ought therein to encounter: And if rea­son sometimes proposeth them, and that contrary to its advice we continue to wish for them; this disorder comes from the imagination, which most commonly fan­cies things feasible, which easily perswade the Appetite thereunto, which afterwards causeth those vain and chimerical desires, of which we have now spoken.

It is far a greater difficulty to know how this darting forth may be effected, when Desire mixeth it self with Fear, Grief, and other Passions where the Soul inwardly retires it self, and venters it self sooner then it seems to have gone out.

We may well beleeve that these Mo­tions follow one another, as we said it happens in Love, that after the presence [Page 261]of ill hath made the Appetite retreat, Desire sends it forth again to seek the good, which is to accrew unto it by the absence of the ill; and that there is thus every moment a continual ebbing and flowing of all these Passions; but I be­leeve this happens not always so, and that even in flying, the Soul may make the Motion which the Desire asketh, without being obliged to return the same way. As he who flees his enemy, at the same time gets farther from him, and neerer the place of his security; so it is likely the Appetite retiring it self, may at once shun evil and pursue good: and that the same endeavours and the same strivings it makes to hasten its flight, may also serve to form those desires which it hath to possess the good it fancies; and that it seeks to go out of it self in the same manner, as when there is nothing but what is purely good which attracts it; for the Soul is so much disturbed at the pre­sence of ill, that it seems as if it were not enough to flee and estrange herself from it; but that she must even hide and steal her self away from her self, that she may by precipitating her flight go beyond her bounds, and go out of herself, as [Page 262]she doth in the pursuit of good. But it is an errour which the Passions easily inspire in a blind power, which is not guided by Reason; whatsoever endeavour she makes, she remaines still within her own limits, and leaves not those places which she beleeves she hath abandoned: it is true that the Spirits which follow the Motions, in effect retire to the Centre of the Body, and that the Organs cause a re­al flight in the creature, which is surpri­sed with this Passion; but all this is with­out the Soul, and we are to speak onely of what is within.

For the full clearing of this definition we have given, there remains onely to be examined, whether the Absent Good is the true Object of Desire; for we proposed at the beginning of this discourse two ve­ry considerable Objections which seem to prove the contrary, since it is evident we often desire the things we enjoy; and that Absence being an evil, is rather capable to take off the Appetite, then to provoke it thereunto; so that in this case, the Ob­ject of Desire cannot be different from that of Love, and so both must be but one Passion.

For the first we have already shewed in [Page 263]the former Discourses, that when we de­sire the good we possess, we alwayes fan­cy somewhat which we doe not yet enjoy, whether it be that the most part of goods not presenting themselves to it in the whole, there must still be a part wanting, or whether this possession be­ing to be but of a short continuance we desire its continuation as a good which is still to come.

To the second, we must say, although it be true that absence draws not the Ap­petite, and that it is goodness onely; it doth not therefore follow, that Love and Desire have the same Motives, nor that both make but one Passion; for besides that it seems that Motion draws not al­ways its species from the end it tends un­to; but ever from the middle through which it passeth to reach thither; as we may judge by the circular Motion, which is onely different from the direct, but for that it makes a bent line; and for that cause should these Passions have but one Object, yet they must be of different species, by reason of the different way they take to attain it; it is true, that in moral things the conditions and circum­stances which have no relation with the [Page 264]Object diversifie the Motives of Actions, and that the absence of Good gives ano­ther Motion to the Soul then goodness of it self alone gives; for although it al­ways seeks to unite it self to the good it knows, if it be not present, it must add another design to this first inclination, and take care to draw near what is far from it, before it can unite it self, and gain a per­fect enjoyment; so that the true Motion of Desire is the Souls drawing neer, and not the union nor enjoyment; that be­ing the Motive of Love, and this of Plea­sure, as we have it elsewhere. Where­fore the Appetite is agitated by several Motions in all these Passions; for in this it Parts it self, and gets out of itself; in Love it binds it self to the Idea of Good, and in pleasure pours it self on it.

PART 3. What the Motion of the Hu­mours and of the Spirits is in Desire.

SInce the Motion of the Spirits is con­formable to that of the Appetite, we may without much difficulty, say how they are agitated in this Passion, af­ter we have showed how the Appetite in some sort diverts it self from the Idea of good, to move towards the absent Object.

For Love which always precedes De­sire, having drawn them from the heart, and carried them to the imagination, to unite them to the image of the good it fancied; Desire follows, which retires them and casts them forth, to come neerer the good it thinks far of: And thence it happens, that the face swels and grows [Page 266]red, that the eyes advance themselves, and seem as if they would go out of their place; the spirits which escape drawing with them the most noble parts, and driving those which oppose their is­sue.

But it may be demanded, if the Ap­petite effectually goes not out of it self, is it therefore so with the Spirits? is it sufficient they beat against their bounds, and stop after that vain endeavour? cer­tainly the greatest part pass no farther; as they are the first Organs of the Soul, without which she can effect no perfect action, she with-holds them to her power, neither do they separate themselves from her but with great violence; for if as it is likely, they are animated, or if they are of those instruments which will al­wayes be united to their principle, they cannot go far from the Soul without lo­sing themselves; and when that happens, it must be against their intention, since every thing endeavours its own preser­vation; when therefore Desire drives them to the surface of the Body, the Soul which is constrained to keep within its bounds, keeps in also the Spirits; but this hinders not a part of them from [Page 267]escaping, and the impetuosity of their Motion from casting them beyond their prescribed limits. They are fluid bodies, they disperse and steal away with the least agitation, they penetrate everywhere, and no resistance can stop them; and al­though as they are Organs of the Soul, they love to be always with her; yet as they are subtil and loose bodyes, which have a great affinity with the air, their first in­clination is to deliver themselves from the prison wherein they are, and to leave the mixture of those gross and impure things, to unite themselves to their like.

But it is also true, that they often is­sue by the Souls command; which be­cause it cannot leave the body it ani­mates, it sends them to execute its de­signes, and causeth that transport, and that influence of Spirits, of which we have spoken in our Discourse of Love out of Inclination.

Yet we must observe that all desires drive not the Spirits into the outward parts; there are those which move them not, as those which are formed in the su­pream part of the Soul, whose actions need no Organs. It is true those desires [Page 268]cannot long stay without the Motion of the Spirits: for the Imagination is so neer the Understanding, that at last it always discovers a part of what it doth chuse; and then working on the Idea's it hath re­ceived, the Spirits run to its service, and agitate the body in the most secret actions of the will; so that in the most Spiritual Passions, which should be hid from infe­rior powers, we see they bear a part, and sensibly alter the Body.

There are even of these desires, which are formed in the sensitive Appetite, some which crave no assistance from the out­ward Senses: For when we desire a good which is no more, or is far distant from us, we know that neither the ears, nor the eyes are employed in the inquiry of it. The Soul alone operates, and even then the Spirits it moves arrive not at these Organs: They cast themselves onely on the substance of the brain, and disperse themselves on this and on that side, with­out causing a change in the outward parts.

In fine, it is an undoubted thing, that the Desire which accompanies Fear, A­versness, and the other Passions, which flee what is harmful, carries not the Spi­rits [Page 269]outwardly, as those which purely seek the good, or resist the ill. On the con­trary, it retires them inwardly, at least if it cause not this Motion, it resists it not, but follows the impetuosity wherewith the Spirits are carried away. But it is al­so certain, that when these cowardly Passions have brought them back again to the heart, Desire again darts them fur­ther out, as if they were to pass beyond it; and that presently after these former, recal them, making thus a long combat of contrary Motions which cause this great trouble, and violent agitation which is at that time felt in the entrails.

Now we should examine whether De­sire dilate the Spirits, whether it drives them with equality; lastly whether it stirs onely the purest blood, and the sweetest humours which are in the veins, as we have discovered was done in Love. But since we have observed that Desire mixeth it self with all the Passions, that it is often with Grief and with Fear, which contract the Spirits, and often with Love and Joy, which extend them; that it always accompanies Anger, how turbulent or impetuous soever it be, and in which the most Malignant humours [Page 270]are agitated we must acknowledge that all these kinds of Motions are indifferent to it, that it fits it self to them all; That sometimes it dilates the Spirits, some­times it contracts them; and at other times it drives them with confusion and vehemency, otherwhiles with order and moderation, according to the Nature of those Passions with which it allyes it self: Yet this takes not of the difficulty; for since Desire presupposeth Love, it seems as if all the Motions which accompany this Passion are to be found in Desire, and that consequently the Spirits are therein agitated in the same beforesaid manner. But besides that we have not spoken in those places of Love in gene­ral, but only of that which Beauty inspires, it is evident that the greatest part of the Passions are formed, and that after Love hath dilated the Spirits, others may be raised which may contract them, to which Desire may ally it self. Otherwise as the emotion of the Soul precedes that of the Spirits, it is often formed of those Passi­ons in which the Spirits are not moved; because the Appetite agitates with so much swiftness, and so nimbly passeth from one Passion to another, that they [Page 271]have not time to follow its Motions, and so obey onely the last and most vehement. Thus Love may mixe it self with Desire, without giving to the Spirits the Motion it would have, were it alone, or that it longer or more forcibly possest the Ap­petite.

But supposing that Love dilates them, and Desire joynes it self with it, will it not cause any change? certainly when the Soul sees the good absent, and that in effect she possesseth it not, she must bate somewhat of the designe she had to open and extend herself, to unite her to its Idea, and she gathers her self toge­ther to pursue it the more swiftly: So that it is likely she contracts not the Spi­rits in this Passion as she doth in Fear; but that she reunites and somewhat rega­thers them, driving them towards the absent Good. But we will forbear these things which being too subtil, and too obscure, flee from our sight, and tire the minde; that we may seek the causes of the Characters we have marked.

PART. 4. The Causes of the Characters of Desire.

LOve and Desire, being the most ge­neral Passions of the minde, are al­so the most fruitful in actions; but if you respect the causes which are near­est their effects, you must confess that Desire is the most active; and that all hu­man actions, although they proceed from Love, as from their original source, seem to draw their origine from Desire, as from their neerest and most sensible cause: so that we may say that Love is as it were the seed, but that Desire is the stock or trunk which affords life and motion to all the branches. However it be, we have not undertaken to give an account of all the effects which this Passion produceth: it will be sufficient to examine the most ge­neral [Page 273]and the most ordinary. And first of all to enquire what it is that renders it importunate, impudent, base, and unqui­et, why it is boundless, and how difficul­ties provoke it.

It is true, that who ardently desires a thing renders himself easily Importunate, because the violent Passion he hath to ob­tain it, makes him blindly seek it, with­out considering the persons, and without examining the time or the place which might favour him in his designe; he pur­sues it everywhere, he craves it continu­ally, and as if all the world ought to con­tribute to his pleasure, he solicites, he urgeth, he tires all those whose succour he may have, and which may make him enjoy the good he desires: besides having no other thought but that, and his minde being continually bent on that Object, reason findes no time to be understood, nor power to contain the sallies of this unbridled Passion. She even suffers her­self to be thereby carried away, and so abandons the conduct of her actions to blinde and rash powers.

And even from thence, that Impudence comes which commonly accompanies De­sire; for as it is a certain boldness which [Page 274]makes us with pleasure undertake disho­nest things, and which makes us scorn the imfamy which they may cause; he must necessarily be impudent who is pressing and importunate; seeing he takes a liber­ty beyond good manners, and that he fears not the blame which his shameles­ness deserves.

But if desire cause boldness, how can it then render a man Base and Time­rous? It may be said 'tis done at several times; That sometimes we fancy the things we desire are easily obtained, and that sometimes there are great obstacles to be overcome; and that as these diffe­rent thoughts enter the minde, they in­troduce either Boldness or Fear, Hope or Despair. Now although this be true, it is also evident, that that Boldness which breeds Impudence, is not always incompa­tible with Baseness; if it apprehend not infamy, it may fear every other thing; and we cannot doubt but those who solli­cite with so much urgency and submissi­on a person inferior to them, are possest with a very cowardly Boldness, and a base and servile Impudency.

Disquiet, Impatience, and Irresolution, are also inseparable from Desire; for the [Page 275]minde seeing it self deprived of the good she imagined necessary for her, can take no rest til she hath obtained it. The mo­ments which retard its enjoyment seem years and ages, the least impediments ap­pear great obstacles, and all the means she findes to make her the sooner enjoy the desired good, are in her opinion weak and unprofitable: so that forming at e­very moment new designes, heaping de­sires upon desires, and increasing difficul­ties by her irresolutions she uncessantly agitates and disquiets herself, and findes not even in their possession the end of her troubles, as we have shewed in the discourse of Joy.

But whenee comes it that Desires do thus encrease and multiply, and that like waves they follow and drive one the other that obstacles make them encrease, and that they have no bounds which can contain them? It is true that the greatest part of our desires are of that Nature that they cannot be bounded, and that they become infinite; but there are others also which never pass their just extent.

To know the reason of this difference, you must suppose that there are desires necessary for this life, and others which [Page 276]are not so; those are common to all crea­tures; and are inspired by Nature, these are proper to man, and proceed from the opinion and choice he makes, not onely of necessity, but also of superfluous things. The first have their certain bounds, be­cause Nature who leads them is determi­ned to a certain end, from which she ne­ver straggles, and wherein she findes her rest when she is there arrived; but the o­thers are infinite; for asmuch as the will whence they originally come is an Uni­versal power, which is not to be filled but by the possession of all things; and which being unable to be satisfied by any one, incessantly runs from one to another, and forms as many desires as there are goods whersof she is in want; it is not that all the desires which part from our choice are infinite; when they are ruled by right reason, they have also their bounds, and we may also be sure that they are as natural and as necessary as those which serve ths necessities of life: For right reason being nothing else but what is convenient for the Nature of man, the Desires which are regulated thereby, are as it were natural, and by so much the more necessary, as they serve the noblest [Page 277]part which is in him. But this belongs to another Discourse.

Let us now see, why Difficulty provokes Desire; it is not that by putting of the Soul further off from the good she thought readily to enjoy, she obligeth her to use the more endeavour to draw neer­er unto it, or else the impediments inspi­ring new designes, give it also new sub­ject for Desire, which uniting it self to the former, make the Passion appear the greater; but these Passions are not Uni­versal; for they suppose we alwayes wish the good, before these impediments pre­sent themselves; and in the mean time it is true, that difficulty and resistance doe often breed a desire of certain things which we had never sought, how desire­able soever they were, had they not been forbidden us, and difficult. We must then conclude that the first source of this effect proceeds from the natural inclinati­on which is in man for his liberty, and his own proper excellency: for being a creature naturally free and glorious, he beleeves that difficulties reproach him his weakness, and that prohibition wounds his liberty; wherefore when either pre­sents it self, he raiseth himself against it, [Page 278]and thinks that bearing himself towards the good, against which they contest with him, he presents those advantages which he received from Nature. Thus far in re­lation to Moral actions: let us now exa­mine the Corporal Characters.

These are of two kindes as is before­said, some by the command of the minde, others purely natural, and happen by ne­cessity. The first are swelling eyes and urgent looks, the trembling of the tongue, watry mouth, several inflections of the voice, talk and silence, the agitation and motion of the Body.

The Eyes and Looks, which are proper to desires, are not onely fixed and setled on their objects; for meditation and at­tention of the minde may procure that; but there is also a certain ardor and vivaci­ty, which makes them come outwards, and seems to throw them on the thing desired; which happens not to those who meditate, whose eyes sink and grow dim, as Aristotle teacheth, and as we shall say in its due place. These Looks then which the Latins so happily call Instantes, Proca­ces, & Devorantes, that is to say, Pressing, Greedy, and Devouring, whence even that vulgar manner of speaking comes, he [Page 279]feeds on him with his eyes; that is to say, he looks on him with ardor. Those looks are the true images of Desire, which be­ing onely a transport and a sally which the Soul makes towards Good, imprint the same darting in the eyes, which are the most mobile and the most obedient parts of the body, casting them out as much as she can, and as much as they can suffer it: Besides, that the spirits which abun­dantly run thither, and would go out, drive them forward to make themselves way, and fill them with the lustre and vi­vacity which we perceive in them.

The trembling of the tongue and a watry mouth, are effects which serve for the ap­petite of Aliments: for the Soul, which hath a secret knowledge of what is useful for its designes, knowing that tasting can­not be without humidity, and that the motion of the tongue is necessary to send aliments down into the stomack, brings this water into the mouth, and stirs the tongue, when we see the things we desire, or hear them spoken of; the Fancie in some manner rendring them present, and causing the organs to do the same thing they would do if they were really on the tongue.

But whence comes this clear und subtil water? Doth it not descend from those kirnels which are in the bottom of the mouth, whose chief use is to receive the superfluous humours of the brain, and to disperse them on the tongue to moisten it? It is evident it commonly proves so, and that the motion of the spirits which the Desire brings into those parts, opens the passages, and makes these waters run the more. But it often also happens, that they come from the stomack, either by the means of those wandring spirits which run thither to cause digestion, or by the contraction of its fibers which squeeze the humour wherewith they are watered, and raise it up on high: for in Desires they sometimes contract them­selves so much, that they even overthrow the stomack; and principally in fish, who naturally are all gluttonous, and who pur­suing their prey too ardently, cause it to run out of its place, and cast it sometimes even into their mouthes. However it be, we must believe that these two effects be­long to the desire of Aliments, and that the Soul hath some reason to employ them to that use. But when she makes them serve other desires, as it often hap­pens, [Page 281]it is an errour which comes from its blindness and precipitation, and which perswades that that which is necessary for one designe may also be so for another, al­though indeed it be quite useless.

The several inflexions of the voice which are observed in Desire, do not all proceed from it: As it mixeth it self with other Passions, it borrows from them the sounds and the accents which are familiar to them. Sometimes it lifts it up with Boldness and Anger, sometimes it lets it fall with Fear and Languor; sometimes it cuts it with grief and astonishment, other times it draws it out with admirati­on and joy. But the change which this alone seems to give, is the precipitation of words, and the long exclamations which commence its discourses: For the force which follows this Passion, causeth the words to go out in a croud; and the darting forth of the Soul causeth a trans­port of the voice, which is always made by the strongest vowels, which most of all open the mouth; as if she would make a freer passage, that she might issue out the more readily. In effect, we never finde the I nor the U in the ordinary ex­clamations of Desire, but onely A, O, and [Page 282]E, which she also chargeth with vehement aspirations which shew the force she useth in issuing forth.

Silence, and confusion of discourse, are the effects of a great distraction of the Minde, which is common to those who ardently desire a thing, when we speak not to them of their Passion, or when they are with persons which cannot serve them therein: For the Soul quitting with regret the thought of the Good she wants, and in­cessantly seeking the means to possess it, flees the conversation which might trou­ble her pleasure and her designe; and re­entring in her self, or rather wandring in the pursuit she makes, she hears not what others say, she silenceth her self, or makes disorderly answers. And her transport riseth often to that excess, that it takes away the use of the Senses, and even ra­visheth her into an extasie, as we shewed in our Discourse of Love.

For what concerns the agitation of the body, it follows the disquiet or the motion which the soul makes towards Good: for when he who is troubled with this Passi­on changeth every moment his posture and his place, casts about his eyes here and there, turns now on one side, now on the [Page 283]other; now riseth, now sits; goes, and stops ever and anon: they are the effects of his irresolutions, and the divers de­signes which his disquiet proposeth: But if he reacheth out his head, if he stretch out his arms towards the desired object, if he goes and walks with large paces, and runs towards it; they are endeavours which the Soul causeth the parts to make to draw neer the good which is distant from it. For although they are often use­less, in the errour she is she still believes she goes forward, and that casting the eyes, the head and hands towards what she desires, it is as much ground gotten, and that at last she shall arrive at the end she tends to.

We have nothing more here to exa­mine, but the necessary effects of Desire. But as the most part of them are to be found in those Passions of which we have already spoken, we shall without difficulty enquire the reasons, and send back the Reader to the place whence we deduced them: For sighs and extasies, loss of speech, sleep and appetite, have herein no other causes but as in Love. The face grows red and swell'd by the arrival of blood and spirits which cast themselves on the outward parts, as [Page 284]is already said. Tears proceed from grief which the privation of Good too atten­tively considered, breeds in the Minde.

The motion of the heart and arteries is great, because the soul endeavours to open them, to send forth a quantity of spirits; frequent, because of the violence and haste it makes to get them out; and unequal, by the mixture of other Passions.

The body grows lean and dry, because those parts which digest the humours, and those which are to be nourished by them, being weakned by the flight of the spirits, per­form it not as they ought and cannot con­vert them into their substance, as was said in the Discourse of Love.

There remains nothing now but an ef­fect of Desire, which, being extraordina­ry, deserves a longer examen then the former: It is, that a too ardent Desire makes a man grow old in a day, as Theorictus; that is to say, makes the hair gray in a short time, according to the ordinary explication of that passage. For my part, I must confess that the observation is particular enough, and I do not remember that I have seen it anywhere but in that Author. But since the same thing happens in Fear and in De­spair, which in a night change the hair, [Page 285]and that cares and displeasures make a man grow gray before his time, it is impossi­ble but Desire may sometimes cause the same effect: all the difficulty is to know how it may be done.

You must then suppose with Aristo­tle, that hair grows gray for want of heat fit and natural for it; that it then suffers a kind of corruption and rottenness, and that it happens as to all other things that in corrupting it turns white: in effect we cannot deny but that it is the old age of the hair. And since that of all the body happens from the diminution of natural heat, it is likely it proceeds from the same cause; when this heat then diminisheth it produceth two effects in the hair; for the aliment which ought to nourish it, digests not but flies, into vapours, and the air fills the place of the Spirits. Now vapours contain much air, and air is the first cause of whiteness, as we see in scum; and ex­perience teacheth us, that to make the hair white, we must wet and expose it to the air.

And it is true that heat growing weak, either by little and little, or suddenly, in­digestion is the chief cause of whiteness of hair, when the heat is consumed by de­ly [Page 286]grees; but when it readily dissipates, as it happens in sicknessess and vehement Passi­ons, it is chiefly the air which whitens it sliding into the pores, and taking the place of the retired spirits.

Some will say, If this be true, the hair of dead men should be always white; na­tural heat being extinct, and the air en­vironing them, might easily insinuate it self into its pores.

To this it must be answered, that after death there remains a natural heat in the hair, as in the bones, which are long pre­served after the expiration of the creature whose parts they were. But this heat is immoveable, and incapable of any frui­tion of life, being deprived of the souls influence, which gave it efficacie and mo­tion: So there are no more crudities made, because the aliments rise no more thither, and the air cannot occupie the place of the spirits which are there fixt and stopt.

Certainly, we cannot but confess that the soul inspires some vertue into those parts, that she takes some care of them, and that she governs them as she pleaseth; otherwise, what should cause that delight­ful and regular painting in the plumage [Page 287]of Birds? what should so justly compass the eye-brows? what should so carefully regulate the hair of the eye-lids? lastly, what should cause all that so wel measur'd a diversity which is to be observed in the hair of beasts? As that commonly fol­lows the species of every creature, it must needs be, that the soul wherein it is con­tained, conduceth also to this work, and that she at her pleasure disposeth of those parts wherein she causeth so many won­ders. This being granted, it is not hard to say how Fear, Desire and Cares may change the hair: for, in retiring the spi­rits, they derive it of the influence it re­ceived from them; they dry up that spring of life which did rise to its roots, and draw away that vital heat which ran thorow its pores.

It is true, this seldom happens, and there must be a great violence and a great disposition to produce this effect. For there are certain actions from which it is very difficult to withdraw Nature; and what tempest soever happens to it, she but seldome forsakes their rudder and conduct. Such are the functions of the Vegetative soul, which are principally made by the means of the fixt spirits; and [Page 288]being not subject to the power of the Ima­gination, or of the Appetite, remain qui­et, whilst the others erre here and there, and are agitated by the several motions which the Passions impress. But yet it sometimes happens, that, by reason of the conjunction which there is between the parts of the soul, the disorders of the one are communicated to the other; and that the Natural faculty is carried away by the Sensitive, principally in those whose spi­rits are more mobile, and the substance of their parts more soft. So that those per­sons whose imagination is very strong, and who have the weakest brain, more easily grow gray then other men, by the violence of those Passions which we have spoken of.

CHAP. VI. The Characters of Hope.

HE who gave away all he had, and reserved onely Hope, made not so ill a bargain as it may be ima­gined: He took for him­self that which is the sweetest in life, the most durable Good which can be found therein. In a word, we may say, that he had for his share all what he had not, and that he truely divided for himself like a King.

Indeed, as there are no other Goods whereof we are sensible, but those which we possess, and those which we hope for; it is certain, that possession af­fords not a perfect contentment here be­lowe, for that it cloys the Minde, and takes away the knowledge of the good it [Page 290]possesseth, that it even corrupts the Na­ture of it, and straight begets a distaste. But Hope, which awakens the Minde, and renders it clearer-sighted, represents the Good as it is, shews it in its purity, and gives a far more delicious taste of it then Enjoyment can: For it is so ingenious, that it separates it self from all the Ills which are mixt with it; it purifies it self from all the defects which accompany it: and as we may say, that it is then the flower of Goodness which it pours into our soul; we may also say, that the Joy it disperseth therein is the flower of Plea­sure, and the most refined sweetness of Delight. Why should we then wonder, finding it so sweet and delightful, if we enter it into all our designes, if we mix it with all our actions, and if it be the last thing we abandon during life? 'Tis what alone sweetens the sharpness and bitter­ness thereof, which patiently makes us bear the disgraces thereof; and of all the good things which may accrue thereunto, this is the onely one which is compatible with those miseries whereunto it is sub­ject: For, should all ills overwhelm a per­son, should all mischances and calamities which we can imagine fasten on him, he [Page 291]yet may have Hope, which perhaps alone may be worth more to him then all other Goods can be without it.

Of a truth, also, it is of all the Passions the most natural to Man: he is sensible of its growth, as he grows in perfection; and feels it weaken, when he fails in that. He ceaseth to live, when he ceaseth to hope; and, to speak soberly, there is none but he alone that hopes: for all other creatures have no more but a shadow of Hope, as they have of Reason; the In­telligences scarce know it: And when Man passeth into their nature, although he still be capable of Love or of Hatred, of Joy or of Grief, of Fear or of Despair, yet is he no longer capable of Hope.

Certainly, since it is that which leads us to felicity, and which gives us the first taste of it, it would be useless to those who are already happie, and to those which cannot be so: And Man, who alone is in the way of felicity, ought also to be onely touched with this Passion. In the tempests wherewith his life is continually agitated, it was necessary that Hope should be his lanthorn, and the star to lead him to his last port; and that in the length and dangers of his voyage, he might at least [Page 292]have the satisfaction to see afar off the end he tends to, and to possess in Idea and by way of advance the happiness he aspires to. For Nature, who never suffers things to arrive at once at their last perfe­ction, would have Man here belowe have some sensibleness of his, that he might as it were make 'say and taste, if we may so speak, of the Soveraign Good, before he should perfectly possess it.

But since that is the true use of Hope, we ought not otherwise to employ nor abuse so noble an help, in pursuit of so many vain things which occupie our De­sires, and which are unworthy of the ex­cellency of our Mindes. That which is destined to nourish and breed up Vertue, must not serve for the nourishment and subsistence of Vice; and that which ought to lead us to Felicity, should not estrange us from it, and precipitate us into misery. For it is certain, that if Hope be not regu­lated by Reason, there are no ill designes formed, nor evil actions performed, nei­ther are there any ill habits which take not their beginning and their growth from it: It is the seed of all the evil which is committed in the world; it is the source of all the miseries which flow thither: [Page 293]and in Truth, as well as in the Fable, it may pass for one of the greatest mischiefs which befel Mankinde. Whatever it be, it is most true, that their weakness is in no­thing more discovered, since, as the Wise man says, all their hopes are but a light froth, which the tempest dissipates in a moment; but a smoke, which the winde carrieth away; and but a dream, which troubles our life with fantasms and chi­maera's. But we must leave these medi­tations to Divinity, and see whether we can describe the Characters of this Pas­sion.

The Poets had reason to feign that Hope onely remained in the bottom of Pandora's box: for it is certainly hid in the very bottom of the soul: It issues not forth as the others do; all its endeavours are secret; and the trouble it causeth may be compared to those tempests which of­ten rise in full sea, without troubling the shore: What violence soever it brings, what stir soever it causeth, nothing ap­pears outwardly; and, did not other Pas­sions mix themselves with it, it would be very hard to discover it. Indeed, he that hopes is always amongst the disquiets of Desire: and the ravishments of Joy, Im­patience [Page 294]and Satisfaction equally dividing his Minde; and the privation of good, with the imaginary enjoyment he hath thereof, cause a certain mixture of displeasure and delight, which at once almost renders him content and displeased. But this chiefly happens when his Hopes are uncertain: for the difficulties which are then greater, figure unto him the success the more doubtful; mixing Fear with his Desires, and Despair with his Fear: Then all at once relevating his courage, and flatter­ing his designes with a favourable event, all his apprehensions vanish, and give way to Boldness, Joy, and Perseverance: He no more mindes those obstacles which astonished him before; at least, after he hath measured them with his strength, af­ter he hath seen them overcome by others, and that he may be as happie as they have been; he easily believes to compass it, and that it is sufficient to un­dertake a great matter, to oblige Fortune. He remembers himself of all the graces that ever he received from her; he in the same manner perswades himself that he deserved them, and that he ought not to expect less; and that having now more credit and power then ever he had, [Page 295]he ought not to doubt of the success he hopes for. He esteems all those which may serve him in this occasion: some he believes are obliged to it by duty or in­terest; others, by affection or honour. In fine, he promiseth himself the assistance of all those which he hath seen, or heard spoken of. And weaving thus intricacies with intricacies, he imagines his designes infallible, and that they ought to succeed according as he hath projected them: as if he were already master of the Good he seeks, he thinks he hath the absolute dis­posal thereof: He destines those who shall share in his good success, and marks those who are to be excluded: and thus making whom he will happy or unhappy, he believes himself the dispensor of the favours and disgraces of his fortune, thence he grows presumptuous, rash, in­solent; he fancies there is nothing that can resist him, nothing he ought not to under­take: He despiseth the designes of a jea­lous man, and the pursuits of a rival; and, as if they ought no longer to pretend to what they hope for, he scorns their weak­ness, and laughs at their despair. In this assurance he abandons the care of his af­fairs, he no longer mindes his own pre­servation; [Page 296]and, without taking heed of the ambushes prepared for him, he by his negligence loseth the good he assured himself of, and often triumphs over an enemy who hath already gotten the vi­ctory over him. In fine, he becomes vain, importunate, and ridiculous; he continually speaks of the services he hath rendered, of the recompences he hath merited, of the means he hath to oblige all the world. If you will believe him, there is none but he can procure graces and favours; they belong to him onely, and he alone also who can revenge himself if he should be refused: Hereupon, imagi­ning that in effect he may meet with a check, he becomes peevish, and grows angry: To some, he reproacheth their negligence, or their ingratitude; to others, their baseness or perfidiousness: and of­ten, not knowing upon what to fall, he accuseth Heaven and Fortune for the mis­chief which perhaps will never befal him.

Thus far Hope carries us, when it is unbridled. Yet must we not believe that it makes this progress successively with­out interruption; suspition and mistrust traverse it every moment; Fear at every [Page 297]step retains it, Despair sometimes stops it all at once; Desire and Boldness suc­ceeding presently after, it findes it self continually carried away, and restrained by contrary motions: and of the calmest of all the Passions, which it is, it appears the most unquiet and the most turbulent. But to speak truth, we ought not to ac­cuse it for these storms; it is the Passions which follow its train: And if there be any thing which it can do alone, it is, that it establisheth the Minde against those difficulties which appear in the search of Good. So that it was not without reason figured with an Anchor, which truly stays ships, but yet hinders them not from be­ing still agitated by waves and tempests. However, Hope hath no outward Chara­cter particular to it; and that which ac­companies it, is but a confused mixture of touches which the other motions of the Soul imprint on the body. It may be com­pared to those ingenious Pictures where­in several figures are seen to represent an­other which is not there painted: For al­though you may therein observe the marks of Desire, of Joy and Boldness, and often those of Fear, of Despair, and of Grief; yet all that represents nothing [Page 298]else but Hope. Indeed, when it begins to be felt, it ravisheth the body, lifts up the head, raiseth the brow, the voice grows firm, the looks assured: And in that air which hath somewhat of severe in it, you may perceive a moderate Joy which sweetens the eyes, a certain sere­nity which sheds it self upon the face, and a blithe vivacity which animates all its actions. But this Calm lasts not long; from time to time impatience and dis­quiet disturb it: They cast their looks here and there, sometimes send them up towards heaven; they sigh at every mo­ment; they cannot stay in a place: some­times they grow peevish and doating; they grow pale, they lose courage: Then, by little and little retaking their first as­surance, they feel their forces augment, they finde themselves heated with a new ardor; they come, they go, they leap; they are in perpetual agitation. But, to speak home, these later sallies come not from Hope: As it is a Passion which na­turally is the most moderate of all, it never riseth to these excesses: All the motions it causeth, are without vi­olence, and without precipitation: It renders the Pulse firm, without being [Page 299]vehement; the Respiration strong, with­out force: It fortifies the actions of all the parts: It awakens languishing Passi­ons; it retains those which are impetu­ous. Finally, it is the most useful of them all, for Vertue, and for Health: Let us therefore enquire what its nature is, and how it produceth all these effects.

PART 2. Of the nature of Hope.

HOpe is so fine and delicate a thing, which forms and ruines it self by such weak means, which so subtilly mixeth it self with other Passions, and which shews it self so little, as we have said, that those who have enquired the nature thereof, are to be excused if they have not encountred it. Indeed, the alli­ance it hath with Desire and Boldness is so great, that it is very hard to separate them, and to discern the motion which is proper to every of them: For Boldness is never without Hope, nor Hope with­out Desire. Besides, the action of the Imaginative faculty glitters so much in this Passion, that that of the Appetite scarce appears: and that is the reason some have defined it by the expectation of [Page 301]good, which is a pure effect of the Imagi­nation, as being nothing but a belief and an opinion which we have of a good to come.

But besides that we may expect Good without hoping for it, as we will shew anon, Hope would not then be a Passion, being no motion of the Appetite. As for those who have placed it in the rank of Passions, some have said that it was the consummation and the perfection of De­sire: Others, that it was a certain confi­dence we had that the desired good would come. But the first confound it with Desire, the others with Boldness: or at least, if Confidence be a kinde of Hope, as it is most likely, it were to define the gender by the species, and an obscure thing by one which is less known. In a word, all the definitions are faulty, being either too much stretched, or too much contracted; and none of them observe the particular motion wherewith the Ap­petite is agitated in this Passion; which nevertheless alone makes all its essence, and without which it is impossible to know its nature. We must then make it our Ground, that Hope respects but good to come, and that Desire always precedes [Page 302]it, forasmuch as Desire is the first motion which the soul makes towards that kinde of good, and that we never hope for any thing, without having desired it before. But because there are also those which we desire, which we cannot hope for, (for well may we wish for Beauty, Knowledge, Glory, Scepters, and Diadems, which are most commonly beyond our hopes) that makes us judge them two different Pas­sions, and that their objects, motives and motions ought also to be different.

Now it is not enough for the object of Hope, that the things be thought possible, (for they have that of common with De­sire, as we have said;) but besides that, we must believe that they will effectually happen. Yet this belief is not most cer­tain and infallible; for we never hope for those things which necessarily are to hap­pen; but they must be doubtful, and we must imagine that there are difficulties to obtain them. But where can the difficulty be? For it is not always to be found in the things we hope for, since there are some which move that Passion, which yet are very easie; not in the means we em­ploy to acquire them, being often with­out difficulty to be performed.

We may then say, that in the things we hope, we always imagine we can never enjoy them but by the means of some other man, whether in effect he labour to make us obtain them, or that he no ways hinder us: For it is certain, that if they were wholly in our own power, and did we believe that nothing could hinder us from the possession of them, they could never beget Hope in us; and the Soul would be content to adde to the Desire, which she would then form faith and as­surance that it would happen; which is an effect of the Judgement, and not of the Appetite.

The difficulty then in Hope, comes al­ways from a third, which is as the medium betwixt him who hopes, and the thing hoped for; in whose liberty we suppose it is, to do or not to do what we hope. For although we should often hope good from those things which do not freely operate, even from those things which are inanimate; as when we hope that Lands will be fertile, and that Seasons will be pleasant; that a beast will delight us, or be serviceable to us: we fancie them to our selves as if they had that li­berty; whether it be that there is in beasts [Page 304]an image of true liberty, or for that we have a natural instinct which secretly in­structs us that there is a Superiour power in the world, which disposeth thereof at will, and according as it thinks fit: So that what we hope depending from the will of others whose masters we cannot absolutely be, it is impossible but we must esteem it difficult, and but that the suc­cess must seem doubtful. It is not but that sometimes the difficulty may be in the thing it self we desire, and the means we use to obtain it: but it is not consider­able in this Passion, being not essential to it. However, from what part soever it comes, we must take it for granted that it is necessary to form Hope. Let us now see what its designe is, and what the mo­tion is which it causeth in the Appetite.

All the difficulties presented to the Soul, either in the search of Good, or assault and flight of Ill, appear greater or less then its forces; that is to say, she be­lieves she can overcome them, or that she cannot resist them: If they are the weaker, they beget Hope, Boldness, and Anger; if they are the greater, they cause Despair and Fear. Now it is like­ly that in difficulties the Soul doth in it [Page 305]self what we outwardly do when they present themselves to us: For as we bend our selves against them, if we suppose we can overcome them; and as we lose strength and courage, if they appear in­vincible; it must needs be, since the mo­tions of the body follow those of the soul, and that there is some relation and resemblance between them, that the soul bends or slackens her self as the bo­dy doth, in the encounter of the difficul­ties she fancies. And indeed, it is the onely difference which can distinguish the motions of the Irascible appetite from those of the Concupiscible: For in these the Soul hath no occasion to employ her force or courage, seeing no enemy she ought to assault, or against whom she is ob­liged to defend her self. Or if she pursue Good, or flee from Ill, it is without bend­ing or slackning her self.

Since it is then a thing common to Hope, Boldness, and Anger, to bend the Soul against difficulties; let us see wherein they are different; and chiefly, what Hope hath particularly therein, it being the subject of this Discourse. We must then suppose that in Hope the Soul di­stinctly observes the Good, but confused­ly [Page 306]sees the difficulties: on the contrary, in Boldness and Anger it considers the dif­ficulties more then the good. For although in these the soul assaults ill, to enjoy the good she expects by victory, she chiefly six­eth her thoughts on the enemy she fights against, and thinks onely on the good which shall thereby accrue, but as a thing at a distance, which provokes not as the presence of ill doth. But in Hope, she neerly faceth the good which presents it self; she attentively considers it, and sees but by the way the difficulties which be­siege her; so that they do not appear so great, and consequently do not oblige her to use such endeavours to resist them as in other Passions.

Indeed in Boldness and Anger she ri­seth up and assaults the ill, because she thinks it so powerful, that she believe she cannot overcome it without assault or combat: But in Hope it appears not so strong, as that it ought to be assaulted; nor so weak, as to be slighted: She keeps her self in a certain mean betwixt heat and neglect; and, without animating her self gainst it, she puts herself in safety, & stands upon her guard: which she doth in stiffen­ing and fortifying her self in her self; as it [Page 307]happens to the body, which, its parts being all equally stretched, without changing place, and almost without moving, makes a vigorous motion, which keeps it firm and extended; which for that cause is called in the Schools, The Tonick motion; The Soul then doth the same in this Pas­sion; without assaulting or fleeing the ill which might traverse it, she fortifies her self, stands on her guard, and with as­surance expects the good she seeks. So that we may define it to be A motion of the Appetite, in which the Soul, in expectation of the good it desires, strengthens and stiffens her self in her self, to resist the difficulties she may encounter therein.

Indeed, the whole nature, the proper­ties, and conditions required in Hope, are contained in this definition. Desire and Expectation, which consist in the opinion that the good will come, are marked as the necessary conditions which always precede it; the desired good, as the ob­ject which moves it; the appetite, as the subject where it is received; and that firm assurance, as the difference of the emoti­on which is proper to it, and which distin­guisheth it from all other Passions. For although Boldness and Anger stiffen the [Page 308]soul also, as we have said, yet are they not content to keep it fixed in it self; they make it rise up, and drive it against the ill, and force it to fight with it.

But this breeds a very reasonable doubt: for, did the soul keep it self stiff & steady in Boldness & Anger, as she doth in Hope, it would follow that Hope must always ac­company them: And yet it is true; a man may cast himself into danger without hope of ever getting out; and that some­times we desire to be revenged of an in­jury whereof we know we shall never have satisfaction: yet it hinders not but that this proposition is most certain, and but that it is true that Boldness and Anger are ever accompanied with Hope: For it is not always the onely good which Bold­ness proposeth, to get out of the danger which it casts it self into; honour and glory, which spring from generous acti­ons, are often the Goods it aspires to, and the enjoyment of which it always hopes, what mischance soever happens to it: al­though it fall under the difficulties it as­saults, it still thinks 't will be to overcome them, if they do but serve to obtain what it pretends to; as in the Discourse of Boldness we shall more fully shew.

For Anger, we will in its place make it appear, that the satisfaction it expects in Revenge, and the principal end Nature hath assigned it, is to hinder the thing which injures us from continuing to do so: so that what can stop the course and continuance of the III, appeaseth Anger; and we are satisfied, when he who hath offended us repents himself of it, when he acknowledgeth that it was not his de­signe, when he flees, or when he hath been hurt; for that then it appears that he wants either power or will to mischief us, or else we suppose we have taken them from him. This then is the satisfaction which Anger always promiseth it self: and if it happen that we despair of obtaining it, as, when the things which offend us appear so powerful to us, that they seem beyond our strength and endeavours, and that we have no hope to be able to stop the malice they have to injure us; we are then no longer capable of Anger, having lost our hope to be avenged, that is to say, to beat back the ill on him who caused it, that he may cease to do us more. If there be then a satisfaction which Revenge is out of hope to obtain, it is not natural to the Passion; it must be a stranger, as what [Page 310]comes from the custom of the Country, from the humour of the person, from the weakness of judgement, and the like. But this shall be in its place more carefully ex­amined. Let us betake our selves to our former Discourse.

The Soul then stiffens it self in Hope, and in some sort suffers that Tonick moti­on which (as we have shewn) happens to the body. But we may say, that what image soever this example may give of the man­ner wherewith the appetite is moved, it doth not fully satisfie the Mind, and leaves always in it a difficulty to conceive how the Soul can move so: For it is not as of Bodies, which have nerves and muscles, which stretch the parts, and keep them extended, drawing them equally on every side: We can imagine nothing like it in the Soul, which is wholly simple, and which would rather suffer to be compa­red to subtil and fluid bodies, which this effect cannot reach, then to those who are massive and heavie, where it is com­monly performed.

Now although this be true, yet it de­stroys not our proposition: for it's certain, the Soul stiffens it self aswel as the Body, but that the manner is quite different. It [Page 311]is not always necessary that the same mo­tions should be made in the same manner: and we see that creatures bend and stretch out their bodies, although by different means. Amongst those which are per­fect, the muscles perform this effect by contracting and loosing themselves: But there are divers in whom these parts are wanting, as in those which are so little, that we can scarce discern them, and in which most likely it is the spirits and the nerves alone perform these actions with­out the use of other organs. There are a thousand other examples in Nature, which clearly manifest this truth; but were there none, the Schools teach us, that spiritual substances carry themselves from one place to another; that they may occupie more or less room; that they drive and draw bodies; that, in sine, they perform almost all the motions which we observe in animate bodies, al­though the manner and the means be quite contrary. Which being granted, we ought not to doubt but that the Ap­petite can stiffen it self as well as living parts; it being needless it should do it in the same manner, or by the same means as they are usually accustomed to do.

But if it were enquired what this man­ner is, and what particular means the Ap­petite useth in this motion; we must con­fess it to be a bold enquiry, to which it seems the minde of man is not able to give satisfaction: For since its know­sedge, how high soever it be, draws its origine from that of the Senses, how can it have any in those things, when the Senses forsake it? How can it discern the ways Nature takes in the motions of the Soul which are not sensible, when it is ignorant of those it keeps in them of the body, which touch the Senses, and are visible to our eyes? Indeed, all our Philosophy must confess, that it toucheth but the extremities of motions, and that it almost never speaks of what passeth between both. And we may say, that Na­ture, which so freely gives all things, seems to be jealous of the art wherewith she doth them, and is unwilling we should see the springs of her works. However it be, I believe more cannot be assured in this matter, then that the soul stiffens it self in exciting and quickning its vigour, and putting it, as the School says, out of the power into act. And truely, since An­gelick natures can move and even trans­port [Page 313]bodies from one place to another, it must be granted that they give to them­selves, & to them also, a certain impetuosi­ty, which changeth the situation and con­sistence they had; some particular vertue must disperse it self wheresoever they ex­tend, which renders them stronger & more agile: and this vertue, according to my opi­nion, is nothing but their Will, wch moves it self; or else their very motion: for things get a force in motion which they have not in rest. The same thing may proportiona­bly be said of the Appetite, which is the first moving power in creatures: For by exciting it self, it agitates & corroborates it self; and being agitated with an equal and uniform motion, which holds it so suspended, without advance or recess; it remains stiff & stedfast, to oppose the diffi­culties which may present themselvs. But, without engaging our selves further in this enquiry, which exceeds the limits of our designe, it will be sufficient to take away a difficulty which springs from what we have already said.

For if this motion of the Appetite be onely an equal and uniform agitation, whereby the soul remains fixt in it self, without advancing or receding; it must [Page 314]follow, that Desire can never be with Hope, since it darts out the soul, and drives it out of it self, and that this re­strains it. We must then say, that it is true, Desire is not always with Hope, al­though it always precedes it. And indeed, when we desire any thing ardently, we perceive that Hope slackens it self; as De­sire also diminisheth, when Hope increa­seth. Certainly they destroy one the other when they meet; Forasmuch as the Soul, in Desire, considers the Good but as ab­sent, and takes no other care but to draw neer unto it: but in Hope, she fancies it so neer, not seeing any difficulties which it cannot overcome, that she almost thinks it as if it were present, (whence it hap­pens, that Joy is greater in it then in De­sire:) So that she makes not therein those sallies and dartings she doth in this, unless she be by some other things forced to it. On the contrary, she stops to receive the Good which seems to be produced and ad­vanced towards her. This truth discovers it 'self in these ordinary phrases in these Passions: For when we say that the De­sire is urgent, ardent, and violent; that it moves it self towards Good; that Hope is fixt and assured; that it upholds those [Page 315]who hope; that it expects the desired things; we unawares manifest how the Soul darts her self out in Desire, and re­tains her self in Hope. So that these two motions being opposite, it is impossible that they can be performed at the same time, and that those two Passions should be there together, but necessarily they must form themselves the one after the other; as we said it must happen in those of which we have spoken in the forego­ing Discourses.

Yet it is very true, that this is not always so, but that Hope mixeth it self most com­monly with Desire, Boldness, and Anger; in all which, the Soul never fails to cast forth her self: for the stedfastness she keeps in that, is not contrary to the dart­ing out of her self which she makes in this; the first being a motion of the parts a­mongst themselves, and the other a mo­tion of the whole thing. And as you see a body may keep it self stiff in it self, and move it self from one place to another, you must conceive the same in the Appe­tite, and imagine that Hope remains sta­ble, whilst those other Passions transport it out of it self. But, neither doth it then stop, as we have said; the cause of these [Page 316]sallies being stronger then that of her re­straint; which, to speak truth, is not es­sential to Hope, but a pure accident which never meets with it but when it is quite alone.

Let us now observe what moves the Appetite to stiffen thus: for although it have the vertue to move it self as it plea­seth, and that it bends it self to resist diffi­culties; yet, being a blinde power, it knows not the difficulties, and the Fancie must necessarily propose them to it; and consequently, it must be that which gives it the first shake, and teacheth the mo­tion which in this encounter it ought to employ. After it hath then discovered the difficulties which might traverse its designes, and that it believes it may over­come them, it commands the Appetite to stand upon its guard, and hold it self firm, for to make resistance. But whence comes the belief it hath to overcome them? From the good opinion it hath of its own strength. Whence it is, that those who have many friends, much wealth and ho­nour, those who have suffered no disgra­ces, and to whom all hath happily suc­ceeded; those who are young and lusty; in fine, all those who think themselves po­tent [Page 317]in the goods of the Body, of the Minde, and of Fortune, easily hope, be­cause they believe they have strength enough to oppose all obstacles, and over­come all difficulties which can happen.

This good opinion is so necessary for Hope, that it makes almost all its kindes and differences: as it is greater or less, it causeth the strength or weakness, the ex­cess or defect of that Passion: It is that which produceth Presumption and Confi­dence, which renders Hopes either doubt­ful or certain, good or ill, which augments or enfeebles them. Indeed, Presumption is nothing but an immoderate hope, which proceeds from a too-great opinion we have of our own strength. Confidence is an assurance we have of an expected help: 'Tis like the faith we give to promises wch the things seem to make in these encoun­ters: for we say, The season promiseth us fruit, That we promise our selves such and such a success from our courage, forces, and friends. Finally, Hopes are either doubtful or certain, great or little, good or ill, according as we conceive the difficul­ties strong or weak, or as we suppose them to be more or less easie to be overcome.

Yet I think some distinction were here [Page 318]necessary: for the most certain hope is not always the greatest; and it is likely it is the greater, the more the soul stiffens it self, since it is the particular motion which forms this Passion. Now she stiffens herself the more, the greater the difficulties are she encounters: But when the hinderances are light, she moves not her self so careful­ly, & consequently Hope is less, although it be more certain. Our common phrase confounds these things: for we say that we have great, strong, and good hopes, when we would speak them assured; and that they are small, ill, and weak, when they are doubtful. Yet for all this, we ought to observe the distinctions we have made: for it is evident, that there are hopes which are weak and small, not because they are uncertain, but because the suc­cess is so sure, and the difficulties so small, that the Soul makes no motion at all for them. And truely we can never call these hopes ill, although vulgarly great and strong ones are esteemed good.

It may be demanded how there may be hopes which are certain, since the belief we have of the event of the things we hope for, is always doubtful. Certainly we must confess that the certainty which [Page 319]is therein to be found, is not infallible and of necessity; it is onely likely, and moral; And we call those certain and sure hopes, which are the less doubtful, and in which there is the least to be feared.

But what? it seems then as if Fear were always mixt with Hope, although they are two contrary Passions. It is true, there is always some cause of Fear, there being reason always to doubt. But it follows not that Fear therefore forms it self and mingles it self with Hope, although even the Soul were surprised therewith. The Passions rise not always up in sight of their objects, whether it be that there are stronger which restrain them, and stifle them at their birth; or whether the Minde considers not attentively enough the causes which ought to move it. In Hope, the Soul is more attentive to the Good, then to the difficulties which besiege her: She looks upon them but by the way, and believes she can overcome them. Even then also, what subject soever there be of Fear, without examination she in effect fears it not. But if she consider the dif­ficulties more then the good, and if she take an opinion that she is unable to over­come them; Hope gives place to Fear, [Page 320]which flees in its turn, out of other consi­derations; causing a flood and ebbe, which is often so swift and rapid, that it seems as if these two Passions mixt and confound­ed themselves together. But we must review these things in the Discourse of Fear. Let us now consider what the mo­tions of the Spirits and of the Humours are in Hope.

PART 3. What the motion of the Spirits is in Hope.

SInce the Spirits move in the Passions conformable to the emotion of the Soul, they must, when she stiffens and confirms her self in her self when she hopes, in some manner suffer also the same agitation. All the difficulty then is, to know how it may be done: for it is not easie to conceive how those fluid and sub­til bodies can get a quality which belongs to those onely which are gross and solid. Neither must you believe they congeal here, as they say it happens in some dis­eases; or that they fix, as those Metalick spirits do whereof Chymistry relates such miracles: for, besides that those we speak of are much finer, and perhaps of another kinde then those are, they must at that [Page 322]time become immoveable, and conse­quently, all the parts whereto they are to run, must remain without action, since they can work onely by their motion: Which yet cannot be true: Experience and Reason shew us, that the organs move freely in this Passion; and that De­sire, which often mixeth with it, as we have shewn, causeth the spirits to move, without ruining the setledness and con­sistence which Hope gives them. We might perhaps imagine that they contract and gather themselves together, that, by uniting and crowding their parts toge­ther, they become stiffer and stronger, and so put themselves in posture the better to resist the assaults might be made against them. And certainly, there is a great like­lihood that some such thing is done in this encounter: For the Soul, which knows that what is united is stronger then what is divided, never fails so to fortifie it self when ill appears. Now the difficulties which are always found in Hope, are taken for evils, because they oppose themselves to the possession of good: And it is there­fore likely that the Soul contracts the Spi­rits, the better to defend her self from that enemy which crosseth her designe. [Page 323]Yet as in this Passion she is wont but by the way to consider of those difficulties which consequently seem not so great, nor so uneasie to be overcome; we must not doubt but that, if she contract the spi­rits, it is so little, that it is neither consi­derable, or powerful to confirm them in the manner they ought to be.

And indeed, the Spirits cannot much contract themselves without retiring in­wardly, and consequently making the face look pale, forasmuch as they draw the blood along with them, and rob the com­plexion of the colour it had before. So that Hope having the property to main­tain the countenance equal, and not to change its colour; if it renders them so firm as we have said, it must be by some other means then by contracting or reuni­ting them together.

To conceive then how this is done, we must observe that the Soul can hope for nothing but what she first loved and de­sired: it is necessary that the Spirits should move conformably to these two Passions, before Hope can agitate them. Now they dilate and open themselves in Love, to embrace the good; and in Desire they commonly recoil a little, that they may [Page 324]the more easily dart themselves towards it. Being in this state then, if Hope in­tervene, it changeth nothing in the situ­ation of their parts, it retains them onely in the proportion they had together; and from free and wandering, as they were, they subject themselves to a certain order which they keep amongst themselves as long as Hope lasts; which is made by the souls intermission, which hath an absolute command over them, placing them as she will, stopping them as she pleaseth, and holding them as it were by the hand in the rank she had placed them: And for that time, they remain firm and stable, without confounding themselves with others, or inwardly retreating, or advan­cing outwardly; which is the particular motion of the spirits in this Passion.

Some perhaps will say, that if these parts remain firm and stable, they will not move, and consequently, that the Spirits would have no motion in Hope. But there are things, which, although they do not change place, forbear not to move. Thus Elementary bodies which are not in their centre, although they are retained and seem immoveable, yet they make a kinde of an endeavour to return to their [Page 325]natural place, which makes them seem either light or heavie. We may say the same of the Spirits, which being retain­ed by a strange violence, are not truely at rest, but suffer a secret agitation which holds them in continual suspence.

Now although the Spirits remain thus firm and stable in Hope, it hinders not but that at the same time they may be agita­ted by other Passions which mix them­selves with it. So Desire and Boldness may cast them forth without mixing their stedfastness, because it consists but in the order of their parts, which this darting forth destroys not, as we have said, seeing we may move a thing from one place to another, without disturbing the order and motion which those parts may have amongst themselves.

It is also true, that as Desire grows weak when Hope is strong, if the Spirits are very stable, their darting forth cannot be so great, because they are not so free, nor so easie to move as they would be were they not restrained: That if Passi­ons rise whose motion quite destroys that of Hope, as Joy and Despair; then we may be sure that Hope ceaseth for a time, to give place to those others; and that [Page 326]the Spirits lose their firmness, to disperse or slacken themselves, afterwards re­suming their first consistence, if the Soul sees new subjects of Hope; which some­times happens so readiry, that it seems as if it were done in an instant, and that these motions confound themselves the one with the other.

I see nothing more here to stop us, but that some may chance to imagine, that if it were true that in Hope the soul and the spirits did bend themselves to resist difficulties, somewhat must appear on the outward parts, and they also must bend themselves for the same purpose; since that in Laughter we see the muscles retire as the soul doth, that in Desire and in An­ger they cast themselves out as she doth; that they slacken in Joy, and that all other Passions make the same impression on the Body, as the Objects do in the Appetite. But we must consider, that the organs of a voluntary motion move not in the Passi­ons, but through the strength and efficacie of the object, which urgeth the soul, and obligeth it to employ all the means she hath to attain the end she proposed her self, as we see it happens in all violent Passions; or else out of a particular de­signe [Page 327]she hath to shew outwardly what she inwardly resents, as she doth in Laugh­ter and in Caresses. So that there being none of those motives in Hope, she needs move none of those outward parts, and contents her self with the agitation she gives the spirits; not considering the ill but by the by, she esteems it not so great, as to employ all her endeavours against it: so that she commonly agitates but the most mobile parts, as are the spirits, the eyes, the brows, and some other parts, as it happens in all other Passions which are weak or moderate.

PART 4. The causes of the Characters of Hope.

BUt since we have spoken sufficiently of the secret tempests, let us now see whence those come which ap­pear outwardly, and examine why Hope renders men bold, presumptuous, teme­rous, insolent, credulous, negligent in their affairs, and impatient in their acti­ons; although it be the most moderate and the calmest of all the Passions of the Minde.

It is easie to discover the cause of its mo­deration, after having shewed how it moves the Soul and the Spirits: for it is impossi­ble it should keep them stiff and stable as it doth, and that it should be subject to those agitations which are abservable in other Passions: On the contrary, those [Page 329]languishing and impetuous ones which mix with it, assume a conformable medio­crity to that kinde of motion which sus­pends the soul between ardor and neg­lect, as we have already said; wherefore it enfeebles the Desire when it is too ar­dent, and stirs it up when it is remiss; it is a spur to Laziness, and a bridle to Vio­lence; it hinders Boldness from being rash, and takes off the transports of Joy: and if it chance to be with Fear, and with Grief, it so moderates them, that they fail not of their courage, and refuse not to admit of the sweetest Passions.

But whence comes it then, that it ren­ders men rash, vain, and impatient? How can Anger and Fury be compatible with it? And if it excite and animate the Cou­rage and the Desires, how doth it beget Negligence and Idleness? And yet we cannot doubt but that in some sort it is the cause of all these effects. But they also who will consider the manner of their production, will confess, that it is neither the nearest, nor even the true cause: For Hope indeed begets Boldness; but after­wards Boldness runs to Temerity: it ex­cites and awakens the Desires; but these bring Disquiet and Impatience with them: [Page 330]it brings Joy with it; but aftewards Joy flees into raptures and extasies: it inspires the Appetite with Revenge; which is af­terwards converted into Fury: Finally, it gives Confidence, and that begets Pre­sumption, vanity, and the scorn of all things which may traverse our designes; whence, after, Negligence and Laziness are bred. So that all these defects come not immediately from Hope, but from the other Passions which accompany it. And it is clear, that when these are raised to this excess, it quite vanisheth, or be­comes extremely weak: For when we are sensible of a great Joy, at that very moment we have no sense of Hope: it scarce appears in violent Desires, nor in the transports of Anger; the soul suffer­ing her self to be born away by the parti­cular motions of those Passions: And Presumption it self, which seems nothing but an excess of Hope, wholly ruines it; imagining that there are no difficulties which can oppose its designes: for, where there is no more a difficulty, there remains no Hope.

However it be, Boldness is easily joyned with Hope, because the Soul having con­firmed her self by this to the resistance [Page 331]of difficulties, is already in state to assault them if they appear very strong, and if she betake her self to consider the danger wherein they may cast her, for want of fighting and overcoming them: Besides that the good opinion she hath of her strength, heightens her Courage, and perswades her that it is not enough to maintain the defensive part, but we must pursue and assault our enemy. If her for­ces are not proportionable to this good opinion, and that she believes them great­er then in effect they are, thence ariseth Presumption; which, joyned with Bold­ness, reacheth to Temerity; and thence grows Insolence: in the same manner as with Joy she begets Vanity, Prattle, and Importunity, as in its place we shall further shew.

Impatience raigns powerfully in this Pas­sion. Forasmuch as it commonly accom­panies Joy, Desire, and Fear, there is al­ways somewhat of these three mixt with Hope; and even they are often found all together. So that we must not won­der if we are unquiet when we hope, whe­ther it be from the apprehension we have that we shall not soon enough possess the good we expect, or from the urgency of [Page 332]pressing desires, or from the sparkling which accompanies pleasure.

There is no Passion so credulous as Hope: for others give credence onely to the Good or Ill proposed, but this equally gives in Both. Indeed, pleasing things one­ly perswade Joy, Love, and Desire: those which are troublesome make no impres­sion on them, without destroying them. On the contrary, Ill onely is resented by Grief, Fear, and Despair; Good hath neither audience nor admittance among them. But Hope hearkens to both of them, forasmuch as being in the midst between both, it easily inclines towards those extremities: and she no sooner be­lieves what favours her designes, but she hearkens to what renders them impos­sible.

The Corporal characters which are found in this Passion, are of two kindes, as in all the rest: The one by the com­mand of the Soul, the others by Necessi­ty. The motions of the head, brows, eyes, and voice, and of all the body, are of the first rank: The rest are in the form of ordinary effects.

The body sets it self upright, the head is lifted up, the brows are raised, for the [Page 333]same intention. For the Soul, which would obtain the good, and resist the difficulties which oppose it, puts it self in posture to do both. Now besides that this posture is advantagious for to see afar off what may happen, it is so also in pur­suance of Good, or in defence of Ill, if one be assaulted by it; it is the most na­tural situation which bodies require for action; it is the motion which begins all other actions of creatures; whether to pursue pleasing things, or to flee or assault ill ones, the first thing they do is to lift up the head and the body. The Soul now putting her self in posture of defence, dis­poseth thus of those organs, that she may not be surprised; and raiseth them, to make them the firmer; as in Despair, and in Fear, where she slackens her self, she bows the body, hangs the head, and casts down the eyes and brows.

An assured countenance is made by a wide opening of the eye-lids with vivacity. A fixt and stedfast look, it is common to Anger, Impudence, Boldness, and Hope; yet with this difference, that in Anger the eyes are too ardent; too open in Im­pudence; and too rude in Boldness. But in Hope they have none of these defaults; [Page 334]all is therein moderate; and it seems as if sweetness and severity were confounded together in all its motions. The eyes then are more open then ordinary, the better to see the good, and the difficulties which present themselves. The sted­fastness of the looks, is a signe that impe­diments astonish not the Minde, and that it believes it shall overcome them. The vivacity of the eyes comes from the Spi­rits which Desire hath driven to these parts, or which Joy hath there dispersed. In fine, sweetness and severity are there­in mixt together, because that at the same time the soul sees the Good and the Ill, and is touched both with the one and the other, and is not so sure to obtain what she pretends to, but that she still hath cause to doubt of it.

This Passion often also makes a man turn up his eyes, for that having need of the help of others to acquire what he seeks, it casts his eyes towards heaven, as to the fountain of all good things, and the common helper of all Nature; and hath recourse to superiour causes, being not always assured of the assistance it promised it self from others.

But when the looks are urgent and un­quiet, [Page 335]they are effects of Desire and Fear, which mix with it; in the same manner as Joy often causeth its transports, spark­lings, and agitations.

To conclude, the voice and the speech are firm, that is to say, strong, without vehe­mency or inequality, neither heightning nor talling, neither trembling nor preci­pitated: For the Soul, which bends it self to resist difficulties, is in no condition to fear: but because also she will not assault them, she makes no great endeavour. Wherefore, the voice falls not, because there is no weakness in the Minde; it riseth not also, there being no violence therein; neither is it trembling, being without fear; nor precipitate, being without impetuosity: but strong and equal, the air being beaten strongly and equally by the Soul, which hath assured and confirmed her self against difficul­ties.

There remains now onely the Necessa­ry Characters which follow the agitation of the Humours and of the Spirits. The first, and that which seems the most pro­per for Hope, is, that the colour of the face changeth not; the reason whereof we touched at the beginning of this Dis­course: [Page 336]For the Spirits, which become stable, stop also the blood, and hinder it from retiring inwardly, or dispersing it self outwardly. So that if sometimes we grow pale, it is an effect of Fear, as blushing is of Love, Desire, Joy, and the rest of the Passions which drive the blood into the outward parts.

Sighs follow Love and Desire also. It is Fear that cools and makes us lose Courage; it is Boldness heats and re-animates it. Finally, Disquiet chiefly comes from De­sire and from Fear, which are augment­ed by tediousness and delays, which re­tard the possession of the desired Good. But these Characters are strangers to Hope, whose examen is not here to be made: Let us onely consider those which seem fit and natural to it.

It renders the Pulse stedfast, without be­ing vehement: for the heart and the ar­teries, which confirm themselves as well as the spirits, make the Pulse appear somewhat harder then it was; and by the touch you may perceive a steadiness which it had not before. But this is without vehemency, forasmuch as the soul makes no great endeavour to assault, as we said; and the heat is temperate, [Page 337]which require a moderate and equal mo­tion. It is true, if Hope fall into some cold and weak nature, it causeth a higher and greater Pulse then it had usually, for­asmuch as the Soul, which knows her weakness, and whose designe is to fortifie her self, somewhat augments the heat, which hath afterwards need of the great­er refreshment. But at that time the Pulse is nothing quicker; the heat being not so increased, that the Soul had need to trouble her self to temper the ardor it might cause; she contents her self to en­large the heart and the arteries, to receive the greater quantity of air. For it is the order which Nature holds when heat in­creaseth, that first she makes the Pulse greater and higher; after, she makes it quick; and, at last, renders it thick: imita­ting herein what she makes beasts do, who, to go to a place, begin to march with great paces; which, if urged, they double; and at last betake themselves to run. How­soever, what we said of the Pulse, hap­pens in respiration, excepting the hard­ness, which the Sense therein cannot be sensible of; although it be likely that the substance of the Lungs may therein harden, as Hippocrates saith it happens in [Page 338]Anger, because it is almost impossible that the Spirits, which run thorow all the parts, should not imprint the quality they have, in those which are soft and obedi­ent, as the Lungs are.

In a word, Hope fortifies all the parts, because the spirits therein are more vi­gorous: and as it stops, and in a manner retains them, that they cannot dissipate, nor make any violent motion, it is not to be disputed, that of all the Passions it is the most advantageous for Health, for Length of life, for Vertue it self, which with so great a care seeks Moderation, which naturally is to be found with Hope. I say again, It is advantageous for the Length of life: for, what serves for a great Health, is not always good to render Life long: Active and vehement heat produceth strong actions, but shortens our days, because the Spirits easily dissi­pate, and suddenly consume the natural moisture. So that, to live long, heat should be moderate, the spirits ought not to be violently agitated, nor also should they be languishing. Now if Na­ture give them not this justness, then it seems there is onely Hope which can ac­quire it us, being the onely one which [Page 339]retains it, and secures it, without suffering excessive heat, or irregular motion. And therefore we must not wonder, if those who feed themselves with good hopes, live longer then other Men: And if death often follows high successes, it is because it makes us lose Hope, which is the true Anchor which holds fast our Soul, our Lives, and our Yeers.

FINIS.
THE Second Part OF T …

THE Second Part OF THE PASSIONS.

Wherein is Treated of the Nature, and of the effects of the COURAGEOUS PASSIONS.

English'd by R.W. Esq

LONDON, Printed by T. Newcomb, for H. Herringman, at the Anchor in the New-Exchange. 1661.

The Stationer to the READER.

A Gentleman of quality during these late unhap­py times, having beta­ken himself to a retired life, made it his business to study this our Incomparable Author; and that he might the better im­print him in his Mind, aswell as render him beneficial to others who understand not his language, made it his pastime to trans­scribe into the English the First and Second Part of the Characters of the Passions, which having been formerly severally brought to light, he easily perswaded us to reconcile them, and obliged us upon a Re­view [Page]to present them this second time in one volume, being confi­dent that they cannot but begrate­full to all learned Men, no Man as yet having ever treated of the Passions in his inimitable way, which hath truly gain'd him the reputation of one of the Chief Philosophers of our Age. Amongst the most eminent wits of his Na­tion who are his fittest Judges, the One calls him, The most splendent light of the time, and one of the greatest Genius of learning. But none flies higher then Mounsieur de Balsac, who tells Mr. Chapelin in two of his Letters to him; in the one, What great matters he ex­pects from the learning and judg­ment of Our Author; and in a­nother he breaks forth into these expressions, Wishing his Book had been far greater, that his pleasure might have been the more lasting; that he never read any thing with [Page]more delight; and that he was sen­sibly charm'd with the beauty of his Passions. Others (saies he) have given us touches and essays of trash and trumpery, with disguis'd translations, and borrow­ed conceits, but he shews us the truth in its original perfect lustre; and were all the parts of Philoso­phy rendred as intelligible in our language, Non esset cur Greciae suos Platones, Zenophantes & Theo­phrastes invideremus. Nor (con­tinues he) do I know why he omit­ted Aristotle, whose sublime & me­thodick stile is most remarkable in this Author, which is indeed so very necessary for the search and illumination of the Truth. Accor­ding to my opinion Celsus his la­tine hath not the graces of his French. Imo vero tersam & elegan­tem dictionem ipsae Gratiae vid [...]ntur mihi ijs manibus formasse quibus, ut vos Poetae vultis, Dominae Veneri [Page]ministrant. So far he. Give me leave to add; his Greatest Glory is from himself; His Design him­self dares acknowledg the greatest and fairest conceivable. Through all his Discourses he discovers the vivacity of his knowledge, and the perspicuity of his judgment, clo­thed in a stile of inimitable elegan­cie; and in fine throughout he witnesseth himself so eminent a Philosopher, Nor in the judg­ment of the best, can he be denied to be Doctor of the Chair. And were his Great design but perfect­ly finish'd, Our age might truly boast, That by him alone Philoso­phy had been brought to its Achme. I shall not cloud him with any farther Eulogie; But desire thee to read him, and be thankful; And so farewell.

THE CHARACTERS OF THE PASSIONS.

PART. I.

CHAP. I. The Character of Boldness.

IF it be true, The Elo­gy of B [...]ld­ness. that Love is the Queen of the Passions, we must beleeve that its birth, and not its desert hath given it that advan­tage; it being the first which is raised in the Heart, those which are formed af­terwards, finding her in the Throne, finde themselves obliged to submit themselves to her, and to give place to their elder, a right which they might contest, were Rea­son and not Nature judge of the differ­ence.

In effect, so turbulent and so factious a state as that of the Passions, ought not to be governed by one that is blind or effemi­nate, who is born to serve, and which would cease to be what she is, did she but cease to command. Boldness were the ra­ther to be imployed, which is a noble and generous Passion, which is the Mother of Valor, and the onely one which can fight, which can overcome, which can triumph.

It's she who hath established all the Powers and all the Empires of the World, who hath made all the great Princes, and all the Hero's, who first opened the way to glory and immortality, and who onely lawfully dispenseth Victories; For al­though Fortune vaunts to be the Mistris of them, to give them when and to whom she pleaseth, they become shameful, if Bold­ness makes them not meritorious: And those who conquer without her, yield to the conquered the honor of the combate, and leave them the fairest part of the Vi­ctory.

To conclude, it's she inspires Vertue with that noble ardor which makes her under­take the high & most difficult things, which lends her arms to combate Vice, which af­fords her strength to quell the Passions, and which after she hath made her triumph [Page 3]over all the Monsters of the Earth, opens Heaven with that holy violence w [...]e­with it would be violenced, and [...] her in possession of those immortal Crowns which to be justly possest ought to be ra­vished. For we must not beleeve that the most noble imployments of Boldness are to gain Battels, to take Towns, and to conquer Kingdoms: Nature thinks not of these disorders, when she sows the seeds of this Passion in the Soul. She minds more important Combates and Conquests which are far more useful, and much more glorious.

Knowing that Man is destined for Fe­licity, that there are a thousand kindes of Enemies which defend his entry, and that himself most commonly opposeth himself most of all, against his own good; She gives him Boldness, as a necessary succor to overcome obstacles, and to enter into the enjoyment of those goods for which they contested him.

So that we may say without her, he would be exposed to the violence of all both within and without himself; That his life would be but a continual sence of fear and of despair. In a word, that he were the most impotent and most unhappy of all creatures. For although he boasts to have a [Page 4]more perfect composition of body, clearer knowledges, more noble Appetites then all other Animals: And that he is not sub­ject to that corruption which destroys all other things; yet when we have well ex­amined these advantages, they would be useless to him, yea they would be perni­tious if he were without Boldness; since the perfect temper which he hath, renders him weak and delicate, that his Reason is naturally timerous and suspitious, that his Passions are base and effeminate, and that immortality without a good issue is a mis­cheif without end, and without measure: So that Boldness bereaving him of Weak­ness and Fear, raising him to generous actions, and conducting him to Felicity, we cannot doubt but it's she who corrects the defects of our birth, which makes it enjoy prerogatives which she affords it, and to which it ows all its nobility, all its excellency, and all its good fortune.

But as this Passion follows the destiny of the most perfect things, whose disorders are always the greatest, and their corrupti­ons the most dangerous: So it happeneth also, that when she passeth the bounds she ought to keep, none causeth greater disor­ders, nor is more an Enemy to Man, and to Civil Society.

It's from her that Vice, which of it self is timerous, and loves to hide it self, takes heart and strength, becomes insolent and proud, that it shews it self brasen-fac'd, and appears in publick: All those detestable crimes which have ruined so many Fami­lies, and so many Republicks, had never en­tered into the thoughts of those who com­mitted them, or at least would have re­mained in them without effect, had not Boldness been a Complice of their wicked­ness.

No, without her there had never been seditious persons, nor Rebells; Usurpers, nor Tyrants; Parricides, nor committers of Sacriledge; without her we had never seen so many Armies defeated, so many Provinces desolate, so many People ruined, so many Empires destroyed without her. In fine, Pride and Ambition which are the sources of all our mischiefs, and of all publick ca­lamities, had been unknown or impotent Passions; And if we may so speak, perhaps Peace and Justice had never retired out of the World, had Boldness never enter­ed in.

So that if we rightly consider the goods and the ills she brings, she may fitly be compared to the heat which the Sun defuseth on the Universe; for like it she heats and stirs up [Page 6]all languishing Vertues, she inspires strength and vigor into all the world, she causeth the noblest effects which are to be found therein, and if she produceth not gold and precious stones, yet we may say she makes Scepters and Crowns.

But like the same heat also she commonly corrupts all the best of things; she brings forth monsters and prodigies, she forms thunders and tempests; and there are whole Climates which she hath turned into De­serts and Solitudes. Even she so much the more resembles it, that as that quality makes use of the light to produce its dan­gerous effects, this Passion also makes use of glory to execute its evil designs. At least she fancies to her self that honor is still to be acquired in all those undertake­ings; and although they are criminal or unhappy, yet she imagins, that the shame to have committed a crime, or to have had an ill success, is far short of the glory to have dared much.

But neither is this a place to defend or condemn her; we must onely therefore de­scribe her, and according to our proposed order, make those Characters appear which she imprints in the Soul and Body of those who are sensible of her.

To design the picture of Boldness, a [Page 7]man had need of the Art and Pensil of those great Painters, The De­scription of a Bold Man. who represented one­ly Gods and Hero's; for it's a Passion al­together heroick, and which at all times hath been placed in the rank of Enthusi­asms, and of divine Furies. In effect, when it enters the Soul it fills it with so much splendor and majesty, it inspires such noble sentiments, and gives it such wonderful motions and transports, that it seems as if it were for us to wrong it, to seek its birth here below, and that with reason we may beleeve that Nature is [...]oo weak to produce a thing that is so excellent.

But whether it be a present from Hea­ven or no, it is certain it is the greatest and most advantagious that the Soul could ever hope for: It compleats all its glory and all its riches; and if it be true that the Sun hath Houses, where he is sensible that his power and forces increase, we may say that Bold­ness is the Throne where the Soul findes its greatness and its elevation, where she placeth her self above all those Powers which assault her, and where she despiseth all those dangers wherewith she may be threatned.

And to speak truth, it's matter of asto­nishment, to see that a man should have none at the sight of precipices, shipwracks [Page 8]and of all the most frightful things in the world; Danger environs him on all sides, his Enemies press him on all parts, Death presents it self to him in a thousand places, and in a thousand manners; all these things astonish him not; nay, he often takes them for illusions, and laughs at them as vain fantasms, which in his opinion are fit one­ly to terrifie timerous minds. But if he ex­pects to find resistance, and that he judg­eth it to be an honor to combate or to o­vercome them; then his Courage swels, his Vigor awakes, his whole Soul seems to increase with his Forces, and as if in effect she were grown greater, he entertains him­self only with great thoughts, he forms none but great designs, and suffers himself to be moved with none but by the most noble and most generous of the Passions; For his spirit is silled with nothing but the glory and the immortality which he intends to acquire. He imagins that all the World makes ready Crowns for him alone to deserve, and as if the approach of the Ene­my did hasten him the Victory, he sees him with pleasure, he accosts him with assu­rance, and beleeves that the beginning of the Combate is but the commencement of his riumph.

You must not at that time think of with­holding [Page 9]him; the advice you give will be cowardly counsel, the ill omens which you observe will be superstitions or weak­nesses. In fine, all the cares we take to withdraw him from the danger wherein he is going to cast himself, are injurious to him, and those that take them are esteem­ed timerous Souls, or Enemies of Glo­ry.

The forbiddings of a Father, the tears of a Family, nor the reverence of the Laws are not able to stop him; he tramples all manner of respects under his feet, and like a torrent which is irritated by obstacles, which throws down Dams, and becomes more rapid by resistance, it adds fury to his passion, he makes way with force; and what is opposed against him serves but to make him with the more impetuosity run to the place of combate. He will not there spend his time in unprofitable dis­course; he speaks, but at the same time he strikes, and his words rather serve to express his Courage then his thought; for he imploys them not in injuries, nor in re­proaches, nor in clearing himself, nor in vain threats; they are but interfering words and short exclamations, which his trans­port wherein he is, draws from the mouth; they are as if they were the boylings of [Page 10]that ardor which agitates him within, or to say better, they are like the claps of thunder which come pouring down on his Enemy.

And truly it can be better compared to nothing then Thunder; like that, at the same time it causeth the lightning, the noise, and the blow; like that, at the same time it strikes, it pierceth, it casts down all that resists it; and if it be true that it dis­dains to touch dead Bodies, and spares those which sleep, it's still the more like un­to it; never assaulting those who have lost heart, or are not in a condition able to de­fend themselves. For although in the heat of the Battel he seems onely to breath cru­elty, and that his fury ought not to be glut­ted with ought but blood and slaughter, yet it's very certain that none make use of Victory more moderately: He never pro­ceeds to insolency, and we may say he at the same time disarms his Passion when he disarms his Enemy; As soon as he sees him on the ground he raiseth him up, he em­braceth him, and not remembring the blows he received, he complains onely of those which he hath given; he speaks mo­destly of the advantage he had over him, and how great soever a lover of glory he is, he yeelds to the chance of Arms, the [Page 11]greatest part of what he hath acquired. It is not that in his Soul he beleeves not but that his Valor made his Fortune good, but that he ardently seeks the praises and the ho­nors which Victory hath made him merit, and but that he esteems all those stupid or envious who admire not the wonders which he thinks he hath done: But it's the nature of the Passion which moves him to flye unto glory, by such noble and civil ways, and to cover his ambition by free and ge­nerous proceedings and by a modest ei­ther discourse or silence: In a word, his freeness is ambitious, his generosity is in­terest, and his modesty is proud.

And in effect, there are a thousand en­counters wherein he loseth his discretion, and cannot hide that high and imperious humor which accompanies him. For if he hath any design in hand, he will al­ways be cheif of the Councel, and of the enterprise; He beleeves and speaks high, that he is the onely man, who knows the means to make it succeed, and it's he one­ly can execute it. And as if Prudence and good Fortune could do nothing without him, he confidently assures that the suc­cess cannot but be unhappy unless he hath the conduct of it, or at least if he be not of the party.

In the mean time, it's certain that com­monly there is no man less capable to give or to follow good counsel then he; Pre­sumption makes him despise the best ad­vice, precipitation bereaves him of fore­sight, and the great confidence which he hath in himself, exposeth him to all man­ner of dangers, and makes him fall in­to all the ambushes which are prepared for him.

It's true, that he perisheth nobly in them, and that the proofs which he gives of his Courage, may wipe away the shame of his temerity or of his imprudence; for although he be surprised by his Enemy, that he sees very well that resistance is useless, and that all what presents it self before his eyes declare his loss; yet all this makes him not lose Courage nor Judgement, after having without trouble, and without appre­hension, considered the greatness of the dan­ger, a certain generous choler and a noble despair seizeth on him, which transports him beyond himself, and carries him through fire and sword, and makes him perform such wonderful efforts, that they seem to surpass his natural strength. He strikes, he casts down, he kills all those whom his sword can reach; and after a long fight finding himself rather cast down [Page 13]then conquered, he leaves a sad Victory to the Victor, and an ample cause of admirati­on and of jealousie.

But we labor in vain in one picture to represent all the motions which this Passi­on can form in the Soul; they are so dif­ferent amongst themselves, that its impos­sible they should be found in one and the same subject. And we may say that Bold­ness is a fire which produceth as many seve­ral sorts of heat and flame, as it is taking in several matters. There is no inclination nor profession which hath not its own par­ticular; and although this Passion be natu­rally generous and modest, and be far e­stranged from choler or cruelty, and be im­compatible with fear or astonishment; yet some are found to be base and insolent, some which are Bragadocio's, brutal and cru­el. Choler almost always accompanies that of Women and Children; and many of those who boldly run into danger lose their courage as soon as it presents it self before them. But that which is most strange is, Fear often devanceth the most noble Bold­ness; those often who are most valiant in fight, dare not speak in publick; and as the most furious Beasts are frighted at the sight of Spectra's, and of the feeblest a­mongst Beasts there are some who with­out [Page 14]cause are afraid at the first encounter of some persons, who cannot endure the presence of some things, and even with­out horror cannot so much as walk in the dark: We will here examine the cause of these differences. We will now therefore see whether Boldness hath as much power over the body, as in hath over the soul, and whether she can imprint out wardly as fair characters as those which she forms within.

Certainly we must confess that no Passi­on gives so advantagious a Mind, nor so noble and becoming a port to a man as this doth; all others corrupt that masculine beauty which he naturally ought to have; some render him fierce and savage, as Anger and Despair, others make him soft and effeminate, as Love and Joy; Bold­ness onely gives him that majestical air, that graceful stateliness, and that bold pride, which becomes his Nature and his Sex.

In effect, can we behold any thing more august, more full of pompe, then a man whom Boldness leads into danger? That generous coldness which appears in his face, that setled look, his proud march, and the noble efforts which he makes in fight, inspire in the mind I cannot tell [Page 15]what kind of veneration, and in my opini­on, make the most magnifick representati­on of vertue which can be imagined. For it is not only in the progress of this Passion that it takes this heroick air; it forms it self from the first motions it makes in the heart, and he no sooner perceives the danger, but we may see in his eyes the resolution which he takes, and the confidence he hath to overcome it.

He coldly considers it, without emo­tion, without changing colour; and if some­times he trembles, and grows pale at the encounter thereof, we may beleeve it is not that he fears it, but it's the greatness of his own Courage which astonisheth him. Neither doth this trouble last long; he pre­sently recomposeth and reassureth himself, and looking through and through his Ene­my with a severe smile, he makes us judge that he at once both scorns and threatens him.

If he thinks he ought to assault him, he marcheth towards him with large paces, but gravely, with an erect and stable sta­ture, with his brow lifted up, and his spark­ling eyes seem as if they would go out of their place, and begin the Combate before they come to handy blows. For without winking, and without heeding any thing [Page 16]else, he keeps them always fixed on him; he considers his port, his pace, his arms; he measures him, and seems to seek afar off those places which are weakest, and marks those which are to receive his first blows. Afterwards he accosts him with a silence both fierce and disdainful, with his forehead shriveled up betwixt his brows, stooping his head, and all his body bowed and short­ned in it self; he assaulteth him, he thrust­eth him, he presseth him; and calling to his succor that noble fury which reigns in Combates, he suffers himself to be carried away by it, and at last abandons himself to all the turbulency and impetuosity whereof it is capable.

Then it is that fire flies up into his face, that his looks become terrible, and that all his air, his port, and his mind render them­selves formidable. His hairs stand on end, his Forehead wrinkles, his Nostrils widen, and all his veins are swoln and extended. Sometimes he blows with impetuosity; sometimes he keeps in his breath, and shut­ing his Lips and his Teeth, he displaies his Arms, and dischargeth his greatest and most heavy blows; Sometimes he sighs under the endeavors he makes, and from time to time he sends forth the short and penetrating lightnings of his Voyce where­with [Page 17]it seems he would provoke his Cou­rage, and startle his Enemy. He stamps the ground with his Feet, he puts forth him­self, he leaps, he bows himself; and the sweat running from all the parts of him mixeth it self with the blood and dust wherewith he is covered, and forms I know not what frightful colour which renders him still the more formidable, whilst his Brest all red and inflamed, raiseth up it self with grievous secourses, and causeth a strong and fond respiration; his heart beats with violence, and did you feel his Pulse, you would easily judge by the greatness, swift­ness and vehemency of it, that the Soul hath none of its powers which are not em­ployed in this Passion. But let us finish his Picture with this Combate, neither is there ought else to be described therein, but ei­ther his Victory or his Loss, which can add nothing to the Characters of Boldness, but those of Joy or of Grief. Let us therefore seek the causes of all these effects in the Na­ture of this Passion.

CHAP. II. Of the Nature of Boldness.

THe Soul proposeth not more difficul­ties in forming Boldness, The Dif­ficulty that is in defining of Bold­ness. then the Minde encounters for attaining the know­ledge thereof. It must combate monsters, and assault whole Armies to acquire this knowledge; and at a less rate then to be of its party; it's impossible to resist so many opinions, and so many errors which have hid or corrupted its Nature. In effect, there is none of the Passions which hath more divided mens minds, which hath been more diversly defined, and of which more strange and more different pictures have been made. For there have been some so extravagant that they would not have placed it in the rank of Passions; beleeving, that to be bold was nothing but to despise danger, or not at all to fear it. And that Scorn being an effect of Judgment, and want of Fear, a privation, neither of them could be a motion of the Appetite; but who can be­lieve that a man that assaults his Enemy, scorns him? Contrariwise, if he scorned him, he would not assault him, since we never assault but those things which may [Page 19]hurt us, and we despise those onely which can do neither good nor hurt. And again, who will beleeve, that not to fear is to be bold, since stupidity and sleep take away fear without making us bold. Others af­firm it to be onely a powerful desire to as­sault and overcome what is hurtful; but since we do not desire to assault any more, when we have once effectually done it; in such an encounter Boldness must cease to be, since then even the desire ceaseth; yet it's certain, that Boldness continues and augments its self even in fight.

Others will have it nothing but a great and a strong Hope; but besides that, there are great hopes often found without any Boldness; what would you say of a Slave whose Masters goodness hath given him a very great and most assured hope of his li­berty, would he then have a very great Boldness? To what purpose should he im­ploy his Courage? must it be to combate his good fortune, or to assault his succeed­ing ill hap?

There are others which call it a resolu­tion of Courage, which makes a man pro­mise himself power enough to overcome the mischiefs which threatens him, that he without astonishment sees them come, nei­ther is he frighted when they are come; [Page 20]But besides that resolution is an effect of judgment, and not of the Appetite, and that often without being bold we are not a­stonished at the danger because we know it not; All the utmost endeavor of this Bold­ness seems to be imployed to bear misfor­tues without daring to assault them; and yet this is the most noble, and perhaps the onely imployment it can have.

Besides this, they will have, that one of the Passions of the Soul must fortifie it, and render it assured against all those ills which are to be shunned with most diffi­culty, and encourage it to pursue those goods which are acquired with the great­est pains: But force and assurance belong not to the Appetite, and instead of being the effects of Boldness, they are rather the causes of it; for the Soul must feel it self strong and assured before she engage herself in Boldness.

To say also with the Schools, that it is a motion which the Appetite makes to obtain a good which is to be acquired with difficultie; it's to be ignorant of the true object of Boldness, which obligeth it self to peril and danger. It is to confound it with Hope and with Anger, even also with Fear, which according to their Maxims, are also motions of the Soul to obtain a dif­ficult good.

To conclude, what definition soever may be given, if it express not the parti­cular motion which the Appetite suffers in this Passion, it doth disguise it, instead of making it known; and rather presents us with the shadow and fantasm of Boldness, then shews what it truly is. Let's therefore endeavor to discover it, and without stay­ing to observe the ill ways, let's conduct the Reader into that which is the best and most assured.

To this purpose we must suppose a thing known to all the World, That Ill is the ob­ject of Boldness? That true Bold­ness is stirred up at the sight of danger; that Combates, Shipwracks, Precipices, and death it self, are the most worthy ob­jects which imploy it. In short that she ap­pears most where the difficulties are great­est, and where she thinks to finde most resistance.

Now as we said in the discourse of Hope, the difficulties and the ills appear unto the Soul either greater or lesser then her for­ces; if they are greater, she flies them; if less, she scorns or else she assaults them. And truly the Schools say not enough when they establish it for a Maxime, That the Soul hath but two sorts of motions, the one by which she pursues good, and the other whereby she flies ill; for she is [Page 22]not in a worse condition then other things of Nature, which have not onely an incli­nation to seek what is fit for them, and flye what is hurtful, but they also have that to destroy what is contrary unto them. How­ever it be, it's certain that the Soul flies not all kinds of ill, that there are some which it assaults; and that if there be any Passi­on which it employs to execute so noble a design, it ought to be Boldness.

Now because that when an assault or a combate is to be made, That the Ill must be present. the ill must needs be present, otherwise the endeavor which were to be made would be vain and useless: It thence follows, that the difficulties and dangers ought to be present, which stir up this Boldness; for if we consider them as absent, they may then perhaps oblige the Soul to prepare it self, and to put it self in a condition to resist it, when it pre­sents it self. But they cannot draw from her any endeavor to assault them; for as much as the presence of the Enemy is ab­solutely necessary when we ought to fight; then indeed it may be an Assurance, a Con­fidence, a Resolution of Courage, but not a Boldness.

In effect, the order which the Soul ob­serves to form this Passion, is to consider the evil to come, and to compare its for­ces [Page 23]with her own, and then having found hers great enough to surmount them, she forms a desire of fighting, and a hope of Victory; and at the same time she pre­pares herself for the assault by the assurance and certainty which she takes of the success of her undertaking, by the resolution she makes to employ all those Faculties which ought to obey her, and by the command which she gives them to prepare themselves for the Combate; then the Appetite obey­ing her orders, strengthens it self, stiffening and settling it self in it self, that the Ene­my may not surprise it, and that it may be in a condition to resist it, if it happen it should present it self.

Yet hitherto there hath been no Bold­ness, there are onely the dispositions which go before her. For even then when the ill suffers it self not to be foreseen, and that it presents it self all on a sudden, these acti­ons must still precede the assault which she ought to make, and there must be some moments which give the Soul time to make all those preparatives which are necessary for her; otherwise in this encounter she would endure no other Passion but that of Astonishment, of Fear, or of De­spair.

In a word, all what precedes the assault [Page 24]which the Appetite makes, Objections which shew that ab­sent ill may raise Boldness. is not Boldness, no more then the preparatives for War are the Battel▪ And truly, as the presence of good raiseth in the mind different motions from those which its absence produceth therein; the presence of ill must also cause other Passions then its absence causeth: Now so it is that she assaults the present ill, and that there no Passion employed for that effect but Boldness; And therefore all those which she forms in absence of the ill, and which she raiseth before she combat it, de­serve not the name of Boldness, or at least the same name must be given to Passions which are altogether different: I know that some will say, that we are often sen­sible of the motion and of the effects of Boldness, although the Enemy appear not; That Anger which is never without her, is sometimes raised against those that are ab­sent; That Hope always accompanies it, which respects onely the future: In fine, that our common way of speaking affords not onely the name of Bold to him who affronts danger, but even to him who propo­seth himself to combate it, even to him who hath already fought it. So that there is no likelihood to restrain Boldness to nothing but the assault, nor to require the presence of the ill as a necessary condition to pro­duce it.

Answ. 1 But all these Reasons do not destroy the truth which we have established; for it's certain, that when Boldness and Anger rise in the absence of ill, the Imagination fan­cies it to it self as present; that strong and lively apprehension she hath found thereof having bereaved it of the remembrance of its absence. Neither is this difficult to conceive if we do but consider the manner with which she works, which makes her ea­sily fall into this error; forasmuch as not seeing the things but by their Images, which being present with it, ought also always to represent the things as present unto it; did she not make reflexion on their absence, which is but a stranger and exterior condi­tion of the body of the image, so that be­ing no party of the principal figure, the Imagination cannot be never so little diver­ted, but she must lose the remembrance thereof, if Sence and Reason call it not back and stop it not, that they may consi­der it; whence it happens that in Sleep and in all the strong Passions, wherein their guids are wont to abandon it, all the things which she imagineth seem unto her as if she saw them, and communicating its error to the Appetite, she causeth it to make the same motions for them, as if they were truly present. When therefore the ills ap­pear [Page 26]not, and that Boldness and Anger forbear not to rise in the Soul; yet for that are they not absent from her, seeing they are present to her thoughts, and of neces­sity we must beleeve, that to raise such kind of Passions that she fancies to her self, that her Enemies are at hand, that they are fal­ling on her, and that she is going to be op­prest by them, unless she assault them.

Answ. 2 As for Hope, its true, that Boldness is never without it; that a bold man always hopes, and that still there is some good to come which seems to be the motive of his under­takings: But from thence it follows not that the present ill should not be the true object of Boldness, or that he is obliged to do ought else but to assault and com­bate it.

For there is a great deal of difference in saying, That Hope always keeps company with Boldness, and in saying, That Hope and Boldness have one and the same object, one end, and one employment; they both of them serve as well as the rest of the Pas­sions to attain the end which the Soul pro­poseth it self; but its an end which is strange to them, and concerns them not; every one hath his own proper and peculiar one, which it at first encounters, and whereto it naturally tends, without taking care for [Page 27]the general which concerns the Soul; they properly are Souldiers which march and fight without knowing the design of the Head which conducts them. But to un­derstand this, we must observe, that the end of actions is that which terminates them, and that they are terminated by their effects. Now there are effects which are near hand, and which are produced first, and others which are made in pursuit of them, and which for the same reason are farther off. In the actions also there is an end which is near, and another which is farther off; that is uniform and changeth not; the other is several and inconstant, according to the divers use whereto the principal cause hath destinated it. So the first effect and the nearest and natural end of Heat, is to warm; the rest which follow for example, are to rost or to burn, accord­ing to the Design which Nature or Art propose.

As the Passions therefore are actions and motions of the Appetite, they have also two kinds of End, the one which is near, and which is nothing but the first effect which is produced by them; so Union is the proper and true end of Love; the ap­proaching to the Good is that of Desire; the Enjoyment is that of Joy; the Com­bate [Page 28]is that of Boldness, and so of the rest. All those other ends which follow this first belong not at all to the Passion, but onely to the principal cause which is the Soul, which destines it to what use it pleaseth her. So that the Combate being the first effect of Boldness, is also the only and true end: And if there be any good which it af­terwards expects, it is not she that consi­ders it, but Hope, or rather the Soul, which stirs up the most generous Passions to sight with those difficulties which hinder her the possession thereof.

The present Ill is then the onely object of Boldness; What the end of Boldness is. the Combate is the only End she tends to; and if that afterwards serves to obtain some good, 'tis a success which hap­pens unknown to it, and which she did not at all propose herself; otherwise we must say, that Hatred and Fear, and the rest of the Passions which flye from ill, have good al­so for their object, since we flie not from ill but for some good which may thereby accrew.

But if any man ask what good and pro­fit the Soul may make by this Combate, in a word, what the principal motive is which engageth her to assault ill: There is no man but will readily answer, That its to overcome it. But this is not to give a [Page 29]full Answer to the Question; we would know what she pretends to by this Victo­ry; for it is not sufficient to say that it's to defeat or chase away an enemy, that it's to have preheminence over him, or to ac­quire the glory to have overcome him: For­asmuch as these latter motions touch not the Sensitive Appetite, and that the other two leave the difficulty intire: Since we may further demand, why the Soul would defeat or drive away an Enemy? and what ever we should say, that it were to flie from ill: besides that this Reason is too loose and too general, and befits all the angry Passions; It's certain, that in flying she estrangeth herself from it in another manner then when she drives it away; so that we must enquire the particular which in this encounter she proposeth herself: Now he that will consider that the Soul stirs up for­ces in Boldness, and that she imploys them only when she thinks that her enemy makes use of her own to ruine her; it's to be beleev­ed that she hath no other design in assaulting it, but to take away from it the power and strength of ill-doing: For which cause we are not satisfied to see our Enemies flie, but we pursue them, that making them lose ei­ther their life or liberty, we may bereave them of all their wreacking power. But we [Page 30]shall insist upon this matter in the Chapter of Constancy.

After which, What the Nature of Boldness is. we believe we shall have sa­tisfied all the proposed difficulties; for as to what concerns the common manner of speaking, which gives the title of Bold to him who is no longer in danger, it's suffi­cient to say that we speak not here of Bold­ness as of a Habit which keeps its name, even when it acts not, but as of a Passion, which is altogether in motion, and out of which it no longer is the Passion of Bold­ness.

Let's then conclude, that Boldness is no­thing else but the motion which the Ap­petite makes in assaulting ill. But how doth it assault it? It can be by no other way but by that whereby all things use to assault their Enemies; for as they fortifie themselves, raise themselves up, and throw themselves on them; the Appetite doth the same, stiffens and fastens it self in it self, it animates, it lifts it self up, and shoots out it self against ill. In effect, either we must not fancy motions in the Soul, nor qualifie the Passions with the name of Mo­tions, or of necessity we must confess that that of Boldness is such as we have said it to be. It's so natural, and so conformable to Reason, that we cannot'assure that the [Page 31]Soul pursues good, and that she runs after it, that she estrangeth her self from ill and flies it, but we must be forced to confess, that seeing she ought to combate it, she is also obliged to raise up, and throw her self against it.

And did not Reason perswade this, let's but consider the motions of the Body, which provokes it, with which hers must necessarily have a correspondence; for it's impossible to see the putting forward of the Head, the startings out of the Eyes, the elevation of the Muscles, the motions of the Arms, the precipitate course, and im­petuous fallies which all the parts perform in this Passion, but we must presently fancy, that it's the Soul which raiseth up it self, that throws it self abroad, and even goes out of it self, to joyn and fight against her Enemy, so that we cannot err in saying, That Boldness is a motion of the Appetite, by which the Soul throws it self forth against ill, to combate it.

For this shooting forth is the different motion which distinguisheth it from all the rest of the Passions in which the Soul shoots not herself forth, as in that of Love and of Hatred, of Joy and of Grief, of Hope and of Despair; and the motive of this springing forth, which is to assault ill, [Page 32]and to combate it, renders it different from Desire and Aversion, from Fear and from Anger; forasmuch as if the Soul cast it self forth in Aversion or in Fear, its to estrange it self from ill, and not to assault it: In Desire it's to approach the Good, and in Anger it's to revenge it self, as in its place shall be declared.

It's true this definition is very different from that which Aristotle gave us in his Rhetorick, where he says, That Boldness is nothing else but a Hope which comes from the opinion which we have that expected Goods are near, and that things, which we fear are far off. But who fees not that it is the true portraicture of Confidence, which is a kinde of Hope; and that A­ristotle in that place pretended not to de­fine that of Boldness? seeing that in that place where he was obliged most carefully to observe it's Nature, he says in express terms, That dangers ought to be very near to provoke this Passion. Beyond all, what de­finition soever he hath given it, he consider­ed it not as a Passion, but onely as a Habit. Without stopping therefore at these things, which concern us not, let's fall on those which are more important; and first, let us see whether it be true, That the Soul hath a design to assault and combate ill in all sorts of Boldness.

There are two things which make us doubt this proposition, the first is, Whether all sorts of Boldness assault ill. That Boldness is not onely employed in assault­ing of ill, but also in resisting and sustain­ing it: Since a man may support a mis­chief, and suffer even death with a Cou­rage. The second is, that there are certain Boldnesses, wherein there is no combate to be made, there being no apparent ill: As when a man runs into danger without knowing it, when he is impudent or ambi­tious; for this considers nothing but ho­nors, and boldly pursues them, and the o­ther is bold, and takes delight to commit dishonest actions, where it seems he hath no enemy to fight.

But these Reasons are easily answered, for as for the first, although we may say, that resistance is a kinde of combate, since the Soul cannot resist but by opposition, and that to oppose, she must stiffen herself a­gainst ill, which in some sence is to assault and combate it; Yet it's certain, that simply to resist ill, or constantly to suffer its en­counters and violence, without making any other effort, properly are not the effects of Boldness, but of another Passion which we call Constancy, or staiedness of Courage, of which in the following Chapter.

As for the second, it's most certain, that [Page 34]there are those which run into dangers without knowing it, and that in such an encounter the Soul needs not assault the ill, seeing it sees it not; but neither then is there Boldness: For as no man will say, that a blind man is bold when he passeth a precipice which he thinks not of; nor that a Childe is couragious that will touch the flame and take up coals of fire, being ig­norant of the effects thereof: It's the same of any other, who goes or lights into dan­gers which are unknown to him: He will onely appear Bold to such as are like him, blind, or ignorant. In a word, the Appe­tite moves not it self but through know­ledge; and when that enlightens it not, it remains immoveable, and forms no Passion. It must have an object to raise it; and if there be any which it knows not of, it is no more touched with it then if it were not at all. So that the danger which is unknown to him, is to him no danger, and therefore he nei­ther flies nor assaults it, and hath neither Fear nor Boldness for it.

It's true, that those who are in that con­dition do often seem to be bold, because we see them in the midst of dangers without a­stonishment, that difficulties stop them not, and that they march with assurance through those obstacles which present [Page 35]themselves before them, but indeed are not such as they appear, and they are rather possest with blindness and stupidity then with true Boldness.

Yet it's that wherein we are most com­monly deceived, forasmuch as it is nothing easie to discern those deceitful signs from those which are true, and chiefly when the Soul is agitated by some ardent Passion; for carrying her with precipitation whether she would go, she takes from her the thought of all what may cross her, and makes her run after her object, without re­garding the lets and dangers she meets in her way. Now it's certain, that then it seems to be Boldness, which inspires her with that ardor, and which gives her those noble motions. Although in truth it is not she, but the impetuosity of the Passion which transports her; And it is thus, that the ambitious, the proud, and the volup­tuous seem bold in several occasions, where­as in effect they are nothing so, because that not considering the difficulties which are in the pursuit which they make afree Honors and Pleasures, they neither see them, nor do they assault them. And with­out doubt, we are to place in this rank the most part of those who fear not dangers being accustomed thereunto as Souldiers [Page 36]and Seamen, or having never tried them, like those who engage themselves in great undertakings, the difficulties whereof they never foresaw, or because they beleeve that they are not threatned by them, as such as think themselves far off, such as are happy, such as are good men, forasmuch as honest men fear nothing. For it's certain, that in the most part of those encounters Boldness is not, if you take it for a Passion. For­asmuch as to some dangers are not known to be so, and to others they are reputed so, although they be absent. Now so it is, that unknown or absent ill raiseth not Boldness, and therefore it is not really to be found in those we have now observed, unless as a disposition or a Habit. But we will have another touch upon this Subject. How Im­pudence assaults ill

Let's now see how Boldness which is to be found in Impudence may assault ill, since we cannot now say what we have said be­fore, that it may be taken for a Habit, or for a disposition, since Impudence is a Pas­sion composed of the other two, to wit, Pleasure and Boldness: So that if there be nothing to be fought against in Impudence, there is some Boldness, which as a Passion is not obliged to assault it.

Certainly to be Impudent, we must know the action we do, is contrary to ci­vility [Page 37]and honesty, otherwise it were folly, or brutality, and not Impudence: For a Childe, a Blockhead, one that is senceless, is never esteemed impudent, forasmuch as they know not what actions are un­civil.

He therefore that knows them, and hath an intention to do them, at that time feels in himself the reason which opposeth it, and the honor which defends him to execute it. Now all what opposeth it self to the Ap­petite, is an obstacle against it, and seems unto it as an evil; and yet Reason, Honor, and Modesty are the Enemies which Im­pudence assaults, which she fights with, which she triumphs over. But we will ex­amine this more particularly in discovering of this Passion. It's sufficient to shew, That there is no Boldness which assaults not true or apparent ill.

We have nothing more to enquire, What the ill is which Soldness asaults. but whether all sorts of ill can raise this Pas­sion; for besides that it is not said, that there is Boldness in fighting with Enemies which are weak, nor that any ought to accuse his ignorance, impudence, or other defects which may be numbered amongst the greatest ills which can happen; Besides these, and many other such like reasons which might be produced on this subject: [Page 38]I say there is no likelihood, that what is properly ill should move this Passion, since that is nothing but a privation of perfecti­on, and that the soul nor ought, nor can as­sault what is not.

To resolve this difficulty, we must ob­serve, that the Soul acknowledgeth not on­ly this privation which we have spoken of, to be an ill, but even all the causes which it produceth, and all those disorders which customarily follow it. For there ever is some weakness or some inconvenience which follows the privation or absence of a perfection; and this weakness or impoten­cy is a real quality, as the Schools teach us; we may therefore say, that Privation which is a Non ens, is not an object which can excite Boldness, because the Soul cannot assault what is not, unless she fancy it as if it were a real thing, as it is with Children who conceive death as a fantasm. That if there be any ill which she ought to com­bate, it's those causes which she brings forth, and the inconveniences which fol­low. And truly, she commonly confounds those two things with the ill it self; for when we say, a man suffers death with courage, we do not precisely understand it of death, for as yet it is not, but of the action of those causes which destroy life, [Page 39]and of the grief which they raise; and when with constancy we support the loss of goods, of honor, or of health, it is not pro­perly the loss which occupies the constancy, but the impotency, the imcommodity and the affliction which are derived from thence.

It's therefore certain, that all true ills are capable to stir up Boldness, so as they be proportionable to our forces; for there are ills which of themselves and by the common consent of men, are so weak, that without fear or fight we ought to despise them; and others which are so powerful that its imprudence to assault them, and which in reason we ought to flie. That if the Soul conceives them otherwise then they are, and esteems those great which are little, and those weak which are very powerful, there indeed the combate which she undertakes against those she ought to slight, is a motion of Boldness; but this Boldness passeth for cowardise, and the as­sault which she makes against those which are above her strength is Temerity; As it is audacity when she slights, chief­ly if she witnesseth it by word or gesture. But we shall elsewhere have another touch upon these differences, which being not essential concern not this discourse, where­in [Page 40]we are onely to examine the Nature and Essence of Boldness. She therefore consists in the assault which the Appetite makes a­gainst ill; and this assault is made by darting it self forth against it. Now we are to enqure how this darting forth is performed, and whether it be any way serviceable to the Soul, seeing that in casting forth herself she goes not out of her self, neither doth she approach nearer to her Enemy. But these difficulties have been cleared in the Treatise of Desire, and ought not to be here repeated.

There remains onely one which might make us doubt of all what hath been said, With what pashons Boldness is compa­tible. did we leave it without examination and re­solution. For although we confess that Boldness is a flying up, and a darting forth of the Appetite; yet because it commonly accompanies Love and Pleasure, and is never without Desire nor without Hope; that even Hatred, Grief and Despair do of­ten call it to their succour, and that Anger is never without it; It seems there is no likelihood that this rising up which she makes can subsist with the particular emo­tion of every of these Passions, which ought to be different from hers.

We must then say, That it's nothing dif­ficult to conceive for what concerns Desire [Page 41]and Anger, since in these two the Appetite darts it self forth, as in Boldness, and that there is no other difference, but that Desire requires not the establishment nor the em­ployment of the Minds forces, as the other two do. And that neither that nor Anger have the same motives with Boldness, for Desire casts it self towards the absent good, to get near it; Boldness, against the pre­sent ill, to combate it; and Anger against the cause of the ill to revenge it self.

As for Hope wherein the Appetite stif­fens it self, we have shewed how that hin­dered it not from casting it self forth, and truly it necessarily ought to be agitated with these two kinds of motions in Bold­ness; Since to grapple with the Enemy he must throw himself upon him; and to com­bate him, he must fortifie himself, which he cannot do but by stiffening himself. Nay, even it's certain, that as Hope and Confidence always precede Boldness, the Appetite must necessarily stiffen and settle it self, before it can either lift up, or dart forth it self, as we shall hereafter declare. There is therefore no inconvenience but that these four Passions may mix and sub­sist together. In effect they are all to be found in Anger; for this is never without Boldness, Boldness without Hope, nor [Page 42]Hope without Desire: And although De­sire presuppose Love, yet we cannot say that Love is to be found in Anger, because it hath a contrary motion to the rest. So that commonly neither that nor Hatred at the same moment are to be found with Boldness, but must pass from the one to the other, as hath been already said in the former Discourses. Which is sometimes performed with so much swiftness that it seems as if they mingled together, that they confounded themselves, and never quitted one the other. Let's return to our first Dis­course, and conclude, That Boldness is no­thing but that motion whereby the Appetite stiffens and darts forth it self against ill, that it may combate it.

Now howsoever it be, the true sence which we ought to have of this Passion, and that considering it exactly, and according to the Rules of Philosophy, its essence and form must be all shut up in this motion; yet must we not altogether condemn the common opinion which conceives it not so simple as we make it, and who mix with it Courage, Assurance, Resolution, Confi­dence, and the despising of danger. For although all these things are not essential to it, and are onely Dispositions which serve to produce and preserve it, We may yet [Page 43]say, they are of her train, they make her appear, and that altogether they render this Passion perfect and compleat. They are indeed commonly confounded together, and they are all used to signifie one and the same thing: For we say a man of great heart and of Courage, a confident man, re­solved, that fears nothing, and all to say he is Bold. And although it seems that this rather becomes the Habit of Boldness then the Passion; yet we forbear not to use them for the one and for the other; since we say an action of courage, an assured and resolute look, a man who fears not danger, which are ways of speaking, which undoubt­edly point at the Passion of Boldness. After all, without contradicting the use of terms, yet must we have the knowledge thereof, and distinguish the things which Nature hath separated, and which the people have confounded.

Courage in effect is properly the natural power from which Boldness proceeds, as the Heart is the subject and principal organ of it. And forasmuch as it is the most noble motion which that can have, and that the force of that part appears more in that Passion then in all the rest, as its pre­rogative, it hath gained the name of Heart; for to call a man Bold, we say he is a Man [Page 44]of Heart, for that he that is Bold hath his heart raised up by the most noble of all the Passions. Or else because his heart is as it ought to be; being hot and dry, which as we shall hereafter discourse is its proper and just temper.

Now for Assurance, it's a pure effect of Judgment, which makes us beleeve our selves exempt from danger, and it's no­thing but the certainty we have to be safe. Now because this belief is a great dispositi­on to assault ill, and that he who beleeves himself to be in safety, fears no danger, thence it comes that we confound Assu­rance with Boldness.

Resolution is another effect of Judge­ment, which without hesitation or stopping at those doubts which the Enemies presence inflicts on those who are timerous, readily determines him to fight with him; and be­cause this design thus taken is an effect of Courage, and of the good opinion a man hath of his own strength, which are dis­positions nearly related to Boldness, we confound them together: So that we take Resolution for Boldness, and a resolute man for a bold and couragious person.

Moreover, We call it Boldness to de­spise dangers, and not to fear them, al­though in that there is no Passion; foras­much [Page 45]as to despise an ill is a clear effect of Judgement; and not to Fear it, is nothing but the want and privation of Fear. Ne­vertheless, because it's the property of true Boldness not to value little ills which u­sually affright and astonish weak and ti­morous Spirits; and that in despising of these, and in assaulting the others, she makes it appear that she fears nothing; Hence it is we take that for Boldness which is only the effect of it, or to speak to the purpose, which is onely the sign of it. For not to Fear is no action but a privation; yet it commonly means the presence of its contrary.

But what shall we say of Confidence, which the Greeks and Latins, and we our selves often admit for Boldness? It's cer­tain, it's a kinde of Hope; or to speak bet­ter it's the consummation and perfection of it. For after the Appetite hath found Hope by stiffening it self against the difficulties which environ the good it aspires to; the Soul which sees herself in a condition not to fear them, fortifies herself in the opini­on she had taken that the things she ex­pects help from, will not fail her, and after a manner gives credit to the promises it seems to have made; Thus we trust in our forces, in our goods, in our friends, foras­much [Page 46]as we then beleeve that what we pro­mised our selves of them will succeed.

And because that we think there are no difficulties in this opinion which ought not to be overcome, and in pursuit that we fear not their encounter; thence it is that it hath been confounded with Boldness, which ought to have the same sentiments, al­though it onely is a disposition which pre­cedes it.

However it be, What the Dispositi­ons to Boldness are. and which way soever you will take these things, either as parts of Boldness, or for dispositions which pre­cede or accompany her; they serve to make known those who are most susceptible of this Passion: For Assurance and Resolu­tion to despise, and not to fear dangers, are effects of the good opinion a man hath of his own strength, without which there could neither be Assurance nor Resolution, Cou­rage nor Boldness; lastly, without which the slightest evils move terror; and even those things themselves which can do no harm, possess us every moment with fear.

Now this opinion is grounded on the forces we effectually have, or else believe we have; but because they are of two sorts; the one in us, and which depend from us, as the forces of the Body, and those of [Page 47]the Mind; others which are without us, and which are not absolutely in our power, as Goods, Friends, Honors, &c. Those who are endued with the former are most susceptible of Boldness; so that a strong and robustious man is commonly more bold then he that is not, and if he hath goods and friends also at his devotion.

But yet we must likewise observe that a man may be strong and robustious several ways; for there is a force of Body which is only fit for resistance for to bear; in a word, to suffer; such is that of Camels, of Asses, of Oxen, and proceeds from a thick me­lancholy. The other is purely active, and all of fire, which comes from choler, or from subtile and stirring blood, as is that of young Dogs, and of generous Horses; the last is composed of the two former, and is observable in Lions, Mastiffs, and in wilde Boars.

Those who have this stupid and passive force, such as melancholy persons are, are but little susceptible of Boldness, being deprived of that heat which is as it were the sonl of strength and of courage; the o­thers which are cholerick, which have that which is ardent and active, are easily carri­ed away with this Passion; but it hath this defect, that it quickly passeth away, and [Page 48]that it discerns not those ills which are wor­thy to be combated, from those which are not. The impetuosity wherewith she is car­ried away, precipitating her designs, before Judgment can examine them: But those who have both, and who are Cholerick and Melancholy, have the Boldness of He­ro's, which is not suddenly kindled, but having once taken, it's long lasting; this fears nothing, it scorns little dangers, it assaults great ones with assurance and reso­lution, and often with a transport which makes it to be thought divine.

After the strength of the Body, we must produce the force of the Minde, for those who think they have it, and promise them­selves great help from their address and good Judgment, how weak soever they be, easily undertake great matters, and believe that they can supply the weakness of other things by the force of their Spirits. Last of all, those who are powerful by their Dignities, by their Goods, or by their Friends, those who never endured a dis­grace, and who believe Heaven, Men and Fortune are favorable to them, have al­ways a good opinion of their forces, and are commonly Bold. But to take away all difficulties which may be made concerning these things, and to give that light which [Page 49]is necessary for clearing the following Dis­courses, where at every turn we are to speak of Courage and of Forces, it's fit we should more carefully examine the Nature of those two, and examine wherein it is they consist.

CHAP. III. What courage is, and wherein it consists.

WE must first suppose that Cou­rage is a quality proper to Animals, That Cou­rage is a power of the S [...]ul. that they onely are susceptible of it, and therefore that the Soul is the principle of it, and that its in her it resides, as in its root, and in its first and true subject; we call likewise a Soul couragious, and say, that the Soul must have Courage to assault Vice, and to resist the Passions thereof.

Now if there be as Aristoile will have it, but three things in the Soul; to wit Power, Habit, and Passion, this Courage must be some one of the three: Perhaps its no Passi­on, since it's very true that a man may have Courage, although he be agitated by none of the Passions, and even when he doth [Page 50]nothing; neither is it an Habit, because it's acquired by use, and that a man may be born with Courage; it's therefore necessa­ry it should be a Power.

But we must observe there are two sorts of Powers, the one, first and radical; the other, second, and derived. The first are parts or in­separable accidents of the soul, which for that reason are equal in all the individuals of every Species; So the power of Reasoning considered in it self, and as it is a Faculty of the Soul, is equally divided to all Men. Seconds are nothing but the dispositions of those organs which are necessary to make these first Powers move: Or to speak out, they are the same Powers which the dispo­sition of Organs renders capable to per­form their actions. And as those dispositi­ons are unequal in their particulars, and that the one hath them more or less per­fect then the other, so are they more or less fit to perform those actions; so that we use to say of him who hath them perfect, and who is most proper to act, that he hath the power and natural Faculty to do such a thing; and of him who hath them imper­fect, that he naturally hath an impotency and incapacity of working.

Now Courage is undoubtedly of the number of those derived Powers, because [Page 51]it requires certain dispositions in the Or­gans proper to elevate and stir up the Soul against difficulties; and the principal of these dispositions is nothing but the na­tural heat of the heart capable to kindle and inflame this noble ardor, which is ne­cessary in these encounters.

But we must here consider two things. What that Power is which makes Courage. First, What this radical vertue is, which enters into the Courage, since the natural and derived Powers are nothing else but the radical, in that they are joyned with their dispositions; certainly we must say, that Nature which hath distributed to all Animals as much strength as was necessary for their preservation, hath also given them the vertue to raise up and employ them when they have need of them. And this vertue is nothing but the irascible Faculty, which is the principle, and as it were the form and substance of Courage: Foras­much as inflaming the Heart, and lifting up the Soul, it doth nothing else but move the natural forces of the Animal to oppose them against those difficulties which pre­sent themselves. And indeed these differ­ences, and the effects of Courage are drawn from the quality of the forces; for as there are some which are proper for the Soul, and others which belong to the Body, every one [Page 52]hath its particular Courage, which stirs it up and sets it on work; such a man will be couragious in the greatest dangers of War, who dares not speak in publick, or will suffer himself to be overcome by the least Passion. On the contrary, there are others who in such like occasions have courage, who lose it at the sight of a weak Enemy, or of the least little danger they encounter; and this proceeds from that the Courage being a vertue which stirs up the forces, when they fail it ought also to fail; and therefore those who are deprived of corpo­ral strength ought to be cowards in War, and couragious in the actions of the Mind and Judgment, if they have the forces which belong to those two Faculties. Finally, as the forces are destined to assault or to resist, as we shall make it hereafter appear, the Courage also employs them in both the one and the other of those actions, and in pur­suit brings forth two different Passions, Boldness which assaults evils, and Constan­cy or Strength of Courage which opposeth it self and resisteth their violence.

The second thing which we ought to know is, Why beat is the principal dispositi [...]n of Cou­rage. why Heat is the principal disposition that creates Courage, and what conditions are requisite for to produce it. The first is easie to be decided, because Heat is the [Page 53]most active of all the qualities, that it stirs up all the other natural Vertues, and makes the best part of the Bodies vigor; neither need we to be astonished, if the Soul being joyned to so powerful a quality, and consci­ous of the help she can draw from thence, have a good opinion of its forces, and if she trust in them, and if she readily oppose them to those difficulties which present themselves.

As for the conditions which this Heat requires to form Courage, What that heat ought to be which forms Courage. there must be three principal ones: The first that it must be natural; the Second, that it must be great and strong; the third, that it must be pro­portionable to the greatness of the Heart.

In effect, a strange Heat as that of a Fea­vor, although it inflame the Heart and the Spirits, yet it augments not the Courage, on the contrary it abates it, as not being confor­mable to Nature. Now for it to be thus con­formable, it must have two things; One that it must be born with the life, and that it must be as it were a continuation of that first flame, which was kindled at its first birth; for if it be once extinguished, there is no means left to reinflame it; and how temperate soever that might be which may be substituted in its place, yet would it be strange and useless; The other is, [Page 54]that it must remain within those limits which Nature hath prescribed; forasmuch as every thing hath a certain measure, be­yond which it ought not pass, without breaking that proportion which ought to be betwixt the organs and their principles to perform their Functions; so that that heat which is more violent then the nature of every Animal can bear, is not natural unto it.

But how conformable soever to Nature it may be, unless it be great, it never will be accompanied with Courage. Where­fore those who are of a cold temperature, as Flegmatick and Melancholy persons are, those who are attenuated with long sick­ness, with long griefs, and who by other Passions quench natural heat, are not cou­ragious.

Yet it is to be observed, that natural heat being not a simple quality, as that of Fire is, but a hot and moist substance, which is commonly called Spirits composed of the Humidum Radicale, and of this heat which Nature inspired with life, it may be great two ways; to wit, in quantity and in quality; that's to say, that there may be much of the Radical Humidity in it, or many degrees of that heat: So Children have more of that natural heat, as to the [Page 55]quantity, as those which are older have much more as to the quality. So in the Winter and in cold Climates, the substance of heat is aug­mented, because not dissipated, and exteri­or cold hinders it from issuing out; al­though it be less burning then in Summer, the coldness of the Air somewhat diminish­ing its vivacity. On the contrary the ardor of the Climate, or of the season draws forth a great part of the substance of Heat, and imprints in what remains a certain acrimony which renders it more violent.

Now although all actions are performed by means of natural heat, yet there are some which more depend on its substance, as concoctions and digestions are, being to be made by means of humidity; so that those who have most radical moisture as Chil­dren, perform these operations most per­fectly, although they have a very tempe­rate heat, such as it ought to be for such actions.

But there are also those which more de­pend on the quality of heat, as are the acti­ons of the Imagination, and those which we call Vital; for those who have the most ardent heat, have the strongest respiration, the most vehement heart beatings, and the most fertile Imagination.

Finally, There are those which equally [Page 56]require both, as those which employ mo­tion, and the forces of the Body, and such Courage is. For it is not sufficient to make a man couragious, to have much radical moisture, since Children which have much of it have but little Courage; nor to have a more sharp and and vehement heat, since in the Summer, and in very hot Climates where the humors and spirits are inflamed by the heat of the Sun, men are but little couragious; but he must have both much humidity and much heat: Since in effect, we see that people which inhabit the most temperate Countries are more couragious then those of the South and North, have­ing more radical moisture then those, and a heat more active then theirs. Even a­mongst Beasts, those which are of a hot temperature, and whose blood is thick, are most couragious, for the same reason, because they have much of the substance of Heat, which is not easily dissipated, being shut up and restrained by such humors as are gross; and besides their heat is stronger, as well by reason of the advantage which Nature hath afforded them, as because she raiseth many vapors which render it more sharp, and that she resides in a thicker subject which renders her more ef­ficatious.

And truly according as humors are gross or subtile, heat diversly operates, and also forms several kinds of Courage; for those which have them subtile and moveable, as the Cholerick, are ready to be inflamed, but it's a flame which lasts not, but its pre­sently spent; others which are grosser, and moderately hot, have a Courage which is not easily provoked, but which being heat­ed is with difficulty appeased. To con­clude, those who are violently hot, and whose humors are gross, fall easily in­to fury, and are of an undaunted Cou­rage.

But that which makes the principal diffi­culty in all these things, What the greatness of the Heart ought to be to make Courage. is the greatness or littleness of Heart. For it's observed that all those Creatures, which proportionably to their Bodies have a less Heart, are coura­gious, as the Dog and the Lion; and that those which have a greater, as Deer and Hares, are timerous. Yet there are other experiences which render these observati­ons doubtful; for even Man hath a Heart greater then all other Creatures in propor­tion to his Body, although he be one of the most couragious. It's certain, that large-Chested men have a great Heart, and that the breadth of the Brest is an undoubted mark of the Hearts heat, which causeth [Page 58]Boldness and Courage: Considering also that those, the temperature of whose Heart is cold and dry, have commonly that part very smal, and are the most timerous. To answer to these Reasons which destroy the precedent Proposition, there are some who say that it's only true in the several kinds of Beasts, comparing the one with the o­ther, and not in the individuals of the same Species; So that the Lion compared with the Stag hath a less Heart, and is more cou­ragious; but that amongst Lions he that hath the greatest Heart, hath the greatest advantage over that which hath a less; yet this voids not the difficulty. For although it be true, that amongst every kinde of Creatures which are naturally couragious, the greatest Heart is accompanied with the greatest Courage: It's also certain that in those that are naturally timorous, the great­est Heart denotes also the greatest Timi­dity.

We must then say that the greatness of the Hearts doth nothing of it self, as to the Courage, and that we must add there­unto the abundance of heat and spirits; for if the Heart be great, and that it hath much heat and many Spirits, it will cer­tainly produce a very great Courage. But if the Heart be small, and that it hath as [Page 59]much heat, and as many Spirits, as that which is great, it will make a more boyl­ing, and a more impetuous Courage, be­cause the heat is more active when it's shut up and restrained; but that also is the cause that it is not so noble and generous; foras­much as that constraint makes it easily pass to fury, and that the smalness of the parts is an effect of the weakness of the forma­tive Vertue, or a defect of the matter which in the principal parts is always vitious. On the contrary, if it have but few spirits, and but little heat, it makes Timidity; and in proportion as it is either large or streight, it will render it litile or great. For even as a little fire warms a great Chamber less then the same would do a little one: So likewise a little natural heat, works less ef­fect in a great and large Heart, then in one that's little and restrained. Wherefore al­though Timidity be common to both, it appears less in this, and is greater in the greater.

We have now nothing to add to the un­derstanding of this business, but to resolve two very considerable Doubts which may arise from the former Discourse. For if the Courage consists in the dispositions we have now spoken of, two things will follow which seem to combate Reason and Expe­rience. [Page 60]1. That Courage will onely be in the sensitive part, because those disposi­tions are all material and sensible; although it be true that there be many which out of meer Reason onely are valiant and couragi­ous, without having this heat in the Heart, which we have observed. 2. That that Ani­mal which hath not these dispositions, will never be moved by any Boldness, seeing he will want the Courage which is a power whence this Passion proceeds; and yet it's certain, that the most timorous in divers encounters perform actions of Boldness and of Courage, and that the weakest are most susceptible of choler, which is a kind of Boldness.

We must then say that there are two sorts of Courage, There are two kinds of Bold­ness. the one which belongs to the superior part, and the other which is in the sensitive Appetite. For since the Ira­scible Faculty is the principle, and as it were the substance of Courage, it must needs be that the Will which hath its irascible part, must also have its particular Courage, and must be as much different from that which is in the Appetite, as the Will is from the Appetite it self. It's true, that Courage consists not onely in the irascible vertue, but that it supposeth also in it a certain disposi­tion which makes it the more easily ope­rate; [Page 61]for an Animal is not couragious for having the irascible part, but for having of it such that it easily may move it self against difficulties. But this disposition ever fol­lows the nature of the subject wherein it is; and it must necessarily be, that if it be in the Will, it must be different from that which is in the Appetite, and consequently that there must be two kinds of Courage. Now as the presence of heat which makes the best and most considerable parts of corpo­ral strengths, produceth this disposition in the sensitive Appetite, the force of the Minde and of Reason works the same effect in the Will: It inspires a secret sence of its power, and of the succour she may draw from thence; it fills it with confidence, and leaves it a certain facility and readiness to oppose it self to those difficulties which present themselves wherein Courage con­sists, as hath been already shewed. Such is that which accompanies the excellent qua­lities of the Mind, whether they be natu­ral or acquired. For a knowing man, hath the courage and boldness to speak; he that is vertuous, boldly opposeth himself against his Passions; and an expert Artist under­takes things in his Art, in which others durst not engage themselves, because that every of them have forces necessary to ex­ecute [Page 62]what they undertake, and that the will which knows what they can do, is ready to stir them up and employ them when it pleaseth.

Now although these two kinds of Cou­rage may one subsist without another, yet they are far stronger when they are joyned together, and assist one the other. For a man whom Vertue or Knowledge hath in­spired with Courage, is more bold in un­dertaking any thing, if he have that fair fire which at his birth is kindled in his Heart, then if he had a coldness which ren­ders that part languishing, and causeth a na­tural Timidity; even as he whose tempera­ture hath rendred him couragious, is far more resolute when the qualities of his Mind may second his natural disposition. On the con­trary, were there but one sort of Courage, a man would be very sensible of the ardor it would inspire; we should know the en­deavors it makes in it self, and the many things which it proposeth every moment the performance of. But the cowardliness which would be in the other part of the Soul at the same time, dissipates those fair resolutions. It checks all those noble mo­tions, and corrupts all the good designs it had formed. Thus it is with those who having all the advantages of the Mind, dare [Page 63]never produce themselves; and others who have much Heart, dare undertake no­thing.

But although this be the true sence a man ought to have of this power of the Soul; yet we must confess, that when we speak of Courage, we commonly mean that which our births shed into our hearts, and which is proper to the sensitive Appetite; because it's common to all Creatures, and that its effects are most sensible and most re­markable.

As for the other Doubt which respects Courage; To wit, whether the dispositi­ons we have observed, be always necessary to its production, is no less diffiult to resolve; For if it be true that Boldness is an effect of Courage, contrary to the experience which we have, those Animals which are natu­rally timerous, can never be susceptible of this Passion: Or that contrary to the Max­ims which we have established, Courage should not depend on those dispositi­ons.

Certainly, we must here again say, that the common manner of speaking sits not so well the truth of the thing; for there is no Animal which hath not Courage, be­cause there is none without some heat, for that its necessary to life; and how little so­ever [Page 64]it hath, it's capable to give that dis­position to the irascible Vertue, which is ca­pable to make it undertake something. In effect, there is no Animal which at every moment finds not some difficulty which it's obliged to oppose. And we every day see that the weakest and most timorous make endeavors to surmount the obstacles they encounter; they must therefore have Cou­rage, Since Courage is nothing but the irascible Vertue, which the Natural heat of the Heart hath rendred capable of working. But be­cause this capacity is greater in some, and lesser in others, the greater hath deserved by its prerogative the name of Courage, as the lesser is called Cowardise, or want of Courage. So that even as we say a man hath no wit because he hath but little; we also say an Animal hath no Courage, because he hath but little: And certainly if we should well consider this gender of Qualities which the Schools call Natural Impotencies, un­der which the default of Courage ought to be placed, we should find that it is different from Power only in respect of less or more. And that the word of [Impotency] means onely a weak Power, and not the absolute privation of Power, because it's a quality, and quality is a real thing. So the default of Courage is rightly Courage, but it's little, [Page 65]weak, and hid, which operates but seldom, and undertakes but light Skirmishes, or at least, if it engage in greater matters, it must be very much sollicited thereto; and the difficulties must have powerfully provoked it, as it happens in the Anger of timorous persons.

Last of all, the common way of speaking affords not the name of Courage, but only to him who is most active, who boldly op­poseth himself to the greatest dangers, and who is always ready either ro assault or to defend himself. But to have this Courage, and to be called couragious, a man must have all the dispositions we have spoken of. So that when we said that Boldness was an effect of Courage, we considered Courage in its Nature, and not according as it's u­sed in our Language. For it's true, that this passion cannot proceed but from the irascible Vertue, in that it can operate, and when it operateth it's called Courage; but it is not always that active and boiling Courage, which marks a great facility of operating, for that it is necessary there must be much natural heat in the Heart to give it this faci­lity. All which will be better understood when we shall have examined wherein Force or Strength consists.

Of Force.

To speak generally, Force is a quality which first and properly belongs to Power, Faculty, or Vertue, and by its means to those actions which it produceth, and to the subject it's found in. So we say that the natural Faculty is strong, that it's ope­ration is strong, and that the parts it resides in are strong: Now the Vertue is strong, when it can perfectly, and with efficacy produce its effect; and it's capable of it, when it hath those dispositions which are necessary for its operation. So that Force or Strength consists in these dispositions, which proportionably as they are more or less perfect, make that also more or less great, and its Vertue to be less or more strong.

Yet it's very true, To what the name of Force is most properly to be applied that although in that sence, Force be a quality common to all Powers, as well Spiritual as Material, all of them having need of certain conditions and dispositions to operate; yet so it is, that to speak absolutely of Strength, all kinde of Strength is not to be understood, nor all sorts of Vertues; For when for ex­ample we say, That Force is necessary to assault, That an Animal or a Body is strong, [Page 67]it is not to be understood of all the Forces it may have, as of the force of the Sto­mack, of the sences, and of the like, but of a certain particular Strength, which be­ing more noble and more excellent then the rest by its prerogative, hath deserved simply & absolutely to be called Force; and it's that which the Passions of the irascible Appetite use, the nature whereof must there­fore consequently be here inquired. To this purpose we must suppose, that all the Uni­verse being composed and filled with things which are contrary and opposite one to an­other, there is nothing which can be there­in without Enemies which assault and seek to destroy it. So that it was the providence of Nature which gave unto all things, not onely those Vertues which were necessary to perform their ordinary, and as it were, domestick functions, but even those which ought to defend them from foreign assaults, and hindering them from receiving those violences which it might receive from a­broad. 'Tis for this reason that every thing hath its proper qualities to preserve its be­ing, as also others to destroy its contrary; and that those Animals where those Ver­tues are more distinct, and less confused, have two different Appetites. The Con­cupiscible, to seek for themselves what is [Page 68]fit, and flie what is hurtful; and the irascible to resist ill, and if it be needful to assault and destroy it. But because there is more trouble and action to resist and assault, then simply to pursue good, or flye from ill; and that Ver­tues are the more noble, the more active they are, as we have shewed elsewhere; it is certain, that in this respect the irascible Appetite is more active and more noble then the Concupiscible; and therefore those Forces which are the Instruments and the dispositions which it hath to work, are also more excellent and more considerable then the rest. It's also the reason for which the name of Force is due unto them out of excellency; and then when we speak simply of Force or Forces, we ever understand those which are destined to resist and to assault.

Now because all Philosophers and all Physitians are agreed, The force of corporal things consists in the tempe­rature. that the Force of all the corporal Powers consists in the temperature which is proper and natu­ral unto them, because the temperature is the first and the most efficacious of all the Dispositions which the Faculties finde in the matter; and that the proporti­on and fitness which ought to be betwixt the instrument and the cause, require this temperature should be proper and natural to the Faculty, as is before said, speaking [Page 69]of that natural heat which forms the Cou­rage; This Maxim, I say, being certain, we must see what this Temperature is, which ought to serve the Irascible Appetite; since it's a material Power. Certainly, since it is to assault, it hath need of heat, being the principle of action in Animals; and since it ought also to resist, it hath also need of dri­ness, which is the principle of this resist­ance. Now there is no temperature which hath these two qualities, but either the cho­lerick Melancholy, or the sanguine Melan­choly, forasmuch as Choler and Blood are Humors which furnish heat; and that Melancholy which is Terrestrial affords dri­ness, solidity, and stability.

In effect, all Animals which are natural­ly strong and couragious, are either Chole­rick Melancholy, as Lions and Dogs; or Sanguine Melancholy, as Bulls, Bears, and wilde Boars. And if we observe what hath been spoken of the Hero's in former times, we may easily judge they were all of the same complexion; and that choler and me­lancholy Diseases, to which they are sub­ject, are certain marks of this temperature; In fine, he that will consider the body of a strong and robustious man, will see that all parts answer these two qualities. That a streight figure, a large Brest, quick Eyes, a [Page 70]strong Voice, and all vigorous motions proceed from that heat which extends and animates the organs; as the bigness of the Bones and Joynts, the bigness of the ex­tremities, the firmness of the Muscles, the hardness of the skin comes from a Melan­choly and terrestrial driness, which renders the humors thick, and the members solid.

Now if it happen that heat alone predo­minates, it will indeed produce Courage and Strength, but it will be an impetuous and a boiling strength, proper to assault and not to sustain. On the contrary, if driness be there without being seconded by heat, it renders the force stupid and pas­sive, which serves to resist and not to assault, as hath been said.

But we must here observe two very con­siderable things. Wherein the tem­per consists First from the example of Physitians, we must not here take the tem­per for the onely mixture of the first quali­ties, but also for all the other dispositi­ons of the matter, as are second quali­ties, the conformation of parts, and the concourse of spirits. As when we say that Force consists in a hot and dry tempera­ture, we understand not that the parts are simply hot and dry, but also that they are of a thick succulent and firm consistence, that nothing is wanting to their conforma­tion, [Page 71]and that the spirits slide therein easi­ly and abundantly. For if this tempera­ture meets with a subtile and loose mat­ter, as is to be seen in those purely chole­rick, it will indeed produce Courage, but the Forces thereof will not be perfect, and cannot long neither maintain a Combate, or a strong assault, because the spirits pre­sently dissipate themselves, and that the parts have not that massive and firm con­sistence which is necessary for resistance; and should they even have these conditions, if they receive not those spirits which are necessary for their functions, or if there be any notable defect in their conformation, they will be weak, and cannot execute the or­ders which the Appetite imposeth on them.

The second thing which is to be consi­dered is, That [...]her [...]re two pri [...]cipal parts in which the [...]t and [...] [...] o [...]ght to b [...]. That the Appetite which is the principle of all those motions which Ani­mals make, useth two principal faculties, which have the direction of those actions; to wit, the Vital Faculty which resides in the heart, and in the Spirits; and the Mo­tive Vertue which is seated in the Brain, and in those organs which depend on it; so that it's chiesly in those parts which we are to consider, and wherein this tempera­ture whereof we have spoken ought to be.

But because the Irascible Appetite is it self placed in the Heart, and that the strength of that part is consequently nearer unto it, then that of the other organs of Motion; and that we may in some sort say, that they are Arms which it hath in hand, or its domestick Forces, and that it leads them it self; and this is the reason it hath more confidence in them then in others, and that they alone are capable to give him both Courage and Boldness.

For the heat of the Heart is a violent and impetuous Minister, which incessantly sol­licites the Soul to follow its motions, which abuseth it out of the ostentation it makes of its forces, and perswades it, that with them, and without other help it can un­dertake all things: It's properly an ambiti­ous Favorite, which engageth his Master in a difficult War, without considering the weakness of the State. He hath Courage, Arms and Men; but the Nerves of War are wanting, neither doth he see that his Allyes cannot favor him: So when Force is alone in the Heart, the irascible Appetite may well stir up those noble Passions, and declare War against its Enemies; but the Nerves and Muscles not seconding its De­signs, its Enterprises are vain and timo­rous. On the contrary, when the Heart is [Page 73]weak, the Appetite is languishing and lazy; and although the Members are robust, it trusts not their Forces, and thinks it a suc­cor too far off to make use of in such ur­gent occasions. Let's then conclude, That that Force which is necessary to assault and to resist, principally consists in the hot and dry temperature of the Heart; and that that may be perfect and accomplished, it must be accompanied with that of the Nerves and Muscles.

But there are still two great difficulties to be decided. The first is, The For­ces belong to the I­rascible Appetite. That all those Dispositions of the irascible Appetite serve also the concupiscible; for besides that Heat and Spirits are necessary for all the Fa­culties of Life, and that Love and Desire are ardent and impetuous Passions, it must needs be that those Creatures which are to go, flie, or swim, and which are often ob­liged to run after good, should have dispo­sitions necessary to perform these great mo­tions, to wit, Heat and Firmness; thus Force will not be particularly affected to the irascible part, but it will be always in common to the concupiscible, which yet is contrary to our ordinary Philosophy, which will have that different Vertues must have different Dispositions.

To answer these Reasons, We shall first [Page 74]say, That it's true, all different Faculties require different dispositions. For if they are with things which serve to many Ver­tues and Actions, there must needs be some diversity which makes this difference, which every particular action requires. So natu­ral heat which serves as the universal In­strument to all the functions of life, is di­versified according to those operations ne­cessary thereunto; it must for some be moist or dry; for others, great, little, or temperate, and every one hath its porti­on and measure different from all the rest. We then confess that the Concupiscible and Irascible Appetite both employ Heat and Spirits, and that there must be firmness in the motions of either of them. But there is this difference, that the one requires a sweet heat, moist, and pleasant; and that the other will have one that is lively, dry, and pungent, for the Reasons we shall here­after deduce: And that that firmness which appears in the motions of the Concupis­cible part, is outwards and purely acciden­tal, not being to be found in the Soul, and happening to the parts out of necessity, in­stead that in others, it's first found in the irascible Appetite, which afterwards com­municates it to the organs; for this Appe­tite onely can stablish it self, and when the [Page 75]Soul suffers this kind of motion, it even forms some Passion of the irascible Appetite. Indeed this establishment of the Soul seems to be the proper agitation of the irascible Appetite, because there is no motion more efficacious to resist and assault then that which reunites the Vertue which hinders it to yeeld, and which renders the assault the more strong; she also makes use of it in all generous Passions; and if she casts herself into Boldness and into Anger, it's certain, she first settles herself. And the onely dif­ference which there is betwixt the motion of Desire and that of Boldness is, that at first the Soul darts it self forth without settling it self, and that in the other it performs both together, as hath been said.

The other difficulty is, How Force is differ­ent from Courage. That if Force consist in the heat of the Heart where we al­so have placed Courage; it must follow that Force and Courage are the same thing; What ever is said, that a man hath Cou­rage, but wants Force; and that Force and Courage must be joyned for the execution of great Designs. We therefore say, that heat alone may make Courage all entire; but that it makes but a part of Force. Be­sides Courage is the power it self, and Force is to be considered as the instrument [Page 76]of this power. For heat is not Courage, but it produceth in the Faculty this disposi­tion and capacity of operating, which we call Courage; instead whereof we may say, that Heat is Force, or at least that it is a part of Force; yet must we not from thence conclude, that Force doth not belong pro­perly and in the first place to Power, because the nature and essence of the Instrument depends wholly from the relation which it hath to its Cause; and were there no Cause, there would be no Instrument. So Strength being the Instrument of Power, it properly and primarily belongs to it, and by its means to those actions and subjects where­in it is. But it's to go too far into the sub­tilties of the Schools. Let's return to our Discourse of Boldness, and see what ef­fect it produceth in the Spirits and in the Humors.

CHAP. IV. What the motion of the Spirits, and of the Humors, is in Boldness.

HAving shewn you that the Appetite stiffens and darts it self forth in Bold­ness, The spirits stiffen and dart forth them­selves in Boldness. we need not doubt but the same mo­tions [Page 77]are made in the Spirits, since they usually follow the agitations of the Soul, and that they are the first organs which she employs to execute her designs; they do therefore stiffen and stablish themselves, and then they rise up, and dart themselves out, just as doth the Appetite. Indeed he that will consider the countenance of a man be­fore he assaults ill, but who onely sees it coming, will perceive no sign of this sally of the spirits, forasmuch as he changeth not colour; and that fire which we see after­wards glitter in his eyes, appears not; for it's certain, that if these spirits cast themselves on those parts, they would carry thither red­ness and splendor, and would not leave them that coldness and equality with which he looks upon, and considers dangers.

And truly since we must grapple with the Enemy to assault him, and that the endea­vors we should make against him would be vain and useless, were he out of reach, the Soul would never rise up nor dart it self forth against it, did she fancy it to be still far off, and not near enough to prove her force, and resent the effects of her power. All what she doth in this encounter, is, to fortifie and prepare herself for the combate; First, stiffening her self in her self, and af­terwards inspiring the same motion to the [Page 78]spirits, and the rest of the organs, which may be serviceable to her in this occasion; in pursuit whereof it follows, that a mans color changeth not, that his looks are staid, and that without growing pale or with­out any disturbance he looks on the most formidable things, because the spirits which are mixt with the humors, and which cause all the other parts to move, stiffening them­selves, render them firm and settled, and by that means hinder the blood from shedding it self abroad, or from retiring inwardly, not that those other motions of the Bo­dy either restrain or render themselves im­petuous.

This then is the agitation which the spi­rits suffer in the beginnings of Boldness, or to speak better, in those preparatives which the Sonl makes for this Passion; For Re­solution, Hope, Confidence, and Staiedness of Courage, which are the fore-runners thereof, require this kind of motion, and without it can neither form themselves nor subsist.

But after the Enemies approach, and that the Soul is risen up to assault and fight him, she moves the Spirits in the same manner, and all stiffened as they are, she with impe­tuosity drives them forth to the exterior parts, and so carries redness to the face, ar­dor [Page 79]and vivacity to the eyes, and violence to all the motions, as we shall hereafter de­clare.

Now to explain how this darting forth is made, we ought here to repeat all what hath been said in the Chapter of Desire; for there is no difference in the motions of these two Passions, as to the agitation, since both in the one and the other the Soul issues as it were out of it self, and casts it self to­wards the object which moves it: They are onely unlike in the end she therein propo­seth herself; since in Desire she carries her­self towards good, that she may get near it, and thereby afterwards enjoy it; and in Bold­ness she darts herself towards ill, that she may combate and overcome it. It's there­fore here we must seek that satisfaction which this subject requires. As also in the Discourse of Hope, that which is necessa­ry to make us understand how the spirits settle and dart forth themselves at the same time, we are onely to observe, that when we said, that the motions of Desire and of Boldness were alike, it ought to be under­stood in this darting forth. For its certain, that the Soul never stiffens it self in Desire unless it be accompanied with Hope, with Boldness, or with Anger; forasmuch as she stiffens herself onely to fortifie herself, [Page 80]and that she needs not employ her strength unless difficulties present themselves, which are not in the Passions of the Concupisci­ble part, as elsewhere hath been already said.

Now the first thing which follows this motion, Whence the Heat comes that raiseth up it self in Boldness. is, the heat which sheds it self o­ver all the Body, and which by degrees aug­ments it self, and proportionably as the im­petuosity grows greater. For at first, before the spirits darted themselves forth, when they kept themselves onely firm, this qua­lity was very moderate, as it is to be found in Hope; but when they begin to make their fallies and dartings which drive and throw them forth, it's then that it be­comes violent, and that at last it inflames all the parts. But the difficulty is to know whence this heat proceeds; for although there be an appearance which the agitation of the heart and of the spirits causeth, since it's a Maxim received in the Schools, That Motion hath the vertue to produce; yet besides the experience which we learn, that Air and Water cool themselves by agitati­on; and that the shock and encounter of Bodies, by which we say heat is engendred, hath no place in those which are subtile and fluid, it is certain that there are Passions where the heart and the Spirits have a very [Page 81]quick and impetuous motion, as we see in Fear, yet even in them heat augments not, but even weakens it self.

For my part, I beleeve that without sticking at common opinions, we may say that the Heart being the source of heat, hath also the vertue of producing it; and that being to lose this quality as a general in­strument of all the functions of life, it must have the power to augment it according to the need we may have. Why should we de­ny it this Faculty, since there is no form which produceth not those qualities which are necessary unto it? The Water of it self alone, doth it not take back again the cold which was taken from it? Doth not the Earth also recover the driness it lost? but what is most considerable, Doth not Heat augment it self in presence of its contrary? And if it be true that that which inflames the Heart in violent passions, proceeds not from motion, as we have shewn even now, what other source can it have, but this se­cret vertue we speak of? In fine, since the Soul resides in this part as in its Throne, and that she is therein stronger then in any other part, what need we doubt but she helps this production? She who in her self contains the vertue of all inferior things, as we have shewed in the discourse of Light. [Page 82]We must therefore beleeve, that the Soul and the Heart augment the natural heat when it is necessary, and that in perform­ing their endeavor, and stirring it self to produce it, they cause it to issue out of those principles where she potentially was.

Besides, Since the Soul hath Forces which she imploys when she will, which she awakes and stirs up at her need, she must needs have the same power over natural heat, which is the most considerable part thereof, and that she may raise it up and encrease it when its help is necessary. And certainly as the motive Vertue contains in potentia the motion which it afterwards produceth, when it hath received the orders of the Appetite; So the Vital Faculty hath in it self a secret source of Heat, which it stirs up and brings to light, if we may so speak, when the Soul commands and judgeth it necessary. Now there is no occasion where­in this succour is more profitable for her, then when she expects the ill either to resist or to combate it, because she hath then need of its Forces, which principally con­sists in heat, as we have made it appear in the precedent Discourses: But forasmuch as there needs more Forces to assault then to resist, that is the cause that there is less heat in Hope and in Constancy, where the [Page 83]Soul stands on the defensive, then in Bold­ness and in Anger, where she assaults and destroys ill. As also that in these two lat­ter the agitation of the spirits is greater; for we do confess that their motion serves for something, not of it self, but by acci­dent, as we say in the Schools, because they bring the heat which they have, and that of the humors which they draw after them, to those parts where they light, and ever sollicite the fixed heat which is therein entertained, to awake and to render it active.

As for those Passions which oblige the Soul to flight, they make a quite contra­ry effect, and because the Spirits retire un­to the centre, and the Soul also finding it self too weak to resist the Enemy, loseth all its Courage, nor cares it to repair its strength, and so suffers the natural heat to be extinguished without endeavoring to re­kindle it.

But that we may well conceive what the endeavor is she makes in other Passions, Wh [...]t the quality of heat is in Bold­ness. we must not consider the quality of the heat which accompanies them, and compare it with that which is observed in those Pas­sions which seek good; for in these it is sweet, humid and graceful; and in those it is sharp, dry, and pungent. So that it's very likely that in the first the Soul em­ploys [Page 84]it and sheds it abroad without violence, and in the other she raiseth it and drives it forth with impetuosity, that in those it on­ly needs its ordinary vertue, and in these it must be greater and more active. Finally we may say, That in the one she useth it as a follower accompanying of her to her friends, but in the other it's an Assistant which she leads with her, even against her Enemies.

In Love indeed, in Desire, and in Joy the outward parts receive not heat, be­cause it's sent thither, but because it flies from those spirits which are sent thither, forasmuch as the Soul needs not that quality to approach or unite it self to good, but only the Spirits which force it to the place where it is. On the contrary, when she is to fight, she sends heat as a powerful instrument to act, and to destroy what is contrary unto it; as also in this design she renders it as strong as she can, whether it be by degrees aug­menting it, or stirring up the Spirits by a continual agitation, or in removing the humors when she is most active, as chole­rick are.

And certainly, what the sensitive Facul­ty doth in these encounters, the natural also doth it very often in those ordinary functi­ons, as is easily judged by the Feavor, [Page 85]which is just like Boldness and Anger, the same heat, the same tempest of the Spi­rits and Humors, and the same design which the Soul hath in those Passions it encounters in that disease. For we must not think that the Feavor is kindled in the Heart by some stranger fire. It's the Soul its self, or rather the Vital Facul­ty which reunites its force, which stirs up natural heat, and which lifts it self up to fight those causes which destroy the har­mony and constitution of the Body. This is readily proved by its crisis, which are those fits of the Feavor which the endea­vors of Nature, and not the Disease stirs up; by the inflammation which the com­ing of the spirits and of the blood causeth in the infested parts, by the cessation of the Feavor in the heighth of the sickness, when the Humors are so malignant that Nature is overcome with them, and that she dares no longer assault them; And by a thousand other Reasons which we might produce, had we room for them; by which we might evidently make it appear that the Feavor is nothing but an innitation and a rising up of natural heat to drive away the ill; and that therefore it's a motion like to that of Anger, and that in the lowest part of the Soul, as well as in the highest there is an [Page 86]Appetite which hath its irascible Faculty to raise it self up against those difficulties which present themselves. However it be the Soul encreaseth Heat in Boldness and in Anger, producing and adding new de­grees to what it had, and stirring it up by the continual agitation of the Spirits.

For although they stir themselves impe­tously in Love, Boldness entertains the moti­ons of the Spirits. in Desire and in Joy, yet their motion is not therein maintained; and the Soul takes no care for their entertain­ment, the transport and the ravishment which the approach, or the possession of good affords her, bereaving her of the re­membrance of what she ought to do, for which cause languors and soundings follow these Passions, unless Hope, Boldness, or the like, mix not with them, and call back the Soul to her Duty, as it often happens in Love and in Desire, which being com­monly accompanied with Fear and Hope suffers not such great and violent accidents as those in Joy are; the Soul therefore is more careful to continue the motions of the Spirits in Boldness and in Anger, then in the rest of those Passions, because the dan­ger she is threatned withal keeps her in breath, and continually sollicites her to op­pose new forces, and to make new endea­vors against the pressures of the Enemy, [Page 87]which she cannot do, but by producing every moment new Heat and new Spirits, and sending them to relieve those which made the first assaults.

Nay often, What hu­mors are moved in Boldness. as if she mistrusted her suc­cors, when the ill appears too powerful, she raiseth up the most working and the most malignant Humors that thereby she might the more easily destroy them. From thence it is that Choler is stirred up in the vio­lence of those Passions; and that in veni­mous Beasts, that poison which is quiet and hid in the centre of the Body, casts it self forth into the outward parts, and chief­ly into those which serve them for arms and defence; which may oblige us to judge that it's the Soul which brings it into those places to assault and destroy the ill, and by a very probable consequence, that she doth the like with those others which have any proper quality for that purpose. To con­firm this Truth, we need onely to consider those dreams which are formed when cho­ler predominates; for they evidently make it appear, that the Soul is accustomed to use this humor to assault evils, and that presently as soon as she sees it in a condi­tion to be thereby relieved, she prepares herself for the Combate, and during sleep she forgeth Enemies, Battels and Victo­ries. [Page 88]At least its certain, that Choler be­ing agitated in these Passions, renders the Heat the more strong and pungent. Or because it's naturally dry, and that driness is a quality which gives most efficacy to Heat, or because those sharp fumes which this humor exhales, when it's moved, cast themselves on the parts, prick them and give them that angry sentiment which the heat of those Passions useth to cause.

CHAP. V. The Causes of the Characters of Boldness.

TO follow the same method we have held in our former Discourses, The mo­rol cha­racters of Boldness. we must here examine two sorts of Characters; the one immediately formed in the Soul, which we call Moral, because they consist in those actions which we call Moral, or at least which respect Manners. The other which are Corporal, and which are remarked in the change and alteration which this Passion imprints on the Body. Those of the first order which accompany Boldness, are truly very numerous, as may be seen in the de­scription we have made of a Bold man; but we may reduce them to certain principal Heads, the knowledge of which will easily [Page 89]bring us to that of the rest: For he that shall know why a Bold man Hopes, and why he is a lover of Glory, will at the same instant know the cause of the greatest part of the other effects which Boldness produceth, and which in some sort depend from those two.

Let's then begin with Hope which ever precedes Boldness, and never abandons it; Hope al­ways ac­companies Boldness. Certainly, it's nothing difficult to give the reason thereof; for after having shewn that to form Boldness, the Soul must know and measure its Forces, that she must beleeve them greater and more powerful then those of the Enemy, and afterwards she must employ them against him, that she may vanquish him; It's impossible but she must hope for the Victory, since she desires it, and that in her judgment she hath all what is necessary for the obtaining thereof. Per­haps some will say, that there are many who fight without hope of conquest; it's true, but also Boldness which is employed in such fights, is not found in the sensitive Faculty; nor is it of the common order of the Passions. It's particular to a man whose reason prepareth often other designs then those which Nature and the Sences are wont to inspire in Animals; For its cer­tain that they never assault any thing which [Page 90]they beleeve not they shall conquer; and if sometimes they are forced to combate Enemies, which they did not dare to assault, or even before whom they had already been put to flight, it's the fear they have of falling into a greater danger, which awakes their Courage, reanimates their Force, and so brings to life again the hope of over­coming those to whom they had yeelded before. But it is not so with men, who often engage themselves in Combates, and cast themselves into dangers, out of which they never hope to come with any advan­tage, and even where they know their loss is certain, because Reason proposeth them a more considerable end then the Victory would afford them, and obligeth them to un­dertake impossible things, to gain honor, and other goods,, which always follow ge­nerous actions. But if in these encounters they despair of over-coming the Enemy which assaults them, they still hope to van­quish those difficulties which inviron the glory they aspire unto; and we may say they yeeld a small Victory to gain a greater, and hazard a little to gain much. But in the fol­lowing Chapter we shall again touch this subject. It's sufficient to have here shewn that in Boldness there is still Hope enough, and that a Bold man is never without Hope.

Now the same principle from whence we have drawn this truth, ought also to furnish us with the reason why a Bold man hath so much Confidence and Presump­tion in himself, why he is not astonished at the sight of dangers, that even he is pleased when he encounters them, and that very often he despiseth them; why he is not su­perstitious, cholerick, or dissembling; In fine, why he hates subjection, and will al­ways command.

For if Confidence be nothing but a con­summated Hope, fortified by the opinion we have that those things whose help we expect will not fail us at our need, it's cer­tain that the Soul which knows its forces, and beleeves them more powerful then the difficulties, and employs them against them with Hope to overcome them, must also be assured that they will not fail her in this occasion, and that she hath cause to trust to the help which she promiseth herself from them.

As for Presumption, which is an immo­derate Hope, and proceeds from the too great opinion we have of our Forces, al­though it doth not always accompany Boldness, yet it follows it, because heat encreasing, and kindling it self in this Passi­on, it stirs up the Soul by its vivacity. It [Page 92]troubles it, by its agitation, and afterwards easily perswades it, that its forces are greater then indeed they are, and that they are all in a condition to serve her, although there often be but one part of them; thus it is when Wine, Fury, and Love inspire the weakest and most timorous persons with a blind Confidence, and a temerous Boldness, which engageth them to undertake things above their power; for the Judgement be­ing weakened by the vapors of the Wine, or by the violence of those Passions and heat, being become stronger by the impres­sion it made on the humors, we need not wonder if the Soul finding it self upheld with the most powerful assistance which she can use in her functions, be deceived in the opinion she hath of her strength, and that she believes them greater then indeed they are.

These Reasons make it appear also, A Bold man is not astonished at sight of dangers. that a bold man ought not to be astonished at the sight of dangers, because astonishment be­ing ever accompanied with Fear and with some Despair, cannot be susceptible of those Passions in the belief he is, that his forces are greater then the difficulties, and in the hope he hath to overcome them. On the contrary, as he flatters himself in this thought, and placeth all his happiness in [Page 93]the Victory, all these things which are to contribute thereunto are pleasing to him; he takes a delight to handle Arms, the found of Trumpets animates him, he be­holds the Enemies approach with joy; and if there be any thing which disturbs his contentment, it is the impatience he hath to be at him, and to begin that Combate which is to crown his valor. It's the same with him who is bold to speak or to write, or to undertake any other design whatso­ever it be; he pleaseth himself in the en­counter of those difficulties which are to employ him, and to make his courage ap­pear; the place, the occasion, the subject of his enterprise far from astonishing him, do but the more assure him, and he is never so content, as when he sees himself ready to set his hand to the work.

But if it be true that he runs thus into danger, that he assaults difficulties, A Bold man de­spiseth dangers. and that he will overcome them, how can he despise dangers? For it is not to slight an Enemy when we assault and seek to over­come him. Certainly, we must confess that he despiseth not all manner of dangers, not all sorts of Enemies, but onely those who are far beneath his strength, and that there­fore he judgeth it unworthy for him to ex­ercise his care and Courage; for since in [Page 94]Nature which gives Animals the know­ledge of their strength and weakness, and instructs them to flie when they are too weak, and to assault when they are strong enough; its very likely that being so wise and so just, as she is, she would not engage them in a too unequal combate, and that she would restrain them when they meet an E­nemy incomparably less powerful then they are, and which cannot offend them. In effect we see that among domestick Beasts, those which are naturally strong and of a great size, scorn the assaults of those who are little and weak; a Mastiff grows not angry, nor ever defends himself against a little Cur which barks at him, and snaps at him, as if he scorned his temerity; he goes on without regarding him, or stands still without being disturbed at the endeavors he makes against him. A child securely plays with the most angry Beasts, beats them with impunity, and hurts them with­out moving them, which they would never suffer from another person.

Some say the same of those which are wilde and savage; and some of them have deserved the name of generous, not onely because they disdain to assault those who are not able to resist them but also be­cause they often content themselves to cast [Page 95]down their adversary, as if in that conditi­on it were unworthy for them any more to exercise their strength, and that it were a shame for them to end a Combate which they had made so unequal. It's true that they forbear not often to pursue the most timo­rous creatures; but it is not as Enemies, it's as their prey; and it's not to fight them, but to take them and feed on them; in a word, it's Hunger and not Boldness which animates them; for when they are not pres­sed with this hard and implacable necessity, they never assault but onely those which they think strong enough to harm them, and scorn the rest which have not that power.

Whatever we believe, it's certain that when the Soul is perswaded that the difficul­ties which present themselves are too weak to traverse her designs, she scorns and dis­dains to fight them. Now this perswasion is grounded on the certain knowledge which she hath of the greatness of her forces, or on a false opinion which she hath conceived of them. For although those who are truly strong and powerful, have rea­son to make no reckoning of the greatest part of those things which alarm others; yet when Boldness hath heated a Courage, how weak soever it be, it abuseth it by a vain confidence it gives it, and makes it believe [Page 96]that the obstacles it meets are nothing con­siderable, that there are none which ought to stop its course, or which is able to make the least resistance: This is commonly ob­served in the anger of Women, of Children, and of Men who are naturally timorous; they fear all before they are possest with this Passion; but when this hath gotten mastery, shame, respect nor danger can ne­ver bridle them. They slight all that oppo­seth their fury, and blindly run whereso­ever rage and despair leads them.

Since Boldness scorns the greatest part of difficulties and dangers, A Bold man is not chole­rick. neither can it be Cholerick or Superstitious, because Anger and Superstition are not compatible with the confidence it hath, nor with the despight it hath of most of those things which assault it.

And indeed we are not angry with what we scorn, because this Passion raiseth not it self up but against things which may of­fend, and that scorn supposeth that they are without that power. So that if a Bold man do very much slight Enemies and dan­gers, we may at least say, that he meets not with so many subjects of anger, as he who is not in that condition. Moreover if it be true that Anger comes from the opi­nion we have to have been offended, he that [Page 97]that presumes much of his strength, and values not that of another man, never hath a thought that he can be offended: Thus Magnanimous Men, and those which are naturally strong and couragious, are not ea­sily angry, because Reason perswades the one that most injuries are not so in effect, or that they are so slight that they deserve not to be revenged; and their strength makes others beleeve, that it's impossible, or at least very difficult for any to hurt them. Last of all, if there are Boldnesses which are susceptible of this Passion, it's at least cer­tain, that the true and heroick is not for the Reasons beforesaid.

Neither is it Superstitious, He is not supersti­tious. because Su­perstition proceeds from weakness and fear, with which Boldness could never subsist; and truly it was never seen that a bold man did heed or give any credit to Auguries and to all other vain observations which have been introduced by Superstition. Those great Men of times past, although they were bred and instructed in those errors, did often despise them. And Homer forgot not to say That his Achilles stopped not on the presa­sages which were told him of his death; That Hector mocked the Augurs, and that in heat of fight he scorned both men and gods.

To speak truth, Boldness having so great an opinion of its Forces, beleeves not that it needs foreign help, and its presumpti­on making it forget that natural inclination which Nature hath given to men to have recourse to Heaven in their necessities, far from becoming superstitious, it falls to the despising of divine things, and easily gives it self up to Blasphemy, Sacriledge and to all other impieties, which we see reign a­mongst Souldiers.

On the other side, he that shall consider the source of Superstition, will finde no o­ther but the weakness of Men, and the mistrust they have had of their own Forces. For beleeving themselves exposed to all kinde of injuries, and being instructed by Nature that there was a Power above theirs, they did seek it every where, to gain such relief as was necessary for them: Those who were basest did believe to finde it in mortal and corruptible things, and so ren­dred them the worship which was onely due to the true Divinity. Others indeed ac­knowledged it immortal, but have divided and multiplied it into as many gods as there were things they stood in need of. To con­clude, all men which are born weak, being moved by fear or mistrust, imagined it was hard to be inclined and to be pleased, that [Page 99]there ever was some want in the duties which were rendered unto it, and that to render it exorable, new respects ought to be added to those which Reason had already dictated unto them; and to observe all those extraordinary things which were as Oracles, which it gave them of their good or ill For­tunes, these are the springs whence all I­dolatry hath flown; the vain observations of things to come, and the superfluous Ce­remonies in the true Religion. In fine, these are the undoubted witnesses, that all Su­perstition proceeds from weakness and from fear, and that it's a Vice proper only to weak and timorous persons, as may be judged also by Women and melancholy persons, to whom it's more familiar then to any; By Southern people, who have ever been accused of Cowardise and of Su­perstition, and by persons that are unhappy and over-burthened with misery, who easily fall from Piety to Superstition.

Freeness is also one of the Companions of Boldness, He is free & with­out dissi­mulation. because a man who believes himself strong enough to overcome his E­nemy, will never call Artifice or Treachery to his help, which are signs and common effects of weakness. Indeed all timorous Animals are more cunning and crafty then the rest. Women are naturally more sub­tile [Page 100]then Men, as amongst them the melan­choly are more suspicious and more dis­sembling. Now this happens from that they are conscious of their own weakness, and therefore are obliged to use Artifice and deceit to supply the defects they have. Boldness then is not subject to these Vices, seeing it hath so much confidence in its Forces, and speaks freely and open-hearted; its procedure is free, neither is there any deceit or treachery to be feared from it, be­cause it fears nothing. By reason whereof there have been some Captains, who have often been hardly perswaded to use strata­gems, which are even allowed by the Laws of War, as if they were unworthy of their Courage and of their Valor. We every day see that in the heat of a Battel, and when Boldness is highest, we despise the rules and postures of Fencing; and even those who are naturally weak and timorous, when they are animated with this Passion, or transported with anger, they forget their slights and subtilties, and pursue their Ene­mies with open force.

Finally, It will always command. It hates subjection, and would al­ways command; for having a good opini­on of it self, it's perswaded that it ought never to submit it self, and that it deserves to have the preheminence above all the rest. [Page 101]And certainly, although this inclination be common to all men, who being born free, think that their Liberty ought to be pre­served more intire, and more absolute in command then in subjection; yet there are some to whom it seems more natural and more proper then to others, because they truly have, or think they have those quali­ties which are fit for command. Now if strength be one of the most considerable, and if it be the most powerful, and perhaps the onely Instrument of Dominion, we need not doubt but Boldness which fills the Soul with so much confidence, and gives her such an advantagious opinion of her strength, doth also powerfully imprint this haughty and imperious humor, which makes him take the upperhand in all en­counters, and renders him incapable to submit himself to the advice and conduct of another: Whence it happens that Bold men are commonly haughty, and but little courteous; that they are opinionative in their resolutions, and that they will always be the head both in Councels and in Enter­prises. In fine, its one of the causes which makes Mutineers and Rebells in a State, which make Hereticks and Atheists in Re­ligion, and which fills families with diso­bedience and with licentiousness: For all [Page 102]these disorders can proceed from nothing but a presumptuous Temerity which will not subject it self to lawful Powers, which will be independent in all things, in a word, which will Command.

The second Head which must lead us to the knowledge of the other Characters which we seek, is the Love of Glory; for he that shall well understand the Reason why a Bold man hath this inclination, will at the same time perceive why he affects Praise, why he is modest, generous, &c.

Let's then conclude, Boldness desires honor more then all the rest of the Pas­sions. That there is no Passion which inspires the desire of Honor and Glory like unto Boldness; for if they are recompences or duties which we are ob­liged to give to the excellency of persons, Boldness is the onely one which gives us the right to exact the debt, since it alone gives men the superiority and excellency which they seek so ardently. In effect, all the Passions whose object is good, in some manner subject man to the good he pur­sues; those which flie ill, oblige him to yield to the ill as the more potent; con­stancy indeed resists it, and yet commonly she beleeves not herself stronger then it, so that this onely dares assault it, and hopes to conquer it, which is more powerful, and which ought to inspire the sentiments of [Page 103]excellency and of superiority, whose just price is honor. Now Boldness alone hath this advantage, and if Anger pretends any share, we know it is from that Boldness is always of its company.

But why doth it fancy That there is ho­nor to be gotten in all its undertakings? It fancies honor in all its en­terprises. since its a strange thing, and hardly to be found in the rest of the Passions, that the worst actions it produceth should appear glo­rious and praise-worthy; certainly it is because they are led by Force and by Cou­rage, which are qualities which Nature hath rendred so noble, having destined them to be the foundation of power and of superio­rity, that it's impossible but all their effects must also be so, and but that consequently they must deserve the honor which is due to the nobility and excellency of the things. And this is so true that men have form'd the first knowledges which they had of Vertue on actions of Force and Courage; At first they knew none but that which was em­ployed therein; at least it appears that they gave it the first place, since they honored all the rest with that name, which ought to have been proper and peculiar unto it; for amongst the Grecians, the word which sig­nifies Vertue, draws its original from War; and amongst the Latins, those who spake [Page 104]most purely, did beleeve that the name of Vertue was in the first place due to the Mili­tary Vertue. And this in my opinion hap­pens, from that nature which destined man for a civil life, hath also inspired in him an advantageous sence of all those things which are necessary to maintain it; now because none is more so then that Vertue which conducts Force and Courage, that a­lone having right to command, to establish order in Society, and resist those enemies which would destroy it, it's certain, that naturally we ought to have more esteem of it then of all the rest, whose object is a good less common, and less considerable; for this reason also more care hath been always taken to render it more duties and respects then to any whatsoever. At all times, and in all kindes of States, the most worthy and the most noble rewards have been re­served for it; the first Crowns which ever were, have been consecrated to it, and it's the onely one to which the glory of tri­umphs hath been destined for the reward of its actions, which is the highest top of all the honor of the earth.

As it is then a Vertue which Nature it self obligeth us to respect by reason of its being destined to the government of a civil life, we must not wonder if that Passion [Page 105]which serves for matter and instrument to those actions, pretends the same right, and bearing with it the same destination, it con­ceives that by a just claim it ought to have the same advantage in all its enterprises. For although Reason make it appear, that Temerity, Cruelty and Insolency, and o­ther Vices which sometimes are mixt with it, render it unworthy so noble a recom­pence: yet so it is, that it doth not always hearken to their devices, and that it more willingly follows the inclinations of nature; so that looking at nothing but what is ho­nest, and having no other guide but the in­stinct it hath for glory, it imagines it ought everywhere to encounter it, and that it's a prize due to all its actions, how evill soever they be.

Moderation in victory, Modesty in speech, The ver­tues which accom­panies Boldness. Generosity, Sweetness and Courtesie towards the vanquished, accompanies not all kind of Boldness, but onely that which is conduct­ed by Reason: For Passion alone is not able to produce such perfect actions with­out being guided by vertue. But as regula­ted Passion forbears not to be Passion, we may speak these to be the Characters of Boldness, since they are proper to one kind of Boldness; Add also that there are some seeds and dispositions in the prin­ciples [Page 106]of this Passion, which naturally ren­der it inclined to produce these actions; for there are generous Beasts which content themselves with the Victory, and which hurt not those they have thrown down: we see even that all Bold men although they have not Vertue to regulate their Boldness, and that they propose not honesty to serve them as the motive, forbear not to act the generous and the modest, even like those who have true Valor. And what in­clination soever they have to take all the advantages they can over their Enemies, yet they restrain themselves, and render not their Victory insolent. Now this part­ly happens from that natural Justice we spoke of, which defends Beasts from pursu­ing a Combate which is too unequal, and partly from the violent desire of honor which this Passion inspires in men. For finding himself continually prest with this secret spur, and by experience knowing that insolency and vanity dishonor a victo­ry how brave soever it were; That on the contrary, Moderation, Modesty, and Ge­nerosity render it the more glorious, they easily are moved to those actions which ought to content their desire, and which promise them the richer harvest of ho­nor and of praise, for which cause we had [Page 107]reason to say, that their Modesty was proud and ambitious, because they consider not the Honesty which vertue proposeth therein, but the glory onely which redounds from thence, and that they respect Honor but even for Honors sake.

Besides, Whence those Vi­ces come which mix them­selves with Boldness. although in these occasions they follow this shadow and appearance of vertue in all other ways they commonly are Arrogant and Proud, because esteem­ing themselves more then others, they think all is their due, and will have the preheminence, as we have already said; They boast and speak advantageously of themselves, forasmuch as the heat of the Passion kindles the desire they have of glory, and makes them seek praise even from their own mouths; and certainly we need not doubt but that Boldness is the source of all those defects; but when it appears base, artificial, cholerick, or cruel, we must not lay the accusation of these vices upon it, but the ill inclinations onely whereto it's received; For it is like that of torrents which enter into great Rivers, and seem presently to break the course of the water, and to make a passage from one shore to the other, yet their impetuosity must yeeld to the current of the River, which swallows them up, and carries them away with it. What Passion [Page 108]also soever it be which is mixed with the ill inclinations, must follow the course they take, and suffer it self to be carried away with those defects and vices which are pro­per unto it. Now these inclinations come from the temper, or from custom; for this corrups the best Natures, and there are men whose births have given them all the dispositions which are necessary to true Boldness, yet which have those defects which we even now mentioned, having for a long time been nourished in them; and the habit they have gotten hath changed all those seeds of vertue which Nature had given them.

But besides custom, the general source of their ill inclinations is in the tempera­ture, The effect of weak­ness. and chiefly in that whence weakness proceeds; for it's that which makes men undertake base actions, unworthy of a true courage, perswading them they must fear all things, that no enemies are little, and that we ought even to assault those enemies which are weak, or those which are with­out defence. It's that which makes them become Artificial and Perfidious, forasmuch as it would supply the defects of those forces by cunning and deceit, as hath been al­ready said: It's that which renders them Cholerick and Vindicative, because it is ex­posed [Page 109]to all manner of injuries, that it's easily hurt, and that the vengeance it takes is a necessary means to keep the rest in their duties. Finally, it's that which makes them Cruel and Bloody, because in that mistrust which it hath of it self, what advantage soever it hath over its enemies, it still doubts that it wants strength sufficient to effect its own revenge; so that to put it self in safety, it moves even to extreme violence, and so renders its victory brutal and cruel. But we shall more particularly examine these things in their due place. Let's finish this picture by those shadows which Fear gives unto Boldness.

For we have said, Whence that fear comes which somtimes accompa­nies Bold­ness. that Fear often went before that which was the most noble and the most generous; that on the contrary there were men who went boldly into dan­gers, and presently after lost their courage; that the most part of the most valiant, durst not speak in publick; and that some with­out cause apprehended the encounter of some things which were but little consi­derable.

To give a reason for these extravagant e­vents, we must first remember, that there are two sorts of Boldness; the one which is led by Nature, the other which is regulated by Prudence. The first considers not always [Page 110]the greatness of the danger it's engaged in, or else it wants strength to entertain a long-winded combate; Wherefore when it finds the danger greater then it imagined it to be, it's surprized with astonishment, which makes it take slight; which commonly happens to new Souldiers, and to those who undertake things without having fore-seen the difficulties which there­in were to have been encountred. And if it be upheld by this active and glittering force which accompanies delicate tempers, as those of Children, of Women, and the like, its first fury and first impetuosity is onely to be feared; for its forces being un­able to furnish it for a longer fight, it quick­ly gives ground, and makes way for Fear, unless some new relief arrive. But it hap­pens not so with that Boldness which is conducted by Reason; before that under­take the Combate, it exactly considers the forces of the Enemy, the greatness of the danger it is entering upon, and all those obstacles which may traverse its design; for which cause it hath not at first that impati­ent ardor which is to be observed in the other. On the contrary it appears cold and restrained; and sometimes even paleness, trembling, and such other accidents of Fear which surprise it in these encounters, [Page 111]do so hide it, that a man might beleeve that it was not there at all, or that it was asso­ciated with its enemy. And certainly the Soul might conceive the danger so great that for a time she may not be capable of any motion unless it be that of Fear; and in that case she could not be agitated with the Passion of Boldness, although she might have the habit thereof. Now although we must say, That the image of the danger being carried to the sensitive Faculty by the Knowledge which the Sences or the Judgment may have given her, the Soul will form Fear in the inferior part, whilst the superior will be raised with a true Bold­ness; and then a man will boldly go to the fight, whom we shall see look pale and tremble at the sound of the Trumpet, and at first sight of the Enemies. Its true, this disturbance will not last long, Reason pre­sently getting the mastery either by re­assuring it self, or raising the Courage of its inferior part. Neither after a man hath taken this noble resolution, is he sus­ceptible of Fear or of Astonishment; he meets with no difficulties which seem not less then he fancied they were; and if his strength fails him in this occasion, his ver­tue forbears not to hold fast, and obligeth him rather to perish then to flye, or rather [Page 112]yeeld to undergo the burthen, then quit his undertaking.

As for those who valiant as they are dare not speak in publick, or who fear the encounter of certain things which in ap­pearance ought not to give them the least apprehension, besides that this rather re­spects the habit of Boldness then the Passi­on, it's an examen which more fitly be­longs to the discourse of Fear then to this: We can onely say, That a Bold man is not so in all things, because he hath not, or be­leeveth he hath not competent forces to undertake them, and to surmount the diffi­culties which are therein to be encountred, every profession, & even every action requi­ring its particular forces. Such a man may have the one, and want the other; so he may be bold in those and timerous in these. He who is naturally valiant and couragious, hath not commonly those dispositions which are fit for the great actions of the Mind; Coldness and Quietness which they require, cannot allay themselves with heat, and that tumult which accompanies Cou­rage: So that if he finde himself engaged to speak in publick, or to do any other the like action, astonishment and fear surprize him, being sensible of his own weakness to execute a design beyond his strength.

We are now to examine the Characters which Boldness imprints on the Body, The cor­poral Charact­ers of Boldness. which as in the rest of the Passions, are of two kinds. For some of them are formed by the Souls command, and the others un­knowingly, and out of a necessity, useless to her design, as we shall make it appear in the examen we intend of every particu­lar.

Let us therefore begin with the Eyes, which afford us the sight of all, and which are the Souls Looking-glasses.

An assured Look, although it be com­mon to all the generons Passions of the Irascible Appetite, belongs particularly to Boldness, because she assaults ill, and that she ought to have more assurance then the rest, which do onely expect it; For we have said in the Discourse of Hope, That this Look was made by a wide opening of the lids with a fixed sight, and with vivaci­ty. This opening is that we might see the enemy the more exactly; the steddiness of sight witnesseth that the Soul is not asto­nished, and this vivacity comes from the arrival of the spirits which dart themselves forth to combate it. And to speak truth, it must have at least these three conditions to form this kind of look. Most of the Pas­sions makes us open our eyes to consider [Page 114]the good or ill which is their object, even Fear seems to be most careful of it, being most of all obliged to provide for her safe­ty. But it hath no set look being not able long to suffer the presence of the enemy, the disquiet she is in rendring her incon­stant and startled. A strong meditation settles, the sight but not with vivacity, for­asmuch as the spirits retreat towards their principles, and so leave a dimness in the eyes: These three things therefore ought to meet to form the Look we speak of; and he that will but observe it, will finde that the motion of the Eye-brows, the carriage of the Head, and the rest of the Face con­tribute somewhat thereunto.

However it be a Bold man looks upon danger with assurance, Why a Bold man shuts not his eye­lids. without winking, and this partly is from that the soul stiffen­ing it self in it self, stiffens the Muscles, and so hinders the lid from falling, and partly because she will not lose the sight of her E­nemy, nor so much as one minute inter­rupt the looks she casts on him. Moreover we may say she hath not then so much need of winking as before, having rendred them stronger by the quantity of spirits which she sent thither. For it's certain, that when these parts are strongest, this motion is least necessary, for which cause Birds of [Page 115]prey, and all other Creatures, which have a strong sight, wink seldomer then the rest; as on the contrary, men whose sight is weak wink at every moment. Moreover this motion of the lids moystens the eyes and cleanseth them, and thereby preserves their transparency and mobility; it's chief­ly destinated to asswage and temper by an interposing obscurity which it brings the splendor of the exterior, which continually beats on it. Now so it is, that those who have a strong sight, can longer and more easily endure the light then others, and consequently they are not obliged to close their eye-lids so often. If it be therefore true, that Boldness sends a great quantity of spirits to those parts, and so renders them more strong and vigorous; It must also at the same time dispence with their winking so often as they did formerly. In fine, if weakness and fear cause them to fall, to cover and hide them from the ill which persues them; Boldness which ap­prehends nothing, and sees peril and dan­ger without astonishment needs not this vain precaution, nor to employ an unprofit­able relief.

A thorow Look is also common to many of the Passions, Why he looks thorow. and chiefly to Indig­nation, Anger, and to Boldness; to form [Page 116]it, the Face must have somewhat of severe, the Eyes must impetuously cast themselves towards the Enemy, and the Head must be somewhat turned on the other side. Now severity is necessary, because we may cast our Eyes aside without looking through, as it often happens in all those Passions which pursue good and flie from ill; for Love, Desire, and Fear at every moment cast their Eyes aside, because severity is wanting in some by reason of the pleasure which they inspire, and in the other by reason of the astonishment which accom­panies them: In effect, Severity is a certain rude, pecuish stifness, which the presence of ill imprints in the whole countenance, and which is onely to be found in these Passions which assault ill; forasmuch as the Soul stiffens it self onely in these encoun­ters which we have spoken of; the Eyes impetuously cast themselves against the Enemy, because the Soul having put it self in a posture of fighting, employs its looks as so many darts which she intends to cast on it, but at the same time it turns the Head another way to shew its aversion from it, that it fears it not, and that it disdains to employ greater forces against it; where­fore we commonly use this kinde of look in threatnings, where by the minde, and [Page 117]by words, without coming to handy-blows we seek to stop the ill, esteeming it not strong enough to need to be assaulted with its strongest arms, in Indignation, and in other little Angers, whereto we intend not Vengance to all extremity, and in the be­ginnings of Boldness, before we are come to blows, when we think to decide the combate by little skirmishes. It's true, that it often happens that a man who dares not assault a potent Foe, will look through him; but that is but to hide his weakness, and make him beleeve it is not for want of force that he assaults him not, but rather that is out of generosity, and because he esteems him worthy of so great an endea­vor.

There are other kind of Looks which often happen in this Passion, Why he contracts and rais­eth the Brows. as those which are urgent and unquiet, those which are rude and furious; but the first proceed from De­sire, and from Impatience, whereof we have else-where spoken; others come from Anger and from Fury, which shall be examined in the Discourse of An­ger.

Let's now come to the motion of the Fore­head and Brows. To find the cause, we must learn it from Physick, that Nature hath not given to the Fore-head a proper moti­on, [Page 118]for the muscles which cause it to move belong to the Brows, which ought to be moveable for the preservation of the Eyes, and to help them in their functions; so that the Front never moves but when the Eye­brows move. Now amongst those motions which they are capable of, there are two prin­cipally which are commonly to be observed in Boldness and Anger; the one is to lift them up, and the other to strengthen them; but its very hard to tell what the motive is which the Soul proposeth it self in every of them, nor of what use they might be in the Passions we have now spoken of; It's cer­tain that according to the order which Na­ture hath prescribed to those parts, they lift themselves up, that they may the more freely see the object which presents it self, either by enlarging the circle of the sight, which restrains it self when they abate themselves, or that they serve to the open­ing of the lids, which after a manner they draw after them: And they strengthen themselves to strengthen the eyes, making as it were a rampire before them to stop those things which might fall from on high, and to defend them from the light which comes from without; for that the obscurity it causeth, tempers the splendor, gathers the spirits, and in pursuit renders [Page 119]the sight stronger and more exact. But if we consider these motions in the Passions, the Soul indeed must propose other motives then these. For I grant that the presence of ill obligeth it to seek all the liberty, and all the strength of the eyes, the better to discover the enemy, and assault him the more rightly; yet there are encounters wherein these cares seem useless, or at least where they are greater then they need to be, because it often happens that we that move the Brows and the sight, at such things as never so little displease us, and wherein its nothing necessary to bring the least precaution. Let's therefore conclude, that the disturbance and the blindness which the Passions cast in the Soul, divert it often from those ordinary ways which Nature teacheth, which make her forget the true use for which those organs were destinated, and pursued her, that what ought to serve her for one end may also be useful for another. So in all vehement de­sires she brings water into the mouth, al­though it be only necessary in that of Food; so she makes those that are alone, laugh and speak, although all those actions are reser­ved for Society, and Conversation. As therefore she is accustomed to shrink up the Brows, to fortifie the sight, and to defend [Page 120]the Eyes against what might offend them, she fancies she ought do the same in the encounters of all kinde of Enemies; and by an error, like that of Creatures, which think they have hid all their Bodies when their Heads are covered; so she thinks that fortifying her Eyes she inspires the same strength in the other parts, and then all of them are in a condition to assault ill, having put that upon the defensive. It's even so also, that she raiseth up the Brows, when she raiseth herself; for although that serves her the better to see the Enemy; yet she fancies this elevation helps her rising up, and that it so far advanceth the execu­tion of her design, as to make the organs move so also. Yet we may observe that that which furthers this error is that the parts are extreamly moveable and obedient, and that they are in action sooner then the Soul is aware of it. For the rest which are more heavy, resist these preparations, and require a greater deliberation to oblige them to stir.

We may yet add to this reason, that the Soul will often by these external motions manifest the state and condition she is in. So that she raiseth the Brows, to shew that she raiseth herself and shrinks them up, to witness that she fortifies and gathers her [Page 121]self together; and this is the more likely, for that without being moved with those agitations, she forbears not also to make those parts move when she will dissemble her weakness and her fear, and make us be­leeve she hath a design to fight.

And now in pursuit of those motions which are made by the orders of the Soul, the figure of the Fore-head necessarily changeth and altereth; for of necessity, when the Brows are lifted up, the Fore­head must wrinckle, and when they shrink up, that must gather it self betwixt the eyes; and then certainly if the skin be fleshy, it makes, as it were, a great cloud in the midst of the Forehead, which Ari­stotle calls for the same reason Nebulous, which is proper and natural to Lions and to Bulls, and which is one of the princi­pal signs of the natural disposition a man hath for Boldness, as elsewhere shall be said.

When the hair stands on end, Why the hair stands on end. it is be­cause the skin its rooted in, is moved; but this motion may be made two ways; for those creatures which have a moveable and musculous skin make it move when they please, and when they will assault or de­fend themselves, they shrink it up that they may render it stiffer and stronger, and [Page 122]then necessarily those plights and wrinkles which are formed must make the hair or feathers stare with which it's covered. It is not so with men, their skin being not mus­culous, they cannot voluntarily move it, but onely out of necessity; and that hap­pens when the spirits with precipitation quit the outward parts of the Head, and flye away elsewhere. For the skin which is then forced to restrain and shut up it self, makes the roots of the hair retire, which are commonly obliquely laid in the thick­ness of the skin, and in reverting of it it makes the hairs rise and stand on end. Commonly fear and astonishment cause this flight of the spirits; and which calling them back again to the Heart, render the Face pale, and makes the hair stand: But this is sometimes also done by a great en­deavor of the Courage. For the Soul see­ing it self pressed by a puissant Enemy, gathers the spirits from all parts, in which its principal strength consists, and sends them to the Arms, and so those other parts which are appointed to assault and combate, so that those which are abandoned of them grow pale, and the skin shrivels, and the hair stands on end, even as they do in fear. Now as Boldness and Anger one­ly can cause this endeavor, its onely they [Page 123]which are capable to produce this effect in the manner spoken of. But when that hap­pens, it's a sign that those Passions will rise either to fury or despair; for which cause we commonly say that a Man that looks pale with Anger is terrible, be­cause the Soul never useth these extra­ordinary means, but when she is extream­ly prest, and when she carries her self away to her last violences. To conclude therefore this Discourse, a Bold mans hair may stand upright, from the fear and from the astonishment which may sometimes surprise him at the sight of danger, or by the last effort of Courage, as hath been said.

The Nostrils open and widen themselves, because the heat growing stronger requires a greater respiration, and obligeth the soul therefore to enlarge the passages; by rea­son whereof those who naturally have those parts wide and open, are commonly bold and cholerick.

The Smile comes from the indignation a man hath to see himself assaulted by a te­merous or insolent enemy, or from our despising of his weak endeavors. But if we would know why these Passions cause these effects, we must see what hath been said in the Discourse of Laughter.

Silence is proper to true Boldness, Why he is silent. chief­ly when its going into danger, either be­cause it is then entirely gathered up in it self to consider the greatness thereof, or because it disdains to speak to any body with whom it denies society, either because it hates or scorns them; or last of all, be­cause it knows Words are arms of weak­ness, and with them Combates are not to be decided. And certainly, Boldness a­bounds not in words, unless in such who have their weaknesses, for the Soul which knows its defect, useth all those means which may releive her, and employs besides those endeavors which she makes, threat­nings, cryings out, and reasons to fright the enemy, and hide her own imbecillity; such is the Boldness of Women and Chil­dren, such is that of Bragadocio's: And this Maxime is so general, that even a­mongst Beasts we see that little Dogs con­tinually bark, when Mastiffs and great ones, which are bigger and taller seldom bark, and are readier to fall on then we are awares. A man that is truly Bold doth the like; he is silent when he sees the enemy, he goes towards him, and assaults him with­out speaking a word; but it's a threatning Silence, and which better expresseth his desire he hath to fight, and the confidence [Page 125]he hath in his forces, then even words them­selves.

Yet this hinders not, What the voice of a Bold man is. but that in the heat of the Combate from time to time, some flashes of his Voice, short and piercing, may escape him, which commonly accom­pany the blows he gives, or the steps he takes; and this in my opinion is to astonish the enemy by those exclamations which re­mark Ardor and Courage; or to animate and provoke himself, his cryings out pro­ducing the same effect with that of the sound of Trumpets; Or rather this comes from the endeavors and struggles which the parts make within; which with impe­tuosity driving the air to the Lungs, force it at its issuing out to resound again, and to form a strong and penetrating sound, be­cause its driven out with violence; Great, be­cause the passages are inlarged by heat; and short, because it's made by sallies and shocks; it seems even as if it issued not with liber­ty, and as if the lips and the teeth stop­ping it in its passage would force it to return and retort it on himself, and to seek other passages, in which it's inwardly heard to resound. This appears in the howlings of Mastiffs and Blood-Hounds, in the roar­ing of Lions; for all of these cast onely forth a great sound, of a short and resound­ing [Page 126]voice, which loseth it self in the hol­low of the Throat and Breast, and which they do not redouble but by long intervals, by reason that the Soul which trusts its strengths, thinks not it ought to double its shocks with that eagerness which always accompanies weakness. The voice of a Bold man is then constrained, disturbed, and as it were entangled in it self, [...], as Aristotle calls it, which the Commenta­tors understood not when they said it sig­nified words which precipitated themselves the one or the other, and enterfer'd by the swiftness of the pronuntiation: For this indeed may happen in Anger for these rea­sons we shall note; but not in Boldness, which is neither loud nor talkative, which shortens as much as possibly, not onely its voice, but even its discourse; for be­sides that it never useth any long threats, it cuts them short at first, and leaves al­ways more to be thought then is said. Quos ego?

Somtimes he blows with impetuosity, whether the pantings and shocks he gives his Breast cause the air violently to issue, or that from time to time keeping in his breath, he is afterwards constrained to use more blowing to drive out the fumes of the Heart, which could not get out during this constraint.

But why doth he keep in his breath? Why he keeps in his breath. Doubtless to fortifie the motion of the other parts; for that we commonly never employ this action, but when we intend to give a great blow to do some other great endeavour. The reason of this Effect is drawn from the nature of the Motion, which is to be on some stable thing, where­on the body moving upholds it self. It's thus that Beasts move, that Birds flie, and that Fish swim, and that all other things move; for in all these motions, the Earth, the Air and the Water, or some other Bo­dy remains firm, and resists the thing a­gitated; and in proportion as the resistance and firmness is greater, the motion also is greater and stronger. Now as the parts of Animals lean more the one upon the other, when any of them is to perform any power­ful motion, it's necessary the rest keep close and even to the furthermost which contribute thereunto. It must finde with­out it self somewhat which may sustain it self; otherwise the motion of the first of these will be weak, and their actions will be the less perfect. Whence it comes that Birds are troubled to flye when their Legs are broken; that we run not so well when our Hands are tied, and leap but ill unless we stiffen our Arms, and shut our Fists; [Page 128]because those parts in the condition they then are cannot uphold, as they ought to do the motions of the rest.

The Soul then which hath a secret know­ledge of all what is beneficial unto her, and who knows that in violent endeavors there must be a great and strong support for those organs which are to move, retains the Breath, that that air which is stopped in the Lungs may keep up the Muscles of respi­ration, and that pressing them on all sides, she stiffens them to support the rest which are engaged in the action. So that we are not content onely to stop the breath, but we drive it, and cause it to descend down that the diaphragma may dilate it self, and press the neighboring parts which thereby are rendred more fit to support those which are in motion.

In pursuit he shuts his Lips and his Tteeh, as well the better to stop the passages of respi­ration, as to confirm the parts, whether it be that their confirmation truly contributes to the great designs we have spoken of, or whether the Soul is abused in the choice she makes, as being useless; as it often hap­pens in divers other occasions, wherein she is hindered by Passion to discern things, and to remember the true use of the organs.

That Coldness which is observed in the beginnings of Boldness, Whence comes the coldness of the Face. is nothing but a certain constancy and assurance of coun­tenance, which is not astonished at the sight of danger, and which also witnesseth nei­ther ardor nor impatience to fight. And it hath been so called, because that besides that, it is the property of cold to render things immoveable; defect of heat is commonly called Coldness. Now this con­stancy and outward assurance comes from that which is made in the Soul and in the Spirits, and which retaining the humors and the parts in the posture she findes them in, hinders the blood from retiring or ex­panding it self, and the organs from move­ing. For in this condition the countenance must not change colour, must remain firm and settled, must appear cold and resolute at the encounter of difficulties: But the first cause of all these effects, is, that at that time the Soul raiseth it self not yet up a­gainst the enemy, onely prepares herself for the combate, as hath been said; for when she assaults him, the Spirits must rise up with her, must carry blood and redress to the face, and fill all with vivacity, ardor, and impatience. The fierceness of the Counte­nance.

This Coldness is followed with a noble fierceness, which animates the countenance [Page 130]of a Bold man chiefly when he goes into danger; for it appears not commonly in the first motions of Boldness, nor in the heat of fight, but onely when he is ready for the assault, and marcheth towards the Enemy: So that it seems it is as a mean be­twixt his staiedness at first, and that ardor which transports him at last.

In effect, as this Fierceness is a kind of severe and disdainful Pride, which comes from the presumption and scorn which Boldness useth to inspire: The Soul cannot be susceptible of it before she hath con­ceived a great opinion of her own strength, because that is the ground of her Pride, nor after she hath found any strong resistance, because that makes her perceive the danger greater then she fancied it, and that there­fore she ought not to slight it. It's there­fore onely when she is ready to fight, for then she is full of the esteem which she hath of herself, and then she disdains the ene­my, whose forces she hath not yet experi­mented.

However it be, the Head is then kept erect, and the Brow lifted up, the look quick, and full of assurance, the counte­nance swell'd and double-gorged, and hath I know not what in it, that's rude and dis­dainful. Now all these are the effects and [Page 131]characters of Pride, as in its place shall be said. For the Soul which in this Passion swells it self, raiseth up the Head, lifts up the Brows, and swels the Face, as if she thought more room to enlarge her self, or by those exterior motions she would make that appear which she hath in herself. An assured look comes from that considence which accompanies its Pride, and that se­vere and disdainful countenance from the indignation she hath to finde obstacles in her designs.

The Posture and the Gate contribute also to this Fierceness; for all the Body keeps it self streight and set, and if he stir, his march is haughty and proud. The Stature erects it self, because the Soul raiseth and stiffens it self, in the design which she hath to as­sault, which puts the Body into such a po­sture as is most advantagious for it to act, as we said in the Discourse of Hope.

As for the proud Gate, its that which A­ristotle calls Magnifick, which is natural to Lions, and is a sign of strength and of greatness of Courage. It's performed with great and grave paces, balancing the Body on either side, and at every step lifting in­wards and forewards the Shoulders. But how difficult soever it be to express this action to the life, its yet harder to finde [Page 132]the true cause thereof. Some have sought it in the same temperature which renders the Body robustious, and have said that constitution being more firm and solid, their parts also were more united and shut together, and so they communicated the motion wherewith they were agitated to one another, and in pursuit that when the Legs did lift themselves up, and advance to go, the Shoulders must be moved in the same manner.

Of a truth, if all those who were of that temper walked after that manner, this pro­position would be somewhat probable. But besides that all those who are robustious walk not so: There are those which are not so, to whom this gate is natural, or at least who in some occasions use it, as in Boldness, in Pride, and the like. We must then refer this effect to a more general cause, which must not be constant and un­changeable as the temperature is, but changeth according to its encounters. And truly if it be a Character proper to Bold­ness, it must proceed from the agitation of the Soul, whether it serve its design, or be done out of necessity. Now he that will consider that the Soul which will board the enemy, stiffens herself to fortifie herself, and begins to raise herself, as to make trial of [Page 133]the assault she is going about, will judge for the reasons which we have so often allead­ged, that she ought to inspire the same motions into the organs, and consequently that she stiffens them, and drives them vi­gorously: So that the march and the other actions of the Body must suffer some change and must be performed after another man­ner then they were wont to be, by reason of that new and extraordinary impression which they receive: A man then which is animated with Boldness, marcheth with a stiffer and more vigorous pace, having a greater number of Muscles which stiffen it, and that all his body weighs and rests it self on that foot which upholds it: So that he the more strongly treads the ground when he walks, wherein the stediness of the things supported consists; and because he cannot so readily displace that foot which stands strong under so great a burthen, of necessity his pace must be slow, and he must go the more heavily. But this slow­ness is recompenced by the greatness and largeness of his steps, his strength second­ing the desire he had to get to his Enemy, mixing, if we may so say, haste with gra­vity: In pursuit of those motions, the Shoulders are moved and stirred, as we [Page 134]have said; Because all the Body stiffening it self, and laying all the weight on the foot, it must needs be that changing place, and carrying the same burthen to the o­ther, the Shoulder must advance and weigh down it self on the same side; and this being done with vigor, the impe­tuosity of the motion causeth it to turn somewhat inwardly, and passing so from the one to the other it ballanceth all the body in marching. Thus then Boldness useth this kinde of gate, so that if it be natural and ordinary, in some it's a sign of greatness of Courage, because the Soul which hath a secret knowledge of the motions it ought to make by instinct, bears it self to this kinde of pace, which is proper to Boldness and to Generosity, and marching without minding it, as if she ought alwayes to affront the Ene­my.

Furthermore, Why he stoops his Head when he assaults. when a Bold man is near danger, and upon the point of assaulting his adversary, he stooping his Head, throws himself on him, whether he thinks he should therewith knock against him, or that his desire of fighting makes him advance that part, as it doth the rest of them; Or that stiffening the Arms to [Page 135]strike, the Neck must stiffen it self to support the endeavor of that motion, and in pursuit the Muscles shorten themselves and so cause the Head to stoop, or in fine, because it would cover it self, and not give aim to the enemies blows; for this reason it is that he bows all his Body, that he gathers himself up, that he contracts himself, and puts himself on his guard, to use the terms of Art.

In the heat of the Combate, His Face is inflamed, his Eyes become ardent, and his sweat runs from all parts; Forasmuch as the spirits and the humors cast them­selves impetuously to the outward parts, and that the heat which the Soul stirs up in this encounter, expands it self every way, dissolves the humors, and causeth them to run through the pores which she keeps open. It's thus, That in great en­deavors, we have often seen blood startle out of the Eyes, Lips, and other parts, and sometimes even from all the Body, in form of sweat. But when this last hap­pens, the transport of the Soul must be excessive. For she must be much urged and constrained to do a very extraordinary en­deavor after this manner to drive out of the veins this treasure of life.

He beats the earth with his feet, to make his Force and vigor appear, and to astonish the enemy by the noise and tem­pest which at once his Foot, his Voice and his blows make.

He darts himself forth, and leaps light­ly, his forces being augmented by heat, and by the motion of the spirits which render him lighter and better disposed.

His respiration is strong and impetuous, because heat is encreased, which augments the force of the vital parts, and requires a greater refreshment, for which cause the Breast and the Lungs extend and enlarge themselves the more to attract the greater quantity of fresh air, and they fall with pre­cipitation, the more readily to drive away the fumes which the boiling of the spirits and the humor excite.

The Pulse is great, high, quick, frequent and vehement, for the same reasons; for the Arteries open and extend themselves very much, that they may receive the more air for the refreshing of the spirits; and as this opening satisfies not yet the need which presseth the Heart, the Soul adds to the greatness of its motion, swiftness, and frequency, the more readily to attract re­freshment, and the oftner to discharge those [Page 137]fumes which heat raiseth up. To conclude, Because she gathers together her forces to assault and combate ill, we need not doubt but the vital Faculty grows stronger, but that she more powerfully moves her organs, and that consequently she makes the Pulse more strong and vehement. It's true, that all these divers beatings of it are also in An­ger; but when we speak of that Passion, we will shew the difference she makes therein; Let's go to more pleasing subjects which hither to have been observed by no man, or at least which our ordinary Philosophy hath not yet examined.

PART. II.

CHAP. I. The Characters of Constancy, or of the strength of Courage.

IF it be true that Boldness hath no other function but to assault and combate; Constancy is differ­ent from Boldness. yet is the Soul often obliged to labour in its own defence, and simply to resist those ills without daring to assault them; there must necessarily therefore be a Passi­on which must serve it in this encounter, and must be different from Boldness. And truly fince Passions are motions, there must be several Passions where there is a diversi­ty of motion. Now the motion which the Soul makes in resisting, is altogether different from that which she makes in as­saulting, whether it be in the manner wherewith it's agitated, or in the end which [Page 139]she hath proposed to herself. For in resist­ance she knows nothing but how to stiffen and streng then herself in herself to stop the effort of the Enemy. But in assault she goes out of herself, and casts herself on it to combate it; here she darts and precipi­tates herself, there she stays and remains stable; here she boldly bestows the blow, there she receives them with assurance. In a word, in the one she would overcome, in the other she is content not to be over­come.

But if this Reason will not oblige us to distinguish these Passions which Philoso­phy hath always confounded, let's but fol­low the common opinion of men, and the ordinary way of speaking in such like en­counters; For they never say, That a man with Boldness bears his ill fortune; nor that he suffers Infamy, Grief or Death boldly, but that he endures them, that he suffers with Courage, with Resolution, with Constancy and with Patience.

If it be not Boldness therefore which produceth these effects, and if amongst the Passions mentioned by the Schools, there is none whereto we can refer them, we are constrained to encrease the number of them, and to add to the emotions of the Irascible Appetite, that which serves [Page 140]to support ills, and to resist them.

Now as those who discover a new Land, commonly give it the name of those Coun­tries which are best known unto them, and which have some likeness together: We have by their example taken the liberty to give this Passion the name of Constancy, a vertue known to all the world, and where­to it hath a great conformity.

And truly there are Passions which al­ways carry the name of Vices, because they always appear to be vitious, as Envy and Impudence. It must follow, that those which always appear vertuous, should also bear the name of Vertues. Now this is of this kinde; for in what condition soever we finde her, what defects soever she hath, we still see some image of Vertue in her. And even when she is altogether irregular, we are forced to admire her, and to afford her those praises which are due to fair acti­ons; let's boldly therefore give her the name of Constancy, since she is not un­worthy of those advantages which are due unto Vertue.

But if any man would object, That what we call Passion is nothing but the action of that Vertue; and therefore that it is nothing necessary to introduce a new Passion, since the actions of Vertues are not properly Passions.

We must first say, That all the actions of Constancy cannot be reckoned for actions of Vertue, since some of them may be vi­cious, as when we resist ills, which necessa­rily we should flie, or when we do not resist them as we ought, nor when we ought, nor for that end which Vertue hath proposed to it self. Moreover an action of Constancy may be performed without possessing of the Vertue; forasmuch as Vertue is a habit which is gotten by custom, and that there is no habit acquired till we perform the first actions of Constancy. Now if there are but three things in the Soul, Power, Ha­bit, and Passion, this first action must be a Passion, since it is neither a Power nor an Habit, as it is easie to be judged. In fine, If Constancy is a Vertue, it must needs have a Passion which serves for its sub­ject, and which makes, if we may so speak, the body and the substance of this action; for Vertue, to speak properly, is but an or­der and a rule which Reason gives to the actions and motions of the Soul: So that we must suppose motions before they can be regulated; and these Motions are Pas­sions, which for that cause are called the substance of Vertues. Constancy being then a Vertue, ought to have a Passi­on to work upon, which is no other but [Page 142]that which we have spoken of, for the rea­sons already declared.

Now although we ought not to think it strange that both of them bear the same name, since the word Boldness is com­mon both to the Passion and to the Ver­tue; yet if after all these reasons any shall think its to prophane the name of Constan­cy to assign it to a Passion, I will not oppose him; he may if he please chuse that of Strength of Courage, because the Soul stiffens it self to resist the ill which assaults it, as shall be seen in the following Dis­course. Let's therefore no longer stop at words, but examine the things in that or­der which we have proposed.

You must not think to meet here with an insolent and an ambitious Passion which like Love or Boldness would be Queen and Mistris of the rest. The Ele­gy of Con­stancy. She is too gene­rous to use flatteries and baseness, which the one employs to establish its power; and she is too modest to subject her Compani­ons by force and violence as Boldness doth; what advantage soever she hath over them, she yeelds them the precedence without pretending to command, she con­tents her self not to obey them. And without marching at the head of the Pas­sions, it's sufficient for her to be a follower of the Vertues.

In effect, it's she which maintains and preserves them, it's she which makes them overcome, and which crowns them; and he who would more nearly examine what she doth for them, might boldly say, that if she brings them not forth, yet at least she accomplisheth them, and renders them worthy of the names they bear, and of the recompence they expect; and truly a vertue which yeelds and keeps not firm, which gives up its arms after the first fight, or flies after the victory, is an imperfect Vertue. And the perfection which it wants can be added unto it by nothing but Con­stancy, which alone can consummate com­menced vertues, and make them deserve the glory they aspire unto.

But I say further, that to examine them from their birth, we may see that they wholly owe it unto her, and that after rea­son hath conceived them, it's she that brings them forth, which makes them o­perate, and makes them subsist. For it's certain, that what service soever Vertue draws from the Passions, they are the one­ly enemies which resist her; they alone form those difficulties which cross her, and it's none but they which are capable to stifle her when she comes to light, and to destroy her when she is in her greatest [Page 144]strength. Without doubt, were there no Passions, Vertue would appear in the Soul like a pure light which would have neither vapors nor clouds to overcome. It would be a Star which would direct its course to­wards good without any let, and which would conduct us to felicity without trouble or disquiet. We should no longer speak of those vices and crimes, but as of such mon­sters as were invented by Fables; and all that great croud of ills, which at every moment disturbs the tranquillity of life, would be unknown or impotent; at least if it yet caused any disorders, we should not rescent them, since it's Fear and Grief onely which render them sensible.

But as it's a necessity imposed on Ver­tue to be born and dwell with its enemies; we must also confess that if any thing can defend it from their violence, and stop those endeavors whereby they seek to op­pose it; certainly, it's she alone to whom it's obliged both for its birth and preserva­tion, and to whom its obliged for all the good which happens unto it. Now it's Con­stancy alone which deserves this glory, since it's she onely that is capable of resisting the Passions, stopping those passages where­by they might enter upon the Soul, and which dissipateth them after they are got­ten in.

And truly its herein we are to admire the providence of Nature, who in the ge­neral revolt wherein she sees all these sedi­tions have engaged themselves against rea­son, doth like a wise Politian, who casts division amongst the Rebells, who gains the most powerful, and makes use of their forces to destroy their own Confederates: For she makes Constancy quit the party of the rebellion, and inspires her with that noble perfidiousness, which causeth her to betray her Complices; in a word, she arms one Passion against all the Passions, against all Vices, and against all ills; and this was the onely expedient to yeeld unto Reason that Empire which belonged unto it, and to bring it to the enjoyment of those Ver­tues and of that Felicity which it was de­stined unto: For being she could perform no action without the help of the Passions, had she been abandoned of them all, she must have remained always idle; and it was necessary that some one of them should be faithful upon this occasion, and that it ought to succour it in a design wherein it meets with such great obstacles and such powerful adversaries. Now it will be no­thing difficult to perswade that she whom we have spoken of, is onely one responsible in this expectation, if we consider that all [Page 146]her nature and essence consists in that sta­bility which the Soul gives herself; and that even as water stops and loseth its mo­tion when it freezeth, so also when the Soul settles it self, and that all its motions cease, that those Passions wherewith she was agitated, dissipate themselves, and the ills which assaulted her can no longer make any impression on her.

And indeed, she is in the condition of a rock which remains immoveable against the violence of the winds, waves and tem­pests; she cannot then be moved, neither by the impetuosity of desire, nor by the over-slowings of lusts, nor with the storms of Fortune. She hath an impenetrable Hardness against scorn, against offences, and against injuries; and although she is assaulted with sickness and grief, we may say that they are floods which indeed by degrees undermine the shoar, but which can never overturn her, nor make her change place.

So that these advantages being not dif­ferent from those which accompany Wis­dom, we must necessarily confess, that Constancy is this same Wisdom, or that it is its general and inseparable instrument; and that amongst the Passions some are common to all Creatures, others proper to [Page 147]Men, but that this is onely peculiar to the Wise; for it's she hath formed all the Phi­losophers of Antiquity, which in all Ages hath produced so many wonderful examples of Fidelity, of Temperance, and of great­ness of Courage; which hath made Reli­gion triumph over Vices and Tyrants. Fi­nally, which hath made the Vertues reign on Earth, and which hath crowned them in Heaven.

Yet we must confess that she owes all the glory of these fair actions to the councels of Reason; and were she not enlightened with its light, she would continue in that blindness wherein all the rest of the Passi­ons are born, and cast the Soul into those precipices whereunto her own evill inclina­tions commonly move her: When this wise Guide indeed forsakes her, she takes part with Vices and Crimes, and renders them the same service she is obliged to ren­der to the Vertues; for she upholds them, and strengthens them, she compleats and consummates their malice; and all the du­ration they have is but an effect of the un­happy perseverance which she affords their ill designs. Its she that locks up the Heart from all the perswasions of Prudence, from all the warnings of Heaven, from all the sentiments of Nature, which hardens it, and [Page 148]renders it immoveable against all their en­deavors, and inspiring it with opinionacy in its resolutions, with Hardness of heart towards the miseries of others, and with Obstinacy in all ill, it renders a man un­worthy of civil society, and an enemy to God, to men and to himself.

But we need say no more of it, nor by a long invective dishonor a Passion which is so useful and necessary to Wisdom, and which hath caused no disorders in the World but through the ill use which men have made thereof. Let's pursue our de­sign, and content our selves here to repre­sent those Characters which she useth to imprint in the Soul, and on the Body of those who are sensible of it.

Although at first this design ought to be neither long nor difficult in the execution, The de­scription of a Con­stant man and that this Passion making no change of countenance, and being not susceptible of that variety which is observable in the rest, so that we need but one figure, and as we may say but one simple touch to draw this Picture; yet besides that it's difficult to express any motion, and that that is one of the most secret and most hid which is in the Soul: There are so many other things which are to be brought into the piece, that it's impossible but the work must be [Page 149]greater and more painful then any man could think. In effect, we must here represent shipwracks and precipices, poverty, exile, and slavery; the loss of honor, of parents, of Friends; all what grief, and the most violent sicknesses; all what tortures, and the most cruel torments; all what despair and death have that is frightful and most hideous; and what is yet more formi­dable, all what the charmes of Voluptu­ousness and Ambition have of most de­ceiving: For to conclude, these are the principal enemies which arm themselves a­gainst Constancy, which assault it and en­deavor to overcome it.

Let's therefore fancy a man animated with this Passion, and see what sentiments he may have at the approach of such pow­erful adversaries. Certainly, it's in these encounters that the Soul forms its most noble designs, and takes the most generous resolutions which it is capable of; every­where else where she expects and affronts ill, she thinks to be stronger and more powerful then it, she still hopes for the Victory, and never fights, but she is up­held by some stronger forces; but here she hath an enemy in front who appears invin­cible, whom she dare not assault, and against whom she alone must resist, and that with­out any other help.

In the mean time, she sees him come without fear, and without astonishment; she considers him without trouble and without disquiet, and if she pretend not to conquer him, she at least assures herself that she shall not be overcome; as knowing that the strongest waves break themselves against the rocks, and that the banks hinder the overflowings of the most impetuous Ri­vers; she promiseth herself the same success from her resistance, and believes that the strength of her Courage will break off the violence of the ills, and stop the course of all those mischiefs which come pouring upon her. In her opinion there is no effort strong enough to make her yield; all the Elements would change place, without making her change her station; and were it possible the mass of the Heavens should break, she imagines that she could sustain its ruines without being over-turned.

But what is more wonderful, is, that she often mistrusts her forces, and sees well e­nough that her resistance will be useless, and her loss inevitable. Neither is this ca­pable to make her change her resolution; although even she might escape the danger by flight, she remains firm and expects the shock of the enemy, with the same tran­quillity and with the same confidence, as [Page 151]if she were sure of the Victory. She also believes that a man is never overcome, if he loseth not his heart, if he delivers not up his arms; that yielding to force, we yield not to honor of the Battel; and that in that of Constancy, we have always this ad­vantage, To triumph over the Conque­ror.

She in pursuit hereof represents to her­self the glory which so many great Cou­rages have acquired in torments and in pu­nishments; the Crowns which they have deserved in the most difficult proofs of pa­tience, and the immortal renown of such fair examples, make her hope, if she can but constantly suffer the ills which threaten her; with this thought she encourageth her self, and without hearing those reasons which might make her yield, she puts her­self in a condition to receive the ene­my, and vigorously to maintain his as­saults.

Behold her now grappling with him; behold her either assaulted with the vio­lence of grief, or by the outrages of For­tune, or by the darts of Calumny: as if she were insensible of all their blows, she neither troubles herself to flie from them, or to repel them; and although she be cruelly wounded by them, she suffers not [Page 152]so much as a complaint nor a threat to come from her, which might make the least resentment of hers appear. She sees her body torn with tortures or with sick­ness, as if it did not truly belong unto her, or in effect, were but her Garment: She considers the loss of her Goods as a debt she repays Fortune, and thinks that an injury is ill onely in the opinion of him that suffers it, and can truly offend onely him that doth it.

Whilst by these reasons she seeks to sweeten her ills, they forbear not incessant­ly to perplex her with fresh pangs, which sometimes are so violent that she cannot save the Body from succumbing under their violence, and from betraying its sensible­ness by its weakness, and by that languor which appals it. But for her own part, instead of growing weaker she becomes more strong and vigorous; and as the earth strengthens it self, when its beaten, we may say, that the blows of grief harden her and render her impenetrable against all its attaints; Grief it self, which seems to be the inseparable companion of adversity and misfortune, cannot reach her; at least it ne­ver riseth to that high Region where she forms her designs, and where she entertains a calm and a continual serenity. It's from [Page 153]thence she securely beholds the storms and the tempests which agitate the inferior parts, the troubles and sufferings whereof she with pleasure often considers and sheds abroad a chearfulness in the complaints and tears which the rigor of her ill often extorts from her Mouth and Eyes.

And truly there is cause of astonishment to see her so calm in the midst of chains and fire, in the midst of publick desolati­ons, in the midst of so many things, the thought of which alone produceth horror and terror; but that in these encounters she should witness joy, that she should bless her persecutors, and that she should speak her pains to be pleasing and glorious, it's a thing which seems to combate Reason and Nature, and which is almost uncon­ceivable: We must also confess that this is the last effort of Constancy, and that she then ought to be upheld by some great and noble Passion, to produce some great and wonderful effect: For commonly griefs and misfortunes use to convey into the strongest and most resolute Soul I know not what kinde of bitterness which renders it pecuish and wary, which at every instant forceth from it some secret complaints, and at length bereaves it of its strength, at least of that ardor and vivacity which it had at first.

It's then there that the Soul employs Constancy against Adversaries: It's thus she defends herself from those ills which assault her with open force. Let's now see what she doth against those which under the appearance of good seek to seduce her, which to betray her, flatter her; and to o­vercome her, use no other violence but one­ly those of enticements and charms. I mean Voluptuousness and Ambition, and all those unjust desires which continually present themselves unto her, which at every moment provoke and sollicite her, and which are the more to be feared, the Sen­ces keeping intelligence with them, and forasmuch as they promise felicity to those who suffer themselves to be overcome by their allurements.

We must certainly confess that she useth no other arms to defend herself against such dangerous enemies, but onely those which Constancy in these encounters affords her; she knows that to render their plots and their forces useless, she needs onely to keep herself stiff and firm; and that in that con­dition she cannot be mollified with Plea­sures, nor lifted up with the winde of Ho­nor, nor carried away by the hope of those goods which she hath not; she knows that Pleasure is ever accompanied with Repen­tance, [Page 155]that Ambition never walks but on precipices, and that Desire is not so much a sign as it is the cause of Poverty. More­over she knows that all the contentment, and all the good fortune which those de­ceivers promise are but impoisoned sweets which corrupt Health and Reason, and de­stroy the quiet of the Mind, and the tran­quillity of Life.

On such like Reasons being resolved to hold out against them, she puts herself up­on her guard, and shuts up all the avenues by which they might surprise her affecti­ons; she turns her eyes from the most pleas­ing objects; she shuts her ears to the most charming words and perswasions; she flies the approach of all those things which might tickle or seduce the sence; For it's certain, that she expects not such kinde of enemies in a stedfast posture, and that she receives them not chearfully, as she doth the rest. She commonly defends herself from these by a wise retreat; and when she cannot shun their encounter, she puts on a certain disdainful severity, which checks them, and renders their caresses vain, and their flatteries of no use. We may even say, that as there are things which instead of being molified, harden themselves by heat, it seems that the ardor of these [Page 156]Passions produceth the same effect in her, and that that pleasure which melts and li­quifies hearts, hardens hers. She becomes indeed as if she were stupid towards all those things which are the most desirable, and the most delicious in the world; the charms of Beauty, the splendor of Riches, move her not; Praise and Glory have no allurements for her; but quite contrary to that unhappy man who is feigned to be in­vironed with goods, which flye from him when he seeks to enjoy them, she appears in the midst of delights, which she flies as soon as they become sensible. If it happen that the Sences betray her, and that unknown to her, they taste the poyson which they present them withal, she cha­stiseth them by the grief which she causeth them to suffer; and for fear least she should herself be infected, she keeps herself pe­cuish and austere, and takes a certain dis­gust of all sweets, and against all the entice­ments of Pleasure. It's thus also that she preserves herself from that Pride and Va­nity wherewith Prosperity is commonly puffed up, from the disquiet and impatience which move violent desires, from those lan­guors and transports which follow irregular contentments. In fine it's thus, she main­tains herself in so just a temper, which ren­ders [Page 157]her modest in good Fortune, severe in Pleasure, content in Necessity, and every way equal and like herself. These are the principal touches which Constancy im­prints in the Soul: we must now observe those which she makes on the Face and on the other parts of the Body. But we may at first say that they are so like those which Boldness forms thereon, that did we know them no other ways but as two Sister Ger­mans, we might easily by the likeness of their lineaments judge, that they are of the same family, or at least that they both have the same inclinations.

For as soon as ill presents it self to a Con­stant man, he expects it with the same Eye, with the same Front, and in the same po­sture as if he were ready to assault and com­bate it; his look is firm and assured, his Countenance changeth not colour, and without stirring his Brows or Lids, he coldly considers the danger which threatens him, and seems to brave with a resolved mind the misfortune it self.

You must not expect from him com­plaints of injuries, nor any of those ex­clamations wherewith Fear and Anger un­profitably beat the Air. Silence commonly shuts his mouth; and if he is obliged to speak, its with a tone of Voice which remarks [Page 158]the tranquillity of his Minde, and the strength of his Courage; for his voice is neither weak nor vehement, slow nor im­petuous, it is strong, equal, and settled; and it's upheld with a certain majestical ac­cent which mixeth respect and admiration with the fear we have to see him so near danger. He holds up his Head without im­pudence; his port is noble without Pride; his pace is grave without Haughtiness; and in all his actions there appears a generous coldness, and a modest confidence.

But it is not onely before the assault that he appears thus resolved; he carries the same air and the same assurance into danger and into fight. When he is first prest by the enemy, he stiffens his Nerves, he holds his Breath, and gathering himself up in him­self, he confirms and settles himself in his po­sture. In this condition, without going back, he beats all assaults which are made against him; he feels fire and sword fall on him without looking pale; he sees his blood run from all parts without astonishment; and findes his Body wounded with wounds, and torn in pieces without complaining, and without so much as wrinkling his Brow. If sometimes any man makes him change colour, cast forth crys, or turn up his looks, it passeth so suddenly that we may easily [Page 159]judge, that the violence of the ill surpri­zed him, and that it hath robbed from him, if we may so speak, those motions from his Constancy. For at the same time he sup­presseth his complaints and his sighs; he devoureth his grief, and bringing back a calm in his Countenance with a smile, and with the sweet looks of his eyes he doth not onely reprehend his first resolve, but makes it appear more gay and better plea­sed. In fine, if he perceive the strength of his Body forsake him, and that he must succumb under the effort of the enemy which assaults him, in falling he makes it appear that his Courage is not cast down; that by his fall he raiseth up himself, and that it is not he that yields, but his ill For­tune.

For he suffers all the insolency of the Victor without murmuring or so much as moving. He sees those blows come with­out being frighted, which will be the loss of his life, and he is already sensible of death, yet still hath a care to compose his Countenance, and to leave on his dying body the remains of his Constancy.

But it's time to enquire the cause of all these effects; neither have we any thing more to say of those Characters which this Passion imprints on the body, when she [Page 160]resists those pleasing and deceitful ills of which we have spoken, since she adds no­thing to her settled Countenance but seve­rity, disdain, and frowardness wherewith she arms herself against their Allurements, and that we have already observed them in the first figures of this Picture. Let's now examine what its nature is, since its the source whence all these effects ought to take their original.

CHAP. II. Of the Nature of Constancy, or strength of Courage.

ALthough at our enterance into this Discourse, Why this Passion is necessary. we have made the nature of this Passion appear, having been obliged to distinguish it from Boldness, to observe the difference of its motions, and the end which the Appetite proposeth it self; yet we must say that we have made therein but an imperfect draught wherein we have one­ly traced out the most remarkable parts, and the grossest lineaments, and that now we must add the last touches, and those colours which were wanting thereunto.

For which purpose we must again betake [Page 161]our selves to those principles which we have established in the precedent Discour­ses, and say, that Nature hath inspired in every thing the care of its own preservati­on, having taught them to seek what is fit, and to flie what was hurtful, and to combate what was contrary to them; that the Soul as the most noble and the most excellent, hath this knowledge, and these inclinations most strong and most perfect: And that all those Passions wherewith she is continually agitated; are the means she useth to attain those ends; some of them being appointed to pursue good, others to flie ill, and others to assault it; That in fine she flies or assaults ills according as she believes herself weaker or stronger then they; and that Fear, Timerousness, and Despair are signs of Weakness; as Hope, Boldness and Anger are effects of Power.

But because this division is grounded on more and less, and that amongst these two there is ever a middle, which is equality: It's not sufficient to have shewn that the Soul is stronger and weaker then the Evil. We must yet add, that their forces may be equal; so that if she ought to flie when she is the weaker, and assault when she is the stronger, of necessity when their [Page 162]strengths are equal, and consequently be­ing neither to flie nor assault, she must re­main simply on the defensive, and that without yeilding to the end eavors of the enemy, and without also undertaking any thing against him, she must content her self only to resist. It must needs, I say, be, that as flying she retires with precipitation, and that she darts herself forth with impe­tuosity when she assaults, she must also stop and keep herself stiff when she in­tends onely to resist; and this stiffening having resistance onely for its motive, and proceeding from the equality we have now spoken of, it must make all the Nature and Essence of this Passion, there being no o­ther which this motion in all circumstances befits.

But before we examine more particular­ly the manner wherewith the Soul is then agitated, Objecti­ons to shew that Constancy is formed with this equali­ty of strength. we must clear a difficulty which ariseth from those propositions which we have established; for there is great reason for us to doubt, That equality of forces should be the principle of this Passion, since it's certain, she often forms it when the Soul is stronger or weaker then those ills which assault her. How many have we seen of those noble Courages who have opposed enemies far more powerful then [Page 163]themselves, who have been firm and reso­lute in those dangers, wherein their loss was certain, and who have constantly suf­fered the greatest imaginable ills without hope, even without having a minde to shun them? On the contrary, is it not an ordi­nary effect of Magnanimity not to employ all ones forces against a weak enemy, and to oppose against him a mans own endea­vors, onely without fighting with him, or pretending to a Victory, whereby he might gain honor? The Soul then may be moved with Constancy at the encounter of these ills which she esteems weaker or stronger then herself; and therefore the foundation on which we thought to have so well esta­blished this Passion, cannot sustain it self, and threatens the ruine of all the super­structure.

Answer to the first Ob­jection. To answer to such strong Objections, we must first observe, that the opinion which the Soul hath of her forces is not essential to the Passions, but an action of Judgment, and not of the Appetite. And that it onely is instead of a natural condi­tion towards their production, in that ge­neral order which Nature hath prescribed those Powers; but forasmuch as this order is often changed in particulars, it also hap­pens, that when the Passions form them­selves, [Page 164]this condition is often wanting as all other things which are strangers to them, and enter not into their essence.

Now this general order will have the sensitive Appetite immediately conducted by the imagination, as by a light which is proper and necessary unto it, and destina­ted to shew it all what it ought to do. And as she would in vain propose unto it to do any thing, unless she thought it were in its power, these forces must necessarily be known unto it, and she must know whe­ther they are great enough to oppose those difficulties which present them­selves.

So that if the Faculties be not put out of that road which naturally they ought to keep, the Appetite could never form any motion, but the imagination must first have compared her strength with the diffi­culties; but that she must have thought her self stronger then them, when she ordains them to combate them; but that she must have believed she was weaker when she counsels us to flie them; and finally, but that she must have judged that at least her forces are equal with theirs, when she ob­ligeth it to expect or to resist them. For it sometimes happens that she thinks herself stronger, and yet she will not assault, whe­ther [Page 165]it be because she slights the enemies weakness, or because natural Justice for­bids her to undertake too unequal a Com­bate, as hath been shewed in the Discourse of Boldness. However it be, that order which we have now remarked is ever ob­served in Beasts, in whom these two Fa­culties absolutely command, and are not hindered in their Functions by any superi­or Power which they are subject to. But it is not so with Man, in whom Reason and Will ought to govern the sensitive Ap­petite, and cause it to move as it pleaseth them; for it often happens that these Fa­culties, without having respect to those motives which the imagination proposeth to the Appetite, oblige him to flie when he might assault or defend himself, and to fight and resist when he ought to betake himself to flight: It is not but that Reason sees that the Combate and the re­sistance which she causeth the inferior part to make, are uselsst to overcome those dif­ficulties, or to stop their course. But as unprofitable as they are for these particu­lar motives, they serve for others, which it judgeth more noble and more useful then those. And the vain endeavors which it then moves in the Appetite, are the means which it employs to attain the pro­posed [Page 166]end. Thus she often assaults an ene­my, when she knows not very well who shall be overcome. But it's onely to ac­quire honor and glory wherewith generous actions are rewarded; she suffers couragi­ously grief, torments and death it self, not to avoid the effect which she believes in­evitable, but to merit those Crowns which Heaven and Earth give unto Constancy. In a word, there are divers motives which may engage her in those designs, and which are good or ill, according as she is en­lightned with false or true light. But it is still certain, that in all these encounters she goes against the general order which ought to regulate the motions of the infe­ror part, and which she herself useth to fol­low in her ordinary actions, there being nothing more reasonable then to flye when we are weakest, to assault when strongest, and to resist upon equal terms.

But it is not enough to know that the Soul resists; Why Con­stancy re­sists ill. we must see what the end is of this resistance, and what profit she gets thereby; for it seems as if it would be more advantagious for her to flie those ills which seem invincible, then to expose herself to its violence, and suffer those efforts which may give her, if not much discommodity, yet at least much trouble, considering also [Page 167]her natural aversion towards it, its princi­pal effect being to put it by, and estrange it from her presence, she ought to follow the motion of this Passion, and not expect an enemy she cannot overcome.

Did Reason onely engage her to this re­sistance, it were easie to discover the ad­vantages she pretends to make; those mo­tives of honor and glory which she com­monly proposeth in those encounters, would evidently make it appear, that she aspires to those noble rewards, and that those are the fruits which her Courage pre­tends to gather; but because these motives are extraordinary, and unknown to the fan­cy, as hath been shewn, that they are not in beasts; and that in our selves Reason doth not always force the inferior part, but suffers it to go its common road; we must seek some other end proper and natural unto it, and see what she pretends unto, when she takes a resolution to resist those ills which assault her.

To speak to the purpose, it's not so easie to be discovered as some may think. And we must confess, that that light which en­lightens the Soul in those occasions, is of the rank of those which Nature sheds a­broad in all those things, which without knowing, know whereto they ought to [Page 168]tend, and which without perceiving it moves to their end. The Soul indeed knows that she ought to assault ill, and that she ought to overcome it; that she ought to resist it, and that she must oppose violence; but she knows not why; and the understanding it self, which often doth the same actions, is not always advised of the true motion which made it undertake them.

Upon this ground we may say, that as the Soul assaults her enemy out of hope to overcome him, and that she seeks to over­come him; to take from him the power of doing ill; that she also resists him not to take away his power, but onely to stop the course thereof, and hinder it from produ­cing its effect; that the advantage she pre­tends to make from this hinderance, is to retard her own loss as long as she resists; or to cause the enemy to lose its will to contuinue his assaults, letting of him know that with the strength she hath, she cannot be overcome. And last of all, to shun the danger wherein she would be engaged, did she but yield or take flight; for she can never slye but she must forsake and quite abandon her Strength and Courage, and to augment those of her enemy, or at least give him free­dom to do all the ill he is capable of.

In effect, did we not oppose grief, fear, and other evils which are in us, they would overflow all the parts of the soul, and would bring her to languish and to despair: Did we not constantly suffer injuries, adversi­ties, and other mischiefs which come from without the imagination, seeing no means whereby to stop their course, would fansie them greater then they are, and make them always appear extream and insufferable; did we not even sometimes stiffen under the burthen of our sufferings, we should be op­prest by their weight; and those parts which yielded to the violence thereof, fall­ing on those which upheld them, would batter them by their fall, and fill them with grief. In a word, whatsoever ill the Soul would flie, she is in the same danger that a Souldier casts himself into who falls before his enemy, or that a whole Army incurs when it flies the sight of a Conqueror, who comes pouring down upon it.

Let's then conclude, that the motive which she proposeth in Boldness, is to be­reave the enemy of the power of doing ill, that in Constancy she onely suspends its ef­fect, and that in Fear she seeks to shun it by flight. Now as there is more security to have no enemy, then to have one who doth harm us; and neither is this so much to [Page 170]be feared as one who puts himself in po­sture to do it: So it's also true, that the Soul is more secure in Boldness which de­stroys ill, then in Constancy which hinders onely its effect: As for the same reason, she ever thinks to fight before she thinks of her own defence, and never resolves to flye but at her greatest extremity, that be­ing her worst condition and the saddest posture she can be reduced unto, leaving the enemy with full power and liberty to work her ruine.

The soul then resists the ills which assault her, Why Con­stancy re­sists ill. to stop the course of them; Let's now see how she resists them. For we question not here that exterior resistance, which is performed by the action of the parts which oppose themselves against the efforts of those things which might harm them. Be­sides that, there ate ills, against which the motions of the Soul would in vain employ this resistance, as those which are purely spi­ritual are; for it resists not afflictions by the opposition of corporal forces, but by her own proper strength. Besides that, the motions of the Appetite do not always de­scend to the organs, whether it be because they are restrained by Reason, or because they are sometimes formed so quickly, and move so readily that it's impossible they [Page 171]should have time to communicate them­selves with the Body. It's certain that all these exterior motions, which are observed in the Passions, are the effects and sequels of those which are formed within the Soul; so that if the Body resist outwardly, the Soul also must within herself perform the same action, or to speak it better, she must of herself resist before she can resist by the Bodies means. So that we are ob­liged to seek in what manner she makes this secret and inward resistance, which she employs against spiritual ills and which is the source and cause of that which she causeth to be made in the organs. This will be nothing difficult, having so often shewn that the agitations of the body are the ima­ges and the Characters of those which are made in the Appetite; that there is some relation and some resemblance betwixt them; and that the Soul exciting both of them, its very likely she would render them as uniform as she can.

Now we experiment it in our selves, that when we must make an outward re­sistance against a puissant Adversary, we stop and remain firm; and to fortifie our selves against his assaults, we stiffen our Muscles and our Nerves, and there is no part about us which becomes not harder, [Page 172]and more solid by the effort which we give our selves: Somewhat therefore like this must be done in the Soul, and consequent­ly she must necessarily stop and confirm herself, that gathering her forces together she must stiffen herself in herself: In a word, she must take, as it were, a kinde of a con­sistence, which yields not easily to the shock and assault of the enemy. The stif­fening of the Soul stops the course of ill, and how.

We are now to see how she can stiffen herself, and of what nature this Firmness is, which she makes use of in this occasion; but because this hath been already done in the Discourse of Hope, and that in that place the Reader may finde wherewith to satisfie his curiosity, It will be sufficient to examine here what it is that makes this stifness, and whether it be a means able to stop the course and violence of the ills which assault the soul.

For it seems at first, that this firmness serves to this purpose onely but in corpo­ral things, which being unable to pene­trate one another are constrained to stop when they meet with any which yields not to their motion; so that in stiffening the Body, and keeping of it firm, we sustain the weight of a burthen, we break the current of a wave and of a torrent; we stop the impetuosity of an enemy which [Page 173]presseth upon us, and would overthrow us.

But in those things which have no Bo­dies, as the Will and Appetite, the stif­ness which either of them takes, cannot in all likelihood stop the course nor the mo­tion of ill, whether corporal or spiritual, the reason of penetration having no place in those things. In effect, let the soul stiffen and strengthen it self as much as she can, she cannot stop the least corporal motion, unless she also stiffen the parts and the or­gans of the Body she animates. And if she assaults those ills which are truly or any way spiritual, such as are injuries, mishaps, afflictions, and the like; this stiffening we have spoken of seems to be a means altoge­ther useless to resist it.

Let's first therefore say, Two forts of Firm­ness. that there is two sorts of Firmness; the one which pro­ceeds from material qualities, and is onely to be found in hard and solid Bodies; the other comes from the impetuosity of the motion, and is common to all things which move, whether corporal or spiritual. Thus Water, Air, and Wind which are of a flu­id nature, and yield easily, acquire a firm­ness by their agitation, which stops the most solid Bodies. Thus Angels, De­mons, and all separated substances restrain [Page 174]one the other, according as their motions are more powerful, as we have elsewhere manifested it. Now the Firmness which the Appetite hath is of this kinde; for it proceeds from the only motion it makes in stiffening it self, even as the members be­come firm by the tonick motion, of which we have spoken in the Discourse of Hope. And as by the first stiffening the bodies re­sist, because they are hard and impenetrable; so also by the latter, all other things resist by reason of the motion which they make, which stops what it encounters, and is in­compatible with it. So that the Appetite resists ills, by making a contrary to what they make.

But because there are some which are corporeal, and other spiritual; it's certain, that the Firmness which this part of the soul takes in stiffening it self, cannot of it self alone stop corporal motions, how weak soever they are, but necessarily the exterior organs must contribute thereunto, and that if it be formed without them, it would prove a vain and useless violence, and an imperfect motion, which would not move to that end which Nature had pre­scribed it. For she hath afforded the Ap­petite the power to stiffen it self at the en­counter of corporal and sensible ills, but [Page 175]onely to inspire the same motion in those Faculties which are under its direction, and cause the organs to make that resist­ance, which is necessary in those encoun­ters.

As for those ills which truly, or in some manner are spiritual, we must consider whether they have motion, as Grief, Fear, and the rest of the Passions; for it's cer­tain, that these may be stopped and restrain­ed by the resistance onely which the Ap­petite makes by stiffening it self in it self. Forasmuch as water loseth its rapidity, and even its fluidity when it settles and con­geals; so when the Appetite stiffens it self, the motions of the rest of the Passions must cease or diminish. If the Soul indeed shut it self up in Grief, if it dilate it self in Joy, if it retire it self in Fear, we need not doubt but Constancy foreseeing these motions, or arriving afterwards must needs hinder or restrain them, bereaving the Appetite of the liberty or facility of moving it self by that stifness which she imprints in it.

But when the ills are without motion, as injuries, exiles, poverty, in a word, all those which are not in the rank of Passions, we cannot say that the Appetite properly and immediately resists them; for that it [Page 176]cannot resist those things which move not, as hath been said; consequently those ills must then have had some motion; but it resists them onely by opposing it self to those Passions which they usually cause. Truly he that constantly suffers Poverty, doth not properly resist Poverty, but the grief, the impatience, the peevishness which follows after it. And he that suffers death with a courage, cannot truly resist death, since it as yet is not, but onely Fear, Grief and Despair which the image of so fright­ful an ill raiseth up in the Soul. Neither are all these things Ills in effect, but onely as we know that they are so; forasmuch as a Man who thinks not himself poor suffers not the Ills of Poverty; and that there are many who effectually are so, and who have the knowledge of it, yet place it not in the ranck of Evils. So that ill is not ill but from the knowledge and the resentment we have of it. Now the knowledge is no true motion, there being no part of the Soul which moves but the Appetite, and there­fore there is no resistance to be made against ill, when it continues in the Knowledge, but onely when it descends in the Appe­titive part, where it forms those Passions which the Soul may resist, as hath been said.

Let's return to our former Discourse, and say, That after having cleared all those dfficulties, it seems as if nothing could hinder us from defining Constancy to be a motion of the Appetite, whereby the Soul settles and stiffens herself in herself, to resist those ills which assault her.

But this definition raiseth new doubts; Wherein Hope and Constan­cy consist. for if the Soul settle and stiffen it self in hope to resist difficulties; and if this stiffen­ing is the difference of the motion which distinguisheth this Passion from the rest, as hath been said; Constancy, to which we give the same definition, is nothing differ­ent from Hope, or that neither of them are well defined. If indeed we ought to con­sider in the Passions nothing but the simple agitation which the Appetite gives it self, this consequence certainly were infallible; but it is not the onely thing which specifies the Passion; there is another motive which regulates this motion, which is as it were the form of it, and restrains it to such or such a species. So that according as the corporal motions are different the one from the other, by the difference of the term and end which they tend unto; those of the Soul are diversified by the several mo­tives she proposeth to herself. So we have observed, that she equally darted herself [Page 178]forth in Desire and in Boldness, and that notwithstanding she suffered two different Passions; forasmuch as in the one she dart­ed herself forth towards the good, that she might draw near it; and that in the o­ther she casts herself forth against ill, that she might assault and combate it. We may also say, that in Hope and in Constancy she moves after the same manner; that she stiffens herself in both to resist the difficul­ties; but that there are different motives which distinguish them from one the other. For in Hope she stiffens herself not actually to resist difficulties, but onely to put her­self in a condition to resist them, if it hap­pen she be assaulted by them; Forasmuch as she considers not the ill but by the way, as a thing far off, as an enemy she can master; but in Constancy she stiffens her­self effectually to resist it, because it's present that assaults her, and seems invin­cible: So that we may say, that the Soul in both these Passions, doth like the Gene­ral of an Army when he passeth through an enemies Country, and when he finds him­self surprized in some Ambuscado; in the one being doubtful of meeting the enemy, he marcheth in good order, he keeps his guards, and puts himself in posture of re­sistance if he should be assaulted; in the [Page 179]other he findes himself engaged amongst them before he was aware of them; and of necessity, unless he will flie, he must defend himself: Even so when the Soul hopes for any good, she marcheth towards it through all those difficulties which environ it; and be­ing in doubt of being assaulted by them, she stands on her guard, fortifies & prepares her self to fight if they should come and assault her; but in Constancy she finds herself surpri­zed by the ill, which perhaps she had never expected, had she but had time to have disco­vered it; nor dares she assault it, being un­able to do ought else but oppose herself to its violence, and bear its effort.

Having cleared this doubt, another a­riseth far more important, which also is more difficult to resolve; for if the Soul stiffens herself in Constancy, and if by its means she resists Grief, and Joy, and the rest of the Passions, the Appetite must be agitated with contrary motions; and for example, opposing it self to Joy, it must stiffen it self at the same time when it di­lates it self, How Con­stancy may be compati­ble with the rest of the Passions. and consequently suffer two op­posite and incompatible motions.

It seems very easie to answer this Ob­jection, if it were true, That Beasts were not able to resist their Passions, and that this kinde of Constancy were proper and [Page 180]peculiar unto Man, forasmuch as we might then say, that these opposite motions would not be found together, and that resistance must be formed in the Will, whilst the other Passion did agitate the inferior parts; yet were it true that Man alone were capa­ble of Constancy, as it is very likely, the difficulty would still remain entire, since its certain that the Will may resist its own motions; and that being susceptible of all the Passions which touch at the Sences, and there being some of them particular which are unknown to the inferior parts, such are Envy, Ambition and Impudence: Neceslarily in opposing the Passion of Constancy, she must at the same time suf­fer these contrary motions, even commu­nicate them to the Appetite, when she is constrained by its to resist those motions which agitate it.

Let's first therefore say, that the Will and the Appetite may engage themselves in so great a resistance, and settle and stif­fen themselves so strongly, that they will not be able to suffer any other motion; and that in this condition if they have not hitherto received a Passion, they will alto­gether hinder it from forming it self; or if it already be there, they will stifle it and stop its course by the firmness which they [Page 181]have confirmed themselves in. And it is certainly so, that a strong and magnanimous man so streng thens his Courage against injuries, losses, and other accidents of For­tune, that they make no impression in his Soul; or if he be surprised by them, he pre­sently stifles the resentment of vengeance, and of the affliction which they give him. Now in this case it's certain, that the in­convenience proposed is not to be feared, because that then the Will and the Appe­tite are agitated with one motion onely, and that they are moved by no other Passion but this, Constancy and strength of Cou­rage; but when they stiffen not themselves so much, and that their Firmness is not so great but that they may also suffer some other motion; then you must imagine that the same thing happens to them as unto the Air, when it's agitated with contrary winds, or the Sea when it suffers in some streights the encounter of several currents and the shock of the encountring waves; for as in those Bodies which are fluid, and yield easily, there are parts which make way through others, which are driven by a contrary motion; It's very likely that the Will and the Appetite have also several parts which may be agitated with different motions, and that in some of them the ef­fusion [Page 182]which Joy requires, will be made whilst the rest stiffen themselves to resist it; And this may easily be perswaded, if we consider that the reasonable Soul and the intelligence which are altoge­ther undivisible, have, as it were, divers parts, wherein we may receive different a­gitations.

Or we must say, that even as the impres­sion of two opposite motions makes not the Bodies which receive them move at the same time forwards and backwards; but it confounds these two motions, so that if they are of an equal strength, the body moves neither this way nor that, or else it moves but on that side whereto the strongest com­pells it, but more weakly then it would have done, had it not been kept back by the other: So when the Will and the Ap­petite are agitated with any motion, if ano­ther contrary thereunto happen, a certain mixture is made which weakens them both, and which also diminisheth those Passions which are formed of it. And indeed by ex­perience we know, that Constancy weak­ens affliction, but that this also abates very much of her force, and that from time to time the Soul had need to reanimate its Courage, and to take up new Arms for to continue her own defence, and not suffer herself to be overcome.

Now for the rest, The Will onely can resist the Passions. how strange soever it seem that we have placed the Will and the Appetite as parallels to one another; yet it's certain that the inferior part alone is not able to resist these Passions, but that the superior must inspire it with the design and motion; otherwise the imagination which proposeth to the Appetite designs which it ought to take in its motions, must at the same time make unto it two contrary pro­positions, the one to form the Passion, and the other to stop it, which is above the power of a material and determinate Facul­ty; Nay, even the Understanding how separate soever it be from matter, and how universal soever it be, would never go so far, had she not those several stages, and those several degrees which its known to have.

For those who have most curiously ex­amined the nature thereof, confess that there are, as it were, two parts in it; the one of which is low, next to the sensitive Soul, and which by reason of that neigh­borhood suffers it self to be easily carried away, and corrupted by the sences; the other is more pure and raised up higher, which for that cause is called the top and height of the Understanding, wherein God hath effused the light of true Reason, and the seeds of all the vertues; and it's that [Page 184]also which inspires the Will to resist those Passions which the other hath raised there, unknown or contrary to its advice; thus these contrary designs whereof we have spoken, are not formed by one and the same power, since that which serves for Con­stancy is formed in the highest part of the Understanding, and that which serves to that Passion to which it is to be opposed, is made in the lower region.

But we have marched too far on preci­pices and on thorns; The Soul resists not ill but by Constancy let's leave these by­ways, and these subjects, which with their difficulty astonish the mind: Let's onely observe, that Constancy and strength of courage, is alone the only means by which the Soul truly resists the Passions; for al­though ordinary Philosophy proposeth o­thers unto us, as to divert our thoughts from the object which raiseth them, to weaken their power by Ratiocination, to fall upon other contrary Passions, and the like. Yet to consider it well, therein there is no true resistance; they are rather flights or fights then a simple defence. For when we will not consider the injury which we receive, that is not to defend our selves from Anger, it's to flie it; even as it is to assault it, when we employ a contrary Pas­sion for to destroy it.

But yet to deserve the honor to have re­sisted them, in what way soever it were, we must have had the design; for we may divert a man from being angry; we may also inspire another Passion in him which may appease his fury, and fear may fall up­on him, which may take from him that fence of vengeance which he may have con­ceived. And yet a man will not say that in these encounters he resists his Passion, for that he had it not in his intention. It is even so with Beasts, in whom one Passion may weaken and destroy another, in whom the same Appetite may stiffen it self, and by its stiffening hinder it self from taking the impression of another motion: No, they do not for that resist their Passions, be­cause besides that they cannot, as I have said, form the design of it; it must needs be that they must be able to reflect on their actions, against those maxims which we have elsewhere established. Let's then conclude, that Constancy is a motion of the Appetite, by which the Soul confirms and stiffens it self in it self, with an intention to resist those ills which assault it.

To examine now those ills, would be to fall into useless and impertinent repetiti­ons; for they are the same which move Boldness, and all what we have said of them [Page 186]in that place, may be here applied. It will suffice if we remember that under the noti­on of ill, we understand not onely a pure privation, but also the causes which pro­duce it, and the incommodities which fol­low it; and that the two latter are the true ills which the Soul resists. The dif­ferences of Con­stancy.

We should have nothing more to say on this subject, did not the method which we have followed in the rest of the Passions ob­lige us to observe the most remarkable dif­ferences of Constancy, and chiefly those which may serve to afford us a reason for those Characters which she imprints in the Soul and in the Body. Let's then say, that there are none essential, forasmuch as the motion and the motive which cause all the essence of this Passion, are equally to be found in all sorts of Constancy; as for those which we call accidental, the most remarkable are drawn from the subject wherein she is found, or from the object which raiseth it, or from the relation which it hath with Reason: For if we consider its subject, it hath one which is in the Will, and another which is in the sensitive Appo­tite: In respect of the Object there are di­vers sorts, according to the several sorts of ill which assault the Soul; but the most considerable is that which resists the Passi­ons, [Page 187]and that which opposeth it self to the violence and endeavors of exterior ills; this is common to all Animals, and depends altogether on corporal strength, namely on those which are most proper to suffer, such as are to be found in the melancho­ly temperature, of which we have spoke in the Discourse of Boldness; the other is proper and peculiar for Men, and princi­pally for those which are most reasonable, because it's commonly Reason which moves us to oppose the Passions, so that herein there needs no other strength but that of the Soul; wherefore those whose spirits are strong by nature or by study, are most susceptible of it: It's true, that the force of the minde depends often from the temperature; whence it is that young peo­ple and Women whose spirits by reason of their constitution are less strong, are troubled to resist their Passions.

Finally, There are some that are vertu­ous, others vicious, according as they are conformable or contrary to right Reason, and so serve for the matter of Vertues or Vices. In effect, Justice borroweth from this Passion Firmness which is necessary unto it to resist Love, Hatred and such o­ther things as might corrupt it; Temper­ance could not moderate the motions of [Page 188]the concupiscible Appetite but by its means; and those Vertues which force produceth by resistance, such as are Pati­ence, Constancy and Perseverance, are maintained onely by it. On the contrary, when she straggles out of the right way, and abandons the conduct of Reason, there is no Vice which she doth not encourage and assist, because she alone resists those motions which the Conscience inspires al­ways in those who undertake or execute any evil design: But although she may be found in all vicious actions, there are some where­in she appears more, as in Temerity, in Hard-heartedness, and in Opiniastrecy, as we shall hereafter make it appear.

Now all those terms wherewith we use to express Boldness, are also employed for Constancy; For to say a man hath suffered death Constantly, we use to say he hath suffered it with a Courage, with Resoluti­on, with Assurance, without fear, and without apprehension; and this happens from that Constancy is as it were a demy Boldness, at least it is instead of it, when it hath no cause to fight, whether we de­spise the enemy, or because its forces are not sufficient to assault it. Wherefore the same causes and the same preparatives which serve the one do also serve the other. [Page 189]And certainly, after the Soul hath found its forces to be equal with those of the ene­mies which assaults her, she assures herself that she shall not be conquered, and con­sequently she hath no cause to be affraid: In pursuit whereof she takes a Resolution to resist him, and for that cause she raiseth her forces, that she may stiffen and con­firm herself in herself, and if it be necessa­ry, she causeth the same motion to be made in the outward organs. As for Courage it's certain that it's in common with Boldness, and with Constancy, for the Reasons alleadged in the former Chap­ter.

CHAP. III. What the motion of the Spirits and of the Humors is in Constancy.

SInce the spirits follow the motions of the Soul, How the Spirits stiffen them­selves. and that they always move as she moves; if it be true that she stiffens herself in Constancy, they must needs also suffer the same agitation; so that since we have treated of their stiffening in the Discourse of Hope, it seems that we should have no­thing more to say here, unless we should [Page 190]repeat those things which we have there al­ready examined. Yet besides that, the na­ture of this motion is extreamly hid, nei­ther is the repetition of these obscure and difficult things useless, and that it would be troublesom to seek far off what ought to be here known; it's fit we should repeat a part of the things which we have said, adding thereunto some new considera­tions for the better clearing of the Sub­ject.

We must first therfore remember that the Spirits stiffen themselves not by congeal­ing themselves, as it happens in some dis­eases, forasmuch as that would render them immoveable, and that this Passion hinders them not from being carried to those pla­ces where they are necessary, nor restrain­ing and taking themselves up in themselves, for that they cannot restrain themselves but they must retire inwardly, and then it must needs be that contrary to the nature of Constancy the face must look pale and change colour, the blood with which they are mixed being forced to follow them, and as they do, to abandon the exterior parts. They therefore stiffen themselves by the intermission of the Soul, which subjects their parts to a certain order under which it restrains them, without being more free [Page 191]or Vagabonds, as before they were. But to conceive this kinde of motion, which is extreamly hid, and most difficult to be con­ceived, we must make use of the same ex­ample, which we formerly made use of, and imagine that it herein happens near upon as water which settles and congeals: For those parts which before were fluid, being seised by the cold which is insinuated a­mongst them, stop and become firm without confounding or mixing themselves together: whilst all the body of the water so settled may be transported from one place to another; and the current of Rivers often draws along with it great pieces which tear down those Bridges and Dams which they meet in their way: But with what rapidity soever they are then carried away, their parts change neither the posi­tion nor the order which they keep amongst themselves without penetrating; they a­mongst one another maintain themselves; and they remain firm without confounding themselves, just as long time as the cold keeps them bound and captivated.

The Soul doth the same in the Spirits; she sheds and slides herself into all their parts, and being she may place them as she pleaseth, she stops them in what order she will, and lead them as it were by the [Page 192]hand to the place she assigns them; so that how fluid soever they be, the one can­not be mixed with the rest; and what agi­tation soever they suffer, they remain stable in that rank wherein they are placed.

Now although this comparison may give us some knowledge of the condition, wherein the spirits are in this Passion; yet it shews us not what is most difficult to be known; for it supposeth, and it's true, that the parts of congealed water are no longer in motion, and we pretend that the spirits have one which entertains this stiffen­ing. We must therefore seek another ex­ample which may make this truth ap­pear, and have more relation to the Soul then cold hath, or any other sensible qua­lity.

Without doubt, How the Angels stiffen Bodies. this is to be found in the firmness which the Angels may give to the Air, and to some other fluid bodies; for besides that they are substances which have a great natural conformity with the Soul; it's certain, that they agitate their Bodies after the same manner as she doth the spirits, and that the stiffness which she imprints on them excludes not motion, as it happens to congealed water.

Let's then suppose with the consent of the Schools, that a certain space of Air be [Page 193]occupied by an Angel, and that the Wind or some other Body seeks to move or pene­trate it; it's a certain thing that the Angel may so stiffen it that he may stop all its en­deavors so that he cannot be shaken or pe­netrated by them.

To know now how he can impose this firmness, we must believe with the common opinion of Philosophers, that the Angels have a motive vertue by which they move themselves, and may also remove bodies, and transport them from one place to another, as all prophane and sacred Histories teach us. In effect it must needs be, that those things which work the one on the other, must have some proportion together, and there must be a­mongst them some common nature, which must serve for the foundation and princi­ple of their action: Now there is nothing which can be common betwixt spiritual and corporeal substances, but the motive Ver­tue, and the Motion; and therefore if they work the one on the other, it must be by that means; which being so, the Angel cannot stiffen the Air but by the motion which it imprints in all its parts, since it's that onely which gives him power over bodies: And to shew that this is true, it is that he is able to be present with all those [Page 194]parts without stiffening them; so that it's necessary that he should raise up his vigor, and agitate them, thereby to imprint on them this quality.

If any should say, that being thus moved, they must needs either be driven, be drawn, be born, or be turned, because these are the several ways by which one thing may be moved by another; and howsoever it may be done, they must necessarily change place; so that herein not changing it, and remaining still in the same situation, there is no probability to beleeve that they suffer any motion.

We must answer, that it's true, that when the Angel imprints any motion in the Bodies, he necessarily makes them change place unless there happen some ob­stacle which hinders them: Now there is nothing which can hinder them but a con­trary motion, because there is nothing common betwixt them but motion, and consequently if there be no contrary mo­tion in the parts of the Air, it's certain that the impression which the Angel will make on them will cause them to change si­tuation: If it happen that after having re­ceived it, that they remain in the same con­dition they were, they must have had a contrary motion which resists this impres­sion, [Page 195]and which being of equal force with it, puts them in aequilibrio, and keeps them as it were suspended without stiring from one side to the other, wherein this firmness consists.

But what? continuing thus firm and stable, and not changing place, can they be in motion? Certainly, We need not doubt it, since it is by motion that they keep this situation, and that we cannot deny but that the impression of the motion must be received therein, but that it agi­tates on them, and that she resists not the first motion which they made, like as a great weight which we hold lifted up or high; for although it still remain in the same place, yet would it not forbear to have that motion which its weight gives it, and we should be sensible of the effort it would make, falling and returning to its centre. Finally, as it were nothing probable to say that a thing which were powerfully drawn on both sides by equal forces, should suffer no motion because it would neither move on the one or on the other side; nor that the arm we stiffen should be at rest, because it still remains in the same place: Philoso­phers and Physitians being all agreed, that these are the most violent motions which bodies can suffer; we must necessarily con­clude [Page 196]that those parts of the Air which are stiffened by contrary motions are in moti­on, although they remain stable and change not their situation.

Let us now apply this Doctrine to our subject and say, that what the An­gel doth in this encounter, the Soul doth it on the spirits; for although she be present to all their parts, yet she renders them not stiff; she must also move them, and before that they also must be moved by a contrary motion; so that being equally driven from one and another, they can nei­ther advance nor go back, but remain im­movable betwixt these endeavors and vio­lences. Now this firm motion which they ought to have, may proceed from the Pas­sions which agitate them; Constancy sel­dom forming herself unless she be prece­ded by some other Passion, or from the im­petuosity they are driven unto in ships; for being very moveable, she easily makes them straggle from one the other, as it happens to all fluid Bodies, when they are a­gitated; and then the Soul giving them a contrary motion proportionable to the first they had, they retain it, and stop them in a certain order which they change not, un­less one or the other cease. But although in this condition they appear immoveable [Page 197]because they remain in the same situati­on, they forbear not to be in motion, as hath been already sufficiently demonstra­ted.

This is what the motion of the spirits is in Constancy. Why the Spirits stiffen them­selves. Let's now enquire the end and profit which the Soul proposeth it self in this firmness. We must not doubt but she desires them for her defence, and em­ploys them to resist those ills which assault her; but at first it seems as an unprofitable means for that design: For if ills have no motion, as Exile, Infamy, and Slavery, this stifness were against them to no pur­pose for the reasons before alleadged; and if they have any, either they are Passions which are formed in the Appetite, whose motions the spirits cannot hinder, or they are Bodies whose violence they cannot stop. In effect, what can this stiffening do against the effort of Grief, against the force of a blow, against the weight of a burthen which falls on them? No, being so easily overcome as they are, it seems that the Soul in vain useth them in these encoun­ters, and that in vain she opposeth herself against such powerful things, against which she is not able to resist. We must undoubt­edly confess, that she often abuseth herself in the motion which she gives those organs, [Page 198]and that she doth not always get those suc­cors which she ought to expect from them, and that she even sometimes agitates them without any need. For when she resists the Passions, it's certain that neither the stif­fening of the Spirits, nor any other moti [...] on of the Body whatsoever, can be either necessary or useful unto her, since they are actions proper unto her, who never goes out of herself, and so consequently is a­bove all the efforts of the corporal organs: Yet if she then ceaseth not to agitate them, it is from that that the Appetite which stirs up these motions, is a blind power, which cannot judge when she ought to make use of those parts; and they are de­stined to obey unto it; it rather in this oc­casion commands them out of custom, then out of design; and they also are so obedi­ent, that we may say that at the least solli­citation it makes them that they put them­selves in a readiness to assist it, and that even they seem to prevent its orders and com­mands.

It is not so when the violence of corpo­ral things is to be resisted; the stifness of the spirits is therein so absolutely necessary, not onely because they are bodies which may work powerfully on those things of the same Nature; but also because they [Page 199]are the first which receives the Souls com­mands, and carrieth them to all the rest of the parts; for being employed in this com­mission, they must needs take that esmoti­on which they ought to inspire in the rest of the organs; and as an Ambassador ought to carry with him the sence of him who sent him, and be throughly perswaded of what he is to make others beleeve; they ought to be agitated with the same moti­ons which the Appetite suffers, and of those which they would imprint on the rest of the parts; so that they stiffen not themselves immediately to resist the forces of the ene­my, but that they may stiffen the Muscles and the Nerves against them, and so powerfully resist their violence. And tru­ly we may consider the body as a great Ma­chine wherein are several Springs which move one another: The first go slowly, and seem almost not to move, although it is they which make the great Wheels to turn, and cause those great motions which are observeable in them: The Spirits are the same thing; we hardly feel their moti­on, neither is it they which perform the last actions, yet they lead the dance to all the rest of the organs; and did that Spring but fail, all the Machine would become im­moveable, neither could the Body act any more.

But the principal reason for the which, in my opinion they thus move, is, that their stiffening contributes to maintain the Mus­cles which in this occasion ought to be stiff; for the Soul which knows that all motion is to be made on somewhat which is stable, stiffens as much as it may the parts upon which those which are agitated are supported; so that often she holds back the breath, that that air which is stopped in the Lungs may serve to uphold the in­struments of respiration, which thereby the better support the rest, as hath been else­where shewed. She therefore affords this stiffening of the Spirits to uphold those vessels wherein they are inclosed, and af­terwards they support those parts which touch them, and they again the rest, to the very last, which serves for a foundation and basis to the principal motion which is made; for although it seems that such frail and moveable things are not very fit for that use, yet as the number of the Wheels and Springs augments the force of the mo­tions; so the number of Butteresses and Upholders renders the resistance the stron­ger; and sometimes for want of the least, a whole Building falls to the ground. It's true that if all the stifness of the Body were onely grounded on the Spirits, it would [Page 201]be very doubtful and suspitious: But as all the rest of the parts also stiffen themselves of themselves, or at least by the intermissi­on of the Soul, if the spirits contribute ne­ver so little, it still helps to make the resist­ance stronger; and this small succour be­ing joyned with several others, produceth at last a great effect. Let us hereunto add, that being in this condition, those which carry with them natural heat where­in the force of the parts principally re­sides, they retain and fix it, if we may so speak, in those places where such actions are to be performed, and not suffering it to re­tire inwardly, nor dissipating it outwardly, they stop and preserve it in those organs which have need of its service.

These are the Reasons for which the spi­rits in Constancy stiffen themselves, What change Constancy brings in natural heat. but the last gives us occasion to examine what change this Passion brings to the natural heat; for if the spirits stop, as we have now said, it seems as if it should be the more quiet and the more moderate; yet this ought not to hinder us from following the general maxims which we established in the Discourse of Boldness, and from saying that when the Soul hath need of its forces, she raiseth them and ren­ders them as vigorous as shee can; [Page 203]that there is no occasion in which they can be more necessary unto her, then when she assaults or defends herself. And that heat being the most considerable part, she must augment it, and stir it up in those Passions, which are to serve these designs; and con­sequently, she must render it greater and stronger in Constancy then it naturally ought to be. This principally appears to be in those which are of a cold and dull complexion, or which are moved by some timerous Passion; for when this comes to animate them, they feel themselves warm­ed with I know not what kinde of extraor­dinary flame; their pulse and respiration encreaseth, their face takes a more lively colour, and all their parts become more agile, and more robustious then they were before. It's true, that heat is not so active nor pungent in this as in Boldness and An­ger, having not the liberty to diffuse it self through the organs, being restrained by the spirits, which are stiffened, and because it is not necessary it should be so strong in a Passion which is not undertaking, and which keeps it self onely upon the defen­sive. We may perhaps say, that if the Soul ought to augment its forces propor­tionable to the need she hath, she ought herein to render the heat stronger then in [Page 202]any other occasion whatsoever, having an enemy in front which appears invincible, which also hath the advantage to be the Assailant under whose efforts she often be­lieves she must succumb. But we may an­swer, that it's true, that she hath here need of all her forces, that she raiseth them, and employs them for her defence; but it's onely those which are fit for that purpose, since she would in vain use others which are destined to assault, being not in a condi­tion to do so, and having neither the Will nor the Courage; now the violence of heat is onely proper the more strongly to work and to destroy the power of the enemy, in which consists the end of the Combate and of Boldness; and therefore it's nothing ne­cessary in Constancy, which hath no such great pretentions, and which hath nothing else to do but to keep the Soul stiff, and to render the organs firm against those e­vils which assault it: It's certain that heat is encreased therein, but it is but to a cer­tain degree proportionable to the design, and capable to give the organs that force which is necessary for them to execute it. For it is not here as with those Passions which tend to good, in which heat en­creaseth without order and without con­duct; because it is not therein ordered by [Page 204]the Soul; that is, it is not called thither as a useful thing for her end, and that it is but an effect which happens to the agitation of the spirits. But in this and in all the rest which assault, the Soul herself takes care to pro­duce heat, she proposeth to herself to use it profitably, and she regulates it as she thinks fit. So that we may say that in this occasion she doth like a subtil Artist, who knows how to order his fire for his works; for some he makes it slow and moderate, for others strong and violent, and some­times he forceth it to the height: the Soul doth the same, she knows to what degree of heat she ought to rise in every of the Pas­sions; in Constancy, she makes it mode­rate, strong in Boldness, but in Anger she drives it to all extremity.

This is what we had to say on the motion of the Spirits; for to know how they can pre­serve their stifness when they are agitated by other Passions, is what we have exami­ned in the Discourse of Hope. As for the motion of the Humors, it necessarily follows that of the Spirits which are ever mixt with them; and it's impossible to fancy that they should stiffen themselves in Constancy, but we must presently judge they also ought to suffer the same agitation.

CHAP. IV. The causes of the Characters of Con­stancy.

WE have said that Constancy and Boldness were Sisters, whose fea­tures and lineaments were so like, that a man might often take the one for the other; and indeed they have many Characters which are common to either, as Hope, Confi­dence, Assurance in dangers, Presumpti­on, Temerity, Desire of glory, and the like; but they also have some which are particular; for Constancy is not as Bold­ness is, Imperious, neither is she subject to Anger, to Insolency, nor to Cruelty, which the other is often carried away with­al: She hath this property also to make men Patient, Persevering, Opinionated, In­sensible, Modest in good Fortune, Severe in Pleasures, Content in Necessity; and these latter we must carefully examine without minding the others, of which we have al­ready discoursed in the former Chapter. And for these it will be sufficient to say, that although they are common to both these Passions, yet they in every one of them have a difference in respect of the end [Page 206]which it proposeth it self; for Constancy hopes as well as Boldness; but this hopes to overcome, and the other to stop onely the course of the evil; both have confi­dence in their forces; but that promiseth its self help to assault it, and this onely to defend it self; both of them may be Te­merous, but the one hath the Temerity to assault an enemy that is too powerful, and the other onely to resist him: Neither of them fears danger; that, because it believes it self stronger then the difficulties which present themselves; And this judgeth her­self as strong as they can be. Finally, both of them propose Glory in all their designs; but that aspires to it by fighting and taking advantages over the enemy, and this by opposing his endeavors, and not yielding unto him. For it's certain, that who will not suffer himself to be overcome, renders himself equal to him who assaults him, and consequently deserves as much honor as is due unto the other; and even that in some encounters it's more glorious to resist then to assault; either when the enemy is pow­erful and formidable; for then it's Temeri­ty to assault, and yet to resist his power we had need of a great deal of Courage; or when he is too weak; for that were Cow­ardice and Injustice to take the advantage [Page 207]which we have over him, and that it's to slight him, not to measure our forces with his. Thus it is that there is more glory to resist Pleasure and Ambition, or with small Troops to oppose himself against a power­ful Army, then if we should assault or would force them: It's thus that Lyons and Ma­stiffs often suffer the assaults of little Crea­tures without being moved, and that mag­nanimous and generous men scorn the weakness of their enemies, without seeking a victory which would but be shameful unto them.

To return to our former Discourse: this Passion is no more subject then Bold­ness to those defects which proceed from weakness and from fear, such as are Super­stition, Deceit, Cowardise, &c. Constancy is not im­perious. because it is couragious and hath a good opinion of its strength. But she hath this particularly, that she is not imperious as the other is, nei­ther is she carried away with Anger, Fury, or Cruelty; the reason is, that seeing she pretends not to conquer, she seeks not that preheminence nor superiority which is ne­cessary for command; but also being she will not be overcome, she will also be in­dependent; and without pretending to com­mand she will neither yield nor obey: whence it is that she renders not men [Page]haughty and proud but opiniated and un­teachable, as we shall hereafter shew. As for Anger, Fury, and Cruelty, being turbu­lent and impetuous Passions, they are not not compatible with this which is reserved and moderate. It's true, there is a kinde of Cruelty which it easily falls into; to wit, Hard-heartedness and insensibility of other mens sufferings; but it is not an active Cruelty, as that is which persecutes, which triumphs, and which exacts punishments; it's rather a defect then an excess; and if the Soul suffers not herein, yet she less acts, as we shall shortly make it appear.

One of the first effects of Constancy is to render Men Patient. She is Patient. But to understand this, we must know what we understand by the word Patience; for some confound it with Constancy; others reduce it to the suffer­ing of injuries, others extend it to all ills which may be resented. In effect, we say that a man hath patiently suffered an injury, a sickness, or even death it self; that with patience he hath suffered Exile, Slavery, the loss of Goods, and of Friends; but we can never say that he hath patiently suffer­ed Pleasure, Ambition, or good Fortune, although we may say he hath constantly resisted them; thus Constancy ought to be more general then Patience, since she re­spects [Page 209]good and ill, and that the other con­cerns only troublesom things; now ills have this property, that besides that they shed abroad in the Concupiscible part of the Soul, Hatred, Aversness and Grief, they also raise up in the Irascible part generous Passions to overcome them to Riot, Bold­ness and Anger, or the timerous to flie them, as Fear and Despair; those of the Concupiscible part may subsist with Pati­ence, seeing a man may be patient, al­though he hate him who hath offended him, have an aversion against him, and be sen­sible of the wrong which he hath done him; but we can never say that he is so, if he seek to revenge himself, if he appear af­fraid, and if he abandon himself to De­spair: So that to speak properly, a Patient Man is he that suffers ill without being moved by any of those motions which ill useth to stir up in the Irascible part, so as it happens not out of stupidity; for we never say, that he who hath lost his Understand­ing, or is senseless, is Patient, although he suffers his ill without any resentment of revenge, without disquiet, and without apprehension; but he must know that he feels it, and that he resists it; And conse­quently Patience is a kinde of Constancy; or to say better, it is but its effect, foras­much [Page 210]much as this stiffening the Soul hinders the enterance in of the Passions, or dissipates them when they are entred. And their absence which is the effect of this stiffening, is what we call Patience; whence we must conclude, that as it happens from that re­sistance which the Soul makes against the Passions, it's proper and peculiar to men, because Beasts are not able to resist their Passions, as hath been declared.

She renders men persevering, She is perseve­ring.Perseve­rance being a kind of Constancy, by which the Soul stiffens herself against that diffi­culty which the length of time produceth: For whether it be that the Faculties which she employs are tired, or that the novelty of the objects obligeth her to alter her design, she cannot long remain in the same action without trouble and digust, and then proposing to herself the good which ought to happen unto her, if she do not change she fortifies herself against the difficulty which this length might cause, and stiffen­ing herself in her first design she continues the action to the last. But that we may not confound things, we must remember that we speak not here of Constancy, Patience, nor of Perseverance as they are Habits; we consider them onely as the actions of those same Habits, or to say better, as the [Page 211]motions of the Soul which cannot be con­tinued when difficulties are encountred withal, but onely by this stiffening which we speak of, which yet lasts not so long as Habits do, as the Schools teach us. Be­sides we must not believe that Perseverance properly and immediately resists the length of time, because it's an ill which is of the rank of those which we have called im­moveable, as are Poverty, Exile, Death, and the like, against which the Souls resist­ance is vain and useless; but it opposeth it self against Frowardness, Fear, Disquiet, and such other Passions as she usually raiseth up; so that it is not to be found in Beasts, who know neither the parts nor differences of time, and which never resist their Pas­sions; yet this may be doubted; for Dogs do a long while entertain the heat they have in hunting; and there are exercises which are taught them, wherein they are so dili­gent either out of Fear or out of Hope, that it's very probable these two Passions ob­lige them to stiffen themselves in their first design to shun the ill, or to enjoy the good proposed unto them. But to speak to the purpose, it is but a shadow or fantasm of Perseverance, forasmuch as to persevere tru­ly, we must know the length of the time to be employed in the performance of a [Page 212]thing, be sensible of those Passions which accompany it, and afterwards take a reso­lution to resist them. Now this cannot be but by great abstractions which Beasts are incapable of, as hath been shewed; they may indeed continue a commenced action, and persist a long while in the labor; but it's the other Passions which keep them in breath, and drive them to that end which they aim at, without any necessity of the Souls stiffening it self to continue them in the action, and to resist those difficulties which the length of time might pro­duce.

To be Opinionate is another kind of Con­stancy, She is O­pinionate by which she remains firm and stable in her resolutions, by unadvisedly opposing another mans reasons, and perswasions: Now a man may several ways unadvisedly oppose himself to ill, either when he knows they are best, and yet he will not follow them; or when he flatters himself in his own opinion, and perswades himself it's most reasonable, although it be nothing so; or even when indeed it is the best, and we persist against it unreasonably; for there are occasions, and places, and persons which oblige us to yield, and which ought to make us quit our resentments and pretences. How ever it be, a constant man easily falls [Page 213]into all those kindes of Opinionateness; for that Confidence having stiffened the Soul against those difficulties which assault her, there is no further perswasion which can take place, so that by the same resist­ance whereby she seeks to stop ill, she op­poseth Truth and Reason; so that she doth like a besieged Town, where the gates which are shut to the enemies, hinder all friends and releif from entring in. More­over this Opinionastrecy commonly comes from Presumption which will not yield nor submit to another mans judgement; and consequently that Constancy which hath a great opinion of its forces, and believes it self invincible, is easily abased by the Con­fidence it hath in it self, which causing it to despise all advice and help from others, renders it incredulous, indocible and Opi­nionasted.

Sometimes she advanceth even to Hard­heartedness, and to Insensibility; She is in­sensible of ano­thers ill. for in the power that she hath to stop all the rest of the Souls motions, she may hinder herself from being sensible of the miseries of another, which is, as hath been said, a kinde of cru­elty and inhumanity. For Nature which takes care for society, gives us a certain tenderness to resist the ills of those which are afflicted, that we might relieve them: [Page 214]And when a man hath so hardened his heart that he cannot be mollified by the resent­ments of pitty, certainly we may say, that he wants not onely the Heart of a Man, but that he is of Marble or of Iron. Beyond all, we must not wonder if Constancy easily falls into this defect, since its principal em­ployment is to resist Grief, which is a good part of Compassion, as in its place we shall declare.

She is Modest in good Fortune, She is modest in prosperity because with the stifness which she gives herself it's almost impossible for her to suffer her­self to be swelled with Pride, or blown a­way with Vanity; and that Insolency which is commonly bred from one of those two Passions, may render its prosperity odious.

She is Severe in Pleasures, She is se­vere in Pleasure. not onely be­cause that in stiffening herself she stops those motions which they might raise, and that they serve her as a bank to hinder them from over-flowing: but also because she findes herself in their presence seised with a certain frowardness, and with I know not what bitterness of mind, which mix­ing it self with the joy which they give, weaken her, and take from her those trans­ports, those raptures, and those sweets which are wont to accompany her, ren­dring [Page 215]her Serious, Reserved and Severe. But how can such sweet and charming things cause peevishness▪ 'Tis without doubt, that she considers them as ills; now the pre­sence of ill is unpleasant, and although it cast not the Soul always into grief, yet it gives her I know not what kinde of di­staste, which renders her wary and peevish; and truly as liking is the first thing which good inspires, which is not, as we have al­ready declared, a Passion, or at least, which is but a breeding Joy: so before ill pro­duceth hatred and sadness in the Soul, it produceth therein a certain angry sence, which is not a motion of the Appetite, be­cause it remains simply in the Understand­ing, which observes the disproportion which is betwixt it and the Object; yet forbears not to disquiet it, and to give it this secret peevishness which we speak of, which is neither Hatred nor Grief; at least, if we may so call it, it is but the com­mencement thereof. Howsoever it be, when the Soul resists Pleasures, they no longer are graceful objects unto her; she looks on them as on poysons to corrupt her, and conceives the same aversion for them which she hath for all such as may destroy her; for which cause we must not think it strange if they render her Severe and [Page 216]peevish, since they are the sence which the presence of ill is always accustomed to im­print.

But if this be so, How Joy is to be found with Grief. How is Joy to be found in the violence of Grief, of Scorn, and of Infamy, with all those evills which so often exercise Constancy? For if it be true, that evils alwayes bring peevishness with them, those which are the greatest we can suffer, must needs fill the Soul with Grief, nor permit never so little a Joy to have any place in her; and yet it is true, that the most part of Lovers take plea­sure in suffering for those they love; that the Ambitious bravely support those traverses which they meet with in the way to Glory; and that Martyrs have always had contentment in their Souls, and vi­gor in their Looks in the greatest of their torments and sufferings. Yet this difficulty is easily resolved, if we do but remember that there are two Appetites in Man, which at the same time may be moved with two contrary Passions; and that in the Will it self there are, as it were, two parts, which may be agitated with several motions; for these truths being supposed, it's easie to conceive how Grief assaults the Sences, whilst Joy sheds it self abroad in the Mind, and how Sadness disturbs the lower region [Page 217]of the Will, whilst the higher is quiet, as ravished with those pleasures which Love, Ambition, or some other noble Desire proposeth unto it. Yet I will not say that Joy and Grief move to that height in Con­stancy. No, it is impossible that either of them can be very great by reason of the stiffening of the Soul which hinders their motion; but this signifies that if when strong they are compatible together, they may more easily be so when they are weakened; and consequently Frowardness which commonly accompanies Constancy, and is but the commencement of Sadness, may subsist with that gayity which is often observed in this Passion; not but that transports and ravishments of Joy may cause soundings and faintings of Grief; neither is there then any Constancy left, and in that very moment the Appetite must release it self to follow the violence of those Passions. It's true that she afterwards stiffens herself, but yet it would be but an interrupt­ed Constancy, and which continues but by several efforts which are sometimes so quick, that the Passions which interrupt­ed them, confounded themselves with this, as we have said it often happens in all the rest of them.

For the rest, from the insensibility which [Page 218]she hath for the ills of another, She is in­different to all. and from the severity she takes in the use of goods, an Indifferency springs which she is subject unto; forasmuch as he who is not touched with those ills which he sees others suffer, and resists all the pleasures of life, is cer­tainly free from all those things which may the most powerfully stop the Mind and en­gage it in the duties of civil society: we are not from him to expect the sweets of friendship, nor those succors which com­passion promiseth to those that are miser­able; the good and ill of particulars and of the publick are indifferent to him, so that rendring himself useless to all the world, he becomes rude, austere and sa­vage.

These indeed are those vices which have been observed in the Sect of the Stoicks, who studied nothing but to exercise Con­stancy; since all their Philosophy consisted to abstain, and to sustain, which are the two employments this Passion is destinated un­to; so that it is no wonder if they fell in­to those defects which usually follow her when we use her not as we ought. Yet we must observe that the indifferency we speak of respects not those things which Con­stancy is not tied unto; for if she oppose a difficulty, she hath no indifferency for it. [Page 219]On the contrary, she stiffens herself, opi­nionates and obstinates herself against it; but beyond that, all is indifferent to her, and she cares neither what may happen nor what concerns the rest.

And again, She is e­qual and content. it's for the same reason that she always appear Equal and Content, for­asmuch as that indifferency which she hath for all things, she hath no desires nor ap­prehensions for them, and is exempt from those cares and disquiets which those Passi­ons breed; add hereunto that equally stif­fening herself at the encounter of goods and of ills, good and ill fortune finde her always in the same plight, and without be­ing carried away by that, or being cast down by this, she always remains in one posture, and ever appears like herself.

But we have strayed too long to finde Reasons, which are easie to be drawn from the principles we have established, and which present themselves unto the Mind as soon as a man would but know them. Let's turn to those Characters which this Passion imprints on the Body.

We shall not be much troubled in this en­quiry, there being but few whereof we have not spoken in the former Discourse, since in the Chapter of Boldness we have exa­mined the causes of an assured Look, of [Page 220]the motion of the Lids and Brows, of silence, of coldness of the face, and of the retention of the breath, as in the Chapter of Hope we have observed, whence was the strength of the Voice and of the Pulse, why the Face changed not its colour, why the Head and Stature were streight; for Constancy hath these effects common with them, and useth the same motives and the same means which they employ to produce them; we shall only remark some little differences, which are to be encountred in them.

For it's certain, What the Looks are in Con­stancy. that this Assured Look is here formed with a large opening of the Lids, a firm Sight, and with vivacity: But its vivacity is not so great as in Boldness, because that in the design which this hath to assault ill, she drives the Spirits out, and so abundantly fills the Eyes with them, that they become altogether sparkling; instead of which Constancy, which stands upon the defensive, stiffens them only with­out driving them forth with impetuosity, so that she renders the Eyes quick, be­cause she stops the Spirits which give them force and vigor; but they glister not be­cause they come not thither in any quantity, and that they want that active motion which makes them glister and sparkle. On the other side, this firmness of sight is [Page 221]accompanied with a certain severity which is not to be found in Hope, because the Soul considers here onely the Ill, the presence whereof makes her peevish, and that even there she looks on the Good, the expectation whereof sweetens the pain which springs from the difficulties which she encounters.

When the Brows are lifted up, What kinde of motion the Brows have. it's onely the better to behold the Enemy, and not to help the rasing up of the Soul, as it happens in Boldness; For which cause they lift not themselves up so much nor so often as in that Passion; because the Soul keeping herself firm and stiff to defend herself, sollicites not the or­gans to make those great and frequent sallyes which follow that impetuosity which she suffers herself to be carried a­way withall in assaulting. So that she lifts up the Brows no more then the ne­cessity of the sight requires, and not to serve the motion wherewith she is agi­tated: She also represseth them for the same reason as in Boldness. For she thinks herself fortified when she hath provided for the securing of her Eyes, as hath been shewed in the former Chapter. But it sometimes happens that in the strongest assaults of Ills, she keeps them unmovable, [Page 222]and that a Constant Man will see the greatest dangers, and suffer most cruel pains without bending his Brow. Now this comes either from his great attention in considering the ill; for it makes him the more to open his eyes, and consequently to lift up his Brows, which then cannot be restrained; or from the confidence he hath of his forces, which defends him from thinking on such small precautions; or from the design he hath by this outward immobility to make it appear that his Cou­rage is not to be shaken. What his Silence is.

Silence is not here fierce and disdainful as it is in Boldness, because fierceness and disdain are effects of Pride, which are sel­dom to be found in true Constancy; But it's modest and serious, and proceeds meer­ly from the attention the Soul is in for to defend herself, and from the confidence she hath of her own strength; for that makes her forget words, and this defends them, since, as we have already said, they are arms of weakness.

As for the rest of the Characters which we have now spoken of, such as are the coldness of the Face, the strength of the Voice and Pulse, holding the Breath, having the Head and Stature erect, there is no difference neither in their effect nor in their [Page 223]cause, from those which accompany Hope and Boldness, for which cause we send back the Reader to those places where we have carefully observed them, and where it doth appear, that if they follow those two Pas­sions, it's because they are always upheld by Constancy, and strength of Cou­rage.

But if she hath such a contexture and conformity with them, Why Con­stancy hath not the rest of the Cha­racters of Hope. why hath she not also all their other Characters? Certainly it's because besides the stifness which they give the Soul, they inspire also other mo­tions which are not to be found in Constan­cy; for Hope indeed stiffens it self against difficulties, but at the same time she aspires to the good which she seeks, and still ex­pects some help which may deliver her up the possession, which makes her unquiet and impatient; she sighs and casts up her eyes, which happens not in Constancy, because she hath no other design but to re­sist Ill. The same happens in Boldness, which stiffens it self also to strengthen it self, but besides that darts it self forth, and throws it self on the Enemy. So that all what follows this darting forth belongs not to Constancy, which when she is alone never suffers this agitation; so the thorow Looks, the widening of the Nostrils, the [Page 224]thunder of the Voyce, the fierceness of the Countenance, a vehement respiration, the redness and heat of the parts, and the like, which proceed from the raising up of the Soul, and from the violence where­with it is agitated, are not to be met withal in all in that Constancy which is ex­empt from those great storms. It's true, that its Pace is like that of Boldness, be­cause that in stiffening herself, she makes the Body weighty and march the more heavily. But she balanceth it not as that doth, forasmuch as she hath not that im­petuosity which causeth the shoulders to turn inwardly, in which this ballancing of the body chiefly consists, and this bold Gate. We may say as much of the Post which is Noble without Pride; for the Head is lifted up without any fierceness, the Stature is streight without lifting up the Shoulders, and the motion of all the parts without constraint or violence is equal and modest: Now all this is conformable to that condition which the Soul is in in this Passion, for that in stiffening herself she stiffens the parts also, which consequently become streight, and that this posture is most safe, and least exposed to injuries, see­ing she can the better see the enemy, and is every way the readier to resist him. But the [Page 225]fierceness of the Countenance, the lifting up of the Shoulders, which are principal marks of Pride, as shall be shewn in its place; they are to be found therein, be­cause the Soul nor ought, nor can extend or lift it self up, nor make any violent motion being stiffened as she is.

The stifness of the Body and parts is a pro­per and particular effect of this Passion; When com [...] stiffness of the Body. for if it be in some other of them, we may say that it's by her means, and because that she accompanies them; but she employs it not when she is to resist any thing which is cor­poreal; otherwise she abuseth herself, and makes a useless endeavor, as hath been said. Now to know wherein this stifness con­sists, and how it's made, we must observe besides what hath been said hereupon in ge­neral, That a thing may be two ways stiff; either because it resists the touch, or that it cannot be staggered; now it may resist the touch by being hard; and it's hard ei­ther because it's dry and solid, as a stone; or because it's extended as a Baloon, or be­cause its parts are shut up and gathered to­gether, as those are which are prest and crowded; neither can it be shaken, either because its weighty, or because it hath a motion contrary to that which would over­turn it. Thus a Column stands firm on its [Page 226]own weight, a building supports it self by its props and butteresses, the Members stiffen themselves being equally drawn by the opposing muscles, which being sup­posed, it's certain that Constancy useth all these means to stiffen the parts, if we ex­cept that hardness onely which comes from driness, forasmuch as there needs a long time to produce that quality. Yet must we make some distinction, for that some stiffen themselves in one way, others in another; the Spirits and the Members which move voluntarily become firm by the opposition of their motions, the Muscles by compression, the Body by its weight and props, which we must particularly ex­amine.

We have shewn how the Spirits stif­fen themselves, and how they communi­cate their stifness to the parts; but there is this difference, That the stiffening of the Spirits comes from the contrariety of motions, and that which is communica­ted is performed by their upholding of them; for being stiffened, it must neces­sarily be that they support the parts which touch them, especially if they be fluid as the Humors are.

Those Members which are destined for voluntary motion, as the Head, the Eyes, [Page 227]the Arms, and the Legs render themselves also stiff by the contrariety of motions; for being composed of several Muscles, some of which cause them to move up­wards, and others downwards, some to the right hand, some to the left, when they are all agitated at once, they must needs re­main firm and stiff and without going ei­ther way, and then they must suffer that motion which is called Tonick, which is the most violent of all, and which makes us most weary. For which cause we are more weary standing upright then walking up and down; and it's more troublesom to look long upon a fixed and settled look, or continually to keep ones Arms stiff, then if we used them to different motions, because that all the Muscles agitate therein, with­out taking any rest; and herein there is but a part engaged, which rests also when the other is in action.

Every muscle in particular grows stiff when its work operates, but that is because it grows hard; now it hardens by pressing and contracting the parts together; for having no other action but to contract and shut up it self, to bring towards it the mem­bers it ought to move, it must needs take up less room, and therefore its parts must [Page 228]be the more streightned, whence this hard­ness comes. Which although it happens out of necessity, forbears not also to be sought for by the Soul, as a thing which may render the body stronger, and the less exposed to injuries; and it is for the same reason, that the skin of Animals streight­ens it self, when they will defend them­selves, whence it follows that their hair and feathers stand on end, as we have else­where declared.

Besides this stifness, the Muscles and the skin may also acquire another by ten­tion. But because there are two sorts of it, the one which is made by drawing strong­ly those things which may be extended as a rope or parchment; the other of filling them with some body, as a baloon; it's certain, that Constancy cannot render those parts firm and strong by this, but onely by the former. And this happens when the Muscles cause a member to bend very much; for those which are opposed to them, and which do not agitate are constrained to lengthen out and extend themselves; and by this extention they become firm, and so render the skin hard. It's thus, that this Passion sometimes extends the hands, that the inside which they oppose to the [Page 229]danger, may become harder, and conse­quently more fit to resist ill.

As for the Body, it grows stiff not onely when all its parts are stiffened, but also by the support and weight which it giveth it self. Now it may be upheld by some exteri­or prop; for the Soul which puts it self on the defensive, seeks both in and out of it self all what can stiffen it. So that when a man is assaulted, he who hath somewhat at his back to stay him up and help to support him against the effort of his enemy, may make the better resistance. The body also up­holds it self by the situation and posture which it takes; for by advancing a foot, or widening a little the legs, it makes for it self, as it were, a prop or a butteress to support it self, which hinders it from being overturned on that side it rests on. Add also how it also enlargeth its Basis, and doth that which Art ordains for great pil­lars, which are better upheld, the larger and greater the pedestal is. Lastly, by making it self weighty, its less subject to be shaken, because that augmenting its weight, it the better resists the motion of those things which beat against it, and so ren­ders it more firm and more stable in its si­tuation. But how can it make it self heavy? [Page 230]Certainly, it is not that it hath more weight then it had, but it is that it makes it more efficient by the motion which it gives it self; for weighty things have much more strength, and make incomparably a great­er impression when they are moved; when the Body therefore stiffens it self, it bur­thens all the superior parts on the lower, and those pressing the earth, by the motion of the Muscles, which are destined for that purpose, they make an effort which aug­ments the force of the weight which they sustain, and so render the Body more firm, and less easie to be shaken.

Besides these motions this Passion em­ploys also that of the Hands, to oppose her­self against the shock she is threatened with­al; for as they are parts destined to the ser­vice of the body, she freely exposeth them, and hazards them to save it from danger, and useth them as Barriers to stop the ene­my, or as a Buckler to receive the assaults, for which cause she opens them that she may cover and defend a greater space; she ex­tends them to render them stronger and har­der, and she advanceth them that she may break and dead the violence of the blows, which she cannot hinder from falling on it.

This is what we had to say of the Cha­racters [Page 231]of Constancy; for the rest which we have observed in its description, they be­long unto her onely by reason of those Pas­sions which sometimes mix themselves with her. So Cries, Sighs, Tears, Groans, the weakness of the Body, proceed all from Pain; Indignation, Threatnings, Blows fol­low Boldness or Anger. The sweetness of the Eyes, the gayness of the Countenance arise from the contentment which Love, Desire and Hope propose.

PART. III.

CHAP. I. The Characters of Anger.

ALthough Anger be a flame which Na­ture kindles in the soul of all Animals, The Elogy of Anger. and that it may be compared to that fire which shines in the Stars, for the preserva­tion of the Universe; It's strange that it's almost never considered but as a frightful Comet, which declares and produceth no­thing but fire and sword; and that Humane Reason should be so unjust as always to condemn a Passion which always fights for Reason and for Justice: Yes without doubt, since she is onely raised in the Soul to repel injuries, and to chastise those she believes have unjustly offended her, we may boldly say, that she never arms herself but against Violence, and ever sides with Rea­son and Equity.

It is not but that men which abuse all the most useful presents of Nature, do often make it serve evill designs; but besides that, to judge according to Reason of the price and value of things, we must not con­sult concerning the abuses which are found in them, nor the ill use which may be made of them. It's certain, that when she ap­pears most unjust, she hath motives which seem equitable, that she must at least have the appearance of Justice to oblige her to take arms; and that if she be deceived therein, it is not she that is to be accused, but rather Malice and Error, who call her to their releif: As we do not blame Soul­diers who are of a Princes Guard when they follow him in temerous enterprises; and that it's sometimes the duty of a good Sub­ject to obey a Tyrant; neither must we condemn Anger which was submitted to Reason to serve for its guard and defence, when she follows it in its irregularities, and obeys its orders how unjust soever they be. In a word, it is not in corruption we are to seek the purity of Anger; we must go back to its source, and enquire in the first channels wherein it runs, if it hath Vertues and Qualities useful for life, and worthy the praise we have given it.

If it be then true, that she comes from [Page 234]Nature, and that this Nature is nothing else but the Art of God, and the effusion of his goodness and wisdom in all his works: we must not doubt that she is not sensible of so excellent an origine, and but that the admirable motions of this Passion are raised by the same spirit which animates and rules the Universe; It's what would imprint in all Creatures the image of his power, and render them as near as possible like unto him, which hath signed in all A­nimals the strokes of his Justice, and hath given them the knowledge of the wrong which may be done them, and the just desire they have of revenging them­selves.

And truly, as if it were the last touch which were to finish their perfection, and his liberality, it seems that there was more care employed to inspire this Passion in them, then for any whatsoever. That there is none which it hath made so common and so natural; and that all the rest are particular to some one, or so imperfect that it's dif­ficult to finde them therein. Love and Pleasure indeed, which seem to be the most necessary and the most general, are hardly to be remarked in the most part of Beasts; Boldness is onely to be found in those which are strong and couragious; Fear [Page 235]surpriseth onely those which are weak; and even there are those which are so fit for certain ages, and for some conditions, that they seldom pass to others: But it is not so with Anger, which makes it self be resented by all in general; the least suffer its esmotions as well as the greatest, and the weak as well as the strong, and there are none which are not provided with arms which may serve for their revenge. Final­ly, she knows no priviledges, and makes no difference amongst men; she agitates Children, as old Men; sick, as she doth the sound; poor, as rich; Kings, as she doth the Subjects; and without confining herself, as the rest do, to some particulars, she animates Families, Nations and whole Kingdoms. But as in the order of Nature, the most necessary things are, the more common they are; we must beleeve that this Passion should not have been so gene­rally dispersed in all Animals, had it not been most important and most necessary for their preservation; and that it would not have been so sensible, and so imperfect in all those which are most imperfect, were it not most profitable and of greater use then all the rest, which for the most part are un­polished and confused in them.

And certainly since all have far more ills [Page 236]to fear, then goods to desire, and that ill it self is more powerful to destroy, then good is to preserve; it was from the wis­dom of him, who exposed them to so ma­ny dangers, to give them stronger Pas­sions to safeguard themselves, then for to seek what was for their use; since it was more advantagious to overcome ill then to flie from it, and that all could not have the Boldness destined to conquer it: It must needs I say be, that to supply this de­fect he must have inspired another Passion to warm the courage of the weakest, and stir up the forces of the most timerous to engage them to fight those Enemies which flight or patience would have rendred ter­rible.

Moreover, since they were all to defend themselves, not onely from such as do ill unwittingly, but also from those who do it out of malice: It was fit they should have lights to discern them, and means to de­stroy not onely their power but also their ill designs; for it had not been sufficient to have provided for their security, if after having overcome them they could not have bereft them also of the desire of ta­king up arms again, and of convincing their unjust untertakings.

It's therefore Anger which causeth them [Page 237]to get the better of such dangerous ene­mies, which stop the course of their vio­lence, and making them lose the will of do­ing hurt, tear up ill by the roots, and shelter themselves from whatsoever they might fear. And indeed Revenge which this Passion employs to that purpose hath no o­ther end but to chastise him that offends, that the punishment he suffers make take from him the desire to continue the injury, and that he who hath received it may not again fall into the like danger. Is there any thing in the world so equitable and so ne­cessary? Is there any thing wherein the providence of Nature is more resplendent? And were it not to be ungrateful towards it to slight so useful a relief, and to condemn so just a defence?

For we must not believe that none but Beasts may lawfully make use of it, that it is incompatible with Reason, & that its never kindled in man, but that at the same time it extinguisheth that divine light which in all its actions ought to enlighten it. No, no, it is in us, and for the same purpose, and for the same necessity that it is in the rest of A­nimals; we have the same enemies which they have, we are exposed to the same dan­gers; and the cares for our own safeguard can be no less innocent then theirs are; [Page 238]whatever we may say, Reason and Anger are not in the number of those Stars which never look on, or meet with one the other without imparting their vertue or bright­ness, or causing some troubles in the world. On the contrary they fortifie one another when they are united, and their conjuction breeds that celestial light in the Soul which raiseth up those languishing vertues, which give heat to those which fight, and inspires them with that divine fury with which they are animated against Vice. Whence can you fansie proceeds that noble Indignation which the Soul conceives for unjust things, but from that Anger which cannot suffer injustice without an alarm? Whence springs that vertuous Frowardness, and that holy Impatience which seiseth upon us at the sight of crimes, but from this Passi­on which hath no other care but to chastise the Authors of them? And whence can that just Despight come wherewith Vertue is provoked at the encounter of such ob­jects as cross her, but from the same source whence she draws those forces which are necessary for to overcome them? To con­clude, the most excellent Vertues would at every moment be lessened, were they not raised up by this Passion: Justice would never proceed to revenge crimes with that [Page 239]zeal wherewith she is so often transported, did she not call it to her assistance. Valor would very rarely produce those great acti­ons which render it formidable, were it not sollicited by it. In a word, there is none to whom she is not as a spur to advance them in the way of glory; and he that would bereave civil life of her, would un­doubtedly leave in it onely Weakness, Lan­guor, and Cowardliness.

But notwithstanding these great ser­vices, we must at last confess, it is the most to be feared of all the Passions, as that which causeth the greatest disorders in the world: By a strange mishap, scarce concei­vable, the commerce it hath with Reason, instead to render it more perfect, hath cor­rupted it; and innocent as she was in Beasts, she is become criminal in men; So that we may say she is in some manner like the va­pors of the Earth, which change into thun­ders and storms when they come near the Sun; and that if she did not rise into the highest Region of the Soul, she could never be able to produce those thunders and tem­pests, which have caused so many publike calamities, and have desolated so many Pro­vinces, and so many Kingdoms.

For we must not believe that the ill it doth, falls onely on some particulars, as [Page 240]that which proceeds from the Anger of Beasts, and from the most part of humane Passions; besides that it renders Cities and whole Nations furious, it never strikes one person onely, but the blow threatens and offends all civil Society: For which cause the Laws which often tolerate the ill use of the rest of the Passions, have never suffered that of Anger, how just soever it were; they ever reserved the revenging of injuries; and whosoever hath usurped that power, commits a crime justly to be resented, and hath most commonly ad­ded to the infamy of the punishment, the shame of the outrage. In effect, they could not have left to particulars a power which onely belongs to the publick, and put the arms of Justice into the hands of a furious person, without abandoning the life and fortune of all men to insolency and cruelty, and without breaking those sa­cred bonds which unite them together in the forms of Communities and Repub­licks.

But what severity soever hath been practised, what restraint soever they have bridled this wilde and untameable Passion withal, they could never hinder it from bringing disorder and confusion where ever it came. It hath made the wisest lose their [Page 241]Judgment and their Reason, brought confu­sion amongst the best friends, filled the most illustrious families with blood and slaugh­ter; and we may say that the earth reaks every where still with the broils it hath raised in the greatest Cities, and in the fairest Provinces. Those things which were ever had in veneration amongst men, are violated by this insolent Passion, which tramples under foot all the respects which Nature inspires with our lives; and its impi­ety raiseth it self even against Heaven, and against the Divinity it self. In fine, if we should speak all the ill it causeth, perhaps we should learn all the ill which is done up­on earth. But the better to shew the disor­ders it causeth, we need but represent a man who hath suffered himself to be car­ried away with these excesses, and consider the strange change which it makes in his Minde and in his Countenance.

Anger is none of those Passions which sweetly insinuates it self into the soul, Descrip­tion of a man in Anger. which flatters it at first, and by weak beginnings takes from it the suspition of its violence; it enters with impetuosity and with open arms; or to speak better, it enters it not; it falls like thunder which strikes unawares, and there is no distinction of time between its fall and the burnings it causeth; for as [Page 242]soon as a man is possest with it he perceives himself inflamed with despight and disdain. Vengeance like a torrent of fire disperseth it self in all its thoughts; Fury prevails over his Reason and his Judgment, and like a devouring flame it runs and crackles in his Veins, it sparkles in his Eyes, thunders in his words; they are nothing but com­plaints, reproaches, and injuries; nothing but threatnings, and imprecations, and blasphemies. The more sweetness and weakness he naturally hath, the more sharp and impetuous his Passion is, the more stormy and insolent. Neither respects nor considerations can restrain him; he ac­knowledgeth neither Masters, nor Friends, nor Parents; Silence provokes him, Ex­cuses commit an outrage, and often inno­cency it self is no less insufferable then in­juries.

As if he minded nothing but to torment himself, he is not able to hear any reason which might calm the disturbance he is in, but he is very ingenious to find out all those which may encrease it: He fancies the of­fence greater then indeed it is; he remarks the least circumstances that may aggravate it; and if it happens that words and effects offend him not in the tone of the voice, or in the motions of the Eyes, he findes great [Page 243]causes of wrath and revenge. Neither doth he stop there, he calls to mind all the for­mer good offices he hath done his Enemy, and the ill usage he hath received from him; even those actions which were before indif­ferent to him, do then seem injurious; the smallest of his faults appear sensible affronts and bitter injuries: And being astonished that he foresaw not his ill designs, he ac­cuseth himself of impudence and of stupi­dity, and adds to his first fury the indigna­tion and despight which he conceived a­gainst himself: Whereupon after having made his resentment sparkle by the extra­vagancy of his discourse, and by all those exclamations which grief and rage drive forth, he all at once falls into a profound silence, and walking with large paces, with a wilde and frightful mind, by the frequent shakings of the Head, and by the grinding of the Teeth, and by his furious Looks he declares that he revolves in his mind the designs of some great and terrible revenge. In effect, there is no ill which a man could make his enemy suffer, which presents not it self to his desires; infamy, punishments, tortures, are the sweetest chastisements he prepares for him; the sword and poison are the meanest instruments which he means to employ; he thinks which blows may [Page 244]be the rudest to be inflicted, what places are most sensible, what death might be most cruel. And to glut his rage, he proposeth to himself nothing less then to strangle him himself, to tear in peeces, and to feed on his very Heart and Bowels. After a thousand such like designs which most commonly destroy one the other, he would that some disorder might happen in Nature for his de­struction, that the earth would open and swallow him up, that the plague might stifle him, that he might be thunder-struck. Finally, he makes vows for his ill fortune that they may supply his own impotency, and sollicites the wrath of Heaven and Hell to perfect the punishment which he hath commenced. But should all this happen, yet would not he be satisfied unless all men did believe that it was he who was the cause of all these mschiefs, that he drew them on his Adversary, and that even he also suffers them far rather for his particular satisfaction, then for the chastisement of his crime.

Whilst he feeds his Passion with these cruel thoughts, we hear long and scalding sighs which at every moment are fetched from the bottom of his Soul; confused and interrupted words, which from time to time escape his fury; and the noise he [Page 245]makes by beating all what he meets with under hand or feet. At last breaking out of his silence, he detestss, he threatens, he blasphemes and discovers all what he hath on his heart, and betraying his secret, he renders the revenge which he meditated of­ten useless, sometimes pernitious.

These are near upon the motions he hath in the absence of his enemy, but this is nothing in respect of those which he suffers in his presence. At first it seems as if he en­deavored to shun his encounter, as if he were unwilling to see him, and in a proud and disdainful way turning his back to­wards him, he grumbles, he murmurs, and forms betwixt the teeth words of indigna­tion and of disdain. But he remains not long in that condition; the flame growing more violent when it's shut up; his wrath is provoked by this restraint, and changing it self altogether into fury, it transports him out of himself, and renders him like a wilde and furious beast; he cries out, he runs, he strikes, and without fear or know­ledge of the danger he casts himself through fire and sword, he drives his friend into them, and cares not to lose what is most dear unto him, so as he may lose him who hath offended him. Like one in despair, he throws himself into a precipice that he [Page 246]may draw him therein along with him; he seeks shipwrack so as he might perish with him; he calls him to fight, wherein the chance of Arms is doubtful; and common­ly the ardor he hath to revenge himself, bereaves him of his revenge; all his skill and address is then useless, most of his blows are vain, he hath no ward against those which are given him; he blindly ex­poseth himself to danger, and like those ruines which break themselves on what they fall, he often locks himself in the arms of him whom he casts down.

If it happen that he hath the advantage, and that he thinks he hath satisfied his Pas­sion, he adds insolency to cruelty; he out­rageth his enemy conquered as he is, he laugheth at his misfortune, and feeding his eyes on the slaughter which he hath made, he feels a certain malignant joy break forth in his heart, which afterward disperseth it self over his face, and which he makes appear in all his actions. But if he believes that he is not revenged, he de­spairs, he rageth, he accuseth insensible things, his Friends, God, and himself; he breaks his sword for not having given the desired blow, he is angry with those who would have appeased him, he strikes the ground, he rails against Heaven, he [Page 247]beats his own face, and tears his hair; at last when he cannot hurt the person, he as­saults the reputation; his enemy hath no de­fects which he publisheth not, he bringeth the vices of his Ancestors out of their graves, and if truth cannot furnish him with reproa­ches and injuries, he borrows them from lyes and calumnies. In a word, to describe all the actions of a man in his wrath, we must fancy, all what temerity, cruelty and fury can effect.

Not that all those who are touched with this Passion, suffer themselves to be carried away to this excess: There are dumb and disdainful Angers, there are those which are quite vapored away in words; there are some that are weak and timorous, others that are noble and generous; and without doubt those are not so extravagant as that which we now described: Yet there is none which raiseth not a great disturbance in the mind, which drives not out of it sweetness and humanity, and which bereaves not a man of the best part of himself. But we shall elsewhere speak of all these kindes of An­ger; let's now see the effects which the vio­lence of this Passion commonly produceth on the Body.

It's most certain, that there is none which so strangely alters the Face as this doth: There is no man whom Anger will not ren­der [Page 248]unknown both to his and to himself; his Eyes are red and inflamed, their moti­on is peircing and rapid; sometimes they look through, sometimes they fix, and seem as if they would go out of their places; we may observe a sparkling driness in them, a wilde and savage disquiet. The Eyebrow is sometimes cast down and sometimes lift­ed up, and after they restrain themselves. The Forehead is wrinkled and gathered be­twixt the Eyes, the Hair stands on end, the Nostrils open and widen themselves; the Lips thinken and lowr themselves, they tremble, they press themselves, and some­times they form a cruel and disdainful smile. He grinds his Teeth, he foams, he blows, his mouth grows dry, his breath stinking, his voice more vehement and sharp then it was at first, at last becomes terrible, and ratling. It often stops all at once, and when it chanceth to form any words, the Tongue faulters, his words in­terfere, and his discourse is intangled: If he holds his tongue, it's an enraged silence, which at every moment is interrupted with sighs, with groans, and the frightful out­cries which he makes; his Face grows pale, inflames and swells; the veins of his Fore­head, of his Temples and Neck are swelled and extended; his Pulse beats quick & vehe­ment; [Page 249]his Breast which is redned is lifted up with great throbs, and he breaths with a violent and precipitate respiration. But who can describe the shakings of the Head, the clappings of his Hands, the throwing about of his Arms, the trampling of his Feet, all his brisk and bold motions; In fine, that continual agitation, which ac­companies Anger. It's sufficient to say that his Countenance, his Minde, his Ge­sture, is an assembling together of all what is most deformed in most cruel Sicknesses, and of what is most horrible in the wildest of Beasts. Let's now seek the cause of all these effects in the Nature of this Pas­sion.

CHAP. III. Of the Nature of Anger.

ALthough Philosophy hath more spoken of Anger then of any of the Passions, The diffi­culty to define Anger. either because it's more easily known, or because its moderation is more important to a civil life then the rest; yet neither hath it succeeded in the definition thereof, better then of those which we have examined. For besides that it ob­serves [Page 250]not the motion proper for it, which is a part of its essence: it is in doubt what gender to give it, what object raiseth it, and the true motive which it hath. Some indeed say it's an effect of vengeance; others that it is not an Appetite, but a rising up of the Soul; some will have it the slighting of that object which moves it; others add thereto injury; othersome there are who deny that vengeance is the true and proper motion of this Passion, see­ing as they suppose, it pretends always to re­venge it self, and that Hatred hath often the same design without being advised by this.

In a word, of all the definitions which have been given it, there is not one which expresseth all the Nature of Anger, which leaves not other difficulties which are hard to be resolved by those principles which we commonly suppose in this business; and truly that of Alexander which seems to be the most exact, hath its defects as well as the rest: For in saying that it's a desire of vengeance, caused by the grief we have of seeing ones self unjustly slighted; be­sides that Beasts are not touched with scorn, who nevertheless are susceptible of this Passion; there are a thousand encoun­ters wherein we may be provoked to An­ger, [Page 251]without having cause to believe we have been slighted; as when we are angry with our selves, or against insensible things. If instead of this slighting you put Injury, the same difficulty remains entire; since it's very probable that Beasts know not in­justice, nor consequently Injury; and that there are many things which make us an­gry at which we cannot justly be offended. Add also, that a man may have the grief to see himself offended, and the desire of being revenged without being angry; for the motion of Grief, and that of De­sire, which belongs to the Concupiscible Appetite, seem not as if they should enter into the essence of this Passion; besides they should tell us what Vengeance is, and why we desire it; for if to revenge ones self be nothing but to retort the ill on him who afflicted it, causing him to suffer the same pains: There is no likelihood that a man should be angry with himself or insen­sible things, seeing no man would be re­venged on himself, and that it is impossible and useless against those things that are without sence.

To say likewise that it's a rising in the Soul, whereby she overcomes those diffi­culties which traverse her designs; This definition would be too general, seeing it [Page 252]befits also Boldness, and that therein the Soul may raise it self without being moved by Anger; for I mind not those who say that this rising up is not an Appetite; since it's a received maxime, That all motion of the Appetitive part is called the Ap­petite.

To conclude, the worst of all those, is that which raiseth it to an ebullition or fix­ing the blood about the heart; for it it not therein that the essence of Anger consists; that is only its effect; it being certain that all Passions are impermanent actions, which are formed in the Soul before she agitates the Body, and principally the humors which are no parts of it.

These are the difficulties which are en­tertained in common opinion; the method which we hold, and the principles which we have established, render not the thing the more easie. For after having shewed that the Soul which will not flye before the enemy, hath but two courses to take, to wit, Resistance and Assault, which are Con­stancy and Boldness; it seems as if we had exhausted all the springs whence An­ger might proceed, as if we were obliged to confound it with one or other of these two Passions. Indeed it raiseth it self up against ill, it assaults it, it would overcome [Page 253]it, even as Boldness; so that they seem both to have but the same object, the same motive, and the same motion, and there­fore to be but one Passion, since these three things which make the difference of all the esmotions of the Soul, render them equal, and every way alike.

Yet since it's undoubted that they are different, and that by experience we know there are ills which move Boldness and not Anger; that this is more impetuous and turbulent then the other, and that there are many persons which are cholerick, as Children, Women, and those that are sick, which we cannot call Bold; there must ne­cessarily be some circumstances, and some conditions in their causes which must make the difference; let's first therefore examine the matter and the object of this Passion, and consider whether it be truly the same which raiseth Boldness.

In the former Discourse we have shewn, What ill is Angers object. That the word Ill did not onely signifie the effect which properly is ill, but also the cause which produceth it. And this di­stinction is so necessary for the knowledge of the Passions, that there are some which have no other object but the ill it self, as Grief; others which consider onely the cause, as Anger, Hope, and Despair. Lastly, [Page 254]others which confound them together, as Boldness, Hatred, Aversion, and Fear.

Now Anger assaults nothing but the cause onely of ill; for a man cannot be an­gry with an injury which he may have re­ceived, but with him who did it: Quite contrary, Boldness looks on the danger without often considering whence it hap­pens.

But as there are causes which produce ill without knowledge, as others which ef­fect it without design, if we considerately examine those which Anger assaults, we shall always finde them agitating with de­sign; for we are not provoked to anger against a stone which hurts us, but against him who threw it. And what ill soever we suffer, it will never raise this Passion, if we do not imagine that there is some cause which had an intention to make us suf­fer it.

Yet because he who chastiseth with a purpose to do ill, doth not always pro­voke Anger, there must be one kinde of ill proper to move this Passion, which being properly moved, may cause the Soul to rise against that which is the cause thereof.

Others as we have already said, will have it be Scorn; there being nothing more [Page 255]powerful to provoke Anger, nor any ill which a man more impatiently suffers; yet since Children and Beasts are not sensible of it, who nevertheless are often touched with this Passion; and that we every day see very many who patiently suffer Scorn, who are all in a fury if you do but take from them what they believe is their due. Finally, we are angry with our selves, with chance, with insensible things, by which we can no ways be despised; so that we must confess there must be some other ill which moves Anger.

Others will have it to be an Injury; men indeed are never so angry as against those by whom they think they have been unjust­ly offended. And when we think the of­fence hath been done without design, or believe that we have deserved it, we no longer seek to revenge it. On the other side, it seems as if Beasts cannot know in­juries, since they know not unjust things: and so we must say that they are not suscep­tible of Anger, could injuries onely pro­voke it.

But if we consider that Children who have not the use of Reason, and whose knowledge is not much different from that of Beasts, forbear not to know when they are unjustly offended; that a Lyon is not [Page 256]angry with a stone or a thorn which hurts it; that there are Beasts fierce enough which in play suffer ill without seeking revenge, and are seldom angry with Children: It's very probable that there is some kinde of justice amongst them, that they know there are ills which they ought not suffer, and that they know who offends them out of design; not that they have the knowledge of things so clear and so distinct as men may have; but the same instinct which guides them to their end without their pre­tending to arrive thereunto, affords them also the knowledge of the wrong which is done them, without discerning it. It's true, there is a great difference in this knowledge, and it's more or less perfect according as Creatures have more or less perfection. A Bee casts out its sting against a stone as well as against an Animal; but a Dog, unless he be furious will never assault any but him who purposely hath hurt him: Beasts are therefore capable of knowing injuries, and therefore we may say, that there is no other ill but that which ought to move Anger.

Now there may be as many kindes of in­juries as there are things which may unjust­ly offend; Scorn is a great injury. but amongst us there is none which so commonly and generally doth it [Page 257]as Despight. And Nature hath given so great an Aversion to the Mind of man a­gainst it, it endures no ill whatsoever more impatiently then that, nor is it more easily or more violently born away by any to re­venge; And this in my opinion, happens from that that Scorn is nothing else but the opinion which we have that a thing merits not consideration, having no con­siderable quality, and that we judge it can do neither good nor hurt; for we ought to honor excellent things, love those which are profitable, and fear those which are hurtful: so that those are to be despised which deserve not honor, and are capable of neither love nor fear: But besids, that man is naturally a lover of himself, that de­sire of vengeance is born with him, and out of that consideration he believes him­self amiable, and that if he be offended he can be hurtful: he hath a secret sence of the dignity of his being, and thinks that he commits an injustice who renders him not the honor which is due unto him. That to despise him is in a manner to contest the advantages which Nature hath given him. Finally, as there is no good which is more his own then that, there is also nothing which can transport him more then for any to seek take it away.

If this original excellency is accompa­nied with those which birth, study, or for­tune may advance, such as are the natural and acquired qualities of the Mind, the strength and beauty of the Body, Honors, Riches, and Friends; it's then that the sence of Scorn is more common, and most insufferable, because that those who think to excel in any thing, believe also that there is honor due unto them, and that in seve­ral occasions many are wanting to give it them. Whence it happens that Great, Rich and Young men, those who have many Friends, Honor, or Beauty, are easily moved to wrath; yet I also know that such as are deprived of these excellent qualities, as are Poor, Old, and Sick persons, in a word, all those who have any defect are Chole­rick, beleeving at every moment that they are despised by reason of their imperfecti­ons; and although they think not that they ought to be esteemed for them, yet they do beleeve it's to commit an injustice, whe­ther it be because their defects seem to de­serve compassion rather then scorn, or whether every one thinks they have suffi­cient store of other good qualities to coun­ter-ballance those wants. Whence the great­ness of an injury.

Now although the kind and the nature of the injury ought to render it more or less [Page 259]sensible, yet neither is it that which mea­sures its greatness: it's the opinion alone of him that suffers it; for how great soever the offence may be, it would never kindle Anger unless we acknowledge and resent it. And often an indifferent thing will grow to a gross injury, if we but imagine it to be so. Now there are two causes which may form this opinion; Truth, and Error; this comes from the precipitation and weakness of the Mind, which commonly follows the temperature and custom; wherefore Chil­dren, Women and sick people are easily moved; whereas a judicious and magnani­mous man seldom grows angry. As for the Truth, it proceeds from the just value we have of the offence, examining the greatness of the ill, the persons, the places, the times, and the causes; for if the ill be great indeed, if he who receives it is a per­son of quality, and he that offends is his in­ferior, or is obliged unto him in any kinde of duty, if it were in publick, if for a slight cause, or that malice was the onely motive, we cannot doubt but the resentment must be the greater. In a word, the further he that offends errs from justice, and from his duty, so much greater effectually the inju­ry is, and the esmotion which it raiseth up in the Mind, must also be the more violent.

He therefore who doth an injury is the object of Anger, Why it riseth up against the cause of ill. and the onely enemy a­gainst whom it imploys all its efforts. Let's now enquire the reason why the Soul riseth up against him, and the design she hath when she assaults him.

All the world is agreed, That it is to re­venge herself; for there is no body agitated by this Passion who respires not venge­ance, who speaks not of it, and with plea­sure executes it not, unless he be divert­ed.

In effect, To revenge ones self on any man, is to make him suffer a punishment proportionable to the ill he hath done; so God revengeth himself on the wicked by punishing them; the Laws revenge crimes by those chastisements which they ordain; and Men revenge particular injuries, by the ill which they inflict on those which have offended them: Anger therefore hath no other design, but that it intends onely to seek satisfaction for the offence received, to chastise him who hath committed it, and to cause him to suffer an equal or pronorti­onable punishment to the ill which he hath done.

But what profit or benefit can accrew unto it by this chastisement? For the inju­ry is done, is received, is resented; and [Page 261]were there any remedy to be applied, it were to be employed for the taking away or sweetning of the ill, and not against the cause which can nothing ease it, and can no ways undo what it hath done.

Were it true that this Passion had no o­ther object but Scorn, we might say that revenge were a necessary means to take a­way the stain and the shame, because that doing ill to him who despiseth us, we should make him know that we were no­thing despicable, since scorn is nothing but the opinion which we have that a thing can do neither good nor hurt. But besides that Scorn is not the universal object of Anger, the revenge it seeks hath a more general end then that; for we are not content to do ill to him who scorns us, to make him lose that conceit, since there are other means to perswade him to it, without lo­sing the desire of our revenge; but necessa­rily Revenge must be a punishment where­with this Passion seeks to chastise those who offend it.

Now all pains and all chastisements are the remedies which Justice employs against Malice; but throughly to examine them, What the motive and the end of chastise­ments is. they are onely preservative remedies. For although we say that the ill committed may be repaired by chastisement, that the equa­lity [Page 262]of Justice demands punishments for those who have offended, as well as rewards for those which have done well. And finally, That it's just that he who hath lift up him­self above that degree wherein the Law hath placed him, should be cast down by it, and suffer pains for the pleasure he took in do­ing it. Yet the question remains still unre­solved, What the punishment doth against that fault which is committed, since it takes not away the ill which is done, nor the blemish or deformity it may have left in the Soul, since even those sufferings have not that power.

And truly all the difficulty is, concern­ing those punishments that God inflicts in the life to come; for as for those which the natural and civil Law have prescribed, we may say with the greatest men of Antiqui­ty that they respect the future onely, having no other end then to make him better who did the ill, or to restrain others in their du­ty by the example, or to provide for the safety of him who may be offended. But all these motives have no place in those cha­stisements which the wicked suffer after death, since they will then be no longer in a capacity to correct them, and that they last to eternity, wherein the example will be useless, and where those whom they [Page 263]would offend need no longer have any thing to fear.

What design therefore hath Divine Ju­stice proposed it self in those long and se­vere punishments? For we must have a a care that we fall not into the error of those who say, God hath no other design in punishing, but to punish; it were to of­fend his Wisdom and his Justice, to make them act without being guided by that so­veraign Equity, which renders to every man according to his deserts. It's true, that those he punishes, deserve to be punished; but why do they deserve it? because they have offended him. And why doth the of­fence deserve punishment, since we cannot hinder the ill from having been done, and that the pain hath no proportion with the offence, nor with the satisfaction which God may require; there being no likeli­hood that the ill which he inflicts on them can or ought to satisfie?

I know that in the design I have to en­deavor to resolve such great difficulties by my particular sentiments; some will say it's a great temerity to seek to fathom the pro­fundity of the Counsels and Judgments of God; that they are mysteries which are ra­ther to be adored with humility, then ex­amined with presumption; and that those [Page 264]who dare enquire after reasons for their chastisements, are in danger of such punish­ments as that Equitable Judge prepares for them. Moreover, if we are obliged to speak of it, we must follow the already re­ceived Maxims, and go by the ordinary road, without taking by-ways, which in all such cases are always dangerous. But I shall oppose this advice onely with the re­spect and submission wherewith I undertake to speak of things which are towards men ineffable and incomprehensible: The neces­sity which this subject imposeth on me to seek all the motives of punishments, that so I might find that which Anger proposeth to its self in Revenge, and the liberty which every man takes to speak what he thinks on questions which admit of no certain decision: Whereupon I suppose I may with security propose my opinion hereupon, since others do not satisfie the difficulties which are to be found therein; and that even according to mine advice they do not sufficiently make known that soveraign Equity which God observes in his judgements.

We may therefore say, That when God hath ordained Punishments, he considered the future no more then the civil Laws do, and had no other design but to keep men in [Page 265]their duty by the severity of punishments, and to hinder them by the terror of suffer­ings from offending him, and rendring themselves unworthy of his grace. But be­cause this forewarning were useless, unless he executed what he hath ordained, he at last makes the guilty suffer the punishment wherewith he before had justly threatned them; not that he would thereby repair the ill committed, or satisfie the offence done him, but because he is faithful and true; so that threatning and establishment of the Law is a work of his Justice, which ought to hinder ill; but the execution is an effect of his faithfulness, which ought to maintain his Justice. For which cause when the holy Scripture, wherein we ought to learn the manner how we are to speak of divine things, says that God is just, it com­monly adds that he is true and faithful; all its pages are full of the fidelity of his Laws and of his Judgements; and when it re­presents the history of things which hap­pen after they were foretold, it precisely observes that they happened that the pro­phecy might be fulfilled; As if the event were onely to render God in his word true and faithful, and to shew that his Justice and his Goodness cause him to make Laws and Decrees; but that after they are made, [Page 266]it's his fidelity which obligeth him to put them in execution.

And truly did Justice exact punishment, and that it were necessary to repair an of­fence by its chastisement, we could never be pardoned without offending Justice; and he who would remit the pain due to crimes, would remain responsible to the Justice which of right belongs unto it. And con­sequently Clemency, Mercy, and Lenity how excellent soever those Vertues are, would be useless, and contrary to reason. To avoid these inconveniencies, we must conclude, that it is not the Justice but the Fidelity of the Law which exacts punish­ments, and so neither is pardon contrary to Justice; and if there be ought else which it seems to clash withal, it's the Fidelity of the Law which the Legislator in parti­culars may dispence withal, since the Law is a floating general thing, which is not determined to any in particular. In effect, the Prince hath power to diminish or change chastisements; he sometimes suf­fers an innocent to suffer punishment for the guilty, and believes he hath satisfied the Law, when the punishment it ordained hath been executed on him, who imputed on himself the crime of the guilty.

Finally, this reason to me seems the [Page 267]more receivable, because it easily resolves that great difficulty which Theology hath always held of the eternity of pain; for to say that pain ought to be infinite, because it respects an infinite object, this and all other reasons which are commonly given, do not fully satisfie the Mind, and still leave some doubt why Divine Justice should exact an eternal punishment for a crime committed in a moment; what necessity is there the chastisement should be infinite, because the object is infinite; and what sa­tisfaction can God have of an offence which most commonly hurts onely him who com­mitted it?

But if it be true, that God ordains pu­nishments but for preservative remedies, it must necessarily follow, that having impo­sed eternal pains to hinder men from of­fending him, he must inflict such as he hath ordained, when they become guilty, or else he could not be faithful, and his forewarn­ing would be useless. Now it was fit to impose these pains; for unless men had been threatned with an eternal punishment, there had been no way to keep them in or­der; and for what time soever God had li­mited their pains, the hope of being af­terwards released would have encouraged them to ill; and with the little sence they [Page 268]had of another life, they would have ha­zarded millions of years for some moments of this, as they might have but contented their evil inclinations. It's certainly evident that a less severity could not have been; since with all the terror which it gives, yet doth it not perform so full an effect as might have been hoped, and that no body can with reason complain of it, since those who do well are not subject to it, and the guilty voluntarily submit themselves there­unto.

When we have said all, we must say of Pu­nishment what is faid of Reward, since there is a proportion betwixt them; now it's certain that the Reward which we expect from heaven, is only grounded on the fide­lity of the Promises of God, and not on his absolute Justice, which was no ways obliged to give us glory, which is a good which fur­passeth all natural capacity, which hath no proportion with created things, and where­to we can pretend nothing, but altogether from the pure grace of the Divine good­ness, which of our selves we can by no means deserve.

But I shall yet go further, to consider man in his natural condition; he cannot of right demand so much as any temporal reward unless it be by vertue of the promises made [Page 269]unto him by divine and humane Laws; for besides that vertue is satisfied in herself, and that the pleasure which accompanies good actions, is the last perfection, and if we may so speak, the only recompence they can as­pire unto; God is not obliged to give man more then to the rest of the Creatures, but onely what is necessary for the accomplish­ment and preservation of his being; nei­ther do men ow themselves to one another, but as they are obliged to render them­selves out of the rigor of Justice; now Re­wards before they were promised, are not of that order; they may pass in the rank of Graces. For to render what is due is no re­compence; it's a payment, and reward is somewhat more then payment: So when we pay a Servant for the service he hath done we reward him not; to reward him, you must give him more then your obliga­tion bore, neither could your gift have been exacted for him by the rigor of Justice, un­less by vertue of the promises which were made unto him: For which cause some have had reason to say, that Honor was not the reward of vertue, because it's a right due to its excellency. It's true, that this duty hath its bounds and measures, beyond which it may pass for a reward, as titles and badges of Honor are which Laws [Page 270]and Princes bestow on those who per­form fair actions, forasmuch as they go beyond the obligation they have to ho­nor Vertue, and that they bestow them not as things due out of necessity, but one­ly by vertue of their promises, whereby they oblige themselves to recompence such as performed such like actions: those also who perform them, render themselves worthy of the effect of those promises, and that is what we call to deserve a re­ward.

Yet this imports not that promises which Princes and Laws make upon these occa­sions, are not inspired by Justice: it's the same as concerning those pains wherewith they threaten those who perform evil acti­ons; for as there are preservative reme­dies to hinder Vice, those are as nourish­ment to entertain Vertue; and it's as just to encourage and provoke men to do well out of hope of reward, as to intimidate and withdraw them from ill by threatning of punishment; As also the exacting of pu­nishments is not the work of pure Justice, but of the fidelity of the Law; after the same manner, the reward a man receives is not an effect of Justice, but of the faithfulness of the promiser; for that besides that a vertuous action is out of duty and obliga­tion, [Page 271]it can pretend to a reward only but as from an expectative grace; the Justice of the Law having considered the future one­ly, and being not destined for things done, unless for example sake, and to render the promises true and faithful.

But it's to carry the matter we treat too high; Let's satisfie our selves in saying, that what concerns punishments ordained by na­tural and civil Laws, the greatest men of antiquity have been of my opinion, and have beleived as we do, that they are on­ly preservative remedies destined to make those better who have erred, to serve for an example to other men, and to provide for the security of those who have been offended.

If this be so, Why An­ger will cha [...]ise him who hath done the inju­ry. Anger which employs Re­venge as a chastisement must have some of these motives. Now its design is not to correct the defects of others, nor to give examples, because Beasts which are subject to this Passion can have no such thought. Neither aims it at the severity of him who hath been offended; as all the rest of the Passions, she respects her own particular preservation onely, and being unable to hinder the offence from having been done, it will at least hinder its continuance. In a word, it endeavors to take away the [Page 272]power of doing ill from him who hath done the injury, that he may do it no more.

And indeed, since Anger is a kind of Boldness, and that Boldness assaults ill to take away its power, Anger which assaults the cause of the ill must needs endeavor to take from him the power of doing ill; and because that in those causes which act with design, the Will is the best part of this power; it's certain, that taking the Will from them, the power is also taken away, or at least it's rendred useless.

Now there is nothing which can better take away the will of doing ill but by making him suffer ill who hath already done it, forasmuch as the remembrance of the pain he suffers must needs hinder him from falling another time into the like dan­ger.

So that the Soul hath no other end when she will revenge herself in Anger, but to hinder him who hath done the injury, from continuing to do him the like: we find it certain by experience that whatsoever stops the course or the continuation of the offence, appeaseth the Anger. So we are satisfied when he who hath done us an injury, hath been hurt, when he re­pents, when he flies, when he makes it [Page 273]appear that he offended us not out of de­sign. Forsmuch as we believe that the pain of his wounds will make him afraid to fall into the like fault; that his repentance hath changed his design of ill doing; that flying he hath lost the power of it; and that ha­ving offended us unawares he did it unvo­luntarily.

On the other side, he who is angry will himself execute his revenge, or if any do it for him, he will have it known that it was he that procured it, as if that know­ledge served to hinder the other from con­tinuing any more to offend him; instead that he who simply hates, cares not for that, and so his enemy suffers ill, he cares not whence he believes it comes. In fine, it's for this cause that those calamities and great miseries, extremety of sickness and death it self, which happens to those who have injured us, take away from us that desire of revenge, although they take not away the hatred and the aversion which we have against them; forasmuch as in the condition in which they are they have not as it seems the power to offend us, and that Anger pretends not to do ill simply to in­commodate him who suffers it, but to guard it self from that violence which a man may afterwards receive.

This is the general end which Nature proposeth to this Passion in respect of ven­geance, which it inspires in all creatures, and which consequently in its source and original is an effect of this primary Justice, which moves every thing to its own preser­vation. The policy and opinion of men hath added thereunto other particulars as Correction and Example, the re­paration of Honor offended, and the preservation of that excellency and su­periority wherewith they flatter them­selves.

For although man considered in himself, may as well as the rest of Creatures re­venge himself of those injuries which he hath received: Yet having been destined for a civil life and society, having reserved to it self the right of revenge, as a matter belonging to the publick, he cannot law­fully exercise it without the help of Laws, unless the danger be very urgent, that he wants time to expect or seek their assist­ance; when therefore they revenge the in­juries of particulars, it's first to provide for their security, because it's the natural end of the Passion, and then to correct those who have offended, and by their examples to keep others in their duties; they accom­modate themselves even to the opinions of [Page 275]men who think their honor receives some diminution when they suffer an injury with­out resenting it, and that Vengeance a­lone can repair it; wherefore the Laws labor to give them this satisfaction, when they take upon them to revenge them; for although this opinion is a vicious fonn­dation, and proceeds from that pride which is born with us; yet nevertheless having past into a custom, and being in some man­ner upheld by Nature, the Law which ac­commodates it self to out weakness tole­rates it, and will not take away from those who have been offended, the consolati­on they have to believe that their ho­nor hath had reparation by revenge.

In effect, Man who is naturally proud, and placeth one part of his glory neither to yeeld nor submit himself, cannot suffer an injury without resenting it, but he must at the same time confess his impotency and his submission; for if he get no satisfaction, it's out of weakness; if he will not seek it, it's out of respect: both ways he yields that preheminence which he pretends to with so much Passion: But when he revengeth himself, he makes it appear that he is not less powerful, nor less considerable then he who hath offended him, and thereby he thinks to change the opinion which [Page 276]might have been conceived in prejudice of his excellency. Its therefore self-love which casts him in this error, and bereaves him of knowing himself destined for a civil life, wherein he may not exercise his revenge, but by the authority of the Laws, which after having made use of punishments for the publick good, doth also leave this be­lief in those who have been offended, that by that means they have preserved their rights and advantages. However it be, this satisfaction is a particular end belong­ing to human revenge, since Beasts cannot pretend unto it, nor are they capable to seek reparation for an honor which they can neither acquire nor preserve.

Beyond this, we can say no more on this subject, In all An­ger there is a desire of venge­ance. but onely to clear the difficul­ty which we proposed at the beginning of this Discourse; to wit, when a man grows angry with himself, with his fortune, or with insensible things, since it's unlikely a man should seek to revenge himself on him­self, and that Fortune is an imaginary thing, which is no more capable of suffering grief then all the rest of insensible things; cer­tainly we need not doubt but in all these encounters there is a desire of vengeance, but its a blind and mad Appetite which the precipitation and impetuosity of Anger [Page 277]stirs up in the Soul; for this Passion raiseth it self so quick that it often prevents all the lights of Reason, and then we need not wonder if it know not those things which move it, and if it often vary its de­signs. We may indeed call it a kinde of Drunkenness, which makes trees appear like men, which represents all things double, and which fancies to it self Chi­mera's to combat them withal; for he who is angry at his chance, doth he not fashion out a fantasm for an enemy? doth he not divide himself when angry with him­self, and is not his sight troubled when he knows neither Parents nor Friends, & takes insensible things as if they were capable of sence? These are therefore the effects of an offended Fancy, like those which dreams or melancholy raise, and which make us believe that it's in these encounters that Anger is the commencement of folly, as says one of the most antient of all the Latin Poets.

Let's therefore conclude, Wherein Anger is different from Boldness. That an of­fence received is the ground of this Passi­on, that who hath committed it is the e­nemy it assaults, and that it riseth up against it to procure its revenge. But for all this we have not yet found the principal differ­ence which ought to be in this definition, [Page 278]and which distinguisheth it from all the rest; for the Soul may rise up against him who hath offended her, assault and combate him to revenge herself, without being moved by Anger; doth not this happen every day in War, wherein we assault our enemies, or we revenge the injuries we have received without accusing this Passi­on of bearing part? Wisdom it self, Mag­nanimity and Justice do they not often seek revenge of wrongs done them, with­out being suspected of having followed the counsels or motions of Anger. Certain­ly we must confess this is that rock where­on we may be afraid to lose our selves; for after all this long discourse we seem con­strained to say, that Anger and Boldness are but one and the same Passion, seeing they have ill for their object, they both assault it, and both would take away its power of doing ill. And although we may say that the Object of Boldness is more u­niversal then that of Anger, since this as­saults onely the cause of ill, and the other assaults it what ill soever it be; that their End admits of the same difference, Anger having no other design but to take away the power of ill doing from that cause which hath already done it; and Boldness endeavoring to take it away without con­sidering [Page 279]whether it be done or no; yet all this would onely serve to conclude, that Anger is a species and a difference onely of Boldness: And without doubt if we respect the end and the object onely of these two Passions, we must be forced to fall into this error; so that there remains the motion onely, whereby the diver­sity which is betwixt them is observe­able.

But what? What the motion of the Soul is in An­ger. Both of them rise up against ill, and it signifies nothing to say that this rising up of Anger is more impetuous then that of Boldness; for besides that it often happens that this is moved with as much or more violence, and more readily then the other, less and more cannot cause an essential difference in the Passions. Must it not then be Grief which ever accompa­nies Anger, which causeth some diversity in these motions? for it's she alone we can fancy is able to contribute any thing there­unto. And indeed this conjecture would be very likely, did not Grief very often joyn with Boldness, without moving Wrath; we may indeed resent the ill, and repel it without being moved by this Pas­sion; and we see daily in single combates that the grief for the wounds we have received, or the displeasure we might have [Page 280]to see ones enemy have the advantage, accompanies often Boldness without any esmotion of Anger: We cannot say a Judge is moved with it when he compas­sionates him who hath suffered an injury, and will revenge him according to Law; and that a Father may not chastise his Children who have offended him without being sensible of the motions of this Pas­sions. Finally, is it to be believed that a man always makes himself angry with sick­ness, with a Beast that bites him, or a Serpent that stings him, when he drives them away, or assaults them? and yet in all these encounters Grief and Boldness are both met.

Yet must we not upon these considera­tions renounce our proposed conjecture; Anger is a mix­ture of Grief and Bold­ness. for since Grief is so strictly conjoyned with Anger, that it can never be separated, and that it is but by chance it mixeth with Boldness; It's to be believed, that it unites it self with this after another manner then it doth with the other, and that this diver­sity causeth an essential difference in their motions. And certainly the Passions may mix together two ways; the one is by con­founding their motions, so that the Soul at the same time suffers two Passions as Hope and Boldness, Boldness and Anger; the [Page 281]other is by making the motion of the one succeed the other, so that two Passi­ons remain not together, but so swiftly follow one another that they seem to be but one, as Love and Desire, Joy and Hope.

Grief therefore may joyn with Boldness both these ways; and without doubt, in the examples proposed they do but follow one the other at several reprisals without uniting their motions. But when they con­found themselves together they cause this Passion of Anger, which is nothing but the union and the confusion of the for­mer; for which cause Anger is never without them, because they are the essen­tial parts whereof it is composed. To confirm this truth, we need onely consider, that the same offence raiseth up in Anger a far more sharp and fretful grief then in Boldness; for there is no other reason of this diversity but that Grief and Boldness have contrary motions; and that the Soul being at the same time agitated by both, cannot but suffer a great violence, and that the displeasure she conceives for the injury received must needs be augmented by the pain she is sensible of in the com­bate of these two Passions. Nature in effect which loves order and equality in [Page 282]all, flies as much as it may this contrari­ety of motions, and if she finde herself engaged in it she suffers it with pain and disquiet; and if it be lawfull to say so, she groans under so heavy a burthen which she cannot long support without being overwhelmed, which is the reason why Anger is not long lasting, and that it presently changeth into other Passions, as into Hatred, Sadness, and into Despair.

But when Grief joyns wsth Boldness so that their motions are not confounded, and that they do but follow and succeed one another, the Soul is not constrained, and tortured, and suffers not that turbulent and painful agitation wherewith she is necessa­rily moved in the encounter of two oppo­site motions. For which cause Grief is not so pungent, nor doth it admit of that en­crease which the pain and trouble of the Soul in Anger suffers.

Its true, that in this occasion these two Passions follow one another so close that they may easily be confounded, and so form Anger, as in fight it often happens, and after the same manner as Grief there­in becomes more pungent; Boldness also becomes more impetuous by reason of the endeavor the Soul makes in the con­straint which those two contrary moti­ons [Page 283]cause in it, as we shall say hereaf­ter.

What may be objected against this do­ctrine, may be, Whether any An­ger may be found without any cause of offence that to form Anger there must be a cause which offends with intenti­on; and that it may happen that Grief and Boldness might confound themselves, were it not for that cause, and therefore altoge­ther without their moving of Anger. But we may boldly answer, that it's impossible it should so happen, and that if Grief and Boldness unite, when no cause hath cau­sed an injury, still the Soul fancies one, as when a man is angry with himself, with fortune, and with insensible things; be­cause the Soul which is instructed by na­ture, in all what is necessary for the pro­duction of the Passions, knows what mo­tion is proper for every one of them, what object ought to move them, and what end she ought to propose herself in them; and not one of these things presents it self so soon to our knowledge, but it presently adds two others, so that in the same man­ner as when she resents an injury, she at the same time forms the design of revenging herself, and afterwards agitates herself by that motion which is proper for Anger; so when she findes herself agitated with this motion, the cause which ought to move [Page 284]this Passion not occurring therein, knowing it is that she is accustomed to make use of in Anger, she forms to herself the cause and object of Anger, and so perfects that Passion which this motion had onely com­menced: And this is the more easie to be believed, for that the motion of the spirits which makes no part of the Passion as that of the Appetite doth, causeth the same effect. For if it happen that the spirits are agitated with a motion proper to a Passion, the Soul which sees what passeth in her or­gans, and knows after what manner she is accustomed to stir them up, presently fan­cies that object which ought to excite this motion; and at last agitates it self con­formably to that motive which this object inspires it withall, and so that esmotion which it meets within the spirits. It's thus that Musick produceth Passion; it's thus that Love out of inclination is formed, as we have shewed in the Treatise we have made thereof. It's then true that An­ger is nothing else but Grief and Bold­ness united and confounded together, and that the turbulent and unequal agitation which the Soul is constrained to suffer in the encounter, and in the shock of these two opposite Passions, makes that differ­ence of motion which is proper unto it, [Page 285]and which distinguisheth it from all the rest. In effect, we cannot conceive that the Appetite in Grief retires it self, and that at the same time Boldness raiseth it up, but we must fancy we see a Sea agita­ted with contrary winds and waves, for the same combate which is made amongst the waves, the same boylings which it rais­eth up, the same efforts with which it beats upon the shoar. Finally, the same trouble and confusion which this great Main suf­fers during the tempest, are in the Soul when she is stirred up by these two violent Passions.

So that it is not without reason that we say the Sea grows angry, and that Anger is a tempest, since there is the same agi­tation in either of them, and that both of them spring from the contrariety of motions which shake these two great depths.

But we may say That if Anger be a mix­ture of Grief and of Boldness, it cannot be in the rank of simple Passions, as we have hitherto conceived, and as at the be­ginning of this work we our selves resol­ved. Certainly, there needs no contest hereupon, and it were to fight against the truth to defend the common opinion; for if there is a Passion which is mixt and com­posed, [Page 286]it's chiefly this, where Grief and Boldness, Desire and Hope are all met to­gether. That if we proposed it as a simple Passion, besides that we did not then de­duce those reasons which ought to oblige us to shun the errors of the School, we may freely confess that upon the way we often discovered those things which at first we never thought to have met withal, and that considering more nearly the nature of this Passion, Reason and Truth have made it appear unto us to be altogether compo­sed, that is to say, of Grief and Boldness, as of its essential parts, and of Desire and Hope as of inseparable accidents or ne­cessary conditions which accompany it. For it's certain, that he that is angry ought to desire and hope for revenge. Yet the Mind may separate these two Passions from Anger without destroying its Nature, for­asmuch as without considering them it may conceive the Soul may be touched with Grief for the injury received, and that she assaults the cause which caused it, wherein all the Essence of Anger con­sists.

So that now we may define it to be A turbulent Agitation which Grief and Bold­ness move in the Appetite,Definiti­on of An­ger.whereby the Soul retires in herself, to estrange herself from the [Page 287]injury received, and at the same time rais­eth herself up against the cause which caused it to be done, for to revenge herself of it. Whence we may judge, that as this Passi­on is mixed, its causes and effects are also of the same nature; for it hath indeed two objects, to wit the Injury and him who did it: It hath two ends, the one to estrange it self from ill, and the other to revenge it self. Lastly, it's composed of two motions, which being united cause this turbulent agitation, wherein we have said the principal difference of this Passion consists.

Yet we are to observe, that as common­ly Boldness vapors more in Anger then in Grief, and yet that there are some Angers in which Grief appears stronger then Boldness; Its certain, that in these encounters the motions of these two Passi­ons are proportionably stronger or weak­er, and that it often happens that its rising up is greater then its contraction; and that sometimes also its contraction is more then its lifting up; but if they are equal, Boldness always appears more then Grief, because in that the Soul produceth and casts it self forth, and in Grief she hides and inwardly retires herself, as we shall make it more particularly appear in the [Page 288]Chapter, wherein we shall examine the na­ture of that Passion.

We must conclude this long Discourse with a resolution of an important difficulty which may here be made: Who those are which are incli­ded to Anger. For perhaps some will say, that if Boldness makes a part of Anger, it will follow that those who are naturally bold, will also be most inclined to this Passion. On the contrary, those who are timorous, should never be sensible of it. Although experience teach­eth us, that those who are truly Bold, are seldom provoked to Anger, and that Children, Women and sick persons which are weak and timorous, are easily moved thereunto. But this objection is easily an­swered, if we remember that Boldness a­lone never produceth this Passion, but that Grief must also meet with it, that these mix and confound themselves toge­ther. In a word, that a man must be sen­sible of injuries, and have a quick and agile Boldness to be susceptible of Anger. Now those who have an heroick Boldness, are not sensible of injuries unless they are very cousiderable, because they despise most of those things which assault them, and that that Melancholy which is in their temperature retains the fury of their spi­rits, giving them time to examine the of­fences, [Page 289]and to consider whether they de­serve to be chastised. On the contrary, those who are weak of body or of mind, and who have a very agile heat, as Chil­dren and Women, and those who have any remarkable defect, finding themselves more exposed to injuries, are easily born away with a desire of vengeance, because their weakness makes them ap­prehend every thing, and the subtile heat which they have is so quickly inflamed, that they have not time enough to consi­der whether they are truly injured, and whether they ought to revenge themselves, or whether indeed they have the power; and that is the reason why the Cholerick are the most angry of all, because they have an ardent and active heat, which ren­ders all their actions precipitate, and be­reaves them of time and means to judge rightly of things; For it's certain that there is no quality so much an enemy to Reason as Heat, and a violent agitation; all the functions of Sence, and principally those of Judgment, being not to be per­formed but when the Soul enjoys a great Tranquillity, as Aristotle says. Whence it also happens that Nature hath placed the brain so far from the principle of heat, that its quiet might not be disturbed by the [Page 290]neighborhood of that active and turbulent quality, as we shall more amply hereafter declare.

CHAP. III. Of the Motion of the Spirits and of the Humors in Anger.

AS Rivers which run into the Sea are sensible of those storms wherewith it is agitated; The spi­rits in Anger have con­trary mo­tions. those spirits which like Rivers take their source from the Soul, and dis­charge themselves there also, must needs suffer part of that great tempest which An­ger raiseth therein: And they must be shaken with the same violence and agita­tion which she resents in herself. If it be therefore true, that she is then moved with two contrary motions, and that at the same time when Grief makes her retire, Bold­ness raiseth her up and drives her forth; it's necessary that the spirits to whom she com­municates all her commotions must be agi­tated after the same manner; and that as she doth, they must restrain and retreat themselves at the same instant, when she raiseth and darts herself forth against ill.

And certainly did not Reason force the mind to confess this Truth, the effects which Anger produces would sufficiently prove it. For besides that a man often grows pale when he is carried away with this Passion, that his voice is vehement and sharp, and that commonly we see in his Face sadness mix and confound it self with fury, which can proceed from nothing but this contrariety of motions; it's impossible to doubt it, if we consider the different pulse which is proper for Anger, and the consistence which the Heart and the Lungs have when it's kindled in those parts; for it hath this in particular, That it makes the pulse higher, and more elevated, then large and extended; And that it retires the Heart and Lungs in themselves, although it then swells them and raiseth them up; now this can be but from these two oppo­site motions we have spoken of, as we shall more fully declare when we enquire into the causes of those effects.

But although this be most certain, yet we must confess that it's harder to conceive how such bodies as the spirits are, can at the same time suffer motions which seem incompatible; for although there are ma­ny examples in Nature which make it ap­pear that a body may be moved in such a [Page 292]manner; that Fish which swims against the course of the water, are insensibly carried away with the force of the stream; that a man may walk in a ship contrary to the course he shapes, and that the heavens themselves, are, as they say, carried towards the West by the Primum mobile, whilst by their natural inclination they tend to­wards the East. Yet this clears not the dif­ficulty, but leaves still a great difference betwixt these motions, and those where­with the spirits are agitated in this Passion; for that there is but one motion in the former proper to the body moved; the other is as a stranger, and as the School says, happens by accident; but here these two motions which the spirits suffer are proper unto them, it's the same mover which produceth them, it's the same sub­ject which receives them; and it seems a contradiction, that at the same time a thing should advance it self and go backwards, that it should tend to two opposite places. In a word, that it should be and not be, in the place where it is.

We must therefore fay, that there are two ways whereby the spirits may receive these contrary motions; How the spirits suffer contrary motions. The first suppo­sing them to have divers parts, some of which are agitated after one manner, and [Page 293]others after another; just as it happens in the Streights, where contrary Currents and Seas meet; for as there are some waves which enter into one another, some which justle and cause the beatings they give one another to boil exceedingly; the same thing certainly is here done, where one part of the Spirits which follows the motion of Grief, and another which is carried away with that of Boldness, and which meeting on the way causeth this turbulent and un­equal agitation which is observable in this Passion; the same way is like that which is performed in Boldness, wherein the spirits stiffen themselves in themselves, and yet forbear not to dart themselves forth. For seeing the parts of a body may amongst themselves suffer a motion which may be different from that wherewith the whole body is agitated, as it happens to the Arm, when at the same time we stiffen and stretch it forth. So it may also be that the spi­rits may retire in themselves, and at the same time be violently driven into the ex­terior parts. And truly as Grief makes its impression before Boldness, because we must resent an injury before we will our re­venge; it's certain, that at that instant the spirits restrain themselves; so that Bold­ness coming after, and not driving Grief [Page 294]away, it must raise the Spirits restrained as they are, and without making them lose the disposition it finds them in, drive them to those places where they are neces­sary.

Now although in little Angers it may happen that the Spirits will be moved onely after the latter manner, yet com­monly they are by both sorts at once, and it must necessarily be. The better to conceive this great storm which they raise in the veins, we must fancy to our selves that they do not onely restrain themselves, as we have said; but that there are some which run and flie to the heart, and others which issue out and impetuously cast them­selves forth, and that in this encounter which is thereby made, they embroyl and confound themselves, they justle and raise themselves up, and so they make a current full of boilings and of foam; it's true, that according as Grief or Boldness predo­minates in this Passion, the ebbing and flowing of the spirits is stronger or weaker; for when Grief is greater, which is pro­perly what we say is to be vexed, there are more spirits which retire to the heart then there are which are darted forth. On the contrary, when Boldness is greater, as when Anger is violent, and turns even into [Page 295]Fury, there are more spirits which dart themselves forth then retire; and then al­though the shock which they give them­selves cannot be so great, and seems to be unable to cause this agitation, which is when they are of equal force; yet this hinders not that trouble and tempest to be therein formed with the same violence which the excess of this Passion requires; forasmuch as if the shock is not then per­formed by the encounter of these opposite motions; yet it's made by the frequent ar­rival of the spirits, which like impetuous floods precipitate themselves on one ano­ther, and making haste to follow the first, finding them in their way dash against them, and drive them as if they indeed op­posed their course.

For it's the property of Boldness and Anger to move the Soul and the Spirits by sallies and by swinges; The Spi­rits move them­selves by sallies. forasmuch as the danger they are threatned withal continually sollicites them to make new endeavors to surmount them, which commonly happens not to those Passions which tend to good, where the Soul having nothing to fear a­bandons herself to every object which pleaseth, and as if she would cast herself whole, and all at once before it; she drives the Spirits thereunto like a flood, without [Page 296]minding to recreate them, whence after­wards follow Languors, Swoonings and o­ther accidents which we have treated of in our Discourse of Joy.

But although these sallies are common to Boldness and Anger; it's certain, that they are more frequent and more readily doubled in this then in the other; because Grief which always accompanies it, pro­vokes, and at every moment urgeth the Soul; and that weakness often meets with it, which renders it the more diligent and careful; instead that in Boldness, seeing onely the ill comes without resenting it, and confiding in her own strength, she believes that this crowding of them together is no ways necessary.

Let's therefore conclude, that Grief re­strains the Spirits, and makes them re­treat to the Heart; that Boldness stiffens and drives them forth, that the forcings of the Soul cause them to make these sallies, which at every moment precipitates them one on another, and that from the com­bate of so many different motions this turbulent ebullition and agitation proceeds wherewith the Spirits are agitated in this Passion.

To seek now what the end of all these motions is, and what the Souls motives is [Page 297]when she excites them, were a useless thing, at least in respect of the stiffening and darting forth of the Spirits, which have been curiously examined in the precedent Chapters: And as for those which Grief causeth, we shall then propose them, when we treat of that Passion; for as concerning the shock, the ebullition, and the trouble which here happens, they are effects which are done out of necessity, without the Souls intention of producing them, being altogether useless for her design.

Yet not to leave the Reader in doubt concerning those two kindes of motions which in Grief we assigned the spirits, it shall suffice to say by way of advance, that the soul is not at that time content to cause the Spirits to retire to the heart, but that she also causeth them to shut themselves up in themselves, and in the design which she hath to estrange herself from the ill which urgeth her, she conceives slight is not able to save her from the danger, unless she shut herself up in herself, if she stop not the Enemies passage, and if as much as she possibly can she hide not herself from him.

After this it will be nothing difficult to declare how Hope and Desire which are al­ways with Anger, may finde in the esmo­tion [Page 298]she causeth that which is proper for them, and causeth their subsistence; for since the spirits dart themselves forth in de­sire, and stiffen themselves in hope; Bold­ness which causeth both of these motions, must needs favor the birth and preservation of these two Passions; even so it is with Hate and Aversion, which commonly ac­company Anger, forasmuch as their agita­tion being conformable to that Grief rais­eth up as in its place we shall make known, it's nothing strange that they are found with it, that they dwell together and main­tain one the other.

What is most difficult herein, How the motion of the spi­rits in Anger can suffer that of Joy. is, to ex­plicate how all these motions may accom­modate themselves with that of Joy; for it's certain, that in the hight of danger, the hope of revenge alone satisfies the Mind, and even we have an extream pleasure to imagine we are revenged, and that Venge­ance executed is sweeter then hony, as the Poet says. Now if Joy dilates and sweetly disperseth the Spirits, how is it possible it can subsist with Anger, which restrains and drives them forth with impetuosity? We may hereupon say, that Joy may form it self in the superior part of the Soul, whilst Anger agitater the inferior, and that when the Spirits which serve these two Powers [Page 299]are moved with contrary motions without incompatibility, because it's performed in several places. But if Joy descends into the inferior part, we must necessarily be­lieve that in the same instant she drives a­way Anger, that the storm which this raised dissipates it self at the arrival of a Passion which always brings with it a calm and se­renity. In effect, when a man flatters him­self with the pleasure which he shall reap in his revenge, he resents not the same agita­tion and those transports which possest him before, his looks are more sweet, his countenance is calm, and all his actions are more modest. I confess that this may be very suddenly changed, but yet it's still true that at that instant he resents it not, and that Pleasure and Anger are two Passi­ons which may succeed one another, but yet are incompatible as well by reason of the contrary motions which they produce, as of the opposite motives which they have. This clearly appears when we have effectually revenged our selves, for then Anger quite ceaseth, and the Joy of the Victory we have obtained remains alone, and those Passions which usually follow it, as Vanity, Insolency, &c. What kind of heat pro­duceth Anger.

We should now speak of that Heat which accompanies these motions, and the ardor [Page 300]which this Passion kindles in all the parts. But this hath been amply done in the dis­course of Boldness, wherein we did shew that the Soul and the Heart have power to augment the natural heat when it's necessa­ry, and that she hath no occasion where­in its assistance is more useful then in those Passions which are to assault ill. For as this quality is the most agile of all, and most fit to destroy what is hurtful, it's also the most powerful instrument which the Soul hath to employ in its combates, where­in the first design she hath is to bereave the enemy of his power of doing ill. For which reason in these encounters she raiseth it up, she augments it, and entertains it in the Heart, which is its natural source, and from thence by a particular priviledge which these two Passions have, she sends it to those organs which she intends to employ. If in effect there are others in which she is dispersed to the outward parts, it is not that it is sent thither because it is useless; it's because it follows those Spirits which are sent thither; but herein both of them are led by the Soul, being necessary for the de­sign which she proposeth herself; the Spi­rits to conveigh strength to the parts, and heat to destroy the ill which presents it self.

Now ill is more urgent in Anger then in Boldness, for those Reasons which we have deduced, we need not doubt but the heat renders it self therein also more violent, as well out of the greatness of the endeavour it makes to produce it, as for that of the agi­tation of the spirits, and the rising up of those pungent humors which it incites. In effect it is certain that it separates Choler, and all what is most malignant in the veins, and that it useth them as offensive arms, the more easily to destroy the enemy. Whence it happens that the bitings of all kinde of creatures are in some sort venemous when they are angry, and the more irritated they are, the more dangerous, and hard to be cured; which ought to make us judge that their teeth are then infected with some ma­lignant humor which Nature brings into those parts, after having separated it from the rest, to render it the more mischevous and fitter to effect what she intends: It's also true, that the separation of the hu­mors renders them more active, giving them liberty, and restoring them that strength which mixture had weakened. But that we may the better clear the Truth of so new a proposition, we must examine whether the Soul hath the power thus to separate the humors; and if after having [Page 302]separated them she can remix them again, and reinstate them as they were before.

As for the first, a man must be very ig­norant of what is done in Nature, and of what is performed in our selves, to doubt of so certain and so evident a thing. The choice which the Soul makes of what is fit for every part, so many kindes of hu­mors as she at every moment drives out of the most healthful bodies, so many evacua­tions as she causeth in sickness, make it suf­ficiently appear that she hath the power to separate what is profitable from what is not so, and that if she have a design to em­ploy venom or choler to execute her re­venge, she may draw them from the mass and places where they are, and afterwards send them to those places where she intends to use them.

The other point is more difficult to be resolved; Whether Nature can reu­nite the Humors which she hath se­parated. for it seems that the order which Nature observes is to drive out what it hath separated, and never to remingle ill humors with good, when she hath once di­vided them from one another; so that if in Anger she separate venom and choler to em­ploy them against ill, she must drive them out without remixing them any more with the rest. And yet we cannot doubt but that when Anger is over, the Humors retake [Page 303]their former places, and but that the Body returns to his pristine constitution. We must therefore say that there are useful and useless Humore, that both of them may be within and without the Veins, and that that order which Nature observes is different according as she is free or con­strained. When she acts freely, after having separated the Humors, and driven them out of the veins, she recalls them thither no more, and how good soever they be, she must needs drive them out of the Body: So the Serosity which is in the Bladder, Choler which is in the bag of the Gall, Blood it self being out of its vessels, never returns into that Mass from whence they were drawn, but she quite expels them; but whilst these Humors remain in the veins, she may separate them from the rest, and after remingle them together, as she commonly doth in Passions, in Feavors, and in those Crisis's which are imperfect; for when Choler is driven by Anger into the surface of the Body, after the storm is over, it resumes the place again which it had in the mass of the blood, and remix­eth it self with it as it was before. It's true that this is not done in a moment, and that time is requisite to resettle it; for which reason a man that is let blood, at [Page 304]his going out of the violence of this Passi­on, his blood commonly appears altogether changed, and a diversity of colours ap­pears, which would make a man believe it were corrupted, were one not assured that after the return of a calm no such thing is to be seen, and that it proceeded onely from this disunion of the Humors, which uniting themselves again return to the blood its former colour.

This reunion is also to be found in Fea­vors which are commonly caused by the se­paration which is made in the veins of those ill Humors which are there gather­ed together; for although it be Nature which separates them that she may drive them out, it often happens that they are so malignant that she dares not undertake it, and leaving them thus in their vessels, she endeavors to repair the error which she had committed by raising up heat to over­come them, remixing them with the rest to temper and sweeten them; and lastly labor­ing for their decoction, the first effect where­of is to reassemble divided things; but if we observe what is done in these crisis [...]s, we need no longer doubt of this Truth; for it sometimes happens that Nature being disposed to terminate a sickness by sweat, after even having already begun, she all at [Page 305]once stops and retains that humor which was ready to issue out. Now it's im­possible it should be left in the veins, but it must embroyl it self with the rest of the blood, since she often retains it the better to concoct it; that she reassumes her design of driving it out many days after, and that there is no likelihood that in so long a time so fluid and penetrating a Humor should preserve it self in its paucity, without mix­ing it self with the rest. To conclude, if the spirits issue out of their vessels, to in­sinuate themselves not onely in the parts but in the Humors themselves which are corrupted, and that after having perform­ed their function they retire to their prin­ciples, and reunite themselves with those spirits which they had left, as we have shew­ed in our Discourse of Digestion, why should not those parts of the blood which go not out of the veins do the same thing? For when we say Choler riseth in Anger, we mean nothing else but the most subtile and the hottest part of the blood, and not that Choler which is an excrement and without the veins; it being true that the Soul never causeth this to remount when she acts freely, and follows her ordinary course, if it happen that she is prest and [Page 306]constrained by the violence of a Passion, or of some disease, it's true then there are no Humors how malignant soever they be, and in what place soever they may be, but she can raise them up, and force them to re-enter the veins, and the most considerable parts. It's thus that vehement Anger is sometimes followed with the Jaundise, with an Apoplexy, with Con­vulsion fits, trembling of the Nerves, and other such like Diseases, which are caused by that violent transport of Hu­mors we have spoken of.

It's thus that in malignant Feavers we see so many sad and unlook'd for acci­dents happen, which astonish the Physi­tian, and overthrow the Patient: But this Discourse concerns Physick; let us pur­sue our design, and seek the causes of those Characters which are proper to this Pas­sion.

CHAP. IV. The Causes of the Characters of An­ger.

ALthough Anger be composed of Grief and Boldness, and for the same cause its probable it should have no other Characters, but those which those two Passions separately produce; yet as in all other things mixture affords new vertues, or so confounds those which are princi­pal, that it makes them appear altoge­ther different from what they were; it also happens that Anger besides those Cha­racters which are common to her with Boldness and Grief, it hath others parti­culars added unto it, which are not at all to be found in the other, if at least they encounter it is with very great differ­ence.

Indeed if we do but consider these which it forms in the Soul, it hath even as Bold­ness, Hope, Confidence and Freeness; it hath just as Grief, Peevishness, Impatience and Heaviness: But Pride, Fury and De­spair are far different herein from those which accompany those two Passions; for if Boldness is proud, it hath strength to [Page 308]maintain its Pride, if it be carried away with Fury, it's after great strivings, and it never happens at its beginning: If final­ly Grief easily fall into Despair, it's a timo­rous, base, heedless despair; but Anger hath a Boldness which is commonly vain, and without any ground, a precipitate fu­ry kindled at the instant of its birth; and when it is in despair of revenge, it's a te­merous, violent and enraged Despair; Be­sides which, it in particular makes great threatnings, speaks much, discovers its se­crets; it's credulous, impudent and opinionate; it's base, cruel, and insolent: But this di­versity appears also in the corporal Cha­racters, as we shall make it known af­ter we have examined the causes of these.

Let's therefore begin with Hope, Why Hope devance­eth Anger which ever gives a beginning to Anger; for it's certain that this Passion is never kindled in the heart, what injury soever a man hath received, or what desire soever to retort it, but first he hopes to have his revenge: So that we are seldom angry with those that are extreamly above us; Demons or dead bodies although they may offend us, will never provoke us; and it hath seldom been seen that a man of a low condition hath been carried away with [Page 309]wrath against his King or against his Lord, forasmuch as such persons are so high that they seem to be out of reach, and that it is, as it were, impossible to do them any harm, and that so having no hope of be­ing revenged, they find it's to no end to be angry with them.

But since this Hope cannot be founded but on those forces which we believe we have, How weak persons hope to be reven­ged. and that Natures which are most weak, such as are Women, and Children, and sick persons, are extreamly susceptible of Anger; how is it possible they should hope to be revenged, having not the power, and carrying always about them a secret sence of their own weakness, as hereafter we shall make it appear?

Certainly it's easie to judge by those vain endeavors which they make in these encounters, that it's from the error of their thoughts, and that the Soul suffers it self often to be deceived in the Judgment she makes of her forces. Now this error commonly proceeds from the motion of heat which awakens and augments it self in this Passion; for as we have said in the Discourse of Boldness, this quality taking part with the corporal forces, being seated in the Heart, and being, if we may so speak, nearest the Irascible Appetite, it [Page 310]cannot be irritated nor increased without the Souls being abused with a vain opinion which it perswades that she is strong enough to undertake great matters.

It's as with a Prince who hearkens onely to generous counsels, to whom his power and greatness are onely re­presented, and who sees no man that pro­vokes him not to take up arms. For how weak soever he is, incessantly finding himself sollicited by those violent Mini­sters, having his ears always filled with their flatteries, he at last suffers himself to be perswaded, and without considering his impotency engageth himself in temerous undertakings; the Soul often doth the like in the weakest bodies, when natural heat kindles it self it the Heart, seeing nothing about it, if we may so speak, but this float­ing and unquiet quality, being every mo­ment provoked by its ardor and by its vi­vacity, and suffering it self to be surprised by the ostentation she makes of her power and vertue, she at last imagines her forces are greater then indeed they are, and with­out remembring her weakness she resolves to combate the ill, and flatters herself with the hope of obtaining the Victo­ry.

But it may be enquired, what it is which [Page 311]then thus irritates and augments this heat, What it is that ir­ritates heat in weak per­sons. forasmuch as if it be the Soul, as we have said, which employs it to destroy the ill, she must needs hope to overcome it, before she will offer to make use of it, since the de­sign always goes before those means which are proper to execute it, and that in effect the Passions are immanent actions, which form themselves in the Soul before the Bo­dy resents them; for there is no question but Hope accompanies strong and robu­stious constitutions; where it is not ne­cessary that heat should be irritated to raise up this Passion, it's enough for them that they know their forces, and are assured of them; but here where weakness is whereof the Soul hath the knowledge, and which consequently ought to make her mistrust herself, there must needs be something to animate her courage. In a word, it's ne­cessary Heat should be augmented before Hope can be therein formed: And yet we see nothing which can raise it, since we sup­pose that there is nothing in the Soul but Grief which proceeds from the injury re­ceived, and that this Passion far from en­creasing heat, is that which diminisheth and at last extinguisheth it.

To resolve this difficulty, we must dis­cover a secret which hath not hitherto been [Page 312]discovered in the Passions, That there are Passions in the lowermost part of the Soul. and say, that in all Animals there are two Appetites, the one which is sensitive, and the other which is natural; that both pursue what is pro­fitable, and flie what is ill; And that both of them again raise themselves up against what is contrary unto them to overcome it.

For it's certain that in sickness Nature irritates herself against ill, and stirs up her forces to drive it away, and that this moti­on is answerable to Anger and to Boldness, which form themselves in the sensitive Soul.

So that all motion of the Appetite making a Passion, this natural Appetite which hath its particular motions, must al­so have its particular Passions. It's true, they are not so perfect, nor in so great a number as the others, being led by a know­ledge less exact, and which discerns not the objects so well as the imagination, for which cause there are few, unless it be Plea­sure, Grief, Boldness and Fear, which are observed to be in this lower part of the Soul; they are likewise so imperfect that we may see they are but gross unfinished images, or the roughcasts of the rest; for the pain which Nature suffers, and I know not what kind of peevishness which follows [Page 313]the indispositions of the Body, are to speak truly, but feeble beginnings of true Grief; like as those secret glimmerings, and those pleasant resentments which accompany na­tural actions, are but the shadows of Joy and of Pleasure; And although Nature provokes and insensibly raiseth herself up against ill, and that we also often see that she is astonished and loseth Courage in the conflict, they are motions which indeed have relation to the Boldness and fear of this sensitive part, but are very far from their perfection, as it is very easie to judge.

All what can be said hereupon is, that these motions deserve not the name of Pas­sions, being not conducted by any know­ledge which is absolutely necessary to form the Passions; but besides that there is a hidden knowledge in all the things of Na­ture, it's most certain that it's more di­stinct and more apparent in some then in others; and that this natural Appetite is more enlightned in Animals then in Plants; for besides this obscure and secret know­ledge, which it hath for vegetative acti­ons; it's also conducted by the vital fa­culty which acts with so much light and dis­cerning, that divers did believe it was the springe of the sensitive Soul; Now al­though [Page 314]Philosophy hath restrained the name of Passions to such motions as are made by the direction of sence, yet we may perceive that its a far fetched circumstance which comes not near the essence of the thing, and that the motion of the Soul for­bears not to be a true motion, although it follows not the orders of the sensitive Soul, so that if it hath not all the conditions of Passion exactly so taken, yet at least it hath, if we may so speak, the body and substance thereof: In a word, it's so like it that as the name of Passions hath been given to the esmotions of the Will by reason of the resemblance which they nave with those of the sensitive Appetite, for want of terms more fit, we may call the motions of the natural Appetite Passions, although they are not so perfect, and that even perhaps they are of another order, and of another gender.

However it be these two Appetites which may sometimes, move separately, as we may experiment it in our selves, when Nature combates sickness, and we are nothing sensible of any of the sensitive Passions, they commonly relieve one the other, and communicate their motions when they are powerfully agitated; whence it happens that violent Passions cause such [Page 315]great disorders in the body, that the pee­vishness and secrer contentment which we have now spoken of ends at last in sadness or in real joyes; and that Grief cannot be very strong in the sensitive part, but that it must be sensible to the natural Faculties, and particularly to the vi­tal.

Now Nature hath this property, when the ill is come to her knowledge, to raise up herself against it, and endeavor to o­vercome it, stiring up the natural heat, and with the spirits conveighing it into those parts where she thinks it is. Thus inflam­mations happen to wounds; thus pain en­creaseth when the impostumes ripen, and that a Feavor breeds in a corrupt body; for all these accidents are effects of this Heat which Nature stirs up, and renders strong­er to combate the ills she resents.

This being true, we need not doubt that when weak and timorous persons suffer a very sensible injury, the grief it causeth in the sensitive Appetite can never de­scend to the natural Appetite: And then this power following its inclination must needs rise up against the ill, and according to its custom stir up natural heat to overcome it; for its undoubted­ly from thence the redness proceeds which [Page 316]appears in the countenance upon the ar­rival of a great grief, and which com­monly accompanies those first tears which grief makes us shed, as in its place shall be more fitly exprest.

If it be therefore true, that Heat a­wakens and augments it self in Grief, she may form Hope for the Reasons al­ready related; so that we can no ways doubt but that Anger is ever devanced by this Passion, even in the weakest and most timorous Natures.

Yet we must here remember what we said before; That that disposition which was necessary to produce this ef­fect, is, that we are very sensible of in­juries, and that heat is very agile, as without doubt it is in the Temperature of Women and Children who are composed of an agile and subtile humidity, wherein heat and the spirits are easily agitated without encountring any obstacle; Be­cause that in that weakness wherein the Soul perceives her self, she hath no time to consider it, so that she must needs be surprised, and as it were drawn away by the precipitate motion of heat; She would otherwise never engage herself in fight, nor ever believe she could over­come her Enemy.

Thence it is that Natures in whom Me­lancholy and Phlegm are thick and gross, are hardly made angry what ill soever you do them, because the Spirits move themselves with pain under the weight of such heavy Humors, and that the Soul hath time enough to consider its weakness before they can make their way or free themselves: So that what en­deavor soever the Natural Appetite can make afterwards, it is not capable to make her change the resolution which she had taken to suffer the ill, and with­out being touched with the least hope of being able to surmount it, resolving herself to Patience, or abandoning her­self to Grief, and to those Passions which follow it. But it's to stop too long on those Subjects which must be handled again in o­ther places.

Let us onely clear two Doubts which may arise from the precedent proposition; for if we often grow angry without Hope of ever getting satisfaction for the inju­ry received; And if even then when we are agitated with this Passion, we grow furious when we despair of our revenge, it must necessarily follow That Hope ought not alwayes to go [Page 318]before or accompany Anger, as we have said.

To answer to the first of these Reasons, Every man that is angry hopes to revenge himself. we must remember that in the order of Na­ture, Vengeance is a chastisement whereby we would take away from him who hath done us an injury the means to continue it. Now as no body makes himself an­gry, but he believes he hath that power; so neither is there any man but hopes to be revenged. And truly, all those actions which proceed from this Passion, how slight soever they be, are punishments by which we pretend to chastise him who hath offended us, since there is not any but af­fords him Grief or Fear; for a bold and brasen-faced mind, an action full of dis­dain, and despight, and injurious words are able to displease persons even that are of the highest condition, and threats are for no other purpose but to fright those against whom we make them.

Now if Grief and Fear are ills, and con­sequently punishments with which the Soul intends to chastise him who hath commit­ted an injury, that he may do so no more, believing that they are able to change his mind; and that it's sufficient to witness our Courage and resentment, to make him even lose the desire of continuing his ill [Page 319]design, and that he may imagine that their little essays are but the beginnings of a greater vengeance: It's thus that the wilde Beasts commonly bound their anger with a slight snap, or a weak blow, and that they often content themselves by affronting those who pursue them, looking through them, shew­ing their teeth onely, and putting them­selves in posture of assaulting them: And although the weakness the Soul is in checks her often from undertaking more, she had rather act thus weakly then to take flight, which would be far more disadvan­tagious; and by these motions which seem bold and generous, she would hide her im­potency and her defects, as in other occa­sions she useth to do. How ever it be, she never makes herself angry but she hopes to be revenged, and to make him who hath offended her suffer some kinde of ill. But it follows not that she ought always to hope for full satisfaction of the injury which she thinks she hath received, be­cause it commonly depends on the opini­on of men, and not in the intention of Na­ture; in effect, the means and the degrees of revenge are commonly different accord­ing to the humor and the condition of the persons, and according to the customs of the Country. A Prince or a Gentleman re­vengeth [Page 320]himself after another manner then doth a Clown; a cruel and bloody minded Man is not so easily satisfied as another; and there are places where we believe with­out a single Duel no satisfaction can be had for an offence; and others where poison and assassination are commonly imployed. Now as it often happens that a man hath not the power to use those means nor to pursue his vengeance to that height; it's most certain that then we despair to re­venge it after that manner, but not absolute­ly to be unrevenged for the reasons afore­said; and it's therefore true, that the hope of revenge always precedes Anger.

As for Despair, What kind of Despair it is hap­pens in Anger. which sometimes hap­pens and renders it more violent, neither is that an absolute loss of hope, nor doth conclude against the Doctrine already pro­posed. For we shall shew in the Discourse destined for that Passion, what the word Despair signifies in our Language as well as in the Greek and Latine; two Passions altogether different; to wit, the common despair wherein we lose all hope, and wherein the Soul gives back and loseth courage, perceiving that she cannot obtain that good which she expected; and that despair, or desperateness which is particu­lar to Anger and Boldness, which instead [Page 321]of mollifying or abating the courage, stif­fens it against all difficulties with a greater impetuosity and transport then it had be­fore. For it's certain, that in this the Soul which findes obstacles which she never foresaw, loseth the hope of effecting what she proposed; but at the same time she conceives another, and forms new designs which engage her in those transports and fougadoes, which are commonly called actions of despair, as shall more fully ap­pear when we throughly discourse on that subject.

Let's now take a view of the other Cha­racters of this Passion, and without stop­ing at Confidence and at Presumption, which have been examined in the Discourse of Boldness, and depend on the same causes which produce Hope, let's enquire the nature and source of Fury, which so often mixeth it self with Anger; for although they are often confounded together and that we commonly give the latter the name of Fury; yet they are two very different things, since there are Angers which are nothing furious, and that Fury is to be found in other Passions and in other acti­ons wherein there is no suspition of An­ger.

There are indeed divers sorts of Furie, What fu­ry is. [Page 322]some have been called Divine, others Bru­tal, and others have been placed in the rank of Diseases. But all have this in com­mon, that they put the Soul out of its na­tural place, and transport it as it were out of it self; some making it perform actions beyond the ordinary strength of men, and which for the same cause seem to have something that's divine; the other causing him to lose his Reason, and embasing him to the nature of the wildest beasts. It's not a place here to examine by retail all these differences; it shall be sufficient to say, that this violent transport wherein the es­sence of this Fury in general consists, may proceed either from the Soul which raiseth up and animates herself, or from that heat which pricks her up, and irritates her; the fury of Love, and the Poetick Fury, are a­mongst those which are divine, those which commonly acknowledge no other cause but the Soul alone, which of herself raiseth herself up, and makes those miraculous sallies which are as Enthusiasms and di­vine inspirations; for having the power to move herself, she in those encounters darts herself forth with so much ardor that she carries herself away; and as he which runs with too much impetuosity cannot stop himself, and often goes further then [Page 323]he willingly would, she abandons herself to the loose which she giveth herself, and so passeth beyond her ordinary limits: But it's not so in Martial and Bacchick Furies, nor in those others which follow Anger or cor­poral sicknesses. For it is not the Soul which begins this motion, wherewith she is in these encounters carried away; it's the heat which the Wine, Boldness, or the di­stemper of the body imprints in the spi­rits, which being agitated by this turbu­lent quality, at every moment strikes against the seat of the Animal Faculties, which drives them forth, and casts them into these extraordinary motions. This there­fore is the general reason whereby Anger passeth into Fury; for a man need not doubt but that this Passion kindles a great fire in the bowels, but that it violently a­gitates in the spirits, and that the quiet which those noble operations of the Soul require, must needs be trouled by that tem­pest which she raiseth in their principal or­gans; so that the Faculties which conduct the Animal, act no longer conformably to the Laws of Nature or of Reason, and having no longer a bridle to restrain them, are hurried away with the rapidity of the spirits and the Passion which drives them, and so perform all their actions [Page 324]with disorder and temerity. But what contributes much to this precipitation, it is Grief which is the first cause of Anger, and weakness which commonly accom­panies it; for both of them are natural­ly impatient and constrained, and eagerly sollicite the Soul to provide for her se­curity; that by reason that the ill is pre­sent; this because it wants forces to resist it, and that there is no time to be lost in so dangerous and urgent an occasion; and from thence it comes, that Anger is most impetuous in the weakest Natures; and that Fury kindles not it self so sud­denly in all the rest of the Passions as in this, for that they are commonly exempt from Grief and weakness, and that con­sequently there can be no cause for the Soul to hasten its endeavors for her defence; its true, that although robust Natures are not so soon transported as the rest, as well for the reasons already alleadged, as for that they are of a stronger and more so­lid complexion, wherein heat is not so ea­sily catching: yet when once Fury hath seized on them, besides that it is more ve­hement and more dangerous, it's also of a longer continuance, because the heat is stronger, and is longer preserved in gross and massive subjects, then in such as are [Page 325]subtile and moveable, such as are women and Children, and all those who are of such like a temperature.

Pride is so proper to Anger that there is no Passion it more often accompanies, Anger is proud. nor with which it's so familiar; and certainly it's a strange thing, that as soon as it's con­ceived in the weakest and vilest Mind that may be, it takes away from it the know­ledge of its baseness and impotency, making it lose all the respect it ought to others, and perswading it neither to yield nor submit to whatsoever it be. We need not go far for an example, since at every moment we may see that from its coun­sels Servants dare confront their Masters, Children their Parents, Subjects their Lords, and what is most frightful, such vile creatures as men are, spare not the most holy things, but often wrack it on God himself; and although this discord appear not so great in persons of a high conditi­on, when they grow angry with their in­feriors, yet they cannot forbear being guil­ty of a very and unjust and odious Pride, when they will hear neither Reason nor de­fences, when silence or excuses provoke them the more, and when a discovered in­nocency is to them but as a new injury; for all this proceeds from the haughty [Page 326]and proud Nature of this Passion which will always be in the right, and have rea­son on its side, which will never yield to any body, and will never acknowledge him for innocent, from whom it believes it hath received an offence, without ever accusing it self of impudence or inju­stice.

But whence may this Pride come, which is often so ill grounded, and is commonly upheld neither by strength nor reason? Certainly, we must not seek the source else­where then in the motion of heat, which troubles the judgment, and drives the Soul out of her ordinary limits, as is before said. For Pride being nothing but a swelling, and as it were an immoderate extention of the Soul, whereby she raiseth herself up more then she ought to do, and in pursuit esteems her self grearer then indeed she is, it is impossible that heat should be pro­voked without giving her a very great confidence, without transporting her out of herself, and consequently without cau­sing this excessive elevation wherein Pride Consists.

Moreover, the secret sence which e­very man hath of the excellency of his be­ing, which awakens him by the despight he believes he suffers by having been offend­ed, [Page 327]for to repair this wrong which he thinks he hath received by being despised, he would lift himself up above him who abased him, and filling himself with a great opinion of himself, finds himself thus puft up with Arrogance and Vani­ty.

Anger abounds in Words and in Threats, Anger is talkative and rail­ing. because the Fancy which is heated by the ardor she kindles in the spirits, and which is full of such thoughts as Pride and Ven­geance inspire, is forced to cast them out on the Tongue, and in its words; and truly we may say, that it is in some man­ner like liquor which the heat of the fire causeth to rise up in great boilings; for the fuller the vessel is of it, the more ea­sily it riseth above the brims, and so the more, and the more abundantly they issue out and shed themselves. It's true, that Grief which is always to be found with this Passion, very much helps this ef­fect by that precipitation, and by that im­patience which it gives the Soul; for which cause Boldness alone loves not to talk so much as Anger, and we may see the same person who boldly without speaking one word will go to fight, who having been offended cannot forbear to cry out and threaten, because Grief at that time mix­eth [Page 328]it self with Boldness, which is as a spur unto it which stimulates it, and af­fords it a useless Fury: But if Weakness joyns also with them, Anger becomes so highly brawling, and riseth to such an ex­cess of words and threats, that we may say that its at that time a torrent, which it's impossible to stop, as is to be observed in that of Women, of Children, and the like. Now this happens from that the Soul which knows its defect, hath a design to hide it by such actions as seem coura­gious, and whereby she thinks she ought to fright her enemy; or from that Grief and weakness which are as we have said, naturally unquiet and urgent, not giving her time to tempt more powerful means to revenge herself, cause her to have re­course to these first arms of Nature, and cause her to dissipate her courage in these vain assaults. And without doubt, he that will but consider that Beasts which are couragious, and Men who are bold and generous, use not to brawle or to talk much when they have been offended by any man, and that they seek their revenge, may well judge that cryings out, reasons and threatnings are the natural defences of provoked weakness, and that those who employ them, mistrust their own forces, [Page 329]and resemble those thunders, which onely make a noise and are heard a long time after their lightnings vanish; for when a Bolt falls, the fire, the noise and the blow are resented at once; and such is that Anger which is kindled in great Courages and in strong and robustious Constitutions, as hath been said in the Discourse of Boldness.

From the same source whence the abun­dance of words comes, Anger is indis­creet. this indiscreet Frank­ness proceeds, which renders it so facile to discover its most secret thoughts; for there is no Passion which is so ill a Guardian of a secret as Anger; and although Love and Joy also are alike unfaithful as that is, yet they commit not the same vio­lence on the Heart; they rather open it then cast it forth, and if they shed it a­broad, it's rather because they fill it, then that they empty it; but Anger suffers no­thing there which she drives not out with force; it exhausts it, by breaking it, and as a fire kindled in a Mine, it tears up and dis­covers all what is hid therein. In effect, it's impossible to conceive the impetuosity with which heat and the spirits issue out of the heart, and the violence with which the Soul throws herself forth for her revenge: but we must also fancy we see an effusion and scat­tering abroad of all her thoughts, and of all [Page 331]her designs; and chiefly of those which have conformity or alliance with Anger, as conspiracies made with or against an E­nemy, those secret good offices which have been done, and the like; which to satisfie its revenge, this Passion discovers. For when a man in anger reveals a conspi­racy, in which his enemy was one of the complices, it's to bring him in danger; when he publisheth an enterprise which he had formed against him, it's a threat; and when he reproacheth him, it's to convince him of wrong, and render him odious: They also are commonly the weakest which fall in this default, whether it be because they speak more, and that it's hard but that in many words much folly must needs be, or whether they would hide their weak­ness by the liberty they take to speak all they know, and all what they have a mind to do.

Yet there are some Angers which are Dumb, Some An­gers are dumb. and yet forbear not to be violent, although they make no noise; often even those which are lowdest, stop on the sud­den, and fall into a silence wherein Fury appears as high as in threatnings. Now this silence happens either from the confi­dence we have in our own strength, which seeks a more noble and a more solid re­venge [Page 331]then that of words, as we have said in the Discourse of Boldness, or from the despight we have of seeing our selves of­fended by persons from whom we expected not we could have received an injury, or from the scorn wherewith we pretend to chastise their insolency; or from that strong intention which the Soul gives her­self to find out means of revenge to dis­cover the motive of the wrong done her, or for such other like designs which Passion casts into the thoughts.

It's impatient and constrained, Anger is impatient not onely by reason of the Grief it resents, and of the desire it hath of Revenge, which are two Passions naturally very unquiet, but also because of the heat and of the agitation which it causeth in the spirits; for it's im­possble that these organs which serve the motions of the Soul and of the Body, should suffer this great ebullition without powerfully agitating both of them, and in pursuit without causing trouble or preci­pitation in the thoughts, strugling in the discourse or in the looks, and a continual change of posture and place which is ob­served in anger.

All Passions are credulous in those things which favor their design, Anger is opiniona­ted. and opinionated in those which resist them, because it's [Page 332]easie to drive the Soul whether she would go, and dfficult to make her take a new course: But as there is none so impetuous nor so rapid as Anger, there is none also in which perswasions are more easily re­ceived to hasten its course, or wherein such as would oppose it are more strong­ly reputed. Indeed we can propose no­thing to a man agitated with this Passion which may render the injury which he hath received greater or more sensible, which may advance or encrease his revenge, and which flatters his design and proceedings, but he greedily receives it, and affords it a ready approbation. On the contrary, he stiffens himself against all those reasons which endeavor to sweeten his resentment and his fury; and although he acknowledg the truth and justice of them, yet he is ob­stinate to combate them, and believes that his opinionacy is able to justifie his An­ger.

Yet he that would near-hand but consider all their actions, will perceive that Pride bears a great part in them, and that besides this general cause which we have now ob­served, this also particularly contributes thereunto: For Pride loves to be flatter­ed, will always be in the right, and never yields to whomsoever it be. So that we [Page 333]need not wonder if Anger which is natu­rally proud, easily hearkens to those who approve and favor its designs, if it repulse those who condemn it, and if it continue sledfast in its resolutions, when even it ac­knowledgeth them unjust.

Cowardliness, Anger is cowardly, insolent and cruel.Insolency and Cruelty sel­dom abandon this Passion, whether it be that the impetuosity and blindness it is in cause it always to pass beyond those bounds which Nature and Reason have as­signed unto Revenge: Or because that Pride causeth it to abuse those advantages which it hath over an enemy: Or lastly, for that weakness which often accompanies it, gives it such counsel, and perswades it that to secure it self against all those acci­dents which it may fear, it's obliged to use the height of the victory, and to car­ry it to extreme violence, as hath been said in the Discourse of Boldness. For which cause Women and those who are natu­rally weak and timerous, are more insolent cruel in their Anger then others are; and when those who have offended them fall under their power, they suffer all the in­dignities, all the outrage, and all the excess which rage and cruelty can in­flict.

Indignation, Disdain and Despight are [Page 334]not properly effects of this Passion, they are rather kindes and differences of it; for they are light Angers which seem to keep themselves almost quite shut up in the Soul, and which never fall into those ex­travagancies and violences which are ob­serveable in the others. All three have this in common, That Grief is always mixt with them, and that they stir up the Soul against those things which give them any displeasure. But there is this differ­ence, that Disdain is never without Scorn, although we have a despight and an indig­nation against such things as we esteem. On the other side, Indignation never is but in Men, although the other two are also to be found in Beasts. To conclude, it's certain that there are persons whom we de­spise without having any disdain or indig­nation against them.

And certainly the word Indignation means, What in­dignation is. that to raise this motion in the Soul, something must happen to a man which he deserves not, and which he is un­worthy of; now as we may grieve for the good or ill which so happens, the difficul­ty will be to know whether either of them be capable to raise it, or whether it be good onely, as Aristotle believes; For his thought is that the Grief we have to see [Page 335]him who deserves it not to suffer ill, cau­seth compassion; and that which we have to see those prosper which are unworthy of it, causeth ndignation. But this seems not to agree with that signification which all Languages give that word, nor even with the Nature of the thing: Forasmuch as the Soul may two ways grieve for the ill it sees those suffer who deserve it not, to wit by compassionating onely their suf­ferings, without employing its forces to combate the ill; or else by raising and lift­ing it self up against it to repell it. Now it's certain that Compassion is altogether without this commotion, taking care one­ly to flye the ill and being quite plunged in Grief and Fear, as we shall shew in its place; And therefore if the Soul makes any effort when she is angry with the ill which happens to any man undeservedly, since this motion can neither be compassi­on nor pity, it must needs be a kinde of indignation. Indeed the common manner of speaking teacheth us that there are per­sons who cannot see their enemies without indignation. That their words are full of indignation and threatnings; that God chastiseth the wicked in the Anger of his Indignation, and even that we are some­times in indignation against our selves. O­ther [Page 336]Languages also use the word in the same sence, for the [...] of the Greci­ans which Aristotle hath placed for this, hath a larger signification then he hath given it, and may be as well applied to the indignation which we conceive seeing a man too ill used, as for that we may have for him who is used but too well. In ef­fect himself confesseth that this Passi­on is attributed to God, who yet ought not to be in indignation for the prosperity of the wicked, because it's he who dis­penseth it to them, but justly because they abuse it and use it unvvorthily by their crimes and by their ingratitude. And truly we must not stick at all at what this incom­parable Author hath said of the Passions in his Rhetorick, in vvhich he hath treat­ed of them but superficially and in most common notions. For its certain, that had he throughly examined them, he vvould have made tvvo sorts of Indigna­tion, the one vvhich the good of another begets in us, and that vvhich happens from the ill vvhich vve suffer or see others suf­fer; and that the true and onely motive vvhich provokes them is Indignity; for vvithout that there can be no Indignation; it's Despight, it's Envy, or the like. So vvhen vve are angry at the good vvhich [Page 337]happens to a man, if vve do not consider him as unvvorthy of it, it's Envy; and al­though the ill must be alvvays unjust vvhich moves us to Anger, if we do not particu­larly look on it as an indignity, it may well beget Despight, or such a kind of an An­ger, but never Indignation: for which cause the motion which the Soul suffers in this encounter, runs not into those violen­ces and excesses which true Anger is carri­ed away withal; because the real ill which causeth Grief consists not in this Indignity, but in the Injustice which out of that con­sideration being a stranger unto it aug­ments it. So that if the Injury for ex­ample-sake is not great, what indignity soever you may conceive, it obligeth not the Soul to make any great endeavors, forasmuch as it is but as a colour which she gives herself to the body and sub­stance of the ill, which in some manner renders it more sensible, though not the greater. And it's also for this reason that Beasts are not susceptible of it, being un­able to make such reflections as are neces­sary to know whether one is not worthy of a thing; Besides men are in indigna­tion to see good or ill happen to those who deserve it not, because it is a thing which [Page 338]seems unjust, and that naturally we have an aversion against what is opposite to Reason and Justice; but how ever we interess our selves so much for them, we often abandon them in the Judgement which we make of the merit of persons, whom we often esteem worthy or unwor­thy of things according as Pride, Love, or Hatred counsel it.

For which reason Ambitious persons and Lovers are extreamly subject to this Passion, for as much as Vanity easily per­swades those that all other men are un­worthy of those Honors which they as­pire unto; and that Love gives a high esteem to those of the person beloved, and a great opinion of their service, for in that, though at every moment they find cause of offence, or are not suffici­ently esteemed, or else from that they are not well used, or that others are bet­ter used, who as they think deserve it not so well: On the contrary, those who are of a servile mind, or base spirit, and are not capable of any noble desire, they do al­most never resent the motions of Indig­nation. What Disdain is.

Disdain is also a kind of Anger, see­ing that to provoke it there must be some­thing [Page 339]which displeaseth, and must cause the Soul to rise up against it. But what renders it different from the rest is, that Scorn which ever accompanies it; for we never disdain any man but we scorn him, although we scorn many things which we do not disdain. So that we may say Dis­dain is a scornful Anger; and thence it is that it never is violent or impetuous, because those things which we scorn deserve not that we should trouble our selves for them: Not that what we disdain is always scorn­ful, or else the Soul would never care to rise up against it, since Scorn is nothing but the opinion which we have that a thing is unworthy of our esteem and of our care, not judging it capable to do good or hurt, as is before said. And therefore it must needs be, that what we ought to disdain may do some ill, but that its power is not so great, or at least that we feign we fear it not: For it often happens in these Passions, that the Soul which knows its weakness endeavours to hide it by actions, which seem outragious, as hath been said.

As for Despight, What De­spight is it hath nothing par­ticular which distinguisheth it from An­ger, as the former have; for it's but a [Page 340]weak Anger, and as it were a slight throw which the Soul to oppose ill gives it self, whether it be because it's of small concern­ment, or because she dares not or will not strongly assault it: For weakness common­ly restrains it and hinders it from driving the Passion whether it ought to go; And Rea­son which is not Mistris of the first motions of the Appetite suffers Despight well e­nough as the beginnings of Anger, but per­mits it not to go any further; for which cause timerous persons, and those who are moderate despise those things which in o­thers would kindle Anger it self.

The Characters which Anger imprints on the body, The cor­poral Charact­ers of Anger. mark out also the same mix­ture of those two Passions of which we have shewn they were composed: For we can­not doubt but a sad and crabbed mind which it sheds over the face, sighs and crys which at every moment it casts forth, and those tears which it so often vents, proceed from Grief; and that the ar­dor which appears in the Eyes, in the voice, and in all its motions, proceeds from Boldness; it's true, that this com­monly produceth those which are most sen­sible and more in number then the other, because it causeth the Soul to issue out, and [Page 341]to discover it self; instead whereof Grief making her retire within herself, causeth al­so the greater parts of its effects to re­main hid, and not to appear as the o­thers do. And certainly, in that number of corporal Characters which are obser­ved in Anger, there are but three or four which depend on Grief, all the rest comming from Boldness and from Fu­ry.

But from what source soever they de­duce their origine, we must not forget that some are made by the order and command of the Soul, and that the rest happen out of a meer necessity, she having no design nor intention to produce them, as is the paleness and redness of the Face, the wrinckles of the Forehead, the swelling of the parts, stammering, &c. For they serve for no other purpose in the design of Anger, and they are onely formed in pur­suit of the motion of the spirits, and of the rest of the parts.

Now as there being many of both of these which have been examined in the foregoing Discourses, which we intend not to touch any more; It shall suffice to let the Reader know that in the Chapter of Boldness he may finde the causes of that [Page 342]through-look, the motion of the Lids, Brows and Forehead, the widening of the Nostrils, the standing of the Hair, and that paleness which sometimes happens in the beginning of Anger; That in the Chapter of Love, he may see whence sighs spring, and why the ruddiness which that Passion raiseth begins at the Eyes; He shall in that of Constancy know whence the firmness of the parts proceeds. As for Tears, and other effects of Grief, we shall speak of them in the Dis­course which we have destined for that Passion.

Besides the Through-look there are two others which are familiar to Anger, to wit, a Fierce Look, and a Furious Look. Both of which have that in com­mon, that they are made with force and vivacity. But the Fierce one hath some­what that is sad and severe, which is not always to be encountred in the Furious, ad­ding also that it is not so ardent and wan­dering as is this.

To render the Look Fierce, Whence the fierce look comes. the Brows must lowre, and gather themselves toge­ther, the Eye must be quick and piercing, and the Sight firm and assured; Such is that of Lions, of Leopards, and of Ma­stiffs, [Page 343]for they naturally have their Eye­brows cast down and restrained, which makes as it were a great cloud in the Forehead, and their Eyes have a certain ardor which seem to breath forth blood and slaughter. And certainly there needs no less then these three conditions to compose such a kinde of Look: foras­much as an Impudent man may well have firmness and vivacity in his looks; but because he archeth up his Brows, and that rude and severe air which proceeds from the contraction of the Brows and Fore­head is wanting to him, he therefore can­not have a fierce look. On the other side, Frowardness and a strong attention of mind may cause this severity to appear in the Face; but because they take away vivacity from the Eyes, they never render the Look fierce. That piercing splendor indeed which appears in the Eyes, and chiefly in those which are blew, which the Latins call Cae­sios, inspires somewhat of cruel and fright­ful in the look, for which cause Tacitus calls the Germans eyes Truces; and we are taught that Panthers and Leopards, have I know not what kind of fierceness in theirs, which the Lyons have not; by reason that they have that colour, and that [Page 344]the Eyes of these are altogether red, which colour is more obscure and less splendent.

However it be, Anger casts down and bonds the Brows to fortifie it self against the Grief it resents, and against the Ene­my which assaults it, as hath been said else­where. It's Look is quick and assured, by reason of that splendor and strength which it casts into the eyes by the quantity of spirits which it sends thither. For we can­not doubt but that the firmness of the sight must be an effect of the strength of the parts, and that the spirits must make the greatest part of their strength, since they become languishing when they receive them no more. To know wherein this firmness of sight consists, we must consider what hath been said concerning it in the Chapter of Boldness.

Although the Furious Look is often taken for the fierce, What a furious Look is. yet is it not the same; for there is a great difference betwixt the ordi­nary looks of a Lyon, and those which he hath when he is provoked: Betwixt the look of a man who is yet Master of his Anger, and that he hath when madded and enraged; that is fierce, but this is furious, and witnesseth an extream trans­port, and a very straggling away of the Soul; [Page 345]it's made also with red and sparkling eyes, which shout forth and seem to go out of the Head, and which rowling from the one side to the other cause a wilde and wan­dering sight; and as in the other the brows are bent downwards, in this they are commonly lifted up, and drawing their lids after them they make the open­ing of the eyes to be wider and rounder, and so discover almost all the white of the eye. Now all these Characters are so pro­per to Fury, that even Physitians make use of them to know when the sick person will fall into such a fit, and that it's impos­sible to consider the state wherein the soul then is without perceiving that necessarily she must produce an effect.

For as the blood boils in the vessels, Red Eys. and impetuously casts it self on all the ex­terior parts, all the veins of the Eyes are filled therewith, and consequently become thicker and redder, for which cause Aristotle says, that those who naturally have theirs so, are subject to that kind of furious Anger whereof we speak, and that this relates to the proper character of this Passion; but you must observe that this redness ought principally to be understood of the Eye, and not of the Lids, & that the veins which are [Page 346]dispersed in the blew of the Eye are those which are swelled, and which cause that redness, which also is a sign of raving in sickness, when it proceeds not from any particular vice of those or­gans.

The Eyes are sparkling, Spark­ling Eyes. not onely by reason of that splendor which the spirits bring with them, but also by reason of the approach of those vapors which the Hu­mors casts on those organs, which exten­ding the Membrane which environs them, render it more united, more polished, and more fit to reverberate the light which they receive. Add also that the continual mo­tion wherewith they are agitated makes them sparkle and glister the more: to which we may also add, that their Driness renders their brightness more quick and peircing; it being certain that humidity dims the light, and that the refraction it makes there weakens the rayes, instead that on dry and polished bodies it's reflected and reverberated all whole and pure; for which cause in Love and in Joy, how sparkling soever the eyes be, by reason of their humidity, yet they have not so strong and so penetrating a splendor as these have.

But whence doth this driness proceed? Is it not from the vehemency of the heat which consumes all the humour which runs over the Eyes, or rather sharp and drying vapors which rise from that cholerick hu­mour which is agitated? for where-ever they arrive, they render the skin dry and parched, as is observable in burning Feavors and in cholerick constitutions.

Besides this, Fiery Eyes. the splendor we have spoken of, mixing it self with that colour which the blood brought to those parts, produceth an enflamed redness, which ren­ders the Eyes fiery, even like unto coals of fire.

They cast themselves forth, The Eyes advance outwards whether be­cause they receive a great quantity of spi­rits, of vapor, and of blood, they swell, and so are constrained to occupy the great­er room; or because the spirits which issue out with impetuosity, drive those parts out of their natural scituation; or finally, because the Soul which is carried out of her self draws them along with her, and causeth them to make a sally like her own.

Wandering Eyes, The Eyes are wandering. which continually move their sight here and there, without fixing on any object, make a part of this furi­ous look, and it's principally what renders [Page 348]them frightful and formidable, for which cause those who have treated of the Na­ture of Beasts, say, that the Panther which after this manner always rowls its Eyes, hath a more terrible and frightful look then any other, and that there is no Beast how fierce or bold soever it be, which it doth not fright and terrifie therewithal. However when the sight becomes thus wandering in sickness, it's a certain sign that the party is falling in­to fury. Yet we must observe, that fear also produceth the same effect, and often renders the looks wilde and inconstant; but besides that the air of the Face which accompanies those Passions, may alone ob­serve a great difference betwixt those looks, it's most certain that they are effectually different from one the other, neither are they made in the same manner. For fear causeth us to cast our eyes on this and on that side; but how light or quick soever the motion it affords them is, it for a while stops them on those objects which present them­selves, and it appears clearly, that it seeks them to consider them, and to see whether it be from them the ill must happen which she fears. But fury without design carries the sight here and there, and without heed­ing what it encounters, casts the eyes on [Page 349]things without seeing them, and all its looks are lost looks, and truly wandering. Now these motions partly come from heat, which is a moving quality, and when it's provoked it puts all in disorder, partly from that agitation which the spirits suffer, which easily communicates it self to the Eyes, being as they are moving, partly from the Souls transport which abandons the conduct of those organs, and suffers them to move at the pleasure of the tempest which she raised. The Brows are not knit.

And according to my opinion its also the reason why the Brows are not shrunk up, as in the fierce look; for since their con­traction is an effect of that care which the Soul takes to fortifie herself, which she al­ways also preserves so long as she is herself, when she is once carried away with fury, and that she is as it were out of herself, she then loseth the remembrance of her pre­servation, and hath no other motions but those which the blindness and madness of the Passion gives: For which cause when she darts & impetuously casts herself out of her natural situation, she draws with her the most movable parts, and so causeth the Brows and Lids to lift themselves up, in pursuit wherof the openings of the eyes must not onely be greater, but they must also-become rounder, [Page 350]because the Lid cannot open much but its angles must be widened, which must also be drawn the nearer to one another to fa­cilitate this extention which is made in the circumference. Now besides that this causeth a round figure, a greater part of the white of the Eye must also appear, which renders the look more strange and dreadful.

Tears which are sometimes shed in An­ger may come from the Grief which we suf­fer by reason of an injury; Whence Tears in Anger. yet common­ly they have no other source but the de­spight we have for not being revenged; for which cause Women and Children are more subject to weep in the strength of this Passion then Men; because they then acknowledge their weakness, and are for­ced to suffer the wrong which was done them without seeking satisfaction. To know now how these tears are formed, and what the motive of the Soul is, when upon these occasions she sheds them, its what in its place must be examined, and to which we have destined a particular Dis­course, which shall follow that of Grief. But we have sufficiently spoken of the Charact [...] which Anger imprints on the Eyes; [...] now consider those which she forms on the other parts of the Face.

The Lips grow thick by reason their sub­stance is soft and spungy, The Lips grows thick. which easily im­bibes the blood which runs thither. And being filled therewith they overturn them­selves, their bounds being free, and being not restrained by the neighboring parts.

But whence comes their trembling, The Lips tremble. and principally that of the lower Lip? Is it not that the spirits crackle in those parts, and cause that part which is extreamly movable to tremble? or that the Choler which is mo­ved, pricks the stomack, which hath a great sympathy with the neather Lip; whence it is that in sickness the trembling of that part is a sign of vomiting. The Lips press one another.

Sometimes they joyn and press one the other, to retain breath, and thereby to render the motion the more strong; or to fortifie those parts which grow hard and stiff by the contraction of the Muscles, as hath been said in the Chapter of Bold­ness.

They also sometimes retire themselves, The Lips retire them­selves. and discover the teeth, which most part of Beasts usually do when they are angry, because those are their natural Arms, which they discover to fright those who vvould offend them, or to be the readier to make use of them. This is also observed in some persons, vvhen they fall into a rage, [Page 352]and fasten on the flesh of any one, whether it be that the Soul makes this endeavor, thinking to fortifie herself, as she doth by knitting the Brows, or whether in effect she would with her teeth tear in peices, and if she could even devour her enemy. For there are men who grind their teeth, who in their anger bite what they meet withal, and who would eat the heart and bowels of those who have done them an injury.

The Voice is sharp and vehement because Anger being composed of Grief and Bold­ness, What the Voice is in Anger. this with impetuosity driving the air which is in the Lungs, and Grief restrain­ing the Muscles, and streightning the pas­sages, so that the voice must needs become shrill, passing through so streight a channel, and being driven out with vehemency, must needs also be strong. But there are two Propositions, which Aristotle hath made in his Physionomy, which may make us doubt whether this voice be that which principal­ly belongs to Anger. The first is that which is gross at first, and at last grows sharp, is the sign of a cholerick person, and this re­lates to Oxen, and to the likeness of their voice. Indeed when these Beasts bellow, their voice at last grows sharp, and hath somewhat in it which is sad and languish­ing, and even in men, affliction and grief [Page 353]in complaints form the same air, and the same languor. Now if this be so, the voice of Anger is not as we said strong and vehement.

The second is, That those who have a sharp and vehement Voice are cholerick, and that this relates to Goats; But besides that these creatures have not that kind of Voice, they were never observed to be incli­ned to that Passion: we must therefore say, that there is an error in those two propo­sitions by the fault of the Translators: for in the first, the word [...], signifies not Anger, as they have translated it, but sad languishing, cast down for matter of courage, and in that sence it's true, that the Voice which is grosse at first and sharp at last, is a sign of sadness, as we shall shew in the Chapter of Grief. In the last there is also the same fault in the word [...], which signifies not Anger, but rather Lasciviousness, which is indeed a quality proper to Goats. Add also that the word [...], signifies not sim­ply a strong and vehement Voice, but a forced and constrained Voice, such as is the bleating of Goats, as shall be said in its place.

The Voice becomes hoarse by the ine­quality [Page 354]of its organs; The Voice is hoarse. for heat melting the humors and making them run on those parts, it renders them moist and unequal, and the voice which it utters is rude, and sounds not; and because that vehemency is joyned with this sharpness thence it is it becomes terrible and fright­full.

Lastly, The Voice stops all at once. Sometimes it stops all at once in despight of ones teeth, whether it be that the violence wherewith it drives the breath, quickly clears the Lungs and de­prives the Heart of its refreshings; and that in this necessity the Soul making haste to cause a new attraction of the air, the Voice is constrained to stop to give it passage. Or whether the Nerves which help to form it, suffer a kind of convul­sion being pricked by those Humors which heat agitates, as it happens to children which cry, whose voice and respi­ration leaps, and so cut and suddenly stop themselves.

The Tongue faulters, The Tongue faulters. either by reason of the quantity of blood which thickens it, or renders it heavy, or by reason of driness which hinders its motion; or by reason of the Souls transport which sends [Page 355]the Spirits elsewhere, and hinders them from having recourse to those parts.

The Words interfare by the hast and im­petuosity which the Soul causeth, The Words imerfare which precipitates the words and thoughts one up­on another.

The Discourse is entangled from the dis­order of reason, The Dis­course is entangled and from the several de­signs it weaves and confounds together.

The Breathing is vehement, Respira­tion is ve­hement. and proceeds from the impetuous respiration which the heat of the Heart and the endeavor of the Soul causeth: For the principal end of Respiration is to refresh the Heart and the Spirits; wherefore when they are heated, it is at the same time augmented. But because also this action is partly volunta­ry since it will advance or retard even as the Soul desires it should, thence it is that the endeavor she makes in all her actions, ap­pears in this, rendring it violent and pre­cipitate.

The same heat renders the Mouth dry, The Mouth is dry. and gives it an ardent Thirst which is not so easily satisfied as that which happens [Page 356]in Fear; as shall be said elsewhere.

Those malignant humors which are moved and heated cause a Sticking Breath.

Laughter is often an effect of Indigna­tion or of Scorn, Laughter in Anger. which are mixed with Anger, as we said it happened to Bold­ness; but commonly it comes from the malignant pleasure we have in Revenge; yet the Temperature contributes much to this effect: For Septentrional people have almost the same air in fight, and we may see them assault their Enemies with a certain insolent Fierceness, and with I know not what kind of scoffing Laughter; instead whereof the Southern people car­ry on their Countenance a fierce Frow­ardness, and a sharp and cruel Sadness; the reasons whereof shall in its place be discovered.

The Redness which this Passion com­monly raiseth up in the Face is not alto­gether like that which Joy, The Face becomes red. Shame and some other Passions shed abroad in it; it is far more clear and less vermilion then in this, for that it proceeds from a cho­lerick blood, whose colour is more pale, by reason the tincture of the Gall which [Page 357]weakens the splendor and Vermilion of the Blood, and causeth this inflamed Red­ness which is visible in the Face and Breast of those who are angry. It also some­times happens that it becomes obscure and blackish, and this chiefly is when Anger is turned into Fury; for the agitation is then so great that the thickest blood is cast on the outward parts which affords it its natural colour, and paints them of that black and livid colour which is to be ob­served on the Cheecks and on the Lips, because they are the most sanguine parts of the Face. As for that paleness which sometimes happens at the beginning of this Passion, we have spoken of it in the Chapter of Boldness.

We must not stay long on the most part of the rest of the Characters which this Passion imprints on the body; the reasons are easily found by those principles which we have established. For we can­not remember the impetuosity and the boilings wherwith the blood and spirits are agited, but we must presently judge, that that is the cause which makes the Veins and Arteries swelled and extended, and that all the rest of the parts are full and puf­fed [Page 358]up, and whosoever shall represent to himself the impatience and the transport wherein the Soul is, will nothing wonder at these motions which in this Passion the Body suffers.

The Head is lifted up, and the Stature grows erect, for as much as the Soul rais­eth up herself to assault the Enemy. And although he be absent she forbears not to put herself into this posture, as if she were ready to throw herself on him, for that the violence of those Passions which trouble her represent him to her thought as if he were truly present, and as if he ought in effect to feel the blows she intends to in­flict.

The frequent flinging out of the Arms, The mo­tion of the parts in Anger. a light and quick pace, a continual change of posture and place, are effects which note the endeavors and sallies of the Soul, the precipitation and impatience she hath to revenge herself.

But whence comes it that we set up our Hands by our sides, when with anger and threatnings we quarrel with any man? it is without doubt to confirm the parts that [Page 359]the Muscles of respiration which they up­hold may the more powerfully operate, and by that means the voice may have the more force and be the longer lasting. For which cause we are never content to place our hands thus on our sides, but that we also advance the Arms and the Elbows, whereby enlarging and extending the Shoulders we render them for the same purpose more stiff.

As for those blows wherewith a man in Anger beats the ground, and all what comes under his hands or under his feet, it's very likely that they are such means as the soul useth to give a repulse to those diffi­culties which traverse her designs; and that the trouble and blindness she is in causing her to take all things for true ob­stacles which stop her, she strikes against, she drives, and she beats them, as it were to break them and to put them by, or else they are the effects of a precipita­ted Vengeance which Anger doth dis­charge on the first Objects it meets, having not either the patience or the power to make them be rescued by its real Enemy. It's thus that Dogs bite the stones which are thrown at them; it is [Page 360]thus we break the Sword which wounded us; in a word, it is thus we revenge our selves on our selves, and above all, its what concerns those from whom we have re­ceived an injury.

But what reason can we give for all those shakings of the Head which are remark­able in this Passion? Whence the sha­kings of the Head. What can oblige the Soul to move it one while to the right, and then to the left, sometimes up and sometimes down, and sometimes on one side onely? And to what end doth she cause these so extravagant motions, and so different the one from another? For to conclude that they are signs and natural effects which Anger produceth in all men of what Nation or of what constitution soever they are; So that if Nature doth nothing in vain, she must herein have her causes and reasons as well as in her great­est and most considerable actions. It is true, in my judgement, they are very hard to be known, and it is with them as with most part of things which hide them selves so much the more unto the Mind, the more they discover themselves unto the Sences, and which are as difficult to be comprehended as they are easily re­markable. [Page 361]And certainly as all natural things are made for some end, or out of necessity; we cannot say but that the al­teration of the Body, or the agitation of the Humors must cause these motions by a necessary consequence, as it happens in the redness of the Face, in the wrinckles of the Forehead, in the splendor of the Eyes, and the like, which are formed by necessity, without being destined for any use; and if we would place them in the rank of actions which are performed for some end: it is nothing easie to observe what motive the Soul therein proposeth it self, no, what service she pretends to draw from thence.

To give further light to these obscu­rities, you must first know whether these motions are not in other Passions, and afterwards seek those motives for the which they were therein formed; and last­ly to see whether they may be applied to Anger.

It is certain that we use to shake the Head and to give it readily two or three turns about, when any thing displeaseth, Why we toss the Head. as e­specially when we refuse or disapprove of [Page 362]any thing, when we are sensible of an ungrateful smel, or when we tast ought that is disgustful. For which cause the vulgar commonly call Wine when it is not good, Wine with two ears, because it makes those two parts move when we turn the Head from one side to the other, and that by that motion we would signifie that we found it to be naught. But what relation can this action have with these sentiments? Is it not that the Soul would turn away the face where the organs of the sences are, from those objects which are displeasing to it, as she useth to fix them on those which please; Or that she seeks by that endeavor to estrange from her what is troublesome? At least it is thus, that when any thing incommodates those parts we shake them about to drive them away; for although this in these encounters we speak of be useless unto it, yet are they nothing extraordinary, since she often de­ceives herself in the same manner upon o­ther occasions, wherein she abuseth those means which Nature hath prescribed her to attain her ends, employing them in o­thers where they are of no use, as hath been shewed, speaking of that water which Desire causeth in the Mouth, and of the [Page 363]motion of the Brows at the sight of di­stasteful things. Or we may rather say, that this shaking of the Head is a mark the Soul would make of the impression which some kind of objects make on her, and that it is an outward image of that action which she performs in herself: For it is her custom that when she would have that appear outwardly which is done with­in, she causeth those motions of the organs which have some relation and resemblance with her own, as we may judge by the laughter of the looks, and by all those o­ther effects whereof we have spoken in this Work.

And certainly, since that at the en­counter of pleasant things she makes par­ticular signs which make known the sence she hath of them, she must needs also have some for those which are displeasing. So that if she sweetly casts down the Head when good presents it self unto her (as it hap­pens when we meet a friend, when we approve a good action, or when we con­sent to the will or advice of another) to signifie by this casting down that she sub­mits herself to the good which by reason of its excellency, and because it always [Page 364]communicates it self with some empire, can never be but with some submission and allowance; it must needs be I say by the reason of contraries, that when she per­ceives any ill, she who hath a natural a­version from it, which in its presence al­ways disquiets its self, and with which she can never have any society or com­munication, must also make some outward motion which represents her impatience, and the endeavor she makes to estrange herself from it. Now he that shall consi­der the shaking of the Head which we speak of, will easily confess that there is none which can better express her averse­ness, her disquiet, and the care she takes not to unite herself with it; for aversion causeth the turn away of the Head; impa­tience makes the change of posture, and those contrary and redoubled motions make it appear that she will not unite with it, since union in natural things, is al­ways made by a simple and uniform mo­tion, if there be no obstacle which hin­ders it.

Besides this it will be nothing difficult to declare why Anger produceth the same effect, since it hath the same object which [Page 365]the rest of the Passions have, and that it cannot consider its enemy but as a vexati­ous ill, for the which it hath an aversion, and whereunto it will ever witness the ha­tred it bears, and the impatience it hath to revenge it self. In effect, this shaking of the Head, is a kind of threat whereby we intend to fright people, and which is not made use of in fight, or when we come to blows; threatnings being then useless, as hath been said.

As for the other motion of the Head upwards, Why we lift up the Head. it is but little observable in this Passion, unless when it would witness the scorn which it conceives of advice given it, or of the designs and threatnings of the e­nemy. In effect, it is a Character fit for Scorn, for him to whom we propose a thing which he slights, usually to lift up his Nose, to witness thereby that he rejects and repels it as unworthy of his esteem and care.

Finally, Why we turn the Head. Anger often causeth a man to turn and lift his Head on one side, chiefly when he cannot or will not be revenged: For when we receive an injury from a powerful person, and have not the power [Page 366]to demand satisfaction we cause our resent­ment to appear by that action, which is familiar to children that have a courage, after they have been ill used, as also those who form a design to revenge themselves when their enemy is absent or far off; Because those are not then in a capacity to execute their revenge by reason of their weakness, nor these by reason of the ab­sence, or far distance of him who hath of­fended them. On the other side, when for some certain consideration a man will not revenge himself although he may, as when we esteem the injury not very consider­able, or that those who have done it de­serves a more severe chastisement, we con­tent our selves with this motion of the Head to cause some fear in them. And certainly it is in the rank of those acti­ons which serve for threatnings, where­by the Soul intends a displeasure or an ap­prehension in those who have offended her, making them believe that those slight punishments are but the beginnings of a greater vengeance, as hath been said: However it be she intends thereby to make known that the injury toucheth her; and that she means to retort it; but that she retains this Passion, and gives it not the [Page 367]liberty to go further; for it turns the head to witness aversion; it lifts it up to signifie its endeavor, and presently brings it into its first posture to shew that it hath no more to do, and that its enough for it to have witnessed its courage and resent­ment.

Some perhaps may say, That we often perform the same action, when we finde a thing to be excellent, as when we would declare that a thing is well done, that a man hath some eminent vertue, that Wine is extreamly good.

To which we must answer, That there is a great deal of difference betwixt these two; For besides that in this we never turn the Head, it is not thrown, but as we have said it is rather drawn and raised up, neither falls it again so soon as in Anger; because its admiration which cau­seth this motion, which raising up the Soul and keeping it in suspence to consider the wonder she incounters, disposeth of the organs conformable to the condition she is then in: Whereunto must also be ad­ded, that the subject of admiration which here occupies the Mind is but mean; for when its very great, it not onely causeth a man to lift up the Head on one side; [Page 368]but he lifts it up altogether, he opens al­so his Eyes and his Mouth, raiseth and extends his Arms and all his parts take such an extatick figure which usually ac­companies those great transports and rap­tures of the Soul, as shall be said else­where. But let us conclude this enquiry which to many may seem of no use, or too much scruple; and let us see whether Anger may be lulled asleep, and whether it affords any release to the Mind, whilst the Body is at rest.

We cannot doubt but that if Sleep can hardly insinuate it self in those Pas­sions which are least violent, it is as it were impossible that it should ever surprise this which is altogether in excess and ve­hemency; The calm it is accompanied withal, cannot agree with the tempest it raiseth; and whether it be formed by the intermission of the Soul which knits and stops the spirits, or by means of those sweet vapors which digestion sends up, which like pleasant clouds tempers the heat of the Brain, and shuts the passage of the sences; we ought not to expect that any of these causes should produce it here wherein there are none but sharp and burn­ing [Page 369]vapors, which heated Choler causeth to rise up in the Brain; and wherein the Soul is so powerfully agitated, that far from being able to stop the Spirits, she cannot retain even herself. Yet this ought to be understood of the time when this Passion is in its rage, and in its greatest ardor; for when it is a little appeased it suf­fers sleep to benum the sences, to repair those losses which its watchings and labour hath caused.

But what rest soever it affords, it forbears not to preserve in the Soul and in the Humors the remains of that storm which Anger had raised in them. For it is commonly disturbed with a thou­sand kinde of Dreams which sometimes represent fires and burnings, sometimes threatnings, and Combates, and Victo­ries; now the cause of all these Dreams comes either from the imagination, which being still full of those species which Pas­sion had there left, and feeling also, if we may so speak, the shake which the desire of Vengeance had given it, it insensibly suffers it self to be carried away, and so continues its first designs, which it al­ways causeth happily to succeed, being no [Page 370]longer conducted by the Sences, nor by Reason, nor taking any other counsel but such as self-love and Pride which Anger brings along with it, affords it. For it is from thence these advantages come which a man who sleeps upon his wrath, believes he receives in all his Dreams; it seems to him that he is alwayes the stronger, of the better address; he never sees his Ene­my but he represents him unto himself ei­ther weak or submitting, and he in them undertakes no combate but he comes off with the Victory and in Triumph.

But it may also happen, that the Soul may be altogether in a calm, and that no remains of the trouble which the Passion had before brought, may stay behind; and yet all these illusions will not forbear to happen, and then it is no longer a conti­nuation of its first designs, but a new mo­tion which the Spirits and the Humors raise in the fancy; for whether their agi­tation subsists after that of the Soul, the impression of the motion, preserving it self longer in these bodies then in the Ap­petite, whether by reason Choler being se­parated from the mass of blood, cannot so soon resume its just place; both are able [Page 371]to form all these violent Dreams which we have spoken of: The difficulty is to know how this may be done, since these things touch not the sences, which are benummed; nor consequently the imagination, which works onely on those images which it hath thence received. And were they even at liberty, there is no likelihood that they should know what passeth thus in the se­cret of the Veins; What then is it which can raise in the Soul all these Chimera's and Phantasms, which have so much re­lation with that Motion which the spirits then suffer, and so much resemblance with that humor which is in disorder?

We must certainly confess, that besides this exterior knowledge which the Sences afford her, she hath another which is inte­rior and secret, which Nature hath inspi­red, by means whereof she sees and knows all what is done in her organs, and that with that light she who is present with all the parts, easily observes what is done in them, and afterwards communicates it to the imagination, which is as it were the center of all her knowledge. But foras­much as this is obscure and confused, she instructs not this Faculty clearly, and af­fords [Page 372]it onely a general view of those ob­jects which concern her; it's for the same reason also that she forms no perfect ima­ges which respect things as they are, but which onely have some relation and agree­ment together. So when choler is moved, although the Soul distinctly knows not the nature nor the species, yet she knows it to be a humor which is hot and ardent, and upon the report which she hath made there­of to the imagination, this fancies to it self sparkling colours, flames and burn­ings, which have a conformity with that general notion which she had received of them. And because that she also knows that this Humor serves Anger and Bold­ness to destroy the Enemy which they as­sault, seeing herself in such a condition as in these Passions she useth to be in, she pre­sently thereupon proposeth such objects and designes, and so forms Enemies, Assaults, and Combates. We may say as much of the agitation which remains in the Spirits after the esmotion of the Soul is at an end. For observing it during sleep, she who knows that it's the motion which in Anger she makes use of, reingageth herself afresh in this Passion, and sleeping reassum the desires and designs of reven [...] which [Page 373]waking she had already given over. She doth the like also proportionably, when the other humors are irregular; when the spirits finde themselves agitated with the motion of some other Passion; in a word, it is thus, that she forms all Dreams which come from the good or ill disposition of the body, as we have shewed in the Trea­tise of Love out of Inclination.

There remains two effects onely to be examined, concerning which we must consult Physick; for it is from her we must learn What Pulse there is in Anger, and in what disposition the Heart and the Lungs are when it is kindled in those parts.

As for the first, All Physicians are a­greed, That the Pulse herein is great, high, quick, frequent, and vehement, and that the violence of the heat, and force of the vital Faculty, are the principal causes of all these differences.

But although all this be true, yet we may say that this kinde of Pulse is not proper and particular to Anger, since it is also to be found in Boldness, as we decla­red [Page 374]treating of that Passion; and that cer­tainly there must be somewhat which hi­therto hath not been observed, which di­stinguisheth it from this, there being no probability that these two Passions should diversly agitate the Soul and the Spirits, without causing also in the Heart and in the Arteries different motions: It is there­fore certain, that in both of them the pulse is great and high; but in Boldness it is full and extented, and we may feel the Ar­tery under our fingers which swells every way; instead that in Anger it puts all her endeavor forwards, and without enlarging it self it darts it self outwardly, making the pulse thereby high, which seems ra­ther streight then large. And certainly as the Spirits follow the design of the Soul which throws herself out of herself to as­sault the Enemy, their sally must needs be made as hers is, from the center to the cir­cumference, and that if the Arteries are to be restrained as it is necessary, and as we shall hereafter demonstrate, it ought to be by the sides, that the Spirits may be left at liberty to dart themselves forth; but there is no question to be made of this effect nor of its cause, if we remember that Grief and Boldness are here mingled together, [Page 375]and that at the same time both of them agitate the Heart and the Arteries with a motion proper to them; for if Grief ought to restrain it, that Boldness at the same time might open it, they must be streightned in some of the parts, and enlarged in others, in pursuit whereof, the Pulse appears high without being extended, as hath been said; yet we must observe that it is principally so in the motions of Anger, or that when it is in the ardor of Vengeance, or that it turns into Fury, this contraction is no more felt but it is found to be altogether large and full, as it is in Boldness; or whether the sence of Grief be stifled, or its effect suspended by the violence of other Passi­ons; or whether the Soul which is then as it were out of herself, minds no lon­ger her preservation, and without having a care of sheltering her self, she blindly exposeth her self to danger, and aban­dons her self to all the rage which posses­seth her.

The Respiration in this is just as it is in Boldness; for although it proceeds from the same causes the Pulse doth, that it is of the same use, and that its motions have the same relation: yet hath it not all the [Page 376]differences, or at least it hath not made them known, because we are not sensible by the touch of the Body of the Lungs where it is formed, as we are sensible of that of the Arteries, and that there is not such a tie betwixt that and the rest of the exterior organs which renders it sensible, as there is betwixt the Heart and these kind of Veins; for which cause there is neither hardness nor softness in the Respiration, as is in the pulse, nor can we observe any thing which comes near this kind of beat­ing, which we said was proper to Anger; although the Lungs suffer the same chan­ges, and be in the same condition as the Heat then is; for Hippocrates assures us, that in this Passion both the one and the other retire and restrain themselves in themselves, [...], although heat at the same time swells them and lifts them up. Now although we cannot doubt but these contrary motions come from the mixture of these two Passions whereof we have spoken; yet it is not easie to observe how they may be compatible together, nor what parts are destined for their re­ception, it being not probable that the same should be agitated by both together. For we cannot herein say of the Heart and [Page 377]Lungs, what we have said of the Arteries, their natural constitution and the action which they are obliged to perform, suffers them not to be restrained, as they are to be lift up: It must necessarily be that they must extend when they open them­selves.

But if they extend themselves so, how can they restrain themselves? Certainly, we must say that their flesh and substance gathers comprench and restrains it self, and that their cavities enlarge themselves, instead that in Joy all the parts release and soften themselves, having not that need to fortifie themselves as here they have; in effect, the pulse which appears harder in Anger then in Boldness, is a certain sign that the substance of the Arteries restrains and hardens it self; and we can­not doubt but that the hardness of these parts comes from the contraction of the Soul, since it is for that onely reason that the pulse becomes hard in Fear.

All the difficulty remaining is, To know why the Arteries which borrow the vertue of moving themselves from the Heart, have not a motion like his, and that they streighten their cavity on the sides, [Page 378]although that enlargeth his own on all sides.

To resolve this difficulty, we must ob­serve that the beating of the Arteries is not the same which is in the Heart, since those open and lift themselves up, whilst this fall and shuts it self. So that they must needs be too different motions, and conse­quently proceed from two different ver­tues. And if this be true, there is no ne­cessity that they should resemble in all things, and the Heart in any sence may enlarge it self without any necessity for the Arteries to do the same; now as the Heart hath its Ventricles placed on the right and left which necessarily ought to open themselves to receive blood and air which enters therein, it's impossible the Soul should cause it to make a motion conformable to the Passions wherewith it is agitated, as is made in the Arteries where this impediment is not, and where she hath all the liberty to satisfie Grief by restraining them, and Boldness by rais­ing them up, as hath been said. As for the Lungs, there is a particular reason for which they cannot restrain themselves as the o­thers do; for they have not the power to move themselves, and of themselves they [Page 379]lift themselves not up to give place to the air which enters. It is the muscles of re­spiration, which extending themselves widen the capacity of the Breast, and con­strain the Lungs to open, to hinder a va­cuum; for which cause waving the mo­tive Faculty, they have not those kinds of motion, which depend therefrom.

But it is to pry too far into the secrets of Physick, and the further clearing hereof would be useless to those who know it, and those who are ignorant of it would never be sufficiently informed. Let us onely say, That although Anger causeth often very great disorders in the Soul and in the Body, Anger is profitable to health. yet it is not always an enemy to Reason, nor to Health. It is absolutely necessary for weak and idle minds, and for cold and gross constitutions; and even in all others it may be compared to winds, which how impetuous soever they are drive away va­pors and mists, clearing the air, and ren­dring it the more pure and wholesom. In effect, if we seek to hinder its course, or that we would restrain it, without suffering it so much as to exhale it self by words, it preserves it self a long time in the Soul, and at last alters the humors, whence of­ten happen great and pernicious sicknesses. [Page 380]For as the inferior part is deaf to the coun­sels of Reason, and that she proposeth to herself revenge as the end she tends unto, she will cause her motion to cease untill she is at least in some manner revenged. So that the Will may then hinder those actions over which it hath a power, such as are words, blows, and the like; but for those which are not under its direction, as are the motions of the Heart, and the agi­tation of the Humors, they must necessa­rily be continued, they must even by this restraint be rendred the more violent, and they must last the longer time, since we de­lay our revenge, which is the end which ought to terminate them.

FINIS.

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