Answer.

This Objection consists of divers Branches, and I shall answer it by degr [...]es.

1. That all Victory doth not give a Right to the Conquerour, but onely when the War being founded on a just Cause, that just Cause hath [...] with Victory. And when that is, depends wholly on the truth of that Quetion, concerning the Lawfulness of any War.

Now [...] there can never be just War on the Subjects part against their [...] they want the Warrart of Supr [...]me Authori­ty, without which (though the Cause should be never so just, and the [Page 2] End never so good,) all the Blood that is shed, is no better than Mur­ther: Therefore though the Subjects in such a War should prevail against their Sovereign, yet neither is he hereby divested of his just Right, nor they invested therewith, because the War was wholly un­just on their part, for want of Authority.

2. Therefore if that Party whose Cause is Unjust, shall yet prevail, and prove successfull, then in answer to the second Branch, I say, that there is no Right acquired by this: For, 'tis a mistake to think that this is the meaning of Jus Victoriae, the Right of Victory, which the Civil Law­yers speak of, as if God had by this lottery testified his Judgment of the Right, and pronounced that Just now, which was Unjust before; or that the present Force is always to be looked on as the Higher Powers, and allowed the Obedience required by the Apostle, as due to them, which is the mistaking of [...], Power, for [...], Authority, and agrees with that speech of the Atheists, Wis. 2. Our strength is the Law of Justice, and that which is feeble is found to be nothing worth. And we know 'tis Gods ordinary dispensation now under the Gospel to permit Violence to oppress the Godly, which sure is no Argument that those prosperous Ungodly, have the sole Right to the Possessions of the World, or that the opprest Godly Man, shall no longer be thought to be op­prest, when the prosperous Oppressour, is arrived at the height of his oppression.

3. The Question then being removed from the Title of Force, (which being itself unjust, cannot confer Right on any,) It must next be con­sider'd, what Dedition (that is, yielding or resigning up of one's Right) can doe. That will be of two sorts; either of the Prince, or the People; and again, either Voluntary or Involuntary.

A Voluntary Dedition, or yielding up, of the rightfull Possessor, if he be a private Man, transfers a Right: But a Prince, being a publick Person, and having an obligation of Protection to his Subjects, cannot without some breach of that Obligation, abdicate his Kingdom, nor consequently voluntarily yield up his Power; or if he do, he cannot transfer the Right to any, (save to the lawful Heir or Successor,) with­out the tacit or express Consent of the People also.

But in case they consent also, then will his Right (in Kingdoms Elec­tive) be transferred by the joint yielding of the King and his Subjects. As for Kingdoms hereditary, the Subjects Consent is not necessary; but the King's yielding up of his Right alone, is sufficient to transfer the Right to the next Heir. Neither can the joint Act both of King [Page 3] and People, transfer this Right, from the next Heir, to any other. The King's yielding is an Absolution of the Subjects from the Allegi­ance formerly due to him by them, and so makes it lawfull for them to yield the same to another; and when 'tis thus free and lawfull to them, the Intervention of their own Act also becomes Obligation on them to submit to that Person so yielded to. And when this is done (in Kingdoms Elective) and withall when no Heir is left to make Claim, or the Claim is relinquish'd by the right Heir, (in Kingdoms hereditary,) then is the Kingdom removed, (and given by God, who now rules not immediately among us, as he did in the time of the Theocracy among the Jews, but is then said to remove a Kingdom, when his Providence so disposes, that by the Laws, and Right among Men, it is removed,) to another.

But till this be done, i. e. till He, or They, in whom the Right both of present Possession, and future Claim by Inheritance, is truly vested, do voluntarily yield up that Right, and when that is done, till they which by their yielding, are freed from their former Bands, do now by their own Act enter, into new, what Force soever there be, and how suc­cessfull soever the Force be, there is not thereby any such Victory com­pleated, as shall be able to confer Right on the Victor, nor remove it from him that hath, and still protests his Right, though as yet he be not strong enough to vindicate it.

4. But then in the next place, if there be a Dedition, or yielding up by the King, and that Dedition involuntary; that is, such as no­thing but the present Success of the Force hath inclined him to, then certainly doth it not so divest him of his Right, as that it shall be un­lawfull for him when he can, to make Claim, and recover it again. As he that by a violent Invader is made to swear to pay such a Summ of Money, it is acknowledged lawfull for him to implead that Thief, and recover from him, what in performance of that involuntary Oath he hath paid him.

In this case the difficulty is, What Condition those Subjects are lest in for that time, betwixt the involuntary Dedition of the King, and his re­newing of his Claim; and the Solution must be, That a Proportion be observed between the Act of the King, and the Subjects consequent Act: The Act of the King is but a present Dedition, and doth not ob­lige him never to make any farther Claim again; and consequently this gives not any such Absolution to the Subjects, as that they may doe any thing which shall prejudice that After-Claim, or blemish his Roy­alty, [Page 4] such as are taking new Oaths of Allegiance, Abjurations of him and his Issue, Engagements to the Usurped Power, &c. All that it can doe, is to make it free for them to submit to such other things, of an infe­riour nature, (which includes not any such blemishment of Rights of the lawfull Prince,) provided that they acknowledge not the lawfulness of the present usurped Power, nor act as Ministers or Instruments there­of. This is the utmost that seems possible to determine in this matter.

5. As for that Power which Tract of Time may be thought to have in this business, that is not considerable, where the Claim is continued, (for that argues the Dedition involuntary,) and much less, when there is no Dedition at all; for there 'twas before supposed, that Force can­not conser Right.

6. And if by this stating of the Case it follow, that the Lot of the faithfull Subjects must be very unhappy at this time, and that great Disorder must necessarily continue in such a broken Kingdom, as long as the Contention between the violent Usurper and the just Owner thus remains undecided. I answer: That this is oft the Lot of the most pious Men under the Gospel, who have their good things here mixt with Tribulations, and must content themselves in the solaces of a good Con­cience, in performing those Duties which cost them dearest, and ex­pect their full payment of joys without hardships, to be paid them in another World.