CAP. I. The Introduction, declaring the reaſon of the choice of this Subject, and the Method of the intended Diſcourſe.

IT is an admirable evidence of the Divine Wiſdom and Providence, that there is that ſutable accommodation and adaptation of all things in Nature, both to their own convenience and exigence, and to the convenience, uſe, and exigence of one another; which evidenceth, 1. That all things are made, governed, and diſpoſed by a moſt intelligent, and wiſe, and powerful Being. 2. That that governing Being is but one, and that all this accommodation, and adaptation, and mutual ſubſervience of the things in Nature are the product of one moſt wiſe decree, counſel, and purpoſe of that one moſt wiſe, intelligent, and ſoverag • n in Being.

It is not here ſeaſonable to make a large proſecution of the particular inſtances of that accommodation of things in Nature, nor of the neceſſity of the former conſequences ariſing from it. The inſtances thereof, that are ſutable to the Deſign meant in this Diſcourſe, ſhall be only theſe two, which I ſhall but ſhortly touch: 1. The admirable accommodation of Senſible Faculty to the Objects of Senſe, and of thoſe Objects to it, and of both to the well-being of the Senſible Nature: 2. The admirable accommodation of the Intellectual Faculty in Man to Intellectual Objects, and of thoſe Objects to it, and of both to the well-being of the Humane or Rational Nature.

Touching the former, the Senſible Nature in its complement and integrity hath five exterior powers or faculties, that are accommodated to all thoſe motions or impreſſions of natural bodies, and their accidents which are uſeful to it; and by theſe five ports or gates all thoſe impreſſions which are uſeful for the perception of the Senſible Nature are communicated to it, namely, the five exterior Senſes. It is not only poſſible, but very likely, that there may be ſuch motions or qualities of Bodies, that make not any impreſſion upon any of thoſe Senſes; but if there be ſuch, they are ſuch as are not of uſe for the perception or convenience of the Senſible Nature. But for ſuch as are neceſſary for ſuch perception of the Senſible Nature, there is no motion, quality, or operation of external Bodies, but what hath accommodated to it a Faculty in Senſe receptive of it: Is there ſuch a motion or objectiveneſs of external Bodies which produceth light or colour, figure, vicinity, or diſtance, the Faculty of Sight is fitted to receive that impreſſion or objectiveneſs, and that objectiveneſs fitted and accommodate to that Faculty. Is there that motion or objectiveneſs that cauſeth ſounds? the Faculty of Hearing is fitted to be receptive of it, and that objectiveneſs or motion (or what ever it is) fitted to make an impreſſion upon that Faculty. And ſo for the other Senſes. And by this adaptation and congruity of theſe Faculties to their ſeveral proper Objects, and by the fitneſs and proportionateneſs of theſe objective Impreſſions, Qualities, or Motions, upon their reſpective Faculties, accommodated to their reception, the Senſible Nature hath ſo much of perception and reception of things as is neceſſary for its ſenſible Being. I ſpeak not here of thoſe other interior Senſes of Diſcrimination of the Objects of Senſe, Phantaſie, Memory, Appetite, and the reſt, for they are not at preſent to my purpoſe.

II. And what is thus excellent and admirable in the accommodation between the ſenſitive Faculties and their Objects, is to be obſerved in the intellectual Faculty, though the Faculty and Object are far more noble and excellent than that of Senſe. As there is an accommodation between the viſive Faculty and its Object, and as there is an accommodation between the Faculty of the Taſte and the Object, the Object fitted to make an impreſſion upon the Faculty, and Faculty fitted to take the impreſſion from the Object; ſo there is an accommodation, and ſutable adaptation, between the intellective Faculty and the intelligible Object, the Object as it were thruſting it ſelf into the Faculty, and the Faculty receiving and perceiving the Object.

The means of derivation, and immediate union of theſe intelligible Objects to the Underſtanding, are various: Sometimes divine and ſupernatural, as by immediate irradiation or revelation; ſometimes artificial and inſtituted, as by diſcourſe and inſtituted ſigns, and thus Intelligibles are conveyed from one man to another by words or writing; ſometimes natural, and that ſeems to be by three kinds of means, 1. by the mediation of Senſe, which is ordinarily the firſt baſis of all humane intellectual knowledge; 2. by ratiocination or diſcourſe of the Mind, whereby even from ſenſible Objects the Intellect receives a farther proſpect of other Intelligibles, not immediately preſented by or to the Senſe, but by conſequences, deductions, and concluſions deduced from things more obvious to Senſe, and perchance at firſt repreſented by it; 3. there ſeems to be a third means, which is a kind of intuition; there are ſome truths ſo plain and evident, and open, that need not any proceſs of ratiocination to evidence or evince them; they ſeem to be objected to the Intellective Nature when it is grown perfect and fit for intellectual operation, as the Objects of Light or Colour are objected to the Eye when it is open, they are underſtood and aſſented unto quaſi per ſaltum & intuitum; and though theſe truths are ſuch as are alſo deducible by ratiocination and rational proceſs, yet the connexion between the premiſſes, and the concluſion in them, are ſo clear, and the tranſition from the premiſſes to the concluſion is ſo ſwift, ſhort, and clear, that it ſeems to be in a moment, and the aſſent to them and evidence of them is inſtantaneous; ſuch are many concluſions of moral and intellectual truths, which ſeem upon this accompt to be congenite with us, connatural to us, and engraven in the very frame and compages of the Soul, becauſe they are Intelligibles of that nature that preſent themſelves, and thruſt themſelves into the Underſtanding immediately, and many times without the mediation of Senſe or Ratiocination. There is that primitive congruity between theſe Intelligibles and the Intellectual Faculty, that they are immediately united as I ſaid by a kind of intuition, and though they are deducible by ratiocination, as concluſions from premiſſes, yet in reſpect of their ſwift tranſitus in the Underſtanding they ſeem to be principles.

Now this excellent Faculty of the Underſtanding, though it ſeems to be paſſive in relation to its reception of its Object, yet it is not barely a paſſive Faculty, it hath an activity about that Object that it receives, and it actively trades upon it to its farther improvement.

And therefore according to the nature of this excellent Faculty the Underſtanding (which as it hath been ſaid is partly active and partly paſſive) there are two things that do much improve and enrich this Faculty.

Firſt, It is improved by its Exerciſe and Employment, the very Faculty it ſelf will degenerate, and grow ſluggiſh, dull, and ruſty by idleneſs: The exerciſe of the Intellective Faculty makes it agil, quick, and lively, yea though the object about which it is exerciſed be poor, little, and low, yet a Man hath this advantage by the exerciſe of this Faculty about it, that it keeps it from ruſt and torpidneſs, it enlargeth and habituates it for a due improvement even about nobler Objects.

Secondly, It is enriched by the nobleneſs and worth of the Object about which it is exerciſed, when the Object is noble, generous, uſeful, and ſutable, at leaſt in a convenient degree to the worth of the Faculty: Diligence and Induſtry, and exerciſe of the Intellective Faculty therein, doth not only exerciſe, imploy, habituate, and enlarge the Faculty, but enrich and enable it by the worth of the Object wherewith it is furniſhed.

There is ſo great variety of Intelligibles in the World, ſo much objected to our Senſes, ſo much deducible from them by Ratiocination and Diſcourſe, and every ſeveral Object ſo full of ſubdivided multiplicity and complicateneſs: And on the other ſide, the life of Man ſo ſhort, and the approaches of the Underſtanding to the knowledge of things, is for the moſt part ſo ſlow, and gradual, and difficult, that it is not to be hoped that a Man ſhould ever attain the full comprehenſion even of any ſmall inconſiderable Inſect, with all its connexions, dependences, relations, deductions, and conſequents; much leſs can it be expected, that any Man ſhould ever attain the full knowledge of that ſtupendious multiplicity and variety, that appears in all or any conſiderable part of thoſe Objects of our Senſes that occur in that mundus aſpectabilis which every day we behold: And yet even the World we ſee is the ſmalleſt part of that which we neither do nor can ſee.

Therefore it ſeems to be worth the care of a Man, that hath a deſire to improve thoſe two great Talents that God hath lent us, namely, his Time and his Faculties; that he not only exerciſe his Faculty to keep him from ſloth and idleneſs, but out of this great multiplicity of Objects to chuſe ſome ſuch for the exerciſe of his Faculties, that by their worth and value may improve and advance them; and ſuch as may be profitable for this uſe and exerciſe, and in ſome meaſure attainable with competent certainty and ſatisfaction.

There be certain qualifications that do much commend an Object to a Man's Enquiry, which are principally theſe:

Firſt, the nobleneſs and worth of an Object: Secondly, the uſefulneſs of this Object being known, or of the knowledge of it: Thirdly, ſufficient certainty touching the Object, or of the knowledge of it: Fourthly, that the Object be ſuch as may be large enough to ſatisfie the Intellective Faculty, and yet not diſtract it through its multiplicity, vaſtneſs, or extent. Something I ſhall ſay of each of theſe.

I. The firſt qualification in the choice of an Object is, that it be noble and worthy of the Faculty that is employed about it. There is not only a congruity herein between the nobleneſs of the Faculty and the Object, but alſo the Faculty is enriched and advanced by the worth of the Object. It was the reproach of Domitian a great Emperour, that he buſied himſelf in hunting of Flies: Yet I do not blame the purſuit of the Works of Nature, even in the Contemplation of the ſmalleſt Works thereof; for though the things themſelves are comparatively low, and inconſiderable, yet even in the ſmalleſt Vegetable or Animal, even in the very little Inſects, there appears the excellent Work of the Divine Wiſdom, and therefore there is a worth and excellency in the Contemplation of them, eſpecially when that Contemplation is directed to the ſearch and admiration of the great Wiſdom and Skill of the great Creator, who in many ſmall Inſects, that in reſpect of their minuteneſs almoſt eſcape the Sight, hath placed and digeſted as great a variety and excellency of Organs, Faculties, and Inſtincts, as in the Whale or Elephant: And therefore the Labours herein of Ariſtotle, Fortunius Licetus, Muffetus, Aldrovandus, Goddart, and others, that have written whole Volumes concerning the generation, production, alteration, and variety, even of ſmall Inſects: Flies and Worms are not without their worth and uſe, ſeeing in the leaſt of theſe the curious Wiſdom, Skill, and Power of the great Maker of all things is conſpicuous; and though they are but little Rills, yet if they be cloſely followed, they are and may be Manuductions to lead us to that Ocean of Wiſdom, Power, and Goodneſs of the God of Nature, from which they had their original.

II. The ſecond qualification that commends an Object, or Subject of Enquiry, is the uſefulneſs of its knowledge. It is true, that there is ſcarce any kind of knowledge of any Object but is grateful and uſeful in ſome meaſure to the Underſtanding: But among the Scibilia or Intelligibilia in the World, there are ſeveral degrees, ſome are not only uſeleſs to be known, but ſeem to be meer impertinencies; as for inſtance, many Grammatical Criticiſms, and how this Word was written by one Author, how by another, what faſhion Cloaths the Roman Officers, Military, Civil or Sacred uſed, and very many Curioſities relating to Languages: It is true, ſo far forth as Words and Languages are means to derive unto us the memory, relation, or underſtanding of the things contained under them, ſo far the knowledge of them is uſeful in order to that end, but Languages ſimply in relation to themſelves are but a narrow piece of ſpeculation, and conſequently thoſe great expences of time and ſtudy that ſome have taken about little uſeleſs Criticiſms, and trifles of that nature, hath been an improvident expence, and miſemployment of their time and faculties. Again, ſome things there are which are yet of more value, but yet but of little uſe, they are known only that they may be known, or inquired into only for the exerciſe of Wit, Invention and Subtilty: What great pains hath been taken concerning the Quadrature of a Circle, and the Duplication of a Cube, and ſome other Mathematical Problems? And many Men have ſpent much time, and written great Volumes touching thoſe matters, which yet were they attained, the knowledge reſts in it ſelf, and is never applicable to any uſe anſwerable to the pains of their acqueſt. Again, there be many things touching Matters Phyſical, which though they are full of contentation to be known, and have their uſe thus far, that they are an inquiry and diſcovery of things that are the Works of God, and of his Wiſdom, and ſerve to explain many Phaenomena in Nature, yet they are otherwiſe of little uſe to Mankind; as concerning the degrees of acceleration of Motion, the gravitation of the Air, the exiſtence or non-exiſtence of empty ſpaces, either coacervate or interſperſed, and many the like, which have taken up the thoughts and times, and exerciſed the Wits, and even the Paſſions of Men in Diſputes concerning them; and yet though the knowledge of them is curious, and contenting in it ſelf, yet it is not much ordinable or applicable to the uſe and benefit of the Man that knows them, or of others: And therefore though the knowledge of theſe Objects be commendable unto us upon an account of their contentation and curioſity, yet they do not commend their knowledge to us upon the account of their uſefulneſs and beneficialneſs.

Again, ſome Objects there are that are not only noble in themſelves, but they have alſo at leaſt a mediate and preparatory uſefulneſs to Mankind, though perchance in themſelves and immediately they have not that commodation. Thus the knowledge of divers parts in Natural Philoſophy, and the rules, motions, and variety of Qualities and Operations of divers Natural Objects, the connexion of Cauſes and Effects, the obſervation of the Order of things in Nature, are of ſingular uſe to carry the Mind up to the acknowledging and admiration of the Great Efficient and Governour of the World, of His Wiſdom, Power, Goodneſs, Bounty, and conſequently to raiſe up the Heart to veneration of Him, dutifulneſs and gratitude unto Him, dependance upon Him, and a deep impreſſion of Natural Religion towards Him, and of all thoſe conſequents that ariſe in the Mind and Life from this habit of Religion: So true is the Saying of an excellent Naturaliſt of our own, A little knowledge in Philoſophy may perchance make a proud empty Man an Atheiſt, but it is impoſſible that Atheiſm can lodge in a Mind well ſtudied and acquainted with Natural Philoſophy.

And as thus the knowledge of Nature is uſeful to Mankind, to bring him to and confirm him in the knowledge of the Glorious God, ſo it is preparatively uſeful, and indeed neceſſary to many uſeful things in this Life, as to make a Man a good Phyſician, ubi deſinit Philoſophus ibi incipit Medicus, where the Philoſopher ends the Phyſician begins; which next to the knowledge of Almighty God is of great neceſſity and uſe to Mankind.

And touching Geometry, Aſtronomy, and Arithmetick, though in the knowledge of them there be many things that are nice and curious, and not ſo much in order to uſe as to ſpeculation and exerciſe of Wit, yet they are ſuch Objects, the knowledge whereof is in many things very beneficent to Mankind, as we ſee in the conſtruction of all Mechanical Engins in the meaſuring of Bodies, Superficies, and Diſtances, in the Rules and Exerciſe of Architecture, Fortifications, and ordering of Battalia's, Computations and Reckonings in Contracts and Merchants Affairs, in Navigation, in the Meaſure and Computation of Time, and the right knowledge of ſeveral Seaſons, theſe Mathematical Subjects and Sciences have great uſe in relation to humane affairs and concerns.

And as thus thoſe more curious Sciences have their uſe in the Affairs of Mankind, and are commended unto us, not only upon the account of the nobleneſs, but alſo of the uſefulneſs thereof; ſo the knowledge of Hiſtory, of Humane Laws, of Moral Philoſophy, and of Political and Oeconomical regiments of the various Modes, Temperaments, and Qualifications of Governments, with their Appendages, are upon the account of their uſefulneſs to Humane Society, and the Peace, Tranquillity, and Order of the World, and of the particular Societies, Relations, and Perſons therein commended to our knowledge and contemplation, as things without which the World of Mankind would ſoon be in diſorder and confuſion. And although theſe Studies are not ſo pleaſing and grateful to the Underſtanding, as thoſe other more curious Contemplations either Phyſical or Mathematical, yet they recompence it with the excellency and neceſſity of their uſe, in relation to the nobleſt viſible Creature, Man, and in relation to his nobleſt and moſt uſeful poſture and ſtation in this World, namely, a ſtate of regulated Society and Government.

Now according to the kind or degree of the uſefulneſs of the Objects to be known, ſo the knowledge thereof is more or leſs commended unto us, upon the account of the various degrees of uſefulneſs: Some Objects and their knowledge are of greateſt value, becauſe their uſe is of more univerſal concern and important neceſſity, and ſuch is the true knowledge of Almighty God, His Greatneſs, Power, Wiſdom, Goodneſs, and Will, eſpecially as He hath revealed Himſelf in His Word, and thoſe noble habits that upon that account are ingenerated in the Soul, as Religion, Gratitude, Obedience, and Tranquillity of Mind, Regularity of the Soul and Life.

And upon the ſame account there is a great value in knowledge of Morals, and of thoſe Duties that we owe to our ſelves and others, and a conformity of Minds and Lives to the Dictates of Religion and Morality. And the excellence of their uſe, and conſequently the commendation of that knowledge upon that account is evident in theſe particulars: 1. The right and true knowledge of thoſe things do not only perfect our Souls and Natures by the excellency of the knowledge it ſelf, but they perfect our Souls and Natures with Goodneſs: They do not only perfect the Intellectual Faculty, but they alſo perfect the Volitive Faculty; they make the Man not only more knowing, but more wiſe, and they alſo make him the better, more juſt, ſober, temperate, religious: A Man may know very much in Mathematicks and Natural Philoſophy, and yet be a bad Man; but a Man truly acquainted with the knowledge of God, and with the due ſenſe of his Duty to Him in matter of Religion, and his Duty to others in points of Morality, which is a part alſo of the Divine Will, is not only a knowing Man, but becomes alſo a good Man (if indeed his knowledge be ſound and true).

Again, 2. All other knowledge meerly or principally ſerves the concerns of this Life, and is fitted to the meridian thereof: They are ſuch as for ought we know will be of little uſe to a ſeparate Soul, at leaſt we do not know whether the Soul in its ſtate of ſeparation will be much concerned in the knowledge of Phyſical or Mathematical Learning, or the Rules or Methods of Political Regiment: But this we are or may be ſure, that the Soul will carry with it into the other World that knowledge of God which it acquires here, and receive an unſpeakable improvement thereof by a nearer union to Him; and it will carry with it thoſe improvements and advances of Piety, Goodneſs, Righteouſneſs, Holineſs, thoſe Habits and Graces that it began here; and as the Soul is improved and made the better in this Life by this knowledge, and thoſe effects and meliorations that it here acquired by them, ſo it will carry along with it thoſe advantages to the next World; for there is a connaturality and congruity between that knowledge and thoſe habits, and that future eſtate of the Soul. So that this kind of knowledge is not only ſerviceable and uſeful for the preſent Life in via, but is proportioned to that ſtate that is in patria.

And as touching the knowledge of things that are meerly accommodate to the preſent Life, they receive their diſparity of value in this reſpect, according to the diſparity or different degrees of uſefulneſs. Some are uſeful for nobler ends, ſome for lower and more inferior ends; ſome are in a greater degree uſeful for the ſame ends than others; and according to the varieties of ends, uſes, and their degrees, the knowledge of them (as in reference to this part of the commendation of an Object, namely, uſefulneſs) is more or leſs eligible. But this is too large a Subject particularly to proſecute in this place.

III. The third commendation of a Subject of Contemplation, and that renders it eligible, is Certainty. Where the Subject is uncertain, and the evidences touching it doubtful, although perchance the ſpeculation that it affords be very high and ſublime, yet ſuch a Subject is not in this reſpect ſo eligible as what is more certain, for it leaves an impartial and ſerious Mind full of doubt and diſſatisfaction; and where it meets with a Man of a buſie phantaſie, ſelf-conceited, and partial to himſelf and his own thoughts, and that would be thought to know beyond the common ſtandard of other Mens Reaſon, it puts him upon the confident framing of Hypotheſes built meerly upon Imagination, and from theſe weak foundations he deduceth Syſtems of Conſequences and Concluſions, which being built upon meer fanciful and inevident Suppoſitions, fall to nothing but duſt and ſmoke as ſoon as their evidence is impartially examined. Some Subjects are ſo remote from us that we are ſtrangers to them, and our knowledge concerning them is meerly conjectural, and thoſe very conjectures for the moſt part wanting competent media to make them tolerably probable. Concerning the Extent of the Univerſe, the Plurality of Worlds, the State of Heavenly Bodies, whether they are inhabited, and with what kind of Inhabitants, whether they are animate Bodies, whether they are moved by Intelligences, or by their own Forms, or by the motion of the Body of the Aether, or thoſe imaginary Vortices wherein they are placed? Theſe and many ſuch Speculations touching things at this diſtance may gratifie the Imagination, but never ſatisfie the Mind. Again, ſome things though they are or may be near unto us, yet are of that ſubtilty that they eſcape our Senſes, and thereby we cannot make our approaches to their diſcovery. As concerning the Nature of Spirits, their ubi, motus, the manner of their Intellection and mutual communication of Notions; by what means or in what manner actual Intellection is effected in the Soul; how the Species, Order, and Circumſtances of things are preſerved in the Memorative Faculty or Organ, or where elſe? theſe and many other hidden parts of Nature, even of a far lower form, are unacceſſible to us.

The Contemplation of the Univerſe, and of the Natural Cauſes and Effects therein, is indeed an excellent Contemplation: For, firſt, it exerciſeth the Intellectual Faculties, keeps them in motion and employment, and thereby perfecteth them. Secondly, It is full of delight and contentation to the Mind. Thirdly, Although the Underſtanding attains not a perfect diſcovery of what it ſearcheth after, yet many times undeſigned and unthought of diſcoveries of many excellent things recompenceth the loſs of the principal intention; as thoſe that have bent their endeavour to attain the Philoſophers Stone, though they never attain their end, yet in their proceſs towards it do many times light upon excellent diſcoveries which they never thought of or deſigned, which in a great meaſure recompenſeth their diſappointment in the Particular ſought after. Fourthly, It gives a great diſcovery of the admirable Wiſdom and Power of God in framing and ordering of the World, and ſo becomes a manuduction to the knowledge, acknowledgement, and adoration of Him.

But yet when we conſider how ſhort and weak our beſt diſcoveries are in the moſt acceſſible, obvious particulars, and narroweſt Integrals of the Univerſe: When we conſider how many things in Nature eſcape our Senſes, and the diſcoveries thereof; and yet how much we ſtand in need of the diſcoveries of Senſe, and ſenſible and experimental obſervation, to bottom any ſound conjecture concerning the Nature, Cauſes, and Effects of the things in Nature, and how uncertain, fanciful, and imaginary our Suppoſitions are without it, whereby it comes to paſs, that we many times frame ſuppoſitions and concluſions concerning things ſuppoſed to be in Nature, before we have any certain evidence, whether in truth the very things about which we frame our ſuppoſitions or concluſions have at all any real exiſtence; or if they have, yet for want of a clear, and ſenſible, and experimented obſervation of them, our poſitions and concluſions touching their Cauſes, Effects, Order and Methods of their procedure are but fictions and imaginations, accommodated to our Inventions rather than to the things themſelves, and ſuch as we rather project we would have them be, if we had the making of them, than what in truth they are. And laſtly, if we conſider the vaſt extent and multiplicity of the whole Compaſs of the Univerſe, and the things therein contained, the many parts thereof, that either in reſpect of their tenuity or diſtance eſcape the reach of our Senſes, the infinite complications and combinations of ſeveral concurrences, cauſes, and contributions to the conſtitution and operation of almoſt every Integral in Nature; the ſhortneſs of our Lives, and the many neceſſary diverſions that we have, and muſt neceſſarily have from thoſe Contemplations. I ſay, when we conſider theſe things, it ſeems a thing utterly to be deſpaired of to attain a full, certain, evident knowledge of the whole Univerſe, or of any conſiderable portion thereof.

And hence it is, that if we conſider the various Hypotheſes of the ancient and modern Philoſophers, touching the general Syſteme of the World, and thoſe more Univerſal and Cardinal Solutions of the common and great Appearances in Nature, we ſhall find them or the greateſt part of them, to be little elſe than excogitated and invented Models, not ſo much ariſing from the true Image of the things themſelves, or reſulting from the real Exiſtence of them, as certain inſtituted and artificial Contrivances of mens Wits and Fancies. And theſe Suppoſitions being thus invented, they diſtort, ſtretch and reduce the Orders of things in a conformation to thoſe pre-conceived Suppoſitions; and then by the Inventers of them, and thoſe that are their followers, and would ſeem to be men of quicker ſight than others, and not to come too ſhort of the perceptions of their Leaders, they are in a little time magnified into the true Solutions of the Arcana Naturae, and then all or moſt of their Argumentations, Poſitions, Superſtructions and Concluſions, are founded upon, and conformed unto, and deduced from theſe excogitated Hypotheſes, as if they were the true, and only and real frame and conſtitution of things, when they have as little reality, and leſs evidence than the imaginary ſolid Spheres in the Heavens, or their Muſick, the Horſes of the Sun, or any other Poetical Fictions.

And if at any time ſome one Phaenomenon of Nature appears, that croſſeth any of theſe Suppoſitions or Hypotheſes, or ſuits not with them, or is not ſalved by them, preſently great pains is taken to ſupply that Defect with ſome ſubſidiary Suppoſition, that may ſtop that Leak, and piece up the Hypotheſis, which muſt be preſently granted to be true, not becauſe there is any evidence of it from the things themſelves, but becauſe it ſuits with that artificial and precarious Hypotheſis which was before taken up and made much of.

This we may eaſily obſerve to be true; if we ſhould examine all the various Suppoſitions of leading men in their ſeveral Sects.

The Chymical Philoſophers make their Tria prima, Salt, Sulphur and Mercury, the great conſtituent Principles of all Bodies; others add two more: And their evidence that they are ſo, are, becauſe they find by their ſolutions by Fire, ſome things which they call by theſe Names, to be that whereinto Bodies are diſſolved; when, for ought can be evidently made out, many of theſe are not ſo much really in the conſtitution of the Bodies themſelves, as the very alterations or changes of them by the force and energy of that active Element, or at leaſt, though after their ſolution, they aſſume the ſhapes of Salt, Sulphur and Mercury, yet there are even in thoſe Conſiſtences very various Contextures, differing extreamly in each Body from other, though they ſeem to aſſume ſome analogy of ſhape: And poſſibly there may be a thouſand Conſtituents of different Natures from any of theſe ſuppoſed Principles in Bodies, both before and after their ſolution by Fire or Heat.

The Ariſtotelians have excogitated another ſort of Suppoſitions of Principles, Matter, Form and Privation. And yet it is very difficult to conceive that any ſuch thing ſhould be as Matter, undetermined by ſomething called Form; and as difficult to conceive what many ſorts of theſe Forms are (which they call ſubſtantial) whence they ariſe, what becomes of them, whether ſome of thoſe they call Subſtantial, are any other than the various Modifications of Matter; whether others of them are not ſome middle Nature, neither Bodies nor Accidents, but Powers of a different nature from Bodies, Accidents, or Qualities, or Subſtances, though not ſo obvious to our perception: This Hypotheſis therefore ſeems for the moſt part, to be a kind of artificial contrivance, not wholly taken from the natures of things, but fitted to give ſome kind of explication of them; and for the moſt part an Engine to guide our Conceptions, as the Figures in Logick, or the artificial Schemes for the finding out a Medium uſed by them; Barbara, Celarent, Darii, &c. Napcas, Cipinis vel Nipis.

Again, if we look upon the Suppoſition of Epicurus, and his Explicator, Lucretius, and his Advancer, Gaſſendus, how many things muſt be taken for granted, that are not only perfectly inevident to our ſenſe, but altogether improbable? The multitude of phyſically indiviſible Atoms, their ſtrange Figures acommodated to their Motion, Adheſion, and Coagulation, their declined Motions, and the means of their Coalition: And when all this will not ſerve to contain things within any poſſible certainty or ſpecifical determination, to patch up that defect, certain Moleculae Seminales muſt be ſuppoſed to make up that Defect, and to keep the World and its Integrals from an Infinitude and Exten • leſneſs of excurſions every moment into new Figures and Animals, and yet made up meerly by chance, and by the contexture of thoſe Atoms which have neither quality nor energy, nor any thing elſe beſides their ſmall and imperceptible Moles, to make them operative, and that Local Motion which they there have; but they teach us not from whence they have it.

Again, If we look upon Des Cartes his Suppoſition, who was not altogether content with the former, but gave it ſome Correctives, though the main Subſtratum be of Epicurus; what colour of evidence have we of the various Configurations of his Atomes, the grinding of them round by their mutual attritions, the coalition of the Globular Atomes into the Heavenly Bodies, the filling of Chinks and Interſtices by the Ramenta of the greater, whereby a Materia Subtilis is diffuſed through the Univerſe, which is inviſible, performs moſt of thoſe motions that we ſee in things, that the Animals are only Engins, and actuated by the mobility of this ſubtil matter? Theſe, and infinite more artificial Inventions of his there are, that neither Senſe nor Reaſon could ever acquaint him or us with; but they are an ingenious Creature of his own fruitful Invention, wittily framed to explicate not ſo much the Nature of things, but thoſe Conceptions he entertained thereof, and to reduce and range them into an Order contrived by him, not by Nature.

This Excurſion I have uſed to ſhew how great a difficulty there is for a man to have a ſuitable conception of the great Fabrick of the World with any tolerable certainty, whereby it hath come to paſs that the readieſt and moſt exerciſed Wits have fallen into ſo great varieties of explication thereof, and yet all of them ſo full of unevidence and incertainty, ſo full of precarious and imaginary Poſtulata, ſo full of unreaſonableneſs, and improbability, and impoſſibilities in themſelves, and one with another, that a man that is not impoſed upon by the Veneration of the Authors, or his own Phantaſie, cannot tell how to fix in any of them but muſt cry out upon them with the Comedian, Probè feciſtis, incertior ſum nunc quàm dudum: Ye have mended the matter well; I am now more in doubt than before: Neither are we ever likely to attain any certain or ſatisfactory knowledge in the Phyſical Cauſes, Effects and Appearances in their largeſt extent and latitude.

4. The fourth commendation of an Object of Knowledge is, that if it be meerly Phyſical or Mathematical, it bears ſome proportion to the Intellective power, neither too narrow, and circumſcribed into a ſmall compaſs, nor yet too full of multiplicity: The former ſatisfies not the Underſtanding; for it ſoon exhauſts all that is in it, and leaves the Underſtanding no work to exerciſe it ſelf withal. The latter ſurchargeth and oppreſſeth the Underſtanding with its multiplicity. And upon this latter account it is, that, although the whole Univerſe and every part thereof are Objects full of excellency and worth, yet the multiplicity thereof is ſo great and various, that the Underſtanding falls under a kind of deſpondency of getting through ſo great a Task: and thoſe that have undertaken the full ſpeculation of all the parts of the viſible World, have done it but ſuperficially, lightly, and in Generals; the time of Life and the Intellective faculty, that moves but gradually and ſucceſſively, have not been ſufficient for an exact account of all things viſible: And therefore they that have deſigned exactneſs and deep ſcrutiny into things, have taken ſome one part of Nature for that purpoſe; and even in thoſe ſingle Objects there is moſt commonly a connexion of ſuch various Appendances or Incidents that they that have ſet themſelves upon ſuch ſeemingly narrow Enquiries, have found it a buſineſs enough to take up a greater portion of Time and Enquiry than our ſhort Lives will afford us; as may eaſily appear by the great and large Tractates of them that have written concerning the little Organ of the Eye, or the Viſive Faculty, the Magnetick Motions and Variations, or ſome other ſingle Organ or Faculty of the Reaſonable or Senſitive Nature.

Among the many Objects of Knowledge, there ſeem to be two eſpecially, which upon the moſt part of the before-mentioned accounts, moſt commend themſelves to our contemplation and enquiry; namely, the knowledge of the ever-glorious God, and the knowledge of our ſelves and the Humane Nature. Almighty God is the higheſt and moſt excellent and ſoveraign Object of the Intellectual Faculty: It is true, he falls not under the laſt qualification. Though he is but one, and one moſt ſimple uncompounded Being, yet his Nature and Perfections, his Power, Wiſdom, Goodneſs, and all other Excellencies are infinite and incomprehenſible by any intellectual Nature but himſelf; and therefore he is an Object infinitely too large for the comprehenſion of any created Underſtanding: He is a Light too bright for our Intellective eye to ſee, but by reflexion, or through the Vail of his Word or Works. The more we know of him, and the more we draw near unto him by ſerious and humble contemplation, the more we diſcover an endleſs and unſearchable Ocean and Perfection in him, ſo that we muſt not, cannot expect to find out the Almighty to perfection; his ways are unſearchable and paſt finding out, and much more his Eſſence and Perfections; ſo that though he be the moſt natural, and the moſt deſirable Object of created Underſtandings, he is an Object infinitely too large for it.

But although in reſpect of the meaſure of his Perfection, he be an Object unproportionate to a created Underſtanding, a Light too bright, and an Ocean too large and too deep for it, yet there is ſo much of his knowledge attainable by us, as is ſufficient for uſe, nature and everlaſting happineſs: and the knowlede of Almighty God, ſo far as it is attainable by our narrow created Underſtanding, highly advanceth the humane Underſtanding upon all accounts, and infinitely excels the knowledge of any other Object in the world, upon theſe enſuing accounts among many others.

Firſt, It is a knowledge of ſuch an Object that hath the greateſt and moſt convincing certainty in the world, a certainty that he is, and in a good meaſure a certainty what he is; for though it be impoſſible for any or all the created Beings in the world, to attain a diſtinct, perfect and full Idaea of the Divine excellencies, in their full, adequate, diſtinct perfections; yet that Image that he hath given of himſelf, in the admirable Frame of ſo much of the world which we know, doth with all imaginable certainty evince, That he is, that he is but one, one moſt intelligent, wiſe, powerful, free, good, ſimple, eternal, infinite and moſt perfect Being, the Fountain of Being, and the firſt Cauſe of all things, though we cannot attain the full comprehenſion of that perfection: And truly it is no ſmall evidence of the Divine Wiſdom and Goodneſs, That that great and important Truth of the being and perfection of Almighty God (the Principle and Object of the greateſt importance in the world to the good of Mankind, and for the advance and perfecting of humane Nature) ſhould be written in ſuch plain, clear and evident Characters in the Works of Nature, and evinced by Evidences riſing from thence, as are obvious to any perſon that hath but the common uſe of Reaſon, and the honeſty to uſe and exerciſe it ſincerely.

Secondly, It is the moſt noble and excellent Object in the world, and that may and doth moſt enoble and advance the intellective Faculty; he is the Fountain of all Being, and of all Perfection: Thoſe Excellencies that are in the nobleſt created Natures in the world, are but ſhadows of that perfection that is in him: Though a created Underſtanding can never take in the fulneſs of the Divine Excellencies, yet ſo much as it can or doth receive thereof, is of greater extent, uſe and value, and doth more advance and enrich the Faculty, than any other Object in the world, though that other Object were fully and adequately known.

Thirdly, Although the Underſtanding can never ſearch out the Almighty to perfection, by reaſon of the infinite exceſs of this Object, beyond the capacity of a created Faculty, yet there is that congruity between this Faculty and this Object, that connatural ordination, as it were, of Intellective Faculty to this Object, as if it were (if not only, yet principally) lodged in the humane Nature for the ſake of this Object; ſo that though there is no commenſurableneſs between this Object and a created Underſtanding, yet there is a congruity and connaturality between them: And hence it is, that ſo much as we do or can know of God, is delightful and grateful to the Underſtanding. And though this abyſs of excellency be infinite, yet it doth not confound, nor diſorder, nor overwhelm the Underſtanding in its modeſt and due ſearches into it: And beſides, although the perfection of his Eſſence, and many of his Attributes, as Infinitude, Immenſity, Indiviſibility, &c. do dazle our Underſtandings, yet ſome of his Attributes, and the Manifeſtations thereof, are not only highly delectable to the Intellective Faculty, but are ſutable and eaſily conceptible by us, becauſe apparent in his Works, as his Goodneſs, Beneficence, Wiſdom, Power, &c. if we attend to it.

And certainly it was the great Goodneſs and Condeſcention of the Glorious God unto his Creature Man, that when he knew all his own Excellencies were too great and too bright for us to ſee, he hath Been pleaſed to diſcover ſo much of himſelf as was fit and neceſſary for us to know, by means that our Faculties might uſe without diſſipation, diſtraction, or too great aſtoniſhment; namely, firſt, By his Works, reflecting his Greatneſs and Goodneſs. Secondly, By his Word, by Divine Revelation diſcovering his Goodneſs, Mercy, Power and Truth. Thirdly, By his Son, through the Vail of our Fleſh; by all which that Brightneſs and Splendor of the Divine Excellence, that by an immediate intuition or exhibition would-have overwhelmed our Intellective Faculty (as it ſtands united to our Bodies) is preſented to us more proportionately to our Capacities and Faculties, by a kind of refraction, and a more eaſie and familiar manifeſtation.

Fourthly, It is the moſt uſeful Object of our Knowledge that can be; and in compariſon of this, all other Knowledge is vain, light and impertinent; and indeed all other knowledge is valuable upon this ſingle account, by how much it gives us a manifeſtation of the Divine Excellencies, and leads and conducts to the knowledge of Almighty God and his Attributes. If I conſider my ſelf in this Life, there is not a moment which I live, or wherein I have any contentation, or comfort, or convenience, but all this I have from his Influence and Bounty; and certainly it concerns me highly to know my Benefactor, from whom I receive my Good, that I may depend upon him, be thankful unto him, probitiate him, and make my applications to him for what I want. Again, the wiſeſt men that have ſearched after happineſs in this Life, though they have miſſed of the place where it is to be found, have with great reaſon placed the beſt happineſs that can be found on this ſide Death, either in Virtue and the exerciſe thereof, or in Tranquillity of mind, or in both, for they are rarely aſunder. Now I may be an excellent Mathematician, a man well ſeen in Natural Cauſes and Effects, an excellent Stateſman and Polititian, and yet be without that Goodneſs that may denominate me juſtly a good man, and without that tranquillity of mind that may make me a happy man: but the true knowledge of God, ſeriouſly and really dwelling and digeſted in the Soul, makes a man a good man, and a happy man; it makes a man to love, fear, honour and obey him that he thus knows. A man cannot truly know him, but he muſt know that in him, which by a moral neceſſity raiſeth in a man thoſe Habits and Diſpoſitions, namely, of Religious Piety towards God, Juſtice and Righteouſneſs to men, Sobriety in relation to himſelf, for in knowing this God, he knows that theſe things are well-pleaſing to him, and the contrary diſpleaſeth him, and he knows him to be a God that knows all things in the world, and that is a bountiful Lord to them that love and obey him, and a juſt Judge of them that deſpiſe or forſake him. And as thus it makes him good, ſo it makes him happy, by giving him the higheſt and moſt firm Tranquillity of Mind that can be; for he knows that this moſt gracious and powerful God orders and governs all the things in the world with irreſiſtible power, exquiſite and infinite wiſdom, and abundant goodneſs, and that he is well pleaſed with them that love, fear and obey him; and upon all theſe accounts a man rejoyceth in his Favour, depends upon his Power, Goodneſs, Wiſdom and All-ſufficiency, reſignes himſelf to his Will; is contented and patient under all conditions, and ſo doth enjoy perfect tranquillity of Mind.

But this is the loweſt portion of the uſefulneſs of Divine Knowledge. There is another Life after this, a Life of eternity, and the influx of the knowledge of God in relation to this everlaſting Life, is infinitely of more moment; it fills the Soul with a capacity of it, with a ſutableneſs and ſtate of congruity to it, with thoſe preparations, diſpoſitions and habits that are neceſſarily pre-requiſite for it, and gives him the fruition and perfect enjoyment of it: That meaſure of the knowledge of God that we attain, is the beſt happineſs we enjoy in this Life, and the perfection of our happineſs in the Life to come, where we ſhall have a more perfect intellectual Viſion of the Glorious God, and as full a fruition of the Goodneſs of God, as that elevated Nature which we ſhall then have, can be capable of: Then that meaſure of the knowledge of God which we here acquire, ſhall be refined and advanced to a degree of perfection ſutable to the advance that this Intellective Faculty ſhall then receive; and that meaſure of goodneſs that by the means of that knowledge is wrought in the Soul in this Life, ſhall then be improved to a higher degree of excellence, and rewarded with a weight of Glory.

This Knowledge therefore of all other Knowledge is to be preferred: And in all our buſie inquiſitions touching other things, we muſt remember our ſelves, as our Lord remembred Martha in the Goſpel. We are buſie about many things, and trouble our ſelves with many Enquiries; but there is one thing, one Object, and the knowledge thereof neceſſary, namely, the knowledge of the glorious God: This is life eternal, to know thee the only true God, and Jeſus Christ whom thou haſt ſent, John 17.3. Whatever therefore we endeavour to know, it muſt be with ſubordination to the endeavour after this knowledge: And as far as is poſſible, all other knowledge, and deſire thereof, ſhould be directed to the improvement of this Knowledge, or in order to it, and to the end acquirable by it.

The ſecond profitable and uſeful Object of our Knowledge, is, the 〈◊〉 Knowledge of our ſelves: And next to the Knowledge of Almighty God, and his Will, and his Son, this Knowledge of our ſelves, ſeems moſt worthy of our endeavour: And therefore I have choſen this Subject for my ſearch and examination at this time: For in this Subject we ſhall find all thoſe Qualifications or Requiſites before-mentioned, that commend any Subject to our Enquiry or Knowledge.

Of any one viſible Subject in the compaſs of created Nature, there is none that we know and are acquainted with, that hath more worth and excellency next to the great Creator of all things, and the holy Angels; and that which ſeems to be moſt noble, the Image of the glorious God; namely, the Univerſe, as it comprehends the Syſteme, Order and Excellencies of all created Beings, digeſted into their ſeveral Ranks and Orders, and collected and put together into that glorious Frame of the Univerſe: But as it is impoſſible for us, at leaſt in this Life, by any means to be acquainted with all the Integrals of that glorious Structure, ſome are in their nature imperceptible by our Senſe; namely, the Spiritual Beings; yea, and the more refined parts of material Exiſtences, which by reaſon of their ſubtilty, eſcape our perception: Other parts thereof are ſo remote, that although they might in their own nature be perceived by Senſe, yet they are at that remote diſtance from us, that they eſcape our Sight, though the moſt active Senſe we have. And again, the vaſt extent of the Univerſe is ſuch, that though we might ſucceſſively ſee the parts of it, yet it is not phyſically poſſible to ſee it at one view; and conſequently impoſſible to ſee at once that beautiful and glorious Image of the more beautiful and glorious God in its full complement repreſented in the entire Frame of the Univerſe.

Again, we cannot but ſuppoſe that there are divers Ranks of created Beings intermediate between the glorious God and Man, which far ſurpaſs man in perfection of Nature and Operations; as the glorious Angels, and created Intelligences; nay poſſibly there may be material Beings of a more refined ſubſtance, and endued with more advanced Forms than ours. Who knows whether the Stars are not furniſhed with intellectual Creatures more excellent for their Subſtance and Forms, than we Mortals? Yea, and for ought we know, the Stars themſelves may have Forms appropriate to them, of a more excellent frame than ours; though, as I have before ſaid, this exceeds our determination.

But although theſe things may be, yet we know not that they are; and if they were, yet we are unacquainted with their natures and kinds; only the reality of exiſtence of Angelical Creatures, and created ſeparate Intelligences, and the poſſibility of Nobler Creatures or Natures than ours, reſiding in ſome parts of the Univerſe, may teach us not to be ſo over-prizing and over-valuing our ſelves, as to think that there are no other Creatures intermediate between God and Man, of a greater perfection than Man. We ſee a multitude of Creatures between us and the loweſt rank of Animals ſpecifically and gradually one below another; and doubtleſs there are, or may be, many ranks of Beings intermediate between the glorious God and Mankind, that have ſpecifical gradations one above another.

But whatever may be ſaid touching theſe, yet certainly of all the viſible Creatures that we are acquainted with, Man ſeems to have a very great Prerogative of excellence. And though he may not bear ſo fair and ſo noble an Image of the Divine Glory as the Univerſe in its full Syſteme and Order, or as thoſe nobler Beings that are of a Rank and Nature above him, yet certainly he bears a greater meaſure of the Divine Image, than any one viſible Creature we know; and ſo far forth as we know: God himſelf affirms thus much of Man, that he created him after his own Image; which he ſayes not of any of the Celeſtial Bodies themſelves; Gen. 1. Man therefore is a Creature, that of all viſible Creatures that we know, is the nobleſt.

We may obſerve in the Creatures of a ſubordinate rank to us, how the more inferiour and ignoble bear ſomewhat of the Image of the ſuperiour, a kind of ſhadow or adumbration of thoſe perfections that in the ſuperiour are more perfect, not only by a gradually, but ſpecifically differing perfection. We ſee in ſome Metals an Analogical reſemblance of thoſe vital effects of Vegetables, growth, digeſtion and augmentation that is more perfectly in Plants and perfect Vegetables: We ſee in Vegetables a reſemblance of Appetition, Election, Generation, and in ſome of them an imperfect Image of that univerſal ſenſe of Feeling which we find more perfectly in Animals: We find in Animals, eſpecially ſome of them, as Foxes, Dogs, Apes, Horſes and Elephants, not only Perception, Phantaſie and Memory (common to moſt, if not all Animals) but ſomething of Sagacity, Providence, Diſciplinableneſs, and a ſomething like unto a Diſcurſive Ratiocination, bearing an analogy, image or imperfect reſemblance of what we find, though in a degree, ſpecifically more excellent in the humane Nature, inſomuch that Porphiry, Plutarch, Sextus Empericus, Patricius, and ſome others have been bold to make reaſonableneſs not the ſpecifical difference of the Humane Nature; and ſome latter perſons would not have the Definition of a man to be Animal Rationale, without the addition of Religioſum; wherein he ſeems particularly to exceed the Brutal Nature: Although in truth that which ſeems to be Reaſon in the Brutes, is nothing elſe but the Image and Analogical repreſentation of that true Reaſon that is in Man, as the Water-gall is the Image, Shadow, or weak Repreſentation of the Rainbow.

And we have reaſon to think that that intellective and volitive power which is in Man, bears an Image and Repreſentation of the like power that is in Angels and ſeparate Intelligences, though neither of equality to that perfection that is in them, either in degree or kind.

And although it were too great preſumption to think that there is any thing in any created Nature, that can bear any perfect reſemblance of the incomprehenſible perfection of the Divine Nature (very Being it ſelf not predicating univocally touching him and any created Being and Intellect, and Will, as we attribute them to God, are, as we may reaſonably think, not only of a Perfection infinitely tranſcending any created Intellect and Will, but of another kind and nature from it) yet though we are not able to comprehend the excellence of the Divine Nature, we cannot frame unto our ſelves a conception of him without the notion of Intellect and Will, though infinitely perfect: It ſeems that thoſe two great Faculties in us, bear a weak Analogy with, and Repreſentation of the Divine Nature. And therefore in that reſpect, Man is the Image and Repreſentation of the Glorious God, though the diſproportion between him and this his Image, be infinitely more than the diſproportion between Caeſar and his Image upon his Coin, or the Sun in the Heaven, and the Shadow of him in a Baſon of Water.

And in this reſpect, the Humane Nature is a worthy and noble Object of our Enquiry and Knowledge, becauſe here is the beſt viſible Image of Almighty God that we can fully acquaint our ſelves with, next to him that was the Brightneſs of the Fathers Glory, and expreſs Image of his perſon, Chriſt Jeſus our Lord.

And beſides this relative conſideration of the Humane Nature, with relation to thoſe Beings that are above him, Man is an excellent Object of contemplation; ſo if we look upon him either abſolutely in himſelf, or with relation to Creatures of an inferiour nature, he is a worthy and noble object of our contemplation.

If we conſider him abſolutely in himſelf, he is an Object worthy of our contemplation; he is admirable in excellent compoſure and figuration of his Body, and in every part apart, and in the whole ſtructure put together, admirable in the Nature, Faculties, and Excellence of his Soul, admirable in the conjunction of both together, admirable in all the operations of Life, Senſe, Intellect and Will, which he exerciſeth in this ſtate of conjunction and union, admirable in his production and generation, and admirable as to the condition of his Soul in its ſtate of diſunion and ſeparation. The ſpeculations concerning him, are all full of great variety, curioſity and worth, becauſe the Subject it ſelf is ſuch.

If we conſider him with relation to other created Beings of an inferiour nature; Firſt, he comprehends all the excellencies that are in the inferiour ranks of Being, and that for the moſt part in a more excellent and perfect manner: The Life that is in Vegetables, and the operations of that Life; the Life and Senſe that is in Senſibles, and the excellent operations of them, all Senſation, Perception, Memory, Phantaſie, Nutrition; with its ſeveral proceſs, the faculties of Appetition, Paſſion, Generation; The diſpoſition of Parts and Organs that are beſt in any Animal are to be found in the diſpoſition, order and texture of the Body of man; and wherein it differs, it differs with much advantage and prelation over the ſtructure of the Bodies of Animals; ſo that the knowledge of Man gives us a full account of the excellence of others, either Animals or Vegetables: He that well knows Man, knows whatſoever is excellent in the Animal or Vegetable Nature. Secondly, Beſides theſe Excellencies common either to the Vegetable or Animal Nature, and Man, there are certain excellencies ſuperadded to the Humane Nature, certain ſpecifical prelations in his Body, the Structure, Poſture, Beauty and Majeſty thereof, certain ſpecifical excellencies and uſefulneſs in ſome of his Organs, the diſpoſition of his Hand, Brain, Nerves and other Integrals: Again, the ſpecifical Excellencies of his Soul in thoſe great and admirable Faculties of Intellect and Will; Of all which in their due time: So that he that is well acquainted with, and knows Man, knows whatſoever is excellent in the Vegetable and Animal Nature, and much more.

So that upon the whole account, we have a Noble and Worthy Object of our Contemplations, in the contemplation of Man.

2. In the contemplation of Man we have an Object that doth not overmuch confound us with its exceſſive multiplicity; and yet it doth not ſatiate, nor proves ingrateful for want of ſufficient variety: Touching the former of theſe, it hath been before obſerved, that he that goes about to make the whole Univerſe and all the ſeveral parts thereof the buſineſs of his Enquiry, as he ſhall find that there are many things therein that he cannot come at, or make any diſcovery of, ſo among thoſe parts of the Univerſe that are objected to a greater diſcovery of our Senſes, the multiplicity is ſo great, that a man of the moſt equal and firm conſtitution, muſt deſpair of Life enough to make a ſatisfactory, particular and deep enquiry into them: But the Object in hand is but one; it is Man, and the Nature of Man.

I confeſs it is true, that he that ſhall make it his buſineſs to take in as it were, by way of a common place, all thoſe things that may be taken up under this conſideration, and follow all thoſe Lines that concenter in this, or almoſt any other the moſt ſingle piece of Contemplation, will make this Subject large enough; and upon that account may be drawn in almoſt all things imaginable: We find in the conſideration of the Humane Nature, a Subſtance, a Body, a Spirit: We find the ſeveral Objects of his Senſes, Light, Colour, Sound, and infinite more: He that upon this account will take in the diſtinct and large conſiderations of theſe and the like Appendices to Humane Nature, in their full amplitude, will have a large Plain, that will more than exhauſt his Life, before he come to the Subject it ſelf which he deſignes. Again, there is an infinite multitude of collateral conſiderations that yet are relative to man; hither comes all the conſiderations of Theology, Phyſick, Natural Philoſophy, Politicks, the conſiderations of Speech, Government, Laws, of Hiſtory, Topography, of Arts, of thoſe Sciences that relate to the Senſes, of Opticks, Muſick, and infinite more; for all theſe have a relation to Man, and are like ſo many Lines drawn from ſeveral Objects that ſome way relate to him, and concenter in him; and he that ſhall make it his buſineſs to follow all thoſe Lines to their utmoſt, ſhall make the contemplation of Man almoſt as large as the contemplation of the whole Univerſe.

When I ſay therefore the contemplation of Man is the contemplation of a ſingle Object, I mean, when it is kept into thoſe ſingle bounds of Man in his own ſpecifical Nature, and under the phyſical contemplation of his Nature, Parts and Faculties, as they are appropriate unto him. And then it is a Subject that we may poſſibly make ſome progreſs in its contemplation and conception within the period of the time, that by the ordinary time of Life, and the permiſſion of neceſſary avocations, a man may employ in ſuch a contemplation.

And yet ſecondly, though in this reſtrained notion, the Subject ſeems to be reſtrained and ſingle, we ſhall find it no very narrow Subject; but there will be buſineſs enough in it to employ our Faculty, and to take up that time, which either more neceſſary, or more imporunate thoughts or employments will allow us; and variety enough to entertain our thoughts with delight, contentation and uſefulneſs.

3. The Third Commendation of this Object to our contemplation, is this, that therein we have more opportunity of certainty and true knowledge of the Object enquired into, than we can have in any other Object, at leaſt of equal uſe, worth and value: Many excellent things there are in Nature, which were very well worth our Knowledge, but yet, as hath been ſaid, either by reaſon of their remoteneſs from us, unacceſſibleneſs to them, ſubtilty and imperceptibleneſs to us, either are not at all ſuſpected to be, or are not ſo much as within any of our Faculties to apprehend or diſcover what they are; or in caſe we have any conception that there may be ſomething of that kind, yet our Notions touching them, are but products of Imagination and Phantaſie, or at beſt, very faint, weak, ungrounded and uncertain conjectures, and ſuch as we can never prove to the ſatisfaction of others or our ſelves.

Our Senſe is the beſt evidence that we have in Nature, touching the exiſtence of corporeal things without us, and where that is not poſſibly to be exerciſed, we are naturally at a great uncertainty whether things are, or what they are. Now the Underſtanding perceives or underſtands things by the aſſiſtance of Senſe in a double manner. 1. It either perceives them immediately, as being immediately objected to, and perceptible to the Senſe; as I perceive the Sun and the Stars by my ſight; I find that there is a Body hard or gentle, or hot or cold, by my Touch; and accordingly my Underſtanding judgeth of them: Or ſecondly, though the Senſe perceive not the Object immediately, yet it doth repreſent certain ſenſible effects or operations; and though by thoſe effects or operations the Underſtanding doth not immediately conclude anything elſe to be, but what the Senſe thus feels or ſees; yet the Underſtanding ſometimes by ratiocination, and ſometimes by the Memory doth infer and conclude ſomething elſe to be beſides what the Senſe immediately repreſents either as the cauſe or the concomitant of it, and doth as forcibly and truly conclude the thing to be, and alſo ſometimes what the nature of that cauſe or concomitant is, as if it were ſeen by the Eye, or felt by the Hand.

I do not ſee, nor by any Senſe perceive the quiet, undiſturbed Air; yet becauſe I do ſee that a Bladder, that was before flaccid, doth ſwell by the reception of that which I ſee not, I do as truly and certainly conclude that there is ſuch a ſubtil Body which we call Air, as if I could ſee it as plain as I ſee the Water: I do not ſee the Animal or Vital Spirits, neither can they, by reaſon of their ſubtilty and volatileneſs, be diſcovered immediately to the Senſe; yet when I ſee that forcible motion of the Nerves and Muſcles, I do as certainly conclude, there are ſuch Inſtruments which the Soul uſeth for the performance of thoſe motions, as if I ſaw them: I come into a Room where there is no viſible or tangible Fire, yet I find by my Senſe the Smoke aſcending, I do as forcibly conclude that Fire is or hath been near, as if I ſaw it; becauſe my ſenſible experience and memory tells me they are concomitant. Upon the ſame account it is, that when my Senſe and ſenſible experience ſhews me that theſe and theſe effects there are, and that they are ſucceſſively generated and corrupted, though my eye ſees not that God that firſt made thoſe things, yet my Senſe having ſhewed me theſe ſenſible Objects, and the ſtate and viciſſtude of them, my Underſtanding doth truly conclude that all this viciſſitude of things muſt terminate in a firſt cauſe of things, with as great evidence and conviction, as if my Senſe could immediately ſee or perceive him: So that in the ordinary way of Nature, and without the help of divine Revelation, all our certainty of things natural, begins at our Senſes; namely, the immediate ſenſe of the things themſelves, or the ſenſe of thoſe effects and operations which after by the help of the Underſtanding are carried up to the diſcovery of things not perceptible by Senſe immediately.

Now there may be many things in Nature unto which we can have neither of theſe acceſſions of Senſe: How many Stars are now diſcovered by the Teleſcope, which were never before known, becauſe not perceived by Senſe? And how many more there may be, which are not viſible to us by that help, we cannot yet know till that diſcovery; We cannot know what the extent of the Univerſe is, whether there be any Worlds without the compaſs of this; whether the Heavenly Bodies are inhabited, and with what Creatures: We cannot know the Nature, Conſtitution, Faculties of created and ſeparate Intelligences, nor the manner of their Ubi, Motion, Intellection, mutual Intercourſe, or detection of their Minds: Theſe things are out of the reach of our Senſe either mediately, or immediately; and conſequently without the help of Divine Revelation, we can never upon a natural account, come to any certainty in them; or the moſt we can otherwiſe know, is by conſidering the reflexed acts of our Underſtanding, whereby we know many acts of our own minds and Soul, which are not perceptible to our external Senſes; and upon that account, we may think that 〈…〉 their perception may be ſomething analogical; But Man is an Object of greateſt vicinity to himſelf, and hath thereby, and by other contributions, the beſt opportunity to know and underſtand himſelf with the greateſt certainty and evidence.

And yet it cannot be denied, that notwithſtanding this great proximity of Man to himſelf, yea, and notwithſtanding the many and great Eſſayes, Attempts, Enquiries and Obſervations that have been made in all ſucceſſions of Ages, by men of excellent Parts, Learning and Induſtry, we ſtill remain, and are like ſtill to remain ignorant of many things of importance concerning our ſelves: The great and wiſe God whoſe Glory it is to conceal a matter, having lodged many things in the Humane Nature, and Fabrick, and Conſtitution thereof ſo ſecretly and ſo cloſely, that notwithſtanding the Experience and Obſervation of near 6000 years, and the ſearch and induſtry of the beſt Judgments in all Ages, and the cloſe proximity of Man to himſelf, there are very many things in our Nature, whereof we neither can, and probably never ſhall be able to give any account to our ſelves or others, with any evident, nay with any tolerable certainty; as if the Divine Wiſdom meant hereby to give to the Children of Men an inſtance to keep them humble, that cannot find out the certainty of what they hourly moſt intimately converſe withal; and an indication of his own profound and infinite Wiſdom, that can thus keep ſecret thoſe things, which in regard of their proximity to us, we have great opportunity to know.

And of this nature are many things which we know to be, but we cannot give our ſelves any ſufficient explication of the manner or reaſon of them. We are certain we have a vital, active Principle in us, by which we ſee, underſtand, remember; which we call the Soul. But whence that Soul comes, or how, and when, and in what manner it is united to the Body, whether it be extended with the Body, or indiviſible, and in every point of the Body, how and in what manner it exerciſeth its nobler acts of Intellection and Volition, or how far forth it ſtands in need of the Organs actually to exert any of thoſe operations; or how far forth it doth or may exert them without it: how or by what means the Species not only of ſenſible Objects, but even of Notions of the Mind are preſerved in the Memory without confuſion and diſſipation, notwithſtanding lapſe of time, and intervention of infinite variety of Objects: whether it be the ſame individual principle that exerciſeth the acts of Intellection, and likewiſe of Senſe and Vegetation; and if it be, what become of theſe Faculties ſubſervient to a temporal Life, in the ſtate of ſeparation of the Soul: where it is that the exerciſe of Senſe is performed; whether in the Brain, or by the Soul, by the mediation of the Spirits in the extremity of the Nerves; and if the former, how the Species of Viſibles are carried through thoſe dark Caverns between the Organ and Cerebellum, ſuppoſed to be the Seat of the common Senſe. Theſe and many more difficulties, ſcarce explicable with any ſufficient certainty, do occur in the little Shop of the Fabrick of Humane Nature. We muſt not therefore think, that becauſe of this nearneſs to our ſelves, all the Phaenomena of our Nature can be rendred as evidently explicable as we do or may underſtand the Fabrick of our Hand by Anatomical Diſſection.

But though this vicinity of our ſelves to our ſelves, cannot give us the full proſpect of all the Intrigues of our Nature, yet we have thereby, and by other opportunities, much more advantage to know our ſelves, than to know other things without us, and by that opportunity of knowing of our ſelves, to know the truth or falſhood, or analogy of very many things without us, which otherwiſe could not be ſo well known or explicated.

1. We have hereby an opportunity to know the Conſtitutions, Frame and Order of our Bodies; It is true, the great advance of the practice and skill of Anatomy hath laid open to ocular inſpection the Fabrick of the Bodies, as well of Brutes and Birds, as Men; and therein they ſeem to be equally obvious to our knowledge: But a Brute or a Man are another thing, when they are alive, from what they are when dead: Anatomy can give us the Poſition, Frame, Situation, Figure and connexion of all the ſeveral Integrals of the Body of Man or Beaſt; but it is the living Mans obſervation of himſelf, that muſt give account of thoſe Vital motions that are in the Body when living; as the Pulſations of the Heart, the Circulation of the Blood, the Communication of the Parts, the Congruity or Diſagreement between my Nature and other things variouſly qualified: The Humor that ſeparates, divides, attenuates and digeſts the Nouriſhment; the ſeveral exertions of the ſeveral Organs relating to their ſeveral Functions, the things that impede or advance the vital or ſenſible operations in a man, what impreſſions are made upon the Blood and Spirits by the ſeveral paſſions of the Mind, what things increaſe or advance the Spirits, what diſorder or diſcompoſe them; the immediate and agil ſubſervience of the Spirits to the Empire of the Mind or Soul. Theſe and infinite more touching the Body, are diſcoverable by Obſervation, and by no other Obſervation, ſo well as by a mans Obſervation of himſelf.

2. We have hereby an opportunity to know much more of the Nature, Operations and other things relating to our Souls, than we can touching other things or Natures. There hath been much Diſpute among Learned men, concerning the manner of the Intellection of Spirits and Intelligences; and by others, touching the knowledge of Brutes, touching their remembring Faculty, whether they have a kind of Diſcurſive Faculty, which ſome call Reaſon; whether they do preſcind or abſtract touching their Voyces; how far they are ſignificant, and whether they intentionally ſignifie by them, how far their Animal motions are ſpontaneous, or meerly mechanical, and which are of one kind, which of another; or whether, as Des Cartes would have it, all are purely Mechanical.

Many vain things have been aſſerted by men that would be counted eminent Wits; but without debating in this place the truth of any of theſe things, it is no marvel if we are to ſeek what are the manner of theſe operations of abſtract Spirits or Brutes; we cannot know them, unleſs we were in them, ſo as to be acquainted with their inward motions, or at leaſt, unleſs they had ſome ſuch way of communicating their Perceptions and Phantaſms unto us, as we have to our ſelves, or one to another: But whatever can be known of them, we may eaſily by inſpecting and obſerving our ſelves, know much concerning our own Souls and the operations of them: We may know that we have a principle within, which we do, as it were, feel diſtinct from our Bodies, whereby we think, and we know we think; whereby we do diſcurſively, and by way of ratiocination deduce one thing from another; whereby we abſtract, divide and define, whereby we have notions of things which were never derived to us by Senſe, as the Subſtance or the Subſtratum of thoſe Accidents of things which are derived to us by our Senſe; whereby we do correct the errors of our Senſe, and judge otherwiſe touching things repreſented, than the Senſe repreſents them. The Senſe repreſents the Sun no bigger than a Buſhel; there is ſomewhat within us tells, and that truly, that it is bigger than the Earth, becauſe we find Diſtance diminiſheth the appearance of Bodies: Our Senſe tells us that the repreſentation in the Looking-Glaſs, hath all the motions, the bulk, figure, colour of that corporeal Moles it repreſents, and repreſents the ſame under all the renditions of a Body, as it doth the thing it ſelf reflected; but there is that within tells us, and that truly, that it is but a meer ſhadow, and no real Subſtratum under that appearance of any ſuch corporeal Moles: We do moſt certainly know that there is that within us, that doth exerciſe a rational Empire over our paſſions and ſenſual appetite; that believes, hopes and acts in order to ends that reſpect another Life than that of Senſe, We do find, as it were, the principal ſeats of theſe operations, we feel our ſelves to underſtand in our Head, and that we will, and reſolve, and love, and hate, and pity in our Heart, almoſt as plainly as we find our ſelves ſee with our Eyes, or hear with our Ears: I feel the propenſions and inclinations of my Mind as really as I feel my Body to be cold or warm. I find in my ſelf that this inward principle doth exert many of its actions intentionally and purpoſely; I reſolve and caſt about to remember things that I would remember; I caſt about for all circumſtances that may revive my Memory or Reminiſcence: When I command any Muſcle of my moſt remote Limb to move, it doth it in an inſtant; in the moment I will it; and hereby I underſtand the motions of my Mind are no way Mechanical, though the motion of the Muſcle be ſuch; I move, ride, run, or ſpeak, becauſe I will do it, without any other phyſical impulſe upon me, and when I ſee many analogal motions in Animals, which though I cannot call them voluntary, yet I ſee them ſpontaneous; I have reaſon to conclude that theſe in their principle are not ſimply mechanical, although a Mouſe-trap, or Architas his Dove moved mechanically, from an artificial principle. And becauſe I find that the remoteſt Muſcle in my Body moves at the command of my Will, and ſince I ſee the energy of my Soul in every particle of my Body, though not uſing intellectual actions in every part, yet uſing ſome that are imperate, as Local Motion; ſome that are natural and involuntary, as the Pulſe of my Heart, the Circulation of my Blood, my Digeſtion, Sanguification, Diſtribution Augmentation: And becauſe at the ſame time I underſtand, conſider, determine, ſpeak, walk, digeſt, and exerciſe, as well intelectual, imperate and involuntary actions, and all from the ſame vital Principle, though operating differently in ſeveral Faculties and Operations: I therefore experimentally feel that my Soul, though it hath the reſidence of the exerciſe of his nobler Faculties in my Head and Heart, yet it pervades my whole Body, and exerciſeth Vital Offices, proportionate to the Exigences or Uſe of every part, the Fleſh, the Bones, the Blood, the Spirits, Nerves, Veins, Arteries, Seminal Parts; and this I feel to be through my whole Body, and if I find any part of my Body be ſo mortified as it becomes like a rotten Branch of a Tree, whether it be Nerve or Joint, whereby that principle cannot communicate it ſelf to it, it putrifies and corrupts, and is not participant of the motion or influence derived from my Soul, becauſe it is now no longer in it to quicken it. And as I find my whole Body the Province or Territory of my Soul; in which it univerſally acts according to the different organization and uſe of every part, ſo I find that my Soul, as to its ſubſtantial exiſtence, is confined within the precints of it, and doth not phyſically act without it; and by all this I learn, that my Soul, if it be a Spirit, may be circumſcribed within the compaſs of a determinate ſpace, that though it be a Spirit, yet its operations while it is in the Body, may be, if not altogether, yet in a great meaſure, organical. I underſtand, remember and reaſon better in my health, than in my ſickneſs; and better in my riper years, than when I was a Child, and had my organical Parts leſs digeſted and inconcocted: And though it be a Spirit, yet I find it is no inconvenience to have ſome analogy, at leaſt of co-extenſion, with my Body. And although it may be a ſimple Spirit, and univocally and eſſentially the ſame, as well in my Toe, as my Head, yet according to the variety of the diſpoſition and organization of the ſeveral parts of my organical Body, it exerciſeth variety of operations; the ſame Soul that underſtands in the Brain, and ſees in the Eye, and hears in the Ear, neither underſtands, nor ſees, nor hears in the Fingers, but moves and feels.

Theſe and many ſuch Perceptions I have touching that principle of Life, Senſe and Intellection within me; and of theſe I have as great a certainty as poſſibly I can have of any thing in the world. Firſt, Although I cannot immediately have any immediate ſight of my Soul, or of its immediate operations, or internal actings, yet I ſenſibly ſee and feel the effects thereof with as great an evidence and demonſtration that it is ſuch, as if I ſaw the Principle it ſelf, and its immediate operations. I ſenſibly ſee and feel that my Hand or Foot moves upon the command of that principle within me: And when that principle is removed by a total deprivation, as Death; or by a partial deprivation, as in a mortified Limb or Member; or by a temporary ſuſpenſion, as in an Apoplexy or Deliquium Animi; I am ſure there is no ſuch motion, becauſe that principle is abſent in Death, or its operation ſuſpended in caſe of ſuch Diſeaſes: It was therefore a principle that was within, diſtinct from my Body, that while it was there, exerted this Empire, and was obeyed in it. Secondly, In thoſe actings of my Soul, which are not in themſelves perceptible by any ſenſible effect, yet I have as firm and certain an evidence that they are ſuch, as if I had a ſenſible perception of them: When I think, or underſtand, or remember, or abſtract, or divide, or define, or purpoſe, or will, it is moſt certain theſe effects or intrinſick operations of my mind are not poſſibly perceptible by my ſight, or hearing, or taſte, or ſmell, or feeling; they are objects of ſuch a nature, that fall not under any perception of any of thoſe Senſes; yet I am as certain, if not much more certain, that I do think, or remember, or abſtract, or reaſon, or reſolve, or will, as that I hear, or ſee, or feel; and I do as certainly know before I write, what I am now writing, that I think or reaſon touching the things I am writing, or that I reſolve or purpoſe to write them, as I am certain that I have written them when I have written them; for the motions of my mind are as certainly obvious to a perception in me anſwerable to them (which I call the reflex act of the Soul, or the turning of the intellectual eye inward upon its own actions) as the motions or rather paſſions of my Senſe are certainly obvious to my Senſe; I ſee the Object, and I perceive that I ſee it: And therefore though he was a little too poſitive that ſaid, Ego cogito, was, as it were, primum cognitum, yet certainly herein he was irrefragably true, that there cannot be any thing more certain and evident to a man that thinks, than that he doth think; and yet that Thinking is not perceptible by any of our five Senſes. Thirdly, But there is yet a farther opportunity of very much certainty in that knowledge that a man may have of himſelf, and of thoſe things concerning himſelf; by that converſation, by the help of ſpeech or ſigns that he hath, or may have with other men. Man only, of all viſible Creatures, having this priviledge of communicating his thoughts and conceptions by inſtituted ſigns of ſpeech or writing; and by this a man acquires a threefold ſuperadded certainty of what he may or doth know concerning himſelf: Namely,

1. He thereby knows that there is a ſpecifical Identity between him and other men, and that they agree in one common rational Nature; for by mutual ſpeech we find that we have both alike an intellective, diſcurſive Faculty, as I do reaſon, ſo doth he; as I divide, define, abſtract, purpoſe, determine, will, ſo doth he uſe the like operations of his Mind; and although oftentimes intereſt and miſapprehenſion make us differ in our concluſion, yet he endeavours to maintain his Concluſion by the like method of Reaſon and diſcurſive Ratiocination as I do; and moſt times when prejudice and miſapprehenſions are removed, that which ſeems reaſonable to him, ſeems ſo to me; whereby it appears that we concenter in one common Nature, and that the Principle of Reaſon and Reaſonable Soul is common to us both, and that we meet in one common rational Nature.

2. He likewiſe knows that as they concenter in one common rational Nature, ſo every one of that Species, hath yet an individual Principle of his own, that individuates, and perſonally diſcriminates one from another: For till we mutually communicate our thoughts by inſtituted ſigns, he knows not what I think or purpoſe, nor I what he thinks or purpoſeth.

3. This adds a certainty to me that I am not deceived in thoſe reflections that I make upon my ſelf, and the collections I make from them; for as I do find I think, I reaſon, abſtract, divide, define, purpoſe, ſo I find by the help of Speech and Signs that he hath the very like internal operations; and as I do find that thoſe do ariſe from a principle different and diſtinct from that moles Corporea which I have, ſo I find that he hath the ſame perception of the original of theſe internal operations, and attributes them to a Principle in him diſtinct from the Body: So that if I might have any imaginable doubt of thoſe reflexed perceptions which I have touching thoſe appropriate operations of my own Mind, I am confirmed in them, becauſe I find the like perceptions in all the men I converſe with. And thus far touching the third Commendable in the ſearch of our ſelves, namely, Certainty and Evidence.

4. The fourth advantage of this ſubject and the knowledge thereof is, the profit and uſefulneſs thereof: Next to the knowledge of Almighty God, and our Bleſſed Saviour, and the Sacred Scriptures, there is not any ſubject in the World that is more neceſſary and uſeful to be known than the Humane nature, with thoſe incidents that do neceſſarily fall into that conſideration; and of all the knowledge that relates to man, there is nothing of greater moment or uſe to be known than Man under the Phyſical notion of his Body and Soul, and both united together. And the uſefulneſs of this Conſideration diſtributes it ſelf into theſe two kinds; Uſefulneſs in reference to Speculation or Knowledge, and Uſefulneſs in relation to Practice or Exerciſe.

1. Touching the Speculative Uſefulneſs there is this to be ſaid, that there is in the contemplation of Man a means of diſcovery and explication of very great and momentous truths. And although poſſibly the very ſame truths may be elicited, and in ſome meaſure explicated by parallel Phaenomena in the contemplation of Animals, yet they are more clearly and eminently evidenced in the contemplation of Man, who, by how much the more excellent and noble a Creature he is above Brutes, and by how much he is the more obſervable to himſelf than they can be, by to much the more uſeful and excellent is the knowledge of himſelf.

Now theſe Speculative truths which I ſhall chuſe to inſtance in ſhall be theſe.

1. The due contemplation of the Humane nature doth by a neceſſary connexion and chain of Cauſes, carry us up to the unavoidable acknowledgement of the Deity; becauſe it carries every thinking man to an original of every ſucceſſive individual thereof by a courſe of generation, till it come to a common Parent of the whole Species, the immediate workmanſhip of the Glorious God.

2. Conſequently, it gives every conſidering man a ſound and full conviction that the efficient of this firſt Parent of Mankind, is a moſt wiſe, moſt powerful and beneficent Being. For the true proſpect of the Humane Fabrick in its eſſential and integral parts, in the fabrick of his Body, and the faculties and operation of his Soul muſt needs convince any man of ordinary reaſon, that can obſerve but clear and evident conſequences, that the Efficient that firſt made this firſt root of Mankind was not only an intelligent Being, but a Being of moſt admirable Power, Wiſdom, and Goodneſs; for ſuch this effect doth neceſſarily declare its Efficient to be.

3. As the contemplation of the Origination of the Species of Mankind gives us an aſſurance of the Exiſtence of the firſt Cauſe, and of his Attribute of Wiſdom, Power, and Goodneſs; ſo the contemplation of the ſecondary origination of Mankind, or the production of the Individuals by generation gives us an evidence of the like power, wiſdom, and goodneſs of God, and a little Emblem of the Divine Power in the Creation of the World. Any man that attentively conſiders the progreſs of the generative production of mankind, will find, that this goodly and noble Creature called Man hath its gradual formation and complement from a ſmall, almoſt imperceptible vital principle, which by the Divine inſtitution is endued with ſuch a regular, orderly, and unerring power, that from moſt inconſiderable and unlikely materials builds up gradually the goodly frame of the Body, cloaths it ſelf with it, and exerciſeth an admirable Oeconomy over it: And this it doth not by ſuch a kind of choice, deliberation and forecaſt as the Watch-maker makes his Watch; for as yet this vital rational principle doth not exerciſe an actual ratiocination or diſcurſive deliberation, neither hath thoſe organs of Heart, and Brain, and Spirits, and Veſſels (by the help of which we exerciſe our Acts of Reaſon) till it hath made and framed them. And yet this admirable Frame is immediately wrought by this little particle which we call the Soul, and moulded, formed and perfected with an incomparable and unerring dexterity, skill, elegance, and curioſity more and greater than the moſt exquiſite Artiſt can ſhew in the moſt poliſhed piece of Artificial work.

Now if this little ſpark of Life that in this work of generation and formation is Vicarius Dei, the Inſtrument of his power and wiſdom; if this little imperceptible Archeus is endowed by the Divine power, wiſdom, and inſtitution with this admirable, regular, and effective power out of ſo ſmall, inconſiderable and unlikely materials to mould up and faſhion the goodly Fabrick of Humane Nature, and to perfect it for a complete habitation for it ſelf, wherein to exerciſe its moſt excellent oeconomy and operations; if this Puſillus divinae lucis radius, ex tantilla & tam improbabili materiae particula mirandam naturae humanae fabricam tam affabrè, eleganter, & inerrabundè formaverit. If we find in ſo ſmall a particle of a created Being this admirable energy, why ſhould we make a queſtion whether that God that at firſt gave this admirable energy to the Soul to frame ſo goodly a piece out of matter ſo near to nothing, ſhould not have power to create a World of matter out of nothing.

2. Again, ſince I do ſee as plainly as I ſee my Paper that I now write upon, that this fabrication of the Humane Body is the immediate work of a Vital principle that prepareth, diſpoſeth, digeſteth, diſtributeth and formeth the firſt rudiments of the Humane nature when it is no bigger than a little Bean; that afterwards gradually augmenteth and perfecteth it to the goodly complement of a Man: And the ſame thing I ſee in the firſt rudiments of all generations as well vegetable as animal. It doth give to me (notwithſtanding all the bold confidence and conjectures of Epicurus, and thoſe that follow him as far as for ſhame they durſt) I ſay it doth give me not only an undeniable evidence, but an exemplar in analogy and explication, that the coalition of the goodly frame of the Univerſe was not the product of chance, or fortuitous concourſe of particles of matter, nor the ſingle effect of matter and motion; but of the moſt wiſe and powerful ordination of the moſt wiſe and glorious God, who thus ordered the World, and inſtituted that Rule, Order, or Law which we call Nature to be the Law of its future being and operation; if I ſee that the Coagmentation of a Man, nay of a Chicken or a grain of Wheat is not by caſualty, but the wiſe and powerful God hath committed the Coagmentation, Diſpoſition, and Formation thereof to their Seminal Principles, tanquam Vicariis & ſubſtitutis Divini Numinis Inſtrumentis, as it were to Vicegerents and ſubſervient Inſtruments of the Deity: I have no reaſon to think that the goodly Frame of the Univerſe was the production of Chance, or Accident, or bare Matter, or its caſual motion or modification thereof; but that the ſame was the Contrivance and Work of the Great, Wiſe, and Glorious God, as a Work in a great meaſure anſwerable to the Excellency of ſuch an Efficient.

3. Again, I find a ſort of Men that pretend to much ſeverity of Wit, and would be thought too wiſe to be impoſed upon by Credulity, where they think they have not evidence enough of Senſe or Reaſon to convince them; that would be thought to be Men above the common rate; theſe have gone about, as far as they durſt, to exclude God out of the World, and pity thoſe Men as troubled with Credulity, and of weak Parts, that believe the Regiment of Divine Providence; a buſineſs that they think, or pretend to think may be made uſe of to impoſe upon the weaker part of Mankind, think it a Fiction, and ſuch as is utterly inexplicable to the ſatisfaction of a reaſonable and impartial judgment. Now the due contemplation of the Humane Nature, and that Oeconomy that the Active Principle in it ordinarily called the Soul doth exerciſe therein to my Underſtanding, gives me both a reaſonable evidence of the Divine Providence governing the World, and a fair explication of it to me.

I mean not in this place to examine the truth or falſity of the Plurality of Subordinate Forms, or whether there be two or three diſtinct Subſtantial Forms or Souls in Man, whereby he is Vivens, Sentiens, & Intelligens; for they are proper for a farther Examination in their proper place: But at preſent I do ſuppoſe, that that one Soul, whereby Man is conſtituted in Eſſe Hominis, is the ſingle Principle of all his operations of Life, Senſe, and Intellection; becauſe, as to this purpoſe which I am now upon, it comes all to one whether there be a Unity or Plurality of Subordinate Forms, or of Souls in the Humane Nature.

I ſay therefore, in the Humane Fabrick we may obſerve two kinds of Forms, if I may ſo call them; the one, the Forma Corporis, as ſuch whereby it hath thoſe Properties or Operations which are common to Bodies of the like make or compoſition; whereby it is weighty and deſcends as other Bodies, it is figured, it hath dimenſions and qualities common to other Bodies; it hath in it ſome parts more active and fiery, others more paſſive and wateriſh, or earthy; it hath its tendencies to corruption and diſſipation: And though after the ſeparation of the Soul from the Body, it perchance loſeth ſome of thoſe particular Qualities, Figurations and Properties that it had before, yet it retaineth many of them; for many of theſe Proprieties of a Body as ſuch, do not depend upon the Specifical Form of the Humane Nature as ſuch: Again, there is in this Body a certain Active Specifical Form, whereby it is conſtituted in Eſſe Hominis, which hath in it, and doth communicate to the Body certain operations ſpecifical to it; by this he exerciſeth thoſe operations which either flow from or are communicated by that Form, as Life, Senſe, Intellection, Volition, and the like: And though Life and Senſe be common to Man and Brutes, and their operations in many things alike, yet by this Form he lives the Life of a Man and not of a Brute, and hath the Senſe of a Man and not of a Brute: For there is no ſuch thing as Animal, or Vivens, not determined unto ſome particular Species, as there is no ſuch thing as a Man not determined in ſome individual: For Univerſals are but Notions and Entia Rationis, having their exiſtence only in the underſtanding power, and not in reality.

And theſe Operations and Faculties of Humane Life, Humane Senſe, and Humane Underſtanding and Volition flow not from the corporeal Moles, but from ſome other active regent Principle that reſides in the Body, and governs it whiles it lives, which we call the Soul. And therefore although the corporeal Moles after ſome kinds of Deaths retain the ſame bulky Integrals, the ſame Figure, Colour, and many other accidents; yet the Soul being removed, the Faculties and Operations of Life, Senſe, and Intellection ceaſe from that Moles corporea, and are no longer in it.

This Principle of Life, Senſe, and Intellection in Man called the Soul, hath the Body as its Province and Diſtrictus, wherein it exerciſeth theſe Faculties and Operations: and we ſhall find the Actions which are performed by it in the Body are of three kinds or natures; 1. Some are immanent, and not terminated immediately in any external or corporeal action. 2. Some are tranſient and ſpontaneous, terminating in the Body, or ſome parts or motions thereof. 3. Some tranſient, but involuntary, and exerciſed and terminated in or upon the Body.

Theſe ſeem to be the ſeveral kinds of Actions of the Soul, at leaſt relating to the Regiment and Oeconomical Government of the Soul upon the Body.

1. The internal and immanent Faculties and Acts of the reaſonable Soul (beſides thoſe of Common Senſe, Phantaſie, Memory, Paſſion and Appetite, common to Men and inferiour Animals) are Intellect and Will; and the proper Acts of the Intellect are Intellection, Deliberation, and Determination or Deciſion: The proper Acts of the Will are Volition, Nolition, Choice, Purpoſe or Reſolution, and Command in relation to Subordinate Faculties: And although there be many actings both of the Intellect and Will that are relative to other things or objects than what immediately concern the Microcoſm it ſelf; yet the principal part of that analogical Providence that the Soul exerciſeth in relation to the Microcoſm or Humane Compoſitum are Intellection, Deliberation, and Determination in the Underſtanding; and Choice, Volition, Nolition, and Purpoſe in the Will; and theſe do or ſhould regularly precede all thoſe imperate Acts of the Soul that relate to the Compoſitum: Before I write, or ſpeak, or go a journey, or eat, or any the like action, there is the deliberation of the Underſtanding, whether I ſhall do this action; the deciſion of the Underſtanding, that it is fit to be done; the choice of the Will to do it, the purpoſe of the Will that it ſhall be done: And although many times the diſtinction of theſe ſeveral procedures of the Soul do not always appear diſtinct, eſpecially in ſudden or ordinary actions, which ſeem to have but one act antecedent to the thing done, namely, the willing of it to be done; yet in actions of weight and importance all theſe have their diſtinct order and procedure. For although in the moſt incomprehenſible and perfect Will of Almighty God there is no ſuch ſucceſſion of procedure; yet in the operations of the rational Soul that is linked to the Body, there is ordinarily that ſucceſſive procedure of thoſe immanent acts of the Soul that relate to any thing to be done. This therefore is the firſt part of that analogical Providence that the Soul exerciſeth in relation to the Body, namely, deliberation or counſel, and deciſion in the Intellect; and choice and purpoſe in the Will.

2. The next Act, which immediately ſuccceds Purpoſe, is the Command that is given by the volitive Faculty of the Soul, and the Execution thereof: and herein are conſiderable, Firſt, The Power commanding, which is the Will, now determined by purpoſe or reſolution. Secondly, The things to which theſe commands relate, or the Object of them; which in relation to the Body is in effect nothing but motion of the Spirits, Nerves, Muſcles, parts of the Body, or the entire Compoſitum; by virtue of this command the Muſcles, the Hand, the Eye, the Tongue perform thoſe imperate commands of the Will; I do not digeſt, ſanguifie, nor my Heart move, nor my Blood circulate, nor my Meat digeſt by any immediate command of my Will; but I eat, I drink, I move my Eye, my Hand, my Muſcles, my whole Body in purſuance of this command of my Will. Thirdly, The executive Inſtrument of this command mediately are my Nerves and Muſcles, but immediately thoſe ſubtil, inviſible and forcible Engins which we call the Animal Spirits; theſe being the moſt ſubtil parts in Nature, and parts of matter ſubtilized, next in degree of purity to that Soul that commands them, are in their nature proper, fit, and ſuitable to be the firſt recipients of the Empire of the Soul; they are the nimbleſt, agil, ſtrongeſt Inſtruments, fitteſt to be executive of the commands of the Soul; they are a middle nature between the Soul and the Body, the nexus animae to the Body; and theſe ſubtil Meſſengers ſpeedily diſpatch themſelves through the Nerves to the Muſcles, which are by theſe Spirits and the native Indoles that is in them and the exact texture of them fitted to move thoſe Integrals of the Body to which they ſerve; and as the Spirits ſhot through the Nerves are the firſt and immediate Inſtruments of the Soul in its imperate acts, ſo the Muſcles are as it were the Inſtruments of the Spirits, or the remote Inſtruments of theſe imperate motions: And by this means the Soul hath the actual imperium and command of all thoſe motions of the Body which are ſpontaneous or capable of being commanded by the volitive Power of the Soul; 'tis by this the Eye-lid opens or ſhuts, the Eye is converted to this or that object, the Lungs are intended or remitted, the Tongue ſpeaks, the Hand ſtrikes or moves, the Foot walks, the Mouth opens or ſhuts, and all thoſe ſpontaneous motions ſubject to the Empire of the Will are performed: And though I chuſe my Inſtance in the ſubject in hand, yet the like imperate motions are in Brutes and Animals, though not by the Empire of Will, which they have not, yet by a Faculty that moves in many things ſpontaneouſly in ſome analogy and adumbration of the Empire of the Will in Man, but incomparably below it both in perfection and freedom.

3. Again, there be very many Operations, that although they flow from this active Principle, yet they are not acts that are imperate by the Will, but they are in a manner natural and unvoluntary; and therefore I call them ſometimes Involuntary, ſometimes Natural, and they are very many and various; ſuch are many of the acts of Senſe, eſpecially the external. Though I do by the Empire of my Will direct the Motion or Acies of my Organ to this or that Object, yet my Eye, my Ear, my Touch, my Smell, my Taſt exerciſe their office of perception upon the Object duly applied to them, without any act of my Will commanding them ſo to do when they are joyned to their Object: So my Heart moves, my Blood circulates, my Meat digeſts, my Body is augmented, without any intention of mind to aſſiſt their actings. So if there be an ill humour in my Body, or a wound in my Hand or Leg, the Vital energy of my Soul thruſts out the Balſamical humour of my Blood to heal the latter, and uſeth all that Oeconomy that is proper for the expulſion or ſubduing of the former; ſometimes by puſtulae or eruptions in the fleſh, ſometimes by ſweat, ſometimes by urine, ſometimes by ſeige; and all this it doth in the moſt congruous way imaginable; ſo that the beſt Phyſicians have not better direction ordinarily in their applications, than to follow Nature in thoſe motions. And all this is done moſt exquiſitely, and yet without any deliberation or rational deciſion of the Underſtanding or Empire of the Will in relation to thoſe Natural motions. I ſhall only therefore obſerve concerning theſe Involuntary motions, 1. That though they are without any dictamen Rationis, yet they are done in a way of as great congruity to its end, as if they were directed by the wiſeſt counſel of the wiſeſt Soul; and it is reaſon good it ſhould, for it is a ſtanding and moſt wiſe Law of exerciſe planted by the moſt wiſe God in this Vital Principle for the regiment of the Body: And therefore though it be not directed by deliberation of the Humane Intellect, or choice of Humane Will, it is ſetled, contrived, implanted and directed there by a higher Wiſdom, even the Wiſdom of the moſt wiſe God: And this indeed is the reaſon of that Excellency that is ſeen in Inſtincts, even of Brutes, and the Formative proceſs in generation; that they ſo aptly and excellently attain their Ends: namely, becauſe theſe Inſtincts and Powers are the immediate Impreſſions, Signatures and Energies placed in them by the Great and Glorious God, whoſe very fooliſhneſs, as the Apoſtle tells us (namely the ſeemingly vileſt and loweſt Impreſſions of his Wiſdom) is wiſer than men. 2. The ſecond thing to be obſerved herein, is, That thoſe Natural and Involuntary actings are not done as the former, by deliberation and formal command, yet they are done by the virtue, energy, and influx of the Soul, and the inſtrumentality of the Spirits as well as thoſe Imperate acts before ſpoken of; wherein we ſee the immediate empire of the Soul: That Soul that moves my hand, my tongue, my foot by way of expreſs command and empire; digeſts, ſanguifies, carnifies, excerts and doth all thoſe Involuntary operations by it influence and preſence: remove but the Soul, there is no more digeſtion, ſanguification, or any other acts of that kind, than there is ſpeech in the tongue. And although in ſome Inſects there appears a palpitation of the Heart for ſome little ſpace after it is ſevered from the Body; and in Chicken and other Fowl, after the ſeparation of the Head from the Body there is a motion of the parts divided, yet it laſts not long, and they are but the irregular and convulſive motions or ſtruglings of thoſe Spirits which could not ſo haſtily diſmiſs themſelves from the veſſels wherein they were incloſed.

I would now obſerve ſome generals in relation to this Adumbration of Providence and analogical Oeconomy of the Soul in the Body, which are theſe: 1. That this analogical Providence of the Soul in relation to its Province the Compoſitum or Microcoſm is univerſal to every part of it; there is not the moſt inconſiderable particle of Fleſh, Bone or Artery, not the ſmalleſt Capillary Vein but it is preſent with, and auxiliary to it, according to its uſe and exigence, and the congruity of its conſtitution; it accommodates it ſelf to the Eye for ſeeing, to the Ear for hearing; and though it accommodate not it ſelf to the Finger in thoſe exertings of thoſe Senſes of Seeing or Hearing, yet it equally accommodates it ſelf to thoſe remote and ſmall Organs as perfectly in relation to Feeling, and to thoſe motions that are ſuitable to them. 2. That even thoſe Exertions of the active Energy of the Soul that ſeem moſt remote from the deliberation of the Underſtanding and immediate active Empire of the Will, are guided and directed with all imaginable congruity to their ſeveral Ends and Uſes. 3. That this very ſame individual Soul may, and oftentimes doth exert all thoſe operations at the ſame time without any difficulty or confuſion: At the ſame time I think, I deliberate, I purpoſe, I command: in inferiour Faculties; I walk, I ſee, I hear, I digeſt, I ſanguifie, I carnifie, my Lungs move ſwifter or ſlower by the empire and command of my Will, my Heart moves naturally by the motion of Palpitation, my Blood by the motion of Circulation, Excretion, Perſpiration; my Guts by the motion of Vermiculation, my Stomach and Inteſtines digeſt, the good ejects and expulſes the bad, my Diſeaſe is reſiſted and expelled, my Wound cured, and a thouſand more concurrent, coincident Motions; and all theſe performed at the ſame time by the Power, Energy and Oeconomy of one individual Soul; and yet all this done eaſily, and ſweetly, and perfectly; without either laſſitude, confuſion, or perturbation.

And all this done by a little ſpark of Life, which in its firſt appearance might be incloſed in the hollow of a Cherry-ſtone; yet this little active Principle as the Body increaſeth and dilateth, evolveth, diffuſeth and expandeth if not his Subſtantial Exiſtence, yet his Energy and Virtue, to the utmoſt confines of his little Province and every particle and atom thereof; yea and it is of that abſolute neceſſity that it ſhould do ſo, that without it the Compoſitum would be diſſolved, and the Body diſſipated into corruption and its firſt principles, as we ſee it falls out ſuddenly after the ſeparation of the Soul from the Body: As the Body could not be reduced into that orderly frame in which it is conſtituted, without the Plaſtick and Formative power of the Soul, ſo it could never be upheld in that ſtate of Order and Convenience without the continued Influence of the Soul: The latter is as abſolutely neceſſary for its continuance and conſervation, as the former for its conſtitution.

I eaſily foreſee two Objections againſt the Method propoſed; 1. That the Hypotheſis it ſelf is not ſufficiently evidenced: How do we know that this Oeconomy is the effect of a Power, or Nature, or Being diſtinct from the Body? and why may it not be the reſult of this Diſpoſition, Harmony, or Contemperation of qualities or parts of that Matter that conſtitutes the Body? 2. And if it be, what need we magnifie the Humane Nature as the great Inſtructer in this buſineſs; ſince we may with a little obſervation find very much the like in Brutes as well as Men? For there we find a ſenſible Perception and Phantaſie anſwering the Intellect in Man; an Eſtimative or Judicial faculty, an Appetition or Averſation and Locomotive faculty anſwering the Will; and the very Oeconomy of the animal Soul or Spirits managing as well their ſpontaneous actions as theſe natural or involuntary exertions of Digeſtion, Egeſtion, Circulation, and the reſt of thoſe Motions called Involuntary or Natural.

To the Firſt of theſe I ſay, That this is not the place for a large reduction of theſe Operations to the regiment of the Soul as a diſtinct active Faculty, diſtinct from the Corporeal Moles and its contemperation, that ſhall, God willing, in its due place be at large diſcuſſed, which I am not here willing to anticipate. In the mean time, let the Objector but honeſtly and impartially examine and obſerve Himſelf, and he will need no other evidence of this truth but his own experience to ſatisfie him, that all thoſe effects proceed from an active, regnant Principle within him, diſtinct from the Moles corporea, or the contemperation thereof. The diſtemper of the humours of the Body cauſe ſometimes ſuch ſickneſs as diſorders the Phantaſie and Reaſon; but ſometimes though it diſtempers the Body, the Intellective faculty and operations are nevertheleſs free and ſound, as Experience ſhews. If this Objector was ever under a Sickneſs or Diſtemper of the latter kind, let him give an account what it is that gives him under ſuch a Diſeaſe the uſe of his Reaſon.

To the Second I need not ſay more than what I have before obſerved; namely, 1. That although the Inferiour Natures have a kind of Image of the Humane Nature, yet it is leſs perfect, and therefore no equal Inſtance in order to the explication of what I herein deſign. 2. As it is leſs perfect, ſo it is more diſtant and leſs evident to us, than our ſelves are or may be to our ſelves; the Regiment and Oeconomy of our own Souls in our Bodies and of them are more evident to us and perceptible by us, than that Regiment and Oeconomy that the Souls of Brutes exerciſe in them, and therefore fitter to be made our Inſtance of that which I go about thereby to illuſtrate; namely, the poſſibility, neceſſity and explication of the Divine Providence in the governing and influencing of the Univerſe and all the parts thereof; which I ſhall in the next place proſecute in the Analogy that this ſmall Regnant Principle bears within its little Province to the Divine Regiment of the Univerſe.

Sic parvis componere magna.

I come therefore to the illuſtration of the Divine Providence, and Regiment of the World by the foregoing Emblem thereof.

1. By this ſmaller Inſtance of this Regiment of this leſſer World by the immediate preſidency of the Soul, it ſeems evident that it is no way impoſſible but that the greater World may be governed by the Divine Wiſdom, Power, and Providence. It is true, there are theſe two diſparities between theſe, namely, the greater World and the leſſer: The greater World is of a more vaſt extent; and again, the Integrals and Parts thereof are of greater multiplicity and variety; but neither of theſe are any impediment, becauſe the Regent thereof is of an infinite immenſity more than commenſurate to the extent of the World, and ſuch as is moſt intimately preſent with all the Beings of the World, and of an infinite Underſtanding, Wiſdom, and Power that is able to apply it ſelf to every created Being, and therefore without any difficulty equally able to govern the whole and every part thereof: This we ſee in Natural agents; that little ſpark of Life, the Soul, that exerciſeth its regiment upon an Infant of a ſpan long, when the Body is grown to its due ſtature, and together with the extenſion of the Body this little Vital particle evolves and diffuſeth it ſelf to the extent of the enlarged Body, governs it with the ſame facility as it did before that extenſion. And the ſenſible Soul of a vaſt Whale exerciſeth its regiment to every part of that huge ſtructure with the ſame efficacy and facility as the Soul of a Fly or a Mite doth in that ſmall and almoſt imperceptible dimenſion to which it is conſigned. For the Soul is expanded and evolved, and preſent to every part and the uttermoſt extremity of the greater as well as the leſſer Animal. And therefore if my Soul can have its effectual energy and regiment upon my Body with eaſe and facility, with how much more eaſe and facility can a Being of immenſe Exiſtence and Omnipreſence, of infinite Wiſdom and Power govern and order a great but yet a finite Univerſe, and all the numerous yet not infinite parts thereof?

2. As there is a poſſibility of ſuch a regiment of the Divine Wiſdom, Power and Influence in the Government of the World, ſo there is a neceſſity of it. It is not enough for the Soul of the Humane Nature to form and mould its Corporeal Vehicle, if it gave over its work when that were done, it would ſoon diſſolve, diſſipate and corrupt. There is the ſame neceſſity for the Divine Influence and regiment to order and govern, conſerve and keep together the Univerſe in that conſiſtence it hath received, as it was at firſt to give it before it could receive it: The intermiſſion of that Regiment and Divine Providence and Influx but a moment after the conſtitution of this World would have diſſolved its order and conſiſtence, if not annihilated its Being.

And indeed, he that obſerves the great variety of things in the World, the many junctures and contributions of things that ſerve to keep up its conſiſtence, the want of any of which (as the diſorder of a little Nerve, Vein, or Artery in the Body) would bring it into a great diſorder; the continual ſtrife between contrary qualities, the ſtrange activity of the active Fiery Nature that involves it, or at leaſt is diſſeminated up and down in it; the vaſt and irregular concretions of Meteors, and thoſe ſtrange and various Phaenomena that are in the World, which as they proceed from or are found in the Integrals of the Univerſe, are devoid not only of Reaſon but of Senſe. And he that after all this ſhall ſee the World upheld without any conſiderable decay or defect, in the ſame ſtate and order as it hath been for many Thouſands of years, will upon a due and impartial ſearch find that it were far more impoſſible that this could be without the Wiſdom, Power, and Influx of a moſt Infinite, Omnipreſent, Omniſcient and Omnipotent Fixed Being, than for the Humane Body to be kept without diſſolution and putrefaction, being deſtitute of the influx and regiment of its Vital Principle the Soul.

And therefore ſome of the Ancients that were willing to ſolve the Phaenomena of the World, have (though erroneouſly) thought that the World was Animate, and that all theſe Operations in the World proceeded from that Anima Mundi, as the Operations in the Bodies of Men proceeded from that Anima Humana that lodged in it; and at length finding ſo great effects that are and may be done by this ſuppoſed Anima Mundi, according to their Hypotheſis, have at laſt proceeded in plain terms to determine that this Anima Mundi was, in truth, no other than the Glorious God; whereas they might with much more eaſe and truth have attributed all the great Oeconomy of the Univerſe to the moſt Glorious God, without diſhonouring him into the exiſtence of a Forma informans, or a conſtituent part of that World which he made.

Others to amend that abſurdity, and yet out of a piece of mannerlineſs and reſpect, as they think, to God, though they deny this Univerſal Soul or Form informing of the whole Univerſe, yet without any ſufficient ground have deviſed ſeveral Syſtems of the Univerſe, and aſſigned ſeveral Souls to each Syſtem or Vortex at leaſt, which ſhould be the immediate Regent in every ſuch Syſtem, as the Soul is in the Body: This, as it ſuppoſeth ſomething without evident ground, ſo it doth without any neceſſity: For the Divine Wiſdom and Power is ſufficient for the management and government of the whole Univerſe; and if ſuch Animae Syſtematum ſhould be granted, yet ſtill there muſt be ſome one common Regent of all theſe Syſtems and their reſpective Souls, or otherwiſe diſorder would follow between the Syſtems themſelves.

But thus far even thoſe ſuppoſitions bear witneſs to the neceſſity of a Providential Regiment of the parts of the Univerſe; that bare Matter, Motion, and Chance cannot perform this buſineſs, but that there is a perfect neceſſity of a Regent Principle beſides it, which may govern and diſpoſe it as the Soul of Man doth his Body: And even that ſuppoſed regiment of theſe particular Souls of every Syſtem, as they muſt needs have it, if they had it at all, from the inſtitution and efficiency of the Wiſe God, ſo they are all continually influenced from him, and the whole College of them governed, guided and ordered by him as their ſovereign Regent.

3. The Third thing that I deſign is this, That although it is impoſſible for any Created Being, or the Operations thereof, to hold a perfect Analogy or adequate Repreſentation of the Divine Wiſdom, Power, and Providence in the governing of the World; becauſe the Wiſdom and the Ways of Almighty God are unſearchable and paſt finding out; they are of ſuch a perfection that no Created Being or Operation thereof can be a juſt Parallel or adequate Reſemblance of them; yet there ſeems to be ſuch an inſtance in the regiment which the Humane Soul exerciſeth in relation to the Body, that with certain correctives and exceptions may give ſome kind of Explication or Adumbration thereof, whereby though we can never get a complete Idea of the Divine Regiment, yet we may attain ſuch a notion thereof as may render it evidently credible, and in ſome kind explicable.

1. The firſt act of the Divine Nature relating to the World and his adminiſtration thereof is an immanent act: The moſt wiſe counſel and purpoſe of Almighty God terminated in thoſe two great tranſeunt or emanant acts or works, the works of Creation and Providence.

The Divine Counſel relating to the work of Creation, is that whereby he purpoſed to make the World, and all the ſeveral Integrals thereof, according to that moſt excellent Idea or Exemplar which he had deſigned or choſen, according to his infinite Wiſdom, in thoſe ſeveral ranks and methods, and in that order and ſtate wherein they were after created and made.

The Divine Counſel relating to his Providence, or Regiment of the World, ſeems to conſiſt in theſe two things: 1. A purpoſe of communication of an unceſſant influence of his power and goodneſs for the ſupport and upholding of things created, according to the ſeveral eſſential ſtates and conditions wherein they were made; ſome being created more durable, ſome leſs; ſome in one rank of being or exiſtence, ſome in another. 2. A purpoſe of inſtituting certain laws, methods, rules, and effluxes, whereby he intended to order and rule all the things he had made with the greateſt wiſdom and congruity, and according to the natures and orders wherein he had created them.

And this is that which I call the law, rule, and regiment of Divine Providence, and ſeems to be of two kinds, namely, general Providence and ſpecial Providence.

The general Providence I call that whereby every created Being is governed and ordered, according to that eſſential, connatural, implanted method, rule, and law wherein it was created. And thus the ſtate and ſeveral motions and influences of the Heavenly Bodies is that general providential law wherein they were created, and according to which they are governed; and the ſuſceptibility of thoſe influences, and the effects thereof, and of that motion, is the general providential law, whereby other phyſical Beings are governed in relation thereunto; the activity of the active Elements, and the paſſiveneſs of the paſſive, the methods and viciſſitudes of generation and corruption, the efficacy of natural cauſes, and the proper effects conſequential to them, the natural properties or affections of Bodies according to their ſeveral conſtitutions, as motion, alteration; aſcent of light, deſcent of heavy Bodies. Theſe and the like are the general providential Laws relating to them. Again, that things indued with ſenſe ſhould have a ſenſible perception, and certain inſtincts connatural to them, that rational and free Agents ſhould move rationally and freely. Theſe and infinite more are the ſtanding and ordinary Rules and Laws of general Providence, and the wiſe God, who ſees all things from the beginning to the end, and therefore can neither be diſappointed nor overſeen in any of his Counſels, hath with that great and admirable Wiſdom ſo ordered theſe Laws of his general Providence, that he thereby governs moſt excellently the World; and they are never totally changed, and but rarely altered in particular, and that only to moſt wiſe ends, and upon moſt eminent occaſions.

And the reaſon is, becauſe the Infinite Wiſdom of God hath ſo inſtituted and modelled thoſe natural Laws, that they are ad omnem eventum fitted to the ordinary adminiſtration of the World. When the wiſeſt Counſel of Men in the World have with the greateſt care, prudence and foreſight, made Laws, yet frequent emergencies happen which they did not, nor could foreſee, and therefore they are neceſſarily put upon repeals, correctives, and ſupplements of ſuch their Laws: But Almighty God by one moſt ſimple foreſight foreſaw all Events in Nature, and could therefore fit Laws of Nature that might be proportionate to the things he made, and not ſtand in need of any change in the ordinary adminiſtration of his Providence.

The ſpecial Providence of God is ſo denominated either in relation to the objects which are ſpecial, or in relation to the acts themſelves.

Special Providence in relation to the objects, is that Providence which Almighty God exerciſeth either to Man or Angels in relation to their everlaſting ends, ſuch as are Divine Laws and Inſtitutions, the Redemption of Men by Chriſt Jeſus, the Meſſage of the Goſpel, and the like.

Special Providence in relation to the acts themſelves, are thoſe ſpecial actings of the Divine Power and Will, whereby He acts either in things natural or moral, not according to the Rules of general Providence, but above, or beſides, or againſt them: And theſe I call the Imperate Acts of Divine Providence; whereof in the next place.

2. Analogal to the imperate acts of the Soul upon the Body are the imperate acts of Divine Providence, whereby with greateſt wiſdom and irreſiſtible power He doth mediately or immediately order ſome things out of the tract of ordinary Providence. For although the Divine Wiſdom hath with great ſtability ſettled the Laws of his general Providence, ſo that ordinarily or lightly they are not altered, yet it could never ſtand with the Divine Adminiſtration of the World, that He ſhould be eternally mancipated to thoſe Laws he hath appointed for the ordinary adminiſtration of the World. Neither is this, if it be rightly conſidered, an infringing of the Law of Nature, ſince every created Being is moſt naturally ſubject to the Soveraign Will of his Creator; therefore though He is ſometimes pleaſed by extraordinary interpoſition, and pro imperio voluntatis, to alter the ordinary method of natural or voluntary Cauſes and Effects, to interpoſe by his own immediate Power, He violates no Law of Nature, ſince it is the moſt natural thing in the World that every thing ſhould obey the Will of him that gave it being, whatever that Will be, or however manifeſted.

Now the Inſtances that I ſhall give touching theſe actus imperati of Divine ſpecial Providence ſhall be, 1. In things ſimply natural: 2. In things voluntary or free Agents.

In things natural we have theſe Inſtances of the actus imperati of the Divine Providence, namely, firſt thoſe that are real and alſo appearing Miracles, as Moſes his Rod turned into a Serpent, our Saviours miraculous curing of all ſorts of Diſeaſes, and raiſing the Dead, and the like: Again, there are other things, that though they are natural effects, and not in themſelves apparently miraculous, yet are in truth the actus imperati of the Divine Providence, Winds and Storms, Hail and Thunder, and many the like, are things that are in themſelves natural, yet when they are in ſuch a ſeaſon and ſuch a juncture, they may be and are, and poſſibly more often than we are aware, actus imperati ſpecialis providentiae: The Eaſt Wind that brought the Locuſts, and the Weſt Wind that carried them off from Egypt, Exod. 10.13, 19. The Eaſt Wind that divided the Red Sea, Exod. 14.21. The Hail that ſlew the Canaanitiſh Kings, Joſh. 10.12. The Rain and Drought, 1 Kings 18. Amos 4.7. Thunder and Lightning, 1 Sam. 13.18. Yea the very Blaſting, and Mildew, and Caterpiller, and Palmer-worm, Amos 4.9. are ſent by God. The ravenouſneſs of a Lion or Bear are natural to them, yet the miſſion of them upon an extraordinary occaſion may be an actus imperatus of Divine Providence, 1 Kings 14.24. 2 Kings 2.24. And although we often attribute as well miſchiefs as deliverances to accidental natural Cauſes, yet many times they are actus imperati of the Divine ſpecial Providence, as much and as really and truly as the motion of my Pen is the actus imperatus of my Will at this time.

And if we enquire how theſe things are effected, though it may be they be ſometimes effected by the immediate Fiat of the Divine Will, yet I have juſt reaſon to think they are moſt ordinarily done by the Miniſtration of Angels, as the deſtruction of the Hoſt of the Aſſyrians, and divers other great Exertions of theſe imperate acts of Divine Providence. Pſal. 103. His Angels that excel in ſtrength, that do his commandements, hearkning to the voice of his word. That as the more refined and efficacious Matter, which we by way of analogy call Spirits, are the executive Inſtruments of the actus imperati of our Will, ſo theſe true and eſſential Spirits are ordinarily the immediate Inſtruments of the imperate acts of Divine Providence.

And therefore although many times Effects purely natural, that have their Originals meerly by the ordinary courſe of Providence, are ordered by ſpecial Providence unto great and wonderful Events, yet it ſeems to me very plain, that there be many natural productions that it may be in the immediate Cauſe, or ſecond, or third, may be purely natural, yet at the fartheſt end of the Chain there is an Agent that is not ſimply natural (as we uſe to call natural Cauſes) but voluntary, ſometimes in the firſt production, ſometimes in the reſtriction, ſometimes in the direction of them, for otherwiſe we muſt of neceſſity make all ſucceſſes in the World purely natural and neceſſary, and Almighty God would be mancipated to the Fatality of Cauſes, and to that Natural Law which he gave at firſt, and Prayers and Invocation upon Him in caſe of any calamity would be unuſeful and ineffectual.

And therefore though Almighty God do not create a Wind for every emergent occaſion, but the Wind is a Vapour breaking out of the Earth, yet the Miniſtration of an Angel may reſtrain, open, excite, direct or guide that Vapour to the fulfilling of thoſe imperate acts of Divine ſpecial Regiment. And it is obſervable, that although the regular part of Nature is ſeldom varied, but ordinarily keeps its conſtant tract, as the Motions of the Heavenly Bodies, yet the Meteors, as the Winds, Rain, Snow, Thunder, Exhalations, and the like, which are in themſelves more unſtable, and leſs mancipated to ſtated and regular motions, are oftentimes employed in the World to very various ends, and in very various methods of the ſpecial Divine Providence.

And hence the Winds and Storms are ſtiled in a peculiar manner, Winds and ſtorms fulfilling his will, Pſal. 148. And, He bringeth his winds out of his treaſury, Pſal. 134. And again, Hath the rain a Father, and who begot the drops of dew? Job 38.28. And again, Can any of the vanities of the Gentiles give rain? Jer. 14.22. Thus the wiſe God, who doth nothing vainly or unneceſſarily, nor infringeth the more conſtant Laws of Nature, when thoſe parts thereof that are more anomalous, and more eaſily applicable to his imperate acts and ends of Providence may ſerve, more ordinarily chuſeth thoſe parts of Nature to execute his ſpecial Providences, that may do it without any great fracture of the more ſtable and fixed parts of Nature, or the infringment of the Laws thereof.

Again, as the Empire of the Divine Will doth exerciſe its imperate acts in the Methods of ſpecial Providence upon things ſimply in themſelves natural, ſo it doth upon Agents or Natures intellectual and free: Sometimes immediately by Himſelf, ſometimes by the Inſtrumentality of Angels or propoſed Objects.

This Exerciſe of the imperate Acts of the Divine Providence may be upon the Underſtanding or Will.

Upon the Underſtanding principally theſe ways, 1. By immediate afflatus, or impreſſion, as anciently was uſual in prophetick Inſpirations. 2. By conviction of ſome Truths, and this may be either by a ſtrong and over-bearing preſenting of them to the Underſtanding with that light and evidence, that it is under a kind of neceſſity of believing them, which was often ſeen in the primitive times of Chriſtianity, wherein God was pleaſed many times irreſiſtibly, and by immediate overpowering the Underſtanding by the powerful impreſſion of the Object or Truth propounded, to conquer as it were the Underſtanding into an aſſent. Or, 2. By advancing and enlightning the underſtanding Faculty with a ſuperadded light and perception, whereby it was enabled to diſcern the truth of things delivered: For as the Underſtanding receives ſome Truths propoſed by reaſon of the congruity between the Faculty and the Object, as the Eye ſees ſome viſible Objects by reaſon of the congruity between it and them; ſo the reaſon why it perceives not all Objects of Truth is becauſe of ſome defect of the Faculty, whereby it holds not a full and perfect congruity with them, either by reaſon of the remoteneſs or ſublimity of the Object, or ſome deficiency of light in the Faculty, which is aided by the Collyrium of the Divine Aſſiſtance, Rev. 2. Or elſe, 3. By ſome extraordinary concomitant moral evidence; ſuch was that of the Miracles of our Saviour and his Apoſtles, the Seals and Credentials of the Truths they delivered: And as thus the imperate acts of the Divine ſpecial Providence are exerciſed upon the Underſtanding, ſo they are exerciſed upon the Will, and that either immediately or mediately.

Immediately, 1. By an immediate determining of the Will: For although the Will be naturally free, yet it is naturally and eſſentially ſubject to the imperium divinae voluntatis, when He is pleaſed to exerciſe that empire upon it: This although he rarely doth, yet he may do it, and ſometimes doth it irreſiſtibly, determining the Will to chuſe this or that good, and yet this without any ſuch force or violence as is ſimply contrary to the nature of it; becauſe as there is no Power in the World but owes moſt naturally an obediential ſubjection to the Lord of Nature, ſo even the Will it ſelf is naturally and eſſentially ſubject to the determination of the Lord and Author of it. 2. By immediate inclining and inflecting it to determin of it ſelf: This is that ſecret ſtriving of the Spirit of God with the Will, inflecting and perſwading it to this or that good: It differs from the former way becauſe that it is irreſiſtible, this though potent yet in its own nature reſiſtible by the Will of Man, though it many times prevails by its efficacy. V. Gen. 6.3. Eph. 4.30.

Again, 2. Sometimes it is done Mediately more humano, and yet not without the mediate ſpecial Empire and Regiment of the Divine Will: and thus it is done two ways, viz. 1. By an irreſiſtible, or at leaſt powerful conviction of the Underſtanding that the thing in propoſal is fit and neceſſary to be done or omitted; for although ſome think that the Will hath a power of chooſing or refuſing or ſuſpending, notwithſtanding the final deciſion of the practical Underſtanding, yet certain we are that ordinarily and when the Will acts as a Rational faculty, it is or ought to be determined by the laſt deciſion of the practical Underſtanding; and 2. By propoſing Moral objects that do more humano guide the Will to determine it ſelf accordingly; and theſe are various, ſometimes Intervention, Perſwaſion, or Examples of others, and ſometimes even the junctures of Natural occurrences. For, as I ſhall have occaſion to ſhew, and is partly touched before, even the Natural occurrences of things are under the guidance and conduct of the Divine Providence, even when to us they ſeem to be either Accidental, or to be the meer product of Natural Cauſes.

And ſurely if we ſhould deny the intervention of Imperate Acts of Divine Providence in relation to actions Natural or Moral that appear in the World, we ſhould exclude his Regiment of the World in a great meaſure, and chain up all things to a fatal neceſſity of Second Cauſes, and allow at moſt to the glorious God a bare proſpect or preſcience of things that are or ſhall be done, without any other Regency of things but meerly according to the inſtituted nature and operations of things. And thus far of the Imperate Acts of the Divine Providence. Only this farther I muſt ſubjoyn as a certain truth, That neither the Empire of the Divine Providence, or his mediate or immediate determinations, perſwaſions or inflexions of the Underſtanding or Will of Rational Creatures doth either naturally, morally, or intentionally deceive the Underſtanding, or pervert the Will, or neceſſitate or incline either to any falſhood or moral evil.

3. The third Analogy that is between the regiment of the Soul over the Body and the Divine regiment of the Univerſe, is in relation to the acts of general Providence, or that ordinary Law wherein Almighty God governs ordinarily the Univerſe and the things in it, without the particular mixture of thoſe that I have called the Imperate Acts of ſpecial Providence, which ſeems to conſiſt of two parts: 1. The inſtitution of certain common Laws or Rules for all created Beings, which (without a ſpecial intervention of his Will to alter or change) they ſhould regularly obſerve; as that the Heavenly Bodies ſhould have ſuch Motions and Influences, that the Inferiour or Elementary World ſhould have its ſeveral Mixtures and Tranſmutations by the application of the active principles and particles in it to Paſſives, and by the virtue of the Heavenly Motions and Influences: That there ſhould be viciſſitudes of generations and corruptions; that Vegetables ſhould have the operation of vital vegetation, increaſe, duration and productions according to their ſeveral kinds; that Senſible Natures ſhould enjoy a life of Senſe, and thoſe ſeveral powers or faculties of Senſation, Phantaſie, Memory, Appetition, Digeſtion, Local Motion, Generation, and thoſe ſeveral inſtincts whereby they ſhould be managed and governed according to the conveniencies of a ſenſitive nature: That the Rational Nature ſhould have thoſe Faculties of a Senſitive Nature, and ſuperadded to it the Faculties of Intellect, Reaſon and Will, whereby it might govern it ſelf as a reaſonable free Agent, and determine it ſelf to this or that action. And theſe are the inſtituted Laws of the Divine common Providence.

2. A continued influx of the Divine Goodneſs, whereby things are upheld and continued in their ſtate of being according to this Law of their Creation: And by virtue of both theſe acts of common divine Providence all things are enabled to act and operate according to the Laws of their being, without the neceſſity of any new individual concurrent act of ſpecial Providence producing, directing, or determining their ſeveral operations. And hence it is that the Will of man by the inſtituted Law of his Creation, and the common Influence of the Divine goodneſs and power is enabled to act as a reaſonable Creature, to determine it ſelf, and to govern its proper actions according to the Law of his Creation, without any particular, ſpecificating, concurrent, new imperate act of the Divine ſpecial Providence to every particular determination of his Will: Even as the continued influx of the reaſonable Soul enables thoſe Faculties which we call Natural or Involuntary, without new deliberation, purpoſe or counſel to every new act thereof: And by this means the World is in an ordinary courſe of Providence governed according to thoſe ſtanding fixed Laws given to the Univerſe and the ſeveral parts thereof by the Divine Will, wherein it is ſupported by the common influx and preſence of the Divine power and goodneſs.

And this is that which being duly conſidered extricateth that Queſtion which hath ſo much troubled the World, concerning the ſinful acts of men, and how far forth the glorious God is at all concerned in them. Certainly the imperate acts of his Bleſſed Will have nothing to do to enforce or neceſſitate the Will of man to any ſin, it is far from the purity of his Glorious Nature: But the general Law of his Providence is only thus far concerned in it, That he hath made Man an intelligent and free Agent, put him into the power of his own Will, but yet ſub graviore imperio, to reſtrain its actings, if he pleaſe, by his ſpecial Providence; and Man in this ſtate of his liberty, when he doth ſin, ſins from the Empire of his own Will, and not from a determination of the Divine Regiment.

But though the contemplation of the regiment of the Soul over the Body hath given ſome analogical explication of the Divine Providence in the Government of the World, yet as this Analogy is but imperfect, the Divine Regiment of the World is infinitely more wiſe, more powerful, more perfect than the regiment of the Soul over the Body, ſo in many things this Analogy by no means holds: For inſtance, The Soul doth what it doth in the Body, though by a kind of efficiency, yet it is but a ſubordinate efficient, and vicarious and inſtrumental in the hands of the Almighty; who as it hath endued the Soul with this energy, ſo the Soul is but his ſubſtitute in this regiment of the Body; but Almighty God is the ſupreme Rector of the World, and of all thoſe ſubordinate provinces and parts thereof: Secondly, in the imperate acts of the Souls regency of the Body and the Compoſitum: She cannot in the Body work immediately without the inſtrumentality of the intermediate animal and vital Spirits: But in the imperate acts of the ſpecial Divine Providence though we may juſtly think he doth moſt ordinarily uſe the miniſtry of thoſe noble natures called Angels, yet he may and oftentimes doth by the immediate Fiat of his own Will exerciſe theſe imperate acts of ſpecial Providence; for his Power is infinite, and all Beings are in an immediate obedience and ſubjection to it.

3. The Soul cannot by its own Will exerciſe any immediate imperate act upon thoſe natural and involuntary operations which yet are exerciſed by an influx from it; indeed it may ſtarve and deſtroy the Body by its Empire, and thereby conſequently impede and determine thoſe natural and involuntary operations, yet it cannot by its Intention or Empire prohibit or ſuſpend their exerciſe, the natural means being allowed and preſent; it cannot effectually prohibit the Heart not to move, or the Blood not to circulate, or the Ventricle not to digeſt: But it is otherwiſe with the Regent and regiment of the World; even thoſe things wherein he hath ſet a fixed Law, which by virtue of the common influence of the Divine Power and Goodneſs they obſerve and follow, are ſubject to the Empire of his ſpecial Providence and the imperate acts thereof. And this is evident in that Adminiſtration of ſpecial Providence which is miraculous; he commanded the Fire not to burn, ſtopped the mouths and appetites of Lions, and prohibited the natural operation and agency of Natural Cauſes. 2. In all the ſpecial Providences that are exerciſed in the World, though they do not viſibly appear to us to be miraculous, yet they moſt certainly are governed by the imperium of ſpecial Divine Providence, whereby it ſometimes excites ſecond Cauſes to production of Effects which being thus excited they naturally produce; ſometimes impeding them, ſometimes diverting them, ſometimes directing them, ſometimes by contemperation, or uniting other more active or contrary Cauſes allaying or enforcing them: and although it may be the interpoſition of the Divine imperium or ſpecial Providence be not immediately the immediate antecedent Cauſe, but it may be the third, the fourth, the tenth, the twentieth Cauſe diſtant from the Effect. Nay though poſſibly the conjunction of the immediate imperium Providentiae be with the Firſt Mover in Nature, the Heavenly, Aethereal, or Fiery Influx, yet the regiment of the Divine Providence is as full and infallible in relation to the imperate regiment of the Effect, as if it were immediately joyned to the deſigned Effect: So that the Moral of that Poetical fiction, that the uppermoſt Link of all the ſeries of ſubordinate Cauſes is faſtned to Jupiter's Chair, ſignifies a uſeful truth; Almighty God doth as powerfully govern and direct when he pleaſeth, and how he pleaſeth, all ſubordinate Cauſes and Effects, as the Soul governs the motion of the Muſcle or Limb by thoſe ſtrings of the Nerve which are rooted in the Brain.

4. Again, the regiment of the Soul over the Body is the regiment of the more active part over the more paſſive, though both making one Compoſitum; but the regiment of Almighty God over the World is not as a part of it, or as a Form or Soul informing it, but as a Rector or Governour, diſtinct, ſeparate, and eſſentially differing from it, his regiment of the World in this reſpect not ſo much reſembling the regiment of the Soul over the Body, which together with it make one compounded Nature; as the regiment of the Maſter or Rector over the Ship, or the regiment of a King over his Subjects.

And thus I have gone through the Speculative conſideration of the Divine Providence reſulting from the contemplation of a Souls regiment of the Body, wherein I have been the longer, becauſe the contemplation of the Divine Providence is a Subject that delights me, and I am contented to dwell upon it as much as I may, and to take up this or any the like occaſion to lead me to the contemplation of it.

And thus far touching the Uſefulneſs of the Contemplation of the Humane Nature, in relation to truths Speculative.

II. The Uſefulneſs of it in relation to matters Practical, wherein I ſhall be ſhorter. This Contemplation hath theſe uſeful Advantages, namely, 1. Phyſical; 2. Moral; 3. Theological or Divine.

1. For Phyſical, by which I mean that practical part of Phyſical knowledge that is called Medicinal. The due conſideration and knowledge of the ſtructure, fabrick and parts of the Humane Body is neceſſarily conducible to that excellent Faculty for the preſervation of life and health, no one thing being more conducible to the advance and perfection of that Science or Faculty than the knowledge of the Humane Body, wherein the Experience of Anatomy and diſſection, and the Obſervations of the ancient and modern Phyſicians hath given a large evidence and teſtimony.

2. The Moral Practical conſequences deducible from the knowledge of the Humane nature are many and uſeful. For inſtance, when I conſider the admirable Frame of the Humane Nature, made by the Wiſdom, and according to the Image of the Glorious God, 1. How careful ſhould it make me that I do not injure that goodly Structure in others, by offering violence to the life of another, or to corrupt him either by evil example or evil counſels? 2. How careful ſhould it make me in relation to my ſelf, not to embaſe that excellent Frame either of my Body or Soul, or both, into the image of a Brute by ſenſuality, luxury, or intemperance; or into the image of a Devil, by malice, envy, or irreligion? How careful ſhould it make me to improve and ennoble thoſe excellent and comprehenſive faculties of my Underſtanding and Will with ſuch Objects as are worthy to be known and deſired? The intellectual Faculty is a goodly field, capable of great improvement, and it is the worſt husbandry in the world to ſow it with trifles or impertinencies, or to let it lye fallow without any ſeed at all.

3. The Theological uſes that ariſe from the knowledge of our ſelves are great and many. When I conſider the admirable Frame of my Body, made up in that elegant, ſtately, and uſeful compoſure; and when I conſider the uſefulneſs, amplitude, and nobleneſs of my Faculties, an Underſtanding capable of the knowledge of all things neceſſary for me to know, accommodate and fitted to the perception and intellection (though not to the full comprehenſion) of a World full of variety and excellency; of a God full of all conceivable perfection and goodneſs; a Memory able to retain the notions of what I underſtand; a Will endued with freedom, whereby I am a ſubordinate Lord of all my actions, and endued with a connatural propenſion and appetite unto rational good; Reaſon and Conſcience to guide and direct me in all the enquiries and actions of my life; and beſides all this, a Soul, the ſtock and root of all thoſe Faculties, endued with immortality, and capable of everlaſting bleſſedneſs: When I conſider that this Soul of mine is not only endued with faculties admirably fitted to the life of Senſe which I enjoy in this World, but find in it certain ſecret connatural rudiments of goodneſs and virtue, and a connatural deſire and endeavour after a ſtate of immortal happineſs. And when I conſider that this Frame both of Body and Soul had its primitive origination immediately from the great Creator of all things; and although my own immediate origination was from my Parents, yet that very productive virtue was implanted in the primitive Nature by Almighty God, and the derivation of the ſame ſpecifical Nature to me was by virtue of his original Inſtitution and Benediction, and by virtue thereof that excellency and perfection of Humane Nature in its eſſential which was firſt formed by the glorious God, is handed over to me, abating only thoſe decays which Sin brought into my nature: I ſay, when I deeply and intimately conſider theſe things, I cannot but be ſenſible that that Being from whom I thus derive this being, and ſuch a being, is a moſt wiſe, powerful and bountiful Being, that could thus frame the Humane Nature, and thus freely beſtow and confer this conſtitution upon me. 2. And upon this ſenſe of his Wiſdom, Power and Goodneſs, I muſt needs entertain it with all imaginable admiration of it, and with all poſſible gratitude, for ſo great and ſo free a gift. 3. And conſequently I cannot chooſe but exerciſe the choiceſt affections I have towards him, of reverence and fear of his Greatneſs and Majeſty, of dependance and reſt upon his Power and Goodneſs, of love to the excellency of his Eſſential Perfection and Communicative Goodneſs and Beneficence. 4. And conſequently of entire ſubjection unto him that upon all the rights imaginable hath the moſt juſt ſovereignty over me. 5. And conſequently of all due inquiſitiveneſs what is the Will and good pleaſure of that God that I owe ſo much gratitude, love and ſubjection to, that I may ſerve and pleaſe him. 6. A reſolved, entire, hearty obedience of that Will of his in all things; thereby to teſtifie to him my love, gratitude, and ſubjection. 7. An external manifeſtation to Men and Angels of that internal love and gratitude I owe him by continual praiſe and thankſgiving to him, invocation of him, reverence of him, and all thoſe acts of Religion, Duty and Obedience which are the natural Proceed of that internal frame of my Soul towards him. 8. A conſtant deſire of my Soul to enjoy as much of this bountiful glorious bleſſed Being, as it is poſſible for my nature to be capable of. 9. And becauſe my eſtate and condition in this life is but a ſtate of mortality, and a temporal life; an earneſt endeavour to have my everlaſting Soul fitted and qualified to be an everlaſting partaker of his preſence and goodneſs in a ſtate of nearer union to him and fruition of him, in that future life of glory and immortality. 10. And conſequently abundance of circumſpection, care and vigilance that I ſo behave my ſelf in this ſtate of probation here, that I neither loſe his favour from whom I expect this happineſs, nor render my ſelf unworthy, unfit, or uncapable to enjoy it.

And thus this deep, ſerious, and comprehenſive Conſideration of our ſelves and the Humane Nature in its juſt latitude, doth not run out barely into Notions and Speculations, but is operative and practical; teacheth a man Virtue and Goodneſs and Religion and Piety, as well as Knowledge, and is operative to make a man ſuch as it teacheth him to be; perfects his nature, enricheth it with practical as well as ſpeculative habits, and fits and moulds and accommodates a man to a conformity to the End of his being.

And theſe be the Reaſons that have eſpecially put me upon the ſearch and enquiry into this Subject, MAN.

I am not without excellent helps and patterns in this Inquiry, nor without the due fruits and effects that it hath had upon the Minds of them that have been exerciſed in it.

Galen, though he ſpoke darkly and doubtfully of the Soul, being deſtitute of much of that light which we now have, yet upon the bare contemplation of the ſtructure of the Body and the parts thereof, in that excellent Book of his De Uſu Partium, reſolves the whole Oeconomy thereof into the Power, Wiſdom, Goodneſs, and Efficiency of the Glorious God; and is tranſported both with the admiration of the Divine Wiſdom appearing therein, and with indignation againſt the perverſneſs and ſtupidity of Epicurus and his diſciples, which would attribute this one Phaenomenon to Chance.

And had he, or ſhould any elſe apply himſelf to the ſearch of that Intellectual Principle in Man, his Soul, he will find a greater evidence of the Divine Wiſdom, Goodneſs and Power; as will eaſily appear in a little conſideration thereof.

CAP. II. Touching the Excellency of the Humane Nature in general.

ALthough I intend a more diſtinct Conſideration of the Humane Nature, and the Faculties of the Humane Soul, and the Parts of the Humane Body, yet it may be neceſſary before we come to the diſcuſſion of the origination of Mankind, to premiſe ſomething concerning the Nature of Mankind, and its preheminence and excellence above all other ſublunary Creatures, that we may have a little taſt touching that Being whoſe origination we inquire. This Conſideration will be of uſe to us in the enquiry touching the origination of Man; to evidence, that neither Chance nor ſurd or inanimate Nature could be the Efficient of ſuch a Being, but a moſt Wiſe, Powerful, and Excellent Author thereof.

I ſhall not at large diſcuſs thoſe Faculties and Organs which he hath in common with Vegetables and Brutes, but thoſe only that belong to him ſpecifically as Man, and thoſe alſo but briefly.

The Corporeal Beings of this lower World are divided into theſe two ranks or kinds; ſuch as are Inanimate or not living, and ſuch as are Animate or living.

Life, according to Ariſtotle in 1. De Anima, cap. 1. is deſcribed by its effects, viz. Nutritio, & auctio, & diminutio quae per ſeipſum fit; and the loweſt rank of ſuch things as have life are Vegetables: for though Minerals have a kind of analogical nutrition and augmentation, yet it is ſuch as ordinarily non fit per ſeipſa, but rather by acceſſion and digeſtion from external Principles and coagmentation.

The Principle from whence this Life flows in all Corporeal Natures that have it, is that which they call Anima, or at leaſt vis Animaſtica. The Faculties or Operations of this Anima vegetabilis are theſe; 1. Attractio alimenti: 2. Fermentatio & aſſimilatio nutrimenti ſic attracti in ſuccum ſibi congenerem: 3. Digeſtio, vel diſperſio alimenti ſic aſſimilati in diverſas partes individui vegetabilis: 4. Augmentatio individui vegetabilis, ex unione & conſolidatione ſucci vegetabilis diverſis partibus individui. 5. Conformatio hujuſmodi particularum unitarum ſpecificae naturae ejuſdem individui cujus est augmentatio; ut in trunco, ramis, cortice, fibris, foliis, fructu, &c. 6. Seminificatio & propagatio ex ſemine vel partibus ſeminalibus. 1. Attraction of aliment: 2. Fermentation and aſſimilation of the nouriſhment ſo attracted, into a juice of the ſame kind with it ſelf: 3. Digeſtion, or diſperſion of the aliment ſo aſſimilated into the divers parts of the vegetable individual: 4. Augmentation of the vegetable individual, from the union and conſolidation of the vegetable juice to the divers parts of the individual: 5. The conformation of theſe united particles, to the ſpecifical nature of the ſame Individual, which is augmentation; as in the trunk of a Tree, the bark, fibres, leaves, and fruit: 6. Seminification and propagation from the ſeed or ſeminal parts. Theſe ſeem to be the proceſs of the Vegetable Nature, Soul, and Life.

2. The next rank of living Creatures is that which hath not only a vegetable life, and a vegetable principle of life, but hath alſo ſuperadded a life of ſenſe, and a ſenſitive Soul or Principle of that life of Senſe, which nevertheleſs as one ſpecifical Principle exerts the acts as well of the vegetable as ſenſitive life.

And this nature 1. Includes all thoſe powers and faculties of the Vegetable Nature, as Attraction, Aſſimilation, Digeſtion, Augmentation, Conformation, and Propagation or Seminification.

2. It includes them in a far more curious, elegant, and perfect manner, at leaſt in the more perfect Animals. As for inſtance, the firſt aſſimilation of the attracted nouriſhment in Vegetables converts it into a watry humor or juice; but the aſſimilation thereof in Animals rectifies this alimental juice into Chyle, and then into Blood: The propagation of Vegetables is without diſtinction of Sexes, but that of Animals uſually with diſtinction of Sexes; and many more ſuch advances hath the animal nature above the vegetable in thoſe faculties or operations which for the main are common to both.

3. It ſuperadds a greater and higher perfection to the animal nature, by communicating to it certain eſſential Faculties and Powers that the vegetable nature hath not: And thoſe are theſe;

1. Senſe. It is true, that Campanella in his Book De Senfu rerum, and ſome others that have written de Perceptione ſubſtantiae, attribute a kind of Senſe to all created Beings, and therefore much more to thoſe that have a vegetable life: And in ſome Vegetables we ſee ſomething that carries a kind of analogy to Senſe; they contract their leaves againſt the cold, they open them to the favourable heat; they provide teguments for themſelves and their ſeeds againſt the injury of the weather, as their cortices, ſhells; and membranes; they ſeem to be carried with a complacency in the propagation of their kinds as well as Brutes, and therefore many of them being impeded therein, they germinate again, though later in the year: And ſome Plants ſeem to have the ſenſe of Touch, as in the Senſitive Plant and ſome others; which ſeems to be an advance of the Vegetable Nature to the very confines, or a kind of contiguity to the loweſt degree of thoſe Animals that are reckoned in the rank of Senſibles.

But this notwithſtanding we deny a real and true ſenſe to Vegetables; indeed, they have a kind of umbra Senſus, a ſhadow of Senſe, as we ſhall hereafter obſerve, that Senſibles have a kind of umbra Rationis, a ſhadow of Reaſon, but it is only a ſhadow thereof. 2. There are alſo in their natures by the wiſe God of Nature implanted even in their vegetable natures certain paſſive Strictures or Signatures of that Wiſdom which hath made and ordered all things with the higheſt reaſon, even the leaſt inconſiderable Herb; and theſe Signatures are bound to their natures by certain connatural inſtincts planted in them; but ſtill they want the active principle of Senſe in them.

Now this Senſe or Senſitive Faculty in Animals is of two kinds; the external Senſes, and the internal. The external Senſes are five, all which belong to the more perfect Animals; and that of the Soul to all Animals, viz. Seeing, Heiring, Taſting, Smelling, and Touching.

And it is admirable to conſider that the great Lord of Nature hath ſo diſpoſed of ſenſible Beings, that although (for ought we know) there may be many more impreſſions or motions of external Bodies that we know not by their communication unto Senſe, becauſe we have not Faculties receptive of them. Yet the Faculties of the five Senſes are adequate and proportioned to all thoſe impreſſions of Objects from without that are conducible to the uſe and well-being of Animals in a ſenſible ſtation or nature.

The internal Senſes are of two kinds, viz. 1. Such as concern perception of Objects: 2. Such as concern the motion to them as uſeful, or from them as noxious.

Thoſe of the firſt ſort have ſome adumbration of the Rational Nature, as Vegetables have of the Senſible, and they ſeem to be theſe; the Common Senſe, the Phantaſie, the Eſtimative Faculty, and the Memory.

The Common Senſe, or Commune Senſorium, which receives the ſeveral reports of the ſeveral Senſes by their ſeveral Nerves into that common receptacle or ſeat of this uſeful office, the Brain; where it diſtinguiſheth the Objects of the ſeveral Senſories.

The Phantaſie, that in a way unſearchable unto us, 1. Creates the 〈◊〉 Images of the things delivered from the ſeveral Senſes to the Commune Senſorium: 2. Compounds thoſe Images into ſome things not unlike Propoſitions, though confuſedly and indiſtinctly: 3. Makes particular applications of them one to another, though ſtill darkly and confuſedly, whereby it excites the Appetite either to proſecute their attainment, or fly from them.

The Eſtimative Faculty, which is indeed no other than the laſt operation or compoſition of the Phantaſie before-mentioned, whereby it concludes that this is a ſenſible good or a ſenſible evil, that it is attainable or feaſible, or not attainable; that though it be good, yet ſometimes it is not ſafe to be attempted by reaſon of the impendence of a greater ſenſible evil. This ſeems to be the dark and confuſed ſhadow of the deciſion of the practical Intellect in Man.

The Memory, which is an impreſſion of the Image of ſome ſenſible Object made by the Phantaſie, which remains ſome time after, the impreſſion, and by the return of a like Objedt again is ſometimes revived and reinforced: But how this Image is made, where it is imprinted, how conſerved, are things we cannot at all attain the knowledge of; they are wonderfull, though common effects of a moſt wiſe and ſtupendious Wiſdom and Power that hath thus conſtituted even the Faculties of the Animal Nature: Only it ſeems to me that theſe Images are not made in the Brain it ſelf, as the Pencil of a Painter or Engraver makes the Image in the Table or Metal, but are imprinted in a wonderfull method in the very Soul it ſelf: For it is plain that Sounds and Voices are remembred, and yet no real configurations are poſſible to be made thereof in the Brain; for what Image can there be of a Sound?

Now as to that Faculty or thoſe Faculties that concern the purſuit or flight of what is thus propounded by the Phantaſie or Eſtimative Faculty, they are generally two: The Appetitus naturalis, which bears ſome analogy to the Will in the Reaſonable Nature; and the acts thereof are either proſecution of the Senſible Object propounded, if preſented by the Phantaſie and Eſtimative Faculty as good; or elſe averſation from it, if preſented as evil.

This is the Faculty of Empire or Command, for in conformity to the determination of the Appetite the motion of the Body follows.

The other Faculties that concern purſuit or averſation, are the Paſſions, the Satellites appetitus, ſerving either in the proſecution of the good propounded, as Love, Deſire, &c. or in oppoſition of the evil preſented, as Anger, Revenge, &c.

And thus far touching the Senſes in Animals, both External and Internal.

2. The ſecond ſuperadded prelation of the ſenſible nature above the vegetable is the faculty and exerciſe of animal and local motion, whereas Vegetables have naturally no other motion but that which is determined and natural, and what is within it ſelf; as the motion of Attraction, Digeſtion, Nouriſhment, Augmentation and Increaſe. Animals have the faculty and power of animal motion; which hath theſe acceſſions, 1. It is or may be ſpontaneous; for though the object moves objectively, yet the faculty or power moves ab intrinſeco, and ſpontaneouſly. 2. It moves the parts ſpontaneouſly, the Leg, the Eye, the Ear or any other part, which cannot be done by Vegetables. 3. Again, it can move the whole Compoſitum from one ubi to another (at leaſt in all Animals except thoſe that are almoſt in the nature of Plants, called Zoophyta or Plantanimali a) which cannot be done by Plants, who are mancipated and fixed to the place of their ſtation or growth, unleſs removed by an extrinſecal agent.

3. The third ſuperadded advantage of Animals is their Inſtincts. It is true, Vegetables have their inſtincts radicated in their nature, as we have before obſerved; yea even things Inanimate have certain ſimple inſtincts, as in the motions of aſcent of light bodies, and deſcent of heavy bodies: But the inſtincts of Animals are ſenſible inſtincts of a more noble kind and nature than thoſe of Vegetables, and ſuch as ſeem to ſavour more of an active principle; as ſagacity of Brutes in taking their prey, defending themſelves, providing againſt the inclemency of the weather, care for their young, building their neſts, and infinite more, which are too long to name.

Theſe are the ſuperadded Faculties of the Animal Nature; and proportionate and accommodate to their faculties are their organizations of their Bodies. And in as much as there is great varieties in the temperaments, diſpoſitions, faculties and uſes of ſeveral Animals of ſeveral kinds, their organizations are not only fitted to the common natures, uſes and powers of ſenſible Creatures, but every ſeveral Species hath its ſeveral accommodation as well of his Organs as of his Faculties to the exigence, uſe and convenience of his proper ſpecifical nature.

Thus the ranks of the vegetable perfections are not only included within the rank of ſenſible Beings, but theſe have greater perfections in what is common to both, and ſuperadditions of other more noble Faculties and Organs not communicable to the former. The Vegetable Nature is indeed like a curious Engin, but it hath but ſome ſimple and ſingle motions, like a Watch that gives the hour of the day, or a Trochea with one Wheel: But the Animal Nature is like an Engin that hath a greater compoſition of Wheels, and more variety of motions and appearances; as one of the compound Engins of Archimedes, or as a Watch, that beſides the hour of the day gives the day of the month, the age of the Moon, the place of the Sun in the Zodiack, and other curious Motions wrought by multiplication of Wheels.

Now touching the Senſitive Natures, there have been two extreme opinions, both of them extremely contrary one to another, and yet both of them, as they are delivered by their Authors, untrue.

1. That Opinion that depreſſeth the natures of ſenſible Creatures below their juſt value and eſtimate, rendring them no more but barely Mechaniſms or Artificial Engins; ſuch as were Archytas his Dove, Regiomontanus his wooden Eagle, or Walchius his iron Spider: that they have no vital Principle of all their various Motions but the meer modifications of Matter, or at leaſt the elementary Fire mingled with their other Matter; that they have no other form or internal principle of Life, Motion, or Senſe but that which is relative and reſults from the diſpoſition, texture, organization and compoſition of their ſeveral Limbs, Members or Organs: This fancy began by Des Cartes in his Fundamenta Phyſica, and hath been followed and improved by ſome of his admirers, and particularly much favoured by Honoratus Faber in his Book De Generatione Animalium; and herein they think they have given a fair ſolution to all the Phaenomena of the Senſitive Nature, and given a fair prelation to the Soul of Man, which they agree to be a ſubſtantial Principle of humane actions: But in both theſe they have been diſappointed; for this ſuppoſition as it gives not at all a tolerable explication of the Phaenomena of ſenſe and animal motions, ſo if it did, it would eaſily adminiſter to a little more confidence and boldneſs, a temptation to reſolve all the Motions of the reaſonable Soul into the like ſuppoſition, only by advancing the Engin or Automaton humanum into a more curious and complicated conſtitution: For he that can once ſuppoſe that the various modifications of Matter and Motion, and the due organization of the Bodies of Brutes can produce the admirable operations of Senſe, Phantaſie, Memory, Appetite, and all thoſe inſtincts which we find in Brutes; is in a fair way of reſolving the operation of the Reaſonable Nature into the like ſuppoſition, only by ſuppoſing the organization of the latter ſomewhat more curiouſly and exactly diſpoſed and ordered as much above that of Brutes, as theirs is above that of Vegetables. It is true, the organization of the humane and animal Body, with accommodation to their ſeveral functions and offices, is certainly fitted with the moſt curious and exact Mechaniſm imaginable; as appears by the ſtructure of the Heart, the Lungs, the Brain, the Tongue, the Hand, the Nerves, the Muſcles and all other parts, and the ſeveral orders and methods of their motions and adaptations to their ſeveral offices, and the exerciſe by them of thoſe Faculties to whoſe ſervice they are conſigned; This muſt needs be acknowledged by every man that obſerves them, or that takes the pains to read the Tracts of thoſe that have written of them; and eſpecially Galen his divine Book De Uſu Partium, Des Cartes and Fabritius concerning the ſtructure of the Eye, the ſame Fabritius and Steno De motu Muſculorum, and divers others.

But that the Principle that ſets on work theſe Organs, and worketh by them, is nothing elſe but the modification of Matter, or the natural motion thereof thus or thus poſited or diſpoſed, or the bare conformation of the Organs, or the incluſion and expanſion of any natural inanimate particles of elementary Fire, is moſt apparently falſe, even to the view of any that obſerves or conſiders impartially.

It is impoſſible to reſolve Perception, Phantaſie, Memory, the ſagacities and inſtincts of Brutes, the ſpontaneouſneſs of many of their animal motions into thoſe Principles, nor are they explicable without ſuppoſing ſome active determinate power, force, or virtue connexed to, and inherent in their Spirits or more ſubtil parts, of a higher extraction than the bare natural modification or texture of Matter, or diſpoſition of Organs, or, as they are often pleaſed to ſtile them, their plexus partium.

Again, it is viſible to the Eye, that that power, or virtue, or principle, whatever it is, that in the generative proceſs firſt immediately formeth and organizeth the parts of the Body, is that which guides, orders and governs all the animal motions of it after: That power which firſt forms the Brain, the Heart, the Liver, the Eye, is that which afterward increaſeth, augmenteth, exerciſeth and employeth them after: And no man living can force himſelf to imagin that that Principle which forms, organizeth, diſpoſeth, and modifieth the parts, is any thing that reſults from the organization or modification of thoſe parts which are not yet moulded or framed, but muſt have its modification from that Principle which is antecedent to any manner of organization or texture of parts into an animal compoſition: No man therefore that hath not abjured his Reaſon, and ſworn allegiance to a preconceived fantaſtical Hypotheſis, can undertake the defence of ſuch a ſuppoſition, if he have but the patience impartially to conſider and look about him.

2. The other extreme Opinion ſeems to advance the Animal Nature too high, at leaſt without a due allay of their general expreſſion; namely, thoſe who attribute Reaſon and a reaſoning faculty or power to Animals as well as to Men, though not altogether in the ſame degree of perfection: ſo that they will not have Reaſon to be the ſpecifical or conſtitutive difference of the Humane Nature, but common to them and Brutes: This Opinion ſeems generally to be favoured by the Pythagoreans, that held Tranſmigration of Souls; by Plutarch, in Grillo, and his ſecond Oration De Eſu Carnium; by Sextus Empiricus, Contra Mathematicos; by Porphyry, Lib. 3. de Abſtinentia ab Eſu Animalium; which he endeavours to prove and illuſtrate by divers reaſons and inſtances; and among the latter by Patricius in his fifth Book de Animis irrationalibus; but above all by the ingenious and learned De Chambre in his Book of the Knowledge of Beaſts, wherein he aſſerts not only the ſimple apprehenſion of Beaſts by phantaſms or images wrought by the Phantaſie, but the conjunction of images with affirmations and negations, which make up Propoſitions, and the conjunction of Propoſitions one to another, and illation of Concluſions upon them, which is Ratiocination or Diſcourſe: And that in farther evidence thereof there is a certain kind of Language whereby Beaſts or Birds, eſpecially of the ſame Species, communicate their conceptions one to another; only this diſcurſive Ratiocination of Brutes he calls Ratio imaginativa, and differenceth it from Ratio intellectualis which belongs properly to Men, principally in this, That the imaginative or brutal Ratiocination keeps ſtill in particulars, and within the verge of particular propoſitions and concluſions; but intellectual Reaſon hath to do with univerſals, and for the moſt part grounds and directs its Ratiocination by them.

Touching the thing called Reaſon, we muſt conſider that it hath a double acceptation: 1. It is taken for every conduct of any thing by fitting means to fitting ends, or the due and convenient ordering and adapting of one thing to another; and this again ſeems to be of three kinds, viz. Active, Paſſive, or Mixt: i. That I call Active Reaſon which from an inward intellective principle orders and diſpoſeth, as the Watch-maker contrives, orders, and diſpoſeth the ſeveral parts of the Watch, ſo that it excites a regular and uſeful motion: 2. The Paſſive Reaſon (which is more properly Reaſonableneſs) is that order and congruity which is impreſſed upon the thing thus wrought; as in the Watch I ſee every thing moves duly and orderly, and the reaſon of the motion of the Ballance is by the motion of the next Wheel, and that by the motion of the next, and that by the motion of the Fuſee, and that by the motion of the Spring; the whole frame, order and contexture of the Watch carries a reaſonableneſs in it, the paſſive impreſſion of the Reaſon or intellectual Idea that was in the Artiſt: 3. The Mixt ſort of Reaſon ſeems to be when a thing concurrs actively and from an internal principle, and (in things that have life) vitally, to the production of a reaſonable effect; but yet per modum inſtrumenti, and in the virtue of a ſuperiour direction of a reaſonable agent: Thus when I plow my ground, my Horſe is harneſſed and chained to my Plough, and put in his track or ſurrow, and guided by my Whip and my Tongue, and ſo draws on my Plough, and this reaſonable work is performed actively and vitally by my Brute in the virtue of my direction. And certainly this kind of latter Reaſon is evident not only in the brute Beaſts in their inſtincts and operations, but alſo in Vegetables, and almoſt in all things in Nature; for they are all indued with a certain inherent activity, which is nevertheleſs implanted, directed, ordered and determined by the great Creator in the Laws of their ſeveral conſtitutions: The proceſs of nutrition and generation not only in Animals but even in Vegetables is done with the higheſt Reaſon, exceeding the imitation of the Humane Reaſon; the Birds making their Neſts, ordering their Eggs and moving them in incubation, feeding and diſciplining their young, is done with the moſt exquiſite reaſon and congruity thereunto, beyond the artifice of the moſt ingenious man. And it muſt needs be ſo; for though they concur actively from an internal Principle to the production of the effect, yet they are determined therein and thereunto, and their track ordered for them and to them by the Laws of their nature inſtituted and imprinted on them by the unimitable Wiſdom of the higheſt intellectual Being. This mixed or inſtrumental Reaſon, as I may call it, therefore all muſt agree to belong not only to Brutes, but almoſt to all things in Nature, and herein differs from Reaſon or Reaſonableneſs which I before call ſimply paſſive, in that it immediately proceeds from the internal active Principles implanted by God in their natures.

2. But there is another kind of Reaſon which we call Ratiocination, or Diſcurſus rationalis, which conſiſts principally in theſe three things, though the two former without the latter make not up a compleat Ratiocination: 1. The ſimple apprehenſion of things themſelves, which is done by images or repreſentations thereof, made either by the Intellect, or by the repreſentations made thereunto by the Phantaſie: 2. The compounding of the images or repreſentation of things with an affirmation or negation; this makes a Propoſition: 3. The compoſition of ſeveral Propoſitions among themſelves, and drawing from them Concluſions; and this is called Syllogiſmus, Ratiocination or Diſcourſe.

But though this be the analyſis of Ratiocination into which by a careful attention it may be reſolved, we are not to think all ſort of reaſoning or ratiocination, even in Men themſelves, is preſently by way of explicit or formed Syllogiſms, or artificial Moods and Figure. Some conſecutions are ſo intimately and evidently connexed to or found in the premiſſes, that the concluſion is attained quaſi per ſaltum, and without any thing of ratiocinative proceſs, and as the Eye ſees his object immediately and without any previous diſcourſe; ſo in objects intellectual many evident truths or principles are primo intuitu aſſented unto: as in objects of Senſe the action is elicited per ſaltum; as many times when a Horſe is hungry and comes to a good paſture, he falls to his food immediately without forming Mr. Chambre's Syllogiſm, This green is graſs, This graſs is good to eat, Therefore this green is good to eat. But the tranſitus from the Senſe to the Phantaſie, and from that to the Appetite, and from that to the motion of Eating is immediate, momentaneous, and per ſaltum.

In brief, as the vegetable nature, as hath been obſerved, hath a kind of ſhadow of the ſenſible nature, ſo the ſenſitive nature hath a kind of ſhadow of the truly rational nature; their Reaſon is but a low, obſcure and imperfect ſhadow thereof, as the Water-gall is of the Rain-bow; and proportionable to their imaginative Reaſon is their animal Language, which though it be a kind of natural ſign of their Imagination and Paſſions, yet it is infinitely below the perfection of humane Language: For we ſee that thoſe Birds who by reaſon of the analogy of their organs by uſe are taught ſome words or ſentences, yet they never proportion thoſe words to an explication of any diſtinct conception ſignified by them, nor can uſe or apply thoſe words they learn to the things they ſignifie, nor can they connex their words or ſentences in coherence with the matter which they ſignifie; and commonly have recourſe to their wild natural notes when they would expreſs their imaginations or paſſions, which notes are at the beſt but like natural interjections, framed by Nature, not by Art, to diſcover their paſſions or impreſſions; and their artificial language or notes are no other than impreſſions upon their ſenſitive Memory by iterated uſe, and drawn out from them upon the ſtrength of ſuch impreſſion, or by repetition of Objects that excite that Memory.

Thus much I thought good to premiſe concerning the vegetable and ſenſitive natures; which may be of ſome uſe in the conſideration of the rational or humane nature; partly to inſtance what this latter includes, namely the whole perfection of the vegetable and animal faculties, and partly to diſcover the preference that the Humane Nature hath above the Animal Life in theſe moſt perfect faculties of Intellect, intellectual Reaſon, and Will.

I ſhall not here diſtinctly and fully examine the nature of Man in the whole compaſs and extent thereof, but ſhall reſerve it to a fuller inquiry; I ſhall only inſtance in ſo much thereof in this place as may be appoſite to my purpoſe, namely, to ſhew that he is a Creature of moſt admirable conſtitution, and ſuch as deſerves our inquiry, and ſuch whoſe firſt compoſure and origination requires a higher and nobler Conſtituent than either Chance or the ordinary method of meer Natural cauſes and concurrences; and that it is ſuch a piece as in its firſt conſtitution and ordination requires an Efficient of infinite Power, Wiſdom and Goodneſs: This is the end and ſcope of my preſent Inquiry.

Now to give a brief Inventory of the Excellence of the Humane Nature, I ſhall obſerve as near as I can this order.

Firſt, I will briefly conſider thoſe Excellencies that he hath in common with the vegetable and ſenſible nature: Secondly, I ſhall conſider thoſe ſpecifical or appropriate Excellencies that he hath above the former, both vegetable and animal nature.

Under the Second general I ſhall conſider Man ſingly with relation to himſelf, and then with relation to other things without him.

In relation to himſelf I ſhall briefly conſider theſe particulars: 1. The excellency of his Soul or intellectual nature in its nature, faculties, acts and habits; 2. The peculiar excellency of his Body; 3. The peculiar excellency of the Compoſitum, conſiſting of both his former eſſential parts.

In relation to things without him, I ſhall conſider him with relation 1. To God, 2. To Mankind, 3. To the other integrals of the World; and therein 1. Of their ſerviceableneſs and accommodation to him; 2. Of his dominion and ſoveraignty over them, and the means and inſtruments thereof.

This is the brief Scheme that I intend of thoſe ſpecifical and appropriate preheminences that the Nature of Man hath above other viſible Creatures.

Firſt therefore, touching thoſe Excellencies that the humane Nature hath above the vegetable and animal Nature, I ſhall ſubjoin theſe enſuing Poſitions.

1. There is no excellent vegetable or animal Faculty in the vegetable or animal Nature, as ſuch, but it is found in the humane Nature; ſuch as are attraction, nutrition, digeſtion, conformation of parts digeſted, proportionable augmentation, generation, ſenſible perception, common ſenſe, eſtimative faculty, ſenſible appetite, locomotive faculty, and animal motion: I meddle not herein with all thoſe ſmaller ſort of Faculties, which are peculiarly appropriate to Vegetables or Animals, as ſwiftneſs, ſagacity, ſtrength, and ſpecial artifices, which belong not to them in the common nature of Vegetables or Animals, but by certain ſpecifical Inſtincts or Faculties, becauſe though it may be ſome of them are not found in the ſame kind and degree in the humane Nature, yet they are ſuch as are abundantly recompenſed by that art and ingeny which appropriately belongs to the humane Nature.

2. There are no Organs in the ſenſible Nature (which yet are more perfect than thoſe of the vegetable Nature) ſubſervient to the Faculties of Life and Senſe, which are wanting in the conſtitution of the humane Body, at leaſt in ſubſtance and equivalence.

3. Thoſe very Faculties and Organs ſubſervient unto them in the vegetable or ſenſible Nature, which are found in them, are lodged in the humane Nature in far more excellency and perfection than they are in the vegetable or animal Nature: So that if the Faculties or Organs ſubſervient to the vegetable or animal Life in Man, do differ in their ſtate or compoſure from thoſe of Brutes, it differs for the better, as obtaining a more exquiſite perfection, uſefulneſs, beauty, and contexture, than thoſe of Brutes, as may appear in the Hand of Man compared with the Foot of Beaſts or Birds; the Foot, the Leg, the Thigh of Man, with thoſe of Beaſts, and the like. It is true, the conſtitution of ſome Faculties and Organs of Senſibles, is more accommodate to their fabrick and uſe than the like Organs of Man would be to the uſe of Brutes; but ſimply comparing one with another, the Organs of the humane Body are more curious and excellent than the Organs of the bare animal Nature. And from hence it comes to paſs, that the full knowledge of the humane Faculties and Organs, ſubſervient to the animal Life in Man, comprehends in effect all the like Faculties and Organs in the animal Nature, though differing in ſome particular textures and poſitions, with a proportionable advance by the acceſs of excellence of the humane Nature.

2. As to the ſpecifical or appropriate Excellencies of the humane Nature above the moſt perfect Animals, they come next to be conſidered.

It is true, that Animals in proportion to the length of their Life attain their complement of their ſpecifical perfection ſooner in proportion than the humane Nature: The animal Soul ſooner expands and evolves it ſelf to its full orb and extent than the humane Soul: Therefore the Horſe that lives naturally about thirty years, comes to his full growth and perfect exerciſe of its animal Faculties in four years; but Man, that lives not ordinarily above ſeventy yeas, comes not to the ripeneſs of his Intellectual Life 'till two and twenty or three and twenty years at leaſt, nor even to his full growth 'till nineteen or twenty: So that what we ſay concerning Man, in relation to the actings of his Mind, muſt be applied to that ſtate and age wherein his Soul hath fully as it were evolved it ſelf, and its Organs fully mature and diſpoſed for the actings of his Soul: He is long ripening, but then his maturity, and the complement thereof, recompenſeth the flowneſs of his maturation.

Now the Excellencies appropriate to the humane Nature are, as before, obſerved of two kinds; 1. ſuch as immediately concern the humane Nature it ſelf; or 2. ſuch as are extrinſecal, but yet relating to it.

Thoſe things that are immediately reſiding in, or part of the humane Nature, come firſt to be conſidered: And they are three: 1. His Soul, or intellectual and volitive Principle. 2. His Body, or corporeal part. 3. The Compoſitum or Coalitum of both thoſe Principles, which complete the humane Nature.

The Soul comes firſt to be conſidered, and therein theſe four things: 1. Its Conſtitution or Nature. 2. Its Original. 3. Its Faculties. 4. Its congenite Habits or rational Inſtincts.

1. Touching the Conſtitution of the Intellectual Soul of Man, I ſhall not in this place enter into a large diſcourſe concerning it, but reſerve that conſideration to its proper place, only in general it is 1. An active principle; 2. It is a ſubſtantial principle; 3. It is not corporeal or material; 4. It is not corruptible or mortal.

2. Touching its Original, whether it be by traduction, or creation, or participation, I ſhall not here diſpute, but reſerve it to its proper place for a fuller diſquiſition. But whether the one way or the other it had its original, there is no inconſiſtency but that it hath thoſe eſſential qualifications above-mentioned.

3. Touching its Faculties, they are two, the Underſtanding and the Will: And here I ſhall not concern my ſelf in the Inquiry, whether the Faculties are the ſame with the Soul it ſelf, or the ſame one with the other, and only diſtinct in notion? whether the Will be any more than the complete or ultimate act of the Underſtanding determined? It is ſufficient, that the acting of the Soul as it relates to perception and deciſion, and as it relates to choice and purſuit, or averſation, are diſtinguiſhable to us, and thoſe notions ſerve to explicate what we mean in the things we diſcourſe of, as the ſuppoſed Circles in the Heavens ſerve to explicate the appearances thereof. The Underſtanding or the Intellective Faculty (the ſhadow whereof only is the Phantaſie in Brutes, but it is but a ſhadow of this of Intellect) is a Faculty that not only gradually but eſſentially differs from and exceeds the perceptive Faculty in Brutes.

Three things there are that give us the beſt notion we can have of the humane Intellect, and the diſcrimination thereof from the animal perception and imagination: 1. The Objects thereof: 2. The Acts thereof: And 3. The Habits thereof.

1. The Object of the humane Intellect is omne intelligibile, which is of a far larger extent than the Object of ſenſible perception or imagination, which as it exceeds not the province of ſenſible Objects, ſo it is in order to the convenience of a ſenſible Life. For inſtance: When a Brute ſees a Man, it ſees his colour, figure, motion, bulk, and by the advantage of Memory or Inſtinct it comes to him, or flyes from him, as it hath received, or thinks it like to receive good or evil by him, but it perceives not ſubſtance. Theſe Objects, among many other that might be inſtanced, fall under the perception of the Intellective, which ſeem not to be within the verge of Imagination or ſenſible perception: 1. The Notion of a Spirit, or ſubſtance void of corporeity. 2. Univerſals, or conception of things as conjoined in one common nature or notion, abſtracted from the Individuals thereof. 3. Abſtracted conceptions, as entity, corporeity, &c. 4. Though Brutes may be able to apprehend multitude, as things more than ſingular, yet they cannot have a diſtinct notion of Number. 5. Though they may have a confuſed imagination of ſomething as paſt, or future, yet it is without diſtinction of Time, or the notion of it. 6. The truth of conſequence in or from the antecedent. 7. The actings of the Mind or Imagination it ſelf, by way of reflection or introſpection of themſelves, are diſcernible by Man diſtinctly, but at leaſt not diſtinctly by Brutes. 8. The truth and evidence of Geometrical Demonſtration. 9. The reaſon or juſt eſtimate of connexion of things to their Cauſes. 10. The moral goodneſs and congruity, or evilneſs, unfitneſs, and unſeaſonableneſs of moral or natural actions; which falls not within the verge of a brutal faculty. 11. The Notions of a Deity, and the reſult thereupon, namely, Religion, is not to be found in Brutes, but ſeems connatural to the humane Nature, as ſhall be ſhewn.

2. The Intellectual Acts, and they are many:

1. Intellectual Perception, which greatly differs from imaginative or ſenſitive perception, as far above it: For in thoſe things where the root of intellective perception is in the ſenſe and phantaſie, the perception intellective oftentimes departs from and corrects the report of the phantaſie, as in the apparent bigneſs of the Sun, the apparent crookedneſs of the Staff in a double medium of Air and Water; though this kind of Intellective Perception be not without the help of Ratiocination.

2. Intellective Ratiocination, which infinitely exceeds that imaginative Ratiocination which ſome have attributed to Brutes. 1. It is diſtinct, and with a diſtinct knowledge of the terms, which in Brutes is confuſed, 2. It is founded for the moſt part in Univerſals, which is not compatible to imaginative Ratiocination. 3. The thread and train of Conſequences in intellective Ratiocination is often long, and chained together by divers Links, which cannot be done in imaginative diſcourſe or ratiocination by ſome attributed to Brutes, which if the tranſitus from the premiſſes to the concluſion be not very ſpeedy and ſhort, that imperfect Ratiocination is loſt in Brutes.

And here I ſhall again a little reſume the former Conſideration touching the imaginary Reaſoning of Brutes, which I have before called the Image of Reaſon, and not truly Reaſon; for it is not a diſtinct reaſoning, but performed in a phyſical moment: And though we ſuppoſe Subject, and Predicate, and Copula, and Propoſitions, and Syllogiſtical Connexions in their Reaſoning, there is no ſuch matter, but the entire buſineſs is at the ſame moment preſent with them without deducing one thing from another, though we form them into notions of diſtinct acts; and this acting of the ſentient Phantaſie is performed, 1. By a preſence of ſenſe, as the Horſe is under the ſenſe of hunger, and that without any formal Syllogiſm preſſeth him to eat: the fire burns the Cats foot, and therefore it pulleth it away becauſe the immediate ſenſe of pain enforceth it. 2. By the preſence of Memory; the Dog hath been beaten for taking the meat out of the diſh, and the next time he ſees it there, though he be hungry yet he dares not venture, for his imaginative Memory makes the paſt ſtrokes as preſent to him as if he felt them. 3. By the preſence of Inſtinct, which puts him upon thoſe motions that are moſt evidently as reaſonable as any thing can be, and yet without the intervention of Ratiocination. For inſtance, Every Creature almoſt hath certain Inſtruments for its defence, and the offence of its enemies, exactly fitted for their uſe, and they have that ſingular dexterity in uſing them that the moſt diſciplined Fencer cannot equal: The Cock, for inſtance, hath his Spurs, and he ſtrikes his Feet inward with ſingular ſtrength and order, and it is not poſſible he ſhould uſe his Spurs with greater reaſon for his advantage; yet he doth not this by any ſyllogiſtical method, or by Ratiocination, but is meerly tutored to it by Inſtinct, which is preſent with him, and at hand without any diſcurſive Reaſoning. And this appears, becauſe while it is yet a Chick, and hath no Spurs, nor cannot hurt by it, nor yet hath ſeen the like motion before to imitate or learn it; yet he readily practiſeth it. And to theſe three preſent impulſes of Senſe, Memory, and Inſtinct, moſt if not all the ſagacities of Brutes may be reduced without the help of true Ratiocination or diſcurſive Reaſon; though witty men by Analytical reſolution have Chymically extracted an artificial Logick out of all their actions.

3. Intellective Memory, which I call an act of the intellective faculty becauſe it is wrought by it, though I do not inquire how or where, becauſe it is not ſolvible: The ſpecifical preferences that it hath above the ſenſible Memory are theſe; 1. That it remembers and retains ſuch things as were never at all in the Senſe, as the conceptions, enuntiations and actions of the Intellect and Will; the conviction of truth or falſhood of propoſitions or reaſonings; the conceptions of univerſals: whereas the ſenſitive Memory retains nothing but ſenſible Objects, or their Images wrought by the Phantaſie. 2. In that it is more complicated and complex than the ſenſitive Memory, retaining the ſeries of propoſitions, argumentations, and a long tract of hiſtorical narratives. 3. In that it is more diſtinct and unconfuſed than the ſenſitive Memory. 4. In that it is firmer, and more fixed and permanent than the ſenſitive Memory. 5. In that it can reſuſcitate and ſtir up it ſelf to remember and call together other Images or media to retrive what it once remembred; which is Reminiſcence, an act of intention, which therefore Ariſtotle in his Book De Memoria & Reminiſcentia makes an act peculiar to Man; whereas the Memory of Brutes is either conſerved by the Images impreſſed by the Imagination, and there continued, or revived and reinforced by the occurrence of external Objects bearing an identity or reſemblance to the Images at firſt impreſſed by the Phantaſie.

4. Deliberation; a ſtaid and attentive conſideration of things to be known and their media, and of their ſeveral weights, concluſiveneſs, or evidence; and of things to be done and their media, their congruity, ſuitableneſs, poſſibility and convenience, and of the ſeveral circumſtances aptly conducible thereunto; which is an act far above the animal actings, which are ſudden and tranſient, and admit not of that attention, mora, and propendency of actions.

5. Judgment; either concerning things to be known, of the weight and concludency of them and ends in deciſion; or of things done or to be done, of their congruity, fitneſs, rightneſs, appoſitneſs: and this if it refers to things to be done, ends in determination or purpoſe; if in relation to things already done, then in ſentence of approbation or diſapprobation: And hither that which we call Conſcience is to be referred, namely, if by a due compariſon of things done with the rule, there be a conſonancy follows the ſentence of Approbation; if diſcordant from it, the ſentence of Condemnation.

And this act of the Judgment in relation to things to be done, and the determination thereupon, is that which is uſually ſtiled the laſt deciſion of the practical Underſtanding immediately antecedent to the decree of the Will, which it muſt follow by a kind of moral neceſſity, when it acts as a reaſonable Faculty, and in the due ſtate and order of its nature; though by its liberty and empire it ſometimes ſuſpends its concurrence. And thus far concerning the Acts of the Underſtanding.

3. Concerning intellectual Habits or the genuine effects of theſe acts in the underſtanding Faculty, and they are divers and diverſly expreſſed by thoſe that have treated thereof.

1. Opinion, when the aſſent of the Underſtanding is ſo far gained by evidence of probability, that it rather inclines to one perſwaſion than to another, yet not altogether without a mixture of incertainty or doubting.

2. Science or Knowledge effected by ſuch evidence, cui non poteſt ſubeſſe falſum; as in caſe of demonſtrative evidence.

3. Fides, or Faith, or Belief, which reſts upon the relation of another that we have no reaſonable cauſe to ſuſpect; and upon this account we believe Divine Revelation when we are ſufficiently convinced that it is Divine Revelation; we alſo believe our Senſes, becauſe we have the greateſt Moral evidence that we can reaſonably have of the truth of their reports, when they are not controlled by apparent Reaſon, impoſſibility, or improbability: We believe good and credible perſons, and this principally referrs to matter of fact, which we cannot or do not controll by our Senſes or other weighty evidence; as that there was ſuch a man as Julius Caeſar, that there is ſuch a place as Rome, though we never ſaw the one or the other; becauſe delivered over to us by credible perſons, and ſuch who could probably have no end to deceive us.

4. Wiſdom; which is a complicated habit referring to all things to be known and done, the due compariſon of things and actions, and the preference of them according to their various natures and degrees.

5. Prudence; which is principally in reference to actions to be done, the due means, order, ſeaſon, method of doing or not doing.

6. Moral Virtues; as Juſtice, Temperance, Sobriety, Fortitude, Patience, &c. for theſe begin in the Intellect, though their exerciſe belong principally to the faculty of the Will.

7. Arts Liberal or Mechanical; for though the exerciſe of thoſe (in which the formal nature of an Art conſiſts) be external, yet the Ideal notion and habit of them begins in the Underſtanding; and a man is firſt a Geometrician in his Brain, before he be ſuch in his Hand.

And all theſe habits of the intellectual Faculty are far advanced above what is found in Senſible Natures; take the laſt for inſtance. It is true, we find a rare dexterity in the Spider and Silkworm in framing of their threads, but this proceeds not from any Intellectual principle in them, but from an Inſtinct connatural to them, and whereunto they are determined by the Law of their nature; again, we find in the Fox, the Hawk, and other Animals admirable ſagacities, wiles and ſubtilties in getting their prey and in defending themſelves: But when we conſider the ſagacity of the Humane Underſtanding, although the particular Inſtincts of ſome Animals are ſcarce imitable by it, yet it exceeds them in other things almoſt of the ſame nature, and ſo by way of equivalence, or rather prelation in thoſe very Inſtincts; witneſs the Arts of Painting, Tapeſtry, Fortification, Architecture, the Engins whereby noxious and ſubtil Animals are ſubdued, and infinite more ariſing from the fruitfulneſs of the Underſtanding and the dexterity of the Hand. And thus much touching the Intellective Faculty, the ſeat of intellective Perception and Counſel: I come to conſider of that other Faculty, the Will, the ſeat of Empire and Authority.

The Will therefore is that other great Faculty of the Reaſonable Soul, and it is not a bare appetitive power as that of the ſenſual appetite, but is a rational appetite, and is conſiderable, 1. In its Nature, 2. In its Object, 3. In its Acts.

1. The Nature of this Faculty is that it is free, domina ſuarum actionum, free from compulſion, and ſo ſpontaneous, and free from determination by the particular Object, wherein it differs from the ſenſitive appetite, which though ſpontaneous, becauſe moving from an inward principle, yet is, if not altogether, yet for the moſt part determined in its choice by the external Object. But how far forth the Will is determined by the laſt act of the practick Underſtanding, or how far ſuch a determination is, or is not conſiſtent with the eſſential or natural liberty of the Will, is not ſeaſonable here to diſpute. This liberty of Will, together with that other Faculty of Underſtanding, is that which renders the humane Nature properly capable of a Law, and of the conſequence of Law, Rewards and Puniſhments; which doth not properly belong to the animal Nature, becauſe deſtitute of theſe two Faculties.

2. The Object of the Will is not confined to a ſenſible Good, but is much larger, namely, ſuch a Good as is compatible to an Intellectual Nature in its full latitude, ſuch as are moral and ſupernatural Good.

3. The Acts of this Faculty are generally divided into Volition, Nolition, and Suſpenſion: That diviſion that herein better ſuits with my purpoſe are theſe, Election and Empire.

1. Election or choice, and this in reference both to means and end; for though the Schools tell us, that Electio is only mediorum & non finis, this is to be intended of the general end or good at large, and in its univerſal conception, for when ſeveral particular ends are in propoſal, there is belonging to the Will a power of Election of theſe, as well as of the means to attain them.

2. The Imperium voluntatis over the Body and the Faculties: We may obſerve in the humane as well as the animal Body two kinds of motions or exertions of Faculties; ſome are ſtiled natural or involuntary, ſuch is the motion of the Heart, the Circulation of the Blood, the perception of the Senſes; when the Organs are open, and the Object applied, theſe natural, though vital Faculties and Motions, are not under the command of the Will immediately, for whether I will or will not, while I live, my Heart beats, my Blood circulates, my Ventricle digeſts what is in it, my Eye ſees when open. But there be other Motions in the humane, and alſo in the animal Nature, that are ſubject to the command of the Will in Man, and to the appetite in Brutes, as local motion, which in Animals is under the regiment of the Appetite, in Man under the regiment of the Will.

Now this Imperium voluntatis may be conſidered in relation,

1. To it ſelf: It can ſuſpend its own acting, either of electing or rejecting.

2. To the Underſtanding: Though it cannot ſuſpend its perception, omnibus ad percipiendum requiſitis adhibitis, yet it may ſuſpend its deciſion or determination, or at leaſt its obſequium to ſuch deciſion.

3. The Paſſions, which are as it were the Satellites voluntatis, and follow the command of the Will, where the Will acts according to its power and authority.

4. To the animal Spirits, and the Veſſels in which they are received when deſigned to Motion, namely the Nerves and Muſcles, thoſe are all ſubject to the Empire of the Will, as to Local Motion of the whole Body or any part thereof, when the Spirits, Nerves and Muſcles are in their due and natural ſtate.

5. To the ſenſual Appetite: And indeed herein is evident both the Empire and Sovereignty of the Will, and alſo the viſible diſcrimination between the Humane Nature and the Animal or Brutal Nature, and its preference before it. In the animal Nature it is evident that the ſenſual Appetite is that which hath and exerciſeth the ſovereignty and dominion over the ſpontaneous actions of the animal Nature, that commands the Foot to go, the Mouth to eat, and all other the ſpontaneous motions in order to a ſenſible good: But in Man the ſenſual Appetite is Regimen ſub graviere regimine, the government of the Appetite is under the government of the Will and controlled by it, at leaſt where the reaſonable Faculty is not embaſed and captived by ill cuſtom or diſorder. And this appears two ways:

1. Sometimes the very motion of the Appetite it ſelf is reſtrained by the Empire of the Will, ſo that a man doth not appetere that ſenſible good which otherwiſe he might or would, becauſe he will not; and this is the moſt natural and noble regiment of the Will over the ſenſual Appetite.

2. Though it may fall out that the ſenſual Appetite may appetere bonum ſenſibile, yet the Will may and doth controll the empire of the Appetite in the execution of that appetition: As for inſtance, A man ſees delicious fruit, and he deſires it; in ſo much, that were there not a controll over the empire of his Appetite, it would command the Hand to reach it, and the Mouth to eat it: But the contrary command of the Will ſuperſedes the command of the Appetite; the Appetite deſires it, but the Hand is forbidden by the Will to reach it.

Now if any man ſhall ſay this contradiction appears, not only in the reaſonable Nature, but even in the ſenſible: The ſenſible Appetite is checked in its execution oftentimes by ſenſual Fear, as in Dogs and Horſes, and other Brutes, yea ſometimes by the remembrance of a former ſuffering for the like attempt to gratifie his ſenſual Appetite; and yet they are deſtitute of any ſuperior faculty of Will to interpoſe a prohibition upon the Appetite. I anſwer, this is true, for in ſuch caſes the impendent Fear is either preſent or in memory, and ſo expected; and it being of a ſenſible evil, hath the ſame influence upon the ſenſual Appetite as the preſent good; and therefore if the evil feared or impendent be a greater ſenſible evil than the good, it over-rules the Appetite to averſation; as the Fiſh that loves the bait, yet feareth the hook, which it diſcerns as a greater ſenſible evil, the very Appetite is thereby determined to averſation.

But the controll of the Will upon the Appetite in the reaſonable Nature, is many times, and indeed moſt often done, not upon the account of a ſenſible evil felt or feared, which of it ſelf were ſufficient to determin the Appetite; but ſometimes upon the account of ſuch hopes or fears as fall not under a ſenſitive notice, as of the command or prohibition by God; yea many times upon a bare Moral account of the indecorum, unreaſonableneſs, unſeaſonableneſs or utter unfitneſs of the thing it ſelf, without any other motive of fear either of a preſent or future ſenſible inconvenience thereby; which Moral conſideration can no way move the ſenſible Appetite, were it not for the Will, which being a rational Faculty is moved by it.

And this is all that I ſhall ſay touching the two great Faculties of the Soul, the Underſtanding and Will: I ſhall not add any thing here touching Paſſions or Affections of the Mind, 1. Becauſe they are but a kind of appendices to the Will, the Satellites voluntatis; thoſe of the concupiſcible kind being as it were the flowers of the motion of Volition, thoſe of the iraſcible kind the flowers of the motion of Averſation. 2. Becauſe the Paſſions for the moſt part are found in the ſenſible Nature, namely thoſe of love, hatred, delight, grief, expectation and fear; and therefore I ſhall not here treat of them.

3. I come now to conſider of thoſe rational Inſtincts as I call them, the connate Principles engraven in the humane Soul; which though they are Truths acquirable and deducible by rational conſequence and argumentation, yet they ſeem to be inſcribed in the very craſis and texture of the Soul antecedent to any acquiſition by induſtry or the exerciſe of the diſcurſive Faculty in Man, and therefore they may be well called anticipations, prenotions, or ſentiments characterized and engraven in the Soul, born with it, and growing up with it till they receive a check by ill cuſtoms or educations, or an improvement and advancement by the due exerciſe of the Faculties. I ſhall ſhew firſt what they are: Secondly, what moves me to think that ſuch are connatural.

1. Touching the former, I think thoſe implanted and connatural anticipations are theſe; namely, That there is a God; that he is of greateſt Power, Wiſdom, Goodneſs, and Perfection; that he is pleaſed with good, and diſpleaſed with evil; that he is placable; that he is to be feared, honoured, loved, worſhipped, and obeyed; that he will reward the good, and puniſh the evil; a ſecret ſentiment of the immortality of the Soul, or that it ſurvives the Body to be capable of rewards and puniſhments, according to its deportment in this life; certain common notions of Moral good and evil, of decorum and turpe; that faith and promiſes are to be kept; that a man muſt do as he would be done by; that the obſcene parts and actions, though otherwiſe natural, are not to be expoſed to publick view, obvelatio pudendorum; that a man muſt be grateful for benefit received; Theſe, and ſome ſuch common notions or intimate propenſions ſeem to be con naturally engraven in the Soul antecedently to any diſcurſive Ratiocination; and though they are not ſo diſtinct and explicite, yet they are ſecret Byaſſes inclining the humane Nature primarily to what is uſeful and convenient for it in proportion to the ſtate of an intellectual Nature: That as we ſee in Brutes, beſides the exerciſe of their Faculties of ſenſitive Perception and Imagination, there are lodged in them certain ſenſible Inſtincts antecedent to their imaginative Faculty, whereby they are pre-determined to the good and convenience of the ſenſible Life: So there are lodged in the very craſis and conſtitution of the Soul certain rational Inſtincts whereby it is pre-diſpoſed, inclined, and byaſſed to the good and convenience proportionable to a rational and intellectual Life; a certain congenite ſtock of rational Sentiments and Inclinations which may go along with him, and fairly incline him to ſuch a trade and way as is ſuitable to the good of his Nature; ſo that he is not left barely to the undetermination, incertainty, and unſteadineſs of the operation of his Faculties, without a certain ſecret and gentle pre-diſpoſition of them to what is right, decent, and convenient for their manage and guidance by theſe common anticipations, inclinations, and connatural Characters engraven in the Soul. 2. And that which inclines me to believe this, is not only the congruity of the ſuppoſition to the convenience of the humane Nature, and the inſtance of the ſenſible Inſtincts in the animal Nature proportionate to their convenience, and the great importance of them to the convenience thereof: But alſo that which is obſervable in the attentive conſideration of the manners of Mankind in general, which ſeems to have thoſe common ſentiments in them, and to accord in them in a very great meaſure; and though evil Cuſtoms and Education much prevails among men, yet it doth not wholly ob •… literate theſe ſentiments, at leaſt from the generality of Mankind.

It muſt be agreed that theſe rational Inſtincts, as I call them, are not always ſo vigorous and uniform in their actings as the animal Inſtincts of Brutes are in their kind, which partly proceeds from that liberty of Will that is in the humane Nature which many times ſuſpends or interrupts their energy and operation, partly from that mixture of the ſentient Appetite with the actings of the reaſonable Soul, which oftentimes tranſport it: Even the more ſimple and uncompounded any Nature is, the more uniform are its motions and actings; the natural Inſtincts and Pro-portions even of things inanimate (as of heavy Bodies to deſcend) are more uniform than the very Inſtincts of Brutes, who have a more complicated form or nature; But as this accidental interruption of rational Inſtincts doth not diſprove their exiſtences, ſo Man hath a greater advantage by the exerciſe of his Reaſon and intellective Faculties, to remove thoſe interruptions, and improve thoſe connatural Sentiments or rational Inſtincts to his ſingular uſe and benefit, which abundantly recompenceth thoſe Interruptions.

And if any ſhall ſay that there are or may be other means of propagation of thoſe motions and inclinations in Men, namely, 1. A Traditional traduction of them into the World; and 2. The Exerciſe of the humane Intellectual Faculties upon the occurrence and obſervation of external Objects and Events: I anſwer,

1. As touching Traditional communication and traduction of thoſe Truths that I call connatural and engraven, I do not doubt but many of thoſe Truths have had the help of that derivation: But, firſt, ſuch a Tradition poſſibly hath not been without interruptions by evil Education, and yet theſe Sentiments have obtained almoſt in all Ages and Places, though not without interſperſion of certain corrupt additaments, obtained likewiſe by evil Cuſtom or Education. But ſecondly, it cannot reaſonably be ſuppoſed that a Tradition could ſo conſtantly and univerſally prevail and obtain among Mankind, unleſs there were ſome common conſonancy and congruity of ſomewhat inherent in Nature which ſuits, correſponds and ſuffragates to that Tradition, and cloſeth with it, and accepts it.

2. As to the other, concerning the Exerciſe and Actings of our Intellectual Faculties, it muſt needs be agreed that thoſe that I call Connatural Principles are in themſelves highly reaſonable, and deducible by a ſtrong proceſs of Ratiocination to be moſt true and moſt convenient; and conſequently the high exerciſe of Ratiocination or intellective Diſcourſe might evince their truth and excellency, though there were no ſuch originally inſcribed in the Mind: But this no more concludes againſt the ſuppoſition, than it would conclude againſt the ſuppoſition of implanted Inſtincts in Brutes; which as they are in themſelves highly reaſonable and uſeful to their ends, and evincible by true Reaſon to be ſuch, as it may be any thing we know: So alſo many, though not all the actings of thoſe Inſtincts might poſſibly in the Brutes themſelves be elicited by a ſtrong intention and exerciſe of their Phantaſie and ſenſible Perception, Ratiocination, and Connatural Implantation, are but ſeveral means or diſcoveries of the ſame thing which in it ſelf is moſt highly reaſonable; only the latter is for the moſt part leſs difficult, and readier at hand. But to the Objection.

1. Let any man but duly conſider how few men there are in the World that are capable in reſpect of the meanneſs of their Parts and Education, to act and improve their Intellects or Faculties to ſo high a ſtrain as the eliciting of thoſe that I call Connatural Principles by the ſtrength of their Intellectual Operation; this requires very choice Parts, great attention of Mind, ſequeſtration from the importunity of Secular employments, and a long advertent and deliberate connexing of Conſequents; which falls not in the common road of ordinary men, but of Philoſophers, Metaphyſical heads, and ſuch as have had a more refined education, which is not the thouſandth part of Mankind; Other men require a more eaſie and familiar acceſs to theſe Truths and Inclinations; and yet we ſee that theſe Sentiments are not confined to the Literati of mankind.

2. Again, I appeal to the moſt knowing men in the World that have but had the leiſure to think ſeriouſly and converſe with themſelves, and that have kept their Minds free from the fumes of intemperance and exceſs, paſſion and perturbation; whether next under Divine Revelation their beſt and cleareſt ſentiments of Morality at leaſt have not been gathered from the due animadverſion and inſpection of their own Minds, and the improving of that ſtock of Morals that they there find, and the tranſcribing of that Original which they found firſt written there: It is true, that it is with the connatural Principles inſcribed in our Minds as it is with our Faculties, they lye more torpid, and inactive, and inevident, unleſs they are awakened and exerciſed, like a ſpark involved in aſhes; and being either ſuppreſſed or neglected they ſeem little better than dead, but being diligently attended, inſpected and exerciſed, they expand and evolve themſelves into more diſtinction and evidence of themſelves. And therefore it was not without ſome kind of probability that ſome of the Ancients thought that Science was little elſe than Memory or Reminiſcence, a diſcovery of what was in the Soul before. But whatever may be ſaid of other matters, certainly the firſt draughts and ſtrictures of Natural Religion and Morality are naturally in the Mind.

And hence ſome thinking men have thought that the ſpecifical difference of the humane Nature is Propenſion to Religion, and therefore define Man to be Animal religioſum, which could not be from any habit barely acquiſite by the exerciſe of Faculties, unleſs the ſame were radically engraven in the very texture of his Soul.

I ſhall add but this one thing more: It is plain that the exiſtence of a Deity as a Being of infinite Perfection, and conſequently of infinite Goodneſs and Juſtice to reward and puniſh, and of infinite Power and Wiſdom, is a truth that is highly rational and demonſtrable by the exerciſe of intellectual Faculties upon the conſideration of the Univerſe and its ſeveral parts; and poſſibly the Immortality of the Soul is evincible by very great reaſon: But theſe great truths are not communicated barely by one kind of means, and it is needful, in reſpect of their uſe, they ſhould all have all contributions, and not only Brains to purſue a long train of conſequences. And yet we ſhall find in the generality of mankind (eſpecially when death begins to draw towards them) a very quick and active demonſtration of theſe convictions, and poſſibly many times more vigorous and active than that rational conviction that is wrought by Speculation and Syllogiſms; which evidenceth that theſe Principles of the exiſtence of a moſt righteous and powerful God, and a ſtate of rewards and puniſhments after death, are more univerſally engraven in the Craſis of the Soul by Almighty God in its natural conſtitution than barely by the exerciſe of Faculties in Speculation and Ratiocination.

And herein it muſt be remembred that I am in this Diſcourſe ſtill in the outward Court of the Gentiles, diſcourſing only as a reaſonable Man, and not taking in the aſſiſtance of the Chriſtian Doctrine and thoſe ſubſidia divinae gratiae that relate thereunto.

Therefore to conclude this point, There ſeems to be two means of communicating and preſerving in the Soul and Conſcience theſe great ſpeculative and moral Principles whereof I have even now treated, viz. 1. That which I here call Connatural, or a certain rational Inſtinct engraven in the very Make and conſtitution of it: And as thoſe that write of Conſcience tell; us it hath three offices or acts, Syntereſis, Syneideſis, and Epicriſis; ſo thoſe Principles are lodged in that Cheſt of the Conſcience called Syntereſis.

2. A ſecond means of attaining and keeping and improving theſe connatural Sentiments or rational Inſtincts both ſpeculative and moral, is that admirable adaptation of the Faculties of the humane Soul to thoſe Principles and Sentiments, that as the Eye diſcerns light and colour by a congruity between the viſive Faculty and the viſible Object, and as the Palate taſts and reliſheth its meat by the congruity between the Faculty and the Object, whereby it judgeth of what is good and embraceth it, and what is evil to it, and rejects it: So in the humane Faculties, thoſe of his Intellect and Will there is a proportionating of the Faculties to the Object, whereby the former diſcerns truth from falſhood, and moral good from moral evil, honeſtum & decorum from indecens & turpe; and accordingly the Will, when it acts regularly and as it ſhould, accepts or rejects it: But as the eſtimative Faculty in Brutes is nevertheleſs conſiſtent with their connatural Inſtincts, which latter have ſtill excellent uſe in the ſentient Province; ſo this adaptation of the Faculties in Man to their Objects doth not exclude thoſe connatural, implanted, rational Inſtincts in the humane Nature, but both conſiſt together, and are of admirable uſe to the humane Soul.

And thus far concerning the Soul of Man, its Faculties and Inſtincts.

I come now to conſider of the ſtructure and fabrick of the humane Body, and that not at large, for that will be for another place, but briefly and ſummarily to give an account of ſome of thoſe appropriate and diſcriminating notices wherein it differs from and hath preference above the moſt perfect brutal Nature: And they are ſuch as either concern the entire Fabrick of the Body, or ſuch as concern ſome ſpecial Parts or Integrals thereof: but I ſhall mingle them together as followeth.

1. There is in the humane Fabrick a greater Majeſty and Beauty than in any Animal in the World beſides; and that appears, 1. In the erectneſs of his poſture; all other Animals have tranſverſe Bodies, as Birds and Beaſts, and though ſome do raiſe themſelves upon their hinder legs to an upright poſture, yet they cannot endure it long, it is unnatural and uneaſie to them, neither are the figures or junctures or order of their Bones, Nerves, and Muſcles fitted to ſuch a poſture. And it is obſervable, that the ſtructure of Man's Body is with that equilibration (notwithſtanding divers prominences therein) the compoſure of his Nerves and Muſcles for the due motion of his Spirits, the ſtructure of his Feet are ſo ſingularly accommodated; that he maintains this erect poſture ſtanding or walking, though his Feet, the Baſis of the Pillar of his Body, be much narrower than the latitude of his Body. 2. In the Majeſty of his Face and Eyes. 3. In the Beauty of his Face: Beauty conſiſts principally in theſe things, Figure, Symmetry, and Colour. No Bird, or terreſtrial Animal exhibits its Face in the native colour of its Skin but Man; all others are covered with Feathers, or Hair, or a Cortex that is obduced over the Cutis, as in Elephants and ſome ſort of Indian Dogs; and though in the torrid Climates the common colour is black or ſwarthy, yet the natural colour of the temperate Climates is more tranſparent and beautiful.

2. There is no Animal hath any Organ of equal uſe to the Arm and Hand of a Man, that Organum organorum, an Organ accommodate to all the uſeful motions, operations, arts and uſes of his life: Man is born without any offenſive or defenſive weapons like to thoſe of other Animals, but by the uſefulneſs and accommodation of this Organ and his Intellective faculty he maketh weapons and uſeth them, he forgeth and mouldeth Metals, builds Houſes and Ships, makes his Cloaths and Ornaments, and exerciſeth all Arts for uſe and ornament.

3. There is no Creature that I know of, hath the like ſtructure of his Leg and Foot; the former being only two to ſupport his Body, have greater and larger Muſcles than any Animal of no greater proportionable bigneſs; and the latter being the Baſis of thoſe Pillars, are admirably fitted by their length and figure for his greſſus progreſſivus.

4. Since the Brain is the great Organ of Intellection in Man, and of Imagination in Brutes, which are the two nobleſt Faculties of either Nature, it will not be amiſs to examine the differences between the Brain of either, and the Nerves proceeding from either, wherein none that I know hath given more light than Doctor Willis in his Anatomy of the Head; all therefore that I ſhall do herein ſhall be to gather up the moſt of thoſe obſervable differences that lye diſperſed in that Book.

1. The humane Brain is in proportion to the Body much greater and larger than the Brains of Brutes, having regard to the ſize and proportion of their Bodies, and fuller of anfractus or ſinuations, and ſo more capable of greater diverſity of employments and uſes in the Perceptive Faculties.

2. There are in the Brain certain portions called protuberantia annularis, nates, & teſtes; and that in thoſe Brutes wherein this protuberantia annularis is largeſt in proportion, thoſe Brutes are of greateſt ſagacity and ſubtilty, as Foxes, Apes, &c. that though in Man thoſe prominences called nates and testes are the leaſt, yet the protuberantia annularis is greater in proportion in Man than in any Animal, the ſtructure of this Organ being fitted to a greater degree of natural ſagacity.

3. That whereas in Brutes the only communication of the Brain with the Heart is by the nervus paris vagi derived from the Cerebellum, and ſpreading its branches into the Muſcle of the Heart; in Man there is not only the ſame communication of that Nerve, but a ramification of the nervus intercoſtalis is alſo inſerted into the Muſcle of the Heart, whereby a greater communication between the Brain and Heart is maintained in Man than in Brutes.

4. That other ramifications of this nervus intercoſtalis are derived into the Cheſt and Diaphragma, whereby principally that peculiar affection of Laughter is excited, more appropriate to Man, together alſo thoſe others of Sternutation and other natural actions common to Men and Beaſts are excited, but not from the like communication of that Nerve in Brutes.

And thus much ſhall ſerve to be ſpoken of the peculiarities of the Humane Body, though what I before ſaid touching the Faculties of the Animal Nature in Man muſt alſo be remembred touching the organical parts of his Body: There is no Organ in the Brutal Body ſubſervient to the Animal Faculties, which is not found in the Humane Body, with ſuch variations and additions as render them more curious, perfect, uſeful, and admirably accommodate to his Animal Life and Faculties; But of this more fully hereafter.

3. I ſhall now ſubjoin a Conſideration of Man in his whole Compoſitum, conſiſting of both his eſſential parts of Body and Soul, and of the aggregation of the Faculties and Organs belonging to either, ſo far forth as they evidence his appropriate and ſpecifical Excellency above the Animal Nature.

The appropriate or ſpecifical acts of the humane compoſitum, are the capacity and faculty of inſtituted Signs, expreſſive of the inward conceptions of the Mind, which are of two kinds: 1. Audible, 2. Viſible Signs.

The Audible Signs are inſtituted Speech or Language, the formal nature whereof conſiſts in two things: 1. Articulate Voice; 2. The accommodation of the Articulate Voice to the rendring or expreſſing of the inward thoughts or intentions of the Mind: And herein is the great preference of the language of Man above that of Brutes or Birds, who though they have audible ſigns that expreſs ſomething of their Imaginations or Appetites, yet they extremely differ from humane ſpeech: 1. They are but ſhort and tranſient, like Interjections in ſpeech, whereby though they expreſs the ſudden motions of their Phantaſie, Appetite, or Paſſions, yet they carry not with them any diſtinct ſeries or long train of their Imaginations; they are ſhort and ſudden, ſomewhat like Sighs or Ejulations in Man. 2. They are not articulate, nor orderly, but ſhort, natural and broken. 3. When Birds, eſpecially by the fabrick of their Tongue and Palate, are taught to uſe articulate words, yet they underſtand not their import, nor do render any conceptions of their Phantaſie by them, nor can anſwer a queſtion by them, but uſe them inſignificantly, as the Organ or Pipe renders the Tune which it underſtands not.

And by the help of ſignificant and articulate ſpeech, one Man expreſſeth the notions or conceptions of his Mind to another, inſtructs another, mutual commerce and ſociety is maintained, which could never be without inſtituted ſigns.

And this Act of inſtituted ſigns, eſpecially thoſe of Speech or Language, proceeds from the entire compoſitum, the Mind inſtituting the ſigns, and communicating its notions and deſires by it, and the Palate, Larinx, Tongue, and Lips, forming the Voice according to ſuch inſtitution, whereunto they are moſt admirably accommodated by their Apertures, Nerves, and Muſcles.

2. The inſtituted viſible Signs, are Writings, Geſtures, Tears, Motions of the Eye, Mouth, and Face, which were long to enumerate: By means of writing, former Ages tranſmit the Memorials of ancient times and things to poſterity; Men underſtand the ſentiments, purpoſes, and deſires of one another, though abſent, and the living converſe with thoſe ancient Philoſophers, and others, that are long ſince dead.

And now in this compoſition of the humane Nature, we have theſe things obſervable:

1. That in this contexture of the Humane Body and Intellectual Soul we have a Creature made up, that is, nexus utriuſque mundi, intellectualis ſcilicet & corporei. The next Range of Beings above him are the pure and immaterial Intelligences, the next below him is the ſenſible Nature. Man is as it were the Comes limitaneus of each Nature, participating of both. And we may obſerve, that in the proceſs of Natural Beings, there ſeem ſome to be Creatures placed as it were in the Confines of ſeveral Provinces, and participating ſomething of either; as in things that have life and that have not; there is placed the Minerals between the inanimate and vegetable Province, participating ſomething analogical to either: Between the vegetable and ſenſitive Province there are Plant-animals, and ſome kind of Inſects ariſing from Vegetables, that ſeem to participate of both: Between the animal and rational Province, there ſeem to be ſome Animals that have a dark Image or reſemblance of the Influxes of Reaſon. So between the corporeal and intellectual World, there is conſtituted Man, participating much of both Natures: It a quod non tranſitur ad extreme niſi per media.

2. That Man in his conſtitution ſeems admirably fitted to the convenience of his Nature, a little World accommodated with Faculties and Organs admirably convenient to it ſelf, a kind of entire State, Kingdom, or Republick within himſelf, fitted with all accommodations and requiſites for the due Regiment of himſelf, as a Senſible and Intellectual Being: He hath the Council or Senate of his Intellect, and her ſubſervient Acts and Faculties to adviſe him; the Empire and Regiment of his Will to command the Satellites and Miniſters of his Paſſions and Animal Spirits to execute his Conſcience for his Tribunal: There wants nothing within this little Circle of himſelf, which may be requiſite to order that little compacted Province for its Political Regiment.

And thus far concerning Man, as relating to himſelf, his Parts, Faculties, and entire Compoſition: It remains, that we take a little ſurvey of him, as he ſtands in relation to things without him; which is the laſt Conſideration that I promiſed in this brief Inventory of the Humane Nature and Excellencies.

The Humane Nature, thus fitted with theſe Faculties, is admirably accommodated to a threefold relation to ſomewhat without him, namely, To Almighty God: To the reſt of Mankind: And to this mundus aſpectabilis wherein he lives.

1. To Almighty God; for being a Creature endued with an Immortal Soul, endued with thoſe great Faculties of Underſtanding and Will, and thoſe Facultates Ancillares of his Affections, he is rendred into a capacity, 1. Of knowing Him: 2. Of knowing his Will, and what is acceptable to Him; for it is in a great meaſure inſcribed in his Soul: 3. Of being a fit Subject to Him, and to obey Him: 4. Of loving and truſting in Him: 5. Of glorifying of Him, eſpecially in the Contemplation of His Works, which are propoſed to his Senſe and Underſtanding: 6. Of Invoking and Worſhipping: And 7. Finally, to enjoy the Bleſſed Viſion of Him, by reaſon of the congruity of his Immortal and Intellectual Nature to ſuch a fruition. And thus we have him in his Duty, Religion; and in his Happineſs, Immortal Life.

2. To the reſt of mankind he is accommodated with Moral principles inherent in his Nature, and improvable by the exerciſe of his Faculties, as is before ſhewn; he is accommodated with Speech and Intellectual ſigns to maintain intercourſe and mutual communion and commerce; and his very diſpoſition and the mutual neceſſitudes of humane Nature neceſſarily maintain mutual offices and correſpondence between them; and the accommodations of Government and Laws are the fruit and productions of his Intellectual nature, and the ſupport of ſociety.

3. To the reſt of the viſible World; there is an admirable accommodation of the humane Nature and Faculties to the Mundus aſpectabilis, and of the ſeveral parts of it, and of them to it.

1. Of the Faculties of the humane Nature to the viſible Univerſe, eſpecially the vegetable and animal Natures, which by means of the admirable advantage of his Intellect, and that ſingular Engin of the Hand, he hath skill and power to ſubdue and bring under, whereby he exerciſeth dominion over them and protection of them, as the Vicegerent and Deputy of Almighty God.

2. Of the Univerſe and parts thereof to the humane Nature and Faculties, which were infinite to enumerate; I ſhall only inſert ſome of them.

1. A kind of awful ſubjection and fear of the greateſt part of the animal Nature, of him and to him; and though ſome be ſo hardy and unruly as to reſiſt him, yet he wants not power by the advantage of his Underſtanding and Hand to ſubdue and maſter them.

2. An accommodation of moſt of the things within the compaſs of the viſible Univerſe to his uſe and convenience, which though I cannot ſay it is the only or the prime end of their being, yet they are ſingularly accommodated to the uſe, delight and benefit of mankind, as might eaſily appear by an enumeration of particulars: The light, motion, and influence of the Sun and Stars; the nature, poſition and frame of Elements; the variety and concurrence of the Meteors; the fertility of the Land; the poſition of the Ocean; the interſperſion of the Rivers; the various Minerals, Vegetables and Animals, ſome ſerving for his food, ſome for his clothing; ſome for his labour and travel; ſome for his delight; the whole compaſs of Nature affording infinite variety of Inſtances of this kind.

3. An admirable accommodation of all the things in the World to his Faculties, and for their delight, advancement and improvement. He hath the perception of Senſe, to which all the viſible Objects of the World are preſented, and he hath the light and ſearching Faculty of his Underſtanding, which as it is qualified for ſuch an employment of Contemplation, ſo it hath a fruitful exhibition of Objects of great variety and excellency, the knowledge whereof doth not only delight and enrich his Faculties, but are ſo many manuductions to the knowledge and admiration of the infinite Wiſdom, Power and Goodneſs of the Creator and Upholder of them.

And thus I have given a ſhort and brief eſtimate of the peculiar Excellencies of the Humane Nature: I did not deſign a large or exact enumeration or deſcription of them; There is not any one particular above-mentioned but would take up the buſineſs of a juſt Volume, and I am eaſily conſcious that I have omitted many things that poſſibly might be of as great importance as any that I have mentioned: But this brief Inventory I have here given as preparatory to what follows, and to pre-poſſeſs the Reader, 1. That a natural Indagation according to the light of natural Reaſon touching the Origination of ſuch a Creature as this, is no contemptible or unworthy enquiry: 2. That ſurely ſuch a Creature as this thus accommodated could not have his Origination from any leſs than an Intellectual, moſt Wiſe, Powerful and Beneficent Being, the great God, Creator and Governour of Heaven and Earth: And this is the ſcope and end of my buſineſs in this Tract, the ſhort Synopſis whereof is as followeth.

There are two grand Opinions among the Ancients touching the Origination of Man: The firſt is, That Humane Species had no beginning, but was Eternal; the ſecond, That it had a beginning.

In the firſt place, I examin the ſuppoſition of the Eternity of Mankind in their ſucceſſive Generations: And in order thereunto I take up the conſideration of the Eternity of the World as it is now conſtituted, and, whether it be in Nature poſſible that it ſhould be ſo: I then deſcend to the particular conſideration of the Eternity of Mankind, whether although there ſhould be a poſſibility of an eternity of ſome permanent created Beings, whether yet there be a poſſibility in Nature, or any probability of evidence that Mankind can be eternal à parte ante, or without beginning.

This I oppoſe by Arguments of two kinds; 1. From the very repugnancy in Nature of ſucceſſive Beings to be without an inception, or eternal, and upon theſe kind of evidences I do indeed lay the principal weight and ſtreſs of my Concluſion, becauſe though theſe kind of Arguments may ſeem more obſcure, yet upon a due conſideration of them they are highly conſequential and concludent to my purpoſe.

2. The ſecond ſort of evidences are Moral evidences, wherein I take into conſideration moſt of thoſe Moral evidences that have been collected by others or thought of by my ſelf againſt the Eternity of Mankind: Whereupon I do conclude, 1. That ſingly and apart many of them are ſubject to exception, yet collectively they make up a good moral evidence touching a temporary inception of the humane Nature: 2. I do conſider the particular deficiencies of thoſe moral evidences taken ſingly and apart: 3. I ſubſtitute other moral evidences that even ſingly and apart have each of them a great moral and topical evidence of this truth and are not capable of any conſiderable Objection againſt them, though taken ſigillatim and apart.

But when all is done, I lay the great ſtreſs of my Concluſion upon the firſt ſort of Evidences natural, or metaphyſical, which ſeem to me no leſs than demonſtrative; and therefore if no other moral evidences were added thereunto, or if thoſe moral evidences ſhould be capable of exception (as ſome of them are) yet the truth of the Concluſion againſt the eternity of Mankind is ſufficiently ſupported by thoſe that I offer in the firſt place, which I call Phyſical and Metaphyſical.

2. Again, I then come to conſider that Opinion which ſuppoſeth an Inception of the Humane Nature.

I conſider the various Hypotheſes that the Ancients entertained touching the manner of that Origination, and ſhew the abſurdity of them in their ſeveral orders.

I then conſider the Moſaical Hypotheſis, and the great reaſonableneſs thereof upon a bare Natural or Moral accompt, without taking in the Infallibility of Divine Revelation.

In order to that, I conſider the whole Moſaical Syſteme or Hiſtory of the Creation of the World, the admirable congruity it hath, both with it ſelf, and with a due and unprejudiced and conſiderate Reaſon.

And laſtly, I deduce certain Corollaries or Conſequences from the whole Diſcourſe, both Theoretical and Moral, and this is in effect the whole Method of what theſe Papers contain: Wherein I proceed meerly upon an account of Natural Reaſon and Light, becauſe in this Diſcourſe I deal with ſuch as are either only or moſt commonly guided and governed by ſuch Sentiments, and therefore I do not call in to my aſſiſtance the Authority of Divine Revelation, though that of it ſelf doth and ought to carry the full and unqueſtionable Aſſent of all good Men that are acquainted therewith.

CAP. III. A brief Conſideration of the Hypotheſes that concern the Eternity of the World.

ALthough I intend not a large Diſcourſe touching their Suppoſitions that hold the Eternity of the World, yet it will be convenient a little to conſider it, for the better application of what follows in the enſuing Diſcourſe, touching the Eternity of the Succeſſions of Mankind, and the poſſibility or impoſſibility thereof.

The Suppoſition of the Eternity of the World is conſiderable under a double relation: 1. With relation to the Notion of Eternity: 2. With relation to the Subject it ſelf, which they would have eternal, namely, the World, either wholly or in ſome parts thereof.

In relation to Eternity it ſelf, two things are to be premiſed: 1. What it is; 2. What its Kinds are. 1. As to the former, in all this Diſcourſe I call that Eternal which is without beginning, or eternal à parte ante. 2. Things thus ſuppoſed Eternal may be of two kinds, either ſuch as have an Eternity ſimply independent upon any thing without it, or from which it ſhould derive that Eternal Being, as we and all good Men ſay that Almighty God is Eternal: Or elſe, ſuch an Eternity as yet ſuppoſeth its dependence upon Almighty God as its Cauſe. And they that attribute the firſt kind of Eternity to the World, muſt do it upon one of theſe two grounds, viz. That there is no other firſt Being, no firſt Cauſe, no God, upon whom the World ſhould depend, or from whom it ſhould derive this its Eternal Exiſtence: And this is the groſſeſt and moſt irrational Suppoſition, as well as the fouleſt Atheiſm, that can be imagined. Or elſe, That although there be in truth ſuch a Being as God, yet the World had not this its Eternal Exiſtence by any derivation or influx from Him, but hath it abſolutely and independently. This is the Epicurean Atheiſm, which though it oppoſe the Eternity of the World in that conſiſtency that now it hath, yet it aſſerts the Eternity of thoſe ſmall and infinite particles of Matter, and the coalition of them into that ſtate wherein they now are in proceſs and ſucceſſion of time and motion, yet without any dependence of the one or the other upon Almighty God, whom he totally ſecludes from the concerns of the World.

Others there are again, that attribute an Eternity to the World, but yet withall acknowledge Almighty God, and alſo Him to be the Efficient thereof: And therefore though they attribute an Eternity to it, yet it is but a dependent Eternity, and ſo though it be Eternal, yet it is but an Eternal Effect of an Eternal Cauſe. Theſe are much more tolerable than either of the former, for they aſſert a God, and likewiſe the dependence of the World in its Eternal Exiſtence and Duration upon Almighty God, as the Cauſe and Root of that Being of the World.

But among thoſe that thus aſſert this dependent Eternity of the World upon Almighty God as its Cauſe or Efficient, there ſeems to be two Parties, namely, 1. Such as ſuppoſe Almighty God the Neceſſary Cauſe of the World as his Neceſſary Effect. 2. Such as ſuppoſe Him meerly the Voluntary Cauſe of the World and of its Eternity. Of the former ſort, that ſuppoſe Almighty God the Neceſſary Cauſe of the World and of its Eternal Exiſtence, there ſeem to be theſe two Parties or different Opinions.

1. Such as ſuppoſe the World a meer natural and neceſſary Emanation from God as its neceſſary Cauſe, without any manner of intrinſecal freedom in Himſelf to do or be otherwiſe, and conſequently it being a neceſſary and connatural Effect of the firſt Cauſe, it muſt be neceſſarily as ancient as Himſelf, and if Almighty God be (as He is) moſt neceſſarily, ſo upon the ſame neceſſity He is the Cauſe of the World, and the World a neceſſary, and conſequently Eternal, Production neceſſarily flowing from the ſame; as if the Sun be Eternal, his Light, which neceſſarily flows from the Exiſtence of the Sun, is likewiſe neceſſarily Eternal. This ſeems to be the Opinion of Ariſtotle, and ſome others that follow him.

2. Again ſome there have been, who will not have Almighty God to be a meer natural and neceſſary Cauſe of the World, but ſuch a Cauſe as is a free Agent, agens per intellectum & voluntatem, and that the World was an Effect of Him, not as a natural or neceſſary, but as a voluntary and free Agent: And yet the World was neceſſarily Eternal, though freely willed to be Eternal. For they do ſuppoſe, that in as much as God Almighty is neceſſarily Good and Wiſe, and it is part of his Perfection to will what is beſt, and always to will it, therefore the Divine Will was always determined, even eternally, to will the Exiſtence of the World, as a thing eternally conſonant to the Perfection of his Nature, to will and always to will what is beſt: And there was never, in all the vaſt and boundleſs Period of Eternity, any one moment wherein he willed not to communicate his own Benignity and Bounty to ſomething without Him; and therefore though he freely willed the World to be, as a free Agent, yet that freedom of his Will was from all Eternity determin'd, by the Perfect Goodneſs and Beneficence of his Nature, ever to will what He once willed, and conſequently to will the World to be Eternally: Herein confounding the Divine Goodneſs with the Divine Beneficence and Benignity, the former being indeed neceſſary, but the latter under the Conduct and Guidance of his Free Will, indetermined by any thing but it ſelf.

Others there are that attribute the Being of the World to the meer beneplacitum voluntatis divinae, neither determined as a meer Natural cauſe, nor determined by any intrinſecal obligation of his own Goodneſs; but only that he willed it becauſe he willed it, though moſt wiſely and bountifully: Many of theſe do not indeed conclude the World to have been eternal, but in conformity to the truth of the Sacred Scriptures conclude it to be created in the beginning of time, but yet do again conclude that there is nothing in the nature of the thing either on the part of Almighty God, or on the part of the World it ſelf, or on the part of the manner of its Creation which is inſtantanous and per modum emanationis; but that ſuch parts of the World at leaſt as have a permanent exiſtence, and are not in a flux of ſucceſſion, might have been not only in ſome period antecedent to that point of time wherein de facto it was created, but alſo that it might have been thus eternally created if the Divine beneplacitum had ſo pleaſed: And therefore many of thoſe do not conclude that it was ſo, but that it might have been ſo eternally created, yet freely and voluntarily without any of the two foregoing neceſſities. Thus • quinas, Suarez and ſome others.

And thus having conſidered theſe various ſuppoſitions touching the divers qualities or qualifications of this eternal Exiſtence of the World, I ſhall now conſider the ſubject Matter which men would thus have to be eternal, or at leaſt poſſible to be ſuch, namely the World. And herein even many of the aſſertors of the Eternity of the World, or the poſſibility thereof, have (and not without cauſe) faln into divers concluſions.

By the World therefore we muſt underſtand either the Matter of the World ſimply in it ſelf, without being determined to this determinate Fabrick wherein it is; and thus it ſhould ſeem that all thoſe ancient Philoſophers that have aſſerted the Eternity of the World, as Ariſtotle, and before him Otellus Lucanus: or, that have aſſerted novitatem mundi in hac conſtitutione, have agreed; thus Epicurus, that aſſerts the coalition of Atoms into this Fabrick that we ſee, was of later edition than Eternity, yet aſſerts that theſe Atoms were eternal: and thoſe Ancients mentioned by Ariſtotle in the 8th of his Phyſicks, that held that the World was made, and unmade and made again by eternal viciſſitudes of Amor & Inimicitia, yet held the conſtituent Matter thereof eternal. And this ſeems to be the moſt comprehenſive acceptation of the World.

2. Again, by the World we may underſtand the World as it is now framed, the viſible World in that form and conſtitution as it now is: And thus it ſeems, Ariſtotle and thoſe others that hold it proceeds neceſſarily from God as a neceſſary cauſe, or as a cauſe determined by his intrinſick Goodneſs, have held the World to be eternal; but yet we muſt not reſt here. The World is like a goodly Palace, a fair large Building; but as in ſuch a Palace there is firſt the caſe or fabrick or moles of the Structure it ſelf, and beſides that there are certain additaments that contribute to its ornament and uſe; as various Furniture, rare Fountains and Aqueducts, curious Motions of divers things appendicated to it, as Clocks, Engins, &c. ſo in the goodly Univerſe there are the great Structure it ſelf, and its great integrals the Heavenly and Elementary Bodies, framed in ſuch a poſition and ſituation, the great Sceleton, as I may call it, of the World: But beſides this there are very various and curious furnitures and accommodations of the Univerſe, as for inſtance, in our inferior World various Animals, Vegetables, Meteors, Minerals, Mixtures, and Men; and in the Heavenly Bodies various Motions and Aſpects.

Now it will be neceſſary for him that aſſerts the Eternity of the World as now it ſtands, or the poſſibility of ſuch an eternity, to conſider whether he applies his aſſertion to the whole World, as conſiſting not only of the greater integrals whereof it conſiſts, as the Heavenly and poſſibly the Elementary Bodies; but alſo of that furniture thereof conſiſting of Men, Animals, Vegetables, Meteors, Minerals, and thoſe accommodations that are to it, as the Motions of the Heavenly Bodies; or whether he intends only ſome parts of it which ſeem more capable of an eternal exiſtence, as being more fixed, and in themſelves permanent, and ſo more able to ſuſtain an eternal and conſequently an immutable exiſtence.

And upon examination we ſhall 〈◊〉 find either of theſe choices full of incurable difficulties, if not utter impoſſibilities, in relation to an eternal exiſtence of the World or any parts thereof.

And this I ſhall in the order of this Diſcourſe evince againſt all thoſe former ſuppoſitions of Eternity; namely, 1. Againſt thoſe that aſſert an independent eternal exiſtence of the World: 2. Againſt thoſe that aſſert an eternal but dependent exiſtence thereof upon Almighty God, as a meer natural and neceſſary Cauſe thereof: 3. Againſt thoſe that aſſert an eternal exiſtence of the World dependent upon God as a free intellectual and voluntary Agent, but yet determined in his external emanations by the neceſſity of the Goodneſs and Beneficence of his nature: 4. Againſt thoſe that aſſert at leaſt a poſſibility of an eternal exiſtence of the World, but dependent upon the freedom of the Divine Will undetermined by the neceſſity of his Beneficence.

Firſt therefore concerning the ſuppoſition of the Eternity of the World in general; I ſhall not in this place diſpute whether there be an utter impoſſibility of any material Being to be either independently or dependently eternal; enough may be ſaid againſt it from the incapacity of any material Being to ſuſtain ſuch a kind of duration à parte ante, and yet without any derogation to the Divine Omnipotence or Goodneſs, which though infinite, yet cannot communicate ſuch a duration to that which in its own intrinſick nature is not capable of it: Nor ſecondly, ſhall I diſpute whether there be any ſuch material or corporeal Being or Beings within the compaſs of the Univerſe, that hath or may have ſuch a kind of permanence or fixedneſs in being that may be capable of an eternal exiſtence à parte ante, either dependently or independently upon Almighty God; admitting by way of argument, but not granting it poſſible, that in the nature of the thing ſome material or corporeal Being may be of ſuch a fixed, permanent conſiſtence as may ſuſtain ſuch an eternal exiſtence; and I here omit this diſpute not becauſe I make the leaſt doubt of the beginning thereof by Creation, but becauſe theſe are matters that require a longer and ſtricter proceſs of enquiry and debate than I intend in this place: and therefore I ſhall deſcend to things that are more plain and evident, and yet ſuch as will abundantly ſerve my deſign in the inquiry in hand.

And therefore for the preſent I ſhall gratia argumenti admit or ſuppoſe, 1. That there are or may be ſome corporeal things in the compaſs of the Univerſe that may poſſibly be of ſuch a fixedneſs, ſtability and permanent nature that may ſuſtain an eternal exiſtence, at leaſt dependently upon the ſupreme Cauſe. 2. And that poſſibly Matter it ſelf undetermined to any particular form, or under any particular conſtitution; the Heavenly Bodies, the Elementary Bodies, and ſuch as ſeem to have a ſimple nature; and poſſibly their figure, poſition, and ſituation may be ſuch as might have this eternal exiſtence, as the Sun, the Stars, the Aether, the four Elements; we will, for avoiding diſpute touching it for the preſent, admit them to have been, or that poſſibly they might have been of that nature, quality, diſtance each from other eternally as now they are, like the great integrals and contignations, figure and concamerations of a goodly Palace: Theſe things I ſay, though in themſelves moſt certainly untrue, I ſhall for avoidance of difficult diſputes admit at preſent. Yet I farther ſay, that though all theſe things were admitted, yet there are ſome great and conſiderable parts and integrals, and appendications unto the Mundus aſpectabilis that we ſee, that are purely impoſſible to be eternal, and do de facto appear ſo to be; and conſequently it is apparent that the World in its full latitude and comprehenſion cannot be eternal.

And herein I ſhall not fix upon little or inconſiderable things, but upon ſuch as highly contribute to the excellency, beauty and uſefulneſs thereof; neither ſhall I fix upon individuals which are apparently tranſient, and neceſſarily have their beginning, duration and end in certain known determinate portions of time, as is evident in the individuals of all kinds or ſpecies of mixed, ſublunary Natures: But I ſhall apply my ſelf to the ſpecies themſelves, which moſt that aſſert the eternity of the World aſſert to be eternal, or to ſuch individuals as are the ſingle Conſervators of their own ſpecies.

And in this debate I ſhall take my meaſure from things in Nature as I find them; and it is reaſonable I ſhould do ſo, eſpecially conſidering that this Diſcourſe concerns principally the Judgments or Opinions of thoſe men that are the great aſſertors of Nature, and the eternity of thoſe Laws, Rules, Orders, or Methods of Nature which they now find and obſerve in it: And it were a great vanity and raſhneſs eſpecially for ſuch men to reject thoſe reaſons which are drawn from the nature of things as now they appear, or for them to go about to anſwer thoſe reaſons by ſuppoſitions of a variety in things from what they now appear. If therefore the ſtate and method of things to be inſtanced in, as they now appear, do involve a repugnancy to an eternal exiſtence, the Arguments drawn from that Suppoſition muſt be concluſive, at leaſt to thoſe great Prieſts and Venerators of Nature and its appearances.

Thoſe things therefore that I would inſtance in, as in their own nature uncapable of eternal exiſtence à parte ante, are theſe:

1. All things that are of all hands agreed to be concreted of other things, and neceſſarily in their own nature require a pre-exiſtence of thoſe more ſimple Bodies out of which they are concreted, and a pre-exiſtence of ſome preparatory antecedent motion for their coalition, mixtion and concretion; as Animals, Vegetables, Minerals, Meteors, and regularly all mixt Bodies.

2. All things that are in their own nature ſucceſſive, as all Motion, Alteration, Generations, Corruptions, and all things that in their own conſtitution have as it were intrinſecally annexed to them, or at leaſt neceſſarily belonging to them in reſpect of their ſituation and poſition, and juxta-poſition to other things, a neceſſary ſubjection to alteration or corruption.

3. All things that do not, nor (their nature conſidered) cannot perſiſt in one immutable ſtate, but have variety in the nature and manner of their exiſtence neceſſarily by the laws of their nature annexed to them.

Theſe things conſtituted and being in that ſtate we find them, cannot without a total alteration of their nature and being from what in truth they are, nor in the ſtate of nature wherein they are placed, can they be eternal or without beginning: And theſe are very conſiderable and momentous parts or appendices of the World, and if it had been eternally without theſe, it had been a very lame and defective World, and ſuch as the wiſeſt man under Heaven could hardly underſtand for what uſe it would be, or why it ſhould have continued in ſuch a defective condition from the endleſs period of Eternity: Or at leaſt if it had its uſe and beauty, certainly it had not had the ſame uſe that now it hath, nor the ſame beauty that now it hath.

And the conſequence thereof is of great moment and importance, viz. If theſe great acceſſions to the World, whereof I am ſpeaking, could not be eternal, and yet without them the World would have been greatly deficient from what it is, the greateſt Arguments for the Eternity of the reſt of the World will neceſſarily fall off: for the ſame reaſon that concludes for the neceſſity of an eternal exiſtence of the World, would as effectually conclude for the eternal exiſtence of that which highly conduceth to the beauty, uſe, and ends of the Univerſe, which yet we ſhall find cannot be eternally exiſting; as it concludes for the eternity of ſuch integrals of the World which poſſibly might be eternal. Again, if it be inconſiſtent with the nature of many of thoſe things eternally to be, which yet contribute much to the glory, beauty, uſefulneſs and excellency of the World, as mixt Bodies, motion, and alteration; how can we think that there is a neceſſity in the Divine Nature to have made that Caſe or Sceleton of the World from eternity which ſhould have been in ſo great a meaſure uſeleſs, and wanting that beauty, order, uſe and perfection which it obtains from the contribution of mixt Bodies, motions, and alterations? And what could be thought a ſufficient motive to have had an eternal Carcaſs of an Univerſe wherein the materials and poſitions of it were eternally laid together, and to conſiſt infinite millions of Ages; and yet that which gives it its beauty and ornament and uſe, at leaſt in a great meaſure, muſt be brought to a beginning five, or ſix, or ten thouſand years ſince, and not before? The nearneſs or novity therefore that is neceſſarily required in theſe great contributions to the beauty and uſe of the Univerſe is a great evidence of the novity of all the reſt: And therefore although the Houſe muſt be built ſome time before it be furniſhed, and the Watch muſt be made, the materials formed, adapted and fitted, and the whole put together before it be put in motion; yet it were unneceſſary and vain to ſuppoſe the Caſe or Fabrick of the Houſe, or the Fabrick and Compoſition of the Watch, were an infinite time before its furniſhing and ſetting into motion.

But to the buſineſs it ſelf, and the Inſtances above given:

1. It ſeems inconſiſtent with the Nature of mixed Bodies that they ſhould be eternal, for then they muſt be as ancient as thoſe ſimple Bodies out of which they are taken.

That there are in our inferior World divers Bodies, that are concreted out of others, is beyond all diſpute. We ſee it in the Meteors; the Clouds are attracted out of moiſt and watry, and alſo earthy Vapours; Stones and Minerals do grow and ariſe in the Earth, out of the ſuccus terreſtris digeſted by the heat of the Sun: Divers Vegetables, and ſome Animals, ſponte nata, ariſe from the temperament of the terreſtrial and watry Matter, the inſinuations of the Aether and Air into it, and the influence of the Sun: Other Animals, and ſome Vegetables, have a more regular production from Seed, as ſome of the perfecter ſort of Vegetables, and the nobler Animals, and Men; which ſeminal Principle is a mixture of the divers particles of Matter and Spirits, derived and elicited from the Plant or Animal.

And as it is apparent, that there are ſuch mixt Concretions, ſo it is apparent, that before the actual concretion of theſe mixt Bodies there muſt be pre-exiſtent to it: 1. The Matter, or more ſimple Bodies out of which they are concreted: Again, 2. There muſt be antecedent to it that Ethereal or Solar heat, that muſt digeſt, influence, irradiate, and put theſe more ſimple parts of Matter into motion and coalition: And 3. Before the full and perfect formation of this concrete, there muſt be a preparation, and digeſtion, and formation of this Matter, before it come into a perfect Concrete, be it of what kind ſoever; and this preparation, digeſtion, and formation, requires a competent mora, or time, antecedent to its complete and full conſtitution. All theſe are evident, in a more ſpecial and eminent manner in the production of Animals and Vegetables, but I ſhall at preſent take the Inſtance, that is obvious every day in our Gardens, in the production of a common Flint or Pebble: Firſt, there is the more ſimple Matter, out of which it borrows its ſubſtance, namely, the Earth, and the Water or Moiſture; then there is the heat of the Sun, that digeſts and concocts both; then there is the conjunction and coheſion of the Matter into a more looſe, or indigeſted and ſofter conſiſtency like Mortar or Clay, and thereby it is prepared to the concrement of a Pebble or Flint, which poſſibly in a week or a month it perfectly obtains. Every Man muſt needs ſee, that in the natural courſe of things this Pebble doth ſuppoſe, as pre-exiſtent to it, the more ſimple Matter out of which it is deſumed, the heat and influence of the Sun, and the due preparation of the Matter; which takes up a competent time, and that neceſſarily, before this Pebble had its complete Being: And conſequently, in the courſe of Nature, it is impoſſible that any Pebble was eternal, for it neceſſarily required theſe things to have been before it could be, and yet if it were eternal, it muſt have been as ancient as that Earth, and that Water, which was its material conſtituent, and as that Sun, whoſe heat digeſted it, or coagulated it, or as that preparation which preceded its conſiſtence.

And though this Inſtance be of one Individual, and that of the baſeſt nature, yet the very ſame reaſon holds in all mixed Bodies, as in Meteors, Comets, Minerals, Vegetables, Animals, their Seeds and Productions. The conſequence of this is, that it is impoſſible that mixed or compounded Bodies can be eternal, becauſe there is neceſſarily, according to the Rules of Nature, a pre-exiſtence of the ſimple Bodies out of which they are deſumed, and an antecedence of their conſtitution preceding the exiſtence of mixed Bodies.

If any Man ſhall object againſt this Reaſon, and ſay, That it deſtroyeth my own Foundation, which ſuppoſeth a creation or concrement of thoſe very Bodies which I ſuppoſe to be mixed, as Animals, Vegetables, &c. without all this preliminary proceſs, or orderly antecedency of ſuch circumſtances, as are now in the courſe of Nature, as it ſtands ſettled, neceſſary to their production: And that, as I do ſuppoſe, all created Beings had at firſt their primitive production by the Fiat of the Divine Will and Power, ſo in the defence of that Suppoſition or Concluſion, I muſt ſuppoſe another method of production of mixed Bodies, than what we now find in Nature as it ſtands ſettled.

I anſwer, That it is true, I muſt and do ſuppoſe another kind of method in the firſt and primitive Conſtitution of things by Creation: But it ſtands and conſiſts with, and is conſonant to my whole Suppoſition, and indeed my general Suppoſition▪ cannot poſſibly be or conſiſt without a Suppoſition alſo, That the firſt conſtitution and coalition of mixed Bodies was quite of another frame or method, than what now obtains in ſettled Nature.

But the Objector muſt conſider againſt whom and what kind of Opinators the Reaſon above given is levelled, who take all their Meaſures from things as they now ſee them in ſettled Nature, and do thereupon aſſert, That the order and method of the exiſtence and production of all things was eternally the ſame as now it is. And therefore certainly this Reaſon is fully concludent againſt thoſe perſons that would ſuppoſe an Eternity in all things in the World, independent upon the firſt Cauſe and Efficient: For certainly thoſe of their Principles do and muſt needs ſuppoſe, that things had no other method of their production than what we now ſee they have, and therefore they muſt (if they hold to their Principles) agree that they had their production always as now they have: The neceſſary conſequence whereof is, that if ſuch a kind of production of mixt Bodies cannot in the nature of the thing be eternal, they cannot have an eternal production.

But it is true, that this doth not anſwer the Suppoſition of thoſe, that though they ſuppoſe an Eternity in mixt Bodies, do attribute even that Eternity to an eternal Creation, and therefore to another kind of production than what we now ſuppoſe to be natural, and conſequently as they ſuppoſe, at firſt in an eternal moment Almighty God created ſimple Bodies, as the Heavenly or Elementary Bodies, ſo in the ſame inſtant He might and did create other Bodies, which though in their conſtitution they were or might be compoſed of ſuch particles, as had they been aſunder and divided, might have been of the ſimple nature of thoſe ſimpler Bodies, yet they were in the ſame eternal moment or inſtant created and put together without any priority of exiſtence in thoſe ſimple Bodies whereof they might otherwiſe conſiſt; nor were ſuch mixt eternal Bodies ſucceſſively deſumed or compounded out of the pre-exiſting ſimple Bodies, but con-created and put together in the ſame eternal and indiviſible moment or inſtant: ſo that a Mineral for the purpoſe might be created in the ſame moment wherein the elementary Earth was created. And although after the completing of the whole Frame of Nature in that eternal, indiviſible, intelligible moment, the production of mixt Bodies either by ſpontaneous or contingent coalition of various particles of Matter, or by an univocal generation, the courſe that is now held in Nature might be obſerved, and that Priority of particles of ſimple Matter, Influx of the Heavens, and Preparation of Matter might be antecedent and precedaneous not only in order but in time to their ordinary productions; yet at firſt it might be, and was otherwiſe in the primitive conſtitution of ſuch mixt Bodies as had their original by Creation.

I do confeſs this Suppoſition may evade the illation made upon the Natural production of mixt Bodies, but then we muſt remember that this quite departs from the method of things as they now ſtand in the courſe of Nature; neither can any man conclude that it was or could be ſo from the obſervation of the Order or Cauſe of Nature, or any rational deduction from the ſame, but muſt have recourſe either to bare Notion or Conjecture, or elſe to Divine Revelation; the former ſeems ſomewhat too light, ſoundly to ground any Hypotheſis; and the latter, namely, Divine Revelation, though it doth diſcover unto us that things had their production in a different way in their firſt Conſtitution or Origination, namely, by the almighty Power of God creating them, yet withall it informs us that that origination was not from Eternity, but in the beginning of Time, which wholly overthrows the Hypotheſis of an Eternal Creation of the World: If therefore they will appeal to Revelation for their Creation, they muſt be concluded by it, not to ſay it was eternal.

2. My ſecond Reaſon is this, Becauſe all things that are in their nature ſucceſſive muſt have a firſt beginning of their being, and cannot be eternal. But there are in the World many things of great note and moment (and without which the Order and Uſefulneſs of the Univerſe would be deficient) which have a ſucceſſive nature; and therefore ſuch things cannot be eternal or without beginning: And this reaſon concludes forcibly as well againſt that independent Eternity ſuppoſed by ſome of the Ancients, as that Eternity dependent upon Almighty God, whether as a neceſſary Cauſe, or as a free voluntary intellectual Cauſe determined by the neceſſary Goodneſs and Beneficence of his nature; or as a perfectly free Agent, determining his Will by his own beneplacitum thus eternally to produce the World.

The Aſſumption or minor Propoſition, That there are many things in the World of great moment and importance to it that are in their own nature ſucceſſive, is apparent; ſuch are all the Individuals of Species of corruptible things, that yet notwithſtanding have a continued ſucceſſion in their individuals, as Vegetables, Animals, and Men, that ſucceſſively propagate their kind. 2. All kinds of Motions to which all natural Bodies are in ſome kind or other ſubject, as the motions of Generation and Corruption, Augmentation, Diminution, and Alteration that are unceſſantly incident to all ſublunary Bodies, and they muſt change their nature and ceaſe to be what they are, before they can ceaſe to be actually ſubject to alterations; ſuch is alſo Local motion, communicable not only to the inferior and ſublunary Bodies, but alſo to celeſtial Bodies, and this motion even of the Heavenly Bodies themſelves ſeems to be partly continued and unintermitted, as that motion of the Firſt Moveable; partly interpolated and interrupted, as ſome affirm of that Motus trepidationis; ſometimes of acceſs and receſs, as the Annual motion of the Sun, wherein ſome have thought there is a ſmall, though impeceptible, reſt in the very point of returning, which we call Solſtices.

The major Propoſition, namely, that ſuch ſucceſſive things cannot be eternal, includes two Affirmations, viz. 1. That the motions or ſucceſſions themſelves cannot be eternal or without beginning: 2. That the things that have neceſſarily and inſeparably theſe motions or alterations annexed to their nature cannot be eternal, ſo long as we ſuppoſe them neceſſarily accompanied with theſe alterations: The former of theſe is conſiderable in this place, the other is conſiderable under the next Reaſon.

Now touching the impoſſibility of the eternal ſucceſſion of the Species, whether of Men, Animals, or Vegetables by natural propagation or proſemination, the ſame and the Reaſons thereof ſhall be fully delivered when we come to the particular conſideration of the Origination of Mankind, and the neceſſity of fixing in ſome common Parents of the individuals of Mankind, and thither I ſhall refer my ſelf.

As touching the eternity of any kind of Motion, eſpecially even of that of the Heavenly Bodies, I ſhall ſay ſomewhat briefly in this place which will be eaſily reducible to any other of the motions in the World, as namely the motions of Generation, Corruption or Alteration, all which are in ſome reſpect but the effects of Local motion of one kind or another.

And there ſeem to be two ſpecial Reaſons even from the intrinſecal nature of the things that encounter the poſſibility of an eternal ſucceſſive duration in them: The firſt concludes againſt all imaginable eternity of Motion of the Heavenly Bodies, whether independent or dependent upon Almighty God; the latter indeed principally concludes againſt the poſſibility of the created or dependent eternity thereof. And they are theſe:

1. If the circular motion of the Sun or Heavens were eternal, then there muſt be two circulations of the Heavens immediately ſucceeding on the other Eternal; the conſequence whereof yet would be, That the one of thoſe circulations would be neceſſarily before the other by the ſpace of twenty four Hours, which would be impoſſible, for then the next ſucceeding circulation would not be ſo ancient as the firſt, and yet both ſhould be eternal, which is impoſſible and repugnant.

This Reaſon a late Philoſopher hath made uſe of in ſubſtance, but in a different method, namely, That if the circular Motion of the Heaven were eternal, then of neceſſity there muſt be granted ſome one circulation of the Heaven to be diſtant from us by an interpoſition of infinite Circulations: This conſequence muſt needs be true, and yet it would perfectly deſtroy infinite Circulation of the Heaven; for it would neceſſarily from hence follow that all the intermediate Circulations were finite, and determinate on both ends; at this end with that Circulation that is preſently in motion, and à parte ante with that Circulation that is ſuppoſed to be infinitely diſtant from us, which excludes any poſſibility of infinitude in Motions intermediate. And if it be ſaid that the firſt of theſe intermediate Circulations is likewiſe infinitely diſtant from this, then it ſhould be infinitely diſtant and yet the next precedent Circulation ſhould be before it, which deſtroys the very nature and reaſon of infinitude. And if it ſhall be ſaid that that next ſucceeding Circulation after that which is ſo ſuppoſed infinitely diſtant from what is now currant, is diſtant from us by a finite interval, and not infinitely, then that one Circulation which preceded it, and muſt neceſſarily be like ours, and conſequently abſolved in the ſpace of twenty four Hours, ſhall by its acceſſion to a finite number of Circulations, or conſequently to a finite interval of duration, make up an infinite ſucceſſion and an infinite duration; the addition of that one antecedent Circulation ſhall make the intermediate finite Circulations infinite, and the addition of a period of twenty four Hours (the uttermoſt extent of one Circulation) ſhall make a finite time or interval infinite, which are intolerable abſurdities, and yet neceſſary conſequences upon the ſuppoſition of the eternal Motion of the Heaven or Sun; or if you will, of the Earth, as the Copernicans will have it.

2. A ſecond Reaſon is this, which though it be but a different and farther explication of the former, yet it renders it clearer and in more perſpicuous terms, which is this: Whatſoever once was and now is not, as it is now paſt, ſo it was once preſent, and before it was ſo preſent was future: Take it in the former Inſtance; It is not poſſible that there could have been any Revolution of the Heaven that is now paſt, but that the ſame was once preſent; as whatſoever now is, is neceſſarily whiles it is ſo; whatſoever hath been, was neceſſarily whiles it was; in praeteritis non eſt contingentia.

The conſequent whereof is, that whiles it is impoſſible but that the remoteſt Revolution of the Heaven once was preſent, That Revolution when preſent, was neceſſarily the Epocha, the terminus from whence all other ſucceeding Revolutions took the courſe or journey; and yet this remoteſt Revolution could not be of a greater period than 24 Hours, which was not ſufficient to make it eternal, yet all the ſucceeding Revolutions took their riſe and journey from it; and muſt needs be cloſed within two bounds, namely, the moſt remote and the preſent Revolution.

Again, if it be impoſſible that there can be any Revolution now paſt which was not once preſent, then the moſt remote was once preſent, and at that time when it was ſo preſent had none before it or more ancient than it; and that Revolution being ſuch as now we have, muſt neceſſarily have its beginning within the ſpace of twenty four Hours, before which it was not, and conſequently when it was ſo preſent could not be eternal; and conſequently all the Revolutions that ſucceeded came after it, was terminated by it, and by ſuch a Revolution that when it was preſent had a beginning and could not be eternal, nor conſequently all the Revolutions that hapned ſince that firſt, which are utrinque clauſa, namely, with that which is remoteſt, and with this that now is in motion.

3. Whatſoever bodily Being is created eternally, muſt neceſſarily be created in ſome certain ſitus or diſpoſition, and muſt of neceſſity remain an eternal duration in that ſitus or diſpoſition wherein it was ſo created. For inſtance, if we ſhould ſuppoſe the Sun created eternally, we muſt neceſſarily ſuppoſe 1. That he was created in ſome determinate ubi or ſitus, for that is undiſpenſably neceſſary to every created individual Body; and therefore if he were eternally created we muſt ſuppoſe him created in tali vel tali plaga mundi, ſuppoſe we to be above our Horizon, or below it. 2. It muſt neceſſarily be, that in that ubi where he was ſo created, that he muſt by an eternal ſpace or duration abide in that ſitus or ubi where he was ſo created; and he muſt (it is true) have a diſpoſition to motion, but he muſt be in diſpoſitione tantum ad motum by an infinite tract of duration: For if we ſhall ſuppoſe that he ſtaid in his ſitus of his Creation but an hour, or a day, or a moment, and then ſet out to move, that moment of his exiſtence before he moved would terminate and bound the duration of his motion, which could not be eternal becauſe it had an antecedent moment before it, which ſecludes it from eternity: Neither can we ſuppoſe him to be eternally created in motion, for he muſt be before he can move, and muſt alſo have a terminus motus à quo. But ſuppoſe we might imagin him to be in the very firſt eternal imaginable inſtant of his eternal being put into motion, yet the terminus of that motion muſt neceſſarily be that ubi and ſitus wherein he was created, which would neceſſarily be the antecedent circumſcription of the line of his motion; and if the line of his motion hath neceſſarily a terminus of its inception, it muſt of neceſſity have a terminus of its duration, and cannot be infinite in duration à parte ante: And as to this purpoſe there will be no manner of difference between a circular motion and a ſtreight motion, if we could ſuppoſe in the vaſt abyſs of imaginary infinite ſpace there were ſome one determinate point from whence a direct local motion ſhould be ſuppoſed to begin its motion, the line that ſuch a ſtreight motion ſhould make would be finite, and conſequently an infinite time could not poſſibly be conſumed in ſuch a motion. And upon the ſame account if the Sun were created in any point of the Hemiſphere, and then preſently took his ſtart or motion to the Weſt, and ſo onward in his circular journey, it were impoſſible that the line of that motion ſhould be of an infinite extenſion, but being drawn out at length like a clew of thred wound off from a bottom, it would be of a finite extenſion, and conſequently the period of that motion could never be infinite. For Ariſtotle tells us truly, that an infinite time can never be drawn out in a finite motion, nor an infinite motion be abſolved in a finite time: This Reaſon the acute and judicious Suarez, 2. Metaph. diſp. 29. ſect. 1. borrows from Antonius Ruvio, and though according to the opinion of Aquinas he be a ſtiff aſſertor of the poſſibility of the Eternal Creation of the World, ibid. diſp. 20. yet he frankly confeſſeth and maintaineth that Motion is of ſuch a nature as is not capable of an eternal duration à parte ante; and thereupon concludes, Propter hanc ergo cauſam existimó Aeternitatem repugnare Motui, & Motum includere repugnantiam cum quadam immutabilitate, quam includit Aeternitas: Ideoque de facto motum non ſolum non eſſe aeternum, verum neque eſſe poſſe. Igitur ex motu aeterno colligi non poteſt Motor eternus vel immaterialis.

And now let any Man conſider what is gained by the Suppoſition of an Eternity of the Bulk or Carkaſs of the World, when yet it cannot hold with it in conſort an Eternity of Motion: 1. That we muſt ſeparate from Bodies that which is moſt connatural to them, eſpecially the Heavenly Bodies, and this for an eternal period, 'till put in motion within the limits of time. 2. We ſhall hereby ſeparate from the Body of the Univerſe for an eternal period that which renders it moſt uſeful, and moſt beautiful: To ſuppoſe an Eternal World, and yet eternally deſtitute of Motion, were to ſuppoſe the whole Univerſe deſtitute of Life, and all Vegetables, Animals, Meteors, the Ebbing and Flowing of the Sea, the whole Furniture at leaſt of this inferiour World, to be none but dead, liveleſs, ſtupid Beings, for ſuch it certainly would be, if the Heavenly Bodies ſhould be deſtitute of their Motion.

And therefore it ſeems wholly diſagreeing to Reaſon, that the World ſhould be eternal, when it is evident, that Motion (which as Ariſtotle truly tells us is, Vita quaedam omnium mobilium) cannot be eternal, and ſo there ſhould be an eternal uſeleſs Carkaſs of a World from all Eternity, without that life of it, its Motion.

And on the other ſide, it ſeems more conſonant to Reaſon, that the Fabrick of the World did not long antecede its Motion, and that ſince Motion is not, cannot be eternal, ſo neither is the Fabrick of the World, but they both began at leaſt very neer together, and the World was not made from Eternity to lye fallow and uninhabited during that infinite abyſs of its pre-exiſtence to its firſt putting forth into any Motion, for ſuch it muſt be, if deſtitute of Motion. And conſequently the evincing of an impoſſibility of an eternal ſucceſſive Motion, doth not only evince, that the whole World, with all its conſiderable Appendices, was not eternal, but doth with great evidence enforce, that the great Integrals of the World it ſelf were not eternal, which had been imperfect without Motion.

And this doth ſalve two Objections at once, viz. 1. That drawn from Gods Omnipotence, that could have made the World eternal, if He pleaſed. The Anſwer is: That whatever could have been done in reference to the Reſt of the World, yet as in reference to ſucceſſive Motion the ſame could not have been made eternal, and yet without derogation to the Divine Power or Omnipotence, but becauſe the nature of the thing could not ſuſtain or bear ſuch a duration.

And likewiſe this anſwers the Argument for the Eternity of the World, drawn from the Divine Benignity and Goodneſs, whereby He is ſuppoſed to be under a kind of intrinſick neceſſity of doing all the good He could, and conſequently to make the World eternally. I anſwer, 1. That as before the World, in its complement and perfection with the advantage of Motion, though there was no determinate time, point, or period, but God might have made it ſooner if He had pleaſed, yet (with all due reverence to His Majeſty) it could not have been in its complement and perfection eternal, becauſe its ſucceſſive Motion could not be eternal, nor conſequently all that glory, beauty and uſefulneſs which accrues to the Univerſe by that ſucceſſive Motion. 2. That although the Divine Will be determined by the Divine Perfection neceſſarily to will his own immenſe Goodneſs, yet he is not determined by his own Benignity neceſſarily to will any thing without himſelf; his own eſſential Goodneſs he wills, and that neceſſarily, and ad ultimum poſſe; but his Benignity is meaſured out ad beneplacitum voluntatis, and not by an abſolute neceſſity ad ultimum poſſe: And therefore although it were admitted that he could have eternally made the World, or made more Worlds or better Worlds, yet he was not bound to it, becauſe the emanations of his Benignity are not neceſſary, but governed in their extent and meaſure juxta voluntatis beneplacitum. 3. And upon the ſame account alſo, though he could have made the World ſooner than he made it, yet he was not bound to it, but to make it when and how he pleaſed, though all his Works carry the impreſſion of tranſcendent Wiſdom and Goodneſs.

And therefore as theſe Reaſons ſeem ſtrongly to conclude 1. Againſt the very poſſibility of an eternal duration of thoſe things that gave the principal ornament, beauty and uſefulneſs to the Univerſe, namely, Variety and Succeſſion of Individuals and Species, and Motion, ſo they do, at leaſt de facto, evidence that if the reſt of the Univerſe were able to ſuſtain an eternal duration, yet they did not, becauſe theſe would be very defective without thoſe that cannot hold that ſtate of Eternity with them.

2. Againſt the truth of that Reaſon and Aſſertion, That Divine Goodneſs did intrinſecally neceſſitate his Will to create things in their beſt ſtate from Eternity, ſince it ſeems evident that the condition and ſtate of many things in the Univerſe that give it much of its uſefulneſs, perfection and beauty, namely Motion, and Succeſſion of Generations and Corruptions, of Animals, Vegetables and Men, are impoſſible to be as ancient as that intrinſick Goodneſs of the Divine Nature, which is as eternal as his own moſt perfect being.

3. I come now to the third Reaſon againſt the Eternity of conſiderable parts of the World, which is this; Sublunary Bodies, whether ſimple or mixt, are by the neceſſity of their nature ſubject to alteration and corruption: But whatſoever is ſubject thus to alteration or corruption, is incapable of ſuſtaining an eternal duration à parte ante, and conſequently ſublunary Bodies are not capable of ſuch an Eternity.

The firſt of theſe Propoſitions, namely, That all ſublunary Bodies are ſubject neceſſarily to alteration and corruption: This naturally happens to ſublunary Bodies upon both or one of theſe accounts, 1. From an intrinſecal Cauſe, which is principally ſeen in mixt Bodies, in which the band and ligament between Matter and Form, nor of the parts of Matter themſelves is not ſo ſtrict and tenacious, but that they muſt neceſſarily in proceſs of time fall aſunder. Beſides, by the continual conteſt between thoſe contrary qualities bound up together in them, there do ariſe unceſſant alterations, and at laſt final diſſolution of them, even from within themſelves 2. From extrinſecal Cauſes: For the very neceſſary compoſure and poſition of things in the World is ſuch, that there is a vicinity between Agents and Patients, and contrary diſſenting active Qualities, that the one inceſſantly invades the other, and alters, changes, intends, remits and corrupts the other; which perpetual lucta is ſeen daily not only in the mixed and compounded Bodies, but even in the more ſimple elementary Bodies, which daily invade, change, alter, and corrupt one the other according to their various degrees of activity, contrariety and vicinity each to other.

And if the World had been eternal, we muſt ſuppoſe it eternally conſtituted of ſuch natures ſo placed and diſpoſed in ſuch ſituation and conſtitution as now they ſtand, or otherwiſe, we do not reaſon ad idem, the World otherwiſe ſhould have been of another make, conſtitution and poſition than now it is; things corruptible muſt have been incorruptible, and the vicinity, activity, contrariety and poſition of things and their natures and qualities muſt otherwiſe have been quite different, and ſo our debate would be transferred quite to another World of another nature and conſtitution from that touching whoſe Eternity we now diſpute.

The ſecond Propoſition is this, That whatſoever is ſubject to ſuch alteration or corruption cannot poſſibly be eternal, at leaſt unleſs we ſhall wholly remove from it by an infinite duration that corruption or alteration to which it is thus neceſſarily ſubject, and ſo make it another thing than what indeed it is.

And becauſe the due and clear explication of this Truth renders the Aſſertion plain in it ſelf, I ſhall diſtinctly examin it; and becauſe we have ſuppoſed that the corruption of things corruptible, and the alteration of things alterable depends, as before, upon a double Principle, viz. That intrinſecal defectibility of the connexion or union of the parts of things corporeal, which is rooted in the very Nature of the things themſelves; and 2. From the vicinity of other contrary active Principles endued with contrary active Qualities which mutually invade one another; which poſition (conſidering the Frame and Conſtitution at leaſt of this inferior World, is abſolutely neceſſary, unleſs we ſhall make the World another thing, and of another Fabrick than what it is) as the moiſture of the Water is contiguous to the dryneſs of the Earth, and the heat of the Sun is contiguous to the coldneſs and moiſture of the Water, and cannot be otherwiſe in the Conſtitution of the World as now it ſtands, and conſequently one muſt neceſſarily work an alteration in the other: I ſhall therefore purſue the ſame method, and firſt conſider ſuch Bodies as ſeem to have an intrinſick principle of alteration or corruption from the diſſolubility of their parts, and the coadunition of ſeveral particles endued with contrary and deſtructive qualities each to other; or ſuch as at leaſt tend to a gradual alteration. And ſecondly, I ſhall conſider ſuch parts of the Univerſe as do mutually act one upon another, and thereby induce corruption or alteration of one by another, according to the prevalency and activity of the one or the other.

But before I come to either of the particulars I ſhall premiſe ſome things which will be of uſe in all that follows, viz. 1. That precedaneous to all Generation of any material Being, according to the courſe of Nature which we ſee, there muſt be a gradual preparation and alteration of the matter before there is a complete generation of any thing: This we ſee in the caſual production of Inſects and Vegetables, and in the natural production of Minerals or Meteors, and in the regular production of Animals and Men. 2. That in things which yet hold their eſſential conſiſtency, yet there are very many alterations, not only accidental, as where things are rarified or condenſed, or made hot from being cold, or cold from being hot, but alſo ſuch as ſeems connatural to the Species: Thus we ſee in a Man, firſt he is a weak little Infant, then a Y • u • h, then a Man, then he becomes an Old Man, and yet continues ſtill a Man till his diſſolution; and to theſe various ſtates of his Age there ſeem to be various alterations accommodate, as difference in ſtature, bigneſs, ſtrength, activity, underſtanding; and the ſame is obſervable in proportion to their capacities in Animals, Vegetables, Minerals, and the like. 3. That theſe alterations are neceſſarily ſucceſſive and gradual, whether they be ſuch as are preparative to Generation or Corruption of Beings, or ſuch as conſiſt with the Exiſtence of the being they have (as thoſe alterations incident to the ſtate of things in their conſiſtency) yet they are not inſtantaneous, but ſucceſſive and gradual; nay thoſe very alterations that are wrought in things by an external contrary Agent, yet they are not in a moment, but gradual and ſucceſſive, which is partly by reaſon of the reſiſtence in the Patient, and partly becauſe the Agent works upon the Patient by a certain local motion of it ſelf or parts, or of its virtue and activity, which cannot be inſtantaneous and tota ſimul, but gradual and ſucceſſive: Thus the Sun reduceth the Clay to its final degree of hardneſs, and the Wax to its final degree of ſoftneſs ſucceſſively and gradually; the Fire aſſimulates the Stubble, and converts it into Fire, not in an inſtant but by degrees, though ſooner or ſlower according to the vicinity of each, and the precedaneous preparations of congruity of the Stubble to be wrought upon by the Fire. 4. That theſe alterations that are thus ſucceſſive and gradual, as they cannot be perfectly inſtantaneous, ſo it is impoſſible they can laſt or continue for an infinite or eternal duration. The reaſon is, becauſe as they muſt have an inception of their motion, ſo they muſt of neceſſity arrive to their complement within the compaſs of time, and can never hold out in their progreſs to an infinite duration: Let us ſuppoſe the Fire and the Stubble to have been created eternally contiguous one to another, the Fire could never have held an infinite duration in conſuming that Stubble, for then it could never have been conſumed; for that which had been burning an infinite time could never be burnt, no not ſo much as any part of it; for if it had burned part after part, the whole muſt needs be abſumed in a portion of time: neither need we labour this, for we ſee that the Fire conſumes Stubble or other combuſtible matter in a ſhort portion of time; and ſince if we talk of an Eternity of the World, or of any thing in it, we muſt in common reaſon ſuppoſe it to be ſuch as now it is, we muſt neceſſarily allow the like properties, activities, natures and operations to things as we find them now have. And ſince we ſee that all bodily alterations are effected in certain portions of meaſured duration or time, we cannot upon any reaſonable account allow to thoſe alterations an infinite antecedent duration; but if any Body or Thing in that imaginary period of Eternity allotted to it had any ſuch alterations as we ſee now are incident to them, they could not poſſibly be of an eternal duration no more than they are now, for that were wholly to alter the ſtate of the World and of thoſe things that are in it. 5. And conſequently whatſoever thing it is that hath or can have an eternal being à parte ante, muſt perſiſt in that eternal being without any change, alteration or corruption; or if it have any alteration or corruption, the firſt alteration, change or corruption that it can have, muſt be in time, and after an eternal, unchanged, unaltered eſtate precedaneous to ſuch alteration; for if we ſhould ſuppoſe it to be eternal, then of neceſſity that alteration or corruption which it hath, muſt be ſubſequent to that eternal ſtate which it had before it was altered or corrupted, and conſequently muſt have had a perſiſtence in that unaltered, uncorrupted eſtate infinite Ages before ſuch alteration or corruption: If it were eternally altered, or eternally corrupted, then it was eternally, and eternally was not; it was eternally without alteration, and eternally altered: The thing muſt be before it can be altered or corrupted, and conſequently its alteration and corruption muſt be ſubſequent and after that exiſtence which it had unaltered or uncorrupted; and conſequently the alteration and corruption muſt needs be younger than that eſtate which it had unaltered or uncorrupted, and conſequently cannot be eternal.

Again, we cannot by any means ſuppoſe that any commencement of alteration in the firſt moment or degree of it could be coeternal to it; for (as is before evident) then that alteration would of neceſſity be perfected within the like portion of time as the like alteration is perfected: Now ſuppoſe it were a corruptive alteration, it may be that is perfected in the ſpace of three or ſix months from its firſt inception, the conſequence whereof would be, that the like alteration of that eternal alterable or corruptible Body, if it began with the thing it ſelf, would be perfected in the like ſpace, viz. ſix months: And ſhould that perfected alteration fall within the compaſs of Eternity, or out of it? If it ſhould, then the thing was eternally unaltered and uncorrupted, and was yet eternally altered or corrupted; was eternally, and yet that Eternity was but a ſpace of ſix months, for ſo long only it had its being uncorrupted: If the alteration or corruption was not eternally perfected, but perfected in time, then an addition of ſix months the more of that alteration added unto a finite duration or time ſucceeding after ſuch alteration, ſhould make it infinite and eternal. 6. And yet the ſuppoſition of an eternal ſtate of any corruptible or alterable Being, in a ſtate of incorruption or unalteration, were utterly to change the very nature of things; and to give them an eternal ſtate, we muſt be forced to gratifie them with a nature not only preter-natural to what they had, but quite of a diſtinct nature: For the purpoſe; That man that is even upon the intrinſick conſtitution of his nature diſſolvible, muſt by being in an eternal duration continue immortal, unalterable, and not for a year, or a million or two of years, but for an eternal duration antecedent to his diſſolution: Nay, it is inconceptible how any ſuch man that hath ſtood the ſhock of an eternal duration without corruption or alteration, ſhould after be corrupted or altered: from any internal principle of corruption or alteration it could not be, for then he could never have ridden out an eternal period; but it muſt be, if at all, by the power of a more powerful Being than himſelf, that muſt violently de novo introduce his change and diſſolution. The Suppoſition therefore of an eternal exiſtence of any thing corruptible, is to alter their very nature, and make that to be incorruptible which is corruptible. And to ſuppoſe that imaginary eternal ſtate of things corruptible, to be utterly of another nature, kind, and condition than what we now ſee them to be, which is an unreaſonable Suppoſition, unworthy of an admirer of Nature, which ſhould be conſtant in his Suppoſition, and yet is the neceſſary conſequence of the granting of an Eternity of corruptible Beings. But particular Inſtances of the ſeveral kinds of alterations and corruptions of things either ab intrinſeco or ab extrinſeco, will make the thing more plain.

1. Touching things alterable or corruptible from an intrinſecal Cauſe, as Vegetables, Animals, Men. If any Vegetables were eternal, as an Oak, or an Elm, then ſome Oak was eternal; if it were, then if it were of the ſame nature as Oaks are now, it was firſt a ſlender Plant, and then gradually grew to his juſt dimenſions, perhaps in two hundred years, and in about two hundred years more decayed, and was corrupted to duſt; ſo that his duration exceeded not four hundred years, and in that period of time he grew perchance from an inch in diameter to ſix foot in diameter, and from a foot high to a hundred foot high: Theſe alterations and augmentations were gradual and ſucceſſive; he was not in the ſame moment one inch and ſix foot in the diameter, nor in the ſame moment was a Plant and diſſolved and turned to duſt; and yet if this Oak were eternal in all this portion of his duration, he muſt be eternally one inch in diameter, and yet eternally ſix foot in diameter; eternally one foot high, and yet eternally a hundred foot high, he muſt have eternally been a Plant, eternally a Tree, and yet eternally corrupted; his duration muſt have laſted but four hundred years, and yet he muſt be eternal, though his firſt being were but four hundred years before utter diſſolution: And yet it is moſt certain that this Tree could not have been eternal; for being but of four hundred years ſtanding, ſomewhat muſt have anteceded that period, and ſo ſomewhat more ancient than what had been eternal.

But let us ſuppoſe this eternal Oak had not been bound to the laws of duration of other Oaks, but to have laſted eternally, and probably would have laſted to this day, had not external force either violently or accidentally corrupted or deſtroyed him; yet did this Oak ever grow bigger or taller than what he once was, or did he put off his leaves in the Winter, and gather others in the Spring? Did he put forth new branches, which before he had not? If he did none of theſe things, ſurely he was not a vegetable Being, he was not like thoſe Oaks that are now growing, but quite of another nature, and we have nothing to do with him, he is a perfect ſtranger to this World: If it did grow from leſſer to greater, and did put forth new branches, certainly the increment could not be eternal, but muſt be done gradually and ſucceſſively, and from one degree of bigneſs to another; and ſince that augmentation could never be of an infinite procedure, but being ſucceſſive, we muſt come to the beginning of that increaſe within the meaſure of ſuch a portion of time as we now find ſufficient for ſuch a production or increaſe, it may be two or three hundred years, which being but a finite duration can never be eternal: And this neceſſary Suppoſition of a ſucceſſive alteration or increaſe, utterly deſtroys the poſſibility of an eternal duration in any thing capable of ſuch alterations; 1. Becauſe it neceſſarily ſuppoſeth ſomewhat precedent to that ſtate wherein it is, namely, a precedent alteration of it, whereby it is now become what it now is, and what before it was not; ſo that it had ſomewhat before its preſent ſtate which ſtateth it to be what it now is, namely, that alteration or augmentation which ſo preceded its preſent ſtate, and conſequently that preſent ſtate wherein it is, could not be eternal, for it had ſomewhat before it. 2. Becauſe that very alteration that anteceded that ſtate which it hath cannot poſſibly be eternal, but muſt be perfected within a certain portion of time deſtined to it, and conſequently muſt have beginning within the compaſs of a determinate time, and cannot be eternally moving to its accompliſhment.

And as this Inſtance gives the impoſſibility of an eternal Exiſtence in any thing eſſentially alterable or corruptible, ſo it would be poſſibly more conſpicuous in the Contemplation of the Humane Nature: If we ſhould ſuppoſe a Man to have been eternal, Was that Man ever an Embryo, a Child, a Youth, a ripe Aged Man? Did he grow from a ſmaller ſtature to a greater, had he viciſſitudes of temperaments and diſtempers, did he eat, digeſt, &c. If he did not, then thoſe eternal Men were not of the ſame Make with the Men that are now, but quite another thing, which we know not what it was, or where to find it: But if he had all thoſe changes he could not be eternal, he ſhould be eternally a Child and eternally a Man, eternally young and eternally old, yea eternally living and yet eternally dead; for all theſe muſt fall within the compaſs of Eternity.

2. But let us now conſider how the Caſe falls out in relation to alterations and corruptions occaſioned ab extrinſeco, and we ſhall find, 1. That as the World is framed, and as thoſe that ſuppoſe it eternal, muſt ſuppoſe it to have been always ſo framed, there muſt neceſſarily be inceſſant mutations, alterations, generations, and corruptions by the invaſion and juxta-poſition of contrary Natures, Agents, Patients, Qualities, Motions; the Earth naturally dry is moiſtned by the vicinity of the Water, and again dryed by the heat of the Sun; the Earth obſtructs the fluidity of the Water by mingling its groſſer parts with it; all things as it were in continual motion and agitation, and mutual preying as it were one upon another; which as neceſſarily occaſioneth mutations, alterations, generations and corruptions, as the very intrinſecal diſſolubility of the natures of mixt Bodies. 2. And as we find this now, ſo we muſt ſuppoſe that this hath been always ſo ſince the World had a being; unleſs we ſhall ſuppoſe, as I have often ſaid, another kind of World than what we ſee: And although we are not acquainted with the ſtate of things out of, or beyond this ſublunary World, in which we ſee this viciſſitude of alterations, yet whether there may not be ſome ſuch mutations in the Ethereal World, we know not; but there may be ſuch, though we cannot certainly know them. 3. And yet it is moſt certain, that it is impoſſible that any thing that is capable of theſe mutations and changes can be eternally under them, but muſt of neceſſity, if it were eternal, conſiſt in ſuch a ſtate of fixedneſs and permanency that were not obnoxious to theſe changes. 4. And ſince it is not poſſible, for the inferior World at leaſt, to be de facto one moment of time without theſe changes and variations, alterations, generations and corruptions; which, as before, are not at all conſiſtent with an eternal duration à parte ante, of that that is ſo ſubject to changes, we have juſt reaſon to deny and diſeſteem this imaginary Eternity can belong at leaſt to the ſublunary World. The late Author of a Book De Aetate Mundi hath given us an Inſtance herein, that if it would hold, we need not go farther; namely, That the great Rocks in the Sea are yet many of them eminently viſible to this day, and yet daily experience ſhews us that thoſe Rocks are gradually diminiſhed by the beating of the Sea againſt them; which had they been ſo dealt with from Eternity, though they loſt but one grain in a million of millions of years, they would not have been, but would have been conſumed an indefinite time long ſince elapſed: But the Suppoſition fails, becauſe it may be that theſe Rocks have at leaſt viciſſitudes of increaſe and diminution by the very alluvion of the Sea, or, which ſeems far more eaſily ſuppoſed, that the Earth and Seas might notwithſtanding have been eternal, but yet the Sea might not have kept the ſame Channel where theſe Rocks now are, from eternity, but gained it in time; the Ancients telling us that the great Atlantick Sea was for the moſt part of it anciently a Continent, or at leaſt a great Iſland as big as Europe and Aſia, and after ſwallowed up and corroded into that vaſt Sea called the Atlantick Ocean, leaving behind it only thoſe reliques now called the Canary Iſlands: I will therefore take my Inſtance in ſome other things.

1. It is evident that divers Minerals are bred in the Earth from an earthy conſiſtence, by the heat of the Sun and other concurrent cauſes ſucceſſively, as may appear to any man's obſervation touching Coals, Rocks, eſpecially of Stone, which from a ſandy kind of Earth gradually concoct into Free-ſtone, when they were before Earth, as may be ſeen in many Quarries by thoſe pieces of unconcocted Earth not yet perfectly digeſted into Stone: If the Body of the Earth were eternal, either theſe concretions were alſo as eternal as the Earth gradually and ſucceſſively digeſted into theſe concretions, or elſe the Earth muſt have had an eternal permanency in that ſtate of ſimple natural Earth, without any ſuch concretions or alterations in it: If we ſhall ſay the latter, we make the Earth another thing than what in truth it now is, which by the aid of the Sun hath theſe concretions and alterations even by a kind of neceſſity of Nature wrought in it: And beſides, if in that portion of eternal duration wherein the Earth and Sun were in that very ſame natural ſtate wherein they now are; the one active, piercing, and digeſtive by its heat; the other paſſive, receptive, and ſtored with materials for ſuch a production. What ſhould hinder but that there ſhould be ſuch production gradually and ſucceſſively prepared, and at length generated by the conjunction of theſe active and paſſive Principles.

And yet if it be duly conſidered, ſuppoſing the Sun and the Earth to be both eternal, the Earth and its parts muſt of neceſſity perſiſt in an eternal unchangeable ſtate in that period of Eternity antecedent to the firſt alteration thereof to any ſuch production: For if the production of theſe Minerals ſhould be eternal, and conſequently infinitely diſtant from us, the productions muſt be eternal, and yet there muſt neceſſarily antecede thoſe productions a ſucceſſive and gradual alteration of thoſe parts of the Earth which were to be moulded in ſucceſſion of time to Coals, or Stone, or Minerals: And though perchance that alteration might take up a long preparation and diſpoſition, yet it could not be eternal, but muſt be abſolved, though in a long, yet in finite time; and conſequently the Earth, if eternal, muſt be before that preparation or alteration, and muſt have continued in an eternal ſtate, deſtitute of ſuch alteration or preparation, and in an eternal diſpoſition thereunto; which yet had been to ſuppoſe the Earth in that eternal period quite deſtitute of that mutation that upon the Suppoſition of the agency of the Sun had been connatural to it. So that upon the whole matter it ſeems plain, That neither ſucceſſive natural Beings, nor corporeal Beings, that are corruptible or neceſſarily ſubject to alteration, either from an intrinſick Principle or from an extrinſick natural Cauſe neceſſarily contiguous or approximate to it in ſituation or virtue, cannot be eternal; which will deprive the greateſt part of the ſublunary World at leaſt of that poſſibility, and muſt leave only ſuch parts of the viſible Univerſe as are incorruptible, unalterable, and unſucceſſive (if any ſuch be) capable of this priviledge of the very poſſibility of an eternal exiſtence à parte ante: And conſequently the whole Univerſe cannot be eternal.

It remains then, they who aſſert the Eternity of the World muſt content themſelves with ſuch parts thereof as are capable of that duration. And accordingly there ſeem to have been three Opinions, which although they aſſume not the Aſſertion of the Eternity of the whole World, yet they endeavour to come as near to it as they can; which I ſhall diſtinctly ſet down and examin.

1. The firſt Opinion is of ſuch, that although they ſuppoſe the ſublunary World not to be eternal in its Frame and Conſtitution, yet they aſſert the Matter thereof eternal, though undigeſted, and not perfected till afterwards: But yet the Celeſtial or Ethereal World, the Stars and Planets they will have eternal, and that theſe were uſed as the great Engins in the ſubſequent formation of the inferior • r ſublunary Wor • d.

Touching the Eternity of Matter, whether Celeſtial or Sublunary, I mean not in this place to meddle; but as to the Suppoſition of the eternal exiſtence of the Celeſtial or Ethereal World, this ſhall be all I ſhall ſay: 1. We are not acquainted with the Conſtitution of them, and whether they are in their nature corruptible or ſubject to alterations; if they are ſuch, they are as equally uncapable of an eternal exiſtence as the ſublunary World. 2. But ſuppoſe them to have a radical incorruptibility and immutability in their natures, yet their Motion cannot be eternal upon the Reaſons before given. 3. And therefore though they are a goodly Fabrick, yet they are not in a ſtate of Permanency of ſo great uſe, beauty and perfection, as in a ſtate of Motion, which is a great part of their excellency, and that which accommodates the ſeveral parts thereof one to another, and all to the advantage and good of the inferior World; and therefore it ſeems not probable that they ſhould have an eternal exiſtence in Reſt and Permanence, and afterwards in a proceſs or period of time be endued with that which is their great perfection, namely their Motion, which neither was nor could be eternal: It rather ſeems more agreeable to the nature of the thing, and to the Divine Wiſdom, whoſe Works are full of wiſdom, excellence, and perfection, to reſpite the Fabrick till it were capable of its moſt uſeful and beautiful perfection, namely Motion; which muſt either be natural to them, and then it were marvellous they ſhould yet enjoy an infinite duration deſtitute of what was natural to them, and yet not capable to be enjoyed by them in an eternal duration à parte ante: Or if it were adventitious from the immediate power of God, or by the inſtrumentality of Intelligences, yet ſurely it was foreſeen by him that knew all his Works from the beginning: and therefore was not likely to ordain an eternal conſiſtence of thoſe Bodies to which he intended to give Motion, their great perfection, not ſooner than time: And therefore though the Heavenly Bodies were admitted capable of an eternal Permanency, yet it is not probable they had their Being before, or at leaſt not ſo long before their Motion.

2. The ſecond Opinion is of thoſe that although they allow not the Mundus aſpectabilis to be eternal, yet do ſuppoſe that beſides that Eternal Generation of the Second, and the Eternal Proceſſion of the Third Perſon of the Sacred Trinity, Almighty God eternally created a World of Intelligences, whereunto he might and did communicate the emanations of his Bounty and Benignity, and that in the beginning of Time he Created this Mundus aſpectabilis which we ſee, for the farther communication of his Bounty and Goodneſs; and this they ſuppoſe more congenious and ſuitable to the Order of things, and of his own Goodneſs and the communication thereof, than to ſuppoſe the Creation of a material World either eternally or quaſi per ſaltum, or at the ſame time with the Creation of thoſe purer Beings, who had a greater ſimilitude and proximity to his own moſt Divine and Spiritual Nature. This though it might poſſibly be ſo, yet we are without any ſufficient Evidence that it was ſo, and ſuch Conjectures of things without our knowledge, or thoſe media that we are capable to exerciſe for the acqueſt thereof, are uncertain and endleſs: Upon ſuch conjectural Congruities the Platoniſts had their Dii ex Deo, the Manichees their Aeones, and Origen his Mundus Animarum: and therefore I leave it as a Conjecture.

3. The third Opinion is of thoſe who though they ſuppoſe the World not to be eternal, and perchance think with reaſon enough that the duration of Eternity à parte ante is ſuch as is only competible to the Eternal God, and not communicable to any Created Being, at leaſt ſuch as is in its own nature either corruptible, alterable, or compounded: yet to the end that they may carry the Communication of the Divine Goodneſs and Benignity as far as is poſſible, are not contented to ſuppoſe the World to be ſempiternal or eternal à parte post, or to be as ancient as the Sacred Scriptures inform us, but will carry up the Creation of the World to an immenſe antiquity, long before Six Thouſand years, and thereby they think they do at once ſalve the large Accounts which the Babylonians and Egyptians and Chineſes give of the duration of their own Kingdoms and Hiſtories, and alſo do, as they think, ſatisfie at leaſt in a great meaſure that immenſe Benignity of the glorious God, whom they declare not only infinitely Good in himſelf, but neceſſitated by the perfection of his nature to comunicate his Goodneſs ad ultimum poſſe to things ad extra.

This Suppoſition of theirs ſeems to be grounded upon two matters which are as I think miſtakes, or at leaſt do no way appear to be evidently true; namely, 1. That Almighty God, though he be by them admitted a free and intellectual Agent, is neceſſitated ab extrinſeco from the Perfection of his nature to do good ad extra, ad ultimum poſſe, which ſeems untrue. 2. And it ſeems likewiſe untrue, that if he were under that intrinſecal neceſſity, yet he were thereby bound to make the World ſooner than we ſuppoſe he made it: For as to the fabulous protractions of the age of the World by the Egyptians or others, they are uncertain idle Traditions, whereof they have no evidence but from the Impoſtures of their fabulous Prieſts.

Touching the firſt of theſe, namely, the Intrinſick Neceſſity of Almighty God to do good ad extra, ad ultimum poſſe, this is that Opinion upon which ſome have built their Hypotheſis of the Eternity of the World, and others, driven from that Hypotheſis by the abſurdities that accompany it, build their imagination though not of the Eternity, yet of a prodigious Antiquity of the World. But it ſeems to me, That although Almighty God being infinitely and eſſentially Good, is neceſſarily carried to will and delight in that his own infinite Goodneſs; yet in his acts of Benignity ad extra he is not neceſſitated by his own Perfection to act ad ultimum poſſe, but although his own Nature be Benign and Bountiful, the ſeaſons, degrees and meaſures, and other circumſtances of its Emanations are guided and directed by the freedom of his own Will.

And the reaſon thereof is evident, namely, Becauſe all the Good that is without, or that is poſſibly communicable by him to any thing without him, is finite, and cannot be infinite; and therefore he cannot be carried to it by an infinite deſire and intention, and yet ſuch it muſt be, if it be ad ultimum poſſe.

And if it ſhould be ſo, there would be infinite abſurdities follow which cannot be ſolved; as for inſtance, That either this preſent World muſt be actually of an infinite extenſion, or that there muſt be either infinite Worlds, or at leaſt as many Worlds as is poſſible to be by the power of Omnipotence. That he hath made ſome Beings of that perfection, that Omnipotence it ſelf cannot make them one grain perfecter, that they are but in the very next degree of perfection to himſelf, and cannot have the addition of one grain more to the excellence of their nature; that the Univerſe is ſo perfect, omnibus numeris, that it is not poſſible for Omnipotence it ſelf to add to it, no nor to alter it in one jot or tittle, either to make it better or worſe, or otherwiſe than it is; nay he cannot, pro arbitrio or dominion make one ſpire of Graſs, or one Fly, or one Worm more or leſs than he hath made, becauſe he hath made it as good as is poſſible to make it, and he is under the neceſſary obligation of his own indiſpenſable Perfection to make and keep it juſt as he hath made it: That the whole Ocean of Omnipotence and infinite Goodneſs is already exhauſted in the Work of the Univerſe, and hath nothing of good left that he can do more. Theſe are the conſequences of this Poſition, That the Divine Will is neceſſitated by the Perfection of his Nature to do good ad ultimum poſſe.

And as theſe abſurdities evince the untruth of the Aſſertion, ſo it is apparent in the very Frame of the Univerſe it ſelf and the integrals thereof, that it is untrue: For upon this Suppoſition admitted, there could not be a diſparity in the Natures of things, but every thing ſhould be conſtituted in that ſtate of being that might be capable of as much of the Divine Beneficence as it were poſſible for God to communicate. And if it be ſaid that this diſparity of things in their degrees of ſpecifical or individual perfection contributes to the beauty and convenience of the Univerſe, which is the primary Object of the Divine Beneficence, this ſalves not the Objection; becauſe it is poſſible that many things might have a greater meaſure of ſpecifical Perfection with great advantage to themſelves and to the Univerſe alſo. But ſuppoſe this inequality of degrees of ſpecifical or individual Perfection might nevertheleſs contribute to the advantage of the Univerſe conſidered collectively, yet do we not ſee that daily there are many deficiencies even in individuals, which might have been ſupplied with exceeding benefit to themſelves, and with advantage to the Univerſe? Are there not among men ſome that want the integrity of their Limbs, ſome that want their Senſes, Memories, Underſtandings; ſome that are extremely vicious, and unjuſt, and degenerate even from the common Principles of Humanity, many that are diſeaſed and infirm, many good men of ſhort and difficult lives; and might not all theſe have the integrity of their Bodies and Minds proportionate to the perfection of their ſpecifical Nature; be virtuous, ſound, long-lived, with advantage to themſelves and mankind, and yet without detriment to the Univerſe? And therefore ſurely ſuch they would have been, if the glorious God were neceſſitated to be Beneficent ad ultimum poſſe, unleſs we ſhould preſumptuouſly aſſert an impotence in him to rectifie theſe things.

2. But if we ſhould ſuppoſe this to be true concerning the Divine Obligation or Neceſſity, let us now examin what the making of the World a million of years elder than it, is would do in the buſineſs.

1. It is true, though we ſay the World is not, cannot be eternal à parte ante, yet it is certain that either upon the nature of the thing or the part of the Almighty and the abſolute power of God, without relation to the determination of his Will, there can be no determinate moment, or tempus ſignatum imaginarium, within the bounds or limits (if I may ſo ſpeak) of antecedent infinite duration, but God might have made it ſooner than he made it; and if a year ſooner than he made it, he might have made it a thouſand years ſooner than that.

2. Conſequently, if the World be not eternal, it is impoſſible to aſſign any time for its making it which anſwered the ultimum poſſe of Almighty God for the making it; and therefore if we ſhould ſuppoſe the World to have been made as many millions of years before it was made, as there have been minutes ſince it was made, it could not anſwer the ultimum poſſe of Almighty God, nor anſwer that imaginary Obligation or Neceſſity of his nature to do good ad ultimum poſſe, for ſtill it might have been made before any hora ſignata.

3. Conſequently the time of the Creation of the World, if it were on this ſide an eternal period, could neither be determined by his want of Power, nor by his neceſſitated Benignity agere ad ultimum poſſe, for in that indefinite time within the limits of Eternity no time can be aſſigned before which he could not have made the World, though it be admitted it could not be eternal.

4. Conſequently there could be nothing that could determin the time or period wherein the World was to have been made, but the abſolute Divinum beneplacitum; there could be nothing without him to determin it, for nothing was till he made it, nor any thing but his own Will within him that could determin it: for his power and goodneſs were undetermined to do it ſooner or later, ſince no time could be aſſigned for the doing of it but it might be done ſooner.

And when all is done, his Beneficence, nor the good which the created Beings might receive from that Beneficence, had had no imaginable advance or enlargement, if the World had been created millions of millions of years before it was; and that upon theſe plain evident Reaſons.

1. Becauſe though the World had indeed been at this hour ancienter, and laſted longer, if it had been created a million of years ſooner, yet the future Eternity or Sempiternity of the World being of all hands admitted, though the Eternity à parte ante be denied, there will be a future infinity for the emanation of the Divine Goodneſs and Beneficence to his Creatures.

2. Conſidering the nature of the Beings themſelves that partake of the Divine Beneficence, there is no advance at all to them by receiving it ſooner or later: If Plato had been a million of years before he in truth was, and had lived his proportion of eighty years, he had taſted no more of the Divine Beneficence than if he had lived as he did about two thouſand years ſince.

3. Neither is there any difference in reſpect of the ever-glorious God, for he received no acceſs of happineſs by the Creation of the World, nor ſtood at all in need of it: And if he might be imagined to have received any contentment in it, yet he had an eternal proſpect of all things as if they had been really made eternally: And beſides, if the World had been myriads of millions of years ſooner than it was, yet it was ſtill infinitely ſhort of an eternal duration; Almighty God had been an infinite duration before without that World, which had it been made millions of years before it was, yet had not held any proportion to that infinite duration that preceded.

And whatſoever hath been formerly ſaid againſt the Eternity of this World doth equally conclude againſt an eternal being of any World antecedent to this, much more againſt an eternal ſucceſſion of infinite Worlds, either of which can have no certainty, nor have any evidence or probability; ſo that as there cannot be attributed an eternal duration à parte ante to any one ſuch ſuppoſed pre-exiſting World, ſo much leſs to a ſucceſſion of Worlds.

The very ſame Arguments that conclude againſt the poſſibility of eternal Motion, or the eternal ſucceſſions of Generation and Corruption, or of ſucceſſive Individuals of Mankind do as effectually conclude againſt an eternal ſucceſſion of infinite Worlds, and therefore I ſhall ſpare the repetition of them.

The Arguments which I have before uſed are ſuch, as though at the firſt view they ſeem intricate, yet they have ſtrength of evidence in them, and ſuch as are accommodate to the nature of the thing which requires Arguments of ſuch a nature; and thoſe Arguments that are more experimental and obvious to ſenſe, though they are more eaſie to be apprehended, yet are more eaſie to be evaded by the Aſſertors of the Eternity of the World.

In the before-mentioned Book De Aetate Mundi two experimental Arguments are brought againſt the Eternity of the World, upon which the Author lays ſome weight.

1. That if the World were eternal, by the continual fall and wearing of Waters all the protuberances of the Earth would infinite Ages ſince have been levelled, and the Superficies of the Earth rendred plain, no Mountains, no Vallies, no inequalities would be therein, but the Superficies thereof would have been as level as the Superficies of the Water.

2. That if this World had been eternal there would have been no Rocks appearing in the Seas above the Water, whereof there are very many viſible; for the motion and agitation of the Water doth wear and eat off gradually the roots and other parts thereof, as is viſible to our obſervation; ſome whereof have their roots ſo corroded by the Water, that they are ready to fall, and others have apparently by that means been either waſted or decayed, that now they are not extant which in ſome mens memory have been ſtanding; and if the bredth of a Barleycorn had been conſumed in a million of years, there had been nothing of them left.

That theſe things are true in fact, and that the reaſon why many of theſe effects are apparent to us to be as they are, is becauſe that theſe Rocks and theſe Protuberances have not been eternal, may bp well attributed to that novitas eſſendi, that finite period wherein they have continued, is very probable and evident to him that is ſatisfied otherwiſe, that the World had a beginning, I eaſily grant: But he that aſſerts the Eternity of the World will find out eaſie evaſions of theſe ſenſible Arguments: They will tell us, and with truth enough, that in a great tract even of a finite duration the Earth muſt have and hath had great mutations: That by the eruption of Bituminous and Sulphureous Vapours, and the firing thereof, theſe protuberances of Mountains and Hills may be made, and have been made in many parts: That as Warts or Wenns growing in our Hands are thruſt up by the humors miniſtred by the extremity of the orifice of ſome Capillary Vein, and increaſe; ſo in the great Body of the Earth ſuch protuberances may be thruſt out and gradually increaſed, though not ſo eaſily perceptible in one Age, and by this means there may be a continued ſupply of what is ſucceſſively abraded from them by decurſion of Waters: That Matter is never loſt or annihilated: That what is decayed by that decurſion of Waters is in ſome meaſure ſupplied by the terrene faeces which that Water brings with it: That by continued viciſſitudes the Earth is repaired by the inſenſible deſcent of Atoms of Matter raiſed in others places, the Atmoſphere being evermore filled with little particles and concretes of Matter which are unceſſantly diſcharged upon the Earth, and as unceſſantly again ſupplied in the Air by the more groſs and terreſtrial parts of thoſe Vapours that are raiſed principally from the Sea and watriſh places, by means whereof the Water juſtly pays in proceſs of time what is borrowed from the Earth by a perpetual circulation. And that hence it comes to paſs that in proceſs of time, even to our view, Channels that were deep and broad, yet by a little time of dryneſs grow narrow and ſhallow; that thoſe Mountains, whoſe chief ſubſtance is Rock, become cloathed with a ſuperficial Mantle of Earth and Mould; that thoſe places, which were formerly filled with Wood, have buried the fallen Trees three, four, or five foot deep in the ground, by an accretion or cover of Earth, derived to them ſometimes by Alluvions or Floods, ſometimes and moſt ordinarily by the deſcent of thoſe Terreſtrial Particles, that are drawn up together with watry Vapours, and either together with thoſe Waters, or after arefaction thereof in the Air, diſcharged upon the Earth, which doth reparare deperditum.

And as to thoſe Rocks in the Sea, they will alſo tell us, that the viciſſitudes of the Sea and Land in a long proceſs of time, much more in an eternal duration, are very many and various: Sometimes that becomes Land which was once Sea, as appears in that part of Egypt thorough which Nilus runs, long ſince obſerved by Ariſtotle, and before him by Herodotus; and even in our memory great quantities of Land are now firm and habitable, where Ships anciently rode; and on the other ſide many parts are become Sea, which were once firm Land: They inſtance in that traditional vaſt Iſland in the Atlantick Ocean, which is drowned, and hath left no Remains of it ſelf, but thoſe Iſlands called the Canary Iſlands; but whether that tradition be true or not, it is very probable, that by particular Inundations the Face and State of the Terreſtrial Globe, by great viciſſitudes, is much changed. And therefore though they ſuppoſe the Terreſtrial Globe Eternal, yet the Earth and Water hath not eternally kept the ſame poſition or ſite that now it hath: And therefore the Sea, ſo often (at leaſt in an Eternal Period) ſhifting its Channel, hath not eternally waſhed the ſame Rocks that now it doth, but after an indeterminate and vaſt uncertain Period, it may be of ten or twenty thouſand years, leaves that Channel which before it had, and gives thoſe Rocks that it waſted opportunity to recruit again, and then perchance after a like vaſt Period of Time viſits the ſame Channel again; and therefore though the World might be Eternal, the alluvion of the Sea upon thoſe Rocks might not be eternally continued, but interpolated. And though the Earth be not animated with a Senſible Soul, yet it is poſſible that it may be a great Immortal Vegetable, which may reproduce or increaſe Rocks or Mountains in various viciſſitudes of vaſt Periods of Duration. And this they think very probably to be collected by the obſervation of things, and yet if it be not to be proved to be thus, yet thus poſſibly it may be, which is ſufficient to elude the force of thoſe ſenſible Arguments.

And the truth is, theſe Solutions do evade the edge and concludency of thoſe Phyſical Arguments, and therefore much weight is not be laid upon them, but upon thoſe of another nature, whereof in the foregoing part of this Chapter.

And there is no way to encounter the Solutions that theſe Men do, or may give of theſe two laſt Arguments, but to have recourſe to what hath been before ſaid, namely, that ſince the Solutions are grounded upon a Suppoſition of Eternal ſucceſſive Motions, whereby by viciſſitudes of long uncertain Periods of the Decays and Reparations of the inferior World, and by eternal viciſſitudes of the tranſlation of the Earth and Seas to ſeveral ſites either by interpolated, or ſucceſſive Motions. And ſince by what hath been before proved, there is an utter impoſſibility in Reaſon and Nature of any Eternity à parte ante of continued or interpolated Motion, there is likewiſe an impoſſibility in Nature that there ſhould be this eternal viciſſitude of decays and repairs of the Earth, or ſhifting of ſtations between the Earth and the Sea. And thus we are at laſt driven to reſort to thoſe though more obſcure yet more concludent Arguments againſt the Eternity of the World which are mentioned in the beginning of this Chapter, or ſuch as are of the like nature, ſome whereof will be hereafter farther conſidered.

Averroes, who was a ſtrong Aſſertor of the Eternity of the World, inſiſteth upon a Reaſon which is witty, but upon a miſtake of the nature of eternal duration, viz. That if the World were not eternal, but created in ſome certain Epocha or Period, it could never have been at all, becauſe an eternal duration muſt neceſſarily have anteceded the firſt production of the World; and that Suppoſition excludeth the poſſibility of ſuch its production, and is contradictory to that ſuppoſed novitas eſſendi of the World; for, infinitum non potest pertranſiri, an infinite duration pre-exiſting to the Worlds production could never be paſſed through, ſo no poſſible acceſſion to the firſt exiſtence of the World through the vaſt compaſs of a pre-exiſting infinite duration.

But this reaſoning of his is inſufficient, becauſe it takes in but a portion of Eternity which is à parte ante, whereas that Maxim is to be applied to the full and entire compaſs of Eternity or Infinitude. For if that Argument ſhould hold, neither Averroes nor Plato, nor any man elſe could have been born in the World, but muſt have had an eternal exiſtence upon the very ſame reaſon that Infinitum non potest pertranſiri; for it is certain that as well an infinite duration anteceded the Birth of Plato or Averroes, as it muſt do the production of the World if admitted to have novitas eſſendi.

And thus much touching this preparatory Diſquiſition concerning the Eternity of the World in general.

CAP. IV. Concerning the Origination of Mankind; and whether the ſame were Eternal, or had a Beginning.

IF the World it ſelf were not eternal, this Diſquiſition touching the Eternity of Mankind were needleſs, becauſe decided in that deciſion.

Therefore our Inquiry touching the Origination of Mankind, and whether it had or had not a Beginning, is in this place by way of Suppoſition or Admiſſion, namely, Whether admitting the great Integrals at leaſt of the Univerſe, the Heavens and Heavenly Bodies, the Elementary World were or at leaſt might be eternal; whether yet Mankind were, or might be eternal? And the Queſtion poſſibly will be much of the ſame kind, with relation to other at leaſt perfect Animals and Vegetables, yea and all mixed or compound Bodies; for we ſhall eaſily find, that admitting thoſe greater Integrals of the World were eternal, yet whatſoever is ſaid againſt the Eternity of Mankind will bear as hard againſt the Eternity of perfect Animals, and almoſt of all compound Bodies.

And although for the more orderly diſcuſſion of this Enquiry concerning the Original of Mankind, I muſt gratia argumenti, and according to the Method propoſed, admit the Eternity of the great Integrals of the World; yet it will appear upon a due examination to be ſuch an Admiſſion as muſt in a great meaſure be contradicted in the debate of what is propounded to be proved, and the particular Reaſons againſt the Eternity of the Humane, Animal, or compounded Bodies will neceſſarily infer an impoſſibility, or intollerable abſurdity in the thing admitted. For inſtance:

To ſuppoſe an eternal exiſtence of the Heavenly Bodies and of the Elementary Bodies in the ſite and poſition in which they are, and to ſuppoſe them in an eternal reſt and unactivity, and without motion, action, paſſion, or perfection of the leſs noble by the more noble, were to ſuppoſe them eternally kept in a uſeleſs, needleſs, imperfect ſtate, for an immenſe, eternal duration, till the firſt moment of their being put into Motion.

Again, to ſuppoſe the Heavenly Bodies and their Motions and Influence, the Fiery Nature diſperſed through all the Sublunary World, with its activity and motion; and the Paſſive Nature of the more paſſive Elements to have been eternally in the World, and in all that eternal duration not to have produced mixed and compound Bodies in that eternal duration until ſuch a determinate point of it, were a thing ſtrangely repugnant in Nature, unleſs Almighty God were pleaſed to uphold their being, and yet ſuſpend their activity for an immenſe eternal period.

And yet to ſuppoſe that the compoſition of Bodies out of the Elements (by virtue of the activity and influx of Motion, out of Matter that muſt by that influx be prepared for compoſition) ſhould be as ancient as thoſe Heavens, or that Motion, that Fiery active Principle that muſt compound them out of thoſe ſimpler Bodies out of which they muſt be compounded (as all this muſt be, if they are eternal) is as impoſſible as any thing that can be thought of.

Again, if we ſhould reſolve the Eternity of the World into the Divine Will, which being neceſſitated by his goodneſs to do all the good he can, even ad ultimum poſſe, and upon that account made the World eternal, it were a ſtrange Suppoſition to imagin that this God ſhould give the great Integrals of the World an eternal being in eternal reſt, without Motion, which is their perfection; or if together with Beings he gave or indeed could give an eternal Motion, it were a ſtrange Suppoſition that he ſhould ſuſpend the efficacy of that Motion or Activity of the active Principles upon the paſſive (which both exiſted) for an infinite ſpace, and then after took off that ſuſpenſion: And yet farther, Suppoſe Almighty God did or could give an eternal being to thoſe Active or Paſſive Natures, and an eternal production of all mixed Bodies for an eternal duration but only Mankind (that is the nobleſt of all ſublunary Natures, and apparently the glory of the ſublunary World, and the very end of much of what is produced) I ſay, it is ſtrange that the inferior World ſhould be moved, agitated, and mingled into various mixed Bodies, and thus continue during the immenſity of an eternal duration without Mankind in the World, if Almighty God were neceſſitated by the Benignity of his nature to do the uttermoſt good he could; and if he could produce Man eternally, there was an equal neceſſity for him to do it as to produce a Tree or a Stone eternally.

All this tends but to this, That if in the debate of this matter we can find that Man either could not be, or was not eternally produced, we have the ſame reaſon to believe that no compound Nature was produced eternally, that no local Motion or corporeal Action was or could be from Eternity; and conſequently, that the Heavenly or Elementary Bodies were not from Eternity: The very ſingle clearing of this one thing, that Man was not eternal, breaks the whole Hypotheſis of the Eternity of the World, cuts aſunder all the connexion of evidence that is for it, renders the moſt conſiderable perfection of the World, its Motion, Action, and Operation impoſſible to be eternal, and the exiſtence of the Bulk, Poſition, and Fabrick thereof (unuſeful, imperfect, and deficient without its Motion, Activity, and Operations) improbable to be eternal. So that the Poſition which I endeavour to prove, namely, the Non-eternity of Mankind, doth in truth deſtroy the Suppoſition of the Eternity at leaſt of the inferior World. But this I only ſubjoyn by the way.

Concerning the Origination of Mankind, Cenſorinus in his golden Book de Die Natali, cap. 4. gives us the ſhort ſtate of the Queſtion, and the ſeveral Authors that hold either way; viz. Alii, ſemper homines fuiſſe, nec unquam niſi ex hominibus natos, atque eorum generi caput exordiumque nullum extitiſſe; alii, fuiſſe tempus cum homines non eſſent, & his ortum aliquando principiúmque natura tributum. Of the former Opinion he reckons Pythagoras Samius, Ocellus Lucanus, Archytas Tarentinus, Ariſtotle, Theophraſtus, Plato, Xenocrates, Dicaearchus, and others.

But for the more clear ſtating of the Inquiry, I ſhall reſume ſomewhat which hath been before ſaid touching the Queſtion before-going of the Eternity of the World, and ſome other things I ſhall add thereunto.

Firſt, it is to be obſerved, that the Queſtion is not here, Whether the ſucceſſive Individuals of Mankind may or ſhall be eternal à parte post, perpetuated to everlaſting by ſucceſſive generation. For although whether that ſhall be or no, depends upon the Divine Beneplacitum, yet there is no intrinſecal repugnance ex parte rei, but that as the World, and the Generations of Men in it have been thus long continued by the communication of the Divine Influence and Providence, ſo both the one and the other by the ſame Influence and Providence may be continued without end: And the reaſon is, becauſe ſuch a duration, and ſuch a ſucceſſive multiplication of Individuals imports only a potential infinitude, and ſuch as never ſhall nor can be completed into an actual infinitude of duration or number: So that as Number is potentially infinite by addition of new parts to it, which yet never ſhall nor can ariſe to a number actually infinite, becauſe after every period thereof there ſtill may be a farther acceſſion of a farther period, yet it never will nor can be actually infinite, becauſe ſtill there will or may be farther additional periods of duration to that which went before.

The Queſtion therefore reſts only as to that part of the imaginary Line of the duration of ſucceſſive Individuals that anteceded any given moment; or, Whether Mankind had any beginning of being, or were eternal or without beginning.

And touching this, there have been ſome that have affirmed Mankind to be without beginning or eternal; others that have affirmed that Mankind had a beginning.

Touching the latter of theſe, and the various Conjectures touching the manner of it, I ſhall write hereafter; at preſent I ſhall conſider and examin the former.

Again, of thoſe that have affirmed Mankind to be without beginning, and that maintain not only the Eternity of the reſt of the World, but alſo of Mankind; they are of two ſorts, viz. 1. Such as have affirmed that the ſucceſſive Generations of Men have been eternal, not only without any beginning, but without any firſt Parents of Mankind, and that they have been always geniti ex genitis. 2. Thoſe that have ſuppoſed that there were ſome firſt Parents of Mankind, which by a natural and univocal generation multiplied their Species, but yet that thoſe firſt Parents of Mankind were eternal Individuals, having an eternal exiſtence in their individual nature, and in relation to them the reſt of Mankind were geniti ex non genitis.

As to the former of theſe Opinions, they ſeem to be divided into theſe enſuing Parties or Opinions.

1. Such as think the ſucceſſive Generations of Men were eternally ſo, and independent upon any Efficient, and neceſſarily by the eternal eſtabliſhed courſe of Nature independent upon Almighty God, or any firſt Efficient of the Species.

2. Such as think the ſucceſſive Generations of Men were eternally ſo, but dependently upon Almighty God, yet as a neceſſary Effect produced by Almighty God as a neceſſary or natural Cauſe, as the Light is a coexiſtent Effect of the Sun.

3. Such as think the ſucceſſive Generations of Men were eternally ſo, but dependently upon God as an efficient voluntary Cauſe of them by eternal Creation, yet ſuppoſe that Will intrinſecally determined to ſuch an eternal Creation of Mankind by the indiſpenſable benignity and goodneſs of his nature.

4. Such as though they take Almighty God to be under neither of the former neceſſities, but an Agent purely voluntary, and determining his own Will by it ſelf only, and that deny the eternal ſucceſſions of humane Generations as to the fact; but yet affirm it poſſible that Almighty God might, if he pleaſed, have created the World and Mankind eternally.

Having thus ſtated the Opinions of the Aſſertors of the Eternity or Beginning of Humane Generations, I ſhall purſue this Method; 1. In this Chapter I ſhall conſider the poſſibility or impoſſibility of eternal Generations of Mankind, with relation to the four preceding Suppoſitions that aſſert it. 2. In the next Chapter I ſhall conſider the poſſibility or impoſſibility of any one Man or Woman eternally exiſting, from whom Mankind had their production by univocal generation. 3. I ſhall afterwards conſider of thoſe evidences of fact and probability, that de facto may ſeem to prove that Mankind had their beginning in time, and the Objections againſt it. 4. I ſhall then deſcend to the Conſideration of the various Suppoſitions of thoſe that have ſuppoſed a temporary Origination of Mankind.

At the preſent therefore I ſhall propound thoſe Reaſons that to me ſeem concludent, that although it might for Arguments ſake be ſuppoſed that ſome parts of univerſal Nature, namely, ſuch as are permanent and fixed, and not in fluxu, might be eternal; yet it is ſimply impoſſible that the Generations of Mankind can be eternal in any of the four foregoing ways.

And before I come to give my Reaſons, I ſhall premiſe two things.

1. In relation to the four foregoing Opinions, there ſeems to be this implyed in them: 1. The two former do moſt clearly take up the entire collection of Mankind and the Generations of them to be a meer natural Effect or Work, with this odds, that the former acknowledgeth no Efficient at all; the latter acknowledgeth God the Efficient or firſt Cauſe of the eternal World and the Generations of Mankind as a natural Cauſe: And conſequently they muſt needs hold, that as Man is now generated, ſo he was eternally ſo; and as he is now, ſo he always hath been; and the meaſure that we take of him now will fit to all thoſe innumerable Men that have been within the vaſt compaſs of Eternity: As Man is now a compound Body of the four Elements, ſo he always was; as he is now nine Months in utero matris, ſuch was the method and the mora of every Man's production; for the Effect is a natural uniform Effect, whether independent upon God as the Efficient thereof, or dependent upon Him as a Natural Effect. And therefore whatſoever is impoſſible to be attributed to Peter, or John, or any other individual Man, is incompetible to every Man in all this infinite Collection within the unlimited extent of Eternity.

But the two latter, though both ſuppoſe an eternity of Generations, and though in Eternity there cannot be ſuppoſed well a firſt, yet do what they can, if they ſuppoſe a production of Man by eternal Creation, they cannot deliver themſelves from theſe conſequences; 1. That there muſt be ſome Man or Men that had his or their beginning in ſome other way then other perſons had it, namely by Creation; for although Creation be an inſtantaneous act of the Divine Will and Power, it muſt of neceſſity be terminated in ſome individual determinate Perſon, and it cannot be quid vagum; the conſequence whereof muſt neceſſarily be, That if there were an eternal Creation of any Man or Men, they that were thus created had their production (if we may ſuppoſe ſuch a production) by a different way from the production of thoſe that had their being by generation; and herein this Suppoſition of the Origination of Humane Nature differs from the two former Suppoſitions. 2. And conſequently, that if the Creation of Man and of the reſt of the World muſt be in the ſame point, as I may call it, of Eternity, the reſt of the World or any part thereof could not be precedent to the Creation of Man; for then they have loſt what they contend for, namely, an eternal Creation of Man: If it were but one imaginable moment after, then the World might indeed have had an eternal exiſtence, but it would be impoſſible for Man to have had that eternal exiſtence by Creation, unleſs in the ſame firſt imaginary conceptible moment of Eternity (an expreſſion improper enough I confeſs) Man and the reſt of the World were concreated: The conſequence whereof, as I before ſaid, is, that thoſe Men muſt not as the former ſuppoſe all Individuals of Mankind had the ſame natural manner of production, for among the whole Collection ſome one or more had a ſupernatural manner of production, namely, by Creation.

2. This being premiſed concerning the different ſtates of the two former and two latter Opinions, ſomewhat I ſhall ſay in general touching the Reaſons I uſe againſt all theſe Suppoſitions: 1. In general, That that kind of reaſoning which reduceth the oppoſite Concluſion to ſomething that is apparently impoſſible or abſurd, is as much a Demonſtration in diſaffirmance of any thing that is affirmed as can poſſibly be in any caſe, if the Concluſion of the affirming party doth neceſſarily inferr an impoſſibility or abſurdity in the nature of the thing affirmed, it is a Demonſtration, Argumentum cum contradictione concluſionis; and ſuch will thoſe be which I ſhall bring. 2. Becauſe the former Suppoſitions touching the Eternity of Mankind, though they conclude in the ſame Aſſertion, yet becauſe they do it by ſeveral Suppoſitions, the Arguments that I ſhall uſe ſhall be of three natures; 1. Such as oppoſe in ſpecial the two firſt Aſſertions: 2. Such as eſpecially oppoſe the two laſt: 3. Such as in common oppoſe both.

1. The Argument that I uſe againſt the two firſt Suppoſitions is this, That it is evident to Experience and the Conceſſions of thoſe very men, that the Body of a Man and all other compounded Bodies conſiſt not only of Matter antecedent to their Compoſition, but alſo of ſuch a Matter as is digeſted from thoſe more ſimple Bodies which we call the four Elements, Fire, Air, Water, and Earth: And therefore of neceſſity, and according to the Principles of theſe very men, before the exiſtence of any compounded Body there muſt be of neceſſity, 1. A pre-exiſtence of thoſe ſimple Bodies out of which this compounded or mixed Body is compounded: 2. A pre-exiſtence of thoſe more active Principles in Nature that are neceſſarily pre-requiſite to the mixing of theſe particles of Elementary Bodies, and to the diſpoſition of them to the Union and Conſtitution of that mixed Body whereinto it is to be formed, namely, the Motions and Influx of the Heavens, the Activity of the fiery Nature, ſubduing the more paſſive parts of Matter to the ſuſception of that Form wherein it is to be brought. 3. A mora, or due ſpace of time intervening between the firſt coagulation of Matter and the firſt inſtant of the diſpoſing thereof, and the complement thereof in its determinate Species, which according to the degree of its ſpecifical perfection is ſometimes longer, and ſometimes ſhorter; as the Statuary ſtrikes more ſtrokes upon that piece of Marble that is completed into the Statue of Caeſar than into the Cube or Pedeſtal whereon he ſtands: all theſe muſt precede, not only in nature, but in time, before the complement of any compounded Body in its ſpecifical conſtitution. And therefore ſince all mixed Bodies require neceſſarily the antecedence of theſe ſimple Bodies, this action of the more active Principles, this mora in the full diſpoſition and digeſtion of them into their complement of a mixed Being, it is ſimply neceſſary that there muſt be a poſteriority in time of every compounded Body, eſpecially the Body of Man, to theſe more ſimple Bodies out of which it is conſtituted, and thoſe ſucceſſive and gradual actions, and of the more active Nature by which it is diſpoſed and completed in its being: And if once we admit a priority and poſteriority, it is impoſſible the latter can be eternal, becauſe it hath neceſſarily ſomething that actually preceded it.

2. The Argument againſt the Eternity of Mankind upon the two latter Suppoſitions is thus; If Man were eternally created, or con-created with the reſt of the World, it is of abſolute neceſſity that that Creation muſt be terminated in that individual Perſon that was thus created. For whether Creation be eternal or not eternal, it muſt neceſſarily be terminated in ſome individual Being that is ſo created. And it is neceſſary alſo that that created Perſon were created in ſome determinate ſtate, and in a ſtate anſwerable to the nature of theſe Men that we now ſee; and though his Life were longer than ours, yet it would be certain that he lived as we do, one day, one month, one year after another, and that thoſe firſt created Perſons did generate their kind by the conjunction of Sexes, as is done in the World. And therefore if both Sexes were created, yet ſooner or later they propagated their kind, as is now done; for though they themſelves had a differing manner of production from thoſe that ſucceeded them, we muſt conceive that their Conſtitution was the ſame, otherwiſe we ſhall not ſo much ſuppoſe an eternal Creation of Man, as of ſomething elſe of a nature eſſentially differing from Man; which is contrary to the Hypotheſis it ſelf: And if this be ſuppoſed, we ſhall never deliver our ſelves from intollerable difficulties and abſurdities. For, 1. There would of a neceſſity be a firſt Man, which cannot be conſiſtent with the attribution of Eternity to Mankind. Again, 2. That firſt Man, if created eternally, muſt needs be diſtant from us by a leſs portion of duration after he had lived a year or two; and conſequently the duration from his age of two years could not be eternal, for it is ſhort of the period of his Creation by two years, and therefore not eternal; neither could his Creation be eternal, for then the adding of two years to a duration leſs than infinite ſhould make it infinite, which is abſurd and impoſſible. Again, 3. Was the generation of the firſt born Man at an infinite diſtance from us, and eternal, or no? If it were, then it muſt be of the ſame antiquity with the Creation of the firſt Man; and ſo the firſt born Man was eternal, and was conſequently before he was born; and his Eternity ſhould be ten, twenty, thirty, or forty years ſhort of the Eternity of his Father, yet both eternal: If the Birth of that Man were not eternal, then conſequently the Generations of Mankind are neither infinite nor eternal; nay conſequently the Creation of the firſt Man could not be eternal nor an infinite diſtance from us, for there muſt neceſſarily be a determinate Period between the Creation of the firſt Man and the Birth of the ſecond, and that time muſt neceſſarily be finite; and the addition of a finite duration to a finite duration can never make an infinite duration.

Eternity therefore, and a duration actually infinite, cannot be applied to ſucceſſive Beings: The abſurdities and incongruities that ariſe upon ſuch an application are infinite and uncurable, and not to be attempted: Nothing but an infinite and indiviſible Being is able to ſuſtain an infinite and eternal duration, it will never fit other things, it is too great for them.

3. I now come to conſider thoſe Reaſons that are applicable indifferently to all the former four Suppoſitions, and render them all alike vain, abſurd, and impoſſible. I ſhall reſume ſome of thoſe that I uſed before againſt the Suppoſition of the World's Eternity, and I ſhall ſubjoyn ſome others more particularly applicable to the condition of Man.

1. If the ſucceſſive Generations of Mankind were eternal, then of neceſſity ſome one Man among them that preceded us was infinitely diſtant from us that are now living in point of duration, and infinite numbers of Men have intervened between us and him; this is plain and undeniable.

If ſo then, if this Man lived to the ordinary age of man, for the purpoſe, till thirty years old, and then had a Son, and after this he lived to ſeventy years old, and died: Was this Son of his diſtant from us an infinite duration, an infinite period of years; or were there infinite Perſons that intervened between this Son and us his remote deſcendants or no? If there were, then the duration from his Father, which was thirty years before his Son, muſt be thirty years greater than the duration of the Son, and yet the Son as eternally exiſting as his Father: if not, then thirty years added to the finite duration from the Son to us muſt make it infinite. There were infinite Perſons in the interval between us and his Father, and but finite between us and his Son, and yet the odds between both muſt be but one. The Father's Death muſt be eternally diſtant from us as well as his Birth, and yet his birth ſeventy years before his death.

2. I ſhall here alſo reſume the Argument above-given againſt the Eternity of Motion (which yet is no other but a different kind of application of the Argument laſt mentioned.) Whatſoever is now paſt and gone, was moſt certainly once preſent; therefore the moſt remotely diſtant Man in that vaſt Period of Eternity was certainly once actually exiſting, and though he be now paſt, yet thoſe Attributes and Conceptions that were applicable and affirmable of him when preſent, are now affirmable and applicable to him though paſt, (abating only the relations of paſt and preſent,) if when he was preſent and actually exiſting he could not be eternal, ſo neither can the addition of all the ſucceeding myriads of Men by ſucceſſive procreation make any one day of that Man's age to be infinitely diſtant from us, for it could not be ſo when he was preſent and exiſting. That Man whereof we ſpeak was ſuch a Man as we are, lived ſucceſſively as we do, and though poſſibly he might be longer-lived than us, yet his age was meaſured by days and years as ours is, and could never be without beginning; and conſequently this Man, when exiſting, was the Radix of all that ſucceeded him, the terminus claudens of all his ſucceeding Generations, which bounds and terminates à parte ante all the ſucceeding Generations; as that Man when preſent was not eternal, ſo neither can the addition of ſucceſſive Generations produce a Line of duration of infinite extent, for that duration is utrinque clauſa, namely, with that Man which was once preſent, and that Moment wherein I now write.

3. My third Argument (which though it be common, is very evident) is this:

It is impoſſible, ex natura rei, that any multitude can be actually infinite, or, (which is all one) ſo great that there cannot be a greater, or, multitudo omnium maxima: But if we ſhould ſuppoſe an eternal ſucceſſion of Generations of Men, or an infinite Series of ſucceſſive individual Men, there would neceſſarily follow an infinite multitude, or a multitude than which there could not be a greater. And therefore ex impoſſibili, there could not be ſuch an eternal ſucceſſion of Generations.

The firſt Propoſition, namely, That it is impoſſible there ſhould be an infinite multitude, or (which is all one) a number actually infinite, is evident by thoſe many contradictions, abſurdities, and intollerable incongruities that would follow upon ſuch a Suppoſition.

It muſt needs be granted that an infinite multitude is the greateſt multitude that can be, there can be no greater; if there can be a greater, then the former was not infinite. For when we have to do with any thing whoſe very eſſence, as I may call it, conſiſts in being greateſt, there majus and minus do alter the very eſſence of the thing, and is identical with magis and minus: A greater or larger Line, or Superficies, or Body is not magis linea, ſuperficies, aut corpus, than a ſhorter, narrower, or leſſer Line, Superficies, or Body, becauſe they agree in the ſame common nature, the one as well as the other is a Line, Superficies, or Body. And ſo of other things.

But when the very Eſſence of the thing conſiſts in a certain eſſential difference of major or minor, there major or minor vary the kind.

And therefore a Line of two foot long (with relation to that extent) eſſentially differs from a Line of a foot long, which under that notion is eſſentially greater or more extended than a Line of a foot long, and it is impoſſible that a Line of a foot long ſhould be as long as a Line of two foot long, as it is impoſſible that a part ſhould be equal to the whole. And yet upon the ſuppoſition of an infinite multitude, it muſt neceſſarily follow that one infinite multitude muſt be greater than another, and yet both infinite; upon the ſuppoſition of infinite Generations of Men, there muſt have been an infinite multitude of antecedent Individuals and Generations of Men a million of years ſince, and yet neceſſarily by the addition of thoſe Individuals that have accrued ſince in that great Period of a Million of years, there muſt needs be an acceſſion of a vaſt number to that multitude that was before, whereby it muſt neceſſarily be greater, and yet both ſuppoſed infinite, that is, ſuch than which there can be nothing greater. Again, the multitude of the individual Men muſt be infinite, and yet the multitude of theſe Mens Eyes muſt be double to the number of Men, and yet both be infinite. And it is but a vain thing to ſay, that though the collection of Men be antecedently infinite, yet it is clauſa and finita in the preſent extreme: as if a Line ſhould be extended infinitely from the point A, the Line would be finite at the point A, — A though infinite towards the other part; and the appoſition of the acceſſional number of Men is to that part that is finite: For though the Generations of Men are limited towards the extreme that is next us, or at the Period of a Thouſand years before us: and though the appoſition of the acceſſional number be towards this hithermoſt extreme which is clauſa or finita, yet the appoſition is to the whole number or multitude, and the collection thereof, and therefore the abſurdity of the Suppoſition of an infinite pre-exiſting multitude, which is more enlarged by the increaſe, is equally evident, as if we could ſuppoſe an appoſition of the number to any other part; for the ſcope of the Argument is to prove the incompoſſibility of Infinite and Multitude, becauſe no Multitude can be greater than Infinite, yet ſuch would it neceſſarily be, if we ſhould ſuppoſe the multitude now greater than it was a thouſand years before: And to render it yet more plain, ſuppoſe on the other ſide we ſhould take the other Operation of Arithmetick, namely, Subduction: If out of that ſuppoſed infinite multitude of antecedent Generation, we ſhould by the Operation of the Underſtanding ſubduce Ten, whether we ſubduct that Number of Ten out of the laſt Generations of Men, or out of Generations a thouſand years ſince, or indeterminately out of the whole Collection, certainly the reſidue muſt needs be leſs by Ten than it was before that Subduction made, and yet ſtill the Quotient muſt be as great as before, which is ſtill infinite.

Again, the incongruity of the Suppoſition of an infinite multitude appears in this, that the part muſt be as infinite as the whole: It is the Inſtance of Algarel, in his Dialogue with Averroes; the Number of 4 multiplied into it ſelf produceth the Square Number of 16, and that again multiplied by 4 produceth the Cubick Number of 64. If we ſhould ſuppoſe a multitude actually infinite, there muſt be infinite Roots, and Square and Cubick Numbers, yet of neceſſity the Root is but the fourth part of the Square, and the ſixteenth part of the Cubick Number. The Inſtance of Algarel, in his firſt Diſputation with Averroes, which Averroes endeavours to anſwer (but tyres himſelf in vain to do it) may explain this Conſequence: The Sun paſſeth through the Zodiack in one year, Saturn paſſeth through it in thirty years; ſo that the Revolution of Saturn to the Revolution of the Sun is as one to thirty, and conſequently as one Revolution of Saturn contains thirty Revolutions of the Sun, ſo two Revolutions thereof muſt contain ſixty Revolutions of the Sun, and ſo if we ſhould ſuppoſe their Revolutions infinite, yet the proportion of the Revolutions muſt neceſſarily hold the ſame, namely, in all the whole Collection, the Number of the Suns Revolutions muſt be thirty times as many as the Number of Saturns Revolutions, and conſequently the Revolutions of Saturn can be no more than one thirtieth part of the Revolutions of the Sun, and yet both being ſuppoſed infinite, the part, namely, the thirtieth part, muſt be as great as that whereof it is the thirtieth part, which is impoſſible.

And this impoſſibility holds in all other things that have ſucceſſion or extenſion, as in quantity, motion, ſucceſſive duration of things, in their nature ſucceſſive. But it is more plain and conſpicuous in diſcrete quantity, or different Individuals, which are already meaſured by Number, without any breaking the continuity that is in things that have continuity, as continued quantity and motion. And therefore they that go about to demonſtrate the impoſſibility of Eternal Motion, à parte ante, or infinite extenſion in a Body, Line, or Superficies, do firſt break it into parts to meaſure them, and reduce them to diſcrete quantity, becauſe the demonſtration is more clear and ſenſible thereby, and therefore they break the Meaſures of Motion into Hours, Days, Years, or ſuch like Meaſures, or into Periodical Revolutions, and ſo they break continued Quantity into Palms, Feet, Perches, or the like; becauſe though the repugnancy of Infinitude be equally incompetible to continued or ſucceſſive Motion, Duration, or continued Quantity, and depends upon the incompoſſibility of the very nature of things ſucceſſive or extenſive with Infinitude, yet that incompoſſibility is more conſpicuous in diſcrete Quantity or Multitude, that ariſeth from parts or Individuals already actually diſtinguiſhed: But the reaſon of both is the ſame, eſpecially if broken and divided into real or imaginary parts.

But in the Matter in queſtion, namely, Multitude of ſucceſſive Men, or ſucceſſive Generations of Men, there is already a ſeparate, divided, diſcrete multitude, without any antecedent work of my Underſtanding, or otherwiſe, to reduce it into parts or diſcrete multitude; and ſo the Inſtances of the Abſurdities that ariſe by an infinite multitude of Individuals and diſtinct Generations, is made more plain and open to view: And he that is deſirous to proſecute theſe Aſyſtata of Infinitude and Multitude, let him reſort to the Prelections of Faber, collected by Monſuerius, in his Metaphyſica demonſtrativa de infinito.

And to ſay the truth, there are none of the Ancients that have any weight in them, that do not agree, that it is impoſſible that any Quantity, either diſcrete or continued, ſhould be actually infinite, but only potentially, either by addition of ſuppoſed parts to either, or by diviſion of Quantity continued into parts infinitely diviſible: But the greater difficulty reſts in the Aſſumption, which is next to be conſidered.

The ſecond Propoſition is this, That if Eternal Generations of Men were admitted, there would be this abſurd Conſequence, that a multitude given might be actually infinite, which remains to be proved.

The Objection that ſtands in the way ſeems to be this, That there is no repugnancy that Multitude might be poſſibly infinite, for as we may without any inconvenience ſuppoſe, that the Generations of Mankind might be ſempiternal or eternal, à parte poſt, ſo there is no inconvenience to ſuppoſe them eternal, à parte ante, for they never co-exiſt, but are ſucceſſive, and ſo do not conſtitute any multitude co-exiſting actually infinite, which is indeed impoſſible; but there is no implication or repugnancy that there might be an infinite ſucceſſion of Generations, for they are not together, but one Generation paſſeth and another ſucceedeth.

And hence it is they ſay, that in moventibus vel cauſis per ſe ſubordinatis, there cannot be proceſſus in infinitum, but we muſt neceſſarily fix in a Firſt Mover, between whom and the laſt Motion or Effect there cannot be a ſeries of Infinite Cauſes for two Reaſons: Firſt, Becauſe if there were Infinite Movers or Cauſes, moving per ſe to the ſame effect or motion, the motion would be infinite, and ſo would the time wherein that motion would be abſolved, for infinitus motus non fit in finito tempore. Secondly, And again, there would be an actual Infinitude of co-exiſting Cauſes, which is impoſſible; and therefore for the purpoſe, to the production of this generation of an Inſect by putrefaction, there is not an infinite ſeries of Cauſes per ſe co-operating to its production, but the ſeries of Cauſes is finite; for the active qualities of the Elements move the Matter, and the Heat and Influence of the Heavens agitate and move, it may be, the Elementary Body, and the Intelligences move the Heavenly Bodies, and Almighty God the Primum Movens moves the Intelligences, and theſe are finite in number: But in cauſis aut moventibus accidentaliter ſubordinatis there may be an Infinitude or Eternity, thus the Father may beget the Son, and the Grandfather begat the Father, and ſo backward to Eternity, and ſo in the ſucceſſive productions of all Animals ex ſemine. For though the Individuals ſucceſſively exiſting from all Eternity, muſt needs be infinite, yet they do not coexiſt, but as one Generation comes another decays, and ſo make no infinite multitude; and conſequently, that all the abſurdities that are heaped upon the Suppoſition of infinite multitude or numbers, conclude nothing to the matter in queſtion, becauſe there is no infinite multitude, becauſe no infinite Individuals or Generations of Mankind coexiſting: And though this cannot at all, according to their ſuppoſition, any way admit the poſſibility of an infinitely extended Body, Line, Superficies, or Place, becauſe that would be an actual infinitude in extent; yet as to ſucceſſive continued things, as ſucceſſive Motion, as that of the Heavens, and ſucceſſive Duration, as that of Motion which we call Time, there is nothing of inconvenience according to their Suppoſition, if they be infinite, eternal, and without beginning; becauſe though they conſiſt of infinite Parts, yet they are not altogether, or coexiſting, without which there is no real Multitude.

So that the Queſtion will be hereby reduced to this Point, Whether in this ſucceſſion of Generations and Individuals of Mankind there be ſuch a Multitude produced that is conſiſtent with Infinitude therein.

I ſhall not here lay hold of that Suppoſition of the Immortality of the Souls of the ſeveral Individuals of Mankind (which if ſuppoſed, would make an infinite multitude actually coexiſting of ſeparate Souls) becauſe ſome of thoſe that maintain the Eternity of Mankind, deny the Immortality of the Soul; others deny the Immortality of the Soul in its individuation, ſuppoſing it to reſolve into a certain common Element of Souls; and others, as the Pythagoreans, though allowing the Immortality of Souls in their individuation, yet ſuppoſe a finite number of Souls might ſupply the infinite Succeſſions of Men by Tranſmigration of theſe in their due time: This I lay aſide, becauſe it would neceſſarily occaſion other Diſputes with Men of thoſe Perſwaſions.

I do therefore ſay, That upon the Suppoſition of the Eternal Succeſſion of the Generations of Men, and the infinite ſucceſſive Individuals thereby ariſen, there doth ariſe ſuch a Multitude as is equally inconſiſtent with Infinitude, as if the Individuals had been all coexiſting, and that all thoſe foregoing Aſyſtata that render any number or multitude of coexiſting Individuals impoſſible to be infinite, render the multitude of ſucceſſive Individuals impoſſible to be infinite; abating only the excreſcence of infinite coexiſting Men to an infinite moles, which inconvenience indeed falls not upon the ſucceſſions of Individuals, ſome by death and corruption making room for new Succeſſors.

And to make good what I ſay, I ſhall deliver theſe enſuing Concluſions.

1. That as in things that are preſent, while they actually are, they alſo neceſſarily are; ſo in things that have been, they have been while they were, actually and neceſſarily: It is as certain that my Father and Grandfather once actually were in rerum natura, as it is certain that I now actually am; for though in things that are yet to come, they are only in poſſibility, and not in act; yet in things that have already been, they have been as actually as what now is; in praeteritis non datur poſſibilitas; and it is as certain that what is paſt, once was actually preſent and exiſting, as what now is, is actually preſent and exiſting. This I ſay to prevent that Objection, That things paſt and things to come are of the ſame nature in relation to their exiſtence, and that only our manner of apprehenſion is that which makes things future only inter poſſibilia.

2. That things that once exiſted and are now paſt, do as really conſtitute a multitude (if many) as things that are coexiſting; It is as evident that the Grandfather and Father and Son did as really make up a multitude, that is, one man, and one man, and one man, (which multitude we call artificially three, though the Father and Son were both Poſthumi) as if they all had or did all now exiſt together; and it is as true a Predication to ſay that theſe were many, as it were in caſe they had all coexiſted, or were now coexiſting: And thoſe three Revolutions of the Firſt Moveable that were paſt three days ſince, are as really a multitude of Revolutions, as the three Stars that this hour coexiſt in Heavenly Conſtellation are a multitude of Stars; and when I ſpeak of a multitude, I mean more than one.

3. That although number, or the digeſting things under this or that number, whether Collective, as three, ſix, nine; or Ordinal, as the ſecond, third, or fourth, be but an operation of the Underſtanding only, yet antecedent to any act of the Underſtanding, and without the help of it, unum and multa, and of thoſe multa, plura, or pauciora have a reality: Plato is one, and Plato and Ariſtotle are multi, or more than one; and Plato and Aristotle and Tully, are a greater multitude than Plato and Aristotle, antecedently to any operation of the Underſtanding.

4. That antecedently to any act of the Underſtanding, even in thoſe things that have a ſucceſſive exiſtence, and are not all together, there is as real an unity or multiplicity as in things coexiſting. For inſtance, The Revolution of Heaven that was diſpatched the firſt Natural day of the laſt week, was as really, as that Revolution which now is in concluding really is; and as it really was, ſo it really was but one: And the Revolutions that followed in the two next Natural days were really more than one, and therefore multa; and the Revolutions of the three next days after, was a multitude greater than the Revolutions of the two former days; and all thoſe ſix Revolutions were really a greater multitude of Revolutions than any one of the former multitudes, and this without and before any operation of the Underſtanding, though indeed the Underſtanding gives them their numeral diſtinction of one, and two, and three, and ſix.

5. That the incompoſſibility of Infinitude with Multitude, or the impoſſibility that any Multitude ſhould be infinite, doth not ariſe either upon the exiſtence or non-exiſtence of the Subjects of that Multitude together at this or any other determinate time, but from the very nature of Multitude it ſelf: So that whether the multa were preſent, or paſt, or fixed, or ſucceſſive, yet the very ſuppoſition of Multitude doth exclude the poſſibility of its infinitude: For 1. It ſuppoſeth a diſcrete Quantity, and any Quantity muſt needs be limited. 2. It ſuppoſeth a conſiſtence of many Unities into which it muſt neceſſarily be reſolved, as the conſtituent Subject or Matter of them. 3. It ſuppoſeth a Term which cannot be the greateſt: It is impoſſible that any Multitude can be ſo great but that a greater may be given: So that as although there were no Man in the World to take notice of it, every Triangle would contain three angles equal to two right-angles, though no Man were in the World to diſcover or aſſent to it; ſo though there were no things in the World exiſting to be denominated multa, and no Underſtanding in the World to form the conception of it, it would be an eternal Truth, That what conſiſteth of many Unities, as all Multitude neceſſarily doth, cannot be Infinite, nor conſequently any Multitude ariſing by ſucceſſion cannot in the nature of the thing be Eternal.

Upon the whole matter therefore, I conclude that it is impoſſible that the Generations of Men or their ſucceſſive Individuals can be Eternal; that a Multitude doth as well ariſe by ſucceſſive as by coexiſting Individuals; that if the Generations of Men and their ſucceſſive Individuals were Eternal, there would neceſſarily follow, that the multitude of ſuch Individuals were infinite as well as if they were all coexiſting, and that it is equally repugnant to the nature of multitude, whether of ſucceſſive or of coexiſting Individuals to be infinite: Therefore there could not be ſuch an eternal ſucceſſion of Individuals or Generations.

And that this Suppoſition, That multitude of coexiſting Individuals, or of Cauſes or moventes per ſe, cannot be infinite; but that ſucceſſive Individuals or Cauſes and Effects per accidens might be infinite and eternal, is in truth a Suppoſition not fitted to the truth of things, or grounded upon any rational difference between the things, but a Suppoſition fitted merely to ſerve that other precarious Suppoſition which Ariſtotle and his followers had taken up touching the Eternity of the World.

And theſe ſhall be all the Reaſons that I ſhall trouble my ſelf withall againſt the Eternity of Mankind, or the ſucceſſive Generations and Individuals thereof; having willingly declined thoſe many other Ingenious Reaſons given by others (as of the Impertranſibility of Eternity, and the impoſſibility therein to attain to the preſent term or limit of antecedent Generations or Ages; the neceſſity of every poſterius to have a prius, that there be an equal number of priora and poſteriora) which either are ſo many various Explications of the Reaſons going before, or at leaſt are not ſo evidently concludent, or are ſubject to Exceptions in ſome particulars.

The Objections both againſt the Reaſons before given, and againſt the Suppoſition it ſelf, I ſhall take up after the next Chapter, wherein I ſhall examin the other Suppoſition before mentioned, namely, The eternal exiſtence of ſome firſt Man and Woman, and the ſucceſſive Generations from them, wherein, becauſe it is touched before, I ſhall be brief.

CAP. V. Concerning the Suppoſition of the firſt Eternal Exiſtence of the common Parents of Mankind, and the production of the ſucceeding Individuals from them.

I Come to that other Suppoſition, namely, of the Exiſtence of ſome one Man and Woman the common Parents of Mankind eternally, and the ſucceſſive multiplication of the Race of Mankind from them by the ordinary courſe of generation. And although this Suppoſition carries with it the clear evidence of its abſurdity, and therefore may ſeem to be ſcarce worth the pains of a Confutation; yet becauſe it lyes in my way, and the Obſervations upon it may be uſeful for other purpoſes, I ſhall ſay ſomewhat concerning it.

This firſt eternal Pair we cannot conceive to have an exiſtence by a bare courſe of Nature, without an eternal Creation of them by Almighty God, and an unintermitted Influence from him to ſupport them in a ſtate of Incorruptibility through the vaſt abyſs of Eternity: For he that will ſuppoſe things purely under that courſe of exiſtence that is proper to them by the courſe of Nature, muſt needs ſuppoſe the Individuals of the humane Nature to have been always ſuch, and of ſuch a Frame as now they are, that is, mortal and corruptible Beings; and though their Ages might anciently be of a longer continuance than now they are, yet (upon a bare natural account) they could not be conceived immortal, incorruptible, immutable, no more than they are now.

Therefore ſince the great admirers of Nature do therefore frame their Hypotheſes of an eternal Succeſſion of Men, becauſe they think themſelves bound to think that all things have ever been as now they are, and becauſe they will not ſubſtitute other Hypotheſes of the Origination or Exiſtence of things in any other manner than they now ſee them. Certainly as to theſe, and ad hominem, it is an Evidence beyond contradiction, that there never was any ſuch pair of Man and Woman that eternally exiſted, but that all Men and other perfect Animals, if they were eternal in their Species, were eternally produced ex prius genitis as now they are, and that there was no one firſt individual of Man or Beaſt that had an eternal Exiſtence, becauſe ſuch a Suppoſition equally croſſeth that courſe of the nature of things which now they ſee, which therefore they make the ſtandard, and their meaſure of things that are paſt.

They therefore that muſt ſupport an exiſtence of the firſt individual Parents of humane Nature, and that thoſe Individuals had an eternal exiſtence, muſt neceſſarily ſuppoſe that they had that exiſtence by an eternal Creation of Almighty God, and an eternal Influx and Support from him in that incorruptible eſtate through all the vaſt extent of an eternal duration.

And by this means they do think, and that truly, that they aſſert a dependence of the Species of things upon Almighty God, which cannot poſſibly be ſuppoſed to be dependent upon him, unleſs they had in their individual nature their exiſtence from him; ſince it is impoſſible there can be any Suppoſition of the exiſtence of any Species (as for inſtance, the Species of Man) unleſs it be ſuppoſed to exiſt in Individuals; nor conſequently a dependence of the Species of Mankind upon God as its Cauſe, unleſs there were a dependence of the firſt Individuals thereof upon him in fieri as their Cauſe: And they likewiſe hope (but vainly) hereby to avoid the inconveniences of ſucceſſive eternal Generations without any firſt Caput or Radix of thoſe Generations, though they fall hereby into the ſame difficulties, and others that are equally intricate and inexplicable.

And although in this Suppoſition we muſt admit the firſt pair that were the Roots of Mankind did herein differ from the ſtate of Mankind now, that whereas now Men live ordinarily ſeventy or eighty years, and are ſubject to Death, yet thoſe firſt radices humani generis were by the Influence of the Divine Power immortal, and not confined to the age incident now to Mankind, but were able to endure the immenſe duration of an eternal being; yet we muſt alſo ſuppoſe that in other reſpects they were of the ſame Make with theſe individuals of Mankind that are now: For otherwiſe inſtead of a ſuppoſition of an eternal being of the firſt individual Man and Woman that had their being by eternal Creation, we ſhall fall into a ſuppoſition of ſomething that was not in truth Man. And therefore, as according to the Doctrine of Moſes and the Truth, Adam the firſt created Man, though conſiſting of a compoſition intrinſecally diſſolvable, had he continued in Innocence, ſhould or might have held by the continued Influx of the Divine Will and Power a ſtate of immortality and indiſſolubleneſs of his Compoſition; yet as to the Eſſentials of his nature, and the Integrals thereof, he ſhould have been and continued like other Men.

And therefore thoſe firſt imaginary eternal Individuals, the Root of Mankind, ſhould have conſiſted of Fleſh and Blood and Mind and Soul and Body as other Men do, they muſt have the ſupport of their Lives by receiving of nouriſhment, by digeſting thereof according to the various proceſs of Digeſtion as we do, they muſt draw in their Breath or Air and emit it again as we do, they muſt have had the like ſucceſſive motion of the Heart and the like circulation of their Blood as we have, the like local motion of their Bodies, the like variation and ſucceſſion of Thoughts as we have; and though the ſuppoſed Eternity of them ſhould have excluded from them corruption or diſſolution in that vaſt Period of Eternity, yet even that duration of his muſt be in this reſpect like ours, that it was a ſucceſſive duration, a duration that was meaſured out by the ſuppoſed coexiſtence of the eternal ſucceſſion of days, and months, and years; And ſuch a duration, as though there had been no ſuch collateral or coextended extrinſick meaſure, yet it was intrinſecally ſucceſſive, and not indiviſible, becauſe he was in his nature a corporeal ſucceſſive Being as well as we; and as we in the very Conſtitution of our Automaton have certain ſucceſſive gradual marks and ſigns and operations, whereby though there were no external ſucceſſive meaſure, by compariſon whereto the ſucceſſion of our duration might appear, as the Motion of the Heavens and Heavenly Bodies, and the like; yet by thoſe connatural ſucceſſive marks and ſigns our beings and durations would be meaſured, and the ſucceſſions thereof would appear; as the viciſſitudes of Reſpiration, the Pulſes, Palpitations of our Hearts, the variety and ſucceſſion of acts of Senſation, the ſucceſſion of our Thoughts and Cogitations; whereby it is apparent we have not only intrinſecal marks and diſtinctions of our ſucceſſive duration, but alſo that our operations are various: I do, I think and ſpeak that to day which I did not yeſterday, the number of my Reſpirations or Pulſes were thus many yeſterday, and as many to day, and it may be more, upon the variety happening in my Body by local motion, repletion, or any caſual perturbation. And as all this I find in my ſelf and other men, ſo I muſt needs conclude the very like was in theſe firſt Individuals that are ſuppoſed to be eternal: For though they had (ex ſuppoſitione) an immortality and preſervation from putrefaction or corruption by the eternal and continued influx of the Divine Goodneſs and Power, yet they were not in a ſtate of perfect immutability in their actions, operations, or exiſtence: For then we muſt ſuppoſe them not to have been Humane Creatures, but Gods, or at leaſt Angels; which nevertheleſs are not wholly exempt from their degrees of mutability and variation, at leaſt in their intrinſick operations: it being the ſovereign Prerogative of Almighty God only, to be without variableneſs or ſhadow of change.

And now I ſhall not inquire what are become of thoſe eternal pair of firſt Parents, where they are, or if they are dead, how it came to paſs they could weather and ſtand the ſhock of an eternal duration, and yet be at any time ſubject to a diſſolution. It may be ſaid they were tranſlated into Heaven, or poſſibly they may be ſince dead, the Divine Beneficence ſubducting in this or that point of time that Influence which it communicated from the time of their firſt Creation, whereby they were kept in a ſtate of immortality till that moment of the ſubduction thereof wherein they began to undergo the common Laws of Diſſolution.

But I do ſay that there is the ſame impoſſibility that any corporeal Individual of ſuch a Make and Conſtitution as Man is, ſhould be eternal in hoc individuo, as there is in the eternal ſucceſſion of ſeveral Individuals: Such a kind of duration cannot be ſuſtained by ſucceſſion of Humane Individuals, much leſs can it be ſuſtained by any ſingle Individual of Humane Nature.

1. The ſame abſurdities and impoſſibilities would follow upon the admiſſion of the Eternity of one ſingle Humane Individual as of ſucceſſive; becauſe that Individual hath neceſſarily a concomitant ſucceſſion of interpolated Motions, namely, the Pulſes of the Heart, and the ſucceſſive Motions of Reſpiration, and divers others. All which will produce multitudes uncapable of Infinitude, as much as the ſeveral individuals of Mankind.

And among all theſe Pulſes and Reſpirations ſome one will be neceſſarily, infinitely, actually diſtant from ſome other Pulſe within the limits of time, whereupon all thoſe former heaps of incongruities and impoſſibilities before obſerved will be conſequential.

2. It is impoſſible that any Being can be eternal with ſucceſſive eternal Phyſical changes, or variety of ſtates or manner of exiſtency naturally and neceſſarily concomitant unto it. But if we ſhould ſuppoſe any one one Man eternal, yet he muſt in the very conſtitution of his being neceſſarily have Phyſical changes and variety of ſtates and manners of exiſtence accompanying him, or elſe we muſt unman him, and make him another thing: Therefore no individual Man can be eternal. The Major Propoſition is evident to any that conſider it. For let us ſuppoſe the firſt Man created eternally in a ſtate of Childhood, Youth, or Reſt, it is neceſſary that he continue eternally in that ſtate, and the firſt moment he moves or alters that ſtate, muſt be on this ſide the uttermoſt limits or compaſs of Eternity, namely, within ſuch a compaſs as is finitely diſtant from this hour, for two Cauſes: Becauſe Reſt muſt needs be antecedent to his Motion, his Childhood antecedent to his Youth, and that to his Manhood; and therefore if his Reſt, Childhood, or Youth were eternal, his motion or alteration of his ſtate cannot be eternal, for then this contradictory Propoſition ſhould be true, That Man did eternally reſt and eternally move, or which is all one, eternally move and eternally not move, for Reſt in Bodies is but an abſence or privation of Motion: That he was eternally a Child, eternally a Youth, and eternally a grown Man.

But let us ſuppoſe that it were poſſible that he might be created eternally in a ſtate of Reſt, or yet in ſome determinate point within the extent of Eternity he ſhould begin to move, that interval that anteceded his Motion muſt be either in a finite or infinite diſtance from us: If we ſhould ſuppoſe it infinite, we contradict our ſelves; for we ſhall make the firſt Motion eternal, and conſequently infinitely diſtant from us; and yet to have a beginning, and ſuch a beginning that was infinitely later than the Eternity of Reſt. And if we ſhall ſuppoſe the interval between the firſt imaginary beginning of that Reſt and the beginning of that Motion, finite, (ſuppoſe for the purpoſe, the time of a Month) then we ſhall upon the very ſame account make the beginning of that Motion to be leſs than eternal, becauſe begun a Month after what was eternal; and conſequently alſo we ſhall make the beginning of that Reſt to be not eternal, becauſe that firſt Motion having a beginning after Eternity, could not be eternal; nor conſequently the beginning of that Reſt could not be eternal, for, ex ſuppoſitione, it is but a Month ancienter than that Motion, which was not eternal: and a finite duration added to a finite duration cannot make an infinite duration: Therefore if Man, ex ſuppoſitione, were created in any ſtate whether of Motion or Reſt, Childhood, Youth, full grown Age, or whatever other ſtate it be, he muſt neceſſarily ſo perſiſt an infinite duration, and if he undergo any alteration from that ſtate, that alteration muſt be in time, or of a puiſne date to Eternity.

The ſecond Propoſition is this; That Man in his very Conſtitution is ſuch, that there is unceſſantly and naturally concomitant with him Phyſical changes, and a variety of ſtates and real changes, without which he would be in vain, and indeed he could not be what he muſt be ſuppoſd to be, namely, eſſentially a Man.

It hath been heretofore ſhewn what great variety of Motions and Alterations do neceſſarily accompany his very Conſtitution, and let any Man but think with himſelf what a kind of thing Man would be during all that immenſe abyſs of his firſt being, if he be ſuppoſed eternally and unchangeably reſting, unchangeably moving, eternally and unchangeably a Child, a Youth, a full grown Man, or any other determinate unchangeable ſtate. As we have before obſerved, though we ſhould admit a poſſibility of an eternal Creation of Man or of any created Being whatſoever, we muſt ſuppoſe him created under ſome of the conditions which are incident to an individual nature; he muſt be created in ſome determinate ubi, and in ſome determinate ſitus and ſtate; he muſt be created in Reſt or in Motion, a Child, or a Youth, or a full grown Man: This Man, unleſs he put off his nature, muſt in ſome finite or limited time at leaſt after the eternal imaginary moment of his Being move locally, or with the Motions of alteration, augmentation, growth or decay. Theſe and the like Motions are, upon the account of his Conſtitution, neceſſarily incident to him within certain ordinary Periods, and are connatural to his very Conſtitution.

And therefore it is irrational, and indeed impoſſible that this created Man ſhould eternally be in a ſtate of Reſt without Motion, without Alteration, Augmentation, Diminution; and yet thus he muſt be conceived to be, if he were eternally made: If once we admit a variation from the ſtate of his Creation, that variation muſt be neceſſarily after an eternal and infinite duration, and therefore within the compaſs of Time: If this Man ſhould be conceived to move or alter his condition within a year, nay a million of years after his Creation, his Creation could not be eternal, becauſe his Creation would be antecedent to that firſt alteration but a finite time; and that firſt alteration could not be eternal, but within the compaſs of a finite time; and conſequently his Creation anteceding that firſt alteration by a finite time could not be eternal, or of an infinite diſtance from the time wherein I write: And conſequently this Creation of Man is not, cannot be eternal, becauſe Man in his very Conſtitution hath the neceſſary concomitants of thoſe alterations that are inconſiſtent with an eternal duration, and ſuch as he cannot be without, according to the very intrinſick fabrick of his native Conſtitution one Week, much leſs an eternal duration.

Again, the truth is, the very Suppoſition of eternal Creation of any Being eſſentially diſtinguiſhed from Almighty God is a perfect contradiction in it ſelf: That which is eternal, is that which is without beginning; that which is created, hath neceſſarily a beginning, although by Creation.

But I ſhall not proſecute this any farther, the Suppoſition of any individual of Mankind eternally created is ſo abſurd that it deſerves not half the words that have been uſed about it: But I have not been ſo prolix in it for the ſake of the Suppoſition it ſelf, but rather becauſe it gives a fair opportunity of clearing of ſome things which could not be ſo aptly done otherwiſe.

And upon all this that hath been ſaid, although it ſhould be admitted that there were an eternal being of a firſt Man and a firſt Woman, yet it were impoſſible in Nature that the Generations of Men ſhould be infinite; and this appears upon the Reaſons here given, and likewiſe upon the former Conſideration of the impoſſibility of the Eternity of Mixed Bodies. For it is abſolutely neceſſary that there be an interval between the firſt exiſtence of the firſt created Parents of Mankind and the production of any deſcendent from them by ordinary courſe of procreation or generation: For ſuch a production cannot by any poſſibility be as ancient as the producents; though Creation may be inſtantaneous, yet Generation in its firſt inception, complement and perfection, cannot be inſtantaneous. Ideóque neceſſe eſt ut primus homo per procreationem ſive naturalem generationem productus, per novem menſes integros poſt primam conceptionem in utero lateat, & demum post ejuſdem in lucem editionem, per omnes gradus infantiae, pueritiae, juventutis, ad complementum maturioris aetatis deveniat: unde etiam neceſſe est ut primus homo per generationem, poſterior ſit primis hominibus per creationem, per ſpatium ad minus novem menſium. Unde ſi daretur primos humani generis parentes extitiſſe per aeternam creationem, impoſſibile est primos homines ex iiſdem prognatos extitiſſe per aeternam generationem; parentum enim exiſtentia praecedere debet exiſtentiam filii, aliter filius per generationem & pater in ſuis poſitivis existentiis erunt aequè antiqui, utrique aeterni: Et ſi detur exiſtentia patris (licet non ſub ea relatione) ante exiſtentiam filii, filii exiſtentiâ principium habeat neceſſe eſt poſterius exiſtentiâ patris, & ſic non aequè antiquum, & conſequenter nec aeternum.

Upon the whole matter, I do conclude, That although the Creation of the common Parents of Mankind might be de facto a very long time ſince, nay although there can be no imaginable time nor imaginable point wherein the Creation of the Individuals might not have been by the Divine Power; nor no imaginable point but that the Creation of the World or Mankind might have been ſooner, if the Divine Will had been ſo pleaſed, (for that denotes only a poſſibility of pre-exiſtence ſooner than it was, if the infinite Agent had ſo pleaſed, and not an actual Eternity) yet it is not poſſible in the nature of the thing that Mankind or any other created Being, that hath ſucceſſion either continued or diſcrete neceſſarily accompanying it, ſhould ſuſtain an actual, eternal, and conſequently infinite duration.

CAP. VI. Certain Objections againſt the Truths formerly delivered, and againſt the Reaſons given in proof thereof, with their Solutions.

THere are certain conſiderable Objections againſt thoſe things that are delivered in the precedent Chapters, and againſt the concludency or evidence of thoſe Reaſons, theſe I have delivered over to this Chapter.

The Firſt Objection is thus: That Eternity, and Infinite, and the notions thereof are too large for our Underſtanding, and we are loſt when we go about to frame Conceptions of them; and all our Argumentations touching them are inevident and unconcludent, becauſe our Underſtanding being but a finite power is capable only of finite Objects, and that the media whereby we go about to evince any thing muſt needs be finite, or otherwiſe they are not comprehenſible by us, and therefore wholly diſproportionate to frame Concluſions touching an Object that of all hands is agreed to be infinite; our Faculties are proportionate to thoſe Objects that are derived to us by the help and inſtrumentality of Senſe, either immediately, or at leaſt mediately, and therefore are not proportioned to the nature of Eternity and Infinitude. And therefore our Reaſoning touching theſe matters is as if he that were born blind ſhould Philoſophize touching Light or Colours, whereunto he hath not, nor never had a Faculty accommodate.

I anſwer, It is true that there is ſomething which I may call Poſitive in the conception of Eternal or Infinite, which the Underſtanding cannot maſter. But ſince it is very plain that all things in the World come under the diſtribution of finite or infinite, or that which hath a beginning, or that which hath not a beginning and is conſequently eternal; If I can (as moſt certainly I may) have a conception of what is finite, and what are the Laws and neceſſary Connexions of it, I can by that Notion conclude that whatſoever is finite, or that muſt be under the Laws and Rules of finite Beings, cannot be infinite: I have a Globe in my Hand, though I know not the Eternity, yet I know that whatſoever hath or muſt neceſſarily have limits or fines, is not, cannot be infinite, and therefore this Globe cannot be infinite: And if I can find in any other thing a parity of Reaſon, I do and may remove infiniteneſs from it as reaſonably and evidently as I do from this Globe I hold, or this Hour I write, or this Life I live: I do therefore certainly know that whatſoever is limited or bounded by ſomewhat that neceſſarily anteceded it, cannot be eternal.

I do not determin what Eternal or Infinite is in the Poſitive nature of it, only I remove Infinitude from what I find to be neceſſarily finite; and determin, that whatſoever hath bounds or limits to it, is quid finitum, and not quid non finitum; and whatſoever hath neceſſarily a beginning is quid temporale, and not quid aeternum: And all my endeavour hath been to ſhew that the things before diſputed are and needs muſt be of ſuch a nature as comes under the notion of what I know, namely, finitum or temporale; and not under the negation thereof, namely, infinitum, or non finitum, or fine principio.

2. Object. That by denying the poſſibility at leaſt of Eternity to created ſucceſſive Beings, I put a reſtraint to the infinite Goodneſs of God, who thereby is ſtraitned in the communication of his Goodneſs, coeternal to his being, which is part of his Divine Perfection; and alſo to the extent of his Power and Omnipotence: which is too bold and adventurous.

I anſwer, Touching the Goodneſs of God, and the neceſſity of his communication thereof, I have before ſaid enough in the Second Chapter, I ſhall not repeat it: But as touching the other reſtraint upon his Omnipotence, I ſay, the denying of Power in God to make a Creature, eſpecially a ſucceſſive created Nature as ancient as himſelf, is no more a derogation from his Power, than to deny him Power to make a Creature as great, and as good, and as powerful as himſelf: The Infiniteneſs of his Duration is a part of the Divine Perfection (in my judgment) incommunicable to any created Being, and it is part of the eminence, and excellence, and tranſcendence of that Divine Perfection, as well as others that are not communicable to any created Being. But ſecondly, Suppoſe that Eternity might be communicated to any created Being, as for the purpoſe, to the more pure Mental Natures, yet I do not diſparage the Omnipotence of God when I ſay it is not communicable to a ſucceſſive Being that is in fluxu; not for want of Power in God, but for want of Capacity in the nature of the thing to ſuſtain ſuch a duration upon the intrinſecal diſcongruity of the one to the other: It would not be a derogation to the Divine Omnipotence, to deny that the Diagonal of a Square ſhould be commenſurate in length to the Sides; for the nature of the thing will not bear it.

3. Object. But a late Author hath with oſtentation enough produced an Argument whereby all thoſe Reaſons and Inſtances concerning the impoſſibility and abſurdity of infinite Generations, infinite Individuals, and infinite Motion ſuppoſed to have actually exiſted, are eaſily diſcharged; and therefore he concludes, that notwithſtanding all that hath been ſaid, the Generations of Men might have been actually eternal, and that there may be infinite numbers of ſucceſſive Men, Generations and Revolutions, and that conſequently it is not repugnant that infinite may be greater than infinite; that there be infinite Days, and Years, and Men, and yet in that infinite 365 times more Days than Years, yet both infinite; the number of Men infinite, and yet the number of their Hands or Eyes double to the number of the Men: That the Suppoſition that theſe are contradictions, are but miſtakes and deluſions of our Underſtanding not able well to digeſt the buſineſs of Eternal, Immenſe, or Infinite. And this he thinks he proves by two principal Inſtances which he thinks are unqueſtionable.

1. That there is and would be ſuch a thing as Duration, and that duration would be ſucceſſive though there were no being in rerum natura, which he calls tempus aeternum.

2. That there is unqueſtionably an infinite Space actually: And yet all theſe imaginary conſequences and abſurdities follow upon that Suppoſition, which are urged as the Reaſons againſt the ſucceſſive eternal duration of Individuals above mentioned: For in that infinite ſpace there are infinite Miles and infinite Leagues, and yet thrice ſo many Miles as Leagues: The extent at both the extremes of Eaſt and Weſt infinite; yet each extreme divided, infinite: and many ſuch the like Inſtances, which yet notwithſtanding avoid not the truth of an infinite extenſion.

To this I anſwer briefly in this place, (for I have elſewhere examined at large the truth of both theſe Hypotheſes) I do in the firſt place premiſe, That as the exceſs (as I may call it) of Being, namely Infinitude, is difficult to apprehend; ſo the defect of Being, namely Nothing, is very difficult to apprehend: When we go about to apprehend ſimple Nothing, yet our Imagination clothes it with ſomething like Exiſtence, and gives imaginary being to Nothing, before we can come to ſhape a thought concerning it.

And certainly Duration and Space are in themſelves relative to ſomething that doth durare, and ſomething that is ſpatiatum, namely, ſomething extended: And if any (thing I cannot ſay) but if any Conceptible is more nothing than another, Duration without a thing that dureth, and Space without a thing that is extended in it, is the verieſt, the abſoluteſt Nothing that can be: While they are in conjunction with the thing that ſuſtains them, they are the meaneſt Being that is, for they are but modes of being; and therefore when the things that muſt ſuſtain them are not, they are the pureſt nothing that can undergo the notion of Nothing.

To ſay there is a duration, whether ſucceſſive, or permanent, or indiviſible, when there is nothing that doth ſuſtain that duration, is a Phantaſm of Nothing under the notion of Something: For it is moſt apparent to any man that will but lay aſide the Phantaſm, That the duration of every thing is diverſified in relation to it ſelf, according to the nature of the thing that endures; and though it coexiſts with a thing that appropriates another kind of duration, as ſuitable to its being, yet it retains ſtill its own duration, as appropriate to it ſelf. Thus the duration of the glorious God is another kind of duration than that of Motion or Bodies, and yet it coexiſts with that duration. Nay poſſibly the duration of a permanent Being (we will take it, a piece of Gold) hath another kind of duration than that of Motion, that is ſucceſſive: So that all the notion that we have of Duration without relation to ſomething that endures, is a fiction that the Underſtanding takes up, and the Image whereby it conceives it, is partly by the ſucceſſiveneſs of its own operations, and partly by thoſe external meaſures that it finds in Motion, rendred a ſucceſſive Nature, and pars poſt partem: And thus the imaginative Underſtanding dreſſeth up a Nothing, namely, Duration without a thing that endures, and then attributes to it what ſhe finds in her ſelf, and the things ſhe converſeth with, namely Succeſſion; when really there is no ſuch thing as duration or ſucceſſive duration, unleſs there is ſomething that doth ſo endure.

And that this is nothing elſe but a creature of the Imagination appears by this: No man alive can ſuppoſe that there is any exiſtence of duration that is to be a thouſand years hence, it reſts meerly in poſſibility; yet the Imagination will dreſs up that future duration under certain proportions that it borrows from the things it ſees and converſeth with.

And what is ſaid of Duration without a Body that dures, is in truth to be ſaid of Space without a Body to which it relates, and therefore well called ſpatium imaginarium.

The juſt apprehenſion of Space ſeems to be this; That whereſoever there is a Body actually exiſting to which Space relateth, there is an actual ſpace: And therefore if we ſhould ſuppoſe nothing to be beyond the convex Superficies of the laſt Heaven, yet the immediate contiguity of that convex to nothing were a real ſpace, becauſe it denotes a true relation to that which is, namely, the convex Superficies of the higheſt Arch of being: Nay, if we ſhould ſuppoſe

that the Univerſe were perfectly ſpherical, and another Univerſe of the ſame dimenſion and figure were created contiguous to it, as A and B, though they were contiguous only in the point of contingency, yet their two imaginary Poles C and D would have really a ſpace between, which would be commenſurate to the Semidiameter of both Spheres; for ſtill there is a real diſtance between the parts of two Bodies, and from that relation ariſeth a real ſpace: So if the Air within a concave Sphere or Cube were annihilated or not there, yet there would be a real ſpace between the ſides of the Cube or Sphere though no Body intervened, becauſe ſtill there remained the ambient ſides, to which that ſpace may as well relate and be commenſurate, as if the vacant ſpace were full of Air.

But without relation to ſome Body, there can be no actual Space; for Space is a term meerly of relation to ſomething that is ſpatiatum.

But then comes in the Author, and brings Lucretius with him, and tells us, that before the World was there was Space, or otherwiſe how could there be room for the Univerſe unleſs there were ſpace to receive it: and ſuppoſeth that if an Archer were upon the convex Superficies of the Heaven there would be ſpace for him, and if he ſhot his Arrow upward, there would be ſpace for that Arrow to fly, or elſe the Arrow would not move from the ſtring.

And all this is very true, and yet it proves nothing of real Space beyond the confines and relation of Bodies.

But as in relation to the infinite active Power of God, nothing had (as it were) a paſſive potentiality to be ſomething, to be a Body, to be a World; ſo conſequently nothing had a potentiality, as I may call it, to become Space when the World was made, and together with the production of Body there was a production of Space: As if at this day in the ſunſhine there ſhould be produced an opacous Body, together with it the ſhadow would be produced: and as the ſhadow, though really nothing when there was no opacous Body, had a kind of potentiality to be, upon the exiſtence of that Body; ſo this abyſs of Nothing had a kind of potentiality to be Space, when ſomething was produced to which it might have relation, as quid ſpatiatum.

And the ſame Anſwer is moſt clearly evident, as to Lucretius his Archer.

There was nothing, and therefore no ſpace, till the Archer came to the convex of the uppermoſt Heaven, but only a potentiality, if I may ſo call it, to receive him when he was there; and when he ſhot up his Arrow, that ſpace that really was not before, but only potentially to ſerve a Body when it comes there, now becomes ſpace for the flight and return of his Arrow; but when it was returned, now the ſpace no more exiſted for the Arrow, nor for the Archer after his coming from the convex of the higheſt Heaven: ſo that though nothing may be ſpace when it hath a Body to which it may relate, yet till that relation it is not ſpace, but nothing.

And certainly that which impoſeth upon perſons to aſſert an infinite Space, is this: Their Imagination and Phantaſie doth firſt create a Phantaſm, that doth ſubire vices corporis, and they fill an imaginary ſpace or an imaginary extenſion with that Phantaſm, and then indeed they have got an imaginary ſpace; I ſay, their Phantaſie and Imagination follows the conception of the imaginary ſpace with an imaginary extenſion, either ſuppoſing the World infinitely extended, or elſe fancying the Archer and the Arrow, and when that is handſomly fancied, the Phantaſm it ſelf doth effectually in the Imagination ſerve the turn to make up a relation between a Body and it, though really there be neither infinite Body, nor infinite Space, till the Body comes to give it its relation.

And if men will needs be concluding, that becauſe I cannot deliver my ſelf from the apprehenſion of ſpace ultra pomoeria coeli, therefore it muſt be ſuppoſed really to be; we ſhall find another imagination hardly able to deliver it ſelf from the apprehenſion of ſomething beyond the laſt Heavens, and again ſomething beyond that, becauſe it cannot frame to it ſelf an apprehenſion of nothing, or of any ſpace to be without a Body in it; and ſo upon the ſame reaſon prove the World infinitely extended.

And yet I appeal to the Phantaſie of theſe very men which either ſuppoſe an infinite empty Space, or an infinite World, whether they can bring their Imagination to ſuch a diſcipline as to ſuppoſe this Infinitude all together, but are fain to go on from one ſtep to another, and to think firſt of a ſpace larger than the Heavens, and then of a ſpace larger than that, and ſo gradually; ſo that if Imagination ſhould be a ſufficient medium to prove a real exiſtence, it would only prove an indefinite ſpace or extenſion, not a ſpace or extenſion actually infinite; for Imagination will never be able per ſaltum to conceive actually Infinite, nor without an Image of Exiſtence to conceive that which actually is not.

Therefore it ſeems to me to be too precarious an Argumentation againſt the ſtrong evidence of Reaſon, to prove the exiſtence of an infinite Space or infinite Body, barely by bold affirming it; or becauſe a man's Phantaſie, or Imagination, or Intellect being accuſtomed to the knowledge only of things extended and real ſpace, cannot deliver it ſelf from the thought of an imaginary ſpace or extent, though there were nothing in the World to ſuſtain it.

And upon this account a late Excellent Author hath uſed a very incongruous medium to prove a moſt certain and important Truth, namely, the exiſtence of God, becauſe there was really a Space before the World was created: Whereas firſt of all, there could be no Space without a Body; and ſecondly, if there could be ſuch a Space, it were of a diviſible exiſtence, which could hold no proportion with the indiviſible nature of the glorious God; Space being quid extenſum, and diviſible; but the Eſſence of God purely ſpiritual and indiviſible, and equally immenſe, whether there were a World or no World, Space or no Space.

4. The Fourth Objection is this: That it ſeems that it is not inconſiſtent that one Infinite ſhould be larger than another, and yet both infinite: Inſtances may be given of two kinds; 1. One Infinite in Intenſion may be larger than another; there are degrees of perfection in Created Natures, a Brute is more perfect than a Vegetable, and a Man more perfect than a Brute; and an Angel more perfect than a Man, and one Angel more perfect than another, at leaſt gradually; and conſequently the Perfection of Almighty God muſt more infinitely exceed the perfection of a Man than it doth of an Angel, and more infinitely exceed the perfection of an Angel of an inferiour Order than an Angel of the ſupremeſt Order, and yet He infinitely exceeds the perfection of the moſt perfect Angel. 2. In Extenſion, or ſomewhat analogal to it: Certainly 〈◊〉 the Eternal God had an eternal duration the firſt moment that he had Created the World as he hath now, and yet with Humility and Reverence in ſo great a Myſtery, we may ſay, and that truly, that he hath endured at this day above five thouſand years longer than he had endured at the Creation of the World: ſo that it is not repugnant to the nature of Eternity to be longer or ſhorter.

I anſwer, That for the obviating of this difficulty I have willingly declined that Inſtance againſt the eternal ſucceſſion of Mankind that purely conſiſts upon the account of additional acceſſions to the latter end, as I may call it, of Eternal Duration.

But firſt, I ſay that this anſwers not at all the Reaſon given, the ſtreſs whereof reſts not upon the incompetibility of an exceſs of one Infinitude above another either in Intenſion or Extenſion, but the incompetibility of any multitude to be infinite; becauſe it is impoſſible that any number or multitude can be infinite if there can be another multitude or number given that exceeds it, which will fall out in the ſucceſſive Individuals and Generations of Men: But the glorious God, as he is moſt ſimply and indiviſibly One, and all his Perfections eſſentially and indiviſibly the ſame with his moſt One and indiviſible Being; ſo the infinite exceſſes both of his Eſſential Perfections and of his Eternal Duration beyond all other Beings, are not meaſurable by multitude or number of degrees or ſucceſſive moments, which would in it ſelf imply either parts or diviſibility, but exceeds them all by an infinite interval that neither hath nor can have any bounds or limits: As his Perfection is infinitely greater than the perfection of a Man, ſo it is infinitely greater than the perfection of an Angel; and were it not infinitely greater than the perfection of an Angel, it could not be infinitely greater than the perfection of a Man, becauſe the intenſive diſtance between the perfection of an Angel and of a Man is but finite: And therefore though that interval between an Angelical and a Humane perfection be ſubducted out of the extent of the Divine Perfection, ſtill the extent of the Divine Perfection is infinite; for what is ſo ſubtracted or ſubducted out of the extent of the Divine Perfection, leaves ſtill a Quotient, if I may ſo call it, Infinite.

Secondly, That which gives a clear Anſwer to the Inſtance is this: The Perfection of Almighty God is a Primitive Eſſential Perfection, antecedent to all created perfection; and all created perfection is a perfection indeed given by the glorious God, according to ſuch meaſures-and degrees as he is pleaſed to beſtow: But as it is a derivative perfection, ſo it is a diſtinct kind of perfection from that which is in God, and of another nature, and makes no alteration in the Divine Perfection, nor borrows any of it: The glorious God was equally perfect before a Brute, or a Man, or an Angel, or a World was created, as he was after; and the production of Creatures of various degrees of eſſential perfection contributes nothing to it, nor takes any thing from it, nor makes any alteration in it: only it gives a new or farther relation from the Creature new created unto the Creator, and that in thoſe various ranks or decrees of perfection is indeed diverſified by diſparity in the Creatures themſelves, and in that comparative preference that one hath above another; but ſtill it is without and below the eſſential infinite Perfection of God, and doth no way affect or alter it. Take this Example in ſome meaſure to explain my meaning; I have a Rod of ſix foot long in my Hand, I take another Rod of four foot, another of two foot long, and apply them to my Rod of ſix foot long; I thereby find that my Rod of four foot takes up a greater ſpace upon my Rod of ſix foot than that of two foot, yet it makes no alteration in my Rod of ſix foot, but that continues of the ſame length as before, only by the application of the ſhorter Rods to it there ariſeth a new relation, or rather variety of compariſon between the Rod of ſix foot and the other Rods. Thus the Divine Perfection is primitive, abſolute, unchangeable; and when a Man is created, there is a Creature made that hath a perfection greater than a Brute, and when an Angel is created, he hath a perfection greater than a Man, and thereby comes in a nearer degree or likeneſs of perfection to the Divine Excellence than a Man doth; but yet it doth not at all alter that Perfection that is primitively and eſſentially and infinitely in Almighty God, but is a perfection of quite another kind as well as degree.

And upon the ſame account it is, that although the extent of the Divine Duration is now greater than it was five or ten thouſand years ſince, yet the duration of the Divine Exiſtence was no leſs infinite ten thouſand years ſince than it is now; becauſe the duration of ten thouſand years is but finite, and therefore though taken out of an infinite duration, leaves ſtill the duration infinite; for finite taken out of infinite, leaves ſtill that which remains infinite.

Beſides, the duration of the glorious God is the duration of ſuch a Being as is indiviſible, and as he hath no diviſibility in himſelf, ſo neither is his Eternal Duration diviſible into parts.

It is true, that when his own Power hath produced a World, and with it Motion, he coexiſts with that Motion and ſucceſſive Duration of created Being, which is little elſe beſides a relation to the things exiſting: And therefore he cannot be ſaid now to coexiſt with that which yet is not, but ſhall be, becauſe the coexiſtence with any thing imports an exiſtence of both the terms of that relation: And although by reaſon of that relation to Beings that are ſucceſſive and have ſucceſſion of parts, as Local Motion, or ſucceſſive Generations; it ſeems to us that he hath a kind of ſucceſſion in his duration, yet moſt certainly the exiſtence of a diviſible ſucceſſion in created Beings doth no more make his duration ſucceſſive than if nothing had been beſides himſelf: As the unſucceſſive duration of Almighty God with relation to himſelf, which is the modus exiſtentiae divinae, doth not communicate unto Motion or other created Being the ſame manner of duration which is appropriate to the Divine Exiſtence; ſo neither doth the exiſtence of Motion or created Beings transfer to the Divine Being ſuch a kind of duration as is proper to them, namely, a diviſible ſucceſſive duration conſiſting of ſucceſſive and innumerable parts: For, as I before have obſerved, the duration of every thing, which is only the mode of its exiſtence or permanentiae in ſuo eſſe, is diverſified according to the nature of the

exiſtence thereof. And though by reaſon of the coexiſtence of one thing with another there ariſeth a various relation or connotation between them, yet it alters not that intrinſecal manner of duration that is appropriate to the Eſſences of the things themſelves.

If we ſhould ſuppoſe the Circle A B C to move about a fixed unmoveable Center at D, whereby the part that is now in A, an hour hence will be at B, and an hour after that at C, and thereby is gained ſucceſſively different relations of ſite or poſition between the fixed or ſtable central Body at D, yet it is without any variation either of ſitus or motion in the central Body at D, which all this while reſts unmoveable, and keeps the ſame unaltered ſite or poſition in it ſelf: So it is in the coexiſtence of ſucceſſive Beings with the indiviſible, fixed, permanent ſtate of the glorious God.

But in all this there is nothing that anſwers or weakens the Reaſon before given againſt the Eternity of ſucceſſive Generations or Individuals, which is not upon this account, that that which is eternal cannot be extended to a greater extent at the hithermoſt and concluding extreme, as I may call it, for at the hither end it is quaſi quid finitum; but that thoſe Beings that muſt by their ſucceſſive exiſtence excreſcere in multitudinem ſive numerum, cannot be eternal upon a certain intrinſick incongruity between Multitude and Number of the one part, and Infinite of the other part: But in the eternal duration of the glorious God there is neither Multitude, nor ſo much as Succeſſion. And this is my ſecond Anſwer.

3. My third Anſwer is this: That although it may be, and certainly is conſiſtent with an eternal duration, that it may be ſhorter, or it may be longer upon the hither end thereof, namely, that extreme wherein it is finite, as is before ſhewn; yet it is impoſſible to be conſiſtent with the very notion of an eternal duration to be longer or ſhorter, à parte ante, in the extreme or remote part thereof, as I may call it; for upon that Suppoſition it ſhould be utrinque clauſa, terminated in the moment wherein I write, and terminated or limited by an antecedent being or duration of ſomething elſe: (With Reverence be it ſpoken) If any thing in the compaſs of Nature might bear an eternal Creation, yet if that Creation were but a moment after the Divine Exiſtence, that created Being could not be eternal becauſe it had a pre-exiſtence of the Divine Being before it: Nay, though I uſe the expreſſion of an antecedent moment to render my conception, yet that very imaginable moment muſt be an infinite duration antecedent to that created Being; and it could not poſſibly be otherwiſe; for if it were poſſible to be otherwiſe, it would conſequently deny the Eternity of God himſelf: for that created Being being impoſſible to be eternal, ſince it muſt, ex ſuppoſitione, have a pre-exiſting moment of the Divine Exiſtence, if that mora prae-exiſtentiae divinae were not eternal, but a moment, or any limited duration leſs than eternal and infinite, it would be but an addition of a limited time to a limited or non-eternal time; and therefore cannot be eternal (and here by the way, the Eternal, Incomprehenſible Generation of the Son, and Proceſſion of the Holy Spirit are no way concerned in this Diſpute, which are not created Beings, nor diſtinct from the Divine Eſſence, or eſſentially diſtinct from one another, but One Incomprehenſible God Bleſſed for ever) though under a perſonal diſtinction.

This therefore being the true ſtate of the matter, the Reaſon herein given doth not at all infirm the important Reaſon againſt the Eternity of Mankind, becauſe neceſſarily there would upon ſuch a Suppoſition follow an Eternity that had a beginning, an Eternity that was puiſne to ſome other thing or ſome other Eternal: And that although that duration which is infinite in one extreme, namely, à parte ante, and finite at another extreme, namely by the preſent time, may have an increaſe, acceſſion, or addition in that part in which, it is finite; yet it is impoſſible that it ſhould have any thing before it in that extreme wherein its Infinity and Eternity conſiſted. This is the chief ſtreſs of the former Debate, which is no way impugned by the Inſtance here given; for the glorious God and his Eternal Exiſtence is ſuch, that it hath not, cannot have any thing antecedent to it; neither is it meaſured by ſucceſſive parts, but is ſimply eternal, infinite, before all things, without beginning of Being or Duration as well as without end; and ſuch a Duration, as it is impoſſible to ſuppoſe any thing before it, or any thing equally ancient to it; but ever was, and ever had Being or Exiſtence, that is, eternally and immutably the ſame; what once he was he ever was, ſtill is, and ever ſhall be.

5. A Fifth Objection is this: That becauſe we have formerly ſuppoſed that nothing can poſſibly be eternal, and together with it have variety of Operations. The glorious Eternal God hath variety of Operations in all the Works of Creation and Providence, his emanant Actions; and alſo in the Counſels and Determination of his Will, his immanent Actions: And therefore the Poſition ſeems to be derogatory to the Eternity of Almighty God.

I had not inſerted this Objection but for the fuller vindication of the Truth, and to ſhew, that it no way in the leaſt imaginable degree derogates from the Truths concerning God.

I therefore anſwer, that when we are ſpeaking of alterations or changes, it may reaſonably be ſuppoſed to be one of theſe kinds.

1. An alteration that with it carries a change of the Nature or Eſſence of a thing; and thus in a large ſenſe generation or corruption, or the eſſential change of any thing or Being into another thing; thus corporeal Matter under any determinate form is changeable, and ſuch a mutability is impoſſible to be conſiſtent with Eternity: and it is thus impoſſible for the glorious God to be ſubject to any change, for he neceſſarily and therefore eternally exiſts, and muſt ever exiſt.

2. An alteration of ſtates or conditions of any Being, which yet as to its eſſential condition perſiſts as before: thus Bodies are every moment changed, ſometimes in quality, as from hot to cold, ſometimes in figure, ſometimes in dimenſions, as the motions of augmentation and diminution: a Child grows unto the ſtature of a Youth, and then of a Man; and ſuch Beings as theſe cannot ſuſtain an eternal duration, à parte ante: and in this reſpect the ever-glorious God is perfectly unchangeable, without ſo much as a ſhadow of change, but eternally and immutably the ſame.

3. A change of the internal and immanent acts of the Underſtanding and Will in a Being endued therewith; as to know that which before it knew not, to will, purpoſe, or determin what before it willed not or purpoſed not. The Schoolmen are indeed many of them a Generation of Men that think they can give an eſtimate of the manner of the Divine Operations, even thoſe that are immanent, when yet God knows 'tis more poſſible for the Infant of a ſpan long to diſcern and underſtand and define and determin the moſt ſublime and abſtruſe Notions of the moſt Seraphical Doctor, than for ſuch a Doctor to give an eſtimate of the hidden Operations of the Divine Intellect and Will: And therefore they are too bold to adventure upon ſuch determinations touching theſe Operations of the glorious God; and in the upſhot arrive at nothing touching them but preſumptuous, uncertain and dangerous Speculations: and it muſt needs be ſo, for as the Heavens are higher than the Earth, ſo and much more are the thoughts of the unſearchable God higher than our thoughts. The more ſober and weighty part of the Schoolmen do conclude this Queſtion in the negative, and aſſert, That Almighty God by one eternal act knew all things from all Eternity, and by the like eternal act willed from all Eternity what he any way willed; and though the termination of that Will reſpected Objects that neither were nor could be eternal, yet his Knowledge and Will was eternally the ſame as ever; and he begins not to know any thing which he did not eternally know, nor to will any thing which he did not eternally will, though the execution of that Will reſpects things to be done in time and futurity. And certainly as this is the moſt probable Opinion, ſo it takes away the pretence of the Objection; the immanent Acts and Operations of the glorious God being eternal and without change.

It is true, ſome late Schoolmen, and after them Clara in his 4th Problem ſeems to aſſert, that, Divina voluntas potest velle aliquid novum ſine mutatione ſui.

But ſuppoſe that this Suppoſition were admiſſible, yet this would not any way be inconſiſtent with the Eternity of the Divine Nature and Eſſence: 1. This is no Phyſical change in Almighty God, but a voluntary and free operation of his Will, which poſſibly was ſo at firſt willed by him to be changed according as he ſaw cauſe in his infinite Wiſdom. 2. That this which is here called a change of his Will, is not in truth a change of his Will, but a change in the Object, which only ſeems to make a diverſification of the Will, but indeed is the ſame Will diverſified only in the habitude to the Object. The Will of God is like a ſtraight unalterable Rule or Line, but the various comportments of the Creature either thwarting this Rule or holding conformity to it, occaſions ſeveral habitudes of this Rule unto it. We need no better explication hereof than that of the Prophet Ezechiel, Chap. 33. from the twelfth to the twentieth Verſe.

4. A change of Actions and Operations in relation to ſome external Object, or terminated therein; and ſuch a change as this is conſiſtent with an Eternal Being, though the change happen in any given portion of Time: Thus the Almighty and Eternal God created the World by his Power and Will in the beginning of Time, and orders, governs and diſpoſeth of the things by his Providence in all the Periods of Time, and yet without any Phyſical or real change in himſelf. And thus he began to be a Creator, when before he was not a Creator; and began to be a Governour of the World after it was made, and exerciſeth divers external acts of his Providence daily which before he did not. For thoſe various acts of his are terminated in ſuch Objects as neither were nor could be eternal, namely, the World and the Government thereof: And although he thereby gain a change of relation or relative denomination, yet it is no real or Phyſical change in himſelf. For all relations ariſe from the ſuppoſition of exiſtence of both the terms of relation, as between the Creator and the thing created, and the Governour and thing governed; and therefore although one of the terms of that relation, namely the Eternal God, had an eternal exiſtence in his own abſolute nature; yet the World, that was the other term of relation, had no eternal exiſtence, but was created in the beginning of Time, and the relation of a Creator or Governour muſt neceſſarily therefore ariſe in Time, and not from Eternity, becauſe one of the terms of the relation, namely the World, had not any exiſtence before Time began.

But in the eternal Generation of the Son and Proceſſion of the Holy Spirit, the termini relationis were all eternal, and conſequently the relation of Paternity and Filiation between the Firſt and Second Perſon, and the relation between the Sacred Perſons of the Trinity and the denomination thereof muſt needs be eternal, becauſe the terms of relation between whom that relation ariſeth were eternal: But it is not ſo between the Eternal God and a temporary World, for the relation could not ariſe till the World had an exiſtence; and a change or acqueſt of a new relation is not at all any real change in God, but is an accident reſulting from the exiſtence of both the termini, and can be no ancienter than the coexiſtence even of the lateſt and neweſt of thoſe terms, which if began in time muſt neceſſarily produce a new relation, yet without any real change in the pre-exiſting and eternal God.

And thus I have done with thoſe Phyſical and Metaphyſical Evidences of the Inception of the World and of Mankind, and againſt the Eternity of both. And although I ſhall deſcend in the enſuing Section to Moral Evidences of probability ſtrongly perſwading the ſame Truth, yet I lay the principal weight and ſtreſs of this Argument upon what is ſaid in the preceding Chapters of this Firſt Section, which though perchance they may have ſomething of obſcurity, as being bottomed upon and fetched from the true nature of the things themſelves, and therefore not ſo obvious and plain to all Capacities, yet they have a concludency in them not inferior, or at leaſt little inferior to Demonſtrations.

CAP. I. The Proofs of Fact, that ſeem with the greateſt Moral evidence to evince the Inception of Mankind: And firſt, touching the Antiquity or Novity of Hiſtory.

I Have now done with thoſe Evidences that in my Underſtanding ſeem, quaſi ab intrinſeco, to evince the Inception of Mankind from that intrinſecal incompoſſibility and inconſiſtency that the Suppoſition of the eternal exiſtence thereof bears with his Nature: I now deſcend to the examination of thoſe Evidences of Fact, which do or may ſeem to contribute to the proof of what is deſigned, namely, Novitatem generis humani.

And although that Evidences of Fact of things remote from our Senſe cannot be ſaid infallible and demonſtrative, becauſe the nature of ſuch matters of fact (ſimply as they are matters of fact) is not capable (as ſuch) of Demonſtration; yet they may be Evidences of high credibility, and ſuch as no reaſonable Man can with any juſt reaſon deny his aſſent unto them.

That which hath been, hath as certainly and infallibly, yea and as neceſſarily been, as that which is: Omne quod, eſt, dum eſt neceſſariò eſt, & omne quod fuit, cum jam preteriit neceſſariò fuit quando fuit, & in praeteritis non eſt contingentia. Only that which is, and is obvious to Senſe, hath this advantage of evidence which that which hath been wants, namely, the immediate evidence of Senſe, wherein though it is not univerſally impoſſible but that Senſe may be deceived, yet becauſe it is the beſt evidence that we have of matters of fact, we give credit to it as a ſenſible evidence, and we have reaſon ſo to do.

But of things tranſacted before our time, and out of the immediate reach of our Senſe, we may have ſuch an evidence as in reaſon we ought as reaſonable Men to acquieſce in, though the evidence be ſtill in its own nature but moral, and not ſimply demonſtrative or infallible: And the variety of circumſtances renders the credibility of ſuch things more or leſs, according to the various ingredients and contributions of credibility that are concentred in ſuch an evidence.

It is impoſſible to demonſtrate by evidence infallible (or which is all one, by evidence that is impoſſible to be falſe) that there was ſuch a Man as Julius Caeſar or Auguſtus, that there was ſuch a Man as William the Conqueror, or King Henry the Eighth, or that ſuch a Man was his Father, or ſuch a Woman his Mother; or that there is ſuch a City as Venice, or Rome, (to me that never ſaw it,) for all theſe I have but by relation from others, and it is not impoſſible but thoſe Hiſtories or informations or relations by which I am informed of theſe things may be falſe: And they are ſuch matters as have in them a leſs evidence than my own Senſe of Sight; for the evidence of my Senſe is ſimple and immediate, and therefore I have but a ſhorter cut thereby to the aſſent to the truth of the things ſo evidenced: But in things that I have by relation from others, my evidence is of greater diſtance; for firſt, I ſee them not by my own Eyes, but it is others that muſt firſt ſee the thing they relate; and ſecondly, though I ſhould think that whatſoever might be believed, if obvious to the Senſe of others, might have as great a credibility as if obvious to my own, yet I muſt have a ſecond poſtulation that muſt have an ingredient to elicit my aſſent, namely, the veracity of him that reports and relates it. And hence it is, that that which is reported by many Eye-witneſſes hath greater motives of credibility than that which is reported by few; that which is reported by credible and authentick witneſſes, than that which is reported by light and inconſiderable witneſſes; that which is reported by perſons diſintereſſed, than that which is reported by perſons whoſe intereſt it is to have the thing true, or believed to be true; that which hath the concurring teſtimony of real exiſting monuments, than that which is without them; and finally, that which is reported by credible perſons of their own view, than that which they receive by hear-ſay from thoſe that report upon their own view: So that it is not with Evidences of Fact as it is with Logical or Mathematical Demonſtrations, which ſeem to conſiſt in indiviſibles, for that which thus is demonſtratively true is impoſſible to be falſe; but Moral Evidence is gradual, according to the variety of circumſtances. Yet ſuch a man would be exploded as an irrational man, that will not believe there was ſuch a man as Julius Caeſar, becauſe the Hiſtorians that write of him might poſſibly conſpire to deceive the World with a Romance, or that the Books may be ſuppoſititious or corrupted; or will not believe that ſuch a Man was his Father, or ſuch a Woman his Mother, becauſe he might be ſuppoſititious; or will not believe there is ſuch a City as Rome, which he never ſaw, becauſe Travellers are wont to love to tell ſtrange things, and ſo may many as well as one.

So that as eternal Truths may have one kind of certainty by Logical Demonſtration, and as Mathematical Concluſions have an infallible certainty by Mathematical Demonſtration, and as matters objected immediately to our Senſe have another kind of certainty by ſenſible evidence, ſo matters ſimply of fact not objected immediately to our Senſe have another kind of certainty, though not altogether equal to the former, nor ſimply infallible, yet ſo highly credible that may juſtly elicit the aſſent of reaſonable men, and ſuch as is proportionate to the nature of the thing, and therefore more cannot be reaſonably expected for the proof of the fact.

In the purſuance of this Argument, namely, Evidences of Fact touching the Origination of Mankind, I muſt therefore ſay that the Evidences thereof are not of an infallible certainty, and ſo much the rather becauſe it relates to a matter that at the neareſt that can be ſuppoſed is near ſix thouſand years diſtant from us, and ſome ſuppoſe more; therefore the Evidences of Fact are as it were percolated through a vaſt Period of Ages, and many very obſcure to us. And therefore all Proofs of this kind except that of Divine Revelation (which though true, and infallibly true, we muſt not by the Laws of Argumentation bring in here, becauſe at one word it determins the Queſtion) will ariſe to no higher than Moral, and therefore fallible in their own nature. We reſt upon what hath been before ſaid for Evidences and Reaſons, that to me ſeem demonſtrative.

But yet the Evidences of Fact which we ſhall produce muſt be conſidered alſo with theſe Advantages for their credibility.

1. They are ſuch as bear a great congruity and conſonancy with, and ſubſervience to thoſe former Arguments that ex natura rei and intrinſecè prove an impoſſibility of an eternal duration of Mankind, à parte ante, which though it doth not, cannot evince that Mankind muſt have their Origination or Beginning in hac vel iſta hora, yet they do evince that Beginning it muſt have, and the evidences of fact are as ſo many teſtes, conteſtes, or ſuffragiales, that bear witneſs to that Truth that the former ſort of Arguments do plainly evince.

2. Though theſe Evidences of Fact taken ſingly and apart, are not without their Objections that may ſeem to weaken them, yet juncta juvant: That evidence at Law which taken ſingly or apart makes but an imperfect proof, ſemiplena probatio, yet in conjunction with others grow to a full proof, like Silurus his twigs, that were eaſily broken apart, but in conjunction or union were not to be broken.

Truths (eſpecially of Fact) are not made Truths by Arguments or Evidence; If there were once ſuch a man as Caeſar, it is moſt certainly true that he was, though no Hiſtorian ever mentioned him; and therefore if there were ten thouſand Authors that mention him kept ſacredly and inviolably in certain Archives unto this day, all this evidence doth not make him to be, but only gives us a light and evidence of great probability that he was: The Stars in the Milky-way, and thoſe Aſſeclae Jovis are not therefore in the Heavens or Aether, becauſe the Teleſcope hath diſcovered them, for they were there before; but the poſition of thoſe Glaſſes preſent them to our perception, and evidence their being, which cannot be diſcovered without them.

And ſo it is with Evidences of Fact, they do not make the thing to be, but evidence them to be; and becauſe if to any one quaeſitum of fact there be many but probable evidences, which taken ſingly have not perchance any full evidence, yet when many of thoſe evidences concur and concenter in the evidence of the ſame thing, their very multiplicity and conſent makes the evidence the ſtronger; as the concurrent teſtimonies of many Witneſſes or many Circumſtances even by their multiplicity and concurrence make an evidence more concludent.

Now theſe Evidences of Fact I ſhall caſt into theſe ranks.

1. We have no authentical Hiſtory of former Ages extant, but what hath been written within the compaſs of four thouſand years.

2. The ſubject matter of thoſe Hiſtories give us no account of the Original of great Monarchies, Kingdoms, or Commonwealths, but what appear thereby to have begun within the compaſs of about five thouſand years.

3. The original Invention and Inventors of moſt conſiderable Arts had their Origination, as far as we can find, by Monuments of ancient times, within the compaſs of about ſix thouſand years.

4. The Original of the Apotheoſes of moſt of the Heathen fictitious Deities appears by the ancient Monuments of former times to have had their beginning within the compaſs of five thouſand years.

5. The moſt authentick Hiſtories and Monuments of Antiquity give us an account of the firſt Fathers, or Capita familiarum, and of the Plantation of the known Parts, Continents and Iſlands of the World within the compaſs of five thouſand years.

6. The Inhabitants of the World do daily increaſe, and their increment ſurmounts daily their decreaſe; which could not be, unleſs the World of Mankind had their original within ſome proportionate time, and could not conſiſt with ſuch a vaſt exceſs of duration which ſome would aſſign, much leſs with an eternal duration, or ſuch as never had a beginning.

7. There hath in all Ages, and among all People been a conſtant tradition retained and believed, touching the Origination of Mankind ex non genitis vel per generationem propagatis.

Theſe are the Heads of thoſe Evidences of Fact which I ſhall uſe in this Argument touching the Origination of Mankind, whereunto poſſibly other occaſional Topicks of the like nature may be added.

And touching theſe Evidences of Fact, this I ſhall ſubjoyn.

1. That I do not lay the weight of this Argument upon thoſe Evidences of Fact, becauſe they have or may have their ſeveral allays and fallibilities, which I ſhall impartially ſubjoyn to every particular Topick.

But I lay the weight of the Argument upon what hath been before ſaid, which to me ſeems to be little leſs than demonſtrative, drawn from the intrinſick nature of the thing, and from that abſurdity which would ariſe upon the Suppoſition of the Eternity of Mankind, and the incompoſſibility of an eternal duration, à parte ante, to ſucceſſive Natures.

2. That although ſingly and apart theſe Evidences of Fact are not ſo concluſive but have their allays and exceptions, yet they have theſe advantages that advance their evidence, as very credible; 1. In that the Suppoſition which they are produced to prove, is not impoſſible to be true: 2. That there is nothing of probability of Reaſon or Inſtance that can be produced againſt the truth of that Suppoſition which is contended to be proved by them: 3. They have ſo much the more weight and evidence, in that they do ſuffragate and bear witneſs to the truth of that Suppoſition (namely, the Inception of Mankind) which holds ſo great a congruity with the intrinſick reaſon and nature of the thing, the contrary whereof, namely, the Eternity of Mankind, is apparently contradictory to a ſtrict and true reaſon.

3. That although theſe Evidences of Fact, taken ſingly and apart, poſſibly may not be ſo weighty, yet the very concurrence and coincidence of ſo many Evidences that contribute to the Proof of the thing deſigned, carries with it a great weight, even as to the point of Fact: it is not probable that that Suppoſition ſhould be falſe which hath ſo many concurrent Teſtimonies bearing witneſs to it: And therefore although I ſhall impartially ſubjoyn thoſe Allays and Abatements which may be brought againſt the ſeveral Inſtances, whereby if ſingle, they might ſeem of leſs weight and moment; yet I do not thereby take off that Evidence which in conſort and conjunction they give to the truth of the Suppoſition intended to be proved by them.

4. That it cannot be expected in an Argument of this nature, which is touching a matter of Fact, that Evidences of Fact can be no more than topical and probable; and therefore though there may be Allays and Abatements that may take away a neceſſary or infallible concludency in theſe Evidences of Fact, yet it is ſufficient that they be probable and inductive of Credibility, though not of Science or Infallibility. Ariſtotle, as I remember, in the beginning of his Politicks tells us that all Truths have not the ſame kind of Evidence, neither indeed can have, and therefore it is unreaſonable to expect ſuch an Evidence as the thing cannot poſſibly bear, though it be a real Truth.

5. That among theſe Evidences of Fact, though all contribute to the Proof of the Suppoſition, yet the three laſt ſeem to be of that nature that they are of greateſt weight, and leſs ſubject to exception.

6. That in as much as in this Argument I deſign only the uſe of Reaſon and Reaſonable Evidence, and endeavour to make my Suppoſition evident to Reaſonable Men as ſuch; I do not therefore make uſe of the divine and irrefragable Authority of the Holy Scriptures: For they that ſubſcribe to the Infallibility and Divine Authority of them, need none of this Method of Ratiocination that I uſe to prove this Suppoſition of the Origination of Mankind, which is ſo plainly and diſtinctly delivered in the Holy Scriptures; and therefore where I have recourſe to the Holy Scriptures, I uſe it but as a Moral Evidence, a Hiſtory highly credible; and I demand of my Reader • this equal Juſtice, That he would at leaſt give it that credit that the Antiquity, Congruity, and Moral Evidence of it deſerves, which certainly would be much more than what the moſt do ordinarily allow to the Hiſtory of Thucydides, Herodotus, Livy, Tacitus, Manethon, Xenophon, Cteſias, or Beroſus.

7. Though in this large Diſcourſe I may ſeem to loſe time by proving of that which is not queſtioned by ſober Men, that in a laborious Diſcourſe of this nature I do rather raiſe a Queſtion that would be at quiet if let alone, at leaſt I loſe time, and, magno conatu nihil efficiam; yet I hope in the Concluſion it will be of uſe to confirm our Faith, to magnifie the value of the Holy Scriptures, and to give ſome ſtop to thoſe Atheiſtical and Epicurean Opinions that begin more than formerly to obtain in the World.

CAP. II. Concerning the firſt Evidence, the Antiquity of Hiſtory, and the Chronological account of Times.

BUT before I begin, I ſhall prefix a ſhort Chronological Scheme of Times, to which I ſhall have occaſion oftentimes to refer; wherein I ſhall not be over-ſollicitous for great curioſity or exactneſs. For although there is ſcarce any one Chronological Writer that differs not from another in the preciſe connexion of Times and Things, yet there will be certainty enough for my purpoſe, if I take ſo much out of them wherein they do in ſubſtance agree, though they differ in their particular Account.

And although the Account of the Years of the World according to the ſeventy, do ſeem more uſeful to the ſolution of ſome difficulties in Chronology, who aſſign 2262 years from the Creation to the Flood; and from thence to the Birth of Abraham 1132 years; whereas the Jewiſh Account aſſigns for the former Period 1656 years, and for the latter 292 years. So that according to the Seventy, from the Creation to the Birth of Abraham were 3394, but according to the Jews only 1948 years; yet I ſhall rather chooſe to follow the Jewiſh Account, and take Helvicus Abſtract for my little, ſmall Chronological Table.

AnniMundi. JUDAICI. ASSYRII. ARGIVI. AEGYPTII. ATHENI ENSES. HISTO RICI. 1656 Diluvium.           8171   Belus. 1771   Ninus. 1823   Semiramis. 1870   Ninus.Sardanapalus. 1948 Abrahamnatus.   2093   Inachus. 2123 Abrahamimors.     2149   Phoronous.Regnante inAttica Ogy ge, & intraannos Phore nei, diluviumOgygium. 2200     Apis. 2210       Aegyptie rum dyna ſtia: The moſis. 2220 Joſeph inAegypto.       2235   Argus. 2300       Prometheiſeculum. 2373 Moſesnatus.         2430         Athenien ſium dynaſtiaz prima: Cecrops. Deucalionisdiluvium. 2450 Exitus abAegypto.           2475   Danaus. 2490 Joſhua dux.     2573   Ganymedisraptus. 2660     Cadmus èPhoenicia inGraeciam migravit.     HerculesAmphitryo nis filius. 2710       Argonau tarum expe ditio. 2750           Bellum Tro janum, &Trojae exci dium. 2850           Reditus He raclidarum. 2905 David RexIſraelis.         Ionica mi gratio. 3000           Homeri aetas. 3060 Athalia &Joas.         Lycurguslegiſlator. 3175 Ʋzziah.         Olympiadesincepti. 3195           Roma con dita. 3325           ſolon & ſe ptem ſapien tes. 3391           Pythagoras,Cyrus.

Having premiſed thus much touching the Chronological Account of ſome Times and Things paſt, without confining my ſelf to the exactneſs of Years, and with omiſſion of many things happening in theſe Periods; I ſhall now proceed with the firſt of my Inſtances, namely, touching the Hiſtories of former Ages, and their Antiquity; reſerving the matter of their Hiſtories, and what may be collected from them, to the enſuing Chapters.

Thoſe Nations whoſe Hiſtorians put fair for the greateſt Antiquity, are the Romans, Grecians, Perſians, Aſſyrians or Babylonians, Egyptians, and the Jews: of all theſe there is ſomething extant.

As touching the Chineſes and their long derived Annals, there is much ſpoken by report or relation, but nothing authentick thereof is extant to the common view but ſome ingenious yet uncertain Collections out of Martinius by Mr. Webb in his Eſſay touching the Primitive Language; Voſſius, and ſome others: and therefore I ſhall ſpare any thing touching them.

Firſt touching the Romans, though there were many Monuments of Antiquity preſerved in writing among them, as appears by their Laws of Twelve Tables, their Faſti Conſulares, the Tranſcripts whereof are extant to this day; yet we cannot expect ſo much Antiquity of Hiſtorians and Writers among theſe, as we may among other People of greater Antiquity; ſince the firſt Foundation of their City was ſome time after the Olympiads began, viz. in the 7th Olympiad, and about the year of the World 3190.

The Grecians, whoſe Monarchy preceded that of the Romans, have more ancient Hiſtorians than the Romans: And not to reckon up their Philoſophers and Poets, that applied not themſelves to Hiſtory, I ſhall only mention theſe that follow: Xenophon, that lived about the 97th or 98th Olympiad; Thucydides and Herodotus, who lived about the 85th or 88th Olympiad; but he among them of greateſt note and antiquity was Homer, who wrote the Hiſtory of the Trojan War; touching the time of his life and writing the Chronologiſts agree not, ſome making him 200 years after the Deſtruction of Troy, ſome more, ſome leſs; but all placing him before the firſt Olympiad, and after the Deſtruction of Troy, thoſe two famous Epochae among the Greeks.

This is the ancienteſt Poetical Hiſtorian that is extant among the Greeks, although it is not unlike that many were more ancient among them, as is mentioned by Tatianus in Euſeb. praeparationis lib. 10. as Linus the Tutor of Hercules, Amphion, Orpheus, Muſaeus, and ſome others; yet we have little extant of them but Poetical Raptures and Fictions, and thoſe alſo but in fragments and pieces traditionally preſerved in ſubſequent Authors.

Among the Perſians, though their Monarchy were more ancient than that of Greece, yet we have leſs extant of Hiſtorical Writings concerning them; the ancienteſt that I have heard of is that of Xenophon, though a Grecian, and Cteſias, who is ſuppoſed to have lived contemporary with Xenophon; Megaſthenes, a Perſian Hiſtorian about the 120th Olympiad, out of whom Abydenus that wrote touching the Aſſyrians and Babylonians extracted many things relating to the Perſians, as appears by his Fragments cited by Euſeb. lib. 9. Praepar. ſect. 41.

Touching the Chaldean or Babylonian Hiſtorians, though that Monarchy be extended to a vaſt Period by ſome of their ancient Hiſtorians, yet the ancienteſt credible Hiſtorians that we have concerning them are, Beroſus who lived about the 130th Olympiad, and Abydenus before mentioned; only it is reported by Simplicius out of Porphyry, that Caliſthenes one of Alexander's Captains brought to Ariſtotle from Babylon a relation of their ancienteſt Aſtronomical Calculations, 1903 years before the Taking of Babylon by Alexander, which is ſuppoſed to be in the year of the World 3620 according to the Septuagint; which gives a probable conjecture of the Inception of the Babylonian Monarchy to be about 200 years before the Birth of Abraham.

Touching the Phoenicians, from whom it is ſuppoſed that not only Learning but Letters themſelves were brought into Greece by Cadmus; the firſt and ancienteſt Hiſtorian is ſuppoſed to be Sancuniathon, who is related by Philo Biblius according to Euſeb. praepar. lib. 1. ſect. 9. to have been before the Deſtruction of Troy, and very near the time of Moſes, and to have written a Hiſtory à prima Univerſi molitione, and that he ſearched many Monuments of Antiquity: The Writings of Mercurius Triſmegiſtus whom the Egyptians call Thoth, and the arcana Ammoneorum volumina, purged the Hiſtory of former times from Fables, and gave a full account of former Ages, whoſe Writings Philo Biblius tranſlated into Greek, and digeſted into nine Volumes, he gathered much from Hierombal the Prieſt of Jao, whom Bochart upon very probable reaſons ſuppoſeth to be Gedeon called Jerubbaal; and having ſet up an Ephod in his City, might be ſuppoſed a Prieſt, and from the intercourſe between them the Idol Baal-berith was brought from Berith the City of Sancuniathon, into Judea.

Touching the Egyptians, they pretended to the greateſt antiquity both of Government and Learning; the latter they principally derived from Hermes, ſtiled by ſome Mercurius Triſmegiſtus, and by the Egyptians Thoth; the Phenicians made claim to this man as theirs, attributed to him the Invention of Letters, of Navigation, of the Virtues of Herbs, Euſeb. lib. 1. Praeparat. ſect. 10. de Phoenicum Theologia; he is ſuppoſed more ancient than Moſes, but we have nothing authentick exiſting which he wrote: The ancienteſt Hiſtorian of the Affairs of Egypt was Manethes the Egyptian Prieſt, who lived about, or as ſome think, before the time of Alexander, he carries up the Res Aegyptiacas to an exceſſive Antiquity, and yet with great particularity and pretended certainty: ſome account him fabulous, becauſe he carries up the Egyptian Dynaſties before the Flood, yea and long before the Creation; others aſſert the probability of the Egyptian Dynaſties to over-reach the univerſal Flood, but ſalve that prodigious exceſs of their numerous Years by reducing them to Months, or Anni Lunares, which were anciently ſo accounted among the Egyptians.

The Egyptians have had other Writers of their Hiſtories, but of a later date, as Ptolemeus Mendeſius, mentioned ſometimes by Euſebius; and thoſe Arabick Hiſtorians mentioned by Kircher in that Book that delivers the Hiſtory of the ſucceſſion of their Dynaſties.

Laſtly, I come to the Jewiſh Hiſtory begun by Moſes, and continued down in a clear ſucceſſion and ſeries of times till their return from the Babyloniſh Captivity and this Hiſtory hath a juſt prelation above all the Writings of other Hiſtorians in theſe enſuing reſpects.

1. It hath the greateſt and moſt particular certainty, and far beyond any of the Hiſtorians before mentioned; it contains the certain Periods of Times, Names, Men, Places, Actions, and all Circumſtances requirable in a Hiſtory to inform; it is not involved in Myſtical expreſſions or Mythologies, but is plain, familiar, and intelligible.

2. It hath the greateſt evidence of Truth that can be expected by a reaſonable man, namely, Evidence from it ſelf, the particularity and circumſtances of the things it relates; Evidence from the ancienteſt Heathen Authors, eſpecially Sancuniathon, Beroſus, and Abydenus before mentioned; Evidence from the ſeveral parts thereof, the Book of one Age bearing witneſs to another; as the Books of Joſhua to thoſe of Moſes, the Books of Kings to thoſe of Moſes and Joſhua, though written in ſeveral Ages; Evidentia rei, or facti, there cannot be greater Evidence than the Regiment of a People for ſo many Ages according to the Laws given and recorded by their firſt Hiſtorian Moſes, and the enjoyment of their Poſſeſſions according to the diſtribution of their next Hiſtorian Joſhua.

3. It is no broken Piece, or Hiſtorical Fragment, but it is carried down from the beginning of Time to all the enſuing Ages of the Jewiſh State, without any chaſma or interval.

4. It hath the evidence of the higheſt credibility that any thing of that nature is capable of, That the Books of Moſes eſpecially, which are the Caput Hiſtoriae Judaicae, were written by that Man Moſes, and that he lived in that Age wherein he is ſuppoſed to write: 1. The conſtant uninterrupted Tradition of that Kingdom and Nation from it firſt coalition, even to this day. 2. The atteſtation of all the ſucceding Writers of that Hiſtorical Series of the Jewiſh Affairs. 3. The inviolable Obſervation of thoſe Laws given by Moſes and recorded in that Hiſtory, as of the Laws given by him. 4. The Suffrage of all Heathen Authors both modern and ancient, that have occaſion to mention the concerns of that People.

5. It is a Hiſtory that contains matters of far greater moment and antiquity than any other Writers but ſuch as in probability made their Collections out of it, namely, of the Tranſactions from the firſt Creation of the World until the Univerſal Flood, and from thence to the time of him that firſt wrote it, namely Moſes.

6. It is a Hiſtory that was really written by Moſes, who was far more ancient than all the Heathen Writers above mentioned (excepting only Triſmegiſtus, of whoſe Writings we have nothing extant) and more ancient than moſt of thoſe Things or Notes recorded by thoſe moſt ancient Heathen Writers which for the moſt part filled their Books; He wrote 540 years before Homer; 200 years before Sancuniathon, according to Bochart's account; 300 years before the Expedition of the Argonauts; 350 years before the Trojan War; and a conſiderable time before the Apotheoſes or Inaugurations of many of the Heatheniſh Deities. So that as the Matter of his Hiſtory, ſo the Time of his writing is far more ancient than the writing of the moſt ancient Heathen Hiſtorians that are at all extent. Much of this I ſhall have occaſion to reſume and enlarge in the enſuing Chapters, yet this was neceſſary in this place.

The Inference that is made from hence is, That probably if the World of Mankind had been Eternal, or if it had any ſuch vaſt diſtance from its Beginning as ſome ſuppoſe, we ſhould have had Hiſtorical Monuments and Writings long before the Age of Moſes.

But for all this, I muſt needs ſay, this Conſideration ſingly (I ſay ſingly) taken and weighed, maketh not much againſt an eternal or at leaſt a vaſter Epocha of the firſt Origination of Man than is ordinarily ſuppoſed; I ſhall therefore ſet down thoſe allays that make againſt the ſtrength of the conſequence drawn from this Topick.

1. It is evident that the uſe of Letters and Writing were far more ancient than the time of Moſes; the Egyptians and Phenicians carry up the original of the invention thereof to Mercurius Triſmegiſtus, which is ſuppoſed long before Moſes: And although Cadmus is ſuppoſed to have brought the uſe of Letters out of Phoenicia into Greece ſome time after the Age of Moſes, according to Polydore Virgil, lib. 1. cap. 6. out of Pliny, Herodotus and others; yet it appears by what is before mentioned, that there were in Phoenicia very ancient written Volumes called Volumina Ammonaeorum long before the time of Sancuniathon. And if we believe the Tradition of Joſephus, the Pillars of Seth were extant in his time; and according to Tertullian ſome Fragments of the Writings of Enoch were traditionally extant in his time: But howſoever Moſes (if he be the Author of the Hiſtory of Job, whom ſome think to be contemporary at leaſt with Jacob) mentions Books and Writings to have been common things in the time of Job, Job 19.23. Joſephus lib. 1. cap. 3. Tertull. de Habitu Mulierum.

2. Surely if Writing were ſo ancient, it is probable that many Hiſtories might be before the time of Moſes which were loſt in ſucceſſion of time, as it muſt be agreed that moſt of thoſe ancient Monuments that in the granted Period of the World were extant before Moſes time are ſince loſt, and many millions of Books that have been written ſince Moſes time have by the injury of Time and Men been loſt; much more thoſe Books which were written antecedent to Moſes time: And the truth is, the preſervation of the Books of Moſes entire unto this day, when ſo many of a far later date are loſt, is to be attributed to the ſpecial Providence of Almighty God.

2. Again, they that aſſign the ſhorteſt time between the Origination of Mankind and the Writings of Moſes, allow it to be ſomewhat above 2460 years: So that although Moſes were admitted the firſt Hiſtorian that ever wrote, it would very near as ſtrongly conclude againſt the antiquity of 2460 years before his writing as againſt an eternal exiſtence of Mankind: if it ſhould be an Argument againſt the latter, it would be ſuch alſo againſt the former.

3. Conſidering the many mutations and caſualties of Wars, Tranſmigrations, eſpecially that of the General Flood, there might probably be an obliteration of all thoſe Monuments of Antiquity that immenſe Ages precedent at ſome time have yielded. Cecrops was contemporary with Moſes, and Belus and Ninus were before him; yet we have no Monuments extant of the Aſſyrians ſo ancient as Belus, or of the Athenians ſo ancient as Cecrops, but ſuch as are Traditions, and written long after their times. So that although I have mentioned this concerning the known Periods of Hiſtorical Writers, yet I think we are to be careful not to lay too great a ſtreſs ſingly on it, and it is the leaſt of all that follow in weight or evidence: And yet this was fit to be mentioned, becauſe it is neceſſary for the more clear diſcovery and application of that which follows.

CAP. III. The ſecond Evidences of Fact, namely, the apparent Evidences of the firſt Foundation of the greatest and ancient Kingdoms and Empires.

I Come to my Second Evidence of Fact, which is the ſubject Matter of Hiſtories, and principally concerning the Evidence ariſing from them of the firſt Original of the moſt conſiderable Monarchies in the World.

Touching the great Monarchies of the World, their Original is ſo well known, and delivered down to us from Authors of unqueſtionable truth, that there need little be ſaid touching them; for they have their confeſſed Epochae within certain and known Periods. As the beginning of the Roman Monarchy under Romulus, which gives the Epocha Urbis conditae in the 7th Olympiad; the beginning of the Grecian Monarchy, which hath its Epocha in Alexander about the 111th Olympiad; the beginning of the Perſian Monarchy, which had its Epocha in Cyrus about the 55th Olympiad, though the ſame were not eſtabliſhed in the beginning of Cyrus, but completed in Cambyſes his Son about the 62d Olympiad. And the like might be obſerved concerning ſeveral ſmaller Kingdoms, whoſe originals are delivered over to us in Hiſtories.

And although it is true that theſe Beginnings of theſe ſeveral Monarchies and Kingdoms do not ſo begin as if thoſe Men that founded theſe Monarchies were the natural Fathers of all thoſe Perſons that did coaleſcere in Regnum vel Monarchiam; or as if thoſe Monarchies were derived from the Heads or Roots that gave them this denomination, as all Men are derived from the common Parent of Mankind, or as poſſibly ſome other of the ancient Monarchies, which we ſhall have occaſion hereafter to mention, were derived: For many times the beginning of Monarchies and Kingdoms was by the coalition of many Perſons, it may be of ſeveral Nations, into an Army, as they did under Cyrus, or into a City, as they did under Romulus, or by tranſmigration of Perſons from one Countrey to another, as the Iſraelites did.

And therefore we are not to take it that theſe Originations of Monarchies were the Origination of all the People that were joyned in it; for they had their exiſtence oftentimes before, and took their denomination from the Dux Exercitùs or the Rector Civitatis, under which they were as it were liſted in their Civil or Military coalition.

And therefore the Argument is not thus neceſſarily that the Roman Monarchy or the Grecian Monarchy had not its beginning before ſuch a time, therefore thoſe Men that were the conſtituent parts thereof had no exiſtence before that time; but that the Civil Society under the Prince, Rector or form of Government then began to be formally ſuch in ſuch a ſpecial Conſtitution.

But thoſe Monarchies that pretend to the greateſt Antiquity are principally,

1. The Aſſyrian or Babylonian Monarchy. 2. The Egyptians, and their Dynaſties. 3. The Grecians. 4. The Chineſes.

Theſe I ſhall examin in order.

1. Touching the Aſſyrian or Babylonian Monarchy, we do with the beſt authority both of Sacred and Prophane Writers ſuppoſe,

1. That it had its beginning ſince the Univerſal Deluge from Ham the youngeſt Son of Noah.

2. That the Reaſons and Authorities againſt that Suppoſition are not of weight enough to evince the contrary.

Before I come to my Reaſons for this Aſſertion, ſomething I ſhall premiſe touching the Aſſyrian Empire, and how it ſtood in relation to that of the Babylonian.

It ſeems that Babylon was at firſt the Seat of the Aſſyrian Empire, the building whereof ſome attribute to Belus, ſome to Ninus his Son, ſome to Semiramis his Wife, and ſome to others: but afterwards the Caput Imperti of the Aſſyrians was Ninive, built upon the River Tigris.

It alſo ſeems, that in proceſs of time the Aſſyrians either new built or repaired Babylon that had lain long neglected, and the ſame was peopled with thoſe People on the South of Aſſyria called Caldeans: That which gives me light of it, and indeed of the whole Hiſtory of the Babylonian Monarchy is Iſaiah 23.13. Behold the land of the Caldeans, this people was not till the Aſſyrian founded it for them that dwell in the wilderneſs: They ſet up the towers thereof, they raiſed up the palaces thereof. It ſeems therefore that Babylon formerly neglected, by this favour of the King of Aſſyria proſpered into a petty Kingdom, and growing powerful did ſet up for themſelves in the time of Ahaz the King of Judah who was contemporary with Tiglah Pileſer, 2 Kings 16.10. And poſſibly the firſt divided King of Babylon was that Nabonaſſar that gave the original of the Aera Nabonaſſaris that began about the beginning of King Ahaz, in the beginning of the 8th Olympiad, about four years after the Building of Rome.

It ſeems that either the ſame Tiglah Pileſer, or his next Succeſſor Salmanaſſar King of Aſſyria that carried away the People of Iſrael in the ninth year of Hoſeah, about four years after the death of Ahaz, 2 Kings 17.6. did afterwards re-take Babylon; for certainly he was poſſeſſed of it at or ſhortly after the deportation of Iſrael; for he brought Men from Babylon, from Cutha, from Ava, Hamath and Sepharvaim, to put into Samaria. 2 Kings 17.24.

It ſeems that moſt of theſe places from whence People were tranſplanted to Samaria, were places conquered by the Aſſyrian Monarch, who did as Victors uſe prudently to do, tranſplant the conquered into other places; and the ſame ſeems evident for ſome of theſe places at leaſt, and as probably for Babylon alſo, 2 Kings 18.24. Iſaiah 10.10. particularly for Hamath, Sepharvaim and Avah: And accordingly he tranſplanted the conquered People into Gozan and other places, 2 Kings 18.11. which were won by Salmanaſſar from the Medes by Conqueſt. 2 Kings 19.12.

Senacherib ſucceeded Salmanaſſar, and came up againſt Hezekiah in the fourteenth year of his Reign, where he received that great blow of 185000 Men, which ſent him back to Nineveh where he was ſlain; and Ezarhaddon his Son reigned in his ſtead. 2 Kings 20.35, 36, 37.

This gave opportunity to the new uſurped Kingdom of Babylon again to break the Yoak of Aſſyrian Monarchy; for it evidently appears that Berodach-Baladan the Son of Baladan was King of Babylon, and ſent to complement Hezekiah when there was another King of Aſſyria, 2 Kings 20.12. Hezekiah having reigned 29 years dyed, and Manaſſeh his Son ſucceeded him.

Manaſſeh reigned 55 years, and towards the latter end of his Reign he was carried Captive to Babylon by the King of Aſſyria, 2 Chron. 33.11. whether the King of Aſſyria had regained Babylon, or whether the King of Babylon had overcome the Aſſyrian, and ſo held the ſtile of that Monarch, appears not, though the latter ſeems probable by comparing the reprehenſion of Iſaiah, 2 Kings 20.17.

Ammon ſucceeded, and reigned 2 years.

Joſiah ſucceeded, and reigned 31 years.

Jehoahaz 3 months.

Jehoiachim 11 years.

Jehoiachin 3 months.

Zedekiah 11 years; the laſt year of whoſe Reign was contemporary with the 19th year of Nebuchadnezzar.

Now putting all the years together from the firſt of Ahaz to the laſt of Zedekiah are about 155 years and 6 months; out of which ſubducting 19 years for the Reign of Nebuchadnezzar, there remains from the firſt of Ahaz to the firſt of Nebuchadnezzar 136 years, which comes very near to the Aera Nabonaſſaris; for according to the common Calculation the firſt of Nebuchadnezzar hapned in the 138th year of Nabonaſſar, which began about two years before the firſt year of Ahaz; or in the ſecond year of the 8th Olympiad.

And that in all probability, Baladan who was the Father of Merodach-Baladan that ſent to viſit Hezekiah, might be that Nabonaſſar whoſe Aera is ſo much celebrated.

After the beginning of the Reign of Nebuchadnezzar the entire Aſſyrian Monarchy was tranſlated to Babylon, and Nebuchadnezzar the King thereof. Herodotus in his Firſt Book tells us that Cyaxares the Grand-child of Dioces firſt attempted the taking of Niniveh, but was repulſed by the aid of the Scythians; and that afterwards he took it, and became Maſter of all Aſſyria, Excepta Babylonica quadam portione.

But according to the Hiſtories of Tobit and Judith, Niniveh was taken by Aſſuerus and Nebuchadnezzar, and afterwards entirely poſſeſſed by Nebuchadnezzar, Tobit 10.17. Judith 11. But this is obſcure, becauſe it hath been conceived that Nebuchadnezzar was a common Name uſed amongſt the Babylonian Kings, as Pharaoh among the Egyptians; only it may not be impoſſible that Nebuchadnezzar who was certainly contemporary with Cyaxares the Mede, might be an aſſiſtant in the Deſtruction of Niniveh with Cyaxares, called it may be by Tobit, Aſſuerus; but how he came to be ſole Poſſeſſor after in the time of Judith, is hard to unriddle.

This Nebuchadnezzar made Babylon the Seat of his Empire, and ſo far enlarged it that it ſeemed as new built, as his own arrogant and vain-glorious expreſſion witneſſeth; Is not this great Babel that I have built? Dan. 4.30.

Upon all this that hath been ſaid, it ſeems plain:

1. That Babylon or Babel was the firſt or ancient Seat of the Aſſyrian Empire.

2. That the ſame was firſt built by Belus, or Ninus, or Semiramis, as the Heathen Writers tell us; or by Nimrod, as the Holy Hiſtory tells us, who poſſibly might be the ſame with Belus.

3. That afterward the Seat of the Aſſyrian Empire was tranſlated to Nineveh the great City of that Empire.

4. That afterward Babylon was again either repaired or enlarged by the Aſſyrian Empire, and was the Metropolis of that part of Aſſyria called Caldaea, the Inhabitants whereof were greatly addicted to the Celeſtial Obſervation, and became ſo famous for it, that a Caldean and an Aſtrologer were terms equivalent in common appellation.

5. That afterward the Babylonians or Caldeans obtained or uſurped a divided Kingdom from the Aſſyrian Empire.

6. That the firſt King of that divided Kingdom was called Nabonaſſar, which give the original to the Aera Nabonaſſaris, beginning about the 8th Olympiad.

7. That about 140 years after the beginning of that Kingdom it grew ſo potent, that it acquired the whole Aſſyrian Monarchy, and became the Seat thereof under Nebuchadnezzar.

8. That Nebuchadnezzar again enlarged the City of Babylon with Buildings and Walls of incredible ſtrength and glory.

This being premiſed, I now come to thoſe Reaſons that ſatisfie me that the Aſſyrian or Babylonian Monarchy was not of that great Antiquity that the Babylonians and the favourers of their Tradition pretended, but had its known Original or Epocha from whence it began.

1. The Authority of the Heathen Authors allow not above 1400 years at moſt for the continuance of the Aſſyrian Monarchy, and lodge the Original of it in Belus the Father of Ninus, the beginning of whoſe Reign is by computation to be caſt in the 153d year after the Flood, according to the Jewiſh Account. Vide probationes indè Petavii doctrina temp. l. 9. per totum. The Account, according to Diodorus Siculus, runs thus; The Aſſyrian Monarchy beginning with Ninus laſted 1360 years unto the fall of Sardanapalus by Arbaces the Mede, after which that Monarchy fell in with the Mede: it continued there until Pul became the Head of the Aſſyrian Monarchy, and after him Tiglah Pileſer, and then Salmanaſſar, and afterwards Senacherib: The Proof they add to this Supputation is this; That from the Fall of Sardanapalus to the Taking of Babylon by Alexander are accounted 543 years, which added to the former number gives 1903 years, the Epocha of the Caldean Aſtrological Calculation brought by Caliſthenes to Ariſtotle at the Taking of Babylon by Alexander; which caſts the Beginning of the Aſſyrian Monarchy under Belus, or at leaſt under Ninus his Son, to be about the year of the World 1717, about 60 years after the Flood, according to the Jewiſh Account; though others, following alſo the Jewiſh Account, caſt the ſame to be about 104 years after the Flood.

But Africanus, and others that follow the Account of the 70 Interpreters, tell us of ſeven Kings of the Caldeans, and ſix Kings of the Arabians that were antecedent to Belus in that Empire, that ſucceſſively reigned in Babylon 440 years; that Belus obtained by Conqueſt the Kingdom, and reigned 55 years; and by this Account the Beginning of the Aſſyrian Kingdom under Ninus was 631 years after the Flood, and one Age after the Confuſion of Languages in the time of Phaleg: But which way ſoever we take, yet we find a Beginning of the Aſſyrian Empire, though they that ſuppoſe it 440 years before Belus, thruſt the Deluge and the Creation farther back than the Jewiſh Account.

2. The Authority of the Holy Scripture by the Pen of Moſes gives us the Original of the Babylonian or Aſſyrian Monarchy in Nimrod, which poſſibly may be the Name in Hebrew of Belus the firſt Founder of it. And here I do not take advantage of the Divine Authority of the Sacred Scripture, but make uſe of it only as a Hiſtory, and ſingly upon that account hath greater evidence of its truth than any Heathen Hiſtorian whatſoever. 1. The Writer thereof was moſt certainly nearer the times of the firſt Foundation, of that Monarchy by above 800 years than any other Hiſtorian that gives us the account of the Aſſyrian and Babylonian Monarchy; which is a great advantage in point of evidence touching the truth of any Hiſtorical Relation. Again, 2. He was not very far diſtant from the Place or Seat of that Monarchy, the Wilderneſs and Paleſtine being not far diſtant from Aſſyria 3. He was deſcended from him that was the native of that Country, namely Abraham, who was born and lived many years in the Caldean Country, and doubtleſs did bring along with him and tranſmit to his Poſterity a fair Tradition of that Empire, being contemporary with Peleg, in whoſe time the famous diſſipation of Mankind and diſtinction of Languages hapned. 4. He was educated in Egypt, the people whereof were greatly learned, eſpecially in Chronological Computations. 5. The coherence and ſynchroniſm of all the parts of the Moſaical Chronology, eſpecially after the Flood, bears a moſt ſingular teſtimony to the truth of his Hiſtory and Computation: for although he draws not down the lineal Deſcendents of Ham and Japhet down to his time, but only mentions their Children and Grand-children for two or three Generations at moſt; yet he draws down the lineal Pedigree from Sem in the Sacred Line down to his very Age, together with their Births and Ages, which are a great evidence of the probability of the reſt of his Account. So that if we take the Hiſtory of Moſes upon a bare Moral account, abſtracted from the Authority of Divine Revelation, he hath greater evidence of the truth of what he relates than any Hiſtorian whatſoever that takes upon him the narrative of the Antiquity of Kingdoms or Empires, the ancienteſt of which Hiſtorians were above 1000 years later than Moſes. But this I ſhall have occaſion farther to improve hereafter.

The Objections againſt this late Original of the Aſſyrian or Babylonian Monarchy (for it had its ſucceſſive tranſlation into theſe denominations) are principally theſe:

1. That it appears by the Account of ancient Hiſtorians, that the Caldeans (in whom the Aſſyrian Monarchy began and ended) at the Taking of Babylon by Alexander had preſerved Aſtronomical Calculations for about 400000 years; thus Diodorus Siculus, lib. 3. cap. 8. Quadringenta tria annorum millia uſque ad aſcenſum Alexandri numerant; and Tully in his ſecond Book de Divinatione mentions the number to be greater, Quadringenta & ſeptuaginta millia annorum, in periclitandis experiendiſque Pueris quicunque eſſent nati, Babylonios poſuiſſe.

2. That it ſeems impoſſible, that if their Monarchy began but in Nimrod, or ſo ſhort a time after the Univerſal Deluge, that in the time of Ninus, by ſome ſuppoſed the firſt, by ſome the ſecond King of the Aſſyrians or Babylonians, the Empire could have grown ſo populous as to build that vaſt City of Babylon, and that of Nineveh, whoſe ſtate and magnificence and amplitude were of incredible greatneſs; or that his Widow Semiramis could at once bring into the field againſt Zoroaſtres an Army of 1700000 Foot-men, 500000 Horſe-men, 100000 Chariots, 2000 Ships, as Diodorus Siculus out of Cteſias, l. 3. cap. 5. And therefore as well Mankind as the Empire of Aſſyria muſt have had a longer continuance to have ſet out ſuch an Army, than the ſucceſſion of an Empire for two or three Governours at moſt, or the ſucceſſions or propagations of Mankind within ſo ſhort a time as this is ſuppoſed to ſucceed the Univerſal Deluge, could afford. To the firſt I anſwer:

1. That ſome will have theſe Years to be but Months, which they ſuppoſe to be accounted Years by the ancient Babylonians and Egyptians: But as we have no certain evidence that they uſed to account a Month a Year, but if we had, yet that reduction will not ſerve; for that number of Lunar Months reduced to Solar Years will ariſe to above 40000 Years, which will over-reach the Creation of Mankind.

2. Therefore we may with the ſame Tully and Diodorus Siculus pronounce it to be an incredible and fabulous Account warranted by no credible evidence, but meerly their own fancy or impoſture; that becauſe they held the World eternal, would gratifie their people with a ſucceſſion of an incredible Antiquity. And it appears to be fabulous, 1. For that in all this time they would probably have gotten the perfect Theory of the Planetary Motions and Poſitions, which it is plain they did not, if we believe the ſame Author; for they were at a loſs touching the true diſcoveries and periods of the Eclipſes, eſpecially of the Sun. 2. For that Caliſthenes, who was very curious in ſearching the famous Periods of the Babylonian or Caldean Celeſtial Obſervations, at the very time when they pretended ſo great an Antiquity, namely, at the Taking of Babylon by Alexander, upon a ſtrict enquiry found their Aſtronomical Obſervations not to be above 1903 years old, which he accordingly reported to Ariſtotle, that employed him ſpecially in that Enquiry, as Simplicius reports in his Commentaries upon the Book of Ariſtotle de Caelo. The prodigious Accounts therefore of the Caldeans of the Times paſt deſerve as little credit as their Predictions of things to come, who, as the ſame Tully there obſerves, flattered both Caeſar and Pompey with long Lives and happy and peaceable Death; both which fell out in the ſucceſs, to both extremely contrary.

2. I come to the ſecond Objection, namely, That it ſeems altogether impoſſible that the General Flood ſhould put a period to all former Governments, and indeed to the whole Race of Mankind except eight perſons, and yet that from theſe in ſo ſhort a time ſuch vaſt and powerful Monarchies, eſpecially as that of the Babylonian or Syrian ſhould ariſe. To which I anſwer:

1. That if we ſhould admit the Computation of the Seventy, now much magnified by Voſſius and others, it would eaſily deliver us from that difficulty; for whereas the Hebrew Computation gives the Univerſal Flood to be but 1656 years after the Creation of Mankind, the Septuagint gives it to be 2262 years: and whereas the Hebrew Account gives us about 300 years from the Flood to the Birth of Abraham, and conſequently about 104, and according to ſome only 58 years from the Flood to the beginning of Ninus the Son of Belus, the Septuagint gives us from the Flood to the Birth of Abraham 1132 years; and conſequently the beginning of Ninus though admitted to have been about 250 years before the Birth of Abraham, would yet have hapned near 800 years after the Flood, which would not only give a competent time for Mankind to grow to that great multitude that is ſuppoſed, but would ſatisfie thoſe preceding thirteen Kings in Babylon that are ſuppoſed to have worn out 440 years before 〈◊〉 the beginning of Belus the Father of Ninus.

2. But the Objection needs not that help, neither doth enforce us to deſert the Hebrew Account to ſatisfie that or the like Objections. For conſidering the long Life of the Ancients that lived within 300 years after the Flood, and conſequently their coexiſtence with thoſe that deſcended from them; we may without the help of a miraculous fertility find that in 104 years Mankind deſcended from Noah and his three Sons and their Wives, might ariſe to a ſtupendious multitude by that Arithmetical Progreſſion that would be found in their Generations. I ſhall not need to ſet down the proceſs of the Computation or the product, it is excellently done to my hand by Temporarius in his ſecond Book Chronologicarum demonſtrationum, and out of him by Petavius his Doctrina temporum, lib. 10. and out of both by Kircherus in the firſt Book of his firſt Tome of his Oedipus Aegyptiacus, where he undertakes, that in the progreſs of 200 years after the Flood the multitude of the coexiſting People might be ſo great, that if they were caſt into a ſquare Battalia, allowing to every perſon but one ſquare foot of ground, the ſide of that Square would be 372 Aſtronomical miles, or 25 Heavenly degrees. And thus far touching the Original of the Aſſyrian, Caldean, or Babylonian Monarchy.

2. Touching the Egyptians, they maintained the Origination of Mankind, and that the ſame was not Eternal, as it ſeems by Diodorus Siculus in his ſecond Book; for they ſuppoſed, in reſpect of the fruitfulneſs of their ſoil and the convenience of their ſituation, that the firſt Original of Mankind was among them, and that the Egyptians were the ancienteſt People in the World.

But though they admitted the Origination of Man, yet they pretended to a very great antiquity of their Nation and Government; and becauſe they would exceed all others, they ſuppoſe their firſt Governours were Gods: Diodorus tells us, that in the 180th Olympiad they pretended a ſucceſſion of Government of 33000 years, whereof the firſt 18000 years they were governed by Gods and Heroes, and the laſt 15000 years by Men.

Manetho, that wrote the Hiſtory of the Egyptians about the beginning of the Grecian Monarchy under Alexander, with very great pretence hath carried up their Government to an incredible diſtance before the Creation of Mankind; for he digeſted the ſucceſſive Governments of the Egyptians into 32 Dynaſties, and to each Dynaſty a great number of Governours and Years, whereof 15 exceeded the time of the Flood, and therefore are omitted by Africanus and others that yet are fond of the credit of Manetho: the other 17 Dynaſties are ſuppoſed to be extended unto the beginning of the Grecian Empire for about 1694 years after the Flood.

But 1. This Account, even of Diodorus Siculus, is very uncertain; for it appears by Cenſorinus, de die Natali, cap. 19. that the ancient Egyptian year was bimeſtris, and after that trimeſtris, and after that, in latter time, of 13 months and 5 days: And ſome tell us, that yet their moſt ancient year was but one month, namely, one revolution of the Moon through the Zodiack; which if it ſhould be admitted, may ſhorten their Account of 33000 years to 3600 years or thereabout. But yet this Anſwer ſerves not, for in all probability their years continued to be 365 days ever ſince the time of the Jewiſh Exody at leaſt, which will carry up the Account far beyond the Creation of Man, though their former years ſhould be ſuppoſed menſtrui or bimeſtres.

Therefore it ſeems either a plain Impoſture of Manetho, out of an emulation of the pretended Antiquity of the Babylonian Monarchy, or at leaſt a very plain miſtake, by reckoning all theſe 32 Dynaſties or Principatus ſucceſſivè, when it ſeems they were all contemporary, and that after Mene, which is ſuppoſed the firſt Head of theſe Dynaſties, the Regiment of Egypt was divided into ſeveral Principalities, and each had his Dynaſty, but the particular Regiment of each ſeveral Principality, Mene being the Head to them all; which is ſo well evinced by Voſſius in his little Tract de Aetate Mundi, out of Eratoſthenes contemporary with Manetho, Herodotus and others, that nothing can be added to it, or reaſonably objected againſt it; though Kircherus in the firſt Book of his Egyptian Antiquities endeavours to carry on the 17 laſt Dynaſties in continued ſucceſſion from Cham to the diſſolution of the Egyptian Monarchy by Alexander; and ſuppoſeth the firſt 15 Dynaſties to have incurred before the Flood, and the traditional memory thereof derived down by Cham to his Poſterity. But of this alſo more hereafter.

Touching the Grecians, it is true, the Grecian Monarchy had its known Epocha in Alexander about the 114th Olympiad: but they were a People long before, though divided into ſmaller Kingdoms or States; but the Memorials of the Babylonians and Egyptians were far more ancient than thoſe of Greece, which derived much of its Learning from the Egyptians. Cenſorinus in his golden Book de die Natali gives us out of Varro a threefold Period of the Grecian Hiſtories or Monuments or Times, Cap. 21. namely, 1. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or incognitum, from the firſt Origination of Mankind (if it had an Original) ad cataclyſmum priorem, or the Ogygian Flood: 2. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or fabuloſum, from the Ogygian Flood to the firſt Olympiad: 3. Hiſtoricum, from the firſt Olympiad until his time. For the firſt of theſe times, Sive ſemper fuit, ſive habuit initium, certè quot annorum ſit non poteſt comprehendi: for the ſecond; Non planè quidem ſcitur, ſed creditur eſſe annos circiter mille & ſexcentos, though he reduceth it by his account to a ſhorter time; namely, 400 years from the Ogygian Flood to Inachus, and from him to the firſt Olympiad according to ſome 400, according to others 395, 407, or 417: I ſhall not trouble my ſelf with the curious enquiry into the number, or the different Account of Chronologers touching it: But within the compaſs of this tempus 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , or Periodus fabuloſa, hapned many of thoſe Relations of the Greeks; namely, the Age of Prometheus, the Flood of Deucalion, ſhortly after the beginning of the Dynaſty of the Athenians, in the time of Cretopus King of the Argives; Incendium Idae, Cadmus and Europa, Ganymedis raptus, Phaetontis incendium, Hercules Amphitryonis filius, Expeditio Argonautarum, Bellum Trojanum & Reditus Heraclidarum, Ionica migratio, and many other fine Stories that have furniſhed ſome of the Poetical Hiſtorians of after Ages.

But however Cenſorinus makes his Computation, Inachus, who was the firſt King of the Argives, though he were about 375 years after the beginning of the Aſſyrian Monarchy, and contemporary with Iſaac, yet he began his Reign about 100 years before the Ogygian Flood, which hapned in the latter end of Phoroneus the Son of Inachus and ſecond King of the Argives. So that Inachus was about 100 years before the Ogygian Flood, and about 1070 or 1080 years before the firſt Olympiad upon this account.

This then being, as it ſeems, the ſtate of theſe Periods, there ſeem two Nations of the Grecians that pretend to greateſt Antiquity, namely, the Argivi and the Attici.

The former had their beginning with Inachus, whether before or after the Ogygian Flood it will not be much of moment, but at leaſt within 1070 years before the firſt Olympiad, which is the higheſt time that the Grecians pretend unto.

Touching the Attici, the Grecian Memorials give us no higher Account than of Ogyges, in whoſe time it is ſuppoſed the Ogygian Flood hapned in that part of Greece called Attica, and takes its name from him, namely, Diluvium Ogygium.

Out of this Kingdom aroſe the Dynaſty of the Athenians, about 200 years after the Ogygian Flood, wherein Cecrops was the firſt Governour contemporary with Moſes; he firſt ſet up the Worſhip of Jupiter, as ſome report. And ſo we have the Original of the Government of the Argives in Inachus, of the Athenians in Cecrops.

It is true, the Egyptian Prieſt under the name of Timaeus in Plato tells us a large Story of the Iſland of Atlantis far bigger than Aſia, and that although now that goodly Iſland be loſt and ſwallowed up in the Sea, yet the Athenians were a kind of Colony tranſplanted from that Iſland into Greece about 7000 years before Solon's time. But this is one of thoſe Poetical Fictions wherewith Plato plays, mingling more ſerious things with it in the following part of his Diſcourſe; and the Story hath no footſteps of any evidence for it, unleſs we ſhall ſuppoſe that Atlantis to be an Iſland that was before the Univerſal Deluge, and deſtroyed by it.

4. Concerning the Seres or Chineſes, a People whoſe Cuſtoms and Hiſtories were ſtrangers to Europe till of late times, wherein ſome Travellers have lately given us ſome account of thoſe great Periods both of their Hiſtories and Government. Voſſius in that little Book de Aetate Mundi, tells us by relation from others, That by their Hiſtories and Monuments their Empire hath laſted 4505 years in the year of Chriſt 1658, which reacheth ſome Ages beyond the Flood according to the Hebrew Account, but according to the Septuagint the beginning thereof falls in the time of Phaleg, 531 years after the Flood; which he brings as an Argument for the Authority of the Septuagint: But the truth is, we are ſtill ſtrangers to the true ſtate of Chronology of the Seres or Chineſes, what we have touching it, is by broken relation of ſome few Travellers, and what they had, poſſibly may be gathered up from the vulgar Traditions of that People, upon which little of ſound concluſion can be made touching their Antiquity. But be it true or not, which we have from theſe Relations, yet their longeſt Period gives them a Beginning, and reacheth not ſo high as the pretended Epoch of the Babylonians or Egyptians, much leſs is there any thing in them that gives any colour of Evidence of an Eternal Duration.

And thus I have gone through the Examination of thoſe Kingdoms and Monarchies which pretend to greateſt Antiquity, the Babylonian or Aſſyrian, the Egyptian, the Grecian, and the Seres or Chineſes; upon all which we may obſerve,

1. That though many of them pretend to a very great Antiquity, yet there are none that give us any ſufficient Evidence of an Eternal Duration; for what are thoſe Periods of the Egyptians or Babylonians to Eternity? Nay many of theſe Nations that pretend to the longeſt continuance, as the Egyptians and Grecians, yet diſclaim an Eternal Succeſſion; pretend themſelves to be Aborigines, and to be the firſt People, but yet not to be Eternal. Indeed their vaſt continuance, if admitted, would ſeem to contradict the Authenticalneſs and Authority of the Moſaical Hiſtory, which contains a Relation of the Beginnings of Mankind within the compaſs of about 5660 Years, according to the Hebrew Account, and about 7240 Years, according to the Septuagint; but doth not ſo much as ſuppoſe an Eternity thereof.

2. That notwithſtanding theſe great pretenſions of Antiquity, yet upon a true examination their great pretended Antiquity is fabulous; and the Origination of their Monarchies began ſome Ages after the general Deluge; and ſo the truth of the Holy Hiſtory concerning the Inception of Mankind, and the Inception of all the Monarchies in the World after the Deluge that happened under Noah, 1656 Years after the Creation of Mankind, is not at all weakened by thoſe Fabulous Antiquities of the Babylonians, Egyptians, or Grecians.

3. That this Inception of the Notable Empires and Kingdoms of the World, even of thoſe that pretend greateſt Antiquity, and the termination of the uttermoſt Extent of the Hiſtories of the Babylonians, Egyptians, and Grecians, within the compaſs of the Extent of their pretended Monarchies, is an Evidence againſt the Eternity of Mankind; for had Mankind been Eternal, they had infinite Ages ſince arrived to all the perfection of Political Government, and to all thoſe Means and Arts for the preſerving the Memorials of things paſt, as they have now attained unto; there would have been no tempus 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , or obſcurum, among the Grecians, but there would have been as fair Monuments and Hiſtorical Narratives of things paſt, before the Olympiads or the Ogygian Flood (which was not univerſal) as after. I ſhall conclude therefore with Lucretius, lib. 5.

Preterea, ſi nulla fuit genitalis origo Terrai & Coeli, ſemperque aeterna fuerunt; Cur ſupra bellum Thebanum & funera Trojae Non alias alii quoque res cecinere Poetae, Qui tot facta virum toties cecidere, neque uſquam Aeternis famae monumentis inſita florent? Verùm ut opinor habet novitatem ſumma, recenſque Natura eſt mundi, neque pridem exordia cepit: Quare etiam quaedam nunc artes expoliuntur, Nunc etiam augeſcunt, &c. —

But yet this Conſideration touching the Antiquity of Monarchies, their Inception, and the Narratives and Hiſtorical Monuments of things, happening within the Periods of their Commencement and Continuances, are not of that weight that we can lay the ſtreſs of this Hypotheſis of the Inception of Mankind upon: And therefore this Conſideration muſt be taken with its allay, I ſhall therefore fully ſet down thoſe Inſtances that do give this Conſideration its due abatement.

1. It is no Conſequence, That becauſe a Monarchy or Kingdom had its Beginning, that therefore the People that conſtituted the Moles of that Kingdom had its Beginning: Kingdoms, Monarchies, and States, often change their Governours, and the Forms of Government, and their Stiles and Denominations, as the Silk-worm doth his ſhape, and yet the People in a continued ſucceſſion the ſame. Rome took its Name from Romulus, but the People were a Farrago, collected and gathered out of the neighbouring Nations. Greece fell into one Monarchy under Alexander, yet the People (that were the Stuffing, as it were, and Materials of that Monarchy) were exiſting before in other Forms of Government, and under other Governours. And though it is by ſome ſuppoſed, That the Aſſyrian Monarchy began in Ninus, yet Diodorus out of Cteſias tells us, That he made up that great Structure of the Aſſyrian Monarchy by the Conqueſt of divers People, who thereby were added to it, as the Egyptians, Phenicians, Syria, Coelicia, Pamphilia, Lydia, Caria, Phrygia, Myſia, and many more, mentioned by him, l. 3. cap. 1.

England began not to be a People, when Alfred reduced it into a Monarchy, for the Materials thereof were extant before, namely, under the Heptarchy. So that the finding out of the Head of a Monarchy is not like the finding out the Head of a River in the Fountain, or the Head of a Family in one common Parent: The ancienteſt Monarchy might have a Beginning, and yet the People, that are the material conſtituent of it, might exiſt long before, under other Forms or Viciſſitudes of Governments.

2. All Nations do not always begin their Hiſtories, or the Matter, of the ſame Antiquity with the People touching which they write; but ſome earlier, ſome later, according to the variety of their Opportunities, Educations, and Diſciplines.

The Iſraelites were certainly the moſt knowing People of the World, began early to record the Memorials of their own Times, and of thoſe that anteceded them, delivered down by Tradition from the Patriarchs: Thus did Moſes; and the Annals of that People are carried down to the very diſſolution of their Government. The Phenicians began their Hiſtorical Monuments after them, the Grecians after them. The Pelaſgi and Attici were a People long before Homer wrote. England was doubtleſs Inhabited before Caeſar came over, yet we have few Monuments of Britain more ancient than Caeſar gives us; and from him, except Beda, we have few Authentical Hiſtories by any known Hiſtorian before the Conqueſt by King William; but they have been all written ſince, or very near his time; and many of the things which they have put together touching the Britains, Picts, Danes, yea and the beginning of the Saxons, have been collected out of broken Monuments in Monaſteries, and Tradition, and digeſted into ſeries and order of times by thoſe that have written long ſince the things done; by men that lived ſince the Normans came in, as Henry of Huntington, William of Malmsbury, Roger Hoveden, Matthew Paris, and others.

3. A third difficulty is this: That in thoſe elder times there were not thoſe means of preſerving the Monuments of things paſt, as after times afforded; for whatever antiquity the World may be ſuppoſed to be, it is plain that Arts have increaſed and grown: Printing is a new Invention, and although Letters and Writing were ancient among the Phenicians, and from them derived to the Greeks, yet we muſt ſuppoſe they were not ſo perfect or ſo common in the elder Ages as in thoſe that ſucceed them. And therefore thoſe that contend for an Eternal ſucceſſion of Men in the World, do ſuppoſe that by a kind of circulation or rotation Arts have their ſucceſſive invention and perfection and traduction from one People to another; and conſequently though ſome might be early able to deliver over Hiſtorical paſſages, as being better inſtructed in Letters and Writing, and more civilized than others, yet others attained it later: As the Europeans had their Learning from the Aſiaticks, ſo the Americans have it from the Europeans, and yet the People of Europe, Aſia, and America may be of equal Antiquity.

Beſides all this, there have been many viciſſitudes and changes whereby ancient Monuments and Hiſtories have been loſt: As 1. The Variation of Languages, or at leaſt of the Characters wherein they were written, many things written in former Ages being ſcarce legible in after Ages, and ſo neglected. 2. Wars and Deſolations hapning thereby, which obliterate many ancient Monuments. If by a kind of common ſtipulation or pact as it were, Monaſteries had not had a kind of common Protection in the viciſſitudes of the Conqueſts of England by the Picts, Danes, Saxons and Normans, we had had very little extant of ancient things. 3. Tranſmigrations of People from one Country to another, whereby they left their ancient Monuments behind them, which were neglected by them that ſucceeded them. 4. Floods and Inundations, eſpecially in the parts of Aſia, which ſwept away many ancient Monuments.

Theſe are the Allays that are to be given to this particular touching the Epochae and Original of Monarchies, Kingdoms, and States, and the Monuments and Hiſtorical Relations of them or hapning in them, and to the weight of thoſe conſequences deduced or deducible from them, in order to the Argument in queſtion touching the Origination of Mankind.

CAP. IV. The Third Instance of Fact proving the Origination of Mankind, namely, the Invention of Arts.

I Come to the Third Inſtance of Fact, namely, the Diſcovery and Perfecting of Arts, and the new Diſcoveries that later Ages have made of things that were not formerly known.

And this Topick conſiſts principally of theſe parts; 1. That there have been ſuch Diſcoveries of Things and Arts not formerly known: 2. That conſequently the World, eſpecially of Mankind, is of a far later Edition than Eternity.

Touching the former of theſe, it is very evident both by the Tradition of the Ancients, and alſo by our own unqueſtionable Experience, that very great Diſcoveries have been in ſeveral Ages made of Things and Arts that were hidden and unknown unto precedent Ages. I ſhall not trouble my ſelf with thoſe large Catalogues of profitable Inventions which have been ſucceſſively diſcovered, when before they were not known, at leaſt for ought appears to us; as the uſe of Husbandry, the making of Wine and Oyl, the diſcovery of the Letters of the Alphabet in ſucceſſive Ages, Muſick, Military and Civil Diſcipline, Engins of War, and Navigation: Theſe and infinite more have been by the Induſtry of former Writers reduced to their ſeveral Epochae and Authors of their Diſcoveries, and ſome of the Authors have had therefore divine Honour given to them by the admiring Heathen. Theſe ſeveral Inventors and Inventions are regiſtred by Diodorus Siculus in his firſt ſix Books, by Clemens Alexandrinus in the firſt Book of his Stromata, by Pliny l. 7. cap. 56. and ex profeſſo by Polydore Virgil in his eight Books de Rerum Inventoribus: In which and other Collections of that kind, although poſſibly there be many things that are fabulous, or grounded upon a very light and uncertain tradition; yet there are many things that are true or very credible, eſpecially ſince the Monuments of ancient times give us an account of the moſt remote Ages of Men; Rudes primùm & incuria ſilveſtri non multùm à ferarum aſperitate diſſimiles, Macrob. in ſomnio Scipionis, l. 2. cap. 10. ſee the elegant deſcription of the elder Inhabitants of the World, Lucret. l. 5. Nec commune bonum peterant ſpectare, neque ullis Moribus inter ſe ſcibant neque legibus uti. With which deſcription of the elder World agrees Plato in his Politicks, Nudi enim & ſine ſtragulis magnam partem foris & ſub dio vitam colebant; and the ſame Plato in his third Book de Legibus ſuppoſeth, that thoſe relicks of Men that eſcaped the ancient Deluges by flight into the Mountains became perfectly ignorant in proceſs of time of thoſe Arts and conveniences of humane Life, which poſſibly their Progenitors might have been better acquainted with.

But we need not go ſo far for a full conviction of that admirable Diſcovery and Improvement of Arts and other things, eſpecially ſuch as are neceſſary for humane Life.

In matters Aſtronomical we have a far greater light than what was two thouſand years ſince; for we find the old Hypotheſis of the Heavenly Syſtem called ſince in queſtion by Copernicus, Galilaeus, and Kepler; the ſolidity of the Orbs detected to be untrue, by the plain diſcovery of Tycho Brahe and others; the new diſcoveries of Stars and Aſteriſms, and their figures, by the help of the Teleſcope, demonſtratively and to the ſenſe.

In matters Philoſophical many new Diſcoveries have been made by Experiences, whereunto the Ancients never attained: And although the Bodies of Men, Animals and Inſects have been theſe many thouſands of years expoſed to the view and ſearch of diligent Phyſicians and Anatomiſts, yet it is a wonder to ſee what new Diſcoveries have been made in Anatomical Diſſections and Obſervations, which ſeem wholly hidden to the Ancients; as thoſe of the Circulation of the Blood by Doctor Harvey; the Venae lacteae by Aſellius; the Repoſitorium Chyli of Pecquet, with the method of its deduction into the Vena cava; the proceſs of Generation and of the Formative actions; the curious Diſcoveries of the Parts and Faculties of ſmall Inſects, by the help of the Microſcope, rendred by Malpighius and others.

Again, the great Diſcoveries that have been made by the means of Pyrotechny and Chymiſtry, which in late Ages have attained to a greater height than formerly.

Again, in matters Mechanical, although it be true that this latter Age hath not arrived to that incredible skill of Archimedes, yet Mechanical powers have been ſtrangely improved, as we ſee in the late improvement of the late diſcovery of the Motion of the Pendulum, whereby the portions of Time are not only meaſured with an incredible exactneſs, but the uſe thereof tranſlated unto Watches, Clocks, and other Engins; ſo we have high advancement of Dialling, Clocks, Pumps, Fountains and other Motions beyond the acqueſts of former Ages.

And although the Art of Navigation hath been very ancient, and the uſe of the Mariner's Needle, which ſome carry up to Amalpes an Arabian in the year of Chriſt 1360; others to the Chineſes, and by them diſcovered to Paulus Venetus; others carry it up to King David: yet the Art of Navigation hath been ſince greatly improved, and many excellent Diſcoveries in relation to the Inclination and Variation of the Magnetick Needle. To theſe we may add the uſe of Guns, Gunpowder, and Printing, which though by ſome aſſerted to be of long uſe in China, yet in this Weſtern part of the World the original of the Invention hath its known Epocha.

By theſe and many more Inſtances of the like kind it may appear, That many Inventions and Diſcoveries of things not only of curioſity but of uſe and convenience to Mankind have had their known and certain Epochae, or a ſufficient evidence of times when they were not uſed or known in the World.

2. The conſequence of this Suppoſition ſeems to be this; That in as much as theſe had their diſcoveries within known Periods, it is not ſuppoſable that the ſucceſſions of Mankind could have been without a Beginning, but rather that they had a Beginning within a reaſonable time: for it is not conceptible that in an infinite, or indeed in a very long period of Revolutions of Mankind, thoſe or any things of this kind diſcoverable would have been of ſo late and puiſne a diſcovery: This is the Argument of Lucretius, who though an Aſſerter of the Eternity of Matter and Motion, yet together with his Maſter Epicurus aſſerts a Beginning of this World which we now behold, Lib. 5.

Quare etiam quaedam nunc artes expoliuntur, Nunc etiam augeſcunt; nunc addita navigiis ſunt Multa, modo organici melicos peperere ſonores; Denique natura haec rerum ratióque reperta Nuper —

And upon the ſame account Macrobius l. 2. cap. 10. in Somnium Scipionis; Si enim ab initio, imò ante initium fuit mundus, ut Philoſophi volunt, Cur per innumerabilem ſeriem ſeculorum non fuerat Cultus quo nunc utimur inventus? Non Literarum uſus quo ſolo memoriae fulcitur Eternitas? Cur denique multarum rerum experientia ad aliquas gentes recenti aetate pervenit? ut ecce Galli vitem vel cultum oleae, Roma jam adoleſcente, didicerunt; aliae verò gentes adhuc multa neſciunt quae nobis inventa placuerunt. Haec omnia videntur aeternitati rerum repugnare, dum opinari nos faciunt certo mundi principio paulatim ſingula quaeque coepiſſe.

But although this Argument at the firſt view may ſeem to have much of evidence in it of the Origination of Mankind, yet it ſeems too weak to lay any great weight, at leaſt ſingly, upon it, as will appear by what follows; though in conſort with other Inſtances it hath its uſe and weight.

The Diſcovery or Invention of things may ſeem to be upon theſe, or ſome of theſe Methods.

2. It ſeems to me that ſome things have been diſcovered unto Mankind by a more immediate interpoſition of the Divine Providence, or the miniſtration of Angels; as for inſtance, the Medicinal Virtue of ſome Herbs, Vegetables, or Minerals, that lye not in the ordinary road of Experience, or analogical collection from Circumſtances, Signatures, or Obſervation.

2. Some things were diſcovered experimentally, though perchance not intentionally, or by deſign in the firſt diſcovery: And thus probably the Virtues of ordinary Simples came to be diſcovered; for the Food of Mankind being anciently Herbs and Fruits, or at leaſt of ſuch of Mankind who either through choice, cuſtom or neceſſity were driven to that abſtemious Diet, there did doubtleſs occurr the experience of various temperaments and operations of thoſe Herbs; ſome purgative, ſome emetick, ſome ſudorifick, ſome aſtringent, which gave Men opportunity of digeſting them into ſeveral ranks and uſes.

3. Some things were diſcovered ex praenotis, & per viam rationalis diſcurſus: Thus probably Men by the Signatures, Taſts and Colours of Herbs, bearing analogy to other things they knew, concluded fairly touching their Nature and Uſe, which by Tryal and Experience they improved into more fixed and ſtable Theorems and Concluſions: And upon this account alſo many Practical Arts, eſpecially relating to Numbers, Weight, Meaſure and Mechaniſm had their production; for the Rudiments of Proportion being lodged in the Mind, they ſeem to have grown intentionally and ex industria into thoſe various practices of Arithmetick, Geometry, and Mechanicks reſulting from thoſe principles per media proceſſus rationalis; and thus thoſe practices of the Rules of Proportion, Mechanical Motions, Staticks, Architecture, Navigation, Meaſuring of Diſtances and Quantities, and infinite more did ariſe.

4. Some things in their firſt diſcovery ſeem purely accidental, and although poſſibly the operation of Reaſon and Tryal and Experiment might or may carry on the Invention into farther Improvements and Advances, yet in the very firſt primo primum of the Diſcovery it may be accidental: The old, whether true or fabulous Diſcovery of Fire may ſerve to explain my conception; wherein it is ſuppoſed, that one ſitting upon a Hill and tumbling down Flint ſtones, upon the colliſion thereof he obſerved ſparks of Fire, which nevertheleſs he after improved by adding combuſtible materials to it; and doubtleſs upon ſuch and the like occurrences many Chymical and other accidental Diſcoveries have been made, beſides and beyond and without the intention of the Operator: And I well knew a Perſon that had not capacity enough to deduce any thing of curioſity per proceſſum rationalem, yet by accidental dealing with Water and ſome Canes did arrive to a moſt admirable excellence in ſome Mechanical Works of that nature, though he never had the Wit to give a reaſon of his performance of them.

5. Some things have been found out by a kind of neceſſity and exigence of Humane Nature; ſuch as Clothes, Societies, Places of Defence and Habitation, and poſſibly much of the plainer ſort of Tillage and Husbandry; Venter magiſter artis, ingeniíque largitor: and commonly theſe were the earlieſt Inventions, becauſe Nature ſtood early in need of them. And hence it came to paſs, that they who had Coelum clementius, that afforded them neceſſaries without the aſſiſtance of conſiderable Induſtry, continued longeſt rude and uncultivated. And therefore if the Husbandry of Ceres or Triptolemus came late into the World, it was becauſe thoſe Eaſtern Countries then inhabited abounded with plenty of Fruits, which ſupplied the defect of Husbandry till the World grew more diſperſed and fuller of Inhabitants, and tranſmigrated into parts of leſs natural fertility.

6. Some things have been diſcovered not only by the Ingeny and Induſtry of Mankind, but even the inferior Animals have ſubminiſtred unto Man the invention or diſcovery of many things both Natural and Artificial and Medicinal, unto which they are guided, and in which they are directed by ſecret and untaught inſtincts, which would be infinite to proſecute. The Fable or Hiſtory of Glaucus obſerving Fiſhes to leap into the Sea, upon taſting an Herb by the ſhore; the Weaſel uſing Plantane as an Antidote; the wounded Stag uſing Dittany to draw out the Arrow, (if true) and divers others, give us ſome Analogical Inſtances.

And theſe are ordinarily the Methods of Diſcoveries. The Things or Objects diſcovered are principally of two kinds; viz. 1. Such things as are already lodged in Nature, as Natural Cauſes and Effects, and thoſe various Phaenomena in Nature, whereof ſome lye more open to our Senſes and daily obſervation; others are more occult and hidden, and though acceſſible in ſome meaſure to our Senſes, yet not without great ſearch and ſcrutiny, or ſome happy accident; others again are ſuch as we cannot attain to any clear ſenſible diſcovery of them, either by reaſon of their remoteneſs, diſtance, and unacceſſibleneſs, as the Heavenly Bodies and things cloſed up in the bowels of the Earth; or by reaſon of their ſubtil and curious texture, eſcaping the clear and immediate acceſs of Senſe, as Spiritual Natures, the Soul and its various Faculties and Operations, and the Reaſons or Methods of them, wherein for the moſt part our acqueſts touching them are but Opinion and Conjecture, wherein Men vary according to the variety of their Apprehenſions and Phantaſies, and wherein (becauſe they want that manuduction of Senſe which is our beſt and ſureſt Guide in the firſt Inſtance in matters Natural) Men range into incertain, inevident, and unſtable Notions.

2. Such things as are Artificial, wherein ſome Diſcoveries are ſimply new, others are but acceſſions and additaments to things that were before mentioned: Some things are of convenience, utility or neceſſity to Humane Nature or the condition of Mankind; ſome things are of curioſity: ſome things are found out caſually or accidentally; ſome things intentionally, and out of thoſe Principles or Notions that ſeem to be lodged originally in the Mind.

Now upon theſe Conſiderations premiſed, it ſeems that the late Diſcovery of many things in Nature, and many Inventions in Art are not a ſufficient Evidence of the Origination or late Origination of Mankind, at leaſt taken ſingly and apart.

1. In things Natural the variety is ſo great, and the various combinations therein ſo many, that it ſeems poſſible that there ſhould not have been a full diſcovery of the whole ſtate of things Natural unto the Minds of Men, although there were ſuppoſed an eternal duration of Mankind. We may give our ſelves a Specimen hereof, if we look but back upon that one Piece of Nature with which we have reaſon to be beſt acquainted, namely, our ſelves; which by reaſon of our vicinity to our ſelves, our daily converſation with our ſelves and others of the ſame Species, our daily neceſſities and opportunities of inquiring into our ſelves, and the narrowneſs of our own nature in compariſon of the vaſt and various bulk of other things, ſeems to render us a Subject capable of being very fully diſcovered. And beſides all this, the more inquiſitive and judicious part of Mankind have induſtriouſly ſet themſelves for many Ages to make the beſt diſcovery they could of the nature of Man. Hippocrates the Father of Phyſicians, who lived in the 82d Olympiad, and above 2000 years ſince buſied himſelf much and profoundly in this Enquiry; and a ſucceſſion of induſtrious, obſerving and learned Phyſicians and Naturaliſts have purſued the Chaſe with all care and vigilancy, and by the help of Anatomical Diſſections have ſearched into thoſe various Maeanders of the Veins, Arteries, Nerves and Integrals of the Humane Body: Yet for all this, in this ſenſible and narrow part of Humane Nature, the husk and ſhell thereof, how much remains after all this whereof we are utterly ignorant? So that notwithſtanding all the Diſcoveries that have been made by the Ancients, and thoſe more curious and plentiful Diſcoveries by the latter Ages, there ſtill remains ſo much undiſcovered that leaves ſtill room for Admiration and Induſtry, and gives us a powerful conviction of our Ignorance, that the things we know in this little narrow obvious part of Nature the Body of Man is the leaſt part of that we know not touching the ſame.

But when we yet conſider how ſmall a part of the Humane Nature is that which is the Corporeal part; and how little we know with any tolerable certainty touching the more noble Parts, Acts and Operations of the Humane Nature, the Principle of Life, Senſe, and Intellection, we have ſtill reaſon to conclude that this little, narrow, near Subject of our Knowledge is yet very difficult for us actually and fully to comprehend, and furniſheth our ſearch with more Materials than we are poſſibly able to exhauſt with all our Induſtry, Care, Study, and Obſervation. When I conſider thoſe difficulties that occurr touching the Production of that we call the Soul, whence it is, what it is, what power it is that performs the proceſſus formativus that digeſts, diſpoſes, models the prima ſtamina naturae humanae that acts with moſt admirable skill, dexterity, infallible order, and in the moſt incomparable way of Intelligence, and yet wholly deſtitute of thoſe Organs whereby we exerciſe the operations of Life, Senſe, and Intellection. That incomparable accommodation of all parts and things fitteſt for uſe, for time, for convenience: Again, when I conſider thoſe various powers of the Senſible Nature, that Regiment that it performs and exerciſeth by the Spirits, Nerves, and Muſcles; the admirable powers of Senſation, of Phantaſie, of Memory, in what Salvatories or Repoſitories the Species of things paſt are conſerved: Again, when I conſider the ſtrange powers of Intellection, Ratiocination, Reminiſcence, and what that Thing or Nature is that performs all thoſe various operations: And when I conſider how little, how incertain, how contradictory thoſe Sentiments of Mankind have been touching theſe things, wherein nevertheleſs they have ſearched and toyled Age after Age; I muſt needs conclude, That if we had no other ſubject of our ſearch and enquiry beſides our ſelves, we ſhould have for ought I know for infinite Ages a continued ſtock for our diſcovery; and when we had learned much, yet ſtill even in this narrow Subject there would be ſtill ſomewhat to be learned; and we ſhould never be able actually to overtake the plenary diſcovery of what would remain; Sic rota poſterior currit, ſed in axe ſecundo. And if this one ſmall near piece of Nature ſtill affords new matter for our diſcovery, where or when ſhould we be ever able to ſearch out all the vaſt Treaſuries of Objective Knowledge that lyes within the compaſs of the Univerſe? So that the new Diſcoveries that have been made in Natural things is not a ſufficient evidence of the newneſs of the exiſtence of Mankind, becauſe of that inexhauſtible Magazin of Natural Cauſes and Effects which poſſibly will ſtore Mankind with new Diſcoveries unto an everlaſting continuance.

2. And the ſame that is ſaid for the redundance of matters intelligible and cognoſcible in things Natural, may be alſo applied to things Artificial. There are theſe things that render Artificial Inventions prodigiouſly fertil and various: 1. The variety of the materials of things that may be applied to Artificial ends and uſes; as we have Iron, Braſs, Wood, Stones, Sounds, Light, Figuration, Tactile qualities; ſome things of a more active, ſome things of a more paſſive nature; ſome things diverſified in degrees of heat, cold, dryneſs, moiſture; various Elements, Meteors: and infinite variety of theſe Materials we have, which may be the material conſtituents or ingredients into Artificial Structures, Engins, Motions, or Effects. 2. The variety of the Apprehenſions and Fancies of ſeveral Men in the deſtination and application of things to ſeveral ends and uſes; and this ariſing in them partly by the various texture and frame of their very temper of their Brains, Blood, and Spirits; partly by variety of Education, partly by Neceſſity, partly by Accidental Emergency: by this means poſſibly the ſame Material is variouſly managed into various Artifices, according to this variety of Phantaſy or Imagination. As take the ſame Wool, for inſtance, one Men felts it into a Hat, another weaves it into Cloth, another weaves it into Kerſey or Serge, another weaves it into Arras; and poſſibly theſe variouſly ſubdiverſified according to the phantaſy of the Artificer: For it is moſt certain that there is not greater variety in the figures and complexions of Mens Faces and Features, and in the contemperations of their natural Humours, than there is in their Phantaſies, Apprehenſions and Inclinations. And hence it is that, for inſtance, the texture of Zeuxes or Apelles inclines him to the invention or improving of Painting, Archimedes to Mechanical Motions, Euclid to Geometrical Concluſions: and hence it muſt neceſſarily come to paſs, that according to the variety of Men that either caſually or induſtriouſly apply themſelves to Artificial Diſcoveries or Inventions, there will enſue variety of Inventions. That Invention that did ariſe from the Genius or temperament of the Phantaſie or Imagination of Apelles, would probably never in the ſame individual Invention have been found out before him, though the World of Men had laſted millions of Years before him; becauſe perchance in that long Period no Man had ever the ſame Syntax of Phantaſie or Imagination that he had, and conſequently though ſome Artificial Inventions are as it were of that common congruity to the general Phantaſies of Men; or ſeem to ariſe upon a common ſutableneſs to the uſe or exigence of Mankind, as digging, planting, ploughing, ſowing, making of Apparel and Houſes; yet ſome have that particular reſpect or cognation to the Phantaſie of this or that particular Man, that they would never have been found out till ſuch a Man had had his being in the World; and conſequently the Invention was not found ſooner, becauſe the Man to whoſe Phantaſie this Invention was accommodate was not born nor lived ſooner.

3. The variety of Application and Combination of ſeveral Materials of Artificial things in their ſeveral Artificial Complements: For it is very plain, that even where things are finite and determinate in their number, yet they ariſe to a ſtrange and prodigious multitude, if not indefinitude, by their various Poſitions, Combinations, and Conjunctions: The Letters of the Alphabet, which ariſe from the ſeveral apertures and conjunctions of the Tongue, the Teeth, the Palate, the Lips, the Throat, are but 24 in number, yet various combinations of theſe Letters are the formal conſtituents of all the Words and Languages in the World: And yet all the Words and Languages in the World do not amount to the hundredth part of thoſe other articulate Languages that might be made out of the remaining combinations of the Letters of the Alphabet, which are not in uſe in any or all the Languages of the World. The general diviſion of Lines in Geometry is into ſtreight and crooked, but the various combinations and poſitions of theſe two ſorts of Lines would make more Figures of Superficies than all the Ages of the World could poſſibly collect or deſcribe.

And from this variety of Materials, variety of Phantaſies and Imaginations, and variety of Combinations or Junctures of things, we may reaſonably conclude that the multitude of Artificials is inexhauſtible; and that although there be many new Inventions diſcovered daily which were not diſcovered before, yet that alone is no ſufficient Argument of the Novity of Mankind; for this Magazin of Artificials is ſo fruitful, vaſt, and indeterminate, that if the World ſhould laſt millions of Ages there would be a ſtore and ſupply for immenſe Ages, Et ſemper aliquid ultra.

It may be poſſibly objected, That although the variety of Materials are great, and poſſibly indefinite and indeterminate, and ſo alſo of the Fancies of Men, and conſequently thoſe various combinations of things that are conſtituents of new Inventions, yet they are not Infinite: For although the combinations of the 24 Letters of the Alphabet are a prodigious number, yet if inſtead of 24 Letters there were 24 millions, as thoſe 24 millions are a finite number, ſo would all the changes and combinations thereof be finite, though perchance not eaſily computable by Arithmetick, in reſpect of the huge exceſs of the number; and conſequently, in an infinite Period of Time, though one of theſe combinations ſhould be exhibited in a million of Years, the whole number of combinations had been infinite Ages ſince exhauſted, and no combination left to make up the material or formal conſtituent of a new Invention.

I anſwer; It is true, the combinations of things finite exiſting muſt needs be finite as well as the things themſelves. But, as I have before ſuppoſed, the Invention of Arts doth not only depend upon the exiſtence of the Materials of things Artificial, no nor ſingly upon the various combinations of thoſe Materials; but upon the Phantaſie, Deſign and Deſtination of Man, which is various, according to thoſe various Temperaments that have ingredience and influence into him: yea and poſſibly alſo upon certain junctures and concourſes of things that might never before befall any other. And therefore, as if upon a ſuppoſed Eternal Succeſſion of Mankind we ſhould find but one individual Socrates or Plato, ſo it is not impoſſible to ſuppoſe that Socrates or Plato ſhould conſiſt of ſuch a Temperament and Conſtitution, ſuch a Phantaſie and Imagination as never any man before had exactly the like; and conſequently he might be the diſcoverer of ſome ſuch Invention as never before was diſcovered. Or if we ſhould be ſo hardy as to ſuppoſe a Man pre-exiſting in all things exactly like to Socrates, both in his Temperament, Body and Mind, yet poſſibly thoſe accidental Occurrences which excited the Imagination of Socrates to the diſcovery and compoſing of ſuch an Invention might not fall in with that Man that is ſuppoſed of a perfect parity with Socrates.

For although perchance exiſting Individuals may not be actually Infinite, yet certain it is that the potential gradation of things may be potentially Infinite, and ſo may the junctures of Occurrences be potentially Infinite; whereby it may come to paſs, that though an Eternal Succeſſion of Men were admitted, yet in ista hora a Man might be produced that had never parem omnibus gradibus & numeris: And ſuch junctures of Occurrences might happen in iſta hora that had never an exact parity of all Circumſtances, and the ſame exact weight and number of Occurrences in any antecedent portion of Eternity.

And hence it may very eaſily come to paſs, that as any one Invention had not its exiſtence in a portion of a thouſand, two, ten, twenty thouſand years before; ſo, if the Ages of Mankind were infinite, it might never have pre-exiſtence before, though the whole Race of Mankind had been induſtriouſly addicted ad ultimum poſſe to have diſcovered or improved Artificial Inventions.

3. The third Allay to the concludence of this Argument is this: That Mankind have been, and in many places are very remiſs and unactive in improving their knowledge and diſcovery of things Natural and Artificial; and that which befalls one Man, or Age, or Place in this kind, may befall another: This may happen by lazineſs and ſloth, by an evil cuſtom, or by overflowing barbarouſneſs and want of improvement by Education: And upon this account we find a great want of Arts and Inventions in the Weſtern World, in Africa, and even nearer hand among the Iriſh: And if now by the acceſſion of Planters of better Education, or by the advanced Induſtry of ſome Inhabitant of thoſe barbarous Countries there ſhould be derived among them the Inventions of profitable or curious Arts, we could not with any ſufficient reaſon conclude that the World lately began in thoſe Countries, becauſe the Original of thoſe Arts and Inventions was but lately begun among them. If therefore thoſe People by reaſon of their Barbarous courſe of life might be ſtrangers unto Arts and Inventions for the ſpace of five hundred or a thouſand Years, why not for a much longer time? why not eternally? Since the very ſame ſupineneſs and negligence might as well poſſeſs thoſe Parts and Inhabitants for many Ages, as well as few; and for interminate Ages, as well as certain: and if at this day they ſhould diſcover and practiſe new Arts and Inventions, it were no greater Argument againſt the Eternity of their Succeſſion, than againſt their Continuance for thoſe many thouſand Years, which probably they have had in that unknown Weſtern World.

4. The fourth Allay of this Obſervation ſeems to be this: That as in Kingdoms and Empires, ſo in Diſcoveries of Arts there ſeem to be very great viciſſitudes and circulations, which ſtrangely vary the Faces of Things and Countries; and this principally done, 1. By Wars and Victories: 2. By Floods, Inundations, or Epidemical Diſeaſes and Plagues.

The Inſtances of the former are various. The Romans were a People civilized and improved into great Knowledge in Arts and Sciences, and in Civil and Military Government; and where they prevailed in Conqueſts and Victories, they did together with their Victories tranſmit Arts, Sciences, and excellent Methods of Government among even Barbarous Nations, which quite altered oftentimes the former Face of thoſe conquered Countries, and by that means thoſe Arts which were not known before in thoſe Places, became in uſe and requeſt in thoſe Countries wherein before they were ſtrangers: not as if they then began for they had their Practice and Uſe long before among the Romans, though their tranſmiſſion and derivation into thoſe Countries that were conquered ſeemed new.

Again, ſome Countries were benè morati, well diſciplined in Learning, Arts, and Knowledge, but poſſibly by the Irruption of numerous Armies of Barbarous People, thoſe Countries were quickly over-grown with Barbariſm and deſuetude from their former Civility and Knowledge, and degenerated into the Ignorance and Barbariſm of their Conquerors; ſo that in a reaſonable Period of time much of their ancient Knowledge and Arts was forgotten, as if they never had it. This was the condition of Greece the Learned Part of the World after their ſubjugation by the Turks, and this poſſibly may be the condition of China in a few years after the great Irruption and Devaſtation by the Tartars; wherein poſſibly if an Age or two hence the ſtate of things ſhould be judged according to the preſent appearance, it would be looked upon as if it had never been the habitation of thoſe Curious Arts which ſome time dwelt there: and poſſibly the ſetting on foot ſome of thoſe very Arts that were once well known in thoſe parts, would be looked upon as the Natales of thoſe Arts, or the firſt Inchoation of them, Wars and Deſolations having obliterated the Monuments of their former practices; which yet nevertheleſs would be in truth but the reviving of thoſe Arts which were long before practiſed, though intermitted and interrupted by the viciſſitudes of Wars.

And upon the ſame account are thoſe alterations that have hapned in the condition and ſtate of People by other accidents, as Inundations, Epidemical Diſeaſes, Corruption of the Air in ſome Parts and Continents, either by ſome eruption of pernicious Vapours, or other Inclemency of the Heavens. Plato in his third Book de Legibus, in the beginning, though he ſuppoſe an interminate Beginning of Mankind, and that there were ſucceſſively Cities, Laws, and Arts; yet he ſuppoſeth that upon theſe and the like Occurrences, thoſe that eſcaped theſe common Calamities betook themſelves to the Mountains, kept Sheep, and preſerved the Species of Mankind; but moſt of thoſe Arts and Sciences which formerly were common, became diſuſed and forgotten among them: But after Mankind multiplying, they deſcended into the Vallies, and by degrees, mutual converſation, the neceſſity of their condition, and the due conſideration of things did gradually revive thoſe Arts which Men had formerly loſt by long intermiſſion. For ſuch is the indoles of the Humane Nature, where it is not ſtrangely over-grown with Barbarouſneſs, that it will by a kind of Natural Sagacity diſcover things, eſpecially neceſſary for the uſe of Humane Life and Society; as Huſbandry, Laws, Government, Architecture, Clothing, and the like; as Bees or Ants provide for their common habitation and ſupply.

Upon all which it may ſeem that we are over-haſty when we conclude, That becauſe Arts or Sciences do perchance diſcover themſelves firſt to our view in ſuch Places or Ages, that therefore this was their firſt and primitive production, or that they were never before. For it may very reaſonably be, that thoſe or the like Arts might have been either in other places, and by a kind of migration or circulation be tranſmitted to thoſe new places either by Armies or Colonies deduced hither; or that even among the ſame People or Nation theſe Arts were ſometimes flouriſhing, though poſſibly having received ſome intermiſſion by great Accidents and Occurrences, they again do repullulare and revive upon the opportunity of Peace, Trade, Commerce and Popular Increaſe. Nay many times it comes to paſs, as is before obſerved, That when People are multiplied, ſo that their places grow ſtrait and narrow, and their ſupplies not proportionable to their number, neceſſity and exigence, it gives an edge to their Induſtry and Invention, and produceth new Diſcoveries of things that were either not known before, or forgotten: And even this one thing hath advanced the Dutch to that eminence of Manufacture, Induſtry and Arts, that they exceed the reſt of the World therein.

We may have an Inſtance of this Circulation of Arts even in this Kingdom of England in that which is our great Manufacture, namely, Woollen Cloth: It appears very plainly by thoſe ancient Gilds that were ſettled in England for this Manufacture, as at Lincoln, York, Oxford and divers other Cities, that in the time of H. 2. and R. 1. this Kingdom greatly flouriſhed in that Art: but by the troubleſom Wars in the time of King John, H. 3. and alſo in the times of E. 1. and E. 2. this Manufacture was wholly loſt, and all our Trade ran out in Wools, Wool-fells, and Leather carried out in ſpecie; and the Manufacture, during thoſe Warly times, held its courſe in France, the Netherlands, and the Hans Towns; but by the Wiſdom and peaceable times of E. 3. and his fair treating of forein Artiſts, which he invited and entertained in this Kingdom, he regained that Art hither again, which for near one hundred Years had been for the moſt part intermitted, which hath hitherto continued to the great Wealth and Benefit of this Kingdom.

So that we are not to conclude every new appearance of any Art or Science is the firſt production of it, but as they ſay of the River Tigris and ſome others, they ſink into the ground, and keep a ſubterranean courſe, it may be 40 or 50 miles, and then break out above ground again, which is not ſo much a new River, as the continuation and new appearance of the old: So many times it falls out with Arts and Sciences, though they have their non-appearances for ſome Ages, and then ſeem firſt to diſcover themſelves where before they were not known, it is not ſo much the firſt production of the Art as a tranſition, or at leaſt a reſtitution of what poſſibly was either before in another, or in the ſame Country or People: And thus ſome tell us that Guns and Printing, though but lately diſcovered in Europe, yet were of far ancienter uſe in China.

So that notwithſtanding this Conſideration of the late Invention of Arts, or Diſcoveries of things Natural or Artificial, Mankind might have had an infinite ſucceſſion, or at leaſt ſuch a continuance as ſurmounts all thoſe Accounts which the moſt prodigal Computations have given: and that Saying of the Wiſe Man may be verified, Eccleſiast. 1.9. The thing that hath been is that which ſhall be, and that which hath been done is that which ſhall be done, and there is no new thing under the Sun: Is there any thing whereof it may be ſaid, See, this is new? It hath been already of old time before.

I ſhall here add a farther Conſideration, becauſe it hath a cognation with the Subject of this Chapter.

There ſeems to be very probable Conjectures made touching the Origination of Mankind, becauſe there ſeems to be one Radical Language from which all others have their derivation, though ſome carry in them more, ſome leſs Memorials of their Original, as they were more or leſs remote in their Inception.

The Languages of the World may be aptly enough divided into the Primo primae, the Primo ſecundae, and the Secundo ſecundae.

The Language which I call Primo primae muſt needs be but one, if the Original of Mankind were but two common Parents of either Sex, as the Holy Scriptures teach us; and this one Language they muſt needs learn either from a conformation of Voices by the Angels, ſuch might that vocal Language be between Almighty God by the miniſtration of Angels, and Adam, whereof we read in the firſt and ſecond Chapters of Geneſis; or it muſt be an inſtituted Language, choſen by Adam in Paradiſe, by which he gave the ſeveral Beaſts their names, and maintained diſcourſe with GOD, and the Woman with the Serpent: For although it is as natural to Mankind to expreſs their Deſires, Paſſions, and Conceptions vocally, as it is for Brutes to uſe their natural vocal Signs, though of a more ſimple and imperfect kind; yet the forming of Languages into this or that particular faſhion or mode, whereby Conceptions may be rendred intelligible to others, is a buſineſs of Inſtitution, Diſcipline, Intention and Conſent. But what this firſt Language of our firſt Parents was, is difficult for us to determin: ſome think it was the Hebrew, and from thence they derive other Languages; others think that the Chineſes Language was the Original, becauſe it is the moſt ſimple, conſiſting moſt of monoſyllables, the moſt natural, fitting the apertures and flexures of the Lips and Tongue with the greateſt eaſe, and yet having the greateſt multiplicity and variety of Words; others again contend for the Scythian Language as the Primitive: all founded upon conjectural Reaſons.

But when we conſider how ſoon Languages are changed, and what a tract of time there was between the Creation and the Flood, and from thence to Moſes, it may be difficult to ſuppoſe that that Language continued ſo long in its purity and integrity; poſſibly if in any Line it continued in its integrity, it might be in the Line and Family of Noah, and ſo down to the Confuſion of Languages at the Tower of Babel.

But it is hard to determin what that Primitive Language was: the Hebrew or Samaritan bids faireſt for it, 1. In reſpect of its Antiquity; 2. In reſpect of many Languages, eſpecially of the Eaſt, that ſeem to be derived from it, as the Caldee, Egyptian, Phenician, Syriack, Arabick, which have a great cognation with it, and derivation, as it ſeems, from it.

And though poſſibly in thoſe Elder times, as in the time of Abraham, theſe ſeveral Languages might be but as ſo many ſeveral Dialects of the ſame Language, whereby it came to paſs that Abraham, though brought up in Caldea or Aſſyria, held conference with the King of Gerar and the Children of Heth, that were Canaanites, and as ſome think, uſed the Hebrew Language; his Servant alſo readily conferred with Laban the Syrian: Iſaac alſo had conference with the Philiſtims and Egyptians, yet it is apparent that in proceſs of time they grew into diſtinct Languages, unintelligible each to other: The Sons of Jacob underſtood not the Egyptian Language when they came down for Corn, Gen. 42.23. neither did they afterward underſtand ordinarily the Syrian Language, 2 Kings 19.26. nor the Caldean Language, Jer. 5.15.

But although it be commonly thought the Hebrew Language was the common Language of the Canaanites, yet it ſeems hard that the Holy and ſuppoſed Primitive Language ſhould be preſerved only in the Poſterity of accurſed Canaan, and from them derived to the Poſterity of Abraham the Holy Seed.

As touching the Language of the Seres or Chineſes, thoſe that ſuppoſe it to be the Primitive Language, do ſuppoſe that Noah's Ark firſt reſted upon the bordering Mountains of China, and that Country firſt peopled by the deſcendents of Noah; that they were not at the building of Babel. But this ſeems to be but a novel Conceit.

2. The Languages that were Secundo primae, were thoſe that hapned upon the Confuſion of Tongues, which the Jews ſuppoſe to be 70 or 72, from that place Pſal. 78. verſ. 55. He hath divided the Nations according to the number of the Princes of Iſrael, or the Sanhedrim; but whether they were ſo many, or more, or leſs, is not poſſible to determin.

Some ſuppoſe thoſe Languages which are ordinarily called Linguae matrices, were ſome of thoſe Languages that aroſe at the Confuſion of Tongues, and are called Matrices, becauſe divers other, eſpecially of the European, ſeem to be much derived from them, namely, the Greek, Latin, Teutonick, Sclavonick, Scythian, Hungarian, Finnick, Cantabrian, Iriſh, Britiſh, Arabick, Friſick, Illyrian, and Jarygium.

But though theſe are taken to be Linguae matrices, yet much of their Languages ſeem to be borrowed from the Hebrew and Phenician Language; and though they ſuppoſe thoſe Linguae matrices might ariſe at the Confuſion of Tongues, yet they were not totally eſtranged from that common Language which univerſally obtained before that Confuſion, which ſome think as before, was the Hebrew; ſome relicks of which Primitive Language were notwithſtanding that Confuſion retained as Indications and Monuments thereof, as Bochart in his Phaleg, and out of him Mr. Gale in his Book called The Court of the Gentiles, endeavours largely to prove.

3. The third ſort of Languages, which I call Secundo ſecundae, are thoſe that have either been derived from thoſe that were Primo ſecundae, or that have been compounded out of other Languages, or taken up de novo of later times, or by all of thoſe ways have obtained in ſeveral parts of the World, as the French, Italian, Spaniſh, Daniſh, Engliſh, and divers others.

Now if it can be well deduced that there was ſome ancient Primitive Language that by reaſonable Evidence can appear to be the common Root of all other Languages, it is reaſonable to conclude, That ſurely there was ſome one common Head that was the Beginning of Mankind; for without this Suppoſition it is hardly poſſible that there ſhould be a common Language at any time in the World, from which as from a common Root all the Languages of the World ſhould in proceſs of time be derived.

But this Evidence alſo taken ſingly, lyes open to ſome Objections that weaken it upon theſe Conſiderations.

1. We have not clear Evidence enough of any ſingle Primitive Language, nor what that Primitive Language was if ſuch there hath been: there might be in proceſs of time a thouſand ſucceſſive Languages, and many that went before have been loſt, and ſucceeded by others.

2. Thoſe ſimilitudes of Words of one Language which are found in another, give us no ſufficient Demonſtrations which of them was Primitive; the reſemblances of words ſignifying the ſame thing in the Hebrew and Greek Language prove no more that the Hebrew was before the Greek, and lent Words to them, than that the Greek was before the Hebrew, and lent the ſimilitude of Words to them.

3. If we conſider almoſt any Language not before-hand or by ſome after means mancipated to Rules, we ſhall ſcarce find any that contain themſelves in the ſame Articulation, Accent or Pronunciation for the ſpace of three or four hundred Years, but are infinitely varied in proceſs of time from what they formerly were. The Engliſh Language that was common and uſual three or four hundred Years ſince, is ſcarce now intelligible by us; yea and the Greek Tongue, though a regular Language, and reduced to a Grammatical Canon, yet a good Grammatical Grecian can hardly underſtand a Native Grecian, nor a Native Grecian the other at this day: yea we are told by Quintilian, as I remember, that in Rome it ſelf in proceſs of time the Latin Language was ſo altered, that the Prieſts could not readily underſtand the Hymns compoſed for their Idol-Service by the ancient Prieſts of Rome.

4. As ſucceſſion of Ages, ſo variety of places in the ſame Country and Nation gives ſuch variety of Dialects in the ſame Language, that one ſide of a Kingdom ſcarce underſtands the other: witneſs the four Dialects of the Greek Language, and the ſeveral Pronunciations of the French in ſeveral parts of France, and the various Dialects of the Engliſh in the North and Weſt that render their Expreſſions many times unintelligible to the other, and both ſcarce intelligible to the Midland: various Provinces of the ſame Kingdom, and that at firſt uſed the ſame Language, in proceſs of time uſe various manners of Pronunciation, which in time alſo alter the ſtructure of the Words as they are ſpoken or written, which in farther proceſs of time alters the Language into ſeveral Dialects, as it did in Greece and other places.

5. Every Nation hath a certain humour or diſpoſition appropriate to it, which by a kind of Natural neceſſity frames the very Air of Words, Speech and Accents accommodate and ſimilar to that Natural humour or inclination; — Graiis dedit ore rotundo Muſa loqui — In the very frame of the Speech of the Spaniard, Italian, French, Dutch, Welſh, Engliſh we may find a kind of Image of their Complexions and Tempers, ſuiting and framing their Speech, Accents, Tone, Pronunciation: Vowels conform thereunto, no leſs than in their Gate and Geſture; and this very Account would in a little time diverſifie one and the ſame Language in the Mouths of ſeveral Nations, ſo that in a little ſpace they would not be the ſame.

6. Commerce and Trade with forein Nations gives great alterations in Languages, each Country borrowing ſome Words, Accents, or Expreſſions from the other, whereby in a little time it is quite altered, and becomes a mixt confuſed Language, made up of the Ingredients of ſeveral Languages.

7. As in Clothes, ſo in Words, Phraſes, and Expreſſions there commonly grow new Faſhions, whereby it comes to paſs that the ſame Words and Phraſes that were not uſed, or ſcarce underſtood in former Ages, become in Faſhion, Reputation and Vogue in another Age; and this obtains ſometims from the Courts of Princes, wherein a Word a little in requeſt ſoon grows in faſhion with the Gentry, and from them at the third hand paſſeth over to the Tradeſman or Countryman.

8. Many times the Literati and Scholares coyn new Words, and ſometimes in common Speech or Writing in their Native Language, give Terminations and Idiotiſms ſutable to their Native Language, unto Words newly invented or tranſlated out of other Languages; which is ſometimes done out of Affectation, ſometimes out of Neceſſity, by reaſon of the want of ſufficient ſignificancy in their own Language; and when ſuch Phraſes or Words come abroad in printed Books, in Sermons or Orations, they become more general, and incorporate into the Native Language.

9. Many Languages of Countries are greatly altered and mingled, and ſometimes totally eradicated and loſt by Invaſions and Victories, or by tranſmiſſion of Colonies by Forein Princes of a different Language. Thus by the chacing the Britons out of England into Wales, their Language was wholly exterminated from hence with them, and by the ſucceſſive Incurſions and Invaſions of the Saxons, Danes and Normans, the Engliſh Language grew a kind of mixture of them all, which yet in proceſs of time hath been ſo much varied, that the Engliſh that was written in the time of H. 1. is not now intelligible.

It is true that thoſe Languages that are not now Native, though ſometimes they were, but are preſerved in Writing or Rules or Canons, have long kept their ſimplicity, as the Hebrew, Greek and Latin, which have been indeed preſerved from being loſt by vulgar uſe, but when a Language once becomes of vulgar uſe, it ſoon loſeth its integrity; thus the Latin degenerated into the Italian, and the very Hebrew and Greek more barbarous by much where they are popularly uſed, than in the ancient Writings, wherein they have been preſerved and kept to their ancient integrity.

Conſidering therefore the great inſtability of Languages, the great variations and changes to which they are ſubject, the great alterations that they have had, the great difficulty of finding any Language which (upon grounds barely of Reaſon, without Divine Revelation) we can ſafely call Original, and the great difficulty of deducing other Languages entirely from it: It is hard for us ſingly to lay any weight upon this Inſtance, to prove the Origination of Man upon a meer Moral Account or Topical Ratiocination thereof.

CAP. V. The Fourth Inſtance of Fact ſeeming to evince the Novity of Mankind, namely, the Inceptions of the Religions and Deities of the Heathens, and the deficiency of this Inſtance.

REligion ſeems to be as connatural to Humane Nature as Reaſon, and poſſibly a more diſtinguiſhing property of Humane Nature than it: For almoſt in all ſenſible Creatures, eſpecially thoſe of the more perfect kind, a certain Image or weak Adumbration of ſomething like Reaſon appears, yet we find in no Creatures below Mankind any thing like Religion, or Veneration of a Deity: And thoſe faint Conjectures touching ſomething analogical to Religion obſerved in Elephants, are too weak to give any reaſonable admiſſion thereof in them.

Religion therefore ſeems as ancient as Humanity it ſelf, at leaſt of ſome kind of dreſs or faſhion or other: therefore if we can arrive at the Inception of Religion, Veneration of a Deity, and thoſe Rites, Adorations, and Services that reſult from thence; we have reaſon to conjecture that the Inception of Mankind was not long before.

And becauſe the Inception of Mankind is not doubted by Jews or Chriſtians, who acknowledge the Truth and Divine Authority of the Scriptures, that reveal and diſcover the Origination both of Mankind and the World, but the doubt only reſteth among thoſe of the Gentile World; it hath been thought a reaſonable Argument to convince the Heathen World of the Origination of Mankind, by diſcovering the Origination not only of the Religious Worſhip of the Heathens, but even of thoſe very Deities which they celebrated and venerated, and paid that Religious Worſhip unto.

And this Diſcovery of the Origination of their Heatheniſh Deities hath been endeavoured by two Methods: Firſt, by following the ancient Hiſtories of the Phenicians, Egyptians, Grecians, and Romans; by which means they have traced up moſt if not all their Heatheniſh Deities to their Original, and their firſt Inauguration into Deities; whereas they were in their original for the moſt part but Men of great Note and Merit or Power in the Ancient World, or ſuch, who outgoing the ordinary rate of Mankind by ſome ſignal Excellence, Learning or Induſtry, were by the admiring inferior ſort of Men tranſlated into the Opinion and Veneration of Gods: and then there wanted not Poets and Prieſts to derive from them a Race and Progeny of Gods, which ſwelled into great Numbers, Pedigrees, and Genealogies of Gods and Heroes, Theogonia, which filled the ſuperiour World as Men filled the inferiour World by ſucceſſive Generations: And thoſe Authors that have given us an account of the Apotheoſes, the Inauguration of the Heatheniſh Deities and their ſucceſſions, are many; eſpecially, Diodorus Siculus in his firſt ſix Books; Euſebius in his firſt and ſecond Book De Praeparatione Evangelii, out of the Ancient Monuments of the Phenicians, Egyptians and Grecians; and Clemens Alexandrinus in lib. 1. Stromat. who gives us an account of the Apotheoſes of Bacchus, Hercules, Aeſculapius, Iſis, Ceres, Serapis, Apis and others, many of them, if not all, having their being and tranſlation into Deities after the time of Moſes; and from the various Denominations of thoſe Heatheniſh Deities, ſome had one Name among the Egyptians, another among the Phenicians, another among the Syrians, another among the Grecians; though poſſibly the Perſons themſelves were for the moſt part the ſame.

Secondly, By carrying up the Original of moſt of the Ancient Deities of the Heathens, and reſolving them into Noah, and his Sons and Deſcendents, deducing by very probable Arguments that Noah was Saturn, Chronos, &c. that Japhet was Neptune, Ham Jupiter, Shem Pluto, Canaan Mercury, Nimrod Bacchus, Magog Prometheus: vid. Bochart. in Phaleg, l. 1. Voſſius de Idololatriae origine & progreſſu, l. 1. and others that have followed thoſe Learned and Ingenious Authors.

But this Inference of the Recentneſs of Mankind from the Recentneſs of theſe Apotheoſes and Origination of Gentile Deities, ſeems alſo too weak to bear up this Suppoſition of the Novitas humani generis.

1. Becauſe although poſſibly ſome of their Heatheniſh Deities might have been of a late Edition, yet there might be many more that might be ancienter, who either were antiquated and forgotten, or they were tranſlated to other Names and Succeſſors; it faring with Idol Gods as it doth with Words or Languages, — Cecidere cadéntque, Quae jam ſunt in honore vocabula. —

The luſt of Mens Fancies in Propagation of Deities was endleſs and unſatiable. We are told out of Varro that there were no leſs than thirty thouſand Heatheniſh Gods and Deities of all ſorts, which were known in his time; and how many more there might be whoſe Names and Worſhip were long before that time antiquated, we cannot eaſily conjecture: only in all probability they were far more than thoſe that ſurvived. And therefore poſſibly there might be a Race and Succeſſion of Apotheoſes long antecedent to thoſe whoſe Originals we have given us in Ancient Hiſtories. We ſee how eaſily the Roman Calendar ſwells with new Conſecrations of Saints, and to what a multitude they have grown within leſs than the compaſs of one thouſand Years; and poſſibly had the World continued many thouſand years before it is ſuppoſed to have began, there might have been an interminate ſucceſſion of imaginary Deities, though many or moſt of their Names are now unknown, or the times of their Conſecrations forgotten.

2. But yet farther, if we ſhould ſuppoſe that this courſe of Idolatry began even ſhortly after the time of Noah and his three Sons, yet it is granted of all hands that the World had ſtood above 1600 Years before the invention of this kind of Idolatry: So that ex confeſſo this was not the firſt Religion in the World, neither did this Religion tread upon the Heels of the Origination of Mankind if Mankind was, and was 1600 Years before thoſe Deities were found out; and ſo this Religion cannot pretend to be coeval with Mankind, nor give us any ſufficient Indication of the Recentneſs of Mankind.

3. But yet farther, it is very apparent that this Veneration of Men Conſecrated into Deities was not the ancienteſt Idolatry, much leſs the ancienteſt Religion of the World: The Worſhipping of the Hoſt of Heaven, the Sun, Moon, and Stars was an Idolatry that way far more ancient than this of the Heathen Gods made of Men: and this is an Evidence of the antecedency of that Idolatry of the Stars and Heavenly Bodies, in as much as when theſe new conſecrated Deities were made, they did as it were incorporate and affix them to that more ancient Idolatry, transferring the Names of moſt of their Gods to the Heavenly Bodies or Aſteriſms; as Saturn to the Star of Saturn, Mars, Venus, Mercury, Jupiter to the ſeveral Planetary Bodies; and to the Sun and Moon a prodigious number of Deities, as to the Sun, Phoebus, Apollo, Oſyris, Horus, and many more; to the Moon, Diana, Hecate, Venus, Aſtarte, and many others: So that although we ſhould allow the firſt Origination of thoſe Heatheniſh Deities to have been when Hiſtorians give us an account, and not before; yet the Idolatry performed to the Heavenly or Elementary Bodies, the Sun, Moon, Stars, Fire, Aether, &c. might have had a long practice among Men before the Invention of theſe later Deities.

4. But yet farther; in as much as Truth is certainly more ancient than Errour, we have reaſon to think that even before the ancienteſt Form of Idolatrous Worſhip in the World, even that of the Heavenly and Elementary Bodies, there was a True Worſhip of the True GOD, which might continue many Ages before any ſort of Idolatry prevailed in the World. So that it would be too raſh to conclude, That becauſe many of the Heatheniſh Deities had their known Original, that therefore no other Religion anteceded it, or that that Religion ſoon followed the Origination of Mankind.

5. Beſides all this there ſeems in the World, or at leaſt it is very poſſible to ſuppoſe certain viciſſitudes or relations not only in Arts and Sciences, as is before obſerved, but even in the Religions profeſſed, which may obtain ſucceſſively both in Places and Ages according to ſeveral viciſſitudes: We ſee that in the Country of Paleſtine ſhortly after the Flood Idolatry obtained among the Canaanites and the deſcendents of Ham; after that, the Knowledge and Worſhip of the True GOD among the Iſraelites for many Ages; and after that, a degeneration of the greateſt part thereof to Idolatry again in the Country of the Ten Tribes, and in a great part among the other Two Tribes: after that a Reformation and Reſtitution of the true Worſhip of God, in the return from the Captivity until Chriſt came; then the moſt ſound and perfect Religion, namely Chriſtianity, obtained for ſome time; then the return of Paganiſm, under perſecuting Roman Emperours; then the prevalence again of the Chriſtian Religion, under Conſtantine and ſome that ſucceeded him; then Popiſh Superſtition; after that Turciſm and Mahumetaniſm, eſpecially in the parts of Greece, Paleſtine, Egypt and other parts of Aſia and Africa. Thus various Profeſſions of Religion have had various Viciſſitudes, Revolutions and ſucceſſive Alterations in Places and Ages.

Albertus Magnus, as I remember, with ſomewhat too much curioſity, and ſomewhat tranſported with too much fancifulneſs towards the Influences of the Heavenly Motions and Aſtrological Calculations, ſuppoſeth that Religion hath had its ſucceſſive Alterations and Seaſons according to certain Periodical Revolutions of the Planets: to the firſt Ages of the World he aſſigns the Preſidency of Saturn in matters of Religion, and ſo downward, according to ſeveral ſucceſſive aſſigned Periods. Theſe are vain Conjectures, but they ſerve to explain what I mean, namely, That there may be ſucceſſive Alterations and Changes in the profeſſed Religion of the World in ſucceſſive Ages, and ſucceſſively in the ſame and other places of the World; whereby it will be hard to determin the Epocha of the Commencement of Mankind by any one Form or Shape of Religion profeſſed in the World; for there may be ſome Religion antecedent to that which to us in this Age appears to have been the ancienteſt; but ſtill with this probable Concluſion, That ſince Truth is more ancient than Errour, it ſeems, that if there were any Religion that was Primitive in the World, it was the true Religion and true Worſhip of the true God, and not Idolatry, or worſhipping of Men or Idols, or the Works of Nature: and conſequently, that although we had no Monuments extant of any Religion ancienter than Idolatry, yet we had no reaſon to conclude that that Idolatrous Religion was the moſt ancient, or coeval to the Origination of Mankind: but rather, that Mankind had an Exiſtence in the World much antecedent to ſuch Idolatrous Worſhip, wherein the true God was for many Ages and Generations truly worſhipped; and that partly by the ſubtilty of the Enemy of Mankind, partly by the apoſtacy and corruption of Humane Nature, and partly by the gradual decay of that true and ancient Tradition of the true Worſhip of the true God, Idolatry and Superſtition prevailed and obtained in the World.

So that although it be a moſt certain Truth that Mankind had an Origination, and was not without Beginning, yet the Evidence of the Origination of their Idolatry and Idolatrous Deities, is no ſufficient Proof or Evidence of the Origination of Mankind.

CAP. VI. A Fifth Conſideration concerning the Decays eſpecially of the Humane Nature, and whether there be any ſuch Decays; and what may be collected concerning the Origination of Man upon that Suppoſition.

THis Argument hath been excellently handled by Dr. Hakewell, I ſhall therefore be the ſhorter in it, yet ſomewhat I ſhall ſay concerning it.

Some of thoſe that have been inquiſitive into the Nature of Man have obſerved two things, which if they were true, would certainly give us an irrefragable Argument againſt the Eternal Succeſſion of Mankind, viz. 1. That the Ages of Men grow gradually ſhorter and ſhorter: 2. That the Quantity of Humane Bodies was ordinarily heretofore much larger than they are now, and by a kind of gradual decay of that Natural Vigour and Strength they decline to a ſmaller Stature. Thus Plutarch inter placita Philoſophorum tells us out of Empedocles, Nostrae aetatis homines priſcis comparatos infantium instar eſſe; and yet Empedocles lived upon the point of 2000 Years ſince, and Plutarch near 1500 Years ſince: and Pliny in the 7th Book of his Natural Hiſtory, cap. 16. tells us the ſame, In plenum autem, cuncto mortalium generi minorem indies fieri propemodum obſervatur, raróſque patribus proceriores, conſumente ubertate ſeminum exuſtione, in cujus vices nunc vergat aevum; and ſome Inſtances are given there and by the Additional Notes thereupon, of the great Sceletons of Mens Bodies found in ſeveral Ages, and that, Jam ante annos mille vates ille Homerus non ceſſavit minora corpora mortalium quam priſca conqueri.

And indeed if this natural Decreaſe of the Ages of Mens Lives and their Bodily Statures had held ſuch a proportion, it would not only avoid the poſſibility of an Eternal Succeſſion of Mankind, but would alſo give us a very late Epocha of their firſt Origination: For a very ancient Original, accompanied with ſuch a natural Decreaſe of Age and Stature by reaſon of that inſenſible but unintermitted decay of the ſtrength and ſtature of Nature, would have long ſince reduced Mankind to be but Ephemeraes in duration, and little other than Inſects in extent, or rather wholly determined, and put a Period to the whole Species infinite Ages paſt.

But it ſeems that theſe are miſtaken complaints both of Empedocles and Homer; for ſurely in ſo great a Period as 2000 or 1500 Years elapſed ſince the death of thoſe Men the experiment of that Decreaſe would have been much more obvious and obſervable than we find it at this day. And although the nature of Mankind and of other Creatures ſubject to corruption, if left to it ſelf without the continued Subſidium and Influence of the Divine Providence, would ſoon have faln into diſſolution per ſaltum, and without the inceſſant and corroding invaſions of ſo long a time; yet that ſame Power that firſt gave Being to things, hath ſupported their ſucceſſive Generations in the ſame ſtate and natural vigour that it ever had, abating thoſe accidental occurrences that Sin, Exceſs, and other occurrences have brought into things.

Firſt therefore as touching the Decays of the Age of Man's Life; we do indeed learn from the Sacred Scripture (for no Humane Hiſtory reacheth ſo high) That the Lives of the Ancients were very long, eſpecially before and for ſome time after the Flood; and this the Divine Wiſdom, Providence and Goodneſs ordered for moſt excellent Ends, namely, the Peopling of the New World, and that without any other means than his own Will, or at leaſt by means unknown to us: in Arphaxad the Son of Shem the great Age of the Ancients was cut to halves, namely to 440 Years; and in his Grand-child Peleg it was again cut to halves, for he lived but 242 Years; and it is alſo true that afterwards gradually to the days of Moſes the Lives of Men became ſhorter and ſhorter, till they fixed in that common Period of the Life of Man of 70 or 80 Years: and although it be true that the Hiſtories of former times give us ſome account of longer Lives of Men, as the Lives of Moſes, Aaron, Phinehas and ſome others, and thoſe mentioned by Pliny, lib. 7. cap. 48. and ſome in our own Experience; yet Moſes himſelf ſtates the ordinary Standard of the Life of Man to be 70, or at moſt 80 Years. Pſal. 90.10. 2 Sam. 19.32, 35. And this we ſhall find true upon the conſideration of the Chronological Account of the Years of the ancient Patriarchs and Kings that ſucceeded Moſes; as likewiſe of the time that the Iſraelites lived in the Wilderneſs, all which that were twenty Years old and upwards at the coming into the Wilderneſs when the Spies were ſent into Canaan, which was ſhortly after their coming thither; all theſe I ſay, except Joſhua and Caleb, dyed within the 40 Years Peregrination in the Wilderneſs: and at this ſtay the ordinary Age of Men hath been for theſe 4000 Years, abating thoſe caſualties either of Diſeaſes or other Accidents that have ſhortned the ordinary complete Ages of Mens Li 〈…〉

2. As touching the Stature of Men, it muſt be agreed that in former Ages there have been Giants and Men of extraordinary Stature: ſome Inſtances we have in the ſame Pliny and other Heathen Authors, and many more in the Hiſtory of the Old Teſtament: But theſe were out of the ordinary and regular courſe of Nature.

But it ſeems that ordinarily in all Ages the Statures of Men have little differed from what they now are, though according to the difference of Climates and ſituations there hath been ordinarily and regularly a difference in the Stature of Men; many times Marſh-Countries, and thoſe that are of a temperate heat, producing Men of a larger ſize than Mountainous or thoſe Parts that are nearer the Sun, as ſome parts of Spain and Galicia.

And that the ordinary Stature of Mens Bodies is much the ſame now as anciently in the ſame Places or Regions appears by undeniable Experience: 1. The Bodies of the Egyptians that have been exſiccated into Mummy, and lain ſome thouſands of Years, are found to have the ſame Stature or very little differing from what they now have; neither could they ſhrink into a ſhorter dimenſion by the length of time, conſidering that the Bones of all parts are joyned in their extremities, and could not become ſhorter without putrefaction, which occurrs not in thoſe exſiccated Bodies.

2. As the firſt practical Rudiments of Arithmetick were taken from the Parts of the Humane Body in the Numeri primarii or Digitales, ſo in Geometry it is evident that the firſt notation of Meaſures was taken from the Parts of the Body of Man, and very ancient both among the Hebrews, Greeks and Romans, and theſe hold ſtill the ſame proportion as they did anciently.

Theſe Meaſures according to the Jewiſh, Arabian and Egyptian Account are as followeth.

6 Barley-corns make 1 Digit.

An Inch conſiſted of 8 Barley-corns, or which is all one, one Digit and ⅓ of a Digit.

The Palm conſiſted of 3 Inches, or 4 Digits, or 24 Barley-corns, mentioned Exod. 25.25.

Spithama, a Span conſiſted of 9 Inches, or 12 Digits; the half of a Cubit, namely, the utmoſt extent between the extremity of the Thumb and the little Finger extended to their greateſt dimenſion. This was the Meaſure of Aarons Breaſt-plate. Exod. 28.16.

A Foot conſiſted of 4 Palms, or 12 Inches, or 16 Digits, or 96 Barley-corns.

A Cubit, the interval between the Elbow and the extremity of the longeſt Finger; this was the Ordinary Cubit, it conſiſted of 6 Palms, which allowing 3 Inches to a Palm is 18 Inches, or a Foot and a half: vid. Kircher in Oedipo, Tom. 2. Claſſ. 8. where writing of the Egyptian Cubit, Habet autem omnis Cubitus ſex Palmos, & Palmus quatuor digitos, & Digitus ſex grana hordei. This was the uſual Moſaical Legal Cubit which they uſed in Meaſures of Building; the length of Ehud's Dagger, Judges 3.16. and that meaſure whereby the dimenſions of the Ark are meaſured: though beſides that common Cubit they had among the Jews and Egyptians two larger ſorts of Cubits, one called Cubitus Regius, which was 3 Inches longer than the ordinary Cubit; and the other called Cubitus Geometricus, which was double to the common Cubit, viz. 3 Foot, or according to others, 6 common Cubits, viz. 9 Foot.

Theſe Meaſures according to the Roman or Latin Account are as followeth.

4 Barley-corns breadth make 1 Digit.

An Inch [Uncia] conſiſted of 5 Barley-corns and ⅓ of a Barley-corn, or which is all one, the breadth of the Thumb, or, 1 Digit and ⅓ of a Digit.

The Palm conſiſted of 3 Inches, or which is all one, of 4 Digits, or 16 Barley-corns.

Spithama, the Span conſiſted of 3 Palms, or 9 Inches, or 12 Digits, or 48 Barley-corns.

Pes, a Foot conſiſted of 4 Palms, or 12 Inches, or 16 Digits, or 64 Barley-corns.

Cubitus, a Cubit conſiſted of 6 Palms, or 18 Inches, or 24 Digits, or 96 Barley-corns.

Greſſus, a Step, two Foot and a half; in Greek 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 .

Paſſus, a Pace, conſiſting of 2 Steps, or of 5 Foot according to the Roman Account, but according to the Greek Account 6 Roman Feet and ¼; ſo that the Grecian Pace was longer than the Roman by a Foot and quarter.

Orgya, or a Fathom, the diſtance between the extremities of the Fingers of each Hand, the Arms being extended, which very near anſwers the length of any perſon from Head to Foot; and to reduce it to a certainty, the uſual eſtimate thereof is 6 Foot. Vide de hac re Danielem Angelocratorem de Ponderibus & Menſuris.

The uſual Computation according to a medium or proportion of the height of a Man is 6 Foot, or a regular Fathom, or 4 Cubits: So Vitruvius, Pes eſt ſexta pars altitudinis corporis, Cubitus quarta: with this agrees Kircher, ubi ſupra; Altitudo humana è quatuor communibus Cubitis Egyptiacis, unus quoque Cubitus ſex Palmis, Palmus quatuor digitis. So that the ordinary height of a Man is 96 Digits which the ancient Egyptians eſtimated to be equal to that Myſtical Cubit among them ſtiled Paſſus Ibidis, or the Trigon that the Ibis makes at every ſtep, conſiſting of 3 latera, each 32 Digits, amounting in all to 96 Digits, the common Meaſure of the procerity of a Man, or 4 common Cubits.

Theſe were the very ancient eſtimates of diſtances taken from the Parts of a Man, and their extent; namely, the Finger, the Thumb, the Span, the Cubit, the Fathom, the Foot, the Step; and theſe were the eſtimates and reduction of them to known and certain Meaſures, and theſe Proportions are ſtill, even in our Age, in Men that are of an ordinary ſtature: The Fingers breadth now as anciently 6 Barly-corns breadth; the 4 Fingers or Palm about 3 Inches; the Span, the Cubit, the Foot, the Step, the Fathom of the ſame extent and dimenſion now as anciently, and the ordinary eſtimate of a tall Man 6 Foot now as then; Witneſs our Qld Statute called Compoſitio Ulnarum & Perticarum; Tria grana hordei ſicca & rotunda (viz. in length) faciunt pollicem, duodecim pollices faciunt pedem, tres pedes faciunt ulnam, quinque ulnae & dimidium faciunt perticam, quadraginta perticae in longitudine & quatuor in latitudine faciunt acram. Whereby we have very plain reaſon to conclude that Empedocles and Pliny were miſtaken touching the gradual diminution of Humane Stature, ſince thoſe Meaſures that took their denomination and extent from the Parts of Men held anciently that extent and length that the very ſame Parts in Men hold in theſe times.

And truly if we look upon the progreſſive Growth and Periods in Humane Nature, as alſo in all other perfect Animals, they hold regularly the ſame ſtate and order as they held in the moſt remote Ages whereof we have any Memorial in Ancient Writings or Hiſtories, The ſame time for the Formative proceſs of the Humane Embryo now as is recorded to have been uſual in the times of Ariſtotle and Hippocrates, viz. ordinarily in the beginning of the tenth Month. Ariſtot. Hiſt. Animal. cap. 3, & 4, Hippocrat, de Carnibus, in fine.

The proportion of Stature the ſame now as anciently; they bred Teeth at 7 Months, Ariſtot. Hiſt. Animalium, l. 2. cap. 10. ſhedding and new breeding of Teeth at 7 Years, Cenſorinus de Die Natali, cap. 14. and again breeding of the noviſſimi maxillares or genuini dentes at 20. Ariſt. Hiſt. Animal. l. 2. cap. 4. At 5 Years of age in an ordinary growth the procerity is half of that which will be attained at full age, Ariſtot. de Generat. Animalium, l. 1. cap. 18. though Pliny l. 7. cap. 16. aſſigns that proportion to trimatos or 3 Years of age, but miſtakenly, as it ſeems.

The ordinary Period of the Humane Procreative Faculty in Males 65, or at moſt 70; in Females 45, or at moſt 50. Ariſt. Hiſt. Animal. l. 5. cap. 14.

The ſeveral Periods of the Ages of the Life of Man according to Hippocrates divided into 7, viz. at 7, at 14, at 22, at 35, at 42, at 61, and from thence to the end of Life, which at moſt is 81 or 84, upon the greateſt ordinary Account. Vide Rhodogin. l. 19. cap. 21.

So that although the Humane Nature, as to that part of it that is Corporeal, is ſubject to changes and corruptions, and not of ſo firm and ſtable a conſiſtence as the Heavenly Bodies, and conſequently not ſo capable of a permanent and fixed conſtancy and continuation as they; yet by the conſtant and unintermitted Influx of the Divine Providence this corruptible and mutable Nature of Mankind, yea and of the other perfect Animals, is admirably preſerved in the ſame meaſure of extent, regular procedure, and length of duration, as it hath been many Thouſands of Years ſince. Indeed it may be poſſibly true, that Accidents, accidental Occurrences, Intemperance, ill and noxious Effluvia from the Earth, Waters, and intemperature of the Air, and other Accidents may in theſe latter Ages of the World produce ſome ſuch Diſeaſes and accidental Diſorders as may poſſibly more infeſt Mankind, and occaſion more Mortality than in former Ages. But as to the regular and ordinary courſe of Natural procedure and ſtate of things with Mankind, yea and other Animals, there ſeems to be little or no decay or variation from what hath been formerly (abating that Concuſſion which the Perfection of the Humane Nature ſuffered by the firſt Fall, and the ſhortning of Mens Lives, which is of another Conſideration.)

And therefore I am not ſo apt to attribute that firm Conſiſtency of the Heavenly Bodies, their conſtant uninterrupted and invaried Motion, and thoſe other Indications of Permanency and Perpetuity, barely or ſingly to the ſingular and indiſſoluble Texture of their Nature or Compoſition, as to that inceſſant Influx and unintermitted Cauſality of the Divine Power and Providence, which I ſo plainly ſee conſerves almoſt an equal regularity in the Motions, Proceſſes, Succeſſion, and Condition of poor, frail, Sublunary Bodies, which in their little Period belonging to their ſpecifical and individual Nature, have the ſame regularities and orders now as formerly, and in the whole Syſteme of their ſpecifical Nature preſerved in the ſucceſſive Individuals for many thouſands of years, obtain the ſame regularity, order, and method of Exiſtence, without decay, as it hath always held.

This Suppoſition therefore of the gradual decay of the ſtate of Humane Nature, though in hypotheſi it would ſtrongly infer a late Origination of Man, yet it is falſe in theſi, and ſo concludes nothing touching the Argument in hand, namely, the Origination of Mankind in ſome determinate Point of Finite Duration.

An Ingenious Perſon, in a new Eſſay of Natural Philoſophy, Entituled, New Principles of Philoſophy, Part. 2. Cap. 22. tells us: That the Sun or Fiery Region gains gradually upon the Inferior Elements, ſo that the greateſt Declination of the Sun in the time of Hipparchus and Ptolemy was obſerved to be 23 deg. 52 min. but is ſince found to be reduced to 23 deg. 30 min. or 28 min. which is a neceſſary Conſequent of the Suns gradual approximation towards the Earth: And if that ſhould be ſo, it were a neceſſary Argument of the Origination of the World, and with it of Mankind, within a certain Period of Time. But we muſt not be over haſty in allowing of that Poſition; for every Day gives us Inſtances how difficult it is exactly to find out the Diſtances of the Heavenly Bodies, Lines, and Motions, eſpecially when we come to meaſure them by Minutes, or Parts of Minutes, which cannot be effected but by Mathematical Inſtruments, which can never reach to a perfect exactneſs in this nature.

CAP. VII. The Sixth Evidence of Fact proving Novitatem generis humani, namely, The Hiſtory of the Patres familiarum, and the Original Plantation of the Continents and Iſlands of the World.

IN Profane Authors and Hiſtorians we may find the Roots and Founders of many Kingdoms, Monarchies, and States, either by Victories, or by Emigrations, or by Inteſtine Commotions, or by common Conſent of the People or Inhabitants: Thus we find the Foundation of the later States or Monarchies in that Conſtitution at leaſt wherein they now ſtand, or in ſome former Ages ſtood; As the Foundation of the Engliſh Monarchy in the Norman Conqueſt; and before that, the Foundations of the Saxon and Daniſh Monarchies in this Kingdom, in the old Hiſtories of Hoveden, William of Malmsbury, and others. The like might be found for the Foundation of the French, Spaniſh, and Daniſh Kingdoms, the Empire of Germany, of the Grand Seignior, and others. And ancienter Hiſtories give us an account of the Foundation of the Roman Empire in Romulus, of the Grecian in Alexander, of the Perſian in Cyrus, of the Babylonian in Nabonaſſar, of the Aſſyrian in Belus, Ninus, Semiramis. But yet, as is formerly obſerved, the Diſcovery of theſe Originations of Civil Coalitions into Kingdoms and Empires, do not lead us up to the Origination of Mankind, in the material Conſtituents of theſe Kingdoms and Empires; for the Men that made up theſe Civil Bodies, or at leaſt their Anceſtors, had a Being before, though perchance under a different form of Civil Government, or under ſome other Names or Governour: As the ſeveral States of Greece, before their coalition into one Kingdom under Alexander, or Philip his Father, ſubſiſted in ſeveral ſmaller Principalities or Commonwealths. For theſe kind of Hiſtories, though they afford us the Inception of new Governors or Governments, the Capita Regiminum, yet they give us not the Capita Familiarum: For though Romulus, for Inſtance, laid the Foundation of the City and Monarchy of Rome, and became as it were the Parent of that City and State, yet he was not the Parent of the Men that were the material Conſtituents of it, for they were a Farrago, or Collection of many people that had their Exiſtence long before in themſelves or their natural Progenitors. And upon the ſame account it is, that although many Hiſtories, as Diodorus Siculus, Thucidides, Herodotus, and others, do give us ſome true and ſome fabulous Derivations of the Names of Places or Countries, from the Men that ſeemed to be the Heads or Roots of thoſe Denominations, yet though they ſhould be all admitted to have truly given thoſe Denominations to thoſe Countries, it doth by no means follow, that they were the Parents of the Inhabitants thereof; but they were ſuch, as either by War, or Power, or Election of the People, preſided in thoſe places, and gave them thereupon their denomination. Thus they tell us, That Helen gave the denomination to that part of Greece which was called Helenica, and thoſe Grecians were called Heleniſtae. Pelaſgus was he that gave the denomination to the Pelaſgi, another part of Greece. Latinus, to Latium and the Latins. Danaus, to another Cept of the Grecians. Tenes, the Son of Cygnus, to Tenedos. Cretas, to Creta and the Cretians. Italus, as ſome ſay, to Italia and the Italians. Romulus, to Rome and the Romans. And infinite more ſuch Alluſions of Denominations of Countries and People, from the Name of him that preſided either in the Army, or Colony, or Countrey unto which ſuch Denominations were after given: And yet Latinus, nor Pelaſgus, nor Cretas, nor Helen, were any more the Natural Parents of all thoſe perſons that were called Pelaſgi, or Cretenſes, or Heleniſtae, or Latini; than Romulus was the Natural Parent of all thoſe people that were the firſt Inhabitants of Rome, or of thoſe that were after Incorporated and Infranchiſed into that Name, City, or Government. Indeed theſe were ſuch perſons, as perchance were the Captains of thoſe Armies or Colonies that were commanded by them, or were ſuch as were the Heads or Founders of the Monarchies or Kingdoms that they thus founded; or ſuch as did ſuſtinere nomen & perſonam totius communitatis, and thereby had the Power and Priviledge to give a Denomination to thoſe Countries or People they governed, calling them after their own Names: But they were not the Natural Roots, or common Natural Parents of all them that bore their Denomination, though it may be very likely they had ſome Children of their own which might participate in that common Denomination.

This therefore ſingly conſidered, namely, the Denomination of People from ſome one Perſon, is not ſufficient to aſſure us that all thoſe Perſons that bore that Denomination were derived by Natural Propagation from him whoſe Name they ſo bear; but though it may be true that ſuch a Denomination may be communicated to ſuch only, as deſcended by Natural Propagation from him, as I ſhall hereafter inſtance, yet it may be otherwiſe: Therefore I have no reaſon to conclude, That whereſoever I find a Society of Men bearing the Denomination of one Man, that that Man was the Natural Parent of thoſe that bear that Denomination, unleſs I have ſome better Evidence than Alluſion of Names, ſince it is apparent in theſe Hiſtories that it is otherwiſe.

Upon this Reaſon it ſeems plain, that it will not be poſſible from any Prophane Hiſtory to find the Original Parents of any one Kingdom, much leſs of Mankind. It is very evident indeed, that by help of a continuation of Prophane Hiſtories or other common Monuments well kept together, the Genealogies and Ramifications of ſome ſingle Families even to a vaſt and numerous extenſion may be preſerved. But that will not do the buſineſs that I intend. For it is rare, and beyond Example in any Author that I know, that the entire and complete Pedigree of the whole Deſcendents of any particular Family is deduced down through the ſpace of a thouſand Years laſt paſt; whereas ſuch Inſtances as muſt ſerve my turn muſt be ſuch as are at leaſt five thouſand Years old, or otherwiſe I ſhall fail in the application of this Topick now in hand to the Matter in queſtion.

It remains therefore that for Inſtances of ſuch Antiquity uſeful to my purpoſe I muſt reſort to the ancienteſt Hiſtory, namely, the Hiſtory of Moſes, which as it is a Hiſtory of the ancienteſt Times and Occurrences in the World, ſo it is a Hiſtory that was written at the greateſt diſtance from this Time, and neareſt to the Times and Things whereof he writes; no Hiſtory in the World being ſo ancient as this by near eight hundred Years, for ſo long lived Moſes the Author of this Book before Homer the firſt Prophane Hiſtorian that is extant.

And if any Man ſhall object againſt the competency of this Inſtance, 1. Becauſe the ſame Moſes whom I uſe in this Topick is the perſon that aſſerts the thing de quo ambigitur, namely the firſt Production of Mankind, and therefore that he is incompetent in this Caſe: 2. Becauſe all that urge the Teſtimony of Moſes urge him as infallible, divinely inſpired, and ſo whatſoever he ſaith muſt not be contradicted; and upon ſuch a Suppoſition there were a compendious way of evincing the Queſtion in hand of the Inception of Mankind, by telling us that Moſes who wrote by an infallible Spirit and Inſpiration, tells us that Mankind was Created by GOD about 6669 Years ſince according to the Seventy; and ſo there needs no farther Reaſon, nor can be any farther Controverſie touching it.

To this I ſhall ſay theſe things: That although it is certain that Moſes was Inſpired by an Infallible Spirit in what he wrote, and that he doth in plain terms tell us that Man was at firſt Created by Almighty God, and therefore to me or any elſe that is ſatisfied of the Infallible Authority of the Holy Scripture, this is ſufficient to ſatisfie that the truth is as Moſes hath informed us, and there needs no other Argument to ſupport my Faith of the truth hereof: yet becauſe I am writing of thoſe Natural and Moral Evidences of this Truth that may be of ſtrength enough to evince the truth of this Aſſertion, upon the apparent Moral Evidences of the credibility of the Writings of Moſes, I ſhall here urge the Authority of Moſes for the Proof of the Matters of Fact in queſtion as I would urge Herodotus or Livy to prove a Matter of Fact alleged by them; and at this time and in this Diſpute ſhall only uſe his Teſtimony as a Moral Evidence of the Truth he aſſerts, as an Evidence of Credibility. And as I ſhall not exact a Subſcription to the Truths he delivers upon the account of his Infallibility, ſo it is not reaſon to deny that Credibility of what he relates, which would be allowed to a Prophane Author; eſpecially when it carries with it ſingly, without the contribution of the Suppoſition of a Divine Authority, as great an evidence of truth as any Hiſtory in World beſides.

And as to that which is ſaid, That the Suppoſition of the truth of what Moſes aſſerts, is to ſuppoſe the thing controverted, becauſe Moſes aſſerts the Creation of Mankind: I ſay, 1. That I ſhall not at all inſtance in that Aſſertion as to determin the Queſtion, but only ſo far forth as it is a Moral Evidence of the truth of it; namely, That this was a thing believed near 4000 Years ſince by Wiſe Men, ſuch as Moſes was, and by them that were much nearer to the time wherein the Origination of Mankind and thoſe other Matters of Fact that are contributory to the Proof thereof was tranſacted; and therefore in common Reaſon muſt needs have a clearer Tradition and Evidence of the truth in this matter than the Ages ſo many thouſand Years after; but this I ſhall reſerve to its proper place. 2. In this place I ſhall not at all inſiſt upon the Tradition of Moſes touching the Creation of Man, but only upon thoſe Hiſtorical Narratives delivered by Moſes relating to ſuch Matters of Fact that were nearer his time, and ſuch as he might very reaſonably know and deliver as an Hiſtoriographer; namely, the Propagation of Mankind after the Flood, and the Reduction of moſt of the conſiderable Nations of the World to their ſeveral Roots or Parents by Natural Propagation, and the credibility of his Relation touching it: Though even the credibility of this Relation of his gives a great Evidence and Atteſtation, even upon a Moral account to what he writes touching the Creation of Man, and thoſe parts of the Hiſtory antecedent to the Flood.

The Sum therefore of the Moſaical Hiſtory that I ſhall in this place make uſe of, is this:

1. That a Univerſal Flood was brought upon the Earth in the Year 1656 after the ſuppoſed Creation of Man according to the Jewiſh Account, although the Septuagint allows a longer Period between the Creation and the Flood.

2. That by that Univerſal Flood all Mankind were deſtroyed except eight perſons, namely, Noah, his Wife, his three Sons, Shem, Japhet, and Ham, and their Wives.

3. That all the Race of Mankind after this Flood, were derived by natural generation from theſe three Sons of Noah and their Wives.

4. That the particular Deſcendents from theſe three Sons of Noah, are truly deſcribed and ſet forth in the 9th, 10th, and 11th Chapters of Geneſis by their ſeveral Names, and drawn down from that Root to the filling and peopling of the whole Earth: Gen. 32. Theſe are the Families of the Sons of Noah, after their Generations, in their Nations; and by theſe were the Nations divided in the Earth after the Flood.

5. That after the Flood, in the time of Phaleg, the Languages of the World, eſpecially of the families of Cham and Japhet, were confounded, and the Nations proceeding from theſe Families diſperſed.

6. That the Family of the Iſraelites was deduced through theſe enſuing Patriarchs, viz.

Sem. Arphaxad, born two years after the Flood, Anno mundi, 1658. Salah. Heber. Peleg. Reu. Serug. Nahor. Terah. Abram. Iſaac. Jacob marries Rachel and Leah, Anno mundi, 2192. Levi, and the Twelve Patriarchs. Kohath. Amram. Moſes, born in the Year of the World, 2373.

So that from the Flood to the Birth of Moſes the Deſcendents from Jacob grew into a great Nation, for in the 80th Year of Moſes Life the Males of the Children of Iſrael, that were above 20 Years old, were above 600000, beſides the Levites, and beſides Women, and Children that were under 20 Years old, Numb. 2.32. and this great Increaſe of this People happened within the compaſs of about 260 Years. And thus, according to the Jewiſh Account in the Holy Text, the Period between the Flood and the Exitus of the People out of Egypt was about 800 Years: But indeed the Account of the Septuagint, partly by the Interſection of Cainan in the Genealogy, and partly by adding 100 Years to that Technogonia of the Patriarchs before Abraham, have made the Period larger by 884 Years. So that according to that Account, the Exitus ex Egypto was at leaſt 1684 Years after the Flood.

Now this Hiſtory of Moſes of the peopling of the World by the Poſterity of Noah, doth theſe two things:

1. It gives us an Account of the Original of all the Nations in the World, not from bare alluſion of Names, nor from bare Coalitions into Civil Societies in which they were formed, as Romulus was the Founder of the Populus Romanus, and Pelaſgus of the Pelaſgi; but it gives us the Account of their Origination by Propagation from the Natural Roots and Parents of them. 2. Although notwithſtanding this Inſtance, it may be poſſible, that though the Natural Derivation of all Mankind was from Noah and his three Sons, yet the Progenitors or Anceſtors of Noah might have no Original, but might be Eternal, according to the Hypotheſis of Ariſtotle: yet when I find the ſame Author that gives me an Account of the Derivation of all the World from Noah and his three Sons, and that with moſt clear evidence and credibility, it gives me a very great Moral Evidence of the truth of his Relation touching the firſt Origination of Man by Creation: For doubtleſs both were derived to him by a conſtant Tradition from thoſe from whom he was deſcended, and it is not reaſonable to ſuſpect the truth of the one, ſince we have a ſtrong Moral Evidence for the truth of the other; namely, the General Flood, and the preſervation of Noah and his Family, and the derivation of all Mankind from him and his Sons: He that hath ſufficient reaſon to believe the Hiſtory touching the latter, will have little reaſon to doubt the truth of the Relation touching the Origination of Mankind; which as in it ſelf it ſeems reaſonable, and no other poſſible Suppoſition to compaſs it but by a Supernatural Production, ſo it hath a moſt excellent congruity with the ſubſequents of the Holy Hiſtory touching the Deſcendents from the firſt Man, the Flood, and the Re-peopling of the World from Noah.

Now the Moral Evidences of the credibility and truth of this Hiſtory are theſe:

1. Moſes that wrote it, had the beſt opportunity that could be to give a true Narrative of this Fact touching the Flood, and the Productions of Mankind by Generation from the Children of Noah: For, 1. It is evident by the Writings of this Man that lie was a very Learned knowing Man, inquiſitive after all ſort of Learning; a Man in great Power and Eſteem in the Court of Egypt, and after that a great Governour of a very great People, which he governed with admirable Wiſdom; and by this means had opportunity to furniſh himſelf with all Monuments and Evidences of Antiquity that might be conducible to the Diſcovery of former things, and his Learning, Judgment and Ability to make an excellent uſe of theſe helps was alſo remarkable. Again, 2. He lived not far remote from the tranſaction of theſe things that he wrote, in compariſon of the Writers or Hiſtorians of after Ages: He dyed above 500 Years before Homer lived, which yet is the ancienteſt Hiſtorian that Greece affords, and he lived within the Period of 800 Years after the Flood and the diviſion of the World among the Poſterity of Noah. Livy and other Hiſtorians give us an account of the Affairs of Rome for above 600 Years before they were born, and many other Hiſtorians for a much longer time, and we give them credit; and certainly ſuch an Occurrence of ſuch remark as the Univerſal Flood and the Re-peopling of the World muſt needs be freſh in memory for ſuch a Period of about 800 Years; eſpecially conſidering that the Peopling of the World was a gradual and ſucceſſive buſineſs, that muſt needs preſerve its Memory even upon its own account, for it was ſtill current, and many were concerned in it in the preſervation of the laying the firſt Foundations of their States and Republicks. 3. As the Period or diſtance of time was not great, ſo if we conſider the longevity of Mens Lives in thoſe times, the Period was not much longer than three Generations, and ſo the Tradition of things might be preſerved freſh and certain unto the time of Moſes without any great difficulty: For Shem that was an Eye-witneſs of the Flood was contemporary with Abraham, Abraham was contemporary with Jacob, Cohath the Son of Levi was contemporary with Jacob, and with Amram the Father of Moſes and Son of Cohath: So that the Tradition of the Flood, and all that ſucceeded, might be handed from Shem to Abraham, from Abraham to Jacob, from Jacob to Cohath, from him to Amram, and from him to Moſes. 4. Beſides all this, without any more Hands in the delivery of it over, it appears that Abraham, Iſaac, Jacob were great Men, had great Families and Wealth, were Men of great Note and Obſervation for their Learning and Knowledge, Men that had great Expectations, having a Promiſe of that Land to be given to their Poſterity; and although they kept Sheep and Cattel according to the cuſtom of thoſe Eaſtern Countries, yet they were great Princes, and Men of excellent Education: doubtleſs Abraham inſtructed his Son in all the Knowledge that he had received by Tradition from his Anceſtors, the like did Iſaac, and after him Jacob. And therefore it might very reaſonably be thought that the Traditions of former things were kept freſh and pure in this Line of Men.

And though we have no Writings extant ancienter than Moſes, yet probably in his time there might be Books, or at leaſt Monuments and Inſcriptions of things done before his time, which might preſerve the Memory of things paſt as well as our Books do now: For it is not to be doubted but Writing was much ancienter than Moſes his time, Job ſpeaks of Writing as a thing in uſe in his time, Job 19.23, 24. and Joſephus tells us of certain Pillars erected by Seth, wherein the Monuments of Learning and Hiſtory were preſerved, Joſeph. l. 1. Antiquitat. cap. 2. and Moſes mentions Books written by others, either before or in his time.

I very well know that Moſes had a greater means to know all thoſe things that to a Jew or a Chriſtian are of greater weight than all theſe; namely, the Infallible Conduct, Revelation and Inſpiration of the Divine Spirit: But the truth is, we are faln into an Age of many Chriſtians in Name and Profeſſion, that yet think it below them to believe upon that account without ſome farther Evidence that may ſatisfie their Reaſon; I have therefore ſubjoyned theſe and the following Conſiderations to make it appear, That upon the bare account of Moral Evidence more is to be ſaid for the truth of the Hiſtory of Moſes than may be ſaid for the truth of any other Hiſtory of things tranſacted before the life of the Hiſtoriographer.

2. Again, we uſually allow ſuch an Hiſtorian to be worthy of belief, even in thoſe things whereof we have no other Evidence than the Credit of the Hiſtorian, if we find many things delivered by him to have ſo great an Evidence of Truth that they cannot well be doubted by any reaſonable Man. I will admit that Moſes delivers many things that were antecedent to him, and can have now no other Evidence than the Credit, Prudence, and Fidelity of the Hiſtorian himſelf; as touching the Derivation of the Nations of the Earth from the ſeveral Sons of Noah, and though poſſibly when he wrote there was a vigorous and authentical Tradition or other authentick Evidence of the Truth of them, which it may be is now ſo loſt that we have no other Evidence thereof but the bare Relation of Moſes (this I do for the preſent admit, though in the ſequel it will appear that there are other concurrent or collateral Evidences that aſſert and atteſt it) yet it is plain that the ſame Moſes writes many things that have ſo undoubted and ſo ſolid a Tradition aſſerting it, that no Man can doubt it that will not firſt deny his own Reaſon. As for inſtance, Can there be any doubt but that the Family of the Iſraelites were derived from Abraham, Iſaac and Jacob, and the 12 Patriarchs; that they were brought out of Egypt under the Conduct of Moſes; that they lived in the Wilderneſs forty Years, and were there miraculouſly fed by Quails and Manna, ſince this was written in that very Time and Age that could and would have contradicted it, if falſe? Can there be any doubt but the Hiſtory of his making the Ark and the Tabernacle were true, ſince both continued for many hundred Years after? Can there be any doubt of the Hiſtory of the Fiery Serpents, and the Cure of their Biting by the Brazen Serpent, which continued in the Wilderneſs until the time of Hezekiah, which was many hundred Years after, with an unqueſtionable Tradition of the reaſon of its Making? Can there be any doubt whether he divided the Land of Canaan, in ſuch manner as is ſet down, in his life time, namely, to the two Tribes and a half on the farther ſide of Jordan; and his Preſcripts for the future dividing of the reſt, ſince it was enjoyed according to thoſe Preſcripts for many hundreds of Years after, and part of it until the coming of Chriſt? Can there be any doubt that he gave thoſe Laws Moral, Judicial and Ceremonial recorded by him, ſince thoſe very Laws have been for the ſpace of near two thouſand Years the very Rule and Model by which the Sacred and Civil Concerns of that People were always ruled and governed, and that in contemplation of the ſame Law that was given by the Hand of Moſes, and ſo recorded in his Books of Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers and Deuteronomy? I ſay we have not greater Evidence that there was ſuch a Man as Alfred, Edward the Confeſſor, or William the Conqueror; or that there were ſuch Laws of the Confeſſor, ſuch a Survey of England called Doomſday made by William the Conqueror, ſuch an Abbey founded by him in Memory of his Victory in Suſſex called Abbatia de Bello; ſuch Laws made by H. 1. as are tranſcribed in the Red Book of the Exchequer under that name; ſuch a Charter of King John made at Reningmead, or ſuch a Charter as Magna Charta made by King H. 3. than we have that there were ſuch Laws, ſuch Diſtributions of the Land of Canaan, and ſuch things done in Egypt and the Wilderneſs as are recorded by Moſes. The Moral Evidence that ariſeth from this Conſideration is this; That ſince in theſe things that are capable of an incomparable Evidence of Credibility in reſpect of the time wherein they were done (though very ancient, and exceeding the Age of any other Author) we find ſuch indiſputable Evidence of Truth, we have reaſon to give credit to the ſame Author relating the Derivation and Beginning of Nations from the Sons of Noah, though in reſpect of the greater Antiquity thereof we have not any other concurrent Teſtimony but that of Moſes: And the rather, though we have not thoſe other Evidences thereof, yet Moſes might have as unqueſtionable Evidences of the things tranſacted between his time and the Flood, which at the greateſt Account was not above 1600 Years, but by the Jewiſh Account about 800 Years before his time, as we now have of thoſe things which were tranſacted in the time of Moſes, which is above twice 1600 Years diſtant from our time.

3. Beſides the Relation of the Traduction of the ſeveral Nations of the World from the Sons of Noah, delivered by Moſes in that ſhort Pedigree or Extract, Gen. 10. we have very many probable Evidences of the conſent of all ſucceeding Ages to that Genealogy of the World; as, 1. The common Tradition of thoſe Ages that ſucceeded ſhortly after Moſes, which commonly eſteemed them ſo deſcended: 2. The Analogy of their ſeveral Names of the Countries wherein Moſes ſuppoſed the firſt Fathers fixed, as Canaan, Miſraim or Egypt, Chittim, Aſſur or Aſſyria, and infinite more of this kind which are not needful here to be remembred, ſince Bochart and thoſe that have tranſcribed out of him give us abundant Inſtances. Neither is it reaſonable to object againſt this that which is before obſerved in relation to other Alluſions of this kind, namely, That thoſe Denominations of Places might not be ſo much from the Roots of thoſe Nations or Families, or from the Captains or Governors that gave Names to thoſe Countries they conquered; becauſe the Hiſtorian Moſes gives us in expreſs terms the reaſon of the Denomination to be from the very Parental Roots of thoſe People or Families: and 2. Becauſe thoſe Heads of Countries or Nations who were nearer to Moſes time gave the Denomination to the Countries which in effect they peopled; as Edomites to the Poſterity of Edom, Moabites and Ammonites to the Poſterity of the two Sons of Lot, Madian to the Poſterity of Abraham by Keturah, and many more: And we have as great reaſon to ſuppoſe that theſe grew and increaſed into great Nations in the time of Moſes, ſince the People of Iſrael who deſcended from a later Stock than any of theſe within the ſpace of little more than 200 Years, increaſed into ſo great a People, that in their going out of Egypt their Males of above 20 Years old amounted to 600000, whereof uſe will be made hereafter.

The late Diſcovery of the vaſt Continent of America and Iſlands adjacent, which appears to be as populous with Men, and as well ſtored with Cattel almoſt as any part of Europe, Aſia, or Africa, hath occaſioned ſome difficulty and diſpute touching the Traduction of all Mankind from the two common Parents ſuppoſed of all Mankind, namely Adam and Eve; but principally concerning the ſtoring of the World with Men and Cattel from thoſe that the Sacred Hiſtory tells us were preſerved in the Ark. And the Objection runs thus:

It ſeems apparent by all Geographical Deſcriptions of this lower World, that the whole Continent of America and the adjacent Iſles thereof are no way contiguous to any parts of Aſia, Europe, or Africa, but disjoyned from the ſame by huge and vaſt Oceans; divided from the Weſtern Coaſts of Europe and Africa by the vaſt Atlantick Ocean; from the North parts of Europe by the great Frozen Seas lying between it and Greenland, which ſeems to be the Northern Coaſt of America; from the North-eaſt part of Aſia, Tartary and Cathay by the Fretum Anian; from the Eaſt parts of China and the Philippine Iſlands by the Oceanus Pacificus of above 2000 Leagues breadth, and is divided from the great lately diſcovered Iſland del Fogo by the Straits of Magellan, and that Iſland again divided from the uttermoſt Southern Continent (if any be) by a great Sea, which though not formerly known to the Europeans and Aſiaticks, being divided from Aſia and Africa by the great Indian Ocean, yet hath been lately diſcovered by Le Maire.

It is alſo evident that this vaſt Continent and the greateſt part of the Iſlands near adjacent to it are well ſtored with Men, and Beaſts of all ſorts: Laetius, in his Diſquiſition touching the Original of the Americans, in his 8th Obſervation gives us an account of above thirty Millions of Americans deſtroyed by the Spaniards in thoſe Parts of America that they have uſurped to their own Dominion, which is not the hundredth part of that great Continent.

The Inhabitants of this Continent as they greatly differ among themſelves, ſo they extremely differ from the Aſiaticks, Europeans and Africans in their Language and Cuſtoms, they recognize no Original from theſe Parts: it is true, they have ſome reſemblance of the Scythians or Tartars in ſome of their barbarous Cuſtoms, and ſome Words they have which ſeem to carry a congruity with Words of other Nations; But theſe are but ſlender Evidences to prove their Traduction from Aſia, Africa, or Europe, eſpecially ſince no Monument is extant that gives an account of their Traduction or Migration thither; and the rather, becauſe it was a World wholly unknown to the Europeans, Africans and Aſiaticks, till the Diſcovery thereof made by Americus Veſputius and Chriſtopher Columbus which is but of late time.

Again, Acoſta tells us in his 4th Book, Cap. 36. there are divers perfect Animals of divers kinds in America which have none of the ſame kind in Europe, Aſia or Africa, as their Pacos, Guanacos, and Indian Sheep; and on the other ſide, many ſpecies of Birds and Beaſts in theſe Countries which are not found in America.

And upon theſe Premiſſes they thus argue:

That ſince by all Circumſtances it is apparent that America hath been very long inhabited, and poſſibly as long as any other Continent in the World, and ſince it is of all hands agreed that the ſuppoſed common Parents of the reſt of Mankind, Adam, Noah and his three Sons, had their Habitations in ſome Parts of Aſia, and ſince we have no probable Evidence that any of their Deſcendents traduced the firſt Colonies of the American Plantations into America, being ſo divided from the reſt of the World, the acceſs thither ſo difficult, and Navigation the only means of ſuch a Migration being of a far later perfection than what could anſwer ſuch a Population of ſo great a Continent; That conſequently the Americans derive not their Original either from Adam, or at leaſt not from Noah; but either had an Eternal Succeſſion, or if they had a Beginning, they were Aborigines, and multiplied from other common Stocks than what the Moſaical Hiſtory imports.

And although their Traditions in America be mingled with ſome things fabulous, yet they ſeem to favour this Concluſion. Some of them acknowledge the Creation of all things by God, and that He fixed certain Arrows in the ground, and from thence the Original of Mankind came. de Laet. de origine gent. Americanorum, Obſervat. 6. Many of them have a Tradition of a Flood, at leaſt in the Continent of America, which diſpeopled all the Countrey, and that out of the Lake Tilocaca the great God created at ſeveral places the common Parents of Mankind: ut videre est apud eundem, pag. 115, & 105. or that certain Men leapt out of a Cave called Picare Campo, or Tampo, and were the firſt Parents of Mankind; and therefore they hold the Tambi the moſt ancient of Mankind.

Beſides, if we could ſuppoſe that either ex induſtria, or by accident ſome might paſs the Seas from Africa, Aſia or Europe into America, yet it is not eaſily conceptible how Beaſts, eſpecially of prey, ſhould be tranſported into America, through thoſe large Seas after the Deluge; neither is it poſſible to ſuppoſe that all the Beaſts of America, which are many of them wholly different in kind from thoſe of Europe, Aſia or Africa, ſhould be conducted over the Seas to be preſerved in the Ark, and after be tranſported again thither: and the improbability thereof is ſo much the greater, becauſe many of the perfect Animals found in America have none of the ſame kind in Europe, Aſia or Africa, and è converſo, but are as it were appropriate to their proper Regions, though ſome there are that are common to America and the other Countries on this ſide. And therefore either the Flood was not univerſal, or new Creations of Animals proper to America hapned there after the Flood.

I anſwer to theſe difficulties: The Author of the Book called Praeadamitae hath ſet down certain Suppoſitions, which though they ſalve the difficulties, yet they croſs the tenor of the Moſaical Hiſtory, viz.

1. That Moſes in the Hiſtory of the Creation of Man doth not ſet down the Original of Mankind, but only the Original or common Parent of the Jewiſh Nation: that Adam was not the firſt Man that was created, but there were very many Ages of Men before him that peopled tho greater part of the World long before the Creation of Adam: And conſequently, though Adam was the common Parent of the Inhabitants of Paleſtine and many of the Countries adjacent, yet thoſe that peopled the far greater part of the World, eſpecially the Parts of America, were not deſcended from him.

2. That the Flood in Noah's time, though it drowned the Deſcendents from Adam and the Countries inhabited by them, namely, Paleſtine and ſome of the adjacent Countries, yet it was no Univerſal Deluge, but the far greater part of the World and the Inhabitants thereof were free from that Deluge; and conſequently that Noah and his three Sons were not the Capita familiarum of the whole Earth, but only of thoſe Families and Nations that were Inhabitants in Paleſtine and ſome of the adjacent Countries; and conſequently that many of the Countries of Europe, Aſia and Africa, and the entire Continent and Iſlands of America were not overwhelmed with this Deluge, though poſſibly they might have their particular Deluges, as hapned in Greece and Theſſaly under Deucalion and Ogyges: and in favour of his Opinion alledgeth the long Computations of the Egyptians, Babylonians and Chineſes; the vaſt Armies of Ninus, Semiramis, Zoroaſter and others, and the great extent of their Monarchies ſuddenly after the Flood; which could not, as he ſuppoſeth, be ſo ſuddenly propagated from Noah and his three Sons: But eſpecially inſiſts upon the greatneſs of the Continent of America and the Iſlands thereof, the populouſneſs and great ſtore of Men and Animals, which could not be in any tolerable probability tranſported from Countries divided by ſuch great Seas from it.

And likewiſe he inſiſts upon the Antiquity of the Egyptian Computations, and upon that fond Reaſon of the Egyptian Prieſt in Plato's Timaeus, That Egppt is the moſt ancient of the habitable World, becauſe neither ſubject to Total Inundations by reaſon it hath no Shoars, nor to Conflagration becauſe of the Inundation of Nilus: That conſequently Paleſtine and the Countries adjacent were only drowned, but the upper Aſia from whence the Dove fetched his Olive-branch was never thereby totally overwhelmed. This is the principal Subject of his 4th Book of what he calls his Syſtema Theologicum.

If there were no other fault in this Author, there is this one that renders him inexcuſable; In that he in all places of his Book pretends to own and maintain the Truth and Sacred Authority of the Moſaical Hiſtory, and ſeems to maintain ſome of his Tenets by Scriptural Suffrage, and yet ſubſtitutes ſuch Aſſertions as any Man, and much more the Ingenious Author himſelf could not, cannot chooſe but ſee, that if they were true would neceſſarily not only weaken but overthrow the Authority and Infallibility of the Sacred Scriptures; at leaſt where it ſeems to croſs the Fabulous Traditions of the Egyptian and Babylonian Antiquity, to which Fables he gives more credit than to the Holy Scriptures, and ſubmits the Authority of theſe to the Authority of thoſe: and while Judas like he ſeems to kiſs theſe Sacred Oracles, he perfidiouſly betrays their Authority, and draws their Truth as much as he can into ſuſpicion. Such a Diſcourſe had better become a plain profeſſed Infidel, and is ſo much the worſe, in that it is done ſlily, and by invidious Inſinuations, ſub Amici nomine: If he durſt have ſpoken out, he would have told us roundly and plainly that the Eleven firſt Chapters of Geneſis were but Fables; That Geneſis 3.20. where Eve is ſaid to be the Mother of all living; That Gen. 7.19, 20. where it is ſaid, that all the high Hills that were under the whole Heavens were covered; That Gen. 7.23. where it is ſaid, that every living ſubſtance was deſtroyed which was upon the face of the Ground, both Man and Cattel and Creeping things and the Fowls of the Heaven, and Noah only remained alive and thoſe that were with him in the Ark; That Gen. 10.32. where it is ſaid, that theſe were the Families of the Sons of Noah after their Generations in their Nations, and by theſe were the Nations divided on the Earth after the Flood; are not to be believed, and are but meer Fictions: This had become a Man of his Principles; but he durſt not ſpeak out.

I ſhall not in this place undertake a particular Anſwer of all that this Man hath ſaid; it is beſides my intention in this place to make ſo large an excurſion, and many others have done it to my hand: only I may ſay thus much, That a Man that gives ſo much cred it to the Egyptian, Caldean, and Grecian prodigious Traditions, in derogation of that very Scripture which this Man in Complement at leaſt ſeems to venerate, might have remembred, That the Tradition of the Univerſal Flood hath obtained in all places, even among the Americans themſelves, and that the Race of Mankind was thereby deſtroyed, except ſome few that were preſerved: That the moſt ſevere and obſerving Sect of the Philoſophers, namely the Stoicks, have conſtantly held viciſſitudes of Deſtructions of Mankind by ſucceſſive Deluges and Conflagrations, and a new Peopling of the World ſucceſſively by the Power of God; That Ariſtotle himſelf inſinuates thoſe great Viciſſitudes, eſpecially of Deluges in thoſe Periodical great Winters which he ſuppoſeth to have hapned, and for the future to happen in this lower World. But of this hereafter.

And although this Author in his 8th Chapter of his 4th Book gives us a computation of a declivity of 600 Perches from the Fountain of Danubius until its fall into the Pontus Euxinus, and ſuppoſeth the higheſt Mountains of Armenia, whereof Ararat where the Ark reſted was the higheſt, doth not exceed the perpendicular height of one Mile above the plain of the Earth; and therefore that an exceſs of 15 Cubits above Ararat would not reach the Head of Danubius, or at leaſt the upper Plains of the Upper Aſia; yet he might have remembred, That though it were admitted, that uſually the heights of moſt Mountains do not exceed a Mile in perpendicular height above their Baſis, yet many Mountains are ſituate in the more elevated parts of the Earth, and have the advantage thereby of the height of their Baſis: and poſſibly it will be found that the Baſis of the Mountains of Armenia is ſituate in higher ground than the Fountain of Danubius or Euphrates. So that an exceſs of 15 Cubits above their height muſt in all probability cover the Plain of the Upper Aſia.

Again, he might have remembred that Egypt, that from the Authority of the Fable of the Egyptian Prieſt is favoured by him with an immunity from Inundation, lyes much lower than the Plains of Paleſtine, yea than the Superficies of the Red Sea it ſelf: And therefore the Water (that naturally keeps its level, neither without a Miracle can loſe it) which overflowed the whole Continent of Paleſtine, even to 15 Cubits above its higheſt Mountains, muſt of neceſſity overflow Egypt, which Ariſtotle by impregnable Evidences concludes to be one of the loweſt Countries in the World, and the very Production and Accretion of the Slime of Nilus; ſo that if the Flood covered Paleſtine, nothing but a Miracle could protect Egypt from it.

The Author of the Diſſertation De Aetate Mundi, cap. 12. though he reprehend the Praeadamitae, and confutes the extravagancy of their Opinion, yet he ſeems to mince the Univerſality of the Flood: Nullum itaque relinquitur dubium, quin unum tantum fuerit diluvium, idque univerſale, cujus apud omnes penè gentes extat memoria: Verùm hîc minime probo eorum ſententiam qui totum terrae globum it a aquis tectum fuiſſe exiſtimant, ut nulla prorſus extaret ejus portio; ad hoc efficiendum multa debuiſſent concurrere miracula. Cum enim univerſae orbis aquae non ſufficiant ad obruendam tam altè terram, etiamſi omnia maria ſiccentur; debuiſſent vel plures aquae creari, vel dicendum cum aliquibus, iſtam aquarum molem ex aliis coeli orbibus decidiſſe, & demum finito diluvio ad ſedes ſuas revolaſſe: Verùm hoc est piè nugari, Deus non facit miracula ſine cauſa: Quid opus erat mergere terras ubi nec olim fuere homines, ac ne nunc quidem ſunt? Stultum eſt putare ante diluvium adeò multiplicatum fuiſſe genius hominum, ut omnes terrae angulos pervaſerit, &c. Ut verò diluvii inundationem ultra orbis habitati termines producamus, nulla jubet ratio, imo prorſus abſurdum eſt dicere, ubi nulla hominum ſedes, illic etiam viguiſſe effectus poenae ſolis hominibus inflictae.

This indeed ſalves the neceſſity of drowning America and the greateſt part of the New habitable World, when it extends the Flood no farther than there were Mankind inhabiting, and confines thoſe Habitations poſſibly within the Circle of Syria and Meſopotamia. And ſo all the Brutes that poſſibly in their firſt Creation were produced ſparſim through all the parts of the habitable World, as well in America as Aſia or Europe, were ſafe and untouched; and all thoſe Birds and Fowl that were within 40 or 50 Miles of the Circulus diluvii might eaſily preſerve themſelves by flight out of the extent of it; yea and the Brutes and Birds which were out of that ſuppoſed narrow extent of Syria and Meſopotamia where the Flood prevailed, might eaſily refurniſh the ſame Continent after the ſubſiding of the Flood, without the wonderful and difficult including of their kinds within the Ark for their preſervation, which if this Suppoſition hold, ſeems a needleſs Inſtitution and Miracle by the wiſe God. Gen. 7.1. Therefore, I confeſs, I am no way ſatisfied with this Gratification of that Author to the Prae-Adamitae.

For firſt, although I take this Flood to be ſomewhat more than Natural, and a thing inſtituted by the Will of God, yet do I not eſteem it a thing purely Supernatural or Miraculous, neither do I ſuppoſe thoſe Waters created de novo, nor ſent out of the Orbs of Heaven to drown the Earth: I do not think the Face of the Earth and Waters were altogether the ſame before the Univerſal Deluge, and after; but poſſibly the Face of the Earth was more even than now it is, the Seas poſſibly more dilate and extended, and not ſo deep as now; the Waters poſſibly more than now, and in thoſe reſpects more capable of diffuſion over the, dry Land. For though there be many great variations in proceſs of time in the Sea and Land, yet it ſeems that ad plurimum the Seas grow deeper, and eat lower into the Earth, and conſequently more dry Land is daily acquired, and the Seas grow narrower and deeper.

Now to deliver this Suppoſition of an Univerſal Deluge from thoſe difficulties, and that neceſſity of multiplication of Miracles, which that Author hath ſubſtituted, we are to conſider:

1. That we are not to make our eſtimate of the quantity of Waters meerly by the Superficies of the Sea, but by its vaſt depth, which in ſome places is unfathomable, and by thoſe vaſt ſubterraneous Receptacles of Water which pour themſelves out in ſeveral great Ebullitions and Marine Springs: Neither is it altogether improbable that the Waters of the Sea, naturally tending downward, and being of a fluid ſearching conſiſtency, might in proceſs of time have worked themſelves even almoſt to the Center of the Earth, and there reſiding in great and vaſt quantities, and poſſibly have in a manner undermined much of the appearing Continent of the Earth: ſo that that which the Prophet ſpeaketh may be true literally, Pſal. 24.2. He hath founded it upon the Seas, and eſtabliſhed it upon the Floods: So that there are greater Store-houſes of Water than appear viſible to the World. If we could ſuppoſe that the incumbent Superficies of the Earth ſhould ſubſide and preſs upon thoſe Store-houſes of Water within its bowels, it might afford a competent ſtore to drown the Earth without a new Creation.

2. Again, we may eaſily compute that the quantity or extenſion of the Body of the Air, even that which is commonly called the Atmoſphere, which at the loweſt account extends ſeven Miles in height, might by condenſation into Water afford a competent ſtore for the drowning of the World, and yet be again rarified into the ſame dimenſion and conſiſtence which before it obtained: for there is that vicinity of Nature between thoſe two Elements, that we daily ſee conſiderable proportions of the one by condenſation changed into the other.

3. When we conſider thoſe immenſe Inundations that are Annually, and with ſome conſtant equality occaſioned by great Rains, as for Inſtance, in the River Nilus, which by the Annual Rains in Ethiopia is raiſed almoſt every Year twenty Cubits, and overflows a conſiderable part of Egypt yearly between the Months of June and October; and the like Inundations yearly hapning by Periodical Showers in the great River of America called Orenoque, between May and September, whereby it riſeth upright above 30 Foot; ſo that many of the Iſlands and Plains at other times inhabited, are 20 Foot yearly at that time under Water. And when we ſee that even the Ocean it ſelf in its daily Tides, eſpecially thoſe that happen about the Equinoxes, cauſed, as the Copernicans ſay, by the Interſections of the Annual and Diurnal Motions of the Earth; we need not have recourſe to a new Creation of Waters to perform this Office of the Divine Providence and Juſtice; He might by a ſtronger elevation of Vapours, or by an extraordinary motion of the Seas perform his purpoſe; which though probably it might not at the ſame time drown Aſia and America, yet by the ſucceſſive peragration of theſe Waters they might drown the whole Earth, as the Inundation of Nilus by the Showers of Ethiopia make the Flood there a Month ſooner than it happens in Egypt.

2. As to the Second Objection; I do confeſs it to be moſt true, that the Univerſal Deluge was a Judgment upon the Old World for their intolerable degeneration from their Duty to God: But I do not think that was the only Reaſon thereof; for the Infinite Power of God might have deſtroyed thoſe Evil Men by a Peſtilence as well as by a Flood, without detriment to the harmleſs Brutes or Birds: But as God Almighty is of Infinite Wiſdom, ſo it is the high Prerogative of that Wiſdom to have variety of Excellent Ends in the ſame Action. I do really think that this Univerſal Deluge was not only an act of his Vengeance upon Evil Men, but poſſibly an act of Goodneſs and Bounty to the very Conſtitution of this Inferior World, though the particulars thereof be hid from us. And if as ſome would have it, it ſhould be coextended only to the places that were then inhabited, and ſo the Flood particular, yet moſt certain it would be, even in ſuch a particular Flood, many great Spots of Ground would be neceſſarily drowned where never any Men were, or inhabited.

3. And it ſeems it is too haſtily concluded, That in the Period of 1656, or as the Septuagint, whom he follows, 2256 Years between the Creation and the Flood, that only Paleſtine, Syria or Meſopotamia were inhabited: For conſidering the longevity of Mens Lives in that Period, a ſmall skill in Arithmetical Calculation will render the Number of coexiſting Inhabitants of the Earth more than ſix times as many as would have hapned in 5000 Years, when Mens Ages were abridged to that ordinary dimenſion which now they have: and the ſtrait bounds of Syria and Meſopotamia would not have held one fortieth part of the Inhabitants; all Europe, Aſia and Africa were not more than ſufficient for them: So that as the World grew full of Sin, ſo it grew full of Men and Beaſts, and ſtood in need of a Deluge to make room for its future Inhabitants.

And this is as much as I ſhall ſay in this place, for the Vindication of the Poſſibility and Reaſonableneſs of the Univerſality of that Deluge recorded by Moſes.

And if any ſhall doubt of the Capacity of the Ark of Noah for the Reception of Brutes, Birds, and the Family of Noah, with the neceſſary Proviſions of Livelihood for them; let him but conſult Mr. Poole's Synopſis, and he will find that which may reaſonably ſatisfie him touching it.

And now I ſhall briefly conſider the Method and Means and Manner of the Peopling of America, and ſtoring that vaſt Countrey with Men and Beaſts and Birds, ſo far forth as we may reaſonably conjecture.

And herein I muſt confeſs that I only make an Abſtract or brief Collection of what hath been done to my hands by thoſe that had better Opportunities and Abilities to do it; as namely, Grotius, Laetius, Breerwood, Hornius, Joſephus Acoſta, Mr. John Webb, Martinius and others, who have profeſſedly written, De origine gentium Americanarum.

Firſt therefore, I ſhall conſider the Manner of Traduction of Men into America.

Secondly, The Manner of Traduction of Brutes into America.

Touching the Traduction of Mankind into America, I do ſuppoſe theſe things following:

1. That the Origination of the common Parents of the Humane Nature hapned in ſome part of Aſia.

2. That though the Origination of the common Parents of Mankind were in Aſia, yet ſome of their Deſcendents did come into America.

3. That ſuch Migration into America by the Deſcendents from Adam, was not only poſſibly, but fairly probable, notwithſtanding all the objected Difficulties.

4. That the Migrations of the Deſcendents of Adam and Noah into America, was ſucceſſive, and interpolated.

5. That although we cannot certainly define the Time or Manner of all theſe Migrations, yet many of them were long ſince, or, as we may reaſonably conjecture, ſome Thouſands of Years ſince; but yet after the Univerſal Deluge.

The Means of Tranſmigration of the Children or Deſcendents of Adam and Noah from Aſia into America muſt be either by Land or by Sea, or by both; and if by Sea, then it muſt be deſigned, and ex propoſito, or caſually.

I think it probable it may be all of theſe ways, but eſpecially by Sea.

Touching the Tranſmigration by Land, it ſeems very difficult, becauſe though it may be poſſible that there may be ſome junctures between the North Continent of America and ſome part of Tartary, Ruſſia, or Muſcovy, yet none are known, unleſs the Frozen Seas in thoſe Parts might be a means to tranſport Men thither; which is difficult to ſuppoſe, thoſe Parts being unpaſſable by reaſon of the great Snows that happen ſo far Northward: though ſome have thought that Groenland is one Continent with America, and that in its fartheſt North-eaſt extent it is joyned to the Continent of Aſia about Japan or Cathay; ſo that a Land-paſſage might be out of Aſia into Groenland, and thence into America. But this is only conjectured, and not fully diſcovered to be ſo.

But however the Caſe now ſtands with the three known Parts of the World, in relation to its contiguity with the Continent of America; it is not impoſſible, but in that long tract of 4000 Years at leaſt, which hath hapned ſince the Univerſal Deluge, there hath been great alterations in the ſituations of the Sea and Earth: poſſibly there might be anciently Necks of Land that maintained paſſage and communication by Land between the two Continents. Many Inſtances of this kind are remembred by Pliny, not only of the great Atlantick Iſland mentioned by the Egyptian Prieſt in Plato's Timaeus, of a great bigneſs, almoſt contiguous to the Weſtern parts of Spain and Africa, yet wholly ſwallowed up by that Ocean to which it hath given its Name of the Atlantick Ocean; which if true, might for ought we know afford a Paſſage from Africa to America by Land before that Submerſion; but alſo many more Inſtances of the like Variations: thus he reports that Sicily was anciently divided from Italy, Cyprus from Syria, Euboea from Boetia. Vide Plin. l. 2. cap. 88, 89, 90, 91.

Strabo alſo in his firſt Book ſeems to referr the Straits or Apertures of the Euxin and Mediterranean Seas to the like ſeparations made by the force of the Sea, and attributes thoſe great Floods and Inundations to the elevation and ſubſiding of the Moles terreſtris, in theſe words; Restat ut cauſam adſcribamus ſolo, ſive quod mari ſubest, ſive quod inundatur; potius tamen ei quod mari ſubeſt: hoc enim multo eſt mobilius, & quod ob humiditatem celerius mutari poſſit. Spiritus enim, hujuſmodi omnium rerum cauſa, ibi eſt copioſior. Sed, ſicuti dixi, cauſa horum efficiens accidentium eſt, quod eadem ſola alias attolluntur, alias ſubſidunt: and he reſembles the ordinary Elevations and Depreſſions whereby the ordinary Fluxes and Refluxes are made, to the Exſpiration and Reſpiration of Animals; but thoſe greater and extraordinary Elevations and Depreſſions of the Earth to the greater Accidents; Nam diluvia, terraemotus, eruptiones flatuum, & tumores ſubiti terrae in mari latentis, mare quoque extollunt; ſubſidentéſque in ſe eaedem terrae, faciunt ut mare dimittatur. And it is no new or feigned Obſervation, That as the Volcans in the Land, as Aetna and Veſuvius, raiſe up thoſe great Protuberances which ſeem Natural Mountains; ſo the like Volcans or Fiery Eruptions happen ſometimes in the Land ſubjected to the Sea, whereby great quantities of Earth together with Fire are thrown up, and grow into Iſlands. De quibus videſis Strabonem & Plinium in locis citatis. And if we may give credit to the Conjectures of Verſtegan, the Countries of England and France were formerly conjoyned, and after ſeparated by the Irruption of the Sea between Dover and Calais. And therefore, although it may be that at this day there is no Land-paſſage from this Elder World unto that of America, yet within the tract of 4000 Years ſuch there might have been, whereby both Men and Beaſts, eſpecially from about Tartary or China might paſs; or between Norway or Finland and the Northern part of the American Continent.

But we need not go ſo far from home, nor reſort to the Ages of ancient times for the evincing the great Changes that have been between the Sea and Lands, ſometimes by tempeſtuous Winds, ſometimes by Earthquakes, ſometimes, and that moſt commonly, by the working of the Sea, by caſting up Silt and Sand, and by exaggerations thereby wrought; elegantly deſcribed by Ovid, 15. Metamorph.

Vidi ego quod fuerat quondam ſolidiſſima tellus Eſſe fretum, vidi factas ex aequore terras; Et procul à pelago conchae jacuere marinae, Et vetus inventa eſt in montibus anchora ſummis. Quódque fuit campus, vallem decurſus aquarum Fecit, & eluvie mons eſt deductus in aequor, Eque paludoſa ſiccis humus aret arenis.

The Inſtances of latter Diſcoveries which make evident this various ſtate of the Globe of Earth and Water, thus deſcribed by the Poet, are among others thoſe that follow.

1. Some Towns that were anciently Havens and Ports where Ships did ride, are now by exaggeration of Sand between thoſe Towns and the Sea, converted into firm Land 2, 3, 4 Miles diſtant from the Sea; ſuch was St Omer in Flanders, Old Rumney in Kent, Rye in Suffolk: vide Mr. Dugdale his Hiſtory of Draining, pag. 173. and the Authors there cited by him.

2. ſome whole Countries, as well as the Egyptian Delta, recovered to be dry Land, partly by the exaggeration of Sand by the Sea or the outfalls of great Rivers; thus the whole Country of Holland ſeems to be an Accretion partly by the Sea, partly by the River Rhine. Dugdale ibid. p. 12.

3. Some great Continents and Tracts of Ground were anciently firm Land, and full of great Woods that could not have leſs time than 500 Years continuance, and yet were afterwards reduced again into the Dominion of the Ocean, and after all that re-reduced into firm Land; leaving the infallible Signatures of theſe ſeveral Changes, though the preciſe times thereof exceed the Memory of any Men alive; Inſtances whereof are as follow.

In the great Level near Thorny, ſeveral Trees of Oak and Firr, ſome ſevered from their Roots, others joyned to their Roots which ſtand in firm Earth below the Moor, and in all probability have lain there hundreds of Years, till covered by the inundation of the freſh and ſalt Waters, and the Silt and Mooriſh Earth exaggerated upon them: and the like monuments of great Trees buried in great quantities in the Iſle of Axholm about 3 Foot, and ſome 5 Foot under ground, whereof there are multitudes; ſome Oaks of 5 Yards in compaſs, Firr-Trees of 30 Foot long. Vide Dugd. ubi ſupra, pag. 141, 171.

Mr. Ray in his Ingenious Obſervations upon his Travels in the Netherlands, &c. pag. 6. gives us the like account of great quantities of ſubterraneous Woods, lying 10 and 20 Ells below the Superficies of the Ground, proſtrate towards the Eaſt, which are ſuppoſed to be anciently thrown down by the irruption of the Sea and ſtrong Weſtern Winds, which yet now, and for all the time of the Memory of Man or Hiſtory extant, are firm Land, namely, Bruges in Flanders.

But that one Inſtance is inſtar omnium, remembred by Mr. Dugdale, ubi ſupra, pag. 172, but of known and notorious truth; the Sceleton of a great Sea-fiſh above 20 Foot long found in the Downs or Uplands of Cammington in Huntingdonſhire, very far diſtant from the Sea; which is an unqueſtionable Evidence that the Sea was ſometime Maſter of that Tract of Ground.

4. Touching the Conchae marinae of ſeveral ſorts, it is moſt unqueſtionable; I referr my ſelf herein to the Relation of Mr. Ray, ubi ſupra, pag. 114. & ſeqq. wherein he gives us an account of theſe Petrified Shells found in great quantities within Continents at a vaſt diſtance from the Sea; and ſome Shells that are found in the Continent, which are ſtrangers in the Ports of the Sea conterminous to thoſe Continents.

There are two Opinions concerning the Origination of theſe Petrified Shells; 1. Of thoſe that have thought (and with great probability) that theſe were left in thoſe places by the Sea, either by the Univerſal Deluge, or that really the Sea did poſſeſs thoſe places where it left theſe Relicks and Memorials of it ſelf upon its receſs to a more ſetled Channel. And certainly if this be ſo, we muſt needs ſuppoſe anciently another Face of the Sea and Earth than what now is; poſſibly many of theſe Vallies and lower grounds might be entirely Sea, and the Hills and Mountains, and other Prominences of the Earth where theſe Petrified Shells are often found, being the Shoars of that great Ocean in thoſe elder times, thoſe Shells were there caſt up, as they are at this day upon the Shoars.

The ſecond Opinion is of thoſe that think that theſe Conchae or Petrified Shells were no other than the Luſus naturae, the Effects of the Plaſtick power of the Earth; 1. Becauſe they are found at ſuch great diſtances from the Sea: 2. Becauſe they are many times of ſuch a kind of Fabrick as are not to be found in thoſe parts of the Sea that is conterminous to thoſe Continents where they are found; ſome are found in the middle of Germany, 200 Miles diſtant from the Sea at the neareſt; Scallop-ſhells are found in the Ditches of Antwerp, and yet they are rarely to be gotten on the Sea or Sea-ſhoar nearer than Gallicia in Spain: 3. Becauſe theſe Shells are ordinarily filled with Stone ſuitable to the Stone of thoſe places where they are found. Theſe and the like Reaſons, though not evidently concludent againſt the former Suppoſition, yet have induced many Learned Men to attribute theſe Phaenomena to the Plaſtick power of the Earth.

For my own part, I have ſeen ſuch apparent Evidences in and near the place where I live of things of this nature, that I am ſatisfied that many of them are but the Relicks of Fiſh-ſhells left by the Sea, and there in length of time actually Petrified; and the Inſtance of the great Fiſh-ſceleton found at Cammington ſeems an undeniable Evidence thereof. And I remember in my youth, in the Liſne of a Rock at Kingſcote in Gloceſterſhire, I found at leaſt a Buſhel of Petrified Cockles actually diſtinct one from another, each near as big as my Fiſt: and at Adderly, mentioned by Mr. Cambden, about 40 or 50 Years ſince thoſe Configurations of great Shells in Stones were frequently found, and for their curioſity, as many as could be found were taken up by ſeveral perſons and carried away; ſince which time, for above 20 Years laſt paſt, there are none, or very few found; which nevertheleſs if they had been the Product of the Plaſtick power of the Earth, would have been Annually re-produced.

And yet I do think that all theſe Petrifications are not always neceſſarily the Monuments of the Sea poſſeſſing thoſe places as its conſtant or uſual Seat, but that many of thoſe Shells ariſe de novo, not barely from the Plaſtick power of the Earth (as ſome Inſects and Vegetables ariſe ſpontaneouſly) but from certain Seminal Ferments brought thither, which are as it were the Seminium, of their production. And theſe Seminal Ferments were firſt in the Sea and Sea-Waters, and might by many means by brought into thoſe new parts of firm Land, 1. By the Univerſal Deluge; 2. By the various mutable ſtations of the Land, and fluxes of the Sea; 3. By elevation of thoſe Seminal Ferments from the Sea or ſome deſiccated places thereof, by the heat of the Sun, and diſcharging them by Rain upon ſeveral parts of the dry Land, and where poſſibly thoſe Seminal Ferments might be digeſted and ripened gradually into theſe Configurations. But touching theſe kinds of Seminal Ferments, and their Energy, more will be ſaid hereafter.

By this digreſſion I mean but thus much, namely, That we can by no means reaſonably ſuppoſe the Face, Figure, Poſition and Diſpoſition of the Sea and dry Land to be the ſame anciently as now, but there might then be Sea where there is now dry Land, and dry Land where there is now Sea; and that there might have been in former times Necks of Land, whereby communication between the parts of the Earth, and mutual paſſage and re-paſſage for Men and Animals might have been, which in long proceſs of time within a Period of 4000 Years may have been ſince altered: That thoſe parts of Aſia and America which are now dis-joyned by the interluency of the Sea, might have been formerly in ſome Age of the World contiguous to each other; and thoſe Spots of Ground, namely, the Philippine Iſlands, and others that are now crumbled into ſmall Iſlands, might anciently have been one entire Continent. And if in places that have been long inhabited, and obſerved by Men, theſe mutations have happened as are apparent to our very Senſes, yet the preciſe Times, Manner and Circumſtances thereof are wholly loſt to us, as in divers parts of Europe is apparent: much more the like Changes may happen in thoſe remote and vaſt Marine Tracts which have been long unknown and unobſerved, and ſcarce poſſible to be obſerved by Mankind, as in the Scythian, Atlantick, Pacifick, and other Northern and Southern parts of the Seas.

Touching the Second Means, namely, the Paſſage by Sea; It ſeems very probable that the greateſt and readieſt means of the migration of Colonies or Plantations into the Weſtern World from the Eaſtern, was by Sea, and the help of Navigation; whereof much might be caſual, by Tempeſts or contrary Winds, but ſome and the more principal might be, ex inſtituto & induſtria.

Navigation, and the uſe of Ships is of that great Antiquity, that it is difficult to aſſign when it began to be in uſe.

It ſeems probable that it was not unknown to the Old World before the Flood, and yet not in that perfection that it was after, their Veſſels being not reduced to that perfection as to endure a wide Sea, ſuch as the Univerſal Deluge was, neither were they probably fitted with ſuch Stores as might be requiſite for ſo long and unexpected a Navigation as the Flood laſted.

But the Ark of Noah was certainly a moſt exact piece of Architecture, and might give a Pattern or Inſtruction for Veſſels of great burthen, and very probably ſince that time the skill of Making and Navigating of Ships was much ripened and improved.

If we conſult the Heatheniſh Hiſtories, we ſhall find Navigation very ancient among the Grecians, but eſpecially among the Phenicians, Tyrians, and Carthaginians.

Polydore Virgil, de Inventione Rerum, l. 3. cap. 15. and before him, Pliny in his Natural Hiſtory, lib. 5. cap. 57. gives us an Account of the ſeveral Inventors of the various forms and appendants of Shipping and Navigation, but yet the thing it ſelf they carry up to higher Memorials; the Navigation of the Argonauts to Colchis for the Golden Fleece, being one of the famous Epochae of the Grecian Computation, happened in about the 1100 Year after the Flood according to the Jewiſh Account; and above 200 Years before them Danaus ſailed out of Egypt into Greece, Shipping being there in uſe long before.

That although we find not expreſs mention of the Pyxis Nautica or Magnet for many Years after mention of the Uſe of Navigation, yet the ſame Author tells us that the Phenicians ſteered their Courſe by the Obſervation of the Stars.

But we have a better and ancienter Account of the uſe and frequency and antiquity of Navigation in the Sacred Scriptures: Jacob died about 600 Years after the Flood, mentions Ships and Havens for Shipping as things well known, and particularly Zidon, as a great Port of Shipping, where Zebulon's Lot was to be caſt, Gen. 49.13. Balaam alſo in the time of Moſes mentions the Ships of Chettim or Greece as a known thing, Numb. 24.24. again, in the Reign of Solomon, the Tyrians are taken notice of to be expert Sea-men; that Solomon had a Navy upon the Coaſt of the Red Sea, that from thence he with the Tyrians made long and great Voyages to Ophir and Tarſhiſh (places, as it ſeems moſt probably, in the Eaſt India, not in Africa or America, as ſome have thought) and thence brought Gold and other Commodities once in three Years. 2 Chron. 8.18.9.21.

And how ſedulous and induſtrious all Maritim Coaſts were in advancing of Navigation, in multiplying of Shipping, in Merchandizing and Trading, in ſearching out and ſubduing Forein Countries, when either they were afflicted at home by War, or grew over-populous, the Hiſtories of all ſucceeding Ages of the Grecians and Perſians, of the Tyrians, Phenicians and Carthaginians, of the Romans and Egyptians, of the Seres or Chineſes; and in later times, of the Venetians, Sicilians, Rhodians, Spaniſh, Dutch, French and Engliſh give us a large Account.

And therefore as later Years, have given us of this Age witneſs, of the Tranſplantations to America from Spain, France, Portugal, England, Scotland, Holland, and ſome Ages before that have given Inſtances of Tranſplantations from Norway into Groenland and Iceland; ſo it ſeems not only poſſible, but very probable, that either by Caſualty and Tempeſt, or by Intention and Deſign, either out of lucre of Gold, or for disburthening of the Countries ſurcharged with multitude of Inhabitants, or by greatneſs of Mind, affecting Noble Undertakings, or by reaſon of Hardſhip, Oppreſſion and Wars at home, or by ſome or all of theſe ways, ſeveral parts of this great Continent at ſeveral times have been planted with Inhabitants, which in proceſs of time have multiplied into thoſe many Nations, and have forgotten their Original, and the Manners, Religion or Cuſtoms of thoſe People from whom they were derived in Europe, Aſia, or Africa. And ſurely we have reaſon to believe that we of this Iſland are not Aborigines, but came hither by Migrations, Colonies, or Plantations from other parts of the World; yet were it not for the help of Hiſtorical Monuments, we ſhould have forgotten who inhabited this Iſland ſix or ſeven hundred Years ago: yea, and notwithſtanding all theſe Hiſtorical helps, we have no Authentick Tradition that can give us any tolerable Account before the time of Julius Caeſar, much leſs of the firſt Plantation of this Iſland: for as to the Story of Brute and his Company, we have but little evidence of the truth of it, and if it were never ſo true, yet it doth not prove it uninhabited before.

Now thoſe Countries in Aſia or Europe that with greateſt probability firſt peopled America, ſeem to be 1. The Britiſh; 2. The Norwegians; 3. The Tartars or Scythians; 4. The Phenicians and Carthaginians; 5. The Chineſes or Seri. I do not at all mention the late Migrations of the Spaniſh, French, Portugals, Dutch, Engliſh, or Scottiſh, but thoſe of a more ancient Edition.

1. Touching the Britiſh Migration, recorded by Dr Powel, ſub anno 1170, who tells us, That Madoc one of the Sons of Owen Gwenith went over twice into the Northern Coaſts of America, and made there a Britiſh Plantation, who though in proceſs of time much degenerated from their Nature, Language, Cuſtoms and Religion, yet retained ſome Monuments of all. This is at large proſecuted by Laetius in his ſecond Obſervation, who gives us many Reſemblances in ſome principal Words between the Language of them and the Cambro-Britains.

2. Touching the Migration of the Norwegians, Hugo Grotius hath made ſome conſiderable Obſervations, which though not altogether approved by Laetius, yet he willingly grants that Iceland, and ſome part of Groenland were viſited and planted by Ericus Ruffus, ſub anno Chriſti 982, and the Chriſtian Religion there planted, and probably from thence Colonies were traduced into the Northern parts of America.

3. Touching the Migration of a conſiderable number of Tartars and Scythians into the North-eaſt part of the Continent of America, over the Fretum Anian, Laetius ſeems to lay much ſtreſs upon it, partly in reſpect of the eaſineſs and ſhortneſs of that Paſſage from Nova Zembla and the fartheſt North-eaſt part of Tartary over that narrow Sea; and partly by reaſon of the congruity of the Barbarous Cuſtoms of the Americans and Scythians, and ſome other Indications of that kind.

4. Touching the Migration of the Phenicians and Carthaginians, eſpecially into the South-eaſt part of the Continent of America, as Mexico and Braſil, Hornius thinks it probable upon many accounts: 1. Upon the great skill and long practice of Navigation, and the multitude of Shipping of the Phenicians and Carthaginians. 2. Upon the Accommodation of the part of Carthage and other African Ports bordering upon the Mediterranean Sea, to make their Voyages Weſtward, and the great advantage of the conſtant Eaſterly Wind, that makes the Voyage to Mexico and Braſil more eaſie. 3. Upon ſome ancient Hiſtories intimating the progreſs of the Phenician and Carthaginian Fleets into ſome Iſlands and Continents in or near the Atlantick Ocean. 4. From the Analogy of many Words, and Names of Places with the Carthaginian Language; all which, and much more to this purpoſe may be ſeen in the Book of George Horne, de Originibus Americanis. 5. And laſtly, much of the Origination of the Americans ſeems to be attributable to the Migrations of the Seri or Sinenſes from the Eaſtern parts of China and the Philippine Iſlands, from the Iſlands of Borneo, and the Molucca's, and Japan, through the Marc Pacificum into the Weſtern part of the Continent of America; which though it be a large Ocean of above 2000 Leagues, between the Philippine Iſlands and the Weſt of the American Continent, and the paſſage thither difficult in reſpect of conſtant Eaſterly Winds between the Tropicks; yet many Reaſons ſeem to induce a likelihood of Plantations from thence, 1. In reſpect of the Antiquity of the Peopling of China, which if we believe Mr Webb was the firſt peopled after the Univerſal Deluge; that the Ark there firſt reſted upon that tract of Mountains that environ a great part of China; that Sem the Son of Noah firſt ſetled there; that it is the moſt Ancient and Primitive Language; that by means of the Antiquity and Setledneſs of this Monarchy, having continued in its entireneſs ever ſince the Univerſal Deluge, it is moſt probable that the Weſtern Continent was peopled from thence. 2. Becauſe they were the greateſt Maſters of Shipping, and beſt skilled in Navigation of any part of the World; that the Pixis Nautica was there known and uſed long before the knowledge thereof in Europe. 3. The many Iſlands on the South-eaſt and South part of China, as Borneo, Java, Gilolo, Celebes and others near the Equator are dis-joyned but by very narrow Seas, not much broader than thoſe between England and France, from the Neck of Land called Terra des Papos or Nova Guinea; and Nova Hollandia, which is now diſcovered to be at leaſt in ſome parts disjoyned from the more Southern Continent by a great Sea, but thought to have been anciently part of the Southern Continent, and poſſibly ſo it may continue in ſome parts thereof.

Upon theſe and the like probabilities it may ſeem reaſonable to conclude, 1. That the Americans had their Original from the Inhabitants of Europe, Aſia and Africa, that tranſmigrated into that Continent either intentionally, or caſually, or both. 2. That thoſe Migrations were not of any one ſingle Nation or People, but from many or divers Nations. 3. That theſe Migrations were not altogether, or at one time, but ſucceſſively in ſeveral Ages; ſome earlier, ſome later. 4. That therefore it is impoſſible to determin the Time or firſt Epocha of ſuch Migrations, but only that they were all ſince the Univerſal Deluge, which is now above 4000 Years ſince: Some Migrations might be within two, three, or four hundred Years after the Flood, ſome later, according to various Accidents; but it is no way probable that the earlieſt Migration thither was leſs diſtant than 1000 Years from this time. 5. That if we ſhould admit that the firſt Migration thither were above 2000 Years ſince, of an hundred Pairs they might eaſily propagate a number competent enough to people all that vaſt Continent. 6. That it ſeems that ſince the laſt of theſe ancient Migrations, ſuppoſe that of Madoc and his Britons, until our late Migrations by the Spaniards, French, Engliſh, Dutch and Scotc • , there probably interceded an interval of at leaſt four or five hundred Years, in all which interval the Commerce and Communication between Europe or Aſia, and America, hath as it were ſlept, and been forgotten both by them and us. 7. That in that interval of 500 Years or thereabouts in all Parts, but in ſome Parts far greater, there muſt in all probability happen a great forgetfulneſs of their Original, a great degeneration from the Primitive Civility, Religion and Cuſtoms of thoſe places from whence they were firſt derived; a ferine and neceſſitous kind of Life, a converſation with thoſe that having been long there were faln into a more barbarous habit of Life and Manners, would eaſily aſſimilate at leaſt the next Generation to Barbariſm and Ferineneſs. It is true, where a Colony comes and keeps it ſelf in a Body, as the Roman Colonies anciently, and our Plantations in Virginia and New England do, and the new Acceſſions incorporate and joyn themſelves unto that Body, Cuſtoms both Religious and Civil, and the Original Language are long kept entire: But where the Acceſſions are but thin and ſparing, and ſcattered among the Natives of the Country where they come, and are driven to conform themſelves unto their Cuſtoms for their very ſubſiſtence, ſafety and entertainment, it falls out that the very firſt Planters do ſoon degenerate in their Habits, Cuſtoms and Religion; as a little Wine poured into a great veſſel of Water loſeth it ſelf: But if they eſcape a total Aſſimulation to the Country where they thus are mingled, yet the next Generation in ſuch a mixture is quickly aſſimulated to the corrupt Manners and Cuſtoms of the People among whom they are thus planted: So that it is no wonder, if in ſuch kind of ſmall Acceſſions ſucceſſively from one and the ſame or ſeveral Countries, the third Generation forget their Anceſtors, and the Cuſtoms, Religion and Languages of thoſe People from whom they were firſt derived, and aſſume various temperaments in their Language and Cuſtoms, according as the places of their Habitation and the Company among whom they live, obtain. And if any man conſider but the ſtrange contemperation and production of our Engliſh Language out of the combinations and mixtures of the Daniſh, Saxon, Britiſh, French, Dutch, and other Countries, he may eaſily perſwade himſelf, that out of the Mixtures of People there may ariſe as great diverſities of Language, Rites and Cuſtoms, as there may Temperaments of Qualities by the various combinations and mixtures of the prime Qualities, or varieties of Words by the various appoſitions of the 24 Letters in the Alphabet: and even theſe Cuſtoms and Languages ſubject to infinite ſucceſſive alterations and variations, according to the variety of Forein Mixtures, Commerce, Victories, Wars, Credit and Opinion of Factions or Parties.

And thus far touching the Peopling of America with Mankind; I ſhall ſubjoyn ſomething touching the ſtoring of it with Brutes and Birds.

It ſeems in the original Creation of things that Vegetables and Inſects, eſpecially thoſe that by their nature may ſponte oriri, or by equivocal Generation, had as large and univerſal production as the habitable parts of the Earth or dry Land; as Fiſhes, for the moſt part, had their firſt created production as univerſal and ſparſim, in the whole extent of the Seas or Waters.

But whether the primitive production of the more perfect Animals both Brutes and Birds, that have ever ſince had their production by univocal Generation, were diffuſively created over the habitable or dry Ground as Vegetables were; or whether there were only certain Capita ſpecierum perfectarum utriuſque ſexus, created in a certain determinate districtus near to the place of the firſt Origination of Mankind, viz. in or near the Garden of Eden; and that the whole Progeny of ſuch Brutes and Birds were propagated after ſucceſſively through the whole World from theſe Capita ſpecierum, ſeems an Inquiry of more difficulty to determin.

Some Obſervations ſeem to favour the former Conjecture, eſpecially conſidering that many Species of Brutes and Birds are as it were appropriate to their ſeveral Countries, as Elephants, Camels, Lions, and divers other Brutes; Parrots, Oſtriches, and other Fowls which are not found in other Countries.

But eſpecially the ſame Opinion is inferred from the Beaſts and Birds which are found in America, which have not the like in the other parts of the World: Acoſta in his 36th Chap. of his 4th Book ſaith, that beſides the Beaſts called Guanaco's and Paco's, there be a thouſand different kinds of Birds and Beaſts of Foreſt in America which have never been known neither in ſhape nor name in other parts of the World; whereof no mention is made, nor names given in Greek or Latin, or other Eaſtern Language of the World.

And in his 34th Chapter of that Book he tells us, That though the Spaniards in their firſt Plantation found certain Beaſts, Birds, and other things in America common to thoſe of Europe, Aſia and Africa; yet ſome Beaſts and other things they brought thither which were unknown there, and for which they had no Names but what the Spaniards brought along with them. So that one of the beſt Indications which they had to know thoſe Beaſts which were originally brought with the Spaniards out of Europe in their firſt Plantation, was, in that the Indians had no other Names for ſuch but Spaniſh Names.

And again, ſince America, as is generally ſuppoſed, is divided on every ſide from Aſia, Africa and Europe by conſiderable Seas, and no known paſſage by Land, ſo that all the poſſibility there could be for traduction of the Brutes into America from the known World, could only be by Shipping: Though this might be, and certainly was a method uſed for the traduction of uſeful Cattel from hence thither, yet it is not credible that Bears, Lions, Tigers, Wolves, and Foxes ſhould have ſo much care uſed for their tranſportation.

And upon the ſame account they ſeem to inferr, That the Beaſts and Birds preſerved by Noah in the Ark could only be ſuch as were appropriated to Aſia, but not thoſe that were of the American kinds, for how ſhould they come from thence to the Ark? Or if it be ſuppoſable that they could be brought thither, why did none of the kinds which are found commonly in America leave ſome of their Kind or Race here?

On the other ſide, it hath been the more received Opinion, That the Capita ſpecierum perfectarum of perfect Terreſtrial Animals and Birds were created near unto the place of Adam's Creation, and that from theſe, and theſe only the Race of perfect Animals, Birds, and Brutes were propagated and traduced over the face of the whole Earth; and that the American Brood was traduced from theſe, and from thoſe Couples of theſe that were preſerved by Noah in the Ark: And that upon theſe Inſtances, whereof ſome are of Divine authority, others are Phyſical.

1. All the Beaſts and Fowls were brought to Adam to give them their Names, Gen. 2.19, 20. which could not have been, if the ſeveral kinds of them in their firſt Creation had not been within ſome reaſonable and approachable diſtance.

2. All the Beaſts and Birds had their kinds preſerved in the Ark, and the reſt were drowned by the Univerſal Deluge. Gen. 7.23.

3. Although the Continent of America was in the firſt Spaniſh Plantations thereof ſtored with wild Beaſts, as Lions, Tigers, Bears, &c. yet thoſe Iſlands that were remote from the Land, though large and fruitful, had not any of theſe Beaſts then in them, as Cuba, Hiſpaniola, Jamaica, Margarita: this is verified by Acoſta, upon a ſtrict examination, Lib. 1. Cap. 21. & alibi, and the ſame hath been found true in other new diſcovered Iſlands by other Navigations: Whereby it appears that the Brutes were not Aborigines, for then they ſhould have been found in thoſe Iſlands as well as in the Continent, as well as Inſects and Vegetables; and that therefore in the Continent it ſelf, the firſt ſtoring thereof was not from it ſelf, but by ſome means of acceſſion from other Parts, for otherwiſe they might have been found as well there as in the Continent.

The two great Obſtacles are, 1. The difference of the Brutes and Birds of that Continent from thoſe of Aſia, Europe and Africa: 2. The difficulty of finding a commodious paſſage from Aſia, Africa, or Europe for ſuch Beaſts and Birds from hence thither, admit they were all of the ſame kind. And touching both theſe I ſhall ſay ſomething.

1. Touching the diverſity of Brutes and Birds of this and the Weſtern World; the difficulty from thence is but ſmall, for there are divers Accidents even in the Eaſtern World, Europe, Aſia, and Africa, that afford us Inſtances of that kind, though, excepting ſome Iſlands, it be one common Continent: I ſhall inſtance only in ſome Accidents of this kind: 1. This Variation may happen by Mixtures of ſeveral Species in Generation, which gives an anomalous Production, as we ſee ordinarily by the mixture of Pheaſants and Hens, Chickens are produced partaking of both in colour and figure, which yet renders them different from both: And it is obſerved by many that the Cauſe of that great variety of Brutes in Africa is by reaſon of the meeting together of Brutes of ſeveral Species at Waters (which in thoſe dry Countries are ſcarce) and the promiſcuous couplings of Males and Females of ſeveral Species, whereby there ariſe a ſort of Brutes that were not in the firſt Creation. This was long ſince obſerved by Ariſtotle, ſo that it grew a Proverb alſo, Semper aliquid novi Africa affert. De generat. Animal. lib. 2. cap. 5. and ſo continues to this day. 2. The Percolation, as I may call it, of Vegetables by Proſemination will alter their Nature, Colour and Shape, as Tulips, or Carnations riſing from Seed will differ in Colour from what thoſe were that yielded thoſe Seeds. 3. Culture will improve Wild Flowers in bigneſs and beauty; and want of Culture will ſometimes make Vegetables degenerate. See for theſe Tranſmutations Sir Francis Bacon, in the 6th Century of his Natural Hiſtory. I have often obſerved, that River-Fiſh, as Trouts and Flounders, and others, will alter their figure, ſome for the better and ſome for the worſe, being put into Ponds. Again in Animals; the Learned Doctor Harvey in the end of his laſt Book de Generatione Animalium, delivers an Opinion which at the firſt view ſeems wonderful ſtrange, viz. That the Conformation of the Proles, both in Men and Brutes, to their ſeveral ſpecifical Shapes and Configurations, is by a certain ſpecifical operative Idea in the Phantaſie or Imagination of Animals, fixed and radicated in them, and conformable to their ſeveral Species; and that monſtrous or anomalous Productions are by ſome diſturbance or diſcompoſure of that ſpecifical Idea, by ſome other inordinate Idea. And conformable hereunto ſeems the Opinion of Marcus Marci, in his learned Book de Ideis formatricibus. Whatever the truth of this Opinion be, it is not here properly examinable; yet it ſeems beyond queſtion, that as to ſome external Signatures, as Colour, Shape, Figure, &c. the Phantaſie or Imagination of the Females as well Animals as of Mankind, eſpecially in momento conceptus and for ſome time after, hath a great Influence: Some there are that think that Jacob's change of the colour of Sheep and Goats by peeled Rods, Gen. 30.37. was partly at leaſt upon a Phyſical account; and he that reads Fienus de Viribus Imaginationis, and Sir Francis Bacon in the latter end of his Natural Hiſtory, will find ſuch Changes by the ſtrength of Imagination as are very remarkable. It is probable, that in the great plenty of Birds and Fowls in uninhabited Woods of the Weſtern World, even the ſeveral aſpects of their Figure and Colour in their ſeaſons of Copulation may make various Configurations and Colours in their Broods. 5. But that which is more to my purpoſe, and of greater evidence, is this; Variety of Soils and Climates makes admirable and almoſt ſpecifical Variations even of the ſame Species of Vegetables, Animals and Men: In Vegetables, a fruitful Soil or Climate improves in Beauty, Bigneſs and Virtue; a barren Soil or Climate impairs them: among Animals, the Indian Elephants are larger than the African; the Engliſh Maſtiff degenerates in his courage and fierceneſs, at leaſt in the firſt ſucceſſion by generation, when brought into France; the Barbary Horſe is of a finer Spirit and Make than the Flanders Horſe, yet degenerates in a great meaſure in the firſt or ſecond generation, when removed from Barbary. Nay let us look upon Men in ſeveral Climates, though in the ſame Continent, we ſhall ſee a ſtrange variety among them in Colour, Figure, Stature, Complexion, Humor; and all ariſing from the difference of the Climate, though the Continent be but one, as to point of Acceſs and mutual Intercourſe and poſſibility of Intermigrations: The Ethiopian black, flat-noſed and criſp-haired; the Moors tawny; the Spaniards ſwarthy, little, haughty, deliberate; the French ſpritely, ſudden; the Northern people large, fair-complexioned, ſtrong, ſinewy, couragious: nay we may ſee in more conterminous Climates, even in thoſe of ours, great variety in the People thereof; the Up-lands in England yield ſtrong, ſinewy, hardy Men; the Marſh-lands, eſpecially about Somerſetſhire, Men of large and high ſtature; the Welſh that inhabit the Mountains, commonly ſharp-viſaged. And there is no leſs difference in the Humors and Diſpoſitions of People inhabiting ſeveral Climates, than there is in their Statures and Complexions. And it is an evidence that this ariſeth from the Climate, becauſe long continuance in theſe various Climates aſſimilate thoſe that are of a Forein extraction to the Complexions and Conſtitutions of the Natives after the ſucceſſion of a few Generations.

And upon this account there may be great variety in the Colour, Figure and Make of divers Birds and Animals in America from thoſe in the Eaſtern World, and yet both have the ſame original extraction; for there is no leſs variety in the Brutes and Birds of Africa from thoſe of Europe or Aſia, and yet nothing impedes their mutual commigrations, being the ſame Continent, though differing Climates.

And therefore although Acoſta and others tell us of Brutes and Birds in America that are not found in Europe or Aſia, it doth not at all enervate the Sacred Hiſtory; it is poſſible there may be the like in Africa, or ſome Parts of Aſia which yet Acoſta never travelled. 2. But if not, they might ariſe by an anomalous Mixture of Species. 3. Poſſibly they may be of the ſame Species with the Primitives, but received ſome accidental Variations in proceſs of time; as the various kinds of Dogs here in England, Maſtiffs, Spaniels, Hounds, Greyhounds, &c. might in their Primitives be of one Species; the like may be ſaid of various kinds of Apes, Baboons, Monkies; of Elks, Buffalo's, and Cows; the like of ſeveral ſorts of Parrots, which primitively might be but one Species, and receive accidental Variations in proceſs of generations, by ſome of the means above mentioned: and thus Crows, Daws, Rooks might be but a baſtard kind of Raven; the Royſton Crow and the Corniſh Daw, though they have accidental differences from thoſe among us, ſeem yet to be of the ſame kind with ours; and ſo poſſibly might the Sheep of Peru, called by Acoſta Pacos and Guanacos, be primitively Sheep, but differenced by their long abode in ſucceſſive generations in Peru; the Auza's and Poulaſſes mentioned by Acoſta, lib. 4. cap. 37. may be but a Species of Ravens, though by the Climate accidentally altered in bigneſs and ſhape.

Theſe things I mention, that it may appear, That even in the ſame Continent, wherein a mutual tranſition may be without difficulty, yet the very Climate may as it were appropriate ſome Brutes to certain Countries, which yet might without any great difficulty be at firſt Creation of them contained within nearer bounds, and might upon the occaſion of the Common Deluge be drawn together into the Ark, and afterwards by their wandring farther, and inuring themſelves to a certain Continent or part thereof, be accidentally changed, and as it were appropriate to it: And alſo to ſhew, That Animals even of the ſame Original, Extraction and Species, be diverſified by accuſtomable reſidence in one Climate, from what they are in another. Therefore poſſibly as little Conſequence may be drawn againſt the common Original of the Capita ſpecierum Animalium in Aſia and America, as may be drawn from the diverſity of ſome kind of Animals inhabiting in divers parts of Europe, Aſia or Africa, which notwithſtanding is one common Continent. I do therefore conclude, That the variety of the Brutes and Birds in America from thoſe in Aſia, where the Ark was made, is no Argument againſt their Original from thoſe that were preſerved in the Ark: Becauſe that it doth not yet appear, that thoſe that are now known in this World do differ any more than accidentally from thoſe in the Weſtern World, viz. either by the Couplings and Mixtures of Animals of ſeveral Species, or by reaſon of the Variety of the Climate, or Temperament thereof; which Variations might be acquired by a diſperſion of them as well into America, as other parts of Europe, Africa or Aſia, after the Univerſal Deluge.

As to the Second, namely, The difficulty of the firſt Migration of Brutes and Birds from Aſia where the Capita ſpecierum were firſt created, and after in the Ark preſerved; I ſhall firſt deliver my ſelf from the leſſer difficulties of the Objection, and afterwards conſider the greater.

1. It ſeems but little difficulty touching the tranſlation of Birds from hence thither: for although without the ſuppoſition of Plato's Atlantis, or ſome number of ſmaller Iſlands in a convenient diſtance in the Atlantick Ocean, it is hardly poſſible to ſuppoſe that any Fowls could maintain a flight from Spain or Africa, croſs the Atlantick Ocean into America; yet there are other Seas between ſome parts of Europe and Aſia, and the Northern parts of America, where Fowls by flight might paſs from hence thither, as the Fretum Anian, and the Sea bordering upon Norway and Finland.

2. As to the Water-Fowls, the difficulty is leſs, for they can and do ſupply the wearineſs of a long flight by taking Water, and infinite numbers of them are found in Iſlands far remote from any Continent, and even in the main Ocean.

3. As to Domeſtick-Fowl, as Hens, Geeſe, Turkies, &c. and tame Animals for uſe, delight, or food, as Horſes, Dogs, Hogs, Sheep, Goats, Deer, Apes, Monkies, Peacocks, Parrots, &c. of which America is furniſhed; there is as little difficulty but they might be tranſported by ſhipping either for uſe or commerce, eſpecially by the Africans, who had ſtore of them; and even Peacocks and Apes were an ancient part of commerce, 2 Chron. 9.21. and Acoſta, lib. 4. cap. 33. tells us that the Dogs and Cattel tranſported not much above 20 Years before his coming thither from Spain, were in that ſpace ſo exceedingly multiplied in St Domingo and other Iſlands poſſeſſed by the Spaniards where there were none formerly, that they became wild, and filled all the Country, that they were forced to uſe what means they could for the deſtruction of the Dogs, and killed infinite numbers of Cows, meerly for their Skins.

4. The only difficulty that ſeems to remain, is touching thoſe ferine, noxious, and untamable Beaſts, as Lions, Tigers, Wolves, Bears, and Foxes with which that Continent abounds: for it is not probable that theſe ſhould be tranſported by ſhipping; no Men would probably be at that charge and hazard with ſuch Beaſts that would do more harm than good: And although poſſibly the frozen Northern Seas might be a Bridge for their paſſage, yet that ſeems unlikely in reſpect of the great Snows that accompany ſuch Froſts, and the impoſſibility of a ſupply of food in ſo great and troubleſom a Journey: And as to Swimming, though it hath been obſerved that Bears have ſwimmed into Iſlands many Leagues from the Continent to prey upon Fowls, and to return again; and though the Seas between Tartary and Cathay and ſome parts of America be not ſo wide as the Atlantick or Pacifick Ocean, yet they are too large to afford a paſſage by Sea, eſpecially for Tigers and Lions, which are not ſo apt to take the Water. And it is not yet certainly diſcovered, though conjectured, that there is any Neck of Ground, or paſſage by Land from any part of Europe or Aſia into any part of the Continent of America.

There remains therefore nothing that I can reaſonably conjecture to accommodate the difficulty, but to ſuppoſe what I have formerly intimated; That although it ſhould be granted that there is now no ſuch Land-paſſage extant, yet within the compaſs of 4000 Years elapſed ſince the Flood there have been ſome ſuch Junctures or Land-paſſages between the Northern parts of Aſia or Europe, and ſome Northern parts of the Continent of America, or between the South-eaſt parts of China or the Philippine Iſlands, and the Southern Continent (though lately there be diſcovered an interpoſition of Sea between the Iſland del Fuogo and that Southern Continent) whereby either from Aſia to Groenland in the North, or from China to Terra auſtralis incognita on the South a Land-paſſage might be from Aſia to America for Men and Brutes, though for ſome Ages paſt either by the violence of the Water, or by Floods or Earthquakes, which hath made great alterations in the Globe of the Earth and Seas, that Bridge or Line of Communication be now broken and obliterated. And truly he that obſerves the infinite company of Iſlands lying between the Continent of China and Nova Guinea, almoſt contiguous to each other, hath probable reaſon to believe that theſe were all formerly one Continent joyning China and Nova Guinea together, though now by the irruption of the Sea crumbled into many ſmall Iſlands.

CAP. VIII. The Seventh Evidence of Fact proving the Origination of Man, namely, The Gradual Increaſe of Mankind.

I Come to the Seventh Evidence of Fact, which ſeems with much ſtrength and clearneſs to evince the Origination of Mankind, and that within ſuch a Period of Time as the Sacred Scriptures propound, namely, The Gradual Increaſe of Mankind upon the Earth.

And becauſe I mean throughly to examin this Conſideration, I ſhall propound to my Enquiry theſe enſuing Particulars.

1. Whether according to the ordinary courſe and procedure of Nature in the Generations of Mankind, there be not a gradual and conſiderable Increaſe of Mankind upon the face of the Earth, unleſs ſome collateral Emergency or Occurrence interrupt or correct that Increaſe.

2. What Correctives there may be ſuppoſed that may check and reſtrain that Increaſe of Mankind, that otherwiſe according to the ordinary courſe of Nature would have obtained in the World.

3. Whether thoſe Correctives or collateral Occurrences which have been, or may be ſuppoſed to have been in the World, have ſo far prevailed, as totally to ſtop that Increaſe of Mankind, which upon a Natural account, without the intervention of ſuch Correctives would have obtained.

4. Whether notwithſtanding all theſe Correctives of the Increaſe or Exceſſes of Generations, yet if ſtill the numbers of Mankind have increaſed, it be not a ſufficient Argument to ſatisfie a reaſonable Man that Mankind had an Inception, and that within ſuch a period or compaſs of Duration as is not of a vaſt or prodigious Exceſs.

I ſhall begin with the firſt of theſe, and I ſhall ſuppoſe, and I think clearly evidence, That without the intervention of ſome accidental or collateral Corrective, Mankind muſt needs increaſe upon the Earth, and that the Generations and Productions of Men and Woman in an ordinary, regular and conſtant courſe of Nature, do very much exceed the Decays of Mankind by Natural courſe of Mortality, allowing into the Account thoſe common Decays of Mankind by ordinary, uſual and common Diſeaſes incident to Individuals.

The Laws, eſpecially of the Romans and others, have determined the Legal Ages of Matrimonial Conjunction of a Man to be 14, of a Woman to be 12; Prudential Conſiderations have protracted it longer. Plato in his Third De Legibus allows and determins the Age of the Woman ſhould be between 16 and 20, of the Man to be between 30 and 35: we will ſuppoſe the medium to be for the Man 26, for the Woman 20. Ariſtotle determins the extreme time for Generation in the Man to be 70, for the Woman 50; the medium to be 65 for the former, 45 for the latter: we will take a ſhorter medium for both, and ſuppoſe the extreme term for Procreation for Man to be 55, for the Woman to be 40 Years; upon this account the terminus or periodus procreativa to be 20 Years: And although within that Period there is a poſſibility of procreation of 20 Children, yet conſidering that all Pairs are not of that fertility, we will take the medium to be leſs than a third part, viz. 6.

And becauſe upon a due Obſervation of the Sexes of Mankind, eſpecially by ſuch as have curiouſly obſerved the Regiſters and Calculations of Births and Burials, there is ſome, though not very conſiderable exceſs of Males above Females, viz. as 14 to 13, or in ſome places, as 16 to 15 (an evidence of the wiſe Providence of God, to bring the number of each Sex to ſo near a parity) yet allowing a redundance to the Males, to ſupply thoſe many Caſualties whereunto Males are ſubject by Wars, Navigations, and other Occurrences that more exhauſt the numbers of Men than Woman. Therefore we will allow to Productions of five Couples, about 16 Males and 14 Females; which though not exactly anſwering either of thoſe proportions, yet comes near to them, namely, 16 Males to 14 Females.

And becauſe partly through the weakneſs of Infancy, and thoſe Diſeaſes that happen to Youth either by reaſon of intemperance, indiſcretion, want of of care, and the ebullition and fermentation of Blood, more dye before 20 Years than between that age and 50, we will ſuppoſe, of thoſe ſix Procreations only two attain to the ſtate of future Nuptials and procreation of ſucceeding Generations; therefore we will allott only two of theſe ſix to attain to the ſtate of Men and Women, and conſequently in an ordinary courſe of Nature live to the common age of Mankind.

And although the common age of Mankind, when they are paſſed the danger of Childhood and Youth, is 70 Years, yet becauſe I would have my Suppoſition as eaſie and general as may be, I ſhall allow 60 to be that ordinary Age, abating great Caſualties and Epidemical Diſeaſes.

And upon this account we may juſtly ſuppoſe theſe things; 1. That theſe two Children may be coexiſting with their Parents for near 30 Years; for if the eldeſt be born at 27 Years of the age of the Father, and the other at 30 Years of his age, and live till the Father be 60 Years old, the youngeſt is 30 Years old at the extremity of his Father's age, which we ſuppoſe 60 Years: and 2. Theſe two Children by Intermarriage may have likewiſe two, three, or more Children by that time the Father attains 60 Years: So that in the compaſs of about 34 Years the number of two, namely the Father and Mother, is increaſed to the number of eight, namely, the Father and Mother, their two Children, and four Grand-children; ſo that in 34 Years they become increaſed in a quadruple proportion, and all coexiſting: and although by that time we ſuppoſe the Father and Mother dye, yet in the like Period of thirty four by a Geometrical Proportion their Increaſe is multiplied proportionnable to the Exceſs of their number above Two.

But if we ſhall ſuppoſe that the Technogonia began ſooner, as at 17 or 18 Years, and continued longer, viz. until 65, and that the Ages of Mens Lives were protracted generally to 70 Years, the Increaſe would be very much greater.

And upon this account it is, that conſidering the long Lives of the Ancients ſhortly after the Flood, and the long continuance of their ſtrength of Procreation, Petavius in his 9th Book De doctrina Temporum; cap. 14. and before him, Temporarius in his Chronology gives us a plain Demonſtration, That within the compaſs of 215 Years after the Flood the Sons of Noah and their Deſcendents might without a Miracle increaſe to prodigious and incredible multitudes. The number of coexiſting Individuals is by one of theſe Authors with very clear evidence computed to 1219133512, deſcended from one of the Sons of Noah. And therefore, that allowing the beginning of the Syrian Monarchy to have been about 153 Years after the Flood, it might ſhortly after the beginning of Ninus his Empire, which is ſuppoſed to have been about 215 Years after the Flood, have grown to that greatneſs, that might eaſily render credible the mighty Cities that were built by him, and the great Armies that he raiſed, and the Battles that he fought, and vaſt Slaughters that he made and ſuffered; But if we ſhould follow the Account of the Septuagint, which gives us a far greater Period of Time from the Flood to Abraham, the advantage of the Increaſe would be ſignally greater; although the common Account of the Jews render the Increaſe eaſily credible, without the help of a Miracle.

And becauſe that there can be no greater evidence of this Truth of the Increaſe of Mankind than Experience and Obſervation, neither can there be any Obſervation or Experience of greater certainty, than the ſtrict and vigilant Obſervance of the Calculations and Regiſters of the Bills of Births and Deaths; and becauſe I do not know any one thing rendred clearer to the view, than this Gradual Increaſe of Mankind, by the curious and ſtrict Obſervations of a little Pamphlet, entitled Obſervations upon the Bills of Mortality, lately printed, I ſhall not decline that light or evidence that this little Book affords in this matter; wherein he plainly evinceth,

1. That the number of Males to Females is regularly as 14 to 13, or as 16 to 15. Cap. 8.

2. That ſuppoſing the number of breeding Couples to be 48000, in about the ſpace of 7 Years, in a healthy time, or in 8 Years, if there be Plagues, the great City of London, which is not ſo healthy as the Countrey, will double, without the help of the acceſs of Foreiners: and therefore Adam and Eve doubling themſelves every 64 Years, would in the Period of 5610 Years, the ſuppoſed diſtance from the Creation of Man, produce a far greater number of Mankind than are now in the World. Cap. 11.

3. That in the Countrey, which is generally more healthy than London, upon a medium of Obſervation of 90 Years, there are five Births for four Burials, ſometimes three to two, and ſeldom in any Year theſe Burials equalled or exceeded the Births; or if they did, yet the ſucceeding Years ballanced it to that proportion of 5 to 4; for in the ſpace of 90 Years 1059 were Born in one Pariſh more than were Buried. Cap. 12.

4. That this Redundance did not much increaſe the place or Pariſh it ſelf, becauſe by tranſmigrations to London, to Forein Plantations, and other places of Trade, they disburthened the proportion of their increaſe, and added to the greatneſs and amplitude of other places, eſpecially London.

5. That conſidering the ſmall exceſs of the number of Males above the number of Females, and conſidering the redundancy of the number of Males is only ſufficient to make good that decay of Males above Females, by Wars and Navigation, and other Accidents more incident to Males than Females; there is very near a parity of Males and Females in the World, to keep it in a conſonancy and congruity to the firſt inſtitution of Matrimonial ſociety between one Man and one Woman.

6. That conſequently Polygamy doth not in the general conduce to the Increaſe of Mankind, becauſe the natural or ordinary proportion between the number of each is equal. But in as much as by reaſon of the great Conſumption of Males among the Turks, by divers Accidents, eſpecially that of their great Wars between them and the Perſians, Tartars, Chriſtians and Moors; whereby there is, or at leaſt in ſome Ages was, a great redundance of the number of Woman above the number of Men: The uſe of Polygamy allowed among them, gives a greater increaſe of People than otherwiſe would be; becauſe of the exceſs of the number of Women above the number of Men, by ſuch Accidents.

Theſe are ſome of thoſe plain and evident Obſervations of the ſeemingly inconſiderable Pamphlets; which give a greater Demonſtration of the Gradual Increaſe of Mankind upon the face of the Earth, than a hundred notional Arguments can either evince or confute, and therefore I think them worthy of being mentioned to this purpoſe.

Upon all which, and much more that might be ſaid, it is evident, That according to the ordinary courſe of Nature, though thoſe common and uſual Accidents of common Sickneſſes, ordinary Caſualties, and common Events are incident to Humane Nature; the number of Mankind doth and muſt neceſſarily increaſe in the World, and the Natural Supplies of Mankind are greater, and more numerous than the Decays thereof. I now therefore come to the Second Conſideration, namely, The Examination of the extraordinary or more univerſal Correctives of the Multiplication of Mankind, which becauſe it will be large, I ſhall allow unto it a diſtinct Chapter.

CAP. IX. Concerning thoſe Correctives of the Exceſs of Mankind which may be thought to be ſufficient to reduce it to a greater Equability.

I Come now to the Second premiſed Conſideration and Inquiry, viz. Whether there may not be found ſome extraordinary Occurrences and Correctives, that may reduce that otherwiſe Natural and ordinary Increaſe of Mankind to an Equability: And I call them Extraordinary, not ſimply in reſpect of themſelves, but in oppoſition to thoſe daily and ordinary Caſualties which happen to Humane Nature; and in reſpect of thoſe great Diſtances and Periods, whether certain or caſual, wherein they may be ſuppoſed to happen: And I ſhall improve this Objection againſt the Increaſe de facto of Mankind, with the greateſt impartiality and advantage that may be.

It is certain that the Increaſe of Brutes, and other Animals which are perfect and univocally generated, is very great in the World: Ariſtotle, that inquiſitive Searcher into Nature, in his 4th Book of the Hiſtory of Animals hath given us an Account touching moſt Animals, of the length of their Lives, times of their Breeding, intervals of their Birth; wherein though poſſibly there may be variation in ſeveral Climates, yet his Account may give a near eſtimate, proportionable alſo to other places.

For Inſtance, the Cow breeds in the ſecond Year, brings forth the tenth Month; lives 15 or 20 Years: the Mare breeds the third Year, brings forth in the twelfth Month; lives 25, 30, and ſometimes 40 Years; the Sheep and Goat bear in the ſecond Year, bring forth in the beginning of the ſixth Month, ſometimes two, ordinarily but one; lives 10, 12, or 13 Years: Sows breed in the ſecond Year, bring forth after four Months; their Young numerous: Bitches breed in the latter end of the firſt or beginning of the ſecond Year, bring forth after threeſcore Days, or in the ninth Week; their Young many, 5, 6, or ſometimes 12; they live 10 or 12, ſometimes 15 or 20 Years: Wolves breed and bring forth as Dogs, only their number fewer, ſometimes 2, ſometimes 3, ſometimes 4: the Doe brings forth after eight Months complete, but one, and ſometimes two; and live long: the Fox breeds 4, the Cat 5 or 6; and lives 6 Years, many times more: the ſpeedy and numerous increaſe of Mice is prodigious; Ariſtotle mentions 120 produced of one Female in a very little time; Pliny in his 11th Book, Cap. 63. hath in effect tranſcribed Ariſtotle herein.

By this it appears, That the Natural Increaſe of theſe Animals is much greater than of Men, yet their numbers have not arrived to that great exceſs, becauſe thoſe that are for food have their reduction by their application for that purpoſe; thoſe that are domeſtical, and not for food, as Cats and Dogs, are kept within compaſs by drowning or deſtroying their Young; and thoſe that are noxious, as Wolves and Foxes, are reduced by that common deſtruction that Men purſue them with.

Touching Birds, their Increaſe ſeems to be much greater than of Men or Brutes, but they have thoſe reductions that bring them to a fair equability, unleſs it be in thoſe Iſlands and Rocks in the Sea unacceſſible by Men, where Sea-Fowls breed. Firſt, their number is reduced by Man for food: 2. For deſtruction, as in Birds that are noxious: 3. By the natural ſhortneſs of the Lives of many that are yet numerous breeders: 4. By the mutual deſtruction of the weaker by Birds of prey; whereof more particularly hereafter: 5. By the Winter cold, which ſtarves very many, either for want of heat or food; and of this more hereafter.

Fiſhes are infinitely more numerous or increaſing than Beaſts or Birds, as appears by the numerous Spawn of any one Fiſh, though ordinarily they breed but once a Year; and if all theſe ſhould come ro maturity, even the Ocean it ſelf would have been long ſince over-ſtored with Fiſh. Now the Correctives and Reductions of theſe are very many. 1. Aristotle obſerves in his 6th de Hiſtoria Animalium, cap. 13. Thoſe Eggs that are not ſprinkled, aſpergine ſeminis genitalis maris, prove unfruitful; a great part are devoured by the Male, and much more by other Fiſh: ſome of their Eggs are buried in the ſlime, and corrupted. 2. Many are taken by Men, and employed for food. 3. As among Birds and Beaſts they are Beaſts and Birds of prey, which are leſs numerous than others, ſo eſpecially among Fiſh: And though the Wiſdom of Providence hath given certain Expedients to Animals, eſpecially Fiſhes of the weaker nature, to eſcape the voracious; as ſwiftneſs to ſome, ſmalneſs to others, whereby they eſcape to Shallows and Shoars unacceſſible to the greater: and to thoſe that are not able to move, or at leaſt not to move ſwiftly, the protection of Shells; as Oyſters, Eſcalops, Crabs, Lobſters and other Shell-fiſh; yet a very great number are devoured by the voracious kind. I do remember, that a Friend of mine having ſtored a very great Pond of 3 or 4 Acres of ground with Carps, Tench, and divers other Pond-fiſh, of a very great number, and only put in two very little ſmall Pikes; at 7 Years end, upon the draught of his Pond, not one Fiſh was left, but the two Pikes grown to an exceſſive bigneſs, and all the reſt, together with their millions of Fry devoured by thoſe pair of Tyrants. 4. Birds alſo of prey, as Storks, Herons, Cormorants, and other Fowl of that kind deſtroy many both in the Sea, Rivers, Ponds and Lakes. 5. Extreme Froſt, eſpecially in Ponds and Lakes, make a great deſtruction of Fiſh, partly by freezing them, partly by the excluſion of the ambient Air, which inſinuates it ſelf into the Water, and is neceſſary for the preſervation of the Lives of thoſe watry Inhabitants. 6. By great Heats and Droughts, not only drying up Lakes, Ponds, and Rivers, but alſo tainting the Water with exceſſive heat; and though theſe two do not ſo much concern Sea-fiſh, who have more ſcope and room, yet they have a great influx upon Rivers, Ponds, and Lakes.

Again, to ſay ſomething of Inſects, whether aiery, terreſtrial, or watry; they ſeem to be more numerous than the common ſorts of univocal Animals, who have an univocal production. For firſt, their firſt production is ſtrangely numerous, out of Putrefaction and much Moiſture, influenced by Heat. Hence Diodorus Siculus in his firſt Book tells us of the numerous productions of Mice after every Inundation of Nilus, ſenſibly and viſibly growing out of the ſlime; Juxta, Thebaidem, cum Nili ceſſavit inundatio, calefaciente Sole limum ab aqua relictum, multis in locis ex terrae hiatu multitudo Murium oritur: which Ariſtotle alſo obſerves, as frequent in other places, lib. 5. de Hiſtor. Animal. cap. 37. Locis enim compluribus tam inaudito modo oriri ſolent, ut parum ex univerſo frumento relinquatur. And in my remembrance, after the drayning of the great Level in Northamptonſhire, and other Shires, ſuch an innumerable company of Mice did upon a ſudden in the Summer time ariſe, as it were immediately out of the ſlimy Earth warmed by the Sun, that they were conſtrained to cut their Banks to drown the Lands, and ſo cure one Inundation with another.

The like numerous production of Frogs happens in ſome Years, which Ariſtotle in the firſt Section of his Problems, and Sir Francis Bacon out of him makes a Prognoſtick of a ſickly Year; becauſe ſuch Productions are the effect of a great degree of Putrefaction in the Elementary Bodies. And we read, that in Norway there was not long ſince ſuch innumerable company of Field-Rats of a new Make produced, ſomewhat larger than Rats, that they threatned a general Conſumption of all their Fruits, but by ſome extreme hard weather they were deſtroyed; yet ſo as the multitude of their Carcaſes produced a noyſom Contagion in the Countrey. And the like numerous production every Year gives us, though ſome Years more than others, of divers other kind of Inſects, as Flies, Locuſts, Worms, Caterpillars, and divers others, which in ſome Countries ſo abound, that they cover the face of the ground, eſpecially in the parts of Africa: quod vide, in the 9th Book of Leo his Hiſtory of Africa, and thoſe additions out of Paulus Oroſius and Alvarez in confirmation thereof. 2. As this original ſpontaneous production is very numerous, ſo the multiplication of theſe Inſects by their Eggs or Seeds is infinitely more; their Lives are ſhort, ſome dye within the compaſs of one Summer, as the Silk-worm: yet a curious Obſerver of that Inſect, namely Malpighius, hath given us an account of the number of Eggs of one Silkworm in one Year to be above 500; though all poſſibly prove not fruitful, yet preſerved carefully from the injury of the Winter, many of them come to perfection the next Spring: And it is apparent that the Erucae, Caterpillars and Worms we ſee upon Hedges and Leaves, multiply their Seeds to a very great exceſs; and this is much more viſible in the Spawn and production of Frogs, and alſo in the multiplication of Mice, the blowings of Flies, and almoſt all kind of Inſects; though their Lives are ſhorter, yet their productions are more numerous and frequent in the ſhort Period of their Lives, than the perfect Animals. So that if there ſhould not be ſome Corrective of the exceſſes of their Productions, the whole Atmoſphere, Earth and Waters would be crouded with their numbers: The contrary whereof is nevertheleſs apparent, for the multitudes of one Summer are for the moſt part exhauſted, and inviſible by the next Spring.

The Correctives therefore of the numerous Exceſs of Inſects ſeem to be principally theſe: 1. The Induſtry of Mankind, in deſtruction of noxious Inſects. 2. The Wiſe Providence hath placed a certain Antipathy between ſome Animals, and many Inſects, whereby they delight in their deſtruction, though they uſe them not as food: As, the Peacock deſtroys Snakes and Adders; the Weaſel, Mice and Rats; Spiders, Flies; and ſome ſorts of Flies deſtroy Spiders. 3. The common ſort of Inſects are the ordinary food of divers Animals, as well Inſects as others: The Spider and all ſorts of ſmall Birds, eſpecially the Swallow, feed upon Flies; the Mole feeds upon Worms; Ducks and divers Water-fowl upon Frogs; the Cat and Owl upon Mice: and thus Inſects become the prey of other Animals, which correct their exceſs. 4. As the hot and moiſt temperament of the Air and Earth produce and increaſe Inſects, ſo that temperament of the Air, Earth, and Waters that ſeems moſt oppoſite to Putrefaction, either deſtroys many of the Individuals, or at leaſt renders their numerous Eggs and Seeds unfruitful, and reſiſts as well the original Production of them from Putrefaction, or abates the Prolifick power of their Eggs or Seeds. 5. Great Rains, and Showers, and Inundation of Waters drowns oftentimes many ſorts of Inſects, and renders their Seeds and Eggs unprolifick, or deſtroys them. 6. But eſpecially the Winter Cold, Froſt and Snow do kill many Inſects, and their Eggs and Seeds, and renders them unfruitful. The Cold and Winter ſeaſon is a great Enemy not only to Inſects, but to many ſorts of Birds, Beaſts and Fiſhes: and therefore Ariſtotle moſt truly obſerves in his 8th Hiſt. Animalium, cap. 13, 14, 15, 16, &c. that to avoid the ſeverity of the approaching Cold, many of them retire into the cloſeſt and warmeſt Caverns they can get; wherein ſome lye for many Months without the benefit of Food, and if they eſcape the ſeverity of the Cold, they as it were revive the next Spring. For inſtance, Serpents hide themſelves 4 Months, Swallows betake themſelves all the Winter to low Vallies and Caverns, Tortoiſes cloſe up themſelves in Holes and Earth all the Winter, as is obvious to daily Experiences; Et Inſecta penè omnia conduntur, praeter ea quae vitam in domiciliis cum hominibus agunt, quaeque prius intereunt quam omnino tempus excedunt. And therefore Bees keep themſelves cloſe in their Hives, ab ortu Vergiliarum, till the next Spring. And yet, though Nature hath given Inſects this Sagacity to avoid the Winter Cold, yet they are not always ſucceſsful in it, but the ſeverity of the Winter finds them out, and deſtroys them: But as for their Seeds or Eggs, which in the precedent Summer are laid up and down upon Leaves, and in other places, they are for the moſt part deſtroyed by the Winter; except ſuch as caſually by the Wind or otherwiſe are diſperſed, and lodged in ſafer Receptacles, and thereby ſurvive the inclemency of the Winter, and yield a new Production or Increaſe the next Spring.

And thus we have ſeen the Methods and Correctives, that by the Divine diſpoſition of theſe ſmall and inconſiderable pieces of Nature are uſed; whereby at once there is a preſervation of the Kind of thoſe little Animals, and yet a prevention of that Exceſs and Redundance which would happen by their numerous Increaſe, to the detriment and ſurcharge of the inferior World.

In all this Conſideration of the Reduction of Exceſſes and Increaſe of Animals and Inſects, two things are obſervable in a ſpecial manner, namely;

1. That in the ſtate of Animals and Inſects, we may ſee ſomething that is analogal to the ſtate of the Elementary and mixed Inanimate Bodies; that there are ſome more active and vigorous Qualities, that ſeem continually to exerciſe a Sovereignty and Tyranny over the more paſſive and weak Natures, and prey upon them: Thus Heat, and alſo in ſome degree Cold, are always perſecuting and foyning at the weaker and more unactive parts of Nature: So among Brutes, Birds, Fiſhes, Inſects there is a continual invading and prevalence of the more powerful, active and lively, over the more weak, flegmatick, and unactive Creatures; the Bear, Lion, Wolf, Dog, Fox, &c. purſue the Sheep, Oxen, Hare, Coney, &c. and prey upon them: the like is evident among Birds and Fiſhes, and generally Inſects, being the weaker and more inconſiderable parts of Nature.

2. That the viciſſitudes of Generation and Corruption are by a kind of ſtanding Law in Nature fixed in things, and the Notions and Qualities of Natural things are ſo ordered, to keep always that great Wheel in circulation; and therein the Acceſſes and Receſſes of the Sun, the Influxes of the Heat thereof and of the other Heavenly Bodies, and the mutual and reſtleſs Agitation of thoſe two great Engins in Nature, Heat and Cold, are the great Inſtruments of keeping on foot the Rotation and Circle of Generations and Corruptions, eſpecially of Animals and Vegetables of all ſorts.

3. That yet theſe Motions of Generations and Corruptions, and of the conducibles thereunto, are ſo wiſely and admirably ordered and contemperated, and ſo continually managed and ordered by the wiſe Providence of the Rector of all things, that things are kept in a certain due ſtay and equability: and though the Motions of Generations and Corruptions, and the Inſtruments and Engins thereof are in a continual courſe, neither the exceſs of Generations doth oppreſs and over-charge the World, nor the defect thereof, or prevalence of Corruptions doth put a Period to the Species of things, nor work a total Diſſolution in Nature.

And upon this ſeemingly impertinent Diverſion touching the Reductions and Correctives of theſe inferior Animals, there may ſeem to be collected reaſonably an analogical Inference of the like means of the Correctives of the Generations of Mankind; and that although in an ordinary courſe of Humane Productions the Increaſe ſurmounts the Decay, yet there may be reaſonably ſuppoſed ſuch Periodical Corrections as might fairly keep the ſtate of Mankind in a mediocrity and equability, although it ſhould be ſuppoſed the Generations of Mankind had been Eternal.

And although theſe Correctives may not happen every Day, or every Year in the ordinary courſe of things, and therefore may be called extraordinary, becauſe they are leſs ordinary than the common Caſualties of Mankind, as Sickneſs or Accident that happens to this or that individual Perſon promiſcuouſly; yet they are in truth no more extraordinary, than a cold Winter is extraordinary; which although it is not every Day, nor doth it happen every Year poſſibly in an equal Degree, yet it is no extraordinary thing in Nature, if it happens once in 5, or 10, or 20 Years.

Having therefore conſidered theſe Correctives in the inferior Animal Nature, I ſhall now ſearch out what may be thoſe Correctives, that may be applicable to the Reductions of the Generations of Mankind to an Equability, or at leaſt to keep it within ſuch bounds as may keep it from ſurcharging the World; whereby if in the Period of 2, or 3, or 4000 Years it may grow too luxuriant, yet it may in probability be ſo far abated, as may allow it an Increaſe of the like number of Years to attain its former proportion. So that by theſe Prunings there may be a conſiſtency of the Numbers of Mankind, with an eternal ſucceſſion of Individuals.

Thoſe Reductions that may be ſuppoſed effectual for theſe Ends, and ſuch as the courſe of Mankind ſeem to have had great Experiences of, are, 1. Plagues and Epidemical Diſeaſes: 2. Famines: 3. Wars and Internecions: 4. Floods and Inundations: 5. Conflagrations.

1. Concerning Plagues and Epidemical Diſeaſes, the Hiſtories of all times give us Accounts of the great Devaſtations that they have made in many places: and ſometimes it hath been, it is true, only in ſome particular Regions or Cities, but at other times it hath been more univerſal; and although at the ſame time, in ſome Seaſons, it hath not univerſally prevailed, yet it hath gradually and ſucceſſively moved from place to place.

The ancient Plagues of former Ages in Forein Parts have been very terrible, and cut off multitudes of People: See a Collection of ſome of them by Dr Hakewill, lib. 2. ſect. 3. as, namely, That Plague in Ethiopia, and alſo in moſt parts of the Roman Empire, in the Year of Chriſt 250; which continued 15 Years, and left not ſo many People in Alexandria as there were formerly aged Men: that under Juſtinian, in Conſtantinople, and the parts adjacent; wherein there dyed 10000 in a Day: that in Africa, whereby according to Procopius, in the Country of Numidia there dyed 800000 Perſons: that in Greece, under Michael Duca; which ſo prevailed, that the living were not ſufficient to bury the dead: and that in Italy, in the Year 1359, whereby there were not left ten of a thouſand; this poſſibly may be the ſame mentioned by Walſingham, but referred to the Year of Chriſt 1349; that prevailed over the World, beginning in the Northern and Southern parts, that the living were not able to bury the dead: Exiſtimabatur à pluribus, quod vix decima pars hominum fuiſſet relicta ad vitam: and preſently after followed a great Murrain of Cattel; ſo that he concludes, Tanta ex his malis miſeria ſecuta eſt, quod mundus ad pristinum ſtatum redeundi nunquam postea habuit facultatem. Vide Lipſium de Conſtantia, lib. 2. cap. 23.

And if we look upon our own Country, beſides thoſe great Plagues that have been in a manner univerſal, there have been very many ſuch in England; ſometimes more general, ſometimes more circumſcribed to particular Cities or places: As that Plague in the North parts of England, mentioned by Walſingham in the beginning of R. 2. that in a manner depopulated thoſe Parts: that mentioned by the ſame Author, Anno 7 H. 4. whereby there dyed in one Year 30000 in London (which was conſiderable then, conſidering the narrowneſs of the City in thoſe days, comparatively to what it now is) beſides the great deſolation it made in the Country.

If we come to latter Years, both in England and in Forein Parts, the Obſervator of the Bills of Mortality before mentioned hath given us the beſt Account of the Number that late Plagues have ſwept away; for Inſtance, In London, Anno Dom. 1592, of the Plague 11503 Anno Dom. 1593 10662 Anno Dom. 1603 30562 Anno Dom. 1625 35400 Anno Dom. 1636 10400 Anno Dom. 1665 68596

We have alſo Accounts of the great Devaſtations made by the Plague in late Years in Forein Parts: In Amſterdam, between 1622 and 1664 84564 And in the Year 1664 24148 Anno 1637 at Prague 30000 Anno 1652 at Cracovia 37000 Anno 1656 at Naples 30000 Anno 1657 at Genoa 70000 Anno 1619 at Grand Cairo in 10 Weeks 73500 And Leo in his Hiſtory of Africa, tells us, that the Peſtilence is ſo hot ſometimes in that City, that there dye 12000 almoſt every Day; and Pliny in 7. Nat. Hist. cap. 50. ſaith that the Southern Plagues happen moſt in the Winter, and move Weſtward, according to the courſe of the Sun; which ſome have obſerved alſo in the Northern, that it ſometimes held a gradual Motion, and for the moſt part Weſtward; as in 1652 at Cracovia; 1653 at Dantzick; 1654 at Copenhagen; 1655 at Amſterdam, and other Towns in the Netherlands; 1656 at Naples and Rome; 1657 at Genoa. And I have ſomewhere read, that in Alexandria in Egypt the Plague is Anniverſary, beginning with the Riſing of Nilus, which is about the 17th of June, and continueth riſing 40 Days, ſometimes 12, ſometimes 15 Cubits, and in its greateſt exceſs to 18 Cubits, and as many Days decreaſeth; ſo that the Plague laſteth 80 Days, and then perfectly ceaſeth with the full Ebb of Nilus.

So that upon the account of Plagues, and extraordinary Epidemical Diſeaſes, there ſeems to be a great Corrective of the Redundance and Increaſe of Mankind.

2. Let us a little take notice of Famines, which though they have not been of late times much obſerved, partly becauſe of the great Induſtry of Mankind, improving and increaſing the Fruits of the Earth; partly by thoſe Supplies that have come by Sea to thoſe Countries that are in want; but principally by the goodneſs of God, in lending the Children of Men ſeaſonable Weather, and fruitful Seaſons, and proſperous Influences: yet in former times they have been very grievous, and deſtroyed multitudes of People.

Walſingham in the Life of E. 2. tells us of ſo ſevere a Famine in England, that they were enforced to eat Dogs and Horſes, yea and ſtole Children and eat them; viz. 9 E. 2. And divers other Inſtances our own Hiſtories give us of other great Famines in this and other Countries.

Ordinarily a Famine and a Plague anciently went together, or the former followed upon the heels of the Plague, by reaſon of ſome of theſe means: 1. Commonly the ſame diſtemperature of the Air that occaſioned the Plague, occaſioned alſo the infertility or noxiouſneſs of the Soil, whereby the Fruits of the Earth became either very ſmall, or very unwholſom: As it happened in that Famine under E. 2. above mentioned, in ſo much that the Hiſtorian tells us, that Medicinales herbae, quae levamen languidis conferre ſolebant, per Veris intemperiem & Elementorum inaequalitatem, contra naturam effectae degeneres, virus pro virtute reddebant. 2. Commonly the Plague among Men was accompanied or followed with a Rot or Murrain among Cattel, whereby the fleſh of Beaſts was wanting, or noxious to thoſe that uſed it. 3. Commonly by a great and general Mortality or Plague the Husbandmen and Labourers were ſo diminiſhed, that there wanted People to gather in the Harveſt, or Till the Ground, whereby there neceſſarily enſued a Famine: And oftentimes by a kind of neceſſity Famines were durable, the Stock being exhauſted one Year, left little for the ſupply of Tillage, Husbandry, or Increaſe for the next.

And as Famine was anciently the Concomitant or Conſequent of Plague, ſo both Plague and Famine, eſpecially the latter, were the uſual Conſequents of War, which bring with it Devaſtation and Deſtruction, and a general intermiſſion of that Husbandry and Care that ſhould ſupply it.

The terrible Effects of Famine, and the great Conſumption of Mankind that is occaſioned, was principally 1. Of the Poor, who upon the bare increaſe of the Price of Victuals, and wanting wherewith to buy, muſt needs occaſion their ſtarving, or a tumultuous gaining it by force, where they could not get it; which was but a ſhort and temporary Relief, and made more want after, by the ſpoil and diſorder occaſioned thereby. 2. Of numerous Armies, who being brought into places of want or ſcarcity without due Conduct or Proviſion, are oftentimes deſtroyed in a Week, eſpecially in cloſe and long Sieges, as it happened in Samaria when beſieged by the Aſſyrians, and Jeruſalem when beſieged by the Romans, wherein more dyed by the Famine than by the Sword.

So that Famines as well as Plagues ſeem to give a great Reduction to the Numbers of Mankind.

3. A few words may ſerve concerning Wars, which are ſo frequent, and bring ſo great a Deſolation upon Mankind, that it ſeems to equal that allay of the Exceſſes of Brutes, Fiſhes, Birds, and Inſects, by the other Beaſts, Birds, or Fiſhes of prey; and the rather, becauſe many if not all the conſiderable Parts of the World are ſome Years at it, though it may be ſome Ages free from Peſtilences and Famines (other than ſuch as are conſequences of War) but in no Age nor Year of the World hath it been quiet from Wars, and thoſe calamitous conſequences thereof, at leaſt in ſome conſiderable parts of the World.

It would be endleſs, and indeed Morally impoſſible, to give an Account of the Numbers of People and Armies that have been cut off by Wars, eſpecially on the ſide of the Conquered. Some few Inſtances may give ſome kind of Eſtimate herein.

Diodorus Siculus in his third Book tells us, that Ninus in his Preparation againſt the Bactrians gathered an Army of 1700000 Foot-men, 200000 Horſe-men, 10600 Chariots: that Zoroastres his Army conſiſted of 400000, who in the firſt Conflict prevailed, and killed 40000, but were afterwards wholly deſtroyed; ſo that probably in that War there fell no leſs than 400000 Men: Darius Hyſtaſpis in the Battel of Marathron, whither he came with an Army of 600000, loſt in one Battel 200000: his Succeſſor Xerxes went into Greece with an Army, according to ſome, conſiſting in the whole number of it and its Appendices, of five Millions, thoſe that ſpake moſt ſparingly, of above one Million; all which within the ſpace of five Years were in effect wholly loſt. Vide Lipſ. de Constant. lib. 2. cap. 21, 22, 24. Alexander deſtroyed the Army of Darius, conſiſting of a Million of Men, the greateſt part whereof fell by the Sword: and Pliny in his 7th Book of his Natural Hiſtory, Cap. 15. tells us, that Julius Caeſar, and his Armies in the time of His Command, killed 1192000 perſons, beſides thoſe that he ſlew in the Civil Wars: And if by the Eſtimate of that one Man, we might make a Calculation of thoſe that were ſlain by the Aſſyrian, Babylonian, Perſian, and Grecian Monarchies, by Cyrus, Darius, Aſtyages, Alexander and his ſucceeding Captains; by Marius, Sylla, Pompey, Veſpaſian, and the ſucceeding Roman Emperors; by Tamberlane and the Scythians; by the Goths, Vandals, Turks, Tartars, Muſcovites, Perſians, Moors, and Chriſtians; by the Wars in this little Spot of England; by the late Wars in France, Spain, Germany; by the Spaniards in the Weſt Indies, the numbers of Internecions and Slaughters would exceed all Arithmetical Calculation.

So that it ſhould ſeem, there needed no other Reductive of the Numbers of Men to an Equability, than the Wars that have happened in the World.

And although Wars are in a great meaſure accidental, or at leaſt proceed in a great meaſure from the Wills of Men, their Pride, Ambition, impatience of Injuries, affectation of Dominion, mutual Jealouſies and Fears of the Potency of each other, and oftentimes accidental Emergencies and Occurrences; yet it ſeems, that abſtracting from all theſe Occaſions, Wars ſeem to be in a manner a Natural Conſequence of the over-plenitude and redundancy of the Number of Men in the World: And ſo by a kind of congruity and conſequence, morally neceſſary when the World grows too full of Inhabitants, that there is not room one by another; or that the common Supplies which the World ſhould afford to Mankind begin to be too few, too ſtrait, or too narrow for the Numbers of Men; that natural propenſion of Self-love, and natural principle of Self-preſervation will neceſſarily break out into Wars and Internecions, to make room for thoſe that find themſelves ſtraitned or inconvenienced.

So that as when the Channel of a River is over-charged with Water more than it can deliver, it neceſſarily breaks over the Banks to make it ſelf room; or when the very Brutes or Animals find themſelves oppreſſed and ſtraitned in their proviſions and ſupplies, by the redundance of their numbers, one neceſſarily preys upon another, or deſtroys another to preſerve it ſelf: So Wars among Mankind are a kind of neceſſary Conſequence of Redundance of Mankind, and will by a kind of Natural neceſſity make it ſelf room, and give it ſelf eaſe by the deſtruction of others, if it can get power and opportunity to do it: And conſequently there ſeems to be no fear of the ſurcharge of the World with Mankind, becauſe there is this natural and neceſſary Remedy at hand; the very Redundance it ſelf of Mankind ſeeming by a natural conſecution to yield and ſubminiſter this Remedy, for its Reduction and Equation. As in a redundance of Humors in the Body, the moſt lively and active do naturally thruſt out thoſe that are weaker or noxious, to make room for themſelves: or as Bees ſwarm to get new habitations, when they are ſo increaſed that their Hives will not hold them.

4. Concerning the Fourth, and alſo, incluſively the Fifth Corrective of the Exceſs of Mankind, namely, Inundations and Conflagrations.

Thoſe that have been Obſervers of things in Nature and Hiſtories of former times, have given us Inſtances of two kinds of Mutations in this Terreſtrial Globe of Earth and Waters: ſome that are more ordinary, and of leſs moment, and of ſuch various have been in the World; ſuch are thoſe mentioned eſpecially by Pliny in his Natural Hiſtory, lib. 2. cap. 85. & ſeqq. ſome places ſevered from the Continent by the interruption of the Sea; thus he tells us that Sicily was divided from Italy, Cyprus from Syria, Euboea from Boeotia, Atlantis and Macris from Euboea, Bosticum from Bythinia; and ſome have thought, though perhaps upon very ſmall evidence, that England and France were ſometimes one Continent, and divided by the interruption of the Sea; and Spain from Africa. Again, ſome Cities and Countries ſwallowed up by the Sea; as Pirrha and Antiſſa, Elis and Buta, half the City of Tyndaris in Sicily, and 30 Miles of the Iſland Cea, with a great deſtruction of Men and Cattel: ſome Countries wholly ſwallowed up and drowned in the Sea; as Acarnania, Achaia, part of Europe and Aſia in Propontis: but above all, that great Iſland of Atlantis, ſuppoſed by Plato in his Timaeus to be greater than Lybia and Aſia, ſwallowed up in the Atlantick Ocean, to which it gives its denomination: but Plato is oftentimes ſo Poetical, that we can hardly tell where he means in earneſt.

But on the other ſide, many times the Sea by a certain recompence makes new room for the Inhabitants of the World, ſometimes by producing notable Iſlands; thus the ſame Pliny tells us that Delos, Rhodes, Anaphe, Nea, Thera, and Tereſia, Hiera, Automate, Thia were produced.

Again, the Sea hath deſerted vaſt Tracts of Ground in divers places, and left them dry Land, as is related by Aristotle in the ſecond of his Meteors, Cap. 14. and by Pliny in a great meaſure, out of him and Herodotus. Thus conſiderable quantities of Land were left by the Sea at Epheſus, at Ambracia and other Parts; and that a very great part of Egypt, namely, that called Delta is but the accretion of Nilus, and was ſometime covered with Water: and according to the conjecture of Herodotus, the Sea poſſeſſed Memphis and a great part of Egypt, to the Mountains of Ethiopia. But theſe are but Conjectures of the Hiſtorian, of what might be in ſome thouſand Years before he was born. Ariſtotle indeed ſuppoſeth, that the City Thebes and the adjacent Parts, were all that were habitable in Egypt in the time of Homer, becauſe he makes no mention of Memphis.

But theſe ſmaller Viciſſitudes, and mutual borrowings and payments between the Earth and Sea, are not thoſe Mutations which ſo much contribute to the Reduction of Mankind; partly, becauſe they are gradual and give Men opportunity to eſcape; and partly becauſe they are not ſuch Devaſtations as may be pares huic negotio (unleſs we believe that wonderful ſwallowing up of the vaſt Iſland, or rather Continent of Atlantis,) and partly becauſe the Sea, which commonly gives in one place what it takes in another, and ſo makes room for the Inhabitants of the World in compenſation of what it takes.

2. Therefore I come to thoſe greater ſuppoſed Correctives, namely, 1. Floods and Inundations: 2. Incendia, Burnings; and again, both, or either of thoſe are alſo varied, according to the Opinions of ſome of the Ancients.

1. They are either ſuch as were all at one time, and did wholly overwhelm and confound this lower World: or 2. They are ſuch as did not wholly diſſolve the lower Word, or put a period to all things living therein.

Again, the former Opinion that held theſe Cataclyſms and Empyroſes univerſal, was ſuch, as either held that it put a total Conſummation unto things in this lower World, eſpecially that of Conflagration: Or elſe ſuch, as though it quite for the preſent confounded the Face of things, eſpecially in this inferior World; yet it was but preparative to a new Formation of things, wherein all things would be put into better Order, till in proceſs of time they again degenerate, and ſo were to receive another Purgation by Fire or Water, according to the fatal Viciſſitudes to which the World is ſubject: And they ſuppoſe, that theſe ſucceſſive unmaking and making again of the World (not unlike the Suppoſitions of Anaxagoras or Empedocles) were Eternal, and ſhould eternally continue in this Viciſſitude; that the laſt Deſtruction of the World was by Water, and that which is to ſucceed is by Fire: And this was for the moſt part the Opinion of the Stoicks, whereof Lipſius in his ſecond Book de Phyſiologia Stoicorum, cap. 21, 22, &c. hath given us a large Account, out of Seneca eſpecially, and others which are not neceſſary to be repeated; and the rather, becauſe they do ſuppoſe that Mankind is neither Eternal nor Perpetual, according to the courſe of Natural Generation: For theſe mighty Concuſſions of Nature, eſpecially that of the Univerſal Conflagration, puts an end to all the Race of Mankind and all living Bodies; though in the Redintegration of the World after theſe Deſtructions there is alſo a Re-production of Mankind, but not by the ordinary method of Propagation as now.

Again, as to thoſe others that held alſo certain Periodical Cataclyſms and Conflagrations, yet they held them not to be Univerſal, nor any Univerſal Diſſolution or Deſtruction of the inferior World thereby; but they were ſuch as were great and notable Devaſtations, ſometimes in one part of the Earth, ſometimes in another; either by certain Rotations, or at leaſt in ſome places more than in other, acocrding to the accommodation or diſaccommodation of them to ſuch Calamities: As the Vallies and lower grounds were more ſubject to devaſtation by Floods, ſo the more Mountainous parts were more ſubject to the deſolations by Fire and Conflagrations.

Plato, who ſeems very uncertain and unſetled in his Philoſophy, ſeems yet to agree with this partial kind of exhauſting the numbers of Men and Brutes, by ſuch partial Floods and Conflagrations.

In his third Book of Dialogues, de Legibus, he gives us an Account of various Methods of the Declinations of Civil Societies, and of thoſe Laws and Cuſtoms, Arts and Sciences in ſeveral parts of the World: and again, how and by what degrees they have been repaired and recovered; the means whereof he aſſigns not only to be Wars and Epidemical Diſeaſes, but great Floods and Conflagrations, which, together with thoſe of Ariſtotle relating thereunto, I ſhall tranſcribe out of the Latin Tranſlation, becauſe perchance more ſignificant than the Engliſh, though not ſo ſignificant as the Language wherein they wrote. And this I do intend to tranſcribe more largely, becauſe they ſeem to contain the full declaration of the Inſtances of this nature.

He tells us therefore in the beginning of his third Book de Legibus; Multos hominun interitus ex diluviis, morbis, aliíſque permultis, olim accidiſſe, ex quibus pauci homines ſuperſtites fuerunt. Again: Eos qui cladem tum evaſerunt (ſcilicet ex diluviis) montanos quoſdam paſtores fuiſſe, in montium cacuminibus pauca ſemina ad propagandum genus humanum conſervata: atqui neceſſe eſt eos aliarum artium fuiſſe expertes, campeſtres autem & maritimae urbes funditus illo tempore perierunt. Inſtrumenta igitur omnia, & quaecunque artium ſive ad diſciplinam civilem ſive ad facultatem aliam pertinentium, extabant inventa, concidiſſe illis temporibus. And afterwards: Ex ea itaque devaſtatione magnam terribilémque humanis in rebus deſolationem tunc accidiſſe arbitramur; fertilium agrorum magnitudinem deſertam, caeteríſque animalibus corruptis, vix boum caprarúmque genus, & illud quidem rarum relictum fuiſſe, quibus paſcendis tunc homines vitam agebant; civitatis verò & diſciplinae civilis & legum memoriam quidem nullam fuiſſe putamus. Tempore igitur progrediente, &c. genere hominum multiplicato, ad eum quem nunc videmus habitum provecta omnia ſunt.

Again, the ſame Plato though in his Timaeus he gives us an Account of the Origination of Mankind, yet he ſuppoſeth that a vaſt Period interceded between that Origination and the Age wherein he lived; and within the compaſs of that Period, that there happened very great and very many viciſſitudes of Floods and Conflagrations in this inferior World, whereby the ſtate of things here was variouſly altered, and the Numbers of Mankind and Animals corrected and reduced at ſeveral times to ſmall proportions, only ſufficient to repleniſh the World, until ſuch time as its Exceſs and Increaſe received again a like Correction or Reduction, by the like Revolutions of Floods and Conflagrations, though ſtill without a total deſtruction of the Species.

In this Book he gives us a perſonated Diſcourſe between Solon and an Egyptian Prieſt, who after ſome diſcourſe of the Antiquity of Athens, the Prieſt tells him; Vos Graeci ſemper pueri eſtis, nec quiſquam è Graecia ſenex, quia juvenis ſemper vobis eſt animus, in quo nulla eſt ex vetuſtatis commemoratione priſca opinio, nulla cana ſcientia: Nam quod apud vos fertur Phaetontem quondam Solis filium currus aſcendiſſe paternos, nec patris aurigatione ſervata, exuſſiſſe terrena, ipſúmque flammis coeleſtibus conflagraſſe; quamvis fabuloſum videatur, verum quodammodo eſſe putandum est: Fit enim longo temporis intervallo coeleſtis circuitus permutatio quaedam, quam inflammationis vaſtitas neceſſario ſequitur: tunc hi qui edita incolunt loca magis pereunt quam mari fluviíſque vicini. Nobis prorò Nilus cum in pleriſque rebus nobis ſalutaris eſt, tum hujuſmodi à nobis arcet exitium. Quando verò Dii aquarum colluvione ſordes terrarum diluunt, paſtores ovium atque bubulci qui juga montium habitant, periculum illud evadunt; veſtrae autem civitates in planitie ſitae, impetu fluminum ad mare rapiuntur: Sed in noſtra regione neque tunc, neque alias unquam aqua in agros ſupernè deſcendit; contra verò ſurſum è viſceribus terrae ſcaturit: quamobrem antiquiſſimarum rerum apud nos monumenta ſervantur. Proinde, ubicunque nec imbrium tempeſtas nimia, nec incendium ingens contingit, licèt alias plures, alias pauciores, ſemper tamen homines ſunt. Quaecunque verò ſive à noſtris, ſive à veſtris, ſive aliis nationibus geſta ſunt memoratu digna, modo ad aures noſtrorum pervenerunt, noſtris in templis deſcripta ſervantur. Apud vos quidem & alias gentes res gestae nuper literis monumentíſque traduntur, ſed certis temporum curriculis illuvies immenſa coelitus omnia populatur; ideo qui ſuccedunt, & literis & Muſis orbati ſunt: quo fit, ut quaſi juvenes iterum ſitis, & rudes, praeteritarum rerum omnium prorſus ignari. Nam & ea ipſa quae modo ex veſtris hiſtoriis recenſentur, à fabulis puerilibus parum diſtant; primò, quod unius tantum inundationis memineritis, cum multae praeceſſerint; deinde, quod genus majorum veſtrorum in regione veſtra clariſſimum ignoretis: ex quo, tu, & Athenienſes cateri nati eſtis, exiguo ſemine quondam publicae cladi ſuperſtite: quod propterea vos latuit, quia ſuperſtites illi eorúmque poſteri, literarum uſu multis ſeculis caruerunt. Then he tells him of the Building of Athens by the Goddeſs Athena, 9000 Years ſince, ex terra & Vulcano accipiens ſemina: the great Wars between them and the Inhabitants of the vaſt Iſland Atlantis, greater than Lybia and Aſia: the ſwallowing up of that Iſland by an Earthquake, Jugíque unius diei & noctis illuvione. Afterwards Timaeus begins, and proceeds with his Narrative touching the Production of the Univerſe, and therein particularly of Mankind, which I ſhall have occaſion hereafter to mention.

Thus this great Maſter ſeems to countenance the Suppoſition of the viciſſitudes of Conflagrations and Floods, eſpecially of the latter, certis temporum curriculis; and thereby the exceſſive multiplication of Mankind corrected, and the viciſſitudes of Arts and Laws interrupted, loſt, reſtored, and repaired: Only he ſuppoſeth Egypt free from thoſe Floods and Conflagrations; though it ſeems neceſſary; that if Inundations prevailed in Greece and thoſe upper Countries, Egypt, that ſeems to lye much lower, could not eaſily eſcape them, though they have no Rain that might occaſion them. But the Prieſt mingles ſome ſtrange and improbable Stories with his Suppoſition of thoſe Viciſſitudes.

Ariſtotle the Scholar of Plato differed much from his Maſter: 1. In his manner of writing, which was much more ſteady and ſevere than the Writings of Plato, who mingled Poetical Fancies with the things he delivered, and ſeems very uncertain and unreſolved in moſt things of great importance. 2. In his Poſition; for Plato ſeems not to hold at leaſt the Elementary World Eternal, though very Ancient: But Ariſtotle, following rather the Opinion of Ocellus Lucanus, and not being able to digeſt thoſe many difficulties he found in the Hypotheſes of the Inception of the World, ſuppoſeth it Eternal, and an eternal conſiſtency in the ſtate it now ſtands; but not without ſome partial, ſucceſſive and periodical Changes in the Elementary World.

And therefore in this Suppoſition of the ſucceſſive partial Floods or Inundations, and Conflagrations, whereby great Changes happen, and a fair Corrective and Reduction of the Exceſs of Mankind, he much agrees with Plato. And he gives us a large and learned Account of his Judgment herein, Lib. 1. Meteor. cap. 14. in theſe Words; Eadem terrae loca neque ſemper fluida, neque ſemper arida ſunt, ſed pro fluminum ortu aut defectu, faciem mutant ſuam: Quamobrem diverſitas inter Mare & Continentem exiſtit, nec perpetuo alia pro Continenti, alia pro Mari habentur; ſed ubi terra aliquando patuit, mare ſuperfunditur; & ubi nunc mare, terra exaggerabatur. Suſpicaríque debemus, haec omnia ita fieri ordine quodam & ambitu; horum autem principium cauſáque exiſtit, quod interiores quoque telluris partes, perinde atque animantium plantarúmque corpora, juventutem atque ſenectutem habeant. Verum iſtis haec per partem ſubire nequaquam contingit, ſed ſimul totum javeneſcat aut ſeneſcat neceſſe eſt: Terrae particulatim hoc idem ob frigus & calorem accidit; haec igitur accreſcere ſimul ac decreſcere propter Solis calorem converſionémque aſſolent. Then he proceeds to ſhew, how that ſucceſſively ſome parts of the Earth grow mooriſh or watriſh, others dry, where it becomes barren; Fountains and Rivers decay, and ſometimes break out in other places; that this makes Changes in the Sea and Land. At quia omnis quae circa terram fit generatio non niſi ſucceſſione & tempore, reſpectu vitae noſtrae quam longo, fieri ſolet, iſta nobis haudquaquam advertentibus fiunt. Atque prius univerſae gentes intereunt pereúntque, quàm horum mutatio ab initio ad finem uſque memoriâ teneri queat: Maximas itaque celerrimáſque clades praelia advehunt, alias morbi, nonnullas ſterilitates; & hae quaſdam ſtatim magnas, quaſdam lentas adeò, ut talium quoque gentium tranſmigrationes nos lateant, propterea quod alii regionem deſerant, alii eo uſque ſuſtinent, quoad nullam amplius multitudinem alere regio queat. Inter primam igitur noviſſimámque loci derelictionem, tempora interveniant adeò longa par eſt, ut nemo meminiſſe poſſit; imò incolumibus etiamnum hiſoe qui remanſerint, longi temporis injuriâ oblivio irrepſerit. Eodem autem modo latere exiſtimandum eſt quando primùm ſinguli populi, quae permutata eſſent & arida à paluſtribus aquoſíſve facta, inhabitare coeperint. Then he gives Inſtance in Egypt; Etenim locus ille totáque regio, quae fluminis tantum invectu nata eſt, ſemper aridior fieri videtur: That all the Oſtia Nili, except one, were made by Art, and not by the River: That anciently Egypt was no more but the City of Thebes; which he proves out of Homer; ſhews, that in the time of Troy that part of Greece inhabited by the Argivi was Mariſh, and had but few Inhabitants, but now become fruitful and populous: That part of Greece inhabited by the Miceni was fruitful and populous, now become barren. Quod igitur in iſto loco, qui parvus, accidit, hoc idem etiam circa loca magna accidere cenſeamus oportet. That there is no cauſe to conceive the Sea leſs than formerly; for though ſome places ſometimes covered with Water, are added to the Continent, yet in other places the Sea hath gained upon the Land. Attamen hujuſce rei cauſa ad mundi generationem haudquaquam referenda; ridiculum enim foret ob parvas brevéſque mutationes Univerſum moveri aſſerere. Porrò, Terrae moles atque magnitudo ad totum Coelum nihil profectò eſt. Verum horum omnium cauſam exiſtimemus oportet, quod ut elapſis certis temporum ſpatiis, inter anni tempora hyems; ita magno quodam circuitu hyems magna, & imbrium exceſſu ſieri ſolet: at hic non ſemper eiſdem in locis efficitur, ſed perinde ut vocatum dilivium quod tempore Dencalionis accidit; etenim hoc circa Graeciam maximè, & eam potiſſimam partem quam antiquam Hellada vocitant, factum eſt, &c. Cum autem neceſſe ſit quandam mutationem eſſe Univerſi, non tamen ortum & interitum; ſiquidem ipſum maneat neceſſe eſt non ſemper eadem loca mari, aut amnibus humectari atque ſicceſcere, quod reipſa quae fieri ſolet liquidò constat. And concludes, That Egypt, Cujus homines antiquiſſimos eſſe diximus, is nothing but a Production of the River Nilus, that is lower than the Red Sea; and therefore that Seſostris and Darius gave over that Attempt of cutting the Neck of Land between the Red Sea and Egypt, for fear of drowning that Country: That the Lake Moeotis is ſhallower, and not able to bear Ships of that burthen as it did 60 Years before, by reaſon of the Slime carried thither, which will in time dry it up: That Lakes grow by the exaggeration of Sand by the Sea, which Lakes in time grow dry: That Tanais or Nilus and all other Rivers were ſometime dry Land, and did not run where now they do. At verò ſi amnes habent ortum & occaſum, nec ſemper eadem terrae loca ſcatent aquis, ipſum quoque mare ſimili modo mutari oportet, quod cum aſſiduè alia deſerat, alia invadat, patet univerſae terrae tractus eoſdem hos Mare, illos Continentem non eſſe, ſed tempore cuncta permutari.

I have mentioned theſe places of theſe Maſters of Learning and Reaſon the more at large, not only becauſe they herein give the ſharpeſt Objections againſt the neceſſity of a Temporary Beginning of Mankind, by applying theſe Suppoſitions as Correctives or Reductions of the exceſs of the Generation of Men and Animals; but alſo they do diſcover herein ſome things that are uſeful in this Inquiry: For Inſtance, 1. It appears hereby that the Inventions of Arts, Sciences, and Laws might be far more ancient than thoſe times that Hiſtorians gave for their Invention: for they might be in other Places or Ages, and either by a ſucceſſive rotation brought from one place to another; or if they were loſt, yet ſucceſſion of Ages might retrive new Diſcoveries of them again. 2. We have a plain detection of the means whereby poſſibly the American People might have their deduction from the Europeans or Aſiaticks; becauſe it is not impoſſible but the Continents might be in ſome Ages or other contiguous, though now disjoyned by the mutations of the ſituations of Seas; though the certain times of thoſe Changes are not tranſmitted by Hiſtory to our Age. 3. That the ancient Hiſtories of things, by Depopulations, Wars, Famines, Inundations, Tranſmigrations of People, and other Accidents may be loſt in after Ages, which poſſibly in former Ages might be known, and ſome Monuments thereof than extant, which are now obliterated and forgotten.

Thus far concerning theſe Reductives by Inundations and Conflagrations, out of the Princes of the Academical and Peripatetical Philoſophers: We ſhall find the like Suppoſitions frequently among the Stoicks, Seneca may be an Inſtance for all that Sect, only theſe vary from the former: for although they do with the former admit and inſtance in temporary and partial Inundations by Earthquakes and other Accidents, de quibus vide Senecam. l. 3. Nat. Quaeſt. de Terrae motu: yet theſe go farther, and ſuppoſe Univerſal Deluges and Conflagarations, which will quite alter the whole Frame of this lower World, and the whole Face thereof. See the Rhetorical Deſcription thereof, Senec. in ſine lib. 3. Nat. Quaest. Qua ratione inquis? Eadem qua conflagratio futura eſt; utrumque fit cum Deo viſum ordiri meliora, vetera finire. Aqua & ignis terrenis dominatur; ex his ortus, ex his interitus. And out of Beroſus aſſigns the Times and Periods of theſe Univerſal Deluges and Conflagrations: Arſura enim terrena, quando omnia ſidera quae nunc diverſos agunt curſus in Cancrum convenerint, ſic ſub eodem poſita vestigio ut recta linea exire per omnes omnium poſſit: Inundationem futuram cum eadem ſiderum turba in Capricornum convenerit; illìc ſolſtitium, hîc bruma confinitur. But yet he ſuppoſeth a Reſtitution of the World after theſe Deſtructions: Nec ea ſemper licentia undis erit, ſed peracto exitio humani generis, extinctíſque pariter feris in quarum homines ingenia tranſierant, iterum aquas terra ſorbebit; natura pelagus ſtare, aut intra terminos furere coget, rejectus è noſtris ſedibus in ſua ſecreta pelletur Oceanus, antiquus ordo revocabitur: omne ex integro animal generabitur, dabitúrque terris homo inſcius ſcelerum, & melioribus auſpiciis natus: ſed illis quoque innocentia non durabit niſi dum novi ſunt, citò nequitia ſubrepit; virtus difficilis inventu est, rectorem ducémque deſiderat; etiam ſine magistro vitia diſcuntur.

I ſhall ſpare mentioning any more to this purpoſe, though many more Inſtances may be given out of the Philoſophers of all Sects, and Poets, as Ovid and others.

Only I ſhall ſubjoyn theſe two Inquiries, and ſo conclude this Objection.

1. Whence it is that theſe Ancients had theſe Conjectures touching theſe Floods and Conflagarations, ſo as to frame them into an Hypotheſis either for the Caſtigation of the Exceſſes of Generation, as Ariſtotle and Plato; or to the total Diſſolution thereof, as the Stoicks; and the means that wrought this Perſwaſion ſeem to be theſe:

1. The things that ſeem to prevail with the Academicks and Peripateticks for theſe Partial Floods and Conflagrations, ſeem to be thoſe dark and obſcure Hiſtories of the things of that nature which had twice before happened in Greece: Namely, for Floods, the Tradition of the Diluvium Ogygium, or Diluvium antiquius, which is ſuppoſed by Chronology to be under Ogyges King of Attica, about 1000 Years before the firſt Olympiad; about 248 Years before the Flood of Deucalion in Theſſaly; about 532 after the General Flood in the time of Noah; and about the 2951 Year of the Julian Period, and of the World 2187, though there is ſome variation among the Computations of Chronologers. This was a Partial Flood, as it ſeems, in Attica, part of Greece. 2. Diluvium Deucalionis, which was alſo Partial, and about 248 Years after the former, in the time of Cecrops firſt King of Athens, or as others, in the time of Cranaus his Son: This is that mentioned by Plato and Ariſtotle, that drowned a great part of Greece, only ſome ſaved by Deucalion by bringing them to the top of Parnaſſus: And out of the Hiſtory of Moſes touching the Univerſal Flood, and the Hiſtory of Deucalion, Ovid made up his firſt Book, attracting in a great meaſure to the latter what was written of the former by Moſes.

And for Conflagrations; they had two traditional Conflagrations in and near Greece, which might give ſome countenance to this Perſwaſion: namely, 1. That of Phaeton, Incendium Phaetontis, which ſeems not to be long after the Flood of Deucalion, though much of the Relation thereof, as the Grecians, and Ovid after them made, was a Poetical Fiction; yet it ſeems it had ſomething of reality in it, as is obſerved by Plato, ubi ſupra. 2. Idae Incendium, which was no great buſineſs, but an Eruption of Fire out of the Hill Ida, as now in Etna: this was about 73 Years after the Flood of Deucalion.

2. As to the Stoicks, who held Univerſal Inundations and Conflagrations, poſſibly they might have the former of theſe from the Traditional Relation of the Univerſal Flood of Noah, which Relation they believed, and upon that founded their Suppoſition of the like Inundations; being acquainted with the Hiſtory of the Flood, but not with the Covenant that God made never to bring a Flood again. 2. As to that of the Univerſal Conflagration of the World, it ſeems it was a known, ancient and received Tradition among the Jews before our Saviour's time, reinforced by him and his Diſciples: This ſeems to be implied in that Prophecy of Enoch, Jude 14. and by ancient Tradition, either from Noah or the ancient Jews this Perſwaſion might be Traditionally derived to the Gentiles, and believed by the Stoicks.

2. It appears by what hath been before tranſcribed, That theſe Philoſophers ſuppoſed thoſe Inundations and Conflagrations to be at great diſtances of times, and yet to be in ſome ſort Periodical, and with a kind of ſtated Revolutions. Plato ſuppoſeth his Floods to be certis temporum curriculis: Ariſtotle ſuppoſeth his Floods to be alſo Periodical, Haec omnia fieri ordine quodam & ambitu; and again, Magno quodam circuitu hyems magna & imbrium exceſſus fiunt, bearing ſome proportion to our Seaſon of the Solar Year. Therefore it may be fit to conſider what kind of Year this muſt be wherein this Hyems magna is ſuppoſed to happen.

Seneca as before hath given us out of Beroſus ſome deſcription of the Periods, namely, when all the Planets ſhall meet in one ſtreight Line drawn from the Center of the Earth to the Tropick of Cancer, then the great Conflagration ſhall happen; and again, when they meet in the like poſition under the Tropick of Capricorn, then the Univerſal Deluge ſhall happen. So that theſe two Conjunctions divide that Annus magnus into two parts, and the Summer-Solſtice thereof ſhall be for Conflagration, the Winter-Solſtice for the Inundation, or that Magna hyems which Aristotle hath aſſigned for his Periodical Inundations. But what is that Magnus annus wherein theſe Revolutions muſt happen, or what number of Solar Years it contains is uncertain, ſome aſſigning a Period that ſeems too ſhort, ſome a Period of a wonderful length.

Cenſorinus, de Die Natali, cap. 10. ſpeaking of this Magnus annus whereof Ariſtotle's Winter ſeems to make the Concluſion, gives us ſeveral Eſtimates of the ſame, ſome making them 2484 Years, others 5552 Years, others 10224 Years, others 100020, others 360000 Years, and others ſuppoſing it Infinite, and that ſuch a Conjunction will never happen.

Macrobius in Somn. Scipionis, lib. 2. cap. 11. both deſcribes and determins this Magnus annus to be when all the Heavenly Bodies ſhall return to the ſame poſition as they were in any time given, which he reſolves to be 15000 Years, in which all the Heavenly Bodies ſhall be in the ſame poſition as they were 15000 Years before. So that if we ſhould aſſign the Caput anni to be 〈◊〉 this Day and Year wherein I write, at the end of 15000 Years all the Heavenly Bodies will be in the ſame poſition that how they are; this he calls Annus mundanus.

Joſephus, lib. 1. Antiquitat. cap. 4. in fine, determins that the Magnus annus is 600 Years; and yet the Flood happened not till 1656 Years from the Creation; which according to the Suppoſition therefore of Ariſtotle ſhould be the Magnus annus, and that Year the Winter-Solſtice thereof.

Plato ſuppoſeth that the Magnus annus animarum is 12000 Years, for in that Period the Soul hath run through all the Spheres and Dances of the Gods and Daemons, and returns to its firſt Station; and the Annus magnus mundanus conſiſts of three of thoſe Periods, namely, 36000 Years, wherein the Soul of the World hath performed its great Circuit, or one Revolution of the eighth Sphere: vide Marſil. Ficin. prolog. in lib. 10. Platonis de Republica: and then not only all the Heavenly Bodies will be juſt in the ſame poſition in which they were 36000 Years before, but all Humane things will be in the ſame ſtate as they were.

Alter erit tum Typhis, & altera quae vehet Argo Dilectos heroes; & erunt itidem altera bella, Ad Trojámque iterum magnus mittetur Achilles.

The Egyptians had their great Apocataſtaſes; viz. 1. Apocataſtaſis dierum, which was 1461 Days: 2. Apocataſtaſis annorum aequabilium, which was 1461 Years: 3. Their Apocatastaſis magna, conſiſting of 25 Apocatastaſes annorum, which amounted to 36525 equable Years; which was their Magnus annus canicularis, whereunto Manetho accommodates his fabulous Egyptian Dynaſties.

There ſeems to be another Annus magnus, viz. the Motion of the ninth Sphere or Chryſtallin Heaven, from Weſt to Eaſt; which though ſome to make it agree with the Magnus annus Platonicus ſuppoſe to be 1 Degree every 100 Years, in all performing its Revolution in 36000 Years, according to the great Platonick Year; yet Alphonſus allows a greater number of Years to that Revolution, viz. 49000 Years: and others I think more. But I think that we ſhall not be able to fit the Seaſons of this Year to the Magna hyems Ariſtotelica, or his Winter-quarter; becauſe 1. We know not whether any of theſe, or any other that can be found, will ſuit with theſe Inſtances upon which it may be thought he grounds his Suppoſition; for the Incendium Phaetontis and the Flood of Deucalion happened very near one the other, as alſo the Incendium Idae: and beſides, if that Flood of Deucalion had faln within the Winter-quarter of any of theſe Anni magni, it would have had a longer Influence upon the World, and extended at leaſt ſucceſſively to all the ſeveral Parts thereof. For the Winter-quarter of the Magnus annus Platonicus, if it had any thing of proportion to our Seaſons, muſt have been a fourth part of that Magnus annus; and then it had laſted above 8000 Years: But howſoever it muſt upon the loweſt Account have laſted a thirty ſixth part, viz. 1000 Years; and then the Effects thereof would certainly have been more permanent and extenſive than to one or two Floods in Greece. 2. Again, could we know the extent of this Magnus annus, yet we can never find the Caput anni, when it begins, and conſequently cannot poſſibly aſſign any probable Period for the Seaſons of it; unleſs we ſhall fondly with Virgil ſuppoſe it began with the Birth of his Patron Pollio's Son, Jam redit & virgo, redeunt Saturnia rgna.

Again, theſe muſt needs be meerly Conjectures, and can have no poſſible Evidence becauſe meerly depending upon Fact and Experience: it is not poſſible that any Man, or any Age of Men can give us any Account of any one Revolution of this Magnus annus, which amounts to 36000 Years.

Therefore it ſeems difficult, and utterly uncertain to ſuppoſe thoſe Inundations and Conflagrations to be Periodical in any proportion to any ſuppoſed time or duration.

And thus far touching the urging of this Expedient for the Reduction or Correction of the Exceſſes of the Generations of Men or Animals, by Periodical Floods or Conflagrations; which though the Generations of Men were ſuppoſed Eternal, might Regulate and Reduce their Numbers when beginning to be immoderate, as our annual Winters correct the excreſcence of Inſects, whoſe multiplication is far more exceſſive than that of Men, and would apppear ſo, if we had a perpetual Summer; yet are reduced to a mediocrity and due equability by the viciſſitudes of Winter Cold and Rain.

CAP. X. The farther Examination of the precedent Objection.

I Have been the longer in the Explication and Inforcement of the former Objection, becauſe as the neceſſary and ſenſible Multiplication of Mankind upon the face of the Earth by the ordinary courſe of Natural Generation, ſeems to be the moſt ſenſible Evidence of Fact againſt the Eternal Succeſſion of Mankind; ſo the Reductives mentioned in the foregoing Chapter ſeemed with moſt Evidence of Senſe to weaken the Inference upon that Obſervation, and by the Suppoſition of thoſe continual or interpolated Correctives to render the poſſibility of an eternal conſiſtence of Propagations of Men, yet without an over-charging of the World with a multitude inconſiſtent with its reception.

I ſhall now deſcend to the Examination of theſe ſuppoſed Correctives of the exceſs of the number of Mankind, and how far the ſame may be true; or if true, how far the ſame may be, or hath been effectual to that end.

Wherein, firſt I ſhall ſet down what is to be agreed touching the ſame, and wherein we differ from that Suppoſition of the efficacy, or availableneſs, or accommodation, or ſuitableneſs of theſe Reductives to the end propoſed, namely, to the containing of the Generations of Mankind in ſuch an equability and proportion as may be conſiſtent with an Eternal Succeſſion of them.

Touching the firſt of theſe things it muſt be agreed, 1. That there have been great Devaſtations and Decrements of Mankind by all or many of the Means mentioned in the former Chapter, namely, Plagues and Epidemical Diſeaſes, Famines, and Sterilities of great parts of the World; Wars and Internecions, not only in Battels and Fights, but even in Perſecutions and Maſſacres, witneſs the great cruelty of the perſecuting Emperours againſt the Chriſtians, the cruelty of the Spaniards among the Indians, the violent bloodſheds of the Papiſts upon the Proteſtants, as the late and former Inſtances abundantly teſtifie: And alſo by Floods and Inundations, eſpecially that Univerſal Deluge in the time of Noah, which probably did ſweep away as great multitudes of Mankind as are now exiſting upon the Earth, conſidering what a Product might ariſe in the compaſs of 1656 Years, the interval between the Creation and the Flood upon the ſhorteſt Account, though the Septuagint render it much longer: and it is not eaſie to judge to what a Sum Mankind might ariſe to in ſuch a Period, conſidering the great longevity of Man's Life in thoſe times; only it is plain that it muſt needs ariſe to a greater proportion than thrice ſo long a Period would yield, when Mens Ages were reduced to leſs than a tenth part of the ſame longevity.

2. It is certain, that were it not for ſuch Reductives as theſe above mentioned, though we ſhould ſuppoſe that the Capita humani generis were only Noah and his three Sons, and that the Generations of Mankind began ſince the Univerſal Flood, yet the multitudes of Mankind would in this Period ſince the Flood have riſen to ſuch an excreſcence, that according to the ordinary method of Propagation (though the Lives of Men were no longer than now they are) that the Earth would not have been able to have received its Inhabitants.

3. It is alſo therefore evident, that the moſt wiſe and glorious God hath uſed theſe Means above mentioned for moſt wiſe and excellent Ends. For it is the high Prerogative and Advantage of his infinite Wiſdom, to bring about complicated and various excellent Ends in one and the ſame act of the diſpenſation of his Providence, by Plagues, Wars, Earthquakes and Floods (all which are at leaſt permitted if not inflicted, but howſoever moſt wiſely and infallibly governed by him) he puniſheth the Sins and Enormities of Mankind, and reduceth the World to ſuch a due proportion as may be conſiſtent with their convenience and reception in this Earth: And for this cauſe, while the World was but thin and empty of Inhabitants, the Ages of Mankind were longer, and more accommodated to the peopling of the World; and as the World grew by that means fuller, ſo their Lives were ſucceſſively reduced to a ſhorter ſcantlet, till they came to that ordinary Age and time of Life which now they have, and for near 4000 Years have held.

4. Therefore alſo it muſt be granted, that the apparent Multiplication of Mankind upon the face of the Earth ſingly conſidered, is not any Demonſtration or Apodictical Argument againſt the Eternity of Mankind: Since, as it is moſt evident, that there is a moſt wiſe and powerful God, who hath a care of the Inferior World as well as the Superior, and whoſe Providence (notwithſtanding the contrary Sentiments of Ariſtotle) reacheth below the Moon, and governs the World with much more Accuracy and Wiſdom than a Gardiner orders his Garden: I ſay, ſince the Regiment of the World, and eſpecially of Mankind, is ſo actually under the Care, Wiſdom, and Power of Almighty God, he that for near 6000 Years by thoſe Methods of his Providence above mentioned hath kept the World of Mankind in a due proportion and equability, which otherwiſe would have grown too great for its reception; could have interpoſed with the like Correctives for twenty thouſand Years as well as ſix, and for a million or other interminate duration for the time paſt or to come; and ſo have prevented that enormous excreſcence of Mankind, that in an infinite time or duration would have long ſince ſurcharged the World; and upon a Suppoſition of a future Sempiternity would produce the ſame difficulty, without ſuch interpoſition of the Divine Wiſdom and Providence.

But all this while it muſt ſtill be remembred, that this Suppoſition ſtill takes in the Wiſdom, Providence and Regiment of the glorious God; for without an intelligent Rector of the World, that ex intentione thus orders the Affairs of Mankind, theſe Reductives either barely, as accidental, or contingent, or periodical and neceſſary, were not equal nor competent Reductives of the Generations of Men, but would be too much or too little, or unſeaſonable in time, place, meaſure, or other Circumſtances for ſuch a Buſineſs, as ſhall be ſhewn.

We therefore are not enquiring what the wiſe and glorious God might or could do in order to the equable Reduction of the World, upon a Suppoſition of an Eternal Duration; but we are upon a Queſtion of Fact indeed, namely, What he hath done, and whether upon the Suppoſition of all thoſe Reductives inſtanced in the former Chapter, at leaſt without the wiſe and intelligent Regiment of God, they have been, or well could be: conſidering the nature and courſe of things of that efficacy to correct the increaſe and exceſs of Mankind, that may render it competible with an Eternal Duration.

I therefore ſhall now come to the things I oppoſe, and they are theſe two; viz. 1. That theſe Means conſidered ſimply in themſelves (without the Conduct and Guidance and Interpoſition of the mighty God) are in themſelves incompetent and unſuitable to the Ends propoſed: and 2. That de facto they have appeared to be ſo; and notwithſtanding their admiſſion, yet de facto the World hath in all Ages increaſed.

Touching the former of theſe, the Incompetency of theſe Expedients to the End propoſed (conſidered ſingly in themſelves) this will beſt appear by induction of particulars.

For Famines, they are de facto incompetent to theſe Ends: for 1. There was never yet known a Univerſal Famine, but the defects of one Country ſupplied by another, as Canaan was by Egypt. 2. It is ordinarily not ſudden but gradual, and foreſeen before felt in the extremity, which gives People opportunity of tranſmigrations. 3. Though the ordinary ſupplies fail, yet neceſſity makes Men ingenious and hardy, and if they have but Landroom or Sea-room, they find ſome ſupplies for their hunger which they did not before think of or uſe; though it be otherwiſe in a cloſe Siege, but that is but a narrow compaſs, and not of moment to be compared to the multitudes abroad.

2. Plagues are indeed a ſharp and ſpeedy Viſitation, yet it hath theſe Allays: 1. Many there are that are able to eſcape it by Flights, ſome by Phyſick, and ſome by their Age and Complexion. 2. It is not ordinarily of long continuance, the ſtrength of the Diſeaſe ſeldom continuing longer than a Year. 3. Though the Deſolation be terrible while it laſts, yet it rarely conſumes one half of the Inhabitants. The late Computation of the Number of the Inhabitants, Men, Women and Children in the City of London and the 16 and 10 Out-Pariſhes are eſtimated at 384000, and about ſix Millions in the whole Kingdom of England. 2. The greateſt Plagues in our remembrance have not ſwept away above 100000 at moſt in London and the Suburbs: Indeed that before mentioned by Walſingham, which was in a manner Univerſal, and ſucceſſively in ſeveral places of the World laſted about 15 Years, is ſaid to be ſo great, that ſcarce a tenth part of People ſurvived it; yet if it left a tenth part, ſuppoſe in England, it left near a Million of People, which in a little time would and did recover and increaſe conſiderably, as ſhall be ſhewn. 4. Again, ſuppoſe the Devaſtation by Plagues greater than Hiſtory gives us an Account, yet it is for the moſt part a Diſeaſe that reigns in ſome times and ſome places, it may fall in thoſe places where the numbers are already too ſmall, and need an Increaſe. And ſo taken ſingly by it ſelf, is incompetent and unſuitable to the Exceſs, unleſs managed by the wiſe Conduct of Almighty God.

3. Touching Wars and Internecions. It is true, it hath been a great Conſumption of Mankind, but yet it is not an equal Corrective of the Exceſs of Generations: 1. Though ſuch have happened, and frequently, yet they ſeem againſt the nature and diſpoſition of Mankind, ordinarily and in a courſe of Humane Conſtitution: Naturally Mankind is a ſociable Creature, and more than Bees, as the Philoſopher obſerves; and though ſometimes Paſſions, Jealouſies and Politick ends produce Wars, yet naturally Man is not a Creature of prey upon others, as Lions and Tigers are. 2. Ordinarily, though Wars are by one Kingdom or State upon another, yet they preſerve their own Societies with increaſe under Forein Wars; and therefore Civil Wars as they are more deſtructive, ſo they are more rare, becauſe they are more unnatural and deſtructive to that which Men uſually are careful to preſerve, namely, their own Societies. 3. It ſeems an improper and unſuitable Corrective, becauſe Accident and the Wills of Men have ſo great an Influence in the production of Wars; whereby it may fall out that Wars may happen in thoſe Ages, Times or Places, and conſequently, Devaſtations upon them where or when they need not to correct. And though it be true, that a Plethory or Exceſs of Numbers of Men, ſometimes by a kind of Natural or at leaſt Moral Conſequence cauſe Wars, yet we have hardly known any produced ſingly upon that Account; though it hath oftentimes occaſioned Tranſmigrations, deductions of Colonies, and new Plantations; and the World hath been never yet ſo full, but a weaker or oppreſſed Party have ſound room to retreat from the violence or inſolence of their Oppreſſors.

4. Touching Floods and Conflagrations. It is true that Almighty God as he manageth the forementioned Reductives by his Wiſdom and Providence, ſo he hath done theſe eſpecially in that Univerſal Deluge: But as they are inſtanced in by the Philoſophers as Natural or Periodical Events whereby Mankind is reduced to an equability, we have no reaſon to believe them. Therefore I ſay, 1. That there doth not appear, either in Hiſtory or in the Obſervation of Nature, any ſuch Periodical Floods or Conflagrations; thoſe that we have Relations of happened indeed near together, and in the ſame Country, viz. in Greece, had they been Periodical or Natural, probably either by a continued Circulation or Rotation, or elſe by the interpoſition of ſome reaſonable intervals, the like would have happened before in Perſia or ſome Eaſterly parts of Aſia, or ſince in Italy or Germany, or ſome other Weſtern parts of the World, which we have not obſerved to be. And therefore this Suppoſition of the Hyems magna, whereby parts of the Earth ſhould be ſucceſſively drowned, ſeems to be only an Imagination, or at leaſt it cannot be known with any tolerable certainty; in as much as the Periods are ſuppoſed to be vaſt, and not happening within any competent time to give us an Obſervation or Proof thereof. And therefore although we yearly ſee a reduction of the numerous increaſe of Inſects, by the Winter Froſt and Storms yearly happening; we have no warrant from thence to imagin that great Winter that muſt make the like reduction of Men and Brutes; for every Year gives us Experience of the one, but never any Age gave us any reaſonable Obſervation, upon which to build an Hypotheſis of the like Periodical Revolution of the other: and the ſame I ſay touching Conflagrations. Indeed there have been accidental and particular Inſtances of both, but not any Periodical Return or Revolutions thereof, quaſi in quodam ambitu & circuitu naturali. 2. If ſuch were ſuppoſed, yet unleſs they were very ſudden, and very general, they would not be ſufficient to make the Correction: Men would eſcape Floods by running up to Mountains and Hills, and though ſome might periſh through improvidence, or though the ſuddenneſs of a Deluge, many would eſcape. 3. Natural and Periodical Floods or Conflagrations would not be ſutable nor commenſurate to the Increaſe, which depending either upon Accidents or the Wills of Men, would poſſibly be more in one place than in another: The Country of Paleſtine would be more peopled than the Sands and Deſarts of Arabia, Egypt than the Mountains of Ethiopia; and fruitful Countries, or Countries open to Trade, and ſafe from Incurſions and Invaſions; more populous than barren Countries, or ſuch as are out of the way of Trade, or ſubject to Inroads: But Natural and Periodical Floods or Conflagrations would probably keep ſome conſtant or ordinary Tract or Courſe, either from Eaſt to Weſt, or from North to South; and poſſibly keeping in ſuch a Climate or Latitude, poſſibly in another; whereby poſſibly theſe Plagues might be more fierce in thoſe places or Continents where the World wants People, and leſs vehement in thoſe places where there needs a Corrective for their exceſs: If theſe ſhould be Univerſal, they would deſtroy the Race of Mankind; if Partial, they would be perchance weak and inſignificant Reductives of the exceſs of Mankind.

When all therefore is done, though it be plain that theſe and the like Calamities are certain Reductives of the exceſs of Mankind, yet they are incompetent of themſelves, and upon a bare Suppoſition of Natural or Accidental Effects. But it is true, as they are either brought and inflicted, or managed and governed by a moſt wiſe and intelligent Being, they are uſeful, and wiſely applied to this End among others.

But in the whole management and conduct of theſe Events and Occurrences whereby Mankind hath been reduced and corrected, we ſhall obſerve very eaſily that Mankind hath ſtill increaſed, and the World grown fuller, even to manifeſt Senſe and Experience, which was the ſecond thing I propoſe to be conſidered.

2. Therefore I do affirm, That notwithſtanding all theſe Ordinary and Extraordinary Occurrences that have afflicted Mankind, as ſhortneſs of Life, divers Caſualties and common Diſeaſes, loſs of Men by Navigation, the Intemperance and Luxury of Mankind, the Weakneſſes and deſtructive Sickneſſes incident eſpecially to Infancy, Childhood, and Youth, Abortions voluntary or accidental, and all thoſe ordinary Caſualties incident to our nature. And notwithſtanding alſo thoſe great and vaſt Conſumptions by Famine, by Peſtilence, by ſtrange and Epidemical Diſeaſes, by Wars and Battels, Sea-fights, Internecions, Maſſacres and Perſecutions, Earthquakes, Floods, Inundations, Conflagrations, or what other extraordinary or terrible and univerſal Accidents that have happened to Mankind in any or all the Ages paſt ſince the Flood of Noah; Mankind hath notwithſtanding all theſe increaſed and grown fuller, the Generations of Mankind have exceeded their Decays.

And becauſe this is an Aſſertion of Fact, it is impoſſible to be made out but by Inſtances of Fact.

And although it be impoſſible for any Man to give an Account of all the Nations of the World collectively, and ſo to make out the Fact; yet if the Inſtance can be made out in one or two Nations, whereof a true and clear Account may be given, it will be more than a common probability that the ſame may be concluded concerning the generality of Mankind.

And therefore I ſhall ſingle out the Inſtances of two Nations, touching whom the cleareſt Account of their Original and Increaſe may be given, and ſuch alſo as had as great an Experience of the ſevereſt of theſe Correctives, and poſſibly much greater than any determinate People or Nation in the World beſides.

The firſt Inſtance I ſhall give is the Nation of the Jews, and I chooſe this People for my Inſtance, 1. Becauſe their firſt Original, and the time wherein it began is moſt clearly, evidently, and unqueſtionably known, and the time wherein it was. 2. Becauſe their ſeveral Increaſes and Abatements and Succeſſions, with the ſeveral times thereof, even down to the laſt Diſſolution of their City under Titus, is moſt clearly by a continued Hiſtory plainly and authentically diſcovered. 3. Becauſe by the ſtrange and admirable Providence of God, even ſince the Diſſolution of their State and Republick they have been to this day continued a ſeparated People from the reſt of the World; notwithſtanding their remarkable diſperſion among all Nations, among whom they have yet remained diſtinct as a ſignal Monument of the Divine Truth and Juſtice, and for what other ſecret ends and purpoſes, is beſt known to the Divine Wiſdom. 4. Becauſe this People hath been in all Ages exerciſed with as many Plagues and Slaughters and Devaſtations of all ſorts, as ever any People under Heaven were. And 5. Becauſe the particulars of theſe Devaſtations, and the ſeveral Times and Ages wherein they happened, and oftentimes the Numbers cut off thereby are Recorded by the ſeveral Authentical Hiſtories of that People, which are extant to this day. And 6. Becauſe their Increaſe even at this day, as in their ſeveral antecedent Periods, is ſignal and evident to all the World. So that what is verified touching the Increaſe of that People, may in all congruity of Reaſon be aſſumed and determined much more touching any other People, and all the People in the World: ſince none had ever greater Inſtances of Abatements or Correctives of the Exceſs of their Number than this People. Laſtly, Becauſe there can be no pretence that their decays or diminutions by thoſe Occurrences were ſupplied by the acceſſion and conjunction of others of other Nations to them: Since it was their Priviledge in which they gloried, and which they ſtrictly and religiouſly obſerved, To keep themſelves ſeparate and diſtinct from the reſt of Mankind.

I ſhall not be ſcrupulous or curious in the Chronological niceties touching their ſeveral Periods, becauſe in this and other Computations that I have uſed I do not aim at curious or preciſe Computations, but only to ſhew the Order and Series of Things for the diſcovery of what I intend; and therefore ſhall take the Account of Helvicus, as being plaineſt and readieſt at hand for my purpoſe.

Iſaac and Rebecca were the two next immediate Parents of all the Families of Eſau and the Edomites, and Jacob and the Iſraelites.

In the Year of the World 2108 were Jacob and Eſau Born: I ſhall leave the Families of Eſau, and carry down that of Jacob.

In the Year of the World 2238 Jacob goes down into Egypt, having then 70 Perſons deſcended from him; which Increaſe was in the compaſs of about 130 Years after the Birth of Jacob, and about 70 Years after his Marriage with Leah. Gen. 46.27.

The Iſraelites increaſe in Egypt, yet not without a great deſtruction of them by their ſevere Bondage, and by the Slaughter of their Males. Exod. 1.

In the Year of the World 2453 the People of Iſrael came out of Egypt, which was about 215 Years after the going down of Jacob to Egypt.

In a ſhort time after the Migration of the Iſraelites out of Egypt they were numbred, and the Number of their Males that were above 20 Years old then amounted to Six hundred and three thouſand, five hundred and fifty, beſides the Levites; from a Month old amounting to 22000. Numb. 1.46. and 2.32. and 3.39. and if we ſhould take into the number of the Eleven Tribes Women, and Children under 20 Years old, we ſhould reaſonably have more than triple the number, viz. above two Millions.

From this time to the time of Phinehas we have no certain eſtimate of their Numbers, yet in this Interval they had very great Abatements and Diminutions, as will appear by theſe Inſtances.

That all this number of People above 20 Years old, except Joſhua and Caleb, died in the compaſs of their 40 Years wandering in the Wilderneſs, Num. 26.65. yet ſome of them could not exceed 60 Years of age.

Of the Plague 34000 in the Wilderneſs, beſides the Complices of Corah: Numb. 16.49. and 25.49. beſides thoſe that died of Fiery Serpents. Numb. 21.

After the death of all that were before numbred, they were again numbred all except the Levites; and the Number of all the Males from 20 Years old and upwards, were Six hundred and one thouſand, ſeven hundred and thirty: among theſe was the Land after divided by Joſhua. Numb. 26.51, 53.

I do not remember any Numeration of the People from this time till the time of King David, and in that Interval that People ſuffered very great detriments.

1. By the Wars with the Canaanites under Joſhua, wherein though they were victorious, yet it could not be without great loſs of Men.

2. After this they endured in the time of the Judges great diminutions under the Kings of Meſopotamia, Canaan, the Midianites, the Philistims, the Ammonites, beſides about 65000 Men ſlain in the Civil Wars with the Benjamites.

3. The Wars in the time of Saul, wherein though he was often victorious, yet at laſt he ſuffered a great Slaughter by the Philiſtims.

4. The Wars of David, both with Foreiners and the Rebellious in his own Kingdom; wherein though he were victorious, yet thoſe Victories could not be obtained without great Loſſes: In the Buſineſs of Abſalom 40000 of the Iſraelites ſlain and loſt in one Battel, 2 Sam. 18.7. in the latter end of the Reign of David, about the Year of the World 2925, which was 435 Years after the Numbring of the People by Moſes and Eleazar, David again Numbers the People, and then the Account of the People of Iſrael was 800000 valiant Men that drew the Sword, and of Judah 500000 valiant Men, 2 Sam. 24.9. in all 1300000 fighting Men: and if we ſhould take in Women, Children, and Aged, it is probable they were above five Millions.

So that in the ſpace of 435 Years, notwithſtanding all theſe Decrements they were increaſed about three Millions.

The next Account of the Numbers of the Tribes of Judah and Benjamin only under Jehoſaphat, 2 Chron. 17.14. and though in the interval between David and Jehoſaphat theſe two Tribes received conſiderable Allays by Wars, Plagues, and Famines, yet the Number of the mighty Men of valour of Benjamin was 380000, and of the Tribe of Judah 780000 mighty Men of valour. The Increaſe of Judah between that and David's Numeration was 280000 fighting Men; and therefore the Increaſe of Women, Children, and Aged not fit for War, muſt needs be much greater and more conſiderable; and yet this was in a Period only of thoſe Years that intervened between David and Jehoſaphat.

After this the ten Tribes were carried away Captives by Salmanaſſer, 2 Kings 17. and only Judah and Benjamin remained: ſo that now all our Account muſt run upon theſe two Tribes, the reſt being carried away, and probably confounded and mingled among the Gentiles. And if we conſider what Calamities theſe two Tribes endured by Wars and Captivities from the time of Hezekiah until their deportation into Babylon, we may reaſonably ſuppoſe that they had as great a Reduction as ordinarily could befall a People: Manaſſeh carried Captive to Babylon, which probably was the iſſue of ſome great Siege or Battel; Joſiah ſlain in Battel by Pharaoh King of Egypt; Jeruſalem taken by Nebuchadnezzar in the 8th Year of Jehojachim, 2 Kings 24.12. again in the 9th Year of Zedekiah the City again beſieged, and after two Years Siege and great Famine and Slaughter, taken. Jer. 39.12.

Theſe ſevere Adminiſtrations of War could not be without great Deſolations, Slaughters and Mortalities, though their Number is not recorded.

The People were carried away Captive to Babylon in the Year of the World 3362 or thereabouts, which was about 437 Years after the Reign of David; ſeventy Years after the Captivity, viz. about the Year of the World 3420, there was a Return of the Jews under Cyrus, which continued in Partial Remigrations for ſome time after.

The numbers of thoſe that returned firſt with Ezra were 42360, Ezra 2.64. this ſeems to be the greateſt number: there were other Remigrations in the time of Darius, and Artaxerxes, both in the 27th Year, though the certain number be not mentioned. We will therefore take ſcope enough, and ſuppoſe them in all 100000 Perſons, which is more than double to thoſe that came up with Ezra.

Theſe continued in a troubled condition from the time of the ceſſation of the Perſian Monarchy until the time of Chriſt, and rarely without Wars, as the Hiſtory of the Maccabees gives us an account; eſpecially under Antiochus Epiphanes, who made great ſlaughter of them.

After that, Pompey by Arms took Jeruſalem and ſubdued Syria in general, not without great bloodſhed; and as they were naturally an unquiet People, ſo the Hiſtories tell us that the Romans and their Governours exerciſed great ſeverity and bloodſhed among them.

And yet for all theſe Correctives and Decrements of this unquiet People, Joſephus tells us, that Nero willing to take ſome Account and Eſtimate of them by their great convention and concourſe in their Paſchal Solemnity, found their number to be Seven and twenty hundred thouſand Perſons, Joſeph. de Bello Judaico, l. 7. pag. 968. where Strangers might not be mingled with them in that Solemnity.

The Deſtruction of Jeruſalem under Titus and Veſpaſian is ſuppoſed to be under the 66th Year after the Birth of Chriſt, about the Year of the World 4006 which was about 586 Years after the Return under Cyrus: Joſephus gives us an Account of thoſe that were ſlain at the Siege of Jeruſalem, viz. 110000, and Priſoners taken 90000, Joſeph. lib. 7. cap. penult. beſides the multitudes ſlain in Cyrene, Alexandria, and other places not eaſie to be remembred.

By which we may reaſonably conclude, That in the Period of about 600 Years this Nation of the Jews increaſed to 27 times more than when they returned under Cyrus; for then we allow the number of them that returned to be 100000, but now they were increaſed to 2700000.

It is true, ſome of the Jews eſcaped this Slaughter and Captivity, ſuppoſe we the number of thoſe that eſcaped were a Million of Jews, ſuch I mean as held rigorouſly to their Jewiſh Law; for many became Chriſtians, and left much of the Jewiſh ſtrictneſs, and poſſibly mingled with other Nations.

But if we ſhould now examin the multitude of the Jews in Europe, Aſia and Africa, we ſhall find vaſt numbers of them in all the Trading Cities' and Countries except England, France, Spain, Portugal, Naples and Sicily, from whence they were formerly baniſhed; yet even in thoſe Countries from whence they have been baniſhed, they are in great numbers, but yet under the diſguiſe of other Names and Nations: But if all the Jews (I mean thoſe deſcended from the Reduces captivitatis Babylonicae) which are in Germany, Bohemia, Poland, Lituania, Ruſſia, Venice, Rome and other parts of Italy; in the Dominions of the Turks, Perſia, Arabia, India, Africa, at Alexandria and other parts of Egypt, were collected into one Body, they would exceed in number any one of the greateſt Nations of the World, and yield an irreſiſtible Army, if they had Weapons and Courage in any meaſure proportionable to their Wealth, Craft, Subtilty, and Numbers.

So that notwithſtanding all the Abatements and Decrements they have had by Wars, Oppreſſions and Internecions, Plagues, Famines, and other Calamities, we find the Product of one Nation derived from only two Perſons, Iſaac and Rebecca, in the compaſs of about 5000 Years ſwoln into incredible numbers of Millions of Perſons now exiſting, and known to be of that Linage and Deſcent, and ſtill continuing unqueſtionably in that Diſtinction, beſides thoſe multitudes derived from the Line of Eſau, and the ten Tribes, which are as it were leſt and confounded, without any diſtinction among other Nations. And thus far of the firſt Inſtance, concerning the Multiplication of the Nation of the Jews.

The next Inſtance that I ſhall give ſhall be nearer home; the Kingdom of England: I ſhall not give any Inſtance touching it before the Conqueſt, becauſe thoſe times are dark, and beſides, the Viciſſitudes and Succeſſions of various Nations in this Kingdom renders the diſcovery of the Progreſs of Generations of Men, or the Increaſes thereof, difficult; as Britons, Romans, Picts, Saxons, and Danes.

The ancient Inhabitants were the Britons, the Body of which People hath been in a great meaſure ſhut up and contained within the Country of Wales; but what by the tranſplanting of many of the Welſh into England, and by tranſplanting of the Engliſh into Wales, it is not poſſible to ſay that all the Britons are confined to the Country of Wales, or that none but Britons are there: and therefore there can be no particular or evident Concluſion made touching their Increaſe or Multiplication. But I ſhall take a ſhorter Period or Compaſs of Time, namely, the laſt 600 Years or thereabouts ſince the Norman Conqueſt.

And although it may be true, that many Perſons of Forein Countries have come into England and planted themſelves here, ſo that the whole Increaſe of this Kingdom cannot be ſingly attributed to thoſe that were either Natives, or ſuch as came in with the Conquerour, but many Scotc • , Iriſh, Dutch, but eſpecially French, either by Naturalizations or Tranſmigrations have increaſed the Inhabitants of this Iſland; yet conſidering that probably the Migrations of the Engliſh into Scotland, Holland, France and other Countries, have made amends for their Migrations hither: We may make a reaſonable Conjecture, that the Deſcendents from thoſe that inhabited this Kingdom in the time of the Conquerour, have increaſed exceedingly above what they were in that time.

And the Evidence thereof is this: King William the Firſt, after his Victory over Herald, did in the 16th Year of his Reign over England caule a Survey to be made of all the Cities, Towns, Mannors and inhabited Lands in England, Northumberland, Cumberland, Durham and North-Wales.

This Survey was finiſhed in the 20th Year of his Reign, and the Book it ſelf preſerved to this Day among the Records of the Exchequer, not only a Tranſcript or Copy, but the very Original Book it ſelf, and is called Doomſday: In this Book are entred the Names of the Mannors or inhabited Townſhips, Boroughs and Cities, and the Owner of them, the Number of Plough-Lands that each contains, and the Number of the Inhabitants upon them, under the ſeveral Names appropriate to thoſe Places: As for Inſtance, Ibi 12 Burgenſes, 5 Villani, 5 Bordarii, 5 Nativi, 5 Radiminches, 5 Cotterelli; and the like, according to the quality or condition of the Inhabitants: So that this Book in effect gives an Account not only of the Manurable Lands in every Mannor, Town, or Vill, but alſo of the Number and Natures of their ſeveral Inhabitants.

To make a Calculation of the Number of Plough-Lands and Inhabitants through all England, as they are recorded, and to make therewith a Compariſon unto the preſent State and Number of Inhabitants at this Day throughout England, is a laborious piece of work, but it is not difficult to be done in any one County; I have tryed the Compariſon in the County of Glouceſter through ſome great Boroughs, as Glouceſter it ſelf, Thornbury, Tetbury and other places, and in effect through the whole County; and I do find,

1. That there are very many more Vills and Hamlets now than there were then, and very few Villages, Towns or Pariſhes then, which continue not to this Day; but now there are as many as then, and many more. The 5th of March, 9 E. 2. there iſſued Writs to the Sheriffs of the ſeveral Counties, to return the Names of the ſeveral Vills and Land-Owners in their ſeveral Bayliwicks, which was accordingly done, and remains of Record in the Exchequer under the ſtile of Nomina Villarum; and the Sum of the Vills of Gloucesterſhire, together with the five Boroughs of Glouceſter, Briſtol, Berkley, Durſly, and Newenham amounted to 234, which I take it are more than are in Doomſday, and yet not ſo many as are at this day; and thoſe that continue to this day, are far more populous than they were at the taking of either of thoſe Surveys.

2. That there is much more Tillage, and more Plough-Lands now than there were then; which happens by the reduction of many great Waſts and Commons into Tillage, or Meadow, or Paſture, which then were only Waſts, and therefore not particularly ſurveyed becauſe of no conſiderable Value, and not taken notice of in that Survey.

3. That the number of Inhabitants now are above twenty times more than they were at that time, as well in particular Towns, Boroughs, and Mannors, as in the general extent of the County; and yet that Survey, even as to the number and quality of thoſe that reſided in thoſe Towns or Mannors, at leaſt as Houſholders, is very preciſe and particular: I have not yet made an exact particular Calculation of the Number recorded in that Book through the whole County, but I will give a few Inſtances of particular Towns, which may give an eſtimate touching the whole.

Glouceſter is now a very great and populous City, formerly before the time of H. 8. a Borough: In the Survey of Doomſday it is ſurveyed diſtinct from the Bertun of Glouc': the groſs of the Borough is ſurveyed together in the beginning of the County, but there are ſome other particular Burgages thereof mentioned under the Titles of particular Mens Poſſeſſions; as, Terra Rogeri de Lacy, Terra Elnuffi de Heſding, &c. The whole concretion of the City of Gloucester conſiſts partly of what was the ancient Borough, partly of acceſſions from the Mannors or Villages adjacent, as Barton and ſome others: I ſhall therefore caſt up the whole Number of all that were in Gloc' or Barton.

In the Survey of Glouceſter there are reckoned 23 Burgages and Houſes; 16 that were demoliſhed for the building of the Caſtle, 14 that were waſted, and ſome that belonged to Osbertus Epiſcopus, not numbred, but yielded the yearly Rent of 10 Shillings; which according to the uſual rate of the Houſes in Glouceſter at that time, which was at 5d or 6d a Houſe, might produce 20 Houſes, in toto, 73. Beſides theſe, there are ſurveyed under the Titles of ſeveral Owners of Lands ſparsim through the Book, as under the Title Terra S. Dionyſii, Eccleſia S. Martini, and others, according to my beſt Computation and Obſervation, 82. Beſides theſe under the Title of the Poffeſſions of St Peter of Glouc', there are reckoned up as many Burgenſes as yielded the Abbot anciently the Rent of 19s and 5d, and 16 Salmons; but at that time 16 Salmons and 50s Rent, without any certain number of Burgeſſes; but if we allow 6d for a Burgeſs, we may ſuppoſe them to 100. The Total 255.

The Mannor of Barton, or the Barton of Glouc', ſome part whereof hath been taken into the Suburbs of Glouc', was of two Owners; part was the King's Lands, part belonged to the Abbey of St Peters, but the whole number of the Houſholders inhabiting the whole Barton, with its members, Tuffly, Barnwood, &c. were as followeth, Villani 56 Bordarii 39 Servi 19 Molini 04 Liberi homines 10 In toto 128

And the Total of the whole Account of the City of Glouc', the Barton with its members; Brewere, Upton, Merwin, Barnwood, Tuffly, Norwent, amounted then only to 383.

And the ſingle City of Glouceſter within the Walls contains at this day near 1000 Houſes and Houſholds.

Again, the Borough and Mannor of Barclay, with the members thereof enumerated in Doomſday, viz. Alkington, Hinton, Cam, Goſington, Derſiloge, Cowly, Ewly, Nimsfield, Wotton, Simondſhall, Kingſcote, Beverſcote, Oſelword, Almondsbury, part of Cromhall, Harefell, Weſton, Elberton, Cromale, Erlingham, Eſcelword are ſurveyed to contain in the whole to 590 Families, whereas at this time there are near 5000 Families in this Precinct; the Pariſh of Wotton yielding upon the point of 2000 Comunicants, and that of Derſilege above 500 at this day.

Again, Tetbury and the Hamlet of Upton belonging to it, the Survey of Doomſday gives us an Account of about 73 Families of all kinds belonging to it: But now I believe there are little leſs than 1500 Communicants in that Pariſh.

Sodbury: the Survey gives us an Account of about 46 Families of all ſorts; they are now near twenty times ſo many.

Thornbury, with the Hamlets thereunto belonging: the Account of Doomſday is of 105 Families of all ſores; there is now near ſix times ſo many.

Aderly, a little Village at the time of making of that Survey, conſiſting not of above 17 Families of all ſorts; now above twice as many.

The like Inſtances might be produced, with the like evidence of very great Increaſes in the Towns of Cirenceſter, Minchin, Hampton, Teuxbury, Campden, Winchcomb, Avening, Weſtbury near Briſtol, and generally through the whole County of Glouceſter; which I do not without juſt reaſon ſuppoſe hath more than twenty times the Inhabitants which it had at the time of the coming in of William the Firſt, which is not now above 604 Years ſince.

And if we ſhould inſtitute a later Compariſon, viz. between the preſent time and the beginning of Queen Elizabeth, which is not above 112 Years ſince, and compare the numbers of Trained Souldiers then and now, the number of Subſidy-men then and now, they will eaſily give us an Account of a very great Increaſe and Multiplication of People within this Kingdom, even to admiration.

And let any man but conſider the Increaſe of London within the compaſs of 40 or 50 Years, we ſhall according to the Obſervations framed to my hands find, That the In-Pariſhes until the late Fire in that time have increaſed from 9 to 10, or a 10th part; and that the 16 Out-Pariſhes have in that time increaſed from 7 to 12, and yet without any decrement or decay of the reſt of the Kingdom.

By which, and infinite undeniable Inſtances that might be given, it is apparent, that within the compaſs of the laſt 600 Years this Kingdom hath increaſed mightily in its number of Native Inhabitants.

And yet it is moſt apparent, that it hath had as great Allays and Abatements of the Multiplication of Mankind in it, as any Kingdom in the World. For Inſtance,

1. In reſpect of the nature of its Situation, which is all Maritim, and conſiſts much in Navigation, which exhauſts abundance of People by Diſeaſes and Caſualties at Sea.

2. It hath been as often viſited with ſore Peſtilences, Epidemical Diſeaſes, and Mortality by reaſon thereof, as any Country: the experience of the laſt 60 Years gives us abundance of Inſtances thereof, and former Ages were as frequently viſited in this kind as later.

3. Forein Wars, both at Sea and Land, have devoured great multitudes of our Inhabitants; as thoſe formerly with Scotland, France, Spain, and lately with the Netherlands and French.

4. No Kingdom in Europe hath had greater Experience of Civil Wars, nor greater Conſumption of Men thereby, than England hath had ſince the time of William the Firſt: For not to inſtance in our Wars with the Welſh and Iriſh, let any man read but the Hiſtories of the Wars here in England between King Stephen, and H. 1. and his Mother, King John and his Nobles, King H. 3. and the Nobility; between King E. 2. and the Earls of Lancaſter and Mortimer; the Wars between the two Houſes of York and Lancaster, and their Partizans, from the time of H. 4. unto the beginning of H. 7. in one Battel between H. 6. and E. 4. killed of one ſide 30000; the Rebellions in the times of H. 7. and others the Kings and Queens that ſucceeded him, and the loſs of many lives that happened by the ſuppreſſion thereof; the late cruel Wars within theſe 30 Years laſt paſt in England; there cannot be Inſtances given in any one Kingdom of greater Abatements of the Increaſe, by Wars and Internecions, than may be given in England.

5. Let us alſo conſider the vaſt Evacuations of Men that England hath had by Forein Aſſiſtances lent to Forein Kingdoms and States, by Volunteers and Auxiliaries; as, to Scotland in the late Queens time, to France, to the Netherlands, to Germany.

6. To theſe alſo add the vaſt numbers of Men that have tranſplanted themſelves not only into France, Holland, and our neighbour Nations, but alſo to Virginia, Maryland, New England, Barbadoes, Bermudas, to Amboyna and other places in the Eaſt India, and laſtly, into Jamaica; we ſhall find upon theſe and other Accounts, that England, hath had as great Correctives of the Exceſſes of their Generations within theſe laſt 600 Years, as any People in the World.

Add to theſe the great Famines and Peſtilences which have happened within the compaſs of 600 Years, recorded in Hiſtory, and obvious to our own Experience.

And therefore, if notwithſtanding all theſe Correctives the number of Men have continually increaſed, and that in ſo vaſt and obſervable a degree above their decreaſe; we have as much reaſon to conclude a parity in the reſt of Mankind: and poſſibly were we as well acquainted with the Concerns of other Kingdoms or States, eſpecially of the Netherlands and France, the Inſtances of this Increaſe would he as much, and poſſibly more conſpicuous than among us.

Upon the whole matter therefore I conclude, That as the Correctives inſtanced in the laſt Chapter are not in themſelves likely to be ſufficient and ſutable to the Reduction of the Increaſe of Mankind to an Equability, eſpecially in an infinite ſucceſſion of Eternal Generations: So by plain Experience it is apparent and ſenſible, that de facto they have not done it in a finite limit of Ages; but Mankind have notwithſtanding them increaſed every Age, and the multitude of them that are born and live, over-ballance the number of them that dye, communibus annis; or being taken upon a medium, though poſſibly ſome one Year gave the advantage of Number to the Deſcendents, yet it is not common nor ordinary, but more than two or three Years for one give the advantage of Number to them that are born and live.

CAP. XI. The Conſequence and Illation upon the Premiſſes, againſt the Eternity of Mankind.

THe great Aſſertors of the Eternity of the World and of Mankind, have certainly gathered their Opinion principally from this, That they find that Mankind is propagated by ordinary courſe of Generation, and this they ſee by Experience: And as they do ſo now, ſo they did a hundred or a thouſand Years ſince, and as far as thoſe Hiſtories they credit give them account, it was ſo in thoſe times, and in the times before them, as far as Tradition could inſtruct them. And although thoſe various Occurrences of Wars, Peſtilences, Migrations, Floods, Changes of Religion and Languages have obſcured the Hiſtories, Relations and Traditions of former times before thoſe Hiſtories that are extant; yet they think it becomes them, as reaſonable Men, to believe that things have been always ſo as now they are; and that it were a fondneſs to ſuppoſe or believe things to be otherwiſe than they have appeared in the tract of all Times or Ages.

And upon the ſame ground that theſe Men aſſert the Eternity of the World, the Inſtance and Argument now produced of the plain and experienced Increaſe of the numbers of Men upon the face of the Earth, ſeems much more forcibly to conclude againſt that ſuppoſed Eternity of Mankind. For it is plain and evident to Senſe, that the World grows every day fuller than formerly, notwithſtanding all thoſe Correctives and Reductives thereof: And we have reaſon to think it is ſo in all places, at leaſt one with another, and in all Ages, and among all People as we find it in England for theſe 600 Years, or among the People of the Jews for above 2000 Years: For among theſe People, and in theſe Periods of Time there have been as many and as great Diminutions and Abatements as ever were in ſuch Periods of Time: and yet though perchance in one Age they have diminiſhed, yet they have not been ſo diminiſhed, but that in the compaſs of four or five hundred Years their Increaſe above what they were before ſuch Diminution, is upon a medium always exceeding their Decay.

And ſince we have reaſon to believe what we ſee, namely, the Exceſs of Generations above their Decays, we have reaſon to believe it was ſo always; and if it were ſo always, it is not poſſible the Generations of Mankind could be eternal.

For if we ſhould ſuppoſe the Eternity of the World, an Increaſe of but one Man in the Period of Millions of Years would have filled more ſpace than all the Earth or the Concave of Heaven could receive: For in as much as in a Duration that never had a Beginning there muſt needs be infinite Millions of Years, the Increaſe of one Man in every Million above what was before, muſt needs produce an infinite coexiſting number, and an infinite moles of Mankind; much more if the Increaſe were in any meaſure proportionable to what our daily Experiences give us Inſtances of. Whereby we find, that although it be poſſible that ſeveral Families may be wholly extinct in a Kingdom in the Period of 5 or 600 Years, and though poſſibly in ſome one Age there may be a diminution of the People of a Kingdom from what they were in the Age before; yet in the ſucceſſion of a very few Ages they again increaſe beyond the diminution, and neither ſucceſſively decreaſe, nor hold an equality; which we may reaſonably ſuppoſe to be the common condition of the World.

And as to that Suppoſition, That even upon a Natural account, when the World grows too full of Inhabitants, they muſt break the Bonds of Society and Peace, and ſo diminiſh each other by Internecions and Wars. As Air compreſſed, or expanded beyond the meaſure of the Veſſel containing it, breaks the Veſſel wherein it is compreſſed to give it ſelf room. I ſhall only ſay, that although the Pride and Ambition and Inſolence of neighbouring Princes or People, or the ſenſe of too much Oppreſſion and Hardſhip hath many times raiſed Wars, yet we never knew Wars to grow meerly upon the account of the Fulneſs of any Country: indeed that Plethory hath many times occaſioned Emigrations, and Tranſplantations, and Navigation, and increaſe of Trade or Manufactures and other induſtrious Employments; but Wars have always grown upon other Occaſions: though, as I before obſerve, the great, wiſe, and intellectual Governour of the World hath by his over-ruling Conduct of the Paſſions of Men, brought about ends for the convenience and benefit of Mankind in this reſpect alſo, as well as to puniſh their Exceſſes and Enormities.

CAP. XII. The Eighth Evidence of Fact proving the Origination of Mankind, namely, the Conſent of Mankind.

I Come now to the Eighth and laſt Evidence of Fact, proving the Origination of Mankind, namely, The general Conſent of Mankind in that Perſwaſion; wherein I ſhall purſue this Order:

Firſt, to conſider the more Popular or Vulgar Opinion of Nations in all or moſt Places and Ages of the World, agreeing in this Sentiment or Perſwaſion, and what may be reaſonably concluded of the truth, or at leaſt great probability of the truth of that Suppoſition of the Origination of Mankind, upon the Suppoſition of ſuch a Conſent. Secondly, to conſider the more reſtrained Perſwaſion of the Learned and more conſiderate ſort of Men, that guided themſelves in their Sentiments not barely upon Popular or Vulgar Opinions, but ſearched deeper into the Reaſons and Evidences of things; namely, the learneder Tribe of Men, Phyſiologiſts and Philoſophers: And then I ſhall alſo conſider the ſeveral Suppoſitions of thoſe that agreed in that Perſwaſion touching the ſeveral Manners and Methods of ſuch Originations, and wherein their ſeveral Suppoſitions ſeem to be deficient, inſufficient, or untrue.

Firſt, touching the National or Popular Opinions touching the Origination of Mankind.

There hath prevailed among the generality of Mankind a common Perſwaſion, that Mankind had an Original ex non genitis; and thoſe Nations that pretend to the greateſt Antiquity, ſuppoſe themſelves to be Terrigenae, or at leaſt by ſome other Method than the ordinary courſe of Generation.

Kircherus in his Oedipus Aegyptiacus, Syntagm. 3. Cap. 1. out of Maimonides gives us an Account of the Zabei, deſcended from Cuſh, and inhabiting the Coaſt of the Red Sea; that though they held the World eternal, yet ſuppoſed the firſt Man Adam to be begotten in the Moon, of a Father and Mother, and from thence he came into this lower World, and was called Apoſtolus Lunae, and taught Men to worſhip the Moon: and for this he cites Maimonides, l. 3. cap. 29. though the late Tranſlation mention nothing of his proceeding from the Moon, but of his coming out of India into Babel, and teaching Men the Worſhip of the Moon: this Fable the Rabbi confutes. Diodorus Siculus gives us an Account of the Opinion of the Egyptians, lib. 1. cap. 2. who though they pretend a vaſt number of Years to have paſſed ſince the Origination of Mankind, yet they ſuppoſe it had an Original; Et ab orbis initio primos homines apud ſe creatos: and they inferr it from the Fertility of their Soil by the Inundation of Nilus, which at its receſs leaves ſo fruitful a Tincture, that thereby and by the heat of the Sun, Animals have their viſible production, part after part: And yet both Ariſtotle, l. 2. Meteoron. and Herodotus in Euterpe do with great probability evince that the fruitfulleſt part of Egypt, namely, the part called Delta where the Nile overflows, is an Exaggeration, or Ground gained by the Inundation of Nilus.

Herodotus, ubi ſupra, tells us, That in the time of Pſamniticus ſometimes King of Egypt there was a Competition between the Egyptians and Phrygians, who were the firſt People, or the Terrigenae, and that by the Experiment of the Education of two Infants which ſhould not be inſtructed, by their Natural Speech in the Language of Phrygia; the Phrygians carried the priority. The thing is fabulous, all the uſe that is to be made of it is, That there was a common Opinion in the Nations of the World, that there was ſome Inception of Mankind otherwiſe than by the way of Natural Procreation.

Laertius, in Prooemio, ſuppoſeth the Grecians to be the firſt Men, A quibus nedum Philoſophorum, ſed hominum genus initium habuit.

The above named Diodorus Siculus, lib. 4. cap. 1. tells us that the Ethiopians claim a greater Antiquity than the Egyptians, who borrowed many of their Laws and Cuſtoms and Religion from them: that as Ethiopia was the fitteſt and moſt congruous place for the firſt Production of Men and Beaſts, in reſpect of the vicinity and conſtancy of the Sun; ſo, de facto the Ethiopians were the firſt Men that were on the Earth, and Terrigenae. Ferunt, Aethiopes primos hominum omnium creatos eſſe; cujus rei conjecturam ferunt, quod non aliunde homines in eam acceſſerunt, ſed in ipſa geniti meritò Indigetes omnium conſenſu appellentur. Et quidem veriſimile est eos qui ſub meridie habitant primos è terra ſuiſſe homines genitos; nam Solis ardore terram quae humida erat arefaciente, atque omnibus vitam dante, decens fuit locum Soli propinquierem primò naturam animantium tuliſſe.

De Laet in his Hiſtory of the Original of the Americans, pag. 178. tells us of the Perſwaſion of divers of the Americans, that held there is one God; Qui omnia creavit, dein plures in terram defixerat ſagittas, è quibus hominum genus ortum & propagatum fuit: though they alſo held other inferior Deities: And Pag. 106. Alii narrant, è quadam ſpecu per feneſtram exiliiſſe ſex aut neſcio quot homines, eóſque initium dediſſe humano generi in loco qui ob eam cauſam dicitur Pacari tampo; atque ideo opinantur Tambes eſſe hominum antiquiſſimos. Vide Acoſt. l. 1. cap. 25. ad idem.

Thus it ſeems there hath been in all Nations, that have had any manner of Order among them, a common Opinion of the Origination of Mankind; though they have dreſſed up the Suppoſition with various Fictions and Imaginations no leſs vain than the Poets, who ſuppoſed Men to grow of the Serpents Teeth ſown by Cadmus, or the Stones thrown over their Heads by Deucalion and Pyrrha.

This perſwaſion and opinion of Mankind of their Original, might be conveyed to the generality of Nations by ſome of theſe ways:

1. By ſome Tradition, derived down unto them from thoſe that lived before them; but then if we look after the original or firſt head of this Tradition, it may be hard poſitively to define from whence it began; but it ſeems probable, that it was from thoſe firſt Parents of Mankind, and ſo the Tradition founded in the Truth of the Fact, and originally delivered by them that perfectly knew it to be ſo: It is true, there are, and have been very many things entertained as true by Traditional Derivation, which either have not any ſufficient evidence of their Truth, or it may be ſome things that do oppoſe the credit of it; and it were a piece of vain credulity to believe every thing, that either vulgar Tradition, or the Artifices of Men, have impoſed upon over credulous ſucceeding Ages and Perſons: And we ſee, that as the Origination of Man hath been traditionally received, ſo thoſe Adjuncts and Fables with which it hath been dreſſed up, have been alſo received and believed with it. But to this I ſay:

1. That the Origination of Man, as a Matter of Fact, could hardly be thought of, but either by very conſidering and thinking Men, whereof hereafter; or by ſuch, as being the firſt Parents of Mankind, knew their Original. And if it be ſaid, they could no more know their Original than a Child new born: It is true, if the Production of Mankind were ſuch at firſt as it is now, or as ſome of the miſtaken Heathen thought it, (viz. in Infantia) it may be ſo: But we ſhall ſee, that if Mankind had their Original ex non genitis, (as moſt certainly they had) then the Formation of Mankind was in his full and perfect Conſtitution, and not by a gradual progreſs from Infancy as now.

2. That the Tradition of the Origination of Mankind ſeems to be univerſal, but the particular Modes or Methods of that Origination, excogitated by the Heathen, were particular, and not common; and therefore, though theſe be fabulous and deſerve not our credit, yet they do not abate the credibility of the univerſal Tradition. The common Tradition and conſent thereunto of the Exiſtence of a Deity, carries in it a great moral Evidence of the Truth thereof, although the particular ſuperadditions and multiplications of Deities, by the Fancies and Traditions of particular Ages or Nations, are fabulous and untrue: Quod ab omnibus ubique & ſemper creditum eſt pro veritate habendum eſt, though the various particular Modes, and Methods, and Hypotheſes, are or may be fabulous.

3. That Mankind had an Original might be known naturally, and without a Revelation to the firſt Individuals of Humane Nature, and conſequently might with evidence and certainty enough, even upon a moral account, be communicated by them to others, and to paſs into an univerſal Tradition: But the Manner of the firſt Production of Men, what gradations were antecedent to it could not poſſibly be known to the firſt Parents of Mankind without Divine Revelation, becauſe it muſt needs be antecedent to their Being, and therefore the particular Manner. therefore could not, upon a bare natural or moral account, be any true Root or Foundation of ſuch a Tradition as according to the Moſaical Hypotheſis of the Origination of Mankind, whereby we underſtand that Adam was created out of the Duſt of the Ground, and then had an Intellectual Soul put into him; Adam might upon a natural account know that now he was, and that before he was not; and he might upon a rational account know, that ſuch a Production of ſuch a Being as he found himſelf to be, could never have been effected without the agency of a moſt powerful and wiſe Being, which we call Almighty God: And this Tradition, both that he was made when before he was not, and that he was created or made by Almighty God, he might with as great evidence and certainty traditionally communicate to his Deſcendents, as any other matter of fact, or rational deduction: But he could never know the manner of his own Production, or the particular Preparations antecedent to ſuch his Being, without Revelation from God, or ſome intelligent Being that ſaw or knew the antecedents to his Conſtitution; neither could he without ſuch Revelation or Diſcovery, deliver the ſame over traditionally with any certainty of truth to his Deſcendents. And conſequently, the general Tradition of his Origination hath a Rode of Credibility in it, to ſuch a Man as will believe that any matter of Fact may be true that he ſees not; though the particular manner of his Orgination is not with any certainty credible to him, that either believes not there is any Divine Revelation, or that believes not the particular Method propounded is in truth a Divine Revelation

So that the general Tradition that Man had his Origination ex non genitis, is a greater Evidence that it was true, than that he was made out of Arrows ſtuck in the Ground; or, ex folliculis terrae innaſcentibus, as ſome Philoſophers.

2. The Ground of this Perſwaſion hath ſprung from ſuch of the Philoſophers, and other conſiderate Men, who upon a ſtrict Enquiry and Examination have found it impoſſible that the ſucceſſive Generations of Mankind could be Eternal, and conſequently Infinite; and therefore have concluded with very great evidence of Reaſon, that it muſt needs have ſome other Origination in ſome one Period of duration, than what is now natural and common. But then being deſtitute of Divine Revelation, or at leaſt not giving due credit thereunto, and being greatly in the dark, and not knowing well how to determin what that Method of the Origination of Mankind ſhould be, ſome took up one Fancy, ſome another, to ſalve the Phaenomenon, according as their Imaginations led them. And hence it was, that ſome thought their Origination was not altogether unlike the ſpontaneous Production of Inſects; only theſe being Annual, required no great contribution of Heavenly Influkes; but that of the Production of Men or more perfect Animals, Non ſine magna coelestium corporum conjunctione ſive mutatione: Others again, more ſoberly attributed it meerly to the Power and Wiſdom of the glorious God: Others, to the efficiency of Angels; whereof in the next Chapter.

And this Contemplation of ſuch Philoſophers and knowing Men coming abroad into the World, the generality of Mankind ſubſcribed to the truth of the grand Hypotheſis it ſelf; namely, That Mankind had at one time or other, or by ſome means or other an Origination differing from the ordinary and natural method of Propagation now obſerved: And finding that the ſame held a ſingular congruity to the nature of things, and the general Conception and Reaſon of the Humane Underſtanding; the generality of the World entertained, and by Tradition tranſmitted this Hypotheſis to their Poſterity.

But finding the Philoſophers and Wiſe Men ſo uncertain and diſagreeing, de modo, and unable to give any ſatisfactory Reſolution thereof; every Nation, and almoſt every Perſon took up what particular Hypotheſis pleaſed them for the Method or Manner of ſuch Origination; and herein the Wantonneſs of Poets, and the Crafts of their Heatheniſh Prieſts and Hierophants abundantly gratified the Fancies of the People with Superſtructions and Inventions of their own.

And indeed it is obſervable, that all thoſe ancient Traditions of things that were truly done, and ſo delivered over and received by Mankind, as they have for the ſubſtance and main of them been preſerved by the ſtrength of this Tradition; ſo where the Holy Scriptures have not been taught or known, theſe Traditions have been admirably dreſſed by Sophiſtications and Superadditions, introduced by the Phantaſies of Poets or the deceits of Heatheniſh Prieſts, or by the gradual corruptings of the Traditions themſelves. Thus the Hiſtory of the Creation, of the Flood, of the Tower of Babel, of Noah and his three Sons; many of which are, for the ſubſtance of them, preſerved among the Barbarous People of the Eaſt and West Indies at this day, as appears by thoſe that have written the Relation, eſpecially of the Americans, as Acoſta, and De Laet have nevertheleſs been covered over with divers fabulous and deviſed Additions and Stories: and ſo it happened alſo among the ancient Heatheniſh Writers, as hath been at large demonſtrated, eſpecially by Bochart in his Phaleg.

Now as touching the Opinion of the Learned Tribe, which, as before is ſhewn, fell into two Parties: The one holding the Eternal Succeſſions of Mankind, whereof in this Second Section: The other holding a Firſt Inception of Mankind, Ex non genitis.

The latter Opinion far out-ballanceth the former, both in the reaſonableneſs thereof, and the multitude and great Learning of thoſe that ſo aſſerted it; and ſhould, according to the propounded Method, be here declared.

But becauſe I intend in the next Section to examin the various Suppoſitions of thoſe of the latter ſort, touching the Manner of the Origination of Man, I ſhall reſerve that Buſineſs to the next Section; wherein I ſhall at once conſider the Learned ancient Authors that hold the Origination of Mankind, and ſhall alſo deliver and examin their ſeveral Suppoſitions touching the ſame.

CAP. I. The Opinions of the more Learned part of Mankind, Philoſophers and other Writers, touching Man's Origination.

I Have in the former Parts of this Enquiry ſhewed, that there have been among Philoſophers and other Heathen, and ſome modern Writers, Two great Opinions touching Man's Origination: 1. Thoſe that thought it indeed to be without any Origination, but Eternal; and this Opinion they took up principally upon two Reaſons: 1. Becauſe the Medium or Clew by which they guided themſelves, was the common, conſtant Method of Productions by ſucceſſive Generations; and they thought it more ſutable to take their Meaſures, and make their Concluſions conſonant to the courſe of Nature, which they ſaw and obſerved, and judged to be always uniform, and like itſelf; which could not be ſuch, if Mankind had any other Method of Origination than now it hath: And in Natural Appearances, Cauſes and Effects, they thought it not becoming the Genius or Spirit of a Philoſopher to call in any other Aſſiſtant or Producent than what was and is the ordinary Rule, Courſe, and Law of Nature as they now find it. And by this means they thought that they proceeded conſonantly both to Nature, and to themſelves. 2. Becauſe that among thoſe ancient Philoſophers that either ſuppoſed the Origination of Mankind to be either caſual, as Epicurus, Democritus, &c. or to be natural, from the Earth, and conjunction of the Influences of Heavenly Bodies in ſome Periodical Aſpects; or partly natural, and partly fortuitous, or at leaſt ſpontaneous, as Inſects ariſe: I ſay, in and among theſe various Suppoſitions of an Origination of Mankind (yea and perfect Animals) ex non genitis, they found ſo much incertainty, improbability, and repugnancy, that they threw them all aſide, together alſo with the Beginning or Origination of Mankind; and took up that more compendious, and more ſutable, as they thought, to the Laws which they obſerved in Nature; and concluded, That the Generations of Mankind and of perfect Animals were without beginning, but always obtained in the ſame manner as now they are. Of this Opinion was Ocellus Lucaenus, and likewiſe Ariſtotle, though in ſome places he ſeems to be doubtful, and although Plato in his Timaeus ſeems to aſſert an Origination of Mankind, yet in ſome other places his Expreſſions are doubtful: and therefore Cenſorinus in his golden Book de Die Natali, reckons as well Plato as Ariſtotle, Ocellus Lucanus, Architas Tarentinus, Xenocrates, Dicearchus, Pythagoras, Theophraſtus, to be Aſſertors of the Eternity of Mankind.

And this Opinion I have examined in the Chapters of the Second Section of this Book, and offered Reaſons Phyſical, Metaphyſical and Moral againſt it. The laſt Moral Reaſon which I offered was, The received Opinion of Mankind aſſerting the Origination of Man, and that as well of the common ſort of People as of the Tribe of the Learned Philoſophers.

The former I diſpatched in the laſt Chapter, but the Suffrage of the Gens literata I reſerved to this Section, becauſe thereby at once I may with the ſame labour ſhew the Opinions of Learned Men among the Heathen, aſſerting the Origination of Mankind, and what their ſeveral Sentiments were concerning the manner of it: And therefore I ſhall be conſtrained herein to mention the Opinions of ſome of thoſe Learned Philoſophers above-mention, and to add ſome others of the contrary Perſwaſion, which out-ballance the former.

2. The ſecond general Opinion, was of thoſe Learned Philoſophers that held an Origination of Mankind ex non genitis; and the Reaſon moving them to this Perſwaſion was, not only the great Tradition that obtained generally in favour of it, and the great reaſonableneſs of the Suppoſition it ſelf; but alſo the many abſurd Conſequences, and indeed irreconcilable Contradictions that they found in the Hypotheſis of an Eternal Succeſſion of Humane Generations without beginning: Inſomuch that the Aſſertors themſelves of Eternal Generations were doubtful of the truth of their own Perſwaſions, as will hereafter appear.

And thoſe of this latter ſort were even Epicurus himſelf, Anaximander, Empedocles, Parmenides, and Zeno Citicus the great Founder of the Sect of the Stoicks, with thoſe that followed or favoured it. But above all, the great Law-giver Moſes, who was divinely inſpired; and yet if he had not that advantage of Divine Infallibility, but ſtood barely upon the great credibility both of his Perſon, his Learning, and the Hypotheſis it ſelf which he delivered, he hath as great a weight, even upon a natural, moral, and rational account as any, or all the reſt put together. But becauſe I intend a particular Explication of the Hypotheſis Moſaica, I ſhall not mingle this among the other Opinions, but reſerve it for the next Section.

The Heathen Philoſophers that held the Origination of Mankind ex non genitis, have theſe things in general wherein they agree one with another, and with the Truth it ſelf; and ſome things wherein they differ among themſelves, and in ſome things from the Truth.

1. They herein agree both among themſelves, and with the Truth, and with that excellent and divine Relation of Moſes, Gen. 1. That Mankind is not Eternal, but had a Beginning ex non genitis.

2. They herein alſo agree among themſelves, and with the Truth, That it is moſt abſolutely neceſſary (if Mankind had a Beginning or Origination) it muſt needs be in a differing kind and manner from that common courſe whereby Mankind is now propagated. This is aſſerted by thoſe that hold the Origination of Mankind by the Efficiency of Almighty God (conſonant to the Moſaical Hypotheſis) either immediately, or partly by the Inſtrumentality of Angels, as Zeno Citicus, Plato and others: it is alſo aſſerted by them that hold the Origination of Mankind to be at firſt fortuitous, as Epicurus and Democritus. And therefore as to theſe Perſwaſions and Suppoſitions, it is not only neceſſary that they ſhould ſuppoſe a differing manner of the firſt Origination of Mankind from what now obtains; but it is conſonant alſo to their Principles, and the grounds of their Suppoſition that it muſt be ſo: This is alſo aſſerted by thoſe that ſuppoſe the Origination of Mankind to be purely natural, and according to the conſtituted Rule of Nature. But yet this Suppoſition, though moſt neceſſarily true where an Origination ex non genitis is once ſuppoſed, yet it ſeems leſs ſutable to the Principles of thoſe Men that aſſert ſuch a natural Production of Mankind as is by them aſſerted, becauſe they mancipating all Productions and Effects to the Laws of Nature, and governing their thoughts, and taking their meaſures barely by it, have no reaſon to think or believe any other Method of Production of Mankind to have at any time been any otherwiſe than as they ſee it now to be; which, as is before ſhewn, was the reaſon why Ariſtotle inclined to the Opinion of the Eternity of Humane Generations, becauſe Nature is preſumed to be conſonant to it ſelf, and always to have been what once it was.

3. But in the Explication of the Cauſe and Manner of this Origination of Mankind, therein they differed very much among themſelves.

This difference conſiſted principally in two great Conſiderations; 1. In the true ſtating of the efficient Cauſe of this Origination of Mankind: 2. In the Manner, Method, and Order of ſuch Origination.

As to the difference touching the Cauſe of ſuch Origination, and the nature of that Cauſe thereof:

1. Some aſſigned a bare fortuitous Cauſe of the firſt Origination of Mankind, as Epicurus, and his Explicator Lucretius; for although in ſome places they are driven to aſſert ſome determinate Semina, of Mankind and perfect Animals, to avoid that indefinite and unlimited excurſion of Atoms; yet they that ſuppoſe theſe Semina, do ſuppoſe a fortuitous Coalition of Atoms to the Conſtitution of theſe Semina, and ſo upon the whole account it is fortuitous.

2. Some aſſign a natural determined Cauſe of the firſt production of Mankind, namely, the due preparation of the fat and ſlimy Earth after a long incubation of Waters, and ſome admirable Conjunction of 〈◊〉 the Heavenly and Planetary Bodies, in ſome certain Period of Time at a long diſtance from us; which as naturally and neceſſarily produced the firſt Couples of Mankind, and likewiſe of other perfect Animals, as neceſſarily and naturally as the return of the Vernal Sun produceth divers ſorts of Inſects, which though they are called ſponte orientia, yet they ariſe meerly from a Connexion of Natural Cauſes, and the various Ferments and Diſpoſitions of the Elementary, and Poſitions and Influxions of the Heavenly Bodies: Thus ſome of the Ancients, and alſo Avicen, Cardanus, Caeſalpinus, Berogardus.

3. Some of the Ancients, that moſt truly aſſign the Origination of Mankind to the moſt High, Intelligent, Powerful, Beneficent Being, viz. Almighty God, and the Beneplacitum and Fiat of his Omnipotent Will; as Zeno Citicus. And thus their differences aroſe touching the Cauſe of this Origination.

As to the ſecond, namely, the different Manner of the Origination of Mankind, Cenſorinus ubi ſupra, Euſeb. praepar. Evang. lib. 1. cap. 7, 8, 9. and others give it as followeth.

1. The Opinion of Anaximander: Videri ſibi ex aqua terráque calefactos, exortos eſſe ſive piſces, ſive piſcibus ſimillima animalia, in his homines creviſſe, foetúſque ad pubertatem intus retentos; tum demum ruptis illis, viros mulieréſque qui jam ſe alere poſſent, proceſſiſſe.

2. The Opinion of Empedocles and Parmenides: Primò, membra ſingula ex terra quaſi praegnante edita, & deinde coiſſe, & effeciſſe ſolidi hominis materiam, igni ſimul & humori permixtam.

3. The Opinion of Democritus and Epicurus: Ex aqua limóque primùm homines procreatos; viz. uteros limo calefacto radicibus terrae cohaerentes primùm increviſſe, & infantibus ex ſe editis ingenitum lactis humorem, natura ministrante, praebuiſſe, quos ita educatos & adultos genus hominum propagaſſe.

4. The Opinion of Zeno Citicus, the Founder of the Stoical Sect: Principium humano generi ex novo mundo conſtitutum putavit, primóſque homines ex ſolo adminiculo divini ignis, id eſt, Dei providentia, genitos.

Ovid, though he were a wanton Poet, and his Metamorphoſis full of Fictions, yet in the Deſcription of the Creation he hath out-done many of the more ſerious Philoſophers; and I believe was not only acquainted with the Moſaical Hiſtory, but with moſt of thoſe Writings that were extant in that time, containing the Origination of the World and Mankind; though he mingle his own Fancies with what he ſo learned: He gives us an account of the Origination of Man, Lib. 2 Fab. 2. and of other Animals, Ibid. Fab. 8. Of the former, Natus homo eſt, ſive hunc divino ſemine fecit Ille Opifex rerum mundi melioris origo, Sive recens tellus, ſeductaque nuper ab alto Aethere, cognati retinebat ſemina eoeli; Quam natus Iapeto miſtam fluvialibus undis Finxit in effigiem, moderantum cunct a deorum.

Touching the latter, the Origination of other Animals after the Deluge, he gives an elegant Deſcription, and from the Inſtance of the Productions after the Inundation of Nilus; —Ex eodem corpore ſapè Altera pars vivit, rudis eſt pars altera tellus.

So, after the Flood, by the moiſture of the Ground and heat of the Sun, —Tellus Intulenta recenti Solibus aethereis, altóque recanduit aeſtu, Reddidit innumeras ſpecies.—

As to the Origination of brute Animals, he ſeems to aſcribe the ſame in effect as happens in the equivocal production of Inſects.

But as to the Origination of Man, he ſeems to agree with the Stoicks, but gives thereof a fuller Explication; namely, 1. That it was a Seminal Production, and not ſo fortuitous as that of Animals. 2. That theſe Semina humanae naturae were either the immediate Productions of the great Opifex rerum, or at leaſt were left in the Earth by the Celeſtial Nature, while it ſtood mingled therewith in maſſa Chaotica: By which means, it ſeems, he thought not that the production of Mankind was by a gradual proceſs and maturation in the Earth, and from it, like the ordinary courſe of the Formative proceſs in utero matris, in the ordinary courſe of Generation; but by a ſhorter and more compendious Method: For, according to the ancient Mythology, Japetus ſignified the Heaven, and Japeti ſatus, or Prometheus the Son of the Heaven, the Divine Providence which Almighty God exerciſed by the inſtrumentality of the Heavenly Motions: And the Ancients attributed the Formation or Configuration of the humane Body in its firſt original to this Divine Providence, whereby thoſe Seminal Particles before deſcribed being taken and included in convenient Elementary Matter, the whole Compoſition was by the Divine Providence moulded up into the humane Shape and Conſiſtency in its firſt Origination. This was that Notion that divers of the Ancients, and Ovid out of them had concerning the firſt Origination of Mankind; vide Caelium Rhodogin. l. 7. cap. 19, & 20. and ſeems to have ſome analogy with that Hypotheſis of Plato in his Timaeus, hereafter mentioned.

Thus we have an account of the Opinions, 1. Of the Pythagorean Philoſophers: 2. Of the old Academicks: 3. Of the Peripateticks, all ſeeming to agree in the Suppoſition of the Eternity of the World: 4. Of the Epicureans, under which I include that of Anaximander and Empedocles, differing only in the modus: 5. Of the Stoicks, which give a true Account both of the Origination of Mankind, and of the Manner of it: where I have been the longer, becauſe it is a Key to all that follows, and gives us a Scheme of it.

Theſe ſeveral Opinions, and the Authors and Aſſertors thereof, I ſhall here farther illuſtrate and examin.

1. Touching the Opinion of the Pythagoreans, becauſe we have nothing extant of his writing, I can ſay little more touching his Opinion; though ſome ſuppoſe, he was not of Opinion that the World or Mankind was Eternal.

2. Touching Plato, it is true, he ſeems very various and Poetical in his writing; and by reaſon of the Method of his Diſcourſes, by way of Dialogues, it is hard to determin what his Opinion was concerning the Eternity of the World, or of the Generations of Mankind.

In the beginning of his third Book de Legibus, but eſpecially in the middle of his ſixth, under the Perſons of Athenienſis hoſpes, and Clinias, he intimates his Opinion of the Eternity of the World and Mankind: Athen. Scire omnes oportet, hominum generationem vel nullum prorſus unquam initium habuiſſe, neque terminum habiturum, ſed fuiſſe omninò ſemper & fore; aut ſi coepit, inaeſtimabili ante nos temporis magnitudine incepiſſe. Clin. Plané. And again, in his Menexemus, under the Perſon of Socrates commending the Country of Attica; Altera ejus laus erit, quod eo tempore quo tellus omnia animalia omnigena producebat, feras & armenta omnia; tellus duntaxat noſtra ad hoc ſterilis erat, agreſtibúſque animalibus vacua, propriè verò ex omnibus animalibus hominem genuit, qui caeteris intelligentia praestat, ſolúſque jus ac deos colit. And again, in his Timaeus, in the Perſon of Timaeus he gives us an Account of the Original of Mankind, and the manner of it, to this effect; That when Almighty God had made and ſet in order the great World, and endowed it with a living Soul, and thereby it became a great Animal; and had alſo made a ſort of inferior Deities (dii ex Deo) and endowed them alſo with Immortality, he brings in the great God beſpeaking theſe inferior Deities; Accedite vos ſecundùm naturam ad animalium generationem, ita ut vim imitemini meam, qua in ortu veſtro ſum uſus. Atque ejus quidem animalis quod in ipſis tale futurum eſt ut cum immortalibus appellatione conveniat, divinúmque vocetur, principatúmque teneat, & juſtitiam ſimul ac vos ultro colat: Ego vobis ſemen & initium tradam, vos caetera exequi par eſt, ut immortali naturae mortalem attexentes, faciatis generetíſque animalia, ſubminiſtrantéſque alimenta augeatis, & conſumpta rurſum recipiatis. Haec fatus, in eodem cratere in quo mundi totius animam permiſcens temperavit, ſuperioris temperationis reliquias miſcendo perfudit, &c. Satis autem & quaſi ſparſis animis, per ſingula ſingulis convenientia temporum inſtrumenta, fore ut animal naſceretur, quod omnium animalium maximè eſſet divino cultui deditum.

Thus he now gives us an account of the Creation of Man, namely, of his Soul by the great God. Therefore Plato ſeems not to be reckoned among the firm Aſſertors of the Eternity of Mankind, nor of the World; and accordingly his follower Proclus herein agrees with his Maſter.

3. Touching Ariſtotle, and the Peripateticks that were his followers, as Simplicius, Averroes, and others (except Philoponus) their Opinion ſeems to be for the Eternity not only of the World, but of Mankind, and of the perfect Animals: ſo that in l. 3. de Generatione Animalium, cap. 1. he determins, Quod non fuit primus leo, &c. and in his way of reaſoning follows Ocellus Lucanus, who was a more ancient Philoſopher, and tenaciouſly aſſerted the Eternity of the World.

Yet Ariſtotle himſelf ſeems not to be over-confident of this Opinion, but holds it as a Problem, and in ſome places ſeems to give Intimations to the contrary. 2. Politic, cap. 6. Putandum est primos homines ſive ex terra geniti fuerunt, ſive ex corruptione aliqua ſervati, ignaros fuiſſe, &c. and in his 3d de Generatione, upon the various Productions of the Earth and Water, Ut animae quodammodo plena ſunt omnia: and in his 10th Problem, ſect. 15. Qui de natura diſſerunt, animantia in principio orta eſſe dicunt ingenti aliqua mundi universíque mutatione: and in his 64th Problem of his 10th Section, Quam ob cauſam animantium alia non ſolum coitu ſed etiam ſponte naturae procreantur, alia ex coitu duntaxat proveniunt, ut Homo & Equus, etſi non ob aliam cauſam, tamen quod aliis gignendi tempus breve ſtatutum eſt. Itaque fieri non poteſt ut tempus quod vim obtinet generandi amplificetur prorogetúrque, ſed temporum viciſſítudine prorogationéque, ut prorogetur contingit; aliis multò generatio ampliari ſolet: etenim vel anno vel decem menſium ſpatio confici aſſolet, quo pacto vel nullo pacto, vel ex coitu procreari illa neceſſe est. So that he attributes the reaſon of the new production of Men and great Animals only to the time that they are to be perfected in utero. And l. 1. Topicor. cap. 11. he ſtates the Queſtion, Whether the World had a Beginning, or not? to be a Problem; wherein probabilities are on either ſide.

By theſe paſſages of Ariſtotle himſelf, he ſeems not to be ſo poſitive in his Opinion touching the Eternity of Mankind at leaſt; but rather inclines to that for the Eternity of Generations, upon theſe Reaſons: 1. Becauſe he was not willing to ſuppoſe any other ſtate of things in the World than what he found; and ſince he never found any production of Mankind, or the perfect Animals, ex non genitis, he therefore concluded them to have been ever produced in that method that he found them in the ordinary and ſetled courſe of Nature. 2. Becauſe, as he was not ſatisfied with the ſtrange and improbable Hypotheſes of Empedocles, Anaximander, and Democritus touching the Production of Mankind; ſo he could not excogitate any of his own which had any clearneſs or certainty to him, being utterly unacquainted (for ought we know) with the Moſaical Hypotheſis. 3. Becauſe he being a great admirer of Nature, and the ordinary proceeding thereof, he was not willing to entertain any ſuch Suppoſition as was not evident, according to the ordinary method of Nature, which he ſo much venerated; eſpecially ſuch as might ſeem diſſonant to his great Hypotheſis of the Eternity of the general Frame of the reſt of the Univerſe.

And therefore, lib. 3. de Generatione Animalium, cap. 11. upon a Suppoſition of a firſt Production of Men or Animals, he conforms his Theſis concerning them to his general Doctrine: Quamobrem de prima hominum atque quadrupedum generatione (ſi quando primum terrigenae oriebantur, ut aliqui dicunt) non temere exiſtimaveris altero, de duobus his, modo oriri; aut enim ex verme constituto primum, aut ex ovo: quippe cum aut intra ſe habeant cibum ad incrementum neceſſe ſit, qui quidem conceptus vermis eſt; aut aliunde accipere, ìdque aut ex parente, aut ex parte conceptus. Itaque ſi alterum fieri non poteſt ut effluat ex terra, quomodo caeteris animalibus ex parente, relinquitur neceſſario, ut ex parte conceptus accipiatur. Talem autem generationem eſſe ex ovo aut verme fatemur. Ergo ſi initium ullum generationis omnium animalium fuit, alterutrum de his fuiſſe probabile eſſe apertum eſt. Sed minus rationis eſt, ut ex ovo prodierint; nullius enim generationem animalem talem videmus; ſed alterum tum ſanguineorum quae diximus, tum exanguium, qualia ſunt inſectorum nonnulla, & ea quae teſta operiuntur, de quibus agitur. Non enim ex parte aliqua oriuntur, ut ea quae ovo naſcuntur. Thus he conforms his Poſition to his general Doctrine, upon a Suppoſition of the ſpontaneous Origination of Animals.

4. I come to the general Doctrine of the Epicureans under which I include that of Anaximander and Empedocles, who though they differ ſomething in the manner of their Hypotheſis, yet they agree in the main for a kind of ſpontaneous production out of the Earth. 1. Empedocles ſeems to think that the Limbs or Members of Men grew here and there ſcattered and diſtinct, and that they were after concrete together by Heat and Moiſture, into the ſtature, as it ſeems, of a full grown Man. 2. Anaximander thinks that they grew into the full ſtature of Men and Women in the involucrum of ſomething like Fiſhes, and then brake out into the World, as it ſeems, in their perfect ſtature. And that near unto this was the Opinion of Anaximander, appears by Plutarch, in Placitis Philoſophorum, l. 5. cap. 19. Prima animalia in humore nata corticibus contenta ſpinoſis, adultiora autem facta ad ſiccitatem deſciviſſe, ruptóque cortice non multum temporis ſupervixiſſe. Only in the recital of his Opinion by Cenſorinus and Plutarch, they both ſeem to agree in this, that they were of full growth when they thus broke their Priſons. 3. Democritus and Epicurus ſeem to think that they were hatched in theſe Folliculi or Terreſtrial Excreſcences, and then nouriſhed by a Juyce of the Earth, until they were able to ſhift for themſelves. Lucretius hath given us the Doctrine of Epicurus in Verſe, in his fifth Book, Pag. 665. which is rendred in Proſe by Gaſſendus, in Syntagmate Philoſoph. Epicur. ſect. 2. cap. 4.

Tum ubi terra dedit primum mortalia ſêcla, Multus enim calor atque humor ſuperabat in arvis; Hinc ubi quaeque loci regio opportuna dabatur, Creſcebant uteri terrae radicibus apti; Quos ubi tempore maturo patefecerat aetas, Infantum fugiens humorem, auráſque petiſſens Convertebat ubi natura foramina terrae, Et ſuccum venis cogebat fundere apertis: Conſimilem lactis ſicut nunc ſemina quaeque Quum peperit dulci repletur lacte, &c.

And again, Lib. 2. Pag. 256.

Denique coeleſti ſumus omnes ſemine oriundi; Omnibus ille idem Pater eſt, unde alma liquentes Humorum guttas mater cum terra recepit. Foeta parit nitidas fruges, arbuſtaque laeta, Et genus humanum, &c.

And afterwards, in the ſame Book, Pag. 281. he gives us the reaſon why the Earth gives not the ſame Productions now.

Jámque adeo fracta eſt aetas, effoetaque tellus, Vix animalia parva creat, quae cuncta creavit Sêcla, deditque ferarum ingentia corpora partu.

But although Epicurus and his followers ſuppoſe that ſmall and imperceptible Atoms of Matter are the firſt Principia of all Corporeal things, yet he doth ſuppoſe that theſe Principia are firſt moulded into Semina, or Seminales moleculae, which were the immediate Conſtituents of all compleat Bodies, whether animate or inanimate; whereby all things are contained and determined within certain Species. Vide lib. 1. pag. 35.

At nunc ſeminibus quia certis quidque creatur, Inde enaſcitur, atque oras in luminis exit, Materies ubi ineſt quoiuſque & corpora prima. Atque hac re nequeunt ex omnibus omnia gigni; Quod certis in rebus ineſt ſecreta facultas.

Which Gaſſendus thus renders, Sect. 2. Cap. 4. in Syntagmate Philoſophiae Epicuri, having given us an account of the Concretion of the Heavenly and Elementary Bodies, he thus determins out of him concerning the ſmaller Parts of Nature: De minus praecipuis & veluti partium particulis, videtur in prima illa commiſtione effecta fuiſſe generabilium & corruptibilium rerum, varia ſemina ex quibus res variae & conformatae tum fuerunt, & deinceps magna ex parte propagari etiam potuerint.

And this caſual Production of Mankind at firſt was not only the Suppoſition of Epicurus, but alſo of the Egyptians and Phenicians.

Touching both, Caelius Rhodog. lib. 2. cap. 11. Phoenicum quidem & Aegyptiorum theologia, caſu homines & reliqua animantium genera prorepſiſſe è terra aſſeverebatur. And Diodorus Siculus, lib. 1. gives us a large Relation of the Opinion of the Egyptians, very like to that of Epicurus and Anaximander; wherein, after ſome declaration of the Manner of the firſt Separation of the Elementary and Heavenly Bodies, he proceeds to tells us; Terram verò lutoſam evaſiſſe, & omninò mollem: H • c primum cum Solis ardore denſior evaſiſſet, ejus poſtmodum ſuperficie vi caloris tumefacta, multis in locis humores eſſe concretos, in quibus putredines tenui contectae pellicula ſint excitatae; quemadmodum in paludibus & stagnis Aegyptiis adhuc videmus accidere, cum frigidam terram ſubitò aeſtus aeris calefacit. Cum verò in humidis calore adhibito generatio fiat, & noctu quidem circumfuſus aer humorem praeſtet, qui die Solis virtute conſolidetur: tandem putredines illae ad ſummum perductae, adveniente veluti partus tempore, exutis confractiſque pelliculis, omne genus educunt animantium: quorum ea quae majorem ſortita calorem ſunt, in ſuperiorem regionem volatilia effecta abierunt; quae verò plus terrae continebant, ſerpentia, aliáque terreſtria evaſerunt animantia. Naturam aquoſam nacta in ſui generis elementum delata ſunt, & appellati Piſces: Terra deinde cum Solis ardore, tum ventis deinceps arefacta, à gignendis majoribus animalibus deſiit. Sed quae generata erant, mutua commixtione alios animantes procreaverunt. Haec & Euripides Anaxagorae Phyſici diſcipulus ſentire videtur, cum in Menalippo coelum & terram mixta olim fuiſſe tradat, ſeparata poſtmodum generaſſe ſingula, arbores, volatilia, feras, aquatilia, & omne mortalium genus. De prima terrae generatione quamvis praeter opinionem nonnullis eſſe videatur, tamen ea quae nunc fiunt teſtimonium his videntur afferre. Nam juxta Thebaidem Aegypti, cum Nili ceſſavit inundatio, calefaciente Sole limum ab aqua relictum, multis in locis ex terrae hiatu multitudo murium oritur: quod argumentum est ab ipſo orbis primordio animantia ſimiliter omnia generata eſſe. Eodem modo quoque & homines à principio genitos, in agris paeſtum quaerentes vixiſſe. And again, in his ſecond Chapter of that firſt Book: Tradunt Aegyptii ab orbis initio primos homines apud ſe creatos, cum bonitate foelicitatéque ſoli, tum propter Nilum qui & multa generat, & ſuapte natura quae genuit facillimè nutrit: nam arundinum radices praebet, & loton & Aegyptiam fabam, multáque praeterea ad hominum victum expoſita. Prima animantia apud ſe eſſe ortae ea utuntur conjectura, quod nunc etiam in Thebaidis agro certis temporibus multi & magni generantur mures; quâ ex re plurimum ſtupent homines, cum videant anteriorem uſque pectus & priores pedes murium partem animatam moveri, poſteriori nondum inchoata, ſed informi. Ex hoc perſpicuum fieri aiunt, ab ipſo orbis ortu primos homines Aegyptum protuliſſe. In nullo enim orbis parte accidit eo modo animaliae creari. I have tranſcribed it at large, as Euſebius did before me, Lib. 1. Praepar. becauſe it contains a large and full Expoſition of the Hypotheſes of thoſe Philoſophers that thus ſuppoſe an Origination of Mankind, and that by a ſpontaneous Production.

In theſe precedent Opinions of Anaximander, Empedocles, Epicurus, and the Egyptians, there is ſomething that agrees with that Truth that I have aſſerted, namely, The Origination of Mankind ex non genitis. And for this purpoſe theſe Inſtances are eſpecially given by me. But there is ſomething that I ſhall in what follows impugn, namely, The Method or Manner of ſuch Productions, which according to theſe Mens Opinions is either purely Caſual, as Epicurus and his followers held; or at leaſt Natural and Neceſſary, as Anaximander, Empedocles, and ſome of the looſe paſſages of Ariſtotle ſeem to import, viz. by ſome great Conjunction of the Heavenly Bodies, and ſome great Natural Mutation in the Elementary World.

5. I now come to the farther Examination of the Hypotheſis of the Stoicks, who alſo agree in this main Truth, That Mankind had an Original ex non genitis: and the Founder of that Sect hath given a rational and true Method thereof, namely, That this Origination was by the Power and Will of Almighty God: But when thoſe of this Sect came to give a more particular Explication of the Manner of this Production, they ſeem to differ.

Tully was generally well inclined to the Stoical Sect, yet ſometimes he is a Stoick, ſometimes an Academick, ſometimes an Epicurean, and indeed in ſome of his Diſcourſes which he hath digeſted in Dialogues, he ſeems to be every thing.

In his firſt Book de Legibus he hath this paſſage touching the Origination of Man: Nam cum de natura omni quaeritur, diſputari ſolent nimirum iſta: perpetuis curſibus, converſionibus coeleſtibus extitiſſe quandam materiam ſerendi generis humani, quod ſparſum in terras, atque ſatum, divino auctum ſit animorum munere. Nam quod aliquibus cohaerent homines, è mortali genere ſumſerunt, quae fragilia eſſent, & caduca: animum eſſe ingeneratum, à Deo: ex quo verè vel agnatio nobis cum coeleſtibus, vel genus vel ſtirps appellari poteſt. Itaque ex tot generibus nullum est animal, prater hominem, quod habeat notitiam aliquam Dei; de ipsísque hominibus nullagens est neque tam immanſueta, neque tam fera, quae non, etiam ſi ignoret, qualem habere Deum deceat, tamen habendum ſciat. Ex quo efficitur illud ut is agnoſcat Deum, qui unde ortus ſit, quaſi recordetur ac noſcat. By this he ſuppoſeth that there might be as it were a Proſemination of the Humane Fabrick by the Converſion of the Heavens, and then the ſame were ſtored with Souls immediately produced by Almighty God.

Seneca, following the received Opinion of the Viciſſitudes of the Deſtruction of the inferior World by Floods and Conflagrations, and the Reſtitutions thereof by the Power of God, though he ſeems to admit Eternal Viciſſitudes of ſuch Making, and Unmaking, and Reſtitutions of the inferior World, in the latter end of his third Book of Natural Queſtions, before cited, Sect. II. Cap. 9. ſpeaking of the Deſtruction of the World by Univerſal Floods: Qua ratione inquis? eadem qua conflagratio futura eſt; utrumque fit cum Deo viſum ordiri meliora, vetera finire: aqua & ignis terrenis dominantur; ex his ortus, ex his interitus. And in the end of that Book: Nec ea ſemper licentia undis erit; ſed peracto exitio generis humani, extinctiſque pariter feris in quarum homines ingenia tranſierant, iterum aquas terra ſorbebit: natura pelagus ſtare aut intra terminos ſuos furere coget, & rejectus è noſtris ſedibus, in ſua ſecreta pelletur Oceanus; antiquus ordo revocabitur, omne ex integro animal generabitur, dabitúrque terris homo inſcius ſcelerum, & melioribus auſpiciis natus; ſed illis quoque innocentia non durabit, niſi dum novi ſunt.

And with this ſeems to accord the Judgment of Plutarch, 2. Sympoſiac. quaeſt. 3. and out of him, Macrob. in 7. Saturnal. cap. ult. where in the diſſertation of that ſeeming ludicrous Queſtion, Ovúmne prius an Gallina? the Diſputant for the latter concludes; Natura primum ſingula animalia perfecta formavit, deinde perpetuam legem dedit ut continuaretur propagatione ſucceſſio. And Plutarch, Probabile eſt primum ortum ex terra temporis perfectione abſolutum fuiſſe, nihílque indigentem hujuſmodi inſtrumentis, receptaculis, & vaſis qualia nunc ob imbecillitatem natura parat & machinatur parientibus.

This was the Sentence and Judgment of the Stoical Philoſophers touching the Origination of perfect Animals and Men.

Upon all which foregoing Diſcourſe it ſhould ſeem, That the generality of the Learned World rather ſuppoſed an Origination than an Eternity of Mankind; and this upon two great Motives.

1. A Tradition which ſeems generally to have been derived unto Mankind from the firſt Parents thereof, and ſo generally believed and entertained.

2. A great congruity of Reaſon that attended this Hypotheſis, and an extrication thereby of the Minds of conſidering Men from infinite difficulties which the Suppoſition of Eternal Generations doth neceſſarily produce.

I ſhould now come to thoſe Philoſophers and Learned Men of later Ages, Avicen, Cardan, Pomponatius Ciſalpinus, Berogardus, and others; which nevertheleſs I ſhall referr to the next Chapter to be examined to another purpoſe.

CAP. II. Touching the various Methods of the Origination of Mankind.

HItherto I have endeavoured to ſhew thoſe Evidences both of Reaſon and of Fact, which ſeem to aſſert the Origination of Mankind; and I have concluded with that laſt in the two precedent Chapters, namely, The Opinion and Perſwaſion of the Unlearned and Learned part of Mankind that have ſuppoſed ſuch an Origination of Mankind, the weight or authority of which reſts in the conſideration of thoſe Means whereby this Opinion or Perſwaſion hath been ingenerated in Mankind: For the Opinions or Perſwaſions of Men, concerning eſpecially a Matter of Fact, have their weight or authority in argumentation from that Principle or Motive of ſuch a Perſwaſion: and this I have reduced to one or both of theſe:

1. Some Tradition that hath been derived, and derived in probability from the firſt Parents of Mankind, that beſt knew their own Inception, which hath ſince accordingly prevailed almoſt in all Places and Ages.

2. The congruity of ſuch a Suppoſition to Reaſon, and the Solution of thoſe Difficulties which muſt needs ariſe from an Eternal Succeſſion of Mankind. And this Motive of this Perſwaſion, though it began with the more thinking and conſidering ſort of Mankind, yet from them hath been inſinuated and derived unto the reſt of Mankind, and by them entertained, as conſonant to the common Reaſon of Humane Nature.

I have laid the weight of my reaſoning touching the Origination of Mankind upon the Reaſons firſt given in the beginning of this Tract; and I have only ſubjoyned thoſe Reaſons of Fact that might probably bear teſtimony to the truth of the Suppoſition, and I have endeavoured to ſhew where the ſtrength, and where the deficiencies of thoſe Evidences of Fact do reſt; and which are moſt concludent, and which not.

I have concluded all theſe Evidences of Fact, with this concerning the common or general conſent of the greateſt and learnedſt part of Mankind therein; and I have concluded with this Evidence of Fact, not as if this were entertained by all: for 1. It is not without Oppoſers, as Ariſtotle, Ocellus Lucanus, and the Pythagoreans: and 2. Common Opinion or Perſwaſion of Mankind, eſpecially touching Matter of Fact, is very fallible and unſtable: 3. In this very Matter in queſtion, there are by common perſwaſion of many of theſe Men, ſuperadded certain fabulous, incredible and untrue Surmiſes touching the Manner and the Methods of this Origination, appearing in ſome of the Opinions delivered in the former Chapter.

But the reaſon why I conclude with that Inſtance touching the Opinions of Men, is, becauſe it lets me into that which is the Second principal Part of this Diſcourſe, namely, The various Hypotheſes of thoſe that ſuppoſed, admitted, or believed this Origination, which are in effect all contained in the former Chapter, which I intend in the following Diſcourſe to examin.

Therefore, having thus partly out of the common Perſwaſion of Mankind, but principally by the other foregoing Reaſons made my Concluſion, That Mankind had a Beginning, now, as I think, delivered what may be ſaid for the proof of this Propoſition, That Mankind had their Original ex non genitis, and in ſome good meaſure eſtabliſhed that Suppoſition; I now proceed to examin the truth or probability of thoſe ſeveral Suppoſitions which are before delivered, touching the Means, Method or Manner of this Origination.

And not to examin every particular Adjunct or Explication of theſe ſeveral Methods, I ſhall divide theſe general Suppoſitions of the Ancients touching the Origination of Mankind into theſe three.

1. The Opinion, That the production of Mankind was ex non genitis, was fortuitous or caſual; ſuch was the Opinion of Democritus, Epicurus, and ſome others: the manner of the Explication thereof I ſhall hereafter conſider.

1. The Opinion, That the production of Mankind was ex non genitis, was natural, and was founded upon a natural concourſe of Cauſes, eſpecially the diſpoſition of the Earth and Water, and the Influx of the Heaven. This was the Opinion of ſome of the Antients, but much improved by ſome later Philoſophers.

3. The Opinion, That the production of Mankind ex non genitis was by the immediate Power, Wiſdom, and Providence of Almighty God, and his meer Beneplacitum. This was the Opinion of the Stoicks, and differs but very little from the Divine Truth touching Man's Creation, as it is delivered by Moſes.

And that which is ſaid either for or againſt theſe Methods of the production of Mankind, will be alſo applicable to the production of the perfect Animals that have their ordinary production ex conjunctione maris & faeminae, and not otherwiſe; though what is ſaid concerning thoſe Animals will be more evident touching Man, which is a far more perfect nature than other Animals.

Firſt therefore I begin with the Opinion of the Epicureans, which was in ſubſtance this; That there were eternally an infinite number of ſmall imperceptible Bodies, that floated up and down in a vaſt infinite Inane; and theſe were the Principia of all other Beings beneath Almighty God: theſe they call Atoms. That thoſe Atoms were eternally and caſually moved in this infinite Vacuum, and by their mutual percuſſions the great Syſtems of the Heavenly and Elementary Bodies were framed and concreted: That beſides that concourſe of Atoms that conſtituted the greater Integrals of the World, there was a certain coalition of Atoms that conſtituted certain Semina or Seminal Bodies, for the ſtoring and furniſhing the greater Integrals of the Univerſe, eſpecially the Earth and Seas: That though the coalition of thoſe Semina were caſual, and by an accidental or fortuitous aggregation of ſome Atoms; yet theſe were the immediate, primitive, productive Principles of Men, Animals, Birds and Fiſhes, and that determined them in their ſeveral Species: That thoſe Primordial Seeds thus fortuitouſly coagulated out of the Prima principia, or Atoms, were ſcattered by their Motion into the Earth and Seas: That by reaſon of the ſtrength of the newly coagulated Bodies of the Earth and Water, and the heat of the Sun, theſe Semina did bring forth Man, and Brutes, and Birds, and Fiſhes; but that by the decay of the ſtrength of the Earth and Waters, that Method of production of Men and perfect Animals is ceaſed, and their production now delegated ordinarily to Propagation: though in ſome places, and at ſome times, eſpecially between the Tropicks, ſuch a Pullulation of Men and Beaſts may be ſuppoſed to be: That yet to this day the ſpontaneous production of ſome ſort of Vegetables and Inſects continues ſtill in force, the Earth and Waters being furniſhed with a ſufficient ſtore of ſuch Semina either of old or daily production; and with a ſufficient ſtrength, by the help of the Solar or Ethereal Heat, to perfect their productions: That the firſt ſpontaneous production of Men and the perfect Animals was in certain Folliculi or Bladders, excreſcent from the Earth; and the growth of theſe Men and Animals gradual, being firſt Embryones, then grown ripe for Birth, then breaking out of thoſe Folliculi, and furniſhed with nouriſhment from the Earth, inſtar lactis, till they were able to ſhift for themſelves.

Touching this Suppoſition, although it contain in it that Truth that I have hitherto contended for, namely, That Mankind had an Original ex non genitis; or, That the Generations of Mankind in that order which now it holds, was not Eternal: yet the Manner or Method of this Epicurean Origination of the World, and particularly of the perfect Animals, but eſpecially of Mankind, is meerly fictitious, untrue, and impoſſible.

1. The Principia or Atoms of infinite number floating in Vacuo infinito, is a thing meerly invented, and hath neither truth, nor evidence, nor probability in it.

2. The Motion of theſe Atoms in this great Vacuum, unleſs firſt excited or put into Motion by ſome intelligent active Principle, is fabulous and incredible.

3. The Coalition of theſe Atoms by fortuitous ſtrokes or motions, and their Coalition into that admirable Order and Conſtitution which we ſee in the Univerſe, or greater Integrals of this Mundus aſpectabilis, is utterly incredible, and indeed impoſſible. But theſe things being beſide my preſent purpoſe, and deſerving a large proſecution, I ſhall diſmiſs.

4. Touching theſe Semina, and the Coagulation of them by the fortuitous coalition of Atoms, they were driven to this Suppoſition, becauſe they found themſelves at a loſs, if they ſhould have ſuppoſed, that per ſaltum their Atoms had been the immediate Conſtituents of Men and Animals; they could never have ſalved that ſpecification of things in their ſeveral kinds, and the continuation of them in that conſtancy and order which is evidently found in the natures of Men and Animals; but either there would be an utter incertainty in the firſt Conſtitution of them, quidlibet ex quolibet; or at leaſt it were impoſſible that they ſhould continue their Propagation of their kind, but the conſtituent Atoms that ſhould make up a Man, might have fallen into the Conſtitution of a Horſe, or a Lion. Lucret. ubi ſupra.

Atque hac re nequeunt ex omnibus omnia gigni, Quod certis in rebus ineſt ſecreta voluntas.

And again, Lib. 2.

Non tamen omnimodis connecti poſſe putandum eſt Omnia: nam vulgò fieri portenta videres, Semiferas hominum ſpecies exiſtere, Quorum nil fieri manifeſtum eſt, omnia quando Seminibus certis certa genitrice creata.

And again, it were never explicable by the various concourſe of Atoms, that there could be ſuch an orderly, conſtant, and admirable accommodation of the parts of the Body to their uſe, or one to another. It is truly ſaid by Galen in his 9th Book De Hipp. & Platonis decretis, l. 9. Quippe cum artem raro fine ſuo fruſtrari, fortunam raro eundem aſſequi, nemo ſit qui neſciat; quocirca temerariam & fortuitam, neque artificialem cauſam fabricae noſtri corporis exiſtimare, abſurdum. And again, in that divine Book De Uſu Partium, but eſpecially Lib. 11. that excellent Philoſopher ſhews the groſs abſurdity and impoſſibility that any happy concourſe of Atoms can ever fit and ſettle that congruity in the Parts of the Humane Body that is there. There needs no other Confutation of the vanity of that Opinion, than that excellent Expoſtulation in that Book, fit for the matter, but too long for the tenth of it to be here tranſcribed.

And therefore to avoid that inſuperable abſurdity, they have ſubſtituted a Medium between the Atomical Principles and the conſtitution of the ſpontaneous Birth of Men; namely, theſe Semina, made up to be the immediate Principle of theſe ſpontaneous Productions of Mankind, as alſo of perfect Animals in their firſt production.

What Semina there were in the firſt Conſtitution of Mankind, I ſhall have occaſion at large to examin in the next Chapter: But at preſent it ſhall ſuffice to ſay and prove, That there is as great an abſurdity and impoſſibility to ſuppoſe a caſual production of ſuch Semina, as there is to ſuppoſe an immediate caſual production of any Man or Animal omnibus numeris perfectum.

For this Seminium humanae naturae muſt have in it the Vital Nature, the power of attracting to it ſelf that ſubſtance which muſt ſerve to make up the Individual: It muſt have the power and energy of that formative act, whereby the Matter is conformed to its ſpecifical Nature; it muſt have potentially at leaſt the whole Syſteme of Humane Nature, or at leaſt that Ideal Principle or Configuration thereof, in the evolution whereof the complement and formation of the Humane Nature muſt conſiſt; and beſides this, it muſt have in it at leaſt potentially all the Faculties of the Humane Soul, not only the vim altricem, but the vim ſenſitivam & intellectualem, and all this drawn from a fortuitous coalition of ſenſeleſs and dead Atoms. Whereby theſe two grand Abſurdities would enſue:

1. That a ſort of dead, ſenſeleſs, unintelligent Particles of Matter, ſhould by their Coalition be advanced into a Being, that at leaſt potentially hath all the Faculties of Life, Senſe, or Intellect, and ſo ariſe to a perfection beyond the Sphere and Circle of their own Nature or Power.

2. That though it might be poſſible, that by skill and the wiſe conduct of an Intelligent Being, theſe Atoms might be ſo marſhalled or qualified, that they might advance to be a fit Seminium of a reaſonable Creature, yet it is not poſſible to ſuppoſe, that meer Chance or Fortune ſhould make up theſe Seminal Rudiments of the Humane Nature, becauſe the Actions of this Seminal Principle muſt be ſo noble and high, and yet ſo various and complicated, ſo curious and choice, that it is never poſſible for Chance to make it up, and yet if the leaſt ſtamen of this Compoſition be out of order, the whole office and uſe thereof is diſappointed: And therefore the ſame Galen makes the proceſſus formativus foetus to be no leſs admirable than the goodly ſtructure of the Humane Body, and as impoſſible to be the work of Chance as the other: And therefore in his Book de formatione foetus he ſaith, Ego vero, ſicut fabricam noſtri Corporis oſtendi ſummam Opificis & ſapientiam & potentiam prae ſe ferre; ita demonſtrari à Philoſophis velim, utrum is Opifex Deus aliquis ſit, & ſapiens & potens, qui & prius intellexit quale uniuſcujuſque animalis corpus eſſet fabricandum, & deinde quod propoſuerat potentia fuerit aſſecutus; an Anima aliqua à Deo diverſa. Neque enim naturae quae appellatur ſubſtantia, ſive corporea ſive incorporea ea ſit, ad ſummum ſapientiae dicent perveniſſe, quam ne ulla ſapientia eſſe praeditam inquiunt, unde eam tam artificioſe in foetuum formatione ſe geſſiſſe credendum non eſt: Hoc enim ab Epicuro aliiſque qui ſine providentia omnia fieri opinantur audientes, nullam fidem adhibemus. And in the Concluſion of that Book he as well blames the Platonicks, Dicentes Animam mundi foetus formare: nunquam tamen adduci potui ut crederem Scorpiones, Phalangia, Muſcas, Culices, Viperas, Vermes, Lumbricos, Pytalas ab eadem fingi & formari, prope ad impietatem accedere hanc opinionem ratus. So far was he from thinking it poſſible for the Nobler Natures of Mankind, or perfect Animals, to be the work of the Anima mundi (much leſs of Fortune) that he could not ſuppoſe it a ſufficient Cauſe of the Generation of Inſects.

And beſides all this, although a Man that hath received the Principle of Believing, that Almighty God might indeed ad beneplacitum mould up certain ſemina humanae naturae, and endue them with that admirable Formative Power: Yet ſurely for a Man that (as Epicurus did) pretends to be guided by the Conduct of Nature only, to ſuppoſe a thing ſo ſtrange to the nature of things, as they now appear, that there ſhould be another kind of ſemen humanum or animale than what is moulded in the Bodies of Men or Animals, and elicited from them by a coincidence only of ſtupid, dead, and ſenſeleſs Atoms, ſeems below the Genius of a Philoſopher. Oportet enim Phyſicum ſimiliter ſe habere in omnibus.

5. And as his Suppoſition of theſe Semina, thus caſually produc'd, ſeems unconſonant both to the Reaſon and Courſe of Nature, ſo his Suppoſition of the Manner of the Generation, and Production, and Nouriſhment of this Foetus, ſeems a Fiction utterly inconſonant to the whole Method of Nature, in relation to Mankind: For what Perſon, or what Age or Country, ever ſaw any ſuch kind of Production as this? any ſuch folliculi humani foetus? Or that ever credibly heard of any Man conceived niſi in utero muliebri? abating ſome of thoſe Fables that Fortunius Licetus delivers in his Firſt Book, cap. 28. or ſuch as have been begotten by an abominable conjunction.

Again, how is it poſſible, that an Infant, whoſe Nature cannot be kept alive one moment ſine calore uterino, ſhould be preſerved in Bladders adhering to the cold Earth? Or that that Infant, who by the very courſe of Nature cannot be ſupported without the care and overſight of others for divers Months, nay ſome Years after his Birth, ſhould be able ſub dio & Jove frigido to preſerve it ſelf? Again, who ever ſaw, or credibly heard of thoſe venae lacteae ariſing in the Earth, and yielding a ſutable nutriment to a new born Foetus? Theſe Suppoſitions muſt withall ſuppoſe a total Inverſion of the Courſe and Nature of Things quite from what they now are, and in all Ages have been; which, though it is true, thoſe that admit a higher Principle than Nature, do and may with ſufficient warrant and conſonancy to their Hypotheſis admit, yet is utterly unreaſonable for ſuch a Philoſopher, who not only with ſome of the ancient Peripateticks excludes any Divine Providence below the Moon, but wholly exterminates it, ultra flammantis moenia Coeli.

And this is all I ſay at preſent, touching that Opinion which ſuppoſeth a meer caſual Production of Mankind. There will be ſomething in the enſuing Chapter, which though it be applied to the Imaginary Hypotheſis of the Natural Production of Mankind, yet will be of uſe in relation to this Hypotheſis of the Caſual Production of Mankind.

CAP. III. Touching the Second Opinion of thoſe that aſſert the Natural Production of Mankind ex non genitis, or the poſsibility thereof.

THe ſecond Opinion is, that by a certain kind of natural Connexion of Cauſes, Mankind not only may be, but in their firſt Origination were produced ex non genitis: Which though for diſtinctions ſake from the ordinary courſe of Generation we may call ſpontaneous or accidental, yet the ſame, if it were true, were truly natural, and deduced by a certain Chain of Natural Cauſes; as the yearly production of Inſects, ex putri materia, or, as the Mice or Rats in Egypt are ſuppoſed by Diodorus Siculus to be produced after the decreaſe of Nilus in Egypt.

This ſeems to be the Opinion of ſome of the Ancients, that yet ſubſcribed not to the Hypotheſis of Epicurus touching the caſual production of things by the uncertain concourſe of Atoms, as of Anaximander and ſome others, which I ſhall not need here again to repeat; and the ſame Opinion hath been aſſerted by others, but with theſe two Correctives.

1. That the ſame is no caſual and fortuitous Production, by the meer caſual conjunction of Atomical Bodies, as Epicurus would have the firſt Semina, at leaſt of Men and Animals, to be made up; but by an ordinary, natural, and neceſſary connexion of Natural Cauſes and Effects.

2. That yet many of them blame the Ancients, as being too venturous in telling us the particular Method or Order of theſe Productions out of Folliculi, or Cortices ſpinoſi, or Fiſhes, becauſe that is not a thing diſcoverable by Experience, or Natural Light; yet herein they agree, That this Production may be, and hath been a Natural Production ex non genitis, though the particular Manner of it is not ſo eaſie to be certainly explained.

Hippocrates the great Phyſician ſeems to have inclined to this Perſwaſion; for, Sect. 3. de Carnibus, he writes to this purpoſe; Quod Calidum vocamus, id mihi immortale eſſe videtur; cunctáque intelligere, videre, & audire, ſentiréque omnia tum praeſentia tum futura, cujus pars maxima cum omnia perturbata eſſent in ſupremum ambitum ſeceſſit, quod mihi veteres videntur Aethera appellaſſe: altera pars locum infimum ſortita Terra quidem appellatur, frigida & ſicca, multáſque motiones habens in qua multum ſanè calidi inest: tertia verò pars medium aeris locum nacta est, calidum quid exiſtens: quarta pars, terrae proximum locum obtinens, humidiſſima & craſſiſſima. His igitur in orbem agitatis, cum turbata eſſet calidi pars magna, alias in terra relicta eſt, partim quidem magna, partim verò minor; & alias etiam valde parva, ſed in multas partes diviſa, & temporis ſucceſſu reſiccata terra iſta, in ea tanquam in membranis contenta circum ſe putredines excitans, & longo tempore incaleſcens, quod quidem ex terrae putredine pinguedinem ſortitum eſt; & minimum humidi habens, id citiſſimè oſſa produxit: And then aſſigns the Methods of conformation of the Nerves, Veins, Arteries, and the reſt of the Body in conformity to this Suppoſition. So this great Phyſician and Naturaliſt delivers his Opinion. Wherein we may obſerve, that he takes the Hot or Fiery Nature to be God, knowing and underſtanding all things; which ſeems to be the ancient Error of the Eaſtern Countries, eſpecially the Perſians.

Yet this is obſervable, 1. That he ſuppoſeth an Origination of Mankind after the Formation of the World. 2. Though the Formative Proceſs of Mankind ſeems in his Opinion to be in a ſort Natural, yet he ſuppoſeth it not purely ſo, but a Production by thoſe fiery Particles which were Particles of a Divine Intelligent Nature. And though he be miſtaken in the Method of the Origination of Mankind, as ſhall be ſhewn, yet he ſuppoſeth it, Opus intelligentis Naturae agentis per ſcientiam.

Avicen in the ſecond Book of his Metaphyſicks, cap. 15. delivers his Opinion; Poſſibile eſſe hominem generari ex terra, ſed convenientiùs in matrice: which Opinion Averroes his Country-man perſtringeth with ſome indignation, Commentar. 8. Phyſicor. cap. 5. Iſte ſermo ab homine qui dat ſe ſcientiae, eſt valde fatuus: his Reaſons, I confeſs, are ſuch as may not be admitted; for being a rigid Aſſertor of the Eternity of the World in the ſtate it now ſtands, he formeth his Reaſons againſt the Opinion of Avicen principally, if not altogether, upon that Hypotheſis.

Cardanus, in his ninth Book, de Animalibus quae ex Putredine generantur, diſcourſing about Locuſts, hath this paſſage; Et non ſolum ea minuta, ſed & majora animalia è putredine, imo omnia credendum est originem ducere; cum jam de Muribus conſtet, & Piſces in aquis recentibus ſponte generentur: but his ſevere Corrector, Julius Scaliger, in Exercit. 193. calls it, Illa impia & nefaria vox; Si Bos aliquando ex putri ortus eſt, cur poſt hominum memoriam ex ejuſmodi procreatione nullus exſtitit? Caeſalpinus, in his fifth Book Quaeſtionum Peripateticarum, cap. 1. undertakes an entire Defence of the Poſition of Cardanus, and contends not only that it is poſſible, but that de facto it is true. The ſum of his Opinion ſeems to be this,

That although the Soul of Man be of a higher nature and extraction, yet the Body, and theſe Powers or Faculties of Life and Senſe may be, and have been formed ex putredine, without the conjunction of Sexes; as Weeds, Vegetables, and Inſects.

And that he meaneth ſuch a Production to be by an ordinary courſe of Nature, he largely inſiſts upon that Axiom of Ariſtotle, Sol & homo generant hominem; which he underſtands in ſenſu diviſo, and that there is in the heat of the Sun an active, generative Principle, which in Matter prepared for its operation, commonly called Putrefaction, produceth a Seminal Formative Seed, ſufficient of it ſelf for the production of the Humane Nature, as alſo of the nature of other Animals.

That the Species of Animals are eternal, not upon the account of an eternal ſucceſſion by ordinary propagation, but by that ſucceſſion that would ariſe in certain great Conjunctions of the Heavens, and the heat of the Sun, which would be productive of the Individuals of the ſeveral Species; though all the Species of Animals were deſtroyed by Floods or other accidents, as poſſibly they might be.

That although the ordinary Method of preſerving the Species of Men and Animals by ordinary Generation, be fitted for the ordinary continuation of the Species; yet without this Method of production out of prepared Earth, Nature were defective, and wanted a ſufficient Expedient for the preſervation of Species upon great Occurrences.

That although this production of Men and perfect Animals ex putri be not obvious to our ordinary Experience, it is not becauſe the Suppoſition wants truth, but becauſe 1. Every place is not fit for ſuch a production, but where there is a conſtant and ſufficient heat, duly to prepare and digeſt the Matter. But the likelieſt place for ſuch production is ſome unknown place between the Tropicks, where the heat is great and conſtant. 2. Becauſe the maturation and ripening of ſuch Productions require longer time than that which is ſufficient for the production of Inſects: for we ſee greater Animals, even with all the advantages of the calor uterinus, require a longer time for their formation and maturation; as, a Man nine months, an Elephant two years; and conſequently, their productions without this auxilium uterinum muſt require longer time.

Then he gives us a large account touching Inſects, that ariſe ex putredine, and yet are of the ſame Species with thoſe that are produced per coitum; and that when they are produced ex putri materia, yet they propagate ſucceſſively Individuals of the ſame kind: and that if greater Animals were thus produced, they would be of the ſame Species with the like Animals propagated per generationem ordinariam, and would accordingly propagate their kind; as many Herbs and Trees ariſe ſpontaneouſly, yet are of the ſame Species with others that are per ſeminationem, and produce Seed, and thereby continue their Species as well as others that ariſe per proſeminationem.

This I take to be the effect of his Poſition and his Reaſons, which are very learnedly and ſmartly refuted by Fortunius Licetus, in his firſt Book de Spontaneo Ortu.

But yet there was one difficulty which Caeſalpinus doth not at all, as I remember, obviate, which yet renders his Suppoſition utterly inexplicable; namely, ſince the Heat and Influences of the Heavens, even in their ſuppoſed extraordinary Conjunctions, muſt needs be uniform at thoſe times, and in or near thoſe Climates wherein they happen, how comes it to paſs that the ſame univocal Heat doth produce at that time any variety of Animals? why ſhould it not produce only Men, as the beſt of Animals, rather than Horſes, Tigers, Lions, &c. Again on the other ſide, ſince the diſpoſition of all the parts of Terreſtrial Matter is ſo divers, and qualified with infinite combinations of Qualities and Particles, how it comes to paſs, that in theſe great Conjunctions there are not infinite varieties of things produced, but they are determinate in certain Ranks and Species of Being; whereas the modifications of the Matter are ſo various and infinite, that the Species of things would be infinite, irregular, Humano capiti cervicem equinam. So that there ſeems neceſſary ſome ſuperintendent Intellectual Nature, that by certain election and choice determined things in thoſe determinate Ranks, and contained them within it: For the heat and influence of the Heavenly Conjunctions and of the Sun being common and univerſal, and the various Particles of the Earth variouſly modified and qualified, there could never only by theſe means be any determining or containing the Species of Animals within any determinate conſtant figures or bounds: And this we ſhall hereafter find neceſſary, when we come to conſider the determination of Inſects alſo in their ſeveral Species.

Again, he gives us not any reaſonable Explication by this Hypotheſis how the diſcrimination of Sexes happen, how all things thus produced come to propagate their kind, and to contain their Productions within the ſpecifick limits of the natures of ſuch Animals; all which were neceſſary to be done, to render his Suppoſition of this natural production of Men or Animals ex putredine to be any way tolerable.

Beregardus therefore in his 10th Circulus Piſanus hath refined and rectified this Hypotheſis of Caeſalpinus, and of Pomponatius that went before him; and though he can never make out the truth or probability of his Suppoſition, yet he hath rendred it more tolerably explicable, eſpecially in relation to the forementioned deficencies; I will give the ſum of his Suppoſition briefly, as I underſtand it: And it ſeems thus;

That the Calidum innatum is that Altrix anima, and Princ • pium ſeminale ſine quo nihil gignitur, and is the Baſis of Life in all things that have it; but yet it is never ſingle, and by it ſelf, but is the firſt Rudiment of Life, and determined by the particular Species of Life in every Individual that hath Life: for there is no vivens that is not either Equus, or Canis, or Vitis, or ſome other determinate Vegetable or Animal.

That there are three kinds of this Life wherein it is ſpecifically determined, viz. Vegetable, Senſible, and Rational.

That at leaſt the two former (he means the latter alſo, if he durſt ſpeak out) are raiſed out of certain Seminal Principles, whereby the Calidum innatum is ſpecifically determined to this or that Specifical Life.

That theſe Semina are not eternal, becauſe made up of things or Principia that are pre-exiſting: this ſeems perfectly to agree with the Doctrine of Epicurus before mentioned, whoſe Patronage he ſeems to take in the Perſon of Ariſtaeus, yet with ſome Correctives, as is hereafter ſhewn.

That there were in Nature various kinds of Calida, or Fiery Particles, or Spiritus ignei, and various kinds of Humida and Frigida; theſe were eternally floating up and down in ſmall Particles, and variouſly agitated and mingled, which made up by this mixture the conſtituent Semina of Vegetative and Senſitive Natures.

That in this Conſtitution of the various kinds of the Spiritus ignei were the conſtituent Animae vegetabilium & ſenſibilium, and the various kind of Humores were the Oleum and Balſamum vitae; and according to the variety of theſe Spiritus ignei, which were as it were Seminium naturae, were the various Species of theſe Semina, and the various ſpecifical production of Vegetable and Senſible Natures aroſe from them.

That the Compoſition of theſe Semina was not meerly fortuitous, as Epicurus, but he gives us a more gentle Explication thereof; Praecipua verò & planè divina est permiſtio iſta, quae in particulas diffringuntur minutiſſimas, & quantum ſatis est ad componendum ſemen misti alicujus aptiſſime coagmentantur, ut non magis quam par eſt, neque minus illud efficient; quippe ſunt naturae ad hoc determinatae.

That theſe are the Seeds of all living things, and they were ſcattered up and down in the Earth and Waters; and that therefore every living Being had its proper Semen for his Origination there lodged.

That yet till the Matter wherein theſe Seeds were lodged were conveniently prepared, there would be no production of Animals by theſe Seeds.

That the Semina of Mankind, and of the greater Animals required a greater and more effectual preparation of the Matter, or a Menſtruum for their production put of thoſe Semina, and therefore required the greater Conjunctions of the Heavens for their production; though ordinary Conjunctions ſerve for the production of Inſects and Vegetables, namely, the regreſs of the Sun.

That by theſe Semina of all living Beings, though the World were eternal, there might be ſucceſſive Supplies and Reparations of Animals and Men; and though the whole Species of Men and Animals were deſtroyed, yet upon the returns of theſe great Conjunctions and Poſitions of the Heavens requiſite for a due preparation of the Menſtruum in the Earth for theſe Semina, their Species would be reſtored out of theſe Semina.

That the Terrigenae might either be produced adulti, and ſo able to ſhift for themſelves; or elſe be furniſhed with a convenient nouriſhment from the Earth; or that they might be in their firſt production not like Infants new born, but able to get their livelihood, as ſome young Brutes are.

Thus we have the Suppoſition of this witty Man alſo, who by the ſuppoſition of theſe antecedent Semina, made up of the divers Spiritus ignei and Humores, hath ſupplied what was wanting in Caeſalpinus, or at leaſt better explicated it; and by ſuppoſing this mixture of theſe Spiritus igneì and Humores in their ſeveral proportions, by ſomething more than a fortuitous means, hath ſomething rectified the exorbitancy of Epicurus; though ſtill he ſuppoſe thoſe Spiritus ignei, which were as it were the various Souls of thoſe various Seeds, and afterwards of the ſeveral Animals produced by them, were natural and eternal.

That which ſeems to have given the original ground-work of all theſe Opinions, hath been,

1. Some Expreſſions that fell from Ariſtotle, which are before mentioned, that ſeem to give countenance to this Opinion.

2. A proud vanity in Men of Wit, to reſolve all things into Nature and pure natural and neceſſary Cauſes, unwilling to recognize the interpoſition of Almighty God, and his Beneplacitum in the Origination of things, and yet finding too many abſurdities accompanying the Hypotheſis of Eternal Generations of Mankind, ex ſucceſſivis genitis.

3. But principally the Obſervation of the ſpontaneous production of Inſects and little Animals ex putri materia, whoſe ſtructure nevertheleſs is as admirable as the ſtructure of greater Animals; and that they alſo being thus originally produced, yet propagate their kind by ſucceſſive Generations, have diſtinction of Sexes and Faculties: This, it ſeems, principally gave ſtart to this Opinion touching the like Origination of Mankind and greater Animals by a natural ſpontaneous production.

And becauſe this Inſtance of the natural production of Inſects is that, which as it probably gave the riſe to this Opinion for the like production of Mankind or other Animals, and ſeems to be the only experimental Inſtance that is given to aſſert the poſſibility or probability of the other, I ſhall conſider it largely under theſe ſeveral Examinations.

1. Whether there be any ſponte orta among Vegetables and Inſects, but eſpecially the latter.

2. Admit there be, yet whether thoſe ſponte orta do ariſe meerly from any natural or accidental Cauſe.

3. Admit they may ariſe from any natural or accidental Cauſe, yet whether there be any conſequence of a like poſſibility in the Origination of perfects Animals, but eſpecially of Mankind.

4. Admit it may be poſſible in Speculation, yet how far forth de facto the ſame hath happened without the interpoſition of the Divine Power; which renders it a ſupernatural, not a natural production.