THE former trouble I gave you upon this Subject, you pulled upon your self by desiring my opinion in it; but for this I now give you, I must beg your pardon, it being singly upon my own account, to do my self [...]ht, and justifie what I then wrote to you, against several aspersions cast upon me in a Pamphlet entituled, The Right of Bishops to judge in Capital Cases in Parliament, &c. made it seems by the same person, who had set out the other Pamphlet intituled, The Honours of the Spiritual Lords asserted, &c. Of which I gave you some account in a Postscript to my former Letter, and I think, without any sharp reflection either upon that Author or his work. The most I said was, When I had instanced in three notorious falsifications of his: The first is, p. 112. where he quotes Mr. Selden to prove, That the Spiritualty made their Proxies in Capital Causes in more Parliaments than the 21 R. 2. for that they did it likewise in the 2 H. 4. and 2 H. 5. which I shew was a mistake, and only said he could not find it so in the Record it self, but that he took it upon trust out of the Margin of [Page 2] Mr. Seldens book of the Priviledges of the Baronage p. 125. where there is such a quotation of the 2 H. 4. and the 2 H. 5. but wholly misapplyed by our Assertor of Honours; for Mr. Selden alledges that Precedent to shew, that whereas 2 H. 5. it was by the then Earl of Salisbury assigned as an error in the Attainder of his Father, (who was condemned of High-Treason in the 2 H. 4.) because it was done Sans Assent des Prelates, which are the words of the Record, Without the Assent of the Prelates (by the way speaks nothing of Proxies) it was then adjudged to be no error, and his Petition rejected, which in truth is a strong Argument to prove that the Prelates had no right to be present at such Tryals and Judgments, which is the main Question between us. And though he being of another mind, had maintained his opinion by so gross a prevarication, I was so far from retorting it upon him with any bitterness, saying, It was disingenious, and a suppressing of truth, and not setting things down faithfully; which is his ordinary language concerning me: Or with insipid jeers, saying, I wear a sharp Sword, a Trenchant Toledo, as one of the younger house of great Alexander; and that he brings me to the Sun like Alexanders Horse; and telling of the Magical combate in Apuleius; and a City of Birds in Aristophanes, and such other scurralous passages as his Book is full of; which shews the sweetness of the Gentlemans nature, and the goodness of his cause, which he maintains only by railing and false assertions: Whereas I rather lessened his fault, saying, [Page 3] only that he was mistaken, by being misled by the Printers misplacing the quotation, so excusing him from any wilful error, and purposely venting of untruths.
I do the like in another great falshood of his in the page following, upon his citing a Record 21 R. 2. In the case of the Earl of Arundel, which he makes to be, That the Lord Steward by the assent of the King, Bishops and Lords, adjudged the said Earl guilty of Treason; whereas the Record runs, That the Lord Steward by the commandment of the King and all the Temporal Lords, and Sr. Thomas Percy, empowered by the Prelates, and all the Clergy of the Kingdom, judged him guilty, &c. This you see is a foul misrepresenting of his Precedent, and imposing upon the Reader a falshood instead of a true Record, for it shews that no Bishop was personally present, and I make it out, That the putting of a Lay-man in their steads, is a strong evidence of the incapacity of all Clergy men to be any of them personally present at any of those Tryals. Yet in this I rather excuse our bold Assertor, shewing how he was misled here likewise by Sr. Robert Cottons Abridgment; and only add this, That methinks one should not venture to quote a Record upon any mans allegation without consulting the Record it self, which, I said, I am sure he had not done; which I think was as gentle a reprimand as could be, and shews, That I supposed him such a lover of truth, as that if he had known it a falshood, he would not have made use of it, only he was deceived, relying upon the authority of that learned [Page 4] Antiquary, Sir Robert Cotton; but in truth I am now of another mind, and see my Gentleman hath a large Conscience, and a mercenary Pen to publish any thing right or wrong to please those that set him on work.
His third notorious falshood is, The Precedent, which he cites of Richard Earl of Cambridge, who he saith, 3 H. 5. was tryed in Parliament, upon an accusation of Treason, and found guilty; the Lords Spiritual being personally present, and bids us see the Record of it in the Tower: To which I only say, That he had not done it himself, for he would have found it contrary to what he asserts; and that the Earl of Cambridge was tryed, condemned and executed at Southampton by a special Commission; and that his Attainder was afterwards brought into Parliament, and there confirmed by Act of Parliament, at which the Bishops might be present.
Now I pray you Sir, do you judge if I gave him any occasion for such a reply as he hath made to me throughout, from the beginning to the end of his Pamphlet: and if he should not first have considered the Beam in his own eye, and have purged himself, and given the world satisfaction for these gross mistakes of his, rather than add more to them as he hath done all along his book, with language fitter for Billingsgate, than for the eyes or ears of any sober man: But I see it is the nature of the Beast, as the Proverb is, which he cannot help, therefore we must take him as he is,
Naturam expellas furca licet, usque recurret.
[Page 5] And now Sir I must beseech you to pardon the trouble I have given you with this long Recapitulation of those his falshoods in his former Pamphlet: In which I have been the longer to set forth the advantage he gave to one that would have fallen soul upon him, and how gently I dealt with him, thereby to justifie, or at least something excuse my sharpness with him now (which I confess and am sorry for) for his base return of scoffings and railings against me, not fit for a Gentleman, who deserved better at his hands, and gave him not the least provocation for it: But tread upon a Worm, and it will turn again. And so I shall apply my self to answer what he saith as to his Arguments in the maintenance of his Assertions, which I think will not prove very convincing, and will follow him, as he sayes he would follow me, step by step, and I hope I shall make it appear, that he hath made many a false step, and will begin with his Postulata's as he calls them, wherein he saith we do agree, but he means I think like Dogs and Cats.
His first Postulatum is concerning the Protestation of the Bishops 11 R. 2. Wherein he saith we both agree that it is a Law, But that I have not set it down faithfully, leaving out the most considerable things in it, because they make against me; which if I have done, I am a very bad man, and may pass not as he stiles me for, One of the younger house of great Alexander, but rather of the house of this great Asserter himself, who is the chief of the family of the Asserters of untruths. His charge against me is, [Page 6] for leaving out a passage in my recital of this Protestation, which is, what they say in the beginning of it, and likewise towards the end of it, claiming themselves to be Peers, and that in right of their Peerage by the Laws and Customes of the Kingdom, they ought to be personally present in all Parliaments. Then he subjoyns another Protestation in the 28 H 6. which he saith also I have not cited faithfully and ingenuously, as I ought to have done. This is a great charge upon me if it be true, that I have done any thing unfaithfully and disingenuously, of which I hope I shall be able to purge my self.
And first give me leave to make a Protestation for my self in the general, which I do upon the faith of a Christian and an honest Man, and it is this, That neither in the citing of these Records, or any other throughout my Letter to you, I have purposely and willingly left out or concealed any thing that I thought material, because it made against my opinion: But what I have written is the naked truth as I am fully perswaded in my Soul and Conscience, and all that I have done in it hath been singly and meerly for the discovery of the truth, and the satisfying of my self and others, of which I take the searcher of all hearts to witness; and let our Asserter say so much if he dares, though for venting falshoods for truths, I find him a daring man.
And now to come to these particulars, I will first lay before you upon what ground and to what end I urged that Protestation of the Bishops, 11 R. 2. It was for two reasons, [Page 7] One to shew, That it being at their desire enrolled in full Parliament by the assent of the King, Lords Temporal and Commons, it came to be the Law of the Land, though it had not been so before: The second thing was to shew that the Salvo of the Prelates in that Protestation extended only to their Right of Sitting in Parliament in other cases, but not in Cases of Blood; and that they did not therein at all pretend to that: which I think I very clearly proved in that Letter, to which I refer my self. But for these omissions which he makes so criminal: As for the first, concerning my not expressing that they made their Peerage a ground of their Protestation: I answer, That since what I conceived and maintained to have been their end in their Protestation, which was, Only to assert and lay claim to their Right of being present in Parliament in all other matters, but matters of Blood, was not at all controverted by me, but that, to which I fully agreed in omnibus, I did not think it at all necessary nor proper to insert what moved them to make such a Protestation, but only so much as was to the purpose for what I alledged that Precedent: The matter of their Peerage is another point, for which in truth there is little ground, notwithstanding all their claim to it; and that it be sometimes attributed unto them by such as desire to please them, and perhaps by many ignorantly and mislead to it, in regard of their sitting in the Upper House of Parliament, and having a Parity of Vote with the Temporal Lords in the Legislative part, and likewise in the judicial part of that House, [Page 8] in all other Cases but of Blood, from which they have been particularly debarred both by their own Canon Law, and afterwards by the Law of the Land, and the custome and usage of Parliament, which may very well make many persons not considering the true nature of Peerage, nor examining with care and diligence what in that particular our Law saith, and what hath been the usage of Parliament, give them that Appellation: But I have in my former Letter cleared also this point (I think) very fully, and shall say more to it in this, when I come to answer that Article hereafter in course, as our Assertor brings me to it, for this now is but by the way upon occasion of this his first Postulatum.
And now for his other charge upon my unfaithful citing the Protestation in 28 H. 6. leaving out how the Lords Spiritual and Temporal joyned in challenging their Right of Judicature, and that the Judgment given by the King concerning the Duke of Suffolk should not turn to their prejudice, but they and their Successors should enjoy their liberties in case of their Peerage hereafter, as freely and as largely as their Ancestors had before them: I shall give a like answer to this as I did to the other, I concealed nothing that was necessary and proper to be said, which may appear by my letting forth particularly the whole proceeding in that Tryal, step by step, how the Prelates joyned in the management of it, from the beginning to the end; therefore certainly it had been no more a disadvantage to me to acknowledge that the Prelates claimed such a [Page 9] Right in a verbal Protestation, than that they did actually exercise it, as I say they did all along in the whole transaction of that business: Therefore if it was designedly done, it was a weak design in me; my end was only to shew the palpable extravagances of that Tryal, and of the Kings taking upon himself to give the Judgment, and so mentioned the Lords Protesting against it, in which the Prelates joyned with the Temporal Lords, as well as they had in all the foregoing passages of it: for the matter of their Peerage, I reserved it still to be spoken to in a clause apart by it self, when it comes to be the proper subject matter in question, I did it in my former Letter to you, and I shall do the same in this.
His second Postulatum is concerning Attainders, in which he saith we both agree that Bishops may and ought to be present, and yet Attainders, saith he, are matters of Blood; and learnedly he adds, That it is not material in the Judgment of any considering person, which way a mans life is taken away, whether by way of Attainder, or by Impeachment; and infers further, That the Canon Law, which by a jeer he saith, I call the Law of Laws, is not so indispensibly obliging. And our Asserter it seems puts himself into the rank of those considering persons, that make an Attainder and an Impeachment two distinct species or kinds of proceeding against a Criminal person to take away Life, saying it is not material which of the two wayes life is taken away, whether by Attainder or Impeachment. Oh the Ignoramus, that wants a considering Cap to judge [Page 10] aright and know what an Attainder is, which is what follows upon the Conviction and Condemnation of the guilty Person, be it upon an Impeachment in Parliament and Tryal there in a judicial way, or by an Act of Parliament in the Legislative way, or by a special Commission of Oyer and Terminer under the great Seal; the Attainder is the Result and Consequent of those three wayes of Tryal and Condemnation, and not a distinct thing running in a different channel from an Impeachment or from any of the other wayes of Tryal, being the end and consequent as I say of all Tryals, when the person is found Guilty. The Term Attainder or Attainted implies so much, which our Etymologists derive from the Latin Attingere, to Touch or Reach to a thing; Now a Criminal person is touched or reached unto, and seized upon by the Law, upon an Impeachment and Tryal in Parliament, or by a Tryal out of Parliament by Commission, as well as by an Act of Parliament, so I think one may give it this Definition, That it is a Notion in Law, whereby the Law reacheth and seiseth upon a Condemned person, taints his Blood and divesteth him of all his Priviledges both in publick and private concerns, which he enjoyed before as a Free Man of England.
Besides, our confident Asserter doth not consider the nature of the Question in controversy, which is not, Whether a Bishop quatenus a Bishop, an Ecclesiastical person in holy Orders, may be present as a Judge in any case when matters of Blood are agitated? and whether the [Page 11] Canon Law be so obliging, as that in no case he may, but whether by the Law of the Land, and the custome and usage of Parliament, the Bishops be forbidden it, when the House of Peers acts in a judicial capacity to condemn any body, and not when they pass an Act of Parliament for it, and I think it is clearly made out, That they may in the latter case, passing a Law for it, and not in the former, to act as Judges in a judicial way.
His third Postulatum is concerning the Petition of the Commons 21 R. 2. That in regard divers Judgments in Parliament had been heretofore undone and repealed, for that the Lords Spiritual were not present at them, the King would command them to make some their common Procurator with sufficient authority thereunto; which would put an end to all controversies: To this he saith, That for me to demand what in particular those Judgments were at this distance of time, is neither equitable nor rational: And truely I made no such demand, for I do very well know what judgments the Commons did then not intend, which were all Judgments in Capital Cases; for it is most clear by all Records of Parliament, and all the vestigia that remain with us of the usage and proceedings of antient Parliaments, that there is not the least colour for so much as a doubt or a suspition that the Prelates or Lords Spiritual could have any part in those Judgments. And we know on the other side, what judgments they had their shares in, which were all Judgments in such Civil Causes as came into the Parliament, and in Criminal [Page 12] Causes that were not Capital, and the Commons then could intend none but these, which was enough to satisfie me, that this Petition of theirs at that time was no wayes contrary or repugnant to what I maintained. And by the way, methinks it is worth observation, the reason they give of their desire that the Bishops would make a Proctor, not so much for that, that their presence there was of so absolute necessity, as that what was done without them was in it self null and void, but to put an end to all controversies; which shews the Prelates had expressed some dissatisfaction, and had gotten some things which had been done in their absence to be undone and Repealed, which considering their power at that time, and how all the Laity was in awe of them, would have a great effect upon mens minds, and make them do what else they would not have done, and perhaps strain a point a little to satisfie them: And still it shews, that notwithstanding their absence they were good and valid, till the same power that had made them did Repeal them. And to shew what an ascendant the Prelates had over King and Parliament and the whole Kingdom at that time, see what they did but the year before 20 R. 2. They declared unto the King in open Parliament, That they were sworn to the Pope and See of Rome, and if any thing were in Parliament attempted in restraint of the same, they would in no wise assent thereunto, but would utterly withstand the same: and can we then wonder, if the Commons were not very loth to displease them, and willing to comply with them much rather than have a controversie [Page 13] with them, and perhaps be fain at last to undo what they had done?
His fourth Postulatum is upon the Protestation of Viscount Beaumont in the name of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal in the Case of William de Pole Duke of Suffolk, which hath been touched upon before, wherein he now saith I have left out the most material words; but what they are he expresseth not, nor can I imagine what he means; As I have already said, I have been very particular in setting down every circumstance of the whole proceeding, acknowledged the actings of the Prelates in it thoroughout as far forth as the Temporal Lords, and then I say, how upon the Kings giving Judgment upon the Duke, that Viscount in the name of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal made that Protestation, That it should not be nor turn in prejudice nor derogation of them, their heirs, ne of their Successors in time to come. I think this was sufficient to shew that I did acknowledg all that could be pretended to for the Bishops Judicature in that business, and what this Assertor would have more, and wherein I have failed I can not imagine, only I see he is a quick-sighted Gentleman and can see further into a Milstone, than another man, and spy a fault which another cannot see.
He hath a fifth Postulatum, to whichI can say nothing, for I understand not what he would be at, he speaks of my accurateness in making a distinction between the Matter andForm of a Law, and then saith, He observes three things (though he expresseth but two) which [Page 14] he saith, he shall have occasion to make use of hereafter when he comes to speak of the particular Cases; and I must refer my Answer to what I shall there find, when I believe I shall make it appear that he makes no great use of them, nor of any other Argument that he brings.
And now I come to the particular Cases, the first is 4 E. 3. of Roger Mortimer Earl of March being then condemned for Treason. Here our Asserter saith, That by 28 E 3. upon his Cousin Roger of Wigmore's petitioning to have this Judgment and Attainder reversed, I acknowledg it to be an Attainder, If I say truth, say nothing to the purpose. This is gentile language, and which discovers my Gentlemans ignorance, as well as his rudeness; his ignorance in conceiving an Attainder to be only by a Law, by an Act of Parliament, in which Bishops may be present, and if they were not so, but did withdraw, it was their own voluntary act, and no diminution to their Rights: I have already upon his second Postulatum handled this point so fully, and made I think both his errour and the truth so clear, as I need not say any thing more to it here.
Then it is a pretty Argument he brings against my saying, That the Record being, Les queur Counts, Barons & Piers les Articles per eur eramine; rebindrent, &c. Which Earls, Barons and Peers having examined the Articles returned, &c. It must be inferred that the Bishops cannot be comprehended under the word Peers, since the Barons are named first; To this his Answer is, Well but I find [Page 15] the contrary, Peers many times put before Barons, particularly in Mr. Selden's Baronage, p. 12. then he cites a Record of the Judgment against John Mautravers, where it is said, For which the said Peers of the Land and Judges of Parliament adjudge and award, &c. Doth this at all contradict my quotation of the Record in Roger of Mortimers Case, but that it is as I say, That the general word Peers is there put after the Barons, and being so cannot comprehend Bishops, because in some other Records that word is put before.
He talks of drawing arguments illogically, I am sure this is so. I would put him a Case, he brings his Action of Slander against one, for that at such a time in such a place he had spoken ill of him, and said he was a lying Knave, and other words that will bear an Action, and proves it by witness; That man proves by other Witnesses, That at another time and in another place he had spoken very well of him, and said, He was a fine Gentleman; I ask now if he would be satisfied with this, and not stand upon it, that he had proved his Plaint, and expects a Verdict and Judgment upon it: So may I say, that my Precedent stands good, and proves what I alledge it for, and what he saith, is not to the purpose.
But I will go further, and make it appear that even his Precedents that he alledges, make all for me, and against himself, and though he charges me with not being so good as my word, saying, That I would run through all the Tryals upon Record, in that I have omitted [Page 16] four in that 4 E. 3. I shall give you an account of those Tryals in that Parliament, and you will see that I could have no sinister end in not mentioning them, and that all of them proved and confirmed my assertion, that the Bishops had no part in any of them. I expressed as much as was necessary to prove they were not present at Roger de Mortimers Earl of March, who was the chief and the principal of those Delinquents, and whose Tryal was the leading Case to all the rest. I give you the words of the Record, how after the exhibiting of the Articles against him, the King bespake the Judges, the Peers who were to judge him, and charged them in these words, Dont le dit Sr. le Roy vous charge Counts, Barons, les Piers de son Royalme, que de st come cest choses touchent principalement, a lui a vous & a tout le people, &c. Therefore our said Lord the King charges you the Earls, Barons, Peers of his Realm, that as these things chiefly concern him and you and all the people, &c. You give righteous Judgment. I ask now if this be not as clear as the Sun at noon-day, that by the words of this Record, I charge you the Earls, Barons, Peers of the Realm, (which is the same as if he had said, I charge you Earls and Barons who are the Peers of the Realm) can be no otherwise understood, but that only the Earls and Barons are the Peers that are there charged, and none else, to give this righteous Judgment: The Earls and Barons are the two Species, particularly enumerated, and Peers is the genus which comprehends both: And the same persons whom the King had so charged are they who tryed and [Page 17] gave Judgement upon the Earl of March, as the Record shews it, saying, Les queux Countes, Barons & Piers, &c. did judge him guilty of those Treasons. And the very same persons did give Judgement immediately in that very Parliament upon the rest, viz. Sir Simon de Bereford, John Mautravers, Boeges de Bayons, and the rest. Therefore my not mentioning their Tryals, which our Asserter lays to my charge as a Crime, and a not doing what I had engaged my self to do, which was to run through all the Tryals in those Parliament Rolls, could not be designedly done, with an intention to conceal any thing which made against me, as it is maliciously and very falsely interpreted, for they all made for me, and it was a passing over sub silentio, of so many Precedents that confirmed and fortified what I asserted. And should you, Sir, ask me, why I omitted the mentioning of them? I profess I could give you no good account of it, but that it was a meer inadvertency.
When the question first arose about the Judicature of the Bishops, I took some short notes of some Copies of Records that I had; and then seeing that all those particular Tryals in 4 E. 3. hung all upon one string, and were managed by the same persons, it seems I thought it then sufficient to set down the proceedings in the first, which was the rule and foundation of the proceedings in the rest, and afterwards when I came upon your request, to take a little more pains in making my enquiry into the usage of ancient Parliaments, I was afterwards more exact in it; but when I wrote my [Page 18] Letter to you, I made use of my notes which I had taken of the first Parliament, and particularly of 4 E. 3. where these other Tryals as I say, were left out. But I shall now give you an account what they are, and you will see it was not for my advantage to conceal them, nor would it have been for our Asserters advantage if they had been mentioned; but he quarrels at every thing.
Only give me leave before I come to that, to set it down as a general Rule, and a very true one, That wherever there is an enumeration of particulars of several ranks and degrees, which goes downwards, beginning with the higher and ending with a lower, and in the close, a general expression is of Others to be added to, and joined with them, those others must not be of a higher rank and a superiour degree to that particular which is last mentioned, but either of the same degree, or of a lower. This is a judged Case even in the business of Bishops in Cokes second Report in the Arch-bishop of Canterbury's Case, p. 46. Ad este adjuge que Evesques ne sont include deins le Statute, 13 Eliz. c. 10. It hath been adjudged that Bishops are not included in the Statute 13 Eliz. c. 10. which saith, That Colledges, Deans and Chapters, Parsons Vicars, and then concludes, and Others having Spiritual Promotions, that these last words cannot include Bishops, for reasons before given, which reasons are upon the Statute of 31 H. 8. concerning the dissolution of Abbies, which mentioning their coming into the Kings hand, by Renouncing, Relinquishing, Forfeiture, Giving up, &c. and concludes [Page 19] with general words, Or any other means; this cannot be understood of an Act of Parliament, which is a higher way of conveyance, than any of those specified. So Sir Edward Coke upon the Statute of Westminster the second, c. 41. which saith, Si Abbates, Priores, Custodes Hospitalium & aliarum domorum Religiosarum, &c. hath this Comment, Seeing this Act begins with Abbots, &c. and concludeth with other Religious Houses, Bishops are not comprehended within this Act, for they are superiour to Abbots, &c. and these words, Other Religious Houses, shall extend to Houses inferiour to them that were mentioned before. So I conclude, that the Record saying, Earls and Barons and Peers, &c. the general words, And Peers, can comprehend none but some other Peers, equal only, or inferiour to Barons, and not any above them, as I am sure Bishops will say they are. And I will tell you when those of a higher degree may, and must be comprehended under a general expression, that is, when the Enumeration or Climax (for so I may call it) goes upwards, beginning with a lower Rank, and rising higher in those which they particularize: As if it be said, Barons, Earls, and all other Peers; here Marquesses and Dukes will be comprehended, and Bishops also would be, if they were Peers, which they are not; but still I say, if the enumeration descend, none higher than the last mentioned, can be understood to be meant by any general clause.
I think you are satisfied that the E. of March was Tryed and Judged only by the Temporal Lords to whom the K. had committed his Tryal, [Page 20] and charged them only with it. Sir Simon de Bereford was the next who was Tryed, and by the same Persons; the Record is Item en mesme le Parlement si chargea nostre Sur le Roy les ditz Countes, Barons & Piers a donner droit & loyal Iugement come affiert a Simon de Bereford, Chebalier, &c. Item, in the same Parliament our Lord the King charged the said Earls, Barons and Peers to give a right and loyal Iudgement upon Sir Simon de Bereford, &c. It follows afterwards, Si agarderent & aviggerent les ditz Countes, Barons & Piers, come Iuges du Parlement per assent du Roy que le dit Simon come treitre fast treisne & pendu. So the said Earls, Barons and Peers, as Iudges of Parliament, did with the Kings assent, award and adjudge Sir Simon de Bereford to be Drawn and Hanged. You see the same persons were his Judges, who had before Tryed and Condemned the Earl of March; yet I must observe a little difference in the expressions: The King in giving the charge to the Peers in the Earls Case, the words of the Record are, The King charges you Earls, Barons, Les Piers de son Royalme, The Peers of his Realm, which must be construed, Who are the Peers, or Being the Peers of his Realm: And then their Judgement comes to be set down, the Record saith, Les queux Countes, Barons & Piers, &c. The which Earls, Barons, and Peers, did so and so, with a Conjunction Copulative [and] before Peers, as if there were some other Peers after the Earls and Barons; which if there were, we are sure it could not be the Bishops, which [Page 21] is all that we are to enquire into: We know that heretofore the Kings of England did sometimes send Writs of Summons to other persons, that were not Peers of the Realm, but persons of Quality, as Bannerets, and some Officers, as the Warden of the Cinque-Ports, whom I find commonly to be the last set down in the List of those who were summoned: And those persons so summoned, came and attended the Parliament, and had Voice and Vote with the Peers, as Members of their House, and as Peers pro tempore, and might be comprized under the general name of Peers, and being Lay-men, might act as Peers in all Tryals, and in all other Judgements of Parliament, both Civil and Criminal, even in Capital Causes; but these could in no sort be esteemed to be Peers of the Realm, though they might pass in a large acceptation, and a vulgar construction of the expression, be termed Peers in Parliament. These now might be summoned to a Parliament, or two or three Parliaments one after another, as pleased the King, and then be summoned no more, if the King was otherwise minded; and they could not pretend to have wrong done them, their former Summons having been Ex mera gratia, without any right of theirs to them. So then I may conclude that it is all one, whether you will take it as it is expressed in the Kings charge then, The Earls, Barons, Peers of the Realm, &c. or as it is when they come to give Judgement, and as it is likewise expressed in the Case of Sir Simon de Bereford, The said Earls, Barons and Peers, [Page 22] &c. and whether that Conjunction [and] before the word Peers, be of any signification or no, to mark out other Peers subsequent to the Barons, is not material to what our Asserter would have to be understood of my leaving out any thing, for it had all made for me, and against him, making it clear enough, that the Bishops had no part in those Judgements.
The next Precedent is the Judgement of Iohn Mautravers, the Record says, Trestouz les Piers, Countes & Barons, assemblez a ceste Parlement a Westminster, [...] ont examine estroitement, & sur ce sont assentuz & accordez que John Mautravers [...] est culpable, &c. All the Peers, Earls and Barons, assembled in this Parliament at Westminster, have strictly examined, and thereupon have agreed and accorded that John Mautravers is guilty, &c. I appeal now to any man that hath but common sense, if it can be imagined, that the Prelates or Bishops can be thought to be meant by that expression of All the Peers, and if it be not the same in signification, as when the King charged them to give righteous Judgement upon the Earl of March, saying, Si vous charge Countes, Barons, les Piers de mon Roialme, &c. And so I charge you Earls, Barons, the Peers of my Realm, &c. There the several ranks of Peers are first named, and the general word, which denotes their Quality, common to both, which makes them competent Judges of those matters, that is, their being Peers is put last: And here in this Record concerning Mau [...]avers it is put first. Which comes all to one. [Page 23] And it is further observable, that at the time of that Parliament, there were no Temporal Lords before Earls, neither Dukes nor Marquesses: So if any others were to be understood to be comprised under that General Title of Peers, it could be only the Lords Spiritual, which is a thing very ridiculous to believe: Can it be thought, nay can our Asserter himself think, I trow not, that when the other particular ranks and degrees of the Peerage are expressed and set down nominatim by name (as one may say) by Tale and by Token, Earls and Barons, that (I say) at the same time, and to be joyned with them in the same action, another rank of men, viz. Bishops must pass under a General Title, and that put in the first place, as if Peerage were an Apellativum [...] to them, or a Genus Imperfectum [...], to the two Species, the Lords Spiritual and Lords Temporal, which Genus the Logicians define to be Quod speciebus suis non communicatur ex aequo, sed alteri magis, alteri minus, uni speciei immediatè & propriè, alteri mediatè & in ordine ad primariam: And that so the Lords Spiritual should still be principally and chiefly meant, by the General Name of Peers, they Primariò, and the Temporal Lords Secundarió. Those Logical expressions I know our Asserter understands well, who blames others for bringing Illogical arguments, therefore I put this to him. But that they are not at all Peers of the Realm, to speak properly and truly, and as they are in the eye of the Law, though they have sometimes been stiled so, both by [Page 24] themselves and others, I have in my former Letter I think made it clear, and all that our Asserter saith to the contrary, hath not made me change my opinion, and I shall say more to it, when I come in course to answer what is there said by him.
In the mean time I shall only add this, which I lay for a ground, that I do verily believe no instance can be given of an enumeration of some particulars in an Universal Collective Proposition, and to leave out that particular which is first in Rank, and ought to be first named, if any at all be named, and to have that to be tacitely implied under the General Term, the Signum Collectivum, As in this Proposition, All the Peers, Earls and Ba [...]ons, gave such a Iudgement: This I say, that if the Bishops did joyn in the Judgement, it would have been so expressed, and they would have been first named, otherwise it is like an Et caetera in the beginning of an Enumeration, which in the close, and after an enumeration of some particulars, may intimate a joyning of some others that are not particularly specified and named, but is never put in the beginning. And I think, I may with confidence affirm, That there is no example in all the Rolls of Parliament, that any of the Benches of the House of Lords hath been particularly mentioned in any business, and if the Prelates did likewise act in it, that they were not also particularly mentioned, and always in the first place, nay, before any other, even before the Prince of Wales, and the Princes of the Blood, as may be seen in [Page 25] the Roll 28 E. 5. upon Roger of Wygmore's Petition, the Record saith, Le Roy [...]st venir devant lui & les Prelatz & Edward son fitz eisne Prince de Gales, Henri Duc de Lancastre, Countes, Barons & Piers le Iugement, &c. The King caused to be brought before him, and the Prelates, and Edward Prince of Wales his eldest Son, and Henry Duke of Lancaster, and the Earls, Barons and Peers, the Iudgement, &c. Now is it probable, or can it be believed, that the Decorum concerning the Bishops being in those times still so punctually observed, and that respect always given to the Prelacy, whenever they were concerned to mention them particularly and in their due place, that they would in that Parliament of E. 3. be content to be comprized under a general notion, and pass as a man may say Incognito, when others have more respect shewed them, to have their names recorded? I do not think that the Clerk of the Parliament durst have been guilty of so great a disrespect to them: Therefore we may well conclude, that in this Judgement upon Mautravers, the Prelates were not at all signified under the general word of Trestouz les Piers, Countes & Barons: All the Peers, Earls and Barons; nor were they at all present, or had any part in that Tryal, no more than in that of Roger de Mortimer, Earl of March.
The other persons judged that Parliament, had all the same Judges, and passed under the same Judicature. The Record for Boeges de Bayons and John Deuerell is, Item tieu Iugement est assentiez & accorde que soit fait [Page 26] de Boeges de Bayons, John Deuerell pur la cause sus [...]ite, &c. Item, The same Judgement was agreed to, and accorded to be given upon Boeges de Bayons and John Deuerell, for the cause aforesaid, &c. The very same words are likewise for the Judgements upon Thomas de Gurney, and William de Ocle. And to prove it more authentically that they were all Ejusdem farinae, of one and the same nature, I will give you the Kings Writ that declares them to be so, to the Lord Treasurer, and Barons of the Exchequer, commanding them so to inroll those Judgements, and with them a kind of Protestation made by those Peers, stiled a Concordia ne trahatur in Consequentiam: An Agreement that it should not be drawn into Consequence: That is, Not made a Precedent, to oblige and compel them to judge hereafter any but their Peers, because of the Judgement they had then given against Sir Simon de Bereford, John Mautravers, and the rest, who were Commoners: For as for those who were their Peers, they could not avoid the Trying of them, particularly in Parliament, where only a Peer of the Realm can be tryed in Parliament time, which hath ever been the priviledge of the Peers; and from which I shall in due time and place, before I make an end, draw I think, an Argument not to be answered, that the Bishops are not Peers, for if they be Peers, and questioned in Parliament time, they must be Tryed in Parliament.
But 4 E. 3. Stephen, Bishop of London, having been complained of in Parliament for saying, That if Edward the Second were still alive (as [Page 27] he was informed that he was, and in Corfe-Castle) he would assist him with all his force, to re-establish him in his Throne; was by the Parliament, referred for his Tryal to the Kings Counsel, and by them to the Kings-Bench, where putting himself super Patriam, to be Tryed as all Commoners do, a Jury was empannelled, and the Tryal went on there in the Kings-Bench, till at last he got the Kings Pardon: This is Term. Pasc. 4 E. 3. rot. 53. Now had the Bishop been truly and really a Peer of the Realm, neither could the House of Peers have avoided the Trying of him themselves, nor would he have submitted to a Tryal elsewhere out of Parliament, the Parliament being once possessed of his Cause.
But this is by the by, the Writ for inrolling those Judgements, and the Concordia is, In Memor and. Scaccarii inter Brevia directa Baronibus de Termino Sancti Hillarii Rot. 33. 5 E. 3. In these words, Rex Thes. & Baronib. suis salutem. Bittimus vobis sub pede Sigilli nostri quaedam Iudicia in Parliamento nostro apud Westmon. nuper tento per Comites, Barones at alios Pares regni nostri super Rogerum de Mortuo Mari & quosdam alios reddita, nec non quandam Concordiam per nos & Pares praedictos, nec non Communitatem Regni nostri in eodem Parliamento factam super praemissis, Mandantes quod Iudicia & Concordiam praedicta in Scaccario nostro praedicto coram vobis legi & publicari & ibidem seriatim irrotulari & de caetero ibidem obser [...]ari faciatis, Teste me ipso apud Wyndesor 15. [Page 28] die Februarii, Anno regni nostri 5. Per ipsum Regem & Concilium. The King to the Treasurer and Barons greeting. We send you under our Seal, certain Judgements given in our Parliament late at Westminster, by the Earls, Barons, and other Peers of our Realm, upon Roger of Mortimer, and some others; also an Agreement made in the same Parliament by Our Selves, the foresaid Peers, and the whole Commonaliy, concerning the matters aforesaid; commanding you, that the said Judgements and Agreement you cause to be read in your presence in our Court of the Exchequer, and there to be enrolled in course, and duly observed. Given under our Test at Windsor, Febr. 15. in the fifth year of our Reign. All this shews there was no variation in any of those Tryals, but all went on pari passu, in the same Method. And it is not probable there could be any great change in their proceedings, the Parliament continuing together so short a time, but fifteen days in all, as Mr. Pryn observes by the Writs of wages in his fourth Part, which is concerning Parliamentary Writs. And I think I may now say, that few will believe I concealed these Precedents because they made against me. The Case of Sir Thomas Berckley is of another nature, his Tryal is said to be Inter Placita Coronae tenta coram Domino E. Rege in pleno Parliamento suo, &c. Mem. Thomas de Berkeley Miles venit coram Rege in pleno Parliamento suo, & allocutus de hoc, &c. about the murther of Edward the Second, and asked how he would be tryed, Ponit se super Patriam: So twelve Knights were empannelled, who did acquit [Page 29] him. I do not look upon this as a Tryal by the House of Peers, acting in their ordinary Judicial Capacity. There was some other Court in those times in time of Parliament, where the Peers probably were the principal Judges, but then were added to them some great Officers of the Crown, and of the Judges of Westminster-Hall, before whom those Pleas of the Crown were held; I confess this is to me Terra incognita, a thing of which I can give no very good account. But I think one may affirm with confidence that no Prelates were amongst them, for they would have been mentioned, if they had been there; as in all Criminal Causes which were Capital, or in any thing concerning such Causes, I observe, they were: And even in this Case of Sir Thomas Berckley the next Parliament, N. 18. it is said, [...]tem en mesme le Parlement si prierent les Prelatz, Countes [...] Barons, pout Mr. Thomas de Berkley a nostre Sur le Roy [...]il lui voustst deliver de meynprise, &c. Item, in the same Parliament the Prelates, Earls and Barons besought the King that he would set Sir Thomas Berkley at liberty from his Mainprize. I do observe they are always named, and never omitted if any else be named, which is my Postulatum to our Asserter, and not as he injuriously would put it upon me, p. 56. of his Pamphlet, That I should maintain, That the Prelates are in all Cases particularly named, or else they cannot be thought to be there, and then to disprove it, quotes a Bill of Subsidy, where the words are, Les Seigneurs & Communes si sont assentez: The Lords and Commons have agreed: [Page 30] And Semble as Seigneurs du Parlement: It seems to the Lords of Parliament; and a hundred such instances more, I know, he may give: And the Trifler could not but know that I could intend it of no other but of the matters in question, which were Judgements in Criminal Causes.
And I shall add but this more to shew the improbability of the Prelates of those times being at all employed in Tryals of that nature, and least of all, that we should imagine they could be comprized under general expressions, which if it were, would argue an unquestionable right and title in them to such a Judicature. Let us consider the Statute made but two years before, it is 2 E. 3. c. 2. which confirms a Statute formerly made 27 E. 1. c. 3. which Enacts, That the Justices of Gaol delivery which are sent down into the several Counties, when they enquire of Felonies and Murthers, if one of them be a Clerk, then some discreet Knight of that County shall be associate to him that is the Lay-man, and shall deliver the Gaol. We see how careful they were then that no Church-man should take Cognizance of Matters of Blood, Canon Law, Common Law, and Statute Law did prohibit it.
And now to follow my Gentleman to the Parliament 5 E. 3. in which he tells me, I have not been fortunate in the choice of my Topick, because that Parliament being called for the redress of the Peace, and the Bishops saying, It did not properly belong to them to give the King counsel for the keeping of the Peace of the Kingdome, signified nothing. But had they [Page 31] said it did not all belong to them, it had been somewhat to the purpose. But under this Gentlemans favour, I think it is to the purpose, to shew that the Bishops did then believe and acknowledge that it did not properly belong to them to look to the keeping of the Peace, that it was not their proper work, which implies that they conceived their duty and employment to lie another way: And it is a strong argument à minore, that if they might not do that, and advise the King in doing what was necessary for the keeping of the Peace, and punishing the breakers of it, much less could they be put upon it to judge in Matters of Blood. And for them to say that It did not properly belong to them, was a little softer, and more respectful to the King to excuse themselves from doing what he required of them for giving their advice, than if they had bluntly said, That it was not at all of their duty to give such advice; which had grated a little too much, and had been a kind of retorting it upon the King for requiring a thing in it self improper and unreasonable. And yet they did as strongly put it off from themselves, saying, It did not properly belong to them; for no prudent and sober man will do a thing that is not proper for him, nor can it be required of him, that he should. So I think my Topick was very good; and I may say I am not altogether unfortunate to have to deal with so weak and impertinent an Adversary.
What he saith in the Case of Sir John Grey, and Sir William de la Zouch, of Bishops, that [Page 32] they are sometimes comprehended under the general word of Les Grantz, I never denied it; but in that place where the King did charge, Toutz les Countes, Barons, & autres Grantz en lour foies & ligeances, &c. All the Earls, Barons, and other great men, &c. I say that Bishops cannot be comprehended there, because in that place it can be understood but of such great persons, whose Rank is after the Barons, where I am sure no Clerk of the Parliament durst ever rank the Prelates. And another Rule which I stand upon is, That if any one Bench of the House of Peers be named and specified, as that of Earls or Barons, that of the Bishops (if the Bishops were present) is never left out, but always first placed.
The next scratch he gives me, is upon the Case of Sir William Thorp 25 E. 3. upon my inferring, that by the General Term of the Grantz in that Parliament, who approved of the Judgement of death given upon Thorp, it cannot be supposed that the Bishops are understood, because they tell the King, that if such a Case should happen afterwards, the King might call any of those Grantz whom he pleased, and by their advice, give such a Judgement of himself, which I say could not be meant of Bishops, because it was no employment for them to assist in Judgements of death. Upon this, my Gentleman is pleased in good serious earnest (as he scoffingly expresses it) to ask, if this be not petere Principium, to beg what I am to prove. And I answer in true serious earnest, that I do not petere Principium, [Page 33] not beg the Question; for the Question is first general, Whether Bishops in Parliament can be employed in such Judgements, and then particularly whether among the Grantz of that Parliament of 25 E. 3. that affirmed that Judgement against Thorp, there were any Bishops? And I infer there was none, because they tell the King, that hereafter even out of Parliament, if any body else offend in like manner, he may take any of them, that is, of those Grantz that now give him this advice, to joyn in condemning him; and by the Law of the Land, a Bishop could not joyn, therefore there was no Bishop amongst them: And that by the Law, Bishops and all Clergy-men were prohibited, appears by the Act of Parliament of the second of that King which I mentioned before, confirming one to the same purpose made in Edward the First's time, that No Clerk should be a Justice of Gaol-delivery for Tryal of Felons: this, I think, is not petere Principium, to prove the true meaning of what was done at that time in the House of Lords, by what the Law of the Land had already established, which must regulate what the House of Lords then did, and doth shew there could be no Bishops in the number of those Grantz.
Then for what he saith of the Commons charging Michael de la Poole before the King, Prelates and Lords, which was in 10 R. 2. and parallelling his crime to that of Sir William Thorp, who for it was condemned to dye; upon which he will infer that Michael de la Poole was charged with a Capital crime, and accused of [Page 34] it by the Commons before the Prelates, as well as before the other Lords, who gave their Judgements upon it. He may examine the Record, and he will find that the Impeachment was only for Misdemeanors, cozening the King in an exchange of Land, when he was Chancellour, and some other miscarriages of that nature: And it is the Impeachment, which is in the nature of an Indictment, that governs the Tryal, be the crime what it will: As it is laid in the Impeachment or the Indictment, it must be so found upon the Tryal, at the least it can be found no higher, less haply it may be: A man that is Indicted for a Misdemeanour, cannot be found Capitally Guilty. And though by a comparison, by way of aggravation, it was likened to Thorp's Case, Michael de la Poole made it appear there was no resemblance between them: And who will take pains to read the Record of Thorp, which I dare say this Trifler never did, nor scarce any Record; will see that the ground of that Judgement, which made it Capital, was that himself had submitted to such a condition, when he took upon him the Office of Chief Justice; the words are, Si sembla a eur le Jugement sur ceo rendu resonable depuis qil se obligea mesmes per son serement a tiel penance fil feist alencontre: The Judgement given upon it, seemed to them to be agreeing to reason, since he had bound himself by his Oath unto such a punishment, if he did contrary to his Oath. And I must say, it would go hard with a great many, if every one should be hanged that cozens the King.
[Page 35] And it is a pretty remark of his upon Sir John Lee's Case 42 E. 3. that the Record saying, That he was brought before the Prelates, Dukes, Earls, Barons, and some of the Commons, &c. He observes, that if at this Tryal any thing had been objected which had been Capital, the Bishops were present at it: And I say he might have made a truer observation than that, which is, That they might be well assured, that nothing Capital was to be objected, because then the Bishops would not have been present. And one thing I am sure is observable, which is, that the Bishops, that is, the Prelates are here recorded to be present, and to be ranked before the Dukes, Earls, &c. We are sure, if any be specified, they are, and still ranked in the first place.
What my Gentleman means, in what he saith upon the Tryals 50 E. 3. I understand not; they are the Cases of Richard Lyons, the Lord Latimer, William Ellis, the Lord Nevill, and John Peach, all these were only charged with Misdemeanors; he saith their crimes were great and hainous, and reckons the loss of Forts among them, which he saith was a crime Capital in Gomenitz and Weston, 1 R. 2. and that I acknowledge the Bishops to have been present at those Tryals. But still this learned Gentleman, who brags here that he will not suffer the World to be longer amused and imposed upon by my Notions, doth himself still mistake the business, not well understanding the nature of the thing he treats of. Otherwise he would consider that the Tryal [Page 36] of a Criminal person must always be pursuant to his Charge; which is a point I have already spoken to, therefore I shall say little here, only this, that the Impeachment of the Commons against those persons, was only for Misdemeanors, their Tryal was accordingly, and the Bishops were present. And for what he saith of Gomenitz and Weston was clean another Case; it was for betraying those Towns which they had undertaken to keep, when the force upon them was not so great: However, it is not material what their Crime would appear to be upon proof, but what their Charge was, and that was Capital. Then for what he adds of the Bishops being comprehended under the general Apellation of Les Seigneurs du Parlement; The Lords of Parliament; in several Cases which he there cites, which he beats upon over and over again, in so many several places of his Pamphlet, and sets up like a Man of Straw of his own making, to make sport with, is what I never denied: my Position is, That I have still observed in all Tryals of Crimes, when Bishops could be present, it is so expressed that they were so, as in all Crimes not Capital; and I do not think one Instance can be given to the contrary. And my other Position, which I affirm with more confidence, is, That if any of the other ranks of the Lords be mentioned, the Bishops are so likewise, or else it is a certain argument that they were not there.
My Gentleman is a little put to his Trumps in the Case of Gomenitz and Weston, 1 R. 2. That is so plain, first, the Commons coming [Page 37] and desiring, That such as had lost Towns and Castles by their own default, might be punished, Per agard des Seigneurs & Baronage; By the Judgement of the Lords and Baronage: whereupon those Lords commanded Gomenitz and Weston to be brought before them, and upon a long hearing, condemned them both to death: And the Lords are particularly named, the Duke of Lancaster first, and ten more Earls and Barons by name, of whom Roger Lord Clifford was the last; and then a general clause, Et plusours autres Setgneurs, Barons & Bannerettes; And many other Lords, Barons and Bannerets. Now this is so plain, and exclusive of all Prelates, as my Gentleman is forced to confess, that it seems doubtful to him who these Lords were, whether the Prelates, or the Lords particularly named; and plusours autres Seigneurs, under which (he saith) very probably the Lords Spiritual might be comprised. I see a truth cannot come clearly from him, a thing that is most clear, he makes it doubtful: And one thing he saith most falsely, of a Petition commanded to be read, Numb. 29. En cest Parlement per les Prelates, & Seigneurs, Piers du Parlement; By the Prelates, and Lords, Peers of Parliament; which Petition he will have to be concerning this matter, which is most false. For that which is said Numb. 29. is of a Petition, and Writ of Error, presented by William de Montague, Earl of Salisbury, which was then read, and nothing at all concerning Gomenitz and Weston; which is a horrible falshood, and imposture of our Asserter [Page 38] to abuse the world so, and impose upon the Reader. The first request of the Commons concerning this business, and to have this matter examined is Numb. 38. and then Numb. 39. there is mention of a Schedule given in by Weston, and the Record saith, Ueue & leue la dite cedule en plein Parlement; The Schedule being seen and read in full Parliament; and any thing concerning Weston or Gomenitz before this, there is not: But some falshood he must still add of his own, for the Jesuites Verse is very applicable to him,
And indeed throughout his whole Pamphlet he doth but Verba dare, take Verba, Words, as in opposition to reality and truth, for it is full of falshoods; or take Words in opposition to matter and good sense, for his whole Book is a very bundle of words, without any good matter in it. But one thing more I cannot but observe, it is his insisting so much upon a thing, which I am confident himself doth not believe, though I have known a teller of stories tell one of his own invention so often, that at last himself hath begun to believe it to be a truth: It is, that after the naming several Lords, and ending with some Barons, there is a general expression, [...]t plusours autres Seigneurs, Barons & Bannerettes; And many other Lords; Barons and Bannerets; my confident Gentleman hath the boldness to add, Under which probably the Lords [Page 39] Spiritual might be comprised; which he knows the Prelates of those times, if they had been concerned in it, would never have endured, and the Clerk of the Parliament would as soon have eaten Fire, as have entered it so.
Then in the Case of the Murtherers of John Imperial, a publick Minister, 3 R. 2. because I observe, that it is expressed in the Parliament▪ Roll, that the Bishops were not present at the framing of the Act to make it Treason in them, which I grant, in other places of my Letter they might have been, being to pass an Act of Parliament in a Legislative way, my Gentleman is pleased to say, That I forget my self: In truth No, I did suppose it, and do suppose it to be a good Argument à minore, to shew that the Prelates were then so modest, as to withdraw upon the passing of a Law for the greater punishment of such a Capital Crime, which in strictness perhaps they did not need to have done, much more then would they avoid the sitting as Judges to take away life in a judicial way, which they could no ways pretend to: But my Gentleman loves to quarrel, and scribble Paper, though to no purpose.
To the Case of Sir Ralph Ferrers, 4 R. 2. he only sings over his tedious plain Song, That under the general word of Lords of Parliament, Bishops may be comprehended, and therefore he will have it, That they must be so: And much good may it do him with his Crambe bis cocta, I may say centies cocta, for I think he serves up this same dish a hundred times in this his learned Treatise.
[Page 40] But I may not let pass what he saith upon the Case of the Bishop of Norwich, 7 R. 2. how extream falsly he recites things, taking all upon trust, how this man or t'other man cites a Record, but never seeing the Record it self, which perhaps he cannot so much as read. He desires it may be taken notice of, that for those Misdemeanors he was adjudged to make Fine and Ransome to the King, and that the Judgement was passed upon him by the Lords by assent of Parliament; where he saith, he hopes I will not deny but that there were Bishops present, and for this sends me to Cotton's Abridgement, 7 R. 2. n. 23. but if he would have looked upon the Parliament Roll he would have found this, Perquoy del a [...]ent des Countes, Barons & autres Seigneurs Temporelz presentz en ce Parlement est assentuz & accordez que vous soiez en la mercile Roy, & mis au fin & raunceon pur vostre malfait solonc la quantitée & qualitée dicell: Therefore by the assent of the Earls, Barons, and other Lords Temporal present in this Parliament, it is agreed and accorded, that you shall be at the Kings mercy, and put to Fine and Ransome, for your misdeeds, according to its quantity and quality. You see now how this man would impose upon us, and what stuff he brings to make good his assertion: If I had been guilty of such a falshood, I should have heard of it to purpose, that both my ears would have rung again; and no Ink this Gentleman could have got black enough to set it out in its colours.
[Page 41] Then he comes to the Case of Michael d la Poole, 10 R. 2 where he saith the same things he did before, and which I have already answered, so to that I refer you.
The next is the 11 R. 2. where the Prelates withdrawing from Parliament, by reason of matters of blood, which were then to come into agitation, enter a Protestation with a Salvo to their right of sitting in Parment, which my Gentleman will have to be meant even of their being present at the agitation of those matters, if they were so pleased. This hath been treated of before at large already, to which I refer you; I will only observe this further at present, out of the words of their Protestation, first, they say, Quia in praesenti Parliamento agitur de nonnullis materiis, in quibus non licet nobis aut alicui eorum juxta Sacrorum Canonum instituta quomodolibet personaliter interesse, ea propter pro nobis & eorum quolibet protestamur, & eorum quilibet hic presens etiam protestatur, quod non intendimus nec volumus sicuti de jure non possumus nec debemus, nec intendit, nec vult aliquis eorum dum de hujusmodi materiis agitur vel agetur, quomodolibet interesse, sed nos & eorum quemlibet in ea Parte penitus absentaxe: This they declare, That it is not lawful for them, nor any of them, by the institutions of the Holy Canons, to be personally present, and that of Right they cannot, nor ought to be there, and therefore they do not intend in any sort, quomodolibet, to be present, but wholly to absent themselves, while those matters are handling. Can any man now [Page 42] have the fore-head to maintain, that they could have a thought of challenging still a right, contrary to such prohibitions, and to say, that it was only the Canon Law that did prohibit them: I say still that the Canon Law was to them above all Laws, and the Prelates of those times conceived themselves to be above all other Laws; even not to be subject to them, but what the Canon Law did allow or forbid, was accordingly by them held to be most lawful or unlawful. The Salvo they add, makes it clear, Iure paritatis nostrae & cuju [...]ibet eorum interessendi in dicto Parliamento, quoad omnia & singula inibi exercenda nostris & eorum cuju [...]ibet Statui & Ordini congruentia in omnibus salbis; The right of our Parity, and of every one of them (that is, our equal right in the general, and of every one of us in particular, with the rest of the Lords) of being present and acting in the said Parliament, as to all things and every thing befitting our State and Order, always remaining unto us safe and entire. Now I would ask, if it can be imagined, that they would, by way of Protestation, reserve to themselves a liberty (when they pleased) to do what they said was not lawful for them to do, and that which of right, and according to the Law to which they were subject and must obey, they could not, nor ought to meddle with? And if such things can be thought to be Statui & Ordini congruentia, for their Salvo extends only to such things as are agreeable to their State and Order. Indeed, I think it a solecism to have such a thought. And I know it will be [Page 43] excepted against, that I do take Paritas here in such a sense, and not to be Nomen Apellativum, to signifie Peerage, a rank of men; but I consider how it is put, that it is Paritas interessendi in Parliamento, which in my opinion is proper to render a Parity, or an equal right with others, to be present in Parliament. But let them construe it Peerage, it matters not to me, I have handled that point fully by it self in my former Letter, and shall do it again in this before I make an end, to shew I am not afraid of that expression; and though in those times the Prelates gave themselves sometimes that Character, that it did not at all belong unto them. And he beats upon this again, That this was left out purposely by me in my citing this Protestation, which I have sufficiently cleared already amongst his Postulata's, therefore I shall not trouble you with it again in this place.
In the Case of Thomas Haxey, 20 R. 2. my Gentleman is so ingenious, as to say, He believes the Bishops were not present, but then he tells you why; because it was an erroneous Judgment, and an Irregular Condemnation, and so commends their Prudence: And sure, he hath been with some Witch to raise some of those Prelates from the Grave, as the Witch of Endor did Samuel, to tell him the true cause why they withdrew themselves, and did then forbear to use their Right, as he saith it is lawful for every man to do, else he could never have hit so pat upon the true cause of their withdrawing, whereas otherwise a man might say it was because they knew they had no right to [Page 44] be there; and if it had been their right, they should the rather have made use of it, to prevent and hinder an unrighteous Judgement, and have caused a righteous one to be given. And more than that, if it was their Right, and that they had a calling to be there, they were bound to attend the Service, and I think it would have been a breach of Duty, and a Sin in them to withdraw themselves from it.
And now I come to a Bundle of Words indeed, it is what he says concerning their Proxies, 21 R. 2. out of which one shall have much ado to pick some sense, and what it is he would be at, I will do my endeavour in it. He first puts us in mind of his fifth Postulatum, and of what he said there of the difference between the Matter of a Law, and the Manner of its enacting, and that a Law may be repealed for the Matter of it, and yet the Manner of making it still hold good. This I suppose he saith, because I except against the authority which that Parliament, at the desire of the Commons, gave the Bishops to make their Common Procurator, in regard that whole Parliament was afterwards repealed, and consequently all it did, made null and void. Yes, saith he, the Parliament was repealed by 1 H. 4. because it condemned those who were his friends, as Traytors to the King and Government; yet the proceedings in that Parliament were just and lawful. To which I answer, That what was done that Parliament, agreeing with the practice and usage of other Parliaments, was [Page 45] certainly just for the Manner of the doing, though the Matter might be repealed, and made null: But what was never done before in any Parliament, nor any thing like it, could not receive any stamp of Authority for its being done in this Parliament, because the Parliament it self had no authority, a subsequent Parliament repealing it, and making it as if it had never been: And this of all the Bishops joyning to make a Common Proctor was never done in any Parliament before nor since.
If any should object, that Henry the Fourth was an Usurper, and had no right nor Title to repeal former Parliaments, nor to make any Laws. This were an Objection if it should be allowed, would have a long tail, and carry a very bad consequence, for it would sweep away at once all the good Laws that were made in three Kings raigns, and would make such a Hiatus in our Statute Laws, as would put things into a very great disorder. We know that in Edward the Fourth's time, which followed immediately after those three Henries, in all the Acts of Parliament which passed, when mention is made of any thing done in those Kings Reigns, still what was done is allowed of, and confirmed, and to their Persons and Government, the Parliament still gives this Character, that they were Kings indeed, but not of right. Which implies the stamp of Soveraign power and authority to be set upon all their actions, and so upon the Parliaments that were summoned and held by them, and principally there, because [Page 46] of the concurrence and conjunction of the whole Kingdome in all things there done. Nay, in some Acts of Parliament we find care taken, that nothing should clash with what had been done in Parliament by some of those Kings, as 14 E. 4. c. 4. there is a Statute concerning Breakers of Truce, and a Proviso in it, That this Act shall not extend to any Act or Ordinance made 2 H. 5. late indeed, and not of right, King of England. But still he is acknowledged King of England, de facto, which goes a great way to authorize any thing done under their power. Therefore 11 H. 7. c. 1. A Law is provided to indemnifie all persons that shall do service to the King in being, whether he have right or no.
As for what is said of the Bishops making their Common Proxy, at the prayer of the House of Commons, That their Proceedings might be valid, and not questioned in future Parliaments by reason of their absence, and that divers Judgements had been reversed, because they were not present. It is true, it is so expressed in the Roll of that void Parliament, which as it hath no authority nor validity in it self, so it is very strange, that if there had been ground for this apprehension, there should remain nothing upon Record in all the Rolls of Parliament, that ever any Judgement, or any other act done in any Parliament had been so repealed. We know it was once attempted 2 H. 5. by Thomas Montacute, Earl of Salisbury (as I told you in my former Letter) who brought his Writ of Error to reverse [Page 47] the Judgement given against his Father 2 H. 4. because the Bishops (as he alledges there) being Peers of Parliament, were not parties to that Judgement, but it was declared to be no Error, and his Petition was rejected. And we know that in Edward the First's time, there was a Parliament held at St. Edmonds-bury, Clero excluso, not a Prelate admitted to it. And in Henry the Eighth's time all the Judges of England declared it for Law, That the King might hold a Parliament with his Lords Temporal and Commons, altogether without the Lords Spiritual. Tout sans les Spirituels Seigneurs, it is in Keilwayes Reports, in Dr. Standish's Case. Therefore there is no reason to think, that any Judgements were repealed upon the Bishops being absent, seeing their presence is not of necessity for the constituting and sitting of a Parliament. And especially not for the Judgements which we treat of in Capital Cases, because by what appears upon Record, and by all the Laws, Canon, Common and Statute Law, they never were present, I always except that Unparliamentary Extravagant Proceeding and Judgement of Henry the Sixth, in the twenty eighth of his Reign, upon William de la Pool.
Our Asserter tells us of some Judgements reversed 15 E. 2. particularly in the Case of the Spencers, but he doth not tell us where he finds it, nor I believe, doth he know himself, having only taken it up some where upon trust, as he doth other things. But in this 21 R. 2. upon the Petition of the Earl of [Page 48] Gloucester, it appears by the Record of the proceedings against the two Spencers, Father and Son, in that 15 E. 2. which are there repeated at large, that there was nothing Capital in their Case, neither in the Charge nor in the Judgement, so as this signifies nothing to the matter in question, which is all can be said to it. And as little shall I say to his witty allusion of bringing me to a sight of my self, as Alexander did his Horse to the Sun, that he might not kick; only this I might say, if I were as foul-mouthed as he, that indeed such a scoffing injurious Scribbler were fitter to be answered with a kick, than with fair reasoning by way of Argument.
Next we come to the 1 H. 4. Sir William Rickhill's Case, where I think, I should do well only to transcribe what he hath written, to shew it needs no answer, but that I should waste too much Ink and Paper: I represented in my Letter to you, that Rickill being sent for into Parliament, no formal charge being against him, to give an account only by what order he had taken the Duke of Gloucester's Confession at Calais, which he did, the Bishops present; but when they came to consider what was to be done upon it, then only the Lords Temporal were asked their opinion, which I alledge to shew, that the Bishops there were not advised with, because it might be preparatory to a further proceeding by way of Tryal: And this our Asserter says, is to serve an Hypothesis, and learnedly gives it us in Greek, and bids the Reader judge, and so do I. Then for the Tryal of Hall, who was one of [Page 49] the murtherers of the Duke of Gloucester, he hath the condescension to acknowledge it probable that the Bishops were not there, but then saith, that they left it to the Temporal Lords, without any Impeachment to their right, it being secured before by the security of a confessed Act of Parliament, 11 R. 2. it is their Protestation he harps at. And if I had as much Greek as he, I would say it in Greek, that he now doth serve an Hypothesis, or in good English, beg the Question, for that is his meaning of serving an Hypothesis, for the Right which the Bishops there saved, he will have to be, and hath forty times repeated it, to judge Capitally when they please; but I have clearly shewed it was not of their assisting in those Judgements, as he still will have it to be, but other Judgements and proceedings in Parliament, where in truth they had a right to assist.
Then follows the Case of William Sautre, 2 H. 4. where he is pleased to give me a wipe for stiling him the Protomartyr of England; and out of his great reading informs, that St. Alban lived some hundreds of years before him; but he must give me leave to inform him, that the common acceptation of Martyrs amongst us Protestants now, is of such Orthodox persons as have suffered for the truth, whom the Papists have put to death for Hereticks, and this man was the first of them in England. He hath some other notable Remarks; one is, that whereas I said that the Bishops and Clergy of those times were the chief Promoters of bringing him to his [Page 50] end, which I meant of their declaring him an Heretick, and then turning him over to the Secular Power, he observes upon it, That then they acted in a Capital Case, which he saith makes against me: And that if it was the Lords Temporal who signed the Warrant for his execution, that the Bishops had no hand in it, and so have escaped my lash, but who were his Judges, nondum constat, I am sure it doth not constare to me to what purpose he saith all this, which I do not find to make either for him, or against me.
No more, than what he saith of the Case of the Earls of Kent, Huntington, and Salisbury, 2 H. 4. who he grants were declared and adjudged Traytors by the Temporal Lords, and no Bishops present, and then saith, he will give a Parallel Case, it is of the Earl of Cambridge, and the Lord Scroope, 3 H. 5. where the Bishops were present, and that I confess they might be so, because it was in passing an Act of Parliament to confirm their Attainder. But my Gentleman is mistaken, as he commonly is almost in all his Assertions, for the Cases are not parallel, the Earls of Kent, Huntington and Salisbury had no Tryal, had not been legally condemned and attainted, but being taken in Circester by the Townsmen rising upon them, were by them in a tumultuary manner put to death, and the House of Peers afterwards in a judicial way adjudged the fact of those Lords Treason, and them Traytors; and this was done only by the Temporal Lords, who are there particularly named. But the Earl of Cambridge and [Page 51] the Lord Scroope had been Tryed, Condemned and Executed at Southampton, and this Judgement afterwards was brought into Parliament, and there confirmed by Act of Parliam. where the Bishops were, and might be present: but our Asserter hath ill luck in all his allegations.
And he will have as ill luck in what he saith to the Earl of Northumberland's Case, 5 H. 4. where I am sure he begs the Question, and doth Disputare ex non concesso, for whereever Lords, or Peers of Parliament are mentioned, he will have the Bishops to be comprehended, whereas those general words, as all other such, are to be understood Secundum subjectam materiam: If it be in a Case where the Bishops are particularly by the Law of the Land, and the continual practice in the execution of that Law excluded, and others are comprized under the same general expression, it must be understood of them only, and not of those upon whom there is such a bar. Now they who will have the Bishops to be Peers, do not make them the sole and only Peers, but allow Earls and Barons to be Peers with them. But I do not allow them to be Peers at all, our Asserter will prove them to be Peers by two Records, Mautravers Case, 4 E. 3. and their Protestation, 11 R. 2. I have already given an account of what is in Mautravers Case, the words are, All the Peers, the Earls and Barons being met, &c. Is it not ridiculous to expound this, that by All the Peers is meant only the Bishops, as if the dignity of the Peerage did principally belong to them, that they should be Peers Sans queue, as the [Page 52] French denominate a thing that belongs to some particular person more properly, and in a more eminent degree, than it doth to any body else? Or is it not more rational, and indeed only so, to understand this expression to import that the Earls and Barons were the Peers who then met, and that saying, All the Peers, the Earls and Barons, &c. the Earls and Barons are an Exegesis, an exposition of the foregoing general denomination of Peers, so Mautravers Case makes nothing for him, but much against him: And as to their own Protestation, 11 R. 2. indeed they call themselves Peers there, but that doth not make them so, I have spoken to this point already very fully, and sorry I am that I am forced to do it again, and to do it so often, but he leads me to it, who doth as the Proverb saith, Reciprocare serram, go over and over the same thing, as much as ever any man did, I think, and as often mistake. The force of my Argument to prove that by the general appellation of the Lords who protested against the Kings delivering the Earls Petition to the Judges, to have their opinion, and judged the fact themselves not to be Treason, but a Trespass, could not be meant Bishops, because the Record saith, Sur quoy le dit Conte molt humblement remercia le Roy, & les ditz Seigneurs ses Piers de lour droiturel Iugement: Whereupon the said Earl very humbly thanked the King, and the said Lords his Peers, for their right Iudgement. Now the Bishops could not be Peers to the Earl, who could not try him nor be tryed by [Page 53] him, they being to be tryed only by Commoners, and Commoners to try them, if there be occasion, of which more shall be said afterwards in its proper place. I will here only observe one thing, that our Asserter hath it instead of Humbly thanked, Humbly reverenceth the King; which he takes out of the Pamphlet that goes under the name of Mr. Seldens Baronage, which I have ever looked upon as a spurious Book, not made by Mr. Selden, who would never have so translated Remercia, and being full of faults and falsehoods, yet this Book, and Sir Robert Cotton's Abridgment, which hath likewise faults enough, are the chief Oracles that he consults, and which do many times deceive him, as the ancient Oracles did those who resorted to them. Of as little signification is what he adds of the Lords of Parliament declaring the action of Henry Percy, who was killed at the Battel of Shrewsbury to be Treason; where he doth assure you the Bishops were present, and you shall have his Oath for it, I dare say, if you will: And how doth he prove it? Why, saith he, the Arch-bishop of Canterbury was present at the former Iudgement, for in express words he prayed the King, that forasmuch as he and other Bishops were suspected to have been of confederacy with Henry Percy, that the Earl of Northumberland would now publish the truth, whereupon the Earl, by the Kings command upon his Oath, purged them all. And then learnedly argues, That here was no departure of the Arch-bishop and of the other Bishops concerned: And I believe him, for [Page 54] in truth here is a good proof that they were all present, but to be purged themselves, that they should not be thought Criminal, not to act as Judges, which is what our worthy Asserter doth assert, and what he would have us think that he fully proves, which he doth more solito, that is Cujus contrarium, &c. Then my Gentleman (for he is an active Gentleman) makes an Alman leap to the very end of the last leaf of Sir Robert Cotton's Abridgement, where he finds a marginal note of Mr. Prynn's to this purpose, That the three Estates must concur to make a Parliament, or Richard the Third's title would still be ambiguous; and this he thrusts in here by head and shoulders, I understand not how to the present purpose, I think only to have the occasion to say, that Mr. Prynn knew better of Records, and what Plein Parlament meaneth than I, and another whom he joyns with me, and twenty more such as we are, which I deny not, though he should add to the number, himself, and forty more who were no wiser than he, who all of them would not make our ballance two grains the heavier.
Then he comes to the Case of the Earl of Northumberland, and the Lord Bardolph, 7 H. 4. which, he saith, I say is like to that of the Earls of Kent, Huntington and Salisbury, 2 H. 4. and that is true, for in both those Cases, those Lords after their deaths (having had their lives taken from them in a tumultuary way, without any formal Tryal) the business being brought into Parliament, were by the Temporal Lords, in a Judicial way of proceeding, [Page 55] adjudged to be Traytors, and their fact to be Treason. But then he adds, that I likewise make the Case of the Earl of Cambridge, 3 H. 5. like to these, which is not true, being of a clean different nature, an Act of Parliament which had its rise from a request of the House of Commons, who brought it up to the Lords; here, I say, the Bishops were, and might be present.
That which he saith to the Case of Sir John Oldcastle, 5 H. 5. is so threadbare with rubbing it over and over again, and hath been so often said, and so often answered, as that it would too much trespass upon your patience, Sir, to trouble you with any one word of it more; I think I have made it exceeding clear, where under the general term of Lords of Parliament, Bishops may be understood to be comprehended, and where not. Those particular Cases which he now brings to prove his Assertion, are point blank against him, that is the Case of Mautravers, 4 E. 3. and of Gomenitz and Weston, 1 R. 2. in that of Gomenitz many particular Lords are named, several Earls and Barons, and then a general clause, Et plusieurs autres Seigneurs, Barons & Bannerettes. Is it possible to think that Bishops come in that fag end? Indeed I do observe one thing in this Case of Sautre, which is not in any of the other; I cannot say that I lay any great stress upon it, yet something it is, that the Record expresses that the Bishops had done with him, declaring him a Heretick, and then Relinquentes eum ex nunc Iudicio seculari: Leaving him from henceforward [Page 56] to the Secular Judgement, as if they should say, They would have no more to do with him.
And as convincingly he argues in the Case of Sir John Mortimer, 2 H. 6. He confesses with me that the Indictment found against him at the Guild hall was brought into Parliament, before the Duke of Gloucester, and the Lords Temporal, Fuit liberatum, It was there delivered to them; and then he cites a Record (as he makes it) De advisamento dictorum Dominorum auctoritate istius Parliamenti ordinatum est & statutum quod ipse usque ad Turrim ducatur; By the advice of the said Lords, it was ordained and enacted by authority of the said Parliament, and by the advice of the said Lords Temporal, that he should be led to the Tower: These are his words, and how he hath mangled, and falsely rendred and expounded the Record, you will judge by the words of the Record it self, which I will here faithfully set down. It is this, Numb. 18. Memorand. quod 26. die Februarii anno praesenti de advisamento Dominorum Temporalium ac ad Supplicationem Communitatis Regni Angliae in praesenti Parliamento existentiam redditum fuit quoddam Iudicium versus Iohan. de Mortimer, de Bishops. Natfield in Comitatu Nertford Chevalier, cujus quidem Iudicii recordum patet in Schedula per Iohannem Hals unum Iusticiariorum Domini Regis de banco edita & praesenti Rotulo consuta: Memor. That the 26th of February of this present year, by the advice of the Lords Temporal, and at the Petition of the Commons in this present Parliament, a certain Judgement was given upon Sir John Mortimer [Page 57] of Bishops-Hatfield, in the County of Hertford, Knight; the Record of which Judgement appears in a Schedule drawn by John Hals, one of the Justices of the Kings-bench, and fastened to this Roll. Then follows the Schedule it self, where is set down what past at Guildhall upon the sinding of the Indictment, and how that Indictment was brought into the Parliament, Coram duce Bedfordiae ac aliis Dominis Temporalibus; Before the Duke of Bedford, and the other Lords Temporal; and how Sir John Mortimer was brought before them by the Lieutenant of the Tower, and how the Commons desired the Indictment might be affirmed, and that Judgement might be given upon him: Then follows, Super hoc viso & plenius intellecto Indictamento, per dictum Ducem de advisamento dictorum Dominorum Temporalium ac ad requisitionem totius Communitatis authoritate istius Parliamenti ordinatum est & statutum quod Indictamentum affirmetur, & praedictus Iohannes Mortimer de proditionibus praedictis sit convictus, ad Turrim ducatur, usque ad furcas de Tyburn trahatur, & super eas suspendatur, &c. Hereupon the Indictment being viewed and well understood, it was by the foresaid Duke, by the advice of the said Lords Temporal, and at the request of all the Commons, ordained and decreed that the Indictment should be affirmed, and the foresaid John Mortimer stand convicted of his foresaid Treasons, should be carried to the Tower, then drawn to the Gallows at Tyburn, and there hanged, &c. This was a Judgement of the House of Peers in [Page 58] their Judicial capacity, upon an Impeachment, and at the pursuit of the House of Commons, who prosecuted and pressed the evidence before the Lords; the words of the Record are, Tota Communitas praefatum Indictamentum illud in omnibus fuxta vim formam & effectum efusoem pro vero & fideli Indictamento affirmat, ac praefatis Duci ac aliis Dominis Temporalibus supplicat eadem Communitas quatenus iidem Dux & Domini Indictamentum praedictum pro vero & fideli Indictamento affirmare vellent, & quod executio dicti Iohannis Mortimer ut de proditionibus & feloniis convicti fiat; The whole House of Commons do affirm the foresaid Indictment to be in all points for the force, form and effect thereof, a true and legal Indictment, and that execution of the said John Mortimer, as of one convicted of the said Treasons and Felonies may follow. This you see was a formal Tryal in all points, and a Judgement upon it, and so it is entred upon the Roll, such a day, 26 Februarii de advisamento Dominorum Temporalium ad Supplicationem Communitatis redditum fuit quoddam Iudicium versus Iohannem de Mortimer, &c. And our Asserter here tells us a tale of a Tub, that the matter should be decreed after by Authority of Parliament, of which the Bishops are an essential part, and therefore were present, which is an excellent Chimae [...]a, as if the Advisamentum Dominorum Temporalium, & Authoritas Parliamenti, were two distinct things, and the work of several persons, some actors in the one who were not so in the other, and that the advice of the [Page 59] Lords Temporal had produced some other things which had a greater authority, and that the Bishops had joyned in that, which shews his ignorance in the course of Parliaments, for the Judgement which is given Judicially in the House of Lords hath upon it the stamp and the authority of the whole Parliament, and that Advisamentum of the Lords Temporal here, was the Judgement, as is the advice and assent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and of the Commons in Parliament in the passing of an Act of Parliament, for when a thing is said to be enacted, by the King, with the advice and assent of the two Houses, that advice and assent of the two Houses is their passing and enacting of it, as to their part in it: For any thing that is done in either House, if the King be mentioned in it, is said still to be done by him with the Advice and Consent of that House, so in a Judgement judicially given by the House of Peers (where anciently the King was often present, when they acted judicially) it is said to be given by the King, by the advice of his Lords, and here the Duke of Gloucester represented the Kings Person, and held the Parliament by Special Commission; so the Judgement is said to be given by him, by the advice of the Lords Temporal. And so the Lords 28H. 6. when the King of himself gave the Judgement upon the Duke of Suffolk, the Lords protested against it, because it proceeded not by their advice and counsel: For that is it which gives the form and being to the Judgement, and stamps upon it the Authority of the Parliament.
[Page 60] Then he comes to a Precedent without debate, as he calls it, which is that of 28H. 6. the Duke of Suffolk's case, and confessed so by me, as he saith, but not truly. For I do not allow it to be a just and legal precedent. I do acknowledge that the Bishops were present all along the whole transaction of that business, but as I said in my first Letter to you, so I must and do say in this, there was in it from the beginning to the end nothing regular, nor according to the usage and practice of Parliaments: Then it cannot be said to be a Precedent, no more than a Monster, that hath no shape nor limb of a true Child, can be said to be a Child. As for the particular deformities of this Monster (for so I may term it) they are already so fully deciphered in my former Letter, as I will not now trouble you with them again: So it shall pass at this time as he will have it, for a Precedent without debate, for it shall not be any further debated. Only I must say still, it is but a single Precedent, and of what force that is, or can be, when the constant course and practice of Parliaments hath been to the contrary, I leave it to you to judge: One single Precedent against all other Parliaments, is an unequal match one would think. I have heard of a great conquering Prince, that gave it for his, Motto, Souls contra omnes, but I have not heard it said so of a Parliament, Solum contra omnia. The authority of any one Parliament I know to be very great, yet it is a known Maxime in the Law, Parliament poit errer, A Parliament may [Page 61] err; and another Parliament may mend what one doth amiss; Parliament-men are men, and may, and do sometimes mistake as well as other men; it is possible they did so, 28H. 6. and more than probable they did so, because no other Parliament before nor since, did ever do the like. And for his Recapitulation of all the fore-mentioned Records, in all twenty seven, which he makes to prove that this was not a single Precedent, as I affirm it to be, all the rest (as he saith) concurring with it, to admit Bishops to be Judges in Capital Cases, I will only say, Sit liber Iudex, resort to the Records themselves, and to what is already said in my former Letter and this, and then judge if he saith true.
Then he hath a fling at me for what I say upon the Case of Nicholas de Segrave, 33 E. 1. where he must give me leave to say with truth, what he saith falsly of me upon several occasions, which is this, That he hath not set down things Faithfully and Ingenuously. He saith Segrave came into full Parliament into the presence of the King, the Arch-bishop of Canterbury, and several Bishops, Earls and Barons, acknowledged his offence, and submitted to the Kings pleasure: Upon this he observes, That here was no Iudicatory of Parliament; and then adds, that the King pardoned him, De advisamento Comitum, Baronum, Magnatum, & aliorum: By the advice of the Earls, Barons, Nobles, and others. You shall see now how faithful and ingenuous a dealer our Asserter is, but certainly he takes all upon trust, and takes not the pains to see any thing himself. [Page 62] First, I do acknowledge it was no formal Tryal, for there was no impeachment nor Indictment against him, but I must say it was Tantamount, for he comes in upon Summons into the Parliament then sitting, where the Prelates were among the rest of the Members of the House, and how long they continued there, it appears not by the Record, but he being come, Nicholas de Warwick, the Kings Councel, charged him, and pressed matters against him. And then the King, as the Record saith, willing to have the advice of the Earls, Barons, Nobles, and others of his Counsel, enjoyned them upon the Homage, Fidelity and Allegiance which they owed him, to give him faithful Counsel, what punishment was fit to be inflicted upon such a fact so confessed: Who all of them upon a serious debate, and advising upon the matter, and well weighing all the particulars of it, and what was by the said Nicholas plainly and expressly acknowledged, do say, That such a man deserved to lose his life. But afterwards the Record saith, Dominus Rer tamen de gratia sua speciali pietate motus, malens vitam quam mortem eorum, qui se voluntati suae submittunt, remittit eidem Nicholao Iudicium vitae & membrorum. But the King moved by his special grace and piety, desiring rather the life than the death of those that submit to his will, did remit unto the said Nicholas the Judgement of loss of Life or Member. Here you see the King advised not with his Prelates, but with the Earls, Barons, and other Nobles, and what did they advise? Not to pardon him, as our Asserter will have it, but they say he deserved [Page 63] death, and then the King of himself would not have it go to that extremity. Now whether this Judgement would have been final, if they had pronounced sentence, and adjudged him to death, as they only said such a man deserved death, or whether this was only to be preparatory to a Tryal, and to proceed afterwards upon a formal Impeachment; I confess it is not clear to me, nor is it greatly material to our purpose, only it shews the Bishops were to give no advice in it one way or other; and it is rather stronger to prove they are not to meddle in such matters, if it was but preparatory: For it shews that in those Capital Cases they must have nothing to do with them to determine and judge any thing concerning them, from one end to the other, ab ovo usque ad mala, as the saying is, neither in the Judgement it self, nor any thing leading to it.
So he comes to the Arch-bishop Becket's Case, where he notably spends his mouth, but like an ill Hound, all upon false Hunting, and indeed runs riot so far, as he is not to be lashed in: He fills several leaves of his Book with Encomium's of the Popish Clergy, because some of them sometimes did what it was their duty to do, which doth not excuse them in the general current of their proceedings, commonly to stand for the authority of the Pope, and the See of Rome, against the Regal power, and the authority of Parliaments, as they did 20 R. 2. saying, They were sworn to the Pope, and to that See, and they would oppose whatever the King, and the Temporal Lords should do. [Page 64] En restriaion del Poair Apostoliqué ou derogagation de la libertoe de Saina Eglise; In restraint of the Power Apostolick, or derogation of the Liberty of Holy Church.
So he takes much pains to assert the Kings natural right to command his Subjects to serve him upon any emergency, and so to make Clergy-men Justitiaries, if he see cause for it: Which then gives them power of Judicature, and I do acknowledge it, but it is to be understood of Judicature in such Cases as the Law of the Land allows; we know they have been some of them Lord Chancellours, Lord Treasurers, Lord Privy Seal; but can he shew me, that any of them judged in Cases of Blood? For this Case of Beckett's is certainly misrepresented in Fitz-Stephens manuscript. We know there have been heretofore in many Counties, Justices of Assize, which have been Clergy-men, joyned with others in Commission, who were not Clergy-men, to take Assizes in the County: And the Act of Parliament, 27 E. 1. c. 3. coming to give power to those Justices of Assize to deliver the Gaols, and so to be made Justices of Gaol-delivery, and try Felons and Murtherers; it provides, that if one of them be a Clerk, then one of the most discreet Knights of the Shire shall be associated to him, that is a Lay-man, and be empowered by the Knights Writ to deliver the Gaols of the Shires, and chasten and punish whom they shall find to be guilty. And this Statute is confirmed, 2 E. 3. c. 2. which makes it manifest what the intendment of the Law is in [Page 65] that particular, that Clerks must not meddle to judge in Cases of Blood, and must hold good even for Bishops, who are all of them Clerks.
As for this Case of Beckets, which only stands upon the credit of a Manuscript, said to be made by Fitz-Stephens, a Monk, whom he characterizes for a sober and grave Historian, and more solito, out of the sweetness of his nature gives me a lash, saying, It is usual with me to let fall expressions to vilifie Testimonies and Precedents when they make against me; and this because I stile it a Blind Manuscript, and suspect the Author as partial, having been a creature of Beckets, and consequently no friend to the King. And therefore I give rather credit to the unanimous consent of the Historians of those times, who do not relate the passages of that Tryal to be as he makes them, than I do to him and his Manuscript. I call it a Blind Manuscript, because it sees not the light, lyes obscure in some bodies Closet, Mr. Selden doth not tell where, and I dare say our Asserter never saw it, though he terms the Author a grave Historian. His tale is, how at that great Council at Northampton, Archiepiscopus laesae Majestatis Coronae Regiae arguitur, quia est a Rege citatus pro causa Iohannis, neque venerat, neque idonee se excusasset, &c. The Arch-bishop is questioned for Treason against the Crown of the King, because he was summoned by the King in the Cause of John (that is one John the Marshal, who complained that the Arch-bishop had done him injustice in his Court) and he neither came, nor had sifficiently excused himself upon [Page 66] sickness, or any other just reason which might necessarily hinder him, whereupon he was condemned to forfeit his personal estate, and the Bishops and Barons not agreeing who should pronounce the sentence, they putting it off from one to another, at last the King commanded the Bishop of Winchester to do it. This is his story, and one may think it a strange piece of Treason, one not to come immediately upon a Summons to attend the King, especially if it be true what all the Historians that write of those times have related of this business. Gervasius Dorobernensis is an Author, as Mr. Selden observes, who lived in that age, and one of whom Mr. Selden, and all Antiquaries (we are sure) have a good opinion: and though our Asserter is confident enough to affirm they all have so of Fitz-Stephen, it is of what I do not find, that much hath been said by them to shew that, nor do I think that any of our Antiquaries, but Mr. Selden, doth so much as mention him: And from Gervasius Dorobernensis, we have this relation, Rex praecepit praesules & Proceres regni apud Northamptoniam una cum ipso Archiepiscopo convenire, &c. The King commanded the Prelates and Nobles of the Kingdome, together with the Arch-bishop himself, to meet at Northampton, where the Arch-bishop was accused of many things; first, that he had not fully done justice to one John that had a suit before him; then that upon this occasion being called into the Kings presence, he neglected to come. To this the Arch-bishop made answer, That John had all the justice done him that was due to him, [Page 67] that he had illegally defamed his Court, that he would not swear upon the Evangelists, as the custome is, but upon an old Song-book which he brought with him. But that being upon this summoned, he came not into the Kings presence, was not upon any contempt, but that he was hindred by a great sickness, and that he had excused himself by two competent witnesses whom he had sent for that purpose; yet this served not his turn, but Curiali Iudicio & Episcoporum consensu condemnatus est; He was condemned by the Iudgement of the Court, the Bishops consenting to it, that all his personal estate should be at the Kings disposing. This now is delivered unto us by an unquestionable known Author, who lived in that time. Fitz-Stephen and he agree in the matter of the Accusation, and agree in the Judgement, but Fitz-Stephen lays it to be Crimen laesae Majestatis Coronae Regiae, High-Treason, which must be for not coming to the King when he was summoned: Gervasius saith, that he sent his excuse by two witnesses, who testified that he was then very sick, and not able to come, which we all know to be a Lawful Essoine, De malo lecti, which cannot be disallowed, but must excuse, nay, justifie any bodies absence. Now can any body that is master of common sense, believe Fitz-Stephens relation, who will have this to be a Capital crime, High Treason, and a Capital proceeding upon it? We see the Sentence was far from Capital, and could not have been such as it was, if the Crime had been laid in the Accusation to be High Treason. Roger de Hoveden in his relation of this [Page 68] business, makes no mention of Treason, He saith, That the King calling a great Council at Northampton, Taedium magnum fecit Archiepiscopo, did a thing which much vexed the Arch-bishop, which was, that he caused his Horses to be put into the Arch bishops Inn, whereupon the Arch-bishop sent the King word, that he would not come to the Council till his Inn was cleared of those Horses; yet upon the second day of the meeting, the Arch bishop came into the Chapel where the Council sate, and there desired the Kings leave, that he might go over into France to visit Pope Alexander who was then there, which the King denied him, and said he should first answer for the injustice he had done to John the Marshal, in his Court: This John having complained to the King, that he had had a long suit in the Arch bishops Court for some Land he held of him, and could have no Iustice, and that thereupon, Curiam Archiepiscopi Sacramento falst ficaverat secundum consuetudinem Regni: He had, according to the custome of the Kingdom, upon Oath charged the Court with wrong doing (which I take to be a protesting against the proceeding of that Court, and the Judgement there given, in the nature of a Writ of Error.) The Arch-bishop answered to this, That John had no injustice done him, and that he brought into the Court a certain strange Book, and would swear upon that; how for want of Iustice, he left my Court, which the Officers that kept my Court, looked upon as an injury done to me, because it is the Law of the Kingdome, Quod qui Curiam alterius falsificare voluerit, oportet eum jurare super sacrosancta Evangelia: [Page 69] Whoever will so charge a Court with false dealing, must take his Oath upon the Holy Evangelists. Notwithstanding this, the King swore he would have Iustice done upon him. Et Barones Curiae; And the Barons of the Court gave Iudgement on him to be at the Kings mercy: Which Iudgement the Arch-bishop going about to reverse, (Iudicium illud falsificare, is the expression) He was perswaded by the Barons to submit himself to the Kings mercy for a Fine of five hundred pounds. Here is nothing in all this that can possibly infer any thing like Treason.
And it is something observable, what both these Authors say of the Judgement given; Gervasius saith, Curiali Iudicio & Episcoporum consensu condemnatus est; as if the part of the Bishops in this judgement were something differing from the Act of the Court, and not comprized in it: Hoveden saith, Barones Curiae Regis judicaverunt eum; as if the Bishops had no hand in it at all. Radulphus de Diceto Decanus Londinensis, I suppose Dean of Pauls, who lived in those times, mentions this business, he saith, That the Arch-bishop was questioned upon John the Marshals complaint, and fined 500 l. and that he was questioned likewise for moneys received by him, when he was Chancellour, for some Bishopricks and Abbies, of which he had received the profits, during their vacancies, and that not finding the Bishops to be his friends, he appealed from their Judgement, but then the Proceres, the Nobles, though he appealed from their Judgement likewise, yet they In eum nec confessum nec convictum, sententiam intorserunt: They wrested [Page 70] a Iudgement against him, though he confessed nothing, nor was at all convicted. You see here is not a word of Treason laid to his charge, nor nothing Capital, or any thing towards it. Matthew Paris tells you the same story, and almost in the very same words. Now let any man judge, whether all those Historians concurring, or single Fitz-Stephen disagreeing, deserves more credit: And that which hath greatest weight with me, is the Argument drawn ex natura rei, the crime which all agree that the Arch-bishop was charged with, was his not appearing upon the Kings Summons, which without a great and a very false Multiplying-Glass, cannot appear to be any thing like Treason: So I must conclude, that since the Charge against him had nothing of Capital in it, the proceedings upon it was not as against a Capital Offender, not brought to Tryal as a Prisoner, but came in upon a bare Summons, and tarried there, and returned at full liberty, the Judgement neither of loss of Life nor Limb, but meerly Pecuniary, and, as some of the Authors say, compounded with for five hundred pounds: I must I say, conclude, that this whole Case is nothing to our purpose, and neither the Law nor usage of Parliament did bar the Bishops from being personally present at such a Tryal.
And now I come to the point of Peerage, which I have so fully handled in my former Letter, as I think I need not say much in this. Our Asserter brings three Arguments to prove them to be Peers: The first is, That it is [Page 71] the general stile of all Parliaments from the beginning, to be Generale Concilium Cleri & Populi, even before the coming in of the Normans; which no man denies. The businesses of the Church, as well as of the Civil State are there determined; the Writ of Summons shews it, which saith, That the King intending to call a Parliament, Pro quibusdam arduis negotiis Nos Statum & defensionem Regni Angliae & Ecclesiae Anglicanae concernentibus. Bishops and Temporal Lords are summoned, and heretofore several others were summoned as Bannerets, and sometimes other persons of Quality who likewise were not Peers, and yet were called to the Parliaments as pleased the King; and the Judges are so summoned at this day, Super dictis negotiis tractaturi consilium suum impensuri. Where the Bishops act as Bishops, and what by the Law of the Land, and the practice and usage of Parliaments they ought to do, that they do, and may do; the Temporal Lords in like manner, and so likewise the Judges every one acts in his Sphere; but this neither gives the Bishops power to judge in Capital Causes, if otherwise it be prohibited them, nor doth it make them Peers, no more than it did formerly the Bannerets, and others, for their being summoned to sit and vote in the House of Peers: We had the experience of this the last Parliament, a Baron pretending to a much ancienter station among the Peers, by proving that his Ancestor had been summoned by one of our former Kings, to sit more than once in the House of Lords, yet not making [Page 72] it appear that that favour had been still continued to him; and it being made appear on the other side, that several Families in this Kingdom would have the same pretence upon the like ground, it was the opinion of the House, that he had no Right to it; and consequently that his Ancestor was never acknowledged to be a Peer os the Realm, and his Blood enobled, which otherwise would have descended from him to his Posterity, and to this present Baron, who is since enobled by a later Creation, but takes nothing from that Ancestor. So then it is clear, that sitting in the House of Peers, and having a parity of Vote, and enjoying many of the same priviledges with the Peers, doth not in true and proper speaking, make the Bishops Peers; no more than 21 R. 2. Sir Thomas Percy sitting with the Peers, and Voting with them, as Procurator for the Bishops, was thereby a Peer.
His next Argument is, That in several Rolls of Parliament they are expressly called Peers, which cannot be denied, nor doth that make them Peers, if the essential parts of Peerage, be wanting to them: We know that denominations are many times taken up in a large and improper sense, for some circumstances, some similitudes, something which is extraneous unto them, yet wherein they agree with things of another nature: And so Bishops having place and vote in the House of Peers, and joyning with the Peers of the Realm, sitting in Parliament, in all things, with equal power uno excepto, saving [Page 73] only in cases of Blood, it is no wonder if they are often stiled Peers of Parliament. But the Precedents he cites, are falsly recited both in the Case of Mautravers, and that of Gomenitz and Weston, as I have shewed before.
His third Argument is, That they have judged as Peers, upon Peers of Parliament. But I deny that they judge there as Peers, but as called to the Parliament, to be Members of the House of Lords, as Bannerets were formerly, and many principal Gentlemen who were still Commoners, and some Officers, as the Warden of the Cinque-Ports, who was no Peer sometimes, and yet summoned up to the House of Lords, and all these judged such Peers as were tryed in those Parliaments in which they sate.
However, that Bishops are not Peers of the Realm, and so consequently not properly and truly Peers of Parliament, though often called so, I think will be clearly made out.
First, I must, as I have formerly done, insist upon the Great Charter, which Sir Edward Cooke saith, is declaratory of the Principal grounds of the Fundamental Laws of England, and which the Statute made 25 E. 3. Confirmatio Chartarum, will have to be observed as the Common Law, and all Judgements given against it, to be undone and holden for nought, this Law is certainly to be obeyed, and what is done in observance of this Law, is most legal: And it enjoyning every man to be tryed by his Peers, and Bishops being tryed [Page 74] by a Jury of Commoners, Commoners are their Peers, and they are Peers to Commoners, and not Peers of the Realm: Peers per eminentiam, as I may call them, or else Magna Charta is broken, and made a Law of no authority.
2. To be a Peer of the Realm, their Blood must be enobled, and their Persons dignified; nor can they otherwise be put into the same rank with those who are so, which would make but an ill accouplement, and they would never draw well together. Now Bishops do not sit in Parliament ratione Nobilitatis, but ratione Officii, as Stamford saith in his Pleas of the Crown, p. 153. En respect de lour possession se launcient Baronies anneres a lour dignitées: In respect of their possessions, viz. the ancient Baronies annexed to their dignities.
3. If they were Peers, and their Persons enobled, their Wives would be noble, and have the priviledges of Peeresses, being Married or Widows, for Husband and Wife are one person in Law; but we know they have no such priviledge, which shews their Husbands to be no Peers.
4. If Bishops were Peers of the Realm, and any of them questioned for a Capital Crime in Parliament time, they could be tryed and judged only by the House of Peers, and by no other Court of Judicature. The Lords could not avoid the trying of them themselves, indeed any but Peers they may refuse, except it be upon an Impeachment by the House of Commons, for then they must retain it, and proceed in it, but not otherwise, [Page 75] except they see some great cause for it, Pro bono Publico, as it is 1 R. 2. when the Commons desired that no suit between Party and Party should be undertaken, and determined by the Lords, or the Officers of the Council, but that the Common Law might have its course, except it be in such a business, and against so great a person as one cannot else hope to have right done in it: The same is confirmed 1 H. 4. which I alledge to justifie the Judicature of the House of Lords, upon those who are not their Peers, upon special occasion: But for trying of their Peers is a duty incumbent upon them, which they must perform; and any Peer who is questioned, may challenge it as his right, and it cannot be denied him. And therefore 4 E. 3. when they had, upon the Kings earnest pressing them, Tryed and Condemned Sir Simon de Bereford, Sir Iohn Mautravers, and other Commoners, they make a Protestation, that they nor their Successors, Ne seroient mes tenus ne charges a rendre Iugements sur autres, que sur lur Piers: Should not be bound nor charged to give Iudgement upon any but their Peers. But we know that they have sometimes turned off Bishops to Inferiour Courts, as appears by the Record of it in the Exchequer, the same 4 E. 3. Stephen Gravesend, Bishop of London, was complained of in Parliament, by one Iohn de Wymburne, for saying, That if Edward the Second was yet living, as he was informed he was in Corf-Castle, he would assist him with all his power, to reestablish him in his Throne. Sir Edward [Page 76] Cooke saith, that by order of Parliament the matter was referred to be tryed in the Kingsbench, but the Record saith, that the Parliament referred it to the Kings Council, and appointed him to appear before them at Woodstock upon Sunday fortnight after Easter, and that they turned him over to the Kingsbench to be Tryed by the Chief Justice Scroope, and his fellow Judges. Whereas had this Bishop been then accounted a Peer of the Realm, he must have been Tryed in Parliament; the Parliament being once possessed of his Cause, and they could not have referred him to any other Judicature.
So here you have four Essential parts of Peerage all of them wanting in Bishops, and the want but of one Essential part is enough to destroy the whole. He can be no Peer of the Realm who is at the Kings sute Capitally Tryed by a Jury of Commoners, if Magna Charta be good Law, which is our All as we are Free-men. Secondly, He who is not himself enobled, cannot be a Peer in equal rank to one that is: For all Peers are equally Peers, as we may say, Peerage doth not recipere magis & minus. The meanest Baron is as much a Peer as the greatest Duke, else they were not Peers, it would be Contradictio in adjecto, an Imparity in a Parity. Thirdly, If the Husband be enobled, the Wife must be so; but the Wife of a Bishop is not enobled, therefore the Person of her Husband is not, for the Wife and the Husband are one. Fourthly, If a Bishop were a Peer, he could in Parliament time be Tryed no where [Page 77] but in the House of Peers, but Matter of Fact we find to be otherwise. Therefore, I think, I may safely conclude that Bishops are no Peers.
But before I leave this point, I must answer one thing which is said, They say, they hold by Baronage, and therefore they are Barons, as Fitz Stephen makes the Bishops in their altercation with the Temporal Lords about the pronunciation of the Sentence against the Arch-bishop, saying, Non sedemus hic Episcopi, sed Barones: Nos Barones, & vos Barones, Pares hic sumus: We sit not here in Parliament as Bishops, but as Barons; we are Barons, and you are Barons: Here we are Peers. Fitz-Stephen's authority signifies nothing to me; but this I know is said, and believed by many, therefore it must be answered, to disabuse many, who may think, that holding by Barony creates a Baron, which it doth no more, than holding by Knights service, makes a man a Knight, or holding by Villanage makes a man a Villain, which many do to this day, even but here at East-Barnet, and yet are good Free-men and no Villains, for it works not upon the Person, as Fleta saith, l. 3. c. 13. the service they do, is ratione tenementi non personae. So the Bishops holding per Baronagium, are thereby made subject to do the service of Barons, and to obey the Kings, Writ of Summons to attend the Parliament, which makes them Lords of Parliament; but affects not their person. The Bishop of the Isle of Man is a Bishop as well as any of the rest, first instituted by Pope Gregory the Fourth, as Sir Edward Cooke saith; but not holding [Page 78] by Baronage, hath no place nor vote in Parliament. We must know that this Tenure by Baronage was first created by William the First, of all the Lands which held of the Crown in Capite, consisting of so many Knights Fees, these Lands were divided, some to Lay-men, some to Ecclesiastical persons: And these were all bound to certain services, though not all to the same, and among others, all to attend in Parliament, whenever the King pleased to Summon them, and so became Lords of Parliament. This continued so till King Iohn's time, when the number of the Temporal Lords growing so great and numerous, that King made some alteration, which certainly was setled and confirmed by Parliament, but justly the time when this was done is not known, the Record of it being lost. The alteration was, that none of the Temporal Lords should come to Parliament but such as received the Kings Writ, a particular Summons for it. These were called Barones Majores; those who were not so summoned, and so did not come to Parliament were stiled Barones Minores, and were still Feodal Barons as before, and held their Lands per Baronagium, but were not Lords of Parliament. Therefore it was not barely holding by Barony, which made the person a Baron even in those times, there was an act of the Kings requisite even in the Summoning of him to Parliament, to make that Honour to affect and enoble the Person, and so to fix it, and make it hereditary in the Family; which way of dignifying a Person continued till the eleventh year of Richard the [Page 79] Second, when Iohn de Beauchamp, Steward of the Houshold, was first created by Patent, Baron of Kiderminster, since which time it hath still been practised to make them all Barons by Patent. But the Bishops have still continued upon the first Institution of being by their Tenures obliged, and accordingly Summoned to attend in Parliament, which made them Lords of Parliament, but not Peers of the Realm.
And now I come to his last point making them a Third Estate, for which he cites the Bill presented to Richard the Third in his first Parliament where they are made so, and to this I can oppose other passages in Parliament clean contrary, as that 2 H. 4. where the Temporal Lords and they together, are made to be one of the three Estates, and other instances may be given of the same nature: But let us a little consider how that Bill was framed, 1 R. 3. it was first devised by certain Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and other Nobles, and notable Personages of the Commons, a Party picked out and chosen for that purpose, who presented it in the behalf, and in the name of the Three Estates of this Realm of England; and what was this to do, to declare Edward the Fourth to have lived in adultery with Dame Elizabeth Gray, whom he had married, being precontracted to Dame Ellianor Bottiler, daughter to the Earl of Shrewsbury, and consequently all his Children, Bastards, Edward the Fifth a Bastard, and Elizabeth his Sister, a Bastard, afterwards married to Henry the Seventh, which entituled [Page 80] him and his Posterity to the Crown, set an end to all the foregoing competitions, and setled it as it is at this day, this Bill, as the Record saith, was first presented and delivered to their Soveraign Lord the King, that was to R. 3. whom they made so in the name and on the behalf of the said Three Estates, out of Parliament, and now by the said Three Estates assembled in Parliament, ratified and confirmed. And truly, I must say, this is not an authority to be bragged of, for making the Bishops a Third Estate.
But then let us see if the Bishops sitting in the House of Lords, have the necessary and essential qualifications of being a Third Estate in Parliament, without which they cannot be a Third Estate there: That the Clergy is one of the three Estates of the Realm, and they the Principal and Chief of them, no body denies: And that they are Summoned to Parliament as a Third Estate of the Realm, the dignified Clergy personally, others of the Inferiour sort by their Procurators and Representatives, is likewise confessed; but not to have any part in making of Laws for the good Government of the Kingdom, no not so much as in matters meerly concerning the Church; but they may offer and propose and be consulted with, but whatever they agree upon must come to the two Houses of Parliament, and receive the stamp of their Authority, before it can be presented to the King to become a Law, and be binding to the People: This is the work of the Convocation which meets at the same time with the Parliament, and there [Page 81] is convened the Third Estate of the Realm; Where the Bishops make the Upper House. and there sit as Bishops according to their Spirituality. But their Summons gives them another capacity, which is to meet in the House of Lords, and there Cum caeteris Praelatis, Magnatibus & Proceribus regni de arduis negotiis Statum regni & Ecclesiae specialiter tangentibus tractare & consilium impendere; and thither they are obliged to come and attend by their Tenure of their Baronies, where they sit in their Personal Capacity, to do the service which they owe for the Lands they hold of the King.
Now we will consider, if being there upon such an account, it can any ways stand with reason, and the nature of a Third Estate, to esteem them to be so. 1. To represent the body of the lesser Clergy, as our Asserter will have them to do, who else, he saith, would be in a worse condition than the meanest Clown, having no body to represent them in giving Aids and Subsidies; first, I say, that as Subsidies were heretofore given in Parliament, which was the ancient Parliamentary way of supplying the necessities of the Crown and Government, where the Convocation gave the Supply of the Clergy, the Bishops as Members of the House of Lords, had nothing to do in it, but as Members of the Convocation they had, and the Representatives of the lesser Clergy, who were chosen by them, and made up the Lower House of the Convocation; they gave their consents, and joyned in that Gift for the whole body of the Clergy; the two Houses of Parliament did [Page 82] only ratifie and confirm what the Convocation had done, and therefore only the beginning and the end of that Act of Subsidy given by the Clergy, not the body of it, was openly read in the several Houses of the Lords and Commons. So 4 R. 2. the Commons having offered to give an aid, so as the Clergy, who enjoyed a third part of the Realm, would pay one third part of the Summ; the Clergy answered, That they were not to grant any Aid by Parliament, but of their own free wills, and therefore willed the Commons to do their duties, and they would do theirs. This was the ancient way of granting supplies in Parliament, where you see the lesser Clergy had their Representatives, which it seems our Asserter did not understand, and so no wonder if he did mistake, as he commonly doth. And this I must say further, the lesser Clergy, as he calls them, are little beholding to him, to have them to be represented by Bishops, having no hand in the choice of them: This I am sure, puts them into a meaner condition than the meanest Clown, who if he have but 40 s. Free-hold, gives his voice to whom he will to represent him in Parliament, to give his assent to part with his Money, and to make any Law to bind him. Of later times they have taken up another way of granting publick supplies, which is of so much in the Pound, which they call a Pound-rate, and this brings in the Clergy to pay their proportion, who are now as busie as any in electing of Members to Parliament. In a word, none can represent another in Parliament, that is not chosen by him; every [Page 83] particular person that hath right of vote, being included in the majority of Vote: So the whole Clergy, being the third Estate of the Realm, and the Bishops not being chosen by them, they cannot represent that third Estate.
2. The Bishops sit not in the House of Lords Ratione Spiritualitatis, as was the opinion of all the Judges of England, 7 H. 8. in Keilway's Reports, in Dr. Standish's Case. Les Spiritual Seignieurs nont ascun place en [...]e Parlament chamber per reason de lour Spiritualtie mes solement per reason de lour temporal possessions: The Lords Spiritual have no place in the Parliament chamber by reason of their Spiritualty, but by reason of their Temporal possessions. How then can they be said to be there a Third Estate, to represent the Clergy of England, when they sit not there as Clergy-men?
3. If they be a Third Estate, they must have a Negative voice to whatever is proposed in the House, if the majority of their opinions be against it. And for our Asserter to say, that the Custome, and so the Law of the Parliament is otherwise, and that the two Estates of the Lords Temporal and Spiritual make but one House, where they vote intermixedly. Why, this shews they are not two Estates, because they do vote intermixedly, for if they were so, they must vote severally, and not be twisted so together as they are, as I said before in my former Letter, like a nest of Boxes one within another. And think what a disparagement it would be to the House of Lords, that two Estates must be clapped together, to make them equal [Page 84] to the one Estate of the House of Commons.
4. If the Bishops were a Third Estate, the Parliament could not act as a Parliament without them, for a Parliament is composed, and must consist of Three Estates, and nothing is binding but what is so passed. But we know that in Edward the First's time, there was a Parliament called and held Clero excluso, and Laws were there made, when none of them were present, and many Acts have passed in several Parliaments, when the Bishops have all voted against them. The Judges in that of 7 H. 8. deliver their opinions for Law: Due nostre Sur le Roy poit assetz bien tener son Parlement per luy, & ses Temporal Seigniors & per ses Commons, tout sans les Spirituals Seigniors: Our Lord the King can hold his Parliament himself with his Temporal Lords, and his Commons, wholly without the Lords Spiritual.
These, and many other Reasons, confirm me in my opinion, that Bishops are neither Peers of the Realm, nor a Third Estate in Parliament, yet they might be both, and not invalidate my Position, which I at first undertook to prove, which was only this, that by the Practice and Custome of Parliament, and by the Law of the Land, Bishops are prohibited from meddling in Parliament as Members of the House of Lords in any Tryal of a Criminal Person, where the Charge, the Proceedings, and the Sentence upon it is Capital, and goes to the Loss of Life or Members, only one Precedent excepted, that extravagant one [Page 85] of 28 H. 6. And my good friend the Asserter who hath almost as many Errata's as Lines in his Book, must give me leave to summ up all my Corrections of them in one Distich, as Martiall did those of his Friend Fidentinus; such another Fidentinus, it seems, as our Asserter; and it was this,
And I must say the Verse doth not better quadrare with the product of his Brains, which hath so many faults as can only be covered and put out of sight with one rasure from the beginning to the end, than this one and the same Name of Fidentinus deciphers the Confidence of them both, Nullâ pallescere culpâ. And so I shall leave my Friend Fidentinus to learn better manners, if he be not altogether incorrigible; and apply my self to peruse and answer (if I can) a Treatise of a worthy Gentleman, who is, I see, of a differing opinion from me, and hath much more of reason, and something, though not much more of civility and fairness in the maintaining of it, so as whether or no his reasons will convince me, I know not; but if they do, I will certainly grant it, for my Maxime is still, Amicus Plato, amicus Socrates, sed magis amica Veritas.
The Writer of this Treatise, intituled, The Grand Question concerning the Bishops right to vote in Parliament in Cases Capital, Stated and Argued; doth state the Question right, that is, Whether the Bishops may be present and [Page 86] vote Judicially in Capital Cases which come to be judged in Parliament, either in giving the Judgement it self, or in resolving and determining any circumstance preparatory, and leading to that Judgement. Then he sets down some things granted on both sides, as 1. That Bishops do sit in Parliament by vertue of their Baronies, and are bound to serve the King there. From this he infers they have a Right of Judicature, which is not denied; but the question is, as he saith himself, what this Judicature is. 2 That they sit by the same kind of Writ, that other Barons do. Upon which he would infer, that they are impowered and required to confer and treat of all the weighty affairs that shall be brought before them, the King having not limited nor restrained the one more than the other. But it follows not, because all are called together by the same authority, that therefore the same duty is incumbent upon all, if there be a higher power that directs what every ones duty is to do, when they are come together. Now the King acts in a higher Sphere by the Law of the Land, and the law and practice of Parliament which prohibits Bishops from meddling with judging of Capital Causes in Parliament, nor did they ever do it, but in one extravagant proceeding in 28 H. 6. where nothing was regular nor Parliamentary from the beginning to the end, which I look upon as altogether insignificant to alter what is so setled by Law and constant Custome, therefore the Kings Writ of Summons cannot dispence with that, to make that lawful, which in it self is unlawful; as I have sufficiently [Page 87] proved it. And I will now go a little further in it, than I did before, for hitherto I have only insisted upon the Law of Parliaments, as a thing setled in Parliament by the Constituons of Clarendon in Henry the Second's time, and the Protestation of the Bishops enrolled in Parliament by the King, Lords and Commons, 11 R. 2. but now I will deliver my opinion (which I submit to better Judgements) that they lye still under a Restraint by the Canon Law, which by the Statute 25 H. 8. c. 12. which (was repealed 1 and 2 Phil. and Mar. but revived 1 Eliz.) is still of force, where it is not repugnant to the Laws of the Realm, which we are sure this branch of it, restraining Bishops from judging Capitally is not; so far from it, that it is confirmed and strengthened by the Law of the Land. 3. The third Particular in which he saith all agree, is, That they have their Votes in Bills of Attainder, acting in their Legislative capacity, which is as much a Case of Blood as the other, and perhaps as much forbidden by the Canon. But I desire this worthy Person to consider, that the Practice of Parliament is the Law of Parliament, and is the commanding Law for regulating the Proceedings of Parliament, and that hath overruled this Point, that in the making of a Law, every Free-man of the Kingdom doth give his consent, either explicitly if he be a Member of either House, or implicitly by his Representative, for every Free-man of the Kingdome is there present, or represented. And it is the Fundamental Constitution of our English Freedome, that no man can be bound by any [Page 88] Law, but what himself hath consented to; now a Bill of Attainder is as much a Law as any Statute Law of the Kingdom. Therefore Bishops have acted in a Legislative capacity to judge and condemn Capitally, as several Precedents we have of it in Henry the Eight's time, but not in a judicial capacity. And to say the Canon Law prohibits one as much as the other, the Statute of 25 H. 8. clears that point, which takes away the force of the Canon in the one, not to abridge Members of Parliament from voting in the Legislative way, and strengthens it in the other, forbidding Bishops to vote Judicially in Cases of Blood. Yet if you will have me deliver you freely my opinion in it, I think it is an abuse crept in since Henry the Eight's time, for before none were judged by Bill, but such as had been slain in open War, or Tryed, Condemned and Executed by Commission, and then the proceedings brought into Parliament, and there approved of, and the Attainder confirmed, but under Henry the Eighth several persons were condemned by Bill, and the Earl of Strafford lately in our memories, which seems now to be authorized by the Practice of Parliament. Sir Edw. Cooke tells a story which he had from Sir Thomas Gaudy, one of the Judges of the Kings-bench, how the King had commanded Cromwel, and the Earl of Essex, to attend the Justices, and know of them, if a man who was forth coming should be condemned by Act of Parliament, without being heard; who after some fencing, answered if it were so, it could not be afterwards called into question; and [Page 89] Cromwel himself was not long after so served; but this is by the way. Multa quae fieri non debent, facta valent. I have been a little the longer in these particulars, because it will much smooth our way in the following discourse.
And this worthy Gentleman must give me leave to say, That he needed not have put himself to all that trouble of his first Chapter, in telling us of the mighty power the Clergy had in the Primitive times in the ordering of Secular affairs, which certainly was more by way of Counsel, than any thing of Authority by way of Judgement, and in a Judicial way. And he will avow to me, I doubt not, that the ministery of the word was a full employment for the Apostles, and so for Bishops, who call themselves their Successors, as well as serving of Tables, and other ministerial duties was a full employment for those whom he calls the Treasurers of the Church; and therefore they said it for themselves, and left it as a Rule for their Successors, even to Bishops, and all other dispencers of the Word and Sacraments, that it was not reason they should leave the Word of God, and serve Tables. Which it seems was a Non est Consonum, by the Law of God, just as by the Common Law of the Kingdom, a Writ was provided, declaring it to be likewise a Non est Consonum, and to be Contra morem & Consuetudinem Regni, that Clergy-men should be employed in Secular affairs. This indeed I hinted at then, as I gave also some little touch at the Government of the Church by the Imperial Law, but not that I put any stress upon [Page 90] it, but meerly to circumscribe the Question, and keeping it within limits, by a Negative, declaring what it was not, and an Affirmative, expressing what it was, how Bishops in Parliament could not Judicially act in Capital Cases.
Therefore were it all so as this learned Gentleman seems to infer, that in France, Spain, Germany, and those Northern Kingdoms which he mentions, that Bishops were joyned with the Civil Magistrates in ordering the Publick Affairs of those Nations, and that they had a share not only in the Legislative, but in the Judiciary part, as he alledgeth two Authors to prove it to have been in France, it would not be of any signification to decide our Controversie, for what is this to us to regulate our Parliaments, and to operate on our Laws? But first for matter of Fact, as to France, to which I can speak a little, having spent many years in that Kingdom, and I have, by way of discourse, informed my self from the Ambassadour who is here from that Crown, who doth assure me, that the Judges (whom they call Counsellors, and not Judges, as we do) who are Clergy-men, as many there are joyned with the others of the Laity, never sit in that Chamber of Parliament, which trys Capital Causes, which they call the Tournelle. I believe the same may be observed in those other Countries which our Author mentions, and I do not see how it could be otherwise, the severity of the Canon Law being so strict in the prohibition of it.
[Page 91] But as I said before, the Primitive Christians had that veneration for the Clergy, and especially for the Bishops, that they were still joyned with the Civil Magistrate, in ordering the affairs both in Church and State. The matters of the Church, they determined Judicially, in Secular affairs, whether Criminal or other, only by way of Counsel, if the Civil Magistrate to whose Province they belonged, did not do his part. I am sure it was so in England. Brompton in his Chronicle, recites the Laws of King Athelstane in this particular: I cited his very words in the original in my former Letter, I shall now repeat them very faithfully in English. He saith, It appertains of right to a Bishop to promote that which is right, both concerning God and the World. A little after he addeth, He ought likewise diligently, together with the Secular Judges, to promote Peace and Concord. And soon upon it, he hath this passage, The Bishop ought to be present in Judgement with the Secular Judges, not to suffer any buds of wickedness to sprout, if he can hinder it. His Presence and his Counsel was rather a check upon the Judge, than to determine any thing in Secular affairs. Sir Henry Spelman is a little more particular in delivering unto us the nature of that mixt Court, it is in his Glossary upon the word Comes. The Earl, he saith, did preside in that County Court, not alone, but joyned with the Bishop; he to deliver what was Gods Law, the other what was Mans Law, and that the one should help and counsel the other: Especially the Bishop to do it to the Earl, for it was lawful [Page 92] for him sometimes to reprove the other, and to reduce him, bring him into order if he went astray. Then he tells us what the work of that Court was, that it had cognizance but of petty matters, That the Earl had not cognizance of great mens businesses, for such matters are to be brought into the Kings Courts, he only judges poor mens Causes. Hence it is, that by our Law, Actions for Debts and Trespasscs are not to be commenced in the County Court, if it be for above the value of 40s. It seems that in ancient times it was but one Court, but each Judge had his proper work, the Ecclesiastical Judge to distribute and deliver to them what was Gods Law, the Secular Judge, Mans Law. And so it continued till William the First's time, who first separated the two Courts, as appears by his Charter to Bishop Remigius, which Mr. Selden relates in his Comment upon Eadmerus, p. 167. which he saith the King did Communi Concilio Archiepiscoporum suorum & raeterorum Episcoporum, & Abbatum, & omnium Principum regni sui: In a Common Council, by the advice of his Arch bishops, and the rest of the Bishops and Abbots, and all the great men of the Kingdom: The words are, Wherefore I command you, and enjoyn you by my Royal authority, that no Bishop nor Arch deacon presume to hold Plea in the Hundred Court any more upon the Episcopal Laws, nor bring any Cause that pertains to the rule of Souls before the Judgement of Secular persons, but that whoever is questioned according to the Episcopal Laws for any misdemeanour or fault, shall come to that place which the Bishop shall chuse and nominate for that purpose, and there shall make answer for himself, [Page 93] and not in the Hundred Court, but shall, according to the Canons, and the Episcopal Laws, do that which is just and right both to God and to his Bishop. This was again confirmed 2 R. 2. and so the Courts came to be divided, as they continue to this day. But nothing can be concluded out of that large Enumeration, of the Bishops being admitted in those ancient times to Publick Councils, which was more for their Advice, and Counsel and Direction, than to act any thing at all Authoritatively and Juridically, and least of all to have any vote to determine any thing in Cases of Blood, which the Canon Law made a Noli me tangere to them: I deny not, but before there were Christian Magistrates, even in the Apostles times, the Ministers of the Gospel did many times interpose and reconcile differences and sutes, which many times happened amongst believers; as St. Paul saith, Is there not a wise man among you, no not one that shall be able to judge between his Brethren? Nor doth he exclude the Bishops, that they may not come in as one of those wise men: Yet 1 Cor. 6. 4. he seems to exclude them: For he saith, If then ye have judgement of things pertaining to this life, set them to judge who are least esteemed in the Church. Which doth seem to intimate, as if he meant not the Bishops, for sure they are not least esteemed. But doth any man think, that they were by this authorized to compel men to submit to their Judgement, to punish or imprison, or lay any corporal punishment upon them, if they would not? Indeed I cannot think so. [Page 94] Nor do I find that St. Augustine was of that opinion, the term he gives to those whom the Author of that Treatise will have to be Ecclesiastical Judges, doth not imply so much, rather the contrary methinks: He calls them Cognitores, which denotes rather one that took notice of such differences, and would endeavour to compose them, than a Judge to determine them, which hath made me examine that passage more particularly. In his Comment upon the 118 Psalm he saith, speaking of those who interrupted them in their enquiry into the duty which they owed to the Commandments of God, Non solum cum persequuntur, aut litigare nobiscum volunt, verum etiam cum obsequuntur & honorant, & tamen cum suis vitiosis & negotiosis cupiditatibùs adiuvandis ut occupemur, & eis nostra tempore impendamus, efflagitant, aut certè infirmos premunt, ut causas suas ad nos deferre compellant, quibus dicere non audemus, dic homo, quis me constituit Iudicem aut divisorem inter vos? Constituit enim talibus causis Ecclesiasticos Apostolus Cognitores, in foro prohibens jurgare Christianos. Here is nothing of coercion in all this, they acted not as Judges, nay, he complains that the Clergy-men themselves were persecuted, and compelled to go to Law; or if they seemed to shew them some respect, and would be ruled by them, and drew them from their occupations to compose things between them, they would not drive them away, and say, who made me a Judge between you? For the Apostle who forbids Christians going to Law, makes the Clergy to be Cognitores, Referees or Umpires between [Page 95] which is the greatest act of Charity that can be, and most befitting the calling of the Ministers of Gods Word. But what saith St. Austin a little after, Good men he saith will hearken to us, and seldome trouble us with their Secular affairs, but others, qui inter se pertinaciter agunt, & quando bonos premunt, nostra Iudicata contemnunt, faciunt que nobis perire tempora rebus eroganda divinis: Good men will hearken to him, he saith, but those who are perverse do Iudicata contemnere, despise his award of it; which shews he took not upon him any authority of determining any thing. And so in his 147th Epistle to Proculianus the Donatist, he hath this passage, Et homines quidem causas suas Seculares apud nos finire cupientes, quando eis necessarii fuerimus sic nos Sanctos & Dei servos appellant ut negotia terrae suae peragant, aliquando agamus & negotium salutis nostrae, & salutis ipsorum: Non de auro, non de argento, non de fundis & pecoribus, pro quibus rebus quotidie submisso capite salutamur, ut dissentiones hominum terminemus, &c. Nothing plainer than that all this is purely out of good will a work of Charity to those who desire him to determine their Secular differences, in which the Clergy then had meerly an eye upon Gods Glory, the good of their own Souls, and of the Souls of those for whom they took that pains. But all this is Nihil ad rem, let the Clergy have right or no right to judge of Secular Causes, it will not decide our Controversie, Whether Bishops in Parliament can meddle in cases of Blood: Hic Rodus, Hic Saltus, if we do all extravagate, I must come back to this.
[Page 96] His next Chapter will be more to the purpose, it is concerning the Constitutions of Clarendon, and the Protestation of the Bishops 11 R. 2. These two particulars well cleared, and no disguise put upon them, will go a great way: He begins with the Constitutions of Clarendon, which he conceives to be that Bishops are thereby required to be present in the Kings Courts, as other Barons are, till they come to give Sentence as to dismembring, or loss of life, and his Method is to judge of them by these three ways: 1. The occasion. 2. The plain sense of the words, according to their true reading. 3. By the subsequent Practice upon this constitution in the Parliament at Northampton soon after.
1. For the occasion, this Author is pleased to say, he can hardly believe I should betray so much unskilfulness in the affairs of those times, as to say, that the Bishops did then affect such a power of Judicature in Secular Causes, and I think I have good warrant to be of that opinion. Petrus Blesensis, whom this Author cites, as living in Henry the Second's time, and knowing the whole proceedings of those Constitutions, complains of it sufficiently. In the first and genuine Edition of them, Printed at Mentz in Quarto, published by Busaeus the Jesuite in 1600, in his Treatise De institutione Episcopi, p. 542. he hath this passage, Illud coelestem exasperat iram & plerisque discrimen damnationis accumulat, quod quidam principes Sacerdotum & seniores populi licet non dictent Iudicia Sanguinis, eadem tamen tractent disputando & disceptando de illis, seque [Page 97] ideo immunes à culpa reputant, quod mortis aut truncationis membrorum Iudicium discernentes, à prounciatione duntaxat & executione poenalis sententiae se absentant. Sed quid hac simulatione perniciosius est? Nunquid discutere & definire licitum est, quod pronunciare non licet? This provokes Gods wrath, and heaps up upon many a danger of damnation, that some of the prime of Church-men, and Elders of the People, though they do not dictate Iudgements of Blood, yet they debate them, and dispute of them, and therefore repute themselves free from fault, in regard they have withdrawn themselves from being present, at the pronouncing and giving order for the execution of the penal Iudgement, though they had before agreed to the punishment of Death, or loss of Limbs. But what can be more pernicious than such dissembling? Can it be lawful to debate and to determine a thing, which it is unlawful to pronounce? Then he compares them to King Saul, that had resolved upon the destruction of David, but would not that his hand should be upon him, but that he should fall by the hands of the Philistines; or to the Scribes and Pharisees, that cryed out against our Saviour, Crucifie him, Crucifie him, but said it was not lawful for them to put any man to death. Is not this as good as Chaucer's Fryer that this Author quips me with, p. 4.? I do not say that Blesensis blamed all the Bishops for evading the Law in that manner, he saith they were quidam Principes Sacerdotum, some of the great Bishops. But the Author would have it to be the Universal Practice and Opinion of all the Bishops and Clergy to understand the Constitution of Clarendon, [Page 98] that they might continue to sit in Judgement till the Sentence was to be pronounced; and in the Edition of Blesensis, Printed at Paris in 1667. instead of quidam it is Printed quidem, but by a manifest error which carries no sense with it, and the Marginal Notes in both Editions shew it, which is, Abusus Clericorum qui causas sanguinis discutiunt; marking out the abuse of them that did so. This was obvious enough to the Author in his quotation of Blesensis, therefore he might have spared the censure of my unskilfulness in the affairs of these times, since I had such a Leader to follow as Blesensis; and more have I cause to complain of his want of Charity to me, p. 31. taxing me with representing those constitutions very unfairly, which is an expression of one engaged in a party, and not of one that only seeks for truth, but to shew his Reading and Learning, as I am afraid that Author doth, who raiseth a great deal of dust meerly to blind mens eyes, and mis▪ lead them into errours; and thus he commends himself for speaking mildly, and much good may his mildness do him.
It is apparent that the Clergy were then very high, having gotten a great head by the favour they had found from the Usurper King Stephen, where on both sides they served one anothers turns, and Henry the Second, to bring things again into order, call'd that great Counsel at Clarendon, where, by the Advice of the Prelates and the Nobility of the Realm, a recapitulation was made of part of the ancient customs and priviledges under [Page 99] the former King, and particularly under his Grand-father Henry the First, which for the future he would have to be observed in the Kingdom, and thus Propter dissentiones & discordias saepe immergentes inter Clerum & Iusticiarios Domini Regis & Magnatum Regni. There were sixteen of those Articles, the eleventh was, that they should hold their possessions of the King in Capite, sicut Barcniam; and should be answerable to the King for their Services; and should as Barons, interesse Judiciis Curiae Regis, quousque perveniatur ad diminutionem Membrorum, vel ad Mortem. Here we see the occasion of that meeting at Clarendon, it was to remove all causes of difference between the Great Bishops and the Civil Magistrates; let us now see what was most likely to displease them, it's not probable it should be for being reduced to stand upon even ground with the rest of the Nobility, and great men of the Realm; but if in any thing they are made less, and abridg'd of the powers which the others have, it stands most with reason they should be troubled at that; and to be forc'd to walk out of the Judgement-hall after they had cryed Crucifige, is a great lessening of their figure, I think more than if they had not at all meddled in it. But this Worthy Author saith, I have made use of the most Imperfect Copy of Matthew Paris, and saith in the Vatican Copy, and several MSS. it runs thus, Debent interesse Judiciis Curiae Regis cum Baronibus, donec perveniatur in Iudicio ad diminutionem Membrorum vel ad Mortem. Now in my opinion, this makes more against [Page 100] the sense he would put upon these words, which is, that they may stay and have a hand in managing the debate upon the Evidence, and agreeing upon the Sentence, but must be gone when it is pronounced, (which as I said before, I look upon as a greater scorn put upon them, as Blesensis saith, Quid hac simulatione perniciosius est, nunquid discutere & definire licitum, quod non licet pronunciare.) For I should think that mentioning in Iudicio in the second part should not have a different constructionthan Iudiciis Curiae in the first part. For there the Judicia Curiae which they may be present at, is to be understood of the whole proceeding, from the bringing in of the Charge against a Criminal person, to the pronouncing of the Sentence: And can it be rationally thought that Iudicium in the second place should be meant only of the sentence which is the principal part, and which the corruption of mans nature doth chiefly lead him unto. The Poet saith,
This power of killing and slaying, Potestas Iuvandi & Nocendi, is a pleasing thing, and we are naturally angry with what abridgeth us of it. So I must conclude this point, that it's most probable the Bishops were most scandalized at this eleventh Article.
Secondly, Let us consider how to arrive at the true meaning of that constitution, which must be by comparing the passages of these [Page 101] times together, whereby we shall see how they understood it: Yoyu have already heard what Petrus Blesensis judged of those who would retain that Image of Judicature, how much he blamed them, and what menaces of Gods Judgements he denounced against them, for the words of that Constitution were not so clear and positive that it gave not Ansam disputandi to those whose Inclinations led them to turn it into another sense, and content themselves to play at small Games rather than sit out altogether. So the Wisdome of that time to make it yet more plain, and take away all ambiguity, moved the King to call another Great Council at Westminster in the year 1175. eleven years after, Ad Emendationem Anglicanae Ecclesiae ex assensu Domini Regis & Primorum omnium Regni; where the third Article is, His qui in Sacris ordinibus constituti sunt Iudicium Sanguinis agitare non licet unde prohibemus ne aut per se membrorum truncationes faciant, aut inferendas judicent. Quod siquis tale fecerit concessi ordinis privetur officio & loco, Inhibemus etiam sub interminatione anathematis, ne quis Sacerdos habeat vicecomitum aut praeposit [...] secularis officium. It is not lawful for those who are in Holy Orders to act at all in Judgements of Blood, wherefore we forbid them to have any thing to do with taking off mens Limbs, or to judge of any such thing. And if any do such a thing, he shall be deprived of the office and dignity of his Orders: And we also forbid, under the pain of being Anathematized, that no Priest shall take upon him the Office of a Sheriff, or of a Secular Judge. This [Page 102] makes it out plain, what the sense of those times was; that it was not lawful for them to act at all in cases of Blood; and this is as much the Law of the Land, as the Constitutions of Clarendon, or as any other Statute Law. But our Author, p. 42. quarrels at this, as only standing upon Roger Hoveden's authority, and wishes he had produced the whole Canon entire for it: Here you have two of our Ancient Historians that liv'd in these times, and agree in Terminis upon the relation of what there passed: But our Author is not satisfied, tells us the Council of Toledo makes an &c. and leaves out the prohibition, which declares the meaning and extent of their Canon: He will have this Prohibition, and Sanction of deprivation to attend only upon the latter part, that is, if they do joyn in pronouncing the Sentence: But where doth he find that distinction allowed, it is what the Clergy have framed and imagined to themselves to give them some Power: Admit we should allow them that, it makes it not the more lawful for them; there is still a Non licet, which is subject to punishment, and though the Ecclesiastical Law doth not go to that height to cut off a Member, deprive him ab Officio & Beneficio, yet it may go less in a lower Sentence, however the Civil Sanction may impose what punishment such a misdemeanour may deserve.
Caetera desiderantur.