• I. THe Errours and Sufferings of the People, are from their Governours.
• II. When the Foundation of a Government cometh to be changed, and the Governours change not the Superstructures accordingly, the People become miserable.
• III. The Monarchy of England was not a Government by Arms, but a Government by Laws, though imperfect or in­effectual Laws.
• IV. The Later Governments in England, have been Govern­ments by Arms.
• V. The People cannot see, but they can feel.
• VI. The People having felt the difference between a Govern­ment by Laws, and a Government by Arms, will always de­sire the Government by Laws, and abhor that of Arms.
• VII. Where the spirit of the people is impatient of a Govern­ment by Arms, and desirous of a Government by Laws, there the spirit of the people is not unfit to be trusted with their Liberty.
• VIII. The spirit of the people of England, not trusted with their Liberty, driveth at the Restitution of Monarchy by Blood and Violence.
• [Page 2] IX. The spirit of the people of England, trusted with their Li­berty, if the form be sufficient, can never set up a King; and if the form be insufficient, (as a Parliament with a Council in the Intervals, or two Assemblies co-ordinate) will set up a King without Blood or Violence.
• X. To light upon a good man, may be in Chance; but to be sure of an Assembly of good men, is not in Prudence.
• XI. Where the Security is no more then Personal, there may be a good Monarch, but can be no good Commonwealth.
• XII. The necessary Action or Use of each thing, is from the na­ture of the Form.
• XIII. Where the Security is in the Persons, the Government maketh good men evil; where the Security is in the Form, the Government maketh evil men good.
• XIV. Assemblies legitimately elected by the People, are that onely Party which can govern without an Army.
• XV. Not the Party which cannot govern without an Army, but the Party which can govern without an Army, is the Refined Party, as to this intent and purpose truely Refined; that is, by Popular Election, according to the Precept of Moses, and the Rule of Scripture: Take ye wise men, and un­derstanding, and known among your tribes, and I will make them rulers over you.
• XVI. The People are deceived by Names, but not by Things.
• [Page 3] XVII. Where there is a well-ordered Commonwealth, the peo­ple are generally satisfied.
• XVIII. Where the people are generally dissatisfied, there is no Commonwealth.
• XIX. The parties in England declaring for a Commonwealth, hold every one of them something that is inconsistent with a Commonwealth.
• XX. To hold that the Government may be managed by a few, or by a party, is inconsistent with a Commonwealth; ex­cept in a Situation like that of Venice.
• XXI. To hold that there can be any National Religion or Mini­stry without publick Indowment and Inspection of the Ma­gistracy, or any Government without a National Religion or Ministry, is inconsistent with a Commonwealth.
• XXII. To hold that there may be Liberty, and not Liberty of Conscience, is inconsistent with a Commonwealth that hath the Liberty of her own Conscience, or that is not Po­pish.
• XXIII. Where Civil Liberty is entire, it includes Liberty of Conscience.
• XXIV. Where Liberty of Conscience is entire, it includes Civil Liberty.
• XXV. Either Liberty of Conscience can have no security at all, or under Popular Government must have the greatest securi­ty.
• [Page 4] XXVI. To hold that a Government may be introduced by a little at once, is to wave Prudence, & commit things unto Chance.
• XXVII. To hold that the Wisdom of God in the Formation of an House, or of a Government, goeth not universally upon na­tural principles, is inconsistent with Scripture.
• XXVIII. To hold that the wisdom of man in the Formation of an House, or of Government, may go upon supernatural princi­ples, is inconsistent with a Commonwealth, and as if one should say, God ordained the Temple, therefore it was not built by Masons; He ordained the Snuffers, therefore they were not made by a Smith.
• XXIX. To hold that Hirelings, (as they are termed by some) or an endowed Ministry, ought to be removed out of the Church, is inconsistent with a Commonwealth.
• XXX. Nature is of God.
• XXXI. Some part in every Religion is natural.
• XXXII. An Universal Effect, demonstrateth an universal Cause.
• XXXIII. An universal Cause is not so much natural, as it is Na­ture it self.
• XXXIV. Every man, either unto his Terrour or Consolation, hath some sense of Religion.
• XXXV. Man may rather be defined a Religious, then a Rational Creature; in regard that in other creatures there may be [Page 5] something of Reason, but is nothing of Religion.
• XXXVI. Government is of humane Prudence, and humane Pru­dence is adequate unto Mans Nature.
• XXXVII. The Prudence or Government that is regardless of Reli­gion, is not adequate nor satisfactory unto Mans Nature.
• XXXVIII. Where the Government is not adequate or satisfactory unto Mans Nature, it can never be quiet or perfect.
• XXXIX. The major part of mankinde giveth it self up in the mat­ter of Religion unto the publick leading.
• XL. That there may be a publick leading, there must be a Na­tional Religion.
• XLI. VVhere the minor part taketh away the National Religi­on, there the major part is deprived of the Liberty of Con­science by the minor.
• XLII. VVhere the major part is deprived of the Liberty of Con­science by the minor, there they will deprive the minor of that Liberty of Conscience which they might otherwise en­joy.
• XLIII. In Israel there was an endowed Clergie or Priesthood, and a National Religion under Inspection of the Magistrate: whence the Christians in Apostolick Times, defraying their own Ministry, could have Liberty of Conscience; whereas if the Christians by going about to take away Tythes, and a­bolish the National Religion, had endeavoured to violate the Consciences of the unconverted Jews, these being far grea­ter [Page 6] in number, must needs have taken away the Liberty of Conscience from the Christians.
• XLIV. Paul in Athens could freely and undisturbedly convert Dio­nysius and others; therefore in Athens there was Liberty of Conscience: but if Paul and his Converts had gone about to drive Hirelings, or an endowed Priesthood or Clergie out of that Church, who seeth not that the Athenians would have driven Paul and his Converts out of Athens?
• XLV. That there may be Liberty of Conscience, there must be a National Religion.
• XLVI. That there may be a National Religion, there must be an endowed Clergy.
• XLVII. Commonwealths have had their wayes of Union. As the Athenians, by bringing their Confederates unto Subjection. As the United Provinces, by an equal League. Or as the Ro­mans, by an unequal League. The first way is tyrannical: In the second, one Commonwealth under the League, is no more then another, and each one as to her self hath a Nega­tive: which kinde of Union, is not onely obstructive, but tendeth (as we have seen both in Holland and Switz) towards Division. In the third way, the Commonwealth uniting other Commonwealths, retaineth unto her self the leading of the whole League, leaving unto each of the rest her own Laws, and her own Liberty.
• XLVIII. Till a Commonwealth be first framed, how such a Com­monwealth should make an effectual Union with another Nation, is not possible to be seen.
• [Page 7] XLIX. The new, unpractised, and heretofore unheard-of Union, (as it is vulgarly spoken) with Scotland, by uniting Deputies of divers Nations, not in a Council apart, or by way of States General, as in the United Provinces, but in the stand­ding Councils of some one Commonwealth in the League, is destructive to Liberty both in England and in Scotland.
• L. If the Commonwealth of England receive Deputies from Scotland in a greater number then that of her own, she receiv­eth Law from a forraign Interest, and so loseth her own Li­berty.
• LI. If Scotland be received in an equal number, it obstructeth the freedom of both, or occasioneth War or Dissention.
• LII. If Scotland be received in an inferiour number, she receiv­eth Law from England, and so loseth her Liberty. The like is understood of Ireland.
• LIII. Whereas a well-ordered Commonwealth should give the Balance to her Confederates, and not receive it from them. The Councils in which divers others are thus united, though in a far inferiour number of Deputies, yet if these lie in wait, or lay their heads together, may be over-ruled, obstru­cted, or over-balanced by forraign interests.
• LIV. VVhere Countries are divers in their Laws, and yet are to receive Laws one from the other, neither the Common­wealth giving Law, knoweth what to give, nor the Common­wealth receiving Law, understandeth what she receiveth: in which case the Union returneth unto Force or Confufion.
• LV. The best way of holding a Nation different or not diffe­rent [Page 8] in Laws, is the Roman, that is, by way of Province.
• LVI. A Province, especially if she have strong holds, may by defraying of a small guard, be kept unto a just League, and for the rest enjoy her own Laws, her own Governmeut, and her perfect Liberty: other wayes of Union, will be found more chargeable, and less effectual, on both sides: for if Eng­land have no Army in Scotland, Scotland will receive no Law from England; and if England have an Army there, her hold consisteth not in the Union, but in the Force. The like is to be understood of Ireland.
• LVII. If a Country be very small, and not able to subsist of it self, as Wales, it may be safely united and held: but the ad­vantage that Wales hath in participation of all Magistracies and Offices, is not that which England is able to afford unto such a Country as Scotland, without subjecting her neck unto the yoke.
• LVIII. The order of a Commonwealth requireth, that it consist, first, of a Civil; secondly, of a Religious; thirdly, of a Mili­tary; and fourthly, of a Provincial Part. The manner of uniting Provinces or different Nations, appertaineth unto the last part; and in the formation of a Commonwealth, to be­gin with that first, which is naturally last, is to invert the or­der, and by Consequence the Commonwealth, which indeed is nothing but order.
• LIX. Where there can be any other Government, there can be no Commonwealth.
• LX. Where there can be a Commonwealth, what tumults soe­ver there happen, and which soever prevail, there can be no other Government; that is to say, without forraign invasion, which throughout, I must be understood to except.
• [Page 9] LXI. If Sir George Booth had prevailed, he must either have intro­duced a Commonwealth, or have restored a King.
• LXII. If a King were restored, he must either govern by an Ar­my, or by Parliaments.
• LXIII. A King governing now in England by an Army, would for the same Causes finde the same effects with the late Pro­tector.
• LXIV A King governing now in England by Parliaments, would finde the Nobility of no effect at all.
• LXV. A Parliament where the Nobility is of no effect at all, is a meer popular Council.
• LXVI. A meer popular Council, will never receive Law from a King.
• LXVII. A meer popular Council giving Law unto a King, beco­meth thereby a Democracy, or equal Commonwealth; or the difference is no greater then in the imperfection of the Form.
• LXVIII. A Commonwealth or Democracy to be perfect in the Form, must consist especially of such an Assembly, the re­sult whereof, can go upon no interest whatsoever, but that onely which is the common interest of the whole people.
• LXIX. An Assembly consisting of a few, may go upon the inte­rest of one man, as a King; or upon the interest of one party, as that of Divines, Lawyers, and the like; or the interest of themselves, and the perpetuation of their Government.
• [Page 10] LXX. The popular Assembly in a Commonwealth, may consist of too few, but can never consist of too many.
• LXXI. In every Commonwealth there hath been a popular As­sembly. This in Israel at the least consisted of twenty four thousand, upon a monthly Rotation. In Athens, Lacedemon, Rome, it consisted of the whole Citizens, that is, of all such as had right in the Commonwealth, whether they inhabited in City or Country. In Venice it consisteth of about two thousand. In the Province of Holland onely, which contain­eth eighteen or nineteen Soveraignties, the Popular or resol­ving Assemblies consist at the least of five hundred Persons: these in the whole Union, may amount unto five or six thou­sand; in Switz I believe they come unto a greater number. And the most of these Assemblies have been perpetually ex­tant.
• LXXII. If the popular Assembly consist of so few, and so eminent persons as are capable of any orderly debate, it is good for nothing but to destroy the Commonwealth.
• LXXIII. If the popular Assembly consist of so many, and for the greater part of so mean persons as are not capable of debate, there must be a Senate to help this defect.
• LXXIV. The Reason of the Senate, is, that a popular Assembly rightly constituted, is not capable of any prudent debate.
• LXXV. The Reason of the popular Assembly, is, that a Senate rightly constituted for debate, must consist of so few and e­minent persons, that if they have the result too, they will not resolve according unto the interest of the people, but accor­ding to the interest of themselves.
• [Page 11] LXXVI. A popular Assembly without a Senate, cannot be wise.
• LXXVII. A Senate without a popular Assembly, will not be honest.
• LXXVIII. The Senate and the popular Assembly being once rightly constituted, the rest of the Commonwealth will constitute it self.
• LXXIX. The Venetians having slain divers of their Dukes for their Tyranny, and being assembled by such numbers in their great Council as were naturally incapable of debate, pitched upon thirty Gentlemen who were called Pregati, in that they were prayed to go apart, and debating upon the Exigence of the Commonwealth, to propose as they thought good unto the great Council; and from thence first arose the Senate of Ve­nice, to this day called the Pregati; and the Great Council, that is, the Senate and the popular Assembly of Venice: and from these two arose all those admirable Orders of that Com­wealth
• LXXX. That a people of themselves should have such understan­ing as when they of Venice did institute their Pregati or Se­nate, is rare.
• LXXXI. That a Senate or Council of Governours having supreme power, should institute a popular Assembly, and propose to it, though in all reason it be the far more facile and practi­cable, is that which is rarer.
• LXXXII The diffusive body of the People is not in a natural ca­pacity of judging; for which cause, the whole judgement and power of the diffusive body of the People must be intirely and absolutely in their collective Bodies, Assemblies or Re­presentatives, or there can be no Commonwealth.
• [Page 12] LXXXIII. To declare that the Assemblies or Representatives of the People have power in some things, and in others not, is to make the diffusive Body, which is in a natural incapacity of judging, to be in a political capacity of judging.
• LXXXIV. To bring a natural incapacity of judging, unto a political capacity of judging, is to introduce Government. To bring a natural incapacity of judging, to such a collective or poli­tical capacity of judging, as yet necessarily must retain the interest of the diffusive Body, is to introduce the best kind of Government. But to lay any appeal whatsoever from a po­litical capacity of judging, to a natural incapacity of judg­ing, is to frustrate all Government, and to introduce Anar­chy. Nor is Anarchy, whether imposed or obtruded by the Legislator first, or by the People, or their Demagogues or Incendiaries afterwards, of any other kinde whatsoever, then of this onely.
• LXXXV. To make Principles or Fundamentals, belongeth not unto Men, unto Nations, nor unto humane Laws. To build upon such Principles or Fundamentals as are apparently laid by GOD in the inevitable necessity or Law of Nature, is that which truly appertaineth unto Men, unto Nations and un­to humane Laws. To make any other Fundamentals, and then build upon them, is to build Castles in the Air.
• LXXXVI. Whatever is violent, is not secure nor durable; whatever is secure or durable, is natural.
• LXXXVII. Government in the whole People, though the Major part were disaffected, must be secure and durable, because it [Page 13] waveth Force, to found it self upon Nature.
• LXXXVIII. Government in a Party, though all of these were well-af­fected, must be in-secure, and transitory, because it waveth Nature, to found it self upon Force.
• LXXXIX. Commonwealths, of all other Governments, are more e­specially for the preservation, not for the destruction of Man­kinde.
• XC. Commonwealths that have been given to cut off their dis­eased Limbs, (as Florence) have brought themselves unto impotence and ruine. Commonwealths that have been gi­ven unto healing their diseased Limbs (as Venice) have been healthful and flourishing.
• XCI. Athens under the Oligarchy of four hundred, was in finite­ly more afflicted and torn with Distraction, Blood and Ani­mositie of Parties, then is England; yet by introduction of a Senate of four hnndred, and a popular Assembly of five thousand, did thereupon, so suddenly, as if it had been a Charm, recover Might and Glory. See the eighth Book of Thucydides; A Story in these Times most necessary to be consi­dered.
• XCII. To leave our selves and Posterity to a farther Purchase in Blood or Sweat, of that which we may presently possess, enjoy, and hereafter bequeath unto Posterity in Peace and Glory, is inhumane and impious.
• XCIII. As certainly and suddenly as a good state of health dispel­leth the Peevishness and Peril of Sickness, doth a good state of Government, the Animosity and Danger of Parties:
• [Page 14] XCIV. The Frame of a Commonwealth having first been propo­sed and considered, Expedients (in case such should be found necessary for the safe, effectual and perfect introduction of the same) may with some aim be applied or fitted; as to an House, when the Model is resolved upon, we fit Scaffolds in building. But first to resolve upon Expedients, and then to fit unto them the Frame of a Commonwealth, is as if one should set up Props, and then build a House to lean upon them.
• XCV. As the chief Expedients in the building of an House are Axes and Hammers; so the chief Expedient in the building of a Government, is a standing Army.
• XCVI. As the House, which being built, will not stand without the perpetual noise or use of Axes & Hammers, is imperfect; so the Government, which being formed, cannot support it self without the perpetual use of a standing Army.
• XCVII. While the Civil and Religious Parts of a Commonwealth are in forming, there is a necessity that she should be suppor­ted by an Army; but when the Military and Provincial Parts are rightly formed, she can have no farther use of any other Army. Wherefore at this point, and not till then, her Armies are by the practise of Commonwealths, upon slighter occasions, to have half pay for life, and to be dis­banded.
• XCVIII. Where there is a standing Army, and not a formed Go­vernment, there the Army of necessity will have Dictatorian power.
• XCIX. Where an Army subsisteth upon the Pay or Riches of a [Page 15] Single Person, or of a Nobility, that Army is alwayes Mo­narchical. Where an Army subsisteth not by the Riches of a Single Person, nor of a Nobility, that Army is alwayes Po­pular.
• C. The English Armies are popular Armies.
• CI. Where Armies are popular, and exercise Dictatorian power in deposing Single Persons, and Monarchical Assem­blies, there can be no greater, nor needs any other Expedi­ent for the introduction of a Commonwealth. Nevertheless unto this may be added some such moderate Qualifications as may prune the Commonwealth, not lop off her Branches. Whom these will not satisfie, it is not a Commonwealth, but a Party, that can.
• CII. If the late King had freely permitted unto the People the exercise of the power inevitably devolved upon them by the change of the Balance, he had not been destroyed. If either of the late Single Persons had brought the People into an or­derly exercise of the power devolved upon them, he had been great. VVhat Party soever shall hinder the People from the exercise of the power devolved upon them, shall be cer­tainly ruined: who or what party soever shall introduce the People into the due and orderly exercise of the power devol­ved upon them, shall be forthwith secure, and famous for ever.
• CIII. A man useth, nourisheth and cherisheth his Body, with­out understanding it; But he that made the Body, un­derstood it.
• CIV. The reason why the Nations that have Commonwealths, use them so well, and cherish them so much, and yet that so [Page 16] few Nations have Commonwealths, is, That in using a Commonwealth, it is not necessary it should be understood: but in making a Commonwealth, that it be understood, is of of absolute necessity. Caput Reipublicae est nosse Rempub. Cicero.
• CV. As the natural Body of a Christian or Saint can be no o­ther, for the frame, then such as hath been the natural Body of an Israelite or of an Heathen; so the political Bodies, or civil Governments of Christians or Saints, can be no other, for the frame, then such as have been the political Bodies or civil Governments of the Israelites, or of the Heathens.
• CVI. It shall be as foon found when and where the soul of a Man was in the Body of a Beast, as when or where the Soul or Freedom natural unto Democracie, was in any other Form, then that onely of a Senate, and an Assembly of the Peo­ple.
• CVII. In those things wherein, and so far as Art is directed or limitted by the nature of her Materials, it is in Art as in Nature.
• CVIII. That Democracie, or equal Government by the People, consist of an Assembly of the People, and a Senate, is that whereby Art is altogether directed, limited and necessitated by the nature of her Materials.
• CIX. As the Soul of Man can never be in the Body of a Beast, un­less GOD make a new Creation; so neither the Soul or Free­dom natural unto Democracie in any other Form whatsoe­ver, then that onely of a Senate, and a popular Assembly.
• [Page 17] CX. The right Constitution, coherence and proper Symmetry of a Form of Government goeth for the greater part upon Invention.
• CXI. Reason is of two Parts; Invention, and Judgement.
• CXII. Judgement is most perfect in an Assembly.
• CXIII. Invention is most perfect in one Man.
• CXIV. In one Man, Judgement wanteth the strength which is in a multitude of Counsellours.
• CXV. In a multitude of Counsellours, Invention is none at all.
• XCVI. Through the defect of Invention, the wisest Assemblies in the Formation or Reformation of Government, have pitch­ed upon a sole Legislator.
• XCVII. It is not below the Dignity of the greatest Assembly, but according unto the practice of the best Commonwealths, to admit of any man that is able to propose to them, for the good of his Country.
• CXVIII. Unto the making of a well-ordered Commonwealth, there goeth little more of pains or charge, or work without doors, then the Establishment of an equal or apt Division of the Territory, and the proposing of such Election unto the Di­visions so made, as from an equal Foundation, may raise e­qual Superstructures; the rest being but paper-work, is as soon done, as said or voted.
• CXIX. VVhere such Elections are proposed, as being mad by the People, must needs produce a well-ordered Senate and [Page 18] Popular Assembly, and the People (who as we have already found by experience, stick not at like work) elect accordingly; there not the Proposers of any power in themselves, but the whole People by their peculiar and natural Right and power, do institute and ordain their whole Commonwealth.
• CXX. The highest earthly Felicity that a People can ask, or GOD can give, is an equal and well-ordered Common­wealth. Such an one among the Israelites, was the Reign of GOD; and such an one (for the same Reason) may be a­mong Christians the Reign of CHRIST, though not every one in the Christian Commonwealth should be any more a Christian indeed, then every one in the Israelitish Common­wealth was an Israelite indeed.

Septem. 12. 1659.