The proceedings of the present Parliament justified by the opinion of the most judicious and learned Hvgo Grotivs, with considerations thereupon written for the satisfaction of some of the reverend clergy who yet seem to labour under some scruples concerning the original right of kings, their abdication of empire, and the peoples inseparable right of resistance, deposing, and of disposing and settling of the succession to the crown / by A lover of the peace of his country.

The proceedings of the present Parliament justified by the opinion of the most judicious and learned Hvgo Grotivs, with considerations thereupon written for the satisfaction of some of the reverend clergy who yet seem to labour under some scruples concerning the original right of kings, their abdication of empire, and the peoples inseparable right of resistance, deposing, and of disposing and settling of the succession to the crown / by A lover of the peace of his country.

Table of contents

§

Title page

The Opinion of the most Learned and Judicious HUGO GROTIUS, &c.

[Page]

[Page]

The Opinion of the most Learned and Judicious HUGO GROTIUS, &c.

THere are some, I do observe, amongst the Clergy of the Church of England, who seem very much concerned for the late King's Interest, and dissatisfied with the Management and Disposure of Affairs relating thereto, by this Great and Honorable Convention of the Lords and Commons now assembled in Parliament. All who cherish Resentments of this kind I dare not indistinguishably condemn, because they may possibly be directed in some by a Principle of Honor and Honesty: But those whose Intentions are honest, and do not principally design thereby to betray their Country into Popery and Vassalage (for such will be the natural Consequences, tho not the Inducements to their Wishes) I desire they would seriously weigh this Right they so much contend for, in the Ballance of Law and Reason, before they pass a Censure, or ground an Opinion.

There can be no Right pretended either to Property or Dominion, but by the Laws of Nature, Nations, or the Municipal Laws of the Country where such Right is claimed, and altho the latter of these are grounded upon and derived from the two former, yet do they notwithstanding take place in the deciding of all Difficulties, so far as their Statutes or Presidents do extend: But where the municipal Laws are silent or defective, there Recourse is to be had to the Laws of Nature and Nations. Upon this account it was, that the Grave and Learned Serjeant Maynard, being applyed unto, as the fittest person, in respect of [Page] his great Age and Learning, to signifie what the Laws of the Land did direct in such an Exigence as this, replyed, That it was true, he was the most ancient of all those who attended that Prosession, that he had outlived several Kings, and several Sets of Judges, but now he had also outlived the Law it self. Intimating thereby, that the Case was so unusual and extraordinary, that it went beyond the Direction of the municipal Laws, and therefore must appeal to a more remote Tribunal.

The Reason why I do more particularly single out the Opinions of this famous Civilian upon this Occasion, is because of the great Credit and Authority he has obtained in the World, especially amongst the Clergy, and is above all other of his Faculty, most tender of the Rights and Prerogatives of Crowned Heads. Upon this account there can nothing reasonably be objected to his Sense of those Scruples and Difficulties which some at present labor under. Therefore I desire they would hear him in his own Words, with the most fair and genuine Translation they will admit.

Grot. de Jure Belli & Pacis, Lib. 1. Cap. 4. Sect. 16.

§

Si Bello injusto & cui Juris Gentium requisita non adsint, Imperium arripuerit aliquis, neque pactio ulla secuta sit aut fides illi data, sed sola vi retineatur possessio: videtur manere belli jus, ac proinde in eum licere quae in hostem licet, qui, à quolibet etiam privato, jure [Page] potest interfici.In reos Majestatis, inquit Tertullianus,& publicos hostes omnis homo miles est.

§

[Page] If any one by an unjust War, such as wants those Requisits which by the Laws of Nations it ought to have, does usurp a Government, nor afterwards enters into any Compact with the People, nor is there any Trust reposed in him, but his Possession is maintained by Force; the right of War does in this Case still continue, wherefore it is lawful to deal with him in all things as with [Page] an Enemy, for he may be justly slain by any private person. Tertullian tells us, That against those who are guilty of usurping Majesty, and against common Enemies, every one is a Soldier.

I know but of three ways whereby Empire can be originally acquired. The first is by Nature, and the Governor a Patriarch, who immediately presides over a Family or City of his own natural Generation, or claims the Government by a Lineal Descent from him who was the common natural Ancestor of all his Subjects. To this Title I think there is no Prince now in the World lays claim: if there be, let him produce his Pedegree, and prove himself the Primogenitus by an Hereditary Line from the natural Father of his People, and I will not farther contend it with him.

The second sort of Empire is by Conquest, of which you see what Grotius says. But put the case the Conqueror had a Right prior to his Conquest, so that the War cannot be called unjust, yet after he has acquired the Government, he cannot at once be in, by two Titles, so as to exercise the respective powers given by both; because if he holds by Conquest his power is Absolute; if by Contract, then limited and directed by the People; and he cannot be both absolute and limited at the same time. From hence it must necessarily follow, that by every Act wherein he transgresses his limited power, in usurping what he had no manner of Right to, he renounces his lawful Title, and rules by force and violence only, and thereby the Conquerors unjust War, and the Peoples just Right to vindicate themselves from this unjust usurpation, is still continued.

As the Case stands now with us in England, if the late King could have claimed by Conquest, as many have pretended he might, from William the Conqueror, only to [Page] palliate some illegal Proceedings; what has been done against him, and much more, in the Opinion of this learned Man, had been both lawful and justifiable. But if he claims neither as a Patriarch, nor by Conquest, then there is only left for him to claim by Compact, under which Qualification I desire you would farther consider him by the Rules which our learned Author lays down.

Grot. de Jure Belli, Lib. 2. Ch. 14. Sect. 4.

§

Promissa quoque plena & absoluta atque acceptata, naturaliter jus transferre, demonstratum supra est; quod itidem ad Reges, non minus quam ad alios pertinet, ita ut improbanda sit, hoc quidem sensu, eorum sententia, qui negant Regem teneri unquam his quae sine causa promisit.

§

That Promises fully made and accepted do naturally transfer a Right, is already shewn. Now this holds as well in Kings as in private Men: their Opinions therefore are not to be allowed of, who hold, that what a King promises without a good cause, is not obligatory.

Contrary to this fundamental Law of Nature and Reason is the Opinion of those Divines who hold all Kings to be Jure divino, and consequently their Power absolute; so also of those common Lawyers who would justifie that all Concessions made by the Prince to his People, in diminution of his Prerogative Royal, (tho dangerous and destructive) are void and revokeable.

Ib. Lib. 1. Ch. 4. Sect. 7. N. 3.

§

Notandum est, primo homines non Dei praecepto sed sponte adductos, experimento [Page] infirmitatis familiarum segregum adversus violentiam, in societatem civilem coiisse, unde Ortum habet Potestas Civilis, quam ideoHumanam Ordinationem Petrus vocat, quanquam alibi &Divina Ordinatio vocatur, quia hominum salubre institutum Deus probavit. Deus autem humanam legem probans, censetur probare ut humanam & humano more.

§

[Page] 'Tis to be observ'd, That Men did not originally unite into civil Communities by any Command [Page] from God, but voluntarily, and from the experience they had that separate Families were alone unable to resist any foreign Force. From hence grew Civil Power, which Peter therefore calls an Humane Ordinance, tho elsewhere it is called a Divine Ordinance, because God did approve thereof as suitable and convenient for the good of Mankind; but when God approves of an Humane Law, he must be suppos'd to do it as humane, and after an humane manner.

In this Paragraph our Author traces a lawful Empire to its Originals: he finds it then to reside in the People, and derives it, together with the reasons thereof, from Them, to such Person or Persons in whom it is by their Act and Sanction plac'd and confirm'd.

Ib. Lib. 1. Cap. 4. Sect. 7. N. 2.

§

Ferri enim leges ab hominibus solent & debent cum sensu humanae imbecillitatis. Haec autem Lex de quâ agimus, pendere videtur à voluntate eorum qui se primum in societatem civilem consociant, à quibus jus porro ad imperantes manat. Hi vero si interrogarentur, [Page] an velint omnibus hoc onus imponere, ut mori proeoptent, quam ullo casu vim superiorum armis arcere, nescio an velle se sint responsuri, nisi forte cum hoc additamento, si resisti nequeat, nisi cum maxima, Reipublicoe perturbatione aut exitio plurimorum innocentium, quod enim tali circumstantia caritas commendaret, id in legem quo (que) humanam deduci posse non dubito.

§

[Page] All Laws and Governments always are and ought to be establish'd by the first Legislators with respect to humane Frailty. The Law we treat of (viz. of Resistance in cases of inevitable necessity) seems to depend upon the Intention of those who first enter'd into Civil Society, from whom the [Page] Right of Governing is transferr'd to the Governor. If such were ask'd, Whether they intended to impose a Yoke equal to Death it self upon all who should offer to resist the Tyrannies of a superior Magistrate, by force, upon any account whatsoever; I much doubt, whether they would declare themselves in the Affirmative, unless perhaps to avoid the Inconveniencies which might attend such a Storm in the State, and the destruction of many Innocents: for what in this case Charity would oblige, may be received as a Law.

Here our Author gives another touch at the Original of Empire, and in effect tells us, that as it first was in the power of the People to make the Laws of Government, so it is absurd to think, that they should not by those Laws secure themselves against the Passions and Infirmities of the Governour, which they then made, that thereby they might be justifiable in re-assuming their native Liberty, so far as to repel by force the violence he should offer either to themselves or their Laws. To this effect, and more closely, does Vasquius write, Lib. 11. cont. Illust. cap. 82. n. 3. Semper licet subditis si possint, in libertatem eam, scilicet quae populi est, se vindicare: Quia quod vi partum est imperium vi possit dissolvi; quod autem ex voluntate sit profectum, in eo poenitere liceat & mutare voluntatem.

[Page]

Grot. de Jure Belli, Lib. 1. Cap. 4. Sect. 13.

§

Si Rex partem habet summi imperii, partem alteram populus aut Senatus, Regi in partem non suam involanti, vis justa opponi potest, quia eatenus Imperium non habet: Quod locum habere censeo etiamsi dictum sit, Belli potestatem penes Regem fore, id enim de bello externo intelligendum est: cum alioqui, quisquis Imperii summi partem habeat, non possit non jus habere eam partem tuendi. Quod ubi sit, potest etiam Rex sui imperii partem, Belli jure amittere.

§

If the Supreme Power be divided between the King and the People, he may justly be resisted by Force if he invade that part which is not his own, because his Power extended not to it. This I conceive must be allow'd, though the King have the Power of Peace and War; for this is to be understood of Foreign War. Whosoever hath any part of the Supreme Power, must also necessarily have a Right to defend it; and where the Government is so constituted, the King himself may justly, by the Right of War, lose even his own part of the Empire.

This is plainly the Case of England, where the Supreme Power is divided between the King, Lords, and Commons, and where the King in his greatest Magnitude is always acknowledged to be Minor Ʋniversis. It is evident then, That if either of these three do break in upon the Rights and Priviledges of either of the other two, Force is justifiable to repell this Invasion: as for instance, If any new Precept, Ordinance or Command should be introduced as an obligatory Law; or if any Law formerly made should be repeal'd or dispenc'd with, which in effect are both the same, by any one of these three Estates, without the Concurrence of the other two in Parliament; this [Page] is such an Invasion as Grotius here speaks of, because this Power of making and repealing a Law is jointly in the King and People, but in neither of them separately. Now whether the erecting of an High Commission Court directly contrary to an Act of Parliament, be not a virtual repealing of that Act; Whether the dispensing with several other Statutes be not equivalent with the assuming of a Power to abrogate them; Whether the establishing a standing Army in time of Peace be not a virtual Introduction of a new Law in it self, and a Repeal of all the old ones in its Consequences; and whether all these be not such an Invasion of that part of the Government which belongs to the People as will justifie Resistance, let the World judge: If so, the Legality then of all that has been done or is farther likely to be done against such an Invader, will easily appear. Theodosius the Emperor often used this excellent Expression, Tantum mihi licet quantum per leges licet; and St. Paul acquaints us with the Conditions of our Submission not for Wrath but Conscience sake, knowing that he is the Minister of God for our Good. Nor indeed does it seem Christian or reasonable, to impose Obedience farther than it shall appear to be for the general Good of the People, for whose Safeguard and Protection, not their Ruine and Destruction, Government, nay Religion it self, was first instituted. Ʋnicus imperii finis est populi utilitas, saith Junius Brutus; and I cannot but concur with this fundamental Maxim, Salus populi est suprema Lex.

Grot. de Jure Belli, Lib. 1. Cap. 4. Sect. 10.

§

Si tamen Rex reipsâ etiam tradere Regnum aut subjicere moliatur, quin ei resisti in hoc possit non dubito. Aliud est enim ut diximus [Page] imperium: aliud habendi modus, qui ne mutetur obstare potest populus: id enim sub imperio comprehensum non est: Quò non male ap [...]es illud Senecae in re non dissimili,Et si parendum in omnibus patri, in eo non parendum, quo efficitur ne Pater sit.

§

[Page] If a King shall endeavour to give up or subject his Kingdom to another, I doubt not but he may be resisted; for Empire is one thing, and the [Page] manner of holding it another, the Alteration whereof the People may hinder, for that is not comprehended under the Notion of Empire it self. To this may that Saying of Seneca be well applied, being in effect the same case, Although an universal Obedience is required to Parents, yet not in those things wherein they cease to act like Parents.

What Designs have been carried on to alter the Government by subverting the fundamental Laws thereof, and by private Leagues and Combinations with a neighbouring Prince, to subject the Kingdom to his Power by admitting of a foreign Army into it, is in part evident by the French King's Testimony, and in convenient time will farther appear, to add to those many other weighty Inducements, which the People had, to proceed by such Measures as the Wisdom of the Nation has thought fit.

Grot. de Jure Belli, Lib. 1. Cap. 4. Sect. 9.

§

Si Rex aut alius quis imperium abdicavit aut manifeste habet pro derelicto, in eum post id tempus omnia licent quae in privatum, sed minime pro derelicto habere rem censendus est qui eam tractat negligentius.

§

If a King or any other Superior Magistrate shall abdicate or manifestly desert the Government, any thing may be lawfully done against him that may be done against a private Person: but he who governs only negligently, is not to be esteem'd as one who hath deserted.

[Page] The Word ABDICATE in its proper Sense, is used to signifie, when a superior Magistrate does renounce and utterly withdraw himself from the Government, or from that share of it which he holds. This may be done voluntarily and designedly, by transferring the Government to another by some formal method of Conveyance, as Charles the Fifth did to his Son, being himself inclined to become a Recluse; or else there may be an involuntary and undesigned Abdication, as when an Office, and the executing of the same, does determine by Misfeasance, or Nonfeasance. The Word DESERT implies only a Nonfeasance, and must naturally amount in all Ministerial Offices (that of a King, who hath only the Executive Power, being no other) to an end and determination of the same, and thereby does vest again in Him or them who first created or instituted the Office, an immediate power to erect and institute a new one, together with such an Officer as they they shall approve of to execute it, with such Restrictions and Limitations as they shall think expedient. How far this poor Government has been abdicated, renounced, deserted and forsaken by Malefeasance, Misfeasance Nonfeasance, and at last by an utter Dereliction, I need not repeat, it being too evident to all, but those who will not see, than whom there is none so blind and incorrigibly ignorant.

Grot. De Jure Belli, Lib. 1. Cap. 4. Sect. 8.

§

Primum ergo, qui Principes sub Populo sunt, sive ab initio talem acceperunt potestatem, sive postea ita convenit ut Lacedaemone, si peccent in Leges & Rempublicam non tantum vi repelli [Page] possunt, sed si opus sit puniri morte, quod Pausaniae Regi Lacedaemoniorum contigit.

§

[Page] Those Princes who are inferior in power to the whole Body of the People, whether by original or subsequent Compact, as in Lacedaemon, if they violate the Laws, or wrong the Commonwealth, such may not [Page] only be resisted by force, but if necessary, be punished by death, which befel Pausanias King of the Lacedaemonians.

How sacred the person of a King is, I cannot determine; but to his Office, as to all things that are for universal good, whilst executed in order to that end, I will allow a Character of Sanctity. Some Kings, such as were by God's immediate appointment, are stiled, His anointed, and were handed to his People with a particular command to be tender of their persons; but this must be understood of such only, who are also Nursing Fathers to their People; for of others of a different stamp, the Scripture speaks but with a slender respect, when it says, I have given you a King in my wrath. In Deut. we find the People left to chuse a King from among their Brethren, and Moses elsewhere prescribing Laws to him. David makes a League with the People at Hebron, which was doubtless that original Contract, according to which he was to go in and out before them. It was a noble expression of the Emperor Trajan, when he delivered a Sword to a Captain of the Pretorian Band, and said, Hoc pro me utere si recte impero, si male contra me: but it is not upon every small occasion, that Kings may be bound in fetters, or that Trajan's Sword should be inverted to his own Breast. A King's Office is sacred, and so is his Right also, which, while it keeps within its due limits, ought not to be invaded. The Laws of God do in positive Terms command Honor and Obedience as well as Tribute to be paid to him, with which the municipal Laws of this Kingdom do equally conspire in favor of his Dignity and Person. But Divine as well as Human Laws, tho they sound absolutely, yet refuse not upon extraordinary Exigencies, to submit to implyed Exceptions. Upon [Page] this account, the Jewish Doctors in case of their Sabbath; which of all things was esteemed most sacred amongst them, and the Laws for the observance of it most strict and absolute, yet they held that Periculum animae impellit Sabbathum, and for the same reason Christ himself justifies the breach of Sabbath, and eating of the Shew Bread, in cases of extreme necessity; so likewise must the danger be imminent, and the necessity very urgent, that can any ways excuse so much as an irreverend thought of Majesty: yet, as the great Law of Necessity is superior to all others, so will it sometimes justifie such Acts as are against all Laws of an inferior Order. In such cases the People are, must and will be absolute and arbitrary, and therefore they cannot by any Contract or Promise either with Prince or Peasant, renounce and abdicate this great Law of Self-preservation, in affirmance of which great truth, Johannes Major in lib. 4. Sententiarum, thus expresses himself, Non posse populum à se abdicare potestatem destituendi Principis in casu quo ad destructionem vergeret. But how far the present Exigence may justifie the act of the People in altering of the Succession where the Monarchy is hereditary, and the Heir may plead his Innocence, the following Authorities will resolve.

Grot. De Jure Belli, Lib. 2. cap. 4. Sect. 10. N. 2.

§

Sciendum est, ejus qui nondum natus est nullum esse jus, sicut nec ulla sunt accidentia rei non existentis. Quare, si populus, à cujus voluntate jus regnandi proficiscitur voluntatem mutet, iis qui nondum nati sunt, ut quibus jus quaesitum nondum est, nullam facit injuriam. [Page] Sicut autem populus expresse mutare voluntatem potest, ita & tacite credi mutasse. Mutata igitur populi voluntate, neque dum existente eorum jure qui expectari possunt, parentibus autem è quibus nasci possunt, qui jus suo tempore essent habituri, id ipsum jus derelinquentibus, nihil est quod obstet quo minus illud ut derelictum, ab alio occupari possit.

§

[Page] We must know, that no Right can belong to him who is yet unborn, as that which hath no existence can have no accidents. Wherefore, if the People, from whose Will all Right of Sovereignty did originally proceed, should happen to change their Will, yet cannot they be supposed thereby, [Page] to injure them who have yet acquired no Right. And as the People may be believed to change their Will by express words, so they may tacitly likewise: allowing then, that the People have changed their Will, and that such future Rights have no real existence in those who are only in expectancy; but that the Parents from whom they may be born, having in them this Right, did relinquish the same, what should hinder but that which is thus derelinquished may be possessed by another.

This Point of Succession, upon supposition that the pretended Prince of Wales was really born of the Queen, requires a decision, for it happening before any alteration actually made in the Government, leaves the point to turn upon the Change of the Peoples Will. Our Author here takes notice of an express and a tacit Change. That the People did in a publick formal manner change their Will as to the Succession, before the Birth of this Child, I cannot say; but it is certain, that they did generally shew their Aversions to such a Succession, long before this Birth, and would undoubtedly have done it in a more publick legal Method, had they not been awed by an illegal standing Army. As to a tacit Change of their Will none can doubt, but it had a full Existence before the young Prince had his, bearing date from that day, wherein publick Prayers and Thanks were by Order, offered up for the Queens pretended Conception, and may by this Parliament, be accordingly so declared.

[Page]

Grot. de Jure Belli, Lib. 2. Cap. 7. Sect. 26.

§

Similis est quaestio, an abdicari possit Regnum, aut jus succedendi in Regnum: & quin pro se quisque abdicare possit non est dubium: an & pro liberis, magis controversum.

Ib. Illud interest interNatos &Nascituros, quodNascituris nondum quaesitum sit jus, atque ideo, auferri iis possit populi voluntate, si etiam parentes, quorum interest jus ad filios transire, jus illud remiserint: quo pertinent ea quae de relictione supra diximus

§

It is such another Question, Whether a King can so abdicate his Kingdom as to destroy the Right of Succession to his Son. That he may abdicate for himself is not doubted; but whether for his Children also, is the Question.

The diversity depends upon the Childrens being born before or after the Renunciation, for those who are yet unborn, the People may deprive of this Right, because it is not yet accru'd, if the Parents, whose Interest it is that such Right should descend to the Children, do also remit it. To the same purpose is what has been said concerning Abdication.

Our Author does here again affirm a change of Succession to be lawful, upon the change of the Peoples Inclination. But he is also farther of opinion, that a King may abdicate for a Child unborn as well as for himself. It is already sufficiently proved by the Authority of this Author, and others, That a Breach of the Office and Duty of a King is an Abdication ipso facto; and if so, that of King James II. may bear date from the day he first erected the Court of Ecclesiastical Commissioners, establish'd a standing Army in the Nation, or took those Customs, the Grant whereof expired by K. Charles the Second's Death, and [Page] ought not to commence again till given by another Parliament. This was done in the very Infancy of his Reign, whereby his Abdication became an early Act, and did betimes cut off both such real and supposititious Issue, as might after pretend by Birth and Title to bring in Popery and Slavery into this Nation.

Grot. de Jure Belli, Lib 2. Cap. 7. Sect. 27. N. 2.

§

Si de primaevâ p [...]pulivoluntate (in Successione controvertendâ dictum)quaestio incidat; non abs re erit, populum qui nunc est, quique idem cum eo qui olim fuit censetur, suum super ea re sensum exprimere; qui sequendus erit, nisi satis certo constet, olim aliam fuisse populi voluntatem, & ex eâ jus quaesitum.

§

If (in discussing of a Right of Succession) any doubt does arise, it would be convenient that the People who now are, and may be supposed to be of the same mind with their first Ancestors, should express the sense of the matter; which ought to be pursued, unless it be manifest, That the original Will of the People was otherwise, and from thence a Right was established.

Our Author, in his own Annotations upon this Paragraph, farther adds, That such Disquisition may be made by Convention of the States (viz. The Lords and Commons) as it was in England in the Year 1571 and 1572, according to Camden. In the two former Paragraphs he puts Cases about the change of a Succession, and resolves them; but by this and by his Annotations thereupon, when any other Doubts shall arise concerning Succession, he leaves them to the Decision of the People, and particularly to the States of England by express Name; as if they were more undoubted Judges in such Controversies than the [Page] States of any other Nation: and they, according to this Learned Author's Opinion, have regularly and justly proceeded to assert their own Rights, and to settle both them and the Succession of the Crown, for the future, upon such an Establishment, that we may reasonably hope and believe, that all the Powers of France, or Prayers of Rome, no nor the very Gates of Hell, shall ever be able to prevail against them.

FINIS.

[Page]

§

§

[Page] [Page] THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE Present Parliament, &c.

§

§

[Page] [Page] THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE Present Parliament JUSTIFIED By the OPINION of the most Judicious and Learned HƲGO GROTIƲS; With Considerations thereupon.

WRITTEN For the Satisfaction of some of the Reverend Clergy who yet seem to labour under some Scruples concerning the Original Right of Kings, their Abdication of Empire, and the Peoples inseparable Right of Resistance, Deposing, and of Disposing and Settling of the Succession to the Crown.

By a Lover of the Peace of his Country.

With Allowance.

LONDON: Printed, and are to be Sold by Randal Taylor, 1689.

Information about this book

Title statement

The proceedings of the present Parliament justified by the opinion of the most judicious and learned Hvgo Grotivs, with considerations thereupon written for the satisfaction of some of the reverend clergy who yet seem to labour under some scruples concerning the original right of kings, their abdication of empire, and the peoples inseparable right of resistance, deposing, and of disposing and settling of the succession to the crown / by A lover of the peace of his country.

Grotius, Hugo, 1583-1645.

Edition statement

1689

Publication

Publisher

Text Creation Partnership,

Place of publication

Ann Arbor, MI ; Oxford (UK) :

Date

2009-03 (EEBO-TCP Phase 1).

ID [DLPS]

A42235

ID [STC]

Wing G2124

ID [STC]

ESTC R17553

ID [EEBO-CITATION]

11739267

ID [OCLC]

ocm 11739267

ID [VID]

48480

Availability

This keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the Early English Books Online Text Creation Partnership. This Phase I text is available for reuse, according to the terms of Creative Commons 0 1.0 Universal. The text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission.

Series

Early English books online.

Notes

(EEBO-TCP ; phase 1, no. A42235)

Transcribed from: (Early English Books Online ; image set 48480)

Images scanned from microfilm: (Early English books, 1641-1700 ; 532:12)

Source

— The proceedings of the present Parliament justified by the opinion of the most judicious and learned Hvgo Grotivs, with considerations thereupon written for the satisfaction of some of the reverend clergy who yet seem to labour under some scruples concerning the original right of kings, their abdication of empire, and the peoples inseparable right of resistance, deposing, and of disposing and settling of the succession to the crown / by A lover of the peace of his country., Grotius, Hugo, 1583-1645., Grotius, Hugo, 1583-1645. De jure belli et pacis..

Extent

20 p.

Printed, and are to be sold by Randal Taylor,. London :: 1689.. (The Latin text of selections from Grotius' De jure belli et pacis is accompanied by an English translation and commentary.) (Reproduction of orginal in Bristol Public Library, Bristol, England.)

Creation

Created by converting TCP files to TEI P5 using tcp2tei.xsl, TEI @ Oxford.

Editorial practices

EEBO-TCP is a partnership between the Universities of Michigan and Oxford and the publisher ProQuest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by ProQuest via their Early English Books Online (EEBO) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). The general aim of EEBO-TCP is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic English-language title published between 1473 and 1700 available in EEBO.

EEBO-TCP aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the Text Encoding Initiative (http://www.tei-c.org).

The EEBO-TCP project was divided into two phases. The 25,363 texts created during Phase 1 of the project have been released into the public domain as of 1 January 2015. Anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source.

Users should be aware of the process of creating the TCP texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data.

Text selection was based on the New Cambridge Bibliography of English Literature (NCBEL). If an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in NCBEL, then their works are eligible for inclusion. Selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. In general, first editions of a works in English were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably Latin and Welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so.

Image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. Quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in Oxford and Michigan. 5% (or 5 pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet QA standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. After proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of 100 instances per text. Any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. Understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of TCP data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. Users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a TCP editor.

The texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level 4 of the TEI in Libraries guidelines.

Copies of the texts have been issued variously as SGML (TCP schema; ASCII text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable XML (TCP schema; characters represented either as UTF-8 Unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless XML (TEI P5, characters represented either as UTF-8 Unicode or TEI g elements).

Keying and markup guidelines are available at the Text Creation Partnership web site.