CHAP. I. The opinions proposed concerning the original of Souls.

IT hath always been found a matter of discouraging diffi­culty, among those that have busied themselves in such In­juiries, To determine the Soul's original. [...]nsomuch that after all the contests and disputes that have been about it, many of the wisest Inquisitors have concluded it undeterminable; or, if they have sate down in either of the 2 opinions, viz. of it's immediate Creation, or Traduc­tion [Page 2] (which of later ages have been the only competitors); they have been driven to it, rather from the absurdities of the opposite opinion, which they have left; then drawn by any rational alliciency in that which they have taken to. And in­deed, if we do but impartially consider the grand inconveniences which each par­ty urgeth against the others Conclusion, it would even tempt one to think, that both are right in their opposition and neither in their assertion. And since each side so strongly oppugns the other and so weakly defends it self, 'tis a shrewd suspicion that they are both mi­staken. Wherefore if there be a third that can lay any probable claim to the truth, it deserves to be heard to plead its cause; and, if it be not chargeable with the contradictions or absurdities ei­ther of the one or other, to be admit­ted.

Now though these later ages have concluded the matter to lye between im­mediate Creation, and seminal Traduc­tion; yet I find that the more antient [Page 3] [...]imes have pitcht upon Praeexistence, as more likely than either; For the plato [...]nists, Pythagoreans, the Chald [...]an Wise men, the Jewish Rabbins, and some of the most learned and antient Fathers were of this opinion. Wherefore I think we owe so much at least to the Mentory of those grave Sages, [...] to examine this Doctrine of theirs, and if neither of the later Hypotheses can ease our anxious minds, or free themselves from absur­dities; and this Grey Dogma fairly clear all doubts, and be obnoxious to no such contradictions; I see no reason but we may give it a favourable admittance: Till something else appear more concin­nous and rational. Therefore let us take some account of what the 2 first opini­ons alledge one against another, and how they are proved by their promoters and defendants: now, if they be found una­ble to withstand the shock of one ano­thers opposition; we may reasonably cast our eies upon the third, to see what force it brings to vouch its interest, and how it will behave it self in the encoun­ter.

CHAP. II. Daily creation of Souls is inconsist­ent with the Divine Attributes.

THe first of these opinions that offers it self to Tryal is, that God daily cre­ates humane souls, which immediately are united unto the bodies that Gene­ration hath prepared for them. Of this side are our later Divines, and the ge­nerality of the Schoolm [...]n. But not to be born down by Authoritys, Let us consider what reason stands against it. Therefore,

(1) If our Souls came immediately out of the hands of God when we came first into these bodies, Whence then are those enormously brutish inclinations, that strong natural proclivity to vice and impiety, that are exstant in the chil­dren of men? All the works of God bear his image, and are perfect in their kind. Purity is his nature, and what [Page 5] comes from him, proportionably to its ca­pacity partakes of his perfections. Every thing in the natural world bears the su­perscription of his wisdome and goodness; and the same fountain cannot send forth sweet waters and bitter. Therefore 'tis a part of our alleagiance to our Maker to believe, that he made us pure and innocent and if we were but just then framed by him when we were united with these terrestrial bodi [...]s, whence should we con­tract such degenerate propensions? Some tell us, that this impu [...]ity was immedi­ately deriv'd from the bodies we are uni­red to; But, how is it possible, that purely passive insensible Matter should transfuse habits or inclinations into a Nature that is quite of an other Make and Quality? How can such a cause produce an effect so disproportionate? Matter can do no­thing but by motion, and what relation hath that to a moral contagion! How can a Body that is neither capable of sense nor sin, infect a soul, as soon as 'tis uni­ed to it, with such vitious debauched dispositions?

[Page 6] But others think to evade by saying, That we have not these depravities in our natures, but contract them by custome, education, and evill usages. How then comes it about, that those that have had the same care and industry used upon them; and have been nurtured nuder the same d scipline and severe oversight, do so vastly and even to wonder differ in their inclinations? How is it that those that are under continual temptations to vice, are yet kept within the bounds of vertue, and sobriety? And yet that o­thers, that have strong motives and al­lurements to the contrary, should vio­lently break out into all kinds of extrava­gance and impiety? Sure, there is some what more in the matter than those gene­ral causes, which may be common to both; and which many times have quite contrary effects.

(2) This Hypothesis, that God conti­nually creates humane souls in these bo­dies, consists not with the honour of the Divine Attributes. For,

(1) How stands it with the goodness [Page 7] and benignity of that God, who is Love, to put pure and immaculate spirits, who were capable of living to him and with him, into such bodies as will presently desile them, deface his image, pervert all their powers and faculties, incline them to hate what he most loves, and love what his soul hateth; and that, with­out any knowledge or concurrence of theirs, will quite marre them as soon as he hath made them, and of dear Chil­dren, render them rebells or enemies, and in a moment from being like Angels transform them into the perfect resem­blance of the first Apostates, Devils?

Is this an effect of those tender mer­cies that are over all his works? And (2) Hath that Wisdome that hath made all things to operate according to their natures, and provided them with what ever is necessary to that end, made my­riads of noble Spirits capable of as no­ble operations, and presently plunged them into such a condition wherein they cannot act at all according to their first and proper dispositions, but shall be nece­ssitated [Page 8] to the quite contrary; and have o­ther noxious and depraved inclinations fatally impos'd upon their pure natures Doth that wisdome, that hath made all things in number, weight, and measure, and disposed them in such exact harmo­ny and proportions, use to act so ineptly? And that in the best and noblest pieces of his Creation? Doth it use to make and presently destroy? To frame one thing and give it such or such a nature, and then undo what he had done, and make it an other? And if there be no such irregular methods used in the fra­ming of inferiour Creatures, what rea­son have we to suspect that the Divine Wisdome did so vary from its self in its noblest composures?

And (3), Is it not a great affront to the Divine Justice, to suppose, as we are commonly taught, that assoon as we are born, yea, and in the Womb, we are ob­noxious to eternal wrath and torments, if our Souls are then immediately created out of nothing? For, To be just is to give every one his due; and how can endless [Page 9] unsupportable punishments be due to in­nocent Spirits, who but the last moment came righteous, pure, and immaculate out of their Creators hands; and have not done or thought any thing since, con­trary to his will or Laws, nor were in a­ny the least capacity of sinning.

I, but the first of our order, our Gene­ral head and Representative, sinned, and we in him; thus we contract guilt as soon as we have a beeing, and are lyable to the punishment of his disobedience. This is thought to solve all, and to clear God from any shadow of unrighte [...]sness. But what ever truth there is in the thing it self, I think it cannot stand upon the Hypothesis of the souls immediate Creation nor yet justifie God in his proceedings. For, (1) If I was then newly created when first in this body; what was A­dam to mee, who sinned above 5000 years before I came out of nothing? If he represented me, it must be as I was in his Loins, that is, in him as an effect in a cause. But so I was not, according to this Doctrine; for my soul ownes no [Page 10] Father but God, its immediate progeni­tour. And what am I concern'd then in his sins, which had never my will or consent, more then in the sins of [...], or Julius Caesar? Nay, than in the sins of Belzebub or Lucifer? And for my body, 'tis most likely, that never an Atom of his, ever came at mee; or, if any did, he was no cause on't. Besides, that of it self is neither capable of sense, sin, guilt, nor punishment: or, (2) Admitting that we become thus obnoxious assoon as in the body, upon the account of his default, How doth it com­port with the divine Justice, in one mo­ment to make such excellent creatures, and in the next to render them so misera­ble, by thrusting them into a condition, so fatally obnoxious; especially since they were capable of living and acting in bo­dies more perfect, and more accommo­date to their new undesiled natures. Cer­tainly, could they have been put to their choice whether they would have come into being upon such termes, they would rather have been nothing for ever. And [Page 11] God doth not use to make his creatures so, as that, without their own fault, they shall have cause to unwish themselves.

Hitherto in this second general Arg. I have dealt against those that believe and assert the original depravity of our na­tures: which those that deny, may think themselves not pinch't by or concern [...]d in; Since they think they do no such dishonour to the divine Attributes, while they assert, that we were not made in so deplorable and depraved a conditi­on, but have so made our selves by our voluntary aberrations. But neither is this a fit Plaister for the sore, supposing our souls to be immediately created and so sent into these bodies. For still it seems to be a diminutive and disparaging apprehen­ [...]on of the infinite and immense Goodness of God, that he should detrude such ex­cellent creatures as our souls into a state so hazardous, wherein he seeth it to be ten thousand to one, but that they will corrupt, and defile themselves, and so make themselves miserable here, and to eternity hereafter. And certainly, be we [Page 12] as indifferent naturally to good and evill as can be supposed; yet great are the dis­advantages to virtue that all men unavoi­dably meet with, in this state of im­perfection.

For considering, that our infant and growing age is an age of sense, in which our appetites, and passions are very strong, and our reasons weak, and scarce any thing but a chain of imaginations, 'tis I say great odds, but that we should be caryed to inordinacy, and exceed the bounds the divine laws have set us. So that our lower powers of sense and passi­ons using to have the head, will grow strong and impetuous; and thus 'tis an hundred to one but we shall be rooted in vice, before we come to the maturity of our reasons, or are capable of the exer­cise of virtue. And wofull experience teacheth us, that most men run so far before they consider whither they are a­going, that the care and diligence of all their lives after, will scarce reclaim them. Besides, the far greatest part of the world are led into wickednesse and all kinds of [Page 13] debauchery, by corrupt and vitious edu­cation. And 'tis not difficult to observe what an inormous strength, bad education hath to deprave and pervert well dispos'd inclinations. Which things consider'd, this way also methinks reflects a Dispa­ragement on the Divine Attributes: Since by creating souls daily and putting them into such bodies, and such parts of the world as his infinite Wisdome sees will debauch them, and pervert them from the ways of righteousnesse and happinesse, into those of vice and misery; he deals with them lesse mercifully then a parent among us would with his Off-spring. And to suppose God to have lesse goodnesse then his degenerate creatures, is to have very narrow apprehensions of his perfec­tions, and to [...] him of the honour due to his Attributes.

(3) It hath been urged with good probability by great and wise Sages, that 'tis an unbecomming apprehension of the Majesty on high, to suppose him assi­stant to unlawful and unclean coitions, by creating a soul to animate the impure [Page 14] foetus. And to think, It is in the power of brutish lust to determine Omnipo­tence to create a Soul, whensoever a couple of unclean adulterers shall think fit to join in their bestial pleasures; is methinks to have a very mean apprehen­sion of the divine Majesty and Purity. This is to make him the worst of Ser­vants by supposing him to serve his crea­ture's vices, to wait upon the vilest acti­ons, and to engage the same Infinite Power that made the world for the per­fecting what was begun by dissolute wan­tons. This Argument was used of old by pious and learned Origen, and hath been imployed in the same service since, by his Modern defendents. But I fore­see an evasion or two, that possibly with some may stand for an answer, the re­moval of which will clear the busi­nesse.

It may be pretended that God's atten­ding to create souls for the supply of such generations, is but an act of his justice, for the detection, and consequently pu­nishment, of such lawless offenders; which [Page 15] therefore will be no more matter of dis­paragement then the waiting of an Officer of justice to discover and apprehend a Malefactour.

But this Subterfuge cannot elude the force of the Argument, for it hath no place at all in most adulteries; yea great injustice and injury is done many times by such illegitimate births; the child of a stranger being by this means admitted to carry away the inheritance from the lawful off-spring. Besides, God useth not ordinarily to put forth his Almighty pow­er to discover secret miscarriages, except sometimes for very remarkable and mo­mentous ends, but leaves hidden iniqui­ [...]es to be the objects of his own castiga­tions. And if discovery of the fault be the main end of such creations, methinks that might be done at a cheaper rate, that should not have brought so much incon­venience with it, or have exposed his own innocent and harmlesse off-spring to undeserv'd Reproach and Infamy.

But further it may be suggested, that it is no more indecent for God to create [Page 16] souls to furnish those unlawful Generati­ons, then it is that a man should be nou­risht by meat that he hath unlawfully come by, or that the Cattle which he hath stoln should ingender with his own. But the difference of these instances from the case in hand is easily discernable; in that the nourishment and productions spo­ken of, proceed in a set orderly way of natural causes, which work fatally and necessarily without respect to morall cir­cumstances; And there is no reason, it should be in the power of a sinful crea­ture to ingage his Maker to pervert or stop the course of nature, when he plea­seth. But in the case of creating souls, God is supposed to act by explicit and immediate Will, the suspending of which, in such a case as this, is far different in point of credit and decorum, from his alte­ring the setled Laws he hath set in the Creation, and turning the world upside­down.

I might further add (4ly), That it seems very incongruous and unhandsome to sup­pose, that God should create a souls for [Page 17] the supply of one monstrous body. And of such prodigious productions there is mention in History. That's a remarkable instance in Sennertus, of a Monster born at Emmaus with two hearts, and two heads; the diversity of whose appe [...]ites, perceptions and affections, testified that it had two souls within that bi-partite ha­bitation. Now, to conceive the most wise Maker and Contriver of all things, imme­diately to create two souls, for a single body, rather then suffer that super-plus of matter which constitutes the monstrous ex­crescence to prove effoete & inanimate, is methinks a derogatory apprehension of his wisdome, and supposeth him to act more ineptly in the great and immediate instan­ces of his power, than in the ordinary course of nature about less noble and ac­curate productions. Or, if it be pretended, that Souls were sent into them while the bodies were yet distinct, but that after wards they grew into one: This, I say will not heal the breach that this Hypo­thesis makes upon the divine Wisdome; it [...]acitely reflecting a shameful over­sight [Page 18] upon Omniscience, that he should not be aware of the future coalescence of these bodies into one, when he made souls for them; or at least, 'tis to sup­pose him, knowingly to act ineptly. Be­sides, that the rational soul is not created till the body, as to the main stroaks of it at least, is framed, is the general opini­on of the Assertours of daily creation; So that then there is no roome for this evasion.

And now one would think that an opi­nion so very obnoxious, and so lyable to such grand inconveniences, should not be admitted but upon most pressing reasons and ineludable demonstrations. And yet there is not an argument that I ever heard of from reason to inforce it, but only such as are brought from the impossibility of the way of Traduction, which indeed is chargeable with as great absurdities, as that we have been discour­sing of. 'Tis true, several Scriptures are prest for the service of the cause; but I doubt much against their intent and in­clination. General testimonies there are [Page 19] to prove that God is the Father and Cre­atour of Souls, which is equally true, whe­ther we suppose it made just as it is uni­ted to these bodies, or did praeexist, and was before them; But that it is just then created out of nothing when first it comes into these earthly bodies, I know not a word in the inspired Writings that speaks it. For that saying of our Saviour, My Father worketh hitherto, and I work, is by the most judicious understood of the works of preservation and providence. Those of creation being concluded with­in the first Hebdomade, accordingly as is exprest in the History, that God on the seventh day rested from all his works. Nor can there an instance be given of any thing created since, or is there any pretended, but that which hath been the subject of our inquiry; which is no in­considerable presumption, that that was not so neither; since the divine way of working is not pari [...] colour or humoursome, but uniform, and consonant to the laws of exactest wisdome. So that for us to suppose that God, after the compleating. [Page 20] of his Creation, and the laws given to [...] things for their action, and continuanc [...] to be every moment working in a quit [...] other way in one instance of beings, tha [...] he doth in all besides; is methinks a som [...] what odd apprehension, especially whe [...] no Reason urgeth to it, and Scripture silent. For such places as this [the [...] of the Spirits of all flesh, the Father [...] Spirits. The spirit returns to God [...] gave it. The souls which I have mad [...] We are his off-spring. Who formeth [...] spirit of man within him, and the like signifie no more, but that our souls [...] a nearer relation to God then our bodies as being his immediate workmanship made without any creature-interposal and more especially regarded by him But to inferre hence, that they [...] then produced when these bodies [...] generated, is illogicall and inconsequen [...] So that all that these Scriptures will ser [...] for, is only to disprove the Doctrine [...] Fraduction, but makes not a tittle for the ordinary Hypothesis of Daily Creation against Praeexistence.

CHAP. III. (2) Traduction of souls is impos­sible, the reasons for it weak and frivolous, the proposal of Praeexis­tence.

THus then we have examind the first way of stating the Soul's original, that of continual Creation; and finding no sure resting place for our inquiry here, we remove to the second.

The way of Traduction or seminal Propagation. And the adherers to this Hypothesis are of 2 sorts, viz. either such as make the soul to be nothing but a pu­rer sort of matter, or of those that con­fess it wholly spiritual and immaterial. He dispatch the former, briefly strike at the root of their misconceit of the souls pro­duction, and shew it cannot be Matter, be it as pure as can be conceived.

Therefore (I) If the soul be matter, then whatever perceptions or apprehensi­ons it hath, or is capable of, they were [Page 22] let in at the senses. And thus the great Patron of the Hypothesis states it, in his Leviathan, and other writings. But now clear it is that our Souls have some con­ceptions, which they never received from external sense; For there are some con­genite implicite Principles in us, without which there could be no sensation; since the images of objects are very smal and inconsiderable in our brains, comparative­ly to the vastness of the things which they represent, and very unlike them in multitudes of other circumstances, so that 'twere impossible we should have the sen­sible representation of any thing, were it not that our souls use a kind of Geometry, or mathematick Inference in judging of external objects by those little hints it finds in material impressions. Which Art and the principles thereof were never received from sense, but are presuppo­sed to all sensible perceptions. And, were the soul quite vold of all such implicit no­tions, it would remain as senselesse as a stone for ever.

Besides, we find our minds fraught [Page 23] with principles logical, moral, metaphy­sical, which could never owe their ori­ginal to sense otherwise, then as it gives us occasions of using them. For sense tea­cheth no general propositions, but only affords singulars for Induction; which being an Inference, must proceed from an higher principle that ownes no such dependence on the senses as being found in the mind, and not deriv'd from any thing without. Also we find in our selves mathematical notions, and build certain demonstrations on them, which abstract from sense and matter. And therefore never had them from any material power but from somthing more sublime and excellent. But this Argument is of too large a consideration to be treated of here and therefore I content my self with those brief Touches, and passe on.

(2) If the soul be matter 'tis impossi­ble it should have the sense of any thing: for either the whole image of the object must be received in one point of this sen­sitive matter; a thing absurd at first view, that such variety of distinct and orderly [Page 24] representations should be made at once upon a single atom; or the whole image is imprest upon every point, and then there would be as many objects as there are points in this matter; and so every thing would be infinitely multiplyed in our delusive senses. Or finally, every part of the soul must receive a proportionable part of the image; and then, how could those parts communicate their percepti­ons to each other, and what should per­ceive the whole? This Argument is ex­cellently managed by the great Dr. H. More, in whose writings this fond Hy­pothesis is fully triumpht over, and de­feated. Since therefore the very lowest degree of perception, single and simple sense, is incompatible to [...] body or matter, we may safely conclude, that the higher and nobler operations of imagi­ning, remembring, reasoning, and willing must have a cause and source that is not Corporeal. Thus therefore those that build the souls traduction upon this ground of its being only body and modified matter, are disappointed in the foundation of

[Page 25] But (2) Another sort of assertors of traduction teach the Soul to be spiritual and incorporeal, and affirm that by a ver­tue deriv'd from the first benediction, it can propagate its like; one soul emitting another as the body doth the matter of Generation. The manner of which spiri­tual production useth to be illustrated by one candles lighting another; and a mans begetting a thought in anothers mind, without diminishing of his own. This is the most favourable representation of this opinion, that I can think on. And yet, if we nearly consider it, it will appear most absurd & unphilosophical For if one soul produce another, 'tis either out of nothing or something praeexistent. If the former, 'tis an absolute creation, which all philosophy concludes impossible for a Creature. And if it be pretended that the Parent doth it not by his proper natural virtue but by a strength imparted by God in the first blessing, Increase and multi­ply, so that God is the prime agent, he only the instrument: I rejoin, that then either God hath thereby obliged himself [Page 26] to put forth a new and extraordinary power in every such occasion, distinct from his influence in the ordinary course of nature: Or else (2) he only concurres by his providence, as he doth to our other natural actions, we having this Ability be­stowed upon our very natures. He that asserts the first, runs upon all the rocks that he would avoid in the former Hypo­thesis of continual Creation, and God will be made the cause of the sin and misery of his spotless and blameless creatures; which absurdities he cannot shun by say­ing, that God, by interposing in such productions, doth but follow the rules of acting, which he first made while man was innocent. For certainly infinite good­nesse would never have tyed up it self to such Laws of working, as he foresaw would presently bring unavoidable in­convenience, misery, and ruine upon the best part of his workmanship. And for the second way, it supposeth God to have no more to do in this action then in our eating and drinking. Consequent­ly, here is a creation purely natural. And [Page 27] [...]methinks if we have so vast a power to [...]ring the ends of contradictorys together, [...]omthing out of nothing, (which some deny to Omnipotence it self) tis much we cannot conscrve in being our creature [...] produced, nor our own intimate selves, since conservation is not more then crea­tion. And tis much, that in other thing we should give such few specimens of so vast an ability; or, have a power so di­vine and excellent, and no faculty to dis­cerne it by.

Again (2) if the Soul be immediately produced out of nothing, be the agent who it will, God or the Parent, it will be pure and sinlesse. For, supposing our parents to be our Creators; they make [...] but as natural agents, and so can only transmit their natural qualities, but not their moral pravities. Wherefore there can no better account be given from this way how the soul is so debauched and infected assoon as it comes into the body, [...] in the former, and therefore it fails in the main end it is design'd for.

Thus we see then that the traduction [Page 28] of the soul supposing it to be produced out of nothing, cannot be defended.

Nor doth the second general way, yield any more relief to this Hypothesis. For if it be made of any thing praeexis­tent, it is either of matter or spirit. The former we have undermin'd and over­thrown already, in what was said against those, that hold it to be body. And if it be made out of any spiritual substance, it must be the soul of the parent, (except we will revive the old enthusiastick con­ceit of its being a particle of the divine essence) which supposition is against the nature of an immaterial being, a chief property of which, is to be indiscerpible. Nor do the similitudes I mention'd in the proposal of the Hypothesis, at all fit the businesse; for one candle lights another, by separable emissions that passe from the flame of that which is kindled, to the [...]ieke of the other. And flame is a body whose parts are in continual flux, as a [...]iver. But the substance of the soul is stable, permanent, and indivisible, which quite makes it another case. And for [Page 29] a mans informing anothers mind with a thought which he had not conceived, it is not a production of any substance, but only an occasioning him to exertan ope­ration of his mind which he did not be­fore. And therefore makes nothing to the illustrating, how a soul can produce a soul, a substance distinct and without it self; Thus we see how desperate the case of the soul's original is in the Hypo­thesis of Traduction also. But yet to let it have fair play, wee'l give it leave to plead it's cause; and briefly present what is most material in its behalf.

There are but two reasons that I can think of, worth a naming (1) A man be­gets a man, and a man he is not without a soul, therefore 'tis pretended that the soul is begotten. But this argument is ea­sily detected of palpable sophistry, and is as if one should argue, a man is mortall therefore his soul is mortall, or is fat and lusty therefore his soul is so. The absurdity of which kinds of reasoning lyes in draw­ing that into a strict and rigorous affir­mation, which is only meant according [Page 30] to vulgar speech, and is true only, in some remarkable respect or circumstance. Thus we say, A man begetts a man, be­cause he doth the visible and only sensi­ble part of him; The vulgar, to whom common speech is accommodate, not ta­king so much notice of what is past the ken of their sences. And therefore Body in ordinary speaking is oft put for Person as here man for the body. Sometimes the noblest part is us'd for the whole, as when 'tis said 70 souls went down with Jacob into Egypt; therefore such arguments as the assertours of traduction make use of, which are drawn from vulgar schemes of speech, argue nothing but the despe­ratenesse of the cause, that needs such pi­tiful sophistries to recommend it. Such are these proofs which yet are some of the best I meet with, The seed of the wo­man shall break the serpents head; 66 souls descended out of Jacobs loins; Adam be­gat a son in his own likenesse, and such like. According to this rate of arguing the scripture may be made speak any thing that our humoursome phancies [Page 31] please to dictate. And thus to rack the sacred writings, to force them whether they will or no to bring evidence to our opinions; is an affront to their Authori­ty that's next to the denying on't. I might adde (2) that begetting also hath a lati­tude, and in common speech signifies not a strict and philosophical production; So that a man begets a man, though he only generates the body, into which fitly prepared descends a soul. And he that doth that upon which another thing ne­cessarily follows, is said to be the cause of both.

(2) The adherents to traduction use to urge, that, except the whole man soul and body be propagated, there is no ac­count can be given of our original defile­ment. And scripture gives evident testi­mony to that early pollution; for we are said to be conceived in sin, and trans­gressors from the Womb.

We have already seen that indeed the way of daily creating souls, cannot come off but with vilely aspersing the divine attributes. And it hath been hinted, that [Page 32] neither can Traduction solve the business: for if the Parent beget the soul out of nothing, it will be as pure and clean as if God himself were it's immediate crea­tour; for though a clean thing cannot come out of an unclean, when any thing of the substance of the producent is impar­ted to the effect; yet where 'tis made out of nothing the reason is very different, Yea, the soul in all the powers that are concern'd in this production is now as clean and pure as ever 'twas; for it is suppos'd to do it by a capacity given, at its first creation while pure and innocent; in which respect it is not capable of mo­ral contagion; this being an ability meer­ly natural and plastick, and not at all un­der the imperium or command of the will the only seat of morall good and evill. Or, if our souls are but particles and de­cerptions of our parents, then I must have been guilty of all the sins that ever were committed by my Progenitors ever since Adam; and by this time, my soul would have been so deprav'd and de­bauch'd, that it would be now brutish, [Page 33] yea diabolical. Thus then we see, that even upon this reason 'tis necessary, to pitch upon some other Hypothesis, to give an account of the pravity of our natures; which both these fayl in the solution of. And, since the former com­mitts such violence upon the honour of the divine Attributes, since the latter is so contrary to the nature of things, and since neither can give any satisfaction in the great affairs of providence and our natures, or have any incouragement from the Sacred Volume; 'Tis I think very ex­cusable for us to cast our eies abroad, to see if there be no other way, that may probably unriddle those mysteries, and relieve the minds of anxious and con­templative inquirers. In which search, if we light on any thing that doth sweet­ly accord with the Attributes of God, the nature of things, and unlocks the in­tricacies of Providence; I think we have found, what the two former opinions aim at, but cannot make good their preten­ces to. And may salute the truth with a joyfull [...]. Wherefore from the mo­dern [Page 34] disputants, let us look towards the antient Sages, those eastern Sophi, that have fill'd the world with the same of their wisdome; And since our inquiries are benighted in the west, let us look to­wards the East; from whence 'tis likely the desired light may display it self, and chase away the darknesse that covers the face of those theories. Therefore it was the opinion of the Indian Brachmans, the Persian Magi, the Aegyptian Gymnoso­phists, the fewish Rabbins, some of the Graecian Philosophers, and Christian Fa­thers, that the souls of men were crea­ted all at first; and at several times and occasions upon forfeiture of their better life and condition, drop't down in­to these terrestrial bodies. This the lear­ned among the Jews made a part of their Cabbala, and preten to have recei­ved it from their great Law-giver, Mo­ses: which Hypothesis, if it appear but pro­bable to an impartial inquiry, will even on that account be preferrible to both the former, which we have seen to be des­perate.

CHAP. IV. (Praeexistence) Praeexistence cannot be dispro­ved. Scripture saith nothing a­gainst it. It's silence is no preju­dice to this Doctrine, but rather an Argument for it, as the case standeth. Praeexistence was the common opinion of our Saviour's times. How, probably, it came to be lost in the Christian Church.

THerefore let us see what title it can shew for our assent, or whether it can prove it self worthy of the Patro­nage of those great Authors that have owned it.

(1) Then, Whether this Doctrine be true or no, Im'e confident it cannot be proved false: for if All souls were not made together, it must be, either be­cause [Page 36] God could not do it; or because he would not, for the first, I suppose very few have such narrow conceptions of the divine power, as to affirm that omni­potence could not produce all those be­ings at first, which apart he is suppos'd to create daily; which implies no contra­diction, or as much as difficulty, to be con­ceived; and which de facto he hath done in the case of Angells. Or, if inconsist­ence with any Attribute should be pre­tended, that shall be prov'd quite other­wise hereafter; And the amicable con­sistence of this Hypothesis with them, yea the necessity of it, from this very consi­deration of the divine Attributes, shall be argued in the process.

Therefore, whoever concludes that God made not all souls of old, when he produced the world out of nothing, must confesse the reason of this assertion to be, because he would not. And then I would ask him, how he came to know what he affirms so boldly? Who acquainted him with the Divine Counsells? Is there a word said in his revealed will to the con­trary? [Page 37] or, hath he by his holy penmen told us that either of the other waies was more suitable to his beneplaciture? In­deed, 'tis very likely that a strong and rea­dy phancy, possest with a perswasion of the falshood of this Hypothesis, might find some half phrases in scripture, which he might suborne to sing to the tune of his imagination. For, in such a Miscel­laneous piece as the Bible is, it will not be difficult for a man that's strongly re­solv'd against an opinion, to find some­what or other that may seem to him to speak the language of his phancy; And therefore it shall go hard, but that those whom their education or prejudice have ingaged against this Hypothesis, will light on some obscure pieces of texts, and broken sentences or other, that shall seem to condemn what they disapprove of. But I am securely confident, that there is not a sentence in the sacred volume, from end to end, that ever was intended to teach, that all souls were not made of old; or that, by a legitimate consequence, would inferre it. And if any there be [Page 38] that seem to look another way, I dare say they are collateral, and were never de­signed by the divine Authors for the pur­pose they are made to serve, by the ene­mies of Praeexistence. Wherefore not to conceal any thing that with the least shew of probability can be pretended from the sacred volume in discountenance of the Doctrine of Praeexistence, I'le bring into view whatever I know to have the least face of a Testimony to the contrary, in the divine Revelations. That so, when it shall appear that the most specious Texts that can be alledg'd, have nothing at all in them to disprove the souls prae­existence, we may be secure that God hath not discovered to us in his written will, that 'twas not his pleasure to create all souls together.

Therefore (I), It may be pretended, that the Doctrine of Praeexistence com­ports not with that innocence and inte­grity in which the Scripture determines Adam to have been made. Since it sup­poseth the descent into these bodyes to be a culpable lapse from an higher and bet­ter [Page 39] state of Life, and this to be a state of incarceration for former delinquencies. To this I answer.

(1) No one can object any thing to purpose against Praeexistence from the unconceiveablenesse of it, untill he know the particular frame of the Hypothesis, without which, all impugnations rela­ting to the manner of the thing, will be wide of the mark, and but little to the businesse. Therefore, if the objectour would have patience to wait till we come to that part of our undertaking, he would find that there was but little ground for such a scruple. But however to prevent all cavillings, in this place i'le shew the invalidity of this objection. Wherefore,

(2) There is no necessity from the Doctrine of Praeexistence to suppose A­dam a delinquent, before his noted trans­gression in a terrestrial body: for consi­dering, that his body had vast advanta­ges above ours, in point of beauty, puri­ty, and serviceablenesse to the soul, what harshness is there in conceiving that God [Page 40] might send one of those immaculate Spi­rits that he had made, into such a Tene­ment, that he might be his steward in the affairs of this lower Family; and an overseer, and ruler of those other crea­tures that he had order'd to have their dwelling upon earth. I am sure, there is no more contrariety to any of the Di­vine Attributes in this supposition, then there is in that, which makes God to have sent a pure spirit, which he had just made, into such a body. Yea,

(3) Supposing that some souls fell, when the Angells did (which the process of our discourse will shew to be no un­reasonable supposition) this was a mer­ciful provision of our Maker, and a ge­nerous undertaking for a Seraphick and untainted Spirit. For by this means, fit and congruous matter is prepared for those souls to reside and act in, who had rendred themselves unfit to live and injoy themselves in more refined bodyes. And so those spirits that had sinn'd them­selves into a state of silence and inactivi­ty, are by this seasonable means, which [Page 41] the divine Wisdome and Goodnesse hath contriv'd for them, put once more into a capacity of acting their parts anew, and comming into play again. Now if it seem hard to any to conceive how so noble a spirit in such an advantagious body, should have been impos'd upon by so gross a delusion, and submit so im­potently to the first temptation; He may please to consider, that the difficulty is the same, supposing him just then to have been made; if we grant him but that pu­rity and those great perfections both of will, and understanding, which orthodox theology allows him.

Yea again (4) I might ask What in­convenience there is in supposing, that Adam himself was one of those delin­quent souls, which the divine pitty and compassion had thus set up again; that so, so many of his excellent creatures might not be lost and undone irrecoverabiy: but might act anew, though upon a low­er stage in the universe: A due conside­ration of the infinite foecundity and ful­nesse of the divine goodnesse will, if not [Page 42] warrant, yet excuse such a supposition.

But now if it be demanded, What ad­vantage Adam's standing had been to his posterity, had he continued in the state of innocence; and how sin and misery is brought upon us by his Fall, according to this Hypothesis: I answer, that then among many other great priviledges, he had transsmitted downwards by way of natural generation that excellent and bles­sed temper of body; which should have been like his own happy crasis. So that our apprehensions should have been more large and free, our affections more regu­lar and governable; and our inclinati­ons to what is good and vertuous, strong and vigorous. For we cannot but observe in this state, how vast an influence the temper of our bodyes hath upon our minds; both in reference to intellectual and moral dispositions. Thus, daily expe­rience teacheth us, how that, according to the ebb or flow of certain humours in our bodies, our witts are either more quick, free, and sparkling, or else more obtuse, weak, and sluggish. And we find [Page 43] that there are certain clean and healthy dispositions of body which make us cheer­ful, and contented; others on the contra­ry [...]orose, melancholly, and dogged. And 'tis easie to observe how age or sicknesse sowres, and crabbs our natures. I might instance in allmost all other qualities of the mind, which are strangely influenc [...] and modifyed according to the bodie's constitution. But none will deny so plain a truth; and therefore I forbear to in­sist further on it. Nor need I mention any more advantages; so many, and such great ones, being consequent upon this. But our great Protoplast and representa­tive, falling through his unhappy diso­bedience, besides the integrity and recti­tude of his mind, he lost also that blessed constitution of Body, which would have been so great a priviledg to his off spring: so that it became now corrupt, weak, and indisposed for the nobler exercises of the soul; and he could transmit no bet­ter to us, then himself was owner of. Thus we fell in him, and were made miserable by his transgression. We have [Page 44] bodies convey'd to us, which strangely do bewitch and betray us. And thus we all bear about us the marks of the first apostacy. There are other sad effects of his defection, but this may suffice for my present purpose. Thus we see how that the derivation of original depravi­ty from Adam is as clear in this Hypothe­sis, as can be pretended in either of the other. And upon other Accounts it seems to have much the advantage of both of them. As will appear to the unprejudiced in what is further to be dis­cours'd of.

Finally, therefore, If the urgers of the Letter of Genesis of either side, against this Hypothesis, would but consider, That the souls that descend hither, for their prae­varication in another state, lye in a long condition of silence and insensibility, be­fore they appear in terrestrial bodies; each of them then might, from the doctrine of Praeexistence thus stated, gain all the ad­vantages which he supposeth to have by his own opinion, and avoid all those ab­surdities which he seeth the other run [Page 45] upon. If the Assertours of daily Creation think it clear from Scripture that God is the Father of Spirits, and immediate ma­ker of souls, they'l find the same made good and assented to in this Hypothesis. And if they are unwilling to hold—any thing contrary to the Nature of the soul, which is immortal and indiscerpible, the Doctrine of Praeexistence amicably clo­seth with them in this also.

And if the Patrons of Traduction would have a way, how sin and misery may be propagated from our first Parent without aspersing the divine Attributes, or affirming any thing contrary to the phaenomena of Providence, and Nature; this Hypothesis will clear the businesse; It giving us so fair an Account how we all dye in Adam, without blotting the Wisdome, Justice, or Goodnesse of God, or affirming any thing contrary to the Ap­pearances of Nature.

I have been the longer on this Argu­ment, because 'tis like to be one main ob­jection; And we see it is so far from pre­judicing, that it is no inconsiderable evi­dence [Page 46] of the truth of Praeexistence.

And now, besides this that I have na­med, I cannot think of any Arguments from Scripture against this Doctrine, con­siderable enough to excuse a mention of them. However, if the candid Reader will pardon the impertinency i'le present to view what I find most colourable.

Therefore (2), It may be some are so inadvertent as to urge against our souls having been of old, that, Sacred writ says We are but of Yesterday; which expres­sion of divine Scripture, is question­lesse to be understood of our appearance on this stage of Earth. And is no more an Argument against our Praeexistence, then that other phrase of his, Before [...] go hence, and Bee no more, is against our future existence in an other state af­ter the present life is ended. Nor will it prove more the business it is brought for, then the expression of Rachels weeping for her Children because they were not, will inferre, that they were, absolutely nothing. Nor can any thing more be made.

(3) Of that place in Ecclesiastes, Yea [Page 47] better is he than both they, (meaning the dead and living) which hath not yet been; since, besides that 'tis a like scheme of speech with the former, it seems more to favour, then discountenance Praeexistence for what is absolutely nothing can neither be worse, nor better. Moreover, we com­ming from a state of silence and inactivi­ty when we drop into these bodies, we were before, as if we had not been; and so there is better ground in this case, for such a manner of speaking, then in meer non-appearance; which yet scrip­ture phraseth a Not being.

And now I cannot think of any place in the sacred volume more that could make a tolerable plea against this Hypo­thesis, of our souls having been before they came into these bodyes; except

(4) Any will draw a negative Argu­ment from the History of the Creation, concluding that the Souls of men were not made of old, because there is no men­tion there, of any such matter. To which I return briefly, That the same Argu­ment concludes against the being of An­gells [Page 48] of whose creation there is no more say'd in the first story then of this inferi­our rank of spirits, souls. The reason of which silence is commonly taken to be, because Moses had here to do with a rude and illiterate people, who had few or no apprehensions of any thing beyond their senses, and therefore he takes notice to them of nothing but what was sensible and of common observation. This reason is given also why minerals were omitted. 'Twere an easy matter, to shew how the outward cortex, the Letter of this Histo­ry is adapted to mean and vulgar appre­hensions, whose narrowness renders them incapable of sublimer speculations. But that being more then needs for our pre­sent purpose, I shall forbear to speak further of it.

I might (2) further adde, that great and learned Interpreters tell us, that all sorts of spirits, angels, and souls are sym­bolically meant by the creation of heaven, and light. And, if it were directly in the way of our present businesse, it might be made appear to be no improbable con­jecture. [Page 49] But I referre him that is curious in this particular to the great Restorer of the antient Cabbala, the Learned Dr. H. More in his conjectura Cabbalistica.

And now from the consideration of the silence of the first History, we descend to the last and most likely to be urged scruple, which is to this purpose.

(5) We are not to step beyond the divine Revelations, and since God hath made known no such Doctrine as this, of the Souls Praeexistence any where in his word, we may reasonably deny it, or at least have no ground to imbrace it. This is the most important objection of all the rest, and most likely to prepos­sess timerous and wary inquirers against this Hypothesis; wherefore I conceive that a full answer to this doubt, will prevent many scrupulous Haesitations, and make way for an unprejudic'd hearing of what I have further to alledg in the behalf of this opinion And

(1) I wish that those that urge Scrip­ture silence to disprove praeexistence would consider, how silent it is both in the case [Page 50] of Daily Creation, and Traduction, we have seen already that there is nothing in Sacred writ to warrant either, but only such Generalls from which the re­spective Patrons of either Doctrine would inferre their own conclusion, though indeed they all of them with bet­ter right and congruity prove Praeex­istence.

(2) I suppose those that argue from Scripture-silence in such cases mistake the design of Scripture, which is not to de­termine points of speculation, but to be a rule of Life and Manners. Nor doth it otherwise design the teaching of Doctri­nals, then as they have a tendency to promote the divine life, righteousnesse, and Holinesse. It was never intended by it's inspired Authors to fill our Heads with notions, but to regulate our disor­derly appetites and affections, and to di­rect us the way to a nobler happinesse. Therefore those that look for a systeme of opinions in those otherways-designed writings, do like him that should see for a body of natural Philosophy, in [Page 51] Epictetus his moralls, or Seneca's Epistles.

(3) Christ and his Apostles spoke and writ as the condition of the persons with whom they dealt administred occasion, as did also the other Pen-men. Therefore doubtlesse there were many noble theo­ries which they could have made the world acquainted with, which yet for want of a fit occasion to draw them forth were never upon Record. And we know, few speculative truths are deliver'd in Scripture, but such as were call'd forth by the controversies of those times: And Praeexistence was none of them, it being the constant opinion of the Jews, as appears by that Question, Master, was it for this man's sin or his Fathers, that he was born blind, which supposeth it of the Disciples also. Wherefore

(4) There was little need of more teach­ing of that, which those times were suffici­ently instructed in: And indeed, as the case stands, if Scripture-silence be Argumenta­tive, 'twil be for the advantage of Praeex­istence; since it being the then common o­pinion, and the disciples themselves be­ing [Page 52] of that belief 'tis very likely, had it been an errour, that Saviour Saviour or his Apostles would have witnest against it. But there being not a word let fall from them in disapprooval of that opinion, though sometimes occasions were admi­nistred (as by the Question of the Dis­ciples, and some other occurrences) 'tis a good presumption of the soundnesse of it.

Now that Praeexistence was the com­mon opinion of the Jews, in those times might be made good with full and con­victive evidence, were it worth our la­bour to insist much upon this Inquiry; but this being only a by consideration, a brief touch of it will suffice us. One of the great Rabbins therefore, Mr. Ben Is­rael in his Problems de Creatione, assures us, that Praeexistence was the common belief of all wise men among the Jews, without exception. And the Author of the Book of Wisdome, who certainly was a Jew, probably Philo, plainly sup­poseth the same Doctrine in that Speech, For I was a witty Child, and had agood [Page 53] Spirit, wherefore the rather being good, I came into a body un [...]filed. As also did the disciples in their foremention'd Que­stion to our Saviour; For except they supposed, that he might have si [...]ned be­fore he was born, the Question had been senslesse and impertinent. Again, when Christ [...] them, whom men said he was they answered, that some said John the Baptist, others Elias, others Jeremias or one of the Prophets, which sayings of theirs suppose their beliefe of a Metem­psychosis & consequently of Praeexistence. These, one would think, were very pro­per occasions for our Saviour to have rectified his mistaken followers, had their supposition been an errour, as he was wont to do in cases not more considerable. Therefore if the enemies of Praeexistence will needs urge scriptures supposed silence against it; they have no reason to take it amisse if I shew them how their Argu­ment recoyls upon themselves, and des­troies their own cause, instead of their Adversaries.

[Page 54] (5) Besides, there were doubtlesse many Doctrines entertain'd by the Apo­stles and the more learned of their fol­lowers, which were disproportion'd to the capacities of the generality, who hold but little Theory.

There was strong meat for the more grown and manly Christians, as well as milk for babes, and weaker constitutions. Now Scripture was design'd for the bene­fit of the most, and they could little un­derstand, and lesse make use of a specu­lation so remote from common conceit, as Praeexistence. Among us, wise men count it not so proper to deal forth deep and mysterious points in Divinity to common and promiscuous Auditories. Wherefore the Apostles and others of their more im­prov'd and capable disciples might have had such a Doctrine among them, though it were never expresly defined in their publique writings. And the Learned O­rigen and some other of the Antients af­firme that Praeexistence was a Cabbala which was handed down from the Apo­stolick ages, to their times; and we know [Page 55] those were early, and had therefore bet­ter advantages of knowing the certainty of such a Tradition, then we at so vast a distance. Nor need any wonder how it came at length to be lost, or at least kept but among a few, who considers the grossnesse of succeeding ages, when such multitudes could swallow the dull and coorse Anthropomorphite Doctrines; much lesse, if he reflects upon that black night of barbarick ignorance which spread it self over this western world, upon the incursion of those rude and unciviliz'd Nations that 'ore-ran the Empire: out of which darknesse, 'twas the work of some Centuries to recover the then obscured region of Civility and Letters. Moreover, it would allay the admiration of any one inquisitive in such researches, when he shall have taken notice of the starting up and prevailing of School-Divinity in the world, which was but Aristotles Philo­sophy theologiz'd. And we know that Philosophy had the luck to swim in the ge­neral esteem and credit, when Plato­nis [...] and the more antient wisdome, a [Page 56] branch of which, Praeexistence was; were almost quite sunk and buried. So that a Theology being now made, out of A­ristotelian principles, 'tis no wonder that Praeexistence was left out, nothing being suppos'd to have been said of it, by the great Author of that Philosophy; and his admiring sectators were loath to borrow so considerable a Theory, from their Ma­sters neglected Rival, Plato.

But [...] at once to remove this stone of offence out of the way, I think Scrip­ture is not so silent in this matter as is imagin'd. And I'me confident, more can be said from those divine writings in be­half of Praeexistence, then for many o­pinions, that it's opposers are very fond of, and think to be there evidently asser­ted. And had this been a commonly re­ceived Doctrine, and mens witts as much exercis'd for the defence on't, as they have been for the common dogmata, I nothing doubt, but that Scriptures would have been heaped up in abun­dance for it's justification, and it would have been thought to have been plainly [Page 57] witnest to, in the inspired volume. For, as mens phancies wil readily furnish them with a proof of that, of whose truth they are strongly prepossessed; So, on the contrary, they'l be very backward to see any evidence of that which is strange to them, and which hath alwaies been re­puted an Absurdity. But my Scripture­evidence is not so proper for this place, I intending to make it an Argument by it self. Therefore if the urger of this ob­jection, will but have a little patience till I come so far on the way of my dis­course, I hope he may be satisfied that Praeexistence is not such a stranger to scripture as he conceits it.

CHAP. V. Reasons against Praeexistence answe­red. Our forgetting the former state is no argument to disprove it: nor are the other Reasons that can be produc'd, more conclusive. The proof of the possibility of Praeex­istence were enough, all other Hypotheses being absurd and contradictious. But it is prov'd al­so by positive Arguments.

NOw therefore to proceed, let us look back upon our progresse, and so en­ter on what remains; we have seen, that God could have created all souls at first had he so pleased, and that he hath revea­led nothing in his written Will to the con­trary. And now if it be found also, that he hath not made it known to our Rea­sons [Page 59] that 'twas not his will to do so, we may conclude this first particular, That no one can say, that the Doctrine of Prae­existence is a falshhood. Therefore let us call to Account the most momentous reasons that can be laid against it, and we shall find that they all have not weight enough in the least to move so ra­tional and solid an opinion.

(1) Then, 'tis likely to be urged, that had we lived and acted in a former state, we should doubtlesse have retain'd some remembrance of that condition; But we having no memory of any thing backwards before our appearance upon this present stage, it will be thought to be a consi­derable praesumption, that Praeexist­ence is but a phancy.

But I would desire such kind of rea­soners to tell me, how much they re­member of their state and condition in the womb, or of the Actions of their first infancy. And I could wish they would consider, that not one passage in an hun­dred is remembred of their grown and ri­per age. Nor doth there scarce a night [Page 60] passe but we dream of many things which our waking Memories can give us no Ac­count of; yea old age and some kinds of diseases blot out all the images of things past, and even in this state cause a totall oblivion. Now if the Reasons why we should lose the remembrance of our for­mer life be greater, then are the causes of forgetfulnesse in the instances we have produced, I think it will be clear, that this Argument hath but little force a­gainst the opinion we are inquiring into. Therefore if we do but reflect upon that long state of silence and inactivity that we emerged from, when we came into these bodies; and the vast change we under-went by our sinking into this new and unwonted habitation, it will appear to the considerate, that there is greater reason why we should have forgotten our former Life, then any thing in this. And if a disease or old age can rase out the memory of past actions, even while we are in one and the same condition of Life, certainly so long and deep a swoon as is ab­solute insensibility and inertnesse, may [Page 61] much more reasonably be thought to blot our the memory of an other Life, whose passages probably were nothing like the transactions of this.

And this also might be given as an o­ther Reason of our forgetting our former state, since usually things are brought to our remembrance by some like occur­rences. But

(2) Some will argue, If this be a state of punishment for former misearriages how comes it about then, that 'tis a bet­ter condition then that we last came from viz. the state of silence and insensibility. I answer, That if we look upon our pre­sent terrestrial condition an an effect of our defection from the higher Life, and in reference to our former happinesse lost by our own default, 'tis then a misery, and a punishment. But if we compare our now-being with the state of inactivi­ty we were deliver'd from, It may then be call'd an After-Game of the divine Goodnesse, and a Mercy. As a Malefactor, that is at first put into a dark and discon­solate dungeon, and afterwards is re­mov'd [Page 62] to a more comfortable and light­some prison, may acknowledge his re­move to be a favour and deliverance compared with the place he was last con­fined to; though with respect to his fault and former liberty, even this condition is both a mulct and a misery. It is just thus in the present case, and any one may make the application.

But it will be said, (3) If our souls liv'd in a former state did they act in bo­dies, or without them? The former they'l say is absurd, and the latter incongruous and unlikely; since then all the powers the soul hath to exert in a body, would have been idle and to no purpose. But (1) the most that can be argued from such like objections, is, that we know not the man­ner of the thing; and are no Arguments against the assertion it self. And were it granted that the particular state of the soul before it came hither is inconceiva­ble, yet this makes no more against it, then it doth against it's after-condition; which these very objectors hold to be so, as to the particular modus. But [Page 63] (a) Why is it so absurd that the soul should have actuated another kind of body, before it came into this? Even here 'tis immediately united to a purer vehi­cle, moves and acts the grosser body by it; And why then might it not in its for­mer and purer state of Life have been join'd only to such a refined body, which should have been suitable to its own per­fection and purity? I'me sure, many, if not the most of the Antient Fathers thought Angells themselves to be embo­dyed, and therefore they reputed not this such a grosse absurdity. But an oc­casion hereafter will draw our pen this way again, and therefore I pass it to a third return to this objection.

(3) Therefore, though it were granted that the soul lived afore-times without a body, what greater incongruity is there in such a supposition, then that it should live and act after death without any uni­on with matter or any body whatsoever, as the objectors themselves conceive it doth? But all such objections as these will fly away as mists before the sun, [Page 64] when we shall come particularly to state the Hypothesis. And therefore I may be excused from further troubling my self and the Reader about them here. Espe­cially since, as hath been intimated, they prove nothing at all, but that the objec­tors cannot conceive vvhat manner of state that of Praeexistence was, which is no prejudice to the opinion it self; that our souls were extant before these earthly bodies.

Thus then I hope I have clearly e­nough made good that all souls might have been created from the beginning; for ought any thing that is made known, either in the Scriptures or our reasons to the contrary. And thereby have re­mov'd those prejudices that would have stood in the way of our conclusion. Wherefore we may now without con­troul, from our proof of, That it may be so, pass on to enquire, whether indeed it is so; and see, whether it may as well be asserted, as defended.

And truly considering that both the o­ther ways are impossible, and this third [Page 65] not at all unreasonable, it may be thought needlesse to bring more forces into the field to gain it the victory, after its ene­mies are quite scattered and defeated. Yet however, for the pomp and triumph of truth, though it need not their service we shall add some positive Arguments, whereby it may appear, that not only all other ways are dangerous and unpas­sable, and this irreproveable; but also that there is direct evidence enough to prove it solid and rational. And I make my first consideration of this kind, a se­cond Argument.

CHAP. VI. A second Argument for Praeexistence drawn from the consideration of the Divine Goodnesse, which alwaies doth what is best.

(2) THen, whoever conceives rightly of God, apprehends him to be infinite and immense Goodnesse, who is alwaies shedding abroad of his own exu­berant fulnesse: There is no straightness in the Deity, no bounds to the ocean of Love. Now the divine Goodnesse referrs not to himself, as ours extends not unto him. He acts nothing for any self-ac­complishment, being essentially and ab­solutely compleat and perfect. But the object and term of his goodnesse is his creatures good and happinesse, in their respective capacities. He is that infi­nite fountain that is continually over­flowing; [Page 67] and can no more cease to shed his influences upon his indigent depen­dents then the sun to shine at noon. Now as the infinite Goodnesse of the deity, ob­ligeth him alwaies to do good, so by the same reason to do that which is best; since to omit any degrees of good would ar­gue a defect in goodnesse, supposing wis­dome to order, and power to execute. He therefore that supposeth God not al­waies to do what is best, and best for his Creatures (for he cannot act for his own Good) apprehends him to be lesse good then can be conceived, and conse­quently not infinitely so. For what is in­finite, is beyond measure and apprehen­sion.

Therefore to direct this to our pur­pose, God being infinitely good and that to his Creatures, and therefore doing al­waies what is best for them, methinks it roundly follows that our souls lived and injoy'd themselves of old before they came into these bodies. For since they were capable of living and that in a much better and happier state long before they [Page 68] descended into this region of death and misery; and since that condition of life and self-enjoyment would have been bet­ter, then absolute not-being, may we not safely conclude from a due consideration of the divine goodnesse, that it was so? What was it that gave us our being, but the immense goodnesse of our Maker? And why were we drawn out of our nothings but because it was better for us to be, then not to be? Why were our souls put into these bodies, and not into some more squallid and ugly; but because we are ca­pable of such, and 'tis better for us to live in these, then in those that are lesse sutable to our natures? And had it not been better for us, to have injoy'd our selves and the bounty and favours of our Maker of old, as did the other order of intellectual creatures; then to have layn in the comfortless night of nothing till 'tother day! Had we not been better on't to have lived and acted in the joyful regions of light and blessednesse with those spirits that at first had being, then just now to jump into this sad plight, [Page 69] and state of sin and wretchednesse.

Infinite Power could as well have made us all at once, as the Angells, and with as good congruity to our natures we might have liv'd and been happy with­out these bodies, as we shall be in the state of separation: since therefore it was best for us, and as easy for our Creatour so to have effected it, where was the defect, if it was not [...] [...] not this to [...] his goodnesse! and to straight-lace the divine beneficence. And doth not the contrary Hypothesis to what I am plea­ding for, represent the God of Love as lesse good and bountiful, then a charita­ble mortall, who would neglect no op­portunity within his reach of doing what good he could to those that want his help and assistance?

I confesse, the world generally have such narrow and unbecomming apprehen­sions of God, and draw his picture in their imaginations so like themselves, that few I doubt will feel the force of this Argument; and mine own observation makes me enter the same suspicion of [Page 70] its successe that some others have who have used it. 'Tis only a very deep sense of the divine goodnesse can give it any perswasive energy. And this noble sen­timent there are very few that are pos­sest of. However to lend it what strength I can, I shall endeavour to re­move some prejudices that hinder it's force and efficacy; And when those spots and scum are wiped away that mi­stake and inadvertency have fastned on it, 'twill be illustrious by its own bright­nesse.

CHAP. VII. This first Evasion, that God acts freely, and his meere will is reason enough for his doing, or forbearing any thing, overthrown by four Considerations. Some in­cident Evasions, viz. that Gods wisdome, or his glory, may be contrary to this display of the divine goodnesse, in our being made of old, clearly taken off.

(1) THerefore, will some say, God worketh freely, nor can he be oblig'd to act but when he pleaseth. And this will and pleasure of his is the rea­son of our beings, and of the determi­nate time of our beginning. Therefore if God would not that we should have been made sooner, and in a better state [Page 72] of life, his will is reason enough and we need look no further. To this evasion, I thus Reply.

(1) 'Tis true indeed, God is the most Free Agent, because none can compell him to act, none can hinder him from acting. Nor can his creatures oblige him to any thing. But then

(2) The divine liberty and freedome consists not in his acting by meer arbitra­rious will as disujnct from his other At­tributes. For he is sayd to act according to the counsell of his own will. So that his wisdome and goodness are as it were the Rules whereby his will is directed. Therefore though he cannot be obliged to act by any thing without himself, yet he may by the Laws of his own essential rectitude and perfection. Wherefore I conceive he is said, not to be able to do those things (which he might well enough by absolute power) that consist not with his ever blessed Attributes. Nor by the same reason can he omit that which the eternal Law of his most perfect nature ob­ [...]geth him to. The summe is, God never [Page 73] Acts by meer will or groundlesse humour, that is a weaknesse in his imperfect crea­tures; but according to the immutable Rules of his ever blessed essence. And therefore,

(3) Tis a derogation from his infinite Majesty to assert any thing contrary to his Goodnesse upon pretence of his will and pleasure. For whatever is most sute­able to this most blessed Attribute, and contradicts no other, that be sure he willeth. Wherefore

(4) If it be better, and more agreeable to the divine goodnesse that we should have been in an happier state, before we came into these bodies, Gods will cannot then be pretended to the contrary, es­pecially it having been proved already, that he hath no way revealed any such will of his) but rather it is demonstra­tively clear that his will was, it should be so. Since as God never acts in the absence of his wisdome and goodnesse, so neither doth he abstain from acting when those great Attributes require it.

Now if it be excepted again (2) That [Page 74] 'tis true that this Hypothesis is most suta­ble to the divine goodnesse and the con­sideration of that alone would inferre it. But how know we but his Wisdome con­tradicts it. I return briefly, That if it be confest to be so correspondent to, and inferrible from one Attribute, and can­not be prov'd inconsistent with another, my businesse is determin'd. Therefore let those that pretend an inconsistence, prove it. (2) The wisdome of God is that Attribute and essential perfection, whereby the divine actions are directed to their end, which is alwaies good, and best: Therefore to do that which is best cannot thwart the divine wisdome, but alwaies includes and supposeth it. Whence it follows, that what so com­ports with goodnesse, cannot stand oppo­site to Wisdome. Wisdome in God be­ing indeed nothing else but goodnesse, contriving and directing for the crea­ture's good and happinesse. For we must remember, what was said above, that what is infinitely full and perfect, can have no ends for any self-advantage; and [Page 75] therefore the ends of the divine wisdome are somthing without himself, and conse­quently the good and perfection of his creatures. So that unlesse it can be prov'd to have been contrary to ours, or any o­ther creatures good, that we should have been extant as soon as the Light, it can­not be concluded to have any contradic­tion to the divine wisdome.

But it will be said again (3) Gods glo­ry is his great end, for the promoting of which his wisdome directs all his Acti­ons; and consequently, that which may be best for the creature, may not be so conducive to the divine Glory, and there­fore not agreeable with his wisdome.

Now though I think the world hath a very mistaken apprehension of Gods glo­ry, yet I shall not here ingage in more controversies, then I must needs. Tis e­nough for my present purpose to inti­mate; That Gods glory is no by-end or self-accumulation, nor an addition of a­ny thing to Him which he was not eter­nally possest of; nor yet is it any thing that stands in opposition to the good of [Page 76] his creation: But the display and com­munication of his excellencies; among the which, his goodnesse is not the least considerable, if it be not that most di­vine and fundamental Attribute which gives perfection to all the rest. So that we may assure our selves, that when ever his goodness obligeth him to action, his glory never stands in opposition. For even this is his glory to communicate to his creatures sutably to his own absolute fulness, and to act according to the di­rection of his essential perfections, yea, though we should state his glory to con­sist alone, in the honour and renown of his Attributes, yet even then the Hypo­thesis of our having been made in the be­ginning will accumulate to his praises, and represent him to his creatures as more illustrious; since it is a more mag­nificent apprehension of his goodnesse, and cleares his other Attributes from those stains of dis-repute that all other suppositions cast upon them. And though his glory should consist, as too many fondly imagine, in being praised and [Page 77] red by his creatures, even on this account also it would have obliged him to have made us all of old, rather then opposed it; since, then, his excellencies had been sung forth by a more numerous Quire, in continual Hallelujahs. Now if it should be urged, that God made all things for himself, and therefore is not obliged to consult the good of his creatures in all his Actions. I rejoin, that God's making all things for himself, can argue no more then his making all things for his own ends, viz. the ends of goodnesse. Be­sides, the best Criticks make that place to speak no more but this, That God or­ders all things according to himself; that is, according to the rules of his own nature and perfections.

Thus then we see that for God to do that which is best for his creatures, is nei­ther contrary to his will and pleasure, his wisdome, nor his glory, but most con­sonant to all of them. And therefore since the Praeexistence of Souls, is so a­greeable to the divine goodnesse, and since nothing else in the Deity opposeth, [Page 78] but rather sweetly conspires with it, me­thinks this argument were enough to conclude it. But yet there are other Ev [...] ­sions which would elude this Demonstra­tion, I shall name the most considera­ble and leave it to the judicious to de­termine, whether they can disable it.

CHAP. VIII. A second general evasion, viz that our Reasons cannot tel what God should do, or what is best, overthrown by several considerations. As is also a third, viz. that by the same Argument God would have been obliged to have made us impecca­ble, and not liable to Misery.

WHerefore the second general eva­sion is, That our Reasons cannot conclude what God [...], there be­ing [Page 79] vast fetches in the divine wisdome which we comprehend not, nor can our natural light determine what is best. I answer (1) Our Saviour himself, who was the best Judge in the case, teacheth us, that the Reason of a man may in some things conclude what God will do in that saying of his, If ye being evill, know how to give good things to your Children, much more shall your Father which is in Heaven give his Spirit to them that ask him. Plainly intimating, that we may securely argue from any thing that is a perfection in our selves, to the same in God. And if we, who are imper­fectly good, will yet do as much good as we can, for those we love and tender; with greater confidence may we con­clude, that God who is infinitely so, will conferre upon his creatures whatever good they are capable of. Thus we see our Saviour ownes the capacity of reason in a case that is very near the same that we are dealing in.

And God himself appeals to the rea­sons of men to judge of the righteous­nesse [Page 80] and equity of his ways. Ye men of Israel and inhabitants of Jerusalem, judg between me and my vineyard, which place I bring to shew that meer natural reason is able to judge in some cases what is fit for God to do, and what is sutable to his essence and perfections. And if in any,

Methinks (2) its capacity in the case before us should be own'd as soon as in any. For if reason cannot determine and assure us, that a blessed and happy Be­ing is better then None at all; and con­sequently, that it was best for our souls to have been, before they were in this state of wretchedness; and thence con­clude, that it was very congruous to the divine goodness to have made us in a for­mer and better condition; I think then (1) That it cannot give us the assurance of any thing, since there is not any prin­ciple in metaphysicks or geometry more clear then this, viz. [...] an happy Be­ing, is better than absolute Not-being. And if our reasons can securely deter­mine this, 'tis as much as we need at present. Or if this be not certain, how [Page 81] vain are those Learned men that dispute whether a state of the extremest misery a creature is capable of, and that ever­lasting, be not better then Non-entity. (2) If we cannot certainly know that it had been Better that we should have ex­sisted in a life of happiness, proportion'd to our natures of old, then have been meer nothing, till some few years since; we can never then own or acknowledg the divine goodness to us in any thing we injoy. For if it might have been as good for us not to Bee, as to Bee, and happily; Then it might have been as good for us to have wanted any thing else that we enjoy, as to have it: and consequently, we cannot own it as an effect of God's goodness that he hath be­stowed any blessing on us. For if Be­ing be not better, then Not-being, then 'tis no effect of goodnesse that we are; and if so, then 'tis not from goodnesse that we have any thing else, since all other things are inferiour to the good of Being. If it be said, It had been better indeed for us, to have lived in a former [Page 82] and happier state; but, it may be, it had not been so for the universe; and the ge­neral good is to be preferr'd before that of particulars.

I say then, and it may serve for a (3) answer to the general objection. If we may deny that to be done by almigh­ty goodness, which is undoubtedly best for a whole species of his creatures, meer­ly on this account, that, for ought we know, it may be for the advantage of some others, though there be not the least appearance of any such matter; we can never then argue any thing from the divine goodness. It can never then be prov'd from that glorious Attribute, that he hath not made some of his creatures on purpose that they might be miserable; nor can it be concluded thence, that he will not annihilate all the pure and spot­less angells; both which I suppose, any sober inquirer will think congruously de­ducible from the divine goodness. And if to say, for ought we know, It may be best for some other creatures, that those should be miserable, and these annihila­ted, [Page 83] be enough to disable the Argument; on the same account we shall never be able to prove ought from this, or any o­ther Attribute. I might adde,

(2) There is not the least coloura­ble pretence for any such suspicion. For, would the world have been too little to have contain'd those souls, without just­ling with some others? or, would they by violence have taken any of the pri­viledges of the other intellectual crea­tures from them? If so, how comes it about that at last they can all so wel con­sist together? And, could other creatures have been more disadvantag'd by them, when they were pure and innocent, then they will at last, when they are so many of them debauched and depraved?

(3) If this be enough to answer an Argument, to say, for ought we know, it may be thus and thus, when there is not the least sign or appearance of any such thing, then nothing can ever be pro­ved, and we are condemned to ever­lasting Scepticism. We should never for instance, from the order, beauty, and [Page 84] wise contrivance of the things that do ap­pear, prove there is a God, if it were sufficient to answer, That things are in­deed so made in this earth, on which we are extant; but, it may be, they are framed very odly, ridiculously, and ineptly in some other worlds, which we know no­thing of. If this be answering, any thing might be answered. But there is yet ano­ther objection against mine Argument from the divine goodnesse which looks ve­ry formidably at a distance, though when we come near it, we shall find, it will not bear the tryall. And it may thus be urged.

(3) If the goodnesse of God always ob­ligeth him to do what is best, and best for his Creatures, How is it then, that we were not made impeccable, and so not obnoxious to misery? Or how doth it consist with that overflowing goodness of the Deity, that we were let to lye in a long state of silence and insensibility, be­fore we came into these bodies? This seems a pressing difficulty, but yet there's hopes we may dispatch it. Therefore,

[Page 85] (1) Had we been made impeccable, we should have been another kind of creatures then now; since we had then wanted the [...] or liberty of will to good and evill, which is one of our essen­tial Attributes. Consequently, there would have been one species of beings wanting to compleat the universe; and it would have been a slurre to the divine goodnesse not to have given being to such creatures as in the id [...] were fairly pos­sible; and contradicted no other Attri­bute. Yea, though he foresaw that some would sin, and make themselves misera­ble, yet the foreseen lapse and misery of those, was not an evill great enough to over-ballance the good the species would reap by being partakers of the divine goodnesse in the land of the living; There­fore however, 'twas goodnesse to give such creatures being. But it will be ur­ged upon us, If Liberty to good and evil be so essential to our natures, what think we then of the blessed souls after the re­surrection; are not they the same crea­tures, though vvithout the liberty of sin­ning? [Page 86] To return to this; I think those that affirm, that, the blessed have not this natural liberty as long as they are united to a body, and are capable of resenting it's pleasures, should do well to prove it. Indeed they may be morally immutable and illapsable: but this is grace, not na­ture; a reward of obedience, not a ne­cessary annex of our Beings. But will it be said, why did not the divine good­nesse endue us all with this morall stabi­lity? Had it not been better for us to have been made in this condition of se­curity, then in a state so dangerous? My return to this doubt will be a second An­swer to the main objection.

Therefore Secondly, I doubt not, but that 'tis much better for rational crea­tures, that this supream happiness should be the Reward of vertue, rather then [...] upon our natures. For, the pro­curement of that which we might have mist of, is far more sensibly gratifying, then any necessary and unacquired injoy­ment; we find a greater pleasure in what we gain by industry, art, or vertue, then [Page 87] in the things we were born to. And had we been made secure from sin, and mi­sery from the first moment of our Being, we should not have put so high a rate and value upon that priviledge.

(3) Had we been at first establisht in an impossibility of lapsing into evill; Then many choise vertu's, excellent branches of the divine Life had never been exercis'd, or indeed have been at all. Such are Patience, Faith, and Hope; the objects of which are, evill, futurity, and uncertainly. Yea,

(4) Had we been so fixt in an inamis­sible happinesse from the beginning, there had then been no vertue in the world; nor any of that matchlesse pleasure which attends the exercise thereof. For ver­tue is a kind of victory, and supposeth a conflict. Therefore we say, that God is good and holy, but not vertuous. Take away a possibility of evill, and in the creature there is no morall goodnesse. And then no reward, no pleasure, no hap­pinesse.

[Page 88] Therefore in summe (5ly), The di­vine goodnesse is manifested in making all creatures sutably to those Id [...]as of their natures, which he hath in his All-com­prehensive Wisdome. And their good and happinesse consists in acting according to those natures, and in being furnisht with all things necessary for such acti­ons. Now the divine Wisdome is no ar­hitrary thing, that can change, or alter those setled immutable idaea's of things that are there represented. It lopps not off essential Attributes of some beings, to inoculate them upon others: But, di­stinctly comprehending all things, assigns each Being it's proper nature, and qua­lities. And the Divine goodnesse, accor­ding to the wise direction of the eternal intellect, in like distinct and orderly man­ner produceth all things: viz. according to all the variety of their respective idea­as in the divine wisdome. Wherefore as the goodness of God obligeth him not to make every planet a [...] star, or e­very star, a sun; So neither doth it ob­lige him to make every degree of life, [Page 89] a rational soul, or every soul, an impec­cable Angell. For this were to tye him to contradictions. Since therefore, such an order of Beings, as rational and hap­py, though free, and therefore mutable, creatures, were distinctly comprehen­ded in the divine Wisdome; It was an effect of God's Goodness, to bring them into being, even in such a condition, and in such manner, as in their eternal idae­as they were represented.

Thus then we see, it is not contrary to the infinite plenitude of the divine goodness that we should have been made peccable and lyable to defection. And be­ing thus in our very essential constituti­ons lapsable; 'twas no defect in the goodnesse of our Maker that he did not interpose by his absolute omnipotence to prevent our actual praevarication and A­postacy. Since his goodnesse obligeth him not to secure us upon any terms what­ever, but upon such, as may most pro­mote the general good & advantage. And questionless, 'twas much better that such, as would wilfully depart from the laws [Page 90] of their blessed natures, and break through all restraints of the divine commands, should feel the smart of their disobedi­ence; then that providence should dis­order the constitution of nature to pre­vent the punishment, which they drew upon themselves: Since those apostate spirits, remain instances to those that stand, of the divine justice, and se­verity against sinners, and so may con­tribute not a little to their Security. And for that long night of silence, in which multitudes of souls are buried before they descend into terrestrial matter, it is but the due reward of their former disobe­dience; for which, considering the happy circumstances in which they were made, they deserv'd to be nothing for ever. And their re-instating in a condition of life & self-injoyment after so highly culpable delinguencies, is a great instance of the over-flowing fulnesse of the divine com­passion and benignity.

Thus then we see, That Gods making us lapsable and permitting us to fall, is no prejudice in the least to the infinite [Page 91] faecundity of his goodness, and his ma­king all things best. So that mine Argu­ment for Praeexistence bottomn'd on this Foundation, stands yet firm and im­moveable, notwithstanding the rude as­sault of this objection. From which I pass to a fourth.

CHAP. IX. A (4^th) Objection against the Argument from God's goodness viz. That it will conclude as well that the World is infinite and eternal, Answered. The conclu­sion of the second Argument for Praeexistence.

THerefore fourthly, it will be ex­cepted, If we may argue from the divine goodness, which always doth what is best, for the Praeexistence of [Page 92] Souls; then we may as reasonably thence conclude, that the world is both infinite and eternal, since an infinite communi­cation of goodnesse is better then a Fi­nite. To this, because I doubt I have distrest the Readers patience already, I answer briefly.

(1) Every one that believes the infi­niteness of Gods goodness is as much ob­liged to answer this objection, as I am. For it will be said, infinite goodness doth good infinitely, and consequently the effects to which it doth communicate are infinite. For if they are not so, it might have communicated to more, and thereby have done more good then now 'tis sup­posed to do, and by consequence now is not infinite. And to affirm that good­nesse is infinite, where what it doth and intends to do is but finite, will be said to be a contradiction, since goodness is a relative term, and in God always res­pects somewhat ad extra. For he can­not be said to be good to himself, he be­ing a nature that can receive no additio­nal perfection. Wherefore this Objec­tion [Page 93] makes no more against mine Ar­gument, then it doth against the infi­nity of the divine goodness, and there­fore I am no more concern'd in it then others. Yea (2ly.) the Scripture affirms that which is the very strength of mine Argument, viz. That God made all things best; Very Good, saith our Tran­slation: but the Original, [...]; and [...] is a particle of the Superlative. And therefore every one that owns it's sacred Authority is interested against this objection. For it urgeth, it had been far more splendid, glorious, and magnifi­cent for God to have made the universe commensurate to his own immensity; and to have produced effects of his power and greatness, where ever he himself is, viz. in infinite space and duration, then to have confined his omnipotence to work only in one little spot of an infinite [...] capacity, and to begin to act but 'tother day. Thus then the late creati­on, and finiteness, of the world, seem to conflict with the undoubted oracle of truth as well as with mine Argument, [Page 94] ment, and therefore the objection drawn thence is of no validity. (3) Those that have most strenuously defended the or­thodox doctrine against the old opinion of the eternity and infinity of the world, have asserted it to be impossible in the nature of the thing. And sure the Divine benig­nity obligeth him not to do contradicti­ons; or such things, as in the very noti­on of them, are impossible. But in the case of Praeexistence, no such thing can be reasonably pretended, as above hath been declared; and therefore there is no escaping by this Evasion neither. Nor can there any thing else be urged to this purpose, but what whoever believes the infinity of the divine bounty will be con­cern'd to answer; And therefore 'twill make no more against me, then against a truth on all hands confessed. Let me only adde this, That 'tis more becom­ming us, to inlarge our apprehensions of things so, as that they may suit the Di­vine Beneficence, then to draw it down to a complyance with our narrow schemes, and narrow modells.

[Page 95] Thus then I have done with the Ar­gument for Praeexistence drawn from the Divine goodnesse. And I have been the longer on it, because I thought 'twas in vain to propose it, without taking to task the principal of those objections, that must needs arise in the minds of those that are not used to this way of arguing. And while there was no provision made to stop up those Evasions, that I saw this Argument obnoxious to; the using of it, I was afraid, would have been a pre­judice, rather then a furtherance of the cause I ingaged it in. And therefore I hope the ingenious will pardon this so ne­cessary piece of tediousnesse.

CHAP. X. A third Argument for Praeexistence, from the great variety of mens spe­culative inclinations; and also the diversity of our Genius's, copi­ously urged. If these Arguments make Praeexistence but probable, 'tis enough to gain it the victory.

BUt now I proceed to another Argu­ment. Therefore, Thirdly, If we do but reflect upon what was said above, against the souls daily Creation, from that enormous pravity which is so deeply rooted in some mens natures, we may thence have a considerable evidence of Praeexistence. For as this strong natu­ral propensity to vice and impiety can­not possibly consist with the Hypothesis of the souls comming just out of Gods hands pure and immaculate; so doth it most [Page 97] aptly suit with the doctrine of its praeex­istence: which gives a most clear and ap­posite account of the phaenomenon. For let us but conceive the souls of men to have grown degenerate in a former condition of life, to have contracted strong and inveterate habits to vice and Iewdnesse, and that in various manners and degrees; we may then easily apprehend, when some mens natures had so incredibly a depraved tincture, and such impetuous, ungovernable, irreclaimiable inclinations to what is vitious; while others have no­thing near such wretched propensions, but by good education and good disci­pline are mouldable to vertue. This shews a clear way to unriddle this ama­zing mystery, without [...]lemishing any of the divine Attributes, or doing the least violence to our faculties.

Nor is it more difficult to conceive, how a soul should awaken out of the state of inactivity we speak of, with those radi­cal inclinations that by long practice it had contracted, then how a Swallow should return to her old trade of living [Page 98] after her winter sleep and silence; for those customs it hath been addicted to in the other state, are now so deeply fastned and rooted in the soul, that they are be­come even another nature.

Now then, if Praeexistence be not the truth, 'tis very strange that it should so exactly answer the Phaenomena of our na­tures, when as no other Hypothesis doth any whit tolerably suit them. And if we may conclude that false, which is so correspondent to all appearances, when we know nothing else that can yield any probable account of them, and which is not in the least repugnant to any in­ducement of belief, we then strangely forget our selves when we determine a­ny thing. We can never for instance, con­clude the Moon to be the cause of the flux and reflux of the Sea, from the an­swering of her approaches and recesses to its ebbs and swellings. Nor at this rate can the cause of any thing else be de­termin'd in nature.

But yet besides. (2) we might another way inforce this Argument, from the [Page 99] strange difference and diversity that there is in mens wits and intellectual craseis, as well as in the dispositions of their wills and appetites. Even the natural tempers of mens minds are as vastly different, as the qualities of their bodys. And 'tis ea­sy to observe in things purely speculative and intellectual, even where neither edu­cation or custom have interposed to sophi­sticate the natural [...] that some men are strangely propense to some opinions, which they greedily drink in, as soon as they are duly represented; yea and find themselves burthened and opprest, while their education hath kept them in a contrary belief: when as others are as fatally set against these opinions, and can never be brought favourably to resent them.

Every soul brings a kind of sense with it into the world, whereby it tastes and relisheth what is suitable to its peculiar temper. And notions will never lye easi­ly in a mind, that they are not fitted to; some can never apprehend that for other then an Absurdity, which others are so [Page 100] clear in, that they almost take it for a First principle. And yet the former hath all the same evidence as the latter. This I have remarkably taken notice of, in the opinion of the extension of a spirit. Some that I know, and those inquisi [...]ve, free and ingenuous, by all the proof and evidence that is, cannot be reconciled to it. Nor can they conceive any thing extended but as a Body. Whereas other deep and impartial searchers into nature, cannot apprehend it anything at all, if not extended; but think it must then be a ma­thematical point, or a meer non-entity.

I could instance in other speculations, which I have observ'd some to be passi­onate Embracers of upon the first propo­sal; when as no arguments could pre­vail on others, to think them tolerable. But there needs no proof of a manifest observation.

Therefore before I goe further, I would demand, whence comes this meer notional or speculative variety: were this difference about sensibles, yea or a­bout things depending on the imaginati­on, [Page 101] the influence of the body might then be suspected for a cause. But since it is in the most abstracted Theories that have nothing to do with the grosser phan­tasmes; since this diversity is found in minds that have the greatest care to free themselves from the deceptions of sense, and intanglements of the body, what can we conclude, but that the soul it self is the immediate subject of all this variety, and that it came praejudiced and prepos­sest into this body with some implicit no­tions that it had learnt in another? And if this congruity to some opinions, and a­versene [...]e to others be congenial to us, and not advenient from any thing in this state, 'tis me thinks clear that we were in a former. For the soul in its first and pure nature hath no idiosynerasies, that is, hath no proper natural inclinations which are not competent to others of the same kind and condition. Be sure, they are not fatally determin'd by their natures to false and erroneous apprehensions. And therefore since we find this determinati­on to one or other falshood in many, if [Page 102] not most in this state, and since 'tis very unlikely it is derived only from the body, custom, or education, what can we con­ceive on't, but that our souls were tainted with these peculiar and wrong corruptions before we were extant upon this stage of Earth.

Besides, 'tis easie to observe the strange and wonderful variety of our geniusses; one mans nature inclining him to one kind of study and imployment, anothers to what is very different. Some almost from their very cradles will be addicted to the making of figures, And in little mechanical contrivances; others love to be riming, almost as soon as they can speak plainly, and are taken up in smal essays of Poetry. Some will be scrawling pictures, and others take as great delight in some pretty offers at Musick and vocal harmony. Infinite almost are the ways in which this pure natural diversity doth discover it selfe. Now to say that all this variety proceeds primarily from the meer temper of our bodys, is me thinks a very poor and unsatisfying Account. For [Page 103] those that are the most like in the temper­ayr, complexion of their bodys, are yet of a vastly differing Genius. Yea they that havebeen made of the same clay, cast in the same mould, and have layn at once in the same natural bed, the womb; yea whose bodies have been as like as their state and fortunes, and their education & usages the same, yet even they do not unfrequently differ as much from each o­ther in their genius and dispositions of the mind, as those that in all these par­ticulars are of very different condition. Besides there are all kind of makes, forms, dispositions, tempers, and complexions of body, that are addicted by their na­tures to the same exercises and imploy­ments: so that to ascribe this to any pe­culiarity in the Body, is me seems a very improbable solution of the Phaenomenon. And to say all these inclinations are from custom or education, is the way not to be believed, since all experience testifies the contrary.

What then can we conjecture is the cause of all this diversity, but that we [Page 104] had taken a great delight and pleasure in some things like and analogous unto'these, in a former condition? which now a­gain begins to put forth it selfe, when we are awakened out of our silent recess into a state of action. And though the imployments, pleasures and exercises of our former life, were without question very different from these in the present estate; yet 'tis no doubt, but that some of them were more confamiliar and a­nalogous to some of our transactions, than others, so that as any exercise or im­ployment here is more suitable to the particular dispositions that were praedo­minant in the other state, with the more peculiar kindnesse is it regarded by us, and the more greedily do our inclinati­ons now fasten on it. Thus if a Musitian should be interdicted the use of all mu­sical instruments, and yet might have his choice of any other Art or profession, 'tis likely he would betake himselfe to Limning or Poetry; these exercises re­quiring the same disposition of wit and genius, as his beloved Musick did. And [Page 105] we in like manner, being by the fate of our wretched descent hindred from the direct exercising our selves about the objects of our former delights and plea­sures, do yet assoon as we are able, take to those things which do most corre­spond to that genius that formerly in­spired us.

And now 'tis time to take leave of the Arguments from Reason that give evi­dence for Praeexistence. If any one think that they are not so Demonstrative, but that they may be answered, or at least evaded; I pray him to consider how many demonstrations he ever met with, that a good wit, resolv'd in a contrary cause, could not shuffle from the edge of. Or, let it be granted, that the Argu­ments I have alledged are no infallible or necessary proofs; yet if they render my cause but probable, yea but possible, I have won what I contended for. For it having been made manifest by as good evidence as I think can be brought for any thing, that the way of new cre­ations is most inconsistent with the honor [Page 106] of the blessed Attributes of God: And that the other of Traduction is most im­possible and contradictious in the nature of things: There being now no other way left but Praeexstence, if that be pro­bable or but barely possible, 'tis enough to give it the victory. And whether all that hath been said prove so much or no, I leave to the indifferent to determine. I think he that will say it doth not, can bring few proofs for any thing, which according to his way of judging will de­serve to be called Demonstrations.

CHAP. XI. Great caution to be used in alledging scripture for our speculative opini­ons. The countenance that Praeex­istence hath from the sacred writings both of the old and new Testament; Reasons of the seeming uncouthnesse of these allegations. Praeexistence stood in no need of Scripture-proof.

IT will be next expected, that I should now prove the Doctrine I have un­dertaken for, by Scripture evidence, and make good what I said above, That the divine oracles are not so silent in this matter as is imagined. But truly I have so tender a sense of the sacred Authority of that Holy volume, that I dare not be so bold with it, as to force it to speak what I think it intends not; A praesump­tion, that is too common among our confident opinionists, and that hath oc­sion'd great troubles to the Church, and [Page 108] disrepute to the inspired writings. For, for men to ascribe the odd notions of their over-heated imaginations to the spirit of God, and eternal truth, is me thinks a ve­ry bold and impudent belying it. Where­fore I dare not but be very cautious what I speak in this matter, nor would I wil­lingly urge Scripture as a proof of any thing, but what I am sure by the whole tenor of it, is therein contained: And would I take the liberty to fetch in eve­ry thing for a Scripture-evidence, that with a little industry a man might make serviceable to his design: I doubt not but I should be able to fill my Margent with Quotations, which should be as much to purpose as have been cited in ge­neral CATECHISMS and CON­FESSIONS of FAITH, and that in points that must forsooth be dignified with the sacred title of FUNDAMENTAL. But Reverend ASSEMBLIES may make more bold with Scripture then private persons; And therefore I confesse I'me so timerous that I durst not follow their example: Though in a mat­ter [Page 109] that I would never have imposed up­on the belief of any man, though I were certain on't, and had absolute power to injoyn it. I think the onely way to pre­serve the reverence due to the oracles of Truth, is never to urge their Authority but in things very momentous, and such as the whole current of them gives an e­vident suffrage to. But to make them speak every trivial conceit that our sick brains can imagine or dream of, (as I intimated) is to vilisie and deflowre them. Therefore though I think that several Texts of Scripture look very fairly upon Praeexistence, and would encourage a man that considers what strong Reasons it hath to back it, to think, that very probably they mean some thing in savour of this Hypothesis; yet He not urge them as an irrefutable proof, being not willing to lay more stresse upon any thing then 'twil bear. Yea I am most willing to confesse the weaknesse of my Cause in what joint soever I shall disco­ver it. And yet I must needs say, that who ever compares the Texts that fol­low, [Page 110] with some particulars mention'd in the answer to the objection of Scripture­silence, will not chuse but acknowledge that there is very fair probability for Praeexistence in the written word of God, as there is in that which is engraven upon our rational natures. Therefore to bring together here what Scripture saith in this matter,

1. [...]e lightly touch an expression or two of the old Testament, which not improperly may be applyed to the busi­nesse we are in search of. And me thinks God himselfe in his posing the great in­stance of patience, Job, seems to intimate somewhat to this purpose, viz. that all spirits were in being when the Founda­tions of the earth were laid: when saith he, the morning stars sang together, and all the sons of God shouted for joy. By the former very likely were meant the Angels, and 'tis not improbable but by the latter may be intended the blessed untainted souls. At least the particle All me thinks should comprize this order of spirits also. And within the same period [Page 111] of discourse, having question'd Job a­bout the nature and place of the Light, he Adds, I know that thou wast then born, for the number of thy days are many, as the Septuagint render it. And we know our Saviour and his Apostles have given credit to that Translation by their so con­stant following it. Nor doth that saying of God to Jeremias in the beginnning of his charge seem to intimate lesse, Before I formed thee in the belly I knew thee, and before thou camest out of the womb, I gave thee wisdome; as reads a very creditable version. Now though each of these pla­ces might be drawn to another sense, yet that onely argues that they are no neces­sary proof for Praeexistence, which I rea­dily acknowledge; nor do I intend any such matter by alledging them. Howe­ver I hope they will be confest to be ap­plicable to this sense; and if there be o­ther grounds that perswade this Hypothe­sis to be the truth, 'tis I think very pro­bable that these Texts intend it favour. which whether it be so or no, we have seen already.

[Page 112] 2. For the Texts of the New Testa­ment that seem to look pleasingly upon Praeexistence, I shall as briefly hint them as I did the former. And me thinks that passage of our Saviours prayer, Father, Glorifie me with the same glory I had with thee before the world began, sounds somewhat to this purpose.

The glory which he prays to be re­stored to, seems to concern his humane nature onely; for the divine could never lose it. And therefore it supposeth that he was in his humanity existent before: And that his soul was of old before his appearance in a Terrestial body. Which seems also to be intimated by the expres­sions of his comming from the Father, descending from Heaven, and returning thither again, which he very frequently makes use of. And we know the Divinity that fils all things, cannot move to, or quit a place, it being a manifest imper­fection, and contray to his Immensity.

I might add those other expres­sions of our Saviour's taking upon him the forme of a servant, of rich for our [Page 113] sakes becomming poor, and many others of like import, all which are very clear if we admit the doctrine of Praeexistence, but without it somewhat perplex and in­tricate: since these things, applyed to him as God, are very improper and disa­greeing, but appositely suit his Humanity, to which if we refer them, we must suppose our Hypothesis of Praeexistence. But I omit further prosecution of this matter, since these places have bin more diffusely urged in a late discourse to this purpose.

Moreover the Question of the Disci­ples, Was it for this mans sin, or for his Fathers that he was born blind? and that answer of theirs to our Saviours demand, whom men said he was; in that some said he was John the Baptist, some Elias, or one of the Prophets; both which I have mention'd before; doe clearly enough argue, that both the Di­sciples and the Jews believed Praeexist­ence. And our Saviour saith not a word to disprove their opinion. But I spake of this above.

[Page 114] Now how ever uncouth these allegati­ons may seem to those that never heard these Scriptures thus interpreted; yet I am confident, had the opinion of Praeex­istence been a received Doctrine, and had these Texts been wont to be applyed to the proof on't, they would then have been thought to assert it, with clear and convictive evidence. But many having ne­ver heard of this Hypothesis, and those that have, seldome meeting it men­tioned but as a silly dream o [...] antiquated absurdity, 'tis no wonder that they never suspect it to be lodg'd in the Sacred vo­lumne, so that any attempt to confirm it thence, must needs seem rather an offer of wit then serious judgement. And the places that are cited to that purpose ha­ving been freequently read and heard of, by those that never discerned them to breath the least air of any such matter as Praexistence, their new and unexpected application to a thing so litle thought of, must needs seem a wild fetch of an extravagant imagination. But however unconclusive the Texts alledged may [Page 115] seem to those a strong prejudice hath shut up against the Hypothesis; The learn­ed Jews, who where persuaded of this Doctrine, thought it clearly enough con­tain'd in the Old Volume of holy writ, and tooke the citations, named above, for current Evidence. And though I can­not Warrant for their Judgement in things, yet doubtlesse they were the best judges of their own Language. Nor would our School-Doctors have thought it so much a stranger to the New, had it had the luck to have been one of their opinions, or did they not too frequently apply the sacred Oracles to their own fore-conceived notions.

But whether what I have brought from Scripture prove any thing or nothing, 'tis not very materiall, since the Hypothesis of Praeexistence stands secure enough up­on those Pillars of Reason, which have their Foundation in the Attributes of God, and the Phaenomena of the world. And the Right Reason of a Man, is one of the Divine volums, in which are writ­ten the indeleble Ideas of eternal Truth: [Page 116] so that what it dictates, is as much the voice of God, as if in so many words it were clearly exprest in the written Reve­lations. It is enough therefore for my purpose, if there be nothing in the sacred writings contrary to this Hypothesis; which I think is made clear enough al­ready; And though it be granted that Scripture is absolutely silent as to any assertion of Praeexistence, yet we have made it appear that its having said no­thing of it, is no prejudice, but an advan­tage to the cause.

CHAP. XII. Why the Author thinks himself obliged to descend to some more particular Ac­count of Praeexistence. 'Tis presump­tion positively to determine how it was with us of old. The Authors de­signe in the Hypothesis that follows.

NOw because inability to appre­hend the manner of a Thing is a great prejudice against the belief on't; [Page 117] I find my selfe obliged to go a little further then the bare proof, and defence of Praeexistence. For though what I have said, may possibly induce some to think favourably of our conclusion, That The souls of men were made before they came into these bodys; yet whil they shal think that nothing can be conceived of that for­mer state, And that our Praeexistent con­dition cannot be represented to Humane understanding, but as a dark black soli­tude: it must needs weaken the per­swasion of those that are lesse confirm­ed, and fill the minds of the inquisitive with a dubious trouble and Anxiety. For searching and contemplative Heads can­not be satisfyed to be told, That our souls have lived and acted in a former condition, except they can be helpt to some more particular apprehension of that stare; How we lived and acted of old, and how probably we fell from that better life, into this Region of mi­sery and imperfection.

Now though indeed my charity would prompt me to do what I can for the re­lief [Page 118] and ease of auy modest inquirer; yet shall I not attempt to satisfie punctual and eager curiosity in things hidden and unsearchable. Much lesse shall I posi­tively determine any thing in matters so Lubricous and uncertain. And indeed considering how imperfect our now state is, how miserable shallow our under­standings are, and how little we know of our present selves, and the things a­bout us, it may seem a desperate under­taking to attempt any thing in this mat­ter. Yea, when we contemplate the vast circuits of the Divine wisdome, and think how much the thoughts and actions of Aeternity and omniscience are beyond ours, who are but of Yesterday, and know nothing, it must needs discourage Con­fidence it selfe from determining, how the Oeconomy of the world of life was or­der'd, in the day the Heavens and Earth were framed. There are doubtless in­finite ways and methods according to which the unsearchable wisdome of our Maker could have disposed of us, which we can have no conceit of; And we are [Page 119] little more capable of unerringly resol­ving our selves now, how it was with us of old, then a child in the womb is to determine, what kind of life it shall live when it is set at liberty from that dark inclosure. Therefore let shame and blush­ing cover his face that shall confidently affirm that 'twas thus or thus with us in the state of our Fore-Beings.

However, to shew that it may have been that our Souls did Praeexist, though we cannot punctually and certainly con­clude upon the Particular State, I shall presume to draw up a conceivable Scheame of the Hypothesis; And if our narrow minds can think of a way how it might have been, I hope no body will deny that the divine wisdom could have contriv'd it so, or infinitely better than we can imagine in our little modells.

And now I would not have it thought that I goe about to insinuate or represent any opinions of mine own, or that I am a votary to all the notions I make use of, whether of the Antient, or more modern Philosophers. For I seriously professe a­gainst [Page 120] all determinations in this kind. But my business onely is, by some imperfect hints and guesses to help to apprehend a little how the state of Praeexistence might have been, and so to let in some beams of antient and modern light upon this immense darknesse. Therefore let the Reader if he please call it a Romantick scheam, or imaginary Hypothesis, or what name else best fits his phancy, and he'l not offend me; Nor do I hold my selfe concern'd at all to vindicate the truth of any thing here that is the fruit of mine own invention or composure; Though I confesse I could beg civilityes at least for the notions I have borrowed from great and worthy Sages. And in­deed the Hypothesis as to the main, is de­rived to us from the platoni [...]s: though in their writings 'tis but Gold in Oar, less pure and perfect: But a late great Artist hath excellently refined it. And I have not much work to do, but to bring to­gether what he up and down hath scat­tered, and by a method-order, and some connexions and notions of mine own, to [Page 121] work it into an intire and uniforme mass.

Now because the Frame of the parti­cular Hypothesis is originally Philosophi­call, I shall therefore not deprave it by mingling with it the opinions of mo­dern Theologers, or distort any thing to make it accommodate to their dogmata, but solely and sincerely follow the light of Reason and Philosophy. For I intend not to endeavour the late alteration of the ordinary systeme of Divinity, nor designe any thing in this place but a re­presentation of some harmlesse philoso­phical conjectures: In which I shall con­tinually guide my selfe by the Attri­butes of God, the Phaenomena of the world, and the best discoveryes of the nature of the Soul.

CHAP. XIII. [7] Pillars on which the particular Hypothesis stands.

NOw the Fabrick we are going to build, will stand like as the House of wisdom upon seven Pillars; which I shall first crect and establish, that the Hypothesis may be firm and sure like a House that hath Foundations. There­fore the first Fundamental Principle I shall lay, is

CHAP. XIV. A Philosophical Hypothesis of the Souls [...]aexistence.

THe Eternal and Almighty goodness, the blessed spring and roo [...] of [...] things, made all his [...], in the best, happiest, and most perfect condition, that their respective natures rendred them [Page 145] capable of, By Axiom the first; and there­fore they were then constituted in the inactuation and exercise of their noblest and most perfect powers. Consequently, the souls of men, a considerable part of the divine workmanship, were at first made in the highest invigouration of the spiritual and intellective faculties which were exercised in virt [...]e, and in blissful contemplation of the supream Deity; where­fore now by axiom 6 and 7, the ignobler and lower powers, or the life of the b [...]ily, were languid and rei [...]iss.

So that the most te [...]uious, pure and simple matter being the fi [...]test instrumens for the most vigorous and spiritual facul­ties according to Principle 2, 4, and 5. The soul in this condition was united with the most [...] and athereal matter that it was capable of inacting; and the inferior powers, those relating to the body, being at a very low ebb of exercise, were wholly subservient to the superiour, and imployed in nothing but what was ser­viceable to that higher life: So that the sences did but present occasions for di­vine [Page 146] love, and objects for contemplation; and the plastick had nothing to do, but to move this passive and [...]asie body, ac­cordingly as the concerns of the higher faculties required. Thus then did wee at first live and act in a pure and aethereal body; and consequently in a place of light and blessedness, by Principle 3^d. But particularly to describe and point at this paradisaical residence, can be done only by those that live in those serene regions of lightsom glory: Some Philosophers indeed have adventured to pronounce the place to be the Sun that vast O [...]b of splendor and brightness; though it may be 'tis more probable, that those immense tracts of pure and quiet aether that are a­bove Saturn, are the joyous place of our ancient celestial abode: But there is no determination in matters of such lubri­cous uncertainty where ever it is, 'tis doubtless a place and state of wonderful bliss and happiness, and the highest that our natures had fitted us to.

In this state we may be supposed to have lived in the blissful exercise of [Page 147] virtue, divine love and contemplation, through very long Tracts of Dura­tion.

But though we were thus unconceiva­bly happy, yet were we not immutably so; for our highest perfections and noblest faculties being but finite, may after long and vigorous exercise, somewhat abat [...] and remit in their sublimest operations, and Adam may fall a sleep; In which time of remission of the higher powers, the lower may advance and more live­lily display themselves then they could before, by Axiom 7; for the soul being a little slackt in its pursuits of immate­rial objects, the lower powers which be­fore were almost wholly taken up and imployed in those high services, are somewhat more releast to follow a lit­tle the tendencies of their proper natures. And now they begin to convert towards the body, and warmly to resent the de­lights and pleasures thereof; Thus is Eve brought forth, while Adam sleepeth. The lower life, that of the body is now consi­derably awakened, and the operations of the [Page 148] higher, proportionably abated. How­ever, there is yet no anomy or disobedience, for all this is but an innocent exercise of of those faculties which God hath gi­ven us to imploy, and as far as is consist­ent with the divine laws, to gratifie. For it was no fault of ours that we did not uncessantly keep our spiritual powers upon the most intense exercises that they were capable of exerting; we were made on for purpose defatigable, that so all degrees of life might have their exercise; and our maker designed that we should feel and taste the joyes of our congenite bo­dies, as well as the pleasures of those seraphick aspires and injoyments.

And me thinks it adds to the felicity of that state, that our happiness was not one uniform piece, or continual repetition of the same, but consisted in a most grate­ful variety, viz. in the pleasure of all our faculties, the lower as well as the higher; for those are as much gratified by suit­able exercises and enjoyments a [...] [...]hese; and contequently according to their pro­portion capable of as great an happiness: [Page 149] Nor is it any more derogation from the divine goodness, that the noblest and highest life was not always exercised to the height of its capacity, then that we were not made all Angels, all the Pla­nets so many Suns, and all the variety of the creatures form'd into one Species: Yea, as was intimated above, 'tis an [...]a­stance of the divine benignity, that he pro­duced things into being, according to the vast plenitude of Forms that were in his all knowing mind; and gave them ope­rations suitable to their respective natures; so that it had rather seemed a defect in the divine dispensations, if we had not had the pleasure of the proper exercise of the lower faculties as well as of the higher. Yea, me thinks, 'tis but a reasonable re­ward to the body, that it should have its delights and gratifications also, whereby it will be fitted for further serviceable­ness. For doubtless it would be in time spent and exhausted were it continually imploy'd in those high and less propor­tion'd operations.

Wherefore God himself having so [Page 150] ordered the matter, that the inferiour life should have its turn of invigouration; it can be no evill in us, that that is execu­ted which he hath so determined, as long as we pass not the bounds that he hath set us. Adam therefore was yet innocent, though he joyed in his beloved Spouse, yea, and was permitted to feed upon all the fruits of this Paradise, the various results of corporeal pleasure, as long as he followed not his own will and appe­tites contrarily to the divine commands and appointments.

But at length unhappily the delights of the body betray us, through our over indulgence to them, and lead us captive to anomy and disobedience. The sense of what is grateful and pleasant by insensi­ble degrees gets head over the apprehen­sion of what is just and good; the Serpent and Eve prove successful tempters; Adam cannot withstand the inordnate appetite, but feeds on the forbidden fruit, viz. the dictates of his deba [...]chea will, and [...] ­sual pleasure. And thus now the body is gotten uppermost, the lower faculties [Page 151] have greater exercise and command then the higher, those being very vigorous­ly awakened, and these proportionably shrunk up, and consopited; wherefore by Axiom 3. and 5. the soul contracts a less pure body, which may be more ac­commodate to sensitive operations; and thus we fall from the highest Paradise the blissful regions of life and glory, and become Inhabitants of the Air.

Not that we are presently quite di­vested of our Etherial state, as soon as we descend into this less perfect condi­tion of life, for retaining still considera­ble exercises of the higher life, though not so ruling and vigorous ones as be­fore, the soul must retain part of its for­mer vehicle, to serve it as its instrument, in those its operations: For the [...]herial bo­dy contracts crasiness and impurity, by the same degrees as the immaterial fa­culties abate in their exercise; so that we are not immediately upon the expi­ring of the highest congruity wholly stript of all remains of our celestial bo­dies, but still hold some portion of them, [Page 152] within the grosser vehicle, while the spi­rit, or higher life is in any degree of ac­tuation.

Nor are we to suppose that every slip or indulgence to the body can detrude us from our athereal happiness; but such a change must be wrought in the soul, as may spoil its congruity to a celestial body, which in time by degrees is effected: Thus we may probably be supposed to have fallen from our supream felici [...]ie.

But others of our order have made bet­ter use of their injoyments, and the in­dulgences of their Maker; and though they have had their periga's as well as their Apoge's: I mean their Verges to­wards the body and its joys, as well as their aspires to nobler and sublimer ob­jects, yet they kept the station of their natures, and made their orderly returns, without so remarkable a defection: And though possibly some of them may somtimes have had their slips, and have waded further into the pleasures of the body then they ought to have done, [Page 153] yet partly by their own timely care and consideration, and partly by the divine assistance, they recover them­selves again to their condition of pri­migenial innocence. But we must leave them to their felicity, and go on with the History of our own descent. There­fore after we are detraded from our [...] ­therial condition, we next descend into the Aerial.