Next, as to the certainty of Salvation, I do exceedingly approve that which is ſet down by Molinaeus. 1. That there are ſome degrees of true Faith which are overthrown. 2. That ſome Elect ones doubt of their Salvation. 3. That there is a certain peculiar degree of Faith, which never fails. 4. That full Aſſurance is to be earneſtly beg'd of God. For, hence I collect. 1. That the Faith which fails, and which doth not fail, differ not ſo much in eſſence as degree; which alſo was the Opinion of Iunius. 2. That Chriſt obtain'd for us perſeverance, and it was promis'd by God on this condition, that we ask and beg it with our earneſt prayers; and therefore not at all abſolutely But, not to be deceived with ambiguity of words, we muſt note; all the Antients ſo affirm that Faith which may be overthrown, to be true Faith, as not to deny to it the effect alſo of Juſtification. For they openly pronounce: Many are damned for latter ſins, to whom the former were remitted: Nor do they leſs conſent to this, juſtifying Grace cannot at the ſame time conſiſt with ſins againſt Conſcience, as Murther, Adultery, and ſuch like. Wherefore, being ſome elect, after the gift of Faith received, fall into fins of this ſort, as by too many Examples it is evident; it follows, and is clearly pronounced by the Holy Fathers, that there may be ſome time after Faith received, wherein a Perſon elect may not be in the ſtate of Juſtification. Theſe things, if need were, might be prov'd by many authorities, and by the confeſſions of Proteſtants. See Confeſſ. Auguſt Art 11. Angl 16. Sax 10.

The antient Authors ſeem to me to acknowledge three ways of certainty concerning Salvation. The firſt whereof is extraordinary, by Revelation: this Austin ſaith, happens to ſome: what man can know he ſhall perſevere to the end in the work and way of Righteouſneſs, except he be aſſured by ſome Revelation from him, who by his juſt and ſecret judgment in this matter, doth not instruct all, but deceiveth none. The ordinary ways are two; the one taken from the time, the o • her from the degree of Faith. Certainty of his salvation a faithful man may have from the time, who is at the point of death, and hath now no hope of life. For, being a Believer knows he doth believe, and withal knows a Believer is juſtified before God (both which by the teſtimony of Holy Scripture, and o • pious Antiquity, we defend againſt the Papiſts) and this time of life is at an end, the Believer knows he dyeth in the ſtate of Grace, and ſo is certain of his Salvation. In reſpect whereof, Proſper having ſaid predeſtination is uncertain to us, addeth whilſt we are among the perils of this preſent life. The other ordinary manner of Aſſurance is from the degree of Faith. For, the Antients do conſtantly deliver, that perfect Charity (according to the perfection of this life, for the moſt perfect, ſaith Auſtin, is not attained here) never fails. Notable is that of Jerom: Charity which Peter before is dental bad, was an herb, and ſprings up young in every one before it is ſtrengthened; and before its perfection, is loſt and recovered. This is that root, which though the Sun, ſaith Auſtin, ſhine hot upon it, cannot wither. And to the ſame purpoſe he asketh, which of the multitude of Believers can preſume, himſelf is in the number of the predeſtinate: for naming the multitude, he ſeemeth to except ſome few excellent ones.

Beſides theſe three ways of certainty, there are other degrees inferior: For, as Bernard himſelf alſo doth acknowledge with all Antiquity, God hath not left his Elect without a teſtimony of conſolation in this life. This teſtimony the more and greater are the exerciſes of Piety, is ſo much the more certain, which the holy Scripture demonſtrates plainly, when we are commanded to make our calling and election firm and s;ure, by Faith, Virtue, Knowledge, Continence, Patience, Piety, Love and Charity: whence that ſaying of Auſtin, agreeing with the Antients, Fear is ſo much abated as Charity is encreaſed.

I proceed now to that part of the Writing, where Molinaeus ſeparates himſelf from thoſe, who againſt all Antiquity affirm, Men are created to this end that they may periſh; and putting Reprobation before the fall, put upon themſelves a neceſſity of attributing to God the efficacious procurement of all ſins, even of the firſt ſin alſo: becauſe, he that abſolutely ſets the end, ought withal to ſet the means, without which there is no coming unto the end. Here the moſt learned man, walking heedfully, does with a little fear declare his judgment, ſaying, he digeſteth not ſuch kind of ſpeaking: to wit, becauſe they are perſons of great Autority that ſo ſpeak. But truly. the danger is not in the form of vvords, but in the Doctrine it ſelf. For, that Opinion directly runs into the Anathema of the Arauſican Council, boldly pronounced by Auguſtin and Proſper.

And here it is to be admired; whereas all they that deduce ſins from a fatal neceſſity, were by the antient Church caſt unto the Manichees the worſt and moſt hated Hereticks; but the Semipelagians were ſuffered very long in their Communion; why at this day, on the contrary, ſuch as make God partly unjuſt, partly unmerciful, partly the Author of all wickedneſs, live freely without cenſure: But, if any man do concieve more meanly of Grace, though not near to Pelagianiſm, all do every where riſe againſt him with equal animoſity. Is the fault ſo much leſs, to load the Benefactor with contumelies, than to deny the benefit?

Rightly indeed, and agreeably both to the Gallic and Belgic Confeſſion doth Molinaeus pronounce, Reprobation is not but in the corrupt maſs. But this corrupt Maſs, ſome conſider in original ſin alone, catching that which is ſpoken of Eſau and Jacob; albeit that very ſpeech is ſuch as goeth afore of Iſaac and Iſmael, which the apoſtle himſelf elſe where declares to be Allegorical. (Gal. 4.) It was, I confeſs, Auſtin's opinion, which diſpleaſes moſt of the Reformed; That ſome children dying in their Infancy are damned for original ſin. But Auſtin could not think this of Eſau: becauſe, in his opinion, original ſin was taken away by circumciſion. Others conſider the corrupt Maſs in actual ſins: to whom Molinaeus ſeems to conſent when he ſaith, ſome men are deſignd to puniſhments for ſins which willingly and by by God unprovok'd they have admitted. Laſtly, ſome there are that conſider this corrupt Maſs, not in any ſort of ſins, but in the contempt of Vocation: for whom that ſentence of Auſtin, concerning the ſame Eſau, ſeems to ſtand; He did not will, he did not run: but if he had willed and runned, he had attained by the help of God, who would give him to run and to will by calling, unleſs by contempt of the call he would become a reprobate. Out of this ſentence therefore might be added to the words of Molinaeus by God unprovok'd, yea and ſeriouſly invited to repentance.

Hither have I been carried unaware (for when I began to write I purpoſed to diſpatch in brief) by the relection of that Paper, wherein the ſentiments of Molinaeus are contain'd. Of which I was not willing to deliver my own Judgment: nor would I have you think ſo. But, as it is a pleaſure to me to compare the antient Writers with the modern, ſo I eſteem'd it worth my pains, moſt noble Sir, to advertiſe you of that which (if I am not much deceiv'd) by my not indiligent reading I have learned, the Judgment of the Fathers touching theſe controverſies. You may, ſo judicious you are, collate the commentations of the antient and more recent Authors one with other; and ſo far as your buſineſs will permit, conſider which of their different Interpretations is more conſonant to the ſacred Context, to Reaſon by God illuminate, and to the edification of Gods Church.

In the Writing of Molinaeus, after the explication of his ſentence, follows a Collection of certain Articles, wherein he thinks the parties will eaſily agree. Of ſome things in them I have already made my Remarks, as may appear by what I have ſaid before, having anticipated them leſt the matter ſhould be ſevered. What remains ſhall now be added.

Free will, by the fall of our firſt Parents, is rightly ſaid, to be loſt in reſpect of pious actions, as it hath no ſtrength to actions of that kind: not ſo, as to ſignifie the native liberty is not in the will, without which it cannot be a will, and by which it cannot will and nill ſuppoſing all prerequiſits, i. ſtrength to will being granted. Therefore Auſtin ſaith. Who among us affirms, that by the ſin of the firſt man, free will periſhed from all mankind? Ad Boniſ. I. 1. Epiſt. 46 And to exclude here all together pious actions, other ſayings will not permit. If no grace of God, how doe; he ſave the world? if no free will, how does he judge the world? And, The Divine precepts would be profitable to no man, had he no free choice of will. Alſo, The Catholick Faith denies not free will neither to good life nor bad; de gra. and lib. arbis. c. 2. nor attributes to it any power without grace. Elſewhere, He that denies free will is not a Catholick: but he is a Catholick, who ſaies that without God it can neither begin nor finiſh any good work. By which ſaying 'tis not ſignified, that by nature we have to will well (which is Pelagian) but by nature we have this thing to will: which being inform'd by grace, we will well. For grace is the Principle from which, the will or free choice is the principle in which converſion is made. That of Auſtin: No will of man reſiſteth God being willing to ſave: De fide ad Pet. is ſo to be explained, that another ſentence of his lately cited be not contradicted: where he ſaith, It is imputed to many that they contemn God willing to heal. There is then a certain Will conditionate, which Proſper calls inviting: there is alſo an abſolute Will, which follows a certain, at leaſt conditionate preſcience.

That of Molinaeus, whom God hath predeſtinated to the end, i. Salvation, he hath predeſtinated to the means; ſeemeth plainly to define, that before he determines any thing concerning Faith, he determines abſolutely to ſave this man. Which definition ſegregates from us all the Fathers before Auſtin. Whether it agrees with Auſtin himſelf, is diſputed: unleſs perchance the word predeſtination be ſo generally taken, as to comprehend alſo that which is not abſolute, but which the means ſuppoſed paſſeth into abſolute.

Concerning the word ſufficient grace, and neceſſary, and free, we have already ſpoken. That none of them can periſh, whom God hath predeſtinated to the Kingdom; none by any means be ſaved, whom he hath not predeſtinated unto life, is fully true in the conjoyned ſenſe, what way ſoever predeſtination, ſo it be abſolute, is taken: but in the divided ſence 'twill be true, if this were true that reprobation is without preſcience of a free act: which Molinaeus ſeemeth to deny. Surely, Proſper was not afraid to ſay, Becauſe they are foreknown the predeſtinate will not fall: Ad obj. Vinc. reſp. 12. Ad Oan. Gal. 7. I. Sent. ſup. cit. c. 7. And, They ſhould be predeſtinate if they would return and perſevere in holineſs. Again, Becauſe he foreknew they would fall by their own will, for this he did not ſeparate them from the Sons of perdition by any predeſtination. Again, Therefore were they not predeſtinate, becauſe they were foreknown that they after would be ſuch by voluntary prevarication. I will add this on the by; the Book De fide ad Petrum, out of which is cited that newly mentioned ſentence, is by the learned thought not to be the work of Auſtin, and that upon weighty arguments.

That which is ſaid, God hath elected the predeſtinate to believe, is well ſaid, ſince every benefit unto which not all attain, is juſtly ſignified in Scripture by the word election. Neither yet does it follow hence, that the ſame men can no way be ſaid to be elected, i. to be juſtified becauſe they believe, if the word becauſe denote not the cauſe deſerving, but in any manner anteceding. In the ſame manner, he ſheweth mercy to us that we may be faithful: nor yet muſt we deny, there is ſome mercy following faith, and therefore ſhewed to the faithful, as ſuch. God by giving faith makes men hear the Goſpel worthily: but yet we muſt not therefore deny, God out of his immenſe goodneſs, whereby he converts many long contumacious, will not purpoſely exclude from that benefit the leſs contumacious, and ſuch as diligently read and hear his word: Neither ſeems it fit to be denied, that ſuch as do attentively hear the Preachers of Gods word, are leſs unworthy of the gift of faith, than ſuch as ſtop their ears like the hearers of St. Steven. Thus in the Goſpel, the Apoſtles coming into any City or Village are bid to enquire, who in that place is worthy: to whom they are oppoſed as unworthy, who will not receive the Apoſtles, nor give audience to the word. Mat. 10. And in the Acts the Jews are ſaid, then at laſt to have judged themſelves unworthy of eternal life (i. by a greater and more ſpecial unworthineſs) after they were filled with wrath, and contradicted the word, and that with blaſphemy, Act. 13. But, if any man, ſpeaking not figuratively or comparatively, ſay there is in the unregenerate any ability to do that whereby he may be worth) to attain to faith, that his opinion is dangerous none I think will deny.

Now whereas Molinaeus ſaith, the Cauſes why he hath elected theſe, not elected thoſe, are with God, and not anxiouſly to be enquir'd by us; firſt he ſeems to intimate, that the only and univerſal cauſe of this diſcrimination is not the divine pleaſure: For this cauſe were open enough, to exclude other cauſes whatſoever. And when he ſaith, they are not anxiouſly to be enquir'd, he ſeems to grant, they may be enquir'd, at leaſt in ſome manner: which ſeems not far from that opinion of Auſtin (which many think was retracted by him) where he ſaith, the cauſe why this perſon rather than that is reprobated, proceedeth from our own merits. Becauſe the groſſer Papiſts refer the word merit to the nature of the work and to commutative juſtice, we do upon very good grounds not dare to uſe this word. The Fathers took to merit for that which is to obtain by doing ſomewhat; and merit for a pious work unto which is a due reward by liberal and gratious promiſe. So, the word being molified, we ſhall leſs wonder now, if among the Fathers more antient than Auſtin we find, man is predeſtinate for merits. For they ſpeake of an abſolute decree of giving glory by way of reward. whence Ambroſe: whoſe merits he hath foreknown, their rewards he hath predeſtinated.

De fide 5.3. To conclude this part: Really, I am of Molinaeus's judgment, that in theſe controverſies ſuch an Article may be contrived, to which the French, Engliſh, Belgians, Helvetians, embracing the more pure Religion, will ſubſcribe: and the Article may beſt be taken out of the Arauſican Council, and out of Proſper Sentences ad capitula Gallorum And I think this ought to be the ſcope. That in good the honor of grace may be kept inviolate; in evil, man may accuſe himſelf, and not draw God at all into the Society of his crime. Moreover, That man may be taught, neither to diſtruſt the Divine aſſiſtance, nor ſeek ſecurity in any other way but in the ſtudy of piety. Withal, I would wiſh that ſobriety to be uſed in determining queſtions, that a fit reſpect may not only be had for Auſtin, and Proſper, and Fulgentius, but alſo that men may abſtain from condemning thoſe ſentences, in which 'tis manifeſt moſt holy men liv'd and dv'd; who after the Apoſtles and before the Empire of Conſtantine, in the Ages moſt conſpicuous for all piety, edified the Church of Chriſt by their words and writings, by their life and blood.

I am now come to the laſt part, which is concerning the Magiſtrate. And here Molinaeus ſaith pleaſantly, He is eaſed by me, becauſe I am forward to teach him what ought to be his Opinion. Wherein he ſhews himſelf much miſtaken in my purpoſe. For my intent was, neither to teach him (whom I thought fit to be admoniſht by your Honor, as from your ſelf, touching ſome things, and that he ſhould never ſee what I had written to you) nor to teach any other, but freely to depoſit my thoughts in your boſom, my moſt noble Friend. And that, upon this occaſion: becauſe I underſtood by you, that Molinaeus beſtowed upon learned Magiſtrates ſome Right which he would not grant to the leſs learned. That did not pleaſe me, I confeſs: and therefore I gave a clear diſtinction, as it ſeemeth to me, and perſpicuous, between the right or power, and the Aptitude or Ability. But Molinaeus here was ſo far from taking my ſenſe, that he aſcribes to me a meaning contrary to my words. He ſaith, I would have a right of making laws to pertain to the learned Magiſtrates. I ſaid it not, yea I ſignified the contrary, that learning makes nothing to the right it ſelf. He ſaith after, a Senator or Judge, if he be a Lawyer, is ſo, as he is a judge. I much diſlike this. For there are many Lawyers, not Judges, and many Judges not Lawyers. The one is a name of office, the other of skill. Take another example. There are many Paſtors (alas!) too unskilful of holy letters. Their office is to interpret Scripture, nor are they without a right, but they have not an Aptitude thereto requiſit. Science therefore neither giveth nor encreaſeth right, but to the good uſing of it conduceth much. An unskilful Prince (not to ſpeak yet of Church-affairs) hath no leſs right to give commands in civil affairs, and to make laws, than a Prince moſt learned. I much admire, theſe things were not conſider'd by a man moſt acute. That which is ſpoken of knowledge, underſtand alſo of probity of mind. He muſt be a good man, that will govern well: but the right it ſelf of governing depends no more upon Virtue, than the dominion of a private eſtate. For, the covetous man is as well Maſter of his goods, as the liberal; though the liberal rightly uſeth riches, which the covetous abuſeth.

Molinaeus ſuppoſed, I would have the Magiſtrate, who ſhall govern the Church, to be Orthodox. Really I would, and all rich men to be liberal. He asketh, who ſhall judge whether the Magiſtrate be Orthodox? If himſelf, great danger: if others, then will the Magiſtrate be ſubject to others Judgment. I will ask likewiſe, who ſhall judge whether the Magiſtrate be ſufficiently skill'd in civil matters? and if that argumentation prevail, I will conclude the Magiſtrate to be ſubject to the judgment of the people. I will ask again, when the Magiſtrate muſt apply himſelf to ſome Church, who ſhall judge whether this, or that Church be the more Orthodox? ſhall he, or the Church? If he, there is alſo the ſame danger as before: if the Church, this is to beg the queſtion: for there is no Aſſembly of Chriſtians, which calls not it ſelf a Church, and that Orthodox too. But, ſaith he, an Infidel Magiſtrate will abuſe this example, and uſurp the ſame power. As if, to alledge an incommodity were to ſolve the Argument. What is there in humane affairs without ſome incommodity? May not I in like manner ſay, if that be given to the Church which I conceive is to be given to the Magiſtrate, an Aſſembly of Heretical Paſtors will alſo abuſe this example and uſurp the ſame right, if any where it prevail, as it hath happened more than once. I will anſwer in the words of Auſtin: Kings, when they are in Error, make laws for error againſt the truth; and when they are in the truth, make laws for truth againſt error. So are good men tryed by evil laws, and by good laws are evil men reformed. You ſee how little Auſtin feared that incommodity. And in truth, it is of no moment. Aurelian the Emperor was not Orthodox: therefore he could not expell from his Biſhoprick the Heretick Samoſatenus. This conſequence was not perceived by the Holy Fathers, who yielded the judgment of Samoſatenus to the Emperor ſo far, that the cauſe being examined, they requeſted he might by the Imperial autority be dethron'd. Neither would Paul have appealed unto Nero, had he believed, no right of judging in a caſe of Religion belonged to him. Wherefore, as Trajan civilly honeſt, Nero wicked, are nevertheleſs equal in the right of Government; ſo pious Conſtantine, and impious Nero are equal in the right of judging, in aptitude and skill unequal.

This moſt learned man further enquires, whether by Governing the Church I underſtand being judge in the heads of faith; or, a power to purge the Church of ſcandals, and to command belief of thoſe things which are contained in the word of God. But I wonder theſe are parted, which do ſeem to me indiſſolubly joyned. For, if it be the office of a King to command, that thoſe things be taught which are true, that ſcandals be avoided; amongſt which Hereſies have the chief place; how ſhall he do this unleſs he judge, what is true, what is Hereſy. For the act of commanding reguires the power of judging. But he ſaith, Thoſe things muſt be commanded to be believed, which are eſtabliſht by the Aſſembly of Paſtors Orthodox. And he that ſays this, does he not ſhew, 'tis at leaſt required to judge who are thoſe Orthodox Paſtors. Now, becauſe the examples of King Edward, of the States of Holland, of the Prince of Orange are alledged, I enquire: when there were in England Romiſh Paſtors, and there were alſo Reformed; in Holland not only Romiſh, but Anabaptiſts alſo and Lutherans; that the Reformed Religion was publickly introduced in both Nations, other being either prohibited or poſtpoſed; did it not ſo come to paſs, becauſe the King, the States, the Prince, judged this Religion pureſt? They embraced then what was ſuggeſted by faithful Paſtors and demonſtrated by Scripture, not for the Autority of Paſtors (for there were many families of them) but becauſe they judged the things agreeable to the Scripture. Albeit they underſtood not the knots and ſubtilities of Theology, it was ſufficient that they did caſt off Idolatry and Popiſh Tyranny, and other errors, with an aſſured judgment.

A queſtion follows, impertinent to this place, touching a King, who will with blaſphemous mouth receive the holy myſteries. I anſwer: either this is forbidden by Divine law, or not: If forbidden by Divine law (as I conceive it is, if the King be ſuppoſed not yet repenting) the King will not be ſubject to the Eccleſiaſtick laws, which Molinaeus ſaith, but to the Divine, which none denies. The like is in a judge of petty cauſes, commanded by the King to give ſentence againſt equity. This Judge will not do ſo, if he be wife. Is the King therefore ſubject to the Judge? No verily: but the Judge is ſo ſubject to the King, that he muſt acknowledge, above the earthly King, the Empire of his heavenly King, who forbiddeth injury to be done to any. But, if you ſuppoſe here ſome law, not Divine but poſitive, proceeding from humane will; to this law whoſoever ſhall affirm a King to be ſubject, ſo as to be unable in any caſe to relax the legal bond, he denies him to be a King.

The Canons of many Synods forbid Epiſcopal ſeats to be erected into Metropolitan: they forbid new Biſhops or Metropolitans to be conſtituted, or a Biſhop to do ſacred offices in another Dioceſe: they forbid Biſhops to undertake civil imployments. Nevertheleſs, by command of the Emperors all this was done very often. The Greek Interpreters give the reaſon, becauſe the Emperor is not ſubject, neither to the Laws nor Canons.

Next, Molinaeus enquires, whether the Kings Counſellors muſt be Doctors of Divinity, or it be alſo neceſſary for the King to be a learned Divine. Verily, my opinion is, that the knowledge of things Divine is requiſit in a King and in his chief Counſellors; not that he may be a King, They Counſellors, but to the end they may rightly perform the work of their places. But I ſay nor ſuch knowledge, as to diſtinguiſh every truth from falshood (for the greateſt Profeſſor of Theology cannot promiſe himſelf this) but to put a difference between things neceſſary to be believed or done, and things not neceſſary; between Heretical and not Heretical. And in the ſame manner I conceive, both the knowledge of the laws, and the art of Governing are deſired in a King. But, ſaith Molinaeus, 'tis fit the leſs learned be taught by the more learned. This argument, if it prove the leſs learned muſt ſubmit to the judgment of the more learned, then in Synods alſo the Paſtors ought to yield to the Doctors: for Molinaeus names them as men of the greateſt learning. And yet 'tis certain, that Paſtors have not leſs, if not more right than Doctors. Our men are wont to uſe the teſtimony of Panormitan, that a private perſon's Judgment, confirmed with better autority of Scripture, is to be prefer'd before the judgment of a Patriarch. To come to the matter, It is indeed the part of the more learned to teach the leſs learned, but not to have command over them. Therefore a Country Judge (as the laws tell us) is not obliged by the Reſponſe of Lawyers; nor is a ſick man bound to the preſcript of his Phyſitian, but ſo far as no reaſon of his own ſtrongly perſwades him to the contrary.

Another queſtion follows. whether a Magiſtrate may adjoyn himſelf to the leſſer number of Paſtors. Strange, that this ſhould be asked by a Paſtor reformed, ſeeing all Magiſtrates, who have in our age reform'd the Church, rightly believ'd the leſſer number of Paſtors againſt the greater. But in the Nicene Synod Conſtantine yielded to the more, and did not addict himſelf to the fewer. Yea, he yielded to the plain and manifeſt truth, which the greater number at that time by Gods bleſſing followed. This doth not always happen: for the greater part oft overcomes the better. But if ſentences are to be numbred, not weighed, the Arimin Council of cccc. Biſhops will be of more value than the Nicene of cxviii. And what ſhould the Emperor have done, when (as Jerom teſtifies) the whole World groaned and wonderd it was turned Arian; was paucity then to be deſpiſed, multitude to be followed? No man in his right mind will ſay ſo. The two Kings are blamed for not believing one Michaia, rather than four hundred falſe Prophets. Well then, the different parties are to be heard, but the Prince ought to lend his autority to that cauſe, not which hath moſt ſuffrages, but whoſe equity the vigor of truth well try'd hath commended to him. That Rule, Every man muſt be believ'd in his own Art, hath ſome probability, but not perpetual certainty. And there is a difference of Arts-men, that often times it is expedient to truſt a few rather than many: So true is the common ſaying, The worſt are moſt. Theology indeed is not the proper Art of a King: but the Art moſt convenient for him is that which learned Writers call regal, leading, architechtonical: whereof the moſt noble part is that which I have named, the knowledge of things Divine; not deſcending to all ſubtilties of the School, nor yet ſtaying within the mean endowments of a private man; but comprehending all the chiefeſt points, and of ſuch a meaſure, that if any thing be wanting, it may be ſupplied by the Miniſtery of others. And I have ſaid before, the like meaſure of other Arts is deſir'd in a King; though I doubt not, if there be any ſcience to which a King ſhould addict his peculiar ſtudy, it is Theology. They greatly erre, who do either repreſent, or make it ſo obſcure and difficult, as to deter Princes from that ſtudy, which the Divine law ſo much commends unto them. But if in that reſpect the higheſt power in cauſes Eccleſiatical is to be denied the King, neither will the right of making laws, many being better Lawyers, belong unto him. I fear alſo, that the ſame reaſon will exclude many Paſtors from all right of ſuffrage.

I do not well underſtand what Molinaeus ſaith of the King of England. For he affirmeth him to be the ſupreme Judge in all Cauſes, as well Eccleſiaſtick as civil, yet not to be the judge of controverſies, nor to own that Title. How Controverſies can be exempt from the univerſal appellation of Cauſes I ſee not, when Judgment is not uſually given but of things controverted. But he ſeemeth to diſtinguiſh between matters of Faith and other Church-affairs. But, to judge what is an Idol, what is Idolatry, does it not pertain to Faith? Queen Elizabeth, and her brother King Edward, preferred the Reformation above Papiſm: not by an ignorant zeal, I ſuppoſe, but with good judgment. Now, the contention between the Papiſts and the Reformed is concerning Articles of Faith. The King, whoſe words are alledged, as removing from himſelf the judgment about Articles of Faith, did he not hear at Hampton Court, the Biſhops on the one ſide, the Puritans on the other? as Arbiter, as Judge? When the Conference was not only of Church Government, but of predeſtination, and aſſurance of ſalvation. Did he not pronounce what ſeemed to him right? What is it then, that he putteth from himſelf? That authority, which the Pope claimeth, who makes himſelf a Judge infallible, to be believ'd on his own word, without the Scriptures. This Right certainly is due neither to King nor Council. For, neither may a Council be believ'd for it ſelf, but for the teſtimony of Scripture on which it relies: becauſe true Faith of things Divine cannot be had but by Divine authority. This ſenſe of the King, the King himſelf ſhall I ſay, or Molinaeus beſt of all explains in his book againſt Cardinal Perron, ſaying, The Emperors never aſcribed to themſelves abſolute judgment and infallible concerning Doctrin; but that they took knowledge of the Deciſions of Councils, and not of Diſcipline alone, he there both confeſſes and proves; adding, that the Emperors examin'd, whether nothing was decreed, in the Aſſembly of Biſhops, repugnant to former Councils: and that, unleſs this be lawful for a King, the King will be nothing elſe but Lictor Eccleſiaſticorum.

Hence it appears ſufficiently, that the Kings judgment is bound to the word of God, but may be inſtructed and led by the Biſhops; yet not ſo, but that he ought to make uſe of his own judgment. And reaſon exacts as much. For no action is good, but which proceeds from the judgment of the doer; and the King, as King, his office is to cheriſh true Doctrine by his laws, and to ſuppreſs the contrary. He ought therefore to have judgment alſo of the Doctrine. Nor is here any more attributed to a King than to a private man. For private men, for themſelves, by the Word of God, judge of Articles of Faith: but the effects differ, in as much as a King can do more than a private perſon: as alſo the judgment of a Father of a family, who is chief in a great houſe, is more largly extended than his, who is the poor inhabitant of a Cottage.

To that cenſure, where they are called flatterers who moved this queſtion in Holland, 'twere eaſy to return one as ſharp, that they are juſtly ſuſpected of affecting a new papacy, who ſo much decline the judgment of the Magiſtrate.