THere's no part of the Chriſtian Faith has produced ſo many Diſputes and Controverſies, ſuch a numerous Variety of Opinions and Sects, as the Doctrine of the Bleſſed Trinity. If we conſult the large Catalogues of Primitive Hereſies, we ſhall find the far greateſt Number of them nothing elſe but ſo many ſeveral Modes and Ways of Explaining the Common Undivided Nature and Eſſence of the Trinity, and the different Offices and Operations of each Perſon.

How far the uncertainty of our Faith in theſe Points, the many Abſurd and Blaſphemous Expoſitions that have been made of them, and the warm and indiſcreet Management of contrary Parties, have contributed to the Prejudice of Religion, and the Scandal of its Profeſſors, has been a common Obſervation and Complaint in all Chriſtian Ages. And ſeveral Expedients have been propoſed for the Redreſſing of this Miſchief, but all Attempts of this kind have hitherto miſcarried. The principal Reaſon of which I humbly conceive to be this: That thoſe who have laboured in this good Deſign, have for the moſt part proceeded upon wrong Meaſures.

Now, the Methods that have been generally and chiefly inſiſted upon, are Three, which are all improper, or inſufficient, and have therefore proved ineffectual, as will plainly appear upon a particular Examination of each.

1. Firſt then, There are ſome who are for Reverencing the Myſtery of the Trinity without ever looking into it at all, who think it not to be the Subject either of Diſpute or Enquiry; imagining every thing of this high and tranſcendent Nature is propoſed to us only as a Tryal and Exerciſe of our Faith; and the more implicit that is, the fuller do we expreſs our truſt and relyance upon God.

Nay, farther, There are thoſe who do not ſcruple to ſay, the more Contradictions the better; the greater the Struggle and Oppoſition of Reaſon, the greater is the Triumph and Merit of our Faith.

But there's no likelihood of ſuppreſſing any of our Doubts or Diſputes in Religion this way: For beſides the Natural Propenſion of the Soul to the ſearch of Truth, and the ſtrong and impatient deſire we have to know as much as ever we can of what immediately concerns us, 'tis generally and very juſtly look'd upon both as the Priviledge and Duty of Man to Enquire and Examine before he believes or judges; and never give up his aſſent to any thing but upon Good and Rational Grounds: And therefore 'twould be a very hard thing to perſwade the World to ſtifle and reſtrain ſo many Powerful Motives of Action: But ſhould they be farther prevailed upon to go directly contrary to their Reaſon, 'twould be much more difficult to Conquer the uneaſineſs of the Reluctance.

And indeed 'tis well the difficulties of ſubduing the Underſtanding are too great to be maſter'd; For a ſlight Reflection will ſerve to convince us, that the neceſſary Conſequences of a blind Reſignation of Judgment would be far more Fatal to Chriſtianity than all our preſent Diviſions.

What Blaſphemies and Contradictions may and have been impoſed upon mens belief, under the Venerable Name of Myſteries? And how eaſie are Villainous Practices derived from an abſurd Faith? This is matter of common Obſervation, and has brought a juſt Scandal upon a large Party of Chriſtians, and given occaſion to Men of light, undiſtinguiſhing Capacities, to deny and ſcoff at the Saving Truths of the Goſpel, becauſe they were accompanyed with a ridiculous mixture of Errors.

No doubt therefore we may, and ought carefully to Examine the Faith and Principles we deſign for the Rule of our Lives, and endeavour to underſtand all our Religion ſo far, as to be able to Juſtifie it, both to our Selves and Unbelievers.

We ought indeed to proceed with all the Caution and Humility imaginable, and take a juſt Eſtimate of our Task and Abilities: But to deny us the Liberty either of uſing or obeying our Reaſon, is a ſuſpicious as well as an unjuſt Reſtraint.

2. There are others, who call the Doctrine of the Trinity an Incomprehenſible Myſtery, and yet are at a great deal of pains to bring it down to a Level with Humane Underſtanding; and are all very earneſt to have their own particular Explications acknowledged as neceſſary Articles of Faith: But the number and diſagreement of the Expoſitors plainly diſcover the vanity of ſuch Pretences.

This has proved ſo unſucceſsful a way, that inſtead of uniting the different Judgments of Chriſtians in one Point, it has broke the Controverſie into a Thouſand more: For Zeal and Oppoſition raiſing up a great many Aſſertors of the Common Belief, and every one looking out for ſome new Terms and Modes of Speech, which ſhould be fuller and more expreſſive than thoſe in Queſtion, the Differences and Diſputes were by conſequence proportionably multiplyed. For the Terms and Forms of Speech made uſe of being capable of ſeveral ſences, and each of them attended with other Acceſſory Idea's, Miſtakes muſt neceſſarily ariſe, and divers new Thoughts be ſuggeſted to ſuch whoſe Heads were employed upon the ſame Subject: And thus it came to paſs, that Defences and Vindications of the Orthodox Faith produced more Hereſies.

Wherefore in all ſuch Matters as theſe, which are too big to be graſp'd, we had better ſit down contented with what we have firm hold of, than tire our ſelves with vain Endeavours to take in more. 'Twould certainly be the trueſt, and the ſafeſt way, ſtrictly to confine our ſelves to Scripture Expreſſions, and never ſpeak of Supernatural Things, but in the Language of Revelation; which being the proper Standard of all other words that ſhall be uſed on theſe Occaſions, 'tis in vain to ſhift the Meaſure, when there's never another to be found which can or ought to reach farther.

It may, however, ſometimes be neceſſary to change this Method, and introduce New Terms to ſecure the True Faith againſt the Falſe Interpretations of ſuch as pervert Scripture. For if Hereticks will make uſe of New Expreſſions to contradict the received Doctrine, we muſt have New Terms to expreſs the ſame Truth in, in Oppoſition to their Hereſie. And in this caſe the Church may very reaſonably require her Members to ſhew their ſteady continuance in the Ancient Faith, by the uſe of ſuch Terms as plainly infer their denyal of any later erroneous Inventions ſet up againſt it.

3. There are a Third ſort of Men in the World, who pretend, That there is no Myſtery propoſed to us as an Object of Faith; and in order to make this of the Trinity appear to be none, they bring a Cloud over the whole Bible, and with ſtrange forc'd Criticiſms and Allegories give the very plaineſt Texts ſuch an unuſual Myſterious turn, as neither the Language will bear, nor is any ways conſiſtent with the Deſign or Character of the Holy Writers.

But this is a very odd prepoſterous Method of Explaining Scripture, by darkening a great part of it to illuſtrate the reſt, and as ridiculous a Project of healing Diviſions, as pulling down a whole ſide of ſtanding Wall to mend a Breach.

And after all, the Socinian Hypotheſis ſeems to me to have more of Myſtery, and Contradiction to Natural Reaſon in it, than what is objected to the Catholick Doctrine.

I am not for clogging the Faith, nor multiplying Myſteries; yet we ought not preſently to deny what we do not underſtand, but ſoberly, and impartially conſider how much we are able to Comprehend, and how far we are obliged to Believe, what we do not.

The Method therefore I deſign to obſerve in the following Diſcourſe, ſhall be different from any of thoſe now mentioned. I ſhall not go about to preſs Men to a Blind Veneration, or Preſumptuous Belief of any thing without Examination; or in Defiance to Reaſon: I ſhall not offer to impoſe any New Arbitrary Explications of my own upon other mens Conſciences, but confine my ſelf wholly to the uſual warranted Forms of Expreſſion. I will not wreſt and ſtrain Scripture to help out a Private Notion, nor do any thing to betray the Juſt Rights and Priviledges of our Common Reaſon; but carefully endeavour to diſtinguiſh How far the Doctrine of the Trinity is a Myſtery, and how far a Myſtery may become an Object of Faith. From whence I hope to make it appear, that nothing hard or unreaſonable is required of us by our Church for the belief of this Article.

In order to which, I ſhall rank all my Reflections upon this Subject, under theſe Three Heads of Enquiry.

Firſt then, I am to Enquire, What it is that perplexes and obſcures our Faith in the Holy Trinity. For before I enter upon a diſtinct and particular Conſideration of the Doctrine it ſelf, 'tis neceſſary to point out ſome of the Principal Cauſes which have occaſioned ſo many Falſe, Abſurd, and Ineffectual Expoſitions of it. And they are theſe four:

The two firſt of theſe have a general Influence upon all Religious Controverſies, but are more eſpecially concerned in this: For there's never more room for Superſtitious and Rigorous Impoſitions, nor fairer Advantages for Cavilling, and drawing abſurd Conſequences, than where a Myſtery is the Subject of Debate.

There are ſome who are apt to be concerned, and cry out, as if the very Foundations of all Religion were overturning, when any particular Scheme or Notion they are fond of, is called in Queſtion. On the other ſide, I have no ſmall Reaſon to believe there are ſeveral who ſtrike at Chriſtianity it ſelf, under the Pretence of bringing down the value of Myſteries.

And indeed if we conſider the general Temper of Mankind, 'tis no wonder that there's more Superſtition and Infidelity in the World than True Religion: For believing every thing, and believing nothing, a ſudden Veneration or Contempt of whatſoever is propoſed to us, equally gratifie the lazy Inclinations of the Soul, which loves an eaſie undiſturbed courſe of Thoughts, and is very difficultly brought to endure the Labour of Attention and Enquiry. Nay, of thoſe who ſeem to have conquer'd this Trouble, there are few who lay themſelves out in a free and impartial ſearch of Truth, but are wholly employed in the purſuit of ſome Notion they have before-hand taken up, and are reſolved to maintain: They are already determined what to believe, and only ſeek out Arguments to Juſtifie or Recommend their Opinions to others.

How far theſe general Reflections are applicable to the preſent Caſe, has been hinted already in the beginning of this Diſcourſe, where 'tis very diſcernible from the Ways and Methods made uſe of for ſettling the Doctrine of the Trinity, that Prejudice and Vanity, a falſe Zeal, and an ill-grounded Contempt have had a large ſhare in the Management of this Controverſie.

Another Reaſon why our Endeavours of Expounding this Point have been vain and unſucceſsful, is the want of diſcerning or conſidering the Bounds and Limits of our Knowledge; from whence it comes to paſs, that oftentimes we ſtrive to ſoar above our pitch, and imagine we underſtand ſome things better than really we do. But eſpecially Men of abſtracted Thinking are very apt to deceive themſelves with falſe Idea's, and are firmly perſwaded they conceive things diſtinctly, which they have but a confuſed Notion of. As for inſtance; It has been delivered down, as the conſtant Faith of a long Succeſſion of Eminent Philoſophers, that the whole Subſtance, Nature, and Eſſence of the Soul is wholly and entirely in all the Body conſidered together, and wholly and entirely in every ſingle Particle of it. And this is a Notion which at firſt view has a great appearance of truth and clearneſs, and is ſuch as the Underſtanding readily cloſes with: But if we would ſtrictly and diſtinctly Examine our ſelves, what we mean by thoſe Terms, I believe we ſhould be able to give but a very obſcure Account of our Opinion; and at laſt, be forced to confeſs we underſtand no more than this by them, That the Soul is the Principle of all the Operations performed in the Body. But ſo it ſometimes happens, that we are tranſported too far in our Enquiries after hidden Truths, till we are loſt in Speculation, and vainly think to Fathom the depths of Knowledge and Wiſdom, without conſidering the ſhortneſs of our time. Whereas we ought rather to examine, and find out the Bounds of our Thoughts, know the juſt extent and compaſs of our Underſtanding, and then reſt ſatisfied with what we are Capable of, without deſiring to know more than we can, or pretending to know more than we do.

But further, the Doctrine of the Trinity has ſuffered very much by the Diſcourſes made about it upon another Account; And that is, that ſome of the Authors of ſuch Diſcourſes have imprudently made choice of improper ways of Expreſſion: Either perplexing plain Revelation too much with Philoſophical Terms and Niceties, or expoſing the Faith to contempt, by homely indecent Similies, and diſproportionate Compariſons.

Now, to keep clear of all thoſe Rocks I have diſcovered others to have ſplit upon, I have endeavoured, what I could; to deliver my ſelf from Prejudice and confuſion of Terms, and to ſpeak Juſtly and Intelligibly: And not being yet prepoſſeſt in favour of any particular Explication, the better to preſerve my freedom of Examining the Subject in hand, I have purpoſely forborn to ſearch the Fathers, Schoolmen, or Fratres Poloni, or read over any later Treatiſes concerning this Controverſie while I was compoſing the preſent Eſſay, reſolving to conſult nothing but Scripture and my own Natural Sentiments, and draw all my Reflections from thence, taking only ſuch which eaſily, and without conſtraint offered themſelves.

2. And thus having cleared the way, and removed every thing which I thought might obſtruct or miſguide my Enquiries, I come, in the ſecond place, to conſider the Doctrine it ſelf; and Faithfully and Impartially to Examine what is ſufficient for Chriſtians to believe concerning the Trinity, or, which is all one in this caſe, what is neceſſary to be believed: For certainly he believes enough, and cannot in reaſon be taxed for a narrow defective Faith, who believes as much as is required of him.

For the better proceeding in which Enquiry, I ſhall lay down this as an evident Truth, which every Man will grant me, that nothing is neceſſary to be believed, but 1. what's poſſible to be believed; and 2. what's plainly revealed.

But here I would be underſtood, as to the laſt part of the Aſſertion, only of ſuch matters which are known to us no other way than by Revelation. For in ſeveral other caſes, I confeſs, we may be obliged to believe meerly upon Humane Teſtimony: Nay, even Revelation it ſelf, as it is a matter of Fact, claims our Aſſent upon no higher a ground.

But further, I ſhall take this for granted too in a Proteſtant Country, that Scripture is the only Standard of all Neceſſary Revealed Truths: Neither in the preſent Inſtance is there any room for a Traditionary Faith. For beſides that, all the Fathers and Ancient Writers ground their Expoſitions of the Trinity wholly upon Scripture, I cannot conceive that the Subject is capable of a plainer Revelation, as I ſhall endeavour to ſhew more fully in the following Diſcourſe.

We are therefore, in the firſt place, to conſider how far 'tis poſſible to believe a Trinity; and next, to examine what the Scripture requires us to believe in this matter.

Now, there are two Conditions requiſite to make it poſſible for us to believe a thing. 1. That we know the Terms of what we are to aſſent to. 2. That it imply no contradiction to our former Knowledge; ſuch Knowledge I mean which is accompanied with Certainty and Evidence.

Firſt then, we can believe a thing no further than we underſtand the Terms in which it is propoſed to us: For Faith concerns only the truth and falſhood of Propoſitions; and the Terms of which a Propoſition conſiſts muſt be firſt underſtood before we can pronounce any thing concerning the Truth or Falſhood of it; which is nothing elſe but the agreement or diſagreement of its Terms, or the Idea's expreſſed by them. If I have no Knowledge at all of the meaning of the terms uſed in a Propoſition, I cannot exerciſe any Act of my Underſtanding about it, I cannot ſay, I believe or disbelieve any thing, my Soul is perfectly in the ſame ſtate it was before, without receiving any new Determination. If I have but a general confuſed Notion of the Terms, I can give only a general confuſed Aſſent to the Propoſition. So my Faith will always bear the ſame Proportion to my Knowledge of the Subject-matter to be believed.

To make this plainer by an Inſtance, ſuppoſe I am required to believe that A. is equal to B. If I don't know either what A. or B. ſtands for; or have no Notion of Equality, I believe nothing more than I did before this was propoſed to me; I am not capable of any new determinate Act of Faith. All that I can believe in this caſe can amount to no more than this, That Something has ſome reſpect to ſomething elſe; that the Matter I am required to believe, is affirmed by a Perſon of great Knowledge and Integrity, who ought to be credited in what he ſays, and therefore the Propoſition here laid down is probably true in that ſenſe the Author means. And what am I the wiſer for all this? What addition is there made to my Faith or Knowledge by ſuch a Propoſition? But farther, ſuppoſe I know that A. and B. ſtand for two Lines, and that by Equal Lines is meant Lines of the ſame length; ſuch Knowledge can produce only a general confuſed belief, that there is ſome certain Line imaginable juſt of the ſame length with ſome other Line: But if by A. and B. are meant two right Lines, which are the ſides of a given Triangle, and I take a Mathematician's Word for it, without demonſtration that they are equal, or of the ſame length, this is a particular diſtinct Act of Faith; by which I am ſatisfied of the Truth of ſomething which I did not believe or know before.

From whence it follows, that Terms and ſimple Idea's muſt be clearly and diſtinctly underſtood firſt, before we can believe any thing particular of the reſpects and relations they bear to one another, which is the only proper Object of Faith.

Another Condition neceſſary to render a thing capable of being believed is, that it implies no Contradiction to our former Knowledge. I cannot conceive how 'tis poſſible to give our aſſent to any thing that contradicts the plain Dictates of our Reaſon, and thoſe evident Principles from whence we derive all our other Knowledge.

As for Example: I do not ſee how any Authority of Revelation can overthrow the Truth of this Propoſition, That the Whole is bigger than any of its Parts. For

Firſt, I cannot more clearly and diſtinctly perceive any external Impreſſions made upon my Soul, nor be more certain that ſuch Impreſſions proceed from God, than I can perceive and be aſſured that the Idea's I have of Whole and part bear this relation to one another.

Secondly, The nature and conſtitution of things makes it impoſſible that this Propoſition ſhould be falſe; for ſuch and ſuch Things or Notions being ſuppoſed, ſuch and ſuch Habitudes and Reſpects muſt neceſſarily reſult from them. So long therefore as I have the ſame Idea's of whole and part, and the ſame Faculties of Perception, I ſhall always perceive the ſame relation betwixt them: And if my Idea's of whole and part were changed, or a new Texture and Frame of Soul given me, I ſhould indeed perceive different: relations betwixt theſe new Idea's; but this would by no means deſtroy the Truth of my former Conceptions, 'twould ſtill be certain, according to the Idea's I had before of whole and part, that the whole was bigger than any of its parts: Which Idea's will always unalterably have the ſame relation to one another. But

Thirdly, Was it poſſible this Propoſition could be falſe, conſidering only the nature of the things themſelves, the Nature of God furniſhes us with other Arguments of the Truth, and Certainty of it. And

1ſt. It is not conſiſtent with the Juſtice, Wiſdom, or Goodneſs of God, to require us to believe that, which, according to the Frame and Make he has given us, 'tis impoſſible for us to believe: For however ſome Men have advanced this abſurd Paradox, that God can make Contradictions true, I am very certain, that upon an impartial Trial of their Faculties, they would find 'twere perfectly out of their power to believe explicitly, and in the common Senſe of the Terms, that a Part can be bigger than the Whole it is a Part of. But

2dly, Admitting it poſſible for us to be deceived in ſuch Propoſitions which have a conſtant, uniform, and univerſal appearance of Truth and Evidence, this would deſtroy all manner of Certainty and Knowledge, and leave us wholly in Darkneſs, Ignorance, and Deſpair; or, which is more Injurious to the Divine Goodneſs to imagine, under an abſolute neceſſity of being deceived: For 'tis not only impoſſible for me to believe, that ſuch a Propoſition as this, That the VVhole is bigger than any of its Parts is falſe; but I cannot deny my poſitive expreſs aſſent to it as true: The Light and Evidence in this Caſe is ſo clear and ſtrong, that I am not at Liberty ſo much as to ſuſpend my Judgment.

3dly, 'Tis Blaſphemy to think, that God can contradict himſelf; and therefore right Reaſon being the Voice of God, as well as Revelation, they can never be directly contrary to one another.

Now to apply all this to the preſent Caſe; ſuppoſe I am required to believe, That One and the ſame God is Three different Perſons: I only ſuppoſe it here, becauſe I have not yet proved how far, and in what ſenſe, we are obliged to believe a Trinity. If this, I ſay, be the Propoſition I am required to give my aſſent to, 'tis plain, by what has been proved before, that I can believe it no farther than the Terms, of which it is made up, are known and underſtood, and the Idea's ſignified by them conſiſtent.

In order therefore to form a determinate Act of Faith in this Point, I muſt carefully examine my ſelf what Notions I have of God, of Ʋnity and Identity, Diſtinction and Number, and Perſon.

As to the Notion of a Deity, 'tis true indeed I have not a full and adequate Idea of God, neither is my Soul capable of it; but what Conceptions I have of his Nature and Perfections, are, according to my Apprehenſion, ſo far clear, as to enable me truly and juſtly to determine which of thoſe diſtinct Idea's, I have in my Mind, are applicable to him, and which are not. And ſuch a Knowledge of the Divine Nature as this, is a ſufficient direction of my Faith in any Propoſition concerning God, where I clearly underſtand all the Idea's attributed to him.

In the next place therefore, I am to conſider what Notions I have of Ʋnity and Identity, Diſtinction and Number.

And here I confeſs I am at a Loſs how to deliver my ſelf, theſe being ſome of our firſt and moſt ſimple Idea's which are ſo clear of themſelves, that I cannot find clearer to explain them by.

For this is certain, that every Man is conſcious to himſelf, that he has a power of perceiving and comparing his Perceptions, and conſequently muſt know when any thing is preſented to his Mind, whether it be perceivable at one entire view, and whether the Object have one uniform appearance or not: He muſt be alſo ſenſible in a ſucceſſion of Idea's, when the ſame Appearances are repeated again, and how often the Repreſentation is varied.

However, notwithſtanding the Clearneſs of theſe Notions, with reſpect to what paſſes in our own Minds, we are not able to make true and diſtinct Judgments of the unity or multiplicity of things without us: For it does not follow, that what is repreſented to the Soul at once, under one Idea or Appearance, ſhould, according to the reality of things, be one undivided nature, neither can it be inferred, that what is repreſented to the Soul under different Idea's are ſo many diſtinct real Beings: For there are ſome Idea's purely of the Soul's own making, and not copied from any external Patterns, where there are a great many particular real Beings, of different kinds and natures, comprehended under one Repreſentation: Thus all the Hills, Plains, Rivers, Trees, and Towns, &c. which the Eye can reach from ſuch or ſuch a Point, we put into one Picture, and call it a Landskip or Proſpect. Thus does the Soul enlarge its View to all the Works of God and Nature; it takes in the whole Creation at a Thought, and calls it World. On the other ſide, the real Natures, and Eſſences of Things, which are allowed to conſiſt in a ſimple undivided Ʋnity, are not conceivable by us at once, but at different Views, by different partial Conceptions, which the Soul afterwards compounds and calls by one Name. Thus when we endeavour to comprehend the Nature and Eſſence of what we call Man▪ we form, at different times, ſeveral confuſed Notions of Subſtance, Body, Life, Senſe, and Reaſon; every one of which is a complicated Idea, and to be reſolved into a great many others more ſimple and diſtinct: As for inſtance, I muſt form a great many Idea's of particular Actions, and the Modes, Differences, and Relations of them, before I can have any tolerable knowledge of what Reaſon is; and ſo for the reſt.

All therefore that we underſtand of the unity of things without us, is this: When we perceive any Object in a continued Poſition, bounded and fenced out from other things round about it, all within ſuch Terms and Limits we call One: And then again, obſerving a great many different Actions, produced in and by ſuch an Object, we judge all theſe Actions and Operations to proceed from one common Principle, in ſome ſuch manner as Streams from a Fountain, or ſeveral Lines from the ſame Centre. And whatever we thus judge to be One, tho' a great many Thoughts and Conceptions go to the forming of ſuch a Judgment, we endeavour, as well as we can, to repreſent to our ſelves under one Idea or Appearance, tho' the Repreſentation be often very confuſed and indiſtinct. And this we do, as ſuppoſing it wholly and uniformly conceivable at one ſingle View, were it not for the Imperfection of our Faculties: Which Suppoſition is not without good Ground; for this we have plain Experience for, that when any viſible Object is of ſuch a magnitude, or in ſuch a ſituation that the Eye cannot receive the whole Image of it at once, we take it in at different times, from different points of Sight; and yet for all this, we find no more Reaſon to doubt of the real Unity of ſuch an Object, than of any other, whoſe Image came into the Soul entire at one Act of Viſion; for we eaſily conceive there may be other Organs of Sight, which would reflect the whole Object together: And from thence we conclude further, that there may be alſo ſome other Mind more perfect than ours, which perceives that as one ſimple Idea which we cannot apprehend, but by a union of ſeveral different Conceptions: From whence it follows, that the moſt perfect Mind, which is God, is the only true and proper Standard of all Unity and Diſtinction.

The Summe of all my Thoughts is this: What is meant by one or more, the ſame or different Idea's is better to be conceived by inward Reflexion, than can poſſibly be explained by Words.

Such an Idea, which is not diſtinguiſhable into different Appearances, I call a ſimple Idea.

When I have any Thought or Perception, which is reſolvable into ſeveral Idea's, I call this a complex or compounded Notion. And hence I term any Being ſimple or compounded, according as it is perceivable by ſome Mind, under one ſimple Appearance, or a complex Idea.

Whether my Idea's are agreeable to the real Natures of Things, or thoſe original Fatterns in the Mind of God, I cannot certainly know; but when they are the ſame, and when they differ from one another, I plainly perceive, tho' I cannot always judge of the Identity or Diſtinction of Things, according as they are repreſented to my underſtanding, under the ſame or different Appearances: For here I ſhould be ſometimes miſtaken too, as 'tis plain I often muſt, if I judged of the real unity or multiplicity of Things by my own Idea's.

The Notions we have of the unity of Things without us, come the neareſt that can be imagin'd to our Idea's of Point, and continued Extenſion; one of which repreſents ſimple unity, the other compounded; the one we apply to what we call ſpiritual Beings, the other to material: For 'tis certain the Conception we have of Body, can never furniſh us with any Idea of ſimple Unity.

By a Spirit then we mean ſomething without extenſion, and conſequently indiviſible, capable of performing ſome ſuch kind of Actions, which do, in ſome manner or degree, reſemble thoſe we are conſcious of: But what that is, from whence I ſuppoſe ſuch Actions to proceed, I have not the leaſt conception of; for all that I conceive, is only ſeveral Idea's of different particular Actions, which no more expreſs the Idea of that Principle from whence they ſpring, than the Idea's of ſeveral particular Lines expreſs the Idea of that Point they are drawn from.

All that we can perceive or imagine of corporeal Ʋ nity, is nothing elſe but a Connexion or joint Poſition of ſeveral Bodies, which, according as it is more or leſs perceivable, according to the ſimplicity or multiformity of the Figure reſulting from it, and the eaſineſs or difficulty of Separation, makes ſeveral degrees of Ʋnion, which all receive the common Denomination of Ʋnity.

Now as Extenſion, by reaſon of its perpetual diviſibility, cannot give us a true Notion of ſimple Ʋnity, ſo neither can I have any diſtinct knowledge of Ʋnion or Compoſition, abſtracted from all Conſiderations of Extenſion. I do not underſtand how a Mind and Body are united, any otherwiſe than that I perceive ſuch and ſuch ſpiritual Actions produced within the Compaſs of ſuch a Body which I call One: Neither am I able to comprehend the Union or Separation of Two ſpiritual Beings, without conſidering them as in the ſame or different Localites; for I have not diſtinct Idea's of ſeveral ſpiritual Natures, nor, if I ſhould perceive the ſeveral Operations of different Spirits, could I diſtinguiſh the ſeveral individual Beings, or Principles, they proceeded from: For who is there that, if all the Thoughts and Motions of the Souls of ſeveral Men were communicated to him, could tell which proceeded from which? Nay, we cannot tell what difference of Actions is ſufficient to determine the different kinds of Principles they proceeded from; neither can any Co-operation, or Conſent of Actions, make us conceive a ſpiritual Ʋnion, without conceiving the ſame Term of Action too. For ſuppoſe two Souls were ſo exactly framed alike, that they always thought and will'd the ſame Things at the ſame times, and were conſcious of each other's Thoughts and Actions, if they were put into different Bodies, 'tis plain we could not properly ſay they were united or made one: And again, ſuppoſing they were in the ſame Body, we could not poſſibly conceive them to be two, any otherwiſe than we knew them capable of a ſeparate Exiſtence; that is, if we examine our Thoughts honeſtly, of a ſeparate Ʋhi, in different Bodies, or elſewhere: Not that I think local Preſence, or Determination, is any way contained within the Idea of a ſpiritual Being, but it helps us to conceive it better, and diſcourſe more diſtinctly about it. And, if we obſerve it, there are ſeveral caſes where our Conceptions and Judgments muſt neceſſarily differ.

Theſe then are all the kinds of Ʋnity and Diſtinction I can poſſibly imagine; namely, in Idea, Principle, and Poſition. Whatever elſe is called Unity, is more properly termed Agreement, the very Notion of which implies a diſtinction in ſome of the fore-mentioned kinds.

Identity is nothing elſe but a repetition of Ʋnity, as Number is of Difference, with the Judgment of the Underſtanding upon it.

What Perſonal Ʋnity and Diſtinction are, will be eaſily underſtood by explaining the word Perſon, which ſignifies one of theſe two things; either a Particular, Intelligent Being, or an Office, Character, or ſome ſuch complex Notion applicable to ſuch a Being. In the firſt ſenſe one Man, or Angel, is one Perſon, and ſeveral Men or Angels are ſeveral Perſons. In the ſecond ſenſe of the word there may be ſo many Perſons as there are different Combinations of the Actions, Relations, and Circumſtances of Intelligent Beings.

And thus having given an Account of the meaning and ſignification of the Terms in which we are required to expreſs our Faith, we are next to Examine, how far, and in what ſenſe we can believe this Propoſition, That One and the ſame God is Three different Perſons.

Now 'tis certain, that if thoſe before-ſpecified are all the Notions we are able to frame of Ʋnity and Diſtinction, then God muſt be One and Three in ſome way or manner there laid down, or elſe in ſome other way or manner not conceivable by Human Underſtanding.

Firſt then, let us ſee how and in what manner God can be One and Three, according to thoſe Notions our Souls have framed of Ʋnity and Diſtinction.

And here 'tis granted on all hands, that nothing can be One and Three in the ſame manner and reſpect: We cannot conceive a thing to be in One determinate Poſition or Ʋbi, and in Three ſeparate Ʋbi's all at once; We cannot conceive that One Principle or Nature ſhould be but One, and yet Three different Principles or Natures too; or that any Object ſhould be truly and adequately repreſented to any Mind or Underſtanding under One Idea, and truly and adequately repreſented under Three different Idea's. 'Tis impoſſible to believe any thing of this kind, becauſe it implies a plain Contradiction to the cleareſt and moſt certain knowledge we can have of Unity and Diſtinction; ſo that if One may be Three in the ſame reſpect 'tis One, then One and Three muſt ſtand for other Idea's than we conceive when we pronounce theſe words; and if ſo, they ought to have other Names, and not be called One and Three.

Since therefore we cannot ſay, that God is One and Three in the ſame reſpect; in the next place let us Enquire, In what different reſpects this may be affirmed of him. Now, as to the Ʋnity of God, this is eaſily believed and acknowledged, as being very agreeable to all our other Notions of the Deity. The chief difficulty lyes in aſſigning the Diſtinction: In attempting which, the beſt and cleareſt way of proceeding will be by going over the ſeveral kinds of Diſtinction before-mentioned.

I will begin with that of Poſition: And here 'tis plain at firſt ſight that we cannot poſſibly conceive God under any difference of Poſition; we cannot exclude Omnipotence from any imaginable point of ſpace: 'Tis the limited Powers and Faculties of created Beings which are the Foundation of all Local Diſtinctions: And therefore when we endeavour to repreſent God to our thoughts in this manner, we conſider him as Omnipreſent; and I can no more conceive Three Omnipreſents, than I can conceive Three ſtraight Lines drawn between the ſame Points.

But though there can be but One undivided Omnipreſence, may there not be Three Infinite Beings Co-equal to one another, and Commenſurate to One Infinite Space? This is far above my Conception too: Infinite ſwallows up all my thoughts. Whatever Idea we apply this Term Infinite to, I think it impoſſible to apply it to another of the ſame Denomination: As for Example; If I apply it to Power, I cannot conſider it as applicable to more than One Infinite Power: For Infinite Power includes all the Poſſibilities of Action; ſo that to conceive more than One Infinite Power, would be to conceive more Power than is poſſible; which is a groſs and palpable Abſurdity. And therefore we cannot conceive Three Infinite Beings diſtinct from one another, any more than Three Infinite Powers, or Three Infinite Spaces, becauſe all Diſtinction implies ſome Limitation, and Limitation is a Contradiction to Infinity. We can indeed conceive Infinite Power, as in ſome manner bounded by Infinite Wiſdom, Juſtice, Mercy, or the like; but in no wiſe as limited by any other Power. We cannot therefore conceive one Infinite Being as bounded by another Infinite Being; for then we ſhould conceive Infinite Power limited by another Power, and the like of all other Attributes, which are the ſame in both: For the Notion of an Infinite Being includes in it all the imaginable kinds of Infinite Perfection.

But if we ſay, there are Three Infinite Beings, and all the Perfections of each are coincident, what ground can we have for ſuch a Diſtinction? Not ſo much, to uſe the former Inſtance, as for that of three ſtraight Lines between the ſame Points; for there the different times of deſcribing the ſame Line may in ſome manner help us to form a confuſed Conception of different Lines: But 'tis not in the Power of the Soul to repreſent to its ſelf Three Eternal Beings of Coincident Perfections. Here's nothing for the Imagination to lay hold of, no manner of ground to deceive our ſelves into a confuſed belief of ſuch a Diſtinction. And therefore I do not ſee how 'tis poſſible for us to believe there are Three diſtinct Principles or Natures all of the ſame Infinite Perfections, which together we call God.

And if there be but One Omnipreſent, Infinitely Perfect Being, how can he be truly and fully repreſented to any Mind under Three different Idea's? The truth of an Idea conſiſts in its Agreement and Conformity to the Original it repreſents; And if ſo, how is't poſſible there ſhould be Three Idea's exactly and adequately conformable to the ſame Original, and yet different from one another? Either theſe Differences found in the Idea's are not in the real Pattern, and then the Repreſentation is falſe; or they are, and then the Unity of the Object is deſtroyed.

'Tis true, indeed we do often apply different Idea's to the ſame individual Object; but theſe are either Partial and Inadequate Conceptions of the Nature and Eſſence of it; or Expreſſive of ſomething Acceſſory and Extrinſecal to the Nature of the thing, ſuch as Modes, Circumſtances, and Relations.

Thoſe Partial Conceptions we frame of the Divine Nature are what we call the Attributes of God: Which, how different ſoever from one another in our thoughts, are all neceſſarily included in the ſimple Idea of God; and therefore cannot be the ground of ſuch a Diſtinction as we are now enquiring after. For when I ſay, that God is Holy, Wiſe, or Powerful, I only ſay that explicitly and in part, which I ſaid implicitly and in full, when I pronounced the Name of God; and the meaning of ſuch Propoſitions is no more but this, That a Holy, Wiſe, Powerful Being, of all other Infinite Perfections is Holy, Wiſe, Powerful, &c. All which Perfections, though conſidered ſeparately under different Appearances by our imperfect Faculties, being really but one ſimple Idea, can be applyed to but one Single Perſon in the firſt ſenſe of the word Perſon, as it ſignifies a particular Intelligent Being, Nature, or Principle; and that for the Reaſons juſt now mentioned concerning the Conformity of Idea's with their Patterns.

From whence it follows, that according to the Notions we are capable of framing of Ʋnity and Diſtinction, which I have particularly examined, with Reference to the Holy Trinity, all the Perſonal Diſtinction we can conceive in the Deity muſt be founded upon ſome Acceſſory Idea's Extrinſecal to the Divine Nature; a certain Combination of which Idea's makes up the Second Notion ſignified by the word Perſon.

And if we fairly and impartially Examine our own Thoughts upon this Subject, we ſhall find, that, when we name God the Father, we conceive the Idea of God ſo far as we are capable of conceiving it, as Acting ſo and ſo, under ſuch Reſpects and Relations; and when we name God the Son, we conceive nothing elſe but the ſame Idea of God over again under different Relations; and ſo likewiſe of the Holy-Ghost.

But if this be all that is meant by Trinity in Ʋnity, Three Perſons, and One God, where is that ſtupendious Myſtery ſo much reverenced and adored by ſome? What becomes of the great Difficulty and Obſcurity complained of by others? What is it that has puzled the Underſtandings, and ſtaggered the Faith of ſo many Learned and Inquiſitive Men in all Ages ſince this Doctrine was firſt delivered? This is an invincible Prejudice againſt the Account now given, and indeed againſt any other Explication whatſoever that has nothing in it hard to be underſtood, or believed: For how can it be imagined that what has paſſed for a Myſtery theſe Sixteen Hundred Years, ſhould now at laſt be comprehended as plainly as a common ordinary Notion?

But if this Account of the Trinity be too eaſie, and falls far ſhort of thoſe High Expreſſions of Diſtinction found in Scripture (as I think it does) and no other grounded upon any Notions our Souls have framed of Ʋnity and Diſtinction can be true or conſiſtent (as I have before particularly proved) then it neceſſarily follows, that God muſt be One and Three in ſome way or manner not conceivable by Humane Underſtanding.

And what we are to believe in this caſe is the Subject of my next Enquiry; which I am perſwaded may very eaſily and quickly be reſolved: For if we are fully ſatisfied from Revelation, that theſe Terms, One and Three, may, and ought to be affirmed of God, but not in any ſenſe of the words we are here in this preſent ſtate capable of conceiving. And moreover, if it be true, as I have already ſhewn it is, that we can believe a thing no farther than we underſtand the Terms in which it is propoſed to us; 'tis plain from hence that all we can poſſibly believe in the matter of the Trinity is, That One and the ſame God is Three in ſome way or manner we are not able to comprehend. And if we are ſure we cannot comprehend what this Diſtinction is whereby God is Three, in vain do we look out for Terms to expreſs ſomething which we have no manner of Conception of. Whatever words we uſe, whether Perſon, Hypoſtaſis, or any other we can invent, or Languages furniſh us with, they all ſignifie the ſame thing; that is, ſome kind of Diſtinction we do not underſtand. And we may rack our Thoughts, tire our Imaginations, and break all the Fibres of our Brain, and yet never be able to deliver our ſelves clearer.

All therefore that we can know of the Trinity by Reaſon, can amount to no more than an Obſcure confuſed Knowledge, which we are forced to expreſs in general and abſtracted Terms, becauſe we are ſure no other reach our thoughts, though theſe are not ſufficient to explain all we mean by them.

Nor is this to be wonder'd at, that we ſhould have confuſed Notions of things which no particular Idea's our Minds are furniſh'd with can render clearer to us: For if we conſider the Degrees and Limits of our Knowledge, and take a ſtrict Survey of our whole ſtock of Thoughts, we ſhall find there are very few things that we know fully and diſtinctly. Moſt of our Notions differ only as more or leſs confuſed, more or leſs general. There is a certain Scale of Knowledge, wherein every thing is ſo fitted and proportioned to our Faculties, that we cannot deſcend below ſuch a determinate pitch in our Conceptions or Explications of any Object propoſed to us.

As for inſtance; ſuppoſe a Blind-Man has a deſire to know what Colour is; 'tis certain he can never form a true diſtinct Idea of it; but yet he is capable of a general confuſed Knowledge, which wants but one degree of Particularity to be clear and perfect Conception. He may know that Colour is not any Subſtance, but ſome Mode or Determination which owes its Exiſtence and Support to ſome other Being; that it is not Extenſion, or any other Accident or Quality perceivable by any of the Senſes he enjoys: He may further be made to underſtand, that it is ſome kind of Senſation, produced by the impreſſion of other Bodies upon that part of a Man's which is called the Eye, which other Men perceive though he does not. Now 'tis plain that ſuch a Man knows a great deal of the Nature of Colour, more by far than another Blind-Man who has not made the ſame Enquiries and Reflections about it; and ſo much as will ſecure him from having any other Idea impoſed upon him for that of Colour, which is ſo diſtinguiſhed and circumſtantiated to him, that, ſhould he now receive his ſight, he would preſently acknowledge the marks before deſcribed to him. And yet after all, it may be truly ſaid, while he continues blind, he has no manner of Idea of Colour, becauſe he has no diſtinct Idea of that particular kind of Senſation to which his general Idea's are applyed. And therefore he can go no lower in his Explications of the Notion he has of Colour: For if he explains it by any Senſation which he receives from his other Senſes, the Idea's he has then in his Mind are indeed more particular and diſtinct, but the Judgment he makes upon them muſt be utterly falſe, whereas before, his Knowledge was only general and confuſed, but yet true.

I have made choice of this plain, familiar Inſtance of Senſe, to ſhew the unreaſonableneſs of thoſe who in higher Speculations complain that the terms brought to explain them are too general and abſtracted; and demand a further Explication of what we cannot poſſibly know beyond ſuch a degree of Particularity, which the Terms already made uſe of, do expreſs.

In vain therefore, and unjuſtly, are we urged to explain the Doctrine of the Trinity more particularly, when we have brought it down to the utmoſt Particularity we are capable of conceiving, and at the ſame time freely acknowledge, we don't know it ſo diſtinctly as 'tis capable of being known.

For then only is the Uſe of general abſtracted Terms to be condemned, either when the ſubject we are upon will admit of a more particular and ſenſible Explication; or, if it will not, when by too much Refining and Abſtracting, we deceive our ſelves, and think ſome Terms we have found out make the Thing clear to us, tho' we have not really more diſtinct Conceptions of it than we had before, and at the ſame time theſe very Terms make it more obſcure and difficult to others. And this is what I remarked before as a Prejudice to be avoided in an impartial Search after Truth.

But ſo long as we acknowledge we have only a general confuſed Notion of the Trinity, or ſuch a Three-fold Diſtinction in the Godhead, as is conſiſtent with the unity of the Divine Nature, we may be allowed to explain this Notion in general abſtracted Terms; becauſe we lay no greater a Streſs upon the Terms than they will truly bear, and require only a Faith proportionate to our Knowledge; that is, a general confuſed Faith, which we expect a clearer and more diſtinct Revelation of hereafter.

And thus I have diſpatched the firſt Branch of my Diſcourſe, wherein I propoſed to conſider how far 'twas poſſible for us to believe a Trinity.

II. I come now to my Second General Enquiry, viz. What it is the Scripture requires us to believe in this Matter? For a diſtinct Reſolution of which Queſtion, I ſhall obſerve the following Method:

1. In ſpeaking to the Firſt, it muſt be allowed, that there is no ſuch Propoſition as this, That One and the ſame God is Three different Perſons formally, and in Terms, to be found in the Sacred Writings either of the Old or New Teſtament: Neither is it pretended that there is any Word of the ſame Signification or Importance with the Word Trinity, uſed in Scripture, with relation to God. There is one Text which plainly enough affirms, without the help of Inference or Deduction, that God is Three and One: But this being a diſputed Paſſage, and no where elſe repeated in the ſame or the like Terms, I ſhall not inſiſt upon it. Nor do I think ſuch a Trinity as we profeſs to believe, ſtands much in need of the Support of this Text; the Matter and ſubject of our Faith in this Point being frequently, largely, and circumſtantially mentioned; and, as it appears to me, interwoven into the very Deſign of the Scriptures.

Now the Summ of all that the Scriptures plainly and expreſly teach concerning a Trinity, is this: That there is but One only God, the Author and Maker of All Things; but that One God ought to be acknowledged and adored by us, under thoſe Three different Titles or Characters of Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt. Which Terms, whatever they ſignifie, according to my Judgment, upon a fair and impartial Conſideration of all Circumſtances that can determine their Senſe, are evidently applied to God in many Places of Holy Writ; and conſequently are truly and properly applicable to him.

2. The Proof of which Aſſertion is the Second Thing I undertook.

But here I find my ſelf foreſtalled by the ſucceſsful Endeavours of a great many Learned Men, who have carefully and nicely examined every Text that can be brought, either for the Eſtabliſhment, or Confutation of the Doctrine of the Trinity. I ſhall not therefore trouble my Reader with a particular detail of all their Arguments; but only acquaint him truly and fairly what were the chief Motives which influenced and diſpoſed me to make ſuch a Judgment as I have, juſt before, declared.

Now the Reaſons which determined my Opinion in this Matter, were ſuch as freely offered themſelves upon an unprejudiced reading of Scripture, and conſidering the Deſign, Connexion, and Analogy of thoſe Writings: And I am apt to believe, if any Man elſe took the ſame Method, and conſidered Things togegether, and not only in looſe Texts and Paſſages, the firſt Reſult of his Thoughts would be the ſame, viz. Theſe Terms, Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt, muſt all be ſo underſtood, as to include the ſame God in their Signification; and that any other Senſe or Explication of the Words, would be attended with greater Difficulties.

But this being a Reflexion which is founded upon the Agreement and Coherence of all the Parts of Scripture, 'twould be a very improper and ineffectual Deſign to go about to confirm the Truth of it from ſome particular Paſſages. Omitting therefore all thoſe Texts, which are a great many, where any of theſe Terms, Father, Son, or Holy Ghoſt, appear to be directly affirmed of God, according to a fair Conſtruction of the Words, I ſhall only obſerve Two or Three Paſſages from the Hiſtory of our Saviour and his Goſpel, which, to my Apprehenſion, do as ſtrongly prove what I have advanced as the moſt formal Expreſſions, and are leſs liable to be perverted by the Criticiſms of Language.

The firſt Obſervation I have to make, concerns the common Forms of Baptiſm, Salutation, and Bleſſing, uſed in ſeveral Places of the New Teſtament.

Now theſe are Matters no way controverted: That our Saviour commanded his Diſciples to go and teach all Nations, baptizing them in the Name of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt. That St. Paul makes uſe of ſuch Salutations as theſe: The Lord be with you; The Grace of our Lord Jeſus Chriſt be with you all; Grace be to you, and Peace from God the Father, and from our Lord Jeſus Chriſt: And particularly cloſes his Second Epiſtle to the Corinthians with this 〈◊〉 and fuller Bleſſing; The Grace of the Lord Jeſus Chriſt, and the Love of God, and the Communion of the Holy Ghoſt be with you all. From whence I infer, that all theſe Terms, Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt, ſignifie God; becauſe I cannot poſſibly conceive 'tis agreeable to the Nature of the Chriſtian Religion, that the Miniſters of it ſhould Teach, Baptize, or Bleſs the People in any other Name but God's.

It cannot be imagined but the People muſt equally believe in thoſe, in whoſe Names they are Baptized or Bleſs'd: They muſt believe that thoſe, who are call'd upon to beſtow Graces and Bleſſings upon them, are able to give what they are called upon for. And whatever is meant by Baptizing in the Name of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt, it ſeems very plain that theſe Three are all equally concerned in what's done in that Sacrament. Whether by this Form of Baptiſm be ſignified on the Miniſter's Part, the Authority or Commiſſion by which he acts in his Adminiſtration; or whether on the Part of the Perſon baptized, be meant any Acknowledgment or Confeſſion, Submiſſion or Dedication of himſelf; or whether this Phraſe in the Name, or, as in the Greek, into the Name, does imply all this, and more, the whole Force and Importance of the Expreſſion, does in the ſame Extent belong to Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. The Power and Authority here received, is derived from all Three: They are all to be acknowledged as Authors of our Salvation; all infallible, and to be believed in what they Teach; have all the ſame Title to our Submiſſion and Obedience, and are Joint-Parties in that Covenant we make in Baptiſm.

The Inference from hence is very Plain and Eaſie: That if any one of theſe Terms ſignifie God, they muſt all Three ſignifie God; and if all Three ſignifie God, they muſt all Three ſignifie one and the ſame God; for God is but One. Now that the One Supreme God, the Lord and Maker of All Things, is here meant by the Word Father, is a Thing not queſtioned; and therefore Son, and Holy Ghoſt, are Terms expreſſive of the ſame Divine Nature.

Should we but ſuppoſe the contrary, That by Son was meant only a meer Man, or ſome Heavenly Being, of higheſt Rank under God; and by Holy Ghoſt was ſignified only ſome created Spirit, inferior to the Son, or the Power, Efficacy, Love, Favour, or Vertue of God how ſtrange would ſuch a Form of Baptiſm appear? I Baptize thee in the Name of God, Peter the Apoſtle, and the Power or Love of God; or, I Baptize thee in the Name of God, Michael the Archangel, and Raphael a Miniſtring Spirit. There needs no more but a bare Mention of ſuch an Expoſition to ſhew the Falſhood of it: What abſurd Conſequences may be drawn from it, I ſhall leave to every Man's particular Reflexion.

Another Thing which mightily confirmed me in this Belief, that the Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt, ſo often named in Scripture, are One and the ſame God, under thoſe Three different Appellations, was this, That the Son, who is the ſame with him that is in other Places called the Lord, and the Lord Jeſus Chriſt, and ſometimes only Jeſus, or Chriſt, was worſhip'd with a Religious Worſhip by thoſe that followed him and embraced his Goſpel: For if he that was called the Son of God, or Chriſt, was thus to be worſhip'd, it plainly and evidently follows from hence, according to all the Notions we have of God and Religion, either from Nature or Revelation, that the Son was alſo God, the ſame true and only God with the Father.

And if the Son be allowed to be God as well as the Father, it will be eaſily admitted that the Holy Ghoſt is ſo too, who appears in Scripture inveſted with all the ſame Characters of Divinity: For Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt, are as conſiſtent with the Ʋnity of the Godhead, as Father and Son only; and beſides, there's greater difficulty in conceiving the Son to be God, than the Holy Ghoſt, becauſe of his Humane Nature. But that he was God manifeſt in the Fleſh, is, I ſay, apparent from the divine Worſhip that was pay'd to him: For that God only is to be worſhip'd, is an evident Principle, as well as an indiſpenſable Duty; and I can as ſoon believe a thing to be, and not to be, as that any thing that is not God ſhould be worſhipped as God.

Now that Chriſt received the Honour and Worſhip due to God only, is plain from abundance of Places of Scripture, where we find he was not only adored with all the outward Expreſſions of Reverence and Devotion, but confeſs'd and acknowledged to be God by an Application of the Divine Attributes to him, ſuch as agree only to God, and are incommunicable to any other, as might be proved at large if it had not been done already: But this being fully inſiſted upon by others, I ſhall only name Two Paſſages to this Purpoſe; the one, Phil. 4. 13. the other, Act. 7. 59. which, if there were no other, are of themſelves ſufficient to ſhew what the Faith of the firſt Chriſtians was: For who, but one that believed that Chriſt was God, could ſay with St. Paul, I can do all things through Chriſt that ſtrengthneth me; or, with St. Stephen, at the inſtant of Death, cry out, Lord Jeſus receive my Spirit.

From theſe, and many other Texts, it ſeems plain to me, that Chriſt was worſhipped, and acknowledged as God; and that therefore he ought ſo to be worſhipped, and acknowledged, we have all the ſame Reaſons to believe, as we have that the Scriptures are True; the Eſtabliſhment of a Falſe Worſhip being a thorough Diſproof of the Authority that Commands it.

Suppoſing therefore the Truth of the Scriptures, there's no way of eluding this Argument, but by giving another Interpretation to all thoſe Places which ſeem to aſcribe divine Honour to Chriſt; which can no otherwiſe be done, than by framing a particular Dialect for this Purpoſe, and giving new Significations to Words, when applied to our Saviour, which they never had before, when uſed upon other Occaſions.

I ſhall not enter upon a particular Proof of this, but paſs on to

Another Argument I obſerv'd from Scripture, which gave me further Aſſurance of the Divinity of the Son, and conſequently of the Truth of the whole Propoſition before advanced; and that is, The Character of Jeſus Chriſt conſidered meerly as a Man. Now 'tis certain, that the Man Chriſt Jeſus, the Son of David, according to the Fleſh, is repreſented by all the Evangeliſts, as having his Converſation in this World with all Lowlineſs, and Humility, and with perfect Holineſs, and Unblameableneſs of Life. And it is not imaginable, that a Perſon of this Character ſhould have ſuffered any Titles to have been given him, any Honour or Reſpect to have been pay'd him, which were not ſtrictly and indiſpenſably due to him; much leſs have taken the Honour and Worſhip, peculiar to God only, to himſelf, if he had not been infallibly conſcious that of a Truth God dwelt in him. I cannot poſſibly conceive that one, who declined all Appearance of Grandeur, Dominion, and Authority, ſhould have allowed of any thing that look'd like Worſhip, or Adoration, or might have been miſtaken for it; or that he, who knew he was believed to be the Son of God, in ſuch a Senſe which ſome thought Blaſphemy, would not have undeceived his Followers, and juſtified himſelf to his Enemies, had he not really been what 'twas Blaſphemy to have pretended to be, if he were not.

I might eaſily purſue theſe Reflections a great deal further, and bring more Arguments to confirm the truth of what I have aſſerted, that theſe Names or Titles of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are applyed in Scripture to the One True God; but I judge it altogether unneceſſary, not only becauſe it has been fully made out already in ſeveral ſet Diſcourſes upon this Subject, but becauſe it is ſo plainly and expreſly revealed, that I am verily perſwaded every Man that reads would believe, were it not for the additional Explications ſuch a Belief is charged with.

3. Which is the next thing to be conſidered: And indeed here lyes the whole difficulty of the matter, the main ſtreſs of the Controverſie. For that God ſhould be called Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, is as eaſily to be believed, as that he ſhould be called Adonai, Elohim, and Jehovah; That the ſame thing ſhould be ſignified and expreſſed by ſeveral names, is no ſuch incredible Myſtery: But if we allow that theſe Terms, Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt, are all applyed to God in Scripture, 'tis not thought ſufficient to ſay, that theſe are three ſeveral Names which ſignifie God; but we are further required to believe that God is One and Three, the ſame God, but three different Hypoſtaſes or Perſons; And that one of theſe three Hypoſtaſes or Perſons, is both God and Man. Theſe are the hard ſayings which puzzles ſome Mens Underſtandings, and make them chuſe rather to wreſt and pervert the plaineſt Texts, than admit ſuch ſeemingly inconſiſtent Conſequences.

Here therefore I ſhall Examine, what grounds there are in Scripture for ſuch an Expoſition:

And what we are obliged from thence to believe when we expreſs our Faith in this particular manner.

Firſt then, as to theſe forms of Expreſſion, That God is One and Three, &c. It is to be obſerved, that theſe Names, Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt, are applyed to God in Scripture in a different way from what any of his other Names are: For the other Names of God ſignifie only Partial Conceptions of the Divine Nature, ſuch as Self-Exiſtence, Power, &c. and are all contained within the ſame Idea of God; and ſo are indifferently uſed upon any occaſion to expreſs the whole Idea of God to which they belong, which is the ſame under every denomination. Theſe therefore cannot be the Foundation of any diſtinction in the Godhead: But Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt, according to our way of conceiving things, ſignifie ſomething Extrinſecal and Acceſſory to the Divine Nature, as much as we know of the Divine Nature by reaſon, the whole Idea of God being conceived as full and compleat before the application of theſe terms; And though all of them are ſeparately and together affirmed of God, yet each of them in ſo peculiar a manner, that there are ſeveral occaſions where when one of theſe terms is uſed with relation to God, 'twould be improper to uſe either of the other. From whence it follows, that theſe three Names of God, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, muſt denote a three-fold difference or diſtinction belonging to God; but ſuch as is conſiſtent with the Ʋnity and Simplicity of the Divine Nature. For each of theſe Names includes the whole Idea we have of God and ſomething more; ſo far as they expreſs the Nature of God, they all adequately and exactly ſignifie the ſame; 'tis the additional ſignification which makes all the diſtinction betwixt them.

What particular kind or manner of diſtinction this is, is not expreſſed in Scripture; but ſince the Church has thought fit to aſſign a Name for it, that of Perſon ſeems to me as proper and agreeable to the whole Tenor and Deſign of the Holy Writings, as any other that could have been choſen for that purpoſe. For Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, whether we conſider the Primitive ſenſe and intention of the words, the general and conſtant uſe of them, or the particular Connexion and Circumſtances in which they are mentioned in Scripture, have plainly a Perſonal Signification; each of them, without any figure of Speech, being determined to ſignifie ſome intelligent Being Acting in ſuch a manner as is there related.

There needs no Proof of this, the plain diſtinction of Perſons imported by thoſe Terms being the chief Argument made uſe of to ſhew that they cannot all be applied to God, but muſt neceſſarily ſignifie Three diſtinct Beings: But that they are all applyed to God in Scripture, has been proved already; And therefore Father, Son, and Holy Ghost may be conſidered as Perſons or Perſonal Characters, which do not imply any diſtinction of Being or Nature.

The Greeks are ſuppoſed to have meant the ſame by Hypoſtaſes as we do by Perſon; this word being ſometimes the very Tranſlation of the other; And if ſo, there's the ſame ground for the uſe of both: But if they meant any thing elſe, they could hardly have ſo good Warrant for it from Revelation.

Now, that one of theſe Perſons or Hypoſtaſes ſhould be both God and Man, there is this Foundation in the Scriptures for. He who is there called the Son of God, did certainly appear in the likeneſs of Men, being in all reſpects, Sin only excepted, truly and properly Man; as his Birth, Neceſſities, Sufferings, and Death ſufficiently teſtifie. 'Tis certain alſo that the ſame Jeſus Christ, who was called the Son of God, and was made in the likeneſs of Man, is affirmed by St. Paul, Phil. 3. 7, 8. to have been in the form of God, when he took the Nature of Man upon him.

But beſides this and many other Texts to the ſame effect, 'tis plain, from what before has been proved, that God did ſuffer himſelf to be worſhipped and adored in and by the Man Chriſt Jeſus: The leaſt that can be inferred from which is, that God was more immediately and peculiarly preſent in Christ, than ever he is ſaid to have been any where elſe: As in the Heavens, Jewiſh Temple, between the Cherubims, in Prophets and Holy Men, who ſpake as they were moved by the Spirit of God. What created Object was ever allowed to intercept the Worſhip paid to God, or ſhare with him in it? Were the Heavens, the Temple, the Cherubim or Prophets to be adored? Nay, has not God taken a particular care to preſerve Men from Idolatry, by forbidding them to Worſhip him in or by any ſenſible Repreſentation? Did not the Apoſtles, who worſhip'd Chriſt, forbid others to Worſhip Men of like Paſſions with Acts 14. ver. 15. themſelves, commanding them to direct all their Devotion to the Living God, who made Heaven and Earth? How then can we ſuppoſe that Chriſt was only a meer Man, or ſome other Creature, and not rather believe that he had the Fulneſs of the Godhead dwelling in him bodily?

But here it is Objected; How can God and Man be united? And to this I muſt fairly Anſwer, that I cannot tell. I have confeſſed already in the Account I have given of thoſe Notions of Ʋnity and Diſtinction, that I have not any juſt or diſtinct Conceptions of the Ʋnion of Spiritual Beings, either with Bodies, or with one another: But this I will venture to ſay, that I can as well conceive God and Man together under one Idea, at one view, as I can conceive a Soul and Body ſo united.

All that I know of the Ʋnion of Soul and Body is; that there is ſome Intelligent Power that makes uſe of the Organs of my Body, and Acts in conjunction with the Motions there produced. And I may as well conſider God united to Man, when he ſo Acts by the Miniſtry and Operation of Man, that the Actions of God ſeem conveyed to us the ſame way as the Actions of one Man are to another. Had thoſe who upon ſome occaſions ſpake by the extraordinary Aſſiſtance of a Divine Power been conſtantly ſo directed, and aſſiſted, how would they have diſtinguiſhed the Motions of their Souls from the Impreſſions of God? And why then ſhould not we think ſuch an Extraordinary Power as this as much united to ſuch Men, as that Common ordinary Power we call the Soul is to thoſe Bodies in which it acts and exerts it ſelf?

Some have been of Opinion, that what we call the Soul, is nothing elſe but a conſtant regular Inſpiration, or a determinate Concurrence of God Almighty with ſuch and ſuch Motions and Capacities of Matter: But whether this be ſo or no, as moſt probably it is not, it ſeems to me very plain from Scripture, that ſuch a Power which we aſcribe to God, did as Conſtantly and Regularly Act in and through Christ, as the Human Soul is perceived to do in any other Man: As appears from his abſolute ſecurity from all manner of Sin and Error, from his conſtant knowledge of the Thoughts and Deſigns of Men, and the Will and Decrees of God; and from his Readineſs and Ability to work Miracles at any time, and upon any occaſion. All which are manifeſt Tokens of an uninterrupted Preſence and Concurrence of the Deity: Eſpecially if we conſider the Calmneſs and Evenneſs of Spirit obſervable in our Saviour, entirely free from all the tranſports of over-ruling Impreſſions, 'tis a further Argument that he did not receive the Spirit of God at times, or by meaſure; but was as conſcious of all the Divine Perfections in himſelf as a Man is conſcious of his own Thoughts.

Such are the Grounds we find in Scripture for thoſe particular Explications of the Trinity before-mentioned.

In the next place, we are to Enquire what the Scriptures neceſſarily oblige us to believe in this Point.

But before this Queſtion can be reſolved, there are two things to be premiſed:

1. That whatever Articles of Faith are abſolutely neceſſary to Salvation, all Perſons of every Rank and Condition are equally obliged to believe them. There is not one Religion for the Peaſant, and another for the Scholar: We have the ſame general Rule to walk by, though particular Obligations may be greater or leſſer, fewer or more, according to different Circumſtances and Relations. And whatever Principles and Duties are of general Neceſſity, ought to be ſo plainly revealed, as to be eaſily underſtood by ordinary Capacities upon a fair and careful Examination.

2. That in order to this end it ſeems to have been the Deſign of the Scriptures to repreſent God in a ſenſible manner; though at the ſame time they take care to aſſure us that God is in his own Nature a Being of different Perfections not conceivable by Human Underſtanding: And is thus repreſented only in condeſcention to our weakneſs, for the help and aſſiſtance of our Devotion. So that all Expreſſions of this kind, where God is the Subject, are to be underſtood in a higher and more Spiritual ſenſe, but ſtill with ſome Analogy to what they properly and uſually ſignifie. Thus, to uſe a common Inſtance, when 'tis ſaid, that God looks down and beholds what's done among the Children of Men; that he hears the Cries of the Righteous, and the Blaſphemies of the Wicked, 'tis not to be imagined that he ſees as Man ſees, that he makes uſe of any Organs of Senſe; but 'tis thus expreſſed to give us more lively Notions and Impreſſions of the certainty of God's Ʋniverſal Knowledge; to aſſure us that God more plainly, fully, and infallibly knows whatever is done in all the Earth, than we are capable of knowing thoſe things which fall within the reach of our Senſes.

This being premiſed, it ſeems very plain to me that the Doctrine of the Trinity is not to be look'd upon as a nice abſtracted Speculation deſigned for the Exerciſe of our Underſtandings; but as a plainer Revelation of God's Love and Good Will towards Men, and a greater Motive and Incitement to Piety than any we had before this Doctrine was delivered.

Had man ſtood confirmed in his Original Righteouſneſs, and there had been no need of Redemption, 'tis highly probable God had never been conſidered by Man in his ſtate of Probation under any ſuch Diſtinction as is now revealed to us; And therefore I ſhould think thoſe different Titles and Relations by which God has been pleaſed to expreſs that Eternal Diſtinction in the Godhead to us, ſhould be chiefly conſidered by us with reference to the great Work of Man's Salvation.

Thus far then the Scriptures require us to believe; That the One only Supream God upon his fore-knowledge of Man's Fall, did from all Eternity Purpoſe and Decree to Redeem Mankind into a capacity of Salvation, by the Death and conſtant Mediation of a Man choſen and enabled for this Work by the fulneſs of the Godhead dwelling in him: And in conſideration of his Paſſion and Interceſſion, to impart ſuch Gifts, Graces, and Spiritual Aſſiſtances, as would be ſufficient to render this Redemption effectual to the Saving of much People.

And moreover we are to believe that God has accordingly executed this his Gracious Deſign towards us: By ſending into the World Christ Jeſus, the Man who before he had ordained, ſhould in the Fulneſs of Time be born, and ſuffer for our Sins; in and by whom, as has already been ſhewn, God acted in a wonderful manner, was worſhipped and adored, and acknowledged in all his Attributes; and with whom he abideth in the Fulneſs of Power and Glory for ever: And, ſince his Death and Reception into Heaven, by a plentiful Effuſion of Spiritual Graces and Influences; by which means a great many have embraced the Goſpel of Christ, and become Heirs of Salvation, and more from henceforth to the end of all things ſhall daily be added to the Church of God, be ſupported in the Faith, and be made Partakers of the purchaſed Inheritance reſerved in Heaven for thoſe that are Sanctified by the Spirit of God.

Now, with reſpect to this great Deſign of Saving Mankind, and the Order and Method of the Divine Wiſdom in the Execution of it; To give us as full and diſtinct Apprehenſions as our Souls are able to conceive of the Miſery of our ſinful Condition, the difficulty of Deliverance, and the unſpeakable Mercy of God in reſtoring us to the Happineſs we had juſtly forfeited; and to raiſe our Souls to the higheſt pitch of Veneration, Love, and Gratitude we are capable of expreſſing for ſuch an ineſtimable Bleſſing; God has been pleaſed to reveal himſelf to us under ſeveral Perſonal Characters and Relations: Such as Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; Saviour, Mediator, and Comforter. By which Names, and all other Expreſſions conſequent thereupon, we are directed to conſider ſome ſuch kind of Diſtinction, and Subordination of Offices and Relations in God, as the Terms made uſe of do commonly import.

Thus when God is pleaſed to repreſent his Love to Mankind, in the higheſt Image of Nature; that of a Father ſacrificing an only well-beloved Son, the exact Tranſcript and Reſemblance of himſelf, perfectly Innocent, and Obedient to his Will in all Things, we are to believe that, by the Sufferings, and Death of Chriſt, God has given greater Proofs of his Love towards us than any Man is capable of doing to another; and that ſuch an Action of an Earthly Parent ſuggeſts the neareſt and likeſt Conception we can poſſibly frame, of what our Heavenly Father has done for us; tho' at the ſame time we muſt acknowledge it comes infinitely ſhort of expreſſing the Riches and Fulneſs of his Mercy and Loving-kindneſs.

And the ſame Uſe and Spiritual Improvement is to be made of all other Revelations of this nature.

And thus we have ſeen how far we are capable of conceiving a Trinity, and what the Scriptures expreſly oblige us to believe concerning this Point.

All that is beyond, lies far out of our Reach and Comprehenſion, and no particular Explications can add any thing to our Faith; for the Terms made uſe of for that End, being in uſe before this Doctrine was taught, muſt either ſignifie the ſame they did before, or not: If the ſame, where's the Myſtery? If not, what do they ſignifie? Something that we cannot explain but in Words uſed already, and then the Queſtion will return again. The ſame Difficulty would attend new Terms invented on purpoſe; for either they would have no meaning at all affixed to them, or elſe they would be underſtood in the ſenſe of ſome other in uſe before. And therefore, had the very ſame Terms and Forms of Expreſſion been found in the Scriptures, as are now in our Creeds, the Revelation of the Trinity had been no plainer, nor we obliged to believe any farther than the preſent Language does import: For upon a fair and diſtinct Examination both of Scripture and Reaſon, it plainly appears, that what's already revealed amounts to as much as we are capable of conceiving, and does beſides imply ſomething more which we can not comprehend; and 'tis not in the Power of Language to make us underſtand any thing better: For 'tis utterly impoſſible to frame any Notions above our own Level. And ſhould God be pleaſed to ſtamp ſome new Idea's upon the Minds of Men▪ they could not be conveyed to others by the help of Words, or any other Signs, but only by the ſame Divine Impreſſions: ſo that whatever Idea's the Apoſtles, and Inſpired Writers, might have of a Trinity by immediate Infuſion, the Terms they have made uſe of can give us but this imperfect Diſcovery of them, that they were ſuch as we are not able to comprehend without the like Aſſiſtance.

This then is the utmoſt we are required to believe, or are capable of believing, concerning the Doctrine of the Trinity, viz. That theſe Three different Terms, Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt, are all applied in Scripture to the One only ſupreme God; That all the Actions, Offices, and Relations, which are in Scripture aſcribed to any of theſe Names, (excepting thoſe proper to the Humane Nature of Chriſt) are there plainly attributed, and do truly belong to one, and the ſame Divine Nature; That there are ſuch frequent and evident Aſſertions of the Ʋnity of God in Scripture, and yet ſuch plain Expreſſions of diſtinction, ſignified by theſe Terms, Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt, as imply a conſiſtency of unity and diſtinction in the Godhead.

That this Diſtinction, whatever it be, is not the ſame with that we conceive betwixt the Attributes of God, which are partial Conceptions of his Eſſence, nor a meer difference of Name, Office, or Relation, ſuch as is ſignified by the like Terms, when applied to Men, (tho' theſe are all the Differences we can expreſly conceive, as applicable to the Divine Nature) but ſome other Diſtinction, which we have but a confuſed perception of, and cannot comprehend or explain by any particular Idea's; which unknown inexplicable Diſtinction is the Foundation of all theſe Differences expreſly conceived by us.

And ſince the Church has thought fit, for the Sake of Unity and Peace, and for the Suppreſſing all Private Diſputes and Interpretations, to appoint ſet Forms to expreſs this our Faith in, I think the Athanaſian Creed as rational an Explication of the Trinity as can well be made. The Worſt that the Enemies of this Doctrine can ſay of it, is, That it is an unneceſſary Multiplication of Terms, and too nice an Endeavour to Explain what cannot be Explained; but not that 'tis Falſe, or Abſurd; nothing being there aſſerted in any ſenſe inconſiſtent with the Ʋnity of God, or the Principles of Right Reaſon: All ſuch Meanings and Significations of any Terms or Expreſſions in that Creed being very improper, as they are there applied, and utterly diſclaimed by the Church that enjoins the Uſe of it.

Nor can it be eſteemed an unreaſonable Impoſition, That we ſhould be obliged to profeſs our Faith of ſomething which cannot be conceived, but confuſedly and indiſtinctly; nor expreſſed, but in general and obſcure Terms. For where's the Hardſhip of being required to believe as far as we can believe? God is Incomprehenſible in his Nature and Perfections, but are we not obliged to believe there is a God who is Incomprehenſible? Are we not obliged to believe there are Joys in Heaven, which it has not enter'd into the Heart of Man to conceive? And, to repeat a former Inſtance, may not a Blind Man be obliged to believe what a Friend of unſuſpected Integrity tells him of the general nature of Colour, tho' he is not able to form a particular Idea of it? And, if theſe Things cannot be denied, What difference can be aſſigned why we ſhould not be under as great an Obligation of believing the Trinity, tho' we are not able to conceive it diſtinctly?

A Threefold Diſtinction in the Godhead, conſiſtent with the Unity of God, is as plainly revealed in Scripture as any other Article of Faith: Nor are thoſe general Abſtracted Terms we find in our Creeds, to be condemn'd as meer uſeleſs and perplexing Niceties; for tho' they are not ſufficient to make us underſtand the Trinity fully and diſtinctly, yet they are proper Limitations to exclude all the Falſe and Unworthy Apprehenſions of this Doctrine, which Pretenders to a more particular Explication might introduce.

III. And now what dangerous Conſequences can poſſibly attend ſuch a Faith as this? 'Tis true indeed, the Adverſaries of the Trinity have drawn up a heavy Charge againſt this Doctrine, and taken a great deal of Liberty in their Diſcourſes about it: But the principal Objections that have been made by any of them are but Three; to which all the reſt may be reduced: And theſe I ſhall endeavour to ſhew, by the Account before given, are very Frivolous and Unjuſt.

1. The firſt Pernicious Conſequence the Doctrine of the Trinity ſtands charged with, is, the Introduction of a Plurality of Gods: But 'tis very plain from what we have ſaid in the former part of this Diſcourſe, that 'tis utterly impoſſible to believe a Trinity in any ſuch ſenſe as implies a Plurality of Gods: For according to the Notions I have there ſhewed we have of the Nature and Attributes of God, 'tis undeniably certain to every Man's Experience, that we cannot conceive more than One God: All our Endeavours to comprehend more are only repetitions of the ſame Idea.

Let Thoſe therefore take care to Anſwer this Accuſation, who, under pretence of giving a more Rational Account of what we are to believe in this Point, ſet up created ſubordinate Gods to be Partners with their Maker in the Glory and Worſhip due to him.

Beſides, we do explicitly declare, that there is but One God at the ſame time we make Profeſſion of our Faith in a Trinity, or Three Perſons.

2. In the next place, therefore we are accuſed of believing Contradictions; and conſequently of deſtroying all the certainty of Natural Knowledge: Which Fence being down, there's no Error ſo groſs or abſurd but may be obtruded upon us; and Tranſubſtantiation has as good a Pretence to be an Article of our Faith as the Trinity. But I need not make any particular Anſwer to this Objection, having proved at large already, that we neither do nor can believe a Trinity in any ſenſe that contradicts the plain and evident Principles of Natural Reaſon. We do not believe there can be more Gods than One, that One can be Three in the ſame reſpect 'tis One; or that One God can be Three Perſons in the ſame ſenſe three Men are three Perſons; or any other Propoſition that's inconſiſtent with thoſe Natural Notions which are the Foundation of all our other Knowledge. But the Patrons of Tranſubſtantiation cannot make this Plea, who in this one Particular deny thoſe very Principles which upon all other occaſions they rely upon with the greateſt Aſſurance. Did they only affirm, that Chriſt was preſent in that Sacrament in ſome way or manner they could not comprehend, but in no way repugnant to the plain and neceſſary Dictates of well-informed Senſe, and right Reaſon, there might be then ſome Reſemblance found betwixt this Doctrine and that of the Trinity; but at preſent the Compariſon is palpably and notoriouſly unjuſt.

3. But Thirdly, 'tis further Objected, That though the Doctrine of the Trinity, as we explain it, could not be proved to contain down-right Contradictions; yet at leaſt it muſt be counted and eſteemed as a Myſtery, and the Impoſition of Myſteries for Articles of Faith, is a thing of very ill Conſequence.

In Anſwer to which Charge, it is to be obſerved, that as in the Doctrine of the Trinity, ſo in moſt other Objects of Faith and Knowledge, there's ſomething that we plainly and certainly underſtand, and ſomething that we cannot poſſibly comprehend: Thus a Man by inward Reflection is Infallibly conſcious of his own Thoughts, and he judges, whatever he perceives within himſelf, to proceed from one Common Principle, which he calls his Soul; and which, from the Nature of its Operations, he is fully perſwaded is ſomething of a different kind from his Body, tho' it always Acts in conſent with it: But what this Soul is, or in what manner united to his Body, he is not able to conceive; and therefore the Doctrine of the Human Soul, taken all together, may as juſtly be ſtiled a Myſtery, as the Trinity. We ought not then to be offended at the word Myſtery, ſince, if we ſtrictly examine our thoughts, we ſhall find that almoſt every thing we pretend to know, comes under that name, even thoſe things we have the greateſt Aſſurance of, our very Souls and Beings.

This being obſerved, we may conſider the Trinity either with reſpect to what may be underſtood of it, or what cannot: So far as we are capable of conceiving a Trinity, 'tis no Myſtery, and conſequently no Oppreſſion of our Faith; And ſo far as it cannot be comprehended, it does not bind us to any Explicit Act of Faith: As is plain from what has been ſaid before concerning the Nature of Faith, and the Perſons obliged to believe this Article: For all things neceſſary to Salvation are to be believed by all ſorts of Men; and nothing can be believed any farther than the terms in which it is propoſed are underſtood: But a Myſtery cannot be brought down to the loweſt Capacities, and be delivered in Terms that are plainly and diſtinctly underſtood, for then it would be no longer a Myſtery: So far therefore as we are obliged to believe, is no Myſtery; For whatever Terms I am bid to believe a thing in I cannot comprehend, I can mean no more but that I believe it to be in ſome manner I cannot comprehend: And I am ſure there's no difficulty or danger in believing that there are ſome things which we are not able to find out, or comprehend.

Theſe are the Reflections which offered themſelves upon a careful and impartial Conſideration of this Subject.

But here I fore-ſee it may be asked, What do we underſtand more of the Trinity now than we did before? What new Hypotheſis is here advanced to ſolve all the Difficulties of that Doctrine by? In Anſwer to which Objection, I have this further to add for the Juſtification of the foregoing Diſcourſe.

Firſt, That the Principal Deſign of my Enquiries was, to know, what God required us all to believe in order to our Salvation, not how far the Soul of Man was capable of diſcovering the deep things of God: For I am fully perſwaded; that there may be things neceſſary to be believed, and yet we not obliged to believe them in that diſtinct particular ſenſe in which ſome Learned. Men have explained them; Though their Hypotheſis ſhould be very Rational and Conſiſtent, and perhaps really true. And therefore could there be any new way found out of making the Trinity conceivable by Human. Underſtanding, I do not think we ſhould be under any Obligation of believing that particular Expoſition of it: For beſides the difficulty of ſuch abſtracted Notions, even in their plaineſt dreſs, with reſpect to mean Capacities, which are all equally concerned in neceſſary Articles of Faith, it cannot be imagined that we ſhould be obliged to believe more than the Chriſtians who lived before us were; that more ſhould be neceſſary to our Salvation than was to theirs: And 'tis certain their Faith was ſufficient and effectual for obtaining Eternal Life, who could not poſſibly believe what we ſuppoſe to be but lately diſcovered.

But 2dly, Conſidering that we were permitted with Humility and Reverence to Exerciſe our Souls in the ſearch of Divine Knowledge; And moreover that we ought as Chriſtians, as well as Men, to give a Reaſon of the Faith we profeſs, and defend it againſt all falſe and unjuſt Imputations; I have alſo made it my buſineſs to enquire, how far we were capable of forming diſtinct Conceptions of a Trinity; And upon Enquiry found that after a Faithful Tryal of our Faculties, and a ſtrict Examination of all the ſimple Notions which make up the Propoſition to believed, we cannot arrive at greater Knowledge in this Point than our fore-fathers have done; And that ſo much of the Doctrine of the Trinity as was a Myſtery to them, is like to be ſo to the end of the World.

Which if I have as fully and ſufficiently proved to others as I am convinced of it my ſelf, I ſhall not think my Time or Labour loſt upon this Subject. For next to underſtanding a thing throughly is to know we cannot underſtand it; next to reſolving a Problem in Mathematicks, is to demonſtrate it cannot be done. Our Souls are as much at reſt, our Deſires as quiet, and all our Deſigns and Purſuits as much at an end when we deſpair of Victory, as when we actually Conquer.

And therefore if theſe be the true and proper Limits of our Faith and Knowledge which I have aſſigned; If I have given a Juſt Account of what we are required to believe concerning the Trinity; How much 'tis poſſible for us to believe of it, and how far we are capable of having diſtinct Conceptions about it; 'tis in vain to ſearch for new Notions and Hypotheſes, which may probably puzzle or deceive our Underſtandings, but can never lead us farther into the Knowledge of the Trinity.

But I will not pretend to meaſure the Abilities of other Men by my own: I ſhall only ſay this more, which I am ſure I can truly affirm, that I have taken all the care imaginable to deliver my Judgment impartially and ſincerely, and have not dared to impoſe any thing upon others, which I do not believe my ſelf, or is any ways inconſiſtent with the Principles of right Reaſon.