CHAP. 1. That Man consisteth of two parts, Soule and Body.

COncerning GOD, we are ac­knowledge him to be a Spirit, as touching the world, we are to conceive of it as a body, in man we have an abridgment of both, of God in respect of the Soule, of the world in compo­sition of the Body, as though the Creator on purpose to set forth a mirror of all his workes, intended to bring into one little compasse, both the infinitnesse of his owne nature; and also the hugenesse of the whole world together, after his own Image in respect of his soule, after his other creatures in respect of life, sence and moving, mortall so farre as he holdeth forth the Image of the creature, immor­tall so farre as hee holdeth forth the Image of GOD his Creator.

This Arg. 1 may be proved by pregnant arguments.

1 No creature can worke out of his owne proper spheare, how can man if totally mortal conceive of immortality, can mortality comprehend immortality? as probably as a man may throw a stone and knock downe the sunne which is farre above his spheare. The beasts mind altogether the earth they eate when they are hungry drinke when they are dry and go when they are beaten and regard their Creator no more then they doe the clock when it strikes. The fish live in the water as the beasts upon the earth because they are aqueall the other terrene, nei­ther rationall and therefore cannot worke above their sphear, but man conceives not only the things of this world, but also of a better, immortality, glory eternity, therfore must needs have something in him that is immortal. Who is hee that desireth not to be immortal? how can he desire it unlesse he know what it is? how can he know what it is unlesse he have somthing in him immortal? none of us covereth to be beginninglesse, bcause none of us are so, neither can be so and because we are not so, we can not com­prehend what it is, for who can conceive of eternity without beginning, but he will end his Wits before his desires? but on the contrary there is not so base a mind upon earth which coveteth not to live for ever, in so much that whereas we looke not for it by natur we seeke to obtayne it by skill and pollicy, some by bookes, some by images, and some by other devi­ces, and even the ignorantest sort of people can well imagine in themselves what immortality is, and are a­ble both to conceive it and beleeve it; but the wisest [Page 3] and learnedest man alive, should he live as long as Mathusalah, and studie what it is to be with out be­ginning all his life time, he must at last yeild to death without fulfilling or filling full his desires; whence comes this? but that our soules being created, can­not conceive an everlastingnesse without beginning yet being created immortal can well conceive an ever­lastingnesse or immortality without end.

Let us yet wade a little deeper, who can dispute, or once so much as doubt whether the soule be Im­mortal or no, but he that is capable of Immortality? or who can understand a difference betweene mor­tal and immortal but he that is immortal?Though they shall rise again as well as man, saith R O. treat of Morta­lity. pag. 50. can a * horse, an ox, a dogge? no, why? because thy are mortall, and can reach no higher than mortality Immortality is out of their Sphear, out of their E­lement, as the Proverbe is, Man is able to conceive what is reason, and what is not; and by that wee terme him rationall, Man knows a difference betwixt Mortality, and Immortality; and therefore must needs be immortall: for to what end should God teach Immortality to a mortall wight.

If a man should hold an argument, that man is not rationall, and dispute it, hee needs other confutation then his owne arguments: so hee that disputes that the soule is mortall, his owne reasoning of it, shall to a wise man prove it immortall.

Secondly, it is plainly proved, Arg. 2 that man consists of two parts, Soule and Body; because they performe severall and different works at one and the same time. The soule or mind of man will be at Constan­tinople, then at Rome, at Paris, at Lyons, in America, [Page 4] in Affrick, and dispatch all these journies in a trice, looke wheresoever thou directest it, there it is, and before thou callest it back, it is at home, while the bo­dy al this time is at home at worke, or perhaps in bed; therefore the soule and body are two different parts: nay, the soule may, and often doth mind and desire good, when the body is acting sinne, Rom. 7.23.24, 25 I find a law in my members warring against the law of my mind (or soule) and bringing mee into captivity, to the law of my members, but was it his body that warred against his mind, and brought it into captivity? reade the next verse, you shall see, O wretched man that I am who shall deliver me from the body of this death? or this body of death, as the margin more truly hath it, this mortall body. So then (saith he) with my mind I will serve the Lord, but with my flesh the law of sin: thus it plainely appears, the soule and body are two different parts.

Thirdly, Arg. 3 that the soule is not the body, nor any part of it, but soule and body two very different things, appears of it selfe without further proofe, for if the soule were the body, or any part of the body, it would, nay must needs grow with the body, and de­cline with the body, it would be maimed with the body, and sick with the body, for else how can it dye with the body, but daily experience proves the con­trary, for were soule the same with, or part of the bo­dy, the greater the body were, the greater would the soule be: but the contrary appears, those that are strongest in mind, are commonly weakest in body, and the soule is seene to be full of livelinesse in a lan­guishing body, and to grow the more in force by the [Page 5] decay of the body, by growing of the soule I meane, (mistake me not) not that it increaseth or diminish­eth, it is capable of neither, but its profiting in pow­er and vertue; againe, if the soule were the body or any part of it, it would languish with the body: hee that is wounded in his body, would be wounded in his understanding, as well as in his members: he that is sicke of any disease, should also be sicke in his reason: he that limpeth or halteth, should halt in his reason al­so; the blind mans soule should be blind, and the lame mans lame; but the contrary appeares, the mai­med, the sicke, the cripples, the blind, have their un­derstanding cleere sighted, their reason sound, their discourse vigorous, and their soule safe and sound; on the other side, many a man dieth, whose body is sound, and differeth not a whit in any part, from what it was when he was living, anatomize him, the quic­kest eyed Chyrurgian shal see, nor perceive no cause of his death, outward nor inward, nor failing of any par­ticular, to cause it, and yet life, motion, sence, and un­derstanding, are out of it, we may say then (if wee are not wilfully blind, for none so blind as he that will not see) that there was something in the body, that was not of the body, that was a farre other thing then the body.

Object. But some say, that the force and strength of the soule, groweth with the body, & Children have none, and Drunkards have soules by jumps, and many other crotchets, as vaine as ridiculous.

I answer, it cannot be said, that a Childs soule grow­eth, or is strengthned by time, but rather his nerves, or sinewes are hardned and strengthned, which the soule [Page 6] useth as strings and instruments to move withall,R O. treat of Morta­lity, p. 19. where hee pleaseth himselfe with the merry conceits of his own fancy, which hee doth in many o­ther pla­ces of that treat. or or act by; and therefore when age weakneth them, a man useth a staffe to helpe them with, though he have as good a will to run, as he had when he was young, you may often heare a decrepid old man boast and talke of the valorous acts of his youth, he desires to be doing the same then, for out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh: The soule then which moveth all at one beck, hath the selfe same power in infancy, that it hath in age, and the same in old age, that it hath in the flower of youth, the fault is only in the instru­ment, which is unable to execute the operation ther­of, the skilfulnesse of a Musician is not diminished by the slacknesse, hardnesse, or moystnesse of his Lute­strings, nor increased by the goodnesse, curious setting or straining of them, only in the one he cannot shew his cunning, in the other he may shew it more or lesse.

Likewise, the speech of Children commeth with their teeth, howbeit the speech doth manifestly utter it selfe first, in that they prattle many things, which they cannot pronounce, and in old men it goeth again with their teeth, and yet their eloquence is not aba­ted thereby, as in Demosthenes, though he surmounted all the Orators of his time, yet there was some Letters he could not pronounce, give unto old age, or infan­cie the same sinewes and teeth, and as lusty and able limbs, and members as youth hath, and the actions which the soule doth with the body, and by the body, (I mean so farre forth as concerne the abilities of sense and livelinesse) shall be performed, as well in one age, as in another: Be but as impartiall in judging of the force and power of thy owne soule, as of the skilful­nesse [Page 7] of a Lute-player, (I say not by the nimblenesse of his fingers, which may perchance be knotted with the Gout, but by the sweetnesse of his Harmony, which plainly sheweth, that hee hath cunning in his head, though hee can shew it no more with his hands) so as thou wouldst consider how thou hast in thy selfe a de­sire to goe, though thy feet are not able to beare thee, a discretion to judge of things that are spoken, though thine eares cannot convey it to thee, a sound eloquence though for want of teeth (or any other impediment) thou art not able to expresse it; and which is above all, a substantiall, quick and heavenly reason, even when thy body is most debile, infirme, weake, crazie, earthly, sick and drooping: Thou wouldst soone conclude, that the force and power, of quickning, moving, and perceiving, is whole and sound in thy soule, and that the default is only, and altogether in thy body: in so much, that if thy soule had a new body, and new in­struments given to her, it would be as lusty, and as cheerfull as ever it was, and the more it perceiveth the body to decay, the more it retireth, or laboureth to re­tire to it selfe, the more active the thoughts are of ano­ther being, of a better being, of an eternall being, which is a plaine proofe that it is not the body, nor any part of the body, but the very life, and in­worker of the body. Arg. 4

Fourthly, unlesse man have in him a soul (or some­thing else) that is immortall, there can be no resur­rection: This I shall prove by solid reason, though R. O. hale in the contrary, to make up the number of his absurdities: for if the soule dye with the body, or if there be no soule at all, and man all body, and so re­duced [Page 8] to the prima materia, how can there be a resur­rection? there may be a new Creation, if you please; the first was a Creation, the matter is the very same, that it was before the Creation: Ergo, the worke the very same, viz. a new Creation, see it by the example of the Creation of the world, a fit paralel for R. O. 2 Pet. 3.10. The day of the Lord will come as a Theife in the night, in which the Heavens shal passe away with a great noyse, and the Elements shall melt with fervent heat, the earth also, and the works that are therein shall be burnt up, and vers. 13. never­thelesse, we according to his promise looke for a new heaven and a new earth, wherein dwelleth Righteousnesse. What? will God raise up the Heaven and Earth, Sun, Moone, and Stars againe out of the Chaos? will he make a Re­surrection of the world? no, no, man, they are brought, to the prima materia, this is worke for a Creation, not a Resurrection, Esay 65.17. Behold, I create new Hea­vens, and a new Earth, &c.

See it by the Apostle Pauls owne Comparison, 1 Cor. 15.36, 37. Thou foole that which thou sowest is not quickned, except it dye, and that which thou sowest, thou sowest not that body which shal be, but bare grain, &c. If this graine have not in it a vitall spirit, a growing a spirit, a resuscitative spirit, a spirit of life, it cannot grow, it is true, the terrene part of it dies, but the vitall part lives, and give a Resurrection (if I may so call it) to ano­ther Plant of the same kind: Take an Oake Tree that is dead and rotten, set in the ground, it will not grow while the world stands. Take an A corne, set that in the ground, it will grow: why will that, and not the other? because there is spirit in that which dies not, but causeth life to the terrene part of it, which dies, [Page 9] and consumes; vvhereas the other hath none. So if man have no immortall spirit in him, here is no place for a Resurrection, it must be an absolute Crea­tion (if any thing) that gives him life againe, but the whole current of Scripture, hold forth a Resurrection and therfore man hath something in him immortall.

In the fift place I might prove that man hath an immortall spirit, uncapable of death, by the testimony of the ancient Heathen, far ancienter (many of them) then Plato, which also is a rationall proofe of a point; for what the God of nature hath taught to all men by nature, is, and must needs be a truth.

But the God of nature hath taught all men by na­ture, that there is a God, that they have an immor­tall spirit, therefore it is a truth.

I doe not say he hath taught it some one man, or some one nation, but the whole world, the Vniver­sality of it shewes it to be of God: The Divel teach­eth not all nations, one and the same particular sinne, but different according to the constitution of the climate they live in, else he would loose his labour, and that he knows well enough, he hath taught it by nature: for those nations that never heard what grace was, hold and confesse, and leave to posterity this truth: all men universally, and particularly have learned it in one Schoole from the mouth of one Teacher, and he perfect, therefore a truth.

The holy Scripture which teacheth us our salvati­on, useth no Schoole-arguments to make us beleeve there is a God, and why so? because we find him present in his works, neither to prove this point, which shines so cleere in nature.

Both Greeke and Latine Authors have plentifully left it to posterity.

The soule is immortall, and liveth perpetually; and never waxeth old. And againe,

The remainder of dead men, remaines void of death.

If you aske him the cause of this, hee will answer you in another verse, thus (for he was a rationall man)

Sybilla.The soule is Gods Instrument, and Image in mor­tall men. Hitherto comes that of the Sybill.

Man by all reason is indued with the Image of God; of the same opinion also were Orpheus, Theognis.

Piadar. in the se­cond song of his O­lympiads. Homer in the fu­nerals of his Iliads Herm. in his Pae­nander. [...] pag. 10. Homer, Hesiod, Pindarus, and all the Poets of old time, which may answer for themselves, and their Countries, and for the residue of their ages.

Hermes saith, the soul is the garment of the mind, and the garment of the soul, is a certaine spirit wherby it is united to the body, and this mind is that which wee call properly the man, that is, a heavenly wight, not to be compared to the beasts, but rather to the gods of heaven, if it be not yet more then they, the heavenly cannot come downe to the earth without leaving the heaven, but man measureth the heaven without removng from the earth: to be short, his conclusion is that man is double, mortall as touching his body, immortall as touching his soul, which soul is the very man, and created of God (saith he) as the light is bred immediatly of the sunne.

And Chalcidins saith, that at his death he spake these words, I goe home againe into mine own country where my better Forefathers and kindred be.

Zoroastres, who is of more antiquity then Hermes, this article is reported to be one of his, that mens souls are immortall, and that one day, there shall be a gene­rall rising againe of their bodies, and the answer of the wise men of Chaldea (Who were the heires of his doctrine) doe answer sufficiently for him.

There is one that exhorteth men to returne with speed to their heavenly father: Who hath sent them a soul indued with much understanding.

Another exhorteth them to seeke Paradice, as the peculiar dwelling place of the soule.

A third saith, that the soule hath God as it were shut up in it, and that it hath not any mortality ther­in, for (saith he) the soule is as it were drunken with God, and sheweth forth his wonders in the harmony of this mortall body.

A fourth saith it is a cleare fire proceeding from the power of the heavenly father, an incorruptible sub­stance, and the maintainer of life, containing almost all the whole world with the full plenty therof in his bosome.

But one of them proseedeth yet further, affirming that he that setteth his mind upon Godliness, shall save even his body, though it be never so fraile: and by those words hee acknowledgeth the very glori­fying of the body.

All these are reported by Psellus, and he confesseth that Plato and Pythagoras learned the doctrine of the souls Immortality of the Caldeans, in so much [Page 12] that some thinke the Caldeans are those that Plato speakes of,Lil. Legum 11. ep. 2. when hee saith, that the ancient and holy Oracles are to be beleeued, which affirme mens souls to be immortall, and that in another life, they must come before a Iudg that wil require an account of all their doings, the result wherof commeth to this, that the soule of man proceedeth immediatly from God, that is to say; that the father of the body is one, and the father of the soule is another; that the soule is not a bodily substance, but a spirit and a light, that at the departure therof from hence, it is to goe to a Paradice, & therfore ought to make haste unto death and that it is so far from mortality, that it maketh even the body Immortall: what can wee say more at this day, even in the time of light wherin we live of the same opoinion was Hordelitus, as is reported by Philolaus.

Clement. of Alex­andria.Of Epicharmus we have this saying, if thou beest a good man in thy heart, death can doe thee noe harme, for thy soul shall live happily in heaven:

It were endlesse to recite al the words of the anci­ent about this subject, conifiming this trueth, for of this opinion were Thales, Anaxagoras, Diogenes, and Zeno, Lucretius, Socrates, Xenophon, read Plato his Ti­maeus, his commonwealth, his Phadon, his Politicks, his laws, Aristotle his books of living things, of the soul his morralls, Michael of Ephesus upon his morrals, Cicero his Tusculaves, his Comforts, his na­ture of the gods; his first booke of lawes, his Scipios dreame, Seneca to Gallio, to Lucillius, concerning the Lady Martiaes son, the shortnes of his life, his book of comforts, Prophririus 4. booke of abstinence, Plu­tarke, these ancient.

For moderne Philosophers, Epictetus, Simplicius, [Page 13] Plotinus, lib. 1. Aenead. 4. concerning the being of the soule lib. 2. Chapter 1. lib. 3. Chapter 18. 14. 20. 21. 23. lib. 4. Chapter 11. and the 7. Book throughout, his book of the senses & memory, his Bk. of doubts concerning the soule, these and thousands more confirme the point though they differ in cir­cumstance, that man consists of two parts, viz. a body and a reasonable and immortall soule, and where they had this notion I shewed before

CHAP. 2. Of the Abilities; Or Faculties of the Soule,

IN the inward man, wee have a summe of whatso­ever life, sence, moving, is in all creatures and more­over a shadow of the godhead it selfe, and that is the thing we have to examine in this Chapter.

In plants we perceive that besides the bodies which we see, there is also an inward vertue which we see not, wherby they live, grow, bud, and beare fruit, which we call the quickening vertue and it maketh them to differ from stones, and mettalls, which have it not.

In sensitive things, we find the very same vertue, whch worketh while they sleepe, and are after a sort as plants, and there withall we find another sort of vertue or power, which seeth, heareth, smelleth, tasteth and feelleth, which also in many of them doeth hord up the things brought in by the sences, which manner of power the plants are voyd of; this we call the sensi­tive vertue, because the effects there of are discerned and executed by the sences.

In man we have both the quickening and sensitive [Page 14] the former uttering it selfe in the nourishing and in­creasing of him and the latter in the subtilty of sence, and imagination, through which hee hath both quick­ning and sensitive life together: but moreover he hath a mind, which reapeth profit by the things brought in by the senses, which by his seeing conceives the things it seeth not; which of that which is not, gathereth that which is, which elevateth the thoughts from the earth and earthly things, yea, and after a sort from himselfe too, this we call the resonable soule, and it is the thing that maketh man to be man, and not a plant or a bruit beast as the other two doe.

But by the way, wheras I say, that the inward man hath a quickening power as a plant hath, a sensitve qower as a beast hath, and a powe of understanding wherby he is man, my meaning is not that he hath three soules but only one soule, that like as in a bruit beast the sensitive soule comprehends the quickening soul; so in man the reasonable soule comprehends both sen­sitive, and quickening, and excecuteth the offices of them all three, all at one and the same time, it both heareth, seeth, smelleth, reasoneth, at one & the same time: the mind of a man wil intend his own houshould affairs, the affairs of the common-wealth, & heavenly things all at once.

Or to speake more fitly, these three degrees are three degrees of life, whereof the second exceedeth and containeth the first, the third exceedeth and con­taineth both the other two, the one, without which the body cannot live, is the vegetable, and is so tied to the body that it sheweth not it selfe in any wise out of it, the second which cannot live without the body is the life of a beast, a sensitive life, which doeth well [Page 15] manifest its power abroad, but yet not otherwise, but by the members and instruments of the body, wherto it is tyed, the third which can of it selfe live without the body; but not the boby without it, is the rationall soule of man, which giveth life inwardly to all his parts, and deliniaments, sheweth forth his life abroad in perceiving all things, subject to sence, and retaineth still his force (as we shewed before) yea and increaseth it, even when the strength of the body: yea & the very livelynesse therof doth faile, you shall see a man for­goe all his sences one after another, as the instruments of them decay, & yet still have life untovched and rea­son qvick, the reason is, the instruments of life fail, but life it self which quickens them fails not, wherby its apa­rent that in this soul of man (which notwithstanding is but one) there are diversities of power, abilityes and fa­culties, the quickening power, doth nourish, increase, and maintain us, & reason nor sence meddle not with it, neither have they power to impeach the working therof: the truth of this appeares, in that these things are best done when our mind is at rest, and our sences a sleep, in so much that oftentimes we forgoe the sence and moving of some parts, by some rhume, or some palsy, and yet some parts cease not to be nourish­ed still, also the sensitive life seeth and perceiveth a far off, yea oft times without setting the mind therup­on, or without considering what the sence conceiveth, some men which have but weake sences, have very quick understandings, & on the contrary, againe some fall into a consumption, which want not the parfect use of their sences, sometimes the reasonable part is so bent and occupied, about the things that it liketh of, that by the increasing of it selfe, it hurteth and dimi­nisheth, [Page 16] the part of it quickneth: Also it standeth in argument against the sences, & reproveth them of fals­hood, & concludeth contrary to their information, & it may be the man that hath his digestion good, and his sences sound, not his wit and reason, sound in like Case, now were the soule but only one faculty it could not be, so but now it is divided manifestly into wit, or understanding, and will, the one serving to device, the other to execute, for we understand many things which we will not, & we will divers things which we understand not, which conttary operations, cannot bee atributed to one power, neverthelesse the uniting of these powers is with that distincknesse, and the distinguishing of them with that union, that ordi­narily they meet altogether in one and the same ac­tion, the one of them (in all liklyhood) as readily as the other, howbeit every one of them doth his owne proper worke severally by himselfe, and one before another in respect of their objects.

CHAP. 3. Of the Essence of the Soule.

IT is not enough to know wee have a soule, say some, whereby we live, feele, and understand, &c. and which being but one, hath in it selfe alone, so ma­ny powers, faculties, and abilities, but it will be de­manded, what this soule is: and truly, if I should say I cannot tell what it is, I should not bely my selfe, I should but confesse mine own ignorance, as many lear­ned men have done before me, and I should doe no wrong at all to the soule it selfe, sith we cannot deny the effects of it; and truly, in my opinion, the lesse we are able to define the nature, and being thereof, the more doth the Excellency thereof shine forth, [Page 17] and appeare, the dulnesse of the understanding is such by the fall of man in Adam, that it cannot conceive of the nature of spirits affirmatively, but by the effects, or negatively, and those that went about to define it, ran into many errours and absurdities; yet it fol­lows not, that man hath no soule; were it not a wor­thy and learned Argument, for a man to reason thus: I know not what the soul is, therfore there is none, or the learned differ in the definition of it; therefore there is none: its just, as if a man should say, I know not where the Indies are; therefore there are none; since it is so then, it needs no long scanning,1 Soule not a quality but a sub­stance. whether it be a substance or a quality; for qualities have no being but in another thing then themselves; the soule which causeth another thing to be, cannot be a quality; for as much as the soule maketh man to be man, who otherwise were but a carkeis, or carrion; therefore we must needs grant, that the soule is a for­ming substance, and substantiall forme; yea, and a most excellent substance, infinitly passing the out­ward man, which by the power and vertue thereof, causeth another thing to have being, and perfecteth the bodily substance, which seemeth inwardly to have so many perfections.

Secondly, as the soule is a substance, not a quality,2 Vnbodily. so it is a substance unbodily, incorporiall. 1. If we con­sider 1 the nature of a body, it hath certaine dementions and comprehendeth not any thing, that is not propor­tioned to the greatnesse and capacitie of it, for as it selfe must have place in another thing 'so must other things occupy some certaine place in it; by reason whereof it commeth to passe, that things can have no place ther­in, [Page 18] if they be greater then it, without annoying one ano­ther, to be short if the thing be lesse then the body that containes it, the whole body shall not containe it, but some part of it only, and if it be greater, some part must needs be out, for there is no measuring of bodies but by quantity, but we see our soule compre­hends heaven and earth, without annoying either other, and also time past, present and to come, with­out troubling one another: and also innumerable places, persons and townes, without cumbering our understanding, great things are there in their full big­nesse, and small things in their utmost smalnesse, both of them whole and sound, in the soule whole and sound, and not by peice-meale, or only in part of it: Moreover the fuller it is, the more it is able to receive; the more things are couched in it, the more it stil cove­teth, and the greater the things be, the fitter is it to receive it, even when they be at the greatest. It fol­loweth therfore, that the soule (which after a sort is infi­nit) cannot be a body, and so much the lesse can it be so, for that, wheras it harboureth so many and so great 2 things in it, it selfe is lodged in so small a body.

Secondly, a body cannot be in divers places at once, nor cannot passe without removing, but the soule as a thousand places may be in it, without occupying any places, so is the mind in a thousand places without changing place, & that not by succession of times, nor by turnes, but often times altogether at one instant, as we shewed in the first chapter, now there is not a bo­dy, that is or can be ubiquitary, or in diverse places at once, it is against the nature of a body, all bodily mo­tion requires time, yea & such time, as within a little over or under is proportioned both to its place, and to [Page 19] the length of its way it hath to go, then it is certain that our soul is not a bodily substance, which thing appear­eth so much the more plainely, that it being lodged within this body, which is so movable, it removeth not with the body.

3 Also it is a sure ground, that two bodies cannot mutu­ally 3 enter either into other, or contain either other, but the greater must needs alway contain, and the other les­ser must needs be contained, but by our soules we enter not only into other bodies, but also either into other minds, so as we comprehend either other, by mutuall understāding, & imbrace either other, by mutual love, it follows then that this substāce, which is able to receive, abodiles thing can be no body, & so much the rather, be­cause the body that seemeth to hold it containeth it not

Fourth. That the soul is no bodily substance is mani­fest, 4 in that it maketh al things that it lodgeth in it after a sort spirituall, therfore it self must needs be a spiritu­all substance, because it bereaves the thing it contains, after a sort of its body, & makes it spiritual, if ther were any bodiliness in it, it were unable to enter into the knowledg of a body, a thousand severall shapes are seen in a glass, if the clear of the glass had any peculiar shape of its own, none of those shapes could be seen but on­ly its own, also all visible things are imprinted in the eye, if the sight of the eye had any peculiar colour of its own, either it would not see at all, or all things would seem like to that colour, which is in the eye; likewise the tongue is the discerner of al tasts, if it be not clear, but encumbred with humors, all things will be of the tast of the humor that the tongue is incumbred with, if it be bitter, they also are bitter, if watrish, they are wa­trish, yea if it be bitter, it cānot judg of bitternes it self, that a thing may receive al shapes al colours, & all tasts [Page 20] it is requisite that it be cleare of all shape, of all colour, of all savour of its owne, and that a thing may in under­standing, know and conceive all bodies, as our soule doeth, it is requisite that it be altogether bodilesse it selfe, for had it any bodilinesse in it, it could not re­ceive any body into it, without marring or altering it selfe or the other, for if you look neerly into the na­ture of a body, you shall find that no body receiveth into it the substantiall forme of a nother body with­out altering or loosing its owne, or the other, neither can passe from one form to another, without marring the first, as is plainely to be seene in wood, when it receiveth fire, in seeds, when they spring forth into buds, and so in other things, what is to be said, then of mans soule which receiveth, & conceiveth the formes and shapes of all things, with out corrupting its own, and morover becommeth the perfecter by the more receiving, for the more it receiveth, the more it under­standeth, and the more it understandeth, the more 5 perfect it is.

Fiftly, if it be a bodily substance, from whence is it, or of what mixture is it; if of any, then of the Elements, if of the Elements, how can that give life, which hath none in it selfe; how can that give understanding, that hath no sence; that divers things that have no being of themselves, should give being to another, or be made a thing that hath a being? that of divers out-sides should bee made one body, or of diverse bodies, one soule; or of diverse darknesses one light, of divers deaths one life; surely this one absurdity is able to countervail and out-weigh all those 69. in R. O. his treaties of mans Mortality, by this it plainly [Page 21] appears, that hee which made the mixture of these bodies, hath for the perfecting our body (beyond nature) breathed a soul into it, to be short, the proper­ty of a body is to suffer, the property of a soule is to doe, & if the body be not put forth, by some other thing then it selfe, it is a very blocke, whereas the soul which is in our body, ceaseth not to stirre up & down, though it have nothing to move it from without, therefore it is to be concluded fom these reasons (and the like that might be alleaged) that the soule is a sub­stance incorporeall, unbodily, notwithstanding it be united to our bodies.

Thirdly, as our soule, is a substance unbodily,3 Immateri­all. so is it unmateriall, likewise, & that appeareth, first because matter receiveth not any forme or shape, but accord­ing 1 to his owne quantity, and but only one forme at once, wheras our soule receiveth all formes without quantity, come there never so many at once, or never so greate.

Secondly, no matter receiveth contrary formes at once, but our soule comprehendeth and receiveth them together, as fire and water, heat & cold, white and blacke, and not only together, but also better by laying and matching of them together.

Lastly, to be short, it appeares, that the soule is not materiall, seeing the more we depart from matter, the more we understand, surely there is nothing more contrary to the substance of the soule then the na­ture of matter, then is this reasonable soule of ours nei­ther a bodily nor a materiall thing, nor depending upon matter in the best action thereof, then must needs be of it selfe, and not proceed from body, or matter, [Page 22] for what can a body bring forth but a body, & mat­ter but matter, and materialls but materialls; and ther­fore the soule is an unmateriall substance, which hath being of it selfe.

4 Imomrtall and incor­ruptible. Plutarke, de sera [...]uminis vindicta tractat.Fourthly, the soule as it is a substance, incorporeall, immateriall, so is it incorruptible, and immortall, Plutarke saith, it is in vaine to dispute thereof: for saith he, the doctrine of Gods providence & that of the immortallity of the soule are so lincked together, that take away the one the other follows, (God grant that experience prove not Plutarkes words true, in some now living) for, saith he, to what purpose was the world created, if there were no body to behold it? or to what end, behold we the creatures in the world but to serve him? and why should wee serve upon no hope? and to what end hath he endewed us with these rare gifts of his, which for the most part doe but put us to paine and trouble in this life, if we perish like the bruit beasts, which know not God.

But because all are not of Plutarkes mind, wee will see if we can satisfie the contrary minded, by reason, for the better satisfying of those who take not so much paines as to enter into themselves, I shall indeavour to paint out to them, their right shapes, by lively reason, which they have defaced by ignorance, and therefor now to the purpose.

1 First I shewed before, that the soule is not a body, neither increaseth nor decreaseth with the body, but contrary wise, the more the body decreaseth; the more the understanding increaseth, the neerer the body draweth to death the more freely doth the mind un­derstand, the more the body abateth the more power­full [Page 23] is the mind, why then should we thinke that the thing which becommeth the stronger, by the weak­nesse of the body, & which is advanced by the decay of the body, should perish to dust with the body? a mans seeing fails, because his eyes faile, but the blind mans understanding encreaseth, because his eyes are not busied, and the old mans reason becommeth more perfect, by the losse of his sight, & therefore why say we not, that the body failleth the soule, but the soule faileth not the body, that the glasses are out of the spectacles, but the eyes good still.

Objoct. 1 But, Mans mortality pag. 13. saith R.O. the part or member is endowed with the faculty, & so seeing is in the eye naturally, & really, and not the soule sees by the eye, and hearing locally in the eare, and so common sence, judgment & memo­ry locally adherent to, and inherent in their places, & hee proveth it, with this frigid argument: because if the member be perished the sence falles.

Answ. To which I answer, if the ey be the thing that seeth, and the eare the thing that heareth, why doe we not see things double, and heare sounds double, seeing wee have two eys & two ears, it is the soul then that seeth & heareth, and these which hee taketh to be our sences are but the instruments of our sences, for when our eys are shut or pickt out, we then behold a thousand things in our mind, yea and then our understanding is most quick sighted, when the quickest of our eye­sight, is as good as quenched, or quite dead how is it possible that the reasonable soule should be tied to the sences? what a worthy reason is it to say the soule dyeth with the sence, seeing the true sences, do grow & increas, even then when the instruments of the sences doe die.

Also I pproved before, that the soule is not the body, nor any part of the body, seeing then it is so, why mea­sure we that by the body, which measureth al bodies, or make that to dye with the body, wherby the bodies that died many hundred yeares agoe, do after a certaine man­ner live still, or who can hurt that thing, whom nothing hurteth or hindreth in that body? though a man loose an arme, yet doth his soule remaine whole stil, let a man forgoe the one halfe of his body, yet is his soule as sound as before, for it is united in its owne substance, & by the force and power of its selfe, it sheddeth it self in­to all parts of the body, though the body rot a way by peice meale, yet abideth the soule whole & undiminish­ed, let the blood drain out, the moving wax weake, the strength perish, yet abideth the mind sound, & lively, it never forsakes its lodging, till there be no roome left for it to lodge in, when our sences are overcome by death, then it doth most labour to surmount it selfe, working as goodly & Godly actions at that time when the body is at poynt to faile it, yea and oftentimes more godly too, then ever it did while the body was in health, as for example, it taketh order for it selfe, for our houshold, for the commonwealth, for a whole king­dome, & that with more uprightnesse, goodnesse, wise­dome and modration, then ever it did before, yea and perchance in a body so far spent, so bare, so consumed, so withered without, and so putrified within, that he that lookes upon him sees nothing but earth, and yet to hear him speake would ravish a man up to heaven, now when a man sees so lively a soule in so weake and wretched a body, may he not from reason conclude, as is said in hatching of chickens, the shell is broken, but there commeth forth a chicken.

Secondly, for proofe that the soule is immortall, see what is the ordinary cause that things perish; fire either goeth out for want of nourishment, or is quen­ched by his contrary water: water is resolved into ayre by fire, which is his contrary: the cause why the Plant dieth, is extremity of cold, or drought, or unsea­sonable cutting, or violent plucking up; also mans bo­dy dieth by encreasing, or diminishing the humors called complection, or by violence; of all these causes which can wee chuse to have any power against our soule? I say against the soule of man, which (notwith­standing it be united to matter to a body) is it selfe a substance unbodily, unmateriall, and only conceivable in understanding; nay, what can be contrary to that which lodgeth contraries equally in it selfe? which un­derstandeth the one of them by the other, which coucheth them all under one skill; and to be short, in which the contrarieties themselves abandon their con­trariety; so as they doe not pursue, but ensue one a­nother.

Fire is hot, and water is cold,Contrari­eties can­not kil the soule. our bodies mislike these contraries, and are grieved by them, our mind linketh them together, without either burning or coo­ling it selfe, and it setteth the one of them against the other to know them the better, the things which de­stroy one another throughout the world, maintaine one another in our minds, nothing is more contrary to peace then warre; and yet mans mind can main­taine peace by preparing for warre, and lay earnestly for war in seeking for peace; even death it selfe which dispatcheth our life cannot be contrary to the life of the soule; for the soule seeketh life by death; what [Page 26] can the soule meet withall, in the whole world that can be contrary to it? which can enjoyne obedience to things most contrary; contrarieties then cannot do it.

Nor want of food.What then, can want of food? How can that want food in the world, which can feed on the whole world, or how can that forsake food, which the fuller it is, the hungrier it is; the more that it hath digested, the bet­ter able it is to digest; the more it hath, the more it de­sireth; take from it the sensible things, and the things of understanding abide with it still; bereave it of earthly things, and the heavenly remaine with it the more abundantly: to be short, a bridge it of al world­ly things; yea, and of the world it selfe, and even then doth it feed with greatest ease, and maketh cheer agree­able to its owne nature.

Also, the body filleth it selfe to a certaine measure, and delighteth in some certaine things; but what can fill the mind? fill it as full as you can with the know­ledge of things, and it is the more eager, and sharper set to receive more; the more it taketh in, the more it still craveth; and yet for all that it never feeleth any rawnesse, it never catcheth a surfit for want of con­coction; what shall I say more, discharge your under­standing from minding it selfe, and then doth it live in him, and of him, in whom all things doe live; a­gaine, fill it with the knowledge of it selfe, and then doth it feele it selfe most empty, and sharpest set upon the desire of the other; now then can that die for want of food, which cannot bee glutted with any thing, vvhich is nourished and maintained vvith all things; and vvhich (in very deed) liveth upon him, [Page 27] by whom all the things which we wonder at here be­neath are upheld.Nor vio­lence.

Well, violence (you will say) perhaps may doe the deed; what is violence, but a justling of two bodies together, but the soul is no body, nor bodily substance, as I proved before, can there be any violence between a bodily, and spirituall substance or betweene two sp­rituall substances; seeing that oftentimes when they would destroy one another, they uphold one another; and if the soule cannot be pushed at; neither inward­ly, nor outvvardly; is there any thing in nature, that can naturally hurt it?

No! will some say? Object. wee see it weakned by an in­counter, as we may discerne by the senses; the more excellent the thing is, which the sence receiveth; so much the more the sense it selfe offended, and grieved therewith: As for example, the feeling by sire, the taste by harshnesse, the smelling by strong savour, the hearing by the hideousnesse of the noyse, whether by a Thunder-clap, or by the falling of a River, the sight by looking upon the Sun, upon fire, or any thing that hath a glistering brightnesse.

I omit that in most of these, Answ. it is not the sense it selfe, but the outward instrument of sence that is offen­ded, & hurt: But let us here see whether ther be the like in the soule, or no; nay the contrary, the more of under­standing, and excellency the thing is, the more doth it, comfort and refresh the mind, if it be darke so that we understand it by halves, it hurteth us nor; yet it doth not delight us; nay, as we increase in understanding it, so it liketh us the better; and the higher it is, the more doth it stir up the power of our understanding; and (as [Page 28] you would say reach us the hand, to draw us to the at­tainment thereof; as for them that are dim-sighted, we forbid them to looke upon the things that are over-bright; but for them of rawest capacity, wee offer them the things that are most intelligible; when the sence beginneth to perceive most sharpely, then is it faine to give over; as if it felt the very death of it selfe, contrary wise, where the mind beginneth to un­derstand, then is it most desirous to hold on still; and whence ariseth this, but that our sences worke by bo­dily Instruments, our mind worketh by a bodilesse sub­stance, which needeth not the helpe of the body; and seeing that the nature, the nourishment, and the actions of the soule are farre different, not only from the na­ture, nourishment and actions of the body, but also from all that either is done, or wrought by the body: can there be any thing more childish, then for us to demee our soules to be mortall, by the abating and decaying of our sences, or by the mortality of our bodies? nay, contrariwise, it may be most soundly, and substantially concluded thereupon, that mans soule is of its owne immortall; seeing that all death as well violent, as na­turall, commeth of the body, and by the body.

Thirdly, 3 the immortality of the soule may be firme­ly proved, even from death it it selfe: The two best de­finitions of death that eyer I heard of, or read of, are these, and both true. 1. Death is a seperating of the matter from his forme. 2. Death is the utmost peri­od of moving, from both which the immortality of the soule may be proved; and first of all from the first.

Wee have already proved the soule to be the forme, and the body must needs be the matter then, and the [Page 29] seperation of the soule from the body, is commonly called death: now then what death can there be of the soule, seeing it is immateriall, death must worke upon a matter, or nothing; for (as one saith) a man may take away the roundnesse, or squarnesse of a table of cop­per, because they have no abiding, but in the matter, but had that or any thing else, such a round, or square forme, as might have abiding without matter, or stuffe wherein to be; out of all doubt, such a forme or shape should continue for ever; nay, which is more, how can that be the corrupter, of a thing, which is the per­fection thereof? the lesse our minds are tyed to these bodily things, the more lively, and cheerfull they be, at a word, the full and perfect life thereof, is the full and perfect with-drawing thereof from the body, and whatsoever the body is made of, and this follow by di­rect consequence from the former. All these things are so clear that they need no proofe; for wee know that every thing worketh according to the proper being thereof; and that same which perfecteth the operations of a thing, perfecteth the being thereof also; it fol­loweth therefore, that seeing the seperation of the body from the soule, and of the forme from the mat­ter, perfecteth the operation, or working of the soule, (as I said before) it doth also make perfect, & strength­en the very being thereof; and therefore cannot in any wise corrupt it, and what else is dying but to bee cor­rupted? and what else is corrupting, but suffering? and what else is suffering, but receiving? and how can that which receiveth all things without suffering, receive corruption by any thing? fire corrupteth and marreth our bodies, and we suffer in receiving it: so also doth [Page 30] extreame cold; but if wee suffered nothing by it, it could not freeze us, our sences likewise are marred, by the successive force of the things that they light upon; and that is because they receive, and perceive the thing that grieveth them; and for the manner of their beha­ving themselves, towards their objects, is subject to suffering; but as the reasonable soul which receiveth al things after one manner, that is by the way of under­standing, by which it alway worketh, and is never wrought into; how is it possible for it, to corrupt or marre it selfe.

For what is the thing whereof our Soule suffereth ought in the substance thereof, I meane where by the substance of our soule is any way impaired or hurt, by minding, or conceiving the same in understanding? as little doth the fire hurt it, as the ayre, and the ayre, as the fire, as little hurt receiveth it, from the frozen Ice of Groenland, as from the scorching sands of Africk, as little also, doth vice annoy it as vertue; for vice and vertue are so farre off from incumbring the substance of the soule, that our mind doth never conceive, or understand them better, then by setting together one against the other, that thing therefore, which doth no whit impaire it selfe, but taketh the ground of perfe­cting it selfe by all things, cannot be marred or hurt by any thing.

In the Second place, I said, death is the uttermost poynt of moving, and the uttermost poynt of this life, for even in living we dye, & in dying we live, & there is not that step that we make in this life, but wee step forward unto death, after the manner of a diall or a clocke which endeth its moving, in moving from [Page 31] minut to minut, take a way moving from a bod, & it liveth no longer; now let us see if the soule also, be ca­ryed with the same moving, if it be, it may dy with the body, if not it cannot, but we see it moves not with th [...] body, nay we see the contrary, a man may have his mind as free as an Emperour, though his body be in prison, whether the mind rest, or whether it be busied, bout the proper operations thereof, it is not perceiv­ed, either by the panting of the hart, or by the beating of the pulses, or by the breathing of the lunges, the bo­dy carries the soule about like a ship, the sticking fast therof, or the tying of it to a post, hinders not our go­ing up and down in it still.

Fourthly, if the soule be subject to the finall corup­tion of the body, it must needs be subject to the alte­ration 4 therof also, and if it be subject to alterations it is subject to time also, for alterations or change are con­sequents of moving, and moving is not made without time, now time past in respect of the body cannot be called againe, but in respect of the mind it is alwaies present, yea and time perfecteth accomplisheth and en­creaseth our mind, and refresheth it from day to day, whereas contrary wise it sorely weareth, wasteth away, and quit consumeth the body. It follws then that the soule is not subject to those changes and corruption, that alter the body, therefore cannot dy with it.

Fifth. It appears that the soul is immortal & incorrup­tible, 5 because it lives by incorruptible things, nothing in the world is nourished by things better then it selfe, neither doth any of them containe greater things then it selfe, but the things that are corruptible doe live of corruptible things, and cannot live without corrupting [Page 32] them, as for example, beasts live by herbs, men by beasts, both by corrupting them turne them to nourishment, of their nature, and therefore things that live by incor­ruptible things, and can so disgist them as to turne them into the nourishment of their nature, & yet not corrupt them, are incorruptible themselves too. Now the reason able soule or mind of man, conceiveth reason and truth, and is fed, and strengthened with them, and reason and truth, are things unchangable, not subiect to time place or alteration, or any thing else that may or can breed corruption, but are stedy, unchangable and everlasting, for that twice two is fowr, that there is the same reason in the proportion, of eight to six, that there is from four to three, or that in a triangle, the three in­ner angles are equall to the two right angles, and truthes that neither years nor thousands of yeares can chang, as true at this day as they were when Euclid first spake them, as true in our schooles as in his, it fol­loweth then that the Soule comprehending reason and trueth, which are things free from coruption., cannot it selfe in any wise, be subject to corruption.

And 6 in the sixt and last place, we might fitly bring in such an argument, as we did in the first Chap. viz. if all that is in us were mortall and transitory, we should never question what immortality is, for of contraryes the skill is all one, if a man had no actuall life or had it only by promise, (were it only a mortall life) hee could not dispute of it, till he had it actually, neither by the same argument, could he speake of immortallity, were he not immortall, but of this more before, therefore I Passe it heer.

CHAP. 4. Obiections against the Souls. immortality answered.

ANd first for the objection and argument of R. O. whom I suposse to be an ingenious man, I desie him, to looke into him selfe, take a litle notice, of the de­mentions and parts therof, let him tell me the reason of the continuall motion of the heart, the breathing of the lungues, & not the effects of it, but the motive cause of it, if he cannot, then let him confesse he hath something in himselfe, which farre transcends himselfe, and the weaknesse of his capacity, which out of ignorance hee reasons against, though he know not what it is, & there­fore I reject all his arguments, ob Jgnorantiam Elenchi, and passe to other things objected to me.

Saith one, Object. the soule dieth with the body because the soule and body are both one, and why thinkes hee so because he sees no more then the body.

I answare, Answ. this argument is all one with theres that denied there was a God, because they saw him not, but yet by his works thou maist perceive there is a God, dis­cerne also by the doings of thy soule, that thou hast a soul, for in a dead body thou seest the same parts remaine but thou seest not the same workes that werein it be­fore, when a man is dead his eye seeth nothing at all, yet there is nothing changed in his eye, but whil he is alive he seeth infinite things that are diverse, the Powre then that seeth is not of the body how lively and quick sighted so­ever the eye be, it seeth not it selfe, wonder not then though thou have a soule and yet thy soule seeth not it [Page 42] selfe, for if thy eye sight saw it selfe, it were not a power or abillity of seeing, but a visible thing, likewise if thy soule saw it selfe it were no more a soule, that is the worker in, and quickner of the body, but a very body unable to do any thing it selfe, a massy substance, subject to suffering, for wee can see nothing but bodies, & bodi­ly substances, because the organ of our sight is corporal; but seeing thou conceivest so many divercities of bodies at once in thy imagination, needs must thou have a Power in thee which is not a body. Object.

But be it (say some) that we have a Power of sence, yet have we not a power of reason, for that we call the power of reason or understanding, is nothing but an excellency or rather a consequence of sence, in so much that when sence dieth, the residue dieth with it. Answ.

In this 1 very objection, thou hast surmounted sence, which thou couldest not have done, if thou hadst had nothing in thee but sence, or nothing far beyound sence, for wheras thou saist, if the sence dye, the rest dieth also, it is a reason that proceedeth from one terme to another, and it is a gathering of reasons which conclude one thing by another; now the sences doe indeed perceive rheit objects, but yet how lively soever they be they reason not; we see a smoke, so far extendeth the sence, but if we thence infer, therefore there must needs be a fire, and thereupon seeke who was the kindler thereof, that sur­mounteth the abillity of fence; we heare musicke, that may a Beast do as well as we, but his hearing of it, is but as a bare sound, whereas we in hearing, regard the har­mony, and discerne the cause of the concords and dis­cords which either delight or offend us, the thing that heareth the sound, is the sence, but the thing that judg­eth [Page 43] of that which the sence conceiveth, is another thing, the like may bee said of smelling, tasting, and feeling, our smelling of sents, our tasting of savours, & our feel­ing of substances, is indeed the six work of our sences, but our judgment of the inward vertue of a thing by the outward sent, or of the wholsomnesse or unwhol­somenesse of food by the tast, or of the hotnesse or ve­hemency of a feaver, by feeling the pulse, yea and our proceeding even unto the very bowels of a man, whi­ther the eye being the quickest of all sences is not able to attaine, surely it is the work of a more mighty power then the sence is, & indeed R. O. saith true on that, there are Beasts, which doe heare, see, smell, tast and feell, much better and quicker then man doeth, yet none of them confereth the contraries of sounds, colours, sents and savours; none sorteth them out, to serving one of another or to the serving of themselves;Iob. 39.20. Psal. 49.20. Reade Plinies nat. hist. Elephants the reason is (as God saith of the Ostrich) the Lord have given them no understanding, and ar David saith, the man without understanbing, dies like a Beast, shewing that a Beast hath none, but often times, man concludes contrary to his sences, our eye tells us there are noe stares up at noone day, but reason tells us there are, or the ends of lines in a long walke, meet in a poynt, whereas reason certifies us that they run direct upon equall distances, one from the other, for want of this discretion certaine Elephants saith vetillio (though the wisest of all Beasts) which were passing over a long bridge, turned backe, being deceived, and yet they wanted fight no more then we doe, yet they that lead them were not deceived, their leaders then, had in them another power or vertue besides their eye sight, which corrected there sight, and therefore ought to be of higher estimation, in like man­ner [Page 36] is it with the other sences, our hearing tells us that the thunderclap is after the lightening, but reason assureth us that they are both together, for there is a certain power in us, that is able to discerne, what pro­portion is between hearing & seeing, also the tast of one troubled with a disease of choller, beareth him in hand that even sugar it selfe is bitter, which notwithstanding he knoweth by reason to be untrue. To be short, those that have their sences most quicke and lively, be not of the greatest wisdom, and under­standing, a man then differeth from a beast, and excel­leth them by some other power then sence, a man ri­deth a great way to learne experience, the man perhaps comes home the wiser, but his horse which perhaps saw as much as he, comes home just as he went out.

Now you see then, there is a great difference be­tweene the sence and the power that governeth the sence; like as the report of a Spy is one thing, and the Spy himselfe another, and the wisedome of the Cap­taine which receiveth the report, and judgeth of it, is a third: nay, who can deny, but sence and reason are divers things, or rather, who will not grant, that in many things they are cleane contrary? Sence bid de­ny, shun, and eschew griefe: whereas reason biddeth sometimes, proffer our legge to the Chyrurgion to be cut off. He that should see Scevola, or Archbishop, Cranmer of late times, burne off their owne hands without once gnashing their teeth, would hee not thinke they were utterly void of sence, so mightily doth reason over-rule sence. To be short, sence hath his peculiar inclination, which is appetite, and reason likewise hath his, which is will, and like as reason doth [Page 37] oftentimes over-rule sence, and is contrary to it, so will correcteth the apetite, or lust that is in us, & war­rath against it for in Agues and feavers wee covet to drink, in Apoplexies, and Bethargies to sleepe, and in hunger to eate, yet from all these things doth our will restraine us: the more a man follows his lust, the lesse is he led by his will (for no man wils to be miserable, which lust leads him too) & the more he standeth up­on pleasing of his sences, the lesse reason ordinarily useth he.

Secondly, let us consider that bruit beasts which 2 have this sensitive part as well as we, if wee have no more then that, how comes it to passe, that a little child driveth whole flocks and herds of them, vvhether hee listeth, & sometimes whether they would not? wher­of commeth it, that many of them in their kind, doe all live, nestle, and sing after one sort: whereas men have their Laws, Common-wealths, manners of buildings, and formes of reasoning, not only divers, but also commonly contrary? now what can harbour these contrarieties together, but only that which hath not any thing contrary to it: and wherein all things doe lay away their contrariety? Surely, it is not the sence can doe it, whose proper and peculiar object is most contrary to sence. Beside this (as I said before) whereas we conceive wisedome, skill and vertue, and such other things, as are all bodilesse: our sences can worke upon nothing, but the qualities of bodily substances: and whereas wee make universall rules of particular things, the sences attaine no further, then the particular things themselves: and whereas wee con­clude of the causes by the effects, our sences perceive [Page 47] nothing but the bare effects, so that hee that denieth, that besides the common sence, there is a reason, or un­derstanding in Man, distinct and severed from sence, is void both of understanding and sence.

Yea, Object. but this reason (say they) or power of under­standing, which is in Man, is corruptible as well as the power of perceiving by the sences. I thinke I have proved the contrary already: nevertheles let us examin the reason a little further. The forme or shape of every thing (say they) doth perish with the matter: Now the soule is, (as they would say) the forme or shape of the body; therefore it corrupteth with the body. This Argument were rightly concluded, if the soule were a materiall forme, but I have proved that the soule is immortall, and hath a continuance of it selfe: and in­deed the more it is discharged of matter, the more it retaineth his own particular forme, therefore the cor­rupting of the matter toucheth not the soule at all.

Another saith, if dead mens soules live still, why doe none of them come to tell us so?

And Answ. now he thinketh he hath stumbled upon a very subtle device, Christ answers, Luke 16. ult. yet we will see a little the rationality, or rather the irrationality of it viz. of the objection.

What intercourse I pray is there betweene things that have bodies, and things that have none? wee see there is small, or no intercourse betweene some King­domes under the Sunne. But we would have God send us soules from Heaven to make us beleeve, as who should say, it stood God greatly in hand to make us be­leeve, more then it did us that we should beleeve, in ef­fect, what else is all this, but a desiring that some man [Page 46] might returne againe into his Mothers wombe, to en­courage young babes against the bitter pinches and paines which they abide in the birth, which he would no lesse abhorre then wee doe death, if he had the knowledge of them. Object.

But they will still beare us in hand, that seeing the vegetive, and sensitive powers be corrupted and pe­rish, the understanding, or reasonable part must needs perish by the same rule: also,

To this (in a word) I answer, this is all one, Answ. as if a man should say, you told me such a man was a very re­ligious man, a good Fencer, and a good Musician, but now he hath lost his right hand, he can neither handle sword nor lute: how then can hee be a religious man still, as you reported him to be? nay, though he loose Instruments, yet ceaseth he not to be an honest man, yea and a Fencer, and Lute-player too in respect of skill; likewise, when our soules have forgone these exercises, yet cease they not to be the same they were before. To make this a little cleare yet, of the powers of the soule, some are exercised by the instruments of the body, & othersome, without any helpe or furthe­rance of the body at all. These which are exercised by the body, are the sences, and powers of the sences, and the powers of the growing, which may carry the same like answer, that is betweene a Musician, and his Lute. Breake his Lute, his cunning remaineth, but his putting it in practice faileth; give him another Lute, and he fals to playing againe afresh. Give unto the ol­dest Hag in the world, the same eyes he had when he was young, he shall see as well as ever he did: after the same manner it is with the growing and thriving [Page 40] power, the vegative power in man, restore to it a good stomack, a sound Liver, and a perfect heart: it shall execute its function, as well as ever it did before.

The power which worketh of it selfe without the body, is the power of reason and understanding, which if wee will, wee may call the mind, but if you still doubt thereof, consider when thou mindest a thing ear­nestly, what thy body furthereth thy mind therein? and thou shalt perceive, that the more fixedly thou thinkest upon it, the lesse thou mindest the things before thee, in so much, that many times, the earnestnesse of his thoughts drives a man (that is going) out of his way, as who should say, that the workings of the body are the greatest impediments that can be, to the peculiar acts of the mind: nay, which is more, this understand­ing part, groweth so much the stronger and greater, the lesse it is occupied & busied about these base and con­temptible things, and is altogether drawne home, wholly to it selfe, as is plainly seene in those that want their eyes, whose minds are commonly most apt to un­derstand, and most firme to remember, do we debate of a thing in our selves? neither our bodies nor sences are busied about it, doe wee will the same? as little doe they stir for that too: to understand, and to will, which are the operations of the mind, the soule hath no need of the body, as for working and being, they accompa­ny one another, saith Aristotle. Therefore to continue still in being, the soule hath not to doe with the body, nor any need of the body: therefore for the soule to act well, or to be well, it had need be quite freed from the body.

But Object. (say they) wee see men forgoe their reason as [Page 41] fooles and melancholly persons, and seeing it is for­gone, it may also be corrupted, and if corrupted, it may also die, for what is death, but an utter and full corrup­tion?

Nay, thou shouldst say rather, I have seen divers, who have seemed to have lost their right wits, have recovered them againe by good diet and medicinable drinks, but had they beene utterly lost and gone; no physick could have restored them againe; therefore of necessity the soule was as sound as before: it was but like an ecclypse of the Sunne, it seems be dimmed; but it is but by the comming of the Moone betweene him and us, in his light there is no abatement at all, but only quoad nos, likewise our eye conceiveth things ac­cording to the spectacles through which it looketh upon them: take away the Moon or clouds and the Sun shineth cleare: take away the impediments, the eye seeth clear, purge away the humours, our imaginations shall be pure, and our understanding as bright as ever, it fareth not with our soules, as it doth with our bo­dies, which after a long sicknesse retaine still, either a hardnesse of the spleene, or a shortnesse of the breath, weaknesse of body, or a falling downe of Rheume upon the lungs; nor as a wound that retaineth a scarre which cannot be worne out, for neither in their un­derstanding, nor in their wils doe our soules feele any abatement: and this appeareth in lunatick folks, and others, who have their wits troubled at times, and by fits, for they be not vexed but at the stirring of their humour, being at other times sober and well e­nough staid in their wits: the like is seen in them that [Page 42] have the falling sicknesse, their understanding seemes only to be ecclipsed, during the time of their fits, but afterward they be as discreet as though they ayled no­thing, you shall never see any body out of his wits, in whom the Physician may not manifestly perceive, ei­ther some default of tht instruments, or some over­flowing of some melancholly humour, that troubled and marred his body, before it troubled or impaired his mind. To be short, whosoever saith, that mans soul perisheth with the body, because it is troubled by the distemperature, or indisposition of the body, may as well uphold and maintaine, that the Child in his mo­thers wombe dieth with his mother, because he moveth with her, and is partaker with her in her harmes, and throws, by reason of the straight conjunction that is between them, and yet we see many children have li­ved safe and sound, notwithstanding their mothers have died: yea, and some of them have come into the world, Object. even by the death of their mothers.

Lastly, whereas some say, that our minds cannot conceive any thing here but by the helpe of the ima­gination: and therfore when the imagination is gone, with the instruments whereto it is tyed, the soule can not worke, nor consequently be.

To this I answer, that it is all one, as if they should say, that because the child being in his mothers womb taketh nourishment of her blood, by his navill, there­fore he cannot live when he is come out of her womb, and his navill strings cut off, when wee see that then is the time that the mouth, and the tongue, and the other parts of the Child doe their dutie, which served before to no purpose, saving that they [Page 43] were prepared for the time to come: even so the soule being scaped out of the body, as a Child out of the wombe, shall begin to performe his operations by himselfe, and that more certainely, for that it shall not bee subject to false reports, neither to the sences inward or outward, but to the very things themselves, which it shall have seene and learned in it selfe: To be short, it shall live, but not in prison, it shall see, but not through spectacles; it shall understand, but not by reports; it shall will, but not by the way of lusting: the infirmities which the body casteth upon it now shall then be done away.

Let us conclude then, that our soule is an un­derstanding, reasonable power, over which death or corruption have no power: If any man yet doubt thereof, let him but examine himselfe: for even his owne doubts will prove it to him: If he stand in contention still, let him fall to rea­soning with himselfe, for by concluding his Ar­guments to prove his soule mortall, hee shall give judgement himselfe, that it is immortall. If I have left out any thing that might bee alleaged, (for who is able to alleage all in justification of any point) let it suffice that here is sufficient for the satisfaction of the ingenuous: If any be otherwise minded, let him see how they can answer these my aforesaid Argu­ments: Consider vvhat I have writen, and the Lord give you a right understanding.