THERE was a Book (I cannot tell just how many Years a­goe, but it was at a time, I remember, when the Fanaticks were not troubled) which, together with some o­ther Books, was put out de in­dustria, toward the raising a Storm upon such People: the [Page 2] Contents whereof came to this, That the Oaths of the late Times, the Covenant, the Nega­tive Oath, the Engagement, were unlawful, and not to be kept; but the Oath which the Justices of Peace take, is unquestionable, and must oblige: And if they do not therefore Execute the Law to their utmost upon the Dissenter, they are Perjur'd Per­sons; and must every Man of them, for ought I could see by that Book, be inevitably Damn'd.

I am very apprehensive, That His Majesties Justices of Peace, throughout the Realm, are lit­tle beholding to any Men for such Discourses. If they were [Page 3] to be supposed of that profli­gate Conscience, that they thought they might Swear any thing, and not be obliged to Perform what they Swear, then might such a Book be Service­able (though not so much, I hope, as barely Reading over the Third Commandment): But if there be any thing of Judg­ment or Discernment required in an undertaking of that Na­ture, to yield the Reader the expected Fruit of establishing his Conscience, if he be a Ju­stice of the Peace, (whether Lord, Knight, Mayor, Alderman, or Gentleman) I must not wish any Body to seek it from that Book: Of which, as the Book­seller [Page 4] then did not name the Author, I will not now rake up the Title. Only the Distress of many Serious, Conscientious, Pious Gentlemen, that are (or at least have bin, or may be) called to this Office, in regard to the Taking and Keeping that Oath, which is then put upon them (in which Case, the ten­der Constable also may be inclu­ded, in regard to His) does re­quire a more Candid determi­nation.

In all Oaths that are Promi­sory (we are to know) there are some Conditions to be sup­posed, or understood, as the Ground of the Lawfulness [Page 5] of such Oaths, which else could be nothing but Snares to any good Men that took them. I do not think it easie presently, nor needful, to reckon up all such Conditions: But as for the Ex­ecution of the Laws of the Land, unto which the Justices Swear, there is this One most certain, viz. That these Laws still be Executed in Subordination to the Supream Authority. There are several things might be In­stanced, which a Justice is to do according to Law; when, upon Command from Above, he is to Surcease: His Authori­ty is Subordinate to the King; and the Laws to Almighty God. God now is the Supream Autho­rity [Page 6] in the World; and conse­quently, there is no Man takes such an Oath to see the Laws Executed, but it must be un­derstood with Subordination to the Authority of Heaven, as that of the King. If therefore there be any thing in the Laws of the Land, that will not stand with our Duty to God, accord­ing to the Law of Nature, or his Revealed Word, the Justice is to be supposed that he Sware not to Execute That; but this Salvo is to be understood in his Oath, Saving the Rights of God Almighty, no less than those of the Crown.

The Ground of this does lye [Page 7] a little more deep, than every one at first sight does see: which is, That every thing that is such, is not indeed Law. That which the Justice Swears to Execute, is the Law: But if this or that particular thing en­joyned by Man, be disagreeable to the dictates of Nature, or the Scripture, which both are God's Will, such a thing cannot be made Law, is no Law; and he is to look to himself, as not Sworn to perform it.

I suppose the Justice will rea­dily give his Ear to this, and it is thus confirmed. Power is a Right to Command. This Right is the Grant of the Su­periour [Page 8] Authority. God is Su­pream of All. He does not grant that a Man, or any Men should Command what he For­bids. Whatsoever then is dis­agreeable to his Will, cannot be Commanded, that is, cannot be Law; and the Justice Swears only to Execute Law.

I remember, a great while agoe, I applied my self to a Justice, to deliver a Quaker out of Goal; I found him willing heartily, but he believed he might not, for fear of his Oath. I went away, not daring, if he thought so, to press him any more to it, but I thought upon it. I considered it was a hard [Page 9] thing that Men by the Law should be Imprisoned, and kept Year after Year, only for their Perswasion. I considered again, that Goodness which makes Men like God, the Rule of Righte­ousness [Quod tibi non vis fieri, alteri, ne fieris], the Law of Love, and the Duties especially of Mercy, Kindness, Gentleness, (which Christ requires of his Followers) did prompt to acts that are Contrary. I resolved then, if the Law required one thing, and Christianity or the Law of Nature another, the Law of God must take place; and no Oath consequently could bind against God's Command­ment.

is to be Exercised: And the Is­sue perhaps will come to this, That according as he believes, the sparing or not sparing such made Faults (that is, Faults of Man's making by Law, upon such extrinsical accounts, and not God's) to be conducive to those ends (if they be good) he is to be guided in his actings.

Saul binds the People with a Curse, That they shall not Eat till the Evening: Jonathan, knowing nothing of this, Eats; and upon Lot and Discovery is Commanded to be Slain. The People, for all this Oath, will not Execute that Law or Com­mand, but save Jonathan. Now [Page 13] look, what would justifie the People in refusing Obedience to that Oath, will acquit the Justice; who upon the same ac­count (for all his Oath) does not Execute some Law of the Realm. The People thought it a rash Determination, an un­reasonable Sentence, and a Sinful Command against the Sixth Commandment, that the Inno­cent should be Punished. It had been Murder, if they had pursued the Oath. And upon that account, we are to judge Saul reproved of his unadvised Curse, and he bound to Repent, but no body to Execute what he had Sworn: And yet all of them, nevertheless, bearing still [Page 14] the same Faith and Allegiance to the Anointed of the Lord.

If you desire more than this, I will distinguish in the next place between the Law and the Reason of it; the Letter of the Law, and the Purpose of it, ac­cording to which it receives its Construction. If a Justice of Peace does act according to the Intent and Reason of the Law, I do apprehend he does perform his Oath better than if he rigo­rously stood upon the Letter. Nay, he may contract Guilt upon himself in the One, when he shall not in the Other. The Laws now against the Dissenter, I apprehend to stand in general [Page 15] upon this Reason, They would have them come to Church, and secure the Peace of the Nation. If a Justice then apprehend, that the using of Rigour will but drive more from the Church, and enkindle disturbance; I ask, Whether he be most obli­ged for the observation of his Oath, to Forbearance or Prose­cution? Severity, it is true, hath been found a little of late (as it so happened) to have done something: But at ano­ther time, with other Persons, where the Conscience is Steel­ed, it hath done, and it can do just nothing, unless where it is Over-Cruel; and that makes Desolation, and at long running, [Page 16] doth but widen the breach. Solitudinem faciunt, & pacem vocant.

Again, Though the Law pass in Parliament, the Executive part is committed to the King. I will suppose now a Prince to be of the Mind, that Tenderness is like to be more conducive to the Good these Laws design, than Violence, or to be in his Judgment against Persecution: I ask then, Whether the Justice, who acts under the King, might not satisfie his Conscience in this, That he shall, according as he Judges, by Indulgence ra­ther than by Rigour, best com­ply with the Will of the Su­pream [Page 17] Governour? I remember well, in the time of the late King, That I my self once heard Him, with my own Ears, declare at Council-Board, and that So­lemnly, (for he rose up, saying so), That He was against the Per­secuting any for their Consciences. This I take to have been his Na­tive Judgment; and whatsoever his Adventitious Practice might be, upon the Scene-altering, there are none but must confess both alike favourable, at the time of his Declaration to his Loving Subjects; which is not so many Years past, as to be out of our Remembrance.

rightly, according to a Mans Conscience, not erring intol­lerably, is) instead of Vice and Ill-doing: I do ask, How can the Justice be bound by his Office to do that which does prevent the Institution it self?

But let us suppose a Justice of Peace, who is of the mind that the Dissenters are ill Men, and their Conventicles not to be endured: I pray let me see this Justice as Zealous also against Prophaneness, Swearing, Drun­kenness, and Debauchery of all sorts, which are Offences a­gainst the Law, and alike Pu­nishable by him: or else, if the Man be so Hot for Restrain­ing [Page 21] Meetings, but Cold for Re­pressing Vice, I can hardly think, that what he does is done meerly out of Conscience of his Oath.

There is a Law, That a Non­conformist may not abide with­in Five Miles of a Corporate Town: What now if his bu­siness brings him thither, and he cannot possibly live else? Is this a piece of Evil-doing, unto which the Ruler should be a Terror? Suppose an In­former should come to a Justice of Peace, and Swear against a Brewer for Brewing with Hops: There is a Law made against That, as I have taken it up, [Page 22] (though it may not be in the ordinary Book of Statutes, which pretends only to Collect those which are fit for use), and the Justice Swears, He will do his Office after the Statutes of the Realm: I will ask now, Upon what account can any equal Justice dismiss such a Brewer, and not Punish him upon that Complaint; but he may, upon the same, dismiss a Nonconformist, who is accused of being in a Corporation, not­withstanding his Oath? If a thing be not Evil, it is against Righteousness to Punish it. No Law but must give place to Righteousness, no Oath can bind against it.

I would put it here to the question, Whether the not coming within Five Miles of a Corporation, as the Brewing with­out the Ingredients of Beer, be matters of that Nature as ought to be brought within the San­ction of a Law, any more than that a Man shall not make Wa­ter against a Wall? Quod non habet rationem publici commodi, non potest proecipi lege humana. I would make it a Moot Case at the Inns of Court, as well as a Probleme in the Schools. What is unreasonable, methinks, should be against Nature, and cannot be commanded for a Law, seeing Laws are grounded upon Reason. I will not be so [Page 24] bold as to averr, That the Exe­cution of such an Act does Clash with Magna Charta, Nul­lus liber homo capiatur, impriso­netur, aut disseisietur de tene­mento, vel libertatibus utlege­tur, exulatur, aut aliquo modo destruatur, nisi per legem Terrae: But if it does but clash with that which ought to be the end of every Commandment, (The end of the Commandment is Cha­rity), it will be more certainly enough to take off the obliga­tion from the Conscience. See Dr. Taylor. Duc. Dub. l. 3. c. 1. r. 3.

But I must advance a step farther: I do not apprehend [Page 25] only, That when the Executi­on of a Law will not consist with the Law of Nature, or God's Word, that is, with Re­ligion, and Moral Good, but when it will not stand with that Political Good which the Law intends, the Magistrate is not in that case to observe it. For, when the King and his Ju­stices are bound to see the Ex­ecution of the Laws, they are not to be look'd on as Blind, Brutish Executioners of them; but that they must judge of them on necessity, so far as concerns their own acting about them. The King must judge whether the matter be good for his passing the Law. The [Page 26] King and Justices must judge, whether it be still good, as to the Execution. Nay, every single Man must Judge of the Laws made, so far as concerns his own Obeying them; seeing, If he be bound to do nothing that is ill, he must likewise be bound before he does any thing, to sa­tisfie himself whether he does ill or no; as is very honestly said, though in an adverse Book, Entituled, Toleration Discuss'd; which came out about the same time with the Book at first intimated, but not named.

By the way, We must upon necessity observe here, the Case being brought on to this state; [Page 27] That the King, as well as the Justice, is concern'd in it. There is therefore the Positive and Negative Power of the King, and there are matters Civil and Ecclesiastical. It is true, That the Government of England, is [...], a Government Regulated by Laws, and that the King can Positively do no­thing but according to Law: But there is this other thing to be known and considered also, That the great Law, the Su­pream Law in all Polities, is the Common Good. And in the use of that Power which is Nega­tive, or in Suspending his own Act (which the not permiting a Process in his Name, or the [Page 28] granting a Nolle prosequi (I think) is no other) in the Ex­ecution of his Government (at least in matters Ecclesiastical, wherein he hath all that Au­thority given him by the Sta­tute, as the Pope ever had) a Prince is never to be said, Not to Govern according to Law, when he does only give Pre­heminence to That which is the Greatest, the Weal of the Com­munity. Salus Populi Suprema Lex esto.

And thus much being said in referrence to the King, Let any one that please, reason what will follow, in regard to the Justice, who is but an Officer [Page 29] (I suppose) under Him, to act in his stead, and in his Name. If the Magistrate then (to go on), whether Supream or Subordi­nate, does judge that such or such a Law be good, and good to be executed, that is, That the Execution of it will tend to the Publick Good, which is in­tended in it (as in all Laws it must be), and that it is not in­consistent with Religion or Mo­rality (in which case the Su­periour Law does vacate this), then is he to look to himself, and what he hath Sworn; knowing that God will not hold him Guiltless, that beareth the Sword, and much less him that taketh his Name also in vain. [Page 30] But if he judge sincerely in his Conscience, That the Execu­tion will not be for the Good, but rather Hurt to the Govern­ment, and the People, (though otherwise the thing be not un­lawful), I do apprehend the Ex­ecution of his Office, in this case, does lye in the Non-Execution of that Law (if the Higher Powers be contented), and he shall do his Duty, by leaving such work undone. I have heard that some Judges, in their Charge to the Jury, have given Directions to Prosecute the Dissenter, upon One Statute of the Queen, and not upon some Other; which, in effect, is a suspending that Law at pre­sent, [Page 31] and justifies this Plea.

In the Oath which the Ju­stice takes, for the Executing his Office, the words run thus; You shall do equal Right to Rich and Poor, after your Cunning, Wit, and Power. By which Word [Cunning] continued from Antient Use, I under­stand not so much according to the best of a Mans Skill and Knowledge of the Law; which is comprised rather in the Word [Wit]; But according to the best of his Discretion, Wisdom, and Prudence; which includes [...], i.e. Candor, Moderation, in Cases that require it: That is, You shall well and truly do [...] [Page 34] trary to the Law of Nature and Reason, lose their force, and are no Laws at all; Finch's Law, p. 75. The Law of Nature and Reason is unchangeable and per­petual, and no Statute can pre­vail against it; Doctor and Student, p. 4. Constat profecto ad salutem civium vitamque omnium beatam conditas esse leges (says Cicero): Ex quo intelligi par est eos qui pernici­osa populis jussa descripserint, quodvis potius tulisse quam leges; in his two excellent Books, De Legibus, which have, in­deed, given the first Light to all things, almost, which our Divines and Lawyers have said well on this Subject. I will [Page 35] add St. Augustine, and turn to no more: Mihi lex esse non videtur quae justa non fuerit; De Lib. Arb. l. 1. c. 5.

After these Testimonies, it is yet needful I explain the thing a little more, for which I bring them. When I say, therefore, That a Command or Law made against Charity, Righteousness, the Publick Good, is No Law; I understand not, but that any Bill which passes the Houses, and the King, is a Law, or Statute of the Realm; that is, a Law in Foro Humano, in Mans Court, or at the Bar in Westminster; and if any Justice will Execute it, the Outward [...] [Page 38] Publicum: And consequently, if a Law prove otherwise, or is against the Common Good; it must be supposd, also, That such a Law is devoid of their in­tention, or is not according to their Will; and so does not bind the Conscience, even upon a double ground; both because it is desti­tute of the Authority it should have from God, and its Autho­rity from the Will of Man also, upon the account already given.

If any Man now rise up a­gain, with a But who shall be Judge? he may return to his Seat, unless he choose to be a Bruit; seeing every man (according to the Religion of [Page 39] Protestnnts) must be allowed a Judgment of Private Discreti­on to be his Guide, in all which himself acts: And if, when a thing is commanded him, he must judge, whether it be a­greeable to God's Word (which is so much harder), how much rather, whether it be aggree­able to Right Reason (which is the Law of Nature) and the Common Good?

There were two Laws made in the latter Long-Parliament, One about Burying in Woollen, and the Other about Waggons; Neither of which were at first regarded: But the Woollen Act being found good for the Pub­lick, [Page 40] was renewed, and is ob­served; but the Other not be­ing so, is neglected; that is, as to the number of Horses, very frequently; but as to the breadth of the Wheels, altoge­ther. I ask now, Whether the Waggoner, that makes no Con­science how many Horses he puts in his Waggon, no more than of the dimension of his Wheels, and breaks this Law, does sin in it? If he does, see­ing he does it every day, and continues without amendment, how can he be Saved? If it be no Sin, because the Common Good supersedes the Law; I ask, Who then is Judge, whether this Law be for the Publick [Page 41] Good, or not? It is plain, the Man himself finds the Incon­venience of it, and he judges what is good for his Waggon, and can do it better than they that Passed the Act; and so or­ders his matters accordingly. Suppose then, an Informer comes to the Justice, and Swears against him; the Justice may Punish him if he will; but he, judging it no ways conducive to the Publick Advantage, as well as the Waggoner (at least, not so much as can countervail the private damage of the Poor Man), lets him go. Here the Justice of Peace does judge of the Law, in regard to his Exe­cution of it; and the Waggoner [...] [Page 44] put Fear into the Heart of Man, to be the Instrument by which his Vicegerents Govern the World.

And now, having stated the Case I took in hand, as near as I can to my Mind, I will sup­pose, the most of such Gen­tlemen, who are in Commission for the Peace (if they may choose), would be willing to live quiet with their Neigh­bours; and if they may enjoy Their own Consciences, be loath to vex others about Theirs; but yet, That there are some of another Make, who either out of Hatred to the Conventiclers, or Zeal for the Church, or Sense [Page 45] of their Office, or Instigation of Others, or put upon it by some Informer, are still for the Executing the Law against the Dissenting Meeter: I must there­fore, take upon me to argue a little with the Justice of this sort, and ask him two Questi­ons; What a Conventicle is? and, In what Manner he will proceed?

For the former, The Act a­gainst Conventicles declares a­gainst all Assembling under Co­lour or Pretence of any Exercise of Religion, in other manner than according to the Liturgy and Practice of the Church of Eng­land: And the Oxford Act de­scribeth [Page 46] such Meetings as, un­der Colour of any Exercise of Religion, are contrary to the Laws and Statutes of the King­dom. It is not all Meetings then of above Four, that are not of the same Family, to per­form a Religious Exercise, are Conventicles; but such as can be proved to be in other manner than according to the Liturgy and Practice of the Church; or, are contrary to the Laws of the Kingdom. The Church and Law now of England, does own the Word of God, and Gods Word commandeth Re­ligious Exercises at home and abroad, as well as Church-Wor­ship. Christ Prayed and Preach­ed [Page 47] on Mountains, in Houses in Ships; and so did his Disciples. Cornelius called together his Kinsfolks and Friends to hear Peter. The Apostle com­mands, To Exhort one another daily, and to consider one another to provoke to good Works. The Thirteenth Canon requires all Persons to Celebrate the Lords Day, not only by Publick, but Private Prayer, Confessing their Sins, Reconciling themselves Charitably to their Neighbours, and using all Godly Conversa­tion. Queen Elizabeths In­junctions, 1559. allows a Mi­nister at all times, when necessity requires, to comfort his Flock with the lively Word of God, [Page 48] which is the stay of Man's Con­science. Moreover, The Church hath appointed the Psalms in Metre, for Private Houses, Forms of Prayer, bound up with the Bible, the Practice of Piety, Nowel's Catechism, Jewel's Works, to be kept in every Parish, where more than Four may Read them. If more than Four or Forty meet to Feast together, the Church and Liturgy forbids them not to give Thanks for their Meat, no, nor to Pray, or read the Scripture, or a Licen­sed Book, or Sing a Psalm, if they will, at the end of their Supper. If any one then shall go to turn the Law and Church against God, by threatning [Page 49] Godly Persons for doing these things, and would seduce the Justice to Prosecute them for it, with Mulcts and Imprison­ment, let the Accusation be heard. Is it for the meer num­ber of such that meet, that they must be made Criminal, or for the Faultiness of the Thing that they meet about? It cannot be for the meer number, because there are more allowed to meet at a Play-House, a Sessions-House, an Exchange, at an Horse-Race, a Cock-Match, a Bull-Baiting, a a Bear-Baiting, an Hunting, an Execution, in the Street, in a Ship. It must be the unlawful Exercise, then, must make it a Crime, or nothing; for to law­ful [Page 50] Exercises no Limits are set. And what, I pray, then is that? If it be only reading God's Word to more than Four, besides the Family; that is not unlawful; nor a Licensed Book, no, nor Repeating a Sermon; for, where does the Law or Liturgy forbid either of them? If Men Meet to call themselves adistinct Church, and to form Rules of Discipline, and Impeach the Government or Liturgy; This indeed, the Canon forbids, and makes it the Character of a Conventicle, and so expounds the Name. Tutors may Catechize more at once than Four; and more than Four may joyn in Prayer: If a God-Father have Four and [Page 51] Four God-Children, may he not, after they are Sixteen Years of Age, Exhort them together to perform their Vow, which he made in their Name at Baptism? May not more than Four to­gether give God Thanks at a Table? More than Four Travel together, or Visit; and are they forbidden Religious Conference, to Edifie one another? Should the Church or Law forbid this, what were the Church but an Anti-Church, and the Law the Devil's Militia, to Fight against Piety, and Mens Salvation?

Well then, The Church and Law not forbidding, but allow­ing these things, I come, in the [Page 52] next place, to inquire how the Justice will proceed; for I will conceive him to be a Man of Temper, who acts with Pru­dence and Righteousness, with Care and Conscience in what he does.

If any Witness will Swear only in general, That above Four met for Religious Ex­ercises, in other manner than the Church and Law alloweth; either they must Swear also what that unlawful Exercise was, or they do not. If not, the Liberties of English-Men are brought to a sine pass, when two Persons, that list, may take them away, and undo Folks at their Will. [Page 53] Is it thus, besides, in all the Courts of Justice? Do they Hang Men as Felons, when any will but Swear that they are Felons, and never tell what they Stole, nor from whom? Will the Lords Condemn a Peer for Treason, if two will Swear that he spake Treason, and ne­ver tell what Words he spake? Will the Church excommunicate a Man, if two will Swear that he is a Murderer, but cannot tell of any body he Murdered? Turks and Heathens abhor such doings, as we abhor Toads and Snakes. If they Swear what the unlawful Exercise was, it is supposed they are but Witnesses and Accusers, and not the Judges. [Page 54] If every Woman or Beggar, that can but Swear, does be­come a Judge, whether the Re­ligious Acts of Lords, Knights, Minister and People, be accor­ding to the Law and Church, or not, when they know not what the Law and Church is; it were far better be among Serpents and Tygers, than for People to have their Estates and Lives at the Will of such Persons: for, who dare then displease any Beggar, Rogue, or Servant? It is not the Accuser, therefore, but the Justice is Judge; and he must Examine the Witness, (seeing else he must become but a Register or Executioner), and that must be of two things; [Page 55] What the unlawful Exercise was? (as is already Suggested) and how the Witness knoweth it?

He must examine first, What the unlawful Exercise was? If they say now, There was a Meeting, and plead Notoriety of Fact: So is there at a Play, at a Market, in a Ship, and o­ther such greater Meetings, as are before-named. If they say, There was Notoriety of a Reli­gious Meeting: So is there in all Church-Meetings, in Meet­ings only for House-Prayer, Holy Conference, Grace at Ta­ble, and the like, not forbidden; which are also before touched. At Doctors-Commons they do [Page 56] meet about Admonishing, Ex­communicating, Absolving, and these are certainly Religious Exercises, of Grand Importance; and yet performed without reading Common-Prayer. Either the Crime that Men are Accu­sed for, is Omission of something required; or Commission of some­what forbidden. The Omission of the Liturgy cannot here be Criminal, because the reading That, is required in Church Wor­ship; but it is not imposed on Private Persons, and Places, Families, Converse, or Occasi­onal Meetings: And there is no Crime of Commission, be­cause neither the bare number of Men, nor any of these Exer­cises [Page 57] before-named, (and sup­posed only here used), are for­bidden. If they say, That the Law forbids not above Four to be at a Play, a Tavern, a Feast; but it forbids all above Four, of another House, to be at any Religious Meeting, it is a Slan­der; for the Law never forbid more than Four to be at Any Religious Exercise, but Forbid­den Exercises, which differ from the Church Liturgy and Practice; which none of the fore-menti­oned Exercises do.

The other thing the Witness must be Examined upon, is, How they know the Accusation to be true? And if it be Omissi­on [Page 58] of the Liturgy, that they Swear, they must Swear they were present from first to last, else they cannot Swear, that it was not Read; and Men must not be Judged and Ruined up­on Presumptions and Opinions of others, without Proof: If part of the Liturgy is said to be omitted, (even in Church) they must Swear which Part. But if they be Crimes of Com­mission that are Sworn, the Words and Deeds must be re­cited, with all that is Integral to the Sense, before any Judg­ment can be given. It is a­gainst all Humanity, Law, or Reason, that any Man should be refused to speak for himself, [Page 59] and see his Accusers Face to Face, and know what they are, and have leave to put Interro­gatories to them. If you re­ply, That Leave to know the Accusers and Witness, will hazard and discourage them, and Leave to plead for ones Self, it may frustrate all, both Judg­ment and Execution. I answer, If indeed you stick there, you are not the Man I took you for, that is, no fair Man; and if that be the Rule you would go by, I will tell you, there is a nearer way than yours yet: Never stand troubling us, or your self with Laws, Courts, Judge, or Witnesses; but take all Mens Goods and Money that you [Page 60] have a mind to, or Imprison or Hang up any Man that you will, without giving any Reason or account for it. It will be considerable Clemency to a Man to let him Dye as Inno­cent, and escape the Infamy of Accusation. Jesus Christ and his Apostles had not so much Justice.

These are things that the Justice, who is of the Prosecu­ting Perswasion, is to think up­on; and if he be a London Ju­stice, there is one thing more to be put to him. There are at least a Hundred, or two Hun­dred Thousand Souls in the great Parishes, in and about [Page 61] London, more than can hear in the Churches: I ask him now, Would you have all, or half these Persons to live as Atheists, and Worship God in no manner at all, in any Congregation, or would you not? If you would not, Why do you Prosecute them for going to Private Meetings, when they cannot come to the Publick, in their own Church, which will not hold them? If you would, I desire, Sir, then very fairly to have done with you; for it were better to have to do with a Mahometan, than with a Christian of such a Mind.

After this, I must return to the state of our Case, to touch it again in the main Point. If any Law of Man be inconsistent with God's Will, either mani­festly by the Light of Nature, or Scripture, such a Law should not have passed by the Law­giver, and is not to be Execu­ted by the Inferior Magistrate, or observed by the People: But if the Matter of a Law be such, as is of an indifferent Nature, and, all Circumstances consider­ed, it does appear doubtful and difficult to us, what we are to do: There is some Rule to be laid down, on necessity, to walk by, or we are at a loss. Now, as God hath given us a Rule in [Page 63] Matters of Religion, which is the Scripture, by which we are to judge and try what is to be Believed and Practised therein; and every Man's own Private Judgment or Conscience must be the Discerner of it: And as in Moral things He hath given us the Dictates of Reason for our Rule: So in Matters that are Political, hath He given us our Rule or Test also which is the Publick Ʋtility, (for the Apo­stle, speaking of the Higher Powers, that give Laws, or Su­pream Ruler, does tell us, That he is the Minister of God for our Good, as I have noted); and Man being a Creature endued with Discernment, by his Ratio­nal [Page 64] Faculties, he is to attend, and compare such things with that Rule; And as they agree, or not agree thereunto, he is to Pass to Execute, to Obey a Law, or Not to do it, accordingly. This is a Truth, I am perswaded, or Light, that I have struck out of the Collision of many Thoughts; and do propose it therefore, as Tasted, Clear, Fixed, and Esta­blished, to Others. When a thing now (to proceed upon it) is really against the Common Good, or a Man so judges (his Judgment not being the Rule it self, but the Discerner of it), such a thing (at least, to that Man) is never to be thought to have the Authority of God (as that [Page 65] Religion hath none of it, which hath not Foundation in Scrip­ture), nor indeed the Intent of Man (this Publick Ʋtility being the scope of the Law-giver, or which ought to be in all his Laws) as hath been before sig­nified and settled; And conse­quently, whether it Be, or be Not so, (as whether it Be (more predominantly) or Not agree­able to God's Word) is, for the most part, therefore, the chief point to be inquired into, as to the Obligation of Conscience, in these matters Any Man may be made to do the thing for fear of Wrath, whether Justice or People: So that, if the Supream Power will have it, they must [Page 66] do it, or Suffer, all Resistance being forbidden; (and as for the Law, it is all one whether a Man act out of Conscience or not, so long as it makes him do it): But if a Man, really in his Soul, does judge the thing Command­ed to be against the Common Good, the Justice that Executes not that Law, and the Man that Obeys it not (if they can escape with Man) are not obliged for Conscience-sake (even, as when they think it against God's Will; for God's Will, indeed, is, that Men should Rule only for our Good), so as they need think, by that Omission, they Sin a­gainst God. I pray, note all the way, I speak still, not of what [Page 67] is safe in point of Law, but of what is Innocent in point of Con­science. And when I allow a Private Man to judge of a Law, whether it be for the Publick Good or not, this is not to have a hand in determining the Que­stion, Whether I am obliged or not to obey it, under the Penal­ty of the Law, but under the Guilt of Sin and God's Judgment?

Neither must I forget to di­stinguish from that well Studied Divine, Dr. Field, upon the Church, between Subjection and Obedience; and consequently, between the not Obeying a Law, and Resisting of Authority; the latter whereof is made always [Page 68] Damnable by the Apostle; and the former is Good or Evil, or Indiffe­rent, according to the Matter required, with consideration of the Circumstances a Man is in. And, though I am perswaded (as to the point of Obedience), that when a Law is unprofita­ble, that is, when a Man does Impartially judge the Matter Commanded, not to be con­ducive to Publick Benefit, (or, at least, if he truly judge the same to be against it), such a Law does not, such a Law can­not oblige the Inner Man (which all wholsom Laws, I hold, do) any farther than to avoid Con­tempt and Scandal: Yet do I (in the point of Subjection) [Page 69] hold and maintain, and am ready (so far as it may concern me) to declare, That I hold it unlawful for any Subject, or Subjects, to take Arms (that is, Levy War) against the Au­thority of the King (that is, a­gainst the Supream Executive Power, which God hath com­mitted into his hands, accor­ding to the Constitution of this Realm), whether as Residing in his Person, or issued out from Him to any other Person or Persons, by his Commissions, up­on any Pretence whatsoever. Which I do declare the rather, because I am out of doubt, that those they call Nonconformists, as well as the Conformists, who [Page 70] understand themselves on both sides, (however it comes to pass, that One Party of them are scrupled for want of but so little Explication as this is), are perfectly reconcileable on that Point.

To conclude, The Law in such or such a particular Case, requires the Justice to act a­gainst the Common Good: What must he do then? I speak not of what he may choose to do, in point of Prudence (which, in case a Law is directly against God's, or so extreamly to Pub­lick hurt, as quite over-bal­lances our Sufferings, is not to be consulted); but of what [Page 71] he is bound to, in point of Con­science: And every one, I think, will give this Answer, That the Superiour Law must have still the Preheminence, unless there be something particular­ly to be alledged, in regard to that Matter; which is not ex­ceptionable in the Case, if it be against God's Word. He must himself judge in referrence to his own Act, or he acts as a Beast, and Punishes as an Horse strikes. And he is also the Minister of God, under the King, for the Peoples Good. This is the very End Of Magistracy it self, Of the Laws, Of the Execu­tion. Consequently, the Com­mon Good, Salus Populi, being [Page 72] the Supream Law; whosoever he be that sincerely seeks That, whether he Executes or For­bears a Statute, he is, he must be, in the Forbearance or Exe­cution thereof, upon that ac­count, the best Minister Of the Laws, Of God, and Of the King: Princeps est Dei imago; Lex Principis opus; Finis Legis Ju­stitia; Ex Justitia Communis Salus.