THE COURT OF THE GENTILES.

PART IV. Of Reformed Philosophie.

Wherein Plato's Moral, and Metaphysic or prime Philosophie is reduced to an useful Forme and Method.

By Theophilus Gale.

LONDON, Printed by J. Macock, for Thomas Cockeril, at the Sign of the Atlas in Cornhil, near the Royal Exchange. MDCLXXVII.

PREFACE.

WHat venimous and efficacious Influences Corruptions in Philosophie diffuse into Theologie and Christianitie,The first Refor­mers of Phi­losophie. has been sufficiently demonstrated throughout the precedent Discourse, touching the Vanitie of Philosophie; as also by the late practices of the Jesuites, who have made it their principal concerne to adulterate Philosophie, thereby to make it subservient to their corrupt Theolo­gie. And it has been to me for some while a sad Con­templation, that Students in Philosophie are compelled to have recourse to the poisoned springs of Jesuitic Phi­losophie, and therewith to imbibe many poisonous infu­sions in Theologie. Hence it was that our first Refor­mers, observing what potent influences corrupt Philo­sophie had on corruptions in Theologie, first attemted the Reformation of Philosophie, and that in order to the Reformation of Theologic and Ecclesiastic Affaires. This noble and generose designe was begun by Wiclef, Wiclef. that great English Apostle, who first begun to engage against Antichristian Dogmes in Philosophic Disputes; wherein he attained unto a great Eminence and Fame, both in England and Bohemia: for John Husse was at first illu­minated by Wiclefs Philosophic Discourses; who was indeed a person, not only of admirable Claritie in ex­plicating Divine Mysteries, but also of a marvellous acu­men to penetrate the secrets of Nature and Philosophie. Wiclef was followed by Wesselus Groningensis, who,Wesselus. [Page]by reason of his incomparable skil in al Sciences, was communly stiled, Lux Mundi. He was called by Philip the Elector Palatine to the profession of Theologie at Heidelburg, Anno 1477. but being, by reason of his warm zele for Reformation, forced to leave his Theolo­gic profession, he undertook that of Philosophie, specially Platonic; which he estimed most profitable and agrea­ble to Christianisme.Savonarola. The same generose designe was e­spoused by Hieronymus Savonarola, in Italia, a person of great natural Acumen and Sagacitie as to Philosophie, as wel as flagrant zele for Reformation. He reduced Philo­sophie to a more natural Forme and Method, rendring it subservient to Theologie, so far as the Darknesse and Ini­quitie of those times would permit; in which noble undertakement he made no smal progresse, as it is evi­dent by his Epitome of Philosophie. To whom we may adde foarnes Picus, Picus Miran­dula. Prince of Mirandula and Concor­dia, a person of prodigiose Parts and Learning; who was also very zelose in his Endeavors for the Reformation of Philosophie, as wel as Ecclesiastic Discipline, as it ap­peares by his most elaborate and learned workes.

Neither were there wanting some in the following Age, who spent indefatigable studies and endeavors for the Reforming Philosophie, in order to the Reformation of Theologie. Among those Ludovicus Vives, Philip Melanchton, Lud. Vives. Jacobus Faber Stapulensis, and Peter Ramus deserve immortal commemoration. Ludovicus Vives, a person of singular parts and Intelligence in Philosophie, made it his designe to detect the Vanitie and Abuses of the Aristotelean Philosophie, as depraved by the Scholastic Theologues. He addicted himself principally to the Platonic Philosophie,Phil. Melanch­ton. as it appeares by his accurate com­mentaries, in August de Civit. Dei. Philip Melanch­ton gave in like manner a very great advance to the Re­formation [Page]of Philosophie: who was a person indued with a great Vivacitie of judgement, and dexterous Sagacitie, whereby he penetrated into the deepest Mysteries of Scho­lastic Sophisterie, as wel as Philosophie. He excelled al Re­formers of Philosophie of his times: whence he is stiled by Hornius, First Philos l. 6. c. 9. The Author and Restau­rator of Philosophie in Germanie: So much was the whole of Philosophie refined by him. He illustrated Logic, Physic, Ethic and Mathematic Sciences; and re­duced them to an excellent and useful Method: he pared off from Philosophie a great quantitie of sterile, inutile, spinose Questions, and clothed her with a more native evident habit or forme, whereby she became Beautiful and Amiable. See more hereof in his life incomparably drawn by Joachimus Camerarius Also Jacobus Faber Stapulensis is greatly renowned for his warme endeavors in order to the Reformation of Philosophie,Fab. Stapulensis. as wel as Theologie in France; for the which he suffered great Persecutions by the Scholastic Theologues at Paris: yet was he preserved by the Mediation of that illustrious Princesse Marguerite de Valois, Queen of Navarre. It was this Stapulensis, who, by his elaborate Lectures and Books, brought to light in the Universitie of Paris, that true Logic and Mathematics, in lieu of that Scholastic Sophisterie, which before reigned there. That which is most marvellous in him is this, that being educated in the midst of Barbarisme, he arrived to so great an Eleva­tion of Philosophic Sciences and ingenuous Arts, as also of Theologie. Beza stiles him one of the most noble personages on earth, in regard of his Learning, Pietie, and generose designes for Reformation. Out of his Schole proceded many Learned men, who proved great Instruments of Reformation. But yet, I conceive, none deserves a more illustrious Character among the first Re­formers [Page]of Philosophie,Pet. Ramus. than Peter Ramus, who follow­ed the steps of Faber Stapulensis, for the Reforming of Logic and Philosophie, as also of other ingenuous Arts; which lay buried under the Barbarisme of Scholastic Theologie. He at first professed and taught the Liberal Arts, Philosophie, and Mathematic Sciences in the Col­lege Prelaea; and afterward in the Royal College, at Pa­ris. He mostly inclined to Plato's Philosophie, greatly opposing Aristotle, which gain'd him the hatred of Ja­cobus Carpentarius, professor also of Philosophie; whose Scholars imbrued their hands in Ramus's bloud, in the ge­neral Massacre at Paris, 1572. This Ramus was a person of a very generose and flagrant zele for the Reformation of Ecclesiastic Discipline, as wel as Philosophie.

Thus we see how much our first zelose Reformers thought themselves concerned for the Reformation of Philosophie,The right use and abuse of Platonic Phi­losophie. in order to a more pure Theologie. And indeed no wonder, since the main corruptions in The­ologie have had their origine from some corruptions in Philosophie, as it is sufficiently demonstrated throughout the precedent part of Vain Philosophie. These and such like considerations gave the first Impresses and Impulses to this our present undertakement, for the Reduction of Philosophie to a more sane and useful Forme and Method. And whereas in my first Conceptions I intended to have discoursed only historically of Plato's Philosophie, since finding upon a review of Plato's Philosophemes a very great Affinitie and Conformitie of mine own Contempla­tions thereto, I have discoursed more largely and Phi­losophically thereon, reducing mine own sentiments thereto; yet not without varietie of Restrictions, Limi­tations, and Amplifications, as the substrate mater may re­quire. And herein we are not without many Precedents both among the more Orthodoxe of the Fathers, as also [Page]our first Reformers. It's wel known, how much Justin Martyr, that great Christian Philosopher, delighted him­self in the Studie of Platonic Philosophie, even to some Intemperance, in that he affirmes, Apol. 1. p. 51. That the Dogmes of Plato were not, [...], aliene from those of Christ And who knows not how much Augustin doth Platonise,Augustinus noster immen­sas Deo gratias agit, qùod ad ejus manus per­venerint libri Platonicorum. Picus Miran­dul. Apol. p. 82. in some of his most sublime Contemplati­ons? Yea, the noble Picus Earle of Mirandula assures us, that Augustin gave immense thankes to God, for the Platonic Books that came to his hands. So great use did his humble, Spiritual mind make of Platonic Philo­sophemes, in order to the exaltation of free, efficacious Grace. So likewise among our first Reformers, Picus Mirandulanus, Savonarola, Wesselus, Lud. Vives, Ra­mus, &c. chiefly addicted themselves to Plato, in or­der to the Reformation of Philosophie. Thus also Jan­senius, that great Patron of Efficacious Grace, greatly prefers Platonic Philosophie before al other. Yea, may we not avouch, that the choisest Physic or natural Phi­losophemes entertained by our New-philosophers, Gas­sendus, Cartesius, &c. are but Imitamens of Contem­plations laid down by Plato? This we have endeavored to make good, in our Philosoph. General. P. 1. l. 3. c. 2. Albeit that Plato's Philosophie has been thus generally entertained by the best of Christian Philosophers, yet it cannot be denied, but that it has been the Prolific cause of the worst Heresies and Corruptions in the Church. For whence sprang Arianisme, Pelagianisme, Mystic Theologie, and may we not say the whole Complexum of Antichristianisme, but from Platonic Philosophie, professed in the Schole of Alexandria? This is evidently demonstrated in the precedent Part of the Vanitie of Philosophie. Al this being granted, yet it follows not, but that Platonic Philosophie may be greatly useful if wel [Page]managed, and rendred subservient to Theologie, as in Augustin. Whereas Origen and his Sectators, the Monkes of Egypt, by their too fond estime of Platonic Philo­sophie, and reduction of the Scriptures, yea the whole of Theologie to a subordination thereto, gave the first Formation, yea perfect Lineaments to the Man of sin, and his Antichristian Theologie. I shal only adde on this Theme what Plutarch, in Cleomene, declares of the Stoic Philosophie; If it fal on great and acute wits, it becomes lubricous, inordinate, and incertain; but if it be mixed with a serious, meek, and humble mind, it greatly conduceth to the true and proper good. So greatly useful may Platonic Philosophie be, if loged in a serious, humble, meek, believing mind; which hath both Wisdome and Grace to render the same subordinate to Theologie.

But now having prefaced thus much touching the first Reformers of Philosophie,The Designe of this Discourse to render Philoso­phie subservient to Christian Theologie. and what Method may seem most conducible to the Reformation thereof, we may not conclude without some notices of the principal designe of this Discourse, and our procedure therein. As for its original Designe, it is too too apparent, that our Theolo­gie of late has received great damage and prejudice by the old Aristotelean Philosophie, as Sophisticated by the Jesuites; as also by New-philosophie, as abused by A­theistic wits: would it not then be a design of great mo­ment, so to Reforme Philosophie, as to render it no lon­ger opposite, but subservient to Theologie? How far we have attained hereto the Reader must be Judge. As for our procedure herein, thus much, it's hoped, we may without Vanitie declare, that we have sincerely endea­voured to render our Philosophemes Conformable to Sacred Philosophie, and the Doctrine of the Church of England. I must confesse, as I grow in years, so I daily [Page]grow more and more in the Admiration of the Wisdome, Zele, and Pietie of our first great Reformers, Cranmer, Jewel, &c. who delivered down to us the Apostolic Doctrine, sealed by some of them with their own bloud. O! how curiose and tenacious were they of the Forme of sound Words! But Alas! what a reproche is it now, a­mong wanton wits, to be an Orthodoxe Divine! What a world of new-coined termes of art are foisted into Chri­stian Theologie, virtually if not intentionally to the prejudice thereof! Chrysostome understandes [...], 1 Tim. 6.20. of Novel Termes and Formes, which then began to be introduced into the Church: Alas! what would he say, if he lived in our days, and heard those vain Clamors, and bablings about words, which are now affected! And was not this the grand crime imputed, by the Orthodoxe Fathers, to Origen, That despising the simplicitie of the Scriptures and Christian Theolo­gie, he affected new Termes and Modes of interpreting Scriptures? which his too great confidence in his own Parts, and presuming himself to be wiser than others pre­cipitated him into, to the subverson of Christian Theolo­gie, as Court Gent. P. 3. B. 2. C. 1. §. 8. And may we not fear the like Catastrophe as to those exotic Notions of some now-adays? May not the Doctrine of the Church of England, which now lyes bleeding, take up that Lamen­tation, Zech. 13.8. These are the wounds, with which I was wounded in the house of my friends? Have we not just cause to persuade ourselves, that were there but an Uniformitie of assent and consent as to the Doctrine of the Church of England, contained in 36 Articles, there would not be so great a Difformitie and disagreament about Discipline, contained in the other three? Albe­it I am no friend to those vexatiose, contentiose, and inutile Disputes of these Times; yet I have been [Page]forced to declare my dissent from some learned and pious men of this Age and Nation; with hopes that it wil not bring me under the Imputation of being Contentiose, disaffected, or irrespectuose towards persons of so great estime for natural Parts, Learning, or Pietie: For I solemne­ly declare, that it is no smal affliction to me to dissent, much more publicly to declare my dissent, from any who are of repute for Learning and Pietie: neither could any thing induce me to offer such an apparent violence to mine one repose and retirement, did I not conceive my self under an essential obligation, to give my Testimonie to those great Truths and Doctrines of the Church of Eng­land, which our Ancestors valued more than their bloud.

I shal conclude with that of profunde and pious Brad­wardine, in his Preface to his most excellent Book, do Causa Dei: where having laid open the Pride, Multi­tude, and continued Successions of the Pelagians, he breakes out into this pure Flame of Divine Zele, Pag. 5. Burning with Zele for the Cause of God I deliberately thrust mine hand into a terrible flame: For I am not ignorant, how much the Pestiferous Pelagians, enraged in their spirits, wil with tumultuose clamors barke at, and with cruel Teeth endeavor to rend in pieces this Paper, or Book.

A PROEMIAL SCHEME OF REFORMED PHILOSOPHIE.

§. 1. WHereas I sometimes intended to have cast the whole of Reformed Philosophie into one Systeme, I am herein in part disappointed, in that I have communicated the principal part of what I intended in my Philosophia Generalis. But what I could not wel digest therein, I have now made public in this Part IV. Of Moral and Metaphysic Philosophie. So that, to speak the truth, I have now put my last period to Philosophie, without the least Intention of making any farther progresse therein: only to give the Reader a Breviarie of the Forme and Method I would as­sume, were I to cast Philosophie into one entire Systeme or Idea; as also to give him an Index where to find al the parts of Re­formed Philosophie more professedly discussed by me, I judge the following Scheme of Philosophie most necessary. Philoso­phie is either General, or Particular: Particular Philosophie is either Notional, or Real: Real Philosophie is either Natural, Moral, or Supernatural. This General Distribution of Philosophie, ta­ken from its object, seems to me of al most genuine and natural; and that which reduceth it to one uniforme Syntagme or Systeme, as it may appear by the following particulars.

Philosophie in its General Idea comprehendes the following particulars. (1) The General Historie of Philosophie,General Philo­sophie. and Phi­losophers; with their several Sects, Dogmes, Modes of Life, Discipline, and Characters: Of which we have treated copiose­ly, Court of the Gentiles, P. 2. and Philos. General. P. 1, & 2. l. 1. (2) The Generic Idea of Philosophie, Cognition: which takes in al [Page 2]the Intellectual Habits. As [1] Opinion; which is a kind of Medium between Ignorance and Science, arising either from Sense, or Affection, or Considence, or Conjectures. Its object is things Physic, Sensible, Singular, &c. Its Attributes, In­firmitie and Incertitude, Obscurite, Instabilitie and Inquietude: Of which see Philos. Gen. P 2. l. 2. c. 1. [2] Experience; its Di­guitie, Object, Subject, Extension, Qualities and Effects: Of which see Philos. Gen. P. 2. l. 2. c. 1. s. 3. [3] Imitation; wherein are considerable its Nature, Origine, Subject, Object, Effects; name­ly Images and Signes, regular Use and Abuse; of which, Philos. Gen. P. 2. l. 2 c. 2. [4] Faith; its Generic Nature, Object both Material and Formal, Act, Subject, Proprieties, Differences, and Species; of which see Philos. Gen. P. 2. l. 2. c. 3. [5] Sapi­ence; its prime Cause, Object, Act, Proprieties, Effects, Con­veniences with and Differences from other Sciences, and Corol­laries; of which, Philos. Gen. P. 2. l. 2. c. 4. [6] Intelligence; which is said to be an Habit of or Assent to first Principes, not Practic but Speculative, which give al evidence to, but receive no evidence from conclusions; as Philos. Gen. P. 2. l. 2. c. 5. s. 1. [7] Science; which is a certain assent to necessary conclusions, by some certain Medium; as Philos. General. P. 2. l. 2. c. 5. s. 2. [8] Art; which is an Imitamen of Nature, or habitual Idea and Exemplar inherent in the Mind of the Artificer, whereby he is directed unto a regular Operation; as Philos. Gen. P. 2. l. 2. c. 5. s. 3. [9] Prudence; wherein we have considered its Subject, the Practic Judgement or Conscience, consisting of two parts, Synteresis, and Syneidesis: its Object, both End and Means: its End and Offices, [...] and [...]: Its Species, [...], Good Counsel, [...], Sagacitie, [...], Experience, [...], Sensate and reflexe Cognition, [...], Providence: its Material parts, Ethic, Oeconomic, Politic: its Causes both Dispositive and Proxime: its Opposites and Differences, specially from Carnal Policie or Craft in 20 Particulars: its Effects, Characters, and Corollaries. Al which we have copiofely considered, Philos. General. P. 2. l. 2. c. 6. Also Court Gent. P. 4. B. 1. c. 1. (3) The General part of Philosophie includes also the Examen of its Ob­ject, Subject, Ends, Adjuncts, Difference from Philosophie and Theologie, Excellence, Effects, Corruption, Right use, Parts, as also the Characters and Offices of Philosophers: which we have largely discussed, Philos. Gen. P. 2. l. 3.

§. 2. Philosophie considered in its Particular Ideas, Notional Philo­sophie or Logic is either Notional, or Real. Notional Philosophie, termed by the Platonistes Dialectic or Rational, because the ancient mode of Reasoning was by Dialogues, is now communly stiled Logic; which pro­perly treats of Notions, either Simple or Complexe. Simple Notions are [...], Imitamens or Ideas of things impressed on the mind, without either Affirmation or Negation: as the Notion or Idea we have of a Man, Horse, or the like. Complexe No­tions are either Propositions, which, being composed of simple Notions, give some judgement of things; or Syllogismes and Dis­courses, which are composed of Propositions; or Method, which is composed of simple Notions, Propositions, and Discourses. These are the four parts of Logic; which are taken from its pro­per End, and answer to the four great Operations of the Mind. For what is the End of al Logic,The End of Logic. but to direct and conduct the Mind into the Cognition of things? Hence Logic is termed by Plato [...], The Art of Introduction, i. e. whereby Men are con­ducted into the knowlege of things: also [...], the Way and Method for the Acquirement of Sciences, and al useful knowlege. Yea Aristotle, as wel as Plato, defines Logic, [...], a Method for the right disposing of every Probleme proposed. Whence also Aristotle stiles Logic, [...], the Organ or Key of al Sciences; whereby we are introdu­ced into the Cognition of althings. Aristotle made Logic the Organ of Philosophie, yet no part thereof; but Plato made it both an Organ and Part. So Ammonius, as Court Gent. Part. 2. B. 3. c. 8. §. 3. Of what great use Logic is, not only for the Ac­quirement of Sciences, but also for the Restauration of the mind to its native Claritie and Acumen, in order to a right Apprehension, Judgement, Discourse, and Method, in the Cognition or Disquisition of things, is most evident to any that understandes the Nature and Use thereof. Yea, according to the Idea I frame of Logic, the Clarifying and Rectifying of the Mind is its principal End, and that of the Acquisition of Sciences much inferior thereto. For of what use are al natural Sciences, but to Clarifie and Ele­vate the Mind, for the contemplation of more Sublime and No­ble Objects? So that to make use of Logic only as an Instrument or Key to Sciences is to deprive ourselves of the principal use thereof; which is to Purifie and Refine the Intellect, in order to the more distinct, real and perfect knowlege of things, speci­ally [Page 4]such as are most Sublime and Divine. I no way dout, but that a judicious person, by the aide of Logic, may be greatly Assisted and Capacitated for the more expedite exercice of Me­chanic or Politic Employments: but O! of what incomparable advantage might Logic be in Theologic Contemplations and Controversies, were it but wel Reformed and seated in a solid, judicious, humble, serious, rectified Mind? So much for the End of Logic.

The Ʋtilite of Logic may further appear if we consider the Parts thereof;The first part of Logic, about Simple Ideas or Notions. which are four, answerable to the four Operati­ons of the mind. 1. The prime or first Operation of the Mind consistes in its simple Apprehension of things, without Affirmation or Negation, Judgement or Discourse. This simple Apprehension of things is by Ideas, or Notions impressed on the Mind: These Ideas or Notions arise either immediately from the things them­selves, considered in their real Natures and Attributes, or else from the Minds Comparation and Abstraction: the former they cal first Notions; the later second Notions. Again these Ideas and Notions may be considered, either in regard of their Quali­tie, namely their Clarite and Obscuritie: or in regard of their Quantitie, i. e. their Extension or Restriction; their Ʋniversalitie, Particularitie, and Singularitie. Now the mind of Man having been by the Fal much wounded and disabled, as to the regular exerting this first Simple Apprehension of things, in order to the Acquirement of right Ideas and Notions, hence the first part of Lo­gic is to succur and direct the mind in this its first Operation of simple Apprehension, for the procurement of Clear, Distinct, and real Ideas or Notions, both first, and second, Universal, Particular,Objective Ideas or Categories. and Singular.

And because al Subjective Ideas or Notions of things arise from, and are indeed but Imitamens or Images of the things themselves, hence Logic, (1) begins with the consideration of the things themselves, as they lie in their Objective Ideas, and are the Ori­ginal Exemplars of al Subjective Ideas or Notions impacted on the Mind. Logic handles these Objective Ideas, not as any part of its formal Object, but only as the Substrate Mater, or prime Elements, from which subjective Ideas and Notions arise. These Objective Ideas or real Beings considered in Logic are reduced by the Aristoteleans, (from I know not what Pythagorean Super­stition) to Ten Categories or Predicaments; unto which they con­ceit [Page 5]al Beings are to be reduced, as to their proper Classes. But this Distribution being now generally exploded by al awakened spirits, yea disapproved by some of the more candid Aristoteleans, we shal content our selves with this curt, yet apparently more native and distinct distribution of Beings. Ens, or Being is either Infinite, or Finite. Infinite Being is but one, namely God, who having no termes of Essence, cannot admit termes of Definition; but doth every way transcend al Predicamental Confinement, as the sober Aristoteleans acknowledge. Finite Ens or Being may be distributed into Substance, or Mode. 1. Substance. [1] Substance is either Incor­porcous or Corporeous: Incorporeous Substance is divided into An­gels, or Human Souls. Corporeous Substance is either Inanimate or Animate: Inanimate Bodies are either Simple, as the Three Hea­vens, with the four Elements, Fire, Air, Water, Faith: or Mixed; which are again divided into imperfectly mixed, as Me­teors: or Perfectly mixed, as Minerals, Metals and Plants. Animate Corporeous Substance is divided into Brutes, or Human Bo­dies. Of al these we have copiosely Philosophised, Philis. Gen. P. 1. B. 3. c. 2. and Court Gent. P. 2. B. 3. c. 9. [2] Mode is not a Complete Ens or Being, 2. Mode. neither is it a mere Non-entitie or No­thing; but of a middle nature between a complete perfect Be­ing and nothing; or, as some properly terme it, Appendicula Rei, an Appendicule, or Little Appendix of a thing. A Mode is either Substantial and Essential, or Accidental. A Substantial and Essential Mode is that which Essentially adheres to the thing, and cannot, no not so much as by Mental Abstraction, be separated from the thing: so that to denie it of the thing Modified there­by, implies a slat contradiction, either Virtual or Formal. Thus Quantitie is a Mode Essentially appendent to and inseparable from Corporeous Substance: in like manner al Proprieties are Essential Modes of the Subject they are proper to. Accidental Modes are such as appertain not to the Essences of things, and therefore may be separated, at least Mentally, if not Really. Again Modes may be distributed into interne and externe: Union and Corporeous Formes are interne Modes; but Actions and Relations ex­terne. Thus much for Single Objective Ideas loged in things.

(2) As for Simple Subjective Ideas, and Notions, First Notions. they are usual­ly ranged under these two Heads, of First and Second Notions. First Notions, are such as arise immediately from the thing it self, or from the Comparation and Comprehension of several In­dividual [Page 6]things under one commun Notion. Hence they may be distributed into Singular, and Ʋniversal. A singular first Notion or Idea is the simple Imitamen or Representamen of some one indvidual thing in the mind: as the Idea of Alexander, Plato, or the like. An Ʋniversal first Notion, is that which comprehendes and re­presentes many different Species, or Individuals: As Animal, Man, Brute. These Universal Ideas or Notions are either Generic, as Animal;Second Notions. or Specific, as Man. Second Notions are only Termes of Art abstracted and assumed by the busy Mind, the more distinct­ly to apprehend and expresse things. Al Disciplines, specially Organic, have certain termes of Art, whereunto they reduce things comprehended under those Disciplines. Such are the parts of speech in Grammar, Noun, Pronoun, Verb, &c. Thus in Logic there are certain Second Notions or Ideas, framed out of first Notions collated or compared together. As by com­paring al Animals together, we find there is one commun Na­ture, in which they al agree, albeit they may have in other re­gards their Specific Differences. Thus it appears, that al Ani­mals agree as to Sense, &c. Thence we conclude that Animal is Genus: which is a second Notion or Terme of Art, under which al Animals are involved. So that indeed these second Notions are not Real, but only Mental or Rational Beings, framed out of Real Beings, and unto which al Real Beings are reduced, as to so many Artificial Classes. These second Notions are by some distributed into Separate or Simple, and Conjunct. Separate second Notions are such as agree to things apart: as Genus, Species, Dif­ference; the Whole and the Part; the Cause and the thing Caused; the Subject and the Adjunct, or the Accident. Conjunct Second Noti­ons are such as agree to things Conjunctly: as Convenience, Di­versitic, Opposition, and Order. Which are copiosely discussed by Logicians, specially the Ramistes; who in Imitation of Cicero, terme this first Part of Logic, which treats of Simple Ideas and Notions, INVENTION; because it furnisheth our Invention with Topics and Arguments, in order to a Judgement and Di­scourse of Things.

2.Propositions and Judgements. The second Part of Logic regardes Propositions or Judge­ments, as it answers to the Second Operation of the Mind, which consistes in a judgement of things by Affirming or denying the same. For albeit the Mind may have a simple Idea or Notion of a thing by simple Apprehension; yet it cannot make a Judge­ment [Page 7]thereof, without Affirmation or Negation. So that the proper object of this second part of Logic, is, to use Aristotles stile, [...], Complexe orations, Notions, or Ideas; such as carrie with them an Affirmation, or Negation. Proposi­tions, in regard of their Species and Affections, admit of various distributions. (1) In regard of their Species, or Kinds, Proposi­tions, are distributed, [1] into Simple and Composite. A Simple Proposition is that which cannot be resolved into other Propositi­ons. The Simplicitie of a Proposition is taken from the Unitie of its Subject, Predicate, and Verbal Copule. As, A man is Ra­tional. A Composite Proposition is that which is composed of other Propositions conjoined. The Principal of Composite Propositions are Hypothetic, and Disjunctive. The parts of an Hypothetic Pro­position are copulated by the conditional particle, If: as, If he be a man, he is rational. The first part is called the Antecedent, the later the Consequent. The Veritie of an Hypothetic Proposi­tion consistes not in the truth of the Parts, but in their Connexi­on. If the condition be impossible, an affirmative Hypothetic is equipollent to a simple Categoric Negative. A Disjunctive Proposition is that which hath parts conjoined by a Disjunctive particle: as, Every Animal is either a Man, or a Brute. [2] Pro­position, as to its kind, is divided into Pure and Modal. (2) The Affections of Propositions are either Absolute, or Relate: Absolute Affections are Quantitie and Qualitie. [1] A Proposition in re­gard of its Quantitie, is either Ʋniversal, Particular, or Singular. The notes of Quantitie regard the subject of Propositions, which is either Ʋniversal or Singular. If the subject be Universal and taken Universally, i. e. in its utmost Latitude and Extension, expressed by the note Al, or No, then the Proposition is Ʋniversal: as Al men are rational. If the subject be Universal, but limited and confined by some note of Particularitie, then the Proposition is Particular: as, Some men are learned. If the sub­ject be Singular, then the Proposition is such: as, Plato was a Phi­losopher. The Aristoteleans adde, though without reason, a fourth sort of Propositions, which they cal Indefinite, consisting of an Universal Subject, without any note of Quantitie. As, Man is learned: Virtue is beautiful. But their mistake herein is obvious: for if an Universal subject be found without restriction and limi­tation, it must be taken Universally. Whence the first Proposi­tion, Man is learned, is false; because al men are not so: but the [Page 8]second, Virtue is beautiful, is true, yet not indefinite, but Uni­versal; because al Virtue is so. [2] In regard of Qualitie, a Proposition is Affirmative or Negative, True or False. A Propo­sition is true, when it conjoins things to be conjoined, or di­vides things to be divided. A Proposition is false, when it con­joins things to be divided, or divides things to be conjoined. The Relate Affections of a Proposition are Conversion, Equipollence, Subalternation, and Opposition.

3.Syllogisme and Discourse. The third part of Logic is of Syllogismes, answerable to the third operation of the Mind, which is Ratiocination or Discourse. That which induceth a Necessitie of Ratiocination and Argumenta­tion is the Composition and Limitation of the human Intellect, which cannot judge of the Veritie or Falsitie of a Proposition, by the sole consideration of its Termes, without assuming a middle Terme or Argument, for the demonstration thereof. A Syllogisme may be considered either in regard of its Composition and Constitution; or in regard of its Division and Species. In the Composition and Corstitution of a Syllogisme, we may consider both its Mater and Forme. 1. The Mater of a Syllogisme is either remote or proxime. The Mater of a Syllogisme. (1) The Remote mater of a Syllogisme is its three Terme; two whereof are Extreme, the other Middle. The Predicate of the Question is always the Major Extreme; because it is ever more Universal and Extensive than, or equal to the Subject. Hence the Subject of the Question is ever the Minor Ex­treme, because lesse, or not more extensive than the Predicate. The Middle Terme is assumed as an Argument to prove the Question, and is collated and compared both with the subject or minor extreme, as also with the predicate and major extreme; either separately, as in simple Syllogismes, or conjunctly, as in com­posite. This middle Terme is so termed not in regard of its Site, but Office: yet in the first Figure it is middle as wel in regard of Site as Office. (2) The Proxime mater of a Syllogisme is its Propositions; which in a simple perfect Syllogisme are three; Major, Minor, and Conclusion. The two first are usually termed the Premisses; the last, the Conclusion; which is the same with the Question, or Thesis to be demonstrated.

2.The Forme of a Syllogisme. The Forme of a Syllogisme consistes in the apt disposition of the Premisses, so as the Conclusion may thence necessarily fol­low. And because al kinds of Conclusions cannot be deduced from al kinds of Premisses, hence Logicians prescribe certain [Page 9]general Rules, for the regular deduction of Conclusions from their Premisses: These Rules they bottome on certain Axiomes,General Axi­omes and Rules. such as these: (1) Particular Propositions are contained in the general of the same kind. (2) A Proposition becomes Particular or Ʋniver­sal from the Particularitie or Ʋniversalitie of its Subject. (3) The Predicate of an Affirmative Proposition having not greater Extension than its Subject, is alwaies considered as taken Particularly; because it is by accident that it is sometimes taken Ʋniversally. (4) The Predicate of a negative Proposition is alwaies taken Ʋniversally. From these Principes the following general Rules, for the right constitution of simple Syllogismes, as to their forme, are dedu­ced. [1] From two particular Propositions nothing regularly can be concluded. [2] From two Negatives nothing duely follows. For two negative Propositions separate both Predicate and Subject from the middle terme. [3] The middle terme must once at least either in the Major or Minor, be taken Ʋniversally. For if it may be taken twice Particularly, it may be taken for diverse parts of the same whole: whence the termes of the Conclusion can nei­ther be rightly conjoined, nor separated. As, Some Animal is a Man: Some Animal is a Beste: Therefore some Beste is a Man. [4] The Conclusion ever follows the weaker Part. i. e. If any one Proposition be Particular or Negative, the Conclusion also is Particular or Negative. The reason is; because the Premisses are the cause of the Conclusion: now we al know, that what in­firmitie is in the cause, follows also in the effect. [5] The termes of a Conclusion may not be taken more Ʋniversally in the Conclusion, than in the Premisses: and the reason is manifest; because we may not argue from a Particular to an Universal. [6] The Minor terme or extreme is the same in the Conclusion, as it is in the Premisses: i. e. if it be Particular in the Premisses, it is so in the Conclusion: and if it be Universal in the Premisses, it must be such in the Conclusion. [7] When the Minor Proposition is an Ʋniversal Ne­gative, the Conclusion also must be Ʋniversal. [8] When the Con­clusion is Negative, the Major Proposition cannot be a Particular Affirmative. [9] When the Conclusion is Negative, the Major terme must be taken Ʋniversally in the Major. The reason is; because it is taken Universally in the Conclusion. [10] A Negative Con­clusion cannot be proved by two Affirmative Propositions. The Rea­sons of these Rules see more fully, L'Art de Penser, or the Jan­senistes Logic, Part. 3. C. 3.

These general Rules for the right formation of a simple Syl­logisme being premissed,Figures and Modes. we procede to Figures and Modes, wherein the formal Constitution of a Syllogisme is placed. A Figure is the regular Disposition of the middle terme or Argument with the two extremes, or the parts of the Question. A Mode is the regular disposition of the three Propositions, according to their differences as to Quantitie or Qualitie: which Logicians expresse by these four vowels, A, E, I, O. A denoting an Universal Affir­mative; E, an Universal Negative; I, a particular Affirmative; O, a particular Negative. There are three Figures. (1) In the first Figure the middle terme or Argument is the Subject in the major and the Predicate in the minor Proposition: hence it be­comes middle not only as to Office but Site. This first Figure has four Modes, expressed by certain termes of Art, whose vowels expresse the Quantitie and Qualitie of the Proposition annexed thereto. As [1] Barbara: which notes each Proposition in the first mode to be Ʋniversal and Affirmative. [2] Celarent: which notes the first Proposition to be Universal and Negative; the second, Universal and Affirmative; the third, Universal and Negative. [3] Darij: which notes the first Proposition to be an Universal Affirmative; the second and third particular Af­firmatives. [4] Ferio: which notes the first Proposition to be an Universal Negative; the second a particular Arffimative; the third a particular Negative. Of these Modes two are Af­firmative, two Negative: the Affirmative are grounded on this principe: Whatever agrees to an Idea or Notion taken Ʋniver­sally, agrees also to al that which is comprehended within the exten­sion of that Idea or Notion. Or thus: Whatever is affirmed Ʋni­versally of an Ʋniversal Idea or Notion, is also affirmed of al that is contained under that Ʋniversal Idea. Thus the Notion of Sense a­grees to al Animals; therefore to al Men and Brutes. The Negative modes are founded on this principe: Whatever is de­nied of any Idea or Notion taken Ʋniversally, is denied also of al that, of which that Idea or Notion is affirmed. Or thus: Whatever is denied Ʋniversally of any Ʋniversal Notion, is also denied of al­things contained under that Ʋniversal Notion. Thus a Brute is de­nied Universally of al men; therefore also of Peter, John, &c. This first Figure hath two Rules, [1] The major ought alwayes to be Ʋniversal. [2] The miner ought alwayes to be Affirmative. The perfection of this first Figure, beyond that of the second or third, [Page 11]consistes in these two particulars. [1] In that al manner of Pro­blemes, as Ʋniversal Affirmatives, Ʋniversal Negatives, Particular Affirmatives, Particular Negatives may be concluded herein: whereas in the second Figure the Conclusion can be only Nega­tive, and in the third only Particular. [2] In that the necessitie of the Syllogisme consequence appears more evidently in this first Figure, than in the second or third. Hence it is, that Logicians advise, that our Arguments be, so far as it may be, reduced to this first Figure; for which they give us many useful Rules. (2) In the second Figure the middle terme is the predicate both in the major and minor Proposition. The Modes of this Figure are four, expressed by those fictitiose termes of Art: Cesare, Ca­mestres, Festino, Baroco. The Rules of this Figure are two. [1] The Major ought alwaies to be Ʋniversal. [2] One of the Pre­misses, and thence also the Conclusion must be ever Negative. (3) In the third Figure the middle terme or Argument is the subject in both Premisses. Its Modes are sixe: Darapti, Eclapton, Disamis, Da­tisi, Bocardo, Ferison. Its Rules are two. [1] The Minor must be Affirmative. [2] The Conclusion must be Particular. So much for the Constitution of simple Syllogismes: whereunto we must also reduce Enthymemes; which are imperfect simple Syllogismes, curtail'd of some one of the Premisses, which lies latent [...] in the mind: thence Enthymeme.

A Composite Syllogisme is twofold: (1) That which has one or both Premisses Composite: This is either Hypothetic, or Disjunctive, A Composite Syllogisme. Hypothetic. or Relative. [1] An Hypothetic Syllogisme, is that wherein the Major, or Minor, or both Propositions are Hypothetic. If the Major only be Hypothetic, the Conclusion is Categoric: but if the Minor be Hy­pothetic, the Conclusion also must be Hypothetic.Disjunctive. [2] A Disjun­ctive Syllogisme is that whose Major is Disjunctive: which if it con­siste only of two members immediately opposite, we may argue from the Position of the one, to the Remotion of the other; or from the Remotion of the one, to the Position of the other. If the Major has more members than two, some being removed, what re­mains is concluded. When upon the Remotion of both or al the members the whole is removed, the Syllogisme is from the enume­ration of the parts. [3] A Relative Syllogisme is that whose Major includes a relation of the parts.Relative. (2) A Syllogisme composed of many Syllogismes is either a Dilemma, or Sorites. Dilemma. [1] A Di­lemma is an argumentation from two members, whereof both [Page 12]are attended with incommoditie. It consistes of a disjunctive Syllogisme, wherein from the Remotion of the parts we con­clude the Remotion of the whole;Sorites. and two Categorics, where­by the remotion of the parts is confirmed. [2] A Sorites is an Argumentation consisting of many Propositions, so connected, that the predicate of the precedent Proposition is the subject of the subsequent; and thence the last predicate concludes of the first subject. Thence a Sorites contains so many Syllogismes as there are termes between the subject of the first Proposition, and the predicate of the last: as in that of Paul, Rom. 8.29, 30.

4. The fourth part of Logic is touching Method, Method. which directes the fourth operation of the Mind, called Disposition. For the mind of man, so far as rectified, is the Orderer and Disposer both of Notions and Things: and the principal End and Office of Method is to succur and assist the mind in the ordering and dis­posing of notions and things. And look as Syllogisme cures the Mind of Errors, so Method of Confusion. Yea indeed, to speak the truth, Method is very influential on al the former parts of Logic, as also on the operations of the mind, about which they are conversant: For how can the mind define, or divide, or di­stinctly explicate simple Ideas and Notions without Method? How imperfect and confused wil its Judgements, Ratiocinati­ons and Discourses be, unlesse Method assist? Hence the Anci­ents, Plato, and others, reduced the whole of Logic to Method, which without al peradventure is the most utile part thereof, if not Comprehensive of the whole. In the general, Method is an Art, whereby the Mind is rendred capable rightly to dispose a series of many simple Notions or Apprehensions, Judgements, and Ratio­cinations, in order to the Investigation, Explication, and Demonstra­tion of truth; as also the deeper impression thereof on the Memorie. In this description we have both the Object, Ends, and Effects of Method. The Object of Method is, (1) Simple Notions and Apprehensions. Wherein we are to consider their Definition and Distribution: In the Definition we are to consider, [1] The Name. And herein the principal care is to clear the Name from al Obscu­ritie and Equivocation: which is best performed by an Examen of and Inquisition into its Etymologie, or Origination, Homonymie, and Synonymie. [2] The Definition of the Thing; which must be expres­sed in termes most known and essential: for what is a Definition but the Idea or manifestation of a Thing? As for Distribution, it [Page 13]is of the whole into its parts; which gives a distinct Idea or Noti­on of a thing. (2) Another Object of Method is, Propositions and Judgements. Wherein we are to avoid al Precipitance, Anticipa­tion, and Prejudice; giving to al Propositions that Measure of Assent as their insite Reason, or Autoritie requires; admit­ting nothing as certain or evident, but what we know or have reason to believe is certainly or evidently true. (3) The last object of Method is Ratiocination and Discourse. Wherein we are [1] To leave nothing ambiguous or obscure in the Termes. [2] To deduce al Ratiocinations from principes most certain and evi­dent in themselves, such as no one invested with commun sense may gainsay. For first principes give evidence and force to al conclusions, but receive none from them. [3] Al Cogitations and Ratiocinations employed for the Investigation of Truth, or Remotion of any error must be digested and ranged into the most natural order: beginning from things more general, sim­ple, and easily to be known; and thence passing on to things more difficult and composite. [4] In seeking out Arguments and examining Difficulties there must be a complete enumeration of all singulars and parts, with a distribution proportionable thereto; that so nothing be omitted, that may conduce to the examen of truth. More touching Method, see Court Gent. Part 2. B. 3. c. 8. §. 3. & B. 4. c. 1. §. Thus much for Logic, wherein we have been the more large; because we have no where treated distinctly and fully of it.

§. 3. Real Philosophie may be, according to its different Ob­jects,Real Philoso­phie. distributed into Natural, Moral, and Metaphysic or Supernatural. Natural.1. Natural Philosophie regardes things considered in their natural Ideas, and Essences: or things considered in their no­tional extension. (1) Things considered in their natural Ideas and Essences belong to Physic or Natural Philosophie strictly so term­ed:Physic. which considers Things Natural, [1] In their General Prin­cipes and Affections. [2] In their parts; which are two, the Macrocosme or greater world, and the Microcosme or Man. Of which see Philosoph. General. P. 1. L. 3. c. 2. and Court Gent. P. 2. B. 3. c. 9. (2) Natural things considered in their Notional Exten­sion or Quantitie are discoursed of in Mathematics, Mathematic. which compre­hend Arithmetic, Geometrie, Astronomie, Music, Optics, Geographie, Mechanics, &c. Of which, Philos. Gen. P. 1. L. 1. c. 2. s. 2.

2. Moral Philosophie is, according to its object,Moral Philo­sophie. distributed in­to [Page 14] Ethic, 1. Ethic. strictly so termed, Oeconomic, and Politic. (1) Ethic strictly so termed regards the morals of private persons. Where­in we may consider, [1] Its Generic Idea, Moral Prudence: where­of we have copiosely discoursed, Philos. Gen. P. 2. L. 2. c. 6. and Court Gent. P. 4. B. 1. c. 1. §. 1. [2] Its prime Object, which is the last end and chiefest good: which we have largely discussed, Philosoph. Gen. P. 1. L. 1 3. c. 3. s. 1. & P. 2. L. c. 1. s. 3. also Court Gent. P. 2. B. 4. c. 1. §. 2, 3. & P. 4. B. 1. c. 1. §. 2. [3] The Prin­cipes of Human Acts: Practic Judgement, Volition or Intention, Consultation, Election: of which Court Gent. P. 2. B. 4. c. 1. §. 24-27. & P. 4. B. 1. c. 1. also Philos. Gen. P. 2. L. 1. c. 1. §. 4. [4] Sub­jective and Formal Beatitude: wherein we are also to consider Ʋse, Fruition and Delectation, or Joy. Of the first see Philosoph. General. P. 1. L. 3. c. 3. s. 1. §. 2. & P. 2. L. 1. c. 1. s. 3. §. 2. also Court Gent. P. 2. B. 4. c. 1. §. 23. But of Ʋse, Fruition, and De­lectation, see Court Gent. P. 4. B. 1. c. 1. §. 4-8. [5] The Morali­tie of human Acts: of which, Court Gent. P. 2. B. 4. c. 1. §. 29. & P. 4. B. 1. c. 2. § 1, &c. also Philos. Gen. P. 1. L. 3. c. 3. s. 3. §. 1. & P. 2. L. 1. c. 1. s. 4. §. 1. [6] Natural Libertie, which we have copiosely explicated, Philosoph. General. P. 1. L. 3. c. 3. s. 2. & P. 2. L. 1. c. 1. s. 4. §. 2. also Court Gent. P. 2. B. 3. c. 9. s. 3. §. 11, 12. & B. 4. c. 1. §. 28. [7] Moral Good, or Virtue, its Causes, Formal Idea or Nature, Parts, and Adjuncts: Of which Court Gent. Part 2. B. 4. c. 1. §. 29-32. & P. 4. B. 1. c. 2, 3. also Philosoph. General. P. 1. L. 3. c. 3. s. 3. & P. 2. L. 1. c. 1. s. 4. [8] Moral Libertie: of which, Court Gent. Part 4. B. 1. c. 3. also Philos. Gen. P. 1. L. 3. c. 3. s. 3. [9] Sin, its Nature, and Causes: of which, Court. Gent. P. 2. B. 4. c. 1. §. 33. & P. 4. B. 1. c. 4. also Philos. General. P. 1. L. 3. c. 3. s. 4. & P. 2. L. 1. c. 1. s. 4. §. 6. [10] The effects and servitude of Sin: Oeconomic. of which, Court Gent. P. 4. B. 1. c. 4. (2) Oeconomic: of which,Politic. Philos. General. P. 1. L. 3. c. 3. s. 6. (3) Politic: of which, Court Gent. Part 4. B. 1. c. 5. & Philos. Gen. P. 1. L. 3. c. 3. s. 6.

3. Metaphysic or prime Philosophie, Metaphysic. which principally regards the supreme most excellent Being and prime Cause of althings, namely God; his Existence, Essence, and Attributes; his Acts of Creation, and Providence; his Concurse and Gubernation, both Na­tural and Supernatural, and Creatural Dependence, &c. Which we have more copiosely discussed, Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. more curso­rily, Court Gent. P. 2. B. 2. c. 8. also Philos. Gen. P. 1. L. 1. c. 2. s. 5. & L. 3. c. 4.

BREVIARIE OF CONTENTS.

The COURT of the GENTILES. PART IV. Of Reformed Philosophie.

Preface.

  • THE first Reformers of Philosophie, Wic­lef, Wesselus, Savonarola, Picus Mirandula, Lud. Vives, Melanch­ton, Stapulensis, and Ramus. 1.
  • The Right Ʋse and Abuse of Platonic Philo­sophie. 4.
  • The Designe of this Discourse to render Philoso­phie subservient to Christian Theologie. 6.

A Proemial Scheme of Reformed Philosophie.

  • Philosophie Considered, 1. Generally (1) in its Historie. (2) In its generic Nature, Cognition. Which includes nine Intellectile Habits. (3) In its Ends, Adjuncts, Differences, Right Ʋse, Abuse, Parts, and Characters, &c. 1.
  • 2. Particularly, 1. As Notional, or Logic. Wherein consider, (1) Its End, the Refinement of the Intellect. 3.
  • (2) Its Parts, touching, [1] Simple Ideas or Notions, both Objective and Subjective, and these both first and second. 4, 5.
  • [2] Propositions and Judgements. 6.
  • [3] Syllogisme and Discourse, its Mater and Forme, Figures and Modes. 8, 9.
  • [4] Method, which regardes the former three Parts. 12.
  • 2. Real Philosophie. 13.
  • (1) Natural: Physiclogic and Mathematic. Ib.
  • (2) Moral: Ethic or Private, Oeconomic, and Politic. Ib.
  • (3) Metaphysic or Prime. 14.

BOOK I. Of Moral Philosophie.

CHAP I. Of Prudence, the last End and chief­est Good, Use, Fruition, and Delectation.
  • MOral Philosophie, its Genus, Prudence. 2
  • Prudence, its Nature and Object. Ib
  • Its Offices and Parts, (1) [...], (2) [...] (3) [...]. 3.
  • (4) [...]. 4.
  • The Subject of Prudence, Conscience. 5.
  • The Law of Conscience. Ib.
  • Synteresis and Syneidfies what. 6.
  • The Rule of Purdence [...]. 7.
  • (1) Subjective right Reason. Ib.
  • (2) Objective right Reason. 8.
  • The Last End its influence in Morals. 9
  • The last End as extensive as the First Principe, and but one. 10.
  • The last End desired infinitely. 11.
  • God the Last End of al. 12.
  • Assimilation to the Divine Bonitie the Last End of Man. 13
  • To adhere to God as our Last End speakes Per­fection. 14.
  • The Chiefest Good its Proprietles Ib.
  • (1) It's the Idea of al Good. 15.
  • (2) It's the Preme Beautle. Ib.
  • The Nature of Beaurie Explicated. 16.
  • The Soverain Beautie of God. 17.
  • (3) The chiefest good most proper. 18.
  • Ʋse and its Regulation. Ib.
  • What Temperance is. 19.
  • The Ʋtilitie of things in reference to their Last End. 20.
  • Concupiscence the Fruition of created good for itself. 22.
  • Intention of God as the Last End, how it must be ever actual. 23.
  • Fruition, its Difference from Ʋse. 25.
  • Al Fruition importes, (1) Love. 26.
  • (2) Ʋnion and Possession. 28.
  • (3) Communion with the best Good, 29.
  • By Contemplation and Love. 30.
  • (4) Delectation and Joy. 31.
  • Which requires, [1] a sweet Good. 32.
  • [2] Possession thereof. 33.
  • [3] Action thereon. 34.
  • Adjuncts of Delectation, [1] Realitie. 35.
  • [2] Connaturalitie and Agreament. 36.
  • [3] Ʋniformitie and Harmonie. 37.
  • [4] Puritie, [5] Force. 39.
  • [6] Infinitude without excesse. 40.
  • The Effects of Delectation, [1] Amplitude. Ib.
  • [2] Quietation and Satisfaction. 41.
CHAP. II. Of the Moralitie of human Acts, and Moral Bonitie.
  • THE Moralitie of human Acts. 42.
  • Moral Bonitie in Conformitie to the Divine Law. 46.
  • The measure of Moral Good Perfect. 48.
  • The Ʋniversalitie of a perfect Law. Ib.
  • Subjective right Reason not the measure of Mo­ral Good. 50.
  • No human Law a perfect Rule. Ib.
  • The Divine Law the rule of Moral Good. 51.
  • Right Reason Objective Light. 52.
  • The Mosaic Law a perfect Rule. 54.
  • The Parts and Causes of Moral Good. 55.
  • The Mater of Moral Good. 56.
  • Things Indifferent in Genere and Specie. 57.
  • No Action Indifferent in Individuo. 58.
  • A Virtuose Wil the Effective Principe of Mo­ral Good. 60.
  • The best End Essential to Moral Good. 62.
  • The Forme of Moral Good in Conformitie to the Moral Law. 63.
  • How the Forme of Good Consistes in the [...], Wel-doing. Ib.
  • How far Circumstances Moralise. 64.
  • The Ʋnitie and Ʋniformitie of Good. 68.
  • Al Good and Virtue Supernatural. 69.
  • The Difficultie of Moral Good. 70.
  • [Page]The Virtues of Pagans only lesser Sins. 71.
  • The Distribution of Virtue into Pietie and Ju­stice. 72.
CHAP. III. Of Virtue and Moral Libertie.
  • MOral Virtue an Habitual Perfection. 74.
  • Moral Libertie as to State in Virtuose Habits. 76.
  • Virtue gives, (1) Dominion. 78.
  • (2) Life, Health, Vigor, and Force. 79.
  • (3) Amplitude and Enlargement. 80.
  • (4) Nobilitie and Dignitie. 82.
  • (5) Beautie and Glorie. 84.
  • Moral Libertie as to Exercice. 85.
  • (1) Contemplation of God. 86.
  • (2) Adherence to the chiefest Good. 87.
  • (3) Dependence on the first Cause. 90.
  • (4) Conformitie, [1] To Gods Precept. 93.
  • [2] To his Providential Wil. 95.
  • (5) The reference of althings unto God, as the Last End. 96.
  • Moral Libertle of Exercice the highest, demon­strated, (1) From its Order. 98.
  • (2) From its Spontaneitie and Suavitie. 99.
  • (3) From its Vitalitie. 101.
  • (4) From its Amplitude. 103.
  • (5) From its Purgation of Sin. Ib.
  • (6) From its Stabilitie. 104.
  • (7) From its Improving Virtue. 105.
  • (8) From its Formal Beatitude. 106.
CHAP. IV. Of Sin and Moral Servitude.
  • SIN a Transgression of the Law. 108.
  • Sin as to its formal Reason Privative. 110.
  • The Causes of Sin, (1) Mans Defectibilitie. 111.
  • (2) The Vitiositie of human nature. 112.
  • The Nature and Influence of Original Sin. 114.
  • (3) Practic Error. 115.
  • (4) Self-love. 119.
  • Sins of Ignorance, Passion, Wilful. 121.
  • The Moral Servitude of Sin. 122.
  • (1) Sin repugnant to human Nature, 123.
  • [1] As a Falling from God. Ib.
  • [2] As it strips of the Image of God. 124.
  • [3] As Enmitie against God. 125.
  • [4] As it divestes men of Humanitie. 126.
  • (2) Sins repugnant each to other. 127.
  • (3) Sin most Impotent. 128.
  • (4) Sin the defilement of the Soul. 129.
  • (5) Sin ful of Shame and Reproche. 130.
  • (6) Sin the Tyrannie of the Soul. 132.
  • (7) Sin ful of Penurie and Want. 133.
  • (8) Sin the Fetters of the Soul. 134.
  • (9) Sin Folie and Madnesse. 135.
  • (10) Sin makes Men Bestes. 136.
  • The Adjuncts and Effects of this Servitude. 137.
  • The Servitude of Sin, (1) Voluntary. Ib.
  • (2) Necessary: the Degrees and Kinds of this sinful Necessitie. 138.
  • (3) Infinite as to Number and Magnitude. 141.
  • (4) Penal: with the Nature of Punishment. 142.
  • (5) Sin in it self the greatest Punishment. 144.
  • (6) Other Punishments of Sin. 145.
  • [1] Sin breeds Fear and Shame. Ib.
  • [2] Sin ful of Instabilitie. 146.
  • [3] Sin ful of Anxietie and Torment. Ib.
  • [4] Eternal Punishment of Sin. 147.
  • Sinners Dead in Sin. 148.
  • (1) The Death of Sin not Metaphoric or Hyper­bolic, but Real. 149.
  • (2) No Seeds of Virtue or Spiritual Life in Cor­rupt Nature. 150.
  • (3) The Impotence of Corrupt Nature to what is Good Ʋniversal and Total. 152.
  • (4) Man cannot prepare himself for the Reception of Virtue. 153.
  • (5) No Freewil in Nature to Moral Good. 155.
CHAP. V. Of Plato's Politie, its Essential Con­stitution, and Administration.
  • POlitic Philosophie what. 158.
  • Politie, its Forme in Order. 159.
  • The Object of Politie, the Multitude or Commu­nitie. 161.
  • [Page]God the Founder of al Polities. 162.
  • Man's Inclination to Sociatle. Ib.
  • Consociation constitutes a Politic Bodie or So­cietie. 163
  • Al Consociation by some Law. 164
  • Perfect Politie requires Amitie and Fraterni­tie. 165.
  • Religion the Principal Ligament of Politic So­cietie. 166.
  • The Ends of Politie, (1) Gods Glorie. 169
  • (2) To render men Virtuose. 170.
  • (3) The Good of the whole. 171.
  • (4) Mutual Assistences. 172.
  • A Politic Bodie or Citie what. Ib.
  • Legislation, its Origine. 176.
  • The Necessitie of Laws. 177.
  • Al Laws Originally from God. 178.
  • The Qualification of human Legislators. 179.
  • Al Laws from the Multitude. Ib.
  • Al Laws for public Good. 181.
  • Virtue a principal End of Laws. 182.
  • The Qualities of good Laws. 183.
  • The Law of Equitie, its use. 184.
  • Conservators of Laws. 185.
  • A Law its Equitie and Constitution. 186.
  • Three kinds of Politic Administration; Mo­narchie, Aristocratie, Democratie. 187.
  • Monarchie mixed with Democratie. 190.
  • Mixed Politie its use. Ib.
  • Moderate Empire best. 191.
  • Tyrannie Empire, its Origine, &c. 192.
  • The Evils of Tyrannie. 193.
  • Civil Magistrates, 1. Their End. 194.
  • 2. Their Qualifications, (1) Wisdome both Na­tural and Acquired. 195.
  • Knowlege of human Laws and Factes. 196.
  • Knowlege of Divine Laws. 197.
  • (2) Virtue, both Natural and Moral. 198.
  • (3) A Public Spirit, free from Self-interest. Ib.
  • A Magistrates Diet and Richesses. 199.
  • (4) His Education and Examen. Ib.
  • Scriptural Qualifications. 200.
  • A Magistrates Facultie and Authoritie. Ib.
  • (1) Divine, (2) Human. 201.
  • Magistrates Conservators of Laws. 202.
  • The Magistrates Exerclce of his Office, (1) With Justice, without Briberie. 204.
  • (2) With Temperance. 205.
  • (3) Moderation, (4) Clemence, (5) Fidelitie. 206.
  • The Effects of Polities Good and Bad 207.
  • Things destructive to Republies, (1) Atheisme. Ib.
  • (2) Lururie and Idlenesse. 208.
  • (3) Prosperitie and Povertie. Ib.
  • (4) Divisions. (5) Injustice. 209.

BOOK II. Of Metaphysic or Prime Philoso­phie, &c.

CHAP. I. Of Metaphysic in General.
  • ARistotle's Metaphysics. 210.
  • Metaphysic Sapience, what. 211.
  • Metaphysic a Natural Sapience. 212.
  • Contemplation, its proper Act. 213.
  • Contemplation of God best. 214.
CHAP. II. Of Atheisme, and the Existence of a Deitie.
  • THe Origine of Atheisme. 215.
  • Atheisme, (1) From Polytheisme. 216.
  • (2) From Vain Philosophie and Policie. 217.
  • (3) From Mans Carnal Mind and Pride. 218.
  • Three sorts of Atheisme. 220.
  • The Monstrose Nature and Pestiferous Influences of Atheisme. 221.
  • The Punishment of Atheisme. 222.
  • The Existence of God demonstrated, (1) From Ʋniversal consent. 223.
  • (2) From the Subordination of second Causes to a First. 224.
  • The World made by a Prime Cause. 225.
  • (3) From a Prime Motor. 228.
  • (4) From the Order of the Ʋniverse. 230.
  • (5) From the Connate Idea of God in the Soul. 231.
  • (6) From Practic Arguments. 232.
  • [1] From Conscience, its Notions and Exer­cices. 233.
  • [Page][2] From the sense of Religion. 234.
  • [3] From the Politic World. 235.
  • [4] From the Atheistes Cavils and Enmitie. 236.
CHAP. III. Of God his Names, Nature, Attri­butes, Unitie, and Simplicitie.
  • GODs Name [...] Being. 237.
  • [...] Jehovah. 239.
  • Jehovah the proper Name of God 240.
  • The explication of Jehovah and Jah. 241.
  • Ehjeh, Elohim, El, Shaddai, Adonai. 242.
  • Elion, Zebaoth, [...]. 243.
  • The Divine Essence and Attributes. Ib.
  • God not Capable of a Definition. 244.
  • Gods Essence Absolute and Independent. 245.
  • 1. The Divine Unitie demonstrated. 249.
  • 2. The Simplicitie of God Explicated. 251.
  • The Simplicitie of God demonstrated. 254.
CHAP. IV. Of Gods Immutabilitie, Infinitude, Eternitie, Immensitie, and In­comprehensibilitie.
  • 3. THe Immutabilitie of God. 257.
  • God Immutable, (1) In his Essence. 259.
  • (2) In his Immanent Acts. 260.
  • (3) In regard of his Word. 263.
  • Gods Immutabilitie demonstrated. Ib.
  • 4. Gods Infinitude demonstrated. 266.
  • (1) By his Independence. 267.
  • (2) From his Ʋnitie and Simplicitie. 268.
  • (3) From his Transcendence. 269.
  • (4) From the Idea of Perfection. 271.
  • (5) From the infinite Bonitie and Beatitude of God. 273.
  • (6) From Gods Infinite Power. 274.
  • 5. Gods Eternitie explicated, (1) By Scripture. 275.
  • (2) By Plato's Philosophemes. 276.
  • The Eternitie of God demonstrated. 277.
  • What Eternitie is. 279.
  • (1) Eternitie not mesurable by time. Ib.
  • (2) Eternitie without beginning or end. 281.
  • (3) Eternitie most Simple and Ʋniforme. 282.
  • (4) How Eternitie coexistes to the parts of Time. 283.
  • (5) Eternitie a fixed Instant. 284.
  • (6) Eternitie the same with the Divine Es­sence. 286.
  • 6. Gods Immensitie and Omnipresence. 288.
  • The Explication and Demonstration thereof, (1) From the Infinitude of the Divine Essence. 290.
  • (2) From Gods Simplicitie. Ib.
  • (3) From his Infinite Power and Operations. 291.
  • 7. Gods Incomprehensibilitie. 292.
  • Its Demonstration by 6 Arguments. 294.
  • How far we may apprehend God. 296.
  • Against Poetic figments of God. Ib.
  • Against Curiositie in our Inquiries after God. 297.
  • The least Notices of God of great moment. 299.
  • Al Notices of God by Divine Revelation. Ib.
  • The Grades or Ascents of Knowing God, (1) Na­tural. 300.
  • [1] By way of Causalite. 301.
  • [2] By way of Eminence. 302.
  • [3] By way of Rematiom. 303.
  • (2) Supernatural, [1] By Christ. Ib.
  • [2] By the Scriptures, &c. 304.
CHAP. V. Of Gods Life, Knowlege, Wil, and Power.
  • THe Life of God. 305.
  • Life in its generie Notion. 306.
  • The Life of God, (1) most Spirituose. 307.
  • (2) Most Actuose. 308.
  • (3) Most Self-moving. 309.
  • (4) Life it self. 310.
  • (5) Eternal Life. 311.
  • (6) The first cause of Life. Ib.
  • Gods Science and [...] most Perfect. 312.
  • The Object of Gods knowlege. 313.
  • (1) The Divine Essence. Ib.
  • (2) Althings cognoscible. 114.
  • The Object of Gods Owniscience, (1) Complexe [Page]Intelligibles. 315.
  • (2) Incomplexe Intelligibles. 316.
  • (3) The Human soul. 317.
  • God knows althings by his Essence. 318.
  • How the Divine Ideas represent althings. 321.
  • Gods Science, (1) most Simple. 322.
  • (2) Intuitive, not discursive. 323.
  • (3) Immutable and Necessary. 325.
  • (4) Most Certain. 327.
  • (5) Absolute and Independent. Ib.
  • (6) Eternal. 329.
  • (7) Infinitely perfect, Essentially, Intensively, Ex­tensively. 330.
  • Gods Simple Intelligence. 331.
  • Gods Science of Vision. 332.
  • God knows things future by his Wil. Ib.
  • Against Scientia Media. 334.
  • The Wil of God. 336.
  • (1) The Object of the Divine Wil. 337.
  • (2) The Divine Wil one pure Act. 338.
  • (3) The Divine Wil Independent. 339.
  • God Independent Physically and Morally. 340.
  • (4) The Divine Wil Immutable. 343.
  • (5) Gods Wil Absolute, not Conditionate. 344.
  • (6) Gods Wil Antecedent, not Consequent. 347.
  • (7) The Divine Wil most perfect. 348.
  • [1] Intensively. [2] Extensively. 349.
  • [3] Effectively. 350.
  • (8) The Divine Wil most Free. 351.
  • What Indifference may be ascribed to the Wil of God. 352.
  • (9) Gods Wil Irresistible. 353.
  • Gods Wil distributed, (1) Into Decretive, or Preceptive. 355.
  • (2) Into Secret, or Reveled. 356.
  • (3) Into Complacential, Providential, and Be­neplacite. 357.
  • Gods Power. Ib.
  • Gods Power his Essence. 358.
  • Gods Ordinate Power the same with his Wil. 359.
  • The Object of Gods Power, every thing possible. 360.
  • What things are Impossible. 361.
  • Divine Power Omnipotence. 363.
CHAP. VI. Of Gods Justice, Veracitie, and San­ctitie. Also of the Trinitie.
  • THe Justice of God. 365.
  • Gods Absolute Justice as to the afflicting the Innocent, and acquitting the Nocent. 367.
  • How far Gods Punitive Justice is necessary. 368.
  • Gods Ordinate Justice from his Wil. 370.
  • Gods Ordinate Justice the same with his Vera­citie. 371.
  • No Acception of Persons with God. 372.
  • The Difference between the Justice of God and that of Men. Ib.
  • How far Gods Justice regardes the Qualities of its Object. 373.
  • Gods Veracitie and Fidelitie. Ib.
  • (1) In fulfilling Promisses. 376.
  • (2) In fulfilling Threats. 377.
  • Gods Veracitie Demonstrated. 378.
  • The Sanctitie of God. 379.
  • Platonic Philosophemes of the Trinitie, with their Abuse. 382.
CHAP. VII. Of Gods Prime Causalitie, Efficience, and Concurse in general.
  • 1 GOD the first Cause of althings. 387.
  • 2. The Object of Divine Concurse. 391.
  • (1) God's Concurse not merely conservative of the Principe. 392.
  • Durandus's Objections against Gods Immediate Concurse to al Operations answered. 394.
  • Gods Concurse to the Substrate mater of Sin what. 395.
  • (2) Divine Concurse reacheth the human Wil, and al its Acts. 396.
  • (3) Gods Concurse Ʋniversally extensive as to al Objects. 397.
  • (4) Gods Concurse Principal. 398.
  • [Page]How Second Causes are al Instruments of the First. 399.
  • 3. Divine Concurse as to its Principe or Sub­ject. 401.
  • (1) Gods Concurse not his Essence absolutely con­sidered. 402.
  • (2) Gods Concurse procedes not from any executive Power in God. 403.
  • (3) The Divine Wil Omnipotent. 404.
  • (4) The Divine Wil of it self Operative and Influ­ential on al second Causes and Effects. 405.
  • 4. The Adjuncts of Gods Concurse. 406.
  • It is, (1) Immediate. Ib.
  • [1] God Concurs Immediately to every Act of the second Cause. 408.
  • [2] God Concurs Immediately to the second Cause it self. 409.
  • [3] The Act of the first and second Cause the same. 410.
  • (2) Independent and Absolute. 412.
  • (3) Previous and Antecedent. 416.
  • (4) Total, not Partial. 417.
  • (5) Particular, not general only. 420.
  • Objections against Gods Particular Concurse an­swered. 421.
  • (6) Most potent and efficacious. 422.
  • Gods Moral and Physic Concurse. 426.
  • Gods Efficacious Concurse Demonstrated. 427.
  • (7) Congenial and Connatural. 428.
  • The Suavitie and Efficace of Divine Grace. 429.
CHAP. VIII. Of Creation, and Providence in General.
  • GODs Creation demonstrated and expli­cated. 431.
  • Creation the Production of something out of no­thing. 432.
  • Active Creation the Act of the Divine Wil. 433.
  • Passive Creation a mode of the thing Created. 435.
  • The Providence of God demonstrated. 436.
  • The Wisdome of Divine Providence. 439.
  • The Eternal Law of Providence. 441.
  • The Wisdome of Providence Active. 442.
  • Providence an Act of the Divine Wil. 443.
  • The Spirit the Immediate Efficient of Providence. 445.
  • Platonic notions of the Mundane Spirit. 447.
  • Providential means used by the Spirit. 449.
  • No second Cause can act but in Subordination to God, and by his Providence. 450.
  • Fire the Create Ʋniversal Spirit. 452.
  • The Object of Divine Providence Ʋniversal. 453.
  • The particular Objects of Providence. 454.
  • The Adjuncts of Providence. It is (1) Efficacious. 455.
  • (2) Immobile and fixed. 456.
  • (3) Connatural and Agreable. 457.
  • (4) Beautiful and Perfect. Ib.
  • (5) Mysterious. 459.
  • The distributions of Providence. 460.
  • Of Miracles. Ib.
  • Providential Conservation proper to God. 461.
  • Gods Conservative Influxe Immediate. 463.
  • Gods Conservation by his Word or Wil. 464.
  • Gods Conservation by Means. 465.
  • Gods Extraordinary Provision for some. 466.
  • Conservation continued Creation. 467.
  • The Object of Divine Conservation. 468.
CHAP. IX. Of Divine Gubernation in general; and as to Sin.
  • DIvine Gubernation. 469.
  • God the supreme Gubernator. 470.
  • Divine Glorie the last end of Divine Gubernation. 471.
  • The order of Divine Gubernation fixed. 472.
  • None can avoid Divine order and Gubernation. 474.
  • The order of Gods Gubernation a Law. Ib.
  • Gods Gubernation by second Causes. 475.
  • Gods Gubernation reaches althings. 476.
  • Divine Gubernation as to Man, (1) Moral, by Law. (2) Efficacious. 477.
  • Wicked Men fal under Gods Gubernation. 478.
  • Gods Gubernation about Sin. Ib.
  • The Causes and parts of Sin. 479.
  • God not the Author of Sin. 480.
  • [Page]God the Prine Cause of the Entitative Act of Sin. 482.
  • Gods Concurse to the Entitative Act of Sin De­monstrated. 483.
  • How Sin fals under the Divine Wil. 485.
  • Gods Wil about the Obliquitie of Sin Permis­sive. Ib.
  • Gods Permissive Wil about Sin Efficacious. 486.
  • Gods Gubernation of Sin Ordinative. 487.
  • Judicial Gubernation of Sin. 488.
  • Gods Attributes Illustrious in the Gubernation of Sin. 489.
CHAP. X. Of Divine Gubernation about Virtue, Virtuose Men, and Angels.
  • SƲpernatural Illumination from God. 490.
  • The Infusion of Virtues. 493.
  • Gods care of Virtuose Men. 496.
  • Gods Gubernation of the Angelic World. 498.
  • The Angelic Law, Obedience, and Disobedience. 500.
  • Good Angels Ministerie as to God. Ib.
  • Good Angels Converse with Saints. 501.
  • Angels employed, (1) at the giving of the Law. 502.
  • At Christs Birth, and for the propagation of the Gospel. Ib.
  • (2) For the Conservation and Protection of the Saints. Ib.
  • (3) For Information, Counsel, Conduct, and Con­solation. 503.
  • (4) Angels Communion with Saints. 504.
  • (5) The final service of Angels. 505.
  • Gods Gubernation as to evil Angels. Ib.
  • Satans the Prince of this World. 507.
  • Satans Power to Temte. 508.
CHAP. XI. Of Creatural Dependence, both Natu­ral and Supernatural.
  • CReatural Dependence what. 509.
  • Every Being Dependent or Independent. 510.
  • One Prime Independent Being. 511.
  • Dependent Being by Participation. 512.
  • The Origine of Dependence. 515.
  • (1) Passive Power. Ib.
  • (2) The Dominion of God. 516.
  • Every Creature Dependent. Ib.
  • Dependence the same with the Essence. 517.
  • Dependence Importes, (1) Subordination. 519.
  • (2) Posterioritie. Ib.
  • (3) Inferioritie. 520.
  • Creatural Dependence, (1) As to Futurition. Ib.
  • (2) As to Essence and Conservation. 521.
  • (3) As to Operation. 522.
  • (4) The Dependence of the human Wil in al its Acts. 523.
  • Dependence Natural, Moral and Supernatural. 524.
  • Supernatural Dependence on Christ, Ib.
  • (1) For Habitual Grace. 526.
  • (2) For Actual Grace. 527.

Table of Hebraic Notions Explicated.

  • [...], Adonai, my Lord 242, 339
  • [...], Ehjeh, I shal be 242
  • [...], Light and Fire 452
  • [...], Then, Eternitie 275
  • [...], El, the potent God 242, 358, 430
  • [...], Eloah, and [...], Elohim 242, 358
  • [...], If, a formule of swearing 374
  • [...], Amen ibid.
  • [...], Truth, Fidelitie 200
  • [...], desperately sick 128
  • [...], a Prince, or Principatie 187
  • [...], Belial, lawlesse 109
  • [...], a son, devoted 122
  • [...], to create 419
  • [...], Gillulehim, filthy Idols 129
  • [...], to adhere 88
  • [...], a word, or thing 363, 428
  • [...], Dath, Order, Law 187
  • [...], mad sinners 136
  • [...], Hallelujah 241
  • [...], separate 496
  • [...], glued 135
  • [...], force or power 429
  • [...], to see 35
  • [...], Aberration 109
  • [...], Abilitie, force 200
  • [...], notes Gods soverain Wil 340, 345
  • [...], to search 317
  • [...], Jah, its import 241
  • [...], Jehovah, its explication 239, 240
  • [...], together 318
  • [...], to forme 318, 419
  • [...], denotes Gods Eternitie 275
  • [...], they that dwel, morally 425
  • [...], to consume 88
  • [...], Stratagemes 506
  • [...], the essential Word 385
  • [...], Prodigies 461
  • [...], Nabal 130
  • [...], Villanie, folie 129
  • [...], free, who 83, 130
  • [...], Willingnesses 429
  • [...], to break 343
  • [...], Eternitie, strength 374
  • [...], to lift up the face, what 366
  • [...], to break, infringe 343
  • [...], rebellious 125
  • [...], Iniquitie 123
  • [...], the most High 243
  • [...], toilsome labor 123, 147
  • [...], is determined 343
  • [...], to evacuate 526
  • [...], tormenting Idols 135
  • [...], Gods determinate purpose 343
  • [...], to supplant 155
  • [...], to perfect 419
  • [...], naked 131
  • [...], the shadow of death 425
  • [...], Zebaoth 243
  • [...], a Speculator 211
  • [...], holy 82
  • [...], Kanna, a Canon 48
  • [...], a beam of the Sun 423
  • [...], to see 35, 380
  • [...], Impetus 125
  • [...], Amplitude 80
  • [...], to amplifie 142
  • [...], poison 128
  • [...], Shaddai, self-sufficient 242, 497

Table of Grecanic Notions Explicated.

  • A & Ω, what in Scripture 267
  • [...], an Angel, what 498, 499
  • [...], sociable 163, 164
  • [...], from [...] Veneration 82
  • [...] Ignorance, what 117, 136
  • [...], Sagacitie 3
  • [...], Truth, what 376, 492
  • [...], Sin, what 108
  • [...], Independent 339
  • [...], Discord 123
  • [...], unimpedible 515
  • [...]. Transgression of the Law 109
  • [...], to adhere 89
  • [...], upon, for 525
  • [...], Insensibilitie 140
  • [...], Essulgence 304
  • [...], from [...] Mars 82, 104, 156
  • [...], Principatie 187
  • [...], absurd, what 136
  • [...], a self-subsistent Idea 327, 339
  • [...], self-motion 99
  • [...], how applied to God 349
  • [...]. Democratie 188
  • [...], Miracles, what 461
  • [...], an Image 304
  • [...], Experience 4
  • [...], to demand 508
  • [...], He is, proper to God 276
  • [...], bene, the forme of Good 63
  • [...], a good Sensation 4
  • [...], Gods complacence 345, 357
  • [...], Dexteritie, what 3
  • [...], Nobisitie, what 83
  • [...] Gods Beneplacite 345, 357
  • [...], Facilitie of Judgement 4
  • [...], good Order 99
  • [...], to take alive 506
  • [...], the Sun of [...] El 242
  • [...], God, its Origination 243
  • [...], Contemplation, what 213
  • [...], Jao, from [...] Jah 241
  • [...], Vitiositie of Nature 115
  • [...], Canon, whence and what 48, 99
  • [...], Comprehension 8
  • [...], to swallow down 507
  • [...], to cauterise 140
  • [...], Societie 158, 159
  • [...], what 88
  • [...], the Word 383, 384
  • [...], to play the Widwise, in Morals, what it notes 398
  • [...], a Method of cheating 506
  • [...], Monarchie 188
  • [...], an Oriental Tradition 299
  • [...], Stratagemes 506
  • [...], a Law, what 46, 52, 55, 181, 186
  • [...], Castigation 143
  • [...], the Divine Mind 383, 384
  • [...], proper to Eternitie 275, 284
  • [...], Concauses, or Instruments 399
  • [...], Oligarchie 188
  • [...], Being, Gods Name 211, 237, 246
  • [...], an Instrument 400
  • [...], Right Reason 7, 8, 50, 52
  • [...] a Definition not proper to God 244
  • [...], the eternal Exemplar 441
  • [...], & [...], what 258
  • [...], Transgression of the Law 109
  • [...], Stupor 125
  • [...], to obey fully 138
  • [...], to circumvent 506
  • [...], a Citie, what 172, 173
  • [...] 159
  • [...] torment 147
  • [...], antecedent Aide 416
  • [...], Providence 3, 439
  • [...], a Larve, Face, Person 369
  • [...], Acception of the person 366, 372
  • [...], callose concretion 140
  • [...], Miracles 461
  • [...], to winnow 509
  • [...], a Sieve ibid.
  • [...], from [...] Sophe 211
  • [...], what 135
  • [...] of Conscience 6
  • [...] of Conscience ibid.
  • [...], to walke by rule 99
  • [...], q. [...] a Sepule [...]e 149
  • [Page] [...], Slaves 144
  • [...], Order, what 98, 161, 187
  • [...], to order 127
  • [...], Prodigies, what 461
  • [...], ordained 347
  • [...], Trinitie among the Platonistes 382
  • [...], a Tyrant, who 192
  • [...], Hypostasis 383
  • [...], the Law of Conscience 5
  • [...], Self-love 119
  • [...], a Lover of Traditions 211
  • [...], Fraternitie 115
  • [...], Prudence, what 2
  • [...], a Character 304
  • [...], Poison 128
  • [...], to lie, or deceive 375
  • [...], the mundane Spirit, what 382, 384, 447

Table of Scriptures Explicated.

Genesis.
Ch.Vers.Pag.
1.1242
1.3358, 433, 452
2.17377
2.18172
2.23, 24161
3.7, 9, 22124
4.12, 13146
10.9194
11.4274
14.19243
14.20242
15.2ibid.
17.1ibid.
18.14363
22.16373
Exodus.
3.12242
3.14212, 238, 241, 246
6.3241
15.3240
15.11378
16.30128
18.21200
22.8242
32.25131
Numbers.
27.16, 17201
Deuteronomie.
1.13200
6.4249
7.682
8.3444
16.18, 20205
17.18, 19, 20197
29.17129
29.18128
29.29356
32.40305
33.2502
1 Samuel.
2.2379
14.39306
15.29374, 378
1 Kings.
21.20131
Nehemiah.
9.6468
Job.
8.16424
11.7, 8, 9292
15.34205
26.13446
26.14358
37.6, 7467
38.41466
42.2314
Psalmes.
5.9151
7.9318
7.14146
8.3446
10.4218
14.1ibid.
16.382
16.4142
17.7, 8496
18.20374
19.6424
25.1333
27.435
27.13, 14527
31.1373
32.2109
32.10, 11343
33.6446
33.13, 15318
34.12, 13102
34.7503
36.5374
39.387
47.8379
51.10412
55.19275
61.2527
63.888, 527
65.11, 12465
72.6406
73.26, 2888, 527
75.2, 3167
82.1, 2205
87.7525
89.1, 8, 33, 34, 35374
90.2, 3, 4275
91.1, 4, 10497
92.12379
93.2275
97.1, 2459
101.3109
102.27251, 164
103.4498
104.27, 30446
104.3435
106.5ibid.
107.20444
110.3428
115.3354, 359
119.4580, 93
119.89343
119.123371
119.137365
119.165103
135.5, 6339, 354, 359
139.1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6317, 440
139.7, 8, 9, 10288, 410
139.11, 12, 13318
141.8526
145.3269, 292
145.15466
147.4440
147.5314, 330
147.15, 16444
147.9466
Proverbes.
3.7, 880
4.2361
8.22, 23275
15.3316
Ecclesiastes.
3.1467
8.4479
Canticles.
1.4527
6.10161
8.5526
Esaias.
1.4.156
9.2425
9.5242
9.17129
10.21430
14.20139
19.18425
22.17130
22.20, 21, 22202
25.1374
26.19406
28.17365
32.5130
40.17238, 246
41.4267
43.1412
43.7419
43.13275
44.5430
44.6, 48241, 246
46.10353
53.11398
55.11, 12406
57.4150
64.6129
Jeremie.
5.1137
13.33153
17.9.155
23.23, 24288, 314
51.58147
Ezechiel.
16.6413
16.44153
23.7129
33.11345
Daniel.
2.20467
4.30218
4.34306
11.36242
Hosea.
2.21, 22438, 465
4.12, 16125
4.17135
6.2146
8.8129
11.1278
13.1, 2131
14.5406
Jonah.
1.14340
3.9377
Amos.
3.6482
5.12142
Micah.
5.2275
6.9312
Habakkuk.
1.13380
2.5142
2.13147
3.4423
Zecharie.
3.7505
9.1682
Malachie.
4.2424
Matthew.
3.9413
4.4444
6.20, 2489
6.2224
7.861
7.1872
8.2360
12.25209
13.12105
16.16305
19.17273
20.21366
22.29364
Marke.
3.5141
Luke.
1.19500
1.37363
10.42214
12.29.146
12.24466
15.13, 14, 15134
16.1389
17.5525
22.3507
22.29, 3097
22.31, 32508
John.
1.951
1.13156
1.1487
1.16525
3.8413
4.24251, 308
5.4502
6.63308
12.2698
Acts.
2.44, 46165
7.53502
8.9135
8.23128
13.48347
15.18315
17.25271
17.26349
17.28311
Romans.
2.2365
2.11365, 372
2.14, 158
3.9133
3.23125
5.12, 13214
5.21133
6.12133
6.13, 16138
6.23144
8.294
8.7125, 127
8.21, 2223
9.11346
9.16359
11.5346
11.17416
11.33295
11.36397
12.3299
12.11104
1 Corinthians.
2.11313
2.14137, 493
4.7157
6.12, 1396
6.1788
7.3121
13.1501
13.12304
15.45308
17.10504
2 Corinthians.
2.11506
4.4304
10.1348
12.991
12.9, 10527
Galatians.
6.1648, 99
Ephesians.
Ch.Vers.Pag.
1.4, 5341
1.9, 11342
2.2122
2.8, 9, 10414
2.11506
4.2472
4.29129
Philippians.
2.12, 13396, 526
3.1648
Colossians.
1.15304
1.16499
2.5161
1 Timothic.
4.2140
6.12.107
6.16293, 306
2 Timothie.
2.19339
4.7, 8107
Titus.
3.6127
Hebrews.
1.3304, 444, 464
2.2502
4.13415
6.17, 18375, 377
9.14308
11.3.320
12.1, 2526
12.11, 12106
12.15128
12.22504
13.8284
James.
1.17258
1.2594
2.852
4.15345
1 Peter.
5.8507
2 Peter.
1.3156
2.12137
3.7465
1 John.
3.4109
Jude.
12 166
Revelations.
1.4, 8, 11240, 246, 267
4.11360
8.2501
18.13144
19.1, 3, 4, 6241

ERRATA.

Proemial Scheme, &c.

  • PAg. 2. l. 37. l. Philologie.
  • p. 5. l. 23. dele, Three.
  • p. 6. l. 23. dele, al.
  • p. 8. l. 1. dele, been.
  • Pag. 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15. Title, for Sect. l. §.
  • p. 5. l. 30. l. [...].
  • p. 14. l. 39. l. Repub. l. 2, 6, 9.
  • p. 18. l. 26. dele hereafter.
  • p. 19. l. 5. l. and pleasures and griess.
  • p. 21. l. 26. l. [...].
  • p. 39. l. 26. l. is, for are.
  • p. 43. l. 7. l. P. 2.
  • p. 52. l. 5. l. [...].
  • p. 63. l. 37. l. P. 2. B. 4.
  • p. 74. l. 31. l. Chap. 2. §. 4.
  • p. 92. l. 34. l. Manuduction.
  • p. 108. Contents l. 15. dele, A Sum of the Pela­gian Historie. Item, l. ult. l. [...].
  • p. 132. l. 7. l. [...].
  • p. 143. l. 24. l. B. 2. Chap. 6. §. 1.
  • p. 156. l. ult. l. Man.
  • p. 202. l. 19. l. N. T. Rom. 13.1.
  • p. 204. l. 38. l. shal.
  • p. 207. l. 25. l. Policie, Item l. 31. l. Policie.
  • p. 215. Contents l. 2. l. Policie.
  • p. 227. l. 38. l. Hurtado de Mendoza.
  • p. 235. l. 2. l. void.
  • p. 250. l. 13. l. [...].
  • p. 258. l. 13. l. [...], Parallaxes.
  • p. 260. l. 39. l. 2.
  • p. 262. l. 33. l. [...].
  • p. 263. l. 36. l. [...].
  • p. 288. l. 37. l. [...].
  • p. 290. l. 1. l. 1. The.
  • p. 292. l. 21. l. God's.
  • p. 298. l. 36. dele, Lastly.
  • p. 327. l. 5. l. See Greg.
  • p. 343. l. 29. l. [...]
  • p. 360. l. 36. l. pro Sect. 4. Chap. 7.
  • p. 361. l. 19. l. Ens possibile.
  • p. 381. l. 18. l. [...].
  • p. 382. l. 24. l. Sect. 35.
  • p. 385. l. 29. l. §. 9. Item, l. 34. l. [...].
  • p. 386. l. 16. l. Cabala.
  • p. 398. l. 28. l. [...].
  • p. 416. l. 26. l. [...].
  • p. 421. l. 32. dele 1.
  • p. 424. l. 17. pro and, l. is.
  • p. 426. l. 3. l. [...].
  • p. 440. l. 3. l. 2. Item l. 5. l. [...].
  • p. 465. l. 28. dele, liquors.
  • p. 469. l. 27. l. [...].
  • p. 492. l. 8. for as, l. is.
  • p. 493. l. 27. l. [...].
  • p. 494. l. 14. l. [...].
  • Item l. 16. l. [...].
  • p. 514. l. 24. l. [...].

THE COURT of the GENTILES.

PART IV. OF REFORMED PHILOSOPHIE: Wherein Plato's Moral and Metaphysic Philosophie is reduced to a useful Forme and Method.

BOOK I.
Of Moral Philosophie.

CHAP. I. Of Prudence, the last End and chiefest Good, Use, Fruition, and Delectation.

Moral Philosophie, (1) Its Genus, [...], which connotes Prudence: wherein consider its Objects, Offices, and Acts: which are, [1] [...], [2] [...] Dexteritie, [3] [...] Sagacitie, and [...], [4] [...]. (2) The subject of Moral Prudence, [...], and particularly the Conscience: Plato's [...], Law of Conscience, [1] In the [...], which is the seat of Principes. (2) In Syneidesis, which is a reflexive Light, and springs from [...] sensation. (3) The Rule of Moral Prudence [...], which is either subjective, or objective: [...], [Page 2] Rom. 2.14, 15. James 2.8. The last End, its In­fluence in Morals: the chiefest Good, its Characters, (1) The Idea of Good. (2) The first Beautie. (3) Most proper. Ʋse, its Regulation and Intention. Fruition, its parts, (1) Love, (2) Ʋnion, (3) Communion, (4) Delectation, considered [1] In its Causes, a sweet Good, Possession and Action. [2] In its Adjuncts, Realitie, Connaturalitie, Ʋniformitie, Puritie, Force, and Infinitude. [3] In its Effects, Enlargement, and Satisfaction.

§. 1. HAving discussed Plato's Natural Philosophie, we now descend to his Moral, which regards the Morals of single Persons, Families, The Idea of Mo­ral Philosophie. and Cities, or Republics. We find the Idea of Philosophie, as it relates to Morals, and Active Sciences, in the Platonic Definitions, pag. 414. [...], Philosophie is a prudent or studiose conside­ration of the Soul according to right reason. Wherein we may con­sider, (1) The Genus, (2) The Subject, (3) The Measure, or Rule of Moral Philosophie.

1. The Genus, 1. Its Genus. Moral Prudence. in this Platonic Definition of Moral Philosophie, is [...], which signifies a prudent Inspection, studiose Consideration, and sollicitous Care, communly stiled by Plato [...], Prudence, or Moral Wisdome; which we have thus copiosely described in the Platonic Definitions: [...], Prudence is a facultie of it self effective of human Hap­pinesse. Prudence what. Wherein we have, (1) The Specific reason, whereby it is differenced from contemplative Science, expressed by that notion Effective. (2) Its Ʋltimate End, which is to make men happie. Again, Prudence is defined in the same Platonic Definitions, [...], A Science of good and evil. Again, [...], A Disposition, whereby we judge what is to be done, and what is not to be done. In al which Defini­tions laid together we have these Considerables.

1. The Ʋltimate End, Its Object. and supreme Object of moral Prudence or Philosophie, namely human Happinesse, which is the measure of al moral Acts, and the first thing treated of in moral Philosophie, according to that of Aquinas: The end of moral Virtues, is the chief principe of Prudence, as Luke 10.41. Of which Chap. 2.

2. We have here the intermediate Objects of moral Prudence, which are in general al Agibles or Practicables. (1) Singulars. (2) Things present. (3) Things in our power. (4) Things good, or evil.

3. Here is also considerable the proper Exercices or Offices of Prudence, which are according to Plato, (in his Charm.) (1) [...],Its Offices. To do what belongs unto us. (2) [...], To understand a mans self. (3) [...], To use al things wel, i. e. with respect to our supreme end. (4) Rightly to distinguish 'twixt good and evil. (5) To conserve the re­ctitude of the Wil. (6) To moderate the Affections. (7) To go­verne the whole Life. Of which see more fully Philos. Gen. P. 2. l. 2. c. 6. s. 3.

4. This moral Prudence may be considered in its Integrals;The parts of Prudence. which are, according to the Platonic account, four: [...]. (1) [...], Providence, which,1. [...], Providence. in the Platonic Definitions, pag. 414. is thus described: [...], Providence is a preparation (or provision) for somewhat future. Which implies, [1] An universal compre­hension of al circumstances, means, difficulties, encouragements, which may make for, or against our end. [2] Serious consulta­tion about, and prudent determination of what is to be done. [3] Prudent precaution of what may impede, &c. this is termed [...], Caution, according to that of the Stoics, [...], A wise man ought never to fear, but al­ways to use caution, &c.2. [...], Dexteritie of Judgment. (2) Another part of moral Prudence is [...], a Dexteritie in judging things: which in the Platonic De­sinitions, pag. 413. is thus defined: [...], Facilitie of judgment, is a connate abilitie of reasoning, or discerning. And Plato, de Repub. 4. pag. 428. saies, [...], Facilitie of judgement is certainly some kind of Science, &c. (3) [...], Sagacitie or perspicacitie of finding out things, 3. [...], Sagacitie. which Plato makes to be an excellent kind of Prudence, or a natural Inven­tion, which directs the Reason to find out things wrapt up in Nature: which he elsewhere cals a Sagacitie of Nature. So in his Epino. pag. 976. ‘There remains a marvellous facultie, where­by we easily and expeditely learne any thing; and having learnt it can faithfully commend it to memorie, and as occasion serves, by an happie celeritie recal it, which some cal Wisdome, others good Nature, but others, [...], Sagacitie of Nature.’ This [...], or natural Sagacitie, Plato makes to be the same with his [...], good Nature: So Plato, Defin. pag. 412. [...], Sagacitie is a natural generositie of mind, whereby a person is enabled happily [Page 4]to conjecture what ought to be done. Again 'tis stiled [...], an acumen of judgment. This natural Sagacitie, Plato, Repub. 2. pag. 376. makes very essential to a Magistrate, in order to his more exact judging of persons and things, and final decision of Contro­versies. Solomon we know was endowed with this natural Saga­citie, even to admiration; which discovered it self in the decision of that arduous case between the two Harlots, 1 Kings 3.23, 24, &c. as also in resolving the Queen of Sheba's questions, 2 Chron. 9.1. which kind of Sagacitie Politicians cal King-Craft. This natural Sagacitie is elsewhere stiled [...], [...]. a facilitie of judge­ment: which in the Platon. Defin. pag. 414. is defined [...], A good judgement tenacious of what is deter­mined by reason. Again, this natural Sagacitie passeth sometimes under the notion of [...], which is defined, Platon. Defin. pag. 412. [...], An habit elective of what is best. One great office of this natural Sagacitie, consistes in the knowlege of men, their several Humors, Inclinations, Designes, Interests,4. [...], Experience. and Combinations, &c. (4) Another part of moral Prudence is Experience, which Plato cals [...], and makes very essential to a true Philosopher. So Plato, Repub. 9. pag. 582. [...], The experien­ced person endowed with prudence is the only true Philosopher. Then he addes: [...]. Thence (in the same Repub. 9.) he joyns Prudence and Experience toge­ther with Reason, which he makes the best Judges of human Affairs: [...], We rightly judge by Experience joyned with Prudence and Reason. And Plato, in his Gorgias, gives us the reason, why Experience is so essential to Prudence: [...], Experience makes our life to passe away according to Rules of Art; whereas inexperience makes us live casually. Again: [...], There are many Arts experimentally found out among men, from several Experiments, &c. And because experimental Prudence is gained by sense and sensible observation; thence Plato Timaeus, pag. 103. defineth it a subtiltie of sense, or good sensation of the Soul: [...], Prudence is a good sensation of Soul. Expe­tience is indeed the main Seminarie of human Prudence. (1) In that it furnisheth us with the choisest observations of past and present times, whereby we are capacitated to make some pru­dent [Page 5]conjecture of what is likely to succede. (2) Experience draws down general Rules and Precepts of Wisdome to particu­lar and proper use. (3) Experience gives men a more inward feeling and lively apprehension of themselves and others. Thence Plato makes this self-knowlege the highest piece of Prudence; which he cals [...], a good sensation. (4) Experience does much greaten and adde to the quantitie of our knowlege, by furnishing the mind with fresh observations: whence Plato brings in Solon speaking thus, ( [...], The longer I live, the more I know and teach. (5) Experience addes not only to the quantitie, but also to the qualitie of our knowlege, by rendring it more clear and distinct. For experi­ence reduceth particular observations, in themselves confused, unto a regular Series and Order; whence general Rules are fra­med, which makes our knowlege more distinct and certain. (6) Experience greatly fixeth and confirmeth our Notions of things.

2. Having finished the Generic Notion of moral Philosophie,2. The Subject of Moral Prudence the Soul, and particularly the Conscience. which is moral Prudence, we now procede to the Subject thereof, expressed in the Platonic Definition by [...], the Soul: for in­deed moral Prudence moveth and influenceth the whole Soul, and therefore it is not unjustly seated therein; though the proper seat thereof be the practic Judgment, which Divines terme Con­science; which is a petty God, or God's Vice-gerent, and Vicar in the Soul, to command, or threaten; to accuse, or excuse; to justifie, or condemne. This Vicarious Divine office of Consci­ence, Plato seems to have had some Traditional Notices of: whence he termes Conscience [...] Fame; and makes it to be a kind of Demon, or petty God in men. So de Leg. 8 [...], This Law of Fame partakes of a marvellous facultie, seing no one durst to breathe otherwise than according to the Dictates of her Law. Serranus here acquaints us,Plato's [...], Consci­ence's Law. ‘That Plato cals [...], his Law of Fame, that Imperial power of Con­science wel known to al; which comprehends those commun Principes, That God is to be feared, &c. This Law of Consci­ence he saies is unwritten, yet notwithstanding there is in al mens minds, [...], a Sacred Law, whose force and efficace tames every Soul, and compels it, by fear, to obey positive Laws. From the authoritie of this Law it is, as the Philosopher teacheth, that men come to understand the diffe­rence [Page 6]of good and evil.’ Again Serranus addes: ‘Our Philoso­pher cals this Divine Law of Conscience, [...], the Law of Fame; and saies, that it is connate in al men, it being a Science that teacheth the difference of good and evil; and the Conser­vator and Vindictor of al Laws; and the [...], or Precursor of that most excellent Chorus of Virtues; whose admirable fa­culties and actions flow from no other Fountain, than the sparks of this [...], &c.’ This Law or Light of Conscience is twofold. (1) Habitual, which is called in the Scholes [...], Synteresis. (2) Actual, which is termed [...], Syneidesis.

(1) The Synteresis, 1. Synteresis, the Habit of Principes. or habitual Light of Conscience is defined, in the Scholes, a natural habit of active Principes. For as speculative Reason discourseth of Speculatives, so practic Reason of Practics: as therefore there are naturally implanted in us certain specula­tive Principes, which appertein to Intelligence; so also are there certain active Principes, which belong to that natural habit of Conscience, called [...], Synteresis, as Aquinas, Part. 1. Q. 79. And this habitual Light or Law of Conscience, is the same with Plato's [...], a Law of Fame, which is elsewhere by him termed [...],2. The Syneide­sis, self-reflexi­on. Right Reason, as anon. (2) The actual Light or Law of Conscience called by the Ancients [...], is Consci­ence strictly taken. So Aquinas, Part. 1. Quaest. 79. Art. 13. ‘Con­science taken properly is not a power, but an Act; whereby we apply our Science to what we undertake; which application is followed by Testification, or Ligation, or Excusation, and Ac­cusation.’ By which it appears, that the proper office of this Syneidesis is self-reflexion; whence follows accusation, or excusa­tion, &c. as Rom. 2.15. And because this reflexive Light of Conscience does necessarily suppose inward sense, hence 'tis oft called [...], sensation, also [...], Synesis, or sensate judgment. So Aquinas, ‘Synesis, or sensate judgment imports a right judgment about particular operables.’ So Plato, in his Theaet. makes al true Science to be a kind of Sensation, [...], Science is nothing else but Sensation. And more particularly, in his Timaeus, pag. 103. he cals [...], Prudence, [...], a good Sen­sation: which exactly answers to the Scripture Phraseologie, which sets forth this reflexive act of Conscience by [...], as Phil. 1.9. [...]. and thence Heb. 5.14. we read of [...],Phil. 1.9. &c. The life of the new Creature, as wel as of the old, consistes in these self-reflexive Acts of Conscience, [Page 7]which spring from inward sense and feeling. And Plato, in his Alcibiad. pag. 133, 134. tels us, ‘That he that reflectes upon himself, his own Soul and Wisdome, thereby becomes as it were omniscient: whereas they, who know not themselves, know not what is good or evil for them; nor yet what belongs to them­selves, or to other men: such therefore can never make good Politicians, or Occonomists, &c.’ In brief; Self-reflexions, or our actions upon our selves, are of al the highest and noblest, and those by which we live and worke as men, and perfect that part of the Soul called Conscience; which directs al we do, according to right Reason, &c.

3. As for the Measure or Rule of Moral Prudence,3. The Rule of Prudence, [...] Right Reason. we find it expressed in the fore-mentioned Platonic Definition under this notion, [...], according to right Reason. This Platonic [...], (which is asserted in like manner by the Stoics, and others) right Reason is the same with the Light or Law of Nature, which is twofold. (1) Subjective. (2) Objective.

1. As for Subjective Right Reason, Light or Law of Nature, Right Reason is 1. Subjective. it is no other than those commun Principes of Moralitie, seated in that part of Conscience which they cal Synteresis, of which in the foregoing §. 6. This Seminarie of engrafted active Notions, or moral Principes is stiled by the Stoics [...], the Commun Law; also [...], right Reason; against which, say they, no­thing is to be done; as Diog. Laert. in Zeno. 'Tis termed by Plato [...], the Law of Being. So Minos, pag. 315. [...], where, saies Serranus, by this appellation [...], Plato understands ‘the Eternal Law of Nature, which, amidst the various Laws of Nations and their vicissitudes, conti­nues uniforme and the same; and thence is truly termed [...], Being; therefore he cals it, [...], the right Reason of the Eter­nal Law: and because our actions are to be measured by the Rule of these commun Notions, therefore Plato names this Law [...], the Royal Law. So again, Serranus in Plato de Legib. 8. The [...], Delineation of this Eternal Law is this. There is in the minds of al, as soon as they are borne, a certain [...], Sacred Law.’ He that consecrates this Law in his mind, as a certain sacred, is thereby furnished with an excellent remedie against the insolence and impotence of human lusts; as it was said of the Tyrant, [...]. These active Prin­cipes, conteined in this interne Law of Conscience, are generally [Page 8]stiled [...], [...], commun Notions: they were named by Zeno [...], Comprehensions; because they comprehended the first seeds or principes of knowlege. Cicero tels us, that Epicurus cal­led them [...], [...]. Anticipations, (as he translates the word) be­cause they supposed a Previous formation of things in the Soul. The Stoics used the same terme likewise. Chrysippus defined this na­tural Law, or Conservatorie of commun Principes, a natural In­telligence of those things, which universally are. Cicero stiles these commun Notions, Inchoate Intelligences, of which see Lud. Vives in August. Civ. lib. 8. cap. 7. The Scripture also stiles these com­mun Principes fixed in Conscience, a Law; so Rom. 2.14, 15. where the Gentiles are said to be a Law to themselves, &c. And indeed these commun seeds of natural light are a private Law, which God has deeply engraven on mens Consciences, and is uni­versally extensive unto al, though with a latitude of degrees; it being in some more, in some lesse, but in al in great measure ob­literated, and defaced since the Fal. It is also by Divines gene­rally termed the Light, or Law of Nature; because it flows in, and with, and from human Nature, either immediately, or me­diately.

2. As for the Objective [...],2. The Objective [...] Law of Nature. Right Reason (which Plato seems to have had some traditional notices of) it contains those broken Traditions of the Moral Law, which were scattered up and down among the Gentiles. That Plato had received some fragments of Gods Law; and that by his [...], Right Reason, he does import the same, seems very probable, both from that expression in his Minos, pag. 315. [...], The Law of Being, i. e. of the first Being, as he usually stiles God: as also from that other expression of his, Minos, pag. 317. [...], This right Reason is the Royal Law, i. e. Gods Divine Law, which is so stiled Jam. 2.8. In this sense right Reason may be said (as the Scholes wil have it) to give [...] esse morale, or Moralitie to hu­man Acts: so Stobaeus de Virtut. Ser. 1. fo. 9. [...], Virtue is a conformitie according to right Reason, and Sin is a trans­gression against right Reason. Where, by right Reason we must un­derstand not the subjective Light, or Law of Conscience, which is imperfect; but the objective Light of Nature comprised in the Moral Law. In this sense we must understand that Principe in the Scholes, That right Reason gives the esse morale to moral Beings. [Page 9]Thus much for the Platonic Definition of Moral Philosophie.

§. 2. Next to the generic Notion of Moral Philosophie,The last End its Influence in Morals. the first thing that comes under consideration is the last End, which is first in intention, though last in execution. Yea, indeed the last End is the first Principe of moral Prudence: For what is Pru­dence, but the right disposition and ordination of al means and actions? And is not the last end the rule and measure of al or­der? Is not every thing then rightly disposed, when it is conve­niently brought into a subordination to its last end? Wherefore the contemplation of the last end is of greatest moment in Moral Philosophie. And they say, that Plato was the first that used the Greek [...] in this philosophic and strict Notion: for Homer and other of the Ancients used the word to expresse an Effect in its accomplishment and perfection; but Plato restrained it so, as to signifie thereby a final Cause, or that which is last in the se­ries of things desired, yet first in intention. This Cicero inter­prets extreme, last, chiefest. What force, efficace and influence the last end has in Morals, Plato frequently inculcates. So in his Theaetetus, he assures us, That al Science is inutile, yea noxious, without the notice of the best End. This last End he makes to be, [...], the principal End of althings: which Proclus cals, [...], the End of Ends. And for the more ful and clear explication of this last End, its universal influence and excellence, the following Propositions are diligently to be considered.

1. Prop. It is necessarie, that we constitute some last End, as wel posititively as negatively, in every Series of Actions. This Hypothe­sis is wel argued by Suarez, Metaph. Disput. 24. Sect. 1. And the reason is most evident: for look as in Descent from the intention of the end to the election and execution of the means, we must necessarily at last stop in some one or more means, which are first in execution, though last in intention; so in Ascent from the means to the end, it is as necessary that we at last stop in some last end, which is first in intention and last in execution. Again, as there is a subordination of second Causes to the first Cause; so in like manner of inferior Ends to the last End. For in Ends, and those things that conduce thereto, there cannot be a pro­gresse into infinite; but as there is a first means from whence the motion begins; so there must be a last end, in which it ter­minates. In Ends there is a twofold order, (1) of Intention, [Page 10](2) of Execution: and in both orders there must be a first and a last. That which is first in the order of Intention is as it were the Principe, which moves the appetite, and gives bounds to it; and therefore can be no other than the last End: that which is first in the order of Execution, is the first means conducing to the last End. So that a progresse into infinite is on neither part possible: if there were not a last end, nothing could be desired, no action of the appetite could be terminated, neither would the intention of the Agent ever cease: if there were not a first means, from whence the execution should begin, no Agent could begin to worke, &c.

2. Prop. The last End of althings must be as extensive and ample, as the first Principe or Cause. Thus Plato, de Leg. 4 p. 715. [...], God, (as the old Tradition testifies) having in himself the Principe, and End, and Medium of althings. In which he plain­ly indigitates, That God is the first Cause and last End of al­things. That the last End is as large as the first Principe is evi­dent, because the order of Ends must correspond and answer to the order of Agents: as they who are under God, ought not morally, neither can they physically move, but as dependent on the motion and concurse of God, the first Cause; so neither ought they to desire any thing under God, but what may con­duce to God as their last End. Such as the Universalitie of the first Cause is in giving Being or Welbeing; such is the Univer­salitie of the last End in requiring and calling for the emprove­ment of al. Neither doth man pay the homage due to his first Cause, farther than his regresse thereto answers his progresse therefrom. God as the first Principe gives Being, and as the last End terminates and sixeth the Being conferred. Wherefore the Creature that dependeth on God as the first Cause, must tend to him as his last End.

3. Prop. The last End of althings can be but one. This Hypo­thesis both Plato and Aristotle concord in. And the reason is most apparent; because althings desire their utmost perfection, which consistes in their tendence to the most perfect Being. Now the most perfect Being can be but one: For if there should be more than one most perfect, then the one would have some­what which the other hath not; and so neither would be most perfect. Every good by the addition of some other good is [Page 11]made better and more perfect, except the most simple and perfect Good, by the participation whereof al other goods are made bet­ter. Hence

4. Prop. Every man, in every human Act, virtually, if not actu­ally, intends some last End. This is manifest; because in every hu­man Act something is desired for it self, which cannot be referred to any other thing: and what is this but some last end? Again, man naturally desireth the complement of al good: and albeit there may not be an actual elicite intention in every man as to his last end, yet there is a natural propension thereto; whence procede al Acts about particular goods.

5. Prop. The last End is desired infinitely, without end or termes. Thence Aristotle, (following Plato herein) in his Magn. Moral. lib. 1. cap. 1. defines the last End thus: [...], The perfect End is that, which being obtained, we neither desire nor need any thing beyond it. So the Stoics, who were akin to the Platonists, define the last End, [...], That for the sake of which al offices are performed, but it for nothing else. So that the last End gives termes and bounds to althings, but admits no termes or measure. As to take away the first Cause of our Being, supposeth us not to be; so to take away the last End, supposeth a confused infinitie as to acting. Therefore something must be simply desirable for it self and for no other: For that which a man desireth in order to a further end, the same he desireth in such a measure as is most conducible to that end: but what he desireth for it self, towards that his desire is infinite: for the better it is, the more desirable: therefore if infinitely good infinitely desirable, without termes or bounds. The only measure of loving our last End is to love it without measure: for the last End being the terme of the appetite, it may not re­ceive termes or limits from any other thing; but by how much the more it is loved, by so much the better is the love. In al­things appetible the last End gives measure but receives none; because the proper reason of althings we desire is taken from the End. Hence

6. Prop. The last End is the terme and measure of althings. What Principes are in Demonstration, the same is the last End in Acti­on: for al means receive their Necessitie, Goodnesse, and Speci­fication from the last End. Whatever is ordained to an end [Page 12]ought to be proportioned thereto, and so measured thereby. The last End has the same influence on the means, as the Aristotelean Forme is said to have on the mater: They say the forme gives the main of Essence, Distinction, Virtue, Operation, and Perfection to the bodie; and doth not the End give the same to the means? How little desirable are the means, as means, without their re­ference to the End? Is not the distinction and perfection of al­things, morally considered, taken from their End? This is wel expressed by Plato, Phileb. pag. 25. [...], Al these things must be referred to the one infinite, i.e. the last End. So again, de Leg. 4. pag. 716. [...], But truly God is to us the chief measure of althings, i.e. God, as our last End, is the measure both of essence, facultie, and operation: al the multitude of means ought to be reduced to and governed by the Unitie of our last End: which is the true meaning of that moral Axiome, Al mul­titude ought to be governed by Ʋnitie. Thus also Aristotle, Eth. l. 3. c. 10. [...], Everything is defined or bounded by its End. Hence the End is stiled the Terme, which confines and fixeth the fluxe of things, which without it are ful of confusion and indetermination. And therefore by how much the more the Soul departs from God, its last End, by so much the more insta­ble, confused, and vagrant it is. Hence

7. Prop. God is the last End of althings. This Hypothesis re­sultes out of the former, and is in it self most evident: for every thing is so far only an end as it is good: wherefore the last end must of necessitie be the chiefest good: and what is this but God? Is not God the prime Cause of al goodnesse in every good? And is he not thence the Cause of every End? Must he not then of necessitie be the last End of althings? For that for which every thing is such, must needs be more such. Again, is not God the supreme and first in order of Causes, and therefore the last in or­der of Ends? Thence Plato, Gorg pag. 499. [...], Althings seemed to us to be undertaken for good. Art thou of the same opinion with us, that the end of al actions is good, and that althings else are undertaken for its sake; but the end it self is not undertaken for any thing else? Wherein he proves, (1) That every end is good, and the last end the chiefest [Page 13]good. (2) That althings else are undertaken for the last end, but it for nothing else. Whereby it's evident, that God is the last end of althings; because the chiefest good, for which althings else are desired. Thence Proclus, that great Platonist, Theolog. Plat. lib. 2. cap. 4. cals God [...], The End of Ends, who convertes al Ends to himself, and subsistes in or about himself. Hence

8. Prop. The ultimate formal Reason or proper Motive of loving things is, not their own goodnesse, but the Divine Bonitie. For the end having the reason of good, and the last end of the chiefest good, hence althings are so far desirable as they refer to the last end and chiefest good, which is God. The end as compared with its means has the same regard, that the formal reason has to its object: now is not the object specified by its formal reason? and must not the means also be specified, determined, and ordered by their last end, which is God? Althings are so far good as they come from and tend to the Divine goodnesse; which is the first effective Principe, Exemplar, and final Cause of al good. So Plato, Repub. 2. pag. 357. tels us, That the chiefest good, which makes al­things else good, is, [...], that which is desired for it self: yea, [...], Goodnesse it self and Being it self. Whence it necessarily follows, that nothing can be the ul­timate formal reason of love or desire, but the Divine Bonitie. For the necessitie and goodnesse of al means is taken from their last end, which is the first Mover in the order of Ends, as the first Cause is in order of Efficients. Hence

9. Prop. Assimilation to the Divine Bonitie is the last End of al­things, specially human operations. For so far as any thing partici­pates of the Divine Bonitie, so far it is made like unto the same: if therefore althings tend to God as their last end, that so they might participate of his Divine Bonitie, it necessarily follows, that the last end of althings is Assimilation to God. What are al Creatures but Imitamens of the Divine Bonitie? And is not every thing so far participant of the Divine Bonitie, as it is assi­milated thereto? Do not althings then in their motions tend to the divine similitude, as to their last end? It's true, the tendence of inanimate Creatures and Brutes, yea of al Minkind in their natural state is only passive and remote: they are reduced to their last end the Divine Bonitie, but they have no active power of adhering thereto. Hence al lower Creatures, yea man himself in [Page 14]his apostate state, have only some vestigia or dark shadows of the Divine Bonitie; the bright image thereof being peculiar to pious Souls, and good Angels. That [...], Assimila­tion to God is the last end of human Nature, Plato frequently in­culcates. Thence saith he, [...], The end of good men is to be assimilated to God. So in his Theatet. pag. 176. he makes Assimilation to God the end of his Philoso­phie; which he elsewhere makes to be Contemplation, Love, and Imitation of God. Hence

10. Prop. Adherence to God as our last End importes not only sub­jection and dependence, but also the best Constitution, Complexion, and Perfection of a rational Creature. For by how much the higher the end is, by so much the more noble and perfect is the act: as the intention regulates and qualifies the Action; so the end re­gulates and qualifies the intention. Now Assimilation to the Divine Bonitie being the ultimate end of the rational Creature, it necessarily follows, that Adherence to this Divine Bonitie be his supreme perfection. The Divine Bonitie, saith Proclus, Theo­log. Platon. l. 1. c. 21. is conscrvative of althings, constitutive and fundative of althings, impletive of althings, and conversive of althings to it self. Such as the last end is, such is the wils motion: that is the best election, which doth most actually intend God as its last end. The nearer the Soul approcheth to God, the more perfect it is: the last end attractes the appetite to it self: for to tend to an end is to be drawen by that end: and by how much the more strongly the Soul is drawen by God as its last end, by so much the more intimately it adheres to him. The motion of the Soul towards its last end is much stronger than that to­wards the means; and therefore the adherence is the greater. What more natural than for a rational Creature to adhere to its last end? And O, what perfection ariseth hence! To be draw­en by God as our last end, is to be drawen by our most noble, perfect, and best self; and therefore this speaks not only Subje­ction, but blessed Constitution and Perfection.

§. 3. Having summed up Plato's Philosophemes of the last End,The chiefest Good, its Pro­prieties. we now procede to his Contemplations of the chiefest Good; which hath intimate connexion therewith. His main Discour­ses of the chiefest Good he layes down in his Philebus, his Convivium, 1. It is the Idea of Good. and de Repub. l. 26. c. 9. we shal reduce the whole to these following proprieties. 1. Plato stiles the chiefest Good [...], [Page 15] the Idea of al good. So in his Philebus, having proposed this Question, Wherein the chiefest Good consistes? he resolves it into the Idea of Good. Which he elsewhere stiles [...], the Good, meaning the chiefest. He termes the chiefest good, the Idea of al good, (1) because it is [...], a self-sufficient Good, yea Goodnesse it self, in the abstract: i. e. al Good, pure Good, Good by himself, and so [...], perfectly Good. The chiefest Good is Good by his own Goodnesse, and not by any par­ticipated Goodnesse. Whence some of the Platonists stile him [...], superessential Goodnesse. Where ever is the chiefest Good, there is the Essence of Good: Goodnesse in the abstract, and the chiefest Good are convertible: you cannot find the one, but you'l find the other also. Whatever good is predicable of any Creature is in the chiefest Good in the abstract: and al know, that Abstracts speak Formes and Essences. So that the chiefest Good must needs be essential Goodnesse in the abstract, and thence by consequence al Good in Idea. Thus Basil, in Psal. 1. [...], The self-good [or Ideal good] is really blessed, unto which al look, and which al desire, as the measure of al good. (2) Plato stiles the chiefest Good the Idea of Good; because he is both the prime Efficient and Exemplar of al Good. [1] He is the prime Efficient of al good. As al Creatures flow from and reflow to God, as the Ocean or plenitude of al Being; so also their Goodnesse participates of the like fluxe from, and refluxe to the Divine Goodnesse. No Creature hath any good in it, further than it partakes of the chiefest Good: whatever you possesse, if you want the chiefest Good, you possesse nothing. Hence, (2) the chiefest Good is the measure of al Good. Every thing is so far good to us, as it corresponds with and refers to the chiefest Good. So Plato, Repub. 2. pag. 357. [...], We love the chiefest Good for its own sake, as also althings else that flow from it: meaning the chiefest Good is the only measure of our love. So Arist. Rhet. l. 1. c. 7. makes that the chiefest Good, which is chosen for it self, and thence the measure of al good.

2. The chiefest Good, according to Plato, is [...],2. The chiefest Good the first Beautie. Beautie it self: or [...], the first Beautie. So in his Conviv. pag. 210. Whosoever is brought thus far, to contemplate things beautiful rightly and in their order, arriving to the end of things [Page 16]lovely, [...], he shal imme­diately contemplate that wonderful native Beautie, for the sake of which we have hitherto undertaken al our labors. Wherein he teacheth us, that we may not fixe our eyes only on these inferior Beauties, but by them, as by so many ascents, mount up to the contempla­tion of the first supreme Beautie, which is our chiefest good. That the prime Beautie is the chiefest good wil be most evident, if we look into the nature of Beautie as opened by Plato, who makes al Beautie to consiste, (1) in Symmetrie and Proportion. So in his Timaeus, pag. 87. [...], Every Good is beautiful: and what is beautiful cannot want measure, order or proportion. Aquinas makes this difference between Boni­tie and Beautie, that Bonitie or Goodnesse properly regards the Wil, but Beautie the Eye and Understanding: thence beautiful colors arise from that varietie and convenance, which is in them to please the eye. That Symmetrie is essential to Beautie, Timaeus tels us, p. 103. [...], &c. The Principes of Beau­tie are Symmetrie or proportion of parts, &c. Thence Plato, Leg. 3. makes Wisdome to be most beautiful: because [...], the chiefest of Symphonies, or Harmonies. So Conviv. pag. 205. [...], Wisdome is the greatest of Beauties. Now Plato, Conviv. pag. 211. saith, The chiefest Good is, [...], of it self, with it self, the most uniforme and simple Being; and therefore most beautiful. Again, is Wisdome most beau­tiful, because most concordant with it self? And is not God the chiefest Good also the most uniforme Wisdome? The propor­tion required to Beautie is wel expressed by Sales, de l'Amour de Dieu, l. 1. c. 1. Union, saith he, establisht in distinction makes order: order breeds convenance, agreament, and proportion: and convenance in things entire and accomplisht makes Beautie. An Armie is beautiful, when it is composed of al its parts, so ranked together in their order, that their distinction is reduced to that agreament, which they ought to have together. To make Music beautiful, there is required not only that the voices be clear and wel distinguished, but also that they be conjoined in such sort one to t'other, that they make one just consonance and harmonie, by means of the union that is in the distinction, and the distinction that is in the union of the voices, which may deservedly be called a discordant Accord, or rather an accordant Discord. Hence (2) Al Beautie ariseth from Perfection and Integritie of parts. Those [Page 17]things are most beautiful in their kind, which are most perfect: And is not the chiefest Good most absolutely and simply perfect? (3) The last and main Cause of Beautie is Splendor, Light and Claritie. Thence Beautie is defined by Plato the Fulgor and Lustre of Good. Splendor and Brightnesse is essential to Beautie, to the end that it may be visible or intelligible. Obscurities, Shadows, and Darknesses are deformed, and render althings deformable; because nothing in them is visible or intelligible: neither order, nor distinction, nor union, nor convenance. So Job 10.22. in the description of the grave, he saith, It is a land of darknesse, as darknesse it self, and of the shadow of death, without any order, and where the light is as darknesse: i.e. There is no light, therefore no order and beautie. Light gives life to brightnesse; which is but a dead inutile thing, if splendor and beautie give not life and effi­cace to it, as we see in lively colors. So in man, his beautie is not accomplisht without a good grace and lustre, which is the life of beautie. Thus in the soverain Beautie of God, the Splendor and Brightnesse of his Perfections renders him most beautiful. Whence Beautie and Glorie, both in profane and sacred Philosophie, have one and the same Idea: for what is beautie, but the effulgence, or shine of al perfections in any object? And if this fulgor or splen­dor be illustrious and most bright, it's termed Glorie. So the beautie of the Sun, what is it but the gloriose effulgence or brightnesse of its light? Whence it being a grand Question a­mong the Ancients, What in Nature was most beautiful? it was answered, Light. Hence beautie is defined by the Orator, A due congruence, with a certain suavitie of color. This suavitie of color is nothing else, but the light or splendor of that perfection or goodnesse which is in the subject. Whence Aquinas defines Beautie, A certain bland face of Bonitie or Goodnesse. And do not al these notions of beautie greatly illustrate the surpassing heart-ravishing Beautie of God the chiefest Good? What more glo­riose, resplendent and effulgent than the chiefest Good? Where may we expect more gloriose light and beautie, than with the Fountain of Light, in whose light alone we behold light? Has not the chiefest Good the most sweet color and bland face of goodnesse? Yea Plato, Repub. lib. 6. pag. 509. discriminating [...] those things which are good by participation only, from [...], the chiefest Good; he addes, That this has [...], a certain infinite immense Beautie. So Conviv. pag. 211. he assures [Page 18]us, That althings else are beautiful, [...], &c. by participation and in some certain mode only; but the first Beautie is, [...], &c. most sincere, pure, immixed; not contaminated with human colors, or other trifles. And then he breaks forth into this rapture of Admiration: O what a blessed sight would it be, to contemplate this divine, sincere, incontaminate, simple, uniforme Beautie! Yea, he positively affirmes, That God, who is the chiefest Good, has [...], the most illustri­ous and amiable Beautie. Thus the spurious Dionysius, de Nom. Divin. cap. 4. saith, ‘That God, as the soverain Beautie, is the Author of the soverain Convenance, beautiful Grace and lustre, which is in althings, making the distributions and departments of his rayes, by which althings are made beautifully to shine forth.’ God intending to render althings beautiful and good, hath reduced their multitude and distinction to a perfect unitie, i. e. to subserve the enjoyment of himself as the first Beautie.

3. Plato makes the chiefest Good to be [...],The chiefest Good most proper, &c. most proper. So Repub. 9. pag. 586. [...], That which is best for every one, that is most proper. Thus Conviv. pag. 205. [...], The chiefest Good is most proper to every one, and yet commun to al: Proprietie with Communitie is proper only to the chiefest Good. There are several other proprieties of the chiefest Good mentioned by Plato, namely that it is the most pleasant, solid, substantial, vital, uniforme, agreable, infinite, eternal, necessary, divine Good: which by his own concession are applicable to none but God. Of which hereafter more in Aristotle's Philo­sophie, B. 4. c. 1. §. 22.

§. 4. Next to the last End,Of Ʋse and its Regulation. and chiefest Good follows Ʋse and Fruition; the former belonging to the Means, the later to End. Ʋse properly consistes in the subordination and reference of althings to our last end, which alone is the object of Fruition. The whole life of man is distributed into Ʋse and Fruition. Ʋse is a tendence or referring thing to our end. This by Plato is oft expressed under the notion of Temperance, which he makes to be the moderate use and reference of althings to our last end. So in his Gorgias, pag. 507. he begins thus: [...], The temperate Soul is good. Thence he collects, That the intemperate Soul is [...], mad and dissolute. Whence he addes: [...], The temperate man wil do that which has a decorum both towards God and men. And he gives the reason of it: [...], [Page 19] For it is not the part of a temperate man to prosecute or flie from what he ought not; but to flie from and pro­secute both things, persons, and pleasures as need requires; as also pa­tiently to tolerate the same. Thence he concludes: [...], &c. This seems to me to be the primarie and chief end of a regular life, that Justice and Temperance be always present. In which we have these observables. (1) That the temperate Soul is the best, and the intemperate the worst. (2) That Tem­perance formally consistes in giving al persons and things their just decorum, and measure. (3) That we then give althings their just measure, when we prosecute, or flie from them, in that man­ner and measure as we ought. (4) That we then prosecute and flie from things as we ought, when we use, or use them not in sub­servience to our last end, which is the measure of althings. This is wel expressed by Aristotle, (who followed Plato herein) Eth. l. 3. c. 15. [...], Wherefore in a temperate man the concupiscent part ought to conforme to reason: for moral good is the end of both. Thence a tempe­rate man desires what he ought, and in that manner as he ought, and when he ought: which is the Constitution, Law, and Order of Reason. Whereby he fully confirmes Plato's sentiment, that Temperance gives althings their just number, weight, and measure, by reducing al to such an Order, as may render them subordinate to the last end. The Stoic expresseth this Temperance in the use of things by [...], sustain what is grievous, and abstain from what is delicious. Which is thus expounded: The temperate man, [...], su­stains without grief the absence of pleasures, and abstains from the frui­tion of them when present. This some make to be a great degree of fortitude: for the valiant man [...], bears things terrible, and forbears things audacious. The sum of al is, that the temperate man is not inordinately afflicted for the losse, or excessively affected with the presence of any infe­rior good, but useth althings in measure and subservience to his last end.

This Temperance in the use of things Plato also illustrates by the notions of Order and universal Justice. So Gorg. pag. 506. The [Page 20]virtate of every thing is its order: [...], That therefore which is constituted and conformed by order, is the virtue of every thing. Wherefore the Soul that keeps its order is better than that which wants it. And what is it, in Plato's sense, for a Soul to keep its order, but to use althings, servato ordine finis, in subordination to its end? This is wel illustrated by Janse­nius, August. Tom. 2. l. 2. c. 19. where he proves out of Augustine, That virtue is nothing else but the order of Love. For by Love, as a Divine Pondus, the Soul reduceth althings to its last end, namely God. This is incomparably wel expressed by Plato, in his Phile­bus, pag. 24, 25. Whatsoever things seem to have excesse or defect, more or lesse, [...], al those ought to be referred to the infinite Being, as the only measure. This he more openly expresseth, Leg. 4. pag. 716. [...], &c. God is to us the measure of althings, unto which scope and mark al our actions, as so many arrows, ought to tend. So Repub. 1. pag. 331. [...], I count the possession of things of great use, yet not for every man, but he who is moderate and temperate, i. e. who refers al to his last end. Thence he addes: [...], That riches are most useful for a wise man, who can and wil use al in subordination to his last end. Whence a thing utile, Definit. Plat. p. 414. is thus described: [...]. Again, [...], A thing utile, is that which renders us capable of suffering wel, or doing good, in order to our last end. So also [...], conducible is defined, [...], that which conduceth to good, namely our last end. These and such like are Plato's Philosophemes about Ʋse, which may be al reduced to these following Propositions.

1. The Ʋtilitie of any created good consistes not in its own goodnesse, but in its reference to our last end. Herein consistes the good of every inferior good, when it subserves and tends to our chiefest good. The good and evil of althings is to be judged by their relation to, or distance from the last end. Things are so far good as they enable us to do good by serving God. Al that we have, or can do is of God, and therefore ought to be for God. Nothing is to be loved or enjoyed for it self, but the chiefest good. Thus Aristotle, Eth. l. 4. c. 1. [...], [Page 21] Those things that come under Ʋse, we may use either wel or il. Thus Riches are reckoned among utile goods. Now he that is endowed with virtue for the use of any thing, doth use that thing in the best manner. Therefore he useth riches best, which hath attained to that virtue, which belongs to the use thereof. Thus riches and al other lower goods must be referred to God. Hence

2. To use any thing, is to refer it to some other thing superior in our estime. Herein consistes the formal difference between Use and Fruition: Things are enjoyed for themselves their own goodnesse; but they are used in order to something else. We do not pro­perly enjoy, but use the means, neither use but enjoy our last end. Hence it follows (1) That al Use of God as a means for the ob­tainment of some other end is inordinate. (2) That al Use of the Creature, which is not referred to God, is also sinful. This perversitie and inordination is found in every sin, whiles men en­joy what they ought to use, and use what they ought to enjoy. This Augustine makes to be the perversion of al order, fruendis uti velle, at (que) utendis frui: When men enjoy the means and use the last end. But of this more, Prop. 4.

3. Things are then used orderly when they subserve and are subor­dinate to our last end. Herein chiefly consistes the order of Love, when it resolves al lower goods and actions into the chiefest Good. Al lower goods are to be desired not for enjoyment, but use; and when we have them, we must use them wel. This is wel explicated by Simplicius, in Epictet. cap. 1. pag. 2. where he tels us, This is the Spirit of Philosophie, [...], to keep the force of the mind free from the bodie and brutish affe­ctions, and to refer the use of al to the chiefest Good. Wherefore it doth allow the moderate use and fruit of externe things, which are esti­med as good, so far as they agree with the true or best good: but yet so far as they differ therefrom, [i. e. subserve not the chiefest Good] she commands, that they be rejected. A Philosopheme worthy of a Christian mind. This is the import of that Divine Admonition, 1 Cor. 7.31. And they that use this world as not abusing it: 1 Cor. 7.31. [...], as not overusing it. When ever we overuse any lower good, we abuse it, i. e. turne it off from its proper use. Man has [Page 22]a great libertie to use althings indifferent indifferently, yet so as al must conduce to his last end. And indeed we are no further master of any thing, or free in the use of it, than it is brought into subservience unto God. Hence,

4.Concupiscence. To use or enjoy any inferior good for it self is to abuse it. This lower Universe and each part thereof was not made for mans Fruition, but Ʋse. It's true, Brutes have libertie to enjoy the good things of senses; because they are not capable of any higher good: but mans libertie lies in the using these inferior goods for an higher end, the enjoyment of God: and when he perverts this order, he fals under miserable cursed bondage. Thus Plato, Gorg. pag. 507. having laid down this Hypothesis, That Temperance consistes in the regular use of althings, he concludes: [...], And thus he must act, lest giving the rains to lusts, and suffering them to wander where they list, whiles he thinkes to satisfie them, he fal into an infinite evil, and live a robbers life. Whereby he means, that when mens lusts grow irregular in the use of things, they soon prove infinite and insatiable. This inordinate love to the Creature for it self is usually stiled Concupiscence and Lust: which is nothing else but a brutish desire after, and fruition of the Creature for it self, without reference to God, the chiefest Good. This tyrannic Concupiscence Plato accurately philoso­phiseth on, Repub. 9. pag. 574. where he describes it, as the greatest Tyrant in the world: Of which see Philos. Gen. P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect. 5. §. 2. This perversion of the order of Love, and abuse of inferior goods Augustine sadly complains of, in that men hereby use what they should enjoy, and enjoy what they should use, i. e. they use God and what belongs to him as means to promote their inferior goods, the object of their fruition; and that against the order of true Charitie, yea of human Nature, which requires, that we should use al lower goods in subordination to God the chiefest Good. Creatures, when they are used in subservience to God their last End, they are then in their proper place and amiable; but when they are made the object of Fruition, they are then in the place of God, and so most abominable. Jansenius, August. Tom. 2. de Nat. laps. l. 2. c. 19. pag. 156. gives this reason à priori, why it is unlawful to love or enjoy any Creature for it self; be­cause it is against that natural order, which is established by the eternal Law. For such is the natural condition of a rational [Page 23]Creature, that, according to the order of Nature, he is placed beneath God, coordinate with intellectual Creatures, but above corporeous Creatures. Wherefore seing God alone is superior to the rational Creature, he ought, according to the Law of Na­ture, by the Pondus of Love to subject himself to God only: which so long as he continues to do, he remains just and virtuose, and most ordinate in his kind; sithat virtue is the best state of a rational Creature; or, according to Augustine, nothing else but the order of Love: and by Love, as by a weight, the Soul is kept in this middle state, under God the most supreme Being, and above inferior Creatures. This therefore is the bitter root of al inordinate motion, when the Soul doth by its love, as a terrene Pondus, move inordinately towards the Creatures, so as to be­come subject to them. Yea, doth not this perverting the order of Love bring the whole Creation under bondage, as Rom. 8.21,Rom. 8.21, 22.22? Wherein consistes the present bondage of the Creatures, but in this, that they are perverted and turned aside from that Order for which they were made, namely from the serving their Creator, to feed the lusts of men? The Creatures are not put to that use for which they were made by God, and this makes them groan to be delivered, &c. Herein consistes the Libertie of al Creatures, and our Libertie in the use of them, that we are thereby made more free in the service and fruition of God; by subjecting our selves and al inferior goods to God, for the ser­ving and enjoyment of him, we gain dominion over our selves and althings else. But if the heart be inordinate in adhering to or use of the most lawful comforts, we immediately fal under bondage to them. The way to have the Spirit free in the use of any created good, is not to use or enjoy it too much, by letting the Spirit to run too far into it, or loving it for it self: for thereby we become slaves it.

5. The more actually the Soul intends God as its last End, Intention. in the use of inferior things, the more perfect is the use of them. It's a great Saying, The most actual Intention is best: Intention is the most eminent act of Love: and the most perfect intention is that which most eyes God in the use of althings. To intend any thing, as Suarez wel observes, is to tend towards it by al manner of ve­hement desires, and important endeavors. Indeed intention dif­fers not from efficacious desire of the end, together with the means conducing thereto: whereby it is differenced from Vellei­tie; [Page 24]which is only a conditionate, saint, imperfect volition of an end, without regard to the means. The more strongly and actu­ally we intend our end, the sooner shal we arrive thereto in the use of means:Mat. 6.22. a single strait intention keeps the Agent strait in its way to its end. Thus Mat. 6.22. If therefore thine eye, i.e. the intention of thy wil, be single, i.e. if it hath a single end, namely God. Jansenius, out of Augustine, Tom. 2. l. 2. c. 20. pag. 162. informes us, that althings are to be referred to God, not only by habitual Intention, as the Scholes determine, but also by an inten­tion virtually actual. And he thus demonstrates it: because the mind, when it acts, must requiesce in the love, not of the Crea­ture, but of God. For this is most certain, according to Augu­stine, that an habitual Intention only without actual or virtual wil not suffice; because the just, when asleep, have habitual intention, yet they cannot then be said to refer their actions to God. Where­fore there is always necessary an actual, or at least virtual intention of referring althings to God. A virtual intention in human acts hath the same force as actual intention: for it acts in virtue and force received from some former actual intention. As when a man in a journey is carried on towards his end by a virtual inten­tion, influenced by some former actual intention. A right inten­tion is the deliberation of a bended wil towards God as the last end: for where the intention is right, God is the predominant end. The end of an action discovers its kind: and the inten­tion discovers the end: For intention properly belongs to the Wil, whose office it is to refer al to the last end. The intention is the guard of the thoughts and desires, that which girds up the mind, and keeps it fixed on its last end, in the use of al means. He that doth not intend and eye God in his worldly concernes, wil not intend him in his best duties and services. To have the intention of the Wil actually directed towards God in al inferior goods is the Spirit of right Use. And herein indeed consistes much of the Souls libertie as to means, to intend God in al. It's a good Notion of Aquinas, That the Soul, by intending temporals in order to God, is elevated and advanced; otherwise it is depressed and brought down, namely when it intends any temporal thing for it self. Thus also Jansenius, in his August. Tom. 2. l. 1. c. 6. pag. 40. where he gives this difference between Ʋse and Fruition: ‘What­ever is loved as an end, which a man desires to enjoy and to be blessed therein, that rules over the Lover: for this is the diffe­rence [Page 25]between Use and Fruition, that the Wil depresseth it self under what it enjoys, but it elevates it self above what it useth: so that it is a Servant of that which it enjoys, but Lord over what it makes use of.’ This inferior visible World what is it but a Map of things invisible? And ought we not then firmely to in­tend God in al these lower things? And is not this the most per­fect use, when the Soul doth spiritually and actually contemplate, intend, and adhere to God in al these lower goods of time? As Intention directs the Wil, so Faith directs the Intention in the use and prosecution of al means: it is the Intention that regulates the qualitie of the action in the use of things; and it is divine Faith and Love that regulate the Intention. This is wel explica­ted and demonstrated by Greg. Ariminensis, 2. Sent. Dist. 38. Quaest. 1. Art. 1. where he proves, That according to the bonitie or pra­vitie of the Intention of the Worker, we are to measure the bonitie or pravitie of the worke. Which he demonstrates by these Conclusi­ons: (1) That Intention only is right or morally good, whereby that is intended or loved for it self, which ought to be loved for it self. (2) Every Intention of a Worker, whereby any thing besides God is intended for it self, that Intention is evil. And the reason is invincible, be­cause every rational Creature ought to refer al his acts to God as his last end. Hence, according to the bonitie or pravitie of the Intention, we may take a measure of the bonitie or pravitie of Use: Every Intention of the Agent, wherein any thing but God is intended as the last end, is a depraved Intention: because no­thing is to be intended for it self but the last end. Whence it follows, that no Intention is right or morally good, but that whereby we intend or love for it self, that which ought to be intended or loved for it self, namely the last end and chiefest good, using and referring althings else, as means subordinate thereto, as it is acutely demonstrated by Ariminensis, in 2. Sent. Dist. 38. Quaest. 1. Art. 1.

§. 5. Having explicated the nature of Ʋse, Fruition. we may with more facilitie and expedition examine what Fruition imports. As to use a thing, is to intend, elect, and imploy it for the acquirement of some other thing; so to enjoy a thing, is by love to adhere unto it for it self, without reference to any other thing. Thus Jansenius, Aug. Tom. 2. l. 1. c. 6. gives us this difference between Ʋse and Fruition. He that useth a thing has dominion over it, to refer it to this or that end; but he that enjoys any thing doth bring down his Soul [Page 26]by love unto a subjection thereto, and is in that regard inferior to it, though superior to whatever he doth use. This Ariminensis, in Sent. Part. 1. Dist. 1. Quaest. 1, 2, 3. has acutely determined: where he gives us the nature of Fruition, and its difference from Ʋse in these Conclusions. (1) No Nolition is Fruition: because every Nil is the slight of the wil, and that which is ordained for some other. (2) Every Volition is either Ʋse or Fruition: because every thing is willed either for it self or some other. (3) No Ʋse is Fruition: because no one that wils a thing for another, can be said to wil that thing as his last end: because the volition of the last end is the cause of the volition of that which refers to that end: but nothing can be the cause of it self: Ergo. (4) Frui­tion and Ʋse may consist together in the Wil, as to different objects. (5) The Wil ought not to Ʋse God: i. e. as a means conducible to some other end. (6) A Love of Fruition must terminate no where but on God. (7) To love any thing for God, is nothing else than to love it, because God is loved: i. e. to love it as conducible to God. In Fruition there are four considerables, (1) Love. (2) Possession of and Ʋnion with the Object beloved. (3) Communion. (4) Dele­ctation and joy. Of these in their order.

1. Al Fruition imports Love. For no man can enjoy what he doth not love: al Love tends to Union, specially with its last end: Yea, according to the Scholes, there is a mutual Inhesion between the Lover and Beloved. The Lover lives in the Belo­ved, and the Beloved in the Lover: which is most true in regard of that Love of Fruition, whereby the Soul enjoys God: for God lives in the Soul that loves him, and the Soul lives in God, who is essential Love. This Love of Fruition is wel expressed by Plato, Repub. 6. pag. 485. [...], But in that man, whose affections are greatly ravished with one object, they are infirme and remisse towards other things, as rivers, derived elsewhere. His mind is, that Love of Fruition is properly towards one object, namely the last end. But more ex­pressely, in his Phaedo, he saith: [...], He that is wise desires always to be with and enjoy that which is better or his best good: i. e. Union and Frui­tion is the main thing his Love aims at. Every one is strongly carried forth by Love towards his last end: yea those very acts of love and desire are fruition in part. Thence Arist. Rhet. lib. 2. [Page 27] cap. 18. [...], Because al are wont to be conversant about what they love. This intime con­nexion between Love and Fruition is excellently wel explicated by Jansenius, August. Tom. 2. l. 1. c. 6. pag. 40. Love of Fruition ordains and disposeth the Love towards its Beloved: whom it re­gards as its first Principe or Cause, and its last end, in the fruition of which it expects perfect felicitie. For what is Fruition but this, to adhere to and acquiesce in another as its first principe and last end? But now every thing that is ordained to another, is in that respect necessarily inferior to that other. Whence Love of Fruition keeps the Soul in subjection to God its last end, but gives it dominion over every inferior good. This Jansenius more fully explicates, Tom. 2. l. 2. c. 16. pag. 149. Many, saith he, thinke they love not such things, to which they are indeed intimately and strongly united: but this is with facilitie detected by Fruition: for Love cannot be wel understood without Fruition, nor yet Fruition without Love; because Love is the beginning of Fruition, and Fruition the end of Love. No man enjoys but what he loves; and no man loves any thing as his last end, but what he would enjoy: whence, as there is no Fruition but what is sweetened with Love, so there is no Love but what tends to Fruition. Therefore Love, according to Augustine, is nothing else but the Wil, by its Pondus, tending to Fruition. What is Love, but a secret Fountain streaming towards Fruition? And what is Fruition, but an Ocean of satisfaction, in which Love is immersed and swallowed up? Is not then Fruition near akin to Love? Thence Augustine, explicating the nature of Fruition, tels us, that to enjoy, is to adhere to a thing for it self: for if it be not adhered to for it self, it is not properly loved or enjoyed, but that other thing, for whose sake it is embraced. But to speak precisely, every kind of Love is not Fruition, but that only which solaceth it self in the embracements of its beloved: which if ab­sent, the wil moves towards it by desires. This is wel expound­ed by Plato, Phaedro, pag. 251. [...], &c. Wherefore every Soul, so long as it is pricked and wounded with desires, it feels grief, and is enraged thereby; and then again it is recreated with the memorie of that first Beautie it once beheld. And thus variously affected, by reason of impatient furie, it cannot sleep, but wanders up and down with desire to see the first Beautie: which when it has once got a glance of, then breaking al [Page 28]bounds of Modesty it solaceth it self in the embraces thereof, &c. By al which it is apparent, (1) That al Fruition of, or love to any Creature for it self is sinful concupiscence. (2) That God alone is to be embraced with a love of Fruition as our last end; because he alone is to be loved for himself. He that loves any thing with God, and not for God, loves him not as he ought.

2.Ʋnion. The next part of Fruition is Possession of and Ʋnion with the Object beloved. Al complete Fruition supposeth Possession and Ʋnion: Frui est termi­nus desiderii. Suar. for if the object be absent, there can be only love of de­sire, not perfect Fruition: because to enjoy a thing is the terme of desire. Plato, in his Timaeus, informes us, that [...], Bea­titude, consistes in nothing else but [...], to have a good Demon dwelling in himself, &c. whereby he understands God. The like also in his Politicus, pag. 309. he shews how the Soul being united to the first Beautie or chief­est Good, it thereby becomes happie. And Thales being asked, What was most sweet? answered, [...], to possesse, meaning the chiefest Good. This possession of the supreme Good, which be­longs to Fruition, is wel expressed by Aristotle, Eth. lib. 4. cap. 4. art. 37. [...], For the virtue of possession and of worke is not the same: For the virtue of possession is that it might be most estimed, pre­cious and dear. Where by Possession he seems to mean Fruition, as by worke, Ʋse. So Aristotle, Rhet. lib. 2. cap. 18. speaking of Rich men, their Fruition of riches as their last end, saith, [...], They receive a great impression from the possession of riches: for they are so affected as if they enjoyed al good: i. e. posses­sing Riches they enjoy them as their chiefest good; and so have their spirits formed by, yea transformed into them: for althings are fashioned and framed into the image and idea of those good things which they possesse and enjoy as their last end: Fruition breeds first imitation of or likenesse unto, and then union with what we enjoy. Neither doth Fruition import possession only, but also union with its last end, i. e. moral and objective union at least, if not physic and real: for without union there can be no Fruition of that good we possesse. Now the union which the Soul has with its chiefest Good is most intimate, firme, and inviola­ble. For the Union of Spirits is far more intimate and firme than that of bodies among themselves, or with Spirits. The [Page 29]senses in extracting pleasures out of sensible good are conversant only about the externe accidents: Moreover the pleasures taken in by the senses come not in altogether, but gradually and by par­cels: therefore the union of object and subject is more remote and partial only: But the Soul, in the Fruition of the chiefest sweetest good, being spiritual, and of the same nature with its object, has a more complete reception thereof, and intimate uni­on therewith: whence the pleasures that attend the same are of al the most spiritual, pure, intense, and permanent, as here­after.

3. Al Fruition importes Communion with our chiefest Good.Communion. Frui, ex vi no­minis est, ca­pere fructum à re. Suar. For to enjoy a thing, according to the origination of the word among the Latines, is to participate of the fruits thereof. And may any participate of the fruits of the chiefest Good, without com­munion therewith? Indeed al union, at least with the supreme Good, is in order to communion; which doth formalise, yea consummate the Souls Beatitude in its most perfect state. It is not the possession of any good can make them happy that have it, unlesse they enjoy what they possesse. This is lively illustrated by Plato in his Phaedo, pag. 80, &c. This Phaedo coming to Socra­tes at the time when he was ready to die, Socrates philosophiseth, even to admiration, on the Souls immortal state after death, and its felicitie in communion with the chiefest Good. His words are these: [...], But the Soul, being a thing invisible, departs to such a place, as is most generous, pure, and invisible, namely to the state of the dead, where it enjoys God the most wise and choicest Good; where, if God wil, my Soul must immediately go. Thence he addes, pag. 81. [...]; Doth not therefore the mind thus qualified go to that divine Being like it self? I say, that divine, immortal, and wise Being? Where when it arrives, doth it not evade altogether happy, being freed from Error, Ignorance, Terrors, wild Loves, and other human Infirmi­ties; and as we say of those who are initiated in Sacreds, spend the rest of its time in communion with God? This he makes to be the state of pure Souls separated; whereas impure polluted Souls [Page 30]passe unto their place of punishment as he in what follows de­monstrates.

This Communion with God Plato, Contemplation. Tim. 90. makes to consiste, [...], in giving the Soul its proper food and motions: which he chiefly placeth, (1) in the Contemplation of God. This he more fully explicates, Conviv. pag. 211. where he makes, The Contemplation of the first Beautie, [...], &c. that divine, sincere, uniforme, simple, pure, incontami­nate, perfect Beautie, to be the most ravishing spectacle; and that which makes us perfectly happie. Acts of Contemplation on God are most tranquille, pleasant, congenial to the Soul, uniforme, self-sufficient, and permanent. Thus Aquinas, 2.2. Quaest. 179. Art. 1. ‘Every thing manifestes its life by that operation which is most proper to it, and whereunto it is chiefly inclined: Now, in as much as Contemplation is the proper act of man whereunto he is most inclined, and wherein he delights most, it follows, that herein the main of his life consistes.’ To contemplate the first cause and last end of althings how delicious and agreable is it! Contemplation binds the mind to its object, and thence in­sensibly transformes it thereinto. Is it not sweet to the eye to contemplate light? And is not the last end the prime light of the Soul? Doth not the contemplation of our last end give us a divine light to improve al other objects we converse with? And are not althings hereby turned into God? Doth not the Con­templation of God, as our choicest Good, enable us to live in God, and to him?

(2) But yet together with Contemplation there must be divine Love and Complacence, Love. which is another part of the Souls com­munion with its last end. Contemplation brings in the chiefest Good into the Soul; but divine Love carries out the Soul to it, by adherence to, and delight in it. The amorous Soul living in God by love, dies in it self. How many artifices doth divine Love use for the enjoyment of its choicest Good? As man lost God by loving the Creature more than God; so by loving God more than the Creature he again finds God, and satisfaction in him. Love to God settles the Soul in one point, out of which it needs not stir to find Felicitie.Dulcius est a­mare quàm a­mari. Sen. A Soul thus inspired with the flames of divine Love has a little Heaven in it. The Stoic thinkes it sweeter to love than to be beloved. Certainly divine Love is most unitive and perfective: it has a violence and pain, which is [Page 31]most sweet and delicious. The Soul by loving its last end posses­seth, enjoys, and lives in it. Have not althings a desire of union and communion with what they love? And the more vehement our love is, if it be of the chiefest good, the sweeter our fruition thereof is. This love gains strength by opposition: it makes the most difficult service sweet. The only limits this victorious divine Love proposeth to it self, is to have no limits. Where ever the Soul turnes it cannot but feel dolors, if it acquiesce not in God; but so far as it adheres to God, it feels no pain. Augu­stine, that great Doctor of Love to God, comprised al Christian Morals in Love; which is the plenitude of the Law and our best Instructor in every Dutie. It is a luminous fire that discovers things most secret, and penetrates things most profound: it is an incomparable Antidote against human corruption. Whence also Augustine termed al Virtue but the order of Love: and its admira­ble efficace is seen in this, that it doth lift the heart above al things create, and yet at the same time depresse it at the lowest centre of self-nothingnesse. Al the labors of this Love are ful of di­vine suavities, and carrie their rewards in them: Afflictions blunt not its edge: cast it into an ocean of miserie, and it swims above al: it estimates its miserie only by the losse, and its Beatitude only by the fruition of its last end. Mediocritie, which in other things is estimed Vertue, is a Vice in Love to God, which admits no excesse. These and such like are the Acts of the Soul in Com­munion with God, as our last end. This Communion with God, the Romans, in their manner and according to their obscure sen­timents, expressed by their Lectisternia, or Beds placed in their Temples, whereon they conceited they feasted and had commu­nion with their Gods: Of which see Lud. Vives in August. Civ. lib. 3. cap. 17.

§. 6. Lastly,Delectation and Joy. Fruition of the choicest Good carries with it satis­fying Pleasures, Suavities, and Delights. No one properly enjoys a thing, who hath not some joy in the Fruition thereof.Frui, est cum gaudio frui. August. The Quietati­on, Delectation, and Satisfaction, which the Soul finds in the enjoy­ment of its last end is greatly illustrated by Plato, in his Philebus, where he treats professedly of this subject. So pag. 15. [...], He that be­ing young having tasted thereof, like one overjoyed, as if he had found a treasure of wisdome, leaping for joy, and as it were under a divine [Page 32]Enthusiasme or rapture, he moves every discourse chearfully and orderly. This Transport of divine Joy is proper to no act but the Fruition of our last end. Thence Phileb. pag. 40. he thus distinguisheth be­tween true and false pleasures: There are in the minds of wicked men [...], painted pleasures, but such as are altogether false. Whence he concludes: [...], Wherefore wicked men for the most part are glutted with false pleasures; but virtuose men with such as are sincere and genuine. Wicked mens pleasures are sucked from some dirtie terrene goods; and therefore only imaginarie and spurious; but the virtuose mans pleasures are formed out of the chiefest good, and therefore genuine and satis­fying. But to philosophise more distinctly of that Delectation, Joy, and Pleasure, which attends the fruition of the chiefest Good, we shal examine and inquire into, (1) The Causes, (2) The pro­per Adjuncts, (3) The Effects thereof; and that according to Pla­to's Philosophemes.

1.1. The Causes of Delectation. Three things are essentially requisite to the constitution of true Delectation and Joy. (1) A sweet Good. (2) Possession of that Good.(1) A sweet Good. (3) Actions consequent to that possession. (1) There must be a sweet Good, out of which al true pleasure is formed: and by how much the more sweet and pleasant the good is, by so much the more perfect is the delight. Satisfying joy is for­med out of nothing but the most amiable best good. This Plato frequently inculcates. Thus Phaedr. pag. 251. treating of the Contemplation of the chiefest Good, he saith: [...], Whom when it shal see, and instil the desire of him into it self, it shal then break al bounds of modestie, and having got libertie of breathing, it shal cease to be exagitated by pricking do­lors. This most sweet pleasure it enjoys in the presence of its sweetest good, so that it can never depart from its embraces, neither doth it value any thing more than its beloved. Such infinite pleasure flows from the presence of the sweetest Good. Perfect Joy cannot forme it self out of any inferior good: it springs only from the best sweetest good, which infuseth its divine suavities into the Soul. What but the first essential, universal, Soul-satisfying good can feed immortal Souls with perfect delights? (2) Another [Page 33]Spring of Delectation is Possession; (2) Possession. which as it is essential to al Fruition, so in a particular manner to Joy that attends the same: for every one is delighted in the obtainment of what he loves: and by how much the sweeter the object beloved is, and the pos­session more intimate, by so much the greater is the delight.Generatio vo­luptatis ex co­pulatione finiti & infiniti. Thence it is a great Philosopheme with Plato, That true Joy issueth from the copulation of finite and infinite, i. e. to speak na­kedly, from the Ʋnion of the Soul with God. This Plato, accord­ing to his allegoric mode, expresseth, Conviv. 206. Al men, saith he, in their manner conceive and are pregnant; and when they have gone their time, Nature desires to bring forth. Thence he con­cludes: [...], Therefore as oft as that which is pregnant adheres to the first Beautie or sweetest Good, it is affected with joy, hilaritie, and pleasure; and brings forth and generates: but on the contrary, when it adheres to what is base and fordid, it is contracted by sorrow and grief; and thence, being not able to bring forth, it is tormented with pains and dolors. By which he describes to the life the different effects which follow on the Souls adhering to God, and to inferior Goods: upon the Souls adherence to God follows the generation of Soul-ra­vishing pleasures; but upon adherence to base worldly good no true pleasure follows, but vexatious dolors and torments. This pleasure, that follows on adherence to, and possession of God, is wel expressed by David, Psal. 25.13.Psal. 25.13. His Soul shal dwel at ease: Heb. loge in goodnesse. When God dwels in the Soul, it then doth loge in goodnesse, or dwel at ease: where there is want, there can be no perfect ease and delight: but when the Soul logeth in divine Goodnesse, it then finds ease and pleasure. Every want wrings and pincheth the Soul: it can never loge with ease, til it loge in the chiefest Good by possessing the same, whereby al its wants are supplied. The Soul, when it sits most uneasie as to inferior goods, so far as it dwels in God, and God dwels in it, so far it finds ease. Properly we never enjoy any thing, til we find rest in it: this the Soul finds so far as it pos­sesseth God. Whence springs delectation and pleasure: Posses­sion gives the obtainment of desires: and desires so far as ob­tained fil with joy proportionable to the desires.

(3) The immediate effective Spring of Delectation and Joy is Motion or Action. (3) Action a cause of Joy. Whence Joy is defined by Cicero, a sweet motion in sense. Yea, things in themselves bitter and irkesome, how sweet are they oft made by exercice! It is generally deter­mined in the Scholes, That operation and motion is the proper cause of Delectation: and is not the operation and motion of the Soul in the fruition of the sweetest good of al the most noble and per­fect? Actings of the Soul on the chiefest good, O what sweet in­spirations of Divine suavities are they attended with! Thus Pla­to, Repub. 9. pag. 582. [...], &c. How great pleasure the contemplation of the first Being brings with it, none but a Philosopher can taste. So in his Phaedrus, pag. 249. speaking of the Contemplation of the first Being, he addes: [...], This is the most ravishing ecstasie and composed of the best things. That al true pleasure ariseth from virtuose exercices about the sweetest good, Aristotle, in imitation of his Master Plato, has wel demonstrated. So Eth. l. 1. c. 9. p. 43. As in the Olympian Games not he that is most beautiful, or most valiant carries away the Crown; but [...], but they that contend for Victorie: So in this human life, they that do good, are made partakers of good things. And then he addes the reason: [...], Their life is indeed sweet and joyous of it self—He is delighted or recreated in just things, who by love embraceth ju­stice— To those that are studiose of virtue, virtuose acts are of them­selves pleasant and delicious: i. e. they carrie in them their own reward, a divine suavitie. And he subjoins the reason: [...], &c. But their life needs not pleasure as an addita­ment or appendix, but has pleasure included in it: For besides what has been spoken, he is not a good man, who is not delighted in good acti­ons. Neither doth any cal him just, who doth not take pleasure in just deeds: or liberal, who is not delighted in liberal acts. So in other Virtues. Whence he concludes: If so then, [...], virtuose acts are of themselves sweet. Whence he collects this general Conclusion: [...], formal Beatitude is the best, fairest, and sweetest thing: i. e. Nothing so sweet as by virtuose acts to adhere to, and enjoy the sweetest and best good. And indeed herein Plato and Aristo­tle accord and agree with sacred Philosophie. For David assures [Page 35]us, that nothing was so sweet to him, as the Contemplation and Fruition of God, by acts of Faith, &c. So Psal. 27.4.Psal. 27.4. One thing have I desired— to behold the beautie of the Lord: Heb. to behold with singular delight. For [...] construed with [...] in signifies, to see with great pleasure and delectation, as v. 13. O! how sweet and deli­cious was it to David to look on the golden Arke, the Symbol of Christs Humanitie, and there by Faith to adore the Deitie! So Psal. 106.5. That I may see the good of thy chosen, Psal. 106.5. that I may rejoice in the gladnesse of thy nation: Heb. to see in good, i. e. to enjoy the good seen with pleasure and satisfaction: for [...] construed with [...] signifies, to enjoy with pleasure. O! how deliciose is the fidu­cial contemplation of the sweetest Good! What is formal Bea­titude, but the immediate, gloriose, perfect Intuition or Vision of the supreme Beautie? And what infinite delectation ensues here­on? What a joyous contemplation is it to behold the Deitie in the Arke of Christs Humanitie? What infusions of Divine sua­vities flow hence? Doth not the Beautie of the first Cause and fairest Good captivate al hearts that behold it? How much spiri­tual delectation is there in one glance on the sweetest Good? How soon is the holy Soul filled with divine suavities, when it can, in any measure, contemplate the Glorie of the prime Beautie. Thus Psal. 104.34. My meditation of him shal be sweet: Psal. 104.34. I wil be glad in the Lord. Yea, would not an appropriating view of the admirable perfections of God, the sweetest Good, turne Hel it self into Heaven? Such are the divine suavities, which attend virtuose acts, in the Fruition of the sweetest Good.

§. 7.2. The Adjuncts of Delectation. We now descend to discourse of and explicate the nature of Delectation in regard of its proper Adjuncts, which are various. (1) Al Delectation and Joy must be real and sincere: (1) It is real. and the more real and sincere it is, the better it is. And doth not this give a great advance to those joys and suavities which attend the fruition of our last end and sweetest good? May any delices be compared with these, in point of sinceritie and realitie? What are al other pleasures in comparison of these, but painted sha­dows, yea mere lies? This is lively illustrated by Plato, Phileb. pag. 40. where he stiles al terrene pleasures, [...], Phantasmes or Imaginations painted in our minds: as when a man conceits he has a vast treasure of gold in his possession, which he has not, yet takes pleasure in such a sick dream. Whence he addes: There are false pleasures in the minds of men, which yet, by mens ri­diculous [Page 36]figments, imitate true pleasures. And then he concludes: [...], Neither do I judge, that we may consider pleasures in any other regard evil, but as they are false. B [...] which he invin­cibly demonstrates, that no pleasures are truly [...]ch, but those that are sincere, real, and substantial; which he makes proper to vir­tuose men, who adhere to the sweetest Good. This real pleasure is elsewhere stiled by him [...], sincere genuine pleasure; which he makes to be peculiar to the fruition of the best Good. This he more openly expresseth, Repub. 9. pag. 580. where he assertes, That a wise or virtuose man only, [...], doth taste of the most genuine and true pleasures. So pag. 583. [...], Neither is there any true pleasure, but that of a wise man. Whereby he, (as Solomon) understands a virtuose man. Thus Plato the Jew, that great Platonist: [...], &c. Because al genuine and sincere joy is found only in the minds of good men; therefore every wise man rejoiceth in himself, and not in things forrein. Thence, saith Seneca, Those things in which the vulgar sort delight themselves, have only a thin superficial pleasure; and sometimes an adventitious joy, which hath no funde or bottome. There is no solid substantial joy, but what slows from, and some way refers to the fruition of the sweetest good: al other pleasures are only opinionative, and grounded on false imagination.

(2) The Delectation that flows from the Fruition of the sweetest Good is most congenial, (2) Congenial Pleasures. and proper to the Soul; and therefore most perfect. Thus Plato, Repub. 9. pag. 585. [...], If therefore to be filled with things consentaneous to nature be sweets then that which is indeed filled with the first Being, and those things that partake most of Being, is more truly affected with true pleasure. His Argument lies thus: Nothing is more delicious to human Nature, than to be filled with such things as are most consenta­neous and agreable to its more noble part the Soul: Now to be filled with the fruition of the first Being and sweetest Good is most proper and agreable to the Soul: therefore this is most de­licious to human Nature. So Plato, Repub. 9. pag. 580. saith, A wise man from the contemplation of God enjoys, [...], [Page 37] pleasures proper to himself, and therefore the best. The perfection of al human pleasures and joys ariseth from their con­naturalitie to the Soul: for this being mans most noble part, yea indeed (according to Platonic as wel as sacred estimation) a mans self, the more congenial our pleasures are hereto, the more per­fect they are: Now the pleasures and suavities, which flow from the fruition of our sweetest good, are of al most connatural and congenial to the Soul. For by how much the more immaterial, spirital, and intellectile our joys are, by so much the more agrea­ble they are to our Spirits: and are any joys more spirital, than those that flow from the fruition of our last end and sweetest good, which is God? Can any thing affect the Soul with higher dele­ctation, than the fruition of the chiefest good, which is so agrea­ble to it, and which she receiveth immediately without the mini­sterie of her externe senses? This is wel expressed by Digby, of the Souls Immortalitie, pag. 459. ‘We are sure that what pleasure a man receiveth, he receiveth by means of his Soul, even al corporeal pleasure: for be the working object never so agrea­ble and pleasing unto him, he reapeth thence smal delight, if his Souls attention be carried in the mean time another way from it. Certainly then those things affect the Soul most pow­erfully, which are connatural to her, and which she seizeth on and relisheth immediately; rather than those impure ones, which come sophisticated to her, through the muddy chanels of the senses. Observe but the different comportment of an am­bitiose and sensual man, and you wil easily perceive this.’ Are not mental pleasures, specially in the contemplation of the first Beautie, most savorie and delicious? Yea, do not these by exer­cice become as it were one with the Soul? Again, are not spiritual pleasures most rational, judicious, discrete, and wise? O! what a world of folie and indiscretion, yea, may I not say, for the most part, brutish passion lies wrapped up in sensual pleasures? Last­ly, these pleasures, which flow from the fruition of the sweetest good, do most elevate, dignifie, and ennoble the Soul; and there­fore are most agreable thereto: whereas sensual pleasures de­grade and bring down the Soul, yea place it below the ranke of Brutes, as Hos. 4.10, 11.

(3) Another proper Adjunct of that Delectation,(3) Ʋniforme Pleasures. which at­tends the Fruition of the sweetest Good, is Ʋniformitie and Har­monie. By how much the more uniforme and concordant plea­sures [Page 38]are, by so much the better they are: what makes Music so sweet and delicious, but its Concent and Harmonie? Hence Plato makes this a character of true pleasure, that it be [...], uni­forme: and the Stoics, who were enemies to pleasure, yet allow­ed an uniforme regular joy, which they made to attend, [...], the tranquillitie and undisturbed state of the Soul. And where may we expect this regular tranquille serene Joy, but in the enjoyment of the chiefest Good? Plato, in his Philebus, pag. 26. makes these pleasures to be [...], symmetrous and harmonious, but terrene joys to be [...], a discordant jarring passion. And he gives us a lively illustration, by the sweet Harmonie that is in Music; which, saith he, is composed of Acutes and Graves, swift and flow, with other infinite Tones, which conjoined make a complete Harmonie: So, addes he, True pleasure is [...], symmetrous; whereas petulant false pleasure is [...], dissonant, [...], circumscribed by no bounds, without measure or order, &c. And in­deed al sensual pleasures are extreme jarring and repugnant, not only to human Nature, but amongst themselves. Doth not the pleasure of Sensualitie fight against the pleasure of Avarice, and both against that of Ambition? This is wel illustrated by Ari­stotle, Eth. lib. 1. cap. 9. pag. 43. [...], Those things which seem sweet to the mul­titude, have an intestine war among themselves; because they are not such by nature: i. e. The pleasures of the multitude are difforme and repugnant each to other; because they are opinionative, artificial, and inordinate, not natural and regular. There is no joy uniforme, regular, or natural, but that which flows from, or tends to the fruition of our last end, which is the measure of uni­formitie and harmonie in Morals. Again, this delectation is by Plato made to be [...], impassible, i. e. such as receives not im­pression from, and therefore admits not conformitie to the various mutations of terrene objects. For whatever receives impression from sensible objects, must needs fal under the same variations and vicissitudes, that those objects are obnoxious unto. And this is the true reason why al sensual pleasures are so variable, dif­forme and dissonant; because the objects, by which they are im­pressed and influenced, are most mutable and difforme. But now those pleasures that attend the fruition of God the sweetest Good partake of his Simplicitie, Immutabilitie, and Ʋniformitie. [Page 39]No Joy so regular, uniforme and harmonious as those that pro­cede from the fruition of God.

(4) The Delectation that attends the fruition of the sweetest Good is most pure and immixed, and therefore most perfect.(4) Pure im­mixed Plea­sures. Thus Plato, Repub. 9. pag. 583. makes the Pleasure of his wise man to be [...], pure; but that of other men to be, not pure, but [...], only an umbratile pleasure. The delectation which fol­lows the enjoyment of the chiefest Good rejoiceth in a twofold Puritie, (1) Objective, as it is fed and maintained by pure ob­jects; whereas al the pleasures of sense are but seculent and dirtie; in that their mater is only sensible terrene good: but the joys and pleasures, which flow from the sweetest original good, partake of the crystalline puritie of their object, which is most pure. (2) Effective, as it doth banish al sorrows and grief. So Plato, Phileb. 53. [...], Al pleasure so far as it is free from grief, it is more pleasant, true, and fair. Thus Repub. 9. he makes [...], Pleasure to be the cessation of grief, and grief the cessation of pleasure. So also, Phileb. pag. 66. he a­voucheth true pleasures to be [...], without mixture of sorrow, and pure. Which is the peculiar privilege of those plea­sures that attend the fruition of the sweetest Good: for al other pleasures are mixed with much grief and sorrow; they being indeed but bitter-sweets; yea more bitter than sweet.

(5) The Delectation which attends the fruition of the sweetest Good are most intense and strong. Thus Plato, (5) Strong Plea­sures. Phileb. p. 44. [...], We must look, not to the least pleasures, but to such as are supreme and most vehement, if we wil make a true judgement of pleasure. For the stronger any pleasures are, the better they are: and the more pure they are, the stronger they are Sensual pleasures are feeble and im­potent, because impure and mixed; but spiritual joys are most po­tent and vehement; because most pure. Again, the vehemence and intensnesse of any pleasure is proportionable to the energie, pow­er, and activitie of the subject, which is assected with such pleasure, and to the Pondus, Bent, or Impetus that it hath to the object it takes pleasure in. Now how vehement is the Pondus, Impetus, and Energie of the Wil, whereby it shooteth it self into its sweet­est Good; which when it enjoyeth, what an ecstasie, rapture, and transportt of joy is it affected with? Doth not Plato stile this, [Page 40] [...], The best and strongest of al Ecsta­sies?

(6) The Delectation which attends the fruition of our last end is infinite and without excesse. (6) Joys with­out Excesse. Thus Plato, Phileb. pag. 27. [...], For pleasure is not al good, unlesse it partake of an infinite nature. His designe is to prove, that pleasure is not the chiefest good; be­cause it is not in its nature infinite, so as to partake of al good: yet so far as it is a consequent that attends the fruition of the chiefest good, so far it is infinite. For as the chiefest good admits of no excesse in our fruition; because it is in it self infinite and al good; so, by a paritie of reason, the joy and pleasure that at­tends the fruition of the chiefest good is infinite without excesse; because the object is infinitely sweet and amiable. The pleasure the Soul takes in the fruition of inferior goods soon admits ex­cesse, which it endeavors to cure by change of objects. Thus Aquinas, 1.2. Quaest. 33. Art. 2. ‘Corporal delectations, when augmented and continued, do excede the natural habitude, and therefore become nauseous; as it is evident in the delices of food: whence the appetite desires change and varietie. But spiritual delectations never excede the natural habitude, but perfect nature: whence the more they come to a consumma­tion, the more they delight us.’ How soon are men glutted with the best of pleasures that sense can afford! And what reme­die have they but intermission or exchange of objects? But now in the fruition of the sweetest Good there can be no excesse, ei­ther in the act of fruition, or in the pleasures that attend it; and therefore there is no need either of intermission or exchange.

§. 8.3. The Effects of Delectation. Having explicated Delectation in its Causes and proper Adjuncts, we now procede to the Effects thereof, thereby to de­monstrate that the most perfect delectation is that which attends the fruition of the sweetest Good. There are two great Effects of this divine Delectation, (1) Amplitude and Enlargement, (2) Quietation and Satisfaction.

1.1. Enlargement. The Delectation that attends the fruition of the sweetest Good brings with it Amplitude and Enlargement. Indeed al de­light and joy brings Enlargement; which ariseth from the Sym­pathie between the object and the subject, or sacultie; specially if the object be ample, how doth the facultie spread it self to enjoy the same? When the animal or vital Spirits are recreated, what [Page 41]enlargement follows thereon? How diffusive are they? Whereas Grief and Sorrow contracts and coarctates the Spirits. This is in an higher degree verified of that spiritual Joy, which attends the fruition of the best Good. There is a twofold Enlargement that follows spiritual Delectation in the fruition of the chiefest Good. (1) There is an Enlargement of the Facultie or Subject. The more pleasure the Soul finds in the enjoyment of its last end, the more its desires are enlarged. Thus Plato, Phileb. pag. 45. [...]; But what? are not those pleasures most excellent, whereof the greatest desires are kindled in us? Whereby he shews, that those are the greatest and best pleasures, that most enlarge the heart in desires after them. Indeed there is an intime connexion be­tween true joy and enlargement; and therefore in sacred Philo­sophie one word is expressive of both. So Psal. 4.1. Thou hast enlarged me when I was in distresse. [...] signifies both to exhilarate and dilate: or to dilate by exhilarating. His spirit was straitned, narrowed and confined by distresse; but dilated and enlarged by spiritual joys from Gods presence. This Dilatation or En­largement, which follows on spiritual Delectation, is wel expli­cated by Aquinas, 1.2. Quaest. 33. Art. 1. ‘Dilatation is a mo­tion unto Latitude; and it agrees to Delectation both in re­gard of its apprehensive and appetitive virtue: for as man appre­hends the conjunction of some convenient good, so his Soul is dilated towards it, in order to its perfect fruition thereof, and satisfaction therein, &c.’ (2) Spiritual Delectation in the frui­tion of the sweetest good brings with it also enlargement in Ope­ration and Acting. Al joy is vigorous and active: as it is the effect of precedent, so the cause of subsequent operation. Delight is the Spring of motion: it puts the Soul into a continual agita­tion: for by how much the more we delight in any object, by so much the more vehement and strong are our operations about it. Delectation makes us ardently and vehemently to move in the fruition of our sweetest good, and in al acts that tend thereto. What divine suavities doth it infuse into al our acts? Thus Plato, Conviv. pag. 210. The mind that converts its eyes to that so great amplitude of the first Beautie, doth no longer regard human affairs, but is as it were captivated thereby, &c.

2. The Delectation which attends the fruition of the sweetest Good, brings with it infinite Quietation and Satisfaction. Satisfaction. These [Page 42]spiritual pleasures do not only amplifie and widen the Soul, but also bring satisfaction. Carnal joys breed a vexatious enlargement of the desires, but never sil them with satisfaction: they may slater and tickle the senses, but never quiet the appetite: the best they leave behind them is repentance. This is wel explicated by Digby, of the Soul, pag. 460. ‘The violence of fruition in those foul pud­dles of flesh and bloud presently glutteth with satietie, and is at­tended with annoy and dislike: and the often using and repeting it, weareth away that edge of pleasure, which only maketh it sweet and valuable, even to them that set their hearts upon it: and nothing heighteneth it but an irritation, by a convenient hunger and abstinence. Contrary, in the Soul, the greater and more violent the pleasure is, the more intense and vehe­ment the fruition is; and the oftener it is repeted, so much the greater appetite and desire we have to returne unto the same.’ Spiritual Delectation in the fruition of our last end doth not only widen, but fil the Soul, and crown its desires with satisfa­ction. Delectation is the quiet of the Appetite in the fruition of its end: where there is no rest, there can be no perfect de­light or satisfaction: and where there is want, there can be no rest: every want wrings the Soul, and keeps it in a restlesse con­dition. So that Quiet and Satisfaction is appropriated to the fruition of the last end and sweetest good. Thence Plato, Con­viv. pag. 211. assures us, That the contemplation of the first, sin­cere, most perfect Beautie is formal Beatitude, that which brings with it perfect Delectation and Satisfaction: for they who arrive hereto, are content to live alone, in conversation with this first Beautie, &c. Of which see Philos. General. Part. 1. lib. 3. cap. 3. sect. 1. §. 2.

CHAP. II. Of the Moralitie of human Acts, and Moral Bonitie.

The Moralitie of human Acts. Moral Goodnesse in Conformitie to the Divine Law. The measure of moral Goodnesse perfect. The Ʋni­versalitie of a perfect Law. Subjective right Reason not the measure of Moral Good, but the Moral Law. Right Reason among the Philosophers the objective Law of Nature. The Mosaic Law a perfect Rule. The Parts and Causes of moral Bonitie. (1) The Mater: Things indifferent in genere & specie: Nothing indif­ferent in individuo. A virtuose Wil the Principe of Moral Good. The best End essential to Moral Good. The forme of moral Good Conformitie to Gods Law. How [...] gives Forme. How far Circumstances formalise Moral Good. The Ʋnitie and Ʋniformitie of al Moral Good. There is no real, moral, or natural Good, but what is supernatural. Moral Good most difficult. The Virtues of Pagans lesser sins only. The distribution of Moral Good into Pietie and Justice.

§. 1. HAving dispatcht the generic Idea and last End, The Moralitie of human Acts. which has the place of a first Principe in Ethics, we now passe on to the Moralitie of Human Acts, and their Bonitie. And here we should first treat of the natural interne Principes of human Acts; namely the practic Judgement or Knowlege, Volition, Consultation, and Election: But having discussed these more largely in Court of the Gentiles, P. 1. B. 4. c. 1. §. 24. we shal not here undertake the dis­cussion of them. As for the Moralitie of human Acts, there are great disputes in the Scholes, Wherein the Esse morale of human Acts doth consiste? Suarez, in 1.2. (which vulgarly they stile his Ethics) Tract. 3. Disp. 1. pag. 207. discourseth largely of the Moralitie of human Acts under these heads. (1) He makes the formal denomination, or that forme whereby an Act is denomi­nated moral, to be more than an Ens rationis properly so ter­med, or a figment of mens minds, something in or appendent to the things themselves. This we grant. (2) He thence dedu­ceth, That the Esse morale in the act of the Wil, besides its En­titie and substance, addes a certain mode of emanation or moral [Page 44]dependence on the Reason adverting, and the Wil freely work­ing. This Hypothesis needs animadversion and restriction. It's true, the Moralitie of human Acts hath dependence on the Reason and Wil as the subject of those Acts: for al moral Acts depend on the physic Principes of those Acts: there is no moral Being but has its foundation in some physic or natural Being: As al moral capacitie is subjected in natural, so al moral Acts. Virtue flowing from God has its seat in the Creature, and so supposeth a create intelligent Nature as antecedent thereto. Thus Cyril A­lexandr. Compend. Dialog. de S. Trinit. Tom. 5. part. 1. pag. 673. [...], That which is holy by participation, being the receptacle of adventitious Sanctitie, that of it self existes primarily in proper nature: namely as Man and Angel, or any other rational Creature. So Damascene, Dialect. cap. 59. [...], That is first by nature which is inferred, but infers not, i.e. secundùm existendi consequentiam: if there be Grace there must be human Nature wherein it is seated; but if there be human Nature, it doth not necessarily follow, that there must be Grace. Thus the human Understanding and Wil precede Virtue, as the subject thereof. Yet hence it follows not, as Suarez seems to conclude, that moral Acts receive their for­mal denomination from their relation to the Understanding and Wil. (3) Hence Suarez concludes, that the Esse morale is a mode not physically and intrinsecally inherent in the moral act; but in the externe act it speaks denomination from the free act of the Wil: and in the very act of the Wil, besides its physic emana­tion from the Wil, it speaks denomination from the reason di­recting, and the Wil acting with a plenarie power. Though, as it has been granted, al Moralitie of human Acts doth presuppose the emanation of those acts from the Understanding and Wil, as their main Principles; yet it follows not hence, that the formal reason of their Moralitie must be taken from this mode of ema­nation. May we not as wel argue, that al virtuose acts are for­malised by their relation to the natural Principes of human acts; because they flow thence? But there lies a mysterie in this Je­suitic Hypothesis, which when laid open wil soon evidence its vanitie and falshood. The Jesuites, and some other Schole-men, in imitation, yet on mistaken grounds, of the ancient Philoso­phers, [Page 45]place the formal reason of al moral Virtue in conformitie to right Reason. Hence no wonder if they make al Moralitie, formally considered, to be a mode dependent on Reason and Wil. But the falsitie hereof wil appear by what follows.

If we consider the Moralitie of human Acts as stated by Plato, it cannot be denied but that he also makes mention of an [...], a right Reason, which he seems to make the measure of al Moralitie, Bonitie, and Vice. But what a vast distance there is be­tween Plato's [...], right Reason, and that maintained by the Jesuites and some other Schole-men, we shal, when we come to discourse of moral Bonitie, sufficiently evince. For the present we shal endeavor to determine the true nature of Moralitie, so much darkened by scholastic niceties, in the following Proposi­tions. (1) Prop. Al Moralitie of human Acts speaks some funda­mental subjective dependence on the natural Principes of human Acts. For there is nothing in Moralitie but has some relation to, yea dependence on human Nature as its subject and fundament. Mo­ralitie is but a mode or relation, which cannot subsist of it self, without a subject and foundation in Nature. Can a man know and love God, without reason and wil? (2) Prop. The Mora­litie of human Acts is not formalised or specified in genere moris by the relation such Acts have to Reason or Wil. For every thing is specified and formalised by its formal reason: and what is the formal reason of any thing but the Idea of its Essence? And wherein consistes the essence of moral Acts, but in their confor­mitie to, if good, or difformitie from, if bad, the perfect mea­sure of Morals? and what is the perfect measure of Morals, but the moral Law? (3) Prop. The Moralitie of human Acts is a real mode, not absolute but relative, appendent to those Acts. That Moralitie is not a mere figment of Reason, but something real is generally confessed, and that on invincible grounds; because it has real influences and effects. Moreover, that Moralitie is not an absolute mode, but relative, is as evident; because the whole of its essence speaks a relation to somewhat else. Hence, (4) Prop. The Moralitie of human Acts speaks some relation to the last end. For the last end in Morals hath the force of a first Principe, Forme, and Measure. It's a great Effate in the Scholes, That the End specifies in Morals. Althings are defined and measured by their last End, but this by nothing. The last end, as a pregnant universal Principe, conteins al Morals in its wombe. (5) Prop. [Page 46] The object mater doth also in some degree concur to the formalising of moral Acts. Thence, saith Aquinas, A moral Act receives its spe­cies from the object and end. And Petrus à Sancto Joseph, Thes. 165. addes, ‘That an Act is moral from the order it has to its object, not considered in its being but morally, as subject to the Rules of Moralitie.’ To this of the object we may adde al essential moral circumstances, which oft adde much to the being and in­tension of Moralitie. (6) Prop. But yet we must conclude, That the adequate exemplar and perfect measure of al Moralitie, formally considered, is the Law of God: This comprehends and gives mea­sure to al other Rules of Moralitie: the last end, object, and cir­cumstances are al measured hereby. Thus Scotus, and other of the Schole-men determine, That the Esse morale, or Moralitie of an Act as such is its relation to that Law, unto which it is referred. And the reason is most evident; because al Moralitie speaks a [...] or relation to some Rule: And what adequate perfect Rule is there of moral Acts, but some moral Law? And thus we must understand the ancient Philosophers, as also some late Divines, who make [...], right Reason the only [...] or measure of moral Acts. That by right Reason we are to understand an obje­ctive Reason or a divine Law wil be most evident by what follows touching moral Bonitie and its measure.

§. 2.Moral Goodnesse in conformitie to the Divine Law. Having inquired into the Moralitie of human Acts in the general, we descend to examine their moral Bonitie and Pravitie. Every thing is so far good as it answers to its proper measure and rule; but evil, so far as it comes short thereof: And what is the measure or rule of moral Bonitie, but the divine Wil and Law? Thus Plato, Repub. 9. [...], That is most distant from reason, which is most remote from Law and Order: i. e. Things are so far conformed to reason and good, as they are conformed to Law and Order. Whence, Definit. Platon. pag. 4.13. [...], a Law, is defined, [...], that which puts an end to controversies about what is unjust or just. Thence [...] is also defined, [...], an obedience of virtuose Laws. And on the contrarie, [...], Injustice is defined, [...], an habit that over looks Laws. This Plato more fully explicates, Gorg. 504. And truly that wherein the order of the bodie consistes may, as it seems to me, wel be termed Salubritie; whence the bodies health ariseth: [...], but those things [Page 47]wherein the order and ornament or goodnesse of the mind consistes, we cal legal and Law: whence men become legitime and orderly. He com­pares the Bonitie of the Soul to the sanitie or health of the Bo­die; which as it consistes in the order and regular temperament of al humors; so the goodnesse of the mind doth in like man­ner consist in its order or conformitie to Law. This is wel ex­plicated by his Scholar Aristotle, Rhet. lib. 1. cap. 9. art. 9. pag. 44. [...], Righteousnesse truly is a virtue by which al have what is their own, and as the Law establisheth: But Injustice, by which men possesse what is not their own, against the precepts of the Law. What he here determines of Justice and In­justice in particular holds true of al other Virtue, and Bonitie, or Vice. But to bring Plato's Philosophemes to sacred Philosophie, touching the conformitie of al moral Good to the divine Law, we shal determine the whole in the following Propositions.

1. Prop. Al moral Bonitie, Moral Bonitie in conformitie to a Law. whether objective or subjective and formal, denotes a conformitie to some Law. The Scholes distinguish moral Bonitie or Honestie into objective and formal. The former is that which constitutes a thing morally good as an object; but the later, that which constitutes an act as an act morally good. (1) In the objects of human Acts there is necessarily required a moral goodnesse, which agrees thereto as objects, as Suarez 1.2. Tract. 3. Disp. 2. strongly proves. And the reasons are demonstrative: For [1] If the object or mater be not morally good or lawful, the act conversant thereabout can never be good: because al mo­ral good requires an integritie of causes: an irregularitie in the object wil render the act irregular. [2] The object of the Wil is good as good: therefore that Bonitie which moves the Wil cannot slow from it, but must be supposed as inherent in or ap­pendent to its objects. [3] This moral goodnesse of the object doth not only agree to human Acts, but also to al other things which may be lawfully loved and embraced. [4] This moral objective Bonitie ariseth from the mater as clothed with al its conditions and circumstances, whereby it is rendred a meet ob­ject for the Soul to close with. [5] The moral goodnesse of any object consistes in its conformitie to or agreament with the Di­vine Law. (2) There is also formal Bonitie or Goodnesse, which constitutes a man formally good. For [1] An object, though never so good, cannot constitute a man or his act formally good. It's [Page 48]true the Act receives some goodnesse from its object, yet only materially and terminatively, not formally, so as to constitute the Act formally good. [2] The Act is so far formally good as vir­tuose, i. e. proceding from right Principes, tending to a right end, and measured by a perfect Rule. Al which presuppose some divine Law as the measure.

2.The Measure of Moral Good per­fect. Prop. That Law, which is the measure of moral Bonitie, must be perfect. This Hypothesis is most evident, and wil appear to be such, if we consider either the nature of a measure, or the condi­tion of the thing measured. (1) As for the nature of a measure, Plato, Repub. 6. wel explicates the same: [...], A defective mea­sure of such things is no measure; for that which is imperfect cannot be the measure of any thing. Every Measure or Rule is indivisible, and therefore capable neither of addition or substraction. Thus Phavorinus: [...], A Canon or Rule is an infallible measure, ad­mitting neither addition nor detraction. And thus much indeed is formally included in the notion Canon: for [...], as the Hebr. [...] Canna, whence it is derived, primarily denotes a reed of such a just longitude, whereby they measured their Lands: and thence it was used in the general for an exact measure: as [...] Job 38 5. is rendred by Aquila [...].2 Cor. 10.13. Phil. 3.16. Thus [...], 2 Cor. 10.13. is expli­cated by [...] such is its use, Gal. 6.16. Phil. 3.16. whereby the perfection of the Divine Law is illustrated. (2) That the measure of moral Bonitie must be perfect, is easily demonstrated from the condition of moral Bonitie: for a plenitude of being, or integritie of Bonitie is essential to al moral good. Moral evil ariseth from the least defect, but moral good requireth an inte­gritie of causes and parts. If there be the least circumstance mis­placed or mistimed, it renders the act vitiose. Now if al moral good must be thus perfect and entire, then it necessarily follows, that its measure and rule must be perfect and entire. But of this more in what follows.

3.The Ʋniversali­tie of a perfect Law. Prop. The perfection of a Law, as it is the measure of moral Bonitie, consistes in its comprehension of the most perfect objective mater, end, and principes. The explication and demonstration of this Proposition depends on the explication of moral good, as to its constitutive parts and causes. It was said before, that al moral good requires an integritie of Being and Causes. In the Scholes [Page 49]they make four Causes of moral Good, proportionable to those in natural productions, namely Mater, Forme, End, Efficient. We shal not at present think our selves obliged to examine or defend the legalitie of this distribution; but endeavor to demonstrate, that a perfect measure of moral Bonitie comprehends each of these Causes and Principes. (1) It must comprehend the object­mater of al moral Bonitie in its fullest Amplitude, Extension, and Ʋniversalitie. Thus Plato, Leg. 1. pag. 630. Truth and Equitie re­quire that they who wil discourse of a divine Republic, determine, [...], that the Legisla­tor has respect, not to one only particle of virtue, and that truly the least; but rather to al virtue, and that he find out Laws according to those several Species of Virtue: i. e. The Law of moral Bonitie must extend it self to al the various Species and Offices of Virtue. If there be any moral Dutie, which the Law of Moralitie extends not to, it is no perfect measure. And this argues the imperfe­ction of Natures light in us, and al human Laws, as hereafter. (2) As for the Forme of moral Bonitie, it consistes in conformitie to the Rule or Law of Moralitie; which if perfect, exacts the most perfect conformitie. Thus Plato, Leg. 1. pag. 630. Our whole dis­course tends to this, to shew, that this Legislator, and al other who wil institute utile Laws, [...], ought, in framing Laws, to aim at the highest Vir­tue, i. e. at the highest conformitie to the best Law. (3) That a perfect Law of Moralitie comprehends the most perfect End is also most evident; because the end is as the Soul and Spirit in Morals: al offices of virtue are but as a dead Corps, without a spirituose perfect end, as Jansenius demonstrates out of Augustine. Thence Plato, Repub. 5. pag. 444. [...], Good Institutes or Laws make way for Virtue, but bad precipitate men into vice. Now he else­where assures us, That the end gives life and perfection to al virtuose Acts. Yea, Leg. 1. he openly saith, [...], Al Laws are to be so constituted, as that they may promote the best end. (4) The Law of moral Bonitie must be perfect as to the Efficient or Principe of Moralitie: i. e. it must extend it self to the qualification of the subject, and its virtuose disposition: for as the end directs the act, so the principes or dispositions of the subject direct the end. Arist. Eth. lib. 3. c. 10. [Page 50]assures us, That [...], the end of every act is according to the habit: i. e. if the mind be not wel-disposed, or clothed with virtuose habits, it wil never aim at a virtuose end. Thence that great Saying of Augustine, The inten­tion of the best end makes the worke good, and Faith directs the inten­tion. So that the Law of Moralitie, if perfect, extends it self to al virtuose principes and moral habits, which the subject ought to be invested with.

3.Subjective right Reason not the measure of mo­ral Good. Prop. Subjective right Reason, or objective human Laws are not a perfect Rule of moral Bonitie. There are two parts in this Pro­position to be examined: (1) That subjective right Reason is not a perfect Rule of moral Bonitie. To explicate and demonstrate this Hypothesis we grant, [1] That Reason is the Organ of ap­prehending, albeit not the measure of our dutie. [2] That pra­ctic Reason or Conscience, so far as illuminated by the Spirit of God, is the regula regulata of our dutie: for Conscience is God's Deputie, and a Law unto a mans self. Yet we denie that there is an [...], or right Reason in nature corrupted, which may suffice as a Rule of moral Goodnesse. I am not ignorant how much the Light of Nature, or, as some terme it, Right Reason is cried up by some as the only Rule of Moralitie. Thus Seneca would needs persuade us, That we have this merit of Nature, that virtue doth premit its light into the minds of al: yea those that wil not follow, yet see it. And not only some vulgar capacities now a-days, but also the Stoics of old generally cried up the Light within them, as the Rule of Moralitie. The Schole-men also, in imitation of Aristotle their Oracle, generally proclaim right Reason to be the formal Rule of moral Good. But that Aristotle and Plato by their [...], right Reason, understood the objective Law either of Nature or Moses, I no way dout but hereafter to de­monstrate. Indeed al our subjective Light by Nature is no other than a nocturne, dreaming, tenebrous knowlege, as Plato stiles it. (2) That no human Law or Laws is the perfect measure of moral Bonitie, No human Laws a perfect Rule of moral Good. is also evident; because al human Laws are extreme de­fective in their extension and prescripts as to al the Causes and Principes of moral Goodnesse: how deficient are they both as to the Mater and Manner of moral Good! What Restrictions, Emendations, and Alterations do they need? What an infinite number of particular cases are there, which no human Law can reach? Wel therefore doth Androcles, in Aristotle, Reth. l. 2. c. 25. [Page 51]informe us, That al human Laws need another Law to correct them, as fishes need salt, to preserve them from putrefaction. This corrective Law they terme [...], Equitie, which indeed is no other than the Law of Nature, as hereafter, cap. 5. §. 5.

4.The Divine Law the Rule of mo­ral Good. Prop. The adequate perfect rule and measure of moral Bonitie is the Divine Law. This Hypothesis being the main wil require more ample explication and demonstration. (1) The Divine Being is [...], the first essentially just and holy Being; and therefore the first essential rule or measure of al Ju­stice and Sanctitie. (2) But the Divine Essence being too re­mote and distant from the Creature, he hath therefore given us a divine Law, as the Miroir and Idea of his essential Sanctitie, to be the rule of al moral Bonitie as to us. (3) This Divine Law given us, as the Rule of moral Bonitie, was concreate and con­natural as to Adam, it being impressed and engraven on his na­ture, and so needed not any further promulgation. (4) Hence the objective and subjective Law or Light of Nature was to Adam, in his innocent state, one and the same; he having a perfect understanding and comprehension of the whole Dutie of man, and so became a Law unto himself. (5) But lapsed man having lost his subjective Law and Light of Nature, as to supernaturals, and very far as to naturals and civils, retaining only some frag­ments or broken notices, our most benigne Lord, out of his great clemence and pitie to lapsed man, gave a new Edition of that na­tural Law, and therein fresh notices of his soverain. wil and plea­sure, touching mans dutie. So that the World was never without an objective Law and Light of Nature, albeit the subjective was lost in Adam. Yea, some Divines of great note conceive, that those very commun natural Notions, communly called the Fragments or Remains of the Image of God lost by Adam, are vouchsafed to us by the Covenant of Grace in and by the Mediation of Christ. Thus they interpret, Joh. 1.9. of Christ's illightening every man: Joh. 1.9. i. e. not only supernatural light vouchsafed to the Elect, but even the natural notices or Light of Nature vouchsafed to the lapsed Sons of Adam is the effect of the second Covenant and Christ's Mediation. And the reason seems demonstrative; because our very Beings and al the comforts of our Beings having been for­feited by the breach of the first Covenant, whatever good we enjoy on this side Hel, is but the overflowing of the Grace of the second Covenant, and Christ's Mediation, by which the [Page 52]whole World stands. So far are we from any real claim to a subjective Light of Nature, by virtue of the first Covenant, as that both subjective and objective Light is from Christ. The objective Light or Law of Nature is stiled by the Hebrews, [...]; and its Offices, [...], the knowen Duties, i.e. by nature: to which they opposed [...], the Divine, namely Institutes, or positive Commands of God. For Jus naturale, the natural Law is not opposed to supernatural, but to positive Laws, as Grotius hath wel observed.Right Reason the objective Law of Nature. (6) This objective Law of Na­ture, in its second Edition, as conteined in divine Revelations of moral Bonitie, was not altogether unknowen to the wiser of the Heathen: and that Plato's [...], Right Reason, was but an Imitamen hereof, we now undertake to demonstrate. He dis­courseth hereof professedly in Minos, pag. 317. [...], That which is Right, is the Royal Law. (1) That by [...] he means the same with [...], is to me unquestio­nable, and I think it wil clearly appear so to others by what fol­lows. (2) He saith this [...], the Royal Law, which is the stile the Hebrews gave their moral Law, as Jam. 2.8. [...].Jam. 2.8. And why doth he terme it the Royal Law, but because it was the supreme Law of God, the King of Kings? Thence Socrates addes, We therefore rightly granted, [...], that this Law was the invention of Being it self, or of the first independent Being. For this generally he un­derstands by his [...]. Thence, Defin. Plat. pag. 416. [...], Sin is defined, [...], an operation against right Rea­son, i. e. the objective Law and Light of Nature. Thus also Ari­stotle, Eth. l. 2. c. 2. art. 6. pag. 76. [...], And truly this, to act according to right Rea­son is commun to al, and let it be fixed as a Canon. So again, Eth. l. 3. c. 8. pag. 153. he saith, Virtues are mediocrities freely under­taken, [...], and so as right Reason shal prescribe. This right Reason he elsewhere termes, [...], the universal commun Law, which al by nature are subject to. So Rhet. l. 1. c. 14. art. 3. pag. 69. [...], &c. I say, Law is either proper or commun: proper or private Law is that written Law, which belongs to particular Nations. [...], The commun Law I cal that which is according to nature: for there [Page 53]is a certain commun Just and unjust, which al consent unto, albeit there should be no societie, or confederation of men. This commun Law of Nature is the same with his [...]. For look as in spe­culative Sciences there are certain first Principes, which are the foundation of al demonstration; so in Practics and Morals, there is an objective Law or Light of Nature containing certain practic Principes, which are the Rule of Conversation. Thus also we are to understand the Stoics, if we wil make a right use of their [...], of which Diog. La [...]rt. in Zeno: The Stoics say, that to live according to nature, is, [...], to do nothing that the commun Law prohibits, which is right Reason diffusing it self throughout althings. Where it deserves a remarque, That they make the commun Law of Nature the same with right Reason. Which cannot rightly be understood of sub­jective right Reason, but of objective it may. Again, they say, This right Reason diffuseth it self throughout althings. Which can­not be understood of any subjective reason, which is confined to individuals; but must be applied to the commun objective Light and Law of Nature, which is diffused throughout the whole Creation, according to the various conditions of things. Thus Hierocles in Pythagor. Carm. pag. 106. saith, That the vices of the mind are, [...], Aversions and Er­rata from right Reason: And pag. 209. he addes: This right Rea­son is the great Legislatrix and Judge of al human affairs, &c. And Stobaeus, de Virt. Serm. 1. pag. 9. also informes us: [...], Vir­tue is a Syntaxe, or orderly contexture according to right Reason; but Vice a Transgression against right Reason. Where by right Rea­son we must necessarily understand the commun objective Light or Law of Nature, not that darke subjective Light in the minds of blind Mankind. Thus also we must understand Parker, Amyraldus, and other Divines, who make [...], right Reason the unic Criterion or Rule of moral Virtue. Though I denie not, but that the Stoics generally, and perhaps Aristotle, as many of his Followers among the Schole-men, by right Reason understand the subjective Light of Nature in mens minds; yet I am very apt to persuade my self, that Socrates and Plato, who seem to be the first Promulgators of this [...], meant thereby no other than the objective Light and Law of Nature, whereof some more [Page 54]commun Precepts were conveighed down by the posteritie of Noah; but those irradiant and bright notices thereof, which shone among them, they received by oriental Tradition from the sacred Books of Moses, wherein Plato was not a little versed, and which by his [...], royal Law he seems to allude unto.

5.The Mosaic Law a perfect Rule. Prop. That Divine Law, which is the adequate perfect Rule and Measure of moral Bonitie, is no where to be found but in the sacred Philosophie or Scriptures. Here, and here only is extant Plato's [...] and [...]. This sacred Rule, whereof he had great notices, he sometimes cals [...], the Divine Word. Here also Aristotle's [...], Commun Law of Nature in its perfection is alone to be found. Hence likewise it was that Py­thagoras, Lycurgus, Solon, Minos, and Plato borrowed the princi­pal heads of their best Laws, as we have at large proved, Court Gent. P. 1. B. 3. C. 9. The sum of the Law of Nature, and al di­vine Precepts is conteined in the Decalogue or Moral Law delive­red by Moses, which is thence stiled by the Hebrews [...], the matrices of the Law and its roots. And indeed what are the Ten Commandments, conteined in the moral Law, but a Transumt, Compend, Abstract, or rather extended Copie of the Law of Nature given to man in the beginning, from that first original Exemplar the eternal Law? Is not the formal reason of al Equitie prescribed and expressed in the moral Law? Ought not this then to be the terme, measure, and scope of al Laws? To clear which we are to remember, that the Ten Command­ments, conteined in the moral Law, must not be taken literally as ten Words, but in a more ample extensive notion, as Christian Pandects, or commun heads of al moral Duties towards God and man, to be explicated and extended accordingly to the Illustra­tions and Commentaries of the Prophets, our great Lord, and his Apostles. Though the Decalogue doth not mention each particular Dutie in the Gospel, yet it doth command obedience to al that are or shal be specified; and expresseth every parti­cular Dutie generically or synecdochically: and although it were not a Dutie from the general Precept, til it was specified in the Gospel, yet when it is once a Dutie, the neglect of it is a sin against the Decalogue. Indeed are there not almost in al the Precepts manifest Synecdoches? Is it not then ridiculous for men to restrain the most ample sense of the moral Law to the narrow [Page 55]confines of its words? Doth not the great Legislator take the blackest sins, as Murder, Adultery, Theft, &c. and place them, as so many commun Heads, in the Decalogue, that so by these we may be instructed, how black and odiose al those other sins, re­ducible to those heads, are? Wherefore to penetrate and dive into the nature and contents of the Ten Commandments, we must in a particular manner inquire (1) What in every Com­mand is treated of, (2) The end for which it was given, (3) What therein is displeasing or pleasing to God. And after al we shal find, that the moral Law is spiritual, holy, just and good, as Rom. 7.12, 14. reaching al the motions and dispositions of the heart. And indeed how absurd is it to conceit, that he, who made the heart, and knows al the diverticules, or turnings and windings of it, should make a Law to reach only the outward acts, and not the inward principes and motions? May we not then conclude, that the Decalogue and moral Law of the supreme Legislator extends its Precepts to the whole Soul, and al its Principes, Powers, Inclinations, Thoughts, Affections, and Opera­tions interne and externe; directing the same to their right ob­jects and ends; affecting them with their inseparable Accidents and Modifications; clothing them with their immutable circum­stances; in such sort, that the action good by this Law can ne­ver be made evil; that which is evil by this Law can never be made good; that which is good or evil by this Law can never be made indifferent? Hence Plato brings in Pindar speaking thus of the regal Power, as I take it, of the Law of Nature: [...], The Law is King over al both mortals and immortals. And Aristot. Pol. l. 4. c. 4. affirmes: [...], That the Law ought to command al. Which is most proper and peculiar to the moral Law, that lively Idea and Image of the Divine Sanctitie and Wil, the original and universal Exemplar of moral Bonitie, that great bond of union, by conformitie whereto mans Wil becomes one with the Divine Wil; yea, man himself one with God. Whence, as Tyndal, pag. 83. wel observes, ‘Mans imagination can make the Law of God neither greater nor lesser: neither can it adde to or di­minish from the Law of God: Gods Commandment is as great as himself.’ Such is the Amplitude of the moral Law as the im­mutable, universal Rule of moral Bonitie.

§. 3. Having considered the Measure and Rule of moral Boni­tie,The parts and causes of moral Good. [Page 56]we now passe on to examine the Nature and Causes thereof. It was before suggested, that al moral Bonitie requires a plenitude of Being, and integritie of Causes; albeit any defect render an a­ction morally evil. This Canon holds true whatever distribution we give the causes of moral Bonitie. Jansenius, in imitation of Augustine, makes two essential constitutive parts of al moral Good, (1) The Office or Mater of the Act, which he makes to be as the Corps: and the End, which he makes to be as the Forme that spe­cifies. (2) Plato, in his Theaetetus, pag. 187. and Arist. Eth. l. 2. c. 4. seem to distribute moral Good into the good deed done, and the [...], the wel-doing of it: i.e. into Bonum, and Bene. The good deed-done is as the mater: and the bene or wel-doing of it, as the forme. (3) Others, according to the Aristotelian distribution of the causes, make four causes of al moral Good, the Mater, Effi­cient, End, and Forme. Albeit I judge this distribution of Causes, as to Naturals, every way absurd, and that which can never be defended; because it makes the same things both constitutive Parts of the whole, and yet also Causes thereof: so that it hence follows, the mater and forme are causes of themselves, which constitute the whole: yet in Morals, where the causes need not such an accurate distinction from the parts, we may admit this distribution: or else we may take the mater and forme as parts, and the efficient and end as causes of moral Good. This being the commun and received distribution, I am not scrupulose in following the same, yet so as not to exclude the two former divisions.

1.The Mater of moral Good. If we reflect on the Mater of moral Good, it comprehends al human Acts, with the Objects and Circumstances relating there­to, whether things necessary or indifferent. It's true, as to the Circumstances of moral Good, there are some that relate to the forme; others to the efficient and end; yet some also that re­gard the mater. The mater of every good action is either good or indifferent: it is good when commanded by and conforme to the moral Law, the measure of objective goodnesse as before: it is indifferent when neither good nor evil, but as it were in the middle between both. Here that which chiefly requires an ex­amen and discussion is the nature of things indifferent; which, so far as it may concerne moral Good, we shal inquire into. Plato, in his Gorgias, Things indiffe­rent. cals a thing indifferent, [...], neither good nor evil, but a middle between these. So [Page 57] Diogenes the Cynic taught, [...], That things between virtue and vice were indifferent. And the Stoics held, [...], Of things some were good, some bad, some neither good nor bad, i. e. in­different. These neuters, or things indifferent, they said, were such as neither profited, nor did hurt. Again, they affirmed, That things might be termed indifferent two ways. (1) [...], &c. Such things as pertein not either to felicitie or miserie, as Riches, Glorie, &c. (2) [...], &c. Such things as men act nei­ther with an Impetus, nor aversation: as the extending the finger, or numbering the hairs of the head, &c. as Laertius, in Zeno. But the more fully to explicate the nature of things indifferent, we are to consider, that things are said in the general to be indifferent, which in themselves are neither good nor evil, but equally in­clined to either. Now this indifference of actions or things, may be considered physically or morally, according to the generic, specific, or individual nature of Actions and Things.

1. If we consider Actions and Things in genere & abstracto, Physic Indiffe­rence in Genere. in their generic abstract nature, without the supervenient determina­tion of the moral Law, so they are in themselves nakedly con­sidered indifferent: For althings physically considered, without their moral estimation and respect to the Law, are neither mo­rally good nor evil. Thus al our Thoughts, Words and Actions nakedly and physically considered, without respect to the moral Law, (which is the rule and measure of moral Good and Evil) are said to be indifferent.

2. Actions and Things are said to be indifferent in specie, Moral Indiffe­rence in Specie. when the mater of them is neither commanded nor forbidden by the moral Law. For as althings are of God, through God and for God, so it belongs to his regal Wil to give moral or spiritual determination to them, whereby they are made good or evil in specie, as to the mater of them. Neither can any created limited power make that which is good, evil, or that which is evil, good, or that which is indifferent, good or evil, except on supposition of predetermination from him, who, be­ing Creator of al, has an absolute dominion over al. Every Creature having termes to its Essence, has also termes to its dominion and operation: a limited Cause must necessarily have a limited power and activitie. Except man had being of him­self, [Page 58]and a World of his own framing, he could not be a rule to himself, for the determination of his actions; but must be de­termined by the Law of his Maker, for the specific nature or qualitie of his acts as good,Quando dici­mus, dari actus indifferentes quoad speci­em, qui non sunt boni nec mali, id intelli­gendum est ne­gativé. Petr. à Sancto Joseph, Thes. 167. or evil, or indifferent. Thence a thing is said to be morally indifferent in specie, when it is nei­ther commanded nor forbidden by God, and so neither good nor evil: for al moral determination ariseth from the Divine Wil expressed in the moral Law. Whence it appears evident, that The reasons of good and evil are not eternal, as some Platonists would fain persuade us; but dependent on the divine Wil and Deter­mination: for althings are therefore good or evil in specie, be­cause so determined by the soverain Wil, promulgated in the natural or moral Law. Whence also we may easily perceive the danger of that commun Notion, among some Divines, That some­things are good because commanded, other things are commanded be­cause good. Indeed this Maxime may be of use, to expresse the difference between moral and positive Precepts, with this limi­tation, that positive Precepts, which regard Worship, &c. are good because commanded; but moral Precepts are commanded because good, i. e. agreable to human Nature, not that they have any moral goodnesse antecedent to the divine Wil and Determi­nation. Hence,

3.No Action in­different in in­dividuo. No Action considered, in individuo, in its individual nature is morally indifferent: i.e. every individual action considered as clothed with its Circumstances, and in relation to its Principes, Manner, and End is either good or evil. That moral Indifference hath place only in specie, in the specific nature of Acts, not, in indivi­duo, in their individual nature, is generally avouched by the Or­thodoxe, yea among the more sober of the Schole-men. This was one of John Husse's Articles, condemned in the Council of Constance, Art. 16. Quòd nulla sint opera indifferentia, sed haec sit divisio immediata humanorum operum, quòd sint virtuosa vel vi­tiosa, That there are no workes [in individuo] indifferent; but this is an immediate division of human workes, that they are either vir­tuose, or vitiose. This indeed we may argue from Plato's Placites, who strongly proves, That al our Acts ought to tend to some good end. So Gorg. pag. 499. [...], It seems, that althings must be done for good, &c. So else­where he saith, That God is the marque and scope, unto which al our Acts, as so many arrows, ought to tend. This is wel determined [Page 59]by Aquinas, 1.2. Quaest. 18. Art. 9. ‘It happens sometimes that an Act is indifferent as to its Species, which yet considered in individuo, is either good or evil: and that because every moral Act receives its Bonitie not only from its object, but also from its circumstances— And it's necessary, that every individual Act hath some circumstance by which it is drawen to good or evil; at least as to the intention of the end. For in as much as it belongs to Reason to order al human Acts; if any Act be not ordered to its last end, it is so far evil: if it be ordered to its last end, it is then good, &c.’ Thus Gibieuf de Libertat. pag. 74. ‘We most evidently gather from the subordination of our Wil to its last end, that there are no human Acts indifferent in individuo; but al are good or evil: for it is not lawful for a rational Creature, so long as he is such, not to returne that back to God which he received from God.’ Again, p. 77. ‘Every thing ought to act according to its nature: and he that doth otherwise is deficient; because nature is the measure of other things. If therefore man puts forth an human Act, he ought thereby to be converted towards God.’ Indeed Indifference can no more be found in individual Acts, than it can be denied as to some Acts considered in their Species. Al Acts of Man in Inno­cence were good: al the Acts of man under the dominion of corrupt Nature are evil: al the Acts of man in Glorie shal be good: al the Acts of man under Grace are either good or evil: not one of al these indifferent. Were al our actions regulated by the Divine moral Law, they would be al good. Yea our very natural and civil Acts, as to their manner, so far as they are mo­rally good or evil, are al regulated and determined by the moral Law. For albeit the Divine Law be not, as it ought not to be, a general sum of Arts and Sciences; nor yet a particular Dire­ctorie for the Government of States or Politic Acts; yet the particular determination of al our Acts fals under the Divine Law, so far as they are moral and Christian; according to the nature of al Professions and Sciences, coincident for the most part in the mater, but distinct in the manner of consideration. Thus much Petrus à Sancto Joseph, that late compilator of Schole-Di­vinitie, Thes. 167. acknowledgeth: ‘There is not, saith he, any Act indifferent in individuo; but every such Act, if it procede from sufficient deliberation, is either good or evil, although not as to its object, yet in regard of its circumstances.’ The [Page 60]scratching of the head, or the taking up of a straw, is either good or evil. This seems a Paradoxe to some that are ignorant, and disgustful to Libertines, who would be so; yet generally granted by Philosophers and Divines, yea scarce ever professedly denied by any, save some sew, who distinguish between Acts proceding from mere Imagination, and such as are deliberate. That no Acts in individuo are indifferent, see the Commentators in Sent. lib. 2. dist. 41. and in Thomam, 1.2. Quaest. 18. Art. 9.

2.A virtuose Wil the Principe of moral Good. Having discussed the Mater of moral Good, we now pro­cede to its next efficient Cause or Principe; which is the Wil, or rather Soul clothed with supernatural Habits of Virtue or Grace. The moral Law requires, that to the constitution of an Act mo­rally good, there concur a good Principe: now the Wil or Soul as willing being the fountain of al moral efficience and operation, its rectitude is necessary to constitute an Act morally or spiritually good. Such therefore as the disposition of the Wil is, such wil the action prove as to its goodnesse or pravitie. The bent of the Wil is as a Pondus that carries the whole Soul either to good or bad: when the deliberation and intention of a bended Wil concurs in a good mater for a good end, the action is good: And what bends the Wil in this manner,Actio recta non erit, nisi recta fuerit vo­luntas: ab hac enim est actio. but virtuose habits? So many degrees as there are of a sanctified Wil in any Act, so many degrees there are of moral Good therein. Moralitie, as wel as Divinitie, is in a more special manner conversant in ru­ling the Wil, which is the measure of good and evil. The bent of the Wil makes a good or bad man, as also act. Thus Plato, Meno: [...], Virtue is to wil, and to be able to performe good. Again: [...], If he wil not to do unrightcously, this is suffi­cient; he shal not do unrighteously. But more particularly Plato, Leg. 3. thus philosophiseth: This is not to be desired, [...], that althings follow his Wil, but that his Wil follow Reason: i.e. that it prosecute what is good. This is wel expressed by Simplicius, in Epich. c. 1. pag. 14. [...], For when the Wil is free and pure in the power of Reason it self, on which our nature dependes, then it is carried to things truly eligible; yea, to truth it self. Wherefore [Page 61]the proper good of the Soul is called [...], Virtue, because [...], pro­perly desirable, and attained by real election. Simplicius here, in imitation of Plato, (whom he much follows) asserteth, (1) That the moral Goodnesse of human Acts dependes on the puritie and goodnesse of the Wil. (2) That moral Good is called [...], Vir­tue, because most eligible. Which derivation he borrowed from Plato. What Virtue properly is, and how it disposeth the Wil to what is morally good, wil hereafter §. 4. and sect. 3. §. 1, 2. come under contemplation: at present this may suffice to de­monstrate, that al moral Good requireth a moral Principe vir­tuously inclined for the production thereof. And had we no other evidence hereof but what sacred Philosophie doth assord, it might suffice. Thus Solomon (the wisest of mere men, since the Fal) Prov. 4.23. Above al keeping keep thine heart: Prov. 4.23. for out of it are the issues of life: i. e. al spiritual life and moral good issueth from the heart rightly disposed and qualified with virtuose graciose Prin­cipes: where the heart thus qualified is not the Spring, there no Act is morally or spiritually alive towards God, but dead. Be the actions never so seemingly splendid and gloriose as to the mater of them, yet if they flow not from this living Fountain, they are but as your Automata, those artificial Machines or Ima­ges called Puppits; which seem to move their eyes, hands, feet, &c. whereas indeed they are moved only by artificial forrein im­presses: such are al moral Acts that flow not from a vital Prin­cipe virtuosely disposed, morally dead, albeit they may seem to have shadows of life. Or look as no member of the bodie per­formes any action of natural life, wherein a pulse derived from the heart beats not; so no action is morally good, wherein there beats not some pulse of a virtuose rightly disposed Wil. Actions are conformable to the fountain whence they spring: no living virtuose Act can procede from a dead corrupt Principe: Being, life, and motion go together in Morals, as wel as in Natu­rals: such as the Facultie, Spring, and Principe is, such wil the motion and operation be, both in Grace and Nature, as Medo has wel observed, on Prov. 4.23. Thus Augustine, on Mat. 7.18. where by the good Tree he understands a believing Wil, which he makes essential to every good Act: for if the Wil be bad, the Act cannot be good: and every unbelieving Wil is a bad Wil: for where there is no Faith in Christ as the first Principe of life, there can be no love to God as the last End: as the end formes [Page 62]the Wil, so Faith formes the End. Thence that of the supposed Ignatius: [...], Faith is the Principe of life, Love the end: these two in unitie perfect the man of God. And Chrysostome saith: [...], Nothing is good without Faith.

3.The best End essential to mo­ral Good. To the Constitution of moral Good there is also essentially requisite the best End. Thus Plato, Gorg. pag. 499. assures us, That al Acts must be undertaken for the last end and best good, as before, Sect. 1. §. 2. This is wel explicated by Aquinas, 2.2. Quaest. 2.3. Art. 8. ‘It must be said, that in Morals the forme of an Act is principally to be attended in regard of its end: and the reason is most evident; because the Wil is the Principe of moral Acts, and the End the main Object, and as it were the forme of the Wil: but now the forme of an Act always fol­lows the forme of an Agent: whence in Morals it is necessary, that what gives an Act its order to an end, give it is also forme, &c.’ This is more nakedly laid down by Angustine: Whatever good is done by man, but not for that end for which it ought to be done, al­beit the office it self [i. e. the mater of the Act] seem good, yet the end being not right, it is sin. This is wel explicated by Jan­senius, August. Tom. 2. lib. 4. cap. 10. ‘Two things are to be re­garded in every act of a virtuose Wil; (1) The office or worke it self done: (2) The cause for which it is done, or the End. In the weighing the Bonitie of any Virtue, our main regard must be to the End. This is as it were the last rest and scope of the mind in acting, that which the Wil, its habit, and act most incline unto. This deservedly rules al Offices, which flow from its Empire, are tinctured with its color and sapor, and ought to be referred to it. This is the genuine cause why so many vexatious litigations were found among the Gentile Philoso­phers, touching the chiefest Good.’ So again he saith, ‘That the Office it self is but as the Corps of Virtue, which is animated by the End, which gives forme and life, without which the office is but as mater without forme, or a carcasse without Soul.’ Aristotle wel instructes us, That the end is the measure of althings: which is true as to moral Good. Thence Petrus à Sancto Joseph, Thes. 166. assertes, That an human action takes its Bonitie or pra­vitie, not only from the intrinsec end of the worke, which is coincident with the object; but also from the extrinsec, which is the end of the Worker. Certainly Offices are to be weighed not so much by [Page 63]their Acts, as Ends: And what is the last end of al good workes, but the Glorie of God? which, though last in Execution, yet ought to be first in Intention, at least virtually, if not formally, in al we do. Thence, saith Angustine, That is not true Virtue, which tends not to that end, wherein the best Good of man consistes. And Gregor. Ariminensis, 2. Sent. Dist. 29. Quaest. 1. proves that, Every volition, which refers not to God for himself, or to other things for God, is vitiose.

4. The last Cause,The Forme of moral Good con­formitie to the moral Law. or rather constitutive part of moral Good is its Forme, which consistes in its Conformitie to the divine moral Law. This may deservedly be termed the Forme of moral Good; because it gives forme and measure to al the former Principes and parts: For wherein consistes the Goodnesse of the Mater, Principes, and End, but in their Conformitie to the Divine Wil and Law? This therefore is the formal Idea or Reason of al mo­ral Good, whereby al difference and perfection is to be measu­red. Arist. Eth. lib. 5. cap. 2. tels us, [...], That the great difference of things is according to their Idea or for­mal Reason. Hence Conformitie to the Divine Law being the formal Reason or Idea of al moral Good, by this we are to take our measures of al differences or perfection therein. This Con­formitie of moral Good to the Divine Law is described by Plato, under various emphatic notions: as (1) it is termed [...] and [...]. So Protag. pag. 326. [...], Al the life of man ought to consist of Concent and Harmonie: i. e. of Uniformitie and Conformitie to the Divine Law. Hence (2) In his Phaedo, he saith, [...], Al Virtue consistes in Harmonie: whereas vice is a confused inordination or irregularitie. So in his Timaeus, pag. 47. he saith, That Harmonie being very near akin to the motions of the Soul, it is given us to reduce the disorders of the Soul to a decorum. So Sto­baeus, Serm. 1. de Virtut. pag. 15. [...], &c. Virtue has for its rule a decorum, or that which is most convenient, i.e. agreable or conformable to the Law of Nature. Hence (3) This Conformitie is stiled by Plato [...], Symmetrie and Symphonie. Al these notions Aristotle comprehended under his [...], Mediocritie, of which more fully B. 4. C. 1. §. 30. and Philos. General. P. 2. l. 1. c. 1. sect. 4. §. 4.

Others place the Forme of moral Good in the mode or manner of doing, namely that it be done wel: How the Forme of Good consistes in the [...], wel doing. and we find some founda­tion [Page 64]for this Hypothesis in Plato's Theaetetus, pag. 187. [...], It's better to a little wel, than much il. Where he seems to make the [...], the w [...]l doing, the forme and measure of good. So Aristotle, Eth. lib. 2. cap. 3. pag. 83. [...], &c. He therefore shal be a Grammarian, who doth what is Grammatic, Grammatically, i.e. according to Rules of Grammar. But yet he addes, by way of caution, That [...], the wel-doing of Arts is not the same with that of Virtues: for the perfection of Arts is in­cluded in themselves, without regard to the perfection of the Artificer: but the perfection of Virtue requires, that the subject be so and so qualified. And then he concludes: [...], He is a righteous and temperate man, not that doth those things, but doth them in such a manner as righteous and sober men do them, i.e. rightcously and soberly. Hence that vulgar Effate, That good workes are to be judged by Adverbes: for al must be done with those adverbial conditions of sacred Philosophie, Tit. 2.12. [...], soberly, and righteously, and piously. This is in a peculiar manner true of good actions, where the mater is indifferent; because such have no goodnesse at al, but what is from the Adverb. So that it sufficeth not that the Act be [...], good, but it must have [...], a right manner of being done: and herein, according to some, the Forme of its goodnesse doth con­siste, even in the manner of it; and any defect herein wil render the action evil: according to those scholastic Maximes, The forme gives being, and any omission or defect therein gives millitie as to moral Good. So in the Canon Law they tel us, That the forme must be precisely and punctually observed. And indeed this notion of the forme of moral Good amounts to the same with the former, and must be resolved thereinto. For a moral Act may be said then to have its [...], or bene factum, wel done, when it is in al points exactly conformable to the moral Law: for al moral Good is a relation of conformitie with the rule of Morals; but the least priva­tion thereof is sin.

But,How far Cir­cumstances for­malise moral Good. to descend to particulars, an human Act is then confor­mable to the Law and wel done, when it is not only good for the mater, but also clothed with al those Circumstances, which ne­cessarily attend its moral goodnesse. The particular forme of moral Good consistes much in the Circumstances that attend it. [Page 65]The Circumstances oft formalise and specisie the Act, making it good or evil: sometimes they only make it better or worse. But the Circumstances have the greatest sway in things indifferent, where the manner of doing doth chiefly specifie the Act. We find the Circumstances of human Acts wel expressed by Aristotle, Eth. l. 2. c. 5. Virtue, saith he, consistes in the wel doing of things: for we may fear, trust, desire, hate, despise, be angrie, pitie, rejoice, and grieve, [...], not duely. [...], But truly to be moved with these affections, when, and in what things, and towards whom, and for what end, and in that manner as we ought, this is the golden mean, and that which is best, wherein Virtue consistes. Whence also Aristotle, Eth. lib. 3. cap. 10. art. 5. pag. 160. assures us, That a defect in any one Circumstance renders an Act evil: [...], But sins may be committed, some, when that is done that ought not; others, when not as it ought; others, because not at that time when it ought, or the like. Thence, art. 10. he addes: [...], For a va­liant man suffers and acts according to the dignitie of the mater, and when, and in that manner as reason [or the Law of Nature] dictates. Thus we see how Plato and Aristotle require to the constitution of moral Good, not only a right mater, but that it be clothed with al due Circumstances, whereby it may be rendred conformable to the Law as to manner. This Hypothesis has been generally maintained among the more sound Schole-men. Thus Aquinas, 1.2. Quaest. 7. Art. 2. ‘A Circumstance is a condition or acci­dent of an human Act, which toucheth it extrinsecally. And seing human Acts are disposed towards their last end by circum­stances, the contemplation hereof greatly concernes Theo­logues. For a Theologue considers human Acts, as a man is thereby ordained to Beatitnde: Now whatever is ordained to an end ought to be proportionate thereto: But Acts are rendred proportionable to their end by a certain commensuration, which they receive from due circumstances: whence the consideration of circumstances chiefly belongs to a Theologue.’ What these circumstances are he addes, Art. 3. In human Acts, ‘Who did it; By what aides or instruments; What, Why, How, When, and Abour what he did it, are to be inquired into.’ Some explain these Circumstances thus: (1) Quis, who, must not be taken for the [Page 66]efficient cause, but for his condition and qualitie, as a private person, or public, &c. (2) Quid, what, must not be understood of the mater or object, but of the qualitie thereof. (3) Neither must Quomodo, how, be taken for the forme or manner, but whether it be done openly or secretly, &c. Greg. Ariminensis, 2. Sent. Dist. 38. Quaest. 1. Art. 1. strongly assertes and proves, That no moral Act wanting its due Circumstance is morally good. ‘By an Act morally good, I understand, saith he, no other (according to the Doctors) than an Act conforme to right Reason, [objective, i.e. the Divine Law] according to al circumstances requisite to this, that the Act be truly virtuose. When therefore a moral operation is not conforme to right Reason, [or the Law] ac­cording to al due circumstances, it is vitiose and morally evil.’ This his Hypothesis he proves by two Conclusions. 1. Conclus. That no moral Act wanting any one due Circumstance, is truly vir­tuose. This he proves by shewing that the contrary implies a contradiction. For if a moral Act want any one due circum­stance, it is not as it ought to be: therefore it is evil. Due circumstances are communly said to be such things, as are re­quired to this, that the Act be truly virtuose: and if an Act be truly virtuose it is conforme to right Reason, or the moral Law: and if such, then it wants not any due circumstance: wherefore if any Act wanting a due circumstance should be truly virtuose, it wil then necessarily follow, That it doth want, and yet that it doth not want a due circumstance: or, That it is truly vir­tuose, and yet that it is not truly virtuose. 2. Conclus. That every such Act as wants its due Circumstances is morally evil and sin. It is evil because it wants its due bonitie or goodnesse, namely its due circumstance. For sin is nothing else but the want of a due good, or voluntarily to act against the Divine Law. Thus much also Suarez grants us, That some conditions that are only circum­stantial and accidental to an Act in esse rei, as to the physic being, are yet essential in esse moris, as to its moral being. So Suarez, 1.2. Tract. 2. Disp. 5. pag. 169. ‘The first opinion, saith he, is, That an human Act may be considered in its natural or moral being: and that circumstances are so called in relation to the natural, not the moral being of the Act; but that al these con­ditions are substantial Principes or proper Causes of the moral action as such.’ He mentions this as the opinion of some Schole­men, namely, that there are no accidental circumstances of hu­man [Page 67]Acts morally considered; but that al these Circumstances are essential and properly influential on the said moral Acts. Which indeed is a great truth, whereunto, though not fully, yet thus far he assents: ‘It is true, saith he, what the first opinion as­serted, That some conditions may be accidental to the act, in esse rei, as a natural act, and yet essential to it, in esse moris, morally considered. And the reason, addes he, is taken à priori, because the esse morale or moral being of an Act primarily dependes on the order of Reason; (we say of the Law:) but now it oft happens, that an act or object hath a diverse order to reason, by reason of diverse conditions of those things that concur to the moral Act.’ Thence pag. 174. he tels us what Circum­stances are essential. ‘Right Reason, (which must be understood objectively) is the rule of human acts and their circumstances: therefore the affection or reason of these Circumstances cannot be better explicated, than by their order or regard to right Reason, (I would say the Divine Law.) And the same rule is to be used for the understanding when the conditions of moral Acts are not properly Circumstances, but essential, namely when they are such as, according to right Reason, are altogether ne­cessary, not only as to degrees, but simply as to the honestie or turpitude of the act. For when a Circumstance altogether changeth the conformitie or difformitie of an human act, it changeth its Species.’ In which he plainly grants, That al those Circumstances which change the conformitie or difformitie of an human act, are specific and essential: Which is al that we need contend for; because the Controversie is not about natural or civil Circumstan­ces, but such as belong to the act morally considered: which if good requireth an integritie of Causes and plenitude of Circum­stances: so that if one Circumstance due to the moral bonitie of the act be defective, the whole act is changed and rendred mo­rally evil. By the whole of which it is most evident, that al Circumstances due to the moral goodnesse of an human act, are essential and specific, such as concur to formalise moral Good; which requires a complete conformitie to the Divine Law, not only in Mater, Principes, and End, but also in al Circumstances morally due to the integritie of such an Act: For al good (as has been sufficiently demonstrated) requires an integritie of Causes; whereas sin ariseth from the least defect: according to that knowen Ef­fate of the spurious Dionysius, Divin. Nom. cap. 4. [...], [Page 68] Good is from one and complete cause, but sin from many and singular defects.

§. 4.The Ʋnitie and Ʋniformitie of al moral Good. Having considered moral Good in its Causes and constitu­tive parts, we now descend to the contemplation thereof in its proper Adjuncts, and Attributes, which we shal deduce and draw forth in the subsequent Corollaries. 1. Al moral Good, Virtues, and virtuose Acts have one and the same simple uniforme Idea and Nature. For al moral Good and virtuose Acts flow from one and the same virtuose Principes, tend to one and the same End, and are forma­lised by one and the same conformitie to the Divine Law. Thus Plato, Repub. 5. pag. 445. It appears to me, as it were in a Watch­tower, [...], that the face or forme of Virtue is one; but that of Improbitie, manifold and almost infinite. His mind is, that al Virtues have one and the same formal Idea or face; but sins have varietie, yea almost infinite de­formed shapes. This Aristotle, Eth. lib. 2. cap. 5. pag. 89. having proved, that al moral Virtue consistes in a Mediocritie and Ʋni­formitie, he addes: [...], Moreover we may sin many ways: (for as the Pythagoreans conjecture, sin is infinite and boundlesse; but good is terminate and bounded) but there is but one way of doing good. Where­in we may observe, (1) That al sin is difforme, boundlesse and end­lesse: it hath no forme, measure or number. (2) But Virtue and moral Good is bounded and uniforme. Whence he concludes with a Verse out of some ancient Poet, ‘ [...],’ For good men truly are simply and uniformely such; but wicked men are difformely and variously so. Thus also Aristotle, Mag. Moral. lib. 1. cap. 25. affirmes, That al Good is [...], uniforme; but al Vice [...], multiforme. Hence Plato asserted, [...], That which is just, is equal and uniforme. Whence that Stoic Hypothesis, [...], Al moral goods are e­qual and uniforme, i.e. conforme to the rule of Moralitie. Al this is wel expressed by Augustine, who makes al Good to con­siste, in Modo, Specie, & Ordine, in Mode, Species, and Order, i.e. in a uniforme conformitie to the rule of Moralitie. Hence,

2.Al moral Good and Virtue su­pernatural. There is no real moral Good, or natural Virtue but what is su­pernatural. This Corollarie evidently follows from the former, and indeed from the whole of this discourse about moral Good. [Page 69]For if al moral Virtue or Good requires an integritie of causes, and is formalised by conformitie to the Divine Law, thence it necessarily follows, that moral Good or Virtue can be but one uniforme simple thing. Thence Chrysostome, Hom. 4. in Gen. cals Grace, [...], a gift above nature, over­coming nature. And Cyril in Esa. termes it, [...], above proper Nature; as elsewhere, [...], a Prero­gative above Nature. I am not ignorant that many of the Schole­men, and too many of our Divines, in imitation of them, make a twofold Good and Virtue; one natural and moral: the other spiritual and supernatural. The natural Virtue and moral Good they make to be that which a man may, by the force of natural Consci­ence and other natural Principes, attain unto: The spiritual and supernatural Good or Virtue they make to be infused. Albeit this distinction may, with due limitations, passe for orthodoxe; yet in as much as it was at first framed by the Pelagians, and ta­ken up by their Sectators in the Scholes, I should be glad if Jan­senius's advice for the utter extirpation of it, were embraced: who, in his August. Tom. 2. lib. 4. cap. 14. pag. 256. gives us the origination of this Distinction, which he makes to be first taken up by the Pelagians from the Gentile Philosophers, specially the Peripatetics and Stoics; who held, that there were in men na­tural seeds of Virtue, which being wel cultivated, might arise up to perfect Virtue. ‘These natural seeds of Virtue, addes he, first the Pelagians and Semipelagians brought into their Heresie; and afterwards the Schole-men introduced the same into the Chri­stian Scholes, to the great prejudice of our Doctrine. For those He­retics held, that out of those philosophic seeds true Virtues-might be educed by the alone power of the human Wil. But because the Schole-men saw that this Dogme was openly contrary to the constantly received Doctrine, they therefore framed a double man in one man; and thence a double Charitie, double Virtues, double Workes; some natural, others supernatural; of which there is not the least footstep in the whole Doctrine of Augustine. As if those very Virtues, which the Philosophers and Schole-men cal Natural, were not, by Augustine, stiled Vices.’ And Tom. 2. lib. 2. cap. 2. pag. 326. he assures us, ‘That he has oft greatly wondred, that many of the Philosophers had more truly, accurately, and holily philosophised of the main Heads of moral Doctrine, than many Schole-men; who would [Page 70]fain frame two men in one; the one a Philosopher, and the other a Christian: whence they also coined a twofold Charitie, twofold Virtues, twofold Workes, and a twofold Beatitude, the one natural, the other supernatural.’ Hence,

3.The difficultie of moral Good. To performe any moral Good or virtuose Act is most difficult and rare. O! how difficult and rare is it for men to performe what is good, from good Principes, Ends, in a good manner as to Circumstances, and universal Conformitie to the Divine Law! Thus Plato, Repub. 5. pag. 476. [...]; But of such as can arrive to the first Beautie, and contemplate him in himself, are there not very few? So Phileb. pag. 16. he saith, [...], To explain Wisdome is not very diffi­cult, but to reduce it to practice and use most difficult. So again: [...], What way men may attain to be good is most difficult, i.e. to understand and practise Again, he saith: [...], It is difficult for a man to be made good, and to continue such. Whence in his Cratylus, pag. 385. he saith, [...], According to the old Proverbe, things good are very difficult. Thence also, in his Epinomis, pag. 973. [...], I say it is not possible for men to be blessed and happy here, except some few only. Lastly Plato, in his Repub. 6. saith, That Virtue hath the most perfect accurate forme, and therefore it requires, [...], the most perfect exactitude and diligence for the acquirement thereof: for [...]; Do not the greatest things require the greatest exactitude? And what things greater than mo­ral Goods and Virtues? Thus Aristotle also, in imitation of his Master, once and again demonstrates the difficultie and raritie of moral Good. So Eth. lib. 2. cap. 5. pag. 89. having shewed, That there were varietie of ways, wherein men might sin; but one only way of doing good; he addes: [...], Therefore it is most easie to offend, but most difficult to do good: for to erre from the scope is most-facile, but to hit it, is most difficult. So in like manner, c. 9. pag. 108. he saith, Virtue consistes in mediocritie, i.e. in one indi­visible point of conformitie. Whence he concludes: [...], &c. Wherefore to acquire Virtue is most difficult and laborious: for it is an hard worke [Page 71]to attain to the middle of any thing. As every one cannot find out the point of a Circle; but only the intelligent Mathematician: So to be angrie, to give money, or the like, is easie; but to be angrie, to give money, &c. to whom, and in such a measure, and at such a time, and for such an end, and in such a manner as we ought, this is not easie. Thence he concludes: [...], The bene or manner of doing good, is difficult, laudable, and beautiful. Wherein indeed he gives us an excellent account of the nature and difficultie of moral Good. (1) He supposeth al moral Good to consiste as it were in one middle indivisible point; so that the least deviation therefrom destroys it.Quò enim ma­gis strenuè cur­rit extra viam, eò longiùs à scopo recedit, ideó (que) sit mise­rior. Calvin. (2) That it is very diffi­cult to find out this golden mean, but much more difficult to reach it by our actions. True indeed it's no difficult worke to performe the act materially good, as to give almes, or the like; but [...], the wel doing of it, i.e. from those Principes, for those Ends, and with those Circumstances, that the Act requires in re­gard of its formal constitution, this is most rare, difficult, and only laudable. Hence,

4. The splendid Heroic deeds of Pagans, The Virtues of Pagans lesser sins only. and al such whose minds are not virtuosely disposed, are but lesser Sins. This is most evident by the confessions of the Philosophers themselves, who require to moral Good an integritie of Causes and constitutive Principes: so that it sufficeth not, that the Mater or Office be good, but there is also required a good disposition and habit, the best end, and al such Circumstances as essentially concur to formalise the Act, or deno­minate it morally good. Now let us inquire, did ever any Pagan or man in his natural state performe any one Act thus morally good? What? can we produce any Pagan or natural man, who had his mind so far sanctified by Faith and Love, as to act by force received from God, out of love to God and his Glorie? Truly Augustine, and Jansenius out of him; are not afraid to declare, that al those Heroic Acts and Exploits, which the Philosophers and Schole-men honor with the title of natural or moral Virtues, are indeed but more splendid sins; because poisoned with pride and vain-glorie. Yea, they rise higher and affirme, that the Stoics themselves, who seemed to be the greatest admirers and secta­tors of Virtue, did indeed come under the Apostles condemna­tion, Rom. 8.6, &c. of living after the flesh; because they made their carnal Reason, Free-wil and Self the only measures and springs of their pretended Virtue. Lastly, al moral Virtue, according [Page 72]to philosophic Placits, is but one: so that the Virtues of Pa­gans must be supernatural, or none at al, as before. Thence Greg. Nazianzen, Orat. 3. in Julian. speaking of the Platonists, Stoics, and peripatetics, saith: [...], Virtue to them is only a speciose name, and in nothing more lasting than this life. Thus Chry­sostome, Hom. 27. in Joan. It is not yet apparent to me that the Gen­tiles lived wel— For if the hope of the celestial Kingdome, and the commination of Hel, with other such like sollicitude, [...], can scarce keep men in Virtue, those who are persuaded of none of these things, wil not embrace Virtue. But if some of them counterfeit the same, this they do out of desire of Glorie, &c. This Hypothesis is frequently inculcated by Augustine; and he grounds it on that eternal Veritie of our Lord,Mat. 7.18. Mat. 7.18. Neither can a corrupt tree bring forth good fruit. So contra Julian. l. 4. c. 3. The unbelieving wil, as every Christian grants, is an evil tree, which cannot produce any other than evil fruits, i.e. sins only. The like Cyril, in Hos. [...], &c. Probitie in those that God hates is without its reward, and good manners tending not to true good shal be always reprehended by him. Not but that many Hea­thens, as Christian Hypocrites, may performe Acts and Offices materially good, which yet may be deservedly (as they are by the Ancients) termed Sins, as they procede not from Faith in Christ, and Love to God, the main Principes of al true moral Good. So Chrysost. (Tom. 17. Hom. 17. Edit. Paris.) [...], They are good workes (i.e. materially) but dead, because they have not Faith.

5.The distrioution of moral Good or Virtue into Ju­stice and Pietie. Albeit al Virtue, according to its formal Idea and Reason, be but one; yet, according to its objective material consideration, it may be variously distributed. Thus in sacred Philosophie moral Good or Virtue is distributed, as to its object or mater, into Holinesse and Righteousnesse, Ephes. 4.24. [...], In Righteous­nesse and Holinesse. Righteousnesse comprehends al Second-table-duties, which regard men; and Holinesse, al First-table-duties, which regard God. This distribution is most ancient, and, I pre­sume, was communly received among the Jews. Sure I am Plato has it, and, as I conjecture, from the Mosaic Institutes. Thus in his Gorgias, pag. 507. [...], [Page 73] But now he that comports himself decently towards men, doth righteous things; but he that behaveth himself ae­cently towards God, doth holy or pious things: but he that doth both rightcous and holy things, must necessarily be righteous and holy. Wherein observe, (1) That he distributes al moral Good into just or righteous, and pious or holy. (2) That he makes Justice or Righteousnesse to regard men, but Pietie or Holinesse to regard God. (3) That some may seem to be righteous towards men, who yet are not pious or holy towards God; as on the other hand, some may pretend to be pious towards God, who yet are not just and righteous towards men. But (4) he that is just and righteous towards men, in giving them their due, as also pious and holy towards God, in giving him his due, such is in­deed a virtuose man, morally good, just, and pious. Thus also Serranus, on Plato, Alcibiad. 2. pag. 136. takes notice, how Plato distributes Virtue, [...], into Pietie and Justice; the former relating to the Worship of God, the later to men; where­by our whole life is duely framed and regulated; these being two seminal roots or commun heads of particular Offices and Duties. Lastly Plato, in his Minos, pag. 319. saith, That we should take di­ligent heed first that we offend not in word or deed against God: and then that we offend not against men, specially such as are divine. A Golden Rule for moral Duties.

CHAP. III. Of Virtue, and Moral Libertie.

Moral Virtue an habitual Perfection. Moral Libertie as to state in virtuese Habits. Virtue gives, (1) Dominion, (2) Life, Health, Vigor, (3) Amplitude, (4) Nobilitie and Dignitie, (5) Beautie and Glorie. Moral Libertie as to Exercice consistes in vir­tuose Acts. (1) The Contemplation of the first Truth. (2) Ad­herence to the chiefest Good. (3) Total actual dependence on the first Cause. (4) Conformitie to the divine preceptive Wil, as also submission to his providential Wil. (5) Ʋsing althings in subor­dination to the Fruition and Service of God. Moral Libertie as to [Page 74]exercice the greatest; because it brings (1) Order, (2) Sponta­neitie and suavitie, (3) A Divine Life, (4) Amplitude, (5) Freedom from Sin, (6) Stabilitie of Spirit, (7) Improvement of Virtue, (8) Formal Beatitude.

§. 1.Moral Virtue an habitual Perfe­ction. THE general Idea and Nature of Moral Bonitie having been discussed, we now procede to the discussion of Vir­tue, as it is the origine and cause of moral Libertie. Plato dis­courseth of Virtue in his Meno, the title of which is [...]. Virtue properly, according to its orgination, signifies a Power or Efficace; it being derived from Vir, which primarily signified among the Ancients a stout valiant man; answering to [...] among the Hebrews. So the Greek [...] primarily and properly signi­fies warlike Virtue or Courage, from [...], Mars; and this from [...] arits, terrible, valiant, potent; or, as Vossius, from [...], marats, to waxe strong. Hence in the N.T. [...] is used to expresse the Divine power and efficace of God, as 1 Pet. 2.9. and 2 Pet. 1.3. [...], i.e. by his gloriose power. Thus [...] is ex­pounded by Hesychius [...], a divine power. So the LXX. translate [...], which signifies the gloriose power of God, [...], as Hab. 3.3. Zach. 6.17. Neither is [...] used in the N. T. more than once, if ever, to denote a virtuose disposition of mind, namely Phil. 4.8. So curiose were the sacred Pen-men in avoiding phi­losophic termes, which had been so much abused. But by moral Virtue we here understand an habitual disposition of Soul con­forme to the Rule of Moralitie, the Divine Law. In which strict notion it has one and the same formal idea or reason with su­pernatural Grace, as Jansenius, Amesius, and others under­stand it. For that there is no real moral Virtue but what is super­natural, has been sufficiently demonstrated in the precedent Se­ction, §. 4. Whence true moral Virtue is nothing else but a cer­tain perfection, whereby man is ordained and disposed towards God, as Aquinas, 1. Quaest. 95. Others cal Virtue, the most regular and best state of a rational Creature. Whether Virtue be a Power, Affection, Habit, or merely Act, has been disputed among the ancient Philosophers,Gratia non est habitus pro­priè, sed habi­tudo sive sani­tas mentis. Aq. 1.2. Quaest. 100. Art. 3. as wel as Schole-Divines. But the com­munly received opinion is, that it is an Habit, or as Aquinas ex­presseth it, an Habitude of the Soul. That Virtue is an Habit Aristotle largely demonstrates, Eth. l. 2. c. 4. as Philos. General. P. 2. l. 1. c. 1. sect. 4. §. 3. An Habit properly is of a middle [Page 75]nature between a Power and an Act, which gives the power an ac­cidental facilitie of acting. [...], a power, Definit. Platon. is de­fined, [...], that which is of it self effective, or ope­rative: but [...], an Habit, is desined, pag. 414. [...], a disposition of the Soul, whereby we are said to be so or so qualified for acting. So that every Habit is in order of nature at least, if not of time, before the Act, but subsequent to the Power. For the Soul by its Habits is made more facile or capable to act. The definition and cognition of Habits depends on the cognition of their proper Object, Subject, Mode of existing in their Subject, and Acts. For the forme of the Act follows the forme of the Agent: and such as the Habit is in relation to its object, such is the Agent. Hence, by how much the more noble and perfect the habit is, by so much the more noble and perfect is the Agent and his operation. Whence Virtue is a su­pernatural Habitude, Habit, or active Forme, whereby the Soul is elevated to supernatural Acts. Thence Virtue is termed by Basil, [...], Completive of Nature. This indeed might be evinced out of Plato's Definition of Virtue, drawen into forme by Serranus, Meno, pag. 68. Virtue is [...], the habit of the Soul rationally operating by the natural power, the best worke, and aiming at the best end. So that al Virtue requires not only the best mater or object, but also the best end. And indeed such as the habitual aptitude or disposition of the Soul is, such wil the end be, as Aristotle, Eth. l. 3. c. 10. pag. 160. wel observes: [...], The end of every action is such as the habit is: as an habit of fortitude makes men affect valiant acts. Again, lib. 4. cap. 13. pag. 254. [...], Such as every man is, such is his action, and speech, and such is his life: i.e. such as a mans habitual frame of Spirit is, such is his end, acts, and life. Al habits are as a Pondus affixed to the Soul, whereby it is strongly bent and inclined towards objects, ends and acts, suitable thereto. Al habitual Vertues are one and the same in regard of principe and seed, though different as to their proper objects and acts. The same habitual Entitie as it facilitates to know God, is called Di­vine Knowlege; but as it facilitates to love God, it's called Di­vine Love; and so in the other virtuose Habits. That Superna­turalitie is a Mode intrinsecally and essentially included in al vir­tuose [Page 76]Habits, is evident, because human Nature, specially as now corrupted, cannot reach an end or act supernatural: For if a natural power should have any activitie in respect of a superna­tural act and object, it may, by a paritie of reason, by degrees attain to the highest supernatural objects and acts, as Alvarez, de Auxil. Disp. 65. demonstrates. Of the nature of Supernaturali­tie, and how it is intrinsecally and essentially included in the substance of al graciose Habits, see Choquetius, de Grat. l. 1. Disp. 7. & 12. Also Thomas Hurtado, Praecursor Theologus, de Supernatu­ralitate Entis, Disp. 1. Controvers. 1, &c.

§. 2.Moral Libertie as to state in virtuose Habits. From what has been laid down touching the nature of Virtue it evidently follows, that al moral Libertie ariseth from those virtuose habits the Soul is clothed with, and agreable exer­cices flowing therefrom. What Natural Libertie is, has been fully explicated Court Gent. P. 2. B. 3. C. 9. Sect. 3. §. 11. How much moral Libertie differs from natural may easily be discerned by any that impartially considers the same. The later indeed is essential to and inseparable from man as man, and al human acts; but the former is proper to man as virtuose, as wil suffi­ciently appear by what follows. Every man is so far morally free as he is near to God. Althings aim at Unitie: God, who is the supreme Unitie, convertes althings to himself: and every thing is so far free and perfect, as it comes near to God. The human Soul has a twofold approche to God, (1) by Similitude, (2) by actual real Ʋnion and Fruition. (1) The more like the Soul is to God, the more one it is with him, and free: al simili­tude is a kind of Unitie: and whence springs the Souls similitude to God, but from virtuose habits? (2) The Soul has actual real union with, and fruition of God by virtuose exercices. Hence ariseth a twofold moral Libertie: (1) As to State, (2) As to Exercice in that state. The former depends on habitual Virtue; the later on virtuose exercices. Of each in their order.

Moral Libertie as to state consistes in virtuose dispositions of Soul, whereby it is capacitated for and made like to God. Thus the spurious Dionysius, Eccles. Hier. cap. 2. [...], Seing the Divine Nativitie or Re­generation is a certain Divine state, certainly he that has not attained to that divine state, shal never know, much lesse do the things delivered by God. Whence also he concludes: [...]. [Page 77] The principal progresse of divine dilection in the sacred observation of divine Commands consistes in the most ineffable framing of our divine state. This Athanasius, Dialog. 1. contr. Mace­don. termes, [...], The participation of sanctitie by Grace. And the supposed Ignatius, ad Magn. [...], the forment of Grace: i.e. that which gives a forment or principe of operation to the whole Soul. And Greg. Nyssenus stiles this State of Virtue or Grace [...], Transelementation, or Restauration of the Principes of the divine life, or of the Soul, whereby it is made like to God, and capable of adhering to him. Whence Damascene, Orthodox. Fid. lib. 2. cap. 12. gives us this excellent Character of Man, as invested with the Image of God: God made man a little world in the greater, another Angel, an Inspe­ctor of the visible Creature, and Disciple of the intellectual; King of those things that are on earth: both terrene and celeste, temporal and immortal, and that which is supreme, [...], by accesse to God to be deified: but to be deified not by transalition into the Divine Essence, but by participation of the divine irradiation. Thence Augustine stiles Libertie the best disposition of Soul. Similitude to God is the highest Libertie as to state: so far as any is made virtuose, so far he is made free: The conne­xion between Pietie and Libertie is so intimate, as that indeed they have one and the same beginning, progresse, and consumma­tion. By how much the more ample, spiritual, pure, and perfect the Soul is, by so much the more free it is: and whence springs the Amplitude, Spiritualitie, Puritie, and Perfection of the Soul, but from virtuose habits? Indeed Plato estimed nothing good but Virtue, and moral Good: whence Antipater the Stoic writ three Books with this Title, [...], That according to Plato Virtue only was good. That Virtue is the most perfect state of the Soul, and that which brings with it most moral Libertie is most evident; because hereby it is rendred ca­pable of adhering to its first Cause, and last End, which is the top of moral Libertie. For wherein consistes the perfection of moral Libertie, but in its conformitie to its most perfect Exemplar, which is the Divine Bonitie? And is not this the privilege of mo­ral Bonitie or Virtue? Hence Virtue is defined by Aquinas, Dis­positio perfecti ad optimum, The Disposition of a perfect Subject, to [Page 78]the most perfect Exemplar and End. Virtue indeed is more perfect than the Soul it self: so Aquinas: ‘Grace, saith he, in it self and according to its essence, is more noble than the nature of the Soul; because it is an expression or participation of the divine Bonitie: and that which is substantially in God, is accidentally in the Soul participating of the divine Bonitie. That which belongs to God by nature, belongs to us by Grace.’ And Sua­rez saith: ‘That Grace is the Bond, whereby man is conjoined to God, his last end.’ Now by how much the more the Soul is conjoined to God, by so much the more sublime, free, and perfect its state and condition is. In sum, Libertie of state consistes in a virtuose or graciose disposition of Soul, whereby it is enabled to understand, embrace and adhere to what is good, in that manner and measure as it ought. Take al the notions of true moral Libertie, and they agree to none but the virtuose man.

1.Virtue gives Deminion. Libertie is defined by the Platonist, [...], a Princi­palitie or Dominion of Life: also [...], a plenary power over althings. Which the Stoics interpret, [...], a self-moving autoritie or power. And whence ariseth this Domi­nion of the Soul over it self and other things, but from virtuose habits? Plato assures us, That a virtuose temperate man is [...], stronger than himself: i.e. by virtue he has dominion over his sensitive part. Again, Repub. 9. he instructes us, That he who is best is most happie and august or royal; because he is able to governe himself, [...]: But he that is most wicked is most miserable, because he is a Tyrant over him­self. May we account him a man fit to governe himself, who is a slave to his unlawful passions and lusts? The Orator defines Li­bertie, a power of living as men list: and who hath this power to live as he list, but the virtuose man, whose wil is conformed to the divine Wil? Doth the voluptuose sensual man live as he list, whose mind is distracted and torne in pieces by unbridled lusts, as by so many wild Horses? Can it be imagined, that the ambi­tiose man lives as he list, whose mind is stil on the rack of am­bitiose designes? Doth the avaricious man live as he list, who the more he has, the more he wants? It's most evident, that no man lives as he list, but the virtuose man, who has a wil slexi­ble to the divine Wil. This Dominion that attends moral Li­bertie is wel expressed in sacred Philosophie:Hos. 11.12. So Hos. 11.12. But Judah yet ruleth with God, and is faithful with the Saints. (1) Ob­serve, [Page 79]That Judah's ruling with God is opposed to that of Ephraim, who ruled also, but not with God, as v. 7. Ephraim en­deavored to exalt himself on the ruines of Gods Worship, by erecting Calves at Dan and Bethel, &c. But Judah ruled with God, and was faithful with the Saints. (2) Judah rules with God: i.e. by serving and obeying God obtains Dominion and Rule over himself and al lower things: he lives as he lists; because his wil is conformed to the Divine Wil.

2. Moral Libertie consistes in the moral Life, Health, Vigor, Virtue gives life, health, vi­gor and force. and Force of the Soul, which also ariseth from virtuose Habits. Al natural freedome supposeth a vital subject in which it inheres: and so, by a paritie of reason, al moral spiritual Libertie suppo­seth a moral spiritual life and vital subject: and indeed life ren­ders every thing most beautiful, active, and perfect. Whence, by how much the more noble, excellent and perfect the life of any thing is, by so much the more raised, noble, and excellent is its state, and al its operations. Life is that which seasoneth eve­ry thing: and every life draws to it things suitable to its nature: so the spiritual, divine, virtuose life has Principes above human Nature, more noble and excellent: and herein consistes moral Libertie as to state. Plato, Repub. 4. pag. 444. informes us, That the health of the bodie consistes in the equal temperament of al humors, &c. So in the Soul, [...], Virtue truly is a cer­tain health, pulchritude and good habitude of Soul: but sin is the dis­ease, turpitude and infirmitie thereof. Health, according to Augu­stine and Jansenius, consistes in the vigor, force and strength of Nature: and what makes the Soul more vigorous and strong than Virtue? Whence is the vigor and force of any Creature, but from its Spirits? And are not virtuose Habits the Spirits of the Soul? That Virtue is the vigor and force of the Soul, Plato once and again assertes. So in his Gorgias, pag. 467. [...], Power is of good, &c. Also pag. 470. he saith, [...], To be able to do much is to be good. And in his Hippias, pag. 375. he saith, Righteousnesse is the vigor and power of the Soul: for the more righteous the Soul is, the more potent it is. Divine Light and Virtue is the strongest thing in the World. In the sensible World nothing is so strong as Light: and in the rational World nothing so strong as Truth and Virtue. Al the force and vigor of lust comes from impotence; but Virtue is as a Pondus or [Page 80]weight on the Soul, which strongly impels it to its last end. What more potent than Love, whereby the Soul adheres to its last end? By how much the more spiritual and pure any facultie is, by so much the stronger it is: and is not Virtue the puritie of the Soul? Again, the strength of every thing consistes in its ad­hence to its first Principes, and last end: departure from our first Principe and last end speaks impotence: And what is it that enables us to adhere to our first Principe and last end but Virtue? The strength of the Soul lies in its abilitie to do good and suffer evil: and whence is this but from Virtue? The better any thing is,Prov. 3.7, 8. the stronger it is. Thence Prov. 3.7, 8. The fear of the Lord is said to be health to the navel, and marrow to the bones. The navel is the great organ, which conveighs both food and physic to the infant inthe womb: also marrow gives strength and vigor to the bones, as Job 21.24. Such is Virtue to the Soul, both health and strength.

e. Moral Libertie as to state consistes chiefly in a divine Am­plitude and Enlargement of Soul, The Amplitude of virtuose Ha­bits. whereby it is made capable of en­joying its first Principe and last End. Indeed al Libertie, both natural and moral, implies Amplitude. Thence, amongst the He­brews, [...] signifies both Libertie and Amplitude, as Psal. 119.45. And whence comes al moral Amplitude as to state, but from virtuose habits? The first most ample Being is God, who has no limits to his Being, or his Felicitie: and so far as man is like to God, so far he enters into this Divine Amplitude of state. Hence the Platonists assert, that Amplitude is founded in Unitie, namely God, and from this divine Unitie it takes its origine and measures. For every thing is by so much the more ample and extensive, by how much the nearer it comes to pure Act. Al mater and passive power brings with it limits and coarctation: every thing is so far straitned and narrowed in its being and appetite, as it par­takes of mater either physic or metaphysic: but on the contrary, so far as things approche unto pure Act, which is God, so far they rejoice in Amplitude and Enlargement, either of Being or Ap­petite: and who approche nearer unto God, who is pure Act, than virtuose Souls, who partake of the Divine similitude? Do not these then partake most of divine Amplitude as to state? How miserably is the Soul straitned, pinioned, and cooped up by sin? But O1 what a boundlesse moral Amplitude do virtuose ha­bits bring with them? Subjection and Adhesion to God by Virtue [Page 81]brings the highest Amplitude and Dominion. For God being the first Efficient, that gives Being, and the last End, that gives blessed Being; it hence necessarily follows, that Subjection and Adhesion to God, in both these respects, must bring the highest Amplitude and Dominion with it. As man, by departure from God, is subject to a miserable necessitie, and coarctation of sin; so by regresse and returne to God he passeth into Divine Ampli­tude. Is not the Assimilation of the Soul to God by virtuose habits, its ultimate perfection as to state? Must not then al di­vine Amplitude take its origine hence? This is wel illustrated by Plato, in his Theaetetus, pag. 176. We may not presume, that sin finds place with God: wherefore we must endeavor to flie from it, as much as may be: [...]. But this flight consistes in this, that we are assimilated and conformed to God, so far as possiby we may be: and that which assimilates us to God is Justice and Sanctitie conjoined with divine Wisdome. His mind is, that Assimilation to God by vir­tuose habits puts the Soul into a state of distance from sin, and conjunction with God, whence al moral Amplitude doth emerge. Thence Cyrillus, lib. 1. in Joan. termes Grace, [...], Sanctitie infused from without by Grace, according to the divine and supermun­dane Image. And Greg. Nazianzen, in Apolog. termes it [...], Dei­fication; also [...], the Appropinquation of God. And the spurious Dionysius, Eccles. Hierar. cap. 2. saith, That in the divine Regeneration men attain, [...], to a divine state or existence. Whence Virtue is termed by Ammonius, [...], as it were a Qualitie of the Di­vinitie in us. Indeed what is the pious virtuose Soul, but an immense bosome and living receptacle of the chiefest Good? And O! what an infinite Amplitude must such a Soul rejoice in? It's a commun Saying among the Platonistes,Bonitas est ne­xus cum uni­tate. That Bonitie is a nexe or conjunction with Ʋnitie, i. e. God. And must not such an intimate conjunction necessarily bring with it the highest Amplitude? Again, Plato and his Sectators generally informe us, that al Virtue is [...], a participation of the divine Nature. So Plato, in his Phaedo, assures us, That a virtuose man is [...], akin to God, because partaker of the divine Nature, as the sacred Philo­sophie, 2 Pet. 1.4. This he explicates at large, Repub. 6. pag. 501. as Gen. 1.26. Now then, if Virtue be such an expression and [Page 82]participation of the divine Nature, must it not of necessitie also partake of the divine Amplitude and Libertie? In short then, the nearer and more like to God the Soul is, the more ample and capacious it is: and by how much the more virtuose it is, by so much the nearer, and more like to God it is: doth it not then necessarily follow, that according to the degree and measure of Virtue, such is the degree and measure of divine Amplitude as to state? Consinement to what is good, gives the greatest am­plitude and enlargement of heart, for the knowlege, love, and imitation of God, as Psal. 119.45. [...] in Amplitude, &c. The Soul never walkes in greater amplitude and libertie of spirit, than when it most firmely and inviolably adheres to God and his Divine Wil.

4. Moral Libertie as to state importes Nobilitie, Dignitie, Emi­nence, Excellence, Nobilitie, Dig­nitie, Greatnesse from Virtue. Singularitie, Separation, and Magnitude or Great­nesse of Disposition, and Condition of Life. And are not al these essentially and intrinsecally included in Virtue, both as to name and thing? [...], Virtue is derived from [...], Mars; as this from [...], arits, a potent valiant man: which notes, that Virtue is most potent and great. So Plato, in his Cratylus, makes [...], Good, to be the same with [...], excellent, eximious, preeminent. And indeed al the notions of Virtue or Sanctitie in sacred Philo­sophie import Discretion, Separation, Singularitie, Preeminence. Thus [...], holy, is derived from [...], to separate from commun use: and it is sometimes synonymous with [...], which signifies pecu­liar, most pretiose, excellent, &c. Whence [...], an holy people, Deut. 7.6.Deut. 7.6. & 14.2. is there interpreted [...], a most ex­cellent, eximious, noble people: by the LXX. as also, Tit. 2.14. [...], a select, peculiar, superexcellent people. And Psal. 16.3. [...],Psal. 16.3. Saints, is interpreted inwhat follows, [...], magnisi­cent, eximious: which shews that none are truly magnificent but virtuose holy persons. Thence also [...], holy, pure, is deduced from [...], veneration, worship; and this from [...], to worship: which they also derive from [...] azaz, to honor. That Sanctitie and Virtue is the Crown of al other Excellences, is evident from Zach. 9.16.Zach. 9.16. For they shal be as the stones of a Crown, lifted up as an Ensigne on his land: i. e. God wil deliver his Saints out of their dangers and troubles; as also lift them up to that honor, which pretiose stones have in the Kings Diademe. The word [...] signi­fies both Separation and a Crown: which notes here, that every [Page 83]Saint is separated by God, as a Jewel in his Crown. Thence God termes them, Mal. 3.17. My Jewels. Which notes both separa­tion and proprietie, as also dignitie and excellence. Indeed Sancti­tie and Virtue is the Glorie and Crown of al other Excellences; because it implies separation from al impurities, and a compre­hension of the highest perfections: It raiseth things and persons, otherwise commun and vulgar, to the highest degree of excel­lene, even to the Image of God, which is the perfection of hu­man Nature. Thus Plato, Leg. 4. pag. 716. largely demonstrates, That conformitie to the divine Image is the highest perfection of human Nature: Of which see Philos. General. P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect. 3. §. 5. But more particularly, That Virtue brings with it the highest No­bilitie, Magnificence, and excellence, is evident from many Platonic Philosophemes. Thus Definit. Platon. pag. 413. [...], Nobi­litie is desined, [...], a Virtue of generose manners. So [...], Magnificence, is pag. 412. defined, [...], a Dignitie according to the most august or venerable right Reason: i. e. according to Virtue. For indeed al the ancient Philosophers made Honor and Nobilitie to be but the shadow and reward of Virtue. A free man, according to the Hebrews is stiled [...], nadib; which signifies also a Prince or Noble man, one endowed with noble, generose, virtuose dis­positions. What more sublime and noble than Vitue?Ut foelicitatis est, quantum velis posse; sic magnitudinis, quantum possis velle. Plin. ad Trajan. Is not that a generose Soul, that is wel-disposed and inclined to gene­rose heroic deeds? Is any Soul more great than he, who can despise great mundane things for Virtues sake? It is accounted by some a great piece of felicitie to be able to do what they wil: but is it not a greater piece of libertie to wil what we ought, which alone belongs to virtuose persons? Is he not truly great, who has a great measure of Virtue? Hence among the Heroic Virtues, there was found out an Apotheosis; which was nothing else but an extension of Virtues and human conditions to a per­fection not human. Virtuose persons are the greatest men in the world: they have the greatest Souls: yea nothing is really great, but what is good. The best Nobilitie lies in the mind indued with Virtue: what mind more great than that, which is subject to the great God? Who is greater than he, who is least in his own eyes? Is not such a Soul most great in divine favor? It was a great Saying of Zeno the Stoic: You are not there­fore good, because great; but you are therefore great beause good.

5. Moral Libertie as to state implies Splendor, Beautie, and Glorie. The Splendor, Beautie and Glorie of Virtue. Plato makes Beautie to arise from the predominance of the forme over the mater, which otherwise is distorme. By the forme I understand the spirituose active Principe; and so indeed it holds true of the Soul, the Beautie whereof consistes in the pre­dominance of virtuose habits, which are as the spirits, and forme of the Soul. For look as the Soul, which is the forme of a man, gives life, vigor, perfection and beautie to the human bodie; so proportionably virtuose habits give life, vigor, perfection and beautie to the human Soul. Plato abounds much in this argu­ment, that Virtue is the Beautie of the Soul. So in his Phaedrus, pag. 279. O Friend Pan [the Ape of the Messias] give me to be beautiful within: i.e. in my Soul. Thence pag. 250. he saith, The Beautie of divine Wisdome [which is the Spirit of Virtue] is so illustrious and amiable, that if it were seen with eyes it would stir up wonderful Loves. Al Beautie ariseth from Light, spirits, and pro­portion of parts: and what gives Light, Spirits, and proportion to the Soul but Virtue? Some define Beautie, the fulgor, or bland face of Goodnesse: and doth not this speak Virtue most beau­tiful? Cicero defines Beautie, a due congruence with suavitic of color: and what hath a more due congruence and sweet color, than Virtue? Among the Beauties of Nature nothing more beau­tiful than Light: and O1 what a gloriose illustrious Light at­tends Virtue? Is not divine Veritie the Spring of Virtue, the most virgin, unspotted, gloriose, affective Light? Plato, in his Philebus, pag. 64. saith, That [...], the Idea or face of Good is composed of three things, [...], Beautie, and Symmetrie, and Truth. Yea, he saith, [...] The very Images of things beautiful, are beautiful. And is not God most beautiful, yea the first Beautie, as before Chap. 2. §. 2. And what is true Virtue but the gloriose Image of this first Beautie? Must it not then be most beautiful? Aristotle, Eth. lib. 1. cap. 8. assures us, [...], accord­ing to the Delphic Inscription, That which is most just is most beanti­ful. And Seneca, Epist. 115. addes: ‘If it were lawful to look into the mind of a good man, O! what a beautiful face should we see? How holy, how resplendent a mind, composed of a magnific and placid countenance? yea, saith he, Virtue is so graciose and beautiful, that it is natural even to wicked men to approve better things: neither has any one so far banished the [Page 85]natural Law, or put off humanitie, as to espouse wickednesse for wickednesse sake.’ So Plato and Aristotle: [...], No man is voluntarily wicked for wickednesse sake. Which shews, that Virtue in it self is most amiable. Greg. Nyssenus, Hom. 2. in Cant. termes Virtue, [...], the Grace of the Beautie of the Soul flowing from God, the supreme Beautie. And Basil, in Psal. saith, That Grace is, [...], the Beautie of the Soul. Also Corysostome, ad Theodor. Paraen. 1. tels us; That a deformed bodie cannot be made beautiful, but a de­formed Soul may be rendred such by Grace: [...], &c. To render the Soul beautiful, although it be fallen into extreme turpitude, to reduce it to the most excellent pulchritude, and so to make it amiable and desirable, &c. In sum, what is Beau­tie but the splendor and lustre of those perfections, which are loged in any subject? And thence is not God the first Beautie, because most perfect? And are not althings so far beautiful as they partake of his Divine Perfection and Goodnesse? For what is al created Beautie, but a ray of the Divine Beautie? And a­mong created Beauties, doth any thing more ressemble the Di­vine Beautie than true Virtue? 'Plato, in his Phaedrus, pag. 250. saith, That Justie and Temperance and other Virtues in this our im­perfect state have little Light and Beautie: but in the future state, [...], then we shal contemplate the most perfect Beautie, &c. And then he concludes: [...], But now Beau­tie [of things divine] has gained this dignitie, that it is the most illustrious and amiable of althings.

§. 3. Having explicated and demonstrated moral Libertie as to state, we now descend to consider it as to its Exercice, Moral Libertie as to Exercice in virtuose Acts. which consistes in virtuose Acts. For it is a good Theoreme in Philo­sophie, That the second Act follows the first: such as the state is, such are the Exercices in that state: As in natural and civil Libertie, such as the state is, such are the Exercices in that state: if a man be, sui juris, a free man, he may act as such in that Cor­poration wherein he is free: Thus in moral Libertie, such as are free as to state, by having their Souls clothed with virtuose ha­bits, they wil exert and put sorth virtuose Exercices in that state. So that moral Libertie as to Exercice is nothing else but a libertie to act according to that dignitie of state they are invested with. [Page 86]Now for the more ful explication and demonstration of moral Libertie as to Exercice, we are, (1) To explicate what it is, and (2) To demonstrate, that it is the supreme Libertie of a rational Creature. As for the explication of moral Libertie as to Exercice we may comprehend it in the following Propositions.

1. Moral Libertie as to Exercice consistes in the spiritual, affe­ctionate, permanent Contemplation of the first beautie or Truth. To contemplate the first Truth, The Contempla­tion of the first Truth. as wel according to sacred, as Plato­nic Philosophie, is one of the supreme parts of moral Libertie as to Exercice. Contemplation, according to the Platonist, is the Exercice of the mind on things intelligible: and what more intelli­gible, than the first Truth? Thence Plate, in his Phaedrus, pag. 247. tels us, That the mind [...], beholding for some while the first Being, and satiating it self in the contemplation of Truth, and giving up it self thereto, is thereby nourished and recreated with the highest plea­sure. As sight is of al the most noble sense, and most quick in apprehension; so contemplation or the sight of the first Beautie and Truth is one of the highest Exercices of moral Libertie; that which brings in most tranquillitie, satisfaction and pleasure to the mind. Of al Contemplations there is none so powerful, so sweet, so free, as the contemplation of the first Cause and last End. As God is infinitely better than al Creatures, so the con­templation of God is infinitely better than the contemplation of al the Creatures. That the contemplation of the first Being is one of the highest Acts of moral Libertie is most manifest; be­cause (1) Contemplation is the highest Act of the Soul; and therefore when placed on the supreme Being and highest Object, must needs bring the highest Libertie and Perfection with it, Joh. 17.3. (2) The mind of man, when rectified, has a flagrant ar­dent desire to contemplate the first Beautie and Truth. Aristotle assures us, [...], That those who are conversant in the inquisition of truth have been sweetest manner of life. How sweet and free is it then to contemplate the first Truth? (3) The contemplation of the first Being gives a wise emprove­ment of al other Beings and Objects which occur. This spiritua­liseth and draws out the Elixir of al objects, providences, persons and things we converse with. (4) The contemplation of the first Beautie is that which most assimilates the Soul thereto. If there were a beautiful Picture, which persons by looking on, [Page 87]should gradually be made like unto, who would not gaze thereon? And is not the first Beautie such, which makes al those as spiri­tually contemplate thereon, beautiful, and free? Joh. 1.14.Joh. 1.14. [...], We have diligently and attentively beheld his glorie, as on a Theatre. The Human Nature is that gloriose Theatre, on which the Deitie descends and offers himself to our contempla­tion: and O! what a gloriose contemplation is this, to behold the Deitie in the golden Arke of Humanitie? How is the Soul hereby transformed into the same gloriose Image, as 2 Cor. 3.18? (4) Spiritual contemplationof the first Being gives possession therefo. Truth is made one with the Mind by contemplation: and doth not the first Truth become one with the Mind, by lively affe­ctionate contemplation thereof? (5) Contemplation of the first Beautie is most influential on the divine Life, and therefore a main Spring of Moral Libertie. Is not this a great Source of Divine Wisdome? Are not contemplative persons in things natural and moral the wisest of men? And is not this most true in things moral and divine? Was it not a great Saying of that great Di­vine, The greatest Musers are the best Artists? and doth not this hold most true here? yea, doth not the Psalmist assure us,Psal. 39.3. Psal. 39.3. That whiles the heart museth, the fire of divine affection burn­eth? Doth not contemplation on the first Beautie fortifie the heart against every tentation, tune it for every service, and sweeten every crosse? Is it not both food and physic to the Soul, the life of our life, yea universally useful in every state and con­dition.

2. Another Exercice of moral Libertie consistes in an intimate and inviolable Adherence unto the last End and chiefest Good. Adherence to the last End and chiefest Good. What the last End and chiefest Good is, with the proper Characters of each, we have, §. 1. of this Chapter, fully discussed: our present worke is to explicate what moral Libertie the Soul acquires by adhering thereto. The last End possesseth the greatest Ampli­tude, Universalitie, and Libertie imaginable, as to al means: it is, as an infinite Ocean, an immense universal Principe, that conteins al Morals in its bosome: althings receive bounds and limits from their last end: but this receives bounds and limits from nothing. Now the last end enjoying such an infinite Amplitude and Libertie, it necessarily follows, that the more intimately and firmely the Soul adheres to it, the more libertie as to exercice it is possessed of. Thence Plato, Leg. 4. pag. 715. saith, That God [Page 88](according to the ancient Tradition, I suppose Judaic) is the Principe and End of althings. And then he addes, pag. 716. That he, who adheres, with a composed mind and sirme purpose, to this last end, is most blessed and free. And in what follows, he lays down the manner how the Soul adheres to God, namely, by conformable Acts of Pietie, &c. And herein indeed his Philosophemes are conso­nant to sacred Philosophie; which frequently placeth moral Li­bertie as to exercice, in inviolable close Adhesion unto God, as our last End.Psal. 63.8. So Psal. 63.8. My Soul adheres closely to thee, as the Original [...] importes. We find the same word in the same sense, Deut. 10.20. Ruth 1.14, 16. Job 41.17. Psal. 119.31. and it primarily denotes, that intimate inviolable conjugal Ad­herence, which is or ought be between man and wife, who are, by Law of Nature, one flesh, as Gen. 2.24. And that this Adhe­rence to God as our last End, and chiefest Good is a main part of moral Libertie,Psal. 73.28. as to exercice, is further evident from Psal. 73.28. But it is good for me: i. e. it is my chiefest Good, that wherein my highest libertie consistes. To draw near to God, [...]. Appropin­quation, Accesse, Adherence to God. Thence the LXX. render it, [...], To adhere to God, to be as it were glued to God: So the word, in its primary notion, signifies. Thence it is frequently used to expresse that intimate conjunction that ought to be between man and wife, as Mat. 19.5. yea Ephes. 5.31. it signifies the conjugal adherence and union between Christ and his Church.1 Cor. 6.17. And we find [...] used in the same sense, 1 Cor. 6.17. [...], He that is glued, or conjugally united to God as his chiefest Good, as the precedent words import. And O! what an high piece of moral Libertie is this, intimately and inviolably to adhere to God, as our last End and chiefest Good? Is the heart ever more free, than when it doth most strongly, by al manner of affectionate exercices, adhere to its chiefest Good? So many grains as there are of a bended wil for God, so much moral Libertie. A tenacious, resolute, invincible adherence unto our last end, by acts of love, desire, and other affections, makes the Soul exceding free in al its motions.Psal. 73.26. Thus Psal. 73.26. My flesh and my heart faileth, [...] signifies to consume with desire, or, to fail with long expectation. This poor mans case was thus stated: He saw the wicked to flourish, and the godly oppressed, which brought him under anxious disputes about the chiefest Good: but, upon inquirie in the Sanctuarie, he was resolved to adhere [Page 89]inviolably to God as his chiefest Good So it follows: But God is the strength of my heart, and my portion for ever. Some render it, the reck unto which my heart adheres: others, the firme adhesion of my heart is to God, my chiefest Good. Whence follows his libertie v. 28.Psal. 86.4. Thus Psal. 86.4. Rejoice the Soul of thy servant: i. e. make me free for and in al moral exercices: and why? for unto thee, O Lord, do I lift up my Soul: i.e. unto thee as my chiefest Good do I adhere. So Psal. 25.1. This tenacious adherence of the Soul to its last end, is lively illustrated by our Lord, Mat. 6.20-24. v. 20. He exhorts them,Mat. 6.20-24. To lay up treasures in Heaven: i. e. to make God their last End and chiefest Good: to cleave to himwith an inviolable intime bent of wil: and he gives the reason of it, v. 21. For where your treasure is there wil your heart be also. the heart and the Treasure are ever toge­ther. This our Lord illustrates by a lively notion, v. 24. He wil hold to the one, and despise the other, [...], mordicus adhaerebit. [...] properly signifies, to hold fast a thing, in opposition to those that would pluck it from us: Thence, to be very tenacious in adhering to persons or things: So in Plato, Xenophon, and Isocrates. It's em­phatically here, as Luk. 16.13.Luk. 16.13. applied to the Souls tenacious adhering to its last End and chiefest Good. Whence it's added, and despise the other. A Soul that tenaciously adheres to its chief­est Good, despiseth al frowns or blandishments that may assault it. Thence v. 25. our Lord concludes, [...], Therefore: i. e. If you adhere to God as your chiefest Good, you will not be so anxiously concerned about the goods of Time. To sum up this Argument. Every Creature has an Element to live in: and when it s in that Element it is most free: The Souls Element is its last End and chiefest Good: and every man is more or lesse morally free, as he more or lesse adheres thereto. For such as a mans last end is, such is the motion of his Soul as to moral good or evil, and moral libertie or bondage. By how much the more we love, delight in and enjoy our last end, by so much the more free we are in al our ways. The libertie of a rational Agent con­sistes, not in having varietie of objects to adhere to, and take complacence in, but in transmitting al to his last end, which is his best good.

That a Wil actually and strongly bended to adhere to its last End and chiefest Good is most free, wil appear by the following Particulars. (1) The more the Wil is fortified by true Virtue to adhere to its last End and chiefest Good, the more free it is [Page 90]from sin, which is the worst servitude. He indeed is truly noble and generose, who is not a vassal to any base lust. Al power to sin is the diminution of libertie. Impeccabilitie or an utter im­possibilitie of sinning is so far from destroying libertie, as that it is perfected hereby. The sweetest and highest libertie is to have no power to sin. Now the more the Wil actually adheres to its last end, the lesse power it has to sin. (2) Moral libertie con­sistes in the Souls being preserved from whatever may damnifie or prejudice it: and wherein consistes the preservation of every things, but in its Ʋnitie? Doth not division ever bring dissolu­tion? And what preserves the Souls unitie so much, as actual ad­herence to God, the first Unitie? (3) The moral libertie of the Wil consistes chiefly inhaving al inferor things subject to it: and when are althings more subject to the dominion of the Wil, than when it is, by a resolute actual adherence, subject to the Wil of God? (4) The more harmonious and uniforme the Souls acts are, the more morally free they are? And whence springs this harmonie, but from actual regard and adherence to the last end? (5) Where ever the Soul finds rest and satisfaction, there it finds moral libetie: and doth not the Rest of the Soul arise from its adherence to its chiefest good. Thence that great Essate of the spurious Dionysius: [...], Bonitie [or the chiefest Good] convertes althings to it self: i. e. al­things tend to and acquiesce therein as in their Centre or ulti­mate perfection. (6) The more the Wil is conformed to the Divine Wil, the more free it is: and whose Wil is more conforme to the Divine Wil, than his, who actually and resolutely adheres to God? Doth not such a Wil touch the Divine Wil in every point, as two strait Lines?

3. Moral Libertie as to Exercice consistes in an actual, Dependence on the first Cause. total, and immediate Dependence on the first Cause of althings. Every Crea­ture having something of Nothing, or passive Power, either physic or metaphysic and obediential; it thence fals under the Law of Mu­tabilitie, which is the root of Dependence. Novitie of Being, De­ficience and Dependence is essential to the Creature, as Eternitie of Being, Immutabilitie, and Independence is to the Creator. For every Creature being only Being by participation; hence Depen­dence becomes intrinsecal to it, and inseparable from its nature, as Suarez, Metaph. Disp. 20. Sect. 5. acutey demonstrates. Yea, Disp. 31. Sect. 14. he further demonstrates, ‘That Subordination [Page 91]or Dependence of a created Being, both in acting and causing, formally belongs to its essential reason as such; because this dependence is founded, not in any qualitie or proprietie of the Creature, extrinsecal to its Essence, but in the very intrinsecal limitation thereof. So that the very Essence of the Creature, as such, is the root of this dependence: and to suppose a Crea­ture, and not to suppose it to be dependent in essence and ope­ration, implies a contradiction.’ Neither has the rational Crea­ture a natural dependence only, but also moral on its first Cause. We find both mentioned by Plato, Leg. 4. pag. 715. where he shews, That God is [...], the Principe and End of al Beings, whose conduct he that follows, shal be happy. And Epinom. pag. 980. he assures us, That he, who pray­ing to God doth trust in his Benignitie, shal act wel. So in his Timaeus, pag. 27. he tels us, That al, who have any thing of an a­wakened mind, when they attemt any mater either great or smal, are always wont to cal on God. Which is an high act of Dependence. Thence Theages, pag. 128. he brings in Socrates philosophising of his Dependence on God, thus: [...], ▵AIMONION, For there is a certain DEMON, which has followed me with a Divine Afflation even from my childhood This is a voice that signifies to me what I must do, &c. What this Demon of Socrates was, is greatly controverted by the ancient Philosophers, who have written Books concerning it. That it was some Divine Afflation or Inspiration they generally grant, as Court Gent. P. 2. B. 3. C. 1. §. 4. It certainly importes his great sense of Dependence on some Divine Power, either Real or Ima­giuary. Yea, Planto, in his Timaeus, saith, That Beatitude or moral Libertie is nothing else but to have [...], a De­mon dwelling in him. Whereby peradventure he may allude to the Hebraic [...] Shekinah, i.e. the Divine Habitation of Gow with men. Thence the Greek Fathers terme efficacious Grace and our Dependence thereon, in imitation of sacred Philosophie, [...], the inhabitation of the holy Spirit, also [...], indwelling Grace. Which alludes to that of Paul, 2 Cor. 12.9. [...],2 Cor. 12.9. that the power of Christ might tabernacle or dwel on me. It evidently alludes, both name and thing, to the Divine [...], or habitation of God with and in men; which denotes the highest Dependence. And indeed here­in consistes one main part of moral Libertie as to exercice. Look [Page 92]as the beams of the Sun touch the Earth, yet hang on the Sun as their original Cause; so doth al true moral Virtue on its first Cause. Virtuose persons, who are most feeble in themselves, are most strong and free by dependence on their first Principe. Where there is a subordination of Causes, either moral or natu­ral, it is the libertie of the inferior to depend on, and receive from the superior. Doth not the first Cause give forth actual assistances usually according to the measure of our actual depen­dence on him? If he drop not in every moment new spirits and influences, how soon do al moral Virtues wither and die away? What more natural than for the second cause to depend on the first? Where there is a limited essence, is there not also a limi­ted dependent Activitie? Can a dependent cause produce any more than a dependent effect? Must not every mutable, varia­ble, defectible Being he reduced to some immutable indefectible first Cause? That which had not Being from it self, may it have Operation independently from it self? Is not the operation of the second cause founded on the operation of the first? If the created Wil cannot subsist of it self, may it expect the privilege of act­ing from it self, independently as to the first Cause? Is not the human Wil a mere passive, though vital, instrument as to the re­ception of divine influences, albeit it be active as to its own ope­ration? Must not then its dependence on the first Cause be ab­solute and total? Yea, is not this Dependence immediate? And, O! how is the Soul enlarged, according to the measure of its actual dependence on the first Cause? Without this dependence the most facile moral duties are most difficult; but with it the most difficult are most facile. The Soul is wel compared to a Glasse without a foot, which so long as the Divine hand holds there is no danger of its being broken; but if God withdraws his hand, it soon sals to the ground, and is deshed in pieces: he need not take it, and throw it against the wal; it wil break of it self. Hence the efficacious Grace of God is termed by the Ancients, [...], Munudaction; also [...], assistent Grace: Again, [...], the energie and coope­ration of God: Basil termes it, [...], al manner of energie: Cyril, [...], the aide from above: Chrysostome, [...], the auxiliant or assistent Power. Greg. Nyssen. in Psalm. saith: [...], The Aide of God is the Head and Sum of Virtue. And Chrysostome, in Gen. [...], [Page 93] The whole of good is from the Grace of God. Whence God is termed by Cyril, in Esa. [...], the Crea­tor and Framer of al good: and his efficacious Grace is termed, by him, [...], the multiforme Energie: also [...], the efficacious Aide: as by Chrysostome, [...], the invinci­ble Assistence. Of which more hereafter. The moral divine Life is nothing in regard of the first Cause, but continual effusions and insusions into the Soul, and in regard of man nothing else but constant regard towards God, and continual dependence on him. As the excellence of the Angelic nature could not preserve them, when self-dependent; so the impotence of Human nature can­not prejudice us, so long as we are dependent on the first Cause. True moral Virtue is a celestial Plant, fed by some invisible root in the celestial World; from which it derives its influences. Members and branches live no life, but the life of their head and root: al divine and moral Respirations toward the celestial world, are from sweet Inspirations of divine Concurse. We cannot active­ly draw down divine influences, but we may enlarge our passive receptive capacitie by actual dependence thereon. Al moral Be­ings, even the Angels themselves, as they have new services to do for God daily, so they are dependent for new assistances; and herein consistes a main part of their moral Libertie. Those who are strongest in self dependence, are soonest foiled; as Peter.

4. Another Exercice of moral Libertie consistes in actual conformi­tie unto God, and imitation of him, both by obedience to his preceptive, Conformitie to the Divine pre­ceptive Wil. and submission to his providential Wil. (1) It's a great essential part of moral Libertie, to conforme to the preceptive Wil of God. God being the prime Exemplar and Measure of al Libertie, it necessarily follows, that the more we imitate and follow God, the more freedome we obtein: and who imitate and follow God more, than they, who conforme most to his Divine preceptive Wil? Nothing more commun in sacred Philosophie than this, That Adherence, Conformitie and Subjection to the Divine Law is the top of moral Libertie. Thus Psal. 119.45.Psal. 119.45. I wil always walk at libertie; because I seek thy precepts. [...], in amplitude: i. e. I wil walk in al manner of Amplitude and Libertie both of heart and ways; because my heart adheres inviolably to thy royal Law of Libertie. The Law of God written on the heart is no other than the very Image of God, a bond or cord of Love, whereby the heart is knit to God, and so made free for the frui­tion [Page 94]of him. Delight in and conformitie to the Divine Law, by al manner of virtuose exercices, is the highest libertie. O! what a regal, gloriose libertie is this, to be always found in ways of obedience to the divine Wil? What a practic contradiction is it to expect moral Libertie in ways of sin? When the Spirit of God takes the Law of God, and transcribes it on the heart, and there­by makes it free to performe actual conformitie to the externe Law,Rom. 8.2 what a soverain Libertie is this? Thus Rom. 8.2. For the law of the Spirit of life, i. e. engraven on the heart, as 2 Cor. 3.3. hath made me free from the law of sin and death: i. e. enabled me freely and chearfully to conforme to the Divine Law, &c. Thus also,Jam. 1.25. Jam. 1.25. But whose looketh into the persect law of libertie: [...] denotes (1) an accurate inspection or prying into a thing, as they who bring their eye close to an object, in order to a more distinct perception thereof. (2) A dwelling on an ob­ject: as some curiose persons, who spend much time in dressing themselves, do, as it were, let their eye dwel on their glasse; just so the eye of the mind should dwel on the Divine Law, which is the glasse, wherein we contemplate the Divine Wil, Image and Sanctitie. Thence follows the object, the perfect Law of Li­bertie. (1) The Divine Law is called perfect, as it is an absolute perfect Miroir or Glasse, wherein we contemplate the Image and Wil of God, and whereby the mind is perfected. (2) It is termed a Law of Libertie, [1] As evangelised and sweetned by evangelic Grace. [2] As it makes those free, that conforme to it. So far as the heart is made conformable to divine Com­mands, so far its actings in conformitie thereto and free and chear­ful. Hence a godly man is said to be a Law unto himself: i. e. if there were no Law extant, yet he would do the same virtuose acts, from that inward Law engraven on his heart. Whence Jam. 2.8. it's stiled the Royal Law: and v. 12. The Law of Li­bertie: because conformitie thereto, from an inward principe of Virtue, is the highest Libertie, according to Divine estima­tion.

And as sacred Philosophie, so Platonic placeth much of moral Libertie in actual conformitie to the divine Law. Plato, Repub. 9. pag. 592. assures us, that in Heaven there is [...], a perfect Exemplar, for him that wil behold it, and by beholding be conformed thereto. Meaning God the original essential Exemplar of al San­ctitie, whose sacred Wil is the grand Patterne of our Conformitie. [Page 95]And leg. 4. pag. 716. he largely demonstrates, That by how much the more conformable the Soul is to the Divine Wil, by so much the more perfect and free it is. It is most evident, saith he, that every man ought mostly to attend this, how he may be of the number of those that follow God. What action therefore is it, that is most beloved by God, and most consentaneous to his Wil? Truly but one, according to the old Proverbe, [...], because like is beloved by lie, whereunto it is conformable, &c. Where­in he shews, that moral Libertie consistes chiefly in following God; which is performed by actual conformitie unto his Wil. Thence Philo Judaeus, that great Platonist, in his Book, That eve­ry virtuose man is free, demonstrates at large, That to be free is to follow God by conformitie to his divine Wil. And indeed what is Libertie as to exercice, but adhering unto God? and who adhere to God, but they who conforme to his divine Wil and Law? Doth not moral Libertie arise from subjection to God? And are not they most subject to God, who conforme most to his Law? It was a great Saying of Pythagoras, [...], Follow God. Thus also Epictetus, in Arrian. lib. 1. cap. 20. [...] The end of Philosophie is to follow God, i.e. to conforme to his di­vine Law. And the ancient Philosophers, specially Pythagoras, Socrates and Plato, made Assimilation to, and Imitation of God the main end of al Philosophie.

(2) This actual Conformitie unto God implies subjection and submission to his providential Wil, both Afflictive and Diretive. Conformitie to Gods providen­tial Wil. And herein also much of moral Libertie doth consiste. Is not that mind most noble, great, and free, which can bear great crosses with equanimitie and patience? Doth not this give more libertie and enlargement than any temporal affliction can deprive us of? O! what a sweet thing is it to have a free generose mind under a straitned consined condition! How facile are burdens made here­by! A virtuose Spirit, that follows God in afflictive providences, becomes a King over his crosses: his losses prove his gain; his re­proche, his glorie; his confinement, his libertie. This is incom­parably wel expressed by Epictetus, in several Philosophemes. So Enchirid. cap. 38. Know, saith he, that this is the main part of Re­ligion towards God, that thou conforme thy self, [...], to obey him, [...], and to ac­quiesce in althings that happen, and willingly to follow, as that which is best governed by the most excellent Mind. Thus also in Arrian. l. 1. [Page 96] c. 12. [...]. To submit the mind, to the mind that governes althings, as good Citizens to the Law of the Citie, this is libertie in its perfection. So lib. 3. cap. 7. [...], &c. I always rather wil what happens; for I estime what God wils, better than what I wil. I adhere to him as a minister and sectator: I desire what he desires, and simply wil what God wils. thus Seneca: That is a great and free mind, which has given up it self to God.

5. Moral Libertie as to exercice importes the using and referring althings in order to the service and fruition of God. The reference of althings to God. Libertie, accor­ding to both sacred and Platonic Philosophie, consistes [...], in the concent, harmonie, symmetrie, and right order of althings: i. e. when al subserve our last end. And what is the last end of man, but to serve and enjoy God? Whence Plato, Protag. 3. pag. 326. saith, That the whole life of man should be composed of harmonie and uniformitie: i. e. al actions, means, occurrences should sweetly conspire and agree for the pro­moting our supreme end. The mind is morally free, not by ex­tending it self to varietie of objects, but by reducing al to unitie, or God, who is the supreme Unitie, which reduceth althings to it self. Again, Libertie implies Election: and is not that the best election, which refers al to its last end? the respect we have to Creatures depends on the respect they have to God: and so far as we refer them to God, so far we are free in the use of them. By subjecting our selves, and al enjoyments to the service of God, we gain dominion and freedome over althings: but if the heart be irregular and inordinate in adhering to the use of the most lawful comfort, it is immediately captivated thereby. This is most evident from sacred Philosophie: as 1 Cor. 6.12. Al­things are lawful to me. 1 Cor. 6.12, 13. Paul seems to have taken up the commun Phrase of those Corinthian Libertines, who under a pretexte, that althings were lawful, did abuse their just libertie to the grieving of their weak Brethren. It's true, saith he, althings are lawful: I grant it: yet withal remember, that althings are not expedient: if you have not a great care, your desires and use of things law­ful wil soon prove unlawful. For my part, addes he, althings are lawful for me, but I wil not be brought under the power of any: [...]. Here is an elegant Paronomasie between [...], which the Corinthian Libertines boasted of, and [...], which signifies primarily, to be brought into bondage, under the power of [Page 97]another. They that use things lawful, without regard to their expendience and subservience to the service of God, are brought under bondage to them. Thence the Apostle addes, v. 13. Meats are for the belly: i. e. for the ventricule or stomach and intestines, to supplie them with nutriment: and the belly is for meats: i.e. to receive and digest them. But God shal destroy both it and them: i. e. take away the use both of meats and ventricule in Heaven. The Apostle brings this as an argument to prove, that our Chri­stian Libertie doth not lie simply in the use of these things; be­cause when we are most free, there wil be no use of them. God gives not men libertie to enjoy what they list, but what they ought: the free use of Creatures consistes in this, to make us more free inthe service of God: herein lies the goodnesse of any Crea­ture, in our being thereby enabled to do good. Those that sub­ject their hearts to God in the use of Creatures, are most free therein: yea, you are never free longer than you serve God by them.

That to serve God is the highest Libertie that human Nature is capable of, sacred Philosophie doth abundantly assure us. It's an old Saying, but most true, that To serve God is to reign. This is a Kings life. Every one hath his Talent from God; and as he doth more or lesse employ it for God, so he is more or lesse free. It's honor enough for the Creature to be employed by his Crea­tor. Yet over an above this God rewards every degree of ser­vicer with some degree of libertie, tranquillitie and peace. There is nothing that has greater dignitie and libertie entailed on it, than the service of God. Thus Luk. 22.29.Luk. 22.29, 30. And I appoint unto you a kingdome, as my Father hath appointed unto me. [...] sig­nifies to appoint or dispose by Wil and Testament. The mind of our Lord is, that, as the Father appointed to him a Kingdome to be acquired by suffering and service; so in like manner he appoint­ed to his Servants a Glorie and Dignitie next to his royal Ma­jestie, to be acquired in the same manner and way. This our Lord addes to give check to their carnal ambitiose humor, v. 24, 25. It follows v. 30. That ye may eat and drink at my table, and sit on thrones judging the twelve Tribes of Israel. There are two things wherein the preeminence of Nobles and Peers is most il­lustrious. (1) In the honor vouchsafed them by their Prince. (2) In their Power and Autoritie over others. Both of these are here mentioned, as belonging to Christs Servants. (1) Their [Page 98]honor consistes in sitting at Christs table. (2) Their power, in sit­ting on Thrones, &c. Yea, we find a strange and unusual honor vouchsafed by Christ to his Servants, Luk. 12.37. He shal gird himself, and make them sit down to mean, and wil come forth and serve them. Joh. 12.26. O1 what an incomparable honor is this! The like Joh. 12.26. If any man serve me. Our Lord here speaks of himself as a great King, who hath many Ministers of State to order his Affairs: and every Minister of his is a King in his place. Thence he addes: And where I am, there also shal my servant be: i. e. in my Kingdome of Glorie, if he follows me in the Kingdome of my Patience. yea, he addes: If any man serve me, him wil my Father honor: i. e. he shal not only be happy, but most honorable. Nei­ther is this Dignitie and Libertie reserved only for Heaven, but even in this life God investes his saithful Servants therewith. Thus it was with Joshua, Zach. 3.7. And I wil give thee walkes a­mong those that stand by: i. e. among the Angels, that stand by and minister to me, and my Church, as Tarnovius.

§. 4. Having explicated what moral Libertie as to Exercice is, we are now to demonstrate,Moral Libertie of Exercice the highest. that this is the supreme Libertie that a rational Creature is capable of.

1. The more ordinate and regular human Acts are, the more morally free they are:Its Order, for al moral freedome denotes order and reference to our last End: and are not virtuose Acts most ordi­nate and regular? Thus Plato, Gorg. pag. 504. [...], The Soul and its acts receive order and ornament from the Law: whence men are made re­gular and orderly: which belongs to Justice and Temperance: i. e. al Acts are so far regular, as they partake of Justice and Temperance, which give order and harmonie to al our Exercices. Justice and Temperance, according to Plato, are universal cardinal Virtues, which regulate and dispose al human Acts according to the best order, wherein their freedome chiefly consistes. Whence Plato makes mention of [...], a Chorus of Virtues, wherein al move in the most regular orderly manner. Yea, he affirmes, That the whole life of man should consiste of Harmonie, Order, and Ʋnifor­mitie. And Rep. 3. pag. 412. he informes us, That a life compo­sed of Contemplatives and Actives, [...], is most musical and harmonious: i. e. The whole life of a virtuose man must be composed, [...], of Symphonie [Page 99]or Concent and musical Ryme: so that Thoughts and Affections must answer to Rule, Words to Thoughts, and Actions to Words: and herein consistes the [...], good Order and Libertie of human Exercices. So again, in his Laches, pag. 188. he assures us,Non est hujus animus in re­cto, cujus acta discordant. Omnia facta dictá (que) tua in­ter se congru­ant ac respon­deant sibi, & una forma per­cussa sint. Vir­tus aequalitas ac tenor vitae per omnia conso­nans sibi. Sen. Epist. That is the best Music, when words and life concord, or agree among them­selves, as also to the Rule. Virtuose Exercices consiste in all equal tenor of life, agreable to it self, and to the Law; which is always attended with a good order, and libertie. It is an excellent Cha­racter of Padre Paul the Venetian, mentioned in his Life, pag. 133. ‘That his life was singularly composed of active and contempla­tive: he always yielding to God what he could, to his Prince what he ought, and of that which belonged to his own Dominion more than he ought by any Law, but that of charitie.’ Again, pag. 175. ‘That which made him most admired, was the coupling together of Virtues, and with conditions that are not usually met in one and the same subject: as Knowlege and Humilitie; Prudence with Meeknesse; Retirednesse and Officiousnesse; Se­riousnesse and Pleasantnesse; Argutenesse without offence; Bre­vitie and Perspicuitie; Sweetnesse and Soliditie.’ So great was the concent and order of virtuose Exercices in this great Soul. Indeed order is the life and perfection of moral Acts: and the more of order the more of libertie. Now virtuose Acts are of al most regular and orderly; because they are measured by the ex­actest Rule, and directly tend to the last End, which is the first Principe in Morals. Thus in sacred Philosophie, Gal. 6.16.Gal. 6.16. And as many as walke according to this rule peace be unto them. [...] signifies a Reed whereby Geometers measured their ground: also the white Line in the Grecian Race. And [...] here signifies, so to walke as to keep an exact order, not to deviate the least from the white Line in our Race. And what is the privilege of those who thus walke? Peace be to them: i.e. moral Libertie and Tranquillitie.

2. The Libertie of an Act both Natural and Moral is to be measured by its Spontaneitie, Connaturalitie, Facilitie, and Suavitie. Virtuose Exer­cies most spon­taneous and sweet. For al Libertie consistes in an [...], a self-motion: and by how much the more spontaneous, connatural, facile and sweet the self-motion is, by so much the more free it is judged to be. And what motions of the Soul are more spontaneous, spiritually con­natural, and sweet, than such as are virtuose? Plato, in his Lysis, assures us, that [...], Good is most proper to our nature, [Page 100]and what is better than virtuose acts? are they not then most proper or connatural? Thence Definit. Platon. pag. 411. Tempe­rance is defined, [...], a self-motion according to na­ture: i.e. connatural, or agreable to rectified human Nature. And Plato, in his Timaeus, tels us, That the best motion of the Soul is in it self; because this is most akin to rational Nature. And when doth the Soul move more in it self, than when it moves virtuosely towards its last end? Is not the last end the best part of our selves? Therefore when the Soul moves virtuosely towards it, doth it not move most in it self? It's a great Notion among the Platonists, That Virtue is, [...], most proper and congenial to man; but sin is [...], most aliene and repugnant. And Brad­wardine strongly demonstrates, That to adhere to God, as our first Cause and last End, is the most natural act of a rectified Soul: and is it not then most free? Every motion of the Soul is so far free as connatural and proper: O! then how free are virtuose Acts? The Platonist instructes us, That to a good man God is a Law, but to the wicked Lust is a Law: Now if God be a Law to a good man, then al his motions toward God are most free. There is indeed a divine Sympathie between a virtuose Soul and the divine Law:Repugnanti non volenti ne­cessitas est. In volente necessi­tas non est. Sen. and therefore he most freely obeys it: for al obey what they love, as Plato assures us: Hence a virtuose man is a Law to himself: he has the divine Law impressed on his Soul: and thence the Law of God is to him a Law of Love and Libertie: so that he obeys it not out of force, but choice: for [...], force cannot touch love. There is a service of Love which is most free: by how much the more closely and inviolably the Soul is, by virtuose acts, subjected to God, by so much the more free it is: for the very act of love, as terminated on the Creator, is formal moral Libertie, as Jansenius acutely demonstrates, August. Tom. 2. pag. 41. Yea virtuose exercices are not only spiritually natural to the virtuose Soul, but also most facile, sweet and deli­cious. Plato, Timae. pag. 81. tels us: Whatever is repugnant to Na­ture, is most irkesome; [...], but what is consentaneous to Nature is most sweet. Now that virtuose acts are most agreable to rectified Nature has been already demonstrated. What can furnish us with greater dexteritie, facilitie, and alacri­tie in acting than virtuose Principes? [...], Alacrite is defined, Definit. Platon. pag. 413. [...], A mani­festation of practic election: and who manifest more free practic [Page 101]election, than such as act virtuosely? Frequence of exercices both in Nature and Virtue give a great facilitie. [...], Customes are defined by Galen, [...], superadded Natures: and Arist. Rhet. l. 1. c. 11. pag. 57. saith, [...], Custome is akin to Nature: whence he addes, [...], Custome makes every thing sweet. Now virtuose exercices frequently repe­ted breed a divine spiritual custome, which is attended with di­vine suavitie and delight. The frequent repetition of the same exercice makes it more facile, dexterous and sweet. Experience teacheth us, that whatever is long customary, turnes into our na­tures, even diseases and poisons. How much more then spiritual­ly natural and sweet are divine customes and habits attending vir­tuose acts? Thence Heb. 5.14. [...].Heb. 5.14. Virtuose customes and habits make the exercices of spiritual senses most familiar, pleasant and sweet, and therefore most free: for the freedome of an act is much to be measured by the delight and pleasure that attends it. And what acts of the Soul have more of true pleasure and delight attending of them, than virtuose exercices? O! what sweet inspirations, what divine suavities are infused into the Soul upon virtuose actings? Frequence of acts makes bitter things sweet: and is not the bitter crosse sweetened by virtuose exercices? are not the most difficult services made facile hereby? Doth not every act of Virtue carry some degree of pleasure, and therefore of libertie in it? And by how much the more pure and spiritual any virtuose act is, by so much the more pure is that joy which attends it. For al joy and pleasure is the effect of some operation: and the more raised and spiritual the operation is, the more refined and strong the pleasure and joy is. The purest and strongest pleasures are such as attend the Souls actual adhesion to its first cause and last end: for the nearer things come to their first Principes, the more joyful and free they are: and what brings the Soul nearer its first Principe than vir­tuose Acts? Is not then a virtuose life the sweetest and most free? Do not acts of Virtue bring with them the most judicious, real, solid, pure, spiritual, strong, self-sufficient and permanent plea­sures and delights, as Psal. 119.14, 16, 20, 35?

3. The Libertie of moral Acts consistes much in their Vitalitie. Virtuose Exer­cices most live­ly. The more excellent and noble the life is, the more free the acts are: and the more virtuose the acts are, the more of the divine life they carry in them. Thus Plato, Charmid. pag. 171. Sin being [Page 102]banisht from the Soul, and Rectitude presiding in every act, it's necessa­ry, that those who are thus disposed, [...], do act wel: [...], and that those who act wel, do live happily. The same pag. 173. But rather let us endeavor discretely to lead our lives and act, that so we may live blessedly. Whereby he intimates, that virtuose Acts are always blessed and free: no man that acts virtuosely can live miserably. Thus also Aristotle, Eth. l. 1. c. 4. [...], To live wel is to act wel. The life of every living Creature exerts and manifests it self most in that operation, which is most proper to it, and unto which it is most naturally inclined: and are not virtuose Acts most proper and natural to man considered in his best state? What is life, but the Actuositie of the Soul informing the bodie? And what more promotes this Actuositie than exercice? Is not also the life and Actuositie of the Soul morally considered improved by virtuose exercices? Where there is natural life there wil be some pulse and motion of the Spirits: So where there is a moral life of Vir­tue there wil be exercice.Quantò perfe­ctiùs quis à se movetur, tantò perfectior est modus vivendi. Aquin. By how much the more perfectly any thing is moved by it self, by so much the more perfect it; mode of living is: and are not those who act virtuosely most perfectly moved by themselves? Plato tels us, Phaedr. pag. 245. [...]. Again, [...]. By which he shews, That it is proper to life, to move it self by it self. And when doth the Soul most freely move it self by it self, but when it acts virtuosely? And as al life consistes in action, even the life of God in a pure Act of understanding and willing; so in like manner the divine moral life in virtuose actions. A vir­tuose Soul, as it has Principes of life above Nature, so also act­ings: for by how much the more noble and excellent the life is, by so much the more excellent is the operation. The life and motion of virtuose hearts, is upward, like that of fire, which is of al the most noble, active, and free life. Thence in facred Phi­losophie, Life is frequently put for a noble, comfortable, free, bles­sed condition of life, Psal. 34.12, 13. consisting in virtuose exercices. So Psal. 34.12. What man is he that desireth life, i. e. a blessed, free, sweet life. And how may such a life be acquired? That he tels you, vers. 13, 14. Depart from evil and do good, &c. The like, Psal. 22.26. & 69.33. & Psal. 119.77. Eccles. 6.8. 1 Pet. 3.10. And Augustine gives us the true reason of this facred Phraseologie; namely, because there is no true life, but what is virtuose, blessed, and free. So [Page 103]that as there is no moral libertie without a divine life; so there is no divine life without virtuose exercices. Whence by how much the nearer the Soul comes to God by virtuose Acts, by so much the more divine and free its life is.

4.Virtuose Exer­cices most am­ple. The moral Libertie of human Acts may be much measured by their Amplitude and Magnitude. And are not virtuose Acts of al most ample and great? Actual adhesion to God and his divine Law importes not only subjection, but also enlargement and li­bertie. Thence Psal. 119.96. the divine Law is said to be exceeding broad or ample: and why? because it is the expression and Character of the divine Sanctitie and Wil, which is most ample. Whence the Soul, by actual adherence to the divine Law, rejoiceth in the divine Amplitude and Libertie. Thus Psal. 119.165. Great peace have they who love thy law. Or,Psal. 119.165. ample peace, with libertie as to walking. Thence it follows: and nothing shal offend them. Or, they shal have no stumbling block: ie. They shal walke in the Kings high-way, according to the royal Law of Libertie, with al manner of libertie and boldnesse.Liber ab infini­to, ad infini­tum, super inf­nitum move­tur. It's a great Saying of the Platonists, That one free is moved from infinite, to infinite, upon infinite: i.e. a virtuose man, in al exercices of Virtue is moved, (1) From God, as the first Cause and original Spring. (2) To God, as the last End, and infinite Good. (3) Ʋpon, or ac­cording to the infinite Wil and Law of God, as the measure and rule of al his virtuose exercices. Whence also they tel us, That the motion of a free Soul is circular, from God, as the first Cause; to God, as the last End; and by God, and his divine Wil, as the mea­sure. Such is the amplitude and magnitude of the Soul in al the exercices of Virtue: So that it fals under no coarctation or con­finement, either in regard of Principe, or End, or Rule; but par­takes in its measure, of that Amplitude, which its Principe, End, and Rule rejoiceth in. For such as a mans first Principe, last End, and Exemplar is, such is he as to libertie, or servitude.Quantò finis al­tior, tantò a­ctus volun [...] est libe [...]. By how much the more ample and sublime the end is, by so much the more ample and free is the Act. Again, the virtuose Soul ad­hering to and depending on God as the first Cause obteins great enlargement. Whereas sin, being an aversion from God our first Principe and last End, puts fetters, chains, limits and confinement on the Soul.

5. Moral Libertie as to exercice consistes in the freedome from vitiofe Inclinations, Affections, and Motions. Plato, in his Timaeus, [...] [Page 104]persuades us, That the culture and cure of every thing consistes in giving it, [...], its proper diet and exercices: and what more efficacious to cure the Soul of its vitiose humors and maladies, than to give it its proper virtuose exercices? When is the Soul more vigorous and healthful, than when it is most in virtuose exercitations? Althings are purified by perfective fer­mentation: and is not the Soul also purified from its noxious peccant humors by the divine fermentation of virtuose affecti­ons? Thus Rom. 12.11.Rom. 12.11. [...], fermenting or boiling in spirit. Syr. [...], which is spoken of boiling waters, Job 41.22. So Job 30.27. LXX. [...], My bowels fermented or boiled. The more the affections ferment and boil by virtuose exercices, the more free they are to serve God, and lesse obnoxious to the ser­vice of sin. By how much the lesse we serve sin, by so much the more free we are: And who serve sin lesse, than they who are most deeply engaged in virtuose exercices? Plato, Tim. pag. 89. tels us, That the most healthful purgation is by Gymnastic ex­ercitation. What is health but the spirituose vigor of Nature? And what more promotes this spirituose vigor than exercice? And doth not this hold true as to the Soul? Is not its most healthful purgation by virtuose exercitation? Doth not this most promote the spirituose vigor and health of the Soul? What makes the fire to conserve it self in its puritie, but its grand and perpe­tual activitie? Doth not also the running stream keep it self pure, whiles the standing Pool gathers mud? Are althings in Na­ture purified by motion?Quantò virtus aliqua intensiùs tendit in ali­quid, tantò for­tiùs repellit omne contra­rium. Aquin. and shal we not also allow the same ef­ficace to virtuose exercices? It's true, virtuose exercices do not purge out sin by their own innate force, as Physic purgeth out il humors; but by the divine promisse, concurrence, and benedicti­on. By how much the more intensely the virtuose Soul actually tends to its last end, by so much the more strongly doth it repel whatever is contrary thereto.

6.Virtuose Exer­cices most stable and permanent. Virtuose Exercices are most stable, firme and permanent: There­fore most free. Moral Libertie as to exercice consistes much in the firmitude, stabilitie, and permanence of such exercices. Whence Plato, in his Cratylus, pag. 415. derives [...], Virtue, [...], because it is always in fluxe or motion: whence he makes it to be synonymous to [...], a facile and expedite progresse: For, saith he, it always flows in an equal stable manner. The Soul, according to Plato, is [...], an ever-moving Principe; and therefore it [Page 105]ought [...], to be always in action. Now it is most certain, that no acts of the Soul are more stable, firme and permanent than virtuose acts. Thus Arist. Eth. l. 1. c. 10. [...], Virtuose exercices are most permanent. And he gives this reason of it: Because blessed Souls live and dwel always in such Acts, without tediousnesse or oblivion. And Plato, in his Craty­lus, tels us: [...], Sloth is the greatest bond and fetter of the Soul, which obstructs al virtuose exercices. The firmitie and stabilitie of every thing ariseth from its adhesion to its first Principe and last End: and by how much the more the Soul departes from these, by so much the more instable and slu­ctuating it is: To stand invariable and immutable in adhering unto God, under al the vicissitudes and various changes of this World, argues great moral libertie as to exercice: and wherein consistes the Souls adhesion to God as its first Principe and last End, if not in virtuose exercices?

7. Virtuose Exercices do greatly improve and advance Virtue, Virtuose Exer­cices improve Virtue. and so by consequence moral Libertie. Plato, in his Timaeus, pag. 90. assures us, That when the faculties of the Soul grow sluggish and lazy, they are rendred more infirme and impotent; but by conti­nual action they are made more robust and vigorous. And doth not this Philosopheme hold valid in Morals, as wel as Naturals? Doth any thing render the virtuose Soul more robust and vigo­rous, than virtuose exercices? So pag. 103. The Soul is nourished and corroborated, [...], by labors and exercices. And are not virtuose labors of al most nourishing and corroborative? Thence, saith Seneca, Labor nourisheth generose minds. O!Generosos ani­mos labor nu­trit. Sen. then how are virtuose minds nourished by the labors of Virtue! As the native heat is preserved by the Pulse, or twofold motion of the heart; so is Virtue by its exercices. It's a trite Saying in the Scholes, Cessation from acts diminish habits, but continuance therein emproves the same. It's true, there is a difference in this regard between acquired habits, and virtuose, which come by in­fusion; because acquired habits are the natural products of their acts, but virtuose habits are not naturally produced by virtuose acts, but given in by God of mere Grace. God rewards vir­tuose exercices with farther degrees and advances of Virtue, or Grace, and that of mere Grace. So Mat. 13.12.Mat. 13.12. For whosoever hath, to him shal be given. [...] here doth not signifie the mere having of a Talent, but the employing, using, or occupying the same: [Page 106]for it is a good Rule among Grammarians, That Verbes, which primarily signifie to have or possesse, oft denote the using of what we have. So here Hath notes to use, occupie, or traffic with what we have. To such it shal be given, and he shal have more abundance: i. e. God wil reward his diligence in using and occupying his Ta­lent, be it natural or supernatural, with much more in the same kind. If his Talent be natural gifts or commun illuminations, he shal receive more in that kind: if true moral supernatural Virtues, his stock shal encrease in its kind. Whence it follows: But whosoever hath not, i. e. employes not by exercice: from him shal be taken away even that he hath: i. e. his Talent shal be taken from him: his commun gifts and seeming virtues shal wither. Yea, virtuose exercices in the sharpest winter of affliction make Virtue to flourish and prosper.Heb. 12.11, 12. Thus Heb. 12.11. Every chastise­ment for the present seems not to be joyous, but grievous; but after­ward it yields the tranquille fruit of righteousnesse, to them that are exercised thereby. [...], exercised as in the Gymnade: whence it follows, v. 12. Wherefore lift up the hands that hang down. [...], signifies such a remission or dissolution as is opposed to intension, firmitude, strength. It here denotes sloth and remisnesse as to labor, whereof the hand is the instrument. Thence he addes: and the feeble knees. [...], the paralytic knees, such as are as it were struck with a Palsie, and therefore unapt for motion. This later clause seems to refer to the Race, which re­quired the exercice of the knees; as labor, that of the hands.

8.Formal Beati­tude in virtuose Exercices. A great and main part of moral Libertie consistes in vir­tuose exercices; because herein consistes formal Beatitude. Both Plato and Aristotle place formal Beatitude in virtuose operations. Thus Plato, in his Conviv. pag. 211. makes the perfection of hu­man Felicitie to consiste in contemplating, [...], &c. the most sincere, uniforme, divine Beautie, &c. of which before Chap. 1. The like in his Phaedrus, pag. 250. So Aristotle, Eth. l. 1. c. 7. defines formal Beatitude, the exercice of the rational Soul, according to the best and most perfect Virtue, in the most perfect life. And Cap. 8. he addes, That to act wel and live wel makes man happy. And the demonstration hereof is most evi­dent. For (1) Operation and exercice is the end of al virtuose Habits and Principes, and therefore their perfection: for every Forme, Power, or Habit is ordained to its act, as to its perfe­ction. Whence Basil termes Grace, [...], com­pletive [Page 107]or perfective of Nature. Which chiefly belongs to gratiose Acts. Thence Aristotle strongly argues, that formal Beatitude cannot consiste, [...], in possession of objective Beati­tude and habitual union therewith, but [...], in use and exercice. For a man may possesse the chiefest good, and have habitual likenesse thereto, and yet not formally happy, as virtuose men asleep. (2) The more Virtue is in exercice, the more it ressembles the Divine Libertie and Perfection. The Di­vine Being and Libertie is a pure simple Act, without the least habit or passive power, either physic or metaphysic: and there­fore the more actuose Virtue is, the more like it is to God. (3) Virtuose exercices bring most satisfaction with them. Both Plato and Aristotle instruct us, That virtuose Acts are of themselves [...], self-sufficient. They inspire sweet satisfaction into the Soul, as before Chap. 1. §. 6. And this is very commun in sacred Philosophie. Yea we are herein assured, that by virtuose exer­cices we may have some prelibations of formal Beatitude, even in this life. This seems the import of that Exhortation,1 Tim. 6.12. 1 Tim. 6.12. [...], Exercise thy self in that famose con­test of Faith. Our Apostle alludes to those famose Olympian Games, specially that of the Race, wherein they contended for a Crown. Thence he addes, [...], lay hold of eter­nal life. [...] here, as v. 19. is of the same import with [...], 1 Cor. 9.24. Phil. 3.12. in which places the Apo­stle seems to allude to such as ran in the Race, who, when they came to the end thereof, laid hold on the [...] or Crown on the top of the Goal. Thus Christians, by virtuose exercices, lay hold on eternal life, as the Crown at the end of their Race. Thus he speaks of himself, 2 Tim. 4.7, 8. [...],2 Tim. 4.7, 8. I have exercised my self in that famose contest. The double Article addes a great Emphase, and shews with what vigor and activitie he had dispatcht his Christian race, and therefore now was in expectation of the Crown. Such efficacious and soverain influence have virtuose exercices on mans formal Beatitude and moral Libertie.

CHAP. IV. Of Sin and moral Servitude.

Sin a Transgression of the Law. Sin, as to its formal reason, pri­vative. The causes of Sin, (1) Mans defectibilitie, (2) The Vitiositie of human Nature, (3) Practic Error, (4) Self-love. Sins are either of Ignorance, of Passion, or wilful. The moral Ser­vitude of Sin, as (1) Repugnant to human Nature, (2) Repug­nant each to other. (3) The Disease of the Soul. (4) Defile­ment. (5) Shame and Reproche. (6) Tyrannie. (7) Penurie. (8) Captivitie. (9) Folie and Madnesse. (10) It makes men Brutes. The Adjuncts of this Servitude. It is (1) Voluntary. (2) Necessary. (3) Infinite. (4) Most penal. Sin the worst punishment. Other punishments of Sin. It brings (1) Fear and shame, (2) Instabilitie, (3) Anxietie, (4) Eternal punishment. Al naturally Slaves of Sin. No seeds of Virtue in corrupt Na­ture. Natural impotence to what is good. No moral Free wil. A sum of the Pelagian Historie.

§. 1. HAving examined the nature of moral Good, Virtue, and Li­bertie, we now passe on to the discussion of moral Evil, and that Servitude which attends it. It's a good Notion of Aristotle, Rhet. l. 3. c. 2. [...], Parallel opposites illustrate each other. So in his Ethics, l. 5. c. 1. a. 17. [...], For the most part therefore the contrary habit is known by its contrary. Which holds true here; in as much as the beautiful Idea of moral Good serves greatly to illustrate the deformitie of moral Evil.Sin a Transgres­sion of the moral Law. Doth al moral Good con­siste in conformitie to the moral divine Law? What then is moral evil or sin but a Transgression of the Law, as 1 Joh. 3.4? That al moral Evil or Sin is a Transgression of the Law, is an Hypothesis fre­quently inculcated, as wel in Platonic as in sacred Philosophie. Thence Definit. Platon. pag. 416. [...] Sin is defined, [...], a practice against right reason, which must be understood objectively, of the Law of Nature, as before. Whence Plato himself, Rep. 9. saith, That Sin is most distant from Law and Order. Again, Leg. 10. he affirmes, [...], That Sin is an intemperate excesse of the Soul. [...] is of the [Page 109]same import with [...], and signifies primarily the excesse of any humor in the bodie: and thence the inordinate and irregular excesse of the Soul and its Affections. For look as Virtue is [...], the Concent and Symmetrie of the Soul; so sin is [...], Asymmetrie and Ataxie. Hence also Plato, in his Epinom. pag. 978. cals Sin, [...], &c. A motion void of reason, order, de­corum, measure, yea a confused agitation, whereby the Soul is depraved, and contaminated. Whence [...], injustice, Definit. Platon. is defi­ned, [...], an habit over-looking, or despising Laws. Yea, Plato, Repub. 9. pag. 574. cals sin [...], Transgression of the Law, as sacred Philosophie, 1 Joh. 3.4. Thus also Aristotle, 1 Joh. 3.4. both in his Ethics and Rhetoric, stiles sin [...] and [...], a Transgression of the Law. But this Hypothesis shines with more illustrious beams in sacred Philosophie, whence Plato borrowed his choisest Philosophemes. Thence in the O. T. al the notions, whereby sin is expressed, signifie a Transgression of the Law. We find three several notions of sin together, Psal. 32.1, 2. (1) [...],Psal. 32.1, 2. which denotes Defection, Rebellion, Prevarication against God. (2) [...], which signifies Aberration and Deviation from the right way of Gods Law. (3) [...], which importes Perversitie, Obliquitie, Ini­quitie, Privation of Rectitude. (4) Sin is stiled, Psal. 101.3. [...],Psal. 101.3. a mater of Belial: i. e. a lawlesse mater, such as wil not come under the yoke. From [...], without a yoke: which the LXX. translate [...]; and whereto Paul seems to allude, 2 Cor. 6.14, 15. (5) Sin is stiled a Violation, or making void the Law, Psal. 119.126. Zeph. 3.4. & Hos. 4.2. [...] They break the bounds of the Law. An allusion to Inundations, and Land-flouds, that break down al bounds. So great is the violence, which sin offers to the Divine Law. (6) Sin is said to be a Tortuositie or wresting of the Law, Psal. 125.5. [...], Obliquations or crooked ways. (7) Sin is called a Declination, Aberration, Deflexi­on, Psal. 119 51, 67. & Psal. 101.3. yea, v. 4. it is stiled [...], perverse. (8) It is termed Rebellion, Psal. 5.10. & 66.7. Which termes, though different in themselves, yet they al import Trans­gression of the Law. Thus also in the N. T. [...], with other notions, whereby sin is expressed, do al import Transgression of the Law. Hence the Stoics held, [...], That al sins are equal; because the least deviation from the Law is a Transgression, as [Page 110]wel as the greatest. Yet hence it follows not, but that there are degrees and aggravations of sins, according to their various ob­jects, and circumstances.

Hence it follows,Sin as to its formal Reason privative. that sin, as to its formal Idea, Reason, or Na­ture is not positive, but privative. For the clearing whereof we may consider these following Propositions. (1) Al moral Evil or Sin is founded in some natural Good. For albeit there be pure good, which has no mixture of evil, either natural or moral, as the chief­est Good; yet there is no pure Evil, which has not for its subject some natural good. It's true there are some Acts that are in­trinsecally evil, that is, so far evil, as that they can never be good: as the hatred of God, and the like. Yet these Acts are called in­trinsecally evil, not as if their evil were intrinsecal to the natural entitie of the acts; for it's possible that the evil may be separa­ted from the acts; but because they cannot be put forth towards such an object morally considered without sin. (2) Al Sin is an aggregate composite Being, composed of positive and privative. The material Subject or natural Act is positive; but the formal Reason, or moral deficience of Rectitude is privative. The positive Act of it self, abstracted from the privation, is not sinful; but both together, as mater and forme, make up one Compositum. It's a Question in the Scholes, Whether Sin thus compounded of privative and positive be unum per se, or per accidens? And Suarez wel solves this difficultie, telling us, ‘That if we consider sin as a physical real Being, it is unum per accidens; but if we consider it as a moral Being, so it is unum per se; because the positive act and pri­vative deficience, are so intimately conjoined for the constitution of one moral Evil, that they may be looked on under the notion of act and power, or mater and forme; so that the act cannot be evil without the privation; nor the privation without the act.’ (3) Every Privation as such is evil, as every Forme or Act good. For what is a privation but the want of some due perfecti­on? And is not every want of due perfection evil to that sub­ject that wants it? Every thing, if it want any good that belongs to it, is so far evil. (4) When we say the formal reason of Sin is privative, the terme formal must not be taken strictly, but in a laxe notion, and morally. For the [...], or Obliquitie of sin being that by which it is formalised, and yet not formally intended by the Agent, hence sin in a strict sense cannot be said to have any formal Cause: yet because this obliquitie or privation of Rectitude [Page 111]doth morally constitute the act sinful, it may in a more laxe no­tion be rightly termed the formal Reason or Cause. (5) Sin, as to its formal reason, is not a Physic or Logic privation, nor yet pure no­thing; but a moral privation, or deficience as to moral rectitude. In this respect some Divines ascribe to sin something positive, not absolutely, as if it were somewhat subsistent, but relatively and mo­rally, as it is opposed to pure nothing: for, say they, sin is a priva­tion, which makes the act whereto it belongs sinful; and there­fore it is not mere nothing. So Suarez saith, that sin is not a real Being, yet it is such a Being as may suffice to the truth of a proposition. Thus indeed Plato, in his Sophist, teacheth us, that [...], non-ens may be considered as pure nothing, and so it is [...], unintelligible, and ineffable: or else it may be considered, as [...], that which truly is not, yet not simply, [...], non-ens, or nothing. And such is sin, not simply and purely nothing, yet according to its formal reason, not a positive real Being, but a moral privation, or as others, a privative relation.

That Sin, according to its formal Idea and Nature, is privative, was generally asserted by the ancient Philosophers, both Plato­nists and others. Thus Plato, Repub. 2. pag. 380. denies God to be [...], the moral cause of sins; because there cannot be [...], a positive idea of sin. So Proclus argues from this place, That there cannot be [...], an Idea of sins; because then it would follow, that God should be the Cause and Author of sin. And Plato himself informes us, that [...], Sin is [...], an irregular affection; and [...], privation of order: also [...], Injustice against Law: Again, [...], a privative Being: and lastly, [...], privation of moral Being, as the night is, [...], the privation of the Suns light. But among the an­cient Philosophers none hath more acutely and solidly defended this Hypothesis, than Simplicius, on Epicbet. cap. 34. pag. 171. where he largely demonstrates, that, [...], Sin really is not in the nature of Beings, but [...], a privation of good. Of which see Philos. Gen. P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect. 4. §. 2. Among the Schole-men this is strongly proved by Ariminensis, Sent. 2. D [...]st. 34. Quaest. 1. Suarez in 1.2. Tract. 3. Disput. 7. sect. 3. pag. 275-278. & Barlow Exercit. 2.

§. 2. Having discussed the formal Nature of moral Evil or Sin, we now procede to its Causes; among which,Mans Defectibi­litie the first Origine of Sin. if we wil ascend up to its first Origine, we must reckon first the Defecti­bilitie [Page 112]of the human Creature, as the original cause of al sin. For, to speak in the Platonic mode, Man, as al other Creatures, being composed of something and nothing, yea more of nothing than something; hence passive power and defectibilitie is essential to his Being. For whatever sprang out of nothing is capable of returning to its originary nothing. Where there is place for Proficience, there also remains a capacitie of Deficience. Every Creature, because made by God, is capable of Proficience; but because made out of nothing, it is also capable of Deficience. It's true, Man, as made by God, was void of al moral deficience or sin; yet as Man, he was never void of Defectibilitie and Muta­bilitie: he had a moral free-wil for good; but a natural free-wil or defectibilitie as to sin: which passing from power into act gave being to the first sin. This is wel explicated by Suarez: ‘In a free Agent, saith he, the mode of failing in an act, ariseth from the dominion he has over his act: hence sin in a free cause doth not always suppose the like sin in the same cause: for it may arise merely from the libertie of the Creature, which is good.’ That the Wil of Adam, in his innocent state, was ca­pable of sinning, was a natural defect, conjoined with a natural perfection: for it was also capable not to sin: and this mutable capacitie being drawen forth towards a prohibited object, was the first origine and root of al sin. Thus moral Evil sprang out of natural libertie in it self good, but evilly applied.

Adam's person being vitiated by that first Sin,The Vitiositie of human Nature. he thereby vi­tiated his own and our Nature. Yea, his personal actual sin is originally ours by imputation: whence there adheres a vitiositie to our natures, whereof we find frequent and great notices in Plato, and other Philosophers. Plato, in his Timaeus, pag. 90. makes mention of a Sin contracted, [...], in our head, [which I understand of Adam] whereby our nature, from the first generation, is corrupted. And Timaeus Locrus, from whom Plato borrowed many physic Philosophemes, pag. 103. explicates the origine of this Vitiositie thus: Vitiositie comes from our Parents and first Principes, rather than from negligence and disorder of pub­lic manners; because we never depart from those actions, which lead us to imitate the primitive sins of our Parents. A great confes­sion of a Pagan, beyond what many that professe Christianitie wil allow. So Plato, in his Critias, saith, That in times past the Divine nature flourished in men [i. e. in the state of Innocence] [Page 113] but at length it being mixed with mortal, [i. e. upon the Fal] [...], human custome [or sin] prevailed to the ruine of man­kind: and from this source there followed an inundation of evils on men. So Leg. 5. pag. 731. [...], The greatest Sin is ingenite in mens Souls. And Grotius assures us, That the Philosophers confessed, [...], that it was congenite or connatural to men to sin; whence the Platonist makes mention [...], of an evil nature: which, De­finit. Plat. pag. 416. is defined, [...], a Vitiositie in nature: also [...], the natural disease, or disease of nature. Thence Plato, in his Politicus, pag. 274. being about to treat of Civil Po­litie, gives this demonstration of its necessitie; because the nature of mankind is greatly degenerated and depraved, and al manner of disorders infeste human Nature: and men being impotent are torne in pieces by their own lusts, as by so many wild Horses. And thence he concludes, That from this plague of vitiositie men were driven to great straits and confusions. The like Stobaeus, Serm. 2. pag. 31. out of Lycurgus's Dictates, [...] [or [...].] [...], &c. Phy! how depraved is mans nature altogether! otherwise there were no need of Laws. Dost thou thinke that man is any thing more excellent than Bestes? Truly but little, except only in figure: Brutes look towards the earth; but man has an erect counte­nance. Thus also Plato, Leg. 10. pag. 906. affirmes, That Souls living on the earth are [...], of a brutish nature. And it is said of Democritus, that he affirmed, The diseases of the Soul to be so great, that if it were opened, it would appear to be a sepulchre of al manner of evils. Yea Aristotle, albeit he were too much a friend to corrupt nature, yet he hath left this ingenuous confession of its vitiositie, Eth. lib. 1. cap. 13. pag. 64. That there is in us somewhat, [...], naturally repugnant to right reason. But Seneca doth greatly illustrate this Vitiolitie of Nature. So Epist. 50. Why do we deceive our selves? our evil is not from without; it is fixed in our very bowels. Again, Al Sins are in al men, but al do not appear in each man: He that hath one Sin hath al. We say that al men are intemperate, avaricious, luxurious, maligne; not that these Sins appear in al; but because they may be, yea are in al, al­though latent. A man may be nocent, although he do no hurt. Al Sins are perfect, [i. e. in corrupt nature] before they break forth in­to effect. These and such like great confessions, touching the Vi­tiositie of human Nature, made Jansenius break forth into a rapture [Page 114]of admiration, that Socrates, Plato, and other poor Heathens should leave us truer and better Philosophemes hereof, than the Pelagians and later Schole-men.

Yet it cannot be denied, but that many of the ancient and mo­derne Schole-men have given us great notices of this natural Vi­tiositie, specially such as were Sectators of Augustine, as Aquinas, Ariminensis, Bradwardine, Alvarez, &c. We may reduce the ex­plication of the whole to the following Propositions. (1) Adams personal actual Sin becomes the natural original Sin of al his Posteritie. This the Gentile Philosophers were ignorant of: they had some notices of the corruption of nature, but were ignorant of the origi­narie cause and manner of its traduction, as Augustine hath wel observed.Iste Tullius rem vidit, cau­sam nescivit. August. Peccatum in­troivit non per modum imita­tionis, sed per modum origi­nis. This Traduction of original Sin from Adam to his posteritie is wel demonstrated by Aquinas, contra Gentiles, lib. 4. cap. 50. where he demonstrates, from Rom. 5.12, 19. against the Pelagians, ‘That this original Sin infects al Mankind, not only in a way of imitation, which the Pelagians grant, but by propa­gation and traduction.’ And Cap. 52. he farther explicates, how Adams personal, actual Sin, by imputation becomes our original and natural sin. This original Sin is termed natural; because congenite with, proper to, and inseparable from corrupt nature, as to any power of its own. It consistes formally in the privation of original Righteoùsnesse: which privation is both our punish­ment and sin: as original Righteousnesse, upon the imputation of Adams Sin, is by divine Justice denied to us; so this privation is our punishment: but as it ought to be in us, and is wanting, by reason of Adam's Sin become ours, so it is our sin. (2) The Vitiositie of Nature or original Sin is said to be voluntary as it in­heres in the Wil, and corrupts the same. Aristotle tels us, Acts are voluntary, because they passe from the Wil; but habits, because they are received into the Wil, and impressed thereon. Such is original Sin as to its Vitiositie, which is as an habitual Pondus impacted on the Wil, and inclining it to al manner of vitiose acts. Others make original Sin to be voluntary, with respect to the commun representative Wil of our first Parent, whose Wil, as he was a commun Head, politically included ours. So Davenant, and the Schole-men. (3) The Vitiositie of corrupt Nature is seminal, ra­dical and universal both extensively and intensively. As every man naturally considered is a Microcosme or little abridgement of the greater World; so morally considered, he is a Macrocosme or a [Page 115]great World of corruption. Yea, al that is of contagion in the greater World comes from the superfluitie of Vitiositie shut up in the heart of man. If corrupt human Nature were not on the earth, there would be nothing in the World but what was good. Yea farther, there is more of Vitiositie in one corrupt Nature, than a world of Sinners can vent. Every man hath sin enough in his own nature to defile the whole Creation. And this corrupti­on of nature is so deep, that al the fire in the World, yea of Hel, wil not fetch it out. It is universal both as to extension of parts and degrees. The man is infected with it from top to toe: it poisons his eye, ear, tongue, hand and every part: it dogs him from place to place. This Plague of corrupt Nature is greater in some than in others, and usually greatest in those of greatest con­dition. Al sins in the heart do not act alike at al times; yet al are there in the seed and root of corrupt nature. Many lusts worke indirectly as Principes that lie low: men act in the power of them, and yet observe them not. (4) This universal Vitiositie of corrupt Nature is the soverain reigning Sin, which breeds, foments, and influenceth al other Sins. Adams person first corrupted our Nature; and human Nature being corrupted, corrupts our per­sons: and our persons being corrupted, corrupt al our actions, and thereby encrease the corruption of our Natures. It is a great Question in practic Theologie, What is a mans reigning Sin? But if we consider reigning sin simply and absolutely, it is no other than corrupt nature. It's true, there are in particular per­sons, according to their particular inclinations, tentations, and circumstances, particular sins that bear sway and rule: but these are but as Viceroys and Vicegerents under the vitiositie of corrupt nature; which is the supreme Soverain and Lord, as a cruel beste nourished in our bowels, ever ready to devour us. The main part of our enmitie against God, and his enmitie against us lies in the vitiositie of our natures, and its contrarietie to God, Rom. 8.6.

§. 3. The first product of Original Sin,Practic Error the cause of al Sin. and that which has a maligne efficacious influence on al sin, is practic Error, or Igno­rance. How great, universal, and venimous the Ignorance of al Mankind by nature is, Plato frequently inculcates. He gives us a lively description hereof in his Repub. 7. pag. 514. ‘Suppose, saith he, a subterraneous Dungeon, in which men should be, from their infance, bound neck and heels together; so that they can see nothing, but some glimmerings of light, or rather [Page 116]shadows just before them: such is the barbaric ignorance of Mankind by Nature.’ It's true, many attain to great specula­tion and contemplation of things divine, even by natures light and heat, assisted by commun illuminations; yet how defective are they as to al practic knowlege, which is the worst ignorance? Thus Plato, Leg. 3. pag. 689. What is the worst ignorance? [...], Lo, when a man loves not but hates, what he knows and estimes to be honest and good: but, on the contrary, loves and embraceth what he knows to be evil and injust. Wherein he instructes us, that speculative knowledge conjoined with practic error renders our ignorance most inexcusable and dangerous. And that which yet addes greater malignitie to our ignorance is, when men fondly conceit they sufficiently un­derstand, what indeed they are really ignorant of: such proud conceits are the worst self-deceits and errors: al the use such make of their knowlege is to concele their ignorance from them­selves and others: their very light addes to their darknesse. And their terrible darknesse is by so much the more deplorable, in that they take it for light; which they follow with pleasure, as children do the Ignis Fatuus, which leads them to Precipices. Thus Plato, Leg. 5. pag. 732. From the same sin this a so happens to men, [...], that every one counts his ignorance his wisdome: Hence it comes to passe, that whiles we know nothing, we thinke we know althings. And are not those greatly to be pitied, who make no other use of their reason but to render themselves more unreasonable and ignorant? Is any thing more worthy of compassion, than the blindnesse of such as seem most quick-sighted and sage in the World? And whence comes this proud affected ignorance, but from mens not knowing God and themselves? Is it not a strange thing, that the Soul which knows althings else, should be so ignorant of it self, and of its Maker? Thence Plato, Alcibiad. 2. pag. 144. saith, It is no wonder, that they who are ignorant of God, should account that which is worst best. Whence he concludes, That the ignorance of the best good is the worst evil. And as to the ignorance of our selves, he openly affirmes, Theaecet. pag. 176. That those are by so much the more what they thinke they are not, [i. e. ignorant] by how much the lesse they thinke they are so. And that this proud affected practic Ig­norance of God and our selves is the root of al sin, he further [Page 117]demonstrates, Alcibiad. 1. pag. 117. Thou seest therefore that Sin is appendent to action by reason of that ignorance, whereby a man thinkes he knows, what indeed he is ignorant of. And he subjoins the reason: Those are left under error, [...], who knowing nothing, thinke they know every thing. Confidence of knowlege is a sure marque of ignorance. Whence he concludes, pag. 118. [...], This ve­ry ignorance therefore is the cause of Sins, and most opprobriose. Lastly, Leg. 5. pag. 732. he assures us, That when we attemt those things whereof we are ignorant, we grossely erre. Such a venimous, ma­ligne, efficacious influence has proud, conceited, practic Error on al sin. Indeed the power of sin lies in the power of darknesse or ignorance: practic Errors foment and maintain lusts. The mind, like a silk-worme, lies intangled in those errors, that came out of its own bowels: when lust hath put out Reason, it soon takes the Chair: men of corrupt minds, are men of sinful lives: Mind and Wil do reciprocally vitiate each other: whiles lust bribes consci­ence out of office, it cooperates with sin. Divine light is a bur­den to a corrupt conscience; which delights to spin out of it self sick dreaming errors, thereby to create its own chains and fetters: a carnal mind vainly puffed up out-reasons al good convictious of dutie: surely there is no dutie done by that man, whose conscience doth not its dutie: for there is nothing in man active for God, when conscience is not first active. It's evident then, that practic error of conscience opens the door to al sin.

And as Plato, so Aristotle, his Scholar, hath greatly explicated and demonstrated the pestiferous influence which practic error hath on al sin. Thus Eth. l. 3. c. 2. pag. 121. where he makes this difference between Sins of ignorance, and ignorant Sins. A drunken man, that kils another in his drunken fit sins ignorantly; and yet his sin is not a Sin of Ignorance, because that ignorance was volun­tarily contracted. Thence he concludes: [...], &c. Therefore every wicked man is ignorant of what he ought to do, and from what he ought to abstain: and by this they are made unjust and wicked. And Eth. l. 3. c. 7. pag. 144. he distributes this practic ignorance into its several kinds. (1) There is, saith he, an ignorance, the cause of which is in our selves. As when drunken men sin ignorantly; which ignorance was contracted by their voluntary drunkennesse. (2) There is an Ignorance of Right or Law: when men are ignorant of their dutie, which they ought [Page 118]to know. (3) There is an ignorance from our own neglect: which had we been diligent in the use of means we might have avoided. (4) There is an ignorance from depraved affections and custome in sin­ning.

We may reduce these Philosophemes of Plato and Aristotle to this more formal distribution. Man is directed in his action by a twofold knowlege, the one universal, the other particular: a defect in either of these causeth sin. Whence it follows, that a man may have an universal knowlege, that this or that is sinful in general, and yet want a particular judgement of its sinfulnesse in this or that case. So that particular ignorance is very wel consistent with universal knowlege. But now, sithat universal knowlege, though most certain, is not so influential on our actions, as particular; because actions are about singulars; hence it follows, that parti­cular ignorance has more force to lead men into sin, than univer­sal knowlege has to prevent it. This particular ignorance may be again distributed into natural or voluntary: and voluntary may be again divided into that which is antecedent, or that which is consequent to the act. Yea al ignorance which ariseth from the Wil, may be looked on as voluntary. For what is involuntary, if it arise from some precedent voluntary act, it may be judged voluntary, according to moral estimation. As in that instance which Aristotle gives of a Drunkard, whose ignorance is volun­tary; because arising from the act of his own Wil. For it is a good Rule of Aristotle, That those Acts whose Principe is in us, may be said to be ours and voluntarily undertaken by us. Lastly we may, with Aristotle, distinguish between sins which are per ignorantiam, i. e. when ignorance is the cause of the sin: and such as are cum ignorantia: i. e. when albeit ignorance attends the sin, yet the proper cause of that ignorance lies in the sinners wil: The former are those which we cal sins of ignorance, but the later not; be­cause the ignorance is voluntary. Men want not so much means of knowing what they ought to do, as wil to do what they know. Reason may rightly discerne the thing which is good, and yet the wil of man not incline it self thereto, as oft as sensual passions, prejudice, or affected ignorance prevail. So that some practic error or inconsideration lies at the root of every sin: either be­cause men do not practically consider al circumstances; or if they do consider them, yet they do not practically determine this or that Act to be evil; but instead thereof they foist in another false [Page 119]Conclusion, That this or that sinful Act is sweet, or profitable. A corrupt Conscience may assent to good premises, and yet dissent from the conclusion, yea consent to a bad conclusion. Lusts per­vert Conscience, and sil it with partialitie and prejudice in its inquiries. The light of a carnal mind is easily reconciled with lust: for a secure Conscience takes up such a Religion as wil not distaste its lusts; nor yet its lusts molest it. There is a peace be­tween the lust and light of a carnal heart: It's easie for a secure Conscience to cast light into prison, and detain the truth of God in unrighteousnesse: to believe as it list, not as it ought. A corrupt Conscience hath many turnings and windings, various co­verts and hiding places for lust: Sometimes the veil of hypocrisie, yea of Religion is made use of to cover sin, as Mat. 23.14. Some­times a good name is put on a bad thing, or a bad designe is justi­fied by a good end: or a good cause is made use of to justifie a bad action: or when mens lusts wil not comply with the rule, men bring down the rule to their lusts. Again, sometimes new lights are pleaded to maintain old errors: Mens lusts make many controversies about sin: they make great sins little, and little none at al. Thus practic error and ignorance is the cause of al sin. Of which see more fully Philos. Gen. P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect. 4. §. 5.

§. 4. Not only practic Error,Self-love a ra­dical cause of Sin. but also Self-love has a maligne venimous influence on al sin. Plato hath excellent Philosophemes on this Theme. So Repub. 9. pag. 574, &c. he describes to the life, ‘the servile condition of a wicked person, under the Tyran­nie of Self-love; how he is thereby violently impelled and hur­ried into al sin.’ So also in what follows, pag. 577. of which hereafter. Thus likewise in his Leg. 5. pag. 731. he lively de­monstrates, [...], That Self-love is [...], an ingenite evil, in which they who indulge themselves, have no remedie against sin. Then he addes: [...], And to speak the truth, self-love is altogether the cause of al those evils, in which the life of man is involved. And he gives the reason of it: [...], For he that loves is truly blind about what he loves; and thence misjudgeth things just, good, and honest; being in this opinion, that there is more honor due to him than to truth. And Aristotle gives us the reason hereof; Be­cause [...], a self-lover [Page 120]acts a! for himself, according to his profit. Every self-lover is chain­ed to that great Idol Self, which he makes his God, and the only Centre, in which al the lines of his Affections and Actions meet. Self is the last end of self-lovers, even in their highest acts of self-denial: if they give their goods to the poor, or their bodies to be burned for Religion, it is al to please self. They may crosse their own wils, but never crosse self as their last end: if they seek after God, it is to advance self: self-love formes al their actions and passions into a subservience unto some carnal self-interest. What makes superstitiose persons so much to vilifie, mortifie, and with so much severitie torment their bodies, but thereby to exalt their inward excellences? And as self-lovers make self the last End, so also the first Principe of al they do. Self-love ever affects self-dependence: it would fain have a World of its own to live, act, and breathe in: it lays the whole weight of religiose services on self as the bottome of its dependence: it would live and die within the sphere of its own activitie, as wel as interest. It's ex­ceeding sweet to self to have a stock of its own even in things re­ligiose to trade with, and thereby merit divine favor. And alas! how soon are men overcome by tentations, when they are self-dependent and self-strong? He that thinkes to keep himself from sin by self-strength, wil soon be overcome by it. Now Self being the last End and first Principe of self-love, it hence becomes a sper­matic universal cause of al sin. Every self-lover is his own Idol: and whiles he inordinately embraces and adheres to himself, he is soon overcome thereby, and so hurried into sin. Yea self-love makes the best duties and services for God most carnal, vile, and abominable to God. Where self is predominant, the inten­tion of the Soul is spurious and rotten: and a bad intention makes the best workes bad. Where self rules, it formes even religiose services into a conformitie to carnal lusts: wherefore he that can­not depart from self, wil soon depart from God, and tumble head­long into al sin. Self-love is the strongest carnal concupiscence, and most directly opposite to divine love. The soverain power of Lust increaseth according to the obedience men render to them­selves and self-love: by obeying self and its particular movements men make it a God: yea, the more men endeavor to humor and gratifie it, the more tyrannie it is. Man has not a worse or more dangerous Companion than himself, his carnal self, which is so potent to draw him into sin. It has always been the ambition of [Page 121]the Creature to deifie it self, not by being equal in nature with God, but by being its first Cause and last End, which is the spring of al departure from God, and conversion to the Creature. And that which makes self-love more potent to promote sin is its poli­cie and many artifices to concele its self and sin. How oft doth carnal self-love put on the masque of true lawful self-love, and thereby delude the Soul into sin? There is a great ressemblance between spiritual self-love and carnal: whence the later oft con­celes it self under the vizard of the former. The more a man loves himself, the lesse he conceits he loves himself: as the more mad a man is, the lesse he judgeth himself so. Self-love is so arti­ficial in its colors, as that it can discolor virtue with the face of vice, and vice with virtues face. Thus by its fraudes and deceits in conceling it self and sin, it greatly advances sin. The members of self-love are principally three. (1) Concupiscence, or adherence to the Creature as our last end. (2) Carnal confidence, or dependence on self as the first cause. (3) Spiritual pride, or an over-valuing estime of self-excellences. Each of these have a venimous influence on al sin, as we have largely demonstrated out of Plato and others, Philos. General. P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect. 4. §. 8, 9, 10.

§. 5. Next to the Causes of moral Evil we may consider its Spe­cies or Kinds. Al moral Evil or Sin may be distributed into in­voluntary, Sins are either of Ignorance, of Passion, or wil­ful. or voluntary: again involuntary, into sins of Ignorance, or of Passion. We find the foundation of this distribution in Plato, Phileb. pag. 22. where he saith, That those who choose sin, do it either involuntarily and ignorantly, or out of a voluntary miserable necessitie. 1. As for involuntary Sins, they are, (1) Sins of Ignorance, when the ignorance is not affected, either from prejudice, voluntary ne­glect, or custome in sin, as before, §. 3. (2) Sins of Passion or In­firmitie, when the passion is antecedent to the wil, and doth as it were extort the consent of the wil, being vehement and violent. For if the passion be consequent to the act of the wil, or but a languid remisse motion, such as doth not force the wil, the sin is not so much of passion, as voluntary: whence passions that arise from evil customes, and follow the wil, do not constitute a sin of passion. Thence Aristotle. Eth. l. 3. c. 3. saith, That every sin from passion is not involuntary. Thus also Suarez, 1.2. Tract. 5. Disp. 4. pag. 395. Now involuntarinesse, in sins either of ignorance or of passion, takes away something of their aggravation: where there is real unaffected ignorance, passion or perturbation, there is lesse [Page 122]of sin. Where there is involuntary Ignorance, there is want of that which might help the understanding: where antecedent in­voluntary passions hurrie men into sin, there is voluntary dissent or subsequent repentance. Hence the Disciples of Aristippus said, That they who sin from perturbation, not voluntarily, deserve pardon, as Laertius. 2. Voluntary wilful Sins, are such as procede from a strong bent of wil, without ignorance or passion as the original cause thereof. Such sins are of greater aggravation, because of lesse provocation, and excuse. From a perseverance in voluntary sins, and frequent repetition thereof procedes a fixed custome and rooted habit of sin, touching which we find many good Philoso­phemes in Plato, of which hereafter §. 7. of the necessary servitude of Sin.

§. 6. The Nature, The moral servi­tude of Sin. Causes, and Kinds of moral Evil being laid open, we may with more facilitie explicate and demonstrate, what that moral Servitude is which attends it. That al moral Evil or Sin is attended with the highest moral Servitude is evident from sacred Philosophie, as also the Philosophemes of Plato and others. There were three ways whereby men were brought under civil servitude among the Ancients: some were made servants by be­ing taken in war; others were bought with a price; others be­came such by being borne in the house of servants, as Ishmael. Sacred Philosophie, in treating of the servitude of sin, alludes to al these three kinds of service. (1) Sinners are said, 1 Kings 21.20. & 2 Kings 17.17. To sel themselves, to worke evil: i.e. de­liberately and voluntarily to commit sin, and that with a ful bent of heart: which is opposed to Pauls being sold under sin, Rom. 7.14. (2) The servants of sin are said to be led captive by sin, 2 Pet. 2.19. (3) Al men by nature are said to be borne slaves of sin,Ephes. 2.2. & 5.6. Eph. 2.2. Children of disobedience: i.e. addicted, devoted, given up to it. So Ephes. 5.6. & Col. 3.6. This is an Hebraic Idio­tisme: for among them [...], a Son, being put in the state of Regi­ment, and construed with a Noun signifying an inanimate thing, is emphatically used to note that such a person or thing is addict­ed or given up to that which is predicated of it. Thus a child of disobedience, is one that is a perfect slave or devoted to it. And Plato, Rep. 9. pag. 575. tels us, That he who is subject to the Tyran­nie of his own Lusts, is the greatest slave imaginable: for he cannot do what he would; but is shut up in the prison of his own unbridled lusts. Therefore in his Cratylus, as he derives [...], Virtue, from [Page 123] [...], always to flow, which importes libertie; so he derives [...], Vice, from [...], because a wicked man is ever fettered and chained by his lusts. But to illustrate the miserable vassa­lage and slaverie which attends al Sinners by nature, we shal con­sider this servitude of Sin, (1) In regard of the Adjuncts and Effects that attend Sin. (2) In the proper Adjuncts, or Attributes that attend this servitude. First as to the Adjuncts and Effects that attend Sin, we shal draw them forth according to the mind of sa­cred and Platonic Philosophie, in the ensuing Propositions.

1. Al moral Evil or Sin is repugnant to human Nature. The Ci­vilian,Sin repugnant to human Na­ture. Justin. Institut. l. 1. tit. 3. defines Civil Servitude, a constitu­tion of the Law of Nations, whereby one is subject to the Dominion of another against Nature. And is not this most true of the moral servitude of Sin? What more against human Nature, than to be subject to the tyrannie of irregular passions? Yea doth not Sin make not only the Creatures an enemie to man, but also himself the greatest enemie to himself? That Sin is most repugnant to human Nature, may easily be evinced out of Plato's Philosophie. Thence he cals it [...] and [...], Discord and Confusion; be­cause it causeth an intestine war, discord, and confusion in human Nature. Thus also in his Lysis, he saith, Al good is [...], proper and agreable to human Nature, but [...], evil is aliene and repugnant to it. Good, albeit it slow not from Nature, yet it in­clines us to what is most for the perfection of human Nature; whereas al Sin tends to its ruine. As al moral Libertie consistes in Virtue, which gives an elevation and advance to human Na­ture; so al moral servitude arising from Sin implies a depression of human Nature. Thus Psal. 106.43. And were brought low for their iniquitie. [...] signifies attenuated, depressed. Psal. 106.43. Vitium contra naturam est, ut non possit nisi nocere naturae. Non ita (que) esset vitium recede­re à Deo, nisi naturae, cujus id vitium est, po­tiùs compete­ret esse cum Deo. August. de Civ. Dei, l. 11. c. 17. It's here spoken of their being brought down from an high to a low condition. Then follows the cause of this their being brought down: [...], for, or in their iniquitie. Their iniquitie was not only the merito­rious cause, but also the instrument or machine by which they were brought down. Nothing doth so much empoverish and bring down human Nature, as Sin. So Psal. 107.12. Therefore he brought down their heart with labor: they fel down, and there was none to help. [...] with toilsome labor. The toilsome labor of Sin is most potent to bring down human Nature. (1) Sin brings down human Nature, and is most repugnant to it, in that it im­portes an aversion and falling from God, who is our most laudable [Page 124]and excellent Being, our first Principe and last End. This is im­plied in that dreadful interrogation of God to Adam, Gen. 3.9. Gen. 3.9. Where art thou? In this Question we may consider [1] That it regards not Adams place, but state: Where art thou? Not in what place, but in what state? How is it with thee now Adam? How doest thou do? Is al wel? What is the condition of thy Soul? Art thou in that state I placed thee in? [2] It's a question not of ignorance as to God, but of conviction as to Adam: it is the question of a Judge making inquisition after the Malefactor. Where art thou? Where is now thy confidence in thine own strength? Doest thou see unto what a condition thy pride, thy unbelief has reduced thee? Thou aimedst to be as God, free from my yoke and Law. But is it so with thee? Art thou not fallen into a miserable bondage? Doth not thy fear, thy running away, and endeavor to hide thy self, discover thy guilt and servitude? [3] It is a sarcastic, biting, upbraiding question. Where art thou? O! how is it with thee now Adam? Hast thou not brought thy self to a sine passe? Where is the Deitie thou affectedst? Plato seems to give frequent hints and intimations of this Fal of Man, and the servitude that attends it. So in his Phaedrus, pag. 245. he compares the Soul, in its innocent state, to a winged Chariot, that slies aloft; but in its lapsed state, he makes it to have lost its wings, and to be imprisoned in the bodie. And the Platonists generally complain of the Souls servitude in the bodie, as a punish­ment of some former sin. Which makes Steuch. Eugubinus and others to thinke, that Plato knew more of the Fal, than he would discover, which he disguised under that Hypothesis, of the Preexi­stence of Souls. So Eusebius, Praep. Evang. lib. 12. cap. 11. pag. 584. thinkes that Plato, in his Symposium, expressed the Fal allegori­cally under the Symbol of Porus, of which see Court Gent. P. 1. B. 3. C. 5. §. 1-6.

(2) Sin puls down and is repugnant to human Nature,Sin strips off the Image of God. as it divestes men of the Image of God. Thus in sacred Philosophie, Gen. 3.7.Gen. 3.7.22. And they knew that they were naked: i.e. they perceived themselves divested of the image of God. Thence v. 22. God said: Behold man is become like one of us! i.e. Ironically, most unlike unto us, a sad spectacle, a prodigiose monster, unlike the Crea­ture made by us. It alludes to the words of Satan, v. 5. And ye shal be as Gods. It is said, Gen. 5.1. That Adam was created in the likenesse of God. But v. 3. it's added, That he begat a son [Page 125]in his own likenesse, i.e. sinful, as he was. This deprivation of the image of God is wel expressed by Paul, Rom. 3.23.Rom. 3.23. For al have sinned and come short of the glorie of God. [...], are deprived, spoiled, divested of the glorie of God. This may be taken (1) Actively: Al have come short of the gloriose image of God, and conformitie to his Law, which Adam was at first invested with. (2) Passively, as to future Glorie. The former sense seems pri­marily intended here. Adams Soul was silled with the gloriose image of God; but ah! alas! how has sin defaced and dis­sigured the Soul! how far short doth it now come of that gloriose Image! This Fal of man from the Image of God Plato was not al­together a stranger unto: for, in his Critias, he saith, that ancient­ly there flourished in our first Parents, [...], or [...], a divine nature, which rendred them happy, but human custome or sin prevailing, an inundation of evils followed.

(3) Sin brings down human Nature and is repugnant thereto,Sin is enmitie against God. in that it infuseth a Principe of confusion, enmitie, and rebellion against God. The perfection of human Nature consistes in an intimate adherence and subjection to God; but sin puts a law of enmitie and rebellion into the heart, Rom. 8.7.Rom. 8.7. The carnal mind is enmitie against God, i.e. a complexe or systeme of al manner of enmitie: yea nothing but enmitie: enmitie in the highest-degree: for ab­stractes speak formes and essences. Greg. Nazianzen, in Apolog. makes three Species of the carnal minds Rebellion and Reluctance against Grace. (1) [...], a servile departure from God. (2) [...], a contentiose aversion and obstinate reluctation against God. (3) [...], a stupor in sin: when men rush into sin, [...], with a bare face. The carnal mind is the greatest enemie God has. Al sin in corrupt nature is a kind of Antipathie against God; that which puts men upon al acts of rebellion against, and aversation from him. Hos. 4.12. A spirit of fornication: Hos. 4.12, 16. i.e. of Idolatrie, which is spiritual fornication. [...] a Spirit denotes a vehement fervor, flame, or impetus of lust: such as carries with it the highest impetuositie, effort, and force. For the Hebrews cal al the extraordinary motions or perturbations of the mind, Spirit. Thence it follows: from under God: i.e. from under his Power, Empire, and Dominion. From under hath the force of a priva­tion, and denotes their aversion from God. Thence he addes, v. 16. For Israel slideth back, as a back-sliding heifer. [...], as a rebellious, contumacious, refractary heifer: such as thinketh her self [Page 126]free, casts off the yoke from her neck, and is impatient of subje­ction, as Deut. 32.15. The meaning is, that Israel, like a lasci­vious refractary Heifer, had cast off al regard to divine Com­mands, and wandred up and down according to her own lusts. Thence follows her punishment answerable to her sin: The Lord wil feed her in a large place. She affects a wandring, vagrant, li­centious course of life, and she shal have it: The Lord wil feed her in a large place, or barren desert, not in a fruitful place. When Churches or people wander from God, he wil feed them in a de­sert of affliction, as Hos. 2.14. Such is the state of those that wander from God. Sacred Philosophie and the Greek Fathers expresse this enmitie of the carnal mind against God, by such ex­pressions as these: [...], to resist God; [...], to resist the Spirit; [...], to affect to overcome the power of God; [...], to make void, or repel Grace; [...], to deride God. And what greater bondage can there be, than for a rational Creature to turne his back on God, and flie from his chiefest good? Doth not this pul down and impoverish human Nature? Thence Plato, in his Politicus, tels us, That after the Golden Age, i.e. the state of Innocence, had its period, sin brought into the world a deluge, [...] of confusion and disorder, &c.

(4) Sin is most repugnant to human Nature,Sin strips men of Humanitie. in that it strips men of the right use of their Reason, Wil, Affections, yea of their comfortable Being and Humanitie. Plato, in his Theaetetus, assures us, That the excellence of man consistes in his Ressemblance unto God; but so far as he fals short thereof, he fals under, [...], Nothingnesse, and Inhumanitie. Sin reduceth human Nature to a kind of Inhumanitie and Nothingnesse, in that it spoils it of the right use of its rational Being and operations. For man having an intrinsec relation unto God, as his first efficient and last End, he so far enjoys his Being, as he doth adhere to God: he that bids farewel to, or departs from God, bids farewel to, and departs from himself, as to al right use of what he has. Man is then said to live, when he useth and enjoyeth things as he ought; which sin deprives him of, in that it makes him use things that are to be en­joyed, and enjoy things that are to be used. Thus it invertes the order of things. Hence it was a commun Saying with Socrates, as also the Stoics, That al Vice is against Nature; because human Nature as such, was made to adhere unto God as its first Cause and last End; which state man by sin doth relinquish; and so by [Page 127]consequence lose the right use of his Being, Life, Reason, Wil, Affe­ctions, and al human Acts. Such is the Repugnance of Sin to hu­man Nature.

2. Moral Evils or Sins are not only repugnant to human Nature, Sins repugnant each to other. but to themselves. This greatly demonstrates the servitude and bondage of Sin: for al moral Libertie implies Order, Harmonie, and Ʋniformitie, which ariseth from Virtue: but Lusts are extreme jarring, dissonant and opposite each to other. Oh! what strange discords, confusions, and seditions are there among lusts in the heart? How is the heart distracted and as it were torne in pieces by them? Lusts are extreme mutinous and lawlesse; they keep no order. Thence in sacred Philosophie it is said, The corrupt mind cannot subject it self to the law of God. Rom. 8.7. [...],Rom. 8.7. cannot keep the place, order, and ranke the Law of God has put the Soul into. It alludes to Military order: for [...] pri­marily denotes the order and discipline of Soldiers. Yea it's ad­ded, [...], neither indeed can be: namely, because the Law is the rule of order, but Lusts are al for disorder: they disagree among themselves, as wel as from the Law of God. Lusts have no end, bounds, measure: what is sin, but a confused Chaos of al manner of disorders? How do sensual passions fight, not only against Gods Law, but against each other? And oh! what a sla­very ariseth herefrom? Thence sinners are described, Tit. 3.6.Tit. 3.6. Serving lusts and diverse pleasures. These sinful pleasures are not only diverse as to Number, but also as to Qualitie, as different and opposite each to other. Thence Jam. 4.1. Lusts are said to maintain an intestine war in mens Souls, whence al externe wars and contests arise. Thus Plato makes frequent mention of the discords and intestine wars of Lusts. So Repub. 5. pag. 444. he makes injustice to be [...], a Sedition of the Soul, or Insurrection. So [...], pag. 214. he makes al virtrose persons to be like each other, and friends; but as for profligate wicked men, they differ as wel from themselves, as each from other. And in his Phaedo, pag. 92. he saith: [...], &c. Al sin is ful of discord, but virtue is harmonious. The reason of this Discord and Repugnance a­mong lusts is this: Al concord and agreament in the Soul ariseth from its adherence to God, who is the first Unitie: so far as men depart from this prime Unitie, so far they fal under confusion, Nulla major poena nequitiae est, quàm quod sibi & suis dis­plicet. Sen. Epist. difformitie, and disorder. And what greater punishment of sin is there than this, that it is displeasing, yea repugnant to it self? [Page 128]How oft do men relinquish the lusts they longed for, and then reassume what they relinquished? What a conflict is there be­tween avaricious and prodigal lusts? But of this more in what follows.

3.Sin most impo­tent and infirme. Sin is the Disease of the Soul, ful of impotence and infirmitie. Al moral Libertie implies health, vigor, force and strength: and wherein consistes the vigor and strength of any thing, but in ad­herence to its first Principes? The more any thing departes from Ʋnitie, the more Division, Contrarietie, Dissolution, and Infirmitie. And is not God the first Principe or Cause of the Soul? Doth it not by departing from him depart from its first Unitie and strength? O! then how impotent and infirme is sin? This is every where intimated in sacred Philosophie.Ezech. 16.30. So Ezech. 16.30. How weak is thy heart! i.e. how sick, faint, and impotent by reason of lust. Yet it follows: Seing thou doest al these things, the workes of an imperiose whorish woman. She had potent impe­riose lusts, but a weak heart to resist tentations. Sin is said to be a poisonous bitter root, which sheds its maligne influences on al our Affections and Actions.Deut. 29.18. Thus Deut. 29.18. Apostasie is said to be a root bearing gal and bitternesse. The Hebrew [...] ren­dred Gal, signifies a poisonous herbe; and so it must be rendred here, a root, whose influences and fruits are poisonous and bitter. Thence the LXX. render it, [...], springing up in gal, or poison and bitternesse. For [...] signifies both gal and poison, answerable to [...], because the poison of some Serpents lies in their gal.Act. 8.23. Peter alludes hereto, Act. 8.23. where [...], signifies the bitter poisonous root of corrupt nature. So Heb. 12.15.Heb. 12.15. Root of bitternesse: i.e. poisonous root of sin. No­thing so poisonous and killing as sin. Whence sinners are said to be, Jer. 17.9. [...], desperately sick, even unto death. So Esa. 24.4. languisheth, as a feeble, crazy, consumtive bodie, as v. 5. Basil, in Psal. saith, That men are rendred by Virtue or Grace [...], without wound and blemish: whence they become, [...], inexpugnable and free, as before, Chap. 3. Thence it necessarily follows, that sin is the wound and blemish of the Soul, that which renders it most impotent and servile. That sin is ful of impotence and infirmitie Plato once and again inculcates. So Repub. 4. pag. 430. he saith, An intemperate man [...], weaker than himself; whereas a temperate man is [...], more potent than himself, i.e. than his sensual appetite. [Page 129]Thus in his Timaeus, pag. 86, 87. he proves, That the irregularitie of our affections is the worst disease. So Repub. 10. pag. 608. he in­formes us, That evil is that which dissolves and corrupts things, but good conserves and relieves. And thence he concludes, That a ser­vile Sinner hath nothing sound. Lastly, Repub. 1. he saith, Ʋn­righteousnesse is the disease of the Soul.

4. Sin is the spot, stain and defilement of the Soul,Sin the defile­ment of the Soul. and there­fore the greatest servitude. Virtue gives a Nitor, Lustre, Splen­dor, Beautie, and Glorie to the Soul; but Sin is the Blot and ble­mish of human Nature: indeed nothing can pollute and defile the Soul but Sin, and sinful Idols. Hence we find mention,Deut. 29.17. Ezech. 23.7. Deut. 29.17. & Ezech. 23.7. of [...], gillulim, filthy Idols. The word signifies both filth and Idols, or sordid, dunghil, filthy Idols, such as pollute by the very touch. So Levit. 26.30. Psal. 106.28. The Soul, by its lusts, running into and being made one with filthy Idols, is thereby made filthy and impure: as on the contrary, when it mingles with things above it, God and things virtuose, it's there­by made more pure and excellent. We read also, Tit. 1.11. of filthy lucre. Lucre is not filthy in it self, but being beneath the Soul, it defiles the same when it is coveted thereby. For when the heart of man runs down into things beneath it self, it is thereby defiled, whence such things are called filthy Idols. This also Plato observed: whence in his Minos, he tels us, [...], A good man is of al most sacred: but a wicked man most impure and polluted. Sin indeed pollutes the whole man. (1) It defiles mens persons: whence sinners are termed Swine, Mat. 7.6. which are the most unclean Creatures. (2) It defiles mens Minds and Consciences, Tit. 1.15. (3) It defiles mens Discourses, words, and communi­cations: Esa. 9.17. Every mouth speaketh folie. [...], which is rendred villanie, Chap. 32.6. signifies the flowers and leaves of plants putrified and rotten. So Ephes. 4.29. No corrupt communication. [...] signifies rotten, stinking, noisome, like rotten fruits or stink­ing breath. (4) It defiles mens Actions and Fruits: Mat. 7.17. [...] maligne fruits. (5) It pollutes whole Nations and Churches. Hence Israel in her Apostasie is said to be,Hos. 8.8. Hos. 8.8. a vessel where­in is no pleasure: i.e. as some expound it, like such vessels as are most abject, and exposed to the most sordid uses, to retein only excrements. So Lam. 1.8, 9. Zeph. 3.1. (6) Yea Sin pollutes our very Righteousnesse and makes it unclean.Esa. 64.6. Esa. 64.6. As an [Page 130]unclean thing, or person; because the terme is masculine. As a lumpe of some filthy mater, or such unclean stuffe, as by the Law was to be burned, Lev. 13.55, 57. or like some leprose person; or one laboring under some noisome disease, even from the crown of the head to the sole of the foot, as Chap. 1.6. Thence he addes: And al our righteousnesses as filthy rags. There are diffe­rent interpretations of these words: some take them as an allu­sion to Beggers Ragges: others, to Ragges polluted by putrified sores: others, to garments defiled by bloud: others, to menstru­ous ragges: but al generally agree in this, that the terme notes much defilement. In sum, there is this universal defilement on human Nature: Adams person first polluted our nature; and our natures polluted defile our persons and whatever procedes from us, or is inherent in us. Hence,

5. Sin is the Reproche, Sin ful of shame and reproche. Dishonor, Shame, and Disgrace of the Soul. As God has entailed honor and renown on true Virtue, so shame and disgrace on Sin: neither can the wit and power of man cut off this Entail. This is frequently inculcated in sacred Philoso­phie, which teacheth us, That Sin doth degrade men, and strip them of their highest excellence, clothing them with shame and reproche.Esa. 32.5. Thuch Esa. 32.5. The vile person shal no more be called liberal, nor the churle said to be bountiful. [...] nabal signifies pri­marily a vile person, a man of no worth, like a withered flower, or leaf in Autumne. Thence it signifies a fool, as Abigal's speech importes, 1 Sam. 25.25. Such a vile foolish sinner shal no more be called [...] nadib, i.e. free, noble, ingenuous, generose Prince. No Nabal or vile sinner, shal, in the days of Christs gloriose reigne, (which this Text refers to, as v. 1, &c.) be called Nadib, free, generose Prince. Esa. 14.20. This is more fully expressed, Esa. 14.20. The seed of evil-doers shal never be renowned. [...], shal not be na­med: or shal not be men of name, or renown for ever. The great God delights to clothe proud sinners with shame and reproche. Thus Esa. 22.17.Esa. 22.17. Behold the Lord wil carrie thee away with a mighty captivitie, and wil surely cover thee. Hebr. in covering wil cover thee. This repetition, according to the Hebrew Idiome, importes, (1) Certainty, (2) Expedition, (3) Abundance, (4) Continuance. He shal certainly, speedily, abundantly, and continually cover thee. Ay but with what? With shame and reproche. It implies such a co­vering as persons fallen into disgrace, or carried captive, or con­demned to die were wont to have, whose faces were covered, as [Page 131]unworthy to see light. And who was it, who should be thus co­vered? It was Shebna the Kings Treasurer, a man covered and clothed with gorgeous apparel, and many Titles of Honor, as v. 18. God first or last clothes the highest of sinners with shame and re­proche. Sin strips men of their highest excellences, and then God, in just judgement, clothes them with disgrace.Exod. 32.25. So Exod. 32.25. And when Moses saw the people were naked. [...], naked, in the shame of their sins, divested of the glorie of God. So it follows: For Aaron had made them naked unto their shame amongst their ene­mies. Ʋnto their shame, [...], or, unto their infamie. LXX. a rejoicing and mockery, namely to their adversaries. Sin makes men a shame, infamie, and reproche to their friends, and the scorne, mockery, and rejoicing of their adversaries. What more con­tumeliose and reprocheful to human Nature, than to be a volun­tary drudge of Sin and Satan? Whiles Nations and Churches keep close to God, they are formidable and terrible to their ene­mies; but when by sin they depart from God, they are the re­proche of al. Thus Ephraim, Hos. 13.1. When Ephraim spake trem­bling, Hos. 13.1, 2. he exalted himself in Israel. Some read it thus: Ephraim was a tremblement to him that heard him: i.e. so long as he kept close to God, he was formidable to al his enemies, he was exalted in honor and renown. But when he offended in Baal he died: i.e. he is now most abject and contemtible in the eyes of al. And why? because he hath departed from the Worship of God to worship Baal. Thence it follows, v. 2. And now they sin more and more. Hebr. They adde sin to sin. O! what an ignoble thing is sin? Doth it not bring al under a scorne? Thus Israel in Babylon, Lam. 3.14. I am made a derision to al my people. Or, as others, to al people, namely round about. Thence Paul demands of the Ro­mans, Rom. 6.21. What fruit had ye then in these things whereof ye are now ashamed? The state of sin is always attended with shame and bondage. This was also wel observed by Plato and many of the wiser Heathens. Thus Plato, in his Phaedrus, cals [...], concu­piscence, [...], the contumelie or reproche of human Nature. So in his Gorg. pag. 477. he saies, [...], The pravitie of the Soul is the basest and vilest of althings. Yea, he affirmes: [...], It is not only by Law, but by Nature more base to do an injurie than to re­ceive it. So in his Symposium, pag. 183. he saith, That love is of it self neither excellent nor vile; but if it be irregular, it is most vile. [Page 132]Whence he concludes: [...], It is therefore a vile thing, vily to obey any vile thing, such as sin is. And he addes, pag. 184. [...], To lust after riches or civil power is most base and vile. The like in his Leg. 5. [...], Injustice is the basest thing imaginable. And he subjoins the reason: For he that fils his Soul with sins, [...] doth reproche it, and make it vile. Indeed no­thing can make man vile, unlesse he first make himself vile by sin. Thence Anacharsis being upbraided by an Athenian, that he was a Scythian, of a base Countrey; he replied, My Countrey is a dis­grace to me, but thou art a disgrace to thy Countrey: meaning by his vitiose courses. And is not this too true of too many English­men? It's true, many, by reason of their high condition in the world, may be exemted from the punishment of their sin, yet assuredly none is or can be exemted from the shame of it. Thence Basil, Psal. saith, [...], That there is a turpitude and impressed stampe or print of sin, as it were of an indeleble tin­cture. Al other excellences cannot keep a man from being vile, if sinful. Antiochus a King is said to be a vile person, because wicked. Seneca tels us, ‘That none is contemned by another, but he who first makes himself contemtible by sin: a free noble mind may live in a Cottage; whereas servitude may inhabit a marble golden Palace.’ Pious humilitie exalts the Soul by ma­king it subject to God, but proud self-exaltation brings down the Soul: nothing more servile and base than to be subject to the imperiose dictates of proud vile lusts.

6. Sin is the greatest Tyrannie, Sin the Tyran­nie of the Soul. and therefore its servitude greatest. Plato, Repub. 9. pag. 574, &c. gives us a copiose, lively, and em­phatic illustration of the Tyrannie of Self-love: [...], &c. When the Soul has subjected it self to the Tyrannie of Love, it's hurried into al manner of flagitiose vices, neither can he abstain therefrom: but that tyrannic Love living in him, [...], in al manner of Anarchie and lawlesse Empire, as a great Monarch, precipitates him into al manner of vices. So also pag. 577. The mind being subject to tyrannic Lust cannot do what it would, but is torne in pieces by violent assaults, &c. Yea he affirmes, That by how much the more men indulge and observe the commands of Lust, by so much the more tyrannic and insolent it is. So in his Gorg. pag. 478. He must needs live miserably, who [Page 133]carries about with him unrighteousnesse, that imperiose Lady, whose commands he can never be free from. And indeed thus much sacred Philosophie informes us, That he who refuseth to be under the sweet Empire of the divine Law, fals under the miserable servi­tude of sins tyrannie. Thus Rom. 5.21. [...],Rom. 5.21. Sin is brought in as a great Tyrant, ruling with the greatest rigor imagi­nable, even unto death. So Rom. 6.12.Rom. 6.12. Let not sin therefore reign in your mortal bodies, that you should obey it in the lusts thereof. [...], he brings in Sin as an infamous imperiose Lady, whom to serve is most unworthy of a free ingenuous Spirit. Thus Rom. 3.9. For we have before proved, both Jews and Gentiles, Rom. 3.9. that they are al under sin. Schmidius reads the first part thus: For we have been al long ago accused and convinced, namely Psal. 14.1, 2, 3. of what? That al are under sin. [...], to be under sin, is to be under the Jurisdiction, Tyrannie, and Sub­jection of Sin; which is here brought in as some imperiose do­mineering Lord, that delights to tyrannise over his Vassals. Sin is the basest thing in the world: O then how servile is subjection to its Tyrannie! A sinner addicted to any base tyrannic Idol he lusts after, doth not possesse that beloved Idol, but that possesseth him, and brings him under a miserable Tyrannie, so that he can neither part with, nor enjoy what he lusts after: and by how the more the Idols he lusts after are multiplied, by so much the lesse power has he over himself, or the things which he possesseth. And the soverain power and tyrannie of sin appears in nothing more than in this, that men do voluntarily obey its dicates and commands. Such whose hearts are chained to any inferior Idol, have no power over themselves: they are not their own: they have no dominion over their own persons, actions, objects of use or fruition, in moral estimation. There is nothing that human Nature more abhors, than to be under the Tyrannie of others; and yet al sinners electively embrace a self-tyrannie, to be under the power of tyrannic lusts.

7. Al Sin is ful of Penurie, Want and Necessitie; Sin ful of penu­rie and want. which is ano­ther attendent of servitude. Plato, Repub. 9. pag. 577. tels us, That the Soul under the Tyrannie of Sin, [...], must necessarily be always under an indigent insatiable condition. So in his Politicus, pag. 274. [...], By al these things, [meaning such as attended the Fal of Man] men were driven into great straits. Thus also, Rep. 9. pag. 579. speaking [Page 134]of one under the tyrannie of lust, he saith, He is a slave; neither are his lusts ever satisfied: [...], and he indeed appears to be a beggar, if any one knows how to look into his Soul. There is nothing so indigent and greedy as lust: the more it has the more it wants: which de­notes great slaverie.Luk. 15.13, 14, 15. Thus we find exemplified in the Prodigal, Luk. 15.13, 14, 15. What is spoken here of famine, want, feeding on huskes with swine, &c. demonstrates that great penurie, slaverie and miserie, which those who are slaves to their lusts are obnoxious unto. This is in a more peculiar manner visible in such whose hearts are captivated by richesse,Neminem pe­cunia divitem facit: imo con­trà nulli non majorem sui cupiditatem incussit. Quaeris quae sit hujus rei causa? Plus incipit habere posse, qui plus habet. Seneca. pleasures, or honors. The ava­ricious man has a vehement desire to be rich, and yet that very desire or lust makes him poor: yea, the richer he is as to this worlds goods, the poorer he is as to the real use and comfort of what he has: whiles he endeavors to encrease an infinite treasure of riches, his lusts also are infinitely increased, which make him most poor. Thus also sensual and ambitiose men, the more they have the more they want: the encrease of what they lust after makes them poorer as to real comfort and satisfaction therein. Sin indeed makes men most poor, in that it deprives them of God, who is the best riches. O! what a poor, shiftlesse, forlorne, mi­serable thing, or rather nothing is Sin.

8. Sin captivates the Soul, Sin the fetters of the Soul. puts chains and fetters on it; which is a great piece of servitude. Al lusts do contract, pinion, and bind up the Soul, which is in it self most ample and extensive. Thus Plato, in his Phaedo, pag. 83. saith, The mind, [...], is bound or fettered by sensual lusts. And he subjoins the reason: Because every pleasure and every dolor of the mind, being as it were armed with a nail, doth fasten it to the bodie, [...], and makes it corporeous, or sensual like the bodie. Wherein he gives us a live­ly symbolic image, how the Soul, by sensual lusts, becomes glued and chained to the bodie, yea transformed thereinto. Every Idol lusted after captivates the heart: so many lusts so many chains: yea every repeted act of sin brings the Soul under new fetters and bonds: the longer such go on in ways of sin, the greater slaves they are. It's true, some mens chains are lined with plea­sures, or gilded over with terrene richesse; but yet that addes not to their libertie: yea, the greatest natures and most noble dispositions, if sinful, have the greatest chains: for by how much the more free such conceit they are, or affect to be, by so much [Page 135]the more they are intangled in their lusts, as Esa. 44.20. Such as feed on any Idol, are chained thereto, neither is it possible for them to deliver their own Souls. Thus Hos. 4.17. Ephraim is joined to Idols, [...] bound, glued, chained. It alludes to the conjun­ction of unclean persons, whereby they become as it were one flesh, as 1 Cor. 6.16. Israel was chained to her Idols by indisso­luble bonds of false Worship, and it was impossible to pul her thence. [...] Idols, from [...], which signifies grief, straits, trou­ble. Idols do greatly straiten, torment, and vexe sinners, and yet they cannot part with them. Plato, Repub. 9. pag. 579. tels us, That sinners are shut up in the prison of their own lusts, and fettered by their irregular desires. Yea, indeed every sinner is chained to the worst of Idols, himself, and fettered by his own lusts. This we find ex­emplified in Simon Magus, Act. 8.9. giving out that himself was some great one: i.e. potent in miracles,Act. 8.9.23. one that could do great feats. Ambitiose self was that unhappy Centre, unto which he was chained. And it is worthy our serious observation to con­sider, how this Idol chains and fetters his heart, even by and un­der a profession of Religion. The case stood thus: Simon per­ceiving the Apostles to outshine him in doing miracles, he has a mind to turne Christian, thereby to gain the same power, they were invested with, as v. 19. Give me also this power. Peter smel­ling out his ambitiose ranke hypocrisie, tels him, in plain termes, v. 23. I perceive thou art in the gal of bitternesse and bond of iniquitie. This [...], bond of iniquitie signifies, (1) a Covenant or compact with iniquitie: such as is between Servants and Masters, or those who are in some deep conspiracie. And so the sense is: he was stil a sworne slave of iniquitie: one bound to sin by an Oath of Allegeance and Supremacie. (2) It is used by the LXX. to expresse the bands of iniquitie, or a chain, such as prisoners are kept in, Esa. 58.6. (3) It denotes, the binding up of many things together. Thus was Simons heart bound up by the chains of many sins. And we find something like to this in Plato's Cratylus, pag. 415. where he saith, That the vitiositie of the mind appears much in sloth: and he thence concludes; [...], Therefore sloth indicates, that the bond or chain of the Soul is most potent and tenacious.

9. Sin is the greatest servitude, in that it makes men sots, fools, Sin folie and madnesse. and mad men: it deprives of the use of reason. Thus Plato, Pro­tagor. pag. 332. [...]; Do not [Page 136]they who act irregularly, act foolishly and madly? So, in his Phaedrus, pag. 231. he makes inordinate love a kind of madnesse. Also in his Timaeus, pag. 86. he makes [...], ignorance, specially of the su­preme Being and Truth, to be [...], the disease and madnesse of the Soul. And the reason is evident; because the pro­per office and use of Reason is to unite the mind to its object Truth, and so by consequence to that Truth primarily, which is first, and most intelligible in it self, namely God, in the contem­plation of whom the minds perfection consistes. But now sin dis­unites the mind from God, and fils it with ignorance, folie, and madnesse. Hence the knowlege of the wicked is termed by Plato [...], nocturnal knowlege; because it neither illuminates, nor directs, nor delights them, which are the three main offices of knowlege. Thus our Lord, the first Light and Truth, assures us, Mat. 6.23. That the very light and knowlege of wicked men, though never so much cultivated and elevated by acquired no­tions, or commun illuminations of the Spirit, is but darknesse, yea the blackest darknesse. Stobaeus also informes us, That, according to Plato, nothing was [...], ridiculous or absurd but sin. And Grotius tels us, That Plato conjoined [...] and [...], as Luk. 23.41. so that nothing is indeed absurd but sin. Hence fre­quently in sacred Philosophie sinners are said to be without [...], an heart, i.e. practic judgement or conscience rightly informed, as Jer. 5.21. and in the Proverbs oft. Yea wicked men are sti­led, Psal. 5 5. as elsewhere, [...], mad men. Thence it is said of the Prodigal, Luk. 15.17. When he came to himself, i.e. to an awakened conscience and sound mind: which denotes, that so long as he lived in sin, he was not himself, but like a mad man. And indeed the more wit men have, if under the power of sin, the greater mad men, fools, and slaves they are; because their wit doth but serve to entangle them in their lusts: their reason doth but fortifie their minds with arguments and cavils against the means of their libertie.

10. Sin, Sin when pre­valent makes men Bestes. when in its dominion and prevalence, transformes men into mere Brutes, which is the worst of servitude. Plato stiles sensual affections the brutish part of a man, which when they prevail, transforme him into a beste. For whatever the heart of man doth vehemently adhere unto, it receives a stampe and character from; yea is transformed thereinto: if the Soul strongly adhere to God, it has the impresse of his image stamped on it: if unto [Page 137]the world, it is transformed into the spirit of the world. And the reason is evident; because al love is a kind of ingresse, or run­ning of the heart into what it loves: Thence follows first Ʋnion, and then, if it may be, Ʋnitie with its beloved. And where it cannot attain to Ʋnitie, it affects Ressemblance and similitude. Thus sinners having their hearts glued to the Idols of time, are trans­formed into their likenesse: by loving sensual carnal objects, they become sensual and carnal. Hence we find sensual sinners stiled, 2 Pet. 2.12. [...], natural brute bestes. Neither is this the case of sensual sinners only, but of the most refined spirits under the power of any base lusts. The Apostle speaking of al mankind in a natural state, saith that every man is, 1 Cor. 2.14. [...], an animal brutish man. Sin has made al human Nature inhuman and brutish: a man is not a man, in true moral and di­vine estimation, til he be virtuose: the wisest and best of men, if not sanctified, are but animal and brutish. Thence the Lord makes diligent inquisition throughout Jerusalem, If there were a man to be found, Jer. 5.1. How few men then are to be found in this sensual age! Al sinners carrie the image of Satan or of Bestes: they are either like Satan in subtiltie and malice; or like Bestes in sensualitie. And ah! what a miserable Metamorpho­sis is this, for man to be made like a beste! were it not much better for man to be a beste, than to be like a beste? For man by be­ing like a beste degrades himself, yea placeth himself below the condition of a beste, which keeps in that state it was made by God.

§. 7. Having considered the servitude of Sin in regard of the Adjuncts and Effects that attend sin, we now come to consider this servitude in its own proper Attributes and Affections, thereby far­ther to demonstrate how miserable it is.

1. The servitude of Sin is most voluntary and wilful, and there­fore most miserable. Electively to espouse evil is the worst of evils.The servitude of Sin is most vo­luntary. The slaverie of sin is in this most miserable, that men voluntarily elect their slaverie. They that take the most libertie in sinning are the greatest slaves; because voluntary slaves:Nulla servitus turpior quàm voluntaria. Every sinner naturally estimes his Prison his Palace; his Hel, his Heaven. The wil tamely and voluntarily puts it self into the fetters of sin, which renders its servitude most sordid: for the more there is of the wil in sin, the more of sin and slaverie: when the servitude of sin becomes a rational choice to the sinner, it is extreme miserable: when [Page 138]men hugge and embrace their chains, love and delight in their sins, yea take a kind of satisfaction therein, what forlorne slaves are they! Who can pitie such, who have no pitie for themselves? Now that al the slaves of sin are voluntarily such, and so most miserable, Plato assures us, in his Phaedrus, pag. 238. [...], &c. It's altogether neces­sary, that he who voluntarily subjects himself to the empire of lust, be as a sick man, &c. i.e. restlesse in every condition. So Aristotle, Eth. l. 3. c. 15. saith, [...], Old men voluntarily serve lucre or profit, as their Idol. This voluntary ser­vitude of sin, the Scripture sometimes stiles a selling a mans self to do evil, as 1 Kings 21.20. 2 Kings 17.17. To sel himself to do evil implies a deliberate,Nec voluptates sibi emit, sed se voluptatibus vendit. Sen. Rom. 6.16. voluntary, wilful giving up himself to sin, which is the highest servitude: for he that sels himself to be a slave, is deservedly such. This is lively expressed in sacred Philo­sophie, Rom. 6.16. Know ye not, that to whom ye yield your selves servants to obey, his servants ye are to whom ye obey: whether of sin unto death, or of obedience unto righteousnesse? [...], to whom ye yield your selves servants. [...], is, so to yield a mans self a servant to another, as to observe every beck and nod of him to whom he yields himself a servant, with al manner of promtitude to obey his commands: yea it signifies, to seek an occasion of serving him. Thus those that yield themselves servants of sin to obey it in the lusts thereof become voluntary slaves thereof, and seek al man­ner of occasions to serve it. We find the same word used in the same sense, v. 13. Neither yield your members weapons of unrighte­ousnesse unto sin. [...], Neither observe al the becks and nods of sin, do not catch at occasions for the serving of it: be not ready to obey its irregular dictates; as it is the practice of those who are slaves thereof. The word is no where else used in the N.T. This voluntary servitude of sin is expressed Mich. 7.3. by doing iniquitie with both hands earnestly, or strenuously, i.e. with a violent impetuose, deliberate bent of heart. The wil is in every thing the best or the worst: when mens wils are in their sins O! how loth are they to part with their chains, their burdens! how do they hugge themselves therein! If mens wils be in their sla­verie, it is by so much the worse: men are never so much slaves, as when their wils are in their slaverie.

2. The servitude of Sin is not more voluntary, The servicude of Sin most neces­sary. than necessary; which addes much to its miserable state. The more voluntarily [Page 139]men sin, the more necessarily: and the more necessarily, the more voluntarily: the voluntarinesse of sin addes to its necessitie; and the necessitie to its voluntarinesse; and both to its servitude. This necessitie, whereby the sinner is determined only to sin, ari­seth from his own free and voluntary impietie. Its dura necessitas, as Augustine phraseth it; and therefore the more servile, because voluntary. As a person laboring under a violent fever the more he drinkes to extinguish his heat, the more his heat and thirst is augmented: so sinners the more greedily they drinke down sin, the more is the feverish heat of lust inflamed; thence the more necessarily do they thirst after it. Wherefore this wretched necessi­tie, that attends sin, doth not oppose its voluntarinesse, but arise from it: the more the sinner delights in sin, the more he is en­slaved to it: and the more necessarily he is enslaved to it, the more freely doth he act it. Such a miserable necessitie is he un­der: For the more insuperable and inevitable any servitude is, the more miserable it is: and such is the slaverie of sin: al the wit, power, and conflicts of corrupt Nature cannot deliver the sinner from it. Men are easily drawen into sin, but not from it. No man ever did by his own forces deliver himself from this slaverie, and therefore no man can: an argument from the Act to the Power is here valid. Yea, this servitude of sin is so invin­cible and necessary, that the sinner wants not only an active pow­er to deliver himself, but the next passive power and desire of being delivered from it. This necessary servitude of sin is termed by Plato, a miserable Necessitie. So in his Phileb. pag. 22. he saith, That those who choose sin choose it either, [...], ignorantly and against their wil, or from a miserable necessitie. Wherein observe, (1) That he distinguish­eth sins into such as are from ignorance and involuntary; and such as are voluntary and necessary. (2) He saith the necessitie that attends sin is miserable. He elsewhere makes mention of [...], a blessed Necessitie, which attends moral libertie, i.e. when men necessarily elect and adhere to what is best: but as for this Necessitie, which attends mens voluntary adherence to sin, Oh how miserable is it! Men are tormented by their sins, and yet cannot leave them.

This miserable Necessitie of sinning is both connate and adnate, Necessitie of Sin connate and ad­nate. arising partly from the corruption of Nature, partly from custome in sin. Continuance in frequent voluntary repetitions of sinful [Page 140]acts breeds a fixed custome and rooted habit of sin, whereby the servitude of sin becomes necessary and insuperable. Thus Plato, Repub. 4. [...], &c. The least prevarication, like a joke, secretly and easily creeps into mens minds, and by custome becoming familiar to us, by little and little steals into private and public manners: wherefore good education is necessary. Thence, Leg. 5. pag. 728. he saith, It is the greatest punishment to be assimilated to wicked men; for thereby they imbibe their customes, and come to have one and the same affection with them. So Leg. 7. he saith, Man is an Animal, which by good education is made tame and mild; but by bad, wild and fierce. Whence beholding some playing at dice, he greatly rebuked them for it: and being asked, Why he so severely reprehended them for such a smal mater? he re­plied: But the custome is not smal: meaning, that sinful customes, though about smal maters, were not smal, in that they drew on a necessitie of sinning. So in his Timaeus, pag. 86. he saith, [...], By an evil habit or custome an evil man is made evil, in an high degree. Hence Antisthenes, being demanded, What was chiefly to be learnt? replied, [...], to unlearne evils, i.e. evil customes. Radicated customes produce a necessitude of sin and servitude, in that they occecate, indurate and harden conscience in sin. This occecation and in­duration of conscience was stiled by Plato and others, [...] and [...], Apathie and Insensibilitie. [...], Apathie, Definit. Plat. is defined, [...], An habit, by which we abhor from affections. [...] or Insensibilitie of sin is wel expressed by Aristotle, Rhet. l. 2. c. 5. [...], The greatest sins are least sensible. By how much the more stupid and senselesse conscience is, by so much the more neces­sary and incurable is the servitude of sin. This Apathie or Insen­sibilitie of conscience,1 Tim. 4.2. is wel set forth, 1 Tim. 4.2. [...], Having their conscience cauterised, or marqued with a cauter. [...], from [...], to burne, signifies a cauter or hot iron, or whatever may be used by Chirurgeons to burne the flesh. Thence [...], by burning to set a marque, or to dead the flesh. The sense is, that their consciences were burned, made dead and senselesse by lusts; as proud flesh by a Cauter. Again, this Apathie of Conscience is in sacred Philosophie set forth by [...], which being derived from [...] a stone, signifies proper­ly a callose concretion, like that of stones; thence Hardnesse, Insen­sibilitie, [Page 141]Inflexibilitie, Immobilitie. It is used metaphorically,Mar. 3.5. Mar. 3.5. to denote the callose concretion and hardnesse of heart, by reason of sin. Whence it is expounded by Suidas, [...], occe­cation. Thence [...], (whence [...] is immediately deduced) is by Suidas and Phavorinus interpreted, [...], to harden, and petrifie, or turne into a stone: by the LXX. [...], to he­betate, Gen. 27.1. [...], to darken, Deut. 34.7. [...], to make heavy, 1 Kings 3.2. [...], to exanimate, or dispirit, Ezech. 21.7. [...], to excecate, Zach. 11.17. Yet according to the proper strict notion, [...] differs from [...], as Joh. 12 40. By al which it appears, that frequent repeted custome in sin renders the con­science blind, obdurate, and senselesse;Difficulter re­ciduntur vitia, quae nobiscum creverunt. De­finit esse reme­dio locus, ubi quae fuerant vi­tia mores sunt. Sen. so that the greatest moral evils are not felt, whereby sin becomes necessary and immobile. For when once conscience is, by frequent repetition of sins, caute­rised, dispirited and made senselesse, it leaves men to the swinge of their own lusts; whereupon follows a miserable necessitie of sin and servitude; which ends at last in judicial hardnesse. Nei­ther doth this immobilitie and necessitie of sinning diminish, but aggravate the guilt of sin: for this necessitie is contracted by the wils voluntary pursuit after sin: and is it not just with God to leave men under the power of their lusts, seing they electively desire to be under them? The sum of al is this. (1) There is a natural obduration or hardnesse of conscience, which is innate and connate with corrupt Nature. (2) There is an adnate or ac­quired hardnesse by custome in sin, Heb. 3.13. (3) There is a judicial hardnesse inflicted by God as a punishment, which seals up sinners from the darknesse of mind to the darknesse of Hel. Each of these Hardnesses has a necessary servitude of sin attending of it, though gradually different. For the second superaddes to the first, as the third to the second.

3. The servitude of Sin is infinite. The servitude of Sin infinite. This Hypothesis is frequent­ly inculcated not only in sacred, but also in Platonic Philosophic. The servitude of sin is infinite, (1) If we regard the object of sin, as it is a departure from an infinite good. (2) If we consider the object or mater it turnes unto, which is an infinite number of Idols. So Psal. 16.4. Their sorrows shal be multiplied, that hasten after another God. Their sorrows, or according to the Hebrew, their Idols: i.e. They that forsake the true God, shal multiplie to themselves an infinite number of Idol-Gods, according to their lusts: which indeed is a great piece of servitude; because every [Page 142]Idol is a great Tyrant. Thus Plato, Rep. 9. saith, An avaricious man [...], whiles he endeavors to heap up an infinite treasure of richesse, involves himself in infinite evils. (3) This servitude of Sin is infinite in regard of the Subject, the Soul, its infinite insatiable desire after its Idols.Hab. 2.5. Thus sacred Philoso­phie, Hab. 2.5. Who enlargeth his desire as Hel. [...] amplifiath, extendeth, even to infinitie. [...] his Soul, desire, or lust [...], as Hel, or rather as the grave, which is never satisfied with dead carcasses. Thence it follows: and is as death, and cannot be satis­fied. This infinite inextinguible thirst after terrene goods is wel illustrated by Plato, in his Gorg. pag. 507. And therefore he must take care, lest that giving way to his lusts, and causing them to wander up and down unpunished, whiles he endeavors to satisfie them, he bring in [...], an infinite evil, and live a vagrant, robbers life. Natural desires are finite, but sinful infinite, as Seneca. (4) The servitude of Sin is infinite, if we consider the nature and kinds of Sin. Thus Plato, Repub. 5. pag. 445. I see as it were from a watch­tower, that the face of Virtue is one, [...], but the face of Sin is multiforme and infinite. Which his Scholar Aristotle wel explicates, Eth. l. 2. c. 5. pag. 89. Moreover there are many ways to sin: [...], for sin is interminate and infinite, but good terminate and finite, as the Pythagoreans hold. This he ex­pounds thus: There is but one way to hit the marque, but infinite ways to misse it. Thence, saith Seneca, Men follow sins without measure, without end: for indeed they have neither end nor measure. Al mo­ral good is bounded and measured by God as its last end, and the Law of God as its rule: but sin knows no bounds either of End or Law. Virtue consistes in number, weight, and measure; but sin is void of each. This infinitude of sin and its servitude is set forth to the life in sacred Philosophie; Amos 5.12. For I know your manifold transgressions and your mighty sins. Here is infinitude both as to multitude and magnitude. This infinite servitude of Sin is oft set forth by a miserable Amplitude. So Prov. 5.23. And in the amplitude of his folie, or sin, shal he wander. So Prov. 21.4. Esa. 57.10. Jer. 13.22.

4. The servitude of Sin is most penal and afflictive, The servitude of Sin most penal. and there­fore most miserable. There were among the ancient Romans servi poenae, servants only of punishment, such as were condemned to digge in metallic Mines, or to sight with wild bestes: and such is every slave of sin; he is obnoxious to the most severe punish­ments. [Page 143]This we shal explicate in the following Propositions. (1) Al moral Evil has guilt appendent thereto, as its immediate effect. Guilt is not a physic accident or mode inherent in the Sinner; but a moral debt contracted by him: which as to God importes a certain moral right he has to punish the offender. Whence Guilt is said to be a medium or middle thing between sin and pu­nishment: for as to its terme it belongs to punishment; but as to the judge, it belongs to sin: yet it more properly belongs to the sin than punishment; because it doth indeed antecede the pu­nishment, but is inseparably conjoined with the sin.Noxa sequitur caput. Thence [...] signifies both Guilt and Sin, denoting that guilt doth essentially and inseparably adhere to al moral evil.

(2) Punishment is an evil of passion inflicted for some moral evil action. Punishment is said to be the necessary debt of sin, and naturally due to the Sinner, as he stands in relation to divine Ju­stice;Qui malum fe­cit, malum fe­rat. yet the actual inflicting of this punishment is not absolute­ly necessary in regard of divine Justice, but rather the effect of his wil: it is most just and morally necessary that the sin should be punished: but yet it is not unjust for God to remit or relaxe this punishment, for the greater advance of his glorie. Every Soul that sins deserves punishment, and fals under an essential, natural, and necessary obligation thereto: and the execution of this punishment is morally necessary for the vindication of divine Justice: of which more fully, Chap. 11. Of the Justice of God.

(3) Punishment is either for the correction and emendation of the person offending, or for the satisfaction of Justice and the person offended: the former is usually stiled [...] or [...], castiga­tion, which Plato makes to be [...], the medicine of the Soul. So Plato, Gorg. pag. 478. tels us, That castigation is the medicine of impietie, &c. Thence Definit. Platon. [...] castigation is defined, [...], The curation of the Soul from its sin. This castigatory punishment is wel consistent with moral libertie: for it's a good Maxime among the Civilians,Jure nullus in­genuus fit ser­vus ex suppli­cio. Gloss. in Justin. Instit. That by right no ingenuous man is a servant of punishment: i. e. al­beit he may be punished as a free Citizen, yet he is not as a slave devoted and destined thereto. But vindictive, judiciary punish­ment, for the satisfaction of Justice and the person-offended, al­ways carries servitude with it. Such offenders are properly poenae servi, according to sacred Philosophie children of wrath, i. e. senten­ced and adjudged to punishment. Hence that Effate among the [Page 144]Civilians: A Servant, whiles he lives, is, according to the civil Law, reputed as dead. Whence Slaves were anciently by the Grecians called [...],Rev. 18.13. Bodies, as Rev. 18.13. because they had no power over their own life, wils, or persons, but were wholly their Lords. Hence,

(4) Every Sinner under the Dominion of Sin, is, Servus poenae, a Slave adjudged to the punishment of Sin. Punishment is the usual attendent of servitude, and the proper effect of sin. Indeed sin and punishment came into the world together, and al the art of man cannot separate them.Gen. 2.17. Thus, Gen. 2.17. In dying thou shalt die. This reduplication, according to the Hebrew Idiome, notes the certaintie, suddennesse, perfection and perpetuitie of this death. The righteous God never intended that any should purchase sin at an easie rate: he gathers his rods for punishment from the same tree, we planted by our sin: Sin is the proper soil wherein pu­nishment grows: those that make bold with Gods Law, must expect that he make bold with their peace and comforts: Sin is never so swift in flying from God, but divine vengeance is as swift in persuing of it. Divine wrath, which is the sorest ven­geance, lies in the bowels of every sin: Death is the proper wages of sin. Rom. 6.23. So Rom. 6.23. [...] properly signifies that stipend of fish or food, which they gave to their Soldiers, to eat with their bread. Death is the proper stipend, which Sin gives to its Sol­diers and Slaves to feed on, to preserve life: it is the reward of al their labors and toil in the ways of sin: 'tis their sustenance and food; al they have to keep them alive unto al eternitie. And O! what a miserable life is that, which is maintained by death?

(5) Sin is in it self the greatest punishment, Sin in it self the worst Jounish­ment. because the greatest evil. Sin was the first evil that came into the world, that which opened the door to al other evils, and conteins in it the spirits, venime, and malignitie of al evils: therefore there cannot be a more severe punishment of sin, than to be left to a course of sin. This Plato once and again takes notice of. Thus in his Gorgias, pag. 477. [...], The moral evil of the Soul is of al evils the greatest. This is an universal evil: no­thing but evil is in sin: it is the Spirit and Elixir of al evil: al evil is in sin; and sin is in al evil. So pag. 479. Thou accountest unjust men happy if they escape punishment; but I account them more miserable. And he gives the reason of it, [...], For not to be punished for sin is the stablissement [Page 145]of Sin. So pag. 472. According to my opinion, O Polus, [...], an unjust man is of al most miserable: yet he is more miserable, who act­ing unjustly avoids punishment. For what greater miserie or pu­nishment can there be, than to be given up by God to the swinge of a mans own lusts, without check or rebuke? Are not such punishments, which seem most silent, most severe and desperate? Albeit men may enjoy securitie in their sin for a while, yet is not this the worst part of their punishment? Doth not the righteous God oft conveigh his worst curses and plagues in the sweet wine of temporal prosperitie? There is no one blessing that such a Sin­ner enjoys, but there is a curse stamped on it. Divine Justice writes a piece of Hel on al his temporal comforts, as he writes a piece of Heaven on al the chastisements of the righteous. Thus also Plato, in his Meno, pag. 78. [...]; For what else is it to be miserable, than to desire evils and to possesse them? And this indeed is a general Dogme with Plato, as in his Gorgias, That to be punished by a Judge for sin is not the greatest punishment; but even then when they are involved in their sins, they fal under the most severe punish­ment. That sin that is guilt in the commission of it,Maximum sce­lerum suppli­cium est in ip­sis. Statim pu­niuntur cum fa­cta sunt, imo dum fiunt. Non nascitur ex ma­lo bonum: ad semen nata re­spondent. Sen. Epist. 87. is punishment in the power of it: so much pleasure as men take in the com­mission of their sin, so much torment they find in the issue. The evil of punishment is answerable to the evil of doing: He that departs from God executes on himself his own doom: and the farther he departs from God, the more he is involved in chains of darknesse. O! what an indissoluble connexion is there be­tween sin and punishment? Can any sin be so deliciose in the commission, as it is bitter in the issue? Is not sin a pregnant mo­ther with child of miserie? Yea, doth it not carrie Hel in its wombe? He that loseth his God by sin, doth he not lose com­forts, life, yea self and al?

(6) Albeit the servitude of Sin be in it self the greatest punish­ment, Other punish­ments of Sin. yet there are many other punishments that attend it. [1] Al Sin is attended with fear and shame. As sin breeds guilt, so guilt breeds fear and shame. So Plato, Leg. 5. tels us, That he who fils his Soul with sin clothes it with reproche and shame, as before §. 6. Prop. 6. And that Fear always attends sin is frequently asserted by the ancient Philosophers; who tel us,Tuta scelera esse possunt, se­cura non pos­sunt. Sen. ‘That Fortune may deliver some from punishment, but none from fear: A no­cent [Page 146]person has sometimes the privilege to lie hid, but never any true confidence:’ Sins may be safe, but not secure: it's a great portion of securitie to do no il. Thence Bion said: [...], That impietie is the worst companion of confidence. And it was a good observation of Tertul­lian, That Nature hath clothed al Sin either with fear or shame.

[2] The servitude of Sin is attended with Instabilitie. Plato, in his Philebus, Imperitis ac ru­dibus nullus praecipitationis finis est. In Epi­cureum illud chaos decidunt inane sine ter­mino. Sen. pag. 59. saith, That such things as have no firmitude in them, are most instable. Such is Sin. The firmitude of the Soul consistes in its adherence to its first Principe and last End. Thence by how much the farther men depart from God, by so much the more instable they are. He that leans on a thing instable must needs be instable in al his ways: and what more instable than Sin and sinful Idols? Whatever the Soul, by inordinate love cleaves unto, it is overcome by, and suffers changes, as that object lusted after changeth. As a Ship is poised by its ballast, and a Bee poiseth its airy bodie by a gravel; so the heart is poised by virtue: but corrupt Nature and sinful passions are ful of Levitie and Instabili­tie, whereby the heart is kept in suspense, as a Meteor in the Air, as Luk. 12.29. [...]. This was Cains curse, and a great part of his servile punishment,Gen. 4.12, 13. Gen. 4.12. A fugitive and vaga­bond shalt thou be in the earth: i. e. in an instable vagrant condi­tion, both as to soul and bodie: and what follows? v. 13. And Cain said unto the Lord, My punishment is greater than I can bear. [...] my punishment, or my sin. O, what an heavy piece of servi­tude is this to an awakened conscience, to have a wandring va­grant spirit! Jam. 1.6, 8. This instabilitie, which attends the servitude of Sin,Hos. 6.2. is wel illustrated, Hos. 6.2. But they al like men have transgressed the Covenant, Hebr. like Adam: i.e. like vain in­constant man. Adam had no sooner entred into Covenant with God, but he brake it. Thus al his seed turne after him.

[3] Another punishment that attends the servitude of Sin is Anxietie and Torment. Thus Plato, Repub. 9. pag. 579. speaking of the Soul under the Tyrannie of Sin, he saith, [...], It is inflamed with perpetual sparkes of Fears, Angors, and Agitations. So in his Sympo­sium, pag. 206. he informes us, That the Soul, when it adheres to sin, is under dolors and torments, and yet brings forth nothing but wind, Isal. 7.14. as Psal. 7.14. He travelleth with iniquitie, and hath conceived mischief, and brought forth a lie. It's spoken of Sauls mischievous [Page 147]yet abortive designes against David: and it alludes to the pangs and torments of a woman in travel. [...] signifies hard toilsome miserable labor, such as poor slaves are tormented with. The LXX. render it [...], which in the Greek Glossary, (found at the end of Cyril) is rendred dolor. So in the N. T. [...] signifies vexa­tious grief and torment, as Rev. 16.10, 11. & 21.4. Hence the Greek word [...], an evil man received its derivation. For every [...], conceives and brings forth [...] miserable torments, David's meaning here is,Qui voluptari tradidere prin­cipia—non ipsi voluptatem, sed ipsos voluptas habet, cujus aut inopia tor­quentur, aut copia strangu­lantur. Sen. That Saul had been long hatching mischievous designes ful of torment and anxietie; and endea­vored by much travel and sore labor, like a woman in travel, to bring them forth and accomplish them; but he could bring forth nothing but a mere lie: he was frustrated in al his mischie­vous contrivements. Note here an elegant Allegorie in these termes, Conceiveth, travelleth, and brought forth: which argues the highest vexation, travel, and torment, which Sinners labor under, in al their mischievous designes, as Jer. 4.31. Wicked men are as much tormented with the sin they love, as with the fear of the punishment they hate: al their labor is pain. So Jer. 51.58. & Habak. 2.13. Sinners are said to labor in the fire, Jer. 51.58. or for the fire: i. e. (1) In vain, without any profit: as if any one should weave a thread over the fire, which brings not only losse of labor, but of materials also. (2) To labor in the fire, notes a dangerous, tedious, toilsome, servile labor, such as is proper to slaves. What more tedious, irkesome, and fruitlesse than the drudgerie of sin?Eccles. 10.15. So Eccles. 10.15. The labor of the foolish weari­eth every one of them. As in Nature, it is not stormes without, but vapors within the bowels of the earth, raised up by subterraneous fires, that cause Earthquakes and Tremblements; so in the Soul, it is not afflictions from without, but the interne fire of lusts and sinful vapors that cause torments and tremblement in Conscience. It's better to be possessed of the Devil in the bodie, than of lusts in the heart, which always breed labor and pain. No Sinner ever attains to what he aims at: he would be somewhat else than what he is; and these desires breed anxietie and torment.

[4] The servitude of Sin is of al most penal, in that eternal pu­nishment is annexed to and entailed thereon. This is the top of al punishment, that Sinners shal be turned into Hel, with al their sins at their back. Neither was this kind of punishment altoge­ther hid from Plato: for in his Gorg. pag. 522. we find this pu­nishment [Page 148]thus described: [...], For a Soul to descend down to Hel laden with many sins, is the most extreme of evils. A great Philosopheme for a Pagan, and that which argues his acquain­tance with sacred Philosophie; which more fully instructes us, that sin is eternally punished in Hel; because it makes a man eter­nally willing to sin. The righteous God takes the same course in punishing sin, as men take in the committing of it: he sees men have an eternal love for and delight in sin, and therefore they shal have an eternal punishment for sin: As sinners lay up eternal treasures of sin, so God layes up eternal treasures of wrath and punishment. In fine, what more just than that he, who by sin acts eternally against the wil of God, should suffer eternal tor­ments against his own wil? And can there be a more penal affli­ctive servitude than this?

§. 8. Having explicated and demonstrated the servitude that attends Sin,Al men borne servants of and dead in Sin. it now only remains to demonstrate that al mankind are borne in this state of servitude. It's a Maxime in the Civil Law, Just. Institut. l. 1. tit. 4. That among Servants there is no diffe­rence, so as one should be more a Servant than another: though a­mong Free-men there are many differences. This holds true in moral servitude: for among the Ilaves of sin there is no difference as to state; because al are dead in sin; and death as wel moral as na­tural admits no degrees: al dead men are equally such without difference. Whence the Civilians have another great Saying; That a Servant is reputed dead whiles he lives. Such are al the ser­vants of sin, who are really dead, whiles they seem to live. Lapsed man is under a miserable, natural, yet voluntary necessitie of sin­ning, wherefore altogether uncapable of erecting himself to a state of virtue, as before §. 7. That al men by nature are dead in sin, is an Hypothesis avouched not only in sacred, but also in Pla­tonic Philosophie. Thus Plato, in his Gorgias, pag. 493. I heard this from the wise men, [...], that we are now dead, and that our bodie is the sepulchre of our Soul. By the wise men, I presume, he means the Barbarians, specially the Egyptians and Hebrews, from whom he received this Tradition, That men are naturally dead in sin. Thus Clemens Alexandrinus, Strom. 5. pag. 419. In the Barbaric Philosophie they cal those dead, who have fallen from their Dogmes, and subjected their minds to lusts. This Pythagoras expressed by the Symbol of a Coffin, [Page 149]which he placed in the room of any expelled out of his Schole, thereby to indigitate, that he was dead. Thence that other Sym­bol of Pythagoras: Abstain from the dead: i.e. from conversation with dead sinners, which Symbol Grotius makes to be derived from the Hebraic Philosophie, according to that of our Lord, Mat. 8.22. Let the dead burie the dead. Moreover Plato cals the life of men dead in sin, [...], a life without life. Also he saith, That mens Souls are in this life, [...], of a ferine or brutish nature. Yea, Aristotle, Problem. S. 10. Prob. 45. assures us, That [...], Nature doth althings that are wicked. Among the primitive Christians nothing more commun than this Hypothesis, That Virtue or Grace could not be educed out of the potence of corrupt Nature, because al men by nature are dead in sins. Thus Cle­mens Alexandr. Strom. 2. proves against the sectators of Basilides and Valentinus, those fore-runners of the Pelagians, That faith is not, [...], the good effect of free­wil, nor yet the prerogative of Nature. But to explicate and demon­strate, how al men by nature are under this spiritual death and moral servitude of sin, take the following Propositions.

1. Prop. This Philosopheme, That al men are by Nature dead in sin, is not hyperbolic, but metaphoric and real. Plato speaking of the moral death of the Soul, he understands it, in his darke way, ac­cording to the mind of sacred Philosophie, whence he borrowed this as other of the choisest of his Philosophemes. Now in sacred. Philosophie this moral death of the Soul is not hyperbolic, but real, albeit metaphorically expressed.Psal. 5.9. Rom. 3.13. Thus Psal. 5.9. cited by Paul, Rom. 3.13. Their throat is an open sepulchre. What David ascribes to the throat, Plato, Gorg. 499. attributes to the whole bodie, namely, that it is but the sepulchre of the Soul. Whence he makes [...] to be, by a Paronomasie, derived from [...], a se­pulchre, as before. And Democritus said, That the diseases of the Soul were the greatest: which if men could open, they should find there, [...], a sepulchre ful of evils. David cals the throat an open sepulchre, because (1) the heart or soul of al by nature lies morally dead and rotten in the bodie as in a se­pulchre. (2) The Soul lying dead in this sepulchre continually sends forth loathsome and noisome smels: as if you draw nigh to an open sepulchre, where dead bodies newly rotten lie buried, you wil soon scent their noisome sumes. (3) Mens mouths and throats are as it were the mouth of this sepulchre, by which [Page 150]mens dead rotten hearts breathe forth their loathsome smels. You may scent mens corrupt hearts in their words, which passe through their throats, those open sepulchres Again, that men are borne naturally and morally dead in sin is wel illustrated, Esa. 1.4. Ah! Esa. 1.4. sinful nation! a people laden with iniquitie, as with a mountain of lead. But lest men should conceit, that al this ini­quitie comes only by custome and frequence of sinful acts, he addes: a seed of evil doers, or maligne sinners. This notes, that men are borne sinners, a sinful brood; that sin is hereditarie, and not only by custome.Esa. 57.4. Thus Esa. 57.4. Children of transgression: i. e. (1) borne in sin, of sinful parents. (2) Addicted to trans­gression, given up to it: for according to the Hebrew Idiome, [...] a child, being used with a Genitive Case of Appellatives, is taken for such an one as is wholly addicted and devoted to such a thing. Thence it follows: a seed of falsehood: i. e. a lumpe or masse of hypocrisie: wholly composed and made up of iniquitie, an adulterous brood. Al sin is in the heart of man, and the heart of man is in al sin, albeit he be not always hurried into al acts of sin. Hence Plato mentions, [...] and [...], an innate and connate evil, or vitiositie of nature, commun to al, as before §. 2. of this Chapter. And Seneca assures us, That corrupt Na­ture has drunke in such deep draughts of iniquitie, which are so far incorporated with its bowels, as that you cannot get it out, but by tearing out its very bowels. Hence,

2. Prop. There are no seeds of spiritual life, No seeds of Vir­tue in corrupt Nature. no active power or disposition to what is spiritually good in corrupt Nature. Thence Cyril Alexandr. termes Virtue or Grace [...], a Prerogative above the Creation. And Chrysostome, in Gen. 4. [...], a Gift above Nature overcoming Nature it self. Where there is a spiritual death, there is a total priva­tion, without the least seed of active power for the production of a virtuose life. Free-wil in corrupt nature is alive to do evil, but dead as to the doing what is good: it is mighty knowing and potent to do evil, as Jer. 4.22. but every way ignorant and impotent as to doing what is good: it can find legs to run away from God, but none to run to him. And if the person be dead, can his acts or workes be alive? May we expect a good thought, or word, or deed from such al their days, so long as they continue in such a dead state of sin? Is it possible for a dead corps to take up its coffin, and grave upon its back, and thence to arise and [Page 151]walke? And is it not much more impossible for a dead Soul to dispose it self towards a virtuose life? It is frequently inculcated in sacred Philosophie, That there are no seeds of spiritual life in corrupt nature. A human power is not sufficient to produce an act more than human. The divine life and motion towards God must procede from God. Mans sin and miserie come from his own free-wil, but al Virtue and Beatitude from free Grace: he that is not acted by divine Grace, is necessarily acted by carnal lust: corrupt nature is not only emty of, but contrary to al good; and therefore al workes done by it are dead workes; because they procede from a dead nature, and tend to death: wherefore true moral Virtue cannot be extracted out of the power of Na­ture. Thus Cyril Alexandr. lib. 1. in Esa. [...], It's proper to human Nature in no wise to receive any hea­venly gifts of Grace out of its own nature, but to enrich it self with the gifts of God above Nature. This Hypothesis, albeit the Stoics and Aristoteleans contradict it, is evidently deducible from So­crates and Plato's Philosophie. Thus Plato, Meno, pag. 99. [...], Virtue comes not by Nature, neither from the Institutes of Learning, but by divine Afflation or Inspiration, without the concurse of the human mind, in those in whom it's produced. It's true, the Stoics held, [...], That Virtue might be taught; because there were sparkes or seeds thereof in human Na­ture, which might be drawen forth by good institution: but this Socrates greatly opposed, as that which was inconsistent with the depraved state of the Soul, and divine concurse for the production of Virtue. And sacred Philosophie is most positive in this, that there are no seeds of spiritual life or virtue in man.Psal. 5.9. Thus Psal. [...].9. Their inward part: or the most sublime, refined, intimate part of the Soul, is very wickednesse, [...], wickednesses, pravities. The Plural for the Singular, and abstract for the concrete; which denotes (1) an Ʋniversalitie both of the predicate and subject: that al their inward parts were ful of sin, and that al sin was in their inward parts. (2) The perfection of Sin. For abstracts, specially in the Plural Number, speak Essences and Spirits. The Elixir and Spirits of Sin are in the inwards of corrupt Nature, Hence,

3. Prop. The inclination of corrupt Nature to evil, Natural impo­tence to what is good. and its impo­tence as to what is good is universal and total. This naturally fol­lows from what precedes: for if the Soul be morally dead in sin, without any seeds of spiritual life, or moral virtue, then it fol­lows, that its impotence to good is total: for as in naturals death is a total privation of life; there is not the least seed for the re­duction of the life lost; so in morals, such as are dead in sin, are under an universal privation of spiritual life, and total impotence to what is spiritually good. This Hypothesis may be demonstra­ted, (1) From the universal ignorance of the natural mind. Plato discourseth accurately of this Theme, as we have in what pre­cedes §. 3. mentioned; but more fully, Philos. Gen. P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect. 4. §. 5. Yea so great and soverain is the natural ignorance of the mind, that those very commun notions of knowlege loged therein are not to be estimed, as some cal them, the fragments of the Image of God, but rather effects of divine Bountie vouch­safed his lapsed Creature upon the Intercession of the Mediator, who illuminates every man that comes into the world, as Joh. 1.9. That al true knowlege of things divine is the effect of divine illumination has been generally confest by Platonists as wel as Divines. Thence Clemens Alexandr. cals Faith, [...], a supernatural contemplation. So Chrysostome cals divine Grace, [...], that which instructes and illustrates the mind; Grace from above, not from human Nature. (2) From the formal Idea and na­ture of moral or spiritual good; which consistes in a conformi­tie to the moral Law, and that not only as to its mater, but also as to its end and manner: now it is impossible for corrupt nature by its own power to reach a supernatural end, or conforme to the moral Law. (3) From the disproportion and incapacitie of the subject. The natural power of the Wil, as now vitiated, has no connatural capacitie, next power, or formal capacitie, for the production of what is spiritually good. Alas! what proportion is there between a carnal mind and spiritual objects? And can an object be received into the mind, unlesse there be some pro­portion? Is not every thing received according to the nature and disposition of the recipient? Can then a carnal mind have any other than carnal notions of things spiritual; as a spiritual mind has spiritual notions of things carnal? See 1 Cor. 2.14. Joh. 6.44. & 8.43. & 12.39, 40. So also for the corrupt wil, it can­not [Page 153]possibly have any connatural virtue, next power or formal capa­citie for the production of any virtuose Act. Is it possible, that a natural power should have any causal connexion with or conna­turalitie unto a supernatural act or effect? (4) Should we sup­pose corrupt Nature to have any moral power for the production of Virtue, would not this subvert the whole Oeconomie and Dis­pensation of efficacious Grace? For [1] Thence the whole efficace of Grace would be measured and specificated according to the complexion of Free-wil, and so variated according to its diversitie. [2] Whence also the last differential reason where­by Grace is differenced from Nature must be resolved into Nature. [3] Natural Free-wil would, from this Hypothesis, be of it self and nextly flexible to spiritual good; and so Virtue not the gift of God. Aristotle himself, who was a good Friend to corrupt Nature, confesseth, al good to be [...], the gift of God. (5) From sacred Philosophie.Jer. 13.33. Thus Jer. 13.23. Can the Ethiopian change his skin? &c. Consider [1] That this is a proverbial speech, touching the vain attemts of such as endeavor to bring about things impossible. Hence that commun Proverb, To wash a Black-moor, relating to such as attemt things impossible. [2] The manner of expressing it is very emphatic: for such rhetoric in­terrogations carrie in them more vehement logic negations. Then he addes: or the Leopard his spots? Then may ye also do good, who are accustomed to do evil. And that this impotence is total and universal, on al mankind, is evident from that other Proverb, Ezech. 16.44. As is the mother such is the daughter, Ezech. 16.44. i. e. This con­tagion runs in the bloud, it is an hereditary disease, commun to al mankind. Hence sinners are said to be borne in sin, Psal. 51.5. and to be in sin, Exod. 32.22. 1 Joh. 5.19. The whole world is said to be in sin, i. e. immersed and plunged thereinto. What this impotence to sin is, and how far natural, we have explicated Philos. Gen. P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect. 5. §. 1.

4. Prop. Man under the servitude of Sin cannot dispose or prepare himself for the reception of Virtue. Thus Greg. Nyss. or de Scopo Christ. Man cannot pre­pare himself for Virtue. [...], The force of human virtue is not of it self sufficient to elevate Souls void of Grace to a forme of divine life, unlesse God build the house, &c. That there can be no disposi­tion, though never so remote, unto true moral Virtue from the alone facultie of Nature, is evident; because nothing can dispose [Page 154]it self to a condition above its nature, by its own force, unlesse it be influenced by a superior Agent. A man in the state of cor­rupt nature cannot by al his own forces natural or moral (1) overcome any one tentation: or (2) mortifie any one lust: or (3) attain any one good thought, inclination, or desire: or (4) remove the Remora, or bar in his heart against conversion: or (5) by doing what in him lieth lay any obligation on God to give grace. I know it is a Position maintained by some, That such as improve their natural abilities to their utmost power, shal thereby obtain supernatural Grace. But for answer hereto [1] It's certain, that none ever did or wil improve to the utmost their natural abilities. [2] Or if men should improve their natural forces to the utmost, what obligation is there on God to give to such supernatural Grace? Is God obliged by any law or pro­mise to give grace upon the performance of such an act or con­dition which is in it self sinful, and hath nothing of true moral virtue in it? And have we not already sufficiently proved, that there can be no true moral virtue but by supernatural Grace? That there is no law or obligation on God to give supernatural Grace to natural emprovements is wel demonstrated by Bradwar­dine, de Caus. Dei, l. 1. c. 37. pag. 316. Yea doth it not implie a contradiction in the Adject, that man should make a right use of his natural abilities, or prepare himself for the reception of supernatural Grace? Is it not also a sacrilegious Hypothesis to suppose, that God should fetch the commun rule of his giving or not giving grace from mans dignitie or indignitie? Corrupt nature wants not only an active power to do good, but also an imme­diate passive power to receive good: thence it can't dispose it self to virtue, which is above its natural capacitie. Is not al true virtue above the whole sphere of corrupt nature? The Greek Fathers, such as were more orthodoxe, acknowleged, That the prepara­tion to Grace was from Grace: whence it was by them termed [...], the direction of the way: also [...], the preparation of the wil: likewise, [...], the at­traction of God. That man cannot either de condigno or de con­gruo merit the first grace, is generally asserted by the sober Schole-men, as Bradwardine de Causa Dei, l. 1. c. 39. and Greg. Arimi­nensis, Sent. 2. Dist. 26. Quaest. 1. Thence the Dominicans in the Council of Trent, (Hist. Counc. Trent, pag. 209.) denied, That the workes preceding vocation are truly preparatorie, and ever gave [Page 155]the first place to God. And Alvarez, Auxil. Disp. 36. Can. 1. de­monstrates, that God never established any Law for the giving grace to such who should improve to the utmost their natural power. But none has more fully improved this Hypothesis, than Jansenius, August. Tom. 3. l. 1. c. 5. where he proves, that mens actions in their natural state merit damnation; and therefore they cannot thereby merit grace. And sacred Philosophic informes us,Jer. 17.9. Jer. 17.9. The heart is above althings fraudulent. [...] signifies to sup­plant and undermine, whence the word here signifies perverse, ful of wiles, fraud, guile. Thence it follows: and desperately wicked: [...], desperately sick, diseased, incurable, wicked. And if so, then how impossible is it, that it should prepare or dispose it self for the reception of virtue? See this more fully demonstrated, Philos. Gen. P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect. 5. §. 1. Hence,

5. Prop. Free-wil in lapsed corrupt Nature hath no moral active power or facultie flexible to any spiritual or truly moral good. In corrupt Na­ture no Free-wil to moral Good. This Proposition is but the result of the former, and may be demon­strated from these following Heads. The Assertion of such a moral Free-wil in lapsed Nature doth (1) raise up the human cor­rupt Wil to the condition of God, and is the Nurse of al Sin. It feeds mens pride and affectation of a Deitie, vain-glorie, carnal confidence, securitie, Atheisme, unbelief, ingratitude. It also cuts the nerves of al divine consolation and peace of conscience. (2) It puls down God from his Throne of Grace, and reduceth him to the condition of a Creature. [1] It strikes at the very Being of God, making him to be dependent on, and moved by the human Wil. [2] It subvertes al the divine Attributes; the Simplicitie, Immu­tabilitie, Infinitude, Omnipotence, Science, Goodnesse, Wil, and al the Decrees of God. [3] It strikes at the Dominion of God over his rational Creatures, and ties him up by Laws and Rules of Ju­stice dependent on the merits of his Creatures. [4] It cuts off Gods Providence and Gubernation over the human Wil, making it to be independent as to Gods Concurse. [5] It abandons and banisheth out of the world al supernatural efficacious Grace: ad­mitting no Grace but what wil stoop and submit to the dominion of the human Wil, and its soverain Empire. [6] It is blasphe­mously injuriose to Christ, and al his mediatorie Offices. It sub­vertes his Priestly Office, by laying a foundation for human Me­rits, &c. It strikes at his Prophetic Office, by denying a necessitie of divine Revelation and Illumination, in order to Salvation. It [Page 156]undermines his Imporial Throne as King, by denying him any Ju­risdiction over the human Wil. It dispirits his special Love to the Elect, by attributing to him universal grace and love to al, even Reprobates. [7] It takes away the office of the Spirit of Grace. [8] It enervates the whole Covenant of Grace, by re­ducing the whole of mans Salvation to a Covenant of Workes. Yea [9] whiles it seems to exalt the Law of God, it doth really take away the use thereof as a rule of life. These and many other are the injuries which this Free-wil offers to God and man. (3) Sacred Philosophie is positive and expresse in denying corrupt Nature any Free-wil to what is morally good.Joh. 1.13. So Joh. 1.13. Not of bloud, i. e. by natural generation. Nor of the wil of the flesh: i. e. Free-wil in corrupt Nature, which is frequently in the Scri­ptures termed flesh by reason of its impotence and infirmitie. So Joh. 3.6. Whatever is borne of the flesh, i. e. of corrupt Nature, or Free-wil in its highest elevation and refinement, as adorned with the most raised commun illuminations and graces, as Esa. 40.6. Nor of the wi of man: i. e. the best of men or Ministers, as Gods Ambassadors. But of God: i. e. by his gloriose efficacious power. So 2 Pet. 1.3. [...],2 Pet. 1.3. by glorie and virtue: i. e. by his gloriose virtue or power. For [...] Virtue in God is [...], his divine power, as Hesychius. So it's used by the LXX. Hab. 3.3. Zech. 6.17 where it answers to [...], which signifies Glorie, Power, or gloriose Power. And indeed it seems to be the grand designe of sacred Philosophie to divest corrupt Nature and Free-wil of al pretence to what is morally or spiritually good. Can a vitiated corrupt Wil be supposed to have any natural connexion with, or Virtue formally effective of a divine life? Is it possible that the new Creature should be borne of the wil of the flesh, which is potent and good for nothing but sin? And must indeed the di­vine Wil be subordinate to mans Free-wil in the dispensation of grace? Is it not more becoming the human Wil to be subordi­nate to the divine? Must we take the adequate reason of Gods dispensing grace from the emprovement of Nature? Is not the gift of Grace a participation of the divine Nature? Must it not then excede the whole sphere of create Nature? Is it not strange Theologie, to reduce the discrimination of good and evil men to the contingence of mans ambulatorie corrupt Free-wil? May we not justly applie Augustins complaint against Cicero to such Divines, who, to make men free, make him also sacrilegious, and a [Page 157]robber of God? In sum, we denie not, but that the Wil is natu­rally free as to its physic act, but we denie that it is morally free as to the mode or manner of acting wel. Thus we see how this Pelagian Philosopheme doth elevate the Creature to the condi­tion of God, and puls down God to the condition of a Crea­ture. Thence Cyril, Thes. assert. 32. to 5. pag. 268. [...], For we denie, that there is one natural operation of God and the Creature: that we may not elevate that which is create to the divine Essence; nor, on the con­trary, depresse the excellence of the divine Essence to a place agreable to Creatures. Wherein he sums up the grand designe of the Pe­lagians then newly started up. Clemens Alexandr. Strom. l. 2. & 5. is very invective against the fectators of Basilides and Valentinus; because they hed, [...], that Faith is natural: i. e. edu­cible out of the potence of corrupt Nature. Which Hypothesis al the Assertors of moral Free-wil are sond of. Theodoritus, in Psal. 118.32. saith peremtorily: [...], Neither can human Nature right­ly performe virtue without divine aide. It's a great Effate of Basil, in his Homilie of Humilitie, where explicating that of the Apostle, 1 Cor. 4.7. And what hast thou that thou didst not receive? 1 Cor. 4.7. &c. he thus philosophiseth: [...], &c. Here al the subli­mitie of pride fals to the ground: there is nothing left thee, O man, as mater of arrogance. Tel me, why doest thou lift up thy self, in re­ference to thine own good workes; whenas thou oughtest rather to ren­der thankes to the Donor of them? For what hast thou, which thou hast not received? And if thou hast received any thing, why doest thou glorie, as if thou receivedst it not? Thou hast not known God by thine own justice, but God hath known thee by his own benignitie. Thence he addes: It is the greatest stupiditie not to understand a man is par­taker of grace, but to arrogate to his own Virtue what belongs to Grace.

CHAP. V. Of Plato's Politie, its essential Constitution, and Administration.

Politic Philosophie what. Politie its Forme in Order: its Object, the Communitie: its first Founder, God. Mans inclination to Societie. The Constitution of a Politic Bodie from Consociation; which is for­malised by some Law. Politic Amitie and Fraternitie, founded in Religion. The Ends of Politie, (1) Gods Glorie. (2) Virtue. (3) Public Good. (4) Mutual Assistance. A Politic Bodie or Citie what. Legislation, its Origine. Laws their Necessitie and Origine. The Qualifications of Legislators Laws from the multitude: for public Good: their principal end Virtue. Their Qualities: the Law of Equitie. Politic Governement, Monarchic, Aristocratic, De­mocratic, or mixed. Moderate Empire best. Tyrannic Empire, its Origine, &c. Civil Magistrates, their End. Their Qualifications, (1) Wisdome, (2) virtue, (3) Public Spirits. Their Educa­tion. Their Autoritie and Office as Conservators of the Law. The Exercice of their Office, with Justice, Temperance, Moderation and Clemence. Things destructive to Politie; Atheisme, Luxurie, Di­visions, Injustice.

§. 1. MOral Philosophie regards persons either in their single Capacities,Politic Philoso­phie. or as conjunct in Societies: the former which they stile Ethic, we have dispatcht, and therefore passe on to philosophise, though more cursorily, of the later. A Societie, called by the Grecians [...], a Communitie, or Communion, is ei­ther of a single Familie, or of many Families incorporated: Moral Philosophie, as it regards a single Familie, is termed Oeconomie; as many Families incorporated, Politic. The former is but a spe­cies of the later, and may be deservedly included therein; and therefore Plato hath not philosophised distinctly thereof. But of the later, namely Politic, he philosophiseth most copiosely and accurately, in his Menexenus, Politicus, Minos, Epinomis, X. Books of Republic, and XII. Books of Laws. That Plato traduced the chief Ideas of his Politic Philosophemes from Mosaic Politics, either immediately or mediately, is generally asserted by the Learned both ancient and moderne. Thus Clemens Alexandr. Strom. 1. [Page 159] pag. 256, 257. and Admon. ad Gentes. Eusebius, praepar. Evang. l. 12. c. 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 47, 48. Of which see Court Gent. P. 1. B. 3. C. 9. §. 6. & Philos. Gen. P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect. 6. §. 6.

[...], Politie, according to the Platonic Definition,Politie its forme in Order. pag. 4.13. is [...], A lawful or regular communion of a multitude sufficient to Beatitude. In which Description we have the formal Constitution, Object, and End of Po­litie. 1. Its formal constitution, which consistes in a lawful regular Communion, or Order. Thus Aristotle, Polit. 3.1. [...], Politie is the Order of the Citie. That Order is the Forme, Spirit, and Life of al Politie is generally asserted by Poli­ticians, and Philosophers. Thus Plato, Repub. 4. pag. 433. philo­sophising of the [...] or good Order of a Republic under the notion of Ʋniversal Justice, he makes it to consist in [...], the regular consent of Gover­nors and Governed, so that every one keeps his proper place and station, [...], that every one actes his own part, and intermeddles not with what is aliene. This is the [...], good Order, which gives life and forme to al Po­litie, that there be [...], a mutual consent between Magistrates and people, to walk and act according to that commun Law or Rule they are under. Thus also pag. 443. he makes Justice to be the [...], Eutaxie of moderate Empire, i. e. [...], the natural constitution of Governors and Go­verned: when each understands and actes his proper parts. This [...] good Order, he makes to be, pag. 444. [...] the Virtue, [...] the Preservation, [...] the Health, [...] the good Habitude, and [...] the Pulchritude or Beautie of a Republic. Whereas, on the contrary, Disorder, [...] and [...], when men keep not their stations, but invade the offices or places of others, he makes to be that which brings [...], a Disease, Turpitude, Infirmitie, Vitiositie, and Anarchie, or Con­fusion to a Republic. Thus pag. 434. [...], Therefore seing there are these three distinct orders of men in a Citie, a curiositie in medling with the Office of another, and mutual Permutation or Invasion of each others place, is that which without al dout brings the greatest dammage to a Citie, and therefore may be rightly termed its peste. This Invasion of each others place he makes to be [...], a certain sedition, as also [Page 160] [...], the Insurrection and Ataxie or want of good order in the Citie. Plato tels us also, That the best and most perfect [...] Politie consistes [...], in a wel agreeing tempera­ment or harmonie of al parts, so that every member keeps its station. This also, Repub. 2. pag. 372. he makes to be the Ʋniversal Justice of a Republic, that althings be acted [...], according to right Order. The force of which order diffuseth it self through­out al parts, and is in a special manner visible in the distinct Ad­ministrations and Subordinations of [...], Rulers and Ruled: which have each their proper offices and workes. Thence, in his Repub. 4. he makes the Justice of a Citie to consiste in this, That every one [...] do what belongs to him; and thence [...], what is convenient: So that albeit there are diverse Rankes of men, yet they al, by virtue of this universal Justice, conspire to make up one [...], Symmetrie or exact proportion and good order, which gives forme and perfection to every Societie. Thence that of Nazianzen, [...], Order is the Mother of Beings, as also their securitie. This good Order, Definit. Plat. pag. 413. is thus defined: [...], Order is a similitude of office and action in al persons and things that relate each to the other: or, more concisely and distinctly, [...], a proportion of Societie or Communion: i. e. when every person and thing keeps its proper place and station. The seeds of this Order are diffused throughout al parts of human Polities, and are the main Foun­dation of al Societie and Communion: For where things are not bounded by Order, there infinite confusions disturbe Societies. Thence Augustin, de Civit. Dei, l. 13. c. 13. defines Order the Dispo­sition of things equal and inequal, giving to every thing its proper place. And herein he makes the Health both of Soul and Bodie to consiste: yea indeed the Conservation, Beautie, Perfection, Vigor, and Activitie of al Bodies, both natural and artificial, Military, Po­litic, and Ecclesiastic, seem chiefly to consiste in their right Order. Thence Job 10.22. the confusion of the grave or state of the dead is lively illustrated by this, that it is a land of darkenesse without any order: i. e. where there is no orderly succession of day and night; or no order among men. Plato philosophiseth accu­rately of the great Advantages which althings acquire by Order. So in his Gorgias, pag. 503. If we consult Painters, and Builders, and al other Artificers, [...], [Page 161] how each of them dispose their worke distinctly in the best order, and compel althings to agree each to other, til their whole worke be constituted and composed in order, and with ornament. Thence he addes, pag. 504. That Order is that which gives Beautie, Forme, and Perfection to al Bodies: of which see more in what follows, §. 5. Again he saith, pag. 506. The virtue of every thing, both of an instrument, and of bodie, and mind, and lastly of every thing animate is not rashly and confusedly ac­quired, [...], but by Order and Rectitude, &c. Whence he concludes: [...], That therefore which is constituted and conformed by Order, is the vir­tue of every thing. And thence he subjoins: That Order or orna­ment which is proper and peculiar to every thing, brings good to althings. By al this it appears, that the Life, Beautie, Wel-being, and Perfe­ction of any Societie consistes in its Order. And the reason is evi­dent; because al Polities and politic Bodies, whether Civil or Ec­clesiastic, are not composed of homogeneous similar parts, al of like name and nature with themselves and the whole, but of dissimilar, such as consiste of diverse Members, of distinct Offices, Formes, Situations, Places: as the human bodie is composed of diverse members, which have al their proper situation, office, &c. So in politic Bodies there is varietie of Members, which are al to keep their station, and legitime subordination, without invading each others place or function. Whence Plato placeth Civil Justice in this, [...], not to invade the af­faires of others; but to performe each his own worke. And as Or­der gives Forme, Beautie, Vigor, and Perfection to Militarie, Natu­ral, Artificial and Civil Bodies, so also to Ecclesiastic. Thence the Apostle saith, Col. 2.5. it was a great joy to him,Col. 2.5. to behold their order. [...] primarily notes militarie Order, which of al Orders seems most beautiful and exquisite. Whence the Church, in re­gard of her incomparable admirable Order, is said to be,Cant. 6.10. Cant. 6.10. Terrible as an Armie with Banners. What more terrible to an enemie, and admirable to friends, than to see an Armie on the March, wel-disciplinated, with Banners flying, and every part moving orderly?

§. 2. The formal Reason of Politie being dispatcht,The object of Po­litie. we now passe on to its Object, which in the Platonic Definition is brought in under the notion of [...], the Multitude or Communitie, not [Page 162]simply considered, but as consociated or conjoined by some com­mun ligament and bond. For in as much as no man can politi­cally rule himself, nor yet one another properly, therefore Politie requires a multitude united together, which Communitie is termed a Citie or Republic. And indeed man is borne for Societie, as his Speech, and Affections do sufficiently indigitate: wherefore al per­sons naturally incline to consociation, either Domestic or Politic. Domestic Consociation is either the first communitie and unitie of man and woman,Gen. 2.23, 24. instituted by the Law of Creation, Gen. 2.23, 24. or of parents and children; or of the whole Familie. Po­litic Consociation is of many Families in one Citie, or of many Ci­ties in one Republic. And for the more ful and distinct expli­cation of the whole we are to inquire into the original Foundation, Causes, and Effects of politic Consociation and Communitie.

1.God the Foun­der of al Poli­tics. The original prime Founder of al politic Societie is God. Thence Plato, Leg. 4. tels us, That every Republic rightly constituted de­pendes, not on human Comments, but on Divine Constitution or Laws: whence he saith, [...], Therefore in order to the right constitution of a Citie let us first cal upon God, that he being present would favor our desires, and adorne our Citie with good Laws. Whence Politic. pag. 290. he saith, That among the Egyptians the King was a Priest, to shew that he ought to consult God in al his Administrations. Thence al your great Legislators and Founders of Cities, when they were about to lay the foundation of their politic Societies, consulted, in apparence at least, some divine Oracle, as that without which they expected no happy issue of their undertakements. Thus Numa pretend­ed, that he had his Laws for the Roman Governement from the Nymphe Egeria, in the Arecine Grove; and Zaleucus, his for the Locrian Constitution, from Minerva; and Lycurgus, his for the Lacedemonian Republic, from Apollo at Delphos; and Minos, his for the Cretians, from Jupiter in the Cretensian Den. And that Plato did really traduce the best of his politic Constitutions from the divine Constitutions delivered by Moses, we have more large­ly proved, Court Gent. P. 1. B. 3. C. 9. §. 6.

2.Mans inclina­tion to Societie. God hath implanted in Mankind a natural Inclination to Societie. Thus Plato, in his Politicus, pag. 261. [...], But we shal not find that a Politician doth concerne himself about one single thing only, as he that [Page 163]drives an oxe, or dresseth an horse: but he is rather like such as provide for a number of horses or bullocks. Whereby he illustrates how Po­litics regard not single persons, but men in Societie and Commu­nitie. Whence in what follows, he cals this politic Science, [...], the Nutrition of an Herd, or the commun Nutrition: i. e. as he explicates his own mind, [...], the commun Nutrition, or Gubernation of many. He makes politic Philosophie to be [...], namely as it concernes a Communitie or Companie of men, who are of al other living Creatures most [...], inclinable to flock together as Herds. For as God hath given Man the benefit of Reason and Speech, the principal Organs of Societie; so he has also given him natural inclinations and affections of and for Con­sociation. And that which renders these natural inclinations more efficacious and forcible, is the indigent necessitous condition of man in this his lapsed condition, which cals for the Advice, Conduct, Assistance, and Relief of Societie, as hereafter, when we come to the Ends of Politie.

3. Albeit man has a natural inclination to Societie, Consociation constitutes a po­litic Bodie. yet that which formaliseth and constitutes any politic Bodie is Confederation and Con­sociation. For a politic Bodie being an aggregate collected out of many individuals, cannot acquire any real union but by Confedera­tion. Thus Plato, Repub. 4. pag. 433. makes [...], The consent of Governors and Governed to be the formal bond of al politic Societies. This consent or confederation is either in a way of Subordination between the Governors and Governed, or in a way of Coordination between the Governed themselves. That Confederation is essential to al politic Societie is evident from the very nature of Order, which gives forme to al Politie. What is Order but the union of the things ordered? And what union can there be between varietie of persons, but by mutual consent? The Order, Beautie, Vigor, Force, Consistence, flourishing, and perfection of althings both Natural, Artificial, Mo­ral and Politic consiste in their Ʋnitie: Division ever brings with it Dissolution and Confusion: every natural bodie hangs together by some ligament or commun bond of Union; so in like manner al politic Bodies. Now what bond of union can there be in a politic Bodie but Confederation? Plato, Repub. 4. assures us, That the best Terme or Boundarie of any Citie is its Ʋnitie: and what more conduceth to the Unitie of a Citie than Consociation by [Page 164]mutual consent? This may be also argued from the very nature and Idea of a Citie; which is defined by Grotius, de Jur. Belli & Pacis, pag. 6. A perfect Companie of Free-men consociated for commun utilitie, and enjoying the same Right. So that Confederation is by al made essential to a politic Bodie, whether Civil or Ecclesiastic.

4.Confederation by some Law. The Confederation and Consociation of every politic Bodie must be bounded and regulated by some commun Law. There can be no po­litic Societie without consent unto some certain Bond of Conso­ciation: which Bond is that commun Law, whereby the Order of that Societie is bounded and regulated. Thus Plato, in his Politi­cus tels us, That in al politic Communitie and Societie, for the prevent­ing Tyrannie and Anarchie, there must be Laws agreed on, accord­ing to which Magistrates must rule and people obey. Thus also, Leg. 3. he saith, That man being by nature, [...], sociable and communicative, he cannot want societie: neither can human socie­tie want a Law: which Law gives bounds and measures to al Orders, whereby the excesses of the more patent are restrained, and the defects of the more infirme relieved. The like in his Protagoras, pag. 326. where he tels us, That a wel-governed Republic is bounded by the formule of certain Laws, which prescribe the Offices both of Rulers and Ruled, and compel each to live accordingly. This is also wel expressed by Hooker in his Ecclesiastic Politie, pag. 25. ‘Two foundations there are which bear up public Societies; the one a natural In­clination, whereby al men desire sociable life and fellowship; the other an Order, expressely or secretly agreed upon, touching the manner of their union in living together. The later is that which we cal the Law of a Commun-wealth, the very Soul of a politic Bodie, the parts whereof are by Law animated, held to­gether, and set on worke in such actions as the commun good requireth.’ Thus much touching the necessitie of some commun Law as the bond of Confederation: but as for the Origine, Na­ture, and Effects of politic Laws, we are to treat thereof under politic Legislation, §. 5.

5.Amitie and Fraternitie. Perfect Politie requires not only Confederation, but also intime Amitie and Fraternitie. Plato, Repub. 3. pag. 415. gives us a Phe­nician Fable, touching the original Fraternitie of al men, which he makes to be the foundation of Polities: [...], &c. Ye are indeed al, who converse together in the Citie, Bre­thren; but seing God has made those of you, who are fit to rule, as [Page 165]Gold, and those who are to assist them, as Silver; the Ruled are but as Iron and Brasse. Two things are here laid down, (1) That al the Members of a politic Societie are [...], borne out of the Earth, that commun Mother, and therefore a Fraternitie. (2) Yet so as that this Fraternitie may not destroy the distinct Orders of [...], Governors and Governed. This Amitie and Fraternitie is sometimes termed Familiaritie, which Definit. Plat. is thus described: [...], Familiaritie is a Communion or Societie of the same kind. Sometimes it is stiled Fel­lowship, which is thus defined: [...], Fellow­ship is an Amitie according to the same custome of life. According to the Civil Law, a Societie is defined, a right of Fraternitie. Societas est jus fraternita­tis. Thence Bacon, in the Life of Henry VII. tels us, (what we al know by experience) That Colleges and Societies of Merchants and Artificers, according to the English mode, are called Fraternities. So the Py­thagoreans called, in imitation of the Essenes, their Societie [...], a Fraternitie. Plato carried this Amitie and Fraternitie so far as to take away al distinction of meum and tuum, and to reduce al to a communitie of Goods. So Repub. 5. pag. 462. [...], These words Mine and not Mine are not used in the Citie. And pag. 464. he gives the reason of this communitie of althings: [...], There are no contentions or Law-suits each with other, because none shal have any thing proper to himself, but his own person: althings else are commun to al. This communitie of althings, if wel bounded, and not abused, may be of great use in some cases; as in the primitive Churches it was a great effect of that Fraternitie and Amitie which was among them, as Act. 2.44, 45, 46. Thence Plato, Repub. 5. pag. 463.Act. 2.44, 46. [...], He estimes and cals his familiar friend as himself. We find this Fraternitie and Communitie esta­blisht to an high degree by Lycurgus in the Spartan Republic, as Plutarch in the Life of Lycurgus, pag. 49, &c. relates: ‘Lycurgus persuaded the Spartans to make a new division of their Lands equally among themselves; to live from thenceforth as Brethren together, so that none should seek to go before each other, save in virtue only: thinking there should be no difference or in­equalitie among inhabitants of one Citie, but the reproches of dishonestie and praise of virtue— Further he made another [Page 166]Law for eating and drinking, and against Festes and Banquets. First he commanded them to eat together al of one meat, and chiefly of those he had permitted by his Ordinance. In these commun Repastes, which the Cretians called Andria, and the Lacedemonians Philitia; either because they were places where­in they learned to live soberly, from Phido, to save or spare; or else because their amitie and friendship grew there one towards another, as if they would have called them Philitia Love-festes, by changing d into l.’ And Plato, Leg. 11. pag. 915. makes men­tion of such a kind of Love-feste in use among the Grecians. His words are: [...], &c. In that kind of Feste, which is made up of Symbols or Collations, and called [...], and celebrated among friends, &c. This [...] or Love-feste was for the preservation of love and amitie among those of the same Societie; which was in use also among the Jews, as it appears by their Feste after the Passeover; whence the Grecians seem to have borrowed their custome, as the Christians their Love-festes, mentioned Jude 12.Jude 12. See more of the nature of this Friend­ship, Philos. Gen. P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect. 6. §. 1, &c.

6.Religion the principal foun­dation of Poli­ties. The principal Foundation and Ligament of al politic Fraternitie and Societie is Religion. Thus Plato, Leg. 4. pag. 713. [...], But it behoved, if the Citie be designed by this name, that it be called by the name of God himself, who is the true Lord of wise men. His mind is, that a Citie ought to be com­posed of wise virtuose men, who have God for their Lord, and therefore may be called the Citie of God. Whence he addes: [...], &c. Namely this Discourse reteining the vestigia of the primigenous Truth teacheth, that there wil be no cessation of evils and troubles in those Cities, whatsoever they be, in which not God, but some mere mor­tal ruleth: but it commandeth, that, with al possible endeavors we imi­tate that life, which was under Saturne, i. e. in the golden Age of the state of Innocence, in which Religion and Virtue flourished. Thence in his Politicus, pag. 290. Plato acquaints us, [...], &c. That among the Egyptians it is not lawful for a King to rule without a Priesthood: yea if any one out of the Royal line should by violence usurpe the Empire, he is forced to [Page 167]be initiated in Sacreds. Moreover in many Cities of Grece, and spe­cially among you [Athenians] thou shalt find the chief Sacreds to be instituted by the supreme Magistrates. For among you they say, that the most august Sacreds and most ancient Rites of Religion are commit­ted to the charge of the King created. By which he shews how much the supreme Magistrate, both among the Egyptians and Grecians, was concerned for the conservation of Religion. Thence Campa­nella, Pol. cap. 8. pag. 156. saith, ‘That the Priesthood acts Gods part in an Empire: therefore there never was any Republic or Societie of men, nor yet can be without a Priesthood.’ So essen­tial is Religion to politic Societies. How much the Civil Magi­strate is to concerne himself for the conservation of Religion is evident from the promise and practice of David, Psal. 75.2, 3. Psal. 75.2. When I shal receive the congregation, I wil judge uprightly. David promi­seth in these words, that when he should obtain the ful guberna­tion of the Kingdome, he would administer it with justice, and settle Religion, which was then miserably dissolved. So it fol­lows v. 3. The earth and al the inhabitants thereof are dissolved: I bear up the pillars of it. By the Earth he means the Judaic King­dome, which was growen very dissolute: but, saith he, I do or [by an Enallage of Tenses] I wil bear up, or confirme, the pillars thereof. Some by pillars understand just and religiose Magistrates: others, Religion and Justice, which are the primarie pillars of a Nation, and these David promiseth to confirme, when King. That Religion is the principal Pillar of any State Plato more expresse­ly inculcates, Repub. 4. pag. 424. where he premits this as a pre­liminary proposition: [...], For a Republic, if it be once wel be­gun, doth always encrease as a circle. Whereby he shews, that the perfection of a Republic dependes greatly on a good beginning. Thence he procedes to shew, That the best beginning and perfe­ction of a Republic consistes in Religion, which he symbolically ex­presseth under the notion of Music: [...], Therefore the Fortresse, as it seems, in which the Office of the Keepers is constituted, consistes in Music. And the prevarication hereof doth secretly steal into and influence mens minds. (1) By the Keepers he understands the Magistrates, whom he makes to be Conservators of the Laws. (2) He saith, the For­tresse and strong Tower of these Conservators of the Laws consistes [Page 168]in the Discipline of Music. That by the Discipline of Music must be understood Religion, is evident by the coherence, as also by the use of this phrase elsewhere: For Plato, herein following the Py­thagorean mode, stileth Virtue and Religion Music or Harmonie. (3) He saith, the prevarication or perversion of Religion hath a great force and efficace for the corrupting mens minds: and therefore the pre­servation of it has great influence on the wel-being of Societies. Thence, in his Leg. 12. pag. 966. he saith: [...], &c. Is not this one of the chiefest things, con­cerning which we have hitherto much discoursed, namely touching God, that he is, and how great and august his forces are, as to human af­faires? Whence he concludes: That no one ought to be elected to the Office of a public Magistrate, [...], save he that is divine or religiose, and addicted to divine studies. Wherein he assertes (1) That the knowlege of God is the best Wisdome and the very Soul of Virtue. (2) That nothing is more [...], impolitic, or against the interest of a politic So­cietie, than the ignorance of God, and neglect of Religion: For without Laws a Republic cannot be happy: neither can there be good Laws without a prudent knowlege of what is best: neither can there be a prudent knowlege of what is best, without the knowlege of God. (3) He shews also that a Republic cannot be happy without Virtue, which also belongs to Religion. (4) Having placed Religion as the Foundation of an happy Republic, he explicates the parts thereof, such as are most influential on politic Bodies, namely the knowlege of the Deitie, his Providence, Justice, &c. Thus elsewhere Plato makes Religion to be the principal Fundamen of a Republic, and thence more ancient: wherefore the first care of Legislators and Politicians, in order to the right constitution of any Republic, as also for the preserva­tion thereof, ought to be for the establishment of Religion. The like Aristotle, Eth. l. 1. c. 13. [...], It's manifest that a Politician ought to know what concernes the Soul, as he that wil cure the eyes, must understand the whole bodie. His de­signe is to shew that it belongs to Politicians and Statesmen to make the people happy, and thence to make them virtuose. Campanella, Polit. cap. 7. tels us, ‘That three Causes, (to speak politicly) found and governe Empires, namely God, Prudence, [Page 169]and Occasion; but in some Empires one is more visible, in some another. In the Hebraic Kingdome God was more visible; in the Roman, Prudence; in the Spanish, Occasion. Although phy­sically God is the Cause of al other Causes.’ Whence Cap. 8. he addes: ‘That al Governements (except wicked Machiavel) have acknowleged, that Prudence doth not so far avail, as to fore­know what Goods or Evils are approching; therefore al Na­tions have had recourse to God, &c.’ But how much the Interest of any politic Bodie or State lies involved in that of Religion, is excellently laid down by Padre Paul the Venetian, that pious and great Politician, as we find it in his Life, pag. 161. ‘Touching the provisions that were to be made from time to time with the Senators, the Father gave his opinion and counsel vivâ voce and vehemently upon al occurrents, having always taught and incul­cated, that not only for Truth and Conscience sake, but even for Necessitie and Reasons of State every faithful man, but most of al Princes ought to invigilate the maintenance and conserva­tion of Religion. He affirmed, that to this end God had con­stituted Princes as his Lieutenants, in those States wherein the Church was planted, and conferred their greatnesse on them, to make them Protectors, Defenders, Conservators of the holy Church, as sacred Scripture makes mention: in which calling the greatest of them can never give a sufficient discharge of himself, except it be by a godly and vigilant care in maters of Religion.’ Thus that great Master of Wisdome and true Chri­stian Politics. How much Religion is the support of States, is wel determined by Solomon, the wisest Politician, or rather by Christ himself, Prov. 8.15. By me Kings reigne, &c. or, as some render it, In me, i. e. in the exalting of me Kings reigne most prosperously. The exaltation of Christ is the support and exal­tation of States: Religion is both the conservant and promovent Cause of States, 1 King. 11.37, 38. Jeroboam held his Crown by it. So Deut. 9.25, 29.

§. 3. Having finisht the original and principal Causes of po­litic Societies, we now descend to its principal Ends, which,The Ends of Po­litie. in the Platonic Definition are al included in that notion, [...], for the Beatitude, or wel-being of a politic Bodie. This politic Beatitude implies many particulars.Gods Glorie. As 1. The Glorie of God, which is the last end not only in Ethic or moral, but also in politic Beatitude. Thus Plato, Leg. 4. pag. 713. assures us, [Page 170] That al manner of evils wil befal that State, where God reignes not. And he addes the reason, pag. 715. [...], &c. God hath in himself the principe, and end and middle of al­things: i. e. althings not only natural and moral, but also politic have their origine from God, dependence on him, and therefore ought to end in him, as their main Centre. Whence, pag. 716. [...], &c. But God is to us principally the measure of althings. Lastly, pag. 717. he addes: [...], &c. This [namely the Worship and Service of God] is the primary end of our life, unto which al our actions ought to collime, as arrows to their Scope. Thence he pro­cedes, according to his blind capacitie, to shew how we ought to honor and worship God. Hence,

2.Virtue. Another principal end of politic Societie is to render men virtuose, and like unto God. This indeed Plato greatly inculcates. So Leg. 4. pag. 716. he saith, That a good man follows God, and is like unto him, and therefore only fit to honor and worship him; which gives stabilitie to a State. So Leg. 12. he makes the knowlege of God and Virtue the great pillars and principal end of Politics. Thence Leg. 9. pag. 877. he saith: [...], It behoveth a Citie to have its Families, so far as it may be, most holy and most happy. Wherein he seems to place the happinesse of a Citie in its Holinesse and Virtue. So Alcibiad. 1. pag. 134. [...], It cannot therefore be, that any should be happy unlesse good. Whence he addes: Therefore, Alcibiades, Cities want not Wals or Naval forces to render them happy: neither can they be so by a multitude of men, or by the magni­tude of power without Virtue. [...], But if thou doest purpose to governe the Republic rightly and worthily, Virtue is to be communicated to thy Citizens. Thence Definit. Plat. pag. 413. [...], politic Philosophie is defined, [...], a Science of things honest and utile: Also, [...], a Science effective of Justice in the Citie. The like Aristotle, in his Ethics, l. 1. c. 13. [...], &c. And it seems, that he who is really a Politician gives his mind and endeavors chiefly to this; [name­ly Virtue] because his designe is to make Citizens good and obedient [Page 171]to Laws. We have instances hereof in the Cretensian and Lacede­monian Legislators: who made it the grand designe to promove Virtue. So l. 1. c. 9. he saith, [...], We made the last end of politic Philosophie to be the chiefest Good: but this makes it the chief­est Concerne to render the Citizens wel qualified, and good, and A­gents of the best things. Such illustrious notices had these poor Pagans of the essential connexion between Virtue and true Po­litics.

3. Another principal end of politic Societie is the good of the whole, The Good of the whole. not only of particulars. Thus Plato, Repub. 4. pag. 420. [...], We constitute a Citie, not for this end, that some one particular number of Citizens be separately happy, but principally that the whole Citie be so. The like he subjoins: [...], Now therefore we frame a Republic as happy, when not a few only therein are such, but the whole. That the public good is a principal end of al Politie, and politic Societie Plato frequently assertes. So Repub. 1. pag. 345. [...], But now I estimed it necessary for us to confesse, that al Empire, as Empire, must regard the good of none other, but such as are subject to that Empire, and committed to its care, whether it be in politic or private Empire. Then he addes: [...], As if the profit from that dignitie of governing were not to returne to them, but to those that are subject to them. By which he instructes us, that Magistrates ought to in­tend not their private interest, but the public. Again, he saith: [...], That must be done which seems best for the Citie. And elsewhere he saith, That neither Republics nor Laws are good, but seditiose, when the public good is not principally regarded. Thence Leg. 9. pag. 859. he tels us, That Legislators ought to put on the person of a Father, not of a Tyrant, i.e. they ought to aim at the public good, not their own private ad­vantage: For public Laws ought to regard public good. But of this more in what follows of politic Administrations, Laws, and Magistrates. Hence,

4.Mutual Assi­stance. Mutual Assistance is another principal end of politic Societie. This Plato, Repub. 2. pag. 369. largely philosophiseth on, as that which gave the original foundation to al politic Societies. He begins thus: [...], &c. A Citie thence received its origine, be­cause none of us was of himself sufficient, but deficient as to many things. Thence he addes: [...] [scil. [...]] [...], But our necessitie, as it seems, wil make this Citie. (1) He makes our necessitie and indigence that which first gave origine to al Cities and politic Societies. (2) The cause of this necessi­tic he makes to be the insufficience of al men to live of themselves, without mutual assistances each from other: Hence it was, saith he, that men at first congregated into Societies, for the mutual relief each of other, Gen. 2.18. according to that general Edict of God, Gen. 2.18. It is not good that man should be alone: which, albeit there it re­gards conjugal Societie, yet it may be extended to al politic So­cietie. For, as Aristotle saith, It was necessary, [...], that they consociate together, who cannot subsiste without each others assistance. Thence Plato procedes to shew the various degrees of Necessitie, which forced men to con­gregate into politic Societies. (1) [...], The first and greatest kind of necessitie is the provision of food, that we may subsiste and live. (2) [...], the second, of Habitation. (3) [...], the third, of Raiment and such like. Now for the supplie of these necessities, he saith there must be in a politic Societie varietie of Artificers; for al are not sufficient for al employments; neither must any one invade the office of ano­ther; but every one ought to take that part as is most proper to him, of which more in what immediately follows §. 4.

§. 4.A politic Bodie or Citie what. From what has been laid down touching the Constitution and Ends of Politic, we may with facilitie delineate the true Idea of a politic Bodie, as also what is preservative or destructive thereof. The Grecians usually confine the notion of a politic Bo­die to a Citie; because at first their Republics and Polities were usually confined to one single Citie. Plato's Idea of a Citie with its origine we have, in what immediately precedes, hinted. He gives it us, Repub. 2. pag. 369. (as before) making the necessities of men the ground of their consociation; adding, [...] [Page 173] Therefore in this manner whiles one asso­ciated to himself another, seing there was need of many for that af­faire, necessitie caused, that those first men congregated many into one seat and place of habitation, as companions and coadjutors each of other. This companie of men we cal a Citie. Wherein he gives us a sum­mary description of a Citie, its Origine, End, Mater, and constitu­tive Parts; which he more copiosely explicates in what follows. (1) He makes the origine, end, and occasion of mens congre­gating into Cities to be commun necessities and mutual assistan­ces. This he more fully explicates in what immediately follows: [...], But one again impartes what he hath to the other, or receiveth from his companion; thus mutually giving and receiving each from other; accounting this way of reciprocal communication ever best. Mutual assistance and communication is the original end and occasion of al politic Societies. The sum is this: Men being not in their single capacities [...], self-sufficient, they find them­selves under an essential obligation to congregate [...] into Corporations, that so they might assist each other by their mutual [...], or conversation, which consistes in their giving to, and receiving from each other. (2) As to the Mater of a Citie, as also other politic Bodies, he tels us, That it is not sufficient that it consiste of three or sour members, but there must be a Societie of different Occupations and Offices. This he insistes on, pag. 369, & 370. [...], There is need therefore of more than four to provide those things of which we have spoken: i. e. Food, Raiment, Habitations, and other Conveniences; for which he tels us, that there is need of Husbandmen, and al manner of Artificers. And he gives his reason for it, pag. 370. [...], Because truly first every one is not borne alike to every one, but very diverse in nature, therefore one is naturally more inclined to one worke. Thus also pag. 371. [...], Therefore our Citie needs many Husbandmen and other Ar­tificers. And he gives the reason in what follows: [...], For which causes, namely that there might be a free Commerce and Trade, we have instituted a Citie. So that the main end of a Citie being freedome of commerce and mutual [Page 174]conversation, it's necessary that there be a multitude or communi­tie to constitute the same. (3) As to the formal Constitution of a Citie, as of al other politic Societies, he saith, this [...], Com­munion must not be [...], a Confusion, but althings must be trans­acted [...], with Eutaxie or good Order, which he termes Justice, as it consistes in the prescribing to each member his pro­per ranke, place, office and exercice in the politic Bodie. For this good Order or universal Justice requires [1] That every member has his proper place and worke prescribed to him; and that he take diligent heed not to invade the office and worke of another. Which invasion Plato greatly condemnes, as [...], a curiose and pragmatic interposition in other mens affaires. [2] That there be a due observation of the distinct Orders [...], of Governors and Governed. (4) Lastly, he makes [...], the plenitude and perfection of a Citie or Republic to consiste in the fore-mentioned communitie and multitude under their different offices, conspiring together and falling into one certain harmonie, for the commun utilitie of the whole. Thence Definit. Platon. pag. 415. [...], a Citie is defined, [...], an habitation of a multitude of men using the same commun Decretes or Constitutions: Also, [...], a multitude of men, which are under the same Law. Whence it is added: [...], The Virtue of a Citie is the constitution of a right Politie. Whence also [...], a Politician or Statesman is defined, [...], one that understandes the constitution of a Citie or Republic.

Agreably to those Platonic Philosophemes Aristotle, in his Po­litics, 1. & 5. makes a Citie to be a kind of animate or animal nature. For look as an Animal, rightly disposed according to nature, is composed of certain proportionate parts mutually or­dinate, and communicating each to other, as also to the whole their exercices and operations; so in like manner a Citie, when duely disposed and instituted, is constituted of such proportio­nate parts, for the mutual aide and assistance each of other. And such as the comparation of an Animal and his parts is as to sa­nitie, such is that of a Citie or Republic and its parts, as to tranquillitie. And what is sanitie, according to the Philosophemes of the wisest Physiologistes, but [...] or [...], a good Disposition or right Order of al parts in the Animal, whereby they are capa­citated [Page 175]perfectly to exert al exercitations and operations conve­nient to their nature: according to which Analogie or propor­tion the Tranquillitie of a Citie or Republic is nothing else but its [...], good Order or right Disposition of al its parts counected together by some commun Law, as Marsilius Patavinus, that great Politician, in his Defensor pacis, cap. 2. pag. 6. has wel de­termined. Cicero defines a Republic, Rem populi, the Affaire of the People: and he desines the People, a Societie of the multitude, Populus coetus multitudinis ju­ris consensu & utilitatis com­munione socia­tas, Cic. conso­ciated by the consent of Right and communion of Ʋtilitie: i. e. accord­ing to our English Phraseologie, The people are a Societis consociated by commun consent and according to some Law, for public Good. This Strabo also, lib. 16. makes to be the origine and formal constitu­tion of al ancient politic Societies, as we shal shew §. 5. on that head of Legislation. A People is defined by Augustin, de Civ. Dei, l. 19. c. 24. a Societie of the rational multitude consociated for concor­dant communion, in those things they consent unto. Which is by so much the better, by how much the more they concord in what is best; and by so much the worse by how much the more they concord in things that are worse. And as the processe of Nature and Art is always from things lesse perfect, to that which is more perfect; so it hath been with al Societies, which begin at first only with two, Man and Woman, Gen. 2.18, &c. which Plato termes [...]. Whence this imperfect Societie extended it self to more perfect families: and then domestic Societie extended it self to Pagus, i. e. to the Societie of Villages: for anciently Pagani were those in the same Pagus or Village, who dranke of the same [...], or Dor. [...]. This Societie of Villages at last ex­tended it self to that of a Citie; as this, to that of a Republic, as Aristot. Polit. l. 1. c. 1. A Citie was at first instituted for the securitie, preservation, and wel-being of the whole. Hence a Citie is defined by Augustin, de Civit. lib. 15. cap. 8. A multitude of men collected together by some commun bond of Societie. So also, de Civit. Dei, l. 1. c. 15. he saith, A Citie is nothing else but a con­cord multitude of men. Thence Grotius, de Jure belli, pag. 6. defines a Citie, a companie of men cons [...]ciated together for the enjoyment of the same Right and commun Ʋtilitie. Wherein note (1) The ge­neric Idea of a Citie, which is a Companie or Communitie, i. e. per­fect: for it is essential to a Citie, both as to Mater and Forme, that it be perfect. It is perfect as to Mater, in that it is composed of al manner of Artificers and Occupations necessary for the sub­sistence [Page 176]and welfare of a Communitie. It is also perfect as to Forme, as it has a perfect Order and Regiment, for the conservation and gubernation thereof. (2) Whence follows the formal con­stitution of a Citie, which consistes in its regular consociation, of which before. (3) Thence also its End is, for the enjoyment of the same Right and commun Ʋtilitie, of which also in what precedes. Touching a Citie, its constitution and perfection see more fully that pious and great Reformer, not only of Religion, but also of Philosophie, Savonarola, Epit. Ethicae, l. 10.

§. 5.Legislation its Origine. Having hitherto discussed and explicated the essential Constitution of a Politie and politic Bodie, we now passe on to the Empire thereof, which consistes in Legislation and Administra­tion or Jurisdiction. That al politic Bodies are bounded and go­verned by Laws has been already proved, §. 2. And we find a clear account hereof in Strabo, Geogr. l. 16. [...], &c. Men that are politic or civil do lead their lives after one commun Law, appointing them what to do: for otherwise, that a multitude should, without harmonie among themselves, concur in the doing of one thing, it is impossible. Of what great use Laws are for the right ordering and governing Republics and al politic Bodies is wel laid down by Plato, Protag. pag. 326. where speak­ing of the Education of Youth, he saith, That after they depart from under their Preceptors, the Republic compels them to learne the Laws, and to live according thereunto; a certain Formule being fra­med, that so none act rashly according to their own wils: but as Wri­ting-masters prescribe such as begin to write certain half-letters, and strokes of the pen thereby to forme their hand, [...], &c. So the Republic, having framed a Formule of Laws, invented by good and ancient Legislators, according to their prescript compels both those that governe and those that are governed to act: but if any trans­gresse their bounds, him they punish: which kind of punishment they cal [...], Correction.

1.The necessitie of Laws. Touching the Necessitie of Laws, we have an excellent Dis­scourse in Plato, Leg. 9 p. 874 [...], &c. It's necessary that Laws be framed for men, [Page 177]that so they may live according to Laws: for if they should live with­out these, they would in nothing differ from the savage bestes. The cause whereof is this; because no mans ingenie is so framed by nature, as that he should certainly know what conduceth to the commun utilitie of human life: or if he should know what is best, yet he is not always able or willing to act the same. This grand reason of State indu­cing a necessitie of Laws he explicates in the parts thereof. (1) He saith it is very difficult without Laws for any to understand what most conduceth to the public good, which is the measure and bond of Societies. So pag. 875. [...], For first it is very difficult [without Laws] to know what that public, not pri­vate, interest is, which true politic Discipline is to provide for. Thence he addes: (2) [...], &c. Moreover, although peradventure some one may, by the aide of politic Science, abundantly understand these things; yet if it be so, that he hath gained an absolute power, and is not obnoxious to the check of any other, he wil not be able throughout his life to persevere in this resolution of preferring the public Interest as best, and of postponing his private concernes after the public utilitie; but mortal nature al­ways impels him to his proper interest and private opportunitie; which without al reason flies from grief and persues pleasure— and thence wil fil the Citie with al manner of evil. These are the principal rea­sons which enforce the establishment of Laws, namely mens ig­norance of what is best, and their strong inclination to promove their private interest, more than the public good. Whence he concludes: [...], &c. Namely, if any mortal were indued with such a nature, as could understand the public good, and were, by a divine afflation, made apt to undertake the same, such an one would not need Laws or their Empire. But such a Divine nature, addes he, is no where to be found, and therefore there remains an absolute necessitie of Laws, to instruct men in what is their dutie, to restrain them from the prosecution of their private interest and lusts, as also to constrain them to what is good. Laws have much more force to compel men to their dutie, than the wisest of men: For let men, though never so wise and just, oppose themselves in the wisest and most just manner to the irregularities of others, yet how inefficacious are their endeavors for reformation! what contradictions do [Page 178]they meet with from those they endeavor to reforme? Yet let the same persons be instructed in their dutie by a Law, and they are with more facilitie convinced thereof and inclined thereto: and why? because they presume the Law doth speak without prejudice, partialitie, and private interest: therefore they look on it as the Oracle of God.

2.Al Laws origi­nally from God. As for the Origine of Laws, Plato assures us, That the best are such as come from God. For he saith, [...], No mere mortal can make Laws to purpose. Whereby he instructes us, that a Republic ought not to depend on mere Comments of men, but on some Divine Law, namely the eternal Mind and Wil, which is the source of al true politic Laws. Whence also he saith: [...], &c. Let us therefore cal upon God for the right disposition of the Citie, and that he favoring us may be present, and grant our requests, and constitute our Laws and Citic. And touching the first Institution of Laws he saith expressely, Repub. 4. pag. 427. [...], It belongs not truly to us: but to the Delphic Apollo the chiefest, best, and first Institutes of Laws belong. (1) That by Apollo he symbolically indigitates the true God, though unknown, wil be evident to any that observes his Phraseologie. Thus also ‘Lycurgus (as Plutarch in his Life re­lates) being about to frame his Laws, he consultes first with the Oracle of Apollo, to establish good Laws in his Countrey— And Lycurgus took so great care to establish wel his Laws, that he brought an Oracle from Apollo's Temple for the chief of them, which Oracle is to this day called Retra, i. e. the Statute-Oracle.’ Thus also Plato, in his Minos, pag. 319. treating of the Origine of Laws, brings in Homer commending Minos, for consulting Ju­piter in order to the framing right Laws: [...], For he saith, Sanè caetero­rum Legislato­rum, quos tan­topere admira­ta omnis vetu­stas est, sanctio­nes multae Mo­saicis similes fuêre. Cunaeus, de Repub. Jud. that Minos conversed with Ju­piter, and used secret conference with him for nine years space: and that he addressed himself to Jupiter, as to a certain Sophist, that he might be instructed, i.e. how to frame Laws aright. (2) That Plato ownes God as the supreme Legislator, from whom the best and first Laws came, is as evident, and that not only from his confes­sion, but also by his practice, in making such a curiose inquisi­tion into the sacred Mosaic Laws, and traducing thence the [Page 179]choisest of his Laws, as we have more largely proved out of his own Workes, as also out of Clemens Alexandr. Eusebius and others, Court. Gent. B. 3. C. 9. Philos. Gen. P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect. 6. §. 6.

3. Human Legislators ought to be men of Wisdome, public Spirits, and virtuose. We find an excellent Character of an human Le­gislator in Plato, Leg. 9. pag. 858. where he puts this Question: Whether ought we to consult a Legislator, more than other Writers, touching things honest, good, beautiful, just? Which being granted, he assumes: It is consentaneous, that of al the Writings, which are used in Republics, those that concerne Laws be most accurately compo­sed; and that al the Writings of other men be so far approved, as they agree to these Laws, and so far exploded as they are dissentaneous. Whence he concludes, pag. 859. [...], Let us therefore take this course in framing Laws for Cities, that the Legislator entirely clothe himself with the person of a Father and Mother: that so those written Laws may represent the image of men indued with a certain sollicitous affection, whereby they take care of those for whom they dictate Laws; as also with a sagacious prudence, whereby they know how to consult things good and commodous for them: But they must not put on the person of a Tyrant, and some impotent domineering Lord, who with an infinite or absolute kind of Empire commands what he lists, and adding menaces, wils that his pleasure stand for reason and Law; whereby he begets only hatred and envie. Wherein we find many great Characters of a good Legislator. He saith (1) He must have a sagacious prudence, or prudent sagacitie, to find out what Laws are best and most commodous. (2) He must put on the person of a Father and Mother, i. e. al manner of tender affections, such as are sollicitous for the good of those for whom the Laws are made. (3) He must avoid al shadow of Tyrannie and absolute Dominion of such as make their Wil their Law, without Reason. (4) He must make such Laws, as may beget, in those for whom they are made, a good opinion of and love to them, not hatred. Hence,

4.Al Laws from the Multitude. Al politic Laws ought to procede originally from the Multitude or from their Representatives. Thus Plato, in his Gorgias, pag. 488. [...], Doth not the Law of Nature constitute, that MANY [or the multitude] are better than ONE? who truly make Laws for one, [Page 180]namely for the commun good. Whence he concludes: [...], Therefore the Laws of the MANY, or Multitude are the Laws of the most excellent. Whence he farther argues, That the Laws of the Multitude are of the best: [...], Are they not also the Laws of the best? For they that are more excellent are better. Thence he addes another Argument: [...]; Are not their [the many] Laws according to nature beautiful and honest; because they are most excel­lent? Whence he concludes: [...]; Do not therefore the MANY [or multitude] judge, that it is just to live according to some equal Right, [or Law of Equitie] and more base to do injustice, than to suffer it? By al which he demonstrates, that the most equal Laws are such as procede from the MANY or Multitude. Thus Plato, in his Minos, shews, That it is both useful and necessary, that Laws be framed by the free suffrage of the people. And his reason is invincible, namely, because al Laws ought to re­gard the public Utilitie, and therefore ought to be confirmed by public consent:Quod omnes tangit ab omni­bus approbe­tur. Jus Civil. For that which concernes al must be approved by al. And herein Plato is followed by his Disciple Aristotle, who Polit. l. 3. c. 6. demonstrates, That the Legislative power belongs to the people, and universitie of Citizens, or to their Representatives congregated in some general Assemblie. This politic Hypothesis is strenuously defended by that great Christian Politician, Marsilius Patavinus, in his Defensor Pacis, cap. 12. pag. 36. where he proves it by these Arguments. (1) The Universitie of Citizens, or Communitie do more perfectly understand and affect the public Good, which is the principal end and measure of al Politie. (2) Laws fra­med by the whole multitude or their Repreentatives are better observed, than such as are imposed on them against their con­sent. For a Citie being a Communitie of Free-men, as Aristot. Pol. 3.4. al Laws are most confirmed by their consent. Again he proves that the coactive power is in the multitude or their more prevalent part, and therefore those Laws are best observed, which are made by their consent. (3) The Communitie or Uni­versitie of the multitude do best understand what is most com­modous or incommodous for the preservation and promotion of their Societie: now al Laws are for the preservation and promo­tion of the Societie: therefore they ought to be approved by al: [Page 181]according to that commun Maxime: That which toucheth the com­mun good of al must be approved by al. Thence he procedes p. 42. to solve a commun objection against the peoples consent in Le­gislation, namely, That the multitude are ignorant, depraved, per­verse, &c. To which he respondes: (1) That the whole multi­tude hath a better judgement and affection, than any single part; because the wisdome of single persons is included in the whole. (2) That the first invention and examen of Laws may be com­mitted to prudent men; and yet the approbation and confirma­tion of them appertain to the universitie or commun multitude. (3) The multitude may commit the whole of Legislation to cer­tain Representatives elected by them. Thus Hooker Ecclesiast. Po­litie, pag. 28, 29. ‘By the Law of Nature, whereunto God hath made al subject, the lawful power of making Laws, to command whole politic Societies of men, belongeth so properly unto the same entire Societies, that for any Prince or Potentate of what kind soever upon earth to exercise the same of himself, and not either by expresse commission immediately and personally re­ceived from God, or else by Authoritie derived at first from their consent, upon whose persons they impose Laws, it is no better than mere Tyrannie. But approbation not only they give, who personally declare their assent by voice, signe, or act; but also when others do it in their names, by right originally at least derived from them. As in Parliaments and like Assem­blies.’ The like Campanella, Polit. cap. 4. ‘As Virtue is the pri­vate Law of an individual person, so the Law is a public Virtue of the Communitie: therefore none may make a Law but the Republic, in whom the commun reason and consent is; or the most wise men, to whom this commun reason is committed by the Communitie, as Solon, and Lycurgus, and Numa; or God, who takes care of al, and is the supreme Reason.’ Hence,

5. Al politic Laws must tend to, Al Laws for public Good. and be measured by the public Good. For that which has its origine from public consent and dependence thereon, must tend to the public Good: Al Laws being but an effect of the public Wil, ought to end in the public Good: whence it is a Maxime in the Civil Law,Publicum jus publicam utili­tatem respicit. Just. Institut. Public Right re­gards the public Ʋtilitie. Thus Plato, Minos, pag. 317. from the origination of [...] (which is generally derived from [...] to distribute) stiles a Legislator [...] a good Distributor, one that distributes to every one what is proper to him. Thus [...] [Page 182] a Law, is that which [...], distributes to al their due, measuring al by the commun good. Whence he addes: [...], Therefore the distributions hereof and Laws are best: and he that ob­serves in these things the most accurate reason of Laws, is most skilful in Law, and the best Distributor. His mind is, that he that frames Laws, and distributes to every one according to what is due to him and the public Good, is the best Legislator and Distributor of Justice. Thus, pag. 320. discoursing of Minos's Legislation, he saith, [...], Therefore he framed such Laws for his Citizens, by the Benefice whereof both Crete enjoyeth a perpetual felicitie, and Lacedemon, from the time that she began to use these Divine Laws. So greatly were Minos's Laws calculated for the public Good. But this Plato more fully determines, Leg. 4. pag. 715. [...], Truly we denie those to be Republics; neither do we account those to be right Laws, which are not referred to the commun Ʋtilitie of the Citie. But those, who so indulge their lusts, as that they make Laws in favor of some Parties, we affirme those to be not Citizens, but seditiose persons; and al those Titles of Right and Laws, which they, by their Comments, pretend, to be void. So severe is Plato' in this point, as that he judgeth al Laws made in favor of some one Partie, and not for the commun Good, to be ipso facto seditiose and void. And he gives the reason, Leg. 9. pag. 875. [...], For the public Reason and Good doth firmely connect and keep together Republics, but oblique regard to private In­terest doth subvert and overthrow them.

6. The principal public Good, Virtue a prin­cipal end of Laws. unto which al Laws ought to tend, is universal Justice and Virtue. For as Virtue is a private Law, so Law is the public Virtue, or that whereby the Virtue of the whole Communitie is measured and promoted. Thus Plato, Leg. 1. [...], Al Laws are to be consti­tuted for the best end, namely for Virtue. So he explicates him­self, pag. 630. where he saith, That a Legislator sent by God to establish utile and commodo [...]s Laws, [...], wil, in the constitution of Laws [Page 183]have regard to no other than the chiefest Virtue. Yea he addes: That he who wil constitute a Divine Republic, [...], must, as Legislator, have respect, not only to one particle of Virtue, and that the least, but to universal Virtue, and accordin gto the formes or kinds of Virtue find out Laws, proportiona­ble thereto. The like he lays down, Repub. 4. pag. 444. [...]; Do not therefore the preclare and illustrious Institutes, or Laws of living make way to Virtue; but base Laws precipitate men into vice? Whereby he instructes us, that Laws, if good, have an efficacious force for the promoting Virtue; but if bad, of Vice. Hence,

7. Al politic Laws must be natural, voluntary, facile, expedite, Laws must be proper, and universal, otherwise they cannot reach that universal Virtue and public Good they tend unto. (1) Al Laws ought to be Natural. So Plato, Leg. 3. pag. 690. saith,Natural. That Laws ought to be constituted, [...], against nature, but according to nature, i. e. the natural condition and exigence of the Communitie. (2) Laws must be Voluntary, Voluntary. or such as the Com­munitie may chearfully assent and consent to. Thus Plato, Leg. 4. pag. 684. [...], &c. But now many prescribe that to Legislators, that they frame such Laws, as the people and Communitie may freely receive; as if any should command Physicians, that they heal with a kind of pleasure and jucunditie to such as they heal. Hence,Facile. (3) Laws must be facile and expedite, otherwise how can the Communitie consent thereto, or chearfully observe the same? Thus Plato, Leg. 3. pag. 684. in what follows on the former: [...], That also had great force at that time, that Laws were more easily constituted. Campanella, Pol. cap. 4. tels us, ‘That those Laws are best, which are curt, facile, few in number, accommodated to the manners of the peo­ple and public Good. Whereas tyrannic Laws are numerous, obscure, difficile, as many snares, utile only to one or few, nei­ther accommodated to public manners and utilitie.’ (4) Laws ought to be proper and agreable to the Communitie,Proper. their state and condition. Hence that commun Aphorisme among Politicians, That laws are to be fitted to times and persons as the shooe to the foot. In matters of Governement men must do what they can, not what [Page 184]they would.Ʋniversal. Hence, (5) Laws must be universally extensive un­to al cases. So Plato, Leg. 1. pag. 630. saith, Laws ought to reach [...], universal Virtue. Thus Aristotle, Pol. 3. where he gives us this difference between the particular judgement of a Judge, and Laws: A Judgement is a particular Law, but a Law is an uni­versal Judgement: i. e. such as must reach al cases; though indeed al human Laws are greatly defective in this particular, as it wil appear by what immediately follows. Hence,

8.The Law of E­quitie. Seing human Legislators cannot by their Laws reach al particu­lar cases, therefore al politic Laws need [...], the Law of Equitie to correct their defects, as also Conservators to keep them from degene­rating. (1) That al human politic Laws are greatly defective as to their comprehension of particular cases is most evident from their Generalitie. Thus much Plato acknowledgeth, Leg. 4. p. 718. where he saith, That althings cannot be opportunely reduced to one certain formule of Law; therefore a Legislator ought to lay down some general indication, before he procede to a singular constitution of Laws: [...], Moreover these things are such, as that they cannot be comprehended and defined by one certain formule. Wherein he instructeth us, that seing Laws cannot be prescribed to al things singular, therefore a Legislator ought to draw up some general Institutes, &c. This imperfection of Laws was taken notice of by Solon and others, who have compared Laws to Spiders webs, which ensnare and entangle the lesser flies, but let the greater break thorough. Hence, (2) al human Laws need [...], a Law of Equitie for the correction of their defects. Thus Plato, Minos, pag. 317. [...], In these things therefore that concerne maters just and injust, and universally such as regard the commodous disposition and ordering of the Citie, that which is RIGHT is the royal Law. [1] That by [...], that which is right he understands the Law of Nature and Equitie is most evident, in that he stiles it the Royal Law. [2] He saith, that by this Law of Rectitude or Equitie al other Laws and politic Institutes are to be regulated and corrected. [3] This Equitie of Nature he makes to be the fundament of al good Laws, in as much as it is one uniforme, sempiterne and incommutable Rule of Ju­stice in al times and Nations: whereas al particular Laws of Na­tions [Page 185]are various and mutable, according to the various conditi­ons and mutations of Times and Nations. This Law of Equitie he describes also, Minos, pag. 314. [...], Law therefore is the invention of him, that truly IS. Serranus by [...], that which is, understands the eternal Law of Nature, which is the source of al private Laws; which is a truth: But considering Plato's Phraseologie, I should rather understand [...], of God, from whom the Law of Equitie and al other Laws have their emanation. [...], Equitie, Definit. Plat. is descri­bed, [...], The imminution and correction of things just and utile: moderation in commerces: a good composition of the rational Soul as to things honest and base. That al politic Laws need a Law of Equitie to correct them, was ancient­ly observed by Androcles, (cited by Aristotle, Rhet. lbi. 2. cap. 25.) who said, That al Laws need a Law to correct them, as fishes need salt to preserve them. Touching this [...], Law of Equitie, its Necessitie, Ʋse, and Nature see Idea Theolog. lib. 1. cap. 8. sect. 2. (3) Politic human Laws need not only a Law of Equitie to cor­rect them, but also Conservators to keep them from degenerating. Conservators of Laws. Whence [...], Autoritie, Definit. Platon. pag. 415. is defined [...], the Tuition of the Law. Thence Plato, Leg. 12. pag. 951. institutes a College for the inspection and conservation of Laws. His words are: [...], &c. Let him have recourse to their College, which is constituted for the in­spection of Laws. Let this College consiste of Juniors and Seniors; and daily at the break of day, before the Sun rising, let them convene. First let there be of the Priests such as excel in the offices of Virtue: then [...] of the Conservators of the Laws ten of those that excel in age and virtue, &c. The sum of al is this: In as much as Laws, without diligent conservation, are apt to degenerate, and fal un­der depravation, from the unbridled lusts of men, therefore there is need of certain [...], Conservators of Laws to keep their Autoritie inviolable: on which account Plato constituted this his sacred College.

9. From what has been laid down of Laws in the general,A Law what. we may with facilitie forme a particular Idea of a Law, which, Defi­nit. Platon. is thus described: [...], A Law is a politic Decree of the Com­munitie constituted not for a certain time only. This last clause is [Page 186]added to discriminate a Law from a Suffrage or Vote, which is there thus defined: [...], A Vote or Suffrage is a politic Decree constituted only for a certain time. To speak more distinctly of a Law, it includes two formal essential parts,1. Its Equitie. Equitie, and politic Constitution. (1) Eqitio is as the Soul of the Law, that which gives vital spirits and life to it; and is one and the same immutable Reason, which ought to diffuse it self throughout al Laws. Whence a Law is defined by Pet. à Sancto Joseph, The Ordination of Reason, promulgated by him that hath the care of the Communitie, for the commun Good. Whence he proves, ‘That al Laws, so far as they participate of right reason, are derived from the eternal Law, as also from na­tural Precepts.’ By the Eternal Law they understand the Divine Decree or soverain pleasure of God, whence the Reason and Equitie of al Laws both natural and politic receives its deriva­tion. Of this Equitie we have suffiiently discoursed in what im­mediately precedes.2. Its Constitu­tion. (2) Politic Constitution is that which draws down general equitie, and applies it to this or that politic Socie­tie, according to the various exigences, circumstances, and rea­sons of State, which are peculiar to that Societie or Republic for which the Laws are made. [1] This politic Constitution is that which gives formal reason to politic Laws, and renders them ob­ligatorie to the Societie, for which they are made. Thence, De­finit. Plat. pag. 415. [...], a Legislator is defined, [...], a Framer of Laws, accordin gto which we ought to live in Republics. [2] This politic Constitution is the mea­sure of al Controversies, Determinations, and Civil Justice in any po­litic Bodie. Whence, Definite. Platon. pag. 413. [...], a Law is defined, [...], a Disceptation whether things be done justly, or not. And [...], the Bonitie of Laws is defined, [...], the obedience of right Laws. [3] This politic Constitution is that which gives Order to al Politie. Thence, Definit. Platon. pag. 413. [...], Order, is defined, [...], a similitude of Office and Action of al those things that are compared among themselves: or more briefly, [...], a Symmetrie or proportion of Societie: i.e. when al that appertein to such a Societie consent to walke and live together by soem commun Law. That politic Constitution or Law gives Beautie, Perfection and Order to al politic Bodies, we are assured by Plato, in his Gorgias, pag. 503, 504. where he shews, [Page 187]that althings both natural and artificial receive their perfection from Order: [...], Therefore an house having acquired order and orna­ment, wil be good and commodous. Whence he concludes, That as health is the virtue and order of the bodie natural; so [...], Legal and Law is the Order of the Soul, as also of Bodies po­litic. Politic Law and Order are intimely conjoined both as to Name and Thing. As for Names, whence had [...], Order its ori­gination but from [...], dath, (or as we may pronounce it, tat) Law, Order? Hence sprang [...], with its Derivates, [...], &c. And as [...] signifies Law as wel as Order; so [...], (from [...] to distribute orderly) Order as wel as Law. Neither do Law and Order agree in the reciprocation of Names only, but also in their Natures. Hence Plato oft useth them promiscuously one for the other, and joins them together as exegetic each of other. So [...]eg. 7. pag. 780. [...], For whatever in a Republic is comprehended under a certain Order and Law, and by the conduct thereof is governed, cannot but be conjoined with the greatest goods: But on the contrary, either when there is no Order, or when things are il constituted, there cannot but follow the greatest perturbation: which pervertes that good Order and al that Ʋtilitie that floweth thence. Wherein we have these observables. (1) He useth Order and Law promiscuously for one and the same thing. So Leg. 9. pag. 875. [...], &c. In the next place we ought to choose Order and Law, which propose what we are to consider, and concernes the commun use of life. (2) He saith, that from this legal Order and its conduct the bonitie and perfection of things politic ariseth. (3) that from the defect and want of this legal Order al perturbation, confusion, and evils in a politic bodie do arise. More touching Order see §. 1.

§. 6. Having explicated Legislation, The several kinds of politic Administra­tion. which takes in the first part of Empire, we now passe on to the second, namely Administration or Jurisdiction, which in Plato's Philosophie passeth under the notion of [...], Regiment or Governement, from [...] arche a Prince, Principatie or Governement. Whence Lot is stiled by the Rab­bines, [...] a Prince of the Judges. So Rom. 8.38. [...] is taken for Principaties. Definit. Platon. [...], Principatie is defined, [...], The care or charge of the whole: Which is a good [Page 188]Idea of politic Jurisdiction and Administration. And that which we are herein to consider may be reduced to these two commun Heads. (1) The several kinds of politic Jurisdiction or Admini­stration, with their preferences. (2) The Civil Magistrate, who is the Administrator of politic Jurisdiction. First, as for the se­veral kinds of politic Jurisdiction or Administration, they are redu­ced by Plato (as by others) to these three Heads, Monarchie, Ari­stocratie, and Democratie. Monarchie, Aristocratie, Democratie. Of these he treats distinctly in his Po­liticus, pag. 291. [...], Mo­narchie is one forme of politic Gubernations. Then he addes: [...], And after Monarchie we may place the Governement of a few, i. e. Aristocratie. Lastly he addes: [...], The third forme of Governement is it not that of the people, called Democratie? These three formes of Administration he di­stinctly explicates, according to their legitime constitutions, ex­cesses, and comparations each with other. The excesse of Mo­narchie he makes to be Tyrannie, when Princes governe without, or contrary to Law: and the excesse of Aristocratie he makes to be [...], Oligarchie, when a few usurpe the sole Admini­stration of politic Affaires: the excesse of Democratie is Anarchie or popular confusion, when there is no distinction between Gover­nors and Governed. As for the comparation of these three Formes among themselves he affirmes, that Monarchie or the Ad­ministration of One is to be preferred, so far as it is moderated and bounded by good Laws, together with a good Moderator and interpreter of those Laws; but on the contrary, if it degenerate into Tyrannie, it is then of al the worst. His own words are: [...], Monarchie bound­ed by good Laws is of al best; but if it be lawlesse, it is of al the most difficult and intolerable. Thence Definit. Plat. pag. 415. [...] a King is said to be, [...], a Prince that governes accord­ing to Laws; whereby he is opposed to a Tyrant, who is said to be one that governes only according to his wil; as hereafter.

In Aristocratie there must be one [...], chief among the Se­nators, who ought to direct and order affaires:The Athenian Politie mixed of Aristocratie and Democratie. yea, in Democra­tie there is something of Aristocratie from the peoples consent. Thence Plato, in his Menexenus, pag. 238. treating of the Athe­nian Republic, its original state, as also that it then enjoyed, he [Page 189]saith, It was an Aristocratie mixed with Democratie. His words are these: [...], &c. For there was the same forme of Politie then as now, namely Aristocratie, under which now we live, and have kept the same for a long time. Some would cal it Democratie, others by another name. But to speak truth it is the Gubernation of the best men, with the peoples consent. For we had in times past Kings: and these truly sometimes came to the Go­vernement by enheritance, sometimes by the suffrage of the people. But now, sithat the power is in the people, they commit the Administration to some most excellent and virtuose persons: neither is any laid aside by reason of infirmitie, or povertie, or low degree of parentage; neither, if the contrary conditions are found, is he therefore promoted, as in other Cities: but there is one Rule of determining al Offices, namely he that is judged the wisest and best man, he is called to public Admini­stration and Office. And the cause of this Administration among us is our equalitie and paritie as to origine. For other Cities being composed of persons different and inequal, they have inequal and different formes of Administration, namely Tyrannie and Oligarchie: also some are Slaves, others Lords: but we, being borne al of one Mother, judge it not equal, that some be Lords, and some Vassals: but that equalitie of stock hath made us to find out this equalitie of Politie, that none precede the other, but in the estime of Wisdome and Virtue. Where­fore their parents and ours having been educate! in al kind of libertie, many noble deeds for the commun utilitie of Mankind have been per­formed: having always judged it necessary for libertie, to fight against the Grecians for the Grecians, and against the Barbarians for the Gre­cians. Thus Plato of the Athenian Politie, wherein he shews, that Democratie doth not require, that al Administrations be trans­acted by the people, but that the supreme Power be in the peo­ple, and that they be their free suffrage elect such as they judge to excel in Wisdome and Virtue as Administrators, or Magi­strates of public Affaires. This he exemplifies by the Athenian [Page 190]Republic; which was a Democratie, in which, [...], the supreme Power was in the Communitie, yet so as that the Administrationof that Power was by the peoples suffrage committed to such as they judged most eminent for Wisdome and Virtue. So that this Politie was indeed, [...], an Aristocratie with the peoples consent, i. e. mixed with Democratie.

Plato here joins Democratie with Aristocratie,Monarchie mix­ed with Demo­cratie. so in his Leg. 3. pag. 693. he joins Monarchie and Democratie as the two constitutive parts of a good Politie: [...], &c. There are as it were two Mo­thers of public Administrations or Polities, out of which he that shal say other formes of Gubernation resulted, speaks the truth: the one of these is called Monarchie, the other Democratie: the former is most eminently in use among the Persians, the later among us. And almost al other kinds of Polities are variously composed out of these. And it's necessary, that a Citie, which would enjoy her libertie and amitie with prudence, participate of both of these: which indeed our commun speech signifies, when we say, that a Citie destitute of these cannot be rightly administrated and governed. In which he demonstrates that Regal Monarchie contempered with popular Democratie is the most equal and best of Dominations, provided that it be wel confined and bounded by Laws: for such a mixed Politie comes nearest to pa­terne Autoritie, which is most natural.

By comparing these Philosophemes of Plato it is evident, that, according to his mind,Mixed Politie its use. a mixed Politie or Gubernation of Monar­chie, Aristocratie, and Democratie, if wel limited and bounded by Laws, is generally useful. Thus the Stoics also held, [...], That the best Politie or Regiment, is that which is mixed of Democra­tie, the Regal Power, and Aristocratie, as Laertius in Zeno. And the reasons hereof are these: Monarchie has an unitive efficace, for the rpeventing Division, Dissolution, and Ruine; which usually ariseth out of Factions; unto which Democratie and Aristocratie is obnoxious: Democratie hath a diffusive facultie, as it takes in the concernes and interest of each individual: Aristocratie has a [Page 191] collective virtue, as it gathers up the interest of the whole Commu­nitie into a systeme of the wisest and best Administrators. As al these three kinds of Polities have their virtues and efficaces, so also they have their excesses: Monarchie with facilitie degene­rates into Tyrannie, Aristocratie into Oligarchie, and Democratie into Anarchie, as Plato, Repub. 8. pag. 563. hath wel observed. Whence for the preventing the excesse of each some great Poli­ticians, as also Theologues have judged a complexe or mixed constitution of al these to be the best of Regiments.

But to speak natively and distinctly,Moderate Em­pire best. as these three kinds of politie Administrations and Regiments may make an excellent Composition; so may they also do wel distinctly and apart, if suited to the complexion, exigences, and condition of States, wel moderated by Laws, and committed to prudent wel-qualified Administrators. No one of these Polities is in it self unlawful, or unuseful, but its excesse: It is not Monarchie, but Tyrannie; nor Aristocratie, but Oligarchie; nor Democratie, but Anarchie that is injuriose to Republics. Each of these Empires, if wel modera­ted, and suited to the condition of the State may be very useful, as Plato wel determines. Thus Leg. 3. pag. 690. [...], That Empire is most na­tural, which is, not violent, and against the wil, but voluntary, as to those that obey. Then he tels us what this natural and voluntary Empire importes, namely, a certain blessed Empire approved by Di­vine judgement, whereby he that is elected governes, &c. Thence he goes on to demonstrate, That an infinite power bounded by no limits is the peste of al Empires: [...], Whether or no did not that happen, because they were ignorant of that great Saying of Hesiod, That Half is oft better than the Whole? seing it is dangerous to usurpe the WHOLE of Power; whereas to assume HALF only is moderate: now that which is moderate is always to be preferred before that which is immoderate, &c. Wherein he shews (1) that the Half of Empire is better than the Whole: or moderate limited power, better than Immoderate and Absolute. (2) He addes the reason, because infinite, immoderate power brings ruine to Re­publics. This he lays down in more naked termes, pag. 693. [...] [Page 192] [...], Let us inquire what else ought to be done: namely sole and absolute Empire ought not to be constituted: and the reason of this our sentiment is; because a Citie ought to be free and friendly to it self, and therefore a Legislator ought to aim at this end. Whence he procedes to shew, that a mixed moderate Empire is best, because most agreable to and preservative of public Liberties and Repub­lic. So Leg. 6. he saith, That an infinite absolute Empire is permi­ciose; but that is the best Idea [...] of Politie, which is a middle between Monarchic and Democratic Domination, [...], which is intermediate between Mo­narchic and popular Politie.

Whence Plato is very severe against tyrannic and al immode­rate Empire.Tyrannic Em­pire its origine, &c. Thus in his Gorgias: [...], I cal that Tyrannie, when a Magistrate counts it lawful to do what he please in the Citie, &c. According to that French Maxime, The Justice of a Prince consistes in his power: i. e. he may do what he can. Whence Plato addes, pag. 510. [...]; Where there is a Tyrant, is he not a cruel and bar­barous Lord? if there be any in the Citie much better, doth not the Tyrant fear him, and can never be cordially a friend to such? So Re­pub. 8. pag. 569. [...], &c. Thou sayst a Tyrant is a Parricide, and a severe nourisher of old age, and that Tyrannie brings the most cruel servitude. Yea Repub. 9. he saith, That one who is really a Tyrant is really a Slave. Again: [...], A Tyrant leads the most miserable life. And Repub. 8. pag. 564. he tels us, That the origine of Ty­rannie is from the abuse of Democratie: For [...], out of excessive libertie ariseth much and most cruel vassalage. Thence on the contrary, Leg. 3. he shews, how the [...] of Democratie sprang otu of the Tyran­nie of MOnarchs: for when the people could no longer bear the Tyrannie of great Men, casting off their yoke they vindicated their Liberties. Definit. Platon. pag. 415. [...], a Tyrant is defined [...], one that governes the Citie according to his own pleasure. This self-wil Gubernation Plato [Page 193]greatly inveighs against, Alcibiad. 1. pag. 134. [...] &c. For he that has a power to do what he list, being destitute of prudence, can we expect that any thing else should happen to him, whether he be a private person or Republic, than what happens to a sick man, who hath power to act what he list, but no mind to be healed, yea rageth impotently and tyrannically against him, who would reduce him from his extravagances? what can be expected but that his bodie perish? Whence he concludes, pag. 135. [...], Therefore O most excellent Alcibiades, thou mayst not make provision for Tyrannie, either over thy self or the Citie, if thou desirest they should be happy, but for Virtue. Wherein note (1) that for any to governe themselves or a Citie merely accord­ing to their own wil, without regard to any superior Law, is Ty­rannie. A man may be a Tyrant over himself by letting the reines loose to unbridled passions, as wel as over a Bodie politic. Yea politic Tyrannie seems to have its origine from self-Tyrannie. (2) That as self-Tyrannie makes a man miserable, so politic Ty­rannie a State. Seneca, in his Instructions to his Pupil Nero, (who after proved a Tyrant) has excellent Philosophemes touching the evils of Tyrannie: ‘To be able to hurt, saith he, is the most pe­stiferous power, or rather impotence: Regal crudelitie doth in­crease the number of Enemies, by taking them away. Thy Grandfather pardoned those whom he conquered: for had he not pardoned them, whom should he have had to reigne over? The power of Tyrants is execrable, but short: A Tyrant differs from a King in deeds, though not in name: He erres, who thinkes a King to be safe there, where nothing is safe from the King: the securitie of a Prince is maintained by the mutual se­curitie of his Subjects: The love of the Citizens is the inexpug­nable Fortresse of the King. Al crudelitie is from infirmitie: neither can that power stand long which is upheld by the evils and sufferings of many: It's necessary that he feareth many, whom many fear. It's more dangerous to be feared, than to be despised. It's Sacrilege to hurt the Countrey; therefore also to hurt a Citizen, who is part thereof.’ Some have obser­ved, that the reason why Nature hath not given a sting to the King of the Bees, is to teach Princes, that nothing becomes Princes lesse than Tyrannie; also that their only defense should be in the [Page 194]strength of their Subjects. The origine of Tyrannie we find in the description of Nimrod, Gen. 10.9. Gen. 10.9. As Nimrod mighty in hunting before Jehovah. Note here (1) that this was a commun Proverbe among the Patriarchs, whereby they described a Tyrant: (2) He is said to be mighty in hunting: i. e. persecution, oppression, and Tyrannie over men, as Jer. 16.16. So the Jerusalemy Paraphrase expounds it. (3) Before the Lord, i. e. openly, daringly, in the very sigh tof God. Hence, Mede, Diatr. 3. pag. 539. on 2 Pet. 2.1. saith, that old Babylon was the Foundresse of tyrannic Do­mination, as also of Idolatrie: and he makes their Tyrannie the effect of their Idolatrie; because God usually punisheth Idolatrie with Tyrannie and Vassalage. This is most true of New Babylon or the Roman Church, which brought in Tyranie into the Christian World together with Idolatrie. And is not this a just recompence and retaliation for God to leave men under the iron yoke of Anti­christian Tyrannie, when they electively and voluntarily embrace Antichristian Idolatrie? O! how proportionable is the plague of Antichristian Tyrannie to the sin of Antichristian Idolatrie?

§. 7.Civil Magi­strates. Having examined the nature of politic Administration and Jurisdiction in regard of its various formes and modes, we now passe on to its Administrators, their Aptitude, Facultie, Auto­ritie, and Office. The Administrators of politic Jurisdiction or Empire are usually comprehended under that general notion of Civil Magistrates. We shal not here consider a Civil Magistrate as confined to this or that forme of Jurisdiction, but more gene­rally under such Ideas and Notions as may agree to every forme of Jurisdiction. Now in a Civil Magistrate, under this general Idea, we are to consider, (1) His End: (2) His Aptitude and Qualification: (3) His politic Facultie, Commission, and Autoritie: (4) The Exercice and Execution of his Office. Of these briefly in their order.

1.1. Their End. As for the End of Civil Magistrates, Platonic, as wel as sa­cred Philosophie informes us, that the proxime immediate end for which they were instituted is the public or commun Good of the whole Communitie. This is the great end of al politic bodies, whether Cities or Republics, as we have before proved, §. 3. and therefore of al Civil Magistrates. Thus Plato, Repub. 3. pag. 413. discoursing of the Office of Magistrates he saith: [...], We must chiefly endeavor that they conceive what they judge wil mot conduce to the commun Good. Thence [Page 195] Politicus, pag. 274. he saith, A King and Civil Magistrate is a Pa­stor of men; and in this regard a God to mortal man, i. e. as Gods Vicegerent for the good of men, as hereafter. Hence Petrus à Sancto Joseph and others make this difference between a King and a Tyrant, That a King has his eye on the good of his Subjects, but a Tyrant on his own private Good and Interest. But of this sufficient­ly in what precedes, §. 3.

2. That which next follows is the Apitude and Qua ification of a Civil Magistrate.2. The Qualifi­cations of a Ma­gistrate. Plato gives us many illustrious Characters of a Civil Magistrate.1. Wisdome na­tural. (1) He makes Prudence and Wisdome an essential constitutive Qualitie or Requisite of a good Magistrate. Thus [...], It is convenient that he who manageth the greatest affaires, should participate of the greatest wisdome. There is a two­fold wisdome required to the constitution of a wel qualified Ma­gistrate. [1] He must be invested with a natural Sagacitie and Dexteritie of judging Persons and Things. Thus Plato, Repub. 2. pag. 376. compares the Sagacitie of a Magistrate to that of a Dog, which can at the first glance discerne his friend from his enemie. Thence Aristotle, Rhet. l. 1. c. 16. pag. 76. compares a good Magi­strate to a Goldsmith: [...], A Judge must be like a Goldsmith, that he may discriminate adulterine just from what is true. This natural sagacitie Solomon was in an incomparable degree in­dued with, as it appears by his sentence given in the case of the two Harlots. [2] As he must have natural sagacitie,2. Acquired. so also acquired Wisdome and Prudence. Thus Plato, Gorg. pag. 489. [...], Oft therefore one wise man is more excellent than an infinite number of fools, as thou sayest; and it is most consent aneous, that this wise man obtain the Empire; and that those are subject to him. By which he instructes us, That wise men ought to rule, and fools obey. Whence he addes, pag. 490. [...], For this I conceive to be just by nature, that the prudent is the more excellent, and that he ought to rule over the more vile. Where­in he layes down two Maximes of State. (1) That the more pru­dent men are, the more excellent they are: (2) That the more ex­cellent men are, the more fit to rule. The reason of this Maxime is [Page 196]taken from the foundation of al Empire, which ariseth from that [...] or supereminence of the Ruler above the Ruled. And because prudence is principally acquired by multitude of years and expe­rience, therefore Plato institutes, that Magistrates be chosen out of the more ancient Citizens. So Repub. 3. pag. 412. [...], That the Se­niors ought to rule, and the juniors to be ruled. Thus among the Romans the Senators were elected out of the more ancient Citi­zens, and the juniors employed in War. Which was but an Imi­tamen of the Judaic Politie. How much wisdome is essential to a Civil Magistrate Plato oft inculcates. Thus Repub. 5. [...], Either let Philosophers reigne in the Cities, or let Kings philosophise. His mind is, that Kings ought to have the wisdome of Philosophers joined to their Majestie, in order to their more happy Guberna­tion. This Plutarch takes notice of as an excellent Character in Numa Pompilius: ‘Under Numa, saith he, there was constant peace without innovation or conspiracie: which verified that of Plato, that the only mean of true quiet and remedie from al evil, is when, from some divine Ordinance from above, there meeteth in one person the right Majestie of a King, and the mind of a wise Philosopher, to make Virtue Governesse over men.’ So Campanella, in his Politics, Cap. 3. observes, ‘That Wisdome only rules wel and naturally; not sophistic, but philo­sophic; not eremitic or monastic, but civil; not opposite to God, but supposite or subordinate.’

There is a threefold acquired Wisdome or Prudence necessary to the right qualification of a Civil Magistrate.1. Knowledge of human Laws. [1] He ought to understand wel [...], the first Principes of Right and Law. Thus Plato, Rep. 6. [...], &c. I conceive therefore, that he, who ignores or knows not the reasons of just and honest, deserves not the name of a Keeper or Magistrate. It is an Effate among Civilians, That [...], or the Law of Equitie lies in the bosome of the Magistrate, i. e. he ought to have clear notices not only of municipal Laws proper to Nati­ons, but also of the Law of Equitie, whereby he ought frequently to direct himself for the correcting the defects and excesses of municipal Laws. Whence it is also an Aphorisme in Justinian's Law, That ignorance excuseth a man from public Office.

2 Knowledge of Factes. [2] A Civil Magistrate must have not only knowledge of Law [Page 197]both natural and municipal, but also a particular comprehension of Factes and Cases that may occur. A Magistrates prudence con­sistes not only in the knowlege of the Law, but also in the appli­cation of it to maters of Fact, and particular Cases that may oc­cur. For there are no human general precepts so universal, but such circumstances may occur, as may cause much variation in mater of Justice. It's a good observation of the Philosopher, That [...], prudence is about things singular, which are much varied by circumstances of Time, Place, Persons, &c. Therefore the prudence of Magistrates ought to inquire, not only what is lawful, but also what is expedient in this or that case. Much of politic prudence consistes not so much in understanding the Rule, as in applying it to the Case ruled. It's a good observation of Padre Paul, that great Venetian Politi­cian, ‘That it is proper to the Prince alone to know what is expedient. None knoweth how to governe a Territorie but the Prince himself, who alone knoweth al the necessities of it.’ I shal con­clude this Character touching the Wisdome of a Magistrate, with what Plutarch in the Life of Lycurgus observes touching his Pru­dence: ‘Men, saith he, communly disdain those that are not wise in commanding; so that the faithful obedience of the Sub­jects dependeth much on the sufficient Command of the wise Prince: for he that directeth wel, must needs be wel obeyed. For look as the art of a good Rider is to make his horse gentle and ready at command; even so the chiefest point belonging unto a Prince is to teach his Subjects to obey. Wherefore the Lacedemonians procured, that not only other people did wil­lingly obey them, but also desired to be ruled by them.’

[3] A Civil Magistrate must have also some knowlege of the Divine Law. Thus Deut. 17.18.3. Knowlege of divine Laws. Deut. 17.18, 19, 20. And it shal be, when he sits upon the Throne [i. e. as King] that he shal write for himself the copie of this law in a book, out of that which is before the Priests and Levites. The original Book of the Law was kept in the Sanctuarie, as Deut. 31.26. and ot of that was the Kings Copie to be written with his own hand, for his instructiion how to governe. Thence it follows v. 19. And it shal be with him: i. e. in al places whither he went, he was to carry this Copie of the Law with him: and why? that follows: that he may learne to fear Jehova his God, &c. The fear of Jehova includes not only interne Affection and Re­verence, but also the externe Worship and Service of God, yea [Page 198]al Religion. Thence follows another end v. 20. That his heart be not lift up above his brethren, &c. Because the Dignitie of a King is so august and great, therefore he is to be much versed in the Divine Law to keep him humble, as David was, Psal. 131.1, 2.

(2) Another essential Character of Qualitie of a Civil Magi­strate is Virtue. 2. Virtue. There is a twofold Virtue requisite to the right constitution of a Magistrate; the one natural, the other moral. [1] A Magistrate ought to have a natural Virtue which con­sistes in an heroic Spirit and natural Grace as to his externe pre­sence,Natural. whereby he sweetly, and yet with Majestie draws his Sub­jects to obey him. Those whom divine Gubernation intends for Empire he oft indues with a great and heroic natural Spirit. Thus Plutarch mentions of Lycurgus, in his Life, pag. 47. ‘As for Lycurgus, the Spartans thought of him thus; that he was a man borne to rule, to command, and to give order; as having in him a certain antural Grace, and power to draw men naturally to obey him.’ But yet, [2] the main Virtue requisite for the qualification of a Magistrate is moral. Moral. Thus Plato, Leg. 12. p. 966. [...], It shal not be permitted, Virtus praecel­lens in Rege praecipua causa est regnandi ci­viliter. Wicles. that any take on him a public Office, but he who with much labor and firme faith hath embraced a pious sentiment of God. Again: [...], We must endeavor, that the Censors of manners be divine men. Again: [...], Wherefore the Censors ought to be most illustrious for a manner of Virtue. Again he saith, [...], That none ought to be chosen a Keeper of the Laws, but he that is divine. So Bacon, in the Life of Henry VII. pag. 26. saith, ‘That it is incongruous, that they should give Laws to others, who are themselves lawlesse.’ Whence Plato, Repub. 3. pag. 416. saith, That a Magistrate should have his gold not in his purse, but in his mind, meaning Virtue, as in what im­mediately follows.

(3) Plato requires of a Civil Magistrate,3. Public spiri­ted and against self-seeking. that he be of a pub­lic Spirit, not avaricious or confined to his private interest. Thus Plato, Minos, pag. 321. [...], Those therefore of the Ancients were the best Legislators, and Pastors of the people: as Homer cals a good Impe­rator [Page 199]the Pastor of the people. Now a Pastor, specially of men, im­plies a public Spirit, free from self-interest. Thence he addes, Repub. 1. pag. 347. [...], Therefore good man affect Empire not for lucre's sake, nor yet for honor— for they are not amb [...]ttose. Again: [...], For if the Citie consisted of good men, the Citizens would strive to avoid the office of a Magistrate, as now they contend for it. Thence it is apparent, that a genuine Magistrate is so spirited, as not to seek his own private interest, but the public good of those subject to him.

This Theme Plato more fully prosecutes,A Magistrates Diet and Ri­chesses. Repub. 3. pag. 416. where he shews, That Magistrates ought so far only to be furnished with Richesses and other necessaries, [...], &c. as that they may not cease to approve themselves the best Conservators: i. e. lest being made drunken with too much prosperitie, they waxe insolent and worse, to the public detriment of the Citizens. Consider therefore whether it be not better, that they be so furnished with necessaries, as to life and habitation, that they possesse nothing as proper, but what urgent necessitie requires. Moreover, that they have neither house nor Buterie, but what is open for al. But as to their provision and Diet, that they have so great plenty, as temperate Soldiers need: and that they receive such a salarie for the discharge of their Office from the Citizens, as that they may neither want, nor have what is superfluous. But this must be inculcated on their spirits, [...], that they ever have gold and silver, and that truely divine and august, in their Soul, so that they need not mens gold and silver.

(4) For the acquirement of these Qualifications Plato requires that Civil Magistrates have the best Institution and Education. 4. Magistrates Education and Examen. Thus Repub. 2. pag. 376. treating copiosely of the Institution of a Ma­gistrate, he distributes the Discipline, in which he ought to be instituted, into [...], Gymnastic and Music: by Gymnastic Discipline he understands such Virtues as appertain to an Active life, namely Temperance, Fortitude, Justice, &c. by Music Discipline he means such Virtues as concerne Pietie and Religion, which is the Music of the Soul and Republics. So again in his [Page 200] Repub. 3. pag. 395. he shews, how a Magistrate ought to be in­stituted and instructed even from his infance in the best Principes and Exemples. And he gives the reason of it: [...], Be­cause imitations imbibed from the childhood, and of long continuance are converted into Manners and Nature: According to that commun Effate, Custome is a second Nature. Neither ought a Magistrate to have good Education only, but also general Approbation. So Repub. 3. pag. 413. [...], And he that hath been tried thoroughout the degrees of al ages, namely of Childhood, Youth, and virile Age, and on that examen has approved himself innocent and spotlesse, let him be constituted Prince and Conservator of the Citie.

These Qualifications of a politic Magistrate are more lively and perfectly laid down in sacred Philosophie.Qualifications of Magistrates in Scripture. Exod. 18.21. Thus Jethro, as inspi­red by God, to Moses, Exod. 18.21. And thou, provide out of al the people, men of abilitie, fearing God, men of truth, hating avarice. (1) [...], men of Abilitie. Or of Power, Force, Virtue, Acti­vitie: i. e. virtuose, active, and able men, in bodie and mind, as Gen. 47.6. LXX. able or potent men. The Hebrews describe them thus: ‘Men of Abilitie are such as are potent in the Command­ments, and exactly look unto themselves, and subjugate their passions, so that there remains nothing dishonest or reprocheful in them, nor evil name. And generally Able men are such as have a potent or couragious heart, to deliver the oppressed out of the oppressors hand, as Moses, Exod. 2.17.’ Maimonides, in Sanhedr. cap. 2. sect. 7. (2) [...], men of Truth: i. e. just men. So LXX. also Zech. 7.9. so Maimonides, in Sanhed. cap. 2. sect. 7. ‘Men of Truth are such as follow after justice for it self, who do love the truth, &c.’ (3) Fearing God, i. e. religiose. (4) Hating Avarice, Deut. 16.19. To these four Qualities here ex­pressed three more are added,Deut. 1.13. Deut. 1.13. (5) Wise men, (6) and Ʋnderstanding, (7) and Known, i. e. approved. Under which se­ven proprieties the Hebrews include al other good Qualities, as Maimonides Sanhedr. cap. 2. sect. 7. Hence,

3.A Magistrates Facultie and Autoritie. From the Aptitude and Qualification of a Magistrate we passe on to his Facultie, Commission, and Autoritie, which is the second essential part. For Civilians make two essential constitutive parts of any politic Administrator: (1) His Aptitude, which has been [Page 201]already dispatcht, (2) his Facultie or Commission; whence his Au­toritie doth procede: of which we are now to discourse.1. Divine. (1) As for the Original Facultie, Commission and Autoritie of al Magi­strates, Plato assures us, that it comes from God the supreme Re­ctor of the Universe. So Leg. 4. pag. 713. [...], &c. When Saturne [i. e. God] understood no human nature was able to governe human affaires, but if it should governe al according to its wil, the World would be fil­led with al contumelie and injustice; he constituted as Governors over human Societies not men, but Demons of a more divine and excellent nature. The great difficultie here wil be, to find out who those Demons were, which God constituted as the first Magistrates. I conceive by these Platonic Demons we are to understand [1] the Patriarchs and the great Hero's, who were the first Magistrates, whereof Plato had many notices. [2] But yet these Demons for­mally include the Souls of great men deified, which the wiser Phi­losophers constituted as Mediators between the supreme God and men, as also Administrators of human affaires, in imitation of the Judaic Messias, (whereof they had many imperfect fragments and Traditions) as we have at large proved, Philos. Gen. P. 1. l. 3. c. 4. sect. 4. as also, Court Gent. P. 3. B. 2. C. 2. S. 2. §. 3.

And herein Plato imitates Moses, who makes the Facultie, Com­mission, and Constitution of Magistrates to be from God.Num. 27.16, 17. So Num. 27.16. Let Jehovah the God of the Spirits of al flesh. He termes Jehovah the God of the Spirits of al flesh, not only as Creator of mens Souls, but also as he gives them spiritual Gifts, of Wisdome, Knowlege, Governement, &c. So Spirit is used, 1 Cor. 14.12. God first qualifies men with an Aptitude or Gifts; and thence follows the Constitution or Ordination: Set a man over the Congregation. Set or Visit, i. e. provide or constitute for Bishop or Overseer: who there­fore is called v. 17. a Pastor or Sheepherd. So among the Grecians, Homer, Plato, and others, a Magistrate is stiled the Pastor of the people. Whence it follows, v. 17. which may go out before them, &c. By this Hebraic Idiome of going out and coming in, and that which follows, leading out and bringing in, is noted the Administration of the Civil Magistrate, as Deut. 31.2. alluding to the office of a Sheepherd, who in these times and countries went out from and came into the Fold before his sheep: whence the same phrase is applied by our Lord to himself as Pastor of Souls, Joh. 10.4, 9. [Page 202]Thus God is said to choose David his servant, Psal. 78.70. Whence Magistrates are said to be, Psal. 82.6. Gods, and the children of the most High: i. e. constituted and appointed to their Office by God. Thence also God saith Esa. 22.20. I wil cal my servant Eliakim: Esa. 22.20, 21, 22. i. e. he shal not intrude into his place, but be called by God. So much the very name [...] Eliakim importes, namely one raised up or setled by God, as Jehojakim. Thence he addes v. 21. And I wil clothe him with thy robe, and strengthen him with thy girdle: i. e. I wil give him thy power and authoritie, and confirme him in thy place. The Robe and Girdle were Emblemes of Power and Office. Thence it follows: and I wil commit thy governement into his hand, &c. So v. 22. The key of the house of David wil I lay upon his shoulder, &c. The Key was also an Embleme of Power and Au­toritie. As for the seat of the divine Facultie, Commission, and Autoritie, from which al Civil Magistrates derive their Autoritie originally, it is loged in the Law of Nature, particularly in that moral Precept, Honor thy father, &c. which gives divine consti­tution to the power of the Civil Magistrate. This we have more fully laid down in the N. T. The powers that be are ordained by God, [...], i. e. are ordained by the constitution and commission of God.

(2) As for the human Facultie, 2. Human. Commission, and Autoritie of the Magistrate, Plato derives it from the peoples Election and Consent. So Repub. lib. 2. [...]. Thus Leg. 6. treating of the Ele­ction of Magistrates, he saith, Such should be chosen as are most eminent for prudence and probitie, and best qualified for the Offices they are elected unto; as also wil attend the same with fidelitie and industry. The termes used to expresse this Election and Creation by, are [...].

(3) Touching the Autoritie of Civil Magistrates Plato makes it to be not Absolute, 3. Magistrates Conservators of the Law. but Subordinate to the Law: For his great Character of a Magistrate is, that he be [...], a Conservator and Minister of the Law. He layeth down this for a fundamental Principe, That a Magistrate may not do what he list, but what he ought. Thus Alcibiad. 1. pag. 134. where Socra­tes instructes young Alcibiades in this manner: [...], Therefore remember, that Power [Page 203]and Empire is not to be acquired, that thou mayest rule over thy self or the Citie as thou list, but according to justice and wisdome. Thence in his Politicus, pag. 276. he distributes civil Government into, [...], Tyrannic and Voluntary. Tyrannic Governe­ment he makes to be violent, when Subjects are forced against Law; but voluntary, when men are governed by their own Laws: and this kind of Administration he saith becomes most, [...], one that is truely a King and Civil Magistrate. So pag. 305. he makes a Civil Magistrate to be [...], the Con­servator or Keeper of Laws. Hence he cites a great Saying of Pindar: [...], Pindar saith, the Law is King over al, both mortals and im­mortals. Whence that Latin Effate, Lex est Rex, The Law is King. The subordination of the Civil Magistrate to Law, Plato more fully expresseth, Leg. 4. pag. 715. [...], &c. I have stiled Magistrates Mi­nisters of the Law not from an affectation of novitie; but because I am persuaded, that the safety of a Republic consistes herein; but the peste and ruine in the contrary. And he subjoins the reason of this his persuasion: [...], For I behold ruine prepared for and present to that Citie, in which Laws are not superior to the Magistrates, but Magi­strates to the Laws: but, on the contrary, safetie to that Citie, where the Law rules over Magistrates, and Magistrates are Servants of the Law, i. e. they subject themselves to the Law and obey the same. For I apprehend al manner of good things, which God usually confers on Ci­ties, to attend this Citie. So prosperous is the condition of that Citie, wherein the Magistrates Administration and Jurisdiction is bounded and circumscribed by, as also subordinate to the Law, which is, to speak in Pindars phrase, the King both of Magistrates and People. Whence, Leg. 6. pag. 761. [...], But let no Judge or Magistrate be exemted and free from rendring accounts, but let him render the account of his discharge of his Office to the Citizens: only those excepted, unto whom the last Appeal is made, according to the exemple of the Regal power. Whence pag. 767. he addes: [...], [Page 204] But in public crimes it's in the first place necessa­ry, that the affaire be brought to the communitie or multitude: for when the Citie is affected with an injurie, it belongs to al to take cogni­zance thereof: therefore the people may justly take it il, if the cogni­zance of such affaires should be wrested from them. Therefore the beginning and end of this controversie ought to be brought to the peo­ple, but the examen and dijudication to the three chief Magistrates. Thence Definit. Platon. pag. 415. [...], Autoritie is defined, the Tuition of the Law.

4.The Magistrates Exercice of his Office. Next to the Facultie and Autoritie of the Civil Magistrate we are to consider him in the actual Administration or Exercice of his Office, which ought to be performed with the greatest exacti­tude and fidelitie. It's a good observation of Aristotle, Rhet. l. 2. c. 19. [...], Dignitie makes great men more conspicuous and illustrious: wherefore such act with greater mo­deration and exactitude. Whence also that great Aphorisme of Pit­tachus, mentioned by Laertius: [...], Magistratie or Governement discovers what the man is. If there be an irregular prin­cipe or passion in a Magistrate, it usually appears in the exercice of his Office. Therefore Plato, Leg. 12. requires, That a Magistrate be most eminent for al manner of Virtues, as before. Now the main Vir­tues which ought to appear most illustriously in a Magistrates exer­cice of his Office, are such as these, Justice, Temperance, Moderation as to passions, Clemence, Self-denial, Courage, Industrie and Fidelitie, of which we find many and great Philosophemes in Plato.

(1) The Magistrates Administration of his Office must be with Justice, 1. Justice and against Bribe­rie. without Briberie, Partialitie, and al Respect of persons. Hence Plato, Leg. 12. requires, [...], That a Judge be sworne before he come to judge. And that he may passe a righteous Sentence, he also ordaines, Demodocus, pag. 383. [...], Neither judge any cause before thou hast heard both parties. And against Briberie he speakes expressely, Leg. 12. [...], That a Magistrate ought to administer Justice without Gifts. Yea the 12 Tables de­termine, That a Judge convicted of Briberie shalt be punisht with death. Briberie in Courts of Judicature is like judicial Astrologie, which, as Tacitus observes, is always forbidden, and yet always re­tained. [Page 205]But sacred Philosophie doth strictly oblige Magistrates to the exercice of Justice, and against al Briberie, in their Admi­nistrations. So Psal. 82.1.Psal. 82.1, 2. God standeth in the congregation of the mighty. [...] standeth, i. e. as President and supreme Judge, teaching others how they are to judge, and punishing them if peccant. So it follows: he judgeth among the Gods: i. e. rewarding those that are faithful, but punishing the unfaithful and unjust. Thence v. 2. How long wil ye judge unjustly and accept the persons of the wicked? Selah. As if he had said: Dare ye be so unjust and par­tial, when as God sits President in the midst of you?— [...] and accept the face or person of the wicked, as Lev. 19.15. Ezra renders it: lift up the faces of the wicked: i. e. by your favour exhilarate and make glad the wicked. Thence he procedes v. 3, 4. to exhort the Judges to the execution of justice. And v. 5. he shews the ruines that follow on unjust Administra­tions:v. 5. They know not. [...]. This notes their ignorance of Right or Law. Neither wil they understand — [...]. this notes their oscitance and negligence in examining Causes, and maters of Fact. They walke in darkenesse, [...]. This some understand of being blinded by private Affections, and Bribes, so that they cannot see what is just and equal; according to Exod. 23.8. And thou shalt take no gift, for the gift blindeth the wise, and perverteth the words of the just. Now by reason of these things, he saith, Al the foundations of the earth [i. e. the Judaic State] are out of course. Which shews, that injustice destroyes the very foundations of a Nation. Thus Job 15.34. And fire shal consume the tabernacles of Briberie. How much Justice is ne­cessary to preserve States, and commanded by God, appears, Deut. 16.18. And they shal judge the people with judgement of ju­stice: Deut. 16.18, i. e. with an equalitie towards al parties and in al maters. So v. 20. Justice justice shalt thou follow: i. e. al manner of justice,v. 20. nothing but justice, exactly, diligently, continually.

(2) The Office of a Magistrate must be administred with Tem­perance. Temperance. Thus Plato, Repub. 3. pag. 403. We have said, that the Keepers [of the Laws, or Magistrates] be commanded, that they al­together abhor Drunkennesse: for it is lawful for any man to be drunke, rather than for a Keeper. And he gives this reason of it: [...], For it is ridiculous, that a Keeper should want a Keeper. Meaning that a Drunkard wants a Keeper himself, and therefore is not fit to be the Keeper of others. Thus [Page 206] Solomons Mother,Prov. 31.4. Prov. 31.4. It is not for Kings to drinke wine. Hebr. it is not convenient for Kings to drinke wine: i. e. a large quan­titie of it: which the Grecians terme [...], a drinker of wine, or one given to wine. Whence Plato addes, pag. 404. That the diet of the Magistrate ought to be [...], simple, not [...], with varietie of dainties, which is most destructive to sanitie.

(3) Magistrates must administer their Office with moderation as to passions, 3. Moderation. and freedome from discords. Thus Plato, Repub. 2. pag. 378. [...], Magistrates of the Citie ought to be possessed with this sentiment, that it is the basest thing for them to contend by mutual discords. How much irregular passions are unbecoming a Civil Magistrate is wel expressed by Aristotle, Rhet. lib. 1. cap. 1. art. 4. [...], It is not lawful to pervert a Judge, by provoking him to anger, or to envie, or to compassion: for this is al one as if one about to use a rule should pervert the same.

(4) Clemence also ought to be illustrious in magistratic Admini­strations.4. Clemence. Thence Plato, Politicus, pag. 274. [...], We said, that a King and Civil Magistrate is a Pastor of Mankind, and in this regard a God for mortal man. Wherein he makes a Magistrate to be Gods Vicegerent, and a Pastor of mankind, which denotes his clemence. Thence that of Seneca to Nero: ‘The cle­mence of a Magistrate workes a shame of sin in the Subjects: that is the greatest punishment, which comes from the mildest Magistrate, &c.’

(5) Magistrates ought to exercice their Office with Self-denial, 5. Fidelitie, &c. Diligence, Courage, and Fidelitie. Thus Plato, Repub. 2. pag. 374. [...];Ex quo se Cae­sar orbi terra­rum dedicavit sibi cripuit. Se­neca. By how much the greater the Office of Magistrates is, doth it not require by so much the greater vacation, and thence the greatest art and diligence? How much sloth and negligence is unworthy of a Civil Magistrate we are assured by Homer, Iliad. 2.

[...],
[...].

It becomes not a Magistrate to sleep swectly the whole night; to whom the people and so great cares are committed. Again, Plato, Leg. 6. [Page 207]requires, that a Judge be indued not only with judgement and prudence for the understanding of maters, but also with fidelitie in and for the determination of them.

§. 8. Having explicated the essential Constitution and Admi­nistration of Politie, we now procede to the Ʋtilitie thereof;The effects of Po­litie both good and bad. as also to what is Conservative and Destructive thereto. As for the Ʋtilitie of a good Politie we have it wel laid down by Plato, in his Menexenus, pag. 238. [...], Politie is the Nurse of men; good truely of good men, but bad of bad men. And we are now to explicate, that our Ancestors were educated in an excellent forme of Politie: by the benefit whereof, both those that now live have become good, as also they which made a good end of their days. He being about to de­scribe the Politie of the Athenian Republic begins with a Preface, touching the efficacious influence of good Politie, to make men good; as also of bad, to render men bad.

Touching those things that are Preservative or Destructive of politic Bodies Plato has given us many Philosophemes.Things destru­ctive to Repub­lics. As for the Preservatives of a politic Bodie, they are sufficiently evident in what precedes touching politic Constitution and Administra­tion; and they wil farther appear by shewing what things are destructive thereto. 1.1. Atheisme, and carnal Po­litie. As Religion is the main Foundation and Pillar of politic Societie; so Atheisme and carnal Politie, in sub­jecting Religion to private interest, is that which brings ruine to the same. What influence Atheisme has on the ruine of Repub­lics Plato frequently inculcates, particularly in his Leg. lib. 10. and elsewhere, as hereafter, when we come to discourse professed­ly of Atheisme, B. 2. C. 1. S. 2. As more open Atheisme, so carnal Politie in prostituting and subjecting Religion to private interest, either of State or single persons, is a great cause of ruine unto States. This was that which brought ruine to the ten Tribes; who after their revolt from Rehoboam and Judah, being afraid, lest that, if the people should go up to worship God at Jerusalem, they would again be thereby induced to returne to their old Alle­geance, they, upon corrupt reasons of State, erected Calves at Dan and Bethel; hoping thereby to keep the people in obedience to Jeroboam, who had usurped the Governement. Now this their politic contrivement in making Religion to subserve their State-interest, [Page 208]whereby they hoped to preserve their usurped Politie, proved indeed the main cause of their destruction. So sotish is the solie of those, who endeavor, by subjecting Religion to State-interest, to secure themselves: which is indeed the most compen­diose way to State-ruine.

2.2. Luxurie and Idlenesse. Another great cause of Ruine to politic Bodies is Luxurie, Sensualitie and Idlenesse. Plato assures us, That Polities are compo­sed [...], out of the manners of Republics, which, whatever way they incline, draw on other things with them: i. e. if a Republic be given to sloth and sensualitie it is near ruine. Thus Repub. 9. pag. 564. he saith, That idlenesse and prodigalitie are the peste of Republics: and where these two il humors are found, they infeste a Bodie politic, [...], as choler and phlegme the natural bodie. Thence Aristotle, in his Politics saith, That Husbandmen and Sheep­herds make the best Citizens, [...], because such converse accord­ing to Laws; for they get their livelihood by working, neither can they be idle. Whereas other Vocations are more obnoxious to idlenesse and luxurie.

3.3. Prosperitie and Povertie. Also excesse of Prosperitie or Povertie greatly promoves the ruine of Republics. Prosperitie hastens the ruine of Republics; as it oft causeth Luxurie, Insolence, and Divisions: Povertie, as it produceth Injustice and Idlenesse. How much excesse of prosperi­tie promoveth the ruine of a Republic Plato, Repub. 9. pag. 564. illu­strates, by the Republic of the Bees, which, when it abounds with much honey, the Drones come and devour al: [...], Rich men therefore, according to my opi­nion, are deservedly stiled the Herbe of Drones, which they devour. Thence Plato, Repub. 4. pag. 421. saith, That there are two things that corrupt and debauch Citizens, and so bring ruine to Republics, namely [...], Richesse and Penurie. And he gives the reason of both. Richesse makes men idle and factiose: An Arti­ficer, saith he, when he grows rich, casts off his Trade. Again, po­vertie hinders men from worke, in that it deprives them of necessaries. Whence he concludes, That Magistrates ought to take diligent heed, that a Citie be not brought to ruine, by the excesse of these two, Richesse and Povertie: whereof the former breeds [...], Luxurie, Sloth, and Innovation: and the later, [...], Sordidnesse, evil Practice, as also [Page 209]desires of innovation. Again, Repub. 8. pag. 552. he saith, Excesse of richesse or povertie threaten ruine, because the former makes men Drones; and the later makes men Thieves, sacrilegious, and addicted to evil practices.

4. Animosities, Factions, and Divisions are a principal cause of State-ruine. 4. Divisions. It's a Maxime of Politicians, concordant with Plato's Politics, That the principal causes of ruine to politic Bodies is from themselves, as in Bodies natural: And what more potent principe of self-dissolution is there than Division? Sacred Philosophie teach­eth us, That a kingdome divided cannot stand, Mat. 12.25. as Mat. 12.25. for indeed Division in althings naturally draws on dissolution. Plato, Repub. 4. assures us, That Ʋnitie is the best bond of any Societie, whereas divisions cause dissolution. Thence Repub. 5. pag. 464. he requires in his Republic, That there be a Communitie as wel of Goods as Affections, [...], whence truely it comes to passe, that men are free from al contentions and di­visions.

5. The last cause we shal mention of State-ruine is Injustice. 5. Injustice. Thus Plato, Repub. 4. pag. 444. makes Injustice to be [...], the vitiositie, [...], and the disease of persons and Republics. This is wel set forth by Augustin, de Civit. l. 4. c. 4. ‘Without Justice what are Kingdomes but great places of Robberie? And what are places of Robberie but little Kingdomes? For indeed the Pirate taken by Alexander, being asked by the King, What he meant thus to infeste the Sea, answered elegantly and truely, And what meanest thou thus to infeste the whole World? But because I play the Pirate in a little Ship, therefore I passe for a Robber: where­as thou doing the same with a great Navie, passest for an Emperor.’ See more of politic Justice and Injustice, in what precedes, §. 7. Parag. 4.

REFORMED PHILOSOPHIE. BOOK II.
Of Metaphysic or Prime Philosophie: wherein Pla­to's Metaphysic Philosophemes are metho­dised and improved.

CHAP. I. Of Metaphysic or Prime Philosophie in general.

A general Idea of Metaphysic or Prime Philosophie: Its generic no­tion, Sapience: Its Object things most excellent, &c. Its difference from Theologie, as a natural Sapience: Its formal Act, Contemplation.

§. 1.Metaphysic or prime Philoso­phie in general. BEfore we enter on the bodie of Metaphysic or Prime Philosophie it wil be necessary that we give some ge­neral Notion thereof, thereby to disabuse the minds of men, who have been so long imposed on by false Ideas, collect­ed out of Aristotle's supposed Metaphysics. For since Aristotle's Metaphysics possessed the Scholes, al men have endeavored to con­forme their metaphysic Philosophemes to them, as the original Exemplar, on a supposition that they were a part of Aristotle's genuine Workes. But I conceive it no difficult thing to demon­strate, what some Learned men have undertaken, that those Metaphysics, which passe under Aristotle's name, are spurious, and not to be reckoned among his genuine Workes. For who can imagine, that such a learned and accurate man as Aristotle was, should be guilty of so great an absurditie, as to stuffe up a great part of his Metaphysics, with the ten Predicaments, and other Logic Notions, which he had so prolixely handled in his Organ of Lo­gic? May we not take it for granted, that nothing properly be­longs [Page 211]to Metaphysics, but what is supernatural, as the name im­portes? Yea doth not the synonymous title, that Aristotle is said to give this Science, cut off above the moitie of his Metaphysics? For Stobaeus tels us, That it was Aristotles manner to cal Metaphysic, Theologie. And this indeed he learned from his Master Plato, who seems to attribute unto Metaphysic one and the same Idea with natural Theologie; the object whereof is God and things super­natural, so far as they may be contemplated by natural light. Hence we may define Metaphysic, or Prime Philosophic, according to Plato's mind, A natural Sapience or Theologie, for the contemplation of things supernatural and divine.

As for the generic Idea or Notion of Metaphysic the Platonists general terme is [...], Sapience; which is deduced from [...] So­phe, Metaphysic Sa­pience. a Speculator or Contemplator; because the ancient wise men were Contemplators, specially of things divine. Indeed Cicero, Tusc. 4. cals al Philosophie, the studie of Sapience: but the Grecian Philosophers, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle seem to confine Sapi­ence to Metaphysic: wherefore they define it, the knowlege of things most excellent and divine, specially the first Being and Cause of althings. Whence they make the Object of this Sapience to be in the general (1) [...], things most excellent and eximious, as the first Being and Cause: (2) [...], things wonderful: i. e. such oriental Traditions as Thales, Pythagoras, and Plato brought from the Barbarics, namely the Hebrews, &c. tou­ching the first Origine of Things, the Wonders of Providence, the Worship of God, and Mysteries of Religion: which Aristo­tle estimed [...], things inutile; because beyond the sphere of his confined corrupt Reason. Whence he stiles those first Philo­sophers, who traded in such oriental Traditions [...], Lovers of Fables or Traditions: For, saith he, a Fable is composed of things wonderful. (3) [...], things most difficult to be known, name­ly Immaterials. (4) [...], things divine. It was a general Principe among the Ancients, [...], Sapience is a Science of things divine. Hence they made Sapience to be the same with Theologie. (5) [...], that which essentially is; also [...], that which always existes; again, [...], Being it self; and lastly [...], Being simply, or the first Being, namely God. For Plato generally by [...], Ens or Being, understandes the first independent Being, God, in comparison of whom althings else are said not to be, or to be mere nothings, as hereafter cap. 3. §. 1. [Page 212]Thence Plato makes Sapience to be [...], the knowlege of Being, i. e. God. Whence also among the Egyptians, in the Tem­ple dedicated to Minerva, the Goddesse of Wisdome, there was this Inscription: I am that which was, which is, which shal be. Which is conteined in the Mosaic description of God,Exod. 3.14. Exod. 3.14. and denotes thus much, that God, who is the first, yea only indepen­dent essential Being, is the prime Cause and supreme Object of al Sapience, of which hereafter more fully. As for the proper act, properties and effects of Sapience in the general, we have fully handled them, in Philos. Gen. P. 2. l. 2. c. 4.

§. 2.Metaphysic a natural Sapi­ence. We define Metaphysic a natural Sapience, whereby it is distinguished from supernatural divine Theologie. It's true, Plato seems to make al Sapience divine and supernatural. Thus in his Epino. pag. 989. he makes al true knowlege of God to be from God. So Repub. 6. pag. 483. he proves, ‘That the mind of man needs divine illumination for the understanding things divine, as much as the eye needs the light of the Sun to see things visi­ble.’ Hence also Plotinus, En. 5. l. 8. c. 5. pag. 546. makes God to be the essential Sapience, from whom al the rayes of created Sa­pience stream, as beams from the Sun. But in as much as these Gentile Philosophers came altogether short of al supernatural knowlege of God, which since the Fal of man is by God appro­priated to the second Covenant, it necessarily follows, that if we wil make Metaphysic a Science distinct from supernatural Chri­stian Theologie, it can be no other than a natural Sapience of ob­jects supernatural: such as the wiser of the Philosophers, Pytha­goras, Socrates, and Plato attained unto, partly by the advantage they had from oriental Traditions, and partly from the working of their own inquisitive minds thereon. So that by Metaphysic here we understand only that natural Sapience, which Plato and other Philosophers gained by their own inquisitive thoughts, dwelling on oriental Traditions, and may be further improved by natural contemplation on objects supernatural. For we see by daily experience what great contemplations of God and things divine the natural mind of man may arrive unto, by means of supernatural Revelations, and the workings of his own thoughts thereon, together with some more commun illuminations of the Spirit; without any supernatural divine knowlege. We find this fully exemplified in multitudes of Platonic mystic Divines, who have given us many raised sublime spiritual notions of some [Page 213]of the highest Mysteries in Theologie, without any supernatural knowlege or sense thereof. The same may be said of many Schole-men, their contemplations of God and things divine. Again we cal Metaphysic a natural Sapience, as it has for its fundament or proper ground rational Arguments, whereby it is distinguished from supernatural Theologie, which has for its proper ground and foundation divine Testimonie and Autoritie. In Metaphysic, as it is a part of Philosophie, Reason is the highest Autoritie; but in Theologie the Autoritie of God is the highest Reason. Yet in as much as Metaphysic ought to be subordinate to Theologie, we also may, yea ought sometimes to explicate and demonstrate several parts thereof by divine Testimonies. For as Metaphysic at first borrowed its object from Theologie, so some of its best Arguments, Demonstrations and Explications are to be fetcht thence.

§. 3. The proper Act of Metaphysic is Contemplation: The proper act of metaphysic Con­templation. whereby it is distinguished from moral Prudence, which chiefly regards Acti­on. Thence in the Platonic Definitions, Sapience is defined [...], a contemplative Science. Not that Socrates or Plato ex­cluded Action from Sapience and Metaphysic, or Contemplation from moral Prudence and Ethics: for no active Science can be wel managed without contemplation, neither is any contempla­tive Science right, if it end not in Action. So that contempla­tive and active Sciences, according to Socrates and Plato, are not to be opposed, but composed, and made subordinate each to other; at least the former to the later: Contemplation ought to assist Acti­on in Morals; and Action ought to crown Contemplation in Me­taphysics. When therefore we make Contemplation the proper Act of Metaphysic, in distinction from Action, which is the proper effect of moral Prudence, it must be understood, not in Aristotle's sense, who makes contemplative or speculative, and active or practic Sciences opposite species, and so inconsistent each with other; but in Plato's, who, Repub. 2. distributes Disciplines into [...], Music or Contemplative, and Gymnastic or Active: the former he makes to respect things divine, and the later things human. Whence the object of Metaphysic being things divine, its proper Act must necessarily be Contemplation: For the highest and most noble act of the Soul about things su­pernatural and divine is contemplation; whence al Affections and Actions proportionable thereto follow in their course. Hence [Page 214]the formal Beatitude of the rational Soul is generally placed in vision or contemplation as the principal part thereof.

This Contemplation,Contemplation of God the most excellent. wherein the Platonists place the formal Act of Sapience or Metaphysic, is wel described by Alcinous, in his Systeme of Platonic Philosophie: [...], Contemplation is a vigorous operation of the Intellect understanding things intelligible. The proper object of this Con­templation they make to be Truth, specially the first Truth, whereby the life of the Understanding is nourished and main­tained. Thence Plato, Repub. 6. pag. 485. tels us, That nothing is more akin to Wisdome or Metaphysic than Truth. And in his Ti­maeus, pag. 90. he makes Contemplation of Truth, principally divine, to be the proper motion of the Soul. And more expressely, Repub. 5. pag. 475. he saith, Those only are true Philosophers, who are much conversant [...], in the contemplation of that which essentially is, namely God: also, [...], such as are most greedy to contemplate the first Truth. So, in his Phaedrus, pag. 247. he assures us, That the contemplation of God with a pure mind, fur­nisheth us with al other convenient cogitations: for the Soul contem­plating that which truely is, and acquiescing in this contemplation, is thereby nourished and recreated with the highest pleasures: and then having acquired the genuine Sapience or Science of that which essen­tially is, and immutably such, being as it were fested with these deli­ces, it again enters into the interior parts of Heaven and returnes home. Wherein he gives us a lively description of those satisfa­ctorie pleasures and delights, which attend the contemplation of God. Thus in the Scholes they usually determine, That a con­templative life is more excellent than an active: and they ground their determination on the preference that our Lord gives to Marie, Luke 10.42. Luke 10.42. And their reasons are such as these: because a contemplative life is, (1) more tranquille and serene: (2) more desirable for it self: (3) more permanent and lasting: (4) more self-sufficient and satisfactorie: (5) more delicious and sweet: (6) more agreable to mans more noble part, the Soul: (7) more divine and beatific. Which being understood of the contemplation of God, holds most true, provided that this con­templation be rightly qualified, namely that it be real, pure, spiri­tual, lively, distinct, firme, solid, affective, effective and influential on the divine life.

CHAP. II. Of Atheisme, and the Existence of a Deitie.

The Origine of Atheisme, (1) from Polytheisme, (2) from vain Phi­losophie and carnal Politie, (3) from the carnal Mind, Pride, &c. Three sorts of Atheisme: practic Atheisme worst. The pestiferous Influences and punishment of Atheisme. The Existence of the Deitie demonstrated from, (1) Ʋniversal Consent. (2) A first Cause: against the Eternitie of Mater, &c. (3) A first Mover. (4) The Order of the Ʋniverse. (5) The innate Idea of a Deitie in the Soul. (6) Practic Arguments from [1] Conscience. [2] Religion. [3] The politic World. [4] The Atheists enmitie against a Deitie.

§. 1. HAving given some summary general Idea of Metaphysic,That there is a God. we now descend to its principal Object, namely God; who may be considered either in regard of his Being, or Opera­tions. As for the Being of God, the first thing to be undertaken, is the demonstration, that there is a God. Plato abounds with ma­ny pregnant and cogent Arguments to demonstrate the Existence of God, against the Atheists of his Age. We shal reduce the whole to the following particulars.

First, Plato explicates the original roots of Atheisme,The Origine of Atheisme. which began to spring up in his days, with its prodigiose nature, and pestiferous maligne influences. 1. He expounds to us some of the principal roots of Atheisme. Thus, de Legib. 12. pag. 967. [...], There are some who thinke, that they who are much conversant in the studies of these Arts and Sciences, namely Astronomie, and other cognate necessary Disciplines, become Atheists; from an apprehension, that things are made and governed by the necessi­ties of certain natural Causes, and not by the force and providence of the divine Wil. In which Platonic Philosopheme there are these Propositions worthy of our contemplation. (1) That there was an opinion abroad, that the Mathematics and other Sciences made many Atheists. (2) That Philosophie abused made men Atheists, by resol­ving [Page 216]al the Products, Events, and Phenomena of the natural and poli­tic World into natural Causes, not the divine Wil and Providence. (3) That these Atheistic infusions and persuasions sprang not really from Philosophie, but the abuse thereof. These Platonic notions we shal endeavor more fully to explicate in the following Propositions.

1.Atheisme 1. from Poly­theisme. Atheisme was not the first-borne of corrupt Nature, but was ushe­red into the World by Polytheisme, its elder Brother, and nursed up by vain Philosophie and carnal Policie. So long as the Deitie maintain­ed an awe and reverence towards it self in the consciences of men, by a sense of its prodigiose operations in creating and governing the World, Atheisme found no place in Nature. We hear little of it til the beginning of the Roman Monarchie: at which time God withdrew the sensible experiments and prodigiose effects of his Omnipotence, which had so long preserved the old World from Atheisme: But beginning now to governe the World more by wisdome, without those miraculose operations before vouch­safed to the infant-world, the effects of his power were not so sen­sible: whence the brutish sensual World began to cal in question the very existence and providence of God, and that from the ma­ny ridiculous Deities which were idolised by men. For Poly­theisme gave a great advance to Atheisme: To multiplie the Di­vinitie is to destroy it: he that has power to believe many Gods, is very capable of falling into Atheisme, to believe there is no God. The corrupt mind of man observing bright impresses and characters of the Deitie in the workes of his hands, began very early to worship the Creature instead of the Creator, Rom. 1.19-23. Hence sprang up first Zabaisme or planetary Deities, and then Hellenisme or Polytheisme, a multiplicitie of al manner of Gods; which laid a foundation for Atheisme: For he that is inclined to believe a pluralitie of Gods, may easily be induced to believe there is no God. So intimate is the cognation and connexion between Polytheisme and Atheisme: As the Atheist believes there is no God, so the Polytheist, or superstitiose person wishes there were none: for al superstition has a legal fear wrapped up in its bowels, which strikes at the very Being of the Deitie. But albeit Polytheisme opened the dore to Atheisme, yet it was hatcht, nur­sed up and maintained by vain Philosophie and carnal Policie, as we have at large proved, Court Gent. P. 3. B. 2. C. 1. §. 4.

2.2. From vain Philosophie and carnal Policie. Philosophie abused makes men Atheists, by resolving al the Phe­nomena of Nature, and States into natural Causes, exclusively as to the [Page 217]Divine Wil and Providence. This lies evident in Plato's Philoso­pheme before cited. Who makes mention (1) of Astronomie, and other parts of Mathematics, as influential on Atheisme. For the Pagan Astronomers then, as many judicial Astrologers now, held, that there was a natural subordination of al inferior Causes and Effects to the Stars: whence they reduced al natural effects, yea many politic, to abstract formes and figures: to some insen­sible Influences or fatal Necessitie. Again, Mathematicians in­uring themselves to ocular sensible Demonstrations, expect the same in divine maters: a bare Testimonie, though never so di­vine, signifies little or nothing with them: whence they disbelieve every divine Mysterie, which fals not under certain rational De­monstration. Witnesse the great Leviathan of our Age and Na­tion, (for so he is pleased to title his Book) who has not been asha­med to make public profession of his Atheisme, and disbelief of althings, which admit not of sensible Demonstration. (2) Phy­siologie or natural Philosophie, as also Medicine has had no smal in­fluence on Atheisme; in that some of the principal Masters in these Sciences have endeavored to reduce al natural products and effects, either to the accidental Concurse of Atomes; or to some hidden virtues and spirits in Nature; or to the various modifica­tions of mater; or to some mundane Spirit, exclusive as to the first Cause and divine Providence. Thus we find the first appearance of Atheisme to be among those philosophic Wits of Grece, Demo­critus, Epicurus, &c. who did al ways possible trie if they could salve the Phenomena of Nature without a Deitie. (3) Eristic Logic has had too great influence on Atheisme, as Plato, Repub. 7. pag. 539. seems to intimate, telling us, That young men, by frequent Dialectic litigations and contradictions each of other, at last come to disbelieve every thing. For Scepticisme naturally tends to Athe­isme: he that disputes every thing, at length comes to believe nothing, even in things divine. (4) But yet the principal Parent and Nurse of Atheisme has been in al Ages carnal Policie. The chief lineaments of Atheisme were formed at Rome, when it be­came the Seat of State-policie. For the secular Politician ascribes al the revolutions of States and human Affaires to some politic contrivement or defect therein. And what makes the present Conclave at Rome and al their adherents so much to abound with Atheisme, but the great confidence they have in their carnal po­licie? Neither hath this politic Atheisme infected Rome only, but [Page 218]also diffused it self throughout the European World. Hence Ma­chiavel, that great secular Politician of Florence, layeth Atheisme at the foundation of his carnal policie. And it is to be feared there are too many such politic Atheists amongst us: some are so bold and daring, as that they are not ashamed openly to professe it: others, by their doutful Scepticisme give cause of suspicion. I wish we had not too strong motives to force such a belief, that a great part of those who professe themselves Christians, had they but the advantages of interest and such like selfish motives, could with as much facilitie turne Atheists. It is natural to carnal rea­son and policie to step up into the Throne of God, and take the Sceptre of his Providence out of his hand, as we find it exemplified in Nebuchadnezar, Dan. 4.30. Dan. 4.30. Is not this great Babylon that I have built? i. e. by my wisdome and power, &c.

3.3. From the car­nal Mind, Pride, &c. Atheisme springs not from true Philosophie, but from the abuse thereof by the carnal mind of man. This Plato has wel observed, in the place fore-cited, de Leg. lib. 12. pag. 967. where he shews that [...], Atheists, who opposed the existence and providence of God, as also overthrew the main fundaments of Religion, were but [...], sophistic, spurious Philosophers. Hence that grand Effate of Sr. Francis Bacon, That a little Philosophie makes a man an Atheist, but a great deal cures him of Atheisme. And indeed, to speak the truth, it is not Philosophie simply in it self, but the infidelitie, car­nal reason, and spiritual pride of mans heart that makes men Atheists.Psal. 10.4. This we are assured of by sacred Philosophie; as Psal. 10.4. The wicked through the pride of his countenance. The Parti­cle [...] through is causal, denoting the proper interne impulsive cause of the wicked's Atheisme. The countenance here is brought in, not as the formal subject or proper seat, but as the Index of his pride: that wherein it doth chiefly discover it self; though the proper subject of it be the heart. Thence the Thargum thus para­phraseth it: [...] through the pride of his spirit. Thence it follows: wil not seek after God. This notes his practic Atheisme, founded in speculative. Whence it follows: al his thoughts are, that there is no God. [...] signifies mischievous thoughts, politic designing imaginations. The wicked, through the pride of his heart, is ful of politic Atheistic imaginations that there is no God. Thus Psal. 14.1.Psal. 14.1. The fool hath said in his heart there is no God. The fool here is not such an one as wants reason, but he that abuseth it unto practic Atheisme. This I am bold to assert, that the ge­nuine [Page 219]and proper cause of that overspreading Atheisme, which covers the face of this politic World, is the carnal Reason, Infi­delitie, and spiritual Pride of mens hearts, not any defect of evi­dence in the objects of our Faith. This is very clear; because the most of your moderne Atheists are as credulous in their way, as any other of the simplest of men: Why else do they so greedily assent unto any infirme Hypothesis of those they admire, upon as sleight and trivious reasons as may be imagined? Certainly, this so great credulitie in things natural or politic, is a sufficient de­monstration, that it is not so much the want of evidence in maters of Faith, that makes men Atheists, as the pride and folie of their carnal reasons, which they idolise. It is a thing most prodigiose, that those who abound with such soft facile credulous humors and inclinations, to believe, yea idolise false Deities created by their own lusts, should have their minds prepossest with an incredulitie so obstinate and unpenetrable by al the impressions of the true Deitie.

2. Plato gives us an account not only of the origine of Athe­isme,Threesorts of A­theisme. but also of its kinds. Thus, de Leg. lib. 10. pag. 888. with mild and soft words he endeavors to convince the proud Atheists of his Age, under the Symbol of a young man, in these words: [...], &c. My Son, thou art yet young: neither do I dout, but that progresse of time wil make thee change thy opinion. Expect therefore, I beseech thee, that now thou give thy judgement of the highest points. [...], But that which thou now judgest a mater of no moment, is indeed a point of the highest consequence, namely, that any one, thinking rightly of God, lives wel or il. But first touching this mater, I wil signifie to thee one great thing, lest I should seem to thee a lyer in this mater, and it is this: [...], Not thou alone, nor thy friends have been the first who have entertained this [Atheistic] senti­ment of God: but from al memorie there have been more or fewer who have labored under this disease. And I wil tel thee what has hap­pened to them: [...], namely no one of them, who from their youth entertained this opinion that God is not, hath persevered therein even unto old age. We find a great instance hereof in Bion, (mentioned by Laertius in his [Page 220]Life) ‘who in his health said: The Gods were nothing: but being worne out by a long disease, and fearing death, he acknowleged their existence, &c.’ Plato addes: As for the two other opinions about God, namely (1) that there is a God, but yet he doth not re­gard human affaires; or (2) if he doth regard them, yet that he is easily reconciled by the prayers and sacrifices of men, there have been some, though not many, who have been infected with these blasphemous sentiments of the Deitie. Plato here, as before in the beginning of this Dialogue, pag. 885. mentions three sorts of Atheists, which in his days diffused their venimous blasphemies against the Deitie. (1) Such as denied the Existence of God. (2) Such as held there was a God, but yet denied his Providence and Governement of human affaires. (3) Such as held Gods providence and obser­vation of mens good and evil acts, but yet withal denied the Ju­stice of God in punishing sin, affirming that God was easily recon­ciled by Prayers and Sacrifices. Now Plato sets himself to refute each of these, of which hereafter. The last of these three kinds takes in practic Atheisme, which is indeed of al the most pesti­ferous and diffusive. For when men believe there is a God, and that the World is governed by him, yet, then to thinke that he wil be pacified by their hypocritic and imperfect prayers and ser­vices, is, in Plato's estime, an high piece of Blasphemie and pra­ctic Atheisme: and therefore he spends much force of Argument to prove, That the righteous God cannot be pacified by the services of the wicked. Of which we shal discourse more fully, in the Ju­stice of God. Plato, Repub. 10. pag. 886. tels us, That those who truely believe the Existence of God, wil not indulge themselves in sin. Whence the Stoics, following Socrates, held, [...], That every wicked man was an Atheist. For they held there were two forts of Atheists, (1) Such as were contrary to God. (2) Such as despised God, by disobeying his Laws, &c. And it was a great Saying of Picus, Earle of Mirandula, That there was but one thing in the World worse than a speculative Atheist, and that was a practic Atheist. The roots of practic Atheisme lie low, as an insensible Spring and Principle, which moves and workes al, and yet is not discerned. Some of the greatest Professors of a Deitie, may be the greatest practic Atheists.

3. In what follows Plato manifests a warme zele and passion against these Atheists and their Atheistic infusions, as the peste of Families, Republics, yea of human Nature. Thus Leg. 10. p. 890. [Page 221]having mentioned the opinion of some Atheists, affirming,The monstrose nature and pesti­serous influences of Atheisme. That the assertion of a Deitie was not from Nature, but the politic constitu­tion of Statesmen, to keep men in awe, he replies: What a monstrose thing, O my Hoste, doest thou relate? [...]; and how great a peste, which in­vades the minds of young men, to the ruine and subversion of Repub­lics and private Families? Whereby he demonstrates, that this prodigiose peste of Atheisme tends to the subversion of States, Families, Persons, yea human Nature. And we have a good ob­servation to this purpose in Campanella, Polit. cap. 8. ‘When Sects [of Philosophers, or others] shal turne to Atheisme, the top of divine wrath, and ruines of people are near: for when th y are come to denie the Providence of God, or the Immortalitie of the Soul, things necessarily suffer a mutation or reformation: be­cause the bridle is taken off from mens consciences, and they also are destroyed by impious Princes.’ Yea, formal Atheisme is repugnant to human Nature, not only morally, but physically, as hereafter. O! what a servile base thing is Atheisme? How doth it bow down the Soul to the basest of conditions! Doth it not expose a man to a miserable venture of al future miseries, but strip him naked of al hopes of future happinesse? Is not every Atheist divided against himself? Do not those remains of light in Conscience, and those secret fears of a Deitie war against his corrupt atheistic Ratiocinations? Have not his irregular passions ful libertie to captivate him and tyrannise over him without check? Yea, doth he not bid farwel to his best being, his first cause and last end? Would it not be thought unnatural for the Plant to bid adieu unto its Mother-earth, which bred and nursed it up? or should the branch renounce and bid defiance to its root, would not al condemne it of unnatural madnesse and ingra­titude? Did the Earth ever disclaim its dependence on the Sun for warme influences, light, and heat? Was the stream ever so foolish, as to bid farwel to its Fountain? And yet is not this the case of every Atheist? Doth he not disclaim his original Foun­tain, Root, Sun, Parent and first Cause? Alas! how much doth he depose and forfeit his Reason, yea human Nature! What are al his atheistic Reasonments but assaults against himself; endea­vors to banish himself from himself? O! what venimous poison doth Atheisme drop on human Nature! It doth indeed commit a rape on humanitie, and plunder it of its native glorie, beautie, [Page 222]dignitie and perfection: it doth unhinge and separate man from his most laudable, noble, and best self: it makes him a slave and vassal to Mater and Motion: it robs not only his Creator of the workes of his hands, but himself of human felicitie and tranquil­litie: yea, it placeth man many degrees below the Brute animal, which enjoys some happinesse in this present state; whereas the Atheist can enjoy neither present contentment, nor yet hopes of future blisse. So repugnant is Atheisme to human Nature.

4.The punishment of Atheisme. Thence Plato procedes, Leg. 10. pag. 890. to shew what should be the punishment of such Atheists. He saith: It belongs to the Magistrate to endeavor their conviction by reason; and if they obstinately persevere, to punish them: [...], some by death, others by stripes, others by bonds, others by infamie, others by banishment, others by miserable povertie. And in the con­clusion of this Discourse, pag. 907. he sums up al thus: We affirme therefore that those three things that were proposed by us, namely, that there is a God: and that he takes care of althings: and that he is not inclined by mens services beyond what is just and equal, have been abun­dantly demonstrated. And then he addes: [...], &c. But for the con­tentions of wicked Atheistic men, we have discoursed more vehemently and warmely of this mater. Namely for this reason, O Clinias, we have used greater vehemence, lest peradventure these profligate Athe­ists, should, by their disputations, conceit themselves to have the better of us, and thence to act althings according to the dictates of their lusts, and belch forth their blasphemous atheistic opinions of God. Where­fore to silence the madnesse of those Atheists, we have used the greater vehemence. And after al he establisheth this Law, That if any speak or act any thing atheistically and impiously against God, he be punished by the Magistrate. If Plato were so zelose and warme against the Pagan semi-Atheists of his Age, what vehemence and zele would he expresse against the bold daring Atheists of this Age? O! what an ignoble, base, degenerate, uncomfortable thing is Atheisme? how repugnant both morally and physically is it to human Nature? Ought not the Atheist sooner to dout of his own being than God's? For if he be, God who made him, must needs be. Thence Padre Paul, that great Venetian Politician, composed a Treatise, That Atheisme is repugnant to human Nature, and is not to be found therein: but that they who acknowlege not the [Page 223]true Deitie, must necessarily feigne to themselves some false ones, as it is mentioned in his Life, pag. 71. In sum, Atheisme is a propo­sition so disnatural, monstrose, and difficult to be establisnt in the mind of man, that notwithstanding the insolence, vanitie, and pride of Atheists, who endeavor by violence to rase out al notices of a Deitie in their Conscience, yet stil they give us some eviden­ces of their fears that there is a Deitie, by listing up their eyes and hands towards Heaven, or such like Indicia in sudden and great calamities.

§. 2.1. Ʋniversal consent for the Existence of God. Plato's zelose Philosophemes against Atheisme having been discussed, we descend to his Demonstration of the Existence of God. First, That there is a God, he demonstrates from the uni­versal consent of al Times and Nations. Thus, Leg. 10. pag. 887. [...], &c. But now giving credit to those Traditions, which together with their milke they sucked in, and which they heard from their Mo­tkers and Nurses; who made it their businesse, to implant these senti­ments on their minds, &c. Wherein he shews, how those that denie the Existence of God contradict the universally received Tradi­tion, which they sucked in with their mothers milke, and that which is indeed engraven on their very Beings, as hereafter. Yea, he makes this Hypothesis, That there is a God, to be [...], a self-evidencing first Principe, which needs no argument for the confirmation thereof; because Nature it self instructes us therein, it being that which the most prostigate men cannot rase out of their Souls. Thence Damascene, Orthod. Fid. l. 1. c. 3. saith, That it never came into Controversie among the most of Grecians, that there was a God. And he gives this reason for it: [...], The knowlege or notion of Gods Existence is naturally insite and ingenite to us, or engraven on our Natures. We may draw forth the force of this Platonic Argu­ment, in Plato's own dialect thus: Have not al mankind in al times and places given their assent and consent to the existence of a Deitie? Doth not al the Polytheisme of the Pagan World give evident testimonie for the existence of a Deitie? What made the Egyptians, Grecians and Romans so fond of their base multi­plied Deities, but a notion engraven on their Beings, fomented by universal Tradition, that there was some supreme Being they owed Hommage unto? It's true, their Hommage and Worship was misplaced as to its proper object, but doth not the act suffi­ciently [Page 224]argue, that they owned a Deitie, albeit not the true God? Hath not the whole World subscribed to the notion of a Deitie? Was there ever any Nation so barbarous, as not to pay Hommage to some supreme Being? Can we give instance of any part of the habitable World, where professed Atheisme gained place or ha­bitation? Has there not been an universal Tradition among the more intelligent of men, that God made the World and governes the same? Yea doth not this notion of a Deitie run, not only through al Times, Ages, and Nations; but even through the Principes of human Nature; yea in the venes and bloud of men? Wel then might Plato say, That men sucked it in with their mothers milke. So much for inartificial Argument.

2.2. From the subordination of Causes to a first Cause. Plato demonstrates the Existence of a Deitie rationally, from the Subordination of second causes and effects to a first Cause. Thus in his Timaeus, pag. 28. [...], Whatever is produced, it is necessary that it be produced by some Cause: for it cannot be, that any thing should be produced or made without a Cause. Then in what follows [...] proves the World was made: [...], The World was made, because it is seen and touched, and has a bodie: But it is clear that such things are produced, &c. Whence he concludes, that God was the Parent and first Cause of the Universe. Plato bottomes his demonstration on these two Hypotheses, (1) That the World was made. (2) That it was made by some precedent Cause. (1) That the World was made and not eternal, was an Hypothesis generally maintained by al the Philosophers before Aristotle; who asserted, That the first Mater was eternal: and that on a mistaken Principe, That nothing could be produced out of nothing. But Plato strongly proves the World could not be eternal; because it is sensible and corporeous: and therefore the effect of some precedent Cause. And his argument may, in his own interrogatorie mode, be thus improved: If the World be eternal, must it not also be immuta­ble and invariable? Can there be any generation and corruption in that which is eternal? For where there are generations and corruptions, there must be causes and effects, which implie prio­ritie and posterioritie: for the cause naturally precedes the effect: but can there be any prioritie and posterioritie in what is eternal? If the World was from al eternitie, must not the things that are generated and corrupted eternally have been, and eternally not [Page 225]have been? Must not the present way of Generation and Cor­ruption correspond with the World's Eternitie? Doth not our reason, yea commun sense assure us, that the Worlds present course of generation and corruption is inconsistent with its Eternitie? Is it not most absurd and irrational to conceive, that one man should beget another successively from al Eternitie? Doth not the very conception of succession in Eternitie implie a flat con­tradiction? Moreover doth not generation and corruption sup­pose an inequal succession of ascent and descent? and is not this incompatible with an eternal Being? Again, if there were an in­finite succession of generations and corruptions, how is it possible there should be any effect or issue? for can there be an end, where there is no beginning? Against the Eternitie of the World, see more largely Derodone, L'Atheisme convaincu, pag. 5. where he proves from al the principal parts of the World, the Sun, Moon, &c. that it could not be eternal: and thence makes good his Hy­pothesis, that it was created by God. See also Sr. Charles Wolse­ley's Ʋnreasonablenesse of Atheisme, Edit. 3. pag. 47-64. & 177. (2) Plato's next Hypothesis to prove God to be the first Cause,The World made by some prime Cause. is, That the World was made by some precedent Cause. For, saith he, whatever is produced, is produced by some Cause. We see no­thing but what is produced by somewhat else; and therefore must rationally conclude, there must be some first Producer. Our reason compels us to look out for some first Cause, that gave be­ing to althings we see. Doth a man beget a man? and was not this man begotten by some other man, and so upward, til we come to some first man? And how came that first man to be pro­duced but by some first Cause? In al subordinate Efficients, is not the first the cause of the middle, and the middle, whether many or one, the cause of the last? If then there be not a first, can there be a middle and last? So that may not men as wel denie al Effects, yea themselves to be as denie a first Cause to be? Surely if God had not a Being, nothing else could be: in things subor­dinate one to the other, take away the first you take away al the rest. Therefore it must necessarily be, that the World was made by some precedent first Cause. This Hypothesis Plato layes down against the Antithesis of Leucippus and Democritus, which Epicurus after­ward espoused, namely, That there was an infinite vacuitie or emty space, in which were innumerous Atomes, or corporeous Particles, of al formes and shapes, which by their weight were in continual agitation or [Page 226]motion; by the various casual occursions of which, this whole Ʋniverse and al the parts thereof were framed into that order and forme they now are in. Against this Antithesis Plato seems to have framed his Hypothesis, laid down in his Timaeus, pag. 28. where he asserts, That the Ʋniverse received its origine, [...], (as it is in the Autographe) not from any casual occursion of Atomes, [...], but from a prudent potent first Cause, who fra­med this Universe according to the most accurate Exemplar of his own divine Ideas. So in his Sophista, pag. 265 he saith: Na­tural things were produced, not [...] from a casual cause without intelligence; but that they were [...], fruits or workes of God the supreme Opi­ficer of althings. We may forme his Argument, according to his own dialectic mode, thus: Is it possible that this beautiful wel­ordered Universe should emerge out of a casual concurse of A­tomes in the infinite Vacuitie? What! were these corporeous Particles eternally there; or only introduced in time? If eter­nally, then is not necessary that they be invariable and immuta­ble? for doth not al variation and alteration belong to time the measure thereof? Can any thing that is in a strict sense eternal varie? are not eternal and variable termes contradictorie, as before? Or wil they say, that these Atomes were introduced or produced in this vacuous space in time? must they not then have some cause of their production? And wil it not hence follow, that there is a first Cause or Deitie, as anon? Again, what a world of absurdities, yea contradictions is this Epicurean Hypo­thesis clogged with? Is it possible to imagine that such minute corporeous Particles should, in this imaginarie vacuitie, be invest­ed with an eternal gravitie, whereby an eternal casual motion is caused here and there, without any tendence to a Centure? Can it also be imagined, that these poor Corpuscules should continue in perpetual motion, til by chance they hit one against the other, and so were conglomerated into this order we find them in the Universe? Is it not a fond sick-brain conceit, that phlegmatic dul mater, and stupid motion should by chance produce such an har­monious Universe? Alas! what a systeme of contradictions would follow hereon? See Sr. Charles Wolseley against Atheisme, pag. 87.

But to descend to the affirmative of Plato's Hypothesis, That the World was made by some precedent first Cause. This he also in­culcates [Page 227]in his Theaetctus: [...], We must take it for granted, that nothing can make it self. Whence it is necessary, that at last we come to some first Cause. (1) That in the subordination of Causes there cannot be a pro­gresse into infinite, we are told by Aristotle, (or who ever were the Composer of that Book) Metaph. l. 1. c. 2. and the reason is most evident; because what is infinite is incomprehensible, and impertransible; as also adverse to al order: for in infinites there is no first or last. Again, if in the subordination of Causes there should be an infinite Series, then it would follow hence, that there never was any Cause which was not subsequent to infinite Causes precedent: whence also it would follow, that there were infinite Causes before any Cause. (2) That nothing ever did or can make it self is most evident from multitudes of contradicti­ons that follow this Hypothesis: for then a thing should be said to act physically before it had a being: to be superior and infe­rior, dependent and independent, to exist and not to exist in the same instant and in one and the same respect. (3) That this Universe was made by some Cause precedent to it self is evident; because it hath a possibilitie not to be: whence it follows, that once it was not: for whatever has a possibilitie not to be, has a passive power at least metaphysic, if not physic: and where any passive power is, there is something of the original nothing, out of which althings were made, by him who is pure Act and perfect Being. Thus Damascene, Orthodox. Fide, l. 1. c. 3. [...], &c. Al Beings are either create, or increate: truely if create they are altogether mu­table: For it's necessary, that those things which began by mutation, should be always obnoxious to mutation, either by being corruptible, or alterable, according to pleasure. But if al Beings be increate, then are they al immutable. Thence he addes: Who therefore wil not conclude, that al Beings sensible, yea that the very Angels may be ma­ny ways changed and altered? Whence he concludes: [...]; Therefore, seing the Opificer of things is increate, he must be also al­together immutable. And what can this be other than God? (4) That God made althings, is strongly demonstrated by Aquinas, contra Gent. l. 2. c. 15. of which hereafter. See also Mendoza Hurtado, Phys. Disp. 10. Sect. 1.

§. 3.3. The Existence of God from a first Motor. Another Argument whereby Plato proves the existence of a Deitie is taken from the dependence of al motions on a prime Motor, or first Mover. Thus Leg. 10. pag. 893. being about to demonstrate the existence of a Deitie against the Atheists of his Age, he makes this Preface: Let us make this Preface to our Dis­course; sithat it is our purpose to prove there is a God, we ought with greater studie and diligence to cal upon him for his aide now, than at other times. Wherefore being as it were confirmed by these bonds, let us begin our Discourse— Therefore if any shal demand of me: [...], whether or no therefore do althings stand stil, and is nothing moved? or, on the contrary, are althings, or somethings moved, and doth nothing stand stil? [...], I wil answer, that somethings are moved, and some­things stand stil, &c. In which discourse, to prove his Thesis touching the existence of a Deitie, he layes down this Hypothe­sis: That God was the [...] the primary and principal Mover in Nature, (as the Soul in the bodie) who moves himself and althings that are, were, or shal be in the Ʋniverse. This Hypothesis he cals [...], and as it were the bonds of the whole disputation. Thence he procedes, pag. 894. thus: Let there then be one motion, [i. e. Motor] which moves it self, but cannot move other things; being al­ways uniforme: another which always moves both it self and other things, by conjoining and disjoining, augmenting and diminishing, ge­nerating and corrupting, which motion is distinct from al the rest. By the former motion he understands that of things natural; by the later that of the first Motor, who moves himself and althings else; which he thus explicates: [...], It is necessa­ry, that he, who can move both himself and other things, do infinitely excel, and that the other Motors are much posterior and inferior thereto. Whereby he gives an infinite preference and prioritie to the first Motor, or Mover in comparison of al other second Movers. And then that there must be one prime Motor he de­monstrates in what follows thus: When one thing is moved by ano­ther, and that other by another whom must we acknowlege to be the first Motor of al these? [...], &c. Him truely that moves himself: for he cannot be changed by any before, seing there can be no mutation before him. Whence he concludes: [...], &c. Therefore we must acknowlege, that the principe of al motions is be that moves himself, and is the most an­cient [Page 229]and excellent cause of al mutations. Wherein he demon­strates (1) That there is one prime, Motor, which is not obno­xious to the motion or mutation of any precedent Motor. (2) That this prime Motor is the principe and cause of al other mo­tions and mutations. Thus also in his Phaedrus, pag. 245 [...], &c. Only therefore that which moves it self, and is the cause of motion to other things, [...], This is the fountain and principe of moving, but a principe has no origine: for from it althings arise; but it from nothing else: neither indeed were it a principe, if it were produced by any thing else. Whereby he proves, that God is the first Motor and Principe of al motion, who moves althings, but is moved by nothing. This Demonstration of Plato seems so strong and bind­ing, that Aristotle his Scholar was not only satisfied therein, but improved the same very much, Physicor. 8. where he thus argues: ‘Whatever is moved is moved by some other: whence there is some first Mover, which is immobile; or there must be a pro­gresse into infinite, from which nature abhors: now the first immobile Mover is simply the first cause of al motions; as the first Mover in every kind of inferior motions, is the cause of al motions in that kind.’ This Platonic and Aristotelic Demon­stration may be thus drawen forth: Doth not al motion procede either from some prime Motor, or else from an innate and self-originated principe of motion? If from an innate self-originated principe of motion, then must not such a motion necessarily be eternal? and if eternal, then can a thing that so moves ever cease to move? Can any thing move, that was not at first moved by some prime Motor, or that doth not infinitely and eternally move it self? Can we imagine any thing not to have a beginning, but what is infinite and eternal? And need we a better argument to prove that al motion had a beginning, than this, that we see it has an end? Do not the several periods, which al motions as wel natural as artificial fal under, clearly evince, that they are not self-originated, but had some beginning and prime Motor? This Demonstration R. Moses Maimonides, in summa Talmud. lib. de fund. Leg. c. 1. thus expresseth: The Heaven is always moved: but it cannot be moved without a Motor: and the Motor is God blessed without hand or bodie. This Argument from a prime Motor is wel improved by Aquinas contra Gent. l. 1. c. 13. & l. 2. c. 6.

§. 4.4. The existence of God from the Order of the Ʋ ­niverse. Plato demonstrates the Existence of a Deitie from the ad­mirable Order, Harmonie, Beautie, and Perfection of the Macrocosme or Ʋniverse. Thus, Leg. 12. pag. 966. [...], The admirable order of the Ʋniverse, namely the reguiar mo­tion of the Stars and other celestial Bodies ordered by the Divine Mind, demonstrate a Deitie. For he that shal look into these things with a diligent inquisitive eye, [...], no such one among mortals can be so far an Atheist, as not to acknow­lege the existence of a Deitie. So pag. 967. [...], affirming that the Divine Mind made and orderly disposeth althings. This Argument of Plato may, according to his own dialectic mode, be thus improved: Is there not an accurate innate order and rectitude in the World? Do not althings sweetly conspire and tend to one commun end? Lo! what an exact subordination of things one to another, and to the whole is there? Can it be imagined, that the Sun, Moon, and Stars should have such regular motions, course, order, and influ­ences, without some infinitely wise Director and Disposer? Is it not a most absurd conceit, that al the regular subordinations of natural Causes and Effects in their proper dependences and uses should be produced by mere Chance? Is there not a most beautiful concent and concatenation of al parts in the Universe? And whence comes it, but from infinite Wisdome and Provi­dence? It's true, confusion is a genuine product of Chance, to use the Atheists phrase; but is not al order the effect of Wisdome and Art? In a curiose Machine or piece of Art doth not the Or­der, Beautie, and Harmonie of different parts speak the skil of the Artificer? And can we suppose, that the infinite Order and Beau­tie which is in the Universe should procede by Chance, and not from an infinitely wise Agent? Consider the Sun, that Eye of the Universe; in its own gloriose structure, situation, conjunctions, regular motions, efficacious influences, and orderly disposition of seasons, according to the indigence and necessities of this inferior Word, and can we imagine that al this should be the result and product of Chance, and not of an infinitely wise divine Mind, as Psal. 19.1, 2, 3? Might we not also descend from those celestial Bodies, to the Regions of the Air and the Meteors loged therein, both ignite and aqueous, their admirable order, perfection and influences? Likewise as to this inferior World, if we examine [Page 231]the origine of Fountains, dive into the Ocean and observe its re­gular Fluxes and Refluxes, &c. if we rake into the bowels of the Earth, and inquire into the origine of Stones both preciose and commun, mineral Juices, and Metals: Lastly, if we destil Plants, or anatomise Animals, what an incomparable Harmonie, Order and Perfection shal we find in each of these, both in reference each to other, and to the whole Universe? This is wel done by Plato, in his Timaus, pag. 28, &c. whence he concludes, That there must be an infinitely wise Mind, who frames al these things into such an ad­mirable order, agreable to his own eternal Ideas. Thus also Joan. Damascenus, Orthodox. Fid. l. 1. c. 18. [...], But that God, who in his own nature is invisible, is made visible by his operations, we know by the admirable constitution and gu­bernation of the Ʋniverse. Wherein he demonstrates the invisible Essence and Existence of God from his visible operations and workes, as Rom. 1.20.

§. 5.5. Gods Exi­stence from the connate Idea of God in the Soul. Plato demonstrates the Existence of a Deitie from the Microcosme or Man, specially his Soul, and those innate Ideas of a Dei­tie loged there. Thus Leg. 12. pag. 966. Do we not know that there are two things which make us believe that there is a God? one which we before mentioned, touching the Soul, [...], that it is the most ancient and divine of althings made: I say, of those things, whose motion admits generation, but so as that it hath obtained an everlasting essence for it self. There are two parts in this Ar­gument which demonstrate the existence of a Deitie. (1) The divine origine and nature of the Soul. (2) Its Immortalitie. (1) The divine origine and nature of the human Soul fully evinceth the existence of God. Thus Plato, Leg. 10. pag. 899. Let him, who formerly denied there was a God, prove that we speak not truth, in giving the Soul the first place; or let him believe us, and so for the future order his life, [...], that he dout not of a Deitie. But let us consider whether to those that thinke there is no God, we have not abundantly proved there is a God. So in his Phaedo, p. 81. Doth not the mind thus affected go, [...], to the divine Being whereunto it is like? This Platonic Argument may be thus improved: Is there not a connate Idea of a Deitie impres­sed and stamped on the very nature of the Soul? Doth not its immaterial, spirital, impassible nature speak its physic cognation [Page 232]with some supreme Spirit, that first conferred that spirital Being on it? Has not the Soul a physic Amplitude, yea infinite Capa­citie, albeit only remote and passive of contemplating some first Truth, and loving some chiefest good? Has not the mind an universal empire and dominion over al objects, to compound things most opposite, and divide things most intimately conjoin­ed; to descend from the highest cause to the lowest effect, and then to ascend from the lowest effect to the highest cause? Has not the Wil an infinite thirst after good, yea is never satisfied without the fruition of some supreme infinite good? And do not these infinite capacities, albeit only natural, remote and passive, implie some infinite object adequate thereto? Was there ever a facultie or power in Nature without an object suited thereto? Cicero tels us, de Nat. Deor. lib. 1. That Nature her self has im­pressed a notion of a Deitie on the minds of al. As if he had said, ac­cording to Plato's mind, Has not God stamped an Idea of him­self on human Nature? May we not as wel abandon our very Beings, our selves, as abandon the notices and characters of a Deitie engraven on our Beings? Doth not every human Soul carrie the signature and marque of his Creator impressed on it self? Is there not an impresse and Idea of a Deitie incorporated and contempered in the very complexion and constitution of the Soul? And albeit man by sin runs away as a fugitive from his Lord and Maker, yet has he not secured his claim to man, by his marque and physic Idea stamped on the Soul of man? The Ideas and Characters of a Deitie are more clearly and lively stamped on the Souls of men, than upon any part of the sensible World. (2) As for the Immortalitie of the Soul, doth not this also im­plie an eternal object answerable thereto? Thus Plato, in his Sym­posium, pag. 207. informes us, That man, who is mortal as to his terrene part, seekes to be immortal as to his more noble part. And if the Soul seekes to be immortal, must there not be an immortal, eternal, infinite good, in the fruition of which it seeks immortal Beatitude? Of this see more fully, Philos. Gen. P. 1. lib. 3. cap. 2. sect. 10. §. 5.

§. 6.The Existence of God demonstra­ted by practic Arguments. 1. From Con­science. Plato has given us some practic and moral Demonstrati­ons of a Deitie. As (1) some moral though imperfect notices of good and evil impressed on Conscience, with affections of fear and shame on the commission of sin. Plato, in his Minos, pag. 317. makes mention of a [...], a royal Law of Nature, some [Page 233]notices whereof remain on degenerate human Nature. These notions the Stoics terme, [...]: the Aristotelians, [...], commun and innate no­tions. Among which they reckon up such as these: That there is a God: that this God was the Maker, and is the Conservator, and Rector of the Ʋniverse: that he is infinitely wise, just, good, &c. That he is to be worshipped: that virtue is to be embraced, vice avoided, &c. These commun notices they make to be connate and engraven on the Soul. And indeed sacred Philosophie assures us, that there are such commun notices of good and evil naturally engraven on mens consciences, as Rom. 2.14, 15. which yet are improved by the workes of Providence, as Act. 14.17. where rain and fruitful seasons are said to be Gods witnesse. Now al Notions of good and evil clearly demonstrate the existence of a Deitie: for the distin­ction of good and evil, as to man, refers to some principe above him: were there no supreme Rector and Judge to reward good and punish evil, the very notions of good and evil would vanish into smoke and vapor. What can be good, if there be not some Being originally and infinitely good, to which it refers, and by whole Law it is measured? Can we imagine how the notions of good and evil should exist in mens minds, if there were not a su­preme Rector to give Laws for the measure thereof? If man had not some supreme Lord to give Laws to him, how could he be guilty of any moral transgression? Can he that is his own Law be guilty of an offence? Who can charge any man with doing il, unlesse he break the Law of some Superior? What could be just or unjust, if there were not a supreme Rector to measure and regulate the same? And could there likewise be any punishments or rewards, if there were not an infinitely wise and righteous Judge to distribute the same? Again, we may with facilitie evince the existence of a Deitie from the Accusations, Tremblements, and Fears of a guilty Conscience. The Atheist may dispute against a Deitie, but doth he not sometimes fear and tremble at a secret apprehension of that Deitie he disputes against? When the Ser­geants of Death come to arrest him, what pannic fears, what con­vulsions are in his Conscience? Doth he not quake and tremble before that Deitie he formerly derided? Thus it was with Bion the Philosopher, who when he lay under the pangs and terrors of death acknowleged that Deitie he before disclaimed. And would the Atheist be but true to himself, and so ingenuous as to lay [Page 234]open his breast, would not his own tremblements and fears of Conscience at times bassie his own infidelitie and disbelief of a Deitie? Have not al Nations in al Ages more or lesse fallen down before the Notion of a Deitie? O! what stings and remorses have there been on the Consciences even of those who have been ex­emted from the punishment of human Laws? Have not many Ty­rants trembled on the Throne, as Felix, when the condemned in­nocent rejoyced, as Paul? Aske Tiberius and Nero, those potent Emperors, what made them to tremble and fear? Were these fears the product of false imagination, and not rather of a guilty Conscience?

(2) Another practic moral Demonstration of a Deitie is taken from that sense of Religion,2. From the sense of Religi­on. which the most barbarous Nations have more or lesse been possessed with. Thus Plato, Leg. 10. pag. 887. It is not possible, but that they believe there is a God, whiles they see their parents with the greatest care sacrifice for themselves and their children; and addresse themselves to God, with earnest prayers in their behalf. Yea, he addes, That al mankind, both Greeks and Bar­barians, when they are pressed with adversitie, or enjoy prosperitie, fal down to the ground and adore some Deitie, [...], neither do they give the least suspicion, but that there is a God. We may draw forth Plato's mind thus: Was there ever any People or Nation so barbarous, as not to fal down before and worship some Deitie? It's true we hear of some that live without human Laws, yea without clothes and other necessa­ries, to secure them from the injuries each of other, and of sea­sons, &c. but did we ever hear of any that lived without some supreme object of Devotion? May you not assoon find a Nation without men, as without some Deitie? Nay, are not some so superstitiose, as where-ever they see any created impresse of a Deitie, to worship that as God? Are not the Plants in the Gar­den, the Birds that flie, the Fishes in the Sea, the Brutes that serve men, worshipped by some as Gods? And lest men should after al misse of the true God, have they not also framed an Altar to some unknown God, as Act. 17.23? Have not al men na­turally recourse to some supreme Being in their extremities? When they find themselves past their own protection, do they not cast their eye upward to some omnipotent Being for relief? Wil the Atheist object, that al these religiose Rites and Actions are but the politic contrivement of Politicians, to keep men in [Page 235]awe and under subjection? Plato, Leg. 10. pag. 889, &c. gives a ful answer to this Objection, assuring us, That it is void of al rea­son to imagine, that Religion and al sense of a Deitie is the mere com­ment or figment of men, instituted as an Artifice, to keep men in their Dutie, by overawing them with the conceit of some supreme Power: than which there cannot be a more capital crime, because the notion of a Deitie is most naturel.

(3) Hence we may deduce another moral Demonstration of a Deitie from the politic World, 3. From the po­litic World. and the necessitie it has of some supreme Rector to keep it in order. This Argument is wel ma­naged by Plato, Leg. 4. pag. 713. The primigenious Truth teacheth us, that there is no cessation of evils in those Cities, in which, [...], not God but some mere mortal presides, &c. In which he makes Religion the foundation of a Republic, which ought in the first place to be provided for: and he gives us this description of Religion, That we believe there is a God, who is the Beginning, Middle, and End of althings; and whose Providence runs through al parts of the Ʋniverse. Thus also, Leg. 10. pag. 800. he assures us, That to denie the existence of a Deitie is the subversion of al politic Societies, as before, §. 1. The force of this Argument lies in this, That the Constitution of al Republics, Nations, and politic Societies is such, that the notices of a supreme Rector and Deitie are absolutely necessarie for the preservation of them. Is it possible, that there should be any politic civil Societie, unlesse there be some bond of Confederation and Consociation? And can there be any Confederation without some fidelitie and confidence each in o­ther? Who wil associate with others, unlesse they can confide in them, at least be secure, that they shal not be ruined by them? Who wil care to live and converse with such, as they look on as their enemies, and by whom they expect to be destroyed? And what ground can there be of confidence and trust in any, if the notions of a supreme Rector and Deitie be banisht out of the world? Who wil make conscience of keeping his word, or not violating al bonds and obligations, if he be not overawed by a sense of some supreme Rector that can punish and reward him? Let us suppose a Citie or Republic of Atheists incorporated under some commun Laws, and consider what confusion, disorders, and inevitable ruine would follow on such an Hypothesis. Would there be any regard or conscience made of words or actions? Doth not. the Atheist, who denies any God above him, destroy [Page 236]al conscience within him? And he that knows he makes consci­ence of nothing, wil also believe, that al his Companions, who are acted by the same atheistic principes, make no conscience of word or deed towards him: and then what diffidences, jealousies, and treacheries necessarily follow hereon? Surely nothing gives men greater confidence and securitie from inhuman violences than a conscience and sense of some supreme Deitie, who is just to punish offenders. Would not every man without this be as a Leviathan, ready to devour his neighbor? Wel indeed might that daring Atheist title his Book of Politics Leviathan, seing every Atheist is or would be such, if he follow his own principes? Are not Dissimulation and Violence the two Cardinal Pillars of the Atheists Republic? O! what Schismes, Seditions, Tyrannie, Anar­chie and universal Dissolution must inevitably attend a Republic of Atheists? Who wil ever make conscience or mind Justice, Order or Subjection to men, who are not overawed with a sense of a supreme Deitie? When every mans Wil is his Law, who wil mind commun justice and equitie? How can the Atheist give cor­dial subjection to any Superior, who owns no supreme Rector to punish, and reward him? Thus we see miserable confusions and dissolutions in States and Republics follow on the denying a Dei­tie and supreme Rector of the politic World. Doth not then the Atheist in denying the Being of a Deitie, deny the wel-being, yea subvert the very Being of the politic World, and al civil Societie?

(4) Lastly,4. From the A­theists Cavils and Enmitie. al the Atheists Cavils and Enmitie against a Deitie, do clearly evince the existence thereof. Were there not indeed a God, the Atheist would not be so sedulous, industrious, indefa­tigable, and implacable in his assaults and attemts against him. We have a good instance hereof given us by Diogenes the Cynic, cited by Laertius in his Life, thus: Lysia the Apothecarie asking Diogenes, Whether he believed there were any Gods? Diogenes replied: [...]; How can I but believe it, when I consider what an enemie thou art to the Gods? May we not make the same replie to the most subtile and proud Atheists? Can we imagine that Atheistic Spirits would spend their most subtile Ratiocinations, the vigor of their Spirits and malice to subvert the belief of a Deitie, were there not indeed a God, whom they hate, and therefore would fain pul off his Throne? If the existence of a Deitie were a poor emty shadow, a [Page 237]mere figment or nothing, would proud Atheists persue it with such violent passion and vehemence as they do? No; their en­mitie against a Deitie strongly proves his Existence.

CHAP. III. Of God, his Names, Nature, Attributes, Unitie, and Simplicitie.

Gods Names. [...] Ens, Being: God only IS in a strict sense. [...] Jehova explicated. [...] Jah. [...] Ehjeh. [...] Elohim. [...] El. [...] Shaddai. [...] Elion. [...] Sabaoth. The Divine Essence and Attributes. Gods Ʋnitie, and Simplicitie.

§. 1. THE Existence of a Deitie being demonstrated,God stiled [...], Ens, or Be­ing. Exod. 3.14. we now procede to explicate, so far as he has reveled himself, his Names, Nature, and Attributes, both according to Sacred and Platonic Philosophie. As for the Names of God, Plato, in his Par­menides, pag. 142. tels us, that properly, [...], he has no name. This is wel expressed by Damascene, Orthodox. Fid. l. 1. c. 15. [...], &c. The Deitie being in­comprehensible, he thence is altogether without Name. Therefore seing we ignore his Essence, we may not inquire after the Name of his Essence. For names are manifestative of things. Yet, addes he, Albeit he be incomprehensible and without Name, as the Author of althings, he as­sumes Names from althings, even from a contraries, as from Light and Darkenesse, &c. Of these Names some are negative, [...], signifying that superessential Being; as inessential, without time, independent, invisible: some are affirmative, which relate to him as the cause of althings: among which those are most proper which are taken from the most ex­cellent things. Whence cap. 12. he saith, That the best Name that can be given to God, is that Exod. 3.14. [...], who is, which denotes plenitude of essence, as in what follows.Non nomen Dei quaeras; Deus est no­men. Minut. Foelix. Thus Plato generally stiles him [...], Ens, or Being: whence Aristotle also makes [...] Ens, the object of his Metaphysics: yet with this difference; [Page 238]whereas Plato, by his [...], understood God the first Being; Ari­stotle by his [...], meant an universal Ens, Being, or rather no­tion abstracted from al actual Beings really existent. That Plato by his [...] Ens, or Being understood God, is evident to any that is acquainted with his Philosophemes: whence he makes it to be the same with [...], Being it self, and [...], that which really is: for, according to his Placits, conformable to sacred Philosophie, nothing in a strict and proper sense can be said to be but the first essential Being: althings else, if compared with God the first Be­ing, are said not to be, Esa. 40.17. Exod. 3.14. Esa. 40.17. That [...], who is, Exod. 3.14. or [...] Ens is the most principal, essential, and proper name of God, Damascene, Orthodox. Fid. l. 1. c. 12. thus demonstrates: [...], Therefore the most principal of al the Names given unto God seems to be this [...], WHO IS, as he answered Moses, Exod. 3.14. Who Is sent me. And he subjoins the reason: [...], For comprehending al in himself, he has Being it self, as it were, an infinite boundlesse Ocean, or which hereafter. Hence Damascene, c. 15. tels us, That the best Names we can give God, are such as are composed of Affirmatives and Nega­tives: as, [...], superessential Essence, and the like. Thus Plato, in his Timaeus, makes [...], that which always is, namely God, to be the only true and proper Being: whereas althings else are in a continual fluxe; and therefore cannot be said, in a strict sense to be existent. This is the reason why he appropriates the name [...] Being, to God the first Being. And we have an illustrious Commentarie hereof given us by Plutarch, on the [...] name [...], Thou art, engraven on the dores of Apollo's Temple: who tels us, ‘That he saw written there in golden Letters two compellations; (1) [...], Know thy self; thereby the God Apollo saluted those that came to worship him: who resaluted their God with this Title of Honor, [...], Thou art. He tels you that many gave their Comments on this Title; but for his part, his sense there­of was this: That the name [...] signified not either order, or num­ber, or any deficient part, as some conceited, [...], but is of it self a perfect compella­tion of God: whereby those that saluted him declared, That Be­ing properly and strictly belongs only to him: [...], &c. for truely we are not participant of Essence; but [Page 239]al mortal nature, being on the confines, yea in the midst of corruption, is but a [...], or emty shadow of Being, scarce appa­rent; on which if you fix your thoughts, it wil soon flie from you. For, as Heraclitus wel observed, No man ever enters a se­cond time into the same river; neither can any apprehend the same frail essence a second time, in the same state: because the celeritie of its mutation doth soon dissipate it: Yea assoon as it existes it pe­risheth: it recedes assoon as it accedes. Whence that which is made cannot properly be said to be: [...], nothing of nature is permanent, yea nothing is: because al Creatures participate more of nothing than of something. But then of God he addes: [...], &c. But God properly IS, and without regard to time, immobile Eternitie: in which there is nothing first or last: nothing past, ancient, or new; but it being one present [...], NOW, it fils up al Duration: in which regard, [...], that which is said TO BE truly IS, not future, not past, not beginning, not ending. Thus God is with the studie of veneration to be saluted: unlesse thou hadst rather reassume the ancient formule, [...], THOƲ ART ONE, &c.’ Wherein Plutarch gives us an incomparable explication of Plato's [...], why this name must be appropriated to God.

But to run up this Platonic Name to its first origine, it is evi­dent, [...] from [...] Jeho­vah. that it was at first derived from sacred Philosophie, and the proper essential Name of God, [...] Jehovah. For the de­monstration hereof we have both indubitable testimonies of the Learned, and also invincible reasons from the thing or name it self. As for testimonies, Eusebius, praepar. Evang. lib. 11. cap. 9. pag. 523. assures us, that this name [...], as appropriated to God, was derived from Exod. 3.14. [...]. So Augustin, Civ. Dei. l. 8. c. 11. Where Lud. Vives shews us the manner how, and reason why [...], was changed by Plato into [...]. The like Steuch. Eugubinus, de peren. Philosoph. l. 3. c. 7. of which be­fore in Pythagoras's Metaphysics, P. 2. B. 2. C. 8. §. 4. But to come to the reasons of the thing, the very name [...], as the LXX. turne it, or [...], as Plato, received its origination from [...] Jehovah, and is indeed of the same import. For we must deduce [...] from the ancient Greek Verbe [...], I am: and this from [...] the name of Juno; or else immediately from [...], which they de­rived from Jehovah: otherwise we may deduce [...] and [...] from [Page 240] [...] ho he is, which is a part of the name [...] Jehovah, which coming from the root [...] he was, properly and primarily signi­fies nothing else, but HE THAT WAS, the same with Plato's [...], and the LXX. [...].

But to explicate this more fully,Jehovah the proper essential Name of God. we must know, that this Name [...] Jehovah is the most proper and essential name of God, whereby his infinite Essence and Perfections are most lively set forth. The Hebrews stile this name Jehovah [...], the name of Substance, or [...], the name of Essence; answera­bly whereto the Greeks stile it, [...], the name of essence; because it doth most properly describe the Essence of God, who, [...], contains the whole of Being or Essence in himself, as an in­finite immense Ocean. That Jehovah is the proper name of God, Critics prove (1) from [...] which being prefixed notes a pro­per name, as in [...] Isaac, and [...] Jacob, with others. (2) In that it hath no Plural Number. (3) In that it's never put in state of Regiment. (4) In that it's never found with [...] pre­fixed. (5) Nor yet with an affixed Pronoun in the end. That [...] Jehovah is a name most proper to God, is evident from Exod. 15.3.Exod. 15.3. Jehovah is his name. Thence the Hebrews terme it [...], the proper name: also [...], the separate name; because separate from other names of God, which are at­tributed to the Creatures. They likewise terme it, [...], the four-lettered Name; because it is composed of four Letters. Thence the Greek [...], and Pythago­ras's [...], of which before, Part 2. B. 2. C. 8. §. 1. pag. 182. Again, they cal it [...], which the Greeks interpret [...], the name of Remembrance, Psal. 30.4. answerably to Psal. 30.4. Lastly, they terme it [...], the gloriose and terrible Name, from Deut. 28.52.

The force and essicace of this name [...] is wel expressed by John, The Explication of Jehova. Rev. 1.4, 8. & 11.17. & 16.5. Rev. 1.4. [...], He that is, that was, and that is to come, or wil be. So v. 8. & 11.17. & 16.5. In which explication note, that [...] is the same with [...], which Beza placeth, Rev. 16.5. and that accor­ding to the Idiome of the Hebrews, who expresse the word future, sometimes by a word that signifies to come. And Critics draw al these three differences of time from [...] Jehovah. For, say they, the letter [...] in the beginning denotes the future, he wil be: [Page 241]and [...] in the middle, being a Participle of the Present Tense, He is: and [...] in the end with kametz under-written, what is past, He was: which is also denoted by the Radix [...] havah. This the Hebrew Doctors acknowledge: for R. Bechai, on Exod. pag. 65. saith, that these three times, past, present, and to come are comprhended in this proper name [...]. And they adde, That God reveled to Moses, Exod. 3.14, 15. those two names [...] and [...];Exod. 3.14, 15. because out of them may be composed those three, [...] I was, [...] I am, and [...] I shal be. Hence we may conclude, that this name [...] Jehova is most sacred, essential, and proper to God, and descri­ptive of (1) his Eternitie, in that it eminently comprehendeth al differences of time, as john expounds it, Rev. 1.4, 8. (2) His simple independent Essence, as he is Being it self, pure, absolute, per­fect Being and Act, void of al passive power, composition, and imperfection. He being indeed and properly [...],Esa. 44.6. Esa. 44.6. (3) His Efficacitie and Causalitie in giving Being and Existence to al his Creatures. He being not only [...], the first independent Essence; but also [...], He that give Essence and Being to al his Creatures. (4) His Omnipotence and Veracitie, in giving being and effect to his promisses, and word. In which regard God saith, Exod. 6.3. that he was not known to Abra­ham, Exod. 6.3. Isaac, and Jacob by the Name Jehovah, i. e. because he had not fulfilled and given effect to his promisse made to them, and thence not opened this name. From this name Jehovah, the Greeks framed [...] and the Latins their Jovis, &c.

There are other Names given to God in sacred Philosophie, whereof we sind some Imitaments in the Grecian Philosophie. As (2) God is stiled [...] jah. This is also a proper Name of God,Jah. which some of the Hebrews make an abregement and part of the Name [...] Jehova, as R. Moses Maimonides, de Fundament. Legis, cap. 6. sect. 4. Hence the LXX. render it by [...], as they do [...]: and so it signifies the eternal, independent Essence of God, who gives essence and existence to al his Creatures, and Wods. It is seldome used but in Songs and Psalmes, as Exod. 15.2. Psal. 68.5. and elsewhere. Whence the Hebr. [...] Halelujah, praise ye Jah, is kept by the Greek Rev. 19.1, 3, 4, 6.Rev. 19.1, 3, 4, 6. Thus also in the Paean, or Song sung to Apollo, they began and ended it with [...], Eleleu Je, which is an evident imitamen of Halelujah. From [...] jah also, which some Greeks pronounced [...], was deri­ved Jupiter, i. e. Father Jah, Juno, Janus, Diana: [...], from [Page 242] [...] the fire of Jah, &c. (3) Another essential Name, where­by God describes himself,Ehjeh. Exod. 3.12, 14. is [...] Ehjeh, I shal be, as Exod. 3.12, 14. which the Hebrews also reckon among the ten Names of God. (4) God is likewise stiled [...] Eloah, and [...], Elo­him, [...],Elohim. ?Elohe in the Plural Number, which some derive from the Arabic [...] to worship: others from the Hebr. [...] to swear: but the most probable origination is that of Marcus Marinus in Arca Noae, Abarbenel, and others; who derive it form [...] El, [...] being added, and so it signifies most potent and soverain Lord. It speakes Gods relation to, Dominion and soverain Authoritie over his Creatures;Gen. 1.1. therefore Moses, Gen. 1.1. treating of Gods Crea­tion and Dominion cals him [...]. Whence Abarbenel makes it to be attributed to God, as the omnipotent Effector and Productor of althings; because when God is brought in as Creator the Scri­pture stiles him by this Name. So Nachmanni makes [...] to be q. [...] El hem, their strength, meaning the Creatures; because he is [...] the force of forces, i. e. the supreme Virtue and Essicace of al Creatures. The Hebrews generally make it to sig­nifie properly a Judge or Magistrate: Thence it is attributed to Civil Magistrates as Gods Vicegerents,Exod. 22.8. Exod. 22.8. From [...] Eloah came [...], as from [...] Elohim. [...] mentioned in the fragments of Sanchoniathon. El. (5) [...] El, another Name of God, is derived from [...] Fortitude, force, or from [...] Fortitude, Virtue, Power, &c. So [...] properly signifies the potent powerful God, who contains in himself the virtues and efficaces of althings. Thence,Exod. 15.11. Psal. 89.6. saith Moses, Exod. 15.11. Who like thee, [...], among the potent, O Lod? So David, Psal. 89.6. Who among the sons of [...] Elim, of the mighty can be likened unto thee, O Lord? Whence God is stiled,Gen. 14.20. Gen. 14.20. [...] the most high El, or mighty God: also Esa. 9.5.Esa. 9.5. [...] El Gibbor, the most mighty God. Aquila renders [...], according to its origination, [...]. Again, God is stiled,Dan. 11.36. Dan. 11.36. [...] El Elim, the most potent of al potents. From this name [...] El, the Syrians stiled their Saturne [...] and [...], as Damascius, in Photius. Hence also [...] the Sun received its origination.Shaddai. (6) God is also called [...] Schaddai; which is most oft joined with [...] El, Gen. 17.1. as Gen. 17.1. & 35.11. as else­where. Some deduce it from [...] to destroy: others from [...] suf­ficient q. [...] Scheddai, Adonai. who is sufficient. (7) [...] Adonai is ano­ther illustrious Name of God, which is first in Scripture given to him by Abraham, Gen. 15.2. Gen. 15.2. [...] and signifies primarily [Page 243] Lord, from [...] Eden, a basis; because a Lord is the basis or pillar of a familie: according to the origination of [...], a King, from [...], the basis of the people: So that according to its origination [...] signifies my bases, stayes, or pillars: and sitly ap­plied by Abraham to God, who, as a basis or pillar, sustained him in al his infirmities. Some thinke it implies a Mysterie of the whole Trinitie. It properly belongs to God as he is Lord of the Universe, a great house built and founded by him: thence among the Latins Dominus à Domus. From Adonai came the Pagan God Adonis. (8) God is stiled also [...] Elion, the most high; Elion. which is an Adjective frequently added to some other name of God, as [...] El Elion, Gen. 14.19, 22.Gen. 14.19, 22. El Elion the Genitor of Heaven and Earth. Which in Sanchoniathon's fragments is thus expressed: [...]. Which fully explicates the Hebrew [...] most high. (9) The Hebrews reckon also [...] Sabaoth, Hostes among the Names of God: but,Zebaoth. as it is wel obser­ved by Buxtorf, this name put absolutely is never attributed to God, but only as appendent to some other divine Name, [...], or [...], or both conjunct, and expressed in our Version the Lod of Hostes. (10) The Greeks cal God [...], which som derive from [...] to run, as it denotes the swift motion of the Sun, which was the first and principal God among the Grecians: and in this notion [...] may be derived from [...] tha, to come. Others derive [...] from [...], as it notes to dispose and order the Ʋniverse, which is proper to God: Others derive [...] from [...] to see; because God sees a'things. These three Originations I find together in Damascene, Orthodox. Fid. l. 1. c. 12. Lastly, others deduce [...] from [...] dai, it sufficeth; and so it answers to [...] shaddai, the Name of God denoting his Alsufficience. But here we are to take notice, that both Sacred and Ethnic Philosophie ascribe unto God various Names, not to make any schisme or breach in his Unitie, but thereby to expresse his various Attributes, and Operations, as in what follows of the Unitie of God §. 9.

§. 2. The various Names of God lead us into the contempla­tion of his Nature and Attributes whereby he has reveled himself.The Divine Es­sence and Attri­butes. The Divine Essence, as in it self, by reason of its absolute Simpli­citie and Infinitude, can neither be defined by us, nor yet appre­hended under any one adequate conception or notion. Derodone would needs persuade us, that God may be capable of a defini­tion, as he comprehends himself, &c. But how improper yea [Page 244]absurd such an Hypothesis is, wil be evident, if we consider, ei­ther the nature of a Definition, or of God. (1) The nature of a Definition evidently demonstrates, that God is not capable there­of: Doth not the very notion of a Definition exclude the Deitie from its confines? What is [...] a Definition but the terme of limits of an Essence? Do not al Definitions [...] limit things? And may God, who hath no limits to his Essence, fal under the limits of a Definition? Whence procede al termes of Definition but from termes of Essence? And can what is infinite be limi­ted? Whence, (2) The Nature of God absolves him from al laws or termes of Definition. As for Derodones replie, That God may be said to define himself, because he perfectly understands him­self, it is very jejune, and unworthy of so learned a Philosopher. For (1) God is the object of the Definition, and not the sub­ject: al definitions are said to be perfect or imperfect in regard of our minds the subjects thereof. (2) May we not as wel say, that God can limit and bound himself, as define himself? for every definition is [...] the terme or Boundary of the Essence. Would it not be accounted next to blasphemie, to say God can confine himself, or make himself finite? and yet such is the import of this Hypothesis maintained by Derodone. And as God cannot be de­fined, so neither be apprehended by one adequate notion: For how can a compound finite capacitie take in a simple infinite ob­ject by one single apprehension? Hence it has pleased the divine Being to revele his infinite simple Essence under diverse Names and Attributes, thereby to render his perfections more apprehen­sible and intelligible by our finite and compound capacities. These Attributes are identified both among themselves, and with the divine Essence: neither are they many in God, but one most sim­ple Essence. Yet, according to our manner of considering things, which is compound, we apprehend them as diverse: For we con­ceive God, [...], according to diverse considerations, not as if there were any real composition in God, as Athanasius. Hence Plato compares God to a Circle: [...], God always acts as in a circle, or makes a circle. Which Symbol he had from the Egyptians, who defined God, an intelligi­ble Circle, whose Centre is everywhere and Circumference no where. A Circle is of al figures most simple, because without angles; and yet most capacious and perfect: wherefore a lively symbolic image of the divine Essence and Perfections. God is the begin­ning [Page 245]of althings as the centre, and the middle of althings as the Diameter, and the end of althings as the circumference. Thence Plato. Leg. 4. pag. 713. saith, God is, according to the old Tradi­tion, the beginning, end, and middle of althings. Again, God gives being to althings as the Centre, governs althings as the Diame­ter, conserves althings as the Circumference. God as a Centre moves al and yet is immobile; as the Circumference compre­hends al. The Centre, as it is one immobile point, indigitates and illustrates Gods Ʋnitie, Simplicitie and Immutabilitie: The cir­cumference, being without beginning and end, most capacious and perfect, poihnts out Gods Eternitie, Infinitie, Immensitie, and Perfe­ction. As the divine Attributes are lively displayed in the Word of God, so also in his Workes. The Omnipotence of God shone forth with most irradiant beams in the Creation of the World, and its infant state by many miraculose experiments of divine Providence: The Wisdome of God has been ever most illustrious in the counterworking al the politic Contrivements and Un­dertakements of his Churches enemies: His commun Bountie, in the preservation and support of Mankind since the Fal: His Ju­stice, in punishing sinners: and al his Attributes in the Redem­tion of sinners. Such are the various Theatres on which Gods Attributes display themselves.

First, God is an absolute independent self Being or Essence. God an absolute independent Es­sence. This Hypothesis Platonic as wel as sacred Philosophie maintains. Thus much al the fore-mentioned essential Names of God, [...] Jehovah, [...], and Ehjeh demonstrate. So likewise the descripti­on of God, Exod. 3.14. [...], &c. whereto Plato's , and [...] concord, as it has been fully demonstrated in what pre­cedes §. 1. Thus Damascemus, de Fide Orthodoxa, lib. 1. cap. 12. [...], &c. [...], WHO IS seems to be the most principal and proper of the divine Names: fo it contains in it the whole of Essence, as it were an infinite Ocean. Thus Author Lib. de Fundamentis, l. 2. c. 27. Therefore it is manifest, saith he, [...], &c. That the name Ens cannot be properly attributed to any Being, but God. For of other Beings it cannot be said, that they al­wayes are, but only whiles they exist, not before, or after. But the blessed God, because he alwayes remains in the same state, therefore his Essence is truely Ens. The notion of Ens is properly ascribed to him, whose Being depends not on any but himself. For in that his Being depends on [Page 246]his own Essence, he is no way contingent— No Creature can be said absolutely to BE; because it depends on another: neither is Being due to it, but with relation to its Cause. The like Eulogus, in Photius: [...], &c. Essence it self is one thing in the superprincipal Trinitie, and another thing in us: for there it is superessential, but here it is not properly Ens. For how can that be properly Ens, which is produced out of Nothing, and of its own nature returnes to nothing? Al Crea­tures have a tincture of their primitive Nothing, yea more of Nothing than Something; and therefore deserve not the name of Being if compared with God the first, absolute, independent Being, as Esa. 40.17.Esa. 40.17. Hence God is stiled by Damascene, [...], superessential Essence. And the Egyptians generally, in imitation of the Mosaic Philosophie, stiled God [...], Ens. Thus Plutarch, in his Isis and Osiris, informes us, ‘That at Sai, in Egypt, there was a Temple dedicated to Minerva, whom they suppose to be the same with Isis, which had this Inscription on it: [...], I AM AL THAT EXISTES, AND IS, AND SHAL BE: AND MY VEIL NO MORTAL YET UNCOVERED.’ This Inscription is but a Periphrase of Exod. 3.14. And by her Veil, with which she was pictured, is meant the incomprehensibilitie of the divine Essence, which no mortal yet unveiled, as hereafter. Yea, Aristotle, Metaph. l. 1. acknow­legeth, that Melissus thought, [...] the one God, to be necessarily [...], Being it self. But sacred Philosophie gives us the most lively no­tices of the divine Essence. Thus Moses inquiring after Gods Name,Exod. 3.14. he describes himself thus: Exod. 3.14. I am that I am: i. e. absolute, necessarie, simple, independent Being, yea as it were al Being.Esa. 44.6. Rev. 1.8, 11. So Esa. 44.6. I am the first and the last, besides me there is no God. Which stile Christ assumes, Rev. 1.8. I am [...] and [...], i. e. I am the beginning and the end, the first and the last, as v. 11. The same c. 21.6. & 22.13. which descriptions of the divine Essence implie these particulars. (1) That God is the first Being. Thus Esa. 44.48.Esa. 44.48. I am he, I am the first, I also am the last. Thus also in Platonic Philosophic God is stiled [...], the first Being. Hence, (2) God is Ens [...], an independent Being. Thence Plato stiles him [...], self-Being: i. e. neither from any other, nor of any other, nor by any other, nor for any other. That must needs exist of, and in and for, and from it self, whose Es­sence [Page 247]is the adequate reason and cause why it existes. Essence and Existence have one and the same formal Idea in God; because he existes in and by his own Essence. It is not so in Creatures: they cannot be said to exist in and by the force of their own es­sence, but by the force of their causes, specially the first: whence it follows, that they are Beings not by essence, but by participa­tion and reception of essence and existence from the first Cause. Hence, (3) God is a Being absolutely and simply necessary. For God existing in and by his own Essence, it is impossible for him not to exist: his Essence is so infinitely and absolutely perfect, as that it includes existence, yea an impossibilitie of not existing. Existence agrees not essentially and necessarily to any Creature, but contingently: whatever Creature existes, might not have existed, and may yet not exist, if it seems good to the first Being. But the first independent Being has Existence absolutely and simply necessary: he is so much in Act, as Ens in its most universal no­tion is in power: his Essence being infinite, necessarily and emi­nently contains whatever is or may be of perfection in al Being, either existent or possible. Whatever is once essentially, simply and absolutely such, is always such; yea necessarily such: if a thing be once simply and absolutely possible, it is always possi­ble: and if it be once simply and absolutely necessary, it is al­ways necessary; because what doth not once implie a contradi­ction, never doth. We see in the World some things are possi­ble, and yet not ac tually existent: now al things that are possible must be reduced to some first necessary Being, that gave them their possibilitie, and must give them their actual existence, or they wil never attain to it. Hence it follows, that the Essence and Existence of the first Being is simply and absolutely necessary. Whence (4) God is in a sense Al Being; because he is the first independent self-Being, simply and absolutely necessary, contain­ing in himself al Being, and imparting to althings al possible essence and existence. Al Beings by participation do essentially and necessarily depend on the first necessary self Being. This the spurious Dionysius, according to the Pythagorean and Platonic mode, expresseth by Unitie. [...], Ʋnitie, saith he, hath al number in it singularly and unitely: so the divine Being, al Beings and Per­fections. The same he illustrates by the Centre of a Circle, in which al the lines unite and subsist. Indeed created Beings conside­red in themselves, without relation to the first Being, deserve not [Page 248]the name of Essence, but Privation: for what are they, it ab­stracted from the first necessary Being, but mere painted or ra­ther possible shadows of Being? Hence, (5) Nothing is univo­cally commun to, or predicated of the first independent Being, and created dependent Beings. It's true we cal the Creature Ens, as wel as God; but it must be understood not univocally, but analo­gically; so as the notion Ens primarily, eminently, and most pro­perly belongs to the first Being; and to the Creatures only analo­gically, or as some equivocally. So also Divines make mention of communicable Attributes, commun to God and the Creatures: yet so, as that they primarily belong to God, and to the Crea­tures only secundarily: albeit they are transferred from the Crea­tures to God, and so in their formal Idea are primarily attributed to the Creature. That nothing can predicate univocally of God and the Creature is most evident; because an efficient, cannot re­ceive a name, taken from that nature, according to an univocal denomination or predication: Now nothing made by God can arrive to the same kind of perfection with God; and therefore nothing can be univocally affirmed of God and the Creature. And this seems to be the genuine reason why Plato appropriated the name [...] to God; (though Aristotle gives it to other things) be­cause it originally, primarily, and most properly belongs to him, in comparison of whom althings else are deservedly said not to be, as in Job and Esaias. (6) The divine Attributes are said to be distin­guished from the Essence, as also among themselves, not only ra­tione ratiocinante, but also ratione ratiocinata, so as the fundament of the distinction be in God himself, as Amesius. (7) Lastly, we find the divine Essence and Attributes wel described by Damascene, Orthodox. Fic. lib. 1. cap. 2. out of the primitive Greek Theologie thus: [...], &c. But that God is without cause, without end, sempiterne and e4ternal, increate, immutable, inalte­rable, simple, incomposite, incorporeous, invisible, intangible, incircum­scripte, infinite, incomprehensible, good, just, ommipotent, the Opificer of al Creatures, comprehensive of althings, provident of althings, the su­preme [Page 249]Soverain and Judge, we both acknowledge and confesse. Also that God is one, namely in Ʋnitie of Essence; which is known in three Per­sons, Father, Son, and holy SPirit, &c.

§. 3. The first Attribute that occurs for explication of the di­vine Being is Ʋnitie, The Divine Ʋ ­nitie. whereof we find great and lively notices both in sacred and Platonic Philosophie. Thus Moses, Deut. 6.4.Deut. 6.4. Hear O Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord. Mose here first cals for their solemne attention, and then laies down his assertion tou­ching the Unitie of the divine Essence; which he seems to bot­tome on the very name [...] subjoined as a part of the predicate, denoting, that he who is the first independent Essence and Essen­tiator of althings can be but one. Thus frequently in the N. T. Mar. 12.32. Rom. 3.29, 30. 1 Tim. 2.5, &c. And we find much in Platonic Philosophie of the same import. Thus Plato, in his Parmenides, (where he lays down his prime metaphysic Philoso­phemes) pag. 142. [...], &c. If there be One, can it possibly be, but that it should part ake of Essence? Where he seems to make [...] and [...], Ens & unum convertible, namely that Ens is one, and one Ens. So he concludes: [...], For ONE always embraceth ENS, and ENS ONE with mutual embraces. His plain naked mind is, that the first Being and One admit of reciprocation, i. e. God the first Be­ing is the prime Unitie. Aristotle also and his sectators make Ens and Ʋnum convertible; but in a far different manner from Plato, who understood both of God. Thus also Pythagoras held, [...], That Ʋnitie is the first principe of al­things. It's true Plato, as others, makes mention of many Gods; yet he tels us, That it was from the Autoritie of their Ancestors, and by reason of the severitie of Laws, [...], without Demonstration or Oriental Tradition: yea he confesseth that [...], Polytheisme was repugnant to right reason. And this he learned from his Master Socrates, who was so zelose and warme in this particular, that he was content to suffer a Pagan Martyr­dome for the avouching the Ʋnitie of God, against the Laws and Customes of the Athenians. Plutarch, on the INscription [...] E 1, Thou art, engraven on the dores of the Delphic Temple, assures us, that the ancient name given unto God was [...] E 1 [...] EN THOƲ ART ONE. For there cannot be many Gods but one: [...], One ought to be Being, as Being one. For [...], Diversitie or Alteritie is placed with the difference of Being: [Page 250]but One is sincere, and without mixture: for by the mixture of another with another a thing is made compound and impure. Wherein he strong­ly proves, that God can be but one, because a pure, necessary, abso­lute Being, or Act, without mixture and composition. Plutarch also, in the Life of Numa Pompilius, assures us, ‘That some learned Romans, and that not without cause, do attribute the order of the beginning and end of mans life to one self-God and Power divine.’ So Laertius, in the Life of Zeno, informes us, That the Stoics held, [...], that there was one God called by diverse names, according to his Proprieties, or Attributes and Operations. Thus Seneca: There are so many Names of God, as there are Offices. Hence they stiled their Jupiter, [...], &c. not that they intended to assert many Deities; but one and the same Deitie, with regard to his various opertions. So Aristotle, in his Book de Mundo, confes­seth, There was but one God, called by diverse names from his effects, Thus also Augustin, de Civit. l. 7. c. 11. ‘Al these names they im­posed on the one God, by reason of his diverse powers and causa­lities: not that from the diversitie of effects they asserted diverse Gods.’ And that almost al the learned Philosopher asserted one God is maintained by Suarez, Metaph. Disp. 30. sect. 10. pag. 97.

As for rational Arguments, the Ʋnitie of God may be thus de­monstrated. (1) That there is a God, who is a necessary inde­pendent Being, has been already proved: hence it is evident, that he can be but one: For a Being absolutely necessary, and from it self, has a necessitie of Being so far as it is singular: therefore it is not multiplicable or more than one. For if a singular is not multiplicable; then whatever agrees to any thing as singular, admits not of multiplicabilitie. That a Being absolutely necessary and independent has its necessitie of Being as singular is evident; because singularitie is essential and necessary to a Being absolute­ly necessary as such: for a Being absolutely necessary is such so far as in act: and it is in act as singular: whence singularitie intrinsecally and essentially belongs thereto, as Suarez, Metaph. Disp. 30. sect. 10. Thus the Author of the Book de Fundament. l. 2. c. 6. [...], &c. ‘There is therefore in the World a Being necessarily existing of it self, which hath no cause nor equal; seing it is the Cause of althings; from which their substance and existence is, but his existence dependes not on any thing without himself. This is the blessed God: who is therefore one; because an Ens necessa­rily [Page 251]existing.’ (2) Again, if there be two or more Gods; then they are al infinite, independent, and self-Beings; or some produ­ced and finite: The first implies a coutradiction; because there cannot be many infinites: the later also; because such Beings should be produced by real efficience and yet eternal; also essen­tially diverse from the first Being that produced them, and yet equal, because God. (3) That which is most singularly perfect, self-sufficient and infinite can be but one. For if there were two things or more singularly perfect and infinite; then they would differ really, or be the same. If the same, then they are not two: if they really differ, then one has somewhat which the other has not: if so, then neither is most singularly perfect and infinite. For infinite comprehendes al perfection. Thus Damascene, Or­thodox. Fid. l. 1. c. 5. [...], &c. The Di­vinitie is perfect and indeficient every way— If then we assert many Gods, they must be different: but if there be a difference among them, where is their perfection? For if one be different either in Bonitie, Wis­dome, Virtue, &c. he so far comes short of perfection: See more of Gods Unitie, Aquinas contra Gent. l. 1. c. 42.

§. 4. Next to the Unitie of God follows his Simplicitie, The Simplicitie of God explica­ted. which is most absolute, as both Sacred and Platonic Philosophie teacheth. Sacred Philosophie expresseth the absolute Simplicitie of God un­der the name [...] Jehovah, as also by the Paraphrase thereon, Exod. 3.14. I am that I am, i. e. a simple pure Act;Exod. 3.14. a Being neces­sarily existent in Act, and therefore most simple, without the least shadow of Power, either objective, or receptive. So Psal. 102.27.Psal. 102.27. but thou art the same, i. e. a uniforme simple Being. Plato in imi­tation of sacred Philosophie, expresseth the same by [...], the first, entire, perfect, uniforme, most simple Being, without the least compo­sition. Thence, in his Conv. p. 211. he stiles God, [...], the sincere and uniforme Beautie; because without al mixture and composition: The Simplicitie of God is described by our Lord under the notion of a Spirit, Joh. 4.24. God is a Spi­rit, Joh. 4.24. i. e. (1) As he is a pure Act, void of al passive power, either physic or metaphysic. Althings are so far spirital, as they partake of Act: and by how much the more spirital things are, by so much the more simple. Among the Elements, the Wind and Fire are most simple, because most spirital; Angels and human Souls are in an higher degree spirital and simple; because exemted from al Laws of physic Mater: yet they are in some respect com­posite [Page 252]of Act and Power, Substance and Accidents; because they are under the laws of metaphysic obediential passive power, as Crea­tures. But God is so pure a Spirit and Act, as that al metaphysic as wel as physic power is denied of him. (2) God is said to be a Spirit, as most vigorous and active. Our Lord assures us, that the Wind being of a spirital nature, Joh. 3.8. bloweth whithersoever it listeth. Yet Angels and human Spirits are much more active and potent: But God infinitely transcendes al other Spirits in point of activitie and efficacitie: which also speakes the simplicitie of his Being. For by how much the more simple any thing is, by so much the more active and vigorous: Al mater is dul and phleg­matic.

Plato philosophiseth much of the Simplicitie of God. So Re­pub. 2. pag. 380. he saith: God doth not varie his forme or shape, but that he is, [...], a most simple Being; and of althings least varies from his own Idea or Essence. So pag. 381. he saith: God remains always, [...], simply one, and in the same forme. Of which more in what follows, of Gods Immutabilitie. But he treats more fully of the Simplicitie of God in his Metaphysics, Parmenid. pag. 137. If one [i. e. God] be any thing, it cannot truely be many, i. e. compound: and he gives this reason of his Hypothesis: [...], Neither can there be any part thereof, nei­ther can it be a whole: for a part is the part of a whole: and that is a whole to which no part is wanting. Whence he concludes: [...], Wherefore neither wil it be a whole, neither wil it have parts, if one shal be one. His meaning is, that God, who is one simple Being, is neither whole, nor has he parts. This Argument he more fully improves pag. 138. Simpli­citie doth not adde any real entitie or mode to that which is there­by denominated simple; but only a negation of composition: For simplicitie is the same with perfect and indivisible Unitie. This Simplicitie of God is most absolute: For (1) he is not composed of Logic parts, as of Genus and Differentia; because there is no­thing before God, nor yet a Species contradistinct to him. (2) God is not composed of physic parts, either essential or integral; be­cause he is a Spirit. Thus Damascene, Orthodox. Fid. lib. 1. cap. 14. [...], &c. Whatever things are spoken of God corporally, are spoken symbolically; but they have an higher mind: [Page 253]for the Deitie is simple, and has no figure. (3) Neither is he com­posed of metaphysic parts, namely Act and Power; because he is pure Act. (4) He is not composed of Ens and Essence; or of Es­sence and Existence; because he is Being in the abstract, Exod. 3.14. He so lives, as that he is life it self, Joh. 5.26. & 14.6. (5) He is not composed of Subject and Accident; because whatever is in God is God. Moreover, God being the most perfect Being, he can neither admit nor need any accidental perfection. So Da­mascene, Orthod. Fid. l. 1. c. 18. In us habits come and go; but not in God: for in him nothing comes or goes: [...], for he is inalterable and immutable; neither is it lawful to ascribe any accident unto him: for goodnesse in God is coincident with his Essence. The same he addes: [...], Neither may we say that there is a Qualitie in God, or that he is compounded of Essence and Qualitie. (6) He is not composed of Attributes; because they are the same with his Essence. Thus Damascene, Orthodox. Fid. l. 1. c. 13. having spo­ken of the divine Attributes and Relations, he addes: [...], Therefore al these must be considered in the whole Deitie in commun, and as the same, and indistinctly, and unitely. (7) Neither is he composed of Decrees; because they differ not from his Nature. (8) He is not composed of Essence and Rela­tion, or Nature and Personalitie; because the personal relations, albeit they admit some kind of distinction, yet they give no com­position; seing each Person is the very divine Essence, though with some incomprehensible modification. Thus Damascene, Or­thodox. Fid. l. 1. c. 15. [...], For the Deitie is not a com­posite; but in three perfect, [Persons] one perfect, indivisible, and incomposite, [Essence.] So cap. 8. God is both Father always existing, and ingenite: God is also the Son, who always, eternally, influxibly, im­passibly is begotten of the Father: God also is the holy Spirit, &c. The Essence and Personalitie are included in the Person of the Father, Son, and Spirit, in a way not of composition, but of ineffable conjunction and union. (9) Neither is the Deitie composed of Essence and Operation. It's true, the operations of God, conside­red in their passive Attingence, and as they terminate on create effects, are the same with or at least only modally distinct from [Page 254]the effect, and therefore really distinct from God; but if we con­sider them in regard of their active Attingence, as relating to God the Principe, so they are the same with the Divine Wil, and there­fore not really distinct from the Divine Essence, as in what fol­lows, Chap. 7. §. 3. Thus Damascene, Orthod. Fid. lib. 1. cap. 13. [...], &c. The true word teacheth, that God is simple, and hath one simple operation. So Chap. 18. [...], &c. The divine effulgence and operation is one Essence, both simple, and im­partible, and boniforme in things partible variate [as to operation] and distributing whatever is constitutive of proper Nature, it remains simple: i. e. albeit it acts variously, according to the indigence of its subject, yet it remains invariable and simple. Hence (10) we must, with Plato, denie, that God, the most simple Being, may be stiled a whole; because he can in no regard be said to have parts.

The absolute Simplicitie of God may be demonstrated (1) From the Perfection of God.The Simplicitie of God demon­strated. Al parts as parts are finite, incom­plete and imperfect. Again, every whole is dependent both on its cause and on the parts whereof it is composed: but there is no­thing incomplete or dependent in God; because he is most per­fect. Moreover al parts are in order of nature before the whole, and therefore need some bond of union to knit them together: but God is [...], without al cause, prioritie, or posterioritie. Last­ly, in every kind things are by so much the more noble and per­fect, by how much the more simple they are: wherefore God be­ing the most perfect Being must needs be most simple. (2) From the Ʋnitie of God. This Argument Plato useth, as before. So Parmenid. pag. 144. We did not therefore speak truely even now, when we said, [...], that Essence, [i. e. God] was divided into many parts: for he cannot be divided into more than one: for unto him al (as it is most consentaneous) are equal. Neither is Being wanting to Ʋnitie, neither Ʋnitie to Being [i. e. God] but these two are altogether equal. Where­in he proves the Simplicitie of God from his Ʋnitie: and it may be thus improved. Unitie is generally described negatively by indi­vision [Page 255]in regard of it self, and division from other things. Now the divine Essence is most indivisible as to it self, but most divided and distant from althings else: therefore it is most one: and if most one, then also most simple. Thus Aristot. Metaph. l. 4. c. 6. [...], &c. Those things, whose essential notion is indivise and inseparable, such are most one and simple. And is not the first Being such? May we conceive the least divisibilitie in his Essence? This Argument is wel urged by Simplicius, in Epict. cap. 1. pag. 9. [...], One Bonitie produceth many Bonities; and one Simplicitie and Ʋnitie, which excels al others, many Ʋnities; and one Principe many Principes: For One, Principe, Good, and God are the same. Where he proves the Simplicitie of God from his Unitie. Thus also the Author of the Book de Fun­damentis, l. 2. c. 10. [...], &c. The name ONE is truely said of that, which is indivise in it self and divise as to althings else. And by how much the more proper it is to any thing tobe distinguished from other things, by so much the more it may be said to be one. Thence he concludes, That nothing in the world can be said to be so one, as to be truely distinct from althings else, but God, who is therefore most simple. So Damascene, Orthod. Fid. l. 1. c. 19. [...], The Deitie [or Divine Unitie] is multiplied in things parti­ble impartibly, drawing and converting things partible, to his own Sim­plicitie: i. e. The Deitie, being in it self the most simple Unitie, is multiplied as to operations in althings according to their indi­gence, yet without the least multiplicitie in it self; but it con­vertes althings multiplied to its own simple Unitie. (3) From the nature of Composition. What is Composition, but the union of things distinct? And doth not imperfection always attend di­stinction? Take the most subtile and refined composition, which they make to be of Ens and Essence, or of Essence and Existence, and doth there not some imperfection attend the same? Doth not al Composition import some efficience, and thence depen­dence? Can that which is compounded be eternal? Doth it not implie a beginning, and that something was before it? Is it not a flat contradiction to say, something was compounded from Eternitie? Lastly, where Composition is, there division may be; [Page 256]and so by consequence dissolution, which to affirme of God is blas­phemous. This Argument is wel improved by Damascene, Or­thodox. Fid. l. 1. c. 12. [...], &c. The Deitie is simple and incomposite: but that which doth coalesce out of many differences is composite. If therefore we shal say, that in­create, independent, incorporeous, immortal, eternal, good, Creator, and the like, are substantial differences, and different substances in God, be­ing composed of so many things, he wil not be simple, but composite: which truely to affirme is extreme impietie. It's meet therefore to con­ceive, that each of these, as affirmed of God, do signifie, not what he is in Essence, but either what he is not, or a certain [...], habitude which he hath to those things that are distinguisht from him, or that participate nature and operation from him. Wherein he gives us the genuine reason, why the divine Essence, which is in it self most simple, is expressed under various Names, and Attributes; namely thereby to remove al imperfection from him, or to illustrate some perfe­ction that is in him, by the habitude which he has to things made by him. (4) From Gods prime Causalitie and Efficience. That God is the frist Cause of althings is clearly evident from what has been before laid down of his Existence. Hence it necessarily follows, that he is most simple: For whatever is composite, is such by some preexistent cause, which framed its composition. This Argument is wel managed by Simplicius, in Epict. c. 1 p. 9. [...], For God is the first Being and Cause of althings: But now what is first, is necessarily most simple. For whatever is composite, as it is composite and multiplied, it is posterior to one. (5) From Gods Actualitie. That there is one pure Act, which is actuated by nothing else, but actuates althings else, is most evident to any, that dare not grant a progresse into infinitie, as to Acts. Now what partakes of pure Act, but the first Being, who was never in possibilitie to be, but always a pure Act as to his Essence? God the first Being is actually and eternally whatever he may be; neither can he ever be what actually he is not. Every Creature had a possibilitie not to be before it was; and it stil retains the same possibilitie: but God is such a pure [Page 257]Act, as that not the least possibilitie, or potentialitie can be affirmed of him. He is such a pure subsistent Act, as excludes al state existing in power or potentialitie, either passive or objective; which speakes the highest simplicitie. (6) From the Immutabili­tie of God. Whatever is composite is mutable: for where there is composition, there may be division, which implies mutabilitie. But God is most immutable, as we shal, in what immediately fol­lows, demonstrate. This Argument is wel managed by Plato, in his Phaedo, pag. 78. [...], Therefore it is most agreable, that those things which are always and equally the same, be incomposite: but things that are otherwise, and not the same, that those are composite. (7) From the Infinitie of God. Whatever is compound has parts: If God has parts, they must be finite or infinite: finite they cannot be; because infinite cannot be composed of finites: also, there is nothing in God, but what is God. Neither can God be composed of infinite parts; because there should then be some­thing greater than infinite; for the whole is ever greater than some one part: also there would be many infinites, which implies a contradiction.

CHAP. IV. Of Gods Immutabilitie, Infinitude, Eternitie, Immensi­tie, and Incomprehensibilitie.

Gods Immutabilitie in Nature, immanent Acts of Knowlege and Wil; as also in his Word. Gods Infinitude as to Essence, and Perfection. His Eternitie explicated and demonstrated. Also his Immensitie. Gods Incomprehensibilitie demonstrated. How far we may appre­hend God: Against poetic Figments of God, Curiositie in our In­quiries after God. Notices of God natural and supernatural.

§. 1. NExt follows the Immutabilitie of God, The Immutabili­tie of God. which resultes from his Simplicitie, whereof we have great notices and de­monstrations both in sacred and Platonic Philosophie. As for sacred Philosophemes, the stile God assumes Exod. 3.14. I am, [Page 258]fully explicates and demonstrates his Immutabilitie. For this phrase denotes, that there is no passibilitie, dependence, successi­on or variation in God. The same may be argued from the name [...] Jehovah, which indigitates and points out to us the necessi­tie, simplicitie,Mal. 3.6. and immutabilitie of the divine Essence. So Mal. 3.6. For I am the Lord, I change not. Which is explicated, Jam. 1.17.Jam. 1.17. With whom there is no variablenesse or shadow of turne. Al these notions are Astronomic: God is here compared to the Sun, as he is the Father of Lights; yet so as that he infinitely out­shines and excels the Sun in regard of his immutable Nature and Essence. For the Sun, although it be not so variable as the Moon, yet, as Plato in his Timaeus wel observes, it has its [...] or [...], Paralaxes and Changes: it appears otherwise at rising, otherwise at noon, otherwise at setting: but now the blessed God admits not any of these variations. Again, the Sun has its [...], tropic shadow, or shadow of turning: it has its annual Tropes, or Turnes and Vicissitudes, which they cal the Solstices; whereby it is nearer to, or remoter from us: accord­ing to which Recesses or Accesses it castes various shadows, and causeth varietie of seasons, Summer, Winter, Spring, Autumne: such is the [...], or tropic shadow of the Sun. But now the im­mutable God admits no such tropic shadows of variations: he fals under no Eclipse, defect or diminution of light. Indeed the Sun as to it self is never eclipsed; albeit it be sometimes hid from our sight, by the interposition of the Moon; yet it then shines with as intense light as ever, somewhere else. Yea, if we wil speak properly, the Stars cannot be said to rise and set in re­gard of themselves, or the Heavens, but only as to us. So the blessed God may varie in his aspects, regards, or providences as to us, yet in himself, yea in regard of his word he admits not the least variation or shadow of turning. To expresse the same more familiarly: when we are in a Ship or Coach that moves, the earth and hils seem to us to move: namely, because our vi­sion or sight is made by a Pyramid, the basis of which is in the object seen, but the point thereof in our eye: Now our eye being swiftly moved by the rapid motion of the Coach or Ship, and the point of the Pyramid moved therewith, hence the ba­sis, and thence the object it self seems to move: Just so it is as to our knowledge of God; our thoughts and conceptions of God being always in fluxe, succession, and motion; we foolishly con­ceit, [Page 259]that the immutable God moves and varies; whereas al the motion and variation is in us, not in him.

The Immutabilitie of God is greatly explicated and demon­strated by Plato, God immutable in his Nature. whose Philosophemes on this Theme may be re­duced to the following particulars. 1. God is immutable in his Essence. Thus Plato, in his Phaedo, pag. 78. [...], That very Essence, which we defined always to existe, [...]; namely that which is Equalitie it self, Beautie it self, Singularitie it self, doth it admit any mutation? Or truely can any of those, name­ly that which is uniforme Being, which existes of it self, and is always the same, and never in any degree admits the least alteration? Whereby he strongly proves, that God cannot fal under the least mutation; because he is an equal, uniforme, simple, self-existent Be­ing. This Argument he more fully prosecutes, Repub 2. pag. 380. [...]; Doest thou thinke, that God is a Prevaricator, and as it were one lying in wait, to appear under different shapes? And some­times to be this, sometimes that; and so to change himself into diverse formes? or rather oughtest not thou to judge, that he is most simple, and of althings least departes from his own Idea? Then he addes the reason, why it is impossible for God to be mutable or variable in his Essence: [...]; Is it not necessary, if any thing depart from its own Idea or forme, that it be changed by it self or by some other? (1) That God cannot be changed by any other he thus proves: [...], Truely such things as have the best constitution are not changed by any other. The same Principe he repetes, pag. 381. [...]; &c. Whatever is wel constituted, either by Nature, or Art, or both ways, doth it admit the least change? On this hand there can no mutation happen to God. Thence (2) he procedes to demon­strate, that God cannot change himself: [...], But doth he change [Page 260]and alter himself? It is evident he doth, if he be in any sort altered. Then he demonstrates, that God cannot change himself: [...]; Whether doth he change himself for the better and more excellent, or for what is worse and baser than himself? He replies: [...], It's necessary that he be changed for the worse, if he be at al changed: For we may not say, that God wants pul­chritude or virtue in any degree. Then he addes: [...]; Doest thou thinke there is any one either of the Gods o men, who wil of his own accord make himself worse in any manner? Thence he concludes: [...], It is therefore impossible, that God should be willing to change himself, but, as it is most consentaneous, seing each of them is most excellent and best, that he remains one and the same simply in the some forme. In which excellent explication and demonstra­tion of the Immutabilitie of God, we have these observables. (1) He makes mention of Gods in the Plural Number, by reason of the severitie of their Laws, and Customes, but intends thereby one only God, as before in the Unitie of God. (2) He demon­strates this one God to be immutable; because he cannot be chan­ged either by any other or by himself. That he cannot be changed by any other he proves; because al change is for the better: but God cannot be changed for the better; because he is best. The same argument he useth to prove, that God cannot change him­self. For such a mutation would be either perfective or amissive: God is not capable of any perfective mutation; because he is the best and most perfect Being: neither is it possible, that he should affect any amissive mutation, because none willingly change for the worse. Proclus addes, that God is [...] invariable; because al mutation is a signe [...] of infirmitie, as it is [...], which is inconsistent with the omnipotent Essence. In sum, this Immutabilitie of the Divine Essence is that Attribute, whereby God is said to preserve his own Being, without the least power of not Being, or conversion into any other Essence, or increment and decrement, or alteration and motion.

1.God immutable in his immanent Acts. God is immutable in al his immanent Acts, and Decrees. There is a twofold mutation, physic and moral: physic mutation is by [Page 261] Addition or Ablation and Substraction of some real Entitie. Mo­ral mutation is either of Science and Knowlege: as when a man judgeth that false, which he before thought to be true: or else of Wil and Purpose; when a man wils that, which before he nilled, &c. God is absolutely immutable in al these respects: he is neither capable of physic nor yet of moral mutation, either as to Knowlege or Wil. For al mutation either of Knowlege or Wil implies inconstance and imperfection, if not imprudence and in­fidelitie; which are al inconsistent with the Divine Being.1. Knowlege. (1) God cannot be said to change in regard of his Knowlege; because his Knowlege is not distinct from his Being: he knows himself and althings else in and by himself: he cannot know any thing that he did not know before; neither can he know any thing other­wise than he did before. He knows things successive without suc­cession, by intuition: also things complexe by one simple intuitive act. His Knowlege is as necessary and eternal as his Essence; and therefore most perfect and immutable, both extensively and intensively. Objects known by God are variable, but his knowlege of them and of their variations invariable. Althings are the same to Gods knowlege, as they are in their own Beings: things past, present, future are present to God in al their circumstances and differences. If Gods Science should be changed, it would be about things future, when they are present, and so passe into pre­terite or what is past: but this cannot be, because those circum­stances of future, present, past are al determined by the Divine Wil, and so present to his Science of Vision. Moreover no objects are the cause of the Divine Knowlege; but, on the contrary, the Divine Knowlege and Wil the cause of al objects, future, present, and past. In sum, God knows al particular objects and circum­stances intrinsecally in the glasse of his own Essence; and there­fore invariably and uniformely. Things both complexe and sim­ple may varie; but God knows them al invariably, in the infi­nite claritie of his own Divine Essence and Ideas. Every thing future, if we compare it with the prescience of God, it is necessa­ry, and necessarily known by him. This Immutabilitie of the Divine knowlege Plato oft inculcates under his Divine Ideas, by means whereof he makes God to have the most accurate, absolute, infinite, eternal, and immutable knowlege of althings. So in his Ti­maeus, pag. 28. as in his Parmenides, pag. 134, &c. as before P. 2. B. 3. C. 9. S. 1. §. 4. and in what follows, Chap. 4.

(2) God is immutable in al the Acts and Decrees of his Wil. 2. Wil. For these also have one and the same Idea with the Divine Essence. Again, if Gods Wil were mutable, his Knowlege must also be so: for God cannot know things future, but by the determination of his own Wil, whence they receive their futurition. It's true, God wils al mutations of things, yet his Wil admits no muta­tion. It's one thing to change a Wil,Deus non mu­tat voluntatem, sed vult muta­tionem rerum. Aquin. and another to wil a change: For God by the same immutable Wil decrees that in such a period of time such a thing shal be, and in another, the contrary; without any beginning to wil what he willed not be­fore, or ceasing to wil what he before willed. God begins to wil or nil nothing: al his Wils and Nils are eternal. He hates nothing that he before loved, nor loves any thing that he before hated: neither doth his Wil admit any degrees of some or lesse. No immanent Act or intrinsec denomination can happen de nov [...] unto God; albeit many, yea infinite externe relative denomina­tions may be attributed to him. Thus the externe relative de­nomination of Creator is given to God in time, not intrinsecally but extrinsecally: the change of Creation was not in God, but in the Creature: the very act of Creation taken passively and ex­trinsecally is in the Creature, and not really distinguished from it: if we consider it actively as in God, so it is the same with the Wil and Essence of God: in which regard God may be said to be Creator from al Eternitie, as his Wil is the productive cause of athings. Thus al other externe relations and denominations attributed to God in time, as Lord, Father, &c. are not because of any new thing in God, but in regard of something new in the Creature from God. There is no new Act in God which was not from eternitie, albeit the effects of those Acts were not from eternitie, but in time. Al mutations are proper to Creatures only, because Creatures: and the mutabilitie of the Creature can have no influence on the immutable God. Thus Damascene, Or­thodox. Fid. l. 1. c. 18. [...], Therefore God is altogether immutable and in­alterable: for he hath determined althings by his Prescience; every thing according to its proper and convenient season, and place. Where­in note, (1) That by Gods Prescience, must be understood the Divine Decree, whence his Prescience resultes, and therefore oft put for it: (2) That by this Divine Prescience and Decree al­things [Page 263]though most mutable and variable, as to their proper times and places, are immutably determined.

3. God is also immutable in regard of his Word. Gods Immuta­bilitie in re­gard of his Word. God being the first Intellect and Truth, he cannot but speak truth: The Di­vine Veracitie is equally immutable in respect of future and past: God cannot but do what he hath said he wil do; because his Wil is immutable. He is most simple and true both in his words and workes: as he cannot be deceived, so neither can he deceive. Thus Plato, Repub. 2. pag. 381. refels the false Ideas and Idols, which the Poets frame of the Gods, as if they should change them­selves into divers shapes: [...], and by certain delusions should de­lude us, that they might seem various to us. Which he makes to be repugnant to the Nature of God, who is [...], immutable, invariable, inalterable, and one that cannot lie; because he is Truth it self. Whence he concludes, pag. 382. [...], &c. Wherefore God is simple and true, both in his workes and words: neither is he changed, neither doth he deceive others, either by phanta­stic delusions, or speeches, or signes, or visions, or dreams. Of which more fully in the Veracitie of God, Chap. 6. §. 2. Only here we are to obviate an objection, which is made from what is mentio­ned in Scripture of Gods Repentance, Gen. 6.6. 1 Sam. 15.11. This manner of speech is only after the manner of men, when they would have that undone which was formerly done: as to God it speakes no alteration in him, but only in his Dispensations and Actions. According to proprietie of speech God cannot be said to repent, as Num. 23.19.

But to give a more ful Demonstration of Gods Immutabilitie,The Immutabili­tie of God de­monstrated. we may consider the Divine Essence and Attributes, which concur al to make good this demonstration. (1) The Divine Essence and its necessitie gives us an invict argument of Gods Immutabilitie. For that which has a necessitie of Being cannot acquire its Essence by any action or mutation: and if it depend not on any other for its Being, it cannot lose the same. Thus Plato, Phileb. [...], The first one necessary Being is not capable of generation and corruption. Thus Jambli­chus: God, saith he, necessarily is, not by an externe necessitie, but interne and natural. Now whatever is necessarily such, is immu­tably such. This Argument is wel improved by the Author libri [Page 264]de Fundamentis, l. 2. c. 5. [...], &c. Whatever is changed is changed by some other: But that which necessarily existes of it self hath not any cause by which is should be changed: for the same thing cannot be the changer and changed: for so it should con­siste of two things, one that changeth, and another that is changed. Al change ariseth either from some externe or interne cause: But God hath nothing without that can make any impression on him: neither is there any thing within him, that can give or receive any impression or change. There is no active power, either without or within God, that can make, nor any passive power within God to receive any impression or mutation. Thus Damascene, Orthe­dox. Fid. l. 1. c. 3. [...], &c. Beings therefore create are altogether mutable: it's necessary therefore that the Opificer and Framer be increate— and if increate then immutable. So l. 2. c. 3. [...], for every create Being is mutable: the increate only is immutable. And he gives this reason of his Hypothesis: [...], for whatever hath beginning may naturally have an end. (2) We may demonstrate the Immutabilitie of God from his Simplicitie. For al mutation properly considered requires some Composition; because there is required some commun subject re­maining under both termes of the mutation. This Argument is wel managed by Plato, Repub. 2. pag. 381. It is impossible that God should be changed; because he remains [...], always the same simply in his own forme. So Phaedo, pag. 78. he proves, that God being [...], a uniforme Being existing of himself, and always the same, cannot admit the least alteration, as before Thence, in his Timaeus, he cals God, [...], one same Being always like himself. God being one simple Be­ing, without Quantitie, Qualitie, or any Accident, having nothing in himself but what is himself, it is impossible, that he should admit any alteration or mutation.Psal. 102.26, 27. Thus sacred Philosophie, Psal. 102.26, 27. They [the Heavens] shal perish, but thou shalt endure—thou shalt change them and they shal be changed. But thou art the same and thine years shal have no end. Where he foundes and bottomes the Immutabilitie of God on the Simplicitie and Identi­tie of his Essence. (3) The Immutabilitie of God may be de­monstrated from his Immobilitie. Thus Plato in his Parmenid [...]. pag. 138. [...], [Page 265] Because if he, [the one God] should be moved, he should be either moved locally, or alterated: for there are only these motions. Very good. But now if this one God should be altered, he should not be one: therefore he cannot be moved accord­ing to alteration. Thence he procedes to prove, that he cannot be moved locally; because he has no parts. Whence he concludes, pag. 139. [...], The one God therefore is, as to al kinds of motions, immobile. The force of this Argument lies thus: God being the prime Motor and Principe of al motion and mutation must necessarily be immobile and immutable: For al grant the first Motor to be immobile: and al motion and mutati­on to be founded in some immobile immutable Principe. Thence Aristotle held God to be [...], the first, immobile Being. So Phi­lo Judaeus makes God to be, [...], the immobile immutable Being, who no way standes in need of any other thing. Again, Plato argues, That whatever is altered or changed, cannot be primarily, simply, and absolutely one, as God is. (4) We may demonstrate the Immutabilitie of God from his pure Actualitie and Impassibilitie. The most pure Act can­not be changed, because passive power, either physic or metaphysic and obediential, is the root of al mutabilitie and dependence. Thus Jamblichus, a great Platonist: ‘God, saith he, hath nothing in himself passible: and this impassibilitie he hath not by ac­quisition, but by nature. An uniforme Essence, of it self incor­poreous and permanent admits not any passions or divisions ei­ther of alteration or mutation. Where there is perpetual order there can be no passion.’ (5) The Immutabilitie of God may be evinced from his Eternitie. Whatever is eternal must neces­farily be immutable; because without beginning and end. That which was before al time cannot be liable to any changes of time. Thus Plato, in his Parmenides, pag. 141. and in his Phaedrus, p. 245. strongly proves, That the first one Being can have neither beginning nor end, and thence no alteration or mutation, as hereafter in the Eter­nitie of God §. 3. (6) The Perfection of God demonstrates his Immutabilitie. Thus Plato, Repub. 2. pag. 381. [...], &c. God, and those things that belong to God are best, and most perfect; therefore he cannot admit any mutation: for what is best is never changed. The force of the Argument lies thus: God, by the necessitie of his Being, has a plenitude of Es­sence and Perfection, and therefore admits not of any augmenta­tion [Page 266]or diminution: for what by necessitie of Nature has a ple­nitude of Being and Perfection, that cannot extend it self any further, but must be infinite: and what is infinite cannot be greater, or lesser; neither can any thing be taken from or added to it. Hence, God being by a necessitie of Nature most perfect, cannot be more or lesse perfect: therefore he cannot fal under any mutation either perfective or corruptive, augmentative or dimi­nutive.

§. 2.Gods Infinitude as to Essence and Perfection. Hence follows Gods Infinitude as to Essence and Perfection. For a Being necessarily, simply, and immutably such must of ne­cessitie be infinitely perfect. A Creature simply and absolutely finite may be in some limited sense said to be infinite; as the Soul of man is in regard of its capacitie said to be infinite; because capable of an infinite object: but nothing is absolutely, simply, and essentially infinite and perfect but God. Infinitie really ex­cludes al negation of Entitie from God, and also includes that God is in pure Act, whatever Ens in its most extensive universal latitude and notion doth include. For an infinite Essence necessa­rily contains, either formally or eminently, whatever is or may be of perfection in al Beings, either actually existent or possible. But to treat more philosophically and distinctly of this Attribute, we are to consider, that infinite is a negative notion, which in­cludes a negation of al termes or bounds: now a thing may be said to be terminated, bounded, or finite in reward (1) of its Essence and Perfection, (2) of its Duration, (3) of its Presence, (4) of its Comprehensibilitie. In al these regards God is said to be infinite. He is infinite (1) in Essence, as most perfect and in­dependent: (2) in Duration, as eternal: (3) in Presence, as om­nipresent, or immense: (4) as to our Comprehension, in being incom­prehensible. We shal here treat only of Gods Infinitude as to Es­sence and Perfection; and of the other, as distinct Attributes re­sulting from this Infinitude of Essence.

Gods Infinitude as to Essence and Perfection may be various ways explicated and demonstrated.Gods Infinitude from his Inde­pendence. Thus Damascene, Orthodox. Fid. l. 2. c. 19. describes God, [...], The increate, in­dependent, immortal, infinite, eternal, immaterial, chiefest Good—the immutable, impassible, incircumscript, immense, indefinible, incorporeous, [Page 267]invisible— without indigence, absolute, most free, omnipotent, and in­finitely potent. By each of these divine Attributes the Infinitude of the Divine Essence may be demonstrated. As 1. By his Inde­pendence. The Infinitude of the Divine Essence consistes in a ne­gation of al limitation and termes. The termes that limit any Essence are its causes: therefore that which is [...] and [...] without any cause, must needs be without termes, and so infi­nite. And is not the Divine Essence thus independent, without al causal termes and limitation? Must not God then be infinite in his Essence? This Independence of the Divine Essence as to al causes and causal limitation is wel expressed in sacred Philoso­phie, by Gods being the first and the last: as Esa. 41.4. I the Lord, Esa. 41.4. the first, and with the last, I am he. So Chap. 44.6. I am the first, and I am the last: and besides me there is no God. Thuse also Chap. 48.12. I am he: I am the first, I also am the last. God is said to be the first, as having no causal principe or efficient that might give limits to his Essence: and the last, as having no final cause, or end, that might give moral limits or bounds to his Wil. This Infini­tude and Independence of the Divine ssence as the first Cause and last End, is wel illustrated, Rev. 1.8, 11. & 21.6. & 22.13.Rev. 1.8, 11. & 21.6. & 22.13. I am [...] and [...], the beginning and the end, the first and the last: i.e. as [...] is the first letter and [...] the last of the Greek Alphabet; so God is the first causal Principe or Efficient, and last End or final Cause, that gives termes and limits to al created Essences; but receives limits and termes from none, and therefore is infinite in Essence and Perfection. Hence God is said to be [...], self-Being, or Being of himself, not by any positive influxe; for that is impossi­ble, that any thing should give Being to it self: but negatively, by reason of his independence on any other Cause. For God as the first, has no efficient, and as the last, has no final Cause; thence by consequence no causal termes or limitation. This Indepen­dence and Infinitude of God, as the first Efficient and last End is wel explicated and demonstrated by Plato, in his Parmenides, p. 137. [...], Therefore if he [the one God] hath no part, neither truely shal he have any beginning, or end, or middle; for such are the parts of a thing. Where he proves, that God has no beginning nor end, [i. e. he is the first and the last] from his simplicitie, or not having parts. And in what follows he gives us the reason of his consequence: [...], [Page 268] But the end and the principe is the terme of every thing: i. e. every thing is terminated and bounded by its causal Principle or Efficient, and last End: therefore, to speak in the language of sa­cred Philosophie, He who is the first and the last, without a first causal principe, or last end to terminate his Essence, must needs be infinite. Thus Plato concludes, in what immediately follows: [...], The one God therefore is infinite, if he hath neither principe nor end. This Argu­ment, which agrees with that of sacred Philosophie, is most co­gent: for that which has no causal termes either of beginning or end, but is the first causal principe and last end of althings, must needs be infinite.

2.Gods Infinitude from his Ʋnitie and Simplici­tie. The Infinitude of the Divine Essence and Perfection pro­cedes from and may be demonstrated by Gods Ʋnitie, Simplicitie, and pure Actualitie. Thus Plato, in his Philebus, pag. 14. [...], One [namely God] is as many and infinite: and many are as one only. Plato here describes the first infinite Being, under the commun Pythagorean notion of one and many: as being one in regard of the simplicitie of his Essence, and yet many, in regard of his infinite Perfections and Ideas or Decrees. So pag. 16. [...], &c. That the one [God] is many and infinite. The force of this Argu­ment lies thus: God being one simple pure Act, must needs be infinite in Essence and Perfection: for that which renders every Creature finite is its essential constitution and composition of Act and passive Power, either physic or metaphysic. It's true Angels and human Souls have no physic passive power, yet they have meta­physic and obediential, as made out of nothing, and so reducible thereto, if their Creator please. But now the first Being God, be­ing one simple pure Act, without the least shadow of passive pow­er, whereby al Creatures are terminated and bounded, it thence necessarily follows, that he must be infinite in Essence and Perfe­ction. God actually and eternally is, whatsoever he may be, and cannot hereafter be, that which now he is not. Al Creatures are somewhat in possibilitie, which they are not as yet in act: whence they have an inclination to or at least a passive power for some­thing which they have not: which being attained unto makes them more perfect. But now where there is one pure Act, al perfection is; because there remains no passive power or capa­citie of receiving additional perfection. Every Act is by so [Page 269]much the more perfect, by how much the lesse of passive power is mixed therewith: whence the one simple pure Act, which has nothing of passive power mixed therewith, must necessarily be without termes of Essence and Perfection. Again, every Essence is so far perfect, as it is in Act: thence the Divine Essence being [...], in a most transcendent singular and infinite degree actual, it must needs be infinitely perfect. Thus Aquinas, contra Gent. l. 1. c. 28. ‘Every thing is so far perfect, as it is in Act; but imperfect as it is in power, with privation of Act. That therefore which is no way in power, but pure Act, must needs be most perfect: such is God.’

3. We may explicate and demonstrate the Infinitude of Gods Essence and Perfection by his Transcendence in Being. Thus Plato, Gods Infinitude from his tran­scendent Essence. Repub. 6. pag. 509. [...], The chiefest Good, [God] is not Essence, but something greater and more august, and infinitely transcending both in dignitie and virtue the nature of althings created. Wherein he makes God to be the Cause of al Essences, yet not properly Essence in that manner as the Creature is, but [...], superessential or transcendent Essence, self-Essence, self-Eternitie. This transcendent Essence and Perfection of God is termed in sacred Philosophie Magnitude: as Psal. 95.3.Psal. 95.3. For the Lord is a great God, and a great King above al Gods: i. e. a transcendent Being. This transcendent magnitude of the Divine Essence and Perfection must be understood principally intensively, as God contains in him eminently and transcendently al perfecti­ons. Thus Psal. 145.3. Great is the Lord, and greatly to be praised; Psal. 145.3. and of his magnitude there is no investigation. [...]: i. e. the mag­nitude of his Essence is an infinite Abysse or Ocean which no mor­tal finite capacitie can dive into. So the LXX. [...], there is no terme or bound to it. This is wel expressed by Damascene, Orthod. Fid. l. 1. c. 19. [...], It [the Deitie] being above Intelligence, and above Reason, and above Life, and above Essence, &c. Whence the commun title he gives God, according to the Platonic mode, is [...], superessential, as before, Chap. 3. §. 1. This infinite transcendent Magnitude of the Divine Essence is also wel expres­sed by Plato, Parmenid. pag. 137. where treating of the one God, without beginning and end, he saith: [...], It is infinite: therefore [Page 270]also without figure: neither doth it partake of a round figure, nor yet of a straight: i. e. God being infinite in Essence is not limited by termes of magnitude or figure. This Argument from the Transcen­dence of the Divine Essence may be thus improved: That which is transcendently Ens or Being, See Suarez, Me­taphys. Disput. 30. Sect. 2. is such per essentiam, essentially: thence it cannot be limited. That which has Being only by par­ticipation from a superior Cause, may be limited either by the plea­sure of the superior Cause, that gives it so much perfection, and no more; or else from the capacitie of the Recipient, which is capable of receiving so much perfection, and no more. But now the Divine Essence, being transcendently and essentially such, without participation, cannot be limited either way; but is in­vested with an infinitude of essence and perfection altogether in­divisible; not precise and limited to one kind of perfection, as it is with the Creature, but containing, in a most eminent transcen­dent manner, whatever is of perfection in the Creature, Whence it is that the divine Infinitude and Perfection admit a reciproca­tion: For Being subsisting of it self contains in it the whole per­fection of essence: and the perfections of althings belong to the perfection of essence: wherefore God being a pure Act, and Be­ing subsisting of himself, nothing of perfection can be wanting to him. Hence God the first necessary, transcendent Being can­not be defined or limited to any certain degree of perfection, but must be infinite, as is wel demonstrated by Suarez, Metaph. Disp. 29. Sect. 3. Thus also the Stoics held, [...], That God is invested with al Essence: who also is incor­ruptible, and ingenerable, being the supreme Opificer and Creator of the whole structure of the Ʋniverse, as Laertius, in Zeno. The sum of al is this: God being [...], self-Being, and transcen­dent superessential Essence, he must needs be universally and emi­nently al-Being, and so infinite in essence and perfection, of which more fully in the following Argument.

4.Gods Infinitude from the nature of Perfection. The Infinitude of the Divine Essence and Perfection may be further explicated and demonstrated from the formal Idea of Perfection, and its peculiar appropriation to God. Al perfection importes some kind of universitie: because that is perfect, to which there is nothing wanting: whence the more any thing is contracted to some certain mode of perfection, the lesse perfect it is: and the more the universitie of perfection agrees to any [Page 271]thing, the more it partakes of perfection. Now God having the whole of essence in himself, must necessarily have an universitie of perfection. God has al kinds, extents, and degrees of perfection in him either formally or eminently: he hath need of nothing be­cause infinitely perfect in his essence: there is nothing without or within him that may limit or bound his perfection. The most per­fect of Creatures have much of imperfection in them; because they are limited in their Beings: one excels in one perfection, ano­ther in another: but none in al perfections: they are al negatively imperfect, if not privatively. Again, the Creatures perfection is for the most part accidental, and separable; as it appears in fal­len Angels and men: But Gods perfection is essential, absolute and universal; and therefore infinite. Thus in sacred Philoso-, phie, Act. 17.25. Neither is he worshipped with mens hands, Act. 17.25. as though he needed any thing; seing he giveth to althing life and breath and althings. Paul demonstrates, to the curiose Wits of Athens, that God is most perfect and wants nothing; because he gives al perfection to the Creature: [...] has a peculiar sig­nificance which carries much emphase in it. [...] signifies sim­ply to want: [...] to be totally indigent: but [...] pro­perly signifies, to have something, yet to want something belonging to its perfection. Such an indigence the blessed God fals not under: he needs nothing as an additament to his felicitie, having in him­self an universitie of perfection; and giving forth to al his Crea­tures according to their indigence. Hence God is stiled by the Hebrews [...], E [...] shaddai, God A [...]sufficient, Gen. 17.1. Thus Plato, Repub. 2. pag. 381. [...], For we shal not say, that God in any degree wants either pulchritude, or virtue. Whence elsewhere he makes God to be [...], self-sufficient, and therefore most perfect. Thus Ari­stotle, Rhet. l. 1. c. 7. pag. 35. [...], And that which is lesse indigent of any other or other things, [is best and most perfect] because it is most self-suffi­cient. So in his Ethl. l. 1. c. 5. he saith, [...], That which is perfect is self-sufficient and in nothing indi­gent: such is the Divine Essence. Thence Plato, Repub. 6. pag. 509. assures us, That God, who is the Idea of al good, his [...], an infinite and immense pulchritude.

But more fully to explicate and demonstrate the infinite Perfe­ction of God, it is apparent by what has been laid down out of [Page 272]Platonic as wel as sacred Philosophie, That a thing is said to be perfect, when it wants nothing: which may be understood either privatively or negatively. That is privatively perfect, which wants nothing due to its integritie: that negatively, which wants nothing of possible perfection. God is in both these regards perfect, and therefore infinitely such. (1) God wants not any perfection pri­vatively: For as he is God of himself; so of himself he has al perfection due to himself: The most simple independent Being cannot be deprived of any perfection due to him, as Suarez wel demonstrates, Metaphys. Disput. 30. Sect. 1. pag. 42. (2) God is negatively perfect, as he wants no possible perfection. Possible per­fection is either create or increate. God, as the first Cause of al­things, contains in him al create possible perfection: and as the first most simple infinite Being, al increate possible perfection: For the first Being is such by a necessitie of Being; and therefore absolutely and infinitely perfect; containing in himself either eminently or formally al created perfections. (1) God contains in himself al created perfections eminently, as he has such a per­fection in a superior eminent degree, as virtually contains what­ever is in an inferior perfection. Whence al the perfections of Creatures, as they are eminently in God, are nothing else but the creatrix Essence of God. The Divine creatrix Essence is said to be eminently althings, as it can by its own eminent virtue and efficace communicate those perfection to althings. For the first su­preme Cause existent of it self, and independent contains al pos­sible perfections simply and eminently in the fontale Ʋnitie and infinite Abysse of his own Essence. God dwelling in the Abysse of his own Infinitude, which the Hebrews cal [...], cannot but contain in himself al created perfections in a most eminent de­gree. (2) God contains formally in himself al perfections simply simple: i. e. such as in their formal reason involve no imperfection, but pure perfection. It's true, no created perfection, according to that adequate reason which it hath in the Creature, is formally in God, but eminently only. For there is not in God any created goodnesse, &c. but he is said formally to contain some of those perfections which are in the Creature; because according to them he has a formal convenience with the Creature, by means where­of the same perfection is, according to the same name and formal reason, attributed to God and the Creature, the infinite dispro­portion which is between God and the Creature being preserved, [Page 273]as Suarez, Metaph. Disp. 29. Sect. 3. pag. 39. Thus God giving perfection to althings has similitude and dissimilitude with al: Similitude, in that whatever perfection is in the Creature, is for­mally or eminently in God: Dissimilitude, in that al those perfe­ctions, which agree to other things according to diverse formes or modes of participation, agree to God according to the infinite Unitie and Simplicitie of his Essence. Albeit God be void of al composition, yet he contains in himself al perfections scattered up and down among the Creatures in the most simple, united, and eminent degree. In sum: according to the mode of Essence such is the mode of perfection: for every thing has lesse or more of perfection, as it has more or lesse of essence: Therefore God, who has al Essence, must necessarily have al perfection.

5.The infinite Bo­nitie and Beati­tude of God. The Infinitude of the Divine Essence and Perfection may be further explicated and demonstrated by the infinite Bonitie and Beatitude of God. Sacred Philosophie every where instructes us, That God is infnitely good and blessed in himself. So Platok, Repub. 6. pag. 508. [...], the Idea of al good, i. e. such a good as contains al good in him: the good of every good. Whence pag. 509. as elsewhere, he stiles God [...], the Good: accord­ing to that of sacred Philosophie, There is none good but God, Mat. 19.17. Mat. 19.17. i. e. there is no original Idea of good but God. Whence Plato cals al created goods, not [...], simply goods, but [...], certain formes or kinds of goods, so far as they participate of the divine good; But, saith he, the Idea of good gives essence to every thing, yet is in it self superessential. Thus Damascene, a great Platonist, Orthodox. Fid. l. 2. c. 2. [...], There­fore because God is good, yea transcendently good, not contented with the contemplation of himself, but from the superabundance of his good­nesse it pleased him, that somethings should be made to which he might do good, and which might participate of his goodnesse: and so out of nothing he brought them unto Being, and framed althings. Whence we may conclude the infinite perfection of God. So Aristot. Eth. l. 1. c. 5. [...], &c. That which is best, is most perfect; and that which is desired for it self, simply perfect: i. e. in­finitely perfect. Such a most perfect good is God, who is essen­tially good, and therefore infinitely good. Hence also springes [Page 274]the infinite Beatitude of God, which gives us further demonstra­tion of his infinite Essence and Perfection. Thus in the Platonic Definitions God is defined [...], an immortal living Being, self sufficient as to happinesse. The proper good of every intellectile Nature is Beatitude: Therefore God being the first Intelligent, Beatitude must necessarily be his most proper good. Now by how much the more noble and excellent any Beatitude is, by so much the more perfect is the subject to which it appertains. This speakes the infinite perfection of God, in that he is essential Bonitie and Beatitude.

6.Gods Infinite Power. Gods infinite Power in the production of althings demon­strates his Infinitude of Essence and Perfection. The magnitude of any virtue or power is measured by the magnitude of its Action and Effect: An Action is by so much the more perfect, by how much the more efficace and force it has to produce its effect: and what actions so efficacious to produce their effects, as the Actions of Divine Omnipotence? Every Agent is by so much the more effi­cacious in acting, by how much the more remote the passive pow­er by it reduced into act is: now mere nothing, which is as the pas­sive power in Creation, being, as to existence, infinitely distant from Act, therefore the power that brings it into act must needs be infinite. Are not something and nothing termes, as to exi­stence, infinitely distant? Can then any but an infinite power reconcile them, or bring something out of nothing? And is it possible that an infinite power should be in any but an infinite Be­ing? Doth not the operation follow the essence? is not every thing such in working as it is in Being? May we not then hence conclude, that God, who is of infinite activitie as to working, is also infinite in his Essence and Perfection? Thence Plato makes God to be the infinite Opificer or Creator, [...], who by his efformative omnipotent words gave essence to althings, as hereafter, in the Causalitie of God. It is indeed altogether impossible, that a finite power should create so many degrees of things, and that out of nothing.

§. 3.Gods Etenritie. From the Infinitude of Gods Essence and Perfection re­sultes his Infinitude in Duration, or Eternitie. For as things are in Being, such likewise are they in Duration: as a finite Being can­not have an infinite Duration; so neither can an infinite Being have a finite Duration. Hence the Eternitie of God necessarily follows from the Infinitude of his Being. The Eternitie of God [Page 275]is lively set forth in sacred Philosophie.Psal. 90.2, 3, 4 So Psal. 90.2. Even from everlasting to everlasting thou art God. Being to treat of the frailtie of human life, he briefly toucheth on the Eternitie of God, that thereby it might appear, how frail mans life is. God is said to be, from everlasting to everlasting, thereby to denote his absolute Eternitie without beginning and end. The Souls of men and An­gels are to everlasting, because immortal: but they are not from everlasting; and therefore not eternal. Every eternal is immor­tal; but every immortal is not eternal. Thence it follows: v. 3. Thou turnest man to destruction, and sayest, Returne ye children of men, He alludes to that Gen. 3.19. Thou art dust, and to dust thou shalt returne. Then the Psalmist addes, v. 4. For a thousand years in thy sight are but as yesterday, when it is past; and as a watch in the night. The Particle [...] some interpret not as a rational conjuncti­on, but as an Adverbe of confirmation, Truely: so that the sense is: Truely, O God, thou art immortal and eternal: so that a thousand years of human life, being compared with thy Eternitie, are but as yesterday, or as a watch of the night, which is very short and ful of difficulties and miseries. The Hebrews divided their nights into four watches, which denote brevitie and danger. So Psal. 55.19. God is said to be, he that abideth of old, Psal. 55.19. or in al eternitie. [...] abideth, or is permanent. Which denotes Gods per­manent essence and existence without al succession, in Eternitie. Indeed Gods Eternitie is but as one permanent fixed [...], or instant, without al succession. I am not ignorant, that some lear­ned men endeavor to baffle this Hypothesis, That Gods Eternitie is one fixed instant, whose reasons we shal examine more fully anon, when we come to treat of the Nature of Eternitie, 5. Prop. At pre­sent we passe on to confirme it by Scripture. So Psal. 93.2.Psal. 93.2. Thy Throne is established of old: thou art from everlasting. Of old. Hebr. [...] ante tunc, before then, i. e. before any certain finite time, ex­pressed by that Particle tunc. The prefixe [...] denoting time sig­nifies before. The sense is, that Gods Throne was established from al Eternitie, before al moments of time. The like Prov. 8.22,Prov. 8.22, 23.23. The Lord possessed me in the beginning of his way, before his workes of old. [...] before al time. It's spoken by Christ as a declaration of his Eternitie with God the Father. So Esa. 43.13. Yea, Esa 43.13. even before the day was, I am he. [...], before there was any day, [or time] I am he, i. e. Jehovah the eternal Being.Mic. 5.2. The like Micah 5.2, Whose goings forth have been from of old, from everlasting. It [Page 276]is spoken of the eternal generation of the Son of God. From of old. Hebr. [...] before any principe or beginning. Thence it fol­lows: from everlasting. Hebr. [...], before the days of time, not of Eternitie: for [...], day of Age, doth not properly signifie days of Eternitie, as our Margine renders it, but time long before, as Micah 7.14, 20. Amos 9.11. Malach. 3.4. The Eter­nitie of God is wel described by Moses, Deut. 33.27. The God of Antiquitie: i. e. the eternal God. So David, Psal. 55.20. God that sitteth from Antiquitie: and Asaph, Psal. 74.12. God is my King from Antiquitie: i. e. Eternitie. But the Eternitie of God is more expressely declared, Esa. 57.15. Who inhabiteth Eternitie. So 1 Tim. 1.17.

As for Plato's Philosophemes touching the Eternitie of God, they are indeed great and illustrious, yea very far conforme to sa­cred Philosophie. So in his Timaeus, pag. 37. [...], &c. But al these are parts of time: but we truely do not rightly at­tribute to the eternal Essence those distinctions of time, namely HE WAS, and HE SHAL BE. For we say: IT WAS, IT IS, and IT SHAL BE. But truely to that Eternitie IT IS properly only agrees. IT WAS, and IT SHAL BE belongs to the articles of time, which is produced: for they are motions, or suc­cessions. But what is always and immutably the same, is not more an­cient or young, &c. Wherein we have these particulars very observable. (1) That the distinctions of time, Was, Is, and Shal Be, are proper only to things sensible and created, which fal under the duration and succession of Time. (2) That thence they cannot properly be attributed to God, who is an Eternal Essence, without beginning or succession. (3) That HE IS is only properly ascribed to God, according to sacred Philosophie, Exod. 3.14. [...], as Esa. 43.13. I am he. So the Inscription on the Delphic Temple, [...], THOƲ ART. Al which illustra­tions of Gods permanent Eternitie are included in the Name Jehovah, as before, Chap. 3. §. 1. Thus also the Eternitie of God is lively explicated and illustrated by Plato, in his Parmenides, p. 140. [Page 277] [...]; But what?: doth the one God seem to have elder or younger, or the same Age, that so he may be? The same pag. 141. Therefore the one God is neither younger, nor elder, nor of the same age, either in regard of himself or any other thing. [...], &c. There­fore the one God, if such, can never be in time: For that which is in time, is it no necessarily elder than it self? And is not that which is elder, always elder in regard of some junior? Therefore that which is always elder than it self, must be always younger than it self, which is a contradiction. He designe is to prove, that God being always the same, is not senior or junior in regard of himself, or any thing else: for then he should be always senior, and yet always junior in regard of himself. Which Argument is indeed demon­strative and cogent. Then he concludes: [...], If therefore the one God no way participate of time, truely he was not ever made, or hath been, neither is he now made, neither shal he ever be made, or be. He here proves the Eternitie of the one God from his Independence, of which more hereafter.

But the more fully to demonstrate and explicate the mind of Plato, and sacred Philosophie touching the Eternitie of God,The Eternitle of God demonstra­ted. we shal endeavor, (1) to demonstate, that God is eternal; and then, (20 to explicae what this Eternitie of God importes. First that God is eternal may be various ways demonstrated: As (1) from the Infinitude of the Divine Essence. The mode of exi­stence always follows the mode of essence: because existence, ac­cording to the confession of the Scholes, addes nothing to essence but Actualitie; neither is it indeed really distinct from essence: Now duration is nothing else but continued existence: whence it necessarily follows, that if Gods Essence be infinite, his Existence and Duration must be also infinite. The Divine Essence necessa­rily existes of it self, and therefore is always in act, never in power to be: whence it must necessarily be eternal. That which is ab­solutely infinite as to essence, can have no principe of its essence; and therefore it must be absolutely eternal as to Duration. What is infinite cannot give Being to it self: for then it should be be­fore and after it self; the cause and thing cause; indepen­dent and dependent in one and the same regard. Neither can [Page 278]what is infinite receive Being from another: for that other must be finite, or infinite: it cannot be finite; because it is impossible, that a finite Principe should give an infinite Being: neither can that other be infinite; because this would lead us into the laby­rinth of a progresse into infinite. Hence we may conclude with Plato, that God is [...], an eternal Essence. (2) We may demonstrate the Eternitie of God from his Independence. Thus Plato, in his Parmenides, pag. 141. [...], &c. The one God doth not participate of Essence, i. e. is not Ens by participation, as he explicates himself, therefore he is eternal. So in his I hadrus, pag. 245. [...], &c. A Principe has no origine: for althings arise from a Principe, but the first Principe ariseth from nothing: neither were it a first Principe, if it were origi­nated by some other. And if it hath no beginning, it can have no end. The Argument lies thus: That which is independent as to any first Cause or Principe, must needs be absolutely eternal: Now that God dependes not on any precedent Cause or Principe has been sufficiently demonstrated in what precedes. (3) Gods Eter­nitie may be demonstrated from his Immobilitie and Immutabilitie. Thus Plato, Tim. pag. 37. What is always and immutably the same, is not elder or younger, &c. as before. Whatever begins or cea­seth to be must sal under motion and mutation: for what has beginning hath Being after not-being: and whatever has end hath not-being after Being; and this in a way of succession and motion. But now the immutable God admits not such a suc­cession of Not-being and Being. We may not say, that ever he was not, or that ever he shal not be: he never began to be, nei­ther shal he ever cease to be; but is always the same immutable indivisible Essence. Thus Plato, in his Philebus, pag. 15. [...], He determines, that the one God is not of those things that have beginning and end. And he gives the reason of his Hypothesis: namely because it is, [...], always one and the same immutable Being, which receives not generation nor destruction; but is one Fir­mitie and Constance: ie. The one God, having a Firmitude, Con­stance, and Immutabilitie of Being, cannot be obnoxious to the Laws of Mutation, Generation, or Corruption; but must be eter­nal. Thus Plato, in his Timaeus, pag. 27, &c. proves, [...], That the first Being, who is always the same, can have neither begin­ning [Page 279]nor end. Thus Plutarch on Gods Name [...] emgraven on Apollo's Temple: [...], Therefore that which truely is one and the same is eternal, without beginning or end. (4) The Eternitie of God may be de­monstrated from his Perfection. The most perfect Being can ne­ver begin to be; because that which gives Being is more perfect, than that which receives the Being conferred. Again, the most perfect Being must necessarily have the most perfect mode of Du­ration, which is eternal. Lastly, the most perfect Being cannot depend on any other for any degree of perfection, and therefore it cannot begin to be.

Having demonstrated the Eternitie of God,What Eternitie is. we now procede to explicate the same, so far as sacred Philosophie gives us light and evidence: For indeed without divine light it is impossible for mortal man, who is confined by Time, to contemplate immortal Eternitie. Have not many great errors had either origine from proud mens confining the Eternitie of God to the Laws of Time? This is incomparably wel expressed by great Bradwardine, de Causa Dei, l. 2. c. 52. ‘These things, saith he, of Eternitie I have more copiosely discussed; because I repute it the most difficult thing for temporal man, who is always accustomed to measure things by the differences and laws of fluent Time, to mount up, above the differences of Time, to the contemplation of Eternitie;which is without mutabilitie of succession.’ And then he gives us an ingenuous confession, that this was his great error, when young and infected wih Pelagian infusions: ‘I, saith he, when I was young and ignorant of the Scriptures, and the power of God, being blinded with this ignorance, or rather borne blind, and deceived with a false imagination, I conceited, that the Divine Knowlege and Wil was changed and otherwise disposed by the vicissitudes of Times, as human Knowlege and Wil. As to such as supersicially read the Scriptures it may seem, that God is this or that way variously affected, as men are. And this ignorance I judge to be the cause, why some others like to me, thinke that God is otherwise and otherwise disposed intrinse­cally, &c.’ Therefore to cure these ignorances and errors about Eternitie we may consider the following Propositions.

1.Eternitie not to be measured by Time. Prop. Eternitie cannot be measured by any differences or Laws of Time. This Proposition is laid down in expresse termes by Plato, Tim. pag. 37. where he largely demonstrates, That no dif­ferences [Page 280]of Time, either future or past can be attributed to Eternitie, as before. It's true, he tels us, That God made time [...], a certain mobile Image of immobile Eternitie; yet so as that none of its differences can properly be ascribed thereto. So Par­men. pag. 141. [...], The one God no way participates of time, as before. So Philo Judaeus, de Mundo: [...], lo Eternitie there is nothing past, nothing future, &c. Thus Damascene, Orthod. Fid. l. 2. c. 3. [...], Whatever hath beginning may na­turally have an end: but God only is ever existent, yea rather about ever: for he is not under time, but above time. And whereas it is said, That the Eternitie of God is oft in Scripture described by diffe­rences of time, we answer, That these are but metaphoric modes of speech, wherein the Spirit of God, condescending to our nar­row capacities, describes the eternal infinite duration of God by the differences of time, yet so, as that he expressely declares, that they do not properly agree to God, but are only assumed as sym­bolic Images of Gods Eternitie, which is Plato's own phrase. And Bradwardine, l. 2. c. 51. gives us the reason of this Transla­tion: ‘The cause of this Transumtion is, because we have not a word which properly signifies the stable mansion of Eternitie: wherefore we are forced to transfer, by way of similitude, our temporal words, according to certain temporal differences, to Eternitie, and Gods coeternal intrinsec Acts.’ That neither God, nor any intrinsec Act of God can be properly measured by time, or any difference thereof is evident; because Time and al its differences are a variable, mutable, and divisible measure; but the Eternal God and al his immanent Acts invariable, im­mutable, and indivisible. In Eternitie there is no divisibilitie; no majoritie, or minoritie; no prioritie, or posterioritie; no ac­cession, recession, or succession; no successive difference of time; but one indivisible, simple, permanent instant. Thus Suarez, Me­taph. Disp. 50. Sect. 3. pag. 639. proves, ‘That what is eternal cannot, as to its own nature, admit the differences of past and future, albeit, by reason of our imperfection, we so speak of it sometimes.’ How far time and its differences may be compre­hended by Eternitie we shal explicate in what follows, 4. Prop.

2. Prop. Eternitie is an interminable Duration, Eternitie with­out beginning or end. without beginning or end. In Eternitie and al eternal Acts neither first or last can be properly assigned. This interminable duration of Eternitie is lively illustrated in sacred Philosophie by al those descriptions of God, which make him to be the first and the last, as Esa. 41 4. & 44.6. & 48.12. Rev. 1.8, 11. He being the First Being, and so without beginning; and the Last, as having no end. Thus the Stoics held, that [...], God is incorruptible and ingenerable, i. e. without beginning and end, as Lacertius, in Zeno. (1) That the Eternitie of God is without Beginning, is evident by many Philosophemes of Plato. As Phaedrus, pag. 245. [...], A first Principe has no beginning, but it gives be­ginning to althings. So in his Parmenides, pag. 141. he proves, That the one God had no beginning, &c. as before. Thus Thales, in Laertius: [...], God is the most ancient of Beings; because without beginning. (2) That the Eternitie of God shal have no end, Plato assertes in his Phaedo, pag. 106. [...], But God, saith Socrates, the very Idea or Essence of life, (as I judge) and if any thing be immortal, it is evident to al, that he cannot cease to be. He makes the Soul to be immortal also; but the Immortalitie of God, who is the original Idea and Essence of life, to be of a more transcendent Nature. Thus in his Timaeus, he distinguisheth between the Eternitie or Immorta­litie of Angels and the human Soul, which have no end; and the Eternitie of God, which is absolute, without beginning and end: The Eternitie of God he makes to be, [...], primary, absolute, and independent as to al causalitie, and therefore not communicable to the Crea­ture: but the Eternitie that belongs to the Creature is, [...], according to a participation of Being, i. e. dependent on the pleasure of God [...], as that of Angels and the hu­man Soul, which shal have no end, albeit they had beginning. The best of Creatures have but an half-Eternitie: albeit they have no end, yet they had a beginning: They may be to everlast­ing, but are not from everlasting, as God is, Psal. 90.2. Besides, the Eternitie of Creatures is not intrinsecal from a necessitie of Being, but dependent on the pleasure of God.

3.Eternitie most simple and uni­forme. Prop. Eternitie is a measure most simple, uniforme, absolutely indivisible, without the least composition or succession. (1) When we cal Eternitie a Measure, it must not be understood formally, ei­ther as to God, or the Creature; because every measure formal­ly considered speakes relation to the thing measured: but if the Creature never had been, God had been eternal. Neither can a measure formally considered be applied to God; because a mea­sure is ever distinguished from the thing measured; but Eternitie is not distinguished from God. Therefore when we cal Eternitie a Measure, it must be understood metaphorically, and according to our manner of speech. (2) We say Eternitie is a simple uniforme measure: i. e. without al parts, divisibilitie, or succession. The An­tithesis to this Thesis is maintained by Vorstius and the Socinians, contrary to the Dictates both of sacred and Platonic Philosophie. Thus Plato, Tim. pag. 37. assures us, That the parts of time IT WAS, and IT IS agree not to Eternitie; because these implie mo­tion and succession; but Eternitie is always immutably the same, as before. The like Aristotle, Metaph. l. 11. c. 4. where al succession is denied of Eternitie. Succession is either privative or positive: Privative succession is between Being and not-being; as mutation, corruption, or annihilation attendes the essence of things, which al Creatures are liable unto. Positive succession is when things re­main not in their Being, without some mutation. The Eternitie of God is in neither of these regards successive: Heraclitus's PHilosopheme, That althings are in fluxe or succession, and nothing permanent, is true of althings but God, who by reason of his Eter­nitie admits not of the least succession. This is implied in his Name I am, Exod. 3.14. assumed by our Lord, Joh. 8.58. Vor­stins makes the Eternitie of God no other than an everlasting du­ration, consisting of temporal parts and succession, as time. And the Socinians follow him herein. But this blasphemous Antithesis is generally impugned by the Orthodoxe, and that with invinci­ble Arguments. As, (1) Eternitie was before al Time, and there­fore cannot be composed of parts of time. (2) If Eternitie were a divisible successive measure, then the parts of which it is com­posed are either finite or infinite: They cannot be finite; be­cause no infinite can be composed of finite parts: They cannot be infinite; because then every part is as great as the whole: for things infinite admit no degrees. (3) Eternitie is the same with God himself, and therefore admits of no parts, composition, or succession, as hereafter, 5. Prop.

4. Prop. Albeit Eternitie be in it self a simple, How Eternitie coexistes to the parts of Time. and indivisible Du­vation, yet it may be said to coexiste unto and comprehend al parts of time and things. Eternitie in it self has neither succession nor ex­tension; yet it has a permanence, according to which it is said to coexiste to althings, that fal under daily succession. In this re­gard Plato cals Time, an Image of Eternitie, as al its parts and suc­cessions are comprehended thereby. For our Divines acknow­lege, that Time is contained in the measure of Eternitie, as the permanent fixed [...], Instant of Eternitie coexsistes to al the differences of time, and althings succeding in time, not as toge­ther, but successively as they existe. Thus the whole of Eternitie coexistes to this day, as also to the next day, &c. Yet we may not say that Eternitie doth attemper it self to the nature of things temporal, whiles it comprehendes and measures the same: For by measuring and comprehending things temporal, we only mean, that Eternitie doth coexiste to them: whereby Eternitie is not more attempered to the nature of time, than time, by co­existing to Eternitie, is attempered to the nature of Eternitie. Eternitie may be said to contain successive quantitie or the parts of Time, in the same manner as the Immensitie of God contains the permanent quantitie of things. Now it is wel known, that the Immensitie of God is not otherwise said to contain permanent quantitie or Bodies, but as it coexistes or may coexiste unto, yea infinitely excede al bodies, although most spatiose: so in like manner the Eternitie of God cannot otherwise be said to contain the successive quantitie or duration of things, than as it is coexi­stent to althings as they existe, and transcendes al their durations. Not only things temporarie in their vicissitudes coexiste to God and his Eternitie; but also God and his Eternitie coexistes to them: which denomination implies no vicissitude in God, or in his Eternitie; but only a vicissitude of the things temporary, and their gradual succession. It's true, as we have before proved, the differences of time past and future are repugnant to Eternitie, as to al intrinsee denomination: for in Eternitie there is nothing past or future, first or last: yet these differences are not repug­nant to Eternitie in regard of extrinsec denomination. For in the coexistence of God with things fluent and successive, there is prioritie and posterioritie, not in God, but in the things tem­porary. The coexistence of things with God is other and other, or successive, according to the vicissitude of the things; and so [Page 284]by consequence the coexistence of God with the Creatures ad­mits of some kind of succession as to externe denomination; not as if there were any new existence of God with the Creatures, but only by reason of the new existence of the Creatures with God. Hence Christ,Heb. 13.8. in regard of his Eternitie, is said to be, Heb. 13.8. The same yesterday, and to day and for ever: i. e. in regard of ex­trinsec denomination, as he coexistes in one and the same uni­forme indivisible Eternitie with things and differences of time, of successive and divisible duration. Thus the Eternitie of God is said to comprehend and measure al differences and successions of times and things.

5.Eternitie a fix­ed Instant. Prop. The Eternitie of God considered in its genuine Idea, is but one immutable, permanent, fixed Instant. This in sacred Philo­sophie the name [...], Jehovah, and I am, Exod. 3.14. fully in­dicate. Thus also [...], according to its origination, primarily denotes, being derived from [...], ever-being, or existing. Whence God, who is Eternitie, is stiled by Plato and his Sectators, [...], ever-being. So also the Poets stile their fictitious Gods [...], ever-Beings, in imitation of sacred Philosophie, which stiles God, Jehovah, and [...], Who Am, thereby denoting, that he is a fixed, permanent, eternal Being, or an ever-standing Now: For I AM, or HE IS, the sacred Characters of God, primarily belong to Eternitie. Nothing can be said It Is in a strict sense as having, [...], a standing permanent Being, as Plotinus phraseth it, but what is eternal. So Plato, Tim. pag. 37. saith, [...], It is, only belongs to Eternitie: i. e. Eternitie is only one permanent [...] or Now. Thus Plotinus (a great Sectator of Plato) Ennead. 3. l. 7. num. 2. pag. 327. He that contemplates al these things contem­plates Eternitie, [...], contemplating life permanent in the same state, having the whole a ways present: but not now this, and anon that, but al together: neither now some one part, and afterward some other, but an indivisible end. Wherein he de­clares, that the Eternitie of God is one and the same indivisible, interminable state or fixed instant, without succession. Whence he immediately subjoins: [...], &c. Where, as in a point, althings are together, without falling under any fluxe, but remaining there in the same instant, i. e. in it­self, without permutation or succession of past and future. And then he [Page 285]concludes with this description of Eternitie: [...], That therefore which neither was, nor shal be, but only IS, having a fixed permanent Being, because it is neither changed for the future; neither by what is past, that is Eternitie. It is therefore about Be­ing in it self, a life together total and ful, and every where altogether without distance. This is the Eternitie we inquire about. In these Platonic Philosophemes about Eternitie we find these observables. (1) That Eternitie has no differences of time or succession of parts, either past or future. (2) That it is but one only fixed permanent Is or Instant. (3) That it is in it self total and ful, without distance of parts. Whence Eternitie is defined by Boe­thius, an interminable possession of life total, perfect, and al at once. It is total, not in regard of parts, but as it includes the most per­fect negation of succession. It is al at once, as it is but one fix­ed instant. Thus Justin Martyr, in Paraen, cals it, [...], The eternal and infinite Now, or Instant. But here we must distinguish [...], an Instant, [...], Nunc, aliud est stans, aliud est fluens. into that which is perma­nent or fixed, and that which is fluent: Eternitie is not a fluent Instant, such as they make to be in time, but nunc or instans stans, a standing fixed permanent Instant; or, as Plotinus stiles it, [...], a standing Being, without past or future, possessing al­things at once, totally and perfectly, without the least vicissitude. Thus Bradwardine, de Causa Dei, l. 2. c. 50. pag. 830. ‘Hence it evidently follows, that there is but one and the same immutable Instant thoroughout al Eternitie; and that the whole of Eterni­tie is not more or greater than its Instant; nor the Instant of Eternitie more simple or lesse than it; but that Eternitie and its Instant are really one and the same.’

But here, before we procede farther, we cannot, without vio­lence offered to the Laws of Philosophic Disquisition, let passe un­examined the assaults, which learned More, in his Divine Dia­logues, Dial. 1. S. 15. pag. 58. makes against this commun notion of Eternitie, That it is a permanent [...] or Instant at once. This Idea of Gods Eternitie he clogges with these Contradictions: (1) That althings should have been really and essentially with God from al Eternitie at once, and yet be borne in time and succession. This Objection is, as I conceive, fully answered in what precedes, [Page 286]4. Prop. To which we may adde, that althings were present with God even before their existence, not in the Dominicans no­tion, by reason of any real presentialitie or coexistence to Gods Eternitie, but only by their intentional coexistence in the Di­vine Decree, as Twisse has wel demonstrated against the Domini­cans, Scientiae Med. lib. 2. pag. 377, 400. (2) Learned More addes: That eternal Duration should be at once, is also to me utterly uncon­ceivable, and that one permanent instant should be commensurate or rather equal to al successions of Ages. To which we answer, [1] as before, That Eternitie is not a fluent, successive Instant, but [...], a standing Instant. [2] That it is not a temporary, finite create Instant, but an eternal, infinite and increate Instant, and therefore every way commensurate to al the successions of Ages. But (3) he addes: Besides, if the Duration of God be al at once, sith no Agent actes but within the compasse of its own Duration, God must both create and destroy the World at once. Whence it seems impossible, that eternal Duration should be indistant to it self, or with­out continuation of Intervals. To which it's answered, [1] That this consequence seems very inconsequent, and unworthy of so learned a man, because not ad idem: for Gods Eternitie, which he makes to be a successive Duration, is really the same with his Essence; but his Creation and Destruction of the World, as Acts ad extra, and in regard of their passive attingence, coincident with the Creature, fal under successive Duration, and so cannot be simultaneous, or at once. [2] His Conclusion, That Gods eternal Duration cannot be without continuation of Intervals, seems to me of very dangerous consequence, and that which both Plato and Plotinus, whom he values, abhor, to say no worse. But [3] to conclude, I grant, that the notion Instant, as applied to Gods Eternitie, is but metaphoric, and rather negative than positive, to exclude al manner of succession, or duration by intervals from God, as before. Hence,

6.Eternitie the same with the Divine Essence. Prop. Eternitie has one and the same Idea with the Divine Essence. Eternitie is nothing else but the increate Duration of God, or God himself. Whence the Platonists stile God [...], supereternal, and [...], transcendent Eternitie. And Plato's mind herein is incomparable wel explicated by Plo­tinus, Ennead. 3. l. 7. num. 1. pag. 325. What therefore must we cal Eternitie? [...], the very intelligible Divine Es­sence. For seing we conceive of Eternitie as most venerand, there is [Page 287]nothing more venerand than the intelligible Divine Essence. So pag. 326. [...], &c. Again the intelli­gible World and Eternitie comprehend in themselves the same things. By the intelligible World he means, according to Plato, the ideal World, i. e. God as decreeing althings. So num. 6. [...]; What therefore principally shal that be, by which we say the whole divine World is eter­nal and everlasting? Where he makes Eternitie to be the first Di­vine Essence, as it connotes an interminable state of Identitie and Life. For to persevere in an Identitie of Essence, with an abso­lute and intrinsec necessitie, is the most noble and perfect mode of Duration, which differs more than generically from al other modes of Duration, and therefore most proper to God, whose Eternitie is a permanent increated Duration. Vorstius and his Sectators make the Eternitie of God to be an Accident, and divi­sible successive Duration: but this Plotinus refutes, num. 3. pag. 327. [...], &c. Neither truely may we imagine, that Eternitie happens to that Divine Nature extrinsecally and as an Ac­cident, but that it is in it, and of it, and together with it. For it is considered as intimately united to and essentially one with the Divine Nature. Wherein he clearly proves, that Eternitie is not an Accident, but the same with the Divine Essence. Which argu­ment may be thus improved. (1) If Eternitie in God be an Accident, either it is caused by God, or not: if it be caused, then it has a beginning, and so not Eternitie. If it be an Accident not caused by God, then it was caused by it self, or without cause: which are both absurd. (2) If the Eternitie of God be an Ac­cident, then finite or infinite: It cannot be a finite Accident; be­cause a finite duration cannot be commensurate to an infinite Be­ing. It cannot be an infinite Accident, because then there would be somewhat infinite besides God. (3) It is apparent, that Eter­nitie cannot be an Accident, if we consider the very nature of Duration, which is not really distinct from the subject whereunto it belongs. For what is Duration, but the persevering of a thing in its existence? And in like manner Eternitie is nothing else but the increate, permanent, adequate essential duration of God; which essentially includes al perfection of Essence, and conse­quently al interne Acts of God, either as to Knowlege or Wil. In sum, Eternitie is the perfect duration of the Essence, Perfe­ction, [Page 288]and Operations of God, as Suarez has wel demonstrated, Metaph. Disp. 50. Sect. 3. pag. 638, 639.

§. 4.Gods Immensitie and Omnipre­sence what. Next to Gods Eternitie follows his Immensitie, or Omni­presence; which denotes his presence in althings, and al spaces; whereof we have lively notices both in Sacred and Platonic Phi­losophie. As for sacred Philosophie it gives us great illustrations of Gods Immensitie and Omnipresence. 1 Kings 8.27. Psal. 139.7, 8, 9, 10. Thus, 1 Kings 8.27. Be­hold the Heaven of Heavens cannot contain thee. So Psal. 139.7. Where shal I go from thy Spirit, or whither shal I flee from thy presence? v. 8. If I ascend up into Heaven, thou art there: if I make my bed in Hel, behold thou art there. [...], thou art there, i. e. by thy immense omnipresent Essence. Thence he addes: v. 9. If I take the wings of the morning, and dwel in the utmost parts of the Sea: v. 10. Even there shal thy hand lead me, and thy right hand hold me. This is coherent with what precedes, and the sense of the whole is this: If I should endeavor to flie from the presence even unto the utmost part of the World, yet must not thy hand of Provi­dence conduct me thither? and cannot then the same hand ap­prehend me there, and correct my foolish infidelitie for conceit­ing that I could hide my self from thy presence? The like Jer. 23.23, 24.Jer. 23.23, 24. Am I a God at hand, saith the Lord, and not a God afar off? Can any hide himself in secret places, that I shal not see him, saith the Lord? do I not fil Heaven and Earth? God is said to fil Hea­ven and Earth, by reason of the Immensitie of his Essence. For God being infinite as to his Essence and Perfection, must necessa­rily also be infinite as to his Presence; so that his Essence cannot be limited by any finite space. Thus Damascene, Orthod. fid. l. 1. c. 17. [...], There­fore the Deitie only is free from circumscription, existent without prin­cipe, without end, comprehending althings, and yet comprehended by nothing. In that he saith, The Deitie only is free from circumscri­ption, he hath discovered a truth, which the Aristotelean Scholes are unacquainted with: for albeit Angels and the human Soul are not circumscribed by corporeous place, yet they are by their Ʋbi, or definitive space, as Damascene demonstrates. Thence c. 19. he saith: [...], Moreover it belongs to the Deitie to diffuse it self through althing impermixtly, but nothing through it. This degree of Infinitie they cal Immensitie; which is prperly estimed by the regard it has [Page 289]not only to finite space, but to al imaginarie space. So that by Gods Immensitie we understand the intimate presence of his in­finite, indivisible Essence in al space, both real and imaginarie, actual and possible. Not that Gods Immensitie is the same with space, as Derodone in his Physics, and others would fain persuade us; who make Gods Immensitie no other than an infinite space: and thence they suppose althings to be in space, as they are in Gods Immensitie. But what dangerous consequences attend this Hypothesis may appear from this, That it supposeth either that Gods Immensitie is only an Accident or Mode distinct from God; or, which is worse, that althings formally and essentially existe in God, as in their proper space or place, and so are not really di­stinct from God; which is little short of blasphemie. Some di­stinguish between the Immensitie of God, and his Divine Pre­sence; making his Immensitie to be an absolute proprietie, but his Presence relative, as it relates to the Creature. But I see no necessitie of restraining Gods Presence to the relation he has to his Creatures; seing it is as infinite as his Essence, and so has respect not only to finite, but also to infinite imaginarie space, whether actual or possible. Neither doth Gods infinite Presence speak any actual or real habitude to any thing without himself: therefore we may estime it as absolute as his Immensitie, and not to be distinguished therefrom. It's true, God is said in sa­cred Philosophie to have his Throne in Heaven, as also in his Chur­ches; but this must be understood only of his gloriose manifestation of himself, and gratiose operations. So Damascene, Orthod. Fid. l. 1. c. 16. [...], God is said to be in a place, and a place is said to be of God, where his operation is manifest. For he diffuseth himself thorough althings parely and without the least commixtion with them; and makes althings to participate of his operation, according to their indigence and receptive capacitie. Whence he addes: [...], &c. Therefore that is said to be the place of God, which most participates of his operation and Grace. Wherefore Heaven is said to be his Throne; because in it the Angels do his wil— And the Church is said to be the place of God; because it is his Temple, &c.

The Immensitie and infinite Presence of God may be explica­ted and demonstrated by the Infinitude of the Divine Essence.Gods Immensitie demonstrated and explicated. For that which is infinite in its Being, must necessarily be infi­nite in its Presence: al termes and bounds as to place or space arise from the termes of Essence: that therefore which hath no termes of Essence, can have no termes of Presence, but must be im­mense. Thus Plato, Leg. 10. pag. 899. having proved, that there is one infinite Being, by whom althings are disposed and governed, he con­cludes, [...], that althings were ful of God that im­mense Being. So Diogenes the Cynic held: [...], For althings are ful of God; therefore men should be reverent.

2. The Immensitie and infinite Presence of God may be ex­plicated and demonstrated by his absolute Simplicitie. Thus Plato, in his Parmenides, pag. 138. [...], But that which neither hath any parts, neither is a whole, much lesse can it be, that it should be confined to any place to space, either in regard of parts or whole. Therefore it neither changeth its place by going into any place, or by remaining in the same place; or by being carried thither, nei­ther by being altered. Wherein he proves, That the one God is immense and infinite in his Presence, because he is present in al places and spaces, not by parts, or as an whole compound Being; but by his simple indivisible Essence. So Damascene, l. 1. de Fide, c. 16. [...], God therefore being immaterial and not circumscri­bed, is not in a place; for he is place to himself, filling althings, and yet above al, and containing al. Whence he concludes: [...], We must know that the Deitie is indivisible, the whole totally existing every where, and not part in part corporally distracted, but the whole in al, and the whole above al. Thence Chrysippus the Stoic said, That the most simple and pure Reing, [...], which also they first cal God, doth diffuse himself throughout al bodies in the Air, and al living Creatures, and al Plants, and throughout the Earth it self. God is essentially and indivisibly in al Beings and [Page 291]space; albeit al Beings are not in God as in their proper space; as Derodone and others too boldly assert: For if althings are in God, as in their proper space, how can we possibly avoid that blasphemous consequence of the Familistes, who make althings but particles of God? Is it possible that any thing is or can be in God, which is not God? If Gods Immensitie be the same with his Essence, as undoubtedly it is, wil it not necessarily follow, that althings, by existing in Gods Immensitie, existe also in God? I greatly value Derodone's acumen in many philosophic Contempla­tions; but yet I find dangerous consequences attending some of his Philosophemes bordering on Theologie; and therefore can­not but conceive my self under an essential obligation to premo­nish young Students thereof.

3. The Immensitie and infinite Presence of God may be ex­plicated and demonstrated by the infinite power, and operations of God both actual and possible. This Argument Plato much insistes on, proving, that God is an universal Spirit, who diffuseth him­self throughout the whole Universe, conserving, somenting, ani­mating and actuating althings. So Leg. 10. pag. 895. [...], There­fore the principe of al motions, and the first motion, which is in those things that are permanent, and those things that move, is, as we must necessarily confesse, he that moves himself, and therefore the mast ancient and excellent. Whence pag. 896. he concludes: [...], &c. God is a Soul universally ruling and dwelling in althings that are moved. Thus Damascene, Orthod. Fid. l. 1. c. 17. having demonstrated, that Angels are confined to some space, he addes: [...], For it is proper solely to God, to be pre­sent every where, according to the same operation. And he explicates the mode of this divine Ubiquitie thus: [...]. But God existing every where and above every thing, workes differently every where and according to the same, by one simple ope­ration. To draw forth the force of this Argument; Gods infi­nite Presence and Immensitie in althings actual and possible may be demonstrated, (1) From his infinite Power in creating al­things, that are or may be. For God being able to create 100000 Worlds, 100000 times greater than this World, his Presence [Page 292]must be infinite; because God workes by the Presence of his Essence:Deus immedia­tè agitimmedi­atione non so­lùm virtutis, sed & suppositi. neither can he worke where he is not present. God workes al immediately, not only by the Immediation of his Virtue, but also by the Immediation of his Essence. Aristotle, Phys. lib. 7. tels us, that the mover and moved must be together: and look as a particular cause is present with its particular effect, so the universal cause with his universal effect. Now God, the universal Cause of althings, hath no other way of Presence with al effects, but by his Essence: Hence that of Damascene, Orthod. Fid. l. 1. c. 18. [...], Althings are distant from God, not as to place, but nature: i. e. God, who is in­finitely distant from his Creature as to Nature, is yet ever pre­sent with it in regard of the Omnipresence of his Essence. (2) Gods infinite Presence is manifested in the Confervation of al­things: as the creatrix Essence was immediately present in ma­king althings, so the conservatrix Essence is immediately present in the supporting althings. (3) Gods infinite Presence may be demonstrated from his immediate actuating al second Causes, as Suarez, Metaph. Disput. 30. Sect. 7.

§. 5.Gods Incompre­hensibilitie. The Infinitude of the Divine Essence, Duration, and Pre­sence being discussed, we now are to procede to God Infinitude as to our Comprehension, or his Incomprehensibilitie, whereof we find bright notices both in Sacred and Platonic Philosophie. Thus Job 11.7, 8, 9.Job 11.7, 8, 9. Caust thou by searching find out God? Canst thou find out the Almighty to perfection? This Rhetoric interrogation implies a vehement Logic negation. Thence it follows: It is as high as Heaven, what canst thou do? deeper than Hel, what canst thou know? The measure thereof is longer than the Earth, and broader than the Sea. Psal. 145.3. So Psal. 145.3. Great is the Lord and great­ly to be praised, and his greatnesse is unsearchable. Where he makes the infinite magnitude of Gods Essence the cause of his Incom­prehensibilitie.Comprehen­dere propriè est arringere rem secundùm omnem mo­dum & omnem rationem quâ res est cogno­scibilis, &c. A­quinas. For to comprehend an object is to apprehend it according to every mode and reason as it is intelligible, thereby to define it, or give termes and bounds to it: For a definition is but the boundary of an Essence: he that perfectly comprehends and defines a thing gives limits and bounds to that thing in his intellect. Now that which has no bounds or termes of Essence, can have no bounds or termes as to our comprehension or defi­nition. Hence properly and strictly God cannot be said posi­tively to comprehend himself, though negatively this Attribute [Page 293]may be given to him, as he knows himself perfectly. Whence that Hypothesis of Derodone and some others, who assert, That God may be defined by himself, is too presumtuous and during; se­ing al definitions give termes and limits to the essences of things: whence if God cannot be limited, he cannot be defined: for terms of definition follow termes of essence. Much lesse can God be defined by a created intellect unto which al definitions refer, as before, Chap. 3. §. 2. Thence it is said of God,1 Tim. 6.16. 1 Tim. 6.16. That he dwels in the light, which no man can approche unto. The Divine Essence, by reason of its Immensitie and Infinitude, is infinitely elevated in Splendor and Glorie, beyond the capaci­tie of our finite intellect. Thus Plato held, God to be [...], a celestial light ineffable, &c. So in his Ti­maeus, pag. 28 [...], and truely it is very dif­ficult to find out that Parent of the Ʋniverse: and when he is found out, to declare what he is unto al, is a thing impossible. So in his Parmenides, pag. 134. [...], Therefore Beautie it self and Bonitie it self is unknown as to us, and al these things which we estime Ideas. And more fully, pag. 142. he thus speakes: [...], Wherefore he [God] is neither named, nor declared, nor conceived, nor knowen, neither per­ceived by any of those things that are. Which indeed are lively illustrations of the Incomprehensibilitie of God. And that Par­menides himself, (whose name Plato affixeth to this his metaphy­sic Dialogue) had the like notices of Gods Incomprehensibilitie, seems probable, by what Lacrtius relates of Melissus his Scholar, who said, [...], That men should not attent to describe God; because there is no comprehensive knowlege of him. This is wel exprest by Damascene, de Fide, l. 1. c. 4. [...], The Divinitie therefore is infinite and incomprehensible; and this only of him is comprehensible, that he is infinite and incomprehensible. So again, c. 13. he saith, That God hath given us a participation of his Bonitie, by producing us out of nothing, and investing us with a facultie of knowledge, yet [...], as he has not made [Page 294]us participant of his Essence, so neither has he given to us the knowlege of his Essence. For it is impossible that Nature [human] should per­fectly know that Nature which is infinitely above it. Whence he concludes: [...]; How can that which is superessential be knowen? The like he addes, c. 17. God, saith he, comprehendes althings, but is comprehended by nothing: [...], for he solely is incomprehensible and infinite, known by none; but he solely is the Contemplator of himself.

But the more distinctly to explicate and demonstrate the In­comprehensibilitie of God, we must consider, that a thing is then said to be comprehended, when it is perfectly knowen so far as it is cognoscible or intelligible. For comprehensive knowledge is that whereby the whole of an object, so far as it is intelligible, is knowen either intuitively or discursively. This manner of speech is taken from the dimension of bodies, which are said to be com­prehended, when their whole quantitie and extension is so con­tained in another, as that nothing of their quantitie is beyond the comprehension of the continent. Hence Zeno and the Stoics his sectators called first Principes [...], Comprehensions; because they fully and perfectly comprehend al conclusions. Now that God is, as to al finite capacitie, incomprehensible is evident, (1) from the nature of Comprehension, which denotes an adequate perfect pene­tration and definition of a thing, as to al its essential Differences, Predicates, Proprieties and Parts: But now God having no Genus or essential Difference cannot be defined, neither can his Essence be penetrated by any finite capacitie. (2) From the infinite dispro­portion between a finite capacitie and the infinite Essence of God. An object is comprehended when it is understood by the intellect so far as it is intelligible: now God being infinitely intelligible, is also infinitely distant from, and so not to be comprehended by a finite intellect. God, as he is of infinite Essence, so also of infinite cognoscibilitie and truth: whence he is not comprehensible by any but himself. (3) From the comparation of things intelligible. The more abstract things are from mater, and remote from sense, the more difficult to be understood. Thence Aristot. Metaph. 2. saith, That our Intellect is disposed, [...], to­wards first Beings most manifest by Nature, as Bats towards the light: i. e things by how much the more pure and spirital they are, by so much the more difficult to be understood. Thus Bradwardine, [Page 295]lib. 1. cap. 1. pag. 27. ‘If there be something difficult to be fully understood, and something more difficult, and something yet more difficult, and so forward; must there not be something most difficult to be understood, which is God? For as in Mathe­matic Conclusions, so in the Creatures, the later is more difficult than the precedent, but nothing most difficult to be understood, but God: which his Immensitie and Infinitie both extensive and intensive clearly demonstrate.’ (4) From the Operations and Provi­dence of God. How little doth the most sagacious Philosopher under­stand, much lesse comprehend of the Workes and Providence of God? How impossible then is it for poor mortals to comprehend the Essence of God? Paul cries out, Rom. 11.33.Rom. 11.33. How unsearcha­ble are his judgements, and his wayes past finding out! And if Gods workes, which are finite and so bear some proportion to our un­derstanding, are so unsearchable, how unsearchable then is his Es­sence? (5) From our ignorance and incomprehension of the least things in Nature. Alas! how little do we know of the least of Beings? Is not our ignorance much more than our knowlege in the commun products of Nature? How little then must we needs know of the God of Nature? This Argument is incomparably wel improved by Bradwardine, l. 1. c. 1. pag. 27. against the prond Philosophers of his Age, presuming they could by their reason give an exact model of the divine Decrees and Operations; whom he thus seriously derides: ‘Prethee, O Philosopher, tel me, what doest thou fully know? I suppose thou darest not say the least Creature. I know, thou doest not perfectly know the least Atome in the Sun, the least dust of the Earth, nor the least drop of water. For in every corpuscule there are infinite figures li­near, superficial, and corporal, &c. Thence he concludes thus: If therefore thou knowest not the least things, yea thou art infinitely ignorant of more than thou knowest, how caust thou fully know the greatest Being? Presume not, but acknowlege thy self to be a man, and that thou art infinitely ignorant of more of God than thou knowest.’ So Aquinas contra Gent. lib. 1. cap. 3. proves from our ignorance of things sensible, how igno­rant we are of the supreme Being. (6) From the mutable varia­ble nature of human Knowlege. In those things whereof we con­ceive we know most, how much are we contradicted by others, who are as confident of their Antithesis, as we are of our Hypothe­sis? Yea, how oft do we contradict our selves, and that in those [Page 296]very things, wherein we thought our knowlege wel grounded? And if our comprehension in things natural be so superficial, va­riable, and contradictory, how much more is it such in the com­prehension of God? That God is incomprehensible as to any created intellect, albeit supernaturally elevated, see Suarez, Me­taph. Disput. 30. Sect. 12. pag. 118.

Although man cannot attain to a comprehensive Knowlege of the incomprehensible God,How for we may apprehend God. yet an apprehensive Knowlege he is capable of. For the Infinitude and Incomprehensibilitie of God hinders not, but that he may be apprehended by a finite understanding, so far as he reveles himself in his word or workes. It's true, al knowlege implies some proportion between the object knowen and the apprehensive facultie: and to speak strictly there is no proper proportion between an infinite object and a finite subject; yet such is the condescendence of the infinite God, as that he has not left us without some means, both natural and supernatural, which have an illative proportion to himself, whereby we are en­abled, as by so many gradations, to ascend up to the knowlege of himself. And we find not only in sacred Philosophie, but also in Plato many good rules to conduct us in our inquiries after and contemplations of the incomprehensible God.

1.Against Poetic figments of God. Plato severely prohibits al his Sectators the entertaining any fabulose Poetic figments of God, whereby he is transformed into va­rious shapes and formes, according to the proud daring conceits of men. Thus Plato, Repub. 2. pag. 377. condemnes Hesiod and Homer for those Fables they coined touching the Gods: and then tels us what those Fables were: [...], &c. When any one doth im­portunely and wickedly forge and represent the nature of the Gods, and Heroes; neither doth duely describe them as they are: just as a Pain­ter, who without the least ressemblance paintes those things which he in­tendes to imitate. Thence he procedes to aggravate the crime of those, who coin such unworthy Fables of God: [...], &c. First truely, the greatest lie is in the greatest maters: whereof Hesiod is the Author, who feignes such false stories of Heaven, &c. He makes Hesiod's Fables about the Gods to be of the blackest guilt; because in the greatest maters. Thence he concludes, in the end of this lib. 2. pag. 383. thus: Albeit therefore we may commend many things of Homer, yet this we do not commend, that he feigned such things of [Page 297]Jupiter— When therefore such things are spoken of the Gods, let us be filled with indignation, and banish the Poets: [...], Nei­ther let us permit the Professors of Learning to make use of such fabu­lose Poets for the instructing of Youth: If truely the Magistrates of the Citie be religiose and divine, they wil, so far as men may, take care hereof for us. An excellent Law for the expelling al fabulose Poets. Thus in the 12 Tables it's reckoned as one of Romulus's Laws: That men believe not the Fables of the Gods. Laertius re­lates of Pythagoras, ‘That descending down to Hel, he saw He­siod's Soul bound to a brazen Pillar making a lamentable noise; and Homer's Soul hanging on a Tree, with Serpents about it, for those things which they feigned of the Gods.’ And Zeno­phanes Colophonius writ against Homer and Hesiod, deriding them for their Fables of the Gods. So much did the wiser Heathens abo­minate those fabulose narrations of God. It was a great Saying of Bias, mentioned by Laertius, [...], Speak of God as he is.

2. Plato forbids al curiositie in our inquiries about God. Against Curio­sitie in our in­quiries after God. Thus Repub. 6. pag. 506. having undertaken to discourse of God, un­der the notion of the chiefest Good, he gives a caution, that we be not too curiose in prying into the incomprehensible things of God. Doest thou, saith he, conceive it consentaneous, that any discourse of a thing whereof he is ignorant? No surely, so far as he is ignorant. Doest thou not know, that opinions without science are base; of which opinions the best are truly blind? Doest thou judge, that they who opine, or measure things by their own opinions, without understanding, differ any thing from those who being blind yet conceit they go in a right path? no surely. [...]; Wilt thou therefore contemplate base, blind, and oblique opinions (of God) when thou mayst hear clear and excellent discourse from others? An excellent rule for the confine­ment of our notions and contemplations touching God to sacred Revelations. Then he addes in Socrates's name: But truely, as for me, I am no way fit for this so great an affair; [namely to dis­course of the chiefest Good] and therefore lest going beyond my ca­pacitie I should come short of what I aime at, and make my self re­diculous, I again and again tremble at my taske. But, blessed Sirs, what that chiefest Good is, let us now let passe: for the Majestie here­of, [Page 298]believe me, greatly transcendes the termes of our knowlege: but let us now consider what are the effects of this chiefest Good, which have most similitude to his nature. Wherein Socrates windes off his Audi­tors from the curiose prying into the Nature of God, and ex­hortes them rather to contemplate God in his effects, specially such as partake most of the Divine Nature. Thence he addes: [...], And I wish I were capable of unfolding, and you of receiving so great a My­sterie, that ye might perceive not only some effects and issues, but also the nature of the Parent: i. e. God himself. What an excellent re­medie doth Plato here afford us against al presumptuose and daring inquisition into the Nature and Secrets of God?Magnitudinem Dei qui se pu­tat nosse mi­nuit: qui non vult minuere non novit. Mi­nut. Foelix. Indeed he that attemts to comprehend the Divine Essence and its magnitude, doth but diminish it, and confound himself: no one conceives aright of God, but he that conceives him to be incomprehensible. Plato gives us good advice, that the Nature and Secrets of God ought to be held in a Mysterie, farther than he reveles himself. How soon are volatile and curiose Wits unhinged by the wingy Mysteries of the Divine Essence? He that indulgeth his curiositle herein, doth but thrust himself into a Labyrinth, out of which he can never extricate himself. The Socratic modestie is very be­coming Christians, not to dive into the Myseries of the Deitie, farther than he hath discovered himself in his workes or word. He that affectes to be a curiose Scrutator of the Divine Majestie shal soon be swallowed up by his Glorie. And how many have lost their Religion and Devotion, by a seeming religiose and de­vote prying into the Secrets of God? It was opportunely said of that serious Christian, who, being by a curiose Wit in way of derision, demanded, What God did before the World was made? re­plied, He made Heks for curiose Wits, who busie themselves about such vain questions. And indeed such as now indulge their curiositie in such frigid jejune speculations about God, shal one day, to their dreadful torment, feel and know how much better it had been for them, with a learned pious ignorance, to passe by the incom­prehensible Secrets of God, than by a proud blasphemous ignorant curiositie to dive into them. Lastly, what profit is it to use cu­riose conjectures in those things, which transcend al human con­jectures? To conclude, as for our contemplations about the Di­vine Perfections of God, we have a good caution given us by Na­xianzen, [...], Be not curiosily inquisitive about [Page 299]the mode. To which we may adde that of Pluto, [...], to be modesely and temperately wife, is to be greatly wife. Which agrees with sacred Philosophie, Rom. 12.3. [...].Rom. 12.3.

3. Plato instructes us,The least notice of God of great moment. That the least notices of God and his Di­vine Perfections ought to be of great moment and estime with us. So in his Critieas, pag. 107. by an allusion taken from Painters he il­lustrates this Hypothesis thus: When Painters draw the Pictures of the Gods, &c. we thinke it sufficient if they give us but any darke repre­sentation of them, neither do we being unskilful animadvert with a cen­sorious eye on their worke; but rest abundantly satisfied in what repre­sentation they give us. But when they come to draw our own picture, or the picture of any that belong to us, we more severely animadvert and censure them, if they erre in the least point. The same is to be observed in the explication of these things, [...], &c. When we discourse of things celestial and di­vine, we thinke our selves abundantly satisfied, if there be the least evi­dence brought for the explication of their nature; but on the contrary in our examens of things mortal and human, we are wont to use greater diligence. Wherefore if those things, which we are now about to dis­course of, be not so exactly, as their dignitie requires, represented by us, you'l pardon us. An excellent preface to a discourse of things di­vine touching God, which Plato is here entering on. Hence,

4.Al notices of God by Divine Revelation. Plato adviseth us not to expect or desire farther discoveries of God, than his own revelation and illumination shal afford to us. So in his Timaeus, pag. 29. [...], It must be remembred both by me that speak, and by you who are Judges of my discourses, that we have but human Nature, and therefore if we can but attain unto some Oriental Tradition or probable relation of these things, [touching God, &c.] we may not inquire farther about them. That by his [...] we must understand some Oriental Judaic Tradition originally of divine revelation, I thinke, wil appear evident to any that consi­ders the use of this phrase in Plato. Indeed in our contemplati­ons and discourses of God it is neither profitable nor safe to pro­cede further than divine Revelation and Illumination shal conduct us. Neither need we be ashamed to be ignorant of such Secrets of God, the humble ignorance of which argues more solid know­lege, [Page 300]than curiose and vain speculations thereof. These are the best bounds for our inquiries about God, not only to follow God learning, but also to leave off inquiring when and where God leaves off to teach: as we may not neglect what God has reveled of himself, so we may not search into what God has kept secret: for as the former argues too much sloth and ingratitude, so the later too much pride and curiositie. It was a great Saying of Augustin: We may safely follow Scripture, which as an indulgent mo­ther goes softly, that she may not go beyond our infirmitie. A belie­ving ignorance in things not reveled about God is much better than a rash science. Al natural reason and investigation about God, ought to follow not precede faith. Hence,

5.The Gradation of our ascent to God. Plato informes us, That our ascent in the contemplation of God musk be by the same degrees, by which he descendes to us, either in his workes or words. Thus Repub. 6. pag. 509, &c. he informes us, ‘That it is above al human capacitie to comprehend the Majestie of the chiefest Good, as it is in its inaccessible splendor, yet we may ascend thereto by certain [...] or [...], Gra es or degrees: which Grades of Ascent must be taken from Gods Grades or degrees of Descent unto us; that so we may, by a cer­tain Analogie and similitude, ascend up to the knowlege of God, so far as it is possible for man.’ Yet he gives us this needful caution, That we must speake soberly of these so great Mysteries, and take heed that we ascribe not [...] a spurious birth to the Parent of the Ʋniverse. The grades or degrees whereby God de­scendes to us, and we ascend to him are either natural or super­natural. 1.Natural Grades of knowing God. The natural Grades or Degrees, whereby God de­scendes down to us, and we ascend up to him, are al the Effects, Products and Workes of God, with al their Virtues, Efficaces, Or­ders, Varieties, and al manner of Perfections. So Plato, Repub. 6. treating largely of Gods Causalitie, he saith, Al natural Causes and Effects are but [...], and [...], Workes, Artifi­ces, and Children of God the great Parent of the Ʋniverse, whereby we may ascend up to the knowlege of God. This is more na­tively and clearly laid down in sacred Philosophie,Rom. 1.19, 20. as Rom. 1.19, 20. where he saith, the visible workes of God, as so many ascents, lead us up to the contemplation of the invisible perfections of God, specially his eternal power and Godhead. That there is a na­tural knowlege of God gained by the Book of Nature is most evident, albeit the Socinians, to serve their Hypothesis, denie it. [Page 301]This natural knowlege of God is either insite or acquisite. So Dion Prusaeensis said, that our [...], persuasion of God was ei­ther innate, or [...], acquisite. Our insite and innate knowlege of God consistes in those commun notices of God, both speculative and practic, which are impressed on the Conscience. Our ac­quisite natural knowlege of God is that which is gained by actual comparation and discourse from the workes of God. This ac­quisite knowlege may, according to the distribution of that spu­rious Dionysius, (who was indeed a great Platonist) cap. 2. de Myst. Theolog. be acquired and promoved three ways: by way of Causalitie, by way of Eminence, by way of Negation.

(1) By way of Causalitie, when by the Effects of God,1. By way of Causalitie. which are either little Images, or at least Vestigia, Footsteps of God, we mount up to the knowlege and contemplation of God, the ori­ginal Parent or first Cause of al. For indeed the effect carries with it the signature, impresse, and ressemblance of its Cause; as you frequently see the Parents complexion or conditions in the Child. Thus Plato, Repub. 6. pag. 507. having laid down this preface, that it was impossible to comprehend, yea to apprehend any thing of the Divine Majestie in himself, he tels us, That he would inquire after him in his off-spring or effects: and then he addes: [...], but take heed lest I should against my wil give you a spurious Idea of the Child of this great Parent. He speakes in the language of Aratus, cited by Paul, Act. 17.28. we are al his off-spring; Act. 17.28. and applies this notion to al lower goods, which he makes to be the off-spring or issue of the chiefest Good; and therefore by them we ascend up to the contemplation of their Parent. So Damascene, Orthod. Fid. l. 1. c. 15. [...], But those things that are spoken [of God] affirmatively, are predicated of him as the cause of althings. And he addes: [...], But he shal be more properly named from things more excellent and more akin to himself: now things immaterial are more excellent. Wherein he instructes us, (1) That our affirmative notices of God are chiefly drawen from his effects. (2) That among his effects those give us the most lively Ideas of God, which are most excellent and akin to him; namely things immaterial, as the human Soul, &c. God so ma­nifestes [Page 302]himself in the whole opifice of the Universe, that we can no sooner open our eyes, but may behold the gloriose Ideas of his Divine Wisdome, Power, and Goodnesse: which ever way we turne our eye, there shines forth some ray of the Divinitie. What is the whole Universe, but a visible Map or Picture of the invisi­ble Deitie? Is not the Creators Name written in golden Chara­cters on every page of the Book of Nature? It's true, some want eyes to see and read their Creators Name in the Book of Nature, but it follows not hence, that there is no natural knowlege of God, as the Socinians would needs persuade us: For that a thing be called natural, it is not necessary, that it be actually in al men; but it sufficeth if it may be derived from a natural principe: be­cause some men are blind, we may not thence conclude, that sight is not natural to a man.

(2) Another natural grade or way of knowing God is by way of Eminence. 2. By way of Eminence. These Notices of God by way of Eminence are best when composed both of Affirmatives and Negatives, as also of termes most simple. Thus Damascene, Orthodox. Fid. l. 1. c. 15. [...], The sweetest notion of God is that complexion of both [Affirmatives and Negatives] as superessential Essence, superdivine Divinitie, supercausal Cause, and the like. When we see any perfection in the Creature, we attribute the same to God in a more eminent degree and manner. And here we are to remember, that the more general notions of crea­ted perfections, albeit they are more imperfect as belonging to the Creature, yet they are more properly attributed to God, than more special notions; because the former are more abstract and simple, the later more concrete and composite: For by how much the higher we ascend to the generic notions of things, by so much the more simple our notions are. Hence it is, that Knowlege is more properly ascribed to God, than Sense or Reason; because it is more generic and simple: so Life, than Vegetation; Spirit, than Soul: hence also [...], Being, as Jehovah which denotes the same, are the most proper Names we can give God; because the most generic and simple notions. And the reason of the whole is this: Seing the Divine Essence is more aptly and familiarly expressed by Abnegation or Remotion, than by Affirmation, hence it follows, that by how much the more concrete and special our notions are, by so much the lesse they agree to God; and on the contrary, [Page 303]by how much the more simple and general they are, by so much the more they agree to God; because they are by so much the more remote from the imperfections of the Creature, as Twisse, Scient. med. pag. 309. Hence,

(3) The best natural way or degree of knowing God is by Ne­gation or Remotion: for the Divine Essence,3. By way of Remotion. by reason of its Im­mensitie and Infinitude, exceding al the Ideas or notions our In­tellect can forme of it, cannot better be apprehended, than by removing al imperfections from it. So Aquinas, Sum. 1. Quaest. 10. Art. 1. ‘Things simple are best defined by Negation; not as if negation were essential to them, but because our Intellect, which first apprehendes things composite, cannot arrive to the cognition of things simple, but by the remotion of al composi­tion. The same he more fully explicates, contra Gent. l. 1. c. 14. In the consideration of the Divine Essence the way of Remotion is chiefly to be used: for the Divine Essence, by reason of its Immensitie, excedes al forme that our Intellect can attain unto; wherefore we cannot apprehend it, by knowing what it is; but we have some notices thereof, by knowing what it is not. For we by so much the more draw near to the knowlege of God, by how much the more we can by our Intellect remove imperfe­ctions from God: for we by so much the more perfectly know every thing, by how much the more fully we contemplate its differences from other things: for every thing has in it self its proper essence, whereby it is distinguished from al other things. But because in the consideration of the Divine Essence we can­not conceive what it is, or its Genus, nor its distinction from other things by affirmative differences, it is therefore necessary, that we conceive of it by negative differences.’ Indeed the most simple, spirital, divine, and excellent things are best set forth by negatives. Hence God himself is best expressed and appre­hended by way of negation. We know rather what he is not, than what he is.

2. The supernatural grades or degrees whereby God descendes to us, and we ascend to him are either Graciose or Glorious. The supernatural Grades whereby we ascend up to God. (1) The grades of Grace whereby we ascend up to God are either ob­jective or subjective. [1] The supernatural objective grades of Grace are either simple or complexe. 1. Christ. (1) The simple objective grade of Grace, whereby we ascend up to God and the contemplation of him, is Christ, the Mediator, who is the essential Glasse, where­in [Page 304]al the Glorie of the Deitie is most resplendent, as 2 Cor. 3.18. He is the image of God, 2 Cor. 4.4. 2 Cor. 4.4. [...] an image is an expresse ressemblance or imitamen of an exemplar, according to its forme or kind; and so it differs from Ves [...]igium, or a Footstep, which gives only some darke notices of a thing, by its causalitie. There are some vestigia or footsteps of God impressed on the sensible world; yea an accidental Image of God on the renewed Soul; but Christ is an essential Image of God, in whom al the invisibile perfections of God become visible to an eye of faith. Thence he is said to be,Col. 1.15. Col. 1.15. the image of the invisible God: i. e. God who is invi­sible in himself becomes visible in his Son. Whence also he is stiled,Heb. 1.3. Heb. 1.3. the effulgence of his glorie, and character of his per­son. [...], is [...], the splendor or effulgence of the Sun communicated in and by its rayes, specially as they fal on a cloud, and so make [...], Parelius, or a reflexe image of the Sun, which seems to be another Sun: so Christ he is the Parelius or reflexe Image of God, who is in himself a Light inaccessible and ful of Glo­rie, as 1 Tim. 6.16. Thence it is added: and the character of his person: [...] notes an Effigies or expresse figure engraven, or impressed: Al the Divine Attributes and Perfections of God are impressed or engraven on Christ's human Nature, in legible and golden Characters: whence he is stiled Emmanuel God with us. He is indeed the golden Arke wherein the Deitie lies couched; a vi­sible Image of the invisible Deitie: whose mediatorie Offices and Relations seem imperfectly expressed in Plato's Demons, of which before.2. The Scri­pture. (2) The complexe objective grades of our ascent up to God are al divine Words or Revelations, both preceptive and promis­sive, whereby the Divine Nature and Wil is reveled to us, as 1 Cor. 13.12.1 Cor. 13.12. For we now see thorough a glasse darkely. We see the face of God in the glasse of divine Words and Ordinances, yet only enigmatically and obscurely. And Plato makes mention of [...], a Divine Word, whereby things divine are reveled to us: which,3. The light of Grace. if I mistake him not, alludes to the sacred Scriptures. [2] The subjective grades whereby we ascend up to the knowlege of God are al Divine Illuminations, whereof we find great notices and Philosophemes in Plato, 4. The light of Glorie. as hereafter Chap. 10. §. 1. (2) There are also Grades of Glorie, whereby glorified Spirits ascend up to the beatific Vision of God, of which elsewhere. These are the va­rious descents of God to man, and the ascents of man to God, whereby his incomprehensible Being is in some degrees apprehend­ed, though never comprehended by poor mortals.

CHAP. V. Of Gods Life, Knowlege, Wil, and Power.

The Life of God in the Actualitie of his Essence: Gods Life most spi­rituose, self-moving, Life it self, immortal, and the Cause of al Lafe. Gods Science, its Perfection; Object both complexe and incomplexe; particularly the human Soul: The Mode of Divine Science by the Divine Essence and Ideas: Gods Science most simple, intuitive, im­mutable, certain, absolute, eternal, and perfect. Simple Intelligence, and Science of Vision: Middle Science what. The Wil of God, its Object, Actualitie; Independence, Immutabilitie, Absolutenesse, Ante­cedence, Perfection, Libertie, Efficace, Distinctions. Gods Power, and its Identitie with his Wil: Its Object things possible: Its In­finitude.

§. 1. HItherto we have considered the Essence of God as existent, The Life of God. we now procede to consider it as actuose, which is usually termed the Life of God, whereof we find great notices in Sacred and Platonic Philosophie. In sacred Philosophie Life is ascribed to God on various reasons: (1) [...] in opposition to al false Gods, or Idols; and so it denotes the Veritie and Truth of his Es­sence and Existence, as Mat. 16.16. [...],Mat. 16.16. of the li­ving God, i. e. of the true very God, in opposition to al false Gods. So Act. 14.15. 1 Tim. 4.10. as in the O. T. Deut. 32.40. Psal. 84.23. Jer. 5.2. (2) [...], by way of Eminence, to distin­guish his Actualitie and manner of acting from that of the Crea­ture: for al life consisting in a spirituose actuositie; every thing is said to live, so far as it is [...], a self-moving Principe, as Plato phraseth it: now God being the most pure Act and Spirit, and the prime [...], self-moving Principe, which moves al­things, but is moved by-none, hence Life in the most eminent de­gree belongs to God, as Joh. 1.4. and elsewhere. (3) [...], effectively, as he gives life to al, either natural, Act. 17.28. Deut. 30.20. or spiritual, Hos. 1.10. 2 Cor. 4.11. Ephes. 4.18. or gloriose, Joh. 14.9. (4) [...], essentially, as the Divine Es­sence is in and of it self actuose. For the Life of God is God himself: hence when he swears by his life, as Deut. 32.40.Deut. 32.40. he [Page 306]swears by himself. And so men, when they would swear by God, they swear by his life, 1 Sam. 14.39. Ruth 3.13. 1 Sam. 14.39. And because Gods Essence is ever actuose, therefore he is said to live for ever, Dan. 4.34.Dan. 4.34. who liveth for ever. So Rev. 4.9.

This Life of God essentially considered is wel described by Plato, in his Phaedo, pag. 106. [...], But that God, saith Socrates, who is (as I take it) the very species, forme, or idea of life, if any thing else be im­mortal, can never die, is confest by al. In which description of the Life of God we may consider, (1) the mode of life he ascribes to God, in that character, [...], the very species, forme or idea of life, whereby the Life of God is essentially diffe­renced from al other Lifes. For no created life can be said to be the forme or idea of life: The Angelic life is of al created lifes the most actuose, spirituose, and noble; yet it cannot be said to be the species or idea of life; because it contains not the whole of life: for the species and forme contains the whole essence. But now the Life of God is the species, forme, or idea of life, because it contains in it self eminently and essentially al life: whatever Spirituositie or Actuositie there is in any created life, it is in a tran­scendent eminent degree comprehended in the essential Life of God. (2) Plato makes this Life of God to be [...], immor­tal. So Aristotle, lib. 2. de Coelo, cap. 3. [...], The Energie or Actuositie of God is Immortalitie: and this is life eternal. This Immortalitie of the Divine Life is [...],1. Tim. 6.16. natural, absolute and essential, as 1 Tim. 6.16. but the immortalitie of Creatures is only [...], acquisite, as Plato in his Timaeus: or in the phrase of sacred Philosophie, [...], by grace and free donation. Angels and human Spirits are immortal by divine donation, but they possesse not Immortali­tie, as the Divine Life doth.

But to explicate the Life of God more fully,Of Life in its generic notion. according to the Analogie it bears to the Animal and Rational Life, we must a lit­tle examine what Life in its generic notion importes. And here indeed we can give only some poor conjectures; in as much as nothing is more difficult to be understood than Life, albeit no­thing more commun. This is one of the Mysteries of Nature; which not falling under the perception of sense, farther than by its effects, we can only give some probable conjectures of it. But [Page 307]thus much we find by the effects to be included in the generic notion of Life: (1) a spirituose Principe, or Spirituositie. So among Animals, by how much the more spirituose they are, by so much the more perfect and noble their life is. The animal life is in­deed composed of vital and animal Spirits in agitation: Hence vigor, health, strength, sense, vegetation, and al the issues of life procede. And by how much the more potent and vigorous the Spirits are, by so much the more active and perfect is the life. So in the rational Life, the more spirituose the exercices of Reason, and Wil are, the more perfect the life is. (2) Life in its gene­ric notion importes also Actuositie. Life consistes not in a mere spirituose principe, but in the agitation of that principe. And the more actuose the spirituose principe is, the more perfect the life is. (3) But the main character that seems most essential to life in the general is [...], self-motion. This Plato makes commun to al life, as wel create as increate: Brutes they have an animal self-motion, men rational, Angels intellectile, but God absolute, essential, and independent. Thus much being premissed of Life in its generic notion, we now procede to explicate how far the Life of God participates hereof.

1. The Life of God carries in it the most perfect Spirituositie, The Life of God most spirituose. as he is the most simple pure Spirit, without the least shadow of Mater either physic or metaphysic. The lesse any thing has of ma­ter, the more spirituose it is: Angels and human Souls are called Spirits; because they are void of al physic mater: but yet they have metaphysic mater, or passive obediential power, and therefore are not pure simple Spirits metaphysically considered. Though I cannot without inhuman violence to mine assent take in that notion of a Spirit given us by Learned More, in his Divine Dia­logues, Dialog. 1. Sect. 24. pag. 94, &c. where he makes extension agreable to a Spirit, and so not proper and essential to Mater solely, according to the Cartesian and ancient Hypothesis. For if a Spirit be capable of extension in a strict and physic notion, which he seems to defend, I cannot imagine how it should be ex­emt from physic mater, and al those laws of physic corporeitie, dissolution, and corruption which attend Mater: yet I can easily persuade my self and grant that learned Author, that al Spirits have, according to the degree of Spiritalitie, an Amplitude of Essence, which is not confined to the narrow space of a Needles point, as the Scholes of old dreamed. As for create Spirits [Page 308]both Angels and human Souls we may justly allow them, without injurie offered to their spiritalitie, metaphysic accidental extension, according to the space they occupie; as also metaphysic mater, as composed of Act and passive obediential power, without the least physic extension or mater. But now God being void, not only of physic, but also of metaphysic Mater, or al passive Power whatso­ever; therefore he is said to be a pure, simple Spirit in the most eminent transcendent degree,Joh. 4.24. as Joh. 4.24. God is a Spirit, i. e. the most simple spirituose Being, and therefore the most living Being. Hence Christ, in regard of his Deitie, is stiled a quicken­ing Spirit, Joh. 6.63. or Spirit that gives life, Joh. 6.63. [...], It is the Spirit [i. e. the Deitie which they were ignorant of] that quickeneth, or gives life. Althings give and have life so far as they are spirituose: Christ as God being the most pure Spirit, he must therefore necessarily be the most living and life­giving or quickening Spirit.1 Cor. 15.45. So 1 Cor. 15.45. Christ as Media­tor is called [...], a quickening, or life-giving Spirit, as he is the Fountain of al spiritual life, and gives out al to his Mem­bers. Again,Heb. 9.14. Heb. 9.14. it's said, that Christ [...], by the eternal Spirit, [i. e. by the infinite efficacitie of his Dei­tie] offered up himself. So that the Life of God consistes much in his Spiritualitie, or Spirituositie.

2.2. The Life of God most actu­ose. The Life of God carries in it the most pure and perfect Actuositie. This Character of the Divine Life follows on and flows from the former: for by how much the more spirituose things are, by so much the more actuose they are: and by how much the more actuose they are, by so much the more living. Nothing can be said to live farther than it is actuose: when it ceaseth to act, it ceaseth to live. Life may be considered either in actu primo, the first act, or in actu secundo, the second act: the first Act of life consistes in the spirituose Principe or Spirituositie of the Agent, before mentioned: the second Act of life consistes in the Actuositie or Operation, that flows from the first Act or Principe. But in the Life of God, which is most perfect, the first and second Act are one and the same; because he is a pure Act, without the least composition of Act and Power, or first and second Act. In al created life the Principe or first Act is distinct from the Ope­ration or second Act; and both together make an accidental com­position of Cause and Effect, or Act and Power: but in the Life of God there is an Actuation without any true causalitie or proper [Page 309]motion. We must conceive therefore of the Life of God as ha­ving the most perfect Actuositie and Actuation, yet so as to ex­clude al real Causalitie, Composition, and Imperfection, which at­tendes every create life, by reason of the distinction between its first and second Act, which God admits not; because he is pure Act without al Power, either essential or accidental, active or pas­sive: his Esse and Agere are the same: his Act is his Essence: which can be said of no create Being: but of God it must be affirmed, because he is the first, most pure, and perfect Act, with­out al power either objective or receptive. The pure Actualitie of God is demonstrated by this, that pure Act is more perfect, than Act and Power: but God is most perfect, therefore pure Act. Every power is indigent, needing an Act to actuate the same: whence it necessarily follows, that we must either admit a pro­gresse into infinite, or grant some first pure Act, which needs no other Act for its actuation, as Bradwardine acutely demonstrates, l. 1. c. 2. pag. 163, &c. Whence we conclude, that the Life of God is most actuose and perfect; because it is a pure Act, with­out al potentialitie. Hence,

3. The life of God is of al most [...], self-moving. The Life of God self-moving. Plato aboundes much in this Character of Life, which he makes to be most essential thereto. So in his Phaedrus, pag. 245. [...], Every bodie that is moved by an externe pulse is inanimate: but that which is moved by it self from an interne Principe, is animate. Where­in he makes [...], self motion from an interne Principe the es­sential character of life. And by how much the more perfect this self-motion is, by so much the more perfect is the life: Plants are said by some kind of Analogie to live, because they have a sha­dow of self-motion, which appears in their Vegetation; yet they cannot be said properly to live; because they rejoice not in any true [...], self-motion, or spontaneitie. Brutes are said pro­perly to live; because they have a true self-motion and spontaneitie, arising from the actuation of their animal and vital spirits: yet their life is much short of the rational life; which consistes in a rational [...], self-motion or spontaneitie of moving towards the last end. And yet the Angelic life is higher than the rational, in that the Angels have no dependence at al on physic mater. But the [...], self-motion of the Life of God is of al most per­fect, in that it is absolutely independent. The most noble Crea­tures [Page 310]have but imperfect self-motion: Angels move themselves, but not primarily, and independently as to God the prime Mo­tor: yea their being moved by God, the first Motor, is in order of nature before their own self-motion: so that they are but, as man, moved self-movers. But God being independent in his Be­ing, is also independent in his self-motion: he moves himself and althings else, but is moved by nothing. This is excellently illu­strated by Plato, Leg. 10. pag. 894. where he proves, That God, who is the prime Motor, moving himself and althings else, doth infinitely excel, of which more largely before, Chap. 2. §. 3. Thus also A­quinas, contra Gent. l. 1. c. 97. ‘Life is in this respect attributed unto things, as they are said to be moved by themselves and not by another: hence those things which seem to move themselves are said, by way of analogie, to live, as living Springs, and Quick­silver. But properly those things are said to move themselves, which are composite of mover and moved, as animates.’ But no­thing operates from it self so much as God; because he is the first Cause of althings, &c. Hence,

4.God Life it self. God is Life it self. For Gods Life being his Essence as actuose and independent, he doth not only live, but is Life in the abstract. Whence Plato, Phaedo, pag. 106. cals God, [...], the very species, forme, or idea of life, as before. Creatures live, but they are not life it self; because they have their life by participation: and every Being by participation must be re­duced to somewhat that is such of it self: therefore the life of the Creature must be reduced to God, who is life it self. Thus Aquinas, sum. part. 1. Quaest. 18. Art. 3. ‘God being Essence it self and Intelligence it self, therefore life doth chiefly belong unto him. For the clearing whereof we are to consider, that seing things are said to live so far as they operate of themselves, and are not moved by others, therefore by how much the more perfectly this mode of self-operating doth belong to any thing, by so much the more perfect its life is— Hence those things that have understanding have the most perfect mode of living; because they have the most perfect mode of self-moving: but albeit our Intellect doth in somethings act it self, yet in some­things it is acted by others— Therefore that which in its own nature is Intelligence it self, and is not determined or moved by any other, that obtains the highest degree of life, and is indeed life it self.’ Hence,

5. God is eternal immortal life. Thus Plato, Phaedo, Gods Life im­mortal. pag. 106. proves, that Gods life is [...], immortal; because he is the Idea of life. So in his Phaedrus, pag. 245, [...], That which is ever moved is immortal: but that which moves another and is moved by another, because it hath an end of its motion, it must necessarily have an end of its life. His designe is to prove, that the Soul being a self-moving principe must necessarily be an ever-moving principe; and so immortal. And his Argument is this: [...], Whatever is moved by it self, i. e. rationally or intellectually, that is ever moved, and therefore im­mortal. Thence he addes: [...], Seing it is manifest, that what moves it self is immortal. So Johan. Grammaticus: [...], That which is moved of it self (i. e. intellectually) is ever moved: and what is so, is immortal. That Gods Life is immortal, is most evi­dent; because, (1) it has no beginning; therefore no end. (2) God being the prime Motor, must necessarily be immobile, without succession or mutation. (3) Al death importes dissolu­tion: and where there is dissolution, there must necessarily be composition and parts: But God is most simple.

6. God is Life effectively, God the Cause of al Life. Act. 17.28. as he is the first cause of al life to his Creatures. Act. 17.28. In him we live and move and have our being: i. e. we receive al life from him, because we receive al motion from him: and we receive al motion from him; because we receive our being from him. So Damascene, Orthod. Fid. l. 1. c. 19. [...], And it, [the Deitie] gives to althings Being as their Nature requires: and it is the Being of Beings, and the Life of things living, and the Reason of things ratio­nal, and the Intelligence of things intellectile. Thus Plato, Phaedr. pag. 245. Therefore that only that moves it self, because it is never deserted by it self, can never cease to be, [...], yea to al other things that are mo­ved this is the fountain and principe of motion. The first self mo­ving Principe or Cause cannot cease to move, because it gives motion to althings, but receives motion from nothing. It is the fountain of al motion, and therefore of al life. Of the Life of God; that it is intellectual, self-sufficient, most blessed, &c. see [Page 312] Suarez, Metaphys. Disput. 30. Sect. 14. pag. 116.

§. 2.Gods Science or Knowlege. Having discoursed of the Life of God in the general, we passe on to explicate the modes and ways, in which this life is said to be actuose. For as the Actuositie of the Rational life is mani­fested by Acts of Intelligence and Volition, so proportionably the Actuositie of the Divine Life is explicated by Acts of Divine In­telligence and Volition. We shal begin with the divine Intellect, Intelligence, Science, and Sapience; which are one and the same in God, and no way distinct from his Essence. For God being a pure Act, the Intelligent, Intellect, intelligible Species, Act of Intelle­ction, and objective Idea, are but one in him. God is the prime Being, the prime Life, and the prime Self-mover; and therefore the prime Intelligent. His Intellect is that whereby he understandes himself, and althings without himself, which either are, or were, or shal be, or may be; together with the various Modes, Orders, and Habitudes of althings; and al these, not by any abstract Ideas, Species, or Images taken from the externe objects; but in the glasse of his own Essence; not successively and by discourse, but intuitively; not in time, but his own Eternitie. Al this wil be evident by what follows.

First,Gods Intellect and its Perfe­ction. as for the Intellect of God and its infinite Perfection above al Human or Angelic Intellect, we find great notices there­of both in Sacred and Platonic Philosophie. We find the per­fection of the Divine Intellect lively described, Psal. 139.1-16. which we shal more fully explicate, when we come to Gods know­lege of the heart.Mic. 6.9. So Micah 6.9. The Lords voice crieth unto the citie: and the man of wisdome shal see thy name. The last clause is rendred according to the Hebrew, by Tarnovius and others, For thy name shal see that which is, i. e. thy most sacred Majestie and Es­sence sees althings as they are. So [...] may be rendred. Plato describes the Perfection of the Divine Intellect, in his Parme­nides, pag. 134. where he assures us, that [...], &c. With God there is the highest and most exquisite Domination, and the highest and most exquisite Science: for otherwise he could not know human affaires. Then he concludes: Were it not an insolent and importune discourse, [...], if any one should spoil God of his knowlege? The Perfection of Gods Intellect, beyond al Human and Angelic Intellect, wil appear by a view of its nature, object, and mode of apprehending. The Intellect of God, as to its nature, [Page 313]has one and the same Idea with the Divine Essence; neither is it invested with any abstract Species, Formes or Ideas of things, ei­ther habitual or actual, distinct from the Essence of God. It's true, mans Intellect is not, as I conceive, distinct from his human Soul; yet it cannot understand any object but by species or ideas actual and habitual distinct from its Essence. Mans Intellect, as to the Act of Intellection, is passive, receiving the intelligible spe­cies from its object: which imperfect mode of Intellection ap­pertains not to God, who sees althings in the glasse of his own Essence, as anon. Gods infinite Science admits not any intelligi­ble species, whereby the object is united to the facultie in us: such intelligible species belong only to Human and Angelic Intel­lects, which receive impression and causalitie from their objects. But the Intellect of God receives no impression or causalitie from its objects, it being the cause of althings. In human knowlege the thing understood is the measure of our understanding; but the divine knowlege is the measure of althings known. Again, the Divine Intellect understandes things complexe incomplexe­ly; but the human Intellect understandes things most simple and incomplexe, complexely. But of these things more in what fol­lows.

As for the object of the Divine Knowlege, it is most universal,The Object of Gods Knowlege. [...], althings intelligible. But more particularly the object of Divine Science is either primary, or secundary: The primary ob­ject of Divine Science is God himself, the Divine Essence, Persons,1. God himself. 1 Cor. 2.11. and Relations, 1 Cor. 2.11. That God is the prime Intelligible is evident, because he is the prime immaterial Being. For al­things are so far intelligible, as they are immaterial: therefore God being the first immaterial and most simple Being, he must necessarily be the first Intelligible. And if God be the first Intel­ligible, then there must be an Intellect and Science proportio­nate to him: which can be no other than himself; who is both Intelligible, Intellect, Intellection, and intelligible Species. Again, God being a pure Act, of supreme Immaterialitie, he cannot but un­derstand himself by himself. For God having nothing of poten­tialitie, it is absolutely necessary, that the Intellect and intelligible species be in him the same: whence he cannot but understand himself by himself. For in Creatures the thing understood being brought into the Intellect by its intelligible species or idea, hence the perfection of Intellection dependes on these two particulars: [Page 314](1) That the intelligible Species or Idea be perfectly conforme to the thing understood. (2) That it be perfectly united to the Intellect: which is by so much the more perfectly accom­plisht, by how much the more efficace the Intellect has in under­standing. But now the Divine Essence being both Intellect and intelligible Species, it cannot but understand it self, and althings else in the most perfect manner. Hence it is that God perfectly understandes himself, so far as he is intelligible: he also knows himself to be of infinite Power, to have a Wil soverain, omni­potent, and universally efficacious. Whence he knows althings else in himself, his infinite Essence and omnipotent Wil.

The secundary Object of the Divine Science is althings else besides God: 2. God knows althings. Althings possible and future, complexe and incomplexe; althings past and present; universal and singular, necessary and contingent, good and evil: with al the Modes, Orders, [...] or relations, which things have among themselves. That Gods Sci­ence is really omniscient, or universally, yea infinitely extensive to al objects intelligible is positively affirmed both in Sacred and Platonic Philosophie. As for sacred Philosophie we find therein illustrious notices of Gods Omniscience: as Psal. 139.1-16. Heb. 4.13. But to give a more particular demonstration of Gods knowing althings, we may argue it, (1) from the infinite power of God thus: Gods knowlege is as extensive as his power: but his power extendes to althings: therefore his knowlege. Thus Job 42.2.Job 42.2. I know thou canst do every thing: and that no thought can be withholden from thee. Or as some render the last clause, no thought of thine can be hindred. Which-ever way we read the words, the sense wil be much the same, namely that Gods Omni­potence is the ground and argument of his Omniscience. He that can do althings,Psal. 147.5. cannot but understand althings, that he can do. The same Argument is insisted on, Psal. 147.5. Great is our Lord, and of great power: his understanding is infinite. The later is a consequent of the former: The Power of God being infinite, therefore his Understanding is infinite. Heb. [...], of his understanding there is no number. This may be understood both extensively and intensively: his Understanding is most per­fect in it self, and most extensive as to al objects. (2) The Om­niscience of God may be demonstrated from his Immensitie and Omnipresence: Gods Science must necessarily extend so far as his Essence;Jer. 23.23, 24. because his Knowlege is his Essence. Thus Jer. 23.23, [Page 315]24. Am I a God at hand, saith the Lord, and not a God afar off? Can any hide himself in secret places, that I shal not see him, saith the Lord? Do not I not fil Heaven and Earth, saith the Lord? Wherein God demonstrates his Omniscience from his Omnipre­sence. So Heb. 4.13.Heb. 4.13. Neither is there any creature that is not ma­nifest in his sight, because he is present with al. Suppose there were a bodie, (as they fancied Argus) ful of eyes, or al eye, would it not discerne althings round about it, without the least turne or mutation of its posture? So God being ful of eyes, or al eye, and present with al Beings, is it possible that any thing should be hid from him? Hence Plato held, [...], althings are ful of God, and therefore nothing could he hid from him. (3) Gods Omniscience may be argued from the Divine Ideas, or Decrees. Al­things were the object of Gods knowlege before they were in be­ing, by reason of his Divine Ideas, which were the original Ex­emplar of althings. This Plato much insistes on, both in his Ti­maeus and Parmenides, as hereafter. (4) Gods Omniscience may be demonstrated from his universal Causalitie in giving Being unto althings. So Act. 15.18.Act. 15.18. Known unto God are al his workes from the beginning of the world. (5) Gods Omniscience may be argued from his preservation of and providence over althings. Plato, Leg. 10. pag. 901, &c. proves, That Gods Providence extendes to the vilest and least of things, whereof he has an accurate knowlege, being [...], the most wise Opificer and Framer of al­things. For every intelligent Worke-man must have a ful know­lege of his own worke; in as much as the idea or knowlege of the Worke-man gives forme to the worke: whence God being the most intelligent Framer and Disposer of althings, he cannot but have an accurate knowlege of al.

But to descend to the particular objects of Gods Science,The Object of Gods Omnisci­ence. we may distribute althings intelligible into complexe, or incomplexe. Complexe Intelligibles are propositions and discourses: Incomplexe, 1. Complexe In­telligibles. real things. 1. The Divine Science has a ful comprehension of al complexe Intelligibles, or propositions and discourses, both divine and human, mental, oral, and scriptural. Complexe Intelligibles are either antecedent to the Wil of God, or subsequent. (1) Complexe Intelligibles antecedent to the Wil of God, are such as belong to the Divine Essence: as that there is a God: That God is eternal, immu­table, &c. These God knows by his Essence alone, and not by his Wil, because antecedent thereto. Complexe Intelligibles subsequent [Page 316]to the Divine Wil, are al such, whose truth is caused by, and so dependes on the Divine Wil. These God knows not by his Es­sence simply considered, nor by the things themselves concerning which they are affirmed or denied, but by his own Wil. For as Gods Wil gives Being to althings, so al propositions that belong to them depend on, and are known by the same Divine Wil. In which regard that commun Saying, The Reasons of good and evil are eternal, if understood as antecedent to the Divine Wil, it is most false. For there is no natural or moral Veritie belonging to any created object or terme, that can be said to be antecedent to the Divine Wil. That al complexe Intelligibles or Propositions subsequent to the Divine Wil are known thereby, see Bradwar­dine, de Caus. l. 1. c. 18. pag. 200. and Greg. Ariminensis, Sent. l. 1. Dist. 38. Quaest. 2. pag. 135.

2.2. Incomplexe Intelligibles. Create incomplexe Intelligibles are either things possible, or fu­ture. (1) Things merely possible to God are known in his Divine Essence. (2) Things future in his Wil, which gives futurition to althings. Things future as to us are distinguished into necessary and contingent: but things contingent as to us, are necessary in regard of the Divine Wil; and therefore necessarily known by God. That things most contingent are necessary in regard of Gods Wil, and so certainly known by him, is most evident, be­cause they are al present to God. For what makes a thing con­tingent uncertain as to us, but because it is future? When it is present, it is certainly known what it is: wherefore althings be­ing present to God by reason of his Divine Wil, which gives su­turition to althings; therefore they must be al, even things most contingent as to us, certainly known by him. Even among men, those that understand the causes of things, and their certain cohe­rence with the effects, may have a certain knowlege of an effect long before it is in being: so an Astrologer foresees an Eclipse: and shal not the omniscient God, who gives Being to al Causes, and actuates them in al their causalities and causal influxes, be al­lowed a perfect knowlege of al effects? Thus Homer, Iliad. [...], Who knows things present, to come, and past. There is nothing so vile, so inconsiderable, but it fals under the omniscient eye of God,Prov. 15.3. as Prov. 15.3. The eyes of God are in every place beholding the evil and the good. God knows whatever is good by his Divine Wil, the productive Cause there­of, and whatever is evil, by its opposite good, as also by the posi­tive [Page 317]Entitie or Act wherein the evil is seated, which also fals un­der the determination of the Divine Wil, so far as it is a real positive Being. For he that perfectly knows a thing, must needs know al the accidents, modes, and appendents thereof: now al Evil being but a privation of what is good, it cannot be hid from the divine Omniscience: otherwise he should not perfectly know the good whereof it is a privation. Again, Evil being but a pri­vation cannot exist but in some positive subject, neither can it be known but by the forme whereof it is a privation: which being known to God, thence the evil also must necessarily be known to him.

The principal object among incomplexe simple Intelligibles is the heart of man: if this be known by God,Gods Omnisci­ence as to the human Soul. then surely nothing can be hid. Now that the human Soul, and al its Principes, Ha­bits, Cogitations, Inclinations, Ends, Designes, and Acts are al known to God, is evident both from Sacred and Platonic Philoso­phie. As for sacred Philosophie, it is in nothing more positive and expresse. To begin with that great series of Demonstrati­ons, Psal. 139.1, &c. O Lord thou hast searched me and known me. Psal. 139.1. [...], thou hast searched me narrowly, sifted me to the bran: thou so knowest me, and al that is in me, as he who knoweth a thing exactly, after the most diligent and accurate inquisition. So much [...] importes, v. 2. Thou knowest my down-sitting and up­rising, v. 2. thou understandest my thoughts afar off. The sense is, there is no part of my life hid from thee: whether I sit or rise, thou knowest it: al mine actions and enterprises are known by thee, as 2 Kings 19.27. al my thoughts are present to thee, long before they are existent. Lyra interprets afar off of Eternitie: my thoughts were in thy Eternitie apprehended by thee, before they were mine. Thence it follows, v. 3. Thou compassest my path, v. 3. and my lying down, and art acquainted with al my ways. Thou compassest, [...], thou winnowest, or huntest my paths. And art acquainted with al my ways. [...], thou hast been accustomed, or, thou so knowest, as one who by long custome and familiar acquaintance understandes a mater. In these two verses he enumerates al the postures of the bodie, sitting, rising or standing, going and lying, whereby, accord­ing to sacred Philosophie, al human actions are expressed, as Deut. 6.7. Then he addes, v. 4. For there is not a word in my tongue, v. 4. but lo, O Lord thou knowest it altogether. The sense is, before my word is formed in my tongue, thou apprehendest it in my thought. [Page 318] v. 5.v. 5. Thou hast beset me behind and before; and laid thine hand upon me. [...], thou hast besieged me, or taken hold of me with a strong hand, so that I can by no artifice flie thy presence: or, thou hast arrested me, v. 6. and seised on me as thy prisoner. v. 6. Such knowlege is too wonderful for me: it is high I cannot attain unto it. [...], thy knowlege is marvellous above me: i. e. this thy knowlege is so admirable and so far above my capacitie, as that I can by no means reach unto it: albeit I know thou knowest althings, yet I am altogether ignorant of the mode how thou knowest althings, by one and the same simple intuitive act, without discourse or suc­cession. Thence. v. 7, 8, 9, 10. he proves the Omniscience of God from his Omnipresence. v. 11, 12. And v. 11. addes: If I say surely the darkenesse shal cover me: even the night shal be light about me. v. 12. Yea the darkenesse hideth not from thee, but the night shineth as the day: the darkenesse and the night are both alike to thee: i. e. the most ob­scure things are as wel known to thee, as the most evident. Whence he addes,v. 13. v. 13. For thou hast possessed my reines, i. e. my most secret thoughts and affections: thou hast covered me in my mothers wombe: i. e. thou gavest me being, and therefore canst not but fully understand every thought of my heart. How can it possibly be, but that thou shouldest understand me fully, seing al that I have or am was from thee?Psal. 7.9. So Psal. 7.9. For the righ­teous God trieth the hearts and reines: i. e. the most abstruse and hidden thoughts, affections, inclinations, and movements of the heart.Psal. 33.13, 15. Thus Psal. 33.13. The Lord looketh from Heaven: he know­eth al the sons of men. And he gives the reason of this divine Om­niscience, v. 15. He fashioneth their hearts alike: he considereth al their workes. [...], who formeth, frameth. An excellent reason of Gods infinite knowlege and its extent to al the thoughts, inclina­tions, intentions, and affections of the Soul. As if he had said: Hath not God framed the hearts of al men? Can any thing then in the hearts of men be hid from God, as Psal. 34.5? The He­brew [...] which we render alike, properly signifies here together, i. e. al of them universally, none excepted: neither is it to be re­ferred to the Verbe frameth, but to Hearts; and so denotes Gods exact knowlege of al mens hearts, and that upon this account, because he made them. So Psal. 94.11. and elsewhere. But so much for the Object of Gods Science.

As for the Mode of Divine Science, God knows al­things by his own Essence. both Sacred and Platonic Philosophic informes us, that God knows althings, not by ima­ges, [Page 319]or species received from externe objects, but in and by him­self, the essential glasse of the divine Intelligence. It's true we poor mortals, who have only a composite successive knowlege of things, cannot apprehend any externe object, but by some ab­stract idea or image conveighed in and by the senses, and impres­sed on the mind, as the stampe of the seal on the waxe: but the Divine Essence being most simple, without the least shadow of passive receptive power, is not capable of such an imperfect suc­cessive mode of understanding things. God being a pure Act contemplates in his own eternal omnipotent Essence the Arche­type of althings possible, and in his own Wil, the efficient of al future evenements. If Gods eternal Knowlege should arise from any intelligible species or representation distinct from himself, then there must be something eternal besides God; also passive Power, and Accidents; which to assert is a dangerous error. One and the same Divine Essence is the universal Exemplar or Idea of althings. For look as in Nature the more noble and perfect Be­ings are the exemplars of the lesse noble and perfect; so the Di­vine Essence, being most perfect, containing in it, in a most emi­nent manner, the seminal Reasons or Ideas of althings, it thence becomes the most perfect exemplar and glasse to the Divine Un­derstanding, wherein it sees althings. It's true, al Ideas of things in us, who acquire our science and knowlege by Analysis, are ta­ken from the objects understood, and thence impressed first on our senses and phantasie; which is as a glasse to the human understand­ing, according to which it formes al its intelligible ideas, formes, or notions of things: but it is not so with the Divine Intellect; which understandes althings by Genesis, without analysing of things, and therefore has althings preexisting in himself, before they existe in themselves. In us the Ideate or thing understood is before the Idea, and the original exemplar of al our knowlege; but in God, his Idea is the original Exemplar, and the Ideate in the create but a Parelius and reflexe image or similitude of the Divine Idea. Al perfections in the Creature flowing from the efficacious Wil of God, must necessarily preexiste in the Di­vine Wil and Essence, before they existe in themselves: as the effect ever preexistes in its cause: hence the Divine Intellect comprehendes in the glasse of the Divine Essence al Creatures, and their proper essences, perfections, distinctions, respects, and operations; and that in a way not of composition, but perfect [Page 320]intuition. These Ideas of althings in the Divine Essence conside­red absolutely are but one; yet if we consider them in the va­rious [...] and regards they have to the several Creatures, so we may look on them as many: for we may conceive the Idea of a man in the Divine Essence, as distinct from the Idea of any other Creature, though in truth it be but the same essence. Hence that famose Essate among the Pythagorcans and Platonistes, mentio­ned by Plato in his Parmenides, That God [...], one and many, i. e. one, as to his most simple Essence, and yet many, as to the divine Ideas, considered in their relation to the particular Ideates they refer unto. These divine Ideas, as they are the original Ex­emplar of althings made, and so the object of Gods Science, are wel expressed,Heb. 11.3. Heb. 11.3. [...], So that we may determine, that those things we see, were not made of things apparent: or were made of those things that ap­pear not: i. e. al the visible things of time were made according to the invisible Ideas of Eternitie: there is nothing extant in this inferior sensible world, but what had its Idea in the superior in­telligible world of Divine Ideas. Thus Plato, in his Timaus, pag. 28. treating of the Origine of the Universe, saith, God in the fra­ming thereof, [...], had an eye on the eternal Ex­emplar, or Idea, which as a seal impressed its similitude on al­things made. Whence that commun Saying among the Plato­nistes:Plato Ideas vo­car, ex quibus omnia quaecun­que videmus fiunt, & ad quas cuncta forman­tur. Grosseteste. This Ʋniverse is but the imitamen of the Divine Mind. That by Plato's Ideas, we are to understand the divine Decrees as the Exemplars of althings future, Robert Grosseteste, that great Impug­nator of the Papal Tyrannie, in his acute Tractate de Libero Arbi­trio, (which is to be found in MSS. in Exeter College Librarie, Oxon.) proves out of Augustin super Gen. ‘Augustin saith, Plato cals Ideas those by which althings we see are made, and accord­ing to which althings are formed: these are immortal, immu­table, invariable. Hear what an Idea is: (according to Plato) An Idea is of those things that are necessary: it is an eternal Exemplar: such infinite Exemplars the natures of things, of Men, of Trees, of Fishes, &c. have, according to which what­ever ought to be made is expressed. These Exemplars of al­things God hath in himself, and thereby contains in his mind the numbers and modes of althings that are to be made or done. He is sul of these figures or formes, which Plato cals Ideas, im­mortal, invariable, infatigable.’ These Ideas in the Divine [Page 321]Mind Plato, in his Parmenides, pag. 134, &c. discourseth more fully of, and the sum of al his Philosophemes about them is this, That these Ideas are most simple, immaterial, eternal, infinite, and immutable, &c. as we have more fully explicated and demonstra­ted, Court Gent. P. 2. c. 9. §. 4. & Philos. Gen. P. 1. l. 1. c. 2. sect. 5. §. 3. & l. 3. c. 2. sect. 1. §. 2. & c. 4. sect. 1. §. 9.

Thus we see how God contemplates and knows althings in the glasse of his own Divine Essence and Ideas;How the divine Ideas represent the Creatures. not as if the divine Ideas were to be considered as a formal concept, but only as ob­jective: whence they are properly stiled by Plato, [...], an Exemplar, which alwayes importes an objective concept, according to which this or that is framed. Thus also Bradwardine, de Caus. Dei, l. 1. c. 19. pag. 225. ‘Things understood by God move the Divine Intellect, not properly, but only metaphorically, [or obje­ctively,] because the Ideas and similitudes thereof are in God, i. e. his Divine Essence, which most distinctly representes al In­teligibles— And because God hath al these Ideas and simili­tudes from himself only, and not from the things understood, which are posterior, he is not said to be moved by them to un­derstand, but very metaphorically and lesse properly. Things future are, according to their proper existence present unto God, yet not simply but in some respect only, namely in the Divine Wil and Prescience.’ So Aquinas assures us, That the Essence of God as understood by God is the Idea of things. The Es­sence of God albeit it doth not formally contain things create, by a formal convenience and similitude, yet it doth contain them according to their formal representation. The very Essence of God is the objective Exemplar of understanding himself, as also of understanding the Creatures. The Divine Essence representes althings according to their proper reasons: which reasons of things in God are the very creatrix Essence, which is the exem­plary representation of al Essences; as the sufficience of God is of al things possible, and the Wil of althings future. The divine Essence, which representes althings; as an Exemplar directes the operation of God in producing the Exemplates or things formed according thereunto. For there is something in God that corre­spondes to al the perfections of Creatures: not as if there were a formal similitude between the Idea and Ideate; but there is something formally existing in God that representes al the per­fections of Creatures. Thus al the Creatures are in the Divine [Page 322]Mind representatively, albeit they are not as to their own for­mal essences really the same therewith. Some over and above this Representation, make these divine Ideas to be also energetic and operative causes of things: but this must be understood (1) either as they are conjunct with the divine Wil, which is the prime Efficient of althings; or (2) not of a proper efficience; but only exemplary. For an Idea in the mind of an Artificer, albeit it worke not as a proper efficient cause, yet it doth worke as an exemplary cause, which is reduced to the efficient. Thus the divine Ideas may be said to operate, as they are the grand [...] Exemplar, according to which the divine Wisdome directes it self in the production, conservation, and disposition of althings. These Ideas, as was hinted, are either of things merely possible; and so they are represented by the divine Sufficience or Essence nakedly considered, and belong to the simple Intelligence of God: or else they are of things future; and so they are repre­sented by the divine Wil, which is the Efficient of althings future. For look as an Artificer has an Idea of his worke; so God con­templates in his own Wil the original Exemplar of althings fu­ture, as Plato, Timeus, pag. 28. One and the same knowlege of God receives diverse denominations, according to the various state of the things known: For if the things known be only possi­ble, then God contemplates them in his divine Essence; but if they are future, present, or past, then he contemplates them in the determination and decree of his Wil. Hence God, by means of these his divine Ideas, the original, universal, and perfect Ex­emplars of althings, has the most perfect comprehension of al­things, whether possible or future, past or present, complexe or simple, necessary or contingent, absolute or conditionate.

The mode of Gods Science in the general being thus explica­ted,Particular Cha­racters of Gods Science. we hence may draw several particular essential and proper characters thereof.1. Most simple. As 1. hence it follows, That the Divine Sci­ence is but one simple Act, without the least shadow of composition or division. Gods Science having one and the same Idea with his Essence, it thence necessarily follows, that in God the Intellect, in­telligible Species, Object understood, and Act of Intellection be one and the same. The divine Essence is a spiritual light, most intelligi­ble, and most intelligent of it self and althings else, in the most simple manner. Hence Plato makes his divine Ideas [...] immixed or pure Act, without the least mixture of Act and Power. [Page 323]Thus Damascene, Orthod. Fid. l. 1. c. 19. Moreover, saith he, it be­longs to the Deitie, [...], to know althings by a simple knowlege, and simply to contemplate althings by its divine, omniscient, and immaterial eye, both things present, past, and future, even before they are. Our intellection passeth from habit or power into act: but Gods intellection admits not either habit or power, but is pure act. Where there is habitual know­lege, there is composition of Act and Power; but the divine Es­sence and Intellection being the same, there can be no such com­position in either. This is wel expressed by Maximus Tyrius, that famose Platonist, Dissert. 1. where discoursing, what God is, accor­ding to Plato, he thus describes him, pag. 10. It remains, that we place God, in the principal Intellect as in a supreme Tower. But here I see a double Intellect: [...], For one can understand, [i. e. it has an habit or power of understanding] albeit it doth not understand, [i. e. actually:] but the other doth understand: [i. e. always, actually: for so he explains himself in what follows] who is not yet perfect, unlesse he understand always and althings, not one af­ter another. Wherein he assertes, [1] that Gods Intellect is always in act, without habit or power. [2] That he under­standes althings. [3] That he understandes althings at once, not by succession, and one thing after another. Hence,

2. Gods Science is not discursive but intuitive. 2. Gods Science. 1. Intuitive not discursive. For it being most simple, and the same with the divine Essence, it cannot ad­mit of the least succession or discourse. Our intellect takes things in, not at once or together, but one after the other by composi­tion, division, and succession: as when we contemplate a man, we consider, (1) his Animalitie, then (2) his Rationalitie, and (3) his Risibilitie. So in complexe notions, we, (1) make a Pro­position, (2) then a Syllogisme, thence (3) a series or method of discourses: And al this we do by composition and division, passing from what is more known, to what is lesse known; and so taking in one after another: which argues much imperfection in us. But now the divine Knowlege is free from al these imper­fections; it admits neither composition nor division, nor yet the least succession; but takes in al objects by one simple intuitive [Page 324]act. This is very wel illustrated by Maximus Tyrius, Dissert. 1. pag. 10. thus: If it pleaseth, we wil illustrate what we have spoken by a similitude: [...], &c. Compare the Divine In­tellect to the sight, but the human to speech or discourse: for the cast of the eye is of althings most swist: which presently, even in the same moment, draws its object to it: but the operation of discourse is like unto a soft pace. Or, that we may use another comparison: [...], Let us compare the Divine Intellect with the irradiation of the Sun, which views one whole Hemisphere of the Earth at once: but the hu­man Intellect with the motion of the Sun, which visits one place after another successively and gradually. Two lively Metaphors to ex­presse the perfection of the divine Intellect beyond the human. For first, as the eye doth in a moment take in the most remote objects, so doth the divine Intellect: whereas al discourse, where­to he compares the human intellect, is but successive and slow. Again, as the Sun doth irradiate one whole Hemisphere of the Earth in a moment, but is many hours in its moving through it: so the divine Intellect doth in a moment of Eternitie compre­hend al objects; but the human is very slow and successive in its apprehension of things. To these Platonic illustrations we may adde that of Aquinas, P. 1. Quaest. 14. Art. 13. where he com­pares the Intuition of God to the vision of such as are on an high Tower or Mountain; who in a moment view a series of objects very remote: but the human ratiocination to such as walke in an high way, who see only things nigh and before them. It's true, the mind of Christians hath some imperfect intuition of God here by faith, as 2 Cor. 3.18. but it's only reflexe and in a glasse: but God comprehendes althings by direct intuition, without the least reflexion. Again, Angels and glorified Souls have some kind of direct intuition of God, without those imperfect glasses of instituted ordinances; but yet their Intuition is only apprehen­sive, not comprehensive and simultaneous as the divine Science. Last­ly, Angelic and human intuition, if real, necessarily requires the actual existence of the object; but Gods intuition requires only the intentional existence of the object in the divine Wil: for things future are the object of Gods intuition, not as actually existent in Eternitie, as the Dominicans avouch, but only as in­tentionally existent in the divine Decree or Wil. Of which see more fully Twisse Scientia Media, pag. 41-58. That Gods Sci­ence [Page 325]is not discursive may be demonstrated, (1) because it is not successive: there is not [...], as Max. Tyrius. Al discur­sive science or ratiocination procedes from Principes to Conclu­sions; but God views althings in his own Essence. (2) Al dis­cursive knowlege is composed of Act and Power: for the Con­clusions are potentially in the Principes, and drawen into act by ra­tiocination: But Gods Science is pure Act. (3) In our mode of knowing things, the more distinctly we can apprehend any thing by its own evidence and light, the more evident and per­fect is our knowlege; as in our apprehension of first Principes: wherefore Gods mode of knowing things being most perfect, it must necessarily be without ratiocination. (4) In al discourse the assent is the effect caused, and the Argument is the cause: but Gods Science is not caused. (5) In al discourse there is pri­oritie and posterioritie, composition and division; which implies much imperfection, and may not therefore be ascribed to God. (6) In al discourse there is much of ignorance mixed with our knowlege; because it is a progression from that which is more known to that which is lesse known: But Gods Science hath no­thing of ignorance mixed with it. Hence,

3. Gods Science is immutable and necessary. 3. Gods Science immutable and necessary. This follows on the former Characters: for in as much as the divine Science is not dependent on the objects known, but the same with his own Essence, hence it must be necessary and immutable. Al human knowlege, being caused by Ideas collected from the objects, is mutable and variable, as the objects are; at least so far as it re­gardes singular sensible objects: for if the object be contingent and mutable, the Science cannot be necessary and immutable: But now the divine Science being no way dependent on the object, it is not obnoxious to those laws of mutation and variation which the object necessarily fals under. The Truth of our Understand­ing is mutable, because dependent on externe objects and Me­diums; but the Truth of the Divine Understanding immutable, and therefore the measure of al Truth, as Aquinas wel notes. This is incomparably wel illustrated by Bradwardine, l. 1. c. 24. pag. 244. God, saith he, by reason of his most infinite claritie comprehendes althings, and al particles of time, as they are most truely in him­self: for he needs not comparation or relation of things past or future to the present instant, according to the manner of our hu­man infirmitie; but he understandes althings together and most [Page 326]clearly by his own Essence and Wil, which represences althings uniformely and invariably. As if there should be an immobile eye in the Centre of the Heavens, which should see by extramis­sion and actively, as God seeth, it would then always see uni­formely without al mutation every part of the Heavens turning round; and the same part now in the East, and anon in the South, and then in the West: Thus God in like manner sees al variable objects and parts of time, with their distinct vicissitudes and suc­cessions, without the least variation or succession; because he sees althings, not passively, by species and impressions received from the things themselves, but actively in his own Essence, and Wil, the active Principe of al. We poor mortals, by reason of our infirmitie, cannot distinctly apprehend al the particles of time, always fluent and succeding each other, and therefore we take the present instant, which of al time is most actual and best known to us, and make it the measure of past, present, and future time: whence our knowlege also is successive and mutable; but God, who knows althings in his own Eternitie, is not liable to such succession and mutation: his Science being a pure necessary Act, must needs be immutable and invariable, albeit it terminates on objects in themselves most mutable and variable: the mutation of the object makes no mutation in the divine Science; because the mutable object is only the secundary object of Gods know­lege: the primary object is the divine Essence, which is immuta­ble; and therefore the divine Science such also. Should Gods knowlege depend on the objects known, then it would be muta­ble as they are, but not otherwise. God necessarily knows every Entitie both actual and potential: wherefore (1) he can never know any thing that he is ever ignorant of. (2) He can never be ignorant of what he ever knows. (3) He cannot know more of fewer things than he knows. (4) He cannot begin to know what he before knew not, or not to know what before he knew, because nothing begins to be future. This immutabilitie of the divine Science, as to things future, arising from the determination of his own soverain Wil, and not from any thing in the object, is nervosely demonstrated by pious and learned Robert Grosseteste Bishop of Lincolne, in his elaborate MSS. De Libero Arbitrio, which lies buried in Exeter College Librarie, Oxon. Wherein he copiosely demonstrates, That the Causes, Origines, and Reasons of althings future, though in themselves never so instable, are most stable, [Page 327]immutable, necessary, yea eternal in the divine Decree and Wil: whence also the Divine Science is most certain, necessary, and immuta­ble. This he confirmes by Plato's Ideas, which are immutable and invariable exemplars of althings future, as before. That the Divine Science is immutable and necessary, so Greg. Ariminens. Sent. l. 1. Dist. 39. pag. 130, 140. Hence,

4. The Divine Science is most certain and infallible. 4. Divine Sci­ence most cer­tain. Thus Plato, Repub. 2. pag. 382. [...], &c. I judge no mortal would be really willing both to deceive, and be deceived, or to be ignorant of supreme Beings, much lesse God. The Science of God being ne­cessary ad immutable, it cannot but be most certain and infalli­ble. To know things certainly, is to know them in their causes: now Gods Wil being the Cause of althings, he thence knows them perfectly. Gods Science is as certain as the future events: for where there is a determinate effect, there must be a determi­nate cause: and where the cause is determinate, there the science also may be determinate. The knowlege of things future in God is as certain, as the knowlege of things present: for every fu­ture, compared to God the first Cause and his Science, is necessary and necessarily future; albeit as compared to the second causes, some effects may be contingent, or contingently future. The primary object of the divine Science being infinitely perfect, namely the divine Essence, it cannot but be most certain and in­fallible: if there be any certaintie and infallibilitie in human Science, how much more in divine Science, which penetrates al Essences and Truths with the most perfect light, and most simple intuition, contemplating every Being and Truth, as it is in it self, in the glasse of the divine Essence? The divine Intellect sees al­things as existent in themselves, by the infinite light of the divine Essence, and therefore most certainly and infallibly, as Esa. 40.13, 14. Hence,

5. The D [...]e Science is absolute and independent, not conditio­nate and dependent on any create Object. Thus Plato, 5. Gods Science absolute and in dependent. in his Parme­nides, pag. 134, &c. makes his divine Ideas to be [...], self-subsistent, and independent, as to al externe objects and condi­tion: For otherwise, saith he, God should not have a certain know­lege of and soverain dominion over human affaires. It's impossible, that any effect should be, or be understood as future in any case, but dependently on its efficient cause: Now what is the first and [Page 328]universal Essicient of al effects, but the Decree of the divine Wil, on which every effect dependes, more than on its proxime cause? Therefore as nothing is antecedent to the divine Wil, so no Hy­pothesis or condition is cognoscible or knowable antecedently thereto. Gods knowlege as it dependes not on the existence of created objects, so neither on any Hypotheses or conditions that are appendent unto such objects, placed in such circumstances. For al futures, whether absolute or conditionate, are known by God, not from the determination of second causes, but from the determinatin of the divine Wil, which is the first Cause. For whence springs the futurition of things, but from the determi­nation of the divine Wil? And must not then the determination of the divine Wil be precedent to the determination of the se­cond CAuse? And if so, may we not then hence conclude, that Gods Science arising from the determination of his own Wil de­pendes not on the existence of, or any conditions that belong to future objects? If the divine Essence be [...] and indepen­dent, must not the divine Science, which is identified therewith, be also [...] and independent? Or if the divine Science should depend on the mutable conditions of its object, can it be any other than conjectural? Where any science dependes on its ob­ject, it cannot be more certain than the object is: whatever con­tingence belongs to the object, wil also influence the Science and make it contingent: whence if the divine Science be certain, as without al dispute it is, then it cannot depend on its mutable contingent object, but must be absolute and independent. Is it lesse than blasphemie to conceive, that the infinite Science of God should depend on any finite object, or finite mutable conditions appendent thereto? Yea, is not such a conditionate Science alto­gether impossible as to God? For must not the object as such be before the act? And may we suppose any created object or con­dition appertaining thereto in any regard to be before the divine Wil and Science? Is not the futurition of althing [...] both objects and conditions, the effect of the divine Decree, [...]refore in order of Nature subsequent to the divine Wil? And if so, then are not al objects and the conditions appendent thereto foreseen by God, in his divine Decrees, without the least dependence on the things themselves or their contingent conditions? Indeed a conditionate Science, to speak properly, is that which as yet never existed, but wil follow on the position of the condition: whence [Page 329]truely such a Science cannot existe even in men, before the con­dition be performed: and therefore where the condition is never performed, it can never existe. How impossible then is it, that such a Science should be found in God, who no way dependes on externe objects for his Science? We must therefore conclude, that God, in the absolute and efficacious Decree of his own Wil, hath predetermined al futures both contingent, free, and necessa­ry in particular, and thence certainly and infallibly knows them to be future, both as to their substance and circumstances. As for sins future God certainly and infallibly knows them both as future and present, in the determination and permission of his own Wil, whereby the create Wil is determined to the entitie of the sinful act, as a real act, and permitted as to the moral pravitie of the act, as before, in the object of Divine Prescience. Hence,

6. The Divine Science is eternal. Thus Plato, 6. Divine Sci­ence eternal. both in his Ti­maeus and Parmenides, makes his Divine Ideas to be, [...], eternal and sempiterne. And the reason is most evident; because the Divine Science is the same with the Divine Essence. If God should begin to know any thing that he knew not be­fore, his Intellection should depend on the object known, which is impossible. Again, if God should begin to know what he knew not before, then he should be composite or compounded of Act and Power, and so not a pure Act: then also he should not be most perfect, and most blessed: for every Act addes to the perfection of the habit or power. Al the successions and vicis­situdes of time or things in time are foreseen by God in his Eter­nitie, by one simple intuitive Act. Thus Maximus Tyrius, Disser­tat. 1. pag. 10. The Divine Intellect is not perfect, unlesse it be ad­ded to it, [...], always to understand. Thus also Aquinas, Part. 1. Quaest. 14. Art. 13. ‘God knows al contingents not only as they are in their own causes, but as they are each of them actually in themselves. And albeit contingents are brought into act and existence successively, yet God doth not know them suc­cessively as they are in their own Being, as we do, but al at once; because his knowlege is measured by Eternitie, as also his Being: but now Eternitie being existent al at once, doth compasse about al time: whence althings that are in time are present to God from al Eternitie, not only as the reasons of althings are pre­sent with him, but because his intuition is from Eternitie cast on althings as they are in their presentialitie.’ This presentia­litie [Page 330]must be limited to the Divine Wil, which gives futurition to althings, and so makes them present to the Divine Under­standing. Hence,

7. The Divine Science is infinitely perfect. 7. Divine Sci­ence infinitely perfect. Thus Plato ascribes to God, Parmenid. 134. [...], the most exquisite per­fect Science: otherwise he could not be Rector of the Universe. So Maximus Tyrius, Dissert. 1. pag. 10. [...], That he be most perfect who understandes both at al times, and althings, and at once. Psal. 147.5. God knows althings, always, and at once; therefore most perfectly. Thus Psal. 147.5. Great is our Lord and of great power: his understanding is infinite: or of his understanding there is no number: i. e. his Understanding is every may perfect: he knows althings, and that in the most per­fect manner. And it is observable, that the Psalmist grounds the Infinitude of Gods knowlege on the Magnitude or Infinitude of hsi Essence and Power: whereby we are informed, that Gods knowlege dependes not on the objects known, but ariseth from his own omnipotent Wil and Essence. The perfection of the Divine Science may be considered essentially, intensively, extensively. (1) Essentially, as Gods knows himself perfectly, in himself and by himself; and althings else in himself. God knows althings distinctly in the claritie of his own Essence: those things that are diverse and multiplied in the Creatures, are most simply and unite­ly in God: Man according to the diversitie of objects, has di­verse notices or apprehensions of things. As he understandes first principes, so his knowlege is stiled Intelligence; as Con­clusions flowing from first Principes, so his knowlege is called Science; as the highest Cause, so Sapience; as things practic and moral, so Prudence: But al these God comprehendes by one simple Act of Intuition in his own Essence. (2) Gods knowlege is most perfect intensively. For every Intelligent is so far perfect as to degrees of knowlege, as he partakes of Immaterialitie. Brutes have some degree of apprehension, as they have spirituose Souls; but these their animal Spirits being but the purer parts of mater, therefore their apprehension is most imperfect, and not reckoned among the species of true knowlege. Mans apprehension depen­ding very far upon his senses and material objects, it's therefore more imperfect than that of Angels: yea, the Angelic Intelli­gence being made up of act and power, which is a kind of meta­physic mater, hence there is much of imperfection mixed there­with, [Page 331]if compared with Gods Intelligence; which being pure Act and exemt from al mater, as wel metaphysic as physic, hence it is most perfect intensively as to al degrees of knowlege. (3) Gods Science is most perfect extensively; not as to kinds or parts of Science, (for it is most indivisible and simple, without al exten­sion of parts) but as to objects; because it extendeth unto al ob­jects. God, by reason of his most infinite claritie, comprehendes al particular things, with al the particles of time in and by him­self. God being in the highest degree immaterial, it necessarily follows, that his Science is most ample and extensive as to its object: for every facultie is by so much the more extensive, by how the more immaterial it is: hence the human Intellect by its act of understanding is said to become althings: how much more true is this of the Divine Intellect, which is in the highest degree spiritual? The Divine Science albeit it be one most simple Act in it self, yet it is most universal and infinite as to its object. Thus Aquinas, contra Gent. l. 1. c. 78. proves that Gods knowlege extendes to an infinitie of things; because God perfectly knows his own Virtue and Power, which is infinite. Again, by how much the more efficacious and clear any Intellect is in knowing, by so much the more able it is from one to gather many things: But now the Divine Intellect being infinitely efficacious, it must therefore necessarily extend to an infinitude of objects. So Brad­wardine, l. 1. c. 1. pag. 7. proves, ‘That the Scientivitie of God and his Intellect is never satisfied with any finite or infinite number of existent singulars, of any one species, or al; but in­finitely excedes each of them, yea, a whole multitude of al, if they could be congregated together.’ That the Science of God is most perfect essentially, intensively, and extensively, see Suarez, Metaph. Disp. 30. Sect. 15. pag. 121.

Having largely discussed the essential Modes or Characters of the Divine Science, we now procede to its distinctions,Gods simple Di­telligence. with relation to its objects. For albeit the Divine Science be in it self one simple Act, identified with the Divine Essence, yet this hin­ders not but that we may, by some inadequate conception of rea­son, distinguish this Science, by reason of its object, into different kinds. The commun distribution of Gods Science is into simple Intellience, and Science of Vision. 1. Gods Science of simple Intel­ligence is of althings possible; which he contemplates in the Al­sufficience of his Essence. For God being in the highest degree [Page 332]Intelligent, he must necessarily understand althings that are intel­ligible: but now whatever may be, may also be known: where­ever there is a possibilitie of existence, there is some intelligibili­tie. Again, God perfectly knows his own Essence and Power: therefore he perfectly knows not only what is future, but also whatever is possible. Not that the existence of things possible is known by God, but only their Essence, which he contemplates in his own EssEnce. Hence this Science of simple Intelligence is called by some Abstractive; because it abstractes from the actual exi­stence of its object.

2. Gods Science of Vision, Gods Science of Vision as to things future. is that whereby he knows things as future, in and upon the Decree of his Wil. Here we must pre­mit, that when we say, Gods Science of Vision terminates on things as future, the conjunctive Particle As, must be taken not formally, as if it denoted any reason of the Divine Cognition taken from the futurition of the thing, but only materially; and so it denotes only thus much, that Gods knows things future to be future, and that by the determination of his own Wil. Bradwardine, de Caus. Dei, l. 1. c. 18. pag. 220, &c. largely demonstrates these Proposi­tions. (1) That God doth not know things future merely by his Es­sence, without the determination of his Wil; because nothing is in its own nature future, but by the Decree of the Divine Wil. (2) That God doth not know things future by the Divine Intellect only: because the Divine Intellect considered in it self is not practic, but only as subsequent to the Divine Wil. (3) That God doth not know things future by the Infinitie of the Divine Science: because the Infinitie of the Divine Science being supposed, it doth not thence necessarily follow, that this or that thing be future. (4) That God doth not know things future by the knowlege of their second Causes: For such a knowlege implies discourse from the cause to the effect: again, such a knowlege would be contingent when the second causes are such. (5) That God doth not know things future by the Infinitie or Immensitie of his own Scibilitie or Scientivitie. (6) That god doth not know things future by the sole permission of his own Wil: because then Gods knowlege should not be certain. Hence he positively concludes,God knows things future by his Wil. (7) That God knows things future by that which gives them their futurition, namely by his Divine Wil. For, as Aristotle 1. Post. 2. instructes us, To know a thing is to know it by its cause: and is not the Wil of God the first Cause that gives futurition to althings? Again, how can God certainly know future contin­gents, [Page 333]such as al human acts are, but in and by some necessary certain cause? And what certain necessary cause can there be of future contingents but the Divine Wil? We may not then search for the causes of Divine Prescience in things future, but in the cause of their futurition, the determination of the Divine Wil. Not as if the decree or determination of the Divine Wil, where­by things become future, did in any moment of Nature precede the Divine Prescience; but in one and the same moment of Na­ture God decrees what shal be future, and foresees it future. Thence he takes the reason of his knowing things future, not simply from his Essence, or sufficience; nor yet from their pre­sentialitie to God, as the Dominicans persuade us, but from the determination of his own Wil. Certainly Gods Wil is most effi­cacious, omnipotent, immutable, and most known to himself: and therefore it is necessary, that whatever he wils should be fu­ture, be so, and known to him to be so: for he wils not only the things themselves, but also al their modes and conditions of con­tingence, necessitie, libertie, &c. Whatever gives any thing its futurition must necessarily also give it its cognoscibilitie or intelli­gibilitie as future: wherefore the Divine Wil giving the former, it cannot also but give the later. Damascene, Orthodox. Fid. l. 1. c. 12. tels us, that [...] God may be deduced from [...] to see: [...], for nothing can be hid from God, yea he is the Inspector of althings. And then he gives us the mode how God comes to know althings: [...], For he beholdeth althings before they are produced, eternally understanding every thing, according to his voluntary eternal Intelligence: i. e. his eternal Intelligence grounded on his own Wil. Thus Bradwardine, de Caus. Dei. l. 1. c. 19. pag. 226. ‘But here we must know, that a thing as future in the Divine Wil and Pre­destination causally, and not extrinsecally in its own proper na­ture, is the cause [or object] of the Divine Science or Prescience: For God no way needs extrinsec things as objects of his know­lege; but he hath althings future with himself intrinsecally cog­nitivè, causativè, intuitivè, seu scientificè, cognitively, causatively, in­tuitively, or scientificly from himself only; and so he knows althings, &c.’ So also Cap. 18. pag. 223. ‘God, saith he, knows things future, by that whereby they are future, namely by his Divine Wil. And he urgeth for this that Principe of Ari­stotle, [Page 334]1. Post. 2. To know a thing certainly is to know it by its cause: But now God knows al futures certainly, therefore by their most true cause, even that which virtually contains al other causes and causations; and this is no other than his own wil.’ That God knows althings future in the determination of his own Wil was the commun Hypothesis of the ancient Scholastic Theologues, as of Augustin before them. So Robert Grosseteste in his M. SS. De Libero Arbitrio.

Thus Scotus assures us, ‘That the Root of the Divine Science as to future Contingents is the determination of the Divine Wil: which determination is not only necessary to cooperate with the free Creature, but also to determine the Wil of the Creature to act freely.’ This Hypothesis is also excellently well explicated and demonstrated by Alvarez, de Anxil. Grat. l. 2. Disp. 7. p. 106. ‘God, saith he, in the absolute efficacious Decree of his own Wil, predetermining in particular al future Contingents, as also free acts, knows certainly and infallibly those to be future, as to al circumstances, as wel as to their substance. Therefore from this Decree there may be assigned a sufficient Reason of the certitude of Divine Science as to al futurs, which are not morally evil.’ And he thus proves his Hypothesis; ‘A determinate cause, which is so efficacious as that it cannot be hindred by any other cause, must needs infallibly produce its effect: but such is the Divine Decree. Ergo. Then p. 108. he explicates how God knows sin: God certainly and infallibly knows al future sins in that Decree, whereby he decrees to predetermine the create Wil to the en­titie of the act of sin, so far as the act is ens, and to permit the moral evil of sin as sin, &c. as before.’

3. The Jesuites superadde to the two former Sciences of simple Intelligence and Vision, Scientia media. Scientia Media, a middle Science, whereby God is supposed to foresee such or such events to be future, on condition that such or such causes he so or so constituted. This Middle Science (1.) supposeth that some events are certainly future independently as to the Wil of God; which is altogether impossibly: for a thing merely possible cannot pass from its state of possibilitie to a state of Futurition, without some cause of that transmutation: now there can be no cause of fu­turition but the Divine Wil, as we shall prove hereafter. No­thing can be future either absolutely or conditionately, but what the Divine Will has decreed shal be future: therefore the [Page 335]object of this Middle Science cannot be things future, but only possible. Doth not this Middle Science, by feigning that future which is only possible, overthrow the very foundation of the Di­vine Science as to things future? Is it not impossible, that the prescience of a thing future should precede the decree of its fu­turition? So Avarez, de Auxil. l. 2. cap. 7. Nothing can make a thing cognoscible as future, but what gives futurition thereto: And what gives futurition to any thing, but the decree and de­termination of the Divine Wil? (2) It supposeth Gods Science to depend upon its object, which also is impossible; because then it should be variable and mutable as the object is. Yea, to speak properly, the object of this Middle Science is not at al cognoscible or knowable: For nothing is knowable farther than it is clothed with some degree of necessitie, at least as to essence or existence: what is not either necessarily existent or future, cannot be known: now the object of this Middle Science is not either existent or future: therefore not cognoscible. Again, God takes not the reason or idea of his cognition from the things themselves or any Hypotheses they fal under, which are al variable, but from the invariable determination of his own Wil, as before. It's true, our Intuition and Cognition is formed by a passive rece­ption of species from its object;Nostra intuitio fit patiendo abobjectis, non sic intuitio divina. and therefore it is murable and variable, according to the variations of the object: but can we imagine, that this imperfect mode may attend the Divine Intui­tion and Cognition? Should the principe and reason of the Divine Cognition procede from and depend on its finite object, must not God also be finite, passive, and dependent? Is not the Di­vine Idea before its Ideate, yea eternal? How then can it de­pend thereon? (3) This Middle Science supposeth the Divine Science to be only conjectural and uncertain. For such as the ob­ject is, such is the Science thereof: a contingent object cannot give a necessary certain Science: al Logic scientific necessitie is founded in physic necessitie: That which may otherwise be, can­not be necessarily known: as Gods knowlege would be false, if he knew those things to be future which shal never be; so would it be incertain, if the object be not certainly future: if the object be certainly future, it must have a certain cause of its futurition, which can be no other than the Wil of God. But now, accord­ing to this hypothetic Middle Science, God cannot divine which way mans Free-wil wil incline it self, before it hath inclined to [Page 336]this or that object. and doth not this render the knowlege of God only conjectural, yea no knowlege at al? For how can a thing be certainly known to be future, without some cause deter­mining it to be such? That Gods knows althings future, though never so contingent in themselves, most certainly in the deter­mination of his own Wil, see Greg. Ariminens. Sent. l. 1. Dist. 38. Quaest. 2. also Grosseteste, de Libero Arbitrio. Wherefore if God has a certain prescience of future contingents, as without al per­adventure he has, we must search for the causes of this Divine Prescience, not in the extrinsec objects, which can never give it, but in God himself, and in the determination of his own Wil, in regard of which al future contingents are necessary; not abso­lutely, but hypothetically, on supposition of the said determina­tion. (4) This Middle Science enervates and destroyeth the Grace of God. [1] It destroyes the Grace of Election; in that it supposeth, that Peter could from his own free-wil, consent to the Cal of God, provided he were put under such circumstances, and invested with such commun aides, even antecedently to his Election to Grace and Glorie; which they make to follow the prevision of his Faith by this Middle Science. And thus the whole of Election dependes on the improvement of Free-wil, and the prevision thereof by this Middle Science. [2] It enervates and dispirits the whole of Christs Redemtion; in that it makes al the efficace of Christs Death dependent on the prevision of mans as­sent and consent to him as Lord. It supposeth that Christ died for no man absolutely, but only on condition that men by their corrupt Wil embrace him. [3] It overthrows efficacious Grace in the vocation and conversion of sinners; in that it resolves al into a moral capacitie or power in corrupt Nature to convert it self. [4] It subvertes the Covenant of Grace; in resolving the whole of it into a Covenant of Workes. [5] It destroyes the Grace of Perseverance; in that it makes the perseverance of the Saints dependent on their own mutable Free-wil.

§. 3. As for the Wil of God,The Wil of God. although it be not really diffe­rent from his Ʋnderstanding and Essence, yet we may, in regard of its effects, conceive of it as in some manner distinct. The Wil of God is taken either properly, for the Divine Volition, In­tention, or Decree, whereby althings receive their Futurition and Existence; or else improperly, for the legislative, declarative, signifi­cative Wil of God; which is the measure of our dutie. The [Page 337]former is that which we are first to discourse of, whereof we find lively notices in Sacred Philosophie; and something also in Plato, Phileb. p. 16. where being about to Philosophise of the Divine Wil, as the original Exemplar or Idea of althings future, he makes this Preface: [...], For althings that ever were invented, being joined together by a certain affinitie and cognation with Art, by means hereof are declared. His meaning seems to be this, that look as althings made by Art have their Idea in the mind of the Artificer, according to which they are framed; so althings of Nature have their Idea in the Divine Mind and Wil, according to which they are accurately formed. Thence he addes: And truly the Ancients, who were better than we, and lived nearer to God, deliver­ed to us this report or Tradition, [...], That althings consist of ONE and MANY, which are said ever to be. (1) That by these Ancients, whence this Ori­ental Tradition came, we must understand primarily the Hebrews, has been sufficiently demonstrated, P. 2. B. 3. C. 2. and elsewhere. (2) That by this ancient tradition of One and Many, we must un­derstand the Divine Essence and Ideas or Decrees of the Divine Wil seems also manifest. Whence he subjoins; [...], That we ought, things being thus consti­tuted, alwaies to inquire after one Idea of every thing in particular, and accurately to observe the same, &c. That by this ONE IDEA, which we are to inquire after, must necessarily be understood the Decree of the Divine Wil, I think wil be evident to any, that seriously considers Plato's Philosophemes of the Divine Ideas, de­livered in his Timaus, and Parmenides, of which before, P. 2. B. 3. c. 9. §. 4. And indeed he seems positively to assert, Parmenid. p. 134. That the Origine of these Ideas cannot be in the object, but must be in the Divine Essence and Wil. We shall reduce the whole of our Philosophemes about the Divine Wil to the following Pro­positions.

1. Prop. God primarily Wils himself, and althings else in subordi­nation to himself. The Object of the Divine Wil. (1.) That the Divine Essence is the primary object of the Divine Wil. is most evident; [1.] because the principal thing willed is to every one the cause of willing: if therefore God should have any other principal object of his Wil besides himself, he should have something besides himself as the cause of his willing; [Page 338]which is impossible: for nothing can move the Divine Wil but his own Bonitie. [2] The Divine Essence is most amabile and appetible for it self, therefore the primary object of the Divine Wil. [3] The primary object of the Wil ought to be equally proportionable thereto: for the virtue and efficace of a facultie is measured by its commensuration and Adequation to its prima­ry object: and what is equally proportionable to the Divine Wil, but the Divine Essence? Hence, (2) God by willing himself, wils althings else in subordination to himself. For he that wils an end, wils althings else in order thereto. God wils althings in order to his own Bonitie: The Wil of God terminates on other things so far as they relate to the Divine Bonitie, and participate thereof: God wils himself Necessarily, but althings else so far as they re­late to himself. Hence (1) God wils al singular Goods, so far as they partake of goodness. For God willing himself as his last end, wils althings so far as they conduce to himself: but every thing so far as it is good participates of, and tends to the Divine good­ness: therefore as such it is willed by God. Hence,

2. Prop. The Wil of God considered in it self is but one, simple, in­divisible, pure Act. The Divine Wil one pure Act. Thus Plato, Phileb. 16. saith, we ought always to inquire after, [...], one idea of althings. Whereby he notes, that the Divine Wil, as the origine of all things, is but one. The multitude of objects willed is no way repuguant with the Unitie and Simplicitie of the Divine Wil: for God by one simple act wils himself and althings else. Althings are one in the Divine Wil and Bonitie; in as much as the Divine Bonitie is the exem­plar of al Bonitie; and the Divine Wil by one and the same act wils both the Divine Bonitie and al other Bonitie. It is other­wise with the Humane Wil, which by one act wils the end, and by another, the means conducing to the end: whence the willing the end is the cause of willing the means: but in the Divine Wil there is no such causalitie of end and means to be found; in as much as by one and the same simple act it wils both end and means: and al grant, that the same thing cannot be the cause of it self. Thence Suaxez Metaple. Disput. 30. §. 16. p. 127, &c. proves, ‘That Gods Wil is not a real power, but the last pure Act: for there is no receptive power in God: althings that are in God are as actual as his effence, and as pure from all Poten­tialitie.’ Hence,

3. Prop. The Divine Wil is most Soverain and Independent. The Divine Wil Independent. Thus the Platonistes generally assert, that the Divine Wil is [...], without cause, and Independent: and Plato makes his Divine Ideas to be [...], Self-subsistent and Independent; because althings else depend on them, but they on nothing else. This Indepen­dence and Self-subsistence of the Divine Wil is set forth in Sacred Philosophie under the notion of a Foundation, 2 Tim. 2.19.2 Tim. 2.19. The foundation of the Lord standeth sure, the Lord knoweth who are his. [...] notes the firm purpose of the Divine Wil: As those that build great Palaces lay a firm foundation, which de­pendes not on any part of the Structure, but the whole Structure dependes on it; so God being to build a Celestial House, layes the eternal purpose of his own Wil as a self-subsistent independent foundation, on which the whole dependes. This Soveraintie and Independence of the Divine Wil the Hebrews expressed by the name [...] Adonai, which denotes Gods Soverain Dominion over the Creature, from [...] a pillar or basis, on which the whole Fa­bric dependes, but it dependes not on the Fabric: so althings de­pend on the Soverain Wil of God, but it on nothing. Thus Plato, Epist. p. 312. [...], About the King of althings, althings are: and althings are for his sake [...] and he is the cause of althings beautiful. Wherein note, (1) th [...]e stiles God [...], The Soveraign King or Lord of al, i. e. according to the originati­on of the word, [...] the basis of al answerably to the import of Adonai, Lord. (2) He saith althings are for God, i. e. to be dis­posed of according to his Soverain Wil and pleasure. And (3) he addes the Reason, because he is the cause of althings. i. e. God, by virtue of his prime causalitie and efficience, has an universal Dominion over al things, to dispose of them as he pleaseth for his Glorie. The light of Nature teacheth, that every one ought to be the supreme moderator of his own work: Hence what ever God wils is just, because he wils it. This Soveraintie and Inde­pendence of the Divine Wil is lively expressed, Psal. 135.5.Psal. 135.5, 6. For I know that Jehova is Great, and that our Lord is superior to al Gods, Jehovah, i. e. the first Supreme Being, who gives being to al­things, but receives nothing from any Creature. Is Great, i. e. Infinite in being, and therefore most Soverain and Independent in his Wil and Pleasure. Whence it follows: and superior to al Gods: i. e. infinitely above Angels and Men, though never so po­tent; [Page 340]who al depend on his soverain independent Wil. Thence he addes, v. 6. Whatsoever the Lord pleased, that did he in Heaven and in Earth. [...], whatsoever the Lord willeth: which notes the Soveraintie, Independence, and Omnipotence of his Wil.Jonah 1.14. So Jonah 1.14. For thou O Lord hast done as it pleased thee [...], according to thy soverain independent Wil. The great­est Notions or Attributes that our shallow judgements can invent, are infinitely too short to expresse the Soveraintie of the Divine Wil.

But the more fully to explicate and demonstrate the Soverain­tie and Independence of the Divine Wil,God indepen­dent physically and morally. we are to consider that as causes, so dependence on those causes is twofold; physic, or mo­ral: Physic Dependence is that whereby an inferior dependes on a superior Cause for real efficience: Moral Dependence is that where­by an inferior dependes on its superior for moral influence. And there is this commun to both: as in Naturals inferior causes de­pendent on superiors in acting, have no power to act contrary to the efficace of their superiors; so in Morals. But now God is neither physically nor morally dependent on any superior cause. (1) He has no physic dependence on any superior cause; because he is the first in the order of physic Causes: Again, he is superior to al Gods, as Psal. 135.5. and therefore cannot be influenced by any. So Plato, Repub. assur [...] [...], [...], That an hypocrite is neither able to hide himself from God, nor yet to force him. The Divine Wil receives no real efficience or influence from the human Wil, but the human Wil is really influenced by the Divine Wil: God wils not things, because we wil them; but we wil things, because God wils them. (2) Nei­ther is God morally dependent on any other. Moral dependence is founded in natural: where there is natural independence in an absolute degree, there cannot be moral dependence in any degree: The rational Creature having a twofold relation to God, as a Creature, and as rational, hence he has a twofold dependence on God, one natural, the other moral: but God being independent as to his Essence, must necessarily also be independent as to Morals. Moral dependence is either Legal, or Final: Legal de­pendence is, when an inferior dependes on the Laws, Remune­rations, or Distributions of any Superior. Final Dependence is, when an inferior dependes on some supreme last end. The Di­vine Wil is in neither regard dependent. [1] It is not legally [Page 341]dependent; because not subject to the law of any. The Divine Wil gives Laws to al Creatures, but receives Laws from none: yea, it hath no legal dependence on any meritorious acts of the Creature: God willeth nothing without himself, because it is just; but it is therefore just, because he wils it: The reasons of good and evil extrinsec to the Divine Essence are al dependent on the Divine Wil either decernent or legislative. [2] The Divine Wil has no final dependence on any superior end; because its own Bo­nitie is its only end. The End is the Cause, Reason, or Motive of willing althings that conduce to the End: but now nothing can move the Wil of God, but his own Bonitie; which indeed is the same with his Wil and Essence: wherefore it cannot be properly said to be the cause of his Wil; because nothing is said to be the cause of it self. When Theologues affirme, That God wils one thing for another, they mean not, that the other thing is the cause or motive of the Divine Wil; but that God wils there should be a causal connexion between the things willed. As God willed the Sun, Moon, and Stars should be for the produ­ction of fruits, and these for the use of man, &c. Gods willing one thing for another notes a causal connexion between the things willed, but no causal influence on the Divine Wil:Deus vult hoc propter hoc: non autem pro­pter hoc vult hoc. Ephes. 1.4, 5. God wils this for that, yet for this he doth not wil that: i. e. God wils effects and causes; and that the effects are for the causes; yet he doth not wil the effects for the causes, as if the causes were the motives of his Wil. Thus we must understand that Text, Eph. 1.4. Accord­ing as he has chosen us in him before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy and without blame before him in love. How are the Elect chosen in Christ? (1) Negatively, they are not chosen in Christ, as the meritorious Cause of Election; nor from a previ­sion of their Faith in Christ, as the motive of Divine Election, according to the Pelagian Hypothesis. But (2) They are said to be chosen in Christ, as their commun Head, that by him they might be made new Creatures, and so partakers both of Grace and Glorie. Christ and Faith have no causal influence on the Divine Wil; but the Divine Wil decrees, that Christ and Faith should have a causal influence on Salvation. Thence it follows, v. 5. Having predestinated us unto the Adoption of Children by Jesus Christ unto himself, according to the good pleasure of his Wil. Here Christ is brought in as the meritorious, antecedent Cause of our Adoption, but as an effect and consequent of Election: For so [Page 342]much the Particle [...] by denotes, namely that Christ as Mediator is the effect of Predestination or Election, but the cause of our Adoption. This is strongly argued by Augustin in his Book, De Praedestinatione Sanctorum. And surely if the Merits of Christ have no causal influence on the Wil of God, much lesse can mans Faith or Merits influence the same. Thence he addes: according to the good pleasure of his Wil: which argues the Independence of his Wil. Thus we see how God wils Christ and Faith for the Salvation of the Elect, and yet doth not wil the Salvation of the Elect for Christ and Faith as the moving causes of his Wil, which is most independent. So God wils both the means and the end; and the means for the end; yet he doth not for the end wil the means, as if the end did move him to wil the means. For in God the volition of one thing is not the cause of his wil­ling another; because there can no efficience of cause on effect, or dependence of effect on the cause be affirmed of the Divine Wil, which is but one simple indivisible act both as to end and means; and therefore neither one nor t'other can be said to move or influence the Divine Wil; albeit the same Divine Wil doth wil a causal connexion between the things willed: in which regard Scholastic Theologues assigne reasons of the Divine Wil, affirm­ing, That the passive attingence of the Divine Wil in respect of one thing, is the cause of its passive attingence in regard of another thing, albeit neither the cause of the Divine Wil: i. e. to speak natively and properly, God wils that one thing shal depend on another, yet the Divine Wil neither dependes on nor is moved by either Gods soverain independent Wil is ful of reasons, as to the ad­mirable dependence of the things willed, according to their subor­dinations, yet there may not be the least reason or shadow of rea­son assigned as the cause or motive of the Divine Wil. Thus Ephes. 1.11.Ephes. 1.9, 11. Who worketh althings according to the counsel of his Wil. [...]. There is the highest counsel and wisdome in the Divine Wil, and yet no reason or cause can be assigned of it. So v. 9. Having made known to us the mysterie of his Wil, according to his good pleasure, which he hath purposed in himself. The Divine Wil is here said to be (1) ful of mysterious wisdome, whereof no reason can be assigned without it self. Thence, (2) it is sti­led good pleasure, which denotes its Soveraintie and Independence. Hence (3) it is said to be in it self: i. e. no reason or cause ex­trinsec to it self can be assigned thereof: though it be ful of my­sterious [Page 343]wisdome and sublime reasons, yet they are al within it self. That there can no cause either physic or moral, legal or final be assigned of the Divine Wil is evident; (1) because the Di­vine Wil is one simple, pure Act; and therefore not capable of any Passion, Impression, and Causalitie from any extrinsec object. (2) Because althings else are the effects of the Divine Wil, and therefore cannot be the cause thereof: because the same thing cannot be the cause of it self. (3) Because the Divine Wil is eternal; but althings else of finite duration: and is it possible, that what is temporal and finite should influence what is eternal and infinite? That there can be no cause of the Divine Wil, see Aquinas, Part. 1. Quaest. 19. Art. 5. & contra Gent. lib. 1. cap. 87. Hence,

4. Prop. The Divine Wil it immutable. The Divine Wil immutable. This Immutabilitie of the Divine Wil ariseth from the Independence, Simplicitie, and Immutabilitie of the Divine Essence, with which it has an essential connexion, yea identitie. Plato discourseth accurately of the Immutabilitie of the Divine Wil, both in his Philosophemes of Divine Ideas, as also in his Phaedo, pag. 78. where he proves, that the Divine Essence and Wil is [...], &c. one uniforme Being, which existes of it self, and is alwayes the same, without the least degree of mutation, &c. of which more fully before, in Gods Immutabilitie, cap. 4. §. 5. But this Immutabilitie of the divine Wil is more clearly illustrated and de­monstrated in sacred Philosophie. Thus Psal. 33.10.Psal. 33.10, 11. The Lord bringeth the counsel of the Heathen to nought. [...], he hath infringed, dissipated, made void: from [...] to break. Thence it follows: He maketh the devices of the people of none effect. [...], he hath broken: from [...] to break, properly the mind or purpose. The divine Wil delights to break and dash in pieces the strongest resolutions and most fixed purposes of proud men. But then follows the Im­mutabilitie of the divine Wil, v. 11. The counsel of the Lord stand­eth for ever; the thoughts of his heart to al generations. [...], the fixed counsel, or determinate purpose of Jehovah. Standeth for ever: i. e. is inviolable and immutable. This verse contains the Antithese of the precedent; whereby David teacheth us, that the divine Wil makes void the proud wil of man, but no human wil can frustrate or alter the divine Wil, as Job 12.13, 14. Thus Psal. 119.89. For ever O Lord thy word is setled in Heaven. Psal. 119.89. [...] is fixed, established. R. Ezora understandes this of the decrees or [Page 344]purposes of the Divine Wil, which are firme, stablished, and im­mutable. So Malach. 3.6. I am the Lord, I change not; therefore the Sons of Jacob are not consumed. I change not: This regards the Wil of God, as wel as his essence; so much the subsequent infe­rence importes: for the reason why the Sons of Jacob are not consumed, must be resolved into the immutable Wil of God, as the original cause. It's true, the things willed by God are oft under mutations; and God wils those mutations; but with an immutable wil: the mutation reacheth not the wil of God, but only the things willed by God; who wils this thing shal be now, and the contrary afterward, without the least alteration in his wil. A wil is then said to be changed, when any begins to wil that, which he before nilled; or to nil that, which he before wil­led: which cannot be supposed to happen, but in case of some mutation in knowlege, or disposition: but neither of these can be affirmed of God. (1) God is infinitely wise, and foresees al contingences, circumstances, and accidents that may happen; and therefore cannot alter his thoughts or purposes for want of wis­dome, as we poor mortals frequently do. (2) Gods disposition towards al objects is ever the same. (3) The human wil is ob­nexious to mutations, from impotence and want of power to ac­complish what we wil: but the Divine Wil is omnipotent and ir­resistible, as Esa. 46.10. (4) If the Divine Wil were mutable, God could not have a certain prevision of future contingents: because the certaintie of Gods prevision supposeth a certaintie of Divine Ideas and Decrees in the will of God: for Gods Science of Vision or foresight of things future ariseth from his Wil, which gives althings their futurition. But it is objected from Scripture, That God is said sometimes to repent: and al repentance denotes a change of the wil. The Response is sacile: when Scripture ascribes repentance to God it is only improperly and in condescendence to our fragile capacitie, thereby to denote a change, not in the Wil of God, but in his dispensation towards the Creature, upon some change in the Creature: So upon the repentance of the Ninevites God repented, i. e. changed his dispensation towards them. O­therwise, when the Scripture speaks properly of Repentance, it saith expressely, That God is not as man, that he should repent, Num. 23.19. 1 Sam. 15.29.

5.Gods Wil Abso­lute, not condi­tionate. Prop. Gods Wil is Absolute, not conditionate. The Divine Wil receives no conditions from the human Wil, but gives al to it. [Page 345]So Jam. 4.15. For that ye ought to say, If the Lord wil. Jam. 4.15. This was an ancient saying mentioned by Bensyra, Sent. Moral. xi. Let man never say, he wil do any thing, before he hath prefaced this, If the Lord Wil. And we find something answerable hereto, in Plato, Alcibiad. p. 135. where Socrates instructs Alcibiades, that he must say, he wil do so and so, [...]. If God wil. So in his La­ches: [...], But I will do this, and come to thee to morrow, if God will. By which it is evident both from Sacred and Platonic Philosophie, that our Wil must expect and receive al conditions from the Divine Wil, but impose or ascribe none to it. There are several Textes of Scripture which some urge to prove a conditionate Wil in God: as Psal. 81.13, 14. Ezech. 33.11. Mat. 23.37. Joh. 3.16. (1) As for the two first Textes, Psal. 81.13, 14. and Ezech. 33.11.Ezech. 33.11. it seems most probable, that they refer primarily to temporal deli­verance and destruction, specially that of Ezech. 33.11. as it appears by v. 2, 3. (2) If we understand these Scriptures as re­ferring to maters of Salvation, then they note only Gods Wil [...] of complacence, not his Wil [...] of Beneplacite. So [...] which Ezechiel useth, signifies not simply to wil, but to ac­quiesce in a thing. And then the sense is, that Gods [...] or complacence is not in the Death of sinners simply as such, but in this, that men turne from their sins and live. But (3) our prin­cipal response is this: God declares by these and such like Scri­ptures his gratiose propensions and inclinations towards penitent sinners: [1] Hereby to demonstrate that intime and indissolu­ble connexion, which he has, according to his Evangelic Consti­tution, established between sincere Reppentance and Salvation. [2] That so these general Declarations and Invitations of Sin­ners to repent might prove an efficacious instrument of particular vocation and conversion to the Elect. For Gods Free Grace albe­it it be in it self absolute and particular; yet it is proposed to sin­ners in Indefinite and Universal Propositions, thereby the more efficaciously to allure and draw their hearts to the embracement thereof. [3] Hereby impenitent Sinners are left without al ex­cuse; in as much as God has so freely and cordially offered Mer­cie to them, would they but embrace the same. Al this implies no proper conditionate Wil in God, but only some conditions in the externe propositions and offers of his Grace; which God con­fers on the Elect. There are many Scriptures that speak Gods [Page 346]Wil to be Absolute.Rom. 9.11. So Rom. 9.11. That the purpose of God accord­ing to Election might stand, not of Workes, &c. Where [...] notes Gods free absolute purpose or Decree, no way de­pendent on any merits or conditions in the Creature: which Rom. 11.5. he termes, [...], according to the election of Grace: i. e. Gods free absolute Wil. The like, 1 Thes. 1.4. and 3.5.

That God wils nothing conditionally is evident (1) from the impossibilitie of such a Wil in God. For if God wils any thing conditionally, he wils that condition also, or not: if he doth not wil the condition, then it is impossible that it should be; and so God is said to wil things on impossible conditions; and then by consequence to wil things impossible; which is too great a re­proche to be cast on the Deitie: If God wils the condition, then he wils it either absolutely or conditionally: if absolutely, then his wil is absolute: for to wil a thing conditionally, and yet to wil the condition absolutely, is to wil the thing it self absolutely. If God wils the condition conditionally, then the condition of this later condition, conditionally: which opens the dore for a progresse into infinite. (2) If Gods Wil should be conditionate, then it would hang in suspense, and depend on the humane wil; and so it should be in the power of the human wil to make void and frustrate the Divine Wil: yea the Divine Wil should be more in the power of mans wil, than the wil of the most miserable slave is in the power of his Lords wil. This destroys the Sove­raintie and Independence of the Divine Wil. (3) To suppose the Divine Wil to be conditionate takes away the futurition of that thing it wils: for nothing can be future of it self, without some cause of its futurition: and there can be no cause assigned why a thing should passe from being only possible to future, but the Divine Wil. (4) To suppose a conditionate wil in God de­stroys the certaintie of Divine prescience: for if the condition hang in suspense, and be not willed by God, the thing willed can­not be certainly known. (5) A conditionate wil ascribes to God imperfection, in that it supposeth his wil to be incomplete, in­efficacious, passive, dependent, mutable, &c. But yet take no­tice, that albeit we exclude al conditions from the Divine Wil, yet we do not exclude them from the things willed: The things willed may be conditionate, and yet the Divine Wil absolute. Hence,

6. Prop. Gods Wil is Antecedent not Consequent. Gods Wil ante­cedent, not con­sequent. The distin­ction of Gods Wil into Antecedent and Consequent, albeit it were by some of the ancient Scholastic Theologues made use of as to the things willed, yet as it is now generally used by the Jesuites and their Sectators, and applied to the immanent wil of God, it is most injurious to him. That Gods Wil is ever Antecedent, is plainly evident from Sacred Philosophie. So Act. 13.48.Act. 13.48. And as many as were ordained to eternal life believed. [...] ordained here cannot signifie disposed or prepared, as the Remonstrants and their Sectators would perswade us: for [...] differs much from [...], neither is it any where in Scripture or any Greek Au­thor, as I can learne, used to signifie an interne Qualitie or Dispo­sition; but it generally signifies to Ordain, primarily in military affaires; and thence in any other maters. So Act. 22.10. [...]. And that [...] cannot be here taken nominally, but must signifie Ordained, is most evident from the sense: For it's said, they were ordained to eternal life, as the terme; not unto faith only, as the means: wherefore if [...] should signifie disposed, the sense must be, they were disposed to eternal life, as many as were disposed: for what is faith but a disposition to eter­nal life? It's most evident therefore, that [...] must signifie not nominally, but participally such as were ordained unto eternal life as the terme, and unto faith as the means, by the absolute and antecedent wil of God. That Gods Wil properly so termed is ever Antecedent and never Consequent may be demonstrated, (1) From the Eternitie of Gods wil. According to Plato, the Idea or Decree of the Divine Wil is ever [...], eternal and sempiterne: Now if the wil of God and its Ideas be al eternal; then not any one of them can be consequent to any act of the Creature, which is in time. (2) From the Simplicitie, Indepen­dence, and Immutabilitie of the Divine Wil. A consequent wil in God supposeth his Divine Wil to hang in suspense, and depen­dent on the mutable ambulatorie wil of man: and is it possible, that the prime cause should depend on, or be influenced by the inferior second cause? What? must the Supreme Soverain Wil attend, yea subserve the nods and becks of human created wil? The act of willing in God cannot depend on any act of the crea­ture as something consequent thereto; because then as oft as the act of the creature is changed, the wil of God must be changed. (3) From the perfection of the Divine Wil. A consequent wil in [Page 348]God, as stated by the Jesuites and their Followers, supposeth an Antecedent imperfect wil, consisting only in a natural Velleitie or imperfect inclination, which is unworthy of the most perfect wil. (4) From the Omnipotence of God. If God wils a thing antece­dently to the act of the creature, which shal never be, then the wil of God is not Omnipotent; but in the power of the Crea­ture, either to fulfil or frustrate the same. And Oh! how in­congruous are such Sentiments to the Divine Omnipotent Wil? If Gods Wil be in the power of the Creature and dependent thereon, then it may be wholly frustrated as to al its counsels and decrees touching the rational world. (5) This distinction of the Divine Wil into Antecedent and Consequent is contumelious to the Beatitude of God. For every one is so far blessed, as he has his wil fulfilled: To have our wils crossed or frustrated is ac­counted by al no smal portion of miserie: may we then imagine; that the Divine Wil properly so termed is ever frustrated? (6) This distinction of Gods wil into antecedent and consequent is also injurious to his Bountie and goodnesse. Sacred Philoso­phie compareth God to a liberal Prince, who deviseth liberal things,Esa. 32.8. and thereby establisheth his Throne, Esa. 32.8. But the liberal deviseth liberal things, and by liberal things he shal stand. It's spoken of Christ as Mediator, or the great King of Sion, as appears, vers. 1. who deviseth al manner of liberal things, and thereby stands, or is established on his Throne, as the word denotes in the Hebrew. Did not Christ keep open house and distribute al his gifts and good things liberally and freely, his Throne would not be established; he would have no Subjects to fil up his Kingdome. But now the distinction of the Divine Wil into Antecedent and Consequent cuts asunder al the nerves and ligaments of Christs Liberalitie, in that it makes him to have an imperfect Antecedent wil towards al, but a Consequent Wil towards none, but those who can by their good merits pur­chase his favor. This distinction of Gods Wil into Antecedent and Consequent is excellently wel refuted by Gregor. Ariminensis, Sent. 1. Distinct. 46, 47. where he concludes thus: ‘Al the good things that we have are given us by God out of his Boun­tie and Grace: and this speakes, that God wills them to us by an Antecedent Wil; because no cause antecedes in us, but al our good things flow from his Bonitie.’

7.The Divine Wil most perfect. Prop. The Divine Wil is most perfect. This Adjunct of the [Page 349]Divine Wil is but the result of the former, and that which makes way to what follows. The perfection of the Divine Wil may be considered intensively, extensively, or effectively. 1. Intensively. (1) The perfe­ction of the Divine Wil considered intensively consistes in its not admitting any intension and remission, or latitude of degrees; but being alwaies intense in the highest degree. For the Di­vine Wil having one and the same Idea with the Divine Essence, it is one simple pure Act, without the least gradual remission, or intension. Hence it is stiled by Plato, [...], the perfect Idea of good, which admits no latitude of degrees, no vel­leitie or incomplete wil. That Gods Wil is always perfect and complete, without the least velleitie or conditionate volition may be demonstrated, [1] from the Simplicitie and pure Actualitie of God. For al composition and latitude of degrees is inconsistent with a pure Act. [2] From the Identitie of the Divine Wil with the Divine Essence, which admits not the least latitude of degrees. [3] From the Immutabilitie of the Divine Wil. For al Velleitie being but an imperfect wil denotes a progression to a more per­fect, and so mutation. [4] From the Wisdome of God. For al Velleitie implies ignorance: and supposeth that God understandes not fully what the issues and events of the human wil may be. [5] From the Omnipotence of God. Al Velleitie notes impo­tence to accomplish what we wil. We may not therefore ima­gine, that Gods Wil is capable of any Velleitie, or conditionate incomplete volition, either formally or eminently; but that it is ever most perfect as to degrees; because it is the same with the Divine Essence. (2) The Divine Wil is most perfect exten­sively, 2. Extensively. as to Objects, in that it extendes it self to al objects. So in sacred Philosophie, Act. 17.26.Acts 17.26. And hath determined the times before appointed, and the bounds of their habitation. It is said, that God hath determined, [...], i. e. by his soverain, perfect Wil gi­ven termes, bounds, measures, and limits to althings: the Divine Wil is infinite and unlimited; it receives limits and termes from no­thing, but gives bounds and termes to althings. Hence God is said by Plato always [...], to play the Geometer, i. e. to mea­sure out to althings their just essences, virtues, perfections, and limits: for Geometrie, according to its primary notation and use among the Egyptians, (from whom Plato borrowed the no­tion) signifies to measure the bounds and termes of land. And it is most appositely applied by Plato to the divine Wil, as it gives [Page 350]measures and termes to althings. (3) The divine Wil is most perfect effectively, 3. Effectively. as it is the efficacious Efficient of al effects; of which hereafter in the divine Causalitie, where we hope fully to demonstrate, That the Divine Wil is the prime Efficient and effica­cious Cause of al effects. The perfection of the divine Wil may be demonstrated either absolutely or comparatively, as compared with the human wil. (1) If we consider the divine Wil abso­lutely, so its perfection may be demonstrated, from its Simplici­tie, pure Actualitie, Eternitie, Immutabilitie, Omnipotence, &c. as before. (2) If we consider the divine Wil relatively, or com­paratively, as compared with a create human or Angelic wil, so its perfection appears, (1) in this, that the divine Wil gives al Bonitie and goodnesse to things; whereas every create wil pre­supposeth goodnesse in things that it wils: every create wil de­pendes on, because it's moved by, the goodnesse of its object; but every create good dependes on the goodnesse of the divine Wil. Hence there can be assigned no cause of the divine Wil, but what is in it self: whereas every create wil has a formal rea­son, cause and motive without it self, whereby it is moved and influenced. (2) In the human wil the volition of the end is the cause of its willing the means: but in the divine Wil, both end and means are willed by one simple indivisible pure Act. (3) In mans wil, Volition and Nolition are distinct Acts: not to wil in man implies a negation or suspension of the wils act: but in God, by reason of the pure actualitie of his Nature, Nolition and Vo­lition are the same. We may not imagine, that the divine Wil is capable of any suspension or negation of Act; but whatever he wils not that it be, that he wils that it be not: also whatever he wils not that it be not, that he wils that it be. (4) Mans wil is circumscribed and limited by justice: he may not wil but what is just; but Gods Wil is not circumscribed by any Laws of Justice: he doth not wil things, because just; but they are therefore just, because he wils them.Quicquid Deus non vult ut fi­at, illud etiam vult ut non fi­at: item quic­quid non vult ut non fiat, id ipsum etiam vult ut fiat. (5) Mans wil is limited as to the sphere of its Activitie: he wils what he doth, but he cannot do al that he wils: termes of essence suppose termes of power and activitie. But God doth not only wil what he doth, but also do what he wils: his power is as extensive as his wil: he can do what he wil: his Wil is omnipotent; because the same with his Essence, as Psal. 115.3.

8. Prop. The divine Wil is most free. The Divine Wil most free. Libertie being one of the supreme perfections that belong to an intelligent rational Creature, it may not be denied to the divine Wil. Yea nothing else could be free, if the divine Wil were not free; because this is the first Principe of al Libertie: as take away the first Cause, you also destroy al second Causes; so take away libertie from the divine Wil, you take it away also from al create wils. Libertie in the divine Wil is absolute, precedent, and regulant; libertie in the human wil is conditionate, subsequent, and regulated. The first in every kind is the measure of al in that kind: now the di­vine Libertie is the first in that kind, and therefore the grand Exemplar of al create Libertie. The most perfect Cause must necessarily have the most perfect mode of acting: but now God is the most perfect Cause: therefore he must have the most per­fect mode of acting: which is to act freely. Yea, the divine Wil is so infinitely free, as that it is moved by nothing without it self: it has not so much as an end extrinsec to its own Boni­tie, whereby it is moved: which kind of independent libertie no create wil may challenge. For every create wil, as it has a first Cause, whereby it is moved physically; so a last end, whereby it is moved morally: but the Libertie of the divine Wil is inde­pendent in both these regards; and therefore most supreme and perfect. The Libertie of the divine Wil may be considered as relating to the operations ad intra, or to those ad extra. (1) The Libertie of the divine Wil as relating to the operations ad intra is only concomitant; not antecedent: for al the operations of God ad intra, i. e. such as terminate on himself, namely loving himself, &c. they are al from a necessitie of Nature, not from election and choice. God cannot but love himself: he necessarily ad­heres to his own Bonitie and enjoys himself, without the least indifference either of Specification, or Exercice. And yet even in these Acts ad intra, which terminate on the divine Essence, and are attended with a natural necessitie, the divine Wil has a concomitant Libertie or divine Spontaneitie; which is sufficient to denominate those Acts free. For as the human wil adheres to its last end by a kind of natural necessitie, which yet is attended with a rational spontaneitie; so in like manner the divine Wil adheres to and enjoys it self by a natural necessitie, and yet with a concomitant libertie or divine spontaneitie. This is wel ex­pressed by Jamblichus, a Sectator of Plato, de Myster. Aegypt. ‘It [Page 352]is, saith he, necessary, that God be as he is, not by an extrinsec violent necessitie, but by a natural and most voluntary; seing he never would be other than he is.’ Here we see the highest necessitie conspiring and according with the highest libertie. (2) If we consider the Libertie of the Divine Wil as relating to its operations ad extra, such as terminate on the Creature, so it is not only concomitant, but also antecedent: i.e. the Divine Wil terminates on the Creature, not from any necessitie of Nature, but by election and choice. For al Creatures, as referred to the Divine Bonitie, are but means: wherefore the Divine Wil has an antecedent libertie either for the electing or refusing of them. This some cal Libertie of Election; because al election properly regards the means. Again, God in willing his own Bonitie ne­cessarily, wils althings so far as they participate of his own Boni­tie: Now the divine Bonitie being infinite, there are infinite ways whereby the Creatures are participable thereof; but al depen­dent on the election and determination of the Divine Wil. Last­ly, if the divine Wil should terminate on the Creatures from a necessitie of Nature, and not from free election, there could no­thing be contingent, as Suarez and others prove.

But here occurs a knotty objection,What indiffe­rence may be a­scribed to the Wil of God. which is thus urged: How can the Divine Decrees admit of an antecedent libertie of election, when as they are the same with the Divine Essence, and so attended with the same natural necessitie? This objection has greatly per­plexed the acutest Wits among Scholastic Theologues. Bradwar­dine, de Caus. Dei, l. 1. c. 14. pag. 212. answers thus: That be­tween the state of possibilitie and the futurition of things in the divine Decree there is a prioritie of origination; not of time, but of nature. But more fully lib. 2. cap. 52. pag. 834. he expli­cates, in what sense it may be said, that God could before nil, what he now wils: ‘It is manifest, saith he, that God could not, either in regard of Time or Eternitie, before nil privatively or positive­ly what he now wils; but only by a prioritie of Nature or Cause, namely by a prioritie of the volutive power in relation to its act.’ By the volutive power we must understand Gods Wil as the effective Principe, not that it is really a power in God. So Gregor. Ariminensis, Sent. l. 1. Dist. 45. pag. 161. answers sundry objections relating to this Hypothesis, and at last concludes, ‘That the Wil of God, as the first Cause of things, may be said to be both necessary and contingent: necessary, as the same [Page 353]with the divine Essence; and yet contingent, as it might not have willed the futurition and existence of things.’ Alvarez, de Auxil. l. 2. Disp. 7. pag. 114. saith, ‘That we may conceive sig­num rationis, a moment of reason before the Decree of the divine Wil determing what should be future.’ And Disput. 116. pag. 913. he distinguisheth indifference into privative and negative: Negative Indifference he makes to be that, which in it self is not more determined to this object than to that; or to act than not to act: and in this regard, addes he, the divine Wil was, before it determined to create the world, in that [signo rationis] moment of reason indifferent to create or not create the world, &c. which negative indifference importes no privation of perfection in God. Al these solutions are much of the same import, and may be re­solved into this: That the divine Decrees may be considered as they are in themselves and with respect to the divine Essence; and so they are necessary: or as they terminate on the Creatures, and are the cause both of their futurition and existence, and so we may ascribe to them a moment of reason, nature, or causalitie, in which they might not have been. And this we stile Antecedent Libertie, or Libertie of Election, which importes no mutabilitie in the divine Wil, but only a prioritie of Causalitie, which very wel accordes with the necessitie of the divine Wil. To conclude this Adjunct touching the Libertie of the divine Wil, Suarez, Metaph. Disp. 30. S. 16. pag. 134. grantes, That a necessitie of Immutabilitie agrees to the Divine Wil, and no way prejudiceth the perfection of its Libertie.

9. Prop. Gods Wil is most efficacious and irresistible. Gods Wil irre­sistible. This Ad­junct of the divine Wil is expressely laid down in sacred Philoso­phie. So Esa. 46.10. My counsel shal stand, Esa. 46.10. and I wil do al my pleasure. The like we find in Homer, Iliad. [...], The counsel of Jupiter was fulfilled. Thus also, Rom. 9.19. Who hath resisted his Wil? By which the Apostle excludes al man­ner of resistence, not only actual, but also possible. That the divine Wil is most efficacious and irresistible may be demonstra­ted (1) from Gods prime universal Causalitie: God, according to Plato, is [...], the most soverain Cause; and [...], the Cause of al second Causes; which are but [...], ministerial instrumental Causes of God, [...], who gives essence to althings. Now the first universal Cause of althings cannot be resisted by any second particular cause. For herein lies the diffe­rence [Page 354]between the first universal cause and second causes: these may fail of their effect by reason of some other cause impeding; but the first universal cause can never fail of his effect; because he contains under his Jurisdiction and Soverain Power al other causes: he that gives Being and Power to althings can be resisted by nothing. Now how is God the first universal cause of al­things? Is it not by his Divine Wil? We may not conceive any other causal executive Power in God but his Divine Wil: he ef­fectes and operates immediately by his wil, without any distinct executive power, as we shal prove anon. (2) From the Omni­potence of the Divine wil. The Psalmist informes us, Psal. 115.3.Psal. 115.3. and 135.5, 6. That God doth whatsoever he pleaseth. So Psal. 135.5, 6. Gods So­verain wil backt with Omnipotence is invincible. The Psalmist shews the transcendent universalitie and efficace of the Divine wil above the human: men wil what they can do, but God can do what he wil; because his wil is omnipotent. If Gods wil were not Omnipotent, he could not do whatever is possible: for he workes althings by his wil: neither is he on any other account stiled in the Creed, Omnipotent or Almighty; but because he can do what he wil. The Divine Omnipotent wil alwaies obtains its effect, because its volition is its operation: its fiat, is its factum esse, its word, its deed. Thence that of Augustin: Gods wil is most certain, because most potent. Of which see more fully Arimi­nensis, Sent. 1. Dist. 46, 47. and Bradwardine, l. 2. c. 29. ‘I wil not, saith he, have him for my God, who is not Omnipotent in Acting; who has not a most Omnipotent Dominion over my infirme wil; who cannot in the most Omnipotent manner make me to wil and do, what he wils; who hath not a wil universally efficacious, infrustrable, indefectible, and necessary in causing; yea, whose wil is not to me necessitie.’ (3) From the Beatitude of God. Aristotle, as reason, assures us, that al men do what they wil, if they can; because herein their Beatitude seems to consist. So Rhet. l. 2. c. 20. p. 138. [...], &c. And if he could, and would, he hath also done it: for al, when they can and wil, act; for there is no impediment. Beatitude is the supreme end of al rational Appetition: therefore what men desire, they do, if they can, as Aristotle subnectes. Hence the Divine wil, if it could not do what it would, it should not be blessed; because Beatitude is the ultimate terme of al volition. So Bradwardine, l. 2. c. 27. [Page 355] ‘Yea, I constantly and freely avouch, I wil not have him for my God, whose most blessed wil poor, miserable, sinful I can, when I please, pul down from the Throne of his Dignitie, and subju­gate, &c.’ (4) From the Infinitude of God. An Infinite Agent can neither be hindred from doing what he would, nor forced to do what he would not: a Passive Subject cannot resist an Active Principe or Agent, unless it has at least equal power: How then is it possible, that a poor, infirme, impotent Creature should re­sist the Divine Wil? Thus Bradwardine, l. 1. c. 10. ‘Now it re­mains to shew, that the Divine Wil is universally efficacious, in­superable, and necessary in causing; being not to be hindred or frustrated any manner of way. For who knows not, that it al­together follows, if God can do any thing, and wil do it, he doth it, &c.’ But of this more when we come to the Causalitie of God, C 7. §. 4.

Having explicated the Adjuncts of the Divine Wil,Gods Wil 1. De­cernent or pre­ceptive. we now descend to treat briefly of its Distinctions: and to omit that spurious Jesuitic distribution of the Divine Wil into Antecedent and Consequent, which is most injurious and repugnant to the perfe­ction of the Divine Wil, as has been demonstrated, we may di­stribute the Wil of God in regard of its object and our apprehen­sions, 1. into Decernent or Decretive, and Legislative or Prece­ptive. Gods Decernent or Decretive Wil is usually termed in the Scholes his Voluntas Beneplaciti: and his Legislative Preceptive Wil, Voluntas Signi. This distribution has its foundation in Sacred Philosophie: for God is oft said in Scripture to wil things that are never offected, as the salvation of Reprobates, or the like, which cannot be understood of his decernent decretive Wil, but may very wel, of his preceptive Wil. But to clear up this distin­ction, we are to consider, (1) That Gods decernent or decretive Wil is univocally and properly said to be his Wil; but his voluntas signi or preceptive Wil is only equivocally, or analogically, and figu­ratively such. Gods decretive Wil is the Divine essence decreeing althings, and so properly and univocally stiled his Wil; but his preceptive Wil is only analogically or figuratively termed his Wil, [1] Metaphorically, as Princes signifie their interne wil, by their externe commands, which are thence termed their Wil. [2] Me­tonymically, as Gods Precepts are effects or adjuncts which partly revele his interne wil and pleasure. Yet they are not in a strict proper univocal sense the wil of God, as Sanderson, De Obligat. [Page 356]Conscient. p. 132. Davenant against Hoard, p. 392. and Ruiz prove. Hence (2) Gods Decretive and Preceptive Wil are di­sparate or diverse, but not opposite: The things decreed by God and the things commanded by him may oppose each other, but the wil decreeing, and the wil commanding do not oppose each other; because they are not ad idem: the Decretive Wil of God is as it were his Law, or the measure of his operation and per­mission; but the preceptive Wil of God is our Law, or the Rule of our operation and offices. The Decree of God determines what he wil do, or not do; the Precept what we ought to do or not to do. Gods Decernent Wil or good pleasure is the sole Rule and Reason of al his actings towards the Creature; but his Reveled Wil is the sole Rule, Reason, and Measure of al the Creatures actings towards him. (3) The Decretive Wil of God is ever Absolute, efficacious, and particular; but the preceptive wil of God is sometimes absolute, sometimes conditionate; sometimes uni­versal, sometimes particular; sometimes efficacious and some­times not. (4) Gods decretive wil is interne and immanent, cal­led in Scripture his [...] good pleasure, which is the measure of his own Affects, and Effects: But Gods preceptive wil is externe, and therefore not the measure of Gods Affects or Effects, but only of our Dutie.

2.Gods secret and reveled Wil. Deut. 29.29. Hence follows another distinction of the Divine Wil into Secret and Reveled; which is much the same with the precedent, mentioned, Deut. 29.29. The secret things belong unto the Lord our God, but things which are reveled, unto us. i. e. Gods secret Wil is the measure of his operation, but his reveled wil of ours. So Prov. 25.2. It's the Glorie of God to concele a thing. Gods wil is stiled secret (1) as the things he wils are unknown to us: (2) as the causes and reasons of his Wil cannot be penetrated by us: (3) as it is as it were the Law, Rule, or measure of his Divine operations. Gods reveled wil is so termed; because it is his plea­sure reveled either in his Word, or Workes: every act of Gods Providence shews somewhat of his Wil, as wel as his Word. (1) Gods Wil reveled in his Word is either promissive or prece­ptive: Reveled promisses are the measure of Gods Benefices to­wards us: Reveled precepts are the measure of our Offices or Duties towards God. (2) Gods reveled providential Wil is ei­ther directive or afflictive. There is a conformitie, which the ra­tional Creature owes to each of these reveled wils of God: To [Page 357]the wil of God reveled in his word there is an active conformitie or obedience due; to the promissive reveled wil there is an obe­dience of faith due, to the preceptive an obedience of love and subjection. To the providential wil of God both directive and afflictive there is a passive obedience of Submission, Resignation and Dependence due. Lastly, this reveled wil of God is never oppo­site to, albeit it be oft diverse from, his secret wil; and the rea­son is, because they are not about the same object: Gods secret wil regards the events of things, his reveled wil the duty of man, either active or passive.

3. Aquinas and others distinguish Gods Wil into Complacential, Gods Wil Com­placential, Pro­vidential and Beneplacite. Providential, and Beneplacite. (1) Gods Complacential Wil, is his simple complacence in al the good Actions, Habits, and Events of men; yea it extendes not only to moral, but to natural goods, as Gen. 1.31. There is a perpetual necessary volition in God, which taketh pleasure in al good, whether create or increate. Such is the infinite Bonitie and Puritie of the Divine Nature, as that it cannot but take infinite complacence in al good. This they cal Gods Love of simple complacence, of which see Ruiz, de Volunt. Dei Disp. 6. §. 2. p. 38. and Disp. 19. p. 214. (2) Gods Providential Wil is that, whereby he is said to wil and intend an end, when he in his providence, either graciose or commun, affords such means which have an aptitude to produce it. As where God sends his Gospel, he may be said really to intend the salvation of those to whom it is sent, albeit they are not al saved; because he vouch­safeth them those means which have a real aptitude to produce the same, were they but really embraced and improved. In this regard Davenant and others affirme, that Christs death is, [...], an universal remedie applicable to al, and that God, by his Voluntas Providentiae (as Aquinas stiles it) intended it as such. This intention or wil of God is measured by the nature of the means, and therefore reducible to Gods Legislative Wil, which gives constitution and measure to al the means of mans salvation. (3) There is Gods Beneplacite or Decretive Wil, which is only strictly and properly stiled the wil of God, as before: So Ruiz de Volunt. Dei, Disp. 18. §. 4. p. 185.

§. 4. Next to the Wil of God we are to treat of his Power, Gods Power. wch as executive and effective has one and the same formal Idea with his Wil, as will appear by what follows. The Divine Power is in Sacred Philosophie illustrated by several names of God, specially by [Page 358] [...] el, and its derivatives, [...] & [...], which signi­fie most potent and soverain Lord. Therefore Moses being about to treat of Gods infinite Power in creating althings, stiles him Gen. 1.1. [...]. which Nachmanni makes to be derived from [...] el hem, their strength, noting the Creatures: and Abar­benel makes this name to be given to God, as the omnipotent Ef­fector and Productor of althings, as before. [...], from [...], or [...], properly signifies the potent, powerful God, who contains in himself infinite force, energie and power. Whence God is sti­led, Gen. 14.20. [...] the most high potent. And Esa. 9.5. [...], el gibbor, the most mighty potent. And Dan. 14.20. [...], the most potent of al potents. In the N.T. God is stiled [...], omnipotent, 2 Cor. 6.18. Rev. 1.8. & 4.8. & [...], the sole potentate, 1 Tim. 6.15. which termes signifie both his Le­gal Power and Autoritie, as also his energetic efficacious power. The Power of God is elsewhere frequently inculcated in Scripture: as Job 26.14.Job 26.14. But the thunder of his power who can understand? Gods power is compared to Thunder, because nothing more ter­rible and potent in this inferior World. Psal. 65.6. Which by his strength setteth fast the mountains being girded with power. So Psal. 77.14. Thou art God that doest wonders, thou hast declared thy strength among the people. And Psal. 93.1. The Lord is clothed with strength, wherewith he hath girded himself: the world also is established, that it cannot be moved. And Psal. 62.11. Twice have I heard this, that power belongeth unto God. Twice: i. e. frequently. That Gods power doth infinitely transcend al create power may be deduced from that of Plato, Leg. 5. [...] whereby he proves, that Gods power is above al create force.

But to discourse more distinctly of the Power of God,Gods Power his Essence. we must remember, that God being a pure Act, active Power cannot in a proper strict notion be ascribed to God, as it denotes a first Act, or Principe of operation, distinct from the second Act, or Operation it self; but only as it respectes the Creature, which is properly said to receive the impressions and influences of Gods Power. God is said to have an active Power, in regard of the effects produced by him, as Suarez, Metaph. Disput. 30. Sect. 17. pag. 144. Thus Aquinas, Part. 1. Quaest. 25. ‘Seing God is most in act, and sim­ply perfect, it's most agreable to him, that he be the Principe of Acts, and active Power, but not passive.’ And more fully, con­tra [Page 359]Gent. l. 2. c. 10. he informes us, ‘That power in God is not as a Principe of Action, but only as a Principe of Fact. And be­cause al power importes respect to another as a Principe, it is manifest, that al power is affirmed of God with respect to Facts or things made, according to truth; and with respect to Action, only according to our manner of understanding; as our Intellect doth, by diverse conceptions, consider both, namely the Divine Power, and its action. Whence if any actions agree to God, which passe not into some fact or effect, but remain in the A­gent; there can no power be affirmed as to such actions; more than according to our manner of understanding, not in truth. Such as are the actions of Understanding and Willing, which implie no power in God. The Power therefore of God, to speak properly, respectes not such actions, but only effects.’ And the reason is evident; because power in God is the same with his Essence, and therefore a pure Act, not distinct from the second Act, but only from the Effect.

Albeit the Power of God be in it self one and the same,Gods absolute Power. yet for our more distinct conception of it we may distinguish it into ab­solute, and ordinate or actual. (1) Gods absolute Power is that whereby he is considered as simply potent to effect althings pos­sible, although they never shal be: as Mat. 3.9. & 26.53. Mar. 10.27. Ephes. 3.20. This has one and the same idea with the Sufficience and Essence of God; and is looked on by us as antece­dent to the Science of Vision and Wil of God: whence it is sti­led by Bradwardine Gods precedent Power. Gods ordinate Power the same with his Wil. (2) The ordinate and actual Power of God, is that whereby God is said to execute what he wils or decrees: which some terme Gods Volutive Power, partly because it is executive of Gods wil, but principally, be­cause it has the same formal idea with the Divine Wil. For that the executive Power of God admits not the least formal difference from his Divine efficacious Wil, is an Hypothesis which both sacred Phi­losophie and the greatest Scholastic Wits greatly persuade us. As for sacred Philosophie it assures us, that Gods executive Power is the same with his effective Wil. So Gen. 1.3,Gen. 1.3. &c. Moses makes Gods fiat, or Wil the prolific Principe of al productions. Thence Psal. 33.9. Gods Word or Wil is said to give existence to althings. So Psal. 115.3.Psal. 115.3. He hath done whatsoever he pleased [...] whatsoever he willed. The like Psal. 135.6.Psal. 135.6. The Lord doth [...], whatsoever he pleaseth, or willeth. Rom. 9.19.Rom. 9.19. Who [Page 360]hath resisted his wil? which denotes the wil of God to be irresi­stible, omnipotent, and the same with his executive Power. And more particularly,Rev. 4.11. Rev. 4.11. [...], And by thy wil they are, and were created. Our Version renders [...] for, which is true, but not primarily intended here: yea, therefore althings are For Gods pleasure, because By it, as the first effective executive Principe. By which it's evident, that Gods executive Power is the same with his actual wil; he actu­ally doth what he wils: and his mere Wil is the effective Prin­cipe of his doing. Hence we find, that those who came to our Lord for any effect of his power, drew an argument from his wil to his power,Mat. 8.2. as Mat. 8.2. Lord, if thou wilt thou canst make me clean: as elsewhere: whereby not only the Deitie of Christ is acknowle­ged, but also the Identitie of his power with his wil; that his power is as extensive as his wil: or, that his wil is omnipotent. This Hypo­thesis, touching the Identitie of Gods executive Power with his Wil, has been avouched and defended by the most acute Scholastic Theo­logues. Thus Bradwardine, de Caus. Dei, l. 1. c. 10. pag. 197. where he proves, That Gods Wil is of it self operative; neither may we place in God any other executive power. And his reasons are cogent. For (1) if there were any thing more required, to the production of an effect, than the Divine Wil, it would thence follow, that the Di­vine Wil is not of it self sufficient to act, contrary to the fore­cited Textes. (2) It's evident, that the Wil of God is in some manner operative of it self, even as our wils are in moving our own bodies. And if the Divine Wil be in one degree operative, why not in every degree? Doth it need any executive virtue for the supplie of its deficience? Is it not omnipotent? (3) If any such executive power be placed in God, it must naturally me­diate between the Divine Wil and effect: but this cannot be, because the effect necessarily follows upon the Divine Volition. The same Hypothesis is defended by Alvarez, de Auxil. l. 2. p. 129. conclus. 1. ‘We may not place in God, besides his Intellect and Wil, any third executive power eminently or formally distinct for the production of things.’ But of this more in Gods Effici­ence, Sect. 4. §. 3. Prop. 2. & §. 5. Prop. 4.

The object of Gods Power is every thing possible: The object of Gods Power e­very thing possi­ble. For every power must have some object adequate thereto: and by how much the higher and more universal the power is, by so much the more universal is the object: and is not the active power of God [Page 361]the first Cause most supreme and universal? Must it not then comprehend under its object al possible Entitie? And the more fully to understand this, we are to understand, that a thing may be said to be possible two ways: (1) Positively: and so that is possible, which may be produced by a power. Things possible are not said in this sense to be the object of Gods power: for then the same thing would be explicated by it self: for to say the power of God is extended to althings positively possible, is the same as if we should say, it is extended to al such things as are by it denominated possible. Wherefore (2) a thing may be said to be possible negatively, in a way of non-repugnance, as it implies not any repugnance of existing: and so althings are possible which implie not a contradiction. And in this sense things possible are said to be the object of Gods infinite Power;What things are impossible. which extendes it self to whatever implies not a contradiction or repugnance of existing. For, in as much as nothing is more repugnant to Ens than non Ens, Ens and non Ens being contradictories, it thence follows, that whatever involves a contradiction cannot come within the comprehension of Ens possible, possible Being, but must be simply and of it self impossible. God cannot verifie contra­dictions; because they have not a passive power or possibilitie of being verified: for the affirming of the one is the denying of the other: they cannot be both true; because they should not be contradictions, if the truth of the one did not necessarily make the other false. That what involves a contradiction comes not within the latitude of the object of Gods power, is not from any defect of power in God; but because the thing has not in it self any possibilitie of existing, or of being reduced into act: for no power can be denominated such in relation to a terme or effect, which implies an impossibilitie of existing; as what is contra­dictorie doth. Al power extendes it self to that which can be actuated thereby: as al sensitive power is conversant about sen­sible objects, so far as they may be actuated thereby: so the power of God is conversant about al possible things, so far as they are capable of being actuated thereby. Whence it appears, that the impossibilitie of contradictions ariseth from the incapa­citie of the mater, not from any defect in the power of God.

Now the impossibles which implie a repugnance of being done by God, are either such as regard God himself, or the Crea­ture, or both. 1. The Impossibles that regard God himself are either [Page 362] absolutely such, or only in some limited sense. (1) The Impossibles, which regard God himself absolutely, are al such as are simply re­pugnant to the Divine Essence. As God cannot deceive or be deceived: he cannot sin, or be the moral cause of sin: he cannot condemne or punish, (though he may afflict yea torment) the in­nocent, or justifie the wicked without a satisfaction. (2) The Impossibles that regard God in a limited sense, are such as implie a certain mode of acting, or a certain Hypothesis repugnant to the Divine Essence. [1] Such as implie a certain mode of acting; as God cannot exert the natural or vital acts of an animal bodie: he cannot eat, drinke, speak, &c. in that mode we do, &c. [2] The Impossibles under a certain Hypothesis repugnant to the Di­vine Essence, are such as these: not to do what he has decreed, or promised. 2. The Impossibles which regard the Creature, or the externe object of Gods power, are such as destroy the essence of the object. Thus God cannot make a Creature independent, or not to depend on himself, both as to Being and Operation. For dependence is essential to a Creature: and therefore to suppose a Creature not to depend on God as wel in Operation as Being, is to suppose a Creature not to be a Creature, as Suarez strongly demonstrates against the Hypothesis of Durandus, who denies Gods concurse to the material act of sin. Again, to suppose that God in the Eucharist should Transubstantiate or commute the Bread into the Bodie of Christ, and yet the Quantitie and visible Accidents of the Bread stil remain, implies a contradiction; be­cause Quantitie or Extension is essential to a bodie. Besides, this Popish Hypothesis of Transubstantiation implies other con­tradictions, in that it supposeth two bodies to be in the same place or space, and the same bodie of Christ to be in two places at once, &c. In like manner we say God cannot, according to the Lutheran Consubstantiation, make the bodie of Christ to be at the same time in the Heavens, and circumscribed thereby, and yet in and with, and under the Bread. 3. Things impossible both in re­gand of God and the Creature are such as are repugnant to the Es­sence of both. Thus God cannot, by his infinite Power, pro­duce an effect equal to himself, infinite in Essence: For by ma­king an effect infinite, he should make his own Essence finite: it is as essential to al products of God to be finite, as it is to God to be infinite, as Suarez, Metaph, Disput. 30. Sect. 17. pag. 147. That, notwithstanding al these impossibilities, arising from the [Page 363]incapacitie of the thing, the Power of God extendes universally to althings possible, see Suarez Metaph. Disput. 29.

Hence the Power of God is, in regard of its object and its ex­tent,Divine Power Omnipotence. Gen. 18.14. said to be, as really it is Omnipotence. This is frequently in­culcated in Sacred Philosophie, as Gen. 18.14. Is any thing im­possible for Jehovah? Heb. [...], Is any thing, or word [i. e. whatever can be spoken of, or whatever God has pro­mised] Impossible, or Marvellous for Jehovah: i. e. above or be­yond his power. It is spoken by the Angel, upon Sarah's unbe­lieving smile, and conceit that it was impossible for God to give her a Son, in her old age. Again, the manner of the speech be­ing in a way of Rhetoric Interrogation implies in it a most vehe­ment Logic Negation. We find the very same character of Gods Omnipotence given by the Angel to Marie, the Mother of our Lord, in relation to her miraculose conception,Luke 1.37. Luk. 1.37. For with God nothing shal be impossible. [...], which we translate thing, primarily notes a word; and so it answers exactly to [...], Gen. 18.14. which signifies primarily Word, and then Thing, specially as applied to God; because al his Words are omnipotent and so equivalent to things. Mark 10.27. With God althings are possible. Hence God is stiled in Scripture [...], Omnipotent, he being indeed [...], as elsewhere. The Omnipotence of God was generally recognised by the most sage Pagans. So Homer, [...], This to thee O God is but a smal thing, albeit to me it be great. i. e. Thy omnipotence can with the greatest facilitie atchieve it. So in his Il. speaking of God, he saith— [...], his power is the great­est, or omnipotent. This omnipotence of God, or the extension of his Divine Power to althings possible, may be thus demonstra­ted: (1) Every perfect Virtue doth extend it self to those things, unto which its proper effect can extend it self: but now the ef­fect of Gods Power extends it self to whatever is possible: there­fore the Power of God must be as extensive. (2) Every Passive Power has some Active Power adequate and commensurate there­to: for every Power is for its act; as the mater is for the forme, according to the Aristoteleans. Whatever therefore is in the pas­sive or obediential power of a create Being, al that God can by his active power actuate, and accomplish. (3) The mode of Vir­tue or Power in every Agent, is according to the perfection of its nature or essence: But now Gods essence being the most per­fect [Page 364]pure Act containing in it al perfection, hence it necessarily follows, that his active virtue must extend it self to althings ca­pable of any perfection, i. e. which implie not a contradiction or repugnance of existing. See Aquinas, Contra Gent. l. 2. c. 22.

Hence it follows,Gods Power in­finite. that Gods Power is Infinite. (1) The magni­tude of power answers in proportion to the magnitude of essence: whence, where there are no termes of essence, there can be no termes of power. Essence and Power in God are the same: where­fore his Essence being infinite, his Power also must be so. Crea tures are limited in their Essence, and therefore in their Power: but the great God having no termes to his Essence can admit none as to his power. What can be too difficult for the Divine Power, which brought al things out of nothing? When the Sad­ducees douted of the Resurrection, our Lord resolves their Error into an ignorance of the Power of God,Mat. 22.29. Mat. 22.29. intimating thereby, that the Power of God was Infinite, and could extend it self to al effects. Thus Aquinas, Part. 1. Q. 25. a. 2. ‘It's ne­cessary that the Active Power of God be Insinite: for by how much the more perfect the forme of any Agent is, by so much the greater is his power in acting: whence the Divine Essence (whereby God acts) being Infinite, his Power also must be In­finite. The like he addes, Contra Gent. l. 1. c. 43. Every thing acts according to its forme, which is its Essence, or a part there­of.’ Whence Gods Essence being Infinite, his Power also is such. (2) The Infinitude of Gods Power may be demonstrated from the manner of his working in creating things: where the passive Power is infinitely low, the active Power must be infinitely high: but now in Creation the passive Power is in a laxe sense infinite­ly low, in that it is purely nothing; thence Gods active Power must be infinitely high. (3) It must, according to Natural Rea­son, be granted, that there is in the Universitie of Beings a power, than which nothing can be conceived greater: and to whom doth this Prerogative belong but to God? And if we can conceive no­thing greater than God, must we not also conceive him to be In­finite in Power? for may we not conceive something greater than al finite Power? (4) Reason also instructes us, that there are somethings simply possible, which cannot be produced, but by a power intensively insinite, &c. That Gods Power is simply infinite, see Suarez, Metaph. Disp. 30. Sect. 17. p. 144. Greg. Ari­minens. Sent. l. 1. Distinct. 42. p. 152.

CHAP. VI. Of Gods Justice, Veracitie, and Sanctitie: also of the Trinitie.

Gods Justice, Absolute and Ordinate. How far Gods punitive Ju­stice is necessary. How far Gods Justice regards the Qualities of its object. Gods Veracitie explicated and demonstrated. Also his Sanctitie. Platonic Philosophemes of the Trinitie, with their Ʋse and Abuse in Theologie.

§. 1. THe next Attribute, that occurs to be discoursed os,The Justice of God. is the Justice of God; whereof we find great characters both in Sacred and Platonic Philosophie. As for Sacred Philoso­phie it sets forth the Justice of God in lively colors, Psal. 19.9. The Judgements of the Lord are true and righteous. Psal. 36.6. Thy righteousnesse is like the great mountains: Psal. 119.137. and Psal. 119.137. Righ­teous art thou O Lord, and upright are thy judgements. Here are two distinct particulars assigned to the Justice of God. (1) He is righteous, and (2) his judgements are upright. Men may be just, and lovers of Justice, and yet their Judgements not upright. But it is not so with God. The like Psal. 50.6. and 96.10. and 98.9. and 99.4. Thus also Esa. 28.17. Judgement also wil I lay to the line, and righteousnesse to the plummet. Esa. 28.17. A Metaphor taken from the practice of Masons or Carpenters, who, when they wil have a thing done exactly, are wont to do it by line and level, as Amos 7.8. so accurate and exquisite are the Judgements of God.Rom. 2.2, 11. So Rom. 2.2. But we are sure that the judgement of God is according to truth. [...]. Reason it self dictates so much to us: were he not just, he were not God. [...], according to truth, or justice: for so [...] here importes: and it is opposed to the Roman Judge­ments, which were at this time most unjust. And he addes the reason, v. 11. for there is no respect of persons with God. [...] signifies the face; from [...] aph the face, or from [...]: Thence [...] signifies, (1) That which, [...], is admoved to, or bound about the face: a Larve, Person, or Masque. For persona, q. [...], from [...] and [...], according to its primary notion sig­nifies a visard, or one that wears it. (2) The face, that part [...], [Page 366] which was covered, [...], with the larve or visard. Thence, (3) The whole man, or person, considered essentially and substantially. (4) Also the externe Figure, Forme, Qualitie, or Dis­position of a person considered accidentally. Whence [...], to accept the person, is to accept or regard any externe Qualities, Relations, Dispositions, or Conditions of the person, which ought not to come under consideration in Judgement.Mat. 20.21. So Mat. 20 21. [...] answers to the Hebr. [...], lifting up the face: and [...], to lift up the face is the same with [...] to accept the face or person. For in those times, the ancient gesture of salutation was by casting the face down on the earth: and he that was saluted lifted up the face of him that saluted; as David Saul. Which custome yet continues in those Oriental parts. And from this custome of Salutation [...] was traduced to signifie the acceptation of the person, contrary to the merits of the cause or thing. For to respect a person is when that in judgement is re­spected, which ought not to come into judgement. When God is said, not to respect persons, the notion Person doth not denote a man, but the condition of a man, which ought not to be regard­ed. Acceptation of persons is only when favor or affection, or the like extrinsec considerations prevail, contrary to Equitie: in which regard God cannot be said to accept persons, because he is under no obligation or Laws of Justice, more than what his own Free-wil has brought him under.

Plato discourseth accurately of Gods Justice, Leg. 10. pag. 904. There being an Objection raised by a juvenile Wit, That albeit God regards Human Affairs, yet it were an easie matter for wicked men, by gifts and favors, to gain his favor. To which Plato thus replies: [...], &c. But neither thou, nor cory other may be thought ever so far to prevail with God by prayers, that he should exemt himself from Divine Judgement, or decline the Tribunal of God: for he hath firmely determined, that no mortal shal escape it. For thou art never neglected by this Judgement; no, albeit thou wert so smal as to creep into the profunditie of the earth: nor yet if thou wert so sublime, as being elevated with wings to flie into the Heavens: but thou shalt suffer deserved punishment, either here or in Hel. Then he addes, p. 906. This Oration is usurped by him, who affirmes, that God can be easily reconciled to unjust men, as if he should cousent to divide [Page 367]the spoil with sinners, even then when they sin: just as if the Wolves should give a smal portion of their prey to the dogs; and these being pa­cified with their gifts, should give the Wolves leave to devour the sheep. Is not this the import of their Oration, who conceive God to be easily reconciled to wicked men? Then he concludes, pag. 907. [...]; Is not God of al keepers the greatest, and emploied in the greatest affairs? Can we then imagine, that he, who keeps the best things, and doth in­finitely excel in the Art and facultie of keeping, is worse than Dogs or poor Mortals, who yet cannot be bribed by rewards from wicked men, given with an il intent, to do what is unjust? Plato here compares God to a Sheepherds Dog, which cannot be bribed by the Wolves to deliver up the Sheep for a prey: much less, saith he, can God be bribed to do unjustly. So Leg. 4.716. [...], Justice is the avenger of those that come short of the Divine Law.

The more fully to explicate the Justice of God,Gods Absolute Justice we must di­stinguish between his Absolute Justice, and that which is Ordi­nate. 1. Gods Absolute Justice is founded on the infinite perfe­ction of his Essence, and has one and the same Idea with his So­verain Dominion over his Creature. For so great is the Maje­stie of God, and so Absolute his Dominion, as that he is obno­xious to no Laws, Obligations, or Ties from his Creature: this Absolute Justice or Dominion regards not any qualities or condi­tions of its object; but God can by virtue hereof inflict the highest torments on his innocent Creature, and exempt from punishment the most nocent. as to afflicting the Innocent. (1) By this Absolute Justice and Dominion God can inflict the greatest torments, even of Hel it self, on the most in­nocent Creature? For every Creature as such is subordinate to God both in suffering, as wel as doing what he pleaseth, as Suarez in 1. 2ae. Tract. 5. Disp. 7. p. 418. ‘We must denie, saith he, that God, as Supreme Lord, cannot inflict on an innocent man al that Evil that is in the torments of Hel.’ Thus in his Meta­phys. Disput. 31. Sect. 14. ‘God hath a ful Dominion over his Creature, to use it as it pleaseth him, for any use that involves not a contradiction. For that Dominion is not in al regards perfect, which includes not a Power to dispose of its object un­to every possible use.’ Again, ‘God cannot make a Create Being, whereof he has not the ful and perfect Dominion. To this ful and absolute Dominion in God there corresponds a ful [Page 368]and absolute subjection in the Creature: for these two are cor­relatives.’ Hence, there is no Justice properly so termed in re­spect of the Creatures, whereby God stands obliged to them, antecedent to the constitution of his own Wil. Nothing more unjust than to denie unto God an absolute Dominion to dispose of the Creature made by him as it pleaseth him. And that God did de facto inflict the highest torments on an innocent pure spot­lesse Creature, even the human Nature of his own Son is most evident. They who denie Gods absolute Dominion over the Creatures, denie him to be their Creator. Must we not allow God, who made althings, a power to order al to the ends he made them for? Doth not God give to every Creature what shape he pleaseth? and may he not then appoint them to what end he please? Is it not an end sufficient for the Being of a Creature to be the objective glorie of any Divine Attribute? And therefore if God should make an innocent Creature to destroy it, thereby to illustrate the Glorie of his Power, who can say he is unjust? The greatest notions that our minds can frame are too narrow to expresse the absolute Dominion of God over his Creature.

(2) God, How far Gods punitive Justice is necessary. by reason of his absolute Justice and Dominion, could, if it had-seemed good to him, have freely pardoned sinners without satis­faction. And here I find my self involved in that grand Que­stion, Whether the vindictive or punitive Justice of God, as to its egresses, be necessary? I am not ignorant that great and holy Di­vines are divided in their thoughts and determinations hereof: Some strongly defending the Affirmative; others the Negative. I may not be so far mine own flaterer, as to presume my self to be capable of reconciling such extremes, yet may I not humbly offer somewhat tending thereto? And first we must distinguish the termes, and then we shal with more facilitie determine the questi­on so as to include the sense of both extremes. We must distin­guish, (1) between the merit of punishment, and the actual adjudging sinners unto punishment. (2) Between the obligation on God to punish, and the obligation on the sinner to receive punishment. (3) Between Natural Necessitie and Moral. (4) Between natural Congruitie and natural Necessitie. (5) Between Gods absolute Justice or Dominion, and his ordinate Justice. These distinctions premissed, we offer these following Propositions for the determining the question and reconciling the extremes. (1) Prop. Al sin necessarily me­rits punishment, albeit actual punition be not an effect absolutely and [Page 369]physically necessary for the vindication of Divine Justice. Al sin has guilt necessarily appendent thereto: and al guilt necessarily im­plies a merit of punishment: for guilt is but a middle between sin and punishment; it necessarily follows sin, and bindes over the sinner, or makes him obnoxious unto punishment: yet actual pu­nition is not absolutely necessary for the vindication of Divine Justice. (2) Prop. There is a necessary debt or obligation on the sinners part to receive punishment, albeit there be not a debt or ob­ligation absolutely and physically necessary on Gods part to punish the sinner. Guilt is not a physic but moral Accident; or mode, or debt improperly so termed, whereby the offender is bound over to suffer such punishment, as the merit of the sin requires: whence on Gods part it implies a certain moral right or power of pu­nishing: not that God is bound by a necessitie of nature to pu­nish, although the sinner be bound by a necessary obligation of his nature to receive and suffer punishment. Hence, (3) God has a natural right to punish sin, yet he doth not punish it from a necessitie of nature, but freely. God most justly punisheth sin, yet he would not be unjust, if we consider his absolute Justice, if he did not punish it. If Gods punishing sin be from a necessitie of nature, and not from the free constitution of his Wil, he must pu­nish sin as necessarily, as he loves himself: and then it wil fol­low, that God cannot relaxate his penal Laws, as to the time, measure, and manner of punishing: yea he cannot accept of the satisfaction of a Mediator: for that is a degree of relaxation. It's true, God necessarily loves his own Glorie which is darke­ned by sin: but yet it is not Gods essential Glorie, but only his manifestative Glorie which is hurt by sin, as Elihu, Job 39.6. Hence Gods punishing sin is not from a necessitie of nature, such as that whereby the fire burnes, or God loves himself: For in al the Acts of God ad extra there is not only a concomitant but also antecedent Libertie, or Libertie of Election, which supposeth some possibilitie of rejection, at least according to the prioritie of rea­son or nature, as before, Chap. 5. §. 3.8. Prop. Whence Gods punishing sin being an act ad extra dependent on the free con­stitution of his Wil, it cannot be from a necessitie of nature. (4) Albeit, God be not under a natural necessitie of punishing sin, yet he is under a moral necessitie to punish the same. By moral necessitie I un­derstand that moral obligation he is under for the vindication of his Justice as Rector of the World. This some cal a natural con­gruence [Page 370]or condecence, which obligeth God to vindicate his own Justice, and declare his infinite displeasure against sin, by punish­ing of it. (5) Lastly, Albeit God might, by his absolute Dominion, considered antecedently to his Wil, let sin passe unpunished, yet by his ordinate Justice, he necessarily punisheth the same. In the considera­tion of Gods moral efficience on his Creature, we are not to con­sider what God can by his absolute Justice or Dominion do, but what by his ordinate Justice and moral Constitution he can do. And in this regard it is most true, that God is under a necessitie of pu­nishing sin, without a satisfaction: and he were inevitably unjust, if he should not punish it. And thus, as I humbly conceive, both opinions, though seemingly opposite, may be easily reconciled. And indeed we find this very Controversie on foot many hundred years since. For Augustin held, That God could save sinners with­out a satisfaction: and Anselme held, he could not. And Bradwar­dine, l. 2. c. 52. pag. 841. undertakes my taske, to reconcile both, by the distinction of Gods absolute Power, and his ordinate Power, as Rector of the World. In the former sense he can, but in the later he cannot save sinners but by Christ. Hence,

2. We passe on to Gods ordinate Justice, Gods ordinate Justice from his Wil. which has a necessary relation to some qualitie in its object, in this or that manner affe­cted or constituted; which qualitie being supposed, its egresse to or execution on its object is necessary, not by any physic necessitie of nature, but by a moral necessitie or natural congruitie, subse­quent to the free constitution of the Divine Wil, in order to the manifestation of the Divine Glorie. And in this sense the Ju­stice of God, in sacred Philosophie, is usually taken, namely for that Attribute whereby God executes the Decrees and Consti­tutions of his own soverain Wil and Word, for the manifestation of his own Glorie. So that this ordinate Justice of God implies several particular Ideas, which we shal endeavor to explicate in the following Propositions.

1. Prop. Gods ordinate Justice ariseth from the free Constitution and Determination of his own Wil. Antecedently to the Wil of God nothing is so far just, that it ought to be, but only that it may be justly and conveniently done, if God wil it: there is no Law of Justice in the actions of God, but what his own Wil pre­scribeth: the Wil of God is not circumscribed by his Justice, but his Justice by his Wil: for nothing is just in Divine Actions, but what he wils, yea because he wils it. Thus Carthusianus, in [Page 371]4. Dist. 46. Quaest. 1. The whole order of Justice is originally reduced to the Divine Wil: whatever God wils is just, neither is his Wil pro­perly restrained by Justice. So Scotus, l. 4. Dist. 46. Quaest. 1. That is always just, which is actually willed by the Divine Wil; and because it is actually willed by the Divine Wil. The Rule of Justice, where­by men are to act, ties them up to one part of the contradiction, so that they are unjust if they act not so; but there is no such Rule of Justice to be affixed to God, farther than the free con­stitution of his own Wil has tied him up. Gods Wil reveled is a Rule of Justice to us his Creatures, but his absolute soverain Wil is that alone that regulates him in al his actions. There­fore learned Davenant saith, ‘That God cannot wil any thing but salvâ justitiâ, i. e. he can do nothing contra justitiam; yet he may wil and do many things praeter justitiam: i. e. he may freely decree and do many things, where salvâ justitiâ, he might as freely have decreed and done the contrary.’ So Lombard. l. 1. Dist. 43. God could have omitted what he doth, and have done what he omits, without injustice. Hence,

2. Prop. Gods ordinate Justice towards the Creature has one and the same Idea with his Veracitie or Fidelitie. Gods ordinate Justice the same with his Vera­citie. Psal. 119.123. Thence in sacred Phi­losophie the Righteousnesse of God is oft put for his Veracitie and Fidelitie in making good his word. So Psal. 119.123. For the word of thy righteousnesse: i. e. the word of thy promisse, which thy righteousnesse or fidelitie is obliged to make good. So Psal. 31.1. & 89.14. There is indeed in God no Justice properly so termed, in which respect he may be said to be obliged to his Creature: but that which we stile the Justice of God towards his Creature, is no other than his Fidelitie, which presupposeth some constitution of the Divine Wil: wherefore, abstracting such a constitution, God cannot be said to do any thing repugnant to his Justice. For what is Justice, according to its general Idea, but to give every one his own? And what has the Creature that it may claim as its own, but what it receives from the Divine Wil? Again, Justice is a Conformitie or Equalitie, according to the obli­gation or debt which every one fals under:Justitia Dei est agere secun­dum conde­centiam Boni­tatis aut Vera­citatis suae. Al­bert. p. 1. tract. 19. q. 77. and what obligation or debt can there befal God, with relation to his Creature, but what his own goodnesse and wil laies upon him? How can God be obliged to any, but by his own wil and word? What then is his Justice, but to act according to the condecence or congruitie of his own Veracitie or Bonitie, as the Schole-men determine? Hence in [Page 372]things where there is no expresse declaration of the Divine Wil, Covenant, or Promisse on God part, if he should pretermit that which he doth, or do that which he pretermits, if he should deal more severely, or more mercifully with any than he doth, there could be no injustice fastened on him. Hence,

3. Prop. There can be no [...],No acception of persons with God. or Acception of persons charged on God. This is expressely laid down, Rom. 2.11. of which before: And the reasons are most evident, (1) Because Acception of persons has place only in him, who is under an obligation to distribute justice, not according to his pleasure, but according to certain Qualities, Reasons, or Conditions inherent in or appendent to the persons, to whom the said justice is to be distributed. But now God is under no obligation, but what flows from his own soverain pleasure, to distribute rewards or punishments to any. (2) Acception of persons cannot have place in the distribution of good things merely gratuitous and free; but only in such as are of debt: But now Gods distributions of good things are merely gratuitous. Thus Aquinas: Acception of persons is only of a thing due; and therefore it cannot be ascribed to God. None can owe any thing to another, but by this, that he doth in some manner de­pend on, or hath received something from another: but God dependes on no one, neither doth he receive any thing from any other. Acception of persons has place only where, in the dispen­sation of things due, any favors one more than another, with re­spect to some circumstance of the person, contrary or beside the merits of the cause. Therefore, albeit God give, out of his mere liberalitie, inequally to persons equal, yet this is not Acception of persons; because there is nothing due. Hence,

4. Prop. There is an infinite distance between the Justice of God, The difference between the Ju­stice of God and Men. and of men. (1) Al human Justice ariseth from an obligation and debt; but Gods Justice from the mere free constitution of his Wil: Man wils things, because they are just; but things are there­fore just with God, because he wils them. (2) Many things that are injust with men, are just with God. The rule of Justice which tieth men to do justly, doth also render them injust, when they do otherwise: But now God, where he hath not brought himself under an obligation by his own free constitution and promisse, hath a libertie of acting or not acting, of doing this or the con­trary in the distribution of rewards, and gifts. If he should not do what he doth, or if he should do what he doth not, his Justice [Page 373]were the same. If God spoil the Egyptians to enrich his people, or if he enrich the Assyrians by the spoils of his people, he is just stil. Where God hath not obliged himself by his own Word, he has a libertie of doing one thing or the contrary without inju­stice. Yet,

5. Prop. So far as God hath obliged himself by the constitution of his own Wil and Word, Gods Justice re­gards the Qua­lities of its ob­ject. his ordinate Justice ever regardes the Consti­tution and Qualities of the object. Gods ordinate Justice being the same with his Veracitie and Fidelitie, it alwaies respects such Qualities and Conditions as its object, by reason of his own con­stitution, is invested with. For God, in the executions of his ordinate Justice, assumes the qualitie of a Judge: and a Judge cannot duely abstain from the administration of Justice: neither is Justice duely administred, unlesse the Qualities of the objects, and merits of the cause be fully inspected and considered. Gods ordinate Justice as Rector and Judge of the Al is chiefly exercised in the reduction of althings to that equalitie and order, which his Divine Wisdome and Wil has prescribed unto them. Hence these two things necessarily follow this Divine ordinate Justice: (1) It never exerts it self, but where those Qualities and Condi­tions, which it has prescribed its object, be found. As it never punisheth any but for sin; so it never rewards any but the God­ly, &c. (2) Whereever these Conditions or Qualities are found, it necessarily exerts it self. It cannot but punish sin where­ever it be; neither can it but reward holiness if sincere. There is a necessitie, not Physic but Moral attendes al its egresses; and that from the free Constitution of the Divine Wil.

§. 2. Next to the Justice of God we are to discourse of his Ve­racitie and Fidelitie, Gods Veracitie and Fidelitie. which is not really distinct from his Ordinate Justice. Thence we find the Justice of God frequently put for his Fidelitie. So Psal. 31.1. Deliver me in thy Righteousnesse, Psal. 31.1. i. e. ac­cording to thy Righteousnesse, whereby thou doest declare thy self just in making good thy promisses. Some make this distin­ction between Gods Veritie, Fidelitie, and Justice: Gods Veritie obligeth him to this, that he promise sincerely: his Fidelitie, that he keep his promisse: and his Justice, that he performe his pro­misse by giving the thing promissed. Touching the veracitie of God we find lively Illustrations and Notices both in Sacred and Platonic Philosophie. As for Sacred Philosophie, it is most ex­presse in the asserting Gods Veracitie.Gen. 22.16. So Gen. 22.16. By my self [Page 374]have I sworne, assuredly saith Jehovah. Assuredly saith: or, the faith­ful saying. [...] neum is peculiar to Gods Oracles, which are al faithful sayings, 1 Tim. 1.15. and 3.1. Of the same letters trans­posed comes also [...] Amen, which notes the faithfulnesse of God. Thus Esa. 25.1.Esa. 25.1. For thou hast done wonderful things, thy counsels of old are faithfulnesse and truth. [...] In faithfulnesse and firm­nesse. Gataker conceives the word here to note firme or firmnesse, rather than true or truth; because the word, in the singular no where else found, is used in the plural for pillars, 2 Kings 18.16. The Veracitie of God is farther explicated,1 Sam. 15.29. 1 Sam. 15.29. The Eternitie or strength of Israel wil not lie. [...] signifies both eter­nitie and strength, which are both great pillars of the Divine Ve­racitie. So Psal. 33.4.Psal. 33.4. The Word of the Lord is right, and al his workes are done in truth. [...] in truth, veracitie, or constance. So Psal. 18.20.Psal. 18.20. As for God, his way is perfect. This seems to be meant of the veracitie and constance of his promisses. Thence it follows: The Word of the Lord is tried. [...] examined, i. e. pure, sincere, like Silver wel refined, neither do they ever fail, as Psal. 12.6.Psal. 36.5. So Psal. 36.5. Thy faithfulnesse reacheth to the clouds: i. e. it is Immense and Infinite. The space between us and the Clouds is vast,Psal. 89.1, 8. and seemingly immense. Thus Psal. 89.1. I wil sing of the mercies of the Lord. By Mercies Kimhi and Ezra under­stand Gods free Constitution antecedent to his promisse. Whence it follows: With my mouth wil I make known thy faithfulnesse. Mer­cie makes the promisse, but Fidelitie is ingaged for the perform­ance of it. So v. 2, 3. and v. 8. O Lord God of Hosts, who is a strong God like unto thee? or, to thy faithfulnesse round about thee? He stiles God most potent, in regard of his Veracitie and Fidelitie in making good his promisses: and then he addes, that Gods faithfulnesse is round about him, which is a Poetic description, de­noting that God is alwaies and in every posture or regard most faithful. And he procedes, in the following Verses, lively to de­scribe the Fidelitie of God:v. 33, 34, 35. particularly v. 33. Nor suffer my faith­fulnesse to fail. [...] Neither wil I lie against my Truth, or in my Truth: i. e. I wil not violate my Veracitie, by not performing my promisse. So v. 34. My Covenant wil I not break. [...], I wil not profane my Covenant, or offer violence to it. Again, v. 35. Once have I sworne by my Holinesse, that I wil not lie unto David. [...] once, i. e. irrevocably, as Kint­hi and Ezra. [...], if I lie to David. The particle if, [Page 375]being used as a formule in swearing, doth greatly denie. For the ancient Patriarchs were wont, under this formule, by a kind of Aposiopesis, silently to couch an Imprecation of evil on the head of him that swore, if he did violate his faith. The great God assumes this formule of swearing from human custome, thereby to declare the firmitude of his Veracitie and Fidelitie in per­forming his oath. Al this is lively explicated, Hebr. 6.17, 18.Heb. 6.17, 18. God being willing more abundantly to shew to the heirs of promisse, the immutabilitie of his counsel, engaged his fidelitie by an oath: That by two immutable things, in which it was impossible for God to lie, or to deceive: for so Grotius conceives [...] ought to be rendred, which signifies an event that frustrates expectation, as Lev. 6.2. Jos. 24.27. Esa. 58.2. Hos. 1.2. Hab. 3.17. Gods Providences ost seem to crosse his Promisses, and so to frustrate our expecta­tions, but really there is not the least mutabilitie on Gods part: he cannot lie or deceive, being bound by two immutable things, his Word and Oath, which give abundant assurance of his Fi­delitie.

Plato also gives very great and illustrious notices of the Vera­citie of God, and those not a little consorme to Sacred Philoso­phie. Thus Repub. 2. p. 382. [...]; Doest thou not know, that both God and men do truely hate a lie? And then he addes the Rea­son: [...], That there is no mortal who would in his soul either deceive, or be deceived, or be ignorant, or be involved in the darknesse of a lie, as to Supreme Beings. Thence he subjoins: [...], Truely a lie should be hated, not only by God, but also by men. Then he addes: shal we imagine, [...]; that a lie is utile to God? What, therefore because he understandes not ancient things, &c.? Whence he concludes: [...], &c. Where­fore God is both simple and faithful, both in work and word: neither is he himself changed, neither doth he deceive others, neither by phan­tastic delusions, neither by words, neither by signes, neither by visions, neither by dreams. Plato here enumerates the several waies, whereby God reveles himself, in each of which his Veracitie is most illustrious. Whence p. 383. he makes this Law for the [Page 376]right establishment of Religion, That men speak and believe touch­ing God, that he is no Deceiver, or Seducer of others, either by Words, or otherwise.

But to discourse more Philosophically of the Veracitie of God, we must first distinguish of Veritie in the general; which is either simple or complexe. (1) Simple veritie is either in the mind, or in things themselves. [1] Simple Truth in the mind consistes in the conformitie of our Notions unto things. And in this regard the Truth of God importes the veritie of his Ideas, or knowlege of things. [2] Simple Truth in Things, is nothing but their confor­mitie to their specific Idea, or formal definition and nature. So we say, that is true Gold, which conformes to the specific Idea of Gold. This some Aristoteleans stile Metaphysic or transcendental Truth: others Physic Truth; it being no other than the real ex­istence of things. For, as Aristotle, (or whoever were the com­pilator of that Book) Metaph. min. l. 1. c. 1. observes, [...], every thing has so much of truth, as it has of existence. Now the veritie of God in this regard, is no­thing else save the simple pure actualitie of his essence and exi­stence. (2) Complexe Truth is either Mental, or Oral. [1] Complexe mental Truth is the conformitie of complexe mental Ideas, Notions, or Propositions unto things: which cannot be ascribed to God, be­cause he has no complexe knowlege, but only simple: albeit he knows al propositions, yet it is not by any complexe notions, but in the most simple glasse of his own essence. [2] Complexe Oral Veritie is either Logic or Ethic: Logic Oral Veritie is when Propo­sitions or Discourses agree with things: Ethic Oral Veritie is when our words agree to our thoughts, which is termed Sinceritie; or our deeds to our words, which is Veracitie.

This Veracitie as to God regards al his words;Gods Veracitie in fulfilling but in a more particular manner his Comminations or Threats, and Promisses; yet with this difference.(1) Promisses. (1) Promisses give a right to the persons to whom they are made, which cannot be taken from them with­out injurie: for albeit it be free to any to make a promisse; yet having made it, his fidelitie is obliged to see it performed. So that in Promisses there is no room for Relaxation or Dispensation; but the words must be taken in the largest sense, and as most fa­vorable for the persons to whom the Promisse is made: accord­ing to that commun maxime in Civil Law, Favors must be am­plified. And that which addes to the obligation of promisses is [Page 377]when they are confirmed by an Oath, which renders them every way Immutable and Irrelaxable. Such are al the Promisses of God, as Hebr. 6.17.Heb. 6.17, 18. Where God is said to confirme his promisse by an Oath, whereby it became every way immuta­ble, as vers. 18. (2) But now as to Comminations or Threats, (2) Threats. there is no right or debt accrews to the persons, to whom they are made, save only a debt or merit of punishment: the threat ren­ders them obnoxious to punishment, if they break that Law whereto the threat is appendent: yet in many Cases, 'specially as to circumstances, the Superior, who made the Law and affixed a threat thereto, has a libertie of relaxing, or dispensing with the penaltie of his Law. The Commination declares the Merit of punishment in the offender, and the Power of punishing in the Superior offended; but yet it doth not alwaies suppose a necessa­rie egresse or execution of vindictive justice for the punishing the offender; at least not as to al circumstances threatned; but stil there remains place in the breast of the Judge, or Superior, 'spe­cially if he be Absolute, and Soverain, either to relaxe or dis­pense with the penaltie of his Laws, either in whole or part. Thus in Gods Threats and penal Laws, he reserves to himself a libertie of Relaxation or Dispensation in many Cases, thereby to make way for his Clemence or Mercie, without the least vio­lation of his Veracitie or Justice. So in the first commination or penal Law, Gen. 2.17. Thou shalt surely die. Gen. 2.17. Heb. in dying thou shalt die. Which Hebraisme denotes a certain, immediate, perfect, and constant death. And yet our Soverain Lord, out of his So­verain rich Mercie, was pleased very far to relaxe and mitigate the rigor of this commination or penal Law, as to many circum­stances, by admitting of a Mediator, and new Evangelic Cove­nant. In this regard God is said to repent or turne from the siercenesse of wrath, as Jonah 3.9. Who can tel if God wil turne, Jonah 3.9. and repent, and turn away from his fierce anger, that we perish not. God by reason of their legal imperfect faith and repentance, turned away his fierce wrath for that time, albeit afterward it came down with vengeance, as Historie assureth us. Neither is it to be feared, lest the Veracitie of God should receive any in­jurie, if al his Threats are not alwaies in al circumstances or parts fulfilled: because al comminations and threats, which have not some character or signe of irrevocabilitie assixt to them, are, ac­cording to their own nature, so to be understood, as not to dimi­nish [Page 378]the right of the Superior, who makes them, to relaxe the same. Thus we see what latitude the Divine Veracitie admits in the fulfilling Comminations and Threats, beyond what can be ad­mitted in fulfilling Divine Promisses, as Grotius wel observes.

Gods Veracitie and Fidelitie in fulfilling his word,Gods Veracitie demonstrated. is founded in and may be demonstrated by, (1) his essential Veritie. Plato makes God to be [...], the first Truth, yea, [...], Truth it self; whence he cannot but be true and faithful in his words. God is Truth essentially, not participatively, therefore nothing but Truth can passe from him. Again, God is pure Truth or Veritie, with whom not the least shadow of Falsitie, Hypocrisie, or Fraude in word or deed can mingle. Pure Truth and falsitie are incom­patible. There are no thoughts or ideas of mans heart so true, but there is some mixture of error or falsitie in them: no words or deeds so sincere and faithful, but something of hypocrifie and falsitie mixed with them: because there is no pure truth in mans thoughts or words. But God being the first, pure, essential Veri­tie, his Veracitie is most pure and perfect, without the least sha­dow of falsitie. (2) Gods Veracitie is founded on, and may be demonstrated by his Eternitie and Omnipotence. Thus in sacred Philosophie,1 Sam. 15.29. 1 Sam. 15.29. The Eternitie or strength of Israel wil not lie. Al lies are from impotence and infirmitie: Truth and Veracitie is ever potent and strong; but falsitie most impotent. (3) From the Holinesse of God, of which we shal immediately discourse. I shal conclude this Divine Attribute with a pleasing observation I long since met with in the Life of Jansenius, Bishop of Ipre, that great Patron of Divine Grace, who being demanded, What Attribute of God was most in his heart, whereby he was most awed? Replied, The Truth or Veracitie of God. And he that writes his Life, prefixed to his Augustinus, assures us, That in his Garden-walkes, and solitary Meditations, with his eyes fixed on Hea­ven, he was oft seen and heard to break forth into this acclamation: O Truth! So great an Admirer was he of Divine Veritie and Vera­citie: and indeed no wonder, seeing it is the great Spring of the Divine life and consolation both here and hereafter.

§. 3. The last Divine Attribute,The Sanctitie of God. we are to discourse of, is the Sanctitie or Holinesse of God, whereof we find great and illustrious Characters in sacred Philosophie. (1) We find the Sanctitie of God set forth in Scripture in a way of eminence and distinction from al created Sanctitie.Exod. 15.11. So Exod. 15.11. Who is like unto thee, [Page 379]O Lord, amongst the Gods, or mighty men! Who is like unto thee glo­riose in Holinesse, &c! Where he placeth Gods transcendent Eminence and Elevation above al Creatures, as that wherein his essential Sanctitie chiefly consistes. And indeed the peerlesse Emi­nence of Gods sacred Majestie is that wherein his Sanctitie chiefly consistes, as we intend anon more fully to demonstrate. Thus 1 Sam. 2.2. There is none holy as the Lord: 1 Sam. 2.2. for there is none besides thee: neither is there any Rock like our God. Hannah here, as Mo­ses before, placeth the Sanctitie of God in his Supereminence a­bove al Creatures. (2) Hence God is frequently brought in, as an object of Divine Worship, with regard to his Holinesse. So Psal. 30.4. Give thankes at the remembrance of his Holinesse: i. e. of his peerlesse Eminences. And Psal. 71.22. Ʋnto thee wil I sing with the harpe, O thou holy One of Israel. Also Psal. 92.12.Psal. 92.12. And give thankes at the remembrance of his Holinesse: or celebrate the memorial of his Holinesse: i. e. Lift up his [...], or transcendent Excellences. Again, Psal. 98.1. O sing unto the Lord a new song; for he hath done marvellous things: his right hand and his holy arme hath gotten him victorie. His holy arme, or the arme of his Holi­nesse: i. e. of his holy power so much above al other powers. The like Psal. 99.3. Let them praise thy great and terrible name; for it is holy. Also v. 9. Exalt the Lord our God, and worship at his holy hil: for the Lord our God is holy. The like v. 5. As God is a transcendent superlative Majestie, exalted above al other Gods, or Majesties, as Exod. 15.11. so in al Acts of Worship we must exalt him, by giving him a singular, incommunicable, peculiar Worship. Whence in Scripture those that give that Worship which is due to God, to any besides him, or in conjun­ction with him, by way of object, either mediate or immediate, are said to profane his holy Name, Ezech. 20.39. & 43.7, 8. because Gods Holinesse, consisting in a superlative incommunica­ble Majestie, admits no corrival in point of Worship. Hence, to sanctifie the holy Name or Majestie of God, is [1] to serve and glorifie him; because of his transcendent [...] or Eminence; and [2] to do it with a peculiar, separate, incommunicated Worship; because he is holy and separate above althings else. Not to do the former, is Irreligion, Profanenesse and Atheisme; not to do the later is Idolatrie and Superstition, as judicious Mede wel observes. Hence (3) God is said to sit on a Throne of Holinesse, Psal. 47.8. God sitteth upon the Throne of his Holinesse. Psal. 47.8. [Page 380]Alluding to the Thrones of Princes, which were in the midst of the people, exalted and lift up, that so their Majestie might ap­pear more illustrious. God being, by reason of his transcendent Eminences, exalted infinitely above al Creatures, he is therefore said, to sit on the Throne of his Holinesse. (4) We find Gods Ho­linesse, in a most eminent manner and with emphatic Characters, proclaimed by such as have any views of God. Thus Esa. 6.3. Holy, holy, holy is the Lord of Hosts. So Rev. 4.8. (5) The San­ctitie of God is sometimes described by puritie. Hab. 1.13. Hab. 1.13. Thou art of purer eyes than to behold evil, and canst not look on iniquitie. [...] prae videndo. [...] here is comparative: as if he had said; O! how pure are thine eyes? how impossible is it for thee to behold sin, with the least delight or approbation? So 1 Joh. 3.3. As he is pure. (6) The Sanctitie of God is sometimes described by Rectitude. Psal. 25 8. Good and upright is the Lord. So Psal. 92.15. To shew that the Lord is upright.

We find also in Plato many great notices of the Sanctitie of God, conformable to those of sacred Philosophie. So Theaetet. pag. 176. [...], Evils find no place with God. Again, [...], God is in no manner unrighteous, but as it seems most righteous. So Repub. 2. pag. 379. he saith, That in Theologie we should use such modules, as come nearest to the Nature of God, and demonstrate what God is. Thus we must constantly ascribe to God things consentaneous to his Nature. Whence he subjoins: [...]; Must we not determine then, that God is in­deed good? [...], But no good is noxious. [...]; But that which hurts not, doth it do any evil? No surely. Whence he concludes: [...], Good therefore is not the cause of althings; but of those things that are good it is the cause; but of evils it is not the cause: i. e. God is the first Cause and Author of al natural and moral good, but as for moral evil he is not the Author or Cause there­of as it is evil; because moral evils as such have no efficient cause but only deficient. Thence he addes: [...], Of good things we must own no principal cause but God: but as for evils we must inquire after some other causes of them; for God must not be estimed the cause of them. His mind is, that God must [Page 381]be owned as the cause of al good, both Natural and Moral; yea, of the materia substrata, or the material entitie of sin, which is a natural good: but as for the proper Moral cause of Sin, as Sin is a deordination or difformitie from the Divine Law, that is proper to the sinner: for God must not be thought to be the Author or Moral cause of sin. This he farther explains, p. 380. Either we must not at al attribute evils to God, or if we do, it must be in that manner as before, namely, [...], we must say, that God hath acted wel and justly, and has inflicted those punishments on them, that thereby he might bring some profit. Wherein he informes us, that God is the cause of penal evils, not as evils, but as con­ducing to good. Whence he concludes: [...], &c. That God, who is good, should be the Author or Moral Cause of Evil to any, this we must with al manner of contention refute, and not suf­fer any in the Citie to speak or hear such things. Plato strongly as­sertes, that God is [...], the principal cause of al good, but not of sin as sin; i. e. he neither commands, invites, encourageth, nor by any other Moral causalitie produceth sin: albeit God doth concur to the material act or physic entitie of sin, which is naturally good, yet he doth not at al concur to the moral production, obliquitie or deordination of sin, which has indeed no real efficient cause, but only deficient, according to that of Proclus: There is no [...], Idea of moral evils. But the more distinctly and yet concisely to explicate the sanctitie of God, we are to know that his original Essential and Absolute Holiness is nothing else but the incommunicable superlative [...] or supereminence of his Divine Majestie, as separate from althings else. For al Sanctitie, and al the notions thereof, spe­cially Grecanic and Hebraic, implie separation and discretion. Whence the Sacred Majestie of God, being, in regard of its in­finite Perfection and Dignitie, infinitely exalted above al Beings and Dignities whatsoever, it must necessarily be the prime san­ctitie. Yea, Holiness is so far appropriated to the first Being, as that the Heathens ascribed a fictitious sanctitie and eminence to al their spurious Deities: whereby they generally acknowleged, that the prime Holinesse belongs only to the first Being. It's true, good Angels and Men are Holy by participation and derivation; but they are not Holinesse in the abstract: this appertains only to he [Page 382]prime, original, essential Holinesse, who is infinitely separate from al other Dignities and Eminences: in whom al Holinesse is in the abstract and essentially; from whom also al Holinesse flows as from the source and spring.

§. 4. We find in Plato not only Characters of the Divine Es­sence and Attributes, Platonic Philo­sophemes of the Trinitie. but also some dark notices of the Trinitie; which, I no way dout, were originally traduced from the Sacred Fountain of Hebraic Philosophie. We have Plato's Sentiments about a Trinitie mentioned more expressely in his Sectators, Plo­tinus, Porphyrie, Iamblichus and Proclus. And the whole is wel ex­plicated by Cyril Alexandr. Contra Jul. l. 1. p. 34. Edit. Paris. 1638. thus: [...], For Porphyrie, expounding the Sentiment of Plato, saith, that the essence of God pro­cedes even to three Hypostases; but that the Supreme God is, [...], The Supreme GOOD; and that after him, the second is, [...], the prime Opificer or Creator; moreover, that the third is, [...], the mundane Soul: (or Universal Spirit:) For the Divinitie extended it self to the Soul of the Ʋniverse. This Platonic Trinitie Cyril refutes, as that which gave Spawn and Seed to Arianisme, as hereafter. I am not ignorant, that Learned Cudworth, in his New Book, against Atheisme, B. 1. C. 4. §. 34. p. 590, &c. en­deavors to apologise for this Platonic Trinitie, and reconcile it with the Christian: Yet he ingenuously acknowledgeth, pag. 580, and 601, &c. That the most refined Platonic Trinitie supposeth an Es­sential Dependence and Subordination of the second Hypostasis, to the First, and of the Third to the Second: Yea, he grantes, that the Platonists generally held these three Hypostases to be three distinct Gods, as in what follows. I conceive those endeavors to re­concile the Christians Trinitie with the Platonic, to be of most dan­gerous consequence, and that which proved Origen's Peste, as Part. 3. B. 2. c. 1. §. 8.

The chief place I find in Plato, wherein he gives us some dark adumbration of a Trinitie, is Epist. 6. p. 323. Let this Law be con­stituted by you, and confirmed by an Oath, not without obtesting, [...], both God, the Impe­rator [Page 383]of althings, both which are, and which shal be; and the Father of that Imperator and Cause: whom indeed, if we truely Philosophise, we shal al distinctly know, so far as that knowledge may fal within the power of blessed men. This description of God Clemens Alexandrinus and others interpret of God the Father, and God the Son, who is indeed the Imperator of althings. We find also in Plato's Epinom. mention of [...], as elsewhere of [...], which they attribute to the second person in the Trinitie. Whence the Poets make Minerva to be [...], the mind of Jupiter, or his Wisdome, produced out of his head, without Mother: as the true Messias was stiled by the Hebrews, The wisdome of God, without Mother. Plotinus, Ennead. 5, Lib. 1. Philosophiseth copiosely of this Platonic Trinitie; the Title of which Book runs thus: [...], Of the Three Principal or Causal Hypostases. And he begins, Cap. 2. with the [...], the Mundane Soul, its Dignitie and Office: and Ennead. 5. l. 5. c. 3. speaking of [...], Mind, the second Hy­postasis in the Platonic Trinitie, he saith, that he is, [...], the Second God. And En. 5. l. 1. c. 7. p. 489. he saith, That this Second God, the First Mind, [...], &c. Being now begotten [by the first God] be­got also al entities with himself, namely the whole pulchritude of Ideas; which were al intellectile Gods. Furthermore we must conceive that this [Begotten Mind] is ful of althings begotten by him, and doth as it were swallow up althings begotten. Thence he addes: [...], But the progenie of this Mind is a certain [...] and Hypostasis consisting in cogitation, &c. Proclus, in Plat. Timae. p. 93. cals this Platonic Trinitie, [...], the tradition of the Three Gods; and he makes, ac­cording to Numenius, the First God, to be the Grandfather, the Second to be the Son, the Third to be the Grandson: i. e. the Second God to be begotten by the First, and the Third by the Second. Por­phyrie also, explicating Plato's mind, cals God the Creator of al­things, [...], the Paterne Mind: who also makes three sub­sistences in the essence of the Divinitie; the first he cals the Su­preme God; the second, the Creator; the third, the Soul of the Ʋni­verse. The like Iamblichus his Scholar, concerning the Egyptian Mysteries: The first God, the prime being, the Father of God whom he begets, remaining in his solitarie unitie, &c. And Plotinus writ a Book of the three Persons or Subsistences: whereof the first he [Page 384]makes to be the Supreme Eternal Being, who generated the se­cond, namely the eternal and perfect Mind, as before. So in his Book of Providence, he saith, That althings were framed [...], by the Divine Mind. Thus Plato in his Phaedo saith: [...], The Divine Mind is the framer and cause of althings. That these Platonic Philosophemes were the Se­minarie of Arianisme, we have endeavored to demonstrate, Part. 3. l. 2. c. 1. §. 9. And this is wel observed by Cyril, contra Jul. l. 1. p. 34. Edit. Paris. 1638. where speaking of Plato, and his Trinitie, he saith: [...], Truely he contemplated not the whole rightly, but, in the same manner as they who follow Arius, he divides and supposeth Subjects, inducing Hypostases subordinate among themselves, and conceits the Holy and Consubstantial Trinitie to be three distinct Gods. And al­beit Learned Cudworth, B. 1. C. 4. p. 590. against Atheisme, en­deavors to wipe off this aspersion, yet he grants the conclusion, as hereafter. But to speak the truth, I find no express mention of a [...] Trinitie in Plato; only he speaks confusedly of a [...] Father Lord, and of [...] the Mind, &c. But among the la­ter Platonistes of the Schole of Alexandria, 'specially those of the golden succession, the Sectators of Ammonius, Plotinus, Por­phyrie, Iamblichus, Proclus, we find frequent mention and notices of a Trinitie, which they thus distinguish. (1) [...] the Su­preme self-being: whom also they stile [...], the one, and [...], the Good. (2) [...], the Divine mind, the Creatrix or Framer of althings: who is also termed by them, [...], the Word, and [...], the seminal Word or Reason, that gives Being to althings. (3) [...], the Soul of the Ʋniverse: and [...], the first Soul, as c. 8. §. 2. These more distinct notices of a Trinitie, I am very apt to perswade my self they received not so much from Plato, but from Am­monius, the famose Head of that Succession; who was either a Christian, or a friend to their Sacred Philosophie, out of which he stole most of his choisest Philosophemes, and incorporated them into the bodie of his Platonic Philosophie, in order to a refinement thereof: which, albeit his designe might be good, yet it proved the peste and subversion of the Christian Theolo­gie, at least among those of that Schole. For Origen, his Scholar, [Page 385]following in his steps, out of too fond a love for Platonic Philo­sophie, reduced Sacred Philosophie to Platonic Dogmes: which proved the original cause of the greatest Errors that befel the Church in succeeding Ages. Thus he makes the Three Persons in the Trinitie, to be, according to the Three Platonic Hyposta­ses, One, not in Essence, but Wil only. So Origen. contra Celsum, l. 8. p. 386. (Edit. Cantabr. 1658.) Where having cited that, Act. 4.32. There was of al the Believers one Heart and one Soul, he brings it to prove what our Lord affirmes, Joh. 10.30. I and the Father are one. And thence in what follows concludes thus: [...], &c. Therefore we religiosely wor­ship the Father of Truth, and the Son who is Truth, as being truely two in Hypostase, but one in concord, consent, and identitie of Wil: So that whosoever sees the Son,—shall in him see God, as in the Image of God, &c. Hence Origen, in imitation of these Platonistes sup­posed an essential dependence of the Son, the second Hypostasis, on the Father; as also of the Spirit, the third, on the Son: of which essential dependence and subordination, see Cudworth a­gainst Atheisme, L. 1. C. 4. p. 581, &c. Yea Origen, in his Com­ments on John wil needs persuade us, That the Word in Divine things is taken only metaphorically. How far Origen's Platonic Phi­losophemes laid the foundation for the Arian and other Heresies touching the second and third Person in the Trinitie, see Court Gent. p. 3. l. 2. c. 1. §. 8, 9. Samosatenus also had his pestiferous infusions from Plotinus's Philosophemes about the Divine [...]: and Arius his from the same Schole, as we have more fully proved in our Discourse of the Vanitie of Philosophie, B. 2. C. 1. §. 8. But whereas Amelius of old, and some late Socinians would fain per­suade us, that John borrowed his [...], Joh. 1.1. from Plato, it's evident, that he had it from the Sacred Philosophie among the Hebrews: for in the ancient Chaldaic Thargum we find fre­quent mention of [...] the Word of Jehovah, whereby they understood the Messias, as Gen. 3.8. Psal. 2.12. and 27.1. as elsewhere. Yea Celsus would needs persuade us, That the Chri­stians came to cal their Jesus, [...], THE SON OF GOD, from their Pagan Ancestors, who called the World made by God, the Son of God: But this is refuted by Origen, Contra Celsum, l. 6. p. 308. Edit. 1658. Where he proves, that this Character of Jesus [Page 386]was to be found in the Writings of Moses and the Prophets, who writ long before the Grecian Philosophers. That al those con­fused notices of a Trinitie among the Platonistes were originally traduced from Sacred Philosophie, see Clem. Alexandr. Strom. 5. p. 436. Eusebius, praepar. Evangel. l. 11. from cap. 14. to 23. Philos. General. Part. 1. l. 1. c. 2. sect. 5. §. 2. and l. 3. c. 4. sect. 1. §. 13. also Court. Gent. P. 1. B. 3. c. 5. §. 7.

Learned Cudworth, in his Book against Atheisme, B. 1. C. 4. sect. 35. p. 548. saith: ‘We may reasonably conclude, that which Proclus asserteth of this Trinitie, as it was contained in the Chal­daic Oracles, to be true, that it was at first [...], a Theologie of Divine Tradition or Revelation, or a Divine Cabala, viz. amongst the Hebrews first, and from them after­wards communicated to the Egyptians and other Nations—However, addes he, we freely acknowledge, that, as this Divine Cababa was but little understood by many of those who enter­tained it among the Pagans, so was it by diverse of them much depraved and adulterated.’ For (1) the Pagans universally called this their Trinitie, a Trinitie of Gods, [...], & [...], the First, the Second, and the Third God. (2) Whence, p. 557. he procedes to demonstrate, that the di­rect designe of this Platonic Trinitie was nothing else but to lay a foundation for infinite Polytheisme, Cosmolatrie, and Creature­worship. Where by the way he wel observes, That these Pagans (who so much cried up this Platonic Trinitie) were the only pub­lic and professed Champions against Christianitie, and the Christian Trinitie. (3) He addes, p. 559. That the Three Hypostases or per­sons asserted by the Christians are truely and really one God; and not one only in Wil, as Origen and the Platonistes avouch. (4) He in­formes us, p. 564. That Proclus and other of the Platonistes in­termingle many particular Gods with those three Ʋniversal Prin­cipes or Hypostases of their Trinitie; as Noes, Minds or Intellects su­perior to the first Soul; and Henades and Agathotetes, Ʋnities and Goodnesses, superior to the first Intellect too; thereby making those particular Beings, which must needs be Creatures, superior to those Hypostases that are Universal and Infinite. So great con­fusions, yea contradictions attendes the Platonic Trinitie, which yet is too much admired.

CHAP. VII. Of Gods prime Causalitie, Efficience, and Concurse in general.

God the first Cause demonstrated. The Object of Divine Concurse. Gods Concurse not merely conservative of the Principe. Durandus's Objections answered. Divine Concurse as to the human Wil, and al create Objects. Gods Concurse principal. How second Causes are Instruments. Divine Concurse as to its Principe the same with the Divine Wil. No executive Power in God distinct from his Wil. The Divine Wil of it self omnipotent and operative. Gods Concurse (1) Immediate both as to the second Cause, its Act, and Effect. (2) In­dependent. (3) Previous. (4) Total. (5) Particular. (6) Ef­ficacious. (7) Connatural.

§. 1. HAving explicated the Divine Nature and Attributes,God the first Cause of al­things. we now descend to the explication of the Divine Causalitie and Efficience; which properly belongs to metaphysic or prme Phi­losophie. Thence Sapience, which takes in the generic notion of metaphysic, according to Aristotle, consistes in the contemplation, not only of most excellent Beings, but also of the prime Cause of althings. That God is the prime Cause of althings, not only sa­cred, but also Platonic Philosophie doth assure us. As for sacred Philosophie, it gives frequent and great demonstrations of our Hypothesis. Thus Esa. 66.2. For al these things have my hands made, and al those things have been. So Psal. 104.24. of which more in Gods Creation. Plato also hath left us great notices of Gods prime Causalitie and Efficience. So in his Phaedo, pag. 96. he demonstrates, how great the ignorance and folie of such is, who wholly busie their thoughts in the contemplation of second Causes, but neglect to inquire after and into the first Cause, who is not only [...], the principal supreme Cause, but also [...], the Cause of causes: whereas al second Causes are only [...], Concauses and Instruments of the first Cause. Thence pag. 97. he addes: But when I sometime heard some one reading and relaeting out of a certain Book, as he said of Anaxagoras, [...], [Page 388]&c. That the Divine Mind doth orderly dispose and governe althings, and is the cause of althings; I was indeed greatly recreated with this Cause, and it seemed to me to be rightly determined, namely that the Divine Mind was the Cause of althings: and thus I reasoned with my self: if it be so, that the gu­bernatrix and dispositrix Mind do thus dispose althings, it doth there­fore place each particular in that place, where it may be best constitu­ted. If therefore any one be willing to inquire after and into the cause of every thing, both of its existence and corruption, he must also inquire, in what regard it may be best, either as to being, or as to suffering or doing any other thing. Ʋpon this account there is nothing more needful for man to inquire after, either concerning himself or other things, [...], than what is best and most excel­lent: for it is necessary, that such an one also know what is worst; be­cause the science of these things is the same. When I pondered these things in my mind, I much pleased my self in this, that I had got a Ma­ster, who would instruct me in the causes of things, according to mine own mind, namely Anaxagoras. In these great Philosophemes of Socrates we have these observables. (1) These contemplations about the first Cause, were some of his dying thoughts, and there­fore such as his mind were most intent on. (2) He greedily im­bibes and closeth with that great Tradition of Anaxagoras, deri­ved originally from sacred Philosophie, That the Divine Mind was the first cause of althings. (3) That the Divine Mind disposed, ordered, and governed althings in the best manner. (4) That he who would inquire into the causes of this, must have his eye on those two, the mater and efficient. For Plato makes but two Principes of things, the Mater, out of which things were made, and the Efficient that formed the mater into shape or that particular forme or essence. This Efficient he elsewhere stiles [...], Idea, making [...], the Idea and mater the two Principes of althings. So the Stoics made two Principes of althings, the Efficient and Pa­tient. Plato sometimes makes [...], Efficient and Cause termes synonymous: so [...], the efficient precedes and the effect follows. (5) That as to efficients, we must alwaies inquire after the best and most excellent, namely God the first Cause: for he that knows the best, i. e. God, may easily know the worst, i. e. second Causes. So Plato, Leg. 4. p. 715. [Page 389]makes God to be [...], the Principe and End of althings. Thus in his Sophista, pag. 265. [...]; Namely, doth Nature, by the force of some casual fortuitous cause, without the efficacitie of the Divine Mind, produce these things? Or, on the con­trary, shal we not determine, that these things have their existence with Divine Wisdome and Science from God? Wherein note [1] that he layes down an Hypothesis, contrary to that of Leucippus and De­mocritus, That things existe not by the casual fortuitous confluxe of Atomes. [2] That althings existe by the Divine Mind. Hence, [3] That althings are framed and disposed in the best order, with the highest wisdome. [4] He makes mention of [...], the Word; which some would understand of the second Person in the Trini­tie, but I should rather take it here for wisdome, as [...] must be understood of Science. The like in his Theaetetus: [...], We must remember, that nothing can be of it self; therefore althings are from some first Cause, of which more fully before, C. 2. §. 2. So Repub. 6. he makes God to be the First cause [...], giving essence to althings: for [...], every thing receives es­sence from the efformative words of the great Opificer. Again, Re­pub. 2. pag. 379. he saith: [...], And of good things there is no other supreme cause to be acknowledged besides God. So pag. 380. he proves, That God is the cause of al good, whether natural or moral. And Epist. pag. 312. he expresse­ly saith, That God is [...], the cause of althings good or beautiful. Thus Damascene, (out of Dionysius Areopagita, who doth much Platonise) Orthod. Fid. l. 1. c. 15. [...], &c. God is the cause and principe of althings, the essence of Beings, the Life of things living, the Reason of things rational, the Intellect of things intellectile, the Restitution and Resurre­ction of them that fal from him, but of those things that naturally perish the Renovation and Reformation: of those things which are moved with a strong impetuositie the great confirmation, of such things as stand the stabilitie, of those things that ascend up to him the way and reductive manuduction. Thence he addes: [...], [Page 390] Of the illuminated the splen­dor, the perfection of the perfect, the Deification of the deified, the peace of the discordant, the simplicitie of the simple, the union of the united, the superessential and superprincipal Principe of every Principe.

For the more distinct demonstration, that God is the prime Cause of althings, these Platonic Philosophemes may be thus for­med into Arguments. (1) That which is such by Essence, is ne­cessarily before that which is such by Participation: but now God is a Cause by Essence; whereas al other causes are such only by participation. God gives essence to althings, but receives it from nothing. Thus Plato, Leg. 6. pag. 509. God the supreme Good gives efficace and force to things, not only for their being known, but also for their existence: [...], when yet that chief good is not pro­perly Essence, but superessential; because greatly transcending the whole nature of things create, both in dignitie and virtue. (2) Al Imper­fectes receive their origine from that which is more perfect: and is not God the most absolutely perfect of al Beings? Must not althings then receive their origine from God? (3) That which is the last end of althings must needs be the first Cause of al? For the first Cause is of equal latitude and extent with the last end: nothing can terminate and bound the appetite of man, but that which gave Being to him: that which is last in order of final causes, must needs be first in order of Efficients: And is not God the last End of althings? Are not althings so far good, as they participate of the Divine Goodnesse? Is not God, to speak in Plato's language, [...], the universal Idea and measure of al good? And must he not then necessarily be [...], the chiefest Good? It's true, there are other [...], inferior derivative goods, but is there any universal, essential, independent good but God? And must not the order of Efficients answer the order of Ends? If God as the last End gives blessed Being, must he not as the first Efficient give natural Being? Can any thing returne to God as the last end, but what flows from him as the first Cause? Thus Simplicius, a Sectator of Plato, in Epictet. cap. 1. pag. 9. [...], The Fountain and Principe of althings is the chiefest Good: for that which is desired by althings, and unto which althings are referred, that is the Principe and End of althings. Whence he concludes: [...], [Page 391] For the one first Being, Principe, chiefest Good and God are one and the same: for God is the first and cause of althings. (4) Must not every multiforme, variable, defectible Being be reduced to some uniforme, simple, invariable, indefectible Being as its first Cause? And is there any uniforme, simple, immutable Being but God? Thus Simplicius, in Epictet. cap. 1. pag. 9. [...], &c. It's necessary, that the first Being be most sim­ple: for whatever is composite, as composite it is after one, and multi­tude, and so produced, &c. Whereby he proves, that the first Cause is most simple. (5) Do not al finite, dependent causes need some infinite independent cause to conserve and actuate them? And is there any infinite independent cause but God? Can any thing be the first cause, but he who is [...] without al cause? (6) Is not the order of causes proportionable to the or­der of effects? Where then there is an universalitie of effects, must there not also be an universal first Cause, which gives Being to al those effects? Is it possible, that the universitie of effects which are in Nature should existe, but by the universal efficace of the first independent Being and Cause? Thus Simplicius, in Epictet. cap. 1. pag. 10. [...], It's neces­sary, that the first cause have the highest and universal influence; for there is an amplitude and abundance of efficace in him, so that he can produce althings of himself.

§. 2. Having demonstrated God to be the First Cause of al­things,The Object of Divine Con­curse. we now procede to explicate the mode and nature of his Causalitie, Concurse, and Efficience. The prime Causalitie and Con­curse of God may be considered with respect to (1) Its Object, (2) Its Subject or Principe, (3) Its Mode of Operation, (4) Its Termes or Effects produced. First, we may consider the prime Causalitie, Concurse and Efficience of God as to its Object, and that (1) Negatively. (2) Positively. We shal state and deter­mine both in the following Propositions.

1. Prop. Gods concurse, as to its object, Gods Concurse not merely con­servative of the Principe. consistes not merely in the communication of force and virtue to the second cause, and conser­vation of the same. The Antithesis hereto was anciently main­tained by Durandus (contrary to the Hypothesis both of the Tho­mistes and Scotistes) in Sent. l. 2. Distinct. 1. q. 5, who supposed, That the concurse of God conferred nothing more on second causes, than [Page 392]a virtue or power to act, and the conservation thereof; without any immediate actual influence on the second cause or its Act in order to the production of the effect. The [...], or principal motive, ground, and reason of this Antithesis is this; If we make God to concur immediately to the Acts and Operations of second causes, he must then concur to the sinful Acts of the wil, and so be the cause of sin. This Antithesis of Durandus was generally exploded by the an­cient Schole-men, both Thomistes and Scotistes, and is stil by the more sober Jesuites. Only in this last Age one Nicolaus Taurelius, in his Book, De rerum aeternitate & triumpho Philosophiae, has under­taken the patronage of Durandus's Antithesis, with this advance, even to the subversion not only of the concurse, but also of the conservation of God. And since there has started up another, Lud. A Dola, a Capucine Friar, who has taken greater pains to defend and promove this Antithesis of Durandus; pretending this as the only expedient for an accommodation between the Thomistes and Jesuites. And for the confirmation of this Hypo­thesis they give this commun instance: On the supposition that a stone should hang in the air, and God withdraw al his concurse for the actuating the stone, yet if the force which suspendes its motion down­ward were removed, it would, notwithstanding the substraction of Di­vine concurse, move naturally downward, or to the same purpose. Albeit I am no friend to those vexatious disputes, which the Scholes of Theologie, as wel as Philosophie, now ring of, yet this Antithesis being, as I conceive, of dangerous consequence, I can­not but, with modestie, expresse my just aversation from, yea indignation against it; with the reserve of that respect and ho­nor, which is due to that learned and pious Divine among our selves, who hath undertaken the defense of Durandus's Opinion. I shal not now enter on the solemn ventilation and debate of this Antithesis, having reserved this taske, if the Lord favor my de­sires, for another subject and stile, which may be of more public use to forrain Nations; but only touch briefly on such arguments as may confirme mine own Hypothesis, with brief solutions of the contrary objections.

That Gods concurse is not merely conservative of the Principe, Virtue and Force of second causes, without any influence on the Act, is evident; (1) because subordination and dependence of se­cond causes on the first, not only for their Beings and Virtue, with the conservation thereof, but also in their Acting and Causing, [Page 393]doth formally appertain to the essential Reason and Constitution of a Creature as such. For the Dependence of a Creature on God, not only in Being, but also in Operation, is, not extrinsee to its essence, but involved in the very intrinsec limitation there­of, as Suarez strongly argues, Metaph. Disp. 31. §. 14. Hence God, by his Absolute Power, cannot make a Creature, which should be Independent, and not subordinate to him in operation: for this implies a contradiction, namely, that a Creature should be, and should not be a Creature. For if it depend not on God in al its Operations, it is not a Creature. (2) If the Created Wil can­not subsist of it self and maintain its own Virtue and Force, much lesse can it Act of it self, or by its own power. The force of this Argument lies in this: If the Create Wil cannot of it self conserve its own Act in Being, when it is produced, how is it possible, that it should produce the same of it self? Yea, is not the very conservation of an Act in Being the same with the pro­duction thereof? Do not Divines say, that Conservation is but con­tinued Creation? how then can the Wil produce its own Act of it self, if it cannot of it self conserve the same? Or, why may it not as wel conserve its Being and Virtue, as conserve its Act of it self? If we then, as Durandus doth, allow God the conservation of the Being, Principe and Virtue; must we not then also allow him, by a paritie of Reason, the conservation of the Act? and if the conservation of the Act, why not also the production there­of? This Argument is wel managed by Bradwardine, l. 2. c. 24. and 32. (3) Whatever is independent in Acting, must also ne­cessarily be so in Being: for termes of Essence always bring with them termes or bounds of Activitie: a limited cause necessarily is limited in its Operations: and where there are limits and termes, there must be Subordination and Dependence. Nothing can operate of it self independently as to all Superior Cause, but what has Being in and from it self: for Operation and its limita­tion alwaies follows Essence and its limitation, as Aristotle assures us. (4) What ever is variable and mutable necessarily dependes on somewhat that is invariable and immutable: but every Act of a Create Wil is variable and mutable; therefore dependent on the immutable first Cause. See more fully Suarez, Metaph. Disput. 22. Sect. 1. Hurtado de Mendoza, Phys. Disput. 10. Sect. 10. §. 17.

But here it is objected by Durandus and his Sectators,Durandus's Ob­jections answer­ed. (1.) That this destroyes human libertie, &c. This objection is fully answered in what precedes of the Wils Libertie, Part. 2. B. 3. c. 9. sect. 3. §. 11, 12. and B. 4. C. 1. §. 28. also Philosoph. General. p. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect. 2. §. 8, 9. Where we fully demonstrate, That the necessary con­curse of God is so far from destroying human libertie, that it doth con­firme and promove the same; in that it produceth not only the Act, but its mode also, determining the Wil to act freely. (2) Durandus ob­jectes, That God can enable the second cause to produce its effect, with­out the concurse of any other: As it is manifest in the motion of a stone in the air, which would move downward without a con­curse. To which we replie, [1] That this supposition is not to be supposed: for as the concurse of God is necessarily required to conserve the Being and Virtue of the second cause, so also as to its motion: neither is it more repugnant to the nature of a stone to conserve it self, than to move it self, on supposition that the Divine concurse be abstracted. [2] Suarez wel respondes, ‘That it involves a repugnance and contradiction, to suppose the crea­ture potent or able to act independently as to the Creators con­curse. And the contradiction ariseth both on the part of the second cause, as also of the effect; which being both Beings by participation, essentially depend on the first cause. And God may as wel make a Being Independent in Essence, as an Agent Independent in Acting: both being equally repugnant to the perfection of God, and imperfection or limitation of the crea­ture.’ (3) Durandus objectes: That it cannot be, that two Agents should immediately concur to the same action, unlesse both be only par­tial and imperfect Agents. The solution of this Objection wil be more completely manifest when we come to treat of the Imme­diation of the Divine concurse, §. 4. 1. Prop. at present let it suffice, [1] That where total causes differ in kind, it is no im­pediment or obstruction to either, that both act immediately in their kind: for the whole effect is totally produced by each. [2] That it implies no imperfection in God to act immediately in and with the second cause; because it is not from any Insuf­ficience or Indigence, that he makes use of the Creature, but only from the immensitie of his Divine Bountie, that he commu­nicates a virtue to the second cause, and together therewith pro­duceth the effect.

(4) But the main objection of Durandus and his Sectators is taken from sinful Acts, unto which, if God immediately concur, Gods concurse to the substrate ma­ter of sin, what. he cannot but be the Author of Sin. [1] This Objection, albeit it may seem to favor the Divine Sanctitie, yet it really destroyes the same, in that it subvertes the Sacred Majestie, his Essence and Independence as the first cause, wherein his Essental Holi­nesse doth consiste, as before. [2] We easily grant, that God is the cause only of good, not of moral Evil as such, as before, c. 6. §. 3. out of Plato. For indeed moral Evil as such has no real Idea or Essence; and therefore no real efficient cause, but only deficient. But yet, [3] we stil aver, that God doth concur to the whole entitative Act of sin, without the least concurrence to the moral obliquitie thereof. For the entitative Act of sin is of it self (abstracted from the moral deordination) physically or naturally good. Whence that commun saying in the Scholes, Al evil is founded in good, as in its subject. There is no pure Evil, but what has some natural good for its substrate mater or subject: Now al good, that is not God, must be from God, as the prime cause: if God were not the immediate essicient of the entitative Act of evil, he were not the cause of al good. Yet, [4] Gods immediate concurse to the material Act of sin, doth no way ren­der him obnoxious to that imputation of being the Author of sin: For he concurs to the material Act of sin, not as a moral cause, but only as a physic cause. God neither commands, nor invites, nor encourageth any to sin, but prohibits the same; and there­fore is not the Author thereof. An Author, both according to Philosophie and Civil Law, is he that Persuades, Invites, Com­mands, or by any other moral influence promoves a thing: But God by no such waies doth cause sin. [5] Albeit God concurs with the deficient cause to the material entitie of sin, yet he con­curs not as a deficient cause. For the Soverain God is not tied up by the same Laws that his Creature is. The same sinful Act, which is a Deordination in regard of man, as it procedes from God is a conformitie to his Eternal Law or Wil. The great God breaks no Law, albeit the Creature is guilty thereof. (6) God, as the first cause, brings good out of that very Act, which is evil in regard of the second cause. The crucifying of our Lord, which was a sin of the first magnitude in regard of the Instru­ments, was yet by the wise God turned to the greatest good: Thus the Moral Evils of men, which are opposed to the Crea­tures [Page 396]good, are yet so wisely ordered by God, as that they are made subservient to the good of the Creator. As wicked men oft extract evil out of good, so the blessed God extractes good out of evil. Touching Gods concurse to, and gubernation of sin, see more copiosely, Chap. 9. §. 2.

2. Prop. The prime cause doth by his concurse influence not only the Effect, The Divine con­curse reacheth the Wil. or Act of the human Wil, but also the Wil it self. This Hypo­thesis is expressely laid down both in Sacred and Platonic Philo­sophie. In Sacred Philosophie we find great demonstrations here­of. So Psal. 110.3. Thy people shal become very willing in the day of thy power: and Phil. 2.13. It's God that worketh in us, [...], both to wil and to do. Thus also Plato, Alcibiad. 1. p. 135. brings in Socrates instructing Alcibiades, that God alone could change the wil. And the reasons which enforce this Hypo­thesis are most demonstrative. (1) To suppose the Wil to Act, without being actuated and influenced by God, is to suppose it Independent and not subordinate to God in such acts. (2) Ei­ther the wil of man must be subordinate to and dependent on the wil of God in al its acts; or the wil of God must be subordinate to and dependent on the wil of man. For in causes that concur to the same effect there must be subordination on the one part, if there be no room for coordination; as here is none. (3) If God by his concurse produce the act of willing, as our Adversaries the Jesuites and others grant, how is it possible, but that he must in­fluence and actuate the wil? Doth not every efficient cause, in producing an Act in a subject connatural to the power or facultie of the said subject, influence and actuate the same power? (4) Al grant, that the effect of the wil is produced by God: and may we not thence strongly argue, that the volition or act of willing is also produced by God, and that by immediate influence on the wil? Is it not equally necessary, that the concurse of God reach, as wel the active as passive efficience of the wil? What reason can there be assigned by the Jesuites and Arminians our Antagonistes, why the wil should not as much depend on the concurse of God for its act of volition, as for its effect? If the effect of the wil cannot be produced, but by the immediate concurse of the first cause, how can the wil it self act, without being actuated by God? (5) Can any act passe from the wil, but by the concurse of the first cause? and if so, must not also the same first cause influence the wil for the production of such acts?

3. Prop. Gods Concurse is universally extensive to al create Objects. Gods Concurse universally ex­tensive. Rom. 11.36. This Hypothesis is frequently inculcated in sacred Philosophie, as also in Platonic. Thus Rom. 11.36. Of him, and by him, and for him are althings. [...] of him, notes Gods Operation in framing al­things; [...] by him, his Cooperation in and with al second causes; [...] unto or for him, his final Causalitie, as althings are for him. This universal Causalitie is termed by Cyril Alexandr. in Esa. [...], the multiforme Energie; because it produceth al manner of effects. Plato also mentions God's universal Causa­litie as to al objects. So Repub. 6. he makes althings, not only visible, but also intelligible, as Sciences, &c. Yea al moral goods, as [...], things righteous, honest, and good, to fal un­der the prime Causalitie of God, who is [...], Righteousnesse it self, Honestie it self, and Bonitie it self; and therefore [...], the cause of al goods. Thus also in his Parmenides, pag. 144. [...], Essence therefore [i. e. God] is diffused throughout al varietie of Be­ings, and is absent from nothing, neither from the greatest, nor yet from the least of Beings. Thence he addes: One therefore [i. e. God] is not only present to al essence, but also to al the parts thereof, being absent from no part, either lesser, or greater. Wherein he assertes, that God is diffused through and present with al parts of the Universe, and al create Beings, giving Essence, Force, Perfection, and Operation to al Beings. Aquinas makes the Concurse of God to extend universally to althings, (1) As it gives forces, and fa­culties of acting to al second causes. (2) As it conserves and sustains them in Being and Vigor. (3) As it excites and applies second causes to act. (4) As it determines al second causes to act. (5) As it directes, orders, governes and disposeth them so, as that they may in the best manner reach their ends. See Aquin. Part. 1. Quaest. 105. & contra Gent. l. 3. c. 70. That the Concurse of God the prime universal Cause is universally extensive as to al objects, may be demonstrated, (1) From the subordination of al second causes to the first cause. Are not al causes, not only effi­cient, but also final, subordinate to God? Yea do not al material and formal Principes depend on the Concurse of God for al their operations? Of which see Suarez, Metaph. Disp. 21. Sect. 1. (2) From the comprehension and perfection of God. Doth he not, in his own Simplicitie, Actualitie, and Infinitude, comprehend al perfecti­ons [Page 398]both actual and possible? Is he not then virtually and emi­nently althings? And doth not this sufficiently argue, that his Concurse is universally extensive unto althings? (3) From the Superioritie and Altitude of God as the first Cause. Is not God the most supreme and highest, because the first Cause? Must not then his Concurse be most extensive as to al effects? Doth not every cause, by how much the higher it is, by so much the more ex­tend it self to varietie of effects? Must not God then, by being the first Cause, necessarily extend his Concurse to al effects? (4) From the Providence of God. That althings fal under the Provi­dence of God Plato, as wel as Scripture, greatly proves, as we shal hereafter Ch. 8. §. 2. shew: and if so, must not then the Con­curse of God universally extend to althings, so far as they par­take of Being, either natural or moral?

4. Prop. Gods Concurse in regard of al second causes and objects is principal. Gods concurse principal. The Principatie and Soveraintie of Divine Concurse, specially as to gratiose effects, is frequently asserted in sacred Philosophie.Esa. 53.11. So it's said of Christ, Esa. 53.11. He shal see the travel of his Soul. Which assures us, that Christ is the principal Parent of the New Creature, as wel as of the old: and that al Ministers, or other Instruments are but, as it were, Midwifes un­to Christ. Thence Plato, in his Theaetetus, pag. 151. brings in So­crates using the same phrase touching himself and his Philoso­phemes. Socrates being about to instruct Theaetetus, one of his Disciples of great ingenie, the more effectually to engage his at­tention and diligence, he professeth, That for his part he was but (as his Mother) a Midwife, to assiste the Soul in the bringing forth of moral virtue: [...], God compels me to play the Midwife, but forbids me to generate. Whereby he ascribeth the principal efficience of al moral virtue to God, reserving only a ministerial subservience to man. So great was the modestie of this poor Philosopher, beyond many that professe Christianitie. Thus Plato, Repub. 6. makes God to be [...], the first and most soverain cause of althings; whereas al second causes are but [...], yea [...], as it were children, or effects and products; and therefore al their effici­ence and causalitie is only [...] by commistion with, and participation from God the first Cause. Thence in his Phaed [...], pag. 99. he affirmes, that second causes, if compared with the first, deserve not the name of causes: [...], [Page 399] to cal these causes is very importune, or absued. Thence he addes: [...], That which is a cause indeed is one thing, and that without which a cause is not a cause another. Plato here makes mention of two sorts of causes. (1) One, which is truely a cause, i. e. the First cause. (2) Another, which is only causa sine qua non, a cause without which the effect is not produced: such are al second causes, whose ministerie the First cause makes use of; yet so as that the principal efficience belongs only to the First cause, in respect of which second causes are only [...], concauses, or subservient causes, employed by God for the production of things. So in his Timaeus, pag. 46. [...], These are concauses, whose ministerie God useth to perfect, so far as it may be, the idea and forme of what is best. But very many estime these to be not concauses, but causes of althings. But, he subjoins: Such have no reason or sense for what they assert: [...], For we must say, that there is a Soul of althings that existe, to whom only belongs the power of Ʋnderstanding: but he is invisible. Whence, in what follows, he expressely distinguisheth between the first and second causes, ascribing principal causalitie to the former, and mi­nisterial or instrumental to the later. There are in these Philo­sophemes of Plato observable, (1) That God is the principal prime cause of althings. (2) That al second causes, if compared with God, deserve not the name of causes; but are only concau­ses, or instruments to transfer the efficience of God unto the ef­fect. (3) That such as ascribe any causalitie to second causes, more than what as instruments they receive from the First cause, have neither sense nor reason on their side. (4) That there is an universal Spirit or Soul, which diffuseth it self throughout al create Beings, and gives vigor, determination, and motion to al second causes and effects.

But now the more fully to explicate Plato's mind touching the principal Concurse of God the first cause,How second Causes are In­struments of the first. and the ministerial or instrumental causalitie of second causes, we must first distinguish, and then state and determine our Hypothesis. We must distin­guish, (1) between principal causalitie simply considered, and that which is such in its kind, and in some respect. (2) Between [Page 400]the second cause its respect to the first, and its respect to the effect. (3) Between an instrument taken in a laxe notion, and in a strict: also between a moral and a physic Instrument: a­gain, between an active and passive Instrument: lastly, between a pure Instrument, and a vital elevate Instrument. (4) Between effects natural and supernatural. These distinctions being pre­missed, we shal state and determine our Hypothesis in the follow­ing Propositions. (1) The Causalitie of God is simply and univer­sally principal, yet that of second causes may be principal in its kind. The concurse of God is so far principal, as that it can and oft doth produce its effect without the concurse of second causes; but second causes can never produce their effects, without the concurse of God the first Cause.Hinc est, quod omnes operati­ones hominis bonas, quan­tumcun (que) fiant à libera volun­tate, tribuere solet augusti­nus ipsi Deo, tanquam qui per voluntatem ut per instru­mentum, quod pro libero suo beneplacito a­git, impellit, flectit, vertit, inclinat quoli­ber motus ipsi­us voluntatis o­peretur. Ipse, inquit, cantat in nobis, cujus gra­tia cantamus. Nempe dicun­tur ista, non ut homini libera voluntas, sed ut gloriatio de sua voluntate tolla­tur, ne puter à se esse quod Deus donat. Jansenius, Au­gust. Tom. 3. l. 2. c. 24. There is no effect which the se­cond cause produceth, but the first cause can produce it alone: for his omnipotent concurse reacheth to al effects that implie not a contradiction, without the least dependence on any second cause: the second cause needs the first in al its operations, but the first cause needs not the second in any. Yea, where the first and second cause concur to the same effect, the concurse of the first cause is infinitely more principal, than that of the second: be­cause the second cause actes not, but as acted by the first cause: The Excitation, Application, Determination, and Actuation of the second cause is from the first. Yet we may not denie a prin­cipal efficience to some second causes, so far as the first cause has communicated to them a virtue of their own to be communica­ted to their effects, as it wil appear by what follows.

(2) Al second Causes, if compared with the first, are but instru­ments of his principal concurse. Thus not only Aquinas, Bradwar­dine and the more sane Scholastics, but also Averroes, de Somno & Vigilia; where he affirmes, That second causes are moved by the first, as instruments by the Artificer. But here occurs a spinose knotty question much ventilated in the Scholes, Whether the Wil in the reception of supernatural habits be an instrument or principal cause? According to the former distinctions I should answer, [1] That, according to the general notion of an Instrument, the Wil may be termed such in the reception and acting of Grace. As it receives Grace it is a passive instrument, yet as it actes Grace it is an active instrument. [2] That the Wil in the receiving and acting Grace is a vital instrument. Hence it is termed by Greg. Nazianz. Orat. 8. [...], [Page 401] a Divine Instrument, a rational Instrument, an Instrument composed and knocked at by that preclare Artificer the Spirit of God. In receiving the first Grace the Wil is only naturally, remotely and passively vital, as it is a piece of human Nature; but in the actuating what Grace is received, it is a spiritually vital instrument. Grace received elevates the human Soul to a spiritual Vitalitie and Instrumentalitie for the act­ing of Grace. Hence, [3] the Wil may, as to the acting of Grace, so far as it is clothed with Divine habits, be termed in some respect a principal Agent, under God, specially if compared with the effect produced. It's true, if the Wil be compared with God, even in the acting of Grace received, it is but a mere instrument; because both Habit and Act are received from God: yet if we consider the Wil as invested and qualified with super­natural habits, which are the same to the Soul that it is to the Bo­die, whereby it is informed and capacitated to produce such or such supernatural Acts and Effects, in this regard we may stile it a principal cause: though, I must confesse, the notion of an Instru­ment, used by Aquinas and others, seems more adequate and ge­nuine to expresse its causalitie by, in as much as al is from God by supernatural infusion.

§. 3. Having inquired into the Concurse of God in regard of its object,Divine Concurse as to its Prin­cipe the same with Gods Wil. we now procede to consider it as relating to its Subject or Principe, which wil afford to us great notices of its genuine nature. The Scholastic Theologues, in their debates about the concurse of God to the supernatural Acts of the Wil, are greatly divided: some placing it in a certain efficacious impulse or mo­tion of God, whereby the Wil is determined to consent and act: others, in a certain actual premotion in the manner of a tran­sient qualitie, together with the operation of the Wil: others, in the very operation of the second cause or Wil, as it procedes from the influxe of God premoving. These make it to be an efficacious premotion or physic predetermination, whereby the first cause makes the second to act: others place this concurse, as to gratiose effects, in certain pious inspirations, cogitations, and in­deliberate motions of love injected by God. Albeit some of these scholastic sentiments may have their place, if we consider the con­curse of God with relation to its passive Attingence, or as it ter­minates on the second cause and effect, yet if we take it strictly, according to its formal Idea, I conceive, no one of these opinions [Page 402]explicate the true nature thereof. Therefore to explicate the genuine nature of the Divine concurse we must consider what re­lation it has to the Divine Wil, whether it be really distinct therefrom, or not. And here we must in the first place reflect on what was asserted and proved in the former C. 5. §. 4. touch­ing the ordinate or executive power of God, and its Indentitie with the Divine Wil: which being supposed, as it has been demon­strated, it naturally follows, that Gods concurse, as to is active At­tingence and effective principe, is nothing else but the omnipotent effica­cious volition of God. For Gods executive power being the same with his Effective Wil, it thence necessarily follows, that his concurse is the same also. Hence Sacred Philosophie every where makes Gods Wil the Effective Principe whereby althings are made, and governed, or directed to their proper Actions and Ends. As Psal. 39.9. and 115.3. and 135.6. Mat. 8.2, 3. 2 Chron. 20.6. and elsewhere, as before C. 5. §. 4. Thus also Plato, Alcibiad. 1. p. 135. brings in Socrates dialogising with young Alcibiades, that Athenian Gallant, in this manner: Doest thou know, saith So­crates, by what means thou mayst avoid this inordinate motion of thy mind? Alcibiad. Yes. Socrat. How? Alcibiad. If thou wilt, O Socrates, i. e. by thy precepts and institutes. Socrat. Thou mayst not say so. Alcibiad. How then? Socrat. [...], if God wil. Meaning, that Gods wil was omnipoten, and so could with­out more ado, merely by his act of volition, worke virtue in young Alcibiades. But now to explicate and demonstrate this Hy­pothesis, namely, That the Divine Wil is of it self operative, we shal resolve the whole into the following Propositions.

1. Prop. God as the first cause of althings doth not concur by his Essence absolutely considered. Gods concurse not his essence absolutely consi­dered. For, (1) If God should concur by his Essence absolutely considered, he should act althings by a na­tural necessitie, not with any precedent Libertie: and then Gods making the world, yea things most contingent would be as ab­solutely and naturally necessary, as his loving himself. It's true, Gods loving himself and al other immanent Acts have a conco­mitant Libertie or Divine spontaneitie attending them, yet they admit not any Antecedent Libertie or Indifference of any kind. But now Gods workes ad extra, such as terminate on the Crea­ture, have not only a Concomitant, but also Antecedent Libertie, or some kind of Indifference; so that God could, according to a signum rationis, or prioritie of nature, not have willed them. [Page 403](2) If God should worke althings by his Essence absolutely con­sidered, things possible should have one and the same Idea with things future; and so Gods Science of simple Intelligence should be the same with his Science of Vision. And the reason of the con­sequence is most evident; because the Essence of God absolutely considered is equally indifferent to things possible, which shal ne­ver be, as to things future, which are to be. (3) Again, Gods Absolute Power should be the same with his Ordinate, and his Suf­ficience the same with his Efficience, if he wrought al things by his Essence absolutely considered. (4) Hence also it would follow, that God should alwaies worke and put forth his Omnipotence to the utmost extent in al operations. For Causes that worke from a Necessitie of Nature worke to the utmost of their power.

2. Prop. Gods concurse procedes not from any executive Power in God. No executive power in God, distinct from his Wil. This Proposition has been already demonstrated, C. 5. §. 4. Yet for more abundant conviction, let us examine the Origine, Necessitie, and Ʋse of an executive Power in the Creature; and then we shal see what little ground there is to ascribe the same to God. The great Assertors and Promotors of executive power have been Aristotle and his Sectators; who, on false Hypotheses, presume, That a substance cannot act immediately without some exe­cutive power; which they make a species of Qualitie. Albeit such kind of Qualitative Powers are now generally exploded by al, who resolve not to serve an Opinion of Aristotle, yet there stil remains a place for executive powers in nature, when the prin­cipal Agent cannot reach the effect immediately. Thus the Soul of Man puts forth al Acts of sense and motion by some executive powers. Yet the human Soul can and doth oft act immediately, specially in its immanent acts, without any executive power. And thus God in al his Effects actes immediately by his omnipotent wil, without any executive power: For he is present in and with al effects, and therefore needs no executive power to supplie his absence. Again, the Wil of God is Omnipotent, as c. 5. §. 3. and we shal anon prove it more fully, and therefore it needs no exe­cutive power to execute what it wils. Is not the Divine Wil proposed to us in Sacred Philosophic as Irresistible? and if it be so, can it not then execute its own pleasure, without any exe­cutive power? Indeed the greatest Scholastic wits have espoused and defended this Hypothesis, namely, That the Wil and Execu­tive Power of God are really the same, and not so much as rationally [Page 404]or formally distinct. Thus Joan. Major, 2. Sent. Dist. 1. q. 1. proves, That God Created the World by his Intellect and Wil, without any ex­ecutive Power formally distinct, of which hereafter, §. 5.4. Prop. Thus Bradwardine, l. 2. c. 29. Alvarez de Auxil. l. 2. p. 129. with others, of whom in the next Proposition. And indeed Suarez Metaph. Disp. 22. S. 2. p. 555. doth in part grant our Hypothesis, in that he acknowlegeth, That the concurse of God, as it regardes the effective principe, is the same with the Divine Wil, which concurs with the Creature to its act. This he cals concursus ad intrà, the interne concurse, which he makes to be the principe of al Acts adextrá. Yet I must confesse elsewhere, namely Disp. 30. S. 17. he makes men­tion of an executive power in God, the same with his Essence, contain­ing in it eminently al create perfections. And so some Divines, as wel as Philosophers, assert an executive power in God. Thus Heereboord, Select. Ex Philosoph. Disp. 8. endeavors to prove, that Gods con­curse, whereby he influenceth things ad extra, is not simply his voli­tion; because Gods volition simply is an immanent Act, but his con­curse is a transient Act ad extra. But this Argument seems to be of no weight; because we easily grant, that the concurse of God, quoad Attingentiam passivam, as to its passive Attingence is distinct from God, and the same with the concurse of the second cause or effect; but that which we are now discoursing of is the concurse of God in regard of its active Attingence, as it regardes God the Principe, and in this respect we only assert, That the concurse of God is the same with his volition simply considered. This wil be fur­ther evident by the next Proposition.

3. Prop. The Divine Wil is of it self Omnipotent and Efficacious. The Divine Wil Omnipotent. This Proposition is most evident; (1) because the Divine Wil cannot be frustrated. Thus Suarez, 1.2 ae. Tract. 3. Disput. 11. Sect. 2. p. 311. ‘We must say, saith he, that when God wils ab­solutely and efficaciously that man wil somewhat, the human Wil cannot discord from the Divine. The reason is clear; be­cause the Divine Wil efficacious and simply absolute cannot be fruitrated, seeing it is infinite.’ So Bradward. l. 1. c. 10. ‘Now it remains to shew, that the Divine Wil is universally efficaci­ous, insuperable, and necessary in causing, nor impedible and frustrablein any manner. Who knows not that it necessarily follows: if God can do any thing and wils, it, he doth it?’ (2) The Divine Wil being the universal first cause of althings, it cannot but be most efficacious. For is not this the main dif­ference [Page 405]between the first and second cause, the universal and par­ticular cause, that this may fail of its effect, but that can never? A particular cause oft comes short of its effect, by reason of the interposition of some other particular cause, that may impede the same: but the first universal cause can never come short of its effect; because there is no other cause can interpose to hin­der it. (3) The Wil of God is infinite: therefore Omnipotent and Irresistible: for where the power of the Patient doth not excede or equalise the power of the Agent, there can be no pre­valent resistence: what then can resist the Divine Wil which is infinite? (4) If the Divine Wil were not omnipotent God were not infinitely happy. For every one is so far happy, as his Wil is fulfilled, as Aristor. Rhet. l. 2. c. 20. (5) It's a common Hypo­thesis in the Scholes, grounded on the highest Reason, That it is impossible but that the Divine Wil should attain its effect. So Aqui­nas, Part. 1. q. 19. a. 6. as others, Hence,

4. Prop. The Divine Wil is of it self operative and influential on al second causes and effects. Thus Augustin, De Trinit. l. 3. c. 4.The Wil of God operative of it self. The Wil of God is the first and supreme cause of althings. Again, A thing is said to be done by God acting, when it is done by God willing. Apud Domi­num hoc est velle quod fa­cere; qura ex ejus voluntate res habent esse Augustin. in Psal. 144. And the reasons of this Hypothesis are most manifest: For (1) if Gods Wil were not of it self Operative and Effective, it were not the first principe and cause of althings. (2) The wil of man is in some things Operative of it self: and must we not allow the same Prerogative to the Wil of God? And if it be in some­things operative of it self, why not in althings? May we not then hence conclude, That there is no active operation or motion re­ceived from God into the Wil, or any other second cause; but from the simple volition of God the motion of the human Wil or any other second cause necessarily follows? This is evident in the first Creation of althings: for by Gods fiat or volition, which is eternal, al­things were made in time, without any other impression or con­curse received: and if Gods first Creation of althings was by his simple volition, without any transient concurse, what hinders, but that al other efficience of God should in the same manner consiste in the simple volition of his wil, without any transient concurse? Thence in sacred Philosophie the Divine Efficience is frequently expressed by the Word of God, as the Word of Creation, Gen. 1.3. Conservation, Psal. 107.20. Gubernation, Destruction, Restitution, &c. thereby to denote the efficacitie of the Divine [Page 406]Wil, as mans Wil is expressed by his word, of which hereafter §. 4.6. Prop. See this Hypothesis wel demonstrated in Bradward. Caus. Deil, l. 1. c. 9. p. 190. & c. 10. p. 196. Ariminensi [...], Sent. 1. Distinct. 45. Joan. Major Sent. 2. Quaest. 3.

§. 4. Having discussed the Concurse of God,The Adjuncts of Gods Concurse. 1. It is imme­diate as it relates to its Object and Subject or Principe, we now come to treat of it in its Adjuncts and Modes of operation, which wil give us great in­dications and notices of its nature. 1. The concurse of God is as to its Mode of operation immediate. This Adjunct or Mode of operation follows immediately on the origine or principe of Di­vine Concurse: for it being nothing but the simple volition of God,Particularly as to gratiose ef­fects. it thence necessarily follows, that it must be immediate as to al objects and effects.Esa. 55.10, 11. This immediation of Divine Concurse is frequently inculcated in sacred Philosophie. So Esa. 55.10, 11. For as the rain cometh down and the snow from Heaven, and returneth not thither, but watereth the earth, and maketh it to bring forth and bud, that it may give seed to the sower, and bread to the eater; so shal my word, that goeth forth out of my mouth; it shal not returne unto me void, but it shal accomplish that which I please, and it shal prosper in the thing whereto I sent it. (1) This must be understood not only of Gods reveled word, but also of his efficacious word of concurse, productive of things.Psal. 72.6. So Psal. 72.6. (2) Gods effective ope­rative word or concurse is compared to the Rain, which by Gods ordinance fals to water the earth, straining it self through the li­quid Air, as through a Sieve, dividing it self into millions of drops, and immediately watering every inch of earth, that so every herbe may receive its proportion of moisture, gradually and immediately according to its exigence: just so proportionably doth the efficacious concurse of God immediately insinuate it self into al second causes, operations, and effects, specially such as are gratiose.Hos. 14.5. The like allusion we find, Hos. 14.5. I wil be as the dew to Israel: he shal grow as the lillie. Esa. 26.19. The like Esa. 26.19. For thy dew is as the dew of herbes. The dew, you know, fals in a silent quiet night, in millions of smal imperceptible drops; and being of a gentle insinuating nature, gradually and insensibly sokes into the erth, tempers and allays the heat thereof, specially in those hotter countries, and immediately insinuates it self into the roots of plants; which, by reason of its moist benigne nitrose qualitie, it comfortes, refresheth, and encourageth; calling forth the fruits hereof, and causing the face of things to flourish with beautie and [Page 407]delight, much more efficaciously than sudden great shours, or land-flouds; which are more violent, but lesse beneficial: Thus Christ's gratiose concurse and influence fals like dew on the Be­lievers heart, in millions of drops; which grad [...]aly, insensibly, and immediately insinuate thereinto, causing it to fructifie and flourish much more effectively, than al the shours of Divine wrath, or Land-flouds of spiritual Bondage, which suddenly break in on the consciences of many convict legal consciences; but soon drie up again, and leave them more barren and hard-hearted than before. The Greek Theologues expresse this immediation of Divine Grace various ways: sometimes they terme it, [...], the in­habitant or indwelling Grace: sometimes, [...], the inhabitation of the holy Spirit; because it is wrought by the Spirit of God immediately as dwelling in the Believers heart.

But to treat more generally of Divine Concurse and its imme­diation as to al Objects, Operations, and Effects, Plato, Leg. 4. pag. 715 assures us, That, according to the ancient Tradition, God has not only, [...], the beginning and the end, but also [...], the middle of althings: i. e. God by his efficacious concurse penetrates althings, and is more intimate and immediate to them, than they are to themselves. So also in his Parmenides, he tels us, That the prime Idea or cause is intimately present with althings, influencing al both smal and great. Whence he termes al second causes, [...], Concauses and Co­operators with God. But before we come to the demonstration of our Hypothesis we must premit somethings by way of explication and limitation. (1) When we say, Gods concurse to al second causes and effects is immediate, we do not thereby exclude al means, as if God did so concur as not to make use of second cau­ses and instruments; but that God concurs immediately in and with al means. As in order to health God prescribes and useth means, yet he concurs immediately in and with those means; so in supernatural effects, God useth Ministers and Ordinances, yet concurs immediately in and with them. (2) God concurs immediately to al second causes and effects, not only by the imme­diation of Virtue, but also [immediatione suppositi] by the immedia­tion of his Essence: for indeed the virtue of God is nothing else but his Essence, or Wil as the effective Principe of althings. The Divine Supposite is not so much as ratione or formally distinguish­ed [Page 408]from his Virtue, which is his effective omnipotent Wil. These premisses being laid down we procede to explicate and demon­strate the Immediation of Gods Concurse in the following Pro­positions.

1. Prop. God concurs immediately unto every Act of the second Cause. God concurs im­mediately to e­very Act of se­cond Causes. This Proposition is asserted not only by the Thomistes, but also by the Jesuites, Suarez, Metaph. Disp. 22. sect. 1. and others. And the reasons are invincible: (1) From the subordination of al second causes to the first. Aristotle, in his Physics, l. 8. c. 5. & Me­taphys. l. 2. c. 12. assures us, That in Agents per se and properly sub­ordinate, the inferior cannot act without the influxe or concurse of the superior cause. And the reason is evident: because if the inferior cause could act without the influxe of the superior, it were not subordinate unto the superior in that act. Neither is it sufficient to say, that the second cause is subordinate to God, as its Essence and Virtue is conserved by God, according to the sentiment of Durandus and his Sectators: for such a subordination of the se­cond cause to the first is only accidental and remote as to its act­ing: And who knows not, that an accidental remote cause is not properly a cause? Al proper subordination implies dependence of the inferior cause on the superior, not only quando but quatenus agit, both when and as it actes. (2) From the limitation and depen­dence of al second causes. Every Being by participation is limited: and where there are limits of essence, there necessarily are limits of Activitie and Operation. A Creature can as wel give Being to it self, as actuate it self independently as to the First cause: whatever receives its Being by participation, receives also its Ope­ration in the same mode of Participation. Dependence on God in Operation is as essental and intrinsec to the nature of a Crea­ture, as dependence on God in essence and conservation of that essence. Yea, it is no lesse than an implicite contradiction to say, that a Creature actes without dependence on God for that act, as Suarez and others prove. And the reason is most demon­strative: for, as Aristotle tels us, The mode of operating alwaies fol­lows the mode of essence: If the essence depend on God for its pro­duction and conservation, so must the operation. Whatever is a Being by participation, must also be an Agent by participation. Yea, the very Act of the second cause is a Being by participation; and therefore it requires the concurse and influxe of the First cause for its production, conservation, and promotion. (3) From [Page 409]the nature of the First cause and its perfection. If God concur not immediately to every Act of the second cause, he is not the uni­versal cause of althings, neither is he omnipotent, and most per­fect. For that very Act is a real Being, or if you wil a mode of Being, and so reducible to real Entitie: it cannot be pure no­thing; because pure nothing cannot be the terme or effect of a real production: If then the Act of the second cause be a real positive Entitie or Mode, and yet God not the First cause there­of, then it necessarily follows, that God is not the universal cause of althings: neither is he omnipotent; because he cannot pro­duce that real Act: neither is he most perfect; because there is something in nature physically perfect, which he is not the cause of. Dependence on God as the First cause, albeit it implies something of imperfection in the Creature as a Creature, yet it importes perfection in God: neither can his absolute perfection as the First cause be preserved and maintained without it. (4) From the Providence of God. If God as the First cause concur not immediately to al Acts of second Causes, how can he order, di­rect, and governe them, so as they shal al determine in his own glorie? Again, how can he hinder such Acts as impugne his own ends and designes? Doth not this Antithesis of Durandus and others, who denie God to concur immediately to al Acts of se­cond causes, cut off the chiefest part of Divine Providence, which consistes in the ordering and directing al human Acts for his own glorie?

2. Prop. God as the First cause immediately concurs, not only to the Act, but also the second cause it self, and its wil, if it be a free Agent. God immedi­ately concurs to second Cause self. This Proposition may be demonstrated, (1) by al the fore mentioned Arguments, which prove Gods immediate con­curse to the Act of the second cause: for every efficient cause producing in a subject an Act connatural to the power of he sub­ject, must needs influence and actuate that power: wherefore God the First cause producing in the wil of man an act conna­tural thereto, must necessarily actuate and influence the said wil in such a production. (2) That gods immediate concurse reach­eth the human Wil, and not only its Act, is evident, because it determines the Wil to act. For grant but this, that the human Wil is not the First cause of its own act, but dependent on God for the production thereof, which the Jesuites grant; it necessa­rily follows, that it is actuated and determined by God in al its [Page 410]Acts. It's true, the human Wil is a free Agent and so a self-determining power; but yet this hinders not but that it is also determined by God as the First cause: God determines the Wil to determine it self; as he moves the Wil to move it self. If God did not determine and move the Wil, it could not deter­mine and move it self. (3) Sacred Philosophie is expresse herein, that God workes immediately on the Wil, as wel as on its Acts and Effects. So Philip. 2.13. God is said to worke [...], to wil and to do. And how can he worke to wil unlesse he worke upon the wil? Can there be any way assigned how God should worke to wil, and yet not immediately determine and move the wil?Psal. 139.9, 10. So Psal. 139.9, 10. If I take the wings of the morning, [i.e. slie most swiftly as the morning] and dwel in the utmost parts of the Sea: even there shal thine hand lead me, and thy right hand shal hold me. His mind is, that he cannot flie from the immediate presence of God; because whereever he goes, his immediate hand or concurse must lead him. To lead a man by the hand, and to hold him here denotes Gods immediate concurse on the Wil and its Acts.

3. Prop. God concurs immediately to the effect by one and the same act with the second cause. The Act of the first and second cause the same. For the explication of this Proposition we are to note, that the causation of the first cause is not the same with that of the second, but only the action whereby the first and second cause concur to the production of the effect. For albeit the influxe of the first cause be distinct from that of the second, yet the Act whereby the first and second cause produce the effect is one and the same.Duo individuo opere operan­tes necessario agant unum & idem, cùm indivisa sit co­rum actio: si autem agerent diversis actio­nibus, oporte­ret operata esse divisa: ficut è contrà actio in­divisa non po­test sacere di­visa opera. Grossetesle, de Libero Arbitrio. This is incomparably wel demonstrated by our Learned and great Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincolne, in his Tra­ctate, De Libero Arbitrio, in M. SS. where he acutely proves, That the Action of God and the second cause, whereby the effect is produced, cannot be deverse; because the Effect is but one and the same; which procedes totally from God as the first cause, and totally from the second cause, as hereafter, Prop. 4. For the more ful explication whereof we must distinguish between the Active and Passive Effi­cience of God: Gods Active Efficience is nothing else but the im­manent efficacious Act of his Wil; which, without al peradven­ture, differs infinitely from the efficience of the second cause: yet Gods Passive efficience, as it relates to the Act of the second cause, is not really distinct therefrom: for it's no way incongru­ous or inconsistent, that one and the same act procede from two [Page 411]different total causes of different kinds, such as the first and se­cond cause is. Whence it follows, that one and the same act both of first and second cause immediately and essentially depend on both in their kind. That the first and second cause immedi­ately concur to the same effect, by one and the same indivisible Act may be demonstrated, (1) from the Dependence which the Act of the second cause has on the active causation of the first cause. The Act of the second cause doth not, as some conceive, depend on any real influxe or concurse transient from the first cause, and distinct from the act of the second cause, but on the mere efficacious volition of the first cause; which is the effective principe of al effects. This is acutely demonstrated by Suarez, Metaph. Disput. 21. sect. 3. p. 568. where he proves. ‘That the action of God is not the way or fluxe to the action of the Crea­ture, but to the effect: neither is an action the terme of an action. Therefore to the universal influxe of the first cause there is no more required, but that the action of the second cause pro­cede from his Wil—not that it procede by another externe action; but it can procede immediately by it self from the wil of God. Whence, when the action of the Creature is said to depend on the influxe of God, either this influxe must be taken for the immanent interne Act, as it influenceth the externe Act of the second cause; or the manner of speech must be taken not transitively, save according to some rational conception.’ If we would speak properly, it must be said, that the action of the Crea­ture is from God. Whence he concludes, in the same page thus: ‘By comparing the action of the Creature to the interne action of God, it is clear, that the action of God is in order of nature before the action of the second cause. Whence it's said, that the concurse of the first cause is before that of the second; be­cause the second cause doth not act but in the virtue of the first.’ Hence, (2) we may farther demonstrate the Identitie of the act, whereby the first and second cause concur to the effect, by the Independence which the act of the second cause has as to al tran­sient acts of the first cause distinct from it self. For if the action of the second cause be from God, by some transient influxe distinct from it self; then that influxe being a Creature wil necessarily re­quire some other transient influxe for its production and preser­vation: and so into infinite. (3) That the action, whereby the first and second cause concur to any effect, is one and the same [Page 412]may be demonstrated from the Inutilitie and needlesse supposition of any distinction between them. For if there be supposed two di­stinct actions, one of God, another of the second cause, as neces­sarily concurring to the production of one and the same effect, then the action of the second is from God, or not: It cannot be said, that it is not from God, but only from the second cause; because then it would be said, that the Effect of the second cause is from God, but not the Act, which is against the nature of a finite limited Being, as we have proved in the precedent Propo­sitions: If it be said, that the act of the second cause is from God, then there is no necessity of supposing any other act of God distinct from this, whereby he concurs to the production of the Effect. Is it not every way superfluous and unnecessary to sup­pose two distinct actions, one of the first and another of the se­cond cause, as concurring to the same effect, when as it is grant­ed, and cannot rationally be denied, that the very act of the se­cond cause is from God? This Argument is wel managed by Sua­rez, Metaph. Disp. 21. S. 3. p. 567. The sum of al is this: Both the first and second cause concur immediately to the production of the effect by one and the same action; yet the influxe or con­curse of the first and second cause considered formally as to the effective principes is really distinct.

2. Having dispatcht the Immediation of the Divine concurse,Gods concurse Independent and Absolute. we now procede to a second Adjunct or mode of operation ap­pendent thereto, namely its Independence and Absolutenesse. That the concurse of God is Independent and Absolute we are assured both by Sacred and Platonic Philosophie. The Absolute Inde­pendence of Divine concurse, as to gratiose effects, is frequently inculcated in Sacred Philosophie.Psal. 51.10. Hence we find a creative effi­cace asscribed to Independent Medicinal Grace.Esa. 43.1. So Psal. 51.10. Create in me a clean heart. Esa. 43.1. The Lord that created thee O Jacob, &c. So Esa. 57.19. as elsewhere. Now what more Independent and Absolute than a Creative concurse? (1) Workes of Creation are out of nothing; and so their Efficient must needs be Independent as to mater. (2) Workes of Creation require an infinite independent Agent, which admits no social cause: for Creation being the production of something out of nothing, which are termes, as to Efficience, infinitely distant, none but an Infinite independent cause can effect the same: who can recon­cile something and nothing, but he who has al Being in himself? [Page 413](3) Workes of Creation are in an instant, and therefore depend not on any Preparations, or material Dispositions of the subject. (4) Workes of Creation are Perfect, and therefore require the most perfect independent absolute concurse. How Independnet and absolute efficacious Grace is in its manner of working, is far­ther evident from that Royal Prerogative which it useth in the conversion of sinners. Doth it not oft let some run on in ful ca­reer, til they have one foot in Hel, and then snatch them as fla­ming torches out of that sire? Thus Ezech. 16.6.Ezech. 16.6 I said unto thee when thou wast in thy bloud, Live. Christs Omnipotent, Indepen­dent Word carries a vivisie efficace in it. How many Lions has this Omnipotent Word turned into Lambes? What timber or heart is there so crooked, knottie, and crabbed, out of which he cannot frame a Vessel of Mercie? What heart so stonie, so rocky, out of which he cannot raise up a Son to Abraham, as Mat. 3.9?Mat. 3.9. Now to change one species or kind of Creature into another, a Lion into a Lamb, a stonie heart into a Son of Abraham, doth not this argue Independent, Absolute and Omnipotent Efficace? So little is this gratiose concurse tied to, or dependent on the least Moral Dispositions, Obligations, Merits, Causes, Conditions, or moving Considerations without it self: it is the freest thing in the world, and therefore compared to the motion of the wind, which bloweth where it listeth, Joh. 3.8. Can we suppose,Joh. 3.8. that any thing the Creature performes should lay the least obligation on Soverain Free Grace? Is it not a childish thing to suppose, that the infinite occan of Independent Grace should ebbe and slow, ac­cording to the various changes and conditions of Mans Free Wil, that most mutable Moon? But that not only Essicacious Grace, but al Divine concurse is Independent and Absolute, may be pro­ved by these invincible Reasons. (1) From the Independence of the Divine Wil, the first cause of althings. The first cause, accord­ing to Sacred and Platonic Philosophie, is [...], without al cause and dependence. Thus Plato, Repub. 6. p. 509. where bring­ing in God, under the notion of the chiefest good, and the first cause of althings, he gives him this character, [...], He is not mere essence, but somewhat more august than essence, transcending al finite essence both in Dignitie and Virtue. So elsewhere he makes God to be [...], the supreme effective cause of al­things, and therefore Independent as to al subservient instrumen­tal [Page 414]causes. Yea, he wil have God the first Cause to be [...], Being it self and Eternitie it self; and thence no way de­pendent on second causes. And the Platonistes generally make God to be [...], superessential, and so most independent. And, alas! how absurd and monstrose is it, that the concurse of the first Cause should depend on the second cause? Is not the Divine Wil the first effective Principe of althings, the same with the Divine Essence? May we not then as wel make the Essence of God to be dependent as his Wil. (2) From the pure actua­litie and simplicitie of the Divine Wil. Al dependence implies a passive receptive power as to that on which it dependes: there is no dependence without some passive power either physic or me­taphysic: But now Gods Wil as it is the effective Principe of althings has not the least passive power: therefore no dependence. (3) From the Primatie and Superioritie of the first Cause. Thus Damascene, Orthod. Fid. l. 2. c. 1. [...], God solely being without Principe, or indepen­dent, he is the Framer of althings, &c. God being the first Cause of althings must necessarily be independent in his Causalitie and Essence. For where there is dependence, there is inferioritie and subordination: And may we presume, that the concurse of the first Cause is inferior and subordinate to that of the second cause? Doth it amount to lesse than a contradiction, to say the first Cause dependes on or is subordinate to the second cause? What! can it be first and yet subordinate? What is this but to be first, and yet not first but second? For dependence and subor­dination is an effential mode of the second cause, as independence of the first. (4) As the concurse of the first Cause is independent, so also absolute; yea therefore absolute, because independent: for that which dependes on nothing without it self, must needs be ab­solute. That the Concurse of God is absolute and no way de­pendent on any conditions of the subject, or object it workes up­on, specially as to gratiose effects, is most evident from sacred Philosophie.Eph. 2.8, 9, 10. So Ephes. 2.8, 9, 10. He saith, v. 8. For by Grace ye are saved through faith, and that not of your selves, it is the gift of God. It's true, it workes through faith; but yet not as a condition in the power of Free-wil to performe, but only as Faith is the Organ or Canal through which medicinal Grace is conveighed into the Soul: the whole is the Gift of God: and why? v. 9. Not of workes, lest any one should boast. As if he had said: Alas! if [Page 415]this medicinal Grace should be suspended on any moral or Evan­gelic conditions to be performed by us, then there were indeed room for boasting: which Christ wil not allow of. Are the deri­vations of the fountain suspended on any conditions the streams can performe? doth not the stream owe al that it has to the free, independent, and absolute communication of the spring? Thence it follows v. 10. For we are his workemanship created in [or by] Christ Jesus unto good workes: i. e. look as God created and for­med the first rude confused Chaos, not for any foreseen goodnesse in it, but out of a pure nothing; so Christ frames the New Crea­ture, not for any foreseen conditions it can performe, but unto al conditions or good workes, as Esa. 19.25. We have an excel­lent discourse against conditional Grace, in Jansenius, August. Tom. 3. l. 2. c. 24. pag. 83. ‘By the predication of this conditio­nal Grace, which enables us to act if we wil, there is nothing gain­ed but the total subversion of Christ's medicinal Grace, and the substituting in the room thereof the Grace of a sound Wil, such as Adam had and Angels now have: and thus Christ hath died in vain: for the proper Grace of Christ, which he by his Pas­sion hath brought to heal our infirmities,Gratia medici­nalis non est talis, quae do­minatrici samu­lando volunta­ti, vel influit, vel non influit, prout imperan­ti sese determi­nare, vel haere­re placet; sed prorsus talis, quae simulac pulsat fores rumpit ostia, repugnantém (que) domat volunta­tem, tollit om­nem ejus re­sistentiam, ra­pit eam secum, & ex invita vo­lentem ineffa­bili suavitate facit. Jansen. August. Tom. 3. is such as doth not only worke the effect if we wil, expecting when our Wils wil move, but it enables us to wil: for herein lies the precise diffe­rence between a sound and sick Wil.’ That the influxe and con­curse of God is absolute may be demonstrated from the absurdi­tie, yea impossibilitie of a conditionate concurse in God. How absurd is it to conceit, that God wil concur with the human Wil in the act of willing upon condition that it wil! Yea, how im­possible is such a conditionate influxe! For if there be any con­dition required to Gods Concurse, then he concurs to the work­ing of that condition, or not: if not, then there is some act of the Creature produced without the Divine Concurse: If God doth concur to that condition, then absolutely, or on some other condition: if absolutely, then his former concurse is not con­ditionate: for he that requires any condition of his act, and gives that condition may be said to act absolutely: besides if God con­cur absolutely to the later condition, why not also to the former act? If God concur to the second condition conditionately, then also to the third, &c. and thus there wil be a dore open to a progresse into infinite, which Nature, but much more the God of Nature abhors. Hence,

3. Gods Concurse is previous and antecedent. Gods concurse previous and antecedent. For the expli­cation of this Adjunct or Mode of Operation we are to consider, that he Prioritie here meant is not of Time but of Causalitie, as the causalitie of the First cause is in order of nature antecedent to the causalitie of the second cause: for therefore the second cause cooperates; because the First cause operates. The Prioritie and Antecedence of Divine Concurse is most evident in gratiose Operations and Effects. Thus Isidorus Pelusiota, lib. 2. Epist. 72. (Edit. Commelin. 1605.) pag. 121. An evil tree, saith he, cannot bring forth good fruit, Mat. 7.18. Mat. 7.18. How did Paul, when he was a Persecutor, become a Preacher? How did Peter, when he had abjured Christ, get off this spot? By what means was the wild Olive implanted into the good Olive, Rom. 11.17. Rom. 11.17? How did the Thief get admission into Paradise? [...], having perceived therefore the force of precedent Divine aide, every one that wils both labors, and moves althings, (for a naked wil sufficeth not) and learnes, and attains Salvation. Wherein he assertes, (1) [...], that supernatural antecedent aide or Grace workes al in maters of Sal­vation. (2) That the naked wil sufficeth not to performe any good. Chrysostome, in Genes. Hom. 9. cals this prevenient Grace, [...], the Grace that seeks what is lost, and is found by such as seek it not. Basil termes it, [...]. Anticipant Grace. So de Baptis. lib. 1. [...], By the prevenient Grace of God we worke and confer our duties, according to saith, by love. This antecedence and Prioritie of Divine Concurse may be demonstrated, (1) From its effective Principe the Divine Wil, which necessarily precedes the Act of the second cause; because eternal and independent, as before. (2) From the effi­cace of the Divine Concurse, as it infallibly determines the se­cond cause to act, and so must be necessarily antecedent thereto, not only. simultaneous, as the Jesuites hold. (3) From the De­pendence and Subordination of the second cause to the First. Al second causes are but [...], Concauses, dependent on and sub­ordinate to the First cause, as Plato: now where there is depen­dence and subordination, here must necessarily be Prioritie and Antecedence of that on which the subordinate dependes. Thus Suarez, Metaph. Disp. 21. Sect. 2. pag. 568. ‘By comparing, saith [Page 417]he, the action of the Creature to the interne action of God, it is clear, that the action of God is in order of nature before the action of the Creature: whence it is said, that the first cause doth first influence or concur; because the second cause actes not, but in and by its virtue.’ Yet it cannot be denied, but that the Jesuites generally allow God only a simultaneous Concurse as o the acts of the Wil; because otherwise, as they conceit, the li­bertie of the Wil cannot be preserved. This simultaneous concurse they make to be nothing else but the very action of the second cause, as it procedes from God. Burgersdicius, Metaph. l. 2. c. 11. grants, that Gods Concurse in supernatural Acts is previous; but yet in naturals he allows it to be only simultaneous. But that Gods Concurse not only in supernaturals, but also in naturlas is previous the Dominicans strongly prove from the very nature of the First cause, and dependence of the second: for where there is subordination and dependence in causalitie, there is posterio­ritie, &c.

4. Gods Concurse to and with second causes is total. Gods Concurse total. This To­talitie of the First cause doth not exclude the Totalitie of the se­cond cause in its kind, but only its partialitie and coordination in the same kind. For it's a trite Rule in Philosophie, that in cau­ses subordinate there may be diverse total causes in different kinds concurring to the same effect, but not in the same kind. So we say that God, and the Sun, and Man are al total causes in the production of a Man; because they al have different kinds of causalitie. When therefore we say, that Gods Concurse is total, we do only denie the Coordination or Copartialitie of the se­cond cause. We allow the second cause to cooperate with God in a way of subordination, but not to be a coordinate, social, or co­partial cause with God. Divine Concurse, specially as to gratiose effects, workes al totally and solitarily: it admits not of a Corri­val or Copartner: it is no partial cause, but workes the whole effect, though not without the subservience of inferior causes and instruments. As in natural causes, you ascribe the whole efficace and causalitic of the instrument to the principal cause; specially if the instrument be purely passive, without any inherent virtue of its own. As you ascribe not the victorie to the Generals Sword, but to his Valor: so here the instruments which Christ useth in the workes of the new Creation are purely passive; they have no efficace, but what is imparted to them by him the prin­cipal [Page 418]Efficient; and therefore they cannot be partial, social cau­ses. This Totalitie of Divine Concurse is wel demonstrated by that great and pious Witnesse against Antichrist, even in the darkest times of Poperie, Robert Grosseteste Bishop of Lancolne, in his MSS. de Libero Arbitrio: ‘Efficacious Grace so workes with the Free­wil, that at first it prevents the act of the Wil, and afterwards concurs; yet not so, as if part were wrought by Grace and part by Free-wil, but each in its kind workes the whole: for two individual Agents must necessarily worke one and the same ef­fect when their action is indivise— This Augustin illustrates by a Rider and the Horse; by whom one and the same act or motion is totally produced: so the Action of God and of the Wil con­cur totally— And so in every effect of every Creature, God and the next second cause produce the same conjointly not a­part, or one this part and that the other part, &c.’ This Tota­litie of Divine Concurse as to gratiose effects is frequently and lively illustrated and demonstrated by the Greek Theologues. Thus Chrysostome, Hom. 12. ad Hebr. [...], &c. We see houses beauti­fully built, Hoc, inquit Bo­naventura, pia­rum mentium est, ut nihil si­bi tribuant, sed totum Gratiae Dei: unde quantumcun (que) aliquis det Gratiae Dei à pietate non re­ceder, etiamsi multa tribuen­do Gratiae Dei aliquid subtra­hit potestati Naturae: cùm verò aliquid Gratiae Dei sub­trahitur, & Na­turae tribuitur quod Gratiae est, ibi potest periculum in­tervenire. Cas­sandri Consul­oat. Art. 18. and we say; the whole is the Artificers: albeit he has worke men under him: so the whole of good must be ascribed to God. So in Genes 715. [...], The whole is from the Grace of God. So ad Ephes. Hom. 18. speaking of Paul, he saith, [...]. Thou seest how in althings be conceles what is his own, and ascribes al to God. So Greg. Nazianz. Orat. 31. speaking of Paul, saith, [...], he ascribes al to God. Thus also Cyril Ale­xandr. and others, as Court Gent. P. 2. B. 3. Ch. 9. Sect. 3. §. 12. This partial concurse supposeth God and the Creature to act to­gether in the same kind of causalitie, which is repugnant both to the nature of God, as also to the condition of the Creature. (1) This partial Concurse is repugnant to the independent, simple, perfect nature of God, as also to his prime, soverain, efficacions causalitie. What more incongruous and unbecoming the supreme infinite Being, than to be yoked with his Creature as a partial, social, coordinate cause? (2) This also is inconsistent with the Subor­dination, Dependence, and Inferioritie of the second cause. For al social, partial causes are as such coordinate and equal: the effect dependes on each, but they depend not each on the other. To make the second cause social and coordinate with the first, what [Page 419]is it but to make it a first cause? (3) This also is inconsistent with the prioritie and antecedence of Gods concurse: for a par­tial causalitie is only simultaneous, which has been already refu­ted. (4) The sober Scholastic Divines have ever owned and ap­proved a Totalitie of Divine concurse. So Aquinas, contra Gent. l. 3. cap. 70. ‘It's manifest, saith he, that the same effect is a­scribed to the natural and second cause and to the Divine Effi­cace; not as if it were partly from God, and partly from the natural Agent; but the whole effect is from both in a different mode: as the same effect is attributed totally to the Instrument, and yet totally to the principal cause.’ The like Alvarez, Di­sput. 85.

The Totalitie of Divine concurse, as to the new Creature and Gratiose Effects, is lively illustrated and demonstrated in Sacred Philosophie. Thus Esa. 43.7.Esa. 43.7 Even every one that is called by my name: for I have created him for my Glorie, I have formed him, yea, I have made him. Here Christ assumes to himself, as the sole, total, principal Agent, the Creation, Formation, and Consummation of the New Creature. As in the old Creation, God made first the rude Chaos out of nothing: then out of the rude Chaos he form­ed the several species of the Universe, and particularly the Bodie of Man out of the dust of the Earth; which was Formation: thence in the last place, he breathed into Man a Rational Soul; which gave Consummation to him: So proportionably hereto Christ here assumes to himself a threefold concurse, and each total, in the framing of the New Creature. he saith, (1) I have created him. [...]. I have educed or called him out of nothing, as I did the first rude Chaos. The new Creature is not educed out of the potence of corrupt Nature, but out of nothing by Divine Om­nipotence. But if this be not enough to expresse the Totalitie of his efficacious Essicience, he addes, (2) I have formed him [...]. This also is a terme whereby the formation of Creatures out of the first chaos is expressed: The sense is; I have not only given him some first lines, a rude masse, or shape of a new Creature; but I have fashioned and formed him, as I at first formed Adam out of a piece of Red Earth or Clay: For so the word signifies, to forme or shape a thing, as the Potter doth his Clay, to this or that forme. And if al this wil not suffice to demonstrate, that Christ is the total Creator and Formator of the New Creature, he addes yet farther, (3) Yea, I have made him, [...]. i. e. I have perfect­ed [Page 420]and completed the whole worke: I have made him such as I would have him, conforme to mine eternal Idea concerning him: he has no part wanting or misplaced; not a finger or little toe defective: he is a complete, perfect new Creature, and that by virtue of my Creation, Formation, and Consummation. Thus the whole of the new Creature, as wel as of the old, is to be ascribed to Christ totally and solely as the Creator, Fictor, and Effector there­of. And here we are also to note, that it was usual with the Hebrews, to expresse the workes of the interne new Creation, under the symbol of the externe old Creation. The Totalitie of the Divine concurse is also we expressed, Esa. 63.5. and Psal. 94.17.

5.Gods concurse particular not general only. The concurse of God as the first cause is particular and pro­per, not only general. This Adjunct or mode of operation may seem novel, but really it is not so. Before we come to the de­monstration of it, we must premit some Distinctions and Limi­tations. (1) We must distinguish between a general providence, and general concurse: we denie not but that Gods Providence, as it extendes to althings universally, may be termed general, which yet doth no way induce or suppose a general concurse, i. e. such as is alike commun to al effects and determinable thereby; as the concurse of the Sun is determinable by the effects it workes on. Such a general concurse is unworthy of the first cause, who determines al effects, but is determinable by none. Bradwardine de Causd Dei, l. 3. c. 7. p. 668. undertakes to give us the origine of this general influxe or concurse, which he makes to be from the Pagan Philosophers, 'specially the Astrologers, who asserted an emanation or irradiation of general influxes from celestial Bodies, which they supposed to be Gods, on al subjects or maters. (2) We must distinguish between a particular cause, and a particular con­curse. We do not affirme that God is a particular cause, but an universal cause concurring in a particular manner to al second causes and their effects. And here Heereboord, Select. Disputat. Vol. 1. Disput. 10, and 11. whiles he justly opposeth his Master Burgers­dicius, for denying Gods concurse to be particular, he himself false into this easie mistake of making God a particular cause. For the obviating of which, as also for the taking away the foundation of al the objections urged against our Hypothesis, we say, that God is an Ʋniversal Cause, and yet his concurse, as to the mode of its operation is particular. God is said to be an Ʋniversal Cause, in [Page 421]regard of the extent of his causalitie, as it extendes to al objects, effects, and second causes universally: and yet his concurse is par­ticular, as it is not, like that of the Sun, determinable by its ob­ject, but doth in a particular manner, according to the exigence and condition of the subject, determine the same. These things being premissed we procede to demonstrate, that the concurse of God is not general but particular, as to its manner of working with al second causes. (1) From the nature of a General con­course; which is of it self indifferent, but modified and determi­ned by the mater it workes on: So the influxe of the Sun is only general and indifferent; because modified by the mater it workes on, as it is evident by the colors in a Rain-bow, as also by the opposite effects it has on the waxe and clay. To suppose Gods concurse to be thus General and Indifferent is every way unwor­thy of the first cause, which determines al second causes, but is determined by none. To assert, that the concurse of God is in the power of the second cause or mater it workes on, what is this but to suppose the second cause to be first and the first second? (2) From the manifold imperfections that are hereby imposed on God. For if the concurse of God be only General and Indiffe­rent, it then hangs in suspense, and has not efficace enough to reach its effect, unlesse it be so or so disposed. Whence also it follows, that it is in the power of the second cause to resist or fru­strate the concurse of God, so that it shal not reach its effect. Hence lastly it follows, that the concurse of God is not efficacious and omnipotent, which we shal anon prove. (3) That the con­curse of God as to its manner of working is not general but par­ticular is asserted and demonstrated by some of the most acute of the Scholastic Theologues. So Bradwardine l. 1. c. 4. and l. 3. c. 7. Joan. major in Sentent. 2. Dist. 28. q. 1. p. 122. Alvarez de Auxil. Disput. 23. with several others.

But here it is objected, 1. by Burgersdicius and others:Objections a­gainst Gods par­ticular concurse. (1) If God concur by a particular concurse to the specification of the action, then he may be said to walke, discourse, eat, &c. To this Objection we respond, [1] by denying, that God concurs to the specifica­tion of the action, albeit he concurs by a particular concurse: for an action is specified from its particular cause, not from the first universal cause. So that here is that which they cal a fallacie of many interrogations, whereof one is true the other false. Or, we may cal it a begging of the Question, in that they suppose, That, if [Page 422]God concur by a particular concurse, he concurs also to the specification of the action, which is an inconsequent consequence. [2] Those Animal acts of walking, eating, &c. ascribed to the second cause, cannot be ascribed to God the first cause, albeit they more prin­cipally belong to him; because they procede not from pure effi­cience, but from information, (to use the Aristotelean phrase) or a bodie so organised. Those actions signifie a relation to the parti­cular subject whence they slow, and therefore cannot be properly attributed to God, as Bradward. l. 1. c. 4. p. 178. and Suarez Me­taphys. Disput. 21. S. 3. acutely replie, shewing that ambulation, eating, &c. do not denote pure efficience, but a subject informed by such motions, which are therefore proper to the said subject. (2) But the main objection of Burgersdicius and others against Gods particular concurse is taken from sinful actions, unto which, say they, God cannot be said to concur by a particular concurse, un­lesse we make him the author of sin. This objection makes a great noise, but has little of weight in it. For (1) The deordination of any sinful act can only be ascribed to the second cause, who is the Author of it, not unto the first cause, who only produceth the physical entitative Act. [2] That which is most sinful in regard of the second cause, is so ordered by God, as that it shal conduce to the greatest good, as before, and hereafter in the pro­vidence of God.

6.Gods Concurse Efficacious. Gods concurse is most Potent and Efficacious. This Adjunct and Mode of operation is most expresse in Sacred Philosophie, specially as to gratiose Influences, which are most potent. Sin is a mighty strong poison, ay but medicinal Grace is a much stronger Antidote. The powers of darkenesse and Hel are very strong; but Christ the Captain of our Salvation, hath Samson-like carried away the Gates of Hel upon his shoulders and led captivitie cap­tive: His Grace is most potent, irresistible, and victorions. Thus Jansenius, Augustin. Tom. 3. l. 2. c. 24. p. 43. having in what pre­cedes sufficiently refuted the Conditional Grace of the Molimstes, he addes: ‘This therefore is the true reason, why no medicinal Grace of Christ ever wants its effect, but al workes both to wil and to do; because with Augustin Grace and the good worke are so reciprocated, that as from Grace conferred the effect of the worke may be inferred, so on the other hand, from the de­fect of the worke, it may be inferred, that Grace was not given. By which manner of reasoning it appears, that Grace as the [Page 423]cause, and the operation of the Wil as the effect are, as the Phi­losophers speak, convertible, and mutually inseparable each from other. For so Augustin speakes of the Conflict against Tentations: Agis si ageris, & bene agis, si à [...]bono ageris: so effi­cacious is medicinal Grace. Yea Jansenins a voucheth, that there is no manner of speech among the Scholastic Theologues so effi­cacious to expresse, that the determination, or predetermination of the Wil is from the Grace of God, but Augustin assumes the same, to demonstrate, that the Grace of Christ is not such, that the effect should be suspended or dependent on any condition to be performed by the human Wil, but that the effect is most potently produced by it, not if the Wil willeth, but by work­ing and determining the Wil to wil.’ So Habak. 3.4.Habak. 3.4. And his brightnesse was as the light: he had bornes coming out of his hand: and there was the hiding of his power. And his brightnesse was as the light. The brightnesse of Christ was exceding gloriose, even like the brightnesse of the Sun, in its meridian glorie. Thence it fol­lows: he had hornes coming out of his hands. [...] properly signifies, to send forth beams as hornes, to irradiate and shine forth. Beams and hornes have some analogie and ressemblance, and therefore the same word among the Hebrews signifies both. Hence the vulgar Version renders [...] Exod. 34.29, hornes, whereas it sig­nifies there beams, as here. Whence it follows: out of his hands. Hands here denote Christ's power, as Act. 11.21. [...] hand sig­nifies power, the hand being the instrument of the bodie, where­by it puts forth its power. Thence he addes: There was the hi­ding of his power: i. e. his secret power lay wrapt up in his effica­cious rays, or concurse, which is exceding influential and potent, like hornes. We find something analogous hereto in Plato, Re­pub. 6. pag. 509. where treating of God as the first Cause of al good, he compares him to the Sun, and his concurse to the rays thereof, in this manner: Thou wilt say, I presume, that the Sun doth not only cause that things are seen, but also that they are generated, do grow, are nourished: although it be not the generation of those things. Thus therefore determine, that the chiefest good, [namely God] doth give to those things that are known not only that they are known, [...], but also force and efficace for their existence, &c. Wherein he compares the effica­cious Concurse of God to the spermatic potent influxe of the Sun, which gives life, sense, motion, nutrition, angmentation and vi­gor [Page 424]to al manner of Insects. Whence those blind Gentiles made the Sun, under the fictitious names of Apollo and his Son Esculapius, the supreme God of Medicine; because the Virtues of Plants de­pend on the Sun,See Court Gent. P. 1. B. 2. C. 8. §. 11. its heat and influence: whence they consecrated the Laurel to Apollo, which signified with them the heat and in­fluence of the Sun: the Laurel being a Plant, as they say, hot and alwaies green. Such a soverain efficace did the Grecian Phi­losophers ascribe unto the Sun, in regard of its influence, not only on Plants, but also on animal Bodies; and therefore it is deser­vedly made by Plato a symbolic image of Gods efficacious Con­curse on al create Beings and Operations. Thus in sacred Phi­losophie we find Christ, as the first cause of al Grace, compared to the Sun, and his gracious influxe to the beams of the Sun. So Mal. 4.2.Mal. 4.2. But unto you that fear my Name shal the Sun of righte­ousnesse arise with healing in his wings, and ye shal go forth and grow up as calves of the stal. Christ here, as the first original Spring of al Grace, and compared to the Sun: whence he is said, to arise with healing in his wings: i. e. his Beams: for the Beams of the Sun are its wings, whereby it conveighs an healing prolific influence to al­things that have life. The Sun indeed vouchsafeth warme effica­cious influences to al natural bodies, both vegetable and animal: it has an universal prolific influence on al sublunarie bodies. Thence it's said Psal. 19.6.Psal. 19.6. And there is nothing hid from the heat thereof: i. e. its warme benigne influxe reacheth, as some conceive, unto al natural effects, even to the very Minerals and Metals. But certain it is, that Vegetables and Plants are greatly influenced by the Sun.Job 8.16. Hence that Job 8.16. He is green before the Sun. Whence is the beautie of Roses, the delicious suavities of Fruits, the medicinal virtues of Herbes, the nourishment of Corne, the fatnesse of Olives, the cordial and heart-reviving influences of Grapes, but from the Sun? So for the animal life, are not al In­sects produced by the Sun? Yea doth not the health, strength, vi­vacitie, and comforts of mans bodie receive much influence from the efficacious beams of the Sun, as Job 30.28. Eccles. 11.7? Is not then the Sun, both in Sacred and Platonic Philosophie, made an apt Symbol to represent the efficacious Concurse of God as the first cause of althings, but more specially of supernatural effects? O! what Soul-reviving influences are there in the warme beams of Divine concurse? What universal, inexhaustible, infinite trea­sures of Divine light and heat are there in the Sun of Righteous­nesse? [Page 425]Are not his beams the light of life, as Joh. 8.12. Psal. 84.11? Such is the efficace of Divine concurse. There is moreover a great emphase and elegance in that phrase, Mal. 4.2. And ye shal go forth and grow up as calves of the stal: i.e. as weak, feeble Calves, which in the winter, by reason of the cold, are kept in the stal, at spring, when they go forth and sport themselves under the warme healing beams of the Sun, how greatly do they grow and thrive: so the sick, infirme friends of Christ, when they lie under the warme, refreshing, corroborating influences of his medicinal Grace. Yea, this efficacious soverain Grace doth not only cure infirme consumtive Souls, but also give life to dead Souls. Thus Esa. 9.2. The people that walked in darkenesse have seen a great light, Esa. 9.2. they that dwel in the land of the shadow of death, upon them hath the light shined. (1) This Prophecie refers to our Lords first Preach­ing among those that inhabited the land of Zabulon and Nephthali, mentioned v. 1. and so applied Mat. 4.14, 15, 16. who were indeed, at the coming of our Lord, under very black Egyptian darke­nesse: whence they are said, to walke in darkenesse. (2) They are said, to dwel in the land of the shadow of death. [1] [...] they that dwel denotes a fixed immobile state, not only of such as tra­vel or passe throwo a countrie, but of inhabitants. Then [2] we have the place of their habitation, the land of the shadow of death. [...] of the shadow of death, whereby we may understand either a deadly shade, such as by the dampe thereof strikes dead; which is very frequent in some darke cavernes of the Earth: or else, by the shadow of death, we may understand the Grave, which is the darke shadowy habitation of the dead; as Job 10.21. the Grave is stiled the land of darkenesse, and the shadow of death. And look as dead men are loged in the darke, shadowy Grave; so were these dead Souls in the land of Zabulon and Nephthali loged in the Grave of sin, under the darke, deadly shade thereof; which implies a total privation of spiritual light and life. Now (3) on these dead Souls dwelling in the Grave of sin the light shined, i. e. Christ the Sun of Righteousnesse arose with healing under his wings, or warme beams of efficacious Grace. Yea, how oft doth this omnipotent heart quickening Grace picke out the worst of sinners as fit mater to exert its soverain efficace on?Esa. 19.18. Thus Esa. 19.18. In that day [i. e. when the Sun of Righteousnesse shal arise on Egypt with healing under his wings] shal five cities in the land of Egypt speake the language of Canaan, [i. e. be converted to [Page 426]God] and swear to the Lord of Hostes: [i. e. bind themselves in­viorably to Christ, by an Oath of Allegeance and Supremacie] one shal be called the Citre of Destruction. [...] which we render the Citie of Destruction is rendred by Grotius, Gataker and other Critics, the Citie of the Sun, called by the Grecians who possessed it, Heliopolis; which the Hebrews expressed by Bethsenes, the house of the Sun, i. e. consecrated to the Sun, their principal God, which was with al manner of idolatric Rites worshipped in this Citie. For Herodotus assures us, that this Citie Heliopolis was one of the sixe, unto which the Egyptians used at some solemne times to repair out of al parts, to celebrate the Worship of the Sun; because here was their renowned Temple of the Sun; as also Mnevis one of their sacred Buls, which they worshipped as God, of which see Court Gent. P. 1. B. 2. C. 8. §. 9. Now this Heliopolis so much addicted to and immersed in Idolatrie is made one of the principal objects, on which the Sun of Righteousnesse should arise with healing under his wings or beams of efficacious medi­cinal Grace. So v. 22. And the Lord shal smite Egypt, he shal smite and heal it, and they shal returne even unto the Lord, &c. What! shal Egypt, yea the most idolatrous Citie of Egypt, Heliopolis, be healed by the soverain Grace of the Sun of Righteousnesse? O! what a potent demonstration is this of the omnipotent efficace of medi­cinal Grace? May not this Argument be further promoved by a reflexion on these Britannic Iles and their prodigiose Idolatrie, when the Sun of Righteousnesse at first arose on them with heal­ing under his wings of Evangelic medicinal Grace?

But for the more ful explication and demonstration of the offi­cacitie of Divine Concurse, we are to consider, that there is a twofold Concurse of God, one moral; the other efficacious; which some terme physic Concurse, because it workes according to the manner of physic Efficients. For a physic Cause is that which really and properly influenceth the Effect: but a moral Cause, as dictin­guished from physic, is that which contributes not any real and proper influxe for the production of the effect, yet he doth so far morally concur, as that the effect is imputed to him, as it's wel determined by Suarez, Metaph. Disput. 17. Sect. 2. pag. 402. A moral cause doth not reach the effect immediately, neither doth it properly move and determine the Agent, but only obje­ctively and remotely, by Commands, Arguments, Incentives, Motives, and such like moral influences: which is only a meta­phoric, [Page 427]indirect, remote, improper, and inefficacious kind of effi­cience. But now a physic Cause, is that which alone deserves, and therefore in the Scholes has appropriated to it self the name of an efficient Cause; because it doth by a proper, real, direct, and efficacious influxe or causalitie reach its effect. God has both a moral and physic or efficacious concurse in and for the production of moral good. He commandes, propones arguments, invites, persuades what is good; as also efficaciously workes the same in those he intendes to do good to. But as for sinful acts God doth not by any moral concurse concur thereto, and therefore they may not be imputed to him as the Author of them.

This being premissed, we procede to demonstrate the efficaci­tie of Gods Concurse. (1) From its soverain nature and omnipotent manner of working, specially in supernatural, gratiose effects. The efficacitie of actual Grace in the Infusion, Conservation, Promotion, and Actuation of Habitual is lively illustrated by the Grecanic Fa­thers of the Primitive Churches; who stile this efficacious medi­cinal Grace, [...], the superne or supernatural vocation and motion: they terme it sometimes, [...], the operant and cooperant Grace: also [...], the Energie, Aide, and Assistence of God: [...], the ineffable Virtue of God; [...], the assistent Power. It's termed also by them, [...], the superne and Divine impulse, or inclination; also [...], the Divine hand; [...], the Grace of protection; [...], the universal Spring of Energie; [...], of it self perfect and sufficiently operative: Chry­sostome termes it [...], a gift above nature overcoming nature: also [...], insuperable Assi­stence. But none among the Greek Theologues seems more live­ly to describe it, than Cyril Alexandr. lib. 1. de Adorat. Tom. 1. where he assertes, That men are turned from sin, [...], not only by words injected into the Soul; [i. e. according to the Pe­lagian persuasion, by moral suasion only] but that God puts forth [...], an energetic efficacious Aide, whereby the infirme Wil is led as by the hand. Clemens Alexandr. l. 1. Paed. c. 3. cals it [...], the Inspiration of God: also [...], the subtile and spirituale instructive force of Divine words. And Athanas. contr. Gent. [...], the power communicated from God. Again he saith, [...] [Page 428] [...], the Grace of God hath overcome. Whence the Greek Theologues termed it, [...], the invincible Assistence. And Chrysostome saith expressely, that [...], al good comes from the Grace and efficacious Virtue of God. (2) From its effective Principe, the Divine Wil. We have be­fore, §. 3. demonstrated, that the Divine Concurse supposeth not any transient influxe form God, but only the act of the Di­vine Wil: which being omnipotent, it thence necessarily fol­lows, that his concurse is also omnipotent and most efficacious. Whence it is worthy our notice, that the Concurse of God is in Scripture expressed by his fiat or word, as Gen. 1.3, &c. And what is this Word of God but the omnipotent Act of his Wil? Hence in sacred Philosophie, the Hebrew [...], and Greek [...], signifie both Word and Thing, denoting to us, that there is an intimate reciprocation between Divine Words and Things: whatever God speakes and sayes shal be done, is done: and whatever is done, is but the effect of his Word or Wil: every Word and Wil of God, which regardes the event and issues of things, is omnipotent and operative. (3) From the Determination of the second cause by the first. Gods Concurse is not only moral, by propounding objects and persuading thereto; but really ope­rative and productive of things. Now in al cooperation the causes cooperating are either coordinate or subordinate: the first and se­cond cause cannot be coordinate, but the later must be subordinate to the former: and if subordinate to, then it must be determined by the first Cause. It's certain, that either the second cause de­termines the first, or the first the second: and is it not more like­ly, that the first cause should determine the second, than that the second should determine the first to act? Can we imagine, that the concurse of the first cause is in the power of the second? Is it not more agreable to the Nature of God, and the condition of a Creature, to determine, that the causalitie of the second cause is subordinate unto, and therefore determinable by the concurse of the first cause? This argument is more fully managed by the Dominicans and Jansenistes. See Bradwardine de. Causa Dei, l. 3. c. 7. p. 669. Alvarez, de Auxil. l. 3. Disp. 18-21. & l. 4. Disput. 32. Jansenius, August. Tom. 3. l. 2. c. 22.

7.Gods Concurse connatural. Lastly, Gods concurse, albeit it be most potent and effica­cious, yet is it also most Connatural and Congenial: there is not more of force, than Divine suavitie mixed therewith. So Psal. 110.3.Psal. 110.3. Thy people shal be willing in the day of thy power. Willing. [Page 429] [...] willingnesses. [...] nadib signifies (1) Free, ready, chear­ful, spontaneous. (2) Metonymically, a free gift or oblation. (3) Princes, who ought to be free-spirited, generose, liberal, as Luke 22.25 (4) The word is here used in the abstract, which carries a great emphase: for abstractes speak essences. (5) It is here also in the Genitive case plural; [of thy willingnesses] which the He­brews use as expressive of a superlative degree. So that the mean­ing is: thy people shal be in the most superlative degree free, ready, willing, as Noble and Free-borne Princes, to offer up them­selves a Free-wil-offering, gift, or oblation unto thee. Hence ef­ficacious Grace was termed by the Greek Fathers, [...], the interne philtrum or charme: by Basil, [...], the Grace which is sweetly received: by Chrysostome, Hom. 31. in Mat. [...], an opportune vocation. Of which see more Court Gen. P. 2. B. 3. c. 9. S. 3. §. 12.Nihil Augusti­no certius est, quàm in Scri­pturis S. Grati­am illam effica­cem, per quam solam opera­mur quicquid. boni opera­mur, nomine­dulcedinis, sua­vitatis, delecta­tionis, nempe spiritualis & coelestis esse significatam. Delectationi Dilectionem, Ardorem, In­flammationem­que subnectit. Sunt emim ef­fectus qui im­mediatè ex illa coelesti suavi­tate germinant. Jansen. August. Tom. 3. De Grat. l. 4. c. 1. Ubi fusiùs de suavi­tate hac spiri­ruali Gratiae Medicinalis tractat. So sweetly doth Medicinal Grace Worke. And yet it workes nevertheless omnipotently: for so it fol­loweth: in the day of thy power. [...] signifies (1) force, and strength of bodie, or mind: and thence, (2) Metonymically, richesse or mi­litarie Forces; because in them men place their strength, job 21.7. Psal. 49.6. We may understand it in both senses: (1) of Christs powerful, efficacious, heart-conquering Grace; which is the cause: or (2) for his powerful Forces and Armies; which are the effect of this Omnipotent day of Christ. Thus we see what an admirable combination here is of Divine Omnipotence, with human Libertie: how powerfully this medicinal Grace actes, and yet how sweetly: it actes so Omnipotently, as if there were no room left for human Li­bertie; and yet so connaturally, and so sweetly, as if there were not the least dram of Omnipotence, and Force in it. Oh! what an om­nipotent Suavitie, or sweet Omnipotence is there in this Medicinal Grace? Who would not come under such a silken, soft, sweet vio­lence as this is? Need we then fear, that any prejudice can befal human Libertie, so long as this Wise, Soverain, Soul-physician workes upon the Wil? Doth he not understand perfectly what are the proper ansae, or handles of the Soul, and so suit his Medicinal Grace thereto? Hath he not a key exactly sitted to every lock, yea, to every ward in the lock of the wil? Is not his Medicinal Grace full of the deepest and highest reason, so that the Mind sees all the reason in the world, why it should embrace the offers made to it by Christ? And doth not the Wil, upon this Divine, heart-logic infused by Christ, move as freely, as chearfully, as connaturally, as if there [Page 430]were no power mixed with medicinal Grace? Doth not Christ take the Wil by the hand and teach it to go, as he did Ephraim, Hos. 11.3? and doth he not also draw it with cords of a man, Coelestis illa suavitas mollit viam ut volun­tas ex carnaliu rerum visco e­mergere possit, & seipsam in justitiam dili­gendam figere. Cum enim non possit morus nisi ab immo­bili fieri, suavi­tas illa immo­bilem quodam­modo reddit animum, ut possit in motu liberum spiri­talis volunta­tis, ac dilectio­nem erumpere. Ex quo fit con­sequenter, ut si illa desit, vo­luntas veluti e­mortua sit. Jans. August. Tom. 3. de Grat. l. 4. c. 7. and hands of love, i. e. with rational arguments, and moral persuasions, as Hos. 11.4? Thus Esa. 10.21. The remnant shal returne, even the rem­nant of Jacob to their mighty God. Here is a spontaneous chearful returne of back sliding Israel; and yet it is to their mighty God, [...] the name given the Messias, Esa. 9.6. Christ drawes them by a mighty power, and yet they returne as freely, as if there were no power and efficace put forth. So Esa. 11.6, 10, 11. The like Esa. 44. Having spoken v. 3. of the effusion of the spirit of Grace, he addes what followed thereon, v. 5.—and another shal subscribe with his hand unto the Lord, &c. A Metaphor taken from such Volunteers as do freely and spontaneously with their own hand list and enrol themselves under a General. So ineffable and admirable is the suavitie of efficacious Grace. Yea may we not conclude hence, that look by how much the more powerfully and invincibly this Medicinal Grace actes on the Wil, by so much the more connaturally, and sweetly it actes? For hereby it determineth, confirmeth, and preserveth the Wil in its highest Libertie, both of State, and Act. For what more natural to the Wil, than to adhere to its chiefest Good? Or when doth it act more freely, than when it is most peremtorily, most inviolably, and most immotably determined to love, and enjoy its best friend, and choisest Good? Thus the Omni­potence, and Efficace of Medicinal Grace, is so far from destroying the Libertie of the Wil, as that it doth most effectually preserve, con­firme, and promote the same.

CHAP. VIII. Of Creation, and Providence in the General.

Creation proper to God: the production of something out of nothing: Active Creation the same with the Divine Wil: Passive Creation what. Gods Providence demonstrated: The Explication of it: The Wisdome and Eternal Law of Providence. Providence an Act of the Divine Wil. The Spirits Efficience in Providence. Providential means. Fire the create mundane Spirit. The Object of Divine [Page 431]Providence. Its Adjuncts: (1) Efficacitie. (2) Immobilitie. (3) Connaturalitie. (4) Perfection. (5) Mysterious. Miracles. Providential Conservation, immediate and mediate; Ordinary and Extraordinary.

§. 1. HAving examined Divine concurse in its object,Gods Creation demonstrated and explicated. effective principe, and Adjuncts or various modes of operation, we now descend to the contemplation of it in regard of its Ef­fects. The Efficience of the first Cause in relation to its effects is usually distributed into Creation and Providence. Creation is the Efficience of the first Cause, whereby he made althings at first, and stil continues to make some things out of nothing. What lively No­tices we have of Gods Creating althings out of nothing, both in Sacred and Platonic Philosophie, hath been sufficiently explicated and demonstrated in Plato's Physics, Court Gent. P. 2. B. 3. Chap. 9. S. 1. &. Our present taske wil be to give some general Ideas of the Creation as it appertains to Gods prime Efficience. 1. It's most evident, that no finite Being can be eternal or from eternitie. Al the Philosophers before Aristotle generally asserted the produ­ction of althings by God: but he, from a confined mistaken no­tion of Gods infinite Effcience, fondly conceited the first mater to be eternal; because he could not imagine, how something could be educed out of nothing. But true Philosophie, as wel as Divine Revelation teacheth us, that althings were made by God, and nothing besides himself is eternal. That the world was not from eternitie we have sufficiently demonstrated, in what pre­cedes touching the existence of God, C. 2. §. 2. This Argument is wel managed by Derodone, l'Atheisme Convaincu, C. 1. And Sua­rez, Metaphys. Tom. 1. p. 536. strongly demonstrates, That it is in­trinsecally repugnant to Creation that it be eternal. Yet the Jesuites generally grant, That it is possible for the world to be from eternitie. Which Hypothesis comes not short of a virtual contradiction: for what difference can be rationally imagined between being eter­nal, and being from eternitie? Is not that which is without begin­ning eternal? And can we imagine that to have a beginning, which is from eternitie? Can any effect and product of the Di­vine Wil be commensurate to it in point of Duration?

2. To Create is the sole Prerogative of God. For (1) the order of actions must be according to the order of Agents: the most Noble and Supreme Action cannot agree to any but the most No­ble [Page 432]and Supreme Agent: And is not Creation the most Noble and Supreme of al Actions? Can it then agree to any but the most Noble and Supreme Agent, God? Creation is the most per­fect of al actions, by which a participate Being may be commu­nicated; because it primarily speakes the production of the whole entitie in its ful latitude:. whence it is manifest, that this action cannot be appropriated or attributed to any, but the first cause, who is Being essentially and of himself: no participate being has force enough to produce the whole of Being. (2) That Creation is proper to God may be argued from the Mode of Efficience. For Creation supposeth an Omnipotence and Independence in the Creator; in as much as he has no passive power or mater to worke on, but only an objective power or possibilitie of the object to be Created, which requires an infinite active power in the Agent. For by how much the more remote the passive power is from Act, by so much the greater ought the active power of the Agent to be: whence where there is no preexistent mater to worke upon, but a mere obediential objective power or nothing, there the di­stance between the Power and Act is, as to efficience, infinite, and impertransible by any finite power: therefore nothing but an in­finite power can bring the extremes Nothing and Something toge­ther. (3) From the Nature of Creation; which is, not a succes­sive but a momentaneous Action: but al the productions of se­cond causes, as they are inferior to, and Instruments of the first cause, are successive motions: for al Instruments act and move in a way of succession. (4) From the limitation of al second causes. For the most perfect of Creatures have only a precarious and Participate Being; and therefore have not in themselves vir­tue or force enough to Create the least of Beings. To Create re­quires a virtue of the most Supreme Order, invested with an Active Power in the most universal latitude. And the reason is evident; because the Creative Power extendes it self to every thing creable: neither doth it expect on the part of its object any thing, but a non-repugnance or obediential power that the effect may be. This wil more fully appear from the following Thesis.

3.Creation the pro­duction of some­thing out of no­thing. Creation is the production of Something out of Nothing. When we say Creation is the production of Something out of Nothing; the particle out of must not be understood as denoting any succession of one thing after another, (for Creation is but an instantaneous [Page 433]eduction) but only the negation of a material cause. Now that God Created althings without any preexistent mater may be de­monstrated, (1) From his Independence and prime efficience as the first cause. For the first Independent Cause being a pure simple act, must necessarily precede al mater, and thence be the cause thereof: that which is the first in Beings must necessarily be the cause of al the rest: whence it follows, that the first mater was produced by God out of no preexistent mater but out of nothing. (2) From the universal efficience of God, as the first cause. Every Agent, so far as it is confined to mater, so far it is particular and limited: for to be confined to mater in acting, is to act in order to some determinate species, whereunto that mater refers: wherefore that Agent which is universal, and commensurate to al effects possible, cannot be confined to mater: such is the first cause. (3) From the universalitie of Effects produced by Creation. By how much the more universal the effect is, by so much the higher the cause is: and by how much the higher the cause is, by so much the more it is extended to al effects. Whence the effects of Creation being of al most universal, and the cause most high, there cannot be supposed any preexistent mater out of which they are educed. (4) Al productions out of mater suppose suc­cessive motion and Transmutation: but Creation is not a successive but momentaneous motion all at once. Al successive motion and mutation must necessarily precede, as to Duration, the effect pro­duced by such a mutation or motion: but Creation doth not by any kind of Duration precede the things created: therefore it cannot be successive, out of preexistent mater.

4. Active Creation is nothing else but the Act of the Divine Wil, Active Creation the Act of the Divine Wil. as the effective principe of althings. This Hypothesis has been fully explicated and demonstrated, Chap. 5. §. 4. of Gods executive power, as c. 7. §. 3. And albeit it may seem to carrie a novitie with it, yet it has sufficient foundation both in Sacred and Scholastic Phi­losophie. As for Sacred Philosophie, its very mode of expres­sing Gods active efficience in creating althings plainly shews that it was no other than the Act of the Divine Wil.Gen. 1.3. Thus Gen. 1.3. and God said, Let there be light. Which Word or saying of God can be understood of no other than the Act of his Divine Wil. For Speech is [...] here, and elsewhere ascribed to God, thereby to expresse the efficacions efficience of his Divine Wil in the production of althings. Thus Maimonides, More Nevochim, [Page 434]Part. 1. c. 65. demonstrates, ‘That this Speech or Word, where­by althings were made, must be understood of the Divine Wil, not of any proper Speech; because al Speech, whereby any thing is commanded, must necessarily be directed to some Being existent, and capable of receiving such a command: but there was no Being then existent; therefore it must be understood of the Divine Wil.’ Thus Hebr. 11.3. The world was framed by the Word of God. So 2 Pet. 3.5. By the Word of God the Heavens were of old. An why is the efficience of the Divine Wil in creating althings expressed by the Word of God, but to shew, that as we, when we wil have any thing done, expresse our Wil by our word of command; so God expressed what he wil have accomplisht, by his Fiat or Creative Word. See more of this effective Word in the Providence of God, §. 3. This Hypothesis of Gods Creating althings by his Wil hath found Patrons not a few among the most accurate Scholastic Theologues. Thus Joan. Major, Sentent. 2. dist. 1. q. 3. proves, That God produced the World by his mere Intelle­ction and Volition, without any other productive power. And his Ar­guments are these: (1) The Human Wil doth not want any o­ther executive power to execute its commands, unlesse it be in such things as it cannot by it self reach: but the Divine Omni­potent Wil reacheth althings: therefore it can execute its own commands, without the mediation of any executive power. (2) The Efficacious Wil of God touching A. gives existence to A. otherwise the Efficacious Wil of God were impedible; and so some one might resist his Wil. (3) Our Wil can by its mere volition produce some effects, namely Habits; it can also move other Powers by its Empire: Therefore the Divine Wil can by its sole volition produce al effects. Thus Augustin, on Psal. 144. With God to Wil in to do; because althings receive Being from his Wil. The like Damascene, Orthod. Fid. l. 2. c. 29. [...], Althings that the Lord hath willed, he hath done, and no man hath resisted his Wil: he willed that althings were made, and they were made: and he wils that the world consistes, and it consistes: and al that he wils he can do, and they are done. From this Active Creation of the Divine Wil God is said by some to be a Creator from al Eternitie. Thus Gregor. Ariminensis, Sent. l. 1. dist. 28. q. 3. fol. 122. This denomination is not extrinsec [Page 435]but intrinsec to the Divine Essence and Wil. Hence Plato stiled the World in regard of this active Creation, Eternal, as it lay, from al Eternitie, in the Divine Wil and Ideas. For the Active Effici­ence of the Divine Wil is every way sufficient to denominate the Passive Power of the World as creable.

5. Passive Creation is something in the thing created, not really, Passive Creation a Mode of the thing Created. but mentally or modally only distinct from it. For the explication of this Proposition we are to note, (1) That Passive Creation doth not so much regard God as the thing Created. God in Creating the World was not reduced from Power to Act, as al Creatures are when they act: for Gods Active Efficience was, as has been de­monstrated, from al Eternitie, and no other than his Divine Wil: neither was there, at the passive Creation of the World, any new act in God, which was not before in him: but there was an ac­cession of an act or existence to the things Created, which was not before: whence, by an extrinsec denomination, God is said to be Creator at the passive Creation of things; as, by an intrin­sec denomination, he was Creator from al Eternitie in regard of his Active Efficience or Decree. (2) Albeit we conceive and ex­presse Passive Creation under the notion of a mutation, yet it is not properly such; because al proper mutation implies a succes­sion of one thing after another; which Creation admits not, be­ing momentaneous and al at once, without any terme from which, or fluxe, which al mutation includes. (3) Some, and those not vulgar Scholastics hold, That passive Creation is no way really but only mentally distinct from the Creature. So the Passive Creation of a Man is really and essentially the same with a Man. Thus Ocham, in Sent. 2.q. 9. and Greg. Ariminensis, in Sent. 2. dist. 1. q. 4, & 5. with the Nominals generally; who presume that Action is not a middle thing between the Cause and Effect. And their Argu­ments in this Case are not to be contemned; for they prove it, [1] From the special Reason of Creation, which is not an Accident, but the very substance or Essence of the thing Created: for if it were some middle thing between God and the Creature, distinct from both, it must be a Creature, and so the terme of some other Creation; and this of some other: which would open a door for a progresse into Infinite. [2] From the Essential Reason of a Creature: for Dependence on the first Cause is of the Essence of the Creature; therefore it is in the Creature, and not really distinct from it: Now the prime and essential dependence of the Crea­ture [Page 436]on the first Cause is Creation: wherefore it can be no more distinguished from the Creature, than the Essence of a thing is di­stinguished from it self. That the Dependence of a Creature on its Creator is not distinct from its Essence, they prove by many and strong Arguments, of which hereafter, C. 11. §. 6. (4) Sua­rez, Metaphys. Disput. 20. S. 5. p. 529. with others, assert, That Creation is somewhat in the thing Create, not really distinct, as a proper entitie, yet, ex natura rei, as a mode thereof. But this Controversie is not material, neither doth it want an easie way of reconcile­ment: for Suarez's modal distinction in effect, as he limits it, amounts to little more than a mental distinction, at least that which they stile rationis ratiocinatae, which has some foundation in the things distinguished. However they both agree in this, that Passive Creation is in the thing Created. Hence it follows,

6. That the Relation of the Creator to the Creature doth not-sup­pose any mutation in God. For Creation may be considered either actively or passively: if we consider it actively; so it is attributed to God by an interne denomination, it being the same with the Wil of God: if we consider it passively; so it is the same with, or not really distinct from the Creature, and ascribed or attributed to God only by an extrinsec denomination and relation, which speaketh no mutation in God. See what precedes of Gods Immu­tabilitie, C. 4. §. 1.

§. 2.The Providence of God demon­strated. From the Creation of God we passe unto his Providence, whereof we find Illustrious Ideas and Notices both in Sacred and Platonic Philosophie. As for Sacred Philosophemes touching the Divine Providence we shal give the mention thereof in the parti­cular Ideas of Providence; we shal here begin with Plato's de­monstration of Gods Providence, which he gives us largely, De Leg. 10. p. 900, &c. where he proposeth the blasphemous Anti­thesis. of an Atheistic Spirit denying the Providence of God in this manner: But thou indeed being carried away with a certain blind and rash madnesse, because thou canst not belch forth thine In­dignation against God himself, neither can the venome of thine enraged Mind reach him, therefore thou fallest into this Affection, [...], That albeit thou grantest there is a God, yet thou deniest that he takes care of Human Affaires. This Antithesis, which Epicurus afterward espoused, Plato greatly opposeth, as that which is most unworthy of the Divine, Infinitely wise, Bountiful, and Soverain [Page 437]Being. In the general he affirmes, That it is not difficult to demon­strate this, [...], That Gods Providence is as wel occupied about the least, as a­bout the greatest and most excellent things. But p. 901. he descendes to particular Arguments: [...]; Wherefore whether it be God, or whether it be Man that neglectes any affair, is it not for one of those two causes? [...]; Either because he conceives it no way refers to the whole, if smal things are neglected: or, if he thinkes it doth refer, yet, his Mind being detained by supinitie, sloth, and delicace, he neglectes it? In what follows he amply de­monstrates, (1) That Providence even about the smallest things greatly conduceth to the good of the whole. And (2) that the least sloth, ornegligence of human affaires may not be imputed to God. Of which see more fully Philosoph General. P. 1. l. 3. c. 4. S. 2. §. 1. The more fully to demonstrate the Providence of God, against the Epi­eurean Antithesis, we shal draw forth Plato's Arguments into the following particulars. (1) The Providence of God may be de­monstrated from his pure Actualitie and Activitie. Every thing is so far perfect as it is Active: to suppose a first perfect Being, and yet to conceit him to be an idle spectator of human affaires, it no lesse absurd than sacrilegious. So Plato, Leg. 10. p. 901. [...], God cannot be corrupted with sloth or negligence: for a remisse timi­ditie can no way befal God. Contrary to this Platonic Demonstra­tion Epicurus held, [...], The blessed immortal Being neither hath any employ­ment of his own, neither doth he trouble himself with the affaires of o­thers. But what more absurd than this Hypothesis of Epicurus, asserting a Deitie and yet denying his Providence? Doth he not hereby discover the infirmitie of his Reason, in supposing a most Supreme blessed Being, who yet standes as an idle spectator of al natural and human occurrences? May we not justly conclude, that Epicurus, by denying the Providence of God, had a secret designe to undermine the very existence of the Deitie? For he could not but know, that if the persuasion of Divine Providence were rooted out of mens minds, the thoughts of a most blessed immortal Being would little overawe or influence mens hearts. Wel therefore might Plutarch, Tullie and other Moralistes de­grade [Page 438]him from the Title of a Philosopher, sithat by denying Gods Providence he cut the sinews of al Moralitie. Do but grant then that there is a God, and it wil necessarily follow, that his Providence extendes to althings. (2) The Providence of God may be demonstrated from that admirable Order, Concent and Har­monie which is most illustrious in al parts of the Universe. Thus Plato, in his Philebus, tels us, that God put into althings, [...], a symmetrie and concent, or [...], a Right Communion, Harmonie and Agreement, whereby they are ad­mirably chained together. The admirable order of althings and affaires both Natural, Politic, and Moral strongly evinceth a most wise Providence ordering al. Is not one thing ordered and dis­posed for some other? Doth not the Sun by its warme influences shine on the earth, that so it may be fruitful? And why is the earth fruitful but to feed the Bestes? And are not the Bestes fed to nourish and serve Man? And why doth the wise God take such care of Man, but that he might be more capable to serving his God?Hos. 2.21, 22. Thus Hos. 2.21, 22. I wil hear the Heavens, and they shal hear the Earth: and the Earth shal hear the Corn, and the Wine, and the Oil: and they shal hear Jesreel. Here, besides the gratiose Benediction of God, the harmonious connexion of the first and second causes is set forth by a lively Prosopopoeia; Jesreel, i. e. the People of God, they cal on or expect relief from Corn, Wine, and Oil: these cal on, or expect nourishment from the Earth: the Earth cals on or expects supplies from the celestial bodies: and these cal on and expect supplies from God. Now where there is such an exact subordination between varietie of things, which understand not themselves, is it not necessary, that there be a wise Mind, that sets al these things in order? If there be Order in things that have no Understanding, must not the ordering of them come from an Understanding infinitely wise? Is there not an admirable Intelligence even in the Natural and Animal world? What a wonderful Instinct is there in the little Bee, as in other Animals? And yet these silly Animals understand not themselves: must there then not be an higher understanding that orders al? And that which yet addes to the Order of althings and proves the Providence of God, is, that al these various parts of the Universe sweetly conspire to promove the Glorie of their Creator. Is there not an infinite varietie of different species, and those of different orders, in the Universe? And do not al these tend to, and in [Page 439]their rankes subserve the honor of their Creator? Is there not a world of Plants and Vegetables, which subserve Brutes? And is there not a world of Brutes, which serve man? And is there not a world of men, which either actively or passively subserve the Glo­rie of their Maker? And doth not this Tendence and Condu­cence of althings to one first Being sufficiently demonstrate an in­finitely wise Providence ordering al? Indeed al order presuppo­seth intelligence and sapience: For order being nothing else but a convenable or agreable disposition of things, according to the dignitie of each, it's necessary for the disposing of things agreably, to compare them among themselves, and to understand their dignitie and ranke, which is proper to intelligence, and then to range them according to their dignitie, which is proper to sapi­ence or prudence: Whence the most perfect order presuppo­seth the most perfect intelligence and prudence. (3) Plato proves the Providence of God from his wise and potent Gubernation of al­things, even the least, to their respective ends, of which hereafter. (4) From Gods Justice in punishing the wicked, and rewarding the righteous. (5) From Gods Benignitie and Liberalitie towards al. (6) Lastly he concludes, that to denie Gods Providence to­wards the least things, [...], it a cogitation both nefarious or blasphemous and erroneous, as Leg. 10. pag. 903. Thus also the Rabbines terme him. [...] an Epicurean, or a profane person [...], who saith, that the holy and blessed God doth not take care of human af­faires. And indeed we have reason to believe, that most of those, whether ancient or moderne Atheistes, who have espoused this Epicurean Hypothesis, whereby the Providence of God is denied, have taken it up rather out of prejudice or passion, than from any rational conviction. So it's said of Diagoras, that he took up this persuasion, out of a mere humor, because the perjured person was not strucke dead by God.

§. 3. Having given the Demonstration of Gods Providence,The Wisdome of Divine Provi­dence. we now procede to the Explication thereof. The Divine Pro­vidence in the general is that efficience of God, whereby he conserves and governes althings, according to the eternal most wise counsel of his own Wil. Thus Damascene, Orthod. Fid. l. 2. c. 29. [...], Providence is the Wil of God, whereby althings receive their most exact Order and Regiment. In our definition of Divine Providence there [Page 440]are many things considerable. 1. It includes an eternal Wisdome and Counsel as the origine thereof. Thus Damascene, Orthod. Fid. l. 3. c. 29. explicates the precedent definition: [...], Butaf al Providence be the Wil of God, it's necessary, that al­things ordered or made by Providence be, according to right Reason, best and most becoming God, and that nothing may be better done. In the Scholes, Providence, according to its generic Idea, is said to be the Reason of Order, whereby al means are duely dispo­sed towards their end: what then is the Providence of God, but a Divine Reason eminently subsisting in the supreme Rector of al­things, whereby althings are most wisely disposed to their last end, by most apt means? Thus in sacred Philosophie the Provi­dence of God is described as invested with infinite wisdome and counsel.Psal. 139.1, 2. So Psal. 139.1. O Lord thou hast searched me. [...], thou hast sounded me, and penetrated into my most intimate parts. Whence he addes: and known me: i. e. most intimately. Thence he procedes to particulars, v. 2. Thou knowest my down-sitting and up-rising, &c. Of which before in the Divine Science, Ch. 5. §. 2. We find Gods providential knowlege as to Celestial bodies wel illustrated,Psal. 147.4, 5. Psal. 147.4. He telleth the number of the stars: he cal­leth them al by their names. Termes borrowed from Generals mu­stering or taking an account of their Soldiers: or else from Ma­sters of Families taking account of al their Domestics: or from Kings numbering their Subjects. And what mean these expres­sions, but to illustrate and expresse the most particular Providence of God, founded on his infinite knowlege of althings, which are in apparence innumerable as the Stars in the Firmament, Gen. 15.5? So v. 5. his understanding is infinite. Heb. [...], of his understanding there is no number. The reasons of his Provi­dence are more in number than the things he provides for, yea every way infinite. These infinite Reasons and Intelligences of Divine Providence are expressed by Plato under the terme [...], Intelligence. Thus in his Philebus, pag. 28. Al the wise consent in this, [...], that the Divine Mind it King of Heaven and Earth. So in his Phaedo, pag. 97. [...], &c. It is the Divine Mind that dis­poseth and directes althings according to their due orders, and is the cause of althings. And that this providential Intelligence and [Page 441]Wisdome extendeth to althings, even to the most minute and least Beings, Plato assertes, Leg. 10. pag. 902. [...], &c. To conceit that God, who is most wise, and both wil and can provide for his own crea­tures, should take care only of greater maters, but not of the least, whereof the care is more facile, how absurd is this!

But to treat more accurately and philosophically of the infi­nite Reasons and Wisdome of Divine Providence,The eternal Law of Providence. we must run it up to the Spring-head of that eternal Law, consisting in those Divine Ideas loged in the mind and wil of God. The Scholes philosophise much of the eternal Law, whereby althings are go­verned to their respective ends: yet they speake so confusedly, as that it is difficult to understand what they mean thereby; whe­ther the Law of Divine Decrees, or the Law of Nature inherent in the things governed. Plato seems to speake more intelligibly than many Scholastics touching this eternal Law, making it to be no other than the [...], the eternal Exemplar of Di­vine Ideas or Decrees, according to which God frames and go­vernes althings. So in his Timaeus, pag. 28. he saith, That God in the framing the World had his eye [...] on the eternal Law or Exemplar. Hence Plato cals Fate, (whereby the Ancients expressed Providence) [...], the Law of Adrastie: which Cicero interpretes, the eternal Law. And Apuleius, a great Ex­plicator of Plato, saith, Fate was that by which Gods inevitable cogi­tations and undertakements were accomplisht. And Pindar sang: [...], That the eternal Law was Queen of althings both mortal and immortal. This eternal Law, as it regardes Providence, is nothing else but that order, method, purpose or counsel, which the most wise God hath from al eternitie determined with himself in his Divine Decrees, as the rule of his Gubernation and Disposition of althings for his own Glorie. Have not althings that are some operation, and that not violent or fortuitous, but regular and orderly? And can any thing exert any regular operation, but in order to some end pre­conceived by some intelligent Agent? And what is that which directes, moderates, regulates and orders althings to their respective ends, but the eternal Law? Thus Augustin: The eternal Law, saith he, is nothing else but that increate Divine Reason or Wil of God, commanding that the natural order be conserved. Every action wil not serve for every end: therefore there must be [...], a Rule [Page 442]or Law to suit actions to their ends: Do not then althings so far as they tend to their last end act and move by some Law? And what is the supreme Law, whereby al the Divine operations of Providence are regulated, but the eternal Exemplar of Divine Ideas or Decrees? It's true, every particular singular Creature has a Law impacted and impressed on its Being, which is an irradiation or beam of the eternal Law, and therefore called by some, though improperly, the eternal Law; by others more properly the Law of Nature. For the eternal Law properly re­spectes the workes and operations of God; who is both Worker, and the Law of his working: the perfection of the Divine Es­sence and Wil gives perfection and measure to al his workes: al Gods providences and workes own him, not only for their Worker, but also for the Law whereby they are wrought: his Divine Wil and Decrees being the measure of al his Operati­ons. So that by this eternal Law althings are bounded and li­mited not only in their Essences, but also in their Operations: and al the Divine reasons of Providences are to be resolved into this eternal Law, which is ful of infinite Reasons, Wisdome, and Counsel; albeit our shallow capacities cannot comprehend, no nor apprehend the same alwaies, in al workes of Providence.

Hence it follows:The Wisdome of Providence a­ctive. that the Divine Reason, Wisdome, and Counsel, that attendes the Providence of God, is not merely spe­culative, but practic and active: for al Laws properly and prima­rily tend to action. Whence in sacred Philosophie the wisdome of Divine Providence is illustrated by that of a wise Builder, skil­ful Physician, expert discreet Master of a Familie, &c. Thus also Plato, Leg. 10. pag. 902, &c. istustrates the same by much the same ressemblances, namely by the wisdome of a skilful Physician, also of an expert Gubernator of a Ship, of a prudent Imperator, of a discreet Master of a Familie, of a skilful Architect, and of an expert Artificer: al which denote active Science, as it wil here­after appear, when we descend to the Gubernation of Providence. And that the wisdome of Divine Providence is indeed most active is evident, in that God by his Providence directes althings to their proper end, namely the Divine Bonitie, which is the last End and first Principe in Morals. Hence it is that al the workes of Divine Providence are said to be disposed in Measure, and Number, and Weight, i. e. in the most exact order and manner that may be. That Providence belongs to practic cognition Aquinas [Page 443]largely demonstrates, contra Gent. l. 3. c. 75. & 97. Hence,Providence is an Act of the Diviue Wil.

2. Divine Providence includes also the Act of the Divine Wil Yea, if we wil speak formally and distinctly, the Providence of God primarily regardes the Wil of God: for al the Divine Rea­sons, Ideas, Decrees, and the eternal Law of Providence must be resolved into the Divine Wil, which is the sole measure of Gods Operations towards his Creatures. Thence Providence is defined by Damascene, Orthod. Fid. l. 2. c. 29. [...], &c. the Wil of God, by which althings that are receive their convenient Gubernation, as before. And he demonstrates it thus: It's necessary, that he who made althings, should provide for them, in the same manner as he made them, i. e. by his Wil. Whence he concludes: [...], God therefore is the Maker and Provisor: and his good Wil is the effective, conten­tive, and provisive Virtue. (1) Indeed the whole of Divine Effi­cience procedes immediately from the Divine Wil, as we have before once and again demonstrated. (2) That Providence be­longs to the Divine Wil is manifest from its very nature, which consistes in a wise ordering althings for its last end: now there can be no disposition or ordering of means for an end, without the volition of the said end. Divine Bonitie being the end unto which althings are directed by the Providence of God, it's ne­cessary, that both end and means be willed by God. Yea, (3) It belongs to the intrinsec Reason of Divine Providence, as Divine, not only to intend and order al means towards its last end, but also infallibly to attain its last end: which implies an absolute, efficacious, omnipotent Wil. For albeit Providence, in its gene­ric notion regardes not so much the end as the means, it being the ordering of means to an end, yet it includes an absolute effi­cacious volition of the end: but now it's simply impossible, that God should wil any end, and yet that end not be attained. Where­in Divine Providence greatly differs from human, which oft wils an end and provides means in order thereto, and yet fals short of its end. (4) That Providence belongs to the Wil of God is evident from the formal parts thereof, Conservation and Guberna­tion, which are Acts of the Divine Wil. (5) The Mode of Di­vine Providence, as expressed both in Sacred and Platonic Philo­sophie, clearly evinceth, that it formally belongs to the Divine Wil. In sacred Philosophie the Mode of Divine Providence is [Page 444]expressed by the Word of God. Deut. 8.3. So Deut. 8.3. Man doth not live by bread only, but by every word that procedeth out of the mouth of the Lord doth man live. By Word here, (as Vatablus wel observes) we may not understand any preceptive or reveled word, but the pro­vidential Word of God, or good pleasure, which provides means, either ordinary or extraordinary, for the sustenance of man. And that this is the genuine sense seems apparent from the designe and scope of Moses; which is to shew, that when bread failed, God by his omnipotent Word, or Wil, in a miraculose manner, pro­vided Manna for them, as an experiment to testifie in al Ages, that man lived not by bread only, but by every word that procedeth out of the mouth of God: i. e. by the soverain pleasure and provi­dential wil of God, which is frequently in sacred Philosophie ter­med, the Word of God. In this sense this Texte is cited and inter­preted by our Lord,Mat. 4.4. Mat. 4.4. But by every word, &c. Moses's words are repeted by our Lord, and opposed to Satans tentation, to shew, that man lived not by bread only, but by the providential word or wil of God, who provides means either ordinary or ex­traordinary for the relief of man, specially of such as trust in him; and therefore there is no reason why we should distrust his Providence, or make use of any unlawful means. In this sense the Word of God is taken,Psal. 107.20. Psal. 107.20. he sent his word and heal­ed them: i. e. his providential Word, or his omnipotent efficaci­ous Decree and sentence.Psal. 147.15, 16. So Psal. 147.15. He sendeth forth his commandement upon the earth: his word runneth very swiftly: i. e. his providential Word, or the efficacious efficience of his Divine Wil.Heb. 1.3. Whence it follows: v. 16. He giveth snow like wool, &c. the effects of his providential word. Thus Heb. 1.3. Ʋpholding althings by the word of his power: i. e. by his providential word, or omnipotent efficacious wil. So 2 Pet. 3.5, 7. In al which Textes, with some others, we must understand Gods providential word; which is no other than the efficacious Decree and efficience of the Divine Wil, for the sustentation, conservation, and gubernation of althings; as the same efficacious efficience of the Divine Wil, put forth in the creation of althings, is in like manner expressed by a word, Gen. 1.3, &c. And it is wel observed by Maimonides, More Nevoch. Part. 1. c. 65. that by Word here, as elsewhere, must be understood not any formal word, but the Act of the Divine Wil, as before of Creation, §. 1. Thus we find other Decrees and Acts of the Divine Wil expressed by the Word of God. So [Page 445] Gen. 1.26. And God said, Let us make man. Gen. 8.21. And God said in his heart, I wil not again curse the ground: i. e. God de­creed and determined with himself, and declared this his Decree to Noah. The efficience of the Divine Wil, in governing al­things is expressed in Sacred Philosophie by the Word of God, to denote the efficace of his Wil: mans word is oft Preceptive, but not Operative: we declare our wils by our words, but cannot ef­fect what we wil thereby: but Gods Providential Word is ever operative: whatever he wils, doth immediately existe, in that time and manner as he wils it: his Words and Deeds are reci­procal: and therefore he expresseth his Divine Providential Ef­ficience by his Providential Word. Thus also Plato sometimes expresseth the efficience of Divine Providence by [...], the Word of God. So Plotinus his Sectator: [...], from one Mind and Word, which sprang from it, this whole Ʋniverse was constituted and disposed. Which possibly may relate to the Increate Word, or Second Person in the Tri­nitie, who made althings, as John 1.1-4. and whereof the Pla­tonistes in the Schole of Alexandria, who succeded Ammonius, had great notices, as before in the Platonic Trinitie, C. 6. §. 4.

3. But yet the immediate Efficience of Divine Providence is in a more peculiar manner, both by Sacred and Platonic Philoso­phie,The Spirit the immediate effi­cient of Provi­dence. ascribed to the Spirit of God. For the clearing whereof we are to consider, that albeit al Divine Operations are usually ascribed to God absolutely, because the same Divine Nature is the individed principe of al; yet sithat, as to the manner of subsisting, there is some Distinction, Relation, and Order between the three Persons, hence the Divine Operations are in Sacred Philosophie distinctly assigned to each person, and eminently to some one. And in as much as the Order of Operation among the distinct persons dependes on the Order of their Subsistence, thence the Conclusive and perfective Efficience in al the great Divine Operations is assign­ed to the Spirit of God, as peculiar to him, according to the mode of his subsistence in the Trinitie. Thus in the Creation, the completive and perfective efficience of althings is ascribed to the Spirit. So in the Fomentation and Formation of althings out of the rude Chaos, it's said, Gen. 1.2. The spirit of God moved on the face of the waters: i. e. in order to the Eduction and Efformation of althings: for [...] properly notes the fomentation and gentle motion of an Hen, communicating vital heat to its egges: and it's [Page 446]applied, Deut. 32.11. to the motion of an Eagle over its young ones, for their protection and perfection. This efficience of al­things is wel expressed,Psal. 33.6. Psal. 33.6. By the Word of the Lord were the Heavens made, and al the Host of them by the breath of his mouth. By the Word of the Lord, we may understand, (1) The Creative Efficience of the Divine Wil, as before §. 1. or (2) Christ, by whom althings were made, as Joh. 1.3. Thence it follows: by the Breath of his mouth: whereby we must understand the Spirit of God, who is called the Breath of his mouth, to note the manner of his procession, which is in a way of Spiration, as the Scripture assures us.Job 26.13. Thus Job 26.13. By his Spirit he hath garnished the Heavens. Or, according to the Hebrew, His spirit hath garnish­ed, [or adorned, beautified] the Heavens, i. e. decked them with those eye-pleasing gloriose lights.Psal. 8.3. Hence Psal. 8.3. the Sun, Moon, and Stars are said to be the worke of Gods fingers, i. e. cu­riosely wrought by the Spirit of God. For by the finger or fin­gers of God, the spirit of God is in a more peculiar manner de­noted, as is evident by comparing Mat. 12.28. with Luk 11.20. where the spirit of God in Matthew is called the finger of God by Luke, as Owen, On the spirit, B. 1. C. 4. Neither did the Spirit's efficience extend only to the production of the Inanimate and A­nimal world, but also to Man and his more noble part the Soul, as Job assures us, Job 33.4. The spirit of God hath made me, and the breath of the Almighty hath given me life. Answerable to Gen. 2.7. And as the first Efformation and Perfection of althings in the Creation is ascribed to the Spirit of God, so the Sustentation, Con­servation, and Gubernation of althings in the course of Divine Providence is in a peculiar manner assigned to the same Spirit. Thus Ps. 104.27.Psal. 104.27-30. These wait al upon thee, that thou mayest give them their meat in due season. 28. Thou openest thine hand, they are filled with good. 29. Thou hidest thy face, they are troubled: thou takest away their breath, they die, and returne to their dust. Thou hidest thy face: i. e. withdrawest the providential influence of thy Spi­rit, and althings returne to dust: the Earth it self, the commun Mother of al corporeous Creatures, seems to be dead, 'til the spring come, and althings receive a new face. Thence it follows, v. 30. Thou sendest forth thy Spirit, they are created: and thou re­newest the face of the earth. Thou sendest forth thy Spirit: whose office it is to conserve, foment, actuate, and to give vivific heat, life, and influence to althings. Whence it follows: they are Created. [Page 447]This Creation is not to be taken strictly of the Eduction of things out of nothing, as at first; no, nor principally of the production of new individuals, though this be included in the Spirits Provi­dential Efficience; but of the Spirits fomenting, vivifying, and re­newing things under a kind of natural death or decay. Thence it follows: and thou renewest the face of the Earth. i. e. Whereas the Earth in the winter season is as it were dead; the Trees and other Plants divested of their verdure, flourishing beautie, leaves, fruits; yea the very juice and radical moisture is retired unto the root; so that the whole seems dead: And as for Animals and Brutes, the greatest number of those we cal Infects are either re­ally or seemingly dead, being without motion: and as for the more perfect Brutes, they are likewise under a kind of partial death; yea the human bodie also in the more cold Northerne Climate: Yet when the Spring comes, the Spirit of God, that Supreme In­create Ʋniversal Spirit, making use of the warme benigne influ­ences of the Sun, together with subterraneous fire, that great create mundane Spirit, reneweth the face of the Earth: i. e. puts new vital Spirits and vivific heat into al parts of the Universe, both inanimate and animate, 'specially Plants and Animals; so that there is a new face, or verdure, flourishing Beautie, Vivaci­tie, Activitie and Fructification in things. Thus, according to Sacred Philosophie, the Spirit of God is said to be that Ʋniversal Spirit, by whose Providential Efficience and Concurrence al Creatures are conserved, sustained, actuated, propagated, animated, fomented, disposed, and governed to their proper ends and usages.

And we find Philosophemes not a little conformable hereto in Platonic Philosophie. What Plato's Contemplations were con­cerning [...], the Soul of the World, we have before ex­amined, Part. 2. B. 3. C. 9. S. 1. §. 5. We shal now treat of the same Ʋniversal Spirit, or Spirit of the Ʋniverse as to his Providential Influence and Concurrence. Plato in his Cratylus, p. 396. cals this Mundane Soul, or Ʋniversal Spirit, [...] Zena, Jupiter from [...] Zen, to animate or vivifie: and he gives this reason of the Origi­nation: [...], There is no other cause of life to us Men, and other Animants, than that Prince and King of al­things. Whence he addes: Rightly therefore is God honored with this name; because it demonstrates, [...], That God is he, by whom Life is communicated to al [Page 448]Animals. This notion of the Mundane Soul answers to Job 33.4. and Psal. 104.30. of which before. Thus Plato, Leg. 10. p. 896. [...], But it has been sufficiently demonstrated, that the Soul is more ancient than althings, sithat it is the principe of motion. His designe is to demonstrate the Providence of God from the Soul of the Ʋniverse, which moves, agitates, foments, vivisies, influenceth, or­ders, and governes althings. And he demonstrates this Universal Spirit or Soul of the Universe to be more ancient than althings, i. e. Eternal and Increate; because it gave forme, life, and motion to althings. Thence he addes in the same page: [...]; Therefore shal we not necessarily acknowlege, that the Soul doth universally governe and inhabit in althings that are moved, yea that it governes Heaven? Whence he concludes: [...], &c. This Soul therefore actuates and impels by its motions, althings that are contained in the Ʋniversitie of Nature, namely of Heaven, Earth, Sea, &c. So pag. 898. [...] &c. Sithat this Ʋniversal Soul moves the Sun. Again he addes: That the Soul of the Ʋniverse, which is in that round splendid bodie of the Sun, moves it every where, as the Soul which is in our bodie leads it every where. He gives us in these three pages several great Philosophemes to prove, That God is the Soul of the Ʋniverse, who actuates, vivisies, conserves and governes althings, as our Souls do our Bodies. Thus Proclus, in Plat. Timae. p. 93. explicates the Platonic Mundane Spi­rit: After Amelius, saith he, Porphyrie thinking to agree with Ploti­mes, [...], &c. cals the Supermundane Soul, the Opificer or Framer of the world. The Spirit of God is called by these Platonistes, [...], the Super­mundane Soul of the Ʋniverse, as being elevated above the Uni­verse, yet animating, actuating, and influencing the whole, and each part thereof. Others terme him, [...], the Mun­dane Soul, or the Soul inhabiting the Ʋniverse. Al these Platonistes make the Universe to be as it were a great Animal, and the Spirit of God to be the Soul that animates, vegetates, actuates, and perfectes this Animal. Thus Origen, [...], l. 2. c. 1. As our Bodie is made up of many members and contained by one Soul; so do I conceive, that the whole world is to be looked on as one huge great Animal, which is contained as it were by one Soul, the Virtue and Reason of God. And [Page 449]so much seems to be intimated in Scripture. Thus also the Pythago­reans held, as we are assured by Minutius Foelix, That God was the Soul diffused throughout the whole Ʋniverse, from whom althings re­ceived Life, Being and Motion. So the Stoics said; That the Di­vine Mind is diffused throughout al parts of the Ʋniverse, as our Soul throughout our bodie, as Laertius in Zeno. And that these Philoso­phemes touching the Spirit or Soul of the Ʋniverse, must be under­stood of the Spirit of God, and were so intended, though imper­fectly, by the wiser Heathens, we are assured by Cyprian, Sermo, de Spiritu Sancto, p. 329. Edit. Basil. 1558. ‘This Holy Spirit from the beginning of the World is said, Gen. 1.2. to be superfused on the waters: not as if he needed the material waters as a ve­hicle, which he rather sustained, and gave congruous motion, and fixed limits to what comprehended the firmament. The Eternal Virtue and Divinitie of this Spirit, albeit the Ancient Philosophers, those Inquisitors of the Universe, could not find him out, in his proper nature, yet by their subtile conjectures they conceived him to be present with althings, giving Life, Motion, Termes, Stabilitie and Use to every thing. This Life, this Motion, this Essence of things the Philosophers stiled THE SOUL OF THE WORLD: conceiving, that al Celo­stial Bodies, I mean, the Sun, Moon, and Stars, yea the very Fir­mament was moved and governed by the virtue of this Soul; and, that the Waters, Earth and Air were impregnated by the Seeds hereof. Who if they had believed that this Spirit is both Lord, and Creator, and Vivificator, and Nutritor of althings that are under him, they might have had some convenient accesse to life. But the Majestie of so great a Mysterie was hid from the wise and prudent of this world; neither could the pride of human Ingenie concerne it self in such celestial secrets, and pe­netrate the altitude of this superessential nature: and albeit they understood, that the Divinitie was the Creatrix and Guber­natrix of things, yet they could no way distinguish what was the Trinitie of the Deitie, or what was the Unitie, or what the proprietie of persons—This is the Spirit of Life, whose Vivi­fic heat doth animate, foment, advance and make fruitful al­things, &. See Philosoph. General. l. 1. c. 2. sect. 3. §. 3. and l. 3. c. 2. sect. 1. §. 4.’

4. Albeit the Efficience and Concurrence of the Spirit in al Providential Operations be, as to its manner of working Imme­diate, Providential means used by the Spirit. [Page 450]yet this hinders not but that ordinarily he makes use of means for the execution thereof, not from any defect of his Di­vine Efficience, but from the abundance of his Benignitie, that so in and by the mediation of Instruments he might render his own Efficience more illustrious and conspicuous, and leave some marque of honor on the means. Whence oft times the Spirit of God useth the most unapt and unlikely means for the production of the most Noble Effects. Yea, oft God brings about the Issues of his Pro­vidence by contrary means, which carry in them a seeming con­tradiction to what God intends. By how much the more potent the virtue of any Agent is, by so much the more doth it extend its operation unto things remote. Now is not the virtue of Di­vine Providence most efficacious? May it not then extend its ef­ficience to means and effects most remote? Doth it not belong to the Majestie, Splendor, and Dignitie of a Prince to have many Ministers of State under him, for the execution of his Soverain Wil and Commands? And doth it not in like manner appertain to the Majestie of God, the Supreme Lord, to have varietie of instruments and means for the execution of his Providence? Al Providence, according to its formal Idea, includes two things Ordination and Execution: The Ordination, being an Act of Intel­ligence and Sapience, belongs to the Supreme Ordinator; who, by how much the more judicious and prudent he is, by so much the more capacious he is to order al means and affaires in subservi­ence to his end and designe: But the Execution, requiring only Force and Power, may as wel and oft more aptly be transacted by inferior Agents or Ministers, invested with executive force in order thereto. Thus in Divine Providence the Ordination and Disposition of al means the most wise God reserveth to himself, as a Prerogative peculiar to his Imperial Crown; but the execution he frequently commits to second causes and instruments, furnish­ing them with executive Forces for the production of the effect, and moreover working immediately, both by the immediation of Virtue and Essence in and with those means. Hence Esa. 28.26. God is said to teach the Husbandman to plough, i. e. how to culti­vate and manage his Ground, as also to sow his Seed, &c.

That no inferior Agent or second cause can execute any piece of Divine Providence,No second cause can act, but in subordination to God, and by his Providence. but in Virtue received from, and subordi­nation to God the prime Cause, is most evident: (1) Because, where diverse Agents subserve one Supreme Agent, it's necessary [Page 451]that the effect be produced by them in commun, as they are uni­ted in the participation of motion and influence from the Supreme Agent: For many cannot produce one effect but as one: Now the subservient Agents of Providence are so far one in their ex­ecutions, as they are subordinate to and influenced by God the Supreme Agent. (2) The complement of the Virtue and Effi­cace of the Second Agent is from the Virtue and Influxe of the First Agent: and is not God the first Agent in al executions of Providence? (3) Al Operation consequent to any influence is ascribed to that which gave the influence, as the proper cause thereof: And do not al second Causes receive their influence from God? Must not then al their Executions and Operations be ascri­bed to him as the prime Cause? (4) Al Actions that cannot sub­siste without the Impression and Influence of some Agent must be attributed to that Agent as the cause thereof: Now can any executions of second Causes subsist without the impression of the first Cause? must they not then al be attributed to him? (5) Whatever applies the active Virtue or draws it forth to act, may be said to be the cause of that Act: as an Artificer, by ap­plying the virtue of any natural thing to any action, is said to be the cause of that action: Now is not al application of any Vir­tue in providential executions from God? Is he not then the cause of al such executions? (6) Doth not the Virtue of every inferior Agent depend on the Virtue of the Superior Agent as such? And are not al second Causes in providential executions inferior Agents as to God the Supreme Agent? (7) Is not every Worker by its operation ordained to its last end? And who, in al Providential Operations, ordains things to their last end, but God the first cause of al? (8) As particular Causes are referred to particular Effects, so the universal Cause to universal Effects: and is not God the Universal Cause of al Effects? (9) To sub­stract or withdraw any providential execution from Gods Ordi­nation and Efficience, what is this but to subvert the best Or­der, even the subordination of second Causes to the first? (10) God is intimely present with and in al providential executions; and therefore cannot but influence the same. The mover and moved are always together: God is the prime mover in al mo­tions, and therefore present with al: the application of Actives unto Passives is by him. That there is not the least executi­on of Providence but what is influenced by God, see Aqui­nas, [Page 452]contra Gent. Lib. 3. Cap. 67, 68, 70, 76, 77.

Not to mention the various means,Fire the Create Ʋniversal Spi­rit. instruments and second causes, which God employs in his Providential Efficience, there is one which deserves a particular disquisition, namely Fire; which is in its kind an Ʋniversal Mundane Spirit, the most potent Instrument of Nature and Art, and that which subserves the Spi­rit of God (the Supreme increate Universal Spirit) in al mate­rial productions of Providence. As for the Origine of this create Mundane Spirit, Gen. 1.3. Moses gives it us, Gen. 1.3. under the notion of [...] Light or Fire, part of which was dispersed among the Cele­stial Lights or Fires, and part diffused into the bowels of the Earth, for the Conservation, Animation, Vivification, and Nu­trition of al parts of the Universe. Plato makes frequent men­tion of Fire, as the most potent natural principe or Mundane Spi­rit, whereby althings are fomented, agitated, animated, and per­fected. So in his Timaeus, p. 31. [...], &c. Nothing seems void of Fire, &c. So p. 56, & 58. he makes Fire to be the Universal Spirit diffused throughout al parts of the Universe. And elsewhere he cals Fire [...], the great Opificer of various effects. And not only the Chymists, but also the Stoics and most of the Ancient Philosophers ascribe to Fire an Universal Efficience, as to al corporeous Effects. Whence do al Minerals, Metals, and Stones receive their Origine but from subterraneous Fires? What gives rise to al Vapors and Fountains but Fire? Whence procede the Fluxes and Refluxes of the Sea, with its saltnesse, but from Fire? What gives Life and Motion to al Insects, but Fire, either Celestial or Terrestrial? Whence springeth the fermentation of humors in the bowels of the Earth at Spring, with the vegetation and fructification of Plants, but from Fire? What are the Animal Souls of Brutes and of Mans Bodie, but a more pure aethereous Fire? These things are more largely demonstrated in our Philosoph. General. P. 1. l. 3. in Plato's Physics. May we not then hence conclude, That Fire is a se­cond Mundane Ʋniversal Spirit, under the Spirit of God most Efficacious and Potent in al natural corporeous productions and executions of Providence?

§. 4.The Object of Di­vine Providence Ʋniversal. Having finisht the principal and instrumental effective Prin­cipes of Providence, we now procede to its Object, which, accor­ding to sacred Philosophie, is of the most universal latitude, ac­cording to the extension of Divine Omnipotence and Efficience. [Page 453]There is nothing so high, as to be above Divine Providence; no­thing so low, as to be beneath it; nothing so ample and exten­sive, as that it cannot be limited by it; nothing so free as to se­cond causes, but it is necessarily determined by it; nothing so natural and necessary, but its operation may be suspended by it, as the fiery Furnace, wherein the three Children were; lastly, nothing so evil, but this Divine Providence can bring good out of it. Among the ancient Philosophers there were different per­suasions about the object of Divine Providence, and its latitude. Epicurus and some before him altogether denied the Providence of God, as before: Aristotle, as Grotius affirmes, confined the Pro­vidence of God to Celestial bodies; yet Laertius saith he held, That the Providence of God did reach [...], &c. even to things celestial, and that he disposed things terrestrial according to the Sympathie they have with things celestial. Some among the He­brews held, that Gods Providence extended to men, but not unto bestes: which sentiment some impute to Pythagoras, who much imitated the Hebrews. Some also among the Arabians asserted a Providence about Universals, or things in commun, but not about Singulars: which sentiment Justin Martyr, in the beginning of his Colloque with Tryphon, reprehendes in some of the Grecian Philosophers as impious. But Plato strongly demonstrates, That the Providence of God extendes to althings, even the most minute. So Leg. 10. pag. 902. But what? if a Physician be willing and able to cure the whole bodie, if he should provide for the greater distempers, but neglect the lesser, would the cure be successeful? No surely. So in like manner neither Gubernators of Ships, nor Imperators of Souldiers, nor Masters of Families, nor Ministers of State, nor any sort of men can wel manage their affaires, unlesse they provide for smal things as wel as greater. Thence Architects denie, that great stones can be wel ce­mented, or joined together in a building without smal. [...], &c. Let us not then conceit, that God is more vile than mortal Opificers; who, by how much the more skilful they are, by so much the more exqui­sitely and accurately, by the benefit of their own Art, they consider both great and smal things, in such workes that belong to their Art. Thence he concludes, pag. 903. It seems to me, [...], that God doth most easily and opportunely provide for althings. This also the Stoics generally asserted, whereof we find an excel­lent account in Arrianus, his Collections of Epictetus's Philoso­phie, [Page 454] l. 1. c. 12. pag. 118. There are some, saith he, who assert there is no God: others, that grant there is a God, but, [...], that he is slothful and negligent, and provident of nothing: [I suppose he means the Epicureans:] a third sort, who hold that there is a God, and that he is provident, but only of greater and celestial things, not of terrene: a fourth sort allow him a Provi­dence over terrestrial as wel as celestial, but only in commun, not as to singulars and particulars: a fifth sort, of which number was Ulysses and Socrates, asserted, that a man could not so much as move without God. Thence he goes on to demonstrate Gods Providence over al things. That Gods Providence extendes it self universally to al and singular Beings, Actions, Substances, Accidents, Modes, &c. may be demonstrated, (1) From the infinite Omniscience and Pre­science of God, which extendes it self to the most minute singu­lars. (2) From the omnipotent Wil of God, which gives Futuriti­on, Determination, Limits, Activitie, and Operation to althings. (3) From the prime and universal Efficience of God as the first cause of althings. Whatever is Ens by participation must procede ef­fectively from God, who is Ens by Essence: and if it procede from him, it must necessarily fal under his Providence. (4) From the certain Determination, Futurition, and Order of al effects. Either althings must fal under the Providence of God, or somethings must happen merely by chance, without any certain cause of their Futurition. (5) From the Justice of God in rewarding what is good, and punishing what is evil: for the executions of Divine Justice depend on his Providence. That Gods Providence ex­tendes to al singulars, even to things most contingent and minute is acutely demonstrated by Aquinas, contra Gent. l. 3. c. 71, 72, 73, 75, 76. So De Potentia Dei, Quaest. 20. he proves, that God is the cause of every action both natural and voluntary five ways: [1] By giving virtue to act. [2] By continued conservation of that virtue. [3] By moving the Agent to act, and applying the virtue to the action. [4] As he is the principal Agent in every Act, and al other Agents but Instruments. [5] As he actes immediately in al Acts of second Agents.

As for the particular Objects unto which Divine Providence extendes it self they may be thus distributed.The particular Objects of Pro­vidence. (1) Al natural Be­ings even the most minute and imperceptible fal under the Provi­dence of God. Sacred Philosophie makes mention of the hairs of the head, which are vile and contemtible even to a proverbe. [Page 455]Yea, al natural Generations, Corruptions, Alterations, Motions, and Actions are subject to Gods Providence. Not only the Generic natures, and Species of things, both Substances and Accidents, are determined by God, but also al Individuals and Singulars, with al their Circumstances and Modes, yea things most minute. Thus Bradwardine, pag. 7, 25, 291. proves, That the least things come under Gods Prescience and Providence. (2) Althings necessary or contingent. There is nothing so contingent or free as to any se­cond cause, but it is determined and fore-ordained by Divine Pro­vidence, as Aquinas accurately demonstrates, contra Gent. l. 3. c. 71, 72, 73. So Bradwardine, pag. 271, 274. What more contingent than the Lot? and yet this fals under the Providence of God, as Prov. 16.33. The lot is cast into the lap; but the whole disposing of it is of the Lord. (3) Althings politic. Al Revolutions, Alterations, Advances, Declinations with al other politic Concernes of State are ordered and governed by Divine Providence. (4) Althings human. Al mans thoughts, inclinations, interests, designes, and undertake­ments are subordinate to Providence. Hence, (5) Al sinful acts fal under the same. (6) Ecclesiastic Affaires and supernatural Acts, Ends and Effects are ordered by Divine Providence, of which here­after. In sum, Gods Providence extendes itself to al those things, unto which his omnipotent Wil, Efficience and Causali­tie extendes: i. e. unto whatever comes within the notion of real Entitie: it reacheth al natural, preternatural, supernatural and moral actions and events. When men contradict Gods Wil of Precept, do they not obey or sulfil his Wil of Providence? Is any thing so great, that it comes not within his power, or so smal, that it comes not within his care? I am not ignorant how much some of late, as wel Divines as Physicians, have essayed to exemt the period or terme of human life from the immutable determina­tion of Divine Providence: but how much this Hypothesis con­tradictes both Pagan and Sacred Philosophie, wil be more fully evident by what follows.

§. 5. From the effective principes and object of Divine Provi­dence,The Adjuncts of Providence. as before stated, there follow many essential Adjuncts and Characters thereof. As 1. Providence is not merely permissive, 1. It is effica­cious. but energetic and efficacious. For (1) Divine Providence neces­sarily supposeth not only an intention of an end, and the order­ing or disposing of means, but also the assecution and attainment of the end. It's true, human providence as such may provide [Page 456]means most proper and expedient, and yet, by the interposition of other second causes, come short of its end; but Divine Provi­dence always reacheth its end. Thus Homer: [...], Gods Counsel and Decree is always fulfilled. (2) Al second causes are subject unto, and therefore can no way impede or hin­der Divine Providence. Whence ariseth al active and passive virtue in second causes, but from Divine disposition? Is it possible then that the executions of Divine Providence should be hinde­red by the force or defect of any inferior Agent or Patient? Are not al natural Agents instruments of Divine Providence? And can the instrument act without the concurrence of the principal Agent? What then can we suppose should impede Divine Pro­vidence? (3) Al providence supposeth an Act of the Wil: and are not al Acts of Divine Volition efficacious? Bradwardine fre­quently assertes and demonstrates, That God permits nothing but what he wils. It's true, man oft permits things, that he neither wils nor doth, because he cannot hinder them; but there is no mere permission with God, without some Act of his Wil. This is proved from the infinite Actualitie, Efficacitie, and Omnipo­tence of the Divine Wil. Thus Bradwardine, l. 1. c. 32. pag. 282, &c. spends a whole Chapter to prove, That althings fal out and are governed by the Providence of God, not only permitting, but actu­ally disposing al. And his arguments are demonstrative. As [1] Otherwise the Universe should not be disposed and ordered in the best manner. [2] The Scripture gives God active names as to al parts of providence, &c. And then Cap. 33. he demon­strates, That where-ever there is any permission of God, there also is his actual Volition. Hence,

2.2. Immobile and fixed. Gods Providence gives to al second Causes and Events a most immobile, immutable, fixed and certain order: things most contingent and free, as to second causes, are necessary and fixed as to Divine Providence. Hence the Stoics, as also Plato, expres­sed this fixed order of providence by Fate, which they made to be an immutable connexion or series of things determined from eternitie, whereby althings are infallibly directed to their ends, of which hereafter in the Gubernation of Providence. That provi­dence puts into things a fixed, immutable order is evident; be­cause, (1) nothing fals out, but what was fore-ordained from al eternitie by infinite Wisdome and an omnipotent Wil. (2) Al particular causes and effects are contained under and subservient [Page 457]to the Universal Cause; and therefore subject to his Order. Yea, this Order must necessarily be most indissoluble and certain; be­cause it is founded in the Efficacitie of the Divine Wil, Efficience and Gubernation, as more fully anon.

3. Divine Providence is most Connatural and Agreable to the exigence and condition of the second causes or subjects it workes upon. The Necessitie and Immobilitie, 3. Connatural and agreable. that attendes the Provi­dence of God, doth no way infringe or impair the Contingence and Libertie of second Causes, but confirme the same. Therefore men act freely, because the Providence of God determines them so to act: So that nothing more conduceth to the natural libertie of the Wil, than the necessary Determination of Divine Providence, because it determines althings to act according to their Natures: it offers not the least force or violence to the Human Wil, but sweetly, though necessarily moves it to the end appointed. Gods manner of ordering and conducting second Causes is without the least prejudice to their proper manner of working: he guides them sweetly according to the principes and instincts he has put into them. For (1) Doth not Divine Providence furnish every second Cause with its Power, Virtue, and Efficacitie to worke? (2) Doth not the same Providence maintain and conserve that Power and Vigor imparted? (3) Is not also the actuation of that Power from Providence? (4) Doth not Providence also most wisely and sweetly, yet powerfully order the manner of working, as also perfect the same? Is it not then most sweet and connatural in al its Executions? Hence,

4. Divine Providence is most Beautiful and Perfect: 4. Beautiful and perfect. al its ex­ecutions are in Number, Weight and Measure. Doth not the Wise Man assure us, Eccles. 3.11. That every thing is beautiful in its sea­son? Is not every execution and particular event of Providence most beautiful and proper at the season allotted it by God? What are al the travels and births of time, but the Eternal and wise Decrees of Providence brought forth into light? Have not al issues and events, not only natural and necessary, but also the most contingent and voluntary their fixed time and limits consti­tuted by Divine Providence, which renders them most beautiful and perfect? Are not those very products, which in their own nature seem most monstrose and deformed, most beautiful in their time and place, as they relate to Divine Providence? Is not God infinitely wise to order althings in the best manner? And is he [Page 458]not also infinitely powerful to execute whatever he ordaines and decrees? Is not that, which in regard of mans Providence and Execution is most sinful and deformed, in regard of Gods Pro­vidence and Execution most beautiful, as Christs Crucifixion? What must we say of al that confusion that seems to be in States and Churches, Persons and Things? Doth it reach the Providence of God? Is it not only in regard of second causes, and our mi­stakes as to the first cause? Cannot, yea, wil not Divine Provi­dence bring a beautiful order out of al this confused chaos? It's true, Sacred Philosophie tels us of evil dayes, which should come to passe in this last Scene of the World: but whence springs the evil of these later days? Is it not from the Lusts of Men, not the Providence of God? Are not the worst of days Naturally good, yea Morally also to those who are good and do good? Is it not the Moral Evil of Men that makes al Times Evil? If Men were better, would not the Times soon prove better? Yea, are not those very Disorders and Confusions, that arise from the Lusts of Men, ordered by Divine Providence in the best manner for the good of the whole? As in Nature varietie addes Beautie, so in the Providence of God varietie of changes renders it more beau­tiful. It was a great saying of a Stoic: He that wil take upon him to mend things, let him first take upon to mend God. Certainly no­thing is done by God, but that which to leave undone were not so good: Many things that seem disorderly and confused as to parts, are not so if we consider the whole. Thus Damascene, Or­thod. Fid. l. 2. c. 29. having proved, that God provides and go­vernes althings according to his most wise Wil, he addes: [...], Therefore God solely is good and wise by nature, or Essentially: As therefore he is good, he provides: for he that provides not, [for such as are under his care] is not good: but as he is wise, he takes care to provide the best things. Therefore it becomes us, attending to these things, to admire al, to praise al, to receive, without curiose inquisition, al the workes of Providence, albe­it they may seem to many injust; because incognite, and incomprehen­sible, as in what follows. That the Providence of God is most perfect, see Aquinas, contra Gent. l. 3. c. 94. Alvarez, de Auxil. Disput. 28. p. 270.

5. Divine Providence is most mysterious and incomprehensible. 5. Mysterious. The Providences of God are much like his Being, very ful of my­steries. So Psal. 36.6. The Judgements of God are said to be a great deep. And Psal. 97.1. The Lord reigneth, let the Earth rejoice: Psal. 97.1, 2. because al his Judgments and Executions of Providence are most Equal and Righteous. Yet it follows, v. 2. Clouds and darknesse are about him. i. e. Albeit his Government is most Righteous, yet much darkenesse and mysterious Providences attend it: there are deep mysteries in his Providential Procedures, albeit Righteous­nesse and Judgement are the habitation or establishment of his Throne, as it follows. Gods Providences are always mater of our Admi­ration, but not of our Comprehension, or Imitation: To mea­sure Providence by our shallow Reason, what is it but to set the Sun by our false Dial? It's wel observed in the Life of Padre Paul, p. 114. ‘In the successe of human things Divine Providence is ever to be admired, where human prudence vanisheth out of sight: it being most certain, that in actions there is an eternal force, and a long chain of Causes, so far without us, that nei­ther our knowlege, or any consideration of ours can ever come near.’ The workes of Providence are much like many curiose pieces of Nature and Art; whereof we see the frame and opera­tions, but that which is the interne moving principe, and gives the greatest force to the operations we see not: So in the workes of Providence, we see the Executions and Effects, but O! how mysterious are the interne Reasons? Is there not a particular though mysterious Providence ordering and directing the Opera­tions of every individual and single Essence? And is there not in every worke of Providence something Divine, which doth puzle the most sharpe-sighted Reason, and hath more in it, than the most acute Philosopher can discover? And why is it that the most of men mistake and censure Providence, but because they cast their eye on some few particulars, but consider not the whole frame and complexe? It's above our narrow Capacities to con­template the whole frame of Providence, and is not this the ge­nuine reason, why we misjudge and mistake the parts? That is not disorder in the whole, which seems so in some one particular, as in the motions of a Watch. These mysteriose procedures of Divine Providence are wel expressed by Damascence, Orthod. Fid. l. 2. c. 29. We must, saith he, admire al the workes of Providence, [...], [Page 460] albeit they may appear to many injust; be­cause Divine Providence is unknown and incomprehensible; and our cogitations, and actions, and things future are known to it only. Thence he addes, towards the close of the Chapter: [...], But we must know, that there are many modes of the Divine Providence, which can neither be explicated by speech, nor comprehended by mind.

§. 6.The distributi­ons of Provi­dence. From the Adjuncts of Divine Providence we passe on to its various Distributions, which are for the most part Modal only, not Specific. As (1) Providence in regard of its Object is distri­buted into General and Special: General Providence is that which respectes althings in general: Special Providence, that which re­spectes some under a special relation to God, as his people. (2) Pro­vidence in regard of its manner of working is distributed into Me­diate and Immediate: Mediate Providence is that wherein God makes use of Means for the execution thereof, of which before. Immediate Providence is, when God produceth Effects without the use of Means. (3) Providence is distributed into Ordinary and Extraordinary: Ordinary Providence is, when God in the production and governing of things observes that Order, which was constituted at first by himself. Extraordinary Providence is when God in the Production, Conservation, or Gubernation of things breakes that natural Order constituted by himself.Of Miracles. The Effects of such extraordinary Providences are, by a Metonymie of the Effect, termed Miracles. A Miracle properly is a Specimen of Creation; because the constituted order of Nature being broken, the Mater has only an Obediential Power for the production of the Effect. Hence nothing but Omnipotence or Infinite Power can properly and physically, in a way of principal efficience, produce a Miracle. It's true the Ministers of God have, when called to it by him, been Instruments of doing Miracles; yet their concur­rence or efficience was only Moral and Instrumental: they wrought al in the Name of God, in a way of faith and dependence on him, and for the manifestation of his Glory. Wherefore our Lord Christ, by working Miracles in his own Name and Autoritie, without any moral dependence on another, gave an evident Con­viction and Demonstration of his being God. For no Creature can worke a Miracle by its own Principal and Physical Efficience: [Page 461]No; this is the Prerogative of the first Cause and Omnipotent Deitie; because every Miracle is educed out of nothing, either as to the thing it self, or at least as to the mode and manner of its being wrought. In Nature, and according to the ordinary course of Providence every passive power has an active power suited to it: and by the application of Actives to Passives the effect is produced: where therefore there is a defect of passive or active power, and yet the effect is produced, that we cal a Miracle: which may be said to be wrought out of nothing three manner of ways. (1) When there is no substrate mater at al to worke on. (2) If there be a substrate mater, yet when the mater is so inha­bile and unapt, as that it has no natural passive power or capa­citie for such an effect. Or (3) when there is a natural passive power and capacitie in the substrate mater, yet there wants an active Principe or Efficient for the educing the effect out of that mater. In al these regards a Miracle may be said to be produced out of nothing, and so the peculiar effect of Divine extraordinary providence. And indeed the very names, both Latin, Greek, and Hebrew, import a power extraordinary and Divine. To let passe the origination of the Latin, which is obvious, Miracles are called by the Greeks, (1) [...], as they are Signes of the Divine Effi­cience and Presence, given for the succur of our Faith; (2) [...], Powers, as they are manifestations and demonstrations of Divine Omnipotence, which is most illustrious therein; (3) [...], Hebr. [...], Prodigies, or tremendous Signes, such as not only ravish men into admiration, but leave also a terror and asto­nishing stupor on the mind. So Phavorinus: [...], A Prodigie is a thing that leaves an astonishment on the Beholders, by reason of the Miracle that is wrought. Whence [...] is deduced from [...], q. [...], that which terrefies and astonisheth. Al which note, that Miracles are the peculiar effects of extraordinary Providence.

The former Distributions of Providence seem only modal, Providential Conservation proper to God. its formal, essential, and specific distribution is into Conservative and Gubernative. Conservation and Gubernation are usually estimed the proper adequate species of Providence. Providential Conservation is that Act of Gods Wil, whereby he makes things to persist and per­severe in their individual Existence, Vigor, Acts, and specific Essences or Species. As for the particular Ideas of providential Conserva­tion we shal draw them forth in the following Proposition. 1. [Page 462]Prop. God is the necessary Conservator of althings. No Creature is sufficient to conserve it self, or any thing else: no particular Agent as such can be properly stiled a conservant Cause; because conservation is but a kind of continued Creation. That no Crea­ture is sufficient to conserve it self, without the immediate con­servative influxe of God, is evident, (1) because every Creature has but a fluid transient nature: wherefore it needs the conser­vative concurse of the first cause to fixe its fluxible Being. It was a great and good Effate of Heraclitus, [...], Althings are in fluxe, nothing is permanent: i. e. the natures of things create are like a river, the parts whereof are always in fluxe; neither doth the same part ever returne again, but emties it self into the Sea, where it is swallowed up: so al Creatures are in continual fluxe; and if God, who alone is pure Act and immuta­ble, did not fixe their Beings by his conservative influxe, they would soon drop into their primitive nothing. (2) It implies a contradiction, that a Creature should persevere in its being with­out Gods conservative concurse. Doth it not implie a contradi­ction, to say, that God made a thing, and yet that thing was not made and caused by God? Now to say God hath made a Creature, which needs not his conservative influxe, what is this but to say, that God made a Creature, which yet was not made by him? So essential is Divine Conservation to the very essence and existence of a Creature, as Bradwardine, pag. 162. Thus also Aquinas, 1. Quaest. 104. demonstrates, That it is not a thing com­municable to any Creature, that it should conserve it self in Being with­out God. (3) Whatever is Ens by participation necessarily de­pendes on that which is Ens by essence for its existence and sub­sistence. Al create Beings in their very essence depend on Divine Conservation; because every effect that dependes on any cause di­rectly and of it self primarily for essence, must necessarily also depend thereon for conservation: But now God is so the cause of al effects, that they from their very nature and by an intrin­secal necessitie depend on him for Being; therefore also for con­servation, as Suarez, Metaph. Disput. 21. pag. 540, &c. God is [...] Jehovah, in some sense Al Being, as Exod. 3.14. I am: i. e. nothing hath essence, existence, and persistence in Essence, but from the pure Actualitie and Efficience of God. (4) If God educed althings out of nothing by his efficacious Wil, then it ne­cessarily follows, that the Wil of God must be the Conservatrix of [Page 463]althings: For althings are so far, and so long existent, as God wils they shal be. Indeed what is conservation but continued creation, or the continuation of a thing made in Being? Is it not necessary then, that the same Divine Wil, that at first gave Being to any thing, conserve the same thing in Being? Thence Aquinas, 1. Quaest. 104. proves, That God conserves every thing by the same virtue and operation, by which he produced it, i. e. by the effi­cience of his Wil. (5) There is great proportion and Analogie in point of conservation between the workes of Art and Nature. For look as every worke of Art doth presuppose a principe and worke of Nature, as wel for its conservation as first production; so every worke of Nature doth presuppose a Divine Efficience for its conservation as wel as for its first production. Is it impossible that a piece of Art should conserve it self without mater? and is it possible, that any worke of Nature should conserve it self without Divine Efficience? (6) No impression can remain on any effect, longer than the vis impressa, or force and action of the Agent continue: and what is the essence of any Creature but vis impressa, or force impressed by God thereon? Al create Essences are but impressions or participations from God, and therefore es­sentially require new force and efficience every moment for their conservation and continuation. (7) Unlesse God conserve althings, how can he order, dispose, and governe them to their respective ends? Not only the operations, but the very essences of things are ordered by God to his own Glorie: and how can this be, if the essences of things are not conserved by God? That God is the necessary Conservator of althings, see Aquinas, contra Gent. l. 3. c. 65. Bradward. l. 1. c. 2. pag. 146, &c.

2. Prop. Gods conservative Influxe and Efficience is most intime and immediate in althings. This Proposition is most evident,Gods conserva­tive Influxe im­mediate. (1) From Gods power to annihilate althings. For if things were con­served by God only mediately, he could not annihilate them so long as that intermediate conservant Cause should concur to their conservation, as it's wel demonstrated by Ariminensis, Sent. 1. Dist. 45. pag. 160. (2) From the passive power or potentialitie of al Creatures. For every potential or thing in power must be actu­ated by some Act immediately: now every Creature in respect of God is but a potential Being; and therefore must be actuated immediately by God, who is a pure Act, and that not only in its operation, but also for the conservation of its Being. (3) From [Page 464]the Omnipresence of the Divine Essence. God being not circumscri­bed or defined to any space, but immense in his Being, it thence follows, that he is intimately and immediately present to al Be­ings, and by this his immediate presence and volition conserves the same. As the creatrix Essence was immediately present by the Divine Volition in the first Creation of althings; so the con­servatrix Essence is also immediately present in the conservation of althings. God is not more distant and remote in the conser­vation, than he was in the first causation of things: God is more intimate to every thing, than the most intimate part of its own Essence is. Thus Suarez, Metaphys. Disput. 30. Sect. 7. pag. 70. proves, That God doth not diffuse his creative or conservative A­ction, but is intimately in every thing, conserving of it, &c. So Bradward. pag. 164. (4) From Gods prime Causalitie, and the sub­ordination of al Creatures to God. Every second cause, whether cau­sant or conservant, cannot cause or conserve any effect, but in de­pendence on and subordination to God, the first Cause: Hence the Efficience of God must intervene between it and the effect, whether it be for causation or conservation: whence it follows, that the Divine Efficience, both in causation and conservation, is more immediate than the efficience of any second cause. Again, the causalitie of the first Cause is more essential and necessary than that of the second cause: there is no effect, which the second cause produceth, but the first cause can produce it by itself. So also as to conservation. The first cause workes by its own proper virtue, and therefore more intimely and immediately than any second cause: The virtue of an inferior cause is not conjunct with the effect, but in and by the virtue of the superior. (5) From the efficacitie and vehemence of Gods conservative Influxe. By how much the more vehemently and efficaciously any cause worketh, by so much the more penetrant, intime, and immediate is its in­fluxe. Now God, as the first conservant Cause, doth more vehe­mently adhere to and efficaciously influence the effect, than any second cause can do. Concerning the immediate Conservation of God, see an excellent Discourse in Bradwardine, de Caus. lib. 1. cap. 2. pag. 164, &c.

3.Gods Conserva­tion by his Word or Wil. Heb. 1.3. Prop. God conserves althings by the word of his Power or imme­diate Volition. Thus Heb. 1.3. Ʋpholding althings by the word of his power. The Apostle ascribeth unto God infinite power in and for the conservation of althings, whether great or smal. It is infinite [Page 465]power that upholdeth the Earth, that stretcheth out the Heavens, &c. And yet the same infinite power is put forth in the conser­vation of the least things, as also for their motions. The same power that moves the Heavens, is also exerted in causing a fea­ther to move: the same power that shakes a leaf, can shake yea rend the mountains: the same strong arme that upholds a dust or atome, can and doth uphold the Earth. And he saith al this is by the word of his Power: i. e. by his omnipotent Volition. So 2 Pet. 3. having old us, v. 5. That by the word of God the Hea­vens were made: he addes, v. 7. But the heavens and earth, 2 Pet. 3.7. which are now, by the same word are kept in store: i. e. by the omnipotent Wil of God. Gods Word being put for his Wil, because we usually expresse our wils by our word. That Gods Word or Wil is the immediate cause of althings and their conservation, we have before fully demonstrated, §. 3. of this Chapter.

4. Prop. Albeit the conservative Influxe of God be immediate, Gods Conserva­tion by means. yet in the ordinary course of Providence he makes use of means for the con­servation of his Creatures, at least such as are corruptible. So Hos. 2.21,Hos. 2.21, 22.22. I wil hear the heavens; and they shal hear the earth; and the earth shal hear the corne, and the wine, and the oil; and they shal hear Jezreel. (1) In this gradation we have a lively descri­ption of Divine Conservation, both as to the whole Universe, as also in regard of the principal part thereof, man, and more spe­cially the Church of God. (2) Neither doth this Prosopopoeia only point out to us the Divine Conservation of althings, but also their causal connexions and subordinations each to other. Jezreel [i. e. according to its proper origination, the seed of God] cals on corne and wine and oil for sustenance and food: and these liquors cal on the Earth for fructifying juices and vigor, in order to their production: and the Earth cals on the Heavens, i. e. [1] on the Aereous inferior Heaven, where the Clouds, Snow, Rain, Dew, and Vapors are, for moist influences; [2] on the Ethereous Hea­ven, where the Sun and Stars are, for warme influences: And then lastly the Heavens cal on God; who gives out both vigor and heat to the Celestial Bodies; and these influences to the Earth; which thence gives juices and vigor to the Plants; whence Corne, Wine, and Oil is given forth to Jezreel. Such is the admirable gradation and subordination of althings, as means of Divine Conservation. Thus Psal. 65.9, 10, 11, 12, 13.Psal. 65.11, 12. Thou visitest the earth, &c. Thence v. 11. Thou crownest the year with [Page 466]thy goodnesse. i.e. Thoroughout the whole year thou doest abun­dantly do good to thy poor Creatures, and so doest as it were adorne, beautifie, and make glad the year. Whence he addes: and thy paths drop fatnesse. Thy paths, orbitae, i. e. the clouds, which are the paths wherein the chariot of thy Providence moves. Drop fatnesse: i. e. Rain and Snow, which by their sulphureous ni­trose efficaces make the Earth fat and flourishing, whereby Man and Bestes are conserved. Whence it follows: v. 12. They drop on the pastures of the wildernesse, and the little hils rejoice on every side. Or are girded with joy. Some understand this of metallic venes, which are in the bosome of the Earth, and do as it were gird it with joy, or metals that cause joy. We find mention also of the providential provision that God makes for his Creatures, Psal. 145.15 The eyes of al wait upon thee, Psal. 145.15. and thou givest them their meat in due season. 16. Thou openest thy hand and satisfiest the de­sire of every living thing. We have here a lively Image of Gods providential conservation, who is brought in as a great Master of a Familie, largely distributing Food, even from his own hand, to al under his care. Such abundant provision doth the Benigne Lord make for the conservation of his Creature. Whence some derive [...] Shaddai the name of God from [...] a dug or teat that yields milk, implying that God feeds al, and supplies them with nourishment. Others deduce Shaddai from [...] dai sufficient, q. [...] Scheddai, who is sufficient: because God is Alsufficient to supplie al his Creatures.

5. Prop. When ordinary means fail, God oft provides extraordi­nary for the relief of his Creatures. Gods extraordi­nary provision for some. Thus God provided for Eliah, and many other of his Servants in their exigences, whereof we find abundant instances in Sacred Philosophie and Historie. Yea how oft doth our liberal Lord make extraordinary provision for mere Brutes in their indigent cases?Psal. 147.9. Thus Psal. 147.9. He giv­eth to the Beste his food, and to the young Ravens which crie. The last clause,Job 38.41. and to the young Ravens which crie, is taken out of Job 38.41.Luke 12.24. Who provideth for the Raven his food? When his young ones cry unto God, they wander for lack of meat. So Luk 12.24. Our Lord makes mention of Gods feeding the Ravens. Which places put together seem to note some more than ordinary provision that God makes for them. The Rabbines, Rasi and Kimhi, with some others tel us, that the young Ravens, by reason of their white co­lor, are left by their Parents to shift for themselves; whence the [Page 467]Providence of God, in an extraordinay manner, causeth flies or wormes to arise out of their dung, by which they are nourished. Plinie and Albertus Magnus incline much to this Opinion of the Hebrews. Others refer this not to the young Ravens newly hatcht, but to such as are ready to flie: which being cast out of the neast by their Parents, and very much affected with hunger slie up and down the Air, making loud cries. Which seems to agree to that of Job 38.41. Thus Aristotle and Elian tel us, that the young Ravens are expelled from their neast by the old ones. To this sense Vossius, Mcy, and others incline. The former sense of the Hebrews is refuted by Calvin, as also by Bochart, de Animal. Tom. 2. p. 203, &c. who makes this case of the young Ravens the same with that of the young Lions, Job 39.39. Psal. 34.10. and 104.21. both of which by reason of their vehement appetite, and un­skilfulnesse to acquire food suffer great hunger, and are in a more than ordinary manner supplied by the Providence of God. What extraordinary provision God makes for the conservation of his own People wil hereafter occur in the Gubernation of God.

6. Prop. The Conservation of a Creature and its first Creation or Production, as they refer both to God, differ only mentally. Conservation continued Crea­tion. Creation gives Being and Existence unto things, Conservation, Continuation in Being. Somethings are conserved immediately by God, becuase subject only to him, as Spirits: That the conservation of such dif­fers only mentally from their Creation is evident: Other things are conserved by God not so immediately as to exclude Means, yet so as that God conserves them immediately in and by those means. Now that the conservation of such things also, as to Gods immediate conservative influxe, differs not really, but only men­tally from thier first production is manifest; because conservati­on as to God, whether it be by means or without means, is but one act continued from the first instant of its Creation or Produ­ction: not that there is any real intrinsec succession in Gods Active Conservation, which is no other than his most simple voli­tion; but we conceive Gods Passive Conservation as successive in regard of the Creatures Duration. Thonce Aquinas and his Se­ctators hold, That Conservation is a continued Creation. Which must not be understood of proper continuation, but according to our manner of understanding, or by reason of its coexistence to true continued succession: For continuation properly so termed is only in things divisible: but Creation and Conservation are one [Page 468]indivisible act, without any successive duration or real continua­tion as to God, but only a most simple indivisible permanence, as Suarez, Metaphys. Disput. 21. Sect. 2. p. 343. demonstrates. Hence we may easily understand, how Creation or the first production of things, and their Conservation as to God differ only Mentally. For the difference is only according to the different mode of our conception, and expression: Things are not said to be conserved in the first moment of their production, nor to be Created in re­gard of their subsequent continuation: For Creation connotes a negation of precedent Being, but conservation on the contrary connotes the possession of Being before produced. Creation in­cludes a Novitie of Essence, which conservation excludes; and conservation includes precedent Existence, which Creation ex­cludes.Nehem. 9.6. Thus Conservation is continued Creation, as Nehem. 9.6. where God is said to preserve althings made by one and the same Act.John 5.17. So John 5.17. My Father hitherto worketh and I worke: i. e. for the Conservation as wel as the first production of things; nei­ther are these Acts as to Divine Efficience really distinct, albeit we may distinguish them as to second causes and means used by God, for the production and conservation of things.

7. Prop. Divine Conservation as to its Objects and Effects is vari­ous. The Object of Divine Conser­vation. Albeit the Conservation of God be in it self one simple Act, not different from the first production of things, save by some con­notation only, yet it admits various Objects and Effects. (1) God conserves Individuals, some to al Eternitie, without the least cor­ruption or alteration: as Angels and Human Souls: Other Indi­viduals shal be conserved for ever, yet not without some altera­tion and resinement, as the celestial Bodies, &c. 2 Pet. 3.10, 12. (2) Such Individuals as are the effects of Natural Generation or Production God conserves in their Species, and in the whole: for the corruptions and defects of some parts belong to the Constitu­tion and Continuation [...] of the whole Ʋniverse, unto which there is more regard to be had, than to any part: albeit the parts also are conserved in their Species, when they decay as to their individual Natures. (3) God conserves also the vigor, virtue and efficacitie of al second causes, together with their Operations so long as they are existent.

CHAP. IX. Of Divine Gubernation in general; and as to Sin.

God the Supreme Gubernator. The end of Divine Gubernation. Its Order most perfect, and immobile. It hath the force of a Law. Its use of means. Its extent to althings. Gods Gubernation as to Men: particularly as to Sinners, and Sin. The Origine of Sin, and its causes. God not the Author of Sin. How God is the cause of the material act of Sin. How far Sin fals under the Divine Wil. Gods Wil about Sin Permissive; not merely Negative, but Ordina­tive. Gods Judicial Gubernation of Sin. What Attributes of God are most illustrious in the Gubernation of Sin.

§. 1. HAving discussed the Conservation of God,Divine Guber­nation. we now de­scend to his Gubernation, whereof we find illustrious no­tices both in Sacred and Platonic Philosophie. As for Sacred Phi­losophemes touching Divine Gubernation they are very many and great, as it may appear in the particulars thereof. I shal at present give only the mention of Platonic Contemplations con­cerning it. Thus Plato, Phileb. p. 28. What, O Protarchus, may we determine, that althings, and this which is called the Ʋniverse, are governed by a certain temerarious power void of Reason, as For­tune wil? Or rather on the contrary, should we not affirme with our Ancestors, [...], that the eternal Mind, and a certain admirable Wisdome, ordering al in the most accurate manner, doth governe? He saith, that accord­ing to the Opinion of the Ancient Wise Men, the Providence of God governes and moderates althings in the wisest manner, and with the best order. Thus also Iamblichus saith, ‘That the Egy­ptians, when they introduce God under the Symbolic Image of one that governes a Ship, thereby signifie his Domination and Empire as Gubernator of the Universe. For as a Gubernator of a Ship in one moment doth easily move, governe, and direct the Ship; so doth God the world.’ We find the same similitude used by Plato, Leg. 10. p. 902, as before. Hence, this Gubernation of God is that act of Divine Providence, whereby he directes, governes, and brings al his Creatures to their proper ends, in the most orderly [Page 470]manner. This general Idea of Divine Gubernation may be re­solved into the following Propositions.

1. Prop. God is the Supreme Moderator, God the Supreme Gubernator. Eccles. 8.4. Soverain Gubernator, and absolute Rector of althings. Thus we may applie Eccles. 8.4. Where the word of a King is, there is power; [or Domination] and who can say to him what doest thou? i. e. by how much the more Soverain any person is, by so much the greater is his Dominati­on. God being King of Kings, and Lord of Lords must necessa­rily be most Absolute in Power and Domination. This is oft in­culcated by Plato, and carries with it its own Evidence. For (1) althings receiving their Being, Perfection, Virtue and Operation, from God, it cannot be, but that he should have an Absolute Do­minion and Soverain Empire over them. (2) Althings tend to God as their last end: therefore he is the Supreme Rector of al. For when many things tend to one last end, it's necessary that there be some Supreme Rector and Moderator that ordaines them thereto. For Gubernation is nothing else but the directing the things governed to their last end. Thus Aquinas, 1. q. 103. a. 3. ‘Seing the end of the Gubernation of the world is the best good, it's necessary, that the Gubernation of the world be best: But now the best Gubernation is that which is by one, &c.’ (3) God is infinitely wise to order althings, and potent to bring them to their ends; therefore he is the Supreme Moderator of al. So Plato, Leg. 10. p. 902. [...], But that God who is most wise, both can and wil take care of his own Creatures, &c. (4) The Bonitie of God argues him to be the Absolute Rector of althings. For it belongs to Divine Bonitie to reduce althings made by him to those proper ends for which they were made. Whatever flows from God as the first Cause, must returne to him as the last end. (5) This is the great concerne of Divine Gubernation, to see that althings reach the end for which they were made. For things wil never certainly and infallibly reach the end for which they were made, unlesse they be directed and governed by the same power which made them. It argues imperfection in an Artificer not to di­rect the worke he made, to the end for which it was made. And may we impute such an imperfection to the first Framer of althings? Hence,

2. Prop. Divine Gubernation proposeth the Glorie of God as the last end of a things. The last end of Divine Guber­nation. What is al Gubernation but the directing althings to some last end? And what is the last end of althings, but the Glorie of God? Thus Plato, Leg. 10. pag 903. [...], Let us persuade this young man, that he, who by his providence takes the care of the whole, that he may conserve and adorne it with necessary virtue, doth wisely dispose and or­der althings to this end: the force and efficace of whose Providence doth diffuse itself into al parts of the Ʋniverse, according to their na­ture. Whereby he explicates to us, how God doth order and dispose althings for the good of the whole and his own Glorie. This he more fully lays open in what follows: [...], &c. But thou know­est not, that al generation of singulars is for this, that the life of the whole may be blessed: his Essence is not for thy sake, but thou wert made for his sake. For every Physician, and every skilful Artificer, makes al for the sake of the whole, aspiring after the commun utilitie. Thence he makes not the whole for the sake of the part, but the part for the sake of the whole. But thou art ful of indignation, because thou canst not see, how that which is best may accord with the com­mun good, and thy proper interest. Here are several things remar­quable for explication and demonstration, that the Glorie of God is the last end of Divine Gubernation. (1) He saith, Al singu­lars are for this, that the life of the whole may be blessed. Why may we not by [...], the whole understand God? That Plato sometimes understandes God by this notion, specially in his Ti­maeus, pag. 90. [...], the contemplations of the whole, &c. I could easily persuade my self. (2) But grant, that we must understand this of the Ʋniverse strictly taken, yet it must at last be resolved into God: for is not the Universe and althings else for Gods sake, not God for the sake of the Universe? (3) Plato illustrates this by the Symbol of a wise Physician and skilful Artificer, who workes al for the sake of the whole: and is not the Di­vine Bonitie and Glorie that great Ʋniversitie or whole, into which [Page 472]al lower ends must be melted? (4) Plato blames his young A­theist, and in him the most of men, for preferring their private good before the good of the whole; which Theologie teacheth is no other than the Glorie of God. That althings are ordered and disposed by Divine Gubernation, for the Glorie of God is mani­fest, (1) From the prime motion and causalitie of God. For God be­ing the prime Motor of althings, and moved by nothing, it thence necessarily follows, that by his Providence he governe and move althings to himself, as the last end. The order of ends necessari­ly answers the order of Agents: the first Cause and Motor must needs be the last end of althings. (2) From Gods Dominion over althings. Every Agent has power to use his own workes for the end he made them: and are not al Creatures the workes of Gods hands? Has he not then power to use them for his own Glorie? (3) From the perfection which althings acquire by subserving the Glo­rie of God. By how much the nearer any Creature approcheth to the Divine Bonitie, by so much the more perfect it is: and is not every thing by so much the nearer the Divine Bonitie, by how much the more subservient it is to the Glorie of God? It was a good Saying of the spurious Dionysius: The supreme Bonitie convertes althings unto itself, which al desire as their last end, and by which they al subsist as their most perfect end. Hence,

3. Prop. The order whereby Divine Gubernation disposeth and re­duceth althings to their last end is most fixed, The Order of Di­vine Guberna­tion fixed. Esa. 40.26. immobile, and perfect. This according to sacred Philosophie is wel expressed, Esa. 40.26. Lift up your eyes on high, and behold who hath created these things; that bringeth out their host by number: he calleth them al by name: by the greatnesse of his might: for that he is strong in power not one faileth. Observe here; (1) he cals on mankind to lift up their eyes for the contemplation of the Creatures thereby to instruct themselves in the Gubernation of God. (2) He founds Divine Gubernation on omnipotent Creation. (3) He expresseth Gods fixed admirable order in governing things, specially the Celestial bodies, by bringing out their host by number. O! what an accurate order do al the Celestial bodies observe in their motions! Is not every one numbered and ranged in its proper place by Divine Gu­bernation? Doth not every one keep its ranke and slation, per­forme its office, and move most regularly, according to that Law which Divine Ordination has appointed it? Thence it follows: And calleth them al by name: i. e. has an accurate knowlege of and [Page 473]command over al, as a wise General that can cal al his Souldiers by name, whose beck and nod every one obeys. Such is the ad­mirable Dexteritie and Domination of Divine Gubernation. But whence springs al this? that follows: By the greatnesse of his might. The magnitude of Divine Power is the cause of his admirable fix­ed Gubernation: because he is omnipotent, therefore it is im­possible that he should fail in his Gubernation. Thus it follows: For that he is strong in power not one faileth. [...], faileth, or is de­prived, i. e. of that fixed order and station, which Divine Guberna­tion has allotted to it: there is not one that detractes its office, but al subserve the Divine order. Thus Plato, in his Phado, p. 97. [...], It is the eternal Mind that disposeth althings in the best order, and is the cause of al— And thus I determined with my self, if it be so, that this gu­bernative dispositive Mind doth thus dispose althings, then althings are placed in that station and ranke, where they may be most rightly con­stituted. The Stoics also, as Laertius in Zeno assures us, held, [...], That the world was governed and ordered by the Divine Mind and Providence, which disposeth althings in the best manner. This gubernative Providence, as it includes a fixed order and series of causes and effects, they cal­led Fate; which they made to be a connexe series of things, or reason, whereby the world was governed. So Chrysippus said: [...], &c. That Fate was a natural Syntaxe or regular connexion of althings, mutually following each other from al eternitie, by an immutable and inviolable complication. Whereby in­deed they seem to understand no other than the series and order of Divine Gubernation, decreed by God from al eternitie. So Stobaeus, in his Physics explicates their mind: [...], The reason of those things, which are governed in the world by Providence. And that this was the original im­port of the Stoic Fate we are assured by Seneca, Minutins Faelix, Lud. Vives, and others. Thus Robert Grosseteste, that great Phi­losopher as wel as Divine, in his Tractate de Libero Arbitrio, (to be found in MSS. in Exeter College Librarie:) ‘We must know, saith he, that Fate may be taken for Providence, according to Boetius, Lib. Consol. Philos. 4. who saith, that Fate is the same with Providence, yet they may admit different considerations; be­cause Providence is that Divine Reason in the Soverain of al­things, [Page 474]which disposeth althings; but Fate is the disposition in­herent in things mobile, by which Providence knits them toge­ther in their proper orders.’ In what follows he proves out of Cicero, Boetius, and others, that Fate is really the same with Provi­dence: of which see Philos. Gen. P. 2. l. 1. c. 3. §. 5. Hence,

4.None can avoid Divine Order and Gubernati­on. Prop. No second cause can totally decline the order prefixed by Divine Gubernation. And the reason is evident; because this Gubernation of God intrinsecally includes, not only a prudent provision of the best means, but an efficacious execution of them, so as they shal infallibly reach their end. It's true, wicked men oft do substract and withdraw their neck from the obediential yoke of Gods preceptive Gubernation, but yet they cannot totally withdraw themselves from the order of Gods providential Guber­nation: whiles they violate the moral and sacred order of Divine precepts, do they not fal into the penal order of Divine punish­ments? Yea, oft do not those very means, which they use to vio­late the Divine order,Gen. 11.4. promove the same? Thus Gen. 11.4. And they said: Go to, let us build us a citie, and a tower, whose top may reach unto heaven; and let us make us a name, lest we be scattered abroad upon the face of the whole earth. You see their designe in building the Tower of Babel was to prevent the judgements of God, or to secure themselves against a dispersion and scattering: and yet, lo! the wise Gubernation of God made this very Tower of Babel, v. 8. which they intended as a means to prevent their disper­sion, the cause thereof, as v. 8. So the Lord scattered them abroad, &c. And yet out of this very dispersion which they feared and felt, Divine Gubernation brought another sacred order, even for the peopling the whole Earth. Thus the most unnatural confu­sions are ordered by Divine Gubernation: the order of Divine Providence is frequently advanced by that which may seem to obstruct or pul it down: whiles men endeavor to escape one or­der of Divine Gubernation, they fal into another.

5.The Order of Gods Guberna­tion a Law. Prop. The order of Divine Gubernation, whereby althings are appointed and reduced to their end, has the force and efficace of a Law. Thence Plato termes this Order of Divine Gubernation, [...], the Law of Adrastie, i. e. Gods fixed Order. So Pin­dar: [...], the Regal Law of althings: i. e. that Order which the Eternal Law of Divine Decrees has constituted for the Gubernation of althings. This Law, whereby Divine Gubernation orders and disposeth things, as it refers to things [Page 475]inanimate and Brutes, comprehendes in it al those Natural In­stinctes, Instigations, Inclinations, and Propensions, whereby they are conducted to their proper ends and usages. Do not things Na­tural, which are not invested with rational notices, or sponta­neitie certainly observe some Laws and Dictates of Nature, which, you may assoon banish them from their Natures, as divest them of? Are not the several kinds of their Operations constant­ly framed and determined according to this Order or Law of their Natures? And do they not hereby follow Divine Gubernation towards their end, albeit they know not what they do nor why? Doth not the silly Bird curiosely frame its neast, and the simple Bee its cel always after the same forme and figure? and so in al other natural operations and productions of mere Brutes, what a fixed Order is there agreable to the Law of their Beings? And whence comes al this, but from the infinite Wisdome and Guber­nation of the Divine Mind, who conductes things most irrational in the most intelligent prudent manner to their ends? May we not then conclude, that the Natural Generations and Operations of althings procede from that Universal Law engraven on their Beings, whereby they are, by the wise Conduct of Divine Guber­nation, directed to their respective Ends? In sum, this Natural Law of Divine Gubernation consistes, (1) In the Natural Prin­cipes of things. (2) In their Natural Inclinations. (3) In al Na­tural Instinctes, and Impulses of Nature. (4) In their Obedien­tial Capacities or Powers, whereby they are ready to receive any extraordinary Impressions, which Divine Gubernation shal offer to them.

6. Prop.Gods Guberna­tion by second Causes. The Executions of Divine Gubernation are oft committed to second Causes and Instruments, yet so as it actes immediately in and with them, yea sometimes contrary to their natural Inclinations. Thus Plato, Leg. 10. p. 903. speaking of Gods Soverain Providential Gubernation, saith: That albeit God takes the care of the whole Ʋniverse himself, yet [...], And over al these parts [of the Universe] are set Rulers and Moderators, who constantly governe althings, even the most minute parts; that so by these they may governe al, even to the last part, unto their end. By those Rulers under Divine Gubernati­on, I presume, he understandes al second Causes made use of there­by. Divine operations do not exclude the operations of the se­cond [Page 467]causes, but these include subordination to Divine operati­ons. Divine Gubernation orders and governes Inferior Creatures by Superiors, Corporals by Spirituals; and Inferior sublunary bo­dies by Superior and Celestial. Thus he governes althings imme­diately as to the manner of Order, and yet many things mediately as to the execution thereof: So that nothing can fal out against or beside the Universal Order of Divine Gubernation, albeit many things do contrary to the order of particular Causes. Touching the Executions of Divine Providence, see §. 3. Prop. 4.

7.Gods Guberna­tion reacheth althings. Prop. The Object of Divine Gubernation is althings in their most extensive latitude. Thus Plato Leg. 10. p. 902, 903. proves, That nothing is so minute and inconsiderable, but it fals under Di­vine Gubernation. But to descend to particulars. (1) Divine Gubernation disposeth of al Seasons, both Natural and Politic. [1] Natural Seasons, Eccles. 3.1. as Eccles. 3.1. To every thing there is a sea­son, and a time to every purpose. A Season: i. e. a certain fixed, determinate time. [2] Politic Seasons, for Human and Politic Actions. (2) Gods Divine Gubernation orders al Vicissitudes and Changes in the world, without the least vicissitude or change in himself.Dan. 2.20, 21. So Dan. 2.20. For Wisdome and Might are his: i. e. for the Gubernation of althings. Whence it follows, v. 21. And he changeth the Times and the Seasons: he removeth Kings, and set­teth up Kings. (3) Divine Gubernation orders al the Meteors, Snow, Job 37.6, 7. Rain, &c. So Job 37.6. For he saith to the Snow, be thou on the earth: likewise to the smal Rain, and to the great Rain of his strength. Whence it follows, v. 7. He sealeth up the hand of every man, that al men may know his worke. He sealeth up the hand of eve­ry one. Elibu's meaning is, that when God sendeth his Snow and shours of Rain, he thereby seals up, or shuts up the hand of the Husbandman, that so he may retire out of the fields home, and consider his worke. Then the Bestes go into Dens, as v. 8. (4) God governeth al motions of second Causes, even such as are most contingent and voluntary, in the most certain manner. (5) God governes al Events of things. It was a great saying of Julius Cae­sar, which he gained by experience, ‘That Fortune, (whereby the Ancients expressed Divine Gubernation) has great force in althings; but more particularly in the affaires of war: where­in oft the most inconsiderable rencontres or occurrences produce the greatest changements.’ Such is the wise and potent Guber­nation of God in Military Affaires.

§. 2.Divine Guber­nation as to Man. Having dispatcht the Gubernation of God in the general notion thereof, we now descend to consider it in its special rela­tion to Man, both in his sinful and renovate State. Gubernative Providence doth reach the whole Universe; but in a more spe­cial manner Man and his Affaires. So Plato saith, Leg. 4. p. 709. [...], That God truely, and with God Fortune and Op­portunitie governe al human affaires. By Fortune and Opportunitie we must understand Divine Gubernative Providence, which in a more peculiar manner regardes Man; because he is capable not only of Natural, but also of Moral Gubernation. God governes every Creature according to its capacitie, whether Natural or Moral: but now al Creatures inferior to man are capable only of Natural Gubernation and Passive Reduction to their last end: they may be governed and directed to their last end, but they cannot governe or direct themselves thereto. But Man being in­vested with a Natural, Passive, remote capacitie of understanding and Wil, can, when in a special manner aided and assisted by su­pernatural Gubernation, actively conduct and direct himself to his last end. Hence Divine Gubernation as to Man is either Mo­ral, 1. Moral by Law. or Efficacious. (1) Gods Moral Gubernation is by Laws and Institutions. Look as irrational Creatures are governed by natu­ral Instinctes, and Inclinations, which are to them a Law direct­ing them to their end; so Rational Creatures have a more ex­presse formal Law, which was at first impressed on their Beings, but now under a new Edition by Divine Revelation, whereby they are directed to their last end. For a Law being nothing else but a certain Reason or Rule of operating, it properly only can belong to intellectual rational Creatures, who alone can understand the reason of their operations. And that this Law is given to Man principally to direct him to his last end is evident, because the Supreme Intention and Efficace of the Divine Law is, to bring Man into subjection to God: and who are subject to God but those, who refer al to him as their last end? Is it not the Intende­ment of every Lawgiver to make those good, to whom his Laws are promulgated? And wherein consistes the goodnesse of Man, but in subjection to God, and adhering to him as his last end? So that the main end of al Laws both Positive and Moral is to direct man to his last end. (2) This also is the main de­signe of Divine Efficacious Gubernation, 2. Efficacious. namely to reduce man un­to [Page 478]to a subordination and subservience to his last end. Only it has a different ay of operation as to wicked and pious men. Wicked men, if they persevere in their wickednesse, are by Divine Gu­bernation reduced to their last end only passively, by penal execu­tions, in order to the vindication of Divine Justice: but elect pious Souls are actively reduced and directed to their last end, by the supernatural Gubernation of the Divine Spirit. Of both these in their order.

That wicked men,Wicked men fal under Gods Gu­bernation. and al their sinful Acts and Deeds are, by Divine Gubernation, reduced to the last end of al, the Glorie of God, wil appear evident, if we reflect on what was before hint­ed, that if the Creature withdraw it self from one order of Divine Gubernation, it immediately fals under another: if lawlesse ir­regular men substract and withdraw themselves from Gods gra­cious and easie yoke of obedience in order to life, they deserved­ly fal under Gods Iron Yoke of vindictive Justice, and Eternal Death: and so whiles they violate one Wil and Order of Divine Gubernation, they fulfil another: If they wil not willingly do Gods Wil of Precept, which brings happinesse with it, what more just, than that they suffer Gods Wil of punishment, against their Wils? Thus wicked men fulfil Gods providential Wil, whiles they break his preceptive Wil. Yea, Satan himself is under chains of irresistible Providence: He is not an Absolute, much lesse a Lawful Monarch, but Usurper; who has a restraint upon his Power, though not upon his Malice: He cannot Act as he would.

And as the persons of the wicked,Gods Guberna­tion about sin. both Men and Devils, fal under the Providential Gubernation of God, so also their Sins. And here we are inevitably engaged in that grand Philosophic and Scholastic Question, How far Sin fals under the Providential Gubernation of God? For the solution whereof we shal first pre­mit some Distinctions: and then resolve the whole into certain Propositions. As for Distinctions, (1) We may consider Sin [1] in regard of its Causes, Essicient and Final: or [2] in regard of its Essential and Constitutive parts, Mater and Forme. (2) We may consider the Permission of Sin; which is either merely Nega­tive or Positive: and both, as belonging to a Legislator, or to a Rector. (3) We may consider the Providence of God as to its Natural Efficience or Judicial Gubernation. These Distinctions be­ing premissed, we shal resolve our Question in the following Pro­positions.

1. Prop. Al Sin, as other things, has its Origine, Causes, and Con­stitutive parts. The Causes and parts of Sin. The Ethnic as wel as the Christian Scholes have admitted many Debates, touching the Origine of Evil, or Sin: and we have this copiosely ventilated by Simplicius, an acute Philoso­pher, in his Commentaric on Epicterus, C. 34. p. 175. &c. And he seems to state it thus: That Sin, being a privation, has no pro­per principe or cause, though as to its substrate mater it may fal under some causalitie. Thus Plato, Repub. 2. p. 380. and Proclus on him, denie, that there is, [...] & [...], any Cause or Idea of E­vils; because, [...], Evil is an irregular pas­sion, or [...] a privation of Being; which must be understood of the formal Reason of Sin: for as to is substrate mater, Plato and his Followers grant, that al good has its Causes. Suarez, Me­taphys. Disp. 11. Sect. 3. p. 251. proves wel, (1) That al Sin must have some Cause: [1] Because nothing is Evil of it self: there­fore from some Cause. [2] Because nothing is Evil, but as it recedes from some perfection due to it: but nothing fails of its due perfection, but from some cause either Agent, or Impedient: Now (2) this being granted, That al Sin has some Cause, it thence necessarily follows, That some Good must be the Cause of Sin. For in as much as we may not procede into Infinite, nor yet stop at some Sin that has no Cause, we must necessarily stop at some Good, which is the cause of Evil. Hence, (3) to explicate in what kind Sin may be said to have a Cause, we must know, [1] that Sin formally as Sin requires not a final Cause, yet it may admit the same in regard of the extrinsec intention of the Agent. That sin formally as sin requires not a final Cause, is evident; because consisting in a privation and defect, it is not properly and of it self intended in things. Thus Simplicius in Epictet. C. 34. pag. 174. tels us, That al Act, [...], does par­ticipate of Good, and therefore Evil can have no end. And yet that Sin may have a final Cause, in regard of the extrinsec in­tention of the Agent, is as evident; because the Agent may in­tend what is Evil for some end: for what is Evil in one kind, may be conducible, or utile in some other. [2] As to the Ef­ficient Cause, al Sin has some Efficient Cause, yet not per se, of it self and properly, but by Accident, and beside the primary, in­trinsec intention of the Agent. Man is said to be Efficient or rather the Deficient Cause of Sin, by producing that Action, to which Sin is appendent or annexed. God is said to be the Ef­ficient, [Page 480]not Deficient Cause of the material Act of Sin, by reason of his immediate Universal Efficience to al real Entitie. (4) As for the constitutive parts of Sin, namely its Mater and Forme; [1] Al Sin as sin has a Material Cause, or Substrate Mater, which is alwayes naturally Good. Whence that great Effate in the Scholes: Al Evil as Evil has for its fund or subject some good. Thence Augustin said, That Evil cannot be but in some Good: because if there were any pure Evil, it would destroy it self. And the Reason is manifest; because Sin, as to its Formal Reason, is not a thing purely Positive, neither is it a pure Negation; but a privation of debite perfection: therefore it requires a subject to which such a perfection is due: And must not this subject then be something naturally good? Is not every real positive Being naturally good; because the Effect of Divine Efficience? Can any perfection be due to any Subject, unlesse that Subject be na­turally good? [2] As for the Forme of Sin, such as it has, it consistes in the privation of that moral Rectitude which is due to the Substrate Mater or Subject. Thus Damascene, Orthod. Fid. Lib. 1. Cap. 15. [...], Evil is the privation of Good, or substance. So Lib. 2. Cap. 30. [...], Sin is nothing else but a secession from Good, as Darknesse is a secession from Light. Of which see more, B. 1. C. 4. §. 1. and Philosoph. General. P. 1. L. 3. c. 3. sect. 4. §. 2. In­deed, to speak properly, Sin hath no Formal Reason or Cause; because it is a privation. Thus Plato, Rep. 2. and Proclus, de­nie, that Sin has any Formal Idea, as before: Yet, according to the commun acceptation of a Formal Cause or Reason, we make its Deordination, or Difformitie from the Law the formal reason thereof. Hence,

2.God not the Au­thor of Sin. Prop. Gods providential Efficience and Gubernation about sin doth no way denominate him the moral cause or Author of sin. Thus Plato, Repub. 10. saith, That God is the principal cause of al good: but as to sin he is, [...], no cause thereof: because [...], he is properly the cause of sin that chooseth it. So Repub. 2. pag. 380. [...], &c. We must with al manner of conten­tion refute that opinion, that God who is most good, is the Author, or moral cause of sin: neither must we concede, that any speak or hear [Page 481]any such opinion in the Citie, if we desire to have it wel constituted and governed. That this Platonic Sophisme cannot be wel un­derstood of Gods natural Efficience to the substrate mater of sin, but only of a moral Causalitie as an Author, is evident from the very reason that he gives thereof; namely, because God is most good: which only excludes Gods moral Efficience from sin as sin, not his natural Efficience from the substrate mater or entitative act of sin, which is in itself good, and therefore from God, the Cause of al good. So that Plato's argument is so far from denying Gods natural Efficience to the entitative act of sin, as that it confirmes the same. The holy God, in al his providential Efficience and Gubernation about sin, whether it be permissive or ordinative, is gloriosely vindicated from being the Author or moral cause of sin; because he doth nothing deficiently, as failing from that eter­nal immutable Law of Righteousnesse. This is incomparably wel explicated by Simplicius, in Epictetus, cap. 1. pag. 24. Our Souls whiles good desire good: but when they are sinful, sinful objects: [...], And both, [i.e. good and bad] act from their own election, not as being compelled by any violent necessitie. Wherefore God may not be said to be the Author of sin: for he made the Soul, which is naturally capable of evil— as being good according to the riches of his Bonitie. In which he clears God from being the Author or moral cause of sin; because al his providen­tial Efficience about sin is only as he is good. An Author' pro­perly, as the Civil Law teacheth us, is he that gives command, Is à quo consi­lium accepi­mus, Auctor noster transla­tè dicatur. Un­de Tutor pro­priè Auctor pulillo dicitur cui consilium impartit. Ju­stin. Institut. counsel, or encouragement to an Act. So a Tutor is said to be the Author of what his Pupil doth, by giving him counsel. So again he is said to be an Author, who doth approve what another doth. In Philosophie, he is said to be an Author, who by suasive or dis­suasive reasons, doth exhort the principal Agent to, or dehort him from any action. The same they cal a Moral Cause, as opposed to effective. Now in no one of these respects can God be said to be the Author or moral Cause of sin: for he neither commands, nor counsels, nor encourageth, nor approves sin, nor yet dissuades from virtue. Neither doth God violently necessitate or compel men to sin; but concurs only to the material entitative act of sin, as the prime universal Efficient, not as a particular deficient moral Cause.

3.God the prime Cause of the en­titative Act of Sin. Prop. Albeit God be not the moral deficient Cause or Author of sin, yet he is the efficient and prime cause of the material entitative act of sin. This is evident both from Sacred and Platonic Philoso­phic. Thus Amos 3.6. Shal there be evil in the citie and the Lord hath not done it? I acknowlege this primarily to be understood of the evil of punishment; yet we are to remember, that evils of punishment in regard of second causes are evils of doing: Gods punish­ing Israel, albeit it were good as from God, yet it was usually sin­ful as to the instruments made use of therein: and yet in this very regard God was the prime Efficient of the material entitative act, albeit he were not a moral deficient cause of the obliquitie. Thus Plato, Repub. 10. pag. 896. [...]; Must it not then necessarily be conceded, that the Soul [of the Universe] is the cause of althings good, both honest, and evil, and base: of althings just and unjust, and of al contraries; in as much as we assert him to be the cause of althings? Wherein ob­serve, (1) That he philosophiseth here of God, as the universal Soul or Spirit of the Universe, influencing and governing althings. (2) He saith, this universal Spirit or Soul is the prime Efficient of althings good. Yea, (3) not only of things honest or morally good, but also of things evil, base, and unjust, i. e. as to their entitative material act: because in this regard they are good. (4) He grounds this Hypothesis on the universal Causalitie of God, as the prime Cause of althings. Thus also Plato, in his Timaeus, pag. 28. [...], It's ne­cessary, that whatever is produced, be produced by some cause. If so, then al natural products must be produced by God, the first Cause of althings: and is not the entitative act of sin a natural product? That the substrate mater, or material entitative act of sin fals un­der the providential Efficience of God, as the first universal Cause of althings, has been universally avouched and maintained in al Ages of Christians, both by Fathers and Schole-men, Papists and Protestants, excepting only Durandus, and two or three more of his Sectators. Thus Augustin, de duab. Anim. contra Manich. c. 6. about the end, where he proves against the Manichees, [who held two first Principes, one of good and another of evil] That what­ever really is, as it is, must procede from one God. Thus also Bradward. de Caus. Dei, pag. 739. where he strongly proves, That God neces­sarily [Page 483]concurs to the substance of the act of sin, albeit not to its defor­mitie. The like pag. 289, 290. Gregor. Ariminensis, Sent. 2. Di­stinct. 34. Art. 3. pag. 110, &c. gives us potent and invict demon­strations, That God is the immediate cause of the entitative material act of sin. Not to mention Alvarze, de Auxil. l. 3. Disp. 34. and other late Dominicans, who, as I conceive, are unjustly loaded with prejudices, by a Divine of name, in this particular. Indeed the very Jesuites and those of their Faction concur with us in this Hypothesis. Thus Suarez, Metaph. Disput. 22. Sect. 1. pag. 551, &c. where he strongly demonstrates, That every action both natu­ral and free, good and evil, as actions, are produced immediately by God, as the first cause. This Hypothesis he maintains stoutly a­gainst Durandus and his sectators, and as I judge with arguments never to be answered. Thus also Ruiz, de Voluntate Dei, Disput. 26, 27. Yea Penottus, de Libertat. l. 8. c. 11. assures us, that al Divines accord, That God is the cause of the natural Entitie of Sin. Among Reformed Divines this Hypothesis is generally main­tained. I shal mention only Davenant (who was not rigid in this way) in his Answer, to Gods love to Mankind, pag. 143, 147, 174, &c. also de Reprobat. pag. 113. where he greatly explicates and demonstrates our Hypothesis.

But to explicate and demonstrate our Proposition by force of reason, take notice, that we say not, that God is the cause of sin, Gods Concurse to the entitative Act of Sin de­monstrated. but that he is the cause of the material entitative act of sin. For the clear­ing of which we are to consider, That many things, which are true under an Hypothesis, and in a limited sense, are not so absolutely. Thus here we may not say simply and absolutely, that God is the cause of sin: yet we may not denie, but that he is the cause of the sub­strate mater, or material entitative act of sin. This was long ago wel observed by Aquinas, who tels us, that al locutions, in which it is signified, that God is the cause of sin, or of moral evil, ought to be avoided, or very cautelously limited; because names that implie deformitie conjunct with the act, either in general, or in particular, it cannot be said of them, that they are from God: Whence it cannot be said of sin absolutely and simply, that it is from God; but only with this addition or limitation, that the Act, as it is a real Entitie, is from God. This being premissed, we pro­cede to demonstrate our Proposition, That God is the prime efficient cause of the material, entitative Act of Sin. This may be demon­strated, (1) From the subordination of al second causes to the first [Page 484]Cause. Whatever is produced must have some cause of its pro­duction, as Plato, Tim. 28. and if it have a cause, must it not also have a first cause? And what can this be but God? unlesse we wil, with the Manichees, asset two first Causes, one of good, and the other of evil. (2) From the Participation and Limitation of every finite Act and Being. Must not every participate, finite, create, dependent Being be reduced to some essential, infinite, in­create, independent Being, as the prime Efficient thereof? (3) From the conservation of the material entitative Act of Sin. Is not the material entitative act of sin a create Being? And can any create Being conserve itself? Doth not Durandus and his secta­tors grant, that the conservation of Beings is from God? And if Gods providential Efficience be necessary to the conservation of the material entitative act of sin, is it not as necessary to its first production? What is conservation, but continued production, as to God? This argument is wel improved by Ariminensis, Sent. 2. Distinct. 34. Art. 3. pag. 110. and by Suarez, Metaphys. Disp. 22. Sect. 1. pag. 552. (4) From the Determination of the second cause of its particular effect. Every second cause being indiffe­rent to varietie of effects, cannot be determined to any one in­dividual effect, but by the immediate cooperation of the first cause. Thus Suarez, Metaphys. Disp. 22. Sect. 1. pag. 552. (5) From the substrate Mater of al evil, which is physically and natu­rally good. There is no moral evil, which is not founded and subjectated in some natural good: even hatred of God, albeit the highest moral evil, yet as to its entitative material act it is na­turally good: which is evident by this, that if that act of hatred were put forth against sin, it would be morally good. (6) From the Ordinabilitie of al evil to some good. There is no act so evil, but the wise God can turne it to some good: the Crucifixion of our Lord, which was one of the highest evils, what good was by Divine Gubernation brought out of it? Doth it not much exalt the skil of a wise Physician so to order poison, as to make it me­disinal? So it exalts Divine Gubernation to bring good out of evil: as it aggravates the impietie of wicked men, that they bring evil out of good. (7) Doth it not take from God the main of his Providence, to denie his Concurse to the substrate mater of sin? What more conduceth to the Amplitude of Divine Providence, than to allow him a Concurse to and Gubernation of al real Acts and Events? (8) To denie Gods Concurse to the [Page 458]material entitative Act of Sin, doth it not, by a paritie of Rea­son, subvert the supernatural concurse of God to what is good? For if God can make a Creature that shal be Independent as to any one natural Act, why may he not also make a Creature that shal be independent as to good Acts? Hence,

4. Prop. The substrate mater, How Sin fals under the Di­vine Wil. or material entitie of Sin fals un­der the Divine Wil. This follows on the former; because the whole of Divine concurse or efficience must be resolved into the Wil of God, as before once and again. But more particularly, (1) The Futurition of Sin, as to its substrate mater, fals under the Eternal Decree of the Divine Wil. Whatever Good or Evil there is under the Sun, as to its real Entitie, must have its futu­rition from the Divine Wil.Immo & pec­catum, quate­nus à Deo justè permittitur, cadit in legem aeternam. Au­gustinus, de ci­vitat. Dei, L. 19. C. 22. sin it self so far as it is justly per­mitted by God fals under the Eternal Law of the Divine Wil, as Augustin wel observes. Sin in its own nature, as Antecedent to the Divine Wil, was only possible: now how could it passe from a condition of mere possibilitie to a state of futurition, but by some intervening cause? And what can we imagine to be the cause hereof, but the Divine Wil? May we not then hence con­clude, that Sin was future; because the Divine Wil determined, for just ends, to permit its futurition? (2) The Divine Wil is not only the cause of sins futurition; but it has moreover a provi­dential Gubernation and Efficience about the actual existence of sin. [1] As for the Natural Entitie of Sin the Divine Wil is the total immediate efficient thereof, as Ariminensis, Sent. 2. Dist. 34. Ar. 3. pag. 110. [2] The Divine Wil also physically per­mits the moral pravitie and obliquitie of Sin, as that which may conduce to the advance of Divine Glorie. For this greatly con­duceth to the illustration of Divine Providence, to permit some defects that may render the whole more beautiful, as Aquinas at large demonstrates, contra Gent. l. 3. c. 71. of which hereafter. Hence,

5.Gods wil about the Obliquitie of Sin permissive. Prop. Gods Wil about the formal reason or obliquitie of Sin is not effective, or defective, but only permissive. (1) That Gods wil about the obliquitie of Sin is not effective is evident, because Sin as to its obliquitie has no effective cause. (2) That the Wil of God is not a defective cause of Sin, is as evident; because the same act which is defectuose and sinful in regard of the second cause, is not such in regard of God: Man breakes a Law, and therefore sins, but God breakes no Law: al his Actions are conforme to the [Page 486]Eternal Law. Whence, (3) Gods Wil about the obliquitie of Sin is only permissive. But now to clear up Gods permissive Wil about Sin, we are to consider [1] That permission properly as to men is not an action of the Law, but a negation of action: when any permits another to do, what he might hinder, but is under no obligation to hinder. Hence no man may permit Sin; because he is under an obligation to hinder it: but God may; because he is under to obligation to hinder it; as also because he can bring good out of it. [2] That Permission is either of a Le­gislator, or Rector. Gods permission of Sin is not as he is Legisla­tor, but only as Rector and Governer of the World. God gives no man a legal permission of sinning, but as Rector he doth pro­videntially permit Sin. [3] That Gods permission of Sin as to the event is nothing else, but the privation of that assistance, which being granted would efficaciously impede and hinder the existence of sin. [4] That Gods permission of Sin can be no way sinful; because he has an absolute Dominion over his own Influences, and may exert them as he pleaseth, without injurie to his Creature: whereas al Mankind are bound together by such a mutual sraternitie and cognation; as also by that obedience they owe their Creator, as that they cannot permit Sin without being partakes thereof. Al men are under a communion of Na­tures, and therefore bound by the Law of Nature to afford re­lief and aid each to other so far as they may for the avoiding of sin. Again, al men are under an essential obligation of subje­ction to their Creator, and so far as they may to prevent sin in others: therefore they cannot permit sin, without being guilty thereof. But the Supreme Rector, being under no Law or obli­gation of subjection, may, for the illustration of his own Glorie, permit Sin.

6.Gods permissive Wil about Sin Efficacious. Prop. Gods permissive Wil about Sin, is not merely Negative, but Efficacious, Bradwardine, l. 1. c. 33. p. 289. demonstrates, That unto whatever Gods permission extendes, unto that his actual vo­lition extendes also. And his Reasons are invict; because God per­mits nothing, but what he wils to permit, &c. So again, C. 34. he thus argues: (1) either God wils or nils the permission of Sin: he doth not nil it; for then it cannot be: therefore he wils it. (2) God voluntarily provides for al voluntary workes with al their circumstances: therefore he voluntarily orders and per­mits sin. (3) That Sin is, is a true Proposition: and whence [Page 487]comes the truth of this Proposition, but from the first truth? Thence doth not God wil, that this Proposition, Sin is, be true? Whence God wils the permission of Sin. He gives us many o­ther Arguments to demonstrate, that God has an actual Efficaci­ous Wil about the permission of Sin, p. 295, &c. In the permis­sion of Sin God doth not only nil to hinder it, but he also wils not to hinder it. Divine permission in this regard differs much from human: Men therefore permit things to be; because they neither wil that they be, nor yet wil that they be not: whence many things fal out besides what they intend or wil. But it is not so with Divine Permission: nothing fals out, but what God in­tendes shal be; and therefore there can be no Negative Permis­sion ascribed to his Providence about sin. To ascribe unto God a mere Negative Permission about Sin, what is this, but to make God a mere idle spectator of Human Affaires? And is not this unbecoming the Supreme Rector of the Universe, to stand and look on, but not to concerne himself about the Gubernation of sinful Acts? Surely if the permission of God be merely a negation of Wil, it wil necessarily follow, that those things that fal out by the permission of God, be either against, or beside his wil: if against his Wil, then he nils them: if beside his Wil, then he wils them not: But now Sin fals out neither against the Wil, nor beside the Wil of God, but according to it. Yea indeed to speak properly and strictly there is no such thing as a Negative Wil of God: the Wil of God taken properly for his immanent volition is always efficacious.

7. Prop. Gods Providential Gubernation of Sin is not only Permis­sive, Gods Guberna­tion of Sin Or­dinative. but also Ordinative. Thus Plato, in his Politicus, tels us, there is a twofold motion of the Universe, one Ʋniforme and Regular: the other difforme, irregular, and defectuose. And he expressely faith, that these [...], Parallaxes or [...] circumvolu­tions and irregularities are governed and ordered by God. i. e. [...]. Albeit Sin be in regard of the second Cause a defect, yet Gods Gubernation of those defects, so as that they may subserve his own Glorie, argues no defect in him: al defects as such belong to the particular cause as defectuose, not to the first Universal Cause, who orders al those defects to the best end: And that the Ordination of those defects belongs to the Gubernation of God is most evident, (1) because this greatly conduceth to the Order and Beautie of the whole Universe. There [Page 488]would be no perfect Bonitie in things create, unlesse there were an order of Bonitie: now the order of Bonitie in things human doth suppose worse and better; and that the worse be ordered for the Better: And to whom doth it belong to order the worse for the better, but to the most wise God the Supreme Rector of al? It's a great Platonic Philosopheme, That Lust never useth Lust wel, but Reason doth. Meaning the Divine Reason in the Gubernation of Evils. May we not then allow this wise and potent Guberna­tor of althings this Prerogative, to order al sinful defects to the best end?Libidine non bene utitur Li­bido, sed Ratio. Jansen. August. (2) Are there not many Heroic Virtues and good Qua­lities, which would finde no room in the universe, were there not some human sinful defects? What room would there be for the patience of the Just, if there were no malignitie in the un­just, as Aquinas observes? As in Naturals, the corruption of one thing is the generation of another, so in Morals, oft the corruptions of wicked men are so ordered by Divine Gubernation, as that they tend to their Regeneration. Therefore if Sin were totally excluded from the Universitie of Nature the wisdome of Divine Gubernation, in the bringing good out of evil, would not be so illustrious and refulgent. (3) The best and most perfect mode of Gubernation is, so to provide for the things governed, as that they be permitted to act according to their natures: for herein consistes the due order of Regiment. Now Divine Gubernation in permitting men to sin, and ordering the same to the best end, doth but leave men to act according to their natures. See this Proposition more fully demonstrated by Aquinas, contra Gent. L. 3. C. 71.

8.Judicial Guber­nation of Sin. Prop. Gods Providential Gubernation of Sin is not only Permis­sive and Ordinative, but sometimes also Judicial. Gods Judicial Gu­bernation of Sin consistes in the leaving men to judicial Occecation and Induration in, and by, and for Sin. Of this Judicial Blindnesse and Hardnesse in and by Sin we find frequent mention in Sacred Philosophie, and somewhat also in Platonic. So Plato in his Gor­gias; p. 472. [...], The Injust Man is of al most miserable; yet he is more miserable, who acting injustly avoids punishment. So in his Theaetetus, he tels us, that a licence to Sin is the greatest punishment of Sin: for a power to do Evil is the worst destruction. Now this Judicial Gubernation of Sin consistes of these several particulars. (1) God suspendes and withdraws the Celestial Influences of Divine Grace, and [Page 489]means of restraint. Thus Gen. 6.3. My Spirit shal not always strive with man. How soon wil the softest heart grow harder than the Adamant, if God withdraw his celestial dews of Grace, as Zach. 7.12. & 14.17, 18? Hence, (2) God leaves men to the plague of their own corrupt hearts, which is, Plato notes, is the worst judgement. (3) God leaves Sinners to the heart-betwitching al­lurements and blandishments of this World. Thus Balaam, Num. 22, &c. 2 Pet. 2.14, 15. (4) God delivers Sinners up to the power of Satan, 2 Cor. 4.3, 4. 2 Tim. 2.26. (5) God so orders and disposeth his providences, as that al do accidentally, by rea­son of their corrupt hearts, tend to their induration. Rom. 11.9, 10, 11. (6) Yea, God permits that the very means of life be to them the savor of death, 2 Cor. 2.16. Esa. 28.12, 13, 14. (7) Yea, the Prince and Mediator of life is to such a strumbling-stone and occasion of death. Esa. 8.14, 15, 16. & 38.13. (8) God leaves them to a spirit of slumber, or spiritual occecasion. Rom. 11.8. Esa. 19.11-14. & 44.18, 19. & 60.1, 2. 2 Thes. 2.10, 11.

9. Prop. In the whole of Divine Gubernation about Sin his Wis­dome, Justice, and Sanctitie, Gods Attributes illustrious in his Gubernation of Sin. with other Attributes are most illustrious and resplendent. (1) Gods Wisdome is eminently manifest in his gubernation of Sin, in that he brings the greatest good out of the greatest evils: those very sins whereby wicked men endeavor to darken the Glorie of God, he turnes to the advance of his Glorie. We have a good Philosopheme to this purpose in Plato, Theaetet. pag. 167. [...], A wise man makes those things which are in themselves evil turne to good, and to seem such, as a wise Physician turnes poi­son into a medicament, which similitude he useth. (2) The Ju­stice of God is most resplendent in the punishing that sin he permits to be. (3) Gods Sanctitie is also most conspicuous, in that those very acts, which are morally evil in regard of God, are both morally and naturally good in regard of Divine Guberna­tion. The sin which God governes is not sin in regard of God, but of the Creature, that comes short of the Divine Law. The holy God violates no Law by concurring as an universal Cause with the Sinner, that violates his Law. The sinful qualitie of a moral effect may not be imputed to the first universal Cause,Duo cùm faci­unt idem, non est idem, Pro­verb. but only to the second particular cause. Here that commun Proverbe holds true: When two do the same, it is not the same: i. e. the same sinful act, whereto God and the Sinner both concur, is not the [Page 490]same as to both; but morally evil as to the Sinner, and yet na­turally yea morally good as to Gods concurrence. Sin as to God speakes a negation of his concurse, not a privation of any thing due: neither doth God wil sin simply as sin, under that Redupli­cation, but only as good and conducible to his Glorie. The rea­son of Gods willing and governing sin, both in the Elect and Re­probate, is univocally one and the same, namely the advance of Divine Glorie: For the greatest evil of sin has something of good mixed with it; which God wils and orders for his Glorie. There is nothing in the world purely, simply, and of it self evil: if there were, God, who is the chiefest good, could not wil it. Lastly, man only is the proper and formal cause of sin or moral evil; because he alone comes short of the rule of moral good: so that Divine Gubernation both as permissive, ordinative, and judicial about Sin is sufficiently vindicated from the least imputation thereof.

CHAP. X. Of Divine Gubernation about Virtue, Virtuose men, and Angels.

Supernatural Illumination from God. The Infusion of Virtues. Gods care of virtuose Men. Gods Gubernation of the Angelic World. The Angels, Law, Obedience and Disobedience. Good Angels their Com­munion with Saints. The Ministration of Angels. (1) At the giving of the Law and Christ's Incarnation. (2) For the Prote­ction of Saints. (3) For their Conduct. (4) Their Sympathie with Saints. Their Ministration at the final Judgement. Divine Gubernation as to evil Angels. Satans power to temt, and his Li­mitation.

§. 1.Supernatural Il­lumination from God. HAving discussed Gods Divne Gubernation about Sin, we now passe on to his supernatural Efficience and Gu­bernation of Virtue and virtuose Men. We intend not to treat hereof, as it belongs to Christian Theologie, but only as it fals un­der metaphysic or prime Philosophie, termed by some Natural The­ologie. 1. Plato gives us frequent and great notices of Divine Illumination, which is the Origine of al supernatural Virtue. Thus [Page 491]in his Theages, he saith, [...], If it please God, thou shalt profit much and speedily: otherwise not. So in his Philebus, he assures us, That the cognition of the supreme infinitie Being is, [...], the gift of God to men. The like, Epinom. [...]; How is it, that God should be accounted the cause of al other good things, and not much more of wisdome, which is the best good? But to treat more distinctly of Divine Ilumina­tion, we are to know, that as there is a twofold spiritual Dark­nesse, the one objective, in the things to be known, the other sub­jective, in the mind that is to know them; so proportionably there is a twofold Light, the one objective, whereby God reveles the things to be known, the other subjective, whereby God takes off the veil from the mind, and thereby inables it to apprehend supernatural Objects. Now by this twofold Light Divine Gu­bernation conductes the Rational Creature to his supernatural end. (1) God conductes the Rational Creature by an objective Light, or Divine Revelation of his Wil, whereby he reveles mans supernatural end, and the means conducing thereto. Some im­perfect fragments, or broken notices of this Divine Revelation were gleaned up by the wiser Heathens, Pythagoras, Solon, Socra­tes, Plato, which gave them sufficient cause to admire, and in some superstitiose manner to imitate the Judaic Institutes and Laws, as the Fountain of the best Wisdome, as it was foretold by Moses, Deut. 4.5, 6, 7. and as we have sufficiently demonstrated in the precedent Parts. Whence we find mention in Plato, Minos, pag. 317. of [...], the Royal Law; as elsewhere of [...], a Divine Word: which, if I mistake not, refer to Divine Revelations vouchsafed the Church of God, for its conduct unto eternal life. (2) As God governes and conductes the Rational Creature by an objective, so also by a subjective Light, which is essentially requisite for the acquirement of its supernatural end. Of this also we find some and those not vulgar notices in Plato. So in his Repub. 6. pag. 507, 508. where he makes an incompara­ble parallel between natural Vision, and Divine Illumination. In natural Vision, saith he, there must be a visive Facultie, an Object visible, and Light to discerne the Object. This Light is derived from the Sun, which is the principal and next cause of Vision. For, addes he, as oft as the eyes are converted to such things as are [Page 492]illustrated by the Sun, vision in the eyes is very apparent. Then he draws up his parallel, pag. 509. [...], Thus also thinke of the mind: For when that in which Truth itself, and Being itself shines forth, inheres in it, it doth consider and understand the same, and then it seems to have an illuminated Mind and Divine Intellect. Wherein observe (1) That God, who is Being itself, as also Truth itself, or the first Truth. (2) That before there can be any true light in the mind, this first Truth must shine forth and irradiate the same. (3) That when God illuminates the mind, there is not only a transient, but a fixed light firmely impressed on it. This Divine Light doth become one with the mind, and so formes, conformes, reformes, yea transformes it into the things known. (4) That the Intellect thus illuminated becomes truely Divine. Thence he subjoins: [...], That therefore that gives truth to those things that are known, as also a facultie to know them, cal thou the IDEA OF GOOD, name­ly the cause of Science, and Truth, which is understood by the Intellect. Note here, that (1) he cals God, considered as the Fountain of al Illumination, the Idea of Good, i. e. the supreme Idea of al Perfe­ction and Truth, in whose light alone we can see light. (2) He saith, that this Idea of good gives truth to those things that are known: i. e. al objective wisdome impressed on things, as also al objective Revelation, whereby things mysterious are reveled. (3) Also a facultie to know things intelligible: i. e. subjective Illuminati­on and Light both habitual and actual. (4) Hence this Idea of good is the cause of al Science and Truth, which is understood. The sectators of Plato thus explicate his mind about Divine Illumina­tion. [1] They make God to be the true essentia Wisdome. Thus Plotinus, En. 5. l. 8. c. 5. pag. 546. [...], The true Wisdome is Essence: and again the true Essence is Wisdome: i. e. God who is Essence itself, is Wisdome itself. [2] This essential Wisdome or Light doth illuminate al, but is illuminated by none: as the Sun gives light to althings, but receives not light from any thing. [3] The create finite Intellect being irradiated by this essential light of life, is invested with true formes and Ideas of things, and is thereby conducted into the knowlege of things mysterious and Divine.

This Divine Illumination is every where inculcated in sacred Philosophie, and generally acknowleged by the Greek Theo­logues. Chrysostome stiles it, [...], The illuminant Intellect, the superne Grace, the gift of the Grace of God, not of human Nature. Greg. Neocaesar. Orat. Panegyr. [...], The greatest gift of God, and the illu­strious afflate from Heaven. And the reasons which enforce the necessitie of such a Divine Illumination for the apprehending of supernatural Truths are taken from the sublimitie of the Object, and the imperfection of the human Intellect: we find both conjoined, 1 Cor. 2.14. The animal man is not capable of the things of the Spirit, 1 Cor. 2.14. &c. By the animal man we are to understand every man void of supernatural light, by which alone things spiritual are discerned: for al knowlege supposeth some proportion between the Object and the apprehensive Facultie: now what proportion is there be­tween the natural Intellect and supernatural Truths? Can an ani­mal facultie take in spiritual objects? Is it possible then, that the natural mind may, by its own force without Divine Illumi­nation, reach supernatural Mysteries? Thence saith Augustin, de Trinit. l. 14. c. 7. Tho human intellect cannot apprehend sublimer intel­ligibles, unlesse it be fortified and perfected by a stronger light. And Greg. Nyssenus, 2. in Eunom. assures us, That it appertains to the Father, Son, and holy Spirit, [...], to il­luminate minds with the light of Divine knowlege. Whence this Di­vine illumination is stiled by the Greek Theologues, [...], illu­mination, [...], irradiation, [...], illustrant Grace.

2. Having explicated Divine Illumination,The Infusion of Virtues. we now procede to treat of the infusion of al other supernatural Habits or Virtues, whereby the Rational Creature is governed and conducted to his last end. That al true moral and supernatural good is no way attainable but by Divine infusion, is every where inculcated in sacred Philosophie. Thus also in the Theologie of the Grecians, it was frequently inculcated, (1) That no one could [...], a­void the snares of sin, but [...], he who was assisted and fortified by God, as Basil, Eth. c. 3. So Greg. Nyssen. Orat. 3. in Orat. Domin. Tom. 1. [...], He that wil avoid domineering sin must cal God for his succur, alwaies having him in his eye, who exerciseth him [Page 494]by tentations. (2) That al true moral or supernatural good comes from God, by Divine infusion. This gratiose infusion of Virtue by God was by various and emphatic notions illustrated by the Greek Fathers, who terme medicinal efficacious Grace, the Spring of this supernatural Infusion, [...], the salutarie Grace; also [...], manuducent and assistent Grace. Again, [...], the Divine infusion, or inspiration: For, say they, [...], that we can do any thing morally good, is from the impulse of God. Yea they make, not only the first infu­sion, but also the prosecution and conservation of al moral good to be from God. Whence Divine Grace is termed by them, [...], persequent, or actuating and conservant Grace. Hence, (3) the Act, whereby the Soul is turned from Vice to Virtue, is termed by the Greek Theologues, [...], Restauration, [...], Revocation, [...], Discession, [...], putting off the old man, [...], Progresse from a bad state to a good, [...], Transmutation of Soul. Of which see more in what precedes of efficacious Concurse, c. 7.

It was a great Question among the ancient Philosophers, Whe­ther Virtue came by institution; or by Divine afflation and infusion? The Cynics and Stoics held, [...], That Virtue was teachable, as Laertius: But Socrates, and Plato his sectator held the contrary. So Plato, Protag. pag. 361. [...], Virtue is not a thing that may be taught, or gained by institution. This he more copiosely demonstrates in his Meno, pag. 89. where he proves, (1) That men are not good or virtuose from the power of Nature: For [...], &c. if men were good by Nature, then certainly some would be so in their tender years. (2) Then he procedes to another Question: Therefore seing men are not good by Nature, may they not yet be such [...], by Discipline and Institution? This also he denies, demonstrating, That Virtue is not a Science, such as may be taught by Precepts: If Virtue, saith he, may be taught, then there must be Masters and Disciples of it. On the contrary, may we not rightly conjecture, that what has neither Masters nor Disciples, that [...], cannot be taught? Whence Socrates assumes thus: [...], Truely I have oft sought diligently, whether there were any Masters to be found, who could teach Virtue, but I could never as yet find any. Thus pag. 93. Now let us consider, whether good men can communicate that Virtue [Page 495]they have unto others: [...], Or, whether virtue be such, as that it can be deli­vered to no one by Institution, nor yet be received by any one in such a way. He demonstrates the later, and exemplifies it by Themi­stocles, who, saith he, was, according to commun estime, a good man, and a skilful preceptor of Virtue, if any ever were. And canst thou thinke he would make others good, and not his own Son Cleophantus? But this, addes he, he could not do. Whence he concludes, that Virtue could not be taught. Thence he procedes to make inqui­sition into two sorts of men, who professed themselves Masters of Virtue, namely Sophists and Politicians, and demonstrates that nei­ther of these could indeed teach men to be virtuose. Yea, p 99. he saith, That God oft makes use of the most unapt Instruments for the producing Virtue: [...]; Is it not meet, Meno, to cal those Divine Men, who being without understanding, excellently performe many of those things they both do and speak? Whence he concludes: But if in this whole Disputation we have rightly found out the case, [...], Virtue is acquired neither by Natures force, neither by any Institutes of Discipline or Doctrine; but it comes to those who have it by Divine Afflation, or Infusion, without the active concurrence, pro­vidence, and industrie of the human soul. Lastly he closeth up his Dialogue with this, That supposing any should by Institution acquire somewhat of Virtue, yet this is but [...], to be adorned as it were with a shadow; where­as Virtue is a thing real and solid: i. e. Al the forces of natural power or artificial Institution give men only a shadow, forme, or semblance of Virtue; whereas the truth and real power thereof comes from God. Whence Bias, as Laertius informes us, advi­sed: [...], What Good thou shalt performe, refer to God, as the Author of it. We have alrea­dy demonstrated, that the supernatural infusion of Virtue by God was generally asserted by the Greek Fathers: (albeit too many of them inclined to favor Origen's corrupt infusions about Free-wil.) Thus Damascene, (who gives us a sum of the Greek Theologie) Orthodox. Fid. L. 2. C. 3. [...], But [Page 496]we ought to know, that Virtue is given to human nature by God; and that he is the Principe and Cause of al Good; and without his coopera­tion and aide, it is impossible that we should wil or act any good. And this he demonstrates from Gods prime Causalitie, L. 3. C. 1. [...], God, who gives Being, is he that gratiosely vouchsafeth Wel-Being. And John. Climacus, scal. Parad. grad. 23. assures us, That, [...], &c. the extremitie of pride consistes in the negation of Di­vine Aide; and the lifting up of our own Virtue is a Demonic Affe­ction: for he that thinkes he can of himself, without supernatural Grace, performe any good, denies God to be his helper in althings. And Greg. Nyssen. saith wel, That the Grace of God is, [...], the sum of Virtue. That supernatural Good and Virtue comes from God by Divine Infusion is generally asserted and demonstra­ted by the Sectators of Augustin and Aquinas. Thus Gregorius Ariminensis, 2. Dist. 29. q. 1. where he demonstrates these Con­clusions. (1) That no just person, invested with habitual Grace, can avoid any one sin, without Divine special assistance: because no just person can by Grace received avoid any one tentation, or per­severe in good. (2) That Adam, before he fel, could not by his own forces, with the general insluence of God, without special assistance, performe any one good act. Touching the necessitie of habitual and actual Grace for the performance of any action really morally and spiritually good, see Jansenius, August. Tom. 3. de Grat. L. 2. C. 2. & 22, 23, &c.

§. 2.Gods care of virtuose men. As al Divine Knowlege and Virtue come under Gods supernatural Efficience and Gubernation, so in like manner al virtuose men. Sacred Philosophie every where inculcates, what a paternal and special Providence God vouchsafeth his peculiar peo­ple. Thus Psal. 17.7.Psal. 17.7. Shew thy marvellous loving kindnesse, O thou that savest by thy right hand them which trust in thee. [...] Separate thy Benignities, or make thy Benignities marvellous. So the LXX. [...], make wonderful: i. e. exert thy wonderful Be­nignitie, as thou art wont to do, towards those that trust in thee. So v. 8. Keep me as the apple of thine eye. [...] as the pu­pil the daughter of the eye. There is an elegance in the similitude. As the Pupil or Apple of the Eye, being like a tender delicate Daughter, the darling of the Eye, is the main of its care; so are the Children of God his darlings. Whence he addes: Hide me under the shadow of thy wings. Which seems to allude to the pro­vidence [Page 497]of an Hen, which hides her young under her wing, there­by to protect, foment, and nourish them. It may also allude to the wings of the Cherubims, which spread themselves over the Pro­pitiatorie, Exod. 25.20. thereby pointing forth Gods protection of his People. Thus, Psal. 91.1.Psal. 91.1. He that dwelleth in the secret place of the most high. It seems to allude to the Holy of Holies, which, in Scriptural phraseologie, is termed the secret place of God, where he dwelt. The meaning is: whoever commits him­self to the Tuition of God, by flying unto his Sanctuarie, he shal be safe. So it follows: shal abide under the shadow of the Al­mighty. [...] shal sojourne, or continually loge. Of the Almighty. [...], Shaddai is one of Gods names, which signifies Self-sufficient, as containing al sufficience in him, from [...] who and [...] dai suffi­cient: or it may signifie, potent to destroy al, from [...] to destroy. God is both Alsufficient to provide for his People, and Omnipotent to destroy al that oppose them. Thence, v. 4. Vers. 4 He shal cover me with his feathers, &c. i. e. He shal overshadow me with his wings, and defend me from al injuries of weather, or birds of prey, even as an Hen protectes her Chicken. So v. 10. Vers. 10 There shal no evil be­fal thee. [...], There shal be no evil impelled to thee, or there shal no evil fortuitously occur to thee: but al be governed and or­dered by a paterne hand of Providence. Thus, v. 14. Because he hath set his love upon me, therefore I wil deliver him, &c. The like description of Gods paterne providence we find Psal. 121.4, 5, 6, 8. as elsewhere.

As for Plato's Philosophemes touching Gods paterne providen­tial Care and Gubernation of virtuose persons, they are many and great. So in his Apologie for Socrates, having proved at large, That Death was no way to be feared by a wise virtuose man, he gives this reason for it, [...], because there can no evil happen to a good man, either living or dead: nei­ther are his affaires ever neglected by God. So Repub. 10. he saith: Whatever happens to a friend of God is best for him. The same he inculcates elsewhere. So Pindar, Od. 1. [...], God thy keeper provides for these cares, taking this sollicitude on himself. And Pythagoras held,Charior est il­lis [Diis] homo quam sibi. Ju­ven. Sat. 10. that Man, so far as he had cognation to God, fel under his special Provi­dence. Yea Plato made virtuose men [...], the possessions of God, according to Sacred Dialect. Indeed Gods paterne Pro­vidence [Page 498]towards the righteous determines al events sweetly and for the best: it extractes good out of the most bitter crosses: they shal need nothing, but what they can better need than en­joy: If God keep them not from miserie, he wil keep them in it: the lesse they have of human help and provision, the more they shal have of Divine. God reserves to himself the care of Tem­porals, that they might be the more obliged to mind Spirituals. Thence said Socrates: Seing God is so careful for you, what need you be careful for any thing your selves? There is not any Attribute or Re­lation assumed by God, but his People have it engaged for them.

§. 3. Next to the Rational follows the Angelic World, which is the Supreme Object of Divine Gubernation.Gods Guberna­tion of the An­gelic world. As for the Creation of the Angels Sacred Philosophie gives us but few if any notices thereof; because its designe chiefly is to describe unto us the state of the Church collected out of men and redemed by Christ, in which the Angels have no share: yet in as much as they are used by God as Ministers of his Church, so they belong to Divine Gu­bernation; on which account we find frequent mention of them in the Scriptures. As to their natures they are said to be Spirits Intelligent and Wise, 2 Sam. 14.20. excelling in strength, and in al ready and swift execution of the Divine Wil, Psal. 103.20. The Life of blessed Angels consistes in the beatific Vision and Con­templation of the face of God, as Mat. 18.10. In Heaven the Angels do always behold the face of my Father: i. e. They always contemplate the infinite Beautie of the Divine Essence, the glo­riose Majestie of his Throne, the transcendent splendor and brightnesse of his Wisdome, Bonitie, and other gloriose perfe­ctions. And the sood of Angels, whereby this their Intellectual Life is recreated and strengthened, is that ineffable delight and satisfaction, which attendes this their beatifie Intuition and Con­templation of the face of God together with the contemplati­on of whatever else hath any conformitie to God, or subservi­ence to the illustration of his Divine Wisdome, Power, Good­nesse, Grace, Justice, with his other gloriose perfections. Thus Damascene, Orthod. Fid. L. 2. C 3. [...], they see God, and are fed hereby, &c. As for the Ministerie of Angels, we find mention thereof, Psal. 103.4.Psal. 103.4. Who maketh his Angels Spirits: his Ministers a flaming fire. They are called a flaming fire by reason of their Spiritalitie and Activitie in serving God: for nothing in the sensible world is [Page 499]so pure, spirital, and active as fire; it being the most potent Mi­nister or Instrument of Nature and Art. Thus Damascene, Orthod. Fig. L. 2. C. 3. makes an Angel to be, [...], a spirit or immaterial fire. For which he cites Psal. 103.4. where [...], flaming fire, saith he, [...], denotes A­gilitie, Ignition, Fervor, Penetrabilitie, and Acumen about the Divine Desire and Ministerie; as also their elevate refined nature and free­dome from al material intelligence. Whence he gives us this de­scription of an Angel: [...], An Angel therefore is an intellectile substance, ever-mo­bile, free, incorporeous, by Grace obtaining immortalitie in nature. As to their Illumination, he addes: that they are, [...], Secondary intelle­ctile lights, receiving illumination from the first independent Light. Their vast Wisdome and Science is also mentioned, Matth. 24.36. Mark 1.3.32. Their mighty Puissance, Force and Power is descri­bed, 2 Pet. 2.11. Their Glorie, Dignitie, and Excellence above other Creatures is frequently inculcated. As to their Dignitie and Office, they are stiled, Col. 1.16. Thrones, Dominions, Princi­palities, Col. 1.16. and Powers. They are also said to be Dan. 10.13. the Chief Princes, above al the Princes of the Earth; and the Title of Gods is given to them, Psal. 8.5. and 97.7. in as much as God imparteth to them his Counsels, 1 King. 22.19, 20. Zach. 1.11, 12. and useth their Ministerie in the Gubernation of the world, but in a more particular manner of his Church, as Hebr. 1.14. Are they not al ministering spirits, sent forth to minister for them, who shal be heirs of salvation? In which description we have (1) Their Nature signified by Spirits. (2) Their Office, to minister. (3) The main Object of their Ministerie, the heirs of salvation. We find no particular mention in Plato, or the more Ancient Philoso­phers touching Angels; yet we find frequent and great notices both in Plato and others touching Demons, and their Ministerial Office between the Supreme God and Men, for the Gubernation of human affaires; which Mede understands partly of Angels. Plato discourseth at large of Demons, in his Cratylus, pag. 397. in his Symposium, p. 202, 203. and in his Repub. 5. p. 468, 469. He makes them to be a kind of Mediatorie Gods, between the Su­preme [Page 500]God and Men, to transporte the Sacrifices and services of men to God, and the gifts and favors of God to men; as also to governe human affaires. Which it's possible may be partly but a broken Tradition of the Ministration of Angels; yet I conceive the Office of these Demons primarily refers to the Mediatorie Of­fice of the Hebraic Messias, and was but a corrupt Imitamen there­of, as we have more fully demonstrated, in what precedes, B. 2. C. 8. §. 11. and Vanitie of Philosophie, B. 2. C. §. 4. also Philosoph. Gen. P. 1. l. 3. c. 4. §. 4.

As al Divine Gubernation begins with a Law, either natural or moral,The Angelic Law, Obedience and Disobedi­ence. so the Angels those intelligent, celestial, gloriose Crea­tures had their Law, whereby they were to be directed and orde­red to their supreme end. What the particulars of the Angelie Law are is not specified; but it is supposed they are for substance the same with those moral Precepts impressed on Adams Soul, excepting such as relate to the gubernation of the human bodie, which Angels are not invested with. It's most certain, that those immaterial gloriose Creatures, as they are in nature more pure, and in power more potent than man; so likewise those of them that have kept their station, are in the Contemplation, Admiration, Affection, Adoration, Imitation, and Obedience of their Creator per­fectly conformed to that Law imposed on them. Whence our Lord makes their obedience the Idea and Exemplar of what we are to pray for, Mat. 6.10. & 18.10. Yet part of those glo­riose Creatures, through the voluntary breach of that Law, where­by they were to be governed, soon fel from their blessed station, even before the Fal of Man. What their sin was cannot be pe­remtorily determined; yet it s generally conceived to be spiri­tual pride in the reflexion on their own sublimitie, dignitie, and excellence, which ravished their understandings into such an ex­orbitant degree of self-admiration, that they lost the sense of their subordination to, and dependence on their Maker: whence their Contemplation, Admiration, Adoration and Imitation of God immediately vanisht: and of gloriose pure Spirits they be­came most impure and unclean, as Luk. 8.2. & 9.42.

As for the elect blessed Angels their offices as to God and Men are various.The good Angels ministerie as to Gad. 1. As to God, (1) they serve him, by standing be­fore his Face, and observing al his Commands. So Gabriel, Luk. 1.19.Luk. 1.19. I am Gabriel that stand in the presence of God. To stand in the presence of God, denotes a posture for the observation of al his [Page 501]Commands, and a promtitude to execute the same. The allu­sion is taken from Courtiers, who stand in the presence of their Prince, ready to observe and obey al his dictates and commands. The like Mat. 18.10. Their Angels do always behold the face of my Father. So Rev. 8.2.Rev. 8.2. And I saw the seven Angels that stood before God: i. e. to observe and execute his pleasure for the destruction of Babylon. (2) They minister to the Sons of God, Mat. 4.11. Joh. 1.51. (3) They laude and adore God the Father and his Son Jesus Christ, Luk 2.13, 14. Rev. 5.11, 12. & 7.11. of which hereafter. And these praises they performe with so much eloquence and suavitie, as that it became a Proverbe, To speak with the tongue of Angels, whereby they understood the highest Divine eloquence and suavitie of speech, as 1 Cor. 13.1.1 Cor. 13.1. Though I speak, with the tongue of men and Angels, &c. (4) They also serve God in the executions of his Threats and Punishments on wicked men, specially the Enemies of his Church. As Act. 12.23. Rev. 7.1, 2. & 8.7, 8, 10, 12. & 9.1, 13. (5) They shal attend and subserve Christ at his second Coming to Judgement. As Mat. 16.27. & 25.31. Luk. 9.26. 2 Thes. 1.7. (6) They mi­nistred to Christ in the first promulgation of the Law and Gospel, as in what follows.

2. But our supreme Lord intending the Angels as ministering Spirits for the heirs of Salvation, Heb. 1.14.Good Angels, converse with Saints. he has also joined them as Parties in the Communion of Saints, under one Head, who is Christ, Col. 2.10. But because they are Spirits and have no flesh, therefore under the Old Testament, whiles the Church was in its Infant-state, they frequently appeared in corporal visible shapes, thereby to strengthen their Faith and assure them of their com­merce with and ministration to the Elect of God. Mede drives this notion much higher than I dare extend it, who on Gen. 3.13. supposeth, that the Law of Converse between Spirits and men re­quires, that the Spirit always presentes himself under the shape of some visible thing; yea, of some such thing, as may lesse or more ressemble its condition. But I conceive, that the highest Communion between Angels and Men is spiritual, without the assumtion of human shapes, specially in these last times: Yet we must not denie, but that the Patriarches and Saints under the Law had frequent Apparitions of Angels in visible formes of men, who conversed with them, eating and drinking, and discoursing fami­liarly with them, touching the affaires they were sent about, as [Page 502] Gen. 18.1. & 19.1 and elsewhere. Sometimes they appeared in more gloriose shapes, like winged Creatures, Esa. 6.2, 6.7. Dan. 8.15, 17. & 9.21, 22. Sometimes they appeared, but spake not, as Gen. 18.12. And sometimes they spake, when no mention is made of their Apparition, Act. 8.26.

As for the subordination and subservience to Divine Guberna­tion,Angels employed at the giving of the Law. in ministring to the Heirs of Salvation and Churches of Christ, we find very great and illustrious notices thereof in sacred Philosophie. 1. Divine Gubernation made use of Angels and their ministration to usher in both the severe Law on Mount Sinai, as also the Mediator of the new Convenant, who reignes on Mount Sion. (1) That God made use of the ministration of An­gels at the giving of the Law on Mount Sinai, is evident, from Act. 7.53. Gal. 3.19.Act. 7.53. Deut. 33.2. This also seems to be the import of Mo­ses's words when he blessed the people, Deut. 33.2. And he said, The Lord came from Sinai, and rose up from Seir unto them: he shined forth from mount Paran, and he came with ten thousands of Saints: from his right hand went a fiery Law for them. By the ten thousands of Saints, we must understand the holy Angels, that attended Gods Divine Gubernation in giving out the Law. Heb. of Sanctitie: i. e. Spirits of Sanctitie, which Jonathan, in his Thargum, interpretes, holy Angels. Heb. 2.2. Whence the Law is called, Heb. 2.2. the word spoken by Angels. So Zech. 14.5. and al the Saints with thee: this may be understood, at least in part,At Christs birth and for the pro­pagation of the Gospel. of holy Angels. (2) Thus also the Lord of Glorie and Mediator of the New Covenant, when he came into the World, was ushered in by a Chorus of Angels, Luke 2.13, 14. And suddenly there was with the Angel a multitude of the heavenly Host, praising God and saying, Glorie to God in the highest, and on earth peace, good wil towards men. These Angels stil sing loud the praises of the Lambe about the Throne of God, as Rev. 5.11, 12. (3) These blessed Spirits were employed also in the solemne Declaration of Christ's Resurrection, Mat. 28.2, 5. Luke 24.4. Joh. 20.12. (4) They also serve the Church in the promoving and propagating of the Gospel, Luke 2.9, 10. Act. 8.26.

2. Divine Gubernation makes use of the ministerie of Angels for the Conservation and Protection of the Heirs of Salvation. 2. For the con­servation and protection of Saints. (1) They are sometimes employed by God for the healing of sicknes­ses and diseases, as it appears by that famose instance at the Pool of Bethesda, Joh. 5.4. where an Angel went down, at a certain [Page 503]season, putting a medicinal virtue into the waters, or drawing forth and applying what virtue was there. (2) They are em­ployed as Watch-men and Gardians to keep the Heirs of Salvation, and succur them in their ways. So Psal. 91.11, 12. For he shal give his Angels a charge over thee, to keep thee in al thy ways: they shal bear thee up in their hands, lest thou dash thy feet against a stone. Hence they are stiled Watchers, Dan. 4.13. Yea their commissi­on and care extendes to little children, Mat. 18.10. This pro­tection over the Church of God was symbolicly pictured forth by the Cherubines, which environed the Tabernacle, Exod. 26.1. as the Life-gard of Angels environs the Church. Hence, (3) They are made use of by Divine Gubernation as an Host of Warriers, to defend the Church from its Enemies, Psal. 34.7.Psal. 34.7. The Angel of the Lord encampeth round about them that fear him, and delivereth them: i. e. from al their enemies. They are Gods powerful Hosts to smite his enemies with sore diseases, Psal. 78.49. Act. 12.23. So at Hezekiahs prayer, an Angel came and killed 185 thousand of his enemies, Esa. 37.21, 22, 36. They being most vigorous and active Spirits sight against the Enemies of Gods Church, persue and scatter them as chasse before the wind, Psal. 33.1, 5, 6. Dan. 10.20. whence they are called Gods Host, Gen. 32.1, 2. (4) They provide food for the Heirs of Sal­vation, when there is need. Thus Eliah, 1 Kings 19.5, 6, 7. was by an Angel supplied with food, in his flight from Jezebel. (5) By Angels the people of God have been delivered out of im­pendent or present sufferings. So Lot from the flames of Sodom, Gen. 19.1, 2. Sadrach, Mesach, and Abednego from the fiery Fur­nace, Dan. 3.28. Daniel from the Lions mouths, Dan. 6.22. and Peter out of Herods Prison, Act. 17.8, 9. (6) Angels at­tend on the Heirs of Salvation at the very moment of their Souls departure out of their bodies, and thence conveigh them into Abraham's bosome, as Luke 16.22. And was carried by the Angels into Abrahams bosome.

3. Divine Gubernation makes use of the Ministerie of Angels for the Information, Counsel, Conduct, 3. For Informa­tion, Counsel, Conduct, and Consolation. and Consolation of the Heirs of Salvation. (1) God by Angels informes his people of mer­cies intended for them. Thus Abraham, of the Birth of Isaac, Gen. 18.10. Manoah and his Wife of the birth of Samson, Judg. 13. Zecharie of the birth of John Baptist, Luke 1.13. Mary of her Conception, Luke 1.30, 31. and the Sheepherds of the Na­tivitie [Page 504]of our Lord, Luke 2.10. The Women of his Resurrection, Mark 16.1, 5, 6. and the Apostles of his second Coming, Acts 1.10, 11. (2) Yea not only particular mercies, but Church-Restaurations and Deliverances have been imparted to the Heirs of Salvation by Angels. Thus Daniel was informed of the state of the Church from his time to Christ, Dan. 7.10, 16, &c. & 8. 13, 15, 17, &c. & 9.21, &c. & 10.5, 6, &c. And Zecharie was certified of the Restauration of Jerusalem, Zech. 2.3, 4. And John of the state of the Church from his time to the end of the World, Rev. 1.1. (3) The People of God have been informed by Angels, touching Gods Judgements on the wicked. Thus Abraham of the Destruction of Sodome, Gen. 18.17, 20. And John of the Destruction of Antichrist. (4) the Heirs of Salva­tion have been conducted in their ways by Angels. Thus Abra­ham's Servant was conducted in his journey by an Angel, Gen. 24.7, 40. Philip to go and preach to the Eunuch, Acts 8.26, 29. Paul to the Macedonians, Acts 16.9, 10. (5) The Heirs of Sal­vation have been counselled and comforted in their sufferings by Angels. Thus Jacob was comforted and encouraged in his going to, and returning from Mesopotamia, Gen. 28.12. & 32.1, 2, 11, 21. Joseph was counselled to fice with Christ from Herods perse­cution, Mat. 2.13. The Lord of Glorie was comforted in his Agonie in the Garden by an Angel, Luke 22.43. And there ap­peared an Angel to him from Heaven strengthening him. So Paul was comforted against the peril of shipwrack by an Angel, Acts 27.23, 24. Yet we are to remember, that God doth not use the good Angels to excite, much lesse to infuse grace; because this is the proper office of the Spirit of Grace.

4. Many Acts which implie Inspection, Angels Commu­nion with Saints. Affection, and Communion with the Heirs of Salvation are ascribed to the holy Angels. (1) They are said to be present in and spectators of the Assemblies of Saints,Heb. 12.22. Heb. 12.22. to the innumerable companie of Angels. Hence Paul requireth of women modest and submissive attire in Church-Assemblies,1 Cor. 11.10. by reason of the Angels being present, 1 Cor. 11.10. (2) Thence also they are said to be not only spectators of the af­faires of Churches, but also in a spiritual manner to be affected therewith, yea to join in the celebration of the Lambes praises, Rev. 5.11, 12.Rev. 5.11, 12. And I behold and heard the voice of many Angels round about the Throne, and the Bestes, and the Elders— saying with a loud voice, Worthy is the Lambe, that was slain, to receive power, &c. [Page 505]The like, Revev. 7.11, 12. They seem to have a great sympathie with the Heirs of Salvation; which they manifest by their glori­fying the Lambe, who was slain for them, as also by the Joy they have in their Conversion, as Luke 15.7, 10. (3) They desire to look into, and to be instructed in the manifold wisdome of God, reveled in and unto the Churches, Ephes. 3.10. 1 Pet. 1.12. (4) They are witnesses with the Lord of those charges laid upon the Servants of God, in order to their service, 1 Tim. 5.21.1 Tim. 5.21.

5. The Angels shal be the Ministers of God, at the final Judge­ment,The final Service and Communion of Angels with Saints. to reap the Earth, to sever the wicked from the righteous, and thence shal live for ever with the Saints, praising and enjoy­ing God. (1) They shal be employed in reaping the earth, and severing the wicked from the just at the last day, Mat. 13.39, 41.Mat. 13.39, 41. And the Reapers are the Angels—The Son of Man shal send forth his Angels, and they shal gather althings that offend, &c. So Mat. 24.31. And he shal send his Angels, with a great sound of a Trumpet, and they shal gather together his Elect from the four winds, &c. (2) The Heirs of Salvation shal at last day be made conformable to, and equal with the Holy Angels; and together with them shal praise, serve, and enjoy God in al manner of intime communion, unto al eternitie, Luk. 20.36. For they are equal to the Angels. Thus some interpret Zech. 3.7. And I wil give thee places to walk, Zech. 3.7. [or walks] among those that stand by: i. e. the Holy Angels, that minister be­fore God. This may include Service both in the Church Militant on Earth, as also the Church Triumphant in Heaven: for Angels stand by, and minister in both. How potent, promt, and agile the holy Angels are to execute every Wil of God, is wel expressed by Damascene, Orthod. Fid. L. 2. C. 3. The Angels, saith he, are [...], The Angels are potent and promt to fulfil the Divine Wil, and are by the agilitie of their nature, found every where present, as the Divine beck commandes them. So much for the Gubernation of the Holy Angels.

§. 4. Divine Gubernation extendes it self not only to the good Angles, but also to the Evil. Satan, by Gods providential per­mission,Gods Guberna­tion as to Evil Angels. is the God of the wicked world, who rules in the Chil­dren of disobedience. 1. Satan is the Prince of this World, Joh. 12.31. (1) He is not a Lawful Prince, but Ʋsurper. he usurpes Christs Crown, and intrudes himself on his Throne. He affectes a [Page 506]Deitie, to be God over the noblest part in Man, his Mind, as 2 Cor. 4.4. (2) He is not an Absolute Prince, but limited: his Power is much narrower than his Wil and Malice: He can do no­thing but by Divine Permission and Gubernation. (3) He is not a Free Prince, but Vassal: confined by Chains of Providential Gu­bernation, Jude 6. (4) The main of his Kingdome consistes in the Free Election of wicked men. Evil men electively put the Crown on his Head, and bow the knee before him: His Crown is supported by the voluntary subjection of wicked men. Ephes. 2.2.Ephes. 2.2. According to the Prince [Arbitrio Principis: i. e. according to the Soverain pleasure of the Prince] of the power of the Air, [ [...], here notes his Dominion and Soveraintie in the Air, i. e. in this inferior part of the Universe.] The Spirit that now worketh [ [...] notes his working with efficacitie] in the Children of Disobedience: i. e. Such as are addicted and have given up them­selves to the disobedience of God, but obedience unto Satan: such as are his voluntary slaves. (5) Satan is a Magnificent Prince, having Legions and vast Armies under his command, Eph. 6.12. Rev. 12.6, 7. (6) He is a Prince of great Wisdome, Expe­rience, and Subtiltie, to deceive al that listen to him. His Pru­dence as a Spirit is vast, and his Experience of more than 6000 years greatly addes thereto.2 Cor. 2.11. So, 2 Cor. 2.11. Lest Satan should get an advantage of us. [...], lest we should be o­ver-reached or circumvented by Satan. It answers to [...], and sig­nifies primarily to have more than we ought; thence, to cheat, de­fraude, &c. The Metaphor seems taken from avaricious Mer­chants, who take al occasions to circumvent. Thence he addes: For we are not ignorant of his devices. [...], answering to [...], notes here Stratagemes, Machinations, Plots, Fallacies, &c. which he termes,Ephes. 6.11. Ephes. 6.11. [...], the wiles of Satan. [...], saith Chrysost. is, artificially to circumvent, to cheat by rules of Art, by a compendiose method to reduce persons or things un­der our power. So that Satan it seems, has got the art and me­thod of deluding and cheating souls. Whence he is stiled, Joh. 8.44. The Grand Old Lyer, 2 Tim. 2.26. or Cheater. We read also, 2 Tim. 2.26. of the snare of the Devil, whereby he takes men captive at his wil. [...] is a military word and signifies to take alive, from [...]. So 2 Chron. 25.12. Satan has such a snare, as he can thereby take sinners captive alive, and at his pleasure. (7) As he is a Prince of Power and Prudence, so also of great malice and [Page 507]rage against the good of Souls.1 Pet. 5.8. Thus 1 Pet. 5.8. he is termed a Roaring Lion, [which notes his rage] seeking whom he may devour. [...], drink up at a draught. Yea, so great is his Rage against the good of Souls, that he counts it a torment to be curbed or hin­dered in the execution of his malitiose designes, as Matt. 8.29.Mat. 8.29. [...], to torment us. O! what a torment is it to him to see a Soul delivered out of his snare? Hence,

2. Satan, being the Prince and God of this World, has, Satan's Power to temte. by provi­dential permission a great power to temte and draw men unto sin. (1) Satan as to us is not a mere Creator of his own Tentations, but he takes the mater from those whom he temtes, or from some circumstances that environ them. Satan is oft the Father, but Sin the Mother of Tentation. (2) Satan cannot reach the human Soul or any Act thereof immediately. The heart of Man is a pri­vie Chamber, into which none can enter but the King of Kings: The thoughts and inclinations of the Soul have a covering over them, which none can take off, but he that made the Soul. Satan may cast in Fire bals, or send in Messengers, and Letters, by the mediation of the Phantasie, but he cannot enter into the heart directly, nor compel it to sin. (3) Satan, by Gods permission, can worke curiously and efficaciously on the Organs of the Bodie, Spirits, Bloud, and other Humors, as Melancholie, &c. which are united to the Soul, and have no smal indirect influence there­on. (4) Though Satan cannot worke immediately on the heart, yet he can worke immediately on the corporeous sensitive Soul, particularly on the phantasie, by making impressions thereon, and forming such Ideas there, as may affect the mind. Satan may temte and persuade to Sin not only Morally, by false suggestions and Images offered; but also in some sense Physically, by impres­sing and fixing those Images on the phantasie, and coloring them over with the apparence of good. (5) Satan has a very great and intime accesse unto the spirits of men, not only as he is a Spirit, but also as he is an unclean Spirit, and his Kingdome a King­dome of darknesse. Hence he is said,Luke 22.3. Luk 22.3. to enter into Judas. [...], notes an intime accesse into Judas, as into his proper house. He had been casting in darts into Judas's heart before, as John 13.2. The Devil having now put into the heart of Judas—to betray him. [...], the Devil having now injected, or cast in this Tentation into his heart to betray his Lord. Now Judas having yielded to the suggestion, or injection [Page 508]of Satan, it's said Luke 22.3. Satan entered into him, i. e. as into a conquered forteresse or Castel; he now takes possession of him, as one devoted to his service. The Spirits of wicked men being very much like unto Satan, by reason of Sin and impuritie, as also they being his Children devoted to his obedience, thence he comes to have a far greater accesse to and power over them, than he had at first by Creation. Satan being the Prince of darkenesse stirs up that darkenesse that is in the heart of man to oppose Divine Light, as he stirs up Lust to oppose the Wil of God. It is difficult but not necessary to know all the Mysteries of Satans Power, where­by he ensnares poor Souls, as Birds, 2 Tim. 2.26. (6) Satan has a very great Power over the Air, and al sensible parts of the Uni­verse. He is said,Ephes. 2.2. & 6.12. Ephes. 2.2. to be the Prince of the Air, which is the Seat of his Empire. Whence Ephes. 6.12. those impure Spi­rits are termed, spiritual wickednesses in heavenly places: i. e. in the inferior Heaven, or Regions of the Air. According to the senti­ments of the Hebrews, al that vast space between Earth and the Astriferous Heaven, which we cal the Air, is ful of these impure Spirits. Thence Satan can, by reason of his great sagacitie and skil in the mysteries of Nature, together with his Power as a Spi­rit do wonders, though not Miracles, in and by the Air: He can so applie Actives and Passives together, as that thence shal follow va­rious and strange transmutations in nature; whereby he kept the Old Pagan World, as now the Indians, in great bondage. (7) Lastly he can temte extrinsecally, by visible Species and Represen­tations, or without, as Mat. 4.1-8.

Albeit Satan be the Prince and God of this World,Satans restraint as to the Elect. yet as to the Heirs of Salvation, he is cast out, and remains under chains of irresistible Providence and Restraint,John 12.31. 2 Pet. 2.4. as John 12.31. 2 Pet. 2.4. Satan and al his Host are in prison, under the bolts and chains of invincible obduration and eternal despair. It's true, he oft accuseth the Heirs of Salvation, and winnows them by his Tenta­tions; but never prevails finally and totally, to bring them un­der his Empire and Jurisdiction.Luke 22.31, 32. Thus we are assured, Luk. 22.31, 32. Simon, behold Satan hath desired to have you, that he may sist you as wheat [...]: But I have prayed for thee, that thy faith fail not. [...] signifies not merely, hath desired, but as an Accuser, hath demanded. For [...] among the Grecians, notes to de­mand a Malefactor, for Inquisition or torment. Thus Satan de­manded Job 1.11. So Revel. 12.10. he is said, to accuse them be­fore [Page 509]God day and night. He accuseth them as Hypocrites, and de­mandes power to temte and torment them. So it follows, Luke 22.31. that he may sift you as wheat. [...] is not a Verbe of frequent use, yet to be found in Classic Authors. [...] is a cribe or sieve; so Hesych. [...]. whence [...] is [...], the chaffe of the wheat. Thence [...] is expounded by Hesych. [...], to sift or winnow with a sieve, as you winnow the chaffe from the corne. Satan's demand was, that he might winnow Peter and the rest of the Disciples as chaffe, or Hypo­crites: But Christs prayer prevails, as v. 32. I have prayed for­thee, as for al other believers. Hence al Satans maliciose plots and undertakements against the Heirs of Salvation are so order­ed by Divine Gubernation, that they al tend to his torment, but to their Salvation. But so much for Divine Efficience and Gu­bernation.

CHAP. XI. Of Creatural Dependence, both Natural and Supernatural.

Creatural Dependence in the general. Every Being Dependent or In­dependent. One prime Independent Being. Every Dependent Be­ing by participation. The Origine of Dependence; (1) Passive Power: (2) The Dominion of God. Every Creature Dependent. The Dependence of a Creature not distinct from its Essence. Crea­tural Dependence in Subordination, Posterioritie, and Inferiorities Creatural Dependence (1) as to Futurition. (2) As to Essence and Conservation. (3) As to Operation. The human wils Depen­dence on God. Dependence Natural, or Moral and Supernatural: Supernatural Dependence for Habitual and Actual Grace.

§. 1.Creatural De­pendence. AS appendent to Divine Efficience we may adde Creatural Dependence, which also appertains to Metaphysic and prime Philosophie. Paul being to discourse among the Philosophie Wits at Athens, and to demonstrate the Unitie of God, and thence the simplicitie of his worship, he bottomes his Argument on the Creatures Dependence on God, Act. 17.28.Act. 17.28. For in him [Page 510]we live, and move, and have our being. Dependence on God for Being, Life, and Motion is essential to every Creature as such: For al Creatures receiving whatever they have, [...], by participation from God, it thence necessarily follows, that they depend on him for al. Plato also gives us frequent and good notices of this creatural Dependence. So Leg. 4. pag. 715. [...], &c. God, having in himself the Principe, Middle, and End of althings, goes straight on, expanding his force and power throughout the whole Ʋniverse, and al its parts. Wherein we have, (1) The Dependence of althings on God, as their first Principe, Middle, and End. God is the first Principe, as he gives Being to althings; the Middle, as he con­serves the Being conferred and moves it; the End, as he gives con­summation and perfection to althings. Thence that Platonic Effate, That althings move from infinite, upon or by infinite, and to infinite: i. e. from God, as the Principe of their Beings; upon, or by God, as the Principe or Cause of their conservation and motion; to God, as their last end. (2) Gods expansion and diffusion of his force and power throughout the Ʋniverse and al its parts, as it were an universal Soul or mundane Spirit, (which Plato oft inculcates) whereby the dependence of althings on God is emphaticly illu­strated. Whence he addes, pag. 716. That he who is puffed up by spiritual pride, or swollen with self-confidence, as though he were inde­pendent, and needed not Divine conduct, [...], is deserted by God and left destitute as to al Divine Efficace and Influ­ence; and being deserted, disturbes al. A lively image of a self de­pendent Creature. We find the whole of this creatural Dependence wel expressed, according to Plato's mind, by Proclus thus: [...], Althings depend on the ONE, by MIND, and SOƲL: i. e. to speak plainly, althings de­pend on God, that supreme Unitie, by Christ, the Eternal [...], or Mind, and by the Spirit, that universal Soul, or mundane Spirit, as before, c. 8. §. 2. But to give a more ful and convictive demon­stration and explication of the Necessitie and Nature of creatural Dependence, we shal resolve the whole into the following Propo­sitions.

1.Every Being de­pendent or inde­pendent. Prop. Every Being is dependent or independent. That this di­stribution of Ens into independent and dependent is adequate and commensurate, is generally confessed by such as discourse of Me­taphysics. And for the demonstration and explication hereof we [Page 511]are to consider, That a dependent Being, and that on which it de­pendes do really differ in number. And the reasons are demonstra­tive: (1) Because nothing as such can be said to depend to itself. (2) The dependent is in order of Nature, at least, posterior and inferior to that on which it dependes. (3) Dependence im­portes subordination to that on which the dependence is. Hence Divines say, that the Son of God, albeit he be, as to Origine, from the Father; yet in as much as he partakes of the same Essence with the Father, he cannot be said to be dependent on him: For he being in the forme [or Essence] of God, thought it not robberie to be equal with God, Phil. 2.6. [...],Phil. 2.6. here is generally rendred by al Rapine or Robberie; and we may take it properly; and so make [...] the same with [...], he did not unjustly assume or arrogate to himself this title and character of being equal with God. For that is accounted Rapine or Robberie in a proper sense, when any injuriosely assumes or takes to him, that which belonges to another: Thus the fallen Angels and Adam committed rapine or robberie against God, by endeavoring or affecting an equalitie with God. Thus also should a Creature affect or arrogate an in­dependence, either in Essence or Operation, it may justly fal under the imputation of Robberie against God; because it thereby equa­liseth itself to God. But our Lord Christ accounted it not robberie to be equal with God, i. e. independent as God is. For one per­son in the Trinitie is not essentially divided from the other; but the Son is so generated by the Father, as that he is not [...], ano­ther essence or thing, albeit he be [...], another person. The Son has the same numeric independent Essence with the Father, and the Spirit. So that although one person be really distinct from the other, yet this distinction being involved in one most simple Divine Essence, it implies a contradiction to say one person de­pendes on the other, which was the great error of Origene, imbi­bed from Platonic Philosophie, as before Ch. 6. §. 4. & P. 3. B. 2. C. 1. §. 8, 9.

§. 2.One prime inde­pendent Being. An independent Being is that which needs not any other Being essentially precedent to itself, as the cause of its Being and Operation. This Proposition may be demonstrated and explicated by its parts thus. (1) There is one prime independent Being. This is evident from the series of causes, in which we find, that althings obey the superior Power, from which they derived their origine: whence it necessarily follows, that to prevent a progresse into infinite, we [Page 512]stop in one prime, supreme, infinite Power, which received no this Being from any other, but is truely [...], Self-being and Self-sufficient, or Independent. Again, that there can be but one prime independent Being is manifest; because where-ever there is Participation, Limitation, Potentialitie, and Contingence, there must needs be Dependence: But now al Beings, except the first Cause, admit Participation, Limitation, Potentialitie, and Con­tingence as to their Essence: and therefore none but the first Being can be independent. Hence it follows, (2) That the first inde­pendent Being admits not any precedent Being, as the cause of its Being. For whatever presupposeth the efficience of some precedent cause, supposeth also Participation, Posterioritie, and Inferioritie: which the prime independent Being excludeth. Whence also it follows, (3) That the prime independent Being is [...], Self-being, or from himself. When we say the prime independent Be­ing is from himself, it must not be understood positively, as if he did effectively produce himself; for that is [...] and impossible; but negatively, that he receives not his Being from any other. Hence we conclude, (4) That Independence is as essential to the first Being and Cause, as Dependence is to second Beings and Causes. As it is essential to the Creature to be defective, indigent, limited, receptive and dependent; so it is as essential to the Creator to be infinite, alsufficient, and without al deficience, indigence and depen­dence either actual, or possible. Hence,

§. 3.Dependent Be­ing by partici­pation, &c. Whatever is dependent is Ens or Being by participation, finite, potential, contingent, and defectible. (1) Every dependent is Ens by participation. For whatever is not Being by Essence and indepen­dently, must necessarily be such by participation: where there is not self-Being, there must be a reception of Being from some other, which connotes participation. (2) Whatever is dependent is al­so finite and limited, both in Being, Virtue, and Operation. [1] Whatever is dependent is finite in Being; because its Being is by participation, and according to communication of the superior Cause. (2) Every dependent is also finite in virtue and efficace: For whatever is limited in its essence must necessarily also be li­mited in its virtue and efficace. Hence, [3] every dependent is also finite in its Operation: For the sphere of Activitie cannot be lar­ger than the sphere of Essence: if the principe be limited, the ope­ration cannot but be limited. (3) Whatever is dependent is also potential. To explicate and demonstrate this Attribute of a de­pendent [Page 513]Being we must consider, [1] that nothing is pure Act, but the first most simple independent Being: no Creature is pure Actualitie: where there is dependence, there is somewhat of Po­tentialitie or passive Power, either physic or metaphysic. Al mater hath a physic passive power, or natural possibilitie of being corru­pted: Spirits have not a physic passive power, or natural principe of corruption, yet they have a met a physic passive power of being annihilated, or cast back into their primitive nothing. [2] Be­sides the natural power, which a dependent Being has, there is an obediential power appendent to its nature. For the explication of which we are to know, that it is essential to a create Being to be subject and subordinate to the first, increate and independent Be­ing so far, as to obey it in receiving al impressions, and acting under it whatsoever implies not a contradiction. Hence the Scholes distribute the power of the second cause, or dependent Beings into natural and obediential: their natural power of recei­ving influences from the superior cause, or acting is that which is appendent to their natures, and whereby they naturally receive or act, and produce effects proportionate to their natures. But the obediential power of dependent Being is, that whereby they are, according to the Law of their natures, apt to obey the first independent Cause, namely God in the receiving or acting any possible effect, that implies not a contradiction; albeit it may excede the natural capacitie, force, or efficace of their Beings. So that this obediential power regardes supernatural effects, which the second cause cannot reach by its own Virtue and Activitie; but only as elevated by the efficacious Concurse of God. Thus the Humanitie of Christ had an obediential power to the Hypostatic Union, unto which it was elevated by the supernatural efficacitie of the Spirit of God. This obediential power which is essential to every dependent Being, is founded in the participation and li­mitation of a Creature, and its subordination to the absolute Do­minion of God, of which more anon. Hence, (4) every depen­dent Being is contingent. For whatever has any passive or obedien­tial power, is obnoxious to the soverain pleasure and concurse of its first cause, to which it owes absolute obedience, even to anni­hilation. Hence, (5) every dependent Being is defectible. For as it is essential to the first independent Being to be indefectible; so also to al second dependent Beings to be defectible. The su­preme God being [...], self-being, and self-sufficient, a [Page 514]pure simple Act, without the least mater or passive power, it is impossible that he should ever fail in any thing: but every Crea­ture being Ens, or Being by participation, and so composed of Some­thing and Nothing, or of Act and Pfassive Power, it cannot be but that it should be Defectible, or apt to fail, which is the root of its Dependence, as it wil appear by the next Proposition.

§. 4.The Origine of Dependence. 1. Passive Power. The Root and origine of al Creatural Dependence is the crea­tures passive power, and Gods Absolute Dominion ever it. 1. One Root and Origine of al creatural Dependence is that passive power, which every Creature is invested with. For the explica­tion whereof we are to consider, that all Creatures, being edu­ced by God out of Nothing, stil retain a tincture or mixture of their Primitive Nothing: so that no Creature can be said to be pure Being: for this is an attribute peculiar to the first Indepen­dent Being, whose name is, Exod. 3.14. [...], who is, or accord­ing to Plato's Phraseologie, [...], Being. Every Creature has something of Nothing contempered with its Being; yea more of Nothing than of Being, which makes it obnoxious to Limitation, Contingence, Mutabilitie, Defectibilitie, and Dependence. Thus Da­mascene, Orthod. Fid. L. 2. C. 3. [...], The increate being solely is interminate or unlimited in nature: for every Creature is terminated or limited by God who created it. Now al li­mits as to Nature and Essence speake a mixture of Nihilitie, Passive Power, and Dependence resulting therefrom; whence Damascene addes: [...], The Deitie only is impassible: namely because exemt from Nihilitie, Passive Power, and Depen­dence. This Nihilitie or Nothingnesse of the Creature is the same with its Passive Power either Physic or Metaphysic; Natural or Obe­diential, whereby it is limited, and confined to such or such a de­gree of Entitie, Existence, and Operation. For where-ever there is any mater or passive power of any kind, there is ever coarctation, and confinement: Nothing is or can be Infinite but the first pure simple Act, who is void of al power and composition; and there­fore of al finitude and limitation. But every Creature being compound of Something and Nothing, i.e. of Act and Power, it's thereby rendred finite and limited to such a degree of Essence and Activitie: and according to the Degree of its Entitie and Actua­litie such is the Degree of its Amplitude and Perfection. Angelic and human Spirits have of al Creatures least of Nihilities or No­thing, [Page 515]and most of Entitie and Actualitie: and therefore they have least of passive power and confinement: But yet because they retain something of their Primitive Nothing, and Passive Obe­diential power, therefore they have something also of limitation and confinement. So for al other Creatures, which are by so much the lesse or more limited and confined in Essence and Ope­ration, by how much the more or lesse they partake of mater or passive power. So that al Dependence ariseth from the Nihilitie, Passive Power, and limitation of the Creature. Hence,

2. Another main root of Dependence is the Dominion of God the first cause of althings. For al Creatures having been educed,2. The Domini­on of God. by the Omnipotent Power of God, out of Nothing, and invested only with a finite limited Being, composed of Something and No­thing, or Act and Passive Power, hence it necessarily follows, that al are subject to the Absolute Dominion of their Creator, and impedible, according to his pleasure. Where ever there is pas­sive Power, there is impedibilitie: There is nothing [...], unimpedible but God, who is Pure Act, and Lord of all. God has an Absolute Dominion over his Creature, for al uses that implie not a contradiction: This plenary and absolute Dominion of God appertains to his Infinite Omnipotence and Supremacie, as the first Cause of althings: For no Dominion is complete and per­fect, unlesse it include a Power for al possible use. May we estime that a perfect Dominion, which has not an absolute dispose of al under its Dominion? And to this absolute Dominion of God must there not correspond an absolute subjection in the Creature? Are not these two correlates? And doth not this absolute subje­ction of the Creature to God, speak its absolute dependence on God? Is it possible that any Creature made by God should be ex­emted from his Absolute Dominion? And doth not Absolute De­pendence on God necessarily follow hence? Neither doth this ab­solute Dependence on God regard only the Essence and Conserva­tion of the Creature, but also al its operations: for otherwise the Creature were [...], unimpedible, which is against the Law of its Creation and Dependence, as §. 11, 12. Thus every Create Being is under the Absolute Dominion of God, both as to its Essence, Existence, Activitie and Operation: God can deprive it of each of these as he pleaseth, yea reduce it to its first Nothing. Hence Dependence on God as to each of these is essential to eve­ry Creature, as in what follows.

§. 5. Every Creature as such is Dependent on its Creator or first Cause. Every Creature Dependent. For the Demonstration of this we shal lay down this Hy­pothesis, which I conceive al wil grant, That it is impossible the same thing should be, and not be. This being premissed we procede to demonstrate our Proposition thus. (1) Dependence both in Essence and Operation is so essential to a Creature, as that the negation of it supposeth the Creature not to be a Creature. The force and evidence of this Argument wil more fully appear in the explication of the next Proposition, wherein we are to de­monstrate the intime connexion between Dependence and the Es­sence of a Creature. At present it may suffice, that we assert, that Dependence is so intrinsecally, essentially, and formally included in the very notion and essence of a Creature, that the negation of it implies a contradiction in the Adject, or an Opposite in an Apposite. For what doth the notion of a Creature importe, but its educti­on out of nothing, by the Infinite Power of its Creator? And he that educed althings out of nothing, is it not in his power also to reduce althings back to their primitive nothing? And doth not this speak an obediential power in althings as to their Creators Soverain pleasure? And where there is an obediential power, is there not also subordination and subjection? And doth not al this formally speak Dependence? Thus Aquinas, contra Gent. L. 2. C. 25. demonstrates, ‘That God cannot make a thing, which shal want any essential principe: for upon the remotion of any essential principe follows the remotion of the thing it self: So that if God should make a thing without any one essential prin­cipe, he should make a thing to be, and not to be.’ And in what follows he proves, that dependence is an essential principe, or mode of a Creature, as Suarez, and that not only as to Essence and its Conservation, but also as to operation, of which, §. 10. (2) The Creatures absolute subjection and subordination to God demon­strates its dependence on God. That God has an absolute Domi­nion over the Creature has been demonstrated in the precedent Proposition: and if the Dominion of God be Absolute, then the Creatures subjection to and dependence on God must also be ab­solute and necessary. It belongs to the Being of a Creature as such to be subject to and dependent on God for the receiving and acting whatever implies not a contradiction. As it is impossible, that God should make a Creature, whereof he has not a ful and absolute Dominion; so it is as impossible, that a Creature should [Page 517]be made, which may not depend on him, as Suarez, Metaphys. Disput. 31. Sect. 14. p. 215. (3) The Indigences and Exigences of the Creature demonstrate its dependence on God. Is not every Creature Multiforme, Mutable and Defectible? And must not e­very Multiforme, Mutable and Defectible Being be reduced to some Ʋniforme, Immutable, and Indefectible Being, as the Original principe of its dependence? is there not a natural levitie and va­nitie in every Creature, which renders it fluxible, variable and in­constant? was it not a great and most true saying of Heraclitus, That althings are in fluxe or motion? Do not althings then need some first Being and Cause to fixe their Beings and Motions? A­gain, doth not every potential Being need some pure Act, to actuate the same? And is not every Creature a potential Being, which needs God, the most simple pure Act, to actuate the same? Doth not every Recipient as Recipient need the active influxe of that principe from wom it receives al? And is not every Creature a mere passive recipient as to God, who is the first influential Cause of its existence, motion, and al? Yea, is not every Creature a mere passive Instrument in regard of the Divine Influxe? Can it subsist or act without Divine concurse? Cut off the dependence of a Creature from its Creator, and what an endlesse Agitation, yea Annihilation would it fal into? See Aquinas, contra Gent. L. 3. C. 91. and Bradwardine, L. 2. C. 20. p. 541. (4) The Depen­dence of the Creature on God may be demonstrated from its Con­naturalitie. What more connatural to the Creature than depen­dence on its Creator? Doth not the Stream naturally depend on its Fountain for derivations? and is it not a violence to it, to be cut off from this dependence? Where doth the infirme member go for animal Spirits in order to sense and motion but to the Head? And is it not most natural to the Ray to hang on the Sun, which gave it existence? O then, how natural is it to the Crea­ture to depend on its Creator, the prime Cause of its existence and operation! What a violence is it to the Creature to be taken off from this dependence? Hence,

§. 6. Creatural Dependence is not really distinct from the Essence of the Creature. Dependence the same with the Essence. That the Creatures Dependence is not really di­stinct from its Essence is evident; because every Creature being Ens by participation, it must necessarily follow, that dependence on the first cause, from whom it participates of Being, is most es­sential to it. As it is essential to the first cause to be Being by Essence, and so Independent; so it is also essential to the second [Page 518]cause to be Being by Participation, and so Dependent: So that the very notion and Idea of a Creature doth inseparably, essentially, and formally include Dependence on God, as that which is not really distinct therefrom. This is incomparably wel demonstra­ted by Suarez, Metaphys. Tom. 2. Disput. 31. Sect. 14. p. 214. ‘As to the root of this Dependence, it must be said, that it is really nothing else but the very essence of a create Being as such; be­cause if we, by the force of our Intellect, remove whatever is superadded to such an essence, we shal find that of it self it has Limitation and Imperfection; so that of it self it is not sufficient to act or cause any thing: and therefore, according to the ab­solute power of God there cannot be such a create Being, which should not have such a subordination to the increate Being: Therefore it is a signe that is founded in the very essential Rea­son of a create Being. Wherefore albeit we may, by the pre­cision of Reason, and some inadequate conception of mind ap­prehend Dependence in Essence in regard of some moment of rea­son before Dependence in causing,—yet this later really super­addes nothing to the Essence of a Create Being.’ Wherein note wel, that he makes not only dependence as to Essence and its Conser­vation, but also as to Causation and Operation the same with the Essence of the Creature. Which Hypothesis he demonstrates and establisheth against Durandus and his Sectators, who assert, the Creatures dependence on God, as to Essence and Conservation, but yet denie it as to causation and operation, specially as to the substrate mater of sin. It may not be denied, but that Suarez, in his first Tome of Metaphys. Disput. 20. Sect. 5. p. 530. saith, ‘That this Dependence of the Creature on the Creator is not al­together the same with the Creature, but a mode distinct there­from.’ Yet these thing he grants. (1) That this Dependence of the Creature on God is something really and intrinsecally ex­isting in the Creature. For al confesse, that passive Creation is in the Creature: But now Dependence is nothing else but pas­sive Emanation or Creation, if we speak of the first Creation, from God. (2) That this Dependence is a substantial or essential mode affecting the substance of the Creature, albeit it constitute not the same. (3) He limits this modal distinction to the de­pendence of the Creature in its first Emanation or Creation, but grants, that its dependence in operation is really the same with the Essence of the Creature. (4) Suppose we allow a modal di­stinction [Page 519]between the Creatures dependence and essence, yet who knows not, but that the most awakened Philosophers now gene­rally grant, that Modes, specially such as are substantial and essen­tial, do not really differ from the things modified. Thus Ca­lovius, Metaphys. pag. 434. ‘Dependence, saith he, is a mode of a create Being, agreeing to it by reason of its imperfection, which is not the very Essence of the Creature, nor yet a new Entitie di­stinct from the Essence; but something affecting the create Es­sence.’ And he cites Suarez for this his Hypothesis. Hence,

§. 7. Creatural Dependence, according to its formal Idea and no­tion, Dependence im­portes Subordi­nation. importes a presupposition of influence, or subordination, posterio­ritie, and inferioritie. (1) Creatural dependence importes a presupposition of influence, or subordination to the first Cause. This is primarily and formally included in the very notion of Depen­dence, neither doth it adde any real entitie or mode distinct from the Creature; but explicates only the intrinsec condition and ha­bitude of the Creature relating to the omnipotent causalitie and influence of God. This subordination to God as the first cause ariseth from the imperfection of the Creature, and the absolute Dominion of God. And as to its latitude and extent, it regardes both natural and supernatural Influences and Beings. By super­natural Beings and Influences I mean such as being above the sphere of Nature, are not connatural to or producible by its force and power. These supernatural Beings have causalities propor­tionable to their Entities, in which they are subordinate to God and dependent on him, as natural Beings in their kind. And in this respect the Creatures subordination to, and dependence on God in the whole of its causalitie, is commun both to natural and supernatural Beings. Yea, supernatural Beings, by virtue of their subordination to God, may be elevated and raised to act and cause somewhat beyond that causalitie which is connatural to them. For even in this regard they are not lesse subordinate and subject to God, than natural Beings are in their kind, as Sua­rez wel urgeth, Metaph. Tom. 2. Disput. 31. Sect. 14. pag. 215. Such is the subordination both as to Naturals and Supernaturals, which creatural Dependence on God as the first cause formally in­cludes. Hence, (2) follows Posterioritie. 2. Posterioritie. Every dependent as such is posterior to that on which it dependes: so the Creature as to God. Aquinas tels us, ‘That al second causes act by virtue received from the first cause, as instruments act by the direction [Page 520]of Art;’ wherefore it is necessary that al other Agents, where­by God fulfils the order of his Gubernation, act by virtue from God; and thence that they are posterior to him And this I thinke, if wel understood, might satisfie al those, who with so much vehemence oppose al kind of predetermination by Divine concurse, as to the human Wil: For if we grant, That God is the first cause of the Wils motion, I cannot see how we can denie him the predetermination of the Wil. Though to avoid needlesse [...], I generally abstain from the terme predetermination; yet without that prejudice which some, I conceive, undeservedly lode it with. For if the Concurse of God be previous to the cau­salitie of the Wil, so as to determine the same to act, as we have demonstrated Ch. 7. §. 4. I as yet cannot, according to my shallow capacitie, see any cogent reason, why the said previous concurse may not be termed predeterminant. But to returne to our Argu­ment, Creatural Dependence implies a posterioritie, [1] as to Nature and Causalitie. [2] As to Origination and Order. [3] As to Dignitie. 3. Inferioritie. Whence (3) Creatural Dependence importes also Inferioritie: For every dependent as such as inferior to that it dependes on. Thus Alvarez, de Auxil. Grat. Disput. 90. pag. 714. ‘Dependence properly in causes efficient importes a certain subordination and inferioritie of him who dependes to him on whom he dependes: therefore the Divine operation of the first cause doth not depend on the cooperation of the second cause; but on the contrary, the cooperation of the second cause de­pendes on the operation of the first cause which is previous,’ as Ch. 7. §. 4.

§. 8. Althings create depend on God as to their Futurition. Creatural De­pendence as to Futurition. For the explication and demonstration of this Proposition we may con­sider, (1) That althings future must have some cause of their Futu­rition. Nothing future is of its own nature, or by its own force future, but indifferent to Futurition or Non-futurition. If things were in their own nature and of themselves future, then they would be always future and never present: for that which agrees to any thing of its own nature, agrees to it inseparably. Hence it follows, that Futurition cannot agree to things of their own nature, but by some cause, which brings them from a state of in­difference and possibilitie, to a state of Futurition. And assuredly that which has not a certain determinate cause of its Futurition, cannot be certainly and determinately future, but only possible. [Page 521](2) That which gives futurition unto althings is the Divine Wil, and Decree. It's impossible, that any thing should passe from a state of pure possibilitie to a state of futurition, but by the wil of God. Things are not foreseen and decreed by God, because future, as some would needs persuade us, but they are therefore future, be­cause decreed by God. Thus Wiclef held, That the Determinati­on of God gave the highest firmitie in the futurition of his worke, as Walden, Tom. 1. L. 1. C. 23. pag. 37. and Bradwardine asserted, That every Proposition of what is future is subjected to the Divine Wil, and originated thereby: So that indeed no Create Being, either sim­ple or complexe, can be future antecedently to the Divine Wil. Whence it necessarily follows, (3) That althings future depend on God for their futurition. Every thing may as wel give Being to it self, as Futurition. Of this see more, Ch. 5. §. 2. Of Gods Science.

§. 9. Al Creatures depend on God as to their first Production and Conservation. (1) Al Creatures depend on God as to their first Production and Existence. Plato, in his Timaeus, p. 28. saith,Creatural De­pendence as to Essence and Conservation. [...], That every thing produced, is necessarily produced by some Cause. For nothing can be the cause of it self: As Novitie of Essence is essential to the Crea­ture, so also Dependence on God for that Essence. Yea, every mutation and state of the Creature, with al its various modifica­tions are from God. Yea, Suarez, Metaphys. Tom. 2. Disp. 31. sect. 14. p. 216. tels us, ‘That a create Being as such, considered pre­cisely and abstractly, requires no other cause but the increate Being, in whom it hath a sufficient cause both Efficient, Exemplar, and Final. For albeit some create Beings require other efficient causes besides God, at least for their more connatural producti­on, yet the reason of a create Being as such requires them not.’ And in what precedes he saith, that the dependence of an effect on any create second cause is not so essential, as its dependence on the in­create first cause. (2) Al Creatures depend on God for their Con­servation. This has been sufficiently demonstrated in what pre­cedes, C. 8. and it ma be further argued from the impossibilitie of a Creatures being conserved, but in a way of dependence on Gods conservative influence: For if a Creature should be con­served by it self, or any other cause, without dependence on the first cause, God should not have an absolute Dominion over it, neither were it in his power to annihilate the same.

§. 10. Every Creature dependes on God as to Operation. This Hy­pothesis, though denied by Durandus, Creatural De­pendence as to Operation. and some very few more, yet it is generally owned by Scholastic Theologues, and that on invict evident grounds. For (1) Operation is the Index of the Essence: what is dependent in Essence cannot be independent in Operation. (2) Let us consider the series of causes, and we shal find, that every Inferior is obedient and subordinate to its Supe­rior in acting. (3) What is an Action but that special Depen­dence, which the effect has on its efficient cause? And is not God the prime efficient of althings? (4) No Virtue or Efficace of any second Cause can actuate itself, but necessarily requires for its actuation the Divine Concurse, which gives al Virtue, as also the conservation and actuation of the said Virtue. The Vir­tue of the Inferior Agent always dependes on the Virtue of the Superior, in as much as the Superior gives Virtue to the Infe­rior, as also the conservation and actuation of the same Virtue. (5) Whatever is limited in its Essence, is also limited in its Acti­vitie and Operation: and where there is limitation, there is sub­ordination and dependence, as wel in operation as in essence. (6) If every second cause depend not on its first for al its opera­tions, then it is impossible, that the first cause should hinder such operations, for the exerting whereof the second cause dependes not on him. Who can hinder that Action, which he cannot by any influence reach? And if this be granted, what wil become of the Providence of God? Must we not, with Epicurus, allow God to be only a Spectator, no way a Rector or Gubernator of the most considerable part of Human Affaires and Acts? That no Creature is [...], unimpedible in operation, we have de­monstrated in what precedes, §. 4. of this Chapter. (7) It im­plies a contradiction that the second cause should act, and yet not be actuated and influenced by the first cause.

And here, whiles under the review of these Sentiments, I may not let passe, without some Animadversion, the Reflexion of a Learned Author (in a new Piece about Gods Prescience) on this Argument, namely, That it can never be proved, that it implies a contradiction, for God to make a Creature, which should be capable of acting without an immediate concurse; if I apprehend his meaning, as laid down, p. 35, 36, 37. But because that Learned Author gives us only his Supposition, without any Demonstration there­of, or solution of those Arguments which the Scholes both of [Page 523] Thomistes, and Scotistes, as also the Jesuites, Suarez and others have urged against the Hypothesis of Durandus, which he seems to espouse, I do not conceive my self obliged to superadde any Arguments for the re-enforcement of this Hypothesis, which as been already copiosely demonstrated, §. 5, 6, 7. also Chap. 7. §. 2, 4. and Chap. 9. I shal only adde thus much, that I cannot, ac­cording to the utmost extension of my narrow apprehension, con­ceive any medium between the extremes of this disjunctive Proposition: Either the Human Wil must depend on the Divine Independent Wil of God for al its natural motions and operati­ons; or God must depend on the Human Will in it self Inde­pendent, for al his Prescience, motives of Election, and all dis­crimination as to Grace, and gratiose operations. I am not ig­norant of the general replie, That this Hypothesis I oppose only cuts off Gods concurse as to sinful Acts. But I would willingly be satis­fied in these Queries: (1) Whether there be any Action of Man on Earth so good, which hath not some mixture of Sin in it? And if God concur to the substrate mater of it as good, must be not also necessarily concur to the substrate mater of it as sinful? Is not the substrate mater of the Act both as good and sinful the same? (2) Again, as there is no Action in this imperfect state so good, but it has some sin mixed with it; so is there any Acti­on so sinful, which has not some natural good as the substrate mater thereof, as we have largely proved, Chap. 9. §. 2? (3) Last­ly, if we cut off the material entitie of sinful Acts from Depen­dence on Gods immediate concurse, do we not indeed thereby cut off the most illustrious part of Divine Providence in govern­ing this lower world? But of these sufficiently in what precedes, specially C. 7. § 9. Hence,

§. 11. The Wil of Man is necessarily subordinate to and dependent on the Wil of God in al its Operations. The Dependence of the Human Wil in al its Acts. The Wil of Man cannot be the solitary cause of its own Act, so as to exclude the efficience of the prime cause, as C. 7. §. 4. It's true, the Wil is a total cause in its own kind, yet not so as to exclude the total influxe of God as the first cause. Yea, God is not only the total, but also the immediate cause of al voluntary Acts; which argues the Wils to­tal and immediate Dependence on God in al its Acts, as C. 7. §. 4. Thus Aquinas: ‘Seing every mutable and multiforme must be reduced to some immobile principe, as unto its cause; and the Intellect and Wil of Man appear to be mutable and multi­forme, [Page 524]it's necessary, that they be reduced to some superior, im­mobile, immutable, and uniforme cause. Yea, he saith, that God is most intimely present to the Wil, and as it were acting in it, whiles he moves it to act.’ And Scotus, in 2. Sent. Dist. 37. Q. 2. Queries, Whether the Create Wil be so far a total and im­mediate cause of its own Act, as to exclude the immediate Efficience of God? And he proves the Negative, because, (1) If so, then it would necessarily follow, that God doth not certainly know the future evenements and acts of the Wil: because his knowlege of things future dependes on the determination of his own Wil, as Chap. 5. §. 2. (2) If so, then God were not the best and most perfect Being; because he should not have Dominion over the Human Wil, as chap. 5. §. 3. (3) Again, if the Human Wil could produce its own Act without the immediate concurse of God, it could also intend the same even to the highest degree of merit without Divine assistence. (4) The Understanding can­not produce its act, without Gods illumination, therefore nei­ther can the Wil its, without Gods concurse. See this more fully in Bradwardine, L. 2. C. 20. p. 541. Also Philosoph. General. P. 1. L. 3. C. 3. S. 3. §. 4. Prop. 1. p. 524. and what precedes, in this Part 4. C. 7. & 9.

§. 12. Lastly,Dependence Na­tural, Moral, and Supernatu­ral. Creatural Dependence, as to its parts, is either Na­tural, or Moral and Supernatural. Natural Dependence is that whereby al Creatures as Creatures depend on God for Essence, conservation and operation. Moral and Supernatural Depen­dence is that whereby the Rational Creature dependes on God as to Morals and Supernaturals. We find both these dependences conjoined in Man: for he having a double [...] or habitude to God (1) as a Creature; and (2) as a Rational Creature: he hath also a double dependence on God,Supernatural Dependence on Christ. (1) Natural, of which in what precedes. (2) Moral and Supernatural. And as in Na­turals Inferior Causes depending on their Superiors in acting, can do nothing without, much lesse contrary to the efficace and concurse of their Superiors, so also in Morals and Supernaturals. Supernatural Elevation is the total, next, and formal Reason of acting supernaturally: and by how much the nearer the receptive Soul is to God, its supernatural influencing cause, by so much the more it partakes of his influence: as in Nature by how much the nearer the thing moved is to the mover, by so much the more efficaciously doth it partake of its Impression. God doth most [Page 525]potently, and yet most sweetly influence the Affect, Act, and Ef­fect of the virtuose Soul, Phil. 2.13. Al effusions of virtuose Acts are proportionate to the Souls dependence on the efficacious infu­sions of God. Yea the natural Wil, by virtue of its Supernatu­ral Dependence, is elevated to act above Nature.

This Supernatural Dependence of the New Creature on Christ, as Mediator and Spring of al Grace, is lively illustrated in Sacred Philosophie. Thus Psal. 87.7. As wel the singers,Psal. 87.7.as players on in­struments shal be there: Al my springs are in thee. Glassius renders the words thus: And they shal sing as those that lead the Dances: Al my springs are in thee. The Psalmist having given us, in the foregoing Verses, a Prophetic Description of the gloriose Reigne of the Messias on Mount Zion, or in Evangelic Churches, and the great number of Converts who should sing forth his praises there, he concludes with this as the burden of their Song: Al my springs are in thee: i. e. Al the Springs of my Divine Life are in thee, O great Mediator: Thou alone art the prime cause and object of my dependence. The New Creatures dependence on Christ for super­natural Grace, is Ʋniversal, Total, Absolute, and Immediate; and that both for Habitual and Actual Grace. For Habitual Grace. 1. Christians have an Universal and Absolute Dependence on Christ for Habitual Grace. So John 1.16. And of his fulnesse have we al received, Joh. 1.16. and Grace for Grace. [...] here signifies, either the same with [...] upon; and then the sense is: Grace upon Grace, i. e. abundant Grace, and that freely: or it may note the Analogie which is between the Grace received from Christ, and Nature received from Adam; and then the meaning is this: Grace for Grace, i. e. as the Child receives from his Parents Member for member; or as al the Sons of Adam receive from him Lust for lust; for there was no lust in his heart, but what was communicated to his Posteritie; so the Children of Christ, the second Adam, receive from him Grace for Grace, i. e. al manner of habitual Graces, answerable to those in his Human Nature. This Supernatural Dependence on Christ for Habitual Grace is also wel expressed by the Disciples, Luk. 17.5.Luk. 17.5. And the Apostles said unto the Lord, Encrease our Faith: [...], Adde Faith to us, i. e. some additional degrees of Faith. The Apostles had been oft rebuked by their Lord for their Infide­litie, and therefore now, having by their frequent relapses gain­ed some sense of their own insufficience, they depend wholly on him for supplies: their own impotence engageth them to depend [Page 526]on his Omnipotence. Grace is a Celestial Plant fed by an invi­sible Root in Heaven, and by Juices derived from a Principe a­bove it self. As the strength of Adam's Habitual Grace could not preserve him when he trusted thereto, and did not depend on his Creator; so the impotence of the New Creature cannot hurt it, so long as it dependes on Christ.

2. The New Creature has an Universal,For Actual Grace. Psal. 141.8. Absolute, Total, and immediate Dependence on Christ for Actual Grace. Thus, Psal. 141.8. But mine eyes are unto thee, O God the Lord: in thee is my trust; leave not my soul destitute. Hebr. make not my soul naked, or emty. [...] signifies to evacuate or make naked. So the Targum [...]. It notes his total dependence on god. We find the Churches absolute and immediate dependence on Christ for Actual Grace lively described,Cant. 8.5. Who is this that cometh up from the Wildernesse, leaning upon her Beloved? Who is this? i. e. this Woman, or Church, that cometh up out of the Wildernesse. This shews her abandoning her own forces and strength. Leaning, or Cleaving to. The Original word is no where else found in the Old Testament. The LXX. render it by a word that signifies, confirming her self: which denotes her dee sense of her own in­sufficience, with absolute and total Dependence on Christ for A­ctual Grace. Christians ought to live immediately and totally on that Grace which is in Christ, and not on habitual Grace re­ceived from him. Members and Branches live on life, but the life of their Head and Root: So Christians ought to live not in the strength of their own Graces, but in the strength of that Grace which is in Christ, as Paul, Gal. 2.20. When men are more rea­dy to act in the force of Grace received, than in dependence on Christ, they soon fal into sin. This Dependence on Christ for Actual Grace is wel illustrated,Phil. 2.12, 13. Phil. 2.12. Work out your own sal­vation with fear and trembling. This fear and trembling doth not implie douting, as the Papists would needs persuade us; but a mo­dest, humble, self-abasing sense of our own insufficience, with an ab­solute dependence on Gos Al-sufficient Grace. Thence it fol­lows, v. 13. For it's God that worketh in you to wil and to do, of his good pleasure. This is a strong inducement to worke the Soul to an holy self-despair and humble trembling Dependence on Divine Grace, because God workes both to wil and to do of his good pleasure.Heb. 12.1, 2. So Hebr. 12.1, 2. Let us run with patience the race set before us, looking to Jesus the author and finisher of our faith. This [Page 527]looking implies absolute constant dependence, as Esa. 45.22. Look unto me, and be ye saved, &c. This Evangelic Supernatural Depen­dence on Christ for Actual Grace is very comprehensive, taking in the whole of the life of faith as to Sanctification. (1) It includes dependence on Christ for Actual Grace in order to Divine Con­duct in al our ways. So Cant. 1.4. Draw me, Cant. 1.4. we wil run after thee. This drawing notes impotence in them that are drawen, but Omnipotence in Christ that draws. So Hos. 11.3, 4. I taught Ephraim also to go, &c. This Divine Conduct is also lively expres­sed, Psal. 119.133. Order my steps in thy Word. [...] confirme, dis­pose, &c. (2) It includes dependence on Christ for Actual Grace, in order to the fortifying and corroborating the Spirit under al Infir­mities, and against al Tentations. Psal. 61.2.Psal. 61.2. When mine heart is overwhelmed: lead me to the Rock that is higher than I. This repre­sentes one tending to some place of safetie, whose own forces fail him to bring him thither. Whence he addes, to the Rock that is higher than I: i. e. too high for me to mount up unto, by mine own strength., So Psal. 27.13. I had fainted, unlesse I had believed: Psal. 27.13, 14. i. e. being surrounded with so many difficulties, I had been quite overwhelmed, had I not depended on, and encouraged mine heart in my God. Thence he addes, v. 14. Wait on the Lord, be of good courage, and he shal strengthen thine heart. Be of good cou­rage, [...] confirme thine heart by dependence on God. LXX. [...] play the man: and then it follows: [...], and he shal make thine heart strong. The like Psal. 73.26.Psal. 73.26. My flesh and mine heart faileth, but God is the strength of mine heart. [...], the Rock of mine heart; or the firme Adhesion and Dependence of mine heart is on God. We find al this exemplified in Paul, 2 Cor. 12.9.2 Cor. 12.9, 10. Most glad­ly therefore wil I glorie in mine infirmities, that the Power of Christ may rest upon me: [...], that the Power of Christ may tabernacle or dwel on me, and frequently manifest it self. And he gives the reason of it v. 10. For when I am weak then am I strong: i. e. Christ is never so strong in me, as when, being most weak in my self, I depend most on his strength. How oft are the strongest Christians foiled by the least Tentations, when they endeavor to overcome them in their own strength? And on the contrary, how oft do the weak­est Christians overcome the greatest tentations, when they de­pend on Divine Grace? (3) It includes also dependence on Christ for Quickening Grace, in order to the performance of al Duties and Services. Psal. 119.25. Quicken thou me according to thy word. [Page 528] [...] put life into me. The like v. 37, 40, 88, 107. Look as wormes that are dead in the Winter, live again at Spring, when under a warme Sun; so the dead heart, when dependent on the warme beames of Actual Grace, as Mal. 4.2. Dependence on Actual Grace brings sweet Inspirations of Grace into the heart, whence flow Divine Respirations of the heart towards God. (4) It in­cludes also Dependence on Christ for Actual Grace in order to Divine Fructification. Psal. 52.8. So Psal. 52.8. But I am like a green Olive-tree in the House of God. the Olive-tree being ful of an unctuose juice, is always green and flourishing with fruits; so was David's heart, by Dependence on Divine Grace. So it follows: I trust in the Mercy of God for ever. To conclude this Subject, it is wel ob­served by Suarez, That the Dependence of a Supernatural Being on God agrees with the Dependence of a Natural Being, the due propor­tion being observed: i. e. as Natural Dependence is Absolute, Imme­diate, and Total; so Supernatural. See more hereof in what pre­cedes, Chap. 10. §. 1. also B. 1. C. 3. §. 3.

FINIS.

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