FOr the foremoſt, I wonder the leſs that this debater does ſhow ſo much diſdainful contempt of my determination, when he is poſſeſſed with ſo much prejudice, as gives him not leave to mind the very main diſtinctions I offer him in it. After he hath therefore in the enſuing, firſt three leaves fallen upon a paſſage of providence, which I have ſet down as proper and indeed peculiar to the matter of the Caſe, he enters the Liſt with theſe words. This is ſufficient to ſhow what may be expected from this new undertaker, who will appear I don • t not as lame in his Reaſonings as he doth in this, and prove as unfit to determine caſes of Conſcience, as to make obſervations of providence. I do not know what kind of guſt one may have of the ſame thing which pleaſes another, but it does become any inge • uous mind to think, that all men are not caſt into the ſame mould, and to take heed therefore, leaſt by cenſuring of that which the moſt of others approve, he brings his own Judgement into queſtion, and becomes the leſs regarded himſelf for it. And really if the ſpleen and extravagancy, of five ſides and a half, and no leſs of about twenty leaves in all, to no purpoſe but abuſe of his paper, do not ſhew more what may be expected in this ſtale undertaker, who hath come out now this fourth time to debate; then that obſervation of mine will diſcover in me, I am miſtaken. For my part let the determination of the caſe be found as ſolid as that obſervation upon the matter of it is pertinent, and I ſhall have no cauſe to be moved by his cenſure. But what is that which hath moved him thus? why, he makes me (ſayes he) ſuch a pittiſul Gamester that I am not reflective (here he quotes the Page wherein I have delivered that hainous word) upon more removes then one of thoſe many I ought to ſee.— Yet I have done my endeavour to comprehend him and to fathome the bottom of his deep diſcourſe. I muſt confeſs I have expreſt my ſelf in theſe words he quotes, I ſpeak verily according to my thoughts, and I can't help that. But one would think by theſe words, we ſhould have at leaſt ſo much integrity now from this perſon, as to ſet down my determination at leaſt in my own words, being ſo few, if not made better by his, that the Reader might judge whether he does indeed look to the bottom of what I have offered, and if after theſe words he yet does not, he may be aſhamed, to expreſs himſelf thus, and ſhew ſuch a ſpirit as this is.

Well in my caſe, I diſtinguiſh then firſt, between the authority of the Magiſtrate, and of his Laws and Commands. To this purpoſe there is a diſtinction which Dr. Field has, parallell with it, to wit, between ſubjection and obedience, ſubjection is that which is due or proper to the Magiſtrate, or to the authority reſiding in his perſon: Obedience is that which is due to his commands, or to the authority of his Laws. By ſubjection we are to underſtand all that which ſtands in oppoſition to reſiſtance, and ſo ſubjection in one verſe in the Apoſtle, is aequivalent with not reſiſting in the other; and the word in the Original does kindly ſerve this purpoſe. Now ſubjection being what is oppoſite to reſiſtance, and what is due to the Authority which reſides in the Magiſtrates perſon, it is what is; and muſt be always due; ſo that we muſt never reſiſt, but be ſubject, becauſe this authority always reſides there. But obedience which is proper to his Laws, or commands, is not due always, becauſe there may be ſome Laws, or things, commanded, devoid of Gods authority, and then if we obey them not, we do not ſin. This is acknowledged, or very near it, in two caſes, by this perſon; in a caſe of ſin, and in a caſe of intollerable grievance, from whence others will follow.

The other diſtinction is between the obligation of the conſcience, and of the outward Man. Let this learned perſon now take of his eyes from the paper, and conſider but a while before he reads on, what he thinks I mean by, and to what uſe I put this diſtinction, and he may take the beſt conjecture whether he be not ſhort in his comprehenſion of it. The outward Man let us know then is obliged by the penalty, the ſword, or wrath: and by Gods command not to reſiſt, or to be ſubject in reference to his authority reſiding in the Magiſtrate himſelf. There are two things then you ſee go to the binding the outward Man, Gods command of not reſiſting, or being ſubject to the Powers, and the Magiſtrates ſword, and force. If we muſt never or by no means reſiſt, then the Magiſtrate may make us do what he will, or elſe we muſt ſuffer. We cannot avoid ſuffering but by reſiſting or obeying, Reſiſt we never may, obey we muſt then, if we will not ſuffer, unleſs the caſe be in the matter of ſin, wherein we all agree in one, that we muſt always ſuffer. The Conſcience is obliged only by Gods will, which is the adequate Rule of Conſcience. I will explain it farther. There is Gods will, and Mans will, a divine and humane Obligation. When God will have a thing to be done as well as Man, I do accompt the Conſcience is bound, becauſe the Obligation is divine: but when Man will have it done, and God requires it not, but only his will is that whatſoever be impoſed, the ſubject however muſt not rebel, I do account the Obligation to the thing to be humane altogether, and the outward Man bound only. Jus Regis vocatur (ſayes Grotius I remember ſomewhere) non quia Rex ita agens juſte ageret ſed quia it a agenti nemini liceret vim ullam opponere. That is as much as to ſay there is a double right a Magiſtrate hath in his commands or actions; A moral right when he commands, or does, thoſe things which he ought to do, or command: or a Political right, (called by Samuel the manner of the King) when though he commands or does thoſe things he ought not (or what God does not allow, but he is accountable to him for them,) yet the ſubject may not reſiſt him in thoſe commands, or acts, and deliver himſelf from them by force. When the Magiſtrate uſes the firſt of theſe Rights, I account the conſcience is obliged: when the ſecond the outward man onely. The termes are uſed we know by grave Divines ſuch as Biſhop Downham (to name no other) in his tract of Chriſtian Liberty: and it will be one benefit of theſe papers, if we can retain with good diſcretion, and ſenſe, what is ſo uſefull, as rather then be without, we ſhall ſtill uſe though with none. And by this diſtinction it does appear, how all that danger which hitherto this man hath fancyed conſequent to my determination, does fall away as the leaves from the trees in ſummer. For ſo long as we do all acknowledge the authority of the preſent Magiſtrate in his perſon with our ſubjection thereunto, that in no caſe it is lawfull to reſiſt, whereby the outward man comes to be bound, ſo that if he will, and when he will, he can force it to obey by his ſword, there is not ſo much as any certain diſobedience, and much leſs is there any danger to his Government, through Inſurrection, or Rebellion, that follows from my opinion.

If in Religious things, or moral, when the Magiſtrate commands any thing againſt a mans conſcience, and the Subject does not obey, his authority nevertheleſs is preſerved, though he cannot force them in that caſe to obedience if he would: how ſhall we think but in things which are ſecular, where be can force them to obey if he will, that there is any danger to his Government, for their obeying ſuch and ſuch a Law only becauſe they dare not to reſiſt (I mean for Gods ſake that they dare not) and not out of conſcience elſe? I would have this worthy, and intelligent, but at this time over engaged perſon, who yet ſees not all the removes which are to be ſeen in this buſineſs, for all his anger at me for my thinking ſo, to conſider whether there be not many learned Men, Writers and others, who hold that the Laws of Men do not obleige the Conſcience at all; and that they cannot, ſeeing Conſcience is Gods Throne, but the external man only▪ and does he think that all ſuch muſt be ſo ſhallow that they are not able to avoid his extemporanous conſequences, or that they ſee not the weakneſs of ſuch a Gameſter (ſeeing he calls himſelf ſo, for it was not I uſed that word) who hath not come yet ſo far here, as to conſideration with himſelf? For I ſay, is there any Men of parts or learning thinks he, that fear God and are Chriſtians, who hold it lawful to rebel, or to deſtroy all Society and Government. 〈◊〉 And if not, how comes it to paſs he ſhould not reſolve with himſelf, that certainly if ſuch conſequences which he would faſten on me will be avoided and denyed by thoſe that hold that human Laws do never bind the Conſcience, they may and muſt be denyed by me with more facility, who have determined that human Laws do with a diſtinction bind it, but not indefinitely as he does.

And what is that diſtinction then which after theſe two other not comprehended by the Debater, does determine the queſtion in hand? That we are to be always ſubject as to the Authority of the Magiſtrate himſelf I have ſaid and yet that we are not bound always to obey his commands, that is, we are not bound always in Conſcience, when yet we are bound in the outward Man. This being ſaid, the determining diſtinction concerning his Laws or Commands, which do bind, and which do not bind the Conſcience is this. The commands of the Magiſtrate are either ſuch as are agreeable to Gods will, or not agreeable to his will. Thoſe that are, bind it: Thoſe that are not, bind it not. The Reaſon is, becauſe the authority the Magiſtrate hath to command, is derived from, and to be founded in Gods will. In the way, The Caſuiſt (ſayes this benign Debater) ſeems to have no low op • nion of his own performance, but rather thinks we may chance to be beholding to him for a new Invention. Here ſayes he, is that very mean indeed for ought I know which is wanting. A great diſcovery! and for ought I know may any body reply that which is not wanting but the very dangerous extream into which the people are apt to run, as he is to follow thoſe with whom I have had to deal. As for thoſe with whom he hath been dealing I preſume it will be found there is nothing of this determination in what they have ſaid; if & I did not eſteem it uncommon, I ſhould (I muſt confeſs) have reſtrained it. Or if I did not think it conſiderable, I ſhould have held my peace alſo. But after this ſcornfulneſs of his why did he not preſent us with that mean which follows in the words of the Caſe, that the Reader might judge, whether it be any diſcovery indeed, or none, or whether it deſerves this Mans contempt or not? For as Cato ſaid of Cicero when he played upon the Stoicks opinions (which another hath noted) Cicero makes others laugh, but is himſelf ridicuculous: So ſay I, this perſon ſtrives here to offer me and my determination to contempt, but the things I have ſaid will bear themſelves out, and he does but diſcover hereby his own deſert. What is that mean then which follows? The words in the Caſe are theſe. That the Laws or Commands of the Magiſtrate (even in Political and indifferent things) does no leſs then bind the Conſcience, when he is the executioner of Gods will, but though the outward man (out of the Caſe of ſin) may be bound if you will, the conſcience cannot be obleiged, and ought to be ſtill kept free, when he is the executioner only of his own. It may be the Debater will not yet be beholding to me for this, and he may chooſe, when perhaps others will, and take it never the leſs kindly for that. It fares with thoſe that beat their heads about notions, as it doth with Miners; they are the condemned Men, and the Gold they dig becomes others: Never the leſs the Man that hath been digging & finds a Veine, may ſay, what he hath found is Gold as well as another, and without pride. He doth not commend himſelf, for his commending the Gold. I think verily that that which I I have here digged is the mean, the Golden mean we are to find in this caſe, and not an extream wherein I follow any as he ſayes: but the avoiding both extreams. The one is of thoſe who hold that human Laws do not bind the Conſcience at all: and the other ſuch as hold as this Man did when he firſt unadviſedly ſet out, and therefore will continue of the mind ſtill, that they bind indefinitely without diſcrimination, at leaſt ſo far by all means, as Dr. Manton his good Neighbor, and every one ſuch as he (whatſoever the breakers of other Laws may be) might be none of Chriſts Miniſters or good Chriſtians on that account.

Well! The will of God which determines the commands of Man to be obligatory or not, upon the Conſcience, muſt be conſidered in the concerns of Religion: in things morall: and in things civil or Political. The rule or Law of God in things Religious, is the Scripture. The rule or Law of God in things moral is the Light of Nature, which alſo is the will of God, as the word is. The Rule and ſupream Law which God hath appointed for things Political is the common good. If the Magiſtrate command any thing in Religion and it be not according to Gods word, then Conſcience cannot be bound to it as Religious, though the outward Man I think therein alſo is bound, if it be not againſt Gods word. It the Magiſtrate command any thing of moral concern, if it be againſt the Law of nature, or common principles of Light in Man, that is the moral Law in the heart, the Conſcience cannot be bound but muſt refuſe it. If he command any thing which is civil or Political, and it be againſt the common good, then is it not agreeable to Gods will, being not conſonant to the rule he hath commanded for civils, and conſequently the Conſcience cannot be obleiged by it upon that accompt. In the mean while ſo long as it is not againſt conſcience otherwiſe, that is ſo long as it is not ſin, the outward man is bound, and if the Magiſtrate will conſtrain a perſon to it, rather then ſuffer he will obey.

There are ſeveral books and Sermons of Miniſters about Religion, which do bind the Readers and Hearers by vertue of Gods will: but the ſupream Rule is Gods Word, unto which conſequently, if what they have ſaid; or writ, be not conſonant, the Conſcience is not bound, and according as the Conſcience of a Man is convinced, whether that which the Miniſter ſays be agreeable to the word or not, ſo is it bound, or not bound by it. The caſe is the ſame in Laws. The Magiſtrate doth give us ſuch and ſuch particular commands, or Laws. His authority he hath from God. The will of God as the ſupream Law, or Rule, in Politicalls, is, that the common good be attended and advanced. They are Gods Miniſters a ſending continually upon this very thing. So far as his Laws, or commands then are agreeable to the common good, ſo far is his Authority good, and muſt obleige the Conſcience being from God. And ſo long as a man is convinced in Conſcience, that they are agreeable thereunto, he muſt be in Conſcience obleiged: but if he be ſincerely perſwaded that ſuch or ſuch a thing commanded, be not for the publick good, the caſe is but the ſame with what I ſaid in Religion, when the Miniſters exhortation diſagrees with the word. The Magiſtrate is but Gods Miniſter in Politicals, and his commands diſagreeing, with the ſupream Law, the common good, the Conſcience cannot be obleiged in this Caſe. Nevertheleſs, ſo long as the outward Man is in the Magiſtrates power, and the Subject may not reſiſt, he can command obedience, out of the caſe of ſin, when he pleaſes to exert his Sword.

Before I paſs off, I am made a little ſenſible how apt our queſtion may be wreſted into a diſpu • e about Terms. It is hardly proper to ſay this or that Law binds the Conſcience, for Conſcience is the diſcerner of my duty, and it were more proper to ſay my conſcience binds me to this Law, then that this Law binds it. It is ſcarce proper neither to ſay the Conſcience is bound, ſeeing it is the perſon is bound. Conſcience is placed in the underſtanding, and when a thing becomes a Mans duty, the will is obleiged rather then the underſtanding. It is not eaſie likewiſe to apprehend how the outward man is bound with diſtinction to the Conſcience, conſidering that this obligation hath it's riſe, and vertue, from our duty of not reſiſting, unto which we are always bound in Conſcience. The term Reſiſting likewiſe is liable to diverſity of acceptation.

It is convenient therefore for me, in my way to give the ſenſe of my Terms (if it be not yet done enough) to prevent needleſs contention. By human Laws I underſtand the declaration of the will of the rightful Governor, what he would have his Subjects do, I will not alſo put in the end of Laws, in order to the common good, becauſe that will preſently ſpoyl the queſtion. For where the efficient is our rightful Ruler, and the Law ſerves indeed for that end, or hath it's right final cauſe alſo, there is no queſtion of its obligation. Yet if I leave out the end the queſtion indeed may be whether ſuch a declaration be a Law, rather then whether it binds. Nevertheleſs as I make a caſe of conſcience of it (and count all our Acts of Parliament Laws) it is all one in effect to me, whether you ſay, ſuch a Law binds not, or ſuch an Act or Law is no Law, and binds not. Ex quo intelliges eos qui pernicioſa et injuſta populis juſſa deſcripſerius, cum contra feceriut quod polliciti pro feſſi que ſlat • , quoduis potius tuliſſe quam leges. Cicero de legious. By Conſcience I underſtand a faculty in Man of deſcerning Gods Judgement concerning himſelf and Actions. It is more proper to ſay a faculty is obleiged, then an habit, or an Act; and that faculty which man hath hereunto, is charged (whilſt himſelf is) to judge whether ſuch a thing commanded be his duty in relation to God, or not. By obligation I underſtand the conſtitution of a due; Obligare eſt jus constituere. By obligation of the Conſcience I underſtand the conſtituting a thing to bedue from me ſo that if I do it not I muſt account or judge that God will condemn me for the neglect, or the making a thing my duty ſo that if I leave it undone I ſin. The obligation of the outward man I account the conſtituting a thing to be due from me ſo as if I do it not, I may not reſiſt, though I be puniſhed; or I may be puniſhed, and ought not to reſi • t, though I could avoid both the thing, and puniſhment by reſiſtance. The word, lacere, ſays Grotius (from one line of whom, a man ſhall have more Inſtruction ſometimes then from anothers book) is diſtinguiſhed in id quod impune fi • , and in id quod v • tio caret. So muſt we ſay the word obligare, is diſtinguiſhed into that which if we do not the thing makes us liable to puniſhment (in foro humano, or according to the law:) or that which if we do it not makes us liable to ſin. That is, there is an obligation human only (which we have had before) that tyes us to obedience upon the penalty of the law: or an obligation divine alſo, which ties us to the duty upon the pain of Gods diſpleaſure, & eternal condemnation. The one of theſe we call the obligation of the outward man, and the other of the Conſcience. By reſiſtance, laſtly, I underſtand the repelling force with force. The word reſiſtance, may be taken largely or ſtrictly. Reſiſtitur contra Imperium agendo aut vim vi reprim • ndo. I take it in the laſt and ſtrict ſence. Let me yet note one thing more, when we diſtinguiſh in the obligation of human laws, between the outward man and the Conſcience, we do not diſtinguiſh the outward man from the will, when we diſtinguiſh it from the Conſcience. The will is wrought upon under both obligations, through fear of mans law, and through fear of Gods. If you divide the outward man from the will, you cannot bind it, but Phyſically, by putting it in Bonds and Fetters. But the obleiging it by the will, is binding it with an human obligation; and that I account too, is not morally, but politicaly (as I have intimated,) to wit as human laws are, norma humani judicij, the man who breaketh a bad law, is according to that law to be adjudged to its penalty, and in ſenſu politico humano is an offendor of the law ſo that if he be puniſhed by the judge, who judgeth by that law, he muſt ſubmit, yet ſeeing the Law is no other then ſuch, he is not made a ſinner by that breach, or to be condemned by God. To ſum up my opinion then without the terms, that thoſe that will may aſſaile me fairly in my ſence I am perſwaded as Gods will is not mans, ſo every command of man in indifferent things is not the command of God: but that when there is no declaration of the magiſtrates will, but it does make the thing he would have, to be due from us ſo, as he may puniſh us by his law for the not doing if he pleaſe, and we muſt bear it without defending our ſelves by force, and conſequently he may compell us to any thing not ſinful by that means: yet does not every declaration of his will, make the thing he requires to be our duty, ſo, that we are neceſſarily guilty of ſin, if it be not done; but contraily though many a man lives and dyes in the breach of ſome laws and ſtatutes of the realm (ſo long as they offer no contempt to the Ruler, nor ſcandal to their brethren, nor reſiſt if they be brought to ſuffer) they may be good Chriſtians for all that (to come to our firſt lock which our debater) and ſervants of Chriſt.

And here I have no more that I know needfull to be ſupplyed, but onely to do this: to produce what I have in my Caſe it ſelf, that the main notion I offer here, and there may appear to be the ſame: and to vindicate that authority which alone ſufficed me then, and ſhall now, for my confirmation. The words which I offer in my Caſe are theſe. Power (ſay I) is a right to rule or command. This right in the nature of the thing muſt ariſe from the grant or will of the ſupream Lord, which is God; without whoſe will (or that grant or Charter which is an act of his will) no power can be derived to any. Now that grant or will of God which conſtitutes any to rule, or to be his Miniſter, being for the Peoples good, (He is the Miniſter of God for our good ſayes the text) it muſt follow that whatſoever is not indeed for the peoples good, the Magiſtrate is not to command, becauſe it is Gods will that he commands only for their good. And it he do command any matter that is otherwiſe, that command hath no authority as to the Conſcience at all as being without the warrant of Gods will. I know I have ſet down this in a few lines, but it hath been the fruit of ſeverall thoughts and years. I thought good to confirm it with one teſtimony of Dr. Taylor, and I perceive this debater ſeems offended, and to accuſe me of diſingenuity for it, as if I had done him wrong. It is neceſſary therefore that I turn again to that Dr. and ſee; only I muſt ſay that I am glad (I muſt confeſs) that I have here ſuch an authority as this Dr. ſo full for me, nevertheleſs Dr. Taylor is not (as farr as I know in a tittle) the author to me; but a witneſs to the light I offer. In the third Book of his Caſes, and the firſt chapter, he comes to treat of human laws, and what obligation they paſs on the Conſcience. In his firſt rule he tells us, the Conſcience is obleiged directly and actively to obey the Laws of Man. Several learned Authors, together with Nine Arguments to the contrary, are propoſed, which he having very hardly aſſayled, comes to his next Rule, that human Laws bind not when there is any intollerable, or grievous evil in the obedience. To make out this, be proceeds to a third Rule, that the Laws of our ſuperiour, that are not juſt and good, do not obleige the Conſcience, and then ſhewing what Laws are ſuch he tells us, that a Law is unjuſt that contributes not to the publick advantage. What can be more orderly and deſireable to my purpoſe! Only yet to be more ſure, it is fit, I cite alſo ſome few of his expreſſions. This is the limit of a Princes power, ſo far as he relates to conſcience, for beyond this the conſcience is not bound. Again, If a Prince make a Law that is not for the publick good, it hath no ſanction but fear, and no tye upon the Conſcience. Again, all ſuch things as are againſt the good of the ſubjects, the Law it ſelf declares it to be no Law, that is, to be more then the ſuperiour hath right, or leave to do. Again, Laws that are made to purpoſes beyond thoſe meaſures, do no ways obleige the conſcience. He is the Miniſter of God for good (ſaith St. Paul) otherwiſe he is not Gods Miniſter, and hath to other purpoſes none of Gods authority, and therefore cannot obleige the conſcience to an active obedience in ſuch, where his power is in incompetent to command.

IT will be time now to come to ſee what he hath objected againſt this Determination. The propoſition I am to maintain, and he to oppoſe, is this. That the laws of a common wealth, and particularly an act, or the acts of Parliament in this nation, that are nor for the common good, do not obleige the Conſcience of the ſubject. Though we acknowledge in the mean time, our alleadgiance and ſubjection to his Majeſty as the executioner of the laws, that our outward man is bound ſtill, and ſpared through his clemency. It is true that there is a queſtion fallen in, who ſhall be judge, whether that which is commanded in a law be for the common good? and I ſhall be ready to ſpeak with the Debator about it, in its order: but in the mean while if it were not for that, what would this reverend man have had to ſay againſt the main determination.

In the firſt place he tells us, that I am a notable inſtance of my Lord B ••• ns obſervation, that there is a little dry Light in the World. I remember Plutarch hath a tract of ſelf praiſe, and among ſeveral things he hath againſt it, one thing he ſayes for it, that there is ſome caſes, and particularly in the caſe of a juſt defence, a man may ſpeak of himſelf, or any thing of his own, as of another. Vnder Plutarchs Apology, I will ſay I do believe this, that in this particular I am indeed an inſtance that there is but little dry light in the World. For let this Debater ſet himſelf to read as many books as he can, yet I ſuppoſe he may find but few, if any that determine this caſe altogether as I do. I know the ſame Light hath ſhone in on Dr. Taylor in ſeveral paſſages, when yet it is mixed with ſuch abundance of other matter, that if this Man may be judge he would be ready to cite him as of opinion againſt me in it. There is lumen ſiccum therefore, and lumen maceratum indeed. I remember the diſtinction well, my Lord Bacon hath it, in his advancement. And I will ſay yet, that the Light which this Debater pretends is macerated Light, Light ſteeped in a prejudiced mind and fetch • from the conceptions of others, and moſtly perhaps from that Dr. whoſe cleareſt rayes he wont receive: When the determination which I have offered hath been beaten out from my own thoughts, and will be found that lumen ſiccum (notwithſtanding his abuſe) which is to be attended in this matter. I am become a fool in • glorying (ſays the Apoſtle) ye have compelled me.

In the next place he produces two places of Scripture, that to the Romans, Wherefore you muſt needs be ſubject not only for wrath but alſo for Conſcience ſake, and that of Peter, Submit your ſelves to every Ordinance of man for the Lords ſake. I anſwer, theſe Texts ſpeak of ſubjection and not of obedience; ſubjection to the Authority, reſiding in the perſons of the Magiſtrate, and if you will in the Government it ſelf: not obedience which is proper to their commands. I his appears from the firſt and ſecond Verſes. Be ſubject to the powers that be. He that reſiſteth the power, reſiſteth the Ordinance of God. The Powers no doubt are, but the Laws and Commands of men be not I hope the ordinance of God with this Man. VVherefore you muſt needs be ſubject, It is the ſame word and ſpoken in reſpect to the reſiſtance before, and in reference to their perſons: it is not wherefore you muſt needs obey all their particular commands for Conſcience ſake, when for Conſcience ſake we muſt ſuffer, rather then obey ſome of them. So likewiſe in Peter, every ordinance of Man, is every human creature in the Original, that is, ſubmit to every ſort of Governor, or Government, whether to the King as ſupream, or others under him. This is plain. Out of theſe Texts therefore may obedience ariſe, from the conſcience of not reſiſting, but no direct obligation on the Conſcience to obey actively can be deduced from hence. Again the Apoſtle tells us in theſe places, that the Magiſtrate is Gods Miniſter for our good, a terror to evil doers, and encourager to well doing, with the like expreſſions. Upon this account he can be ſuppoſed to command only for the common good, and when a Law or Command of the ſupream Magiſtrate is ſuch, I deny not but it binds the Conſcience no leſs then he. This is ſufficient between us, that no Argument poſſible can be drawn from either of theſe places to ſerve his turn, ſeeing a Law muſt be ſuppoſed to be againſt the common good, and yet to bind the conſcience according to him. Moreover, this I muſt ſay ag • in is moſt evident that obedience indefinite cannot be proved by theſe Texts, becauſe ſome commands of the Magiſtrate may be evil, morally evil (as hath been intimated) and we muſt not obey them: or civily evil, and then though we do obey for the Swords ſake, and becauſe we muſt not reſiſt, the Conſcience is not bound in ſuch a Caſe.

It is therefore a pieviſh obſtinacy in this perſon to perſiſt in theſe following words. VVe are no conſidering when and in what caſes a Law may ceaſe to obleige and quite alter its Nature, but whether while it doth obleige and is in force it lays a tye on the Conſcience or no? and to this we ſay yes. Laws while they are obligatory bind the Conſcience. Becauſe the Scripture faith ſo, and we ſay ſo indefinitely, becauſe that is the Scriptures language alſo. Firſt it's certainly falſe that all Laws of Men do indefinitely tye the Conſcience, and therefore the Scripture doth not ſay ſo, nor can ſay ſo, which muſt be granted by him in the caſe of moral evil. Secondly this Debater is utterly loſt that he would not learn of me to diſtinguiſh between the obligation of the outward man, and the Conſcience; an obligation in foro extertori ſive politico, & in foro interiori ſive conſcientiae. For it is falſe again that he ſayes we are not conſidering when and in what caſes a Law doth ceaſe to obleige, for this is the very thing we are conſidering, in reſpect to the Conſcience; and as for the obligation of the outward Man, he hath not yet thought of it. And I ſay as Dr. Taylor hath again and again, that ſuch a Law, as is not for the common good, hath none of Gods authority, and ſo ceaſes to be any Law as to the Conſcience, when yet we being not to reſiſt, (as is and muſt be often ſaid) the outward man by the Sword may be brought to obey. Thirdly the ſpeaking that Laws while they do obleige (or are of force) do tye the Conſcience, in this Man, who hath not received yet the diſtinction of the obligation of the outward Man Politically, and the inward Man which is morally, is extreamly ſenſl • s, and conſequently falſe if he underſtood the ſenſe. For Laws that are obligatory or do obleige the outward man, that is are Politically in force, may yet be morally null, as to the Conſcience, that is, obleige it not, when being not for the common good I ſay they are without the authority of Gods will. Fourthly there is a manifeſt bar and contradiction in theſe words to his own determination after, if he durſt been plain in it. For here he will be ſo obſtinate to ſay ſtill that human Laws bind indefinitely, nay and ſuborn the Scripture to falſe witneſſing in affirming that they ſay ſo, when they ſay only be ſubject indefinitely (while he makes all Laws (that is Univerſally) and indefinitely aequivalent here, leaſt he come off upon that word,) which we muſt not do, and yet in the end he is forced to come to confeſſion and acknowledge (ſeeing Dr. Taylor will tell him ſo, from whom he will borrow that he has) that moral Divines and Lawyers (and I had hoped he were one of the firſt) do determine that human Laws bind not in the caſe of intollerable grievance. I have cited theſe words in the way ſomething more acrimoniouſly then any other paſſage hitherto, not that I have cauſe to be angry at them, as I have at others, but to ſhew occaſionally how I might take up this Gentleman likewiſe in the reſt of theſe raw Sheets, if I had a mind to exagitate that weakneſs which hitherto (till his eyes be opened farther by this controverting the point) is ſuch as may have that epithite given to it at preſent which the Scriptures does in one place give unto darkneſs (though I acknowledge his ſufficiency otherwiſe,) even weakneſs that may be felt.

In the third place he wont allow my little comment on Paul. The Scripture ſayes the Magiſtrate is Gods Miniſter to us for good. Very true, and the Apoſtle makes that an argument why we ſhould be obedient to him becauſe it is for our benefit. But this Caſuiſt turns the words another way, and makes them an outlet to diſobedience, by taking that to include an exception to the general precept of ſubjection, which is in truth nothing but a reaſon to enforce it. By this paſſage and ſuch as this I take my conjecture of the happineſs of this mans expreſſion, which makes what he ſayes very often to look conſiderable, when if it be reflected upon with more thoughts (but that this Man himſelf tells the Apologiſt ſomewhere that he is no melancholly Man) it ſignifies nothing. If there be any thing ſubſtantial in theſe words it muſt hold, if it he put into others; and then muſt this be denyed that when the Apoſtle tells us the authority the Magiſtrate hath from God is for the peoples good, we may not argue thence that he hath no au • hority from God for their hurt. But this arguing is good, and therefore this paſſage is but words. For indeed, is there any man that ſerves not Levi • than but God, will maintain that the Magiſtrate hath any au • hority committed to him of God but for the publick benefit? Let this perſon take heed he turns not God into the Devil, and deſtroyes all. If he dare not maintain that, then whatſoever is commanded againſt the publick benefit hath no authority to bind the conſcience; and it will be in vain for him to talk idly of the danger he apprehends from my determination which hath none in it, when if he look not better to himſelf he muſt be upon the juſtifying Tyrann • , and bring ruine upon the World. Again ſuppoſe we build nothing on the very Text, this is a principle in the law of nature, as c • ea • ly written in mans heart as that he is a ſociable creature to wit, that the end of Government and Laws, are for the good of the community, and conſequently that there ſhould be none, but for that end. From hence then, that the good of the community being the ſupream Law as the general and ultimate end, of whatſoever is commanded, it muſt irrefragable follow, that whatſoever Law is made or is to be made, it muſt be over ruled by this ſupream, and have its obligatory power originally from thence. We know in all Laws or any other things in the world, the inferior muſt give place to the greater or to the chief. God requires ſacrifices and mercy, both are his Laws, it theſe interfare, mercy muſt be exerciſed and ſacrifice binds not. It is no plainer in the earth that the elements give way from their own natures to ſerve the World, then that the greater or chief obligation muſt vacate the leſs. I might fill a ſide with inſtances, if any elſe could not do it. Whereas this matter then is written with a ſunbeam on the heart of man, and the Apoſtle hath an intimation of it, it is but very ſit and agreeable to reaſon, that we fetch a comment on the ſex from that book he hath touched, that is the book of nature, or this natural Light which will convince every man, that the publick good being the end of ſociety, there can be no power from God but for that end. Again it is true the Apoſtle from hence argues for ſubjection, and he may ſay that he does not argue for any thing elſe. But what then? when Paul argues one thing from this truth, may not another argue from thence alſo ſomething too? St. Paul argues well, the Magiſtrate is the Miniſter of God for our good, therefore we muſt be ſubject: And Dr. Taylor argues well, and therefore he hath none of his authority for other purpoſes; or that Law that conduceth not to the publick good cannot bind the conſcience, becauſe it hath none of Gods authority. Moreover, the Apoſtle argues for ſubjection, and that indefinite, but I ſay he argues not, nor may be conſtrued to argue for obedience indefinite, and therefore howſoever theſe words tinckle, there is no doubt but we may and muſt make an outlet from theſe and the like Texts, that in ſome caſes of the Magiſtrates commands, we may not think our ſelves bound to obey in point of Conſcience, though in regard of non-reſiſtance and ſubjection, there is no diſobedience does follow in the caſe. We ſay not that this paſſage of the Apoſtle doth include an exception to ſubjection for that is Univerſall and indefinite; but we can ſay it muſt include an exception to indefinite or Univerſal obedience, that is as to all the Magiſtrates commands, becauſe there may be many of them wicked, unjuſt, or morally evil, unto which we are not bound, and conſequently, ſay I, nor to ſuch as are civilly ſo.

THe great and principal exception he hath, and which will deſerve the pains, is upon a queſtion which comes in as neceſſary to be askt upon my determination, and it is this. It being ſuppoſed, and to be granted, that the will of God is that alone which does oblige the Conſcience, and that according as a thing commanded in human Laws does conduce to the pub • ick good or not, ſo is it agreeable or not to his will: the queſtion is who ſhall be judge, whether a thing commanded by a Law be for the common good or no, and conſequently agreeable to Gods will and obligatory to the Conſcience. I anſwer every Man muſt be Judge on neceſſity himſelf in reference to his own action. I prove this. Every Man muſt judge of his own actions whether they be agreeable to the will of God or no. But to judge whether a thing commanded by a Law be agreeable to Gods will, is to judge whether it be conducive to the common good or not. Therefore every Man is judge himſelf, whether a thing commanded be for the publick good or no, in reference to his own action. Again, to judge whether we are bound in Conſcience to any thing commanded in a Law, is to judge whether it have Gods authority or not. But a Law or any thing commanded by a Law hath Gods authority or not, according as it is conducive to the common good. Therefore a Man muſt judge, whether that which is commanded him in a Law be for the common good or not, to judge whether he be bound or not bound to it in Conſcience. I muſt needs ſay there are ſome have had occaſion to be more ready to reſolve this queſtion, then otherwiſe they have deſired. We have had late impoſitions, and thought many times in what ſenſe they might be taken. We have come quickly to ſee, if they be taken, it muſt not be in any ſenſe of our own, we can frame, which were moſt looſe; but it muſt be in the impoſers meaning. This meaning is not certain, but ſome have believed thus and ſome otherwiſe. In the upſhot then this is that I have been brought, in my laſt thoughts, to conclude, that if a Man after the beſt means he can uſe for the underſtanding the Impoſers meaning, can take what is impoſed in that ſence which he verily believes in his own heart to be their meaning, he ſhall do well and ought to take it; if he cannot, he muſt for bear and chooſe to ſuffer. Being thus prepared in order to the determining a mans own act, about the taking an impoſition, when the queſtion lyes upon the meaning of the Law-giver, and the ſubject I count being changed only into his generall end in this, I had no cauſe to ſtick here, where there is but one and the ſame anſwer to be given to all ſuch queſtions. To wit, that notwithſtanding there may be ſeverall good cautions of thinking reverendly of our ſuperiours judgments, and not leaning too much on our own, with the like words uſed in the way, we muſt come to this reſult at laſt, that according as every man for his own part (after the beſt enquiry or exerciſe of his reaſon he can make) does believe in his very Conſcience whether the thing commanded in a Law be for the publick good or no, I mean it in reference to his own doing it, that is moſt plainly according as he believes in his own ſoul that the doing the thing which is commanded (by his example or otherwiſe) is conducive to the publick good or not, ſo muſt he account it agreeable or not to Gods will, and his Conſcience accordingly be bound, or looſed in regard to the performance.

I will convince the Debater from his own mouth and from the thing it ſelf.

From his own mouth we have a Caſe hath fallen very luckily before mentioned. What if Magiſtrate miſtake in a Law, and the matter be not conducive to that end for the publick he ordained it? He anſwers he is not bound to be of the Magiſtrates opinion, but may judge it better the Law were otherwiſe, yet thinks he is bound to obey it. But if this man and ſo another may be, and is, of a contrary opinion to the Magiſtrate, that the thing commanded is not for the publick benefit, as he acknowledges in that Caſe of his own putting, then hath he acknowledged in effect all that for which he cavills ſo much at me upon my anſwer to this queſtion.

For the thing it ſelf, In the firſt place no mortal man on Earth, can have power to make me, or him, or any underſtand, to think, or believe otherwiſe then we do. If I do think then, that ſuch a thing commanded be not for the common good, ſo I ſhall think, and muſt think do what the Magiſtrate can, or my ſelf either. And it 〈◊〉 do believe ſo then do I judge or believe that i • is not according to Gods will, and conſequently that I am not bound in Conſcience 〈◊〉 . If you ſay I ſhould not think ſo, it is unlawful to judge ſo, you contradict this man, who ſays, he is not bound abſolut • ly to be of the Law-givers opinion, that all ſuch things are for the publick good as he decrees; which is as truly, as ſtoutly ſaid againſt himſelf, for the matter will not bear it to be otherwiſe. In the ſecond place, Conſcience is a faculty which God hath put into Man, to judge of his own actions, in reference to his approving or condemning him for them. Whatſoever actions then are accountable unto God at the great day, are to be judged at preſent by Conſcience. We are accountable now no doubt to God for our civil actions, as well as others; and when in matters that are civil, thoſe things have or have not his approbation, as they do, or do not conduce to the common good, it follows that every man muſt judge of the things commanded him, whether they be or they be not to the common good, that he may be accountable unto God, according to what he is bound or not bound in Conſcience by them. In the third place our Proteſtant Divines in their cont overſy which the Papiſt Do judice, do allow to every man a judgement of private diſcretion which is the ſame with this judgement of Conſcience, that what means ſoever we uſe for our information, we muſt be the laſt judges our ſelves of the things we do, whether they are agreeable to Gods will or not, and according to our own belief muſt reſolve upon the practiſe or forbearance of them. It ſeems to me now a thing unreaſonable and injurious unto mankind, if we ſhall take away from the ſubject this judgement of private diſcretion in things that are political which we cannot but allow them in all other their morall and religious actions. If there be an infallible judge in Civils we may expect one in religions matters. But if there be no Pope nor Counſels but may erre in their Canons, there are no Law-givers but may erre in their Laws, and there is no cauſe why any ſhould indeed be more ſhy of granting the ſubject this judgement of diſcretion in reference to what the Prince hath Enacted, any more then what the Church hath declared, but only that they could not ſo well tell the rule to judge of things Civill as they could to judge of Doctrines and morall Precepts. As God therefore hath given us the Scriptures for a rule of religion, that when any thing is required of us to believe or practiſe as neceſſary to Gods worſhip or our ſalvation, we may and are to try it, by this rule, and can be obliged thereby no farther then we do judge it agreeable to this rule: and as in morals he hath given the law of nature for our rule: ſo hath the Almighty given to man his rule alſo in things politicall (which he hath written in his fleſhly tables, as ſure as there is any law of nature, and that is Gods will, as the ſcripture is) whereby the Laws of every Common-wealth are to be tryed and judged, the Law-giver being accountable to God according as he acts by it, and the People obliged in Conſcience, ſo far to obey his will as he commands agreeably to it: and this Rule or Law as I have before ſaid, is the common good. Things are religiouſly good or evill as they agree or agree not with the Scriptures. Things are moraly good or evill as they agree or agree not with the Law of nature. Things politically good or evill as they agree or agree not to the publick advantage. If I am commanded any thing about my religion I will go to the Scripture, if that commands me otherwiſe I cannot obey it. I will go to the morall Law in matters of vertue and vice. In politicall things, or things required by human Laws, I muſt go to this rule I have propoſed: I muſt judge of them as good or evill in their kind by that. If my doing the thing will not anſwer the rule, I am not bound in Conſcience to active obedience. In the laſt place if this be not granted, when you allow the ſubjects to be reaſonable agents in things religious, or morall, that may bring what is ſuperiour command's of that nature to the reſt of Gods will, you turn them into bruites in things civil while they may bring what they are commanded to no teſt, in relation to their own actions. If you deny me my judgement of private diſcretion, you will not let me act as a man. Indeed this perſon will have the liberty to judge otherwiſe then the Magiſtrate does, and yet be bound in Conſcience to obey, which is to be beneath a bruite, for the beſt act ſpontaneouſly, and follow the dictates of their ſenſe, if they be not hindred. But this man will have his judgement one way, that the thing is not good, and his will and actions another way, and that not upon conſtraint from without, but upon the principle of Conſcience, which is a contradiction againſt all good ſence. But as for others and this man too otherwhere (who makes it a placing our ſelves in the throne to determine otherwiſe concerning the publick welfaer, then the proper judge of it doth, ſo conſiſtent is he with himſelf, and ſuch need hath he to be angry if one adviſe him to be more reflective • on what he writes 〈◊〉 that will not let us have a judgement different from the Lawgiver, and ſo to act only upon theirs, they make men to become Horſe as the and the Mule, upon whom the rider gets up, and they muſt go on, the why, and the whither as the driver pleaſes. But if this be the Iſſue which this mans opinion will lead us to, and this ſon of Circe ſhould expect by the conjuration of theſe few leaves to transforme us preſently out of our humanity, that we ſhould be content to be governed hence forward without, the exerciſe of our own reaſon, or aſſent that is, not to act out of election, but to be moved in civill obedience only as we are driven, we ſhall have little cauſe to be very forward to hearken to him. He may lay down his Penn and take a Whip in his hand and go Whiſtle.

But let us hear his exceptions to this anſwer. Who ſhall be judge whether a Law be for the publick good or no. His anſwer is ready at his Tongues end, for he needs not go deep for it. The Magiſtrate muſt judge, what is for the publick good for the making the Law, and we muſt judge as to our obedience to it. Then which it is hard to write any thing more inconſiderate and dangerous. I do acknowledge this to be my judgement, and for which I have offered here ſome reaſons, and it is not his ſaying this anſwer is inconſiderate and dangerous ought to prejudice it, if it be well adviced, and there be no danger indeed in it. For neither doth this man know the previous thought on other occaſions upon which this hath been ſet down: nor hath he yet underſtood the ſtate of my opinion right, that he ſhould charge it with any of thoſe conſequences, as are but the Lyons, and the Bears, the Chariots and the Armies, that fly in the Clouds of his own Immagination. But let us hear the reaſon of this wonderful deciſion which he hath as ready as he had his anſwer. Becauſe ſaith he every man is made by God the judge of his own actions, I cannot for my life ſee how that follows from this, though I have put his reaſoning into the plaineſt form that ever I could. It is pitty but this mans life ſhould be ſaved, and therefore I will tell him my reaſoning Thoſe Laws, I was ſhewing, which be not for the common good are not agreeable to Gods will, or have not his Authority, and ſo bind not the Conſcience. The queſtion upon this was as it is ſet down, and the anſwer and the reaſon with the addition of the words following. Becauſe God hath made every man judge of his own actions, and conſequently of all circumſtances, whether they are agreeable or not to his will for his forbearing or doing of them. If God then hath made every man judge of thoſe things which he is to do in all the circumſtances, whether they be agreeable or not to his will, then muſt he judge whether thoſe things that he is commanded to do in human Laws be for the common good or no, becauſe thoſe Laws only are agreeable to his will (I had laid down before) which are for the common good, and thoſe that are not are devoid of his Authority and bind not the Conſcience. This I deny not to be my very ſubſtance, and as the reaſoning is manifeſt, and will appear ſo (I doubt not) to the indifferent, ſo muſt it not be thought to be inculcated too often, either there, or here, ſeeing no man can ſtand ſafe in diſpute, but he that knows what is, and when he is upon his foundation. For the mans diſdainful expreſſions I have (I account) my ſatisfaction, and he his ſufficient reproof, that he hath no more cauſe for them. It is not ſence to ſay the Magiſtrate muſt judge what is for the publick good in reference to his act of making the Law, and we in reference to ours of obedience to it; for he doth not only judge but enjoyn, when he makes a Law; which leaves us no liberty but to judge whether his will and Gods do not claſh together. And why is not this ſenſe, what reaſon is this that 〈◊〉 is not ſenſe? if he could have ſaid the Magiſtrate does enjoyn, and not judge at all before he enjoyns it, then he might have pretended to ſay thus. But if the Magiſtrate muſt not enjoyn any thing before he hath conſidered, and judges it to be for the common good, and if he doth enjoyn any thing that is not for the common good he hath no Authority from God for it, then does it appear neceſſary, that we do conſider likewiſe, and judge whether it be for the common good, and have his Authority, or elſe we cannot be bound in Conſcience to it. And thus you ſee very good ſenſe, evidence and fulneſs in this anſwer to the queſtion and that the Magiſtrates will, declaration of his will, or enjoyning a thing, does not take away our liberty and duty, to conſider when he hath enjoyned it, whether we be yet in Conſcience in obliged, or in prudence only, and the outward man to obedience. The miſtake of this perſon is that he thinks we may not judge of a Law, but only whether it be againſt Conſcience, when we muſt no doubt judge alſo whether it be obliging to Conſcience, or otherwiſe how ſhall we make Conſcience of it? We are not to judge only whether it claſpes with Gods will, but whether it agrees with it. If the Magiſtrates will be not againſt Gods will, yet if it hath not his will and authority with it, it is not obligatory to the Conſcience. The Magiſtrates will binds not aſunder from Gods, In morals the caſe is not thus, whatſoever is not according to Gods will is againſt it: But in civil and indifferent things a thing may not be againſt his will, that is againſt any moral precept (as our obedience I ſpeak of to ſome human Laws) and yet have none of his Authority for it. Thus prudence, the preſervation of my ſelf, and the Magiſtrates honour, may prevail with me to do a thing which I think otherwiſe I have no obligation to do in my Conſcience.

I will yet add. I diſtinguiſh my obediénce, and my obedience out of Conſcience, or my obedience out of other generall rerſons, and my obedience out of Conſcience, to this particular command. I do not reſolve my obedience, into a judgement of private diſcretion whether a Law be for the common good or no, for I can apprehend eaſily that when God hath required the Magiſtrate to make no Law but according to this rule, no unjuſt, or unprofitable Law, he hath not yet commanded that I ſhould never obey ſuch a Law. I may obey out of a generall implicit apprehenſion of duty; or a ſingular love to my ſuperiors perſon, for fear of his diſpleaſure: to avoid the danger of the Law: or out of ſeverall prudentiall conſiderations, regarding the Magiſtrate, my ſelf, or others: when yet If I come to the point, whether I am bound in Conſcience to do the particular thing commanded, that is whether there lyes a divine obligation on me as well as that from the Law to do it I am on neceſſity then to examine it, by the rule which God hath ſet me, and that being no other but the common good in politicalls, I muſt reſolve my obedience out of Conſcience into this judgement, when I reſolve my prudentiall obedience otherwiſe. It may ſuffice me therein, ſo long as the thing is not ſinfull, that I am obliged by man. It may be but very rare if. I queſtion my Rulers commandment, which is like to be only perhaps in ſome grievous preſſure. If the Law be bad, my obedience yet and my example may do good, nor does the Magiſtrates abuſe of his office I hope take away my liberty to endure it if I pleaſe. The true ends moreover hapily of obedience, may be obtained, when the end of Ruling is neglected. Nay the common good may be promoted poſſibly, by my yeilding to a Law when the Law it ſelf does croſs it. And farther my diſobedience may do more hurt to the common good then the obeying that hurtfull command would do. So farre am I from diſcouraging any from obedience to human Laws (as a thing generally good and prudentiall) when I would keep the Conſcience free, and not have it burdened with ſin for every want of their performance. I ſee indeed by this and other learned perſons, what an immagination they have got, that if I reſolve the queſtion whether I am in Conſcience obliged to obey ſuch a Law, by my private judging of the thing commanded whether it be agreeable or not to the common good I do uſurpe the place of the Ruler and make myſelf only my own Lawgiver, as they are apt to ſpeak. But this is a miſtake, for beſides that when I judge of the thing commanded by its Rule, this judgement of mine is not the maker of my duty but the diſcerner of it, and ſo I do not become any Law-giver to my ſelf in the buſineſs: I diſtinguiſh the obligation of a human Law, and the obligation of Conſcience (formaliter. & ſimpliciter) by that Law. If I reſolved the whole obligation of human Laws into this Ru • e, and my judgement of the Law by it, ſo that I held it muſt never be obeyed on other reaſons, or that if I were puniſhed for not obeying, I was not bound to ſubmit, then did I offer injury indeed to my Ru • er and uſurped his Government. But if I reſolve only the obligation of my Conſcience by that Law into this rule, and my judgement of it accordingly, I uſurpe no power of the Magiſtrates, which I leave him ſtill over the exterior man, but I keep God only as I ought in his own feat of the Conſcience. And verily if the Conſcience of man be concerned in every human law, I would fain know, how any of our great Clerks can ſay that human laws bind not in the caſe of intollerable griveance. If God does command me to do the thing, it is not any griveance of minde can excuſe me, but if it be man indeed commands it only and not God, the griveance will be reaſon enough for me to call it in queſtion, and to avoid it if I may; but the reaſon of my non-obedience, muſt not have this foundation, that it is my grievance, or that I cannot endure it, but that conſideratis conſiderandis, I am not obliged to it in Conſcience.

THus far his exceptions are but words, let us paſs now to his reaſons againſt my anſwer.

His firſt reaſon is, It is no eaſy thing to judge what is beſt for the Peoples good, Kings themſelves find it neceſſary to have their Councets to adviſe about it. To judge what is beſt for the Peoples good is indeed a high matter. To judge only whether a thing be for the common good or not, is another matter. The judgement of every one is free, and any body may judge of any thing as he is able, and as he will. The Cock may paſs his judgement on the Pearl he ſcraped up. That which comes to carry any ſtreſs upon judging, is the conſideration of the effect that depends upon that judgement. The judging of a thing which a Man himſelf hath to do, hath this effect depending on it, the doing his duty, every one is to judge of all thoſe things and circumſtances which belong to his own acts, whether or no they be agreeable to Gods will, that he may do as he ought; and the rule of this will in politicals, I have declared. There is the act now of the Magiſtrate, and the act of the Subject. There is a great difference of the concern or moment that lies on a judgement of the ſame thing when the act of the one depends upon it, and when there depends upon it the act only of the other. The act of the Magiſtrate is to make the law, and ſee it executed; the act of the People is to obey it. By this firſt reaſon of his againſt my anſwer, do I ſee good reaſon for it, and the ſufficiency of it. The Magiſtrate judges whether a thing be for the common good, or according to our ſupream rule in reference to his paſſing it into a law, and then to cauſe it to be executed. The People and every particular perſon does judge, whether the thing commanded be for the common good, in reference only to the obligation of their Conſciences to obedience. Upon the judgement of the Magiſtrate, there does depend an effect of univerſal concernment, that is the obligation of a whole Nation to live according to the Law he makes, upon the judgdement of each particular when the law is made, there depends no concern but a mans own, and that reſpecting his inward man only. Now its certain that the Magiſtrate in regard of ſuch an effect as depends upon his judgement, hath need indeed of the greateſt wiſdome, and the ableſt Councel, and he cannot be too cautions in his proceeding, ſeeing if he be miſtaken, and the Conſciences of the Subjects be not obliged by ſuch a law, yet are their perſons liable to be compelled and they muſt not reſiſt, which may prove a vaſt inconvenience, and to be avoided only by a right information at firſt about the matter. But as for a private perſon who judges not what is beſt for the peoples good (as he ſpeaks right in regard to the Magiſtrate) but onely judges of the thing commanded whether it be agreeable or not to the will of God, or the rule of his (which he hath given to the world about Politicals, if they forget not to minde it, to wit) that it be in • eneral for their good, the effect which (I have ſaid) does attend ſuch a judgement, is of that nature onely as requires no greater underſtanding or diſcretion, then every man hath for himſelf to act by in all the reſt of his life and converſation. He judges here according to his Rule in theſe things, as he doth in other of his actions according to the word whether he be bound or not bound in Conſcience to them. And God requires of him to judge and act but according to his talent in all buſineſs whatſoever. He will acknowledge the outward man to be bound, and in a matter of his ſoul which concerns no body but him, or the inward obligation of his Conſcience, you muſt leave him to God and his own Judgement.

His next reaſon is, That when Men know what is conducing to their good, they are not apt to do it without a Law. And what does this prove or contradict? It proves it good therefore that the people have a Law-giver or Governor, and that he ſhould be wiſer and better then they, as Plato may urge it: But does it follow they may not therefore judge, whether the thing commanded be for their good; Surely this will be a good reaſon why the people ſhould judge of it. For if the good they conceive in it, is the reaſon they admit to have any Law, and the argument to preſs them to obey it, then muſt they judge of that good, and whether it be conducive to that good or not. In the mean while the difference of the reaſon and ends, (which is diſtinguiſhed, in the Magiſtrates judging of a thing to be for the common good or not, and the peoples does ſufficiently declare the weakneſs and vanity of ſuch ſpeeches, as this Man hath ſeveral of. He that makes every Man judge of what is for the peoples good, takes away the principal power of the Magiſtrate. And why ſo? as if it were an act of power, and that uſurped for any but the Prince to have a judgement of diſcretion over his civil actions. Again, if the people be able to judge of that there is no need of any Law or Law-giver. As if when men knew their duty they needed no Magiſtrate to make them do it, and that while himſelf too is telling us the need of Laws, becauſe men a • e not like to prefer the publick good though they comprehend it, before that of their own particular perſons. I cannot I perceive, be throughly intent to anſwer what is inſignificant, but the ſubſtance in the main of theſe two reaſons comes to this, that every man is not able to bring the thing commanded by the Magiſtrate to the rule, ſo as to judge whether it be for the common good or not, and therefore they muſt act only upon the judgement of the Law-giver, and conſequently be no reaſonable agents, in their Political obedience. For ſatisfaction therefore to this, Let us conceive the Magiſtrate commanding ſomething moral or Religious, there are no Proteſtants but do hold that every man for himſelf muſt bring here what is commanded to the rule of the moral Law and Scripture, and according as himſelf believes it conſonant or not to the rule he judges it, ſo is he bound to obey it or not to to obey it. Now let any man who hath but the heart to think and ſpeak with integrity, conſider whether a rude and illiterate man that never could read a word in the Bible, be more able to judge whether a thing commanded by the Magiſtrate be agreeable or not to the word of God; or whether it be conducive or not to the common good? ſuppoſe the Waggoner as unlearned as any man, I will ask whether ſuch a man be not more able to judge of the Law concerning Waggons, that is whether it be good for the high wayes and conſequently whether he had beſt or not obſerve the act, then to judge whether the Doctrine and Diſcipline of the Church of England, or whether whatſoever is contained in the whole Book of Common Prayer with the Rites and Ceremonies, be agreeable or not to the Scriptures of the old and New Teſtament? I ſuppoſe there is no man will have the hardi • ſſe to oppoſe ſuch a manifeſt conviction. And if in regard to his practice, this man and every other that uſes the Common-prayer muſt judge as well as he can of the lawfulneſs of it, or elſe he cannot act in faith: and ſo likewiſe of all thoſe doctrines or practiſes he yields unto them, then will there I hope be no ſtumbling block left here upon this account, I do advance therefore and reſt upon this one argument, if the incapacity, unfitneſs, or little ability that ſome men have to judge of what is required by the Magiſtrate, whether it be agreeable or no to the common good, be a reaſon ſufficient for the denying to the ſubject ſuch a judgement: then muſt the leſſer ability of ſuch to judge whether that which is required be agreeable to the word of God, be a reaſon ſufficient to diſcharge them from judging of it by the word. But the conſequent is falſe, and therefore the antecedent. By the way, obſerve, if any man diſtinguiſh between judging of a Law whether it be for a common good: and judging of the thing commanded by a law, or rather of a mans own doing the thing commanded, whether it be for the publick good or not, I am to be underſtood of the laſt, when I ſay the Magiſtrate judges of the thing in reference to his paſsing it into a law and we judge of it ſo paſſed in reference to our obedience or obligation by it.

His third reaſon is the ſame with the firſt. The people are ſo far from being able to judge, that the wiſeſt Princes find it difficult, only we have more words for the enlargement; which conſiſt partly in a grave kind of diſcourſe from a paſſage of a Biſhop Bramhall, of the ſeverall things and circumſtances that the Law-giver is to weigh in his making of a law, which the people cannot conſider and attend unto: and then in an idle deſcant upon this, that it is not fit therefore that laws ſhould be ſuſpended till the ſubjects be agreed they are for their good, with the like words, as if there were any indeed ever dream'd that a Law-giver, who is with us the Parliament, could not make a law untill they had conſulted the people firſt, whether they all of them judged the matter ſuch, that if it were paſſed into a law, they ſhould be bound in Conſcience to the performance, and before they had an affirmative anſwer from them (who muſt be made loath too to be ſatisfied about it) they could paſs no act or ſtatute of the Realm. This is the ſenſe in which this man let his pen run here, and then concludes. The Prince is in an ill caſe who hath ſuch ſubjects, and he is not in very good, whoſe Divines begin to inſtill ſuch doctrine into them If there be any thing in thoſe more words and the ſame reaſon that ſeems of moment, it is already anſwered I count by diſtinguiſhing the part of the Law-giver, the ſubject, whoſe judgement of a thing commanded in a law already paſſed, for the ſatisfiying himſelf whether he be obliged in Conſcience to the doing, can by no means prejudice the act of the Law-giver in the paſſing the law as is manifeſt, nor does it throw it down being paſſed. For this is a miſtake in this perſon very palpable, as if a human law could not be of force unleſs a mans Conſcience be obliged by it. I obſerved this in him before where he ſaid, Laws while they do oblige tye the Conſcience, and that the cauſe of his error was the want of preſent knowledge to diſtinguiſh between Political and morall obligation. The obligation which is on the Conſcience is morall and can be no other, and paſſes on it I have ſaid from Gods inſtitution of our generall duty: but the obligation which is Political belongs to the outward man and may ſtand good when the morall ceaſes, and for as much as this obligation of the outward man it ſelf does ſo ariſe from the commandment of God for ſubjection, and that we ſhould not reſiſt, it may appear to the impartial that will conſider aright of what is ſaid, that the queſtion or ſingle point between this man and I concerning the obligation of human Laws, in reference only to the conſcience, is really and in good earneſt very little or not at all material to the Magiſtrate, or the civill Government, which way ſoever it is determined. And when there are ſo many learned men of divers ſorts who exerciſe their liberty in maintaining the opinion of either extream without controle or prejudice to the world, its a thing hardly becomming either a temperate minde, or modeſt Learning, or that I ſhould have moſt expected from this Authour a free Theology, to expreſs himſelf in this manner, as if a man could not endeavour the finding out a middle way that is ſo needfull in ſuch a controverſie but he muſt be adjudged one that is broaching of ſomething againſt the State, and deſerved correction.

His fourth reaſon is, Grant the ſubjects ſuch a power (that is, a power only of judgeing of their own civill acts) and in a little time no law ſhall be obſerved. He proceeds, Taxes will not be paid. He goes on. There will be Inſurrections and Rebellion. Upon this, he brings in certain narrations, of the Subſidy of Head money in Richard the Seconds time and what followed; of the aid granted to Henry the Seventh in his third year and the Northern Rebellion; then of a ſubſidy in his thirteenth year when the Corniſh-men took up arms, then of the caſe of Henry the eight about Aliens, and of one John Lincoln a Broaker that was hanged. See more in a certain dialogue between a Couceellor of ſtate, and a Juſtice, he has in his ſtudy; for this it is for the man to light on a new book, he muſt by all means be teling us of what he was reading laſt. And thus had we at the begining of theſe Papers from the tenth argument of Bellarmine againſt Image worſhip, the relation of the Iconomachi and what befell them in the time of Leo Iſaurus; in the time of Conſtantinus Copronomus; in the time of the horrible cold and freezing of the Pontick Sea, the drought after, and the death of the Emperour, The man hath a ſtrange fruitful application. This brings to my remembrance an advice once I received from an ingenious and prudent Woman, who ſeeing me over ingaged in diſpute ſometimes with an Anabaptiſt, who was a man of much talk and being not willing I ſhould be ſo much concerned: you muſt not ſays ſhe, argue with theſe men in the way you do; you lay down the ſubject, and ſpeak upon that, and then think to hold them to it, and are moved when they ſpeak from the point, and ſo are confounded; but you ſhould (ſayes ſhe) give them leave to ſpeak ſo long until you can lay hold on ſomething that they ſay, and whatſoever it is, you muſt ſpeak of that; and by this means while you take them up ſtill upon their laſt words, whether it be to the point or not, you will never want matter no more then they do, and by the uſe of their own weapon may deal with them. I muſt profeſs if this man who hath ſo apt an expreſſion, do come to get this knack of it, as he appears to have in theſe continuations and apendix, he may continue his continuations while he lives, and I know no body able to diſpute with him, unleſs I could light on the fellow that would preach with any body, but it ſhould be (he ſaid) in a Negative way, And Peter went to Antioch. He went not to be drunk, here he ſpeaks of drunkenneſs, gluttony, and all manner of exceſs. He went not to lye with women, there he ſpeaks of fornication, and uncleanneſs and all other deadly ſin. But he went to preach, there he ſpeaks of the Scriptures from Geneſis to the Revelation, of the Fathers the Schoolemen, the Councels, and all the books that ever he read to this day.

For the reaſon it ſelf without its appurtenance, I have I account prevented it in the ſtate of my opinion. The ſtate alone of what I have ſaid, will wipe off any ſuch miſtaken conſequence, which he would injuriouſly bring upon it. It is one queſtion whether we are to obſerve a law: & another whether we are bound in Conſcience to obſerve it. The queſtion between us in the bottom of the point is not concerning outward obſervation: but the inward obligation of Conſciences. And the truth is as I was ſaying at the cloſe of the other reaſon, that this buſineſs does not really concern the Magiſtrate, or the Common-wealth directly at all (though indirectly and ex conſequenti any thing may concern any body) for what is it to the Magiſtrate or the community, ſo long as he can enforce the thing to be done if he will, whether a man does do it out of Conſcience, or out of diſcretion only: out of fear of God, or fear of the law, or his ſword. The Magiſtrate cannot take any cognizance out of what principle a man acts; the judgement is not within his jurisdiction, and if a man doth not act out of Conſcience, he cannot make him. It is ſufficient, ſo long as a man acknowledges his authority from God, that he muſt therefore be ſubject and muſt not reſiſt, and conſequently if in good earneſt he ſtand upon it, and will have obedience from him, let it be in any thing but ſin, there is no help for him that is, he may not help himſelf by reſiſtance) but he muſt yield to it, whether he will or no. This is that which ſecures government, and Governors. Let every man be held bound in Conſcience but thus far, and as for the reſt, it is a matter concerns each ones own ſoul only and his private peace, and it will become thoſe that are prudent to be very tender what they determine in the buſineſs.

It is true this reverend Perſon thought I believe he had ſpoken well in his ſaying, that it is hard to write any thing more inconſiderate and dangerous then that I have: but if a man ſhould write any word againſt ſubjection to Magiſtracy, or his own preſent Magiſtrate, or that it were lawful to reſiſt if the Magiſtrate ſhould impoſe any law againſt the common good (when yet it is not ſin, I account many times not to obey it, and eſcape if we can without reſiſtance), this let me tell him were dangerous (I cannot ſay more dangerous becauſe the other is not dangerous,) that the man may receive ſome ſhame and conviction for his own being ſo inconſiderate in his cenſure of what he underſtood no better. This Debater ſhall not have I will warrant him, a breath or Title of this nature from me. Nay if a law be good I mean politically good (and a law is politically good where it is for the common good,) I am ready to believe and hold it is obliging, obliging to the Conſcience, not only that we muſt obey rather then reſiſt (which we muſt do if the thing be politically evil, unleſs we count ſuffering to be better) but if we could eſcape with man, we muſt yet do it, I count leaſt we offend God, if a law be not politically good, I ſay we muſt not reſiſt for all that, and upon that account rather then ſuffer we are lyable to obedience. And what is there now, or what reaſon is there that any ſhould deſire more. Let us here our man of Proverbs. A man muſt not reſiſt (ſayes our Caſuiſt) that is expreſs, and rather then reſiſt he muſt ſuffer, but this is to ſteal a gooſe, and ſtick a feather; I thank him firſt for this, that he hath not left out this paſſage wholly in this place, leaſt his Reader elſe might have thought me indeed ſome dangerous perſon, whereas theſe words have acquitted me; and I anſwer, that this Gooſe he ſpeaks of my ſtealing, is the thing ought to be ſtolen or removed, and that which he makes ſo light of, is to be brought in the Room of it, to wit, this man is of opinion that human laws even all laws indefinitely bind the Conſcience, ſo that a man muſt ſin if he break any of them, This is his Gooſe, that is, his fooliſh opinion, an opinion intollerable: and inſtead of this, that which I would bring in is, that though we conceive there be ſome laws, which if a man ſometimes obſerves not, he is not to charge himſelf with ſin, yet if he be compelled by the lawful Magiſtrate, rather then reſiſt he muſt ſuffer, and rather then ſuffer obey. But why muſt he (ſayes he) when he is already perſwaded that he need not unleſs he be forced? this is ſtrange! where is this Debaters reaſon! I ſay he muſt, though he ſhould not ſin elſe by neglect, becauſe he is forced, and cannot help it, but for avoiding of ſuffering, he does it. But wrath or ſuffering is not to be feared when the multitude is agreed not to be injured. I anſwer here is the want of the diſtinction which this author would not take from me, between the authority which is in the Magiſtrates Perſon, and that of his commands. The one is from God immediately, the other mediately by vertue of the things commanded being for the common good, and ſo particulars of that generall morall duty which is required of God. Some may uſe other words to expreſs this diſtinction by the Magiſtrates authority it ſelf, and the exerciſe of it in his commands or laws: but this muſt be known that diſtinguiſh we muſt here to the ſame ſenſe I intend, and be very careful too of the diſtinction or we ſhall be loſt. If the multitude be agreed not to do a thing that is ill, it is well I take it, and as they ought, it was manifeſtly Jonathans caſe. But if they agree together not to ſuffer, if the Magiſtrate will enforce the thing, let there be but the leaſt Officer will act in it, then they reſiſt, and ſin againſt God, and it is not juſtify able upon any terms, ſuppoſe a whole army and but two men in it will ſtand by the Prince, he may. I muſt affirm to ſpeak ſtrictly on the point of Conſcience, by theſe two men alone, puniſh a whole army for any thing they refuſe to do, and they muſt bear it, and cannot help themſelves, but with ſin which they muſt not do. For he that reſiſteth the power, reſiſteth the ordinance of God, and receiveth to himſelf damnation. We know the caſe under Maximinian, when a whole legion of Chriſtians were commanded to ſacrifice, and they choſe rather to ſuffer decimation twice over, being executed man by man, rather then defend themſelves while their lives were at ſtake, and the ſword was in their hands. Such a Conſcience ought we to have of our ſubjection (and ſo much does the concern of government and the whole World lye upon it,) when of obedience as to ſome particular commands we need to have none. In ſhort there lyes no obligation upon Conſcience ſometimes to obey, but there does alwayes not to reſiſt, and that both ſerves the Magiſtrate turn, and ſuffices when he pleaſes to have a civil thing done.

I will not yet leave his laſt reaſon, ſeeing he layes ſo much ſtreſs on it, and his ſtrength of all comes to this. I do not take here his very words, but matter which he may expreſs as he will otherwiſe. The People muſt not be allowed to judge of their own actions, which are commanded by the Magiſtrate about civil things, becauſe they will be ſwayed by their own intereſts, and judge thoſe Laws againſt the publick good which are not for their private profit: by which means unleſs they be taught and hold that all Laws indefinitely do bind their Conſciences, they will notwithſtanding the Magiſtrates power, abſolve themſelves from what they pleaſe, no Laws will be obſerved, and all Government come to the ground, Unto this as his ſubſtance, beſides my anſwer I have already given, I ſhall crave leave to offer a few conſiderations.

In the firſt place, this is certainly a ſhal •• w apprehenſion, which muſt ſuffer a conviction from the conſtant experience of the world. For how is the world governed? there is not one of a hundred that obſerves the Laws out of Conſcience; if they did, then muſt they for ought I know be careful to g • t the Statutes and read them as their bibles, which one of a thouſand never do. But men underſtand, it they do ſuch or ſuch things, they are l • able to be ſued, or to be bound to the Seſſions or the like, and to avoid the danger of the Law, they obſerve it. Now it is a fooliſh thing to ſay the Laws will not be obſerved, or the world will not be governed, unleſs by another means then that by which it is governed, and the Law are obſerved. Our Nations and Heathen Nations, and thoſe Nations which never had the fear of God to believe a judgement to come, have been kept under the obſervation of the Laws of their Country by theſe means.

In the ſecond place, this is not only againſt univerſal experience, but it confronts the very inſtitution of God, the appointment of the Magiſtracy, God hath made the Magiſtrate his Miniſter, and put the ſword into his hand, for the ordering and governing Societies, and Common wealths, and if this indeed will not ſerve that purpoſe, then you render his inſtitution inſufficient, and make his Miniſter to bear the ſword in vain. The Law (ſayes the Apoſtle) is not made for the righteous, but the diſobedient and unrighteous. If all were righteous and would of themſelves make Conſcience of doing what they ſhould do, there would be no need of Magiſtrate or Law: but when the Law and Magiſtrate is appointed for this end: to bring the refractory to order, and thoſe that make no Conſcience of what they do to be ruled, how fond muſt the imagination be which conceits, unleſs men do firſt beleive themſelves bound in Conſcience to obey, they will not obſerve the Laws?

In the third place, if it be for ſome perſons particular intereſt to break the Laws, it will be the concern of others that they be forced to keep them if they be indeed for the common good: & ſo ſhall they joyn with the Magiſtrate in his cauſing the execution of them. This indeed is that which upholds all Laws that are good. The publick intereſt being greater then the private does uphold them. Whereas if a Law be not really for the publick good, this is one certain reaſon at the bottom of its invalidity, and decay, becauſe it hath not root enough, upon the publick utility, to maintain it ſelf againſt particular enchroachments. If a Non-conformiſt come within five miles of a Corporation there is no body hurt by it, and no body like to be concerned at it, were this a thing truly conducing to the publick good, then muſt the publick be diſadvantaged in their breach of that Law; and if the publick, then muſt ſome more eminently, and thoſe ſhould be as much concerned, that they obey as themſelves to avoid the obſervation. By the way, when the advantage for the publick does not countervaile and exceed the private loſs or dammage that particular perſons ſhall ſuffer by a Law, ſuch a Law I take to be unjuſt, or at leaſt Politically evil, and binds not the Conſcience. However that which I here affirm is, that whether men make a Conſcience of a Law or not, if the Law be good: the publick advantage will prevail (when the Magiſtrate is minded) or cauſe it to be obſerved.

In the fourth place, it is a thing very unpolitick to offer to the world any principle upon which it ſhould be governed, which is other then that which does govern it. If the world be governed by the Magiſtrates ſword, and the Conſcience only that we muſt not rebell, and is governed as well as ever it is like to be governed: it is but an unhinging the world to pretend they muſt receive this principle, that human laws bind the Conſcience; or elſe there will be no need to obey, ſeeing the People may joyn and chuſe not to be forced as he ſpeaks. It is a ſaying, if a Horſe knew his ſtrength, what might he not do? he would not let man ride him and uſe him as he does. If the world knew their ſtrength, that the Magiſtrate indeed could not puniſh them whatſoever they did, unleſs they joyned with him one againſt another, when there is juſt cauſe for it, they might ſhake off every yoke: but as the whole body of the People cannot be made to know this, ſo as at once to agree upon it, any more then the Horſe can, though every particular man does know it: ſo were it an utterly ruinous thing to ſpeak of it if they could. It is true if the people did agree together (which agreement is their ſtrength, and they cannot know one anothers preſent minds all) that they would not be forced, they might chooſe: but then when they made no Conſcience to reſiſt, how ſhould this man think upon his principle, that they would make ſuch Conſcience to obey.

In the firſt place, it does ſeem to me a pernicious thing to the ſouls of pious and tender Chriſtians, to lay any ſuch load upon the Conſcience which is more then it can bear. I ſay there is no temptation hardly more dangerous to the undoing of a ſoul, then to preſs it upon ſuch things as goes beyond it, and over ſets it. If a man does believe he is bound to make Conſcience of every command of his ſuperiour and Law of the Realm or elſe he doth ſin, it is enough to make him caſt off all the Laws, and when his duty is made ſo grevious to him, that it ſeems impoſſible for him but to live in ſin, to be ready for reſiſtance next, and then all Magiſtracy is gon. The way to have ſome Laws obeyed out of Conſcience, is to take off its obligation from others; and if a Magiſtrate indeed might chooſe whether his Subjects Conſciences ſhould be bound by all his Laws or not, there is good reaſon for him to be content that the matter ſhould be as it is. They are bound in Conſcience not to reſiſt, and he knows not his own ſtrength if he deſire any more: although when a Law is for the common good, then is there Gods command alſo which takes place. There is one thing I cannot but add, which might make another conſideration, what if a deſpotical Prince was ſo wicked, as reſolving to be damned himſelf to ſeek the damnation of all his people, and ſhould thereupon make ſo many Laws, and about ſuch trivial things on purpoſe, that none of his Subjects might regard to keep them, but live and die in the wilful breach of them: I pray let this Debater tell me really whether according to his opinion it does not lye in the power of ſuch a Divel as this is, to carry a whole Nation to Hell with him.

In the ſixth place, let us ſuppoſe the Conſciences of men were bound indefinitely to all Laws, does this Author think really that the belief of this would make the world to obſerve them, and ſo maintain Government more then the Magiſtrates ſword? I doubt me he is here more wide: we ſee too well that when the worldly or carnal intereſt of men is concerned, what little regard Conſcience has. It were happy indeed for the Earth if the fear of God Almighty did but prevail more with the Generality then the fear of a ſuite at Law, or a Penalty of twenty ſhillings. If intereſt will prevail with a man, to judge a thing commanded him to be againſt the common good, when it is for it, the ſame intereſt of his it is like with ſuch a man would prevaile ſtill upon him not to obſerve the Law, though he were bound in Conſcience to it.

In the ſeventh place, then thoſe few honeſt perſons that would obſerve a Law if they thought themſelves bound in Conſcience to it, not withſtanding their private intereſt be againſt it, will likewiſe make the like Conſcience in their judging of a Law, ſo as not to be byaſſed by their particular concernment to think otherwiſe of it, then does comport with the publick advantage. And this in effect will come to the ſame iſſue.

In the laſt place. I will offer you one preſident to pinne the basket. It pleaſed God in the late times that this caſe became Dr. Saunderſons own caſe. The Act of Uniformity bound the Miniſter to read Common Prayer. This Law the Dr. acknowledges to be of force, for all the Times; but if he obſerves the Law he muſt looſe his living. Upon this he conſiders of the Act, and when he looks on the immediate particular end of it, he can find nothing but that their remains obliged to it. He then looks on the general and ultimate end, and that he conceives right to be the publick good, wch is intended or is to be ſuppoſed to be intended in all laws. Upon this end he comes to the conſideration whether all circumſtances being weighed, it be conducive for the common good for him to obſerve this Law or not: and being in the reſult fully perſwaded in his own mind that the benefit to the publick could no wayes countervail his particular loſs and ſuffering he concludes it lawful by the neglect of that Law to retain his living. There is a ſober perſon having read my Caſe ſhewed me a Manuſcript of the Doctors (but would not let me write any thing out of it) for the confirmation of my judgement. I cannot relate either the whole matter or words of it, but theſe two things I affirm for truth in it. That be comes off upon the conſideration of the general end of the Law, the publick benefit: and judges himſelf whether his obſerving that Law were conducive to that end in reference to the determining his own practice. And here I have (I account) my full weight for my ſelf, and think I had beſt to fetch the poor man before alſo, who finding no ſufficient relief from this Authour about his Cottage, may meet with it from this inſtance to his ſatisfaction, and it will come to this, whit • ſeems a little more then I have yet quite ſai •• that not only when a Law is politically •• vil, but when it is good in regard of its general obſervation, yet if a man be perſwaded fully in his Conſcience upon ſuch du •• conſiderations and cautions as he ought to take, that his particular keeping of it under the preſent circumſtances he lyes, is not ſo much for the common good really as his not keeping of it is (which I will take to be plainly this poor mans caſe inſtanced, who if he holds not his houſe muſt with his Family preſently fall on the Pariſh), he is not to charge his ſoul with ſin for his wholeſome breach of it. After this I will yet ſubjoyn a little more in reference alſo to ſome others. When the Apoſtle gives us this precept, obey thoſe that have the rule ovér you, though there be no words added by way of exception, it is to be ſuppoſed the things they command are for our edification, this being a condition neceſſarily implyed to all rightful obedience, that the Ruler hath authority in what he injoynes. But the Miniſter hath authority only for mens edification, and hath none in things againſt their ſpiritual good, according to our authority (ſayes the Apoſtle) for edification, not deſtruction. The Caſe is the ſame with the Magiſtrate. His commands that have authority muſt be to our civil good. It is a miſtake therefore (how ingenious and ordinary ſoever it may ſeem in ſome that ſay, the people have liberty to judge indeed, whether a thing commanded be lawful, but not at all whether it be convenient. That by all means they count it to be denyed, as if the allowing any ſuch thing would preſently (as this author fancies too) ſubvert all Government. I heſe Perſons I perceive therefore diſtinguiſh not between judging what is ſit for the general, or univerſality, which judgment indeed is proper to the ſupream Magiſtrate: and judging what is fit for a mans ſelf only to doe. All things are lawful for our (ſayes the apoſtle) But all things are not expedient. I will not be brought under the power of any. a Chriſtian judges for himſelf of both theſe; of the lawfulneſs and of the expedience of his own actions. If this be not granted then muſt he be brought under the power of indifferent things, which he ought not to be: and then does he ſubmit himſelf unto the Ordinance of man or the human Creature as his ſervant and not as free and as the Servant of God. Again theſe perſons have not yet conſidered what I have been telling ſtill in theſe papers, that this liberty is aſſumed of us in reference only to the Conſcience or to our obligation in for interiori; and that while the outward man i • ſtill acknowledged to be bound, there is n • danger at all to Government in the matter On the contrary ſide there is this intollerable ſnare, or evil conſequence does follow on the denyal hereof, that every time any human Law (the matter whereof is not for bidden of God) is not obſerved, the ſubject muſt ſin, and conſequently if he live and dyes knowingly and wilfully, in his neglect he muſt be damned, I will yet propoſe therefore one or two inſtances. There is a Statute in Henry the eights time (if I miſtake not) which remains unrepealed, that no man ſhall brew with Hopps. I do ask hereupon whether there be any Brewer in this Nation knowing of this, that can be ſaved? I do not find my Debator can anſwer me this queſtion; and I do not doubt but there are many Brewers that are honeſt men and good Chriſtians, as well as I believe he is. If you will ſay that this Law now is antiquated through diſuſe; I will ask then what think you of thoſe Brewers that diſuſed it at firſt? was they all damned neceſſarily who willfully brought it into diſuſe? the Caſe is a frequent Caſe as to all the like Laws, and you muſt come at length to this, that thoſe who obſerved not this Law at firſt did judge it was not good for the Nation, or not fit to be kept: and upon that judgement are to be juſtified. It follows then both that a Law againſt the common good binds not the Conſcience: and that every man for himſelf may judge whether it be ſo or no in reference to his own acting. Another inſtance ſhall be this, ſuppoſe a Father or a Maſter lays ſome ſtrict charge on his Son or Servant to lay out a Thouſand pounds on a Commodity which is more perhaps (but for his Credit) then he is worth by half. This Son or Servant in going to do it, bears of the growing or coming in of this Commodity by great quantities in ſome parts of the Kingdome, and upon his own diſcretion alone and good conſideration of what may fall our, forbears, his Father or Maſter perhaps now at preſent is grievouſly chaſed: but within few days the price of the Commodity falls half, and then he ſees that if he had been obeyed he had been undone. From hence doe there appear not only the neceſſity, but benefit, of allowing a judgement of diſcretion unto Perſons of capacity, under the commands of their Superiours; and that I ſay not meerly to judge whether the thing commanded be lawful or unlawful in reference unto God whereof there is no queſtion: but whether it be convenient or inconvenient to that end or outward good which by that command is deſigned. It appears alſo from both theſe inſtances, that the commands of men do not by vertue of the fifth Commandement it ſelf bind the Conſcience immediately and abſolutely, but mediately and ex hypotheſi, to wit upon ſuppoſition thoſe commands are good, human laws Dr. Taylor will have it bind the Conſcience directly and properly. I do not love to diſpute about terms, but if any think he intends immediately, he is out, for they do bind only by the intervention of Gods will, he argues, the authority of the Magiſtrate is Gods authority. I anſwer the authority which is in the perſon of the Magiſtrate as Gods Miniſter is Gods authority, and binds directly and immediatly to ſubjection: but the commands of the Magiſtrate have not Gods authority, unleſs the things commanded be agreeable to his will, and then it is by the intervention of his will, I ſay, that the Conſcience is bound to obedience. A third thing appears that the Conſcience of man is not bound by vertue of Gods authority unto every command of our Superiors though the thing commanded be in a matter ſometimes which of it ſelf or its own Nature, is indifferent becauſe the conſideration then of the external commodity, or diſcommodity only, could not juſtifie the breaker of any of them. If as ſoon as a Father or Maſter had forbidden any thing, the Commandment of God took place immediatly, and he thereby is to be reckoned to forbid it too, this Son or Servant might not break ſuch a command though he did gain a thouſand pounds, or though either that Maſter or Father ſhould be undone by it There be ſeveral examples might be fech't from Hiſtories of great Commanders and Embaſſadors that to a chieve ſome great exploits have been forc't to leave the inſtructions of their Princes, for which though at their return they have begged their pardon (out of form) as being obnoxious to the Law, yet have they had that Conſcience of their own fact towards them and toward God, as not only to be free from ſin, in that diſobedience, but to expect ſome ſignal reward for the ſervice of ſuch tranſgreſſions.