A TREATISE Concerning the INDIFFERENCIE OF HVMANE ACTIONS.

I Have often wondred at some Prelatists, char­ging the poore non-conformists with deny­all of things indifferent; from which their Writings do sufficiently acquit them: Dr John Burgess (in his Rejoinder, Pag. 188, 189.) tells us, that M^r Bradshaw against all Lear­ning, and sense, resolves, that there is no­thing indifferent. But from this accusati­on, we have Dr Ames his Vindication (in his fresh suite against Ce­remonies, pag. 161, 162.) Dr Hammond (in his grounds of Ʋnifor­mity) accuseth Amesius himselfe for this opinion; but with how little truth, the Reader may soone see, if he please to peruse these following places in him, Med Theolog. lib. 2. cap. 3. sect. 13, 14, 15. De Conscientiâ &c. lib. 3. cap. 18. Gregory de Valentia informes me, that one of the Articles of John Husse, (anathematized in the Councill of Constance) was, that nulla sunt opera indifferentia. That which Papists of old charged upon him, these men impute to those, whom they have been pleased to nickname Puritan's. But [Page 2]for the untruth, and injustice of this crimination, we dare appeale to the more moderate, and Learned of their own party. The Reverend, and Learned Dr Sanderson disputeth against them, for making the restraint of the outward man in matters indifferent, an impeachment to Christian liberty; on Rom: 14.3. Pag. 24.25. And this presupposeth that they held somethings to be in their nature indifferent. I shall therefore spend no more time, or pa­per, to wipe off an aspersion so manifestly untrue, and unjust: But yet however this hath occasioned me to resolve upon the briefe stating of the truth touching things, or actions indifferent: and in order hereunto I shall 1. Premise some Distinctions con­cerning the actions of man; and 2. Explaine what is meant by indifferency.

1. First, The actions of man are either indeliberate or deli­berate.

1. Indeliberate, which proceed, either from the disposition of naturall qualities (as hungering, thirsting, the easing and disbur­dening of nature) or else from the force of Imagination, (as rubbing of the beard, or hand, scratching of the head, lifting up of a straw from the ground, and such like things, when a man thinks not of them.)

2. Deliberate, which proceed from deliberate reason and are properly humane, and rationall actions, all voluntary actions.

These may be considered two manner of waies. 1. In the generall, actu signato. 2. In the singulars, and individual's, actu exercito.

The former consideration is meerly in regard of the object; The latter taketh in all circumstances whatsoever: The former is a consideration of actions, secundum speciem, according to their sort or kind; The latter is a consideration of them in regard of their actuall existence.

In a second place we are to enquire, what is meant by the indif­ferency of actions: It apparently carrieth in its notion, a nega­tion of morall goodnesse, and illnesse: I say, sig nantèr, of morall good­nesse, and illnesse; because the most indifferent actions are tran­scend [...]ntly, and may be naturally good. An indifferent action then is that, which is neither morally good, nor evill: The nature of things indifferent, (saith the great Hooker in his Ecclesiast. Policie, [Page 3]Pag. 59.) is neither to be commanded, nor forbidden, but left free, and arbitrary: With which I would desire Dr Hammond to reconcile what he hath in his Treatise of Will-worship; that the best of morall actions, the highest degrees of v [...]rtue, and of worship, the most superlative love of God are uncommanded: and he, I hope, will give me leave to adde, that they are not forbidden, and hereupon I shall conclude, that (by Mr Hooker his definition) they are indifferent; which is as unsober a conceit allmost, as can be uttered, and unworthy of any serious refutation. I shall here onely make use of part of his expressions against Ames (in his grounds of Ʋniformity, Pag. 14.) He that thinks the highest degree of vertue is indifferent, doth certainly use other Dictionaries then we doe. But to leave him, I shall for clearing the nature of indifferency propound, and satisfie two Queries.

1. What medium indifferent things are betwixt things morally good, and evill? whether medium abnegationis, or participationis? The Author of Altare Damascenum affirmeth it to be medium or a mid­dle between them by way of abnegation, Adiaphora non sunt media per participationem, ut rubedo inter album, & nigrum; sed per negatio­nem utriúsque extremi, conformitatis & difformitatis ad rectam ratio­nem, seu legem, pag. 496.

But for the disproofe of this, I shall desire you to observe out of Esse indif­ferens ad bo­num, & ma­lum contin­git dupliciter, aut per modum abstractionis, secundum quod universale aliquid significat ut abstractum [...] differentiis, & concontrariis dividentibus ipsum, unde in suâ communitate significatum signi­ficatur ut indifferenter se habens adutramque differentiam. Sicut animal réque significatur u [...] rationale neque ut irrationale, & tamen oporter omne particulare animal esse rationale vel irrationale. Et similiter est hoc. Si enim significetur actus in eo quod est agere, haber quiden [...] bonitatem in quantum est ens, sed indifferenter se habet ad bonitatem, vel malitiam moralen [...] Et similiter bonum ex genere indifferenter le habet ad bonum & malum ex circumstantiâ [...] fine, quamvis non inveniatur aliquod bonum in genere particulari, quod non sit aliquâ circum­stantia vestitum, & ad aliquem finem ordinatum, unde oportet, quod bonitatem, vel malitia [...] contrabat. Et secundum hanc considerationem quidam dixerunt omnes actus indifferen [...] esse in eo quod sunt accus, & quidam dixerunt, quod non omnes, sed aliqui, accipientes mag [...] in speciali nomina actuum, quae non exprimunt aliquid, unde actus, ad malitiam vel bonitat [...] determinetur, vel materiam vel finem vel circumstantiam, sicut comedere, coire, et hujusmo [...] Alio modo conting it hoc secúndum, quod aliquod particulare significatum desicit a suscep [...] ­bilitate alicujus perfectionis, sicut lapis à susceptibilitate visus, & hoc modo aliqui actus, qui d [...] ficiunt a susceptibilitate bonitatis moralis dicuntur indifferenter. lib. 2. senten. dist. 40. quaest. 1. Capreolus, that a thing may be said to be a medium, or middle betwixt that which is morally good, and morally evill; either by [Page 4]way of abstraction from them (as a generall nature is abstracted from it's differences, a subject from it's accidents,) or else by way of repugnancy unto them, because it is uncapable of them; and thus a stone is of a middle nature betwixt that which seeth, and is blind; because it is uncapable of both sight, and blindnesse. Now it is this latter way, that a thing is said to be a medium by the ab­negation of each extreame, as is evident by the instances usually brought for the exemplification hereof; For they are of such things as are uncapable of, and repugnant unto both extreames. And the most indifferent actions, that proceed from deliberate reason, are capable of becoming either good, or evill, by circumstances, and carry no repugnancy thereunto: so much is confessed by Di­doclave himselfe in the place above mentioned. Tertium quod constituit hujus medii formale est non repugnantia ad utrunque extre­mum. Actus homicidii in bove cornu-peta nullam habet conformita­tem, aut difformitatem adrectam rationem, non tamen dicitur actus in­differens, quia ibi est repugnantia ad utrunque extremum, nam bos est animal irrationale. Adiaphora igitur sunt dubia, indistincta, & U­TRÓQUE vergentia, sed non magis vergentia in unum quam alterum extremum.

Others therefore conclude, that indifferent actions are a medi­um, or middle betwixt good, and bad, in a way of participation; and that either potentiall, or actuall.

1. Potentiall, There is in them a non-repugnancy unto either of the extreames, unto morall goodnesse or badnesse, so that they may be either good, or bad by circumstances.

2. Actuall, and this agreeth onely to such indifferent acts, as become good by circumstances; for they being but imperfectly good, are in part good, and in part evill, and so partake actually of both extreames. By this you may see, though indifferent actions, which proceed from deliberate reason may in some sense be said to be a medium of participation betwixt that which is morally good, or evill; yet they are not said to be a middle of participati­on in such a strict sense, as lukewarmnesse is betwixt cold, and heat; for that alwaies partaketh actually of both extreames (cold, and heat,) whereas indifferent actions doe not alwaies actually partake of the two extreames, (morall goodnesse or badnesse,) but onely when they are good; for many of them may be, and [Page 5]too often are by circumstances totally and altogether evill, and in no respect good. Amesius qualifies the matter, and affirmeth that as it is not medium merae abnegationis, so it is medium ali­cujus participationis, a middle not of meere abnegation, but of some participation. Absolutely, and simply, in strictnesse of speech, it is neither medium negationis, nor participationis: 1. Not negationis; because it hath no repugnancy unto it's extreames: 2. Not participationis; because it doth not allwaies actually partake of both extreames; But yet, secundum quid, after a sort, and in some respect, it may be reduced unto both medium abnegationis, and participationis: It resembleth medium abnegationis, because as such it is neither of the extreames; and it resembleth medium participationis, because sometimes it actually participates of both extreames: And thus you see how these different opinions may be reconciled; But yet (because denominatio fit à potiori) we shall rather reduce it unto medium participationis; because unto that it hath the greatest resemblance.

A second question is; Whether all indifferent actions be equal­ly indifferent? no more bending unto evill, then unto good? Di­doclave holds the affirmative, Nec solum (saith he) requiritur ne­gatio conformitatis, seu difformitatis ad legem ceu rectam rationem, sed etiam majoris propensionis in unam quam in aliam partem. And againe afterwards: Adiaphora non sunt magis vergentia in unum quam alterum extremum. The incomparably Learned Dr Sander­son is of a contrary opinion, that some things are unequally indiffe­rent, Indifferentia ad unum (as he is pleased to call them) I shall transcribe his words, and with all due reverence of his person briefely examine them.

Dr Sanderson on Rom: 3.8. pag. 58.59.

Things unequally indifferent are such, as though they be neither universally good, not absolutely evill, yet even barely considered, sway more, or lesse rather the one way, then the other: And that either unto good, or unto evill. Of the former sort are such outward actions, as being in morall precepts indefinitely commanded, are yet sometimes sinfully and ill done: as, giving an almes, hearing a sermon, repr [...]c­ving an offender; and the like, which are in themselves good, and so to be accounted, rather then evill; though some unhappy Circumstance or other may make them ill. Of the latter sort are such outward [Page 6]actions, as being in morall precepts indefinitely prohibited, are yet in some cases lawfull, and may be well done: as, swearing an oath, tra­velling on the Sabbath day, playing for money, and the like: which are in themselves rather evill, then good, because they are ever evill, unlesse all circumstances concurre to make them good. Now of these actions, though the former sort carry the face of good, the latter of evill; yet in very truth both sorts are indifferent. Ʋnderstand me aright: I do not meane indifferent, indifferentiâ contradictionis, such as may be indifferently either done, or not done; but indifferent onely indifferen­tiâ contrarietatis, such as (suppose the doing) may be indifferently either good, or evill: because so they may be done, as to be good, and so they may be done also, as to be evill; but yet with this difference, that those former, though indifferent, and in some cases evill, are yet of themselves notably and eminently inclined unto good rather then evill; and these latter proportionably unto evill, rather then good.

For answere: The first sort of actions, such as being in morall precepts indefinitely commanded, are yet sometimes sinfully and ill done, (as, giving an almes, hearing a sermon, reproving an of­fender, and the like,) are not in the language of the Schoolmen, in­different actions: This I shall make good by an argument out of Suarez (brought by him unto another purpose;) He disputing against some, that held all humane actions to be indifferent, proves the contrary; First in inward, then in outward actions: and his argument concerning outward actions stands thus. If ex­ternall acts be considered according to an objective goodnesse, or illnesse, this cannot be true, because there are many actions in their own nature objectively evill, and prohibited, and there are other also objectively good, and honest; because this goodnesse, and illnesse is not taken by extrinsick Denomination, from the inward act, but from it's intrinsecall agreement with, or repug­nancy unto right reason. Those actions which have a materiall, and objective goodnesse, are not indifferent actions in the language of the Schooles. But the actions, that the Doctor speaks of, have an objective, and materiall goodnesse, because they are comman­ded, and therefore they are not indifferent. But, saith the Doctor, they are indifferent at least indifferentiâ Contrarietatis, ‘such as (sup­pose the doing) may be indifferently either good or evill: because so they may be done, as to be good, and so they may be done also, as to be evill.’

For answer: By this account all outward ordinances of God, all externall acts of worship, and indeed all outward good works whatsoever should be actions indifferent, because they may be done well, or ill: But to say that all these are indifferent would be very strange language: for although they may have evill cast upon them externally by the agent, yet this is no hinderance but that they may be in themselves objectively and materially good, as being matter of precept.

But perhaps there may be some mystery in this clause, indefi­nitely commanded: They are commanded, but not to be perfor­med alwaies, but only l [...]co, & tempere debitis; according to the known rule, Affirmativa praecepta obligant semper, non ad sem­per.

For answer: This will nothing alter the case; for hereby it will follow, that the matter of all affirmative precepts should be in­different; And whosoever shall say so takes indifferency in a different notion from the usuall acception thereof by both Papists, and Protestants; who jointly make it to be a middle thing be­twixt that morall goodnesse, and badnesse, which is called objective or materiall.

As for the second sort of Actions, I readily confesse that in some sense they may be said to be unequally indifferent, inclining and swaying more to evill, then to good. To cleare which I shall distinguish of a twofold consideration of such actions: They may be considered meerly in regard of their object, or else also in regard of the circumstances, which usually are annexed with them: In re­gard of their object they are equally indifferent; But yet in regard of Circumstances may be said to be more notably and eminently inclined unto evill then unto good; because the circumstances, which generally, and commonly are connexed with them, are evill.

But as for the reason, which the Doctor bringeth to prove them to be unequally indifferent, rather evill, then good, is to me very unsatisfying. His words are, which are in themselves rather evill, then good, because they are ever evill, unlesse all circumstances concurre to make them good.

The ground of my exception against this reason is, because as much may be said of all outward good works, religious duties, and [Page 8]services whatsoever: They are all ever evill, unlesse all circum­stances concurre to make them good, according to that of Dio­nysius, Bonum fit ex causâ integrâ malum ex quovis defectu. I shall conclude my answer unto this second Qu [...]re, with rehear-sall of Dr Ames his proposall, and decision of it. An actiones in­differentes nihil inter se differant, sed aequè omnes à bono, & malo distent?

Resp. In suâ intrinsec â natur â nihil omnino differunt; sed tamen quaedam sunt, quae ut plurimum habent circumstantias malas annexas, atque adeò dicuntur vergere in malum, aut in malum sonare, ut ac­cusatoris aut carnificis munere fungi: quaedam etiam, quae ut plurimum habent circumstantias bonas annexas, atque adeò dicuntur vergere in bonum, aut in bonum sonare, ut colere agros, diligentiam in studiis ad­hibere, &c.

In their own intrinsecall nature they differ nothing at all: but yet there are some which for the most part have evill circum­stances annexed to them, and so bend more toward evill, and have an evill name: as to do the worke of an accuser, the office of an hangman, &c. some there be also which for the most part have good circumstances, and so bend toward good, and have a good name, as to till the ground, to follow our study diligently &c.

Having premised these things, I shall in the next place, proceed to lay downe some conclusions concerning the indifferency of the actions of man: and they shall be three.

1. Conclusion. The Indeliberate actions of man which pro­ceed from the disposition of naturall qualities, or onely from the Imagination, as to rub the beard, or hands, to scratch the head, to move the head, feet, or a staffe (The mind being not intent upon them,) may be, and are indifferent, not onely in the generall, but in their individuals, and singulars: The reason which 1. 2ae qu. 18. art. 9. Aquinas giveth for this is very solid; Because such actions to speake pro­perly are not morall, and humane, for they do not proceed from the soule as reasonable: Those actions, which are not morall, or of morall consideration, are uncapable of morall goodnesse or bad­nesse: for morall goodnesse, or badnesse implieth a morall beeing: But now those actions which proceed from the disposition of na­turall qualities, or from the force of the Imagination onely are [Page 9]not morall, are not of morall consideration, they are extra genus moris: And the reason is because actions have their morality from this, that they are some way or other immediately, or mediately derived from reason.

Against this reason of Aquinas, Sed contra hoe instatur, quia u­bi invenitur dominium ra­tionis, vel vo­suntatis, ibi in­venitur genus moris, led do­minium ratio­nis vel volunta­tis invenitur non solum in actibus qui se­quuntur ratio­nem deliberan­tem, sed etiam qui praecedunt, in quantum à ratione praeve­niri potuerunt, ut dictum suit, supra, dist. 24. q. 5. (alioquin in sensualitate nullum posset esse peccatum) ergo actus pro­cedentes à solâ imaginatione pertinent ad genus moris, qui [...] subsunt imperio rationis, in quantum ab ea pos [...]unt praeve­niri, et sic per consequens sunt susceptivi bonitatis, & malitiae moralis, cujus oppositum assu­mebatur pro fundamento. Et ad hoc potest dici, quod aliqui actus procedentes ab imaginatione, et praevenientes deli­b [...]rationem rationis sunt tales, circa quos ratio debet esse pervigil, ne insurgant, et tales sunt actus appetitus sensitivi circa materiam peccati &c. & respectu talium actuum quantumcunque deliberationem praeveniant, potest esse negligens ratio in reprimendo, & peccare &c, Et de his procedit ratio, scilicet quod sunt aliquo modo in genere moris, rec sunt indisterentes. Alii autem sunt, circa quos ratio nullo modo tenetur esse pervigil, nisi in casu ratione alicujus ad­juncti, quia objecta talium secundum se non sunt materia alicujus peccati &c. ut levare festucam, vel fricare barbam: Et tales actus ut sic pervenientes, quos non tenetur praevenire ratio, nifi in casu sunt purè extra genus moris, & indifferentes ad bonum, & malum, de quibus intelligenda est przdicta opinie. Durand propounds this following objection: that if the acts of the imagination be unca­pable of a morall being, and so not of a morall consideration, that then they are uncapable of sinne: for every sinfull action is a mo­rall action: But now they are not uncapable of sinne: for it is most evident, that in sensualitate potest esse peccatum, that sin may be in the indeliberate acts of the sensitive appetite, and in the acts of the imagination; and the reason is, because the sensuall powers or faculties are said to belong or appertaine unto reason, though not essentialiter, yet participativè, as being under the conduct and guidance of right reason, obliged to hearken unto it's voyce, and to obey all it's just Commands, and dictates.

The answere here-unto in the same Author is, that the indelibe­rate acts of the sensitive powers, and faculties are of two sorts.

1. Some have for their matter, sinne, and such are morall: for they are voluntary, though not directly, as being produced or com­manded by the will, yet indirectly, as being that, which the will is able, and obliged to hinder: and therefore reason ought to be watchfull to prevent the rising of them.

But now there are some indeliberate acts of the sensitive facul­ties, which have not for their obiects the matter of sinne, such as are above instanced in, and of them we may say indefinitely, and in the generall, that they are not morall; because they are not voluntary, either directly, or indirectly; Reason is not bound to [Page 10]keepe any watch over them, nor is the will bound to restraine, and represse them; nisi in casu, ratione alicujus adiuncti, as Durand limits it. As when they are a hinderance to Duties, or against that decency which is required in the worship, and ser­vice of God; As for example if a man should be rubbing of his beard, scratching of his head, moving of his feete, or any other part of his body in an undecent way in the act of receiving the elements in the Lords supper: That which I have said touching this Conclusion is for the substance of it in Ames de Conscientià. lib. 3. cap. 18. His words I shall transcribe. Actiones quaedam ita sunt hominis, ut non sint proprie humanae, illae scilicet, quae proce­dunt ab imaginatione nudâ, & non a ratione deliberatâ, ut fricare manus, aut barbam, scalpere caput, levare festucam, &c. dum aliud aliquid cogitamus. Hujusmodi actiones non sunt moraliter bonae aut malae: quia non sunt in genere moris constitutae, dum omni consi­lio destituuntur. Quamvis enim istis etiam p [...]ssit quis peccare, ut si tempore precum vagari sineret imaginationem suam, et huiusmodi nugis indulgere, ipsae tamen actiones per se neque malae sunt, neque bonae. Subijciuntur quidem istiusmodi motus imperio arbitrii humani; sedita subijciuntur, ut possint exerceri nullo rationis actu praeeunte: nequè vlterius illas ratione praevenire tenemur, quam ut officiis non ob­sint. — Sicut in oculorum palpebris movendis moderandi potestatem habet ratio, et voluntas: sed non est operae pretium observare quoties conni­vemus, si modo caveatur, ne praeter decorum, aut officium aliquid in istis admittatur.

1. There be some actions, which though they be actions of man, yet they are not humane actions, such are those which proceed from imagination only, and not from deliberate reason, as the rubbings of mens hands, to scratch the head or beard, to take up a straw, &c. while we are thinking of something else: these actions are not morally good or evill, they want that which is re­quired to make them so, namely counsell and deliberation: for although a man may sin by those actions, as if in time of prayer he suffer his imagination to wander, and do give way to such toyings as those. Yet these actions considered in themselves are neither good nor evill. It is true these motions are subject to the Com­mand of mans will, but yet they are so subject, that they may be exercised without any precedent act of reason; neither are we [Page 11]bound any farther by reason to prevent them, but only so far that they hinder not the duties we are about. So for moving of the eye-lids, reason and the will have power to moderate them, but it is not worth the while to take notice how often we winke, if so be we take heed, that in such things nothing be done, which is undecent, or against our duty.

A second Conclusion: There be divers deliberate actions, that proceed from deliberate reason, which if they be considered in actu signato, in the generall, secundum speciem, according to their sort, or Kind, as abstracted from all singularizing circumstances. are indifferent, neither morally good, nor evill: This I shall con­firme by scripture, and by reason.

1. By scripture: And here we have a most signall place. 1. Cor. 6.12. All things are lawfull unto me. Here all things are to be ta­ken not absolutely, but limitedly, for all indifferent things: for as for things Commanded, they are not onely lawfull, but also necessary, and therefore must be done loco & tempore debitis: And as for things prohibited, they are unlawfull and sinfull. The words then are an undeniable proofe of the indifferency of some actions, and withall an explication of such indifferency: Indifferent actions are meerly lawfull, neither necessary, nor unlawfull; They may lawfully be done, and lawfully be abstained from. In this text then we have the extent of our Christian liberty asserted, and li­mited.

1. We have the extent of it unto all indifferent things asser­ted; And the Apostle contents not himselfe to affirme it once, but doubleth the affirmation: The reason of which may be, because he thought it an important point, or because he would put it out of all doubt, and controversy.

2. We have also a twofold limitation, or restraint put upon the use or exercising of our Christian liberty as touching things indif­ferent; But all things are not expedient; But I will not be brought under the power of any.

Many think, that Paul speaks these words per mimesin, a figure called imitation; that he speakes not in his own person, but re­hearseth the words of the Corinthians: so that here is, first Corin­thiorum [...], the objection of the Corinthians, All things are lawfull for me: secondly, Aposteli [...], the reply of Paul, [Page 12]But all things are not expedient: But I will not be brought under the power of any. But whether the Apostle uttered his own words, or the Corinthians is not materiall: because, suppose they be the words of the Corinthians, he grants them with due limitations: The sentence of Paul, saith Aegidius Hunnius, consist's of a con­cession, and correction.

1. A Concession of the lawfulnesse of all indifferent things. All things are lawfull for me.

2. A Correction or restriction of this large grant: wherein he sheweth: that though all indifferent things be in their generall nature lawfull; yet they are in some cases to be abstained from, when they are inexpedient: when they enthrall us unto either per­sons, or things: But all things are not expedient: But I will not be brought under the power of any.

A great difference there is amongst expositors about the cohe­rence of these words: Some thinke, that the Apostle makes way for that Argument which he handles at large chap: 9. All things are lawfull for me; therefore to receive a salary for preaching of the Gospell is lawfull: But I will not make use of this my liberty: Because it will not be expedient unto the promoting of the Gospell amongst you, but an hinderance rather: And because I will retaine my full liberty of reproving you, which I shall in great part lose, if I should receive my whole livelyhood from you: As it fares with the false prophets among you, that are no better then Trencher chaplaines, that dare not touch your sores, medle with either your sinnes, or errours, for feare that hereupon you should shorten your benevolence: I will not be brought under the power of any. But the coherence is too farre fetcht, and we may say the same of others, who would make these words to cohere with chap. 8. v. 9.

Others with more probability derive the connexion of the words onely from the present chapter: and they are again subdi­vided: some fetch it from the words foregoing: Others from the words following.

1. From the words foregoing. The Apostles discourse about going to law with Brethren before the unjust, and unbelievers: The Corinthians might be ready to object in behalfe of this their practise, that it was a thing in it's own nature indifferent, not [Page 13]prohibited by the word of God, and therefore lawfull; for all things are lawfull, that is all indifferent things. True, saith the Apostle, but. 1. all things are not expedient: And in particu­lar for Christians to sue Christians before Paganish Tribunals is so far from being expedient, as that it is an impediment unto Chri­stians own glorifying of God in his immediate worship and service, as also unto their quiet, peaceable, and comfortable communion with Brethren.

2. I will not be brought under the power of any, either persons, or things. And if you goe in this manner to law with your Bre­thren you will put your selves under the power of many both per­sons, and things.

1. Persons: Perhaps you will lie at the mercy of an unjust judg: a false witnesse may undoe you; A corrupt lawyer betray you; your own witnesses will command your table, and purse, though for attesting the truth; And though your Advocates be never so faithfull, you must give them your most diligent attendance; As the proverb is, you must not only pay, but pray them too.

2. Things: The many matters, the things of the world, which you sue for, will have you so farre under their power, as that they will be a great hinderance to your free, and full service of God; for if they doe not wholly withdraw you from it, they will wonderfully distract you in it; Because law suits will take up the greatest part of your time, and the best of your thoughts. Quidem hanc partem sic explicant: Sub nullius redigar potestate, i. e. Non patiar me propter res pe­cuniarias, ac temporales, ve­sut essem sub earum potesta­te, vel abstrahi vel distrahi, quo minus li. berè, & abs­que impedimento serviam Deo, quod non potero, si tempus & cogitationes impendam litibus. Esthius in loc.

Adde unto this, that for Christians, especially in those primi­tive times, to pursue their Brethren unto the judgment-seats of heathens, in matters capable of an amicable compromise by the mediation of Brethren, was a plaine evidence, that they were under the power of the world, and the things thereof; for who but a muck­worme, a vassall to his wealth, would doe a thing so much unto the discredit of the Gospell, and reproach of Christianity; espe­cially seeing they might with greater probability expect justice from the umpirage of saints, then the sentences of professed un­believers?

Others in the next place look for the cohaesion of these words for­wards, upon the Apostles ensuing discours, touching fornication: not only the Corinthians, but the Gentiles in generall held simple for­nicatiō to be a thing indifferent. The old man in the Comedian, spake the sense of the generality of them: Crede mihi non est slagitium ado­lescentulum scortari. And you will the less wonder at this, if you cō ­sider, that Durand, a Popish Schoolman, held it to be unlawfull, not by the law of nature, but only by the positive law of God: Quod autem dicunt quidam, quod simplex fornicatio est peccatum mortale de se, exclusâ omni lege positivâ, divinâ & humanâ, non benè intelligo, lib. 4. dist. 33. quaest. 2. And upon the Consideration of this opini­on of the Gentiles touching the indifferency of fornication it was, (think interpreters,) that fornication is Acts. 15. by the first Coun­cil ranged amongst indifferent things, bloud, and things stran­gled; The use of which was forbidden onely for a time. Unto this erroneous supposition the Apostle answereth per limitationom, & per inficiationem: He limits the generall rule touching things indifferent, and then he denieth the instance in question; And this his denyall he illustrateth, and confirmeth from vers. 13. unto the end of the chapter. Unto this his deniall he premifeth limitations of the generall rule. All indifferent things are lawfull: He puts a double restraint upon it. The first; But all things are not expedient, or profitable: Many indifferent things sometimes prove an impe­diment unto our Christian race, and then they are to be forborne. A second restraint is in these words: But I will not be brought under the power of any: My affection unto indifferent things shall be so temperate, as that it shall be in my power to forbeare them upon reasonable and important Considerations. There should be an indifferencie in our desires towards things indiffe­rent, so that they should not have the command of us▪ but we should be able to use, or not to use them, as the concurrence of particular circumstances guide us.

To give yet further light unto these words, I shall briefly con­sider their coherence as they lie in 1 Cor. 10.23. with little vari­ation. The Apostle there states a case of Conscience touching the eating of Idolothytes, things offered unto Idoles. First, he resolves, that to eat them publiquely in the temple of Idoles, at the idolatrous feasts of these Idoles, was to have communion in the [Page 15]worship of these idols to have fellowship with Divels; to be partakers of the table of Divels: He that did thus eat them, did eat them considered formally, as sacrificed and consecrated to i­doles; He did eat them in the honour of the idols, unto which they were offered; He did tacitly acknowledg their Deity, and interpretatively approve of the Idolatrous worship and service of them; But now the Apostle alloweth a private use of things offered to idols, If they were not eaten under a religious notion, but considered onely and materially as meat, matter of food, and as the good creatures of God. Two cases he instanceth in, wherein they might be thus eaten; First, they might buy them in the shambles, and eat them in their own houses, vers. 25. And secondly, they might eat them at the tables of their unbelieving neighbours, that invited them: This latter part of the Determination of the question he confirmes, and limiteth, by putting in an exception in the case of scandall: And unto all this he prefixeth the extension of our Christian liberty, unto all indifferent things in the generall, together with two restrictions, that we are to put upon it in the use and exercise: Even indifferent things are to be forborne, when they are not profitable, and conducing unto the ends, which a Christian should propound: when they are destructive and scanda­lous unto our Brethren: Omniami­hi licent, om­nia scilicet adi­aphora, quale est comedere idolothyta, non quasi sacra, aut quasi idolothy. ta, sed tanquam communes ci­bos. Ubi nota, Ha­ctenus egit Paulus de ido­lothytis, qua talibus, ficque vetuit ea come­dere. Unde v. 14. Fugite, ait, ab idolorum cultu, scilicet, ne sitis mensae, & calicis dae­moniorum par­ticipes, ut expli­cat v. 20. puta, comedendo ci­bos idolis obla­tos, eo modo & iis circumstantiis, quibus censeamini eos, quasi sacros, seu quasi idolothytum in honorem idoli velle comedere [...] hoc vero versu transit ad secundum casum, scilicet, quo idolo­thytum non formaliter qua idolothytum, sed materialiter, qua cibus vel caro est, comeditur, & de hoc ait: omn [...]a mihi licent, sed non omnia expediunt, quia, ut sequitur, non omnia aedificant. Quasi dicat, Materialiter licet vesci idolothyto per se, per accidens tamen non licet, si sequatur scandalum, pater ex v. 27. 28. 33. Cornel. Alapide in loc. All things are lawfull for me, but all things are not expedient: All things are lawfull for me, but all things edifie not.

Unto these two places (1 Cor. 6.12. 1 Cor. 10.23.) I shall adde one more (1 Cor. 8.8.) But meat Commend [...]th us not to God: for neither, if we eat are we the better: neither if we eat not, are we the worse: Meat (that is) the use and eating of meat (abstractly considered, and in the generall) commendeth us not to God: for the kingdome of God is not meat and drink: for neither if we eat, are we the better, [...], have we the more, (that is) the more vertue in our selves, the more grace and favour with God: Neither if we eat not, [Page 16]are we the worse [...], have we the lesse, the lesse vertue in our selves, the lesse acceptation with God: Eating then of any sort or kind of meat (considered, as abstracted from all singularizing circum­stances) is a thing indifferent that hath neither vertue, nor vice in it, neither pleaseth nor displeaseth God: And what the Apostle speaketh of eating of meat, is applyable by way of analogy and proportion unto a world of things of the like nature, as shall be manifested by the reasons for the Conclusion, unto which in the next place I hasten.

The Protestants generally thus argue: The nature of things indifferent (as the Learned Hooker determineth) is neither to be commanded nor forbidden, but left free and arbitrary: But now there are divers humane and voluntary actions, that are in the generall neither commanded, nor forbidden (as to eat, drink, goe a journey, walke into the field:) Therefore there are diverse hu­mane and voluntary actions, that are in the generall, and for the kind indifferent. This argument the Papists dislike because they think, that there are matters of Counsell, which containe the high­est degree of morall goodnesse, and perfection: And yet thinke they are uncommanded, and no man will say that they are for­bidden. The Argument of the Schoolmen therefore generally runs thus: Actions, that are neither agreeable, nor disagreeable unto right reason are indifferent: But there are divers humane and voluntary actions, that in their generall nature, and conside­ration carry, neither conformity, nor repugnancy unto right reason: And therefore there are divers humane and voluntary actions, that are indifferent. This argument is thus managed by Ubi autem ratio non debet esse magis recta affirmando quā n [...]gando, ibi voluntas non debetmagìscon formari rationi affirmativae quam nega­tivae: unde po­test sic argui. Ille actus nec est bonus, nec est malus, circa quem ratio non potest esse magis recta in affirmando quam in negando, sed levare festucam, quantum est praecisè ex ratione, quam fortitur actus ex objecto, est hujusmodi, quia ratio neque affirmando quod levanda est, neque negando levandam esse magis recta est, ergo actus de se neque bonus est, neque malus. Major pater, quia persecutio & fuga actus voluntatis quoad bonitatem vel malitiam correspondent affirmationi, & negationi rationis practicae quoad veritatem & falsitatem, & ideò ubi est ratio aeque indifferens quoad veritatem, & falsitatem in affirmando & negando, ibi est actus indiffe­rens quoad malitiam & boniratem in prosequendo, & fugiendo. Minor probatur, quia rectitud [...] retionis confi [...]it in conformitate ad aliquam legem naturalem vel divinam vel ex his derivatam, [...]irea autem tales actus, ut levare festucam; vel buiusmodi, nulla lex aliquid determinat, nec divina, nec naturalis, nec ex his derivata, ergo circa cos sic acceptos ratio non potest habere ali­quam rectitudmem, vel obliquitatem magis in affirmando quam in negando, & haec suit minor. Sequitur ergo conclusio. lib. 2. dist. 40. q. 1. Durand: That act is neither good nor evill, but indifferent, [Page 17]Concerning which there is in the reason of man no more recti­tude, or irrectitude and obliquity in the affirmation, then in the negation in it's dictating either the practice, or in its dictating the forbearance thereof. For the pursuit and eschewall of the will are in regard of morall goodnesse, or badnesse correspondent unto the dictates of the practicall understanding, and therefore where there is an indifferencie in point of truth in the understandings dictates concerning the doing, or not doing of a thing, there is an indifferency in regard of morall goodnesse or badnesse in the wills imbracing, or eschewing of that thing. If the understan­ding erre not, whether it prescribe the performance, or forbearance of an action, then the will sinneth not, whether it performe or for­beare it: But there are divers acts concerning which there is in the reason of man no more rectitude, or irrectitude and obliquity in the affirmation, then in the negation of them, in its dictating the practise, or in its dictating the forbearance of them: This he proveth because the rectitude of reason consists in conformity unto some naturall law, or some divine law, or some law derived from these: But there are divers humane actions concerning which, there occurreth no such law, either forbidding, or comman­ding: and therefore there is no rectitude or obliquity in the rea­sons or understandings affirming or denying of them. It is indiffe­rent, which way the understanding takes, whether it dictates the doing or not doing of them: and consequently it is indifferent, whether the will willeth, or nilleth them. Here by the way I cannot but take notice, how Durand unawares crosseth their doctrine of Evangelicall Counsels: for Suarez (de leg. lib. cap. 14.) will tell him, that Counsell is not properly a Law: By this doctrine of Durand then in matters of Counsell there should be no rectitude of reason, because no conformity unto any law: But this by the by.

This argument is yet further improved by Sunt qui­dem complure [...] actus, quos dum praecisè consideramus, ut versantur cir­c [...] hoc, vel illud objectum; nec laudamus, nee vituperamus tanquam bonos vel malos, sed censemus esse indifferentes. Loquimur e­nim in propo­sito debonitate, & malitiâ mo­rali propriè, ut scilicet bonitas non est qualis cunque con­gruentia cum ratione; & vo­luntate homi­nis, sed congru­entia ejusmo­di, ut habeat laudem secundùm aestimationem hominum; tanquam aliquid, nempe quod quadret in rationem hominis, etiam ut recta est, & ut is habet sibi à Deo propositam beatitudi­nem, ut ultimum finem. Quemadmodum etiam contra, malitia moralis, cui opponitur moralis bonitas, consistit in repugnantiâ quâdam erga rationem rectam hominis, quae secundum huma­nam aestimationem habeat vituperium, tanquam aliquid repugnans, & nocens homini, ut is hi­beat beatitudinem propositam sicut ultimum sinem omnium actionum. Sic itaque loquendo pro­prie de bonitate, vel malitiâ morali affirmamus, quosdam esse actus, qui ex objecto suo nee boni, nec mali sunt, sed indifferentes. Tom: 2. Com. Theol▪ qu. 13. punct: 2. Gregery de Valen­tia. [Page 18]The Morall goodnesse (saith he) which we speake of, is such a congruence unto reason, as carrieth praise with it according unto the usuall estimate of men, and appertaineth unto mans ever­lasting happinesse, his chiefe, and soveraigne end; and answer­ably the morall ilnesse or badnesse of an action stands in such a re­pugnancie unto right reason, as that according to the usuall esti­mation of men, it is worthy of dispraise, and is an impediment unto his attaining his supreame end, the eternall blisse of his soule; But now there are severall humane actions that consider­ed in themselves have neither praise nor dispraise; neither preju­dice, nor advantage the salvation of our soules; are neither helps, nor lets unto the obtaining of our highest end and happinesse, and therefore there are actions morally indifferent.

Unto what hath been said, I shall adde two arguments more out of a late Philosopher. Irenaeus, A Carmelite or white Frier Si omnis actus esset bo­ [...]as aut malus ex suo objecto, seu suâ specie, liceret nobis judicare de [...]uolibet proxi­ [...]i opere, & tale [...]psum asserere, [...]uale habet ob­ [...]ectū, sicuti [...]ctus ex ob­ [...]ecto determi­ [...]atospronunti­ [...]musbonos, aut [...]alos determi­ [...]atè: sed non [...]cet ita de sin­ [...]ulis Judicare, [...] Matth: 7. [...]ujus ratio [...]st apud patres, & Interpretes quod plerique actus sint medii, scilicet de se indifferentes, ut sint [...]oni, aut mali: ergo, &c. Multi actus sunt mali praecise ratione prohibitionis, V.G. portare arma de nocte: ergo i [...] [...]nt ex specie suâ indifferentes. Ethic: cap: 3. Sect: 2.

First, upon actions morally good, or bad, we may lawfully passe our Censures, that they are such; But we should passe rash judg­ment, if we should censure Divers actions of our Bretheren to be determinately virtuous, or determinately vitious, moraly good or bad: Let not him that eateth not judge him which eateth. Rom. 14.2. There are therefore some actions, which for their kind are neither good, nor bad, but indifferent.

Secondly, Many acts are evill, onely by the prohibition of some positive law; As unto the Jewes it was unlawfull to eate Swines flesh, to weare a garment of divers colours, as of woollen and linnen to­gether, Deut. 22.11. These actions therefore, and many the like, were of themselves, and in their owne nature, indifferent, and be­came unlawfull onely by the ceremoniall law given unto the Jewes, which law being abrogated, it is now a thing indifferent and law­full for Christians to eate swines flesh, or not to eate it, to weare a garment of linsey-woolsey, or not.

Unto these scriptures and reasons I shall adde the testimony of Hierome, frequently quoted for this purpose. Bonum, inquit, [Page 19]est continentia, malum est luxuria. Inter utrumque indifferens ambulare, capitis, naribus purgamenta projicere, sputis rheumat a jacere. Hoc nec benum, nec malum est: sivè enim feceris, sivè non feceris, nec justitiam habebis, nec injustitiam. Aristotle, and Sextus Empyricus give in their verdict for the truth of this assertion, whose sayings the rea­der may peruse at large in Raynaudus moral. disciplin. distinct. 4. quaest. 1. Art. 3. num. 39. pag. 550.

There is but one Considerable objection, which I shall briefly pro­pound and answere. Whatsoever agreeth unto the species, the sort or kind of a thinge, agreeth unto all individuals contained under it, And therefore if there be humane actions, that be indifferent, secundum speciem, according to their kind, the Individuals of such actions are indifferent too, which will be opposed in a third Conclusion: That which doth agree unto a thing per se, the oppo­site thereof cannot agree unto it, either per se, or per Accidens: And therefore if some actions are per se of themselves indifferent, it is impossible for the Individuals of such actions to be morally good, or evill. Dicendum est quod actum [...]sse indifferen­tem secundum speciem suam potest intellig [...] dupliciter, scili­cet secundum quod negatio importata per hoc quod est in­differens, potest duplicitet ordinari ad copulam verbalem: uno enim modo potest post poni, & sic est sensus, qd de ratione specificâ actus est, quod sit indifferens et si isto modo aliquis actus secendum speci­em esset indifferens. non solùm esset impossibile dare sub tali specie actum individualem indiffe­rentem, immo impossibile esset sub tali specie dari actum, nisi indifferentem, quia ea quae sunt de ratione speciei conveniunt omni individuo sub tali specie, sed si nullus est actus indifferens se­cundum speciem suam; sub quo tamen sensu argumentum procedit. Alio modo potest negatio importata per hoc, quod est indifferens, praeponi copulae verbali sub hoc sensu, quod de ratione specificâ actus non est, quod fit indifferenter, vel determinate bonus vel malus, sed tamen u­trunque potest ipsi per aliud convenire, sicut homo ex suâ specie non habet quod sit determi­nate albus, vel determinate niger: et tamen per aliud ei utrunque iftorum convenit. Et hoc mo­do sunt multiactus qui sunt indifferentes secundum suam speciem, nullus tamen secundum in­dividuum, quia individuum multa includit quoad existentiam suam quae ad rationem speciei non pertinent. Lib. 2. dist. 40. q. 1.

Unto this objection Durand answereth, by distinguishing of a twofold sense of this expression. An act is indifferent secundum speciem, according to it's kind. The first is, that indifferency is of the specifick nature of such an act. And this sense, which is the sense of the objection, is false, for then it would be impossible for any individuals of such an act not to be indifferent: But now there is a second sense of the expression, that the specifick nature of such an action doth not involve, or imply in it's notion morall either goodnesse [Page 20]or ilnesse, But is equally and indifferently abstracted from both: And this sense is true: It is not of the specificke nature of many actions to be determinately good, or determinately evill; though they may be either by circumstances. As for the confirmation which is added; Morisan Ethic. Murc: Physic. The answer unto it is usually as followeth; A thing may be said to agree unto another per se, either positively, or negatively.

1. Positively, when it is predicated in primo, or secundo modo di­condi per se, when it is either an essentiall predicate, or proper passion: And thus it agreeth unto man to be a sensitive creature, to be indued with the powers of understanding, willing, laughing, &c: And in this sense indifferency doth not agree per se, unto any humane voluntary actions, for then it would agree unto them al­waies, and in all places, so that it would be utterly impossible for the individuals of such actions to be morally either good, or bad.

2. Negatively, When a thing of it selfe is not such, although by accident it may be such: And thus we may say of a man, that per se he is not white, he is not blacke, he is not tawny, he is not of an olive colour, or the like, because each of these colours considered separately, are accidentall unto the nature of man, considered in the generall, and in it selfe: And yet the individuals of the nature of man may some of them be white, some blacke, some tawny, some of an olive colour, or the like: Even so we may say of divers voluntary rationall actions of man; that per se, (considered, as devested from all circumstances) they are indifferent, morally neither good, nor bad: because morall goodnesse and badnesse is accidentall unto the nature of such actions considered in them­selves, and yet the individuals of such actions are all of them either good, or evil, las shall be cleared by the next conclusion, unto which before we proceed, let us make some application of this second conclusion.

Against this doctrine of Indifferency there are two failings; one in the defect, Another in the excesse:

There are, First, some, that faile in the defect, who know not the full extent of indifferency: and so either impose, as necessary, or condemne, as sinfull, things that are in their owne nature indiffe­rent. Thus in the primitive Romish Church there were some new converts, who abstained from swines flesh, and other meats prohi­bited by the ceremoniall law, as unlawfull, The use of which yet [Page 21]was indifferent and lawfull under the Gospell: I know, and am per­swaded (saith Paul,) by the Lord Jesus, that there is nothing un­cleane of it selfe. Rom. 14.14. Thus also amongst the Corinthians there were some weake Christians, that branded for Communion, and fellowship with Idolaters all eating of things offered unto idols, Though bought in the market, or eaten at private meetings; In both which yet Paul pronounceth in generall there was no un­lawfulnesse, 1. Cor. 10.25, 27. Amongst us there are divers per­sons, that are doubtlesse well affected in matters of Religion, and yet are too rigid in censuring as sinnes divers innocent and harm­lesse recreations: This is an errour in, and consequently a blemish unto the understanding: Paul calls it a weaknesse in the faith, Rom. 14.1. that is an imperfection in point of knowledg, and that privative, or blameable: For the faith and conscience of in­different things is never indifferent, we are never to judg a thing indifferent, to be either sinfull or necessary. Our Saviours com­mand, John 7.24. Judge righteous judgment may be extended unto things and actions as well as persons: Therefore as we are not to call good, evill, or evill, good; so neither are we to call things indifferent, either evill, or necessary. This is injuriously to straiten the grand Charter of our Christian liberty, and pre­sumptuously to make the narrow way to heaven narrower then ever God made it. Besides, it openeth a gappe unto many mis­chiefes, it filleth the Church of God with needlesse, and endlesse disputes, it perplexeth the minds of many conscientious people with unnecessary and unprofitably scruples; it causeth many bitter and uncharitable censures, and occasioneth many dangers: In the believing Jewes that lived in the Church of Rome, in Pauls time, there was but a little mistake touching things indifferent, meats and daies; but how pernicious was the sequele hereof? Hereupon the strong despised the weake, and the weak judged the strong, Rom. 14. And this was a great disturbance unto the peace of the Church, and a great hinderance unto the comfortable com­munion of the Saints.

2. Against this doctrine of indifferency there are some, second­ly, that faile in the excesse, who make things necessary or sinfull, to be but indifferent. There be some, that hold observation of the Lords day, preaching of the word, in distinction from meer rea­ding [Page 22]of it to be no ordinances of God, but things meerly indiffe­rent; Erastians affirme, that Church Government, and Ecclesiasti­call censures are onely matters of indifferency: The Heathens in the Apostles times generally ranked fornication amongst things indifferent: The like estimate some of the Corinthians had of eating things offered to Idols, in the midst of an Idols temple, at a religious feast of that Idol, which was a palpable communica­ting with Devils, and therefore a fact in it's own nature unlaw­full: And some Travailers, that professe themselves Protestants, have as large and loose Consciences, as these Corinthians had; for they have the same opinion of being present at an idolatrous masse, and bowing to popish Idols. Dr Peter Heylin (as him­selfe informeth us) made no scruple of kissing a Crucifix, when it was desired of him, to discriminate him from a Hugenot: No lesse loose were the Principles of the Adiaphorists, and Flaccians in Charles the 5th his time, who pressed the Interim; which gave allowance to divers errours, and superstitions of the Church of Rome, as matters that were indifferent: Our Prelatists ever and anon in the controversy of Symbolicall ceremonies alleadge their indifferencie as a thing without dispute, which is never granted by us; however it may sometimes for disputation sake be suppo­sed. But what talke we of Ceremonies, whil'st some of greatest note among'st them have so eagerly pleaded for such sports, and pastimes upon the Lords day as indifferent, which a devout Pa­pist would reckon a grosse profanation thereof? Now this latter failing against the Doctrine of indifferent actions, in a way of excesse, is as much against the Purity of the Church, as the for­mer fayling, in a way of defect, was against the peace of the Church: It opens as wide a dore to all licentiousnesse and pro­fanenesse to call good and evill indifferent, as it doth to call good evill, or evill good, and therefore a woe equally belongs unto it with this latter.

Secondly, we may be exhorted unto thankfulnesse, Because God hath indulged us Christians a greater extent of our liberty about things indifferent, then he ever vouchsafed unto the Jewish Sy­nagogue. Many things, in their own nature indifferent, were prohibited them by positive precepts, and so made unlawfull unto them; This was a yoak (said Peter,) which they were unable [Page 23]to beare, Acts 15.10. Blessed therefore be God, who hath freed us from this yoake by our Lord Jesus Christ, who hath abolished in his flesh the law of Commandments contained in Ordinances, Eph. 2.15. So that now all (indifferent) things are lawfull unto us; There is nothing uncleane of it selfe, Rom. 14.14. all things indeed are pure, Rom. 14.20. Ʋnto the pure all things are pure, Tit. 1.15. Every creature of God is good, and nothing to be refused, 1 Timoth. 4.4.

There be two waies, unto which I shall direct for expressing our thankfulnesse for the inlargement of this our liberty. 1. A stout asserting of it. 2. A due and discreet use of it.

1. A stout asserting of it against Judaisme, Popery, or any other sect or party, that shall be so presumptuous towards God, and injurious towards us, as to abridg us thereof in any part. Stand fast therefore in the liberty, wherewith Christ hath made us free, and be not intangled againe with the yoake of bondage, Gal. 5.1. The Apostle would have us not to be intangled againe with the Jewish yoake of bondage; And there is the same reason, why in in­different things we should decline any other yoake of bondage, which any man whatsoever should make, and attempt to put upon our necks: for liberty towards things indifferent is one branch of that liberty, wherewith Christ hath made us free: and therefore we should stand fast against all opposers. But now in this our asserting of our Christian liberty we should use a great deale of moderation towards weake dissenting brethren: 'Tis [...]he A [...]ce which the A postle Paul gives in the like case, Rom. 14.3. Let not him that eateth, despise him, that eateth not: The eating of meats prohibited by the Mosaicall Law was after Christ's death indiffe­rent; But yet there were among the Romans some weaklings in the faith, who thought the ceremoniall law still in force, and consequently judged, the eating of all meats therein forbidden, to be sinfull; Now the Apostle would not have those that were strong in the faith, that is, more knowing, better principled, and more fully instructed in the extent of their Christian liberty to despise, to disdaine, and contemne those poore soules for their ig­norance, and weaknesse in judgment; But to reach out the right hand of fellowship unto them, to receive them into an intimate communion, to deale gently, and tenderly with them, restoring them in the spirit of meeknesse, with all possible prudence, and [Page 24]caution: Him, that is weak in the faith, receive you, but not to doubt­full disputations, Rom. 14.1. The Apostle doth not prohibite allto­gether all disputations for the future touching the point in con­troversy: for he himselfe elsewhere very zealously disputes the matter, only he interdicts such disputes as were unseasonable for the present: because these Jewish converts were so extreamly wedded unto the Law of Moses, as that to have prest upon them in their first conversion an abolition thereof, was the ready way to have utterly prejudiced them against and alienated them from Christianity: He would have them first to be taught the first principles of the Oracles of God, the first Principles of the Doctrine of Christ, Heb. 5.12. and chap. 6. vers. 1. And when they were well principled, and setled in the Christian faith, then they might pro­ceed to a calme, and peaceable debate of this subject: for then their mind would be more capable of instruction, and the fore­mentioned prejudice would be more easily removed: Indeed, after a while, there would be no place for such a prejudice: for when once there was a plenary promulgation of the Gospell, to observe them afterwards would be a virtuall abrenunciation of the Christian Religion, a denyall, that Christ is come in the flesh. When once the Apostles had gived the Jewish Synagogue and Ceremonies an honourable funerall, and respective buriall, for any man afterwards to revive the observation of them, would be to rake in their dust, and sacrilegiously to violate their grave: Pre­indè nunc quisquis Christianorum, quamvis sit ex Judaeis, similitèr ea celebrare voluerit, tanquam sopitos cineres eruens, non erit pius de­ductor vel baiulus corporis, sed impius sepulturae violator, August: Epist. 19.

A second way of expressing our thankfulnesse for the extension of our Christian liberty in things indifferent is a due and discreet use of it, such an use of it as may st, and with Gods glory, and may be no waies inconsistent with our own or others edification. Touching this use of our liberty Paul gives us a generall caution, Gal. 5.13. only use not liberty for an occasion unto the flesh; that is, to live according unto the flesh. Suitable unto which also is the advice of St Peter, 1 Pet. 2.16. not using your liberty for a cloake of maliciousnesse, But as the servants of God: In which advice there are two parts: On enegative: not using your liberty for a cloak of [Page 25]maliciousnesse: that is, for a colour or pretence unto any sinne for [...] is (as Dr Sand [...]rson well observeth) taken here more larg­ly for all manner of evill and naughtinesse, according unto the adequate signification of the Greek and Latine Adjectives, from whence the substantive used in the text is derived. Another part of the advice is affirmative, using your liberty as the servants of God: that is in the use of this liberty admit of nothing, that may be prejudiciall unto the service, unto the honour and glory of God: for this would be a most unthankfull abuse, and not a true use of it.

To informe us more fully, and particularly what we are to doe in this weighty point, I shall briefly propound such restraints, as we are by the rule of Scripture to put on the use, and exercise of our Christian liberty in things indifferent, for without such restraints we can never use this our liberty aright, and as we ought: There be some loose people, that are impatient of all these restraints: If they judg a thing lawfull in it selfe, they never consider, or consult farther, but without more adoe adventure on it: But these men ever and anon abuse their libertie unto Gods dishonour, their own danger, and the scandall of both bre­thren, and aliens: They use their liberty as an occasion to the flesh, for a cloake of maliciousnesse: He that gives himselfe the full swing in things indifferent, He that will doe whatsoever is lawfull, will soone slide into things unlawfull, and ere he is aware indulge himselfe in the practice of them: So Clemens Alexandrinus [...]. 1. Qui faciunt quicquid licet, huc cito delabuntur, ut faciant quod non licet. For prevention of this licentiousnesse, I shall out of Gods word recommend unto you six restraints to be put upon this part of your Christian liberty in the use and exercise of it, 1. By Prudence. 2. By Temperance and Sobriety. 3. By Con­science. 4. By Religion. 5. By Authority. 6. By Charity,

1. By Prudence: which in indifferent things is, first, to compare them with those ends which every Christian should ayme at. 2. To consider whether there concurre not an obligation to some duty, or other.

First then, It is the worke of Christian prudence to compare indiffe­rent actions with those ends, which every Christian should propound [Page 26]unto himselfe: the glorifying of God, the salvation of his own soule, and the edifying of Brethren: And to examine whether they be expedient, or inexpedient, profitable and conducing, or unprofitable and impedient unto these ends: And if upon due con­sideration it finds them inexpedient, an hinderance unto these ends, it then forthwith dictates a forbearance of them: Because whatsoever is an impediment unto these ends is opposite unto them, and in that regard sinfull: This restraint our Apostle lay­eth downe in way of Doctrine for the instruction of all. All things are lawfull for me, But all things are not expedient, 1 Cor. 6.12. and Chapt 9. we have him putting it upon himselfe in his own practise: It was lawfull for him to have received of the Corin­thians a competent, and honourable maintenance, for his labour in the Word and Doctrine, as being a matter of due debt from them: But he did not exact it, but wrought with his hands for his livelyhood, because he found it would have obstructed, and hindered the end of his preaching, which was the spreading of the Gospell, that the word of the Lord might have free course, and be glorified in the conversion of soules.

A second act of Prudence about indifferent things is to consider, whe­ther in that nicke of time we are about an indifferent action there con­curre not an obligation unto some duty or other; And if there doe, then prudence dictates, that pro hic & nunc, we should abstaine from that indifferent action; because otherwise we should preferre it above a necessary and commanded duty; And though it be simply in it selfe lawfull, it would become accidentally sinfull, to wit, by comparison; Thus it would be sinfull for a man to walke in the fields, if there lay upon him at the same time an obligation to heare such a sermon: Thus also it would be sinfull for a man to follow recreations in themselves lawfull, when the necessities of his family call upon him to follow his occupation, the workes of his ordinary calling.

A second Restraint (that we are to put upon the use of our liber­ty about things indifferent) is by temperance and sobriety, and this restraint also we have laid downe by the Apostle in the place but now quoted. 1. Cor. 6.12. All things are lawfull for me, But I will not be brought under the power of any: Now what is it that brings a man under the power of meates, and drinkes, apparell, recreations? [Page 27]but an over-vehement affection unto them. This makes man a vas­sall unto those things, over which God hath given him a full Lord­ship, and dominion: Qui nimis rem aliquam amat (saith Aquinas) quodam modo servus istius efficitur, He that loves a thing over­much, renders himselfe thereby the servant thereof: Know yee not that to whome yee yield your selves servants to obey, his servants yee are, to whom yee obey, Rom. 6.16. He that immoderately affects those things, that are in themselves indifferent, cannot disobey, or resist the least temptation unto sinne drawn from them, and therefore is no better then a slave unto them, nay an Idolater of them: You may see how Paul censures the false Prophets for such an excesse, Rom. 16.18. They that are such serve not our Lord Jesus Christ, but their owne belly, Their God is their belly Phil. 3.19. We may say the like of those, that like the rich glutton, Luke. 16.19. fare sumptuously or deliciously every day, and will have a splendid retinue, when the lownesse of their state requires a meaner table and smaller attendance; of those that are wedded unto such gaiety and bravery of apparell as is above their purses, or unsuitable un­to their age, and ranke; As also of those that are so mad upon their recreations, sports and pastimes, as that in the pursuite of them they forgoe their meales, and sleepe, they neglect the worship of God, and their particular callings, unto their great impoverish­ment, if not finall and totall beggery.

A third limitation upon the exercise of our Christian liberty in things indifferent is to be by conscience: for though a mans conscience cannot legitimate sinnes, either of Commission, or Omission; yet it is of force sufficient to make that sinfull, which is in it felfe in­different, & lawfull: for this we have the Apostles determination, and that touching both a condemning and doubting conscience.

1. A Condemning Conscience, Rom. 14.14. I know and am per­swaded by the Lord Iesus, that their is nothing uncleane of it selfe; But unto him that esteemethany thing to be uncleane, to him it is unclean. Unto the authority of Pauls Testimony I shall adde two reasons.

1. Every man takes the voyce of his conscience to be the voyce of God; And therefore he that doth a thing in it selfe indifferent against the judgement of his Conscience, he disobeyeth and slight­eth the voyce of God, as for the manner of his action, and is a fight­er against God.

A second reason I shall give you in the words of Willet upon the place, Because the goodnesse or badnesse of an action is esteemed by the will and affection of the doer; Now when he thinketh a thing to be evill, and yet doth it, It shewes that such an one hath, deliberatam peccandi voluntatem, a deliberate mind and purpose to sinne.

The Apostle, secondly, gives us the same resolution touching a Doubting consci [...]nce, Rom. 14.23. He that doubteth, is damned if he eate, because he eateth not of faith; for whatsoever is not of faith, is sinne: that is; he that performech an indifferent action, and yet doubteth of the lawfulnesse thereof, deserveth damnation, because he doth not act out of faith; for whatsoever we performe, though, it be (intrinsecally, in it selfe) matter of indifferency; nay though it be matter of duty, yet if it proceed not from a beliefe of it's lawful­nesse it becomes (accidentally and extrinsecally) sinfull; It bewrayes a wicked and a wretched heart, that is not afraid of sinne, but in a great readinesse to commit it; who, almost would doe any thing that he doubteth would anger and grieve a deare friend? God then is not so deare as he should be unto such men, as dare adven­ture upon the practise of that, which they are doubtfull is displeas­ing unto him: Let us therefore hearken unto that exhortation, which the Apostle gave unto the Romans concerning thinges indifferent, Rom. 14.5. Let every man be fully perswaded in his owne minde: And this exhortation he backes with a very good reason. ver. 22. Happy is he which condemneth not himselfe in that thing which he alloweth: that is, he that doth not condemne as sinnefull, that which he chooseth and embraceth in his practise; such a man is in that respect, and so farre forth happy, as being free from those terrors, which torment those, who do what their consciences con­demne.

Thus you see, that not only condemnation, but doubtfulnesse of Conscience is a sufficient warrant to forbeare things that are in themselves indifferent: But yet it is no ground for us to assume a liber­ty of condemning the same things in others, who are sufficiently satisfied touching their indifferency and lawfulnesse: Let not him that eateth not judge him that eateth. Rom. 14.3. Let not him that is weake in the faith, that out of ignorance censureth, or suspecteth divers actions to be sinnefull, which he cannot prove to be so by any convincing argument; Let not such an one condemne for such actions the [Page 29]strong in the faith, those who are as godly and more knowing, then themselves: This exhortation the Apostle enforceth by divers rea­sons in the following words; for God hath received him; who art thou, that judgest another mans servant? To his owne master he standeth or falleth, yea, he shall be holden up; for God is able to make him stand, ver. 3.4.

The first argument is taken from the relation of the strong unto God, or Gods acceptation of them; for God hath received him; to wit, into his favour, into an intimate union, and communion, into his family, as a servant, as a sonne, as a member of his onely begotten sonne: To condemne him then is to throw a dishonour upon God himselfe.

A second reason is, Because for the weake to condemne the in­different actions of the strong for sinne, of which they cannot prove them guilty, is a grosse and presumptuous vsurpation of Gods preroga­tive, for which we have no Authority: who art thou that judgest another mans servant? Thou art but a fellow servant at the most: And God only is the master of the family, the Church: and therefore the unlawfulnesse of what is done in it is to be determined by Gods precepts, and not by thy humour, or fancy, thy ungrounded surmises: If God hath permitted a thing, how darest thou interdict it? To his own master h [...]standeth, or falleth. The words are to be understood in a law-sense, and their meaning is that God alone acquits or condemnes the actions of his servants, and none else: They are to be tryed by his word and will, and not by thy jealou­sies, and suspicions. Others expound the words thus: If a man eat and drink temperately with outward prayer and thanksgi­ving, who but God can discerne, whether he eat or drink unto the glory of God, or no? It followeth he shall be holden up: that is, he shall be justified. This fact of his, his eating of meats forbid­den by the Leviticall Law, shall be abetted and maintained: For God is able to make him stand: though thou load him with censures, God is able to acquit, and cleare him.

4thly. Our Christian liberty towards things indifferent must admit of a restraint in the out ward practise of it▪ By Religion, by the Religion of a vow, of an oath, Deut. 23. vers. 21, 22, 23. When thou shalt vow a vow unto the Lord thy God, thou shalt not slack to pay it: for the Lord thy God will surely require it of thee, and it would [Page 30]be sinne in thee. But if thou shalt forbeare to vow, it shall be no sinne in thee. That which is gone out of thy lips, thou shalt keep, and per­forme: even a free-will offering, according as thou hast vowed unto the Lord thy God, which thou hast promised with thy mouth. It was in­different for Ananias to have sold, or held his possession: But when once by solemne vow he had devoted it unto God, to keep back any part of the price in his own hand, was no lesse then sacri­ledge: Suppose Lusory lots be in themselves lawfull, yet if a man swear, that he will never play more at Cardes, or Tables, &c. By this Oath a man hath bound himselfe from such games for the future: and if he play at them, he shall incurre the guilt of perju­ry: Numb. 30. v. 2. If a man vow a vow unto the Lord, or sweare an Oath to bind his soule with a bond, he shall not breake his word, he shall doe according unto all that proceedeth out of his mouth. Calvinist's about oath's concerning things indifferent have this case: Whe­ther they be obligatory in trifles? As if a man should sweare to lift up a straw, to rub his beard, to give an apple, to lend a pinne unto a Child: This case Casus po­sterior est, cum res aut ob sui levitatemindig­ [...]na est viri pru­dentis delibera­tione, nec cassâ [...]nuce interest [...]fecerisne an non feceris, ut levare fe [...]ucam de terrâ, fricare barbam &c. aut ob parvitatem ma­zeriae non estmultum estimabilis; ut dare pomum puero, aciculam commodare &c. Juramen­zum de re illo sensu adiaphora omnino est illicitum. Arguit enim sancti nominis Dei aut nimiam irreverentiam, fi (ut ferè fit) ex quodam habitu jurandi longo usu contracto impru­denti fo [...]tè exciderit; aut apertum contemptum, siquis id sciens prudensque ad miserit, scilicet [...]on est Deus advocand us testis, nisi ubi dignus vindice nodus inciderit: ubi causa exigit non justa modo sed & gravis. Et in hoc omnes consentiunt, caeterum de obligatione quid sta­ [...]uendum? Video quidem plerosque casuistas pontificios in eâ esse sententiâ juramentum de re exiguâ et parvi momenti esse suâ naturâ nullum, & non obligate; quia scilicet re [...] levis [...]onest idonea materia juramenti, & lex non curat de miminis. Sed miror potuisse eos, qui [...]liàs videri volunt esse tam Lyncei, in tetam apertâ caecu [...]ire: nisi quod putidae illi distinctioni peccati mortalis & venialis, quo velut fermento totam Theologiae moralis massam faedè corru­perunt, locum relictum cupiant. Sed obligare juramentum in re vel levissimi momenti con­ [...]at; primò, quia in re gravi & levi eadem est veritatis & falsitatis ratio. Secundò, quià in assertorio juramento, qui alitèr dicit quam res est, etsi in re levissimâ, pejerat, ergo à simili & in promissorio, qui aliter, facit, quam jura vit. Tertio, quià ali [...]egrave;r, quantum in se esset, Deum fallae rei [...]estem faceret. Quar [...]ò [...]quià omnis jurans tenetur facere totum quod promisit, quatenùs potest, & [...]cet [...]sed dare puero pomum, & possibile est, & licitum, ergò tenetur praestare, non debuit ergò sic [...]urari: sed ubi iuratum est, debet impleti. De Jurament: Obligat: praelect: 3. Sect. 15. Dr Sanderson thus answe­reth. 1. He premiseth that such oath's are unlawfull, Because in them Gods most Holy Name is taken in vaine. The Great God of Heaven and Earth is appealed unto, and called upon to wit­nesse [Page 31]unto toyes: But yet notwithstanding his resolution is, that such oath's binde; and for it he giveth foure reasons.

1. Truth and falsehood have place in a light, as well as in a serious matter.

2. Because in an assertory Oath, He that saith otherwise then the thing is, though it be in a most triviall matter, is forsworne: therefore by the like reason, he is perjured in a promissory oath, that doth otherwise, then he hath sworne.

3. Because Otherwise, he that hath taken such an oath, should make God as much as in him lieth the witnesse of a false­hood.

4. Because every one that sweareth, is bound to doe all that he hath sworn, so farre forth as he is able, and so farre forth as the thing is lawfull to be done: But the matters here spoken of are possible and lawfull, v. gr. it is possible and lawfull to give a child an apple, &c. therefore such oath's are to be performed: Indeed such vaine oath's should not be taken, but being once taken they ought to be fulfilled.

A fift restraint upon the exercise of our Christian liberty in things indifferent is by the just commands of authority, unto which we must be subject for conscience sake, Rom. 13. v. 5. The Apostle Peter having, 1 Pet. 2.13. 14. exhorted us to submit our selves unto every ordinance of man for the Lords sake; In vers. 16. (by the ge­nerall consent of interpreters) he prevents an obiection, that might be made against this submission, from our Christian liberty, As free, and not using your liberty for a Cloake of maliciousnesse, but as the servants of God: Upon which words it is well observed by Estius (out of Oecumenius and Chrysostome) that, As free is to be construed with [...], submit your selves: And not (as Bede would have it) with well doing. And from this connexion we may learne two things.

First, That in submission unto every ordinance of man, wee must not infringe our Christian liberty: We must not enslave our selves to sinne, Sathan, and the World.

Secondly, That submission unto every Ordinance of man, and our Christian freedome may very well stand together: We may submit our selves as free: we may be obedient subiects, and yet free Christians: This may also be further gathered from what [Page 32]the Apostle hath in the following words touching the abuse, and use of our Christian liberty; Not using your liberty as a cloake for maliciousnesse, but as servants of God: Here we have. 1. A dehortation from the abuse of our Christian liberty, not using your liberty as a cloake of maliciousnesse: now to alleadge it as a plea for exemption of us from the yoake of temporall dominion, is to use it as a cloake of maliciousnesse; for not onely scripture, but even nature it selfe condemneth disobedience unto, and rebellion against magistrates, as a very High point of maliciousnesse, that is naughtinesse, and wickednesse.

2. We have here a Direction unto a right use of our liberty, u­sing it as the servants of God: Now the service of God is so farre from being a barre, as that it is rather a spurre unto this subjecti­on; for First; it is for the Lords sake, that Peter would have us to submit our selves unto every ordinance of man, vers. 13. Secondly, How can be cordially serve God, that contemnes and disobeyes his deputy, and ministers? so the Apostle stiles the magistrate, Rom. 13.4, 6. And Thirdly, The servants of God are obliged to yeild obedience unto all his commands, and one of them is to be subject unto the higher powers, Rom. 13.1. They then that resist the higher powers doe not use their liberty as the servants of God.

But now, (that we may not runne into another extreame, and with the flatterers of states, and Princes, extoll the power of the magistrate beyond all bounds of moderation;) I shall desire you to take notice, that the power of the magistrate in things indiffe­rent is not arbitrary, but is to be limited by the end of all Magistra­cy, the publick good, Rom. 13.4. He is the Minister of God unto thee for good. Unto this publick good some indifferent things carry a tendency, and such the magistrate may command; unto it others may be prejudiciall, and such he may forbid: But now he should abuse his power, and play the tyrant, If he should in­joyne things unprofitable; As if he should command men to throw stones into the water, to pick strawes, to scatter feathers into the aire, or the like. By this you may see, that the legislative power of the temporall magistrate in things indifferent is not unlimited: But now as for Ecclesiasticall superiours, They have no commission for to make any lawes properly so called. To make this good Ames quotes Junius against Bellarmine, [cont. 3. lib. 4. cap. 16. n. 86, 87. [Page 33]and chap. 17. n. 9, 10, 12, 13.] where he sheweth, that Christ is the onely law-giver, that appointeth things in his Church; and that he hath appointed all that are requisite, and that the Church maketh no lawes (properly so called) to appoint any new things to be used, but onely canons, orders, directions, ordering in seemly manner th [...]se things which Christ hath appointed: and that if she adde any thing of her own, she doth decline: And the reason is, Because unto her is com­mitted no authority of appointing new things, but a ministry to observe, and d [...]e such things which Christ hath appointed.

[This argument is prosecuted at large By Ames in his Reply unto Morton chap. 1. Sect. 16. and vindicated in his fresh suit against Ce­remonies, pag. 64, 65, 66. usque ad 71. from the rejoynder of Dr John Burgesse.]

The sixth and last restraint, which I shall mention, that is to be put upon the outward exercise of our Christian liberty in things indifferent is by Charity: and that. 1. Ʋnto our selves. 2. Ʋnto others.

1. Ʋnto our selves: He that truly loves himselfe, will deny him­selfe the use of things indifferent, if he think it will hazard the health of his better part, his spirituall and immortall soule; He will forbeare those sports, and Pastimes he most delights in, if he find that they usually tempt him to Choler, or covetousnesse: He will not so much as step into a Taverne, Inne, or Alehouse, if he find himselfe prone unto excesse: According unto the advice, that Solomon gives in the like case, Prov. 23.2. Put a knife unto thy throat, if thou be a man given unto appetite: Our Saviour exhorts us to pluck out our right eye, and to cut off our right hand, when they offend us, Matth. 5.29, 30. And Maldonate supposeth that he speaks literally of a true eye and hand indeed: neither (saith he) is there any absurdity in such a sense: because the plucking out of the right eye, and the cutting off the right hand is mentioned only in a way of hyperbolicall exaggeration. In which there is under­stood such an exception, as is usuall in the like cases, if it might be, if it were lawfull: He parallels it with a hyperbole of the same na­ture in Gal. 4.15. I beare you record, that if it had been possible, yee would have pluckt out your own eyes, and have given them unto me; If it had been possible: that is, as Estius glosseth it, si natura permitte­ret, If nature would give way unto such a mutilation: Our Sa­viour [Page 34]therefore signifieth, that we must incurre the greatest losse, rather then expose our selves unto the danger of sinne: And from this we may conclude that we must cast away our most be­loved indifferences; when once they scandalize us, that is, when they prove occasions of, and incentives unto sinne.

2. Charity towards others should put a restraint upon the use of our Christian liberty in things indifferent, and make us to for­beare all indifferent things whatsoever, that may destroy the soules, weaken, or wound the Consciences of others, 1 Cor. 8.12. Ʋse not liberty for an occasion to the flesh, but by love serve one another, Gal. 5.13. Where the Antithesis implied in the particle, but, plainly sheweth, that we use our liberty for an occasion unto the flesh, if we do not by love serve one another, in the exercise there­of. Knowledg puffeth up, but charity edifieth. 1 Cor. 8.1. that is, a firme and full knowledg of our liberty in things indifferent, if it be separated from Charity, is apt to swell the mind with pride, and make men to despise, or set at naught weak, doubting, and scru­pulous Brethren; But Charity edifieth, that is it is care­full to build up others, as living stones in the spirituall house of God, the Church; It inclineth to promote their graces, and gracious practises, and to avoide whatsoever is of a destroying nature unto their soules, that is, every thing that may occasion their fall into sin: Now that indifferent things may some­times be of an unedifying and destroying nature, the Apostle af­firmeth 1 Cor. 10.23. All things are lawfull for me, but all things edifie not, do not build up our brethren in truth, faith, and holi­nesse, do not farther them in their Religion, charity, and justice: for that the Apostle speaks of the edification of others is plaine by what followeth in the next verse, Let no man seek his own (that is, only) but every man anothers wealth, that is, spirituall, the edifi­cation and salvation of anothers soule. And therefore indifferent things are to be forborne in case of scandall, when they prove to be of a destructive nature unto the soules of men, when they weaken their graces, hinder their duties, and lead them into sin. This course the Apostle prescribes unto the Romanes in the case of things legally uncleane before the coming of Christ. Those that were strong in the faith among them, well instructed in the do­ctrine of Christian liberty, knew very well, that the legall un­cleanesse [Page 35]of meates and drinkes, all Jewish festivalls and fasts were removed by Christs death, and that nothing was now of it selfe uncleane, but all things indifferent and lawfull: yet the Apostle would have them in the use of this point of Christian liberty not to scandalize those, that are weak in the faith, that is, such as (be­ing newly wonne from Judaisme to Christianity) were as yet un­instructed about the cessation of Ceremonialls, Rom. 14.13. Judge this rather, that no man put a stumbling block, or occasion, to fall in his brothers way; that is in the use of meats and drinkes, that were before the Gospell Levitically uncleane, and neglect of Jew­ish Festivalls and fasts, the observation of which was for a while indifferent, untill the interrement of the Ceremoniall law: For however the words run generally, yet if we look to the coherence backwards, the foregoing part of the chapter speaks onely of such things, meates, drinkes, and daies: and if we look to the coherence forwards, it speaks onely of such things, meats and drinks, vers. 15. Destroy not him with thy meate, for whom Christ died, ver. 17. for the kingdome of God is not meat and drinke. v. 20. for meate destroyes not the worke of God: it is evill for that man who eateth with offence: It is evill not simply in it selfe, but accidentally by scandall. And there­fore I shall conclude, that the place is in a speciall manner appli­able against scandalizing by abuse of liberty in things indifferent.

Interpreters ghesse at three things, wherein the practise of the strong amongst the Romanes might scandalize the weake.

1. It might unsettle them in, and distast them against the Chri­stian Religion: for they might hereupon think it to be contrary unto the Law of Moses, which they so highly reverenced, and so at last it might occasion their relapse unto Judaisme. 2. It might embolden them to sinne against their consciences, by eating that which they thought to be uncleane. And 3dly, it might grievously ex­assperate them, and provoke them to powre out many a bitter, un­charitable, and sinfull censure upon the actions, and state of those that were strong in the faith.

In vers. 21. The Apostle proceedeth to inlarge his doctrine touching this particular, beyond the controversy, that occasioned this his discourse: for (as Estius well noteth) He teacheth, that to avoid the scandall and offence of our Brethren we are to abstaine, not onely from things prohibited by the law, but also from things [Page 36]not prohibited, from flesh, wine, and any indifferent thing whatsoe­ver: It is good neither to eat flesh, nor to drinke wine, nor any thing whereby thy brother stumbleth, or is offended, or is made weake. It is good, that is, it is morally good. 1. Good in regard of God, a thing very acceptable, and pleasing unto him. 2. Good in regard of our Brethren, profitable and conducing unto their edification. 3. Good in regard of our selves, a duty that God requireth of us: And from this we may inferre that the contrary hereof is (by the rule of contraries) morally evill: it is displeasing unto God, hurt­full unto the soule of thy Brother, and sinfull in thy selfe.

In vers. 22. The Apostle prevents an objection of the strong: Hast thou faith, have it to thy selfe before God: He speaks not of a faith (saith Chrysostome) that is [...] of doctrines and tenets, to wit, such as are fundamentall, and necessary unto sal­vation: but of a faith, [...], concerning the subject matter here handled, meats, and dayes, things indifferent, a beliefe touching their lawfulnesse: the strong amongst the Ro­mans might be ready to obiect, that their knowledg and perswa­sion of their Christian liberty in the matter controverted amoun­ted unto a Divine faith: for it was built upon a divine Revelation: Each of them might say as Paul did above vers. 14. I know, and am perswaded by the Lord Jesus, that nothing is uncleane of it selfe. The Lord Jesus hath taught me this liberty now is it not fit, that my practise should be agreeable unto my beliefe; that I should exercise my knowledg, and act according unto my judgment: seeing it is so well grounded, why should I forbeare the doing of that, which I know to be lawfull? Unto this the Apostles an­swer is, that they should not make a vaine ostentation, or unsea­sonable discovery of their faith: that is, knowledg, and perswasion, unto the offence of their Brother, the hazard of his soule: but ra­ther in such a case conceale it, and content themselves with Gods knowledg, and approbation of it, who seeth in secret, and will reward openly, Matth. 6. Hast thou faith, have it to thy selfe before God: This prudent and charitable management of Christian liberty, the Apo­stle exhorts the Corinthians unto, in their carriage towards their Brethren touching things offered unto Idols. 1 Cor. 8.9. take heed lest, by any meanes this liberty of yours become a stumbling block to them that are weake. In Chapt. 10. he determineth, that it was [Page 37]lawfull to eat things consecrated to the Idols, and he instanceth in two cases. 1. When they were sold in open markets. vers. 25. 2ly, When they were made use of at private f [...]asts: But unto this his determination he subjoyneth the exception of scandall, vers. 28.29. If any man say unto you this is offered in sacrifice unto idols, eat not, for his sake that shewed it, and for conscience sake; The earth is the Lords and the fulnesse thereof. Conscience; I say, not thine own, but of the others: for why is my liberty judged of another mans conscience? This some understand of the unbelieving Idolater, others of a weake brother: And indeed this practise gives an wound unto both their consciences. 1. The Idolater triumphes, because he thinks it an honour unto his Idol, and so he is confir­med, and hardned in his Idolatry: And then, 2ly, As for the weak Brother, he supposeth, that the meat is so polluted by Consecrati­on and sacrifice unto Idols, as that to eat thereof is a compliance with Idolatry; and therefore altogether sinfull; and hereupon the eating of these meats by the strong may occasion in the weak two scan­dalls. 1. The example of the strong may intice them unto imitation; and so they will sinne against their consciences. 2ly, The practise of the strong may provoke them unto rash and uncha­ritable judgment: both scandals give a great blow unto the Con­science of the weake: But, that the Apostle speaks of the latter scandall, I am induced to think by the words following: Why is my liberty judged of another mans Conscience? that is, why doe I needlessely, indiscreetly, and unseasonably expose my Christian liberty unto the rash censures of a weake Brother, who may be ready to traduce it, as a prophane licentiousnesse? why shall I drive him upon a sin, which I may prevent by a prudent and cha­ritable forbearance of the exercise of my liberty? Liberty is a thing, which men out of an excessive selfe love so much overva­lue, as that they are very impatient of any restraint to be put upon it at all: But the Restraint, that Charity prompts us unto, is of all others most disregarded; because there is nothing almost, that is so much undervalued, as the precious soules of our poore Brethren, and therefore we make but little conscience how thick we throw scandals in their way: I shall therefore briefly pro­pound such weighty, and pressing arguments, as the Apostle useth to perswade the Romans, and Corinthians to abstaine from a scan­dalous [Page 38]use of their liberty in things otherwise indifferent, and lawfull: and they are drawn, either, from the nature of things indiffe­rent, or from the nature of scandall.

1. From the nature of things indifferent: and here, the first argu­ment is Rom. 14.17. the kingdome of God is not meate and drinke: It doth not stand in indifferent things; for they are neither the way to the kingdome of Glory, nor our duty under the kingdome of grace: They are no part of Gods worship, and service, no matter of Religion: the weale and safety of Gods people is in no wise wrapt up in them; nay, many times a rigid pressing, and un­seasonable practice of them is a great disturbance unto the peace, and a great hinderance unto the edification of the Church, the kingdome of Christ.

A second Argument from the nature of things indifferent, is the great latitude of them: Though some of them be scandalous yet there will still remaine an ample field of them besides, 1 Cor. 10.28. If any man say unto you, this is offered in sacrifice unto idols, eat not for his sake, that shewed it, &c. the earth is the Lords, and the fulnesse thereof: It is as much as if he had said; though ye abstaine from things offered unto idols, yet there is no doubt of want, no feare of pinching your bellies: for you have the earth, and the fulnesse thereof for your supply: And from the scandall by meats, we may argue in like manner touching the scandall by recreation: If cards, dyce, tables offend thy brother, there is plenty enough of other sports, bowling, chesse, draughts, &c.

A second sort of arguments, that the Apostle insists on, are ta­ken from the nature of scandall: It is a sinne against that tender love, which we owe unto our brethren: And when ye sinne so against the brethren, 1 Cor. 8.12. (And that 'tis no small, but a very hainous sinne, the next words evince) And wound their weake consci [...]nce, The words are [...], where (as Beza well observeth,) the Antecedent is put for the consequent, beating, striking, or smiting for the effect thereof, wounding: As weapons or whips wound the body; so scandalls the conscience. Unjustly to wound the body, the face, the eye of our Brother is a cruell and inhumane part; but to wound so tender a piece as his conscience, to wound a weake, a sicklie, a dis­eased conscience is the very height of inhumanity. To wound [Page 39]the soule of a Brother with sorrow, is a breach of charity; If thy Brother be grieved with thy meat, now walkest thou not charitably, Rom. 14.15. And hence we may reason in a way of comparison à minori ad majus, that to wound the soule of a Brother with sinne, violates Christian love in a farre higher measure; for the wound of the least sinne is in its own nature mortall; and therefore scan­dall is not onely of a wounding, but of a killing and destroying nature; it is a soule murder, Destroy not him with thy meat, Rom. 14.15. Indeed the weak, that were scandalized, might by Gods mercy, and Christ's merit, escape an actuall destroying and dam­ning: But the Apostles meaning is, that the strongs scandalizing of them carried in it's nature a tendency towards their destructi­on: for it drew them into sinne, and sinne without repentance will destroy the soule: This malignant and destructive efficacy of scandall the Apostle urgeth also unto the Corinthians Epistle 1. chapt. 8. v. 11. And through thy knowledg shall thy weake brother pe­rish: that is; through thy scandalous abuse of thy knowledg of thy liberty in eating things offered unto idols, thou shalt doe, what lieth in thee, to farther the perishing of thy weake Brother: This cruelty that is in scandall towards the soules of our Brethren, is aggravated from Christs Redemption, Gods Creation of their soules.

1. From Christs Redemption of their soules: Destroy not him with thy meat for whom Christ died, Rom. 14.15. And through thy know­ledg shall the weake brother perish, for whom Christ died? But when ye sin so against the Brethren, and wound their weak conscience, ye sinne against Christ: 1 Cor. 8.11, 12. In the judgment of charity thou art to rank thy weake Brother in the number of those, for whom Christ dyed: Christ died for his salvation, and how da­rest thou oppose his worke by doing that, which tends unto his damnation? Christ parted with his life to save him, and wilt not thou for that end abridg thy selfe of thy liberty in a few indifferent things.

2. From Gods creation of their soules: for meat destroy not the worke of God, Rom. 14.20. that is the soule of thy brother: for that is stiled Gods worke in a way of eminency: because it was one of the choycest, chiefest, and most eminent workes of the Creation, made as it were with the consultation of the whole Trinity, and [Page 40]had in it engraven the very Image of God himselfe: Therefore not only the defacing, but the very attempting to deface this would redound very much unto the dishonour of the worker God; And he will doubtlesse accordingly resent the despi­sing of his workmanship: Some interpreters expound the place of the work of Gods grace in the sanctification, or regeneration of the soule, wherein faith is begotten, and that faith in a peculiar manner is the worke of God, we have Christs own testimony, John 6.29. Jesus answered, and said unto them, this is the worke of God, that ye believe on him, whom he hath sent: But even so the words display the horrid malignancy of scandall: for they shew that he who scandalizeth his brother, fighteth against God; that he goeth about to demolish that, which hath God alone for the builder. It was a part of Christs character not to breake a brui­sed reed, nor quench the smoaking flax, Mat. 12.20. How unsuita­ble unto this, is the disposition of those by whom offences come? For they doe what lieth in them to quench the very beginnings of grace, and goodnesse. Indeed the worke of Gods grace is so all-powerfull, as that it will finally prevaile against all resistance: If God have begunne a good worke, he will performe it untill the day of Jesus Christ, Phil. 1.6. And the gates of hell shall never be able to prevaile against it, Matth. 16.18. But yet the gates of hell will be ever hindering of it: and in especiall by the spreadth of scandals. And this very opposition is a warre against heaven, (in the lan­guage of the Scripture) a destroying of the worke of God. There is one sequele more of active scandals of this nature, that our A­postle mentioneth, Rom. 14. and 1 Cor. 10. which deserveth also our consideration: and it is the blot of infamy, which they will contract unto our names, and the very Christian liberty, which we abuse: A scandall in this case, tending unto sinne, is usually accompanied with a scandall tending unto disgrace, or defamation: And how carefull we should be to decline scandall, even in this English sense of the word, the vehemency of the Apostles interrogations will sufficiently informe us, 1 Cor. 10.29, 30. Conscience, I say, not thine own, but of the others: for why is my liberty judged of another mans conscience? for, if I by grace be a partaker, why am I evill spo­ken of, for that for which I give thanks? Unto these interrogations adde we the Apostles precept also, Rom. 14.16. Let not then your [Page 41]good be evill spoken of: that is, give none occasion for this great priviledg of your Christian liberty to be traduced.

Before I take my leave of this restraint of our liberty by Chari­ty in the case of scandall, I shall examine the restraints, that some have put upon it, without any warrant from scripture: Those in which they most confide, are two. 1. They limit it unto the scandall of the weake, and, 2. Ʋnto matters that are undetermi­ned by Authority.

1. They limit it unto the scandall of the weake: for the scandall of the malicious, and presumptuous persons, The scandall of Pha­rises (say they) may be neglected, Mat. 15.12, 14. whether in our Ceremonies there was an active scandall, a scandall given will be largely disputed in the next treatise, for the present therefore we shall only prove that we are to avoid such an active scandall in the malicious, as well as the weake.

For First, Such a scandall is of a soule destroying nature: De­stroy not him with thy meate, Rom. 14.15. And who so wicked, and malicious upon the face of the earth, whose soule a true Chri­stian charity will exclude from it's care, mercy, and compas­sion.

Secondly, The Apostles motive reacheth unto the wicked and malicious: Destroy not him with thy meat, for whom Christ died, Rom. 14.15. for they may be in the number of those, for whom Christ died, who for their present state and condition may be most wicked, and malicious; such as oppose themselves, such as are in the snare of the Devill, taken captive by him at his will.

3. The Apostles prohibition, 1 Cor. 10.32. extendeth unto the malicious, as well as the weake, Give none offence neither to the Jewes, nor to the Gentiles, nor to the Church of God: where Jewes and Gentiles are distinguished from the Church of God; and therefore by them are meant such as were unconverted, and as yet enemies unto the faith of Christ, and Church of God. And the things wherein the Apostle would have their offence to be avoided were matters of indifferency; Whether ye eat or drinke, v. 31. But now, lest some should be ready to object unto Paul that which our Saviour said of the Scribes and Pharisees, Matth. 23.4. that he did bind a heavy burden and grievous to be borne, and [Page 42]lay it upon mens shoulders: but he himselfe would not move it with one of his fingers: the Apostle in the next verse sheweth, how that his practice was conformable unto his precept, Even as I please all men (good and bad) in all things (that is, in all indifferent things) not seeking mine own profit, but the profit of many that they may be sa­ved, 1 Cor. 10.33.

In a second place, the Fautors of our Ceremonies limit this re­straint of our liberty in things indifferent by charity, in the case of scandall, onely unto things undetermined by Authority. Where Authority hath determined our choice, we must (say they) hold to their determination, any scandall to the Contrary notwithstan­ding. It seems then in case the magistrate command it, we may wound the weake consciences of our Brother, Destroy with our indiffe­rencies, the worke of God, him for whom Christ died. It is good (saith Paul) neither to eat flesh, nor to drinke win [...], nor any thing whereby thy Brother stumbleth, or is offended, or is made weake, Rom. 14.22. But our Prelatists determine quite otherwise, if authority enjoyne it, it is good (say they) to eat bread, drink wine, weare a surplice, use the signe of the crosse in Baptisme, though thereby never so many Brethren stumble, or are offended, or made weake.

The unreasonablenesse of this assertion Ames in his reply to Morton hath proved by many arguments, That are as yet unan­swered, which I shall here transcribe.

A scandall in the nature of it is spirituall murder: Now suppose a superiour should command a thing in it selfe indifferent, whereupon murder were like to follow; as to runne a horse, or a cart, in a certaine way, at a certaine time, when it may be unwitting to the commander, little children were playing in the way, would any mans conscience serve him to doe it?

Avoiding of scandall is a maine duty of Charity: May Superiours at their pleasure appoint how farre I shall shew my Charity towards my brothers soule? Then surely an inferiour earthly court may crosse the determinations of the high court of heaven.

The superiours have no power given them for destruction, but onely for edification: If therefore they command scandals, they goe beyond their Commission: neither are we tied therein to doe as they bid, but as they should bid.

If determination by superiours were sufficient to take away the sinne of a scandall. Then they doe very ill that they do not (so farre as is possible) determine all things indifferent, that so no danger may be left in giving of offence by the use of them. Then the Church of Rome is to be praised, in that she hath determined of so many indifferents: then Paul with the other Apostles might have spared a great deale of labour in admonishing the Churches how they should avoid offences about some indifferent things: A farre shorter way had been either to determine the matter fully: or else to have given order, that the Chur­ches should among themselves determine it at home.

But say that the Archbishop of Corinth (for now I suppose such a one) had called his convocation, and with consent of his Clergie had deter­mined, that men might, and for testifying of liberty should, at a certaine time eat of such and such meats, which men formerly doubted of: would not yet the Apostle have given the same direction he did? Would not good Christians still have had care of their brothers consciences? Can the determination of a superiour be a sufficient plea at the barre of Gods judgment seat, for a man that by virtue or force thereof alone, hath done any acti [...]n, that his conscience telleth him, will scandalize his brother.

Lastly, I would faine know whether those superiours do not give a great scandall, which take upon them determinately to impose unnecessa­ry rites, which they know many good m [...]n will be scandalized by? Thus farre Ames. But this opinion of Ames, is I confesse to be understood cum gravo salis, with many limitations, which I shall lay downe fully in the Tractate that next followeth.

If the Prelates would have seriously laid to heart that golden saying of Paul (1 Cor. 8.13. If meate make my brother to offend, I will eat no flesh, while the world standeth, lest I make my brother to offend) This would supersede all further dispute of this argu­ment: for thence it is easie to evict, that it is unlawfull for Church governours to command the observation of things indifferent, when in all probability they will scandalize: how dare they make that the matter of a Church Canon, which Paul durst not adven­ture upon in his own personall practice? He thought it unlawfull to do a thing otherwise indifferent, to eat flesh in the case of scan­dall; and therefore doubtlesse he judged it unlawfull in such a case to impose any such matter upon others: Greater was the impor­tance [Page 44]of the flesh forborne by Paul unto his health, and the com­fort of his life; then the profit of the controverted ceremonies can be unto the worship and service of God: And besides, the indifferency of eating flesh was a thing cleare, and evident unto all, that were well instructed in the Doctrine of Christian liberty; whereas the indifferency of our ceremonies will at least be judg­ed a very doubtfull matter, and that by very indifferent men, who shall thoroughly ponder the Arguments of Didoclave, Parker, Ames and others against them, which to this day remaine unan­swered. The Prelates will not pretend unto such an ample au­thority in the Church of God, as Paul had: But though they be farre inferiour unto him in point of Authority, they are not yet so humble, as to imitate him in the condescention of his charity. Pauls peremptorie resolve was to forbeare a thing indifferent, wh [...] it scandalized. If meate make my brother to offend, I will (saith he) eat no flesh, while the world standeth, least I make my brother to offend, 1 Cor. 8.13.

But what a wide difference, nay contrariety was there betwixt this charitable resolution of Paul, and the rigid practise of the Prelates. For they were obstinately bent to presse the Cere­monies, with all severity, without any care, or Conscience of the scandals ensuing: nay their endeavour was daily to adde unto the heape of former ceremonies, though they knew that thereby the scandals would be increased: They spake a language quite con­trary to that of Paul: we will enjoyne (say they) the surplice, crosse, kneeling in the sacrament of the Lords supper, while the world standeth, as long as we have any power, and authority in the Church of God, Let who will be offended: This their rigour brings unto my mind a cruel command of Cum Au­gustus coenaret apud Vedium Pollionem. Fregerat u­nus ex se [...]vis ejus cry stalli­num: rapi eum Vedius jussit, nec vulgari quidem periturum morte [...] muraenis objici jubebatur, quas ingens piscina cont [...]nebat. Q [...]s non hoc illu [...] putaret luxuriae causa facere? saevitia erat: evasit è manibus puer, & confugit ad Caesatis pedes: nihil aliud petiturus, quam ut aliter periret, nec esca fieret. Motus est novitate crudelitatis Caesar, & illum quidem mitti, crystallina au­tem omnia coram se frangi jussit, complerique piscinam. Fuit Caesari sic castigand us amicus: bene usus est viribus suis. E convivio rapi homines imperas, & novi generis paenis sancinari? si cali [...] tuus fractus est, viscera hominis distrahentur▪ tantum tibi placebis &c. Seneca de ira. Lib. 3. Vedius Pollio, that was countermanded by Augustus Caesar supping with him: A [Page 45]poore boy his slave had casually broken a Chrystall glasse, and for this Pollio most inhumanely condemned him to be throwne into a great pond of Lampreys, there to be devoured. The boy escaping from those appointed for his execution, prostrated him­selfe at the feet of Caesar, who then sup't with his master, and de­sired not pardon, but onely commutation of so horrid and un­naturall a death: Augustus was extreamly transported with the strangenesse and novelty of so inhumane a cruelty, and hereupon to prevent the like for the future he forthwith commanded all the Christall glasses of Pollio, though his friend, to be broken, and the fishpond to be filled up: for the breaking of a sorry glasse he thought it a disproportioned and too severe a punishment, to have a mans bowels pluck't in pieces, and torne asunder. This spirit of Vedius Pollio breathed in many of our late Prelates; The Ceremonies in comparison of mens soules were but as paltry trifles, as glasses, and feathers: and yet, by the maintenance of them, they hazarded the soules of thousands (In as much as in them lay) they destroyed the worke of God, they destroyed those for whom Christ died; they scandalize Papists, and separatists: people and Pastours: conformists, and non-conformists, as Mr Parker at large demon­strates: Dr John Burgesse (as I have often heard) urged this sto­ry in a Sermon before King James to perswade him unto the a­bolition of the Ceremonies: And King James had doubtlesse ex­pressed a Christian, and royall care of his people, if he had broken these glasses in pieces: if he had cashered these toyes out of the Church, which had broken so many in their estates, wounded so many in their consciences, and endangered the salvation of so many soules: and hereby have prevented those unspeakable griefes, feares, and scandalls, which they formerly occasio­ned.

I proceed unto the third and last conclusion, which is, that no deli­berate actions of men, which proceeds from deliberate reason, if they be considered in actu exercito, in the singular or particular, as cloa­thed with circumst ances, are indifferent, but all of them are morally either good, or evill.

For the better understanding of this Conclusion, I shall out of [Page 46] Circum­stantia una aut altera actionis alicujus huma­nae potest esse indifferens, ut si studiosus unus cum aliosermo­nem conferat, indifferens est, saepenumero, u­trum vernaculo utatursermone, an Latino: led sermo ipse, cum omnibus suis circumstantiis, vel bonus est, vel malus. Ra­tio est, quia de­terminatioacti­onisnon pendet ab una circum­stantia seorsim, sed ab omnibus conjunctim. Datur actio aliqua singularis, in qua nulla bonitatis ratio reperitur, quae inalia non possi [...] in­veniri: atque adeo quod hoc tempore, hoc vel illud potius agimus quam aliud, in eo saepe ni­hil boni aut mali occurrit. Opportunitas, aut animi suggestio, sine ullo respectu bonitatis mo­ralis, satis h [...]bet ponderis ad singula [...]em istam determinationem. Quamvis igitur nulla singularis actio humana sit, quae neque est bona neque mala, fiunt ta­men variae, quae singulariter & in comparatione ad alias, neque sunt necessariae, neque illicitae. Sicut enim statuarius certam rationem saepe non habet, cur istam potius quam aliam statuam fa­cit, si [...]a nen aliquam faciat, necesse est, ut vel regulas artis sequendo bonam faciat, aut aberrando malam, sic est in multis actionibus hominum singularibus, quae quoad exercitium nullam habent rationem propriam, praeter inclinationem animi, sed cum exercentur vel bonae sunt, vel malae. De cas. cons. Lib. 3. cap. 18. Ames adde two limitations of it.

1. Then; this conclusion is to be understood only of an ade­quate consideration of the circumstances of singular actions, for not onely one, but more circumstances of a humane action in the in­dividuall may be indifferent: In a conference of schollers it is many times indifferent, whether they discourse in latine, or Eng­lish, whether in the morning, or afternoone: But yet their whole conference considered adequately with all circumstances is either good, or evill; And the reason is because the determination of an action doth not depend upon one circumstance apart, but upon all joyntly.

A second limitation of the conclusion is that it is not to be exten­ded unto every comparative consideration of humane actions and their circumstances: I know, that not onely actions indifferent, but also those that are commanded become sometime to be sinfull by comparison; when they are preferred to better actions. God dislikes those recreations, that otherwise he alloweth, when they justle out duties: nay he abhorreth sacrifice when it is inconsistent with mercy: but notwithstanding this, when there is an equality, if not of actions themselves, yet of their morall motives as to hic, and nunc this present time and place, Then curiously to compare and ballance such actions, were needlesse: for in such a case, the prelation of one before the other, would be a thing meerly ar­bitrary, neither good nor bad: Reading, prayer, meditation are things commanded: but many times that I set apart such an houre for reading principally may be a thing indifferent: that I make choice of one Recreation before another, of bowling before Chesse, draughts, &c. that I choose to walke in the forenoon, ra­ther [Page 47]then in the afternoon, may be of no morall consideration, and so neither good, nor evill, but a matter of indifferency. Looke as an Image carver may have no peculiar reason to make this Image, rather then that; yet if he make any Image at all; either he followeth the rules of his art, and then he makes a good Image, or he swarves from those rules, and then he makes a bad image, and doth not worke like an Artist: So many times it may be to a Christian, a marter meerly indifferent to performe this or that action, he may have no obligation to doe either, or at least to doe one rather then the other, but may be left unto his own mind, and pleasure: but yet he is as a Christi­an obliged to regard such circumstances in all his actions, and therefore whatsoever he doth, he doth it either well, or ill; for ei­ther he observeth these circumstances, and then his action is good, or he neglects them, and then it is bad.

The conclusion being thus explained may be made apparent from the end, and rule of deliberate actions.

1. From their end, and what ought to be the end of all deliberate actions of man may be evidenced from their relation unto their Ori­ginall, from a consideration of them absolutely as they are in themselves.

1. From their relation unto their Originall, the rationall soule, or the soule, as rationall, they flow from man, as man, they proceed from his deliberate reason, and therefore, should have the same end, which man as rationall should propound, the glori­fying of his maker; If they have not this end, they are evill: and if they have this end, why then (if there be no fayling otherwise) they are good. This argument is by Quaerenda igitur sunt fir­miora praesidia, sententiae hu [...] manos actusin [...] differentes infi­ciantis. Unum duco ex opera­tione humana prout est ger­men naturae ra­tionalis. Hom [...] enim ad suas o­perationes ha­bet se veluti a [...] bor ad fructus ut optimè ad [...] vertit Antoni [...] l. 9. de vita sua [...] num. 8. & pu [...] ch è Guliel. Pa [...] lib. dev irrut. c [...] 12. initio: cu [...] ea tamen diff [...]rentia, ut scit [...] notavit Anto [...] us l. 11. num. quod arboru [...] & quarumvi [...] plantarumfru [...] us, alii percip [...] unt: ipse hou [...] fructus sui percipit, nec alii, sed sibi ipsi laborat. Cum igitur operatio humana se habeat ad [...] turam rationalem, sicut fructus & germen ejus, necesse est, ut idem sit finis operationis ab hum [...]na natura prodeuntis, & ipsius naturae rationalis. Sic enim videmus, servata proportione, ac [...] dere in omnibus aliis naturis. Et ratio est, quia cùm natura sit actus quidam primus, actio ve [...] sit actus ejus secundus, qui est ipsamet tendentia actus primi in objectum & finem suum; nec [...] sarium profecto videtur, ut idemmet sit finis ultimus actionis & naturae actionem principia tis: sicut trunci & germinum & totius a [...]boris, ac fructuum, idem est finis. Debet ergo hum [...] nae naturae & actionis huma [...] esse idem sinis. Atqui finis ultimus humanae naturae est De [...] E [...]go sinis quoque ultimus actionis nostrae debet esse Deus. Constat autem, actum indiffer [...] tem, si daretur, non habiturum pro fine Deum: nam sic non esset indifferens, led revera bon [...] Ergo careret aliquo, quod habere deberet, nempe relatione illa ad finem ultimum naturae hu [...]nae; ac proinde esset malus moraliter, non autem indiff [...]tens. Moral. disciplin: dist 4 q 1 art. 2. n. Raynaudus thus urged: [Page 48]man is related unto his operations, as a tree unto it's fruits and branches: and therefore there is the same end of the humane ope­rations, and the humane nature, and the reason is, because that nature is the first act, and it's operation the second act which is a tendencie of the first act towards it's object, and end; and there­fore it seemes necessary, that there should be the same uttermost end of the nature, and the operation; Even as there is the same end of the tree, it's stock, branches, and fruits: But now the ut­termost end of the humane nature is God: and therefore God should be the uttermost end of every humane action, and conse­quently no humane action can be indifferent: for if it have not God for it's end, it is sinfull: because it wants that relation unto the uttermost end of the humane nature, which it ought to have: and if it have God for it's end, then it is morally good, if it want not any other essentiall requisite.

2. From a consideration of them Alterum sententiae no­strae firmamen­tum profero ex [...]ctu humano [...]er seipsum considerato. Hoc est non [...]uatenus est [...]ermen natu­ [...]ae, & quatenus [...]undem cum a finem ul­ [...]mum habere [...]bet, sed solitariè, perinde ac si non esset fructus illius naturae. Sic igitur argumentor. Actio [...]mana vel ultimo refertur ad Deum, sive actu, sive virtualiter, & suapte natura, quatenus est ra­ [...]ni conformis, & sic est bona: vel nullo modo in Deum tend it: & sic eo ipso deflectit ab eo fine, [...]que mala moraliter. Nam eo ipso quod non fit ob finem increatum, nec in eum tendit sal­ [...]m virtualiter, sicut faciunt omnes boni actus, sistit omnino in bono creato, est que ejus fruitio. [...]rversum autem est, frui utendis, ut latè tradit D. Augustinus 1. de Doct. Christ. a cap. 3. &c. 21. 22. ostendens omnia bona creata debere tantum cadere sub usum nostrum, sub fruitionem [...]em non nisi Deum. Ergo Actus humani carentes bono fine, vel intrinseco, vel extrinseco, sunt [...]ipso depravati, carentque aliquo quod habere deberent. Est enim in omni actione creatâ, [...]itum ut sit fruitio fruendorum: id est, ut ultimò ad Deum tendat aliquo modo. Nam si non [...]eret hoc ex debito, posset esse fruitio utendorum, nihilque idcirco haberet indebitum. Quia [...]ur actus humanus, qui dicitur fore prorsus indifferens, esset fruitio puri boni creati, quod u­ [...]dum fuisset non fruendum; merito convincitur non fuisse indifferens, sed oblitus coeno turpi­ [...]nis moralis, ob defectum volitionis ad finem debitam. n. 38. loc. praedict.absolutely as they are in themselves: Every humane rationall action is referred unto some chiefe end or other, and that must be, either the creature, or the creatour: If it be the creature, then the creature is most sinfully injoyed, as mans supreme end, and highest happinesse: whereas it should be only used, as a means: and hereby it is at least virtually, and interpretatively idolized, deified, and placed in the roome of God: If it be the Creator then the action is good, unlesse it be in some other regard defective. And so you see that [Page 49]unto whatsoever end it be referred, either created, or uncreated, it cannot be indifferent.

For the further enforcement of this reason, I shall alleadge, and open some few scriptures.

The first is Matth. 12.36. But I say unto you, that every idle word that men shall speake, they shall give account thereof in the day of judgment. Three things here merit our consideration. 1. What is meant by an idle word. 2. What by giving account thereof: and 3dly, How this makes against the indifferency of humane actions, con­sidered in their singulars, and actuall existence.

1. What is meant by an idle word: that which hath no obliquity in it but this, that it wants a good and honest end: That it is un­profitable, and unfruitfull, both unto speaker, and hearer: quod aut utilitate rectitudinis aut ratione justae necessitatis caret, as Gre­gory, Homily. 6. As for those, who think, that an idle word is ex­tended unto every word, grossely wicked, false, lying, blasphemous, the very context will disprove them: The occasion of our Saviours discourse was that blasphemy of the Pharisees, vers. 24. But when the Pharisees heard it, they said, this fellow doth not cast out Devils, but by Beelzebub, the prince of the Devils: Now our Saviours drift is to discover the sinfulnesse; and danger of this blasphemous speech of theirs: And this he doth, as by severall arguments, so particularly, in this verse, by arguing a minori ad majus, from the lesse to the greater: As if he should have said: If in the day of judgment ye shall give an account for every idle word, then much more for such a blasphemous vomit as this of yours, That I cast out De­vils by the assistance of Beelzebub: That our Saviours Argument here stands thus Maldonate tels us, all are of that opinion that he ever read. And for this coherence take these two Rea­sons.

1. Our Saviour proceeds in a way of aggravating the now men­tioned Blasphemy: But if by every idle word you understand every grossely wicked, and blasphemous word, there will be little aggravation hereof: for to say that every wicked lying, blasphe­mous word, that men shall speake, they shall give account there­of in the day of judgment, falls very short of what was spoken allready of this blasphemy vers. 31.32. That it was a blasphemy against the Holy Ghost, and not to be forgiven, either in this world, or in the world to come.

2. Compare we these words with those immediately foregoing vers. 35. A good man out of the good treasure of the heart, bringeth forth good things: and an evill man out of the evill treasure, bringeth forth evill things: In the latter part of these words, by evill things are understood such evill words as were notoriously such, such as even the Pharisees acknowledged to be so; The Idle words then in vers. 36. are distinguished from them, as may very probably be gathered from the Antithesis insinuated in the particle [but] But I say unto you every idle word, that men shall speake, they shall give account thereof in the day of Judgment: It is apparent, that our Saviour spake of such words, whose sinfulnesse seemed strange, and new unto such loose commentators on the Law, as the Phari­sees were: And it is very observable, that he ushereth in this his commination against every idle word with the very same forme of speech, that he useth (chapt. 5. vers. 12, 28, 31, 34, 39, 44.) In his correction of their corrupt glosses upon the law of God. So then our Saviour speakes of that, which sounded as very harsh and rigid doctrine in the eares of the Pharisees: But I say unto you that every idle word, that men shall speak they shall give an account thereof in the day of Judgment: Notwithstanding your slighting thoughts of your vaine, and unprofitable discourse, I, who am the truth, and know fully the mind of God, as being alwaies in his bosome, doe assure you, that every idle word, which men shall speak, every word, which is not referred unto a good end, they shall give an account thereof in the day of Judgment.

2. Enquire we, what it is to give an account of every idle word in the day of Judgment. The phrase sometimes signifies onely triall, and examination, Luk. 16.2. Heb. 13.17. But that here it importeth condemnation, and punishment, Illa verba dixit ad incuti­endum homi­nibus timorem, & ex aggerandam severitatem divini judiciitergo sen sus illorum verborum est [...]ta homines reddituros rationem otiosi verbi, ut si nullam aliam excusationem, vel rati­onabilem causam habeant, pro illo puniendi sunt alioquin verba Christi nullum fere pondus [...]ut energiam haberent, neque aliquem metum inferent, cum tamen illo singulari exemplo vo­ [...]luerit Christus ostendere, quam sint g [...]aviter puniendi homines: pro verbis pravioribus. De boni­ [...]tate & malit, humanorum actidisp. 9 Sect. 3. Suarez proveth from the scope of the words which was to terrifie the Pharisees for their blasphemy, and to deterre others from the like, by dis­playing, [Page 51]and amplifying the severity of Gods judgment against it: And unto this the threatning of punishment and condemnati­on for every idle word is more conducing, then a proposall of a bare tryall and examination of every idle word, which is agree­able unto the best words and works of men: because for them they may give an account with joy, Heb. 13.17. In the words then, there is plainly a Metalepsis, the Antecedent, to give an account in the day of Judgment is put for the consequent to be punished in hell­fire, Every idle word that men shall speak, they shall give an account thereof in the day of Judgment: that is they without repentance shall be condemned, and everlastingly punished for it: And this acception of the phrase we find elsewhere, as 1 Pet. 4.5.

I passe on unto the third particular how this makes against the indifferency of humane actions considered in their singular and actu­all existence: I answere: because it concludes against the indiffe­rency of any words of men; for those words, which in the generall, and in their own nature are indifferent: yet as drawn into exer­cise, and putting on circumstances they are idle, if they have no goodnesse adjoyned unto them, by reference unto their due, and requisite ends: And if they be idle they are sinfull, and conse­quently not indifferent: And what is said of idle words of men is applyable unto the idle thoughts, and workes of men: for the thought of man is a more rationall act then his speech, more an act of reason: And his rationall works proceed from his thoughts, and are of farre greater moment and importance then his words: and so in the upshot we may inferre that if mens idle words are not indifferent, then neither mens idle thoughts, and works: And the justnesse of this inference, I shall confirme by two arguments.

1. Idle words are therefore sinfull, because (being the birth and product of reason, and the free will of man) there is not in them propounded an end suitable unto the reasonable nature of man: Now all the vaine thoughts, and idle works of men are the issue of rea­son, and freedome of will: and therefore, (because they are not referred unto such an honest end, as becomes the dignity of such a rationall creature, as man,) they are faultie and viti­ous.

2. Idle words are therefore morally evill: because in them, that precious treasure, time, is wasted, in which a man may be more [Page 52]lavish, then in the most prodigall mispence of money: But now our time is vainly consumed to no good end, and purpose, in our idle thoughts, and works: and therefore they are sinfull, as well as our idle words: and consequently not indifferent.

A second place is, 1 Cor. 10.31. Whether therefore ye eat, or drink, or whatsoever ye doe, do all unto the Glory of God: To eat, and to drinke abstractively considered, are indifferent actions, and yet such actions are here commanded to be referred unto the glory of God: and therefore if they be not thus referred, they are sinfull: And we may say the same of all other actions, that are in specie, in their own nature indifferent. Capreolus (lib. 2. dist. 40. quaest 1. pag. 562.) noteth, that these words of the Apostle [Let all things be done unto the Glory of God] may be understood two manner of waies negatively or affirmatively.

1. Negatively, and then the sense is, do nothing against Gods glory, nothing that may dishonour him: Things offered unto idols were in themselves the good creatures of God, and to eate them an action in it selfe indifferent, but to eate them in the Idols Temple was to countenance Idolatry, and so a high dishonou­ring of God, To eat them also with the scandall of a weake bro­ther, was to prejudice, and obstruct the glorifying of Gods name.

2dly, The words may be understood affirmatively, and so there is (as Capreolus observeth) a threefold reference unto the glory of God.

• 1. Habituall.
• 2. Actuall.
• 3. Virtuall.

1. An habituall reference there is unto the glory of God, where­soever there is the habit, the grace, or vertue of the love of God, the principle of actually referring all things unto the glory of God. But now this is not sufficient: for the habit of love may (for a long time) lie idle, and un-active, and be consistent with very grosse sins: as we see in David, Peter, and others.

2. An action is actually referred unto Gods glory, when there is an actuall cogitation of God, and his glory: And this, (though it ought frequently to be done) is not yet required in every action: well it may be our happinesse in the next life; But it can not be [Page 53]our duty in this; because it would leave no roome, or place for other duties: Thus for an Artist to be alwaies thinking upon the rules of his Art, would be a disturbance unto his worke: for a traveller to have perpetually in his thoughts, the end of his journey would retard his progresse therein.

In a third place therefore, the reference of all our actions un­to Gods glory, that is here exhorted to, is onely virtuall. And that an action may virtually be referred unto Gods glory three things are required. 1. The above mentioned habituall reference unto Gods glory must be presupposed, as also. 2dly, A forego­ing actuall reference of a mans selfe, and all that belongs unto him un­to the glory of God, and the more frequent this is, the better, and 3ly, The Action it selfe. 1. Must not be referred unto any end op­posite unto Gods glory. 2. It must be referred unto some end subor­dinate unto Gods glory, that carrieth a tendency unto it, and is naturally referrible thereunto.

Now such an action is said to be virtually referred unto Gods glory, because it is done in the virtue, and force of some prece­ding actuall, and explicite proposall of Gods glory as a supreame end: for the virtue, and force of the chiefe, and utmost end abideth in all inferiour ends subordinated unto it; so that he, who pro­pounds unto himselfe those inferiour ends, may be said to pro­pound implicitly, and mediately Gods glory for his uttermost end. Thus those godly persons who have first actually made Gods ho­nour and glory, the maine ayme of their desires, endeavours, and undertakings, may be said afterwards to referre even their eating, and drinking, their recreations unto Gods glory virtually, if they ayme at no dishonest end, though their explicit and imme­diate intendment be onely the refreshment of their bodies, by which they are the better fitted, and prepared for the glorifying of God in both their generall, and particular callings. Thus e­very step in a mans journey, (so he goe not out of the way) may be said to be virtually designed unto the end of his journey, and yet it is neither necessary, nor expedient, that in every step a man should have actuall thoughts of the end of his journey.

Unto this sentence of the Apostle here, Estius makes Parallel two other places.

The first, Col. 3.17. Whatsoever ye doe in word or deed, doe all in the name of the Lord Jesus, that is; for his glory and honour, for his names sake.

The second is, 1 Pet. 4.11. If any man speake, let him speake as the Oracles of God: If any man minister, let him d [...]e it as of the abi­lity, which God giveth, that God in all things may be glorified through Jesus Christ; Not onely in publick ordinances, not onely in acts of worship, not onely in necessary duties, but even in indifferen­cies, in all the common actions of this life.

But as for any further exposition of these two places in them­selves, or application unto the matter in hand, I shall referre the reader unto what I but now spake on the 1 Cor. 10.31. which with due change will serve here.

I shall therefore passe on unto a second argument taken from the rule of humane actions, right reason: Unto this rule all rationall actions, proceeding from deliberate reason, are either agreeable, or disagreeable: If agreeable, then they are morally good; for right reason is a part of Scripture materially considered: If disa­greeable, then they are vitious and sinfull; For the will of man is bound to looke to it's rule, and conforme all it's actions there­unto: and therefore if in any thing it neglect, or thwart it, if it swarve therefrom in the least particulars, it thereby commits a sinne.

Unto these two arguments I shall adde a third, drawn from the relation betwixt m [...]rall goodnesse and illnesse: They are privative­ly opposite; and inter privative opposita non datur medium in proprio subjecto susceptivo; betwixt things privatively opposite there is no middle, either of abnegation, or participation in capable subjects: Thus every sensitive creature either seeth, or is blind: but we can­not say of a stone, that it is blind, although it seeth not; because it is not capable of sight: Now morall goodnesse and illnesse are privatively opposed, (the formality of sinne being nothing else, but a privation of that morall goodnesse, which is required unto every rationall action;) Now every rationall action, Every action, that proceeds from deliberate reason, and freedome of will, considered in its singulars, and as drawn into exercise is capa­ble of morall goodnesse; because it is referrible unto a good end: and therefore it is either good, or evill, and so not indifferent.

Against this there are divers objections: unto those of Scotus the reader may supply himselfe with answers out of what hath been said already: As for the arguments of Vasquez, there is but Prima ratio est desumpta ex eo, quod Doctores prio­ris opinionis concedunt, esse nimirum actionem in­differentem ex seâ specie, & objecto, tamet­si in individuo nulla maneat indifferens. Ra­tio vero est hu­jusmodi. Nulla est na­tura in specie, quae non ha­beat aliquod individuum in quo ratio ejus maneat, & non destruatur per contrariam: cum igitur sit actio humana indiffe­rens secundum suam naturam & speciem, habere debet aliquod individuum ac proinde esse pote­rit aliqua actio individua, & singularis, quae maneat indifferens. In 12ae tom. disp. 52. cap. 4. pag. 378. one of them merit's any examination, and yet that hath been also answered out of Durand. (b)

In briefe, it run's thus. As no Genus, no generall nature can be without one species, so no species, no speciall without one singular. No specificall nature but hath at least one individuall: and there­fore, if there be some humane actions, that be in their species, in their specificall nature indifferent, there must needs be an indivi­duall of such an action, that must be indifferent: and consequent­ly all humane actions considered in the individuall are not moral­ly good, or evill.

This hath been sufficiently answered allready; but now I shall, ex abundanti, adde two things more.

The first is out of Hunc loquendi modum, fateor esse ca villo obnoxium; impugnaturque ab Argentina in 2. d. 40. qu. unica. art. 2. in 2. particuli: quia nulla potest esse species cujus non possit esse aliquid individuum. Ergo si dantur actus secundum speciem indifferentes, debent quoque dari indiffe­rentes secundum individuum. Quod argumentum agendo de specie, & individuo in sensu quotidiano, & vulgari, rectè concludit, sed non contra eos, qui admittunt actus secundum spe­ciem indifferentes, negant autem dari indifferentes in individuo. Nam hi Autores fatentur illos ipsos actus, quos admittunt, esse secundum speciem indifferentes, habere queque indifferen­tiam quoad gradum illorum specificum restrictum per individuationem. Tantum itaque ne­gant, eos actus, si spectentur cum omnibus sibi debitis accidentibus, esse moraliter indifferentes. Et hoc appellant, actus non esse indifferentes secundum individuum: nempe quia individuum, secluso rigore illo Metaphysico, in quo tantùm importat restrictionem gradus specifici, involvit congeriem omnium horum accidentium, aut ut passim loquimur, conditionum individuantium, secundum quam congeriem actus humanus non est indifferens, quatenus vel inter illa accidentis est debitus finis extrinsecus, & sic actus est bonus. vel non est debitus finis, & sic est malus, Mor. disc. distin. 4. qu. 1. art. 2. Num. 31. Raynaudus: An humane action that con­sidered specifically is indifferent, in regard of object or matter may in it's individuals and singulars be lookt upon two manner of waies. 1. Inadequately only as touching matter, or object. 2. Adequately in regard of all circumstances.

1. If an humane action be considered specifically indifferent [Page 56]as touching matter or object, then all the individuals or singulars of that action are indifferent too, not simply and absolutely, but se­cundum quid; that is only as touching their object, and matter: But notwithstanding this, if we consider them adequately in respect of all circumstances, they are either good, or evill: for either they are cloathed with all circumstances required in a rationall action, and then they are good: or else they want some, or one of these circumstances, and then they are evill and sinfull, for malum fit ex quovis defectu.

The second is out of a moderne Thomist; Respon­deo, posse ali­quid esse in­differens dupli­citer. 1. Quod Indifferentia fit de ejus essen­tiâ. 2. Quod ipsi conveniat per accidens, & ab extrinse­co. Si sit indiffe­rens priori mo­do, necesse in inferioribus sal­vari istam in. differentiam, quia tota essen­tia superioris reperitur in in­feriori, siquidem essentia consist it in indivisibili: si sit indifferens posterio [...]i modo, non est ne­cesse salvari indifferentiam in inferiori: nam quae per accidens superiori conveniunt, sunt ab ipso separabil [...] ergo fine illis potest communicari inferiori. Si talia accidentia repugnent inferiori. V. C. posse praedicari de multis numerò differentibus, convenit naturae humanae secun­dum speciem consideratae, sed per accidens, & ab extrinseco, scilicet per operationem mentis eam abstrahentibus à singularibus, & cum illis ipsam conferentis; talis autem operatio est merè contingens tali naturae. Ex opposito, esse animal rationale convenit eidem humanae naturae tanquam illius essentia. Ex quo fit, u [...]humana natura nequeat communicari inferioribus, quin ipsis tribuat [...] animal rationale, sed non ipsis communicat posse de multis numero praedicari, alioqui quodlibet individuum esset species. Jam ut ad propositum veniam, Indifferentia actui secundum speciem concessa non est ipsi essentialls, sed accidentalis per abstractionem ab indivi­duis: imo non est indifferentia moralis positiva: quasi actus ille sit moralis, & indifferens: sed est moralis negativa, quatenus actus ille non est moralis, sed caret ordine ad rationem morum regu­lam, ideoque nec bonus est, nec malus moraliter. Unde patet non debere in ullo individuo salvari talem indifferentiam, nisi fortè in actibus indeliberatis, qui similiter non sint morales; fed ipsi absunt à nostrâ quaestione. Ethic. cap. 3. Sect. 2.Irenaeus. A thing may be said to be indifferent two manner of waies. 1. When indifferency is essentiall unto it. 2. When indifferency agreeth unto it onely by accident, and extrinsecally, from something that is extra­essentiall unto it: If indifferency were essentiall unto an humane action, considered specifically, then every singular, or individuall thereof must be indifferent too; because the essentials of every thing superiour in point of predication are imparted, and attribu­ted unto every thing, that is under them in point of predication; as every individuall of the humane nature is a sensitive creature, a living body, &c. But now indifferency is ascribed unto some humane actions (considered specifically) onely by accident, and ex­trinsecally, from the operation of our understandings, abstracting, and devesting them from those circumstances good, or bad, where­with in their individualls they are apparel'd: and therefore agre­eth [Page 57]not unto their individuals look't upon without such an ab­straction.

By what hath been said, Application. you see that our most indifferent acti­ons are liable unto sinne; and therefore afford matter of humilia­tion for the time past, matter of Caution for the future.

1. Matter of humiliation for the time past: In their singular, and actuall existence they were morally either good or evill, san­ctified or sinnefull; and good they could not be, unlesse there did concurre all requisites: And (alas,) how seldome hath there oc­curred in them such a concurrence? sometimes they have risen from a wrong principle; other times they have been directed un­to bad ends: most times they have been faulty in regard of either measure, or manner: It is very seldome, but there hath been wan­ting in them some circumstance, or other, that the word of God, or law of nature requireth: And the totall want of one of the least of such circumstances will so vitiate indifferent actions, as that it will not onely render them sinfull, but make them sinnes, meritorious of all the flames, and torments in hell: and that which deserves so severe a punishment, calls for a very eminent sorrow and contrition: God hath set bounds unto the use of our liberty in things indifferent, (as unto the waves of the sea,) saying, thus farre shall ye goe, and no farther: He hath commanded, that it should be restrained by prudence, Temperance, conscience, Religion, Authority, and charity; But we have transgressed these limits, and have exceeded all bounds of moderation: We have used this part of our Christian liberty very imprudently, and intempe­rately in regard of our selves; irreligiously, and profanely in re­spect of God: against the dictates of our conscience, a deputy un­der him; against the obligations of our oathes, and vowes unto him: disobediently against the lawfull commands of our superi­ours: uncharitably with the scandall of many poore brethren. And thus have we most shamefully, and unthankfully abused this great priviledg of Christianity, by using it as an occasion unto the flesh, as a cloake of maliciousnesse; and so have prostituted it unto the very service of Satan himselfe: When Job's Sons and Daughters had feasted together, Job offered burnt offerings according unto the number of them all: for he said, it may be that my sonnes have sinned, Job. 14.5. Their feasting was a thing indifferent, and very lawfull [Page 58]in it selfe: but, because it was obnoxious unto sinne, therefore Jobe sacrificed in the behalfe of them all: It may be (saith he) that my sonnes have sinned: The possibility of sinne in the indifferent things of others (especially such as are neerly related:) stirs up in the godly a feare, and a holy jealousy of them, and rowseth unto prayers for them: and therefore much more should the certaine, and undoubted assurance of the adhesion of sinne unto our own indifferent actions provoke us, with contrite hearts to deprecate the wrath of God against us: All the indifferencies of unrege­nerate men are sinnes: Ʋnto them that are defiled and unbelieving nothing is pure, Tit. 1.15. the plowing of the wicked is sinne, Prov. 21.4. And however unto the pure all things are pure. Tit. 1.15. that is, all indifferent things in themselves are lawfull, yet they may and doe accidentally become sinne, when they are not in all particulars rightly circumstanced: And then they present us with fresh occa­sion for the renewall of our repentance and faith in Christ Jesus: And how often this happeneth, is a matter, that the most wakefull and quicksighted conscience can hardly discerne: so that the best of us may apply unto our indifferencies that of David, Psalm. 19.12. Who can understand his errours: cleanse thou me from secret faults.

Secondly, The liablenesse of our indifferent actions unto sinne should be a motive unto all possible caution and warinesse for the future in them: There is no humane action so indifferent, but it is capable of sinne, nay (if it be not in all particulars rightly circumstantiated,) it becomes actually sinfull; and therefore our hearts should be very watchfull against sinne in the use of all in­differencies, in our meales, in our feastings, and merry meetings, in our journey's, in our ordinary talke, and discourse, in our walkes, in the actions of our ordinary vocations: Indeed the rule of Gods word doth not at all either command, or forbid the matter of such actions: but the manner of performing them commeth under the rule: They are all to be done to the glory of God, in the name of Christ: every good creature is to be sanctified by the word, and prayer: That Command, which God gave Abraham (to walk before him) is not to be straitned unto the ordinances of God, but to be extended unto all deliberate acts of a mans life, and conversation, Gen. 17.1. Zechariah (in his prophecy of the ge­nerall call or conversion of Jewes, and Gentiles) gives this for one [Page 59]character of such, as shall be converted, that they shall have a sa­cred and sanctified use of things common and indifferent: In that day shall there be upon the bells of their horses, holinesse unto the Lord, yea, every pot in Jerusalem and Judah shall be holinesse unto the Lord of Hosts, Zech. 14.20, 21. Not onely acts of immediate worship, but all rationall actions, whatsoever, should be offered up as spirituall sacrifices acceptable unto God by Jesus Christ, 1 Pet. 2.5. The Apostle exhorts the Romans to salute one another with an holy kisse, Rom. 16.16. this kisse was no religious rite in Gods worship, but a ceremony of civility; and therefore in it selfe a thing indifferent: And yet the Apostle requires holinesse for the qualification of it: All our civill actions ought to be such, as becommeth saints; that is, so farre forth holy for manner, that they be free from sinne, and unto the glory of God: Indeed this is a strictnesse impossible unto lapsed man: But though we cannot exactly and perfectly observe it, yet we may sincerely and cordially endeavour it: And this sincere and hearty endea­vour is that, which God, for Christ's sake, will accept, reward, and crowne; and therefore it concernes us very much to use our utmost diligence herein: and the rather, because we are (by farre) more prone and ready to slide into sinne in things indiffe­rent ere we are aware, then in such things, as are for their na­ture, and matter sinfull; for in such things the danger is more ap­parent, and therefore the more feared, and watcht against; Where­as, if once we know, and are perswaded, that actions are indiffe­rent, and lawfull, then we are apt to think that all is safe, and that we need not trouble our selves with any farther considerati­ons touching their expediency, and edification; and tha [...] there is no reason to perplex our hearts and conscience with an anxious care of referring them to Gods glory, of walk­ing before God in them, and of putting holynesse unto the Lord upon them. Now when once such thoughts as these creepe in­to mens heads, it cannot be imagined, unto what excesses, and failings it exposeth them: Adde unto this: that looke as the consi­deration of the lawfulnesse, and indifferency of actions occasio­neth a surprizall many times with hainous sinnes: so also it proves (by accident) an obstacle unto repentance for such sinnes: When the Godly fall into grosse, and acknowledged sinnes, either of o­mission, [Page 60]or commission; why, the checks of their own consci­ences, the publick ministery, the reproaches of enemies, and the admonition of Christian friends will soone awaken them, and informe them of their guilt: But as for the sinnes, that adhere unto their indifferencies, how quickly are they hardened in them? For it is very seldome, that, either their consciences, or their mi­nisters, or their Brethren take notice of them; or if they doe, they are apt presently to hold forth the indifferencie, and law­fulnesse of such actions in themselves, as a buckler to ward off all accusations of Conscience, all upbraidings of enemies, all repre­hensions, of either ministers, or private friends: Those, that are most lavish of their time, and purses, in gaming, will plead; that they follow none, but lawfull sports: A Gentleman, that mur­ders the greatest part of his time in hunting, hawking, and the like exercises, and redeems but an inconsiderable portion of it to do God, and his Countrey service, thinks, that he hath enough to stopp the mouth of all reproofe, to say, that the recreations, which he pursueth are things indifferent: such riotous persons, as wast their pretious houres in joviallity, and goodfellowship, usually make this Apology for themselves: that it is not unlaw­full to drinke with a friend in a Taverne or alehouse. To awa­ken from this licentiousnesse, and to quicken in us a carefull watchfulnesse over our hearts in the use of things indifferent, I shall, for conclusion of this discourse, propound some exam­ples of the severity of Gods judgments against the sinnes of mens indifferencies: Davids numbering of the people was a thing not evill in it selfe; but his curiosity, pride, and carnall confidence in an arme of flesh made it so; And God was dis­pleased with this thing, therefore he smote Israel, 1 Chron. 21.7. with a pestilence, that devoured 70000. Doubtlesse most of those feminine ornaments (mentioned, Esay 3.) were in themselves lawfull; but the haughtinesse, and wantonnesse of the daughters of Zion abused them unto sinne; And how severely this sinfull abuse of them was threatned, you may read at large from verse the 16 usque ad 25: for Hezekiah to shew unto the Babylonian Ambassadours the house of his pretious things, the silver, and the gold and the spices, and the pretious oyntment, and all the house of his armour, and all that was found in his treasures, all that was remar­kable [Page 61]in his house, and dominion was in it selfe, but a civill en­tertainment, and not unlawfull: but because he did it out of vaine ostentation, this turned it into sinne, and this was one of the sins, which God chastised with the captivity of the whole nation, Esay 39 2 Chron. 32. 2 Kings 30. To be cloathed in Purple, and fine linnen, and to fare sumptuously were things in themselves indifferent; but the excesse of the rich glutton made it sinfull unto him: and this sinne, not being repented of, was unto him a forerunner of hell torments, Luke 16.19, 23. They were the sinnes of things indifferent that had a great hand in, and influence upon the drowning of the old world, and the burning of Sodome, Luke 17. vers. 27, 28, 29. In the daies of Noah, they did eat, they dranke, they married wives, they were given in marriage, untill the day that Noah entred into the arke; and the flood came and destroyed them all. Likewise also as it was in the daies of Lot, they did eat, they dranke, they bought, they sold, they planted, they builded: But the same day that Lot went out of Sodome, it rained fire and brimstone from Heaven, and destroyed them all.

OUr Apostle directs us, in the verse immediately preceding this Text, concerning Good; in this Text concerning Evill. Towards Good he exacts a prudent warin [...]sse; towards Evill a scrupulous fear­fulnesse. Towards good, a prudent warinesse, Prove all things, and then, hold fast that which is good. Nothing, how colourable soever, is to be received hand over head, before triall and examination by the ballance of the Sanctuary: for, Vitia virtutes mentiuntur (saith Gregory) vice is maskt under the skin of virtue; falshood, disguised under the face of truth: so that one is often mistaken for the other. The grossest enormities have been glast and coloured over with the name, and face of virtues: the most poisonous heresies have often gained the esteeme and applause of Orthodox Tenents [...] and therefore as we must stedfastly retaine that which is truely true and good; so must we prudently discerne, and carefully distinguish between that which is so indeed, and in truth, and that which is so only in shew, and colour; this we must reject, that keep, and hold fast: Prove all things, hold fast that which is good. But he requires now towards evill a farre different carriage: there he looks for a scru­pulous fearfulnesse. Though we must not hold fast any thing that hath but the appearance of good, yet we must abstaine from but the appearance of evill.

Abstaine from all appearance of evill: or from every evill appea­rance: [Page 68]the Words may be rendred indifferently, either way, both rendrings being equally consonant to the truth, and Ori­ginall.

In the words our Apostle meets with a cavill, rife among the Libertines of our, and former times, who when their scandalous courses are charged upon thē, baffle of all with this plea: that they are not intrinsecally sinfull. Could I (will the profanest Liber­tine say) once see such and such things proved to be unlawfull: why I would make no more words of the matter, but soone for­beare them. I, but have they the blush, the appearance of evill? that should be motive enough to shun them.

But are we sure this is the Apostles meaning? are not the words capable of another interpretation? First, some mislike our translation of [...], species, by appearance, and rather think it should be meant logically, for sort, or kind. That it may be so, Mat. Flac. Illyricus and Beza determine, That it is so the Syriack. Interpreter, and after him Faber, and after them our own great and learned See his An­notations. Doctor Hammond resolve. But I would faine know upon what ground they are thus singular against the Cur­rent both of Ancient and Moderne Expositors. Setting aside this place the word occurres (as I thinke) in the whole new Te­stament but foure times, In Luke 3.22. and 9.29. John 5.37. 2 Cor. 5.7. And in none of these places is it, can it be taken in a Lo­gicall notion. If not elsewhere, why here? especially seeing such an acception is not inforced by the scope, coherence, any other circumstance of the Text, or any absurdity otherwise unavoi­dable.

But some dreame of a foule absurdity, that would ensue upon translating [...] species, appearance. If every appearance of evill should be abstained from, then should good things, the best things be eschewed, for they commonly appeare to be evill unto sense, and carnall reason, that discerne not the things of the spirit of God. How easily may an acute wit set false faces upon them and worke a bad conceite of them into either weake or ill appre' hensions.

Unto this we may adde that of Dr Hammond in his treatise of scandall. pag 9.10. Appearance of evill (saith he) is so uncer­taine [Page 69]and unconstant a thing, that to abstaine from it, universim, can­not be the matter of any possible Command. This feare will quickly vanish and be discovered to be idle, and vaine, when anon we shall explaine that distinction of appearance of evill, into reall, and imaginary: for the present therefore, leaving these men, pro­ceed we, secondly, to others, who agree with us in interpreting [...], in a vulgar, familiar, and common sense, for appearance: but then their exposition is not so generall, as ours: for they restraine the place to matters of Doctrine, and will not allow it to be ex­tended to matters of practise: and countenance, they think, the con­text gives their glosse: for the Apostle having at the 19 verse ex­horted not to quench the spirit, in verse 20. prescribes a meanes for cherishing the spirit, viz: a reverent demean our towards the word of God. If ye will not quench the spirit, despise not prophe­sying. And next, lest that some should except: are we thus re­verently to receive promiscuously all prophesyings, and doctrines preached unto us, and not to beware of some, of false prophesy­ings and doctrines? the Apostle, (say they) more distinctly di­rects, how we should demeane our selves. First, towards all prophesyings in generall: how, secondly, towards true: how, 3dly, towards false. First, all prophesyings, and doctrines whatsoever must be diligently examined, Prove all things. Secondly, all true prophesyings, sound, and orthodox doctrines are to be imbraced, with a firme, and unremoveable assent, Hold fast that which is good. Lastly, as for false prophesyings and doctrines even their very ap­pearance is to be shunned. Thus they &c.

But first, I propose unto the consideration of the learned, whe­ther or no an exact and acurate coherence be to be looked for in most of those precepts, delivered by the Apostle, from vers. 13. usque ad vers. 23. The loose and abrupt manner of heaping them together perswade (me thinks) that there is as little depen­dance of many of them upon either the foregoing, or following precepts, as is to be expected between Solomons Proverbs, or Bede's Axiomes. Hence is it that Neque ne­cesse est hanc partem inter­pretari (ut qul­dam faciunt) ut connexionem habeat eum iis, quae proximè praecedunt: nam potius videtur Apostolus re­fricare memoriam ejus, quod praecipit cap [...] superiori: ut honesti ambulent, ad ecs, qui foris sunt, &c. Estius. Estius holds it not necessary to interprete [Page 70]the place so, as that it should have conne [...]cion with those duties that immediately precede: rather (thinks he) the Apostle seems to rubbe up the memory of what he commanded in the former chapter, at verse the 12. That ye may walke honestly towards them that are without.

Secondly, Suppose a coherence of the words with the former, must it needs be that which they obtrude? The words may sit under our interpretation, and yet the Analysis of the Context run smoothly, as thus:

The Apostle having at verse 19. dehorted from quenching the spirit, next adviseth use of meanes tending to the preservation of its gracious and glorious residence in the soule: which meanes are either negative or positive: he assignes but one negative means, viz: a removall of a maine barre and powerfull obstacle unto the presence of the spirit, contempt of preaching, Despise not prophecy­ing, vers. 20. of the positive means, two concerne good, one evill: the two concerning good, are boni diligens examinatio, constans electio: Prove all things, hold fast that which is good. This respe­cting evill, est universalissima ejus rejectio, an abstinence not onely from all kinds, but even from all appearance of evill.

Lastly, suppose the primary scope and intention of the Apostle be limited unto matters of doctrine: yet because the maine reason, for which they themselves conceive appearances of evill, even in matters of doctrine to be interdicted, is avoidance of scandall, the precept of which is juris naturalis, and not only doctrines but al­so actions are scandalous: justly therefore unto these, as well as those, is the text appliable, and applied too, by all Schoolmen, or others that ever I met with purposely treating on the point of scandall. Should we then against the more generally received opinion of either former or later times, admit of their narrow and curtaild interpretation for the cleare, and indubitate sense of the Apostle? Yet to make the words more instructive, their use more generall, we might warrantably put an enlargment upon them, and extend them ad mores, as well as ad dogmata: ad a­genda, as well as ad credenda: to the decalogue, as well as creed; not onely to doctrinall truthes, but morall duties also.

Use of a division here is none, but to bewray Logick: and there­fore without more adoe we will roundly betake our selves to Limitation, Confirmation, and Application of the plaine point here commended to us: we are to abstaine not onely from things intrinsecally sinfull, but from all shewes and appearances of sinne.

For Limitation, appearance of evill is either in positions or actions.

First then? tis questioned whether or no wee are to abstaine from all positions, which have an appearance of evill: of fals­hood.

For resolution we must distinguish,

• 1. Concerning appearance of evill in positions.
• 2. Concerning abstinence from such an appearance.

Appearance of evill in Positions is twofold:

• 1. Either in regard of their matter and substance.
• 2. Or else in the termes, and expressions used in their proposall. That which is in regard of their matter and substance, is, either to our selves or others.

Secondly, to distinguish concerning abstinence from the appea­rance of evill, or falshood in Positions: we may be said to ab­staine from doctrines false in appearance, two manner of waies; either

• 1. When we abstaine from assenting to them.
• 2. Or when we abstaine from publishing of them.

We abstaine from assenting to them either positively, or nega­tively.

Positively, when by a positive, or reall act of the understanding we dissent from, we reject them. Now dissent from them is twofold,

• 1 Either absolute and peremptory,
• 2. Or else but conditionall, and cautionary.

Negatively, when we do not dissent from them, but onely not assent unto them: when we suspend our assent.

To apply these distinctions.

Note first, that though the substance or matter of Doctrines appeare to be false unto our selves, our own judgments, yet are we not bound to abstaine positively from assenting to them, to [Page 72]dissent from them, to reject them; for this appearance may not be true and reall, grounded upon the doctrines themselves, which perhaps may not send forth the least colour or shadow for sus­picion, but only put and fastned upon them by means of the er­rour, ignorance, and darknesse of our understandings, that per­haps not with due care and circumspection, but rather with much precipitancy have given their censure of them: and there­fore however at first blush they seeme false, yet when once the light of our reason is cleared from mists, and clouds, they may upon due examination prove true: and to dissent from, and reject a truth would be a foule errour of, and blemish to our under­standing. Obliged we are then, to abstaine, not positively but ne­gatively from assenting to them: that is, not to dissent from them, but only not to assent unto them, to stay our assent, to demurre a while, before we give in our judgment, lest we receive any thing with a doubtfull, entangled, and perplexed Consci­ence.

Of this Calvin gives us an hint in his exposition on this place, Speciem mali interpretor, cùm nondum it a comperta est doctrinae fal­sitas, ut merito rejici queat, sed tamen aliqua haeret sinistra suspicio, & timetur, ne quid veneni lateat: ergò ab eo genere doctrinae, quod ma­lum, etiamsi non sit, apparet, abstinere praecipit, non quod in totum re­jici permittat, sed quia recipi, aut fidem obtinere non debet. Cur enim priùs quod bonum est teneri jussit, nunc abstinere vult, n [...]n simpliciter à malo, sed à mali specie? quia ubi dijudicatione in lucem producta fuerit veritas, tunc demum ei fidem haberi decet: ubi autem subest falsi metus, aut mens dubitatione est implicita, p [...]dem referre, vel gradum suspendere convenit, nè quid dubiâ perplex áque consci­entiâ amplectamur. By the appearance of evill I understand (saith he) when as the falshood of a doctrine is not yet so throughly detected, that it may be deservedly rejected, but yet there sticks some bad sus­picion of it, and 'tis feared, lest poison lurke under it: therefore he commands us to abstaine from that kind of doctrine, which though it be not evill, yet appeares so: not as though it ought altogether to be re­jected, but because it ought not to be received, to be believed. For why doth he before command us to hold fast onely that which is good, and here he wills us to abstaine not barely from evill, but from its appea­ [...]ance? Because when after a thorough sifting a truth is cleared, 'tis [Page 73]fitting it should forthwith be believed: but when as the falshood of it is feared, or the mind with doubting is intangled, we must for a while withdraw our assent, lest we embrace any thing with a doubting, and perplexed conscience.

But suppose I for mine own part am firmely perswaded of the truth of such, or such a Tenet, or at least unconvinced, unper­swaded of it's falshood, and yet it appeare generally unto others to be false unto the judgments of the godly learned, of most of the ancient Fathers, unto either generall or provinciall Councils: in such a case, what course must I take, because it hath appearance of falshood unto others understandings, must I therefore dissent from it, or stop mine assent unto it?

For answer, take these foure following rules.

First, we owe so reverend and humble an esteeme of, and submission unto the Spirits of the Prophets, to the judgment of learned, sober, and pious Divines, unto the writings of the ancient godly Fathers, unto the Canons, and decrees of Oecumenicall, and Provinciall Councils, as that whatsoever Tenents the whole Church representative, to wit, a generall Councill, or the greatest and chiefest part of the Church most of the Fathers and Divines too, of later and present times, have rejected and condemned for false, and erroneous, we should abstaine negatively from assenting to, that is, though not change, yet suspend our beliefe of them, and not fully passe over our full and absolute assent unto them, un­till by diligent inquisition, servent prayer, imploring the guidance of Gods holy spirit, and use of all other good means, either their consonancy with, or dissonancy from the truth, be cleerly discerned, fully confirmed, and manifested unto our Consci­ences.

But Christian modesty stayeth not here, but goeth one step further, and in a second exacts of us a conditionall, probable, and Dr Jackson.cautionary dissent from all doctrines thus generally suspected, and censured: for upon generall dislike of a doctrine, as upon a pruden­tiall motive, we may ground a strong presumption, an high and probable conjecture of the falshood of it: so that hereupon wee may reject it, though not in an absolute and irrevocable way, yet with this limitation and caution: so the apparent verity therein of it selfe do not force us to embrace it. So sottish I am not, [Page 74]as to measure truth by multitude of voices: for errours I know that have grated upon the foundation, nay heresies, that have rai­sed the foundation, have had their cloud of witnesses: yet I should so farre honour a publick testimony, as to suspect mine own, and others private bare opinions, not back't by plain scrip­ture, with evident sense, or a full demonstrative argument, ra­ther than a generall suffrage: for, nemo omnes, neminem omnes, fefellere, Pliny. improbable as for one to deceive all, so for all to deceive one, River Nee dubita­mus caeteris quidem pari­bus, majorem & pleniorem men­suram commu­nicari publicis Ecclesiae admi­nistris five in una aliqua pa [...] ­ticulari Eccle­sia munus su­um obeant; five in coe [...]u a­liquo legiti­mè & in Chri­stinomine con­gregati de vero scriptutae sensu inter se confe. rant quam sin gulis & priva­tis qui neque tot donis in­structi sunt, ne­que tot oculis vident, neque privatâ & sim­plici medita­tione aequare possunt multorum collationem & disquisitionem. Isag. ad Scrip▪ Sac. cap. 19. Pag: 272. makes no doubt, but caeteris paribus, that is, if parts, prayer, diligence of study after the truth, be equall, that then a greater and fuller measure of the gift of expounding the Scrip­ture, and deciding controversies thereabouts, is communicated to the publick ministers of the Church, (whether they execute their function severally, and apart in some one particular Church, or else jointly conferre and discourse among themselves concerning the true and genuine sense of the Scriptures in some assemblies call'd lawfully, and in the name of Christ) than unto severall pri­vate men, who are neither endowed with so many gifts, nor see with so many eyes, nor by their private and single meditation can equall the united consultations and enquiries after truth of ma­ny. And thus you see how farre Christian modesty requireth us to abstaine from assenting to doctrines upon the appearance of evill, or falshood, which they carry unto those, who in interpeting scripture, and deciding controversies, have committed to them the publick office of direction and instruction of others: but yet it taketh not from us the judgment of private discretion; for Chri­stian liberty alloweth us such a freedome of dissenting from, or assenting unto, what the Church, and her ministers say, as is to be specified in the next two following rules.

In a third place therefore, although the Church, or the grea­test and cheifest part of her, charge errour and falshood upon such a doctrine, yet this bare and single testimony, not seconded by any scripture or reason, is not to gaine so farre upon our beliefe, as that thereupon we should presently reject, and dissent from the doctrine thus generally censured with an absolute and pe­remptory [Page 75]dissent. This were to give unto the Churches deci­sions as high and over-ruling a suffrage in our hearts, as is onely due to divine revelations to receive them, not as they are indeed the word of men, but as if they were the word of God: to yeild unto them an absolute divine faith, and credence. This were a meere Vassallage of our soules, understandings, faiths, unto the authority of an humane testimony: a thing utterly unworthy the generosity and freedome of Christian Spirits. If God hath indulged to any the exercise of such dominion over mens faiths, and consciences: alas! then to what purpose hath he placed that glorious lamp of reason in our bosomes? of what use are our in­tellectualls? What place is there left for St Pauls proving of all things? St John's tryall of the Spirits? but the truth is, 1 Joh. 4.1. that God is so farre from enslaving our understandings, or captivating our beliefe unto the judgment of any mortall, as that he approves not onely of a forbearance from a flat, and absolute dissent from doubtfull doctrines thus publickly, and generally disliked, but also of a full and peremptory assent unto doctrines manifestly true, though condemned in a generall Councill, as is apparent from the fourth and last rule, which is:

If a doctrine be, as true in it selfe, so also clearly, and evidently by me apprehended to be so, and yet appeare generally to be false unto others, of what degree, order, or condition soever; never­thelesse it Commands absolute subscription, and assent of the mind without contradiction, without hesitancy, nay without so much as suspense of judgment. If the verity then of a doctrine be apparent, it must over-rule the assent of the understanding against the testimony of the whole world. For the testimony of men, of the wisest, holiest men, considered either apart, or assem­bled in a councill, admits, as allwaies of examination, and tryall by the ballance of the Sanctuary, and rules of right reason, so likewise of contradiction and denyall, when in it there is an ex­presse, and evident variation from either reason, or divine autho­rity. In such a cause we may lawfully, and safely dissent from it; allwaies provided, that it be not in an insolent manner, but with a reverend, child-like, and respectfull bashfulnesse.

But to goe on, if I am not to abstaine from assenting to a doc­trine manifestly true, because it appeares generally to others to [Page 76]be false, must I not yet abstaine from publishing, from spreading of it, either by writing or preaching?

For answer, thou must consider the generall nature and qua­litie of the doctrine, thus wrongly either accused, or suspected of falshood, and also of what use, and importance it is in regard of the present times, and places, wherein thou livest, and if it prove to be a doctrine either fundamentall, or at least of such weight and moment that from the publishing of it, will spring a greater good, more glory to God, and benefits to the Church then the trouble and disquiet it brings can be an evill, thou art then at no hand to conceale it, so should'st thou be unfaithfull both to God and his Church, and become accessary to the betraying, nay murther of the truth. Si de veritate scandalum sumatur (saith Gregory) melius est ut scandalum oriatur, quam ut veritas relinquatur. If scandall or offence be taken at a truth which the estate and exigence of those soules committed to a mans charge requireth him to publish, better suffer the whole world to be scandalized, than such a truth disadvantaged, either by de­niall, or but a cowardly smothering, and dissembling, thereof. ‘Que­madmodum enim’ (saith Calvin) ‘Charitati subjicienda est nostra libertas, Cal. lib. 3. Just. c. 12. Sect. 13. ita sub fidei puritate subsidere vicissim charitas ipsa de­bet: As our liberty is to be subjected to charity, so also our Chari­ty it selfe to faith's puritie.’

But now if it be a doctrine, either not fundamentall, but of a low­er rank and quality, wherein both orthodox writers, and prea­chers may vary and abound in their owne sense, without preju­dice to the foundation: or if it be of so small use, that upon its di­vulgement, it is not probable there will arise so much honour to God, and edification of the Church, as may preponderate those mischiefes, that hurly-burly, those tumults, and contentions in the Church, which in all likelyhood will ensue thereby, thou must then forbeare to vent it, either from presse, or pulpit; so shalt thou best consult for thine own private quiet, and publick peace. And we must follow after things that make for peace, and edification: Rom. 14.19. About such matters to be contentious, we have no custome, nor the Churches of God: and indeed about them to be contentious were the right pranke of a Schismatick: for not [Page 77]only he is a Schismatick (saith Non enim Schismaticus eò agnoscitur, quod fovet per­versum dogma, i nó conting it aliquando, ut sententia schis­matici hominis verissima sit, ta­men quia eam neque loco ne­que tempore debitis, nullá­que necessitate urget, Schisma­ticus est, & scandalum ob­jecit Dei popu­ [...]o [...]cum enim non agatur sa­lus Ecclesiae, ostendit se non adductum stu­dio gloriae Christi, sed suae potiu; existi­mationis Ec­clesiam tur­bâsse. Cameron in selectiora quaedam N. T. loca. Tom. 2. in Mat. c. 18. v. 7. Cameron) who maintaines a per­verse Tenet: a man may hold a very true opinion, and yet play the Schismatick, and give scandall unto the people of God by de­livering it in a rash, unpeaceable, and unseasonable manner, nei­ther in fit place, nor due time, no necessity urging thereunto▪ for seeing in determining of his opinion the glory of God, and weale of the Church lye not at the stake, he plainly shewes, that he hath troubled the Church, lead with desire of not Christ's glory, but his own Credit. I confesse indeed, that a controverted, and sus­pected truth even of this low quality may be peaceably, and mo­desty professed, and debated too in private, but a publick pro­mulgation thereof is at any hand to be forborne, non sub intuitu mali, sed minoris b [...]ni, not under the apprehension of any evill in the truth, but only as a lesser good, which will not consist with a greater, the tranquility of the Church; or if you will, the publick promulgation of such a truth is to be forborne, sub intuitu mali, etsi non simpliciter, tamen per accidens talis: under the apprehensi­on of evill, not in the controverted truth, but in the promulgation thereof, which though it be not simply evill, yet becomes acciden­tally so, to wit, by comparison, in respect of a greater good then re­quired, preservation of the generall quiet; with which for the present it cannot stand, unto the care of which it is opposed, though not primo & per se, yet ex consequenti connexione virtu­tum, as Suarez upon another occasion phraseth it. But I di­gresse.

To goe on to that appearance of evill in doctrines, which is in the expressions used in their proposall, a thing I could wish it were not to rife amongst many, who like no truth, unlesse delivered in hereticall terms; men wonderfully taken with the language of Ashdod, the Romish dialect. But let it be our care to refraine all words, and phrases, which carry an appearance of either heresie or schisme; for though they may, and are by us meant in an ortho­dox sense, yet carry they a shrewd shew of evill, make others jea­lous, and suspicious of our soundnesse, and therefore In rebus fidei verba debent esse ca­sta, & exacta. & quae rem ip­sam propriè ex­primant, & hae­reticis non praestent occasionem calumniandi. Pet. Martinez, lib. 12. de locis cap. 9. ad tertium. Canus although he will by no meanes assent, absolutely to that usuall [Page 78]saying; ex verbis inordinatè prelatis fit haeresis: yet he is content to approve of it, if it be moderated with this caution, secundum praesumptionem audientium, & judicum, qui per exteriora signa de­bent judicare de haeresi: if it be understood according to the sup­posall of hearers, and judges, who ought and indeed can judge of heresie onely by outward signes. Between a minister and Po­pery let there be a great Chasma, a distance as wide as between heaven, and earth, nay heaven, and hell: yet if his phrase do but smell of Popery, if his words, though not his meaning, trench neer upon it, men will presently exclaime that he hath a Pope in his belly, at least that he sounds for a Parley, and thinks upon condi­tions of peace with the Romish harlot. And besides as this sus­picious complying in phrase, and language with the known er­rours of Popelings, or other novellers, and corrupt teachers grieves the setled and judicious, so farther it staggers weaklings, con­firmes and hardens aliens, and Apostates: rather opens than stops the mouthes of gain-saying carpers, and sooner disadvantageth the truth, than converts an adversary. So farre is it from effecting the usually pretended end, reconciliation; as that to use the similitude of our Saviour, Mat. ch. 9. v. 16. like the putting of a new peece of cloth unto an old garment, it maketh the rent worse, and wider. There goeth a manuscript from hand to hand, said to be penned by a learned Dr San­derson. Doctor of this Church, where­in (that amidst notwithstanding all the variety of opinions there may be yet preserved in the Church the unity both of faith, and cha­rity) private men are advised in their own writings to observe formam, sanorum verborum, and to abstaine not onely from suspected opinions, but as much as may be also from phrases and speeches obnoxious to misconstruction and exception.

For first, it is not enough, much lesse a thing to be gloried in, for a man to be able by subtilty of wit, to find loop-holes, how to evade, and by colourable pretences, to make that, which through heat of passion, or violence of opposition hath falne from him unadvisedly, to seeme bow­soever defensible. But he should have a care to suffer nothing to passe from him, whereat an ingenious and dispassionate adversary (though dissenting from him in opinion,) might yet have cause to take distast, or exception.

And besides, it were a thing of dangerous consequence in the Church, [Page 79]if every man should be suffered to publish freely whatsoever might by some straine of wit be made capable of a good construction, if of it selfe it sounded ill, or suspiciously. For so many erroneous, unhappy noti­ons implicitly and virtually serving to the patronage and protection of Schisme or heresie, might be cunningly conveighed into the minds of men, and impressions thereof insensibly wrought in their hearts, to the great damage and distraction of the Church.

This last reason for the substance you may meet with in Aqui­nas 2. 2 dae. q. 11. a. 2. where (having told us out of Hierome, ex verbis inordinatè prolatis fit haeresis: that by unwary irregular ex­pressions, by words disorderly spoken, the most dangerous here­sies have often taken their first rise, and originall) he afterwards gives us the reason hereof: Similiter enim per verba quae quis loqui­tur, suam fidem profitetur: est enim confessio actus fidei: & ideo si sit inordinata locutio circaea quae sunt fid [...]i, sequi potest ex hoc corrupti [...] fidei: Ʋnde Leo Papa quâdam Epistolâ ad Proterium Episcopum Alexandrinum dicit, quod inimici crucis Christi, omnibus & verbis nostris insidiantur & syllabis, si ullam illis vel tenuem occasionem de­mus, quâ Nestoriano sensui nos congruere mentiantur. Likewise a man professeth his faith by words, which he speaketh; for con­fession is an outward act of faith, and therefore, if there be but an inordinate speech about matters of faith, the corruption of faith may hereupon ensue.

Whence Leo the Pope, in a certaine Epistle unto Proterius Bi­shop of Alexandria saith, that the enemies of Christ's Crosse lye in waite for all our words, and syllables, if in them we give any the least occasion, upon which they may faine that we comply with Nestorianisme. Hence is it that Aquinas himselfe having proposed this question, whether or no this proposition be true, Christ is a creature in his answer thereunto tells us, first in generall, cum hae­reticis nec nomina debemus habere communia, ne corum errori favere videamur, then more particularly, unto the question; that the Ar­rian hereticks have said that Christ is a creature, and lesse than the Father, in regard not onely of the humane nature, but also divine person, and therefore resolves, that lest we should seeme to coun­tenance their errour, we must not say absolutely that Christ is a Creature, and lesse than his Father; but onely with this limitation, according to the humane nature.

Ariani autem-heretici Christum dixerunt esse creaturam, & mino­rem Patre, non solùm ratione humanae naturae, sedetiam ratione divi­nae personae, & ideò non est absolutè dicendum, quod Christus sit Cre­atura, vel minor Patre, sed cum determinatione, scilicet secundum hu­manam naturam. Nay not only Aquinas, but generally all the Schoolmen, and Civilians too, are so precise in this particular, as that among the degrees of damnable propositions are ranked by them not only propositions down rightly hereticall, or erroneous, but also Propositio scandalosa, quae etiam malè sonans, seu pi­arum aurium offensiva, ap­pellatur, quae praebet occasi­onem ruinae auditoribus, hoc est facili­tatem cadendi in haeresin, ut funt multae propositiones, quae licet cum modificatione adjuncta, sunt verae, per se ta­men & absolu­ [...]è sine modifi­catione prola­ [...]ae videntur favere proposi­tionibus haereticalibus. Ut si quis assereret simpliciter Patrem majorem Filio, & Deum in in­carnatione factum creaturam, & similes, quae magis sunt exponendae, quàm extendendae. Ar­ [...]oldus Albertinus de agnoscendis assertionibus Catholicis & hereticis. quaest. 60. Propositio hae­esin sapiens, aut malè circa ea, quae ad fidem pertinent, sonans, est illa quae in prima significatio­ [...]e, quam verba prima facie ostendunt, sensum habet haereticum, quamvis piè intellecta sensum liquem habet verum. Alphonsus à Castro de justa haereticorum punitione: cap. 3. propositio sapiens haeresin, propositio male sonans, every proposition, that doth but smell, that hath but a smack of heresie, that sounds but ill or suspiciously; and such are all propositions, that in the first signification, which their words at first blush seeme to import, have an hereticall sense; all propositions, that of them­selves, that is, uttered absolutely without any explanation, or quali­fication, seeme to favour or countenance hereticall propositions, all though they be capable of a good construction, and with many cautions, limitations, and restrictions might passe for currant. And therefore was it, that the Councill of Basil condemned this pro­position, Christ sins daily, because taken properly tis false and against the faith, although perhaps it may be freed from errour, if ex­pounded in a unproper sense, thus; Christ sinneth daily, not in himselfe, but his members. Explicatur optimè, modo suprâ tacto de propositione aequivocá, quae in proprio aliquo ensu, potest esse haeretica, & in alio etiam propriè Catholiea, nam illa absolutè, & sine distincti­one, vel declaratione prolata merito dicitur male sonans, in quo distinctio alia adh [...]beri potest. Nam quaedam propositio diciturab extrinseco malè sonans, alia ab intrinseco. Ab extrinseco [...]catur, quando suspicio, vel malus sonus, non ex propositione nude sumpta, sed cum circum­antiis personae, loci, aut temporis oritur. Suarez de triplici virtute Theologica tract. de fide isp. 19. Sect. 7. Dicendum igitur est, quod propositio sap [...]ens haeresin illa est, quae quamvis non opareat haeresis manifesta, quin potius aliquando poterit habere aliquem bonum sensum, tamen [...] quibusdam circumstantiis, vel ex parte afferentis, vel ex temporum calamitate, faporem quen­ [...]m habet haeresis, & suspicionis judicio prudentum & sapientum, id est, suspicionem quandam [...]ajorem vel minorem pro qualitate circumstantiarum. Bannes. Suarez saith, that if an equivocall [Page 81]proposition having two proper senses, one Cath [...]lick, another hereticall be delivered absolutely without any distinction, or decla­ration, in which sense 'tis meant, it is then deservedly said to be propositio malè sonans. The same author goeth on and tels us, that a proposition is said to be malè sonans, not onely ab intrinseco, but also ab extrinseco when the suspicion or ill sound thereof ariseth not from the proposition taken nakedly, as it is in it selfe, but considered jointly with the circumstances either of the person delivering, or of the time and place, in which it is delivered. Omitting his instance, I will give you others more true, and savory. The word Sacrament with the ancients sounded no other, than an holy significant rite; in those times then to have called matrimony, orders, &c. Sacra­ments, had been (it may be) without all manner of offence. But now, since the Church of Rome hath peremptorily determined, that therebe Seaven Sacraments properly and strictly so called, seaven outward and sensible signes, which by divine institution, have an­nexed unto them the promise of justifying grace. He that shall now terme any thing a Sacrament, besides Baptisme, and the Lords Supper, renders himselfe thereby justly suspected.

In the writings of the Fathers, the words of satisfaction, and merit have been of large use. Satisfaction signified every bitter afflictive acknowledgment, or penitentiall mortification of our sins, whereby we prevent, and turne away God's hand, and punish­ments for them. Merit, denoted onely obtaining, procurement, impetration, and according to this acception of the words, a man might safely have heretofore affirmed, that our prayers, almes, and other good works are satisfactory and meritorious. But now since some of the Romanists have wrested these sayings of the Fathers unto a worse sense, than they were uttered in: and hereupon taught that works are properly satisfactory, just com­pensations for our sins, wherein we make recompence unto Gods wronged justice, and redeeme our selves at least from temporall punishments; that works are strictly and properly meritorious of eternall life, deserving and earning it ex condigno, in the way of condigne wages; as if there were an equality or due proportion between it and them, without all regard unto Gods gracious ac­ceptance of them; he that shall now averre these propositions, may without breach of charity be justly thought to embrace [Page 82]them in that false, and erroneous sense, which our adversaries the Papists take them in.

Hitherto concerning doctrinall appearance of evill, in Doctrines. Practicall appearance of evill in manners or matters of practise next followes; Dr Scla­ter in locum. and that may againe be divided into Reall or I­maginary. The distinction is the same with that of others. Ali­quid habet speciem mali, vel p [...]r se ex conditione operis, vel per accidens ex aliorum interpretatione.

The difference between these must be well weighed, else we may as fouly be mistaken, as once the Pontickes were, who, as Florus tells us, fighting in a night with the Romans, per errorem lon­gius cadentes umbras suas quasi hostium corpora petebant: mistaking their own shadowes projected long as at the going downe of the Moone, laid at them as at the very bodies of their enemies: or as the Romans themselves, were, unto whom when Tiberius Gracchus touched his head with his hand to exhort the people, as by a signe, to stand upon their guard for their lives, it seemed as if he deman­ded a diademe. Cùm plebem ad defensionem salutis suae manu ca­put tangens, praebuit speciem regni sibi, & diadema poscentis, Flor. lib. 3. cap. 14. To distinguish them then, a reall appearance of evill flowes per seex natura operis, from the nature, and condition of the fact it selfe: when that of it selfe, and in it's own nature, is a very pro­bable signe of evill: and so it is, when it is ordinarily done for an evill end, when it is per se an occasion of Sin in our selves, and of scandall unto others: it must be occasio data, non accepta.

First, when naturally, and not onely casually, it may prove, and ordinarily doth prove an occasion of an incentive to sinne in our selves.

Secondly, when it becomes an occasion of scandall or offence, of scandall tending unto sinne in the weake, of scandall tending unto sorrow and vexation in the strong and discreet:

Such an appearance is there of adultery, in a mans lying in bed with another mans wife, though he hath no carnall knowledg of her.

Talis sc. ma­terialis usus circumcisionis semper habet speciem mali, non ex acci­dentia tantum, sed quasi per se supposito Eccesiae stau. Suarez. de le­gibus lib. 9. cap. 14. Such an appearance of Judaisme, (than which few greater evills) is there in the (c) circumcision of those Aethiopian Christi­ans, that live under Prester John. Such was the appearance of evill in Christians sitting at meat in the Temples of Paganish Idols, in [Page 83] Naamans bowing himselfe in the house of Rimmon, however Ca­jetan excuse him with a pretty distinction, inter genu flexionem imitativam, & genu flexionem obsequii. And such also is that ap­pearance of evill in a good mans intimate fellowship with bad ones, in a true and formall compliancy with aliens in the signes of profession. As in a Protestants presence at the superstitious, and Idolatrous worship of Papists, or in any other complementings with them in the expression of that worship.

Now no actions that have this reall appearance of evill are up­on any pretext whatsoever to be ventured upon, and for this I shall give two Reasons.

First, because in them there is allwaies a scandall given, an active scandall, as is plaine from Aquinas his definition of scandall, 2. 2dae. qu. 43. art. 1. Scandalum (saith he) understand it of an active scandall) est dictum vel factum minùs rectum praebens alteri occasionem ruinae. For a word or fact is Dicitur autem minùs rectum, & non absolutè ma­lum, aut non rectum, ad de­notandum, posse etiam scandali ratio­nem esse in actu, qui non sit undequaque pravus, sed tan­tum habeat spe­ciem mali; aut qui duntaxat ratione effectus sc. ruinae alte­rius, malus sit, licet alioqui per le omnino sit bonus. Itaque quamvis per illam particulam, minus rectum sig­nificetur in praedicta [...]finitione actus, qui ex aliquo capite careat debitâ rectitudine, atque ade [...] simpliciter sit non rectus, seu pravus, tamen propter dictam rationem meritò hoc ipsum signifi­catur illo modo dicendi, scil: minus rectum. Non enim id duntaxat minus rectum appellati so let, quod simplicitet rectum est, licet non adeò, comparatione altetius; sed etiam id, quod prop­ter aliquem defectum est minus rectum, quam simpliciter debet, & quod ideo est absolutè, & simpliciter malum. Juxta illud D. Dionysii cap. 4 de divinis nominibus: Bonum consurgit e [...] integra causa, malum autem ex quocunque defectu. Greg: de Valentia Comment: Theo [...] Tom: 3. Quest. 18. Punct. 1. minus rectum some way or other irregular, not onely when tis a sin in it selfe, but also when it hath a manifest shew of sin; for the bare and naked shew of sin may (praebere alteri occasionem ruinae) morally lead another to sin, may be the morall cause of anothers sin, as well as sin it selfe; the actions, in which there is onely an appearance of sinne, may yet provoke another unto the practise of sin, as the performance of the sinfull action it selfe: To see a Christian sitting at meat in an Idols Temple, at an Idols feast, may tempt a raw convert unto Idolatry, as well as to behold him kneeling before an Idoll. For this I could muster up the suffrages of all the schoolmen, a ge­neration yet of divines, that are none of the precisest either in positions, or practise. But I will not trouble my Reader with the testimonies of above two of them. Opus malum (saith Suarez) vel habens speciem mali, quod de se inductivum est ad pecc an­dum, vitandum est; naem illud est verè scandalum activum, ut patet ex [Page 84]definitione ejus, moraliter enim inducit hominem ad malum. Quod vero non operteat esse verè malum, sed satis sit apparere, patet, 2 Thes. 5.22. 1 Cor. 12. Ratio est, quia tenemur rectè operari, non solum coram Deo. sed etiam coram hominibus. Secundo, quia cum opus ha­bet speciem mali, inducitur proximus ad malum opus, non solum suâ malitiâ, sed etiam ex vi mei operis, & ex quadam fragilitate. Suarez, op. de triplici virtute tract. 2 disp 10. sect. 3. Quotiescunque datur occasio scandali (saith Vasquez) malo opere, aut habente speciem mali, semper imputatur scandalum tribuenti occasionem, sive scandalum se­quatur ex malitiâ, sive infirmitate, aut ignorantiâ. Tunc enim qui praebet occasionem scandali, peccat peccato scandali activi, quod nullâ ratione licet. Ratio vero est, quia nullâ justâ aut rationabili causâ excusari potest aliquis â peccato, qui coram alio peccat, vel exercet opus habens speciem mali: & ideo jure optimo dicitur tribuere occasio­nem peccandi, quia tale opus ex se occasio est peccandi. Vasquez opusculis Moralibus. tract. de scandalo.

But now (to proceed unto a second reason) besides the evill of scandall in actions, that carry a reall appearance of evill, there is also reductivè the guilt of that evill of which they have an appea­rance; for that command, which forbids such a sin, forbids all the shewes and occasions of it, all the preparatives unto it; as is usu­ally observed by Commentators upon the Decalogue. Thus the prohibition of adultery takes in all the causes, and signes thereof: by this rule to sit at meat in the Idols Temple, at the Idols feast, was not onely a sin of scandall, as being a provocation unto, and so a participation of the sin of Idolatry in weake and ignorant spectators; but also a sin of Idolatry by way of reduction, a sinne against religion, a transgression against that worship, which God requireth. Suarez expresseth this, though somewhat obscurely, yet more fully: first he layeth down this conclusion; Quando ali­quis indirectè inducit alium ad peccandum per actionem malam, vel habentem speciem mali, etiam incurrit specialem malitiam scandali: against this conclusion he propounds amongst others this objecti­on; Sequitur eum &c. per actionem non malam, sed habentem speciem mali contrahere duas malitias. Ʋnam scandali contra charitatem: aliam illius speciei peccati, ad quam proximus inducitur. Consequens est contra divum Thomam hic, et sumitur ex Paulo primo ad Corinth. 8 & 12. Ʋbi manducantem scandalosè sacrificata Idolis, non repre­hend [Page 85]reprehendit, ut Idolatram, sed ut scandalosum. Sequela autem patet, quia ille est causa talis malitiae, ergo incurrit illam. Unto this his answer is: that an action onely evill in appearance may have a double obliquity in it, to wit, that of scandall, and that of which it is an appearance, unto which it induceth Concedo, inquit, ibi esse duas malitias. Est tamen advertendum, dupliciter contra aliquam virtutem peccari. Ʋno modo per se primo, quia directe agitur contra objectum ejus, vel circumstantias illi ex se debitas, & hoc modo actio solum mala in apparentia, nullam virtutem offendit. Alio modo pec­cari potest tantum ex consequenti connexione virtutum. Nam ut dictum est 1.2 quia actus virtutum sunt undique boni, quando hic, & nunc actus alicujus virtutis potest esse contrarius alteri virtuti, (quamvis in suo objecto, vel circumstantiis quasi intrinsecis non habeat defectum) non potest prudenter fieri, atque adeo neque est actus virtutis simpliciter, & ideo participat malitiam contrariam utrique virtuti, sed alteram per se, alteram quasi p [...]r accidens, & consequenter. Sic etiam propria malitia scandali ferè semper fundatur in alia malitiâ, tamen ex consequenti, & per accidens, semper habet aliquo-m [...]do illam conjunctam ex defectu circumstantiae debitae, saltem propter aliam vir­tutem, propter quam non laed ndam prudenter cessandum ess [...]t ab opere hic, & nunc, habente speciem mali, quamvis ex se esset alias honestum. Suar: de triplici virtute Theolog. tract. de charitat: disp. 10. Sect. 2. 'Tis of this reall appearance I believe that the Apostle is here one­ly to be understood. But yet to make this our discourse com­pleate I shall also take in consideration that appearance of evill in an action which is but imaginary; and this is ascribed there­unto from our own, or others misconceits and censures thereupon.

First, from our own. And here, if a man be in his own Consci­ence stedfastly, fully and firmely perswaded, that such an action is evill and unlawfull, which yet in truth is not so, but lawfull: what ought he to doe?

These times afford many instances by which we may exemplify this case: There are many Sectaries that professe they thinke it unlawfull to frequent the publique Ordinances, to pay tithes unto the Minister, Contribution unto the Magistrate; and there be some, that thinke it unlawfull to sweare in any cause, though cal­led thereunto by a Magistrate; and yet all these particulars are not onely things lawfull, but bounden duties.

For resolution we must premise two things.

First, we must take into our consideration, the nature of the action, and the condition of the person that harbours this misper­swasion of the action: the action in its nature may be either ne­cessary, or indifferent and arbitrary: and the person misjudging it may be, in respect thereof, either sui juris, or determined therein by the lawfull command of some superiour power.

Secondly, we must with Durand distinguish betwixt ligar [...], and [...]bligare, to bind, and to bind unto. Sciendum (saith he) lib. 2. dist. 39. qu. 5. quod aliud est ligari, aliud obligari, qui [...]n. obligatur debet, vel tenetur, id facere ad quod obligatur, nec quantum est ex parte suâ aliter absolvitur ab obligatione. Ligari autem dicitur m [...]raliter, qui sic dispositus est circa aliquod agibile, quod non potest licitè proce­dere, prout exigit natura illius agibilis, ad modum illius qui ligatur corporalitèr, nec p [...]test procedere etiam in rectâ & planâ via. Con­science is said obligare to bind unto, when 'tis a bounden duty to doe or not doe what it dictates, when tis not onely a sin to do any thing against it, but also not to doe according to it: Conscience is said ligare meerly to bind, when 'tis a sin as to act againstit, so al­so to act according to it.

Capreolus and others that follow him quarrell with this distinction that Durand puts between ligare and obligare: But Capreclus himselfe laith down a distinction of obligation, that will come unto all one: Obligatio (inquit) potest referri ad du [...]. Primo ad conformandum se tali conscientiae, & ad nullo modo discordandu [...] illi, & ad non deponendum eam, secundò ad non discordandum [...]i, sed non ad confermandum, nec ad non dep [...]nendum. Primò strictissimè sumi­tur, & illo modo Conscientia erronea non obligat. Secundò sumitur largè, & illo modo intelligitur conclusio nostra, quod conscientia erro­nea obligat, quia habens eam tenetur non discordare illi, ita quod illa stante faciat oppositum, quod illa dictat. Nec tamen tenetur se con­formare illi, nec tenetur eam conservare, immo potest, & tenetur eam dep [...]nere. Here his obligation largely so called differs nothing from Durand's ligation; The Controversy then is but a strife of words; and therefore not worthy the heeding.

These things thus premised I shall lay downe foure Conclu­sions. First Conclu­sion.

First, if the action in its nature be not necessary, but indifferent, [Page 87]and arbitrary, and the person mis [...]udging it, be in respect thereof sui juris, not determined therein by the command of any superiour power. Why then he is bound in Conscience during this his o­pinion, to abstaine from the action. (For we suppose it indifferent; and a man may lawfully forbeare action where there is no neces­sity of doing, à licitis po [...]est absque p [...]ccato abstineri.) We suppose it, although indifferent, yet against Conscience: and whatsoever is done repugn [...]nte consci [...]ntiâ, with a setled reluctancy of a mans own judgment, and conscience against it, cannot be of faith, and whatsoever is not of faith is sinne See Dr San­derson in lo­cum.Rom. 14.23. That is whatso­ever action is done without a firme perswasion of the lawfulnesse thereof, let it be quoadrem, and essentially, in it selle lawfull, nay ne­cessary, yet it becomes qu [...]ad hominem and accidentally evill, unto him it is sin. Now that action may lawfully, must necessarily be forborne, that can be omitted, but cannot be committed with­out sinne.

But now on the contrary (to come to a second Conclusion) if ei­ther the action be in its nature necessary, Second Con­ciusion. or the person entertai­ning this misprision thereof be justly enjoined performance of it by some superiour power, that can herein lawfully challenge obe­dience from him by a law, not me [...]rly p [...]nall; and so the action too, though indifferent for its nature, be yet in its use, and unto him become necessary. Why then this misperswasion of its un­lawfullnesse cannot bind to abstaine from it; for so it should ob­lige unto either omission of a necessary duty, or else disobedience unto lawfull authority, both great sinnes. And n [...]lla est obligatio ad illicita. There is no obligation unto things unlawfull can lye upon us.

For, first, obligation is onely to that which is a morall good; now nothing unlawfull can be a morall good; and therefore an erroneous Conscience cannot oblige unto it.

Secondly, no command of an inferiour power can oblige, if it be contrary to the command of a superiour power; But if an er­roneous Conscience should bind unto things unlawfull, it should oblige against the commandement of God, whose Vicer [...]y Consci­ence is, Indeed Conscience is the next rule of voluntary acti­ons: But

First, it is a well-informed conscience that ought to be this rule, [Page 88]the will is not bound to follow a blind guide: for then being of it selfe coeca potentia, it must needs fall into the ditch.

And secondly, conscience is but a subordinate rule unto the Law, and Word of God; and therefore its power to oblige is derived there from: it obligeth not therefore, but by vertue of some command of Gods Law, or word; and Gods Law cannot command things un­lawfull, for then it should clash with it selfe. (f) Diversi­modè amen li­gat Conscien­tia recta & e [...] ­ronea, rect [...] simpliciter li­gat & per se, erronea aute [...] secundum quid & peraccidens. Dico autem rectam ligare fimpliciter, quia ligat abso­lutè & in om­nem eventum. Sienim aliquis conscientiam habet de vitando adulterio istam conscientiam sine peccato non potest deponere, quia in hoc ipso quòd eam deponeret errando graviter peccaret. E [...] autem manente non potest praeteriri in a ctu sine peccato. Unde absolute ligat & in omnem eventu [...]: sed conscientia erronea non ligat nisi secundum q [...]id, & sub conditione. I [...]le enim cui dictat conscientia, quod tenetur fornicari, non est obligatus ut fornicationem sine peccato dimit [...]ere non possi [...], nisi sub hac con­ditione, si talis conscientia duret. Haec autem conscientia removeri potest absque peccato, un­dè talis conscientia non obligat in omnem eventum. Potest enim aliquid contingere, scilicet Depositio conscientiae, quo contingente aliquis ulteriùs non ligatur. Quod autem sub condi­tione tantum est, secundum quid esse dicitur. Dico etiam quod conscientia recta per se ligat [...] erronea vero per accidens. Quod ex hoc pate [...], qui enim vult vel amat unum propter alterum, illud quidem propter quod amat, reliquum per se amat, quod verò propter aliud, quasi per acei­dens, sicut qui vinum amat propter dulce, amat dulce perse, vinum autem per accidens. Ille autem qui conscientiam erroneam haber credens esse rectam, aliàs non erraret nisi inhaereret conscientiae erroneae propter rectitudinem, quam in ea credit esse, inhaeret quidem per se loquen­do rectae conscientiae, sed erroneae quasi per accidens [...]in quantum hanc conscientiam quam cre­dit esse rectam, contingit, esse erroneam. Et exinde est quod per se loquendo ligatur à con­scientiâ rectâ, per accidens vero ab erroneâ. Capreol: Ex Aquinate Lib. 2. sent. Dist. 39. Quest. 1. Ar. 1. Nemo potest obligari ad malum sub rationem mali, sed benè ad malum, quod invincibiliter judicatur esse bonum, & quod proponitur sub ratione boni. Nec conscientia obligat contra le­gem Dei per se formaliter, sed solum per accidens, & materialiter. Becanus Sum: Theol: Scho­last: T. 2. Tract. 1. chap. 4, Q. 7. Capreolus, Becanus, Raynaudus with many others resolve that however a right and well informed Conscience onely binds unto a thing per se formaliter & in omnem eventum; yet an erroneous conscience, denominated such from an invincible and involuntary errour, may oblige unto a thing materially, per accidens, sub conditi­one, and secundum quid. It obligeth per accidens as it is apprehen­ded and believed to be right, and well informed; so that an errone­ous Conscience is adhered unto, for the rectitude supposed to be in it. It obligeth sub conditione upon condition that such errour of Conscience lasteth: for it may be removed without sin: and when it is removed the obligation ceaseth; & then, that which obli­geth conditionally, obligeth onely sceundum quid, and not absolutely.

Unto this I have three exceptions.

First, they limit themselves to errour invincible and involunta­ry, which is not imputable or blameworthy.

This errour may be conceived to be; either in matter of fact, or in matter of rule.

Errour in matter of fact, as when Jacob mistooke Leah for Ra­chell; as when a poore subject, that cannot judge of the titles of primes, thinks a usurper to be his lawfull Soveraigne, or as when a man takes goods left unto him by his Parents to be truly his own, though perhaps a great part of them were gotten by fraud or oppression, without any knowledg of his: These and the like particulars are all impertinent unto our present purpose; and therefore I shall not stay upon the consideration of them.

Errour in matter of Law, right, or rule is againe twofold, either in regard of law naturall, or law positive. Now unto all that have actuall use of reason, The errour of the law of nature is vinci­ble, and voluntary; because the law of nature is sufficiently pro­mulgated unto them, it is written in their hearts, Rom: 2.15.

And we may say the same of Christians, that enjoy the plenary promulgation of the Gospell, and are capable of understanding it: for the Gospell sufficiently reveales all divine positives; so that a rationall man may know them, and is bound to know them; and Aquinas states it rightly. 1.2dae. q. 19. art 6. voluntas concordans ra­tioni erranti circaea, quae quis scire tenetur, semper est mala: If a man erre concerning such things, as he may know, and is bound to know, such an errour is (at least indirectè) voluntary, and sinfull, and cannot oblige.

A Second exception: Conscience hath no power to oblige, but what it deriveth from God: and therefore what it obligeth unto, God also obligeth unto: and God is the m [...]rall eause, and conse­quently the Authour of whatsoever he obligeth to: but he can­not be the morall cause, and authour of that which is sinne, and un­lawfull, either perse, or per accidens and therefore neither he, nor his deputy Conscience can oblige so much as per accidens unto that which is unlawfull.

A Third exception shall be the objection of Durand in the place above quoted: Sola vera notitia de re obligationem non t [...]llit, ed magis confirmat: sed vera notitia de eo quod errenea conscientia [Page 90]dictat, tollit obligation [...]m, ergo obligatio nulla fuit. To be well informed, and to have a true knowledg of a thing cannot take away any obligation to it; But to be well informed, and to have a true knowledg concerning that, which an erroneous Conscience dictates, takes away all obligation to it; Therefore there was never any such thing as an obligation to it.

The most considerable objection is that of Becanus [Sum: Theol. 2. part. p. 1. tom. 2. tract. 1. cap. 4.] Durandus concedit illum p [...]ccare, qui operatur contra hanc conscientiam: Ergo debet [...]tiam concedere, hanc conscientiam obligare. Nam ubi non est [...]bligatio, ibi nec peo­catum. Durand grants, that he sinneth who acts against an er­roneous Conscience: therefore he ought also to grant, that an erroneous conscience obligeth: for where there is no obligation there can be no sin.

But the answer hereunto is very easy by distinguishing concer­ning obligation, which is twofold either as touching the matt [...]r, or manner of actions. Though there be no obligation, as touching the matter of such actions, concerning which an erroneous Consci­ence dictates: yet there is a generall obligation as touching the manner of all actions, that they be done without the Contempt of conscience: and therefore in every action where conscience is contemned, sin is committed: Quaevis voluntas (saith Aquinas, 2dae. q. 19. art. 5.) à ratione five rect á five errante discordans semper est mala.

Which brings me unto my third conclusion. Third Con­clusion. Allthough this erroneous conceit of the unlawfullnesse of this action, suppos [...]d to be necessary either in its nature, or at least in its use, because lawfully commanded by authority, doth not obligare, that is, so bind, as that I must fol [...]ow it, yet it doth ligare, so intangle and per­plex, as that I cannot without sin oppose it, and for this I shall al­ledge these following reasons.

First, because whosoever goeth against his Conscience, (whe­ther ill or well informed it matters not) goes against the will of God, although not for the thing he doth, yet for the manner of do­ing it, although not mat [...]rially, yet formally, and interpretatively: be­cause whatsoever the Conscience dictates, a man takes for the will of God: each mans Conscience being a Deputy God to informe, and direct him. Looke as he who reviles, wounds, kills a pri­vate [Page 91]man, mistaking him for the King, is guilty of high treason against the King himselfe: so, he that 'thwarts the judgment of even an erroneous Conscience, fights against God, warres against Heaven: because what his conscience saies, he thinks to be the voice of Heaven.

Thus you see, that he, who acts against an erroneous Conscience in such an action, carrieth himselfe as disaffected towards God▪ for he knowingly adventureth upon that, which he thinketh will in­finitely displease him.

And in a second place: such an action is an argument of disaffecti­on towards that rule of our morall actions, which God hath ap­pointed: he that hath an erroneous Conscience, supposeth it to be right and well informed: and therefore, if he act against it, he slights that, which he takes to be the rule of his working: and therefore his action is, for the manner of it, lawlesse, and irre­gular. Velle ali­quid contrà Synteresin na­turalem ratio­nis [...]id est, con­tra primum ali­quod principi­um m [...]r [...]le à synteresi dicta­ [...]um, omnino est malum & peccatum. Sed qui vult id, quod ratio ju­dicat esse ma­lum & fugiendum, five id verè, five fallò judicet, vult aliquid contra synteresin: Ergò omnino peccat. Major est evidens. Adversatur namque id imprimis legi naturali, quae po­tiffimum sucet in principiis primis meralibus. Minor probatur. Nam principium illud pri­mum, scilicet, malum non est prosequendum, sed vitandum: inprimis vetat, ne quis, quantum in ipso est malum consectetur. Ut enim praeoepta naturalia affirmativa jubent inprimis ut homo, quantum in ipso est, bonum prosequatur; sic etiam praecepta negativa p [...]ohibent imprimis, nè homo quantum in ipso situm est, sectetur malum. Qui autem seu verè seu fal [...]è judicat ali [...] quid esse malum, & nihilominus illud prosequi vult, is hoc ipso, quantum in se est, sectatur ma­lum. Nam quod objectum ipsum per se sit revera bonum aut malum, hoc quidem non est in bominis voluntate situm, sed illud solùm, ut quod ipse malum judicat vel bonum, id vita­re, aut pro [...]equi velit. Quocirca qui judicans aliquid esse malum five ve [...]è, five falsè, illud nihi­lominus vult, is quantum in ipso situm est, vult malum, & proindè direc [...]è violat legem illam naturalem synteresis, quae id ipsum inprimis vetat. Greg. de Valentiâ tom. 2. disp. 2. q. 14 punct. 4.

Thirdly, in such an action there is a depraved, affection towards sin: and that in Morals is the fountaine of all ilnesse: If a mans conscience be right, and well informed, and he act against it, eve­ry one will grant, that such an action proceeds from the love of that which is sinne: and there is the same reason to say as much, of that action, which is against the dictate of an erring Conscience.

Besides these reasons I shall alledge Scriptures (to omit Rom: 14.23. allready spoken of) B [...]canus quotes also Rom. 14.14. To [Page 92]him that este [...]meth any thing to be uncleane, to him it is uncleane. The learned Dr Hammond alledgeth for the same purpose the 1 Cor. 8.7. For some with (h) Conscien­t [...]m Idol [...] vo [...] ­cit Aposto [...]us non sc [...]en [...]iam­qua quis rectè de sim [...]la [...]s sentiat:ut malè interpretatur & malè probat Cajetanus; ea in re singularis: sed judicium quo quis existi­met Idolum esse aliquid, id est a [...]icujus vit­tutis: ac proin­de cibos immo­latitios ab ido­lo pati muta­tionem ali­quam, sicque afficere & co. inquinare posse edentes. Quod quidem judici­um erroneum est: atque ex [...]o sequitur ut talem habens conscientiam, fi edat idolo­thytum, ed at illud quasi [...]ido [...] lothy [...]um: id est quali immutatum aliquo mo so per hoc quod idolis sacrificatum sit ut eius opinione tam ido­lum quà idolothytum sit aliquid. Et conscientia ipsorum, cum sit infirma, polluitur. Illativè pats haec exponenda est: ut sensus fit [...]atque ita animus eorum erronea hujusmodi conscientia imbutus, cum sit infirmus, eo quod scien [...]ta, qua fidem unius Dei quam habe, tapplicet ad particulates conclusiones, ut suprâ dictum est, polluitur peccato: dum videlicet contra conscientiam quam idolothyto habent, existimantes edentes contaminari, de illo edunt. Estius in locum.Conscience of the Idoll, i e. b [...]ing re­solved in mind that it is not lawfull to eat or taste of any [...] or [...], part or portion of the Idol-feast, (whether [...], at the idol table, or having bought it at the shambles (as it seems was the fashion of those [...], to be sold there at second hand, chap. 10.25.) accounting it unlaw­full to eat any meat consecrated to that use, do yet eat that which is of this nature, and by so doing, their weake i. e. uninstructed Conscience, is polluted, i.e. they sin against their Conscience, do that which they are perswaded they may not doe, which although it be never so innocent and harml [...]sse thing in it selfe (an Idoll being simply nothing) yet to them which do it, when they thinke it unlawfull (and all have not knowledge, saith he in the beginning of the verse, i. e. are not sufficiently instructed in their duty) it is pollution or sin.

I shall proceed unto the fourth, and last conclusion. The only way then for a man to rescue himselfe out of these difficulties is to rectify his Conscience, to depose, and correct the errour thereof, so he shall escape contempt of the judgment of his own Consci­ence on the one hand, and breach of either Gods or mans lawes on the other.

This Rayunaudus (from whom I know none do dissent) expres­seth as followeth [Moral. disc. dist. 4. q. 3. art. 1. n. 247.] Ʋnum igi­tur illud subsidium superest, ut judicium de malitiâ vincibilitèr er­rans, abjiciatur: Si enim neque adhaerere ei licet, ut primo loco mon­stravimus: neque illi obsist [...]re, ut nunc diximus; non aliud superesse po­test, quàm ut homo errorem depellat, quod posse supponitur, alinmque de malitiâ sensum induat: alioqut quocunque se vertat, in culpâ erit.

An imaginary appearance of evill issues, Secondly, from the sup­posals [Page 93]of, not only our selves, but others that censure it, whose judgments are either misled by ignorance, and weaknesse, or else blinded through pride and prejudice: such was that in the moving of Hannah's lips, not afforded by her fact, but only fastned on it by old Eli his hasty censoriousnesse: no other appearance of evill was there in our Saviours healing the diseased, his Disciples pluck­ing and eating of the eares of corne on the Sabbath day; 'twas not grounded on their actions; but onely fancied by the Pharisees swelling uncharitablenesse. What other was that appearance of evill, with which the Gentiles charged the primitive Christians, lifting up of their hands in prayer, when they accused them for adoration of the Clouds? as appeareth by Tertullian, and by a Poet of their own, qui puras nubes & coeli numen adorant. Parker par [...] 2. pag 63.

This imaginary appearance of evill proceeds, from either sup­posals of willfull, or weake ones: The censures and supposals of wilfull, proud, and wicked ones, and the scandals thence arising, scandala Pharisaeorum, I determined (in my first Edition of this booke) that we might slight our warrant (said I) is our Saviour's president. Wh [...]n his Disciples told him, that the Pharisees tooke offence at his speech, he made no reckoning thereof, but answered, let them alone, Matth. 12.13, 14. and we, warranted by his example, may th [...]n be secure and regardlesse of many calumnies, and groundlesse exceptions against the gov [...]rnment, discipline, and ceremonies of our Church: for th [...]re hath been so much spoken and written concerning these subjects, as that the pretence of weaknesse is quite taken away from those that are capable of information.

First, here my censure of the non-conformists to be wilfull, proud, and Pharisaicall was very rash, and uncharitable: all that I can say in excuse for my selfe is: that when I wrote this, I was a very young man, and conformity vnto the Ceremonies established by Law was then generally embraced, without any of the least contradiction, for ought I knew; nay stoutly and zealously plea­ded for by men, whom I admired for the generall report that went of their sanctity, and Learning v.g. Dr John Burg [...]sse, Dr Sclater, Dr Sanderson and others: And then I had read but one side, being an utter stranger unto what the Inconformitants could say for themselves: and their adversaries represented their obje­ctions, and answer, to be so weaks: and ridiculous: as that 'tis no [Page 94]great wonder, that I was prejudiced against them: But, about the beginning of the long Parliament, being awakened with the generall complaint of the Godly against the Ceremonies, I began to thinke a new of the controversy, and out of my former pre­judice intended a full vindication of the discipline, and Ceremonies of the then Church of England: and in order here­unto I read all such books of the non-conformist's as I could pro­cure: for I knew well by experience, that a controversy can never be well handled, unlesse all dissenting opinions thereabouts be weighed: but upon perusall of the non-conformists I soone found: that their adversaries most disingeniously misrepresented all that they said: that they resused to joine issue with them in the state of the Question: that they came not up to an orderly grapple with their arguments: and that they seldome regularly replyed un­to the solutions, which were given unto their objections: and this quickly produced an alteration in my judgment, and I be­lieve it will do so too in all, that will make such an impartiall search into the matter, as I have done.

But Secondly, to come unto the examination of that aspersion: that the scandals of the malitious, of Pharisaicall, and willfull spi­rits are not to be regarded, so as to forbear that, by which they are scandalized.

Gregory de Valentia: though he lay downe the affirmative in the generall, yet afterwards he delivers it to be his opinion: that we are to doe what lyeth in us to prevent the scandals of even Pha­risees, so it may be done without any great losse, or notable da­mage unto our selves. Existimo etiam, si quis cum nullo suo, vel pene nullo detrimento posset impedire scandalum proximi Pharisaicum, aliquid faciendo vel omittendo, debere ipsum facere. Nam ut tradi­dimus suprà in quaest. de correctione fraternâ, etiam is qui ex malitiâ [...]eccaturus alioqui est, est in aliquali necessitate spirituali, ac proinde ut (illic vidimus) debet ex charitate corrigi, vel aliter à peccati scanda­ [...]o impediri, quando [...]id sine detrimento proprio fieri potest. tom. 3. disp. 3. q. 18. punct. 4.

For the better stating of this Question, I shall premise some distinctions of scandall: a scandall is either active or passive.

An active scandall is in all such words, or deeds, as culpably oc­casion the fall of another into sin: and this is againe by Gregory [Page 95]de Valentia [tom. 3. disp. 3. q. 18. punct. 1.] rightly subdivided into that which is per se, and into that which is per accidens.

An active scandall perse is in such publique acts, as either by the expresse intent of the agent, or from their nature, and in themselves, are inductive unto sinne: and they are againe twofold:

First, all publick sinnes, or sinnes committed before another:

Secondly, all such publick actions, as carry a reall and manifest appearance of sin.

An active scandall per accidens is in such things, as are not in themselves, and in their own nature occasions of sin unto another: and this is, either in an unseasonable performance of positive duties, commanded by affirmative precepts, which are not necessary hic & nunc: or else by an unseasonable use of our liberty in things in­different.

A Passive scandall is the fall of another into sinne: and this (by the author but now mentioned) is subdivided into given, and taken.

Scandalum datum, a passive scandall given, is that which ariseth truly from the active scandall of another, as from its morall cause.

Scandalum acceptum, a passive scandall that is onely taken, is that which is onely the fault of the party scandalized, and cannot be imputed to any other, as a morall cause: the words or deeds of another may be an occasion of it, but not a culpable occasion.

I desire that these distinctions of scandall may be well heeded: for the want of Consideration of them hath occasioned a great deale of confusion in mens discourses about scandall.

First, many exclude from active scandall all things that scanda­lize per accidens: and then, what will become of those scandals Paul speaks against? Rom. 14.1 Cor. ch. 8. ch. 10.

Secondly, most confound a passive scandall with scandalum ac­ceptum, a scandall that is onely taken, and make them to be of an equall extent: whereas a passive scandall may de distributed into both given, and taken: if it be culpably both given, and taken: then it is scandalum datum: if it be culpably taken, and not culpably gi­ven, then it is scandalum acceptum.

Well, these distinctions being thus premised: I suppose it will be agreed upon by all sides: that the question is to be understood. First of active scandals, our scandalizing of the wicked: or Secondly, [Page 96](which comes all to one) of such passive scandals of them, as are given by us, as well as taken by them: Not, thirdly, of such passive scandals, as are onely taken by them, not given by us: for from the guilt of these we may wash our hands, so that there is no ob­ligation upon us to forbeare those things, by which they are in this manner scandalized.

My Conclusion shall be: that we are to eschew the active scan­dals, and consequently scandala passiva data, of the wicked, and malitious, those that are Pharisaicall and willfull spirits: this is apparent: First from Paul's prohibition of scandall, 1 Cor. 10.32. Give none offence neither to the Jewes, nor to the Gentiles, &c. he spake of unconverted Jewes, and Gentiles, such as were enemies unto the Christian faith: and the Jewes were of all men the most malitious enemies thereof.

Secondly, from our Saviours denunciation of a woe unto the world by meanes of scandall, Matth. 18.7. Woe unto the world because of offences; which undeniably is to be extended unto all sorts of men.

Unto these two arguments we may adde foure other, taken from, First, the distribution; Secondly, relation; Thirdly, effect; Fourthly, opposite of an active scandall.

First, from the distribution of an active scandall, and perusall of the members thereof: An active scandall (as I shewed but now) is distributed into scandalum per se, and per accidens: now there is no doubt, but that we are carefully to avoid such things as scandalize the wicked, and malicious per se, of themselves, and in their own nature, publick sins, or such words, and deeds as have a reall appearance of sin: all the question will be concerning such things as scandalize them onely per accidens, our duties, and our indifferencies: and by these they are frequently scandalized, and that out of an errone­ous opinion concerning their unlawfulnesse: in which regard the resolution will be pertinent unto the matter in hand.

First then: duties, that are commanded by affirmative precepts, may be forborne, hic & nunc, sometimes, and in some places, to a­voide the scandall of the wicked, and malitious. The usuall instances are in reproofe, admonition, punishment of sin, and the like: and this is warranted

First, by the precept of our Saviour, Matth. 7.6. Give not that [Page 97]which is holy unto the dogs: neither cast ye your pearles before swine: lest they trample them under their feet, and turne againe and rent you.

Secondly, by the example of David, Psal. 39.1, 2. I will keep my tongue with a bridle, while the wicked is before me: I was dumb with silence, I held my peace even from good.

Thirdly, by that rule in Divinity; affirmativa praecepta obligant semper, non ad semper; they alwaies bind, but not to alwayes: they do not oblige to doe the things required at all times, but only, when they are expedient for the glory of God, and the good of others: To reprove, and admonish sinners is a duty commanded by God, Lev. 19.17. Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thine heart: thou shalt in anywise rebuke thy neighbour, and not suffer sin upon him. But now this duty is not to be performed unseasonably, when tis likely to bring no glory to God, nor good unto others, but ra­ther likely to scandalize them. Thus every private man is not bound to runne into an ale-house, or taverne, there to reprehend a company of desperate drunkards, who would looke upon his re­prehension as an act of pragmaticalnesse, and insolency, and for it be ready to quoite him downe the Staires, or run him through with their swords: and as imprudent an act would it be, in Spaine, to run into their Churches, and there to cry against the Idolatry of the Masse; and in the Streets of C [...]nstantinople to declame a­gainst the impostures of Mahomet; for hereby we should scan­dalize them indiscreetly, and foolishly occasion them, as to blas­pheme our religion, so to cut us in peices.

Unto the forementioned rule in Divinity I shall adde another out of Logick; finis dat mediis amabilitatem: 'tis the end onely makes the meanes desireable: Now reproofe, admonition, punishment, and the like duties are enjoined as meanes, in order to the reformation, and bettering of others: when therefore they are not likely to conduce unto this end, but rather to oppose and hinder it, pru­dence in such a case dictates an abstinence from them. But let us take two exemplifications of this out of Aquinas 2. 2dae. q. 43. art. 7. The first is concerning the punishment of sin: dicendum, quòd poenarum inflictio non est propter se expetenda: sed poenae infli­guntur, ut medicinae quaedam ad cohibenda pecc. ta, & ideò in tantum habent rationem justitiae, in quantum per eas peccata cohibentur. Si [Page 98]autem per inflictionem poenarum manifestum sit plura & majera pec­cata sequi, tunc poenarum inflictio non continebitur sub justitia. Et in hoc casu loquiturAugust. in lib [...]o contra e­pistolam Par, men [...]an [...] docet, quod ubi schis­matis pericu­lum timetut, a punitione peccatorum cessandum est.August quando scilicet ex excommunicatione aliquorum imminet periculum schismatis: tunc enim excommunicati­onem ferre n [...]n pertinet ad veritatem justitiae.

The second is concerning brotherly reproofe: dicendum quod correptio fraterna ordinatur ad emendationem fratris: & ideò in tan­tum computanda est inter spiritualia bona, in quantum hoc consequi potest. Quod non contingit si ex correptione frater scandalizetur, & id [...]o si propter scandalum correptio dimittatur, n [...]n dimittitur spi­rituale bonum.

But to proceed next to the scandall of the wicked by our in­differencies: That we are to forbear things indifferent when they scandalize the wicked, and malitious. Parker [in his treatise of the Crosse part. 2. pag. 57.] proves by many instances: when the thing was indifferent, doth not our Saviour foregoe his liberty, to please the malicious? as when he paid tribute lest he should offend them? Matth. 17.27. They were malicious at Corinth, and seek [...]rs of occa­sion against Paul, that were likely to be offended by his taking of wages there: yet the thing, being no necessary duty, he thinketh it his duty to forbeare his power therein, 1 Cor. 9. The Heathens are malicious to take offence, when Christians go to Law for their own: yet, because going to law is not a duty necessary, it must be forborne, and Christians rather must loose their own, then give occasion of scandall to them, 1 Cor. 6. v. 6, 7. Unto these examples let me adde another (quoted by the same authour elsewhere) out of Ezra 8.22. I was ashamed (saith Ezra) to require of the King a band of Souldiers and horsemen, to help us against the enemies in the way: because we had spok n unto the King, saying, the hand of our God is upon all them for good, that seeke him, but his power and his wrath is against all them that forsake him Here for Ezra to have asked of the King of Persia, a Heathen, a band of souldiers, and horsemen for his safe conduct, was a thing lawfull: and yet he forbore it, lest he should scandalize him by begetting in him a suspicion, that that was false, which he had told him concerning Gods power, and justice.

A second argument is drawn from the relation of an active scan­dall: it is the morall cause of a passive scandall; so that he who scandalizeth another, partaketh of, and is accessary unto the sin of [Page 99]the party scandalized, and we are not to partake of, or be accessary unto the sins of any, 1 Tim. 5.22. We must have no fellowship with unfruitfull works of darknesse in any whomsoever, Eph [...]s. 5.11.

A third argument is fetcht from the effect of an active scandall: 'tis of a soule destroying nature, & so a kind of spirituall murther: destroy not him with thy meat for whom Christ died, Rom. 14.15. for meat destroy not the works of God, vers. 20. and who should not trem­ble at the guilt of the murther of any soul whatsoever? for there is no soule so wicked, but may (for ought thou knowest) be one of those, for whom Christ shed his most divine, and precious blood.

The last argument is taken from the Opposite of scandall, Cha­rity, and its act beneficence: We are to love all, even our most ma­litious, and persecuting enemies, Matth. 5.44. We are to do good unto all, though especially to the houshold of faith, Gal. 6.10. We are to exercise patience, and meeknesse, towards even those that oppose themselves, 2 Tim. 2.14, 15. And from this it will inevitably follow, that we are to scandalize none.

Here we have usually objected the example of our Saviour, who slighted the scandall of the Pharisees, Matth. 15.12, 13, 14. Then came his Disciples and said unto him: knowest thou that tho Pharisees were offended after they heard this saying? but he answered and said &c. let them alone they be blind leaders of the blind &c.

The objection concernes onely the scandalizing of them in things indifferent; and unto it I shall give an answer in the words of Parker part 2. part. 57. If this be all the warrant we have, not to forbeare in a thing indifferent for the malicious, then have we no war­rant at all, because the scandall (there) not cared for, is when the Phari­sees are offended, at his abstaining from their washings, and his prea­ching of a true doctrine: both of which were necessary duties for him to doe. And when he defendeth his healing on sabbaths, and his Dis­ciples plucking eares, upon this reason they are duties of necessity and charity, he plainly insinuateth, there is no defence for deeds unnecessary, when the malitious are scandalized.

In a second place I shall alleadge the Objection of the Schoole-men which by Gregory de Valentia is thus urged [Tom. 3. disp. 3. q. 18. punct. 4.] Nam qui non ex ignorantiâ, aut infirmitate, sed ex ma­litiâ scandalizatur, non laborat tali aliquâ necessitate spirituali, cui [Page 100]non possit ipse sine ope alterius proximi facile prospicere mutando pra­vam suam voluntatem. Ergo alter non tenetur tunc cum ali quo suo detrimento prospicere. Pharisees, the wicked, that are scandalized out of meere malice, and not out of ignorance, or weaknesse are not in any such spirituall necessity, or danger, but that they can easily provide for the safety, and indemnity of their soules, with­out the help or assistance of others, by changing their depraved will: and therefore others are not bound to incurre any detriment for the prevention of their scandall.

The answer unto this may easily be foreseen, for here is nothing but Jesuiticall dictates, that are alltogether proofelesse.

First, Pharisees, the wicked, that are scandalized out of malice, are in a greater spirituall necessity, and danger, then those, that are scandalized out of ignorance, or weaknesse: for, they are in the snare of the d [...]vill, taken captive by him at his will. 2 Tim. 2.16.

And therefore, Secondly, they are more unable to help them­selves, and prevent their own falling into sin; for their hearts are altogether destitute of any gracious habits: there is not in them the spirit, a renewed principle, to make head, or resistance against the flesh, the sinfull corruption of their natures: there is need then of all help possible to keepe them from falling: and all will be uneffectuall, unlesse God also put in his helping hand.

Whereas he talkes: that 'tis an easy matter for a wicked, and malitious man to provide against all danger, and need of his soule, by changing his perverse, and naughty will: this is a very grosse Pelagian conceite: for it ascribes that, unto the power of mans corrupt will, which can be wrought only by the omnipotent grace of God.

By this time (I hope) the Reader is sufficiently satisfyed that the active scandals of the most wicked, and malitious are not to be contemned.

But yet there remaineth a great difficulty in the point to be cleared; and that is, when an active scandall is committed towards them, in our duties, and indifferencies?

First, we actively scandalize them by our duties, when they are not rightly circumstanced, seasonably performed, in due time, and place: when they are not expedient unto those ends, for which God enjoyned them: now when this is, cannot be determined by [Page 101]any generall rule, but every one must be left to be guided by his spirituall prudence, and wisdome. [But for this hereafter I shall allot a peculiar digression by it selfe.]

Secondly, we actively scandalize them by our indifferencies, when 'tis probable they will occasion their passive scandall, their falling into sin; But now this generall rule is to be limited, and I shall give you three limitations of it.

The first limitation: this rule is to be understood, when the use of our indifferencies is likely to prejudice, and obstruct the propa­gation of the Gospell, and the forbearance of them will in all pro­bability conduce unto the advancement of the Credit of the Gos­pell, and not otherwise, ordinarily: upon this account, it would have been scandalous in Paul to have received maintenance from the Corinthians: but tis now unscandalous in Ministers, to accept, and challenge that maintenance, which is due unto them by the lawes of the land; for a generall forbearance thereof now would soone be followed with the utter ruine of the Gospell.

A second limitation: the forementioned rule is to be understood, when the forbearance of our indifferencies is likely to win upon the wicked, and malitious, so as to further their conversion, and not otherwise, when it onely exposeth unto their contempt, scorne, and derision, 1 Cor. 9.19, 20, 21, 22. Though I be free from all men (saith Paul) yet have I made my selfe servant unto all, that I might gain the more. And unto the Jews I became as a Jew, that Imight gain the Jewes: to them that are under the law, as under the law, that I might gaine them that are under the Law. To them that are without Law, as without Law (being not without Law to God, but under the Law to Christ) that I might gain [...] them, that are without Law. To the weake became I as weake, that I might gaine the weake: I am made all things to all men, that I might by all meanes save some. Here tis very remarkable, that Paul was made, in things indiffe­rent, all things unto all men, only in order to their salvation, to gaine their soules unto Christ; and why should we abridge our selves in the use of our liberty, in things that are of great expe­diency and conveniency unto us, when such a restraint of our li­berty, is not a probable means of reaching the said end? what reason can be given, why we should incommodate our selves, by forbearing all such indifferencies, that wicked men are scanda­lized [Page 102]at, when such forbearance is unprofitable unto their spiri­tuall good, and unlikely to bring them any jot the nearer unto God and Heaven?

A third limitation: the forementioned rule hath not place, when by the forbearance of our indifferencies, at which some wicked men are scandalized, there is incurred as great, if not a greater scandall, then that by their use: as when they are hereby confir­med, and hardned in their errour, and sinne; and others are hereby drawn into the like: prudenter advertendum est (saith Bernard) scandalum scandalo non emendari, qualis emendatio erit, si ut aliis scandalum tollas, alios scandalizas.

Thus you see how the rule is to be limited; and without such, or the like limitations, rigidly to presse it, would make against both the liberty, and peace of conscience.

First, against the liberty of Conscience: for it would in great part evacuate, and annull the grand charter of our Christian liberty in things indifferent, it would (as Peter saith in another case) put a yoke upon the neck of the disciples, which neither our Fathers were, nor we are able to beare, Acts 15.10. All things are lawfull for me (saith Paul) But I will not be brought under the power of any, 1 Cor. 6.12. But now if we must forbeare all our lawfull conveniences, at which wicked men perhaps will be purposely scandalized, we should be brought under the power of them, we should be little better then their slaves; and what an unspeakable, and intollerable vassalage would that bee? Quoties scandalum pa­ssivum alterius futurum est, ex malitia nullus debet omittere opus, quod nec est malum, nec h [...]qet speciem mali propter malitiam alteri­us, quando o­pus illud utile est temporaliter, vel spiritualiter operanti, quia non postulat ratio, ut malitiae alterius cum damno nostro succurramus, alias quilibet malitia sua possit nobis vocere, ut omitteremus opus nobis u­tile: malitia autem alterias nobis vocere non debet Lucssius Turrianus.

Secondly it would make against the peace of Conscience; for it would so perplex mens consciences with doubts, and uncertain­ties; as that they would hardly know when, and how to act in the use of things indifferent, for wicked men are very prone to be scandalized at the lawfull conveniencies of the Godly: and there is no doubt, but many are so wicked, as that they would of set pur­pose nourish, and cherish such scandals in themselves, if they thought that the Godly would hereupon forbeare such their con­veniencies: there be some people of such malevolent spirits against [Page 103]Ministers, as that they are scandalized at the decent apparell of them, & their wives, at their competent fare, and moderate house­keeping: and, if they must make the humor, and opinion of such men the rule of their walking in all things indifferent, it will be a very difficult matter for them to know how herein to carry them­selves▪ But this doctrine, that we are to forbeare all indifferencies, at which wicked men are scandalized, if it be unlimited would create perplexities, not only unto Ministers, but unto all sorts of men, especially such as have any thing due unto them from others: for grant this, and how often will a Landlord be at a losse to demand his rent? a Creditor his debts? and the magistrate his tribute or contribution?

Adde unto this, thirdly, that this doctrine, without limitation, will tend unto the overthrow of publick peace, and order, and brings in nothing but anarchy and confusion: for publique peace and order depends much upon the preservation of propriety: and upon what a ticklish point would propriety stand, if we must for­beare to exact, or receive all such temporals, at which wicked men are scandalized, that can be forborne without sin? unto what wrongs, and injuries would this expose such, as are well affected? for there be some men so wicked and malitious, as that they would be scandalized at their temporals for the nonce to deprive them of them. I shall conclude this particular with the resoluti­on of Aquinas 2. 2dae. q. 43. art. 8. Propter eos, qui sic scandala conci­tant, non sunt temporalia dimittenda: quia hoc & noceret bono commu­ni: dar tur enim malis rapiendi occasio, & noceret ipsis rapientibus, qui retinendo aliena, in peccato remanerent. Ʋnde Greg. dicit in Moral. Quidam dum temporalia à nobis rapiunt, solummodo sunt tolerandi: quidam verò aequitate servata prohibendi: non solae cura, nè nostra subtrahantur, sedne rapientes non suae, semet ipsos perdant.

But what if this imaginary appearance of evill flow from the sup­posall of a weak one, yet an holy one.

Why then it must be omitted, but with this caution, so it may be without sin, or as the ordinary glosse upon that 15 of Matth. v. 12, 13, 14. resolves it, Salvâ triplici veritate, vitae, Justitiae, Doctri­nae, so the threefold verity of life, justice, and doctrine be preserved safe: Nam per hanc triplicem veritatem (saith Gregory de Valentia), in­telligitur omnis rectitudo, & immunitas à peccato in actionibus huma­nis. [Page 104]Veritas namquevitae continetur in actionibus rectis, quas quis in seipso exercet convenienter rectae rationi, & appetitui recto, atque ad [...]o verè veritate quadam practicâ: Veritas autem justitiae rectis actionibus quae exercentur erga alterum similiter, convenienter rectae rationi, prout verè & absque peccato oportet: veritas denique doctrinae continetur fide verâ, & minimè erroneâ: By this triple verity is understood all the rectitude and freedome from sinne, that is in humane actions, for the verity of life is contained in those regular actions, which any one exerciseth in, and towards himselfe agreeably to right reason, and a well governed appetite, &c. The verity of justice consists in those regular actions, which are performed towards another, likewise sutably to right reason, as it behoveth, truely and with­out sinne.

And to conclude, the verity of doctrine consists in a true, regu­lar, and unerring faith: if these three verities be kept inviolate, every thing must be abstained from, upon which followes scanda­lum pusillorum, a scandall springing from either the ignorance, or weaknesse of our brother: but, because this resolution may be thought both too generall, and obscure (the Schoole-men them­selves sumbling much about its explication,) we will therefore goe to worke more distinctly, and particularly.

Consider whether or no the action, in which this appearance of evill is imagined to be, is necessary, or indifferent.

If it be necessary, and commanded by God, it must not be omit­ted, though all the world be offended: For evill must not be done, that good may come thereof.

Galvin. l. 3. Inst. c. 19. Sect. 13. Calvin, telling us, regard ought to be had of charity, limits how farre, usque ad aras, that is, so for our brothers sake we offend not God: I may adde, so for our brothers sake we endanger not our own soules. Scandalum quod oritur ex rebus perse bonis, & necessariis non licet evitare: quia non est faciendum malum, ut evenia [...] bonum. Bonum enim est expetendum, q [...]atenus bonum est, non expetitur autem quatenus bonum est, si malum simul expetitur. Nam qui expet [...]t bonum, abhorret à malo [...]qui autem ab­horret a malo, qua malum est, is nullo malo quodcunque sit, non potest allici. Jam vero nullae sunt res planè necessariae praeter eas quae sunt in se bonae, atque eiusmodi, ut nisi voluntas illas expetat, à suo vero, & proprio obiecto abhorret▪ it a que ut maximè tumultuetur mundus, tamen omnia, etiam extrema quaeque subeunda sunt, ut fiet illibata Dei gloria. Cameron, in electiora quaedam N. Test. loca▪ Tom. 2. in Math 18.7. To prevent scandall and sin in our brethren, [Page 105]we may not runne upon sin our selves: for a well ordered charity, as Aquinas gives the reason 2. 2dae. q. 43. a. 7. beginneth ever at home, making a man cheifly desire and endeavour the salvation of his ownsoule, and consequently more sollicitous to avoid sinne in himselfe then to prevent it in other: I may not then omit or neglect necessary duties, because to some they seem but needlesse niceties; I must not fly true holinesse, and the power of Godlin [...]sse, because unto the world it appeares but braine sick peevishnesse, and an irrationall precisenesse: others errour should not be se­conded, and countenanced with mine impiety, and disobedience.

Scandalum, nisi fallor, non bonae rei, sed malae exemplum est, aedi­ficans ad delictum, Bonae res neminem scandalizant, nisi malam mentem. Si bonum est modestia, verecundia, fastidium gloriae, soli Deo captans placere; agnoscant malum suum, qui de tali bono scandalizan­tur. Quod enim si & incontinentes dicant se à continentibus scan­dalizari, continentia revocanda est? Tertullian.

Here it will not be an unprofitable, A Digression. nor much impertinent di­gression, to give you the summe of what Thomas and his Interpre­rers say upon this Question, An bona spiritualia sint propter scan­dalum dimittenda?

Not to mention their rotten distinction between matters of counsell, and matters of precept, we will only out of them take no­tice, that there is a difference between transgression of a precept, and a temporary, partiall, or occasionall forbearance of the matter com­manded by a precept.

No pre [...]ept whatsoever, whether of the Law of Nature, or else but p [...]sitive, is, for eschewing the scandall of any whether weake, or malitious, to be truly broken or transgressed. And a precept is transgressed whensoever what is enjoyned in it is omitted at such a time, and in such a case, when all the particular circum­stances, which we ought to regard, being considered, we are tyed to all performance of it.

But yet however upon emergency of scandall, that which is commanded by some precepts Opera divi­ [...] praecepti af­firmativi, quod non pro semper obligat, debent aliquando deferri pro aliquo tempore, quando causarent pusillis scandalum, donee illi sint melius instructi, sed circumstantiae illius scandali sint mutatae, ita ut conting at praeceptum affirmativum etiam iuris quasi naturalis, aliquando hic & nunc non obligare propter concursum negativi praecepti de non ponendo offendiculo pusillis. Joan [...]es Wiggers. may pro hic & nunc, in some [Page 107]times, and at some places, be omitted, may for a while be forborne, untill the scandall taken thereby can be removed by information, or instruction, or untill the circumstances of the scandals be some way or other changed. Promulgation of a truth, and Christian re­proofe, are duties commanded by God, and yet are to be some­times abstained from, for scandals taken by, not onely the weake, but all malitious. Reprove not a scorner lest he hate thee, Prov. 9.8. Speake not in the cares of a foole, for he will despise the wisdome of thy words, Prov. 23.9. Give not that which is holy unto the dogges, nei­ther cast ye your pearles before swine, lest they trample them under their feet, and turne againe and rent you, Matth. 7.6.

To explaine this farther, recourse must be had unto that old and golden rule. Affirmativa praecepta semper obligant n [...]n ad sem­per. Affirmative precepts do alwaies bind, but not to alwaies: so that we are not bound to performe alwaies what they enjoine, but only loco & tempore debitis, when we have due time and place. Now as by the intercurrency of other circumstances, so especially by occurrence of the scandall of weake brethren there may not be opportunity, and seasonablenesse of doing what we are urged unto by some affirmative precepts; and so those precepts may pro his & nunc cease to be obligatory: For when the obligations of two precepts seeme to meete together at the very same time, that which is of greater obligation tieth us, and so consequently we are for the present freed from the obligation of the other. Now the negative precept of eschewing the scandall of the weake is more obligatory than many affirmative precepts; and therefore (to use the words of Malderus,) contingit aliquando praeceptum naturale affirmativum, hic & nunc non obligare, propter concursum negativi praecepti naturalis de vitando scandalo pusillorum: For example, vindicative justice binds a magistrate to execute wrath upon him that doth evill: Charity on the other side obligeth him to hinder, as much as he can, the scandall of the weake: now Charity is a virtue, of an higher note and nature, than vindicative justice: the precept belonging unto charity (hinder as much as you can the scandall of the weake) doth more strictly tie us, than that pertai­ning unto vindicative justice, (punish the guilty). And there­fore, if it be probable, that a great and spreading scandall will be taken at the punishing of delinquents: a Magistrate may not [Page 106]transgresse against justice, and yet deferre the execution thereof.

But so manifold and different are the degrees of obligation in affirmative precepts: such is the variety of circumstances apper­taining unto the matters commanded by those precepts, and con­stancy of alterations about those circūstances, as that I do not see, how any unvariable rules, or constant directions can be given for Christian carriage in this case. For particulars then, every man is to be left unto the guidance of his spirituall prudence and wis­dome, which is to direct him in a right apprehension, and discretion of circumstances: to define the opportunity, and seasonablenesse of practising what is commanded by affirmative precepts: and to compare them and the precept of eschewing the scandall of the weake together: and thereupon to determine, which is hic & nunc, most obligatory, or doth most strictly tye us to the obedience of it, as being of greater moment. Only in the generall wee may safely say thus much: that whereas wee have said, that for shunning the scandall of the weake, we may forbeare the practise of things commanded by affirmative precepts, Hic & nunc, in some places, and at some times, it must all­wayes be taken with this proviso, that there be not incurred a greater, and more perilous scandall, by forbearance, then would pro­bably be occasioned by practise of the thing commanded; which is done, when either first, more are scandalized by the forbearance, than in all likely-hood would be at the practise: or else, secondly, when the body in generall, the Church and Common wealth, or the greatest, and cheifest part of either is scandalized at the forbeare­ance, and onely some few particular private persons stumble at the practise: or else, thirdly, when others take occasion by this partiall and temporary forbearance of what is commanded by affirmative precepts, to contemne the precepts themselves, as being by this our carriage induced to beleive that we verily despise them, and do not so much, for a while forbeare, as utterly disclaime the practise of what they command.

Thus you see, that, according to the common opinion of the schoolemen, things commanded may in case of scandall for a while be omitted or forborne; but Vasquez and Becanus dissent from them in this particular: the explication and confirmation of their opinion I will propound, and then breifely passe my censure there­on. [Page 108] Sum. Theol. Schol. 3. par ca. 27. q. 5. Becanus, to make way for his opinion premiseth, that there is a difference between naturall precepts, for some saith he bind simply, and alwaies whatsoever circumstances intervene, and their obligation never ceaseth, such like are those that forbid lying, perjury, hatred of God, Idolatry &c: for these facts are so intrin­secally sinfull, as that they cannot by any circumstances be made lawfull: others now bind not simply, and absolutely, but with cer­taine circumstances, and therefore they bind as long as those cir­cumstances remaine, they cease to bind when those circumstances are changed: Such is the precept for bidding to kill: for that binds with these circumstances, that we kill not by our private autho­rity, except in case of necessary defence. Take away these cir­cumstances, and it binds not, for it is lawfull to kill upon the com­mand of authority, or in our necessary defence: such also is the precept of eschewing scandall: for, however it be dictated by the law of nature, yet it obligeth not absolutè & quomodocunque: but with certaine circumstances: and one circumstance necessarily re­quisite to make it bind us is, that there occurre not any other precept, either naturall, or positive. The reason is, because every one is bound to have a greater care of his own, than others salva­tion, and consequently, rather to avoid sin in himselfe, than to prevent it in his brethren. And therefore that precept which is given us for the prevention of sin in others, is but of a secondary ob­ligation. Now the precept of eschewing scandall is imposed, onely for the hindring of sin in others, and therefore doth not tie us, when there occurreth any other precept, which is given for the avoiding of sinne in our selves. But it may be objected, that the precept of shunning scandall is of the Law of nature, and there­fore is more obligatory than those precepts that are but positive. Unto this Becanus answereth, that a naturall precept is more ob­ligatory, than that which is positive, caeteris paribus, that is, if each precept, both that which is naturall, and that which is positive, be primarily reserred unto the furthering of our own salvation, unto the preventing of sin in our selves: But now if on the other side the primary scope of the naturall precept be to hinder sin in others, as it is in the precept of scandall; and the principall end of the po­sitive precept be to shun sin in our selves, then that precept which is positive doth more deeply bind us, than that which is naturall.

Againe, secondly, it may be objected: that if the obligation of the naturall precept of eschewing scandall ceaseth upon occurrence of but a positive precept; why, then it seems, this positive pre­cept detracts or derogates from the naturall precept of avoiding scandall: as being of greater force, and validity? In no wise, onely it takes away a circumstance requisite to make the precept of avoiding scandall obligatory, quare cum dicimus (saith Vasquez) non esse omittendum praeceptum positivum propter vitandum scanda­lum proximi, non dicimus praeceptum naturale derogari pracepto po­sitivo tanquam fortiori; sed dicimus occursu praecepti positivi cessare quandam circumstantiam necessariam, ut [...]blig [...]t praeceptum de vi­tando scandalo etiamsi naturale sit.

But all this labour would have been saved, if the question had been rightly stated: for, whereas it is said, that one circumstance necessarily requisite to make the precept of eschewing scandall bind us, is, that there occurre not any other precept either naturall or positive: this is to be understood cum grano salis, with this limi­tation, in case such precepts bind (all circumstances considered to the performance of what they enjoyne) hic & nunc, at such a par­ticular time and place; for then omission of what they enjoine would be sinfull, and we are not sinfully to omit any thing, for prevention of scandall in our brother: Unto the proofe of which the reason of Vasquez and B [...]canus may be applyed.

But, the obligation of affirmative precepts is not universall ad semp [...]r, but only l [...]co & tempore debitis: and therefore what they enjoyne may sometimes, in the case of scandall, be prudently o­mitted; but perhaps this which I say is all that Vasquez and Beca­nus aime at; and then they have no adversary that I know of; Every one will grant unto them, that one circumstance necessarily requisite to make the precept of eschewing scandall bind us, hic & nunc, in such a time and place, is, that there occurre not any other precept binding us to what it enjoyneth at that very in­stant time, and place: for it is evident unto all, that upon occur­rencie of such obligations, though scandall ensue, it would not be on our parts a culpable scandall, an active scandall. But it may be thought that I have staied too long upon this digression: to returne therefore where we left.

Secondly, if the action in which this appearance of evill is sup­posed [Page 110]to be, be but indifferent: why then, the best direction that we can have will be from what the Apostle Paul writes unto the Romans chap. 14. and unto the Corinthians, 1 Cor. 8. and chap. 10. of converts amongst the Romans there were some strong, and knowing ones, that were well principled, and so knew very well their deliverance from the yoake of the mosaicall Law: and here­upon, without any scruple, did eat such meats as were prohibited thereby, perhaps Swines flesh, or the like: Now at this their pra­ctise, severall weak Christians, who were as yet ignorant and un­instructed touching the latitude of their Christian liberty, were in severall regards scandalized, as I have shewen in a foregoing treatise: But yet here the practise of the strong was a thing indifferent in it selfe vers. 14.20. and the appearance of evill (to wit, a prophane, and irreligious contempt of the Law of Moses) was only imaginary, arising from the ignorance, and errour of the weak, who thought that Law of Moses to be still in force, and un­abrogated; and the scandall consequent hereupon was only p [...]r accidens, flowing not from the nature of the action in it selfe, but from the misapprehension of the weake: and yet the Apostle blames the strong for scandalizing the weake: and therefore in this their action, though indifferent in it selfe, there was an active scandall, a scandall culpably given, as well as taken. The Apo­stle gives the same resolution unto the Corinthians concerning things offered unto Idols; to eat them at the Pagan religious feast, and in the temple of an Idoll, carrieth a reall appearance of com­munion with, and approbation of an Idolatrous worship of the Idoll, and so is scandalous per se, of it selfe, and in its own nature, 1 Cor. 8.10. cap. 10. vers. 20,21. But now to eat these same meats when sold, and bought in the shambles, or set before them in pri­vate meetings, the Apostle resolves to be a thing lawfull, and in­different, 1 Cor. 10. v. 25, 26, 27. And indeed it could not carry a reall, but only an imaginary appearance of evill; for they were the good creatures of God, and so uncapable of any morall pol­lution, and they had no religious use, and so did not reflect any glance of the least honour, credit, or countenance to the Idoll. The scandall then, accrewing by them, was only per accidens; and yet they were by the Apostles advise to be forborne, if such scan­dall were likely to ensue upon the use of them. But if any wan [Page 111]say unto thee, this is offered in sacrifice unto Idols, eat not for his sake that shewed it, and for conscience sake, 1 Cor. 10.28. Here we have a generall rule, together with three limitations thereof.

First, a generall rule: if any man imagine evill, and sin to be in an indifferent action, and hereupon be scandalized, that action is to be abstained from; if any man say unto thee, this is offered in sa­crifice unto Idols, eat not, for his sake that shewed it.

But now here are couched three exceptions.

First, we are not bound to abstaine from things indifferent, un­lesse the scandall consequent be probable; if any man say unto you, this is offered in sacrifice unto Idols &c. if he say nothing, but smo­ther his opinion, and dislike in his owne brest, we may be guiltlesse and blamelesse. And indeed, if we are to forbeare all indifferent things, in which there is only a meer possibility of scandall, we should be at an utter losse, and uncertainty in our actings in things indifferent, and never know what to doe, we are obliged then to abstain from things indifferent, only in the case of Quando attentis etiam omnibus ci [...] ­cumstantiis actus inordina­tus unius non est ta lis, ut pr [...] ­babiliter putar [...] possitasteri fu­turus occasio ruinae, non eri [...] peccatum scan­dali, nec distin­ctum, nee non distinctum, ut sentit etiam Bannes hic art 4. in fine. Nam tune nonpotest quis censeri causa moralis ruinae alterius. Gregor. de Va­lentiâ. tom. 3. q. 18. punct. 2. scandall pro­bable, and not in the case of scandall meerely possible, and so much is observed by Calvin upon the 1 Cor. 8.13. Deinde non jubet nos Paulus divinare nunquid offendiculo futurum sit quod facimus, nisi cum est praesens periculum.

A second exception is; that we are not required to abstaine from things indifferent, in which our weake brethren imagine that there is evill and sin, and thereupon are scandalized, unlesse they have some probable ground for their imagination: for though the eating of the Idolothytes at a private feast was not an action in it selfe scandalous, or inductive unto sin; as being free from both sin, and all reall appearance of it, yet the Corinthians scan­dalized hereat had a probable ground why they conceived it to be unlawfull and sinfull, the late morall or religious relation that the Idolothytes had unto an Idoll: this is offered in sacrifice unto Idols; Mr Rutherford [in his treatise of scandall pag. 53, 54.] expresseth this limitation as followeth; we read not of scandals cul­pable in Gods word, but there be some morall reasons in them; and he apply eth it unto the offence, that is taken, at tolling of bells, at a ministers gowne, when he preacheth: there is no apparent mo­rall reason why the tolling of a Bell, or a ministers gowne should scandalize; for they are of meere civill use, and have no morall [Page 112]influence in the worship; for the same tolling of bells is, and may be used to convocate the people to a Baron Court to heare a de­clamation, to convocate souldiers. This exception, that I have lai­ed downe, is, I conceive, grounded, as upon what the Apostle saith; so also upon the reality, and truth of our Christian liberty in things indifferent, which otherwise would signifie nothing; for if we are to abstaine from all indifferent things, in which another without probable ground imagineth that there is sin; the servi­tude of Christians under the Gospell would be farre greater, and more intolerable, then that of the Iewes under the mosaicall administration.

A third exception; which we may gather hence, is, in great part, coincident with the first, and 'tis; that the abstinence unto which we are obliged, in things indifferent, in the case of scandall, is not universall, and totall, but limited ad hic & nunc, those times, and places in which there is danger, or likelyhood of scandall: the Corinthians were, in their private feasts, to forbeare eating Idolothytes, only in the presence of persons apt to be scandalized, and might elsewhere use their liberty without regret of Con­science.

Unto these exceptions insinuated here by the Apostle we may adde divers others, of which, some may be collected from what we above said touching the scandall of the wicked in things indiffe­rent mutatis mutandis, and by and by I shall adde others; but first I shall examine some restrictions, which I gave in a former edi­tion of this booke.