NOTHING is more commend­able then the Exercising of the Humane Mind in such requisite Contemplations, as most Effectual­ly conduce to the Improvement of the Un­derstanding in things of special Importance.

And tho' Man do's Exist in a World whose Structure is no less admirable to his Spe­culation then how he came to have Being in it, or Originally Ensoul'd above other Creatur's: Yet Nature, is no such Step-Dame as not to Communicate, by her Works, such plentiful discoveries to the Rational Faculty as have an ample perspicuity and genuine [Page 2] tendency to Improve our Apprehensions.

A Treasure of Science that ought to be far more valuable, by the Judicious, than an excess of Worldly Riches that may fill the Coffers of such as are meanly Apprehensive, or ungratefully Inconsiderate of the boun­ties of Providence that in a Natural Course Replenish the Earth they Possess.

So that in Effect they are no farther sen­sible of the Conduct of Nature, in whatsoever they most advantageously Injoy, then a Man might be of a tale in a Romance that Repre­sents some, above others, Indiscretely For­tunate. How precious should then be con­sider'd the deserts of such Persons, who by their Elaborate Endeavours, and Learn'd Pro­ficiencies so nearly trace the footsteps of Na­ture, that they render their Knowledge Ap­proximate to her closest Recess: Whose mighty Door is no way so perspicuously open'd as by the Key of Philosophical Science, which if duely apprehended, or more regard­fully Incumbent on the Souls of Men; it would discountenance not a few, that out of more than necessary respects to their Worldly Interest and concerns of Life, bereave them­selves of time and advertency in reference to such common Objects as by Ordainments [Page 3] from above have a present Operation on our Senses: To which purpse more Emphatically in the ensuing Discussions.

But here it may be observ'd, that notwithstan­ding that by the Natural facility of Providence much is convey'd to common Understanding; tis not to be concluded from thence, that all are equally discernable: Which, in Effect, were to Affirm, that in the numbers of Men, every Man was alike Intelligent, or no less capable of Philosophical, or Mathematical Literature, then such as are Eruditely famous in both.

It being very evident, that as some Persons are by Nature Exalted to predominant Accom­plishments in order to the Government of Infe­riors; so there is an undeniable superintendency conferr'd on others as being gifted from Above to be Supreame in Science, if their Superiority be Legitimately qualified. But if Arbitrary or Transgressing from genuine and natural proba­bilities, or methods of certainty, it then dege­nerat's, in its best Interpretation, to a studied fiction, or artifice of Learned Tyranny; by imposing, at will, on the Judgments of others.

Nor is it to be admir'd from the unwary condescentions of Men; that a Person of re­puted Capacity should subject their Opinions to the Dictatorship in Science that he is prone [Page 4] to Attribute to himself: Insomuch that the Errors that drop from his Pen, instead of being tax'd, find a passable Reception.

Whether this Reflection is applicable, as too much an opiniator, to the otherwise Ingenious Des-Cartes, I leave to a serious Examination of his Principles by the Reader of what here fol­lows: Which shall contain the main Essentials of this Part of his Works I now treat of; tak­ing due care to deliver the meaning of his Words as plainly in English as they are to be found in the Latin.

His first considerable Assertion is, That in search of Truth, we may not improperly doubt of the imaginary and sensible Existence of Things: (his reason is) Because the Senses of a Man awake may err, as well as when by Dream he ima­gines any Thing that never had Being suitable to his Imagination.

To which may be replied, That notwith­standing that it may be granted, that both waking and dreaming the Fancy may repre­sent Objects that never were truly such; it being very possible, that a Man may contem­plate on a Chimera, a Monster, or the like, that never had Being in the World: But that being done, and the Imagination examin'd, 'twill be found, that such Particulars had a pre­cedent [Page 5] residence in the Senses; however disor­derly or uncouthly the Figures of different Bodies imaginably appearing: For Example, 'tis impossible, otherwise, to imagine a Sub­stance partly composed of Man and Beast, such as the Centaurs, or other seeming Mix­tures of Creatures which had no other rise than from Poetical Fables: Yet these being sub­stantially represented by the Fancy either waking, or sleeping; the sensitive Part of the Imagination will peremptorily determine, That the different Shapes and Figures of any such Things that the Fancy seems to Unite, had a pre­cedent Residence in the Senses; as their Species had been discernable in Part, or in their whole Shape and Figure: It being no less easie to imagine half a Man, or half a Horse, than it is to conjoyn their Proportions by the license of Fancy as it may Intrigue with our Senses: So that whether this Learned Monsieur were sleeping or waking when he inscrib'd this Query, 'tis cer­tain, That he declin'd the sensible Method of his Intellect, as he undertakes to separate the Mind from participating with the Senses: Yet on this improbable Distinction, is grounded much of his subsequent Matter. Who affirms immediately after, That of Things which we sometimes judge most cer­tain, and such as may be properly termed Mathe­matical [Page 6] Demonstrations, or Principles of themselves manifest, we have afterwards doubted; because, says he, we have observed some such Propositions that have been erroneously delivered.

But can it be argued from any Mathemati­cal Problem, That whosoever doubts or com­mits that mistake is not therefore certain of his Senses; which were all one as to assert, That he who is not Mathematically knowing (of which Science too many in the World are igno­rant) cannot assure himself, that he is in any other kind sensible. For Illustration, let a Mathematical Line be supposed, and according to the Axiom of Euclid granted to signifie length, but no breadth, which may be allowed a very necessary and refined Maxim as being, in a Mathematical Sense, the abstracting of Matter from Lines consider'd in themselves, that in substance they may not be Part of their Measure: But as a Line is beheld in any kind represented or delineated, it is impossible for the Eye to perceive it in any other capacity, than as it appears to have both Longitude and Latitude; for else it could not be the Object of Sight, which clearly explains the Difference be­twixt Geometrical Science and Sense; the one being made evident by the Instructions and Rules of Practice, the other annexed as a Pro­priety [Page 7] to Nature; by whose assistance a Man may certainly be said to see and feel tho' total­ly ignorant of any Mathematical Theorem.

There is nothing more evident, than that every Man is endu'd with freedome of Will, by the Concession of God, and their natural Compositions, to imploy their Senses in the most obvious and certain way of Manage­ment; but far from being alike capacitated in the Gifts and Contemplation of the Mind: One may perform whatsoever can be required from his Senses as perfectly as another, not­withstanding there be a vast disparity in their Understandings; which in effect is granted by this Author, as he words the Particulars I hi­therto treat of: And mentions nothing more of Moment to be observed, untill he comes to his seventh Head, where he states the most Capital Principle, as he conceives, in order to the erecting of the Proofs he subsequently offers: But whether to be allowed that Validity, he seems to magnifie, will soon appear.

Rejecting, says he, all Things of which we can in any manner doubt, as also supposing them false; we may easily suppose, That there is no God, no Heaven, no Bodies; and that we have neither Hands or Feet, or any Bodies: But not that we, who so imagine, are nothing; because it is absurd [Page 8] to conceive, That whatsoever thinks does not Exist at the Time of its Thinking: Wherefore he con­cludes, That he is, and that he Thinks, is of all the most certain Truth that can be acquired by Philosophical Order.

Who would not judge, That so wild an In­vention as this, in order to Improve Know­ledge, might not rather proceed from some Person in Bedlam, than from Des-Cartes? Of whom if Interrogated, how he comes to sup­pose, That a Man may point-blank, on the ac­count of his Fiction, deny the Being of a God, together with all the visible Particulars already mention'd? As to the Existence of the Deity, he that considers the necessity of its Concession, as he beholds the wonderful Conduct of the Universe, with so many miraculous Objects as are contain'd therein, will as soon give credit to any Forgery of Fables, as to doubt of the World's Omnipotent Creator. And no less im­possible to acquiesce in his other Suppositions; there being no Body that has his Eyes to See, and Hands and Feet, can doubt, That he discerns That which is called Heaven above his Head, and that he feels with Hands, and treads on the Earth with Feet. But, if you'l pass the Supposition of Des-Cartes, he will assure you, That both Seeing and Feeling is not so In­telligible, [Page 9] as Ego cogito, and Ego sum: Where­as, in truth, I neither can understand, That I either Live or Think, but as my Senses Con­spire with my Intellect: If not, one may as well conclude, That he may live without Think­ing of whatsoever he knew before, or was sensibly requisite to his Being and Life.

So nakedly has this Author stript the Hu­mane Soul from the necessity of participating with the Body; and This he farther under­takes to Affirm by his next Step, where he po­sitively expresses, That there is no other Method of defining the Nature of the Mind, and its di­stinction from the Body: Adding, That it may be done by Examining what we are, and supposing all Things false that are diverse from us; whence (says he) we may perspicuously apprehend, That no extension, Figure, local Motion, nor any Thing like these, Attributed to the Body, could appertain to our Nature: On which account he concludes, That meer Cogitation is more to be preferred, in point of certainty, than any Corporeal Thing that could be Apprehended.

To which I Answer, That had it been de­manded, of this thinking Gentleman, Whe­ther at the time he writ This Treatise, he did not Contemplate of some Bodily Notion? [Page 10] For how could he Pen the Wording in any Kind of Extension, Figure, local Motion, or the like, and be without Thought of their Being, when he nam'd them such?

Had he been in that Season, to have Answer'd This Querie, it must have posed his Contem­plating in the singular way he proposes. And if the Author of this Conceit could not perform what he requires, it could not be Doctrinal to others: It being as Impossible totally to separate the Mind from the Senses, as to think of a Non-Entity, or what has no Existence; which were a contradiction to Nature and the sensible Impression adherent to the Intellect with the Being of Things; and such s cannot be apprehended by it, other­wise than as they are Compossed of quanti­tive and Bodily Parts.

Could I imagine another World as vast as This, with as many Individual Beings and Creatures of all Sorts, as are contained with­in the Compass of the Universe we Inhabit; I could think of no other in all its Parts, than such a One, or in likeness, the same with This, that had with all its Particulars, been the precedent sensible Object, of my Understan­ding. So heterogeneous to the Nature of [Page 11] Humane Comprehension, is the Principle of Des-Cartes, whereby he endeavours to separate the Imagination from the Commixture it has with our Senses.

These Discussions, if duly considered, are sufficient to defeat the farther Progress of his Maxims; which, in Effect, will be liable to the same Confutation: But to give him the Scope he takes, together with the Advantage he can make by it; let us admit the Question he makes, in his Ninth Particular, which he con­ceives very Emphatical to the purpose; and where he has this passage; supposing, by a kind of Interlude of his Fancy, himself to See, to Walk, and have Being, and all these Cor­poreally performed, yet makes no certain Conclusion from thence: Because (says he,) I may sleeping think I See, or Walk, notwith­standing my Eyes be not open, and that I move not from the Place I was in, and perhaps as if I conceiv'd that I had no Body: All which if referred to the Operation of the Mind, where­by he Imagin'd or Thought that he saw and walked, he determines certain.

And I Affirm no less, if to the Imagination be annexed, the Impression made in it, by the Senses. For so I can Think that I saw, or [Page 12] walk'd when I Slept; which Imports no more, than that there was a Residence in my Intel­lect, conveyed by my Senses of my Seeing, and observing of my walking Person when I was really Awake. So that it must be a very empty Notion to conceive, That I can be Per­sonated meerly by the working of my Brain, without Comprehending any concern of the Senses: For Example, Seeing, or Moving must needs have a necessary Relation to my Bodily Parts, and the Senses that appertain to Moti­on; as I cannot move on the Ground, but as, on it, I feel I move. So that all that can be Implied from this visionary Conceit of Des-Cartes, is, That the Fancy imaginarily Retain'd, what before had been actually performed by the Senses.

He proceeds to Explicate, That misconception, by not orderly Philosophizing, is the absolute Cause that the Mind is not accurately distin­guished from the Body.

And here, methinks, he imposes too cri­tical a Task to be practically Discharged by the common Use of Humane Understanding, considering how few the World affords that are philosophically Accomplished, or suffici­ently Instructed to that purpose: Or if they [Page 13] were, could they be therefore convinced, That his manner of distinguishing the Mind from the Body, is not a more refined Conceit than can be exerted by any Imagination that resides in Bodily Composition? Is it not manifest, that Elementary Substances are the Ingredients of our Constitutions as they tem­per our Flesh and Bloud? And can the Soul that resides within their Circumference, and Acts by them, contemplate her self discharged from them; yet at the same time, as is ac­knowledged by Des-Cartes, imploy her Ima­gination in Representing such Objects as could not be known to her, but as the Senses had made their Impressions, on Things, on the Intellect, that in their material Proprieties and Shapes had been precedently apprehended by them: And it were unnaturally absurd to annex Thought to any other Method actuated by the Brain of Man: It being no less Insignificant to allow the Mind a distinct Exercise within the Body, the Region of her Dominion, than to suppose a Prince to Go­vern without the requisite Assistance of his Subjects.

Thus far, I conceive, stand sufficiently Taxed the groundless Mistakes, if not Fictions [Page 14] of this Learned Author: Whose Defects did chiefly Emerge from his attributing to his Abilities, as if proceeding from him as the first of Men, that by their Grandeur could remove such Difficulties, that, in their Na­ture, are too perplexed for the Resolution of the eruditest Pen, as they relate to the man­ner of Being and Acting of the Humane Soul: Which if considered absolutely spiri­tual; the Question may be, How any Thing, perfectly spiritual, can be Inclosed, Actuate, and Exist in a Corporeal Substance? Since in a Philosophical Construction, nothing can act on Body, or have Being with it, in any consideration; but what is composed of Bo­dily Parts. If contrarily, the Mind or Soul of Man, be deemed a material Essence, the Attribute of Immortality conferred on its Dignity by common Opinion, will be de­bas'd by That Definition; notwithstanding it may be affirmed, That whatsoever its Sub­stance is, or manner of being in the Humane Body; it is equally facile to the Omnipotent to eternilize its Existence, as to Transform by Resurrection, the Dust of a rotten Carkass to the material Figure and Parts of the Body that had been so consumed.

[Page 15] In the next place he takes for granted, That the Mind may with that simplicity understand it self, as it may doubt of all Things else.

But how can that bare Intelligence be At­tributed to the Mind, that cannot by what has been before discussed, so much as Ru­minate of any Thing of which it does not participate with the Senses? The Reason he gives to the contrary, is, That the Mind find­ing in its self many Ideas, which so long as it contemplates, and of nothing, without it self, either Affirms, or Denies, it cannot be deceived. But can he prove that the Mind, at that time he proposes, has no Comix­ture with the Senses: The Argument he gives to make good his Assertion, is, That the Mind being furnished with divers Notions, composeth Demonstrations, to which so long as it attends, it assures it self that they are true. And what these Ideas are he Exemplifies, by Affirming, That the Mind is replenished with Ideas of Numbers and Figures; besides common Notions, amongst which this, that if to Equals be added Equals, there shall remain Equals, and the like; on which ground he proves, That the three Angles of every plain Triangle are Equal to two Right. Which cannot be denied by any Man that under­stands Mathematical Certainties.

[Page 16] But must every Man that Reads Des-Cartes, be so skilled in that Science as to be able to Demonstrate, That the three Angles of a Triangle are equal to two Right Ones; which many thousands of Men are not able to per­form? And if not, they will be little advan­taged by the Notions here mentioned of this Author. However, to treat him in his own Method, and for satisfaction of such as are ma­thematically knowing; Can it be denyed, That taking the half of Four, there will equal­ly remain Two: And this must properly sig­nifie the Substracting from some Numerical Quantity, as it really Relates to its Arithmeti­cal Proportion or Measure; it being impossible to take the half of Nothing: Wherefore the Maxim must have reference to some substan­tial Thing; or as the Figure of Four had been precedently seen, or written, to whatso­ever purpose it might sensibly Relate; and if so, the Demonstration cannot meerly proceed from the Mind without the concur­rance of the Sense; as I cannot tell One, Two, Three, and not be apprehensive, that I count Something. And he that would de­termine to the contrary, may as well Affirm, That a Man can tell Cash without the Use of [Page 17] his Feeling and Fingers; or fancy Money in a Bag and be able to compute its Summ by the notional operation of the Mind, accor­ding as it is applyed by this Author.

Who to exalt the height of his Ideas, tho' far incompatible to what he designs 'em, he under­takes to prove, That amongst the Troops of Fancy, which may be exerted by the Brain, there will be found one of that sublime Tendency, that the most perfect Existence, or Being of a God, may be im­plyed by it; together with such a necessary and eternal Being, as distinguishes it from the pos­sible, or contingent Existence that may be attri­buted to all other Things.

If This Doctrine be true; I may conse­quently determine, That the Methods of Providence by which the Universe and whatso­ever it contains Subsist, are but so many Con­tingencies; or that 'twas accidental that the Sun did yesterday Ascend to the Meridian, if not Deified by an Idea of his Existence: Whereas there must be such a determined and necessary Being of Providence, by the Decree of the Almighty, in the Conduct and Preserva­tion of the Universe, with whatsoever it con­tains, that it cannot have a Period otherwise than by a total Cessation of its natural Effects [Page 18] and Operations, as so many Bounties conferred from above, on the vast Circumference of the World, together with every Individual Thing that appertains to it.

Not that it can be denyed, That by the usual Effects of Nature, no Minute does pass in which there are not produced Innumerable Alterations as in course, Generation and Cor­ruption succeed one another in the various Changes of all Things that have Life and Growth: Yet, not to be implied, That by any Idea of them that can be imagined, accor­ding to This Author, is to be understood that they accidentally subsist, or vary in their manner of Being, which would, by Con­struction, Impute Contingencies to the Incom­prehensible Wisdom and Methods of Provi­dence tending to the Conservation and Pro­duction of Men and Creatures.

But to return to the remaining Part of his Fourteenth Particular, where he undertakes, with ample Assurance, to exalt his Idea of the Being of a God, by the Proof that is to be made, that the three Angles of a Triangle are equal to two Right, from whence as a parallel certainty he concludes the Existence of God supremely Per­fect.

[Page 19] But can it be Affirmed of any Idea, as he terms it, That because it is a Mathematical Truth, That the three Angles of a Triangle are equal to two Right; that it is sufficient to prove, from That Theorem, the miraculous Being and Perfection of Omnipotencie. And thus he again supposes, That all Men must be so far Geometrically Knowing, or they will be defi­cient, or without demonstrative Conviction that the Deity does Exist.

If This Doctrine were true, it were no less requisite that all Mankind should have Re­course, betimes, to the School of Euclid; where they might be Instructed as fully of the necessary Proportions of all the Angles and sides of that Figure, together with what its Area contains in Feet, Inches, or the like; naturally and usefully applicable to Corporeal Mea­sures: Which were very disconsonant to his Idea of any Perfection in a Triangle, as he would parallel it to the proving of the Existence of the Deity; which cannot be likened to any Commensurable Figure, or Being: Because two Immensely Infinite to come within the Pre­cinct or Computation of Lines. And he that most exactly discerns the Properties of a Tri­angle, in every of its Capacities, can but ap­ply [Page 20] it to Commensurable Parts and Proportions, as before express'd, and nothing more absurd than to assimilate their Proofs, on any ac­count, to the undenyable Existence of the Omnipotent so fully evident to the Eye and Sense, in the sublime Wonders beheld within the Compass of the Universe: Insomuch, That it is very Emphatically expressed by the Poet, where he Affirms, That God has taken care to Inform us by miraculous Mediums suitable to these Words—Os homini sublime dedit Caelumque videre, jussit et erectos ad sidera tollere vultus. As much more obvious to general Apprehension than any Geometrical Problem. Could it be unknown to the Intelligent Des-Cartes, how vast a multitude of Humane Kind are scarce able to Define a Triangle as a Figure consisting of three Angles; and far less apprehensive of the Truth of its useful Attributes; if not Regardlesly unconcerned, whether there is such a Thing or no; or not at all conducing to the Exerting of Omnipo­tence? For which they conceive they are, by the Goodness of Providence, furnished with more palpable Motives: And such as are ap­proved by himself, as shall be observed in con­venient Place.

[Page 21] In the mean time he much Insists on his Triangular Idea, as a Truth that gives a main Rise to the Proof of the necessary Existence of Omnipotence; because as he Affirms, That there is no other Idea to be found so absolutely certain; and yet he Grants, in effect, That it is no more than that, in a Triangle, the three Angles are equal to two Right: The disparity whereof, as he renders the Application, has been, I pre­sume, sufficiently noted already. Notwith­standing, it may not improperly be farther demanded, Why a Person of his exquisite Science should not alledge other Mathemati­cal Certainties, rather than fix, as he seems to do, on the peculiar Example he gives of a Triangle? Yet not to be questioned that the manifest Perfection of a Circle, in being a Round without any Point that can signifie its Beginning or End; together with the admira­ble Equality; not to be found in any other Figure, that every Line, as so many wonder­ful Attributes, has to each other, if drawn from its Center to its Circumference; is a more Sublime resemblance and Proof of an Infinite Being, than is consistent with a Trian­gle. All which, but most especially its Cir­cular Perfection, if considered by its proper [Page 22] Excellency, is no other than an Indeterminate Individual, or Geometrical Wonder, not to be Attributed to any other Figure: No Man having ever been able to give it an exact Measure, or such as may be deemed its Square; tho' the accurate Endeavour of the Famous in Mathematical Science. Whereas the Tri­angle is every way comensurable by the Sides and Angles it contains.

If a Unite be considered in its Arithmetical Capacity, it is a nearer Parallel to the proving of an Incomprehensible Existence of God, than can be deduced from the Idea he under­takes to give of a Triangle: Nothing being more admirable than the Entireness of the number One; in being both its own Root and Square, and also its Cube and Root; and in the same manner continues, in a Geometrical Progression, to the highest of Powers: Nor can it be wholly Divided or Substracted by any other Number: Which Excellencies sole­ly appertain to Unity.

Yet from none of these Examples, how­soever certain in themselves, can be asserted the Existence of God by such an Idea, of any of them, as may Universally prove the necessary Existence of the Deity, both as they [Page 23] are the Truths of Science; and therefore not every Man's sensible Conviction, as also that they are only applicable to Things of a mate­rial Being; As I cannot term the Square, Cube, or any figurative Demensions, the Comprehension or Measures of Nothing: Which, in effect, is required by Des-Cartes, as he would Abstract his Speculation from all con­comitancy with the Bodily Senses: And conse­quently imputes it as a Fault, or Neglect in not distinguishing accordingly, the perfect Idea of God, as it Impresses on the Mind the necessary existency of the Almighty.

But the main Objection is, and far from being Answered by him, That the Imaginati­on cannot be separated from Objects of Sense: For let a Man Contemplate with the utmost exactness that his Mind can afford, it will certainly terminate on one Thing or other, that resembles Material Parts; tho' by Sup­position as vastly Extended as 'tis possible to Imagine: Wherefore had this learned Gentle­man thoroughly considered the Speculative Part, of his Idea, when he Inscrib'd its Noti­on; as sure as he was of Humane Composi­tion, he would have annexed a Corporeal Representation, in some kind, to what he calls [Page 24] his Idea; or he must, as Insignificantly, or as near to nothing have imployed the Labour of his Brain, as if he could have Contempla­ted of a Vacuity: All which is equally absurd to whomsoever will allow to himself the liber­ty of Thinking.

On which consideration, and fully to con­fute his Supposition of bare Ideas of the Mind: It has pleased the Almighty by the wonderful and no less apparent Prospect of the Universe, with every Thing contained within its Bound­less Complex; to convince us, That nothing is comprehended by it, but what may imply the Denomination of Corporeal Miracles: Yet so admirably different, that what is of Elementary Form and Substance, within the Residence of Earth and Air, seems perfectly distinguished by the manner of Being and Essence, of the Sun and Stars, tho' of Bodily Resemblance: Yet none of them have other appearance, in the most Refined Conception we have of their Natures, than Objects of our Senses. And tho' the Original of the Universe, or the Individuals it Comprehends, be not manifest by any external Assurance; 'tis per­fectly evident, That they had a Beginning from an Omnipotent Cause; by reason that our [Page 25] not knowing how they had Primitive Exist­ence; is an undeniable Conviction, That in being Miraculous to our Understanding, or as so many Actual Works, wonderfully visible; they could not be produced, or continued, otherwise than by an Omnipotent, Incom­prehensible Will and Providence. So far does the Observation of admirable Facts, that by Divine Conduct are openly exposed to the Eyes of our Reason and Sense, exceed the most Refined Dictates of Science; as they direct the Sublime Ascents of our Concepti­ons by a more exact Progression, than Geo­metrically can be given to the highest of its Powers. How impertinent is it then to depart from the Road of Common Sense, by suppo­sing such an Idea in the Mind, as from any Mathematical Problem might guide us to the Proof of a Deified Existence? tho' contrary to the palpable Method of the Omnipotent, Or­dained by the Miracles of his Works: Which enormous Mistake is evidently This Author's, in a great Part of his Treatise, as he mainly endea­vours to Parallel his Demonstration of the Ex­istence of God with Mathematical Certainty.

Which Science, tho' above all to be pre­ferred, for the Dignity of its unerrable Maxims, [Page 26] and particularly so esteemed by me: Yet I cannot but judge it Incompatibly applied, even by this learned Author, to the purpose he would intend it; and deserves a Remark accordingly.

He yet farther proceeds to heighten his No­tion of Ideas; amongst which he selects the Idea of something most exquisitely perfect; by which he would have understood the neces­sary Existence of God. I will favour the Ambiguity of his Expression so far as not to believe, That he meant by his Idea a necessi­tated Existence, which could imply, that the Deity had an Exigency of Being from some other Thing: Because, whatsoever is necessi­tated cannot have, of it self, an entire volun­tary Existence; or, as one Cause might Ne­cessitate the Being of another; which cannot be applied to Supreme and Infinite Perfection. Nor was it possible for him or any Man to Imagine, by the most Refin'd Contemplation, That the necessary Existence of God can be more clearly understood, then by the Actual Prospect he has given us of his All-Sufficiency, and wonderful Providence annexed to the Conservation of the Universe, and All it contains. And if otherwise Interpreted, the [Page 27] Being of God, as separated from the Miracu­lous Prospect and Munificence we actually receive from the excellency of his Works, that fill the World we Inhabit: Were in effect to Attribute to the Deity a solitary Existence, or not the Author of the Innumerable Effects of Infinite Goodness that have an Emanation from him. So that 'tis not any Idea, of ne­cessary Existence by which God can be appre­hended; but rather the necessitated Being that the Total Comprehension of Heaven and Earth does receive from his Ordainment.

Which appears to be very significantly the Sense of This Author; as upon farther considera­tion he thickens his Idea in his 17th Particular, where he has this Expression: If any Man has the Idea of a Machine, or Fabrick produced by most curious Artisice, he will concede, That it Merits the utmost Inquisition of his Thought, whereby to be Informed of the Authentick Cause by which it was so accurately Effected; and such as could by no Device, or Humane Skill, receive Perfection.

What could these Words Import, other than his substantial Idea of the Constituted Being and Conservation of the Universe, in Reference to God the Author?

[Page 28] And having added to his Idea, the weighty Consideration of the World's Existence, he might well acknowledge, That it is the sub­stantial Union of Matter and Form, that gives admirable Subsistence to every Individual Thing, Circumscribed by the mighty Uni­verse; wherein is visibly presented, by the wondrous Proprieties of Composition and Conduct, an Incomprehensible Founder.

Which Perfections not to be Imitated by any Parallel Structure, or performed by Hu­mane Industry or Art; he fully annexeth to their Excellencies, the necessary Dependency and Manifestation of Omnipotent Power. By which Method, according to the soundest Spe­culation of Des-Cartes, may be perspicuously Exerted the otherwise Indefinable Being of the Almighty: Because, as he grants, the Extent of Humane Composition, in Soul and Body, cannot farther Ascend than by Objects of Sense, or such as have visible Limitation, to the Admiration, tho' not to the perfect Defi­nition of their sublime Cause; which can be no other than God as far exceeding all Imaginable expressing and height of Rational Accents.

[Page 29] And is not this Doctrine more readily ap­prehended by all that may, (if they please) be ocular Spectators, or by any means sensible Discerners of the Works of the World, that, by Omnipotent Appointment Surround them above, and below; than from the dry Idea of a Triangle, whose three Angles amount to two Right: And from thence deduce the Truth of God's necessary Existence; which if possible, by Mankind, so to be Demonstrated, 'twere no less requisite for Women than Men, to be able to Resolve the Problem; if they would Assert their Belief of the Being of a Deity: It being highly necessary, in order to that especial Concern, that there should be a suffici­ent Number of Female Geometricians: Which I confess might add Certainty to their Instru­ctions, tho' not otherwise Divine, when they Preach in the Society of Quakers.

Wherefore I may well admire, That such a Confufed and Impracticable Principle should be entangled, by this Author, with Mathema­tical Verity; of which Science he had, as to other Uses, a Learned Accomplishment: It being his real mistake, or too much Curiosi­ty, where he undertakes to Confirm, by a Mathematical Inference, That God does Exist; [Page 30] instead of the open Evidence, that is visible to Mankind, from the Miraculous Consistence of the World, and the Works it compre­hends. Wherefore 'tis judiciously Affirmed by Incomparable Bacon, That he had rather be Impos'd on by the Jewish Talmud, or Alcaron, then deny, That the Universe, with whatsoever it contains, is without the Rule of a Mind, or, which is all one, the Sovereignty of the Deity.

But the Authority of this Quotation, to­gether with the Reasons I have before Inserted, are very disagreeable to the Mental Idea of Des-Cartes, by which he rather Insers the Being of the Deity by his Notion of the Structure of the World, than by the Prospect we have of its actual Conduct and admirable Composure. On which he grounds this Interrogation; from whence (saies he) had any Man Being, that has an Idea of God's Perfections, unless from something more perfect than himself? Which doubtless is true, if un­derstood of the apparent means described in the wonderful Figure and Facts comprehend­ed by the Universe, as the Effects of an Omnipotent Cause. And thus may Thought ascend, by a miraculous Scale, to the acknow­ledgement of the Immense Power and Provi­dence [Page 31] of God actually manifest by Works. But not as this Author Affirms, From being as he calls it, naturally Enlightned or Capacitated from a meer Idea of the Mind, whereby to con­clude, That Man has a present, or primivitive Ex­istence from any Thing more perfect; as he Insinu­ates: Since 'tis very possible, That from an Idea, more natural than his, may be Imagined that Humane Composition and Life, might be produced in a Course of Nature, which some have been prone to Determine, from Materials very much inferior to the Subsistence of Mankind, either in Soul or Body.

And this is frequently discernable as from Elementary Commixtures and Operations, Animals proceed from Vegetables, and the contrary. Insomuch that Aristotle, in his last Chapter, of the Generation of Animals, con­jectures; That the Origine of Men as well as other Creatures, might have in Time past, an Earthly Production; and which he in another Place, supposes, by a long back­ward Computation of Time, to have proba­bly been an Artifice of Nature heretofore known and omitted. Yet none of these Me­thods, however they were, but must have had the allowance of Providence, without [Page 32] which there can be Nothing, in any kind, compleated. Notwithstanding, it cannot be Affirm'd, with Des-Cartes, That although we have not, as he alledgeth, Being from our selves; 'tis no assurance, That we can derive our immediate Existence, from something more perfect than our Natures: Which if an uni­vocal Truth, relating to God, the most Su­preme and Perfect of Beings; it may be ob­jected whether so many Imperfections as are naturally Adherent to our Compositions, could be consistent with any Perfections that were bestowed by the Almighty; or by which we must not have been more excellently temper'd in the best of our Faculties, than really we are: If not every Individual of Man­kind equally perfect in all Parts of Knowledge, had the Humane Mind been so commited to our Bodies by Supreme Allowance: The con­trary of which may be Asserted from Com­mon Experience; as sure that Particulars of Mankind are not more different in their Ex­ternal Features, than they are in the Inter­nal Proprieties of the Soul.

However Des-Cartes is pleased so far to Dis­sent from the Universal Sway of Experimental Science, that he undertakes to Philosophize [Page 33] against the Rules, and Dictates of Nature, by devising of Principles whereby he would totally sever the Mind from the Body: And with that Parity too, that he excepts no Imbe­cillity incident to Sex and Age; if the Mind be clearly evacuated, by a Dose of his Idea, from Corporeal Thought, should it tend to the Soul of Being, Operation and Management, that is ineffably conferred by Providence on the Works of Nature: Yet all these mighty Li­mits, howsoever appearing providentially im­passible; must be so refinedly penetrated by his Idea, that it may not encounter a Substance, tho' no grosser than the least Particle of Epi­curus's Atoms. But how to fix the Imagina­tion on any Thing of Infinite Perfection, so as to surpass the Boundaries of the Universe; and in that vast Journey of Thought, exempt from the Intellect, all Bodily Perception; were no less absurd than the Epithete of an Incor­poreal Phantasme: Which every Man that does Think, either Sleeping, or Waking, may sensibly confute: It being impossible to ima­gine, by any strength of Thought, the Per­fections of God farther than our Compositions of Body and Soul, are capable to extend.

[Page 34] Yet this manner of Humane Intelligence, is so peremptorily thwarted by the Suppositi­ons of this Author; That he undertakes so to dis-joyn the correspondency that the Intellect has with the Senses, That, according to his Maxims, Men cannot be assured, that either God or their Souls Exist; if their Imagination be not very singularly applied by expelling at pleasure, all conception of Bodily Objects; or that there is any such Thing as Corporeal Residence, or Motion; or that the Heavens are Replenished with Stars; or that there is Earth, or that Men have Bodies and subluna­ry Existence; or at most but Moral Certain­ties, That we sensibly perceive, there are any such Things: Unless by his manner of Idea, the Mind may be so stript from its Corporeal Appurtenances, That it may Reign with such simplicity in its Kingdom of Thought, that it may have nothing to do with Dominion over the Senses, or Body wherein it has Be­ing. On which distinct Method of Thinking he conceives does depend the Natural Propri­ety of the Soul, as it may, by Imagination, be separated from the Body. To come there­fore to the Improbability of his Assertion: Let it be granted, That he, or any other Man, [Page 35] could reject by Speculation all Bodily Particu­lars that are visibly and sensibly perceived within the Compass of the World; were it possible, at the same time, to entertain Thought by no Representation of other Things of a Corporeal Nature; which would amount to the creating of Thought somewhat more Fictitious than when ensoul'd by Poets their Invention of Gods and Goddesses: Because they did not transport their Fictions beyond, or without the resembling of Something in Being before. But exceeded by the Imaginary Suggestions of this Author, who gives no rise to his Thought from any Thing by likeness precedently known to himself, or any Body else: Yet from this pure Conceit does he ar­gue the clear Existence of the Humane Soul, and the Knowledge that it may perfectly have of the Being of God.

I should not have made this Discussion here, being much to the purpose of which I have already Treated; had not Occasion been gi­ven, by what succeeds, so far to Impress, its necessary Reiteration.

To proceed therefore with him to his 21 Particular, where he undertakes to prove, That from the Evidence we have of Something more [Page 36] perfect than our selves, we may clearly determine the manner of our Duration, and Temporary Con­tinuance; as also the natural Subsistence of all other Things; because, as he alledgeth, no such Particulars depend on themselves. Which is a clear Truth, if he would intend by his Noti­on the Intermediate Conduct of Providence in the Modalities, Production and Conserva­tion it gives, in a usual Course, to Things with­in the Boundaries of the Universe. In which may be discerned, That some Individuals are more or less durable, or subject to Decay, Alteration and Periods of their Existence: Yet all these Varieties are not openly to be under­stood otherwise than, in a natural Method, they may be Effects of Elementary Operations; and this is no less than experimentally certain, as sure as there is Heat, Cold, Dryness, and Moisture: And consequently, the Ingredients of Bodies as they have temperatures from them; which is notoriously manifest in the Com­plexions, Dispositions, and Tempers of Men and other Creatures. But without these necessary Mediums, to lift up our Imagination, after the manner of his Idea, to a meer Notion of a sublime Cause that gives Being and Conserva­tion to all Things; were to depart from the [Page 37] immediate School of Providence, by under­tertaking to be our own Instructers of what we cannot without its natural Information, by any contemplative Thought, or imaginary Speculation, howsoever Refined, possibly ap­prehend. Yet on this incomprehensible Way of Thinking, is generally Erected the main Fund, and Tendency of his Principles, where­by he undertakes to Improve Humane Under­standing.

I find nothing more Intervenes, in this Part of his Treatise, that requires in Sub­stance any farther Remark: Wherefore to avoid Repitition, I pass on to his 25th Head, where he has this Expression.

If God, from himself, or others, Reveals any Thing, that exceeds the genuine strength of our Understandings, such are the Mysteries of the Trinity, and Incarnation of Christ, We ought not to refuse their Belief; nor admire, That many Things are both in the Immense Nature of God, as also in those created by him, that surpass our Capacities.

All which I readily acknowledge, tho' I cannot but admire, that so speculative a Person as Monsieur Des Cartes, should not annex to his Belief of this Three-fold Mystery, the ad­mirable [Page 38] facility of Providence, by which the most Essential Part of That stupendious Ar­ticle of Humane Faith, comprehended in Christ the Second Person in the Mysterious Creed of Christianity, is so far, for our more sensible Conviction, of familiar Resemblance to the Works of the Omnipotent, as they are com­posed of Bodily Life and Figure, relating to Man and Creatures; that by this Dispensati­on the Redeemer of Mankind is represented in the Form and Substance of Flesh, as the most captivating Object of our Devotion and Sense: It being impossible to conceive, how any Idea of Worship can so Mystically fasten the Mind, that it may be totally barr'd from Conspiring with the Senses in the admittance of Corporeal Objects. Which may be no inconsiderable Reason, why Christian Profes­sion has allowed the Representations of the Passion and Resurrection of Christ, to im­press their Memorial on the Heart of the Believer.

How little does the manner of this Author's Idea, so magnified by his Pen, conduce to the proving, That God does Exist; or that the Worship of Christ, otherwise than a Miracu­lous Work, proceeding from Omnipotent [Page 39] Power, should be the Object of Humane De­votion? With this Distinction, That although every Fact of the Almighty comprehended by the Universe, be equally wonderful; we are obliged, by Precepts, to pay the Duty of our Souls to no other than Christ.

Which this Author seems to acknowledge, where he excepts his bare Idea, of the Being of a Deity, from the stupendious Co-existence of God in the Substance of Flesh: As if but beholding to his Speculation for the Belief of the One, and to Religion for the Other. From whence it may be concluded, That it was the Design of Des-Cartes to decline the common Road of Providence, in hopes to be celebra­ted for a singular Conceit of his Brain, where­by he would Instruct others to believe, That the Method of God's Works, tho' as broad­ly visible as the Features of the World's Face, were too narrow to exert from them, his Idea of the Almighty. Because, as he Affirms, 'Tis possible to Imagine, That there is no Heaven, no Earth, no Bodies of Men; and yet by a naked Idea, in the Mind, be assured, That God does Exist, tho' none of his Works had Being at all.—

[Page 40] But Passages of this Nature, having been precedently taxed, the Reader is referred to them.

The next Point that he comes close up to, is, That we ought not to weary the Brain with disputing of what is meant by Infinite: Because he judges it absurd in Man, who is of a Finite Being, to determine any Thing of an Infinite.

To which purpose he gives several Instan­ces; As the vain Discussion, or Quere, Whether if a Line be supposed Infinite, the middle Part of that Line be not also Infinite? Because, with such Things, (saies he) we ought not to be concerned, unless we Judge our Mind also In­finite.

Which I fully grant Judiciously Advised: But find it very dissentaneous to a main No­tion of his, formerly mentioned, whereby he Affirms, That 'tis very facile by a meer Idea of the Mind, tho' acting within the Limitation of the Body, to imagine the Infinite Existence of the Deity, by no other Speculation than may be made on the Wings of Thought, when on its Contempla­tive Journey. But how to be clear from all Cor­poreal Impediments, both within, and with­out the Body, notwithstanding he here allows it confined to a Finite Imagination; appears [Page 41] too like a Contradiction, in the Terms he de­livers; or which is much the same, that in one Place, of his Writings, he spoke of an Infinite Idea, and of a Finite in another: How therefore to reconcile him to himself, on that account, is not to be apprehended.

And this may be aptly Inferred from what he adds in the Paragraph I treat of, where he Affirms, That no Extension can be Imagined so Vast, that a Greater cannot be given; which is as numerically certain, as that Archimedes, by sixty three Cyphers and a Unite before them, produc'd a greater Number than could be E­qualled if the Total World from the Center of the Earth to the Sphere of the fixed Stars, were Replenished with the numerous Particles of Sands of the Sea. If Thoughts could be Multiplyed so as they might exceed the Summ before mentioned, as many more might be added to their Number: Yet every par­ticular Thought would be severally termi­nated by some Object of Sense. On the contrary, the Notion of Infinite may rather pass for a manner of Speaking than actually explicable by the Humane Intellect: And thus Immense, Infinite, and the like, are attribu­ted to God, not as their meaning is otherwise [Page 42] to be understood than as they have Reference to the Works of the Almighty; of which, because no account is to be given how they either began or are continued; our highest Admirations, not to be expressed by Accents of Speech, ought to exalt our Wonder, Incom­prehensibly annexed to a Word of Infinite Denomination.

And this, in Substance, he soon after con­cedes; where he holds it very advisable, that we should not Inquisitively Reason of Natural Things, or the End to which they are Ordained, farther than God and Nature have Constituted and Pro­pos'd them to our Observation, least we should seem to arrogate to our selves any participation with his Counsels: To which he judiciously adds, That God is to be acknowledged the Effici­ent Cause of all Things, yet so, as that he has not extinguished the Natural Light of our Un­derstandings in being familiarly acquainted with such Attributes and Effects of his Omnipotent Power, as he has manifestly exposed to our Ap­prehensions: All which are undoubtedly requi­site to our Duty.

But how does this concenter with his single Idea of God, as here he requires the concur­rence of our Reason and Senses, to the use­ful [Page 43] Exposition of such Objects as are mani­fest to us?

And what can be implyed from thence, other than that the abundant Operations and wonderful Effects of a Supreme Cause are evident in the apparent Being and Works, within the Compass of the Universe, that must necessarily depend on it; without which it were impossible for us to have the plenitude of a sensible Conviction? Insomuch, that I think it not improper to insert the Opinion of certain a Astrologer; who Affirms, That if the fixed Stars had not a constant Distance, or that the Diurnal Motion of the Coelestial Sphers did not perpetually move in Time, no Individual Thing would last a Moment; which Notion, of this Astrologer, if but con­jecturally Allowed, has a far more significant Relation to the Proof of the Existence of God, as a Supreme Cause, than can be appropriated to any Idea of the Mind that abstracts the Im­mense means and Facts of Providence from the obvious Concurrence they have with our Contemplation of the Being of the Al­mighty, and the superlative Disposer of whatsoever we can behold, or Imagine: And I should be glad if the contrary had [Page 44] not been the mistake of the Learned Des-Cartes.

His next Considerations is, That God is su­premely True, and the Illuminator of our Under­standings; and therefore cannot deceive us, or at All the Cause of those Errors that we are of our selves obnoxious to. Which is undeniable, if by the Enlightning of our Minds, he means the Conviction we have from the Works and Operations of Providence, that conspicuously assure us, That Omnipotence is their Supreme Cause and Author. But if he explains fully his meaning, as he seems to do, by what fol­lows in his next Particular; his Sense is, That if we have a clear and distinct discernment of any Object, by the Faculty of Knowing given as from God, we cannot be deceived. Insomuch that he Affirms, That God were a Deceiver, if he had bestowed on us a perverse and false Con­ception of Things, instead of a true One.

If This Opinion of his were sound, and that God had so impowr'd the Humane Mind, that it could, of it self, serenely distinguish Truth from Falsehood: What Reason can be given why All Men should not equally be perspicuously Intelligent, as most suitable to the Capacious Munificence of the Almighty? [Page 45] And consequently every Man's Reason and Senses irresistably compliant: Since 'tis not Imaginable, That such a Gift, Authorized by God, could be less than Universal and perfect, as it must needs affect the Understandings of All Mankind; and next compleat an Equali­ty of Knowledge and Goodness, with all other requisite Endowments of the Soul: The pos­sibility of which is strenuously asserted by this Author in his 30th Particular, where he Af­firms, That these admirable Gifts may be ac­complished as well Sleeping, as Waking, if duely adverted how our clear Thoughts may be distin­guished from such as are confused. Which Di­rection of his, if rendered practicable, would amply tend to Humane Felicity, by cleansing the Minds of Vicious Persons, Fools, and Knaves; nay, abrogate the use of Bedlam, by a Recipe from the Pen of Des-Cartes: Who Affirms, That 'tis but being thoughtfully Indu­strious and Imaginatively separate, either Sleeping, or Waking, the Purity of Thoughts from such as are confused.

But were it Interrogated, Whether any Sorts of Men, (before mentioned) since none are excepted by him, might not Affert, with as much Confidence as he undertakes to direct [Page 46] them; That they had either Dreaming, or Waking, a clear Idea of Truth, in one Kind or other; which could not be mistaken if avowed by them that the Notion was clear and distinct, and therfore perfect? Because not otherwise, as he alledges, the Gift of God, whereby the Mind of Man, is Enabled to separate, by pure Imagination, Truth from Falshood.

If Distinction of Thought, from Thought, by any Power of the Mind, can be termed a certain Representation of Truth, and princi­pally meant of God, or whatsoever is ordain'd by him; it must as has been already proved, be grounded on some admirable Prospect of the Works of the Omnipotent, and thence conclude as a mighty Truth, That he wonder­fully Exists, or it could fix on nothing.

In Summ, should a Man endeavour to Re­fine the clearest Conception that he could possibly have of a Spiritual Existence, his Ima­gination might not be so Immensely dilated as to meet with no Corporeal Stop from the prone Concurrence of the Intellect with the Senses, and the familiar Admittance that is yielded, by the Mind, to their Objects: Yet such a Man might assure himself, That he as [Page 47] certainly discerns the Truth of Bodily Objects Entertained by his Imagination, as can be pretended, by any Method of Thinking, pre­scribed by this Author.

And thus 'tis. too commonly the Fate of many to be seduced by the over-curiosity, and search made by particular Persons who would build their Esteem on the Novelty of their Tenents; the usual allurements of In­constancy in the Humane Soul: Till rejected by Time they are held no farther useful than Almanacks out of Date.

Whether the same Success may not be ex­pected, relating to some Parts of the Writings of Des-Cartes, where he undertakes to Improve Knowledge by Methods more Consonant to Fiction than Science, not a little to the disre­pute of, otherwise, his vast Abilities; I leave to the Reader to determine.

In his 9th page, he gives us this Caution, That notwithstanding God can be no Deceiver, yet, frequently it happens that we deceive our selves; which is no less Divine as to God, then certain that Mankind are diversly Erroneous; as more or less their Frailties are incident to their Dispo­sitions and Natures.

[Page 48] But if granted according to his often re­peated Maxim of Humane Knowledge, That Perfection of Thought is so clearly applicable to the Humane Mind, that the cumber of sensible Objects, may, by Idea, be totally emptied from it, and nothing remain but perfect Intelligence: How, according to that Tenent, can he Affirm, That the Mind does admit Deception? If suitable to his common Notion, not seldome Instanced by him, the Mind may be so notionally and wonderfully Il­luminated, that it cannot be without Certain­ty; because its perfect Apprehension must be given from something more perfect, which is God: And no Body can think otherwise, if the means, that God has Ordained by his Works, be regardfully considered; On which account, 'tis not to be understood, how his manner of Thought can have else any contiguity with our Reason, or Senses. And which, I suppose, has been enough before Con­futed. In his following Words he endeavours to be plainer understood by granting, That in the Intellect is Volition, as well as Imagination, which by its Impulse on the Humane Mind, ren­ders it erroneously obnoxious. But can it be consistent with the Notion, so much applauded [Page 49] by him, of a perfect Idea of Truth essential, as he defines it, to the Humane Mind, and notwithstanding that Perfection, to admit the possibility of being Imposed on by the Will: Is, in effect, to acknowledge, That there is no such perfect Determination in the Mind whereby to distinguish Truth from Falsehood; or if there were, how can it be supposed, That the Certainty of the Imagination, when fil­ling of the Mind, would not subject the Will to the reality of Truth conceived by it? Which to deny, were no less absurd than to Assert, That the Soul, by its own consent, did Rebel against its main Prerogative, and Re­nounce the highest Propriety of its Domini­on: So that no Notion of Truth, in a Na­tural Course, can have any stedfest Assurance in the Mind, if lyable to the Refractory Con­tradiction it may have from the Will: Inso­much, That had he named the Notional Idea, he so much contends for, an Irresistable In­spiration; he must have been more Divinely understood by his Reader: By which he might have inferred, That by a zealous Contemplati­on of the Mind, there would have been wanting no perfect Certainty or Conception, of all Matters tending to Holy Religion and Life: [Page 50] Things very necessary, and exceedingly con­ducing to Universal Satisfaction and Repose of the Soul, if such an agreeable and unerra­ble Idea could manifestly have Issued from the meer Result of Thought; without being be­holding to any Intermediate Work, or Con­duct of Providence to sublimate the Specula­tion. But enough has been before Inserted, in Opposition to the manner of Thinking, prescribed by his Pen; and for which, as his main fund, he requires no more than that a Man should Imagine, That there is something, in being, more Perfect then himself: All which he assures might be accomplished by all Man­kind, as a Gift, from above, conferred on the Soul; did not the peremptory. Sway of the Will resist the clear discernment of Truth Inherent in the Mind. For whose single and unconfinable Perfections, notwithstanding he had averred them before, he soon after­wards acknowledges their Limitation in these Words.—The Intellect, (saies he,) extends its preception but to few Things offered unto it.

What he would mean by Things offered unto it, unless actual Objects, is not to be understood; neither does he signifie how he would otherwise be apprehended by the [Page 51] Epression; which can have no numerical, or specifical Construction, except he had Nomi­nated any real Thing or Object represented by the Imaginary Faculty of the Mind. From whence it may be concluded, That, he does, in this Place, in his own terms, however dissen­taneous to what he had formerly Asserted, enough concede, That there can be no o­ther than a limited Idea to Things con­sisting of Matter, Form, and Bodily Parts: It being no less Unnatural than Impossible, That the Intellect should, at one Time, be conversant with Objects of Sense, and at another, be whol­ly intent on meer Speculation without them.

Yet he undertakes to Inform, How this unna­tural repugnancy of Thought may pass on the Autho­rity of his Tenent; by Impeaching of the Humane Will, for Arbitrary Compelling of the Mind to be Confused and Finite; whereas it would other­wise distinguish by clear and distinct Certainty whatsoever was imagined by it.

And yet he could not but know that it is Inconsistent with the Essential Method of Rational Understanding, to averr, That the Judiciary Part of the Mind can be so compul­sively managed, or streightned by the Will: Notwithstanding that the contrary is far more [Page 52] Intelligible, in respect that there can be no actual tendency of Thought, in the Soul of Man, but must have a necessary Consent of the Will: It being absurd to Imagine, That a Man can Think of any Thing without its As­sent and Concurrence; which were no better Sense, than if one could be said to Think, and not be a voluntary Thinker.

If duely considered, the Faculties by which the Understanding is compleatly Executed; 'tis very demonstrable that the Mind is not more Annexed to the Will, than furnished by the Memory; whose Office is to keep the main Records of the Soul, and from their nu­merous Catalogue present such Memorials as are occasionally proper to Attract the com­plyance of the Understanding and Will. There being no real Thought on whatsoe­ver Object imployed, other than what has been, in Substance, or Similitude, by the Memory precedently retain'd.

And therefore unwarrantably Asserted the Supposition of this Author, whereby he would Inferr the separate Actings of the Faculties of the Soul, or the possibility of clear Perception without their Concurrence.

[Page 53] True it is, that Humane Understanding is too frequently Sway'd, Impedited, and Cor­rupted, by the impetuousness of the Will, as it conspires with the Appetite and Senses, which by their plausible, and importunate Tempta­tions, so prevail on the Understanding, that its Rational Excellence is, in many Kinds de­based, as it allows their Sensual Admittance; but still no otherwise than as it consents with the Will: And therefore not, truly inferred by this Author, that the Intellect is so wildly guided, and imposed on by the Will, that it ab­solutely resigns, or deserts its Rational Throne; or any clear Intelligence that by the Gift of the Almighty is naturally Inherent in the Mind of Man: But rather betrayed by the Trea­chery of the Will and Senses, to impare by its frail complyance the requisite Intelligence and Prerogative that ought to be inseparable from its Supreme Dominion.

Wherefore this Learned Monsieur, after he thoroughly labour'd the most concise Criti­cisms of his Brain, by endeavouring to prove That the Faculty of clear, and distinct Perception was Inherent in the Mind; He does notwith­standing acknowledge, in divers Passages of the Treatise I deal with, That the Mind cannot [Page 54] so exert its Jurisdiction as not to be Perplexedly, or Confusedly prevailed on by the Will: Which he fully Attributes to the Inveiglement of the Understanding caused by the Conspiring of the Will with the Senses, and the natural Free­dome by which it Operates on the Intelligent Capacity of the Humane Soul: Which is, in Substance, the compleat Sense of several Par­ticulars Written by him; but most especially in his 38 Head, where he grants, That the perspicuity of Discernment conferred on the Soul, by Divine Appointment is no farther Absolute than as it meets with a voluntary Assent, by which it is either made our perfect Apprehension, or on the contrary, evaded by the Actual Freedome of the Will: For which he gives this Instance, in this manner Embellish'd; The Will, (saies he) toge­ther with the Senses, ought to compleat the Al­legiance they owe to the Sovereignty of the Hu­mane Intellect, as God's select and natural Vice­gerent over the Body and Members; which being frequently violated by the irregular Conduct of the Will and prevalent Complyance it obtains from the Appetite and Senses; the genuine Duty is re­nounced that ought to be perfectly paid to the native Monarchy of the Mind; and instead thereof, a Foreign and Sensual Usurpation raised by the con­fus'd Mobile of the Senses.

[Page 55] This Paraphrase may be Emphatically al­lowed on his Words; nor can it be denyed, That the excellent Faculty, with which the Understanding is imbued is not by innumera­ble Depravations erroneously misguided by the proneness of the Dispensation it gives to the Importunate Sensualities Incident to Humane Constitutions: Which is very manifest in the different Qualifications and Tempers of the Body and Mind; as by common Experience, some Individuals of Mankind excell in Pru­dence and Moralities of Life the Dispositions of others. Insomuch, that it may be questi­oned, Whether, or no, from a Natural Course of Providence the different temperatures of Body and Mind do not proceed? And there­fore more prevalent, if not hardly to be Resisted.

All which, upon the Matter, is precedently acknowledged by himself, where he confesses, That notwithstanding the Soul of Man is En­lightened by God, with clear Perception, it is lyable to the depraved Conduct of the Will and Senses. But how he can exempt the Under­standing from such a contiguous Depravation, and require its separate Intelligence; yet grant, as he does, That the Humane Body [Page 56] and Soul are Conjoyned and Exist, as all Things do, by the Ordination of God; tho' no one Body and Soul but operatively different from others, and no less various than Corpo­real Features are ocularly distinguished. So that the Soul, tho' given by God, has no absolute assurance of unerrable Perfection; notwith­standing that, according to his Doctrine, it cannot be destitute of perfect Discernment tending to all requisite Certainty in whatso­ever it Determines.

But had he been ask'd, Why every Thinking Man who grants that he Exists, and all Things else, by the admirable Dispensation of the Om­nipotent, should not be proportionably com­pleated by his Understanding and Senses, where­by there might result an unerrable Percepti­on or Notion of Things evident from such as are confus'dly understood? The Quere would doubtless pose as Learned a Thinker as was this Author. As also, if supposed such a po­sitive Certainty in Humane Understanding, as he undertakes to Assert, Why it should be thought to be so insufficient a Gift of God, that it should not at all Times be able to over­rule, or not absolutely suppress the Imperfect Assaults and erroneous Temptations of the Will and Senses?

[Page 57] Notwithstanding that Experience assures, That there is no Universal Humane Perfection, either known or practised: And as certain it is, That he would not have presented the World with so many Inventions of his Brain, whereby to explain the Principles he Avowes; if he had thought, That every Man's In­telligence, or Capacity of Thinking, had been evident, or not wanted the Instructions of his Pen: It being absurd to conceive, That the Soul should be sufficiently Capacitated from God, to distinguish betwixt certain and un­certain Cogitations, and want any Advertise­ment from Man more Methodically to advan­tage its Intelligent Faculty: Of which, he amply concedes, That no Man can be assured of its perspicuous Execution, by reason of the powerful Reluctancy and Impediment it receives from the Will and Senses.

To as little purpose does he offer his Di­stinction betwixt the Act of Volition and the Assent to be deceived, that proceeds from the In­clination that the Understanding has to be swayed by the Senses: But how any Man can be said to Assent without the voluntary Freedome and Concurrence of his Will; is more like a Con­tradiction than rationally to be Apprehended. [Page 58] And must, in his own Phrase, tend to the defeating of the Amplitude of Knowledge bestowed by God on the Humane Mind, if rendered conditional, or subordinate to our voluntary Complyance.

By which manner of Discussions, he has confusedly Involved the Serenity he would allye to his Principles, in order to the unerrable Perception Attributed by him, to the Intellectual Faculty. Yet after several Passages of this Nature, he seems to Recant them in his 43 Particular, where he perempto­rily Affirms, That it is as impossible to the mistaken, if we yield our Assent to such Things as we clear­ly understand, as to believe, That God is a Deceiver.

If this Tenent were true, the Brain of every Man would, as it were by Divine Decree, be filled with Certainties: But how assured of this Infallible Discernment; the Answer that must be given, from the Principle of Des-Cartes, is, by clearly distinguishing of Things by the perspicuous Faculty of the Humane Intellect: Because, (saies he) it rarely happens, That any Man will yield his spontaneous Aslent to any Thing of which he has not a veritable assu­rance from his Understanding: But if duely [Page 59] considered how numerously the World is Replenished with Mankind, of all Ages and Complexions, that give up their Assents to the Dictates of others, as they conceive them to be more Intelligible than themselves; and yet, in so doing, however they erre, may not be less confident of direct Perception than any of their Tutors.

To be plain, were there such an absolute Gift conferred on the Soul by Divine Appoint­ment; 'tis not to be denyed, That Men, Wo­men and Children, would be equally Gifted, and accordingly distinguish by the undeniable Clearness of their Intellects, all Notions of Things certainly to be apprehended, or du­biously to be rejected: Because God, as he Affirms, Has endued the Soul with a separate Jurisdiction, and perfect Determination without the Assistance or Concurrence of the Will and Senses; and therefore as a compleat Donative from Above, might have a ripe Discernment before the Bodily Parts grow to Perfection.

And if so, there is more Reason to expect, That it should Actuate, alike perspicuously, the Intellectual Faculty in the Youth, Age, and Sexes of Mankind, than that they should be differently Judicious, or disagreeably sub­ject [Page 60] to the Imbecillities of their Natural Com­positions, as they appear to common Ob­servation: Yet this Conclusion has as near a Resemblance to his Premises as Grass to Grass.

This Reflection may well have a pertinent Allowance; if considered with what confi­dence he Averrs, That God has so disposed the Soul in the Body of Man, that it can exactly di­stinguish of Truth and Falsehood in every Con­sideration: Whereas the contrary is rather manifest as our Corporeal Existencies are pro­videntially sustained: By which it appears, that, in Course of Nature, the Life is no o­therwise Ensouled in the Body, than as it is Complicated with the Affections and Tin­ctures of the Senses: And from whence the Act [...]ons of the Mind suitably Exert their Operations: And this is very apparent from the Natural Concourse of Elementary Ingredi­ents that mix with our Dispositions and Mora­lities of Life. So that 'tis not to be doubted, That by a Natural Conduct, and Capacity appropriated to their Bodily Constitutions, some Men are more Scientifically Intelligent, Discreet, and Temperate than others: As con­trarily, the vast Numbers of Inconsiderate, [Page 61] Imprudent Idiots, and Frantick Persons in several Kinds, are every where Evident; which can have no other Cause than Issuing from the Irresistible Sourse of their Corporeal Tem­pers, together with the Tides of Commotion and Disturbance, on which the Soul, as on so many Impetuous Billows, is more or less perpetually Fluctuated. Wherefore 'tis not a little bold in this Author, who peremptorily Affirms, That there is a clear and distinct Per­ception, on all Accounts, Resident in the Under­standing, if as he requires, the Prejudices we have from our Constitutions, and Bodily Imper­fections were distinctly avoided by separating the Intelligence of the Mind from all Intermixture of the Senses; as a Faculty, conferred by God, on the Humane Intellect: Which to deny, accor­ding to his Notion, were all one as to term God a Deceiver. I call'd this his Tenent bold be­fore, and I may add to it Presumption, and Ignorance, beyond expectation in so Learned a Writer: Might he not as well have Affirmed? that a Man can have an unerrable Prospect and Conception of the manner of the Ex­istence of the Omnipotent, as also of the Original Being of the Universe, together with Mankind, and every Individual Animal and [Page 62] Thing within its total Extent; had there been such a Divine Gift bestowed on the Intellectu­al Faculty: And must have been far more Infallibly manifest in the Uniting of Religion tending to the Worship of God; which doubtless, as the most necessary Intelligence, would have been Conferred by the Almighty, whereby he might be more unanimously Adored by all Mankind. But this is not so Decreed by God, nor in the Power of Man to accomplish by Resisting, as he Insinuates, the Prejudices and Incapacities incident to our Innate Tempers of Body and Mind. Not that I deny, that there is a constant visible Con­viction palpably discernable in the Works of the Almighty, by which the total World is Miraculously Constituted; from whence may be fully concluded, without any help of the Method, or Idea of Thought delivered by Des-Cartes; that God does Exist, and is to be Worship'd: And he that otherwise Inferrs must Repine against the Measures of Know­ledge Providentially Ordained; which were all one with the Incongruous and Exorbitantly absurd Assertion of this Author, That implyes a Deceptiom in God, if, in effect, he did not de­ceive the determin'd Progression of his Providence, [Page 63] in its Natural Conduct and Operation; by dispen­sing to All Mankind an unerrable Apprehension of every Truth, that ought to be most requisitely understood, however disproportion'd to the Tempers of Mind and Body; or experimentally repugnant to the Ordain'd Course of Nature, differently ma­nifest in the Faculties of the Soul, Science, and Gifts; as they are variously specified and propor­tioned in Humane Persons. Not that the Intel­lectual Capacity is thereby so generally or naturally Disproportioned as not palpably to discern all requisite Truths expanded in the Miraculous Works of the Omnipotent; which otherwise had been Impertinently exposed to the sensible Conviction of our Understanding: Insomuch, that every vulgar Sense, if not Sloth­ful, or Regardless, or not naturally deprived of their Intellectual Faculty, or not made so Happy as to be induced by proper Instruction, and Teaching; cannot but acknowledge from the Facts and Conduct of Providence, that they are the Effects of an Infinite Cause; and consequently no other than so many Infalli­ble Convictions that the Deity does Exist, and ought to be Ador'd.

And whosoever Affirms to the contrary, does in effect Arraign Providence, or term [Page 64] it a Deceiver, together with such visible Won­ders as are Externally manifest, and whereby we receive sensible Apprehension of the Being of a God, tho' Invisible to our Eyes.

Wherefore the Tenent of this Author, That there is a Power in the Mind of Man to di­stinguish, by meer Idea, Truth from Falsehood, must be a very Imperfect Notion; there being nothing more difficult, if not Impossi­ble, than for the Humane Soul to be so far Disrob'd of its habitual Impediments, the Senses; as clearly to discern at all Times, the most requisite Truths: Because, if at any one time the Idea of the Mind, as he defines it, be less Perfect than at another; it is impossi­ble for any Man, by that manner of Specula­tion, to be secure, That he does not Erroneously Contemplate, by not effectually separating the Purity of meer Imagination from all the Defects Incident to Humane Nature.

Notwithstanding, if you will rely upon the Notion of Des-Cartes, he tells you, That God were a Deceiver, unless the Soul of Man, given from above, were not, by Executing his Man­ner of Idea, an Infallible Discerner of Truth from Error. Which he is no more able to prove, than if he had undertaken to convince [Page 65] the World, That by Imagination the Soul may discharge it self from its Co-habitation with the Senses; or that in a Notional Conception both Parts of a Contradiction may be deter­mined true: Which is the same with his pe­remptory Contradiction of the open and pow­erful Truth of God's Existence, manifest in the Being of the Universe, and all it contains, by Affirming, That 'tis possible, by meer Thinking to apprehend that there is a Deity; without the wonderful Objects and Means of Providence evi­dently conveyed to the Eyes of our Reason and Senses.

True it is, That the Intelligible Faculty has a fervent and Indefatigable Desire of appre­hending in the most Spiritual and divinest Con­ception, such Things as might sublimely ac­complish the Understanding: Which restless Endeavour in the Humane Soul is no less apparent than endlessly continued in vari­ous Searches and Inquisitions whereby to De­termine, on the most considerable Accounts, whatsoever, the divided Tenents and No­tions of Men would most satisfactorily Re­concile.

But such is the Infelicity of the Soul, that as it is Incumbered or Clogg'd with the Senses; it [Page 66] cannot, by its best Conceptions, be absolutely divided from them; and therefore uncapable of acquiescing in agreeable Concord, otherwise than as the Soul is United with them in the most sensible and familiar way of Con­viction.

Had Des-Cartes been asked Whether or no it was not far more facile to Demonstrate the Geometrical Measure of so many Acres of Land, than Mathematically to Compute the Immense Distance, from us, of the Sphere of the fixed Stars? He would soonhave granted, That an Account of the Former was much ea­sier to be performed than of the Latter. How much more remote, from the most accurate Prospects of our Understanding, are the Infi­nite Attributes of the Omnipotent! Or not possibly to be discerned by any Idea of Mind, otherwise than as they are effectually Pu­blished, to our Useful and Holy Admiration, in the Miraculous and Immense Consistency of the Total World.

The next considerable Undertaking of this Author is, briefly to deliver such Notions of which All our Thoughts are most especi­ally produc'd or compounded: And how by them are to be distinguished such as are Clear, [Page 67] from others Obscure, or by which we are deceived.

To which purpose his main Maxim in his 48 Particular, he thus expresses,—What­soever they are (saies he,) that Relate to our Perception, are to be considered as Things, or as certain Affections of Things, or as eternal Verities having no Existence without our Cogitation. Of those that are to be considered as Things, the most general are to be comprehended by the Denomi­nations of Substance, Duration, Order, Number and the like, as they may be understood to apper­tain to All other Things. And these he annexeth unto two Generalities, the One of which he defines, in reference to Things as they are only conceived by Thought of the Mind, or, as he terms them, wholly belonging to a thinking Sub­stance; the Other, as it respects Materiality, or Body: But Perception, Volition, with all their Modalities, he refers to what, he calls the Sub­stance of Thinking, either as to Magnitude, or Ex­tension; as they may be considered in Length, Breadth, Height, Figure and Motion; Situa­tion, Divisibility, and the like. Other Things there are which by experience we find, that do neither solely appertain to the Mind, nor to the Body; and which proceed from the strict Intimacy [Page 68] and Union that the Mind has with the Body; as the Diversities of our Appetites and Pas­sions, which have no Consistence with sole Co­gitation.

And this is the full Sense, of the Place I treat on, as near as his Words can be pro­perly Englished.

The first Remark that ought to be Judici­ously tender'd on this Part of his Treatise, is, Whether according to sound Reason, or es­sential Rules of Philosophy, he has duly de­fined what he calls Substantial Thinking, by the Epithet he gives it, appropriated to the Mind?

But if to a Thinking Substance be annex'd, according to him, the Essence or Propriety of Thought; the Quere may be, How any Thing that is Substantial can be genuinely supposed to Imploy Thought, otherwise than on something that is also Substantial? And if so, why not likewise Corporeal? Except he could sensibly make it appear, That Substance can be separated from Corporeal Existence: Which he has not been able to Explicate, notwithstanding that he has attempted to do it with the most Refined Method of his Philosophical Science; as may be seen in this Tract of his, which has occasioned my Re­marks, [Page 69] and I doubt not, in the Sense of a Judicious Reader, precedently by me dis­proved.

But to go with him as far as his Assertions require; and next suppose, That the Humane Soul is a Substance; but in what manner Substantial, is not Defined by this Author, in any Kind, either as Incorporeal, suitable to the Dialect of the Schools; or otherwise as the Rational, Sensitive and Vegetative Soul are in the Body entirely United.

The Proof that he offers for giving to it a Substantial Denomination is grounded on the Proprieties or Qualities, he annexeth to it: Because whatsoever is not something can neither have those nor any other Attributes: All which in his 13 Particular, he farther undertakes to Explain; and where he expresses.—That Substance is not to be understood but as it Relates to some Attribute or other, which chiefly declare its Nature and Essence; and to which they ap­pertain: Adding, That as Length, Breadth and Depth, constitute the Nature of Body; so by Thought is Constituted the Nature of Substantial Thinking. From whence he concludes, That whatsoever can be Attributed to Body presupposeth Extension, or the manner only of something Exten­ded; [Page 70] but what are to be found in the Mind, are so many various Modalities of Cogitation. The Ex­ample he gives is, That Corporeal Figure cannot be understood but in the Thing that is Extended; nor Motion but in whatsoever is moved; contrarily, Extension may be understood, by the Mind, with­out either Figure, or Motion.

This Paragraph, tho' written by the Pen of Des-Cartes, cannot have so favourable an Interpretation as might render it Congruous to common Understanding.

That the Rational Soul may be Substantial is not Philosophically to be denied: Nor so Defined does it lessen the possibility it has of being Immortal; because equally in the Pow­er of the Almighty to give the Souls of all Mankind Immortality, together with the compleating of the Dust of rotten Carcasses, according to the Doctrine of the Resur­rection, unto the same Bodies they Ani­mated in Life-time, and to Restore to them, each Individual Soul that was precedently theirs.

But to Affirm, with this Author, That meer Cogitation, is a Substance of it self in the Humane Intellect, is a very Irrational Conjecture: For how can Thought have any [Page 71] Similitude with Sense, but as thereby it may be Imagined to Relate to some sensible Ob­ject? Nor can it Actuate in any other Kind, if the Soul be Substantial; it being Impossible, That Substantial Cogitation, whatever Phrase he gives it, can, otherwise, be Impioyed than on something that must Assimilate its own Nature: And that must be either Consistent of Bodily Parts, or of Substance equivalent to it. Nor is it possible to apprehend, how any Thing called Substance can be distin­guished from what is quantitively Corporeal; or not have suitable Attributes, in every Consideration. So that his Idea of a meer Thinking Substance, in the Soul of Man, can have no significant Congruity with Thought: It being totally Irrational to suppose, That any deliberate Conception of the Mind should be fixed on no Object.

Should a Man Contemplate on France, or Holland, who had never been personally in either of those Countries; he must distin­guish, as he had received Information, or Read of them, the Nature and Situation of those Regions, together with such necessary Considerations as were requisite for him to understand; or he could not have any Intel­ligible [Page 72] Apprehension of any of those Places: So that the Position of this Author, That there is in the Soul such an abstracted manner of Cogitation, or Thread-bare way of Thought, which by his Notion, is Defined a Thinking Substance; were no other than to allow the Soul a Substantial Nature, but a very Imper­tinent or Idle Being in the Body: Or which is much the same, to be capacitated to Think, tho' without Cogitation of any Thing besides it self: Yet on this separate way of Thought, depends the whole Structure of his Idea, whereby he would prompt the Intellect to di­stinguish betwixt Thoughts Confused, or such as Intrigue with the Senses, from those that have a sole and pure Residence in the Mind.

As frivolous, if duely Examined, are the Modalities of meer Cogitation delivered by him, where he Intimates, That whatsoever can be Corporeally applyed, must be under­stood to have Extension and Bodily Parts; and must therefore Relate, in one Kind or o­ther, to the Thing moved or extended. And is it possible to Imagine, That the Soul should be endued with Speculative Thinking, yet un­perceptible of any proper Object to entertain its sensible Contemplation? All which is re­quir'd [Page 73] by Des-Cartes, who positively Affirms, That Extension may be understood by the Mind, without Figure, or Motion: By which he would imply, That clear Cogitation may be appre­hended without Application to any Ima­gin'd Thing or Conception by the Sense, That it is really such: Which Words of his, if rightly consider'd, imply a very singular Contradiction; it not being in the Power of Thought exactly to Judge of any Thing but as it appears in Extension, Figure, or, if mov'd, in Motion: How else can any of these Particulars be Mathematically computed; which could not but be known to so great a Geometrician as was this Author?

In his 14 Particular, he confidently enough offers to Explain his most sublimated Notion of Thinking, in these Words,—It is very facile, (saies he) to distinguish betwixt two clear and distinct Ideas; the One relating to a cogita­tive Created Substance, the Other to a Corporeal Substance; if distinction be made of all At­tributes of Cogitation, from those of Exten­sion: And thus he supposes, That a Man may have a perspicuous and distinct Idea of an uncreated and independent Thinking Substance, by which he means God. But should I Interpret, according [Page 74] to him, the Deity to be a Thinking Substance; I must also Imagine the Deity of such a Sub­stance as may be comprehended by sensible Cogitation: And next, notwithstanding all the Refin'd Caution given by Des-Cartes; I can have no other than a Corporeal Notion of God, or in Resemblance to Bodily Sub­stance; because, in any other Considerati­on, it were Incompatible with the Humane Soul, as it Acts its Cognition by the aid of the Senses.

I may therefore well admire, Why he De­fines the Deity an Uncreated Substance, and not Explicate to his Reader what Kind of Sub­stance he intends by the Definition: Which can be no otherwise Interpreted than that he took care to avoid the Critical Objection, or Absurdity, in the Opinion of not a few Eru­ditely accomplish'd; by not supposing, That there may be such an Existence that can be truly Denominated both Incorporeal and Sub­stantial: By reason that Matter and Form, Extension, and Parts, are the Proprieties of Substance, as it can be conceiv'd by Thought; and whatsoever is said to be Incorporeal can have none of those Attributes; because no­thing but Body is capable of them.

[Page 75] Wherefore 'tis no less naturally Improper to Assert the Being of an Incorporeal Sub­stance, than to Affirm, That there may be such a Thing as body, without Body; which how far repugnant to the common Dictates of Reason and Sense, is obvious to every Man's Understanding. And which could not but be foreseen by Des-Cartes, who, to avoid that grand Reflection, covers his Idea of God with the general Notion of an Uncreated Substance; notwithstanding that it is equally Impossible to Imagine a Substantial Existence, however it came to pass; without the Qualifications of Body, before mentioned. Because the Term given by him, of Substance Uncreated, takes nothing from any Corporeal Propriety that might appertain to it. Insomuch, That whe­ther Substance be deem'd Created, or Un­created, it may be Denominated Corporeal, for ought that, by this Author, is prov'd to the contrary: Who, by his Undertaking to call the Soul of Man a separate Thinking Sub­stance, tho' confin'd to the Body, and per­fectly Impower'd to distinguish, after his Me­thod, Truth from Falsehood; does in effect appropriate to God, whom he supposes to have committed that Animated Substance in­to [Page 76] the Body of Man; no other difference of Epithet than by denominating the Deity an Uncreated Substance: The grossness of which Tenent, if uncensur'd, were enough to Infect the Brain of Man; by Insinuating, That neither the Almighty, or any Humane Individual, with whatsoever may be nam'd Animal, or Vegetal, is other than Corporeally Existing: The Reasons already given being of sufficient Validity to Convict Mankind, That there can be no evident Distinction made, betwixt the Word Substance and Body.

How much more Judiciously safe, had it then been, for the Learned Des-Cartes, had he Asserted the Infinite Consistence of the Omni­potent, rather by the Epithet of Incompre­hensible Admiration; than to have deliver'd, its more than wonderful Being, by the Philo­sophical Notion of something substantially Existing? Because the Word Substance takes from the Immense Nature of the Almighty; as it may relate to Body and Commensurable Parts, whereby he has expos'd it, to no small contest; for Reasons already Inserted: It being a far surer Aphorism to define what the Deity is not, than by any Term of Science to express what it is, or any clear Idea of its Miraculous Being.

[Page 77] In his next Head, which is the 55 of his Dis­cussions, he farther dilates on his Thesis of meer Cogitation; as he would separate it from all Corporeal or sensible Concomitancy: And this he attempts to Explain, by Affirming, That Duration, Order, and Number, may be distinguish'd without annexing of them to any conceiv'd Substance. Which if duely consider'd, are but so many Insignificant Varations of his former Positions: For how can any Corporeal Thing be said, perfectly to endure, or to have Orderly, or Numerical Being; unless the Substance, or Body, to which they ap­pertain, be also understood in every of these Considerations?

Can it be properly Justified, That any quan­titive Thing is to be apprehended as to the time of its continuing such; but as there may be perceptibly deduc'd from it, a real Intelli­gence why it so long in that manner Remain'd, or was Alter'd, or Chang'd into another?

Is't possible to perceive the Flame of a Candle extinguish'd, and not at the same time Discern, That the Matter that fed the Flame is alterable with it? Yes certainly, did it burn by Hours or Minutes accounted from a Watch or Dial.

[Page 78] And is it not plainly manifest, by the prece­dent Example, that Duration, Order, and Num­ber, essentially appertain to the entire Consist­ency, or Alterative Nature and Qualification of the Matter unto which they belong?

A Tree may be older than I can Compute, tho' not to the Man who, in past time, did plant it: But if its Decay, or Withering, in any of its Parts, be visible to me: I may be able to account the Day or Season in which I per­ceiv'd it did Alter. Wherefore to conclude, as does this Author, That Duration, Order, and Number, are but the Modalities of Sub­stance, is a very fantastical Conceit; since they must have an Inseparable Tendency, more or less, by their Co-herent Attributes, to the Perfection, or Imperfection of what­soever does Exist.

If a Six-pence be broken into two Parts, there will remain in either of those Pieces, a different Proportion in Number, Orderly Figure, and Duration, than when it was whole. And tho' this is but an Artificial In­stance, as it may have Reference to any Thing broken or sever'd; 'tis not impossible that, by Time, might naturally be produc'd the same Effect; because whatsoever does [Page 79] Corporeally subsist, must be subject to Alte­ration in all its Capacities.

So that what he simply calls the Modalities of Being, is indeed Essential to Substance and its Bodily Parts; or no other than necessita­ted Change, sooner or later, of all Individu­al Things that are extant to Humane Obser­vation. The Stars that Illustrate, as the most Refin'd Jewels of Illumination, the Firma­ment above, and least apprehended, by Thought, to vary in any of their Proprieties; cannot be certainly exempted from Present or Future Alteration; either as they have, or may vary in their Order, Influence, Motion, or what besides may be Incident to their Es­sence and Nature.

How Insignificantly then is argu'd by this Author, That neither Order, Number, or Continuation, in any Thing that Exists, is otherwise to be understood, than as so many Modalities of Substance? Tho' to every Man's Reason there can be no Variation or Change in any of These, but there must be also a substantial Alteration in whatsoever may be call'd Body, or Substance.

In his 56 Particular he undertakes to make out what he farther means by the Modalities [Page 80] he gives to Things; which he grants, In some re­spects, may be Interpreted Attributes, or Qualities; and as Substance may be said to be Affected or Vary'd by them not Improperly call'd Modalities: But most generally, he allows them, when consider'd as Inherent in Substance, the Terms of Attributes.

And what would he infer from this puzzle of Words, and perplexing of Terms, other­wise than he has precedently mention'd? For if Modalities, Qualities, and Attributes, may be apply'd to Substance in all its Capacities, Propri­eties, and possible Variations; how is he able to make good his former Assertion, where he denominates them the meer Modalities of Cogita­tion? So that whatsoever Alteration is either Naturally, or Essentially Incident to Sub­stance, is no farther Real, in the Judgment of Des-Cartes, than what may have the empty Notion of Modality; tho' both in substance and manner of Being, the Thing does not continue the same as it was before: Which is a perfect Contradiction to sensible Evidence, if duely apprehended the precedent Instan­ces; which, as I conceive, are amply sa­tisfactory.

There yet remains a Part of this Head that may well be Interpreted somewhat Crazy. [Page 81] Notwithstanding that he undertakes to expli­cate the soundness of its Importance as he intends: To which purpose his Expression stands briefly thus,—In God, (saies he) can­not be any Modalities or Qualities, but only At­tributes; because in him, there can be no Varia­tion: And no less Excellency of Subsistence, does he appropriate to Things Created; if no different Modalities, or Diversity of Existence and Duration is to be found in them; and conse­quently exempts from thom all Qualifications and Modalities, and instead of those, he Dig­nifies their Being by the Name of Attributes annex'd to their Natures.

If this Doctrine could be verified, there might be no distinction betwixt the Substance of God, as Defin'd by this Author, and any other Thing of whose Existence and Durati­on we have no variable Prospect: Of which the Universe, for ought can be prov'd to the contrary, affords many. And who can doubt, but it may be so Affirm'd, not only of Stars, that have unchangeable Magnitudes above us; but also of the most Durable Rocks of Adamant, which by their Permanency and la­sting Continuance, admit of no certain Com­putation, whereby may be Imply'd their Tem­porary [Page 82] Alteration, or Change? And 'tis no wonder, if with the Modern Philosophical Mine, pretendedly discover'd by this Author, there be discern'd some Rubbish amongst the Diamonds which he endeavours to polish by his Brain.

For what is more gross, than to render, as he does, the Attributes of an Uncreated Sub­stance, or of God, the same with Created; and next to grant, That there is no other Distinction be­twixt Substance and Substance but as they differ in Attributes; which if true, there could be no exact distinguishing of Uncreated, and Created Existence: By reason that a Corpo­real Being might, according to his Affirma­tion, have the same Attributes. Nor is there any Discussion more Philosophically difficult, than to explicate, how Substance and Body may be differently apprehended by any Intel­ligible Distinction of Science: But whosoever will rely upon the Opinion of Des-Cartes, must wipe out of the Essence of his Intellect all actual Perception of Objects represented by the Senses; and next be so far reconcil'd to his Idea, as to Denominate the Humane Soul a peculiar Substance committed to the Body by God, but nothing ally'd to Corpo­real [Page 83] Nature; tho' naturally actuating the Body of Man: As if it were no Contradiction to de­termine, That Substance, not to be understood Body, can operate on Body. To evade which obvious Objection, he frequently labours, as may be observ'd by the Remarks precedently made on his Treatise, to sublimate his con­ceiv'd Idea, by supposing, That the Faculty of separate Thought was so dispos'd by God as a perfect Thinking Substance Inherent in the Mind: To which, as a Gift of Perfection, he Imputes unerrable Conception; asking no other Conditions, whereby to remove the Misapprehensions and Frail­ties of Thought, than very considerative and discreet Thinking: Which is the utmost perfor­mance that can be rationally attain'd by any Contemplative Act; but not with that com­pleat Assurance requir'd by him, whereby Thought may arrive to such a Veritable Certainty, That it may not at all be Complicated with the Senses; or beholding to them for any Object of their Conveyance to the Judgment-Seat of the Under­standing: Which is no less Inconsistent with Humane Capacity, than to believe with Des-Cartes, That it is possible so to Discipline the Mind, as to be one of his Thinking Proselytes: Tho' not able to Demonstrate, That there is [Page 84] any sensible Certainty in that speculative Mode of Thought, which by a main Artifice of his Brain he endeavours to promote.

Nor less discrepant from the soundest Opi­nion grounded on Divine and Philosophical Science, is the Denomination he gives to the Deity, which he defines, an Uncreated Thinking Substance; or as he would intend, the Almighty an eternal Thinker: Which is very like a Con­tradiction in Terms: It being impossible to al­low to Thought, by common Acceptation, o­ther than a temporary Attribute; or not to be otherwise Defin'd than Exerted in Past, or Present Time: Which, if apply'd to God, were all one as to Impute to the Deity a tem­porary Thought; and must Imyly Solicitude and Care suitable to the Nature of Con­templating on something to be Improv'd or Perfected by Thinking, that was not before exactly consider'd: Which how far destructive to the Attribute of Omnipotent Perfection, I suppose was not duely weigh'd, by this Author, when he penn'd this Paragraph. I find a Con­ceit in Plato much more passable, than what is written by Des-Cartes, who being ask'd, What God did? His answer was, That the Deity ex­ercis'd Geometry. On which, the Learned [Page 85] Gassendus, has this Comment, That Geometry as it Relates either to Contemplation, or Action, may not be incongruously understood of God; as he may be said to Contemplate, and chiefly consi­der himself in that Act, Emphatically express'd, in the Being given by the Omnipotent to the Universe; together with the proportional Conser­vation it has from Supreme Power and Conduct.

Which is a better Exposition than that of a thoughtful Deity, deliver'd by this French Philosopher; who makes no such sublime Distinction betwixt an Uncreated and Created thinking Substance, as does in any kind Attri­bute to God, what he means by Uncreated Thinking, or how, or in what manner to be apprehended; as it may be apply'd to the Dei­ty: So that according to the Latitude of this Author's Idea of Thinking; perfect Thought may be Inherently Attributed to the Humane Mind, no less than to the Almighty; with this only difference, That Man is not an Ori­ginal but a Created Thinker: And 'tis as possible, if granted, as this Writer determines, That perfect Thought, bestow'd on the Soul by God, may be fill'd with Perfection, as it solely resides in the Intellect, no less Created than if it had been eternally such.

[Page 86] To conclude, it is far more congruous to the Propriety of the Diety, if said, That he has for ever determin'd, than by any Notion Af­firm'd a Thinker: It being not to be deny'd, That Thought can have other Construction but as Imply'd, by its Past, Present, or Future Contemplation on something in Being: Which cannot be an Object of Omnipotent Thinking; because nothing could really Exist that was not, by him, so foreseen and E­stablish'd.

Whereas Humane Reasoning must necessa­rily proceed from Principles deduc'd from ap­posite Conclusions gradually made and de­pending on Antecedents and Consequents of Proof in every Consideration: Which can have no resemblance to the Science of God; whose perfect Knowledge is perpetually the same: And therefore admits of no successive Degrees, or Qualifications, tending to the Method of Argumentative Confirmation.

In his 60 Particular he attempts to surprise his Reader, but how Improperly may be ga­ther'd from the Expression he delivers in these Words,—Whosoever (saies he) does ac­knowledge, That God could make us certainly In­telligent of whatsoever we may distinctly Appre­hend; [Page 87] must, for Example, grant, That we may have an Idea of Substance extended, or Corpo­real; although we do not, as yet, assuredly know that any such Thing does really Exist; tho' cer­tain of the possibility of its Existence.

And I may well Reply, That 'tis as far from my expectation to find in Des-Cartes, so weak an Argument, in order to the Grandeur of the Matter, he would prove; by his Affirming, That we can have no absolute Assurance, unless the Intellect be immediately Im­power'd by God, that Bodily Substance and Extension have other than a possibility of be­ing such: Which has so very opposite a di­sparity to natural and sensible Conviction, that it appears no less Irrational, than if he had undertaken to Argue Mankind into the Belief, That it is possible to have Senses and yet be de­stitute of their Use.

Can a Man live and not be sensible, That Substance, in its Bodily signification, has a proper Being? Or can he feel, and eat the Food that nourishes his Corporeal Composi­tion, and not be Knowing, otherwise than by meer Cogitation, that he subsists by it, or that there is any such Thing, but in possibili­ty Existing? Yet so determin'd, by the Dictates [Page 88] of this Author, however Contradictory to common Sense; or as Unsound, in his Way of Reasoning, as if he had declar'd, That a Man might have Corporeal Life, but be dead as to all Bodily Consideration; whilst by sole Ccogitation in the Mind, he may have only a living Notion of the possibility of the Being of Substance and Body; as they may be distinguish'd by their natural Capacities.

Which Opinion of his he would Confirm, as he presumes, with no greater difficulty, Than as any Man may judge that he is a real Thinker, and by that Thought exclude from him­self all other Substance, either Thinking or Ex­tended. On which Supposition or Consistency of Thought, as he intends it, he certainly concludes, That every Man may distinguish him­self, not only from every Thinking Substance, but also from all others of Corporeal Denomi­nation.

Had a Poet been Author of this Conceit, he had not farther surpass'd the Excesses of Fiction, than this French Writer has done by the liberty he allows to his Invention, deviated from Principles of Reason and Philosophy: For what is more preposterous to Both, than to conclude as he does, That it is possible for a [Page 89] Thinking Man to separate himself, by meer Thought, from the substantial Similitude he has to all others of Humane Nature; as also from whatsoever can be said Corporeally to Exist. And may not the same Person by as good consequence Determine, That he is a Thinker in Body, without being sensible, that any Bodily Life, Composition, or Parts, appertain to him? Which requires no plainer Confutation than what has been already ob­serv'd on Passages of this Author, precedent­ly tending to the same purpose; as may be discern'd by whomsoever shall heedfully in­spect these Papers.

All which, in effect, is conceded by him­self, before he comes to a Period of the Head I Treat of; where he thus Expresses.—That although we suppose, That God has so strictly Joyn'd to the Cogitative Substance other Corpo­real Substance, that they cannot be more firmly Connected; and from their Conjunction Constitu­ted their Union: Notwithstanding they may re­main absolutely distinct, because God may reserve a Power to separate their Beings, tho' Corporeally Inclos'd: Or to confer Conservation on both as United, or separated; however they participate, by Existence, with the Extent of the Body.

[Page 90] These words, in Summ, can have no other Signification than what may be conster'd a Distinction without an apparent Difference, and therefore Logically Unintelligible; there being no Notion more perplex'd than his manner of Uniting Substance to Substance, in a Corporeal Figure, and yet expect, that they ought to be requisitely distinguish'd.

The Reason he gives in Summ, is, That it may be so Ordain'd by God, That whatsoever are Conjoyn'd by him takes not from his Power to dis­unite their Conjunction, by capacitating their Separation; or as the Soul may singly Act without any Assistance or Concurrence of the Senses appro­priated to the Body.

If this be the best Argument that he can Alledge, by which he would heighten the Notion, so much Celebrated by him, of the Minds operating by a distinct and clear Idea from all Corporeal Concomitancy; it is more than Intricately, in this Place, urg'd by him; who grants the firm Union, Constita­ted by God, of Soul and Body; yet will needs Imagine; that their Separation is also determin'd by God: And thus, by Des-Cartes, the Act of God is render'd contradictory to it selt.

[Page 91] B [...] now does he undertake to Explain his Proposition? Why verily, by no better Assu­rance than that it is possible for the Almighty so to dispose the Humane Mind, that it may operate divided from the Body and sensible Parts; tho' naturally United to all of them: Which, in effect, does annex Contradiction to the Act of God; it being palpably evident, That the Understanding Faculty does actuate its Intelligence with the Concurrence of the Senses: But no such manifest Assurance, that by any separate Power of the Mind the same can be Effected. Let a Man Imagine, by his utmost Force of meer Thought, That by the Speculative Act of the Mind, is represented the Shape, Proportion, Likeness, and Colour, of any Object, whether it be Moving, Standing, or Lying; 'tis not in his Power so perfectly to discern all their several Proprieties, as if they were visibly perceiv'd by him, and consider'd as proper Objects to entertain all other re­quisite Parts of his Senses: But very Impos­sible to Contemplate, of any of these, by a­ny separate Act of the Understanding distinct from Sensation: Because there could be no Idea or Notion of such Things that had ne­ver been convey'd to the Intellect by the [Page 92] consent of the Senses; as by Seeing, Feeling, Smelling, Tasting and Hearing, are occasional­ly compleated the useful Appurtenances to the Humane Intellect: Wherefore it might be well admir'd, Why the useage of Eyes, Hands, and Ears, with other of the Senses, should be na­turally Incident to the Bodily Parts and Com­position of Man; if the Mind could solely be perfectly apprehensive without them? And doubtless these Excellent Gifts had been Insig­nificantly conferr'd on Mankind; if Thought, abstracted from Sensation, might be alone exactly apprehensive. Nor can sufficient Rea­son be given, Why the Mind should not have been solely bestow'd, however Ordain'd to Exist; if by its single Intelligence it could have perform'd the divers Operations, and Actual Capacities that are joyntly Exerted by the Soul and Senses?

'Tis not to be deny'd that the Existence of the Mind, unconfin'd to Body, had been as easily accomplish'd by Providence, had it been so determin'd, as it is now Resident with the Society of the Senses: And questionless, if so establish'd, had, exalted Humane Felicity to a paramount degree: Nothing tending more to the detriment of Mankind, than [Page 93] the complicated and prone Inveiglement of the Soul by the Allurement of the Senses: So that could the Mind have been exempted from Corporeal Conjunction, it had certainly, by a glorious Act of Providence, been dis­charg'd from its Bodily Confinement; to­gether with the exorbitant, and wicked Temptations, it receives from the Appetites and Senses. But this being repugnant to its Decreed, and natural Station in the Body of Man; no room is to be found there for the Idea of Des-Cartes, by which he does incom­patibly infer, That the Humane Soul is of a di­stinct Substance, tho' Co-herent to the Body of Man, and actually concomitant with Cor­poreal Operations.

In his 64 Particular, he farther attempts to Explain what he would mean by his Definition of a distinct Thinking Substance; his Allega­tion is, That Cogitation and Extension may be understood as one and the same Mind may have diversity of Thoughts; or as one and the same Body, retaining its own Quantity, may be diverse­ly Extended; at one time in Longitude, at ano­ther in Latitude, or contrarily less in Latitude than in Depth, and the like, by which they may be distinguish'd; as also consider'd as Modalities of the Substance to which they belong.

[Page 94] Can this be Judg'd a proper Method, in order to the Improving of Humane Under­standing, according to the undertaking of this Author; as he Defines the varied Propri­eties of Substance, whether in Length, Breadth, or Depth, no other than different Modalities applicable to the same Substance? Whereas the contrary is Mathematically certain; be­cause the Extent and Proportions, in one and the same Body, must necessarily have a Commensurable Alteration.

If the Basis of a solid Substance be suppos'd to be lengthened one Foot more than it was before; the Latitude and Depth of the same Body cannot but have as to its Proportion, an Essential Variation: Which evidently proves, That what he Terms meer Modality, or acci­dental Change of local Parts in the same Sub­stance, is neither Arithmetically, or Geometri­cally true: It being no less absurd to Affirm, That the half of a Number is all one with the whole; or that the different Situation, Mea­sure, and Being of Substance, were neither a quantitative or formal Alteration in refe­rence to the reality of Place, Figure, or Mo­tion; as they ought to be apprehended in all their Capacities. On which consideration, [Page 95] the Idea of this French Writer, is fo far from tending to a significant Modality, as he would apply it; that it rather vanishes as a fictiti­ous Comment, or Shadow of his Brain.

To be plain, should a Man Collect a nu­merous Summ of Refin'd Notions, with the most Artful Curiosity that could imploy his Imagination, whereby he would dignifie the Humane Intellect; he might find the Under­taking no less difficult, to the finest Thread of his Reasoning; than to Invent a more wonderful Passage into an obscure Labryinth than could be ever attain'd by rational Con­duct: There being no passabler or clearer Prospect by which the Soul of Man may discern the Manner of its actual Being and Exercising of the Intellectual Faculty; than as it is operatively Conjoyn'd, with the temper of the Body and Senses: To whose united Concurrence may be Attributed, more or less, the qualified Abilities of the Understand­ing in every Consideration. Do we not Ex­perimentally know, That Judgment, Wit, Passions, Affections, vertuous or vicious In­clinations, with all the Moralities of Life, are Influenc'd by the Mind; as it does partici­pate with the Elementary Composition Inhe­rent [Page 96] in the Body and Senses: Insomuch, That their several Inclinations may be term'd the Effects of Heat, Cold, Moisture, or Drought, as they adhere to our Natures.

Is not a Wise Man distinguish'd by the Ju­dicious Temper of his Thoughs; the vain by their Levity and insipid Conversation? No less discernable than one Man's strength of Mind, or, Corporeal Vigour, has a natural Variation from another: To which may be Emphati­cally added, the experimental Observation as it respects the Intellectual Faculties; of which some are Impower'd with a more considera­ble vivacity of Apprehension, Judgment and Wit, in Age; than was manifest in Youth: But in others, contrarily, a Decay, or Wi­thering of their Understandings no less appa­rent than the Wrinkles of their Brows and Cheeks: Which could proceed from no other Cause but as the Vigour of the Mind does na­turally Impair, in divers examples of Age; with the Strength and Temper of the Arteries, Nerves. Members and Senses, that appertain to the Body: Yet not universally so, because, not seldom observ'd, That some Persons, who have liv'd to Antiquity of Years, have rather been compleated, in all Kinds, by their In­tellectual [Page 97] Abilities; for which there can be given no better Reason, than, that notwith­standing they have some Corporeal Deficien­cies incident to Age; yet none in the Principal Assistants of the Brain, and its Contiguity with the Senses.

All which is far more evidently demonstra­ble than a suppos'd Thinking Substance, sepa­rately acting in the Body of Man, according to the Tenent of Des-Cartes; together with his Imaginary Modalities, by which he would insinuate a distinct Thinking Faculty to the Humane Soul, without any specifical Assistance receiv'd from the Senses: A Notion no less absurd, than 'tis impossible to Think, and not be exactly sensible of the Thing, or Object Thought on: Either as it had been at the same time convey'd to the Understanding by some One, or more of the Senses; or their Impression, by the Memory before retain'd.

Which fully Confirms the Philosophical Maxim; That nothing is in the Intellect, but what was before in the Senses: Yet not so to be Apply'd, or Instanc'd here, as might, in any respect, derogate from the Excellency of the Humane Soul, or its Immortal Estate, when Life departs from the Body; it being [Page 98] in the Power of the Almighty to Eternalize its Being; howsoever it was Compos'd, or the manner of its Existence when Resident in the Body of Man.

I find no other Discussions in this Treatise of Des-Cartes, that require a more pertinent or accurate Observation, than may be Imply'd from what is already Written: Wherefore to avoid unnecessary Repetition, I descend to his Conclusion; where he briefly Summs the most considerable Principles on which he had founded his precedent Arguments; commit­ting them, as very advisable, to the perusal of his Reader.

The First of his Counsels is, That we should be very cautious, how we adhere to Former Opini­ons that have not been strictly Catechiz'd and found true by a subsequent Examination: Which I confess is plausibly Advis'd.

But how does he make good these Admo­nishments? Why, by heedfully regarding, as he prompts us, such Notions we have in our selves, by which, he would suppose, We are enough enabled to arrive to clear and distinct Knowledge.

Here he Epitomizes the main Force and Application of his Former Ideas, in order to [Page 99] erect perfect Understanding in the Humane Intellect; and by which he undertakes so to Cleanse it, that the Senses may have nothing to do with its orderly Perception: As if the Determination made by the Intellect, with the Assistance of the Senses; were no less de­trimental to the Principality of the Mind, than the loose Advice of a City-Mobb would be to their Monarch: Whereas, by a surer Inference, the bare Idea of the Mind, intro­duc'd by Des-Cartes; if duely consider'd, does Imply such a License of Thought, as is no way consistent with the orderly Rule of Man's Understanding: It being possible, That the Body-Politick of Reason, or perspicuity of Thought, in its orderly Method, should be perform'd without the Concurrence of the Senses; no more than a Man can be assur'd, he lives, and not sensibly demonstrate, both in Soul and Sense, that he does so. But so fully, I conceive, has been, by what is Writ­ten before, refell'd the Conceit, of this Au­thor, relating to his so often Inserted, or rather devis'd Tenent, or Manner of certain Thinking, under the Notion of an Idea; that it appears too like a Fable Invented by himself.

[Page 100] Towards the Close of his Treatise which he takes to be, on divers accounts, a very Irre­fragrable Advancement to Humane Under­standing.

He much Celebrates this Instance, viz. That amongst all the Notions, by which Man is enabled to discern Propositions of Eternal Verity; there is none more signally applicable than the certain Affirmation, That out of Nothing, comes Nothing: Which Allegation, of his, if ma­turely consider'd, will be found Improper, nay, absurd: As what can be more opposite to Reason and Sense, than to suppose, That a Notion, or Thought of the Mind, can have nothing for its Object? Because whatsoever is conceiv'd, by Intellectual Thinking, must be really Existent; it being all one as to Imagine, That Non-entity, or Vacuity, has a Natural and Certain Being, notwithstanding that the Universal World is replenish'd with Bodies of divers Kinds, and no room left either in the Universe, or Brain of Man for the Concepti­on of Nothing. So that to derive a Notion from what can be Interpreted by no Word, Etymology, or substantial Thought; is no other than as if Monsieur Des-Cartes had Ima­gin'd himself Nothing, in Body and Mind, [Page 101] when in order to manifest a certain Truth, he Penn'd his Contemplation of Nothing.

And 'tis much to be admir'd, That this Author, who endeavours to Embellish his Opi­nion by a new Way of Reasoning, should comply with the Obsolete, and no less Imper­tinent Position of some Former Philosophers; by which they would Infer, That the Term or Accent of Speech, that Verbally did Relate to Nothing, was contradictory to whatsoever had Essential Being: Whereas there can be no Contrariety or Opposition, betwixt Nothing and any Thing that may be said, either as a Cause, or Effect, to have real Existence. On which ground it may aptly be requir'd, That the pretended Philosophical Tenent, that would Assert, That out of Nothing, comes No­thing; should be as clearly Expung'd out of all Discussions of that Nature, as if a Man should undertake to Argue, that one Impossi­bility could produce another: Or Celebrate a Non-entity, under the Notion of Eternal Truth, and Crown it on the Pate of Non­sense. Besides all which Absurdities, 'tis very apparent, That this supposed Principle is abso­lutely Inconsistent with the most general Be­lief of Mankind, that allows Perfect Creation, [Page 102] from Nothing, of the Total World: Which how Incompatible with the Tenent, here mention'd of Des-Cartes, I leave to the Judi­cious Peruser of this Treatise.

And thus I Conclude my Remarks on the First Part of his Philosophy, call'd, The Principles of Humane Knowledge.

THE Magnitude of the Title ap­pertaining to the Second Part of the Philosophy of Des-Cartes, cre­ates in his Reader, an Egregious Expectation of a superlative Method, and un­doubted Assurance; whereby the Humane Mind might satisfactorily apprehend the ad­mirable Consistence of the Material World, [Page 104] providentially Dispos'd for the vast Habitati­on and Benefit of Man and Creatures.

Which is so Important a Knowledge, That the Misdemeanour of the Intellectual Faculty cannot be excus'd from being Impeach'd by the Assembly of the Senses; if negligently Regardless, or not industriously Apprehensive, as far as can be Extended its Solid Contem­plation; How Mankind is sensibly Sustain'd by the peaceable Order and Conduct of Nature: And next to that Philosophical Speculation, the Soul of Man ought to bewail its Infelicity, in Bodily Life; when perniciously allur'd by Covetous, or Ambitious Desires, to Possess more of the Earth he treads on, than ought to be his, to the Detriment or Ruin of others: Instead of deducing from the regular Con­stitution of the World, in which he Subsists, How unnaturally he Lives, by Infringing the Rights of Humane Society: Which ought to have an Impression on the Soul, in a Philo­sophical, and Moral Conception. This is as a Proaemium fitly annex'd to the ensuing Treatise, I thought not Improper to Insert; before I come to the First Particular of Des-Cartes, which as a Platform or main Fund to his subsequent Notions, he Compiles; by [Page 105] undertaking to Explain the Reasons by which the Existence of Material Things may be cer­tainly understood.

His first Words are these,—Although there is no Man that does not fully convince him­self, That Material Things do really Exist, not­withstanding that it has been dubiously render'd by me, in the precedent Discussions, or accounted amongst the Prejudices incident to the Childhood, or Greenness of our Years; it is now Incumbent, on me, to search for the Reasons that may produce its perfect Intelligence: To which purpose he infers, That whatsoever we apprehend, must neces­sarily proceed from something, that is not the same with the Humane Mind; nor is it in our Power, as he Affirms, to think of one Thing more than another; but as from some other Thing we are Affected, or receive Impression on the Senses: And makes this Quere, Whether that Thing be not God, or differently to be conceiv'd?

This Part of this Head, may be pertinent­ly Answer'd, by demanding, On what ground Des-Cartes undertakes to conclude, that the Soul is so dispos'd, as it operates on the Senses by the Idea it has from God? Which perfectly contradicts the Notion deliver'd by him in the 7th Particular of his First Part, and Remark'd [Page 106] by me, accordingly; where he declares, That it is in our Power to reject whatsoever we doubt of, or feign that it is false; and thus we may suppose, that there is no God, no Heaven, no Bodies, and that we have no Hands, no Feet, or Bodies Constituted.

But in his Second Part, which I now deal with, he restores the Senses, that he had Ab­dicated before, to the uses of the Mind. By which it appears, that he was conscious of his former Mistake; and that 'tis not possible to discourse, as he does, in this Part, of Material Principles, without allowing the Association of the Mind to its sensible Discernment.

The Reason that he mentions is, That be­cause we sensibly, and distinctly perceive, from the Impulse of the Senses, any certain Matter ex­tended into Length, Breadth and Depth, whose Parts are diversly Figur'd, and variously Mov'd; as also how they affect us with different Conceptions that we have of their Colours, Smells, Griefs, and the like: If God should Imbue the Mind with an Idea of such Extended Matter, and afterward should cause any other Thing so to dispose the Humane Intellect, that it might fix its Imagination on what had neither Extension, Figure, or Motion; no rea­son can be given, why God might not be thought a Deceiver.

[Page 107] This Passage can have no excusable Defence, if judiciously Examin'd: The Question he offers being so ill Stated, or Inconsistent with the accurate Part of Reasoning, That it can­not amount to Refin'd Sophistry. For how­ever he might conceive. That the Soul, toge­ther with its Mental Idea, might be placed in the Body by God; it could not be without assurance, that the World is replenish'd with Corporeal Beings that cannot be Denomina­ted such, but as Length, Breadth and Depth, Colour, Taste and Smell, are their natural Pro­prieties: So that where the Intellect and Sen­ses are joyntly Illuminated, in whatsoever Method, by the Act of God; they must be far more certain than to admit any room for Misconception, or the If, or Quere, Inserted by Des-Cartes; by which he would Infer, That could a Man, Ensoul'd by God, Imagine by any other means, that there is no such Thing as Longitude, Latitude, Depth and the like, appertaining to Corporeal Substance; he might call God a Deceiver: Which were all one as to suppose, That a Man duely apprehen­sive, of any Object, should by the Will of God, voluntarily Determine, that he is not; which is no less Irrational, than Impossible to all of [Page 108] competent Understanding: But no disallow­able Tenent if apply'd to other Particulars of Mankind, whose Intellects are not of suffici­ent Ability, if not naturally stupid, or acci­dentally unsound, or phrenetically distemper'd; as is the condition of such as are Distracted, and, in a manner, totally destitute of the Use of their Rational Faculty: And who can doubt, that not a few of these, want Capacity to define Length, Breadth and Depth, as Inseparable to Bodily Existence? Which could not have been, if Mankind were Universally endu'd by an Impartial Course of Nature, Or­dain'd by God, and so committed to the Hu­mane Body: Where it must have had a more excellent Residence than could be impedited, or debas'd by Corporeal Attributes; and must have likewise been compleated with as perfect an Idea, in every respect, as this Author endea­vours to prove: But not being perform'd, his manner of Argument turns the point of a Di­lemma against his Assertion, by which he would annex a more general and perfect Idea to the Soul of Man, than is experimentally Certain; and whereby, in effect, he Terms God a De­ceiver; because, according to his Doctrine, e­very Soul, within a Humane Body has not a pa­tallel Idea of exact Knowledge.

[Page 109] A Blessing much to be wish'd, or rather Implor'd by Prayer, were it not repugnant to the Methods of Providence omnipotently de­termin'd; by which the Intellectual Faculty is differently Impowr'd, as its Corporeal Do­minion is more or less Absolute; either as it commands, or is weaken'd in Rule, by the Conspiracy of the Senses: Which cannot be otherwise, the Mind being surrounded and continually endanger'd by the frail Composi­tion and Temperatures of the Bodily Parts, in which it operatively Resides.

On the contrary, were there such a clear Idea, from above, infus'd into the Soul of Man, as is Instanc'd by Des-Cartes; by which every requisite Notion, or Truth, might be perfectly apprehended: It were not con­sistent with the Justice of the Almighty, if every Individual of Mankind were not equally Intelligible; on which account, one Man, might be as wise, in every Consideration, as any other: And if so, there would be less necessity for Superior Magistracy, or Rule; could every Man be alike Discreet in govern­ing of Himself.

In the mean time, Des-Cartes has introduc'd a new Character, on the Stage of Philosophy, [Page 110] more compleat in Thought than is univocally Consistent with the Figure of Humane Com­position; by which is Personated the Dress and Mode of the Mind, as it is Cloth'd by the Senses: From whence 'tis apparently manifest. That the Powers of the Rational Soul are fre­quently exerted suitable to the diversity of Tempers that sensibly Exist, Improve, or Decay, in the Body of Man.

And this as Naturally Certain as Animal Creatures of the same Kind, vigorously Grow, or Impair; or are more Subtil, Active and Strong, proportionable to the Elementary Mixtures by which they Subsist. And there­fore as highly presumptuous, as to Argue a­gainst the Methods of Providence, if discuss'd, Why Men and Creatures are so Constituted in their Several Capacities of Being, and Life? Which is above the search of Man's Reasoning, and only known to the Omnipotent Disposer of whatsoever the Universe contains. All which, if duely consider'd, sufficiently ex­plodes the Novel Scene of this Part of the Philosophy of this Author, together with the Actual Character he gives to Mankind, in his Modalities of Intellectual Apprehension, as 'tis Personated by his Pen.

[Page 111] His Second Particular begins with a Truth, but ends with a Falsehood: Where he grants, That the Mind, or Soul of Man, is more strictly United to its peculiar Body, than to all other Bodies: The Reason he offers is, Because we have an Apprehension of Griefs, and other sensi­ble Advertencies that happen unthought on by us; of which the Mind, he conceives, could not be Intelligent, as it is meerly Cogitative, but as it is Conjoyn'd to a Certain extended and moveable Substance call'd the Humane Body.

The Antecedent Part of this Head is un­doubtedly true; which signifies no more, than that our Souls have more to do with our own Bodies, than with any other: And who could have expected, that Des-Cartes could have presented his Reader with so vulgar a Specu­lation? Which has no other Tendency, than that every Man is as far apprehensive as the Compliment of his Soul and Senses will ex­tend; and thus are Griefs, Passions, Affecti­ons, sensibly distinguish'd by us, when Ap­pertaining to others: Because the Rational Fa­culty sympathetically complies with the Sen­ses in Conveying their Intelligence to Things, of that Kind, without us; as he that has felt a Wound or Pain in any of his Corporeal Parts, [Page 112] will judge of the same in others. But how to think of any Thing that appertains to our selves, and not to perform it by help of the Mind, as a sensible Thinker; is a Riddle not to be unfolded by the Writings of Des-Cartes.

In his Third Particular he attempts to clear the Point; but, in effect weakens it, by this Feeble Proposition of his: The Perception of the Senses does not direct us to Discover what is really in Things, but as they are render'd profita­ble, or detrimental to Humane Composition: Un­less sometimes, or by accident, we are Taught by the Senses what those Bodies are, and how they Exist. And therefore (saies he,) we must Depose the Senses, and solely Judge by help of the In­tellect according to the Ideas that are Incident to it, by Nature.

Whosoever is Master of a Grain of Reason, must be convinc'd, That a Contradiction is Imply'd by the manner of Argument, here urg'd by this Author: Who grants, That by the Conjunction of the Soul and Senses, we perfectly Discern what is Beneficial, or Hurt­ful to us; but in that Act, do not certainly apprehend what those Things are: Which is all one as to Affirm, That we may be Intel­ligent, [Page 113] yet not undoubtedly assur'd of what we understand: Unless the Intellect be Refin'd by Idea, after his manner, as the most natu­ral Way of being clearly Apprehensive; and with such disparagement to the Senses, That they may be, in his Opinion, neglected: Tho' common Experience might have convinc'd him, that they are, by Nature, Constituted Assistants and real Proofs of whatsoever is openly and demonstratively understood.

But it seems he omitted these Considerati­ons: And therefore in his next Particular, which is his 4th, he positively directs, as he would intend the Use of his Idea, by which he Argues, That the Nature of Matter, or Body, does not Consist in that it is Hard, Ponderous, or any other Manner affecting the Senses; but only as it is a Thing extended in Length, Breadth and Depth: And for durition, or hardness, the Sense discovers it no farther, than as the Parts of a Hard Body Resist the Motion of our Hands meeting with it.

Here he would exalt his Idea to the height of Dominion in the Mind, and level the Senses below the Capacities that Nature has allow'd them: Nothing being more Philoso­phically Irrational than the Supposition he [Page 114] Inserts, That the Nature of Body is only to be understood as it has Longitude, Latitude and Depth; and why not also as it is Weighty, Hard and Colour'd? Is not Air as much a Body as Iron, and yet perfectly distinguish'd by the compact Durition of the Latter, as its Essential Propriety? And as absolutely diffe­rent in Colour, could the diaphanous Substance of Air be as visible to the Eye; and although it be not, we may conceive the Distinction, much surer, than we could by intruding on the Mind a conceited Idea; because we are sensibly Assur'd, That no Corporeal Thing can have Being in Nature, without its coloura­ble Property: And this as familiarly Certain, as that a Bay-Horse cannot be Denominated a Horse, if his natural Colour could be sepa­rated from his Substance.

There are many Things that may be said to have Colour, that are not genuinely their own: And so a painted Cheek, whether in Man or Woman, is no Dye or Complexion of Nature, but Artificically Colour'd: And we Judge of Pictures as they Resemble the Life by the Colours apply'd to them by the Skill of the Painter.

[Page 115] And 'tis no less evident, that Des-Cartes has presented his Reader with a very Fictitious Varnish of his Pen; if he meant no other distinction of Colours, Relating, or Apply'd to Material Substances, than in this Place he mentions: And in Summ concludes, That Weight, Colour and such like Corporeal Qualities may be separated from their Inherence in Matter; so that the Nature of the Substance, to which they belong, does not depend on any of them.

And is not this a concise Manner of Idea, in this Author, by which he would have us believe, That Bodily Substance may have Ex­istence, and be sensibly perceiv'd without being discern'd by its genuine Shape, and Figure? If Colour, Hardness and Weight, with other Qualities appertaining to Matter, are defin'd Accidents in a Philosophical Sense; yet allow­able such as, when natural, are inseparable Proprieties from Bodies to which they apper­tain? And 'tis some wonder, that this Learned Monsieur should forget, on this occasion, That noted Logical Maxim,

So that the Idea of this Author, as it is here Apply'd by him, is so far from a Weighty, or [Page 116] indeed a Colourable Notion, That 'tis as sure­ly Confuted as a White Plum may be di­stinguish'd by the Act of Nature, from a Black one.

The next Step he takes, is to present his Reader with the Doubts of some Persons, who Determine, That Bodies may be so Rarified, or, Condens'd, that they may have, by Rarifaction more Extension than when Condens'd. To which Number of Dubitants I desire to be added: Because I conceive nothing more clear than the doubt he Delivers.

Is it not very evident, That Snow when dis­solv'd, by Rarifaction, into Water is substan­tially Extended farther than before; as it may be observ'd falling from a Hill into a River? And is it not as manifest, That some Parts of Wood, when Thinn'd and Rarified by Fire, convert to Smoak? So that 'tis impossible to deny, that Corporeal Alteration is not Incident to Rarifaction, which gives it a variable and different Extension, if compar'd to the space it Precedently fill'd; and this amounts to De­monstration, instead of Opinion.

But he that will be Proselyted, by the Do­ctrine of Des-Cartes, must, in this Case be such a compliable Sceptick as to Renounce his [Page 117] sensible Conviction, and accord with him where he contends to Argue, That who­soever, will attentively Think and admit no­thing but what he clearly understands, will Judge, That no more is Effected by Rarifacti­on and Condensation than Change of the Corporeal Figure. And this, in few words, is the summ of what is contain'd in his Fifth and Sixth Particular, that is worth a Remark.

The Reason he offers is, That Rarified Bo­dies, having many Pores, are there Replenish'd with other Substances; and by that means be­come Condens'd.

This Conceit of his is as distant from Proof, as Fiction is from Truth: And nothing more obviously Answer'd; since 'tis Philosophical­ly Certain, That Condensation is added to Bo­dies which are made more or less Solid, as their thinner Parts are proportionately expell'd by Rarifaction: And thus a tenuous Sub­stance is gradually render'd more compact, and harden'd by the Fire; as is, in divers Kinds, Experimentally Observable: Which however producing Alteration of Figure in their Corporeal Extent; 'tis as they receive So­lidity or Durition from the Capacity that their tenuous Parts have in order to Rarifacti­on: [Page 118] So that 'tis not, as this Writer Infers, from any Intervals, or Cranies in Bodies, fill'd with other Bodies, that causes Conden­sation; but so much of the Tenuity of their Compositions as being vanish'd by Rarifaction, leaves them more compactly Harden'd.

Suppose he had been ask'd, Whether the thin Substance of Air, or Fluid Body of Water, did Exist with any such Pores or Inlets in them that might be Receptacles for other Bodies? He could not probably have solv'd the Questi­on, notwithstanding 'tis very apparent, That Air is Thicken'd by Moisture that exhal'd, by the Sun, is mingled with it. But Water being a grosser Substance, is Condens'd as its Thinner Parts are by Heat extracted from it; and this may be discern'd in every standing Pool, or Puddle.

All which is Equivalently acknowledg'd by him in his Entrance to his Seventh Head, Where he grants, That there are no Pores in Air, or Water, that may add to their Amplitude, by giving Reception to other Bodies whereby they may be more Replenish'd: Yet would have it pass, in being suppos'd, for a Ratio­nal Fiction; but I expected his Proof, and [Page 119] therefore must be excus'd, if I reject his Fable.

As for Corporeal Extent, caus'd by Rari­faction; he seems to allow none otherwise than as he would a new Body so Extended: Which is not Universally true; and may be so understood from the Example given already, of Snow Dissolv'd, by Rarifaction, to Wa­ter; which, when Snow, was but Water Con­geal'd: So that it cannot be properly said to have a new Body but alter'd to the Fluid Sub­stance which it had before.

The like may be Affirm'd of Lead, or o­ther Materials, that when melted, and en­larg'd by Extension, do not lose the Deno­mination of the same Corporeal Substance; in which Sense, Lead, when Dissolv'd, is as truely Lead, as it was in its precedent Ex­istence.

Examples might be added, on this Subject, did the Reply that I have made require far­ther Illustration; wherefore I proceed to his next Point, which he thus States:—Quantity and Number differ, only in Reason, from the quantitative or number'd Thing; This Position he procceds to Explicate by Affirming, That the whole Nature of Corporeal Substance, [Page 120] may be consider'd, as contian'd in the space of ten Feet, altho' we attend not the Measure of any such Number of Feet: And by Converse, (saies he,) the Number Ten may be understood, as well as a Quantity of so many Feet, although we are regardless of its Determinate Substance.

Here the gentile Monsieur renews his Ad­dress, to his Mistress of Thought, under the Notion of Idea: Which he endeavours to Compleat by such a refin'd Mode of Philoso­phical Courtship, That like a Platonick Lover, he separates Sense from the Motives he En­dears. But I presume, that his Amour has met with divers coy Reprimands from Rea­son, the most Celebrated Mistress and Beauty of the Understanding.

And 'tis no presumption, I conceive, if I Attribute a rational Success to my Pen, which has, more than often, refell'd the Cartesian Idea in divers preceding Discussions: Where­fore I might refer my Reply to what I have already Written: Did not the respect that I have to the Abilities of this Author, tho' none to his Mistakes, oblige me to prolong my In­spection; together with an earnest Desire of being convinc'd, might I find Cause, from his Proposals. But instead of meeting with any [Page 121] Motives of his, sufficient to reconcile me to his Assertions, I may justly observe an Errone­ous Relapse to his former Principles.

And thus in his 8th Particular, that oc­casions my Debate; He supposes, That the whole Nature of Corporeal Substance contain'd in a space of Ten, or any Number of Feet, may be understood without any Computation of it, as locally Commensurable; and this to be accom­plish'd by a sole Idea of the Mind, in his Opinion. But is it possible to promote meer Thought, by an Insensible Act, suitable to the purpose he intends it? Can a Man that never under­stood how a Plain Superficies may contain Body, or is produc'd according to his Exam­ple, to a space of Ten Feet; Conceive, or Delineate such a Figure, without know­ing that it is Compleated by Multiplying of 5 by 2?

Should a Mathematical Tutor Inform his Pupil, That it would be sufficient for his In­struction, if by Mental Speculation he Ima­gin'd that there was, in Nature, such a Thing as a Plain Superficies, tho' he did not appre­hend that Longitude and Latitude were its Numerical Proprieties: Could Science be Improv'd by such an Impertinent and Idle [Page 122] Idea that can signifie nothing either to Theory, or Practice?

On the contrary, every Man must be as competently Intelligent, as was this Author, of the Qualifications of Lines that appertain to superficial Content; and as certainly too, as the Dimensions of any Number of Acres may be figuratively Included in a Square or Parallelogram, or he will profit little on this Question, by Reading of Des-Cartes:

Who next proceeds to inform us, That notwithstanding 'tis a certain Truth, (and so I think too,) that nothing can be taken from Quan­tity, or Extension, but the Substance, to which they belong, must also be Leslen'd: And converti­bly, not the least Part of Substance can be exempt­ed; but as much of Quantity and Extension will be taken from it.

This Opinion of his he alledges as oppo­site to the Tenent of others, of whom he saies, there are some that consider Corporeal Substance as distinct from its Quantity: Which Conception of theirs causes them confusedly to think, that the same Substance may be term'd Incorporeal.

Whether there was ever Man of such a wilde Imagination may well be question'd: Since nothing can be more absurd than to [Page 123] Imagine, That Substance might remain, in any Kind Substance, without its proper Quantity; and next, notwithstanding that Contradiction, or as he calls it confusion of Thought, to suppose, the same Substance Metamorphos'd, by a mysterious Way of Thinking, to Incorporeal; which is no less contradictory to the natural Being and Defi­nition of Substance, than if a Man should determine, that Body could cease to be Body: Because Substance is inseparable from Quan­tity, as its Corporeal Propriety; and therefore by no Notion, or Object of Sense, can be deem'd Incorporeal. But notwithstanding that the Incomprehensible Idea of Incorporeal Substance is reprov'd by Des-Cartes, as No­tionally Confus'd; the Sense that he delivers in the 64th Particular of his First Part, or Trea­tise of Humane Cognition, is ally'd to the same Absurdity, as may be observ'd from my Re­marks on that Head: Where he supposes That Cogitaion and Extension may be consider'd as Modalities of Substance; because, as he Af­firms, The Humane Mind may have diversity of Thoughts; by which the Cogitative Substance, as he Defines it, may at one time Imploy its Idea of Things, clearly distinguish'd, without the As­sistance [Page 124] of the Senses; at another, operate in Conjunction with the sensible Parts of the Body: Is not this such a manner of Idea as would render the Thinking Substance of the Mind with, or without Quantity; as pleases the Thinker? Which little differs from the Irra­tional Notion of Incorporeal Substance; if any Thing, by excluding of Quantity, might be possibly Imagin'd substantial.

From whence it may be inferr'd, That the Criticisme offer'd by Des-Cartes, in this Place, in order to refell the Opinion of others, does considerably reflect on his own.

And thus I proceed to such of his Par­ticulars as occasion my Remarks; which I shall Insert no oftner than the Subject re­quires.

In his 11th Head, he reminds us of the Idea that we may have of Body, by the Exam­ple he gives of a Stone, from which we may reject all that is not Essential to the Nature of Body: As if a Stone be melted, or pulveris'd, it does not therefore cease to be Corporeal: We may also reject Colour, because we frequently observe Stones that very pellucidly shine, as if they were without Colour. And so we may reject Gravity, Lightness, Heat and Cold, with All other Qualities; because [Page 125] they are either not consider'd in the Stone, or be­ing Chang'd, the Corporeal Nature of the Stone is not alter'd with them.

Here methinks he makes a great Pudder to little purpose; or no other than to prove that which no Man ever deny'd: If there can be any Thing more Experimentally manifest than That Substance, by what means soever varied or Chang'd, will still retain Quantity, as its Corporeal Propriety, not to be separated from it by Force or Fire: So that the Essential Na­ture of Body cannot be destroy'd, tho' it be lessen'd or divided into Innumerable Particles of the same Substance: But not so continue in the Qualities of Colour, Weight, Heat, Cold, Moisture, or the like, that were its former Appurtenances: Because Alteration must necessarily Change its accidental Quali­fications, consonant to the Philosophical Max­im, a non esse tale ad esse tale: Which signifies, that it is otherwise, than it was in Figure or Di­mension, together with such like External Qualifications as it precedently had, and are naturally diversified according to Corporeal Alterations.

But amongst the Examples which he pre­sents to his Reader, as so many select Jewels [Page 126] of Thought, I cannot but observe the blemish that I find in the Diamond of his Idea; where he supposes, That the Substance of such a Stone may be so Transparent that its Colour might not be visible: But how any Thing can be so refinedly splendid as not at all per­ceptible by its Colour; is not less absurd, than to Affirm, that something is seen without being discern'd: It being Optically, and Physically, impossible to be sensible of any Object of Sight, unless its Colour be sufficiently visible with its Substance.

True it is, That a Diamond may be sever'd into Parcels of its Substance, and that its Splen­dours will proportionably lessen with its Corpo­real Parts: But not suitable to the Altera­tions made as to Figure, Colour, or Extent, in Bodies of weaker Complexion and Sub­stance: For Example, Straw, or Stubble, will sooner yield, in all their Capacities, to the Alteration enforc'd by Fire, or to any natural Method of Change; than Wood or Coal. So that 'tis not provable, as Affirm'd by Des-Cartes, That with every Corporeal Mutation may equally be rejected the above-mention'd External Attributes, that did appertain to their Substance; and nothing continue with them [Page 127] but Length, Breadth and Depth, the com­mon Proprieties of Body.

To which he adds this Incompatible Pro­position; That by Idea of Space, not Corporeally Replenish'd, may be comprehended an Idea of what is call'd Vacuity. Was ever Fiction so perfectly supposititious as to Fancy, That Space had a Being, and not the Local Continent of Substance? Or that the Universe, the vast Womb of Nature, might, by its miscarrying admit of Vacuity? Which, properly Con­ster'd, amounts to the Production of nothing. Wherefore the Appellation, or Word Vacui­ty, can signifie no more than a cursory Accent of Speech: Or such an empty Idea, as I may modestly say, is not seldom obtruded into the Writings of this Author.

Some of his subsequent Particulars, where he differenceth Space from Place, are indeed more nice, if not frivolous, than could be Thought to drop from the Pen of the Learned Des-Cartes, who takes it for granted, That if any Corporeal Thing be remov'd from the Lo­cal Being, in which it was; we are not there­fore to conceive, that its Extension does depart with it.

[Page 128] Which Position of his may be pertinently wav'd, by Affirming the contrary to be true: As what is more Essentially annex'd to the Comprehension of Body; than its due and proportionable Extension as it Relates to the Place by which it is contain'd? Wherefore if a Stone be mov'd from the Local Situation it precedently had; its Extension or proper Space, as its natural Capacity, does Insepara­bly remove with it; and not remain, as this Author would Imply, as the same Extension, or Place, might be possess'd with other Bo­dies: Or under the confus'd Notion of Space not fill'd, with any Thing readily Imagin'd, we may be so vain to suppose, as he gives License to the Conception, That Indeterminate Space, if so Apprehended, may be thought Vacuity: Which he Infers, by Reflecting on the misapprehension we may have, that the same Local Extension does not Remain, tho' the Body, to which it appertain'd, be Remov'd.

A manner of Inference Philosophically un­found; because, no Corporeal Substance can be taken from its due Place, unless its pro­per Extension, and Space, to which it belongs, be movable with it: Not that it may not leave behind, or after its Removal, the like [Page 129] Local Capacity; as it may at large, be said to have been contiguous to that Sub­stance: Or instead of its continuance there, the Space, that it before possess'd, is imme­diately replenish'd by the Accession of some one, or more Bodies: And this perpetually Executed by the Act of Nature, touch'd by the Scepter of Eternal Providence: Which otherwise, must cease to be, or vanish with the World, her Universal Habitation, by An­nihilating her Existence. And therefore ex­orbitantly Impossible to allow any Epithet to Vacuity, That by all the Representatives of Nature is determin'd to have no Propriety within her spacious Dominion.

As improper is the Example he gives, in the same Paragraph, Of a Person suppos'd to be seated in a Ship, and moves not although the Ship removes whilst he sits still.

But were his sole Corporeal Extensions, in Length, Breadth and Depth, in Motion, as he late in the Ship; his Local Space would Remove with him, without depending on the Sailing of the Ship.

Before he makes a Close on this Head, he gives a more than ordinary Instance of a Ship under Sail, and the Earth in Motion, at the [Page 130] same time, which, according to the Copernican System he would Insinuate; but in general Af­firms, That if a Ship sailes as far from East to West as the Earth Revolves from West to East, ac­cording to its Motion in the Ecliptick, as the Copernicans Imagine, a Man sitting in the Ship does not Change his Place, because the Local Determination both of the Motion of the Ship and Earth is to be consider'd as relating to some Immovable Points of Heaven.

This Ship according to his Supposition of the Earth's Motion, must be committed to the desperate Conduct of a Copernican Pilot: For if the Ocean, together with all the Rivers and Streams that the World affords, be Affirm'd to compleat in Conjunction with the Earth, one Globulous Circumference and Figure; as is the Opinion of many Learned Philoso­phers: The rapid and mounting Motion that the Sea must have, in being contiguous to the Earth's Revolution, considering that it is naturally Lighter, and therefore Higher than the Earth, would soon overwhelm the Ship, with vast Mountains of boisterous Waves, in spite of the best Marriners Skill and Com­pass; and doubtless, in that Irresistible Storm the Man he supposes seated in the Ship would [Page 131] be totally toss'd from his Station. So that, if granted the Copernican Hypothesis as it Im­plys the Conjoyn'd and Revolving Motion of the Superficies of the Earth and Ocean, 'tis impossible to conceive how a Naval Voy­age could be at any time perform'd; or the Intercourse and Trade of Nations by Sea at this Day, or heretofore practicable; an Ob­jection that gives no Inconsiderable Confuta­tion to the Copernican System: Which whether or no perceiv'd by this Author, he seems, at least, in this Place to be Indifferent, as to that Opinion, by granting, where he Concludes this Particular, That it may be Thought if we please, that in the Compass of the Universe there are no such Imaginary Points, and consequently no Permanent Place as to the Being of any Thing; otherwise than by Thought we so de­termine.

To which it may be Answer'd, That as to any fix'd Points, in any Caelestial Orb, there is no Cause to Imagine them, but as they Re­late to the Commensurable Motion of some other Thing, or by conceiving Imaginary Points in the Orbits of the Sun and Planets: Yet not at all true, if otherwise Applied; be­cause it is Philosophically certain, That Motion, [Page 132] generally Consider'd, must be made from Point to Point gradually Mov'd with whatso­ever is Moving; otherwise there could be no Mathematical Computation, or Time, estimated as Proprieties of Motion: In which Sense it may be likewise Asserted, That the Sun and Stars no less than every other Thing, may be judg'd to Remove with such Mova­ble Spaces as naturally appertain to the Mea­sure of their Extensions, however their Diur­nal, or Annual Revolutions, may be termi­nated by such Points as may be deem'd fix'd in Orbits above. In summ whatsoever is Mov'd, must have an actual Beginning and determinate Period, or in a Philosophical Sense, a quo, et ad quem: Which is no other than the Movable Progression, from Space, to Space, of any Individual Thing with all its Parts: Yet so as it may be said, tho' in Motion, still to continue the Place Incident to its proper Extent: And therefore incongru­ously Conceded by Des Cartes, That by Li­cense of Thought we may Think, that there is no such Thing as Permanent Place apper­taining to any Thing; which in some Sense is as unnaturally Absurd, as it one should under­take to Contemplate, that there is no Corpo­real [Page 133] Being: Since Body cannot be understood, either Moving, or not Moving, but as con­tain'd by Place, nor Place without Local and Bodily Existence.

The difference that he makes in his 14th Particular, betwixt Place, and Space, is, That in his Sense Locality more expresly signifies Situati­on, than Magnitude or Figure; and contrarily, these are more noted by us, when we speak of Space: And thus we frequently mention one Thing as succeeding to the Place of another, although it be not of the same Magnitude or Figure.

All which, amounts to no more than a Quibble of so many Words, that ought to have one and the same ordinary Application: And therefore very incongruously Asserted by this Author, That by Place is more appositely understood Situation, than Magnitude or Figure But how can any Thing be said to be duely Situated, unless its natural proprieties be Lo­cally understood? Nor less dissentaneous is it to common Experience, should his Notion be allow'd, or manner of Thought; by which might be suppos'd, That one Substance could genuinely supply the room of another, tho' not of the same Magnitude, or Figure: Which [Page 134] is a contradictory Supposition; because na­turally repugnant, or rather Impossible, that any one Thing should be said to possess the Local Being of another, and not have its proper Attributes.

In his 12th Head, he had allow'd, That if any Corporeal Thing were remov'd from the Space, or Place, in which it was; that we may believe the Local Being that it had before, possess'd by some other Body, or Bodies, or term'd Vacuity: Which as a Notion fit to be Enroll'd a­mongst Modern Absurdities was Remark'd accordingly.

But in his 17th Particular, having prece­dently granted, That in a Philosophical Con­ception there could be no such Thing as Vacuity, or where no Substance does Exist: He seems in few words, to Recant what he Inscrib'd in his 12th Head; acknowledging That by customary Manner of Speaking, is not to be un­derstood by the Term, or Word Vacuity, That Place, or Space can be Apprehended by it, in which there is nothing; but in which there are none of those Things that we conclude ought to be there: And thus a Vessel is said to be empty, that appointed to contain some other Thing, is fill'd only with Air; or a Fish-Pool empty, though full of Water, because no Fish in it.

[Page 135] So that in effect, he grants, That the Curso­ry wording of Emptiness, or Vacuity, under the Phrase of nothing, ought to be referr'd to the Predicament of Non-sense.

But vulgar usage of Words is, and will be more practicably Retain'd, by the gene­rality of Mankind, than any Concise, or Philosophical Language of the Schools: Wherefore this Author might have spar'd much of the Instructions of his Pen on this Subject; because surer known to Men of Science than any Reception it may proba­bly meet with in the Dialect of common Persons.

It was ever an undoubted Maxim, That Vacuity is Inconsistent with the Essential Be­ing of Nature; because Substance must be Attributed to whatsoever Exists by her Prero­gative; and this as an old Truth, is sufficient­ly acknowledg'd by Des-Cartes: Notwith­standing that throughout his New Model of Philosophy, there are few Tenents of the Erudite Ancients, however Celebrated by Time, that he does not undertake to Con­fute.

But where he Refells the obsolete Opinion, or rather Conceit of Epicurus, and some of [Page 136] his Predecessors, concerning the World's Ori­ginal from the accidental Concourse of In­divisible Atoms, his Pen Conspires with the Vogue of Learned Antiquity; which unani­mously determin'd, That there could be no na­tural Existence but in Quantitative and Corpo­real Beings. So that the Opinion of Innume­rable Atoms, or Thing next to nothing, as they were deem'd Inconsistent, or Ex­empted from having divisible Parts; in Future Time became the Subject of Invention, or such Poetical Allusions, as by the fantastical Poem of Lucretius are committed to Perusal. There we may Read how, by admirable Con­ceit, Things, call'd Atoms, destitute of Cor­poreal Proprieties, had Motion and Flight as their Wings were Imp'd by the Artifice of Fiction: And next, to fill the World with their suppos'd procreative Faculty, how they met and embrac'd like Male and Female.

I confess, That a fabulous Process of the Original of the Universe may be more excu­sable; because the most exquisite, and pene­trating Ingenuities of Mankind have been to wonder, pos'd in the account they have gi­ven of the World's Beginning; insomuch that the utmost Inquisition they could make [Page 137] has led them to such an Extasie, or Stand of Thought, That they have only been able to admire the Constituted Perfection of the World, they Inhabit, instead of discerning in what manner it was produc'd.

Whether the Imagination or Principles of Des-Cartes, as they have Reference to this stupendous Subject, will expand a prospect to the Eye of the Intellect more requisitely o­pen than hath, as yet, been explicated by the profoundest Industry of Humane Science; will be seen, in such of his following Particulars, where he Treats of the vast Consistency and Appurtenances of the Visible World.

And thus I come to his 21st Particular, by which he would have us understand, That the World we Inhabit is boundless in Extension: Be­cause, as he states his Argument, wheresoever we suppose its Limits, we must necessarily grant, That beyond those Imaginary Limitati­ons are real Spaces, and such as contain Cor­poreal Substances indefinitely Extended.

Against which, I offer a brief and obvious Exception, by sensibly proving, That as we cannot Imagine any Indefinite Extension or Space in the World in which we have Be­ing, so were another World equally Vast and [Page 138] Contiguous to this, it were impossible to ap­prehend a boundless Corporeal Space within its total Continent: By reason that uncircum­scrib'd Space cannot be the Receptacle of Ma­terial Substance; because whatever includes Body must have commensurable Attributes, or such as, in a Geometrical Sense, may be defin'd a Superficies terminated by Length and Breadth: Which demonstrably profligates his pretended Idea of Indefinite Space or Ex­tension. So little is, in this Case, the Do­ctrine of Nature beholding to the Philosophy of Des-Cartes.

His next Conception, produc'd by his fruit­ful Idea, is, That Heaven and Earth are of one and the same Matter, and that there is no possible Being of more than one World.

The first of this Head he no otherwise proves, than as he takes it for granted, That if there were Infinite, or Innumerable Worlds, they would be all of the same Matter; where­fore he concludes there can be but One.

The Objection that may be made against his Affirmation, that the Matter of Heaven and Earth is the same; is, because Heaven can be no otherwise understood than as it has a Select and Primary Distinction from all Bodies of [Page 139] Elementary Composition: Which is appa­rently manifest in its Figure, Motion and Height, absolutely different, and far more Excellent than can be compar'd with other Substance: Wherefore Zanchius, writing of the Works of God, gives to its most Sublime and Refin'd Perfection, a spiritual Epithet; to which purpose the Learned Pena, in his Pre­face to Euclid, defines it an Animated Spirit universally diffus'd: To these may be added the Authority of Jamblichus, a very con­siderable Author, who in admiration of its Substance, allows to its Perfections, the nearest Attributes to Incorporeal Exist­ence.

And who can doubt that the Judgment, of any one of these erudite Persons, in being more speculatively Refin'd, and naturally suitable to the wonderful Objects, Immensly distant from the Earth we tread on, should not have a deference from our Understandings highly Superior to the gross Definition given them by Des-Cartes? Who determines, That the Sub­stance of Heaven and Earth alike proceeds from the Heap of Nature's common Ma­terials.

[Page 140] And whereas he Asserts, in the latter Part of this Head, That it is not possible to Imagine more Worlds than One.

I think the contrary may be as certainly Affirm'd, as that the World we reside in, has a natural Confinement: A Truth no less fa­cile to Thought, than 'tis easie to delineate a Circle that in any Point shall touch another, and yet leave, betwixt them, no Intervening Space that is not substantially repleted.

But this Speculation, however readily exert­ed, cannot be the proper Entertainment of the Mind; unless I imagine a Similitude of Things and Beings, Correspondent to the World in which I am: As by the diligence of Thought I might observe, in a devis'd World, the same Persons, Creatures, Trees, and Fields, with such other Objects, that had been visible to me in this. Wherefore I take liberty to think, contrary to the Opinion of this Author, That the Intellect strengthned by the Senses, is sufficiently enabled to Transport its Pro­spect to the plurality of Worlds. To avoid which Imaginative Power of the Mind, he annexes to his Idea of Matter undeterminate Extent. A Notion absolutely Inconsistent with the Nature of Substance in all its Capaci­ties; [Page 141] which cannot have an Indefinite Being: And therefore no less absurd than if suppos'd, that Matter, or Substance, could be actual­ly Infinite.

In some of his following Particulars, he be­stows many Words on the Motion of what­ever may be deem'd Matter, or Substance; but finding nothing of Consequence to ob­serve in most of them, or that occasion any considerable Remark in being Dissentaneous to what he delivers: I pass to his 25th Parti­cular, in which he Comprehends the main Fund of what he intends by Corporeal Move­ment; the Instance which he gives, is, That any one Body, or Substance, in his Sense, may be said to Move out of the Vicinity of other Bo­dies, that were contiguous to it before, and as at rest, into the Vicinity of others.

By this Definition, he proclaims an endless War in the Campains of Nature; where the opposite Commotions and Powers of Indivi­dual Bodies, endeavour to possess the natural Beings of their quiet Neighbours. From which Problem, could it be prov'd, might be deduc'd a better Disciplin'd Argument, in behalf of Exorbitant Potentates, when Mo­lesting, or Intruding into the peaceable Vici­nities, [Page 142] and Provinces of others, than has, as yet, been urg'd on their Part: Because it might be dextrously grounded on the Toleration and Conduct dispens'd, by Imperial Nature, amongst her subordinate Dominions.

This War of Nature, denounc'd by so Emi­nent a Philosophical Herald as Des-Cartes, could not but Incense many Combats in the Schools of Science: But how far prosperous there, or disallow'd, is not requisite, in this Place, to Discuss.

I shall therefore Imploy the Force of my Understanding, without being oblig'd to the Assistance of any Tribe or Scholastical Associ­ation, to attack his Arguments, where they deserve the most Emphatical Opposition.

My first Assault, on this Head, shall be a­gainst the main Fort of his New-Modell'd Fortification; where, to defend his Principles, he Exerts the Artillery of his Idea, which, according to the Level of his Notions, must batter to pieces the entire Confederacies of Na­ture; and so separate their Societies and Rooms in the Universe: That unless a more pathetical Expedient can be found than what he offers; Towns and Countries, with what­ever they contain, may as soon be Remov'd [Page 143] out of this World, and Situated in another, as one Corporeal Substance can Usurp the Province, or Being of another: Because no quantitative Matter but must, if Mov'd into the Place of any other, possess the Space that naturally appertain'd to its Existence.

And whether, could he suppose, That a Bodily Thing could Remove, that is, by any means, Expell'd, by the Motion of another Substance from its proper Appartment? Since neither his Brain, or any other Man's, can by an empty Idea so diminish the World as that any Particle of it might be conceiv'd to va­nish to Vacuity. Nor less Intolerably opposite to the Proprieties of Nature, is the Maxim he Inserts of the Translation of Material Things, into the proper Residence or Place of others.

Not that 'tis deniable, that Bodies are alte­rably Mov'd, or Chang'd by Effects of Rari­faction or Condensation, and other ordinary Methods of Nature, as to their manner of Ex­tension and Figure; but not as to the Space that Circumscrib'd their Substances; because it is Impossible for them, for Reasons before mention'd, to be naturally provided for, by any other Room, for their Existence: And thus if any Receptacle, or Vessel, be suppos'd fill'd [Page 144] with Earth, or Water, and those Materials afterwards Remov'd; the Air will as com­pleatly replenish the same Compass or Space, as if it had been fill'd by the others before.

The last Example, given by me, ought to be understood of a preternatural, or violent Motion, enforc'd by the Hand of Man, or other Accident; by which a Substance that might be precedently in its proper Sphere, or Place of Rest, is forcibly dispossess'd of its Room by some other; when Nature to pre­vent Vacuity, her main Abhorrence, supplys the Place of the Body, Irresistibly Remov'd, with another Substance: Which in her natu­ral Method is never effected by her ordinary Alterations caus'd by Generation, Corrupti­on, Rarifaction, Condensation, and the like; or by which the more Weighty Body is Ex­pell'd by the Lighter: No more possible then that the Earth, or any Part of it, should mount from its Center unto the Ambient Air above it.

Wherefore the general Maxim of Des-Cartes, by which he would Infer the Transition of Bodies into the Vicinities and-Spaces of others; is no less absurd than contradictory to the E­stablish'd Course and Laws of Nature in order [Page 145] to her Preservation of Things either as they Move or Rest: Which should [...] otherwise admit, or according to this Author, there must be a Confus'd Interruption, if not a Penetration of Bodies, Philosophically impos­sible, not only of those that surround the Earth we Inhabit, but also of the Celestial Lumi­naries that Immensely Move above our Heads; if they Revolv'd into higher or lower Vicinities and Orbs than are naturally their own.

So perplexedly Inconsistent is the Opinion of this Writer, with the Beings of whatso­ever the World contains. As Incompatible, to common Understanding is the Notion that he delivers in his 26th Particular, where he un­dertakes to prove, That there is not more Action requir'd to Motion than to Rest: Which seems, at first sight, a Paradox of a Novel Edition. But had he seriously consider'd, after the In­scribing of this Sentiment; and next had been ask'd, whether his Pen had not been more commodiously Inclos'd in his Desk, and his Hand in his Pocket, than acttually Imploy'd when he Writ this uneasie Sense? he would have clearly distinguish'd betwixt Motion and Rest; as Words that Imply their difference both in Name and Nature.

[Page 146] And 'tis some wonder, that Des-Cartes, who largely abounds with Fanciful Niceties, should have so narrow a Perception as not to discern the broad Contrariety that Interprets Motion and Rest sensibly opposite. To which pur­pose, Aristotle defines Rest as the privation of Motion in whatsoever is naturally apt to Move. Wherefore the proper tendency that Things, in Motion, have to acquiesce in their genuine Place, is render'd by some Philoso­phers, as their final Perfection: Because no­thing can be said to Move, but it does also to its utmost Power, expedite its Innate Propen­sity to be sedate in its due Station.

If a Stone falls from any considerable Height, Experience assures, that it swiftest Moves when nearest to the Earth, the Center of its Being: But of its self incapable of Active Movement when it comes to its resting Place; all which is Heterogeneous to the Doctrine of this Author, who allows to the Acquiesence of any Thing no less Motion than it had when it Mov'd.

The Instance he gives is, Because we per­swade our selves, that our Bodies, at our Will, Move and Rest, for no other Reason than that they adhere to the ground in being heavy: And [Page 147] continues to say, That our Corporeal Weight, and other Causes, not Animadverted by us, re­sisting the Motion that we would incite in our Members, effect our Fatigues or Weariness, whilst we Impute more Action, or greater Force to Insti­gate our Motion, than to cause it to Cease.

Here he creates an Idea, not unlike to the Poetical Fable of Ixion's, embracing of a Cloud instead of Juno; for what can be more obscure to sensible Conception, than to Infer, as he does, That the Body by suspending of its Motion, does as indefatigably Move as when tir'd by Action? Which is much the same as if he had undertook to prove, that 'tis possible for a Man to feel as uneasie a Movement sit­ting still as when he was weary of Walking. Nor is the Weight of the Animated Body, as to it self, or as it may be Diseas'd by Motion, the only Cause of the Appetite it has to be reliev'd or eas'd by Rest; but as Nature com­pells it, in being ponderous, to promote its lowest Acquiescence in its Immoveable Place Essentially Center'd in the Bosome of the Earth, as the Body has Room or Capacity to Descend: Nor would its Motion, till thither arriv'd, be Impedited or Fatigu'd by the La­bour of its Corporeal Parts, any more than [Page 148] a Stone, as it falls downward, can be weary of the Motion of its Substance. So totally Irresistible is the Power of Nature, that no longer appropriates either Rest, or Life, to any Individual Thing, than is necessarily con­sistent with its Place and Being.

If by her Indulgence she has Impower'd Mankind and other Animated Creatures with Corporeal Faculties and Parts, whereby they may diversly Execute their Local Movements, as her gracious Distinction and necessary En­dearments peculiarly conferr'd for the conve­nient Support and continual Subsistence of Living Individuals; 'tis contrary to the gross Allay of their Bodily Compositions. Thus the Body of Man or Animal, may Move on the Surface of the Earth, or by the extraordinary Energency of Life be exalted towards a Mountain's top, when their Corporeal Sub­stances, could they depart from the Conduct of Life, would with far more Acceleration tumble downwards.

Let a Man, of the most expert and vigorous Agility, take a Leap upwards, his Person shall come to the ground by swifter and easier Degrees than his Activity, by its utmost Force, could Ascend.

[Page 149] Wherefore 'tis no painful Action, as this Author Insinuates, by which a living Sub­stance acquires its Rest; but rather a natural and Irresistible Motion that inclines it to at­tain its proper Residence: Which proceeds from no other Cause than the Quantitative Magnitude and Weight that Imposes the Descent of every Corporeal Thing, as near as it can be promoted, to the Inferior Place of its Repose.

If a Feather falls from any Height, allow­ing for the hinderance that its Levity may receive from the Commotion of the Air; it will Descend no less proportionably to its Weight than a Lump of Lead must do if dropt from the same Altitude. And this is Mathematically certain, because no Substance, whatever, can be said to Move but as it has Commensurable Parts.

These Examples are sufficient to Totter his Arguments on the Fund he erects for them: Of which there remaineth One that he con­cludes this Head with, and in his Sense, ve­ry apposite to his purpose. I wish that I had so found it, because I love not to Dispute where it can reasonably be avoided. His Words are these,—There is as much Acti­on [Page 150] requir'd to the Removing of a Ship, that stands Still on Water any Length Forward, as it is to Move it as far Backward. From whence he would conclude, That a Corporeal Substance, in being Mov'd from and to the Place where it Rested before, is equally Active.

Who could have expected that a Notion so Counter to direct Sense should be Inscrib'd by Des-Cartes: Since 'tis not the Motion of the Ship, as he puts the Case, but the force of Hands that compells its Movement from and to the Place where it remain'd before. And therefore a pretty kind of Supposition; or if Term'd a Ridicule, the Application might well be excus'd, by which he would Intrigue his Reader to be Conceited with him, that any Corporeal Thing might Philosophi­cally Move, tho' naturally it did not Move at all.

Which perfect Contradiction, to approv'd Reason and Principles of Science, is very apparent in the Example he gives of the Ship enforc'd to Remove; which, of it self, might have stood Still; or contrarily, had it not been supported by Water, would have sunk, in being ponderous, as far downwards as it could Descend.

[Page 151] Which gives us a sound Assurance That the Proprieties of Motion and Rest, of old determin'd, will not be discompos'd by the Novel Institutions of this Author; whereby he would Change the very Grammatical Con­struction in the Words of Motion and Rest, by Converting their Significations into meer Modalities, or diversified Actions of the Thing Moving, or as it ceases to Move.

But had it been demanded of him, Whe­ther, if suppos'd he were fast-a-sleep when he Dream't of this Tenent, his Body had no less Action than as if he had Imagin'd it to be really Walking or Running? I believe he would have otherwise distinguish'd Moti­on and Rest than fancy'd, by him, in this Treatise.

Nor is the Similitude Incompatible with the Explanation he offers at the End of the Page I write of; where he tells us, That by Motion is to be understood Corporeal Transiti­on, or as he calls it Translation, out of the Vicinity of Contiguous Bodies into the next Ap­proximation of others; but not out of one Place into another: Which is allowable if apply'd to the fix'd Capacities of Nature, as poten­tially she may be Imagin'd to Circumscribe [Page 152] every Individual Substance; tho' not, in common Understanding, actually True: Be­cause no Corporeal Thing can properly Move, unless its Commensurable Place does Remove with it.

In which Sense, no Substance can be con­ceiv'd to Move into the Vicinity, as he Terms it, of another, but it must necessari­ly carry its Bodily Space and Comprehen­sion with it: No otherwise than a Man can be said to step into his Neighbour's Ground out of his own, and not Transfer with him the Inseparable Space that before Circum­scrib'd his Body; tho' the Ground, that con­tain'd his Person, could not Remove with him into his Neighbour's.

Yet nothing can be deduc'd, from any of these Instances, that Implies, That Rest and Motion are equally Active, and not Con­trarieties; or only different Modalities, ac­cording to him, of whatsoever does Move or cease its Motion.

But if his Idea of Corporeal Movement be follow'd to the Vicinity unto which he guides it; 'tis possible it might have acquie­scence there; since he undertakes not to prove, that it actually Mov'd after it came thither.

[Page 153] Other Particulars I find of his, relating to his preceeding Notions of the Motion of Bodies; and to which he has annex'd the de­lineating of a few Schemes, or Diagrams. But finding in them no Demonstrative Proof, or other concernment than what I have before Discuss'd, or Answer'd: I therefore avoid the perplexing my Reader with such obscure Di­versities, which in my Judgment, he delivers on this Subject, or as extravagantly distant from either Philosophical, or Mathematical Certainty, as Fiction is from Truth: And thus I come to his 31st Head, which I had also omitted, had I not observ'd, that he there attempts to unvail more speciously his Myste­rious Idea, than he had formerly done: The Proposition he endeavours to prove, is, That in one and the same Body there may be Innume­rable diversities of Motion.

Notwithstanding, he grants, That no In­dividual Body can be understood, to have more than one proper Motion; because, as he Affirms, it must be understood, when Moving, to recede from several Bodies resting contiguous to it: However it may participate of Innumerable Mo­tions if it be part of other Bodies that have di­versities of Motion.

[Page 154] The Example he gives, is, Of a Man walking in a Ship, having a Watch in his Pocket; the Wheels of the Watch Move but by one proper Motion, but participate of another, whilsi being Conjoyn'd to the Person that walks they compose one Part of Matter, and another as they are Ad­joyn'd to the Ship, as also to the Ship fluctuating on the Water, and likewise as it is joyn'd to the Sea, and lastly as it is so to the Earth, if the whole Earth be Mov'd.

To which, if Reply'd, That in the entrance he makes into this Particular, he starts an Ar­gument against himself; the Consequence will make it good.

For although it be true, That all Corporeals, whether Animate, or Inanimate, of ponde­rous Compositions, have a natural and direct Inclination to Move downwards; but not their sole motional Property: A Man by the Power and Faculty that enables him locally to Move, can step upwards as well as downwards; and by innumerable Actions and Motions of his Parts can abundantly vary his Postures, together with his Feet, Limbs, and Fingers: Impowr'd with useful diversities that admira­bly proceed from the Provendential Support, that is, to wonder, bestow'd on Humane Life; [Page 155] which could not without those accomplish­ments, conveniently Subsist: To which pur­pose, enough has been Inserted in my prece­dent Remarks.

But as to the other Part of this Head, where he insists, instead of other Proof, on the Ex­ample he gives of the Instrumental Movement of the Wheels of a Watch in the Pocket of a Man, as participating of the Motion of the Person, and also of the Ship: Is sufficient without troubling my Reader with other of his Instances of like signification, to terminate my Reply: Which briefly is thus,—The Argument he offers, is neither rationally, or Philosophically applicable to what he As­serts; if consider'd, That the Motion of the Parts and Wheels of the Watch are totally Artificial, and therefore cannot be naturally Contiguous to the Motion of the Man or Ship: No more than Invention attain'd by Art can be certainly deem'd the Method of Nature, that allows no participation to the Motion of Things, but as they are genuinely dispos'd and influenc'd by her proper Conduct: Which cannot be equivalently Counterfeited by Humane Artifice, no more than 'tis possi­ble for the Brain of Man to create a Fabrick [Page 156] suitable to the Structure of the World, to­gether with the Innumerable Materials and their distinct Capacities and Operations, con­tain'd by it.

A Speculation of such undeniable Excellen­cy, That had it been thought on by Des-Cartes, his Reason and Abilities in Science had other­wise dispos'd the Credit of his Pen, than to have Inserted the Incongruous Comparison by which he would Parallel, in his Sense of Motion, the Performance of Art, with the Action produc'd by Nature. Which is very different from the Epithet he gives to Motion and Rest in his 38th Paragraph, where he deter­mines, That, by the Ordainment of God, Matter together with Motion and Rest were, as to their ordinary Course, originally Constituted. From whence he concludes, That all Parts of Mate­rial Things, were primarily so dispos'd by the Will of the Almighty, as by their divers Conservations, the World's total Matter might be continually pre­serv'd by the same determin'd Method, that every of its Particulars receiv'd when first Created.

From which Immutable Decree of the Omnipotent he derives several Laws or Rules of Nature.

[Page 157] The First of which he considers as her constant Industry and Prerogative, whereby she would, as far as her Regalia's extend, unalterably continue every particular Thing in its Manner of Being: And thus, whatsoever Mov'd, should, by her In­tention, be always Mov'd. So that if any Part of Matter represented its Motion in a Square, or other suitable Figure, it would so perpetually con­tinue, did not some other Thing interrupt its Movement.

All which might be conceded, were not Nature oblig'd to dispense with, for Universal Convenience, such Alterations, in her Me­thods of Rule, that she accommodates to the frail Disposition of her Elementary Subjects; whose Distempers, unless so prevented, would be more disorderly, or confus'd.

For which Reason, she necessarily waves her Original Intention as to the permanent conti­nuance of her Subordinate Individuals; by Exercising, in a manner, against her Will, a Tyrannick Power, by which she kills some Beings, to give Life and Repose to others: Which could not otherwise have room to Exist, were the Compass of the World far greater than its conceiv'd Dimension.

[Page 158] And thus we ought to apprehend the vari­ous Effects of Motion, as also such Alterati­ons as relate to Generation and Corruption, by which Things cease to be, and others have Being. Tho' neither Motion, or any of its Concomitants, or Tendencies, here menti­on'd, can be reasonably suppos'd, according to the Opinion of this Author, to endeavour incessant Movement, did not some other in­tervening Thing put an end to their Motion by obstructing its farther progress: Which were to Affirm, That Motion were void of Design, if any Thing Mov'd regardless of its proper Residence.

If granted, That the Motion of one Thing may cause the Motion of another to cease; 'tis not to be understood as any hindrance that its natural Capacity can receive, or the Intendment it has to Arrive where it ought to remain.

It being absurd to suppose, That Motion, as it is appropriated to Material Composition, of which only we can be sensible, should be actually, or potentially Imbu'd with a perpe­tual motional Faculty; which were to allow it Indeterminate, and therefore Infinite; con­trary to the undoubted Philosophiaal Maxim, non datur Infinitum actu in rerum Natura: And [Page 159] as experimentally certain, as that a Man can­not always Run, or Walk.

The Second Law, which he Attributes to Na­ture, he thus delivers, Every Motion, of it self, is in a streight Line, and therefore whatsoever circularly Moves, always endeavours to depart from the Center of the Circle it describes.

Before I enter my Replication to this Head, which, in some respects, is very questionable; I think fit to Inform the Reader, how he does here Dissent from what he deliver'd in his 32d Particular, where he grants, That Motion may be, not seldom, exceedingly Contorted, Twisted, or Wrested; which he must intend by such a lineal Movement as might be neither Direct, or Circular. And therefore it must have such a kind of oblique Curvitude as cannot be com­prehended by the Definition of regular Curv's, or such as may be term'd Geometrically Com­mensurable; which by Learned Mathemati­cians is solely Attributed to the Circle, Pa­rabola, Hyperbola, and Ellipsis: The Reason they give is by demonstrating, That no other Curvitudes can, in every of their Points, have a due Relation to streight Lines; as it may be equally prov'd.

[Page 160] On which Mathematical Certainty is grounded their rejecting of all other Curv's, as Mechanical; because, in particular, they cannot be Geometrical by right Lines ap­plied to such Figures; and therefore not to motional Things and Parts, by Indistinct Commensurations; and such as may express their common equality.

Whosoever desires to be assur'd by Geo­metrical Delineament and Proof, to this purpose, he may Inspect the Commentary of Van-Schooten, a Dutch Mathematician, on the Geometry of this Author. In the mean time this Observation is sufficient to explain the egregious Mistake of this Writer, as to the Place before-mention'd: Where contrary to the actual Performance and Method of Na­ture, that allows to every Thing Mov'd Com­mensurable Space and Parts; he Allys the possibility of Motion to such a perverse and irregular Figure, as would render it absolutely confus'd, instead of being orderly consistent with the Certainty of Measure.

But now in the above-mention'd Se­cond Law of Nature, as he defines it, he thinks 'tis very manifest, That Motion, by its simplicity of Operation, should be con­its [Page 161] simplicity of Operation, should be con­tinu'd in a streight Line, but never in a crooked.

Which is true, if meant of such Things, that by their Inherent Proprieties of Length or Weight, Ascend, or Descend; which are always continu'd in a streight Line: But are not so in every Thing that Moves, as may be evidently perceiv'd in that admirable Provi­dence by whose Conduct the Celestial Moti­ons of the Sun and Planets have a constant Circular Revolution. Which sublime Man­ner, and excellency of Motion, is no o­therwise naturally theirs; than suitable Gravity, or Lightness, is the Cause that Things so compos'd Move upwards, or downwards.

These Examples are sufficient to refell his general Hypothesis, by which he would limit the genuine Action, of whatsoever does Move, to a direct Line; without excepting the Orbs above, That he well understood did Move otherwise.

[Page 162] To which purpose, he delineates a Diagram the same in Effect, with this that follows.

Let a Stone be suppos'd to Move by any Force, according to his Example, in a Sling, as E A Circularly Mov'd in the same instant in which it is in the Point A determin'd to Move, any whe­ther, in a Right Line towards C; so as the Right Line may be the Tangent of the Circle. It can­not be imagin'd to terminate Motionally Contorted, tho' it first comes from L to A, by a crooked Line; because nothing of that Curvitude can be under­stood to remain in it whilst it is in the Point A. But should it then be out of the Sling, it would not [Page 163] Move forward towards B, but towards C.—From whence he concludes, That whatsoever does Cir­cularly Move, would always endeavour to depart from its Center.

Here he undertakes to give Nature a Law against her natural Legalities; if not such a fictious Swing as would whisk her ordinary Operations, out of their usual Course, into the Region of Fables.

It being very Demonstrable that both Parts of the Proposition, to which this Dia­gram Relates, are erroneously Applied.

As to the First by which he would prove, That all Motion does of it self proceed in a right Line; 'tis broadly untrue, if consider'd, that 'tis no less Naturally than Mathematically Certain, That whatsoever Moves, must be progressive with the Proper Superficies and Space, in every Kinde, that appertains to its Substance: When a Man Walks does he not suitably Move to the Height, Breadth, and Depth, which, at that Instant, expos'd the Proportions of his Figure? The same may be Affirm'd of the Motion of Animate, or Una­nimated Bodies.

[Page 164] On which ground, Geometricians determine, That a Line, of it self, has no Commensurable Proportion compar'd to a Superficies; and therefore to no substantial Velocity, or Moti­on, in any Consideration; otherwise than as, betwixt two different superficies, lines may be allow'd a Relative Proportion; as in Squares, Parallelograms, and other Figures, that assi­milate in Height, and Breadth. Wherefore to Assert as he does, That by Intendment of Nature, all Corporeal Motion is comprehen­ded in a streight Line; were all one as to Affirm, that a Mathematical Line, which, by Euclid is defin'd to consist meerly of Points, that have no Parts, otherwise then suppos'd, should singly Measure a Superficies the Conti­nent of Body. Not but in a genuine Philo­sophical Sense, a Material Composition may have a direct Motion, allowing its requisite Extension, Place, and Superficies transferr'd with it, either upwards or downwards, accor­ding to the Nature of its Substance, but no other lineal Rectitude, as is already De­monstrated: Where I Instanc'd the natural Tendencies that Things Light, or Ponderous, have to their proper Stations; and therefore Inconsistent with the Example he gives in the [Page 165] Diagram of a Stone Enforc'd, by other Mate­rial Thing, or in a manner sling'd from its di­rect Movement into the obliquity of a winding Figure; which must so detain it as never to depart, or 'tis not to be doubted, that the Weight of the Stone would cause it to Move downward towards its resting Place: On which account, the Stone may be suppos'd to be taken from the Sling and flung at the Head of his Argument.

As intolerably extravagant is his other Principle, or rather Conceit that he annexes to the Law of Nature; whereby he would take it for granted, That whatsoever does circularly Move, has, in its self, an Inherent proneness to Recede from its Center: Which is totally opposite to the Supreme Perfection of Circular Motion, if compar'd with what­soever is directly Lineal: Because it is the Measure of Lineal Movement without sepa­rating its Terminations as the other does. Which is obviously evident in the Motion of a Wheel, where the Terms of its Motion are not so distinct that any one can be thought se­parated from the other. But when a weighty Thing directly Move's from a Superior Place to an Inferior, it may truly be Affirm'd, that [Page 166] the Terms, of any such direct Motion, are by their Interval and Distance considerably separated; which Separation Imports Com­position of Terms; but none to be found in Circular Movement, as is manifest by the pre­cedent Example.

Wherefore Aristotle acutely Defines the excellency of Circular Motion, by considering, that it is more Absolute, or simply Compleat, than can be Attributed to any other Figure; by reason it is more Equal, and therefore less obnoxions to Irregularity, and consequently more durable: From whence he concludes. That it was the most perfect and first of Moti­ous: As likewise a possibility of Being Eter­nal; because no Part of a Circle can be said to be its Beginning or Period; and where neither the First and Last, of any Thing, is discernible; it may be allow'd, in a manner, Eternal. To which purpose, the Poet Virgil compendiously expresses the admirable Re­volution of the Hours, Days, and Seasons of the Year, by no more Words than, In se cir­oumvolvitur Annus.

Which shews, that Circular Motion is not effected by any forcible Cause or Inclination that any Thing Mov'd can, by that means, [Page 167] be endu'd with, whereby to depart from its Center, according to the devis'd Maxim of this Author: But rather a continu'd Provi­dential and Natural Method in order to the Computation of Time, together with the Innumerable Benefits that from thence ac­crew to Mankind, with whatsoever the World Comprehends. And if otherwise reputed, 'twere as easie to believe that Providence might receive a forcible Period; or that the Sun and Planets have as natural a propensity to drop from the Orbs in which they Revolve, as the Stone might have to fall out of the Sling, in the precedent Diagram. So that the Principle which he would Entitle to the Law of Nature, does more concenter with the Tenent of a Philosophical Renegado, out­law'd by her regulr Ordainments, than could be expected from the Pen of Des-Cartes.

I endeavour'd to be as piquant, as I might be, in my Remark on this Subject, because he owns it for a main foundation on which he Erects not a few of his ensuing Discus­sions.

The Third Law that he gives to Nature, is, That any one Substance, meeting with a [Page 168] Stronger, loseth nothing of its Motion by its Occurrence to one of greater strength, but lessens its Motion by as much as it Transfers to the other.

Here he continues a perpetual War a­mongst the Subjects of Nature; and with that exorbitant violence, that he allows Vi­ctory to the Stronger on all considerations: Whereby he Interprets the ordinary Course of Things, tending to the Universal Preservation and Conduct of Nature, no other than so many Hostilities Executed by the Strong a­gainst the Weak.

If Bodies are alter'd by the movable Ef­fects of Rarifaction and Condensation, they are not so Mov'd, or Produc'd by a preter­natural and varied Violence; but rather use­fully Convey'd and Dispos'd to such Recepta­cles of Nature where their Beings were wanted, and could not be supply'd without the convenient Alterations of Material Things. The like may be said of Generation and Corruption Incident to all Elementary Com­positions.

And tho' Nature, in some Sense, may have the Artribute of Perpetuity; there can not be the same permanency allow'd to Par­ticulars within her Dominion, whereby they [Page 169] might be equally Everlasting with her self; which would level her Incessant Prerogative, in common with her Subjects, or imply the Dissolution of her superlative Dominion: Too profound to be fathom'd by the most skilful Brain of Man, or be disorder'd by any Speculation inconsistent with her Perfections: Which had this Author requisitely consider'd, he would not have enterpriz'd the Imbroyl­ing of her Rule with so many turbulent Di­versities, or Anarchical Violence, that may be Imputed to his Principles as they derogate from her operative Contrivements, and Mo­tion of Things in Reference to their due con­tinuations and apt disposure, agreeable to the Capacities of their Existence.

But notwithstanding he has frequently Catechis'd Nature according to the Model of his invented Principles, and especially, in this Place, where he attempts to enact Laws as if Confirm'd by the touch of her Scepter: As also to present his Reader with several subse­quent Rules, by which he would be under­stood to have prevented what might be Al­ledg'd against them.

All which I inpected with the clearest Eye of my Understanding, being no less desirous [Page 170] that my Pen should have been convinc'd by his, than he endeavours the Estimation of his own.

But finding, by the strictest Inquisition I could apply to his offer'd Probations, That I was led into a Wilderness of Notions, out of which no Thought of mine could give me Passage: I concluded, That it would be no small ease to my Reader, and my self, if I omitted such of his Intricate Discussions, and delineated Schemes, as might have per­plex'd the utmost Diligence of the considerate Peruser. For which I have, in some Part, his own consent; as may be seen in his 53d Particular, where he acknowledges that his precedent Rules, as to the Nature and Mo­tion of Corporeal Substances, are not easily understood. And where there is not a facili­ty of Perception, relating to the intended purpose; it can have no other Construction than Impertinent, or Trivial, or at least, not worth a labour'd Explanation.

And thus I pass to his Conclusion, where I observe, in general, That he is more confi­dent of his Premisses than was to be expected from so Ingenious a Writer.

[Page 171] In the Assertion he closes with, he delivers this Affirmation, That no other Principles are admitted by him than are both Physical and Ma­thematical Certainties; because by them not on­ly all the Phaenomena's of Nature are explain'd, but also Certain Demonstrations given from them.

If this peremptory Assurance be true; the Author of these Remarks has taken no small pains to little purpose; but if not so, the commendation he has bestow'd upon his Un­dertaking will be as little to his advantage, as the Indulgent Applause, usually is, that Men Attribute to their peculiar Wit or Science: To which I might Reply, without disrespect­ing this Author, or the Modesty that becomes my Pen, That I am not more in the Right than he is in the Wrong, wheresoever I have differ'd from him, either on the Philosophi­cal or Mathematical Account: As in refe­rence to both, I may, without Ostentation, Aver, That his Idea's, Propositions and Allega­tions, as they are tax'd by me; are rather Im­probabilities, if not fictitiously introduc'd by him than naturally Ally'd to Proof or the Be­ing of Things.

[Page 172] For tho' Mathematical Operations cannot be Refin'dly Contemplated, but as they have an Immaterial, or Spiritual Eminency re­lating to the proportionable Dimensions which they unerrably give to whatsoever may be regularly Defin'd of substantial Ex­istence: Yet by a distinct Excellence, par­take not at all of Matter howsoever Com­mensurated by them. And thus may a Pro­position in Euclid be prov'd, if only, in Thought, delineated: But when apply'd to any Material Being, the Substance unto which it Relates, must as really, and in the same manner Exist, as is suitable to the Certainty of its Demonstration.

But not to be so understood by the Do­ctrine of Des-Cartes, who sets Nature at Work as he fancy's her Operations. Inso­much that a Substance cannot directly Move towards its proper Place of Being, but he conceives it more or less obstructed by some other Body, or whirl'd in a Line, of a diffe­rent Denomination, to another Point of the Compass, or not to be Imagin'd whether: Much of the same Similitude with the Figure of the Stone in the Sling, as it is inserted in the preceding Diagram.

[Page 173] All which exorbitant Modalities and Mo­tions of Things, as he supposes them to Act as they are either Hard, Flexible, Con­dens'd, or Fluid; are rather singular Fictions, or forcible Contrarieties, Complicated by his Brain, than concentring with the prone Faci­lity of Natural Operations: Absolutely In­consistent, by a Philosophical Maxim, with the prodigious and continual Violence im­pos'd on Causes and Effects; as by this Author is devis'd the Conduct of Nature. Yet after all, he is no less confident than to Affirm, that his Philosophical Hypothesis is Mathematically Certain in every Considera­tion: Which, without other rebuke to the Phrase of his Boasting, is as far from being prov'd by Rules of Science, as Fiction may be from undoubted Truth: Or as if he had undertook to have delineated, out of Euclid, a Coat for the Moon, that should have demonstrably fitted her Figure in every Change of her Appearance.

If I have dealt freely with Des-Cartes where his Notions and Proofs were questionable; 'tis agreeable to his Example, who spares no Author where he thought him Taxable. [Page 174] Tho' I have been favourable in not extend­ing my Exceptions so far as I might have taken occasion: Which I hope the Reader will excuse, or think himself oblig'd; be­cause I Entertain'd him with no more Words than I thought sufficient to give a Period to my Remarks on the Second Part of the Phi­losophy of Des-Cartes.

IF admirable, even to extasie of Thought, by what manner of natural Operation, or superlative Act of Providence, the Humane Composition, in Soul and Bo­dy, was Originally produc'd to that transcen­dent Degree, That his Intellectual Faculty, by lineal Descent and Right, continues him an absolute Monarch of Understanding, in [Page 176] Reference to the Government of himself and other Creatures: 'Tis highly incumbent on Man, to be not only gratefully conside­rate of his being such; but also to acknow­ledge his utmost Celebration of the Supreme Cause of his wonderful Existence. Which mighty Consideration ought to transport the Prospect of Thought far beyond the Excel­lency conferr'd on Mankind in Soul and Person: Which can be but narrowly com­par'd with the vast complex of the Universal World and the Innumerable Wonders sur­rounded by it.

Wherefore, if the best Inspection made by the Humane Intellect, in Contemplating the manner of its rational Being, be pos'd, by its own Riddle, above its Power to unfold: How stupendiously must then be Involv'd the most elaborate Attempt of Man's Under­standing; when to the peculiar Wonder that is Exerted from his own Existence, he adds the Innumerable Miracles conspicuously visi­ble in the Structure of the Universe? And what is yet more Transcendent, the admira­ble Author of what we are, and all we behold, seems Envelop'd, from the Eye, by his won­derful Fabrick and Works.

[Page 177] If the Learned Des-Cartes, in the beginning of this Treatise, seems not a little fond of his own Applause, by signifying to his Rea­der, That he has Invented certain Principles, by which, he conceives, That Nature is unveil'd in her, as yet, unknown Recesses: He is far more modest, in his subsequent Expressions, where he bows the Knee of his Philosophy to the Infinite Power, Amplitude, and Beauty, of the Works of the Almighty: Concluding withall, That it is highly requisite to avoid all such confident Ima­ginations, whereby we might undertake, by un­certain Suppositions, to limit Omnipotent Power, or Abstract in any Kind, from its Incomprehensible Performance.

This Conclusion I submit to, but cannot approve the confidence of his Introduction contain'd in the Entrance he makes into this Paragraph; as the Reader may perceive by the Remarks I have made on his First and Se­cond Treatise; where, I presume, I have effectually demonstrated, That his Principles could not have an entire Birth-right from the Womb of Nature: Which, in substance, he does acknowledge by the Advice he gives, before he ends this Page, That we ought not to believe, That, by Divine Determination, the World [Page 178] was Created meerly for our sakes; or that it is possible, by any Thought of ours, to apprehend the End for which it was Ordain'd: Adding this Reason, That many Things are now in Being, and heretofore, that were never seen or understood by Man, or any Use they could yield to him.

In his 4th Particular of this Third Part of his Philosophy, he confidently assures us, That his Principles are so vast, and fruitful, that they not only Imply many more than are to be perceiv'd in the World we behold; but al­so far more numerous than we can Imagine: To which purpose, he begins, in his Method, with the Phaenomena, or the main natural ap­pearances; the Causes of which he commits to his subsequent Investigations, or as, he intends them, Proofs of such Effects as he, in this Place mentions.

And next; he pertinently Rebukes the too common Ignorance of such that by their ocu­lar simplicity erroneously judge, that the Sun and Moon, as they seem to appear, are there­fore much bigger than other Stars. Which vul­gar Mistake is easily prevented by duely appre­hending the Distance of the Sun and Moon from the Earth, and comparing of their Diame­ters [Page 179] as they are now observ'd; to all which I fully agree.

Wherefore to recount how far remote the more than wonderful Celestial Luminaries are from our Earthly Habitation; I will not dispute the Computation, he delivers, by opposing against his Account, the Elder Observations of Learned Astronomers: But rather so to compare Ancient and Modern Calculations, as thence may be apprehended the Indefatigable Endeavour and Industry of Men to render a sublime Account of the won­derful Height, Figure, Beings, and Motions, that, to the amazement of our Eyes, continue their shining Bounties innumerably influenc'd for the Support of Humane Life, with what­soever subsists within the Compass of the World: Which universal and admir'd Mu­nificence, being highly consider'd by Persons famously Erudite, both in past and latter Times, exalted the Ambition and Gratitude of their Science to be as far, as was possible for them, requisitely Intelligent of the conspicu­ous Embellishments of the Skies; that they might be, from thence, the more Supreme­ly sensible of the Blessings they receiv'd from Above.

[Page 180] But whilst in this Transcendent Inquisition of Thought, they Imploy'd the best of their Skill and Diligence, 'twas soon found too di­stinctly Excellent to be exactly Computed, howsoever they vary'd the Schemes of their Hypothesis: As not being able by Art, Con­ception of the Mind, or any Instrumental Assistance, tho' proper for Commensuration of Things familiarly near to our Eyes and Senses, to reach, suitable to common Certain­ty, the most Approximate top of the Spheres of Heaven.

The distance of the fix'd Stars are allow'd by exquisite Astronomers, as also by this Au­thor, to be too Immensely remote for any accountable Measure that can be given of them. And therefore I shall only take notice of the Sun and Planets, together with their Magnitudes, and Distance from the Earth; but as to their Distance from us, because it is usually by Astronomers accounted by Dia­meters, or Semidiameters, of the Earth, yet seldom declar'd by them, the Sum of their Measures as they may be applyed to Leagues, Miles, or the like: I think fit for the advan­tage of the Reader, to Impart how much in English Miles, as the most useful Computati­on, [Page 181] a Diameter of the Earth does amount to. Which I prov'd by this Method; it ha­ving been Experimented by Judicious Obser­vators, That one Degree of a great Circle above, correspondent to the Superficies of the Earth, Answers to a direct Journey of 73 Miles, which multiplied by 360 Degrees, al­low'd to the orbicular Form, or Circle of the Earth, the Summ will be 26280 Miles for the total Compass of the Earth: And because the proportion of the Diameter of a Circle to its Circumference is, by approv'd Mathe­maticians, accounted as 7 is, very near to 22: According to which Method I computed a Diameter of the Earth to contain about 8327 Miles; and her Semidiameter somewhat more than 4163 Miles.

To apply which to Ancient Astronomical Observations, or such of the accurate Arabians, mention'd by Learned Gassendus, as observ'd suitable to the Ptolemaick Principles, they are thus Inserted according to the Mediocrity of each Planet's Distance from us.

[Page 182]

After these, the most signal Astronomer was Nicholas Copernicus, a Canon of Torunense, who liv'd about 190 Years past: Some of whose Observations, as I read, were made at Frueburg in Prussia in the Year 1525, where the Elevation of the North Pole is 54 Deg. 19^m: He was a Man of vast Inge­nuity, however questionable his Hypothesis of the Motion of the Earth; but if apply'd to the Sun instead of the Earth, there is no bet­ter Astronomical System, and so approv'd, by the Learned at this Day. Nothing Remaka­ble is found in him as to the Magnitude and Distance of the fix'd Stars, more than that the Earth was as a Point if compar'd with the great Orb above; judiciously conceiving them too Remote for his applying to them any certain Rule or Demonstration where­by to compute their mighty Distance: Of the Planets, he chiefly regarded the Sun [Page 183] and Moon; defining the Sun to be 3240 times bigger than the Earth; and the Moon no less than 860 greater, in which Computa­tions he doubtless Err'd, as may be seen by the following Examples; but most egregi­ously mistaken in the Account he gives of the Moon; she being certainly discern'd much less than the Earth ever since the approv'd In­vention and Use of the Telescope:

His next famous Astronomical Successor was Tycho-Brahe, a Noble Man of Denmark; who is said to have been learnedly Accom­plish'd, as also furnish'd by his large Expence, with abundance of Instruments excellently proper for his great Undertaking: Where­fore the Computations he mentions are highly esteem'd at this Day.

The Observations he made of the Distance, and Magnitude of the Planets, are these according to their Mean, or Mediocrity of Distance.

[Page 184] Whosoever is desirous to Convert the Planetary Semidiameters into English Miles, may readily perform it by the preceding Example.

The Magnitude of the Planets compar'd to the bigness of the Earth, are these that follow,

By these disagreeable Computations, of so many eminent Persons, may well be discern'd how far beyond, the reach of Science, are the shining Wonders above our Heads: Not more Impossible to be exactly Compu­ted, than if a Man should undertake to touch the Center of a Star with the end of his Fin­ger; or to extend a Line, by any prospect of Art, to the nearest Verge of boundless Om­nipotence.

Nor is it in the Power of Geometry in many Cases, tho' more clearly demonstrative than other Sciences, to express its due signifi­cation [Page 185] and Extent by numerical Computations, as is evident by abundant Theorems: Of which, these may be thus signally Inserted.

In a Square, or right Angled Parallelogram, the Diagonal that, in either of those Figures, is drawn from one Point of its Termination to another, is potentially equal, in such Delinea­ments, to any two Sides that include the right Angle; as may be Demonstrated, by these Ex­amples, grounded on the 47th Proposition of

the First Book of Euclid, from whence it is prov'd, That the Square of B D, in either of the Figures, is equal to one half of the Figure to which it appertains: So that the Square of the Line B D, in both of them, is equal to the half of 16 which is 8: Tho' there be no such Square Number as 8, or any true Square Root to be given of it; but instead thereof such an Irrational Root as is 2, with a large decimal Fraction Annex'd thereto.

[Page 186] The like might be Affirm'd of a Line di­vided according to the 11th of the 2d Book of Euclid, by extreme and mean Proportion, so that the Square of the greater Segment may be equal to the Product of the whole Line and lesser Segment: Which may be lineally Demonstrated, tho' incapable of being Equall'd by any numerical Summ, or the lite­ral Powers of Algebraical Equations: Which admirable Dignity of Lines, caus'd incompa­rable oughtred to Entitle the latter Proposition, almost Divine; and as much is here prov'd in commendation of the Precedent.

These Instances I think sufficient to express the excellency of Geometry; and withal of such occasional Importance, in reference to my Remarks on some Passages of this Author, that it Incites me to apply, according to the nearest Epithet and Derivative of the verbal Name of Geometry; its most undoubted, and perfect Use, to the dimension of a plain Superficies: Which, in the Sense of the great and wise Philosopher Socrates, in whose cele­brated School the admir'd Euclid was said to Instruct, is surest imploy'd on such Supputati­ons that have convenient Extents and Periods on the Ground we tread, and possess; and [Page 187] therefore more sensibly Computed, by the familiar Measure that may be taken from our Steps and Paces, when any Portions of Land are, by that Method, to be dispos'd or ac­counted. But no such lineal Certainty, was ever Invented, that could so elevate the Side of a Triangle, that it might undoubtedly a­scend to a Celestial Superficies, or Angles to be taken from above, by any Instrumental Perfection, whereby the Geometrical Propor­tions, of its other Sides might be duely re­solv'd. All which may be undeniably con­cluded by whomsoever shall Inspect the Plane­tary Magnitudes, and Distance from us; as I have before Inscrib'd them out of the diffe­rent Records of famous Astronomers: From whence it may be evidently Asserted, That no Geometry, or Science of theirs, could de­monstrate their Systems, or Astronomical Calculations. Notwithstanding, 'tis Ordain'd by the Almighty in Power and Conduct, that the Sun, in giving comfortable Light to our Eyes and Splendor to our Days, should be more Certain in Motion, and usefully com­putable, by never progressing from his Ecli­ptick Line, than any other of the Celestial Luminaries. And thus by the Prince of Stars, [Page 188] the Sun, are the Accounts of Time and sea­sonable Blessings of the Year continually di­spens'd.

Which is Emphatically express'd by Ovid, in the Second Book of his Metamorphosis, in these Verses.

But 'tis to be noted, That although the Sun, by the Munificence of Heaven, is the refulgent means whereby the Solemnities of Time are distinguish'd, and celebrated by us: Yet no such absolute exactness, tending to the Measures of his sublime Motion, can be computed by us, as may render his just Place, or Movement equal to his Revolution in his mighty Orb, Term'd by Astronomers the dif­ference betwixt his mean and apparent Moti­on: Which proceeds from his slower Pro­gress [Page 189] in one Semicircle of his Annual Course than in the other; or because his proper Journey in the six Northern Signs of the Eccliptick is somewhat longer, before dis­patch'd, than in the Southern; which is a certain Proof, that the Center of his Excen­tricity is different from the Center of the World.

But no such Incongruity has ever been observ'd betwixt the due Motion of the Sun, and that which appears to us, as renders it Insufficient for the convenient Use of the Dial, Hour-glass, or Clock: Which ought to be signally consider'd, as a peculiar Benefit of uncomputable Providence, that permits us not to Err, where we can give no exact Ac­count, in the necessary Computation, even by ordinary Means, of our Hours, by Day and Night.

He were much to blame that instead of being pertinently satisfied with the Extent of Science in Things of nearest concernment, or because the Sun, so far as is requisite for him to understand, Illuminates his Time; would therefore Judge, to the grievance of his Brain, That he could as approximately compute the Arithmetical Distance of the [Page 190] Orb of Light, from any Part of the Super­ficies of the Earth, as by a Quadrant he could find the Sun's Horizontal Exaltation or Hour of the Day: Tho' Experience assures, that the most transcendent Skill has been variously frustrated in the Attempt; as may be perceiv'd by Examples in this Treatise, by me Inserted. Wherefore the sublimest Admiration of the far distant Wonders above us, is more cer­tainly our Duty than any Task that can be given to Science, by which Men would reckon the remote Distance of the Neighbourhood of Heaven. But notwithstanding these dis­couragements, it may be allow'd commenda­ble in such, That by the Eruditeness of their Skill would Ascend to the most compleat and nearest Admiration of Things, no less obvious than perspicuously visible, as a welcome Dis­covery to all Mankind.

These considerable Particulars I thought fit to mention, as a proper Parenthesis, before my return to Des-Cartes; whom I find, as if somewhat deterr'd by the Mistakes of others, to offer his uncertain Computation; and which he only Applies to the Distance of the Moon and Sun, from the Earth. Which converted into Miles by the Rule before given: The [Page 191] Moon's Distance from the Earth is 249810 Miles. And the Sun's Distance, by taking a mean pro­portional Number betwixt 600 and 700 Dia­meters, because he Inserts no certain Number; I conceive to be nearest the Truth of what he intends: Which mean Proportional is very near 648, which multiplying 8327, the Earth's Diameter in Miles, as before found, the Distance of the Sun from the Earth is 5315896 English Miles. Which Distances, according to this Au­thor, Relate to the Copernican System of the Earth's Motion: The Truth of which Hypo­thesis will be effectually question'd by what succeeds.

But these Distances, if true, and compar'd with the appearing Diameters of the Sun and Moon, as they may be perceiv'd by the Te­lescope, will prove the Sun much greater than the Earth, and the Moon much lesser: And so they were found by the Observations of Tycho, precedently Inscrib'd.

The Distance of the Five other Planets, from the Sun, as they relate to the before­mention'd System, he thus accounts: Mercu­ry above 200 Diameters of the Earth, Venus a­bove 400; Mars 900, or 1000; Jupiter above 3000; Saturn 5, or 6000 Diameters of the [Page 192] Earth, distant from her. The Copernican Hypo­thesis is so much the same with his; and so frequently Inscrib'd in Almanacks, that I shall desire my Reader rather to Inspect any one of them there, than to trouble my self with delineating of a Diagram, to so thread bare a Purpose here.

The difference that he allows the Stars, not only as some of them are greater than others, but as the Planets receive their Illuminations com­municated to them by the Light of the Sun; Concenters with the general Opinion of all Astronomers.

Nor will I directly oppose the Imagination he Annexes, by which he Attributes to every of the fix'd Stars, a particular Fountain of Light; and as distant from the Sun, as the Sun is from us: Concluding, That were we Situated as near the six'd Stars as we are to the Sun, we might observe any one of their Magnitudes as much Illuminated as the Sun appears to our Sight.

On which ground, 'tis possible he may be, tho' but in Conceit, as much in the right, as any certain Argument, or Proof that can be urg'd to the contrary; by reason of the won­derful appearance, and immense remoteness of the fix'd Stars from us. Notwithstanding [Page 193] that the famous Tycho, as far as his accurase Observation could elevate his Computation, determines in general, that the fix'd Stars are not nearer the Earth than 13000 of her Semidiameters.

But in the 11th and 12th Particulars of this Treatise, this Author delivers a more unparal­lel'd Paradox than ever was Imputed to a Learned Pen: The First is, That the Earth, tho' a very opacous Body, is as perfectly enlightned by the Beams of the Sun, as the Moon; wherefore he conceives the Earth to be also a Planet: And why might he not have Affirm'd the same of Glass, Iron, or any other solid Substance? since we are assur'd by common Experience, That every one of these are not only capable of being Illuminated by the Sun, but will also have their Shadows: So that according to his Opinion, any gross opacous Matter may be estimated on a shining Day, no less a Madam, in Composition and Feature, than the Moon or Planet Venus.

It seems he forgot that these Stars continue their Light, whilst the Earth has not Sun-Light longer than the Sun shines on her. But why he so cheaply compares the Dominion of the bright Queen of Night, with the dull Earthly [Page 194] Lamp, on which we Inhabit, I connot guess; un­less by some one of those, which he calls distinct, and unerrable Ideas, he imagin'd, That his Per­son was elevated to a Market in the Moon, and there observ'd some Utensils, in a Ihon of all Trades-Shop, marvellously reflecting the Illuminations and Beams of the Sun: And surely he might as well allow the possi­bility of these Examples, with whatsoever be­sides has Being on Earth, as perfectly Existing in the Moon: Since by his Tenent; a very capacious World may be thought encompass'd by Her.

His other egregious Mistake depends on the Former, which is, That he fancies, that the Earth performs the Part of the Sun, by Illuminating the Face of the Moon, beheld by us, when she is in her New Estate, or Con­junction with him.

Which Notion is very false, both in a Phi­losophical and Astronomical Consideration: Nothing being more unnatural, than to At­tribute Planetary Light, either Communicable, or Inherent, to the unrefin'd Body of the Earth; which can be no otherwise under­stood, by reason that there is no such Thing as a pure Element of Earth; but rather its [Page 195] Substance grosly Commixt and Corrupted, by the Intercourse of the other Elements: And thus Air, Earth, Fire, and Water; as Use and Observation assure us, are impurely mixt. And should the Earth, as she does, and must necessarily so Subsist, receive Light or Flame from the Sun, in common with the Planets: Her corrupt Frame and combustible Materials would have been long ago totally burning; to the utter dissolution of the Figure and Composition that she now possesses: However Antecedent to the Opinion, of some Learned Divines, that defers her Conflagration to the Day of Judgment.

And this might have been effected with as much Facility, as a Burning-glass kindles a Pipe of Tobacco: Especially if granted, the Earth a Planet, according to this Author, and always Moving; because Motion where it is sufficiently continu'd, Inflames every Thing that is materially capable to be set on fire; as is visible in the Axletree of a Waggon caus'd by the Movement of the Wheel that round it turns.

The like might be determin'd in reference to the Moon, and other Motional Stars; if their Compositions were Elementarily min­gled: [Page 196] But their Substance is more Sublime, and Excellent; if not superlative to any De­finition that can be given of their Nature and Manner of Existence: As I doubt not is Emphatically prov'd by my Remarks on the 21th Particular of the Second Part of this Author's Philosophical Treatise: To which I refer the Reader.

And whereas he would confirm his Asser­tion, by pretending, That the Earth Illuminates, some part of the Moon, when she is in Con­junction with the Sun: 'Tis no less diametri­cally opposite to what we behold, in that State of the Moon, than it is to Astrono­mical Certainty; and why might not the Moon as well receive Light from the Earth, according to his Doctrine, when at her Full she is sometimes so Eclipsically opposite to the Sun, as twice a-Year he passes by the Nodes, or is near unto them, call'd the Dragon's Head and Tail, that she appears totally Darken'd? Which can be no otherwise caus'd, than as the Earth is betwixt her and the Sun: But could she then receive any glimpse, or sign of Light from the Earth, it would be as discernible as at any other Time: Which enough Confirms, That the Earth is no Lu­minary [Page 197] Planet, and therefore none at All; as will be prov'd by what is to come.

In the mean time, 'tis not improper, on this Occasion, to Explain the Phases, or Fi­gure of the Moon, especially when in Con­junction with the Sun; which, without the trouble of a Diagram, may be thus readily Express'd.

'Tis not to be doubted, That the Moon, as she moves round the Earth, has always one half of her Illuminated by the Sun; but not so as that half is always visible to us: Tho' sometimes more, or less, or nothing of her Enlightned Half appearing towards us; by reason, that as so many Semicircles, or as it were Semiglobes of the Moon's Compass, are turn'd to the Eye, or Earth; they cannot, considering their Curvitures, be discern'd, in Plain, by the Eye. And this differently hap­pens, as the Light of the Sun to Sight, may be obstructed by the Convex, or Mountainous Part of the Earth; or by the Intervening of Aerial, Vapours which cause the Face of the Moon, that is turn'd towards us, to be Re­presented more Dark and spotted, than o­therwise, she would appear. Which several Phases, or Figures, observable in every State, [Page 198] or Age of the Moon, almost never the same; proceed from no other Cause, than the di­versity and swiftness of her Motion, far ex­ceeding all other Stars; as is well known to Astronomers.

Whence it is, that after her Monthly Change and Renovation of her Figure, she sooner or later Describes, as it were, a Glimpse of Light in a small Arch of her Circumference: And suitably encreas'd and varied, according as the Diversities of her Motions, and other accidental Occurrences, permit her to be be­held by us.

Which Manner of Appearance, in the bloome of her Light, does sufficiently demonstrate, That her Figure and Motion are Orbicular, and not Elliptical; as some of the Copernicans, or Cartesians, too confidently Determine.

The next Application of my Pen shall be in fitting my Observations to such Particu­lars, as suitable to the main Intention of my Discussions, ought to be most considerably Inspected, either as orderly Examin'd, or as I find them dispers'd in his Treatise; omit­ting such Things as are either Inconsiderable in themselves, or not to be repeated, because formerly Answer'd by me.

[Page 199] Of which the First requires a Supreme Mention, as it egregiously directs the Pro­spect of the Humane Intellect to the con­templating of the resplendent Fountain of Light, diffus'd by the Sun; by whose mu­nificent Beams our Days are Bless'd; and the Moon and Stars, the wonderful Torches of Night, kindled for the direction of our Eyes.

How difficult is it therefore to conceive the remote Nature or Being of so Transcen­dent a Miracle notwithstanding that we re­ceive its commodious Benefits, as they grow with our Hours? Which shews how far, be­yond the reach of our Understandings we are made happy from Above. On which account I cannot but admire the cursory De­finition that is deliver'd by Des-Cartes, by which he would Attribute to the Sun an Epi­thet not more Refin'd, than what may be signi­fied by his general Notion of a flaming Sub­stance: But grants, as he cannot do other­wise, That the Sun does not Inflame in resem­blance to Fire we use: If it did; our Earthly Habitations and Subsistence would be con­sum'd to Ashes.

[Page 200] But, notwithstanding, the Word Flame, as he Inserts it, is not allowable, because we cannot be sensible of any Thing that flames, but we must also apprehend, that it has a burning Capacity: And so we under­stand the Flame that proceeds from Lightning that bursts thorough Clouds with Thunder. But no such kind of violent Heat or Burning can have Emanation with the Innumerable Raies or Beams of the Sun. There are divers Things that may be said to have Heat, and yet no Flame: As the Warmth that a Man feels, or resides in the Temper of his Body: And thus Heat may be properly term'd a Cor­poreal Quality; as also, that it may be com­municated from one Material Being to ano­ther: But in the Sun there can be neither Flame, or Heat, diffus'd from his Substance; which is very evident in Mountanous Situations, that, however high they Extend, and there­fore nearer to the Sun, are far Colder than Inferior Regions: Which could not, be if the Substance of the Sun were naturally Hot, or a Flame, in any kind, as defin'd by this Author.

Against whom the general Opinion of most approv'd Philosophers is fully oppos'd [Page 201] by denying, That the Elementary Qualities of Heat, Cold, Moisture and Dryness, are either Inherent or directly proceeding from the pureness of Light transmitted from the Sun and Stars: As also that Experience assures us, That sometimes, when the Night is abundantly enlighten'd by the Moon and Stars, their Nocturnal Motions account colder Hours than if the Night had been Dark and Cloud­ed. And comparatively the same may be not seldom observ'd in a shining Day, when the Aerial Cold is not at all profligated by the Splendors of the Sun; but rather conti­nues more frigid than if his Diary of Hours had, for that time, Revolv'd in a Mist.

How then does it come to pass, that the Sun and Stars, which only dispense their Illumi­nations to the Day and Night, and refinedly Existing above whatsoever Purity that can be suppos'd most Excellent in Elementary Com­positions; should notwithstanding be conceiv'd to Influence such Qualities, or other Sub­stances, which they have not in their own?

The best Account given by the Erudite in Philosophical Science is, That the shining Ra­diations of the Sun and Stars by their Moti­on, together with such Parts of the Air and [Page 202] other Bodies most contiguous to their Revo­lutions, and the commixture of Celestial Beams convey'd, do operate in a wonderful Method, on inferior Substances, which is the soundest Reason, that they can render, or cause of the Variations of Heat, Cold, Moi­sture and Dryness, that as so many accidental Effects, and admirable Operations, are bene­ficially dispos'd from above.

On which stupendious Consideration, the safest Determination should be rather sublime­ly to admire, than to Define the miraculous shining of the Stars and Sun; or Term their Illuminated Substance, according to the Te­nent of Des-Cartes, no other than may be liken'd to a Flame produc'd by Fire: Nothing being more unadvisably Rash, than to be inquisitive of such Existencies, Causes and Effects, that, by the Conduct of Heaven, are con­ceal'd from us.

His other Mistake, and I presume so to name it, is, That he Affirms the Sun as absolute­ly fix'd to a Point, in his Orb, as the Stars are in the Firmament above him: By which deter­mination he takes from the Sun the Glory of his Ecliptick, or Annual Progression. And as to his Substance, and Manner of Being, he [Page 203] defines it no other than very fluidly Compos'd and Moveable; as also perpetually Discipated and extinguish'd by some circumjacent Matter: But so as when any Part is dispers'd or extinguish'd, the Sun is immediately replenish'd with other: And I conceive he would be thought to Ima­gine the same manner of Existence relating to the Number of Stars and Planets. But as to the Term of Fluid, which he apply's to the Substance of the Sun; it can neither in a Grammatical, or Philosophical Sense, be other­wise Conster'd than as the Word is appropri­ated to some moist, or wet Matter that Moves with a feeble Current: And thus as he states the Case, something is always sliding into the Sun, whilst as much slips from his Substance.

But could he judge, or any Man for him, That the Alteration he mentions in the Sun, might not too nearly resemble, or be proper­ly Interpreted an Elementary Change, in as mean a Source as concurs with Corporeal Al­terations familiaar with us: It being impos­sible so to distinguish the Supplement, or Di­minution of any Material Thing, that it may not have a Natural Tendency to Generation, or Corruption; which must be Imply'd, as [Page 204] the Proprieties of Substance, wheresoever it is alterably varied in Proportion or Fi­gure.

The fix'd Stars he grants, more Immensely di­stant from us than can be probably Computed; and I believe he is in the right. But I think he may be as much in the wrong by his Inven­ting of so many separate Orbits, Motions, and Distances, upwards and downwards, from one another; as by Imagination he has remov'd some Thousands of Stars from the Constella­tions to which all Former Astronomers de­termin'd them fix'd: As also, by defining of them no other, to whomsoever will accept his Hypothesis, than in Grandeur and Refulgency e­qual to the Sun, were they as near our Eyes; but wherever they are, he continues them fa­sten [...]d to their single Circumferences in the same manner as he allows the Sun: So that, accor­ding to his Opinion, had we longer Opticks, we might behold every one of them, in a separate Sphere, as fully Conspicuous as the Days bright Phoebus. But after all, he offers not so much as a plain Triangle to prove his Conceit.

Some Schemes he has rais'd in which he so confusedly Represents, and as it were Embroi­ders [Page 205] the above-mention'd Spheres of Stars; and by so many Obliquities and Figurative windings, together with their Curvitures on all sides, up­wards, and downwards, that there cannot be discern'd, amongst them, one Section of a Cone, or conical Figure, that can be Geome­trically describ'd.

The Substance of the Heavens, as also their Vicinities, he calls Fluid; into which he Infu­ses abundance of liquid Matter, that may be compar'd to a Whirl-pool, and these he deno­minates Vortices: And next, lets go, amongst them, as he finds occasion, such deminutive Substances, which he Terms Moving Globuli; or rather swimming Spawns of Matter, much of fictitional Resemblance to the devis'd Atoms of Epicurus.

By these Things, fancifully Imploy'd, he undertakes to Revolve all the Motional Stars, to­gether with the Earth, which he takes for a Co­pernican Planet, instead of the Sun, that he exempts from Motion whether Diurnal or An­nual.

His Diagrams, to this extravagant pur­pose, I leave to the Inspection of the Rea­der, as they are to be found in his Book; be­ing not desirous to Cumber mine, or punish [Page 206] my Brain and Fingers, by copying of such of his Draughts that I conceive are Improperly Applyed.

The main concern that I shall chiefly insist on, shall be the Plea that he makes for the Mo­tion of the Earth instead of the Sun; which I shall question, before a very Supreme Tribu­nal, as he ought to be Philosophically and Mathematically accountable.

That the Earth is Globulous, or naturally Round by the Coition and Knitting of its Parts to its Center; is also Astronomically prov'd, because to such as directly Travel to­wards the North or South Points of the Meri­dian, the Pole appears either more or less Elevated or Depress'd: Moreover that going farther Eastward, or Westward, the Eye may behold some Stars Rise sooner, or Set later than others. To which may be added, that the Moon, the more Easterly Eclips'd, is, by her proper Motion, as it were backward from West to East, more Hours from the Meridiam, or Midnight, than Westerly Eclips'd.

By the Globe of the Earth is comprehen­sively meant, as Cosmographers Determine, its being surrounded, or being continu'd with [Page 207] the Orbicular Superficies of Water, as its Parts appertain to one and the same Center with the Earth: To which may be added the common Experience of Navigators, who Sailing from a Port discern the Convex Su­perficies of the Water above the Land.

That the Earth is plac'd in the Center of the World is Philosophically prov'd; be­cause whatsoever is ponderous, within the Compass of the Universe, naturally tends downwards, or which is all one, to the Cen­ter of the Earth; from whence should she Ascend 'twere no less than to Recede from her Center, on which she is pois'd by her own Weight, in Moving upwards; all which were absurdly Impossible.

By undoubted Astronomical Observations 'tis certainly prov'd, that the Earth is the Cen­ter of the Universe: Otherwise the World could not be divided into two Hemispheres; because neither more nor less than six Signs of the Zodiack, above the Earth, are at any time visible: As also, that the Moon could not be Eclips'd in Diametrical opposition to the Sun, if the Earth did not Intervene.

And tho' the Globe of the Earth does Cir­cumferentially contain near 26280 English [Page 208] Miles; it is but, as it were, a Point if com­par'd to the Firmament, or Orb of the Sun, above: To which may be added the obvious Observation Demonstrated by the Hour-Lines of every Dial; from whence it is very perceivable, that the Shadow Moves no less Regularly, about such Centers, than it sur­rounds the Center of the Earth.

Nor could any Artist, for the Use of his Profession, raise a direct Perpendicular apply'd to any Height, or Level; if his Hand, Line and Plummet, were rapidly Revolv'd by the Motion of the Earth: Which must, by its swift Acceleration, were there Truth in the Co­pernican Hypothesis, Move, according to Learned Computation, at least 1111 of our Miles in one Minute of an Hour: A Revo­lution far more allowable to the Sun, as his Substance is defin'd, in a manner Spiritual, by erudite Authority, than to the heaviest of Bodies, the Earth. Some undertake to al­ledge, That the Motive was, because that by his System he avoided some Epicycles and Circles that had been with greater difficulty us'd by Ptolemy: Which may be allow'd on that Consideration, or as, mutatis mutandis, Astronomers at this Day apply his Theory to the Sun instead of the Earth.

[Page 209] And if Affirm'd, as the Copernicans usually argue, That extraordinary Motion ought ra­ther to be Conceded to the Earth than the Sun, by reason that the Earth is so very small, if compar'd to the vast Dimension of the other: The Answer is, That a swift Horse will sooner dispatch a long Journey, before an Ant can go a Yard.

Whosoever would adhere, notwithstanding the convincing Allegations here mention'd, to the Copernican, or Cartesian System; might find his Opinion Ridicul'd by very young Experience: Insomuch that the Boy, who found the Roost or Nest of a Bird this Minute, might seek it, if he could, above a Thousand Miles at the next. Nor could the Bird find, by the swiftness of its Wing, when the Earth rapidly mov'd Eastward, better then the Boy, its Roost, or Nest; as it design'd to fly to­wards either Westward. And doubtless the Brain of the Boy, and Bird, might be giddily discompos'd by the hasty Progression of the Earth, which could not but totter every Thing that belong'd to her Surface: And much more easily Imagin'd, that Men had their Heels struck up as she Revolv'd, than that one of Mankind could, in that wonderful Cir­cumstance, [Page 210] Stand, or Walk, on her Superficies. But what might become of Houses and Edifi­ces, if Revolving with the Durnal Motion of the Earth? Why surely the best that could be hop'd from the Hypothesis, by the World's In­habitants, would be, That their Chimneys might smoak when arriv'd with them, to their Antipodes: Since, as sure as Check, the Copernican System would whirle um thi­ther.

But 'tis a Doubt, they would be confusedly shatter'd and toss'd from their Foundations, before swing'd to that Point of the Earth's Di­ameter. If Men will not be laugh'd out of the Conceit of the Earth's Motion; they may, if they please, consider the soundness of the Reasons here offer'd, in a Philosophical and Astronomical Sense: And 'tis probable they may, that way, confute their precedent Tenent.

To be plain, I have mention'd no Absurdi­ties that are not naturally Incident to that Hypothesis; as certainly, as no Habitation, in the known World, could a Moment continue its due Situation, either as to Heaven or Earth, if they were granted: To prove which, let the following Diagram be well Inspected, [Page 211] in which the Circle W, E, B, Represents the Horizon, E, Ae, W, the Equator; B, Z, P, the Meridian; E, W, the East and West Azimuth. Let the Earth, according to the Copernican System, be suppos'd to be in the Equator E, Ae, W, on any one of the Equi­noctial Days of the Year, and in any one of the Hours of the Day, on both Sides of the Meridian B, Z, P; as they are here signified on the Equinoctial W, Ae, E: Let Z denote the Zenith, Z, Ae, the Latitude of London 51 deg. 30 m. The Lines drawn from the Zenith Z, and continu'd by the prick'd Lines to the Horizon W, E, B, on both Sides of the Equator, are vertical Circles or Azi­muths: The Points where they touch the Place of the Earth in the Equator, in any of those Hours, if the Earth be suppos'd to Move; are to be understood as they are Number'd by Hours, in the Diagram. Of all which, one Example may serve, instead of more: Wherefore in the Spherical Triangle Z, Ae, 1 there is given Z, Ae, the Latitude of London, or Distance of the Zenith from the Equa­tor, W, Ae, E, 51 deg. 30 m. Ae 1 the Hour on the Equator 15 deg. with the right Angle Ae, the Interfection of the Meridian and Equa­tor, [Page 212] by which may be found Z 1 the Di­stance, in that Hour of the Azimuth of the Earth from the Equinoctial W, Ae, E, the dif­ference

betwixt it and Z Ae, the true and fix'd Latitude of London, should the Earth Move, by resolving of the spherical Triangle Z, Ae, 1, and comparing of the Side Z 1, when found, with Z Ae, will be 1 deg. 33 min. in one Hour's time: In two Hours, 5 deg. 53 min: In three [Page 213] 12 deg. 24 min: In four 20 deg. 22 min. If the several Triangles be Resolv'd suitably to those Hours: So that the Zenith and Elevation of Pole, as also the Meridian, must accordingly vary, together with the Points of the Com­pass and Situation of Countries throughout the World; if the Earth be suppos'd to Move: All which sufficiently Refell, or totally Con­fute, the Copernican Hypothesis.

And tho' by this Calculation, the Earth is Imagin'd to be in the Equator; 'tis not to be doubted, if the Earth were thought to de­scribe, by her Ecliptical Declination, any Pa­rallel to the Equator, that there could be wanted suitable Proportions; if applyed by whomsoever understands the Doctrine of the Sphere. At present 'tis enough prov'd, by me, how much, in any time given, the Earth, by Moving, must transfer and alter the Zenith and Elevation of the Pole, as may be per­ceiv'd by the Diagram here delineated: And perfectly Demonstrates the Copernican Absur­dity, or rather the Impossibility of Motion in the Earth; however comply'd with by the Opinion of Des-Cartes: So that the Earth may be confin'd to her Immoveable Station, [Page 214] to the expunging of the Planetary Room gi­ven her, in any Scheme, by this Author, be­twixt Mars and Venus; from whence, by his Hypothesis, he removes the Sun, and places him below the Planets as their common Center. But the Proofs that I have Inserted, are, I presume, in all kinds, so perspicuous, that I need not Catechise any Delineation or Diagram of his in order to a clearer Con­futation: So that if the Earth does not Move, and surely no Proof of his has been weighty enough to Remove her, she must be no Va­grant from her Place, whatsoever becomes of his Hypothesis.

For which Reason, I hold it Impertinent farther to Imploy my Ruling-Pen, Compass, or spherical Calculation in Opposition to his Planetary Theory: Had he not added to his Novel System the Superfetation of Comets, which he denominates Planets, with no less assurance than if by a Convention of Stars it had been signify'd to him, That they ought to be Natu­raliz'd into their Number; tho' formerly re­puted spurious intruding Foreigners, and confin'd by the Learned Ministery of Science, to Exercise their Motions and Posutres far below the nearest Palace of Heaven; till ad­vanc'd [Page 215] by Des-Cartes to Superior Orbs: Who assures us, That 'tis expedient to allow, to their irregularity and rambling Above, as vast a Sphere as can be suppos'd betwixt Saturn, the sublimest of Planets, and the six'd Stars. But by what means he exalts their Substance to that Height, shall be consider'd, when I Treat of the Ma­terials with which he undertakes to fur­nish, and, in a manner, Compose the visible World.

Which he tells us, in his 54th Particular is by such an unerrable Idea committed to his Un­derstanding, That it were all one as to question an Inspiration dispens'd by the Almighty, as to doubt of the Principles and Causes that he de­livers: Tho' he could not but know, that he was their first Communicator. But had he been ask'd, Why God should so limit his Pro­vidence as not precedently to Illuminate other Men, with as much scientifical Certainty as he imputes to the Novel Discoveries made by his Pen? He might have been somewhat out of Countenance, or pos'd to Reply: Which in effect he confesses afterwards, where he acknowledges, That it is not safe to be con­fidently conceited, or too far pr esume on private Opinion; but rather as a Philosopher, or by way [Page 216] of Hypothesis to propose such Notions, which if suppos'd untrue, they may be equivalent to Truth, if deduceable from them such Things as may be experimentally useful.

Here he seems to depose Fiction from the Throne of Reason, by depending on such Certainties that are above whatsoever Fund, can be erected by Humane Imagination; and this he briefly signifies, by attributing Cre­ation to the World with such absolute Per­fection, that originally compleated the Sun, Moon and Stars: As also, that the Earth was primarily embellish'd with Vegetables of all Kinds, maturely perfect: And that the first of Mankind which he believes, was Adam and Eve, were Created in the exactest Bloom of Man and Woman: Of all which he grants himself Religiously, and Rationally assur'd. But notwithstanding he advises us, as our more ready Expedient, rather to consider by what means Things might be produc'd, than in what Method they were originally Created by God.

In my Opinion, he had better have ac­quiesc'd on the Miracle of the Creation, than to have prepar'd the expectation of his Rea­der, as he does in this Paragraph, by inviting him to attend on the Seminary of his Brain, [Page 217] from whence he under takes to Expose the Principles, Beginnings, Ingredients, Vegetations, &c. of what­soever the Universe contains; as likewise out of what Materials the Humane Composition was first effected: Avowing, that his Principles are very Concedable.

And so I grant, could any one Miracle be understood by undertaking to prove it by admitting of another: It being as Impossible to Explicate, by any material Process, the Ori­ginal Production of an Atom, as any Star of the First Magnitude.

And such I doubt may be found, not a few, of his Incomprehensible Suppositions; as un­accountable, perhaps, to Man's Understand­ing, as if he had undertaken to Enumerate the Points that are contain'd in the unknown Circle of the Universal World. The main Phoenomena's of his stupendious Philosophy, Relate to the Primitive Existence of Matter; which Matter, he abundantly divides into diversities of Parts, and them again as vari­ously divisible: To these he appropriates dif­ferent Motions; but supposes, that every Sub­stance of which the visible World is Com­pos'd, might, by Divine Appointment, be very near equal: Of which he Imagines, that [Page 218] the Heavens and Stars were produc'd; and of the most fluid Materials; applying the more Gross or Thick to inferior Things.

All which, in his Opinion might be no less orderly determin'd; than if they had Origi­nally slipt out of Chaos with all their seve­ral Capacities and Motional Dexterities.

Thus far I have Extracted the quintescence of his Hypothesis; or indeed but a reviv'd Mo­del, as it may be well understood, of the Doctrine of Epicurus; there being little diffe­rence betwixt his Theory of Atoms and setting them on work, as he opens the Door of Chaos, than as diminutive Particles of Nature, they are busily Modell'd by Des-Cartes.

And I think, that the Poetical Fancy of Ovid may be admitted to share, in Principles, with both, where he expresses the first Start of the World's Individuals out of the confus'd Seeds of deform'd Chaos in these Verses:

But should the fanciful Monsieur Des-Cartes be question'd for the Chaos of his Prin­ciples [Page 219] out of which he deduces the Consti­tuted World; the Infancy of Nature would be as oddly understood from his Positions, as in the fantastical Doctrine of Epicurus, or in the Lines of Poetical Ovid.

Wherefore, as I conceive his Maxims to be too innumerably perplex'd and entangled for my Brain, or a better to explicate; I shall wave them accordingly by confining my Ob­servations to a cursory Consideration of some Particulars that I judge most useful, and therefore fit to be separated from the rest.

The Primitive Ingredients annex'd by this Author to the Original Consistence and forming of the Visible World, together with every Individual Substance, within its vast Circumference, are comprehended in three Elements no otherwise different than as they are more or less fluid.

The First of which he conceives so forcibly acting, that in meeting with other Bodies it is divided into very diminutive and numberless Particulars: Accommodating its various Figures to the replenishing of all Angles that were caus'd by them.

The Second Element he supposes divided into very small spherical Particles; but of certain, [Page 220] and determinate Quantity; and divisible into many less.

The Third he defines more Gross, or Thick; consisting of Figures not very inclinable to Moti­on: Of the first of these he conceives the Sun and fix'd Stars Compos'd; the Heavens, or Fir­maments above of the Second; the Earth, toge­ther with the Planets and Comets, made up of the Third.

Which Catalogue of Elements he thinks very significant; because, as he conceives, that only the Sun and fix'd Stars properly emit Light; the Heavens transmit it; and by the Earth, Planets, and Comets, remitted, which difference he judges may be discern'd; and therefore believes it well referr'd to Three Elements.

If Nature has accommodated us with Four Elements, of which we are as certainly Intel­ligent as that Heat, Cold, Moisture, and Dryness, are incident to her genune Producti­on of Things: This Author has exempted one out of her Catalogue; and what is more, has complicated a Trinity of Elements into one Substance, which he no otherwise distin­guishes, than as in some Operations and Capacities, it is more Fluid than in other; [Page 221] as he applies it to the primary Production of the Visible World, and whatsoever had Being in it. So that the First Star that twinkled in the Universe, was, in his Judgment, but such a refin'd Part of Fluid Matter, which if sufficiently thicken'd might have grosly produc'd an Ele­phantick Constellation in the Firmament. But of such Particulars more hereafter, or when I Inscribe my intended Remarks on the Fourth Part of his Philosophy, where he Treats of the Earth and its Appurtenances.

In the mean time, I shall briefly Elevate my Observations to the height of his Suppositions as they tend to the Method deliver'd by Des-Cartes, whereby he would conceive in what manner the fix'd Stars and Sun might be Ori­ginally form'd and compleated.

In the beginning, he means of the World, the Matter of the First Element increas'd, by reason that the Particles of the Second Element, by their assiduous Motion did impair one another: From whence it ensu'd, that the Quantity of the Second Element was greater in the Universe than was necessary to fill up such exiguous Spaces that were between the spherical Particulars of the Second Element, as they were mutually Incum­bent: So that whatsoever did remain, after those [Page 222] Spaces were so replenish'd, had a Recourse to cer­tain Centers: And there Compos'd the most Fluid spherical Bodies, the Sun on one Center, and six'd Stars on others: But afterwards when the Parti­culars of the Second Element were more attrited, or worn, and receding equally from their Centers, they left such spherical Spaces as were, from all Circumjacent Places, by the flowing thither of the First Element, exactly fill'd.

His Words I have deliver'd in as clean English as I could fit, or contract them to his purpose; but that being done, I must con­fess that I cannot Conster their meaning: It being very unconceivable, how he could fur­nish his Brain with a speculative Idea of such Particles of Nature separately and fluidly Moving; since whatsoever is Fluid must ne­cessarily Imply a continu'd material Emanati­on of the same Substance; as in purest Water it is impossible to imagine any separate Fluidi­ty in any of its Particles; no more than the most diminutive Bubbles, when discern'd on a flowing Spring, or River, can be said to be separately Fluid. And next to Affirm, as he does, That such Materials could movingly Atteriate or Rub one another less; there being no such Capacity in any Fluid Substance: [Page 223] Wherefore if he had us'd the Epithet of washing, or dashing, of greater into smaller Particulars, tho' somewhat Improper; the Ex­pression had been more pardonable than his calling them Rubbers of one another into any Fluid Diminution. And what is more, he undertakes by their reciprocal Motions to fill up every Corner amongst them: But how to find an Angle in any continual Fluid Mat­ter, cannot be understood by Geometrical Delineation; wherefore I wonder to find in so knowing a Mathematician, as was this Author, so undemonstrable a System.

But howsoever Interpreted, he undertakes abundantly to Replenish, with such petit ma­terial Quantities, no less than three of the Superior and vastest Heavens: And next by his Invented Vortices, which in a Grammatical Sense, may be denominated Whirl-pools, he Circumvolves Clusters of them, until he has dispos'd them capacious enough to be Meta­morphos'd, by Motion, into the Figures of the Stars and Sun.

Against the main of his Opinion that the Heavens are fluidly Compos'd, on which the rest of his Phaenomena's depend, there is far­ther to be objected, That it is unnatural, and [Page 224] clearly Inconsistent with undeniable Philoso­phical Principles; and as contradictory to ocu­lar Evidence: By which we are assur'd, as perfectly, as by Sight we can discern, that the Sun and Stars must be of the same Ce­lestial Substance with the total Heavens; and which is not denyed by Des-Cartes otherwise than as he supposes some Parts of it, which he calls the first or most fluid Element; and there­fore ought not to be so defin'd by him: Be­cause whasoever is Fluid is also dissipable, and consequently may be more Extended, Dilated, or Contracted; but neither of these are to be observ'd in the Figure or Appearance of the Sun, that always continues exactly Sphe­rical; tho' at some times, the clearness of his Figure is not equally perceivable by reason of Exhalations and Vapors that interpose, betwixt his Splendors and the Eye of the Beholder. Moreover if any Part of the Celestial Sub­stance were fluidly dissipable; Nature would be necessitated, to prevent Vacuity, the de­tested Opposite to her Existence; that some inferior Matter, or Body, should Ascend to supply that place in the Heavens where the Parts were separately remov'd: Which were repugnant to Providence, that has ordain'd, [Page 225] that no other than the Substance of Heaven, by any Natural Motion, shall possess the Supreme Part of the Universal World: If it could, the Elementary and Corporeal Mixture of Bo­dies below, might be corruptly intermingled with the refin'd Nature of the Heavens, which are apparently unalterable, undiminish'd, and as totally uncorrupted: In which Sense it may be concluded, That the Heavens are Im­mutable, and therefore Impatible; as be­ing of supremest Excellency, or not at all partaking with the distemper'd Compositi­ons, or Ingredients that constitute other Bo­dies.

If the Heavens are determin'd to be of the most tenuous Subtilty and Perfection, as ne­cessarily they must be, because far supremer than all other Beings of the Visible World, and therefore a Propriety inseparably conferr'd on the Superiority of their Existence; inso­much as they never can Descend; which is absolutely contrary to all other Quantita­tive Magnitudes that Move downwards, or, like the heavy Composure of the Earth, natu­rally tend or reside in the lowest Place: Yet in a wonderful manner the Substance of the Heavens may be deem'd no less Tenuous than [Page 226] excellently Solid, by reason that the entire­ness of their simplicity admits not other Sub­stance to be Coherent or Moving with them: For which Reasons, had this Author defin'd, in the same manner, the Substance of the Heavens, it had been far more concedable, than to have determin'd them, in any kind, Fluid; as being an Epithet not at all Concen­tring with the Notion we ought to have of the sublimity of their Motions, and refin'd­ness of their Appearance. To Summ, in a Word, my Objection, nothing can be Term'd Fluid, but must have a moist Propriety, and Moisture, in whatsoever Substance, is nearly Ally'd to Water, and therefore of some weight: Whereas it is possible to allow Admirable, or Incomprehensible Tenuity, not at all ponde­rous; which claims a Dignity perferrable to any Opinion that can be alledg'd to the contrary.

The other Mistake of this Author is, That he is positive in Affirming That the Motions of the Particles, or Globuli, as he names them, of the Celestial Substance, have a natural propen­sity, to depart from their Centers: Notwith­standing, he grants them, however diminitive, to be spherically Figur'd; by which Inclination or [Page 227] Endeavours of theirs to be excentrically Re­mov'd; he Affirms, That the Light of the Stars and Sun is both attain'd and consistent with them.

Which Maxim of his, in effect, were all one, as if he had determin'd circular Motion to be preposterously and forcibly Conferr'd; as he would suppose the prone inclination of Things to relinquish Central and Circular Movement: A Tenent highly unnatural, and contrary to the Method of Providence, that doubtless does, in a manner, Celebrate the most sublime and excellent Substance of the Heavens with the most perfect Motions. How Stars then should attain their wonderful Light, or exactness of their Figure, by an irregular Motion; were to debase the Omnipotent Cause of their Il­luminated Existence: As I have remark'd, on his Notions of the Laws of Motion, in the former Second Part of this Treatise.

As also, by what I prov'd a little before, in this Part, by undoubted Principles of Philo­sophy in opposition to his Idea, or Supposi­tion, of the exorbitant Motion of such Fluid Globulous Particles of Matter, that by their Flux and Reflux, he would imagine the Light of the Sun continually preserv'd and [Page 228] replenish'd: Is the reason, as I precedently instanc'd, why I think them impertinent, and consequently avoid the giving of my self the trouble of delineating divers of his perplex'd Diagrams; as being sufficiently, I believe, confuted, together with his Methods of Moti­on, and the Funds on which he erects them: All which, to the best Eye of my Under­standing, seem no less obscure, or uncom­putable, than if a Man should undertake to Demonstrate the several Movements, Obli­quities, Situations and Figures of innumerable multitudes of the most diminutive Sands, when scatter'd, by Winds, throughout the largest African Desart.

On which account, I may well omit such Theories, Systems and Schemes of his, that I take to be insufficient, or such as, in his own Words, he declares rather probable than Certain: Wherefore the passing from whole Pages of them, to what may be more Intelli­gible, or sensibly communicated; cannot be unacceptable to my Reader, if I that way exempt the Labour and Toil of his Eyes, from Inspecting of such Things, as might, in no kind, satisfie his expectation, or deserve the pains of the Inscriber.

[Page 229] And thus I pass to his 115th Particular, where he undertakes to tell us, how a fix'd Star may be converted into a Comet.

The Cause he renders, of such a blazing Prodigy, being no other, Than that it is a Glo­bulous, Opacous, and hard Substance congeriously Compos'd of abundance of Spots rapidly mov'd by some whirling Vicinity, or Vortex, of his Deno­mination; which mov'd irregular, and if so descending, passes to inferior Vortices, where making a stop he determines it a Comet.

But if it afterwards descends to a certain di­stance from any Star, to which the Center of that Vortex does belong, it then remains there, and Revolving about it, is an absolute Planet: This, in brief, is the substance of this Head, as he delivers it.

What considerate Man is there, that by reading of those Words, would not Interpret them of a complicated, dark, or heavy Sense; if compar'd to the admirable Celerity, of their Import, by creating of a Comet, or on his Conditions, a Planet? Unless by favouring the Pen of the Learned Des-Cartes, some gentle Reader might deem it the most sublime Stuff that ever was written by any Author. And such, I doubt, are the Ingredients by which he [Page 230] Composes, in any of his Considerations, the Substance of a Comet.

But if there are in the Heavens no such Materials, of which he undertakes to Meta­morphose fix'd Stars into Comets, or into Planets, and constitute Vortices and Globuli, to­gether with the Motions he annexes to them; all that he has written on that Subject, may signifie no more than Vapours of his Brain; and Comets no other than spuriously produc'd by sublunary Exhalations sublimely elevated, as not a few of the Learned have Written; and perhaps, as surely so Compos'd, as that the Bo­dy of Des-Cartes consisted of Elementary Parts; into what Vapourous, or Crude Imaginations must then vanish his Hypothesis of Comets!

That there is no such Substance in the Hea­vens, as he distinguishes them by his Trine of Elements, before mention'd, is very manifest, both as he defines them Fluid, and from the Motion he annexes to them: Which if granted to Move as supplemental or dimi­nishing of any Material Thing, they must partake of Elementary Nature and Mixture: Because whatsoever is dilated, or contracted, must likewise vary Extension; and nothing but what is Elementary can be so understood, [Page 231] or be properly the Object of Sense: On which ground, the most Judicious Philosophers have defin'd the Heavens, with all their orbi­cular Vicinities, of a distinct Essence from the rest of the World, which cannot be Af­firm'd of the Vortices or Globuli devis'd by this Author, of which he declares some more fluidly, thin, opacous, gross, or thicker than others: And where lives the Man, that pretends to the least Philosophical Sense, that would admit any of these Definitions or Qualifications, otherwise than as Elementary Proprieties incident to the alteration and cor­ruptible Tempers of Things in that manner Constituted?

But so much has already been Written to this purpose, of the Nature of the Sun and Stars, to which I can add nothing here, unless I reiterate my former Discussions; tho' I am as little a Friend to Repetitions, as I am to te­dious Pen-men: A Reflection that might be pinn'd on some Treatises of this Author, with­out being pronely Satyrical: Who seems to va­ry his Fluid Phaenomena's, Vortices and Globuli, in several Diagrams; but if duely consider'd, are to no better purpose, than where the Fund of any one of them proves unfound, the o­thers [Page 232] are disprov'd: And I have dealt with some of his Tractates accordingly, by wa­ving divers of his Particulars, where I thought they might be, in a small compass, significantly Answer'd.

The Substance of what he delivers of the various Appearances and prodigious Motions of Comets is briefly thus; granting that by the most accurate Observation that can be made of them, no exact Rule is to be given of their Trans­migrations from one part of Heaven to another, as in a few Months or Days they frequently vanish from our Sight; and sometimes not much more, or at other times, Move less than amounts to a mid­dle part of Heaven; as also, that when they are first seen they usually seem of greatest Extension: But towards their Period, gradually diminish, and as in the beginning of their Appearance, their Mo­tion is swiftest; about the end, they are observ'd to Move slowest.

All which admirable Diversities and Phae­nomena's, he considers as caus'd by such Vortices and Globuli, as I have already men­tion'd, and for the Reasons given by me, shall totally be declin'd, together with the Imagina­ry Proofs that he would deduce from them.

[Page 233] But in their stead, as far more explicitely satisfactory, I shall present my Reader with the most considerable Opinions of Learned Philosophers, in reference to the Cause, Ef­fects, Being and Motion of Comets.

That they are Prodigies of an extraordinary Nature, is unanimously determin'd by the Famous in Science.

Seneca, of all the Latin Writers most spi­ritually Ingenious, writes to this purpose, in the 7th Book of his Natural Questions.—As of many Things, saies he, that we grant in Be­ing, we are Ignorant, and in particular of the Mind, or Soul within us, by which our Persons and Actions are guided: As also, of what, or how produc'd that Mind or Soul: How then can we undertake certainly to know other mysterious Existencies, so far remov'd from us, when the Mind within us, as to its own Being, is a Mystery to it self?

And therefore not to be admir'd, if Comets, the most rare and surprizing Objects, are so visible to us, that by no certain Rules, their Intervals, Beginnings and Periods, are under­stood by us.

And well may the Humane Mind, as Seneca infers, if deficient by not apprehending the [Page 234] manner of its Existence, as imperfectly con­sider Things above us; and especially such as are highly distant from our Eyes, and use of our Senses. Wherefore Aristotle, in his Trea­tise, de Coelo, acutely determines, That Ce­lestial Objects, as they are, of all others, most Remote from sensible Perception, so no less distant from any evident Demonstration, or Science, that can be Affirm'd from their Ob­servation. That Comets are produc'd from Elementary Exhalations, as their Principal Cause, is the general Opinion of many of the Learned Ancients and not a few of like Re­pute amongst Modern Authors: Because in Figure they diversly vary as their Substance Inereases, or Diminishes, according to the time of their Appearance, untill their Matter, as it were consum'd, they totally vanish: Which they frequently do, when in their high­est Elevations; and therefore never observ'd to Rise or Set as does a Star or Planet, and consequently not of their Substance, no more than a Star can be defin'd mixt or elementarily Existing. Whereas, to the contrary, 'tis o­cularly evident, that the Matter of Comets is gradually Extinguish'd; which proceeds from no other Cause than that Comets are natu­turally [Page 235] alterable, and decay as to their extent, bigness, fading of their Colour, and shining Appearance; in such a man­ner as can be Attributed to no other Cause than the variety of their Elementary Com­positions; which nothing can have but what may tend to a corruptible Period: More properly ascrib'd to the extraordinary Phoeno­mena's of Meteors, then converted, from the Substance of Stars, into Comets, or chang'd from thence to an absolute Planet; suitable to the wonderful Supposition of Des-Cartes.

The exalting of Comets to Celestial Rooms and Etherial Movements, may be imputed to the mistaken Supputations of their Heights and Distance from us; either as they have not been or cannot be exactly observ'd: In respect that the Progressions of Comets are so instant­ly and perplexedly various; as precipitately, in some Moments of Time, they are motionally downwards; and, in other, as immediately Ascendant: From which uncomputable dif­ficulties the endeavour'd Calculations of Fa­mous Astronomers, as to the exactness they intended, have been doubtless frustrated.

Which may well be admitted, if judiciously weigh'd, how hard 'tis to give a true Account [Page 236] of Things far above us: Insomuch that it is almost as facile to Compute their remoteness by the Eye, as to render it Arithmetically or Instrumentally Certain. Should a Jacob's Staff be made ten times longer than Salisbury Steeple, it might prove too short by any Pro­portions, it could give, were it apply'd to the surveying of the Distance of a Comet from the ground we tread on; tho' no other than a Meteor in the supremest Region of the Air: Because we do not certainly know, how far the Lowest, Middle, or Sublimest Part of the Areial Region is distant from us.

Suppose a high Cloud did Diametrically Intervene betwixt the Sun and us, and let a Man be imagin'd, as near as possible, by the most approv'd Instrument to take its central Altitude above the Horizon: And the very next Moment that the Cloud removes, let him also, in the same manner observe the Horizontal Height of the Sun; 'tis not to be doubted, that he might find, by comparing, little difference betwixt their Altitudes.

And if this be probable, we may be as­sur'd of the uncertainty of Astronomical Ob­servations that would higher Ascend.

[Page 237] The uncertainty of the Place of Comets, and their Distance from us is also more or less by reason of the different Inequalities of the Superficies of the Earth, which is a main Cause of the Erroneous Computation both of their Quantity and Distance; by reason that the Eye ought to be in the Center when Ob­servation of Comets is any ways perform'd: As also, that the Eye is hinder'd, or obstructed by Reason of such gross and fuliginous Mat­ter as is naturally incident with Comets: Since all Vision by optick Principles, must necessarily be dispos'd and form'd according to the Disposition of the Medium by which it is receiv'd and convey'd to Sight: And thus the irregular and various Disporportions that ap­pear in the Figure, Quantity and Distance of Comets, are diversly beheld, or in a manner by Refraction, not unlike the viewing of a piece of Money in Water, it seems to be greater than it is, and at the top, when it is really at the bottom: According to which Similitude the parallactical Angle, or the dif­ference betwixt the true and apparent Place of a Star, tho' the best Geometrical Method in order to its Calculation, is very uncertainly found by accurate Astronomers, when apply'd [Page 238] to Comets; and notoriously evident if com­par'd their Observations; which are so exceed­ingly Discrepant, that even to Infinite Degrees and Miles their Computations differ as they Relate to the Magnitude and Distance of Co­mets from the Earth. All which may be egregiously apprehended if conferr'd the Ob­servations of Famous Tycho with other Learn­ed Astronomers that were before, and after him, of Eminent Reputation.

To which may be added the ocular Expe­rience of Ages past, whereby 'tis assur'd, that Comets together with their blazings, are Dissipated and Extinguish'd, when they nearly approach to the Ecliptick or Equator: Which is contrary to the Motion of the Planetary Luminaries that regularly Move in respect of those Circles, about the Sun; from whose Beams they receive the brightness of their Splendors: So that Comets either in Place, Nature, or Motion, can be no other than ele­vated Meteors and therefore of no Simili­tude with, or Derivation from Celestial Sub­stance; or at all Compos'd by such un­explicable Methods as are Instanc'd by the Scheme, Diagrams and Notions of Des-Cartes.

[Page 239] Lastly, the Matter of Comets may be in­disputably Affirm'd, elementarily Mixt, and obnoxiously Distemper'd and Compos'd, from the malevolent Effects that, too frequently are consequent to their Appearance: As Plagues, Famine, Destruction of Cattle by killing Di­seases, scarcity of Grain, and the like: And sometimes superlatively omnious as they pre­sage the Death of some Prince: Whose Pe­riod as Ptolemy is quoted by Albertus Ma­gnus, is most especially signified, when a Morning Comet is in the Sign that did Ascend at his Nativity. In Summ, that Co­mets are terribly Prodigious, and extraordi­nary Prognosticks dispens'd from Above; or as severe Emblems of the displeasures and punishments of Heaven inflicted on the Ini­quities of Kings and Subjects; are no less true than signally Recorded by credible Hi­storians. Of which wonderful Examples, together with their portentous Attributes, I find nothing said, in this Treatise, by this Author; tho' otherwise, perhaps, too far in­quisitive of the Production and Nature of Things, however Remote from common Un­derstanding.

[Page 240] And here I would Close my Remarks on the Third Part of his Philosophy; were not I oblig'd to Note, or indeed Reprehend his Conclusion; in which he infers, in Confir­mation of his former Doctrine, That the Pla­nets, although inclin'd to Circular Motion, never perfect any such Movements, either in Longitude, or Latitude.

To which I Reply, by a necessitated Reite­ration, being not desirous, that his Conclusion should have the better of my Pen, by which I have judg'd, or rather prov'd, his Premises tax­able: Wherefore I thus briefly repeat my for­mer Assertion, which was, That the Attributing in his Method, of imperfect Motions to the Planets, by contriving their Movements in Figures not exactly Circular, was an errone­ous lessening of the Perfection of Providence; which could not but ordain, to the most Re­fin'd Existencies of Stars and Planets, such Movements as might be comprehended by the most absolute of Figures, which must be the Circle: Because there cannot be other­wise so useful a Computation of their Moti­on, as, is Demonstrated by many celebrated Astronomical Observators; by whom the new Mode of confining the Planetary Moti­ons [Page 241] to an Oval, or Ellipsis, was never thought o [...] or wanted by them. Nor can I appre­hend, how the Account of our Days and [...] could be so commodiously render'd, as by Circular Motion they are computed. Which might be some Reason, why judicious Euclid did not mention, in any Part of his Ele­ments, the Ellipsis, or any sort of Curv's, fre­quently found in the Schemes and Diagrams of Des-Cartes; as either certainly to be Enume­rated, or Geometrically explicable: Where­as in his Third and Fourth Book he demon­strates Circular Commensurations, and also such Lines as usefully relate, or may be ap­ply'd to them.

'Tis said of Plato, who being ask'd, what God did? Answer'd, that he exercis'd Geome­try; as by Man might be consider'd the Pro­portions of his Conduct, and Motion of his Works: But had Des-Cartes been so Interro­gated; he must have Reply'd, according to his Hypothesis, That the irregular Figures, Schemes and Delineaments, that abundantly replenish his Diagrams, ought to be receiv'd as the Geometry of Heaven: However in­consistent with the soundest Notions, that Men can have, of the Conduct, Order and Motions above us.

[Page 242] Other Objections might have been Insert­ed, as due Reflections on the Idea's, Principles, devis'd Theories, and Problems of this Au­thor; which, to deal freely with my Reader, have more reference to the boundless Sphere of Fiction, than to any common Place of Science, or methodical Probation. Where­fore I have been thirftily cautious, and I pre­sume not Indiscreet, by separating such Things from other of his Imaginations, on which I could more commodiously ground my Re­marks, and thereby facilitate their Use to pu­blick Understanding: An Instance not im­properly Annex'd to the Close I give to the Third Part of the Philosophy of Des-Cartes.

WITH no small Labour and Diligence, according to the best of my Understanding, I have thoroughly Inspected, and carefully Contracted my Remarks, to such Particulars as I judg'd of most familiar Con­sideration, to whomsoever should peruse what I have Written. And as in my precedent Tractaets I omitted such Maxims, Arguments, Premisses, Conclusions, Schemes and Dia­grams, [Page 244] of this Authos, which I conceiv'd rather obscure Repetitions, or posingly Com­pos'd, than obviously perspicuous to the Ap­prehension of the Reader; an Oversight that ought to be highly avoided by a judicious Writer. The same rational Method, or sepa­rating of divers complicated Tenents, Asser­tions, and pretended Proofs of this, otherwise, Learned Frenchman, from what I have more Compendiously, and I presume, usefully In­serted; I shall continue in this Fourth Part of my Observations on his Philosophical Prin­ciples.

The Works of his Composing, that I have to do with, being so frequently intermix'd with divers Modalities by him Propos'd and Invented, that neither concenter with Old, or New Probabilities; that should the ablest Pen­man undertake to Paraphrase, or Comment on them, 'twere much the same as the at­tempting to explicate one Solecism by al­ledging another.

'Tis said of Lucretius, That he was the first of Philosophical Poets; and it may be as per­tinently Affirm'd, of this Author, that he is the first of Fictitious Philosophers: The main Bulk of whose Treatises, for the most part, [Page 245] are rather thicken'd by his affected Imaginati­ons, than rational Conjectures deducible from Rules of Science; which in divers Places of his Writings, however indulgent to his Devi­sings, he is so ingenuous as to acknowledge; but with this confident manner of excuse, That he supposes his Inventions ought to be more allow­able than whatsoever can be urg'd against them; which I have, as I believe, and shall endeavour farther to disprove. And thus I proceed to consider his Hypothesis of the Being and Pro­duction of the Earth.

In the first Page and entrance, he makes into his Fourth Part of his Philosophical Trea­tise, he transfers the Principles which he had ap­ply'd to the Constituting of Superior Beings, in his Third Part, to the original Forming and Ex­istence of the Earth we Inhabit: Which, in his First Paragraph, according to his design'd Imagination, in Substance is thus: Let us feign (saies he) That the Earth was primarily Constituted solely of the Matter of the first Element, (which has been mention'd by me, in the Third Part of his Philosophy) as was the Sun, tho' much less; as likewise to have a vast Vortex, or whirling Substance, about her; the Center of which Vortex was the Center of the Earth: [Page 246] But as some Particulars, or Globuli, as he calls them, were channell'd, or hollow'd, and some, but not all, very diminutive, of that First Ele­ment, they adher'd, and so were converted into the Matter of the Third Element; (which I likewise noted in the foreg-oing Tractate,) and from thence, first of all, were the opacous Spots en­gender'd on the Superficies of the Earth, resem­bling those we behold continually to generate and dissolve about the Sun. And next tells, how such Particulars were Thinn'd, or Condens'd, Ascending, and Descending, some to Etherial Parts; some to the Higher, others to the Lower Region of the Air: As also, how the thicker of their opacous Spots cover'd, and darken'd the whole Surface of the Earth.

Thus I have briefly summ'd his Sense; the doing of which, has caus'd such a won­derful Confusion in the utmost extent of my Intellect, that I cannot there find room for the whirling of his Vortices and Globuli: Or were the Brain of Man as big as the Earth, it might prove too small for the comprehensive Understanding of his Hypothesis: By which he displays his Scene of Chaos, together with the diffusion from its Womb of such Particles, or Seeds of Nature, That by their Motions and [Page 247] continu'd Involutions, and Revolutions, Thin, or Thicken, without the operative concurrence of Heat, Cold, or any other Elementary Quality; untill a sufficient quantity of them meet in a Lump, that might produce the Figure and Magni­tude of the Earth.

But from what shadow of Reason, or Philosophical Authority could Des-Cartes fan­cy, That either the Universe, or Earth, part of the whole, might be Constituted, or any ways generated by Motion unless of Bodies Com­pos'd of such Elements that are common to our Apprehensions? Because nothing if not so temper'd, is capable of Motion, or compu­table by Time, the natural Propriety of Moti­on; and therefore not of such Chimerical Ma­aterials, or unqualified Particles of Nature, as he numbers in the actings of his devis'd Triplicity of Elements: Which if granted, 'twere, in ef­fect, to Assert, That Motion, Time, and the Elements we usually understand, and by which we subsist, were operative and original Causes of the World's Existence: So that the Earth, together with Mankind, and whatsoever it con­tains, might have had, in the Opinion of this Author, a capacity of subsisting, or wonder­fully forming it self, without a miraculous Creation.

[Page 248] Nor can his Supposition be excus'd, by al­ledging, That the Almighty might Ordain the Fabrick and Structure of the Earth, by any Mo­tion of Substances that were not Elementary: Be­cause impossible to conceive any other tempe­rature of Things, that could be motionally capacitated to produce other Beings. But of what Composition, or how establish'd, the Heavens above; are Thoughts too remote and spiritual, as I have prov'd, by Learned Au­thority, in the precedent Treatise, to be defi­nitively reach'd by the Humane Intellect: Notwithstanding which sublime Considerati­on, the Earth is plac'd by Des-Cartes above; and instead of the Sun, as a Planet, according to the Copernican System, in as lofty a Room as is the Orbite betwixt Mars and Venus.

In answer to which, enough I believe has been objected in the former Third Part: But now, having suppos'd the Matter of the Earth before intermingled with that of the Hea­vens; he tells us, how the Materials of the Earth delaps'd, or slipt from above, towards the Inferior Place, according to his Phaenomena, of the Sun; and next distinguishes the Earth into three Regions.

[Page 249] The First of these which he calls the most In­ward, he supposes to contain so much of the Matter of the First Elements, not otherwise there Mo­ving, or of other Nature, than as it was in the Sun; except that its Substance was less pure: But thinks that the Earth in passing from the Sun; and surely, in his Sense upwards, be­cause by his Hypothesis he has preferr'd the ministerial Situation of the Terrene compositi­on, much Superior to Phoebus the King of Il­luminating Beings, as also that it continually became spotted, and could not be purg'd or clear'd of them: From whence saies he, I am easily persuaded, That the Earth was then full of the Third Element, did not it follow, that she could not, if at that time so solid, be so near the Sun, (he means downwards) as now she is. To which purpose, he has devis'd a Right-worshipful Scheme; but left by me, to the Inspection of such as have no other Imployment for their Eyes.

The Second Element of the Earth, he de­termines opacous and thickly Substantiated, as consisting of divers Minute Particles that apper­tain'd to the first Element: And this, in his judg­ment, Experience assures by the Spots in the Face of the Sun, which excepting their refin'dness and [Page 250] subtility, are the same with those of the Earth: Yet notwithstanding hinder the Light that would else more appear in the Sun.

But concludes, after some offer'd Reasons, which I do not mention, because I think 'em Irrational, That these two Elements have little to do with us; because no living Man ever ascend­ed to their Stations.

But by what Authority does he present us with a Theory of Things that he confesses no Body could ever be assur'd of: And for that Reason, I might pass from them with no less neglect than the Man, who reading an Inscription at Athens that was Dedicated to the unknown God, thought it had little to do with his Contemplation: And no more my concern what this Author delivers here; these Elements having been sufficiently, I doubt not, Remark'd by me, in the Third fore-going Part of his Philosophy.

Notwithstanding I will briefly add some­thing, avoiding, if possible, Reiteration of Words, on the same Subject already written: Or only by way of Interrogation, were Des-Cartes present, desire to be inform'd in what Mint of Nature, he Coin'd these Elements, and as her Bank-stock Pay's them off, in Par­cels, [Page 251] to his Reader? In doing of which, he introduces, and a while continues, the ori­ginal Empire of Nature, in Power and Credit, numerously attended by very inconsiderable Subjects, which he calls petty Globuli, surround­ing her Throne, and immediately committed to the Government, and disposal of revolving Vor­tices that whirl'd them, without any orderly Me­thod, or Proportion, either East, West, South, or North; or sometimes only upward, to the height of Heaven, and as soon precipitately downward; by which medly of Motion he conceives abundance of their Fluid Substances exceedingly thinn'd; whilst others were as nimbly thicken'd. As if the Hands of Nature had been busily imploy'd in kneading of their Clusters till thoroughly condens'd.

Yet grants them so insipidly temper'd, that by no proper Term, Naturally, or Philoso­phically Intelligible, he determines them ei­ther light or heavy; as he distinguishes their Ele­ments from whatsoever is Elementarily Compos'd: And thus, according to his Method, he ima­gines, That Nature made her first Entrance out of the Closet of Chaos; and having not thoroughly wash'd her Face, he supposes some of her Spots might afterwards visibly remain [Page 252] in the Figure and Substance of both Sun, Moon and Earth.

If next he had been ask'd, on what account he attributes Spots to the Luminary of Day, or Night, together with the Terrene Sphere of our Being; that are within no compass of reasona­ble Apprehension, he must have return'd a motly Answer. Since undeniable, That what­soever is capable of Spots, as its propriety, must be naturally colour'd, and therefore of a mixt, Elementary Composition; by reason that nothing can be observably spotted, but is also colour'd by mixt Ingredients, and con­sequently the Object of Sight.

But the Sun and Moon, were never held, by found Opinion, Elementarily Constituted; wherefore not of any of his suppos'd Ele­ments, no more than 'tis possible to conceive, how Air could be alterative, or operate on Air, or Water on Water; without partaking of Elementary Mixtures: A Truth confirm'd by Experience in every Thing that is Thinn'd, Thicken'd, Ascends, or Descends; as sure as Earth is more ponderous than any of the o­ther Three Elements ordain'd by Providence to exert all such Operations of Nature, as are with clearest Evidence understood by us. [Page 253] From whence may be concluded, that the seeming Spots in the Sun, or Moon, are no other than meteorous Exhalations or Vapours that interpose betwixt the Luminaries and the Eye of the Beholder; as surely as we fre­quently discern more or less clear, in Ap­pearance, the Sun and Moon, and therefore no Spots Inherent in their Substance.

As for the Spots that he annexes to the out­ward Complexion of the Earth, what Man ever heard of any of their Colours, except of such Things as have Being and Growth on her Sur­face; as Trees, Plants, Men, Women, Beasts, Grain, and such other Things, as might from Causes, be produc'd? How to Reply, had he been thus Interrogated, I dare Answer for him, he could not have told.

And thus I come to the farther Examination of his Third Element, by which he undertakes to Exspand the Original of all Things within the Compass of the Earth.

To which purpose, I will briefly Summ the Order and Materials, by which he forms his Phaenomena's of the Earth's Production.

All which he supposes, were produc'd of the Fragments of a certain Thinn and Fluid Compo­sition, which he Entitles, The primary Element [Page 254] of Nature: These Imaginary or Globuli-Frag­ments, proceeding, (as he derives them) from Spots in the First Element, and descensively ope­rating on the next, term'd by him a Second Ele­ment, they confus'dly, and exceedingly disorder'd in Motion and Figure, tended downward, from their first sublime Height, till at last they became more congeriously Thick, suitable to the grossness of the Earth's Composure, and Settlement; where it now remains.

So very intricately obscure, or vainly per­plex'd, does this conceited Monsieur debase the original Wisdome and Conduct of Nature, both as to her own Establishment, and the Pro­duction of her Works; which could never be so disproportionably and irregularly ef­fected by the prudent Diligence and Intend­ment of her Operations: Which, as this Au­thor commits them to her peculiar Conduct, I do not see why they should not have been, by her Management, as highly refin'd and continu'd, as he delivers the Materials of her first purest Celestial Element: And conse­quently of them, so sublimately ordain'd, have produc'd the Substance of Man and Wo­man, that being exalted to a Superior Room in the Etherial Heaven, the Eyes of Beauty [Page 255] might have there shin'd instead of Stars, now beheld, of the first Magnitude: And next to these, why should she not have gradually Il­luminated the Substance of Animals, with all other Materials and Plants, that being naturally cleans'd from such Terrestrial Ingre­dients, Alterations and Mixtures, that are now in them, they might have remain'd splendent Parts above, instead of being Re­volv'd and whirl'd in globuli's, or dispers'd Fragments of Nature, downwards, untill they clos'd in a Lump that compleated the Earth, in Figure, disposition of Parts, and Situation, suitable to the Opinion of this Author?

Such Queries may not be unfitly urg'd a­gainst his total Hypothesis, with all its Appur­tenances; to which I add these palpable Ob­jections.

First, that it is egregiously preposterous, if not an Impeachment or lessening of the Di­gnity of Nature, supposing that by her volun­tary Actings she debas'd the superiority of her Existence, by crumbling of her Materials into innumerable Bits, or Particles, in all kinds, of impurer Substance, and next dispose them, by a rambling, or giddy Progression, so gross­ly to meet as they might constitutively finish [Page 256] and sustain the small inferior Bulk of the Uni­verse call'd Earth; or rather denominated the spurious Daughter of Nature, if so engender'd by her actual consent.

Whereas contrarily, 'tis the inseparable At­tribute of Nature, intentionally to Conserve, whatsoever depends on her Regalia's, in its proper and utmost Perfection. And although, that by such Elementary Compositions and Mixtures, as are understood by us, she is ne­cessitated to vary her Conduct, as Things are, in course, Generated, or Corrupted, in order to produce such Existencies that could not be continu'd in themselves; and therefore Pro­videntially convertible into other Beings: Yet she constantly preserves her most genuine Progression, which is, that nothing shall so alter as not to have Matter and Form incident to their Corporeal Proprieties: Not unlike a Sovereign Ruler, within whose Dominions there is no period of his numerous Subjects by Death, because enough are begotten that succeed them.

But no such Procreation could be consistent, or produc'd, as an Elementary Triplicity is de­vis'd by Des-Cartes; and not at allaccomplish'd or season'd with such natural Ingredients as [Page 257] are the Elementary Adjunct to Bodily Ex­istences: But rather of such a simplicity and incommunicable Qualification, that 'tis as reasonable to imagine, That Earth should pro­ceed from meer Air, or Water from Fier, as that his imperfect, and uncompounded Ele­ments, should, by their Vortices, and Globuli, arrive to any Corporeal Production: Because the Principles of all Things could be no other than Contarrieties, and therefore Elementary: Insomuch, that had not Providence other­wise dispos'd natural Operations than are con­triv'd by this Author; neither the Heavens a­bove, however excellent and refin'd their Es­sence, or the Earth we possess, with all its Appurtenances, could have been effected.

The next Objection, is briefly thus,—Suppose, it were conceded. That his Hypo­thesis, relating to the Constituting of the Earth's Existence, were allowable; could it be conceiv'd, that the diversities of Being and Motion which he annexes to his Particles of Nature, should be either operative or motional before the Sun, Stars, World, or any Ele­mentary Composition, a main Cause of Mo­tion, Version and Alteration of Bodies, as naturally they ought to be understood, did [Page 258] really Exist? Because nothing can Move up­wards or downwards, but what is Corporeally mixt; and therefore consisting of Commen­surable Parts, whose Movements must be gra­dually computed by Time, Nature's unerra­ble Accountant: But by the Incomprehensi­ble Phaenomena's of this Author, the World was fill'd with temporary Motions, before it or Time was, or could be summ'd by computable Progression of any Thing, that could be its porportionable Measure; according to his Suppositions: Which Impossibility is so disregarded by this Writer, that Time, were his Notions true, might have continu'd, some thousands of Ages, before it could be understood to have Being, or his small Globuli, Circumvolv'd by their Vortices, could have constituted and fill'd the local Situation of one Mile of Earth, with all its Materials, from top to bottom, with their diminutive Particulars.

Which Absurdities, if well consider'd, might have deterr'd, as Learned a Person as Des-Cartes, from posing his Intellect, with so many unexplicable Imaginations, whereby he would assimulate, however far above Thought, the stupendious Consistence of the World to miraculous Systems invented by his Brain.

[Page 259] As for the Elements that he undertakes to deliver as the first Principles whereby the Earth was Constituted, which, as I have already prov'd, are neither Philosophical, or Natural; he tells us in his 13th Particular, That the more Solid, or thicker of them, are not always Inferior, in Place or Motion, to those that are thinner; the Reason he gives is, That notwihstanding they are uniformly Revolv'd, they so adhere to one another, by the Irregularities of their Figures, that the Globuli of one Element cannot extricate them­selves from the Compulsions upwards, or down­wards, of another.

This Gentleman, who had no otherwise differenc'd his principal Materials, by which he would Constitute the Structure of the Earth, than as the Parcels of his small Globuli, were more or less extended, begins now, in ef­fect, to grant them Elementarily mix'd, as e­very Thing must be that is Thinner or Thicker than another, or different in Weight and Measure: But so as by his turbulent Vortices, the lighter were mingled with the heavier, in such a complicated manner, that they could neither Ascend or Descend, as they ought to have done by their Qualifications. But gives no certain reason, why they might not always have continu'd [Page 260] so Intermingled, and Confus'd; and there­fore never have separated from one another? Since he determines no Cessation of the impetuous Movement of them caus'd by his whirling Vorti­ces: How then could the Earth be Compos'd, or Constituted, by such Irregular Particles of Nature, that neither by their Motion, or dif­ferent Temperatures, could be disincumber'd from one another, and consequently so ex­actly Embodied as might compleat the total Substance of the Earth?

In his 14th and 15th Particulars, he under­takes to Describe what he means by diversities of Bodies, which he supposes form'd in that, which he denominates his Third Region of the Earth; and these, he believes might be pro­duc'd as the Globe of the Earth, distinguish'd into three Regions, having been devolv'd towards the Sun, and the Vortex, in which it was before, taken from it, variety of Bodies were distinguish'd in it: Whose Productions he designs to explain afterwards; but first, he delivers three or four Axioms, on which they depend.

• [Page 261]The First is the general Motion of his Celestial Globuli.
• The Second is their Gravity.
• The Third Light.
• The Fourth Colour.

His First Position I am oblig'd to reflect on, and more severely, could it be avoided, than I am willing to do; out of the respect that I have to this Learned Author. But ha­ving Geometrically prov'd, by what I have Written on the Third Part of his Philosophy, That there can be no Motion, either Diurnal, or Annual, to be Attributed to the Earth, the Copernican way, instead of the Sun: I cannot but add, That it is far more egregiously Suppo­sititious, that the imperfect Agitation of his Globuli, which he Inserts, in the Page I write of, should perform their Annual or Diurnal Motion about the Sun, correspondent to his Imaginary System: It being highly improba­ble, that such different Particles, which he defines Globuli, both in Substance, Bigness, Quantity and Measure; as also, irregularly Moving, by his Concession, should compleat­ly finish the Diurnal or yearly Motion of the [Page 262] Sun; because not to be thought, that they could Revolve suitable to any Figure Geome­trically computable: And therefore impossi­ble, even to Absurdity, the fictitious Circum­volution that he appropriates to his Region of Globuli, than if without them, he directly had Asserted the Motion of the Earth: Because the Earth, allow'd by the Learned, to be Circu­larly Form'd, is more capable of Revolution, than that such diminutive Substances, as are disagreeably Compos'd, both in Quantity and Figure; should so perfectly unite their Move­ments as exactly to Represent, or Conspire with the Earth's Motion, in the room of the Sun, either Hourly, Dayly, or Yearly, ap­pertaining to Ecliptical Circulation.

In order to which performance of his de­vis'd Globuli, he makes yet more gross their Incomprehensible Phaenomena's; by Affirming, That they incline to Move in a streight Line, tho' he grants them not figuratively such; as if Things could be propense to Move directly, if naturally oblique in Proportion and Figure: Notwithstanding that 'tis impossible, that what­soever Moves, should describe any other Su­perficies, or Figure, than is suitable to its Corporeal Parts. Nor can any Thing be said [Page 263] in a proper Sense, to incline to Move in a streight Line, but as it must be either upwards, or downwards; according to the Nature of its Gravity, or Levity.

To be plain, the most favourable Salvo that can be apply'd to this Broken Head of his Hypothesis, is, that he judges it safer, for his manner of Copernicanism, to substitute his whirl'd Globuli as Assistants, by their Move­ments, to the Motion he allows the Earth: Because, as I conceive, he might apprehend, that Objections to be made against the Earth's Revolution; as also, that by such an Hypothesis, the Situation of Countries and the Elevation of the Pole must infallibly alter, as has been already demonstrated, might be rebated, or not so unanswerably Alledg'd. Tho' to Men of competent Apprehension, the Absurdities are the same, whether the Earth alone, or his Glo­buli and the Earth, in any Kind, Intrigue, or conjoyn their Circulations.

Can a Man that has season'd his Intellect with the least Relish of Mathematical Princi­ples, conceive it possible for the confus'd Phaenomena's of Vortices and Globuli, menti­on'd by Des-Cartes, to absolve the mean or equal Motion, which, Astronomy assures, is [Page 264] annually consummated in the Ecliptick? Or, that the ponderous Structure of the Earth, should be so regularly elevated from her Cen­ter, as that any Point of its Superficies, or its Vortices, and Globuli, in the Sense of this Author, might at one time have an Apogaeon height, or utmost Distance from the Center of her Orb, and at another a Perigaeon-near­ness unto it: Which were much the same, as to think it feasible for clusters of Flies, no bigger than Gnats, when they numerously seem to Circulate in Sun-shine, to remove the weighty firmness of the terrene World; or perform, instead of the Sun, the Ecliptical Revolution of the Day, or Year.

Yet on this preposterous and feeble Con­duct, is erected the main Hypothesis of this French Writer, both as to the Composition, Be­ing and Motion of the Earth, with all her Cir­cumjacent Particulars: Which shews, that he takes to himself an unpresidented Dictator­ship in Science, whereby he would celebrate the Fictions of his Brain, without any requisite or probable assurance, that they ought to be Conceded.

To which purpose, he Inserts the various Actings of his several Elements, tho' by no [Page 265] Body, but himself, so nam'd; and by these, so Invented by him, together with Vortices and Globuli form'd from them, he judges, That the Earth, with whatsoever it Comprehends, might be totally Constituted; as he their prime Artificer has contriv'dly set them at work.

The first Action tending to the compleating of the most refin'd Substance, or Parts of the Earth, he considers, as produc'd by the Motion of the most tenuous Matter of what he Terms a Third Element; which he supposes so very pure, that, even to Transparency, it may cause Bodies, tho' appertaining to Earthly Composition, very clearly to Shine.

And thus we have the Earth, according to the Doctrine of Des-Cartes, both a motional and illuminating Planet. But should I ac­count the numerous diversities of the fictiti­ous Motions, and shifted Inventions by which this Author confers a shining Capacity on some Particulars of the Earth's Substance, I might more than fire, if not abuse, the Pati­ence of an indefatigable Reader. Neither could I do other than impertinently load my Pen with repeated Objections, and manifest Confutations of his Theories of Motion, as [Page 266] they have been diversly apply'd by him on this, or other Subjects: The Movements of Things, in his Method, as he annexes their Qua­lities and Motions, being neither exactly agree­able, to streight Lines, or their proper Ten­dencies, or to such Curv's, as might be of Ma­thematical Construction; and therefore in­consistent with the Geometry of Nature: Which, as to her Works, must proceed from a regular Process; to which purpose, enough has been already written by me.

I will therefore, in this place, briefly In­spect the Fond of the shining Attributes that he confers on some Particulars of the Earth, as they are stated by him.

The principal Reason that he offers, is, That 'tis experimentally found, that pure Liquor in the Earth, of tenuous Consistence, is also pelluci­dous, or shining.

Which cannot be true, if by clearness he means an Illuminating Quality: No more than the purest Water that can be Imagin'd, may be said to Shine, because it is clear. And who ever beheld any shining Part of the Earth otherwise than by diffus'd Beams of the Sun' Moon, or Stars, it might be enlightned; tho' without any Illumination as to its own Capa­city?

[Page 267] Where are the Eyes that in a gloomy Day or Night, ever observ'd the shining of a Mole-Hill on the Surface of the Earth: Or such little Morsels of the Ground as Worms deject; which might be compos'd of such Materials, as he describes his diminutive Globuli to consist of, for any reason given, by him, to the contrary?

To confirm these Objections, this one, that includes many, may pertinently be added.

If, as he imagines, the diaphanous Parts of any of his Celestial Elements, as they are de­fin'd by him, should by any intelligible Move­ment so operate, as they might be so qualita­tively Constituted, as to embue any particular Substance, or Places of the Earth with a shining Capacity; since he has undertook to Meta­morphose our terrene Habitation into a Pla­netary Composition: How can it be probably apprehended, that his Fluid Globuli, by their feeble Commotions, should be conjoyn'd to the Surface of the Earth, notwithstanding that the condense, or crusty Parts of her Sur­face are thickly harden'd and nourish'd by the Roots of Grass, Trees, Minerals, Stones of all kinds, diversly temper'd, and not possibly penetrable by any compulsive Motion of his [Page 268] diminutive, and impotent Globuli; unless so much of the gaping Superficies of the Earth could be suppos'd to receive their Fluid De­scents, to no other purpose, than she does Rain when distill'd by the Dissolution of Clouds? Which being done, there could but a dewy gloss appear on the Ground, that might not more imbrighten any Part of the Earth's Figure, than when, in some moist Seasons, the Glow-worm, with her Light, is engender'd.

So that whosoever would persuade himself, that the terrene World, or any Part of it, was ever primarily compleated or motionally dispos'd by the Globuli and Vortices compre­hended in the Diagrams and Theories of Des-Cartes, may as readily believe, that the Globe of the Moon was originally produc'd by the efficacious Seeds of a Carret-Bed.

Nor does he deny, in some respects, the in­congruity of his Principles, as in his 18th Particulars, he confesses, The Materials, by which he moulds the Frame of the Earth's Com­posure, and first Existence, to be confusedly ope­rative; by granting, that the liquid Parts, which he Attributes to the prime Formation of the Earth, were disorderly complicated with his Celestial Globuli. Yet might by their Operations, in his [Page 269] judgment, upwards, downwards, or transversly, be separately distinguish'd by the Similitude he Porduces of a Glass of Wine in the Must, having Dregs not only on the top, and bottom, correspon­dent to Gravity and Levity, but also on the sides of the Glass: When afterwards the Wine being clear, notwithstanding that it before consisted of various Particulars, it becomes pellucidous, or shining: and not more gross or thicker in any one Part than in another.

Here he presents his Reader with a Philoso­phical Weather Glass; by which he would determine the temper of the Season, when the Earth was forming by his diversified Globuli, and whirling assistance of his Vortices: Which petty Operators, as he states the Metaphor of their Condition and Conduct, might be as drunk (as Flies may be suppos'd) when some of them are, as it were, giddy on the top of a Glass of strong Liquor, or lean to its Sides, for supportance, whilst others more ebrietously replenish'd, heavily sink to the bottom: All which may be assimulated, without any wrong to the Brain of this Author, unto the giddiness of his Phaenomena's: It being im­possible to conceive, from what rational Course of Nature he could produce the Substances, [Page 270] together with the Movements of his de­bauch'd Globuli, by which he constitutes the Being of the Earth: Considering, that he de­duces their original Descent from what he Terms his first pure Element.

In his 19th Head, he positively assures us, That the Third, and main effect of his Celestial Globuli are so perfectly operative, that they con­vert liquorous Drops residing in Air into rotund Figures, the reason as he States it is, because those Celestial Globuli find more Passages into a watry Drop than into the Circumjacent Air: And by that means, as near as may be, Move in right Lines, or in such as most approximate unto direct lineaments; whence it is manifest, in his Opi­nion, That such Globuli, that are in the Air, are less motionally hinder'd, as they meet with a watry Drop, according to the continuance of their Moti­ons in a streight Line, or nearest unto it, if that Drop of Liquor be exactly spherical, than if it had taken any other Figure. But if any Part of the Superficies of that Drop, be extended be­yond a spherical Figure, the Celestial Globuli by their more forcible discursions, made in the Air, more strenuously assault the watry Drop, than were it other Substance, and immediately thrust it downwards towards the Center.

[Page 271] The Reader, I presume, will excuse me, if in this Place, and some others of his Writings, I deliver the Notions, of this Author, in more uncouth Accents than I would willingly com­mit to his Perusal: It having been my care, no less than necessary Diligence, to render as genuinely, as might be, his Latin Expressi­ons into English.

If my Remarks on his precedent Praticu­lar had any sharp Allusion, dress'd in a plain and familiar Application; I cannot rebate, on this occasion, the point of their tendencies: Wherefore, if prov'd by me, in the forego­ing Head, tho', by a comical Similitude, that his Hypothesis had inebriated his Globuli: I may as judiciously Assert, That his Sense, in the Particular, I now Treat of, may be, by no extravagant Similitude, term'd unnatural, or Philosophically, and Mathematically In­toxicated; unless I could Affirm, in his be­half, that his Globuli, which, as he supposes, might by the force of their whirling Vortices, so dispose their Materials to the Constituting of the Earth, that the very Grapes that caus'd drunkenness in the Head of the Patriarch Noah, were engender'd by some of their giddy Compositions.

[Page 272] And as sure, as the Earth is now in Being, Nature might be deem'd out of her Wits, if according to his disorderly Process, she could be thought to Design the Production of the earthly World.

Or what can be more improbable, than the Tale he tells, of his Celestial Globuli converting of liquorous Drops, hanging in the Air, into round Figures?

And what Reason does he give; why, no better than as he supposes, That his Globuli may find more passage in watery Drops than in the circumjacent Air?

But does not common Experience confute this Imagination? Let a strenuous Hand fling a smooth Peeble-Stone into the Air, and after­wards into Water, will it as soon pass any Part of the Superficies of Water as of the Air? Or will it not, the Water being of a more condense Substance than Air, have, pro­portionably, a longer Motion and Passage, by the ressistance of its thicker Body, than might be given by the Tenuity of the Air? A Truth so practically evident, that it could not be unknown to many of the young Contempo­raries at School with Des-Cartes; wherefore I wonder to find him of a contrary Opinion here.

[Page 273] As little concentring, in any kind, with sound Principles, are the Proprieties that he annexes to his Globuli; which, if, in their Motion, engaging with any Part of a watry Drop that is extended beyond a spherical Figure, they immediately, with greater force, assail it, and by compulsion enforce it towards its Center.

But if any Part of it be nearer its Center than another, his Celestial Globuli, contain'd in that watry Drop, forthwith imploy their utmost Force to expell it from its Center; and next altogether concur to make one spherical Drop.

Here by a perverse Contradiction he noto­riously thwarts the surest Maxims of Philo­sophy, as they pertinently Relate to the Na­ture and Motion of Corporeal Beings. Nor is there any Thing more irrational, if not Philosophically absurd, than to define, as he does, globulous Materials, and debar them of Motion natural to their Figures: It being not possible to imagine, that whatsoever is rotund should be more propense to Move in a streight Line, or the nearest unto it, than in a circular Revolution. If a Ball be let fall from the Hand, will it it not rotundly Move suitable to its Figure? And could this Author imagine, That a Demonstration so experimen­tally [Page 274] obvious would be wav'd by any Princi­ple of his Geometrically Inconsistent; or that the exactness of Things circularly Mov'd, of all others most perfect, should incline to deviate from their Centers? Or if that were granted, is it at all probable, that they could have freer migrations, according to this Au­thor, through any one of his suppos'd watry Drops, than in the tenuous Substance of the Ambient Air? Which being done, they are, in his Sense, sometimes compulsively enforc'd towards their Centers, if their Figures be not absolutely spherical; but if exactly round, as forcibly remov'd from their Centers. And thus he Implicates, if not so, crosly Involves Contradictions, that he determines the ope­rations of Nature, more consonant to the exerting of a Step-dame's Arbitrary Conduct, than suitable to the comely Effects, by which she regularly produces the Motion and Be­ing of Things.

All which must be conceded as Principles of Nature, incident to her Rule and regular Intention; as surely as some of her Materials are more substantially heavy, or lighter than others; and will therefore have a natural Re­course, upwards or downwards, to their Cen­ters accordingly.

[Page 275] Wherefore it may be admir'd in what Fit, or Heat of Fancy, the Brain of this Monsieur was Inveigled when by so many perplex'd Words, as also opposite Terms and Methods, he did, in a manner, angrily Impose the Li­mitations of his Measures, on the stupendi­ous Productions of the Works of Nature: Insomuch, that his Maxims, if soberly con­sider'd, signifie, little other, than a design'd Rape committed on the Grandeur of her Fi­gure and Beauty, together with the provi­dential Facility, by which she compleats and preserves her Legitimate Conduct and Opera­tions. So that his Invented Elements, with all his Diagrams of Vortices and Globuli, seem fictitiously devis'd, or appertaining to the Imaginary System of some other World; since not at all probable, that they could belong to the Composure of this.

But enough has been in this Place, and oc­casionally before, I believe, satisfactorily In­serted, on this Subject, that it were imperti­nently tedious if more be added.

There remains one Particular, that ere I conclude on this Head, requisitely deserves a considerable Remark; because it Includes a very curious and subtil Mathematical Problem: [Page 276] Which he thus expresses; the Angle of Con­tact by which the Tangent Line touches a Circle, and by which only it is distant from a right Line, is less than any Rectilineal Angle whatsoever, and in no Curve Line, besides the Circle, is every where equal: Wherefore he Affirms, That a streight Line cannot more equally, and less every where inflect, or bend, from its Points, than when it degenerates into a Circular.

I have read in the History of Algebra, writ­ten by Dr. Wallis, who mentions the contro­verted Question, concerning the Angle of Contact made by a streight Line where it touches the Circle; but in his Opinion, thinks it nothing, if not a right Angle, in being perpendicular to the peripherial Point of the Circle; because not otherwise, numerically Computable: He also Inserts his Disceptation, as I remember, by Letters that pass'd betwixt him and a certain Learned Person, who un­dertook to defend, against him, the Determi­nation of the famous Mathematician Clavius, in whose Judgment, the Angle of Contact was properly something, tho' not Commen­surable; and therefore not otherwise defina­ble, than as being less than any acute Angle whatsoever; which I take to be the more [Page 277] probable Opinion: By reason that it could not be denominated Angular without it ap­pertain'd to something, tho' but of general or tacit Application. And thus, in the Judg­ment of Euclid, the Angle of Contact has a singular Attribute, where it touches the peri­phery of the Circle, but not otherwise ac­countable or to be summ'd by Number: The Reason is, that in every Circle, whether equal, or unequal, the Point in the Circumference touch'd by a right Line will be the same in all of them; because no other Line can fall between the Point of Contact, in any of their Peripheries: And could it be Commensurable, it would be of one Equality: Whereas, con­trarily, in every direct Figure, or where two right Lines touch one another, the Angle they make may be Geometrically lessen'd by any intervening Line, or Lines, that meet in the Angular Point: But not so to be under­stood of the Angle of Contact, which has no proportion in its self, if compar'd with any other figurative Angle.

To which purpose, the Learned Proclus si­gnally Determines, That the Point in the Cir­cle, where the Angle of Contact meets with a streight Line, is mixtly Compos'd of a direct [Page 278] Line, and the Curviture of the Circle; and therefore not Commensurable by any distinct Line, that can be numerically computed. So that the Angle of Contact may be well Term'd singular, by reason it has no propor­tional Similitude, or Quantitative Propriety, correspondent to any other Angular Delinca­ment. And the more Admirable, because the wonderful Extent, and Power of Geome­try, computatively Explains by the vastness of its Science, all other Angles, Mathematically qualified, except that which is lineally annex'd to the touch of the Circle. And what is yet more wonderful, the tangent Line that In­cludes, and makes the Angle of Contact, is perfectly Commensurable, tho' not the An­gle where it touches the Circle; a Geome­metrical Secret that has not a little perplex'd, if not pos'd the Pens of famous Mathema­ticians.

Wherefore I think it not improper in this Place, to present the Reader, so far as it Re­lates to the Proof I offer, with this familiar Diagram. That E C the tangent Line, where it touches the Semidiameter A C, is a right Angle, is ocularly Demonstrative; because [Page 279] it is Perpendicular to the Diameter; notwith­standing that it makes no certain provable

Angle, where it touches the Circle; by reason that the Curviture of the Circle is betwixt it and the Semidiameter; and that it is a proportional Line, is prov'd by the 4th Proportion of the Sixth Book of Euclid: For as A B, is to D B, so is A C, to E C; which is also the Tan­gent of the Angle E A C: Whence it is ma­nifest, that E C the Line of Contact is Com­mensurable, but not the Angle made by its touching of the Circle.

[Page 280] Or this Proposition may be thus demon­strated; the Angle at D, made by the prickt Line D C, in the Triangle A, D, C, is a right Angle, as is always the Angle in the Semicircle; therefore the Angle; A, C, D, is less than a right Angle, tho' it may be allow'd greater than any acute Angle, and the Angle at C made by the tangent Line, less than any acute Angle that can be given: Otherwise, the Point where the tangent Line touches the Circle, could not be, in that Point, singular; as before demonstrated. So that in the Triangle A, C, D, if D be a right Angle, the Angle at C must be less than a right Angle; because in every plain Triangle, the three Angles are but equal unto two Right▪ Which confirms the former Demonstration.

And from which may be concluded, that of what demonstrative Quantity, the Angle of Contact does actually consist, is, as yet conceal'd from Geometrical Inquisition: Or not to be discover'd, untill a certain Proportion can be found betwixt a streight and a curve Line; which perhaps may never be Demonstrated: If not as impossible, as to prove, a Curve com­mensurately distinguish'd from a Curve.

I confess, I am not a little beholding to this Learned Monsieur, for the occasion he has [Page 281] given me to discuss, I conceive not unsatis­factorily to the Judicious, the Question con­cerning the Angle of Contact so much con­troverted by Celebrated Geometricians: And which, by a certain fineness in Science, is more pertinently apply'd to the purpose, he would intend it, than any Mathematical Pro­position, Theorem, or Diagram of his that I have met with.

But I cannot thank him for the Conclusion he deduces from thence; or because he takes it for granted, That a streight Line by reason of the near approximation that it has to the Circle, in the Point of Contact, never less inflects from every of its Points, than when it degenerates into a circular Figure.

By which Inference he does highly dispa­rage the Contexture and Theory which he devises for the Motions of his Vortices and Glo­buli, in order to their material compleating of the Universal World: If their Motions, in any kind, tending to a direct Line, be allow'd to degenerate; when from that manner of Move­ment they convert to circular Revolution. Which were all one as to charge the motional Exactness and Conduct of Nature, providen­tially dispos'd, with Mistake, or Imperfection, [Page 282] relating to her Operation and Works: Be­cause no figurative Motion can be imagin'd so absolutely compleat, excellent, and of certain continuance, as is circular Movement: By reason that no Part of a Circle can be Term'd its Beginning or End. Whereas con­trarily, no Motion can be made in a streight Line, but must have separate, intervall'd and terminated Parts: Which enough disproves the Allegation of this Author; as sure as that by Geometrical Dignity and Proof, the Cir­cle has a superlative perfection above all other Figures. And were it not to be so acknow­ledg'd, there is little reason, why the Wisdom of Providence should annex the admirable Computation of Days and Years to circular Revolution. But so much has been said, by way of Confutation, in my former Remarks, on this Subject, that I need not renew them here.

Nor is it requisite, that I should farther re­flect on his elaborate Expressions, Draughts, Schemes and Delineations, by which he un­dertakes to confirm the Motion of Things, in order to the Constructure of the Universe, together with the Being of the Earth; since, I doubt not, I have refell'd his total Hypothesis [Page 283] on which his Principles are grounded. Where­fore I shall pass from all of them, to the En­tertaining of my Reader with some especial Thoughts, relating to the Original of the World, and Earth, we inhabit, as are Ancient or Modern, of most erudite Reputation.

I. Concerning the Magnitude of the Universal World, the Questions are; Whether it be Infi­nite, or Finite, materially replenish'd or not?

II. As to its Duration, or Continuance; Whe­ther it had any temporary Beginning, or eter­nally Constituted?

III. As to Number; Whether it be one, or nu­merously Existing? Tho' as to Number, there can be no Controversie, if the World be granted Infinite; because there can be but one Infinite.

IV. Another grand Querie is, From what Cause, or Matter, was the World Originally Compos'd?

V. And next, From whence, or in what manner that Cause and Matter did proceed? Of these, Disputes have been rais'd, till ceas'd by Con­ceding of One, or more Eternity of Causes.

All which Particulars have been exquisitely Treated of, by great Philosophers; if the la­bour of their Search, could have been as satis­factorily [Page 284] repaid, by discerning of what they so earnestly sought: But they soon found that Infinite Science is inconsistent with Finite Un­derstanding: It being impossible, that in the most exquisite Imagination of Mankind, there should be an Idea, or Phantasm, of any Thing of Infinite Denomination, or Being, either as to Magnitude or Time: Because neither Magnitude, or Time can be Infinite­ly Computed: Insomuch, that nothing, but what is Infinite, can have an Infinite Con­ception.

So that should a Man, of the most subtil and refin'd Reason, undertake to argue from one Effect of an immediate Cause, and next to a Remoter; and by that manner of Rea­soning continually Ascend; he would find, That his Imagination could have no eternal Progression, but would fail, as if tir'd, by its stupendious Journey; or how to proceed far­ther, not at all impower'd to direct it self.

Nor is it consequently absurd, in the Judg­ment of Learned Philosophers, if the Structure of the Universe be thought either Finite, or Infinite; by reason that both, or either of those ways, of its Constituting, are alike pos­sible to the Conduct and Operation of the [Page 285] Almighty; as the World now is, or might so have been, formerly beheld, with whatsoever it contains.

If nothing can properly be said to Move, but as it is Mov'd by some Cause of Motion, which must be granted Supreme and Eternal: A main Querie depends on that Concession; which is, Whether Matter, the subject of Mo­tion, must not be also allow'd Eternal; in which Sense, the World might be held perpe­tually and motionally Existing: Contrary to the Opinion of Some; who determine, That the Omnipotent Cause, or Deity, was eter­nally Immoveable, or not at all Operative, untill the World's total Creation was miracu­lously compleated: But the Objection, against that Opinion, will be more difficultly An­swer'd; if urg'd, That whatsoever may be thought eternally Immoveable, cannot be probably conceded the primary Cause of Mo­tion; which Imply's a temporary, or Finite Beginning, as applicable to any Date of the World's Creation: A Consequence, in the Judgment of some, that Confirms the per­petuity of the World's material Consistence; as also, That, by Omnipotent Power it was al­ways in Motion till gradually perfected as it [Page 286] now Exists: It being, not at all, Inconsistent with Divine Power, if so ordain'd, That Matter should be unaccountably motional, in order to the stated Disposure, and exact Con­summation of whatsoever has Being, within the vast Circumference of Heaven and Earth: Yet no such Thing as Infinite Matter, in any consideration, rationally to be suppos'd the Original, out of which proceeded the World's Existence, with all its Particulars: By reason that it were a Geometrical Contradiction, should Matter be defin'd Infinitely subsisting: Since absolutely certain, that whatsoever may be Term'd Matter, Substance, or Body, must also be quantitively Commensurable: Wherefore, in this Case, the World might be, before Time was, materially Consistent; if duely distinguish'd betwixt Infinite, and eternal Duration; which by Omnipotent Will and Power might be effected, by determining a perpetual continuance of Matter, tho' not Infinitely Existing.

The great Philosopher Aristotle not a little concenter'd with the same Opinion, as he thought it more probable to appropriate Eter­nity to the material Being of the World; in opposition to the Sentiments of some Philo­sophers, [Page 287] who thought it was generated, accor­ding to the Opinion of Plato, by a certain Mutation from what it had been, to what it afterwards was, or now is.

But although, in the Judgment of Aristotle, the substantial Existence of the World was deem'd Everlasting; he could not believe, that its Matter was actually Infinite; because whatsoever is material must be quantitive, and therefore Mathematically computable, as before Instanc'd: So that if Aristotle be re­concil'd to Aristotle, he may be understood, to deny the Being of the World from any precedent Alteration, or Change that could proceed from its natural Composure, or any generative Faculty, that could be suppos'd in it, at all produc'd: But in this Belief▪ he does not absolutely oppose its total Crea­tion.

If he firmly conceiv'd, That it was never effected by any generative Method; he does not, by that Tenent peremptorily dissent from the possibility of its Existence, by a miraculous Creation: To which purpose, in his Second Book of the World, he Affirms, That the World, is the Ordainment of God: And in his Twelfth Book of Metaphysicks, he positively Asserts, [Page 288] That the World, and whatsoever it contains▪ de­pends on God as its Original Cause. Which duely apprehended, is more contiguous to Divine Allowance, than the Universal Principels of Catholick Des-Cartes; who having fill'd the World with one pure Element, and by that deter­mination left no Space or Room, whereby there may be imagin'd any natural Operation, by which the different Qualifications and Proprieties that he confers on his Vortices and Globuli, could be possibly deduc'd.

Insomuch, that it may be Affirm'd, That his petty Phaenomena's, together with his Hypo­thesis of the World's Production, are more Ir­rationally fabulous, than the little imperfect Notions of Atoms, expos'd in the Writings of Epicurus; who teaches, That the World, be­fore it had Beginning, did consist of most diminutive Places, that were not replenish'd with Bodies; his Reason is, That had such Pla­ces been fill'd with any Corporeal Beings, there could not have been Room for the Motion of his Atoms; because one Body might oppose, in the Space it possess'd, the Movement of another; and so frustrate in every kind, the progression of his Atoms, in order to the Constituting of Heaven and Earth: The Modalities of which Parti­cles [Page 289] of Nature, by Epicurus denominated A­toms, together with their motional Attributes, may methodically be read in the Writings of the Philosophical Poet Lucretius, to which I refer the Reader.

And next to proceed with Monsieur Des-Cartes, I find that he has not only elaborately Intrigu'd, if not unsuccessfully perplex'd his Brain, as I have precedently prov'd, by form­ing of such Materialities, and their Move­ments, whereby he would Embody the Fond, Situation and Existence of the Terrene World; but also, as he Imploys his farther Speculations on the Elements of Air and Wa­ter, as being of nearest vicinity to the Earth we Inhabit.

The Air, by his Definition, is of a tenuous and fluid Substance, congeriously compos'd of his Third Element, already mention'd; and there­fore declares it thin, and pellucidous. That the Air consists of a Fluid tenuity is undeniable; but not to be allow'd glist'ring or shining of it self; which is very evident, as we ocularly discern the capacious Complex of the ambi­ent Air, more, or less, Enlightned; and con­sequently Warmer, or Colder its Tempera­ture and Effects as it proportionably re­ceives, [Page 290] and is qualified, by Illuminations from Above.

And therefore not true, as inferr'd by this Author, that because the Air is of a liquid and tenuous Consistence, that it is therefore naturally, and not accidentally Lucid: If otherwise, why might not this opiniative Mon­sieur as well Attribute Inherent transparency, or shining, unto Water; that is so nearly ally'd to Air, in being of a fluid and thin Sub­stance? But who ever observ'd any shining in either of these Elements in a cloudy Day, or Night? So that Experience assures, That nei­ther Air, or Water have, in themselves, any Illuminating Propriety; unless he could con­vincs us, That a congeries of his Globuli, of which he Asserts the vast quantity of Air and Water is Compos'd, were glisteringly par­cell'd, like studded Diamonds: But allowing, neither them, nor their Vortices, and Elements from whence he derives them, any such Ca­pacity, or so much as a Being, in rerum natura, I cannot but totally reject them, wheresoever I find them, as formerly I have done.

My next remarkable Consideration shall refer to his 48th Particular, where he delivers [Page 291] the two main specifical Qualities that he an­nexes to the Nature of Water; some of which he determines flexible, others inflexible; and if separated one from another, some of them compose, or produce Salt Water, whilst o­thers sweet, or fresh.

This Principle of his can never be so per­fectly Season'd, as that it shall not taste of a Paradox, in the very Sense of the Word; as it is apply'd by common Understanding: For what is more distastful to obvious Intelli­gence, than to Attribute to the Fluidity of Water, a flexible, or inflexible Qualification? Whereas Water, by its appropriated Inclina­tion may be properly said to flow, but not to bend, or consider'd as absolutely Inflexible: A Stick, or Cane may be bow'd by the Hand; but can a Man so grasp a quantity of Water, as he may be thought to Inflect, or bend the liquid Material; or feel, in any of its fluid Substance, such an Inflexible Part; that he could not squeez, or if he did, im­mediately observe it stiffen'd into a Salt Com­position? Could this be readily perform'd by Manual Operation, it would doubtless ad­vantageously facilitate the Salt-Manufacture, and gratifie the Inventer with a Pension and [Page 292] thanks from the Publick, for his beneficial Project.

But I cannot perceive any such assurance in the Writings of this French Gentleman; if not rather, an Imaginary Perfection con­ferr'd by him on the Actings of his Globuli; as he supposes them sometimes to thin Water into Air, or thicken Air into Wa­ter: Much like the pretended Experiments of Empiricks, who boastingly teach, That their Operations consist of such a quintessence of Things, as were never understood before: Whereas indeed, 'tis a devis'd Tale of so ma­ny Non-Entities, as to any Use, or Effect, that could be actually perform'd by any real process of such Authors.

The next Exterior and Contiguous Ele­ment to Air is Water, as it is, by Philoso­phers, Elementarily understood; of which, In his 49th Particular he offers a very confide­rable Account, as he applys it to the Ebbing and Flowing of the Sea: The external Superficies of the Earth being, in some sort, surround­ed by the Ocean, whereby the Globulous Form of the Earth is more exactly com­pleated.

[Page 293] There is no Speculation, within the Pre­cincts of Nature, that has more perplex'd Learned Authors, than the Discovery they would attain, of the Causes that effect the Flux and Reflux of the Sea, every six Hours of Day and Night; as it is variously observ'd in different Climes, and Situations of the Earth.

But as to the Ocean in general, the same Compass of Time, relating to its Floating and Refloating is usually expended: Where­as in the Baltick, as also, in some other Seas, there are no such Egressions and Regressions of the Waves of the Sea; which failure is by some thought to proceed from the nar­rowness or streightness of the Shores, and the adjoyning Caverns of the Earth, not large enough to receive, or be fill'd with the huge Billows of the rolling Water: Or because the coldness of those Parts of the World, obstruct the Rarifying of Exhalations requi­sitely conducing to the sufficient Tumefying, or Swelling of the Waves that flow to their Shores.

Whether these Reasons, or more that might be added, have an effectual tendency in or­der to the various Fluxions, and Refluxions [Page 294] of the Ocean, observable in many Places of the Earth, I will not dispute; being more inclinable to believe, that it is a Secret more deeply absconded by Nature, than can be pe­netrated by the most accurate Inquisition of Humane Science.

Notwithstanding it may be Affirm'd, That the remote Cause may probably be deriv'd from the Etherial vigour of divers Stars; but most especially from the Moon, when gradually arising above the Horizon she di­sperses her Beams obliquely on the Ocean, and by that means warmes, as also exhales from the bottom of the Sea, such Exhalati­ons, that being Dilated, Tumefy'd, and con­sequently so weightily Increas'd, as, in a man­ner, they Revolve to Shores.

The next Diversity may be apprehended from the Degrees of Motion made by the Moon, as she departs from the Meridian, to­wards the West Part of the Horizon; by which Movement, she disperses her Raies and Light, less obliquely, and therefore not so efficaciously transmitted to the Sea, or gene­rative of Vapors; whence follows such a remission of the Tumidity of the Ocean, that it seems to Reside, and by so doing [Page 295] causes an Ebb or with-drawing from the Land.

Other Varieties of the Flowing and Eb­bing of the Ocean, as they depend on the Motion of the Moon by Day, or Night, might be mention'd here: But I conceive the Instances I have given are enough, and which I thought conveniently interpos'd; be­cause the most Remarkable Opinion amongst Philosophers, before I came to the Judgment of Des-Cartes, on this profound Subject.

To which purpose, he rely's on the Phae­nomena of his Vortices and Globuli, together with the Motion of the Earth and Sea, con­tiguous unto it, and a Scheme delineated to that end. On all which, I am oblig'd to In­sert no other Remark; than by insisting on my absolute denial of the total Hypothesis of his Vortices and Globuli, as also of the Earth's Motion, either Diurnal, or Annual; which by the Diagram that I have given, in the Third Part, I doubt not, is Geometrically demonstrated: So that it were a needless Repetition should I reiterate the same Con­futation.

In his 51st Particular, I confess, he has a Conceit, which, as to the Flux and Reflux [Page 296] of the Ocean, could I Correspond with the dependence it has on his other Systems, ap­pears to be Mathematically acceptable; by the Instance he gives, and seeming probation, why in Equinoctial Times, or when the Moon is either at Full, or at New; the Flowing of the Sea is greater than at other Seasons: Which he thinks he Confirms, by alledging, That the Moon, at such Times, and condition of her Light, has always a Vicinity to the Plane of the Ecliptick, and that the Earth, which he supposes motional, makes its Diurnal Progression, according to the Plane of the Equator: From whence, saies he, it comes to pass, that those two Planes Intersect one another, but in Solstitial Times are remotely distant: Concluding from thence, that the greatest Tides and Floatings of the Sea are in the Spring, and Autumn of the Year.

This Theorem, howsoever it may appear to have some fineness, suitable to the Coper­nican Dialect, much endear'd by this Author, does undeniably Subvert that whole Hypothe­sis: For were it granted true, That the Earth, by its Diurnal Motion, did vicinely Revolve, (as he Asserts) at the Time of the Equinocti­al, to the Plane of the Equator; the Point, [Page 297] or Zenith over our Heads, must in that In­stant be remov'd, or under the Equinoctial, and consequently some other Point, in that great Circle of the Sphere, be made our Ze­nith: The like may be Affirm'd, if the Earth were Imagin'd to be, by her Annual and Diurnal Motion in any Parallel to the Equa­tor: In all of which diversities, both the Zenith, as also the Elevation of the Pole, must more, or less, vary or alter, in every Minute and Day of the Year throughout the World; contrary to Astronomical Proof and Observation: By which, it is very manifest, that both the Zenith and Elevation of the Pole are constantly the same, suitable to the Situation of Climes, to which they apper­tain: All which, in the former Treatise, is lineally prov'd by me; as certainly as that there is such a Figure as a spherical Tri­angle.

If wav'd the improbable conjecture of the Motion of the Earth, by allowing the long receiv'd Hypothesis of the Sun's Diurnal and Annual Revolution in the Ecliptick: 'Tis not to be doubted, that when the Sun is in ei­ther of the Equinoctial Points, that the Moon is more approximately and directly impower'd [Page 298] by the vicine Illuminations that she then re­ceives from the Sun; by reason that the Ecliptick, only in those Seasons, meets the Equator in one and the same Point: And tho' when in opposition to the Sun, that is to say, at her Full, or greatest plenitude of Light, she has a greater horizantal Distance, visible to the Eye, at that instant of Time, than at an other: Yet receiving, in that remote Aspect, a more direct Illumination than she does in other positions of her Orb, she ope­rates more powerfully on the Ocean; because the Sun has, at that time, no declination from the Equator.

The like effect may be attributed to the newness of her Light, the Sun being in the Equator, when, in Conjunction with him there, she is Illuminated nearest to a direct or perpendicular Line, wherefore her Beams must necessarily operate more vigourously on the Sea; and thus, by the observable, Propriety that she has to dilate, and encrease Moisture, the Waves and Tides of the Ocean may well be granted more Impetuously high and swell'd, at Equinoctial Times, than at other Seasons: As also, that the Earth, allow'd the Center of the Equator, as it is [Page 299] contiguously surrounded by the Ocean, can­not but more efficaciously receive in that Estate and Position of the Luminaries, and especially of the Moon, a transcendent flow­ing of the Waters of the Main, that are nearest to the Verge of the Earth's Circum­ference.

In a word, when all is said that can be thought, on this Subject, there is no such Cause, to be prov'd, that in all Parts, in every National Being and Situation of the Earth, can be certainly applicable to the Flux and Reflux of the Sea, which is Experimen­tally found so variously different, both as to Time and Continuance, in all Parts of the Habitable World. Which cannot proceed from any uncertain Operation descending from above; but rather caus'd by interve­ning Obstructions arising from the diversities of the Temper of the Air, and Wind that alter and compell, more or less, the Motions of the Watery Element.

Other Reasons and Discussions of Authors tending to the Resolution of the fathomless difficulty appertaining to the Ebbing and Flowing of the Sea, might be here added: But finding them to be rather disputative [Page 300] than clearly demonstrative: I shall not bur­den the Ingenuity of a Reader, by Inscribing their perplexities with my Pen: Having, I conceive, deliver'd what is of greatest proba­bility on this wonderful Subject.

Of what Extent or Compass the Sea is I find not, in this, or other Writers. But that it is larger than the Earth, is evident; because it surrounds the Terrene World: And 'tis not to be doubted, that whatsoever con­tains is greater than any Thing contained by it.

But as to the Depth of the Ocean, 'tis Computed, by some accurate Navigators, not to be more than two and a half of En­glish Miles: Which is very strange, if the Depth of the Sea be taken for its Diame­ter. Considering that the Sea, for the rea­son here mention'd, is bigger than the Earth; but much less, if by its Depth be accounted its Diameter: As may be seen by the Com­putation, of the Diameter of the Earth, that I have formerly Inserted.

Thus far of the Earth, and its Exterior Parts.

[Page 301] As to the Inferior, I observe divers Par­ticulars mention'd by Des-Cartes; and which he supposes might be caus'd and produc'd by Ma­terials, according as he imagines their Ope­rations and Effects: But these being Things of small Consideration, or Improvement to Knowledge; as also that their Nature and Uses are, for the most part, as familiarly un­derstood, as that there are Plants and Mine­rals of several Tempers, and natural Pro­prieties: I shall therefore pass from them, to Things of more Moment; and next, as ve­ry commodious Interials of the Earth, re­lating to the necessary supportance of Hu­mane Life, examine the Philosophy of this Author, where he Inserts his Reasons, why Fountains and Springs that Emerge from within the Earth, should taste liquidly fresh; notwithstanding that in some Depths, or Wells, the Water is Salt.

To be sure he continues the Phaenomena's of his imaginary Elements, Vortices and Glo­buli, in order to the producing of Things, as well under as above the Surface of the Earth: And thus we have, from him, Fountains and Rivers replenish'd with Water. To which pur­pose, he has expos'd to the Eye, some impress'd [Page 302] Diagrams, by which he undertakes to explain such liquid Emanations underground, in the Cranie's of the Earth, in Similitude to the Circu­lation of Bloud in the Veins and Arteries of Men and Animals.

But this fanciful Monsieur, having not been able, as I have frequently observ'd, to De­monstrate either the necessary Being, Moti­on, or Capacity of such Materials, as he ve­ry confidently Introduces: I am apt to con­clude, That if the Earth had not been natu­rally Impower'd by other means, than such as are tender'd by Des-Cartes, whereby to sustain, and engender her liquid Existencies, in all the necessary Parts and Compositions of her Bo­dy: She had been endu'd with no more Moisture, than is to be found in the Sun­burnt Sands of Africa.

Real Causes there are, that may be defin'd perfectly Elementary, and therefore not ally'd to any Impotent Existencies, or such as may be term'd procreative Fathers and Mothers, on whose Mixtures depend all Terrestrial Mat­ter or Substances deliver'd with a simple Ele­mentary Name, by this Author.

And thus, in the Sense of approv'd Phi­losophy, Springs and Fountains, together [Page 303] with the sweetness of their Waters, may be deriv'd from Exhalations, which being Con­dens'd in the hollow Passages of the Earth, are converted into Water; as may be ob­serv'd of a kind of Breathings evaporated from a Pot of Liquor, that by the frigidity of its Cover are thicken'd into small Drops of a liquid Nature.

From whence it ensues, that great quan­tities of Sea-Water flowing in many Caverns of the Earth, such tenuous Parts are exhal'd from them that being moistly Condens'd are turn'd into Fountains.

He bids us not wonder, as indeed we need not, if in the bottom of some Wells, there may be found Salt-Water: Which he thinks might there remain, because the brinish liquidity is not strain'd or clear'd from the Water of the Seas as it passes to such Profundities.

That Water in some Wells is Salt, not­withstanding they are far distant from the Sea, is not to be doubted; but the reason he gives for their being so, is not certain: Because it is very likely, that the Sea-Water might not pass to any remote Parts within the Earth, and not be alter'd or purified from their saltness, by meeting, as also mixt, with abun­dance [Page 304] of fresh Water that passes and repas­ses within the Earth.

Nor is it impossible, that divers hot Sub­stances, as Minerals, and the like, contain'd in profound Places of the Earth; might not so efficaciously rarifie such quantities of Wa­ter, that the residue would remain thicken'd, and therefore more aptly inclin'd to saltness.

But as the Supremer and not less Impor­tant Cause of the saltness of Water in Wells, especially of some that are farthest distant from the Sea, may be reasonably thought to proceed from the powerful Exhalations effected by the Sun and Stars; by whose Influence and Heat, the tenuous Parts of Wa­ter are Extracted, tho' from deepest Wells, leaving such a crassitudeness, in the residue as gives to it a Salt Qualification. Nothing be­ing more certain, than that whatsoever is thicken'd, and thereby render'd more dryly adust, especially where Earth has any Com­mixture with it; saltness, as its concomi­tant Quality, will be there found.

The same Reason may be given for Salt, discover'd in Mountains, mention'd by this Author.

[Page 305] Nor is the Cause at all different, if not more obviously expos'd, from whence pro­ceeds the briny Relish of the Superficies of the Ocean: Which openly Revolving under the Celestial Luminaries, has its tenuous Parts supremely Exhaled, and consequently the Regions replenish'd with Clouds; which be­ing dissolv'd into Drops of Rain, there is no Salt Acerbity to be perceiv'd in them; which proves, That the Moisture exhal'd from the Sea is of a more tenuous Substance than that which is left behind, and therefore of a fresher Taste.

To which may be added experimental as­surance, that the Sea is less brackish at bot­tom than on its superficial Parts: Which sufficiently confirms, that the Saltness of Sea-Water is produc'd by the Motion and Heat that is Influenc'd by the Sun and Stars.

That the Waters of the Ocean are rather accidentally than naturally Salt; as also, that they purge themselves in their passage to Shores, may be signally noted from the Ex­periment made by Julius Caesar; who when Besieg'd in Alexandria, caus'd Pits to be digg'd in the Shore of the Sea, which reliev'd his Army with Water potably fresh; by reason [Page 306] that the Sea-Water had its Saltness, in a manner strain'd, as it pass'd thorough the Sands on the Shore.

That the Southern Ocean is salter than the Northern, can be effected from no other Cause, than that the Sea, in that Part of the World is Warmer than the other; correspon­dent to the Air and Winds, that coming from the South are Hotter, to Sense, than those which are blown from the North.

There is no Question more Controverted by Philosophers, then the Causes that limit and confine the Ocean, tho' by its Elemen­tary Propriety higher than the Superficies of the Earth, and perpetually supply'd with innumerable Springs, Fountains, Rivers and Flouds, that vastly Unite their Currents, as they elapse from the inward and outward Parts of the Earth: Yet do not so replenish the Sea, however by Nature elevated above the Terrene World, that it executes that Pre­rogative by a general Inundation: Or by par­ticular Exorbitancy, gain more on any Part of the Earth's Surface than it loses in another.

The Reason of which, as it is render'd by some of erudite Proficiency, is, because great quantities of the Water of the Sea, are re­ceiv'd [Page 307] by Caverns within the Earth; as like­wise, that the Ocean is much commixt with Terrene Materials, which depress, in divers Places of the Sea, the outragious height and swelling of its Waves, before they arrive to Shores: As also, that the hard Composition and Dryness of the Earth, contiguously resist the Attacks made by the Water.

These Instances, I doubt not, are sounder Probabilities, tending to the Decision of the Grand Question, (before mention'd) than any to be deduc'd from the Reasons given by Des-Cartes: Which are so complicated, if not intricately perplex'd, that he might have spar'd his endeavour to explain them by any Draughts, or Schemes; which, if duely In­spected, would rather expose their Obscu­rity, than Intelligibly clear them to the Sense of the Peruser.

And thus I pass to what he Writes of Things contain'd in the Internal Parts of the Earth, together with their Causes: The most prin­cipal of which relate to Earth-quakes, the Eruption of Flames out of Mountains, such as are observ'd of Aetna in Sicily, and Vesu­vius, in Campania. Of these, proceeding from subterraneous Effects, Operations and [Page 308] Causes; I cannot find, if granted his Prin­ciples, That a more accurate Discovery is explicated by his Pen, than what has been Written of their wonderful Productions and Consequences by others.

Much he Inscribes of Stones, Minerals, and in Summ, without enumerating of their several Denominations, of the principal Things that are contain'd in the Bowels of the Earth. But most especially, he Treats of the Magnet, or Load-stone, together with its admired Proprieties.

This precious Stone, above all value for its commodious and extraordinary Use; whose transcendent Excellencies untill disco­ver'd, in some few Ages past, was wanted to the Conduct of most Approv'd Naviga­tors: Who, before understood the Sympa­thetick Virtues and wonderful Attraction of the Magnet, as by its affectionate Touch, the Points of a Needle are directive on the Ocean; were too frequently, without a Guide, be­nighted, and wanderingly toss'd on the wa­tery World; or necessitated to Furl their Sails, and fix Anchors in the bottom of the Main, untill discern'd the Munificent appea­rance of some noted Star, whose Motion, being Calculated, directed their Journey on the Waves of the Sea.

[Page 309] Whereas now, the Pilot more certainly Sails by the Compass that contains his Ma­gnetical Needle, than, he could, before its Invention, by any other Computation. By what means, or happy Accident, this admi­rable Benefit, whose secret Cause and Effica­cy is so occultly reserv'd by Nature, from the eruditest Search of the Learned, was first Discover'd; seems rather the beneficial Act of Providence, than concentring with Humane Invention.

Notwithstanding all which, Des-Cartes is so fondly confident of his supposs'd Phaenomena's, in every consideration, that he doubts not to promulge, as he would be taken for a para­mount Minister to the Counsels of Nature, such Secrets, that being enclos'd in her Cabinet, could only be Reveal'd by him. To which purpose, he presents his Reader with no less than Thirty Four Particulars, whereby he would explain the mysterious Sympathy of the Load-stone and Iron.

On which I am oblig'd to bestow no other Remark, than by taxing of their dependan­cies on the Construction and Management he gives to his fabulous Elements, Vortices and Globuli; by which he attempts to Con­stitute [Page 310] the World, and all its Individuals, together with their occultest Qualifications, and manner of Existence: As surely as he Imagines, that in this Place, he has Decipher'd every Syllable relating to the obscurest Contex­ture, Being, and Nature of the Magnet; the most useful Jewel of Stones, with all its Ex­cellencies.

Had it not been as easie for this Author, having furnish'd his Brain with so many Noti­ons, Theories and Systems, by which he under­takes to penetrate and display the total Recesses of Nature, to have given a Philosophical Rea­son, Why the Remora, tho' one of the least of Fishes, adhering to the Stern or Rudder of a great Ship, should stop her Course, when under Sail, in a Tempestuous Sea? Or, Why the Eyes of a Crab-Fish should burst the Stone engender'd in the Bladder of Man? Yet these Experiments are related by un­doubted Authors; but so as they are referr'd to ocult Causes, or such as are impossible to be extricated by Humane Comprehension: On which account Pliny, the great Natu­ralist, acknowledges, that there are many Things, wholly absconded, by the Majesty of Nature.

[Page 311] From whence I conclude, That had this Learned Monsieur been as modest, in his Opinion, he had never propo'sd any Maxims of his, in order to Frame the miraculous Con­sistence of the Universal World, by Materials and Operations of his devising: For doing of which, however the labour of his Pen, and pregnancy of his Fancy, might in those re­spects, acquire Applause: Yet, in a Judicious construction, they cannot be allow'd any other Encomium, than may be given to Ovid, for the first Line, or Introduction, to his fictiti­ous Poem; where he tells his Reader, that In nova fert animus mutatas dicere formas Corpora—To be plain: I would as soon rely on the Metamorphosis of that Poet, by which he fabulously produces the Universe, with all its Appurtenances; as confide, on that account, on the Principles engender'd by the Brain of Des-Cartes. Not but I grant, that the most accurate Thinker, even where Causes of Things are obscurely Envelop'd, will signally attain the nearest room to Phi­losophical Reputation.

Notwithstanding, the endeavours of Men are so far unfortunately obstructed; that where Knowledge is most desir'd, and would [Page 312] requisitely be embrac'd, the greatest difficul­ties not seldom Interpose: Insomuch that the Faith we assign to the Zenith of our Sal­vation above; Encounters, too often, the Soul with dubious Sentiments, that in a na­tural Conception are more remote from our Apprehension; than the absconded Cause that guides the Magnetical Needle to Epitomize a Line that would direct its Points towards the vastly distant Poles of the World.

The main Supposition of this Author, and on which chiefly his before-mention'd Thirty Four Particulars, relating to the especial Incli­nation of the Magnet, or the Needle touch'd by it, to regard the Nothern and Southern Points of Heaven; is, That he supposes two Poles in the Magnet that respect those Parts, or Poles on which he imagines the Earth to Move. But how the Load-Stone should be accomplish'd with two such Poles, that Sympathetically affect those Points of the World, he offers no natural Reason for their Consistence or Operation.

Some of the Learned have thought, that by a secret Sympathy Influenc'd by Nothern and Southern Stars, the Magnetical Needle points towards them.

[Page 313] Others have more naturally, appropriated the Cause to vast quantities of Iron situated, as some think, under the North, or South Pole of the World: From which Opinion, perhaps as probable as any other, may be in­ferr'd, That if one end of the Needle does steadily Point Northward, the other will as certainly Point Southward; because the Nee­dle will be then demonstratively in the same Plane, with the Meridian Line, if not acci­dentally hinder'd:

As may be Geometrically prov'd by the fol­lowing Diagram: Let the Point of the Ma­gnetical

Needle be in M, in the Line A B; [Page 314] to which Point the Line N M falls per­pendicularly, from the North Pole N, on the Point M: It is manifest, that the Point in M, if continued to S, as it is here signi­fied by the prickt Line M S; shall be in the Plane of the Meridian Line extended from N M to S: Because the Lines C D E F, and A B are perpendicular to the Line N M, in the Point of their common Interfections at M: So that the other end of the Magne­tical Needle will respect in the same direct Line, the South Point of the Meridian: But if it had directed its Point obliquely to that, or any other Point in the Line A B, the Variation would have been equal to the di­stance of that Point, or Angle made by it, from the Plane of the Meridian Line N M.

But notwithstanding the strong Inclinati­on, or sympathetical Affection, that the Magne­tick Needle has directly to represent the two Polar Points of the World: 'Tis frequently observ'd, that in some Places of the Earth, 'tho not far distant from one another, it con­siderably differ'd, if compar'd with what it does in other Situations.

[Page 315] And what is more admirable, if plac'd, as near as could be judg'd, on the same foot of Ground, it has at one time more or less vary'd, than at another: And thus it is fre­quently observ'd that very near the same Place, higher, or lower, or on the contrary Sides of a Wall or Window, that the Magnetical Needle hath pointed on contrary sides of the Meridian: Which might be from different Azimuths, as the Compass was plac'd; much like to the Sub­stile of a declining Dyal on several Plaines.

Whether caus'd by some Aspects and Motions of Stars, Alterations of the Air, Water, Earth, and Seasons of the Year, or Metals conceal'd within the Surface of the Earth: If not, as some have Imagin'd, di­verted, or variously drawn aside by quan­tities of Iron that in Towns and Cities, were more, or less, when Observation has been made, near their Precincts: As was the Opi­nion of Learned Gilbert, who is said to have spent 50000 Crowns on his endeavour to find out the Secret. But whatever were the Cause; I think it not improper to mention the signal Observation made by practical Mr. Gunter, in the 279 Page of his Book, where he Writes, that being inform'd in [Page 316] what place Mr. Bourough, in the Year 1580, had observ'd the Variation of the Compass at Limehouse near London, compar'd with the Azimuth of the Sun, to be 11 dig. 15 m. That he on the 13th of June, 1622, made Observations on several Parts of the Ground in that Place; and could find the greatest Variation of the Needle to be but 6 deg. 10 m. Which differs from the Observation made by Mr. Bourough 5 deg. 5 m. And tho' betwixt these Observations there was 42 Years difference; it may be demonstratively concluded from them, that if the Earth be suppos'd to Move, as Des-Cartes Imagines, it could not vary its Poles, nor the Magne­tical Needle, if granted, with him, to have Poles also, by the Virtue it receives from the Touch of the Magnet; because both these Learned Authors made their Experi­ment in the same Place.

Having consider'd these Observations, and not knowing whether, or not, the Variation of the Compass had been observ'd at Wind­sor, where I now Reside, I made, from a high and convenient Place, these following Obser­vations, by comparing the Magnetical Azi­muth [Page 317] of a Needle six Inches long, and I believe exactly touched, with the Azimuth of the Sun, from the Meridian Eastward; or all one, as to Calculation, if number'd from the Meridian Westward, and found the several Variations of the Compass in this present Year, September the 9th, 1699, betwixt the Hours of Four and Five in the Afternoon, according to the several Altitudes of the Sun, as in this Table Inserted.

If the mean pro­portional

Number be computed be­twixt the first Va­riation and the last, as they are Inscrib'd in this Table, it will be found 14 deg. 51 m. which differs but 3 deg. 37 m. from Mr. Bourough's Observation: Which might be his Method, as he might observe betwixt Hours: Or else, from a suitable Altitude of the Sun, made his Observation; which is more probable, the Needle standing at one and the same Point, as it will do for some time, at least, if it be exact; than that his Ob­servation, at one and the same Place at Lime­house, [Page 318] should differ so many Degrees, as are above noted, from the Variation of the Com­pass found there by Mr. Gunter: In Summ, I found that Mr. Gunter's Observation of the Variation of the Compass, at the first place he observ'd when the Sun was at 19 deg. of Altitude, for he mentions several; differ'd but 3 deg. 20 m. from the first of mine, as his Needle might Point Westward from the Meridian, and mine Eastward, which was at 19 deg. 11 m. of the Sun's Al­titude: From whence I conclude, That had he made his Observation at the same Al­titude and Declination of the Sun, as was done by me, there had been proportiona­bly the same difference, if compar'd with my Table; supposing his Magnetical Azi­muth to have continu'd at 82 deg. 2 m. as it was first in his; and his Observations, at his first Station, at Limehouse, as many as mine.

In a Word, having duely ponder'd the Calculations made by my self and o­thers, whereby to attain the exact Determi­nation of this Great, and as yet unresolv'd Secret of the Variation of the Compass: I consider'd, that as the Magnetical Needle did Point, for the most part certainly, at [Page 319] so many Degrees of Variation, as it will do for a considerable space of Time, if the Needle be as perfect as it ought to be; that there could be no surer Method, than to find such a Theorem, as should, as near as possible, demonstrate the Annual Varia­tion of the Compass: To which purpose, I devis'd this Process:

If betwixt the Sun's Declination of 30 m. from the Equator, as also his Altitude, sup­pose 30 m. or less, if thought necessary, be taken the mean proportional Sine, betwixt his Azi­muth at 30 m. of Declination and Altitude, and the Complement in Degrees, of the most constant standing of the Magnetical Azimuth; and next that the same be done from his greatest Declination, wanting 30 m. and 30 m. of Altitude, and the difference taken be­twixt both the Mean Proportionals so found; it is probably, the most certain way to find the Variation of the Compass, in any one Place, throughout the Year.

Example.

By my Observation at Windsor, Sept. 9th, 1699: I found the most constant and fix'd [Page 320] Point of the Magnetical Needle to be 33 deg. Eastward from the Meridian, or the same if ac­counted Westward from the Miridian, whose Complement to 90, is 57 deg. The Mean proportional Sine betwixt the Sun's greatest Azimuth at 30 m. Of Altitude and Decli­nation and the Magnetical Azimuth was 66 deg. 19 m.: And the Mean proportional Sine betwixt the Magnetical Azimuth, and his Azimuth of greatest Declination wanting 30 m. and Altitude 30 m. was 51 deg. 21 m.: The difference betwixt which Mean Pro­portionals is 11 deg. 58 m.: Which I take to be the most approximate Variation of the the Compass at Windsor, in the Place where I observ'd, that can be given throughout the Year.

After these Observations, I continu'd the Needle for several Weeks in the same Place, and found the difference of its Pointing very inconsiderable, or not varying a Degree from whence it had stood before; as also, that it sometimes return'd to the very De­gree, to which it had precedently pointed: Which as I discern'd was upon Change of Weather; and inclin'd me to conclude, That as Clocks and Watches go truest in a se­rene [Page 321] Season, and temperature of the Air, that the Magnetical Needle might likewise somewhat vary: It being not less probable, that it might be so affected, considering its Elementary Temper, as well as other mix'd Bodies. And I am very apt to impute its temporary Variation, chiefly to that Cause, rather than to any other: Tho' I well know, that not a few pretend to other Reasons; or such as I have already Instanc'd.

As also how they infer, That in Places re­mote from Towns and Cities, the Magnetical Needle does more, or less vary: Which Ob­servations were they Judiciously made, and Methodically collected and compar'd, might doubtless be a performance that would be gratefully receiv'd; and in some respects for­ward the Curiosities of Men to a more re­quisite Reasoning, or useful discovery of the Causes and Effects, that are admirably Im­ply'd in the Proprieties of the Load-stone.

But if Des-Cartes had been ask'd the Cause of these Diversities, or Variations in the Magnetical Needle, however impossible as he grounds his Opinion, by reason of the Ob­servations I have Inserted; he would confi­dently [Page 322] have referr'd them to the Consistence and Qualifications that the Magnet, in his Sense, receives from some one or more of his Invented Elements; by which he supposes that particular Parts of the Load-stone are chan­nell'd, or craggy, more or less, suitable to such striated, or hollow Particles of the Earth that respect its two Poles North and South.

But how comes the Earth to have two such Poles, if by Poles be understood, as in an Astronomical Sense they ought, Points in the Axis of a Sphere, or Planetary Orb? I may conclude, that if the Earth be Im­movable, as I presume has been egregiously prov'd in the Third Part of my Remarks, then the Earth has no such Poles, as he would pro­vide for her.

Or were I a Cartesian Proselyte, and should grant, according to his Hypothesis, That the Earth is Imbu'd with a Diurnal and Annual Motion suitable to the Vortex, by which, in the Opinion of this Author, she does Revolve: Must I not also Affirm, That if the Magnet has correspondent Poles with the Earth, that it also Concenters, in all respects, with the same Motion? But where is the Man that ever observ'd, or can reasonably Infer, That [Page 323] any such Movement is Incident to the Load-stone, more than to a Flint, or Peeble?

The most probable Reason that is gi­ven for the diversified Variation, at seve­ral times and places, observ'd, of the Ma­gnetical Needle, as it experimentally relates, to different Points of the Compass, may, in Summ, be referr'd to what this Author cites from our Country-man the Learned Gilbert; who chiefly imputes the Cause of the diversities to some Inequalities or altera­ble Tempers in the Superficies of the Earth: Or because there are more Load-stones in some Parts of the terrene World than in other: To which may be added, agreeable to the Opinion of Des-Cartes, that in some Seasons, more Iron is digg'd out of the Earth, and convey'd to distant Places, or Regions for publick and private Uses: Which might contribute much to the changeable Variati­ons of the Magnetical Needle; as they have been by Learned Observators, at several times, differently Computed.

Upon the whole Matter, tending to the great Secret of the Needle touch'd by the Magnet, I find not, that the Inferences, above menti­on'd, are more passable with me, than any [Page 324] Allowance of mine, correspondent to the Opinion, of this Author of Poles in the Earth, or Affinity with them in the Load-stone, or Virtue, on that account, conferr'd by him on the Needle.

Wherefore I judge, that I may with found­er confidence adhere to the Reasons and Ob­servations, precedently offer'd by me, than on any determination of the Magnetical Secret, tender'd by this Writer: The Max­ims and Principles of Des-Cartes being so entirely deduc'd and connected by him, that if one of his Particulars be Answer'd, he gives no labour to his Opposer to have to do with more. Which I confess I take for a favour, tho' possibly against his Intention. And should I have been more Elaborate in my pursuit, or Conviction of his Tenents, as I perceive them perplex'dly deliver'd, and entangled both in the Sense, Method, Fi­gures and Schemes, by which he does, in a manner, no less pose himself than his Reader; my Replications would have been no less ungrateful to a Judicious Peruser, than if I had elaborately undertaken by one obscurity to manifest another: So that I may safely conclude, that the occult Quality, [Page 325] in reference to the Magnet, with all its Pro­prieties, is not more darkly reserv'd by Na­ture, than 'tis envelop'd in the Writings of Des-Cartes. Nor need I repeat, that if I have render'd Invalid his First main Particular; by proving, as I have done, neither the Earth, or Magnet has any such Poles, or Motion, Incident to his Hypothesis; I may undoubtedly alledge, that his other Positions are totally Ineffectual.

And thus I pass to his 184th Particular, where he mentions some other Things, as Jet, Rosin, Wax, Vitriol and the like; to which he annexes, in resemblance of the Magnet, a Propriety where­by they Attract other diminutive Bodies: But of these not having made such perfect Experi­ments, as might render them clearly Intelligible, or grounded no less evidently, in his Judgment, than he has signified by the Composition, and Motions of Things, deducible from his supposed Elements, already disprov'd by me: He does, to as little purpose, Instance their Names and Natures. And therefore require no farther Discussion: It being my essential Design to limit, chiefly my Remarks to such Heads and Places of his Tractates, that I judge usefully conducing to the Improvement of Science, or [Page 326] whatsoever by the Humane Mind would be most desirably understood: To which pur­pose, I will take occasion from the hint he de­livers of his Intention to compleat this Fourth Part of his Philosophy, wherein he has given, (after his manner) the Earth a Formation and Being, together with divers Things relating to its external, and internal Comprehension; by ad­ding his Treatments of the Original Production of Animals, Plants and Mankind.

The last of which I shall principally insist on; tho' wav'd, or deferr'd by him, in his 188th Particular, to some future Treatises, of which he was not fully resolv'd, or, at that time, furnish'd with leisure, or thoughts proper for his design'd Enterprise on those Subjects: Yet I find, that the Substance, of what he omits here, and especially that of the Original of Humane Production, is to be read in the 29th Page of his Distertatio de Methodo, or the right use of Reason, in order to the Investigation of the Truth of Science: Which I conceive was written before the Principles of his Phi­losophy; or indeed an Epitome, for the most part, of what is to be found in them.

[Page 327] Wherefore, I shall briefly select from thence, so much of his Method, tending to the primitive Existence of Mankind; as also by what Cause, or operation, individual Man was originally Constituted in his admirable Form, and, more than wonderful Intellectu­al Capacity.

The Summ of all which he comprehends in these Words: viz. That God did form the first Being of the Humane Body in all things correspondent to what it is now; both in the External structure of Members, as also in the Internal and Organical Parts, produc'd out of the same matter, by which is meant by Des-Cartes, his first Element, as before remark'd by me. The method by which he supposes that God compleated the primary formation of Man, he takes to be no other than a corporeal substance, without either Sensitive, or Animated Proprieties, or, such as are observable in Plants, or Beasts, but only endu'd in the Heart with a kind of Fire without light, which he compares to a Hay-rick, distemperately warm before it is thoroughly dry; or the calefaction that is in new Wine, be­fore separated from its Dregs.

But how he comes to give an Existence to Fire, in the original production that he confers [Page 328] on the Humane Body; is no less contradictory to Sense, than if he had Affirm'd, that Flame could be infus'd into any Corporeal Thing without its Illuminating Capacity.

True it is, that Hay ill-digested will smoak in the Stack, or Mow; and if not prevented set the whole on Fire: And likewise experimen­tally certain, that New Wine will ferment, un­till cleans'd by its Operation; the latter, by reason of its predominant Quantity of Moi­sture, not capable of being inflam'd, as will the former; that by prevalent dryness, op­posing of its Moisture, smoaks and burns, by degrees, unless hinder'd, the Hay's distemper'd Substance.

And is it not a mean conceited Similitude of­fer'd by Des-Cartes, by which he would render the Corporeal Figure of Original Man, as di­stemperately Consistent, tho' the immediate Manu­facture, as he dilivers it, of the Omnipotent? Yet being so far effected, could have no o­ther Representation, than as the Material Composition might be Imagin'd to fumigate, or Smoak at the Nose and Mouth, in re­semblance to the distemperatures of Hay and Wine, mention'd by him, yet not potentially operative, either by Rarifaction or Condensation; [Page 329] tho' impossible to be suppos'd where any Thing is capacitated to Evaporate, Thicken, or Harden, that it should not be naturally endu'd with suitable Qualifications: Which is grosly deny'd by this Author, as he conceives, That Fire might be so diffus'd, by the Act of God, into the Substance and Composition of Ori­ginal Man, that it might be destitute of its proper Effects; either as to Alteration, or Di­minution of the Matter that contain'd it: And if so, he must be very obscurely conceited, that would imagine a blind Fire uselessly Con­stituted in the first Humane Body by Omni­potent Power.

The Material Substance out of which he con­cludes the primary Being of Man's Corporeal Shape and Proportion, is doubtless abstracted by him from his primary invented Element, and which he denominates the sole Materiality of whatso­ever the World contains.

But that Element, according to his Defini­tion, being exceedingly Fluid and Tenuous, and no room left, by reason of its plenary Existing for any other Thing, or Substance through­out the Universe, as I have precedently men­tion'd; 'tis very Incompatible with common Understanding, that this simple Matter, and [Page 330] therefore incapable to produce any other Substance different from its own; should by Des-Cartes be presum'd, if pardon'd the Ex­pression, to fill the Hands of the Almighty in or­der to Constitute the total World withall its admir'd Particulars, in a natural Method: Which seems no less Improbable, than if a Man should undertake, by grasping of Air, to make it of as solid a Substance, as is the Flesh and Bones of Man.

But waving that Absurdity, as also, that Fire without Light, was originally convey'd by God, according to his Supposition, into the then, unliving Heart of Man, only to warm that prin­cipal Part; If Fire could be thought so to reside, contrary to its elementary Nature and consuming Propriety, untill this Author ima­gin'd the whole Humane Body first Animated, by the infusing of the Soul by the Act of the Almighty: What could be imply'd by it, more than, that Fire was Ineffectually dispos'd into the lifeless Heart of Man by Divine Appoint­ment; yet not at all operative, otherwise than by impertinently warming of the Part with­out either vegetative, or sensitive Heat, as he defines it? Which were all one as to conceive, That the Omnipotent seem'd to do something, [Page 331] by an extraordinary Method, tho' nothing farther Excellent, in reference to the Original Figure of Man's Corporeal Being, than if a skillful Statuary had Compos'd the likeness of the Humane Body in any Material Sub­stance.

Wherefore the Fable of Prometheus tending to his forming of Man out of Elementary Ingredients, not a little resembles the devis'd Part of the Almighty, as it is deliver'd by this French Philosopher; with this difference, that Prometheus is said at once to compleat, by a Celestial Expedient, his Artificial Man; where­as several Operations are allow'd by Des-Cartes, even to the Work of the Omnipotent; tending to the primary Production of the Humane Body and Soul.

Nor do I preceive, That this Author, if allow'd the fineness of his Invention, does more sublimely Celebrate the introducing of the Soul of Man into his imaginary Ma­terial Machine, than is Divinely Attributed to the Fable of Prometheus, the Son of Iapetus, in the Metamorphosis of Ovid; where 'tis thus Express'd,—

This Fable may be taken as an Imitation of Providence, by the Artifice of Prometheus: Who, having moulded the Statue of Man, could not perfect his Work, untill he had stole Celestial Fire; and by conveying it into the Material Figure, which he had Compos'd, the Life and Soul of Man was at once pro­duc'd: Which was very agreeable to the Religion of the Ancients, which Celebrated their Gods, and Goddesses, in the Form of Men and Women; and Ensoul'd them wth no greater difference, compar'd with Man­kind; than as they allow'd to their Deities Immortal Reason and Life. To which Ovid seems refin'dly to allude in one of his Elegies, where as a sublime Encomium of the excellency of the Faculties and Gifts, incident to the Hu­mane Soul, he derives its Descent from above, by Affirming, That—Sedibus aethereis spiritus ille venit.

[Page 333] This Expression of the Poet is not more Poetical, than Admirable, as he intends the Soul to the Perfection, Reason and Conduct, evidently discernable in Stars, the shining Or­naments of Heaven: But should the Soul be suppos'd originally Infus'd by God, as a think­ing Substance into the Body of Man, suitable to the Imagination of Des-Cartes, and not abso­lutely capacitated to discharge it self from the innate Depravations and prone Allurements of the Senses, 'twere some disparagement to its Accession to the Body by the Gift and Ordain­ment of Divine Providence.

Yet such an uncertain and complicated Soul is, by this French Writer, appropriated to the Body of Man, where, in some Actions, he makes it a meer thinking Substance; but in the sensible execution of Thought, he allows it Co-operative and inseparable from the Senses: And this, to the utmost force of his Brain, he Asserts in the 187th Particular of this Part I Treat of, where he delivers these Words—The nature of the Mind is such, that by it alone may be apprehended divers Corporeal Motions, as also Sensations in many respects. The Example he gives, is of Words spoken, or written, which may affect us with Troubles, Griefs, Perils, Sadness, or the [Page 334] like; as also, how their contrary Accents in refe­rence to Content, Pleasure, and Satisfaction, are verbally understood by us.

Which signifies no more, however he strains his Inferences, than, that there is an Inseparable Concomitancy of the Contemplations of the Mind, and their applications to the Senses. If I open a Book, and view in it a whole Page of Letters; by a meer superficial Inspection of what is there Written, or Printed, I can understand nothing; but if I Conster those Words, as their tendency and meaning Imply, I am soon Intelligent, whether they relate to Sorrow, Gladness, Pain, or Grief; either as to my self, or any other Person: Because I am perfectly apprehensive of their Motives, Cau­ses and Effects; as they sensibly Incite my Conception of them. The Reason is plain, if consider'd the reciprocal Allowance and Re­ference, that any one of our Senses has to ano­ther; it being as easie for me to determine, by seeing a Bone, or Lump of Flesh at distance, that they are really such as if they had been touch'd, or handled by me. If I hear of an Arm or Leg, by any means, sever'd from the Body of Man; the Connexion that the Senses have with the Imagination, as undoubtedly [Page 335] assure me of the manner of the Wound, Grief, and Part cut off, as if I had occularly beheld it. Not that I can directly judge the Quality, or full extent of the Pain that is not distinctly felt by my self: Yet as the Part is an Object of Sense, and in which I, as well as another Man, may be in the same kind, grie­vously Afflicted; 'tis very possible, that by a natural Sympathy, which is reciprocally Con­ferr'd on the sensitive Parts of the Bodies of Men; I may, in effect, be as sensibly Intelli­gent of the Pain, or Grief, in any Member of another Person; as if with the Point of a Wea­pon, I should wound the same Part of my own Body.

And did not the Soul and Senses thus ap­prehensively Conspire; there would not be that Reluctancy, Defence, and Prevention, us'd by us, for the safety of our Corporeal Parts; nor should we be so actually sensible that Mortality is the inevitable consequence of unsupportable Violence, Wounds, and Maladies, that surrender our Bodies to Death. And this clearly invalidates the Allegations and Instances, that he gives, on this Head, to­gether with the Example he mentions of a Sword that may so hurt, or dismember any Part of the [Page 336] Body, that we may in Mind, be grievously appre­hensive of the local Motion of the Force, or Blow, as it wounds the Part; tho' the Motion of the Sword and Body hurt, be very different: From whence he concludes, That the Humane Mind by a bare speculation of local Motion, together with its forcible onset made on the Body, may judge of all Corporeal Afflictions and Sensations whatsoever.

And is not this a pretty kind of Quibble in Des-Cartes, by not considering, That it was not the Motion of the Blow, or the wounded Part that represented to the Intellect, or Mind, the hurt receiv'd; but as the Pain of the Member, or Part, assur'd the Imagination un­to which it was inseparably united? It being very possible, for a Man to be sensibly appre­hensive of a Wound, or Blow, tho' he does not conceive, or see the Motion of the Wea­pon that gave it: But as he is sensible of the Pain, he could not doubt, that it was effected by forcible means, tho' no otherwise relating to the Wound; or more diversified from sen­sible Conception, than, on this occasion, this Author does render the Mind, or what he calls a Thinking Substance, by a modality of Thinking without Sense.

[Page 337] Nor is it Imaginable, how any Thing, that is not Elementarily Compos'd, can operate on the Humane Body that is so constituted: Wherefore the Word Substance, applied to the Soul, cannot be understood Incorporeal, by the determination of Des-Cartes, who, where­soever he treats of Substance, appropriates unto it quantitative and dimensive Parts, both in a Plilosophical and Mathematical Consideration: And particularly, in the last Page of this Fourth Part of his Philosophy, condemns the Doctrine of Atoms, deliver'd by Democritus; because he allows them no Commensurable Quantity.

Had it been demanded of this French Phi­losopher, What kind of Substance must be the Essence of the Soul, when separated by Death, from the Body, in whose Elementary Composition it did precedently Exist? He could not define it otherwise than quantitative, as every Thing, call'd Substance, is by his Opi­nion allow'd to be; and therefore the same after the period of the Body's Life. And consequently, no less agreeable to his Doctrine, if Affirm'd, That the thinking Substance, call'd by him the Humane Soul, must have, when separated from the Body, a Circumscrib'd, or Elementary Being, suitable to the Nature [Page 338] of Substance, as it may be conceiv'd quanti­tatively Dimensive. Which Objection should a Cartesian endeavour to evade by Affirming, That the Soul separated from the Body is progressive to the Sphere of Spirits, or Things superlatively refin'd and stripp'd from Mat­ter; and unto which some allow Definitive, not Circumscrib'd Beings; he must next grant, That the Soul cannot have Existence there, otherwise than in a Material Superficies proportionable to its Substance, and there eternally Circumscrib'd, where Spirits and Immaterial Beings are without such Limits; which were all one as to reside temporally amongst spiritual Existencies. To avoid which Absurdity, he cannot be thought to mean otherwise, than that the Soul, upon its imme­diate departure from the Body, is Metamorphos'd into a Spirit: And next, that it has a spiritu­al Passage through all Elementary Bodies that intervene betwixt it and its immaterial Residence appointed by God.

But here may arise a Querie, Whether Motion can be Attributed to any Thing without Body? Or in what manner it can Move, where Bodies are, or be in Motion, with­out removing of them? Which, in that Cir­cumstance, [Page 339] would render a Soul, however deem'd spiritual, Commensurably Moving; as by Parts of Time it might have an inter­mixt Progression, with other Substances, as its temporary Measure.

Certain it is, that Stars, the Luminaries of Heaven, if duely consider'd their wonderful Motion, unalterable Essence, and continuati­on, may be allow'd our most visible and perpetual miraculous Objects; or somewhat more than, in Nature, can be properly worded. But should those Etherial Beings be suppos'd, in any Place, where Elementary Substances might Exist; it were impossible they could move uncommixt with Things of different Nature from theirs: Wherefore it must be granted, That the Orbs above, toge­ther with the Stars and Planets, are of one simple Essence, or Manner of Existence; and therefore cannot Mingle, or Move with other Matter distinct from their own: Tho' by Divine Appointment, as Parts of the same miraculous Substance, they are only Illumi­nated.

But should the Soul of Man be Assimilated, by any refin'd Contemplation to the Nature to the Etherial Luminaries, for want of a [Page 340] more obvious, or excellent Comparison; 'tis not easie to conceive, how in its Passage from the Body, when Life departs, it should remove to its appointed Residence, separated from In­tervening Substances, which in their Tempera­tures and Parts are of the same Elementary Composition with the Humane Body that had been actuated by it.

Which Objection was doubtless consider'd as causing some Hesitation in the Thoughts of Des-Cartes; who, notwithstanding the pretended cu­riosity of his Imagination, in reference to the Soul dispos'd, according to his Method, into the Ori­ginal Formation, by God, as he delivers the Ope­ration of the Humane Body: He does not at all express the Manner of its departure, from its Corporeal Station, at the period of Life: Or by what means transferr'd, or remov'd to its Immortal Residence; which was to be ex­pected from the process he delivers: Who ha­ving determin'd, that the Humane Soul is a think­ing Substance, and notionally Active in the Con­duct of the Living Body, he might as well have Inserted the Method of its Progression after Death, from its Bodily Habitation; and how, being a Substance it arriv'd to its Immortal Abode, with­out being Complicated, Mov'd, or Moving, in its [Page 341] Passage, with any material Thing by any re­semblance to what it perform'd, when acting in the Inclosure of the Body of Man.

All which, according to the liberty he gives to his Invention, might have been as success­fully deliver'd by him, as the dispatch he gives to his Globuli and Vortices by variety of Schemes, and Diagrams, that have no better proof than the Suppositions of Des-Cartes: But it seems, he thought it safer for his Pen to Inscribe his Imagination of the Soul, primarily convey'd, by the Act of the Almighty into the Humane Body, than by what subsequent Means, or Pasport from above, its Substance arriv'd, after the Death of the Body, to its determin'd Existence. Of which I find no mention in any of his Works; other, than that he leaves the Manner of the Soul's passing from the lifeless Body, together with its Journey to its Immortal Residence, to the miraculous Conduct of the Almighty.

And I think it devoutly Judicious, if, ac­cording to his Example, I silence my Querie, on this Incomprehensible Subject: Since by the Will of the Omnipotent Disposer and Conservator of the Universal World, together with the Being of Mankind in Soul and Body, [Page 342] our rational Abilities more aptly tend to ad­mire, than determine the Manner by which we are Ensoul'd to live, or after Death to remain Immortal.

A Contemplation sublimely incumbent on the Humane Mind, that is enough Capacita­ted to understand its Intellectual Dignity; however its Essence and Operations, within us, are superlative to our Apprehensions, or ex­act Definitions to be given of them.

Wherefore I doubt not that my Discussions, on this great Particular, are no less valid, where I differ from him, than what I have Remark'd on not a few of his main Principles, Maxims, Notions, Hypotheses, and Schemes; or demonstratively wav'd, or rejected the Insuf­ficiency of others, on whatsoever account: So that I dare Affirm, that I have not omitted any significant or useful Animadversion.

And had I more particularly insisted on any Speculations, or Matter seemingly varied and Instanc'd by him; I had, in effect, but encreas'd Words to one and the same tenden­cy: And therefore, where, in Substance, my Observations, on some Things include other, I desire that my Reader would ingenuously con­sider them, as they ought to be understood.

[Page 343] And tho' this Author is very inclinable to Celebrate his own Esteem by frequently Affirming, That his Assertions and Tenents, are Philosophically and Mathematically cer­tain: I will boast of no Success of mine, to the contrary, farther than is Equivalent with the Proofs I have made, and to which I refer the Judicious Peruser.

And thus I conclude the Fourth and last Part of my Remarks on the Plilosophy of Des-Cartes.