The history of the United Provinces of Achaia collected in Latine by the learned Jacobus Gothofredus ; and rendred into English, with some additions, by Henry Stubbe. — Achaica. English

The history of the United Provinces of Achaia collected in Latine by the learned Jacobus Gothofredus ; and rendred into English, with some additions, by Henry Stubbe. — Achaica. English

Table of contents

Title page

TO THE READER.

THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED PROVINCES OF ACHAIA.

[Page]

THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED PROVINCES OF ACHAIA.

THE Peninsula of Peloponnesus (now called Morea) was at first ruled by certain Kings, until the Sons of Ogygus came to the Government; they happening to practise such a tyranny as rendered them insupportable to their Subjects, several of the Cities determined to free themselves, and associate into one Republick: thus twelve of them united into one Democracy. This Vnion continued until the times of Philip of Macedon, and his Son Alexander: then the puissance of Macedonia growing great and terrible, this Vnion began to dissolve, the Macedonians by sundry artifices sowing divisions betwixt the Cities; whereupon some of them submitted to the prevailing Macedonians, others fell under the dominion of sundry Tyrants. But they were soon sensible of the miseries which their dissensions had brought upon them, and the departure of Pyrrhus into Italy having given them an opportunity to revolt, they ejected the several [Page] Tyrants, and re-established their Liberty, and Ten of them formed such a Republick, with so great Vnanimity and Friendship, that nothing could seem more firm, or better regulated. Though their Cities were separate, yet they had but one Government, and each did heartily contribute to the support of the rest. They were renowned for their Great Justice and Moderation; several Commonwealths borrowed from them the Model of their Government; and upon emergent Controversies, their Neighbours would remit the decision thereof unto the Achaeans: not by reason of their Great Power, (for they were hardly considerable thereupon amongst the Greeks) but for their singular Justice and Probity, the which procured them an universal Reverence, and made others desirous to contract Amity with a People famed for all those Vertues which beget Esteem, but not Terrour, in their Neighbours. There was a perfect Equality betwixt all the Vnited Cities; all were equally capable of Honours and Employments in the State: They sought not to enlarge their Territories, by the oppression of their Neighbours: The Aids they gave at any time, were un-interessed; and all the Advantages they derived thence, was, to have relieved the Distressed, and to have restored the General Peace. These Maxims made several upon sundry occasions to seek Their Friendship, as the Kings of Macedon, Pergamus, Egypt, and Syria; and at length the Romans courted them into a Confederacy, which proved in the issue destructive to their Republick.

The Principal Authority at first was fixed in Two Captains and a Secretary of State; But after some time, they thought it more expedient for the Administration of Affairs, that the Executive Power should be lodged in one State-holder or General, whom they termed Strategus, who was chosen indifferently from out of any of the Cities, according to his Extraordinary Worth; and his Government continued but one year, unless it were anew confirmed unto him. They held a General Assembly of the States twice each year, in the Spring and Autumn, at a certain place in [Page] the middle of their Territories called Aeglum, the most populous and rich of all the Confederate Cities: The States assembled in a certain Grove dedicated to Jupiter; all matters appertaining to War and Peace, all Laws and Alliances were dispatched there; the State-holder, with Ten Adsessors (called Demiurgi) presiding therein.

Amongst their Laws, these, not to name others, were esteemed to be very prudential. That no Assembly should continue above three days, but the States should come to their final Resolution within that time: Whereby all long Debates and Quarrels were prevented, and all opportunities cut off whereby their Counsels might be retarded, or Factions introduced. Another was, That no Foreign Embassador could have Audience in the States, without communicating his Message first, to the end that the States might know wherefore they were assembled. Whereby they secured themselves against all such Projects as might tend to the overthrow of the State, and had time to weigh things maturely and dis-passtonately before the Session. Also, That none of the Vnited Cities should send abroad any Publick Embassies, but with the participation of the rest. They did think it fundamental to their preservation, that all things should be managed by Joynt Consent, and no room be left for separate Counsels: That all the Cities should have the same Alliances, and move by the same Maxims. So tender were they of this Law, that they expresly provided for it in their Treaties with the Romans; cautioning that the Romans should not make any Addresses to any of their Cities privately, but to the Publick: And the Authority of the Republick seemed ruined, when Appius Claudius did by his Artifices prevail with the Lacedemonians to give him a private and separate Audience: whence arose Dissentions betwixt the Confederates, and many began to pursue their proper Interests and Respects, to the overthrow of the Republick. Against Bribes they had this most Renowned Constitution, That none should receive any Gifts or Pensions from any Foreign Prince. And this was so rigorously observed, and such a sense imprinted [Page] in the Achaeans thereof, that when King Eumenes offered them one hundred and twenty Talents, with the Interest whereof, the charges of such as came to the General Assembly should be defrayed; they generously refused it, and were inclined to renounce all Amity with him, for making such an Overture. Apollonius the Sicyonian thus argued against the Proposition: The money which is frankly offered by the King of Pergamus, is so considerable in it self, that it may deserve the Regards of the Achaean Republick; but if we look upon the Intention of the Donor, to accept thereof is Bribery and Corruption repugnant to the Law: Single Persons were prohibited to take any Bribe or Present, and should the Whole Republick at once make it self obnoxious? It would be a perpetual shame, and most ignominious to be said, That the States General of Achaia were maintained by the King of Pergamus; and that the Councils of the Vnited Cities were managed by such as eat the Bread of a Foreign Potentate. If this President were admitted of, others would imitate his Example, and the Liberty of the Republick would be exposed to sale. That Controversies were apt to arise betwixt States, and their Ends and Interests might in time prove opposite to those of the Republick: If such Donatives and Presents as these were tolerated, the Achaeans would infallibly run into this perplexity sooner or later, either to be ungrateful to their Benefactors, or of betraying their proper Liberties and Interests, to avoid that Imputation. In fine, there was nothing of advantage in present, that could countervail the fatal Inconveniencies which would ensue thereon.

By these and such-like Constitutions the Achaeans preserved their Republick in a flourishing condition: and although their Vnion drew upon them the Envy and Hatred of their Neighbours, yet did they support themselves against the Attempts of the Aetolians, Lacedemonians, Eleans, and Macedonians, which Nations, either separately, or in conjunction, did make War upon them: But at length the Romans, partly by Artifice, and partly by Force, subdued this Little Republick, which proved too generous and openhearted, [Page] to subsist against the subtilties and clandestine frauds of the politick and ambitious Romans.

The Romans having rendred themselves Masters of Italy, Sicily, Sardinia, and Corsica, having carried their Victorious Ensigns into Illyricum, and triumphed over Carthage in the second Punick War; they seemed now qualified for any great Attempt, and to be able to carry every thing before them; their strength at Sea being as redoubtable as their Puissance by Land. When Ambition and Power concur in one, they either find or create Occasions whereon to work. The Grand Stratagem of the Romans, whereby to advance themselves, was this; To Contract an Alliance with all Petty Princes and States: to embolden them against Noster Populus Sociis de [...]enden dis terrarum [...]am omnium potitus est. [...] cero. their puissant Neighbours; and then by a feigned Generosity to undertake the Protection of their distressed Allies; whereby the Weak Ally became their Slave, and the Conquest of the Other added to the Riches and Puissance of the Republick. They drew all Controversies to their Cognizance; they interposed in all Quarrels, and thereby made themselves at first Arbitrators, then Lords of the Vniverse. To gain them a footing in Greece, they seek out the Aetolians, the veriest Rogues of all the Countrey, a people living upon Rapine, infamous for their Treachery and Baseness; with these Villains the Romans make a strict Confederacy; they promise to annex unto the Aetolians the Country of Acarnania, and to drive Philip of Macedon, with his Forces, out of their Territories; whose Arms these Free-Booters of Aetolia had drawn upon them. The Romans told their New Allies most plausible Stories concerning the Generosity of their State towards their Confederates, how they Livy l. 26. c. 24. had incorporated some into their Republick, with all the Priviledges and Franchisements which themselves enjoyed: that others they so highly obliged, as to prefer the title of Their Friends and Associates before that of Citizens. The League being concluded, and a particular Article inserted, that neither should make Peace without the other; the Aetolians imbarque themselves in the War; but, being [Page] but slenderly aided by the Romans, they are beaten, and enforced to submit on hard Conditions: the Romans draw advantage thence, and to defeat the Treaty of Peace send them powerful Succours; whereupon the Aetolians take courage, and frustrate all Endeavours of the Mediators. The Achaeans and other adjacent States were jealous of the Consequences of this War, lest it should give the Romans opportunity to settle themselves in Greece; and knew not how to demean themselves betwixt two such Potent States as Rome and Macedon: Their Statists varied in their Judgments; some preferred the Amity of the One, some of the other. But whilst the alternate success of the War seemed to ballance Assairs, they moved not, being content to see each weaken the other. After that the Victories of Attilius and Flaminius had reduced Philip and his Macedonians to a low condition, and that a great part of Greece confederated with the Romans, who then pretended they would restore the Liberty of Greece, the Achaeans summoned a Council to debate of their Affairs: They had for their immediate Enemies the Lacedemonians, they suspected the power of the Romans, they had very great Obligations to the Maccdonian Kings, and were Confederates with them; But they had some Quarrels with Philip, and beheld him as a [...] Cruel and Perfidious Prince, and who would severely prosecute the Victory, should he happen to obtain it. The Romans sent Embassadors to the Assembly, and proffered to give them Corinth (then besieged) if they would joyn their Forces with those of the Romans, and their Confederates. Philip by his Agent solicites them either to adhere to him, or to remain Neuters during the War. Aristaenus the State-holder perswaded them to prefer the Amity of the Romans; He exaggerated the strength of the Romans, and their success; He depressed the power of the Macedonian; He aggravated every Injury that Philip had done unto the Achaeans, and expatiated into a General Character of his Evil Nature and Barbarity. He laid before them the danger of involving their Estate with the declining Fortunes of [Page] Philip; the hazard of continuing Neuters; that the Romans proffered an Alliance; the question was, Whether they should embrace it, or refuse their Friendship? They would not acquiesce in a Neutrality: and must either be made effectually Friends or Enemies. The Council was divided in their Sentiments; some departed without declaring themselves; others had such a sense of the Favours they had formerly received from the Macedonians, that they could not assent to any League that was to their prejudice, or repugnant to that Amity which had been vowed and sworn to them. But at length the more pressing Counsels were embraced, as the most prudent and safe, if not generous. The Romans behaved themselves so at first, that they seemed to have no cause to repent them of their determination; a peace ensued thereon, and the Roman Consul at the Isthmian Games caused Proclamation to be made, That He restored [...] to all Greece its intire Liberty. The People hereat were transported with Joy; they magnified the Vertue and Valour of the Romans, That ever there should be such a People in the World, that should submit themselves to all the Expences and Perils of a War, meerly to set others at liberty, and those not being of their Neighbours, but remote and distanced by great Seas: That they should overcome all these difficulties out of a generous Inclination to oblige Mankind, and to establish equitable Governments throughout the Earth. To set all Greece free at one Proclamation, none but the most elevate Spirits could design such a thing, nothing below the Vertue and Fortune of Rome could atchieve it. The Achaeans had their Vnion augmented by the annexing of Corinth, Triphylia, and Herea, which the Macedonian had alienated: Nor did they a little rejoyce, when the Romans undertook a War against Nabis King of Sparta, for the Recovery of Argos, the Consul protesting that the Romans were no otherwise interessed in that War, than to compleat their Favours unto Greece, by restoring that City unto its Liberty. The Aetolians began to suspect the candour of the Romans, how speciously soever they concealed their intendments; they said, That this Ostentation [Page] of Liberty was vain insignificant, whilst the Roman Power continued in Greece; that Nabis and Argos were but pretexts assumed for the continuing of their Forces there. On the other side, the Achaeans intreated the Romans that they would perfect their Glory by freeing Argos, and putting a restraint upon the Robbers of Aetolia. The Romans having procured the Argives their Liberty, and united them again to the Republick of Achaia, they withdrew all their Forces according as they had promised, thereby to vindicate their Honour before the whole World (as Flaminius said) and shew what Liers those Aetolians were, who had reported that 'twas indiscreetly done to put the whole power of Greece into the hands of the Romans, and to avoid the Government of Macedon, by subjecting themselves unto New Lords: He further admonished the Cities, That they would esteem of men by their performances, not words, and thence conclude whom to trust or distrust: That they would not abuse the Liberty given them, which would be the more durable, if more moderate: That they would preserve Amity with their Neighbours, and Justice within themselves: That by such a deportment they would be secure against the Enterprize of any Foreign Prince, or designs of ambitious Citizens: That Domestick Quarrels and Sedition gave opportunity to the Factious; and parties oppressed do more readily joyn with Foreigners, than yield to their fellow-Citizens: That they should so comport themselves in that Freedom given to them, that the Romans might never repent the Benefits they had conferred on Greece. The Achaeans seemed to be most happy in their New Alliance; they had the Guardianship of the Seas, they had made a new Acquest of Lacedemon, and incorporated it with the rest of the Vnited Cities: Whilest the Aetolians, the first and dear Allies of the Romans, were slighted by them in the conclusion of the War; and reaping no Benefit by their Friendship with Rome, they began to enter upon New Designs with King Antiochus.

This felicity of the Achaeans was not advantagious to them; it was the first Step unto their ruine. They had brought Foreigners into their Territories, discovered [Page] to them their strength and weaknesses, acquainted them with their Armies, Councils, and Interests; they had raised the Reputation of Rome to such an heighth, that all their Citizens were either amazed at its puissance, or dazled with its splendor. They had ruinated their Old Neighbours, deserted their ancient and known Friends, and without regard unto Oaths or Obligations, confederated with the all-conquering Romans. It was the undoubted Interest of Greece to oppose it self against the growing Power of the Romans; they and all Asia ought to have united against them, and not by making separate Wars at sundry times, to facilitate the general Conquest. The Achaeans did all they could to prevent that destruction which they saw to be unavoidable: they shewed all possible deference unto the Romans; they rendred them all imaginable Services, not only in the War against Philip, but that other waged with King Perseus. Though Antiochus courted them to stand Neuters, and without hazarding themselves, to attend the issue of that War with an entire strength; yet were they so fond, or so obsequious towards their New Allies, that they assisted the Romans in overthrowing Him; and when the Romans had subdued Him and Philip, the Boeotians and Aetolians, they aided them in their War upon Asia against King Antigonus. The Romans had inveigled several other Princes to joyn their Auxiliaries with them, as the King of Macedon, of Pergamus, and Bithinia, telling them they needed not to fear the Romans, as Enemies to all Kings in general, or suspect they would ever impair their strength or grandeur; they shewed them the happy instances of such Princes they had much advanced; whilst Antiochus did in vain remonstrate that the Romans aimed at the Vniversal Empire, that none could be safe that lived near them, that it behoved all men to have a regard unto those raging Fires which consumed the dwellings of their Neighbours. These prophetical Remonstrances had no success: the Achaeans were obstinately addicted to the Roman Alliance, and so tender in the preservation thereof, that by a publick Edict they prohibited any Macedonian to [Page] come into the Territories of Achaia, lest it should create a jealousie in their good Friends of Rome, to whom now they had enslaved themselves. Presently after the War with Philip was ended, they were convinced of the Servitude whereinto they had brought themselves: they durst not make VVar upon Nabis, but with the consent of the Roman Senate: and upon every occasion they were necessitated to send Embassies thither, and to depend on their advice: they durst not give audience to the Embassadors of Antiochus in their Assembly, but in the presence of their Consul. The Romans now had acquired that puissance, that the Aid of the Achaeans was no longer requisite to them, and what had been hitherto the effect of an inviolate Friendship, must be continued out of Duty; there is no contesting of respects with the potent and ambitious; there is no allegation of mevits and services unto them; their kindness must be owned as pure courtesie; and the Weaker must thank them as much as if they had given all they have not taken away. VVhen Antiochus made VVar upon the Romans, the Messenians revolted from the Achaeans to the Aetolians: after the VVar was ended, the Achaeans endeavoured earnestly to bring them again into the Vnion, and made war upon them, when all gentle means failed. They finding themselves not able to resist, make applications to the Roman General, declaring that they would surrender their City into the hands and disposal of the Romans, but not unto the Achaeans. He thereupon goes to the State-holder of the Achaeans, and commands him to withdraw his Army from Messene; which when he had done with a ready Obedience, the Roman reproved him for attempting such a matter without his Leave and Authority, bad him to dismiss his Army, and call an Assembly of the States; that the Messenians should be re-united to Achaia; but if they had any Grievances, or needed any thing for their security, they should repair to Him at Corinth. The State-holder having summoned the Assembly, their Good Ally begins to expostulate with them about the Isle of Zant, which He said they detained unjustly: that They [Page] were but Auxiliaries in the war against Antiochus; that the Romans were the Principals therein, and fought for Themselves, not for the Achaeans at Thermopylae. Notwithstanding that Diophanes the State-holder shewed the Justice of their Title, and how it was fairly yielded to them by the Enemy, yet were they at last compelled to This Resolution, That they referred the whole Affair to the Judgment of Quintius: who gave them this Civil Determination: If he could believe that the possession of that Island would be of any real advantage unto the people of Achaia, he would immediately perswade the Senate and People of Rome to continue it unto so deserving Allies: but, as a Tortoise is then safe from all danger when she contracts her self within the Covert of her Shell; but whensoever she puts forth the head or legs, she exposeth her self to the hazard of every blow: So the Achaeans being shut up by the sea within Peloponnesus, might easily secure their Confines and adjacent Territories, but if they did endeavour to extend their power into remote places, their new Acquests would but create them greater Expence and Danger, they being not defensible by reason of their distance. The Assembly acquiesced readily in this determination of the point, neither durst their State-holder Diophanes make any further opposition thereunto: whereupon the Isle of Zant was surrendred up to the Romans. This facility of the people might have obliged others of a more gentle Nature, and lesser Designs, unto some reciprocal kindness and acknowledgment: but the fierce and ambitious move not by those vulgar principles; in such, Vertue is not the Rule of their Deportment but as it is subservient to their purposes; and if their Actions be but Great and Prosperous, they will make Themselves to be confessed Good and Generous. The Romans drew advantages from this Condescension of theirs; and construing it to arise from fear, and a just sense of their weakness, they proceeded to intermeddle in the Government of the Republick it self, and to interpose upon Quarrels happening therein. The Inhabitants of Aegium repaired unto the Roman Consul with a Complaint against [Page] the people of Achaia, for that their State-holder Philopoemen had removed the General Assembly (which had bin constantly held within their City) and decreed that it should not be fixed any longer in one place, but successively be held in each of the Confederate Cities: And whereas the Adsessors indicted a Convention at Aegium, caused them to meet at Argos: the Generalty submitting to the vvill of the State-holder, and the Roman Consul, though He came in favour of the Aegians, was enforced to repair unto Argos, vvhere he found, upon Debate, that Philopoemen had the greatest Party; and all he did vvas to shew how ready he should be to enterprize upon their Soveraignty.

The premises one vvould think to be manifest Signs of that servitude vvhich the Romans purposed to introduce in Achaia. The Romans vvere present at, and took an account of their publick Transactions: The Ackaeans vvere to make War and Peace as the Romans directed: The Romans made themselves Arbitrators in their Domestick Quarrels: The Legates from Rome acted vvhat they pleased amongst them, proceeding so far as to deprive them of vvhat they had rightfully acquired in War, and that by an Argument rather facetious than strong, but that a Roman urged it. But vvhat ensued did most effectually demonstrate the Intentions of their Allies of Rome.

The Lacedemonians had been ancient and bitter Enemies to the people of Achaia, but by the means of Philopoemen they vvere lately united to the Republick of Achaia, and made a part of their Assembly. It is more easie to procure peace than amity, to unite the Territories of Cities, than the Minds of the Inhabitants: VVhere Enmity is inveterate, all Reconciliation becomes instable; former Feuds and Emulations easily revive: Thus some Acquests do not augment but impair the strength of the Empire; and vvhat vvas intended by the amicable Acbaeans for mutual Security and VVelfare, the factious Lacedemonians turned to their ruine. Each party being jealous of the other, there could not be long vvanting an occasion of Dispute. The Spartans [Page] had proscribed some of their Citizens out of their Confines; these Exiles remained and were protected within certain Castles and Villages of Laconia which the Romans had annexed unto the Jurisdiction of Achaia; and which were situate betwixt the Sea-coasts and City of Sparta. The Lacedemonians did desire very much to re-gain their Maritime Towns, that they might have access to the Sea for Exportation and Importation, as also for the dispatching of Embassadors to manage Leagues at Rome, or elsewhere: To bonest this Design of theirs, and to give some colour to the attempt, they pretended to seize upon those Exiles, as men proscribed by the State, and who by continuing in the Voisinage so near their City, did foment divisions and create dangers therein: And hereupon in the night the Lacedemonians surprized one of these Sea-Ports; but the Country taking the Alarm, and imbodying, they were driven out again the next day. The News of this attempt filled the Exiles with terrour and suspicion, and though the present peril was over, yet they and the rest of the Inhabitants determined to provide for their future tranquility by sending Deputies to Achaia, to relate what had happened, and to crave their protection. The State-holder for the time being, Philopoemen, having had a perpetual jealousie of the Lacedemonians lest they should grow too potent, and knowing with how much difficulty those are retained in an equal condition with others, who have been used to command, and preserve a poinant sense still of their former Grandeur and Puissance; He defended the Cause of the Exiles, and procured a Decree to be passed in the General Assembly, That the Lacedemonians should be deemed to have violated the Vnion, except they delivered up to punishment the Authors and Contrivers of that Attempt. And some Officers were sent to Sparta to demand them as Prisoners. The Lacedemonians were incensed at this Decree; they knew the extent thereof, if the Criminals came once to be inquired into; and to avoid the consequences thereof, they exaggerated to the Populace the pride and the indignity of the Achaeans who had taken such [Page] a Resolution against their City, that by such Vnion there was not any parity established, but the Spartans were absolutely enslaved, the rest combining to depress them: Hereupon they determined to renounce the Vnion aforesaid, and to send Deputies to the Romans to surrender their City absolutely into their power: They saw their condition to be such, that they must be subject to some body; and it was most prudential to annex themselves to the Greater Republick, and which practised against that of Achaia, than to continue in League with the Weaker, and those so treacherous Confederates: They doubted not but the ambitious Roman would embrace their protection, and pardon the greatest faults in those which put themselves into their tuition; whereupon they put to death thirty of the Friends to Philopoemen and the Exiles; and immediately sent to Fulvius the Roman Consul, to come into Peloponnesus, and accept of their Surrendry. The Achaeans, in prosecution of the former Arrest, and to avenge these new Indignities, declared War against the Lacedemonians; the notice whereof hastned the Roman Consul into Peloponnesus, where He interposeth betwixt the adverse parties, and artificially exalperateth both, by his ambiguous Speeches, against each other: Sometimes He shews himself amicable to the one, sometimes to the other, sometimes haughtily reproves them both, and at last concludes with this resolve, That both Parties should refrain from Hostility until they had sent Embassadors to Rome, to know the pleasure of the Senate. Hereupon both sides sent their Embassadors to Rome; but the Achaeans had this disadvantage, that their Commissioners did not well agree in their Negotiation, or Sentiments concerning Affairs. The Romans seemed to have a very great esteem and honour for the Republick of Achaia; yet they did not think it suitable to their ends, that the Government of Lacedemon should be changed again, and the General Vnion consolidated: Wherefore they returned so intricate an Answer, that the Achaeans thought the whole matter to be remitted unto them; and yet the Lacedemonians were perswaded [Page] that there was much in reserve. The Achaeans formed an Army, and having encamped on the Borders of Lacedemon, they sent to demand those which had occasioned their Revolt from the Vnion, giving assurance that they should suffer no punishment but accordingly as upon a fair Trial they should be found culpable. But whilst they delayed their Answer, several of the Exiles who were in the Camp of the Achaeans (exasperated through former injuries) fell upon the Lacedemonians, and slew seventeen of them; and afterwards sixty three of them being taken, were sentenced judicially to death by the State-holder. After this, the Achaeans drove away the Authors of the late Revolt, took many Slaves and sold them, pull'd down the Walls of Sparta, restored the exiled Persons, and abrogated the Laws of Lycurgus.

Though this Action of the Achaeans cannot be condemned of Injustice, yet it falls under the censure of much imprudence. The Lacedemonians had so great a Veneration for the Laws of Lycurgus, that they esteemed nothing more sacred: They were sensible that all their ancient glory and felicity proceeded from the observance of those Constitutions, and all their hopes of recovering their pristine Honour, or retaining their present Dignity, depended thereon: Their high Spirits could not endure this alteration, the calamity whereof was aggravated, in that it was done by the Achaeans, a Republick over which their Ancestors had formerly triumphed, and given a Government unto, and from whom, as their late Confederates, they did not expect so rigorous usage. None are so impatient of Adversity as those which have known great Prosperity: Great Souls cannot endure Servitude, especially when they suffer under those whom they contemn; and they prefer a subjection to Foreigners before even an equality of living with such persons. 'Twas true, the Achaeans needed not to fear any Insurrections from the Spartans alone; nor had they any other State in Greece to combine with for their support: But since the Romans were so suspicious an Ally, and did usually sacrifice all regards [Page] [...] [Page] [...] [Page] to those of Empire; Since they did already enterprize upon the Soveraignty of Achaia; and drew the Cognizance of their actions to the Consuls and Senate of Rome; they ought to have demeaned themselves with more caution, and rather have abandoned Sparta to it self, (though it had remained a continual and vexatious but weak Enemy) then have driven them to have recourse to Rome for protection. The Lacedemonians were not less sensible of their own Condition than they were of that of the Achaeans; they knew that the Romans contracted Alliance with that Republick out of Interest, to facilitate the overthrow of the Macedonians, their sole Competitors for the Dominion of Greece; that Leagues so founded, vary according as Interests do; that the services which the Achaeans had rendred unto Rome, had lost their Merit and Obligation when the Macedonian was totally overthrown; and whatever Honours the Senate had conferred on the Achaeans since, whatsoever amity was professed unto them, yet 'twas incident to all power to fear rather than love those from whom it may receive a shock; That they had just reason to apprehend lest the Achaeans should at some time or other assume a concern for the Honour and Liberty of Greece. and make themselves head of a League to that purpose against Rome; That 'twas not consistent with the Roman Grandeur to persevere in an Alliance whereby the petty Republick of Achaia should treat on equal terms with Rome, and be intreated in such a manner as much more potent Kings did not pretend unto. Upon these infallible Maxims of State, the Lacedemonians presumed upon a kind reception at Rome, and dispatched their Deputies thither; they remonstrated there that the Majesty and Authority of the Roman Senate was contemned by the Achaeans; that they acted what they pleased, and arrogated what power they would, over their weak Neighbours and Confederates; they represented the disasters of the Spartans, into what they were fallen, and from what estate: they made use of all Arguments that might work upon the Pride, Jealousie, or Compassion of the Romans: And the Senate who was ready to seek lesser causes [Page] of Quarrels, listened hereunto with attention. The Achaeans were necessitated to oppose an Embassy of theirs to that of the Lacedemonians, but they could not agree upon the Instructions: Some were for the Deputies to insist upon the Liberties of Achaia, that the Republick was Soveraign over its Members, that such Controversies as these ought to be determined by the States General; that when they embraced the Alliance of Rome, they did not subject themselves thereunto; that the Freedom of Achaia and of all Greece in general would be ruined, if they tamely submitted the actions of their Republick to be examined, debated and reversed by an Appeal to Rome. This was the opinion of such as were zealous for the Honour and Liberty of their Country; but others were so terrified with the Glory and Puissance of Rome, that they proposed more mild and submissive Counsels, that the Achaeans ought by all possible deference to preserve a good correspondence with Rome, whose amity though it were not substantial or intire, yet the shew thereof was of great advantage to support the Honour and Interest of Achaia in Greece; that the Neighbouring States would despise and affront their small Republick, if once they saw that Friendship to decrease; that such opportunity ought not be given to those that envied their condition; nor ought they to incense the ambitious and proud Romans in this juncture, and draw upon themselves that power which they could not resist; that the poor and barren Country of Lacedemon was not worth the dispute; the accessional of Territory to the Republick, did not countervail the Expence, Trouble, and Danger with which it must be kept; that a moderate Greatness was most suitable to their Government, and to their present Interest; for by enlarging their Territories, and keeping Armies on foot, they vvould but multiply the fears of the Romans, and so accelerate their destruction: that 'tvvas inconsistent vvith the peaceable Maxims of their State, to retain these litigious Spartans vvithin the Vnion, vvhence vvould arise a perpetual distraction in their Counsels, and divisions in their Assemblies: that the name of Liberty vvas [Page] sweet, and Soveraignty a most agreeable thing; therefore their Counsels aimed at its preservation, which was best to be done now by condescension; that such an expedient might be found that the whole might seem an Act of their State, and not of the Roman Senate; and that, if the Achaeans acquainted the Romans with the full Nature of their Vnion, and the Justness of their proceedings in conformity thereunto, and then left the Lacedemonians to the entire disposal of the Romans. Thus were the Achaeans divided in their opinions; and these their Resentments being known at Rome, made the Senate jealous of the Achaeans, lest they might take some seasonable occasion to become Enemies of the Roman Greatness; whereupon they fomented the Animosities betwixt the Lacedemonians and Achaeans, till they became implacable against each other: they protracted the Debate, sometimes commiserating the Oppressed very much, sometimes gently arguing for the authority of the General Assembly and State-holder of Achaia: They blamed the factiousness and obstinacy of the Spartans; then they reprehended the passion and severity of the Achaeans; and at length plainly undertook the defence of the Spartans against their good Allies of Achaia, sending them word sometimes that the Senate did not approve their actions; sometimes that they ought to make amends for their defaults: And finding that a great Party of the Achaeans (some out of love, some out of fear) did adhere to the Romans, they thought it necessary to nourish those dissentions, by sending frequent Embassies into the Country; whereupon they tell them, That they ought to take care that the Embassadors of Rome might always have free access to their States General, as the Achaeans should have to their Senate. It is true that the Achaeans did retain still some generous thoughts; and had the boldness to deny Caecilius the freedom of coming to the General Assembly, because he did not communicate his Message to the State-holder first: It is true, Lycortas the State-holder told the Roman Embassador Appius Claudius, who was sent to examine things, That the Achaeans had indeed the Romans in great [Page] veneration, and (if they please to have it so) stood in great fear of them, but they did more reverenee and fear the Immortal Gods. Also, That the Achaeans were indeed the Allies of Rome, but they did not by the Confederacy surrender up the Soveraignty of their Republick; they were still free, and were no more obliged to render an account of their actions unto the Romans, than the Romans were unto them. In fine, the amity was contracted upon equal terms, neither were they thereby become the Subjects of Rome: But Appius Claudius, being a fierce Man, replied confidently, That he should advise his good Friends of Achaia, that they would by a ready compliance make a courtesie of their Obedience; that they should do ill to deny the Requests of such as were able to compel them. These last vvords extorted an universal sigh from the Hearers; but withal imprinted such a terror in them, that they determined to obey the Resolves of the Senate; and such Decrees were passed as favoured the Spartans in general, and in particular those of them whom the Achaeans had banished the Countrey. The Spartans were continued as a part of the Republick of Achaia, but with some Immunities which were repugnant to the Laws of the Vnion; the Exiles were restored to their Possessions; the which Obligations they derived from the Romans not Achaeans: And upon pretence of avoiding future Contests, the cognizance of the most important Cases emerging, was reserved unto the Romans, ordinary matters might be transacted by the Spartans and Assembly of the Achaeans: And further to weaken the Republick, the Romans declared it to be at the choice of any of the Confederates to persist in or relinquish the Vnion. Whereupon some of the Vnited Cities began to design a Revolt, and to dread a Confederacy whereunto the Romans appeared no longer Friends: The M [...]ssenians began first to fall off; and renounced the General Assembly of Achaia, slaying the State holder; and though the Romans were obliged by their League to assist the Commonwealth of Achaia against all its Enemies; at least, not to aid them with Ammunition and Corn out of Italy; yet did [Page] they no ways interest themselves in the War, nor would they seem to condemn the Revolt of the Messenians.

Behold to what a degree of misery this Republick brought it self by its intestine dissentions and animosites! When fear had once seized their minds, they apprehending nothing so much as the Puissance of the victorious Roman, and all relief was impossible unto them who had abandoned their old Friends of Macedonia to contract this pernicious Alliance with the most powerful State of Rome. Such were now their Resentments, that every man strove to shew his devotion to the prevailing Roman: If there were any Patriots left, they did but exasperate the Senate, and add to the domestick Discord by their unseasonable refractoriness: It now seemed prudential for them to expedite their Slavery, that they might procure the better conditions. The Romans understood the artifice, and made use of it to compleat their ruine: Thus that deportment which obligeth a generous Vertue, doth work contrary effects in the Ambitious. All great Cases were decided at Rome; thither were frequent Appeals made; thence came very imperious Answers oftentimes: So that there remained onely a shadow of the Supreme Power in the States General and the State-holder, the Substance was in the Roman Senate: And when the people saw to whom the most effectual applications were made, they ran into Parties, and when there was any competition betwixt the Interests of their Native Country, and those of Rome, those that could best reward and punish, had the preference in their affections. The perpetual dissentions at home, the terrours from abroad, the helpless condition of a broken Government, made every man indifferent, or despair thereof. The Supreme Officers of State, even the State-holders were no longer chosen for their Merits and Fidelity to their Country, but accordingly as they were devoted unto the Romans, and were recommended by them. None that were faithful to the Republick were to be elected, lest the Romans should grow jealous thereat: The Romans could menace them, and say, They knew very well who were well-affected unto them; and were [Page] well pleased to see their Adherents signally to distinguish themselves from the adverse party. There is no greater or more sure prognostick of approaching destruction, than when the Subjects of one State dare avow their concernments for another; and the Foreigner can boast of and number his Creatures there.

Whilst the Affairs of Achaia were in this troublesome and dangerous posture, there happened an occasion for them to regain their former Liberty; but the State-holder, and too many others were so devoted to their Great Allies of Rome, and did so magnifie the advantages of their friendship, and the dangers imminent from their enmity, that they lost this last and happy opportunity. Perseus King of Macedonia had recollected the Spirits of the Macedonians, which the Romans had broken by vanquishing his Father Philip; and having formed such a strength as might alone dispute the Soveraignty of Greece with the Romans, he animated the several Republicks to assert their common Liberties, and joyntly to recover that Glory which their Countrey had lost by pursuing of private and separate Ends: He made particular overtures to the Achaeans, and desired they would lay aside all enmity against him, and forbear those Jealousies which had been so destructive to Greece; that they would no longer remember the Injuries his Father did them, nor think Him to have succeeded Philip in his Passions as well as Kingdoms: the flourishing Estate of the Realm was indeed such that it transported the Macedonians to a design of enlarging their Bounds by the Universal Conquest of Greece; but they were now reduced to other terms, and enforced to contrive now their own safety instead of the Ruine of their Neighbours: that the same motives which induced them to renounce the ancient amity contracted with the Macedonians, ought to prevail much more with them to abandon this new and perilous Confederacy with the imperious Romans. Some there were who thought the Proposition reasonable; others suggested a Neutrality, and that the Achaeans should assist neither Rome nor Macedon in the War, but form their [Page] councils according to the event of things; since by taking either side they should draw upon them the indignation of the other, and render their Ally if victorious, too powerful. But those which favoured the Romans did overrule the rest, so that all audiance was refused unto Persius, and 'twas resolved effectively to assist the Romans, of whom they now stood in so great aw, that they were extremely perplexed lest the Senate should know that such points had ever been debated in the General Assembly. Within four years the Romans did totally subdue the Macedonians, and reduced the Kingdom into a Province, the Achaeans heartily congratulating them for these victories which they had helped to atchieve; and receiving from the Senate the publick thanks and praises due to so faithful Confederates. The whole world stood amazed at this prodigious success of the Romans, and yielded generally to that power which they saw to be irresistable: nor did men less admire the counsels and maxims by which the Republick of Achaia had steered in that juncture, since that they could not expect to subsist long in their present condition; for insatiate ambition distinguisheth not betwixt friends and foes, and despiseth the vulgar niceties as obstacles to Empire. There being nothing of force in Greece to check the Roman Arms, nor any powerful Confederate to be sought unto after the conquest of Macedonia, the Romans left off their former artifices, and clandestine practices upon the Republick of Achaia, and began openly to manifest their intentions. The Senate drew to its cognisance those causes which usually were decided in the generall Assembly of the Amphictyones: that Council or Diet received the complaints of the several States and Principalities of Greece; the proud Roman thought that shadow of Sovereignty and Vnion might in time prejudice his Affairs, and facilitate some League against the new Conquerour: several of the best and wisest in Achaia were sent for to Rome, and falsly traduced to have privately favoured the unfortunate Macedonian, and without hearing they were condemned to perpetual imprisonment in Tuscany. The [Page] Achaeans thereupon found the falsehood of the measures which they had taken, and that their Liberty was absolutely overthrown, nor could they tell which way to avenge themselves, or prevent the evils that threatned them: They sent sundry Embassies to Rome, desiring that those which were committed might be brought to a publick trial, either at Rome, or before their Superiors in Achaia: but all these sollicitations proved vain and ineffectual, the Romans proceeding to tell them, that they were dangerous persons, and not to be trusted at home, and that the Achaeans themselves seemed to have this opinion of them, when they sent them prisoners unto Rome: that the Senate would never detein them, but for the welfare of Achaia, which would be embroiled should these angry and enterprising persons return thereto. After seventeen years of importunity, when the principal and most active men were dead, and the rest become dispirited by their sufferings, and their interest lost by so tedious imprisonment and absence, about three hundred of them were released: In the mean time, the Romans had caused the Achaeans to renounce the ancient allyances which their Republick had with the Kings of Aegypt, and people of Rhodes: they animated the Aetolians to fall off from the Vnion of Achaia and defended them therein: they set on foot the old contentions betwixt the Spartans and Achaeans, and having thus distracted that Republick, and incensed the respective members thereof one against the other, they caused a General Assembly to be held at Corinth, where the Roman Embassadors endeavoured effectually to perswade the States General, that it was most expedient for them to dissolve the Vnion, and each City separately to dispose of its own Soveraignty, and manage its affairs by independent Officers and Laws. The people of Corinth hearing this, rose in a tumult, and slew several strangers that were in the Town, and put some affronts upon the Roman Embassadors. Hereupon the Senate complained of the Achaeans, that the Majesty of the people [Page] of Rome was injured by the contumelious usage of their Embassadors: and a war ensued, which terminated in the desolation of Achaia, and the burning of Corinrh: The States General being dissolved, and the vanquished Achaeans sold for slaves by their friends of Rome, that they might the more sensibly understand to what condition they reduce themselves, who make their neighbours too great, and put themselves into their mercy by overthrowing that power which should be the counterpoise.

The ruine of this Common-wealth hath given occasion to sundry Writers of Politics, as Polybius and Jacobus Gothofredus, to condemn their proceedings. The success of humane affairs is so various, and wars are managed with such uncertainty, and such circumstances do oftentimes befal Republicks that 'tis not in their power to pursue the most safe counsels, and sometimes an high, though no assured hope ought to be preferred before the more cautelous, if more humble thoughts. It is easie to determine the immediate causes of the subversion of that Republick; but if the wisest of those which condemn their League with Rome, had lived in those daies, and were to form their counsels upon the posture affairs were then in, and not upon that prospect which un-concerned posterity hath thereof, perhaps they would have embraced those resolutions which they now reprove.

The Achaeans had indeed a very ancient League with the Macedonians, they were of the same Continent, and as it were of the same Language and Consanguinity: they had received many benefits by the Macedonian amity, and Philip himself had aided them against their Enemies of Lacedaemon. But this amity with Philip had very many circumstances whereupon it might be questioned for the future. For the Macedonians were a warlike people, of great strength, famed for their invincible Militia, they had long aimed at the Vniversal Monarchy of Greece, they had now extended their conquests far into Thracia, and had subdued in a manner all Greece, but Peloponnesus: the sense [Page] of those Benefits which the Achaeans had received from the Macedonians, was much effaced by the late deportment of Philip, who had not only dilated his Acquests unto their Confines, (besieging Athens, and oppressing the sturdy Aetolians) but aided them against Lacedemon with so slender Forces as if he intended not the preservation and welfare of his Allies, but by such artifices to reduce all Peloponnesus under his subjection at last. These things duly considered, it may seem to have been well done of the Achaeans to call in the Romans, and to prevent their apparent Ruine by joyning with a Foreigner, whose strength might counterpoise that of Philip, and bring them less of terrour, since the remoteness of Italy, the Contingencies of War by Sea and Land, the puissance of Macedonia, might bring both Parties into such a condition as not to be able to molest or invade the peaceable Neighbourhood. The effects of these Counsels proved happy at first, for immediately Philip courted their Friendship, restoring them some Towns which he detained from them; their coldness towards the Macedonians had emboldened the Romans to begin a War, which by reason of the other with Hannibal, they could not well prosecute: So that the Achaeans had, without Expence or Trouble, abated much of the pride and ambition of Philip.

After that the Romans had put an happy end to the Second War with Carthage, they began to cast a jealous Eye upon the Macedonian Empire: they saw their Allies of Aetolia subdued by Philip, and the Cities of Asia ready to contract a Defensive League against them. The Consuls animated the Senate and People to invade Macedonia, shewing the intrinsick power of that Kingdom, the Alliances with which it was fortified; how easie it would be for Philip to attempt Italy, as Pyrrhus had done; how prone men were, after they had provided against known Dangers, to pursue unknown Hopes, and not to stop where they begun. The War being resolved upon, they sent to solicite the several Cities and Republicks of Greece to joyn with them against Philip; and after they had given a Reputation to their Arms by some [Page] Exploits against the Macedonians, they send their Embassadors, and withal their Fleet, unto Achaia, offering them a perfect amity if they would actually joyn with them, but would not acquiesce in any Neutrality. Hereupon the States General were perplexed, they saw those Naval Forces on their Coast which were able to vanquish them before they could receive any assistance from Macedonia; the goodness of their Ports did but facilitate their Conquest, since the Romans were Masters at Sea. They must either draw the War upon themselves, who were not able to undergo it, or transfer it into Macedonia. Their Condition admitted of no middle Counsels, and of the Extreams the latter was the best. The miscarriages of Philip in the beginning of the War, as to Conduct and Valour, made them see which side had the advantage of the other: and they had reason to confederate with those who were then able to distress them, and would in the end bear away the Victory. By preserving their Country entire at present, and contributing onely a part of their strength to the aid of the Romans, they should still be in a posture considerable to mediate in time for a peace, and render other courtesies to the Macedonians, the depressing of whose puissance was becom their present Interest, as it would be their future to rescue it from utter ruine.

Hitherto the Counsels of Achaia seemed prudential; the Macedonians were reduced to their ancient Confines, all Greece was restored to its Pristine Liberty; nothing accrued to the Romans by this War, but the Glory of having delivered Greece, and weakened the Realm of Macedonia that it was no longer formidable to its Neighbours. But the Romans had further ends, and made use of that specious Generosity onely to insinuate themselves into the affection of the credulous Greeks, who neither understood how hard a thing it was for a City to preserve its Liberty after it hath recovered it; nor how it was impossible for Greece to unite for the general Defence, when they were cantonized into so many petty Republicks. The Achaeans were become the most united and potent Republick in Greece; they had powerfully [Page] interceded for their Neighbours of Boeotia, and obliged the Romans to compose the general Affairs of Greece by a Peace with Philip. It behoved the Romans therefore by all artifices to divide and weaken the authority of that Republick; the which they effected in such manner, that when Perseus the Son of Philip had settled his Kingdom, accumulated great Riches, and disciplined his Militia, and put himself into a condition to dispute again the Fortunes of Greece, should Rome attack it; the Achaeans had not the Resolution to embrace his Friendship, and concur with those of Rhodes, and others, to uphold the Liberty of Greece by an equal counterpoise of those two Powers; but chuse to adhere unto their League with the Romans, though after the subversion of Perseus, they must be at the discretion of their Victorious Ally. Had the case been to be resolved by the Modern Policies of Europe, they had not fallen into this Error. For the Law of Nations is now reconciled to that of Nature, which knows no consideration superior to that of Self-preservation: to preserve the Neighbouring Powers equally ballanced, 'tis esteemed lawful and wise to change Alliances, according as either side declines. This hath been the constant practise of England, France, and Italy. How often do we find the Pope and Venetians to change sides during the Wars betwixt Francis the First, and Charles the Fifth in Italy? Thus Lewis XII. and Maximilian, and Ferdinand, together with Pope Julius, combined in the League of Cambray to abate the growing Power of the Venetian Republick, which seemed to aim at the Soveraignty of Italy: And afterwards Ferdinand and Julius associated with the Venetians and K. Henry VIII. to ballance the power of France, whose Victories in Millan and the Venetian Territories, created new fears in them. No sooner had Charles the VIII. by an unexpected Success conquered the Kingdom of Naples, but the Venetians, the D. of Millain, and all the Potentates of Italy, (who had either accepted a Neutrality, or actually joyn'd in the assistance of Charles) grew jealous thereat, and changed their [Page] Counsels, forming a League to expel the French out of Italy, preferring the general respect unto their Security (though against a confederate Prince) before any obligation of Leagues and Promises. But the Achaeans either were too plain and simple to comprehend these things, or of too strict Justice to admit the Suggestion. They could not believe those Maxims, That the Honour of Statesmen ought to be spun out of course Cloth; That the Heroical Characters of Vertue were onely to be found in the Discourses of Philosophers; being more spoken of, than practised, by the generous Roman. They had not met with those Oracles which the Lawyers and Politicians suggested unto Queen Elizabeth upon another occasion, viz. "All Contracts with a Prince are understood Cambden Hist of Q. Eliz. ad Anno 1595. & Zouch de jure faeciali, part 2. sect 4. Alber. Gentilis de jure b [...]lli, l. 3. c. 14. to admit an interpretation of sincere Fidelity; neither is a Prince bound by his Contract, when for just cause the Contract turneth to the Publick Detriment. The Peace is not broken, if a Prince go back from his Contract, when it is done by accident of a new Case, or when the matter cometh to a new Case, concerning which other provision would have been made, if it had been thought upon. Leagues and Contracts of Princes ought not to be cavilled, neither ought to be observed to them that break Contracts. A Prince is not bound to a Contract solemnly made in a cause respecting his State, if it tend to the prejudice and detriment of his Subjects. Every Contract, though sworn, is understood if matters continue in the same state, but not if they be changed. A man is bound more strongly to the Commonwealth, than to his own Promise. And out of the Authority of Seneca, A wise Seneca de beneficiis, l. 4.34. man doth not change his determination, all things continuiug which were when he took it: therefore he never repenteth him because no better thing at that time could be done, than was done, no better thing ordained than was ordained." The Stateholder of Achaia had not such of his Council as were of the Cabinet to Henry IV. when he violated his Faith given to Q. Elizabeth. A. D. 1598. There had been a Contract made betwixt those two Princes at Millan, A. D. 1592. under their Hands and Seals, bona fide, and in the word of "Princes, [Page] that with joynt forces they should make a war offensive Camden hist. of Q. Eliz. ad an. 159 [...]. and defensive against the Spaniard, as long as he should make war with either of them, and should enter into no peace with him, without mutual consent betwixt them, and both of them to be comprehended in the Peace." The same League was renewed betwixt them in Id. ibid, ad ann. 1596. 1596. and it was expresly covenanted again, that neither the King nor Queen shall treat of any Peace or Truce without the consent of each other. The Dutch were comprehended as Allyes in the same League; yet Henry the fourth having attained the Kingdom, dissipated those of the League, and reduced almost all places appertaining to the Crown under his obedience, he determined to treat alone with the Spaniard, and, if he might have the remaining Towns surrendred up to him, to purchase those advantages with ease, and to establish the affairs of his Kingdom by infringing his royal word. The Dutch and English sent their Embassadors to disswade him from those purposes: Oldenbarnevelt remonstrated, That the Estates case was by Gods mercy, and the Queens favour and assistance brought to that pass, that they had been able not only to defend themselves, Id. ibid. ad an, 1598. Grotius Hist. Belg. l. [...] but also to aid France in her extremities. Then, how earnestly the French King had desired the League of offensice and defence with them, which they had willingly contracted for the Queen's sake, not once thinking that so great a King would ever have a thought of breaking the same League. He appealed to the French Kings conscience before God, whether it were honorable for the King to separate his cause from them, to whom He had joyned himself with so great obtestations, when they had given no cause of separation. He concluded (after many reasons why they could not embrace peace with the Spaniard) that some Kings to attain power, had neglected Leagues, but for the most part with sad event. For the State of Kings, unless it stand in fidelity cannot subsist in power. Sir Robert Cecil put the King in mind with what vows he had bound himself lately before the Earl of Shrewsbury after the ratification [Page] of the League, and before, by many Letters signed with his own hand. And he stuck not to affirm that the Queen had not offended at all against the Conditions of the League; yea that she had performed more; but the King had observed nothing; and withall he drew forth the Instruments of the League. He also modestly put Him in mind that some course might be taken, whereby those great sums of money formerly lent, might be paid unto the Queen, who being now forsaken, had learned too late, to provide more carefully for her own State in time to come, and not bestow her Benefits on ill Deservers. King Henry the Fourth dismissed them with gentle Answers, and acknowledged the Queens most ample Benefits towards Him, promising that there was nothing which for her sake he would not most affectionately do. But yet He concluded the Peace (She and the Dutch being excluded) and excused himself in words to this effect: "Although the Queen have begun a War against the Spaniard, and that with Honour, and hath hitherto continued it with happy success: yet if she will not enter into another manner of War, the lesser Wealth must of necessity at the length yield to the greater. For my part, though having been bred up in Arms, Henricus 3. pacem fact [...]m necessitate excusaevit. N [...] quivisse se sine aeterna subditorum exprobra [...]one, honestissimas conditiones rejicere: quando tristis regni st [...]tus pacem atque otiu [...] pos [...].— [...]idanus annal. Belg. l. [...] I am taken with the love of Wars above all others: Yet seeing I am a King, and have People under my Government, there is a Conscience to be made of exposing my people to the fury of the Wars; and it were a foul sin, if in an irreligious ambition I should, to mine own detriment, and the detriment of my Confederates, refuse peace when it is offered, when it cannot be redeemed without Blood, and grosly neglect the People committed unto me."

The whole Story is too long to be transcribed out of Cambden, Grotius, and Reidanus, &c. but if the Acheans had been so fortunate as to have prognosticated what Posterity would think to be equitable, prudent, and consonant to the Law of Nations, or had for their Counsellors those which understood as much, Sully, Villeroy, and Jannin, they had never faln so ignominiously under the power of the Romans. They [Page] would have moved in that juncture by so flexible Maxims of State, that they could not have been fooled into their ruine by the Romans; nor have been obnoxious to the inconstancy, revenge, or ambition of Perseus K. of Macedonia. But they moving by such Principles as their potent Allies did not admit of (except it were upon prospect of greater advantages) the issue of their demeanour hath left unto this Age a durable monument of State-folly, and to the Virtuosi a Noble and Luciferous Experiment how to make Corinthian Brass, whensoever there shall be another Achaia, another Corinth, and another Rome.

I might adde to this History of Achaia, another of Rhodes which was parallel thereunto: 'twas briefly thus. The Commonwealth of Rhodes being situated in an Island, had derived those Advantages from the frequent Troubles and Revolutions of Greece to acquire a great Trade and Naval Strength: they were very expert in Navigation, and were in a manner Lords of the Neighbouring Seas. Such was their fame and puissance, that the Laws of Oleron were never in such esteem as the maritime Constitutions of the Rhodians. When the great power of Antiochus in Asia made them jealous lest he should attempt upon their Liberty, or at least deprive them of the Dominion of the Sea, they thought it Policy to combine with the remote Forces of Rome, to depress the power of their Neighbour. They convoyed the Romans into Asia, they instructed them with the Sea-coasts, the Arts of Navigating and fishing at Sea. Before that time the Romans kn [...]w not how to manage a Sea-fight, they had Ships and Courage, but understood not the Arts and Stratagems of Sea fights. The Rhodians beat Hannibal in a Sea-fight for them; and when the indiscretion of the Roman Praetor had almost ruined their Fleet at Myonesus, the Rhodians by their valour and dexterity recovered the day. The Romans never atchieved any great Exploit at Sea without the aid and assistance of the Rhodians; but the Rhodians gained sundry Victories without them. The Romans rewarded their services with the donation of several rich Territories, which were adjacent to them upon the Continent. But when the power of Rome had setled it self in Greece and Asia, and that there was no counterpoise for their Puissance but Perseus of Macedon: They began to suspect their Great Allies, and admitted of an Embassy from Perseus; some of their Senate did animate them to interpose for Perseus, and to declare War against those that should refuse a Peace; they shewed the excessive Greatness of Rome, their increase of [Page] Shipping and able Seamen, the Ports, the Traffick, the Armies, the Alliances which they had in the Neighbourhood: that the liberty, trade, and dominion of the Sea, which the Rhodians then enjoyed, were in danger, and continued only by the indulgence of those whom their Alliance had made too Great. Hereupon they did dispatch an Embassy to Rome, shewing that the Macedonian War would bring so great an interruption to their Commerce, that the Rhodians must have a regard to the Peace, and should be put upon New Debates about their proper Interest, in opposition to those that rejected their Mediation. The Senate received this Message with indignation, and knowing that their strength at Sea was become such that they needed not the assistance or advise of the Rhodians, they immediately deprived them of all they held in the Terra firma, and slighted all their subsequent Applications and tenders of aid: When that Perseus was subdued, the Rhodians sent Embassadors to congratulate the Senate for the success; but they were not received with the least solemnity, but inforced to go in mourning from door to door, to beg the favour of each Senator towards their poor Commonwealth, against which the Romans were so incensed. But no Prayers or Tears could prevail with their proud Ally: A War was decreed against Rhodes, and their destruction resolved upon. The Rhodians vvere extreamly perplexed at this news: those vvhich had advised them to interpose betwixt the Macedonians and Romans, vvere forced to fly, or kill themselves, or sent Prisoners to Rome: and if nothing vvould mitigate the anger of the Romans, they determined to imbark all their People, and sail to Rome, and there prostrate themselves before the Senate, either to be absolved or put to death, as they pleased. After great Submission and Importunity, their Embassadors prevailed to stop the War. And because they had acted the Mediators, the Senate resolved that the Rhodians should neither be esteemed Friends nor Enemies of Rome. They vvere reduced to the narrovv Confines of their ovvn Island, and their Trade so impoverished, that their Naval Strength and Povver declined therevvith, and the Romans managed the Dominion of the Sea, according to the Laws of Rhodes.

FINIS.

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THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED PROVINCES OF ACHAIA.

Collected in Latine by the Learned JACOBUS GOTHOFREDUS, And rendred into English, with some Additions, By HENRY STVBBE.

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LONDON: Printed by Andrew Clark for Jonathan Edwin, at the Three Roses in Ludgate-street. 1673.

TO THE READER.

[Page]

[Page]

THE late Revolutions in the United Netherlands brought into my memory the Republick of Achaia; this being the Original from whence the Dutch framed their Common-wealth. Vpon this account I retain in the Translation those terms of State-holder, and States-General, &c. The subject was thought heretofore so considerable as to employ the Pens of Polybius and Jac. Gothofredus: and I believe the Reader may find [Page] as much of delight and benefit in the perusal of the ensuing Treatise, as of most Pamphlets which are obtruded on the world each Term.

Information about this book

Title statement

The history of the United Provinces of Achaia collected in Latine by the learned Jacobus Gothofredus ; and rendred into English, with some additions, by Henry Stubbe.Achaica. English

Godefroy, Jacques, 1587-1652.

Edition statement

1673

Publication

Publisher

Text Creation Partnership,

Place of publication

Ann Arbor, MI ; Oxford (UK) :

Date

2003-01 (EEBO-TCP Phase 1).

ID [DLPS]

A42904

ID [STC]

Wing G924

ID [STC]

ESTC R17634

ID [EEBO-CITATION]

12166161

ID [OCLC]

ocm 12166161

ID [VID]

55325

Availability

This keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the Early English Books Online Text Creation Partnership. This Phase I text is available for reuse, according to the terms of Creative Commons 0 1.0 Universal. The text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission.

Series

Early English books online.

Notes

(EEBO-TCP ; phase 1, no. A42904)

Transcribed from: (Early English Books Online ; image set 55325)

Images scanned from microfilm: (Early English books, 1641-1700 ; 71:6)

Source

— The history of the United Provinces of Achaia collected in Latine by the learned Jacobus Gothofredus ; and rendred into English, with some additions, by Henry Stubbe., Achaica. English, Godefroy, Jacques, 1587-1652., Stubbe, Henry, 1632-1676..

Extent

[4], 32 p.

Printed by Andrew Clark for Jonathan Edwin ...,. London :: 1673.. (Translation of: Achaica, seu, De causis interitus reipublicae Achaeorum.) (Reproduction of original in Huntington Library.)

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