PRide and Vain-Glory, are Things which Human Nature is strangely subject to; there being scarce any one so mean, but who judges that he hath something or other that he may justly be Proud of, and value himself for. But as Pride is Folly in the general, so it apparently dis­covers itself in this respect, That those Men are usu­ally most Vain, who have the least Reason to be so, and that too in Things that are the least valuable in themselves. Thus, as the Prophet intimates in the Verse before the Text, Men frequently glory in Bodily Strength, in Beauty, and Agility, and in the Affluence of external Possessions: Things which are the meanest Appurtenances to our Natures, and which are neither in our Power to get nor keep. Wisdom indeed, and Judgment, Learning and Parts, Wit and Penetration, and all the Nobler Endowments of our Minds, are things of the greatest intrinsick Worth and Value, and we have much more reason to esteem our selves for them, than for all the Goods of Fortune, or any Bodily Excellencies. But yet, Let not the wise man Glory in his Wisdom and Knowledge neither; [Page 4] tho' as the Targum on the place hints, it were as great as that of Solomon himself; for we have in reality no just ground to value our selves for even this, when we consider that the best of us have it but in a very slender Proportion; and that our highest Knowledge is very imperfect and defective. Hence it comes to pass, or at least ought to do so, that the Modesty and Humility of truly knowing Men en­creases with their Learning and Experience: Their being raised something above the common level, in­stead of lessening and shortening in their Eyes the Statures of other Men, encreases their Prospect of a Boundless Field of Knowledge all around them; the more of which they discover, the more they find yet undiscover'd. But he that knows but little, vainly thinks he knows every thing, and judges all is empty and void that is without the Bounds of his scanty Horizon.

Another great Vanity there is also in Pride, which is, That Men are frequently conceited and Proud of those things, which they have the least share of, and are fond of such Actions as do plainly discover their Defects. For usually those Men are most forward to talk of Learning, who are least acquainted with Books; and those make the greatest Noise about, and Pretensions to Philosophy, who have the least insight into Nature. Those who talk most of Certainty and Demonstration have usually the most confused Idea's, and the most Superficial Notions of things, and are the farthest of all Men from true Science. This is apparently seen in the Pretenders to Scepticism and Infidelity, and in all the Atheistical Writers. No Men express themselves with such an insupportable [Page 5] Insolence as these New Lights, these Reformers of our Philosophy and our Politicks; who yet after all are Proud knowing nothing, as St. Paul speaks, Rom. 1.21. But are vain in their imaginations; their foolish heart is darkened, and professing themselves to be wise, they become fools. And therefore it is that the wisdom of God appears as foolishness to them, because the carnal mind savoureth not the things that are of God.

Tho' would Men but studiously apply themselves to consider of, would they carefully and impartially examine into, and would they but seriously make use of those Means that God hath graciously given Mankind, in order to attain a sufficient Knowledge of his Nature and Perfections; They would then find so much Beauty, Wisdom, Harmony, and Excellency in this inexhaustible Fund of Knowledge, as would sufficiently Reward their Pains and Endeavours. And this we may glory in; this Knowledge will be the most noble and honourable that our Capacities can attain unto; and in comparison of which, there is no other Qualification and Excellence in our Natures at all valuable. For here we have an Object the greatest and most perfect that can be, the more we know of which, the more we shall exalt and perfect our selves. Here are no empty Speculations; no difficiles Nugae, no false Lights, nor Phantastical Ap­pearances; but 'tis a real and substantial, an useful and practical Knowledge; a Knowledge that doth not only delight us for the present, but which brings constant and lasting Satisfaction here, and eternal Happiness hereafter. Let him therefore that glorieth, glory in this, that he understandeth and knoweth God, that He is the Lord, who exerciseth loving kindness, [Page 6] judgment and righteousness in the earth, for in these things do I delight, saith the Lord. In which words, there are these two Things chiefly considerable:

I. A Supposition that God is capable of being known to us by his Attributes.

II. An Account of some of those Attributes which he exerciseth in the Earth, and in which he delights.

Under which Two Heads, I shall, in pursuance of my general Design, endeavour to Answer those Ob­jections that Atheistical Men have brought against the Attributes and Perfections of the Divine Nature.

I. Here is a Supposition that God is capable of being known to us by his Attributes. He that glo­rieth, let him glory in this, that he understandeth and knoweth God, that he is the Lord, who exerciseth loving kindness, judgment and righteousness in the earth.

'Tis plainly supposed here, That this Knowledge which we are directed to acquire, is a possible Know­ledge. God would not command us to understand him by his Attributes of Goodness, Mercy and Justice, which he continually exerciseth in the Earth, if it were impossible for us to attain to it: He would not delight to do such Works in the World, if nothing of them could be known, nor himself by them. But the Psalmist tells us, the Lord is known by his Works: And that the Heavens declare his Glory, and the Fir­mament sheweth his handy-work: And St. Paul is ex­press, That the Invisible Things of Him are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his Eternal Power and Godhead.

[Page 7]And indeed, These Attributes of God are what is most and best known to us, and from the certain Knowledge that we have of these, we may be effe­ctually assured of the Existence of some first Cause, some Supream Being in whom all these Attributes and Perfections must inhere. The Infinite Nature, indeed, of This Divine Being is Incomprehensible to our shallow and scanty Understandings, and we can­not by searching find it out, nor discover the Almighty unto Perfection. But notwithstanding we have as cer­tain a Knowledge, and as clear Idea's of his Attri­butes as we have of any thing in the World. And Grotius's Gloss on this place is very just and proper: God doth not bid Men know him according to his Nature, which exceeds Humane Capacity to do, but according to those Attributes or Properties of his which relate to Mankind, which the Hebrews call Middôth, i.e. those Measures or Dimensions of Him which are proportionable to our Understandings and Capacities. And such his Attributes are, for we see them visibly exerted in the Works of the Creation, and we find them necessarily included in the Notion that we have of the Supream Being, or the First Cause of all things; as I have already shewed in ano­ther Discourse.

But this, some are pleased to deny; and say, That nothing at all can be known of God, but only, that he is: for his Nature is perfectly Incomprehensible; that we do but dishonour God, by pretending to Understand and to talk about his Attributes; about which we can say nothing but only what serves to ex­press our Astonishment, Ignorance, and Rusticity; and therefore the Civil Magistrate ought to determine [Page 8] what Attributes shall be given to the Deity. This seems to be the Sense of Vaninus, and is plainly of Mr. Hobbs; and was before them of Sextus Empi­ricus. Which take in their own words:

Non Deum melius Intelligimus quam per ea quae negamus nos Intelligere, saith Vaninus Amphi­theatr. Provid. Aetern. p. 9.. Again, Deum nullis tam plenè indicatum intelligimus Vocibus, quàm iis quae Ignorantiam nostram praetendunt. We can have, saith Mr. Hobbs, no Conception of the Deity, and consequently all his Attributes signifie only our Inability and Defect of Power to conceive any thing concerning Him, except only this, that there is a God Humane Nature, p. 69.. And in another place, saith he, God's Attributes cannot signifie what he is, but ought to signifie our desire to honour him; but they that venture to reason of his Nature from these Attributes of honour, losing their Vnderstanding in the very first Attempt, fall from one Inconvenience to another without End and Number, and do only dis­cover their Astonishment and Rusticity Leviath. p. 374.. Again, When Men (saith he) out of Principles of Natural Reason dispute about the Attributes of God, they do but dishonour him; for in the Attributes we give to God, we are not to consider Philosophical Truth Leviath. p. 191.. And therefore he concludes, That those Attributes which the Soveraign Power shall ordain in the Wor­ship of God, as signs of Honour, ought to be ta­ken and used for such by Private Men in their Pub­lick Worship Leviath. p. 192.. In which he agrees as he useth to do, exactly with Sextus Empiricus; who tells us that the Sceptick is in the right for assert­ing Gods according to the Laws and Custom of his Country; and in paying them that veneration and wor­ship which on the same account becomes due to them, [Page 9] will not venture to determine any thing Philosophically about them [...]. Adv. Math. p. 317..

Now from these Passages, I think it appears plain enough, that tho' these Men did in words pretend to own and acknowledge a God, yet in Fact they were Atheists, and had no true Belief of any such Being. For a Deity without the Attributes of Understanding and Wisdom, without Ends or Design; none of which Mr. Hobbs asserts expresly, can be in God Leviath. p. 190., is a Ridiculous stupid Being, an Idol that every rational Agent must needs despise, and which can never be the Object of any one's Adoration, Love, or Obe­dience. To assert therefore that the Attributes of God are not discoverable by Reason, nor agreeable to Philosophical Truth, but may be declared to be any thing which the Soveraign Power pleases to make them; this is designedly to expose the Belief and Notion of a Deity, and to render it so Precarious, that it can be the Object of no Rational Man's Faith. And this last named Writer Treats the Deity after the same manner in most other Places of his Works; He saith, we must not say of Him that he is Finite, that he hath figure Parts or Totality, that he is here or there, that he moveth or resteth, or that we can con­ceive or know any thing of him; for all this is to dis­honour him: And yet to say that he is an Immaterial Substance, that he is an Infinite and Eternal Spirit, is, he saith, Nonsense, and what destroys and contra­dicts it self. However he is willing to allow the word Immaterial or Spirit to be used towards God, as a Mark of Honour and Respect.

That is, we may attribute to God what we know to be Nonsense and Contradiction, and this is the Way [Page 10] to Honour him; and to speak of him any other way, is to Dishonour Him! Who doth not perceive that it was plainly the Design of this Writer to treat of the Deity after such a manner, as should deprive Him of all Knowledge and Care of Humane Affairs, and con­sequently, effectually Banish out of Mens Minds a just Veneration for Him, and Adoration of Him? Such Men are the most Dangerous and Mischievous of all others; Profess'd Atheists can do no great Harm; for all Persons are aware of them, and will justly abhor the Writings and Conversation of Men that say boldly there is no God. But there are but few such; they have found a way to pass undiscovered under a fairer Dress and a softer Name: They pre­tend to be true Deists and sincere Cultivators of Na­tural Religion; and to have a most Profound Respect for the Supream and Almighty Being: But when this Profound Respect comes to be throughly examined and duly understood, it will appear to be the most abominable Abuse that can be, and a most wicked and Blasphemous Idea of the Deity. For they make him either nothing but the Soul of the World, Universal Matter, or Natura Naturata, a God that is an absolutely necessary Agent, without any Rectitude in his Will; without any Knowledge, Wisdom, Goodness, Justice, Mercy, or Providence over his Works. But let such Persons take what Names they please upon them­selves, a little consideration will soon discover what they are in reality; and, I hope, give Men a just ab­horrence of such Notions, tho' never so speciously put forth.

But let us now proceed to examine what Ground there is from the Nature of the Thing, for Men to [Page 11] advance such wicked Opinions, and to shew the weak­ness and precariousness of them. And here it must be premised and taken for granted, that there is a God. This is what the Persons I am now concerned with, pretend to own, and to acknowledge. Which being supposed: It appears very plain that we may have if we will, and some Persons, as I have shew'd Sermon 4^th. and 5^th., have always had, a very clear Notion or Idea of the At­tributes and Perfections of such a Being; as also that they are fixed and immutable Properties in the Divine Nature. For by professing to believe a God, they must mean, if they mean any thing, The first Cause and Author of all Things, and the Governour and Disposer of them; A Divine Being, containing in him­self all possible Perfections; without being subject to any manner of Defect. This I have already hinted at in another place In my Se­cond Sermon, and shall now more large­ly prove.

So far is it from being true, that we cannot reason of the Nature of God from his Attributes, nor Discourse of those Attributes from our Reason; That this seems to be the only proper Way of enquiring into the wonderful Depth of the Divine Perfections. I mean, the only Way we have without Revelation, for I am not now considering what God hath farther disco­vered of Himself to us by his Word. For tho' the Deity doth abound with Infinite Excellencies and Per­fections; yet by the Light of Nature we can discover those only, of which he hath given us some Im­pression on our own Natures; and these are the Scales and Proportions by which our Reason must measure the Divine Attributes and Perfections. For in order to gain good and true Notions of these, we ought [Page 12] to take our Rise from those Perfections and Excel­lencies which we find in the Creatures, and especially in our selves.

There can be but two Ways of coming to the Know­ledge of any thing; by its Cause, and by its Effects. 'Tis impossible for us to make use of the former of these, in Reference to the Deity: For He being himself without Cause, and the First Cause and Original of all Things cannot be known to us this Way. But by the second Way, he very properly may be the Object of our Knowledge, and we ought to apply our selves to this Method, in order to understand the Attributes of God. For whatever Excellency or Perfection we can any way discover in the Effects of God in the World, i. e. in the Works of the whole Creation; the same we cannot but suppose must be in Him, in the highest and most noble Proportion and Degree; since they are all owing to, and derived from Him.

And if we take a serious and considerate View of the Excellencies and Perfections that are to be found in the Creatures, or the Works of God in the World; we shall find that they may be redu­cible to these Four general Heads; Being or Sub­stance, Life, Sensibility, and Reason. All which we find to be in our selves, and therefore they are at hand, and ready to assist our Meditations; and these will, if duly considered, lead us into a good Way of discovering the Attributes and Perfections of the Di­vine Nature. And I doubt not but a great Reason why Men have had and advanced wrong Notions of God, hath been because they have had such of them­selves, and of those Perfections that are in our own Natures. Men that do not understand that the true [Page 13] Perfection of Humane Nature consists in Moral Good­ness, or in an Universal agreeableness of our Will to the Eternal Laws of Right Reason, cannot conceive aright of the Attributes and Perfections of God: For they will be for making him like themselves, guided by vehement Self-love, and inordinate Will, or whatever predominant Passions possess them.

'Twere easie to Trace this in the Epicurean Notion of a God dissolved in Ease and Sloth, and who neg­lects the Government of the World, to enjoy his own private Pleasures; and in the Hobbian one of a Deity not guided by any Essential Rectitude of Will, but only by Arbitrary, Lawless, and irrisistible Power; for both these Opinions are exactly agreeable to the Genius and humours of their Authors and Propagators.

But to proceed with our Deduction of the Divine Attributes from the Excellencies and Perfections which we find in our selves. 1. If in the first place we con­sider Being, and the high Perfections that do belong to it; we shall find that they must needs be in the Deity, who is the First and Supream Being, and the Cause and Author of all others in the World, in the utmost Perfection. Now the highest Perfe­ctions belonging unto Being, we find to be these two: 1. That it shall have an underivable and necessary Existence, always be, and never cease, die, terminate or be extinct; and, 2. That it be Great and Ample as to its Extent, in opposition to Littleness or Scanty­ness, and to being Limited, Circumscribed, Bounded or Restrained by any Other Thing.

And if we attribute these two Perfections to God, thence will plainly Arise his Eternity, and his Im­mensity or Omnipresence. For what cannot possibly [Page 14] cease to be, but hath necessary Existence included in its Nature, is Eternal. And what cannot be any way Limited, Circumscribed or Restrained, must needs be Boundless and Immense, and present every where. And I dare say, that these Notions of God's Eternity and Immensity, do find an easie admission into, and are firmly rooted in all considerate and unprejudiced Minds; and who are not debauched by Sceptical and Atheistical Metaphysicks. For 'tis impossible for any one that thinks at all, to have a Notion of a Deity that can die, or cease to be; or that is so confined and imprisoned in any one part of Space, that he can ex­tend himself no farther: No! it must be an Epicu­rean Stupefaction of Soul, indeed, that can induce a Man to fancy a Mortal or a Topical God; one that may be slain, or die of old Age, or be shackled and confined to any one part of the Universe, exclusive of the rest. And tho' a Man cannot find perhaps that he hath an adequate Idea of Eternity; yet that God must be without Beginning or End, he will readily allow, as soon as he considers the Thing; for he will perceive that the First Cause of all Things could not be caused by any thing else, but must be Self-existent, and without Beginning: and if nothing could cause his Being, nothing can take it away neither, and con­sequently he must be Everlasting or Eternal. And of this Attribute the Heathens had a clear Idea and Belief, giving God the Title of [...], and Swear­ing usually by the Immortal Gods. Tully saith, Deum nisi Sempiternum Intelligere quî possumus? How can we conceive the Deity any otherwise than to be an Eter­nal Being. And Aristotle in many places makes Eter­nity Essential to the Idea of God; and particularly, Lib. 2. de Coelo.

[Page 15]And so as to Immensity or Omnipresence, tho' he, in­deed, cannot tell the manner how a Spirit or Imma­terial Substance permeates Matter, or is present to every part of it; yet he will conclude that the Deity must some how or other actually fill and be present with all things; since 'tis impossible he should be excluded any where, or be in any respect bounded or limited; as 'tis also that he should act or operate where he is not. Nor would, I believe, any free and unprejudiced Mind have recourse either to the No­tion of God's being Universal Matter or Infinite Space, in order to solve His Immensity or Omnipresence. For the former, he would see, necessarily makes the Deity materially divisible, into Parts actually separated from each other; and to be part of him here, and part there; which he could not but think monstrously absurd and impossible: and the latter renders God nothing at all, but Imaginary Room, Vacuity or Space, in which Bodies are capable of Moving up and down, or to and fro, without hindrance or impediment from any Medium. Which how it should, any more than the former account for the Energetical Power, Wis­dom, Justice and Goodness of the Divine Nature, (the noblest Perfections he can have any Idea of) 'twould be as impossible for him to conceive, as it is for the Assertors of it to prove. The ancient Hea­thens allowed this Attribute of Immensity to the Deity, by common consent. Tully tells us, That Pythagoras asserted, Deum esse animum per Naturam Rerum omnium intentum & comeantem, De Nat. Deorum. And he cites it as the Opinion of Thales Milesius; Deorum omnia esse Plena, De Legib. lib. 2. which Virgil also affirms expresly,—Jovis omnia plena. And again, [Page 16] Deum nam (que) ire per omnes Terras tractus (que) maris, coe­lum (que) profundum, Georg. lib. 4. And Seneca tells us, That God is ubi (que) & omnibus proesto Ep. 95.. And in ano­ther place De Benef. lib. 4., Quocun (que) te flexeris, ibi Deum videbis Occurrentem tibi, nihil ab illo vacat, Opus suum ipse Implet.

2. If we consider Life; Another Perfection which we find in our selves, we must needs conclude that this is in the Deity too, who is the great Author and Fountain of Life, in the highest Degree and Propor­tion imaginable. Now the Perfection of Life seems to consist in Activity, or an Energetical Power to Act, or Operate; in opposition to Impotence, Weakness, or Inability. And this Perfection, no one sure can pos­sibly doubt to be in the Deity. For besides that 'tis impossible for us to conceive that Life and Activity in our selves can proceed from a Dead and Unactive Principle; our Reason must needs reject the Notion of an Inanimate, and Impotent Deity, or of one that is any way defective in Power, as soon as it can be proposed to it. Can we imagine that a Being from whom all Life, Power and Energy is derived, can be without it himself? and that he who hath, as Simplicius calls it, [...], a whole entire or per­fect Power, that hath all the Power of Nature at His Command, can be unable to perform whatever is possible to be done? that is, whatever is agreeable to, and consistent with, the other Attributes of the Divine Nature? And if so, must not then such a Being be own'd to be Almighty or Omnipotent? From whence we see another great Attribute doth plainly arise. And of this Attribute of the Deity, there was a plain and clear Notion all along among the Heathen [Page 17] Writers; as appears from Homer in many places, who speaking of God, says, [...]. The same thing also we have in the Fragments of Linus, long before Him. And in Callimachus also, in express words. As also in Agatho, an Ancient Greek Poet cited by Aristotle in his Ethicks. So in Virgil and Ovid, you have frequently the Title of Pater Omni­potens given to the Deity. And this Attribute of Infinite Power in God, Epicurus set himself with all his might to confute; denying there was any such thing as Infinite Power at all; that thereby (says Lucretius, lib. 1.) he might take away Religion too.

And from hence also his Eternity might be natu­rally deduced. For we cannot conceive this Life or Activity, this Almighty Power that is in God, can ever cease, decay or determine, any more than it can have had a beginning, and consequently such a Being must necessarily Exist, be Eternal, or Endure and Live for Ever.

3. If we proceed a little higher, and consider Sen­sibility which is another great Perfection that we find in our selves, and some other Creatures, we must needs Attribute This also, and that in the highest degree, to the Divine Nature. I take this now in the general, for that Power or Faculty whereby any Being is capable of taking Pleasure or feeling Pain. And such a Sen­sibility, or something Analogous to it, we cannot but think God must have in the most exquisite Perfection, since our Own, as well as that of all other Creatures, must be derived from Him. And tho', indeed, we ought to think that the Infinite Perfection of his Nature secures him from all Possibility of feeling Pain, (since nothing can contradict his Will, run [Page 18] counter to his Desires, or frustrate his Expectations) yet we have no reason to suppose the Deity insen­sible of Pleasure; but may justly conclude from hence, that he is always most perfectly happy. For he con­tains in Himself all Possible Good and Infinite Excel­lencies and Perfection, and of this He is most exqui­sitely sensible, and consequently must eternally be Pleased and delighted with himself in the Enjoyment of his own Infinite Fulness: And this Notion many of the Heathens had of God, that he was a most Happy Being; stiling Him frequently, [...]; and [...].

4. But the Highest Perfection which we can dis­cover in our selves, and in any created Beings what­ever, is Reason. And this, no doubt, we ought also to attribute to God in the highest Degree and Per­fection. Now the Perfection of Reason seems to con­sist in these two Things:

1. In Knowledge and Wisdom in the Understanding Faculty. And,

2. In Rectitude or Righteousness in the Will.

All which we cannot but suppose the Divine Nature to be perfectly endowed with. And first as to Know­ledge and Wisdom; The former of which, implies an Understanding of things as they are in themselves, according to their true Natures and Properties: And the latter, a considering of them as to their Relations to, and Dependances upon one another; or in other words, according as they are fit or qualified to be Ends or Means.

And these must certainly be in God, for the same reason that we have found in Him the other Perfe­ctions above-mentioned. To the Deity therefore, [Page 19] from this Consideration, we ought to Attribute Om­niscience, and Infinite, or most perfect Wisdom; for no doubt we ought to conclude, That the Deity both knows every thing according to its Nature, and also understands its Usefulness and Subservience to any End, Design or Purpose whatsoever. And therefore it was as stupidly or impiously said by Mr. Hobbs, That there can be no such thing as Knowledge in God, and that he can have no Ends. For I cannot imagine there can one so grossly Ignorant and Foolish be found among Mankind, who doth really believe there can be an ignorant or a foolish God; and who would not abhor such a Position as monstrously absurd and impossible. A Man must be a long while conversant with Athe­istical and Sceptical Philosophy, before he can grow so dull as not to perceive the force and Power of the Psalmists Logick and reasoning in Psal. 94. v. 8, 9, &c. and he must be very Studiously brutish and Learnedly foolish, before he can think that he that planted the Ear, should not be able to hear himself; and that he that formed the Eye should not see; and that he that gave and taught all Knowledge to Men should have none himself.

The mighty Reason that Mr. Hobbs is pleased to give, Why there can be no Understanding in God is, because that Faculty being in us nothing but a Tumult of Mind, raised by External Things that press the Or­ganical Parts of our Bodies Leviath. p. 190., there can be no such thing in God. And in other places, he sagaciously determines, that 'tis impossible to hear without Ears, to see without Eyes, and to Understand without Brains, none of which God hath; and therefore must be Igno­rant and Stupid. But, methinks, 'tis very hardly [Page 20] done of Him, to determine the Deity to be Corporeal, and yet to assign Him none of these Material Organs in order to make him an Intelligent Being. Why should not the same Matter which is able to form the Mechanick Understanding of so great a Philosopher, be capable of being modified as Intelligently in the Divine Nature? Must the Deity have the worst and most stupid Body of All others? Into what abomi­nable Absurdities will such Principles as these lead a Man! or rather into what abominable Impieties and Blasphemies will Vice and Pride hurry him! He doth not only think wickedly that the Deity is such an one as himself, but infinitely worse; a Corporeal Being that hath less and fewer Perfections than a Corporeal Man! But I must not dwell on shewing the Design of this Writer, having sufficiently done it already. I shall only now add, that I think I have already proved that Matter alone cannot think, know, nor under­stand; and therefore it is not Mens Brains, but their Soul that hath this Intelligent Power; and no doubt an Infinite and Immaterial Mind, needs not any Ma­terial Organs to convey Knowledge to him, in whom all the Treasures of Wisdom and Knowledge do In­habit, and from whom they are all derived and do proceed.

And there was, Anciently amongst the Heathens, a clear belief of the Infinite Knowledge and Wisdom of God. Tully tells us, that Thales used commonly to say, Deos omnia cernere, the Gods behold or know all things. And Seneca saith, Deo nihil Clausum est; interest Animis nostris, & mediis cogitationibus inter­venit. And as to the Wisdom of God, Tully deduces it after the same manner as we now have done, by [Page 21] attributing the Excellencies of the Creature to the Deity in the Highest Perfection. Sapiens est Homo, saith he, & propterea Deus; Man hath Wisdom, and therefore God, from whom the Wisdom in Man is derived, must needs have it himself. But again, As we must attribute to God Infinite Knowledge and Wisdom; so we must Rectitude of Will or Perfect Righteousness too. And since the Rectitude of the Will consists in an exact Conformity of it and all its Affections to the Impartial Rule of Right Reason; we cannot but suppose also, that the Will of God is in a most exquisite Conformity to the Dictates of his Unerring Reason; and that the Deity doth in every respect act exactly agreeable thereunto. And by this means we shall find that God must be Just and Righ­teous in all his Proceedings, and that he always exe­cuteth Justice and Righteousness in the Earth, and de­lights in these things. Our Adversaries, indeed, do assert, That there is no such thing as any distinction between Good and Evil, Just and Vnjust, that can be taken from any common Rule, or from the Objects them­selves; but only with Relation to the Person that useth them; who calls that Good which he loves, and that Evil which he hates Leviath. p. 24, 63, 64, Spinozae Oper. Posth. p. 37.. That God doth every thing by his Irresisistible Power; and that in that is founded our Obedience to Him, and not in any Principle of Gra­titude to him (b) for Benefits which we have received from him. Leviath. p. 187. That Justice is founded in Power, and that whatever is Enacted by a Soveraign Power can't be Unjust. The Groundlessness of which Impious and Dangerous Notions, I shall fully shew in a subsequent Discourse; and therefore shall only now observe, that this Way of depriving the Deity of these most ex­cellent [Page 22] and lovely Attributes of Justice and Goodness, and making Him to Act only according to the Arbi­trary Dictates of Irresistible Power, gives us the No­tion of a Devil instead of a Deity, of an absolute Ty­rant, instead of a righteous Governour of the World; and is directly contrary to the Sober and Considerate Sentiments of all Mankind Plato calls the Deity [...], the very Idea or Essence of Good. And herein he seems to have followed the Pythagoreans and Timaeus Locrus in particular: Who asserts of Mind, according to him the first Principle of the Universe, that it is, [...], of the Nature of Good: And saith further, [...], that they call it God, and the Principle of the best things. Aristotle also reckons Moral Goodness among the Perfections of the Divine Nature: And Plutarch saith, 'tis one of the chiefest Excel­lencies in the Deity; and that on this account it is that Men love and honour Him. Hierocles in Carm. Pythagor. asserts the Deity to be Essentially Good, and not by Accidental or External Motives., in whose Minds a plain Di­stinction between Good and Evil is founded, and who can never be brought with­out doing great violence to themselves, to assert that the Deity is not guided in all things by the Eternal Rules of Truth and Justice, and that the Judge of all the Earth should not do right. They see the comliness and loveliness that there is in good and just Actions among Men; and therefore cannot suppose that an Infinite and Almighty Being can do any thing contrary to them; they are sensible that Deviations from those Rules pro­ceed only from the Defects and Imperfections that are in our Natures; but that God, who is [...], who possesseth and sustaineth all things, cannot make use of any indirect Means to procure himself Happiness, or to slave off Misery; since the Perfection of his Nature gives him all the one, and secures him from all the other. And they which certainly never believe that God will do any Action, that they do not think suitable to be [Page 23] done by a good and just Man; But will on just Grounds conclude, That whatever Excellence or Perfections they can any way discover to be in a Good Man, must needs be in the highest Proportion in God, and con­sequently that the Deity must be most Righteous, Just and Good, and most Kind, Merciful and Gracious in all his Dealings with his Creatures.

And thus we see how by considering the Excel­lencies and Perfections which we find in our selves, and attributing them in the Highest Proportion to that Supream Being the Deity, from whence they must all be derived; we may attain to a good and clear Knowledge of the Properties and Attributes of the Divine Nature: We may find them to be such as are agreeable to the plainest Reason and to Philoso­phical Truth: and consequently conclude, that they can have no such weak and precarious Foundation as the Order of the Civil Power, and the Will of the Supream Magistrate.

And were it now my Business, 'twere very easie from hence to shew also the True Foundation of Reli­gious Worship; that it doth depend on the Right Ap­prehensions and Notions that we have of the Attri­butes of God; and that our Obedience to Him, is founded in our Gratitude to him for the Benefits which we receive from Him, and consequently is our Reasonable Service. But the Proof of this will be more proper in another Place.