YOur importunities have at last prevail'd, and since abler Pens have hitherto declin'd to espouse the quarrel, I will for once force my own inclination to silence and reservedness, and briefly give you my thoughts on that unlucky Pamphlet, call'd, A Defence of the Charter and Municipal Rights of London.

The Author, I find, is a Gentleman of the long Robe, a person so well known of late for his unweary'd diligence, and extraordinary faculty in scribling▪ that I need not give you any other Character of him, but that some three years ago he writ a Book in vindication of the Bishops Right of Judicature in Parliament; and for this piece of service expected no less than to be made Lord-Chief-Baron of the Exchequer in Ireland. But missing of that Preferment, he grows peevish and angry with the Court and Clergy, and to be even with both, and perhaps to appease his angry Brethren of the Separation for his former Mercenary undertaking, he adds a Baboons Tail to his Picture, a Postscript to his Book, the most virulent and malicious, that has yet escap'd the hands of Justice. Ever since, he has continu'd firm to the Cause, laid aside his useless Law, and zealously imploy'd his better Talent against the Church and State, in favour of the Faction; and this about the Charter is the last effort of that wise Head-piece, which he has stuff'd with such a miscellany of wild Paradoxes, interwoven with some impertinent Truths, that 'tis far more difficult to digest them into method, than to answer and confute them.

First, to lay a solid foundation for his great design, he tells us, That Monarchs, as well as Republicks, have often erected Municipal Cities, and by their Charters bestow'd upon them several Franchises and Priviledges, as to choose their own Magistrates, and governby their own Laws, while subservient to the publick Laws of the Sovereign Authority, pag. 1. This is certainly very true; but how far it makes for the Charter of London, against the Quo Warranto, is a Mystery not to be comprehended by every vulgar capacity: for 'tis no less plain in History, that not only Tyrants and Vsurpers, as he mentions, but just and lawful Sovereigns, have divers times suppress'd such Municipal Cities, for good and necessary causes, as for being disloyal to their Prince, or factious and seditious against the Government; and then the main Question will be, How far the City of London has of late been guilty of such Crimes, as by Law deserve the like Punishment?

This, in short, is the plain state of the Question; for 'tis most unreasonable to think, that any King or Republick ever gave their Municipal Cities any such Liberties or Immunities, as were not forfeitable upon their abusing the Power they receiv'd; when otherwise, neither Prince nor People cou'd be secure from the insolence of such uncontroulable Citizens, without a standing Army to keep them in awe. But our Gentleman, it seems, is unwilling to touch upon this critical point of speculation; and as the Defence of the Charter is the least part of his Pamphlet, so now he runs quite from the purpose, to tell the King like a dutiful Subject, He may, if He please, take His Quietusest, and let His people govern themselves; For it is impossible (saith he) that mankind should miscarry in their own hands, pag. 2. Now, since they have often miscarry'd in the hands of Princes, is it not more expedient for the publick good, if this Maxim will hold, that the Prince shou'd mind his own private business, and not trouble himself with the Government, which the People can do better without Him?

This is Mr. Hunt's new Model of Government, who out of pure love and kindness to the Monarchy, chalks out a ready way for his Sovereign to ease Himself of all the thorns and prickles of His Crown, and become a glorious King like His Father; And therefore seems very angry, that the Court, (i. e. the King) should be troubl'd with the Power of appointing Officers in any City or Corporation in the Kingdom, tho' it be found of absolute necessity for the keeping His Crown upon His Head, and protecting His best Subjects from a Band of Associators and Ignoramus-Juries.

Oh! But by this new form of Corporations, it will be in the power of a Popish Successor to put the Government of all Corporated Towns in England into the hands of Papists▪ p 5. And without it, I say, it will be no less in the power of the Faction, to put the same Government into the hands of Fanaticks. What a Bugbear is this Popish Successor! whose very Name turns the brains of a Whig into a Magnifying-glass, that will transform Ants into Gyants, and Mole-hills into Mountains! We have as good Laws as the wit of man can devise, to secure us from the encroachments of Popery, and to disable Papists from bearing any Office, Civil or Military, either in or out of Corporations: and yet this Popish Successor, who possibly may never succeed, this great Goliah, can break through all those Laws, and will certainly do it, to curry favour with a handful of Papists, and make himself a Slave to the Pope.

This is not all; For this mode (saith he) of incorporating Cities and Towns, doth ipso facto change the Government; for that One of the Three States, an essential part of the Government, which is made up of the Representatives of the People, and ought to be chosen by the People, will by this means have five sixth parts of such Representatives, upon the matter, of the Courts nomination, and not of the Peoples choice;—and at the next turn we shall have a Parliament of Papists and Red-coats, pag. 6. O profound Politician! has not our Government been Regal and Monarchical from the beginning? how then can the House of Commons, in comparison but a late Institution, necessary not for the Being, but for the Well-being of the Monarchy, be an Essential part of it? Or how can any Rul • r be term'd a Monarch, that has 500 Demagogues Joynt-Governours with Him? These, and such other Republican Maxims, have been in a great measure the main foundation of all the miseries and confusions we suffer'd under the late Tyranny of the Rump-Parliament; and after our sad experience of those Tragical times, surely we have reason to think, that none but such as wou'd bring us back to the same calamities, and sing the second part to the same Tune, would now endeavour to assert or maintain them: yet they are so very familiar to our Irish Chief-Baron, that there is hardly a page in most of his Pamphlets, but has a strong tincture of them. In his great and weighty Considerations considered, he says, The Parliament derive Their Authority from the same Original the King derives His▪ The King hath not His Power from Them, nor They theirs from the King: They Both derive their Authority from the consent of the People, either tacit or express, in the first institution of the Government, or in the subsequent alterations of it, pag. 16. Is not this a rare Assertor of the Monarchy, that makes both Houses thus co-ordinate with the Prince, and all the Three subordinate to the People; turns the Governed into Govornours, and leaves to the King the Title only, but to His Subjects the Power and Dominion? The Law tells us, That all Authority and Jurisdiction, Spiritual and Temporal, is derived from the King, 1 Ed. 6. c. 2. §. 3. And Plowden, as great a Lawyer perhaps as Mr. Hunt, says, That the King has the sole Government of His Subjects, fol. 234, a. How then can Mr. Hunt make the People the Original of Power, since all is derived from the Prince? or how can either or both Houses of Parliament pretend of themselves to have any share in the Government, which is wholly in the King? or claim any Authority or Jurisdiction over the People, but as deriv'd from the Sovereign?

Let us therefore explode these Republican Notions, that have cost us so dear, and cannot in the least avail either Parliament or People, but will always make the Prince jealous of their proceedings, who can better hear the complaints and humble Petitions of his dutiful Subjects, the constantIn making our ancient Laws, (saith the great Antiquary Mr Selden) the Commons did petere, the Lords assentire, & the King concludere: in his Judicature in Parliament, pag. 132. stile of our ancient Acts of Parliament, than the Imperious dictates of his fellow-Governours; for, experience confirms what Lucan long since has told us, Nulla fides Regni sociis, omnis que potestas Impatiens consortis erit.

But how shou'd this new form of Corporations make their Representatives in Parliament, not of the Peoples choice, but of the Courts nomination, is not very intellig • ble in my apprehension: since every Cobler can tell, the Free-men of Corporations, and not their Officers, have the sole power of electing their Representatives. Where then is the danger of a Parliament of Papists and Red-coats, (tho' there had been no Law to disable the former from sitting in the House, till they forswear themselves, or abjure their principles) unless the major part of the Free-men of England, which I hope shall never happen, be suppos'd to embrace the Popish Religion? We have seen, to our cost and to our shame, a pretended Parliament of Red-coats and Round-heads, which like the Aegyptian Locusts devour'd all the fruit of the Land, and turn'd Europes Paradise into a Field of Blood; and this blessing we owe to Mr. Hunt's poor harmless Dissenters; which I hope will make us so wise for the future, as never to give them the like opportunities.

It were endless to follow this lawless Scribler through every page and paragraph, or severally to take notice of all his incoherences, and impertinent digressions. To come therefore close to the business of the Charter, we must turn over many pages, and step from the beginning almost to the end of his Pamphlet, to find out something that may seem to the purpose. Three points he offers at last in defence of the Charter, which he says to the Londoners, he comes to defend against theirs, and he might add as well, his own, reason and understanding, p. 31. For if he has a grain of Law or sense left, he knows that of these points the first is impertinent to what he undertakes, and the rest but fallacious cavillings, to impose upon the Vulgar, and make them obstinate to their cost.

First, he says, That the Dissenters, tho' Excommunicate, have a vote in the Election of their Officers. 2ly. That the Common-Council cannot destroy or surrender the Charter. 3ly. That the Sherivalties of London and Middlesex are in the City by Common or Statute-Law; and consequently not to be displac'd, but by Act of Parliament, tho' with the consent of every individual Citizen, p. 32. For the first, he takes a world of pains to prove, that the Excommunication of Dissenters does not render them uncapable of giving their Vote in the Election of the City-Officers. And what then? Is the Charter never to be forfeited, while the Dissenters have a Vote or Suffrage in such Elections? or are they so numerous in the Common-Council, as to out-vote the Members of the Church of England? are their tender consciences still so plyable, as to receive the Sacrament in their Parish-Church to serve a turn, and run to a Conventicle all the year after? to take Tests and Oaths to get into Imployments, and break all with a breath to promote the Good Old Cause? nay, venture to forfeit their Ears to the Pillory, and their Souls to the Devil, to help off an active Brother catch'd by the Tongue? These are the harmless Clients of our Irish-Chief-Baron, of whom we may well say with the Poet, —Mille adde catenas, Effugiet tamen hac sceleratus vincula Proteus.

These, I mean, not the mis-led or seduc'd, but the Heads and Ring-leaders of the Faction, who always hold with the Hare, and run with the Hound, and make conscience of nothing but Conformity, and yet conform for Preferment. To these their deluded followers owe all the severities of late used against them, and the City this so-much-talk'd-of Quo Warranto, with all the unlucky consequences, which Mr. Hunt says are like to attend it: there being no other way to rescue the Government out of their hands, or secure His Majesty's Crown and Dignity, and the Lives of his good Subjects, from pack'd Juries, and perjur'd Ignoramus's.

But they have (says our Lawyer) an utter abhorrence against Popery and the Plot, and joyn forwardly and zealously against it, p. 16. 'Tis true, they make a great noise and bussle about that horrid Conspiracy, but in reality they have done more than the Papists were able to do, to stifle and confound it. They attaqu'd the Church of England, whilst in the heat of prosecuting the Conspirators, and labour'd under the Umbrage of the Popish-Plot, to carry on another of their own, to subvert the establish'd Government, and insensibly to decoy us into Presbytery, and their darling Commonwealth; as the Tryal and Condemnation of their Proto-Martyr Colledge; their Green-ribbon-Clubs, and Ignoramus-Juries; their Vox Patriae's, and Vox Populi's; their Appeal from the Countrey to the City; the Speech of their Noble Peer; and in short, the tendency of all their Seditious Libels, back'd with the Depositions of several Witnesses▪ do as plainly demonstrate, as Coleman's Letters and Execution prove the wicked designs of the Papists. They inveigl'd some of the principal Discoverers of the Popish-Plot to espouse their Party, and vilifie the Church; which frightn'd many a Loyal Gentleman, that cou'd not forget the Contrivances of the late times, where Popery was the First, but Monarchy the Last Act of the Tragedy, and made them suspect these same persons, now their hand was in, might at last be wrought upon, to turn against the obedient Sons of the Church, whom they had already stigmatiz'd with the ignominious Names of Tories, Masqueraders, and Church-Papists. In short, they contriv'd so many shams and silly stories, as made the very truth questionable; and when they saw the English Plot was not like to embroil the Nation, they invited a number of profligate wretches out of Ireland, gave them Cloaths and Money in abundance, and took so much pains to set up these unmanageable Tools, that in fine they dash'd both Plots to pieces, one against the other.

Are we not then beholding to our true-blew-Protestants, after all these fine exploits, for their abhorrence against Popery and the Plot, and to Mr; Hunt, for his zealous vindication of their Proceedings? He was formerly suspected to be a man of no Religion; but now, like a generous Soul, he owns his Party in their greatest distress, and openly declares against the Church of England, as Betrayers of God's Cause, and the Peoples Liberties. Some of little understanding among you (saith he) that thus behave your selves, are excusable, as misguided by some of your Ministers, who are in good earnest begging Preferments, Dignities and Benefices for themselves, by offering and betraying our Church to a voluntary Martyrdom, p. 12. I need not comment upon this scurrilous Reflection, 'tis enough to say, 'tis the product of Mr. Hunt's own Brains, who, according to his Fee, tho' against his conscience, spoke for his Clyents; for Lawyers, he tells us, (and who more fit to know?) have Opinions to sell at any time, tho' they have not the least colour of Reason to support them, p. 19. If this Confounder both of Law and Gospel, be thus for fouling his own Nest, we need not wonder at his frequent snarlings at the Loyal and Christian Resolutions of our Reverend Clergy, or expect better usage from a man that openly sides with the Enemies of our Church.

I come now to his second point, which is so wild and so extravagant a paradox, as deserves rather to be laugh'd at by men of sense, than to be answer'd or confuted: since, besides several that have done it within these two years past, there are not many Corporations in England, whose Charters have not been surrendred by their Common-Council, without so much as consulting their Common-halls; and yet were never question'd for it, as Betrayers of their Trust, or of the Liberties of the People.

But he drives home the Nail in his 3d. assertion, where he says, that the Sherivalties of London and Middlesex, or the right of choosing their Sheriffs, (the main point now in dispute, and what most concerns the King, after our late experience, to have in His own disposal) cannot be parted with, without an Act of Parliament, tho' with the consent of every individual Citizen. But sure the Gentleman is not in earnest; for I hope he will allow us, that tho' alone they cannot, yet with the consent and approbation of the Common-hall, or of every Citizen, the Common-Council may surrender the Charter: who then, the Charter being thus surrendred, has the power of choosing the Sheriffs, when the Corporation, the City and the County is dissolv'd, neither Mayor nor Alderman, Citizen nor Free man to found? The Inhabitants in general cannot choose them, for they have no right now to do it, neither do they receive any new power by the surrender of the Charter; and yet the Free-men cannot, when there is no such thing in being, no more in London than in Westminster, or any other Dissolv'd Corporation.

But to be short in a Case so plain, since the Gentleman requires an Act of Parliament for displacing the Citizens Right of choosing their Sheriffs, here is One ready to his hand, for taking away, upon their neglect or misgovernment, all their Franchises and Liberties, and consequently this power of electing their own Officers and Magistrates; an Act found by the prudence of our Ancestors, so necessary for to maintain the publick Peace, and keep that over-grown City within the bounds of duty, that Henry IV. tho' he sought occasions to ingratiate himself with the People of London, the better to secure his Usurpation, yet cou'd not be wrought upon by their intreaties to have any material part of it alter'd, much less annull'd or repeal'd. The Act take as followeth.

280. Edwardi 3i. cap. 10o.

BEcause that the Errors, Defaults and Misprisions, which be notoriously used in the City of London, for default of good Governance of the Mayor, of the Sheriffs, and the Aldermen, cannot be enquired nor found by people of the same City: it is ordained and established, That the said Mayor, Sheriffs and Aldermen, which have the Governance of the same City, shall cause to be redressed and correated the Defaults, Errors, and Misprisions above-named, and the same duly punish from time to time upon a certain pain; that is to say, at the first Default a Thousand Marks to the King, and at the second Default two Thousand Marks, and at the third default, that the Franchise and Liberty of the City be taken into the King's hand. And be it begun to enquire upon them at St. Michael next coming, so that if▪ they do not cause to be made due redress, as afore is said, it shall be enquired of their Defaults by Enquests of people of Foreign. Counties; that is to say, of Kent, Essex, Sussex, Hertford, Buckingham, and Berk, as well at the King's Suit, as others that will complain.

And if the Mayor, Sheriffs and Aldermen, be by such Enquests thereto assigned, Indiaed, they shall be caused to come by due Process before the King's Justices, which shall be to the same▪ assigned out of the said City, before whom they shall have their. Answer, as well to the King as to the Party. And if they put them in Enquests, such Enquests shall be taken by Foreign People, as afore is said. And if they be Attainsed, the said pain shall incurr and be levied of the said Mayor, Sheriffs and Aldermen, for default of their Governance. And nevertheless, the Plaintiffs shall recover the treble Damages against the said Mayor, Sheriffs, and Aldermen. And because that the Sheriffs of London be Parties to this business, the Constable of the Tower, or his Lieutenant, shall serve in the place of the Sheriffs, to receive the Writs, as well Originals of the Chancery as Judicials, under the Seal of the Justices, to do thereof execution in the said City. And Process shall be made by Attachment, and Distress, and by Exigent, if need be: so that at the King's Suit the Exigent shall be awarded after the first Capias returned, and at the third Capias returned at the Suit of the Party. And if the Mayor, Sheriffs and Aldermen have Lands or Tenements out of the City, Process shall be made against them by Attachments and Distresses, in the same Counties where the Lands or Tenements be. And that every of the said Mayors, Sheriffs and Aldermen, which do appear before the said Justices, shall answer particularly for himself, as well at the peril of other which be absent, as of himself. And this Ordinance shall be holden firm and stable, notwithstanding any manner Franchise, Priviledges or Customs. And this Ordinance shall extend to all Cities and Boroughs of the Realm, where such Defaults or Misprisions be used, and not duly corrected nor redressed: saving that the Enquests shall be taken by Foreign people of the same County where such Cities or Boroughs be. And that the pain of those of the said Boroughs and Tolws, which shall be thereof Attainted, shall be judged by the Discretion of the Justices, which shall be thereto assigned.

This Act was a great Curb to the people of London, and kept them for many years after, very obsequious and dutiful to their Sovereign; but in process of time, finding it was not duly put in execution, they began to forget it at last, and wou'd now and then break out into some extravagance, which afterwards cost them very dear. Finding therefore themselves very uneasie under this restraint, tho' neither in Edward III. nor his Successor's Reign they durst motion to have that Statute repeal▪d, yet when the Vsurper Henry IV. came to the Crown, they labour'd hard to get themselves rid of it, but cou'd gain no more than the following Clause; which many in London, who always think ill of the King and His Ministers, will think of no great advantage to the Defence of the Charter.

OUR Lord the king considering the good and lawful Behaviour of the Mayor, Sheriffs and Aldermen, and of all the Commonalty of the same City of London towards him, and therefore willing to ease and mitigate the Penalty aforesaid, by the assent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and of the Commons aforesaid, hath Ordained and Established, That the Penalty aforesaid, as well of the Thousand Marks, and of the two Thousand Marks, and of the seizure of the Franchise comprized in the said Statute, shall not be limited in a certainty, but that the Penalties in this case be by the advice and discretion of the Justices thereto assigned, as other Cities and Boroughs be within the Realm; And that the Remnant of the same Statute, and the Process thereof, stand in their force, 1 H. 4. cap. 15.

Now, I appeal to Mr. Hunt's own Judgment, provided he has so much moral honesty, to speak nothing of his skill in the Laws, as will qualifie him for an Irish Chief-Baron, Whether or no these two Statutes be not as plain against the Charter, supposing the Mayor, Sheriffs and Aldermen to have been negligent in their duty, and a fortiori if they and the Common-Council be found guilty of the Crimes laid to their charge, as Magna Charta or the Petition of Right is for the Liberty and Property of the Subject; For, that 'tis neither Treason nor Felony, nor yet the Subversion of the Government, but Crimes of a far inferiour nature, that are meant by the Errors and Misdemeanors mentioned in the said Acts, is apparent by another Statute made some three years after, by the same King Edward III. where it is Enacted, That the Mayor and Aldermen of London shall rule and redress the defaults of Fishers, Butchers, and Poulters, and put the same in execution, upon the pain late ordained touching the City of London, 31 Ed. 3. cap. 10. Now, if the whole City, for a bare neglect of duty in their Officers, as for omitting to punish the Misdemeanors of silly Trades-men, were by these Acts of Edward III. so grievously punishable, as for the first Offence to forfeit a Thousand 〈…〉 no less in the 〈◊〉 value than 2000 l of our now 〈…〉 so much in the 〈◊〉 use and price of things) 〈…〉 for the second offence, and for the third to forfeit their Franchise and Liberties to the King: what shall be thought of others, if they are found not only to have laid an Illegal Arbitrary Tax upon their fellow-Subjects, and in a tumultuous manner invaded their Properties; but wink'd at, if not encourag'd, the publishing of Treasonable Papers and Pamphlets; and instead of suppressing others, presented their Prince with a most Scurrilous one of their own, by way of Petition, to tax His Majesty with misgovernment, and endeavour to bring Him into hatred and contempt with his People?

As for the aforesaid Clause of 1 H. 4. tho' intended for (as really it was) a great favour to the City, that they shou'd not for every trisling fault be oblig'd to pay such a vast Fine as a Thousand Marks, twenty times greater than that sum now; yet if their Crimes had been found of a transcendent nature, striking at the very Root and Life of the Government, we may be sure the Justices, by vertue of this very Clause, wou'd have immediately seiz'd their Charter, without bringing them to any further Tryal. So that this Clause, tho' in small inferiour misdemeanors it be a great advantage to the City, yet in Crimes of State, where the Crown and the Monarchy are concern'd, 'tis no less an advantage to the King.

Thus, Sir, you have seen how well Mr. Hunt has defended the Charter against all the Power both of Law and Reason, and you will find him altogether as happy in the rest of his undertakings. I omit his impertinence on the Play, call'd, The Duke of Guise, his unmannerly application of the Characters, and his framing of Parallels where little or no similitude can be found: Yet en passent I cannot but pity the condition our Lawyers INNOCENT and GENTLE PRINCE is reduc'd to,pag. 27. by the slie insinuations and bewitching flatteries of this and such other Sycophants of the Faction, who puff'd him up, and possess'd him with such chymerical hopes of a Crown, as made him forget his Obedidence to his Princes will, and the positive command of his Natural Father; Natural, I say, because in our Laws the Maxim is, Qui ex damnato coitu nascuntur, inter liberos non computantur, i.e. Bastards are not counted amongst Sons, Coke 1 Instit. f. 3. or as Littleton says, A Bastard is quasi nullius filius, because he cannot be Heir to any, apud Coke 2 Instit. §. 188. Now, if by Law this Prince can be Heir to none, what a madness it was to advise him to aspire to Three Hereditary Kingdoms, or think to carry them tamely by Popular Applause, when nothing but the Sword can establish a crack'd Title?

But the best people of England (says this non-sensical Scribler) have no other way left to shew their Loyalty to the King, and love to their Religion and Government, in the long intervals of Parliament, than by Prosecuting His Son, for the sake of the King, and his own Merit, with all the demonstrations of the highest esteem, p. 28. They are certainly very hard put to it, if this (not to PROSECUTE his silly Latinism) be the only shift they can make to express their Loyalty, when Children can tell, they might, if they had any, better shew it, by prostrating themselves at His Majesty's feet, and declaring their readiness to venture their Lives and Fortunes in defence of His Sacred Person, and the Rights of His Crown, against all the attempts of the Popish Plotters and Whiggish Associators. 'Tis true, some of the best People in England have had, for the King's sake, and in some measure for his own Merits, sufficient kindness for his Grace, and still wish him more Grace and consideration, than to continue obstinately disobedient, contrary to common Prudence, and to all the ties and obligations of Nature, of Duty, and of Gratitude: But as for Mr. Hunt's best People of England, tho' pretended his only Friends, they have been upon all occasions his real Enemies, made a Property and a Tool of him, to set him up, like another Perkin Warbeck, in opposition to the Royal Line; and if that succeeded, to kick him down again, as they did Richard Cromwell, to make room for Themselves and their darling Commonwealth.

But to return from this digression, and examine what is left yet unanswer'd of this idle Pamphlet: I find our Chief-Baron wou • d-be has stumbl'd at last on those two famous Statutes of Edward III 4 Ed. 3. 14. 36 Ed. 3. 10. to prove, that Parliaments must be held once every year; which (saith he) is confirm'd by an Act of this King, call'd, the Trienial Act, p. 21. But by his Lordships good leave▪ these Statutes, if well consider'd, will be found to have been made rather to oblige the Commons (who then grumbl'd no less at the frequent calling, than the Factious do now at the long intermission of Parliaments) to send their Representatives to the King's Great Councel, than to bind the King to summon them when there was no occasion for their meeting; and therefore, to make the case more plain, the conditional Clause, If need be, which may aptly refer to the whole period, is expresly provided in the said Statutes. For to affirm, it was absolutely enacted that a Parliament shou'd be held once every year, whether there was any, or no need of their meeting, when the choosing of Members was so troublesom, and their expences eundo morando & ad propria redeundo so chargeable to the people, besides the great Taxes they usually granted, is altogether unreasonable. As for the Triennial Act of this 16▪Car. 2. 1. King, it makes more against than for his Lordships design; since it requires but to have a Parliament once in three years, and not sooner, without some extraordinary occasion; which, I doubt not, but His Majesty, according to His late most Gracious Declaration, will see punctually observ'd, as He has been pleas'd to do in the whole course of His Reign.

And the Statute of Provisors, 25 Ed 3. is no less impertinent to his purpose; for tho' it be the Right of the Crown of England, and that the Law of the said Realm is such, that upon the mischiefs and damages which happen to His Realm, the King ought, and is bound by Oath, with the accord of His People in Parliament, to make remedy and Law, in removing the mischiefs and damages which thereof ensue: Yet if His People in Parliament prove peevish and obstinate, and will not accept of His Majesty's gracious Condescensions, nor of the expedients by Him propos'd; who then is to be blam'd, the King or His People? How many Proposals and Overtures of accomodation have been made by His Majesty to His last Parliament at Westminster? and how undutifully they were rejected by some Leading-Members in the House of Commons? How often did he offer to consent to any reasonable expedient they cou'd find out, for securing the establish'd Religion, in case of a Popish Successor? But all was slighted, as if nothing but the Subversion of the Monarchy was able to secure some Gentlemen in their Religion, that were shrewdly suspected to have none to lose:

This discourse, I know, will not relish with our Irish Chief-Baron, who seems already very angry, that a Cabal (as he calls the Loyal Addressers of the Nation) shou'd take upon themselves to arraign the Proceedings of our latest Parliaments, p. 8. And yet his unmannerly Worship, because he thinks 'tis a Priviledge peculiar to the Godly to speak evil of Dignities, scruples not to rail at the best Parliament that ever met in his time, which really was (what he scoffingly calls it) a Parliament of famous Loyalty; tho' in their latter days, when by the Death of several good Members, too many of the old Leaven had crept in, that vigor was much abated, which they always express'd in their former resolutions; and for which this Factious Lawyer presumes to say, that obliquely they gave the Papists many assistances, p. 14. and in plain terms calls them, the corrupt Villains of the late Long-Parliament. Considerations consider'd. p. 19. But to clear this point, without insisting upon retortions and recriminations; I say, to arraign the Proceedings of the Parliament, in its true and legal sense, that is, of King, Lords, and Commons, is a very great and a very hainous Crime, not to be conniv'd at, or endur'd in any Subject whatsoever; because it tends to the vilifying, and consequently to the subverting the Government; for as Seneca well observ'd, Nihil valet Regum potestas, nisi prius valeat authorit as: If Princes lose their Authority, the awe and reverence due to them from the People, they have lost their Power and Command, and are in effect more than half Depos'd. But to arraign the Proceedings of the Parliament, when this Name is abusively appropriated to the House of Commons, to whom this lawless Scribler attributes a high and uncontroulable Power, (p. 9.) as if the King and Lords were only Cyphers, the Crime is not near so unpardonable as some people wou'd have us believe. I am sure Mr. Justice Hutton in his Argument against Ship-money, (which so pleas'd even that Rebellious Conventicle of Forty-One, who swallow'd up the King's Prerogative and the Peoples Liberties in their Parliament-Priviledges, that they gave express Orders to get it printed) thought it no such Crime to say, I know not whether the last meeting in Parliament, either by ill choice of the Members of the House, or by the great encrease of the number, or by the ambitious humour of some Members of that House, who aim'd more at their own ends and designs, than the good of the Commonwealth, things were so carry'd, not as was us'd in ancient times, but so disastrously that it hath wrought such a distast of this course of Parliaments, as we and all that love the Commonwealth have just cause to be sorry for it. p. 33. Nevertheless, I must confess, that even in this sense 'tis not becoming every private Pen to censure or condemn them, upon every slight occasion; and the motives must be very extraordinary, when such practices are allowable. Yet when we consider, that matters have been so carry'd on for some years past, that of necessity we must e • ther mislike our Princes Wisdom and Councils, for Proroguing and Dissolving so many Parliaments; or conclude, as undoubtedly we must, that the unseasonable heat of the Leading-Members in the House of Commons, necessitated His Majesty to take such unwelcom resolutions: And withal, when we find, not only the King, but the generality of the Nation in their repeated Addresses, express their dislike to the Proceedings of a prevailing Party in that House; all Loyal Subjects, I think, concern'd in the election of such Members, ought to be so just to Themselves and the Publick as to declare their own Integrity, and their constant affection to the King, that the world may see they are no Abettors of the unwarrantable resolutions of their Representatives; who perhaps ran into such unusual extravagancies, in hopes to be seconded by their Principals. But tho' the occasion be never so extraordinary, it must nevertheless be granted for an undeniable Maxim, that whatsoever misdemeanors any Members of that Honourable House happen to commit▪ it ought not to reflection the House in general, nor yet the errors of the whole House at any time, put either Prince or People out of love with that wholsom and excellent Constitution. For such is the instability of Mundan affairs, that (as the Poet said) Nihil est ab omni parte beatum; there is nothing upon Earth but hath its failings, and even the best of Governments has sometimes its own inconveniences: Thus Princes are now and then apt to give too much credit to their flattering Favourites, and be led for a while by their evil Counsels till time and experience convince them of their error; and 'tis pla • n, the wisest Assembly that ever sate • n the House of Commons cannot be always free free from the like mistakes, but are sometimes mpos'd upon, by the plausible pretences of some designing Politicians, and cunningly decoy'd in, to act contrary to their inclination to their interest, and their duty. Of this kind we have several remarkable passages in the Intestine-Troubles of Forty-One, where a few Factious Members in both Houses insensibly inveigl'd the rest, and inflam'd the whole Nation into a general combustion; And these four years past can sufficiently furnish us with fresh instances almost of the like nature, but that through the great Prudence of our Sovereign and His Most Honourable House of Lords, mindful of their Fathers miscarriages, all these endeavours prov'd abortive and unsuccessful.

If we ser • ously consider what measures some persons of greater parts than honesty made use of at that time, as well in as out of Parliament, we shall find cause enough to admire how people that pretend so much Religion & Loyalty, so much affection to their King and Countr • y, cou'd be wrought upon to run head-long into such extravagant courses, so destructive of the Prerogative-Royal, and of the Peace and Settlement of the Three Kingdoms. The horrid Popish-Plot, which has already cost us so many Millions in our Trade and Commerce, and, I am afraid, a great deal more in our Credit and Reputation abroad, was made a stalking-horse by the ambitious to attain to their expected Greatness, of being chief Ministers, if not chief Magistrates of all the K's Dominions: And because His Majesty, wisely considering it was impossible to make a just and impartial enquiry into that hellish Conspiracy, whi • e the people were so far transported with heat and passion,Ne frena animo permitte calenti; da spacium. tenuem que moram; male cuncta ministrat impetus. which nothing but time cou'd cure; and withal discovering what use some designing Demagogues intended to make of this Plot against the Monarchy, thought it convenient, or rather necessary, sometimes to Prorogue, sometimes to Dissolve his Parliament, and call another, in hopes to meet with one of a better temper, and more moderation; Our cunning Machiavellians took hold of this opportunity, to enflame the unthinking multitude, and make them believe their All was betray'd, without a speedy Parliament, to enquire into the Popish-Plot, and redress the Grievances of the Nation; and therefore they clamour'd, it was absolutely necessary they shou'd all joyn in a Petition to His Majesty for that purpose: whereby they were sure, either to gain their point, and get the Parliament to sit, which they might model and influence, as they pleas'd; or at least know the strength of their party by the number of Subscribers, and lessen His Majesty's credit in the hearts of his People. To this end Agents are sent about▪ and the Petition is sign'd by many Legions of the Goaly Party. None so forward to subscribe this Petition to the Son, as they who petition'd for Justice aga • nst the Father. There you might see Presbyterians, Independents, Quakers, Brownists, and Anabaptists, all in a string, to petition His Majesty for a speedy Parliament. A mysterious Riddle to all sober and understanding men, that Fanaticks, who always but in Forty-One dreaded the face of that August Assembly, shou'd now be more zealous for their sitting, than the True-Protestants of the Church of England. It was certainly an Omen that cou'd portend no good either to Church or State; and therefore, as the King had reason to mistrust there lay a Snake in the Grass, the Brethrens zealous petitioning to that purpose, did rather hinder than forward their meeting.

At last, when it could not be thought the effect of the Fanaticks importunity, but of His Majesty's grace and goodness, the Parliament met on the 23 of Octob▪ 1680, and the King having solemnly renew'd them His former promises of complying with any thing they cou'd in reason propose, desir'd them to wave all unseasonable disputes, and hasten to settle the affairs of the Nation, and bring their meeting to a happy conclusion. The People were generally big with expectation, to see the issue of this famous Session, and doubted not but all their jealousies and distractions wou'd now be fully removed, the Three Nations settl'd and compos'd, and the Popish Plot speedily shifted to the bottom. Parturiunt montes. They sate almost for three entire months without any lett or interruption: and what have they done all this while towards the effecting these weighty matters that lay before them? what great progress have they made towards the suppressing of Popery, or putting a period to that hellish Conspiracy? They spent nine or ten days about my Lord Stafford's Tryal; and when all expected the other Lords shou'd immediately follow, our charitable Patriots, tender it seems of shedding more Popish-Blood, sate down to breath themselves, and not a word more of the Papists to the end of the Chapter.

The truth is, the Leading-Members, that govern'd all in the House of Commons, had other fish to fry. They were ferreting out Papists in Masquerade, or half-reform'd Protestants, now thought more dangerous than the profess'd Romanists. A Reformation they intended both in Church and State, and God knows where it shou'd have ended It was enough they fix'd the Popish-Plot by the conviction of my Lord Stafford; but it seems it was their interest to keep it on foot for other purposes, perhaps in imitation of the wise Romans; who thought it impolitick to demolish their great Rival Carthage, which, while standing, might serve to keep them from idleness and exercise their Valour. The Papists therefore must have a time to breath, and the Fanaticks are the great favourites of the House, while known Protestants of the Church of England, under the odious names of Abhorrers, are forc'd to bear the brunt, and suffer as Betrayers of the peoples Rights and Liberties, for obeying their Sovereigns Proclamation, tho' not repugnant to any known Law or Statute, but approv'd of by the Judges, and other Sages of the Law, and conformable to an express Act of Parliament in the like case provided. 13 Car. 2. c. 5.

'Tis the peoples Right, I know, or to speak more properly, 'tis their Duty, to petition their Prince for relief and redress of their Grievances; but still 'tis the undoubted Prerogative of the Sovereign to judge whether such Grievances be real or pretended; fit to be granted, or necessary to be rejected: And when upon weighty considerations, as the Subject ought in duty to suppose, the Prince openly expresses his dislike to such Petitions, to importune him any further is very unmannerly, and plainly tending to Sedition. 'Tis an undutiful part in Subjects (saith our British Solomon) to press their King, wherein they know before-hand he will refuse them. In his Speech to the Parliament. anno 1609.

The evil consequences of these tumultuous Petitions are too well known to those that remember our late unhappy Confusions, to be dwelt upon, or describ'd in so small a Treatise. 'Tis enough, that the wisdom of the Nation, both King and Parliament, after His Majesty's miraculous Restauration, have declar'd, It hath been found by sad experience, that tumultuous and other disorderly soliciting and procuring of hands by private persons to Petitions, Complaints, Remonstrances, Declarations, and other Addresses to the King, or to both or either Houses of Parliament, for alteration of matters establish'd by Law, redress of pretended Grievances in Church or State, or other publick Concernments, have been made use of, to serve the ends of Factious and Seditious persons gotten into power, to the violation of the publick Peace, and have been a great mens of the late unhappy Wars, Confusions and Calamities in this Nation. 13 Car. 2. c. 5.

Besides, our Lawyers tell us, and King James declares in his Speech to the Parliament, on the last of March 1607,You all know, that Rex è Lex loquens; and you often heard me say, that the King's will and intention being the speaking Law, ought to be Luce clarius. And again; In any Case, wherein no positive Law is resolute, Rex e Judex; for he is Lex loquens, and is to supply the Law▪ where the Law wants. That Rex est Lex loquens; and where the Law is silent, the King's will is a temporary Law. Upon what account then were the Abhorrers of the late tumultuous Petitions, so exactly resembling those of Forty, and so contrary to His Majesty's express Orders and Proclamation, censur'd or imprison'd? what Crime have they committed, or Law have they violated? or can there be any transgression, where there is no Law; or Punishment, where there is no Transgression? Oh! (say they) tho' there be no positive Law directly against Abhorrers, yet 'tis the great Fundamental Law, Lex & consuetudo Parliamenti, and the Priviledge of Parliament, that they may judge what Crimes are punishable ex post facto, and by their arbitrary Power punish any man for what they please. This, I must confess, is a pretty knack to help us off at a dead lift, and will serve as well to vindicate the most exorbitant proceed • ngs of a mad Parliament, as self-preservation is generally wrested to justifie the horrid Conspiracies of Rebellious Subjects. It proves the great Earl of Strafford has been lawfully Executed, tho' his very Enemies then gave us reason to believe, and both King and Parliament since have declar'd, him Innocent; And the known Laws of the Land are at this rate very defective, since they are not the entire Rule of the peoples Civil Obedience, but are further liable to be try'd by that mysterious Riddle, Lex &, consuetudo Parliamenti; which neither our Fathers, nor We, were able to understand.

'Tis an undoubted Maxim both in Law and Reason, that promulgation is absolutely necessary to the obligation of all positive constitutions, insomuch that the immediate Laws even of the Almighty, are not obligatory, where they were never preach'd, or made known. How then comes it to pass, that so many Loyal Subjects and good Protestants have been troubl'd upon the account of those mystical Riddles, Lex & consuetudo Parliamenti, and the Priviledges of Parliament, which were never publish'd or made known to the people, but lie dormant in the House of Commons, till started up as occasion requires? It were to be wish'd, that Honourable Senate wou'd so far oblige the Nation, as to give them a true description of this Law and Custom of Parliament, and an exact account of their Priviledges; that people might in some measure for the future be able to shun those dangerous rocks, and not be surpriz'd or shipwrack'd on such hidden shelves. Till then all those loud pretences of securing the Subject from Slavery and Arbitrary Government, must seem very ridiculous to the sober and judicious, who as they cannot be easily impos'd upon by outward appearances, to believe peoples words not suitable to their actions, will be apt to mistrust, that what these Gentlemen so stifly oppose in others, they design wholly for themselves.

But to come closer to the purpose, let us suppose the Parliament has this Arbitrary Prerogative, to turn our most innocent actions into misdemeanors, and make what they please a breach of Priviledge: yet by what Authority can the House of Commons alone pretend to execute that Power; or take upon them to be sole Judges, that cannot act as Justices of the Peace? Our Ancestors, it seems, have brought their Hogs to a fair Market, who have struggled for many Ages to preserve themselves and Posterity from the unbounded rule of Arbitrary pleasure, and having wrested that Power from their Soveraign, like wise Politicians, have left it in the hands of their Fellow-Subjects, nay, of their Attorneys and Servants, to whom as such, they always allow'd their daily wages for their attendance in Parliament. 'Tis certainly an odd kind of Liberty, that the people can neither be Fin'd nor Imprison'd by their Soveraign, unless for transgressing some known penal Law of the Land; but their Deputies and Trustees may uncontroulably punish them for any thing they are pleas'd to call Criminal.

Is this the great happiness of Freeborn Subjects, instead of one to have five hundred Masters, and see the Fundamental Laws of the Nation, Magna Charta, and all the good Statutes confirming and explaining the same, thus eluded and made useless by a pretended Custom of Parliament? What are we the better at this rate, that by the Great Charter of the Liberties of England, c. 29 'tis declar'd, That no Freeman shall be taken or Imprison'd, or be disseiz'd of his Freehold or Liberties, or his Free Customs, or be Outlaw'd, or Exil'd, or in any manner destroy'd, but by the lawful Judgement of his Peers, or by the Law of the Land? Or that 28 Edw. 3. c 3. 'tis enacted, That no man of what estate or condition he be, shall be put out of his Land or Tenements, nor taken, nor Imprison'd, nor disinherited, nor put to death, without being brought to Answer by due Process of Law. Or, to omit many others, that 42 Ed. 3. c. 3. It is assented and accorded for the good governance of the Commons, that no man be put to answer without Presentment before Justices, or matter of Record, or by due Process and Writ Original, according to the Old Law of the Land; and if any thing be done to the contrary, it shall be void in Law, and holden for error. What are we the better, I say, to have these and several other Statutes to the same purpose, if they are not of force to secure us on all sides from the slavish yoke of Arbitrary Power? If a breach be once made in these great Bulwarks of our Liberties, and that even by those Sentinels appointed to guard us from all Illegal Incroachments, where is our Security? What will it avail the flock, that they are safe from Wolves, if they are in danger to be devour'd by the very Dogs that shou'd defend them? Or to what purpose shou'd people struggle to avoid Scylla, if at the same time they suffer themselves to be swallow'd up in Charybdis? 'Tis an old saying▪ Infeliciter aegrotat, cui plus mali venit a medico • uam a morbo; and we have found this too true by a dear-bought experience. God preserve us from receiving any further confirmations of it from those State-Empyricks, that labour to make us exchange the reality for the name, and the substance for the shadow, or Liberty.

'Tis plain by the foregoing Statutes, that no man ought to be taken or Imprison'd, without being brought to Answer by due course of Law; and that none can be brought thus to answer, without Presen • ment before Justices, or matter of Record, or by due Process and Writ Original, according to the old Law of the Land. What pretence then have the House of Commons, who can bring none to Answer in this manner, to any right or legal power to take or Imprison any Criminal whatsoever? 'Tis true, the Common, and generally all men in Authority, are inclin'd to enlarge their own Jurisdiction, and stretch it as far as possible; but sure a bare Vote of that House in favour of themselves, or a late practice never heard of in former Ages, shall not be of force enough in any Court of Justice to elude the solemn Acts of King and Parliament.

Besides these Statutes, too plain to admit of any comment, even by the Common Law of this Realm no Subject can Imprison another, but our Ancient Courts of Record, and such as have the Kings express Commission for so doing. I say Courts of Record, because (as appears by divers adjudg'd Cases in our Law Reports) no other Court can Fine or Imprison the Subject: Courts (saith Coke) which are not of Record, cannot impose a Fine, or commit any to Prison, lib. 8. f. 38. And again, Nulla Curia, quae Recordum non habet, potest imponere finem, neque aliquem mandare carceri; quia ista tantummodo spectant ad Curias de Ib. f. 60. Beechers Case. The like he hath fol. 120. Bonham's Case, and lib. 11. f. 43. Godfrey's Case, and in several other places. Recordo. Now our best Lawyers will tell us, that the House of Commons is no Court of Record, nay properly speaking is no Court at all. 1. Because there is no Court, but what is establish▪d by the Kings Patent, by Act of Parliament, or by the Common-Law, i.e. the constant immemorial custom of former Ages. Plowdens Comment. fol. 319. and Coke 1 Instit. f. 260. But the House of Commons cannot pretend to have any Patent or Act of Parliament to be a Court, and yet the Common-Law makes nothing for their purpose: For they were never own'd as such, nor ever had as much as a Journal-Book, much less Records, till Ed. 6's. time: And moreover, it was never heard before Sir Edward Cokes fancy, there were two distinct Courts in the same Parliament; since therefore the House of Lords is undoubtedly the Supream Court of all England, they are properly the High Court of Parliament, and consequently the House of Commons is no Court in Law. Secondly, There is no Court without a power of Tryal; but the House of Commons have no power to try any Crime or Offence; for they cannot; nor ever pretended to examine upon Oath: And therefore since there can be no legal tryal without Witnesses, nor are Witnesses of any force in Law, unless examin'd upon Oath, the House of Commons not claiming the power to administer Oaths, cannot bring any matter to a Tryal, and consequently can be no Court. I must confess Sir Edward Coke (who in his latter days thinking himself disoblig'd, was no friend to the Monarchy, and therefore took a great deal of pains to extol the Power of the Commons, in opposition to the Kings Prerogative and the Jurisdiction of the Lords) is, or at least pretends to be, of another opinion. In the 4th. part of his Institutes he tells us, That the House of Commons is to many purposes a distinct Court, p 28. which he very Learnedly proves by this rare Demonstration, That upon signification of the Kings pleasure to the Speaker, they do and may Prorogue or Adjourn themselves, and are not Prorogu'd or Adjourned by the House of Lords, ib. Whereas (to say nothing of Commissioners for examining Witnesses, or regulating any publick business, of Arbitrators, Referees and the like) every Committee of Lords and Commons, tho never so few in number, must upon this account be a distinct Court, because they may thus Adjourn and Prorogue themselves, without their respective Houses. But he goes on, and to prove the House of Commons, is not only a Court, but a Court of Judicature and Record, he says p. 23. That the Clerks Book of the House of Commons is a Record, and so declared by Act of Parliament, 6 H. 8. c. 16. Whereas that House, as I have already hinted, had no such Book as a Journal, much less any Authentick Record, before the first year of Edward the sixth; all their material Proceedings till then being drawn in Minutes by a Clerk appointed to attend them for that purpose, and by him entr'd of Record in the House of Lords: And therefore the words of the Statute are, That the Speakers License for Members going into the Country, be entred of Record in the Book of the Clerk of the Parliament, appointed for the Commons House: Which undoubtedly must be meant, not of the Commons, tho order'd now and then to wait upon them, but of the Lords Clerk, who alone is stil'd Clerk of the Parliament. I omit, that altho the Act had expresly call'd the Commons Book, a Record, yet this cou'd no more make it so, than the words of the Common-Law, Recordari facias loquelam in Curia Comitatus vel Baronis tui—& Recordum illud habere coram Justiciari • s nostris, &c. us'd in the Writt for removing a Plaint out of the Court-Baron, or County-Court to the Common-Pleas, can prove the County-Court and Court-Baron; to be Courts of Record; which yet Coke himself denyes in several places of his Institutes. See 1 Inst. f. 117. and 260. and Rolls in his Abridg. f. 527.

This is not all, the Lords and Commons must be made all Fellows at Football, and of equal Authority, in point of Judicature: The Lords (saith he) in their House have Power of Judicature, and the Commons in their House have Power of Judicature, and both together have Power of Judicature, p 23: But I wish, since the Lords Judicial Power, as well with as without the Commons, is beyond all dispute, this great Lawyer had so far oblig'd Posterity, as to have left us some convincing Argument to make the World believe the like of the House of Commons; or at least given us some Instances of their using this Power in former Ages, as the Lords have done time out of mind. In the mean time, 'tis a shrewd Argument against his Assertion, that in H. 4. time the Commons themselves in their Petition to the King, declar'd, That the Judgments of Parliament appertained only to the King and Lords, and not to the Commons; and therefore they prayed the King out of his special Grace to shew unto them the said Judgments and the cause of them; that so no Record might be made in Parliament against the said Commons, without their privity. To which the Bishop of Canterbury answer'd by the Kings command, That the Commons are Petitioners and Demanders, and that the King and Lords always had, and of right shall have the Judgments in Parliament, even as the Commons themselves have shewed; saving that in Statutes to be made, or Grants and Subsidies, or such things as are to be done for the publick profit of the Realm, the King will have especially their advice and assent, 1 H. 4. Rol. Parl n. 79. Who now is to be believ'd, Sir Edward Coke attributing to the Commons, or the Commons themselves wholly disclaiming all Power of Judicature? Or shall a single Lawyers Ipse dixit, or proofless assertion, be of greater weight, than so solemn a Declaration upon Record, approv'd off by King, Lords, and Commons?

But to be short, and to argue ad hominem against our late Demagogues at Wesminster, if they thought themselves a Court of Judicature and Record, as Sir Edward Coke is pleas'd to make them, 'tis strange what cou'd be their motive (unless to shew their Arbitrary Power to the World) to Imprison so many of His Majesties Loyal Subjects, and after a long and chargeable Confinement, release them, without offering to bring them to any legal Tryal: For if these Gentlemen were reputed Criminal, they ought to have been try'd according to Law; if Innocent, they shou'd not have been Imprison'd. And to say their Confinement was by the House design'd for a punishment of their suppos'd Misdemeanors, 'tis contrary to common sense and to all Laws both humane and divine. For at this rate, people will be condemn • d before they are heard, and punish'd before they are convicted; nay, which is worse than Abington-Law, to hang a man first, and try him after, they shall be punish'd at will, and never brought to a tryal. What can be safe, if this be admitted? or who can be secure either of Life or Liberty, if a prevailing Faction in the House of Commons may toss him thus in a Blanket without any Rhime or Reason, contrary to the undoubted Right of the Subject, and the Fundamental Laws of the Nation?

But we are told, the Commons have often Imprison'd people for misdemeanors, and releas'd them again at their own Discretion. I wish they had shew'd us withal by what Authority or Law they committed them; for a facto ad jus is no good argument with any man of sense or judgment. How many Appeals have been made to Rome, and provisions of Benefices procur'd from thence, during the Papal Usurpation? Yet these being contrary to Law, the Authors were still punishable, and it was no excuse for any, that others had done the like before. The Commons have been a constituent part of the Great Council of the Kingdom, either since the 16th. of Henry I. as some Historians write, or since the 49th. of H. 3. in the year 1364. as most Authors agree; and yet all this while we cannot find, that by their own Authority they imprison'd any Criminal, till in the 4th. of Ed. 6. about the year 1550 they committed Criketost to the Tower, when the King was an Infant, and all govern'd by the ambitious Duke of Somerset: who to be sure wou'd not expostulate with the House of Commons about such a trifle, as he thought it, whilst they forbore to question him for his more illegal and arbitrary Proceedings.

Now, if there be no other argument to justifie the Commons imprisoning Delinquents, but the practice of their House since the 4th. of Ed. 6. 'tis plain, the commitment of Criketost was illegal, because not justifiable by any former practice of that House; and consequently, cou'd be no fit Precedent to be imitated in succeeding Parliaments. And if their first Essays of this kind were unwarrantable by Law, their subsequent Commitments cou'd be no better; for, Quod ab initio non valuit, tractu temporis non convalescit. To what purpose then are such unwarrantable Examples alledg'd to justifie the late proceedings of the Commons, if not to prove one absurdity by another? since they can hardly think of any thing, how wild and unreasonable soever; but they may find one instance or another, to offer as a Precedent, in some of our former Parliaments. For experience tells us, this Great Council, much less theDyer f. 60. a. says, the Parliament consists of three parts, viz. the KING, as chief Head; the LORDS, the chief and principal Members of the Body; and the COMMONS, the inferiour Members. meanest of the three Estates, (tho' our modern Republicans wou'd fain snatch the great Priviledge of Infallibility from the Pope's Cushion, and place it in the Speakers Chair) has not been always free from mistakes, but is found to have often deviated from Justice, Truth, and Loyalty. We must therefore, with Seneca, look, non qua • itur, sed qua eundum, not what is, but what ought to be done; and consider, that 'tis not the example of frail men, impos'd upon through ignorance, or led by passion, or private interest, but the approv'd Laws of the Land, ought to be the Rule both of the Magistrates Government, and of the Subjects Obedience.

What! says a factious Petitioner, cannot the House of Commons imprison any Criminal? Have they no authority to chastise their own Members, or punish the Invaders of their Priviledges? Have they not often exerciz'd this Power; and is it possible the King and Lords wou'd have so long conniv'd at their proceedings, had they been illegal or unjust? Does not the House of Peers punish the Breakers of their Priviledges; why then may not the House of Commons be allow'd to do the like?

These are the mighty arguments our great Champions for the House of Commons always insist upon; but how weak and insignificant they are, is very obvious to any, tho' but meanly vers'd in our Laws, and the constitution of our Government. For my part, I have always been, and still am, as much for maintaining the just Priviledges of that House, as any man whatsoever; 'tis my interest to do it, and nothing but Truth and Loyalty shall ever induce me to speak against any of their Pretensions: yet I must say, the power they claim now-a-days, to punish all sorts of misdemeanors, and what they please to term a breach of Priviledge, is not to be endur'd by any free-born Subject; For, besides that 'tis needless, because such offences may, and by Law ought to be try'd in the ordinary Courts of Justice, 'tis very dangerous to the Publick, least the Grand Inquest of the Nation, appointed to represent the Peoples Grievances, and pray redress, shou'd upon this account be diverted from pursuing those weighty affairs, by every sawcy Footman belonging to the meanest Burgess in their House.

I confess, it were somewhat tolerable in the Commons to imprison and punish their own Members, for words by them spoken, or misdemeanors committed in the House: 1. Because by 4 H. 8. c. 8. they are not punishable elsewhere for any rashness in Parliament, that does not amount to Treason Felony, or breach of the Peace, which the Commons neither Coke 4. Inst. p. 25. & 31 H. 6. n. 26, 27. can, nor I hope will, as in Forty-One, endeavour to protect. 2ly. Because 'tis suppos'd, the Members upon their entring into that Assembly, unanimously agreed the lesser number shou'd always submit to the greater, and the major Vote be observ'd as the Act and Sense of the whole House; if therefore by consent and original compact every single Member submits himself to the rest, he cannot complain, tho' otherwise they had no authority, if they imprison him for his misdemeanors, because scienti & volenti non fit injuria, provided always they exceed not the common Rules of Justice, nor the bounds of our establish'd Laws; for then no private Act can bind a Subject, tho' made with his own free consent; as appears by Clark's Case against the Mayor and Burgesses of St. Albans; Coke lib. 5. p. 64. I cannot therefore but think the power assum'd of late years by the House of Commons over their fellow-Members, to expel them the House, when and for what they please, without any legal Tryal, (which the Lords never practic'd against any of their Peers) is in it self most unreasonable, and of very dangerous consequence; as Mr. Prynne, tho' otherwise a great Champion for the Priviledges of Parliament, proves at large in divers of his Treatises▪ The practice (saith he) of sequestring and expelling Commons by their fellow-Commons only, is a late, dangerous, unparliamentary Usurpation, unknown to our Ancestors, destructive to the Priviledges and Freedom of Parliaments, and injurious to those Counties, Cities, and Boroughs, whose Trustees are secluded: the House of Commons being no Court of Justice, to give either Oath or final Sentence, and having no more authority to dismember their fellow-Members, than any Judges, Justices of the Peace, or Committees, have to Dis-judge, Dis-justice, or Dis-committee their fellow Judges, Justices, or Committee-men, being all of equal Authority, and made Members only by the King's Writ, and the Peoples Election, not by the Houses, or other Members Votes; who yet now presume both to make and unmake, seclude and recal, expel and restore their fellow-Members at their pleasure, contrary to the practice and resolution of former Ages, to patch up a Factious Conventicle, instead of an English Parliament. In his legal Vindication of the Liberties of England▪ p. 10.

But whatever Power the Commons can pretend to have over their own Members, to say they can lawfully punish others, tho for a breach of Priviledge, much less for any other Crime, seems to me a very groundless Assertion, not warrantable by the Ancient Law and Custom of Parliament, but rather contrary to the Fundamental Constitutions of our Government: First, because 'tis impossible to make out from whom this Power is deriv'd; From the King? The Factious will not own it, and none can prove it: For they have neither Patent nor Statute to shew for't, nor yet any Legal Prescription, which is a constant immemorial Custom, such as the Lords have in point of Judicature, to warrant it; the Ancientest President they can alledge, being that of 4 Ed. 6. or the Case of Ferrers referr'd to them by the Lords in the 34 H. 8 about sevenscore years ago. Do they deri • e it then from the People, from the Freeholders and Freemen, their Electors? These have no such Power of themselves, they can Imprison none without His Majesties Commission; and what they have not, sure they cannot give: Nemo dat, quod non habet. As for the Power given by the Electors to their chosen Members, who are order'd by the Writ of Summons to have from the persons they represent, Plenam & sufficientem potestatem, 'tis no Judicial Power, nor Political Jurisdiction, which the People have not, and consequently cannot give, but only a Power of consenting as well for their Principals, as for themselves, to the Kings Laws and Ordinances. And certainly, if the King be the Suprem, and the only Suprem Governour of this Realm, as we affirm in the Oath of Supremacy; and if all Authority and Jurisdiction Spiritual and Temporal be derived and deducted from the Kings Majesty, as 'tis expresly declar • d 1 Ed. 6. c. 2. § 3. Or as Old Bracton saith, Ea quae sunt Jurisdictionis & pacis, ad nullum pertinent nisi ad regiam dignitatem. lib. 3. c. 24. Unless the Commons can make out they have their Power from the King, they can have no manner of Jurisdiction, and by consequence cannot lawfully Punish or Imprison any Criminal, if not perchance their own Members in the Cases aforesaid: Besides, in the first Parliament of Queen Mary 'tis declar'd, That the most Ancient Statutes of this Kingdom do give, assign, and appoint the correction and punishment of all Offenders against the Regality and Dignity of the Crown, and the Laws of this Realm, unto the King 1 Mar. Sess. 3. c. What then are the breakers of the Commons Priviledges; are they Offenders against the Dignity of the Crown, or the Laws of the Realm? If so, they ought according to this Act to be punish'd by the King; if not, they are not punishable at all: for to trouble any, that does not offend against the Crown, or the Law of the Land, is very Illegal and Arbitrary, and a high breach of the Liberty of the Subject.

Secondly, because the Law has expresly provided where and how breaches of Priviledge ought to be punish'd, and gives the House of Commons no power to take any cognizance of them; for by several Statutes it appears, that if a Parliament-man, or his Menial-servant, be Assaulted, Beaten or Wounded, in Parliament-time, Proclamation shall be made where the deed is done, that the Offendor shall render himself to the Kings-Bench within half a year after, there to be tryed; and if the Offendor will not appear, he shall be Attainted of the Deed, and pay to the Party griev'd his double Damages, to be tax'd by the discretion of the Judges of the said Bench for the time being, or by Inquest, if need be, and also make Fine and Ransom at the Kings will. Moreover, it is accorded in the same Parliamenti, that likewise it be done in time to come in like Case, 5 H. 4. c. 6. and 11 H. 6. c. 11.

As for the Commons freedom from Arrests▪ 'tis certainly a very Ancient Priviledge, granted by our Kings to that House, the better to enable them to attend the publick service, to which they were summon'd; as appears by Edward the first's Answer to the Templars, who having some Tenants in the Parliament, that were behind with their Rents, Petition'd the King to have leave to Distrain for the said Arrears in Parliament-time; which he utterly refus'd, saying, Non videtur honestum quod Rex concedat quod illi de Consilio suo distring antur tempore Parliament. 18 Ed. 1. Rot. 7. in Thesaur. Receptoris Scaccar. Yet that it was not formerly held so sacred, nor did extend near so far, as some people now imagine, is plain from the Case of Thorpe 31 H. 6. Who, tho Speaker of the House of Commons at that time, was Imprison'd in the Fleet during the Prorogation of the Parliament, for a 1000. Marks Damages given against him for a Trespass done to the Duke of York. And the Parliament being Re-assembled, the Commons earnestly desir'd to have their Speaker discharg'd, but it was adjudg'd by the Lords, that he shou'd remain in Prison according to his Sentence, and they choose another Speaker: whereupon they elected Sir Thomas Charlton, and made no further clamours, as some now wou'd do, that their Priviledges were invaded, 31 H. 6 Rot. Parliam. n. 25, 26, &c. Seldens Baronage fol. 115.

Now for the Tryal of a breach of this Priviledge, tho I find no positive or express Statute, that orders it to be decided in the ordinary Courts of Justice, yet that they may lawfully do it, is a plain consequence of the foregoing Acts of Parliament: For to argue a majori ad minus, since Assaults upon Parliament-men are far more Criminal than Arrests, if the ordinary Courts of Justice can try the greater, they may certainly try the lesser Crime. And accordingly they have often taken cognizance as well of this as other Priviledges of Parliament; as appears in the Case of Done against Mich. 12. Ed. 4. Rot. 20. in the Exchequer. Welsh, and ofHill. 14 E. 4. Rot. 7. River against Cosyn, Dyer fol. 59. Skewish against Trewynnard, and many others. But the most usual practice of former times was, to make application to the King and Lords for redress in this particular, for as Sir Edward Coke himself confesses, The determination and knowledge of this Priviledge belongs to the Lords of Parliament, in his select Cases 63. And therefore the House of Commons, upon the restraint of any of their Members or Menial Servants, of which themselves took no cognizance till of very late days, always made their humble request to the King and Lords for his enlargement. Thus when William Lake Servant to William Milred, a Member of the House, was taken in Execution of Debt, and Committed to the Fleet, the8 H. 6. Rot. Parl. n. 57. Commons Petition'd the King and Lords for his Liberty. The like they did in Walter 39 H. 6. n. 9. Clarks Case; and in the Case of William 14 Ed. 4. n. 55. Hide: And to omit several other Precedents, even in the 43 Eliz. when a Bill was preferr'd in the Star-Chamber against Belgrave a Member of that House, the Parliament then sitting, for Misdemeanors by him committed against the Earl of Huntington; the Commons well knowing they had no Authority of themselves to protect their Member, made their earnest, but ineffectual, Application to the Lords for relief. Sir Simon D' Ewes Journals p. 612 And in the same Parliament a great asserter of Priviledges, upon a debate about Subpaena's, said openly in the House, Our use at this day is not warranted by Ancient course of Precedents; for if a man had been Arrested upon a Subpaena, upon notice given, he shou'd have had a Writ of Priviledge, which of course Her Majesty must have allow'd: D'ewes Journals pag. 655. which is conformable to the Report made 18 Eliz. by Mr. Attourney of the Dutchy upon a Committee appointed for setting Mr. Halls man at Liberty; That the Committee found no Precedent for setting at large by the Mace any person in Arrest, but only by The Lords themselves cannot by Priviledge of Parliament set any at Liberty by their immediate Orders to the Gentleman vsher, or Serjeant at Arms, but only by a Writ of Priviledge from the Lord Keeper; as appears 43 Elizab. D'ewes Journals, p. 608. Writ; and that by divers Precedents of Records perus'd by the said Committee, it appeareth that every Knight, Citizen or Burgess, which doth require Priviledge, hath us'd in that Case to take a Corporal Oath before the Lord Chancellor or Lord Keeper, that the Party for whom such Writ is pray'd, came up with him, and was his Servant at the time of the Arrest made, D'ewes p. 249.

The famous Case of Ferrers, Burgess of Plimouth 34 H. 8. tho often alleadg'd in favour of the Commons, is so far from making any thing for their purpose, that it plainly shews they never offer'd till then to punish any breach of Priviledge, for altho they found, not only that the Sheriffs of London deny'd to deliver their Burgess, but that the Officers of the Counter beat their Serjeant and broke his Mace; yet knowing they had no coactive Power of themselves, they were forc'd to repair to the upper House, (which they wou'd never have done, had their own Authority been sufficient) and complain to the Lords of the injury they receiv'd; who judging the contempt to be very high, for the Commons greater satisfaction referr'd the punishment thereof wholly to themselves: which condescension, it seems, gave such encouragement to that House, in succeeding Parliaments, who have been always sure never to loose, but still to gain ground upon the Prerogative and the House of Peers, that now and then they made bold, even without any Warrant or direction from the Lords, to punish some breaches of Priviledge, and at last other misdemeanors. For King Edward the sixth, because of his Minority, and his two Sisters by reason of their Sex, being not so active, nor so fit for business, as their Predecessors, the Commons took hold on this opportunity to get themselves into Power, and endeavour'd by punishing Offenders to render themselves the more formidable to the People.

From hence they proceeded to regulate Elections, and tho the Law is very plain and positive in this Case also; yet the Commons have taken upon them of late days, not only to decide who is duely chosen, and who unduly return'd; but have further assum'd the Power to punish the Offenders, contrary to divers Acts of Parliament in that Case provided: For by several Statutes it appears, That if the Sheriff makes an undue Return, his punishment is 200 l. one to the King, and the other to the party duely Elected; besides a years Imprisonment without Bail or Mainprise: And the person unduely return'd is to continue a Member of the House, but at his own Charges, without any allowance from the place, for which he serves. As for the return, if any makes complaint thereof, It ought to be tryed, not by a Committee of Elections, but before the Justices of Assizes in the proper County, or by Action of Debt in any Court of Record; as appears 11 H. 4. c. 1. and 8 H. 6. c. 7. and 23 H. 6. c. 15. These are the Laws for regulating Elections, and pursuant to them Queen Elizabeth, in whose time the Commons busi'd themselves too much in that matter, sent a notable check to the House in the 28 year of her Reign, for their medling with choosing and returning Knights of the Shire for Norfolk; a thing (said she) impertinent for the House to deal withall, and only belonging to the Office and charge of the Lord Chancellor, from whom the Writs Issue and are return'd, D'ewes Journal, p. 393. Which Message wrought then so far upon the House, that for some years after they forbore to medle much in any thing of that nature, but apply'd themselves, when occasion requir'd, to the Lord Chancellor or Keeper, who proceeded therein as the Law directed, without taking any great notice of the Commons Votes or Resolves; as we find by a remarkable Instance in the 35 of this Queen, when Sir Edward Coke then Speaker, was order'd by the House to attend upon my Lord Keeper, to move his Lordship to direct a New Writ for choosing a Burgess for Southwark instead of Richard Hutton, suppos'd to have been unduly elected; and another for allowing Sir George Carew, who was duely elected, but not return'd, to be Burgess for Camelsford in Cornwall; and a third for changing the name of John Dudley, return'd Burgess for New-Town in the County of Southampton, into the Name of Thomas Dudley, alleadg'd to be the same person, but his Name mistaken. My Lord Keeper answer'd, that the Returns for Southwark and Camelsford shou'd stand good, but as for the said John Dudley, he wou'd direct a new Writ for choosing another Burgess in his stead for Newtown, D'ewes Journals, p. 494. Now if this was the legal way of Proceeding in Queen Elizabeth's Reign, warranted by the Statutes lately quoted, and allow'd by the great Lawyer Sir Edward Coke, and the whole House of Commons at that time, by what Authority cou'd it be alter'd in succeeding Parliaments? or is it just that the Ancient Precedents of former Ages shou'd be avoided by unwarrantable new-ones of later times? Without question, had the House of Commons then known, they had any Power to mend the said Returns, or punish the Offendors, they wou'd never have sent their Speaker to wait on the Lord Keeper's pleasure about it; and if that House had no such Authority, 'tis strange how can their Successors pretend to have any.

Thus we see the House of Commons was not in former times allow'd to regulate the Election of their own Members, nor to Imprison any for undue Elections or Returns, nor yet for a breach of Priviledge, much less for any other Crime or Misdemeanor. Nothing was heard in those better days of that terrible Sentence, Take him Topham; not a word of the Subjects Imprisonment during the Will and Pleasure of the House of Commons. The sitting of Parliaments then wasSee Prynn's Remarks on Coke's 4 Inst. p. 42. short and sweet, dispatching more business in three days, than of late they have done in so many months. Their Study was, to Redress, not Create Grievances, and preserve or procure a good understanding betwixt the King and His People; and not like Banbury-Tinkers, instead of mending one hole, make a great many.

Oh! but (say some) the Connivance of King and Lords is a strong Argument that the Commons have done nothing herein contrary to Law. I Answer, 'tis rather a very weak and frivolous Plea; first, because tho the King be oblig'd by His Coronation-Oath to govern by Law, yet all knowing men will allow He has a Prudential Power to suspend the Execution of such Laws, as he thinks prejudicial to the publick Interest; and consequently may, when he sees occasion, wink at some illegal attempts of His Subjects, to avoid a great Inconvenience. If thefore of late times the King, and if you will, the House of Lords, did connive at some unwarrantable resolutions of the Commons, rather than exasperate the whole House, too Jealous of their own Priviledges, and thereby frustrate the chief end of Calling His Parliament, the Security of the Publick; it was Policy and great Prudence to wave it at that time, tho now 'tis the height of Folly to make this a warrant for doing the like again, contrary to so many legal Presidents, and express Acts of Parliament. Secondly, because the gathering of Peter-pence in this Kingdom, has been conniv'd at by King, Lords and Commons, for divers Centuries of years; yet it was an Illegal Tax upon the Subject, contrary to Magna Charta and the Fundamental Laws of the Nation, 25 H. 8. c. 21. Likewise the Clergy made divers Canons and Constitutions, which have been conniv'd at for several Ages both by King and Parliament; yet are declar'd by 25 H. 8. c. 19 To be much prejudicial to the Kings Prerogative Royal, and repugnant to the Laws and Statutes of this Realm. The same may be said of the Ancient Custom of Archbishops and Bishops, declar'd by 1 Ed. 6. c. 2. to be contrary to the Common-Law of of the Land, tho practic'd and conniv'd at, time out of mind. And to omit several other Instances, Cardinal Wolsey for exercising his Legantine Power, and the whole Clergy for receiving it, tho conniv'd at for many years as well in as out of Parliament, were nevertheless found guilty in a Premunire in His Majesties Court of Kings-Bench. Connivance therefore is no good Argument of any things being legal, and the tolerating of a Custom, tho never so long, cannot warrant its continuance, while the Law is against it. Presidents indeed of former Ages, when legal and just from the beginning, are of great force in Judicial Proceedings; but no new President of late days can have that weight in any Court of Justice, and to be sure will never be allow'd, if contrary to Law and the Authentick Records of Antiquity.

But the House of Lords (say they) use to punish the Breaches of their Priviledges, and several other Misdemeanors; why then may not the House of Commons do the like? A most ridiculous parity; for they might argue as well, the Court of Kings-Bench Fines and Imprisons Delinquents, therefore the Grand-Jury may do the like when they please. For the Commons in Parliament are really the Grand-Jury of the Nation, appointed to enquire after Briberyes, Extortions, Monopolies, and other publick Oppressions, and complain thereof to the King and Lords, and humbly pray redress; yet they are no Judges in any Case themselves, but are None can be Judge and Party, Coke's 8 Reports, Dr. Bouham's Case. f. 118. b. Parties, as being the Attorneys and Representatives of those that are injur'd. So far they are from having any Judicial Power, that they cannot as much as administer an Oath upon any occasion whatsoever; which undoubtedly the Law wou'd not have deny'd them, but that they were never design'd forThe constant Custom of the Commons, even to this day, to stand bare with their Hats in their hands, while the Lords sit cover'd, at all Conferences and Tryals, is a plain Argument they are not Fellows or Colleagues in Judgment. Judges or punishers of any Criminal; because qui negat Medium, negat & finem. But the House of Lords is not only a Court of Judicature, but the Supream Court of the whole Kingdom; they are look'd upon by our Laws as persons of no less Integrity, than Honour, in the distribution of Justice; and besides, are assisted by all the Judges of England, by the 12 Masters of Chancery, by the Kings Learned Council, and by His Attorney and Solicitor General; in consideration whereof the same Laws have repos'd that extraordinary trust in this August Assembly, that to them alone it belongs to redress delays, and reform the erroneous Judgments of other Courts of Justice, and give a final decision to all manner of Appeals. Now by the Laws of other Nations, as well as ours, 'tis the nature of Superior Courts, that they may determine matters tryable by an Inferior; and therefore it must be allow'd, that tho the House of Commons cannot, because no Court of Judicature, yet the House of Lords, the dernier resort of all Suits and Actions, may, if they please, punish the Invaders of their Priviledges, notwithstanding that the Law directs them to be try'd in Inferiour Courts.

Having thus sufficiently demonstrated, that the House of Commons have neither Common nor Statute-Law, nor yet any legal Precedents to warrant their Fining or Imprisoning the meanest of their Fellow-subjects, 'tis high time, I think, tho a great deal more might be said on this subject very useful to be known, to give you a brief account of other Particulars, and examine whether the Remedies propos'd in Parliament by our late Mountebanks of State be not equally dangerous, if not really worse, than our Disease. But to expose the designs of some ill men there, and the unwarrantable Votes and Resolves they got pass'd in the Lower House, is a task no less tedious than difficult for me to undertake. I will therefore tell you in short, that notwithstanding all the noise and clamour they made about the Protestant Religion and the Liberty of the Subject, the Nation had too much reason to believe, they minded more their own ends, than the common good of the People. The Kings best Subjects, who having so many years experience of His Majesties most happy Government, declar'd themselves satisfi'd with His prudent management of Affairs, and in Obedience to His Royal Proclamation, express'd their aversion to all Tumultuous Petitions, were no more run down on the one side, than the Factious Fanaticks, even such as signaliz'd themselves in the late Rebellion, were countenanc'd and favour'd on the other; insomuch that many were of opinion, people had no surer way to ingratiate themselves with some of the Leading Memberr, than openly to asperse the Government, and reflect upon the King and His Ministers as Favorers of Popery, and Designers of Arbitrary Power. 'Tis almost incredible what pains they took to get the Notorious Anabaptist Ben. Harris discharg'd out of Prison, for no other reason that I find, but because a Dissenter, who with a great deal of favour was condemn'd only to the Pillory instead of Tyburn, for publishing that Treasonable Pamphlet, The Appeal. Neither is this all; the main Bulwark of our Church must be broke down, the Penal Laws against the Non-conformists Repeal'd, to let in a Deluge of Sectaries, the scandal of the Reformation, who have nothing of Christianity but the Name, to Profane the Temple of God: And because this Project luckily miscarry'd, their Friends in the House endeavour'd to leave them a new kind of Dispensation, and the very last 10 Jan. 1681/80;. day of their sitting, that with their dying breath they might testify to the World their great zeal for the Dissenters in general, of what sect or perswasion soever, to the admiration of most men, they pass'd the following Vote.

Resolved, That it is the Opinion of this House, that the Prosecution of Protestant Dissenters upon the Penal Laws, is at this time grievous to the Subject, a weakening of the Protestant Interest, an encouragement to Popery, and dangerous to the Peace of the Kingdom.

I need not comment upon this unwarrantable Resolve, by which our worthy Patriots, even without the King and House of Lords, once more were pleas'd to assume to themselves a Power of suspending, and consequently of making, Acts of Parliament. The encouragement this gave to the Republicans to pursue their wicked Designs against the Crown and the Church, like to have prov'd fatal to both, is enough to convince the World, they cou'd hardly do the Nation a greater mischief; and that their confining several Gentlemen, tho contrary to Law and Reason, was not near so dangerous to the Government, as their breaking down the Rails of the Church, to let a swarm of Sectaries creep in at the Windows.

It was observ'd with some admiration, how during this Session of Parliament, there was not one Fanatick Imprison'd, nor so much as question'd by the Commons for any Crime or Insolence whatsoever, very few Papists molested; but the true Sons of the Church of England daily Prosecuted in vast numbers, to their great loss and vexation, tho it prov'd at last the eternal shame and confusion of the Authors.

I cou'd not but smile to see the perplexity they were in, when one of the Judges, to his never-dying fame, for giving the first Precedent of that kind, made application to the House of Commons about the Execution of his Trust, and desir'd their Opinion whether he shou'd do Justice to one of their Prisoners, by granting the Writ of Habeas Corpus to Mr. Sheridan, then in the Custody of Serjeant Topham. Three several days the Case was stifly debated in the House, the Act read twice or thrice over, and yet no resolution taken. The Warrant of Committment, which order'd the Gentleman to be confin'd, without any Cause shown, During the Will and Pleasure of the House of Commons, was look'd upon so Illegal and Arbitrary a Procedure, even by several Members of the House, that Serjeant M. till he heard it was already made publick, wou'd have them immediately recal the Old, and grant a New Warrant more conformable to Law. Besides, the words of the Statute were so full, as admitted of no Comment, and so plain for the Liberty of the Subject, as made it undenyable, that Prisoners, unless for Treason or Felony, were still Bailable, by what Person or Persons soever Committed, not excepting the King and Council, much less the House of Commons, who had no Legal Power to Commit any Criminal. But still the point was very nice, and the Leading Members no less uncertain what resolution to take; for if they openly declar'd against the Habeas Corpus, the Nation wou'd be much alarm'd, and suspect these Gentleman, instead of securing, intended to invade, the Subjects Liberty; but if they allow'd the Writ, the delicious power of Imprisoning such as they had a picque to, was utterly lost, and all persons referr'd to the ordinary Courts of Justice, or upon their failure, to the House of Lords, the suprem Tribunal of England. At last Sir William Jones, like an Imperious Dictator, starts up to decide the matter, and having made a bawling Harangue concerning the Power of the House, and their Intention of not binding themselves by that Act, which yet must bind the King, tho it might as well be alleadg'd He did not intend it, he boldly concludes with threatning and daring the Judges to do their duty; Precibusque minas regaliter addit: The same reasons (says he) which may be given for discharging such as are not Committed for breach of Priviledge, if it be grounded on the Act for the Habeas Corpus, will hold as strong for discharging of Persons Committed for breach of Priviledge; and so consequently deprive this House of all its Power and Dignity, and make it insignificant. This is so plain and obvious, that all the Judges ought to know it; and I think it below you to make any Resolve therein, but rather leave the Judges to do otherwise at their Peril; and let the Debate fall without any question, See the Debates of the House, pag. 217. Was not this a rare Assertor of our Liberties, who instead of allowing us the benefit of the Laws, wou'd have us all made Beasts of burden to maintain the Grandeur of some Arbitrary Demagogues in the House of Commons; and be content to turn Gally-Slaves, rather than their Power shou'd become useless or insignificant? But I find this daring Speech did not frighten all the Judges; for Baron Weston, to his immortal Renown, had still the courage to grant the Habeas Corpus, and rather expose himself to the malice of the Faction, than deny or delay Justice, contrary to his Oath.

Our Religion and Liberty being thus secur'd, have we not reason to be fond of these worthy Patriots, who tugg'd so hard against Popery, the better to bring in Presbytery; and to make sure that the Prince shou'd not use Arbitrary Power, took all possible care to keep it in their own possession. It was the Kings Prerogative in the days of yore to have the Power of making War and Peace, and declaring who shou'd be counted Friends, and who reputed Enemies to the Kingdom. But now the Tribunes of the People are willing to ease him of that trouble, and take upon themselves by the following 7 Jan. 1680. Vote, to declare some of His Majesties best Subjects and most Faithful Friends, Enemies to the King and Kingdom.

Resolved, That all persons who advis'd His Majesty in His last Message to this House, to insist upon an Opinion against the Bill for excluding the Duke of York, have given pernicious Councel to His Majesty, and are promoters of Popery, and Enemies to the King and Kingdom:

And this extravagant Vote they are pleas'd particularly to apply to four Noble Peers of the Realm, exposing them to the Rable, without the least colour of proof, for Promoters of Popery, and Enemies to their Soveraign; for no other reason, but because they were truly Loyal, and free from the contagious leaven of the Faction. What a happiness it is, to live within the Walls of the House of Commons, where the Knave becomes Honest, and the Fool a Politician? where People are sure never to be in the wrong, but always impeccable, and may freely rail and reflect upon their Betters, which without doors wou'd cost them very dear. Yet I cannot but wonder, why these Noblemen (unless they, as well as many others, took that Character for a mark of Honour from the givers) have taken no course, at least with the Printer and Bookseller, if not with the then Speaker, for ordering such Scandalous Votes to be publish'd, contrary to express2 R. 2. 5. 11 R. 2. 11. &c. de Scandalis Magnatum. Acts of Parliament. For if the Kings immediate Command cannot be allow'd as a good excuse in Law for any Illegal Act, so that altho the Prince be unaccountable, yet the Minister is to suffer for his Obedience; sure a Vote of the House of Commons shall not be thought of force, at least out of Parliament-time, to Protect any Offender from Justice; because whatever Title the Members, within the sacred Walls of the House, may claim in some Cases to impunity, their Officers and Servants, who execute their Illegal Commands abroad, cannot in the least pretend to have any.

But how shou'd these Noblemen be enemies to the King and Kingdom, for their advising His Majesty against the Bill of Exclusion, when the whole House of Peers, (few discontented Lords Dissenting, who by their Lives and Conversation never shew'd themselves the truest Protestants, nor the best Subjects) openly declar'd against it, and upon the first reading threw it out of doors, is a Mystery not easily to be understood. His Majesty in His Message to the Commons, declar'd, He was confirm'd in His Opinion against that Bill by the Judgment of the House of Lords, who rejected it; why then are four Lords singl'd out, and not the whole House declar'd Promoters of Popery, and Enemies to the King and Kingdom? The reason some will guess, that the Leading Members saw matters were not yet ripe, to shew themselves bare-fac'd, or discover the bottom of their Designs, and once more to Vote the House of Lords dangerous and useless, and therefore to be laid aside. But why the Opposers of the Bill of Exclusion enemies to the King and Kingdom? When 'tis made plain even to Demonstration in several Treatises publish'd these four years past about the Succession, that the Promoters of that Bill, tho some perhaps meant otherwise, were in fact Enemies to the Monarchy, and no Friends to the King nor to the True Protestant Religion. 'Tis strange that such as loudly exclaim against Popery, shou'd have the face at the same time to practice the worst of Popish, or rather Jesuitical Principles, and endeavour to force their Soveraign to disinherit His only Brother, upon a bare suspicion of his being of another Religion; which Henry the 3. of France, being tender of the Monarchy, and of the Hereditary Right of Succession, was so far from offering to the King of Navarre, tho a known Protestant and but a remote Kinsman, that he cou'd never be perswaded to give the Royal Assent to the Bill, which the powerful influence of the Factious Duke of Guise got pass'd by the three Estates, for his Exclusion.

Oh! but (say they) Popery and Slavery will break in upon us, if the Duke succeeds. And I am sure, Anarchy and Presbytery, and an Intestine Civil War, will undoubtedly follow, if he be excluded, the King expos'd to danger, and the Kingdom to ruine. How fatal it prov'd to Henry 6. that he suffer'd the good Duke of Gloucester to be made away by his Prosecutors, which made way for his own Deposition, and consequently for his untimely end, Historians do abundantly testify; and Baker tells us, how the great Duke of Somerset, then Protector, by Sacrificing his Brother the Lord Admiral to the malice of his Enemies, in hopes to stop their mouths by yielding to their demands, clear'd the way for himself to the Scaffold. A Warrant (saith this Historian) was sent, under the hand of his Brother the Protector, to cut off his Head; wherein (as afterwards it prov'd) he did as much, as if he had laid his own Head upon the Block: For whilst these Brothers lived and held together, they were as a strong Fortress one to the other; the Admirals Courage supporting the Protectors Authority, and the Protectors Authority maintaining the Admirals Stoutness; but the Admiral once gone, the Protectors Authority as wanting support, began to totter, and fell at last to utter ruine. Besides, there was at this time, amongst the Nobility, a kind of Faction; Protestants, who favour'd the Protector for his own sake; and other of the Papal inclination, who favour'd him for his Brothers sake: But his Brother being gone, both sides forsook him; even his own side, as thinking they could expect little assistance from him, who gave no more assistance to his own Brother, Bakers Chronicle p. 307.

What a noise they make about these terrible Bugbears, Popery and Slavery, as if both were inseparable, and actually breaking in upon the Nation, or rather come as far as the Lobby of the House of Commons? For my part, tho I have no reason to be fond of either, the one being no less contrary to my Nature, than the other to my Principles, yet I cannot be startl'd at every shadow, nor believe that the Duke, having already spent the Prime of his days, let him succeed never so soon, will be able to introduce amongst us any new, much less the Popish Religion. Neither can I be perswaded, contrary to common sense and the experience of so many Ages, but that the Papists are as fond of their Liberty and Property, and consequently as great enemies to Slavery, as any Protestant whatsoever. For, to them we owe the unparallel'd Common-Law of this Realm, Magna Charta and all those wholesom Statutes grounded thereupon; to them we are oblig'd for the incomparable Frame of our well-temper'd Monarchy, which affords very much to the Industry and Happiness of the Subject, yet preserves enough for the Majesty and Prerogative of any King, that will own his People as Subjects, and not as Slaves or Villains. Who then but a Fool or a Mad-man, wou'd think Slavery the unavoidable consequence of that Religion, the Professors whereof, even in the time of their blindest zeal and greatest darkness, (for since then they are much refin'd) made such impregnable Bulwarks against it, and provided such wholesome Laws to defend themselves from all the encroachments of Arbitrary Power: Insomuch that the high and mighty Pope himself, who often endeavour'd to enslave this Kingdom, and make it Tributary to his avarice, found to his great grief, that tho some ignorant Bigots wou'd contribute to fill his Coffers, yet the generality of the Nation were so tender of their own and their Princes Rights, that they always oppos'd him with true English Courage; as appears not only by hundreds of adjudg'd Cases reported in our Law-Books, but by divers Records and Acts of Parliament. For 25 Ed. 3. Stat. of Provisors, 'tis enacted, That such persons as obtain Provisions, or collation of Benefices from Rome, and thereupon disturb the Presentees of the King, or of other Patrons of Holy Church, or of their Advowees, The said Provisors, their Procurators, Executors and Notaries, shall be attached by their body, and brought in to Answer: And if they be convict, they shall abide in Prison without being let to Mainprise or Bail, or otherwise delivered, till they have made Fine and Ransom to the King at his Will, and gree to the Party that shall feel himself grieved: And nevertheless before they be delivered, they shall make full renunciation, and find Surety, that they shall not attempt such things in time to come, nor sue any Process by them, nor by other against any man in the Court of Rome, nor in any part elsewhere, for any such Imprisonments, or Renunciations, nor any other thing depending of them. And in the same year it was Enacted, that he that purchas'd a Provision in Rome for an Abbey, shou'd be out of the Kings Protection, and any man might do with him, as with the Kings Enemy, 25 Ed. 3. c. 22.

2 • Ed. 3. c. 1. upon the grievous Complaints of the Lords and Commons in Parliament, It was ordain'd, that all People of the Kings L • geance, of what condition that they be, which shall draw any out of the Realm in Plea, whereof the cognizance pertaineth to the Kings Court, or of things whereof Judgements be given in the Kings Court; or which do Sue in any other Court to defeat or impeach the Judgements given in the Kings Court, if they appear not within two months after warning given, shall be put out of the Kings Protection, and their Lands, Goods and Chattles forfeit to the King, and their Bodies wheresoever they may be found, shall be taken and Imprisoned, and Ransomed at the Kings will.

13 R. c. 2. 'Tis Enacted, That if any do accept of a Benefice of Holy Church contrary to this 25 Ed. 3. Statute of Provisors. Statute, and that duly prov'd, he shall within six Weeks next after such acceptation, be exiled and banished out of the Realm for ever, and his Lands and Tenements, Goods and Chattles shall be forfeit to the King. And if any Receive any such person banished, coming from beyond the Sea, or being within the Realm after the said six Weeks, knowing thereof, he shall be also exiled and banished, and incurr such forfeiture as afore is said. And their Procurators, Notaries, Executors, and Summoners shall have the pain and forfeiture aforesaid. And c. 3 It is ordained and established, That if any man bring or send within the Realm or the King's power, any Summons, Sentence, or Excommunication against any person, of what condition that he be, for the cause of making motion, assent, or execution of the said Statute of Provisors, he shall be taken, arrested and put in Prison, and forfeit all his Lands and Tenements, Goods and Chattels for ever, and incur the pain of life and of member. And if a Prelate make execution of such Summons, Sentences or Excommunications, that his Temporalties be taken and abide in the Kings hands, till due redress and correction thereof be made. And if any person of less Estate than a Prelate, of what condition that he be, make such execution, he shall be taken, arrested, and put in Prison, and have Imprisonment, and make fine and ransom by the discretion of the Kings Councel.

16 R. 2. 'tis declar'd, That the Crown of England, which hath been so free at all times, that it hath been in no earthly subjection, but immediately subject to God in all things touching the Regalty of the same Crown, ought not to be submitted to the Pope, nor the Laws and Statutes of the Realm by him defeated and avoided at his will, in perpetual destruction of the Sovereignty of the King our Lord, His Crown, His Regalty, and of all His Realm. And moreover, the Commons affirmed, That the things attempted by the Pope, be clearly against the King's Crown and His Regality, used and approved of in the time of all his Progenitors: Wherefore they and all the Leige-Commons of the same Realm, will stand by the King, and His Crown, and His Regalty, in the cases aforesaid, and in all other cases attempted against Him, His Crown, and His Regalty, in all points, to live and to die.

These, and several other38 Ed. 3. Stat. 2. c. 1. 2 H. c. 4. 7. H. 4. c. 6. 3 H. 5. c. 4. Statutes, too tedious 〈◊〉 to be inserted, have been provided in former ages when the Pope's power was at the highest, and provided even by Popish Kings and Popish Parliaments, to secure themselves and the Nation from all Papal encroachments. Neither have our Judges been less severe against the Popes unwarrantable pretensions, who in pursuance of the Common-Law of the Land, tho' no Statute had been made to that purpose, judg'd it a very hainous Crime in any Subject of England to obey, or put them in execution. In the Reign of King Edward I; when a Subject brought a Bull of Excommunication from Rome, against another Subject of this Realm, and publish'd it to the Lord Treasurer of England: this was by the Common-Law of the Land adjudg'd Treason against the King, his Crown and Dignity, 30 lib. Ass. pla. 19. Brook tit. Praemunire, pl • 10.

An Excommunication by the Archbishop, albeit it be disallow'd by the Pope or his Legate, is to be allow'd; neither ought the Judges give any allowance of any such Sentence of the Pope or his Legate, 16 E. 3. tit. Excom. 4.

An The same is resolved, 12 H. 4. f. 16. 14 H. 4. f. 14. 8 H. 6. f. 3. 20 H. 6. 1. 35 H. 6. 42. 7 E. 4. 14. 12 E. 4. 16. Excommunication under the Popes Bull is of no force to disable any man in England. And the Judges said, That he that pleadeth such Bulls, tho they concern the Excommunication of a Subject, were in a hard Case, if the King would extend his Justice against him 30 E. 3. lib. Ass. pl. 19.

The King presented to a Benefice, and his Presentee was disturb'd by one that had obtain'd Bulls from Rome; for which offence he was confin'd to perpetual Imprisonment, 21 Ed. 3. f. 40.

One Morris being elected Abbot of Waltham, sent to Rome for a Bull of confirmation; But it was resolved by all the Judges, that this Bull was against the Laws of England, and that the Abbot, for obtaining the same, was fallen into the King's mercy; whereupon all his Possessions were seiz'd into the King's hands, 46 Ed. 3. tit. Praemunire, 6.

In the Reign of Ed. 4. the Pope granted to the Prior of St. Johns to have Sanctuary within his Priory; But it was resolved by the Judges, that the Pope had no power to grant Sanctuary within this Realm; and therefore by judgment of the Law the same was disallowed▪ 1 H. 7. f 20.

In the same King's Reign, a Legate from the Pope came to Callis, to have come into England; But the King and his Councel would not suffer him to come within the Kingdom, until he had taken an Oath, that he should attempt nothing against the King or his Crown, 1 H. 7. f. 10.

And in the Reign of H. 7. the Pope had excommunicated all such persons whatsoever as had bought Allom of the Florentines; But it was resolved by all the Judges of England, that the Popes Excommunication ought not to be obeyed, or to be put in execution within the Realm of England, 1 H. 7. f. 10. These, and many other such Cases, you may see in the first part of Coke's 5th. Reports.

Now, if not only the Judges, but the Representative-wisdom of the Nation, even King, Lords, and Commons, in the thickest mist of Popish ignorance, were so resolute against the Bishop of Rome, and so careful to preserve their own Rights and Liberties inviolable: who can be so silly, as to believe, that a Popish Prince in this Kingdom, and at this time of the day, when Popery it self is much refin'd, and the whole Nation irreconcilably bent against it, will ever submit to any Papal Usurpation, much less make himself or his People Slaves to the Court of Rome?

Alas! says one, but our sweet Abbey-Lands are in danger to be lost, and reassum'd by the Popish Clergy, what course then shall we take to secure them? Believe me, if the Law will not do it, I know no other way, but a project I hear shortly to be set on foot for Insuring all the Church-Lands in the Kingdom these 40 years to come. The parties concern'd will propose very reasonable terms, and will undertake, the squinting Trimmer, who maliciously whispers about, he wou'd take seven years purchase for his Church-Lands, in case of a Popish Successor, shall have fourteen well secur'd, whenever the Duke succeeds. But why our Abbey-Lands more in danger, than any other part of our Estates? since we have the same security for the one as for the other, and both as firmly secur'd, as the Law can make them, or the wit of man devise. 'Tis well known, that the Popish 1 & 2 Phil. & Mar. c. 8. num. 32. Clergy in Queen Maries time, the better to forward the peoples reconciliation with the Church of Rome, by their Petition to the Queen, consented that all the Church-Lands dispos'd of to Lay-men, shou'd be settl'd on the Possessors and their Heirs for ever, without any danger of revocation; And this was approv'd of by the Pope's Legate a latere Cardinal Pool, Volentes ac decernentes, quod dictorum bonorum Ecclesiasticorum ram mobilium quam immobilium possessores praefati non possiut in praesenti nec in posterum, seu per Conciliorum Generalium vel Provincialium dispositiones, seu Decretales Rom. Pontificum Epistolas, seu aliam quamcon que censuram. Ecclesiasticam in dictis bonis, seu eorundem possessione molestari vel inquietari, 1 & 2 Phil. & Mar. c. 8. num. 33. willing and ordaining, (as he says) that the present possessors of Ecclesiastical Goods, as well movable as immovable, shall not at this time, nor in time to come, be disquieted nor molested in the possession of the said Goods, either by the disposal or order of any General or Provincial Councils, or by the Decretal Epistles of the Bishop of Rome, or by any other Ecclesiastical Censure whatsoever. And besides this, to crown the work beyond all exception, and bind it with a triple Cord which is not easily broken, all is confirm'd in full Parliament, by the Queen, by the Cardinal and Clergy, and by the Lords and Commons; by whom 'tis enacted, That all and every Article, Clause, Sentence and Proviso contained or specified in any Act or Acts of Parliament, concerning or touching the assurance or conveyance of any the said Monasteries, Priories, Nunneries, Commandries, Deanries, Prebends, Colledges, Chantries, Hospitals, Houses of Fryers, Rectories, Vicarages, Churches, Chappels, Archbishopricks, Bishopricks, and other Religious and Ecclesiastical houses and places, or any of them, or in any ways concerning any Manors, Lands, Tenements, Profits, Commodities, Hereditaments, or other the things before specified to the said K. H. 8. or K. Ed. 6. or either of them, or any other person or persons, or Body-politick or Corporate, and every of them; and all and every Writing, Deed, and Instrument concerning the assurance of any the same, shall stand, remain, and be in as good force, effect and strength, and shall be pleaded, and taken advantage of, to all intents, constructions, and purposes, as the same should, might or could have been by the Laws and Statutes of this Realm, in case this present Act had never been had or made, 1. & 2 Phil. & Mar. c. 8 §. 39. And 'tis further enacted, That whosoever shall by any Process obtained out of any Ecclesiastical Court within this Realm or without, or by pretence of any spiritual Jurisdiction, or otherwise contrary to the Laws of this Realm, inquiet or molest any person or persons, or body-politick for any Manors, Lands, Tenements, Hereditaments, or things above-specified, contrary to the words, sentences and meaning of this Act, shall incur the danger of the Act of Praemunire, ib. §. 41.

What cou'd the wit of man contrive or devise more firm in Law, or more satisfactory to all parties concern'd in Church or Abbey-Lands, than these and several other paragraphs provided in the same Act of Parliament? Why then are people by groundless and imaginary fears discompos'd, or frightn'd out of their wits, and made tools to drive on the Designs of some ill men, against the Monarchy and the Church, who will have nothing sufficient to secure them in the Religion they have not, but what will unavoidably shake the very foundation of the Government? 'Tis true, our State-Mountebanks in their Address presented in the Name of the House of Commons, are so dutiful to their Sovereign, as humbly to threaten, this may possibly happen, if the Duke succeeds: We further humbly beseech Your Majesty (say they) in Your great Wisdom to consider, whether, in case the Imperial Crown of this Protestant Kingdom should descend to the Duke of York, the opposition, which may possibly be made to his possessing it, may not only endanger the farther descent in the Royal Line, but even Monarchy it self, 21 Dec. 1680. But that season, I hope, is over, and the Nation now thorowly sensible of the fatal consequences of such resolutions, and can never forget the unparallell'd Tyranny of the Rump, nor the doleful Tragedies that ensu'd the Quarrel between York and Lancaster, which made England a Field of Blood.

But what has this great Prince, once the peoples darling, done to deserve so severe a treatment, or be thought so dangerous a person to the Publick? Has he defrauded any of an Ox or an Ass; or was he ever found worse than his word, or unjust in his dealings? If he has chang'd his opinion, which yet is improbable, about the modes and circumstances of Religion, 'tis plain he has not chang'd his moral Principles, nor his natural affection to his Countrey. I need not instance how often he expos'd his Person to danger, like a common Sea-man, to fight our Battles; nor how zealously he always studied the true Interest of the English Nation, in opposition to French Designs; a truth too well known even to his most inveterate Enemies, but ill rewarded with ingratitude. 'Tis prodigious, what tricks and arts have been us'd of late to incense the unthinking multitude against His Highness, and set them a-madding with the apprehension of Stakes and Faggots, and all the Chymoera's of a crack-brain'd fancy: when 'tis palpably evident, it is not in the power of any Prince, tho' the greatest Bigot of Papists, to force this Nation in point of Conscience, or alter the establish'd Religion; since the Laws de Haeretico comb • rendo, (which in Queen Maries time were in force, and warranted the Cruelties then committed upon the Protestants, as the Statutes made by Queen Elizabeth, do the executing of Priests and Jesuits as Traytors, both uncharitable and ill-becoming a Christian-Magistrate) are now happily repeal'd and abolish'd. Why then shou'd people be bugbear'd out of their senses, with imaginary fears of Smithfield-Faggots; or think that the Duke, who never advis'd his own Children to become Papists, wou'd offer, tho' able, to compel any other to renounce his Religion? If He has express'd some kindness for such Romanists▪ as had signaliz'd their Loyalty to His FATHER here, or to His BROTHER Abroad, when those that now call themselves true Protestants, openly absur'd his Title, 'tis an instance of his gratitude and good nature, but no Argument of his approving the Opinions of that Party. And yet we have no better proof, than such groundless whispers and surmises, unless we believe the ridiculous Salamunca Doctor's peeping through the Key-hole, of his being a Papist, or any way inclin'd to the Popish Communion. How false then is the Preamble (and therefore justly rejected, had there been no other reason, by the House of Lords) of the intended Bill of Exclusion, That the Duke of York is notoriously known to have been perverted from the Protestant to the Popish Religion? Or the extravagant Vote, whereon they grounded this Abortive Bill?

Resolved, That the Duke of York's being a Papist, and the hopes of his coming such to the Crown, hath given the greatest countenance and encouragement to the present designs and conspiracies against the King and the Protestant Religion.—2 Nov. 1680. Whereas it might with greater Truth and Justice be

Resolved, That the late endeavours of some Leading men in the House of Commons in favour of the Fanaticks, and their declaring, That if His Majesty should come by any Violent Death, they would revenge it to the utmost upon the Papists; has given the greatest countenance and encouragement to Colledge and his Accomplices to conspire against the King and the Church; and has openly expos'd His Majesties sacred Life to the blind zeal of the Faction; to whom, besides the prospect of destroying their enemies, it was a great temptation to commit the villany, that they cou'd safely leave it at anothers door.

Thus, Sir, I have given you in short my Opinion on Mr. Hunts Defence of the Charter; and for your further satisfaction have added some Remarks on the Proceedings of our worthy Patriots (so much commended by that Gentleman) in the last Parliament at Westminster. There remains a great deal more to be said as well of this, as of the other that follow'd at Oxford; but some earnest business requiring my attendance, I will at present give you no further trouble, only speak a word or two to the general Calumny cast by the Factions on all that dare oppose their Designs, and which I cannot well expect to escape, viz. That we are no Friends to Parliaments. But I appeal to any man of Sense, whether I, who wou'd have the Commons freely enjoy their Priviledges, yet confin'd within their Ancient and Legal bounds, or the Fanatick that labours to make their Power absolute and uncontroulable, be a greater friend to that Honourable Assembly? And whether they can possibly have more pernicious enemies, than such as make them Controullers, instead of Councellors, to their Soveraign, and Competitors with him in the Government; when their Being wholly depends on his Will and Pleasure, and can expect to fit no longer than during their good Behaviour? How Fatal the Insolencies of the 3d. Estate in France, Anno 1614. prov'd to that Nation in general, who never since had the like Assembly, is particularly observ'd by several Historians. 'Tis true, we have no reason to mistrust any such thing, having so good and so gracious a Prince, as has solemnly engag'd His Royal word, That no Irregularities in Parliament shall ever make Him out of Love with Parliaments, Declar. p. 9. Besides that our Constitution is such, that we cannot reasonably fear it. Nevertheless, Policy as well as Duty requires, that the Commons give no such distast for the future, as will justly occasion even any long intermission of their meeting; since Parliaments, provided they behave themselves with Prudence and Moderation, Are the best method (as His Majesty says) for healing the Distempers of the Kingdom, and the only means to preserve the Monarchy in that due credit and respect, which it ought to have both at hom and abroad. Ibid.