Humane Nature: OR The Fundamental Elements OF POLICY. BEING A Discovery of the Faculties Acts and Passions of the SOUL of MAN, From their Original causes; According to such Philosophical Principles As are not commonly known or asserted. The Third Edition, Augmented and much corrected by the Authors own hand.

By Tho. Hobbs of Malmsbury.

LONDON, Printed for Matthew Gilliflower, Henry Rogers, and Tho. Fox, Booksellers in Westminster-Hall. MDCLXXXIV.

To the Right Honourable, WILLIAM EARL OF NEW-CASTLE, Governour to the Prince his Highness, One of His Majesties Most Honourable Privy Council.

My most Honoured Lord,

FRom the principal parts of Nature, Reason and Passi­on, have proceeded two kinds of Learning, Mathe­matical and Dogmatical: the former is [Page] free from Controversie and Dispute, because it consisteth in comparing Figure and Motion only; in which things, Truth, and the Interest of Men, oppose not each other: but in the other there is nothing un­disputable, because it compareth Men, and medleth with their Right and Profit; in which, as oft as Reason is against a Man, so oft will a Man be against Reason. And from hence it cometh, that they who have written of Justice and Policy in General, do all in­vade each other and themselves with Contradictions. To reduce this Doctrine to the Rules and In­fallibility of Reason, there is no way but, first, put such Princi­ples down for a Foundation, as Passion, not mistrusting, may not seek to displace; and afterwards to [Page] build thereon the Truth of Cases in the Law of Nature (which hither­to have been built in the Air) by degrees, till the whole have been inexpugnable. Now, my Lord, the Principles fit for such a Foun­dation, are those which heretofore I have acquainted your Lordship withal in private Discourse, and which by your Command I have here put into a Method. To exa­mine Cases thereby between Sove­raign and Soveraign, or between So­veraign and Subject, I leave to them that shall find Leasure and Encou­ragement thereto: For my part, I present this to your Lordship for the true and only Foundation of such Science. For the Stile, it is there­fore the worse, because, whilest I was writing, I consulted more with Logick than with Rhetorick: But [Page] for the Doctrine, it is not slight­ly proved; and the Conclusions thereof of such Nature, as, for want of them. Government and Peace have been nothing else, to this day, but mutual Fears: And it would be an incomparable benefit to Commonwealth, that every one held the Opinion concerning Law and Policy here delivered. The am­bition therefore of this Book, in seeking by your Lordships counte­nance to insinuate it self with those whom the matter it containeth most nearly concerneth, is to be excused. For my self, I desire no greater honour than I enjoy already in your Lordship's favour, unless it be that you would be pleased, in Continuance thereof, to give me more Exercise in your commands; which, as I am bound by your ma­ny [Page] great Favours, I shall obey, being,

My most honoured Lord,
Your most humble, and most obliged Servant, THO. HOBBS.

IN Libellum praestantissimi THO. HOBBII Veri verè Philosophi, de Naturâ Hominis.

QVae magna Coeli moenia, & tractae Maris,
Terrae (que) fines siquid aut ultra est, capit
Mens ipsa, tandem capitur: Omnia hactenus
Quae nôsse potuit, nota jam primùm est Sibi.
Accede, Lector, disce quis demùm sies;
Tranquilinam jecoris agnoscas tui,
Quî propiùs haeret nil tibi, & nil tam procul.
Non hic Scholarum frivola, aut cassi logâ,
Quales per annos fortè plus septem legit;
Ut folle pleno prodeat, Rixae Artifex;
Vanasque merces futili linguâ crepet:
Sed sancta Rerum pondera, & sensus graves
Quales parari decuit, ipsa cùm fuit
Pingenda Ratio, & vindici suo adstitit.
Panduntur omnes Machinae gyri tuae,
Animaeque Vectes, Trochleae, Cunei, Rotae;
Quâ concitetur arte, quo sufflamine
Sistatur illa rursus, & constet sibi:
Nec, si Fenestram pectori humano suam
Aptâsset ipse Momus, inspiceret magis.
Hîc cerno levia Affectuum vestigia,
Gracilesque Sensûs lineas; video quibus
Vehantur alis blanduli Cupidines,
Quibusque stimulis urge [...]nt Ir [...] graves.
Hîc & Dolores, & Voluptates suos
Produnt recessus; ipse nec Timor latet.
Has nôrit artes quisquis in foro velit
Animorum habenas flectere, & populos cupit
Aptis ligatos nexibus jungi sibi.
Hîc Archimedes publicus figat podem,
Siquando regna machinis politicis
Vrgere satagit, & feras gentes ciet,
Imisque motum sedibus mundum quatit:
Facile domabit cuncta, qui Menti imperat.
Consultor audax, & Promethei potens
Facinoris Anime! quis tibi dedit Deus
Haec intueri saeculis longè abdita,
[Page]Oculosque luce tinxit ambrosiâ tuos?
Tu mentis omnis, at Tuae nulla est capax.
Hâc laude Solus fruere: Divinum est opus
Animam Creare; proximum huic, Ostendere.
RAD. BATHURST, A. M. Col. Trin. Oxon.

Humane Nature: OR THE Fundamental Elements OF POLICY.

THE true and perspicuous Ex­plication of the Elements of Laws Natural and Politick (which is my present Scope) dependeth upon the Knowledge of what is Humane Nature, what is Body Politick, and what it is we call a Law; con­cerning which Points, as the Writings of Men from Antiquity down wards have still increas­ed, so also have the Doubts and Controversies con­cerning the same: And seeing that true Know­ledge begetteth not Doubt nor Controversie, but Knowledge, it is manifest from the present Con­troversies, That they which have heretofore writ­ten [Page 2] thereof, have not well understood their own Subject.

2. Harm I can do none, though I err no less than they; for I shall leave Men but as they are, in Doubt and Dispute: but, intending not to take any Principle upon Trust, but only to put Men in Mind of what they know already, or may know by their own Experience, I hope to erre the less; and when I do, it must proceed from too hasty Con­cluding, which I will endeavour as much as I can to avoid.

3. On the other side, if Reasoning aright win not Consent, which may very easily happen, from them that being confident of their own Knowledg weigh not what is said, the Fault is not mine but theirs; for as it is my Part to shew my Reasons, so it is theirs to bring Attention.

4. Mans Nature is the Summ of his natural Facul­ties and Powers, as the Faculties of Nutrition, Mo­tion, Generation, Sense, Reason, &c. These Powers we do unanimously call Natural, and are con­tained in the Definition of Man, under these words, Animal and Rational.

5. According to the two principal Parts of Man, I divide his Faculties into two sorts, Faculties of the Body, and Faculties of the Mind.

6. Since the minute and distinct Anatomy of the Powers of the Body is nothing necessary to the pre­sent Purpose, I will only summ them up in these Three Heads, Power Nutritive, Power Motive, and Power Generative.

7. Of the Powers of the Mind there be two Sorts, Cognitive, Imaginative, or Conceptive and Mo­tive; and first of Cognitive.

[Page 3]For the understanding of what I mean by the Power Cognitive, we must remember and acknow­ledge that there be in our Minds continually cer­tain Images or Conceptions of the Things without us, insomuch that if a Man could be alive, and all the rest of the World annihilated, he should ne­vertheless retain the Image thereof; and all those Things which he had before seen or perceived in it; every one by his own Experience knowing, that the Absence or Destruction of things once imagined doth not cause the Absence or Destruction of the Ima­gination it self; This Imagery and Representations of the Qualities of the Thing without, is that we call our Conception, Imagination, Ideas, Notice or Knowledg of them; and the Faculty or Power by which we are capable of such Knowledge, is that I here call Cognitive Power, or Conceptive, the Power of Know­ing or Conceiving.


2. Definition of Sense.

4. Four Propositions concerning the nature of Con­ceptions.

5. The First proved.

6. The Second proved.

7, 8. The Third proved.

9. The Fourth proved.

10▪ The main Deception of Sense.

1. HAving declared what I mean by the Word Conception, and other Words e­quivalent thereunto, I come to the Conceptions themselves, to shew their Differences, their Causes, and the Manner of the Production, so far as is necessary for this Place.

2. Originally all Conceptions proceed from the Action of the thing it self, whereof it is the Conception: Now when the Action is present, the Conception it produceth is also called Sense; and the Thing by whose Action the same is pro­duced, is called the Object of the Sense.

3 By our several Organs we have several Conceptions of several Qualities in the Objects; for by Sight we have a Conception or Image com­posed of Colour and Figure, which is all the No­tice and Knowledge the Object imparteth to us of its Nature by the Eye. By Hearing we have a Conception called Sound, which is all the Knowledge we have of the Quality of the Ob­ject [Page 5] from the Ear. And so the rest of the Senses are also Conceptions of several Qualities, or Na­tures of their Objects.

4. Because the Image in Vision consisting of Colour and Shape is the Knowledge we have of the Qualities of the Object of that Sense; it is no hard matter for a Man to fall into this Opinion, that the same Colour and Shape are the very Qualities themselves; And for the same cause, that Sound and Noise are the Qualities of the Bell, or of the Air. And this Opinion hath been so long received, that the contrary must needs appear a great Paradox; and yet the Introduction of Species visible and intelligible (which is necessary for the Maintenance of that Opini­on) passing to and fro from the Object, is worse than any Paradox, as being a plain Impos­sibility. I shall therefore endeavour to make plain these Points:

That the Subject wherein Colour and Image are inherent, is not the Object or thing seen.

That there is nothing without us (really) which we call an Image or Colour.

That the said Image or Colour is but an apparition unto us of the Motion, Agitation, or Alteration, which the Object worketh in the Brain, or Spirits, or some internal Sub­stance of the Head.

That as in Vision, so also in Conceptions that arise from the other Senses, the Subject of their inherence is not the Object, but the Sentient.

[Page 6]5. Every Man hath so much Experience as to have seen the Sun and the other visible Objects by Reflection in the Water and Glasses; and this alone is sufficient for this Conclusion, that Co­lour and Image may be there where the Thing seen is not. But because it may be said that not­withstanding the Image in the Water be not in the Object, but a Thing meerly Phantastical, yet there may be Colour really in the Thing it self: I will urge further this Experience, that divers Times Men see directly the same Object double; as two Candles for one, which may happen from Distemper or otherwise without Distemper if a Man will, the Organs being either in their right Temper, or equally distempered, the Co­lours and Figures in two such Images of the same Thing cannot be inherent therein, because the Thing seen cannot be in two Places.

One of these Images therefore is not inherent in the Object: but seeing the Organs of the Sight are then in equal Temper or Distemper, the one of them is no more inherent than the other; and conse­quently neither of them both are in the Object; which is the First Proposition, mentioned in the precedent Number.

6. Secondly, that the Image of any Thing by Reflection in a Glass or Water or the like, is not any Thing in or behind the Glass, or in or under the Wa­ter, every Man may grant to himself; which is the Second Proposition.

7. For the Third, we are to consider, First that every great Agitation or Concussion of the Brain (as it happeneth from a Stroak, especi­ally if the Stroak be upon the Eye) whereby the [Page 7] Optick Nerve suffereth any great Violence, there appeareth before the Eyes a certain Light, which Light is nothing without, but an Apparition only, all that is real being the Concussion or Motion of the Parts of that Nerve; from which Experience we may conclude, That Apparition of Light is re­ally nothing but Motion within. If therefore from lucid Bodies there can be derived Motion, so as to affect the Optick Nerve in such manner as is proper thereunto, there will follow an I­mage of Light somewhere in that Line by which the Motion was last derived to the Eye; That is to say, In the Object, if we look directly on it, and in the Glass or Water, when we look upon it in the Line of Reflection, which in Effect is the Third Proposition; namely, That Image and Co­lour is but an Apparition to us of that Motion, Agi­tation, or Alteration which the Object worketh in the Brain or Spirits, or some internal Substance in the Head.

8. But that from all lucid, shining and illu­minate Bodies, there is a Motion produced to the Eye, and, through the Eye, to the Optick Nerve, and so into the Brain, by which that Apparition of Light or Colour is affected, is not hard to prove. And first, it is evident that the Fire, the only lucid Body here upon Earth, worketh by Motion equally every Way; insomuch as the Motion thereof stopped or inclosed, it is presently extin­guished, and no more Fire. And further, that that Motion whereby the Fire worketh, is Dilation, and Contraction of it self alternately, commonly called Scintillation or Glowing, is manifest also by Experience. From such Motion in the Fire [Page 8] must needs arise a Rejection or casting from it self of that part of the Medium which is conti­guous to it, whereby that part also rejecteth the next, and so successively one part beateth back another to the very Eye; and in the same manner the exteriour part of the Eye pres­seth the interiour, (the Laws of Refraction still observed.) Now the interiour coat of the Eye is nothing else but a piece of the Optick Nerve; and therefore the Motion is still continued thereby into the Brain, and by Resistance or Re-action of the Brain, is also a Rebound into the Optick Nerve again; which we not conceiving as Motion or Rebound from within, do think it is without, and call it Light; as hath been alrea­dy shewed by the Experience of a Stroak. We have no Reason to doubt, that the Fountain of Light, the Sun, worketh by any other Ways than the Fire, at least in this Matter. And thus all Vision hath its Original from such Motion as is here described: for where there is no Light, there is no Sight; and therefore Colour also must be the same Thing with Light, as being the Ef­fect of the lucid Bodies: their Difference being only this, that when the Light cometh directly from the Fountain to the Eye, or indirectly by Reflection from clean and polite Bodies, and such as have not any particular Motion internal to alter it, we call it Light; but when it cometh to the Eye by Reflection from une [...]en, rough, and coarse Bodies, (or such as are affected with internal Motion of their own that may alter it) then we call it Colour; Colour and Light differing only in this, that the one is pure, and [Page 9] the other perturbed Light. By that which hath been said, not only the Truth of the Third Proposition, but also the whole Manner of produ­cing Light and Colour, is apparent.

9. As Colour is not inherent in the Object, but an Effect thereof upon us, caused by such Motion in the Object, as hath been described: so neither is Sound in the Thing we hear, but in our selves. One manifest Sign thereof, is, that as a Man may see, so also he may hear dou­ble or treble, by Multiplication of Echoes, which Echoes are Sounds as well as the Original; and not being in one and the same Place, can­not be inherent in the Body that maketh them: Nothing can make any Thing which is not in it self: the Clapper hath no Sound in it, but Mo­tion, and maketh Motion in the internal Parts of the Bell; so the Bell hath Motion, and not Sound, that imparteth Motion to the Air; and the Air hath Motion, but not Sound; the Air imparteth Motion by the Ear and Nerve unto the Brain; and the Brain hath Motion, but not Sound: from the Brain, it reboundeth back into the Nerves outward, and thence it becom­eth an Apparition without, which we call Sound. And to proceed to the rest of the Senses, it is apparent enough, that the Smell and Taste of the same Thing, are not the same to every Man; and therefore are not in the Thing smelt or tast­ed, but in the Men. So likewise the Heat we feel from the Fire is manifestly in us, and is quite different from the Heat which is in the Fire: for our Heat is Pleasure or Pain, according as it is great or moderate; but in the Coal there is no [Page 10] such Thing. By this the Fourth and last Propositi­on is proved, viz. That as in Vision, so also in Conceptions that arise from other Senses, the Sub­ject of their Inherence is not in the Object, but in the Sentient.

10. And from hence also it followeth, that what­soever Accidents or Qualities our Senses make us think there be in the World, they be not there, but are Seeming and Apparitions only: the Things that really are in the World without us, are those Mo­tions by which these Seemings are caused. And this is the great Deception of Sense, which also is to be by Sense corrected: for as Sense telleth me, when I see directly, that the Colour seemeth to be in the Ob­ject; so also Sense telleth me, when I see by Re­flection, that Colour is in the Object.


1. Imagination defined.

2. Sleep and Dreams defined.

3. Causes of Dreams.

4. Fiction defined.

5. Phantasms defined.

6. Remembrances defined.

7. Wherein Remembrance consisteth.

8. Why in a Dream a Man never thinks he dreams.

9. Why few Things seem strange in Dreams.

10. That a Dream may be taken for Reality and Vision.

1. AS standing Water put into Motion by the Stroak of a Stone, or blast of Wind, doth not presently give over moving as soon as the Wind ceaseth, or the Stone setleth: so neither doth the Effect cease which the Object hath wrought upon the Brain, so soon as ever, by turn­ing aside of the Organs the Object ceaseth to work; that is to say, Though the Sense be past, the Image or Conception remaineth; but more obscure while we are awake, because some Object or other continually plieth and sollicit­eth our Eyes, and Ears, keeping the Mind in a stronger Motion, whereby the weaker doth not ea­sily appear. And this obscure Conception is that we call Phantasie, or Imagination: Imagi­nation being (to define it) Conception re­maining, [Page 12] and by little and little decaying from and af­ter the Act of Sense.

2. But when present Sense is not, as in Sleep, there the Images remaining after Sense (when there be many) as in Dreams, are not obscure, but strong and clear, as in Sense it self. The Reason is, That which obscured and made the Conceptions weak, namely Sense, and present Operation of the Object, is removed: for Sleep is the Privation of the Act of Sense, (the Power re­maining) and Dreams are the Imagination of them that sleep.

3. The Causes of Dreams (if they be natu­ral) are the Actions or Violence of the inward Parts of a man upon his Brain, by which the Pas­sages of Sense by Sleep benummed, are restored to their Motion. The Signs by which this ap­peareth to be so, are the Differences of Dreams (old Men commonly dream oftener, and have their Dreams more painful than young) proceed­ing from the different Accidents of Mans Body; as Dreams of Lust, as Dreams of Anger, ac­cording as the Heart, or other Parts within, work more or less upon the Brain, by more or less Heat; so also the Descents of different sorts of Flegm maketh us a Dream of different Tastes of Meats and Drinks; and I believe there is a Reci­procation of Motion from the Brain to the Vital Parts, and back from the Vital Parts to the Brain; whereby not only Imagination beget­teth Motion in those Parts; but also Motion in those Parts begetteth Imagination like to that by which it was begotten. If this be true, and that sad Imaginations nourish the Spleen, then we [Page 13] see also a Cause, why a strong Spleen recipro­cally causeth fearful Dreams, and why the Effects of Lasciviousness may in a Dream produce the Image of some person that had caused them. Another Sign that Dreams are caused by the Action of the inward Parts, is the Disorder and casual Consequence of one Conception or Image to another: for when we are waking, the Antece­dent thought or Conception introduceth, and is cause of the Consequent, (as the Water followeth a mans Finger upon a dry and level Table (but in Dreams there is commonly no Coherence, (and when there is, it is by Chance) which must needs proceed from this, That the Brain in Dreams is not restored to its Motion in every Part alike; whereby it cometh to pass, that our Thoughts ap­pear like the Stars between the flying Clouds, not in the Order which a Man would chuse to observe them, but as the uncertain Flight of broken Clouds permits.

4. As when the Water, or any liquid Thing moved at once by divers Movents, receiveth one Motion compounded of them all; so also the Brain or Spirit therein, having been stirred by divers Objects, composeth an Imagination of divers Conceptions that appeared single to the Sense. As for Example, the Sense sheweth at one Time the Figure of a Mountain, and at another Time the Colour of Gold; but the Imagination af­terwards hath them both at once in a golden Mountain. From the same Cause it is, there ap­pear unto us Castles in the Air, Chimaera's, and other Monsters which are not in Rerum Na­tura, but have been conceived by the Sense in [Page 14] Pieces at several Times. And this Composition is that which we commonly call Fiction of the Mind.

5. There is yet another Kind of Imagination, which for Clearness contendeth with Sense, as well as a Dream; and that is, when the Action of Sense hath been long or vehement: and the Experience thereof is more frequent in the Sense of Seeing, than the rest. An Example where­of is, the Image remaining before the Eye after looking upon the Sun. Also, those little Images that appear before the Eyes in the dark; whereof I think every Man hath Experience, (but they most of all, who are timorous or superstitious) are Examples of the same. And these, for Distincti­on-sake, may be called Phantasms.

6. By the Senses, which are numbred ac­cording to the Organs to be five, we take Notice (as hath been said already) of the Objects with­out us; and that Notice is our Conception thereof: but we take Notice also some Way or other of our Conceptions: for when the Conception of the same Thing cometh again, we take Notice that is again; that is to say, that we have had the same Conception before; which is as much as to imagine a Thing past; which is impossible to the Sense, which is only of Things present. This there­fore may be accounted a Sixth Sense, but internal, (not external, as the rest) and is commonly called Remembrance.

7. For the Manner by which we take Notice of a Conception past, we are to remember, that in the Definition of Imagination, it is said to be a Conception by little and little decaying, or [Page 15] growing more obscure. An obscure Conception is that which representeth the whole Object together, but none of the smaller Parts by them­selves; and as more or fewer Parts be represen­ted, so is the Conception or Representation said to be more or less clear. Seeing then the Con­ception, which when it was first produced by Sense, was clear, and represented the Parts of the 0bject distinctly; and when it cometh again is obscure, we find missing somewhat that we ex­pected; by which we judge it past and decayed. For Example, a Man that is present in a Fo­reign City, seeth not only whole Streets, but can also distinguish particular Houses, and Parts of Houses; but departed thence, he can­not distinguish them so particularly in his Mind as he did, some House or Turning escaping him: yet is this to remember; when afterwards there escape him more Particulars, this is also to remember, but not so well. In Process of Time, the Image of the City returneth but as a Mass of Building only, which is almost to have forgotten it. Seeing then Remembrance is more or less, as we find more or less Obscurity, Why may not we well think Remembrance to be nothing else but the missing of Parts, which every man expecteth should suc­ceed after they have a Conception of the Whole? To see at a great Distance of Place, and to re­member at great Distance of Time, is to have like Conceptions of the Thing: for there wanteth Di­stinction of Parts in both; the one Conception being weak by Operation at Distance, the other by Decay.

[Page 16]8. And from this that hath been said, there followeth, That a Man can never know he dream­eth; he may dream he doubteth, whether it be a Dream or no: but the Clearness of the Imagi­nation representeth every Thing with as many Parts as doth Sense it self, and consequently, he can take Notice of nothing but as present; whereas to think he dreameth, is to think those his Concep­tions, that is to say, obscurer than they were in the Sense: so that he must think them both as clear, and not as clear as Sense; which is impossible.

9. From the same Ground it proceedeth, that Men wonder not in their Dreams at Place and Persons, as they would do waking: for waking, a Man would think it strange to be in a Place where he never was before, and remember nothing of how he came there; but in a Dream, there cometh little of that kind into Consideration. The Clearness of Conception in a Dream, taketh away Distrust, unless the Strangeness be excessive, as to think himself fallen from on high without hurt, and then most commonly he waketh.

10. Nor is it possible for a Man to be so far de­ceived, as when his Dream is past, to think it real: for if he dream of such Things as are ordinarily in his Mind, and in such Order as he useth to do wa­king, and withal that he laid him down to sleep in the Place were he findeth himself when he awa­keth; all which may happen: I know no [...] or Mark by which he can discern whether it were a Dream or not, and therefore do the less wonder to hear a Man sometimes to tell his Dream for a Truth, or to take it for a Vision.


1. Discourse.

2. The Cause of Coherence of Thoughts.

3. Ranging.

4. Sagacity.

5. Reminiscence.

6. Experience.

7. Expectation.

8. Conjecture.

9. Signs.

10. Prudence.

11. Caveats of concluding from Experience.

1. THe Succession of Conceptions in the Mind, Series or Consequence of one after ano­ther, may be casual and incoherent, as in Dreams for the most part; and it may be orderly, as when the former Thought introduceth the latter; and this is Discourse of the Mind. But because the Word Discourse is commonly taken for the Coherence and Consequence of Words, I will, to a­void Aequivocation, call it Discursion.

2. The Cause of the Coherence or Consequence of one Conception to another, is their first Co­herence or Consequence at that Time when they are produced by Sense: As for Example, from St. Andrew the Mind runneth to St. Peter, because their Names are read together; from [Page 18] S. Peter to a Stone, for the same Cause; from Stone to Foundation, because we see them together; and for the same Cause, from Foundation to Church, and from Church to People, and from People to Tumult: and according to this Example, the Mind may run almost from any Thing to any Thing. But as in the Sense the Conception of Cause and Effect may succeed one another; so may they after Sense in the Imagination: And for the most part they do so; the Cause whereof is the Appetite of them, who, having a Conception of the End, have next unto it a Conception of the next Means to that End; As, when a Man, from a Thought of Honour to which he hath an Appetite, cometh to the Thought of Wisdom, which is the next Means thereunto; and from thence to the Thought of Study, which is the next Means to Wisdom.

3. To omit that kind of Discursion by which we proceed from any Thing to any Thing, there are of the other Kind divers Sorts: As first, in the Senses there are certain Coherences of Conceptions, which we may call ranging: Examples whereof are; A Man casteth his Eye up­on the Ground, to look about for some small Thing lost; the Hounds casting about at a Fault in hunt­ing; and the Ranging of Spaniels: and herein we take a Beginning arbitrary.

4. Another sort of Discursion is, when the Appetite giveth a Man his Beginning, as in the Ex­ample before, where Honour to which a Man hath Appetite, maketh him think upon the next Means of attaining it, and that again of the next, &c. And this the Latines call Sagacitas[Page 19] and We may call Hunting or Tracing, as Dogs trace Beasts by the Smell, and Men hunt them by their Footsteps; or as Men hunt after Riches, Place, or Knowledge.

5. There is yet another Kind of Discursion beginning with the Appetite to recover some­thing lost, proceeding from the present backward, from Thought of the Place where we miss at, to the Thought of the Place from whence we came last; and from the Thought of that, to the Thought of a Place before, till we have in our Mind some Place, wherein we had the Thing we miss: and this is called Reminiscence.

6. The Remembrance of Succession of one Thing to another, that is, of what was antecedent, and what consequent, and what concomitant, is called an Experiment; whether the same be made by us voluntarily, as when a Man putteth any Thing into the Fire, to see what Effect the Fire will produce upon it: or not made by us, as when we remember a fair Morning after a red Evening. To have had many Experiments, is that we call Experience, which is nothing else but Remembrance of what Antecedents have been followed by what Consequents.

7. No man can have in his Mind a Conception of the future; for the future is not yet: but of our Conceptions of the past, we make a future; or rather, call past, future relatively. Thus after a Man hath been accustomed to see like Antecedents follow by like Consequents, whensoever he seeth the like come to pass to any Thing he had seen before, he looks there should follow it the same that followed then: [Page 20] As for Example, because a Man hath often seen Offences followed by Punishment, when he seeth an Offence in present, he thinketh Punish­ment to be consequent thereto; but consequent unto that which is present, Men call future: And thus we make Remembrance to be the Prevision of Things to come, or Expectation or Presumption of the future.

8. In the same Manner, if a Man seeth in present that which he hath seen before, he thinks that that which was antecedent to that which he saw before, is also antecedent to that he pre­sently seeth: As for Example, He that hath seen the Ashes remain after the Fire, and now again seeth ashes, concludeth again there hath been Fire: And this is called again Conjecture of the past, or Presumption of the Fact.

9. When a Man hath so often observed like Antecedents to be followed by like Consequents, that whensoever he seeth the Antecedent, he looketh again for the Consequent; or when he seeth the Consequent, maketh account there hath been the like Antecedent; then he calleth both the Antecedent and the Consequent, Signs one of another, as Clouds are Signs of Rain to come, and Rain of Clouds past.

10. This taking of Signs by Experience, is that wherein Men do ordinarily think, the Diffe­rence stands between Man and Man in Wisdom, by which they commonly understand a Mans whole Ability or Power cognitive; but this is an Errour: for the Signs are but conjectural; and according as they have often or seldom failed, so their Assurance is more or less; but never full and evident: for though a Man have always seen [Page 21] the Day and Night to follow one another hither­to; yet can he not thence conclude they shall do so, or that they have done so eternally: Ex­perience concludeth nothing universally. If the Signs hit twenty times for one missing, a Man may lay a Wager of Twenty to One of the Event; but may not conclude it for a Truth. But by this it is plain, that they shall conjecture best, that have most Experience, because they have most Signs to conjecture by; which is the Reason old Men are more prudent, that is, conje­cture better, caeteris paribus, than young: for, being old, they remember more; and Experience is but remembrance. And men of quick imaginati­on, caeteris paribus, are more prudent than those whose Imaginations are slow: for they observe more in less Time. Prudence is nothing but Con­jecture from Experience, or taking of Signs from Experience warily, that is, that the Expe­riments from which he taketh such Signs be all remembred; for else the Cases are not alike that seem so.

11. As in Conjecture concerning things past and future, it is Prudence to conclude from Ex­perience, what is like to come to pass, or to have passed already; so it is an errour to con­clude from it, that it is so or so called; that is to say, We cannot from Experience conclude, that any Thing is to be called just or unjust, true or false, or any Proposition universal whatsoe­ver, except it be from Remembrance of the Use of Names imposed arbitrarily by Men: For Ex­ample, to have heard a Sentence given in the like Case, the like Sentence a thousand times is [Page 22] not enough to conclude that the Sentence is just; though most Men have no other Means to con­clude by: But it is necessary, for the drawing of such Conclusion, to trace and find out, by ma­ny Experiences, what Men do mean by calling Things just and unjust. Further, there is ano­ther Caveat to be taken in concluding by Expe­rience, from the tenth Section of the second Chapter; that is, That we conclude such Things to be without, that are within us.


1. Of Marks.

2. Names or Appellations.

3. Names positive and privative.

4. Advantage of Names maketh us capable of Sci­ence.

5. Names universal and singular.

6. Vniversals not in Rerum Natura.

7. Aequivocal Names.

8. Vnderstanding.

9. Affirmation, Negation, Proposition.

10. Truth, Falsity.

11. Ratiocination.

12. According to Reason, against Reason.

13. Names Causes of Knowledge, so of Errour.

14. Translation of the Discourse of the Mind in­to the Discourse of the Tongue, and of the Er­rours thence proceeding.

1. SEeing the Succession of Conceptions in the Mind are caused, as hath been said before, by the Succession they had one to another when they were produced by the Senses, and that there is no Conception that hath not bin produced imme­diately before or after innumerable others, by the innumerable Acts of Sense; it must needs follow, that one Conception followeth not ano­ther, according to our Election, and the need we have of them, but as it chanceth us to hear or see such Things as shall bring them to our Mind. [Page 24] The Experience we have hereof, is in such Brute Beasts, which, having the providence to hide the Remains and Superfluity of their Meat, do nevertheless want the Remembrance of the Place where they hide it, and thereby make no Benefit thereof in their Hunger: but Man, who in this Point beginneth to rank himself some­what above the Nature of Beasts, hath observed and remembred the Cause of this Defect, and to amend the same, hath imagined or devised to set up a visible or other sensible Mark, the which, when he seeth it again, may bring to his Mind the Thought he had when he set it up. A Mark therefore is a sensible Object which a Man erect­eth voluntarily to himself, to the End to re­member thereby somewhat past, when the same is objected to his Sense again: As men that have past by a Rock at Sea, set up some Mark, thereby to remember their former Danger, and a­void it.

2. In the Number of these Marks, are those Humane Voices, which we call the Names or Ap­pellations of Things sensible by the Ear, by which we recall into our Mind some Conceptions of the Things to which we gave those Names or Ap­pellations; as the Appellation White bringeth to remembrance the Quality of such Objects as produce that Colour or Conception in us. A Name or Appellation therefore is the Voice of a Man arbitrary, imposed for a Mark to bring in­to his Mind some Conception concerning the thing on which it is imposed.

3. Things named, are either the Objects them­selves, as a Man; or the Conception it self that we [Page 25] have of Man, as Shape and Motion: or some Privation, which is when we conceive that there is something which we conceive not, in him; as when we conceive he is not just, not finite, we give him the Name of unjust, of infinite, which signifie Privation or Defect; and to the Privations themselves we give the Names of Injustice and In­finiteness: so that here be Two Sorts of Names; One of Things, in which we conceive something; or of the Conceptions themselves, which are called positive: the other of Things wherein we conceive Privation or Defect, and those Names are called Privative.

4. By the Advantage of Names it is that we are capable of Science, which Beasts, for want of them are not; nor Man, without the Use of them: for as a Beast misseth not one or two out of many her young Ones, for want of those Names of order, One, Two, and Three, and which we call Number; so neither would a Man, without repeating orally or mentally the Words of Number, know how many Pieces of Money or other Things lie before him.

5. Seeing there be many Conceptions of one and the same Thing, and for every Conception we give it a several Name; it followeth that for one and the same Thing, we have many Names or Attributes; as to the same Man we give the Appellations of Just, Valiant, &c. for divers Ver­tues; of Strong, Comely, &c. for divers Qualities of the Body. And again, because from divers Things we receive like Conceptions, many Things must needs have the same Appellation: as to all Things we see, we give the same Name of Visible; and [Page 26] to all Things we see moveable, we give the Ap­pellation of Moveable: and those Names we give to many, are called universal to them all; as the Name of Man to every particular of Mankind: such Appellation as we give to one only Thing, we call individual, or singular; as Socrates, and other proper Names: or, by Circumlocution, he that writ the Iliads, for Homer.

6. The Universality of one Name to many Things, hath been the Cause that Men think the Things are themselves universal; and so serious­ly contend, that besides Peter and John, and all the rest of the Men that are, have been, or shall be in the World, there is yet something else that we call Man, viz. Man in general, deceiving themselves, by taking the universal, or general Appellation, for the thing it signifieth: For if one should desire the Painter to make him the Picture of a Man, which is as much as to say, of a Man in general; he meaneth no more, but that the Painter should chuse what Man he pleaseth to draw, which must needs be some of them that are, or have been, or may be, none of which are universal. But when he would have him to draw the Picture of the King, or any particular Per­son, he limiteth the Painter to that one Person he chuseth. It is plain therefore, that there is nothing universal but Names; which are therefore called indefinite; because we limit them not our selves, but leave them to be applied by the Hearer: whereas a singular Name is limited and restrained to one of the many Things it signifieth; as when we say, This Man, pointing to him, or giving him his proper Name, or by some such other Way.

[Page 27]7. The Appellations that be universal, and common to many Things, are not always given to all the particulars, (as they ought to be) for like Conceptions, and like Considerations in them all; which is the Cause that many of them are not of constant Signification, but bring into our Mind other Thoughts than these for which they were ordained, and those are called aequivocal. As for Example, the Word Faith signifieth the same with Belief; sometimes it sig­nifieth particularly that Belief which maketh a Christian; and sometime it signifieth the keeping of a Promise. Also all Metaphors are by Profession aequivocal: and there is scarce any Word that is not made aequivocal by divers Contextures of Speech, or by Diversity of Pro­nunciation and Gesture.

8. This Aequivocation of Names maketh it difficult to recover those Conceptions for which the Name was ordained; and that not only in the Language of other Men, wherein we are to consider the Drift and Occasion, and Contexture of the Speech, as well as the Words themselves; but also in our Discourse, which being derived from the Custom and common Use of Speech, re­presenteth unto us not our own Conceptions. It is therefore a great Ability in a Man, out of the Words, Contexture, and other Circumstances of Language, to deliver himself from Aequivoca­tion, and to find out the true Meaning of what it said: And this is it we call Vnderstand­ing.

9. Of two Appellations, by the Help of this little Verb is, or something equivalent, we make [Page 28] an Affirmation or Negation, either of which in the Schools we call also a Proposition, and consisteth of two Appellations joyned together by the said Verb is: As for Example, Man is a living creature; or thus, Man is not righteous: where­of the former is called an Affirmation, because the Appellation, Living Creature is Positive; the latter a Negative, because not righteous is Priva­tive.

10. In every Proposition, be it Affirmative or Negative, the latter Appellation either compre­hendeth the former, as in this Proposition, Charity is a Vertue, the Name of Vertue compre­hendeth the Name of Charity, and many other Vertues beside; and then is the Proposition said to be true, or Truth: For, Truth, and a true Proposition, is all one. Or else the latter Appellation comprehendeth not the former: as in this Pro­position, Every Man is just; the name of Just com­prehendeth not Every Man; for Unjust is the Name of the far greater Part of Men: And the Proposition is said to be false, or Falsity: Falsity and a false Proposition being also the same Thing.

11. In what manner of two Propositions, whether both Affirmative, or one Affirmative, the other Negative, is made a Syllogism, I forbear to write. All this that hath been said of Names or Propositions, though necessary, is but dry Discourse: and this Place is not for the whole Art of Logick, which if I enter further into, I ought to pursue: Besides, it is not needfull; for there be few Men which have not so much natural [Page 29] Logick, as thereby to discern well enough, whether any Conclusion I shall make in this Discourse hereafter, be well or ill collected: Only thus much I say in this Place, that Making of Syllogisms is that we call Ratiocination or Reason­ing.

12. Now when a man reasoneth from Principles that are found indubitable by Experience, all Deceptions of Sense and Aequivocation of Words avoided, the Conclusion he maketh is said to be according to right Reason: But when from his Conclusion a Man may, by good Ratiocination, derive that which is contradictory to any evident Truth whatsoever, then he is said to have concluded against Reason: And such a Conclusion is called Absurdity.

13. As the Invention of Names hath been necessary for the drawing Men out of Ignorance, by calling to their Remembrance the necessary Coherence of one Conception to another; so also hath it on the other side precipitated Men into Errour: Insomuch, that whereas by the Benefit of Words and Ratiocination they exceed brute Beasts in Knowledge, and the Commodi­ties that accompany the same; so they exceed them also in Errour: For, true and false are Things not incident to Beasts, because they adhere not to Propositions and Language; nor have they Ratiocination, whereby to multiply one Untruth by another, as Men have.

14. It is the Nature almost of every Corporal Thing, being often moved in one and the same Manner, to receive continually a greater and greater Easiness and Aptitude to the same Motion, in­somuch [Page 30] as in Time the same becometh so ha­bitual, that, to beget it, there needs no more than to begin it. The Passions of Man, as they are the Beginning of voluntary Motions; so are they the Beginning of Speech, which is the Motion of the Tongue. And Men desiring to shew others the Knowledge, Opinions, Con­ceptions and Passions which are in themselves, and to that End having invented Language, have by that Means transferred all that Discursion of their Mind mentioned in the former Chapter, by the Motion of their Tongues, into Discourse of Words: And Ratio now is but Oratio, for the most part, wherein Custom hath so great a Power, that the Mind suggesteth only the first Word; the rest follow habitually, and are not followed by the Mind; as it is with Beggars, when they saw their Pater noster, putting to­gether such Words, and in such manner, as in their Education they have learned from their Nurses, from their Companies, or from their Teachers, having no Images or Conceptions in their Mind, answering to the Words they speak: and as they have learned themselves, so they teach Posterity. Now if we consider the Pow­er of those Deceptions of the Sense, mentioned Chap 2. Sect. 10 and also how unconstantly Names have been setled, and how subject they are to Aequivocation, and how diversified by Passion, (scarce two Men agreeing what is to be cal­led Good, and what Evil; what Liberality, what Prodigality; what Valour, what Temerity) and how subject Men are to Paralogism or Fallacy in Reasoning, I may in a Manner conclude, [Page 31] that it is impossible to rectifie so many Errours of any one Man, as must needs proceed from those Causes, without beginning a-new from the very first Grounds of all our Knowledge and Sense; and instead of Books, reading o­ver orderly ones own Conceptions: In which Meaning, I take Noste teipsum for a Precept wor­thy the Reputation it hath gotten.


1. Of the two Kinds of Knowledge

2. Truth and Evidence necessary to Knowledge.

3. Evidence defined.

4. Science defined.

5. Supposition defined.

6. Opinion defined.

7. Belief defined.

8. Conscience defined.

9. Belief, in some Cases, no less from Doubt than Knowledge.

1. THere is a Story somewhere, of one that pretends to have been miracu­lously cured of Blindness (wherewith he was born) by St. Albane or other Saints, at the Town of St. Albans; and that the Duke of Glo­cester being there, to be satisfied of the Truth of the Miracle, asked the Man, What Colour is this? Who, by answering, It was Green, dis­covered himself, and was punished for a Coun­terfeit: for though by his Sight newly recei­ved he might distinguish between Green, and Red, and all other Colours, as well as any that should interrogate him, yet he could not possibly know at first Sight which of them was called Green, or Red, or by any other Name. By this we may understand, there be two Kinds of Knowledge, whereof the one is nothing else [Page 33] but Sense, or Knowledge original, as I have said in the Beginning of the second Chapter, and Remembrance of the same; the other is called Science or Knowledge of the Truth of Propositions, and how Things are called; and is derived from Vnderstanding. Both of these Sorts are but Experience; The former being the Experience of the Effects of Things that work upon us from without; and the latter Experience Men have from the proper Use of Names in Language: and all Experience being, as I have said, but Re­membrance, all Knowledge is Remembrance: and of the former, the Register we keep in Books, is called History; But the Registers of the latter are called the Sciences.

2. There are two Things necessarily implied in this Word Knowledge; the one is Truth, the other Evidence: for what is not Truth, can never be known. For, let a Man say he knoweth a Thing never so well, if the same shall afterwards appear false, he is driven to Confession, that it was not Knowledge, but O­pinion. Likewise, if the Truth be not evident, though a Man holdeth it, yet is his Knowledge thereof no more than theirs who hold the con­trary: for if Truth were enough to make it Knowledge, all Truth were known; which is not so.

3. What Truth is, hath been defined in the precedent Chapter; What Evidence is, I now set down: and it is the Concomitance of a Mans Con­ception with the Words that signifie such Concep­tion in the Act of Ratiocination: for when a Man reasoneth with his Lips only, to which the [Page 34] Mind suggesteth only the Beginning, and fol­loweth not the Words of his Mouth with the Conceptions of his Mind, out of Custom of so speaking; though he begin his Ratiocination with True Propositions, and proceed with certain Syl­logisms, and thereby make always true Con­clusions; yet are not his Conclusions evident to him, for Want of the Concomitance of Con­ception with his Words: for if the Words alone were sufficient, a Parrot might be taught as well to know Truth, as to speak it. Evidence is to Truth, as the Sap to the Tree, which, so far as it creepeth along with Body and Branch­es, keepeth them alive; where it forsaketh them, they die: for this Evidence, which is Meaning with our Words, is the Life of Truth.

4. Knowledge therefore which we call Sci­ence, I define to be Evidence of Truth, from some Beginning or Principle of Sense: for the Truth of a Proposition is never evident, until we conceive the Meaning of the Words or Terms whereof it consisteth, which are always Con­ceptions of the Mind: Nor can we remember those Conceptions, without the Thing that pro­duced the same by our Senses. The first Prin­ciple of Knowledge is, that we have such and such Conceptions; the second, that we have thus and thus named the Things whereof they are Concep­tions; the third is, that we have joyned those Names in such Manner as to make true Propositi­ons; the fourth and last is, that we have joyned those Propositions in such Manner as they be concluding, and the Truth of the Conclusion said to be known. And of these two Kinds of Knowledge, where­of [Page 35] the former is Experience of Fact, and the later of Evidence of Truth; as the former, if it be great, is called Prudence; so the latter, if it be much, hath usually been called, both by Ancient and Modern Writers, Sapience or Wisdom: and of this latter, Man only is capable; of the former, brute Beasts also participate.

5. A Proposition is said to be supposed, when, being not evident, it is nevertheless admitted for a Time, to the End, that, joyning to it other Propositions, we may conclude something; and to proceed from Conclusion to Conclusion, for a Trial whether the same will lead us into any absurd or impossible Conclusion; which if it do, then we know such Supposition to have been false.

6. But if, running thorow many Conclusions, we come to none that are absurd, then we think the Proposition probable: likewise we think pro­bable whatsoever Proposition we admit for Truth by Errour of Reasoning, or from trusting to other Men: And all such Propositions as are admitted by Trust or errour, we are not said to know, but think them to be true; and the Admittance of them is called Opinion.

7. And particularly, when the Opinion is ad­mitted out of Trust to other Men, they are said to believe it; and their Admittance of it is called Be­lief, and sometimes Faith.

8. It is either Science or Opinion which we com­monly mean by the Word Conscience: for Men say that such and such a thing is true in or upon their Conscience; which they never do, when they think it doubtful; and therefore they know, or think they know it to be true. But Men, when [Page 36] they say Things upon their Conscience, are not therefore presumed certainly to know the Truth of what they say: It remaineth then, that that Word is used by them that have an Opinion, not only of the Truth of the Thing, but also of their Knowledge of it, to which the Truth of the Pro­position is consequent. Conscience I therefore de­fine to be Opinion of Evidence.

9. Belief, which is the admitting of Propo­sitions upon Trust, in many Cases is no less free from Doubt, than perfect and manifest Knowledge: for as there is nothing whereof there is not some Cause; so, when there is Doubt, there must be some Cause thereof conceived Now there be many Things which we receive from Report of others, of which it is impossible to imagine any Cause of Doubt: for what can be opposed a­gainst the Consent of all Men, in Things they can know, and have no Cause to report other­wise than they are, (such as is great Part of our Histories) unless a Man would say that all the World had conspired to deceive him. And thus much of Sense, Imagination, Discursion, Ratioci­nation, and Knowledge, which are the Acts of our Power cognitive, or conceptive. That Power of the Mind which we call motive, differeth from the Power motive of the Body: for the Power motive of the Body is that by which it moveth other Bodies, and we call Strength; but the Power motive of the Mind, is that by which the Mind giveth animal Motion to that Body wherein it existeth: the Acts hereof are our Affections and Passions, of which I am to speak in general.


Of Delight, Pain, Love, Hatred.

Appetite, Aversion, Fear.

Good, Evil, Pulchritude, Turpitude.

End, Fruition.

Profitable, Vse, Vain.


Good and Evil mixt

Sensual Delight, and Pain; Joy and Grief.

IN the eighth Section of the second Chap­ter is shewed, that Conceptions and Apparitions are nothing really, but Motion in some internal Substance of the Head; which Motion not stopping there, but proceeding to the Heart, of Necessity must there either help or hinder the Motion which is called Vital: when it helpeth, it is called De­light, Contentment, or Pleasure, which is nothing really but Motion about the Heart, as Concep­tion is nothing but Motion in the Head; and the Objects that cause it are called pleasant or de­lightful, or by some Name equivalent; The Latines have Jucundum, à juvando, from helping; and the same Delight, with Reference to the Object, is called Love: but when such Motion weakeneth or hindereth the vital Motion, then it is called Pain; and in Relation to that which causeth it, Hatred, which the Latines express [Page 38] sometimes by Odium, and sometimes by Taedium.

2. This Motion in which consisteth Pleasure or Pain, is also a Solicitation or Provocation ei­ther to draw near to the Thing that pleaseth, or to retire from the Thing that displeaseth; and this Solicitation is the Endeavour or internal Be­ginning of animal Motion, which when the Object delighteth, is called Appetite; when it dis­pleaseth, it is called Aversion, in Respect of the Displeasure present; but in Respect of the Dis­pleasure expected, Fear. So that Pleasure, Love, and Appetite, which is also called Desire, are divers Names for divers Considerations of the same Thing.

3. Every Man, for his own Part, calleth that which pleaseth, and is delightful to himself, Good; and that Evil which displeaseth him: insomuch that while every Man differeth from other in Con­stitution, they differ also from one another con­cerning the common Distinction of Good and Evil. Nor is there any such Thing as Absolute Goodness, considered without Relation: for e­ven the Goodness which we apprehend in God Almighty, is his Goodness to us. And as we call Good and Evil the Things that please and displease; so call we Goodness and Badness, the Qualities or Powers whereby they do it: And the Signs of that Goodness are called by the Latines in one Word Pulchritudo, and the Signs of Evil, Turpitudo; to which we have no Words precisely answerable.

4. As all Conceptions we have immediately by the Sense, are, Delight, or Pain, or Appetite, or Fear; so are all the Imaginations after Sense. But as they are weaker Imaginations, so are they also weaker Pleasures, or weaker Pain.

[Page 39]5. As Appetite is the Beginning of animal Mo­tions towards something that pleaseth us; so is the attaining thereof, the End of that Motion, which we also call the Scope, and Aim, and final Cause of the same: and when we attain that End, the Delight we have thereby is called the Frui­tion: So that Bonum and Finis are different Names, but for different Considerations of the same Thing.

6. And of Ends, some of them are called pro­pinqui, that is, near at hand; others remoti, far off: but when the Ends that be nearer attaining, be compared with those that be further off, they are called not Ends, but Means, and the Way to those. But for an utmost End, in which the ancient Philosophers have placed Felicity, and dis­puted much concerning the Way thereto, there is no such Thing in this World, nor Way to it, more than to Vtopia: for while we live, we have Desires, and Desire presupposeth a further End. Those Things which please us, as the Way or Means to a further End, we call profitable; and the Fruition of them, Vse; and those Things that profit not, vain.

7. Seeing all Delight is Appetite, and presuppo­seth a further End, there can be no Contentment but in proceeding: and therefore we are not to mar­vel, when we see, that as Men attain to more Riches, Honour, or other Power; so their Ap­petite continually groweth more and more; and when they are come to the utmost Degree of some Kind of Power, they pursue some other, as long as in any Kind they think themselves behind any other: of those therefore that have attained to [Page 40] the highest Degree of Honour and Riches, some have affected Mastery in some Art; as Nero in Musick and Poetry, Commodus in the Art of a Gladiator; and such as affect not some such Thing, must find Diversion and Recreation of their Thoughts in the Contention either of Play or Bu­siness: and Men justly complain of a great Grief, that they know not what to do. Felicity therefore, by which we mean continual Delight, consisteth not in having prospered, but in prospering.

8. There are few Things in this World, but ei­ther have Mixture of Good and Evil, or there is a Chain of them so necessarily linked together, that the one cannot be taken without the other: As for Example, the Pleasures of Sin, and the Bitterness of Punishment, are inseparable; as is also Labour and Honour, for the most part. Now when in the whole Chain, the greater Part is good, the Whole is called Good; and when the Evil over-weigheth, the Whole is called Evil.

9. There are two Sorts of Pleasure, whereof the one seemeth to affect the corporeal Organ of the Sense, and that I call sensual; the greatest Part whereof, is that by which we are invited to give Continuance to our Species; and the next, by which a Man is invited to Meat, for the Preservation of his individual Person: The other Sort of Delight is not particular to any Part of the Body, and is cal­led The Delight of the Mind, and is that which we call Joy. Likewise of Pains, some affect the Body, and are therefore called the Pains of the Body; and some not, and those are called Grief.


1, 2. Wherein consist the Pleasures of Sense.

3, 4. Of the Imagination, or Conception of Power in Man.

5. Honour, honourable, Worth.

6. Signs of Honour.

7. Reverence.

1. HAving in the first Section of the prece­dent Chapter presupposed, that Motion and Agitation of the Brain which we call Conception, to be continued to the Heart, and there to be called Passion; I have therefore obliged my self, as far forth as I am able, to search out and declare from what Conception proceedeth every one of those Passions which we commonly take notice of: for, seeing the Things that please and displease, are innumerable, and work innumerable Ways, Men have not taken notice but of a very few, which also are many of them without Name.

2. And first, we are to consider, that of Con­ceptions there are three Sorts, whereof one is of that which is present, which is Sense; another, of that which is past, which is Remembrance; and the third, of that which is future, which we call Expectation: all which have been manifestly de­clared in the second and third Chapters; and [Page 42] every of these Conceptions is Pleasure or Pain present. And first for the Pleasures of the Body which affect the Sense of Touch and Tast, as far forth as they be Organical, their Conceptions are Sense: so also is the Pleasure of all Exonerations of Nature: All which Passions I have before named, Sensual Pleasures; and their contrary, Sensual Pains: to which also may be added the Pleasures and Displeasures of Odours, if any of them shall be found Organical, which for the most Part they are not, as appeareth by this Experience which every Man hath, that the same Smells, when they seem to proceed from others, displease, though they proceed from our selves; but when we think they proceed from our selves, they dis­please not, though they come from others: the Displeasure of this is a Conception of Hurt thereby from those Odours, as being unwholesom, and is therefore a Conception of Evil to come, and not present. Concerning the Delight of Hearing, it is diverse, and the Organ it self not affected thereby: Simple Sounds please by Aequality, as the Sound of a Bell or Lute: insomuch as it seems, an Equality continued by the Percussion of the Object upon the Ear, is Pleasure; the Contrary is called Harshness, such as is Grating, and some other Sounds, which do not always affect the Body, but only sometime, and that with a Kind of Horrour beginning at the Teeth. Harmony, or many Sounds together agreeing, please by the same Reason as the Vnison, which is the Sound of equal Strings equally stretched. Sounds that differ in any Height, please by Inequality and Aequality alternate, that is to say, the higher [Page 43] Note striketh twice, for one Stroke of the other, whereby they strike together every second Time; as is well proved by Galileo, in the first Dialogue concerning local Motion: where he also shew­eth, that two Sounds differing a fifth, delight the Ear by an Aequality of striking after two Inequalities; for the higher Note striketh the Ear thrice, while the other strikes but twice. In like Manner he sheweth wherein consisteth the Pleasure of Concord, and the Displeasure of Discord, in other Difference of Notes. There is yet another Pleasure and Displeasure of Sounds, which con­sisteth in Consequence of one Note after another, diversified both by Accent and Measure; whereof that which pleaseth is called Air; but for what Reason Succession in Tone and Measure is more Air than another, I confess I know not; but I conjecture the Reason to be, for that some of them imitate and revive some Passion which otherwise we take no Notice of, and the other not; for no Air pleaseth but for a time, no more doth Imitation. Also the Pleasures of the Eye consist in a certain Aequality of Colour: for Light, the most glorious of all Colours, is made by equal Operation of the Object; whereas Colour is perturbed, that is to say, unequal Light, as hath been said, Chap. 2. Sect. 8. And therefore Colours, the more Equality is in them, the more resplendent they are: and as Harmony is pleasure to the Ear, which consisteth of divers Sounds; so perhaps may some Mixture of divers Colours be Harmony to the Eye, more than another Mixture. There is yet another Delight by the Ear, which happeneth onely to Men of skill in Musick, which is of another Nature, (and [Page 44] not as these) Conception of the present, but rejoycing of their own Skill; of which nature are the Passions of which I am to speak next.

3. Conception of the future, is but a Supposition of the same, proceeding from Remembrance of what is past; and we so far conceive that any Thing will be hereafter, as we know there is something at the present that hath Power to produce it: and that any Thing hath Power now to produce another Thing hereafter, we cannot conceive, but by Remembrance that it hath produced the like heretofore. Wherefore all Conception of future, is Conception of Power able to produce some­thing. Whosoever therefore expecteth Pleasure to come, must conceive withal some Power in himself by which the same may be attained. And because the Passions, whereof I am to speak next, consist in Conception of the future, that is to say, in Conception of Power past, and the Act to come; before I go any further, I must in the next Place speak somewhat concerning this Power.

4. By this Power I mean the same with the Faculties of the Body, Nutritive, Generative, Mo­tive, and of the Mind, Knowledge; and besides these, such further Power as by them is acquired, viz. Riches, Place of Authority, Friendship or Fa­vour, and Good Fortune; which last is really nothing else but the Favour of God Almighty. The Con­traries of these are Impotencies, Infirmities, or De­fects of the said Powers respectively. And because the Power of one Man resisteth and hindereth the Effects of the Power of another, Power simply is no more, but the Excess of the Power of one above that of another: for equal Powers op­posed, [Page 45] destroy one another; and such their Op­position is called Contention.

5. The Signs by which we know our own Power, are those Actions which proceed from the same; and the Signs by which other Men know it, are such Actions, Gesture, Countenance and Speech, as usually such Powers produce: and the Acknowledgement of Power is called Honour; and to honour a Man inwardly, is to conceive or acknowledge that that Man hath the odds or Excess of that Power above him with whom he contendeth or compareth himself. And ho­nourable are those Signs for which one Man ac­knowledgeth Power or Excess above his Con­current in another: As for Example, Beauty of Person, consisting in a lively Aspect of the Coun­tenance, and other Signs of Natural Heat, are ho­nourable, being Signs precedent of Power genera­tive, and much Issue; as also, general Reputation among those of the other Sex, because Signs con­sequent of the same. And Actions proceeding from Strength of Body, and open Force, are honou­rable, as Signs consequent of Power motive, such as are Victory in Battel or Duel; A d'avoir tué son homme. Also to adventure upon great Exploits and Danger, as being a Sign conse­quent of Opinion of our own Strength, and that Opinion a Sign of the Strength it self. And to teach or perswade are honourable, because they be Signs of Knowledge. And Riches are honourable; as Signs of the Power that acquired them: And Gifts, Cost, and Magnificence of Houses, Apparel, and the like, are honourable, as Signs of Riches. And Nobility is honourable [Page 46] by Reflection, as a Sign of Power in the Ance­stors: And Authority, because a Sign of the Strength, Wisdom, Favour or Riches by which it is attained. And Good Fortune or casual Pro­sperity is honourable, because a Sign of the Fa­vour of God, to whom is to be ascribed all that cometh to us by Fortune, no less than that we attain unto by Industry. And the Contra­ries and Defects of these Signs are dishonourable; and according to the Signs of Honour and Dishon­our, so we estimate and make the Value or Worth of a Man: for so much worth is every Thing, as a Man will give for the Use of all it can do.

6. The Signs of Honour are those by which we perceive that one Man acknowledgeth the Power and Worth of another; such as these, to praise, to magnifie, to bless, to call happy, to pray or supplicate to, to thank, to offer unto or present, to obey, to hearken unto with Atten­tion, to speak to with Consideration, to approach unto in decent Manner, to keep Distance from, to give way to, and the like, which are the Ho­nour the Inferior giveth to the Superiour.

But the Signs of Honour from the Superiour to the Inferiour, are such as these; to praise or prefer him before his Concurrent, to hear more willingly, to speak to him more familiarly, to admit him nearer, to employ him rather, to ask his advice rather, to take his opinions, and to give him any Gifts rather than Money; or if Mo­ney, so much as may not imply his Need of a lit­tle: for Need of a little is greater Poverty than Need of much. And this is enough for Examples of the Signs of Honour and Power.

[Page 47]7. Reverence is the Conception we have concerning another, that he hath the Power to do unto us both Good and Hurt, but not the Will to do us Hurt.

8. In the Pleasure men have, or Displeasure from the Signs of Honour or Dishonour done unto them, consisteth the Nature of the Passions, whereof we are to speak in the next Chapter.


1. Glory aspiring, false Glory, vain Glory.

2. Humility and Dejection.

3. Shame.

4. Courage.

5. Anger.

6. Revengefulness.

7. Hope, Despair, Diffidence.

8. Trust.

9. Pity and Hardness of Heart.

10. Indignation.

11. Emulation and Envie.

12. Laughter.

13. Weeping.

14. Lust.

15. Love.

16. Charity,

17. Admiration and Curiosity.

18. Of the Passion of them that flock to see Danger.

19. Of Magnanimity and Pusillanimity.

20. A View of the Passions represented in a Race.

GLory, or internal Gloriation or Triumph of the Mind, is the Passion which proceedeth from the Imagination or Conception of our own Power above the Power of him that contendeth with us; the Signs whereof, besides those in the Countenance, and other Gestures of the Body [Page 49] which cannot be described, are, Ostentation in Words, and Insolency in Actions: and this Passi­on, of them whom it displeaseth, is called Pride; by them whom it pleaseth, it is termed a just Va­luation of himself. This Imagination of our Pow­er or Worth, may be from an assured and certain Experience of our own Actions; and then is that Glory just, and well grounded, and begetteth an Opinion of increasing the same by other Actions to follow; in which consisteth the Appetite which we call Aspiring, or Proceeding from one Degree of Power to another. The same Passion may proceed not from any Conscience of our own Actions, but from Fame and Trust of others, whereby one may think well of himself, and yet be deceived; and this is false Glory, and the Aspiring consequent thereto procureth ill Success. Further, the Fiction (which is also Imagination) of Actions done by our selves, which never were done, is Glorying; but be­cause it begetteth no Appetite nor endeavour to any further Attempt, it is meerly vain and unprofitable; as when a Man imagineth himself to do the Actions whereof he readeth in some Romance, or to be like unto some o­ther Man whose Acts he admireth: And this is called Vain Glory; and is exemplied in the Fable, by the Fly sitting on the Axletree, and saying to himself, What a Dust do I make rise! The expression of Vain Glory is that Wish, which some of the School mistaking for some Appetite distinct from all the rest, have called Velleity, ma­king a new Word, as they made a new Passi­on which was not before. Signs of Vain Glory in [Page 50] the Gesture; are, Imitation of others, Coun­terfeiting and Usurping the Signs of Vertue they have not; Affectation of Fashions, Captation of Honour from their Dreams, and other little Stories of themselves, from their Country, from their Names, and from the like.

2. The Passion contrary to Glory, proceeding from Apprehension of our own Infirmity, is called Humility by those by whom it is approved; by the rest, Dejection and Poorness: which Con­ception may be well or ill grounded; if well, it produceth Fear to attempt any Thing rashly; if ill, it utterly cows a Man, that he neither dares speak publickly, nor expect good Success in any Action.

3. It happeneth sometimes, that he that hath a good Opinion of himself, and upon good ground, may nevertheless, by Reason of the Froward­ness which that Passion begetteth, discover in himself some Defect or Infirmity, the Remem­brance whereof dejecteth him; and this Passion is called Shame; by which being cooled and checked in his Forwardness, he is more wary for the Time to come, This Passion, as it is a Sign of Infirmity, which is Dishonour; so also it is a Sign of Knowledge, which is Honour. The Sign of it is Blushing, which appeareth less in Men conscious of their own Defect, because they less betray the Infirmities they acknowledge.

4. Courage, in a large Signification, is the Absence of Fear in the Presence of any evil what­soever: but in a Strict and more common Mean­ing, it is Contempt of Wounds and Death, when they oppose a Man in the Way to his End.

5. Anger or sudden Courage is nothing but [Page 51] the Appetite or desire of overcoming present Oppo­sition. It hath been defined commonly to be Grief proceeding from an Opinion of Contempt; which is confuted by the often Experience which we have of being moved to anger by things in­animate, and without Sense, and consequently incapable of contemning us.

6. Revengefulness is that Passion which ariseth from an Expectation or Imagination of making him that hath hurt us, find his own Action hurtful to himself, and to acknowledge the same; and this is the Height of Revenge: for though it be not hard, by returning Evil for Evil, to make ones Adversary displeased with his own Fact; yet to make him acknowledge the same, is so diffi­cult, that many a Man had rather die than do it. Revenge aimeth not at the Death, but at the Captivity or Subjection of an Enemy; which was well expressed in the Exclamation of Tiberi­us Caesar, concerning one, that, to frustrate his Revenge, had killed himself in Prison; Hath he escaped me? To kill, is the aim of them that hate, to rid themselves out of Fear: Revenge aimeth at Triumph, which over the Dead is not.

7. Repentance is the Passion which proceedeth from Opinion or Knowledge that the Action they have done is out of the Way to the End they would attain: the Effect whereof is, to pursue that Way no longer, but, by the Consideration of the End, to direct themselves into a better. The first Motion therefore in this Passion is Grief; but the Expectation or Conception of return­ing again into the Way, is Joy; and consequent­ly, the Passion of Repentance is compounded [Page 52] and allayed of both: but the predominant is Joy; else were the Whole Grief, which cannot be, forasmuch as he that proceedeth towards the End, he conceiveth Good, proceedeth with Ap­petite; and Appetite is Joy, as hath been said, Chap. 7. Sect. 2.

8. Hope is Expectation of Good to come, as Fear is the Expectation of Evil: But when there be Causes, some that make us expect Good, and some that make us expect Evil, al­ternately working in our Mind; if the Causes that make us expect Good, be greater than those that make us expect Evil, the whole Passion is Hope; if contrarily the Whole is Fear. Absolute Privation of hope is Despair, a degree whereof is Diffidence.

9. Trust is a Passion proceeding from the Belief of him from whom we expect or hope for Good, so free from Doubt that upon the same we pursue no other Way to attain the same Good: as Distrust or Diffidence is Doubt that maketh him endeavour to provide himself by other Means And that this is the Meaning of the Words Trust and Distrust, is manifest from this, that a Man never provideth himself by a second Way, but when he mistrusteth that the first will not hold

10. Pity is Imagination or Fiction of future Ca­lamity to our selves, proceeding from the Sense of another Mans Calamity. But when it light­eth on such as we think have not deserved the same, the Compassion is greater, because then there appeareth more Probability that the same may happen to us: for, the Evil that [Page 53] happeneth to an innocent Man, may happen to every Man. But when we see a Man suffer for great Crimes, which we cannot easily think will fall upon our selves, the Pity is the less. And therefore Men are apt to pity those whom they love: for, whom they love, they think wor­thy of Good, and therefore not worthy of Cala­mity. Thence it is also, that Men pity the Vices of some Persons at the first Sight only, out of Love to their Aspect. The Contrary of Pity is Hardness of Heart, proceeding either from Slowness of Imagination, or some extreme great Opinion of their own Exemption from the like Ca­lamity, or from hatred of all or most Men.

11. Indignation is that Grief which consisteth in the Conception of good Success happening to them whom they think unworthy thereof. See­ing therefore Men think all those unworthy whom they hate, they think them not only unworthy of the good Fortune they have, but also of their own Vertues. And of all the Passi­ons of the Mind, these two, Indignation and Pity, are most raised and increased by Eloquence: for, the Aggravation of the Calamity, and Exte­nuation of the Fault, augmenteth Pity; and the Extenuation of the Worth of the Person, together with the magnifying of his Success, which are the Parts of an Orator, are able to turn these two Passions into Fury.

12. Emulation is Grief arising from seeing ones self exceeded or excelled by his Concur­rent, together with Hope to equal or exceed him in Time to come, by his own Ability. But, Envy is the same Grief joyned with Pleasure conceiv­ed [Page 54] in the Imagination of some ill Fortune that may befall him.

13. There is a Passion that hath no Name; but the Sign of it is that Distortion of the Coun­tenance which we call Laughter, which is always Joy: but what joy, what we think, and where­in we triumph when we laugh, is not hitherto declared by any. That it consisteth in Wit, or, as they call it, in the Jest, Experience confuteth: for Men laugh at Mischances and Indecencies, wherein there lieth no Wit nor jest at all. And forasmuch as the same Thing is no more ridi­culous when it groweth stale or usual, whatso­ever it be that moveth Laughter, it must be new and unexpected. Men laugh often (especially such as are greedy of Applause from every Thing they do well) at their own Actions perform­ed never so little beyond their own Expectati­ons; as also at their own Jests: And in this Case it is manifest, that the Passion of Laughter proceedeth from a sudden conception of some Abi­lity in himself that laugheth. Also Men laugh at the Infirmities of others, by Comparison where­with their own Abilities are set off and il­lustrated. Also Men laugh at Jests, the Wit whereof always consisteth in the elegant Disco­vering and Conveying to our minds some Ab­surdity of another: And in this case also the Passion of Laughter proceedeth from the sudden Imagination of our own Oddes and Eminency: for what is else the Recommending of our selves to our own good Opinion, by Comparison with another Mans Infirmity or absurdity? For when a Jest is broken upon our selves, or [Page 55] Friends of whose Dishonour we participate, we never laugh thereat. I may therefore con­clude, that the Passion of Laughter is nothing else but sudden Glory arising from some sudden Conception of some Eminency in our selves, by Comparison with the Infirmity of others, or with our own formerly: for Men laugh at the follies of themselves past, when they come suddenly to Remembrance, except they bring with them any present Dishonour. It is no wonder therefore that Men take hainously to be laughed at or derided, that is, triumphed over. Laughing without Offence, must be at Ab­surdities and Infirmities abstracted from Persons, and when all the Company may laugh together: for, laughing to ones self putteth all the rest into Jealousie, and Examination of themselves. Besides, it is Vain-Glory, and an Argument of little Worth, to think the Infirmity of another, suffi­cient Matter for his Triumph.

14. The Passion opposite hereunto, (whose Signs are another Distortion of the Face with Tears) called Weeping, is the sudden Fal­ling out with our selves, or sudden Conception of Defect; and therefore Children weep often: for seeing they think that every Thing ought to be given them which they desire, of Necessity every Repulse must be a Check of their Expec­tation, and puts them in mind of their too much Weakness to make themselves Masters of all they look for. For the same Cause Women are more apt to weep than men, as being not only more accustomed to have their Wills, but also to measure their Powers by the Power and [Page 56] Love of others that protect them. Men are apt to weep that prosecute Revenge, when the Revenge is suddenly stopt or frustrated by the Repentance of their Adversary; and such are the Tears of Reconciliation. Also revengeful Men are subject to this Passion upon the beholding those Men they pity, and suddenly remember they cannot help. Other weeping in Men proceedeth for the most part from the same Cause it proceedeth from in Women and Chil­dren.

15. The Appetite which Men call Lust, and the Fruition that appertaineth thereunto, is a Sensual Pleasure, but not only that; there is in it also a Delight of the Mind: for it consisteth of two Appetites together, to please, and to be pleased; and the Delight Men take in delight­ing, is not sensual, but a Pleasure or joy of the Mind consisting in the Imagination of the Pow­er they have so much to please. But the Name Lust is used where it is condemned; otherwise it is called by the general Word Love: for the Passion is one and the same indefinite Desire of different Sex, as natural as Hunger.

16. Of Love, by which is understood the Joy Man taketh in the Fruition of any present Good, hath been already spoken of in the first Section, Chap. 7. under which is contained the Love Men bear to one another, or Pleasure they take in one anothers Company; and by which Nature, Men are said to be sociable. But there is ano­ther Kind of Love, which the Greeks call [...], and is that which we mean, when we say that a Man is in Love: Forasmuch as this Pas­sion [Page 57] cannot be without Diversity of Sex, it can­not be denied but that it participateth of that indefinite Love mentioned in the former Sec­tion. But there is a great Difference betwixt the Desire of a Man indefinite, and the same De­sire limited ad hunc; and this is that Love which is the great Theme of Poets: But notwithstand­ing their Praises, it must be defined by the Word Need: for it is a Conception a Man hath of his Need of that one Person desired. The Cause of this Passion is not always nor for the most part Beauty, or other Quality in the Beloved, unless there be withall Hope in the Person that loveth: which may be gathered from this, that in great Difference of Persons, the greater have often faln in love with the meaner; but not contrary. And from hence it is, that for the most part they have much better Fortune in Love, whose Hopes are built upon something in their Person, than those that trust to their Expressions and Ser­vice; and they that care less, than they that care more: which not perceiving, many Men cast away their Services, as one Arrow after ano­ther, till, in the End, together with their Hopes, they lose their Wits.

17. There is yet another Passion sometimes called Love, but more properly good Will or Cha­rity. There can be no greater Argument to a Man, of his own Power, than to find himself able not only to accomplish his own Desires, but also to assist other Men in theirs: and this is that Conception wherein consisteth Charity. In which, first, is contained that natural Affecti­on of Parents to their Children, which the Greeks [Page 58] call [...], as also, that Affection wherewith Men seek to assist those that adhere unto them. But the Affection wherewith Men many times bestow their Benefits on Strangers, is not to be called Charity, but either Contract, whereby they seek to purchase friendship; or Fear, which maketh them to purchase peace. The Opinion of Plato concerning honourable Love, delivered according to his Custom in the Person of Socrates, in the Dialogue intituled Convivium, is this, That a Man full and pregnant with Wisdom and other Vertues, naturally seeketh out some beautiful Person, of Age and Capacity to conceive, in whom he may, without sensual Respects, ingender and produce the like. And this is the Idea of the then noted Love of Socrates wise and continent, to Alcibiades young and beautiful: In which, Love is not the sought Honour, but the Issue of his Knowledge; con­trary to the common Love, to which though Is­sue sometimes follows, yet Men seek not that, but to please, and to be pleased. It should be therefore this Charity, or Desire to assist and advance others. But why then should the Wise seek the Igno­rant, or be more charitable to the Beautiful than to others? There is something in it savouring of the Use of that time: in which Matter though Socrates be acknowledged for continent, yet the Continent have the Passion they contain, as much and more than they that satiate the Appetite; which maketh me suspect this Platonick Love for meerly sensual; but with an honourable Pretence for the Old to haunt the Company of the young and beautiful.

[Page 59]18. Forasmuch as all Knowledge beginneth from Experience, therefore also new Experience is the Beginning of new Knowledge, and the Increase of Experience the Beginning of the In­crease of Knowledge. Whatsoever therefore happeneth new to a Man, giveth him Matter of Hope of knowing somewhat that he knew not before. And this Hope and Expectation of future Knowledge from any Thing that happeneth new and strange, is that Passion which we common­ly call Admiration; and the same considered as Appetite, is called Curiosity, which is Ap­petite of Knowledge. As in the discerning of Faculties, Man leaveth all Community with Beasts at the Faculty of imposing Names; so al­so doth he surmount their Nature at this Pas­sion of Curiosity. For when a Beast seeth any Thing new and strange to him, he considereth it so far only as to discern whether it be like­ly to serve his turn, or hurt him, and accordingly approacheth nearer to it, or fleeth from it: Whereas Man, who in most Events remember­eth in what manner they were caused and begun, looketh for the Cause and Beginning of every Thing that ariseth new unto him. And from this Passion of Admiration and Curiosity, have ari­sen not only the Invention of Names, but al­so Supposition of such Causes of all Things as they thought might produce them. And from this Beginning is derived all Philosophy; as Astrono­my from the Admiration of the Course of Heaven; Natural Philosophy from the strange Ef­fects of the Elments and other Bodies. And from the Degrees of Curiosity, proceed also the [Page 60] Degrees of Knowledge amongst Men: For, to a Man in the Chace of Riches or Authority,) which in Respect of Knowledge are but Sensuality) it is a Diversity of little Pleasure, whether it be the Motion of the Sun or the Earth that ma­keth the Day, or to enter into other Contempla­tions of any strange Accident, than whether it conduce or not to the End he pursueth. Because Curiosity is Delight, therefore also Novelty is so, but especially that Novelty from which a Man conceiveth an Opinion true or false of bettering his own Estate; for, in such Case, they stand affected with the Hope that all Gamesters have while the Cards are shuffling.

19. Divers other Passions there be, but they want Names: whereof some nevertheless have been by most Men observed: For Example; from what Passion proceedeth it, that Men take pleasure to behold from the Shore the Danger of them that are at Sea in a Tempest, or in Fight, or from a safe Castle to behold two Ar­mies charge one to another in the Field? It is certainly, in the whole Summ, Joy; else Men would never flock to such a Spectacle. Nevertheless there is in it both Joy and Grief: for as there is Novelty and Remembrance of our own Securi­ty present, which is Delight: so there is also Pity, which is Grief: But the Delight is so far predominant, that Men usually are content in such a Case to be Spectators of the Misery of their Friends.

20. Magnanimity is no more than Glory, of the which I have spoken in the first Section; but Glory well grounded upon certain Experience of [Page 61] a Power sufficient to attain his End in open Manner. And Pusillanimity is the Doubt of that. Whatsoever therefore is a Sign of Vain Glo­ry, the same is also a Sign of Pusillanimity: for sufficient Power maketh Glory a Spur to ones End. To be pleased or displeased with Fame true or false, is a Sign of that same, because he that relieth on Fame hath not his Suc­cess in his own Power. Likewise Art and Fal­lacy are Signs of Pusillanimity, because they depend not upon our own Power, but the Igno­rance of others. Also Proneness to Anger, because it argueth Difficulty of proceeding. Also O­stentation of Ancestors, because all Men are more inclined to make shew of their own Power when they have it, than of anothers. To be at Enmity and Contention with Inferiours, is a Sign of the same, because it proceedeth from Want of Power to end the War. To laugh at others, because it is an Affectation of Glory from other Mens Infirmities, and not from any Ability of their own. Also Irresolution, which proceedeth from Want of power enough to con­temn the little Difficulties that make Deliberations hard.

21. The Comparison of the Life of Man to a Race, though it hold not in every Part, yet it holdeth so well for this our Purpose, that we may thereby both see and remember almost all the Passions before mentioned. But this Race we must suppose to have no other Goal, nor other Garland, but being formost, and in it

To endeavour, is Appetite.

To be remiss, is Sensuality.

[Page 62]To consider them behind, is Glory.

To consider them before, is Humility.

To lose Ground with looking back, Vain-Glory.

To be holden, Hatred.

To turn back, Repentance.

To be in breath, Hope.

To be weary, Despair.

To endeavour to overtake the next, Emulation.

To supplant or overthrow, Envie.

To resolve to break thorow a Stop foreseen, Cou­rage.

To break thorow a sudden Stop, Anger.

To break thorow with Ease, Magnanimity.

To lose Ground by little Hindrances, Pusillani­mity.

To fall on the sudden, is Disposition to weep.

To see another fall, is Disposition to laugh.

To see one out-gone whom we would not, is Pity.

To see one out-goe whom we would not, is In­dignation.

To hold fast by another, is to love.

To carry him on that so holdeth, is Charity.

To hurt ones self for hast, is Shame.

Continually to be out-gone is Misery.

Continually to out-go the next before, is Felicity.

And to forsake the Course, is to die.


1. HAving shewed in the precedent Chapters, that Sense proceedeth from the Action of external Objects upon the Brain, or some inter­nal Substance of the Head; and that the Passions proceed from the Alteration there made, and continued to the Heart: It is consequent in the next Place, seeing the Diversity of Degrees in Knowlege in divers Men, to be greater than may be ascribed to the divers Tempers of their Brain, to declare what other Causes may pro­duce such Oddes, and Excess of Capacity, as we daily observe in one Man above another. As for that Difference which ariseth from Sickness, and such accidental Distempers, I omit the same, as impertinent to this Place, and consider, it only in such as have their Health, and Organs well disposed. If the Difference were in the natu­ral Temper of the Brain, I can imagin no Reason why the same should not appear first and most of all in the Senses, which being equal both in the wise and less wise, infer an equal Temper in the common Organ (namely the Brain) of all the Senses.

2. But we see by Experience, that Joy and Grief proceed not in all Men from the same Causes, and that men differ very much in the Constituti­on [Page 64] of the Body; whereby, that which helpeth and furthereth vital Constitution in one, and is therefore delightful, hindereth it and crosseth it in another, and therefore causeth Grief. The Difference therefore of Wits hath its Original from the different Passions, and from the Ends to which the Appetite leadeth them.

3. And first, those Men whose Ends are sen­sual Delight, and generally are addicted to Ease, Food, Onerations and Exonerations of the Body, must needs be the less thereby delighted with those Imaginations that conduce not to those Ends, such as are Imaginations of Honour and Glory, which, as I have said before, have Respect to the future: For Sensuality consisteth in the Pleasure of the Senses, which please only for the present, and take away the Inclination to observe such Things as conduce to Honour, and consequently maketh Men less curious, and less ambitious, whereby they less consider the Way either to Knowledge or other Power: in which two con­sisteth all the Excellency of Power cognitive. And this is it which Men call Dulness, and pro­ceedeth from the Appetite of sensual or bodily Delight. And it may well be conjectured, that such Passion hath its Beginning from a Grossness and Difficulty of the Motion of the Spirit about the Heart.

4. The Contrary hereunto, is that quick Range­ing of Mind described, Chap. 4. Sect. 3. which is joyned with Curiosity of comparing the Things that come into the Mind, one with another: in which Comparison, a Man delighteth himself either with finding unexpected Similitude of Things, otherwise much unlike, in which [Page 65] Men place the Excellency of Fancy, and from whence proceed those grateful Similies, Meta­phors, and other Tropes, by which both Poets and Orators have it in their Power to make Things please or displease, and shew well or ill to others, as they like themselves; or else in discerning suddenly Dissimilitude in Things that otherwise ap­pear the same. And this Vertue of the Mind is that by which Men attain to exact and per­fect Knowledge; and the Pleasure thereof con­sisteth in continual Instruction, and in Distinction of Places, Persons, and Seasons, and is commonly termed by the Name of Judgement: for, to judge is nothing else, but to distinguish or discern: And both Fancy and Judgement are commonly comprehended under the Name of Wit, which seemeth to be a Tenuity and Agility of Spirits, contrary to that Restiness of the Spirits suppo­sed in those that are dull.

5. There is another Defect of the Mind, which Men call Levity, which betrayeth also Mobility in the Spirits, but in Excess. An Example where­of is in them that in the midst of any serious Discourse, have their Minds diverted to every little Jest or witty Observation; which ma­keth them depart from their Discourse by a Pa­renthesis, and from that Parenthesis by ano­ther, till at length they either lose themselves, or make their Narration like a Dream, or some studied Nonsence. The Passion from whence this proceedeth, is Curiosity, but with too much E­quality and Indifference: for when all Things make equal Impression and Delight, they equally throng to be expressed.

[Page 66]6. The Vertue opposite to this Defect, is Gra­vity, or Steadiness; in which the End being the great and Master-Delight, directeth and keep­eth in the Way thereto all other Thoughts.

7. The Extremity of Dulness is that natural Folly which may be called Stolidity: But the Ex­tream of Levity, though it be natural Folly di­stinct from the other, and obvious to every Mans Observation, I know not how to call it.

8. There is a Fault of the Mind called by the Greeks [...], which is Indocibility, or Difficulty of being taught; the which must needs arise from a false Opinion that they know already the Truth of that is called in question: for certainly Men are not otherwise so unequal in capacity as the Evi­dence is unequal between what is taught by the Mathematicians, and what is commonly discour­sed of in other Books: and therefore if the Minds of Men were all of white Paper, they would all most equally be disposed to acknowledge whatsoever should be in right Method, and by right Ratiocination delivered to them: But when Men have once acquiesced in untrue Opinions, and registred them as Authentical Records in their Minds, it is no less impossible to speak intelligi­bly to such Men, than to write legibly upon a Pa­per already scribled over. The immediate Cause therefore of Indocibility, is Prejudice; and of pre­judice, false Opinion of our own Knowledge.

9. Another, and a principal Defect of the Mind, is that which Men call Madness, which appeareth to be nothing else but some Imagina­tion of some such Predominancy above the rest, that we have no Passion but from it; and this [Page 67] Conception is nothing else but excessive vain Glory, or vain Dejection: which is most propable by these Examples following, which proceed in Appearance every one of them from Pride, or some Dejection of Mind. As first, we have had the Example of one that preached in Cheap­side from a Cart there, instead of a Pulpit, that he himself was Christ, which was spiritual Pride or Madness. We have had also divers Exam­ples of Learned Madness, in which Men have manifestly been distracted upon any Occasion that hath put them in Remembrance of their own A­bility. Amongst the learned Men, may be re­membred (I think also) those that determine of the Time of the Worlds End, and other such the Points of Prophecy. And the gallant Madness of Don Quixotte is nothing else but an Expres­sion of such Height of vain Glory as reading of Romance may produce in pusillanimous Men. Al­so Rage and Madness of Love, are but great In­dignations of them in whose Brains is predo­minant Contempt from their Enemies, or their Mistresses. And the Pride taken in Form and Be­haviour, hath made divers Men run mad, and to be so accounted, under the Name of Fantastick.

10. And as these are the Examples of Extremi­ties, so also are there Examples too many of the Degrees, which may therefore be well ac­counted Follies; as it is a Degree of the first, for a Man, without certain Evidence, to think himself to be inspired, or to have any other Effect of Gods holy Spirit than other godly Men have. Of the second, for a Man continually to speak his mind in a Cento of other Mens Greek or Latine Sen­tences. [Page 68] Of the third, much of the present Gallan­try in Love and Duel. Of Rage, a Degree is Ma­lice; and of Fantastick Madness, Affection.

11. As the former Examples exhibit to us Ma­dness, and the Degrees thereof, proceeding from the Excess of Self-Opinion; so also there be o­ther Examples of Madness, and the Degrees thereof, proceeding from too much vain Fear and Dejection; as in those melancholy Men that have imagined themselves brittle as Glass, or have had some other like Imagination: and Degrees hereof are all those exorbitant and causless Fears, which we commonly observe in melancholy Persons.


1. HItherto of the Knowledge of Things natural and of the Passions that arise naturally from them. Now forasmuch as we give Names not on­ly to Things natural, but also to supernatural; and by all Names we ought to have some Meaning and Conception: It followeth in the next Place, to consider what Thoughts and Imaginations of the Mind we have, when we take into our Mouths the most blessed Name of GOD, and the Names of those Vertues we attribute unto him; as also, what Image cometh into the Mind at hear­ing the Name of Spirit, or the Name of Angel, good or bad.

2. And forasmuch as God Almighty is incom­prehensible, it followeth, that we can have no Con­ception or Image of the Deity, and consequently, all his Attributes signifie our Inability and Defect of Power to conceive any Thing concerning his Na­ture, and not any Conception of the same, except­ing only this, That there is a God: For the Ef­fects we acknowledge naturally, do include a Power of their producing, before they were pro­duced; and that Power presupposeth something existent that hath such Power: And the Thing so existing with Power to produce, if it were not E­ternal, must needs have been produced by some­what before it, and that again by something else be­fore that, till we come to an Eternal (that is to [Page 70] say, the first) Power of all Powers, and first Cause of all Causes: And this is it which all Men conceive by the Name of GOD, implying Eterni­ty, Incomprehensibility, and Omnipotency. And thus all that will consider, may know that God is, though not what he is: even a Man that is born blind, though it be not possible for him to have any Imagination what Kind of thing Fire is; yet he cannot but know that somewhat there is that Men call Fire, because it warmeth him.

2. And whereas we attribute to God Al­mighty, Seeing, Hearing, Speaking, Knowing, Lo­ving, and the like, by which Names we understand something in Men to whom we attribute them, we understand nothing by them in the Nature of God: For, as it is well reasoned, Shall not the God that made the Eye, see; and the Ear, hear? So it is also, if we say, Shall God, which made the Eye, not see without the Eye; or that made the Ear, not hear without the Ear; or that made the Brain, not know without the Brain; or that made the Heart, not love with­out the Heart? The Attributes therefore given unto the Deity, are such as signifie either our In­capacity or our Reverence: Our Incapacity, when we say Incomprehensible and Infinite; our Re­verence, when we give him those Names, which amongst us are the Names of those Things we most magnifie and commend, as Omnipotent, Omniscient, Just, Merciful, &c. And when God Almighty giveth those Names to himself in the Scriptures, it is but [...], that is to say, by descending to our Manner of speaking; with­out which we are not capable of understanding him.

[Page 71]4. By the Name of Spirit, we understand a Body natural, but of such Subtilty, that it worketh not upon the Senses; but that filleth up the Place which the Image of a visible Body might fill up. Our Conception therefore of Spirit con­sisteth of Figure without Colour; and in Figure is understood Dimension, and consequently, to conceive a Spirit, is to conceive something that hath Dimension. But Spirits supernatural commonly signifie some Substance without Dimen­sion; which two Words do flatly contradict one another: and therefore when we attribute the Name of Spirit unto God, we attribute it not as the Name of any Thing we conceive, no more than we ascribe unto him Sense and Understand­ing; but, as a Signification of our Reverence, we desire to abstract from him all corporal Gros­ness.

5. Concerning other Things, which some Men call Spirits incorporeal, and some corporeal, it is not possible by natural Means only, to come to Knowledge of so much, as that there are such Things. We that are Christians acknowledge that there be Angels good and evil, and that there are Spirits, and that the Soul of Man is a Spirit, and that those Spirits are immortal: but, to know it, that is to say, to have natural Evidence of the same, it is impossible: For, all Evidence is Conception, as it is said, Chap. 6. Sect. 3. and all Conception is Imagination, and proceedeth from Sense, Chap. 3. Sect. 1. And Spirits we sup­pose to be those Substances which work not upon the Sense; and therefore not conceptible. But though the Scripture acknowledge Spirits, [Page 72] yet doth it no where say, that they are incor­poreal, meaning thereby, without Dimension and Quality: Nor, I think, is that Word Incor­poreal at all in the Bible; but it is said of the Spi­rit, that it abideth in Men; sometimes that it dwelleth in them, sometimes that it cometh on them, that it descendeth, and goeth, and com­eth; and that Spirits are Angels, that is to say, Messengers: all which Words do imply Locality; and Locality is Dimension; and whatsoever hath Dimension, is Body, be it never so subtil. To me therefore it seemeth, that the Scripture fa­voureth them more, who hold Angels and Spirits corporeal, than them that hold the con­trary. And it is a plain Contradiction in natu­ral Discourse, to say of the Soul of Man, that it is tota in toto, & tota in qualibet Parte Corporis, grounded neither upon Reason nor Revelation, but proceeding from the Ignorance of what those Things are which are called Spectra, Images, that appear in the dark to Children, and such as have strong Fears, and other strange Imaginations, as hath been said, Chap. 3. Sect. 5. where I call them Phantasms: For, taking them to be Things real, without us, like Bodies, and seeing them to come and vanish so strangely as they do, unlike to Bodies; what could they call them else, but incorporeal Bodies? which is not a Name, but an Ab­surdity of Speech.

6. It is true, that the Heathens, and all Nations of the World, have acknowledged that there be Spirits, which for the most part they hold to be incorporeal; whereby it might be thought, that a Man by natural Reason, may ar­rive, [Page 73] without the Scriptures, to the Knowledge of this, That Spirits are: But the erroneous Colle­ction thereof by the Heathens, may proceed, as I have said before, from the Ignorance of the Cause of Ghosts and Phantasms, and such other Apparitions. And from thence had the Greci­ans their Number of Gods, their Number of Dae­mons good or bad, and for every Man his Genius; which is not the Acknowledging of this Truth, That Spirits are; but a false Opinion concerning the Force of Imagination.

7. And seeing the Knowledge we have of Spi­rits, is not natural Knowledge, but Faith from supernatural Revelation given to the holy Wri­ters of the Scriptures; it followeth, that of Inspi­rations also, which is the Operation of Spirit in us, the Knowledge which we have, must all pro­ceed from Scripture. The Signs there set down of Inspiration, are Miracles, when they be great, and manifestly above the Power of Men to do by Imposture: As for Example, the In­spiration of Elias was known by the miracu­lous Burning of the Sacrifice. But the Signs to distinguish whether a Spirit be good or evil, are the same by which we distinguish whether a Man or a Tree be good or evil, namely, Acti­ons and Fruit: For there are lying Spirits, where­with Men are inspired sometimes, as well as with Spirits of Truth. And we are commanded in Scripture, to judge of the Spirits by their Doctrine, and not of the Doctrine by the Spirits. For Miracles, our Saviour hath forbidden us to rule our Faith by them, Matth. 24.24. And Saint Paul saith, Gal. 1.8. Though an Angel from Heaven [Page 74] preach to you otherwise, &c. let him be accur­sed. Where it is plain, that we are not to judge whether the Doctrine be true or not, by the Angel; but whether the Angel say true or no, by the Doctrine. So likewise, 1 Joh. 4.1. Believe not every Spirit: for false Prophets are gone out in­to the World. Vers. 2. Hereby shall ye know the Spirit of God. Vers. 3. Every Spirit that confesseth not that Jesus Christ is come in the Flesh, is not of God: and this is the Spirit of Antichrist. Vers. 15. Whosoever confesseth that Jesus is the Son of God, in him dwelleth God, and he in God. The Knowledge therefore we have of good and evil Inspiration, cometh not by Vision of an An­gel that may teach it, nor by a Miracle that may seem to confirm it; but by Conformity of Doctrine with this Article and Fundamental Point of Christian Faith, which also Saint Paul saith is the sole Foundation, That Jesus Christ is come in the Flesh, 1 Cor. 3.11

8. But if Inspiration be discerned by this Point, and this Point be acknowledged and be­lieved upon the Authority of the Scriptures; How (may some Men ask) know we that the Scri­pture deserveth so great Authority, which must be no less than that of the lively Voice of God; that is, how we know the Scriptures to be the Word of God? And first, it is manifest, that if by Knowledge we understand Science infallible and natural, as is defined, Chap. 6. Sect. 4. proceeding from Sense, we cannot be said to know it, be­cause it proceedeth not from the Conceptions ingendered by Sense. And if we understand Knowledge as supernatural, we cannot have it [Page 75] but by Inspiration: And of that Inspiration we can­not judge, but by the Doctrine: It followeth, that we have not any Way, natural or supernatural, of the Knowledge thereof, which can properly be called Infallible Science and Evidence. It re­maineth, that the Knowledge that we have that the Scriptures are the Word of God, is only Faith, which Faith therefore is also by Saint Paul defined, Heb. 11.1. to be the Evidence of Things not seen; that is to say, not otherwise e­vident but by Faith: for, whatsoever either is evident by Natural Reason, or Revelation super­natural, is not called Faith; else should not Faith cease, no more than Charity, when we are in Heaven; which is contrary to the Doc­trine of the Scripture. And, we are not said to believe, but to know those Things that be evi­dent.

9. Seeing then the Acknowledgment of Scri­ptures to be the Word of God, is not Evidence, but Faith, and Faith (Chap. 6. Sect. 7.) consisteth in the Trust we have of other Men, it appeareth plain, that the Men so trusted, are the holy Men of Gods Church succeeding one another from the Time of those that saw the wondrous Works of God Almighty in the Flesh. Nor doth this imply that God is not the Worker or Efficient Cause of Faith, or that Faith is begotten in Man without the Spirit of God: for, all those good Opinions which we admit and believe, though they proceed from Hearing, and Hearing from Teaching, both which are natural, yet they are the Work of God: for, all the Works of Nature are his, and they are attributed to the Spirit of God: As [Page 76] for Example, Exod. 28.3. Thou shalt speak unto all cunning Men, whom I have filled with the SPIRIT of Wisdom, that they may make Aaron's Garments for his Consecration, that he may serve me in the Priests Office. Faith therefore wherewith we believe, is the Work of the Spirit of God in that Sense, by which the Spirit of God giveth to one Man Wisdom and cunning in Workmanship more than another, and by which he effecteth also in other Points pertaining to our ordinary Life; that one Man believeth that, which, upon the same Grounds, another doth not; and one Man reverenceth the Opinion, and obeyeth the Commands of his Superiour, and others not.

10. And seeing our Faith, that the Scriptures are the Word of God, began from the Confidence and Trust we repose in the Church; there can be no Doubt but that their Interpretation of the same Scriptures (when any Doubt or Con­troversie shall arise, by which this Fundamental Point, That Jesus Christ is come in the Flesh, may be called in question) is safer for any Man to trust to, than his own, whether Reasoning or Spi­rit, that is to say, his own Opinion.

11. Now concerning Mens Affections to God­ward, they are not the same always that are described in the Chapter concerning Passi­ons There, for to love, is to be delighted with the Image or Conception of the Thing loved; but God is unconceivable: To love God there­fore, in the Scripture, is to obey his Com­mandments, and to love one another. Also to trust God, is different from our trusting one another: [Page 77] for, when a Man trusteth a Man, (Chap. 9. Sect. 8.) he layeth aside his own Endeavours: but if we do so in our Trust to God Almigh­ty, we disobey him; and how shall we trust to him whom we know we disobey? To trust to God Almighty therefore, is to referr to his good Pleasure all that is above our own Power to effect: and this is all one with Acknowledging one only God, which is the first Commandment. And to trust in Christ, is no more but to acknowledge him for God; which is the fundamen­tal Article of our Christian Faith: And consequently, to trust, rely, or, as some express it, to cast and roll our selves on Christ, is the same Thing with the Fundamental Point of Faith, namely, that Jesus Christ is the Son of the living God.

12. To honour God internally in the Heart, is the same Thing with that we ordinarily call Ho­nour amongst Men: for it is nothing but the Acknowledging of his Power; and the Signs there­of, the same with the Signs of the Honour due to our Superiours, mentioned Chap. 8. Sect. 6. viz. to praise, to magnifie, to bless; to pray to him, to thank him, to give Oblations and Sa­crifices to him, to give Attention to his Word, to speak to him in Prayer with Consideration, to come into his Presence with humble Gesture, and in decent Manner, and to adorn his Wor­ship with Magnificence and Cost: and these are natural Signs of our honouring him internally: And therefore the Contrary hereof, To neg­lect prayer, to speak to him extempore, to come to Church slovenly, to adorn the Place of his Wor­ship [Page 78] worse than our own Houses, to take up his Name in every idle Discourse, are the manifest Signs of Contempt of the Divine Majesty. There be other Signs which are arbitrary; as, to be unco­vered, (as we be here); to put off their Shooes, as Moses at the fiery Bush, and some other of that Kind, which in their own Nature are indifferent, till, to avoid Indecency and Discord, it be otherwise de­termined by common Consent.


1. IT hath been declared already, how external Objects cause Conceptions, and Conceptions, Appetite and Fear, which are the first unperceiv­ed Beginnings of our Actions: for either the Actions immediately follow the first Appetite, as when we do any Thing upon a sudden; or else to our first Appetite there succeedeth some Concepti­on of Evil to happen to us by such Actions, which is Fear, and which holdeth us from proceeding. And to that Fear may succeed a new Appe­tite, and to that Appetite another Fear alter­nately, till the Action be either done, or some Accident come between, to make it impossible; and so this alternate Appetite and Fear ceaseth. This alternate Succession of Appetite and Fear du­ring all the time the Action is in our Power to do or not to do, is that we call Deliberation; which Name hath been given it for that Part of the Definition wherein it is said that it last­eth so long as the Action, whereof we deliberate, is in our Power: for, so long we have Liberty to do or not to do; and Deliberation signifieth a Taking away of our own Liberty.

2. Deliberation therefore requireth in the Action deliberated two Conditions; one, that it be future; the other, that there be Hope of doing it, or possibi­lity of not doing it; for, Appetite and Fear are Expe­pectations of the future; and there is no Expectation [Page 78] [...] [Page 79] [...] [Page 80] of Good, without Hope; or of Evil, without Possibility: of Necessaries therefore there is no Deli­beration. In Deliberation, the last Appetite, as also the last Fear, is called Will, viz. the last Appe­tite, Will to do, or Will to omit. It is all one therefore to say Will, and last Will: for, though a Man express his present Inclination and Appetite con­cerning the disposing of his Goods, by Words or Writing; yet shall it not be counted his Will, because he hath still Liberty to dispose of them other ways: but when Death taketh away that Liberty, then it is his Will.

3. Voluntary Actions and Omissions are such as have Beginning in the Will; all other are involuntary, or [...] voluntary, such as a Man doth upon Appetite or Fear; involuntary, such as he doth by Necessity of Nature, as when he is pushed, or falleth, and thereby doth Good or hurt to another: mixt, such as participate of both; as when a Man is carried to Prison, Going is voluntary, to the Prison, is involuntary: The Example of him that throweth his Goods out of a Ship into the Sea, to save his Person, is of an Action altogether volunta­ry; for, there is nothing therein involuntary, but the Hardness of the Choice, which is not his Action, but the Action of the Winds: what he himself doth, is no more against his Will, than to flee from Danger is against the Will of him that seeth no other Means to preserve him­self.

4. Voluntary also are the Actions that proceed from sudden Anger, or other sudden Appetite in such Men as can discern Good or Evil: for, in them the Time precedent is to be judged Delibe­ration; [Page 81] for then also he deliberateth in what Cases it is good to strike, deride, or do any other Action proceeding from Anger or other such sudden Passion.

5. Appetite, Fear, Hope, and the rest of the Passions are not called voluntary; for they pro­ceed not from, but are the Will, and the Will is not voluntary: for, a Man can no more say he will will, than he will will will, and so make an infinite Repetition of the Word [will]; which is absurd, and insignificant.

6. Forasmuch as Will to do is Appetite, and Will to omit, Fear; the Cause of Appetite and Fear is the Cause also of our Will: But the propound­ing of the Benefits and of Harms, that is to say, of Reward and Punishment, is the Cause of our Appetite, and of our Fears, and therefore also of our Wills, so far forth as we believe that such Rewards and Benefits as are propounded, shall arrive unto us; and consequently, our Wills fol­low our Opinions, as our Actions follow our Wills; in which Sense they say truly, and properly, that say the World is governed by Opinion.

7. When the Wills of many concur to one and the same Action and Effect, this Concourse of their Wills is called Consent; by which we must not understand one Will of many Men (for every Man hath his several Will) but many Wills to the producing of one Effect: But when the Wills of two divers Men produce such Actions as are reciprocally resistant one to the other, this is called Contention; and, being upon the Persons one of another, Battel: whereas Actions proceed­ing from Consent, are mutual Aid.

[Page 82]8. When many Wills are involved or inclu­ded in the Will of one or more consenting, (which how it may be, shall be hereafter declared) then is that involving of many Wills in one or more, cal­led Vnion.

9. In Deliberations interrupted, as they may be by Diversion of other Business, or by Sleep, the last Appetite of such Part of the Deliberation is called Intention, or Purpose.


1. HAving spoken of the Powers and Acts of the Mind, both cognitive and motive, considered in every Man by himself, without Rela­tion to other [...]; it will fall fitly into this Chapter, to speak of the Effects of the same Power one upon another; which Effects are also the Signs, by which one taketh notice what another con­ceiveth and intendeth. Of these Signs, some are such as cannot easily be counterfeited; as Actions and Gestures, especially if they be sudden, where­of I have mentioned some; (for Example, look in Chap. 9.) with the several Passions whereof they are Signs: Others there are which may be counterfeited; and those are Words or Speech; of the Use and Effects whereof, I am to speak in this Place.

2. The first Use of Language, is the expressi­on of our Conceptions, that is, the begetting in one another the same Conceptions that we have in our selves; and this is called Teaching; wherein, if the Conception of him that teacheth continually accompany his Words, beginning at something true in Experience, then it begetteth the like Evi­dence in the Hearer that understandeth them, and maketh him to know something, which he is therefore said to learn: but if there be not such Evidence, then such teaching is called Perswasion, and begetteth no more in the Hear­er, [Page 84] than what is in the Speakers bare Opini­on. And the Signs of two Opinions contra­dictory one to another; namely, Affirmation and Negation of the same Thing, is called Controver­sie: but both Affirmations, or both Negations, Con­sent in Opinion.

3. The infallible Sign of teaching exactly, and without errour, is this, that no Man hath ever taught the Contrary: Not that few, how few soever, if any; for commonly Truth is on the side of a few, rather than of the Multitude: But when in Opinions and Questions considered and discussed by many, it happeneth that not any one of the Men that so discuss'd them differ from another, then it may be justly inferred, they know what they teach, and that otherwise they do not. And this appears most manifestly to them that have considered the divers Subjects wherein they have exerci­sed their Pens, and the divers Ways in which they have proceeded, together with the Diversity of the Success thereof: for, those Men who have taken in hand to consider nothing else but the Comparison of Magnitudes, Numbers, Times, and Motions, and how their Proportions are to one another, have thereby been the Authors of all those Excellencies by which we differ from such savage People as now inhabit divers places in America; and as have been the Inhabitants here­tofore of those Countries where at this day Arts and Sciences do most flourish: for, from the Studies of these Men, have proceeded whatsoever cometh to us for Ornament by Na­vigation, and whatsoever we have beneficial [Page 85] to humane Society by the Division, Distinction, and Portraicting the Face of the Earth; whatso­ever also we have by the Account of Times, and Foresight of the Course of Heaven; whatsoever by Measuring Distances, Plains, and Solids of all Sorts; and whatsoever either elegant or defen­sible in Building: All which supposed a Way, what do we differ from the wildest of the In­dians? Yet to this day was it never heard of, that there was any Controversie concerning any Conclusion in this Subject; the Science whereof hath nevertheless been continually amplified and enriched by the Conclusions of most difficult and profound Speculation. The Reason whereof is apparent to every Man that looketh into their Writings; for they proceed from most low and humble Principles, evident even to the meanest Capacity; going on slowly, and with most scrupulous Ratiocination; viz. from the Im­position of Names, they inferr the Truth of their first Propositions; and from two of the first, a third; and from any two of the three, a fourth; and so on, according to the Steps of Science, mentioned Chap. 6. Sect. 4. On the other side, those Men who have written concerning the Faculties, Passions, and Manners of Men, that is to say; of Moral Philosophy, and of Policy, Government, and Laws, whereof there be infi­nite Volumes, have been so far from removing Doubt and Controversie in the Questions they have handled, that they have very much multi­plied the same: Nor doth any Man at this day so much as pretend to know more than hath been delivered Two thousand Years ago by Aristotle: [Page 86] and yet every Man thinks that in this Subject he knoweth as much as any other; supposing there needeth thereunto no Study but that ac­crueth unto them by natural Wit; though they play, or imploy their Mind otherwise in the Purchace of Wealth or Place. The Reason whereof is no other, than that in their Writings and Discourses they take for Principles those Opnions which are already vulgarly received; whether true or false, being for the most part false. There is therefore a great deal of Diffe­rence between Teaching and Perswading; the Sign of this being Controversie; the Sign of the former, no Controversie.

4. There be two Sorts of Men that common­ly be called learned: One is that Sort that pro­ceedeth evidently from humble Principles, as is described in the last Section; and those Men are called Mathematici: The other are they that take up Maxims from their Education, and from the Authority of Men, or of Custom, and take the habitual Discourse of the Tongue for Ratiocina­tion; and these are called Dogmatici. Now see­ing in the last Section those we call Mathematici are absolved of the Crime of breeding Contro­versie, and they that pretend not to Learning cannot be accused, the Fault lieth altogether in the Dogmaticks, that is to say, those that are im­perfectly learned, and with Passion press to have their Opinions pass every where for Truth, with­out any evident Demonstration either from Ex­perience, or from Places of Scripture of uncon­troverted Interpretation.

[Page 87]5. The Expression of those Conceptions which cause in us the Experience of Good while we deliberate, as also of those which cause our Expectation of Evil, is that which we call Counselling, and is the internal Deliberation of the Mind concerning what we our selves are to do or not to do. The Consequences of our Actions are our Counsellors, by alternate Succession in the Mind. So in the Counsel which a Man taketh from other Men, the Counsellors alternately do make appear the Consequences of the Action, and do not any of them deliberate, but fur­nish among them all, him that is counselled with Arguments whereupon to deliberate with him­self.

6. Another Use of Speech is Expression of Appetite, Intention, and Will; as the Appetite of Knowledge by Interrogation; Appetite to have a Thing done by another, as Request, Prayer, Petition: Expressions of our Purpose or in­tention, as Promise, which is the Affirmation or Negation of some Action to be done in the future: Threatning, which is the Promise of Evil; and Commanding, which is that Speech by which we signifie to another our Appetite or De­sire to have any Thing done, or left undone, for Reasons contained in the Will it self: For it is not properly said, Sic volo, sic jubeo, with­out that other Clause, Stet pro Ratione Voluntas: And when the Command is a sufficient Reason to move us to Action, then is that Command called a Law.

7. Another Use of Speech is Instigation and Appeasing, by which we increase or diminish [Page 88] one anothers Passion: It is the same Thing with Perswasion; the Difference not being real; for, the Begetting of Opinion and Passion is the same. But whereas in Perswasion we aim at Getting Opinion from Passion; here, the End is, to raise Passion from Opinion. And as in raising an Opinion from Passion, any Premisses are good enough to inforce the desired Conclusion; so, in raising Passion from Opinion, it is no mat­ter whether the Opinion be true or false, or the Narration historical or fabulous: for, not the Truth, but the Image, maketh Passion: and a Tragedy, well acted, affecteth no less than a Murther.

8. Though words be the Signs we have of one anothers Opinions and Intentions, because the Aequivocation of them is so frequent according to the Diversity of Contexture, and of the Com­pany wherewith they go, which, the Pre­sence of him that speaketh, our Sight of his Actions, and Conjecture of his Intentions, must help to discharge us of; it must therefore be extream hard to find the Opinions and Meaning of those Men that are gone from us long ago, and have left us no other Signification thereof than their Books, which cannot possibly be understood without History, to discover those aforementi­oned Circumstances, and also without great Pru­dence to observe them.

9. When it happeneth that a Man signifieth unto us two contradictory Opinions, whereof the one is clearly and directly signified, and the other either drawn from that by Consequence, or not known to be contradictory to it; then [Page 89] (when he is not present to explicate himself better) we are to take the former for his Opi­nion; for that is clearly signified to be his, and directly; whereas the other might proceed from errour in the Deduction, or Ignorance of the Repugnancy. The like also is to be held in two contradictory Expressions of a Mans Inten­tion and Will, for the same Reason.

10. Forasmuch as whosoever speaketh to ano­ther, intendeth thereby to make him understand what he saith, if he speak unto him either in a Language which he that heareth understandeth not, or use any Word in other Sence than he believeth is the Sence of him that heareth, he intendeth also not to make him under­stand what he saith; which is a Contradicti­on of himself. It is therefore always to be supposed, that he which intendeth not to deceive, alloweth the private Interpretati­on of his Speech to him to whom it is ad­dressed.

11. Silence, in him that believeth that the same shall be taken for a Sign of his Intent, is a Sign there­of indeed: for, if he did not consent, the La­bour of Speaking so much as to declare the same, is so little, as it is to be presumed he would have done it.


THus have we considered the Nature of Man so far as was requisite for the finding out the first and most simple Elements wherein the Compositions of Politick Rules and Laws are lastly resolved; which was my present Purpose.


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