Plato's demon, or, The state-physician unmaskt being a discourse in answer to a book call'd Plato redivivus / by Thomas Goddard, Esq. Goddard, Thomas. 1684 Approx. 467 KB of XML-encoded text transcribed from 199 1-bit group-IV TIFF page images. Text Creation Partnership, Ann Arbor, MI ; Oxford (UK) : 2009-03 (EEBO-TCP Phase 1). A42895 Wing G917 ESTC R22474 12060903 ocm 12060903 53230

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Early English books online. (EEBO-TCP ; phase 1, no. A42895) Transcribed from: (Early English Books Online ; image set 53230) Images scanned from microfilm: (Early English books, 1641-1700 ; 71:5) Plato's demon, or, The state-physician unmaskt being a discourse in answer to a book call'd Plato redivivus / by Thomas Goddard, Esq. Goddard, Thomas. [16], 376, [4] p. Printed by H. Hills, Jun. for Walter Kettilby ..., London : 1684. Errata: p. [4] at end. Reproduction of original in University of Chicago Library.

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eng Neville, Henry, 1620-1694. -- Plato redivivus. 2007-08 Assigned for keying and markup 2007-08 Keyed and coded from ProQuest page images 2008-03 Sampled and proofread 2008-03 Text and markup reviewed and edited 2008-09 Batch review (QC) and XML conversion

PLATO's Demon: Or, the STATE-PHYSICIAN Unmaskt; Being a Diſcourſe in Anſwer to a Book call'd Plato Redivivus.

By Thomas Goddard, Eſq

Si unum Id ſpectamu , quam nefaria voce Lutorius Priſcus mentem ſuam & aures hominum polluerit, neque carcer, neque laque •• , ne ſerviles quidem cruciatus in eum ſuffecerint.

Tacit. Ann. lib. 3.

LONDON, Printed by H. Hills Jun. for Walter Kettilby, at the Biſhop's Head in Saint Paul's Church-yard, 1684.

To His ROYAL HIGHNESS, JAMES Duke of YORK, &c. Royal Sir,

THe ſenſe which all ſober Men, and good Subjects, ever will retain of that Safety and Protection, which the Nation owes to your Princely Wiſdom, and true born Courage, obligeth us to look upon your Royal Perſon (next to His moſt Sacred Majeſty) as Our Sword, Our Shield, and Our ſecureſt Hopes.

You are Our Head in Council, and Our Arm in Battel: and as we all ought to fight under your Royal Banner againſt the force and injuries of a Foreign Foe; ſo is it Our Duty to oppoſe no leſs, the Seditious Conſpiracies, and Traiterous Aſſociations, of Our little, malicious ſcribling Enemies at home.

Amongſt many of that deceiving, or deceived Crew, none ſeems more impudently extravagant than the Author of a Libel call'd Plato Redivivus. The Book it ſelf, with the encouragement which I had to anſwer it, I received about May laſt at Paris, from that moſt Loyal and moſt Worthy Miniſter, my Lord Preſton. What I have been able to do in this little time, I moſt humbly offer at your Highneſs's Feet, being fully aſſured, that your Royal Highneſs will never refuſe your Princely Protection to what Perſon ſo ever ſhall ſincerely endeavour to defend (according to his ſtrength) Our Regal Government with its juſt Rights, and Prerogatives. May Heaven continue your Royal Perſon a Bleſſing to theſe Kingdoms, to the utmoſt extent of Providence and Mercy: And may theſe Nations endeavour to deſerve ſo great a Bleſſing, by an unfeigned Reſpect, Duty, and Gratitude without limit.

Your Royal Highneſs's Moſt Obedient, Moſt Faithful, and Moſt Humble Servant. T. G.
TO THE READER.

THe inquity and licentiouſneſs of the times are ſuch, that thoſe wicked Principles which the moſt perverſe of men in former days would hardly truſt to their private thoughts, In theſe men impudently dare to publiſh.

Amongſt many Seditious Libels, which of late have come abroad, none is more inſolently bold than that which bears the Name of Plato Redivivus. The Author ſeems ſo hardened and confirmed in his Villanous Errors, that he makes no ſcruple to offer Treaſon and Sedition, for Reaſon and Loyalty: He would make us believe that he is ſupporting Our Government, whilſt he endeavours utterly to deſtroy it: Propounds ruine and ſlavery in a quiet and peaceable way: And diſapproves a Civil Page 219. War only becauſe he doubts the ſucceſs: He beſeeches the King therefore that he would be graciouſly pleaſed to lay down his Imperial Crown: Tells Page 220. him it will make himſelf Glorious, and his People happy: Adviſeth him toPage 249. quit his lawful Power, that he may be great: Diveſt himſelf of his Prerogatives and Liberties that he may be free; and become a ward to a Popular Juncto, that he may live at eaſe. And that this their Pupil King may not doubt the kind intentions of his Indulgent Governours, they promiſe to take immediatelyPage 258. the Adminiſtration of the Regal Authority into their own hands, and make him as idle, as he would prove an inſignificant Prince: Eaſe him of the trouble of making Peace and War abroad, andPage 237. Officers and Miniſters Page 239. at home; Take away from him the diſpoſal of the Militia, by Sea and Land, as alſo of his own Revenue, as affairs too mean and below the conſideration of ſuch an abſolute Monarch: Diſingage him from the Obligation of beſtowing Honours, and Titles, upon Perſons deſerving well; That Barons, Earls, and Dukes ſhall be henceforward createdPage 252. by the Authority and Favour of Gentlemen, Eſquires, and Knights. And laſt of all, that the Dignity of this their Glorious King might loſe nothing of its luſtre, from the Communication of laborious buſineſs, and the concerns of Government, it is propoſed, that the King ſhall have no more Authority to Page 249. Call, Adjourn, Prorogue, or Diſſolve Parliaments: That their Annual Seſſion ſhall be perpetuated to all Eternity.

And leaſt an Honeſt, Sober and Loyal Parliament, ſhould (in proceſs of time) undo what a Knaviſh, Hotbrain'd and Traiterous Aſſembly had impoſed upon us,Page 249. Elections are to be regulated according to their own fancies, and Honeſty and Loyalty are to be perpetual marks of Incapacity. And in a word, when they are once elected, It is concluded, that they ſhall be Judge and Party in their own Cauſe, Page 254. and govern themſelves World without end, according to their own Independent and moſt Soveraign Right of Power.

Now leaſt theſe, and many other Propoſitions, (howſoever illegal and extravagant) ſhould not be embraced as chearfully as they are loyally and honeſtly intended, Our Author aſſures us, That he hath propoſed nothing in Page 258. his Diſcourſe which intrencheth upon the Kings Hereditary Right.

Theſe, Worthy Reader, are the juſt Principles and ſound Foundation upon which Our Author pretends to build his new-found Government. And that the Effect may anſwer ſo good and ſo great a Project; He aſſures us, that ſuch a bleſſed Reformation will not fail to work Miracles. The King ſhall be more abſolute when he hath no Power at all, than everPage 249. he was, or could be before: The Lords more honourable when they receive their Honours from the People, Page 256. 7. than when they were given by the King. The People ſhall enjoy their Liberties and Properties more Secure, now they are become their own Slaves, than when they were the Kings Subjects: No Fires in London but of their own making, no Want in the Country, no Wars abroad, nor Troubles at home but of their own raiſing: Presbyterians Page 186. and Papiſts like Peace and Righteouſneſs ſhall kiſs each other: The Lyon ſhall lie down with the Lamb, and there ſhall be no more enmity between the Serpent and the Seed of the Woman.

Nay, ſuch is the force of our wonderworking politick Apoſtle, that provided his Tyrannical, Popular Ʋſurpation may take place againſt a Lawful, Natural, & the moſt Eaſie Monarchy upon Earth, all Intereſts will be reconciled, all Perſons, of whatſoever different Principles or Profeſſions they be, whether Jew or Greek, a Samaritan, or of the dwellers of Meſopotamia; They ſhall all underſtand his charming and irreſiſtible reaſoning in their own Languages, that is, according to each man's deſign, and the deſires of his own heart.

Now although the extravagances & fallacies of our vain Magiſterial Author, are obvious enough to all ſober, conſidering men, yet ſince Error is more communicative than Truth, and ſome men (eſpecially ſuch as may be already prejudiced are more apt to embrace Shadows, than retain Subſtances, I have endeavoured to diſtinguiſh Both, unmask our Republican Daemon, & ſhew no leſs his horrid Claws, than his Cloven-feet.

I ſhould now make ſome excuſe that this Anſwer comes ſo late into the World, but I have a ſufficient Witneſs, that I had never ſeen the Book call'd Plato Redivivus, before I received it at Paris, about May laſt, from My Lord Preſton, His Majeſties Envoy Extraordinary in the French Court: To his Lordſhip, I owe the firſt motion, and encouragement of anſwering it, you the advantage (if any be) and ſatisfaction of the Anſwer.

Next I muſt inform you, that I meddle little with the Law-part, which is now and then to be met withal in Our Author; not only becauſe it hath been ſufficiently anſwer'd already, but beſides, if there be any breach of the Law or Government by any Perſon whatſoever, the Courts of Juſtice are open, which are the proper places for Law matters; and when Plato ſhall think fit to ſhew himſelf and legally accuſe, both himſelf, and ſuch other of the Kings Subjects, who may have been deceived by him, will receive a more full & ample ſatisfaction, than I durſt pretend to give them.

The hiſtorical and rational part I endeavour to anſwer as plainly, as my judgment and little time would permit, which I have done alſo by way of Dialogue, that I might in all things comply with Our Authors method, as far as is reaſonable. Many impertinencies I have paſſed by to avoid tediouſneſs. Thoſe faults in this Diſcourſe which ſhall not be found malicious, I hope the Reader will excuſe; ſmall miſtakes may be eaſily rectified. And as to the whole, if the Reader ſhall pleaſe to examine it as impartially, as it is writ ſincerely, I perſuade my ſelf, that he will find nothing misbecoming an Honeſt Man and a Loyal Subject. Farewell.

PLATO'S Daemon: OR, The State-Phyſician unmaskt; BEING A Diſcourſe in Anſwer to a Book call'd Plato Redivivus. The Argument.

An Engliſh Gentleman lately return'd from France, and Italy, where he had ſpent ſeveral years, is invited by a very conſiderable Merchant, and his near Kinſman, to his Country Houſe, where diſcourſing of many things with great liberty, the Merchant accidentally opens a Book, call'd Plato Redivivus, which the Traveller had brought down with him into the Country; This becomes a new ſubject of Diſcourſe, and both deliver their opinions concerning it with great freedom, as follows.

Firſt Diſcourſe. Merchant.

GOod morrow, Couſin, What, up and ready too ſo early? How do you like our Old Engliſh Country Air?

Traveller.

Very well Sir, and indeed the pleaſantneſs of this ſituation, with thoſe many delights which appear round about it, are ſufficient to raiſe any Man from his Bed, eſpecially one who hath been ſo long a ſtranger to the happineſſes of a Country retirement, and who loves them ſo much as I do.

Mer.

I rather feared that notwithſtanding our beſt endeavours here, your time would paſs tediouſly away, for having ſeen all France and Italy (which they call the Garden of Europe) I apprehended that the beſt part of England, would have appeared no better to you, then an uncultivated Deſert.

Trav.

No, nor yet ſhall Lumbardy, nor Capua which is the Garden of Italy, be ever preferr'd by me before our own bleſt, happy ſoil.

Mer.

I am glad to find you ſo good an Engliſhman, the rather becauſe we may now hope to keep you henceforward in a place which, it ſeems, you like ſo well.

Trav.

Believe me, Tutto il mondo è pa ſe. All Countries are in this alike, that they have their conveniences, and inconveniences, their particular delights, and their particular wants. And when we ſhall have made a juſt eſtimate of all the Kingdoms in Europe, I know none, which for pleaſure and profit, ought to be preferr'd juſtly before our own.

Mer.

Sir, I was always ſatisfied with my own Countrey, and the little encouragement you give me to exchange it for any other confirms me now ſo much in my Opinion, that I am reſolv'd never to croſs the Seas, except ſome greater Buſineſs, than I can foreſee, ſhould neceſſitate me.

Trav.

I have now ſpent ſomewhat more than Eight years, (as you know Couſin) out of England. The firſt time I went abroad, I only learnt my Exerciſes, and made thoſe Tours of France and Italy, which generally other Gentlemen uſe to do. I could then have told you who was the beſt Dancing Maſter of Paris, where liv'd the moſt faſhionable Taylor, the airieſt Perriwigmaker, and ſuch like. In Italy, where the beſt Wines, and what Curioſities were particular to every City.

But having almoſt loſt the bon gouſt, as they ſay, or relliſh for thoſe youthful pleaſures, ſince I went laſt abroad, I have made other remarks, and grown more ſullen poſſibly than I ought to be; can tell you now of the pride and libertinage of the French Nobleſſe, the impertinence, coquetry and debauchery of the Gentry, the miſery of the Commonalty, the extream poverty of moſt, and ſlavery of all. In Italy the reſtraint of their Wives and Women, the jealouſie of Husbands and their general vindicative humour: At Venice the inſupportable inſolence of their Nobili Venetiani, and triumphant Vice. At Genoua the ſcandalous Mechanick Traffick and notorious Avarice o their Grandees, inſomuch that they ſtarve even a Jew in his own Trade: Their frequent aſſaſſinations, pride and ill manners. The dull Bigotry of Florence, and hard impoſitions upon Subjects. The formalities of Rome, the loſt Vertue and Courage, and natural Cowardize and Poltronery of the degenerated Romans; the inſolence of the Commonalty del regna, as they call it, or Kingdom of Naples, the Robberies of their Banditti, the great Titles, and ſmall Eſtates of the Nobility; the hereditary riſſes or quarrels of the Piedmonteſi, and thoſe of Monferat, and (from their ill adminiſtration of Juſtice) their eternal Proceſſes. And to conclude, add to this, the arbitrary Government exercis'd generally all over Italy, and the heavy impoſitions upon their Subjects, greater than they ought to bear.

Now, Couſin, with all I have ſaid, compare the extream happineſs of the Engliſh Nation. The Riches of the Commonalty, inſomuch that ſome have thought it to be the greateſt part of our diſeaſe; The vaſt trade and proſperous condition of our Merchants; The Hoſpitality, Wealth and Modeſty of our Gentry; The high quality and true worth of our Nobility, their uncorrupted Loyalty to their Prince, and unaffected kindneſs for the People.

But above all let us reflect ſeriouſly upon the moſt happy ſecurity and liberty of our Perſons and Eſtates, which all ſtrangers are forc't both to admire and envy: Our freedom and exemption from all manner of Taxes and Impoſitions, but ſuch as we our ſelves ſhall conſent to.

And not to be too tedious upon a ſubject which is ſo large, let us truly conſider, and at the ſame time bleſs God Almighty for our juſt Laws, and impartial execution of them, for the admirable & equal Conſtitution of our Government; where the Prince hath ſo great a power, and the People ſuch ample priviledges, that as our form of Government is Monarchy, and that as perfect and free as the Sun ever ſaw, ſo it is eternally ſecur'd from the corruption of Tyranny.

Over all this, our preſent Age enjoys a Prince ſo moderate and ſo juſt, that his mercy and goodneſs have been his greateſt faults, and his Government over us hath been ſo modeſt, that his greateſt Enemies are forc't to conſeſs, That his preſent Majeſty never did any Act of arbitrary Power, nor to k from any particular Perſon the benefit of the Law; Plato Red. p. 18, 19.

Theſe conſiderations have oblig'd all Perſons of all Nations whom I have hapned to meet abroad, o who have heard or read any thing concerning us, to congratulate with me the incomparable Conſtitution and eaſineſs of the Government under which we live, and applying the happineſs of Virgil's Husbandman to our own People, have often repeated:

O fortunatos nimium, bona ſi ſua norint, Anglicolas.

Now, Couſin, if you have an inclination to leave all thoſe general bleſſings, beſides your particular ones of a noble Houſe, a healthful & pleaſant ſituation, delightful Garden, plenty of water & freſh ſprings, and many other great conveniences belonging to them, then Couſin, go abroad, and there learn to be wiſer.

Mer.

No, good Couſin, I intend to remain a fool and ſtay at home, & to ſpeak plainly, if I had as good an Opinion of the preſent Conſtitution of our own Government, as I have an ill one of thoſe which you have mention'd, all thoſe foreign pleaſures, which the moſt Frenchefi'd Traveller would make us believe were to be found amongſt them, ſhould not perſuade me to leave Old England, not ſo much as for one ſingle Month.

Trav.

How, dear Couſin? Is it poſſible that there ſhould be any thing in the Conſtitution of our own Government which can diſpleaſe a man of your ſenſe, and ſolid Judgment, and one whom hitherto I have ever thought very well affected to it?

Mer.

Truly Sir, few men love their King and Countrey better than my ſelf. I have never forwarded any irregular addreſs to his Majeſty, nor given my Vote for any notorious Phanatick, nor am I look'd upon as ſuch amongſt them. But I muſt confeſs, when I reflect upon the differences and animoſities between the King and the Houſe of Commons, the diſcontents of a great number of People, the Danger of Popery, and many other ſuch conſiderations, which I have not at preſent in my mind, I cannot but think there is a fault ſomewhere, and where to lay it more modeſtly, and more reaſonably than upon the Conſtitution of the Government itſelf, is what I cannot find out.

But we ſhall not want opportunity to diſcourſe as much as you pleaſe of theſe matters, ere we return to London: And in the mean time, I think it a good hour to break your faſt. What Drink do you chooſe for your Mornings draught?

Trav.

Good faith Couſin, a mouthful or two of good Air is to me the moſt acceptable Breakfaſt in the World.

Mer.

Pray uſe no ceremonies. You know and believe, I hope, that our friendſhip, as well as near relation gives, you the ſame freedom in my Houſe, as you have in your own. If therefore you will eat or drink any thing, ſpeak what you like beſt, and the Butler ſhall bring it you immediately But if you be reſolv'd to ſtay till Dinner, I will in the mean time carry you to a very pleaſant walk, and ſhew you a little Arbour at the end, agreeable enough.

Trav.

Moſt willingly. I'll only put on my Cravat and Perriwig and wait upon you.

Mer.

And I, until you are ready, will (with your leave) examine what curious Books you have brought down from beyond Sea.

Trav.

Very few beſides ſuch as I carried over; for I find London the beſt Library, and England the beſt Univerſity for learned men in Europe.

Mer.

I am glad you think it ſo. Let's ſee, what have we here? Hugonis Grotii de Jure Belli ac Pacis? This we have tranſlated into Engliſh ſince you left us.

Trav.

I heard ſo in Italy, but never ſaw the Book, I ſhould have thought it a very difficult undertaking by reaſon of many expreſſions ſo particular to the Civil Law and Latin, that they are hard to be rendred into our Language.

Mer.

It is very well done, and of good uſe, I can ſhew it you when ever you pleaſe. For in my vacant hours I love a little reading, eſpecially when I meet with an Author, who is univerſally allow'd to be of a ſolid Judgment & great Learning.

Trav.

You could not have met with one in my opinion who more truly poſſeſſes thoſe two qualifications then Grotius did. Joſeph Scaliger tells us, that he was prudens Politicus, optimus Groecus, Juris-conſultus, modeſtus, proeſtantiſſimus in Epigrammatibus, and certainly he deſerv'd all or more than he hath ſaid of him.

Mer.

What have you got next? The holy Bible in Engliſh? Nay then, Couſin, we may hope, that beſides your Engliſh inclinations, you have brought over with you alſo your Engliſh Religion. For I think the Papiſts ſeldom make uſe of the Bible.

Trav.

Sir, I aſſure you, I profeſs the ſame Religion which I ever did, and hope I ever ſhall. I mean the true Orthodox Proteſtant Religion of the Church of England, as it is by Law eſtabliſh'd, and in my Heart do believe it, not only a ſafe Religion, but the moſt ſound and the moſt pure in its Doctrine as well as in its diſcipline, that is profeſs'd this day in any part of the whole World.

Mer.

I ſhall ever agree with you in the Doctrine, and not much differ from you in the Diſcipline. But let us proceed. What fine gilt Book is this? Plato Redivivus. 'Tis a ſtrong piece, Couſin.

Trav.

As ſtrong as Muſtard, Couſin; Children are afraid of it, becauſe it bites them by the Noſe, as they fancy. But thoſe of riper years, eaſily diſcover the fallacy, for when examin'd, it leaves no impreſſion behind it.

Mer.

Have you read it Sir?

Trav.

Pleaſe to open it, and you will find whether I have or no.

Mer.

I perceive indeed that your red Lead Pen hath examin'd it very ſtrictly; every leaf looks almoſt as diſmal as a Martyr.

Trav.

Not a Martyr, I beſeech you; but if you will ſay a Sacrifice, I will admit of the Compariſon.

Mer.

Why Couſin? What diſtinction do you make between theſe two?

Trav.

Martyr, Sir, is generally taken in a good ſenſe, and in a good cauſe, but a Sacrifice may be ſaid to be offer'd either to God or to the Devil.

Mer.

Which is as much as to ſay, That you believe the Author hath undertaken an ill cauſe.

Trav.

Yes, Sir, and under any good Government beſides our own, eſpecially in that Republick, which he ſo much admires, both himſelf and his works would have been made publick Sacrifices to Juſtice, and to the quiet of the eſtabliſh'd Government, long before now.

Mer.

But is it not hard, that a Man of great Learning, ſhould not have liberty to give his Judgment in a caſe of ſo great conſequence, as the Peace and Security of our Government, under which our lives and fortunes, and our all, are to be preſerv'd or ſhipwrack'd; eſpecially when his deſign is ſo apparently good and commendable?

Trav.

Firſt, Couſin, as to our preſent Author, to deal plainly with you, I cannot poſſibly remark, either his great Learning or his good deſign. But ſuppoſing he had both (which I ſhall hardly grant you) yet I muſt maintain, that any private perſon, who unauthoriz'd by our lawful Government, ſhall publiſh either by words or writings, any arguments or diſcourſe, againſt the Conſtitution of the Government by Law eſtabliſh'd, is a peſtilent, pragmatical Deceiver, a ſeditious Calumniator, and Perturbator of our Peace: His words and writings become ſcandalous Libels, and both deſerve the extreameſt puniſhments, which the rigour of the Law or Reaſon in that caſe provides.

Mer.

Hold, hold, dear Couſin, be not ſo angry.

Trav.

Sir, I ask your pardon; for whilſt you entertain me with ſo much kindneſs, it were indeed unreaſonable that I ſhould offend you in the Perſon of any Man, for whom you may bear the leaſt reſpect.

Mer.

No, no, Sir, you miſtake me; for in the firſt place I have no acquaintance with the author, ſuppoſing it, whom common fame ſpeaks him: Beſides, want of freedom in diſcourſe, abates ſo much of the profit, as well as the pleaſure of it, that I muſt conjure you to uſe all the liberty henceforward imaginable, and ſo with your good leave I intend to do my ſelf. But I confeſs I wonder'd a little to ſee you ſo warm and vigorous in the Defence of a Government, under which we muſt needs agree, that even to our own knowledg, and poſſibly amongſt our own friends, there have happen'd caſes very ſevere (not to ſay more) which ſure muſt be faults, either in the Governours, or the Government.

Trav.

Perhaps in neither, for though as you ſay, we may have remembred many particular caſes, which to us have ſeem'd hard, yet it may be, if we had fully examin'd the circumſtances of each caſe, we ſhould have found, either ſome miſmanagment in the Perſon, or ſome very unlucky contingency, which neglects or misfortunes we preſently throw upon the Government, that we may the eaſier diſcharge our ſelves.

Indeed ſuch particular caſes, how hard ſoever they may ſeem to thoſe concerned, yet ought they not to overbias or prejudice a Mans Reaſon or Juſtice, much leſs make him undermine, and endeavour to ſhake the very Conſtitution of our preſent Government; which having ſubſiſted ſo long, been conſtituted, approved, confirmed, by ſo many wiſe, juſt, and valiant Princes; and conſented to, eſtabliſhed, and couragiouſly aſſerted by ſuch a long Series of our grave, and learned Anceſtors, remains the ſame at this day in the ſubſtantial part, which it ever hath been in the beſt of times, and under the adminiſtration of much greater Politicians than our quack Stateſman, (who ever he was) ſeems to have been.

Mer.

I know not what our former Conſtitution hath been. It is ſufficient to mind you, that now the incertainty of grants, and Court favours hath been ſuch, that many men have never enjoyed, what with great pains and expence they thought they had obtained; and I ſtill think that a fault.

Trav.

I gueſs poſſibly what you mean, and I confeſs Machiavel above all things adviſes his Prince to avoid the imputation of eaſineſs, or unſteadineſs. He would not have him be, Varius, or Levis, as he calls it. But on the contrary, to be ſo firm and conſtant in all that he ſays, or reſolves, as not to leave in any Man, ſo much as the hopes of moving or deceiving him. Ita ſententiam ſuam quam ſemel pronuntiavit, ratam ac firmam haberi velit, ut ab ea nunquam deduci, aut dimoveri poſſe procerto teneant, ac talem de ſe opinionem ſuſtineri ac retineri ſtudeat, ut illorum nemo veniat, ut illum aut decipi aut flecti poſſe cogitet. This certainly is good advice, and poſſibly very proper in our circumſtances; and this exact care of a Prince in keeping his word, and not paſſing one grant over the head of another, might be more practicable in the little Government, under which Machiavel wrote, than in ours, which hath ſuch numerous Offices depending upon his Majeſties grace and favour. But ſtill if this Fermete, be wanting, and hard caſes do ſometimes happen, yet nothing can be more ridiculous and unjuſt, than preſently to accuſe the Government: For ſuch things have happen'd under the beſt forms of Government that ever have been, or ever will be, whether Monarchical or Democratical, and will ever happen, whilſt we are govern'd by men, who are all more or leſs naturally ſubject to inevitable frailties. We muſt therefore diſtinguiſh between the Supream Governours, and the ſubordinate ones, and both from the Conſtitution of the Government. The firſt, as I ſaid, are ſubject to weakneſſes and infirmities, and when they are too frequent, I mean in the ſubordinate Officers, they may be eaſily remov'd or chang'd, without deſtroying or altering the Government.

For as a man would be juſtly thought mad, or highly imprudent, who finding that by the negligence of Servants, a Door-poſt, or Window, a Joyſt, Beam or Rafter of his Houſe had been decay'd, ſhould immediately pull down the whole building, with a deſign to repair only thoſe little breaches; ſo that Politician is certainly moſt unfit for a Prince's Cabinet, or Houſe of Parliament, who finding, it may be, ſome miſmanagement in State-affairs, ſhould preſently reſolve to pull down the Fabrick it ſelf, I mean Monarchy, and in its place build up a phantaſtical Commonwealth, then tranſform that into an Optimacy, then an Oligarchy, till having paſt through all the misfortunes, which innovation and change have generally produc'd, we fall neceſſarily into confuſion and Anarchy, and in that moſt miſerable ſtate, become either Slaves to ſome mechanical Tyrant, ſprung up from the Lees of the people, and rais'd by the foul breath of vulgar applauſe, or made eternally a pittiful Province loaden with afflictions, and groaning under the heavy Taxes of a foreign Conquerour.

By this time, Couſin, I hope you underſtand the difference between Governours and Governments; the ſolid Foundation, or the whole Houſe it ſelf, from its Ornaments, or ſome neceſſary or convenient parts of it, and the dangers which attend the change of the one, more than of the other. I ſhall endeavour to ſhew you next, if you command me, what unjuſt pretences our old neglected Politician has found out, to endeavour an alteration in either, and what falſe arguments he produces to favour his pretence.

Mer.

Nothing can oblige me more; And that we may not loſe the advantage of this fine morning, ſince you are now ready, let us be walking. I'le lead you through my Garden, which brings us into the walk I ſpake of, and in the Arbour, if you pleaſe, we may diſcourſe farther of theſe matters.

Trav.

Moſt willingly. And to help the unfaithfulneſs of my memory; I'le take my conſtant companion Grotius in my Pocket.

Mer.

And I, that I may be able now and then to make ſome oppoſition, or at leaſt ask ſome pertinent Queſtions, will take with me our friend Plato Redivivus.

Trav.

Beſt of all: You will find, whatever is well or ill ſaid by him already ſcor'd to your hand.

Mer.

Come then, let us walk. You ſee, Couſin, that my Garden is but ſmall, but the Soil is very proper for Fruit, and lies well enough to the South Sun, which is a great advantage to us.

Trav.

Yes: And I ſee you have plaſht your Vines upon Treilles; which ſure ripens the Fruit better than when they touch the Walls. Then your Gravel walks are particular to our Country, and finer than any thing I have ſeen of that kind, either in France or Italy.

Mer.

You may take notice alſo that I want not Water, for I have an excellent Spring, which lies cloſe by the Arbour to which we are going, that ſerves all the offices of my Houſe. Here Sir, is the walk I told you of.

Trav.

It is indeed very pleaſant and I ſuppoſe we ſee at the end of it the Arbour you mean.

Mer.

The ſame. There we ſhall have a very fine proſpect over a great part of our Country. But what will pleaſe me much better, I hope to have there the advantage of your Diſcourſe, upon a ſubject, which will be no leſs delightful than profitable, to a man who has had neither time nor learning enough to examine thoſe high points, which do not much belong to a man of my profeſſion.

Trav.

Sir, I am very well ſatisfied concerning your judgment and your learning alſo: For I remember you were reputed the beſt Scholar in Paul's School, when I was at Weſtminſter. And if the death of your Father had not happen'd in the nick of time, you were deſign'd for Oxford, when I went to Cambridg. However having lately had occaſion to read ſomewhat more of theſe matters, than it may be you have done, I ſhall be very willing to give you my opinion, as far as my reading goes, provided you will excuſe my ignorance, and preſumption, in ſeeming to inform you of what poſſibly you are better inſtructed than my ſelf.

Mer.

Pray, dear Couſin, let's loſe no time in complements, we are now in the Arbour, and here are ſeats convenient enough.

Trav.

Sir, I am ready to obey your commands. And that we may proceed in ſome method, at leaſt as good as your Author there has taken; and becauſe I ſuppoſe it is thought by ſome, that he has treated as fully and clearly upon that ſubject, as is neceſſary to ſatisfie a reaſonable man, let us examine him from the beginning to the end.

Mer.

That I fear will be too tedious for you.

Trav.

No Sir, you have only to read thoſe places, which are marked with the red lead Pen; And if you pleaſe to add any arguments of your own (which I am confident will have more weight, than many which he has produc'd) I will endeavour to give you the moſt plain and ſatisfactory Anſwers I can.

Mer.

Agreed; And in the firſt place I find, you have wounded even Plato himſelf in the very Title of the Book.

Trav.

No Sir, it is only his Ghoſt or Doemon, Plato Redivivus; For to tell you the truth, I never was a friend to ſuch troubleſome ſpirits. But in earneſt, do you not think it a little arrogance in our Polypragmatick (notwithſtanding the gentle excuſe of the Publiſher) to aſſume the Title even of Plato himſelf. I am confident, could Plato look into the world again he would be much aſham'd to ſee how ill a figure his Ghoſt makes among all ſober men, and it would prove a ſecond death more cruel than the firſt, to ſee himſelf ſo ill Traveſtie.

Mar.

But Couſin, he that maintains Plato's opinions, may ſurely without offence call himſelf Plato's Friend and Diſciple, and Honoris gratia, as our Author ſays, take upon himſelf the name of him, whom he admires and follows; that is common enough at this day among our ſelves.

Trav.

'Tis true, but in that caſe he ought rather to have ſtiled himſelf Plato Britannicus: That would have made diſtinction enough between the Maſter and the Scholar, agreed better with the inſtances which you have brought on his behalf, and have been more modeſt than Redivivus.

However you muſt conſider that Plato and others living then under Common-wealths, wrote in favour of that Form of Government, under which their lives and fortunes were protected. And beſides, many of them, being but the late corruptions of Monarchy or Ariſtocracy, wanted the learn'd Philoſopher's defence. But to alter, nay totally deſtroy the ancient eſtabliſh'd Government, under which we enjoy all the bleſſings and liberties, which our Anceſtors ever did, or we can reaſonably deſire, would have been ſo much contrary to the Wiſdom and Judgment of Plato, that he would no more-have wrote in our days, for a Democracy in London, than for Monarchy at Athens.

Add to this the vaſt difference between the State of Greece in thoſe days, and that of Great Britain in theſe: The firſt was divided into ſeveral different Governments, all aemulous of one anothers greatneſs, and were oftentimes forc'd to make great alterations in their Polities, according to the miſfortunes, or ſucceſs of their Neighbours, who beſides were all upon the ſame Continent, and had no other bounds or ſeparation between them, than a hedge or brook, or at moſt a little River.

But England having ſubſiſted gloriouſly and happily, more than 1700 years, as authentick Hiſtory can witneſs, under a Monarchical Government, and divided from the world by a Ditch which nature has made, not eaſily paſſable, Toto diviſos orbe Britannos, fears no interruption whatſoever, in our Tranquillity or Government, but ſuch as may proceed from ſeditious men, whom falſe miſchievous and calumniating perſons (ſuch as our Author may, if tolerated, decoy into ſome Rebellion as unnatural, as to themſelves deſtructive.

To conclude, I appeal to all wiſe men, whether the Government of Athens in thoſe days, be more applicable and neceſſary for us and ours in theſe, than to affirm, that the Government of France could not poſſibly ſubſiſt, except they introduce the Diſcipline of Geneva, or Polity of the little Commonwealth of Luca or Genoua.

Mer.

I am much pleaſed with this way of reaſoning, and am well ſatisfi'd, that times, and places, and circumſtances, may alter our reaſon exceedingly, and that no one Polity, or Form of Governments or laws whatſoever, are univerſally proper for all places.

Plato, I think, introduc'd in his Commonwealth, a commonalty or common uſe of Wives or Women, as well as of all other Goods and Chattels. Lycurgus forbad the uſe of Gold and Silver, divided all the Lands equally amongſt all, and permitted the noble exerciſe of ſtealing. Sure could theſe two learned men preach the ſame Doctrine in our days at London, as they did then in Sparta and Athens, they would be look'd upon rather as madmen, than great Law-givers and Philoſophers.

Trav.

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , or rapto vivere, was indeed commendable among the Aegyptians, and generally all the Grecians, as well as Spartans. But it was not, ad ſumptum libidini proebendum, as Gellius obſerves, but only pro exercitio diſciplináque reipublicoe factitatum. To accuſtom their youth to vigilance and agility, that thereby they might be initiated in ſome meaſure in military affairs, and learn the practical part of laying, as well as avoiding the ſnares and ambuſhes of their enemies.

This practice in Peace prepar'd them for War abroad, and the impoſſibility of gaining any thing at home, together with the ſmall reward of Induſtry, ſo inclin'd them to it, that they fancied, they could be no where more miſerable, than in their own Houſes, nor ever lead a more unfortunate than a peaceable life, Ils eſtoient ſi malheureux en leurs maiſons (ſays my Author) qu' ils ne demandoient que la guerre pour en ſontir, & trouver dans la fatique des armes du ſoulagement a leurs maux. And I am confident, whoſoever ſhall conſider impartially the Laws and Conſtitutions of thoſe older Democratical Governments, I mean of Rome, as well as Sparta and Athens, will find, that they were adapted, and contriv'd rather for the e largement and conqueſt of other Countries, than the peace and ſecurity of their own, and in effect they were all three in contitinual Wars; ſometimes Conquerors, ſometimes reduc'd to the utmoſt extremities of Conqueſt, untill at laſt, having paſt through all the miſeries which Change and Wars produce, they were united all, and conſolidated under a Monarchy, from which only true ſolid Form of Government, they at firſt proceeded.

Now how improper ſuch Laws and Conſtitutions would prove for us, who are in no meaſure in their circumſtances, and to whom all foreign acquiſitions, have been juſtly thought rather chargeable, and prejudicial, than advantageous, I leave to you and all ſober men to determin.

As for Plato, it is true, that he permitted the promiſcuous uſe of Women, as may be ſeen in his 4 Repub. for which amongſt other things Ariſtotle reprehends him in his 2 Polit. c. 5.

But that might proceed from the little reſpect which he had for that Sex, and great love for the other, which made him ſo great a Paederaſtiſt, or to ſpeak plainer, a Sodomite that he wiſh'd himſelf as many eyes, as there were Stars in the Heavens, the better to admire his dear Alexis, his Phedius, or his Agathon; witneſs (amongſt other tender expreſſions) that celebrated Diſtich to his beloved Agathon.

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 .

I cannot paſs by a memorable paſſage to this purpoſe of Philo, a great favourer of Plato, who tells us in his Book De vita Contemplatrice, that Plato's Convivia's were all ſpent in the affairs of love, not of Men towards Women, or Women towards Men, which the Law of nature doth very well approve, but of Men towards one another, or youths no way differing but in their Ages, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , &c.

Now whether our Climate be warm enough to entertain ſuch Philoſophical and Amorous notions, will be an experiment amongſt his Politicks, worthy the name of Plato Redivivus.

But to return to his Government, and that you may not be carried away with the fame only, or great reputation of any man, whether ancient or modern; give me leave to mind you, that Plato, as great a Philoſopher as he was, had nevertheleſs an Antagoniſt, as eminent in all manner of learning as himſelf; I mean the admirable Xenophon, who, whilſt Plato inſtituted his Commonwealth, defended worthily the moſt excellent Government of Monarchy, as may be ſeen at large in his Cyropaidia. And ſo jealous were theſe two famous men of their name and honour, that as Plato in all his writings never named Xenophon, tho' contemporaries, ſo Xenophon alſo never made any mention of Plato.

Mer.

This, Couſin, is thus far very plain and ſatisfactory, that is to ſay, that the ancient Cuſtoms, Laws, and Governments of Greece, or any other part of the World, though contriv'd and modell'd by men extreamly learned, and moſt proper for thoſe times and Countries, where they were in force, are not for that ſingle reaſon practicable in our days, and in our Kingdom, any farther than our caſe and circumſtances agree with theirs.

And that the Authority of Plato, Lycurgus, or Solon, or any other, are to be admitted no farther than their laws are proper or convenient for us.

Trav.

Right, for though Galen, Hypocrates or Aeſculapius himſelf, ſhould have deliver'd as an Oracle that Phlebotomy is good in Feavers, yet if a modern Phyſician ſhall from thence affirm that we may as ſafely bleed an ancient Phlegmatick perſon, languiſhing under a malignant Feaver, as a vigorous, young, Sanguine man, who is ſick of a burning Feaver, I think in reaſon, we ought not to admit of his inference.

Beſides, you muſt again remark, that as Democracy, ſo Monarchy had equally its learned Champions, as Homer, Callimachus, Ariſtotle, Seneca and others.

Mer.

I apprehend you, and from thence you would inſinuate, that the Republiques of Holland, Venice, or Geneva, may as well follow the Maxims of Xenophon, and imitate the Governments of Perſia, and generally all the Eaſtern Monarchies upon the bare credit of that Great Man, and example of thoſe Flouriſhing Empires as England, France, or Spain, the diſcipline of Plato, upon his ſole Authority, and Fortune of his little Grecian Common-wealth. Your inference is moſt reaſonable, and your deſign moſt juſt, which is to diſengage our judgments from the dependance upon any Mans great Reputation, I have only one queſtion or two to ask you, before we leave Greece, the rather becauſe I would be well informed, concerning a Country whoſe proſperity under their good Laws, and Democratical form of Government, our Author has produced as great arguments, and rules for our imitation.

Trav.

By all means Sir, for as nothing can oblige me more, than to uſe all poſſible freedom in asking whatſoever you doubt, or ſeems difficult to you, ſo you can never make this Diſcourſe without that liberty, either pleaſurable or profitable.

Mer.

Pray then Sir, give me leave to mind you, that you were juſt now ſaying, that ſome of thoſe Grecian Republicks, were but the corruptions of Monarchy, or Ariſtocracy: and that notwithſtanding their excellent Laws, they were not only engaged in many moſt deſperate Wars, but that their very Laws themſelves, ſeem'd to induce them: If your memory can ſerve to make this out, or bring any few examples, I ſhall be extremely ſatisfied, eſpecially ſince the true knowledge of the ancient ſtate of Greece, will be a great help to me in your following diſcourſe.

Trav.

I ſhall endeavour to give you as plain and as ſhort an anſwer, as the caſe, and my memory will permit. And to your firſt Queſtion, I muſt tell you, that all Greece was originally Govern'd under moſt abſolute Monarchies. And that they deſcended for many ages ſucceſſively from Father to Son, as generally amongſt us at this day.

I will pitch chiefly upon Athens and Sparta, which I ſuppoſe will be ſufficient at preſent: I need not begin ſo high as the very original of Greece it ſelf, and tell you they were peopled by Fathers of Families. I mean Jon, Javon, or Javan the Son of Japhet. Whence durum Japeti genus, and thence their name 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , as is obſerv'd by Suidas.

Of theſe you may read farther in Joſephus and other Authors. I ſhall only mind you, that before Deucalion's Floud, Cecrops was ſaid to have brought Learning, and with it Idolatry out of Aegypt into Greece, and was King in that Country, which we call Attica or Athens. Ante Deucalionis tempora Regem habuêre Cecropem. Cran us ſucceeded Cecrops, to whoſe Daughter Athis that Country owes its name. After him Amphiction, who dedicated the Town to Minerva, and from her name call'd it Athenae. In his days happen'd the Floud of Deucalion: After that per ordinem ſucceſſionis, the Kingdom deſcended to Erichthe s or Erichthonius, then paſſing through many others, unto Theſeus, and from him to Demophoon, who was an aſſociate in the Trojan War. There you have a long Catalogue of the Grecian Kings, without the leaſt mention either of an Ariſtocracy or a Democracy amongſt them. And from thence the Kingdom fell by ſucceſſion to Codrus, the Son of Melanthus, who was the laſt King of Athens. Euſebius in his Chronology gives us the names of Sixteen Kings of Athens to Codrus incluſively, which ſpace of time makes up near Five hundred years. And in his time it was, that a War broke out between the Athenians and the Dorians. Which laſt when they conſulted the Oracle of Apollo, which ſhould have the better, it was anſwer'd, that they ſhould certainly overcome their enemies, except the King of the Athenians were ſlain: Upon this, ſtrict charge was given to their Army, that none ſhould preſume •• hurt the Athenian King; but Codrus being inform'd, as well of the Anſwer f the Oracle, as the order which the Dorians had given, unknown to any, clad himſelf in a miſerable habit, and geting in that condition into the Enemies Camp, rais'd on purpoſe an impertinent quarrel, and was there according to his intent, ſlain by his enemies. This being ſoon diſcover'd, the Dorians of themſelves retreated home, and the War ended: Quis eum non miretur, aith Paterculus, qui iis artibus mortem quoeſierit, quibus ab ignavis vita quoeri ſolet?

Much ſuch an action did Leonidas King of Sparta for the ſafety of his Country in the Perſian War, at the ſtreights of Thermopiloe. Who being admoniſh'd by the Oracle, that either himſelf muſt fall, or Sparta, dy'd deſperately fighting in the midſt of the Perſian Army.

I believe, Couſin, you will hardly remark two more generous actions of publick ſpirited men in any Commonwealth, than thoſe of theſe two M narchs. But to return to Athens, M don Son to Codrus, was firſt Archon Athens, in whoſe Family that Kingdom continued, having chang'd nothing by the name of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , into Archon, until the death of Alcmoeon.

After him Charops was firſt created Archon for Ten years only, which conſtitution laſted Seventy years. The laſt of thoſe was Erixias—Tum annu s commiſſa eſt magiſtratibus Respublica. Then Monarchy lay bleeding, and their Archon became but an annual Magiſtrate.

The firſt of theſe was Creon, to whom Nine other Princes were choſen, ex nobilibus urbis. And under this Form it was, which we may truly call an Ariſtocracy, That Solon was appointed to make them laws, which it ſeems were contrived ſo equal, between the Senate and the People, that he was we •• eſteem'd, and thank'd on both ſides: This was the firſt conſiderable change in the Athenian Government, for wh •• was before a Monarchy, and Govern'd abſolutely according to the will of the Monarch, became now an Optimacy, or if you will, according to Iſocrates, a mix'd Democracy, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , and had now, by the diligence of Solon, certain publick written Laws, which (as I ſaid) ſeem'd ſo reaſonable, that both the Prince and the People obliged themſelves to obſerve them.

Mer.

Pray Couſin, by your leave, had the Athenians no Law before Solon? And did their Kings rule after their own Wills, which we may call, Fancies or Inclinations?

Trav.

Firſt, Sir, the Athenians had, as I ſaid, no certain publick Laws, by which they might conſtantly know their Duty, and which might regulate the Princes Commands, as well as their Obedience, except a few which Draco made for them about ſixty Years before Solon; which being now moſtly antiquated, ſignify'd little. Solon therefore is truly ſaid to have found Laws proper for the Government and Times, which were both much out of order and diſtracted. Adminiſtratio Reipublicoe annuis magiſtratibus commiſſa, ſed Civitati nulloe tunc leges erant, quia •• bido Regu •• pro legibus habebatur. Legitur itaque Solon, vir juſtitia inſignis, qui velut novam Civitatem legibus conder t, &c.

And for their Kings, I muſt tell you, that anciently, not only in Greece, in which there were ſeveral Kingdoms, but generally all the World over, the People were govern'd, purely and ſimply, according to the good Will and Pleaſure of their Prince. This you will eaſily believe was very inconvenient for the People. For, ſince there are more bad than good amongſt all ſor s of Men and Profeſſions, it happened by conſequence, that there were generally in the World more evil than juſt and vertuous Princes.

The laſt therefore were ador'd as Gods. The firſt, from the very ill uſe of their right of Power, were deſervedly call'd Tyrants, and ſometimes remov'd by violence, when their Yoke grew inſupportable.

Mer.

I do not wonder at it; for humane Nature hath its Bounds, beyond which it cannot ſuffer; and both Reſpect and Obedience too, will break, when bent with too much Rigor and beyond their Trempe.

Trav.

This hath happen'd, and may do ſo again, eſpecially amongſt People whoſe Underſtandings having been never open'd by the more glorious Rays and Light of the Goſpel, follow, at beſt, the Dictates of Nature only; amongſt which, that of Self-Preſervation is none of the leaſt. But you will obſerve, that theſe Accidents are ſtill no Arguments againſt a Monarchical Form of Government, no more than the happy Reign of a good King, and the entire Obedience of moſt dutiful Subjects, are certain Reaſons for it, theſe being Contingences, and may vary often, in Prince, or People, or in both together.

Mer.

What ſolid Foundation then do you eſtabliſh for perpetuating a Government, and judging of its Goodneſs?

Trav.

The ſame which God and Moſes did, I mean, good Laws, of which we have as many, as prudently penn'd, and as proper for us, as any People upon Earth; not only in the point of Meum and Tuum, but the more neceſſary parts of Obedience and Command, the Right of Power and Honour in the Governour, and Right of Priviledge and Protection in the Governed; that the one may be ſecur'd againſt Oppreſſion, and the other from Violation. And in this it was, that Solon, (having probably in his Travels peruſed Part, it not all the Law of Moſes, and nicking the Circumſtances of the troubleſome Affairs in Attica) ſucceeded ſo well that, as hath been ſaid, he had the Fortune to make ſuch Laws, and contrive ſuch a Form of Government, as for a time pleaſ'd both Parties.

Mer.

Pray, How did Athens proſper under theſe new Laws, and this Innovation in the Government?

Trav.

As for the Laws, they continued in Force for many Years: but for the Form of Government, it ſucceeded as generally all Innovations do, eſpecially ſuch as are popular; for, his mingled Democracy became, even in his own Days, a perfect Monarchy, under the Reign of Piſiſtratus, to whom, even Solon himſelf was a conſtant Privy Councillor.

Mer.

It ſurpriſes me extreamly, that ſo wiſe a Man as Solon ſhould fail ſo groſly in ſo material a Point as the Eſtabliſhment of his new Government.

Trav.

Sir, you will ceaſe to wonder, when I ſhall tell you how the Caſe and his Circumſtances ſtood. Attica was divided into three principal Factions, according to the three different Situations of the Country. The Mountaineers were all for a Popular Government; thoſe of the plain or low Country affected an Ariſtocracy; the Coaſters, and thoſe who liv'd near the Sea-ſide, deſir'd rather a mix'd Government; but all the People and poorer ſort were ſo generally indebted to the Rich, that they paid annually no leſs than the ſixth part of all they had, to their Creditors: whence they were call'd Hectemor i; and many were ſo deſperately engag'd that they were forc'd to ſell their Children.

In theſe Diſtractions and Afflictions, the more ſober part did believe, That nothing could ſo truly heal their Grievances as returning again under the Government of a Monarch; whoſe Power being deſpotical, might, according as himſelf ſhould think moſt juſt, end all their Differences, by eaſing the Poor, without exaſperating the Rich.

In this Conjuncture, Solon (being a rich Merchant, and a wiſe Man, and living ſplendidly enough) grew ſo popular, that the common People invited him to take the Government wholly upon himſelf. Two of the Parties were very zealous in it, and the third ſeem'd well enough ſatisfy'd that the Management of all ſhould be in the Hands of ſo prudent a Man, as he was thought to be.

But Solon very unadviſedly refuſing what was offer'd him, ſuffer'd himſelf to be choſen after Philombrotus their Archon; and then, to gratifie the People, who had been ſo reſpective to him, he aboliſheth their Debts, and gave them a greater ſhare in the Government than in good reaſon and Policy they ought to have had. All their Law-givers and Politicians, after Draco, (as Joſephus cont. App. obſerves) aut Civitatem laudantes, aut Reges, that is, affected, according to their Circumſtances or Inclinations, a Popular or a Monarchical Government.

Mer.

But this ſure ſhould rather have ſtrengthned their popular Government, than introduced another ſo contrary to it.

Trav.

No Sir, that's a Miſtake; for when Men are unduely raiſed to the Helm who are born to obey, or as Agrippa obſerves, Qui hoereditariam obedientiam ſuſceperunt, their new Power, like Strong Liquors, intoxicates them, their Heads grow giddy, and they become more inſolent and unſupportable, even to their Fellows, for whoſe ſakes they receiv'd their Honours, than the moſt abſolute Monarchs generally have been. This makes them eaſily ſhake off the ſervile Yoke, and return to the Obedience of their natural Prince, or elſe ſome aſpiring Man amongſt them uſurps all. So the popular Sedition of the Gracchi, and ſome others of the Tribunes, confirm'd the Authority of the Conſuls, and introduc'd at laſt (even by the Conſent of the People) a Monarchical Government.

Mer.

This Obſervation is moſt juſt, and common enough amongſt us, nothing being more ridiculouſly proud and inſolent, than a Clown in Office. But what became afterwards of Athens?

Trav.

Piſiſtratus having govern'd very well, about thirty five Years, left the Kingdom to his Son Diocles; who being murther'd by one of his Subjects, the other Son, Hippias, was baniſh'd by the Rebellious Multitude, and the Government fell again into the Hands of the People. Then it became an Ariſtocracy, and was governed wholly by the Senate, Permittente populo imperium ad Senatum transfertur. Then a Tyranny under thirty Governours, each of which was more cruel than any of their former Kings had been. Then they reduc'd the thirty to ten Tyrants; then the Government came to the People again; and, in a Word, paſſing through all the Changes and Forms which they could invent, they had nothing certain and eſtabliſh'd but continual Wars, which laſted untill they became Slaves to the Macedonian Conquerour, and at laſt remain'd Subjects to the Roman and Grecian, as at preſent to the Turkiſh Emperours.

Mer.

And was this the Condition of the celebrated Athenian Governments? are their Wars and Changes the admirable Bleſſings which we are encouraged to ſeek after?

Trav.

Sir, I relate only matter of Fact, as you will find at large in Thucydides, Juſtin, Plutarch, and ſeveral other Authors; make what uſe of it you think fitting.

Mer.

The Uſe is plain; which is, To ſeek after Peace while I live, and, by the Grace of God, endeavour, as far as belongs to a Man of my Profeſſion, to ſupport the preſent Government by Law eſtabliſhed, that we may avoid the Plague of Innovation, and the Slavery of ſome Macedonian Conquerour. One Word more, dear Couſin: How came Athens to produce ſuch excellent Wits as it ſeems it did, in thoſe troubleſome Days?

Trav.

As our Miſeries under the Tyranny of the rebellious Houſe of Commons, and Uſurpation of a Plebeian, produced ſeveral moſt learned Works; or as the Perſecution of the Primitive Church procur'd the excellent Volumes of many Holy Fathers and Martyrs.

Beſides, you muſt believe •• at Athens had ſome Intervals of Proſperity: but that is ſtill little to our purpoſe; for, I cannot think it reaſonable that we in this Age ſhould be oblig'd •• in ur all the Misfortunes, which Innovation generally produces, in hopes that the next Age may be (if poſſible) more happy and flouriſhing t •• n we are at preſent.

Mer.

Sir, I am hitherto perfectly well ſatisfied, and eg your Pardon for the Trouble which I have given you; but it will ſhorten our way very much in our Diſcourſe hereafter. One word concerning the famous Spar ••• Commonwealth, and then I have done.

Trav.

That will not coſt us much time. You muſt know then, that Sparta was govern'd originally by Kings, as Athens was. They reckon nine ſucceſſively to Lycurgus, whoſe Power was alſo moſt arbitrary. But then the Kingdom falling, by Right of Succeſſion, to Charyllus, Poſthumate Son to Polybita, Lycurgus his Uncle taking the Advantage of his Nephew's Minority, gave the People Laws, and made ſome Alteration in the Government, which conſiſted principally in the Inſtitution of a Senate compoſed of twenty eight of his own chiefeſt Friends. The Kingdom he deliver'd to his Nephew aſſoon as he came of Age.

Mer.

What kind of Government do you call that?

Trav.

Monarchy, without doubt. It is true, their Senate had given to them a greater Right of Power than ours have, who enjoy only a Right of Counſel and Conſent, or a ſubordinate Power for the Diſpenſation of Juſtice; and the People had Liberty to chooſe their Senators. But the Right of making Peace and War, vvith ſeveral other Prerogatives, together vvith the Right of Succeſſion, continued alvvays in the Prince.

Mer.

I have heard much talk of the Ephori. Were not they created on purpoſe to abate the Authority of their Kings?

Trav.

Sir, they were not created, until about an Hundred and thirty years after the death of Lycurgus: And then if we may believe their Kings Agis and Cleomenes whom our Author hath mention'd) their Authority was only to do juſtice, whilſt their Kings were abſent in the Wars, and were properly the Kings Miniſters, they uſurped indeed afterwards a Soveraign Authority and dar'd to depoſe the Kings themſelves; for which Uſurpation, Cleomenes, who divided again the Land among the People, ſlew them publickly as enemies to the ancient Government, and preſent proſperity and peace of Sparta.

Mer.

Pray Couſin, what new Laws did Lycurgus inſtitute with his new Government.

Trav.

Many Sir, but ſure not much to our purpoſe, or fit for our imitation; for at firſt they had none, Non habentibus Spartanis leges inſtituit, &c. Their Prince's will, being (as I have already obſerv'd) the only rule. But Lycurgus conſidering, I imagin, the greatneſs of the Spartan name, fram'd Laws moſt proper for the encouraging War, and educating the People from their infancy in a military kind of Diſcipline; Amongſt other Laws he totally forbad the uſe of Gold and Silver, Auri argentique uſum, velut omnium ſcelerum materiam ſuſtulit, he forbad traffick, but encourag'd idleneſs and ſtealing.

He commended parſimony and hardſhip, and order'd that all the People of Sparta, ſhould always eat together, that none ſhould eat at his own houſe, except upon great occaſion. That the young Women ſhould dance, and exerciſe publickly without any manner of covering upon them, and many ſuch, too long to repeat at preſent.

Judge then how ridiculous and unpracticable, and unneceſſary theſe Laws would appear in our age, and in our climate and circumſtances; To conclude let me refer you to two ſufficient Authors, concerning the Spartan Laws. The firſt is Ariſtotle, in his 7. Pol. cap. 14. who tells us, that the cheif admirers of the Spartan Commonwealth, have plac'd its ſole excellency, in having Laws adapted moſt Particularly for War and Victory. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . &c. The other is Euripides in his Andromache. His Words are theſe;

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . Si vis Martia Vobis lacones abſit, et ferri decus, Spectatur ultra quid ſit eximium, nihil. What can ye boaſt, ye Spartans, if ye ceaſe To fight like Dogs, and live like Men in Peace.

Add to all, this ſingle Conſideration, That Lacedemonia was but as a ſmall Province, in Compariſon of the Kingdom of Great Britany; and Sparta, no more than a Corporation Town. And when you have done this, let their Law, or Form of Government, be what it will, I dare undertake to make it appear, that they are ſo far from being made an Example for our Imitation, that our own Government, as diſtemper'd as our Author would have it, even at this time, while we are diſcourſing, is a more excellent Form, and the Laws more juſt and reaſonable and conducing more to the Safety and Perpetuity of the Government, and Peace and happy Subſiſtence of the People, than either Sparta or Athens ever enjoyed, or any other part of Greece, or Government in the World, except that Monarchy, which God himſelf was pleas'd to inſtitute, and which, above any other, ours does moſt particularly imitate. And this, I hope, is a ſufficient Anſwer to whatſoever our Author hath offer'd concerning Greece.

Mer.

Dear Couſin, You have more than perform'd your Promiſe; and that my Pleaſure as well as Profit may be compleat, pray let us proceed with our Author.

Trav.

Aſſoon as you pleaſe.

Mer.

What ſay you then to the firſt Day?

Trav.

Very little, ſave only that I never knew a Day worſe ſpent in my Life, nothing being more nauſeous than to read the impertinent Complements of three Fools, extolling one anothers great Parts and Learning; when, if we may believe the Publiſher, who comes in like Sapientum octavus, the eighth wiſe Man, the whole Triumvirate, or if you will, Quatrumvirate are included in the politick individuum of the Engliſh Gentleman.

Mer.

Really, I was almoſt deceiv'd at firſt, and did begin to fancy that I knew the Phyſician.

Trav.

It was without doubt his Deſign to deceive all Men.

Mer.

To what Purpoſe?

Trav.

That he might make the credulous Reader believe, that there were more learned Men of his Opinion beſides himſelf. But truly, I think that neither the State of Venice, nor Colledge of Phyſicians, are much oblig'd to him, for picking out two of their Societies, to make up ſo ridiculous a Comedy.

Mer.

Is that way of writing Ancient or Modern?

Trav.

Dialogue was oftentimes very properly uſed among the Ancients; but they ſeldom introduc'd more than two, if the Subject of their Diſcourſe were grave and ſerious.

Mer.

Why then hath our Author made choice of three?

Trav.

I ſuppoſe the noble Venetian wanted Learning enough, to comprehend ſo profound a Diſcourſe, and the Phyſician, we muſt imagine, had not anatomiz'd or ſtudied the Body Politick, ſo throughly as he had done the Body Natural, and ſo could not ſee ſo far into a Milſtone as a Venetian Stateſman can, who, as our Nobleman tells us, will ſometimes diſcover a State Maraſmus breaking out, two hundred Years after the paſſing an indigeſted Law; and this without the help of any Teleſcope: both therefore poſſeſſing ſeparately theſe eminent Qualifications, became joyntly an Auditory worthy of Sir Politick Wouldbee's Doctrine. Beſides, you know the number Three is moſt perfect. But had I been advis'd withall, I could have ſhewn our Author this Number of Three ſo ingeniouſly and politically plac'd, that our Medicopolitico-Venetian Publiſher might have born a better part than he does, in his Book, without either altering the Number or ſpoiling the Figure.

But, to be ſerious, I muſt confeſs, Couſin, that I have ſometimes heard two or three Fools cog •• onaring one another, as our Author calls it; and it hath been pleaſant enough: But that one Coglione ſhould preſume to coglionare three Kingdoms, impoſe upon His Majeſty, deſpiſe the Wiſdom of the Lords and Commons, His Majeſty's Privy Council, and Learned Judges of the Land; and laſt of all, to give the Fool to all our Worthy Anceſtors, who have liv'd within the Compaſs of four hundred years, according to his Account, is ſo ridiculous a piece of Inſolence, that I know not whether I ſhould be more angry at his Arrogance, than laugh at his Impertinence. But, let us proceed, and ſee whether the ſecond Day will afford us any thing better.

Mer.

Nothing, Sir, can be more acceptable to me. But, I think, the ringing of that Bell tells us, that Dinner is ready. In the Evening my Coach ſhall carry us into a pleaſant Ai a little farther from home; where, if I ſhall not too much tire you, I ſhould be extreamly pleas'd to hear your Opinion of the Second Part.

Trav.

Moſt willingly, Sir; and by that time I ſhall have rubb'd over ſome few of my old Notes, whereby I may be able to give you a little better Satisfaction than hitherto I have done.

Mer.

Dear Couſin, I ſhall own my ſelf much oblig'd to you; and in the mean time, let us go drink a Health or two to our Good Friends at London.

Trav.

Sir, I wait upon you.

Second Diſcourſe. Mer.

COme Sir, we are now in the open Air, and, I think, in a pleaſant Country. And, to tell you the Truth, I am ſo much pleaſed with our Morning Diſcourſe, that I cannot any longer forbear importuning and perſecuting you, untill we ſhall have got through our politick Author, and examined whether we be really ſo ſick as he would make us believe we are; and if we be, whether he hath gheſſed right at our Diſtemper, and our Cure.

Trav.

In good faith, Couſin, I am perſwaded he plays the Knave with us, as thoſe idle People did, when they took in the Gentleman's Doublet, making him believe he was in a Dropſie, and only let it out again when they thought fit to tell him he was cur'd. But however, pray Sir proceed.

Mer.

The firſt Remark which you have made lies, I perceive, upon the high Commendation which the Noble Venetian hath beſtow'd upon our Country, in Page 16.

Trav.

Pray read it.

Mer.

He ſaith then, That ſince he arriv'd in England, he finds it one of the moſt flouriſhing Kingdoms in Europe, full of ſplendid Nobility and Gentry, the comelieſt Perſons alive, valiant, courteous, knowing and bountiful; well ſtor'd with Commons, honeſt, induſtrious, fitted for Buſineſs, Merchandiſe, Arts, or Arms, prodigious for Learning, and ſucceeding to Admiration, in the Perfection of all Sciences.

Trav.

Add to this, the good Character which our Author himſelf gives of us, That there is not a more Loyal or Faithful People to their Prince in the whole World, than ours are: that we have as gracious and good a Prince as is any where to be found, having never yet heard that he did, or attempted to do, any the leaſt Act of Arbitrary Power, in any publick Concern, or endeavoured to take from any particular Perſon, the benefit of the Law: that his only Brother, and Heir to the Crown, is a moſt glorious and honourable Prince, one who has expos'd his Life, ſeveral times, for the Safety and Glory of this Nation, who pays juſtly and punctually his Debts, manages his own Fortune diſcreetly, and yet keeps the beſt Court and Equipage of any Subject in Chriſtendom: is courteous and affable to all: and in fine, hath nothing in his whole Conduct to be excepted againſt, much leſs dreaded. Theſe are our Author's own Words. Now, dear Couſin, if all theſe extraordinary Happineſſes be the Symptoms of a diſtemper'd Government, then the Lord keep me and my Friends out of a healthful one.

Mer.

But yet you ſee, that both the Venetian and himſelf concur in this, That the Poſture of our Affairs is turbulent, the Government and the People diſunited, the Gentry diſcontented; and to cure all this, he tells us, That the preſent Conſtitution of the Government it ſelf lies agonizing, muſt be alter'd and chang'd from what it is, or all will come to Deſtruction.

Trav.

Indeed I am apt enough to believe, that ſomewhat is ami s amongſt us. But to lay the fault upon the Government rightly underſtood, that I think is unreaſonable.

Mer.

Pray Sir, pleaſe to inform me what you mean by Government rightly underſtood.

Trav.

Moſt willingly, ſince it is extream neceſſary to avoid Equivocations, of which, our Author, and moſt ſuch malicious Writers as he is, are very full.

Government then, is divided into the Material part, and the Formal part. The material part, or Subjectum materiale, is the People. The Subjectum Formale, or Proprium, eſt perſona na plureſve pro cujuſque gentis legibus ac moribus, is one or more Perſons, according to the Cuſtoms of different Countries, in whom the right of Power reſides.

Now, by this diſtinction, when a Man ſhall tell you that our Government is diſtemper'd, you will certainly ask him, whether he means in the material or formal Part, becauſe Government, by uſe, is become an equivocal Word.

Mer.

I underſtand you and ſuppoſe that our Author means the formal part.

Trav.

Without doubt he does; but therein, I think he is miſtaken. For, when the whole Craſis of a Body is decay'd, and Infection is gotten into the very Marrow, and Soul of Life, the Body conſumes all over, and in every part, and never produces ſuch lively and beauteous Marks of Health and Vigour, as thoſe which the Noble Venetian and Engliſh Gentleman have numbered up. But on the other ſide, when a little Choler only, or Heat, or ſome ſharp Humours, abound, they generally ſhew themſelves in ſome little Tettars or Pimples, on the Face, without infecting the whole Maſs of Blood And though I be no Phyſician, am yet perſwaded, that they may be eaſily cu 'd by ſome ſlight Purge; or, if you pleaſe, breathing a Vein with ſome proper Juleps, and keeping a little Diet for a time.

Now theſe Tettars and Pimples in our Body Politick, are ſome of thoſe few diſcontented Gentlemen, whoſe number, our worthy Author has himſelf augmented, or ſome of the ignorant and turbulent Commonalty. But, had I been call'd into Conſultation with our State-Phyſician, (whom, between you and I, Couſin, I believe to be only a Quack) I ſhould never have agreed, that the whole Oeconomy and Syſteme of the Body, ſhould be ſo much diſcompos'd to purge it of Humours ſo eaſily remov'd.

Mer.

But what if this Choler run on untill it come to the Diſeaſe which they call Atra bilis?

Trav.

It would be ill advis'd, to neglect the Cure ſo long: but if they ſhould, a few ſtronger Medicines apply'd, by a skil ul hand, would remedy all at laſt.

But of theſe matters, we ſhall diſcourſe more fully, in a more proper place. And in the mean time, pray go on.

Mer.

In Page the twentieth, you note theſe Words; The evil Councellors, the pen ioner Parliament, the throughpac'd Judges, the flattering Divines, the •• ſie and deſigning Papiſts, the French Councils, are not the cauſe of our Misfortunes. What have you to ſay to this?

Trav.

Little, Sir, ſave only, I would have you remark the Malice of the Man. But he and his Party are known ſ well, that their Tongues are become no Slanders. For firſt, as to evil Counſellors, we muſt believe, that there ever hath been ſuch, and ever will, whilſt Men have different Judgments: that is to ſay, if we mean thoſe, as in all Charity we ought to do, who following their Opinions, give ſometimes Counſel, which in truth, may be prejudicial rather than advantageous for us; witneſs our Author himſelf, whom ſuppoſing to be (as in great Charity we may) an honeſt Man, hath yet given Counſel, even undeſir'd and unauthoriz'd, more pernicious to our Government and Happineſs, than the worſt of our evil Counſellors could ever have invented.

As to the Penſioner Parliament, I muſt confeſs, till of late days, I never knew it was a Crime for a Parliament Man to hold an Imployment from the King, nor a fault in the King, to endeavour to o •• en the Rancor of a virulent Member, any more than in an indulgent Father, to hire, by fair Words and Promiſes, a froward and perverſe natur'd Child, to live peaceably and decently in the Family amongſt the reſt of his Brethren, ſince the Deſign both of the Pater Patrioe, and Pater Familias, is no other than to procure to himſelf and Family, a quiet and happy Life.

For the Judges and Divines, if their great Worth and Learning, and moſt exemplary Lives, did not ſpeak plainly, and loud enough in their Behalf, they would not want better Pens than min to defend their Cauſe.

But I think their Sphere is much above the noiſe, much more the danger of this barking Mongrel. When e nam'd the buſie and deſigning Papiſt, I was in great hopes, that he would have added the Presbyterians too, and then we might have come betimes to the Cauſe of our Misfortunes. But, ſince he has thought fit to leave them out, I ſhall alſo let them alone till occaſion requires. For his French Councels, I know them no more than himſelf does; and, in my Opinion, had our Author had any Wit in his Anger, he might have forborn in this place, to have revil'd the Divines and Judges of our Land, the King's Council, and Parliament it ſelf; that is to ſay, all that we hold under the King, ſacred and religious amongſt us: eſpecially ſince he tells us immediately, that theſe are not the Cauſes of our Misfortunes; the finding which out, is, I think, one main Deſign of his Politick Search.

Mer.

Very well, Sir. The next thing is, We have plaid handy dandy with Parliaments, and eſpecially the Houſe of Commons, (the only Part which is now left entire of the old Conſtitution) by adjourning, proroguing, and diſſolving them, contrary to the true meaning of the Law.

Trav.

That's enough. I have only to remark his two Parentheſiſes. In the firſt he tells us, That the Houſe of Commons is the only part that is now left entire of the old Conſtitution. Pray, Couſin, Have you heard what is become of the Houſe of Peers? or, Do you know how it comes to be leſs entire than ever it was? I am perſwaded you cannot tell me.

Mer.

I imagine his Meaning may be, that their Eſtates are not ſo great as formerly they have been; or that the Houſe of Commons depended more upon them formerly than now they do.

Trav.

For the firſt, it is falſe, there being as great Eſtates now in the Houſe of Lords, as, generally, ever there were. And for the dependance of the Commons upon the Lords, that is to ſay, wearing their blew Coats, making up their Lords-train, waiting upon them to the Houſe of Lords, and making a La e for them to enter, and ſuch like, as he tells us, pag. 135. Let him endeavour to reduce the Houſe of Commons to this old Conſtitution if he can, and he will ſoon ſee, how far the Commoners will think themſelves oblig'd to him for it. If not, why does he talk of an old Conſtitution?

But Sir, with his good leave, and the Commoners too I take the Houſe of Commons to be the lateſt Addition to that Aſſembly, which altogether we call a Parliament. I do not remember to have heard any News of a Houſe of Commons, as it is now underſtood, untill ſeveral Years after the Norman Conqueſt, that is, untill the end of the Reign of Henry the Third, at ſooneſt. But though ſome contend for the eighteenth of Henry the Firſt; But the Houſe of Lords hath ſubſiſted, and been a Court of Judicature, even before the Roman Conqueſt, 1700 Years ago. Witneſs, amongſt many other Paſſages, the Diſpute between King Caſſibelaunus and Androgeus Duke of the Trinovantes. Whoſe Son, or Nephew, having ſlain the Son of the King, Caſſibelaunus commanded the Duke to ſurrender him, in order to his Tryal, that he might ſuffer ſuch Puniſhment as the Noblemen or Lords of the Kingdom ſhould judge moſt it. Commotus Rex Androgeo mandavit, t nepole ſuum ſibi redderet paratum alem ſententiam ſubire, qualem Proceres regni judicarent. So we read of Vortegern, the Britiſh King, Vortegernus excitatus perſtrepentium vocibus ſuper ſtatu publico in medium conſulit Sententias Magnatum. So of theMalm. l. 1. Saxon Ethelwulphus, Cum concilio Epiſcoporum ac Principum concilium ſalubre ac remedium uniforme f. 22. affirmavi, &c. So Edmundus Rex Anglorum •• m concilio & conſenſu Optimatum meorum, &c. Beſides many hundred of ſuch Inſtances (proving the Exiſtence of a Court of Lords from the Conqueſt of Will the Firſt, untill the end of Hen. the Third) are to be found in Eadmerus and other good Authors.

But, it being none of my buſineſs to defend, in this place, the Prerogatives of the Houſe o Lords, I ſhall not offer any thing further concerning them. But ſince our Author troubles himſelf ſo much about the old Conſtitution of the Houſe of Commons, and (detracting from the Houſe of Lords) calls the Lower Houſe the only entire part of the old Parliaments. I ſhall beg leave to mind you what was the Cauſe and Deſign of their firſt Inſtitution; as I find it in the beſt Hiſtories of thoſe Ages; and by that you will eaſily perceive their Antiquity, as alſo, which was the eldeſt Conſtitution.

William the Conquerour,P. 57. 154. 211. (called by Eadmerus, and others, William the Great,) having maſter'd the Power and the Fortune of the Engliſh Nation, what he retain'd not, in Providence, as the Demeſnes of the Crown, or reſerv'd not, in Piety, for the Maintenance of the Church, the reſt of his Kingdom he divided amongſt ſuch of his principal Lords as ſailed hither with him in the Barque of his Adventures, giving to ſome, whole Countries, to others, conſiderable parts of it; ſo as in the County of Norfolk, for inſtance, there were not above threeſcore Chief Lords or Owners, and half of them not very conſiderable, as appears by Doomſday.

And as the Eſtate, ſo the Council of the Kingdom was entruſted into few Hands, none being employed in the publick Councils, but only theſe great Lords and Peers who were Conciliarii nati, born to that priviledge, and came thither without Leave and without Summons.

And although at firſt this great Power and Truſt in ſo few hands, was look'd upon as a great Obligation to thoſe Lords, and a great Security to that King, ſo long as their Intereſts ſtood united in their new Conqueſt; yet, in the next Age, when the heat of that Action was over, their Intereſts divided, and the Obligation forgotten, it proved to the ſucceeding Kings ſo great a Curb and Reſtraint to Sovereignty, that nothing fell more intimately into their Care, than how to retrench (as much as they durſt) the Power of that Nobility which they began to ſuſpect, and was like, in time, to mate even Monarchy it ſelf.

Though others foreſaw the miſchief in time, yet none attempted the Remedy untill King John; who no ſooner began to reign (in his own Right, for, by the way, he practis'd a little in his Brother's time, and by that Experience found Mat. Paris his Words true of the Barons, viz. Quot Domini tot Tyranni.) But he bethought himſelf to frame his Counſel of ſuch a Conſtitution as he might have Credit and Influence upon it.

To be ſhort, he was the firſt that durſt reſtrain the tumultuary acceſs of the Barons to Council; he was the firſt that would admit of none but ſuch as he ſhould ſummon, and would ſummon none but ſuch as he thought fitting: and beſides, he would ſend out Summons to ſeveral of the Commons (or leſſer Tenants) mixing them with the Nobles, and engaging them thereby to his Intereſt: and whereas, before, the Council conſiſted of the Nobility and Clergy, he erected a third Eſtate, a Body of the Commons, or leſſer Tenants, which might, in ſome meaſure, equal the reſt, and be faithful to him. All which appears in the Clauſe Rolls and Patent Rolls of the ſixth Year of this King; and in vain, before that time, ſhall any Man ſeek either for Summons or Advice of the Commons in any of theſe great Councils.

King John having put this Cheque upon the Councils, conſiders next, how to ballance the unequal power of the unruly Barons; and firſt he tampers with the Biſhops and Clergy: ſain he would have drawn them into his Party, at leaſt, to his Dependency; but that Tryal coſt him dear. In the next place therefore, that he might create new Dependances and new Strength to himſelf, he becomes a great Patron and Founder, or at leaſt, Benefactor to many conſiderable Corporations, as Newcaſtle, Yarmouth, Lynn, and others; inſomuch, that he is taken notice of by Speed, and other of our Chroniclers, and ſtiled particularly, the Patron of Corporations: Thus you ſee not only when, but for what Reaſon, the Inſtitution of the Houſe of Commons was firſt thought upon; and indeed, according to their old or firſt Conſtitution, their Attendance in Parliament, or (as we ſay) their ſerving in Parliament, was look'd upon rather as an eaſier Service due to the King, than otherwiſe, as a Priviledge granted to the People; as may be ſeen, not only in the Caſe of the Burgeſſes of St. Albans in temp. Ed. 2. recited by the Worthy Dr. Brady againſt Petit, but alſo by many other good Authorities, too long for this place.

But, begging your Pardon for this long Story, I now proceed to the ſecond Parentheſis; in which, he makes no Scruple, to accuſe his preſent Majejeſty, and his late Sacred Father, of breaking the Law, in adjourning, proroguing, and diſſolving Parliaments.

Indeed, Couſin, I know nothing that reflects more truly upon the Conſtitution of our Government, than that it ſuffers ſuch peſtilent ſeditious Men, as our Author ſeems to be, to live under it. For nothing ſure is more evident, in the whole or any part of the Law, whether Statute, common or cuſtomary, than that the Kings of England, ever ſince the firſt Parliament that ever was call'd, have had, and exercis'd the ſame Power, in adjourning, proroguing, and diſſolving them, as his preſent Majeſty or his Father of Bleſſed Memory, ever did.

And, that you may have Plato's own Authority againſt himſelf, I muſt anticipate ſo much of his Diſcourſe, as to inform you, That in p. 105. you will find theſe very Words; That which is undoubtedly the King's Right, or Prerogative, is, to Call and Diſſolve Parliaments.

Nay more, ſo great was the Authority and Prerogative of our Kings over the Houſe of Commons, according to their old Conſtitution, That they have in their Writs of Summons named and appointed the particular Perſons all over England, who were to be returned to their Parliaments: ſometimes have order'd, that only one Knight for the Shire and one Burgeſs for a Corporation, ſhould be ſent to their Parliaments, and thoſe alſo named to the Sheriffs, and ſometimes more; as may be ſeen, by the very Writs of Edw. 2. and Edw. 3. fully recited by the aforeſaid Dr. Brady, from p. 243. to p. 252.

Beſides, Sir, what is more reaſonable and equitable, than that our Kings ſhould enjoy the Power of Adjourning, Proroguing, and Diſſolving, that their Council or Parliament, when, and as often as they pleaſe, ſince our Kings alone, in Excluſion to all other mortal Power in England whatſoever, enjoy olely the Prerogative of Calling or Aſſembling theſe their Parliaments, when, and where, they alone ſhall think convenient.

Mer.

I confeſs, we generally ſay, That it is a great Weakneſs in a cunning Man, to raiſe a Spirit which afterwards he cannot lay; and that in ſuch caſe the Spirit tears him in pieces firſt who rais'd him. And, I think, we have had the Misfortune to ſee ſomewhat very tragical, of this kind, in the beginning of our late Troubles, if it were not poſſibly the great Cauſe of his late Majeſty's fatal Cataſtrophe. But truly, excepting that caſe, I never heard the King's Authority, in proroguing or diſſolving Parliaments, queſtion'd before.

Trav.

Well, Sir, go forward to the twenty fifth Page; for all between, is nothing but quacking, and ridiculous Complements, or Matter as little worth our notice.

Mer.

He tells us there, that it remains undiſcovered, how the firſt Regulation of Mankind began; that Neceſſity made the firſt Government; that every Man, by the Law of Nature, had, like Beaſts in a Paſture, Right to every thing. That every Individual, if he were ſtronger, might ſeiſe whatever any other had poſſeſſed himſelf of before.

Trav.

Hold a little, Sir, that we may not have too much Work upon our Hands at once. I think he ſaid before, at Page 22. That he would not take upon him, ſo much as to conjecture how and when Government began in the World, &c.

This, Couſin, I cannot paſs by, becauſe it ſeems to be the only piece of Modeſty, which I obſerve, in his whole Treatiſe. And I ſhould commend him for it much, but that I have great reaſon to ſuſpect, that he pretends Ignorance, only to cover his Knavery, and thereby leave room to introduce ſeveral other moſt falſe and pernicious Principles, which we ſhall endeavour to refute.

Firſt therefore, I ſhall take the Liberty, not only to conjecture, but to tell him plainly, when and where Covernment began, and how alſo it continued.

Government then, began with the World, and God, who had the Sovereign Right of Power over the whole Univerſe, inveſted Adam with ſo much as was neceſſary for the Government of this World, and that in ſuch expreſs Words, that there can remain no doubt, but ſuch as is malicious and willful. And God ſaid, be fruitful and multiply, and repleniſh the Earth, and ſubdue it, and have Dominion over the Fiſh of the Sea, and over the Foul of the Air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the Earth.

And, leaſt thoſe Words, every living thing, ſhould not yet be general enough to comprehend Mankind, God gives Adam the rule over his Wife Eve, the only humane Subject that was then upon Earth, and from whom, all the Race of Mankind was to proceed.

And ſurely Adam had naturally a Right of Power over thoſe whom himſelf begot. Unto Cain God gave the rule over his Brother Abel, and after God had baniſh'd him from the Protection of his Father, he builds a City, and ſecures it by Walls. Can any body be ſo blind as not to ſee that Cain was abſolutely Governour of the Place, and had an undoubted Right of Power over thoſe Subjects which proceeded out of his own Loins?

I confeſs, the Affairs of that Age before the Flood, are a little obſcure; and ſince Moſes thought fit to paſs them over with ſo great Silence, it is reaſonable we ſhould do ſo too. But, we may moſt probably conjecture, as well from that ſhort Hiſtory in the Bible, as from the Authority of Joſephus, and after him Grotius, That the neglect of Government, and of the exerciſe of Power in thoſe days, produc'd the Deluge: for formerly Government was but a trouble; and as the beſt of Men cared for no more than was neceſſary for the Preſervation of their particular Families, ſo ſome were unnatural enough to abandon their Children to the Licentiquſneſs of their own corrupt Inclinations. Whence proceeded Violence, as the Text ſays, The Earth was corrupt, and filled with Violence. And, as Grotius tells us, Ante Dil vium Gigantum oetate promiſo a invaluit coedium Licentia. And from thence follow'd the Puniſhment of their Violence, by that univerſal Catacliſ

But howſoever it was before the Flood, I ſuppoſe it will be ſufficient for our purpoſe, if we deduce the Hiſtory of Government, and the Right of Power, from the Reſtauration of Mankind to the firſt Grecian Kingdoms; which, I hope, may be done ſo plainly, and that by the Authority of approv'd Authors, that not only Europe, Aſia, and Africa, but even America it ſelf, according to the imperfect Accounts of Solon, Plato, and Pliny, and of later Authors, Joſephus Acoſta, and Herrera, will appear to have been repeopled and govern'd abſolutely by Fathers of Families.

But, not to embarque into ſo wide an Ocean as that is, we ſhall keep our ſelves within the Streights, where Affairs being more certainly known, they will prove more pertinent to our purpoſe. Which is, to ſhew, when, and how Governments, and the firſt Regulation of Man began in the World after the Flood.

I think, there are very few who doubt the Truth of the Flood it ſelf. Common Experience, even in our days, in ſeveral Countries atteſteth it; beſides, moſt Authors, both Greek and Latine, agree to it, even as it was deliver'd by Moſes.

I confeſs, the Greeks, from the Aſſyrians, talk of a Deluge happening under Sythithrus, or Xi uthrus, as alſo Ogyges and Deuc lion. But we are aſſur'd by Grotius, de verit. Rel. Chriſt. That they ſignifie the ſame in Greek as Noe in the Hebrew Language. Philo de proemiis & poenis tells us plainly, that whom the Chaldaeans call Noe, the Greeks call Deucalion. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . And many other good Authorities there are, it being moſt uſual among the Greeks to contrive expreſſive Names. So Plato obſerves of Solon, That he, ſearching into the Force and Signification of the Hebrew Words, turned them into the Greek Idiom, vim ipſam ſignificationémque nominum perſonatus ea ipſa noſtr veſtivit Sermone.

This being granted, I ſuppoſe all Men muſt agree, that Noe had a Right of as abſolute Power in him, as any Man upon Earth ever had. Not only as he inherited it from Adam and the reſt of Mankind, but even from his own Father Otyartes, if we will believe Abyd us the Aſſyrian, and Alexander Polyhiſtor, who ſay, that Otyartes, being dead, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , his Son Siſythrus reigned in his ſtead eighteen Years; in which time the Deluge happen'd. However, a Monarch he was, and I do not hear, and am confident you will not believe, that he receiv'd any Inveſtiture or Right of Power from his Children, but that as his Authority was ſucceſſive, ſo it was divided among his Children, according to their Generations, by whom the World was progreſſively re-peopled.

Mer.

But, Sir, if the World was repeopled progreſſively, as you ſpeak, that is to ſay, from Father to Son, ſure Fathers were more humane than to ſuffer their Children to live together like Beaſts in a Paſture, as our Author ſays; Men having not, certainly, debaſed their Natures ſo ſoon, to be equal with the Beaſts which periſh, and turn their young ones out a grazing, without any farther Care what became of them.

Trav.

No ſurely, Couſin, for beſides natural Inſtinct, which we have common with other Creatures, and by which we are deſirous to preſerve our Young, God has beſtow'd upon us all a rational Soul, more than the reſt of other Creatures have, by which we may find out the beſt and eaſieſt way to obtain artificially what naturally we thus deſire.

Mer.

Methinks then, Sir, we ſhould eaſily contrive a way to live happily together, and peaceably, Peace being, undoubtedly, more rational and natural than War. Nor can I eaſily believe, That naturally we ſhould covet what another hath poſſeſs'd himſelf of before; but rather leave that to every Man which he had appropriated to himſelf and Family. Pray, Sir, is Nature a God or a Devil?

Trav.

Nature is certainly a God, or elſe, rather, the Opifex Dei, whom we call Natura naturata, that is, the Cauſa Cauſata, or ſecond general Cauſe of all ſublunary Beings whatſoever. God is the firſt Cauſe, who out of nothing hath made Matter. Whether that nothing be a Nothing, which to us is incomprehenſible, Nullam rem è nihilo gigni divinitus unquam, or whether it be that Materia prima, which ſome Philoſophers have believ'd antecedent to the Elements themſelves, and which others agreeing with the Rabbins, have call'd Hyle, Ench. phyſ. Reſt. Can. 18. by which they ſeem to mean a kind of Shadow, or Darkneſs, incomprehenſible, the fancy of a thing rather than a thing indeed; a Matter without Form, yet moſt deſirous and capable of all Form; without a Body, and yet the Foundation of all Bodies; in ſhort, a vaſt abyſs of Cold and Night, which we cannot comprehend. I ſay, whether God created all things out of Nothing, which we cannot conceive, or out of this materia prima, which we can as hardly explain, I'll not determine. It is ſufficient, for my purpoſe, to declare, that God is the firſt Cauſe, and made matter, and that what I here call Nature is the ſecond Cauſe. Who, working upon the ſecond Matter, or materia Elementata, produceth ſeveral Effects, according to its ſeveral Diſpoſitions.

In the next place, Nature can neither create nor yet deſtroy; her Power extends no farther than Generation and Preſervation, or changing old Matter into new Form. The God of Nature only hath the power of Annihilation; and as he made all things out of nothing, ſo he alone can again reduce all things into nothing.

To conclude, Nature is moſt juſt and good in all her Actions. And as ſhe hath receiv'd the Command of Preſervation from him who hath given her the Power of Generation, ſo ſhe hath tranſmitted that inviolable Precept unto all things, which ſhe hath made, according to their different Kinds and Species. And this is the Ground and Foundation of that univerſal Law of Nature, which is ſo immutable, that it cannot be changed. Jus naturale adeo immutabile eſt, ut ne à Deo quidem mutari queat, ſaith Grot. l. 1.

And this is ſufficient for the Explanation of Nature, what ſhe is; that is to ſay, a Spirit, infinitely good and juſt, and abhorring, above all things, Violence and Deſtruction.

Mer.

Dear Couſin, this is extreamly ſatisfactory, to ſhew what Nature is, and by conſequence, what her Laws muſt needs be. And indeed, we ſee it moſt plainly by the Effects: for, amongſt the various kinds of Beaſts and Fowl, there is ſcarce a Creature found which is not ſolicitous to preſerve its Young. And by this Law of preſerving what we have produc'd, the World was govern'd, from Adam to Moſes. And had we as exactly obſerv'd this Law of Nature as ſhe hath obey'd that of the firſt Creator, the World ſure would have needed no other Law, nor known any other Government.

Trav.

This, Sir, is that Law, which to our ſhame, continues uncorrupted amongſt Birds and Beaſts. An Eagle ſtoops not upon an Eagle, a Lyon preys not upon a Lyon; Man only devours Man, and from being made a little beneath the Angels, degenerates below the worſt of Beaſts.

Mer.

This ſure proceeds from ſome accidental Corruption; to recompence which, God Almighty hath given us Reaſon, which, methinks, joyn'd with the natural Law of Preſervation, ſhould produce Government, and by conſequence, Peace and Happineſs.

Trav.

Your Obſervation is moſt juſt: for, the World being peopled, as well before the Flood as ſince, ſucceſſively, Succeſſion begets Inequality, the Father being greater than the Child. And inequality neceſſarily produces Superiority, which eternally includes a natural Right o Power.

Mer.

By this Rule then, Noah, as well as Adam, being our firſt Parent, ſhould have been an Univerſal Monarch; the whole right of Power being lodg'd originally in himſelf, pray what became of this Power?

Trav.

Firſt you muſt obſerve; that Power never dyes, but deſcends to him who beſt repreſents the laſt Poſſeſſor, and that is naturally the eldeſt Son: for his Title being before thoſe who are poſteriour to him, it cannot paſs to them but through him. So you ſee Noah ſettles the Power only upon his eldeſt Son Shem. Canaan, he ſaith, ſhall be a Servant to him, and Japhet ſhall dwell in the Tents of Shem; which, according to the Interpretation of the beſt Expoſitors, is, under the Government and Protection of Shem.

Mer.

How came this Power then ſo ſoon divided, as we hear in the Hiſtories of thoſe elder times.

Trav.

By the expreſs Will of God himſelf, who whilſt the People were building Babel, confounded their Language, and diſperſed them abroad, that the Earth might be the better repeopled

Mer.

Did then the People of different Languages chooſe to themſelves particular Governours who were to conduct them, or did every Man go according to his own Fancy?

Trav.

Neither, but were all govern'd according to their different Languages, by the Head of the Family, that happen'd to be in that Language, whoſe Right of Power proceeded from their Father Noah, and from them the firſt Kingdoms of the World were begun and continued.

Mer.

Can you name me any of thoſe Kingdoms ſo begun?

Trav.

I think I can. And firſt, Japhet is ſaid to be Father of the Europoeans. Japetus Europoeorum genitor, ſays Grot. Gomer, his Son, of the Galatians, or 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . Magog founded the vaſt Empire of the Scythians, where his Name is to this Day remembred; Madian the Medes, Javan the Greeks, as hath been already obſerv'd: theſe are the Sons of Japheth. The Sons of Javan were, Eliſhath, Tarſhiſh, Kittim, and Dodanim. By theſe, ſaith the Text, were the Iſles of the Gentiles divided in their Lands, every one after his Tongue, after their Families in their Nations, Gen. 10. From Ham proceeded the Africans; from Cuſh, his Son, the Cuſei or Ethiopians. From Seba, the Son of Cuſh, the Sabeans. From Aſhur, the Son of Shem, the Aſſyrians. From Lud the Lydians. The Caldoeans from Arphaxad; and from his Grandſon Eber, the Hebrews.

But it would be too tedious to relate in this place, all the Kingdoms, Countries, and Cities, that had their Beginnings and Names from the Sons of Noah. If therefore you be not yet ſatisfied, I ſhall only recommend you, beſide the Bible, to Euſebius, Nicholaus Damaſcenus, Pliny, Strabo, Joſephus, and of our Modern Authors, to Grotius, and the Learned Doctor Stillingfleet.

Mer.

Sir, I am very in linable to believe all that you have here obſerv'd, having heard and read much to this purpoſe. But then, Sir, People muſt always have liv'd under ſome Government, and have been obedient to ſome Superiour, which will ſurely deſtroy our Authors perpetual State of War, as alſo his univerſal Right, which every one had to all things; and, in a Word, will ſo totally diveſt the People of that original Liberty, which he pretends they had, and Right of Power which they were able to beſtow, and upon which Foundation he ſeems to build the greateſt part of his Diſcourſe, that according to your Principles, we ſhall not meet with any People who had any right of Power or Liberty, but ſuch as was granted them and derived from their Governours.

Trav.

Sir, This Liberty is no where to be found, but in the ſhallow Brains of ſuch conceited Men as our Author ſeems to be. And I am perſwaded, that he will never be able to produce one ſingle Inſtance of any People whatſoever, even to this day, that were ſo free, or enjoy'd ſuch an original or virgin Liberty, that they could of themſelves give a Right of Power, which never had been poſſeſs'd but by themſelves. From whence it will follow, That all popular Governments have been Ʋſurpations, except ſuch People alone, who having leave from their Mother City, have planted Colonies in Foreign Countries. Such were moſt of thoſe Grecian Governments, which we find in Aſia, and in Italy, and in ſome parts of Greece it ſelf. And they all bore generally this Mark, That they followed the form of Government of thoſe from whom they proceeded, and ver paid them a dutiful Reſpect: which when neglected or denied, generally produc'd War; witneſs the long Peloponeſian War, largely deſcribed by Thucydides. Theſe things conſider'd, let us draw this Concluſion, to which all Politicians muſt agree, and even our Author himſelf, whether he will or no, That all Commonwealths have been founded upon Ʋſurpation or Rebellion, or the Grant or Permiſſion of ſome ſuperiour and antecedent Power.

Mer.

How comes it then to paſs, that ſo many Philoſophers, and all our Antimonarchical Authors, pretend, That the People were before the Prince, that they are above him, that they made him, and by conſequence, may depoſe him. That their Liberty and Freedom was independent upon any, untill, for their own Intereſt and Advantage, they parted from it; and much to this purpoſe?

Trav.

From the Ignorance of ſome ancient Philoſophers, and the impious Complaiſance of ſome of our modern Wits.

Mer.

What do you mean by the impious Complaiſance of our modern Wits?

Trav.

I mean, Sir, that neglecting the Hiſtory of Moſes; which being the moſt ancient, and moſt authentick of any extant, is penn'd beſides by the Aſſiſtance of the holy and infallible Spirit of God himſelf; neglecting, I ſay, what our very Faith obliges us to believe moſt ſacred; we run fooliſhly after the blind Conjectures of Men, who were as much inferiour to Moſes in Learning and Wiſdom, as they are poſteriour to him in Time.

Mer.

What is it theſe Philoſophers teach us contrary to Moſes, and wherein lies their Error?

Trav.

It conſiſts chiefly (as it relates to our Caſe) in their Ignorance of the Hiſtory of the Creation, and want of a true Notion of the Deity. Hence they teach, That the World was made, or rather, made it ſelf, by chance, and that Mankind was, at firſt, but the natural Production of the Earth, as Plants, and ſome few Animals at preſent are produc'd. So the Epicurean Lucretius tells us in his ſecond Book.

Jamque adeo affecta eſt oetas, effoetáque tellus, Vix animalia parva creat, quoe cuncta creavit Secla, deditque ferarum ingentia corpora partu. Haud, ut opinor enim, mortalia ſecla ſuperne Aurea de Coelo demiſit funis in arva. Nec Mare, nec fluctus plangentes ſaxa crearunt Sed genuit tellus eadem, quoe nunc alit ex ſe. The Earth's grown now ſo barren, ſo decay'd, She ſcarce brings forth a Mouſe, who all things made. In her once pregnant Womb all Creatures lay. Thence monſtrous Beaſts and Gyants broke their way. For I can't think the golden Chain of Jove E're let them down from their bright Heavens above; Or that the Billows of the working Main, Made thoſe vaſt Rocks which do themſelves contain: But that the Earth, as other Mothers uſe, Whate're ſhe feeds, did firſt her ſelf produce.

Diodorus Siculus gives us a long account of the Creation; where, amongſt other things, he tells us, That when the great Separation was made of the Waters from the Earth, the Earth remain'd, nevertheleſs, very moiſt, over which a Pellicule, or kind of Skin, in moſt places was ſpread. This preſerv'd the Seeds of all things whatſoever, which after due Fermentation, and the nouriſhing heat of the Sun, the Pellicule broke, and all ſorts of living Creatures appear'd. Thoſe which participated moſt of Heat, became Birds and Fowl. Thoſe which were of a more groſs and earthly Compoſition, were made Men and Beaſts; and the more moiſt became Fiſh.

After this, the Moiſture and Surface of the Earth being hardened, and dry'd, by the continual heat of the Sun and drying Winds, the Earth could no more produce any conſiderable Creatures, but that they were henceforward propagated by Generation, according to their ſeveral Kinds and Species.

Now, Sir, notwithſtanding this fine Fancy, you may eaſily ſee its great Error, if you conſider, that the Earth produc'd thoſe living Creatures either by Chance or Accident, or by the poſitive Will of God.

If the laſt, then we ſhall eaſily agree with you, it being indifferent to us which way God was pleas'd to take for the making of Man, ſuppoſing he was made and propagated ſucceſſively by Gods Order: but this the Philoſophers generally deny.

If the firſt, Then how comes it to paſs, that Accident and Chance ſhould form Male and Female, ſo fitting for the work of Generation, that few things do more manifeſtly declare the Wiſdom of our Maker, than the Compoſure of thoſe Organs, which ſerve for the Nutrition of the Infant in the Womb, and whatever elſe belongs to our Conſervation and Propagation.

And indeed, when we come to conſider ſeriouſly of what many of the Ancients have deliver'd concerning the Creation of the World, we ſhall not find them ſo different from the Doctrine of Moſes as ſome imagine.

The Phoenicians and Egyptians, and ſome later Philoſophers, as Ariſtotle, Anaxagoras, and amongſt the Poets, Heſiod, Orpheus, Ovid, Virgil, and others, ſuppoſing that Mankind proceeded originally from the Earth, have aſcribed the Production to ſome particular Cauſe, as the brooding of a Pigeon upon the Chaos, incubitum columbae, Anaxagoras to a Mind, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Ariſtotle to Nature, moſt of the Poets to Amor, or Love: but all as they have fetch'd theſe Notions from the Phoenicians, and they from Moſes, ſo they mean the ſame thing which Moſes did, that is to ſay, God; which for want of that Illumination which Moſes had, they could not better expreſs.

Now ſome Men, not well underſtanding what the Philoſophers meant, and others refining upon Notions which the Philoſophers themſelves had too groſly interpreted, have deliver'd Opinions moſt ridiculous.

Hence Mr. Hobbs will have Men produc'd like Muſhrooms, fungorum more. But ſure it were moſt reaſonable, that thoſe Muſhroom Men ſhould be kept in ſome ſharp and ſour Pickle, untill they had diſclaim'd a fooliſh Fancy, which is ſo contrary to the Word of God; which is the publick Rule of our moral Actions and Obedience.

Mer.

Sir, I believe moſt aſſuredly the Hiſtory of the Creation, as Moſes hath wrote it, and think, that in Reaſon, as well as Conſcience, we ought ſo to do. But, ſetting aſide the Divine Inſpiration, Are there any other Reaſons why we ought rather to believe Moſes in that Particular, than any other of the Learned Grecian Philoſophers?

Trav.

Yes, Sir, there are three principal Reaſons, which ought to engage our Belief for Moſes rather than for any other Hiſtorian whatſoever. And they are, firſt, The Antiquity of his Hiſtory; ſecondly, The Reaſon in his Hiſtory; and thirdly, the Teſtimony of others concerning both.

For the firſt, It is agreed by the Greeks themſelves, That they have no Hiſtory ancienter than that of Homer. Conſtat apud Groecos nulla invenitur conſcriptio poëmate Homeri vetuſtior, ſaith Joſephus contra Appion. And yet Homer liv'd above ſix hundred Years after Moſes.

But, not to trouble you with what you may find elſewhere, I ſhall refer you to the ſame Joſephus, and to Grotius de Verit. Rel. Chriſt. and laſt of all, to the Origines Sacroe of Dr. Stillingfleet, or Mr. Gale's Court of the Gentiles.

For the Reaſon of his Hiſtory, eſpecially as it relates to the Creation of Man, nothing ſeems more juſt, than that God Almighty, who is the Fountain of all Wiſdom and Goodneſs, ſhould have rather choſen to propagate the World at firſt, as he did at laſt after the Flood by Succeſſion, than by ſuch a promiſcuous Production of the Earth as is before mention'd; that even thereby he might prevent (as he did) that State of War ſuppos'd by our Author, and thoſe many Miſchiefs and Inconveniences which would attend an Equality intolerable, and never yet known upon the Earth. And notwithſtanding the ridiculous Arguments of Mr. Hobbs, and ſome others, they could never yet produce any good Authorities or Examples, where this Equality was ever to be found, except in their own Underſtandings. The Learned Pompenatius, in his Treatiſe de immort. Animoe, tells us, That if the Inequality which is amongſt Men were taken away, the Race of Mankind would be deſtroy'd, or at beſt, ſubſiſt with great Inconvenience; and that it is not the occaſion of Diſcord, but rather of the moſt perfect Harmony. Hoecque inoequalitas, ſi toleretur, aut genus h manum periret, aut non commodè conſtaret. Neque inoequalitas inter homines, commenſurata tamen, debet diſcordiam parare, imo ſicut in ſymphonia vocum commenſurata diverſitas concentum delectabilem facit, ſi commenſurata diverſitas inter homines perfectum, pulchrum, decorum & delectabilem generat.

On the other ſide, by this ſucceſſive Propagation God hath ſecur'd Man's Preſervation, and that by introducing a natural form of Government and Obedience, ſo certain, and ſo reaſonable, that it might have continued even to this day, had not the Negligence of the Governours in the firſt Age permitted a Confuſion. And the Ambition and Avarice both of the Governours and Governed in the latter Age, ſo entangled the Reins, that they have made it ſometimes as hard to drive as to be driven.

In the next place, the compiling of the Law of Moſes ſhews ſo demonſtrably the Wiſdom and Reaſon of the Law-giver, that his Laws have been the Ground and Patterns for the beſt and moſt ancient both of the Attick or Greek, as well as Roman Inſtitutions.

And laſtly, for Teſtimony concerning the Veracity of his Hiſtory, we find even the very Particulars confirm'd by the moſt ancient Authors. Heſiod, Homer, and Euripides, declare, That Man was made out of Clay. Callimachus calls Man 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , lutum Prometheum. The Hiſtory of Adam and Eve, of the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil, and the Serpent, are atteſted by Sanchuniathon.

In the moſt ancient of the Grecian Ceremonies and Myſteries, they uſed to ſhew a Serpent crying out 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or Eva; Heſychius, Clemens in protreptico and Chalcidius ad Timoeum tell us, that according to the account of Moſes, God forbad our Fore-fathers the eating of the Fruit of certain Trees, left thereby they ſhould come to the Knowledge of good and Evil, ex quibus notitia boni malique animis eorum obreperet.

The Story of the Gyants is atteſted by Pauſanias, Philoſtratus, and Pliny. Beroſus, and Abydenus the Aſſyrian, with many others, give a perfect Account of the Deluge. Trogus Pompeius, Polemones, Manetho, Lyſimachus, and others, of the flight of the Children of Iſrael out of Aegypt, under the Conduct of Moſes himſelf. All which, and a great deal more to this purpoſe, abundantly confirm the Authority of Moſes his Hiſtory, and oblige our Approbation and Belief, even without the expreſs and indiſputable Command both of God and Man.

Mer.

I am perfectly ſatisfy'd, and ſhall reap this advantage from the long Trouble I have given you, that I ſhall henceforward apply our Authors Propoſitions to the Hiſtory of Moſes; and according as they are conformable to it, approve them, or otherwiſe, if contrary, totally reject them; and for the preſent, am ſufficiently convinc'd that the firſt Regulation of Mankind began from paternal Governments. For his Neceſſity, univerſal Right to all things, the regulating of Ownerſhip and Property, and the Mediation of ſome wiſe men, for the conſenting to the eſtabliſhing a Government, I ſhall look upon them hereafter as canting Terms, contriv'd by ſome Commonwealths Men, and not at all conſonant to Reaſon or Truth, eſpecially ſince he hath not produc'd one Inſtance of any Government originally ſo begun, againſt twenty which you have, and I believe can produce, for the deducing many great Governments from Fathers of Families.

Trav.

You will find, that the force of all his reaſoning, quite through his Book depends chiefly upon ſuch canting Propoſitions as you have here repeated. But pray proceed.

Mer.

He tells us then, p. 31. That could we trace all Foundations of Polities that now are, or ever came to our Knowledge ſince the World began, we ſhall find none of them to have deſcended from Paternal Power.

Trav.

Did you ever meet with a more impudent or more ignorant Author? You remember, I ſuppoſe, thoſe Inſtances which I have already produc'd to demonſtrate the repeopling the World by Fathers of Families, which are confirm'd to us by approv'd and irreproachable Authors. Beſides, what is more notoriouſly known, than the Hiſtory of the Edomites, or the Poſterity of Eſau or Edom, and the Hatred which continued in his Family againſt the Sons of Jacob, when they deny'd the Iſraelites Paſſage through their Country. Nay ſo certain is it, that that great Nation deſcended from Edom, who was the eldeſt Son of Iſaac, and Father of his Family, and that they ſpread as far as the Red Sea, that the Greeks themſelves, from his Name Edom, which they interpret 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , have left the Name of Mare Erythroeum, even to this day.

Nor leſs known is the Genealogy of Iſmael the Son of Abraham, from whence the Iſmaelites or Arabians, whom Epiphanius calls the Saracens, are lineally deſcended.

And, as a conſtant Mark of their unqueſtionable Deſcent from Iſmael, they have, to our Age, retain'd the Cuſtom of being circumciſed after the thirteenth Year, according to what we find written of their Father Iſmael himſelf.

There are beſides, as I told you, many more undoubted Inſtances in thoſe Authors, which I have already nam'd to you. And if our Politician hath any reſpect for the Holy Bible and Hiſtory of Moſes, let me recommend him to the twenty fifth Chap. of Geneſis, where Moſes numbring the Children of Iſmael, concludes, Theſe are the Sons of Iſmael, and theſe are their Names, by their Towns and by their Caſtles, twelve Princes according to their Nations. And they dwelt from Havila unto Shur, that is before Egypt, as thou goeſt towards Aſſyria. And whilſt he hath the Book in his hand, let him turn forward to the thirty ſixth Chapter of Geneſis, where, after a long Catalogue of the Dukes and Kings which deſcended lineally from Eſau, it is ſaid, ver. 31. And theſe are the Kings that reigned in the Land of Edom before there reigned any King over the Children of Iſrael. And theſe are the Names of the Dukes that came of Eſau, according to their Families, after their Places, by their Names. And Verſe the laſt, Theſe be the Dukes of Edom according to their Habitations, in the Land of their Poſſeſſions, he is Eſau the Father of the Edomites.

Now what can be more particular or expreſs, than what I have here produc'd? Or what can he mean by tracing the Foundation of Polities, which are, or ever came to our Knowledge ſince the World began, if theſe will not paſs for ſuch?

He cannot pretend that we ſhould bring a long Roll of Parchment, like a Welch Pedigree, ap Shinkin, ap Morgan, and ſo from the Son to the Father, untill we arrive at ap Iſmael, ap Eſau, ap Magog, ap Javan, and ſo forth: that would be too childiſh to imagine of him; for we know very well, that all the Kingdoms upon the Earth have oftentimes chang'd their Maſters and Families.

But if he means, as ſurely he muſt, if he mean any thing, that we cannot name any ſuch Kingdom or Government that hath been ſo begun, then he is groſly miſtaken: for, the Aſſyrians, the Medes, the Ethiopians, or Cuſoei, the Lydians, the Jones, or Greeks, and very many others, are ſufficiently known, and preſerve to this day the very names of their firſt Founders; who (as is made appear) were all Fathers of Families.

Mer.

Couſin, I begin to be very weary of this rambling Author. Pray, therefore let us go on as faſt as we can.

Trav.

Read then what follows.

Mer.

As for Abraham, whilſt he liv'd, as alſo his Son Iſaac, they were but ordinary Fathers of Families, and, no queſtion, govern'd their Houſholds as all others do. What have you to ſay to this Holy Patriarch and moſt excellent Man?

Trav.

I ſay we are beholden to our Author, that he did not call him a Country Farmer, ſome ſuch a one, it may be, as in his new Model of the Government, is to ſhare the Royal Authority. Indeed it is hard, that whom the declar'd Enemies to the Hebrew People have thought fit to call a King, we who adore the Son of Abraham, will not allow to be better than a common Houſholder?

Mer.

I confeſs, my Reading is not great; but as far as the Bible goes I may adventure to give my Opinion: And if I miſtake not, the Children of Heth own'd him to be a mighty Prince among them.

Trav.

Yes Sir; and the Prophet David, in the hundred and fifth Pſalm, calls him the Lords Anointed. But, becauſe I perceive the Word of God is too vulgar a Study for our Learned Stateſman, I have found out a Prophane Author who concurs with the Hiſtory of the Bible.

And firſt, Juſtin makes no Scruple to call him in plain Words a King. Poſt Damaſcum Azillus, Mox Adores, & Abraham & Iſrael, Reges fuere. lib. 36. Joſephus alſo, and Grotius, who are Men of no ſmall Repute even amongſt the moſt Learned, have quoted Nicolaus Damaſcenus to vindicate the Regal Authority of Abraham.

His Words are very intelligible, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . And tells us moreover, that in his Days (which was in the Reign of Auguſtus) the Fame of Abraham was much celebrated in that Country: and that there was yet a little Town remaining, which was called by his Name.

Mer.

I perceive, when Men grow fond of their own Imaginations they run over all, and neither Reaſon nor Religion have any Power to ſtop them.

Trav.

Then he introduceth Samuel upon the Stage, chiefly I ſuppoſe, to inſinuate, that the People had a Power, and did chooſe themſelves a King: which is ſo notoriouſly falſe, that they never had the leaſt ſhare, or pretended any in the election of Saul. It is true they choſe rather to be govern'd by a temporal King, who was to live amongſt them, and rule as other Kings did, than continue under the Government of the King of Heaven and Earth; and ſo the Word choſe relates wholly to the Government, but not to the Perſon of the Governour. For which, Samuel alſo reproves them, and accordingly they acted no farther, leaving the Election of their new King wholly to God, and their Prophet, and God did particularly chooſe him from the reſt of their People, and Samuel actually anointed him before the People knew any thing of the matter.

Afterwards, leſt ſome might have accus'd Samuel of Partiality in the Choice, he order'd Lots to be caſt, which in the Interpretation of all men, is, leaving the Election to God; and Saul was again taken. What Junius Brutus, another old antimonarchical ſeditious Brother, objects concerning renewing the Kingdom at Gilgal, where it is ſaid, And all the People went to Gilgal, and there they made Saul King before the Lord, will ſerve very little to prove any Right of Power in the People, no not ſo much as of Election: for confirming and renewing the Kingdom, and ſuch like Expreſſions, ſignifie no more, than the taking by us the Oaths of Allegiance and Supremacy, which I think were never thought to give the King any Right to the Crown, but only a juſt Right to puniſh us for our Perjury as well as Diſobedience, in Caſe of Rebellion. So renewing the Covenant with God, as particularly a little before the Death of Joſhuah, cannot be ſuppoſed to give a greater right of Power to God Almighty, than what he had before, but is only a ſtricter Obligation for the Peoples Obedience, that they might be condemned out of their own Mouths. And Joſhuah ſaid unto the People, See ye are Witneſſes againſt your ſelves.

So Samuel makes the People bind themſelves to God, to their King, and to their Prophet, that they would faithfully obey him whom the Lord had ſet over them. And behold, ſaith Samuel, the Lord hath ſet a King over you. But having ſpoke more to this purpoſe elſewhere, and the Caſe being moſt clear, as well by the Hiſtory it ſelf, as by the Authority of Grotius, and other learned Men, that Saul and the reſt of the Hebrew Kings, did not in the leaſt depend upon their People, but received all their Right of Power wholly from God, we will proceed with our Author. Only I muſt note by the way, that with the learned Gentleman's leave neither the Sanhedrim, the Congregation of the People, nor the Princes of the Tribes, had any manner of Power, but what was ſubordinate, and that only to judge the People, according to the Laws and Inſtitutions of Moſes. And ſo they continued to the Babyloniſh Captivity, Grotius only obſerving, in favour of the Sanhedrim, that they had a particular Right of judging concerning a whole Tribe, the High Prieſt and a Prophet.

Mer.

Well, Sir, we are now come to our modern deſpotical Power. What ſay you to Mahomet and Cingis Can.

Trav.

Prethee, Couſin, let's not trouble our ſelves with thoſe Turks and Tartars, they are yet ar enough off, and not like to trouble us, nor does their Government much concern us; we have Laws of our own ſufficient, which as they ſecure us from the danger of any Deſpotical Power or arbitrary Government which can riſe up amongſt our ſelves, ſo they do no leſs protect the Perſon of our Supream Magiſtrate or King, from all manner of Violence or Juriſdiction of the People.

Mer.

In the next place then we come to an Aphoriſm, which is, That Empire is founded in Property. Upon which, he tells us, he muſt build the moſt of his ſubſequent Reaſoning.

Trav.

Ay marry, here's Work indeed. And no doubt but the Foundation being ſo ſolid, the Building will laſt eternally. But let us ſee, in page 40. he gives us this Aphoriſm in Latine; and then it runs thus, Imperium fundatur in Dominio: which, leſt we might not underſtand, he tells us his meaning of Dominium, is, the Poſſeſſion of Lands. And that what Kings ſoever in former times had no Companion in the Sovereign Power, they had no ſhare likewiſe in the Poſſeſſion of the Ground or Land.

Truly, Couſin, I do not remember to have met with ſuch grave and ſerious Fooling in any Author beſides himſelf. But we will examine his Reaſoning, and his Aphoriſm, as fully and impartially as we can. And in the firſt place it is moſt neceſſary that we ſhould define the Word Imperium, which ſurely we cannot do more plainly, than when we ſay, That Imperium eſt jus Imperandi, Empire is a Right of Command. Now that this Right of Command ſhould be fix'd or founded upon what in it ſelf is incapable of receiving any Command, or paying any Obedience, I mean Land, is ſo abſurd a Propoſition, that it makes Empire an empty Name only, and Sound: for when you thunder your Imperial Laws through your hollow Rocks, your ſhady Groves, and Woods, thoſe ſtiff and ſtately Subjects of your new found Empire, will pay no other Homage or Obedience, than a Return of your Commands upon your own Royal Head, by the Repetition of a fooliſh Eccho, the only Subject which can entertain you with Diſcourſe.

You, in the mean time, muſt remain like Midas, amidſt his Gold, without Service or Suſtenance, except being wholly transform'd into an Aſs, or grazing, like Nebuchadnezar, amidſt your fertile Paſtures, you might indeed in ſuch caſe become a fat and luſty, though a beaſtly, Emperour.

But, Couſin, to be ſerious, the great Folly of our Authors Aphoriſm will appear more demonſtrable by putting a familiar Caſe or two, and ſuch as may ſhew us plainly, upon what Empire is truly founded, and upon what it is not.

Let us ſuppoſe then, that the King ſhould make ſome Nobleman or Gentleman, Duke or Prince, or (if you will) Emperour of ſome vaſt tract of Land, in the Weſtern Part of Terra Auſtralis incognita; which we will alſo imagine totally uninhabited. What kind of Emperour do you think this Nobleman would be?

Mer.

Truly, Sir, if he had no Subjects, I think he would appear much ſuch another kind of Prince as Duke Trinkolo, in the Comedy.

Trav.

You have hit upon a very proper Inſtance.

Mer.

But pray, Couſin, why may not our Emperour have Subjects having Land to beſtow?

Trav.

Undoubtedly ſo he may; but they muſt be procur'd one of theſe three ways: either from his own Loins, as in the old World, that is, from his Wife and Children; or from Slaves, ſuch as may poſſibly be bought in ſome other Part of the World; or from Free People, whom he may probably carry over with him.

Mer.

Very well; and why may not the Land be peopled, in time, by his own Family, eſpecially if Polygamy be permitted, as formerly it was, and both himſelf and Sons take to themſelves ſeveral Wives.

Trav.

So it may, Sir, but this will not do our Buſineſs; for, his Empire, in that caſe, will not be founded upon the Poſſeſſion of his Land, but the Perſons of his Children, who become naturally his Subjects, even when he did not poſſeſs one Acre of Land. For God and Nature have ſo inveſted a Sovereign Right of Command in Fathers over their Children, that no Power upon Earth can take that Right away.

'Tis true, the Civil Law, for the Good of all, has reduc'd even Fathers themſelves under the Civil Government, who is ſtill Pater Patrioe. But, naturally, every Father is Emperour in his own Family.

Mer.

I underſtand you, Sir; for, Fathers having naturally a Sovereign Right of Command over their own Children, if then he peoples a Country by his own Poſterity, the Poſſeſſion of his Land gives him no more Power than what he had originally, and from a higher Title too, before. It is plain; but why may he not then ſtock his Land with Slaves, from Guiney, or other Parts of Africa?

Trav.

O Couſin, but properly ſpeaking there is no Empire of Slaves. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 .

For Ariſtotle, lib. 8. de Rep. and from thence Grotius aſſure us, That ſuch a Government is not properly an Empire, but an over-grown Family. Qui ergo tali tenetur imperio populus, in poſterum non civitas erit, ſed magna Familia. Beſides, Reaſon it ſelf convinces us of this Truth: for no Man is a Slave willingly, and what we hold by force is not truly an Empire, which, as I ſaid, is Jus Imperandi, but a Tyranny, which always includes Injuſtice.

Mer.

But, by your leave, may not a Man juſtly command his Slave.

Trav.

Yes Sir, as he may uſe his Oxe or his Horſe, and they are always look'd upon as part of our Perſonal Eſtate, and paſs accordingly. But naturally, or according to the Law of Nature, which is Juſtice, no Man is born a Slave, Servi natura, id eſt, citra factum humanum, hominum nulli ſunt, ſaith Grotius, lib. 3. Whence the Civilians tell us, Contra naturam eſſe hanc ſervitutem

Lawfully indeed, which is humane Inſtitution, Men become, and are ſometimes born Slaves, but Subjects we are both by Law and Nature too.

All Politicians therefore, and Civilians, have made a Diſtinction between Subjects and Slaves: the laſt are ſo by Accident and Misfortune, and againſt their Will, for the ſole Benefit of their Lord and Maſter; the others are Subjects by Nature, and willingly continue ſo, not only for the Honour of their Emperour, King, or Supreme Governour, but for the peaceable and happy Subſiſtence of themſelves. So Tacitus diſtinguiſheth them in theſe Words, Non Dominationem & ſervos, ſe rectorem & cives cogitatet. And Xenophon of Ageſilaus, whatſoever Cities he reduc'd under his Government he exempted from thoſe ſervile Offices which Slaves pay their Lords, and only commanded ſuch things as were fit for Free-Men to pay their Supreme Governour. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . Nor are there, or ever were there, any ſuch Kingdoms of Slaves.

For, though the Turk and Tartars at preſent, the Perſians, and generally all other Eaſtern Kings, anciently govern'd deſpotically; yet their Subjects always had a Civil as well as a Perſonal Liberty, and were generally ſo far from being govern'd againſt their Wills, that, as Apollonius obſerves, the Aſſyrians and Medes ad r'd their Monarchy, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . The Cappa ocians would not accept of the Liberty which the Romans offer'd them, Negantes vivere ſe poſſe ſine Rege.

The ſame Philoſtratus tells us of the Thracians, Scythians, and thoſe Myſians which inhabited about the Helleſpont, that they had no manner of Satisfaction in the Propoſition of a Liberty, which they car'd not for. And the Tarks, at this day, being ſo taught by their Prophet and their Alcoran, think it an Honour to dye by the Command of their Emperour.

Mer.

This I comprehend well: but why may not thoſe Slaves be made free?

Trav.

That indeed they may. But then they come under the third Conſideration; which is, That our Emperour may People his Country with Free-Men, whom he is ſuppoſed to carry over with him. But then I muſt ask you, Whether you imagine, That Men who are Free at home will become Subjects in a Foreign uncultivated Country, unhealthful it may be, and dangerous, and very remote from all their Friends and Relations, and whatever elſe they once eſteemed, without the Hopes of ſome Recompence and conſiderable Advantage?

Mer.

Without doubt, they will not: But, why may not the Proprietor of the Land grant ſuch Proportions of it, to theſe Free-men, as may encourage them to tranſplant themſelves and Families, as they do at preſent, to Carolina, and other Colonies.

Trav.

This is, and may be done: but then, Sir, you muſt obſerve, that, according to our Authors Aphoriſm, part of his Empire muſt go for it; whence will ariſe the moſt ridiculous Soloeciſm that ever was heard of, which is, That by how much he encreaſeth in Subjects, by ſo much he decreaſeth in Empire. Which is as much as to ſay, That by how much he becomes powerful, and rich, and ſtrong, by ſo much he becomes leſs an Emperour.

Nay, and in proceſs of time, when his Lands ſhall happen to be all peopled, he ſhall be no Emperour at all.

Mer.

But, Sir, Why may he not retain, ſuppoſe, half the Lands to his own uſe?

Trav.

He may, Sir: Yet ſtill the Empire being founded upon the Poſſeſſion of the Land, he is but half ſo great an Emperour, now his Empire is half peopled, and begins to be ſupply'd with all Neceſſaries, as he was when no humane Creature beſides himſelf, did inhabit it. Which is ſo abſurd, that nothing can be invented more unreaſonable.

Mer.

I know not what to ſay againſt this; but muſt only ask you one Queſtion more. Whether you pretend to make an Emperour without Land?

Trav.

I do not ſay I would, nor was there, it may be, any ſuch Emperour ever known. Yet I muſt tell you, that it is more rational to affirm, That a Man may be an Emperour without Land, than without People. So many of the Roman Generals were called Emperours, when they had little to fix their Empire on, beſides their Army.

But this alſo we ſhall illuſtrate by this following Caſe. Suppoſe then That after the Death of this preſent Emperour of Germany, the Princes Electors ſhould think fit to chooſe this preſent King of France in his ſtead. I do not know that he hath any Lands in Germany; yet, nevertheleſs, what kind of Emperour do you ſuppoſe he might prove?

Mer.

Without doubt, as great as his Predeceſſor.

Trav.

Truly, I believe as great, and as perfect an Emperour, to all Intents and Purpoſes, as ever enjoyed that Auguſt Title, ſince Charlemaigne. Which, ſure, is an Argument moſt demonſtrable, that Empire is not founded according to our Authors erroneous Aphoriſm, in the Poſſeſſion of Lands.

The wiſe Queen Eliz. underſtood this Truth well enough, when ſhe us'd to ſay, That ſhe car'd not to rule in her Subjects Purſes, but in their Hearts. And the truly politick Church of Rome knew moſt aſſuredly, that they ſhould raiſe their temporal Empire to the utmoſt height that their Ambition could ſuggeſt, not when they invaded ſome few Territories, belonging to ſome of their neighbour Counts and Princes, but when they could fix their Empire in Mens Minds, perſwading them that they had a Right of Power over their Souls and Bodies, the Lands followed then of Courſe; and you find them preſently depoſing Emperours, and diſpoſing of Kingdoms, and other temporal Poſſeſſions, with no leſs Freedom than they did their ſpiritual Benefices.

And, to comply with our Author's Country Compariſon of a Carter and his Teem, let him command his Waggon, or his Cart, with all the Rhetorick and Artifice he can, ſee whether all his Endeavours would not prove ineffectual to obtain the leaſt Motion; and whether himſelf would not look ridiculous. Beſides, could the Cart obey, and drag the Teem after it; where could we ſee a more irregular and prepoſterous Sight?

But by governing well and commanding his Horſes, the Cart will certainly follow with eaſe, and both arrive ſafely and happily at their Journeys end.

Whence it is eaſie to infer, That Empire is always founded upon Living Bodies, and not upon Lands or Things inſenſible.

Mer.

Pray, give me leave to ask you, Whether you think this Aphoriſm of our Authors falſe in it ſelf, or by him ill underſtood?

Trav.

Sir, I am not oblig'd to defend another Man's Propoſition. It is ſufficient for me, if I prove that it is falſe, according to his own Interpretation.

But however, that I may give you all the Satisfaction which you can reaſonably deſire, I will ſo far comply with you, as to tell you, That Empire may be well enough ſaid to be founded in Property, but by no means when he conſtrains Property to ſignifie the Poſſeſſion of Lands.

Mer.

Dear Couſin, I muſt entreat you, that you will give me your own Interpretation, eſpecially ſince the true underſtanding where Empire ought to be fix'd, will be a arther Light to me.

Trav.

Sir, If you can have Patience, I ſhall endeavour to ſatisfie you, as briefly as the Subject will permit. And firſt, I muſt again remind you, that the formal part of all Empire is Power, or a Sovereign Right of Government; whether reſiding in one or more is not material

Power thus fix'd in ſome Perſon, hath for his Objects, firſt, the Perſons to be govern'd; ſecondly, the Territory containing them.

The firſt is ſometimes alone ſufficient to create an Empire; the ſecond may be divided or chang'd, the Empire remaining ſtill entire. Imperium, ſays Grotius, D Jure B, & P. l. 2. c. 3. duas ſolet habere materias ſibi ſubjacentes; Primariam perſonas, quoe materia ſola interdum ſufficit: Secundariam locum, qui territorium dicitur.

This ſecond Matter Grotius calls Dominium, as it is diſtinguiſh'd from Imperium. Ideóque, ſaith he, Dominium non in cives tantum, ſed & in extraneos tranſit, manente penes quem ſuit imperio.

Theſe rightly underſtood, it will be no difficult Matter to affirm, That Empire is founded in a Sovereign Right of Command, or Government, or Power over Perſons and Men; which that we may bring under the Term of Property, we will ſay, That Empire conſiſts in holding this Government or Power, as Grotius expreſſes it, In pleno Jure proprietatis, or, In patrimonio imperantis, that is properly, or in Property, or in chief, or how elſe you pleaſe to render theſe Words in Engliſh. Which Grotius, in the ſame Chapter, explains, by a Jus regendi, non aliunde pendens. A Right of Government not depending upon any other humane Authority whatſoever.

Mer.

But, Sir, ſince you have founded Empire upon a Supreme Right of Government or Power over Men, how comes it to paſs that we find a Right of Power, and Priviledges, and Government too, ſo founded in the Poſſeſſion of ſeveral Lands, that the Poſſeſſion of thoſe Lands alone gives a Man ſeveral Rights and Prerogatives.

For example, amongſt us 'tis ſaid, That whoſoever hath the Right and Poſſeſſion of the Barony of Burgaveny, beſides ſome others, becomes thereby a Baron of England, and enjoys thoſe Priviledges which belong to it.

In France I have heard ſay, That nothing is more common than for Men to receive their Titles according to their Lands, whether Count, Baron, Marqueſs, and ſo forth.

Is it not plain then, That the Right of Command or Power, which is Empire, may be founded upon Property, according to our Author's Interpretation, that is, the Poſſeſſion of Lands?

Trav.

I agree to what you have urg'd; that is to ſay, That ſeveral Priviledges, and Right of Power, are annexed to ſeveral Lordſhips or Terres Nobles, that they have thereby haute & baſſe Juſtice; and their Juriſdiction extends to Life and Death. Nay more, in ſeveral parts of Italy, and particularly in Lombardy, there are ſeveral Imperial Feuds, which Grotius ſeems to call Regna Feudalia, which have almoſt as great Prerogatives as ſome other Kingdoms have. They make Laws, raiſe Taxes, and mint Money, as other greater Kingdoms do. And yet all this makes little for our Author's Aphoriſm, as by him interpreted.

Mer.

The Reaſon, if you pleaſe.

Trav.

Becauſe all thoſe little Lordſhips, or Principalities, whether they were inſtituted at firſt by the Goths and Vandals, or Lombards, or granted afterwards by ſeveral later Emperours and Kings, or both, as is moſt probable, yet they did, and ſtill do, at this day, depend upon a Superiour Power, and pay Homage and Fealty for thoſe Priviledges which they enjoy; which is much different from Empire, or a Sovereign Right of Power. And yet, even in this Caſe, this ſubordinate Power is ſo far from being founded upon the Poſſeſſion of all the Land belonging to the Feud, which is our Author's Propoſition, that very often their Liberties depend only upon the old Walls of a ruinated Caſtie, and a very inconſiderable Number of Acres, which repreſent the whole Feud, or Mannor, the reſt of the Land having been ſold away, and become the Property of others, ſome ſmall Rent only, or Acknowledgment, being reſerv'd. And after this manner, the Supreme Power may as well tye Priviledges to a Poſt, and grant the Poſſeſſor of that Poſt ſuch Royalties as the Proprietor of ſuch a Caſtle or Land. Which is very far from proving, that the Poſſeſſion of Lands doth thereby originally create a Sovereign Right of Power.

Mer.

Couſin, I have heard, and read too, I think, that the Sea hath formerly eaten up a conſiderable part of your ancient Patrimony, and from thence, it may be, you are no Friend to Lands. But, for my part, I will ſtand up for Land as long as I can; and muſt therefore ask you, Why thoſe Rents or Acknowledgments were reſerv'd, if not to teſtifie, that they came originally from the Lord, and that thereby he ſtill keeps up a kind of Sovereign Right to the Lands themſelves; knowing well enough, that his Power, according to our Author, is founded upon them.

Trav.

This yet ſignifies nothing: for although the Reſervation of theſe Rents or Services do preſerve the Memory of the Benefactor, and continue the Reſpect due from the Tenant, yet this is perſonal only, and hath no Relation to the publick Right of Power or Government.

For, when this Rent was not reſerv'd, yet whoſoever lives within the Juriſdiction of ſuch a Fewd or Mannor, is always ſubject to him, who enjoys the Lordſhip.

So in England, Services and Quit-Rents have been generally receiv'd and paid, untill the late King, and his preſent Majeſty, were pleas'd to diſpoſe of them.

But to believe that this hath leſſened his Sovereign Right of Government, is a Fancy that ſure cannot enter into the Head of any ſober Man. But let us put a plain Caſe.

Suppoſe the Kingdom of England were at any time obtain'd by abſolute Conqueſt, as I conceive it was more than once, and that ſuch Conqueſt gives the Conquerour a Sovereign Right, not only to our real and perſonal Eſtates, which we find to have been wholly in the hands of ſome of our Kings, but alſo over our Liberties and Lives, as may be fully ſeen in Grotius, de Jur. B. & P.

Now, Sir, ſuppoſing a People in this Condition, and having nothing of their own, ſubmit themſelves, and all they have, to the Mercy of the Conquerour, as the Carthaginians did to the Romans, you will grant, I imagine, that this Conquerour is an Emperour to all Intents, having an abſolute Right of Power over the People and their Land alſo.

Mer.

Yes certainly, as long as he keeps himſelf and People in that Condition there cannot want any thing to make him an abſolute Monarch.

Trav.

But we will farther ſuppoſe, That our Conquerour (being of a more noble, and more humane Temper, than, it may be, our Author would have been) orders diligent Inquiſition to be made into the Value of his conquer'd Lands. Which being done, and enter'd into a Regiſter, ſuch as we call Doomſday Book, the Conquerour divides moſt of theſe Lands between the Conquerours and the Conquered; ſome he returns to their former Owners, upon certain Conditions or Services; others he changeth. To his Noblemen and Favourites he grants great Titles and Priviledges, to the Gentry leſs, and to the vulgar or common ſort, ſome ſmall Poſſeſſions, which with a little Labour and Diligence, will enable them to live eaſily and peaceably the reſt of their days.

All theſe become an Inheritance to themſelves and their Heirs, according to their ſeveral Tenures, (which the Conquerours have generally created) and which we call Property. Theſe, Sir, being thus eſtabliſhed, and the Lands of the Kingdom ſetled after this manner, the Conquerour or King himſelf reſerves, it may be, a ſmall part, which we call Crown Lands; and in Conſideration of his Right of Conqueſt, and thoſe Benefits which he hath beſtowed upon his People, in granting them their Liberties, Lives, and Lands, he continueth to himſelf the Power of making and aboliſhing Laws, according as he ſhall think moſt fit, and proper for the Peace, Honour, and Safety of his Government. He creates Magiſtrates for the due Execution of theſe Laws; who, in his ſtead, and by his Authority, have a Power to judge between his Subjects, and in ſome Caſes between his Subjects and himſelf, or his Attorney.

Beſides theſe, he retains the ſole Power of making Peace and War, of diſpoſing of the Treaſury, whether it be his own particular Revenue, or ſuch as may be granted for the Defence and Security of the Kingdom, and ſuch other Prerogatives as Sovereign Princes generally pretend to.

And after all, he obligeth all his Subjects, generally and in particular, to pay him Homage and Fealty for the Land and Priviledges which they hold or have receiv'd from him, and to bind themſelves and their Heirs for ever to become true and faithful Subjects unto him their Liege Lord, his Heirs and Succeſſors for ever; as may be ſeen at large in the Form of our general Oath of Allegiance: and this under no leſs Penalty than the loſs of our Lives, Honour, and Eſtates, whatever they be.

Now, Couſin, after the Diſpoſition of the Lands, as hath been here ſuppos'd, and this Eſtabliſhment of the Government, according to the good Will and Pleaſure of him who is Maſter of all, and the Conſent and Confirmation of the People, who have receiv'd thoſe Lands and Priviledges, can you believe that our Conquerour is leſs an Emperour than he was, when he kept all the Lands in his own Hands, and undiſtributed?

Mer.

Methinks, in good Reaſon, in Juſtice, and in Gratitude, he ſhould loſe nothing of the Power which he hath reſerv'd, by reaſon of the Graces and Priviledges which he hath granted.

Trav.

No ſure, Sir, he rather acquires another Right, and becomes doubly their Soveraign, that is to ſay, both King and Father of his Country; for ſince Government is agreed even by our Author, to have been inſtituted for the Good of Man, certainly, that Governour who doth the greateſt Good, is by conſequence the greateſt Emperour. So Joſephus (in the Speech which Judah makes in the Behalf of his Brother Benjamin, to his unknown Brother Joſeph, chief Miniſter of the Egyptian Kingdom) obſerves, That Power was given Men to do Good. And by how much we extend our Bounty, by ſo much we enlarge our Empire, Ad ſervandos homines potentiam datam exiſtimare, & quô pluribus ſalutem dederis, hôc te ipſum illuſtriorem fore.

Mer.

Couſin, all this is very fine, and ſeems indeed moſt reaſonable and moſt juſt. But I perceive we are not yet come to a right Underſtanding of the Caſe.

For, if a Prince or Sovereign Monarch ſhall, out of a Principle of Goodneſs, or what you pleaſe, entruſt Part of his Power in the hands of the People, let the Conditions be what they will, when they are once poſſeſſed of that Power, moſt likely they will think it reaſonable, to ſhare the Government alſo; or, to uſe our Author's Expreſſion, p. 45. if the People have the greateſt Intereſt in the Property, they will, and muſt, have it in the Empire. So if a Maſter of a Family ſhall think fit to arm his Servants, to the Intent only, and upon the expreſs Condition, that they ſhall never uſe them but in Defence of their Maſter and Family, and that only according to his own Commands; yet, nevertheleſs, if in proceſs of Time the Servants ſhall believe that the Maſter doth not govern his Family for their mutual Advantage and Security, it is ten to one, but that having the Power in their Hands, they will pretend to govern the Family as well as the Maſter: nay, and if the Maſter prove too obſtinate, turn even himſelf out of the Government and Family too.

Trav.

Very well. I did indeed expect, that at laſt we ſhould come to Club Law, and that your convincing Arguments would end in the invincible Force of Powder, Ball, and Musket.

Pardon me, Sir, I do not ſpeak this of your ſelf; for I know, that according to our Agreement, and for the Support of our Diſcourſe, you only perſonate our Author, whoſe Words are, They will and muſt have it in the Empire.

Now, though will and muſt are not proper Terms amongſt civiliz'd and reaſonable Men, yet nevertheleſs, ſince we know that Deformity in ſome Countries, and when in Vogue, paſſeth for Beauty; and a Diſeaſe grown Epidemical aſſumes the Name of Health, according to that of Seneca, Recti locum tenet error, ubi fit publicus.

I ſhall endeavour to pull off the ugly Vizard, and unmask our ignorant State-Phyſician, and demonſtrate firſt, That it is not reaſonable, that thoſe who have the greateſt Intereſt in the Property, or the Poſſeſſion of the Lands, according to our Author's Interpretation, ſhould have any Right of Power in the Government, otherwiſe than what is ſubordinate, and deriv'd from the Supream Magiſtrate.

Secondly, That by having this Intereſt in the Property, they have not thereby more Right, no nor more Power, than if they had it not.

Thirdly, That all Sovereign Princes have a Right of Power over the Lands themſelves, notwithſtanding the Property be divided amongſt the People.

Fourthly, That moſt Kings who have had the Sovereign Power, have yet had many Companions and Sharers in the Poſſeſſion of the Land.

And laſtly, I ſhall give an Anſwer to your Inſtance which you have produc'd concerning a Maſter and his Servant.

Mer.

Dear Couſin, Excuſe the Liberty I take, ſince you know, we at firſt granted it to each other. Beſides, the deciding theſe main Points will be in a great meaſure ending the Trouble which I give you. And being confident that you will be able to make good what you have promis'd, I ſhall reap the Advantage of your Pains, and you the Honour and Satisfaction of confirming me, and it may be many others in an Opinion, which we were rather willing to believe than able to juſtifie.

Trav.

Sir, not to loſe Time, I ſhall begin with the firſt, That it is not reaſonable, that thoſe who have the greateſt Intereſt in the Property, ſhould have any Right of Power in the Government, except what is ſubordinate and deriv'd from the ſupream Magiſtrate.

To prove this, we muſt make theſe two general Diſtinctions, which are, and ever were in all Governments whatever: That is to ſay, between the Governour and the Governed, which muſt of neceſſity be two different Perſons: for, as Plutarch obſerves in his Introduction to the Lives of Agis and Cleomenes, one Man cannot be Maſter and Servant, nor can he who commands be able at the ſame Time to obey. So Grotius tells us, Quod cogens & coactum requirunt diſtinctas perſonas, neque ſufficiunt diſtincti reſpectus. I never heard but that the People were always taken for the Governed. To moderate and regulate whoſe unruly Paſſions and inclinations, Government it ſelf has been hitherto continued in the World, and they are generally call'd the Body of the Kingdom. The Governour has been ever underſtood to be a ſingle Perſon, or Counſel, or more, who are likewiſe properly call'd the Head. Both form the Body Politick. Right of Power is like the Soul, and is ſeated in the Head; whence diſperſing itsvital Heat, through proper Arteries and Veins, it nouriſheth and gives Motion to all the Body, and every part of it. The Body thereby is enabled to preſerve the Head from Violence. The Head alone commands, and the Body performs. The Body cannot command, nor hath the Head any Action, nor can it poſſibly obey. The Head ſeparated from the Body deſtroys both.

Mark, that Right of Power, which is Empire, hath no other Object or Subject than the Body, and in its Exerciſe, is properly and ſolely founded thereupon. The Body parted from the Head, is no more a Body, but a Carcaſs. And the People, without a Supreme Governour, is no more a People, but a confus'd deform'd, and unactive Multitude. Mark, that the People have no Life, nor Power, nor Motion, but what they receive from the Head. This is the conſtant Doctrine of the moſt Learned Authors who have ever treated of Government.

Mer.

Sir, I have often heard this Compariſon made: but, if you allow that a Head may be compos'd of ſeveral Members, as you ſeem to ſuppoſe, when you ſay, a Council, or more, we ſhall then eaſily agree. For all we deſire is, That a Head may be choſen or made up out of the reſt of the Members.

Trav.

Neceſſity ſometimes, and Violence, have compos'd ſuch a monſtrous Head, over which alſo they have been forc'd to raiſe another Phantaſm; ſuch as the Stateholders in Holland, the Doge of Venice, or Duke of Genoua. So I have obſerv'd in many places, and particularly in the Prince's Gallery at Monaco, two famous Heads, which were ſo artificially contriv'd, that at firſt Sight, or at a Diſtance, they have repreſented a humane Shape. But upon a ſtricter Examination, we have found them patch'd together of ſeveral ſorts of Fiſhes, Fowls, Beaſts, or Inſects.

Now, beſides that all unnatural and monſtrous Productions have been obſerv'd by Naturaliſts, to be generally of ſhort Continuance, ſo they do not at all deſtroy my Propoſition, which is, That there muſt be a perfect Diſtinction between the Governour and the Governed: and that howſoever the Head be compos'd, whether of one Monarch, or thirty Tyrants, as in Athens, or of five Hundred, yet there the ſole and total Right of Arbitrary Power, doth and muſt reſide.

Mer.

I cannot approve of Arbitrary Power; and I ſhould think, that in this Caſe there can be no Danger of it: for, the Body having by much the greater Force and Strength, may not only refuſe to obey what they do not approve of, but if the Head ſhould impoſe too obſtinately, by virtue of their Strength, they may reſiſt, and eaſily reduce their Head to their own terms; nay, even to obey the Body.

Trav.

They may ſo, Sir, and ever might ſince the Beginning of Bodies, and ever may whilſt Bodies continue in the World; no matter whether they be fat or lean. But the Conſequence alſo ever was, and ever will be, Confuſion, Diſſolution, and the Deſtruction of both.

This puts me in mind of a Fable which Plutarch relates in the Life of Agis, King of Sparta; which if our Author would have impartially conſider'd, it might have ſtop'd the furious Current of his Popular Pen. The Story is this:

The Serpent's Tail, who had been ever us'd to follow its imperious Head, grew weary, at length, of this ſervile Complaiſance, diſputes the Precedency; and having brought the Body into its pernicious Faction, the triumphant Tail begins to take the place, and marches firſt. But being no ways qualified for that Government which it had uſurp'd, it train'd the Head through Thorns and Briars, through Waters, and down Precipices; till having totally blinded and diſabled the Head, and the Tail no ways able to ſupport its Life, both became a Prey, and were ſwallow'd up by a Vultur, who had watch'd the fatal Conſequence of this unnatural and irregular Motion.

You ſee here the Effect of Force againſt a Right of Power; which, ſince it comes in my way, it is moſt neceſſary we ſhould diſtinguiſh: for Power, by Abuſe, is become, I perceive, another of our Authors equivocal Words.

All Power came originally from God Almighty; for, There is no Power but of God, the Powers that be are ordained of God, Rom. 13. 1. which muſt be always underſtood a Right of Power; for God doth neither Violence nor Wrong. Namque odit ipſe vim Deus. And if ſometimes we have ſeen Violence and Force prevail againſt Power, which is a juſt Authority, it is only a mark of Permiſſion in the Divine Providence, as a Puniſhment for Sin, not of Approbation. Narratur in teſtimonium divinae Providentioe id permittentis, non in facti humani approbationem. Theſe are the Words of Grotius.

The Body Politick is compos'd of Men, that is to ſay, Duſt and Clay, without Form or Action, untill God breath'd into his Noſtrils the Breath of Power, and it became a living Soul.

Power then is a Ray of the Divinity it ſelf. And notwithſtanding the inſolent Mockery of our Atheiſtical, conceited Author, where there is a Sovereign Right of Power there is Jus •… um.

So when God, at the Requeſt of Moſes who was unable to govern ſo great a People without ſubordinate Officers, inſtituted the Court of the Sanhedrim. God took of the Spirit that was upon Moſes, and gave it to the ſeventy Elders, which was this Right of Power, and they began to propheſie; a conſtant mark of this Right of Power, which they deriv'd from Moſes, and was ſubordinate as generally the Conſtitutum is to the Conſtituens.

So when Saul was anointed King as a Mark of his undoubted Right of Power, he propheſied amongſt the Prophets. So again, when Moſes growing old, deſir'd that God would ſet a Man over the Congregation, that they might not be as Sheep without a Shepherd, the Lord ſaid unto Moſes, Take Joſhuah the Son of Nun, and lay thy Hands upon him, and thou ſhalt put ſome of thine Honour upon him, that all the Congregation of the Children of Iſrael may be obedient.

What ſhould all the Congregation of the Children of Iſrael be obedient to, but to the Commands of Joſhuah, who had received this Right of Command, which is Power and Government, immediately from the Hands of Moſes.

Power then is the Soul of Government, receiv'd from God himſelf. It is a Spirit which gives Life to the Body, but not the Body it ſelf.

Power is like that nouriſhing Heat and Light of the Sun, which we are ſenſible of by its Effects, that is, its Influence upon all ſublunary Bodies, by its Attraction, Reverberation, or Tranſmiſſion through proper Vehicles. Not by contact of the Body.

Nay, we are aſſur'd, that the Aether, which is nearer the Sun, is dark.

Power ſhews it ſelf by its Effects, that is, Government, which it produces by Tranſmiſſion alſo of its Influence through proper Vehicles, which are ſubordinate Officers, whom it animates and inſpires.

Power is inviſible, incomprehenſible, eternal: Power never dyes, and in its original it is Omnipotency, which is God. And when God himſelf had inveſted Moſes with this Power, he was pleas'd to tell him, That he ſhould be unto his Brother Aaron inſtead of a God.

Mer.

Sir, I am much pleas'd with this Deſcription which you have given of Power. And indeed, ſince Government is one of the greateſt and moſt neceſſary Bleſſings which Mankind enjoys, that Government cannot ſubſiſt without Power, and that Power is originally in God, who is the Fountain of all Power, nothing ſeems more reaſonable, than that we ſhould deduce all humane Authority from that inexhauſtible Source, and reſpect it accordingly.

I have only one Argument againſt what you have propos'd; which, however it may ſeem ſtrange, yet I muſt beg leave to offer it to you. And it is this, That I have heard ſome Learned Men, both Ancient and Modern, ſeem to maintain, That although God may poſſibly be the univerſal Governour of the World, or governs the Univerſe in general, as the Sun, Moon, and Stars, and ſo forth, yet that he doth not, (as being beneath ſo great a Majeſty) inſpect or mind the little particular Governments of our ſmall Globe of Earth.

Trav.

This is, indeed, the pernicious Doctrine of the Epicureans; which, with its Diſciples, ought to be baniſh'd all good Governments, Qui ex bene moratis urbibus ejecti ſunt, as Grotius tells us, cap. de poenis. Ita & coerceri poſſe arbitror, nomine humanae Societatis, quam ſine ratione probabili violant.

Gaſſendus, I confeſs, in his Treatiſe de Vita & Moribus Epicuri, ſeems too much to favour this Opinion. But Grotius, whoſe Judgment I prefer before the Philoſophy of both; and St. Paul, whom we Chriſtians ought to reſpect before all three, tells us, Heb. 11. v. 6. That he who cometh to God, muſt believe that he is, and that he is a Rewarder of thoſe who diligently ſearch him. Grotius alſo, in the ſame Chapter, ſays farther, That that Religion which in all Ages has been accounted true, is chiefly grounded upon four Principles; the third of which he ſays is this, That God takes Care of humane Affairs, and determines them according to his moſt juſt Decrees, à Deo curari res humanas & aequiſſimis Judiciis dijudicari. And after he hath quoted, to the ſame purpoſe, Cicero, Epictetus, Lactantius, and others, he concludes, That Revera negare Deum eſſe, aut negare à Deo curari actiones humanas, ſi moralem effectum reſpicimus, tantundem valet. That to deny there is a God, or to deny that he regulates humane Affairs, is in Effect the ſame thing. And particularly in the ſame Chapter, Sect. 44. he tells us farther, that Epicurus, when he took away the Providence of God, in the Government of the World, he left nothing of Juſtice, but the empty Name. That Juſtice is no farther neceſſary than profitable, and that we ought to abſtain from hurting one another, out of no other Conſideration, than the Fear that thoſe, whom we offend, ſhould revenge themſelves. Epicurus cum Divinam providentiam ſuſtuliſſet, Juſtitiae quoque nihil reliquit niſi nomen inane, &c. But theſe, and many other of the Epicurean Principles, are rather plauſible than ſolid, witty than judicious, and ſtriking the Senſes, are rejected by a ſober Ʋnderſtanding.

Beſides, Couſin, we Chriſtians are obliged by a truer, and much more Divine, Philoſophy; to which, we have all ſubſerib'd, and which is become a publick Law and Rule amongſt us: and with good Reaſon, for nothing is more dangerous in all Governments, than to regulate Publick Actions according to Private Opinions.

Publick Actions muſt have Publick Rules, and publick Obedience muſt have Publick Laws, under which we muſt acquieſce, untill they be alter'd by Publick Authority; otherwiſe we may eternally wander after the falſe Lights of fooliſh Men, who from their Extravagancies would be accounted witty.

Mer.

Sir, I ſhall not diſpute any farther, either your Reaſons or your Authorities; both which I allow as moſt authentick: pray, therefore, proceed.

Trav.

Having told you then, what Power is, I come now to Force; and as the firſt is the ſpiritual part of Government, ſo the latter is the material part. Force is the Arm and Nerve, which being animated by lawful Authority, produces Power in the general Acceptation, which is properly, and in a good Senſe, the Ʋnion of both. Force, without this Right, is, Vis injuſta, or Violence. With it, it becomes the juſt Defence, which Nature hath given all Creatures, as well as Man, to preſerve to themſelves their Lives, Liberties, and Poſſeſſions. Without it, that is, when we invade the Poſſeſſions of another, it becomes Robbery and Rapine, and is no more excuſable in Alexander than the Pyrate. Tully de Officiis 3. and Grotius, who cites him, beſides many others, tell us the ſame Truths in plain Words, Ʋt quiſque malit ſibi, quod ad vitae uſum pertineat, quam alteri acquiri, conceſſum eſt, non repugnante natura. Illud natura non patitur, ut aliorum ſpoliis noſtras facultates, opes, copias augeamus. And Grotius adds this Conſequence, Non eſt ergo contra Societatis naturam, ſibi proſpicere atque conſulere, dum jus alienum non tollatur. Ac proinde, nec vis, quae jus alterius non violat, injuſta eſt. It is Right of Power therefore, which makes Force juſtifiable, both according to the Laws of Nature, and the Laws of Man.

To conclude, Power or Authority, and Force, are generally ſo united, that they oftentimes are miſtaken, and paſs for one another. But they are alſo ſometimes ſeparated, as a Right may be from the Poſſeſſion, and by this Inſtance we may eaſily diſtinguiſh them. A lawful Prince hath firſt Power and Authority, to which Force is added. A Rebel firſt procures a Force, or Strength, and afterwards uſurps a Power.

Mer.

This is plain enough; and I have nothing to reply.

Trav.

Having then made theſe neceſſary Diſtinctions, I affirm, That the People, (which is the Force and Strength of all Kingdoms) by how much their Strength is great, (whether in Land, or Perſonal Eſtate) by ſo much their Power, which is Authority, or Right of Government, ought to be the leſs. And this not only becauſe it is incongruous and unnatural, that the Governed ſhould become their own Governours, or that the ſeveral deſtructive Appetites of the Members ſhould train after them, the Reaſon which ought to regulate all; but it is alſo very imprudent, and againſt all the Rules of true Polity and Government. For it hath been ever the Rule and Endeavour of wiſe Men, ſo to ballance Power and Force, that neither may offend the other, but that by the harmonious Accord of juſt Commands, and faithful Obedience, a State may become moſt happy, invincible, and eternal.

Hence Power never ought to aſſume an adventitious Force, ſuch as Mercenary Souldiers, which have generally prov'd deſtructive both to Prince and People; nor the People uſurp a Power, which belongs not to them; ſuch as the Seditious Tribunes of Rome often pretended to, which loſt them both that Power and Liberty which they had. Government conſiſts in Command and Obedience; whence Empire is defin'd by ſome to be certus ordo in jubendo & parendo. Command is the Effect of Power, Obedience the Reſult of both, and Peace, Happineſs, and Security, the end of all. The general Interruption proceeds from want of due Obedience; the ſole Conſideration of their Force makes Men dare to diſobey.

What then can be more irrational and abſurd, than that the Governour ſhould, by granting a Right of Power, countenance their Violence; and by giving a pretence to Diſobedience, make it more difficult, if not impoſſible, for himſelf to govern. It is like uncurbing, or laying the Reins upon the Necks of headſtrong Horſes; which is againſt the Reaſon and Practice of all good Governments upon Earth.

Were the Beaſts well tempered, it were yet more practicable; but by how much their Strength is dangerous, by ſo much a ſtricter Hand ought to be kept over them.

What wiſe Pilot would ever truſt the Helm into the Hands of an inſolent Crew of Mariners? Or, What prudent Prince would ſubmit his Scepter to the Will of arrogant Subjects, whoſe Wills they themſelves declare to be, to govern equally, if not ſuperiour to the King.

If our Author had meant a ſubordinate Power we would eaſily have agreed; and I think there are few People, under Heaven, who enjoy a larger Proportion of profitable and honourable Employments, than our Engliſh Subjects do. But, an independent Right of Power is deſtructive to the Prince as well as People, and would only ſerve the turn of a few pragmatical, ambitious, antiquated Politicians.

Mer.

But, Sir, if the People have the Force, as they have by enjoying ſo great a ſhare in the Land, and ſhall think it reaſonable to have the Government alſo, how will you help your ſelf? This is the main Point, which you have not yet anſwered.

Trav.

Have a little Patience, for my Clock cannot ſtrike Twelve all at once: and this is the ſecond point, viz. That by having this Intereſt in the Property, as our Author calls it, they have not thereby a greater Power, or Force, or Strength, than if they had it not.

And firſt, you muſt admit, that the Poſſeſſion of Lands, giving thereby no Right of Power, as hath been ſufficiently prov'd: If then the People by Force only, endeavour to procure to themſelves this Right, it is a formal Rebellion; and what they ſhall obtain thereby is abſolute Ʋſurpation.

But in the next place, by having the Poſſeſſion of theſe Lands ſuppos'd, they are not more enabled to uſurp this Power than if they had them not: for, the Strength of all Governments being eternally in the Perſons of the Governed, whether they be rich, or whether they be poor, it muſt follow, that when they pleaſe to rebell, no Governour or Governours whatever under Heaven, can of themſelves poſſibly reduce them: for the Number is even in the moſt popular Government, ten thouſand of the Governed to one that governs. And this is a natural, irreſiſtible Inequality of Strength, which even in their natural, naked Eſtate, without other Arms than ſuch as Nature hath given all Creatures, according to their different Kinds, puts them always in a Condition to deſtroy the Government when they pleaſe.

You muſt not urge, that a great Number may probably preſerve their Obedience, and follow the Party of the Governours. For it is already ſuppos'd in our Caſe, that the greater Number, having the Poſſeſſion of the Lands, muſt and will ſhare the Government.

Might, indeed, if put in Execution, will ever be too hard for Right, and May and Ought can never ſtand againſt the Torrent of Will and Muſt.

This needs no farther Demonſtration: Ten Servants in a Family will eaſily turn their Maſter out of Doors, though they have not the Propriety of one foot of Land upon the Earth.

Examples we need not. However, ſince our Author hath furniſh'd us with one, as he hath done many others againſt himſelf, I ſhall mind you of it.

The Turk, he tells us, who is abſolute Proprietor of all the Lands in his vaſt Empire, is not yet thereby ſo ſecure, but that the Palace and Seraglio have often become the Shambles of thoſe Princes.

Mer.

But, Sir, that, he tells you, has been done by his Janizaries, which he calls a Mercenary Army, and not his natural Subjects. But could he introduce his Timariots into the places of thoſe Janizaries, this horrid Flaw, and Inconvenience in the Government, had been wholly avoided.

Trav.

But why does he entertain theſe Janizaries, if not to preſerve him from the Violence of his diſcontented and numerous Subjects? And why dare the Janizaries act theſe horrid Murders, if not becauſe they know themſelves too ſtrong? And what Security can he give, that his Spahis would not do the ſame thing if their Prince ſhould endeavour to keep them in too ſevere Subjection. Never, ſure, did any ſober Author maintain Propoſitions ſo irrational; nay, inſomuch that their contrary is true. What People are more happy and quiet than thoſe, who poſſeſſing a reaſonable Proportion of Lands, live in Plenty, and enjoy, in Security, the Fruit of their own Labours? In this our Nation is bleſſed particularly, above all others: for, ſetting, aſide Ambition, what do we want to make us happy? And what hinders our Happineſs from being ſecure? who can offend us and remain unpuniſh'd.

Our Cattel, our Houſes, our Lands, are inviolable; our Perſons as free as the Air, which is it ſelf reſtrain'd within certain Bounds; and we (as all Men ought to be) within the Compaſs of juſt and reaſonable Laws. What People, who are at eaſe, would of themſelves diſturb their own Happineſs? And what oftner occaſions Rebellion than the Pretence of Miſery and Oppreſſion?

What made the People of Athens, according to our Author, endeavour a Change in the Government, but their great Incumbrances and Debts to the Nobility?

What made the People of Rome mutiny againſt the Senate, but the want of their Lands? And what occaſion'd the Barons Wars in King John and Henry the Third's Time, but the Severity of their Tenures, and want of their Rights and Priviledges, as they pretended?

What, indeed, begins all Wars on the Peoples ſide, but Oppreſſion; and what eſtabliſheth Peace, but Eaſe and Plenty? Our Author's divine Machiavel is wholly of our Opinion, and tells us amongſt other things, That if a Prince will preſerve to his Subjects their Poſſeſſions, their Priviledges, and their Women, he runs no manner of Danger, but ſuch as may proceed from the Ambition of a few, which yet he aſſures us we may eaſily, and by many ways, prevent. In odium omnium maximè adducunt bonorum direptio, & ſuarum raptus mulierum. Quotieſcunque bonis parcitur multitudinis & honori, praeclarè ſecum agi ducunt homines. Id duntaxat fit reliquum oppugnandum, ambitio nimirum paucorum, quoe multis modis, nulloque negotio reprimi poteſt. Prin. cap. 19.

Mer.

Sir, I can very hardly grant you this Point, it being one of our ſtrongeſt Holds, which we muſt defend to the laſt Drop of Blood. I muſt tell you therefore, that though the greateſt Number, ſuch as I muſt own is ever compos'd of the People, be always capable of uſurping the Government, over the Governour, who is indeed no more than a ſingle Man againſt a whole Nation in point of Strength; yet whilſt the Tenures are preſerv'd, ſuch as were formerly in England, the Prince had a ſtricter Tye upon the People, than when having relinquiſh'd them, he hath no other Obligation upon them than his Parchment Right of Power, and, if you pleaſe, their Oaths of Allegiance; both which are cancell'd in a Moment, while the Lands remain eternally in the People.

Trav.

I have already told you, That publick Right of Government, or if you will, the Right of publick Government, doth not in the leaſt depend upon Tenures: for they are only particular Services and Royalties, which Princes have ſometimes thought good to reſerve to themſelves, more or leſs, according as they alone have thought fit, and may be alter'd or relinquiſh'd, without diminiſhing their Publick Right of Government over the Nation, they being ſuch as regard rather the private Perſon of the King, as Lord of a Mannor, than his Politick Capacity, as Supreme Magiſtrate, or Governour of the State. And indeed, many of theſe Services and Tenures were rather very inconvenient and burthenſome to the People than beneficial to the Government.

Many ſuch were anciently known in England and Scotland, as well as France. Amongſt others, what was more inhumane, than that the Lord ſhould have a Right to lye with his Tenants Wife the firſt Night they married: which in France they call Droit de Jambage. Some Services were very ridiculous, and ſome extravagant. So I have heard of a Tenure in France, by which the Tenant is oblig'd, at certain Times, to drive a Cart with twelve Oxen round the Court of the Mannor Houſe. In which time, if any of the Oxen happen to dung in the Court, the Cart, with the twelve Oxen, was forfeited to the Lord of the Mannor: but if none of the Oxen ſhould dung, untill they were driven out of the Court, then the Lord was to receive only one Egg. Now how do theſe and many other ſuch Services, relate to a Right of Government? So many Mannors were held of the King, to accompany him in his Wars in England, or in France, or elſewhere; ſome were obliged to carry his Spear, ſome his Sword, others his Helmet, and ſuch like, which are all merely private Obligations, and which any private Man might reſerve, upon conſideration of Lands given.

It is true, the King had then a ſtronger Tye upon particular Perſons, than ſince he hath releaſed them. But this, I ſay, hath no influence upon his Publick Right of Power; for the Supreme Magiſtrate is always (notwithſtanding any ſuch Releaſe) Maſter both of our Eſtates and Perſons, as far as they are neceſſary, for the Preſervation of the Government.

So you ſee Care is taken that all Lands ſhall pay their Quotas towards Horſes and Footmen, which is in uſe at this day; which Forces ſo paid, we call the Militia. His Majeſty may preſs Souldiers, and by the Conſent of his great Council, the Parliament, charge our Eſtates and Perſons with ſuch Sums as ſhall be thought expedient for the Occaſion. And this brings me to the third Point, which is, That all Sovereign Princes have a Right of Power over the Lands, notwithſtanding the Property be divided amongſt the People. And this proceeds from the Dominium Supereminens, which is eternally in all Supreme Magiſtrates or Magiſtrate whatſoever; whoſe Duty it is to look after, and by all means ſecure, the Preſervation of the Whole, in which every particular is involv'd. Nor is it a ſufficient Objection, to ſay, That Laws or Impoſitions may lye very heavy upon particular Men, if ſuch an Arbitrary Power ſhould reſt in any Government: for Laws cannot be always made ſo eaſie, but that Occaſions may happen, which may make them ſeem very hard to ſome, Id modò quoeritur, ſi majori parti, & in ſummo proſint.

Hence Grotius, from Thucydides, remarks an excellent Paſſage of Pericles to this purpoſe: Sic exiſtimo, ſaith he, etiam ſingulis hominibus plus eam prodeſſe civitatem, quoe tota rectè ſe habeat, quam ſi privatis floreat utilitatibus, ipſa autem univerſim laboret. Qui enim domeſticas fortunas bene collocatas habet, patria tamen everſa, pereat & ipſe neceſſe eſt, &c. All which, Livy thus briefly expreſſes; Reſpublica incolumis, & privatas res ſalvas facile proeſtat. Publica prodendo, tua nequicquam ſerves. That whilſt the Commonwealth is ſafe in general, our particular Concerns may be alſo eaſily ſecur'd. But by deſerting the publick Intereſt of the Nation, we do thereby no ways preſerve our own. Nothing, therefore, ſeems more reaſonable, and indeed neceſſary, than that the Government ſhould have always a Power, to compell every particular Subject, who ſtanding upon their private Rights and Properties, would thereby ſuffer the Whole to be deſtroy'd.

For, though naturally every Man hath a Right to maintain what is his own, and by conſequence might oppoſe whoſoever would endeavour to take his Property from him; yet Grotius tells us, That Government, which is inſtituted for the publick Tranquillity of the Whole, or, Tranquillitas publica in qua & ſingulorum continetur, acquires thereby a more Sovereign Right, even ver our Perſons as well as Poſſeſſions, than we our ſelves can pretend to; that is, as far as ſhall be neceſſary for obtaining that great end of publick Preſervation. Civili ſocietate ad tuendam Tranquillitatem inſtituta, ſtatim civitati jus quoddam majus, in nos & noſtra naſcitur, quatenus ad finem illum id neceſſarium eſt. Whence Seneca obſerves, That the Power of all is ever in the Supreme Magiſtrate, but the Property remains, nevertheleſs, in the Hands of particular Subjects. Ad Reges Poteſtas omnium pertinet, ad ſingulos Proprietas. And ſo, as hath been ſaid, the King in Parliament hath a Right to diſpoſe of our Eſtates and Perſons as ſhall be thought neceſſary for our publick Security. And where Sovereign Princes act without Parliaments, they have in themſelves the ſame Authority.

I have ſpoke already of the Power which the Government hath over our Eſtates; and for our Perſons, Grotius hath furniſh'd us with a Caſe, very ſtrong to ſhew the great Extent of Sovereign Authority. He puts a Queſtion, Whether an innocent Citizen may be abandoned, ad Exitium, even to Deſtruction, for the Common Good. Without doubt, ſays he, ſuch an innocent Citizen may be ſo abandon'd. Dubium non eſt quin deſeri poteſt. And going ſtill on, how far ſuch a Citizen is oblig'd to deliver himſelf, he concludes, That he may be forc'd to it, and ſacrific'd too, to prevent an imminent Miſchief, both againſt his Will, and entirely innocent. Quare & in noſtra controverſia, verius videtur cogi poſſe civem; for, ſaith he, Though one Citizen cannot compell another to any thing more than what is ſtrictly juſt according to Law, yet the Superiour hath a lawful Authority, as Superiour, to force an innocent Man to ſuffer for the Common Good. Par parem cogere non poteſt, niſi ad id quod jure debetur ſtrictè dicto. At ſuperior cogere poteſt, etiam ad illa, quae quaelibet virtus praecipit quia in jure proprio Superioris, quâ ſuperior eſt, hoc eſt comprehenſum.

We find, even in the Commonwealth of Holland, ſo much envied and applauded by Men, who are given to change, that in the late Wars with England and France, they taxed Mens Purſes with ſuch heavy Contributions, that they were almoſt as much diſſatisfied with their Governours at home, as afraid of their Enemies abroad: and all this was done much againſt the Wills of almoſt every particular Subject. Nay more, I have heard ſay, That their Fond, or Principal, (the greateſt part of their Eſtates, for want of Land, conſiſting in Money) is ſo involv'd in the great Bank, that they can never retrieve their Principal again. But their Eſtates being wholly at the Diſpoſe of the Government, when that falls, they periſh.

I confeſs, I do not know of any Chriſtian Kingdom where a more arbitrary power is exercis'd. But it is, it ſeems, neceſſary for their affairs, that it ſhould be ſo. Yet nevertheleſs it is no rule for our imitation, their circumſtances being extremely different from ours.

Mer.

I perceive you will not be perſwaded, to let us enjoy our properties, and our ſhare in the government together, notwithſtanding our author aſſures us, that we will and muſt have it. But pray, Sir, ſetting aſide your reaſons, why you have taken from us our ſhares, (which indeed at preſent, (I know not how to confute) let me prevail with you to be rul'd, in this matter, by examples of other great Kingdoms. And you know, Plato Redivivus tells us for certain, that thoſe Kings who had no companions in the Soveraign power, had no ſharers likewiſe in the Dominion or poſſeſſion of the land. But if the Senate or people, or both did ſhare the land, they ſhar'd alſo in the Adminiſtration of the Soveraignty. And pray why ſhould we, (who enjoy no ſmall poſſeſſions) be excluded?

Trav.

Couſin, under-favour, your Plato redivivus is a moſt impudent Ghoſt. For provided it ſerves his turn, he makes no Conſcience of advancing downright falſhood for undeniable matter of fact, which will appear more fully hereafter. We will begin with the Scythians, who contending with the Egyptians for antiquity, have been thought the firſt people, which inhabited the earth after the ſloud. The people were not known in Hiſtory before their Kings, whoſe power alſo was arbitrary. So ſure it is, that the firſt known Governments upon earth were Monarchical. Principio, rerum, gentium, nationumque Imperium penes Reges erat, ſays Juſtin. And immediately after, Populus nullis legibus tenebatur, arbitria Principum pro legibus erant. And yet we find the ground ſo common to all, that every man was as much Proprietor as the King himſelf. Hominibus inter ſe nulli ſines, ne que enim agrum exercent, nec domus illis ulla, armenta & pecora ſemper paſcentibus, & per incultas ſolitudines errare ſolitis. Every man had a propriety to as much ground as was neceſſary for himſelf and his cattle, which alſo he choſe, as he thought moſt convenient. Yet ſo far were the people from pretending any ſhare in the Government, that no Kings were more abſolute than the Scythians, nor did any enjoy their Government longer. And if we follow them into the upper Aſia, which they totally conquer'd, we do not find their Kings pretending to one foot of the land.

Mer.

What good then did their conqueſt do them, if they did not enjoy the poſſeſſions of the conquered?

Trav.

They made the ſame uſe of it, as all Conquerors generally have done, that is to ſay, leaving the lands to their proper owners, they only exacted a Tribute, which was gathered amongſt themſelves. Yet nevertheleſs, contrary to our Author's Propoſition, they always retain'd the Empire, or Government over them, and that for no leſs time than 1500 years. Aſiam perdomitam vectigalem fecere, modico tributo magis in titulum imperii, quam victoriae praemium impoſito. His igitur Aſia, per mille quingentos annos vectigalis fuit. Pendendi tributi finem, Ninus Rex Aſſyriorum impoſuit. Ninus then was the firſt, who freed the Aſſyrians from their Tribute, and the Scythian Empire. Nor do we read, that he enſlaved them more under his own. But leaving them their poſſeſſions entire, yet preſerving always the Supreme right of Government, required only ſuch Contributions, as himſelf thought neceſſary.

After the Aſſyrian Empire, that of the Medes began. But no alteration can I find in the Property of the lands. On the contrary we read, that the Perſians became only Tributary to the Medes. Sed civitates, quae Medorum tributariae fuerant, mutato imperio, conditionem ſuam mutatam arbitrantes, à Cyro defecerunt. That Thoſe Perſian Cities, which were tributary to the Medes, under Aſtyages, revolted from Cyrus. But to leave no diſpute in the caſe, Xenophon in his Cyri Inſt. l. 4. tells us in plain words, that Cyrus bid the Aſſyrians be of good heart, that their condition ſhould be no ways altered, but in the change of their King. That they ſhould enjoy their houſes and their lands as formerly they did, and have the ſame right over their wives and children. Cyrus victos Aſſyrios jubebat bono eſſe animo, eandem ipſorum ſortem fore, quae fuerat, mutato tantum Rege. Manſuras ipſis domos, agros, jus in uxores in liberos, ut fuiſſet hactenus.

This, I think, ſhews moſt clearly, that the people enjoy'd the Property in their lands, not only under the Medes but the Perſians alſo. And yet they were ſo far from ſharing any part of the Government, that all men agree, no Princes to have been more abſolute than the Medes and Perſians.

Now if this be true, as ſure it is, for Xenophon was a very good Judge, who wrote particularly the Hiſtory of Cyrus, what an ignorant, or what an impudent Author is Plato Redivivus, who boldly affirms, p. 52. that Cyrus by name, and other conquering Monarchs before him, took all for themſelves.

From Aſia, let us travel into Egypt, and by the way we will take notice of the Government of Sodom and Gomorrha, and thoſe five Kingdoms which we read in Scripture, to have been ſubject to Senacherib King of Aſſyria for twelve years. But we do not find, that either before or after their defection, the King of Aſſyria had any right to their lands, but only a tribute, which they at length refus'd to pay.

With the Hiſtory of the Bible Joſephus agrees, who tells us, chap. 10. Eodem tempore, cum Imperium Aſiae penes Aſſyrios eſſet, Sodomitarum res, tam opibus, quam numeroſa juventute florebat, ut a quinque Regibus adminiſtrarentur, donec victi ab Aſſyriis, Tributum eis ſolvebant.

The Egyptian Kings, notwithſtanding the conceit of our Author, and it may be of ſome other his Antimonarchical Accomplices, were as abſolute as any Kings of the Eaſt. Egyptiorum Reges, ſaith Grotius, ut alios Reges Orientis ſummo imperio uſos, non eſt dubium.

From the firſt Egyptian King to Chencres Pharaoh, who was overwhelm'd in the Red Sea (for Pharaoh like Auguſtus is only a title of honour) Authors have reckoned a Succeſſion of Ten Kings, a time long enough to have eſtabliſh'd a firm Government. And yet we ſee in the days of Joſeph's Adminiſtration, his Subjects had an undoubted property in their lands, which at laſt they ſold, with their freedom alſo, to purchaſe bread. Quibus agri fuere, ſaith Joſephus, partem aliquam in praetium alimentorum, Regi decidebant—And again, Non ſolum corpora ſed animos gentis in ſervitutem redegit neceſſitas. Which ſervitude we muſt interpret ſlavery, and was now diſtinguiſh'd from ſubjection: for there is no queſtion, but that Subjects in thoſe days, were free both in their perſons and eſtates, which they enjoy'd in property, and only liable to ſuch Impoſitions and Services, as concern'd the publick happineſs and ſecurity of the Government.

We can by no means agree with our Author, that the Egyptian Kings held a kind of precarious Kingdom, ſuch as the Heraclides in Sparta. But being abſolute, according to Grotius, or ſumma poteſtate praediti, were not yet ſo barbarous, as to appropriate to themſelves, all the poſſeſſions belonging to their Territories, or otherwiſe enſlave their Subjects, than according as misfortunes or neceſſity forc'd them to ſell their Liberty. Yet even in this caſe we find, that Pharaoh return'd the Lands to moſt of them, upon payment of the Sixth part only of the uſufrute which he retein'd, as Joſephus tells us, Jure Dominii, which conditions they moſt gladly accepted, Laeti inſperata reſtitutione agrorum. And to conclude, let me inform you (from good Authorities) that the Egyptian Kings were ſo far from retaining or reſerving all the lands to themſelves, that after the general diviſion of their Territories, their Lands were diſtributed into Three Equal parts; One part was appropriated to the Kings uſe, and was Demeſne or Crown-lands; the Second part was aſſign'd to their Prieſts, for their Subſiſtence, and the ſupport of the neceſſary charges of their Sacrifices, and other Offices belonging to the Worſhip and Service of their Gods. And the Third part was allotted to their Calaſiri or Milites, which were thoſe who profeſſed arms for the defence of their Country.

In the next place, The Romans who held the Soveraign Empire of ſo great a part of the world, had it ſo little in their thoughts to make themſelves Proprietors of all the land belonging to their Empire, that as well in their firſt as latter Monarchy, they ſeldom took away more from the Conquered, than was almoſt neceſſary for preſerving their Dominion over them, by the maintaining of Garriſons, or planting ſuch Colonies, and Praeda militaria amongſt them, as might, at their own expence, and charges, preſerve their fidelity to the Romans, and ſecure the publick peace: Hence Petilius Cerealis reproaching the French (after his victory over them) for their folly, and defection from the Roman protection, he tells them, That although the Romans had been often provoked, yet they added nothing more to what they might claim from their right of Conqueſt, than ſuch conditions as might ſecure their publick peace. For (ſaith he) there can be no peace without arms, nor can armies be maintain'd without pay, nor can pay be procured but by Tribute and Taxes. Nos quanquam toties laceſſiti, Jure victoriae id ſolum vobis addidimus, quo pacem tueremur, nam neque quies gentium ſine armis—Tac. Hiſt. 4. Salluſte tells us, That the ancient Pious Romans took nothing from the Conquered but the liberty of doing injury or wrong: Majores noſtri religioſiſſimi mortales nihil victis eripiebant, praeter injuriae licntiam. And that they encreasd their Empire by their goodneſs and mercy. Ignoſcendo auxiſſe Pop. Rom. magnitudinem.

Certain it is, that Romulus and ſome others of thoſe firſt Roman Monarchs, us'd their victories with ſo much moderation, that the Conquered were ſcarce ſenſible, or ſorry they were overcome; whence Claudius (blaming, in his Speech to the Senate, the ſeverity of the Athenians and Lacedemonians) At conditor noſter Romulus, (ſaith he) tantum ſapientia Tac. Ann. xi. valuit, ut pleroſque populos eodem die hoſtes, dein Cives habuerit: But our Founder Romulus was ſo prudent a Prince, that he caus'd many to become Citizens of Rome, who the ſame day had been the Roman enemies. And Grotius takes notice particularly out of Appian, that the Romans when they ſubdued Italy, took but a part even of thoſe Italian landsGrot. de I. B. & p. l. 3. from the Conquered. Romani cum Italiam armis ſubegiſſent, victos parte agri mulctarent: and again, etiam victis hoſtibus, terram non omnem adimebant, ſed partiebantur. And this hath been done (as is already obſerv'd) for their ſupport and ſecurity. And it hath been univerſally a Cuſtom amongſt all Nations, that (howſoever the Conquerors might differ concerning the Perſons or Perſonal eſtate of thoſe whom they overcame or what might fall to them nomine praedae) they generally left the Lands in the poſſeſſion of their ancient Proprietors and Inhabitants of the Country (except ſometimes in the caſe of Colonies) upon the payment only of certain Tributes or Taxes. Very many examples occur in all Hiſtories, I ſhall only therefore take notice of what Tacitus obſerves of our ancient Britains, They paid (ſaith he) their Tribute readily enough, and performed ſuch other Duties as were commanded them, provided they had no affronts or injuries put upon them, for thoſe they could not bear; being brought only to obey, but not to ſerve. Ipſi Britanni dilectum ac Tributa, &c. in vita Agrip.

Theſe then were the Cuſtoms of the Romans, and Greeks too, concerning Lands between themſelves and the Conquered; let us now ſee how they diſpos'd of their Lands between themſelves and their Natural Subjects, and we find that Romulus made the firſt general diſtribution of his Free men into Tribes, and that Thoſe again he diſtinguiſhed into Patres and Plebes, who were afterwards called Patricians and Plebeians, or Lords and Commons; the Patricians were compos'd of ſuch as were eminent either in Birth, Courage, Wealth, or any other remarkable Virtue, and to theſe many great Priviledges and Poſſeſſions were granted; out of theſe alone were choſen their Prieſts, as well as Senators, and other inferiour Magiſtrates.

The Plebeians minded only Tillage and Husbandry, and other mechanical employments, and were called Commoners, or Roman Citizens, which title became afterwards an honour of no ſmall eſteem, and was much affected by their neighbours, and purchaſed by particular Admiſſion or Denization; many ſuch were choſen out of the Sabins, Volſcians, Samnites and others: but leſt this diſtinction between Patricians and Plebeians might beget on the one ſide, Inſolence, and on the other, Envy, thoſe prudent Monarchs thought fit to unite them by a more endearing Relation, whence the Patricii were called Patroni, or Patrons of the People, and were to protect them, not only in all Law Suits, but in what other occurrences might happen to them. The Plebeians alſo were ſtyled Clientes or their Clients, who beſides the Protection of their Patrons, received alſo Lands from them, under certain conditions, which remained many years inviolable: for example, in caſe the Patron ſhould be taken by the Enemy, the Client was to contribute towards his Ranſome, as alſo towards the advancement of their Daughters in their Marriages; they were not to inform or give teſtimony againſt their Patrons; or if they did, they were accurſed and condemned as Traitors, Diis inferis devovebantur, & proditionis erant rei, beſides many other obſequious duties and reſpects: ſo we read that Appiu Claudius gave Lands to his Clients even in the very Infancy of the Roman Government.

Nor was this jus tutelare, perſonal only, but it was alſo Gentilitium, that is, it extended it ſelf into whole families, as for inſtance, ſome of them (with their whole Generation) were Clients under the protection of the Aemilian, ſome under the Julian, and others under the Claudian Families. This conſtitution was of great uſe to the Common-wealth, for the credit which the Patricii had with their Clients, was ſufficient oftentimes to appeaſe their popular diſturbances, who yielding either to the Authority or Entreaties of their Patrons, were brought to acquieſce, though with ſome little prejudice to their own right, and this continued many Ages, until the ambition of the Tribunes interrupted this good correſpondence between the Princes and the People: and ſo honourable did the name of Client grow, that many States and Governments, who have voluntarily committed themſelves to the fidelity or protection of the Romans, did not diſdain that Title.

Thus we ſee the Lands, even within the narrow compaſs of the firſt Roman Monarchy, divided amongſt the Princes and the People, which Lands ſo given to the latter, were called Clientela's; and accordingly we may obſerve under Servius Tullius their ſixth King, a Regiſter of their particular Eſtates: Regis ſolertia, ita eſt ordinata reſpublica, ut omnia Patrimonii, dignitatis, aetatis, artium, officiorumque diſcrimina, in tabulas referrentur. Flor. c. 6. So we read of the Confiſcation of the particular lands of Tarquinius ſuperbus; and yet Romulus and his ſucceſſors were as abſolute Monarchs, as any of the Caeſars have been; and Julius Caeſar himſelf by Will deviſeth part of his own private eſtate to the Romans.

Thus was property, or the poſſeſſion of Lands, divided amongſt the people, during the firſt Roman Monarchy, thus it continued under the Roman as well as Graecian Empire, thus it remains at preſent in the German Empire, and thus it is eſtabliſhed in all the moſt Chriſtian Monarchies upon earth: and not to forget our own Country, I muſt obſerve out of a learned Author, that our ancient Britiſh Kings who were as abſolute as any, made diſtribution alſo of their Land amongſt their Subjects after this manner; one pa t they gave to the Archflamens to pray for the Kings, and their poſterity, a ſecond part to the Nobility to do them Knights ſervice, a third to the Husbandmen to hold of them in S ••• age, and a fourth to the Mechanicks to hold in B rgage. l. MS. H ſt. Brit. And yet Plato Red. dares obtrude this propoſition upon us p. 40. That in all states, if the King had no Companions in the Soveraign Power, he had no ſharers likewiſe in the Dominion or poſſeſſion of the Lands.

But for further ſatisfaction let us conſider the Government of Gods people, or the Kingdom of the Jews. I think all will agree, that the Hebrews were proprietors of their Lands, and held them upon as good a Title, as the people of England do theirs, even at this day. We find in that Hiſtory a particular account of the diſtribution of the Lands according to their Tribes, who were at that time under a Monarchical Government, whether we look upon God Almighty as their King, who according to Grotius, Hobbs, Junius Brutus, and all good Authors, was Rex peculiaris Iſraelitarum, or as Brutus tells us De jure Mag. p. 226. Ab initio Deus ipſe aternus ejus Monarcha fuit, non eo tantum nomine quod ipſe rerum omnium ſupremum dominium obtinuit, ſed ſingulari quodam modo, nempe, &c. Or whether under their High Prieſt, who was Gods vicegerent, except when he raiſed them up a Judge. We hear of no Tenures or ſervices amongſt them, other than ſuch as all Subjects upon earth, are oblig'd to perform for the honour of the King and publick ſafety.

It is plain from the ſtory of Ahab in the caſe of Naboth's vineyard, that Naboth had a clear right and property in the poſſeſſion of his lands, and that their Kings had no authority, in their private capacities, to force any Subject, ſo much as to ſell his land upon reaſonable conditions. Yet nevertheleſs, neither the Kings of Perſia, nor of Egypt, nor of any part of the Eaſt, were more abſolute than the Kings of Iſrael were, and yet none had a leſs proportion in the poſſeſſion of the lands.

Mer.

Sir, I ſhall grant you all except this, That the Kings of Iſrael were abſolute, which I can hardly believe, eſpecially ſince our Author tells us the contrary, and inſtances in the Sanhedrim, the Aſſembly of the Tribes, and Congregation of the Lord, who all had a ſhare in the Government, as they had in the property.

Trav.

I confeſs ſeveral zealous Commonwealths men have aſſerted this falſe doctrine, and amongſt others, their old Coryphaeus, Junius Brutus. But I find no colour of pretence for this their aſſertion, but we will examine the caſe, as fully as this occaſion will permit, and refer you afterwards to what I have writ more at large concerning this point elſewhere.

And firſt, it is neceſſary that we ſhould agree, what we mean by an abſolute Monarch, which is indeed a point rather controverted, than clearly decided by any Author, that I have yet met withal.

Salluſt thinks it conſiſts in an exemption from all humane juriſdiction, Impune quidvis facere, hoc eſt Regem eſſe. Others, that to be abſolute, a Prince ought to govern peremptorily, according to his will. So Juvenal, Sic volo, ſic jubeo, ſtat pro ratione voluntas.

A third ſort have declar'd that King truly abſolute, who giving Laws to others, is ſubject to none himſelf. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 .—to command without being oblig'd to give a reaſon why or wherefore 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , as Aeſchylus ſaith, and again, Rex eſt ſuo utens jure, nulli obnoxius. Hobbs will have it conſiſt in the ſubjection of our wills to that of the Prince, Homo ille, vel concilium illud, cujus voluntati ſinguli ſuam voluntatem ſubjecerunt, ſummam poteſtatem ſive ſummum imperium ſive dominium habere dicitur.

Grotius, whoſe opinion I muſt always eſteem very much, tells us, that the moſt abſolute or higheſt power, is of that Prince, whoſe actions are not accountable or ſubject, to any other mans right or authority, ſo as that they may be made void, according to the will or pleaſure, or decrees of any other mortal man, Poteſtas ſumma illa dicitur, cujus actus alterius juri non ſubſtunt, ita ut alterius humanae voluntatis arbitrio, irriti reddi poſſunt. De jure B. & P. p. 47.

But with ſubmiſſion to ſo great authorities, Theſe do not reach the definition of an abſolute Monarch, in a good ſenſe as it ever ought to be taken. For though they have given their Prince exemption from all Laws, and power enough to command, yet they have not excluded Tyranny, which indeed is oftentimes miſtaken for abſolute power.

I confeſs it ſeems hard to deſtroy the Tyrant, and yet preſerve the abſolute Monarch. However I ſhall preſume to give ſuch a definition, as may do both, which I refer to the impartial judgment of thoſe who ſhall conſider it.

An abſolute Monarch then is he, who having receiv'd a juſt authority, executes the Laws of God and Nature without controul. By receiving a juſt authority, I exclude one principal mark of a Tyrant, which is intruſion, or uſurpation. In the next place, I oblige the abſolute Monarch to execute the Laws of God and Nature, and nothing contrary to them. By this alſo Government is freed from Tyranny, in the uſe or exerciſe of authority.

For he who governs according to the Laws of God and Nature (I ſpeak of a Natural Monarch, or a Monarch in the ſtate of Nature) does no unjuſt thing, and is by conſequence no Tyrant.

And laſtly, as I have ſecur'd the abſolute Prince from Tyranny, ſo I have plac'd him above all conditional limited Governments, by theſe words, [without controul.] For he who commands or governs as far as the Laws of God and Nature permit, hath certainly as ample, and as abſolute a Juriſdiction, as any mortal man can juſtly poſſeſs. This is ſo large a power, that he who acts beyond it, that is, contrary to it, is deſervedly eſteem'd a Tyrant, and in ſuch caſe the people are not oblig'd to obey. And the reaſon is, becauſe the Prince, having never receiv'd an authority to command that which is unjuſt, that is to ſay, contrary to the Laws of God and Nature, the people are acquitted from their obediences as to that particular command.

All that we have now to do, is but to apply this definition to the Hebrew Kings, and from thence we ſhall be able to judge of their abſolute power.

And firſt it is certain, that they receiv'd their right of power from God himſelf, and no other, which continued by Succeſſion, eſpecially after David, unto the Babyloniſh captivity.

I have not time at preſent to inlarge upon this point, and anſwer thoſe frivolous objections which ſome men have brought againſt it. You will find this done more fully in another place, and confirm'd by the authority of Joſephus, Grotius, and the Hiſtory of the Bible.

I know ſome have pretended that David received his authority from the people, and would prove it by a paſſage in 1 Chron. 11. where it is ſaid, that the Elders anointed David King over Iſrael. But we muſt obſerve, that David was Anointed firſt by Samuel, and that by the expreſs command of God himſelf, and next, this ſecond Anointing by the people ſignified nothing more, than to exclude by this publick act, the pretenſions of Isboſheth eldeſt Son to Saul, Who without the ſpecial reveal'd will of God, would have ſucceeded his father. And this was ever practiſed, where there was any interruption or diſpute in the Succeſſion. So Solomon was anointed, becauſe of the difference between him and Adonijah, otherwiſe that Ceremony was not abſolutely neceſſary, and was many times totally neglected. Beſides, in the caſe of David, it is plain, that he received no right of power from the people, but from God, and that by their own confeſſion both before and after their anointing. And the Lord thy God ſaid unto thee, thou ſhalt feed my people Iſrael, and thou ſhalt be ruler over my people Iſrael. And again, They anointed David King over Iſrael, according to the word of the Lord by Samuel, 1 Chron. 11. 2, 3. Hence Grotius obſerves, that David gave God thanks, for that God had ſubjected his people unto him. David Deo gratias agit, quod populum ſuum ſibi ſubjecerit.

Taking it therefore for granted, that David received no right of power from the people, by conſequence he depended upon none but God, as all the moſt Soveraign Princes do, and this is one great mark of an abſolute Monarch.

In the next place, he executed the laws of God and nature without controul. I never heard any queſtion made of this, except in the caſe of judgment concerning a Tribe, the High Prieſt, and a Prophet. Which judgments Grotius ſuppoſed, were taken from the Hebrew Kings, Aliqua judicia arbitror regibus adempta. But I rather think, under favour, that they were more properly, Principibus conceſſa, which makes a conſiderable difference. For I find no mention of any time or power, who could take thoſe judgments from the King.

On the contrary we read of ſeveral Kings, erecting Courts of Judicature, and making Judges both in Gods cauſe and in the Kings. And theſe three points being of the higheſt conſequence, the judgment of them might moſt probably be granted by the King, to the determination of the higheſt Court of Juſtice.

In the firſt of Chron. chap. 26. v. 5. We find David making Rulers over the Reubenites, the Gadites, and the half Tribe of Manaſſeh, for every matter pertaining to God and the affairs of the King; but more particularly in the ſecond of Chron. chap. 19. Jehoſhaphat does the ſame thing, but in terms more plain, And he ſet Judges in the Land through all the fenced Cities of Judah, City by City. And ſaid to the Judges, take heed what you do, &c. Moreover in Jeruſalem did Jehoſhaphat ſet of the Levites, and of the Prieſts, and of the Chief of the Fathers of Iſrael, for the judgments of the Lord, and for controverſies when they return'd to Jeruſalem. And behold Amariel the Chief Prieſt is over you, in all matters of the Lord, and Zedekiah the ſon of Iſhmael, the Ruler of the houſe of Judah, for all the Kings matters.

Indeed I ſhould think that this is plain enough to prove, that their Kings had in them the Supreme right, of adminiſtring juſtice through their territories, and made their Subordinate officers, who wholly depended upon them; and I am the more confirm'd in this opinion, becauſe I find both the High Prieſts and Prophets too judged, condemned and pardoned, even againſt the judgment of the Sanhedrim, by the Kings ſingle authority.

So Solomon baniſhed the High Prieſt Abiathar. Solomon Abiatharem Ponti icem in exilium miſit, ſays Joſephus lib. 8. ſo Jehoiakim ſlew the Prophet Ʋriah. And they ſent forth Ʋriah out of Aegypt, and brought him unto Jehoiakim the King, who ſlew him with the Sword, Jer. 26. 23. The ſame did Joaſh King of Judah to Zachariah the Prophet, And they Conſpired againſt him, and ſtoned him with ſtones at the command of the King, 2 Chron. 24. 21. and ſeveral other inſtances there are.

On the other ſide, when the Sanhedrim intreated Zedekiah, that they might put Jeremiah to death, by his own ſingle authority he preſerv'd him againſt them.

Merch.

Under favour, Sir, I have heard this very caſe of Jeremiah, urg'd againſt the Soveraign power of the Hebrew Kings, and produced as an inſtance to ſhew the independent right of the Sanhedrim. For when they ſollicited the King, that they might put him to death, Zedekiah anſwered, Lo he is in your power, the King is not he that can do any thing againſt you.

Trav.

I confeſs I have read this example in Junius Brutus, and know not which moſt to wonder at, his impudence or his impious knavery. The words in the Vulgar Tranſlation, which Scaliger eſteems the beſt, run thus, Ecce in poteſtate veſtra eſt, nam contra vos Rex nihil poteſt. In hoc negotiorum genere ſcilicet, ſaith Grotius.

But our brute Author, by an unparallell'd wickedneſs, perverts both the ſence and words of the Holy Scripture, and tranſlates it, Ipſis contradicere nulla in re poſſe. And ſo would make the Sanhedrim ſo abſolute, that the King could not contradict them in any thing, but we ſhall diſcover his impoſture by the Hiſtory it ſelf, and practice of Zedekiah even in this very caſe.

And it is firſt certain, that the King meant nothing more by this anſwer, than that he left Jeremiah to be Tried by his Judges according to Law. And indeed as his affairs ſtood, he was unwilling to diſpleaſe the Princes, in a caſe which they thought ſo nearly concerned the good of the people and ſafety of the King, which they believ'd was indanger'd by the diſcouraging Prophecies of Jeremiah. Rex Zedechias, ſays Joſephus, nè in Principum invidiam tali tempore incurreret, voluntati eorum reſiſtens, permiſit eis, ut de Propheta Jeremia quicquid libent facerent, lib. 10. c. 10. Yet our Villanous Presbyter is ſo ſhameleſs an Author as to affirm from hence, that the Sanhedrim was ſuperiour to the King-Rege ſuperiorem, q. 3. p. 73. Nay and could judge the King himſelf, Illi Regem judicare poſſunt, which I am confident was never found in the whole Hiſtory of the Bible.

But to return to this caſe. We find firſt, that Zedekiah had by his own authority impriſon'd Jeremiah, ch. 30. v. 3. And Jeremiah the Prophet was ſhut up in the Court of the priſon, which was in the King of Judah's houſe. For Zedekiah King of Judah, had ſhut him up.

Next we may obſerve, that the Princes applied themſelves to the King, that they might have leave to put the Prophet to death, and that in terms reſpectful enough, Jer. 38. 4. Therefore ſaid the Princes unto the King; We beſeech thee, let this man be put to death. Now what needed this impertinent, and indeed abuſive complement to the King, if the whole authority was in the Sanhedrim, or Princes themſelves. But to take away all manner of diſpute, we find not only application made to the King, to releaſe Jeremiah and his own order thereupon, Ebedmelech went forth out of the Kings houſe, and ſpake unto the King, ſaying, My Lord the King, theſe men have done evil in all that they have done to Jeremiah the Prophet, whom thou haſt caſt into the dungeon, &c. Then the King commanded Ebedmelech the Egyptian, ſaying, Take from hence thirty men with thee, and take up Jeremiah the Prophet out of the dungeon before he dies, cap. 38. I ſay, beſides this, we read alſo in the ſame chap. That Jeremiah made his addreſs to the King, that he might not dye, which moſt aſſuredly, being a Prophet of the Lord, he would never have done, had it not been in the Kings power to have granted his requeſt, or had it been an infringement of the lawful power of the Sanhedrim. And thereupon Zedekiah, without asking leave of the Elders, promis'd him that he ſhould not dye, and in terms which ſufficiently expreſs his Soveraign authority. Then Jeremiah ſaid unto Zedekiah, If I declare it to thee, wilt thou not ſurely put me to death. So Zedekiah the King ſwore ſecretly to Jeremiah, ſaying, As the Lord liveth that made us this ſoul, I will not put thee to death, neither will I give thee into the hands of theſe men, that ſeek thy life, v. 15, 16. I think theſe words need no explanation, I ſhall only add this remark to ſhew the fourberie of our Author, which is, That in caſe this ſtory could have paſs'd according to his own ſenſe of it, yet it would not have prov'd what he deſign'd it ſhould have done. For Zedekiah at that time was not abſolute as the former Kings of Judah had been, but was tributary to the King of Babylon. And when the year was ended, &c. King Nebuchadnezzar made Zedekiah King over Judah and Jeruſalem, 2 Chron. 36. 10. Which is confirm'd by Joſephus in theſe words. Nebuchadnezzarus exprobat ingratitudinem Zedechiae, quod cum à ſe accepiſſet regnum, accepta poteſtate abuſus eſſet, in authorem beneficii. It being then moſt clear, that the Hebrew Kings were abſolute, or enjoy'd a Soveraign right of power, and yet notwithſtanding this, the property was divided amongſt the people, who had yet no ſhare in the right of Government, but what was ſubordinate; I muſt conclude that Plato Redivivus is no leſs impudent and falſe, than his maſter Junius Brutus was; when he affirms univerſally, that if the people had a ſhare in the property, they had a ſhare in the Government, or where the King had no companions in the Soveraign power, he had no ſharers likewiſe in the Dominion or poſſeſſion of lands.

Mer.

Sir, So many men amongſt us have aſſerted an Independent right of power in the Sanhedrim, that I cannot yet get off from that opinion, unleſs you can ſhew me ſomewhat more particular, than yet you have done, concerning their inſtitution, and that they receiv'd not their power from God, but from man, which in ſuch caſe will make them ſubordinate and ſubjects.

Trav.

I have already told you, that at the requeſt of Moſes, God was pleas'd to admit of ſuch a Council or Court of Judicature, and that then they receiv'd their power, not only from the hand of Moſes, but even from that power which Moſes himſelf had, and no new power immediately from God. But if this be not plain enough, I will offer you another paſſage, by which we ſhall determine the two main points. Firſt, whence the Court of Seventy Elders received their authority. And ſecondly, How large it was.

In the firſt of Deut. v. 13. you ſhall find Moſes thus ſpeaking to the people, Take ye wiſe men and underſtanding, and known amongſt the Tribes, and I will make them rulers over you. So I took the chief of the Tribes, wiſe men, &c. and I charg'd the Judges at that time, ſaying, &c.

Here you ſee the authority proceeding wholly from himſelf, and for its extent you read immediately after, that Moſes reſerves all appeals to himſelf, which is the undoubted mark of Supreme Authority, And the cauſe which is too hard for you, bring it unto me, and I will hear it. And ſo you ſee, in the forementioned caſes of David, Jehoſaphat, Zedekiah and others, that the practice was conformable to the inſtitution, where the Kings of Judah exerciſed their Soveraign power, even in thoſe caſes which belonged moſt particularly to the knowledge of the Sanhedrim. This Brutus confeſſes in expreſs words, who contradicts himſelf, as ſuch falſe men do, in moſt that he ſays. Propterea boni Reges, quales David, Jehoſaphat & caeteri, quia omnibus jus dicere ipſi non potuiſſent, etſi in gravioribus cauſis, ut è Samuele apparet, ſupremum ſibi judicium recipiebant, nil prius vel antiquius habuerunt, quam ut Judices bonos & peritos, ubique locorum conſtituerent, q. 3. p. 89.

Of theſe Judges the greater Court was call'd Sanhedrim Gedola, the Supreme Senate, the leſſer Sanhedrim Ketanna, the leſſer, and inferiour Court.

The leſſer was again ſubdivided, and out of theſe, were Judges diſtributed into moſt of the Cities, for the eaſe of the people.

From them appeal might be made to the Court or Sanhedrim Gedola which always was at Jeruſalem, and who had many priviledges above the others, poſſibly not much unlike our Houſe of Lords, at this day. Now, Couſin, if I underſtand Latin and Engliſh, I think the caſe is plain, that the Hebrew Kings, (notwithſtanding the Sanhedrim) had the ſole Soveraign right of power. But I refer all to your better Judgment.

Mer.

I have nothing to reply againſt Scripture arguments, eſpecially when they are ſo clear, as theſe ſeem to be. I am only afraid, that this great trouble which I have given you, hath taken away the pleaſure you might have had in viewing our Country, and talking of ſome other more diverting ſubject. But preſuming ſtill upon your goodneſs, I muſt deſire that you would compleat the Reformation, which you have more than begun in me, and by giving me ſome account of the Gothick Government, which it ſeems hath prevail'd in a great part of Europe, you may make me capable of defending the doctrine, and the good conſtitution of our Government, againſt all hotbrain'd and ambitious innovators.

Trav.

Sir, I have no greater pleaſure than in obeying your commands, nor have I loſt thereby the advantage of this fine evening.

The Goths therefore, if we may believe Jordanes, who was himſelf of that race, and whom Procopius (writing only of the latter Goths) no where contradicts, broke out of the Iſland Scanzia, or Scandinavia, and with all their ſubſtance, men women and children, advancd ſouth-eaſt. And after ſeveral Skirmiſhes and Victories by the way, they at laſt ſat down about the palus Moeotis.

Here they inhabited many years, and following the warmth of the Sun, ſpread Eaſtwards towards the South of Scythia, and the lower Aſia. Their Government all this while, which laſted many hundred of years, was an abſolute Monarchy, and the Tenth part of the lands were generally appropriated to the ſupport of their Prince, who deſcended from father to ſon, as at this day amongſt us, and in Ottofriſing: you have a long catalogue of their names, and an account of their memorable actions.

But in proceſs of time, (thoſe Northern people, propagating very much under a warmer climate than their own) a great detachment paſt over into Europe, whence came the diſtinction of the Viſigoths and Oſtrogoths, which is as much as to ſay, the Southern, and the Weſtern Goths.

The latter ſpread themſelves over Germany and France, and erected ſeveral Kingdoms. Their Government was Arbitrary enough, and ſomewhat more than that of the Germans. Paulo jam addictius regnantur quam caeterae Germanorum gentes, ſaith Tacitus de moribus Germ. Yet we find the Germans themſelves under a Kingly Government, the lands divided, and yet neither their Noblemen nor people, had any other ſhare in the Government than by way of Council, or a ſubordinate authority for the Adminiſtration of Juſtice, whch is much different from a right of Power or Command. Agri pro numero cultorum ab univerſis per vices occupantur, quos mox inter ſe ſecundum dignitatem partiuntur.

Theſe were like great Farms, which they choſe according as the ſituation pleas'd them. Colunt diſcreti ac diverſi, ut fons, ut nemus, ut campus placuit. Their Councils were compos'd of the Commoners, and of the Nobility, but were diſtinct, and the Noblemen had the greateſt intereſt. De minoribus rebus Principes conſultant, de majoribus omnes. Ita tamen ut ea quoque quorum penes plebem arbitrium eſt, apud Principes pertractentur.

But in all theſe elder Governments we muſt conſider their circumſtances, which were confus'd, and much different from thoſe, which are at this day eſtabliſhed generally all the world over. The people were more barbarous than now they are, unſetled, and much addicted to wars.—Whence they appear'd more like the children of Iſrael in the Wilderneſs, than the people of God in Jeruſalem. And I cannot think that their polities, (though they make little againſt us) ought to be propos'd by any ſober man, as examples for our imitation.

We come now to the Oſtrogoths, as nearer to our time, and purpoſe.

A great body then of theſe, paſſing the Danube, poſſeſſed themſelves of Hungary or Pannonia, and ſome of Thrace, where they inhabited ſorty eight years. In Hungary they had their Kings, and paid them too ſuch an awful obedience, that they eſteemed it the greateſt impiety, ſo much as to whiſper any thing that detracted from their honour. Solummodo ſuſurris lacerare nefas ducunt.

And if by chance any of the Noblemen ſhould have offended their King, though in never ſo ſmall a matter, and even unjuſtly accus'd, yet the pooreſt Scullion belonging to, and ſent by the King, had a power, though alone, to ſeize that Nobleman, encompaſſed and guarded by all his friends and adherents: And thus without Meſſenger or Serjeant, both impriſoneth or otherwiſe puniſheth the unhappy offender, according to the Order of the Prince, whoſe Will paſſeth amongſt all for an unqueſtionable Law. Quod ſi aliquis ex comitum ordine, regem, vel in modico, offenderit, quando etiam iniuſtè infamatus fuerit, quilibet infimae conditionis lixa, a Rege miſſus, Comitem licet ſatelli ibus ſuis ſtipatum, ſolus comprehendit, &c. Sola Principis voluntas apud omnes pro ratione habetur. Ottofriſ. de reb. geſt. Fred. primi, lib. 1. ca. 31.

Now if Plato Redivivus will needs produce ancient cuſtoms among the Goths, and impoſe them, without any farther conſideration upon us, I hope he will give me leave alſo to offer the example of theſe Loyal Oſtrogoths, which I am ſure, if duly followed, would prove a better cure for us, whatever our diſeaſe be, than our Doting Mountebank impudently propoſed.

From theſe Oſtrogoths, and Gepidae—ſprang the Lombards, whom Narſes, the Roman Patrician, inviting into Italy, and ſhewing them the goodneſs of the Soyl, and warmth of the climate, by the richneſs of the Wines, and pleaſantneſs of the Fruit, which he ſent them as a Preſent to encourage their remove, at laſt they undertook the journey, and finding the Countrey fully anſwer their expectation; from gueſts, as they were intended, they became maſters. And having introduced ſeveral of their own Laws and Cuſtoms, have left many of them remaining even to this day, with the name of Lombardy to one of the moſt fertile Provinces of Italy.

Merch.

Pray what kind of Government did they ſettle amongſt themſelves?

Trav.

The moſt popular that could be contrived. For hating the Roman Emperors, from whom they had uſurped thoſe Lands, which they did poſſeſs, (as the offender is oftentimes the laſt reconciled) they ſet up a Government as contrary to Monarchy as they could invent. For, obtaining leave to uſe their own form under certain conditions, and reſtrictions, they choſe to be governed under Conſuls, which they elected annually, for the moſt part, out of three orders, which they diſtinguiſhed into Captains, Vaivods, and the Commonalty. And that they might ſecure themſelves from the ambition of the great ones, they made no ſcruple to chooſe into the moſt honourable employments, the moſt mercenary Tradesmen and Artificers. Inferioris conditionis juvenes, vel quoſlibet contemptibilium, etiam mechanicarum artium opifices, quos caeterae gentes ab honeſtioribus, & liberioribus studiis tanquam peſtem propellunt, ad militis cingulum, vel dignitatum gradus, aſſumere non dedignentur.

Merch.

What was the effect of this their Popular Government?

Trav.

The ſame which generally happens in all ſuch low irregular conſtitutions, that is to ſay, defection from their Soveraign, and diviſion amongſt themſelves; ſo that every Town became a different Commonwealth, and were never united or friends, but when they were to oppoſe the Emperor, and that they ſeldom fail'd to do, as often as occaſion happened.

For inſtance, the Emperors always reſerved a certain tribute, which they called Fodrum, to be payed them as often as they ſhould paſs out of Germany into Italy. The denial of this Fodrum, produced moſt deſperate Wars, inſomuch that the Emperors were generally forced to fight their paſſage to Rome, through their own Dominions.

At laſt under Frederick the firſt, moſt of thoſe Corporation Towns were utterly deſtroyed.

Amongſt theſe, Milan was the chief ſeat of Rebellion; then Breſcia, Bergamo, and ſeveral others ſhared in the ſame fate, as they had done in the ſame fault.

Merch.

I thought there had been ſeveral Imperial feuds in Lombardy, as you lately obſerved, and Counties—what became of them, did they follow the Government of thoſe great Towns?

Trav.

Sir, there were ſeveral Marquiſſes and Counts, who had great priviledges and poſſeſſions. But in the abſence of the Emperor they were in a manner neceſſitated—to acquieſce under the irreſiſtible force of an inſolent people. Vixque aliquis nobilis, vel vir magnus tam magno ambitu inveniri queat, qui civitatis ſuae non ſequatur imperium.—But many times upon the return of the Emperor into thoſe parts, they have been eſtabliſhed in their Dominions, and the Rebells ſeverely puniſhed, as in the caſe of William Marquiſs of Monferat, and the Biſhop of Aſte; to whom when the Citizens of Aſte, and Quiere, (the chief Towns belonging to them) had refuſed to do juſtice concerning their rights and priviledges, the Emperor, Frederick the firſt, puniſhed thoſe Citizens moſt ſeverely, as Revells and his declared enemies.

Now, Sir, if you have obſerved any thing in the Government of thoſe Lombards, which either makes for our Authors propoſition, or pleaſes your ſelf, let me know it, and I ſhall ſhew you all the farther ſatisfaction I can.

Merch.

I have nothing more to offer concerning them. I hate their Government, which I think makes little for us. But I would gladly hear ſomewhat more of the Goths and Vandals, becauſe tis ſaid, they lived under a Monarchy, though limited.

Trav.

The later Goths, which were of the race of the Viſigoths, being much weakned and harraſſed by the Romans, at laſt, under their King Alaric, obtained permiſſion from the Emperor Honorius, to retire into Spain. But being treacherouſly purſued by Stilico, whom they overcame, were ſo incenſed againſt the Romans, that they immediately returned, and ſacking Rome again, ſet down in that part of France, which they call Provincia, or Gallia Narbonenſis. There being again beaten, they entred into Spain, and poſſeſſed it, which happened about the year of our Lord 412. Here they ſetled a Monarchical Government, but not ſo abſolute as formerly it had been, before their ſeparation, a great part, both of the power, as well as the poſſeſſions, being in the people.

Much ſuch was the caſe of the Vandals, (who after they had run over almoſt all Italy, taken Rome and Naples, and had ſpread themſelves all over Campania,) follow'd the Goths into Spain, whence (being invited by Bonifacius General to the Emperour Valentinian) they paſs'd the Streights at Cadiz into Africa, which they poſſeſs'd near 100 years, according to Procopius his account, until Beliſarius General to the Emperour Juſtinian, routed them, and reſtor'd the Province to the Roman Empire. This happened about the year Five hundred and thirty.

Now, Couſin, you muſt obſerve that though both theſe Goths and Vandals inſtituted a kind of Kingly Government, yet their Prince was rather a General than a Monarch, and their affairs were for the moſt part ſo turbulent, that they were in a continual ſtate of war. Sometimes their ſucceſs was good, but generally bad. And, as the honour of Victory is given to the chief Commander, ſo the ill fortune falls heavieſt upon his head, who governs. Hence thoſe inſolent people might poſſibly, as our Author ſays, beat the Kings brains out, or commit many outrages upon his perſon, who was indeed in ſome things accountable to his people, and held a Kingdom ſo precarious, that Grotius thinks them not worthy of the name or title of Kings.

But no man ſure that had not his hands in ſome meaſure, already dy'd with the blood of one of the beſt Kings, could have commended a people for beating out the brains of their Soveraign, nor imagined, that ſome excellent perſon, as he ſays, contriv'd a Government, in which the people have ever been call'd and accounted moſt barbarous, by all the moſt civiliz'd Monarchies, and learned men in Europe, and even by Procopius himſelf.

He tells us, that nothing remains, that may give us any great light, in what their excellencies conſiſted. Truly our Author ſeems to have grop'd in the dark for all the arguments and authorities which he hath produc'd to favour his innovation. But no wonder, men avoid the light, when their deeds and principles are evil.

Mer.

But what ſay you to the poſſeſſion of lands, and ſhare in the Government, which are the points that chiefly concern us.

Trav.

Sir, you may eaſily believe, that if the people were Maſters of the Government, they would not fail to give themſelves large proportions of the lands. But this made their Government ſo irregular, and ſubject to ſo many inconveniencies, that inſtead of being ſetled according to the exact rules of the Polities, as our Author thinks, it was moſt inſupportable, and not capable of any long ſubſiſtence. And in effect, we ſee both their name and government ſo totally extinct, that thoſe people who poſſeſſed almoſt all Europe, are not now to be found in any part of it.

Such was the caſe of the once flouriſhing Kingdom of the Jews; which (when the Seditious people, as Menahemus, Eliazarus, and others, endeavoured to ſet up a popular Government,) was utterly deſtroy'd, and of two ſuch mighty Nations, nothing is left, but ſome few wandring remains or old ruſtick monuments, which ſerve only to teſtifie that they once have been.

I confeſs, had the authority of the Gothick Kings been Abſolute and Independent, I know no great inconvenience, that their diſtribution of the lands, could have produced. Yet that too ought to be done, with diſcretion and good conſideration, or many miſchiefs, and ruine in the end may enſue.

To this purpoſe, our Author, I thank him, hath put us in mind of a memorable example. For Plutarch tells us, that Cleomenes King of Sparta, endeavouring to make himſelf Abſolute, ſlew the Ephori. And the better to ingratiate himſelf with the people, divided the lands amongſt them. But being deſperately attack'd by Antigonus King of Macedon, before he had well eſtabliſhed his Soveraign Authority, he could not raiſe money, to pay either his Mercenary ſoldiers, or his own Citizens. Whence for want of that power, he was totally routed, Lacedemon ſack'd, and the whole Kingdome became a Province to the Macedonians.

Mer.

Without doubt many Contingencies may happen, in which an Abſolute Power in the Prince, may prove the greateſt ſecurity to a Kingdom againſt a Foreign Invaſion. For whilſt the people are conſulted withal, or intreated to contribute toward the neceſſary expences of war, by an untimely frugality, and indiſcreet husbandry the whole may be loſt.

I remember a ſtory very appoſite to this purpoſe, in the wars between the Greeks and Turks under Conſtantine the Fifteenth, and laſt Chriſtian Emperour of Greece. The numerous Army of the Turks, had ſo waſted the beſieged in Conſtantinople, that Conſtantine had no hopes of preſerving the City, but by a ſupply of Mercenary Soldiers. To procure theſe, a conſiderable ſum of mony was requiſite. But the brutal and covetous Greeks would not be prevail'd upon to part with any thing at preſent, though they had no other hopes, to preſerve all for the future. So the unfortunate Emperour was ſlain, and the City taken, and ſack'd from top to bottom, with all the inſolences that might be expected from a Pagan Conquerour. Among the Greeks, the Admiral Notaras was accounted the moſt rich, and had been the moſt ſolicited by the Emperour to prevent, by a chearful contribution, and his good example, the fatal hour of the Grecian Empire. But curſed avarice doth often blind our reaſon ſo much, that we are forc'd to yield That to our enemies, which might have once preſerv'd our friends. And ſo it happened. For Notaras burying all his Treaſure, whileſt the Siege endured, at laſt to preſerve his life, and complement the New Emperour Mahomet the ſecond, he raiſed his dead money from the grave, and preſenting i with himſelf at the Emperour's feet, offer'd the one to ſecure the other. But the generous Turk looking ſternly upon him, Thou dog, ſaid he, I take thy Treaſure, not as thy gift, but as my due, by right of conqueſt. Which hadſt thou in time given to thy poor Prince, whom thou haſt perfidiouſly betray'd, thou mighteſt have preſerv'd both thy Country, and thy King. Go then with a miſchief, and receive the juſt reward due to thy Treachery. So he commanded him to be executed with no leſs ſeverity, than if he had been a Traytor, even to Mahomet himſelf.

But, Sir, Begging your pardon for this Digreſſion, let us return to the Goths, of whom I think you were ſaying, That they have left little behind them, which retains the memory that they once have been. Pray, what ſay you to thoſe Tenures, which are yet extant in many parts of Europe. Were they not of the Gothick inſtitution, and do they not ſufficiently teſtifie, not only that they were, but that they were alſo a wiſe people, ſince their Government has remain'd ſo long after them.

Trav.

Sir, I perceive you uſe the word Government promiſcuouſly, as indeed our Author himſelf does. Sometimes he makes it ſignifie the Supreme right of power, ſometimes the Subordinate, and ſometimes neither, but only the effects of Government as in this caſe.

Now though theſe Tenures have remained in ſome Kingdoms, yet they prove little of the wiſdom, and nothing of the excellent Government of thoſe Goths. For the laſt, it is either totally loſt, or elſe ſo changed, that it is not any more to be known. For I do not hear or read of any ſuch precarious Kingdom as theirs was, extant at this day in Europe. Nor is it probable there ſhould, for as hath been already obſerved, ſuch a conſtitution is ſo irregular, and contrary to the nature of Government, that it cannot continue long in that neutrality. For either the people will take all the power into their hands, whence ſome little Commonwealths have ſometimes ſprung up, or elſe the King will by degrees become abſolute and independent, ſuch as moſt of the Monarchs are at preſent throughout the whole world. And for their Tenures, you will eaſily find how they were continued, if you conſider that many little Kingdoms have been built upon the ruines of the declining Roman Empire, which had been overrun by the Goths and Vandalls, Roman paulatim coepit minui jam gentes quae Romanorum provincias non regna habitabant, R ges creare jam ex illorum poteſtate ſubduci—& in proprii arbitrii authoritate ſtare diſcunt.

Theſe new Princes thought nothing more conducible to the eſtabliſhment of their new Governments, than to make as little innovation as they could, but rather leave the conquered, who were afterwards to become their Subjects, in the ſame condition as they found them. And thoſe Tenures having no great matter of ill in them, provided their Lords had no right in the Soveraign Authority as they had not; many of them have continued, with little alteration to this day.

This, Couſin, is I think ſufficient to prove, that contrary to our Author's propoſition, moſt Kings which have been in the world, though they had an abſolute and an independent right of power, yet they have permitted the Lands to be divided, and in the poſſeſſion of the people. And that though in the mixt Monarchy of the barbarous Goths and Vandalls, ſome part of the power as well as poſſeſſions, were in the Commonalty, yet that is no reaſon to us, why, neglecting all the other more civilized and flouriſhing Empires of Aegypt and Aſia, as well as Europe, we muſt alone bring thoſe Northern inſtances, in contradiction to all the Southern, and the Eaſtern learning, as the only true politick examples, for our preſent imitation. And to conclude, The inſtance which you have brought of a maſter, who entruſts the ſword into the hands of his ſervants, with conditions, nevertheleſs, oaths and obligations to uſe it only in defence of their maſter, and according to his command, and no otherwiſe, yet you ſay, theſe ſervants, having the power in their hands, may when they pleaſe govern the Maſter himſelf, and turn him out of doors too, if they think it convenient ſo to do. This indeed cannot be denied, but it proves nothing ſtill of our Authors propoſition. For although they have the ſword in their hands, yet it being delivered upon the forementioned conditions, and under ſuch obligations, they receive thereby no right of power, but are rather under ſtricter vows of obedience. And truly Couſin, when law and conſcience, vows and proteſtations, and all that is binding upon Earth, or ſacred in Heaven, prove but ſlender bonds and tyes too weak to keep us within the compaſs of a ſworn Allegeance to our Lawful and Natural Princes and Governours, all Government in ſuch caſe muſt break in pieces, and the Governours can by no other way be ſecur'd from the inſolences and unjuſt force of the governed. And ſeriouſly, Sir, Plato Redivivus ſpeaks of the Church with ſuch malicious diſreſpect, and in ſuch ſeditious terms of the State and Government by Law eſtabliſhed, that it is ſhrewdly to be ſuſpected, he hath neither fear for God, nor honour for the King. What kind of cure then might be expected, ſuppoſing we were diſtemper'd, from ſuch a looſe, irreverent and Atheiſtical quacking Fop, I leave to your ſelf and all ſober men to determine.

Mer.

Dear Couſin, I am moſt entirely ſatisfied with all that you have ſaid, from the very beginning of our firſt diſcourſe. And though ſome of my impertinent queſtions, may have made the ſubject more tedious to you, than otherwiſe it might have been, yet you have thereby totally remov'd all ſcruples, which might have remain'd concerning the good and reaſonable conſtitution of our Government. Being moſt aſſur'd, that no people upon earth, can live more happy and ſecure under theirs, than we under our own, provided the ſtrictneſs of our obedience, correſpond with the juſtneſs of our Laws. Beſides, we have alſo gain'd this advantage, from the aſſurance of our health, that we need not trouble our ſelves to look after a phantaſtical cure for an imaginary diſeaſe, which is no where more truly to be found, than in the ſhallow brains of Plato Redivivus. Being therefore fully convinc'd, that the Conſtitution of our Government, is, thanks be to Heaven, very healthful and vigorous, you have in your diſcourſe this evening, ſufficiently anſwer'd our Author's whole Libel, ſo that I ſhall not give you any farther trouble concerning it, b t ſhall ſacrifice the whole to the flames, or to ſome other, not very reſpectful end or office.

Trav.

I ſhall eſteem my ſelf very happy, if I have contributed any thing toward your ſatisfaction or divertiſement. However if you pleaſe, tomorrow morning we will run over what is worth the obſerving, in the reſt of his ſecond and third Diſcourſe. And I am apt to believe, that it will prove leſs tedious, and more pleaſant, than what we have done this afternoon.

Mer.

Moſt gladly, Sir, For if it be not troubleſome to you, nothing can be more acceptable to me. In the mean time, we will bid the Coachman drive us home, where we will remember all honeſt and Loyal good Subjects in a glaſs of the beſt Wine in the Cellar.

Trav.

I approve very well of your motion, and if you pleaſe, we will conclude all with our hearty wiſhes and prayers, for the good health, ſafety and proſperity of his moſt Sacred Majeſty, whoſe unparallel'd goodneſs is ſo great, that as none of our Virtues can ever equal it, ſo neither can our vices reach it, except it be the moſt barbarous tranſcendent malice of his mercileſs and blood-thirſty enemies.

Diſcourſe the Third. Mer.

GOod morrow to you, Couſin.

Trav.

The ſame to you, Sir, or a better. How have you reſted after our long diſcourſe yeſterday?

Mer.

I perceive by the time of the day, that I have ſlept long enough, but really my head has been ſo full of Politicks and Proclamations, that I am ſure I have done more work in ſix hours ſleep than our Plato redivivus can ever effect, all the days of his life. I have Reform'd Monarchies, Regulated Republicks, Transform'd Ariſtocracies, pull'd down, and then ſet up and new modelld vaſt Empires. In a word, I have ſetled the whole world under ſuch excellent forms and polities, that we ſhall never hear more diſputes betwixt Priviledge and Prerogative, Property and Power, People and Prince. No more Sedition nor Civil wars at home, no more Invaſions from abroad, but having regulated the Ʋniverſe according to the Polity of private States, we may begin when we pleaſe to turn our Swords into Plough-ſhares, and our Spears into Pruning-hooks, for we are to enjoy an uninterrupted peace and ſecurity even unto the end of time, and all things.

Trav.

Nothing is more common, than for the diſcourſe of the day, (eſpecially when it is out of the common road) to furniſh matter ſufficient for dreams at night. But pray what kind of Government had you ſet up.

Mer.

'Twas a Perfect free Monarchy, which ſo incens'd Plato Redivivus, who methoughts was of the Company, that in the height of our debate we had like to have fallen to Cuffs. At laſt I told him plainly, that I did not take him for a Conjurer. With which opprobrious word, being more offended than with all that had been ſaid before, rather than not paſs for a cunning man, he was not aſhamed to confeſs, that he had ſtudied the Black art, dealt by the Devil, and underſtood Cornelius Agrippa, better than he did his Creed, and that to convince me of my miſtake, he would ſhew me ſuch an infallible proof both of his skill and parts, that I ſhould be aſham'd for ever after to have treated a perſon of his talent and qualifications with ſo little reſpect. And immediately (whileſt I was expecting the event) our old Committe man, had transform'd himſelf into a little Cubb Fox. But to that ſmall body there was fixt a pair of Aſſes Ears, ſo large and diſproportionate to the Head, that this moſt ridiculous object occaſion'd ſo hearty, and ſo loud a laughter among the Company, that I awakened with the noiſe, and my Politicks ended.

Trav.

The Concluſion was pleaſant enough, but indeed I ſhould have thought, our Author had had no part about him, of ſo modeſt and well temper'd a beaſt. But let us proceed in his examination, which hence forward ſhall be done with as much brevity as the caſe will admit.

He tells us, p. 40. that for perſonal eſtate, the ſubjects may enjoy it in the largeſt proportion, without being able to invade the Empire, and that the ſubjects with their Money cannot invade the Crown. This is the firſt time, that I remember to have obſerved where lay the weak ſide of invincible Gold. Indeed till now I ſhould have laid the odds for money againſt land, and I am the more confirm'd in that opinion, becauſe I remember very well, that in an election of a Knight for the Shire, a certain money'd Merchant, not having three hundred pound per Annum lands in the world, was able nevertheleſs, to carry the Election againſt a worthy Gentleman, of an ancient Family, who had at that time, above four thouſand pounds per Annum lands of inheritance. And it was thought, that the force of money, procured the advantage. Many ſuch caſes I ſuppoſe have happened in other Counties, which argument ſure will hold in a Kingdom, as well as in a County, ſince the former is compoſed of the latter.

But our Author, who has the legiſlative power in his head, makes there, what card trump he thinks ſit. And from his unerring judgment, there is no appeal.

Merch.

I think Plato is miſtaken. But Sir, you have ſlipt a remark a little before this; and it is, that Modern writers are of opinion that Aegypt, till of late, was not a Monarchy; and the only conjecture, which he produces, is, that originally all Arts and Sciences, had their riſe in Aegypt, which they think very improbable to have been under a Monarchy.

Trav.

O ſilly, truly for our Authors reputations ſake, I thought to have paſſed by ſo childiſh a conjecture. I will not go about to prove, that really all Arts and Sciences had their riſe in that Countrey, becauſe our Author hath confeſſed it. Nor tell you that Aegypt, was an abſolute Monarchy many hundred years before, becauſe I have already given you good authorities for it. Neither will I trouble you with a long Catalogue of moſt excellent men, for all manner of learning, who lived as well under the elder Monarchies, as later ones of Rome, Germany, Spain, France, England and many others. Let our Authors own profound Learning, riſe up in judgment in this caſe againſt himſelf, ſince it is plain, that his vaſt politick knowledge, ſprang up, bloom'd, brought forth fruit, withered and decayed, and all under a Monarchical Government. For whether we conſider him in the days of King Charles the Iſt. or under Oliver, or at Rome, or ſince his preſent Majeſties happy Reſtoration, he hath ſtill ſucked in a Monarchical Air. I do not hear that all was effected at Geneva, though moſt probably the firſt ſowre Grapes came from thence, which have ſet his teeth on edge ever ſince.

Merch.

Indeed I think ſo ſober a politician might have ſpared ſuch a little malicious remark. But to go on, he tells us, p. 45. That Rome was the beſt and moſt glorious Government, that the Sun ever ſaw.

Trav.

Our Stateſman hath coupled beſt and glorious together, as Poulterers uſe to do a lean and a fat Rabbit, that one may help off with the other. But his vulgar cheat muſt not paſs. For glorious, we will admit of that Epithete, and good Authors give us the reaſon how it came to be ſo, which is not much to our purpoſe. But for beſt, we muſt examine that a little farther.

I could cite many Authorities to prove that the Roman Commonwealth was one of the worſt Governments, that ever ſubſiſted ſo long. But becauſe I would ſpeak ſomewhat to our noble Venetian, who ought to have read his own Authors, concerning Government at home, before he came to judge of another abroad, I will refer him for full ſatisfaction in this point, to the Diſcorſi politici of Paulus Paruta, a Nobleman and Senator of Venice, and Procurator of Saint Marco. Who in his firſt diſcourſe, comparing ſeveral Antient Commonwealths, with that of Venice, when he comes to Rome, he tells us plainly, That the Sun never ſaw a more confuſed State. That it was really no regular government at all, and that its chief default proceeded from the exorbitant power of the people. Whence Tacitus calls it, lib. 3. Corruptiſſima Reſpublica.

Now, Sir, if this noble Senator, who alſo had been Ambaſſador abroad, underſtood any thing of Government, as I believe he did, even more than the Engliſh Gent. Young Venetian and learned Doctor, put all together, then we muſt conclude, that our Author is miſtaken. But ſince it is not the firſt time, we will put it to account.

Mer.

Well, Sir, he ſaith next, p. 52. That Moſes, Theſeus, and Romulus were founders of Democracies. What ſay you to that?

Trav.

If I miſtake not, he tells us the ſame thing in p. 28. 32, & 69. In ſome of which he calls their Democracy, in plain Engliſh, a Commonwealth. For Moſes, I have already prov'd his authority to have been Independent, even in the higheſt meaſure, upon any but God, and that in the exerciſe none ever us'd it more arbitrarily, witneſs the ſevere puniſhments againſt the Idolaters, when he came down from Mount Sinai. Where without any farther Ceremonies, or legal trial, he call'd the Sons of Levi to him, and ſaid: Put every man his ſword by his ſide, and go in from gate to gate throughout the Camp, and ſlay every man his brother, and every man his companion, and every man his neighbour. And the children of Levi did according to the word of Moſes, and there fell of the people that day about 3000. men.

Many other inſtances there are of his Deſpotical power; beſides, the Text ſaith in plain words, that Moſes was King in Jeſhurun.—For the calling together the Congregation of the Lord by ſound of Trumpet, all men, who ever read the Bible know, that it was generally to tell them ſome meſſage from God, reproach them for their miſdeeds, exhort them to amendment, and ſuch like. But I am confident they never did any one act, which proceeded from a right of power while Moſes liv'd. Nay, on the contrary, when the Seditious Princes, Corah, Datban and Abiram, as alſo Aaron and Miriam, murmured againſt Moſes's Soveraign authority, being deſirous to have ſhar'd with him in the Government, we find that God puniſhed their Sedition moſt ſeverely, and the two laſt eſcaped the Juſtice of Gods ſentence, only through the great interceſſion of Moſes. Who knows not that his Praeſecti Jethroniani, were only ſubordinate Judges appointed by his own order, and for his own eaſe. All which, beſides the common conſent of learned men, makes it clear that Moſes held the Supreme Civil power, wholly in himſelf, call him King, or Captain, or what you pleaſe.

Next Theſeus being own'd after his long Travels, by his father Aegeus, found Attica Tributary to Minos, King of Candia, and the Kingdom divided in it ſelf, into ſeveral little Burgs, which ſet up for ſo many particular ſeveral Governments. Theſeus therefore being a diſcreet Prince, endeavour'd to reduce them to their former obedience by peaceable means. To that purpoſe he perſwades them to unite under one Government, knowing that they would become thereby, (like a bundle of Arrows) much the ſtronger.

And that the name of Tyrant might not affright them, or the loſs of their fond power and freedom diſcourage them, he promiſed to abate ſo much, of his own Soveraign right of Government, as to conſult with them, and take their opinions in weighty affairs, as he did in a common Hall or meeting place called Aſty. In this method things went proſperouſly on until one Mneſteus, a factious and an ambitious Prince of the houſe of Ericthonius, inſinuating to the people, that Theſeus intended at laſt to enſlave them, he cauſed the Athenians to rebell. Theſeus retired to the Iſland S yros, where he ended his days. Mneſteus uſurped the Kingdom; but having held his ill gotten honour but a little while, the ſons of Theſeus were remitted to the Throne of their father, and Theſeus was ever after adored amongſt them as a God.

Now if there be any thing in this ſtory, which makes for our Author, much good may it do him.

And laſtly, Romulus cannot ſure be ſaid to have inſtituted the Commonwealth of Rome, any more than Charles the Fifth the Republick of Holland, from whoſe ſucceſſors thoſe people rebelled. Tacitus ſays moſt clearly, That Rome was governed in the beginning by Kings, and that their liberty was procured by L. Brutus. Ʋrbem Romam à principio reges habuere. Libertatem & conſulatum L. Brutus inſtituit. And to ſhew the extent of his power, he tells us, Ann. lib. 3. that Romulus governed them according to his will. Romulus ut libitum nobis imperaverat. Plutarch calls the Government all along a Monarchy, and after Romulus had inſtituted the Senate, compoſed of the Patricii or chief Citizens, whenſoever he appointed them to meet, they were obliged, ſays he, to obſerve his orders and commands, without making any reply. Conſtat initio civitatis Reges omnem poteſtatem habuiſſe, ſays Pomponius. That in the beginning of the City (of Rome) their Kings enjoyed intirely the whole Soveraign Authority.

But not to multiply Authorities, to prove ſuch vulgar truths, I ſhall refer you to our Authors chief Divine, I mean the Divine Machiavel, (as he ſtiles him more than once) his words are full and very intelligible, where he calls all three Princes and their Governments Kingdoms. Verum ut ad eos, qui non fortuna, ſed ſingulari virtute in Principes ſunt evecti veniamus, (ſpeaking all the while of Kings) excellentiores dico fuiſſe Moſen, Cyrum, Romulum, Theſeum, and again, which puts all out of diſpute, At qui Cyrum & reliquos, qui Regna ſibi pepererunt, & conſtituerunt, &c. And farther of Romulus, quo Romano imperio potiretur, de Principe, ca. 6. And yet Plato Red. hath the confidence to affirm p. 31. that Romulus himſelf was no more than the firſt officer of the Commonwealth, and (choſen as the Doge of Venice is) for life.

But if Plato's Divine were not an ignorant Aſs, then our Author is certainly a very impudent impoſtor.

Merch. Indeed, Couſin, I have great reaſon to believe, that Plato's authorities and examples are as falſe, as his principles abſurd. Beſides, ſuppoſing theſe great men had inſtituted popular Governments, (as I am fully convinced they did not) what doth that concern us? Is there no difference between the foundation of a new Government, and the continuation of an old one? Is there no diſtinction between the Roman State in its infancy, which extended not for ſeveral years above fifteen Miles, beyond their Walls, and the Empire of great Britain and Ireland? We know that many priviledges may be granted to the people at firſt for encouragement, which afterwards may be inconſiſtent with the ſafety of the Government. And is there no regard to be had to different circumſtances? but let us proceed.

In p. 62. we read, That it is not dangerous to a City, to have their people rich; but to have ſuch a power in the Governing part of the Empire, as ſhould make thoſe, who manage the affairs of the Commonwealth depend upon them, which came afterwards to be that, which ruined their libertie, and which the Gracchi endeavoured to prevent, when it was too late. What means he by this?

Trav.

Sir, We will preſerve his ſence, but giving other names to the Country, People, and Governours, we ſhall ſee more plainly how it runs. Let us ſay then, that it is not dangerous for England, to have their people rich even in land (for he ſpeaks immediately before of the Romans purchaſing lands) but to have ſuch a ſhare in the right of Government as ſhould make the King, who manages the affairs of the Kingdom depend upon them; methinks it is very clear, and it has ever been my judgment, that the people might have what proportion their induſtry could procure them in the lands, provided they did not pretend to any ſhare in the Soveraign authority.

Mer.

But this is directly contrary to his own beloved Aphoriſm. Sure there muſt be ſomewhat more in it, or elſe you will make him contradict himſelf.

Trav.

Faith, Sir, I cannot help that, Truth will come out ſometimes in ſpite of the Devil. Nor know I how to mend his ſenſe, except I ſhould make him appear, at the ſame time, the moſt falſe, partial, and prejudiced ſcribler that ever wrote.

Mer.

No matter, Sir, let us, if we can, preſerve his ſenſe, which I believe he values himſelf moſt upon, and let his honeſtly and honour take their chance.

Trav.

Let us then ſee what follows, Which, ſays he, came afterwards to be that which ruin'd their liberty, and which the Gracchi endeavour'd to prevent. Pray Couſin, what is the antecedent to which, in theſe two places?

Mer.

Sure, Sir, that is moſt plain; and according to my underſtanding, it is, that power in the governing part of the Empire, &c.

Trav.

You are right without doubt; and I dare affirm, that Q. Ennius himſelf, could not make any other conſtruction of it. And if ſo, then the whole ſentence runs thus. It was not dangerous to the Commonwealth of Rome to have their Subjects rich; but it was dangerous that the Subject ſhould have ſuch a power in the governing part of the Empire, as ſhould make their Governours depend upon them, which power of the people in the governing part of the Empire, came afterwards to be that, which ruin'd the peoples liberty. And which power (for all the world knows, that, and, in this place is a conjunction copulative) the Gracchi endeavour'd to prevent, &c.

Now, Sir, the firſt part of this Sentence is moſt really ſound doctrine and truth, though diametrically oppoſite to Plato's grand propoſition, upon which undeniable Aphoriſm, as he ſays, he is to build moſt of his ſubſequent reaſoning.

For indeed the people, though never ſo rich, are by no means to be truſted with a right of power, but as I have ſaid, rather the contrary, leſt they ſhould confound government, or ſet it upon its head, with its feet uppermoſt. And ſo that power, which the Roman people pretended to, under the Seditious Gracchi and others, was the true cauſe which made the Commonwealth no longer governable under that form. Haec ipſa in perniciem redibant & miſera Reſpublica in exitium ſuum merces erat. Flor. l. 3. c. 13.

But leſt all ſhould come to ruine, and the conquering Romans be at laſt overcome by their own victorious arms, the arbitrary government of the Roman Emperours was introduc'd, as the only remedy for the truly diſtempered State. Non aliud diſcordantis patriae remedium fuiſſe quam ut ab uno regeretur, Tacit. Ann. 1.

But how the Gracchi endeavour'd to prevent this power in the people, who ſtood up ſo violently for them, is a riddle, which can be ſalv'd this only way, That in truth, though they ſet on foot the popular pretence of Liberty and Property, yet honour and Empire was the true game, which they themſelves hunted. Seditionum omnium cauſ s (ſaith Florus) Tribunitia poteſtas excitavit, quae ſpecie quidem Plebis tuendae, cujus in auxilium comparata eſt, re aut m Dominationem ſibi acquirens, ſtudium populi ac favorem Agrariis, frumentariis, Judiciariis legibus, aucupabatur.

Mer.

Sir, I am apt to believe, that our Author means by which, in the laſt place, The ruin of the people's Liberty, which the Gracchi endeavour'd to prevent.

Trav.

Indeed the ſence is ſomewhat mended, but the Engliſh is ſtark nought, however we'l conſider it according to your conſtruction, the ſtory then is this, Tib. Gracchus an ambitious Gentleman, and diſcontented with the Senate, for what reaſon I care not, ſtruck in with the people, and became their Tribune.

The firſt great thing which he undertook, (in outward appearance, for the good of the people, but truly for the advancement of his own private deſigns and Empire, which he affected) was, the eſtabliſhment of the Agrarian law, and reſtitution of the lands among the people.

Mer.

Pray what was the Agrarian law, and land, which the people ſo much deſired might be reſtored. Had they any injuſtice done them, or were they forceably taken from them?

Trav.

No ſure, Sir, If there were any injuſtice in the caſe, it lay in the reſtoration; but you ſhall be Judge your ſelf. When the Romans under the Infancy of their Government had conquer'd any of their neighbours, they uſually took away ſome of their lands, which were diſpoſed of, partly for the ſupport of the State, or publick revenue, and the other part was diſtributed among the indigent Citizens and Soldiers, eſpecially the Lame, Ancient, and decrepit, and ſuch as had deſerved well, who were thence called Emeriti, or Veterani milites, now theſe Lands remained to them and their heirs, upon the payment of ſome ſmall acknowledgment, or performance of ſome certain Services which were in the Nature of Tenures. But in proceſs of time, when the Roman Empire, and with it, luxury encreas'd, the common people, following the example of their Governours, liv'd in great eaſe and plenty. To ſupport which, many ſold their lands, either to the richer Noblemen, or to their fellow Citizens, as they could find a Chapman. Ʋnde enim Pop. Romanus Agros & Cibarios flagitat, niſi per ſam m, quam, Luxus, fecerat, hinc ergo Gracchana ſeditio, Flor. l. 3. cap. 12.

Mer.

Was there no difference between the Lands given to the Citizens, and thoſe which were thus beſtowed upon the Soldiers?

Trav.

Yes, thoſe granted to the Citizens were of the more ancient Inſtitution and called Clientela's, which ſome good Authors believe to have been the original of all Tenures. Thoſe given to the Soldiers were called Praeda militaria, or ſtipendiaria, and were ſuch lands as had been taken from ſome conquered Provinces (as hath been before declared) Thoſe which bordered upon the Skirts of the Enemies Countries, were generally granted unto ſome of their principal Captains and Commanders, which became an Inheritance to themſelves, and poſterity upon preſumption and Condition, that they ſhould, and would defend their Prince and Country, with the greater courage and fidelity, ſince in effect they ſecured at the ſame time, their own Eſtates. Hence it is ſuppoſed, that thoſe Inheritances which we now call Feuds had (in proceſs of time) their firſt Inſtitution, though the word Feod m was unknown to the ancient Romans.

And it is further conjectured, That from the differences between thoſe Clientela's and theſe Praeda militaria, ſprang our ancient Tenures, and their ſeveral diverſities, as grand Serjeanty, Knights Service, Soccage, &c. Now theſe Praeda militaria were not (in their Original Inſtitution) alienable, ſo as the Clientela's were, whence (as hath been ſaid) the Citizens or Clientes, took the liberty to ſell theſe lands as their occaſions required, which lands ſo ſold, became, as in good reaſon they ought, the inheritance of the purchaſers, and ſo deſcended from father to ſon for ſeveral generations, till at laſt it came into the fancy of Tib. Gracchus to have theſe lands reſtor'd again to the people.

And that he might kill two birds with one ſtone, that is, impoveriſh the Senate, or Government, which (being an Ariſtocracy) he hated, and enrich the people whom he ſeemingly protected, he orderd that the purchaſers, or thoſe in whoſe families theſe lands were found, ſhould be re-imburſt out of the publick revenue.

You may gueſs what a diſturbance this muſt needs make, among the Senators and Noblemen whom it chiefly concern'd, and what inconveniences would inevitably happen upon a rediſtribution of thoſe lands, which had been ſo long conſolidated with their own.

Mer.

Nothing, methinks, could be more unreaſonable, and unjuſt.

Trav. No matter, Sir, for as I have ſeen two doors of a room ſo artificially contriv'd, that the ſhutting of one, hath at the ſame motion open'd the other; ſo generally whereſoever Ambition enters, Juſtice immediately avoids the place; and indeed, Haud bene conveniunt.

Gracchus therefore, eagerly purſuing Dominion, Ʋt qui die Comitiorum prorogari ſibi vellet Imperium, puts forward this Agrarian Law with great vehemency. Which, when his Collegue, and another Tribune of the people, M. Octavius, oppos'd; (without whoſe conſent nothing could be concluded, nor law paſs'd) moſt contrary to all Juſtice, and Law too, Gracchus by force and violence, (a thing before unheard of) turns him out of his Office.

Having thus gain'd his point, and ready to finiſh what he had ſo proſperouſly begun, Scipio Naſica, with the moſt worthy of the Citizens and Nobility cuts him off; and for a mark of ignominy, flings his carkaſs into the river.

Now as the ſame Laws were promoted by his brother Caius, with this difference, that he extended his inſolence farther, deferring the Judgment of caſes, which had been ever particular to the Senate, to the people, and introducing the antiquated Licinian Law, by which no Citizen was to poſſeſs above 500. acres of land, within the Domicilium Imperii; ſo the ſame fate attended him, and that even with the conſent of the people, for whoſe ſake he ſeem'd to have purſu'd this ſpecious deſign; Who perceiving at length the ambition and irregular proceedings of their great Patron, the injuſtice of their pretenſions, and the little good the reſtitution of theſe lands would do themſelves, they totally deſerted him. Inſomuch, that Caius, when his fatal hour drew near, fell down before the Statue of Diana, praying, That the people, who had ſo baſely abandon'd him, might never enjoy that liberty, which he endeavour'd to have obtain'd for them.

Mer.

I am much ſatisfi'd with this ſtory, and am apt to believe, that many of our own worthy Patriots, who cry up ſo much for Liberty and Property, and the intereſt of the people, intend more really their own particular advancement; yet nevertheleſs you ſee our Author calls theſe men Illuſtrious, and renowned perſons, their actions and undertakings Heroick.

Trav.

He doth ſo; and undoubtedly he would ſay the ſame thing if he durſt, not only of Brutus, but of the Dominican Friar, Ravillac, and Hugh Peters himſelf, (or whoever elſe it was) that murder'd our late Soveraign.

But you have heard the opinion of Florus, with whom Plutarch agrees, and all the ancient Authors, that I have yet met withal. And to conclude, Tacitus, who ſeems to have been friend enough to a Democratical Government, calls them diſturbers of the people. Hinc Gracchi, & Saturnini turbatores plebis. Ann. l. 3.

Merch.

Tis well; We come now to Agis and Cleomenes. Who were they?

Trav.

They were Kings of Sparta, and their Deſigns and Fates much the ſame with the Gracchi. The difference was chiefly this, that the former being already Kings, they endeavoured by the ſame means, that is to ſay, by abolition of debts, or novae tabulae, diſtribution of lands and favour of the people, to procure to themſelves an abſolute authority againſt the uſurped power of the Ephori. The Gracchi, being truly Subjects, followed the ſame courſe to uſurp the Empire, but againſt the lawful Authority of the Senate. This is only to be obſerved of Cleomenes, that at the ſame time, when he endeavoured to poſſeſs the Soveraign power, he thought it nevertheleſs no Soleciſm in the Politicks, to give the property of the Lands among the people. In a word, the ſame wheel, troubleſome and dangerous ambition, moved equally all four; againſt which Plutarch inveighs moſt ſeverely, in his introduction to the Lives of thoſe Spartan Kings.

Merch.

And may all ambitious diſturbers of our peace, meet with the ſame Cataſtrophe. Next our Author tells us, that alteration of the property, is the Ʋnica corruptio politica.

Trav.

I grant it, Sir, if you apply property to the right of power in Government, but not if reſtrained to Lands, as hath been already proved. And for the favourable opinion which he hath of confuſion, or Anarchy, may himſelf be confounded (in this world I mean) by his own looſe principles, and ungovernable unquiet Spirit.

Merch.

What ſay you of the Laws and Government of Switzerland, and the Low Countries?

Trav.

Little Sir; their Laws and Governments are as notoriouſly known, as their Rebellions; and ſeveral Authors have writ fully of both.

Merch.

Very good, we come next to the moſt famous Republick of Venice, where amongſt other things vulgar enough, our Nobleman tells us, that the great difficulty in the adminiſtration of that Republick, hath been to regulate their Nobility, and to bridle their Faction and ambition, which can alone breed a diſeaſe in the vital part of their Government. And this they do by moſt ſevere Laws, and a very vigorous execution of them.

Trav.

Right: But becauſe he hath not been pleaſed to let you know what thoſe Laws are, give me leave to inform you. I ſhall not ſpeak of little Mutineers, thoſe poor Rogues are eaſily cut off. But come to the great and noble Villains, and concerning ſuch their Law is this:—when any eminent man, whoſe relations and dependences are commonly very great, ſhall (uſing as yet no other weapon than his tongue)—defame the Government, by calumnies and opprobrious Speeches, and thereby endeavour to draw off, firſt the affection, and next the obedience of the people to their lawful Magiſtrate, and that the Government thinks not fit to call him publickly to account, leſt ſome diſturbance might happen through the intereſt of his friends; or leaſt the municipal Laws of the State might not be ſufficient to reach his life for any particular thing, though his complicated ills make him obnoxious, in general to the Government, and dangerous in it, or that a perjured Jury ſhould acquit him, which would make him more malicious than before, knowing full well, that when a man becomes ſo purged, the Devil enters into him again with nine Spirits worſe than himſelf. I ſay under ſuch circumſtances, their method of—proceeding is this. Firſt, information being given to ſome of the Conſiglio di Dieci—and ſufficient evidence concerning matter of fact, his proceſs is made, which requires very little time, and by majority of votes he is condemned to die; the offender being all this while ignorant of what is doing, and at liberty as at other times. This done, the buſineſs comes into the hands of the Inquiſ tori del Stato, who are three annual officers, choſen out of the Dieci—as alſo the Gao or Capo di Dieci—who are alſo three, but choſen monthly, and out of the ſame body. Theſe Inquiſitori are to ſee the Sentence executed, which is left to their diſcretion, and which they manage according to the circumſtances of the offender. If there be no difficulty in taking him at home, then the way is this: the Inquiſitori, or any two of them, ſend for a file of Musketeers or more, who accompanied with an Officer, Confeſſor, and Executioner, and in the moſt quiet time of the night, they force (if need be) the houſe of the offender; where being apprehended, he is acquainted, at the ſame inſtant, both with his offence and puniſhment. It is too late, and in vain to plead, or diſpute; but being carried away into a Gondola prepared to receive him, they put off, accompanied with another, toward the Sea, and being come to the place they deſign, the offender having received abſolution from his Confeſſor, they place him upon the midſt of a Plank laid between the two Gondola's, with a Stone about his neck, then putting off their Boat, the criminal falls, for ever forgotten, to the bottom of the Sea, nor is there a man in the whole ſtate of Venice, who dares ever after inquire what is become of this Great Nobleman; ſometimes in ſuch caſe they are ſtrangled. But if the offender happens to be a perſon having a great retinue (as many have of Bravos) and that the forcing of his Palace may prove troubleſom, and make too great a noiſe from the oppoſition which the officer may meet withal, from the number of the Domeſticks, then the Inquiſitori ſend for ſome of the moſt daring and notorious of the Banditi, and at the ſame time accompany the meſſage with a paſs or ſafe-conduct, both for his coming to Venice, and return.

Upon his appearance before the Inquiſitori, they inform him of their buſineſs, which is, to hire him, at the price of his own pardon, and a conſiderable reward, to ſhoot or ſtab ſuch a Nobleman, who hath been condemned by the Conſejo di Dieci—and that to be done whereever he meet him even in the midſt of the place of St. Marco.

The Bandito ſeldom refuſeth theſe conditions, but requires their order for his own abſolution. Upon which the Inquiſitori give him a billet, or piece of white paper folded up after a certain manner, and markt with their nail only, without any word or written letter whatever. This done, the Bandito diſpatcheth the Nobleman, but no man knowing that this perſon had ever been accuſed, much leſs condemned. The Bandito, as an aſſaſſinate, is carried immediately to priſon. Who when he comes there, demands the Keeper of the Priſon, or chief officer, to whom he delivers his billet, upon ſight of which, the doors of the Priſon are immediately ſet open, and the Bandito returns whither he thinks fitting himſelf.

After which, none even of his near Relations—dare ever make any queſtion concerning his death. Such is the puniſhment, and ſuch the manner of executing notorious and eminent Calumniators of the Venetian Government. And ſure it hath been one of the greateſt reaſons, that hath preſerv'd that State ſo long from a Popular or a Monarchical Uſurpation.

Now though this be the practice of the moſt renowned Republick of Venice, yet I am confident our Author would much blame ſuch an Arbitrary way of proceeding under any Monarchical government, eſpecially if himſelf (as he juſtly deſerves) ſhould happen to be made the firſt example, as he is of that kind, one of the greateſt offenders.

Mer.

The Tongue indeed is an unruly and a dangerous member, and in my opinion, in ſome caſes, ought to be reſtrain'd under no leſs penalties, than we do the violent actions of our hands.

Your next remark is in p. 88. where it is ſaid, that the people, (under the Roman Emperours) who had really an intereſt to endeavour a change of Government, were ſo prevented by ſeeing the Prince, whom they deſigned to ſupplant, removed to their hand, that they were puzled what to do; taking in the mean time great recreation to ſee thoſe wild beaſts hunted down themſelves, who had ſo often prey'd upon their lives and eſtates, &c.

Trav.

Very fine ſport indeed for an old Rebel, and I am perſwaded, Plato would be highly pleas'd (as old as he is) to follow briskly ſome ſuch Royal chaſe. But his blood-hounds are at preſent a little out of tune, and I hope he will loſe his impious diverſion. But to return to his Hiſtorical obſervation, he tells us, that the people, who had an intereſt to change the Government, wanted time to deſtroy their Prince themſelves, becauſe it was done ſo to their hands. And yet the miſchief on't is, that under the firſt change of the Government which is generally the moſt inſupportable, the people had as much time as they could have wiſh'd. For Auguſtus liv'd an Emperour about forty years, and dy'd in peace, beloved and lamented.

Tiberius, his Succeſſor, had obtain'd the age of Seventy eight before he left his Empire, with the world; a time long enough for ſuch good Subjects and Patriots of their country as Plato Redivivus, to have chang'd the Arbitrary Government to its ancient popular conſtitution.

Claudius alſo reign'd long enough, and the people wanted not time nor opportunity. And for thoſe ſucceeding Caeſars, as Nero, Galba, Otho, Vitellius, they were taken off rather by the fury of the Soldiers, and private malice and ambition of particular men, than diſcontent of the Citizens. Nay, the people, as they chiefly defended their Emperours whilſt alive, ſo they were the moſt conſiderable ſufferers by their deaths. And notwithſtanding the great irregularity in the Politick principles of thoſe Emperours, by keeping the Soveraign power, and yet leaving the property to the people. That Empire (though latterly much divided and diſmembred, chiefly by the Emperours themſelves, and partly by the Ambition of the Roman Biſhops) hath ſubſiſted 1700 years, and may for ought we know, continue as many more, and yet no Government more averſe to our great Politicians rule.

But, Sir, if we muſt anſwer all the impertinencies, incongruities, and miſapplications of this Scribbling Statesman, there will be no end of our diſcourſe. Pray therefore let us make as ſhort work as we can, and to that purpoſe we will reduce what is moſt conſiderable under ſome heads. And the firſt thing which occurs, is the account which he gives, p. 97. and 145. of the Government of France; In which he tells us, that France hath no Freemen below the Nobility, that is Yeomen. That the Gentry are very needy and numerous, becauſe the elder brother in moſt parts of the Kingdom, hath no more ſhare in the diviſion of the paternal eſtate, than the Cadets, excepting the principal houſe, &c. which they call, Vol de Chapon. And from hence he draws ſeveral falſe arguments. To the firſt, I cannot find, upon the beſt examination I could make, any conſiderable difference between the conſtitution of France, and that of England, as to the Gentry and Commonalty. For although I do not obſerve, any ſuch titular diſtinction as Yeomen in France, which is alſo antiquated, or almoſt loſt and confounded amongſt us. Yet there is a notorious difference between the Roturiers, or thoſe whom he calls Villains, and the Freeholders. The latter are compos'd generally of little Merchants, Tradeſmen, Shop-keepers, and ſuch like, and they are diſtinguiſh'd by their Tenures or Services, which they call Droit de Corvie, and Droit de Cenſive. The firſt is properly Villenage, as, working for his Lord, either with his Body, Cart, or Horſes, or ſuch like. The other, that is to ſay, Droit de Cenſive, doth not oblige the Free-holder to any manner of ſervile office, but only the payment of ſome ſmall rent, as Cocks, Hens, or ſome little part of the profits. They have their Quint and Requint, which are certain Fines upon Alienations, as alſo their Copyholders, and lands held in Gavelkind; and in a word, I know no greater difference, between the French and Engliſh Subjects, as to the point of Lands and Properties, than this, That the Lands ennoble, or at leaſt give Titles in France, as Comte, Baron, Marquiſs, which priviledges were taken away, I think, from the Engliſh, under the reign of Hen. 3. and which came originally from the French, being introduc'd by William the Conqueror.

As for the needy and numerous Gentry, to the laſt, all the world knows, that France is extreme populous, as well in Commonalty as Gentry. The men being very Briſk, and the women, it ſeems, very Pregnant. But for their wants, I mean of the Gentry, I think it is as publickly known, that they proceed generally from a different cauſe, from what our Author hath aſſign'd. That is, from the Scruple which they make of undertaking any Mercantile employment, which is the greateſt ſupport of our Engliſh families, ſo that there is no Cadet of a houſe ennobled, who had not rather trail a pike, than be an apprentice to the greateſt Merchant in France.

All theſe Cadets, our Author hath brought to Court, and made them the chief props of the preſent French Government and greatneſs. But he hath forgot, That as the young French Nobility are very numerous, ſo the vaſt number of Eccleſiaſtical Preferments, Monaſteries and Temporal offices, depending eternally and at all times upon the Crown, do entertain ſo many of theſe young Cadets, that I am confident, at leaſt two thirds of the younger children, are provided for after this manner, without depending immediately upon the King's Purſe. As to the diviſion of the Paternal eſtate, amongſt the Cadets, except the principal houſe, which he calls Vol de chapon, our Buzzardly Author of a French Capon, hath made a long-wing'd Hawk. For what he calls moſt part of the Kingdom, is particular to Paris only, as with us in London, and Kent formerly, (I ſuppoſe by reaſon of the Traders) the Iſle of France, Limouſin, Xantonge, and it may be ſome one Province more, which poſſibly I have not remembred.

Thus you ſee, Couſin, how our Author augments, or diminiſheth, changetth or diſguiſeth the truth of things, as they make moſt convenient for his purpoſe, and what little credit ought to be given to him. We ſhall therefore take no more notice of France. For his premiſes being demonſtrably falſe, his conſequence whatſoever it be, cannot hold good.

Mer.

Sir, I never thought all to be Goſpel, that hath been preached by our divine Plato. But now we come to the Clergy, let us ſee what reſpect he hath for the Spiritual Government, ſince the Temporal doth ſo much offend him. He tells us then very ſincerely and frankly, that he could wiſh, there never had been any Clergy amongſt us, &c. For you know the Northern people did not bring Chriſtianity into theſe parts, but found it here.

Trav.

Moſt excellent. You may perceive how happy we are like to be under the New Government of our infamous Author, who rebelling againſt God, and Man appointed to rule over us by Gods authority, hath left nothing that I know of, to ſet up for, but H ll and the Devil. But his argument is very ſtrong, for the Northern people did not bring Chriſtianity into theſe parts.

Indeed it is great pity that we have not retain'd the Gothick, or Saxon, and Northern Paganiſm with the Gothick Polities. But our learned Hiſtorian, ſhould have had at leaſt ſo much reſpect for Antiquity as to have conſider'd, that the Eccleſiaſtical Government, or Clergy, was eſtabliſh'd here according to his own confeſſion, even before the barbarous Northern people came here themſelves, and I thank God, it ſtill continues in a great meaſure amongſt us, even at this day, and I hope is like to do ſo, notwithſtanding the Fanatical and pernicious doctrine of Plato and his helliſh diſciples. And for the inſtitution of our Eccleſiaſtical government, and foundation of our Biſhopricks, and many of our Monaſteries, which our Author aſcribes to moſt villanous cauſes, 'tis certain from the beſt Hiſtories extant among us, that King Lucius, about the year 180. converted no leſs than thirty one of the Temples of the Heatheniſh Flamins and Arch-flamins into ſo many Chriſtian Biſhopricks, whereof London, York & Caerlyon, now S. Davids, were made the Metropolitans of the Province.

But our Pagan Politician, hating Chriſtianity it ſelf, hates no leſs the eſtabliſhment of the Chriſtian Religion, which he vilifies with notorious ſlanders and falſities. And as for Monaſteries, not to give a particular account of all their ſeveral beginnings, which were generally from the benevolence of moſt pious men and women, and too many to be numbred, we read that King Edgar the peaceable, founded no leſs for his own ſhare than forty ſeven.

Mer.

Sir, I concur with you both in your Hiſtory and your hopes, and ſhall ever add my moſt hearty prayers, and wiſhes. But our Author proceeds, and in the next page, had he had wit enough, he would have turn'd the whole order into ridicule. But knowing well that his ſtrongeſt arguments, and chiefeſt talent conſiſts in opprobrious language, the foul-mouth'd Fanatick is not aſham'd to call our Chriſtian Anceſtors barbarous, and thoſe good men, who at the expence of their blood and liv s, pla ted and prop gated the Chriſtian Faith amongſt s, Vipers.

Trav.

He is equally miſtaken in both. For not ſix pages farther, that is in p. 106. he there is pleas'd to give our Anceſtors, the title of a plain-hearted and well-meaning people, who were barbarous before in p. 100. But to call a man a Saint or a Devil, is indifferent to him, and promiſeuouſly us'd, according as either ſerves beſt for his purpoſe.

For the Eccleſiaſtical Vipers, I do not think indeed that his wit has furniſh'd him, with a character anſwerable to the deſign of his malice. For a Viper is known to be an Animal, much more uſeful and valuable, than our Author himſelf is like to be. For although that God and Nature have given it a ſting, or teeth if you will, to defend it ſelf from violence, and puniſh ſuch as offend it, yet we know, that of its body are compos'd the moſt Soveraign Cordials: Such are the excellent Works of our Learned Clergy, which are found to be the moſt effectual Antidotes againſt the poyſonous Blaſphemies and Hereſi s of our Schiſmatical Diſſenters. Beſides, Naturaliſts aſſure us, that the Viper hath ſuch a care, and tender affection for its young, that upon any preſſing danger, ſhe receives them again into her own body, and charged with the load and ſafety of what her ſelf gave life to, ſuffers no injury to approach them until firſt it hath paſſed through her own body, and ſhe deſtroyed. But our unnatural ſneaking and malicious worm, and good beſides for nothing, is barbarous enough to tear out the bowels of his indulgent mother, (the Holy Church I mean) even whilſt thoſe very bowels, are yearning to ſee the ſad condition of her deſperately abandoned Son, and in the height of his wickedneſs, opens her tender arms to receive this child of perdition into her Sacred boſome. But the Prodigal will never return, and ſo let us leave him, whilſt our Church of England, wanting as little my defence as, apprehending his reproaches, will ſtill remain firm upon the rock, ſecure, though ſadly lamenting thoſe miſerable ſhipwracks, which ſtorms of our own raſing have procured.

Merch.

And may the providence of Heaven preſerve her, until from militant ſhe becomes triumphant. In the mean time, I perceive, we are like to have more work about the civil Government. For in p. 103, our Author tells us, that the Soveraign power of England is in King, Lords and Commons.

Trav.

Right, Sir, when there is a Parliament in being, and as it is taken for one intire body, of which, the King is Principium, caput & finis. But there is no Soveraign power in the houſe of Commons, neither is there a Soveraign power in the houſe of Lords, either conjunctim or diviſim, joyntly or ſeparately without the King, therefore the Soveraign right of power can be no where but in the King; right of council is in the Lords and Commons in Parliament duly aſſembled, but right of command is in the King. For he both calls the Parliament and diſſolves it. One Soveraign power cannot diſſolve another Soveraign power (could they be ſuppoſed together) except by force. But the Kings of England have ever called and diſſolved Parliaments, not by force, but by right of power and command, which belongs to them by inherent birthright, and lawful and undoubted Succeſſion. A Bill which ſhall have regularly paſt both Houſes, and brought even to the Royal aſſent, is no Act, nor hath it any manner of force, as ſuch, without the Kings will. Le Roy le veult doth ſolely, and neceſſarily transform a Bill into a Statute, and is the eſſential conſtituent part of it. His Will doth alone give life and being to that which is no more than a dead inſignificant letter without it. Nay though a Bill ſhould paſs both Houſes with the unanimous conſent, and approbation of every individual Member, yet the King may refuſe it; and it is indiſputably the right of our Kings ſo to do, if they ſhall ſo think ſitting; which prove evidently (amongſt other things) that the Soveraign Power is ſolely in our Kings.

Merch.

But, Sir, Plato Red. inſinuates very ſtrongly, p. 123. that It is a violation of right, and infringment of the Kings Coronation Oath, to fruſtrate the counſels of a Parliament by his negative voice, and that in his opinion the King is bound confirmare conſuetudines, or paſs ſuch laws as the people ſhall chooſe.

Trav.

The Delphick Oracle did never impoſe Laws more peremptorily to the Greeks, than Plato Red. would arrogantly obtrude his private opinions upon us; for notwithſtanding all the Laws are againſt him, yet he alone would pretend to deveſt the King of this his undoubted Prerogative.

But, Sir, there is a difference between new modelling a Government, and maintaining it according to its ancient inſtitution: If Plato deſigns the firſt, he may as well pretend it is inconvenient that the Imperial Crown of England ſhould be Hereditary, and Succeſſive, and endeavour to make it Elective; for the right of a negative voice in Parliament, is as certainly the Prerogative of the Kings of England, as their right of Inheritance or Succeſſion is.

But having no deſign to d •… te ſo much at this time, what lteration might be convenient for us, as o maintain, what the Kings Right •• and ever hath been, according to the •• cient, as well as preſent Conſ •… tion of the Government, I muſt, 〈…〉 do averr, That the King, enjoyin •• reditarily, and undeniably this N •… tive voice in Parliament, hath himſelf the Supreme power of England. And this, the Engliſh Gentleman and his Doctor ſeem to acknowledge, p. 105.

Beſides, If the Soveraign power of England were not ſolely in the King, then when there is no Parliament there could be no Soveraign power in England, which is ridiculous and abſurd. For there is no Free and independent Kingdom, or Commonwealth upon earth, in which there is not at all times, a Soveraign power in being. If the Soveraign power ceaſeth for a moment, the power which remains becomes dependent, and at the ſame inſtant a higher power muſt appear. But the Imperial Crown of England depends upon none but God. Omnis ſub Rege, & ipſe ſub nullo, niſi tantum Deo, ſays Bracton, an ancient and a Learned Author: and again, Rex non habet ſuperiorem niſi Deum, The King has no Superiour but God. Or as it was expreſs'd under H. 4. The Regality of the Crown of England, is immediately ſubject to God, and to none other.

Mer.

But ſince the King can neither make any Laws, nor levy any Taxes without the conſent of both Houſes, it ſhews ſure, that at leaſt ſome of the Soveraign power reſides in them.

Trav.

I perceive, Couſin, you have forgot your Grotius, for he tells you, that you muſt diſtinguiſh between the Empire, and the manner of holding the Empire, or the Jus ab uſu Juris. Aliud enim eſt Imperium, aliud habendi modus. So that although the Kings of England do generally promiſe, or ſwear not to alter the Government, nor to make Laws, or levy impoſitions, but according to the ancient Conſtitutions of the Kingdom; yet nevertheleſs this takes not from him his Soveraign right of power, for that he hath in him by Birthright and Inheritance, and according to the Original Inſtitution of the Kingdom, and which is antecedent and Superiour alſo to any Oaths or Obligations. I'll give you Grotius his own words, as you will find them, l. 1. c. 3. ſ. 16. Non definit ſummum eſſe Imperium, etiamſi is qui imperaturm eſt, promittat aliqua ſubditis, etiam talia, quae ad imperandi rationem pertineant. But he confeſſeth indeed, that ſuch a Conſtitution, is a little limitation to the Supreme power. Fatendum tamen arctius quodammodo reddi Imperium. But it doth not follow from thence, that there is any authority Superiour to his own. Non inde tamen ſequitur ita promittenti Superiorem dari aliquem. And he gives you the example of the Perſian Monarchs, who though they were as abſolute as any Kings could be, yet when they enter'd upon the Government, they ſware to obſerve certain Laws, which they could not alter. Apud Perſas, Rex ſummo cum Imperio erat, tamen & jurabat, cum regnum adiret, & leges certa quadam forma latas mutare illi nefas erat. So alſo that the Egyptian Kings were bound to the obſervance of ſeveral Cuſtoms and Conſtitutions, Aegyptiorum Reges, quos tame ut alios Reges Orientis, ſummo imperio uſos non eſt dubium, ad multarum rerum obſervationem oblig abantur.

Mer.

Very well, Sir, but pray why may not the Soveraign power remain ſtill in the people, eſpecially if all be true, which our Author boldly affirms, p. 119. viz. That our Prince hath no authority of his own, but what was firſt entruſted in him by the Government, of which he is head.

Trav.

Here Plato plays the Villain egregiouſly, is a Traitor incognito, and carries Treaſon in a dark lanthorn, which he thinks to diſcover or conceal according to the ſucceſs of Rebellion which he evidently promotes. But we ſhall unmask this Republican Faux. And firſt our King, whom he calls Prince, (not underſtanding, it may be, the difference between Regnum and Principa us) hath no authority, ſaith he, but what was firſt intruſted by the Government. Here Government is a word of an amphibious nature, and can as well ſubſiſt under a Monarchy, as a Commonwealth. For if Rebellion doth not proſper, then Government in this place ſignifies the Law of the Land; and indeed, the King's authority over us is eſtabliſh'd by the Law, that is to ſay, the conſent and acknowledgment of the People in due form, That the King hath inherently, antecedently, and by Birth-right, a Soveraign authority over all his people, and this is confirm'd to him, both by Statute, Common Law and Cuſtom, according to that of 19. H. 6. 62. The Law is the inheritance of the King and people, by which they are rul'd, King and people. But if the Commonwealths men gain their point, if the Aſſociation, and its brat, bloody murder, had taken its damnable effect, then Government had moſt plainly ſignified the People, and that is truly our Authors meaning; for the words which immediately follow are theſe, Nor is it to be imagin'd, that they would give him more power, than what was neceſſary to govern them. What can be the antecedent to They and Them, but the word Subjects, which precedes in the beginning of the Sentence. This is the true Presbyterian or Phanatick way of ſpeaking their moſt miſchievous Treaſons, which like a Bizzare, with a little turn of the hand, repreſents ether the Pope or the Devil.

But ſince we are ſo plainly aſſured of his meaning, I'll take the liberty for once, to put it plainly into words, and I think it will then run thus: That our King, having neither by birthright, nor by a long undoubted Succeſſion of above ſix hundred years, any Authority of his own, but only that which the people have intruſted in him, (for they would give him no more, than what was juſt neceſſary to govern them, p. 119.) the people, in whom the Soveraign power reſides, may call this their miniſter, otherwiſe called King, to an account for the adminiſtration of this his truſt; and in caſe he ſhould not acquit himſelf, according to their expectation, the Soveraign Subject might puniſh this their Subject King, turn him out of his office, as all Supreme governours may their ſubordinate officers, nay and ſet up any other form of Government whatſoever, without doing any manner of injuſtice to their King.

This is our Authors doctrine, as appears not only by inevitable conſequences, drawn from this m tuated or fide-commiſſary power, which he hath placed in the King, but from the whole context, and courſe of his Libel.

Now though Hell it ſelf could not have invented a propoſition more notoriouſly falſe, though the whole Aſſociation could not have aſſerted a more Traiterous principle, though the Supreme power or Soveraign right of Government, hath been fixed to the imperial Crown of England, ever ſince the beginning of Hiſtory or Kings amongſt us, or the memorial of any time, though more than twenty Parliaments, which are the wiſdom and Repreſentatives of the whole Nation, have by ſeveral explanatory Acts and Statutes, confeſſed, declared and affirmed, that this Soveraign Authority, or power of England is ſolely in the King, and his la •• ul Heirs and Succeſſors, in excluſion to all other mortal power whatſoever. Rex habet poteſtatem & jurisdictionem ſuper omnes qui in regno ſuo ſunt; Nay although all the Power, Priviledges, Liberties, and even the Eſtates of the people proceeded originally from the meer bounty of our Kings; as both ancient and modern Authors, and Hiſtories have evidently made it appear; And after all, notwithſtanding our Author hath not produced one ſingle authority, or one little peice of an Act, Statute or Law, to prove that the Soveraign power is in the people, or that the King held his authority only in truſt from them, (as he plainly affirms) or when they entruſted him with it, or had it in themſelves to grant; yet by an unparallelled piece of impudence and vanity, he dares to bring his own private opinion, in competition with the wiſdom, learning, practice, decrees and juſtice of the whole Nation, condemn our Anceſtors, as betrayers of the peoples rights and priviledges, and by a ſingle, ipſe dixit, prove himſelf, the only true Phyſician, learned Stateſman, and (except ſome who in moſt Ages have been Executed for their moſt horrid Treaſons) the only worthy Patriot of his Countrey and Defender of its rights.

Now leſt ſome of our ignorant and infatuated multitude, like the Children of Hamel, ſhould dance after our Authors popular and Northern Bagpipe, until he precipitates them all into inevitable ruin and deſtruction, I am reſolved not to inſiſt at preſent upon his Majeſties Hereditary and undoubted Soveraign right of power, which he now poſſeſſes, not only by preſcription and a Succeſſion of more than eight hundred years, but by all the La s of the Land, as hath been already declared, and the univerſal conſent of all his good Subjects, confirmed by their Oaths of Allegeance, from which none but Rebels and perjured men can depart: I will not I ſay at preſent urge thoſe arguments, which are ſufficient to convince opiniaſtrete, and wilful ignorance it ſelf, but will attack him in his ſtrongeſt Gothick orts, and the rational part, upon which he ſeems moſt to value himſelf.

And firſt for theſe Goths, I cannot find in any Hiſtory, when it was they came over into England, nay I am confident that all Learned men will agree, that there is no probable conjecture from any Author, that they ever have been here, or croſt our Seas, or came nearer us than Normandy; one argument (amongſt others) is the flouriſhing condition of our Iſland above France (where the Goths and Vandalls had made ſome ravage) in point of Learning and Sciences, inſomuch that Alcuinus an Engliſhman, and Scholar to the Venerable Bede, was ſent unto Charles the Great, to whom he became Doctor or Profeſſor in Divinity, Aſtronomy and Philoſophy, and by his direction erected the Univerſity of Paris. But to return to our Goths, it is certain, that at firſt they travelled South-Eaſt, which is very different from South-Weſt, ſuch as i our ſituation from theirs. And yet our politick Author tells us poſitively, according to his uſual method, that they eſtabliſh'd their government in theſe parts after their conqueſt, p. 93. And endeavouring to prove in p. 46. and 97. that according to their inſtitution, the people had an influence upon the Government, he tells us that the Governments of France, Spain and England by name, and other countries, where theſe people ſetled, were fram'd accordingly.

Here we ſee our Country conquer'd, and an excellent form of Government eſtabliſh'd by the Goths, ſo good, and admirably juſt, that we in this age muſt quit our happy Monarchy, which hath ſubſiſted moſt gloriouſly many Hundreds of years, only to run a wool-gathering after theſe precarious Gothick Princes, and yet no man could ever tell us when this conqueſt happend, nor by whom, nor what became of them, nor indeed any thing more, than what the extravagant fancy of our Author hath imagin'd.

As for the Romans who conquer'd us, ſure they were neither Goths, nor Northern people, and ſo nothing can be pretended from that Conqueſt, nor are the Saxons, who next invaded us, to be called Northern people, by us at leaſt, who lye ſo much North to them our ſelves.

But forgiving Plato all his abſurdities and incongruities, the rather that we may find out the Truth, and confound him with it, we will ſuppoſe, that by his Goths and Northern people, he means the Saxons, for the Danes were but a very little while, I think not thirty years, maſters of England, and ſo, what may be gather'd in favour of his popular Government from them, if any thing could, would not be much material.

We will imagine then that our Saxons were of the race of the Goths, and that (retaining their cuſtoms) They introduc'd many of them amongſt us, ſuch as might be the diviſion of the lands, into ſeveral Feuds, which they called Thane lands, (and were like our Mannors or Lordſhips) under certain Tenures or Services. Many alſo they might have found amongſt the Britains, and retain'd them under their own Government: for it is certain the Britains held lands by ſeveral Tenures, but whether they were originally of their own Inſtitution, or the remains of the Roman Clientela's, and Praeda militaria, I will not determine.

I have already told you, that the Goths upon their firſt Tranſplantation, and after they were ſetled in their new poſſeſſions, were govern'd by Kings, whoſe power encreas'd deſpotically, according as the people grew ſecure and civiliz'd, and ſo they continued above a thouſand years; nor do I find that the people in all this time pretended to any other ſhare in the government, than to meet in General Councils, when the affairs of the Kingdom oblig'd their King to aſſemble them. And truly I ever thought ſuch National Aſſemblies, when well regulated, very conducible to the ſecurity, and happy ſubſiſtence of all Governments, and ſuch our antient Monarchs have thought fit to make uſe of, and have tranſmitted the cuſtom of convoking ſuch Councils, which we not call Parliaments, even to our days. But that theſe Counſellors ſhould have any right of command, is ſo contrary to the deſign of their Inſtitution, that as this muſt needs be dangerous to the Government it ſelf, ſo they make their good Inſtitution uſeleſs, by rendring themſelves ſuſpected to the King, who alone hath the right to aſſemble them. For what wiſe Magiſtrate, would by his own authority raiſe a power, which he apprehends might ſhock his own.

The ſad effects of this, we have ſeen of late days among our ſelves, when our Commoners in Parliament, who were meer Counſellors, and no more, or Repreſentatives with a power to conſent, have arrogated to themſelves a Soveraign authority, and under that pretence, have forceably and violently ſubverted our antient Government, and deſtroyed our Lawful and Natural Governour himſelf, and have beſides, of late, ſpent ſo much time in unneceſſary new diſputes concerning their own rights and prerogatives, which really do not much concern us, that they have totally neglected thoſe main ends of their meeting, which are the Security of our Government, under our Lawful Soveraign, and the peace and happineſs of his people, and which are the only bleſſings and benefits, which we deſire of them.

Nay, they have been ſo far from procuring thoſe advantages for us, to which purpoſes they have been ſolely entruſted by us, that their diſputes concerning the Succeſſion to the Crown of England, which is indiſputable; The Right which the King hath to borrow money upon good Security, which was never taken from the pooreſt of his Subjects; ſhewing mercy upon unfortunate offenders, which is his Nature, as well as undoubted Prerogative, and ſeveral ſuch other irregular Heats and Animoſities, are the moſt apparent cauſes of our preſent horrid Conſpiracies, troubles and diſtractions.

But to return to our Goths, I have told you, that after their diviſion—thoſe that ſpread toward the Weſt and Southern parts of Europe, were in a continual ſtate of war, and ſo their King was but their General, whom ſometimes they did depoſe or continue, according as they found him capable of that great employment, upon whoſe conduct, in their dangerous circumſtances, their Lives and Fortunes did chiefly depend, and ſuch in ſome reſpects was the caſe of our Saxons under their Heptarchy here in England. All the world knows that they invaded us without any pretence of title, being only call'd in as friends by Vortigern, the Britiſh King, to aſſiſt him againſt the Scots, and by degrees encroaching upon the Britains, they erected ſeveral Kingdoms, until at length the Native Inhabitants were totally over-power'd.

But this made very little alteration in their affairs; for wanting a common enemy, they were always quarrelling amongſt themſelves, uſurping upon one another, untill their ſeveral little Governments were united under one Soveraign Monarch, who was Egbert as ſome write, or Alfred the eighteenth King of the Weſt-Saxons.

`Tis true, that duringVide Chron. Sir R Baker. their Heptarchy, they choſe one amongſt themſelves, who was the Supreme head of the reſt, and was call'd King of Engle-lond. And it is recorded that eight of the Mercian Kings, in a continued ſucceſſion, kept the Imperial Crown of the Heptarchy. But it was rather a titular honour, than a Soveraign right of Government, and I do not find, but that every particular King in his own Province, did generally exerciſe thoſe two great Regalities, of making Laws, and levying Taxes, by vertue of his own authority. But whether they did or not, it is little to our purpoſe, ſince we have no reaſon to follow the examples of thoſe petty Kings and Ʋſurpers, eſpecially when we conſider their circumſtances. But if we muſt lay aſide the form of Government ſince the Norman conqueſt, from whence our Aera begins, and concerning which our Hiſtories are more certain and Authentick, let us then rather conſult the Adminiſtration of thoſe Weſt-Saxons, who ſolely and Soveraignly enjoy'd the Crown of England. And not to be too tedious, we will ſix upon King Edward the Confeſſor, the laſt (except Harold) of our Engliſh Saxon Kings. I ſhall not trouble you with much neither concerning him, becauſe you may find at large whatever can be ſaid of him, in our own Engliſh Hiſtories. I ſhall only therefore make this remark, that we have had no Kings ſince William the Conqueror, nor was he himſelf, more abſolute, than King Edward the Confeſſor was.

I remember nothing of his impoſitions, but rather believe there might have been none during his reign, becauſe I find that he remitted to his people the yearly Tribute of 40000 l. that had been gathered by the name of Danegelt. But for Laws which now are made by Act of Parliament, I obſerve no ſuch Parliamentary way of proceedings in his days. It is true, that he called a Councel, or Wittena Gemote (which ſome call very improperly a Parliament, eſpecially as it is now underſtood) in the ſecond year of his Reign, but the Commoners were ſo far from having any right of power, that their preſence was not really neceſſary. Minores laici non ſammoneri debent, ſed ſi eorum praeſentia neceſſaria fuerit, &c. Which ſhews plainly, that they might be omitted. Nay although they were ſummoned and did not appear, nevertheleſs the Parliament was taken to be full without them. Which is a ſufficient proof, that the Commons, were not ſo much as an eſſential part of the Parliament; and it is certain that Edward the Confeſſor took the ſame courſe about his Laws, as the Greeks and Romans formerly had done, the firſt fetching their inſtitutions from the Aegyptians, and the latter from the Greeks. So King Edward having gathered together the Laws of the Mercians, Weſt Saxons, Danes, and Northumbrians, he ſelected the beſt, and compiled them into one body, which (being approved in Council ) by his own authority, he commanded they ſhould be obſerved, and they were the fountain of thoſe which we call at this day the Common Law.

Canutus the Daniſh Ʋſurpe , called alſo a Council or Parliament at Oxford, in which he made ſeveral good Laws, but I do not find that the Commoners pretended any right, in the Supreme authority, at that time, any more than afterwards.

But however I cannot believe, that their example is any argument for us, to forſake the preſent conſtitution of our Engliſh Monarchy, to hunt after the polity of an Invader, who with his Succeſſors enjoyed not the Crown of England, the fiftieth part ſo long, as the Norman Line hath done.

Now, Couſin, you ſee what is become of thoſe great expectations which we might have had, from the noiſe and buſtle, which our Author makes of the Northern polities, and their exact rules of Government, but ſo it falls out, that in our days, mountains are no leſs apt to bring forth mice, than formerly. And that when there is a great cry, there is not always the more wooll. For in this caſe, contrary to his undeniable Aphoriſm, though it may poſſibly be true, that the Saxons made ſome diviſion of the Lands amongſt the people (for our preſent diviſion of Lands and Tenures alſo, were generally made and inſtituted by the Normans) yet they retained the Soveraign authority themſelves.

Merch.

Sir, I am obliged to you for remembring me, of what I had read before, but could not apply it ſo well to our preſent purpoſe, as you have done. But believing that you are clearly in the right, I ſhall not trouble you any farther concerning thoſe Northern polities, but deſire that you would proceed, and let me know what you mean by the rational part.

Trav.

By the rational part, I mean this, that granting all to be true, which our Author hath affirmed, concerning thoſe Goths and Northern people, and that in the original conſtitution of our Government, the people had a ſhare in the Supreme Authority, and that the prerogative, which our King at preſent lawfully poſſeſſes, hath been by degrees gained from the people. (All which is ſo notoriouſly falſe, that on the contrary, the people have lately encroached upon the prerogative), yet I ſay at this time, and as our preſent circumſtances ſtand, it is more rational, that all honeſt and ſober men, who laying aſide ambition and malice, conſider impartially the juſt rights and liberties of the people, together with the preſervation of our Government, and the general happineſs of the Nation, ſhould rather endeavour by all lawful means, to increaſe the power of his preſent Majeſty, than diminiſh it. And ſuppoſing we were at liberty, to chooſe what form of Government we pleaſed, rather continue it a Monarchy as it is, than ſet up ſuch a Democratical form, or phantaſtical model, as our Author, (having ſtoln it in a great meaſure, from the propoſitions of the Rebels ſent to the late King in the Iſle of Wight, and the tranſactions of Forty Eight) hath propoſed to us.

Merch.

The performance of this, Sir, will be ſuch a full ſatisfaction to us all, that nothing will remain farther for our conſideration, but to contrive a means, how we may better ſecure our preſent Government, and by enacting farther good Laws, if neceſſary, with a ſtrict execution of them, reduce our peſtilent Republican diſturbers of our peace, unto a due obedienc to their Natural and Lawful Prince.

One thing more I muſt beg of you by the way, which is, to let me know, why you ſuppoſe all along, that ou Author would ſet up a Commonwealth, ſince he tells us plainly, p. 209. That he abhorrs the thoughts of wiſhing a Democracy, much leſs endeavouring any ſuch thing, during theſe circumſtances we are now in, that is, under Oaths of obedience to a Lawful King.

Trav.

I thank you, Sir, for putting me in mind of it, but indeed I thought, you had by this time ſufficiently underſtood, how to diſtinguiſh a Presbyterian, or otherwiſe Phanatical Commonwealth man's publick declaration, from his more private meaning. I muſt therefore mind you of this obſervation by the way, that I never yet met with any of thoſe Authors who was not demonſtrably a wilful, malicious Knave in his writings. But truly in this caſe, I think, our Author is frank and plain enough. I ſhall therefore mind you of ſome paſſages, which I ſhall leave to your own Interpretation. He tells us, p. 182. That our preſent eſtate inclines to popularity, and I do not find, but that he inclines as much to comply with our eſtate as they could wiſh, but let us come to his declaration againſt it, where he proteſts that he hates the thoughts of wiſhing a Commonwealth, but yet inſinuates, from the ſtory of Themiſtocles his firing the Grecian ſhips, That nothing could be more advantagious and profitable for us, which ſurely ſhews his good inclinations plain enough. But I am fully perſwaded that our Governours have taken no leſs care to ſecure us againſt the literal, than the metaphorical ſence of his ine tale, and will as well preſerve our Navy, as our Government from his Diabolical deſigns.

But now, he gives us the reaſon, why he cannot think of a Commonwealth, becauſe (conſcientious good man) he is loth to break his oath of obedience to a Lawful King.

But for this Lawful King himſelf, it is no matter if he be perjur'd to the very bottom of deſtruction, who having no leſs ſworn, and that ſolemnly too, to maintain the antient Monarchical Government, as at preſent by Law confirmed and eſtabliſh'd, with all the rights and prerogatives belonging to the Imperial Crown of England, may break all, betray his poor Subjects, their rights and liberties, abandon them to the mercy of unmerciful Tyrants, and be damn'd if he pleaſes. Nay our Author kindly adviſes him to it, and rather than his curſed project ſhould fail, he perſwades him, it is the beſt thing he can do. Whereas it is plain, That the power of the Kings of England is reſtrained or limited (as we may ſay) in nothing more conſiderable, than this, viz. That they cannot by their own Grant ſever their Prerogatives from the Crown, nor communicate any part thereof to any one, no not to the Princes their eldeſt Sons, as may be ſeen more at large in Sir J. Davies, upon Impoſitions, cap. 29. beſides many other good Authors. Nay more, he tells us there, That neither the Kings Acts, nor any Act of Parliament, can give away his Prerogative; and farther, that no Act of Parliament in the Negative, can take away the Kings Prerogative in the Affirmative. Yet notwithſtanding this, (and ten times more that may be ſaid to this purpoſe,) our King is adviſed and perſwaded, nay, almoſt neceſſitated (as our Author would have it) not only to quit ſome One of his Prerogatives, but (to make ſhort work) to releaſe, and give them up all at once.

In the next place, let us conſider Plato's excellent new model it ſelf, and here (like a wiſe Politician) he hath made Three co-ordinate powers in being at the ſame time, that is to ſay, King, Lords, and Commons.

I confeſs, for the King, he ſays little of him, and with great reaſon, for indeed he ſignifies nothing more than a Cypher, which, as in Arithmetick, is only to make the Commons more valuable.

But to do our Author right, he hath yet a farther uſe to make, of this his otherwiſe uſeleſs Prince; that is to ſay, whileſt neither his own Right, nor his Power, nor our Laws can ſecure himſelf; his Name nevertheleſs is to preſerve theſe his Maſters. With that they hope to prevent all oppoſition, and civil wars at home. For ſhould they forceably depoſe him, they juſtly apprehend, that his Loyal Subjects in England, would endeavour to revenge ſuch an inſupportable wrong. Nor can they believe that the Kingdoms of Scotland, and Ireland, would again tamely ſubmit their Necks to the ſervile yoke of a few ambitious, Engliſh Commoners; or that foreign Princes themſelves, would even for their own ſecurities ſake, quietly, and unconcern'd, countenance this horrid injuſtice, and outrage done to the ſacred dignity of Kings. But if they can perſwade his Majeſty willingly to depoſe himſelf, and at the ſame time diſinherit his Heirs and Succeſſors, they imagine that none can pretend to diſapprove, much leſs blame, or impute to them, the volunry act of a King. For as, Volenti non fit injuria, and by conſequence no offence in them; ſo they will certainly reſerve to themſelves the honour of puniſhing in the King, as their maſterpiece, and laſt act of juſtice, the Treaſon which he ſhall have committed againſt himſelf. To facilitate all this, our Author hath taken from his Majeſty, his Militia, and his Revenue, that is, men and mon y, which are the ſtrength and ſinews of Power, and in the Commoners he hath plac'd the Royal authority, of Calling, Proroguing and Diſſolving themſelves. And left the King, in this miſerable condition, ſhould have yet any hopes left, even of ſecuring his own Perſon, he hath taken from him the power of making his own Officers, and beſtowing thoſe imployments, which have always depended upon the Regal authority. Nay, the Lords themſelves are no more to receive their Honours from the Fountain of all Honour, but muſt lick the duſt from the ſhooes, of their once obſequious vaſſals.

So our poor Maſter, having nothing now to give, muſt loſe the hopes, even of a grateful friend, who in his extremity, might at leaſt wiſh him well, and ſpeak a good word for him to his inſolent Governours.

Mer.

But, Sir, our Author leaves moſt of theſe things in the diſpoſition of the Parliament, by which he tells us, that he ever underſtood, the King, Lords and Commons, ſo that neither his Militia nor Revenue, can be ſaid to be ſo abſolutely taken from himſelf, as granted to the Parliament in general, of which he is ſtill to be the head.

Trav.

Ah, Couſin, there is deadly poiſon in this his varniſhed treacherous Cup, and you will eaſily perceive it, when you conſider, Plato cares not ſo much, that the Militia ſhould be in the power of the Commons, as out of the King. For whileſt the King cannot diſpoſe of it, without the conſent of his Lower Houſe, judge you, whether they will ever agree to the raiſing any force, which they ſhall not themſelves command.

If then any difference ariſe, upon that, or any other point, (which unavoidably, and deſignedly will happen) then are the Commoners become immediately maſters of all. For what can the King do, though joyn'd with the Houſe of Lords, without a right of command or force, againſt a multitude, and that ſo unequal too, that (if the Houſe of Commons in Parliament, repreſent the whole Nation, as they pretend they do) then are they at leaſt ten thouſand men againſt one, though all the Nobility be included with the King. The neceſſary conſequence of all this muſt be, that if on the one hand, the King and Lords, agree with the Commons in all things, then the Commons govern more abſolutely, than if there were neither the one nor the other, becauſe there is no pretence againſt them.

On the other hand, if they in any thing differ from the Commons, then undoubtedly the diſagreeing Lords, as formerly, ſhall be turned out of doors, the King ſet aſide, and the Votes made by the Houſe of Commons, Jan. 4. 1648, revived and confirmed, which being very ſhort, but plain, I ſhall here repeat. Firſt, That the people, under God, are the original of all juſt power; Secondly, That the Commons of England aſſembled in Parliament, being choſen by, and repreſenting the people, have the Supreme Authority of this Nation; Thirdly, That whatever is enacted, and declared for Law by the Commons of England aſſembled in Parliament, hath the force of a Law; Fourthly, That all the people of this Nation are included thereby, although the conſent and concurrence of the King and Houſe of Peers, be not had thereunto.

What think you now, Couſin, of theſe four Votes, even whilſt the King and Lords were yet in being. Do they not look, as if they deſigned a Commonwealth, or rather to eſtabliſh an arbitrary Tyrannical power, in the Houſe of Commons, and yet their propoſitions all along to the King, were the ſame, which Plato hath again offered us, that is, leaving the Militia, the publick revenue, nomination of officers, and ſuch like to the Parliament, by which was always meant, King, Lords and Commons. This is the politick web, which our Author pretends to have ſpun out of his own ſhallow brains, and indeed it is ſo very wondrous thin, that if our preſent Stateſmen could not with half an eye, ſee through it, I ſhould be apt to agree, with our Author, p. 22. that they ought in conſcience to excuſe themſelves, from that ſublime imployment, and betake themſelves to callings more ſuitable to their capacities, as Shoomakers, Tailors, and ſuch other mechanick profeſſions.

Merch.

Sir, the Sun at noon day is never more clear, than that he deſigns, at beſt, a Commonwealth. And indeed where three co-ordinate powers are in being at the ſame time, it is impoſſible they ſhould continue long in that ſtate, but ſome one or two muſt certainly in time over balance, and get the advantage of the other. I think Lucan confirmed this long ago, when he ſaid,

Nulla fides regni ſociis, omnisque poteſtas Impatiens conſortis erit.—

And the King having neither power, ſtrength, money nor officers, it is ten thouſand to one, as you obſerve, on the Commons ſide, who are actually poſſeſſed of all. Pray therefore proceed, and let us know, why in reaſon we ſhould not comply, with our Authors Popular Government, ſince he tells us that our preſent ſtate inclines to Popularity.

Trav.

Moſt willingly. But in the firſt place, in all changes of Government we muſt conſider, what inconveniences we find, under the preſent conſtitution, and what way we propoſe to our ſelves, to have them prevented by an alteration, otherwiſe we ſhall never be able to aſſign any reaſon for a change at any time. I muſt therefore deſire you to tell me frankly, what fault you find, grievances, according to the cant of our Diſſenters, in our Monarchy as at preſent Eſtabliſhed.

Merch.

Truly, Couſin, I have oftentimes thought ſeriouſly with my ſelf, what thoſe grievances ſhould be. And though I was once carried a little away with the ſtream, and cried, Liberty, and Property, and Grievances of the Nation, with ſome others of the wide mouth'd pack, yet to deal plainly with you, I could never be ſatisfied from them, nor from my own obſervation, what thoſe grievances were in particular.

Trav.

I believe it indeed, but however ſince our Author, who is a knowing man, aſſ res us, that our diſeaſe is ſo deſperate, that we have no hopes but in a deſperate cure. Pray let us both, though no State Phyſicians, lay our heads together, and think with our ſelves, what our ſickneſs may be, eſpecially ſince the beginning of every cure, proceeds from the true knowledge of the diſtemper. For my part, I do aſſure you, I will aſſiſt you what I can, in finding out the one, and for the other, we will leave it to our betters.

Firſt then I ſhould think, that as all diſeaſes ſhew themſelves by ſome Symptoms upon the natural body, ſo the diſtempers of the body politick, muſt be alſo viſible, and will diſcover themſelves, either in our liberties, properties, or our Religion. We will begin with our Liberties, and pray, Couſin, think with your ſelf, whether you want any ſuch civil liberty, as you could wiſh for, or know to be given under any other Government upon earth.

Mer.

Trouble not your ſelf for that, for except I could have ſomewhat granted particularly to my own perſon, I am ſo far from wiſhing our Subjects more liberty in general, that I really think we have too much.

Trav.

What mean you by too much?

Mer.

I mean, Sir, amongſt other things, that men, eſpecially of late, have taken to themſelves the liberty of reflecting upon, or calumniating the Government, and our Governours, as alſo to ſlander one another, with ſo much bitterneſs and cunning, that we are ready to be deſtroy'd before we know any thing of the matter. And yet they keep ſo within the compaſs of the Law, that the Scrutiny of a Jury can never reach them. Nay, I have heard ſay, that ſome are ſo excellent at it, that they will talk you an hour together, within a hairs breadth of Sedition, and Treaſon, dance upon the low rope, with children ty'd to their feet, and naked ſwords in their hands, and upon the high rope, hanging only by their toes, or nape of the neck.

Trav.

Right, but I have ſeen ſome of them hang, with the rope round about their necks, and indeed I never wonder'd at it.

Mer.

Yes, men who are only impudent bold fellows, and have not the skill to cut a feather, very often dance themſelves into that nooſe. But to be ſerious, really, Couſin, methinks, that calumniating is a moſt pernicious liberty; for in my opinion, men ſhould either accuſe judicially or not at all.

In the firſt caſe, the accuſed hath, we ſuppoſe, a fair Trial, at which he may make his defence, and if he prove innocent, will be freed. But in the latter, a man is condemn'd, and executed too, before he hears of his accuſation. It is like killing a man with thoſe inviſible ſubtle poiſons, which work their effect, even whilſt you are reading the complementing Letter, which conveys them; your reputation and good name is gone, your acquaintance gaze upon you, with a different air than formerly; you find a coldneſs in your friends, neglect in your relations, and diſreſpect from all. And at length the poyſon, having crept through thoſe with whom you might have occaſion to converſe, you find your ſelf generally condemn'd, before you know of what, or by whom you were accuſed; and in truth Brinvillers were more tolerable in any Government, than theſe peſtilent Calumniators.

Trav.

Indeed, Couſin, you have ſpoke a great deal of reaſon, and I am perſwaded, that the immediate cauſe of our diſtractions, proceeds from the malicious Calumnies of a few knaves, who know they lye diſpers'd amongſt a great many fools, who think they ſpeak truth.

The Publiſher of the divine Machiavels Prince, is very juſt in this particular, telling us, that in all good Governments, Calumniators ought to be reſtrain'd, and puniſh'd by the ſtricteſt ſeverity: Qui Rempublicam recte inſtituere velit, ferri nullo modo debent calumniae, ſed puniendi ſunt calumniatores. Quodſi hiſce rebus in Republica non rectè proſpectum ſit, multa mala patrantur, unde ſeditiones & turbae ortum habent. And concludes with the ſtory of Furius—Camillus, who having gain'd a great deal of honour amongſt the Romans, for the good ſervice which he had done, in freeing them from the imminent danger of the Gauls: Manlius Capitolinus, envying above all, his great reputation, endeavour'd by all means to leſſen his credit. But finding the Senate and Nobility firm in their good opinion concerning Camillus, he then apply'd himſelf to the Commonalty, who being ever the moſt ſuſceptible of falſe impreſſions, were continually plied with the falſe aſperſions of the envious Manlius, inſinuating amongſt other things, that the vaſt ſum of money, which was ſuppoſed to have been paid the Gauls, remained yet in a great meaſure, in the poſſeſſion of Camillus, and the Senators, who appropriating to their uſe, what was ſaid to have been paid their enemies, inſtead of Governours and Protectors, became themſelves the greateſt enemies the people had, by endeavouring to ſupport their own luxury, at the expence of the peoples miſery. Whereas, if that mony were again diſtributed, (as in juſtice it ought) amongſt the poor Citizens, it would make their preſent condition much more eaſie, than otherwiſe it was like to be in a great many years. Intereſt is the great wheel, that moves all the world, either to good or evil actions. The Commonalty thus ini cens'd by Manlius, were now work'd up to that point which he deſir'd, and ready either for rebellion, or any other inſolence, which their Incendiary ſhould ſuggeſt. In the mean time the Senate, perceiving this growing miſchief, to obviate any farther diſturbance, they create a Dictator, on purpoſe to examine into the whole matter, and puniſh the offender, whereever he ſhould find the offence. He appoints therefore a day to Manlius, who attended with vaſt multitudes of the credulous Commons, is ask'd by the Dictator, where or with whom, that vaſt ſum of money was lodg'd. But Manlius, unprovided to anſwer a queſtion, which it ſeems he did not expect, and heſitating much, without giving any ſatisfactory account of what was demanded, he was caſt into chains, and puniſh'd according to the hainouſneſs of the offence.

Mer.

And may all the Manlii amongſt us be alike confounded. Next, Sir, I cannot approve of the liberty men take, of publiſhing their private ſentiments, which are generally grounded upon nothing but conjecture, and Enthuſiaſtical follies.

Trav.

Certainly, nothing would conduce more to our quiet, than that the liberty of the preſs ſhould be reſtrain'd. But ſince it is not our buſineſs, to look into thoſe liberties, which we enjoy, ſo much as into thoſe, which we want, let us leave the conſideration of theſe, and many other ſuch things, to our prudent Governours.

I ſhall only note this one thing by the way, that ſince the Act of Habeas Corpus, I think I may confidently affirm, that even at this time, when there is ſo much danger of a pretended ſlavery, the Subjects of England enjoy a greater liberty, than was known to any of our Anceſtors before us.

Pray therefore proceed to the ſecond conſideration, which is our properties.

Mer.

That is wholly unneceſſary, for all the world knows, that whatſoever we poſſeſs, is ſo ſecured by the Laws of the Land, that the King himſelf doth not pretend in prejudice of thoſe Laws (which indeed are his own Laws) to touch the leaſt Chattel that belongs to us, nor can any Tax be impos'd, but ſuch as ſhall be granted by Act of Parliament, which is the very Government, that our Author ſo much approves. And in a word, Plato himſelf has clear'd this point, telling us, p. 127 That the people by the fundamental Laws, that is, by the conſtitution of the Government of England, have entire freedom, in their lives, properties, and their perſons, neither of which, can in the leaſt ſuffer, but according to the Laws.

And to prevent any oppreſſion that might happen in the execution of theſe good Laws, which are our Birthright, all Trials muſt be by twelve men of our equals: and in the next page, leſt the King's Soveraign authority, might be urg'd as a ſtop, to the execution of thoſe Laws, he tells us, That neither the King, nor any by authority from him, hath any the leaſt power or jurisdiction, over any Engliſh man, but what the Law gives him.

And if any perſon ſhall be ſo wicked, as to do any injuſtice to the life, liberty, or eſtate, of any Engliſhman, by any private command of the Prince, the perſon aggriev'd, or his next of kin, (if he be Aſſaſſinated) ſhall have the ſame remedy againſt the offender, as he ought to have had, by the good Laws of the Land, if there had been no ſuch command given. Now, dear Couſin, in the name of ſenſe and reaſon, where can be the fault and diſtemper of our Government, as it relates to the eaſe and priviledge of the Subject, if this be the conſtitution of it, as at leaſt our Author himſelf affirms?

Trav.

Faith, Sir, I could never find it out, nor any man elſe, that ever I could meet withal. And what is ſtill ſtranger, our great Platonick Phyſician hath not vouchſafed to give us any one particular inſtance, in what part our diſeaſe lyes, notwithſtanding he alarms us with diſmal news of being dead men, and that without ſuch a ſtrange turn of Government, as his pregnant Noddle hath found out, we are ruin'd for ever.

'Tis true, he tells us, that the property being in the hand of the Commoners, the Government muſt neceſſarily be there alſo, and for which the Commoners are tugging and contending very juſtly, and very honourably, which makes every Parliament ſeem a preſent ſtate of war.

Mer.

But, Sir, if it be true, that we enjoy all thoſe benefits and bleſſings before mentioned, & that the Government it ſelf ſecures theſe properties, inviolably to us, (which we know to be moſt certain, without the teſtimony of Plato or any man elſe) what then does this tugging concern us, or what relation has it to our happineſs, which is already as great, as we can wiſh it to be? Muſt the enjoyment of our properties, put us into a ſtate of war? Muſt our health become our diſeaſe, and our fatneſs only make us kick againſt our maſters? what can this contention for Government ſignifie more, than ambition? and what could their ſucceſs produce leſs than Tyranny? ſhould the Houſe of Commons become our maſters, what could they beſtow upon us, more than we already enjoy, except danger and trouble? And what can our preſent Government take from us, except the fears of thoſe fatal conſequences, which ſuch a popular innovation would induce? Let then the property be where it will, and if we poſſeſs it ſecurely, we are the happier for it.

Trav.

Your reaſons are too plain, and ſtrong to be reſiſted, I ſhall quit therefore this point and inform you, how our Author ſeems in many places to inſinuate, that the want of frequent and annual Parliaments, is the cauſe of our diſtemper, and that calling a Parliament every year, might prove a pretty cure, according to a certain Act in the time of Edward the firſt, and that then, inſtead of hopping upon one leg, we might go limping on upon three.

Mer.

Faith, Couſin, you are now gotten out of my reach, and you muſt anſwer this your ſelf. I can only proceed according to my former rule, which is, that if we be as happy as we can be, a Parliament cannot make us more.

Trav.

That anſwer is, I think, ſufficient to ſatisfie any reaſonable man. However we will ſpeak ſomewhat more particularly concerning this matter, as we find it recorded in Hiſtory.

Our Author informs us in p. 110. That by our Conſtitution the Government was undeniably to be divided, between the King and his Subjects. (which (by the way) is undeniably and notoriouſly falſe: for according to our ancent Conſtitution as well under the Saxon as our Norman Kings, the Government or the right of Power was originally and ſolely in our Kings) And that divers of the great men, ſpeaking with that excellent Prince King Edward the firſt about it, called a Parliament, and conſented to a Declaration, of the Kingdoms right in that point. So there paſſed a Law in that Parliament, that one ſhould be held every year, and oftner if need be. The ſame he confirms in p. 159. and in other places.

Now, Sir, if after theſe fine Speeches by thoſe great men, (whom undoubtedly our Author could have named) to this excellent Prince, it ſhould happen at laſt, that there was no ſuch Act, during the Reign of Edward the firſt, what would you think of our Author?

Merch.

In troth, Sir, it would not alter my opinion, for I already believe him to be an impudent, magiſterial Impoſtor.

Trav.

I fear indeed he will prove ſo, for except he hath found in his politick ſearch, ſome looſe paper, that never yet came into our Statute books, we muſt conclude that he is groſsly miſtaken. For the firſt Act that is extant of that kind, was in the Fourth of Edward the Third, and the words of it are theſe: It is accorded that a Parliament ſhall be holden every year once, and more often if need be.

Now, Sir, you muſt obſerve, that this Act was made, whilſt the King was but Nineteen years of age, and both himſelf and Kingdom under the care of Twelve Governours. His Mother, Queen Iſabel, and Roger Mortimer, very powerful, the Governours of the Pupil King divided amongſt themſelves, and many other preſſing affairs of the Nation, oblig'd moſt people to propoſe that expedient of frequent Parliaments, as the moſt probable means to ſecure the peace, and proſperity of the Kingdom, at leaſt until the King ſhould come of riper years, and thereby many differences be reconciled.

After this, in the Thirty ſixth year of his Reign, he called a Parliament, and wanting money, (as generally he did,) the Parliament would grant nothing, until an Act paſſed for maintenance of former Articles and Statutes there expreſſed, And that for redreſs of divers miſchiefs and grievances, which daily happen, a Parliament ſhall be holden every year, as another time was ordained by Statute.

Theſe are the two Statutes intended by our Author, when he tells us that the Statute of Edward the firſt, was confirmed by that glorious Prince Edward the third. Whereas in truth they were both made by the ſame King, and both in a great meaſure, revoked in his own time. Having declared after the making this laſt Act, that he yielded to it, only to ſerve his own turn.

This Sir, is the matter of Fact, upon which our Author builds his great pretenſions to the old conſtitutions of Annual Parliaments. The firſt Act was made whilſt the King was very young, the ſecond, when he wanted money, and had Twenty ſix ſhillings and eight pence granted him upon every ſack of wool tranſported for three years. And both firſt, and ſecond Acts were broken by ſeveral intermiſſions before he died.

Beſides, we muſt make this remark, that a Parliament ſeldom met, without giving the King ſome money, which might encourage thoſe Kings to aſſemble them oftner, than lately they have done. But the truth is, Annual Parliaments were lookt upon as ſo great a grievance to the Nation, that we find, that about the Tenth year of Richard the Second his Succeſſor, it was thought a great Prerogative in the King, that he might call a Parliament once a year. And both Houſes appointed the Duke of Gloceſter, and Thomas Arundell Biſhop of Ely, to acquaint the King, that by an old Statute, the King once a year might lawfully ſummon his Court of Parliament, for reformation of corruptions and enormities within the Realm.

And if we conſider with our ſelves, we ſhall find, that if yearly Parliaments were impoſed upon us, they would become grievances, equally inſupportable, as to have no Parliaments at all.

For if the Knights, Citizens, and Burgeſſes be choſen out of the Countrey Gentlemen and Merchants, inhabiting thoſe Countries, where they are elected, (as ſure they ought to be) what inconvenience, if not ruin, muſt it bring upon their affairs, when they ſhall be forced to run every year, a hundred or two hundred Miles from their particular domeſtick affairs, to ſerve in a formal Parliament, in which it may be, the greateſt buſineſs will be, to make buſineſs for the next.

Indeed, for idle perſons, who live about Town, and have nothing to do, but to ſcrible knaviſh politicks, to the diſturbance of honeſt men, ſuch a conſtitution might do well enough, if they could get to be choſen members. But we find from experience and Hiſtory, that in thoſe days, when Ambition and Faction, were not ſo much in vogue as at preſent, men were ſo far from making parties, to get into the Parliament, that many Commoners, and Lords too, have petitioned and been excuſed their attendance, The King's, Queen's, and Prince's Servants, have ſtood upon their priviledge of exemption. So James Barner was diſcharged by the King's command, Quia erat de retinentia Regis, 7. R. 2 and the Lord de Veſſey, in Edward the Fourths time, obtained Licence not to ſerve in Parliament during his life. Rex conceſſit Henrico Bromflet, Dom. de Veſſey, quod ipſe, durante vita, ſit exoneratus de veniendo ad Parl. Beſides, the very Writ of Summons ſhews, that in the original inſtitution and deſign of Parliaments, a frequent meeting could not be neceſſary. For they were only to treat, & concilium impendere de magnis & arduis negotiis. Now God help us, if every year ſhould produce, ſuch magna & ardua negotia, ſuch difficult and weighty affairs, that the King, with his Judges and rivy Council, could not determine them, without aſſembling his great Council the Parliament. I confeſs, in our Authors Chimerical model, I am perſwaded our circumſtances would be bad enough; but I thank God, we are not gotten there yet. Thus you ſee, Sir, that this grievance, in not having annual Parliaments, is become no grievance at all.

Mer.

I begin, Couſin, to loſe all manner of reſpect, for this miſtaken Mountebank. For I perceive, notwithſtanding his great words and pretences, all is but wind, emptin ſs and cheat. Having therefore fully ſatisfie me, concerning our liberties, properties, and Parliaments pray forget not to ſay ſomewhat of our Religion.

Trav.

Sir, I ſhall not preſume to meddle with the Doctrinal part of any Religion, that being none of my Province. Nor ſhall I ſay much concerning the Ceremonial part or diſcipline of our own, that is to ſay, the Church of England. It is ſufficient to mind you, that both the Doctrine and Diſcipline in Church Government, have been eſtabliſhed and confirm'd by ſeveral Acts of Parliament, and Statutes: Which Parliaments, being the moſt Soveraign power, that our Author himſelf pretends to, ſet up amongſt us, we ought all to acquieſce in, and be concluded by what they have done, until an equal authority ſhall repeal thoſe Acts, or otherwiſe determine concerning us.

Mer.

There is no objection can be made againſt this anſwer. But, Sir, ſince the difference in our Religion, ſeems manifeſtly to occaſion moſt of our troubles, why may not the King, by his own authority, diſpence with the penal part of theſe Laws, or grant a toleration, eſpecially to Proteſtant Diſſenters, or encourage an Act of Parliament for uniting them into the Church of England, or elſe why might not the ſame Church releaſe ſome part of the rigour of the Diſcipline and Ceremony, ſince 'tis agreed on all hands, that the obſervance or non-obſervance of them, are not points neceſſary, or abſolutely conducing to Salvation.

Trav.

Couſin, I ſhall anſwer you all theſe queſtions as plain as I can. And firſt, I ſhall never believe, that true and unfeigned Religion, eſpecially amongſt men, where the Doctrine agrees, is ever the real cauſe of any troubles, diſturbance or diſobedience to lawful authority, ſuch as is that, which produces an Act of Parliament, (even in our Authors ſence) being ſo contrary to the Doctrine and Principles of Chriſtian Religion, that I may confidently affirm, where one is, the other cannot be.

Such men therefore, who make uſe of that Sacred name, to countenance any diſquiet in the Government, ought, according to the moſt impartial judgment which we can make of mens opinions by their actions, to be eſteemed as men having no Religion, rather than as true Profeſſors of the Chriſtian Faith, and that they put the higheſt abuſe, and indignity, upon Chriſt and his Apoſtles, when they make the profeſſion of their moſt peaceable doctrine, a pretence, mask or cloak to cover their Secular intereſt or ambition.

Mer.

But, dear Couſin, we muſt judge charitably, and not conclude all Diſſenters ſuch knaves and villains, as either to have no Religion, or to make that which they have, a blind to ſome other worldly deſign.

Trav.

Truly, Sir, for the commoner ſort of people, I am inclin'd enough to think (it may be) better of them, than they deſerve, knowing well how apt they are to be carried away with every wind of doctrine. But thoſe who are their Ringleaders, are by ſo much the more inexcuſable, by how much they take advantage of the peoples weakneſs. Yet this would be only pernicious to themſelves, and puniſhable in the world to come. But their ungodly and malicious Preachers, and factious heads, mingling dexterouſly worldly poiſon, with their ſpiritual food, at length their whole bodies, and maſs of blood becomes corrupted, when grown rank, and ſwell'd (like the heathen Propheteſſes,) with the deadly poyſon, and power of the Devil, they ravingly diſpenſe their Enthuſiaſtical dreams and viſions, no leſs injurious to the Providence of God, than to the government of man. Since then, I ſay, theſe their wicked Counſellors do certainly produce theſe effects, it is equally charitable to think, that they have no Religion, as to ſay, that they abuſe that which they profeſs, to ſuch damnable ends.

Mer.

But they tell you no ſuch thing. On the contrary, no men talk more of God, none inveigh more bitterly againſt the debaucher es of the age we live in, none pretend greater humility, and in a word (to outward appearance at leaſt) none ſeem to practiſe more ſincerely the doctrine which they preach.

Trav.

Quid opus eſt verbis, cum facta videam? What Poiſoner, do you think, would not tell you, that the Ratsbane which he offers you is the pureſt ſugar? You and I, Couſin, cannot forget, how theſe very men, (ſome of which are living at this day) and their diſciples, behaved themſelves, when in the rebellious ſanctified times, they uſurp'd the whole power of the land.

Can you forget how they perſecuted the Church of England? how they Sequeſter'd our Eſtates? Impriſon'd, Proſcrib'd and murder'd our Perſons? forc'd many to ſeek out Dens and Caves in Woods and Rocks, to ſecure their lives, from the inſolence and fury of theſe humble-minded, goſpel-preaching, holy Wolves? Are they yet chang'd? are they not purſuing ſtill the ſame point? Are their Aſſociations and Conſpiracies againſt the foundation of our antient rights, priviledges, government, and life it ſelf of His preſent Sacred Majeſty, evidences of their repentance for the murder of the late Bleſſed Martyr, for thoſe flouds of innocent blood, which have corrupted our land ever ſince, and thoſe violent extortions and impoſitions executed upon the Eſtates of their fellow Subjects, and fellow-labourers too, in that Vineyard, which both pretend to cultivate, and with whom they profeſs to agree in the Subſtantial and Doctrinal part of Religion? Are theſe arguments to convince us of their ſincere intentions towards us?

Mer.

This is indeed notorious matter of fact, and undeniable; but however, they now expreſs a willingneſs to comply with us, and to be comprehended, all under one Church, and Church government. Only they deſire that our Ceremonies might be aboliſh'd, which being circumſtantial only, and not abſolutely neceſſary to Salvation, (which is the great end of Religion,) they pray that our Governours in conſideration of their weakneſs, would not tye them to harder meat than they can digeſt, but (being babes, and to be fed with milk,) would have us condeſcend to their infirmities, and not to boaſt too much of our own ſtrength, for thoſe who are ſtrong ought to take heed l ſt they fall.

Trav.

I perceive, Sir, you have been more converſant with this ſort of people, than I thought you had, for I find that you have gotten their very Cant; but you ſhall have, I hope, a very ſatisfactory anſwer. And firſt for our ſtrength, I confeſs it behoves us all to take heed leſt we fall: but if that great care be an argument againſt us, it is no leſs againſt themſelves. For if it be ſo difficult for the ſtrong to paſs through this narrow way, and over theſe dangerous preoipices; what circumſpection then ought the weak Travellers to uſe in this their Pilgrimage? Ought they not rather to ſeek to us for ſome ſupport, than truſt to their own imbecillity? And you cannot deny, but that they do truly acknowledge themſelves to be weak, or that they abuſe us, when they deſire we ſhould condeſcend to them, both which will equally reflect upon them. And next, Sir, for our compliance with them, rather than their conformity with us, I think it the moſt unreaſonable requeſt that ever men made. Will a wiſe Father comply with a froward Son, or a Maſter with his obſtinate Servant, or a Phyſician with the deprav'd and falſe appetite of his ſick patient? Sure it would be nothing leſs, than inverting the whole courſe and order of nature.

Mer.

Sir, I am convinc'd that they may and ought to comply with our Government, but ſince your hand is in, pray let me have your opinion concerning the Popiſh Recuſants, and whether you do not think that they are more to be apprehended in our Government, than the Diſſenters are, and by conſequence, that a Parliament, or Parliamentary way of Government might not be very conducible to our ſecurity againſt them, eſpecially as our circumſtances ſtand, and may probably continue.

Trav.

I underſtand you, Sir, and ſhall give you my ſence of the thing freely as hitherto I have done. And in the firſt place, I anſwer plainly, that I do not think the Papiſts (I mean now and always the Secular or Temporal Papiſts or Lai y) ſo dangerous to our Government, as the Diſſenters; but that according to the rule of true Polity, the former are more tolerable among us than the latter.

Mer.

Have a care, Couſin, that you do not contradict the good account which you gave of your own Religion yeſterday. For whoſoever ſtands up for a Popiſh toleration at this time, will be ſhrewdly ſuſpected to be at leaſt Popiſhly inclin'd, if not a Papiſt.

Trav.

Sir, I again confirm what I ſaid yeſterday, nor do I tell you now, that I would have the Papiſts tolerated, it belongs to the Government to look after theſe matters, but I muſt affirm, according to my judgment, that if the queſtion be put, which may be the moſt ſafely tolerated, the Papiſts or Diſſenters, I muſt give it for the Papiſts; and I think I ſhall produce good reaſon, and authority for this my opinion.

Mer.

Pray, Couſin, uſe all manner of liberty in your diſcourſe, for I only minded you of your Profeſſion yeſterday, not that I queſtion your ſincerity, but as being an impartial Judge, neither a Papiſt nor a Diſſenter, I might oblige you to ſettle this point equally between them.

Trav.

I do not pretend to be a Judge, but ſhall endeavour to open the caſe faithfully, and leave the reſt to your more prudent determination.

Firſt then, we muſt ſtate the difference between theſe two parties, as they relate to us—and not to deſcend to particular points, I ſhall only ſay, that the Papiſts differ from us in the doctrinal part of Religion, that is to ſay, in points which they believe abſolutely neceſſary to Salvation. The Diſſenters in the Diſcipline only, viz. Ceremonies and Church Government, which they declare may be—either uſed or neglected, without the neceſſary conſequence of damnation.

Mer.

Right, Sir, and from hence I ſhould conclude, that the Diſſenters agreeing more nearly with us than the Papiſts, ought rather to be tolerated than they, who differ ſo much, and ſo materially from us.

Trav.

And I for that very reaſon hold the contrary.

Mer.

Pray, Sir, proceed, and unriddle this Paradox.

Trav.

Next then, we muſt agree, that the doctrinal parts of the Popiſh Religion in which they differ from us, (as Tranſubſtantiation, and ſome others, ſuppoſing them right and nec ſſary as they believe they are) conſiſt of ſuch high ſpeculative points, as cannot poſſibly be made demonſtrable by humane reaſon, nor otherwiſe be ſeen than by the eyes of faith, but require a ſupernatural revelation, or the ſpecial Grace of an inviſible omnipotent power, working in our hearts. Hence Grotius tells us, that Doctrina h c penitus in animum admitti nequeat, niſi ſanctis Dei auxiliis accedentibus. lib. 2. 4. 20.

This then ſuppoſed, I muſt affirm, that outward force is not a proper means to convince a mans reaſon of ſpeculative truths For a man cannot always believe juſt when he ſays he will; but rather oftentimes, when he pretends he will not, he is then forc't to believe, (if proportionate arguments be uſed) even whether he will or no, and theſe proportionate arguments are ſuch as force the reaſon only, and whilſt they perſtringe the mind, do not conſtrain the body, ſuch as oblige by way of atiocination to conſent to certain propoſitions, and neceſſary conſequences, which they cannot avoid, arguments which reach the inward man, but leave the outward man untoucht. Now how improper a means orporal violence is, to obtain ſuch a ſpiritual end, I leave to your judgment.

If it be then neceſſary that a mans reaſon ſhould be convinc't of a ſpeculative truth, before he can beleive it, it will follow, that thoſe who uſe violence and force, to oblige a people to embrace an opinion, which they do not, or can not underſtand, commit either the greateſt injuſtice towards man, or the greateſt impiety toward God.

The injuſtice towards man lies in this, that they either force them to profeſs, what they do not believe, which is hypocriſie and a lie; or they puniſh them for not doing that, which is not in their power to do, which is the height of Tyranny. And Grotius tells us, in his Cap de poenis, that it was provided in the Council of Toledo, That then eforward no man ſhould be forc' to believe, for God will have mercy, on whom he will have mercy; and whom he pleaſeth to harden, he hardeneth. Praecipit ſancta Synodus nemini deinceps vim inferri, cui enim vult Deus miſeretur, & quem vult, indurat. And he adds, quod perinique faciunt, that they do moſt wickedly, who puniſh men amongſt Chriſtians, for not believing or erring in ſome ſpeculative points, which they do not underſtand. St. Auguſtine alſo, Athanaſius, Hilarius, and Salvi nus are all of the ſame opinion, as may be ſeen there more at large in the ſame Cap. de poenis, where Grotius farther informs us, that the French Biſhops were condemned by the Church, for uſing violence againſt the Priſcili niſt .

In the next place, if it be not injuſtice towards man, it is impiety towards God, and muſt ſuppoſe, that the gift of the holy Spirit ra e o Ill mination, which is neceſſary for the underſtanding theſe Divine myſteries is in the power of mortal man, which was the ſin of Simon Magus ſon to buy the holy Ghoſt for money, or to o tain it by force, is equally injuriou , and diſhonourable to a Deity. And we find, that although the Sadduces differed from the reſt of the Jewes, in ſo material a point, as that of the Reſurrection, which they totally denied, yet they received no manner of puniſhment upon that account, nor was there any force uſed to perſwade them to embrace and believe ſo neceſſary a doctrine, when yet, at the ſame time Sabbath-breakers, becauſe it related to the diſcipline and Government of the Church, were puniſhed with Death.

Merch.

I thank you, Sir, and do aſſure you, that I was ever of this opinion. But I do not yet underſtand, why you do not apply the ſame reaſons for Diſſenters and other people, as well as the Papiſts.

Trav.

I thought, Sir, the laſt inſtance would have anſwered that queſtion, which is, that the Diſſenters differ only in point of diſcipli •… and Government, which according to our conſtitution they agree—command nothing damnable, or impoſſible to be underſtood, or contrary to the hopes of Salvation. And in ſuch caſe, outward force is the proper means to reduce obſtinate men to their duty, and a compliance with that Government which they ought, and which they confeſs they may obey. So in ſome Roman Catholick Countries the Proteſtant Religion is tolerated, and its profeſſors ſecured by many Grants and Priviledges, becauſe their difference conſiſts in ſpeculative points, whereas thoſe Roman Catholicks themſelves who (agreeing in the Doctrinal part) ſhall differ in the Diſcipline or Church Government, are puniſhed with the extreameſt rigour. We muſt diſtinguiſh therefore between Diſcipline and Doctrine, as alſo between faith and obedience.

And in confirmation of this, we may remember another reaſon, why a toleration is more allowable to Popiſh Rec ſants, than to the Diſſenters, viz, becauſe it is notoriouſly known, that the Papiſts have ventured both their lives and fortunes to ſupport our preſent Government, as it is by Law eſtabliſhed, even againſt theſe very diſſenters, who rebell'd againſt it, and by force of arms, and open hoſtility, endeavour'd totally to ſubvert it. And having obtain'd a victory, did actually deſtroy both our lawful King and Governour, as well as government.

Mer.

This is too true, and it were impudence to deny any part of it. But it hath been ſaid, that the Papiſts in our late troubles ventur'd their lives, more out of hopes of their own eſtabliſhment, than of the Government.

Trav.

That, under favour, is a malicious and a frivolous objection. For what grounds of hopes had they to alter the Government, againſt the conſent of the whole Nation, when joyn'd with ſo conſiderable a part, as the Church of England, they were both overcome by the Diſſenters, it was morally impoſſible. Beſides, they had generally taken the Oath of Allegiance, which for ought I can hear, they have not broken, (generally I ſuppoſe, for if there be any of them who refuſe the Oath of Allegeance, I look upon them as out of the Kings Protection, and little better, or full as dangerous as open enemies.) Nor can I imagine, what other Government, they could, or were ever ſuppos'd to introduce, contrary to that, which was then eſtabliſh'd, and which they ſwore to maintain. I am apt enough to believe, that they might hope for ſome eaſe or exemption from the rigour of the pen l Laws, which neither you, nor I, can blame in them, if they had deſir'd.

Mer.

But though they have taken the Oath of Allegeance, yet you ſee, that they will not be prevail'd upon, to take the Oath of Supremacy. And you know, that according to our Law, the King is no leſs head of the Eccleſiaſtical, than of the Civil Government.

Trav.

True, Sir, But this is as much an argument againſt the Diſſenters, as the Papiſts. For it is not a greater crime in them, nor prejudice to the State, to tolerate men, who by the principles of their Religion, are taught to ſubmit their Conſciences to another Spiritual guide in Spiritual matters, as many Soveraign Princes themſelves do at this day; than thoſe, who owning the King to be Supreme head of the Church by their words, diſown him by their actions, that is, in not obeying his Laws, or Rebelling againſt him as ſuch.

Beſides it is well known, that the general opinion of the Popiſh Recuſants, (the Laity I mean) concerning the Pope's Supremacy hath no ill influence upon our Civil Government, which is that, which I chiefly intend in this diſcourſe, but that they think themſelves indiſpenſably oblig'd, to defend our Lawful Kings, and their Civil Authority, not only againſt all temporal powers whatſoever, but even againſt the Pope himſelf.

Mer.

This, Sir, I have heard much controverted, and the contrary opinion affirm'd by ſome of their own Writers, that is to ſay, That the Pope may, and doth Excommunicate heretick Kings, as he calls them. By which act, their Subjects are no more bound to pay them their obedience, nay, and can abſolve the people from their Oath of Allegeance, and impower them to depoſe their natural and lawful Prince, and ſet up ſome other in his ſtead. Now, Sir, this is ſuch a doctrine, as makes the Papiſts uncapable of ever being truſted under any Proteſtant Government.

Trav.

I confeſs, Sir, I have heard that ſome private men have maintain'd ſome ſuch erroneous and perniciou Principles, and flattering the Pope, have endeavoured to raiſe his power to a much ſublimer pitch, than ever Chriſt himſelf, or any of his Apoſtles pretended it ſhould arrive. But, Sir, as Temporal Princes have been ever uſurping upon one another, and by moſt unchriſtian ways, ſacrificed the innocent blood of many thouſands of men, for the promoting their own greatneſs, and ſatisfying their ambitious deſigns, ſo theſe Spiritual Emperours have follow'd too much the ill examples of Temporal Princes. And being, it may be, more ſolicitous to extend their power, than encreaſe the number of true believers, have perverted the good uſe of St. Peters Keys, and have rather opened by them the door of diſſention, and diſcord upon earth, than the gates of the Heavenly Paradiſe.

For ſome years, theſe holy Fathers exerciſed their arms againſt one another, and how much blood and horrid troubles the diſpute between the Biſhop of Rome, and Patriarch of Conſtantinople concerning Primacy, hath coſt Chriſtendom, is ſufficiently recorded in Hiſtory. I may add farther, that this their contention, became at laſt the ruine of the Greek Empire; but hitherto the Temporal Princes enjoy'd their rights and Prerogatives undiſturb'd, until Hildebrand, otherwiſe called Gregory the ſeventh, arrogated to himſelf a Soveraign authority over all Chriſtian Kings and Emperours, as may be ſeen at large in the Hiſtory of Henry the fourth Emperour of Germany, who was the firſt unfortunate example of the Papal uſurpation, which is confirm'd by a learned Roman Catholick Biſhop, and one who lived in the Reign of Fred. the firſt, his words are theſe: Lego & relego, ſaith he, Romanorum Regum & Imperatorum geſta, & nunquam invenio quenquam eorum ante hunc à Romano Pontifice excommunicatum vel regno privatum, niſi forte quis pro Anathemate habendum ducat, quod Philippus ad breve tempus à Romano Epiſcopo inter poenitentes collocatus, & Theodoſius à beato Ambroſio propter cruentam caedem à liminibus Eccleſiae ſequeſtratus ſit. Ottofriſing. c. 35.

After this, ſeveral encroachments were made upon other Princes, and the Popes (making uſe as well of St. Paul's Sword, as St. Peter's Keys) reduc'd moſt of them under their obedience, and as the ſame Author expreſſes it, deſtroy'd them by that very power, which they had firſt receiv'd from the benevolence of the Emperours themſelves; ſeeming to imitate therein the Prophet David, who firſt overcame the Philiſtine by the providence of God, and then cut off his head with his own Sword. Videntur culpandi Sacerdotes per omnia, qui regnum ſuo gladio, quem ipſi à regum habent gratia ferire conentur, niſi forte David imitari cogitent, qui Philiſtinum pri o virtute Dei ſtravit, poſtmodum pr prio gladio jugulavit.

Now, Sir, after the Popes were in poſſeſſion of theſe great Prerogatives, and had perſwaded the people to contribute as well to their own, as their Princes ſlavery, by granting them this univerſal right of power, it is no wonder if ſome of their own Clergy have endeavoured by falſe arguments, to maintain this uſurp'd authority. But, Couſin, it is well known, that this is now become no more, than an old antiquated title, and gives him no right over Soveraign Princes at this day.

It is true, thoſe Princes, who ſubmitted themſelves to the conſtitutions of the Council of Tre t, permit the Pope to exerciſe ſome Spiritual Juriſdiction in their Kingdoms. But it is univerſally, and publickly declared, that the Popes have no Civil or Temporal Authority over Soveraign Princes, nor can they by their Spiritual power, or, authoritate clavium Eccleſiae, depoſe any King or abſolve any Subject from their Faith, Obedience, or Oath of Allegean e.

Mer.

Can you give an inſtance of 〈…〉 made by any Popiſh Kings, and conſented to by the Roman Clergy.

Trav.

Yes, Sir, and that ſo fully, that there can remain no ſcruple or difficulty, and it is by the moſt Chriſtian King of France, and eldeſt ſon of the Roman Church, and a ſevere perſecutor of the Proteſtant Religion. I will give you the words of the Declaration it ſelf, as far as it concerns this particular, that you may the better judge your ſelf of the truth. It is Declared by the Gallick Church, Primum beato Petro ejuſque ſucceſſoribus, Chriſti Vicariis ipſique Eccleſiae rerum ſpiritualium, & ad aeternam ſalutem pertinentium, non autem civilium & temporalium à Deo, traditam poteſtatem, &c. Reges ergo & Principes in temporalibus nulli Eccleſiaſticae poteſtati Dei ordinatione ſubjici, neque authoritate clavium Eccleſiae, directe vel indirecte deponi, aut illorum ſubditos eximi, à ſide atque obedientia ac praeſtito fidelitatis Sacramento, ſolvi poſſe. Hancque ſententiam public tranquillitati neceſſariam nec minus Eccleſiae quam Imperio utilem, t verbo Dei patrum traditioni & Sanctorum exemplis conſonam—omnino retinendam.

Which is thus Engliſhed. It is Declared—Firſt, that the Power of Spiritual things and ſuch as concern eternal Salvation, but not of Civil or Temporal affairs, was delivered by God to the bleſſed Peter and his Succeſſors Chriſt's Vicars, and to the Church it ſelf, &c. Kings therefore and Princes in Temporal affairs are not Subjected by the appointment of God to any Eccleſiaſtical power; nor can they be directly or indirectly depos'd by the authority of the Keys of the Church; nor can their Subjects be freed or abſolv'd from their Faith and Obedience, and their Oath of Fidelity. And let this Sentence neceſſary to the publick tranquillity, nor leſs profitable for the Church than State, be irrevocable as agreeing with the Word of God, the Tradition of Fathers, and the Examples of the Saints or holy men.

This, Sir, is the firſt article in the Declaration of the French Clergy, which is aſſerted, regiſtred, and confirmed by the whole Ʋniverſity of Paris, the Sor one, and Faculties des Droits Civil and Canon, as may be ſeen fully in the Edit du Roy, ſur la Declaration faitte par le Clergie de France de ces ſentimens touchant la puiſſance Eccleſiaſtique, and publiſhed this preſent year 1683.

Now Sir, in my opinion, this ſo ſolemn and national declaration, together with the concurrence and conſtant profeſſion of all the Engliſh Roman Catholicks, that I have met with, doth ſure by much overbalance the writings of any private men or Jeſuits whatſoever. And ſuch Principles (although they be moſt erroneous, and moſt damnable) yet when we come to examine the caſe impartially between the very Jeſuits, and our Diſſenters, even as it relates to theſe moſt horrid poſitions, we ſhall find theſe Diſſenters have ſo far outgone the Jeſuits themſelves in the Doctrine of Depoſing Heretick Princes (that is to ſay Princes who differ from the Church of Rome in Fundamentals, or Speculative Doctrines, which they believe abſolutely neceſſary to Salvation) that they have dared to maintain publickly the Doctrine of Depoſing even Proteſtant Princes, and their own natural and moſt lawful Soveraigns, and abſolving their Subjects from their Oaths of Allegeance, and this, not for any difference in the Doctrinal part, which is abſolutely neceſſary to Salvation, but for Diſcipline only and Church Government, which right of Government is ſo inherent to the Imperial Crown of England, that it makes up, and is one of the conſtituent parts of it. And that theſe are the very principles of our Diſſenters, I refer you, for ample ſatisfaction, to their own very words where and when delivered, as they have been Collected and Publiſhed by the care and diligence of the moſt worthy Mr. L'Eſtrange, in his Diſſenters Sayings. Now when our Diſſenters ſhall think fit to make ſo Solemn and Publick a Declaration as the Papiſts have done at Paris, againſt the Doctrine of Depoſing Kings, and abſolving Subjects (as is before recited) I ſhall be as ready to do the Diſſenters juſtice in that particular, as I have now done to the Papiſts.

Merch.

Sir, I perceive you are a very good advocate for the Papiſts, and indeed I muſt needs confeſs, that I am abundantly ſatisfied, with thoſe arguments, which you have produced in their favour, and do heartily wiſh, they could as well comply with the Spiritual, as I am perſwaded they will live peaceably and quietly under the Civil Government.

And as to the preſent queſtion of Toleration between the Papiſts and the Diſſenters, I perceive that the force of your argument conſiſts in this, that the Diſſenters, (beſides their more than Jeſuitical principles, moſt pernicious to Civil Government, as hath been now declared) that they (I ſay) agreeing with the Church of England in the Doctrine, differ chiefly concerning Government, to which in conſcience they ought, and confeſs, they may ſubmit: but the Papiſts diſagreeing in the Doctrine and ſpeculative points, which they believe abſolutely neceſſary to Salvation, cannot poſſibly comply with us, without the apparent danger of eternal damnation. So having a more juſtifiable pretence, to differ from us in the Spiritual Government only, than the Diſſenters in either the Eccleſiaſtical or Temporal, they ought the rather of the two to be tolerated. Truly the reaſon of this is very obvious in the Oeconomy of our families. For if a Maſter ſhould command two of his Sons or Servants, to go, for example, half a ſcore miles upon earneſt buſineſs; and the one ſhould excuſe himſelf for this reaſon, that he is certainly aſſured, or believes poſitively and unfeignedly, that a company of Robbers, or a Lion is in the way, (which anſwers to Damnation, in the caſe of the Papiſts) and that he ſhall be murdered or devoured; that the other Son, or Servant, having no ſuch fears upon him, doth nevertheleſs upon ſome much more ſlight, and frivolous pretence obſtinately refuſe to obey the Maſter, deſiring alſo that hence forward, the Maſter would go upon his own errands himſelf, (which agrees with the condeſcenſion that the Diſſenters require from the Government) I think indeed in this caſe, though both be guilty of diſobedience, yet the former is much more excuſable, and tolerable than the latter, and that the obſtinate Servant, is much more unreaſonable, and dangerous in the family, than the other. I can ſay nothing againſt this, but only wiſh, that the one had leſs fear, and the other more duty and reſpect.

Having then, Sir, given me full ſatisfaction, concerning theſe three main points, viz? our Liberties, Properties, and Religion, under our preſent Government; in which having found no faults negatively, we ought not to deſire any change or innovation. Yet nevertheleſs be pleaſed to let me know affirmatively why a Commonwealth might not be rationally promoted and ſet up in this preſent troubleſome conjuncture of our affairs.

Trav.

Let us then agree, that our Author deſigns a Commonwealth, as I have already prov'd from his own mouth. Beſides, the conſtitution of his mix'd Government will inevitably bring it upon us, or return us again to a Monarchy, where we are. For though he doth not tell us plainly, that he deſigns totally to remove the King and Royal family, yet ſo many inconveniences will happen, that as (it may be) in the beginning of the late Traiterous Aſſociation, all the Traitors might not at firſt reſolve upon the barbarous murder of his Majeſty and Royal Highneſs; yet when they were once engag'd in the one, they found the other ſo neceſſary to be effected, that it was morally impoſſible to ſucceed in the former, until the latter was actually executed.

It being then moſt certain, that our Authors intention was to eſtabliſh a Common wealth, I ſhall now give you my reaſons, why we ought not upon any terms to admit of it.

And firſt, I ſhall not inſiſt much upon thoſe vulgar inconveniences, which are viſible to all men. As for example, the inevitable conſequences of moſt bloudy wars. For can any rational man believe, that all the Royal family, ſhould be ſo inſenſible of their right and honour as never to puſh for three Kingdoms, which would ſo juſtly belong to them, or could they be ſuppoſed to leave England, under their popular uſurpation; what reaſon hath Scotland to truckle under the Domination of the Engliſh Commonalty? What pretence hath the Engliſh Subject, (ſuppoſing they were to ſhare in the Engliſh Government,) over the Kingdom of Scotland? All the world knows that that Kingdom, belongs ſo particularly to our King, that the late Rebells themſelves, did not ſcruple to call him King of the Scots. Why ſhould Ireland alſo become a Province to an Engliſh Parliament? Or ſhould both Kingdoms be willing to ſhake off the Government of their Natural, Lawful and antient Monarchy, why ſhould they not ſet up a Democracy, or an Ariſtocracy, or what elſe they pleas'd amongſt themſelves? Is there never a Stateſman in the three Kingdoms but Plato Redivivus? Can none teach them to Rebel but he? No rules to maintain an uſurpt Authority, but what we find among his extravagancies? I am confident you do not believe it. Shall theſe people, notoriouſly known to have hated one another, whilſt formerly they were under different Governours, become the ſtricteſt friends, when they ſhall return unto thoſe circumſtances, under which they were the greateſt enemies? Will the French King take no advantage, (having ſo good a pretext) of our Diviſions? Or ſhould we unite againſt him, under our popular Governours, was it ever known that a Confederate army was able to defend themſelves long, againſt an Army of equal ſtrength, commanded by one ſole abſolute Monarch? Can we foreſee any thing, but moſt deſperate wars; and can wars be ſupported, but by moſt heavy taxes? Were not our Thimbles and Bodkins converted in the late times into Swords and Mortar pieces, and by a prodigious tranſmutation, never before heard of, were not our Gold and Ear-rings turn'd into a brazen Idol? Theſe conſequences, Couſin, and diſmal effects of a Commonwealth, beſides many other, are ſo obvious, that I ſhall not ſpend any more time to mind you of them. Suppoſing then that none of thoſe former horrid inconveniences might happen, I muſt mind you by the way, that one reaſon why our Author and the Aſſociators deſire a Commonwealth, proceeds from the fear of a certain Arbitrary power, which they pretend the King would introduce, as may be ſeen, pag. 161. 208 and in ſeveral other places.

Now, Though nothing be more extravagant, than ſuch a groundleſs imagination, our Author having aſſured us, that his Majeſty never did one act of Arbitrary power, ſince his happy reſtoration. And moreover, pag. 176. That our laws againſt Arbitrary power, are abundantly ſufficient. Yet, that we may no more diſpute this point, I muſt produce Plato's own authority againſt himſelf in theſe words: That the King fears his power will be ſo leſſened by degrees, that at length it will not be able to keep the Crown upon his head, pag. 208. Nay, farther in pag. 214. he ſhews us, That it is impoſſible he ſhould ever become an Arbitrary King. For his preſent power, as little as it is, is yet greater, than the condition of property can admit and in a word, from his beloved Aphoriſm, and the whole courſe of his Libel, he endeavours to prove, that Dominion being founded on the property, and the property being in the people, the King can have no manner of hopes upon earth, of becoming abſolute, nor introducing an Arbitrary Government, but by ſome Army of Angels from Heaven, who muſt procure him an Authority, which he cares not for.

The next, and main reaſon, why our Author would ſet up a Democracy, at leaſt as far as I can collect, from the whole ſcope of his diſcourſe, is, becauſe the State inclines to popularity.

Now, Sir, for this laſt time, I muſt make uſe of our Author's own reaſons againſt his own poſitions, and do affirm, that for this very reaſon, (were there no other) all ſober men, and true Politicians, ought to oppoſe with their utmoſt endeavours, a Popular Government.

I will not recount to you the many miſchiefs, deſolations and deſtructions, which a popular power hath brought along with it, whereever it go he better of the antient Eſtabliſhed Government of the place. Somewhat hath been already ſaid to this purpoſe in our diſcourſe, and much more may be read, in the Hiſtories of moſt parts of the world, to which I refer you, and ſhall only mind you of ſome inevitable conſequences, which will follow ſuch an innovation amongſt our ſelves. And firſt, if it be true, that the King hath no power to make himſelf abſolute, then we have no cauſe to apprehend an Arbitrary power in him, and by conſequence, no reaſon to change.

But if the inclination of the people be ſuch, that they will take advantage of the King's want of power, and introduce their own Government, what moderation may we expect from men, towards thoſe, who are to become their Subjects, who ſhaking off all ſenſe of Juſtice, Law, Religion, and temper, dare uſurp the Soveraign authority over their natural Governour? Where ſhall we appeal for mercy, when having cut the throat of the moſt merciful King in Europe, we expoſe our own to our ambitious and unmerciful Tyrants? Where ſhall we expect compaſſion towards our ſelves, when we ſhall become Parricides and Regicides to our father and our King? Where ſhall we ſeek after Eq ity, when the Houſe of Lords the ſupreme Court of Equity, are moſt unjuſtly turn'd out of doors? and what end of our miſeries can we ever hope for, when our Tyrants by our villanous Authors conſtitution, have not only got all the Wealth and Militia into their hands, but have perpetuated their uſurpation, by annual Parliaments, never to end? Who being Judges of their own priviledges, p. 254. may regulate elections, as they ſhall think fit, p. 249. Sit, Adjourn, Prorogue, and Diſſolve, as they alone ſhall judge expedient.

What more barbarous villany was ever propos'd, and publiſh'd, under a lawful and peaceable Government, beſides our own, upon earth? But ſuppoſe our poor Country thus enſlav'd, and our antient Kingdom turn'd into a Commonwealth, what can our new maſters do for us more than is already done? Can our lib rties be greater, as to our perſons and eſtates? It is impoſſible to ſuppoſe it Will our properties be more ſecur'd? all the Laws that ever were upon earth, under any Government, cannot make them more inviolable.

Nothing then can remain, but liberty in Religion, which we call, of Conſcience. Shall all Religions, as Papiſts, Orthodox Proteſtants, Presbyterians, Independents, and other Fana icks and Secta i •• , be promiſcuouſly tolerated? If not ll, then injuſtice muſt be done to thoſe who are reſtrained. Who being all equally freeborn Subjects, our grievances will not thereby be heal'd. If all, can any man of ſenſe and ſobriety imagine, that men of ſuch different principles, aggravated too by ſtrong animoſities, and prejudice, will rejoice, or be ſatisfied, to ſee the tranquillity or propagation of thoſe principles which they hate and believe moſt damnable? Or ſhould they eſtabliſh one Church, which ſhould be the mother Church, under whoſe diſcipline and government, the other different Congregations were to be regulated? would it be the Orthodox Church of England? Ah, Couſin, let us conſider, what our Author declares, p. 188. I will add, ſays he, the little credit the Church of England hath among the people, moſt men being almoſt as angry, with that Popery, which is left amongſt us, in Surplices, Copes, Altars, Cringes, Biſhops, Eccleſiaſtical Courts, and the whole Hierarchy, beſides an infinite number of idle, uſeleſs—Superſtitious Ceremonies, and the ignorance and viciouſneſs of the Clergy in general, as they are with thoſe dogm 's that are aboliſh'd. So that there is no hopes that Popery can be kept out, but by a company of poor people call'd Fanaticks, who are driven into corners as the firſt Chriſtians were, and who only in truth, conſerve the Purity of Christian Religion, as it was planted by Christ and his Apostles, and is contain'd in Scripture.

Now, Sir, can we hope that an impudent Fanatick, who dares publiſh all this, even whilſt our Government is yet intire, will fa l to introduce his Geneva diſcipline, and bring his poor F naticks out of their corners, when he or his diſciples, ſhall be once themſelves at the helm in our Palaces?

Will he ſuffer, think you the orthodox Religion of the Church of England, by Law eſtabliſhed, or its profeſſors, to enjoy thoſe juſt rights and priviledges, which they have done ever ſince the firſt plantation of Chriſtianity among us? Or ſhall we not be all crowded into thoſe corners, from whence he ſhall have fetcht his poor Apoſtolick Fanaticks? Will the Papiſts have better meaſure than the Proteſta ts, and will this be a ſetling the Nation and redreſſing its Grievances? Muſt our gracious King, and his lawful Succeſſors, who alone do and can, and are willing ſtill to protect us, be deſerted, and ſhall we run headlong into the open jawes of thoſe weeping, wa ling, canting, praying, ſtill diſſembling, but ever devouring Crocodiles? Dear Couſin, oblige me not to ſpeak more upon ſuch a diſmal ſubject, the conſideration of which, muſt either break our hearts or raiſe our indignation beyond that temper, which I would willingly retain

Merch

Sir, aſſure your ſelf, that I heartily comply with you in all that you have ſaid, and ſym athiſe with you no l ſs in your uſt reſentment than fears of their diabolical machination But we have a God moſt manifeſtly gracious to us, in his wonderful preſervation of his Majeſties perſon, and diſcoveries of their deep and damnable Conſpiracies againſt him We have a King, merciful, loving, and tender of u , oven beyond the ordinary extent of humane nature; a Council wiſe, Loyal and •• cumſpect, and a people univerſally •… teſting this Traiterous Aſſociation, and all the conſequences of it. And for my own particular, let that moment b the laſt of my life, when I comply with our falſe Authors deteſtable propoſitions.

Trav.

Sir, I am moſt truly glad to find you ſo well ſatisfied, and will hope, that the plainneſs and ſincerity, which I have uſed, in obeying your commands, will qualifie the ted ouſneſs, and my want of judgment. If there yet remains any thing, which you would have me explain to you, pray proceed, for we have yet a little time left before Dinner.

Merch. Sir, I find one l •• f o two urned down, let us ſee what they contain, and then I have done In p. 112. ſpeaking of a certain Act of Parliament, which it ſeems he cannot produce, concerning anſwering all petitions, before the Parliament could be diſmiſſed, he tells us, That if there were nothing at all of this, nor any record extant concerning it, yet he muſt believe that it is ſo, by the fundamental Law of the Government, which muſt be lame and imperfect without it. For it is all one to have no Parliaments at all, but when the King pleaſes, and to allow a power in him, to diſmiſs them when he will, that is, when they refuſe to do what he will. Here you ſee, Sir, he couples granting petitions, and a power in the King to diſſolve Parliaments together. The one he affirms, the other he denies. What have you to ſay to this?

Trav.

Nothing Sir, only deſire you to remark, as I ſuppoſe you have done all along, the prodigious impudence, and vanity of our Author, who dares advance his own private opinion in matter of Law, againſt ſeveral Statutes determining abſolutly the contrary, the univerſal conſent of all Lawyers, and continu l practice of near ſix hundred years ſtanding.

Merch.

What ſay you next to the Title of the Duke of Mo •• outh

Trav.

Little; our Author himſelf looks upon it as ridiculous, and impoſſible to be ſupported Nor do I think, that we are much beholden to his honeſty or conſcience alone for this frank declaration, though indeed it is plain and agreeable to reaſon But he hates the thoughts of a ſingle perſon and it is no injuſtice to him, to believe from all that he hath ſaid, that if Jeſus Chriſt ſhould come upon earth again, and pretend to govern according to the preſent conſtitution of ur Government under a Monarchi •• l form he would find Plat Redivivus a Rebellious Spirit and ever the Son of Ambitious Lucifer. For the fa lts of that unfortun ••• Duke, I ſhall only ſay that if he a have merit enough to be lamented, he hath ſence enough to thi k himſelf the moſt unhappy of all manki d, and muſt believe the preſ rv tion of his life the evereſt puniſhment.

Merch.

Will you ſay nothing of the Duke of York? Our Author you ſee, ſpeaks a great deal concerning him. Somethings look fair, but it is eaſie to perceive his mali •• through the diſgu ••• .

Trav.

No, Sir, his Royal per ••• , and high merit, are as much above my needleſs defence, as our Authors little fri olous acc ſation: we have only therefore to pray, that God would pleaſe to continue him long a bleſſing to theſe Nations, and that we may be no leſs protected by his Council, than defended by his more than Heroick o r ge.

Merch.

Pray give us then your opinion concerning our ure in general.

Trav. Where there is no diſeaſe, there can be no ure, beſides, I ever held it to be the greateſt inſolence and v •• ity imaginable to preſume to give counſel, to the great Counnil of the Nation, undeſtred and unauthoriſed And for my own part, I have no •… ner of pretence to o g e •• an 〈…〉 Have you any thing more Co ſin, i particular?

Merch.

Sir, I have made ſome other few remarks, as the impertinent compariſon, which Plato hath made of a Bayliff, Attorney, or Referr e, as they relate to the chooſing the Speaker of the Houſe of Commons, all which is directly againſt himſelf, his magiſterial definition of Prerogative, and many other arrogances and follies, all which, I hope I ſhall be able to anſwer my ſelf without giving you any farther trouble.

Trav.

Sir, I do not in the leaſt qu ſt on it, however if any thing hath been omitted, in which I may be able to give you farther ſatisfaction, I ſhall v r be ready to obey your Commands.

Coelum ipſum p timus ſtultiti , neque Per noſt um p •• im •• ſcel •• Iracunda, Jovem ponere, fulmina. Hora . arm. l. 1.
THE CONTENTS.
DISCOURSE I.

OF the Gra i n Commonwealt •• , comp red w •• h England Page 4, 5. Of Plato, Lycurgus, Sparta, and Athens, p. 26. 27. & ſequent. The original of the Graecian Governments, p. 34. & ſeq. Of Solon, p. 37. Of Athens, p. 41. Of Sparta, p. 47. The Ephori, p. 48.

DISCOURSE II.

Diviſion of Government, p. 59. Of the Houſe of Commons, p. 65. their Inſtitution, p. 68. Of the Houſe of Lords, p. 66. 67. Of the Kings prerogative in Adjourning, Proroguing, and Diſſolving Parliaments, p. 7 . The beginning of Government before the Flood, p. 76. After the Flood, 7 . Of Ogyges, Sithuthrus, Deucalian Noe, p. 79. Of Nat •• e, p. 8 . Firſt Kingdoms af •… the Flood, inſtituted by fathers of Fam lies, p. 87. 802. No right of Power nor Liberty originally in the People p. 89 Commonwealths founded upon Ʋſurpa •• on, &c. p. 90. Of the Cre tion of the World, and Mankind, according to •• cretius, and ſome other. Heathen Philo o •• ers, p. 91. & ſeq. Of Moſes •• d ••• Hiſtory, p. 97. & ſeq. Abraham h d Regal Authority, p. 107 Saul •• t choſen by the people nor depended po them, p. 109. Empire not founded o Property, p. 113. upon •• at it is found •• , p. 125. 127. Not reaſon ble th •• the People who have the greateſt intereſt in the Property, ſhould have any right of power in the Governmeent, except what is ſubordinate, p. 14 . Of Power, 48. God governs human affairs, p. 154. Of force, p. 156. That the people by •• ving an intereſt in the Property, have ot •• ere •• greater power, force, or ſtre gt than if they h d it o , p. 1 2. Of •… es, p. 169. All Soveraign Pri ••• s •• v igh of o er ve t e 〈…〉 the proper y be divi •… the people, p 71. Mo •• rchs who h ve •• jo e the S p e e A thority h ve yet left the property to the people Of the Scythians, p. 178. Of the Aſſyrian , Medes and Perſians, p. 180. Of the Aegyptian Kings, p. 182. Of the Romans, p. 185. Of the Brittiſh Kings, p. 192. Of the Kings of Iſrael r of the Jews p. 193. Definition of an bſolute Monarch, p. 196, 197. David •• bſolute Monarch, p. 199. Of Zed kia , and Jeremiah, p. 204. Of the a hedrim, p. 209. Of the Goths, . 212. Of the Lombards, p. 216. Of the Vandalls, p. 221. Of Cl •• m •• s King of Sparta, p. 225. The death of the laſt Chriſtian Greek Emperour, and loſs of Conſtantinople, p. 226.

DISCOURSE III.

Moſes, Theſeus, and Romulus, ot Founders of Demo r ci s a Plato Red averrs, p. 242. Of the Gracchi and Agrarian L w p. 25 . 53. Of Agis, n Cl •• m ne , p. 260. Puniſhme t of Sedition an Cal mni •• ors of the Government in Venice, 26 Of the French Gentry, Fr emen, and R ••• ••• rs their •… res, p. 27 Vindi •• tion of 〈…〉 Clergy and Eccleſtaſtical Government againſt the malicious reflections of Plato Red. p. 274. 277. Soveraign right of power ſolely in the King, p. 279. 284. Of the Kings negative voice in Parliament, p. 281. The Kings of England depend not upon the people, nor received their right of power from them, p. 285. & ſeq. 288. The Goths not in England, p. 291. Of the Saxons and their Tenures, p. 293. 297. Of our late Parliament, p. 295. Of K. Edward the Confeſſor, p. 298. Plato Red. deſigns to ſet up a Commonwealth, p. 304. Of the King prerogative, p. 306. Of our Liberties, p. 315. Of Calumniators, p. 317. Of our Properties, p. 322. Of Annual Parl. p. 325. Of Religion p. 333. Of Diſſenters, p. 335. Of Popiſh Recuſants, 340. Of Toleration, 342. Of the Popes Supremacy, 350. 355. Diſſenters Doctrine of Depoſing Princes, 357. A Commonwealth not to be promoted in this preſent conjuncture of affairs, 361. 367. Of Arbitrary power in the King, 365. Of Liberty of Conſcience, 369.

ERRATA.

IN the Preface, Line 1. for Inquity, read Iniquity p. 66. l. 17. put out But. p. 80. for p rſonatus, r. perſ ••• tatu l. 12. for Abydnu , r. Abydenu . p. 86 l. 11. for Government, r. faith. p. 143. l ult. for Vital heat, r. Animal pirits p 144. l. 1. for Veins, r. Nerves. p. 185, 255, 256, 294 for Praeda, r. praedia. p. 186. for lientiam, r. licentiam.